Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam

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Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
I. Introduction: Excerpts of the Mahdi and Mahdism
II. The Founding and Development of the Islamic Principle of the Body Politic
III. The Decline of the Islamic Principle: The Introduction of Religious Arguments in Political Conflicts
Appendix
Bibliography

Citation preview

EARLY MAHDISM P olitics and Religion in the Form ative Period o f Islam

BY

JAN-OLAF BLICHFELDT

LE ID E N — E. J . B R IL L — 1985

STUDIA ORIENTALIA LUNDENSIA EDITED BY

GÖSTA VITESTAM VOLUME TW O

LEID EN — E. J . BR ILL — 1985

EARLY MAHDISM P olitics and Religion in the Formative Period o f Islam

BY

JAN-OLAF BLICHFELDT

LEID EN — E. J . B R IL L — 1985

ISBN

90 04 07643 3

Copyright 1985 by E. J . Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. J. BRILL

à Marie-Christine

CONTENTS Preface................................................................................................

ix

Abbreviations....................................................................................

xi

I. Introduction: Excerpts of the Mahdi and Mahdism 1. The concept of al-M ahdl...................................................... 2. The Shicite Conception of the M ahdi................................. 3. The Materialization of the Concept.................................... 4. The Problem ........................................................................

1 7 10 13

II. The Founding and Development of the Islamic Principle of the Body Politic 1. The problem of succession and continuity.......................... 2. The Conquest of Ira q .......................................................... 3. The Establishment of Küfa.................................................. 4. The Scheme of Payments.................................................... 5. Conclusive remarks: The Mohammedan Ideology and Political M ake-up................................................................

15 18 27 36 42

III. The Decline of the Islamic Principle: The Introduction of Religious Arguments in Political Conflicts 1. The Situation....................................................................... 63 2. The Political Culture of K üfa.............................................. 71 3. The Dissemination of the A rgum ents................................. 90 4. The Final Consolidation of the A rgum ents........................ 100 5. Conclusion........................................................................... 117 Appendix............................................................................................

129

Bibliography.......................................................................................

133

PREFACE The general aim of the present work is that of a first attempt to recon­ sider some of the characterizations which traditionally have been ascrib­ ed to the vast and colourful literature in Islam on the subject of the disorder and final End of this world. For this purpose we have chosen to begin our study with that epoch of Islamic history wherein conceptions such as that of al-mahdx were practically conceived and cultivated. The Arabic sources employed in this study are made up of the stan­ dard sources for the early history of Islam. Among these we mention the chronicle of at-Tabarï (d. 310/923) and Ansäb al-Ashräf of al-Balâdhurï (d. 279/892). Another important source is the Kitäb al-futüh of Ibn A 'tham al-Kùfï, which only recently has been recognized as a major source for the early Islamic history. Having been thought to have died as late as 314/926, Ibn A 'tham ’s work was considered partisan and fan­ ciful. But Shaban, in his study on the Abbaside revolution, has shown that Ibn Actham was a contemporary with al-Madâ3inï and al-Wäqidt, and that his work was in fact composed already in 204/819. The system adopted for the rendering of the Arabic terms and sentences is identical with that of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, except for some changes so that ‘k’ is rendered ‘q ’, and ‘îh \ ‘df> ‘k h \ ‘dh’ and ‘ah’ are rendered ‘th*, ‘dj’, *kh’, ‘dh’ and ‘sh’ and they have all been put in italics. In the case of the many Koranic passages, we have quoted from A rthur J . Arberry’s The Koran Interpreted. With regard to the verse numbering, they all follow the standard Cairo edition, and where they differ from the numbering of G. Flügel’s text, which is used in almost all Western translations and writings on the Koran, the latter are also given in parentheses. There remains for me to thank a number of friends and colleagues for their help and encouragement. First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor Professor Dr. Gösta Vitestam, whose guidance and thoughtful criticism have constandy been sources of aid and inspiration. I am also indebted to Professor Dr. Jan Hjärpe and to the members of our researchseminar, particularity Docent Dr. Bengt Knutsson, docent Dr. Bo Lundén and Teol. Kand. Samuel Rubenson for all their helpful comments. I also wish to extend my thanks to Fil. Dr. Jan Retsö for the many discussions and ‘expeditions’ during our two years of stay at the Swedish Theological Institute in Jerusalem.

X

PREFACE

I owe special thanks to Fil. Kand. Anna-Margit Lindqvist for her pa­ tience in preparing the manuscript, and to Fil. Dr. Bengt Ellenberger who has corrected my English. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the editorial board of Studia Orientaba Lundensia and to Dr. F. Th. Dijkema of E. J . Brill. Lund, March 1985

J . O. Blichfeldt

ABBREVIATIONS Bal. MS Bal. Ansab Bal. Futuh Ibn Ath. Ibn Hish. Khal. Tarikh Khal. Tabaqat Tab. Ubayd Yaqubi, Buldan Yaqubi, Tarikh Yusuf

al-Balädhurl, Ahmad b. Yahyä, Ansäb al-ashräf, MS Suleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Reisûlküttap Mustafa Efendi, nos. 597-8, 2 vols. al-Balädhuri, Ahmad b. Yahyä, Ansäb al-ashr&f, vol. I, ed. M. HamldaUâh, Cairo 1959; vol. V, ed. S. D. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936. al-Balâdhurï, Ahmad b. Yahyä, Futûh al-buldân, ed. M. J . de Goeje, Leiden 1866. Ibn Actham al-Küfî, Abü Muhammad Ahmad, Kitàb al-fiitüh, ed. M. A. al-Mucld Khan et al., 8 vols., Hydrabad 1968-75. Ibn Hishäm, Abù Muhammad cAbdalmâlik, Sirat an-nabt, ed. M. M. D. cAbdalhamîd, 4 vols., Cairo 1391/1971. Khalifa b. Khayyät al-cUsfurï, TaMkh, ed. A. D. al-cUmarï, 2 vols., Nadjaf 1386/1967. Khalifa b. Khayyät al-'Usfurï, Kitäb af-tabaqàt, ed. A. D. al-cUmarï, Baghdad 1387/1967. At-Tab an» Muhammad b. Djarïr, TaMkh ar-rusul wa ’l-mulük, ed. M. J . de Goeje et al. 15 vols., Leiden 1879-1901. Abû cUbayd al-Qâsim b. Sallâm, Kitàb al-amwâl, Cairo 1353/1935. Al-Yacqübl, Ahmad b. Abl Yacqüb, Kitàb al-buldân, ed. M. J . de Goeje, Leiden 1892. Al-Ya'qübî, Ahmad b. Abî Yacqüb, Ta’rîkh, ed. M. T . Houtsma, 2 vols., Leiden 1883. Abü Yüsuf, Yacqüb b. Ibrâhîm, Kitàb al-kharàdj, Cairo 1302/1885.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION E xcerpts

of the

M ahdi

and

M ahdism

1. The Concept of al-Mahdx In Islamic societies a recurrent pattern of phases of belief in an Ex­ pected Deliverer may be discerned. It is often designated as “ Mahdism” , since the title given to such a personage is that of al-Mahdi.1 The doctrine of the Mahdi rests, in general terms, on three basic features. He will appear during the period of anarchy and chaos which will precede the coming of the End of the World. During this time upheavels and dissension2*will divide the Muslim community and lead to political strife, social disorder and moral degeneration. Men will turn away from their faith and become so secularized that the Koran will be studied only as a many-coloured piece of material, and that fasting, almsgiving and other pious acts will no longer be known.9 Instead they will desire to obtain material objects for their own sake and pay no at­ tention to their fathers and those before them.45And so rampant will in­ justice and oppression be that men who remain faithful and obedient will not be able to stand up from their matresses in order to go to the mosque, and will have no recourse but to renounce human affairs and live in seclusion.9 Secondly, there is the association of the appearance of the 1 The word, which means the one led by God to the truth, is a proper name so that it has become like most names. Moreover, it is the designation of one who has been an­ nounced as good news, to come at the end of time. (Tàdj al-carús, vol. X, p. 408). 2 The concept refers to the Arabic word fitna (pi. fitan), which in the Koran is used with the meanings of temptation, trial, punishment, misfortune, discord, sedition or civil war. Thus.yüfrw on the one hand came to be employed in the sense of the final trial of man by God, as well as the torments afterwards, such as “ Upon the day when they shall be tried at the Fire” , (Koran 51:13). On the other, it is connected with the kind of revolt or civil war which breeds schism and through which the believer’s purity of faith is gravely endangered. The latter notion is particularity illustrated by numerous hadllhs of the trouble to come, in which the community will be destroyed, and from which the believer must flee. The events in the early period of Muslim history, such as the murder of cUthman, the third Caliph, and the subsequent struggle between cAll and Mu'awlya, the result of which was the shi^at CAK have been built into the Muslim conscience as the archtype of fitna, serving both to portray historical religion and the constituent forms of the framework of what we may call existential myths. 2 Ibn Kathlr, Nihäyat al-bidäya wa ’n-nihäya f i ’l-fitan wa ’l-malähim, vol. I, p. 19. 4 Ibid. p. 20. 5 Ibid. p. 42.

2

INTRODUCTION

Mahdi with a brief intervening Golden Age in which he will put an end to trials and the divisions of the Muslim domain in order to reconfirm the revelation of God and restore the justice of the past through the re­ establishment of the original Mohammedan faith and form of govern­ ment. Hence he shall reconcile the weak with the strong, and lavish his gifts upon anyone who asks—for it is told that when some companions of the Prophet became afraid of the trouble that might follow after his death, they asked him about it, and he said: “ In my nation there is the Mahdi who shall come forth; he shall live five or seven or nine years; and a man shall come unto him and say, ‘O Mahdi, give m e’, and the Mahdi shall pile inte his lap as much as he can carry” .6

Finally, there is the matter of giving a more precise identity to the character of the Mahdi. The views on this are, however, many and con­ tradictory. For instance, the historian Mufahhar b. Tahir reports that some held that the Mahdi was CA1I b. Abi Tälib, the fourth Caliph, while others associated him with the Caliph al-Mahdi (d. 169/785), the son of Abû Djacfar cAbdallah al-Mançûr, who was the real founder of the Abbasid dynasty.7 According to the same source, however, there were also those who claimed that the only Mahdi to be expected was cïsâ ibn Maryam, i.e. the biblical Jesus who, in accordance with the prevalent orthodox view, shall appear once more on earth in order to clean the world and kill the swine.8 Concerning the personal characteristics 6 At-Tirmidhï, al-Djàmi1 af-fakih, vol. II, p. 36. 7 Mufahhar b. Tahir al-Maqdisî, Kitâb al-bad? wàH-timkh, vol. XVII, pp. 180-3. It may be added that the background for this somewhat unusual inquiry was a request made by a minister of one of the Samânid princes, who in 356/966 asked Ibn Tahir to draw up a summary of the learning of his time. Apart from the common stock of M uslim erudition, the author included the fruits of his own personal investigations through con­ versations with Zoroastrian priests and Jewish rabbis. The work was later ascribed to Abú Zayd Ahmad b. Sahl al-Balkhl (d. 322/938)—nobody can tell why—and catalogued under his name. * For a better comprehension of the personage of Jesus in Islam, we will briefly m en­ tion some of the characteristics ascribed to him by the Koran. For one thing, he is, from the time of his birth and onwards, designated by the term al-masih, ‘the Messiah’, which is, however, completely void of any Christian sense. For Jesus the Messiah, is in th e Koran an ordinary man, just like all the other prophets before him, and M uham m ad after him. As for die word masih, it is a loanword from the Aramaic m'shîhâ, which w as used as a name for the Redeemer, although it has been suggested that it may have b een taken over from the Ethiopie masih (J. Horovitz, Koranische Untersuchungen, p. 129). I n Arabic literature on the subject we also find that the term is considered a lo a n ­ word—either from Hebrew or Syriac, as in the Anwär at-tanzil wa-asrär at-tahuil of alBaydâwï, p. 157. It nevertheless remains true that through that name, the personage of Jesus acquired a special significance. Moreover, Jesus is expected to return. For this belief, there is o n ly one reference in the Koran, which, however, contains a few variant readings. In th e Arberry translation it runs as following: “ It (innahü) is knowledge (ct7m) of the Hour (lissaca)” (43:61). But, on the assumption that the passage is continuous, the pronoun is

INTRODUCTION

3

through which the Mahdi is to be recognized when he appears, M utahhar b. Tahir reports that, here also, the views appear to be divid­ ed.9 He was, in the opinion of some, to be the son of a slave girl, having brown eyes, teeth of extreme whiteness, and a beautyspot on the cheek; others emphasized the fact that he would be bom in Medina, and be reared in Mecca; yet others held that he would come forth from the for­ tress of Alamût. Such statements about the Last Things very often accompany the concept of the Mahdi figure, and one will do well to consider them, their nature and features as such as well as their actual relationship to the appearance and role of al-Mahdt. Considering, then, the former aspects of the Last Things, the central position in the Koran of the theme of the Day of Judgement is first of all worth mentioning. The angel Isräfil10 will blow his trumpet, and everybody will die, then to be resurrected. During this excitement, through which fear, trembling and complete confusion will arise, God will come down with His angels,11 and all mankind will be gathered in front of Him and His angels12 to be judged. And as a result, they will be assigned to either Paradise or Hell, depen­ ding on whether their deeds have been mainly good or bad. Following the general trend of literary expansion by means of hadtths and tafstrs, this theme of the Last Things soon became the object of commentaries and enlargements, attracting the attention of both the conventional theologian and the popular preacher. And so immense was this production that a whole literature more or less mythological in character developed, composed not only around the traditional questions of death, resurrection and doomsday, but also around the appearance of usually taken as referring to Jesus, and Him is read calam (mark). Following this second reading, then, which is also the one accepted by the Muslim tradition, there will be a sec­ ond coming of Jesus, because it has been foretold to be one of the signs of the Hour of Resurrection. At this point of the argument one may adduce another verse, referring to the Christian claim that Jesus had been crucified: “ —no indeed; God raised him up to Him; God is All-mighty, Allwise. There is not one of the People of the Book but will assuredly believe in him (biht) before his death (mawtihi), and on the Resurrection Day he will be a witness against them” . [4:158 (156) 159 (157)]. Now, if both pronouns (bihi and mawtihi) are taken as referring to Jesus, his death can be considered real only after his second appearance in connection with the coming of the End and the final Judgement. (al-Baydâwî, op. cit. p. 240). * Mutahhar b. Ja h ir, op. cit. p. 182. 10 Isräffi, the angel of resurrection, is mentioned in the later literature only, and con­ stitutes, with Djibrfi, his partner Mdca^fi and the angel of death, Tzra^fl, whose name is also absent in the Koran, the order of the Archangels. » Koran 2:210 (206). 11 Koran 25:22 (24).

4

INTRODUCTION

the various signs which would occur during the period immediately preceding the actual Day of Judgement. As indicated above, these signs are largely thought of as being expressed in terms of moral degeneracy and social and political disorder. Yet this literary genre did not confine itself to the foretelling of such signs. Rather these were only considered to be a prelude to other far more ominous signs of physical abnormality19 such as the cosmic smoke, ad-dukhân,14 the beast, ad-däbba,15 a sunrise in the west, three separate eclipses, and a fire emanating from the city of Aden in southern Arabia, all of which will drive mankind to the final place of gathering. Summoned there shall also.be the one-eyed giant adDadjdjäl and the mythological peoples Yädjüdj and Madjûdj,16 whose* w Ibn Kathïr, op. cit. vol. I, p. 52. *♦ The Arabic word for the cosmic smoke is dukhän, and is referred to in the Koran, 41:11 (10) in connection with the creation of the world: “ Then He lifted Himself to heaven when it was smoke, and said to it and to the earth, ‘Come willingly, or unwillingly!’ They said, *We come willingly.’ ” R. Bell in his The Qur'an, vol. II, p. 478, has proposed an alternative translation of the word, namely ‘mist’, connecting it with Genesis 2:6: “ But there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground’’. From a contextual point of view, however, it appears more fitting to translate the word by ‘smoke’, relating it to the formless darkness of Gen. 1:2, as well as to the two following verses of the sura which seems to reflect the narrative in Genesis of the first two days of creation. ** In the Islamic tradition the beast (däbba) has become a regular preliminary to the Last Judgement. The tradition is based on the Koranic verse which describes passing of the judgement of the unbelievers: “ When the Word falls on them, We shall bring forth for them out of the earth a beast that shall speak unto them: ‘Mandkind had no faith in O ur signs’ ’’, [27:82 (84)]. As for the origin of the concept of ad-däbba it may, in this connection, suffice to quote the words of T . André in his Der Ursprung des Islams und das Christentum, p. 63, that “ aus dem teuflischen Wesen der Apocalypse ist im Koran ein Gottesbote geworden” . (Cf. Revelation 13, Daniel 7). 16 The unseparable couple Yädjüdj and Mädjüdj is first mentioned in the Old T esta­ ment, appearing under the names God and Magog. In Genesis 10:2 Magog is named to be one of the children of Japhet, who was one of the sons of Noah. In another Biblical reference to Gog and Magog, the latter is said to represent a land, eref ham-mägög, while the former is seen as its inhabitants: “ Son of man, set thy face against Gog, the land o f Magog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal, and prophesy against him ” (Ezekiel 38:2). This warning was connected with the belief that two peoples, identified by th e names of Gog and Magog, during the Last Days were going to burst forth from th e ir isolation, devastating the world as they marched along, until they were destroyed in th e land of Israel. In Muslim eschatology, this picture is repeated basing itself on tw o Koranic passages, 21:96: “ There is a ban upon any city that We have destroyed; they shall not return till, when Gog and Magog are unloosed, and they slide down out of every slope,” and 19:92 (91) ff., where it is related that a dam was erected by Alexander the G reat in order to isolate Yädjüdj and Mädjüdj since they were causing corruption (mufsidun) o n earth, it has added many other details. Indeed, their escape out of the wall, and their in ­ undation of the adjacent lands have been so elaborately worked over and received, th a t it has become one of the most prominent and recognized signs of the End.

