Early Latin Theology: Volume 19 9781442698079

Table of contents :
Contents
General Editors’ Preface
PARS 1: De Notione Sacrificii / PART 1: The Notion of Sacrifice
PARS 2: De Ente Supernaturali: Supplementum Schematicum / PART 2: The Supernatural Order
PARS 3: De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei / PART 3: God’s Knowledge and Will
PARS 4: Analysis Fidei / PART 4: Analysis of Faith
PARS 5: De Ratione Convenient / PART 5: The Notion of Fittingness
PARS 6: De Conscientia Christi / PART 6: The Consciousness of Christ
PARS 7: De Gratia Sanctificante. Supplementum / PART 7: Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace
Appendices
Index

Citation preview

COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN

VOLUME 19 E A R LY L AT I N T H E O L O G Y

GENERAL EDITORS Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran

COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD

LONERGAN

EARLY LATIN THEOLOGY translated by Michael G. Shields edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour

Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto Buffalo London

© The Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada 2011 Printed in Canada isbn 978-1-4426-4387-1 (cloth) isbn 978-1-4426-1235-8 (paper)

Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetablebased inks. Requests for permission to quote from the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan should be addressed to University of Toronto Press.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Lonergan, Bernard J.F. (Bernard Joseph Francis), 1904–1984 Collected works of Bernard Lonergan / edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Includes bibliographical references and index. Incomplete contents: v. 19. Early Latin theology / edited by Michael G. Shields, Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. isbn 978-1-4426-4387-1 (v. 19 : bound) isbn 978-1-4426-1235-8 (v. 19 : pbk.) 1. Theology – 20th century. 2. Catholic Church. I. Crowe, Frederick E. II. Doran, Robert M., 1939– III. Shields, Michael G. IV. Monsour, Daniel, 1958– V. Title. bx891.l595 1988

230

C880-933283-

rev

The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of the Malliner Charitable Foundation, which made possible the production of this entire series. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund.

Contents

General Editors’ Preface, robert m. doran / xv E NG L I SH T R A N S LA T IO N Part 1: The Notion of Sacrifice / 3 Introduction to ‘The Notion of Sacrifice,’ michael g. shields / 3 1 The Definition of Sacrifice / 5 2 Justification of This Definition / 7 3 The Propriety of Symbols / 9 4 First Application of the Definition / 13 5 A Second Application of the Definition / 13 6 The Causes of Sacrifice / 29 7 The Difference between the Sacrifice of the Cross and the Mass / 37 8 The Value of This Inquiry / 47 Part 2: The Supernatural Order / 53 From the 1973 Introduction to ‘De ente supernaturali,’ Regis Edition, frederick e. crowe / 53 [Introduction] / 61 Thesis 1: There exists a created communication of the divine nature, which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle whereby there are operations in creatures through which they attain God as he is in himself. / 65

vi

Contents Thesis 2: This created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion not only of human nature but also of any finite substance, and thus is absolutely supernatural. / 79 Thesis 3: Acts, not only of the theological virtues but of other virtues as well, inasmuch as they are elicited in the rational part of a person and in accordance with one’s Christian duty, are specified by a supernatural formal object, and therefore are absolutely supernatural as to their substance and are so by reason of their formal object. / 97 Excursus 1: Degrees among the supernatural acts themselves / 123 Excursus 2: A note on purely entitative supernaturality / 127 Thesis 4: Potency to the absolutely supernatural is obediential. / 127 Excursus 1: On the natural desire to see God through his essence / 139 Excursus 2: Supernatural acts as vital acts / 161 Excursus 3: Divine concurrence / 179 Excursus 4: The efficacy of divine concurrence / 189 Thesis 5: Interior actual grace essentially consists in vital, principal, and supernatural second acts of the intellect and the will. / 229

Part 3: God’s Knowledge and Will / 257 From the 1973 Introduction to ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei,’ Regis Edition, frederick e. crowe / 257 1 The Aim of This Treatise / 263 2 The Nature of Metaphysical Analysis / 265 3 The Comparison between Eternal and Temporal Being / 267 4 Immanent Contingent Operation / 271 5 Action and Passion / 273 6 Necessary and Contingent Being / 275 7 Contingent Future Realities / 277 8 Divine Transcendence / 279 9 Principles of Priority and Simultaneity / 281 10 God’s Knowledge / 285 11 The Various Roots of Middle Knowledge / 287 12 Order / 297 13 The Meaning of Good and End / 299 14 Evil / 303 15 God’s Will / 309

The Robert Mollot Collection

vii

Contents 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

God’s Love / 315 Efficient Causality / 317 God’s Action / 323 Other Opinions about God’s Action / 337 Can God Be Accountable for the Formal Element of Sin? / 343 God’s Antecedent Will / 353 Other Conceptions of God’s Antecedent Will / 361 Why God Allows Culpable Evil / 365 Conceptual Designations in God (Signa Rationis) / 373 Predestination and Reprobation / 379 Objections / 389 A Brief Summary of Principles / 403

Part 4: Analysis of Faith / 413 From the 1973 Introduction to ‘Analysis Fidei,’ Regis Edition, frederick e. crowe / 413 1 The Logical Process / 415 2 The Psychological Process / 417 3 The Reflective Act of Understanding / 419 4 In the Psychological Faith Process the Reflective Act of Understanding Is Pivotal / 421 5 Difference between the Logical and the Psychological Process / 423 6 Constraint of the Intellect and Rationalization / 425 7 What Is the Analysis of Faith? / 427 8 A Brief Overview / 427 9 The Motive of Faith as Acquired / 429 10 The Supernatural Formal Object / 433 11 Those Who Believe Properly Attain a Supernatural Formal Object / 437 12 An Alternative Explanation of the Above / 439 13 Acts Which Immediately Precede Faith / 443 14 Acts Which Remotely Precede Faith / 445 15 The Grace of Conversion to Faith / 449 16 The Properties of Faith / 453 17 The Necessity of Faith / 457 18 The Necessity of the Preambles of Faith / 459 19 The Faith of Heretics, of Demons, and of Those Who Have Knowledge / 467 20 The Meaning of ‘Right Reason Demonstrates the Truth of Faith’ / 469

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

viii

Contents Opinions / 471 Page on the Necessity for the Preambles / 477

Part 5: The Notion of Fittingness: The Application of Theological Method to the Question of the Purpose of the Incarnation / 483 1 The Notion of Fittingness / 483 2 The Root of Fittingness / 491 3 The Excellence of Order / 495 4 Conceptual Designations / 503 5 The Fittingness of the Incarnation / 507 6 The Necessity of the Incarnation / 523 7 The Purpose of the Incarnation / 525 Part 6: The Consciousness of Christ / 535 From ‘Note on the Context of De conscientia Christi,’ frederick e. crowe / 535 The Consciousness of Christ / 537 Part 7: Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace / 563 Introductory Comments to ‘Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace’ / 563 [1 Historical Sketch] / 565 [1.1] Habitual Grace: Preliminary Notes / 565 [1.2] The Nominalists / 567 [1.3] The Sixteenth-Century Reformers / 573 [1.4] The Way of Proceeding / 575 [1.5] The Notion of Justice / 575 2 The Positive Doctrine of Sacred Scripture / 581 [Thesis 1:] To those whom God the Father loves [1] as he loves Jesus, his only-begotten Son, (2) he gives the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so that (3) into a new life they may be (4) born again and (5) become living members of Christ; therefore as (6) just, (7) friends of God, (8) adopted children of God, and (9) heirs in hope of eternal life, (10) they enter into a sharing in the divine nature. / 581 3 Understanding the Faith / 615 3.1 Sanctifying Grace: The Problem / 615 [3.2] Preliminary Notes on the Nature of Sanctifying Grace: Notions / 623 [3.2.1] Formal Cause and Formal Effects / 623 [3.2.2] Divine Love / 625

The Robert Mollot Collection

ix

Contents [Theorem 1:] All divine love as an effective principle is predicated essentially and thus equally of the three divine Persons. / 629 Corollary [to Theorem 1:] Absolutely all grace, inasmuch as it is related to divine love as its effective principle, by that very fact is related not to notional but to essential divine love. / 629 [Theorem 2:] Not everything that is stated contingently about the divine persons is stated by appropriation. / 631 [3.2.3] The Ontological Foundation of Grace / 631 [3.3] The Immanent Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace / 637 [3.4] The Transcendent Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace / 641 [3.5] Corollaries / 661

Appendices / 667 Appendix 1: ‘The Notion of Sacrifice’: Three Drafts on Theological Method in Connection with the Idea of Sacrifice / 667 Appendix 2: ‘God’s Knowledge and Will’ / 675 Editors’ Introduction / 675 Appendix 2A / 679 Appendix 2B / 679 Index / 683

LATIN TEXT Pars 1: De Notione Sacrificii / 2 1 Definitio Sacrificii / 4 2 Definitionis Iustificatio / 6 3 De Proprietate Symboli / 8 4 Prima Definitionis Applicatio / 12 5 Altera Definitionis Applicatio / 12 6 De Causis Sacrificii / 28 7 De Differentia Sacrificiorum Crucis et Missae / 36 8 De Valore Peractae Inquisitionis / 46 Pars 2: De Ente Supernaturali: Supplementum Schematicum / 52 [Introductio] / 60

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

x

Contents Thesis I: Exsistit creata communicatio divinae naturae, seu principium creatum, proportionatum, et remotum quo creaturae insunt operationes quibus attingitur Deus uti in se est. / 64 Thesis II: Haec creata divinae naturae communicatio non solum naturae humanae sed etiam cuiuslibet finitae substantiae proportionem excedit ideoque est supernaturalis simpliciter. / 78 Thesis III: Quia actus non solum virtutum theologicarum sed etiam aliarum virtutum, inquantum in parte rationali et sicut oportet a Christiano eliciuntur, ab obiecto formali supernaturali specificantur, ideo simpliciter supernaturales sunt quoad substantiam et quidem ratione obiecti formalis. / 96 Scholion I: De gradibus intra ipsos actus supernaturales / 122 Scholion II: De supernaturalitate mere entitative / 126 Thesis IV: Potentia ad supernaturalia simpliciter est obedientialis. / 126 Scholion I: De naturali desiderio videndi Deum per essentiam / 138 Scholion II: De actibus supernaturalibus qua vitalibus / 160 Scholion III: De concursu divino / 178 Scholion IV: De efficacia concursus divini / 188 Thesis V: Gratia actualis interna essentialiter consistit in actibus secundis intellectus et voluntatis vitalibus, principalibus, et supernaturalibus. / 228

Pars 3: De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei / 256 1 De Fine Huius Operis / 262 2 De Natura Analysis Metaphysicae / 264 3 De Comparationis Entis Aeterni et Temporalis / 266 4 Operatio Immanens et Contingens / 270 5 De Actione et Passione / 272 6 De Necessario et Contingente / 274 7 De Futuris Contingentibus / 276 8 De Transcendentia Divina / 278 9 Principia Prioritatis et Simultaneitatis / 280 10 De Scientia Dei / 284 11 De Diversis Radicibus Scientiae Mediae / 286 12 De Ordine / 296

The Robert Mollot Collection

xi

Contents 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

De Bono et Fine / 298 De Malo / 302 De Divina Voluntate / 308 De Amore Divino / 314 De Causa Efficiente / 316 De Actione Divina / 322 De Divina Actione Sententiae Aliae / 336 Utrum Formale Peccati in Deum Reduci Possit / 342 De Voluntate Dei Antecedente / 352 Voluntatis Antecendentis Conceptiones Aliae / 360 Cur Deus Malum Culpae Permittat / 364 De Signis Rationis / 372 De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione / 378 Obiectiones / 388 Principiorum Summula / 402

Pars 4: Analysis Fidei / 412 1 Processus Logicus / 414 2 Processus Psychologicus / 416 3 Quid Sit Actus Intelligendi Reflexus / 418 4 Quod in Processu Fidei Psychologico Cardo Est Actus Intelligendi Reflexus / 420 5 Quantum Differunt Processus Logicus et Psychologicus / 422 6 Quid Sit Coactio Intellectus et Quid Rationalizatio / 424 7 Quid Sit Analysis Fidei / 426 8 Brevis Conspectus / 426 9 Motivum Fidei in Facto Fsse / 428 10 De Obiecto Formali Supernaturali / 432 11 Quod Qui Credit Sicut Oportet Obiectum Formale Supernaturale Attingit / 436 12 Quod Iterum Aliter Ponitur / 438 13 De Actibus Qui Proxime Fidem Antecedunt / 442 14 De Actibus Qui Remote Fidem Antecedunt / 444 15 De Gratia Conversionis ad Fidem / 448 16 De Proprietatibus Fidei / 452 17 De Necessitate Fidei / 456 18 De Necessitate Praeambulorum / 458 19 Circa Fidem in Haereticis, Diabolis, et Scientibus / 466 20 Circa Illud, ‘Recta Ratio Fidei Veritatem Demonstrat’ / 468

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

xii

Contents Opiniones / 470 [Page on the Necessity for the Preambles] / 476

Pars 5: De Ratione Convenientiae: Methodus Theologica ad Finem Incarnationis Applicata / 482 1 Quid Sit Convenientia / 482 2 De Radice Convenientiae / 490 3 De Excellentia Ordinis/ 494 4 De Signis Rationis / 502 5 De Convenientia Incarnationis / 506 6 De Necessitate Incarnationis / 522 7 Circa Finem Incarnationis / 524 Pars 6: De Conscientia Christi / 534 Pars 7: De Gratia Sanctificante. Supplementum / 562 [1 Adlineamenta historica] / 564 [1.1] De gratia habituali. Initia / 564 [1.2] Nominales / 566 [1.3] Novatores saec. XVI / 572 [1.4] Modus procedendi / 574 [1.5] De notione iustitiae / 574 2 Positiva Sacrae Scripturae Doctrina / 580 [Thesis I:] Quos diligit Deus Pater (1) sicut Iesum Filium suum unigenitum diligit, (2) dono eos increato ipsius Spiritus sancti donat, ut (3) in novam vitam (4) renati (5) viva Christi membra efficiantur; quare (6) iusti, (7) Deo amici, (8) filii Dei adoptivi, et (9) haeredes secundum spem vitae aeternae, (10) consortium divinae naturae ineunt. / 580 3 Intelligentia Fidei / 614 3.1 Gratia Sanctificans: Problema / 614 [3.2] De Natura Gratiae Sanctificantis: Praenotamina / 622 [3.2.1] De causa Formali et Effectibus Formalibus / 622 [3.2.2] De Amore Divino / 624 [Theorema I:] Essentialiter et ideo pariter de tribus personis dicitur omnis amor divinus inquantum est principium effectivum. / 628 Corollarium: Omnis prorsus gratia, inquantum respicit amorem divinum ut principium effectivum, eo ipso respicit amorem non notionalem sed essentialem. / 628

The Robert Mollot Collection

xiii

Contents [Theorema II:] Non omnia quae contingenter de divinis personis dicuntur, per appropriationem dicuntur. / 630 [3.2.3] De Fundamento Gratiae Ontologico / 630 [3.3] Secundum effectus formales et immanentes / 636 [3.4] Secundum effectus formales et transcendentales / 640 [3.5] Corollaria / 660 Appendix IIa / 678

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

General Editors’ Preface

Volume 19 in the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan gathers the various writings that can legitimately be considered to be Bernard Lonergan’s earliest efforts in what he would come to call the functional specialty ‘systematics.’ The seven works presented here were all written while Lonergan was teaching dogmatic and systematic theology in Montreal and Toronto in the 1940s and early 1950s. At least three of these writings (here chapters 2, 3, and 7) were explicitly considered supplements to the texts Lonergan was using in his courses. It is in such supplements that his original synthesis of systematic issues can often be found. We have provided introductory notes for each of the selections presented here except for the fifth, where I judged that the necessary background could conveniently be presented in the first footnote. Some of these notes cite abundantly from Frederick Crowe’s editorial introductions at the beginning of valuable versions that he edited in the early 1970s with Conn O’Donovan and Giovanni Sala. These editions were invaluable in preparing the present text. Many readers will be more or less familiar with the first six items presented here, but only a few will be familiar with the seventh. It consists of a set of notes for a course on grace that Lonergan team taught in 1951–52 with Fr Elmer O’Brien, sj. There are in the Lonergan Archives three sets of notes on grace from Lonergan’s courses in 1947–48 and 1951–52. The two sets of notes from 1947–48 can be found on the website www.bernardlonergan .com, with English translations by Michael Shields available at 16000dte040 and 16200dte040. It was felt that, despite the valuable material contained