5

INTRODUCTION

previous appearance on earth is connected with an exceptional period of terror and fear. And indeed, it is through these figures that the relation­ ship between the other ashrät as-sä^a, the signs of the Hour, is established. Thus, we will take a closer look at ad-Dadjdjäl. As his name indicates17his essential activity is to lead the crowds astray, to accomplish miracles, and to kill Elias and Enoch, the two witnesses brought forward against him by God; these, however, will immediately come to life again. This deceptive role is also illustrated by his appearance. Since these characterizations have, not surprisingly, been considerably expanded during the formative time of the hadtths, we shall limit ourselves to the picture of ad-Dadjdjäl, as he is depicted in the earlier collections of Muslim Traditions. He is reddish with frizzy hair; his one eye is in his broad forehead and is like a floating grape; he has a wide throat; and he is obese. On his forehead are written the letters KFR (i.e. kafir ‘unbeliever’), which, however, only the believers can detect. The times of hardship which are supposed to precede his appearance have in some sources been connected with Yadjüdj and Madjudj. But while trying to conquer the world, ad-Dadjdjäl will be killed in either Syria or Palestine by cïsâ b. Maryam, who has by now descended into the world. He will then kill the pigs, break the cross, destroy the sypagogues and the chur­ ches, and kill the unbelievers. According to others, however, the killing of ad-Dadjdjäl is performed by the Mahdi, while the function of cIsa will be that of his assistant.18 In view of this, the figure of al-Mahdx appears to be connected with those events which according to the Islamic tradition are divinely established and foretold as preceding the Day of Judgement. As a per­ son, however, he has obvious defects, such the above-mentioned lack of precise identity. Another is the apparent merging with the ritual drama of restitution which had already been connected with the second coming of cîsâ b. Maryam. Indeed, there is no doubt ampng scholars that the concept of the eschatological Mahdi developed considerably later than that of cIsä, and had only little by litde managed to obtain a place in the already fixed scenery of the Last Things. The reason for this late ap­ pearance lies undoubtedly in the fact that whatever position the figure of al-Mahdx may have enjoyed among the Muslim faithful, it remains that the word is not mentioned in the Koran. Thus the whole Mahdist theme 17 The word, which in Arabic means ‘the deceiver’ is an adjective of Syriac origin, V J . W . It is used as an adjective in Peshifto, Matthew 24:24: ycoooûj 34

/

f l ’

.IÇifoï Iffl/

jl£¡t U lS» » !'

18 For instance, see the passage of Ibn Khaldün, quoted below p. 8.

6

INTRODUCTION

was, by a majority of the orthodox theologians, regarded with such cau­ tion and suspicion that many times it led to complete omission of his name. There is, for instance, no mention of the Mahdi in al-Bukhärl’s al-Djämic af-pahth. In Muslim’s collection, we have in the customary sec­ tion of enumerating the signs which will precede the End of the World, a hadxth which expresses its thematic content in the following way: “ The Prophet came to us while we were having a conversation, and asked: ‘What are you talking about?’ We said: ‘We talk about the Last Day’. He replied: ‘It shall not appear before you have seen ten signs appearing before it’; then he named the smoke, ad-D adjdjäl, the beast, the sunrise from the W est, the descent of cïsâ ibn Maryam, Yädjüdj and M ädjüdj, the three an­ nihilations—one in the East, one in the W est, and one in Arabia, and finally a fire which commences in Yemen, driving people to their (final) gathering-place” .1920

But no Mahdi. Similarity, when the Hanafite teacher Abù Hafs anNasafi enumerates the portents of the Day of Judgement, he mentions the emergence of ad-Dadjdjäl, the best of the earth, Yädjüdj and Mädjüdj, the descent of cïsâ from above, and the rising of the sun from the W est.30 And al-Ghazzäll follows the same path. For in the work in which he summarizes his view on theology, he not only omits the mention of the Mahdi, but as well limits himself to alluding to the signs preceding the crack of Doom: “ And when people get up in the morning, the K a^ a has been taken aw ay and they cannot see any trace of it. This will be when seven years have elapsed without anyone having performed the pilgrimage. Then the K oran will be taken away from the copies so that people, when arising in th e morning, will suddenly see the sheet shining white without any letter in it. Then the Koran will be abolished from the hearts so that no one w ill remember a word from it. The people will return to poetry and songs, a n d the telling of stories about the pre-islamic times. Then ad-D adjdjäl w ill emerge and cîsâ descend in order to kill him. At this moment time shall b e similar to one who expects to give birth to a child” .21

In other—but less authoritative—collections, however, this reluctance is completely lacking. Thus we find that in al-Djämic af-fahfh of Abü cIs ä at-TirmidhI (d. 279/892-3), and in the works of Ibn M ä d ja (d. 283/896-7), and Abü Dä3üd (d. 275/888-9), various reports are g iv e n 19 Muslim b. al-Hadjdjâdj, al-Djâmi1 af-fahîh, Vol. V, chapter al-fitan, no. 110. 20 Abü Hafs cUmar b. Muhammad b. Ahmad an-Nasafi, al-^Aq&id, p. 5. This tract by an-Nasafi (d. 537/1142) was later enlarged under the title of al-cU m da f i ’l-^aqPid, as a defense and elucidation of the original publication by Häfi? ad-Dm A b ü ’1-Bara k ä tcAbdallah b. Ahmad an-Nasafi (d. 710/1310). It may also be remarked t h a t both of them belonged to the Hanafite school. The text referred to above on p. 5 is in the later publication found on p. 28. 21 Abü Hämid al-Ghazzâlî, Ihyä Hilüm ad-din, vol. I, pp. 207-8.

INTRODUCTION

7

on the appearance and the tasks of the Mahdi. In the long run, this presence in at least some collections, should appear to be on a par with being represented everywhere. For when these large collections of tradi­ tion were sought out, amalgamated and condensed into one single work, the principle of selection turned out to be that as long as a theme was dealt with in one and was in agreement with the rest, it should be reproduced. One of the most remarkable among these condensations was the two-volume Mafâbïh as-sunna by Abü Muhammad al-Husayn b. alFarrâ al-Baghawï (d. 516/1122), which, further shortened and simplified, was published by Muhammad b. cAbdallâh al-Khafib.2 22 1 Once on the market this revision became extremely popular, and as it was continually re-printed its conveying to the faithful of the Muslim themes of faith had an impact that can hardly be overestimated. Follow­ ing the above-mentioned principle, there is no exclusion of the Mahdist theme. Thus, in the name of the venerable composers of traditions he is pictured with the other personages of the faith, although in a traditional way: he shall arise from the offspring of Fatima, his appearance shall be characterized by a distinct forehead and a curved nose, and while reign­ ing for seven years he will replace the injustice and evil of the earth with rightness in measure and justice.23 2. The ShiHte Conception of the Mahdi In the Shicite façon, the belief in the Mahdi, on the other hand, is essential, being, in the hearts of the multitude as well as in the declara­ tions of the theologians, identified with the return, radjca, of the Hidden Imam. The history of the Imams is a long one, since it is thought to begin with the existence of Gods primordial Word and Spirit in a cosmic epoch before time and creation. From this pleromatic state, and into the world of time and man, a chain of successors was established by God. As such, they were all equipped with a special kind of knowledge and certain spiritual qualities in order to guide and lead the believers right, and moreover, provide for the intellectual and religious needs of man. In ac­ cordance with this view, it was held that the Prophet Muhammad had communicated his esoteric knowledge to cAlï, who in his turn, had handed it over to his own sons.24 Thus, among the Kaysänis25 there was 21 Muhammad b. 'Abdallah al-Khatfb, Mishkàt al-mafabïh. 22 Ibid, chapter al-fitan, p. 231. 24 This kind of communication between the Godhead and his electees has also been understood in terms of a cosmic act, in which Muhammad and cAlï with this progeny were all creations emanating from the Word and Light. 25 The name refers to those among the Kufans whose interests were championed by

8

INTRODUCTION

the view that Muhammad b. Hanafiya, a son of cAlï’s by another spouse than Fatima, was held to be the master of all the sciences, and all the mysteries connected with the interpretation of the Koran, the sciences of the remote regions and psychology, which he had acquired from CA1I and Husayn, the two Sayyids preceding him.36 In a more elaborate version, this idea of possessing and conveying such insight was said to be founded on the following dual concept of reality: “There is an esoteric side to everything external, a spirit to every form, a hidden meaning, ta’wil, to every revelation, and to every similitude in this world a corresponding reality in the other world” .37 Being repeatedly employed by various Alid pretenders, the titular appellation of cd-Mahd» finally became an integrate part of the teachings of the imamology among the imamis,38 i.e. those Shicites who recognize the appearance of twelve Imams, the one succeeding the other. For when the twelfth Imam, Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-cAskarI disappeared in the year 265/878 in his own home, which he had inherited from his father, the eleventh Imam, Hasan al-cAskarI, in a cellar, the Imamis declared him to be al-Mahdïal-muntazar. According to them, this occasion had been predicted both by the Prophet and the following imams. In the Shicite concept of the M ahdi, there are several salient points to consider. Like the imams before him, he is said to have had a miraculous birth (255/869). For immediately after his birth, he began to prostrate him self in the attitude of prayer. He was—in this state—pure and circumcised, and he uttered the profession of faith. And in the arms of his father the child enumerated the names of CA1I to himself and prayed that the relief of community be in his hands.39 Equally miraculous was the growing u p of the infant. Thus, when his father died, less that five years later, Muhammad had reached manhood and was of age to bear the burden o f the imäma. After his disappearance the Mahdi, so we are told, w ent, through two periods of concealment. The first, lasting until H. 328, A.D. 939, and designated al-ghayba a?-fughrä, ‘the little one’, was w hen he communicated to the community through special representatives.92876* al-Mukhtär b. Abl cUbayd; his revolt against the establishment of the Kufan ashràfoî th e early Umayyad period is dealt with below, p. 94 ff. There is nothing to indicate, however, that this view of superhuman qualities was held while either al-Mukhtär o r Muhammad b. al-Hanafiya were alive, and it must therefore be attributed to the subse­ quent religious development of that group. 26 Muhammad ash-Shahrastanl Kitäb al-milal wa *n-nikaly p. 109. 27 Ibid. p. 112. 28 As far as this brief summary of the concept of the Mahdi within the Shl*ite branch is concerned, we will exclusively refer to the belief and practice among the Ithnà cashariya9 i.e. the so-called Twelver Shi*ism. 29 Al-Mascüdl, Ithbät al-wafïya lïl-imàm cAlt b. Abi Tàlib, pp. 249 ff.

INTRODUCTION

9

Then followed the second and longer concealment, al-ghayba al-kubrä, during which his followers were shut off from any kind of communica­ tion and adviced not to inquire about things, and which will continue until he returns at the End of the World. This return will be preceded by a long period of chaos and degeneracy, to continue with increasing in­ tensity until evil, falsehood and wickedness dominate the earth. The disintegration is to be complete and universal, and will be characterized by political unrest, immorality, falsehood and a total disregard for the principles of religion. Nature will also manifest similar signs of disorder and chaos. Then, in the final stage of this total disintegration, the Mahdi will reappear, and he will usher in a new era of restoration. Once here, he will reign for a period of seven years, each year equating ten of our years. Then, at the end of his 70 years of reign, the Mahdi will die and forty days later his resurrection will follow.30. Connected with this notion of deliverance is, among the Imamis, the idea that al-Qä’im,31 when he arrives on earth, will complete the task of Husayn in Karbala9. Hence, according to many traditions, he shall ap­ pear on the day of cÄshürä, i.e. the 10th of the Muslim month of Muharram , on which Husayn was slain by men in the service of the Damascene Caliph Yasîd b. Mucawlya.32 And although his first appearance will be in Mecca, he will make his headquarters in Küfa. There, nearby the site of Karbala9 and on the spot where CA1I was killed and buried, the Mahdi will have his seat. To pious Shicites, such symbolic representations were, however, insufficient for the deep-felt passion of revenge and redemp­ tion. Thus, many accounts predict not only the return33 of Husayn to revenge his own blood, but also the karrat al-Husayn together with the Prophet, cAl! and Hasan as well. But in spite of the shifting between roles of an avenger and that of establishing, on the command of God, equity and justice on earth, together with the return of the above men­ tio n ed historical persons, the Mahdi of the Imamis is all the same necessary, because through him, the beginning and the following events with the “ misunderstandings” , to use a Gnostic phrase, will come to an end. For the future can only be secured if history is corrected, and then controlled.*

M Al-cUkbari, Al-Irshäd li’sh-shaykh al-Mufid, pp. 341-2. 91 As it Became customary not to mention the real name of the imam, he was also referred to—in addition to al-Mahdi by means of other names, including in the form of tides and epithets al-QSHm, Hudjdjat Si Muhammad, and Sähib az-zamän (cf. Muhammad Bâqir Madjlisî, Bihar al-anwàr, vol. LI, p. 28 ff.) ** Al-cUkbari, op. cit. p. 341; MadjlisT, op. cit. vol. LII, p. 182 ff. ** Since the word radjca, return, has exclusively been reserved for the particular event of the return of the Mahdi, the return of Husayn is expressed in terms of karra.

10

INTRODUCTION

3. The Materialization of the Concept In the fourteenth century, the Sunni Muslim version of Mahdi belief was summarized by the Arab historian Ibn Khaldûn: "It has been commonly accepted among the masses of the people o f Islam , as the ages have passed, that there is inevitable that a man of the family o f Muhammad will appear at the end of Tim e, who will aid the faith and make justice triumph; that the M uslims will follow him and that he w ill reign over Muslim kingdoms and will be called al-M ahdt. The appearance of ad-D adjdjil and of the other Signs of the Last Day, which are established in sound tradition will come after him. cIsa will descend after his ap­ pearance and will kill ad-D adjdjil or will descend along with him and aid him in that killing; and in worship cîsâ will follow the M ahdi. ” 34

And indeed, it is generally acknowledged that it was in the hearts of the Muslim multitude that the belief in the Mahdi was kept alive and, so that, in times of particular strain, arising from alien domination o r from inner tensions of an unstable society, it could become quite active. That is to say, his arrival was expected in the immediate future in order to set things straight. In such circumstances, the ill-defined Sunni con­ ception of the Mahdi was made more applicable to the situation at stake by being attached to a claimant at hand, or so formulated that an ap­ propriate candidate could declare himself the Expected One. In this respect, Islamic history shows many instances of claimants to the throne of the Mahdihood, who together with a group of supporters would seek to challenge and overthrow the existing political order by force of arm s. If successful, such a mahdi-movement has been described to have passed three major phases of progression." Following this categorization, the movement would be initiated through an intensive propaganda for what we may call Islamic revivalism, having as its prime goal to win support among the restless and discontented. Secondly, when a sufficient number of adherents had been recruited, a military teocratic organiza­ tion would be formed. In the course of repeated efforts at propagating its claims, as well as countless military raids and campaigns from inac­ cessible hidingplaces, the movement would change its strategy to open challenge of the sitting regime. As a third and final phase, we m ay observe the emergence of a territorial state, whose theocratic aspirations will gradually become obsolete until they have finally faded away. 14 Ibn Khaldûn, al-Muqaddima, p. 246. 13 P. M. Holt, ‘The place in History of the Sudanese Mahdlya’, Sudanese Notes and Records, 1955, p. 107. Moreover, as another general rule, one may observe that such Mahdist revolts have seldom achieved much success when they have not been based on existing tribal loyalities as well as patterns of socio-political opposition.

INTRODUCTION

11

The Mahdist movements have been many and widespread. Although each movement ought to be treated separately, we have for the sake of il­ lustration, chosen to depict some features of a movement, whose rela­ tionship to the aspirations of the Mahdi as well as its own aspirations, appear to be fairly well in accordance with the above mentioned scheme of progression. Hence the Almohad movement in the Maghreb, the leader of which was Ibn Tüm art (born between 471/1076 and 474/1081). In the traditional fashion, he made his debut as a moral reformer, preaching wherever he came. ‘‘Pious and devout, he lived in squalid poverty, subsisting on the coarsest fare and attired in rags; his courage was great; he blamed with extreme severity the conduct of those who were transgressing the divine law, and not content with obeying God’s commandments, he laboured to enforce their strict observance; an oc­ cupation he took such pleasure in that he seemed to have been naturally made for it, and he suffered with patience the vexations to which it ex­ posed him. The ill usage which he incurred at Mecca by his zeal caused him to pass into Egypt, and having expressed the highest disapprobation of the culpable proceedings which he witnessed there, he was treated by the people in the roughest manner, and the government drove him out of the country.” 36 From Cairo he proceeded to Alexandria, where he em­ barked for his native country, the Anti-Atlas of Morocco. But as soon as he was on board, he started to correct the profane conduct of the crew. And when he arrived in Mahdiya, he continued the same line of activity. Placing himself within a mosque situated on a roadside, he used to watch those passing by, and whenever he saw something reprehensible, he would take action.37 Arriving in Morocco, he continued as before, and clashes with the authorities were inevitable. Then, finally, one Yintân b. cUmar, an Islamic legist who had taken Ibn Tüm art under his protec­ tion, succeeded in convincing the stubborn preacher of his mortal danger, so that he prudendy withdrew to Agmät. Until then Ibn Tüm art had apparendy neither viewed himself as an actual or potential leader of a movement, nor considered himself in terms of a rebel against an established authority. On the other hand, his learning and piety must have made an impression, for during the many long halts in his journey, he often found ready audiences. This was also the case among his countrymen, although their motive appears to have been more con­ nected with the political circumstances of the day than with their concern for the individual fulfilment of their religious obligations. Thus, he was encouraged to assume the spiritual leadership of substantial tribal forces M Ibn Khallikan’s biographical dictionary, trans. by de Slane, vol. Ill, p. 206. 37 Ibid. p. 206-7.

12

INTRODUCTION

which without doubt were held together by their common hostile sen­ timents against the current Almoravide government. After what may seem as a ritual withdrawal and due considerations, Ibn Tüm art ‘reap­ peared’ in public, and declared himself to be the Mahdi promised to the Muslim community at the end of Time in order to fill the World with righteousness. He then retired to his Berber Hargha tribe of Maçmüda, who are not nomads but mountain peasants, built a mosque in Tüimäl (Tin Mallal) in the High Atlas, and began to work out a doctrine for his Mahdist aspiration and an organization to promote it. Thus, in a text written by himself, Ibn Tüm art declares: “ The following is the promise of God, which he made known to the M ahdi, the true promise which he does not change. His obeyer is pure, more pure than any before or to come, as it has been seen in no one nor will be again; there is none like him among men, none that can set up against him or contradict h im ......................................................................................................... to none can he remain unknown, none can neglect his command. If any comes against him as an enemy he is rushing headlong to destruction and has no hope of salvation. He cannot be approached save by what he ap­ proves; all things issue from his command. All happens according to his will, but this is also the will of his Lord. To recognize him is an essential religious duty, obedience and devotion to him is an essential religious duty, and to follow him and to be guided by him ........................................................ The bidding o f the Mahdi is the bidding of God, only he who knows him not ascribes it to him self” .M

As for the secular task, the immediately following years were passed in the consolidation of the Almohad power. And with the death of Ib n Tüm art in 524/1130, the administrative and military genius cAbd alMu5min, who had been recognized as the executive leader of the movement, was able to defeat their enemies to such an extent that by A.D. 1140 he and his men reached the Mediterranean in the region o f Oran. Ten years later they had swept away the small dynasties which had established themselves in eastern Algeria on the ruins of th e Almoravid state. At its height it was an empire extending from Marrakesh and Fez in the Marrocean West to Tunisia and T ripolitania in the East. As a final remark it may be added that when, after the death of Ibn Tüm art, the emphasis was more and more given to the aspect o f expansion of the territorial state, the Islamic ideology, so prom inent during the time of Ibn Tüm art, was increasingly losing ground. M From the so-called “ Confession of the M ahdi” , in ‘The Collected Works o f th e Mahdi Muhammad ibn Tüm art’, printed in I. Goldziher, Materialen zur Kenntniss d e r Almohadenbewegung in Nordafrika, Zeitschrift der Deutsche» Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1887, pp. 128-9.

INTRODUCTION

13

4. The Problem The al-Mahdt concept in its fully developed form became a recurrent theme in Islamic history because it was able to gather various kinds of social and political tension and to unite them into an active opposition, or, if the time was not rape, quiet expectations of a new time. The main instrument was the emphasis on that past phase of the cultural development when the believers were guided and led by the Prophet Muhammad; that was according to them, the best of times. The tensions had their origin in the less fortunate classes, which—once the pattern had been established—increasingly resorted to this form of political selfexpression. The history and ideas behind this notion should not be understood as eschatological in the traditional sense of the word. Therefore, com­ parisons with Jewish Messianism, or with the Christian conception of the second coming of Christ, will not aid our understanding of the whole complexity of Mahdism in its Muslim context. Nor should it be considered exotic and sectarian, reflecting the views . of extremes such as the established sects of the Kharidjites and the Shicites. Still, Mahdism grew out of their political attitudes and ex­ periences following the death of the second amir al-mu^mimn, cUmar b. al-Khaftab, and it is here, among the multifarious groups of malcontents and the events leading up to this situation, that we must begin our in­ quiries. Much work has been devoted to meticulous descriptions of the various Mahdist movements and tedious presentations of the theological literature which, in one way or the other, deals with the appearance of al-Mahdi\ but there have been few attempts to set it in a wider context of Islamic history. But it is inconceivable that the kind of super-spirituality which has been commonly associated with the coming of the Mahdi, was suddenly implanted in Islamic thought, as has been the implicit position of scholars from East and West alike, who in one way or another have dealt with that subject. The notion of a Mahdi must have emerged from a particular set of social and political conditions. The aim of the present work is to throw some light on these circumstances. O ur study is divided into two parts and opens by oudining, as a background, the time following Muhammad’s death. The immediate problems of succession, the so-called wars of the ridda and the subsequent skirmishing and conquests in the north are focused on in a chapter on the founding and setdement of Küfa in southern Mesopotamia. To this background also belongs the treatment of the groups participating in the conquest of Iraq and their payment. A cardinal point in this work is to show how the start, and perhaps even the success of this expansion was

14

INTRODUCTION

directly influenced by a number of directives for practical action issued during the Medinan Umma period. We shall therefore conclude this part with some notes on the content of the unequivocal socio-religious con­ tract regulating demands and expectations between Muhammad and his clan of supporters. The remaining part will deal exclusively with the political setting in Kûfa, and particularly with one so-called activist group, known under the names of musayyarin and qurrä5, and the kind of hetrodox concepts which developed among them, the most extraordinary of which was the appearance of al-mahdt.

PART TWO

TH E FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF TH E ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF TH E BODY POLITIC 1. The Problems of Succession and Continuity The death of Muhammad confronted the infant Muslim community with something of a constitutional crisis. For the Prophet had left no provision for the succession, nor does it appear that he had even hinted at how the community—known to us as the umma—ought to organize themselves in order to secure the supertribal organism between the believers and their dependants and the various clans and ethnic groups of the city, which Muhammad had established by his coming to Medina. We do not even know whether there had been a discussion among the leaders in Medina about how they should act themselves in the case of Muhammad’s death. But if they did, which is plausible, they can only have been discussing the future leadership in terms of electing a tribal chief. But we do know that on the very afternoon of Muhammad's death the clans of Khazradj of Medina had met separately to decide on the ques­ tion of leadership. The circle of the Prophet's old companions was, however, quick in realizing the danger of such tribal initiatives which, in addition to creating tensions between the Khazradj and their fellow Medinans, would also provoke the Mohammedan community. It is evi­ dent that in their opinion this could only be achieved by acknowledging as their head one who was not recognized as a tribal partisan, and who would have as his major tasks to continue the amalgamation of the various Arab groups which Muhammad had begun, and to formulate a joint strategy toward the regions which were pardy or completely outside their control. The emergence of Abû Bakr as the new leader must been seen as a victory for this view. For during his short term of office (11/632-13/634), he held to the policy of consolidation in the various regions where he had support, which besides from Medina itself also included Mecca and T ä5if. During much of that time, however, his policy was more and more governed by the attitude, soon to spread among the Arab tribes, to re­ nounce whatever obligations they had previously had to Muhammad’s M edina, which they, one by one, set out to meet. The outcome of these campaigns—which Muslim historiography has called the hurüb ar-ridda,

16

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

the wars of apostasy, on the assumption that during Muhammad’s lifetime almost all Arabia had converted—was, after some minor defeats, very successful. And it was not long before their original object of maintaining unity and political position as established under Muhammad was changed to one of challenging the political power and aspirations of other movements in the whole peninsula. From the very beginning, the opposition movements which Abü Bakr had to deal with expressed themselves in two ways. Thus, there was those who protested against paying tax to Medina, from which they never got anything back. Moreover, their tax rebellion was an obvious means of trying to limit, or even reduce, the political influence of the Medinan state. The groups within this category were made up of both Muhammad’s former allies and those who had been outside his reach, such as people belonging to the tribes of Fazära, Asad and Tamlm from the Nadjd, and tribes from Bahrayn, cUmán and Yemen. As to the other opposition movements, they, too, contested M edina’s political ambi­ tions, but were in addition equipped with their own local 'prophets’, who—just like Muhammad, were functioning in the joint capacity of religious men and political leaders. To this category belonged the tribe of Asad, led by their 'prophet’, Talha b. Khälid, the 'prophetess’ Sadjah—supported by groups belonging to the tribes of Tamlm and Taghlib in the northeastern part of Arabia—and Maslama b. Habib, another ‘prophet’, strongly backed by the tribe of Hanlfa in the Yamäma; the two prophets were commonly known by the derogatory diminutives "Julayha’ and 'M usaylima’. The campaigns against these various opposition fronts were soon set in motion. As soon as Usama b. Zayd had returned from the expedition to the north, which had originally been prepared by M uham ­ mad—allegedly to avenge the Byzantine victory at M u3ta in 8/629 over a column which he had sent there but had been dispatched after his death by Abú Bakr, the Medinan alliance began to hit back. It started w ith a skirmish between the vanguard of the Muslim army and a splinter of the tribe of Ghatafan at Dhù ’1-Qa??a (11/632), where the forces of A bû Bakr, after having fled from a surprise attack, reassembled and defeated the enemy. The next encounter, the battle of Buzäkha, took place shortly after the one at Dhü ’1-Qa$?a. At the head of the Medinan forces w hich, incidentally, had been chiefly recruited along the route, in the by now traditional fashion, was Khälid b. al-Walld, while the command o f the other side, i.e. the allied forces of the tribes of Nadjd—Asad, Tayyi3 a n d Ghatafan—was in the hands of the above-mentioned Talha b. K hälid. Here a new victory was won by the Medinan alliance, and Talba. is reported to have fled to Syria.

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

17

After the victory in al-Buzâkha, Khâlid dispatched detachments of his army in several directions. It was not long, however, before they reassembled in order to participate in the big and decisive battle of cAqraba5, at the end of the year 11 (633) or beginning of 12 (633), against the tribe of Hanïfa, which was under the command of Maslama b. Habib. Banü Hanïfa, which formed part of the larger tribal group of Bakr b. W a’il, an ancient group of Arabian tribes in Central and East Arabia with a prominent position in the northern Arabian Kinda Em­ pire, inhabited with the other tribes of the group the region of alYamäma, where they made a living as farmers as well as herdsmen. By seeking to extend their influence to the region between al-Yamama and Iraq, so that they could strengthen their position as conductors of the caravans from Yemen to Iraq, they came into conflict with the Tamïm, and there were several battles. With an army of allegedly 40.000 men, who had previously engaged successfully with the Medinan forces, and an aim which apparendy was to establish a trade monopoly, built on the Hanafis of al-Yamäma and an effective control of the surrounding group of tribesmen,1 there can be no doubt that Maslama’s movement represented the most serious threat throughout the ridda wars. Thus, when Khâlid and his men had succeeded in completely defeating the Hanafis—the last scene of which was when Maslama and the last of his followers were forced to seek refuge in a garden, where they were all killed—the importance lay not in the victory of one rival over the other, but rather in the message to the other Arabs of their capability and of the advantage of joining their movement. Added to this principal point was a second one, the practical fulfilment of which was to have far-reaching consequences: permission to re-enter the fold of the victors,2 was only granted to those who had not openly declared themselves for the rebellious opposition, while those who had fought and been defeated were, on principle, kept from any participation in the future activities, such as the coming campaigns.3 Considering, then, the ridda wars in a wider perspective, they were not exclusively tied to the re-conversation of the apostates, but rather the occasion for an escalation of the various types of antagonism on which M uhammad had built his Medinan state. The difference was, however, that instead of many local areas of confrontation, there was now one. T he ruling group was the same as under Muhammad, those who had been upright and done the good and rewarding deeds, such as the ‘ Tab. 1:1930-1. 2 Tab. 1:1962-3, as well as similar instances in the pages which follow (up to and in' eluding p. 1980). * Tab. 1:2225.

18

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

muhädjirün, anfär and the tribal allies who had proven themselves reliable in thick and thin; and the stationary but influential groups from Mecca and T*3if, regardless of their previous controversies with Muhammad. Below them were all those to whom Muhammad had appealed for sup­ port and submission and who, when they were compelled to choose sides, had decided to back Medina against the murtaddün. Without going into detail, they were made up of men from the tribes of Ghifar, Muzayna, Djuhayna and Sulaym from the Hidjäz, T&yyi3 and Tamlm from the Nadjd, as well as some Yemenite tribes. Beneath these two groups, for­ ming the bottom layer, were all those Arabs who had been subjugated during the ridda wars. As mentioned above, they were deemed un­ trustworthy. In contradistinction to those who had remained faithful, and to whom were the rights and the rewards, they were—whatever their religious and political records might have been—second-class Arabs, whose designation, murtaddün, cannot have sounded much better than kàfirün and munäfiqün. As for the motives for being 'faithful’ and willing to line up behind the Medinan campaigns, there can be no doubt that the expectation of a reward, that is of receiving a share of whatever was conquered, was one, if not the major incentive. Again, this was nothing new, but was an ex­ tension of a cardinal principle in Muhammad’s political action pro­ gramme, which will be dealt with below. 2. The Conquest of Iraq After the battle of cAqrabâ5, Khâlid b. al-Walïd, who as the real victor was in command of an army close to the Sassanian border, with some five hundred men joined the tribesmen of Shaybän, also from Bakr b. Wa5il, in their raids into the border territories of Sassanian Iraq. It is not clear whether Khälid was acting in accordance with some agreement between him and Abû Bakr. Considering, however, the wars of ridda and the subsequent conquest of Iraq as interconnected and simultaneous, as a process outside geographical designations in which the M edinan alliance was aiming at subjecting the Arab tribes not only in Arabia b u t also in the desert border-land to the north,4 it is not unlikely that K hâlid and his men were instructed to go there to link the Shaybänls with th e other tribes.5 In the north, this process of consolidating power over the Arab trib es was soon followed by renewed enterprises, when the Medinan govern­ ment, in 13/634, organized an expedition. It was comprised by the h a rd 4 E. Shoufany, Al-riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia, p. 147. s Bal. Futuh, p. 241.

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

19

core of Medinan loyalists from Mecca, Medina, T ä’if and tribesmen from the outside and led by Qurayshites like cAmr b. al-cÀ$ and Yazîd b. Abi Sufyän. Dispatched into the Byzantine territory in southern Palestine, it was composed by four separate contingents which operated in various directions. In contrast to previous engagement, however, this penetration into the Byzantine sphere of interest only marks a change of the theatre in which it was intended to operate, not of strategy, in the sense that it was not aiming at a major military confrontation with the Byzantines.6 Thus, it adhered closely to the previous policy of political consolidation and pressure for expansion by means of promised benefits to the participants—be it in this world or in the Hereafter—which as part of Muhammad’s political action programme, had been put into effect with the Prophet’s flight to and settling down in M edina.7 Although far more determined and organized, the aim of these campaigns does not, therefore, seem to have varied much from the instructions presumably given to Khâlid b. al-Walïd in Iraq. It was, however, not long before the Arabs must have realized that, before long, they would be faced with an organization of professionals, whose presence would constitute a major obstacle to their strategy of cementing the new State by means of joint tribal enterprises within the framework of Muhammad’s slogan of batde and booty.8 Abü Bakr therefore ordered Khâlid b. al-Walld to leave his activities in Iraq and rush with as many men as possible to the relief of his fellow generals on the Syrian front. Here, the city of H ïra on the west bank of the Euphrates had capitulated to Khâlid and his sworn by now ally, al-M uthanna b. H aritha, chief of the Shaybän tribesmen. Thus, while al-M uthanna was left to carry on the campaign alone, Khâlid hastened in a perilous march across the Syrian desert, and in April 13/634 he suddenly appeared before Damascus direcdy in the rear of the Byzantine army. After looting the city he withdrew, and managed to join the other Arab forces in the south, the result of which was the decisive victory of Adjnadayn in Djumädä 1,13/July 634. After only two years in office Abü Bakr died, leaving behind him an Arabia which for the first time was involved in a common and unifying interprise: conquest in the north. As we have hinted above, this was, no coincidence, but had been—although different in scale and with varying degrees of support—the underlying motive from the beginning. If M edina were to continue the process of implanting the new religion, it had to make sure that it maintained its leading position among the Arabs • Bal. Futuh, pp. 107**8. 7 For a more detailed exposition of these features, see below the chapter, Conclusive remarks: The Mohammedan ideology and political make up, p. 42. * Loc. cit.