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

xvi

General Editors’ Preface

in these 1947–48 notes, they were too loosely organized to be presented in a collection of Lonergan’s writings. But this is not the case with the 1951–52 notes. These represent the most complete systematic treatment of sanctifying grace to be found in Lonergan’s known writings, both published and unpublished. In this set of notes readers will also find an early statement of the hypothesis that first appeared in print in the 1957 Divinarum Personarum, in which the four divine relations are coupled with four created graces that participate respectively in the relations: paternity with the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation, active spiration with sanctifying grace, passive spiration with the habit of charity, and filiation with the light of glory. The treatment of this hypothesis is more ample in the 1951–52 notes than in Divinarum Personarum or the later De Deo Trino: Pars systematica. It is also clear that in these notes Lonergan is addressing a number of issues that were very current at the time and presenting a unique perspective on some of them that has unfortunately remained relatively unknown for a number of years. I welcome the inclusion of these notes into the Collected Works. I dare say that they will prove to be extremely valuable as students of Lonergan work to transpose the theology of grace from the theoretical framework of Scholastic theology to the interiority framework of a methodical theology, for the theoretical elements are present here in a manner and to a degree that may be unmatched elsewhere. It is recommended that the notes be read with both a bible to check the many scriptural references and a copy of the Summa theologiae to read the many texts of Thomas Aquinas that the notes refer to. Supplementary materials for all of the items contained in this book are available on the website www.bernardlonergan.com and are mentioned in the introductions and/or notes for each item. As in other volumes in the Collected Works, the Oxford American Dictionary and the Chicago Manual of Style have been relied upon, not slavishly but with a predisposition in their favor. Lonergan’s texts refer to Denzinger’s Enchiridion in the familiar notation db, but the translations add the later ds (Denzinger-Schönmetzer) and nd (Joseph Neuner and Jacques Dupuis, The Christian Faith, 7th ed.) numbers. We continue to use the New Revised Standard Version of the bible, for the most part, and to put brackets around editorial footnotes and comments. Once again, as General Editor I want to thank both Michael Shields for his excellent translations of these works and Daniel Monsour for many long hours spent tracking down important research information as well as for

The Robert Mollot Collection

xvii

General Editors’ Preface

illuminating comments regarding the theological content of the items here presented. Finally, I thank Marquette University for its continued support of my participation in the Collected Works project. In particular, with this volume I wish to thank the Rev. Robert A. Wild, sj, who has recently retired after fifteen years as President at Marquette. Fr Wild was extremely kind and generous to me and to the Lonergan Project at Marquette. robert m. doran Marquette University

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

EARLY LATIN THEOLOGY

PA R S 1

De Notione Sacrificii1

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 1

The Notion of Sacrifice1

Introduction to ‘The Notion of Sacrifice’ by Michael G. Shields In 1972, Bernard Lonergan handed over to Frederick Crowe, who was beginning to set up a Lonergan Centre at Regis College, a considerable collection of materials from the teaching and research he had done in earlier years. Included in the collection was a folder, now in the Lonergan Archives in Toronto, labeled simply Eucharistia, containing among other things a sixteen-page typewritten Latin monograph entitled ‘De Notione Sacrificii,’ presented here with an English translation.2 In the same folder there are approximately forty pages of notes, mostly in Latin, on various aspects of the Mass as ‘a true and proper sacrifice.’ Included in those pages is a document of seven pages, ‘Sacrificium apud S. Augustinum,’ consisting of passages from the works of Augustine painstakingly transcribed by Lonergan. Next to it are six pages, also published here as appendix 1, containing a rough draft in English of what appear to be three attempts at an essay on ‘The Idea of Sacrifice.’ This document is of interest not so much because of Lonergan’s thought about the meaning

1 The document ‘De notione sacrificii’ is to be found in the Lonergan Archives, Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, batch ii, folder 33, item 11 (A219); it can also be found on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, at 21900dtl040. 2 These items may be found on the website www.bernardlonergan.com by entering ‘Eucharist’ into the search option on the Archive page.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

4

De Notione Sacrificii

1

Definitio Sacrificii

Sacrificium definitur proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis. Affectus: habitus actusque tum intellectus tum voluntatis Sacrificalis : qui est latreuticus, propitiatorius, eucharisticus, et impetratorius. Latreuticus: qui soli Deo debetur, Creatori scilicet, Primo Agenti, Summo Bono, et Fini ultimo Propitiatorius: qui Deo debetur propter peccata Eucharisticus: qui Deo debetur propter beneficia collata Impetratorius: qui Deo debetur propter beneficia conferenda N.B. ‘Affectus sacrificalis’ designat illum statum mentis et cordis qui homini convenit erga Deum (1) qua Deum (et ideo est latreuticus), (2) qua peccatis offensum (et ideo est propitiatorius), (3) qua fontem omnium beneficiorum tam praeteritorum quam futurorum (et ideo est eucharisticus et impetratorius). Unde affectus sacrificalis dicit brevem synthesin virtutis religionis qua recte ordinatur mens et cor hominis erga Deum. Symbolum : obiectiva manifestatio sensibilis et per se socialis. Manifestatio: transitus de ignoto, obscuro, confuso in notum, clarum, distinctum. Obiectiva: quae ipsa manifestatione habetur; opponitur manifestationi relativae quae, nisi cognitionem alteri auget, frustratur. Sensibilis: quae sub sensibus externis (oculis, etc.) cadit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

5

The Notion of Sacrifice

of sacrifice as because they reveal his constant overarching concern with theological method. The contents of this folder clearly served as materials for teaching on the Eucharist. Lonergan taught such a course only once, at the Collège de l’Immaculée-Conception in Montreal, 1943–44. The following year he gave a seminar there on ‘Selected Questions on the Eucharist’ as well as a series of lectures on the theology of the Eucharist at the Thomas More Institute. It is highly probable, then, that the contents of this folder belong to those years.

1

The Definition of Sacrifice

Sacrifice is defined as a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. Attitude: habits and acts of both intellect and will. Sacrificial : that which is latreutic, propitiatory, eucharistic, and impetratory. It is – latreutic: as worship which is owed to God alone as Creator, First Agent, Supreme Good, Ultimate End, – propitiatory: as addressed to God because of sins, – eucharistic: as thanksgiving owed to God for benefits received from him, – impetratory: as a petition addressed to God for benefits to be received. Note: ‘Sacrificial attitude’ designates the proper stance of mind and heart towards God (1) as God (hence it is latreutic), (2) as offended by sin (hence it is propitiatory), (3) as the source of all good gifts both past and future (and hence it is eucharistic and impetratory). As such, ‘sacrificial attitude’ denotes a brief synthesis of the virtue of religion which regulates the relationship of one’s mind and heart towards God. Symbol: an objective manifestation that is perceptible and is per se social. – manifestation: the transition from what is unknown, obscure, and vague to what is known, clear, and distinct. – objective: that which is had through the manifestation itself. Its opposite is relative manifestation, which is frustrated if it does not increase knowledge in someone else. – perceptible: that which can be apprehended by the external senses.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

6

De Notione Sacrificii

Socialis: quae ad communitatem pertinet secundum aliquam rationem. Per se: dicitur ‘per se socialis’ quia in stadio parum evoluto societatis humanae, symbolum forte individuale esse potuit; puta sacrificia patriarcharum. N.B. ‘Symbola’ duplex fundamentum habent in natura humana. Aliud enim est fundamentum in natura hominis sensibili et corporali: unde oportet quod homo interius sentit, sensibiliter et corporaliter exprimat. Aliud vero est fundamentum in natura hominis sociali: unde oportet ut quod singuli homines interius sentiunt, congregati communiter exprimant. Proprium: quod gradum perfectionis debitum possidet. N.B. Inter omnes constat non quodlibet symbolum affectus sacrificalis esse verum et proprium sacrificium; at quinam gradus perfectionis requiratur et sufficiat ut tale symbolum sit verum et proprium sacrificium, acerrime disputatur. Quam quaestionem methodologice evitamus asserendo indeterminatum quemnam gradum perfectionis requiri ut symbolum affectus sacrificalis sit verum sacrificium. 2

Definitionis Iustificatio

Ea definitio methodologice iustificatur quae elementa certa conservat et elementa dubia indeterminate amplectitur. Atqui tradita definitio certa conservat sed dubia indeterminate amplectitur. Ergo tradita definitio methodologice iustificatur. Maior videtur evidens. Minor per partes probatur: (a) Tradita definitio elementa certa sacrificii conservat. Asserit enim sacrificium esse symbolum affectus sacrificalis. Quod assertum est certum: positum enim ab Augustino et Aquinate in omnes fere theologorum elucubrationes est transfusum. Dicit enim Augustinus: ‘Sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est, sacrum signum est’ (De Civitate Dei, x, v). Confirmat Aquinas: ‘Oblatio sacrificii fit ad aliquid significandum. Significat autem sacrificium quod offertur exterius, interius spirituale sacrificium quo anima seipsam offert Deo’ (Summa theologiae, ii-ii, q. 85, a. 2).

The Robert Mollot Collection

7

The Notion of Sacrifice

– social: that which pertains to a community in some respect. – per se: we say that it is ‘per se social’ because at a more primitive stage in the development of a human society it could perhaps have been an individual symbol – the sacrifices of the patriarchs, for example. Note: Symbols have a twofold foundation in human nature. One is their foundation in our sentient and corporeal nature; hence the need we have of expressing perceptibly and in a bodily way what we feel interiorly. The other is their foundation in our social nature; hence the need that individuals have of gathering together to express in a communal way what they think and feel interiorly. Proper: that which has the degree of perfection that it ought to have. Note: All agree that not any and every symbol of a sacrificial attitude is a true and proper sacrifice. But it is hotly debated just what degree of perfection is required and sufficient to constitute a true and proper sacrifice. We avoid this question methodologically by asserting that a certain indeterminate degree of perfection is required for a symbol of a sacrificial attitude to be a true sacrifice. 2

Justification of This Definition

A definition which preserves elements that are certain and covers in an indeterminate way elements that are in doubt is methodologically justified. But the definition we have given preserves what is certain and indeterminately covers what is in doubt. Therefore the above definition is methodologically justifiable. The major premise seems quite clear. The minor premise is proven part by part as follows: (a) The definition given above preserves the certain elements of sacrifice, for it asserts that a sacrifice is a symbol of a sacrificial attitude. This assertion is undoubtedly correct: it was stated by Augustine and Aquinas and has entered into virtually all the treatises of theologians since. Augustine: ‘A visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is, a sacred sign, of an invisible sacrifice.’ (De Civitate Dei, x, v [ml 41, 282].). Aquinas confirms this: ‘… a sacrifice is offered for the purpose of signifying something; the sacrifice that is offered outwardly is a sign of that interior spiritual sacrifice in which the soul offers herself to God …’ (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 85, a. 2 c.).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

8

De Notione Sacrificii

Resonat dtc: vide t. 10, col. 1279s.3 (b) Tradita definitio elementa dubia indeterminate amplectitur. Tota et diuturna disputatio de essentia sacrificii proprie dicti ad hanc quaestionem reducitur: quid requiratur et sufficiat ut affectus sacrificalis symbolizetur proprie? Atqui tradita definitio hanc dubiam quaestionem indeterminate resolvit asserendo sacrificium esse proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis. Ergo tradita definitio elementa dubia indeterminate amplectitur. 3

De Proprietate Symboli

Symbolum posuimus in genere manifestationis obiectivae. Iam vero ideo fit manifestatio obiectiva ut perfectio superior in ordine inferiori reproducatur seu exprimatur. Sicut Deus perfectionem infinitam in ordine finito manifestat creando, ita homo perfectionem spiritualem in ordine sensibili et sociali repraesentat symbolizando. Unde notavit Sorokin, sociologista eminens, ubi cultura est religiosa, artes poeticas, pictorias, etc., esse symbolis refertas.4 Sequitur symbolum proprium esse manifestationem obiectivam propriam. At proprie reproducitur superior perfectio in ordine inferiori si analogica quaedam proportio exsistit inter inferius manifestans et manifestatum superius. E contra, impropria est obiectiva manifestatio si loco analogicae proportionis non invenitur nisi aequivoca quaedam similitudo. Quibus dictis, definiri potest symbolum proprium. Symbolum proprium est quod non aequivoca similitudine sed analogica

The Robert Mollot Collection

9

The Notion of Sacrifice

See also Dictionnaire de théologie catholique [dtc], x (19) 1279–80.3 (b) Our definition also covers doubtful elements in an indeterminate way. The whole long-standing dispute about the essence of sacrifice properly so called comes down to this: What is required and is sufficient for a sacrificial attitude to be symbolized properly? But this definition deals with this doubtful matter in an indeterminate way by stating that a sacrifice is a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. Therefore this definition covers doubtful elements indeterminately. 3

The Propriety of Symbols

We have placed symbol in the category of objective manifestation. Now, an objective manifestation is made in order to reproduce or express a higher perfection in a lower order of being. Just as God manifests his infinite perfection in the finite order by creating, so humans represent spiritual perfection in the visible and social order by symbolizing. As the eminent sociologist Sorokin has remarked, when a culture is religious, its poetry, graphic arts, and so forth, are full of symbols.4 A proper symbol, therefore, is a proper objective manifestation. But a superior perfection is properly reproduced in a lower order if there exists an analogical proportion between what manifests in the lower order and the higher perfection that is manifested. Contrariwise, if instead of an analogical proportion there is only an equivocal similarity, that objective manifestation is improper. We are now in a position to define a proper symbol. A proper symbol is one which, not by way of an equivocal similarity but

3 [In part v of the article ‘Messe’ (cols. 795–1403): ‘La Messe chez les théologiens postérieurs au Concile de Trente. – Essence et efficacité’ (cols. 1143–1316), by A. Michel.] 4 [‘So far as the style of art is concerned – whether it be in painting, sculpture, music, literature, drama, architecture – in the Ideational mentality it is symbolic, its physical exemplars being merely the visible signs of the invisible world and inner values.’ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fluctuation of Forms of Art, vol. 1 of Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book Co., 1937–1941) 95. For Sorokin’s characterization of the mentality of Ideational culture as distinct from that of Sensate and Idealistic cultural mentalities, see ibid. 72–73. See also his remarks on Ideational art in The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Ltd., 1941) 31–32.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

10

De Notione Sacrificii

quadam proportione repraesentat in ordine inferiori et sensibili perfectionem spiritualem. Quae tamen definitio, etsi conceptus clarificet et ordinet, minus tamen est utilis ad proprietatem symbolorum cognoscendam atque mensurandam. Unde praeter abstractam definitionem addimus tria capita magis specifica e quibus oriri potest symboli proprietas. (a) Proprietas symboli habetur in primis e naturali aptitudine rerum actionumve ad significandum seu repraesentandum. Puta, naturaliter et sponte quadam sua affectus sacrificalis repraesentatur symbolice quando solemniter animal occiditur, eius sanguis loco speciali effunditur, eius corpus adstante plebe comburitur. Nam praeter omnem conventionem humanam vel legitimam institutionem, quid aliud nisi symbolum affectus religiosi per tales actiones intendi possit? Dicamus ergo eo maiorem esse symboli proprietatem quo maior sit naturalis aptitudo rerum actionumve ad significandum. (b) At aliud etiam est caput proprietatis in symbolis. Quantumvis proprium sit symbolum ex naturali aptitudine, obscura sane et confusa manet significatio determinatae perfectionis spiritualis. Puta, holocausta fieri posse vel in cultum Dei veri vel in cultum daemoniorum, vel in spiritu et veritate vel superstitiose. Quid repraesentent e sola naturali aptitudine numquam determinabitur. Unde aliud est caput proprietatis symbolorum, scilicet, conventio, lex, institutio. Nam quo certior, quo clarior, quo distinctior est symboli significatio, eo maior est eiusdem proprietas. Quae certitudo, claritas, distinctio magis habetur per legem iure legitimo latam quam per conventionem sponte ortam, et iterum magis habetur per institutionem divinam quam humanam. Porro, sicut forma est praestantior materia, ita conventio, lex, institutio magis confert ad proprietatem symboli quam rerum actionumve aptitudo naturalis. (c) Tertium denique est caput proprietatis in symbolis, nempe, realis coniunctio quae intercedit inter symbolum manifestans et perfectionem spiritualem manifestandam. Quae realis coniunctio potest esse moralis uti in sacrificiis cruentis veteris legis ubi morali aestimatione animal homini substituebatur et pro homine Deo offerebatur. At ista realis coniunctio potest esse etiam physica uti in summo sacrificio

The Robert Mollot Collection

11

The Notion of Sacrifice

by a certain analogical proportion, represents a spiritual perfection in the lower order of sense perception. Nevertheless, although this definition clarifies the concepts and puts them in order, it is not so helpful in recognizing and assessing the propriety of a symbol. Hence, besides this abstract definition we add three more specific sources from which the propriety of a symbol can be derived. (a) The propriety of a symbol derives first of all from the natural aptitude of objects or actions to signify or represent something. For example, the ritual slaughter of an animal, the pouring of its blood in a special place, and the burning of its body in the presence of the people naturally and in a way automatically represent symbolically a sacrificial attitude. For apart from all human convention or legitimate institution, what other purpose could such actions have if not to be a symbol of a religious attitude? Let us say, then, that the propriety of a symbol will be in proportion to the natural aptitude of its objects or actions for signifying. (b) There is also another source of propriety in symbols. However proper a symbol may be by reason of its natural aptitude, its signifying of a determinate spiritual perfection surely remains obscure and vague. Holocausts, for example, can be offered either to worship the true God or to worship demons, offered either ‘in spirit and in truth’ or superstitiously. Just exactly what they represent will never be determined solely from their natural aptitude. There is, therefore, a second source of propriety in symbols, namely, convention, law, or institution. The more certain, clear, and distinct a symbol is in its signifying, the more proper it is; and this sort of certainty, clarity, and distinctness results from the legislation of legitimate authority more than from some spontaneous convention, and also from divine more than from human institution. Moreover, just as form is more perfect than matter, so convention, law, and institution invest a symbol with greater propriety than does the natural aptitude of objects or actions. (c) There is a third source of propriety in symbols, namely, the real connection between the symbol that manifests and the spiritual perfection to be manifested. This real connection can be a moral connection, as in the bloody sacrifices of the old law in which an animal was morally estimated to be a substitute for a human being and was offered to God in place of that person. But this real connection can also be physical, as in the case of the su-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

12

De Notione Sacrificii

Domini nostri Iesu Christ qui in proprio corpore symbolum affectus sui sacrificalis in ara crucis exprimebat. Ergo propter realem coniunctionem inter symbolum et symbolizatum augetur proprietas symboli. 4

Prima Definitionis Applicatio

In primis definitio est applicanda ad sacrificium perfectum omnibusque numeris absolutum, nempe, sacrificium crucis quod dicitur. Ubi affectus sacrificalis maxime perfectus est repraesentandus. Ubi hic affectus sacrificalis singularis prorsus et perfectissimus summa proprietate repraesentatur. Nam summa est aptitudo naturalis ad significandum affectum sacrificalem ubi mors violenta effuso sanguine vitam pretiosissimam interemit. Summa praeterea est huius significationis certitudo, claritas, distinctio ubi lex et prophetae et ipse princeps legislatorum et prophetarum, Dominus Iesus, declarant auctoritate divina quid per istum symbolum naturale significetur. Arctissime denique inter ordinem spiritualem et sensibilem est coniunctio quae intercedit inter animam et corpus unius eiusdemque hominis. Quibus omnibus simul sumptis et perspectis, sane dicendum est non per aequivocam similitudinem sed analogica proportione sacrificium crucis repraesentare seu symbolizare affectum Christi sacrificalem. Unde sacrificium crucis est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis Christi morientis. 5

Altera Definitionis Applicatio

Deinde definitio est applicanda ad sacrificium eucharisticum quo proprie symbolizatur sacrificalis affectus corporis Christi mystici. (a) In primis ergo sacrificium eucharisticum proprie symbolizat affectum sacrificalem ipsius Christi capitis corporis mystici. Nam sacrificium eucharisticum est proprium symbolum sacrificii crucis. Sed sacrificium crucis est proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi capitis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

13

The Notion of Sacrifice

preme sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ who in his own body expressed a symbol of his sacrificial attitude upon the altar of the cross. A real connection between the symbol and the symbolized, therefore, increases the propriety of the symbol. 4

First Application of the Definition

This definition is to be applied first of all to that sacrifice that is absolutely perfect in every way, namely, the sacrifice of the cross. In this sacrifice a sacrificial attitude is to be represented in the most perfect way. In it this utterly unparalleled and most perfect sacrificial attitude is represented with the utmost propriety. For the loss of a most precious life by a violent and bloody death has the greatest natural aptitude for signifying a sacrificial attitude. Furthermore, the certainty, clarity, and distinctness of this signification is at its maximum when the law and the prophets and the greatest of the lawgivers and prophets, the Lord Jesus, declare by divine authority what this natural symbol signifies. Finally, the closest connection between the spiritual and the sensible order is that which exists between the soul and the body of one and the same person. In the light of all these factors taken together, it must surely be said that it is not by an equivocal similarity but by an analogical proportion that the sacrifice of the cross represents or symbolizes Christ’s sacrificial attitude. The sacrifice of the cross, therefore, is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the dying Christ. 5

A Second Application of the Definition

Next, this definition is to be applied to the Eucharistic sacrifice as a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the mystical body of Christ. (a) First, then, the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ himself, the Head of the mystical body. For the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the sacrifice of the cross. But the sacrifice of the cross is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ the Head.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

14

De Notione Sacrificii

Mediate ergo sed vere sacrificium eucharisticum est proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi capitis. Consequentia valet. Nam symbolizatio, repraesentatio, manifestatio est relatio transitiva. Si A est maius B et B est maius C, tunc A est maius C. Similiter, quod repraesentat repraesentans, repraesentat primum repraesentatum.5 Quod proprie repraesentat proprie repraesentans, proprie repraesentat primum repraesentatum. Proinde, sacrificium eucharisticum proprie repraesentat sacrificium crucis. Factum repraesentationis asseritur a Concilio Tridentino: ‘quo cruentum illud semel in cruce peragendum repraesentaretur’ (db 938). Quod factum ante asseruerunt Augustinus et Aquinas; post resonarunt theologi. Proprietatem deinde repraesentationis invenimus eam quae analogica proportione se habet ad affectum sacrificalem Christi qua Capitis corporis mystici. Mystico enim corpori proportionatur symbolum mysticum, rebus et verbis apparentibus sed latente praeterea realitate compositum. Et rerum quidem naturalis aptitudo non est ad sacrificium crucis repraesentandum sed ad idem sacrificium caena sacrificali participandum. Verborum vero significatio clare et distincte denotat sacrificium crucis. Panis enim dicitur corpus illud quod traditum est. Vinum deinde dicitur sanguis novi testamenti effusus in remisisonem peccatorum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

15

The Notion of Sacrifice

Mediately, therefore, but in a true sense, the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ the Head. The conclusion follows logically. Symbolization, or representation, or manifestation, is a transitive relation. If A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. Similarly, that which represents a representation represents that which was first represented.5 And that which properly represents a proper representation properly represents that which was first represented. Accordingly, the Eucharistic sacrifice properly represents the sacrifice of the cross. The fact of this representation is stated by the Council of Trent: ‘… by which the bloody [sacrifice] accomplished once for all on the cross might be represented’ (db 938, ds 1740, nd 1546). This had been asserted by Augustine and Aquinas, and is echoed by subsequent theologians. Next, the propriety of this representation we find to be that which is related by an analogical proportion to the sacrificial attitude of Christ as Head of the mystical body; for a mystical symbol consisting of external objects and words, but with an underlying reality besides, is proportionate to the mystical body. The natural aptitude these objects have is not for representing the sacrifice of the cross but rather for participating in this sacrifice by way of a sacrificial meal. The meaning of the words, however, clearly and distinctly refers to the sacrifice of the cross. The bread is declared to be that body which was given up, and the wine is declared to be the blood of the new covenant shed for the remission of sins. 5 [The idea of transitive relation, applied here to the field of representation, may be illustrated also by the phrase causa causae est causa causati, ‘the cause of a cause is a cause of that which is caused.’ Thus, in the proper causal series, in which A is the cause of B and B is the cause of C, ‘there are three real relations of dependence with respect to an id a quo: B depends on A, C depends on B, and C depends on A even more than on B.’ Bernard Lonergan, ‘On God and Secondary Causes,’ in Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 55. See also in the present volume, ‘The Supernatural Order,’ 246 and ‘The Knowledge and Will of God,’ 322 and 328. There is a brief mention of transitive relations, though it is concerned specifically with whether identity is always transitive, in Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, vol. 12 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 736–37.)]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

16

De Notione Sacrificii

Unde et ipsis rebus qua distinctis advenit significatio sacrificii crucis: quatenus enim panis pro corpore et vinum pro sanguine separatim ponuntur, significatur separatio illa realis corporis sanguinisque Christi in ara crucis, unde et Paulus, ‘Quotiescumque enim manducabitis panem hunc et calicem bibetis, mortem Domini annuntiabitis donec veniat’ (1 Cor 11.26). Cui repraesentationi in rebus et verbis exsistenti accedit institutio ipsius Christi. ‘Hoc,’ inquit, ‘facite in mei memoriam.’ Et quidem in memoriam mortis sacrificalis uti ipse testatus est asserendo ‘corpus pro vobis traditum’ et ‘sanguinem novi testamenti effusum in remissionem peccatorum.’ Unde ex institutione Christi ideoque iure divino eucharistia est proprium symbolum sacrificii crucis. Denique ex reali coniunctione, ne dicam identitatem quandam, eucharistia est proprium symbolum sacrificii crucis. Nam eadem est victima (db 940), cum idem sit corpus et idem sanguis. Idem praeterea est sacerdos principalis (db 940), nam vis verborum consecrationis est virtus Christi ministri excellentiae. Sicut enim vere quando Petrus vel Iudas baptizat, Christus baptizat, multo magis quando sacerdos quilibet consecrat, Christus consecrat. Eatenus ergo se extendit identitas inter sacrificium crucis et eucharistiam ut, testante Tridentino, sola offerendi ratio differat (db 940). Quae differentia sane non aufert proprietatem symboli; cum aliud sit sacrificium crucis et aliud sacrificium eucharisticum, aliqua diversitas intercedat necesse est.

Concludimus ergo eucharistiam propter rerum verborumque significationem, propter institutionem ipsius Christi, propter miram illam identitatem sacerdotis et hostiae, esse proprium symbolum sacrificii crucis. Sed sacrificium crucis supra demonstratum est esse proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi Capitis; et praeterea symbolizatio demonstrata est relatio transitiva; ergo concludendum quod eucharistia est proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi Capitis corporis mystici. (b) Deinde, sacrificium eucharisticum non solum est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis Christi Capitis sed etiam est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis membrorum seu ecclesiae. Secunda haec pars est demonstrandum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

17

The Notion of Sacrifice

Hence these objects also in their distinctness from each other come to signify the sacrifice of the cross; for inasmuch as the bread stands for the body and the wine separately stands for the blood, the real separation of Christ’s body and blood on the altar of the cross is signified. Hence also the words of Paul, ‘Whenever you eat this bread and drink this cup, you will be proclaiming the death of the Lord until he comes’ (1 Corinthians 11.26). In addition to this representation in objects and words there is the institution by Christ himself. ‘Do this,’ he says, ‘in memory of me.’ In memory, in fact, of his sacrificial death, as he himself makes clear by his words, ‘the body given up for you’ and ‘the blood of the new covenant shed for the remission of sins.’ Therefore by reason of its institution by Christ, and thus by divine sanction, the Eucharist is a proper symbol of the sacrifice of the cross. Finally, because of the real connection and even a certain identity between them, the Eucharist is a proper symbol of the sacrifice of the cross. The victim is the same, since there is the same body and the same blood. Moreover, the principal priest is the same, for the force of the words of consecration is the power of Christ, the minister par excellence. Just as when Peter or even Judas baptizes, it is really and truly Christ who baptizes, all the more is it true that when any priest consecrates, it is Christ who consecrates. So complete is the identity between the sacrifice of the cross and the Eucharist that, as Trent declares, only the manner of offering is different (db 940, ds 1743, nd 1548). This difference certainly does not do away with the propriety of the symbol; for since the sacrifice of the cross is not simply the same as the Eucharistic sacrifice, there has to be some difference between them. Our conclusion therefore is that the Eucharist, by reason of the signification of its objects and words, its institution by Christ himself, and the marvelous identity between priest and victim, is a proper symbol of the sacrifice of the cross. But we have shown above that the sacrifice of the cross is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ as Head, and moreover have shown that symbolization is a transitive relation. We must conclude, therefore, that the Eucharist is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ as Head of the mystical body. (b) Next, the Eucharistic sacrifice is not only a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ the Head but is also a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the members of the mystical body, that is, of the church. This second point we must now demonstrate.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

18

De Notione Sacrificii

Porro, affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae dupliciter considerari potest, nempe, principiative vel terminative. Principiative sumitur affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae in suo fonte, scilicet, quatenus a Christo Capite per sacrificium crucis sacrificio eucharistico continuatum atque extensum ad ecclesiam est derivandus. Terminative sumitur affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae prout actu exsistit in membris ecclesiae, nempe, non quatenus procedit a fonte in membra sed quatenus iam a membris est receptus. Proinde, sive principiative sumitur sive terminative, dicendus est affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae proprie symbolizari in sacrificio eucharistico. Aliter tamen et aliter. Proprie enim atque essentialiter affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae principiative sumptus repraesentatur in sacrificio eucharistico. Sed proprie et tamen accidentaliter affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae terminative sumptus repraesentatur in sacrificio eucharistico. Tria ergo tractemus. Primo demonstrandum erit affectum sacrificalem ecclesiae principiative sumptum symbolizari proprie in sacrificio eucharistico ratione analogicae proportionis. Secundo idem erit demonstrandum ratione exterius apparentium, institutionis, realisque coniunctionis. Tertio demonstrandum erit proprie sed accidentaliter in sacrificio eucharistico symbolizari affectum sacrificalem ecclesiae terminative sumptum. (c) Primo igitur ratione analogicae proportionis affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae principiative sumptus proprie in sacrificio eucharistico symbolizatur. Et sic proceditur. Symbolum principiativum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae est symbolum proprium eiusdem affectus. Atqui sacrificium eucharisticum est symbolum principiativum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae. Ergo sacrificium eucharisticum est symbolum proprium eiusdem affectus. Maior potest dici per se evidens: asserit enim symbolum principiativum alicuius affectus principiative sumpti est symbolum proprium eiusdem affectus principiative sumpti. Attamen maior potest generalius demonstrari ita ut includatur etiam affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae terminative sumptus. Nam illud symbolum est proprium quod analogice proportionatur ad perfectionem symbolizandam (id quod est definitio symboli proprii).

The Robert Mollot Collection

19

The Notion of Sacrifice

The sacrificial attitude of the church can be considered in two ways, namely, in its origin and in its term. Considered in its origin, the sacrificial attitude of the church is understood in its source, that is, as flowing from Christ its Head through the sacrifice of the cross continued and extended to the church by the Eucharistic sacrifice. Considered in its term, the sacrificial attitude of the church is understood as actually existing in the members of the church, that is, not insofar as it flows from its source to the members but insofar as it has already been received by the members. Accordingly, whether considered in its origin or its term, the sacrificial attitude of the church must be said to be properly symbolized in the Eucharistic sacrifice, but in a different way in each case. Considered in its origin, the sacrificial attitude of the church is properly and essentially represented in the Eucharistic sacrifice. Considered in its term, it is represented properly but per accidens in the Eucharistic sacrifice. There are three points, therefore, to be dealt with here. First we must demonstrate that the sacrificial attitude of the church considered in its origin is properly symbolized in the Eucharistic sacrifice by reason of analogical proportion. Second, the same must be demonstrated by reason of outward appearances, institution, and real connection. Third, we shall have to show that considered in its term, the sacrificial attitude of the church is properly but per accidens symbolized in the Eucharistic sacrifice. (c) First, then, by reason of analogical proportion, the sacrificial attitude of the church, considered in its origin, is properly symbolized in the Eucharistic sacrifice. We proceed as follows: An originating symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church is a proper symbol of that attitude. But the Eucharistic sacrifice is an originating symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church. Therefore the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of that attitude. The major premise of this syllogism can be said to be self-evident, for it asserts that an originating symbol of any attitude considered in its origin is a proper symbol of that attitude considered in its origin. However, the major premise can be shown more generally to include also the sacrificial attitude of the church considered in its term. For a proper symbol is one that is analogically proportionate to the perfection to be symbolized (this being the definition of a proper symbol).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

20

De Notione Sacrificii

Atqui symbolum principiativum analogice proportionatur ad perfectionem principiatam (in omni enim principio causali datur saltem proportio analogica ad principiatum). Ergo symbolum principiativum est etiam symbolum proprium. Minor remanet demonstranda: nempe sacrificium eucharisticum esse symbolum principiativum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae (utique principiative sumpti). Quod est symbolum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae videtur per se evidens; nam symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi eo ipso est symbolum omnis veri affectus sacrificalis quatenus affectus sacrificalis est. Remanet ergo ut monstretur hoc symbolum esse proprium. Et hoc tripliciter demonstratur: primo ratione commemorationis sacrificii crucis; secundo ratione applicationis eiusdem; tertio ratione procuratae participationis eiusdem in caena sacrificali. Primo ergo ratione commemorationis. Quod membris ecclesiae commemorat sacrificium crucis est symbolum principiativum affectus sacrificalis in membris. Atqui sacrificium eucharisticum membris ecclesiae commemorat sacrificium [crucis].6 Ergo ratione commemorationis sacrificium eucharisticum est symbolum principiativum affectus sacrificialis ecclesiae. Maior: nam commemorando exterius excitat ad affectum sacrificalem; exempla enim trahunt, et maxime illud exemplum de quo ipse Christus, ‘Et ego si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum’ (Io 12.32). Minor: ‘Hoc facite in mei memoriam.’ Praeterea, db 938. Secundo, ratione applicationis. Praenota: ne sit confusio inter operationem sacrificii et sacramenti; sacramentum efficit id quod significat; sed non esset verum dicere sacrificium significare affectum sacrificalem ideoque talem affectum efficere. Alia enim et profundior est operatio sacrificii unde derivatur et ipse virtus sacramentorum et praeterea voluntas ut recipiantur et dispositiones quibus fructuose recipiantur. Unde sic proceditur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