20

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

of the peninsula. Measures had to be taken for the provision of m aterial benefits, but on a much larger scale than during the time of M uham m ad. Hence the examples set by Khälid and al-M uthanna, and the expedition of 13/634.9 While the original aim of the raids was the continuous search for various kinds of benefits, they were, when they met with opposition transferred into regular battles, and then into military campaigns. T he principal motive, that of paying off the campaigners, nevertheless re­ mained unchanged, as will be seen from the following. Another signifi­ cant point connected with these initial ‘out-of-state’ campaigns has already been mentioned above: only those who had supported the regim e during the ridda wars against the insurgents were allowed to take p art.10 Thus, with the Arabs who flocked northwards, there were two particular conceptions. On the one hand, there was the expectation that the p a r­ ticipants would—in one way or another—be sufficiently rewarded for their toil and struggle. On the other, there was the emergence of a new class, that is a group of people whose rank in society was exclusively connected with their previous service for the regime in Medina. In short, regardless of their tribal affiliations or standing tribesmen with what we may call Islamic priority had, following their conquests and victories, particular claims of rights. Before his death in 13/634 Abü Bakr had urged the companions to elect cUmar b. al-Khaftab as successor. Apart from the fact that this act of nominating the successor was unprecedented, his choice of cU m ar appears to have been met with general recognition.11 He had been the chief engineer behind the support of Abû Bakr as the new leader of the community, and during Abù Bakr’s time of office he had always acted as a faithful and authoritative counsellor. Almost instantly cUmar set out to organize and coordinate the campaigns in Syria and Mesopotamia which had been hitherto left to the discretion of the army commanders in the field. After a few years, when the whole of Syria had fallen into the hands of the Arabs, these measures were also extended to Egypt, which had been conquered from the Byzantines through a privately initiated cam­ paign by one of the Qurayshite generals of the early expedition into * Bal. Futuh, pp. 108-9. 10 Compare p. 17 with footnote 2, and Tab. 1:2079, 2083-4; Bal. Futuh, p. 107. 11 On the question of the significance and actual importance of the dying Abü Bakr’s designation of cUmar as his successor it appears that neither did any formal act o f in­ vestiture in fact exist, nor would such an act have had any value, for it would have been quite out of keeping with Arab custom. Against this background, therefore, it must be quite proper to describe Abü Bakr’s act of designating £Umar as an innovation which did not carry great weight in the matter. The case was rather that cUmar came to power as a direct result of the personal support given to him by a majority among the leaders o f the community.

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

21

southern Palestine, cAmr b. al-cA$ at the head of some 3.500 tribesmen.12 Among these measures was a system of solutions for a number of important problems, and in the following sections some of them, of particular interest for our context, will be mentioned. One of these solutions was cU m ar’s decision to allow those who had revolted and fought against the Medinan community to side with his troops in their raids against the north. Equally significant, however, is the fact, that they were not used everywhere. For instance, in the bands of the 3.500 men who had followed cAmr b. al-Ä? from Palestine to Egypt and mentioned above, as well as the reinforcements dispatched from Medina under the leadership of az-Zubayr b. al-cAwwäm, there is no mention of former ex-rebels.13 Likewise on the Byzantine front, the men from Mecca, Medina and T*Dif had initially been reinforced by tribesmen who had been loyal to the Medinan cause,14 but as the Arabs 12 Bal. Futuh, p. 212; Ibn cAbd al-Hakâm, Futüh M ifr, p. 57. As to a more precise number of the horsemen who escorted cAmr b. al-cÂç, as well as these men’s native background, Ibn cAbd al-Hakâm informs us that J* Ju> ¿1* Y ^ ^ J* «1 As to the place, the publisher reveals that to a variant manuscript a gloss is attached, explaining the word cakk as baladf i 9l-Yaman, while another has the information min Nadjd kulluhum. Compare Yäqüt, M ucdjam al-buldän, s.v. 13 Ibid. p. 61. Indeed, through, the* statement w ¡3* ^ j*» j ut JWj ^ ^ os-U. j ji ut, J » ¿¿U un the author indicates that the conquest of Egypt was carried out by the elite among the Medinan soldiers at hand. Such praise would hardly be used about former ridda men. A few words must be added to the description of the military strategy of conquest through the setting up of a hi$n. When Arab warriors wanted to attack a stationary target, they often set up an adjacent stronghold, hi$n. This would usually be equipped with a surrounding khandaq and several abwàb from which roads would lead to various courtyards within the hipi where each military unit would gather and organize its at­ tacks. Once the combat had started, each attacking unit would when withdrawing, be relieved by fresh troops, whose appearance was, however, always tactically planned so that the defenders never knew from which side they were to expect the next attack. This kind of operative scheme, in which an attack and withdrawal was followed by another, was known as al-karr wa’l-farr, as shown in the following lines of a poem ydt JUf J& t)

“ and the (new) attack after the retreat when it is disliked to advance and to clash together” , Abû Tammâm, Kitàb ashcâr al-hamäsa, vol. I p. 249. The terms appears also to have been used as a direct battle cry, for when Yazid I in 64/683 sent a Syrian army against cAbdaUah b. az-Zubayr who had come out in Mecca with the clame to be amir, al-M ukhtâr b. Abl cUbayd ath-Thaqafi is reported to have shouted V 1¿ft ut against the Syrians. See below, p. 107. 14 See Tab. 1:2084, where this initial army is described as consisting of people like Suhayl b. cAmr and his kind from among the people of Mecca. As he was presumably typical for this Meccan element in the army, it may be of interest to place his past record within a Muhammadan context. He fought against the Muslims at Badr, where he was taken prisoner but later set free. He was one of the envoys whom the Meccans had sent to M uhammad at Hudayblya. But after the battle at Hunayn (8/630) just after the pilgrimage of the Prophet and his co-religionists, he embraced Islam and was, until his death in Syria in 18/639 among its most zealous supporters.

22

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

penetrated deeper into Byzantine territory more manpower was needed, and the matter of reinforcements became more and more pressing. It had been problem even in the time of Abü Bakr, who had tried to solve it by means of ordinary recruitment, but his policy toward the ridda tribesmen had limited this resource considerably. Hence, another method of recruitment was initiated to seek support for campaigns against the Byzantines among the numerous groups of Arabs who had for some time resided in Palestine. If not before, this must have become fairly obvious to the Arabs during the incident of Mardj a$-$uf!ar, a place located some 33 kilometres south of Damascus close to the present Tell Shaqhab. After their bloody victories at Adjnädayn and at Fihl (or Fahl) east of the Jordan, the Arabs tried, at the end of 13/634, to reach Damascus. Among their bands there was one led by Khâlid b. Sacid ,ls which, while making its way up toward the north, spotted troops of regulars belonging to the Byzantine army. Khâlid, however, completely misjudged the tactical capacity of the Byzantines, since, when the Arabs in their usual style of battle had rushed through the enemy lines and were led to believe that the enemy had withdrawn to Damascus and that they could therefore safely encamp in the vicinity, that is at M ardj a$-§uffar, the Byzantines had come back and stealthily surrounded their camp. In this critical position Khâlid appealed to the local Arab popula­ tion for help, but in vain.1 156 The reason was, of course, that there was no alliance of neither obligation nor rights between them; there was not even a pre-arranged deal on the booty. At any rate, it was not long before the native Arabs realized this potential source of manpower and cIkrima b. cAmr, one of the more successful captains in the wars against the ridda insurgents, was assigned the task of forming this new alliance.17 In doing so, he adopted a method whereby he and his companions first proved themselves by driving out the Byzantine forces in the region, and then, when it was clear to everyone that there was booty to distribute, they showed their readiness to discuss terms for co-operation with local Arab settlements.18 That the Byzantines were not able to follow up their success and had to take refuge instead behind the walls of Damascus was due solely to the fact that cIkrima succeeded in obtaining this support.19 15 Before taking part in the campaign, Khâlid b. Sacid had served as resident-general of $anca5, appointed by the prophet. He fell at Mardj a?-§uffar. “ Tab. 1:2084-5. 17 'Ikrim a b. cAmr, also sumamed Abü Djahl, was originally an antagonist of Muhammad who fled from Mecca at its capture. He was however pardoned, and led the Muslim troops in various operations until he fell in Syria. *• Tab. 1:2085. '» Tab. 1:2086.

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

23

This composition of the forces available in Syria is significant, because it demonstrates clearly that when cUmar succeeded Abû Bakr and allowed the ridda insurgents to join the other native Arabs, they were not employed in the Syrian campaigns. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that smaller groups of former ridda tribesmen were used as auxiliaries in the campaigns in Syria. Such was undoubtedly the case with the former ridda leader Qays b. Hubayra b. al-Makshùh al-M urâdï,20 whose brief presence in Syria is recorded. However, shortly before the battle of Yarmük (16/637), he was transferred to the Iraqi battlefront with a group of 700 confederates.21 And indeed it was in this area that the former rebels were now employed as the new wave of rein­ forcements. O ur knowledge of the events leading up to this situation is unfortunately incomplete, but what we know is that when Khälid b. alWalïd in 13/634 made his dash from H ïra to the Byzantine territory, he left—as already mentioned—his ally al-M uthanna al-Häritha in charge of the continous military operations in Iraq. At this disposal he had Khälid’s own men—the heroes of cAqraba5—and bands of newcomers from eastern Arabia. The former group had been severely reduced. Originally recruited for the purpose of defeating rebels throughout Arabia, it consisted of tribesmen as well as the Anfär and the muhädjirün.22 But when they entered Iraqi territory with Khälid, and permission was granted to everybody to leave the campaign if they so wanted, the Medinans decided to turn back.23 Khälid b. al-Walld was thus left with around 2.000 tribesmen who, having to all appearance been recruited for the purpose of manpower and tribal strategy, belonged to very obscure dans.24*The latter group consisted of members from M uthanna’s own dan, the B. Shayban, and other groups among ‘resident’ Arabs “ be­ tween him and al-cIroq” , who had not been engaged in the ridda wars.29 Together they numbered some 20.000, and were later to constitute the core of the soldiers known as ahl al-ayyäm, those who participated in the 20 When Muhammad made Farwa b. Musayk the head of the tribal confederation of Madhbidj, to which the tribe of Murad belonged, Qays b. Hubayra left his tribe and went to Çancâ>, where he sided with the competing prophet of Yemen, al-Aswad. After having defeated and killed Abnä3 who had previously been recognized by Muhammad as governor of $an, al-Aswad was himself killed by Qays b. Hubayra. In the meantime the Muslims forces had regained their lost position in Yemen. Qays b. Hubayra tried to escape but was captured. However, he swore himself free from the charge of having killed al-Aswad, and was released. After having enlisted on the side of the Muslims he finally disappeared in Persia. 21 Bal. Futuh, p. 256. 22 Tab. 1:1930. « Tab. 1:2020-1. 24 Tab. 1:1887, 1905. 22 Tab. 1:2021.

24

THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE OF THE BODY POLITIC

ayyäm that followed the ridda wars.26 But with Khälid’s departure the question of manpower, coupled with the growing internal danger of the many immobilized fighting men among the murtaddün, appears to have reconsidered once more, for shortly afterwards M uthanna suddenly ap­ peared in Medina, requesting that the repentful murtaddün should be allowed to participate in the raids in Iraq.27 Abu Bakr, who was at this time in his deathbed, held, however, firmly by his principle of excluding the ridda tribesmen completely from taking part in the campaigns. Still there must have been a growing demand for a change of this policy, since when cUmar succeeded Abü Bakr one of his first political acts was to prove to his fellow companions and other hardliners that they had to change their attitude toward their former foes, if not to find the necessary manpower, then as an act of reconciliation toward the remaining ridda and non-ridda tribesmen who together had expressed their resentment against the present policy of exclusion. First, he issued an invitation to the non -ridda tribesmen to join al-M uthanna and his men in Iraq. When this call—as expected—was met with absolutely no response, he turned without discrimination, to all Arabs, pointing out that, since there was in Hidjäz not much of anything, he was now asking where they were, those who wanted to immigrate into Iraq according to the promise of God, strü f i ’l-ard allait wacadakum Allah jx'1-kitàb anyawarrithakumühä, “ for God will render His people inheritance of the nations’’.28 This call for immigra­ tion with its subsequent mawärith, land of inheritance, was how­ ever—clever as it may seem for the problem at hand—no invention on the part of cUmar, but an intrinsic part of that political action pro­ gramme, the origin and other elements of which have been referred to in brief above.29 This new shift of attitude was also extended to another group. For when cUmar was going to appoint the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi front, and was advised to choose Tab. 1:2989-90; Bal. Ansab, V:92, 81; Ibn Ath. 11:234-5. •®' Tab. 1:3089, 3091, 3102; Bal. MS, 1:344, 346, 347; Ibn Ath. 11:275 ff. 102 Tab. 1:3069, 3082; Bal. MS, 1:346.

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Having made the necessary preparations the Meccan party set o u t for Baçra. On approaching the town they claimed that they had come to revenge the murder of cUthman and initiate a new shürä.109 As cU thm an b. Hunayf, the new governor appointed by CA1I, was unwilling to comply with their claims, hostile action took place between the two parties, and the Meccans managed to occupy the bayt al-mäl. In a last effort a group of tribesmen led by Hakim b. Djabala tried to drive them away from the treasury, but were defeated. In the other camp CA1I had departed for Küfa where he expeced to find the additional manpower which—together with those who had already rallied around him—was necessary to deal with his antagonists. This task had, however, been complicated by the fact that Kûfa’s governor, Abù Müsä, whose appointment to that mifr had been re-confirmed by cAlI, had engaged himself strongly in the matter and urged the Kufans to refrain from siding with any of the two parties.* 104*Thus, al-Ashtar was sent to Kùfa to muster his support there, and when Hasan, cAlI’s son, arrived in Kúfa to inform Abû Músa of his dismissal, al-Ashtar, with the men he had gathered, had managed to occupy the qafr.109 The road was now cleared, and when CA1I arrived Abú Músa had in fact resigned; all those who wanted to give support to the new amir were free to do so. CA1I did not, however, try to enter Kûfa, but pitched his camp at a place out­ side the mifr called Dhû Q är. From there he set off for Ba$ra to meet the opposing party. To start with, steps were taken to reach a settlement,106but there were on both sides people who had engaged themselves very strongly for a final decision in which the other part was out of the way, and the negotations broke down. The battle which then followed—which has gone into the history as the Batde of the Camel—lasted only a litde less than a full day, and resulted in the defeat of the Qurayshite faction. Many were killed, among whom were both Talfra and az-Zubayr. After the victory, CA1I entered Ba$ra, the people of which gave him their bayca.107 He then set off for Kûfa, which he made his headquarters. >®» Tab. 1:3093, 3098, 3100-1, 3116-7, 3156, 3170; Bal. M S, 1:347-8. 104 This attitude rests on the point of view that without political unity it is neither obligatory nor desirable to opt for one particular faction. Seen in a historical perspective, this attitude of standing up for a particular view or contesting party was spiritualized so as to become socio-politically relevant exclusively in an eschatological context which, together with other elements such as al-mahdi al-muntafar, will be treated in the second volume of this study. ,0* See the map at p. 115. ««« Tab. 1:3185; Bal. MS, 1:358. See also Ibn Ath. 11:295 f; Bal. MS, 1:353. For a more general account of the encounter between CA1I and az-Zubayr, see Tab. 1:3162-8. 107 Tab. 1:3229; Bal. MS, 1:362.

THE D EC U N E OF THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE

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Well aware that there was still opposition against him he probably began to plan his next measures. One of these must have been to deal with thé governor of Syria for some twenty years, M ucâwïya b. Abi Sufyän—whose acquaintance with and personal views on qurra* have been related above—who had avoided swearing any oath of allegiance to CA1I. Now, 'U thm än had been from the house of Umayya, and when CA1X sent for his bayca, M u'âwïya, who was the first cousin of the slain amir, declared himself wait, i.e. next of kin, with the duty of avenging the death of a kinsman; he could not swear CA1T allegiance before he had presented the m urderers.108 Moreover, he followed his earlier opponents in their demand that 'U m ar’s precedent of creating a shürä should be followed. When these and other acts of the opposition did not cease, cAlï had no choice but to march north in order to seek a decision. And on the plain of south of ar-Raqqa on the west bank of the Euphrates, the nominal supporters of 'A ll and the Syrian Arab troops of M u'âwïya faced each other for several months during the year of 38/657. They did not meet in open battle but they spent the time in skirmishing until the beginning of the peaceful month of M uharram, for which a truce was agreed upon. When the holy month had elapsed the fighting began again. For some time the battle wavered indecisively back and forth; since most of the IM This was indeed the time when every faction resorted to religious arguments. For apart from our main concern, the qwnra* and their claims, the party around cÀ5isha, azZubayr and had as the motive for their opposition agaisnt CA1I declared that the slaying of 'U thm än was maflüm, i.e. a kind of killing referred to in the Koran: “ And slay not the soul God has forbidden, except by right. Whosoever is slain unjusdy, We have appointed to his next-of-kin authority; but let him not exceed in slaying; he shall be helped.” [17:33 (35)] When M u'âw ïya entered the scene of opposing views, he took to the same principle, for in demanding that the m urderers should be handed over by their protectors to be killed, he used phrases which are not only identical with the preeding verse from the K oran, but also a second verse where cAli and his supporters are identified with the hypocrites and Jews: “ But had We prescribed for them , saying, ‘Slay yourselves’ or ‘Leave your habitations,’ they would not have done it, save a few of them; yet if they had done as they were admonished it would have been better for them , and stronger confirming them, and then We surely would have given them from Us a mighty wage, and guided them on a straight p ath .” [4:66-8 (69-70)] (Na$r b. Muzafeim al-M inqarl, Waqcat

p. 127).