21

The Notion of Sacrifice

But an originating symbol of a perfection is analogically proportionate to the perfection that originates from it, for in every causal principle there is at least an analogical proportion to that which originates from it. Therefore an originating symbol is also a proper symbol. The minor premise remains to be proven: namely, that the Eucharistic sacrifice is an originating symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church (considered in its origin, of course). That it is a symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church seems selfevident, for any symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ is by that very fact a symbol of every true sacrificial attitude insofar as it is a sacrificial attitude. It remains, then, for us to show that this symbol is a proper one. This we do in three ways: first, by reason of its being a memorial of the sacrifice of the cross; second, by reason of the application of this sacrifice; third, by reason of the participation in this sacrifice procured in the sacrificial meal. First, by reason of its being a memorial: That which reminds the members of the church of the sacrifice of the cross is an originating symbol of a sacrificial attitude in those members. But the Eucharistic sacrifice reminds the members of the church of the sacrifice of the cross.6 Therefore by reason of its being a memorial the Eucharistic sacrifice is an originating symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church. As to the major premise: this external commemoration arouses a sacrificial attitude; examples draw one, most of all that example of which Christ himself said, ‘And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all to myself’ (John 12.32). As for the minor premise, recall Luke 22.19, ‘Do this in memory of me.’ See also db 938, ds 1740, nd 1546. Second, by reason of the application of the sacrifice of the cross. Note: Be careful not to confuse the operation of the sacrifice with the operation of the sacrament. A sacrament effects what it signifies, but it would not be true to say that since a sacrifice signifies a sacrificial attitude it therefore effects such an attitude. The effect of the sacrifice is quite different: it operates at a deeper level, and is the source from which flow the power of the sacraments as well as both the willingness to receive them and the dispositions required for their fruitful reception. We proceed now to our proof:

6 [Reading crucis for eucharisticum.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

22

De Notione Sacrificii

Quod applicat sacrificium crucis est principiativum affectus sacrificalis membrorum ecclesiae. Atqui sacrificium eucharisticum applicat sacrificium crucis. Ergo est principiativum affectus sacrificalis membrorum. Maior: quod applicat sacrificium crucis est natum aptumque a Deo propitiato impetrare ut membris ecclesiae donetur cum alia sanctitas tum principalis illa sanctitas quae est rectitudo affectus erga Deum et ideo affectus sacrificalis. Minor: doctrina solemnis Tridentini (db 938) et theologorum (e.g., iii, 83, 1). Tertio, ratione procuratae participationis. Quod procurat participationem sacrificii crucis, procurat assimilationem affectus membrorum ad affectum sacrificalem Christi. Atqui sacrificium eucharisticum procurat participationem sacrificii crucis. Ergo procurat assimilationem affectus membrorum ad affectum sacrificalem Christi, ideoque est principiativum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae. Maior: nam in participatione sacrificii crucis per communionem spiritualem et maxime per communionem sacramentalem, efficitur intima unio inter Caput et membra et assimilantur affectus membrorum cum ad alios affectus Capitis tum maxime ad affectum sacrificalem Capitis. Minor: sacrificium eucharisticum procurat participationem sacrificii crucis, nam est idem sacrificium sola offerendi ratione diversa (db 940) et in hoc sacrificio membra communicare debent saltem spiritualiter (db 944).

(d) Deinde, sicut supra ratione analogicae proportionis inter principium et principiatum, ita nunc ratione exterius apparentium, ratione institutionis, ratione realis coniunctionis, demonstrandum est sacrificium eucharisticum esse symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis membrorum principiative sumpti.

The Robert Mollot Collection

23

The Notion of Sacrifice

That which applies the sacrifice of the cross is an originating principle of the sacrificial attitude of the members of the church. But the Eucharistic sacrifice applies the sacrifice of the cross. Therefore the Eucharistic sacrifice is an originating principle of the sacrificial attitude of those members. As to the major premise: that which applies the sacrifice of the cross is by its very nature suited to obtain from God, appeased by that sacrifice, the gift of holiness for the members of the church, including that basic holiness which consists in the right attitude towards God and hence a sacrificial attitude. The minor premise is the solemn teaching of the Council of Trent (db 938, ds 1740, nd 1546) as well as of theologians – for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 83, a. 1. Third, by reason of the participation in the sacrifice of the cross procured through the Eucharistic sacrifice: That which procures a participation in the sacrifice of the cross procures an assimilation of the attitude of the members of the church to the sacrificial attitude of Christ. But the Eucharistic sacrifice procures a participation in the sacrifice of the cross. Therefore, it procures an assimilation of the attitude of the members to the sacrificial attitude of Christ and so is an originating principle of the sacrificial attitude of the church. As to the major premise: participating in the sacrifice of the cross by spiritual communion and especially by sacramental communion effects an intimate union between the Head and the members. The attitudes of the members are assimilated to those of the Head, including above all Christ’s sacrificial attitude. As to the minor premise: the Eucharistic sacrifice procures a participation in the sacrifice of the cross, for they are one and the same sacrifice with only the manner of offering being different (db 940, ds 1743, nd 1548); moreover, in this sacrifice the members ought to communicate at least spiritually (db 944, ds 1747, nd 1552). (d) Next, just as we have shown that by reason of the analogical proportion between a principle and that which originates from it the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the members’ sacrificial attitude considered in its origin, so now we must go on to demonstrate the same by reason of the outward appearances of that sacrifice, by reason of its institution, and by reason of its real connection.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

24

De Notione Sacrificii

Primo, ratione exterius apparentium ingreditur ecclesia cum in rem oblatam tum in ipsam oblationem sacrificii eucharistici. Ingreditur in rem oblatam: aqua enim vino admiscetur ut repraesentetur unio ecclesiae cum suo Capite in hoc sacrificio (db 945). Ingreditur in ipsam oblationem: nam sacrificium eucharisticum fit sacerdotum ministerio (db 940); qui sacerdotes sunt ministri publici ecclesiae (db 944); unde et ipsa ecclesia immolat Christum (db 938). Secundo, ratione institutionis. Ecclesia enim est sponsa illa sancta et immaculata (Eph 5.27) quae tamen nullum aliud symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis agnoscit quam sacrificium eucharisticum. Quae lex et institutio, cum sit iure divino, clare et distincte demonstrat sacrificium eucharisticum esse proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae. Tertio, ratione realis coniunctionis. Idem est principium cum affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae tum etiam ipsius membrorum coadunationis ad Christum et inter se. Hoc idem principium est Christus sub speciebus panis et vini. Quod est principium affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae est iam demonstratum. Quod est principium coadunationis corporis mystici alibi demonstrabitur.7 In eo ergo corpore, unde ecclesia est corpus, exhibetur tamquam in suo fonte et principio affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae. Datur ergo in sacrificio eucharistico coniunctio dynamica inter symbolum et symbolizata, sicut in cruce dabatur coniunctio physica et in vetere lege coniunctio moralis. Obiecerit tamen quispiam: pariter valere has rationes circa affectum sacrificalem membrorum terminative sumptum quam circa eundem affectum principiative sumptum. Respondetur quod non pariter. Nam haec fere omnia in ipsam essentiam sacrificii eucharistici ingrediuntur. E contra, constat actualem illum affectum sacrificalem ecclesiae qui terminative sumitur (puta, affectus sancto-

The Robert Mollot Collection

25

The Notion of Sacrifice

First, by reason of the outward appearances, the church enters both into that which is offered and into the very offering of the Eucharistic sacrifice. It enters into that which is offered; for the water is mixed with the wine in order to represent the union of the church with its Head in this sacrifice (db 945, ds 1748, nd 1553). It enters also into the offering itself; for the Eucharistic sacrifice is effected through the ministry of priests (db 940, ds 1743, nd 1548) who are public ministers of the church (db 944, ds 1747, nd 1552), and so the church itself offers Christ (db 938, ds 1740, nd 1546). Second, by reason of its institution. The church is that holy and spotless bride (Ephesians 5.27) who, however, recognizes no other proper symbol of her sacrificial attitude than the Eucharistic sacrifice. This law and institution, since it is of divine right, demonstrates clearly and distinctly that the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the church. Third, by reason of its real connection. The principle of the sacrificial attitude of the church is the same as that of the union of its members with Christ and with one another. This principle is Christ under the appearance of bread and of wine. We have already shown that this is the principle of the sacrificial attitude of the church. That it is the principle of the unity of the mystical body is demonstrated elsewhere.7 In that Body, therefore, whence the church herself is a body, is to be found the sacrificial attitude of the church in its source and principle. Hence in the Eucharistic sacrifice there is a dynamic unity between the symbol and the symbolized, just as on the cross there was a physical unity and in the Old Law a moral unity. Someone might object here that the above reasons apply equally to the sacrificial attitude of the members considered in its term and to this same attitude considered in its origin. No, we reply, not equally. All the elements mentioned above enter into the very essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice. On the contrary, it is clear that the actual sacrificial attitude of the members considered in its term (such

7 Maurice de la Taille, Mysterium Fidei. De augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi sacrificio atque sacramento: Elucidationes L in tres libros distinctae (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 3rd ed., 1931) Eluc. 36–38 = pp. 474–98.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

26

De Notione Sacrificii

rum commemoratos, affectum celebrantis, stipem dantis, adstantium, etc.) non intrare nisi accidentaliter in hoc sacrificium. (e) Hactenus de affectu sacrificali membrorum prout exsistit in causis suis, primo, in anima Christi, deinde, in sacrificio crucis, tertio, in sacrificio eucharistico. Iam est agendum de affectu sacrificali ecclesiae prout est in effectu, seu prout terminative exsistit in mentibus cordibusque Christianorum. Porro, circa hunc affectum terminative sumptum datur duplex consideratio: considerari enim potest, primo, tamquam principiatus seu quatenus totus derivatur ab affectu sacrificali Christi; sed etiam considerari potest prout est affectus in tali subiecto, puta, in Petro vel Ioanne vel alio quolibet. Proinde, affectus sacrificalis membrorum terminative sumptus, prout tamen totus derivatur ab affectu Christi, proprie symbolizatur per proprium symbolum affectus Christi. Alia ex parte, affectus sacrificalis membrorum prout est affectus in tali et tali persona, proprie repraesentatur per aliquam actionem manifestativam affectus istius personae. Iam vero secundum utramque considerationem affectus sacrificalis membrorum habet proprium suum symbolum per ministerium sacrificii eucharistici, nempe, omnia procurando, parando, faciendo ad dignam huius mysterii celebrationem, sive exterius sive interius. Sicut enim affectus actu exsistens membrorum totus quantus derivatur ab affectu Christi, nullum aliud proprium symbolum haberi potest nisi symbolum proprium affectus Christi. Quatenus ergo membra ministerialiter concurrunt ad tale symbolum efficiendum, manifestant suum affectum eumque in proprio suo proximo principio manifestant; et quidem unusquisque secundum gradum suum in corpore mystico hierarchice organizato. Attamen, non essentiale sed accidentale est sacrificio eucharistico repraesentare affectum sacrificalem membrorum terminative sumptum. Nam quantum ad id quod repraesentatur, semper est idem affectus sacrificalis Capitis. Quantum vero ad modum quo repraesentatur, nihil essentiale addit affectus sacrificalis actualis membrorum sicut nec quidquam essentiale demit defectus sanctitatis: nam ‘illa munda oblatio est, quae nulla indignitate aut malitia offerentium inqinari potest’ (db 939).

The Robert Mollot Collection

27

The Notion of Sacrifice

as the attitude of the saints commemorated in the liturgy, the attitude of the celebrant, the stipend of the donor or of the congregation, and so on) enter only per accidens into this sacrifice. (e) So far we have been considering the sacrificial attitude of the members as existing in its causes: first, in the mind and heart of Christ, next, in the sacrifice of the cross, and third in the Eucharistic sacrifice. Now we must turn our attention to the sacrificial attitude of the church as it is in its effect, that is, as it exists in its term, in the minds and hearts of Christians. Now this attitude considered in its term can be further looked at under two aspects: first, as originating from its source, that is, as entirely flowing from Christ’s sacrificial attitude; but it can also be looked at as an attitude in this or that subject, in Peter or John or anyone else. Accordingly, the sacrificial attitude of the members considered in its term, yet as entirely derived from Christ’s attitude, is properly symbolized by a proper symbol of Christ’s attitude. On the other hand, the sacrificial attitude of the members as an attitude found in this or that person is properly expressed by some action that manifests the attitude of that person. Under both aspects the sacrificial attitude of the members has its proper symbol through the ministry surrounding the Eucharistic service, that is, in obtaining and preparing and carrying out all that is needed for the worthy and proper celebration of this mystery, both externally and interiorly. For just as this attitude as actually existing in the members is derived in its totality from Christ’s attitude, there can be no other proper symbol for it than the proper symbol of Christ’s attitude. Insofar, then, as the members come together as ministers to produce this symbol, they manifest their own attitude and manifest it in its proper proximate principle – each person, however, according to his or her degree in the hierarchically organized mystical body. Nevertheless, it is not essential but accidental for the Eucharistic sacrifice to represent the sacrificial attitude of the members considered in its term. For what is represented is always the same sacrificial attitude of the Head. As to the manner in which this is represented, however, the actual sacrificial attitude of the members adds no essential element, nor does any lack of holiness take away any essential element: ‘… that clean oblation, which no unworthiness or sinfulness on the part of those who offer it can defile’ (db 939, ds 1742, nd 1547).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

28

De Notione Sacrificii

(f) Quibus dictis conclusiones sunt colligendae. Sacrificium eucharisticum est proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis Christi Capitis, primo, prout repraesentatur in sacrificio crucis, secundo, prout ad membra derivatur per sacrificium eucharisticum multiplicandus, tertio, prout in membris cooperantibus iam est multiplicatus. Est ergo sacrificium eucharisticum symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis corporis Christi mystici, tam Capitis quam membrorum; essentialiter quidem est symbolum huius affectus qui est in Capite et a Capite in membra derivatur; accidentaliter vero est symbolum eiusdam affectus actu derivati.

6

De Causis Sacrificii

Hactenus de sola essentia actum est, nempe, de eo quo sacrificium est sacrificium. Iam ad considerationem latiorem proceditur et distinguuntur variae causae. (a) Causa exemplaris Causa exemplaris sacrificii est id quod repraesentatur, scilicet, sacrificium invisibile quo anima se offert Deo, seu affectus sacrificalis. Quemadmodum subiectio totalis animae ad Deum sit centrum sanctitatis et iustitiae, vide i, q. 95, a. 1; i-ii, q. 113, a. 1; etc. Haec interna oblatio et immolatio animae communiter dicitur ‘sacrificium improprie dictum’ quia non est symbolum; forsitan convenientius diceretur ‘sacrificium invisibile,’ ‘sacrificium exemplare,’ ‘sacrificium eminenter sumptum’; est enim unde sit sacrificium et quo tendat. (b) Causa finalis Sacrificia esse in honorem cultumque Dei inter omnes constat; sed quemadmodum hoc sit, perspiciendum. Omnia ergo sunt propter Deum, causam finalem, tripliciter: absolute, quatenus Deus est ultimus finis-qui universitatis creatae; horizontaliter, quatenus omnia tendunt ex natura sua ad aliquid constituendum quod est participatio quaedam perfectionis divinae; verticaliter, quatenus concrete in universo hierarchico inferiora quaeque ita ordinantur in superiora ut totum sit ad ipsum Deum attingendum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

29

The Notion of Sacrifice

(f) Let us sum up the above conclusions. The Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ as Head, first, as that attitude is represented in the sacrifice of the cross, second, as destined to flow to the members of the church through multiplication of the Eucharistic sacrifice, and third, as now multiplied in the members themselves through their active participation. The Eucharistic sacrifice is therefore a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the mystical body of Christ, of its Head as well as of its members. Essentially it is a symbol of that attitude which is in the Head and flows from the Head to the members; accidentally it is a symbol of this same attitude as actually received in the members. 6

The Causes of Sacrifice

So far we have been dealing only with the essence of sacrifice, namely, that by which a sacrifice is a sacrifice. Now we broaden our consideration to determine its various causes. (a) Exemplary cause The exemplary cause of a sacrifice is that which is represented, namely, the invisible sacrifice by which the soul offers herself to God, that is, her sacrificial attitude. As to how this total submission of the soul to God is the very core of holiness and righteousness, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 95, a. 1; 1-2, q. 113, a. 1; and so forth. This interior offering and immolation of the soul is generally referred to as a ‘sacrifice in an improper sense’ because it is not a symbol; it might perhaps be more appropriate to call it an ‘invisible sacrifice,’ an ‘exemplary sacrifice,’ or a ‘sacrifice in an eminent sense,’ since it is that from which a sacrifice originates and toward which it tends. (b) Final cause All agree that sacrifices take place to honor and worship God; but we must now try to understand how this is so. All things exist for God as their final cause, and this in three ways: absolutely, inasmuch as God is the ultimate end (finis-qui) of the created universe; horizontally, inasmuch as all beings tend by their very nature to constitute something that is a certain participation in the divine perfection; and vertically, inasmuch as concretely in the hierarchy of the universe, lower beings are ordered to the higher ones in such a way that the whole exists to attain God.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