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soldiers had fellow tribesmen, and even near relatives, in the opposite camp, their will to tight was not strong. And so lukewarm was the sup­ port of the two opponents that the khathcam leader of the contingent on the Syrian side is reported to have suggested to the ra3s Khathcam on the cA ll's side, that they should let cAli and M ucâwïya tight it out themselves and then, afterwards, join the victor.109 A turning-point in the battle oc­ curred, however, when Syrian troops went out against the other side with copies of the Koran—that is at least what the report says—tied to their lances. The proper meaning of this incident is unclear, and it may even be regarded as tictious or diversive, but considering the situation at hand it may very well have been a signal to lay down the arms agreed upon in the talks which had taken place between tribal sections from the two sides; they would thus try to force a settlement of the conflict through negotiations. Still, the appearance of the Koran in the battle could have been more than a sign. For, since there was no agreement or procedure on how to call a halt between the fighting parties before one of them had been ut­ terly defeated, it may very well have been used to remedy that deficien­ cy. On the other hand, it may have been employed as a purely tactical device. For instance, it is very hard to believe that M ucâwîya and cAmr b. al-cÂç, the former governor of Egypt, one of the most skilful associates of M ucäwlya and the man who had allegedly advised the Syrian gover­ nor to hoist the mafähif on the point of the spears, had no information about the highly heterogeneous formation of the groups behind cAlï. Among these were powerful tribal groups such as the one behind alAshcath, which when forced to choose had taken cAll’s side; and others which were either split in their support, or excluded from the direct pro­ cess of nomination and therefore unwilling to take part in a battle from which they stood to gain nothing. Likewise, they must have known that there was nevertheless a core of battle-hardened fighters including the qurrä\ Thus, when the Syrians with their mafähif on their lances shouted out to the other side: hädha kitäb Allah cazza wa-djalla baynanä wa-baynakum man li-thughür ahl ashshahn bacda ahl ash-shahn wa-man li-thughür ahl al-Hräq bacda ahl al-Hräq110

they provided all the lukewarm people on the Iraqi side with an excuse for laying down their arms without ruining their reputation. This tactical initiative, whether planned or not, was however opposed by CA1I himself as well as the qurrä5and other likeminded, whose mutual interest was to get rid of M ucawlya. 109 Na?r b. M uzähim al-M inqarï, op. cit., p. 257. "® Tab. 1:3329.

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Nevertheless, when it became dear that a considerable part o f cAll’s own following, which was quite soon to distinguish itsdf as a group of its own,111 joined with the tribal groups in calling for a truce and for negotations, CA1X had no option but to accept the Syrian proposal. It turned out that Mucäwlya wanted each of the two parties to appoint one man, whose the decision—as long as it was not contrary to the word of God—was to be binding to both parties.112*Among the Iraqis there was no objection to such an arrangement, and when cAmr b. al-cA? was chosen as the Syrian ddegate, they chose, in spite of cAlï’s vehement ob­ jections, Abû Mûsâ al-Ashcarî. This agreement between the two sides was consummated by a meeting at which a number of principles were laid down on which the arbitration was to be based; they are recorded in a document known as kitâb alqadïya. A proper discussion of this document is outside our scope, and we shall only mention that the two representatives were instructed to base their discussion on the Koran together with as-sunna al-cädila al-hasana aldjämica ghayr al-mufarriqa.11SThe arbitration took place the following year at Dümat al-Djandal, or Adhruh, in ancient Edom. The reports of this event are unfortunately vague and incomplete. Still, the two versions of the convention which have come down to use seem to indicate the issues which were on the agenda. Thus, the old question of whether cUthman had been jusdy or unjustly killed, and therefore, whether M ucâwïya’s claim—as cUthm an’s kinsman—for vengeance was justified, turned up once m ore.114 Presumably the arbitrators decided that the acts with which cUthman had been charged were not breaches of divine law, which would have justified putting him to death. The only detailed account of the discus­ sion reports how, when Abû Mûsâ and cAmr met at the arbitration court, cAmr immediately tried to prove M ucâwïya's right to rule by right of revenge. He referred to the Koran, verse 17:33 (35), which has been quoted above, but once this argument has been offered the report breaks off—unintentionally or not—without recording Abu M üsä's point of view. Nevertheless we may assume that they discussed the question of who was to become amir—a question which had become associated more and more with the preceding one—since there is evidence that Abû 111 I.e ., al-khawäridj, or as they were also called, al-muhakkimün, 'those who go out’ and ‘those who repeat the phrase: là hukm ilia li-lläh', i.e. the power of decision rests with God alone. 1.2 Na?r b. M uzähim, op. cit., pp. 498-9; Tab. 1:3333. 1.2 Tab. 1:3336-7; Nagr b. M uzähim, op. cit., pp. 509-11; Ibn Ath. IV:13-17. 114 This version is found in Tab. 1:3354-6, and is related in accordance with ashShacbl, while the other, also referred to below, is found on pp. 3358-60 from al-Kalbl, but this latter one only relates the results on the meeting. (See also Tab. I: 3342).

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THE D ECUNE OF THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE

Müsä did in fact suggest that both CA1I and M ucâwïya should be set aside; instead they should choose a new leader by the old custom of shürä. cAmr agreed to this, but when their decision was announced he suddenly rose to declare that, while he supported Abü Müsä in his proposal to set aside his fähib—cAlï—he would himself remain loyal to M ucâwïya as his fähib and as cUthm an’s wait. At this point the meeting broke up, anger flaring up between the two arbitrators. Since the arbitrators had been unable to reach an agreement after the $iffin confrontation CA1I decided to settle in Küfa; he remained there until his death in 40/661. During this time, he experienced one set-back after the other, the inevitable result of which was that his position was gradually weakened. The troubles began immediately after the events of $iffin, for already on the road back from the batdefield a group in his own army broke away from the units returning to Iraq and withdrew to the village of H arürä3, not far from Küfa. Despite their opposition, they were not intransigent about reaching a setdement, and therefore representatives of cAlï, and Anally CA1I himself, went to see their leaders. In the discussions it became clear that their resentment against cAlï was due to allegations that he had set men to judge over God's commands, that he had not permitted the taking of prisoners and booty in batde,119 and that, when the kitab al-qafiya was drafted, he had agreed to let his tide of amir al-muhninin be erased. On his side, cAlï insistendy tried to give their leaders reason to expect that he would repudiate the agreement to arbitrate, together with his offers of regional commands to the heads with strongest followings, who on cAlï’s orders had been singled out by his own men in advance. As a result a good number of the opponents left the camp and returned to K üfa.116 But as it became clear that the ar­ bitration was proceeding without any opposition on his part, the people from H arürä3 began once more to express their discontent. And when CA1I sent Abü Müsä together with Ibn cAbbas to a meeting which was a part of the agreement of kitab al-qafiya, a group among them, left Küfa when cAlï would not bow to their demands. This they did by secredy leaving the mifr in small groups and re-assembling in Djisr anNahrawän, a site on the road to Persia along the river Tigris, not far from the future Baghdäd. Although CA1Î at first instructed his followers to leave them alone, he was later forced—particularly by al-Ashcath—to deal with these seceders or khawäridj, ‘those who went out’, under which name they were to be known from now on. Thus, when it became ap­ parent that no decision was to come out of the arbitration, CA1I instructed*1 111 I.e. the Battle of the Camel. Tab. 1:3350 ff.; Ibn Ath. IV:89 ff.

THE DECLINE OF THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE

97

his forces, which had originally been gathered to undertake another campaign against M ucawiya, to make their way through Nahrawän; and so they did. After a hopeless succession of negotiations the camp was at­ tacked, the seceders defeated, and cAlî was again up to march against the Syrians. But once more he found himself without support, and once more the greatest reluctance was found among tribal leaders, whose contacts with the other side had increased considerably since the waqcat and who pressed him to go back to Küfa. Until then, cAlï had tried to build up a force which could deal with the imminent threats from his competitors. In the Iraqi context, this had been achieved by balancing the ordinary tribal followings with other groups of tribesmen who lacked tribal support and who, as a conse­ quence, had let themselves been mobilized at one level or another of the qm ä\ In view of their past experience with similar supra-tribal forma­ tions, the tribal leaders cannot have considered this development as par­ ticularly desirable, and in awaiting the next initiatives, showed no haste in closing ranks around CA1I. He had also lost support in the other group. This was—as we have seen—apparent even at the time of Çiffin, when a group among them insisted that CA1I should accept M u'aw lya's proposal. For, said the two, Miscar b. Fadaki at-Taimml and Zayd b. Husayn a(Ta*!,117 addressing cAlî on their behalf, they had now achieved that right from the book of God which cUthman had denied them and for which reason he had been killed. And now it only remained for him to act ac­ cordingly, otherwise they would do to him as they had done to 2* Brother of $ac?aca who fell as a standard-bearer for cAl! in the Battle of the Camel. 127 He was among the early-comers, and fell in 65/685 as one of the tawwâbün at (Ayn al-W arda, i.e. the place where a m ultitude of people, led by the Kufite Sulaymân b. Çurad, who had gone out to “ avenge the blood of H usayn” , met Ubaydalläh b. ZiySd and his men. See also pp. 104 f. «“ Tab. 1:3155. >*» Loc. cit. 120 This includes—as we have pointed out above—such views as that of Abu Músa alA sh'arl, or the one prevailing among those who wanted to combine tribal affiliation with past achievments for the religious cause, as well as that of tribal leaders without that past.

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what was considered to be the sunnat an-nabt at the time, maintained the social and political order. Successful as this form of organization turned out to be during the government of M ucâwïya, there were nevertheless signs of unrest. The men behind it were all malcontents, but with different backgrounds. Thus, one group consisted of Kufan early-comers who had been among cAll’s supporters, but who had no longer any role to play in the new government-backed tribal organization. Another was made up by new­ comers, many of whom had not reached Küfa until after cAll had become amtr, and who tried to improve their conditions by resisting the supremacy of a remote tribe. That these protestants had their base in the old qurrä5 movement is fairly evident, for when Ziyäd b. Abfli was ap­ pointed governor in 51/671 after M ughlra b. Shucba who had died, he warned H udjr b. cAdï, whom the sources picture as his main opponent, and his supporters—whom Ziyäd called ‘this class of base men and those a little stupid’, hàdhihï’s-sifla wa-h&uUP as-sufaha*—that they should be cautious about making H udjr losing his sense of orientation.131 Indeed, during this period the men who had gathered around H udjr were described as qurrä5 ahí al-Küfa.132 But as their open opposition did not cease, H udjr and about a dozen of his adherents were arrested and sent to Mucäwlya on the charge of khalc, i.e. trying to depose a ruler, which significantly had been the phrase employed by the qurrä>in their opposi­ tion against cUthman. When H udjr and six of his companions refused to denounce cAlï, they were executed.133 In 60/679 Mucäwlya died and political aspirations came again into the open. In our context, this is particularly evident from a succession of let­ ters which Sulaymän b. $u rad 134*and others, such as Musayyab b. Nadjaba, Rifaca b. Shaddäd133 and Habib b. Mu?ahir wrote to Husayn b. CA1I. In these letters they complained about his enemy’s treatment of the umma and its fayJ and its khiyär, and about the state money stipulated for the tyrants and rich.136 Accompanying these complaints however was also an invitation to come to Kùfa and resume command there with their help. In the best argumentative fashion they declared that in that case they would rise to action, to do away with the enemy as Thamûd had 1,1 Ibn Sacd, op. cit., vol. V I, pp. 151*2; Bal. MS, 1:801. 132 Bal. MS, 1:811. »*» T ab. 11:114-35; Bal. M S, 1:800-11; Ibn Sacd, op. cit., vol. V I, pp. 152-3. IM A companion of the prophet, who settled in Küfa in the quarter of K huzica and who fought with cAli at $iffin. 115 He was among those who had come to Iraq during cAll’s time as amir. Their tribes included Arhabîs, Ham dânls, Badjalis, Kindis and NakhäcTs (Ibn Ath. 11:252-5, IV: 127-8). At Çiffin, Rifaca was on cA ll's side, as a Badjali commander. 136 T ab. 11:233-4.

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been done away with;137*they also suggested that such an act might even bring about a manifestation from above: “ Come, perhaps that God will convoke us by means of you on the basis of the truth.,,,3,

Husayn tarried, but sent in his stead his cousin Muslim b. cAqH to Kùfa. He was the son of cAqÜ b. Abi Tähb and had in spite of his name at the time of the conflict between CA1I and MucäwXya seen his interests best served by siding with the latter. When Muslim had established himself in Küfa, he assumed the role of Husayn’s emissary and began to prepare for Husayn’s arrival by taking homage from the Kufans on H usayn’s behalf. 18.000 men are said to have given him their bayca.139 In the meantime Yazld b. M ucawlya had learnt that feelings were smouldering there, and he instructed cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd140 to betake himself immediately to Kùfa to deal with the situation there. When this became known, Muslim felt compelled to mobilize, but the Kufans abandoned him. Overwhelmed by Ibn Ziyäd and the local forces, which had also been strengthened through the support of the ashräf Muslim and H änl b. cUrwa, in whose house he had stayed, were both captured and beheaded.141 Thus, while Husayn was on his way to Kùfa, cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd had regained control over the same mifr. Moreover, he had forcefully succeeded in re-establishing the loyalty between the ashräf and the government, which, due to their apparent inability to control their followers, had been badly shaken. Husayn, on his side, does not appear 1,7 Cf. the Koranic verses: “ And the evildoers were seized by the Cry and morning found them in their habitations fallen prostrate as if they never dwelt there: ‘Surely Thamood disbelieved in their Lord, so away with Tham ood!’ ” 11:67-68 (70-71); see also 11:94-95 (97-98). As to Tham ud, they were certainly a real people. They are mentioned in several classical sources as well as in pre-Islamic Arab poetry, and seem to have been associated with the North-W est of Arabia. But when—in the words of the Koran—a messenger, Salih, one among themselves, was sent to them and as proof of the truth of his message produced miraculously a she-camel and a foal, which were to be respected and given a share of the water, Tham ùd disbelieved and ham strung the camel, TTierefore they were destroyed. Tab. 11:234. Significantly, the phrase lacalla Allah, ‘perhaps God’, is taken from a Koranic context, for instance 42:17 ( 16), in which it refers to the impossibility of foreseeing what God may decide to let happen in the near or distant future. »*• Tab. 11:264. 140 Son of Ziyäd b. Ablh who as viceroy of Iraq had residence in Baçra. 141 Tab. 11:267-9, while a more general reference is found in 11:227; Ibn Ath. V:86 ff; see also Yakubi, Tarikh 11:288 ff.; Bal. MS, 1:308 ff., 478 ff.

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to have been completely ignorant of these last events; for instance, it is reported that the news of Muslim’s death had reached him en route and that he had wanted to turn back, but Muslim’s brothers and son had spurred him on for the sake of revenge. However, as soon as they had set foot on Iraqi territory they came into contact with armed units loyal to ‘Ubaydallah. First they were met by a detachment under command of al-Hurr b. Yazld, who forbade liusayn to continue his advance toward Kúfa and also to return to Medina, liusayn and his men then turned, making their way along the Euphrates, but in the opposite direction to that of Kûfa, until they reached a place called K arbala’. There they en­ camped, and soon some 4.000 Kufan warriors under command of cUmar b. Sacd b. Abi Waqqä?, the son of the commander-in-chief at QädisTya, had surrounded them and laid siege to their camp. On the 10th of M uharram in the year 61 (October 10, 680), after it had become dear that liusayn would not yield and swear an oath of allegiance, (Umar b. Sacd ordered his troops to attack, and liusayn and many with him were killed. Almost immediately after the killing of liusayn the political activism was resumed, but due to the control of cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd it kept itself from open confrontations.142 Stirring arguments were traditionally needed to win support. One of the more prominent activists, cUbaydalläh b. cAbdallah al-M urn, directed impassioned appeals to people who had not yet decided to show their colours. A striking feature in the exhortations of this man—who is reported to have been min ducät ahl al-mifr—is the shift from enumerating grievances and piling up religious paraphrases to exalting the glorious past manifested in God’s choice of Muhammad for the deliverance of the faithful: “ You were upon the brink o f a pit o f Fire, and H e delivered you from it; even so God makes clear to you His signs; so haply you will be guided’’,143

and denouncing the murder of the Prophet’s grandson, a misdeed which could only be expiated by repentance, by turning against the killers and by repudiating the deviators, al-qäsifün.144 Thus, •« Tab. 11:497 ff. '« K oran, 3:103 (99). 144 Not surprisingly, the term is found in the K oran, but only in one passage, which is laid to have been uttered by a company of djinn converted by his preaching: “ And some of us have surrendered, and some of us have deviated. Those who have surrendered sought rectitude; but as for those who have deviated, they have become firewood for Gehenna!” (72:14-5).

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“We call upon you (innä tuuPûkum) to the Book of God, and the sunna of His Prophet, and to claim the blood of his house, and for the strife against those who consider lawful that which God has declared to be unlawful,141and the apostates (al-märiqün). ” 1446 The first meeting following this call took place toward the end of the year 61 H (the summer of 681)147 in the house of Sulaymän b. $urad, w here, together with other men such al-Musayyab b. Nadjaba and Rifaca b. Shaddäd, he began to discuss future opposition.148 To widen their base, Ibn Çurad also seems to have entered into correspondence with likeminded men outside Kûfa, for an exchange of letters is mentioned be­ tween him and Sacd b. Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman in MacUPin and alM uthanna b. M ukharraba al-cAbI in Ba$ra, who both assured him their support.1491* As to the action programme, they decided to confíne themselves to taking revenge on the tribal leaders for Husayn’s death.190 The, in 64/683, Yazîd b. M ucâwïya suddenly died, and M arwän b. al-Hakam, the undisputed senior member of the house of Umayya, emerged as the new amir al-mu^minîn. In the meantime, Ibn Zubayr had staged his long planned revolt against the Umayyads, an immediate result of which was that he had managed to get Iraq on his side. U nder these circumstances cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd, who in accordance with the custom from the time of his father had resided in Ba$ra, but as governor of both Baçra and Kûfa, was expelled. He went directly to Damascus, where he offered his service to Marwän. In Kûfa, this had the effect that Ibn Ziyäd’s deputy, cAmr b. Hurayth, was turned out as well. On the request of the Kufans, Ibn Zubayr appointed a new governor, cAbdalläh b. Yazîd, who arrived in 84/684.191 At this time, Sulaymän b. Çurad declared that the time was ripe, but announced that—due to the changed political conditions—they now, in l4S I.e. al-muhillün: “ O believers, profane not G od’s waymarks nor the holy m onth, neither the offspring, nor the necklaces, nor those repairing to the Holy House seeking from their Lord bounty and good pleasure.” (5:2) This meaning must be taken from the pre-Islamic designation of those tribes which, because they did not recognize the sanctity of Mecca or the sacred months and therefore stood outside the Meccan commercial alliance, were described as performing unlawful deeds. (Cf. M. J . K ister, ’Mecca and T amlm ’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, p. 141 ff.) 144 Tab. 11:507-8. 147 Bal. Ansab, V:204 fT.; Tab. 11:497 ff. 144 Bal. Ansab, V:204 ff.; T ab. 11:497 ff. 144 Bal. Ansab, V:206. 1M Bal. Ansab, V:205-6; Tab. 11:506-8; Ibn Ath. VI:47 ff. 1S1 Bal. Ansab, V:207.

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order to pursue their goal, had to head for the Djazlra and the real master-mind behind the slaying of Husayn and his followers. This was HJbaydalläh b. Ziyäd, who was there to set up forces for the reconquest of Iraq. However, this blatant change of policy met with such wide­ spread opposition that only 4.000 or 5.000 out of the 16.000 who had originally enlisted actually assembled at Nukhayla192 on the agreed date.193 Keeping near the Euphrates, they halted at T*ff> the place of Husayn’s grave where they abandoned themselves to expressing their grief. Thence they proceeded to cAyn al-W arda, where they met the 30.000 strong Syrian army under Ibn Ziyäd. After three days of fighting most of them including Sulaymän b. Çurad, had been killed. The men who had decided not to follow Ibn $urad were not to be left to themselves, for another champion of the cause of the malcontents had appeared on the scene, namely al-M ukhtâr b. Abî cUbayd ath-Thaqafi. He had arrived in Küfa with the aim of building up a new dissident movement from the Kufan qurrâ3 faction.194 He claimed to be a representative of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiya, who was the son of another spouse of CA1I than Fätima, and his endeavours were not without success, although it appears that the quarters in which he made his tabshir, his call for renewed action on the behalf of religion when he entered Kúfa, was pre-arranged.199 More important, however, is the fact that as these men represented the clans of Baddä3 and Hind of Kinda, as well as sections of the clan of Hamdän, al-M ukhtär’s initial backing probably came from there.196 Al-Mukhtär was bom in T ä3if in the first year of hidjra, A.D. 622. His father was Abu cUbayd Mascüd b. cAmr b. cUmayr b. cAwf from the tribe of Thaqlf who was slain in the battle of the Bridge in 13/634.197 AlMukhtär, who had accompanied his father to this batde, was then taken under protection of his uncle Sacd b. Mascüd ath-Thaqafi, who during cAll’s government was appointed governor in Madä’in. He spent his youth in Medina. Not much is known of his early life, and the informa­ tion we have does not provide us with an unambiguous picture. Thus, on the one hand, there is a story which relates that when Hasan b. CA1I b.*451 *** I.e. to the west or north of Küfa on the road to Syria (Tab. 1:3345). As Buwayb also is situated there, the above mentioned battle of Buwayb is also called the batde of Nukhayla. ,M Bal. Ansab, V:208-9; Tab. 11:540-2. 154 When al-M ukhtâr inquired about the situation and heard that there was a group of men who was on the look-out for a man who could rally them in support of their own cause, he is reported to have exclaimed: “ I am Abü Ishâq, I am, by God, I am in favour of them, and I shall gather them on the course of that which is right!” (Tab. 11:531). ,M See below, pp. 107 f. Tab. 11:509; Bal. Ansab, V:207; Ibn Ath. VI:54-5. ,w Tab. 1:2174 ff.; Bal. Ansab, V:214.

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Abi Tälib was carried wounded to M adä5in, al-M ukhtär advised his uncle to capture liasan and hand him over to Mucäwiya; but his uncle refused.158 On the other, he is reported to have served as deputy for his uncle, the governor, when he had to leave M adä’in in pursuit o f a Khardjite group.159 Moreover, he is said to have begun his political career when he was in the service of cA li.160 It is difficult to say whether this contradiction has to be ascribed to al-M ukhtär’s opportunistic character or to lack of other information, but it remains that in the following years his leanings varied from a simple anti-Umayyad posi­ tion, which he expressed in his support of Ibn Zubayr, to an attitude more similar to that of the oppositional forces in Küfa. Thus, for in­ stance, when the governor of Kûfa, Ziyâd b. Abïh, in 51/671 accused Hudjr b. cAdï of conspiracy against the Umayyad sovereign and demanded from the Kufan ashräf that they co-sign this accusation as witnesses, al-M ukhtär managed to avoid putting his name on the list.161 And nearly a decade later, in 60/679, when Muslim b. cAqH came to Kûfa on behalf of Husayn b. CA1I b. Abi Tälib, he found his first lodg­ ings in the house of al-M ukhtär,162 who, already at that time, must have acquired first-hand information on the recent plans for conspiracy against the local government as well as on the leading men behind the plans. After the downfall and death of Muslim al-M ukhtär, who appears not to have been present in Kûfa at the tim e,163 was taken to the gover­ nor and accused of having had a hand in that revolt. But as al-M ukhtär denied any part in it, cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd struck him in the eye with a stick and threw him into jail. There he remained until after the killing of Husayn had taken place, when he was released by the intercession of his brother-in-law cAbdallah b. cUmar b. al-Khaftab, but striedy ordered to leave the misr within three days.164 Leaving Kûfa al-M ukhtär headed for Mecca, where he went to see Ibn az-Zubayr, who was said to receive homage secredy but who would not disclose his intentions before he was strong enough.163 Then, sitting with him and his friends, al-M ukhtär spoke out: *»• Bal. Ansab, V:214; T ab. 11:2, 520. 159 Ad-Dinawarl, op. cit., p. 218; Tab. 1:3366. 180 Ad-Dinawarl, op. cit., pp. 118, 155, 220. >•« Tab. 11:134. It should be mentioned that there is another record of the same episode, but this does not contain any information of a refusal. (Tab. 11:740-48). 182 T ab. 11:237, 502; Bal. Ansab, V:214; Ibn Ath. V:56; ad-Dinawari, op. cit., p. 245. 189 Tab. 11:520-1; Yaqubi, Tarikh, 11:307; Bal. Ansab, V:214-5. 184 Tab. 11:522-3; Yaqubi, Tarikh, 11:307; Bal. Ansab, V:215-6; Ibn Ath. V:271. 185 Tab. 11:524.

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“ You shall not wait! Stretch out your hand and I will pay homage to you, and give us that which will please us.” 166 As it appears, however, nothing came out of this, and a little later alMukhtär left for T a3if, his native city, where he remained for a year.167 During that time he is not mentioned in the sources, and we can only surmise that he was considering the situation and its possibilities of entering the political scene. Then, a year later, during which Ibn azZubayr had made public his claims to be the new amir, al-M ukhtär sud­ denly appeared in Mecca. After some hesitation on al-M ukhtär’s part they met once more, and this time the result was a deal, in which it was stated that al-M ukhtär would recognize Ibn az-Zubayr’s claims on the condition that no decision would be made unless he had been consulted, and that he when he had overcome his adversaries, would be called upon to be assigned to affal camalika. 168 Having sided with Ibn az-Zubayr alMukhtär now stayed in Mecca, and when a Syrian army sent by Yazld laid siege to Mecca in 64/683 he fought bravely with both arms and words: And ibn Abt cUbayd, ibn M ascüd And ibn al-kurrdr Id 'l-furrdr, And ibn al-muqdimtn ghayr al-muhdjimin . . . 169

However, at the time of Yazld’s death in the same year the Syrian troops were withdrawn. In view of this situation and of the agreement between him and Ibn az-Zubayr, al-M ukhtär must have been full of expectations for a new assignment. But alas! probably because Ibn az-Zubayr did not have much confidence in him he was very much left to himself, and after some months, when he had realized that he had no future in Mecca, he left Ibn az-Zubayr and set out for Küfa. But before that decision he must have prepared himself thoroughly, for it is reported that he used to ask people who came from there about häl an-näs bi’l-Küfa wa-hay^atihim. It was during this activity when he heard that a group of Kufans were waiting for a man who would rally them in support of their cause, that he announced "himself as that m an.170 When he arrived in Kûfa in Ramadän/May 64/684, he saluted everyone he met. He took up their old*• •** Tab. 11:526. Loc. cit.; Bal. Ansab, V:216; Ibn Ath. V:274. “ • Tab. 11:527-8; Bal. Ansab, V:216-7; Ibn Ath. V:276-7. '•» Tab. 11:528; Bal. Ansab, V:217. 179 Tab. 11:528-31; Bal. Ansab, V:217. According to another report, however, al-M ukhtär is said to have left for Kûfa with the permission of Ibn az-Zubayr after al-M ukhtär had informed him that there were groups of people in Küfa which were on the look-out for a leader and that, if he could occupy this vacant position, he might be able to influence them to go against the Syrians (Bal. An­ sab, V:271-2; Al-Mascüdl, Murûdj adh-dhahab, vol. V, pp. 170-1).

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complaints, although making them fît his own frame of dacwa a n d political aspirations, and promised them success and prosperity.171 A t a gathering in al-M ukhtär’s house the same evening, he was told th a t many had joined Sulaymân b. Çurad, a fact which al-M ukhtär m ust have known from his inquiries before his departure. Then al-M ukhtär announced that: “ al-M ahdî b. al-Waçî (trustee), Muhammad b. CA1T, has sent me to you as his confidant (amin), helper ( waztr), elected (muntakhab), and commander (amir), and charged me with the task of fighting the perpetrators o f pro­ fanation (m ulhidün),172*and to seek to avenge the blood from the fam ily o f his house, and to defend the weak (fhicafey) .>U13

It is fairly reasonable to assume that these designations and his assignment in Küfa were al-M ukhtär’s own invention. As a m atter of fact, the only trace of relationship between him and Muhammad b. al­ i i anafiya is a letter which al-Mukhtär allegedly sent to him after a similar one had been sent to CA1I b. al-Husayn. In this letter al-M ukhtär had offered CA1I his bayca for a joint cause and also sent him a sum of money. CA1I, however, had refused, and called him a liar. Then followed—if we are to trust our source—the letter to M uhammad wherein he repeated his offer. But before Muhammad had time to res­ pond, CA1I turned up and strongly urged him to follow his example. Upon the advice of Ibn cAbbas, however, who warned him about the reaction from Ibn az-Zubayr, Muhammad decided to pass over the cayb al-Mukhtär in silence.174 The exact time for the writing of these letters is not quite clear, but considering the context, one may assume that the letters were written to create an alternative base for al-M ukhtär’s own aspirations, and possibly—at this stage—some more precise plans for how to deal with the future policy when Ibn az-Zubayr appears not to have wanted to go along with him. But of course, this does not exclude the possibility that al-M ukhtär had been in touch with either of the two, or for that matter only Ibn Hanafîya, at an earlier date—for instance during al-M ukhtär’s year in T a3if, as has been presumed by van Gelder.175 Still, with Sulaymân b. Çurad as the acknowledged leader, it was dif­ ficult for al-M ukhtär to get the support hë needed. He nevertheless went on with his dacwa, setting the position of Ibn Çurad up against his mis­ sion from al-mahdï Muhammad b. CA1I b. al-Hanafiya, as well as poin­ *« Tab. 11:532-3; Bal. Ansab, V:217. 172 In Bal. Ansab, V:218 we have wa-amarant bi-qitäl al-muhilltn. Tab. 11:535. •7* Bal. Ansab, V:272. 175 H. D. van Gelder, Afufrtär de valsche Propheet, p. 29.

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ting to the practical consequences of being led by a man who was without any experience in art of war and would therefore risk to kill both himself and them .176 It is hard to say whether these arguments were convincing or not, but it remains that when Sulaymän b. $urad finally decided to leave Küfa, and assemble an army in the camp at Nukhayla, only four thousand followed. However, what appears likely is that many of those who had decided to stay home were in disagreement with his strategy of going after Ibn az-Ziyäd without punishing the actual participants, such as cU m ar b. Sacd b. Abi Waqqä?.177 After the departure of Ibn §urad and his following the Kufan ashräj\ alarmed by the activities of al-M ukhtär, were able to convince the governor of Küfa, cAbdallah b. Yazld al-Khapnl, who had been ap­ pointed by Ibn az-Zubayr and had arrived there just after al-M ukhtär, that the Thaqafite’s plans were far more dangerous than those of Ibn §urad—for Sulaymän ibn $uradyurîd qitàl aïdàHkumà wa-inna ’l-M ukhtâryurïd al-wuthüb bikumä f i mifrikumâ, 178

and therefore had to be put behind bars. Having been seized and im­ prisoned, al-M ukhtär did not give up, but infatigably continued his ef­ forts to win support. After the defeat at cAyn al-Warda these endeavours were extended to also include the act of receving bayca. This can be seen from a letter which al-M ukhtär wrote the survivors of the companions of Ibn §urad when they returned to Küfa. It began by praising their courageous deed. But, wrote al-M ukhtär, although Ibn $urad had done what he did, he had not been their man, for that was himself, the com­ mander Im d agent, the champion and avenger. Then he asked them to rejoice and prepare themselves, for if he were released he would draw his sword wherever their enemy might be.179 At the same time a group of five men were speaking for him and receiving homage from people on his behalf.160 174 Bal. Ansab, V:218; Tab. 11:509-10. 177 Bal. Ansab, V:209. ,7< Bal. Ansab, V:218; Tab. 11:535. T ab. 11:569, 598-9. iso T heir names were as-Sa*ib b. M alik al-Ashcarï, Yazld b. Anas, Afimar b. Shumayt, R ifa'a b. Shaddâd al-Fityânï and cAbdallah b. Shaddâd al-Djushaml (Tab. 11:601). In this context it should furtherm ore be mentioned—as other scholars have done earlier—that there are indications that there was a strong element of Yemenites among the early supporters of al-M ukhtär. Likewise, the ‘committee of five’ through which alM ukhtär appears to have conducted his activities, also belonged to Yemeni tribes (Khal. Tabaqat, pp. 152-3; T ab. 11:601). O n the other hand, ad-Dlnawari mentions that the South Arabian tribe of Hamdän and the al-hamrä*, Persians who had setded in Küfa, were the groups which contributed the highest numbers of supporters (ad-Dlnawari, op. cit., p. 296).

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After a while, al-M ukhtär had obviously had enough of his im­ prisonment, for he wrote to his brother-in-law cAbdallah b. cU m ar b. al-Khaftab and asked him to plead his case with the government. A b ­ dallah did so, and through his oath and the guarantee of ten a sh rä f maW öfin al-M ukhtär was set free. But before A bdallah b. Yazld and his collector of kharädj, Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. Talha, let him go, they made him swear—in the name of the One God, His might and m er­ cy—that he would not engage himself against the two as long as they were in power; the fíne for a breach of his oath would be 1.000 badana, camels particularly fattened for sacrificial purposes, and the release of all his slaves, men and women alike.1,1 During the time of al-M ukhtar’s detention, an intense and extensive recruitment to the A lid cause must have taken place, for as soon as he was set free, a large number of Kufans paid homage to him. Alarmed by this development, Ibn az-Zubayr decided to strengthen his control over its inhabitants, and assigned A bdallah b. MutI* with the combined of­ fices of governor and collector of the kharädj.1*2 Ibn MufT arrived in Kúfa in Ramadan 65/April 685. Shortly afterwards the governor entered the m inbar, and there he spelled out the conditions under which they could expect to live. He had, he said, been appointed over the m isr, thughür and the collection of their fa y 2, the revenues; but as a concession to what the Kufans had claimed as their rights he did not intend to remove their surplus, f a f l , of these revenues, except when they agreed to it. He also maintained the necessity of acting in accordance with the w a fïya , the instruction, as it had been laid down by cUmar b. al-Khaftäb and cUthman b. A ffan. To this invitation to a political programme of reconciliation was however added the warning to keep in line and to keep an eye on ‘the little stupid ones among them’, the sufahä 2 For if not, he would surely know how to deal with any kind of opposition, including to correct defection and deviation among what he termed ‘the doubting wry-faced’, a l-a fcar al-m urtäb. The response to this address was not long in coming, for immediately one as-Sa3ib b. Malik al-Ashcarï, an old supporter of al-M ukhtär stood up and declared: “ Concerning the instruction of Ibn az-Zubayr that you shall remove the surplus ifa fl) o f our fa y 2on ly if we consent, we call upon you as a witness to the fact that we shall not agree to your removal of the surplus of ourfa y 2, for it shall be devided only among us. And furthermore: there will be no pro­ ceedings according to our own points o f view, but to the stra of CA1I b. Ab! Tälib as he acted in these matters in this our country, until he died—may the mercy of God be upon him. There is no need for us to have the stra of »•* Tab. 11:600; Bal. Ansab, V:219. •« Tab. 11:602; Bal. Ansab, V:220; Ibn Ath. VI:87.