30

De Notione Sacrificii

Iamvero sacrificium potest dupliciter considerari: primo, materialiter prout est res quaedam actioque, et sic est propter Deum secundum datum modum triplicem sicut quaelibet alia res vel actio; secundo, sumi potest sacrificium formaliter prout est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis, et sic sacrificium est obiectiva et symbolica agnitio atque approbatio ipsius huius triplicis finalitatis omnium rerum in Deum. Unde finalitas sacrificii formalis est esse compendium quoddam symbolicum finalitatis universi in Deum. (c) Causa efficiens Causa efficiens sacrificii est causa quae efficit ut constituatur symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis. Non omnis causa efficiens est etiam offerens sacrificium: Deus enim primum agens efficit omnia sacrificia sed sibi ipse non offert sacrificia. Offerens sacrificium est duplex: principalis et ministerialis. Principalis est causa per se, efficiens, proxima, sua virtute proportionata: unde colliges non Iudaeos deicidas obtulisse sacrificium crucis; non enim erant causa per se quibus praeter intentionem fiebat hoc sacrificium. Ministerialis: est causa per se, efficiens, proxima, sed per virtutem alienam proportionata. Ministerialis est duplex: quae ministrat proprio nomine, et sic ecclesia quae est corpus mysticum ministrat et offert; quae ministrat nomine alterius, et sic celebrans ministrat nomine ecclesiae. (d) Causa honestatis sacrifici Late dicitur omne quod confert ad hoc quod sacrificium sit honestum: offerens, oblatum, finis intentus, circumstantiae. Stricte habetur ex honestate offerentium sive principaliter sive etiam ministerialiter modo proprio nomine agunt. Unde sacrificium eucharisticum inquinari non potest: non ex offerante principali qui est Christus impeccabilis; non ex ministerio ecclesiae quae est sponsa illa sancta et immaculata de quo Eph. 5.27. Ministerium vero celebrantium, etc., fit alieno nomine neque ipsum sacrificium afficit nisi accidentaliter per complementum extrinsecum. (e) Causa acceptationis sacrificii

The Robert Mollot Collection

31

The Notion of Sacrifice

Now a sacrifice can be considered in two ways: first, materially, as consisting of a certain thing and action, and in this sense it exists for God according to the three ways mentioned above like any other thing or action; second, formally, as a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude, and in this sense a sacrifice is an objective symbolic recognition and approval of this threefold finality of all things towards God. Hence the finality of a formal sacrifice is to be a compendious symbol of the finality of the universe towards God. (c) Efficient cause The efficient cause of a sacrifice is that cause which constitutes it as a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. Not every efficient cause of a sacrifice is also an offerer of that sacrifice: God as first agent effects all sacrifices but does not offer sacrifices to himself. Those who offer a sacrifice are of two kinds: principal and ministerial. The principal offerer is a cause per se, efficient, proximate, and proportionate by its own power. Hence the Jews in putting Christ to death did not offer the sacrifice of the cross, for they were not its cause per se since they had no intention to offer this sacrifice. The ministerial offerer is a cause per se, efficient and proximate, but proportionate through the power of another. There are two kinds of ministerial causes, one who ministers in his own name, and it is in this way that the church as the mystical body ministers and offers; and one who ministers in the name of another, and in this way the celebrant ministers in the name of the church. (d) The cause of the worthiness of a sacrifice Broadly speaking, everything that contributes to the worthiness of a sacrifice is such a cause: the one who offers, that which is offered, the intention, the circumstances. Strictly speaking, the worthiness of a sacrifice results from the worthiness of those who offer it, the principal offerer or even the ministerial offerer acting in his own name. It is for this reason that the Eucharistic sacrifice is incapable of defilement: not from the principal offerer, Christ who is without sin, nor from the ministry of the church, that holy and spotless bride referred to in Ephesians 5.27. The ministry of the celebrants and others is carried out in the name of another and affects the sacrifice itself only accidentally by way of an extrinsic complement. (e) The cause of the acceptance of a sacrifice

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

32

De Notione Sacrificii

Sacrificium offertur Deo colendo, propitiando, gratiis donando, impetrando. Quod si a Deo acceptatur, pro divino beneplacito est. Tamen hoc non est intelligendum ac si Deus pro lubito irrationabili hoc acceptet et illud reiciat sacrificium. Sensus est Deum sicut facit ut sacrificia offerantur etiam facere ut offerantur acceptabilia et oblata acceptentur pro divina sua sapientia et providentia. (f) Causa materialis Idem dicit quod oblatum, immolatum, victima, hostia, donatum, sacrificatum (utique materialiter sumpta). Est illud subiectum quod est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis; est res significans, repraesentans, symbolizans; et quidem prout fit praecisio ab obiectiva significatione, repraesentatione, symbolizatione. Propter mysticum sacrificium eucharisticum quod constat elemento apparente et elemento latente, fit distinctio inter causam materialem substantialem et causam materialem modalem. Causa materialis substantialis est subiectum substantiale in quo fit repraesentatio, significatio, symbolizatio propria alicuius affectus sacrificalis; puta, corpus Domini nostri Iesu Christi. Causa materialis modalis est species externa sub qua latet causa materialis substantialis; puta, sub specie propria vel aliena. (g) Causa formalis Est ipsa propria repraesentatio, significatio, symbolizatio alicuius affectus sacrificalis. Est hostia, victima, oblatum, immolatum, donatum, sacrificatum formaliter sumptum; puta, non qua talis res sed praecise qua hostia, etc.; seu est talis res non qua res sed praecise qua symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis. Porro, propter mysticum sacrificium eucharisticum in quo et elementum latens et elementum apparens dantur et utrisque habetur proprietas symbolizantis seu significationis, distinguuntur causa formalis quoad substantiam et causa formalis quoad modum. Causa formalis quoad modum invenitur in exterius apparentibus, puta, cruente vel incruente, per ministros vel sine ministris, et eiusmodi. Causa formalis quoad substantiam invenitur in iis elementis propriae repraesentationis quae exterius non apparent, puta, significationem, institutionem, realem coniunctionem, etc., quae intellectu conspiciuntur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

33

The Notion of Sacrifice

Sacrifice is offered to worship, propitiate, thank, and petition God. But its acceptance rests upon God’s good pleasure. This, however, is not to be understood as if God capriciously accepts one sacrifice and rejects another. The meaning is rather that just as God provides for sacrifices to be offered, so also does he see to it that what is offered is acceptable to him, and these offerings are accepted in accordance with his wisdom and providence. (f) Material cause The material cause is that which is offered, that which is immolated, the victim, the gift, that which is sacrificed (understood materially). It is that subject which is the proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude; it is that which signifies, represents, symbolizes, and that does so prescinding from any objective signification, representation, or symbolization. Because the mystical Eucharistic sacrifice consists of a visible element and a hidden one, we distinguish between its substantial material cause and its modal material cause. The substantial material cause is the substantial subject in which there is a proper signification, representation, symbolization of some sacrificial attitude, that is, the body of our Lord Jesus Christ. The modal material cause is the external appearance under which the substantial material cause is found, whether that be its own proper appearance or the appearance of something else. (g) Formal cause The formal cause is a proper representation, signification, symbolization of some sacrificial attitude. It is the victim, offering, gift, that which is immolated or sacrificed, understood in a formal sense – that is, not as this or that thing but precisely as victim, offering, and so on. In other words, it is this or that thing not as a thing but precisely as a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. Again, because there is in the mystical Eucharistic sacrifice a hidden element and a visible element and both have the property of symbolizing or signifying, we distinguish between its substantial formal cause and its modal formal cause. The modal formal cause is found in the various elements that appear outwardly, such as the bloody or unbloody manner of the sacrifice, through ministers or without ministers, and the like. The substantial formal cause is found in those elements of a proper representation which do not appear externally, such as the signification, the institution, the real connection, and so forth, which are apprehended intellectually.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

34

De Notione Sacrificii

(h) Nota de sensu quorundam verborum Quadrupliciter ergo dici possunt ‘oblatio’ ‘immolatio’ ‘donatio’ ‘victimatio’ et eiusmodi. Primo, eminenter quatenus dicunt interiorem oblationem sacrificii invisibilis quo anima se offert Deo. Quod eminens esse convenienter dicitur, nam ex invisibili sacrificio caetera omnia profluunt. Secundo, formaliter quatenus dicunt ipsam propriam repraesentationem seu symbolizationem affectus sacrificalis. Et hic usus subdividi potest in formaliter quoad modum et formaliter quoad substantiam, utique ratione singularis sacrificii eucharistici quod est consummatio et perfectio caeterorum omnium veteris legis (db 939). Formalis quoad substantiam est oblatio, immolatio, donatio, etc., quatenus obiective verum est quod Christus suum corpus et sanguinem offert, immolat, donat. Formalis quoad modum est oblatio, immolatio, donatio, etc., quatenus obiective verum est quod cruente vel incruente, sub specie propria vel specie aliena, sine ministerio sacerdotum vel cum ministerio sacerdotum, Christus suum corpus et sanguinem donat, offert, immolat. Denique materialiter dicitur oblatio, donatio, immolatio quatenus adest modus formalis praecisione facta a ratione sacrificii: puta, id quod sensu et phantasia ducti homines censent essentiam sacrificii, nempe, sanguinis cruentam effusionem, corporis mortem vel combustionem, altare, calicem, panem, sacrorum verborum pronunciationem, vestimenta, candelas, etc. (i) Nota de fundamento datae distinctionis Primo, cum sacrificium visibile sit invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, ineptum prorsus est procedere a modo materiali (puta, sanguinis effusionem) ad rationem oblationis, donationis, immolationis. Sed procedendum est a sacrificio invisibili suaque interna oblatione ad eandem qua repraesentatam ut ultimo loco ad materialem modum repraesentationis perveniamus. Secundo, quantum ad distinctionem inter oblationem, immolationem, formalem quoad substantiam et quoad modum attinet, fundamentum est concilium Tridentinum. Sanctissima enim synodus nominat pariter sacrificium crucis et sacrificium eucharisticum cum oblationem tum immolationem: ‘semel se ipsum in ara crucis … oblaturus erat’ (db 938)

The Robert Mollot Collection

35

The Notion of Sacrifice

(h) A note on the meaning of certain words The words ‘oblation,’ ‘immolation,’ ‘donation,’ and the like can be taken in four different ways: Eminently, as referring to the interior offering of that invisible sacrifice by which the soul offers herself to God. The term ‘eminent’ is fitting, for from this interior and invisible sacrifice everything else follows. Formally, as referring to the proper representation or symbolization of a sacrificial attitude. This usage can be further divided into modally formal and substantially formal by reason of this unique Eucharistic sacrifice which is the fulfilment and consummation of all the sacrifices of the old law (db 939, ds 1742, nd 1547). Substantially formal is the act of offering, immolating, giving, and so on, inasmuch as it is objectively true that Christ offers, immolates, and gives his body and blood. Modally formal is the act of offering, immolating, giving, and so forth, inasmuch as it is objectively true that whether in a bloody or unbloody manner, whether under his own appearance or under that of something else, whether with or without the ministry of priests, Christ offers, immolates, and gives his body and blood. Finally, offering, immolating, giving, and so on, are taken materially when the formal mode is present but prescinding from the essential idea of sacrifice; for example, what people, led by their senses and imagination, look upon as the essence of a sacrifice: the actual shedding of blood, the killing or burning of a body, an altar, a chalice, bread, the uttering of sacred words, vestments, candles, and the rest. (i) A note on the basis for the above distinction First, since the visible sacrifice is a sacrament of an invisible sacrifice, it is quite inappropriate to proceed from a material mode (from the shedding of blood, for example) to the essential notion of oblation, donation, immolation. One should proceed rather from the invisible sacrifice and its interior offering to that offering as represented and so finally to arrive at the material manner of representation. Second, as regards the distinction between substantially formal and modally formal offering or immolation, the basis for this is found in the Council of Trent. For this holy synod refers indifferently to the sacrifice of the cross and the Eucharistic sacrifice as both offering and immolation: ‘… who was once and for all to offer himself … on the altar of the Cross …’ (db 938, ds 1740–41, nd 1546);

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

36

De Notione Sacrificii

‘sub speciebus panis et vini … obtulit’ (db 938) ‘se ipsum ab Ecclesia per sacerdotes … immolandum’ (db 938) ‘in Missa … Christus … incruente immolatur qui in ara crucis semel se ipsum cruente obtulit’ (db 940). Deinde, sanctissima synodus asserit identitatem quandam inter crucem et missam: ‘Una enim eademque est hostia; idem nunc offerens …’ Sed addit differentiam in ratione offerendi, quae differentia, quatenus a concilio proponitur in eo est quod alia cruenta, alia incruenta, alia sub propria specie, alia sub speciebus panis et vini, alia sine sacerdotum ministerio, alia cum tali ministerio (db 938, 940).

Quae omnia simul sumpta solidum praebent fundamentum distinguendi inter rationem formalem quoad substantiam et quoad modum: quoad substantiam ratio formalis est quod Christus corpus suum obtulit seu immolavit; quoad modum ratio formalis est quod fecit cruente vel incruente, sub specie propria vel aliena, sine vel cum ministris.

( j) De effectibus seu fructibus sacrificii Effectus proprius sacrificii est eiusdem finis intrinsecus seu forma, nempe, constitutum symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis. Quod si hoc symbolum constitutum a Deo acceptatur, accedunt qui dicuntur fructus sacrificii. Fructus primarii sunt cultus honorque Deo datus, Dei propitiatio, Deo gratiae actae, petitiones ad Deum delatae modo acceptabili et acceptato. Fructus secundarii sunt qui in hominem a divina largitate redundant: peccatorum remissio, poenarum satisfactio, gratiarum donatio, petitionum exauditio. 7

De Differentia Sacrificiorum Crucis et Missae

‘Unum itaque et idem sacrificium esse fatemur, et haberi debet, quod in missa pergitur, et quod in cruce oblatum est; quemadmodum una est et

The Robert Mollot Collection

37

The Notion of Sacrifice

‘… he offered [his body and blood] under the appearances of bread and wine …’ (db 938, ds 1740–41, nd 1546); ‘… he himself was … to be immolated by the church through her priests …’ (db 938, ds 1740–41, nd 1546); ‘… in the Mass there is the same Christ immolated in an unbloody manner who in a bloody manner offered himself once on the altar of the cross …’ (db 940, ds 1743, nd 1548). Next, the Council affirms a certain identity between the cross and the Mass: ‘It is one and the same victim who then offered himself on the cross and now makes his offering …’ But it goes on to state the difference in the manner of the offering, which difference, as expressed by the Council, consists in the fact that one is a bloody sacrifice, the other unbloody, one is in Christ’s proper appearance, the other under the appearances of bread and wine, one is carried out without priests, the other through their ministry (db 938, 940; ds 1740–41, 1743; nd 1546, 1548). All of these points taken together provide us with solid grounds for distinguishing between the substantially formal aspect and the modally formal aspect. As to substance, the formal aspect is the fact that Christ offered, or immolated, his body; as to mode, the formal aspect is the fact that he has done so in a bloody or in an unbloody manner, under his own proper appearance or under the appearance of something else, with or without the ministry of priests. ( j) The effects, or fruits, of a sacrifice The proper effect of a sacrifice is the same as its intrinsic end or form, namely, the constitution of a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. If this symbol is accepted by God, there follow what are called the fruits of the sacrifice. The primary fruits are worship and honor given to God, the propitiating of God, thanks given to God, and petitions presented to God in an acceptable way, and accepted. The secondary fruits are those benefits which the divine largesse grants to us: the forgiveness of sins, satisfaction for the debt of punishment, the granting of graces, and answering prayers of petition. 7

The Difference between the Sacrifice of the Cross and the Mass

‘We assert, and it must be held, that it is one and the same sacrifice that takes place in the Mass and that was offered on the cross; for the victim is

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

38

De Notione Sacrificii

eadem hostia, Christus videlicet dominus noster, qui seipsum in ara crucis semel tantummodo cruentum immolavit. Neque enim cruenta et incruenta hostia duae sunt hostiae, sed una tantum; cuius sacrificium, postquam Dominus ita praecepit “hoc facite in meam commemorationem” in eucharistia quotidie instauratur. ‘Sed unus etiam atque idem sacerdos est Christus dominus. Nam ministri qui sacrificium faciunt, non suam sed Christi personam suscipiunt, cum eius corpus et sanguinem conficiunt. Id quod et ipsius consecrationis verbis ostenditur. Neque enim sacerdos inquit “hoc est corpus Christi” sed “hoc est corpus meum”: personam videlicet Christi domini gerens, panis et vini substantiam in veram eius corporis et sanguinis substantiam convertit. ‘Quae cum ita sint, sine ulla dubitatione docendum est, id quod sancta synodus explicavit, sacrosanctum missae sacrificium esse non solum laudis, et gratiarum actionis, aut nudam commemorationem sacrificii, quod in cruce factum est; sed vere etiam propitiatorium sacrificium quo Deus nobis placatus et propitius redditur. Quare si puro corde …’8 E quibus colligitur dare unitatem quandam identitatemque inter sacrificium crucis et missae, unde hoc non nuda commemoratio sed vere propitiatorium sacrificium. Quod quidem communi loquendi modo confirmatur: nemo enim de sacrificiis novae legis loquitur sed de sacrificio novae legis. Quemadmodum vero detur haec unitas, quaestio perplexa est sed, uti opinor, fundamentalis prorsus. Nam si resoluta fuerit, omnes alias quaestiones facile resolutum iri videtur. Sic ergo quaestio ponatur: utrum unum numerice idemque sit sacrificium crucis et sacrificium missae.9 Dicitur primo: non datur quoad omnia unitas identitasque numerica. Probatur: contradictorie opponuntur ‘cruente’ ‘incruente’; ‘sub specie propria’ ‘sub specie aliena’; ‘sine ministris’ ‘sacerdotum ministerio’; unde saltem ratio offerendi differt. Cf. db 938, 940.