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cUthmân applied on ourJay3as well as on ourselves. For this (stra) was only /set into operation/ due to selfishness and /personal/ desire. There is no need for the stra of cUmar b. al-Khaftab for our Jay3, although of the two it is to us the lesser evil.*’189

T he significanse of these lines is obvious. To the economical and political discontent which had earlier been the base and incentive for the qurra3 movement was added yet another layer of arguments which, in close connection with those of religion, were concerned with choosing a stra, a proper frame for the governing principles in the society. D uring the cource of this discussion, however, Ibn Mufl* must have realized that the support behind these points was considerable, and therefore, when as-Sa’ib had finished his speech, he added “ Our behaviour toward you shall only be by means o f that which you will like and desire.“ 1*4

Althought this statement may have had a quieting effect on many Kufans, it had no impact on the party behind al-M ukhtär, which stuck to the previous dacwa practice of calling for the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet, to which they added the avenging of the blood of the family of the house of the Prophet and the pleading of the weak. This list was—at regular intervals and on different occasions—repeated again and again,189 so that, at the time when al-Mukhtär and his companions had succeeded in defeating Ibn Muti* and the ashräj, it seems to have become an integrated part of the oath of allegiance itself: “ Praise belongs to God, H e who has promised His friend victory, walïyahü an-nafr, And promised H is enemy defeat, cadüwwahü al-khasr And appointed him into this condition for ever, ilä äkhiri ad-dahr as a promise given, wacdan m ajcülan, and a decree decreed, qaçlâ3an maqjxyan, Certainly, he who invents lies, falls into destitution. T o us has been raised a banner, räyah, T o us has been spread out a standard, ghäyah, About the räyah, it has been said to us: hold it upright and don’t put it down, irjacühä wa-lä taja^ühä, And about the ghäyah: hasten to it and don’t aggress against it, idjrü ilayhä wa-lä taHadühä. 186 For we have heard the call of the caller, dacwat ad-däH, and the urging of the shepherd, ihäbat ar-rä% How many a man and woman messenger of death, näcin wa-näHyah, a killed in the dug front-ditch, al-wäghiyah.*1845 »“ 184 185 »«

Tab. 11:603; Cf. Bal. Ansab, V :220-l; Ibn Ath. VI:88. Bal. Ansab, V:221. For instance, in Tab. 11:606, 609, 613. Cf. Koran 2:190 (186).

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So away with those who are refractory, faghä,1*1 who change the truth into lie, kadhdhaba, and who turn the back to it, tawallä. Verily, come here, O People, And swear a homage o f guidance, baycat hadan, And by Him who has created heaven as a roof sewed together, saqfan m alfiqan, And the earth’s ravines to paths, fidjädjan subulan. 188 For you, after paying homage to the amir al-mubnintn CA1I and his fam ily, have not given a homage which is more rightly guided, ahdä, than it. And the people paid homage to him according to the Book o f God, the sunna of His prophet, the avenging o f the blood of the ahl al-bayt, the battle, al-djihäd, against the muhillün and the sheltering o f the weak” .1'9

As their activity continued to increase, the seriousness of the situation must soon have become clear to the local authorities, and when the chief-of-police, Iyäs b. Muçlârib al-cldjll, informed Ibn MutI* that the news had reached him that al-M ukhtär was about to deploy all his forces in an endeavour to take the mifr, the governor decided—upon Ibn M utjärib’s advice—to imprison him. But since, under the prevailing circumstances, they did not want to take any chances, it was agreed that the governor should request the presence of al-M ukhtär in order to discuss matters of mutual interest. Two men were then sent to convey him this message, and al-M ukhtär seems to have agreed to go with them to the governor. But just as he was preparing himself to go, one of the two, Zä3ida b. Qudäma—a kinsman and allegedly a supporter of alM ukhtär—is reported to have warned him of the trick by reciting a verse from the Koran: “ And when the unbelievers were devising against thee, to confine thee, or slay thee, or to expel thee, and were devising, and God was devising; and God is the best of devisers.” 190 *

Al-Mukhtär took the point, immediately sat down, told the two messengers that due to a strong fever he was unable to comply with the request, and the two men left to inform Ibn Mut!*.191 Al-Mukhtär he had all the time been eagerly occupied with the kind of preparations which he saw fit and within the reach of being accomplished for the uprising against the governor and the men on his side. An im1(7 Cf. Koran 20:43 (45), 48 (50) and Paret’s Commentary and References. 199 Cf. Koran 21:31*32 (32*33). Instead of malfüq the Koran has mahfûf, ‘well* protected’. Cf. Tabari, makfüf, ‘cupped (with the hand)’. See further Koran 7:20 (19) and Paret’s Commentary to these verses. 109 Bal. Ansab, V:228; see also Tab. 11:632. 190 Koran 8:30. 191 Tab. 11:604; Ibn Ath. IV:89-90.

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p o rta n t move in this direction was, without doubt, his success in gaining th e support of Ibrahim b. al-Ashtar—son of the prominent qurräH Mälik b . al-A shtar—who with his large following seems to have been regarded as alm ost indispensable, if the revolt was to have a reasonable chance of success.192 According to the same sources, however, Ibrâhîm, who like h is father had been on cAll’s side at $ifim, but afterwards appears to h av e refrained from participating in any kind of opposition, had not show n much interest in joining al-M ukhtär and his associates. It was o n ly after considerable pressure, the mainspring of which was an alleged le tte r from Muhammad b. al-Hanafiya to Ibrahim, in which he was in­ sistently asked to join al-M ukhtär, that Ibrâhîm gave in and swore him allegiance.193 This picture of Ibrâhîm, which in our context is par­ ticularly well illustrated by his disengagement from Ibn $urad’s move­ m e n t, or his alleged importance in providing the needed manpower, can n o t—in our opinion—be considered complete. The point is rather, we think, that Ibrâhîm did not went to engage himself in some arbitrary factionalism , and would resume his former role only if there were clear sig n s of the emerging of a new overall alliance of opposition, not unlike th e one which had existed during cAlï’s reign. The consequences of lack­ in g such a broadly based coalition are clearly indicated by the case of Ibn § u rad . This may also be the reason why al-M ukhtär wanted Ibrâhîm to be on his side. Ibrâhîm was important not only as a commander with a considerable following, but also as a man of great prestige and in­ fluences; if he could be persuaded to join, al-M ukhtär could expect other opponents of Ibn Mutî* who did not belong to his group, to follow his example. Thus, it is reported that only after that a deputation of men, each of whom was said to represent the sadäi al-qurrä5 wa-mashyakhat al-m ifr wa-ßirsän al-carabi94

h ad come to him to ask for his support, Ibn al-Ashtar changed his mind. However, he did so only on the condition that they would entrust him w ith the command. This demand was impossible to satisfy, since the command had been already conferred upon al-M ukhtär. But alM ukhtär, upon hearing Ibrahim ’s terms, seems to have got the response he wanted, for soon afterwards he responded with a letter which once more bore the signature of Muhammad b. al-Hanafïya al-Mahdl, in which it was stated that if Ibrâhîm sided with al-M ukhtär and his group, ,M Tab. 11:609; Bal. Ansab, V:222. m Tab. 11:612; Bal. Ansab, V:223. Tab. 11:612. Among the members of the delegation, those mentioned are: YazTd b. Anas al-Asadl, Afemar b. Shumayt (or Shamlt) al-Afemasî, M alik b. cAmr an-N ahdl, cAbdallah b. Kamil (Tab. 11:612-3).

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he would have the command of the cavalry and the expeditionary force, and all the lands situated between Kúfa and Syria.199 Having read the letter, Ibrâhîm appears to have been in doubt whether or not the letter was genuine, but after those among the qurrä0 who had previously beseeched him his support, had testified to its authenticity, he accepted the letter and its contents, and gave al-M ukhtär his bayca. 196 The movement which now emerged can therefore, broadly speaking, be said to have been made up of two factions. On the one hand, there was the hard core of seasoned activists, at the time gathered around the strategy and personage of al-Mukhtär. On the other, there were those who—for whatever reason—had decided to make common cause with the hard core. The arguments used to convince potential supporters may frequently have been those which were employed by the men in the deputation, who when pleading to win the support of Ibrâhîm b. alAshtar reminded Ibrâhîm of the time when his father was sayyid an-näs, and the cause for which he had fought and finally died, and that the out­ come of the planned struggle would, if he chose to participate, decide whether or not he was to resume the former status of his father among the people,197 not to mention the f afila, accorded to him, if he put himself behind the movement’s dacwa and waztr.198 Accepting these points, we may finally add that trying to ascertain whether the letters from Muhammad b. al-Hanafiya to Ibrâhîm were falsifications—as implied by our sources, and more explicidy by scholars in the West—is inconsequential.199 Rather, the letters should be viewed in their historical context, as a practical and quick response to the need that had arisen of providing Ibrâhîm with a means of defining the condi­ tions for his participation. Just before the date on which the revolt against Ibn Mufî* and his men was to break out, i.e. the 14th of Rabí* al-Awwal, 66/19th of October, 685, Iyäs b. M udärib, the head of Ibn M u ff’s police force, conveyed to the governor the information that al-M ukhtär was about to rise against them .200 Since he did not know the exact date Iyäs responded im­ mediately, and as a first precautionary he sent his son Räshid to a place called Kunäsa, while he and his men began to circulate around the sûq. When Ibn Mutf* learnt of these activities he advised Iyäs to instruct the * >»* Tab. 11:610; Bal. Ansab, V:222. 190 Tab. 11:611-2; Bal. Ansab, V:222-3. **7 Tab. 11:610. '*» Tab. 11:611; Bal. Ansab, V:222-3. As for waztr, ‘helper’, see below, pp. 127 f. IM A good example of this approach is found in D .S. M argoliouth, ‘On M ahdis and M ahdism’, Proceedings of the British Academy (1915-16). «» Tab. 11:613; Bal. Ansab, V:223; Ibn Ath. VI:99.

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trustworthy tribal leaders to betake themselves to their tribal meetingplaces, the so-called djabbänät, in order to act on any unrest that might arise. The djabbänät mentioned in this connection were those belonging to as-SabîS Bishr b. Rabl^at al-Khathcamî, Kinda, Sälim, M urad,201 and Çâ^idiyùn. Also the other public places, the süq> the mosque and the castle were mentioned to have been under the surveillance of Iyäs b. Muçlârib and his corps of police.202 It may be added that these 201 For the specific locations, see the map below. 202 Tab. 11:614; Bal. Ansab, V:224; Ibn Ath. VI:99-100. Djabbänat as-Sabï*, also called djabbänat Hashshâshln, belonged to as-SablS who were a branch of Häshid, a subclan to the Yemeni tribe of Hamdän. Djabbänat Bishr, named after one who is said to have been present at Qädislya, was for the tribe of Tayyi*. Djabbänat Kinda contained members of the tribes of Kinda and Rabl*a; djabbänat Sälim, named after a prominent Kufan, Sälim b . cAmmär, contained tribesmen from the tribal group of Qays, cAmir b. §ac$aca, while djabbänat Muräd, i.e. Murad b. Malik, a tribe belonging to the Yemeni stock of Madhhidj of course belonged to that group; djabbänat a$-$a*idiyin was for the tribe of Asad. Finally, it ought to be added that these djabbänät were not the only ones in the mifr, but perhaps those where the oppositional elements were most likely to be found. For a better comprehension of the Kufan surrounding, we have added a map taken

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djabbänät—more commonly known to be the places used for tribal cemetaries—being nothing but flat open spaces were used not only as places of assembly, but also for rallying and mustering soldiers.203 So, when the tribal leaders left their houses in central Kufa to visit the sur­ rounding tribal lands, selecting some to the exclusion of others, they probably did so in order to concentrate on those quarters where the scheduled revolt was most likely to And the strongest support. But on the evening of Tuesday, the 12th of Rabí* al-Awwal—two days before al-M ukhtär and Ibrahim had agreed to stage the revolt—the coup accidentally got out of hand. That evening Ibrahim and a large band of people, all carrying weapons concealed under their clothes, where on their way to al-M ukhtär’s house, when they met Iyâs b. Muçlârib ac­ companied by his shurat. Iyäs immediately demanded that Ibrâhîm should come with him to the governor. After some discussion Ibrahim suddenly had a spear in his hand, and stabbed Ibn Muçlârib to death. The crowd immediately dispersed, while Ibrâhîm and his companions continued to al-M ukhtär’s house, informed him about the incident, and urged him immediately to proclaim the beginning of the revolt; and so he did.204 Thus, when the sun rose the following day, al-M ukhtär and his followers were ready to meet the enemy, and had taken their positions near the monastry of Hind in the Sabakha.209 Ibrâhîm, on his side, had been out all night to gather as many men and horses as he could, in order to have sufficient forces to match the governor’s men from the djabbänät. This was apparendy easy, for the following day Ibrâhîm was able to defeat the forces which had been dispatched against him. Indeed, so complete was his victory that he could leave his position and come to alM ukhtär’s assistance. Al-M ukhtär’s forces were hard pressed by the men of Shabath b. Ribcî at-Tamîmî, who had been stationed in the Sabakha proper at the same time as the djabbänät were approached by men loyal to Ibn Mud*. Together they were able to put Shabath’s force to flight. It seems fairly evident that at this point the main supporters of Ibn Mud*, the shurafi?, must have realized the loss of the areas surrounfrom L. Massignon, ‘Explication du Plan de Küfa (Irak)’, of the mifr as it was between the 7th and 9th centuries of the Christian Era. Some 500 years later, when Küfa was a deserted and ruined city, the geographer Ibn Djubayr of Granada, who visited the place between 578/1182 and 581/1185, speaks of its djabbänät as if there had been no more than one, on which the tomb of al-Mukhtär had been repaired and a cupola erected. (Ibn Djubayr, Rihla, pp. 187, 188). 2#s L. Massignon, ‘Explication du Plan de Küfa (Irak)', p. 347; H. Djait, 'Les Yam an ites à Küfa au Ier siècle de l'Hégire*, pp. 176-7. ** Bal. Ansab, V:225; Tab. 11:615-6; Ibn Ath. VI: 102. 205 See the map above.

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ding the djabbänät, for after these confrontations they withdrew to their own quarters in the centre, where the fighting continued.206702But here too the forces of al-M ukhtär and Ibrâhîm were victorious, and finally Ibn MutI* and many among the ashräf took refuge in the qafr, where they were besieged for three days. But on the evening of the third day, when Ibn Mutl* had slipped away and succeeded in finding a hiding-place in the house of Abü Müsâ al-Ashcarî, the tribal leaders indicated that they were ready to ask for aman.207 When this was granted them, they made their bayca to al-M ukhtär, the contents of which was identical with the earlier dacäwt slogans: their doctrine was the Book of God and the sunna of the Prophet, their task to revenge the blood of Muhammad’s family, to wage war against the mufiiUün, to defend the weak and to fight those who would fight him and accept those who had made peace with him .208 But if the batde had been won, the tension between the tribal leaders and the new masters of the misr did not cease. At first, al-M ukhtär tried to follow the practice of hilm by carefully appointing some of the ashräfto posts of importance.209 Another part of this policy was his omission to realize that cardinal point in his dacwa which had proclaimed revenge on the slayers of Husayn and his following at Karbala5; many among them belonged to the ashräf This situation did not last long, for once Ibrâhîm b. al-Ashtar had left Kûfa at the head of an army to march against the forces led by cUbaydalläh b. Ziyäd, the ashräf rose against al-M ukhtär. However, Ibrâhîm was not further away than that, when the news of what was going on in Kûfa reached him, he could hasten back to alM ukhtär’s rescue. The revolt was crushed, and with it the lenient policy toward the ashräf\ who were subjected to harsh reprisals. Many were killed, and their houses razed to the ground. Yet many of the ashräf suc­ ceeded in escaping to Muçcab b. az-Zubayr in Baçra. O n the 14th Ramadän 67/3rd April 687, after his men had been defeated at M adhär on the Tigris and later at H arürä5, al-M ukhtär was killed by forces under the leadership of Mu$cab and tribal leaders from Baçra and Kûfa. 5. Conclusion There can be no doubt that the revolt in Kûfa under the leadership of al-M ukhtär and Ibrâhîm b. al-Ashtar was planned in co-operation with a 202 I.e. in the afwäh as-sikak and sikak al-umara*. For this development, compare Tab. 11:617 with Tab. 11:626, Bal. Ansab, V:225 and Ibn Ath. VI: 108. 207 Tab. 11:617 ff.; Bal. Ansab, V:226 f.; Ibn Ath. VI:103 ff. 202 Tab. 11:633; Bal. Ansab, V:228; Ibn Ath. VI: 115. 20* Tab. 11:634-5; Bal. Ansab, V:229.