Dicitur secundo: non omnino potest negari omnis unitas identitasque numerica.

The Robert Mollot Collection

39

The Notion of Sacrifice

one and the same, namely Christ our Lord, who offered himself only once in a bloody manner upon the altar of the cross. Nor does the fact that the victim, being bloody and also unbloody, mean that there are two victims; there is but one victim, whose sacrifice, following the Lord’s command, “Do this in memory of me,” is renewed daily in the Eucharist. ‘But there is also the same priest, Christ the Lord. For the ministers who perform this sacrifice act not in their own person but in the person of Christ when they bring forth upon the altar his body and blood. This is evident from the very words of consecration: the priest does not say, “This is the body of Christ,” but “This is my body”; acting, that is, in the person of Christ the Lord, he changes the substance of bread and wine into the true substance of Christ’s body and blood. ‘This being the case, what the holy synod explained must be taught without demur, that the holy sacrifice of the Mass is not only an act of praise and thanksgiving, nor a mere memorial of the sacrifice of the cross; it is truly a propitiatory sacrifice which placates God and renders him propitious towards us. If, therefore, in purity of heart, …’8 From this we conclude that there is a certain unity and identity between the sacrifice of the cross and the sacrifice of the Mass, so that the latter is not a mere memorial but a truly propitiatory sacrifice. This finds its confirmation in the ordinary manner of speaking: we do not speak of the sacrifices of the new law but of the sacrifice of the new law. How this unity is had, however, is a perplexing question but, in my opinion, quite fundamental. For if this is solved, all other questions would, it seems, be easily solved as well. Let us therefore state the question: are the sacrifice of the cross and the sacrifice of the Mass numerically one and the same?9 Assertion 1: There is not in every respect numerical unity and identity. Proof: ‘Bloody’ and ‘unbloody,’ ‘under his own proper appearance’ and ‘under the appearance of something else,’ and ‘without ministers’ and ‘through the ministry of priests’ are mutually contradictory; hence at least the manner of offering is different (db 938, 940; ds 1740–41, 1743; nd 1546, 1548). Assertion 2: Not all numerical unity and identity can be denied.

8 Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini … (Rome: Ex typographia polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1907) part ii, chapter iv, §§76–78, pp. 232–33. 9 See dtc x (19) 1286–89 [and note 2, above].

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

40

De Notione Sacrificii

Hebr. 9.25: ‘non ut saepe offerat’ Hebr. 9.28: ‘semel oblatus est’ Hebr. 10.12: ‘unam pro peccatis offerens hostiam’ ubi ‘offerens’ stat pro aoristo ‘prosenenkas’ et totum opponitur ‘easdem saepe offerens hostias.’

Hebr. 10.14: ‘una enim oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos’ Conc. Trid.: ‘vere propitiatorium esse … Una enim eademque est hostia, idem nunc offerens … sola offerendi ratione diversa’ (db 940). Cat. Rom.: ‘unum idemque sacrificium’ ‘neque cruenta et incruenta hostia, duae sunt hostiae’ unde ‘vere propitiatorium’ neque ‘nuda commemoratio.’10 Dices: possunt fieri distinctiones: non saepe offert cruente; semel oblatus cruente; una hostia materialiter spectata, scil. idem corpus quod saepius offertur et sacrificatur; unum idemque sacrificium ratione hostiae materialiter spectatae et offerentis materialiter sumpti; non duae hostiae materialiter, sed duae formaliter. Respondeo: concedo has distinctiones fieri posse cum maiori vel minori ratione; melius probabiliusque opinari quis videtur qui distinctionibus non indiget quibus non indiguit S. Paulus, C. Trid., Cat. Rom; denique addatur ratio theologica. Si aliud sacrificium additur sacrificio crucis, hoc videtur aestimari insufficiens. Contra, si idem sacrificium, clarissime constat cum sacrificium crucis esse sufficiens tum sacrificium missae non esse nudam commemorationem sed vere propitiatorium. Et haec videtur argumentatio concilii Tridentini et Cat. Rom. Unde ad solutionem problematis. Primo, non agitur de sacrificio invisibili Christi, de sacrificio eminenti quod interius mente et corde perficitur. Praeterea, hoc sacrificium qua praesuppositum non facit difficultatem specialem: si enim sacrificium crucis et missae est aliqua ratione numerice

The Robert Mollot Collection

41

The Notion of Sacrifice

Hebrews 9.25: ‘… he does not have to offer himself again and again …’ Hebrews 9.28: ‘… Christ … offered himself only once …’ Hebrews 10.12: ‘But when Christ had offered’ (ʌȡȠıİȞȑȖțĮȢ, aorist participle) …; the whole statement is in contrast to [the priests of the old law] ‘… offering [ʌȡȠıijȑȡȦȞ, present participle] again and again the same sacrifices …’ (v. 11). Hebrews 10.14: ‘By virtue of that one single offering he has achieved the eternal perfection of all whom he is sanctifying.’ Council of Trent: ‘… this sacrifice is truly propitiatory … For it is one and the same victim, now offering … only the manner of offering being different’ (db 940, ds 1743, nd 1548). Roman Catechism: ‘one and the same sacrifice … there is but one victim … hence a truly propitiatory sacrifice … and not a mere commemoration.’10 Here someone might suggest that certain distinctions be made: Christ does not repeatedly offer in a bloody manner; he was offered once in a bloody manner; there is one victim from a material point of view, namely, the same body which is offered and sacrificed over and over again; one and the same sacrifice by reason of the victim considered materially and of the offerer considered materially; not two victims materially but two formally. To this we reply that such distinctions can be made with more or less reason; but a better and more probable opinion would seem to be the opinion of one who has no need of distinctions that St Paul and the Council of Trent and the Roman Catechism did not need. To this we add a theological reason. If another sacrifice is added to the sacrifice of the cross, then the latter might seem to be considered insufficient. On the other hand, if they are the same sacrifice, then it surely follows both that the sacrifice of the cross is sufficient and that the sacrifice of the Mass is not a mere memorial but truly propitiatory. This seems to be the line of argument of the Council of Trent and the Roman Catechism. From this we come to the solution to the problem. First, we are not speaking here of Christ’s invisible sacrifice, the eminent interior sacrifice in his mind and heart. Besides, this sacrifice as presupposed does not create any special difficulty: for if the sacrifice of the cross and of the Mass are in some way numeri-

10 [See note 8 above.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

42

De Notione Sacrificii

unum idemque, pariter actus intellectus et voluntatis quibus fit hoc numerice unum sacrificium potest esse unus idemque actus humanus. Si enim multa inter se ordinantur, per modum unius intelliguntur et voluntur. Praeterea, etiamsi multa sacrificia invisibilia et eminentia (quod non conceditur), tamen nihil sequitur de unitate vel multiplicitate sacrificii formalis. Secundo, generice omnia sacrificia sunt eadem, nam omnia sunt symbola. Tertio, specifice ratione affectus sacrificalis repraesentati, idem est sacrificium crucis et missae. Idem enim semper symbolizatur affectus sacrificalis Christi morientis. Dices: etiam symbolizatur affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae. Respondetur: directe, Nego; consequenter, Concedo. Symbolizato affectu sacrificali Christi, omnis similis affectus per consequens symbolizatur. Instas: ergo pariter in cruce et in eucharistia symbolizatur affectus sacrificalis ecclesiae, nempe, per consequens. Repondetur: quatenus datur repraesentatio, Concedo; quatenus haec repraesentatio est propria, Nego; proprietas enim pendet non solum ab eo quod repraesentatur sed etiam a modo quo repraesentatur. Quarto, eadem numerice est causa materialis substantialis tam in sacrificio crucis quam in eucharistia. Idem numerice est Corpus et Sanguis Christi; id quod offertur, immolatur, victima vel hostia fit. Quinto, causa formalis in sacrificio est id quo subiectum seu causa materialis fit symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis Et sub hoc aspectu aliquatenus identitas, aliquatenus diversitas invenitur in cruce et in eucharistia. Idem numerice est affectus sacrificalis Christi morientis, qui immediate in cruce, mediate in eucharistia repraesentatur. Nam eucharistia est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis Christi morientis eo quod est symbolum proprium sacrificii crucis. Idem numerice esse intentionale, quod in cruce manifestat affectum Christi sacrificalem, in eucharistia manifestatur. Aliter, esse intentionale quod in cruce est ipsa obiectiva repraesentatio, symbolizatio, manifestatio,

The Robert Mollot Collection

43

The Notion of Sacrifice

cally one and the same, then the acts of the intellect and will by which this numerically one sacrifice is made can likewise be one and the same human act. For if a multiplicity of things are interrelated, they are understood and willed as one. Furthermore, even if there were many such invisible and eminent sacrifices (which we do not grant), nevertheless no conclusion follows concerning the unity or multiplicity of the formal sacrifice. Second, generically all sacrifices are the same, since all are symbols. Third, specifically by reason of the sacrificial attitude that is represented, the sacrifice of the cross and of the Mass are the same. For it is the same sacrificial attitude of Christ at his death that is always symbolized. Here one might object that the sacrificial attitude of the church is also symbolized. To this we reply that it is not symbolized directly, but only as a consequence. When Christ’s sacrificial attitude is symbolized, every similar attitude is symbolized as a consequence. But, the objector goes on, therefore both on the cross and in the Eucharist the sacrificial attitude of the church is likewise symbolized, that is, as a consequence. Here we reply that, inasmuch as there is a representation, we agree; but that inasmuch as this representation is proper, we deny; for the propriety of a representation depends not only on that which is represented but also on the manner in which it is represented. Fourth, the substantial material cause in both the sacrifice of the cross and in the Eucharist is numerically the same. It is the numerically same body and blood of the Lord which is offered, immolated, the sacrificial victim. Fifth, in a sacrifice the formal cause is that by which the subject, the material cause, becomes a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude. And under this aspect there is some identity and also some difference between the cross and the Eucharist. The numerically same sacrificial attitude of Christ at his death is represented immediately on the cross and mediately in the Eucharist. For the Eucharist is a proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of Christ at his death by the very fact that is it a proper symbol of the sacrifice of the cross. The numerically same meaning (esse intentionale) which on the cross manifests Christ’s sacrificial attitude is manifested in the Eucharist. To put it another way, the meaning which on the cross is the very objective rep-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

44

De Notione Sacrificii

in eucharistia est obiective repraesentatum, symbolizatum, manifestatum. Idem numerice esse intentionale quod in cruce per suam praesentiam facit ut corpus Christi sit formaliter hostia, victima, immolatum, oblatum, symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis, in eucharistia adest per modum repraesentati et facit ut corpus Christi sit formaliter hostia, victima, immolatum, oblatum, symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis; nam eucharistia, eo quod repraesentat sacrificium crucis, est sacrificium. Unde esse intentionale numerice idem duo facit: (a) per modum manifestantis facit ut sacrificium crucis sit sacrificium; (b) per modum manifestati facit ut sacrificium eucharisticum sit sacrificium. Attamen, quot sunt sacrificia, tot sunt esse intentionalia seu causae formales. Praeterea, unum est esse intentionale principale quod adest in sacrificio crucis et efficitur cruente per realem immutationem non solum accidentalem sed etiam substantialem corporis (qui moritur) et sanguinis (qui effunditur) a solo summo pontifice offerente, Domini nostri Iesu Christi. Et alia sunt esse intentionalia secundaria, quae sunt causae formales sacrificii repraesentando principale esse intentionale, quae fiunt incruente, nullatenus Christo immutato, sub specie aliena exsistente, ab eodem sane summo pontifice offerente tamen sacerdotum ministerio. Et ex his adiunctis haec sacrificia sunt symbola propria affectus sacrificalis non solum Capitis sed etiam membrorum. Unde concluditur: Numerice idem est sacrificium crucis et sacrificium eucharisticum: (a) quatenus idem numerice affectus sacrifcalis repraesentatur; (b) quatenus ab eodem numerice offerente principali repraesentatio efficitur; (c) quatenus in eodem numerice Corpore et Sanguine repraesentatio efficitur; (d) quatenus idem numerice esse intentionale per suam praesentiam est causa formalis seu repraesentatio propria in cruce et in eucharistia est per suam repraesentationem formale formalis faciens11 ut aliud esse intentionale sit repraesentatio propria.

The Robert Mollot Collection

45

The Notion of Sacrifice

resentation, symbolization, manifestation itself, is objectively represented, symbolized, manifested in the Eucharist. The numerically same meaning which by its presence on the cross renders the body of Christ formally a victim, immolated, offered, a proper symbol of his sacrificial attitude, is present in the Eucharist by way of representation and renders the body of Christ formally a victim, immolated, offered, a proper symbol of his sacrificial attitude; for the Eucharist, by the very fact that it represents the sacrifice of the cross, is itself a sacrifice. Hence the numerically same meaning does two things: (a) as manifesting, it is what makes the sacrifice of the cross to be a sacrifice; (b) as manifested, it is what makes the Eucharist to be a sacrifice. Still, there are as many meanings, or formal causes, as there are sacrifices. There is one principal meaning present in the sacrifice of the cross and carried out in a bloody manner through the real change, not only accidental but also substantial, of the body, which dies, and the blood, which is poured out, by the sole High Priest who offers it, Christ our Lord. There are other secondary meanings that are formal causes of the sacrifice by representing the principal meaning, which are carried out in an unbloody manner, with no change whatsoever in Christ, existing now under a different appearance, by the same High Priest as offerer, but through the ministry of priests. And in these circumstances such sacrifices are proper symbols of the sacrificial attitude not only of the Head but also of the members. Conclusions: The sacrifice of the cross and the Eucharistic sacrifice are numerically the same: (a) since the sacrificial attitude represented is numerically the same; (b) since the representation is effected by the numerically same principal offerer; (c) since the representation is effected in the numerically same body and blood; (d) since numerically the same meaning through its presence is the formal cause or proper representation in the sacrifice of the cross, it is also through its representation in the Eucharist the formality of the formal [cause] there,11 making the other meaning to be a proper representation.

11 [The Latin here is very condensed. As in note 5 above, representation grounds a transitive relation between the sacrifice of the cross and that of the Eucharist, expressed here in terms of transitive formal causality. As the esse intentionale of the sacrifice of the cross is the formal cause or proper representation of that sacrifice, so also the same esse intentionale is the formal

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

46

De Notione Sacrificii

Sacrificium eucharisticum est et absolutum et relativum: (a) absolutum quia est symbolum proprium affectus sacrificalis; (b) relativum quia est tale symbolum mediante alio sacrificio. Sicut se habet sacrificium eucharisticum ad sacrificium crucis, ita se habet sacrificium crucis ad affectum sacrificalem Xti morientis. Sicut affectus sacrificalis Christi morientis non additur ut quid diversum sacrificio crucis: est enim sacrificium invisibile huius visibilis sacrificii; ita etiam sacrificium eucharisticum non additur ut quid diversum sacrificio crucis: est enim sacrificium perpetuum unice et semel peracti sacrificii.

8

De Valore Peractae Inquisitionis

Analysis haec sacrificii eucharistici substantialiter coincidit cum analysi P. Gabrielis Vasquez;12 quam recenter amplexi sunt Goetzmann,13 Souben,14

The Robert Mollot Collection

47

The Notion of Sacrifice

The Eucharistic sacrifice is both absolute and relative: (a) absolute, as a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude; (b) relative, because it is such a symbol through the mediation of another sacrifice. The Eucharistic sacrifice is to the sacrifice of the cross as the sacrifice of the cross is to the sacrificial attitude of Christ at his death. Just as Christ’s sacrificial attitude at this point was not superadded as something different from the sacrifice of the cross, since it is the invisible sacrifice of that visible sacrifice, so also the Eucharistic sacrifice is not superadded as something different from the sacrifice of the cross; for it is the perpetual sacrifice of that unique and unrepeated sacrifice. 8

The Value of This Inquiry

This analysis of the Eucharistic sacrifice is substantially the same as that of Fr Gabriel Vásquez,12 which has been followed more recently by Goetz-

cause, the esse intentionale, of the proper representation of the Eucharistic sacrifice.] 12 [See Gabriel Vásquez, Commentaria et disputationes in tertiam partem Sancti Thomae, vol. 3. The eight authors that Lonergan immediately goes on to mention as modern followers of Vásquez’s theory are the exact same authors mentioned in Edward F. Dowd, A Conspectus of Modern Catholic Thought on the Essence of the Eucharistic Sacrifice (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1937) 76–93. This is not mere coincidence. For in the Lonergan Archives, batch ii, file 33, item A218 (www.bernardlonergan.com, 21800dtel40) consists of six typed pages of notes on the first two chapters of Dowd’s book. Obviously, then, Dowd’s book is Lonergan’s source here. Dowd distinguishes Vásquez’s theory of ‘Representative Immolation’ from the theories of ‘Real Immolation,’ associated originally with Cardinal Juan de Lugo, ‘Virtual Immolation,’ associated originally with Leonard Lessius, and ‘Composite Immolation,’ associated originally with J.M.L. Monsabré and Henri Lamiroy. And in introducing Vásquez’s theory, he mentions in particular disp. 220 and disp. 222 from vol. 3 of Vásquez’s Commentaria et disputationes … (See A Conspectus …, 76–79.) On the last page of his notes, under the heading ‘Theoriae immolationis repraesentativae,’ Lonergan follows Dowd and cites disp. 220, c. 3, n. 25 and n. 26 as the place where Vásquez considers sacrifice ex parte materiae, ex parte actionis, and ex parte significationis, and where the distinction between an absolute sacrifice and a relative sacrifice is made.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

48

De Notione Sacrificii

Schepens,15 Lesêtre,16 Lebreton,17 Coghlan,18 Rickaby,19 Šanda.20 Evitatur tamen defectus logicus in systemate Vasquezii quatenus omne sacrificium ponitur in genere symboli et divisio fit inter symbola immediate et mediate repraesentantia. Unde salvatur ratio sacrificii absoluti quae obscuratur in theoria Vasqueziana. Praeterea, per notionem symboli proprii, explicatur cur praesentia realis requiritur ut sacrificium eucharisticum sit vere et proprie sacrificium; hoc enim requirit Vasquez sed cur requirat, non explicat. Praeterea, explicatur doctrina Augustini de sacrificio mystici corporis, Tridentini de

The Robert Mollot Collection

49

The Notion of Sacrifice

mann,13 Souben,14 Schepens,15 Lesêtre,16 Lebreton,17 Coghlan,18 Rickaby,19 and Šanda.20 Our analysis, however, avoids the logical defect in Vásquez’s system in that it places all sacrifice in the category of symbol and distinguishes between symbols that are immediately representative and those that are mediately so. This safeguards the idea of absolute sacrifice which is not clear in the Vásquezian theory. Moreover, using the notion of a proper symbol we explain why a real presence is required for the Eucharistic sacrifice to be a true and proper sacrifice. Vásquez also required this, but did not explain why. Also, we explain Augustine’s teaching on the sacrifice of the mystical

13 [See Wilhelm Goetzmann, Das Eucharistlisch Opfer nach der Lehre der ältern Scholastik. Eine dogmengeschliche Studie (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1901); ‘The Essential Note of the Eucharistic Sacrifice,’ The Ecclesiastical Review 34 (1906) 386–404. Dowd describes Goetzmann’s position briefly on pp. 79–80 of A Conspectus … See also M. Lepin’s brief mention of Goetzmann’s position in L’Idée du sacrifice de la Messe d’après les théologiens dupuis l’origine jusqu’à nos jours (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1926) 605.] 14 [See Jules Souben, Nouvelle théologie dogmatique, vol.7, 5th ed. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1910). Dowd describes Souben’s position briefly on p. 80 of A Conspectus …, citing two pages from vol. 7 of Nouvelle théologie dogmatique.] 15 [See P. Schepens, ‘Comment la messe, est-elle un sacrifice?’ Nouvelle revue théologique 39 (1907) 483–96. Dowd describes Schepens’s position briefly on pp. 80–82 of A Conspectus … See also M. Lepin’s brief mention of Schepens’s position in L’Idée du sacrifice 605–606.] 16 [See Henri Lesêtre, La foi catholique, 14th ed. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1911). Dowd describes Lesêtre’s position briefly on pp. 82–83 of A Conspectus … See also M. Lepin’s brief mention of Lesêtre’s position in L’Idée du sacrifice 604–605.] 17 [See the article ‘Eucharistie’ by Jules Lebreton in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique i, (1910) cols. 1548–85, at 1582–83. Dowd describes Lebreton’s position briefly on p. 83 of A Conspectus … See also M. Lepin’s brief mention of Lebreton’s position in L’Idée du sacrifice 605.] 18 [See Daniel Coghlan, De sanctissima eucharistia (Dublin: Gill, 1913). Dowd describes Coghlan’s position briefly on pp. 83–85 of A Conspectus …] 19 [See Joseph Rickaby’s two articles, ‘The Sacrifice of the Cross’ and ‘The Sacrifice of the Mass,’ in The Lord My Light (London: Burns Oates; St Louis: Herder, 1915). Dowd describes Rickaby’s position briefly on pp. 85–86 of A Conspectus …] 20 [See Adalbert Šanda, Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae specialis, 2 vols. (Freiburg im Brisgau, 1922). Šanda presents his position in vol. 2 of Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae specialis, and Dowd describes it briefly on pp. 86–87 of A Conspectus …]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

50

De Notione Sacrificii

repraesentatione, commemoratione, applicatione, participatione sacrificii crucis, tt. de valore accidentali.21 Valor analyseos est in eo quod systematice et cohaerenter videtur salvare salvanda. Procedit a datis positivis sive revelationis ipsius sive doctrinae ecclesiae et theologorum; horum datorum ordinationem quaerit secundum illud S. Thomae, sapientis est ordinare. Quantum ad tritum obiectionem contra theoriam Vasquezii, nempe, repraesentatio sacrificii non est sacrificium sed sacrificii simularcum,22 respondetur. Primo, omne sacrificium visibile est in genere simulacri, nempe, symbolum est affectus sacrificalis seu sacrificii invisibilis. Secundo, non omne simulacrum est sacrificium, sed illud quod proprie repraesentat affectum sacrificalem. Tertio, sacrificium eucharisticum est proprium symbolum affectus sacrificalis, ideoque verum et proprium sacrificium.

The Robert Mollot Collection

51

The Notion of Sacrifice

body, Trent’s teaching on the representation, commemoration, application of, and participation in the sacrifice of the cross, and the teaching of theologians on its accidental value.21 The value of this analysis lies in this, that it appears to safeguard in a systematic and coherent way all that needs to be safeguarded. It proceeds from positive data, the data of revelation itself and of the teaching of the church and of theologians, and seeks to arrange these data in order, in accordance with St Thomas’s dictum, sapientis est ordinare. To the trite objection against Vásquez’s theory, namely, that the representation of a sacrifice is not itself a sacrifice but the mere image of one,22 we make the following reply: First, every visible sacrifice is in the category of image, for it is a symbol of a sacrificial attitude, the invisible sacrifice. Second, not every image is a sacrifice, but only that image that is a proper representation of a sacrificial attitude. Third, the Eucharistic sacrifice is a proper symbol of a sacrificial attitude, and is therefore a true and proper sacrifice.

21 [Lonergan inserted this sentence by hand.] 22 [See the criticisms Dowd brings against Vásquez’s theory in A Conspectus … 87–93. Lonergan may have had these in mind here.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 2

De Ente Supernaturali: Supplementum Schematicum1

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 2

The Supernatural Order1

From the 1973 Introduction to ‘De ente supernaturali,’ Regis Edition, by Frederick E. Crowe The work ‘De ente supernaturali,’ whose title we might translate ‘On the Supernatural Order,’ was written by Bernard Lonergan in the fall semester of the academic year 1946–47, the last semester he taught at the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal. After joining the faculty there in the summer of 1940 he had taught a variety of treatises: sacramental and eucharistic theology, creation, eschatology, etc. In the year 1945–46 he moved into the area that was to become almost synonymous with his seminary work: trinitarian theology; and in 1946–47 into the area of his doctoral

1 [In some of the editorial footnotes that follow, reference is made to the ‘autograph,’ the ‘first edition,’ and the ‘Regis College edition’ of ‘De ente supernaturali.’ The autograph refers to the undated typescript of ‘De ente supernaturali’ that was done by Lonergan himself during his time at L’Immaculée-Conception, Montreal, and handed over to a typist for stencilling and mimeographing. This autograph was among the papers that Lonergan gave to the newly established Lonergan Centre of Regis College in 1972, and in all probability is the item listed in the Lonergan Archive as lp-ii 26/1 a192 – now available online at www.bernardlonergan.com, 19200dtl040/ a192. The first edition of ‘De ente supernaturali’ refers to an evidently later typescript, also completed at L’Immaculée-Conception, and dated 1946. Two copies of this were used, both of which include Lonergan’s own handwritten corrections, presumably made by him when he used the text in teaching

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

55

The Supernatural Order

thesis (kept fresh meanwhile by writings and graduate courses): the theology of divine grace. The manual that served as basis for the course was the set of notes called simply ‘Tractatus de gratia,’ prepared by Père Paulin Bleau, who had just died after many years as a dominant figure on the faculty of the college.2 Lonergan’s work was supplementary to this manual, and thus we have the sense of the otherwise puzzling notion in the title: ‘Supplementum schematicum.’ This procedure became a pattern that Lonergan would follow for some years: to use a standard manual as basis for the positive part of his courses (introducing his own ideas by way of excursus as he did so), and to devote his special energy to the theoretic side, sometimes by way of lectures, sometimes by way of a written supplement (as in the present case), and sometimes by way of a full-scale book, as happened later in regard to both Christology and the Trinity. It is important to notice this and not regard ‘De ente supernaturali’ as Lonergan’s course on divine grace; in fact, it supposes the whole positive and dogmatic part of his course to have been taught already. It is Lonergan’s own original contribution to the theology of grace, rather than the manuals he used in his course, that interests us here, and to understand that, it will be useful to locate ‘De ente supernaturali’ in the series of related works that Lonergan wrote during this fifteen-year period. There was first of all his doctoral dissertation, ‘Gratia Operans. A Study of

the course ‘De Gratia’ at the Jesuit Seminary, Toronto, during the academic year 1947–48. One of these is now online at the same site, 19201dtl040/ a192-1. The other is la 117 in the Lonergan Research Library, and is online at the same site, 11700dtl040/la 117. The Regis College edition refers to the re-edited version prepared in 1973 by Frederick E. Crowe, with the assistance of Conn O’Donovan and Giovanni Sala, as part of a project to make Lonergan’s early Latin theology more readily available to students and scholars. This edition took into account both the autograph and the first edition, and some of Crowe’s editorial footnotes for this edition have been incorporated into the Collected Works edition. The Regis College edition is online at the same site, 19202dtl070/a192-2.] 2 A set of Père Bleau’s notes is to be found in the collection of papers at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College [lp 1a-20/2 a66, and in the online archive www.bernardlonergan.com, at 66000dtl040. See also below, p. 85, note 29.]. An account of his life and work, written by Eugène Gousie, may be found in Nouvelles de la Province du Bas-Canada, 24e année, mars 1945, pp. 54–63.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

57

The Supernatural Order

Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.’3 It was prepared during his graduate studies at the Gregorian University in Rome from 1938 to 1940 (though not defended publicly till 8 June 1943, and then in Montreal), and rewritten for publication as a series of articles in Theological Studies 1941–42.4 A rapid survey of the thesis shows that Lonergan delved deeply into St Thomas on practically all the questions that come up later in ‘De ente supernaturali,’ but from a doctrinal viewpoint the central topic was the reconciliation of divine dominion with human freedom, which is but one aspect of the synthesis set forth in ‘De ente supernaturali,’ and is found in two scholia of thesis 4, on the divine concursus and its efficacy. A number of shorter works written during this period throw an illuminating cross-light on the ideas of ‘De ente supernaturali’ and its history. There is Lonergan’s article-length review of a book by E. Iglesias in Theological Studies;5 this appeared in December of 1946, from which one may judge it to have been written by September at the latest and therefore to be just prior to ‘De ente supernaturali.’ Thus scholion 3 of thesis 4 gives presumably a direct translation [into Latin] of a good part of this review-article. Subsequent to ‘De ente supernaturali’ is a talk Lonergan gave in 1949 before the Jesuit Philosophical Association: ‘The Natural Desire to See God.’6 This is on exactly the same topic as scholion 1 of thesis 4. Then there is the work Lonergan wrote, again as a ‘supplementum schematicum,’ at Regis College in the second half of the year 1949–50: ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei’;7 it too has close links with the scholia of thesis 4 on the divine concursus and its efficacy. Finally, in the Roman period of work there are links with the reconciliation of grace and freedom in Lonergan’s Christological work on the freedom of Christ, and with the structure of the supernatural order in his Trinitarian work on the divine missions.8 The network of relationships

3 [Now part 2 in Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).] 4 [The articles now form part 1 of Grace and Freedom.] 5 [‘On God and Secondary Causes,’ now chapter 3 in Collection, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 53–65.] 6 [Now chapter 5 in Collection, pp. 81–91.] 7 [See below, pp. 256–411.] The context was the course on God, ‘De Deo Uno’; Lonergan taught that part of the course which dealt with predestination. 8 Bernard Lonergan, De Verbo incarnato, 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964); De Deo Trino: Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

59

The Supernatural Order

linking these works should sometime be studied, but this introduction can only indicate the field of labor.9 For illumination of ‘De ente supernaturali’ from another angle we turn to the context of current theology in the 1940s. The old debate between the Bañezians and the Molinists was still alive, kept vivid in the 1920s and 1930s by such redoubtable antagonists as Garrigou-Lagrange and d’Alès; it easily accounts for the concentration of interest on divine concursus and its efficacy. But newer questions were claiming the attention of theologians. Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel appeared just in this year of 1946, though it does not seem that Lonergan had access to it at the time of writing ‘De ente supernaturali.’10 However, when he taught the course on divine grace soon after at Regis College (in 1947–48), he gave special attention to Père de Lubac’s thesis, and it was the controversy surrounding that thesis that occasioned his address before the Jesuit Philosophical Association in 1949. Shortly after that a page of revision was introduced into the Regis text of ‘De ente supernaturali’ to clarify Lonergan’s position on the natural desire for God …11 But the student of Lonergan must finally turn from the context of his writings and the context of theological currents in those years to study the ‘De ente supernaturali’ itself. May the editors12 suggest that he not allow the interest of the controversies in which it engages to distract him from the more enduring elements of the work. These surely lie in the structure given the supernatural order, the fundamental ground for the distinction

9

10 11 12

1964. [The latter is now available in English, with Latin facing pages, as The Triune God: Systematics, vol. 12 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).] [For some of the most important links, see J. Michael Stebbins, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). There could be added to the list the notes on courses taught on grace at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto in 1947–48 (a160 and a162) and 1951–52 (a205). These are now available on www.bernardlonergan.com as, respectively, 16000dtl040, 16200dtl040, and 20500dtl040.] [Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946).] Part of Surnaturel had already appeared in periodicals, but not the controversial final chapter. [See below, pp. 156–60.] [Besides Frederick Crowe, the editors of the Regis edition of these texts were Conn O’Donovan and Giovanni Sala.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

60

De Ente Supernaturali

[Introductio] Duplex exstat quaestio praevia: cur de ente supernaturali tractetur; cur ab ente hoc abstractissimo ordiamur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

61

The Supernatural Order

between the natural and the supernatural, the beginning of a study of their relationship, the very structure of the theological treatise itself, and other basic questions of this sort dealt with in ‘De ente supernaturali.’ To dwell on the latter point for a moment, this is the first work Lonergan wrote in what he would later call the order of the via synthetica, and, though he does not seem at this time to have given the same thought to the contrasting via analytica, this initial effort at methodical theology is of immense importance to the historian of his thought. It is time to turn to the work of the editors and the details of this edition. Here we must mention a factor of the highest interest to students of Lonergan. In the collection of papers acquired from him in the spring and summer of 1972, the ‘Autograph’ of ‘De ente supernaturali’ was found along with others … This … turned out to be of special significance, definitely showing that the long and important scholion on the efficacy of the divine concursus was wrongly located at the end of thesis 5 in the various editions; it does not belong there at all, but rather belongs to thesis 4 as scholion 4.13 This fact is illuminating for seeing the structural unity of the work and for grasping the significance of this question in the total view of Fr Lonergan on the theology of grace. … We have only to add a word on earlier editions. The original edition at Montreal was done on folded legal-size paper to give 84 pages. Bits and pieces of the work were mimeographed on 8½ × 11 paper at Regis College between 1951 and 1964, with disjointed pagination. The whole work,was mimeographed at the College of St Francis Xavier (the Gesù) in Rome around 1959–60; this edition, 60 pages on legal-size paper, makes some attempt to correct errors …14

[Introduction] Regarding the supernatural order of reality, there are two preliminary questions to be addressed: why do we treat supernatural being at all, and why are we beginning our treatise with a consideration of this very abstract entity?