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qurrä* nucleus. With them were also other groups of malcontents, whose support had been won through their politico-religious dacäwi activism. This is particularly evident from the statement by Ibn Mufl* after he and the ashräf had been defeated, when he claimed that their loss of power could only be attributed to the abject and base people in their own followings: arädhilukum wa-sufahähikum wa-faghämukum wa-akhissä*ukum.210 In our view that this activism had its origin in what we have called M uhammad’s action programme. Having as its first tenet the message of the Coming of the End with the inescapable punishment and reward, this preaching was soon adopted to the existing social and political situa­ tion by anticipating the course of these events. As one instance of this kind we have mentioned how the notion of the final punishment of all unbelievers, al-kuffar, and the other enemies of God was transformed into an immediate battle, in which those who believed were called to stand up on His behalf to crush all the abhorrent and aberrant. The eschatological convictions, the waiting for the signs of His manifestations were replaced by action by the community members themselves as a kind of prelude to the actual appearance of these events, thereby making the predicted future accessible in their own lifetime. Among the other terms in this respect we have mentioned the concepts of al-umma and reward, a major function of which was to re-group those tribesmen who were the first and most eager to side and fight with Muhammad against the declared adversaries, taking a chance on his promises of land and livelihood in abundance. Accompanying this policy there was a continuous flow of admonitory phrases, hammering the leitmotivs for present action and future expectations for social and economic benefits. At a later stage, when a wide body politic had been formed, applicable to some kind of federation among groups of tribesmen, this principle became the decisive impetus for the mobilization and subsequent conquest of lands in the north. Following this stage, when a large number of tribesmen had come out in support, securing indisputable gains or at least having them within their immediate reach, the ideo-religious promises of the action programme might well have been forgotten. This was all the more likely as the social contract had still a shallow and unfounded base. However, through some sort of political flair the new leadership in Medina seems not to have been unaware of the problem. This can be seen as early as during the wars of ridda, when there was an endeavour to adapt much of the former dacäwt ideology to the new political situation: evil, «• Tab. 11:631; Ibn Ath. VI: 111-2.

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ungodliness and the like were personified in the term murtoddün, the in­ surgents against Muhammad’s Medina alliance, in distinction to all those who had sided with Medina and remained faithful both to M uhammad and after his death to his afhäb. That this adaptation of the activist precepts from the Koran into prac­ tical guiding-lines during the time of the campaigns was successful is sufficiently supported by our sources. Accordingly, the murtoddün were refused participation in the campaigns which followed, and although this ban was later annulled by cUmar, they were—at least in prin­ ciple—never to assume any commands. On the other hand, the tribesmen who had been among the faithful supporters fulfilling the various activist requirements mentioned above, as well as those who had proven themselves loyal during the political crises subsequent to M uhammad’s death, played prominent parts. At the time of the foun­ ding of Kûfa, this policy was further strengthened by being built into a more comprehensive system established for the distribution of the pen­ sions, aHiya. By means of a register, dxwän, each recipient was placed in one of the three categories of sawäbiq, or seniority. If the man in question belonged to the anfär or the muhädjirün, he was to receive between 3.000 and 5.000 dirhams; if he had been among the ahl al-ayyäm, the tribesmen involved in the operations preceding the major battles, he was granted 3.000 dirhams; while those who came afterwards but soon enough to take part in the battles, would receive less, 2.000 dirhams. To this class belonged also all those who hade come during the time which followed after these battles, and they could expect—depending on how early they had in fact arrived—to receive between 200 and 1.500 dirhams. In Iraq, this pension was supplemented by the so-called /ayMand, i.e. lands which had been allotted to the initial conquerors. For reasons given above, the ahl al-fay5 decided not to settle there, but to consider these lands *a mortmain for themselves’, and instead put reliable men in charge of them. A major point in this thesis is that among those who followed M uhammad’s exhortations to battle for a due reward, many came from marginal and insignificant tribal sections. During the wars of the ridda and the subsequent raids into Iraqi territory, this development ap­ parently continued. When these men chose to affiliate themselves with the new religion, i.e. the umma-group around Muhammad, they must have hoped for prospects far more advantageous than their previous situation. As members of a new and different political organism they also had an opportunity to improve their tribal status. In the case of Kûfa, this quest of position and rights is well demonstrated by two groups which both had political aspirations. One was the group of tribal leaders,

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the shurafip, who, as things were getting back to normal, tried to recover their traditional authority and influence in public affairs. The other in ­ cluded men whose qualifications were merit and rank in the new m ove­ ment, the ahl al-ayyäm who were later absorbed into the ahl al-Qâdisïyn, who had settled within the Kufan territory, but without strong tribal ties. The confrontation of tribal leaders with a group of tribesmen possessing privileges without tribal references, appears not to have been co­ incidental, for both Muhammad and the men after him had bitter ex ­ periences in the often short-sighted perspectives and self-interests of th e shuraja\ The underlying principle in dealing with the tribal leaders m ust therefore have been to try to keep their followings under control: they should never suffer damage or have reasons to be aggrieved, nor should they be given the opportunity to establish a power-base of their own. In Kùfa such countermeasures were noticeable immediately after th e settling. In order to balance the influence of the tribal leaders a corps o f civil servants was raised from men committed to tajuiluf and possessing säbiqa. Relevant names in this context are cAmmär b. Yäsir and A b ­ dallah b. Mascüd. Then there were the early-comers with their special benefits, granted and well protected. Typical of this period is also the presence of such prominent d a n leaders and their followings as had been among the murtaddün and were consequently shut off from any significant position, and of a growing number of late-comers who had been left with small stipends. However, at the time of the batde of Nihäwand (21/642), these dans and discontented rawädij were considered so dangerous that the sanctions against the former ridda leaders began to disappear. This development continued during the governments of cUthman and M ucäwlya; thus it was not long before the tribal leadership had—generally speak­ ing—regained its former position. Parallel with this development was the endeavour to establish a central authority on local matters. According to this policy, the governor should be able to interfere with proceedings relating for instance, to the local bayt al-mäl. This was what cU thm an’s brother tried to do as governor in Küfa, when he began to distribute small sums of money to people who according to the register were not eligible to receive these pensions. Following these events, we may observe a division within the body of ahl as-säbiqa wa’l-qudma. On the one hand, there were those who, having a proper tribal descent, chose to be included in and represented by the kinship groups. On the other, there were those who were convinced that, since their insignificant tribal standing gave them little or no influence at all in the community, the interests connected with their privileges could not be properly attended to. However, at this stage, their opposition

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seems to have been neither deeply rooted nor broadly accepted. Among those who may have decided to stay on, were people who from a prin­ cipal point of view did not want to give in to the shurafi?, or who, for ideo-political reasons, objected to any deviation from the action pro­ gramme which Muhammad had worked out in their presence. Having no other means, these Kufans protected themselves and their alleged rights with the only arguments available: their service to the Prophet and his cause in this world, and his promises and rewards in this matter. And as the gap to those in power increased, a revival of the Koranic phraseology of appeal emerged. Although this dacwa activism—as we have called it—was at first quite rudimentary, it soon found its form and was then brought forward with increasing force. Indeed, framed by an extensive political theology, it was later to be known under the general appellation of Shicism. In view of what has been said above, it is our contention that the ap­ pearance of the mahdï epithet belongs to the first stratum of this political theology, wellfoimded in M uhammad's own action programme and developed in line with other dacwa concepts. Throughout this thesis we have pointed out some of the contexts in which the dacwa terminology is particularly striking. For instance, in one of al-M ukhtär’s calls which was formulated while he was in prison and addressed to one of the home-comers from cAyn al-W arda, Rifaca b. Shaddâd, there is a long row of epithets, each of which has its indispensible place in a remodelled action programme. Broadly speaking, they may be said to belong to either of two kinds: authority conferred by selection and delegation, or execution of the predicted punishment and the maintenance of what had been revealed as the will of God. Thus, alM ukhtär announced that he was the appointed commander, al-amir alma^mür, the reliable agent, al-amïn al-ma^mün, and the commander of the forces, al-amtr al-djaysh, who would fight the tyrants, qàiil al-djabbàrïn, take revenge on the enemies of religion, al-muniaqim min atda* ad-dxn, and allow retaliation on the band of wrong-doers, al-muqid min al-awtär, so that they all could gather to seek the blood of ahl al-bayt, defend the weak and fight the violaters, djihäd al-muhilltn.2n In other more recitative ut­ terances, this action programme was supplemented with predictions for the future, the main points of which were that the tribal leaders were to be put on trial and the fair allocation of the m il resumed.212 As the basis for these a-concepts we have indicated the action programme set in motion by Muhammad. Because of their inability of the low status first-comers to mount an open opposition these concepts ■“ Tab. 11:569. «“ Bal. Ansab, V:235-6; Ibn Ath. V:273-*, VI: 113-4.

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slowly developed into the main weapon of protest for them as well as for other malcontents. Having found their means against the political power, the qurrä5and those who followed them soon found themselves in a pressing situation, the result of which was that their dafâwî argum ents underwent some radical changes. The aim was no longer to influence th e government to change its policy, but to challenge its very right to pow er and authority. A temporary culmination in this respect was th e assassination of cUthman. With the rise of CA1I, new and invaluable in ­ gredients were added to the arguments. Two of these are particularly striking. Having built his leadership on the support of the qurrä5and the like-minded, CA1I deliberately seeks to assume roles which would corres­ pond to their arguments of the Mohammedan religion. For instance, his dealings with the defeated party after the Batde of the Camel have been compared to M uhammad's policy after the conquest of Mecca.21* A nd when the people who had been engaged in the killing of cUthman, o r their supporters, sought to justify the m urder with the argument that they were fighting the evil and eschewing all compromises, CA1!—pro­ bably hesitantly—followed suit. This is a particularly evident from both the Battle of the Camel and the waqcat Sijfin. Soon their enemies were his enemies and vice versa. As a matter of fact these events no doubt m ark the beginning of the post-Mohammedan notion of the model leadership, which in the beginning was termed sirat cAlï. And as in the Koranic days, the right and obligation to fight under the leader of the community are stressed. It is in our view that among these dacäwt concepts, employed with the particular task of identifying the Medinan action program with the situation at hand, is the Mahdist argument. Thus, the employment of the term mahdx was not motivated by a desire to bring a religious flavour to the movement, but came into being as yet another dacäwi argument, carefully selected among similar expressions in the Koranic phraseologi. That this is the case becomes fairly evident when we consider the place and function which the various aspects of 'guidance’ were given in Muhammad’s preaching. From the very beginning of M uhammad’s prophetic activity there must have been a strong conviction in his mind that he was being guid­ ed. According to H arris Birkeland,* 214 at least, who in his studies of a number of the oldest suras in the Koran held that «» Bal. MS, 1:363. 214 H. Birkeland, The Lori Guideth, Oslo 1956. Previously it had been suggested that the paramount thought of this period had been the idea of the imminent Judgement with God as the sole Judge (C. Snouck Hurgronje, Versprtide Geschäften, Vol. I, p. 203); as well as that of the One God besides whom no others exist (R. Bell in e.g. The Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment, p. 72).

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“The experience which became decisive for Muhammed’s whole future activity must have been the recognition of God’s merciful guidance in the life of himself and his people, that means in history.’’219 For, Birkeland continues, before God could have been conceived as the Judge, he had to be a reality, detached from Muhammad’s previous ex­ perience of the divine power as a historic force. Indeed, so distant from the practice of Arab paganism was the experience of this god that in the beginning Muhammad was not quite sure what to call the divine power which he had met, and therefore the god was referred to as rabb, followed by a suffix or genitive. Consequendy, rabb is not a proper name, and has probably been taken to give “ expression to the idea of a personal-historical master or ruler as opposed to local or mythical, more or less physically determined, supernatural powers, living in stones, trees, wells, or to celestial bodies.’’* 216 And similarly, while the pagan Arabs were able to conceive of divine forces only as fate, luck, or human skill and ability, Muhammad saw his god as the Lord who ruled history and guided men: He guided the Quraysh in their resistance toward the Abyssinian expedition in the north (sura 105), as He has—until Muhammad’s own time—provided them with food against hunger and made them secure against fear (sura 106); and He guided Muhammad so as to make the poor orphan rich and to give him ‘abundance’ (suras 93, 94 and 108). In this perspective, it was only natural that in the subsequent developement Muhammad made sure to point out that in the past this ‘personal-historical’ master had made himself known through similar acts of guidance. Thus, the Koranic narratives of that past have it that the first man was created on the assumption that by observing his duties toward his creator and following His guidance he would be able so to conduct himself that he could stay in his first abode, Paradise, or aldjanna.217 And afterwards, when Adam, as the name was of the first man, had been expelled, God took pity on him and set him straight.218 So also with the Book which was sent down to Moses and the Evangel, for in them there was a light and a guidance, nür wa-hudan.219 Those who received this guidance were Ibrâhîm, Müsä and H ârûn, and some of their fathers, offspring and brothers, who were all said to have been 216 H. Birkeland, op. cit., p. 5. 216 Ibid., p. 131. 212 Cf. Koran 20:121 (119); 7:19 (18), 22 (21), 27 (26); 2:35 (33). It ought to bee remarked that in the Koran the same word is used to designate the place which the faithful will enter upon in the Hereafter. 212 Koran 20:122 (120). 212 Koran 6:91; 5:46 (50).

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guided to a straight path.220 It is not surprising that one of the names of God is al-hädx, the Guide.: “ Even so We have appointed to every Prophet an enemy among the sinners; but thy Lord suffices as a guide and as a helper.”221 The notion of guidance assumes an equally important place in Muhammad’s political action programme, in which it was given a con­ temporary application. For in this context it is repeatedly employed to remind the mvñninün of the correct examples to follow, and frequendy in the same phrase as its counterpart, i.e. that of straying from the right path, flaläl, which had earlier been used as an explanation of M uham­ m ad’s own way to guidance.222*Thus, all those who had reacted positive­ ly to the message of Muhammad were characterized as the righdy guid­ ed, al-muhtadün, while those who were considered to be in opposition were said to be so because God had intentionally led them astray so that they would be without any patrons {awliyä7) to set them right.229 In more precise terms, these muhdadün were said to be made up by all those who do not invoke idols,224*but who have come to believe in the straight path,229 in God, and in the Last Day; who have performed the falät, paid the zakät and who fear nothing but God.226 The muhtadün are also patient when misfortunes fall upon them;227 they are not among those who have clothed their faith with wrongdoing;228 in sum: “As for those who believe in God, and hold fast to Him, He will surely admit them to mercy (rahma) from Him, and bounty (fadl), and will guide them to Him on a straight path.”229 The muhtadün were generally speaking all those who had reacted favourably to M uhammad’s message by giving active support and showing obedience. The other term, ad-flällün, those who deviate from the straight path, was applicable to anyone standing in direct or indirect opposition to Muhammad. Included in this category were also those who 220 Koran 16:121 (122); 37:118; 6:84-88. 221 Koran 25:31 (33). Cf. also A. H. Ghazzâlî, al-Maqfad al-asnä* wa-sharfc asma* Allah ai-husnä, p. 158. 222 Koran 93:7. 222 Koran 18:17 (16), 17:97 (99). 224 Koran 6:56. 222 Koran 2:213 (209); 22:54 (53). 224 Koran 9:18. 227 Koran 2:156-7 (151-2). 222 Koran 6:82. 229 Koran 4:175 (174). See also 2:157 (152); 28:56; 36:21 (20); 43:49 (48).

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had detected from their belief, and then even grown in unbelief,230 these were promised not only a horrible treatment in H ell,231 but also a miserable earthly life.232 In this sense, then, it is fairly clear that the no­ tion of being under guidance was employed as a dacwa concept, having as its main task to promote M uhammad's political course of action at the expense of potential competitors: “ Say: ‘As for me, my Lord has guided me to a straight path, a right religion, the creed of Abraham, a man of pure faith; he was no idolater.’ Indeed, one may say that the notion of guidance was exposed to the same dichotomic pattern as referred to above: having originally its place with the initial references to that instant when Muhammad felt himself com­ missioned to proclaim the message of the heavenly affairs and the com­ ing of the End, guidance accompanied by its counterpart, (ialäl, was now extended to the worldly sphere, to contain the initial assurance to M uhammad that he had been chosen, as well as to provide the people around him with the argument that M uhammad's Medinan ‘world’ was the right choice. It was also in this last sense that the term guidance was used by alM ukhtär. It was employed on a number of occasions, but we will in the following restrict ourselves to some striking examples. For instance, when it was brought to al-M ukhtär’s knowledge that a group of Kufans were looking for a man in accordance with their views, who could force them into concord, hudan was employed along with the other dacâwï con­ cepts of good and bad: “ Al-Mukhtär said to him (the informant): (I, Abü Ishäq, I am, by God, for them! I shall gather them in accordance with the course of truth, and with their help expel the retinue of the false and kill every obstinate giant.’ Häni} b. Abi Hayya al-WadicI234 then said to him: ‘Woe unto you, O Ibn Abl cUbayd! You can nothing but put people to delusion and just therefore someone other than you may become their commander. For he who is the companion of discord is as close as someone can be in causing evil, and the worst among people in acting.’ **> Koran 3:90 (84). *»» Koran 56:51, 92. «* Koran 20:123-24 (122-23). *•» Koran 6:161 (162). SM I.e. the man who gave al-Mukhtar the informations upon his request of how things were going in Küfa.

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THE DECLINE OF THE ISLAMIC PRINCIPLE

But al-Mukhtär answered him: ‘I shall surely not summon (acPü) to discord (al-fitna) but I summon (adcu) to guidance (al-huda) and to the Community (al- f* sjlyjl J

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