13 [See below, p. 189, note 105.] 14 [For information on the texts used for this edition, see above, p. 53, note 1.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

62

De Ente Supernaturali

De ente supernaturali tractatur ut explicetur gratuitas gratiae. Si enim gratuitum Dei donum non esset, gratia non esset. Ex parte quidem haec gratuitas explicatur quia in Adamo peccavimus et ideo iuste eis privamur quibus ante peccatum Adamus gavisus est. At haec explicatio est partialis tantum et minor totius atque facilior pars. Maxime gratia est donum gratuitum quia excedit proportionem nostrae naturae, quia supernaturalis est. Si vero quis mavult dictis sacrae Scripturae et sanctorum Patrum ita esse contentus ut theologorum explicationes missas faciat, audiat Aquinatem:

… quilibet actus exsequendus est secundum quod convenit ad suum finem. Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari. Quaedam enim disputatio ordinatur ad removendum dubitationem an ita sit; et in tali disputatione theologica maxime utendum est auctoritatibus … Quaedam vero disputatio est magistralis in scholis, non ad removendum errorem, sed ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum veritatis quam intendit; et tunc oportet rationibus inniti investigantibus veritatis radicem, et facientibus scire quomodo sit verum quod dicitur; alioquin si nudis auctoritatibus magister quaestionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita est; sed nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret, et vacuus abscedet.15

Agitemus ergo quaestionem magistralem, non utrum gratia sit gratuita, sed cur sit gratuita vel quaenam sit radix huius veritatis. Quantum ad ordinem attinet, planum est duplicem ordinem esse possibilem, vel resolutorium qui de veritatibus revelatis ad eorum ordinationem intelligibilem procedit, vel compositorium qui ex intelligibili ordinatione ad ordinanda descendit. Iam vero ubi pueri sunt instruendi, praecepta paedagogica imponunt ordinem resolutorium: pueri enim nisi ex multiplicatis et repetitis exemplis nihil capiunt. At ubi auditores sunt maturiores, ubi acies mentis valet ex paucis exemplis ad totius intelligentiam pervenire, longe praestat ordo

The Robert Mollot Collection

63

The Supernatural Order

We are treating supernatural being in order to explain the gratuitousness of grace. If it were not God’s free gift, given gratis, it would not be grace. It is true that this gratuitousness is partly explained by the fact that in Adam we have all sinned and are thus justly deprived of those endowments Adam enjoyed before his sin. But this is only part, and indeed the lesser and easier part, of the full explanation. Grace is above all a gratuitous gift because it exceeds the proportion of our nature, because it is supernatural. Now, one who prefers to be content with the words of Scripture and the Fathers while ignoring explanations given by theologians ought to hear what Aquinas has to say: … every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argumentation can be directed to either of two ends. One kind of argumentation is directed to removing doubts as to whether something is so. In such argumentation in theology, one relies especially on the authorities … But another kind of argument is that of the teachers in the schools. It seeks not to remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is necessary to base one’s arguments on reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand how what is said is true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an appeal to authorities alone, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed as stated; but they will acquire no knowledge or understanding, and they will go empty away.15 The question we are discussing is of the second kind, not whether grace is gratuitous but why it is, what is the root or ultimate ground of this truth. As for the order to be followed in this treatise, there are clearly two alternatives: an analytical order which proceeds from revealed truths to their intelligible ordering, and a synthetic order which goes from this intelligible ordering down to the truths themselves. In teaching children, sound pedagogy demands that one proceed analytically, since children only learn from many repeated examples. But in the case of more mature students, whose keenness of mind enables them to arrive at an understanding of the whole matter from a few examples, the syn-

15 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales 4, q. 9, a. 3 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

64

De Ente Supernaturali

compositorius in quo memoria non oneratur et dulcedo intelligendi expellit laborem. THESIS I Exsistit creata communicatio divinae naturae, seu principium creatum, proportionatum, et remotum quo creaturae insunt operationes quibus attingitur Deus uti in se est. Scopus 1 Colliguntur veritates ex tractatibus de Verbo incarnato, de gratia habituali, de virtutibus infusis, de Deo fine ultimo. 2 Quae veritates collectae in unum ordinem rediguntur sub ratione communicationis divinae naturae. Quare materialiter thesis nihil asserit quod alibi non tractetur et probetur; sed formaliter sumpta thesis addit ordinationem materiae aliunde derivatae. Notiones quaedam praeviae natura: substantia prout est principium remotum operationum. substantia: id cui competit esse per se; essentia simpliciter dicta. Haec definitio est accuratior: ‘per se’ dicit habitudinem alicuius ad se ipsum, ideoque est relatio rationis tantum;3 essentiae simpliciter dictae opponitur essentia secundum quid, seu accidentis ontologici quod habet quidem essentiam et ‘quod quid est’ non perfecte sed cum ordine ad aliud in quo est. operatio: actus secundus. Est notio primitiva, ideoque per exempla tantum exponi potest, puta, moveri, lucere, sentire, intelligere, velle. principium: quod est primum in aliquo ordine. Maxime distinguitur duplex ordo, ordo cognoscendi et ordo essendi, seu ‘quoad nos’ et ‘quoad se.’ In ordine cognoscendi principia seu prima sunt ipsae operationes quas

The Robert Mollot Collection

65

The Supernatural Order

thetic way is far preferable, wherein the memory is not overburdened and the task of learning is rendered effortless with the joy of understanding. THESIS 1 There exists a created communication of the divine nature, which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle whereby there are operations in creatures through which they attain God as he is in himself. Aim of the Thesis 1 Truths from treatises on the incarnate Word, on habitual grace, on the infused virtues, and on God as ultimate end are brought together. 2 These truths are then arranged in one order under the formality of the communication of the divine nature. In its subject matter, then, this thesis makes no assertions that are not made and proven elsewhere; but considered formally it adds an ordering of material taken from other treatises. Some Preliminary Notions nature: substance considered as the remote principle of operations. substance: that to which per se existence belongs; essence simply so called. The latter definition is more accurate. ‘Per se’ states the relation of a thing to itself, which is only a conceptual relation;16 essence simply so called is opposed to essence in a qualified sense, that of an ontological accident which does have an essence and a quiddity, though not absolutely, but with an ordination to something else in which it inheres. operation: a second act. This is a primitive notion, and hence can only be explained by examples, such as to be moved, to shine, to feel, to understand, to will. principle: that which is first in some order. It is most important to distinguish between the order of knowing and the order of being, that is, between things as they are with respect to us and as they are with respect to themselves. In the cognitional order, the principles, that is, what are first in that or-

16 Or, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 25, ¶10, §236.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

66

De Ente Supernaturali

directe experimur et ex quibus expertis procedimus in cognitionem potentiarum accidentalium et ipsius substantiae. In ordine essendi seu ‘quoad se’ principium remotum est substantia, ex qua profluunt potentiae accidentales, in quibus tamquam in principiis proximis recipiuntur operationes. proportio: paritas habitudinum. V. g., sicut A se habet ad B, ita C se habet ad D. proportio naturae: paritas habitudinum inter substantiam et esse, potentias accidentales et operationes. Haec naturae proportio declarari solet per varia effata: (1) Potentiae accidentales profluunt ex substantia. (2) Operari sequitur esse. (3) Esse recipitur in substantia et ab ea limitatur. (4) Operatio recipitur in potentia accidentali et per eam limitatur.17 Sine hac naturae proportione non potuissemus ex operationibus concludere ad exsistentiam et differentiam potentiarum (voluntas, intellectus possibilis, intellectus agens, etc.) neque ad exsistentiam et differentiam animae humanae et animae beluinae, neque ad illius spiritualitatem et huius materialitatem, etc. Proportio enim naturae est ipsius naturae obiectiva intelligibilitas.

Termini exsistit: vere asseritur esse a parte rei, sive ad modum veritatis particularis, uti unio hypostatica, sive ad modum veritatis generalis, uti oeconomia salutis. creata: ens finitum et contingens. communicatio: id quo commune fit quod secus esset proprium (non commune). divina: pertinens ad actum purum, Deum unum et trinum. proportionatum: secundum legem proportionis naturae. remotum: illud principium est remotum ex quo profluunt principia proxima in quibus ipsae operationes recipiuntur. attingere: habitudo actus ad obiectum. Deus uti in se est: actus purus et infinitus qua talis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

67

The Supernatural Order

der, are the operations themselves that we directly experience; and from what we experience we proceed to a knowledge of accidental potencies and of the substance itself. In the order of being, of things as they are with respect to themselves, the remote principle is substance, from which arise accidental potencies in which operations are received as in their proximate principles. proportion: parity of relations. For example: as A is to B, so C is to D. proportion of nature: a parity of relations between substance and existence, and between accidental potencies and operations. This proportion of a nature is commonly expressed by various statements: (1) Accidental potencies arise from substance. (2) Operation follows existence. (3) Existence is received in substance and is limited by it. (4) An operation is received in an accidental potency and is limited by it.17 Without this proportion of a nature we would be unable from their operations to arrive at a knowledge of the existence of potencies (will, possible intellect, agent intellect, and so forth) and the differences between them, or at a knowledge of the existence of and difference between the human soul and an animal soul, or at a knowledge of the spiritual nature of the former and the materiality of the latter, and so on. The proportion of a nature is the objective intelligibility of the nature itself. Terminology exists: is truly said to be in reality, either as a particular truth such as the hypostatic union, or as a general truth, such as the economy of salvation. created: that which is finite and contingent. communication: that by which something becomes common or shared, which otherwise would be proper (not common, restricted to itself). divine: pertaining to pure act, God one and triune. proportionate: in accordance with the law of the proportion of a nature. remote: that principle is remote which gives rise to the proximate principles in which the operations themselves are received. attain: the relation of act to its object. God as he is in himself: pure infinite act as such.

17 For a metaphysical explanation of this proportion, see Aquinas’s treatment of the angels, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 54, aa. 1–3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

68

De Ente Supernaturali

Opponitur Deo uti ad extra imitari potest, et ideo dicit rationem quae creaturae inesse vel creatura esse non potest. Quid sit creata communicatio divinae naturae Uti in ipsa enuntiatione declaratur, creata communicatio divinae naturae est principium creatum, proportionatum, et remotum quo creaturae insunt operationes quibus attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est. Ad cuius pleniorem intelligentiam exponemus (1) quaenam sint operationes quibus attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est, (2) cuinam iure suo vindicentur operationes eiusmodi, (3) in quibusnam etiam inveniantur, (4) quemadmodum ex ipsis operationibus ad communicationem creatam divinae naturae concludatur, et (5) quid sit increata communicatio divinae naturae. (1) Duae sunt operationes quibus attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est: in intellectu, visio beatifica; in voluntate, actus caritatis. Beatus enim intuitive et immediate videt ipsum Deum uti in se est; videt Deum et non creaturam quandam; videt Deum totum, etsi non totaliter seu ea perfectione qua Deus se ipsum cognoscit. Vide tractatus de Deo fine ultimo et de Deo uno.18 Beatus etiam amat quod intellectu apprehendit; amat ergo ipsum Deum uti in se est; et quidem amat non propter propriam utilitatem vel delectationem sed propter bonitatem ipsius Dei obiectivam, nam amat Deum sicut amicus amicum. Praeterea, eadem specifice est caritas viae et patriae, testante Paulo: ‘Caritas numquam excidit’ (1 Cor. 13.8).19 (2) Christus Dominus, Deus simul et homo, isque solus iure sibi vindicat eiusmodi operationes. Nam sine beatifica visione Christus ut homo non cognosceret se ipsum qua Deum prout Deus est Deus. Pariter sine caritate Christus ut homo a Christo ut Deo divideretur quoad voluntatem. Operari sequitur esse: qui est homo etiam est Deus, et quidem non imitatio quaedam Dei sed ipse Deus infinitus; ex ‘esse Deum’ sequitur cognoscere et amare Deum prout in se est.

The Robert Mollot Collection

69

The Supernatural Order

Its opposite is God as imitable outside himself, and therefore it denotes that which can neither be a creature nor be in a creature. What is a created communication of the divine nature? As is stated in the enunciation of the thesis, a created communication of the divine nature is a principle that is created, proportionate, and remote whereby there are operations in creatures through which they attain God as he is in himself. For a fuller understanding of this, we shall explain (1) what those operations are through which God is attained as he is in himself, (2) which creatures may in their own right claim such operations, (3) in which creatures they are actually to be found, (4) how we can conclude from these operations themselves to the fact of a created communication of the divine nature, and (5) what an uncreated communication of the divine nature is. (1) There are two operations through which God is attained as he is in himself: the beatific vision in the intellect, and the act of charity or love in the will. The blessed in heaven have a direct intuitive vision of God as he is in himself. It is God they see, not any created thing; they see all of God though not exhaustively, that is, as perfectly as God sees himself. See the treatises on God as ultimate end, and on God as one.18 The blessed also love what they apprehend with their intellect. They love God, therefore, as he is in himself; and indeed they love him not for their own benefit or pleasure but because of the objective goodness of God himself, for they love him as a friend loves a friend. Moreover, this love in heaven is specifically the same love as in this life, according to St Paul: ‘Love never ceases’ (1 Corinthians 13.8).19 (2) Only Christ the Lord, as God and man, claims such operations by right. Without the beatific vision Christ as man would not know himself as God according to the way God is God. Similarly, without charity Christ as man would be volitionally divided from Christ as God. Operating follows being: he who is man is also God, not some imitation of God but infinite God himself, and from this ‘being God’ there follow knowing and loving God as he is in himself. 18 [When Lonergan refers the reader to treatises, he is thinking of traditional Scholastic theological texts.] 19 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 67, a. 6.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

70

De Ente Supernaturali

Alius vero nemo praeter Christum est Deus simul et homo, vel Deus simul et angelus; cum nemo alius habet ‘esse Deum,’ nemo alius sibi iure vindicat cognoscere et amare Deum uti in se est. (3) Etiam inveniuntur eiusmodi operationes, quoad visionem et caritatem in beatis angelis et hominibus, quoad caritatem tantum in protoparentibus ante peccatum, in viatoribus iustificatis, in animabus purgatorio detentis. Quibus omnibus insunt hae operationes, non iure quodam sed gratis, aliter tamen et aliter. Unde distinguuntur: (a) gratia Dei quae collata est angelis et protoparentibus; (b) gratia redemptoris quae confertur post Adae peccatum et intuitu meritorum Christi redemptoris. Quae divisio est extrinseca: fundatur enim in subiecto recipiente et non in ipso dono quod recipitur. Gratia Christi dici potest vel gratia Dei vel gratia redemptoris: nam Christus est Deus, in quo omnia constant (Col. 1.17); et Christus est exemplar omnium quibus insunt hae operationes. (4) Ex naturae proportione concluditur ad creatam communicationem naturae divinae. Si bos intelligeret et vellet, non solum diceres eum habere intelligere et velle sed etiam intellectum possibilem et voluntatem; unde ulterius colligeres corpus bovinum informari anima intellectiva. Pariter, quibus insunt operationes quibus attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est, eisdem insunt non solum principia proxima harum operationum, nempe, lumen gloriae et habitum caritatis, sed etiam principium proportionatum remotum earundem operationum; quod principium est id quod dicimus communicationem naturae divinae, et cum sit contingens, etiam necesse est ut sit finitum et creatum. Quod tamen principium est duplex: aliud principale, aliud secundarium. Principale est unio hypostatica, seu gratia unionis, qua hic homo, Dominus noster Jesus Christus, vere et realiter est Deus. Non enim vacuum nomen sufficit sed obiectiva realitas requiritur ut hic homo vere dicatur Deus; quae realitas, cum sit contingens, etiam est creatum quid atque finitum. Secundarium est gratia sanctificans seu habitualis, qua sumus filii Dei,

The Robert Mollot Collection

71

The Supernatural Order

No one besides Christ is at once God and man, nor is anyone both God and an angel. Since no one else possesses ‘being God,’ no one else rightfully claims a knowledge and a love of God as he is in himself. (3) These operations, as far as both vision and loving are concerned, are also found in the blessed, both angelic and human; and as far as loving alone is concerned, in our first parents before the fall, in those persons in this life who are justified, and in the souls in purgatory. All of these persons possess these operations, though not by right, but gratis, as a free gift; they have them, however, in different ways. Hence we distinguish: (a) the grace of God granted to the angels and our first parents, and (b) the grace of the redeemer granted after the fall of Adam in view of the merits of Christ the redeemer. This is an extrinsic division: that is, its basis is in the subjects receiving grace, not in the gift of grace itself. The grace of Christ can be said to be either the grace of God or the grace of the Redeemer, for Christ is God, ‘in whom all things hold together’ (Colossians 1.17), and is the exemplar of all those in whom these operations are present. (4) From the proportion of nature we conclude to a created communication of the divine nature. If an ox were to understand and will, you would say that not only does it perform the operations of understanding and willing, but also that it possesses a possible intellect and a will, and you would draw the further conclusion that that bovine body was informed with an intellective soul. Similarly, those who perform operations by which they attain God as he is in himself also possess not only the proximate principles of these operations, namely, the light of glory and the habit of charity, but also the remote proportionate principle of these same operations. This principle is what we call the communication of the divine nature, and since it is contingent it is also necessarily finite and created. This principle is twofold: primary and secondary. The primary principle is the hypostatic union, the grace of union, by virtue of which this man, our Lord Jesus Christ, is really and truly God. This Name by itself is not enough: an objective reality is required in order that this man be truly said to be God, and this reality, being contingent, is something created and finite as well. The secondary principle is sanctifying or habitual grace by virtue of which we are children of God, sharers in the divine nature, justified, friends

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

72

De Ente Supernaturali

consortes divinae naturae, iusti, amici Dei, etc. Vide tractatum de gratia habituali, et db 799 s. (5) Praeter creatas communicationes divinae naturae, etiam exsistunt increatae communicationes duae. Pater Filio, Pater et Filius Spiritui Sancto communicant divinam naturam. Quae communicationes sunt aeternae, necessariae, et increatae. Increatae sunt, nam realiter identificantur cum processionibus divinis, quae realiter identificantur cum relationibus divinis ad intra, quae realiter identificantur cum essentia divina, quae realiter identificatur cum esse divino increato. Vide tractatum de Deo trino. Quid in nobis sit creata communicatio divinae naturae Materialiter substantia et natura sunt eadem; formaliter natura differt a substantia inquantum natura est substantia non qua substantia sed qua principium proportionatum et remotum relate ad operationes. Pariter, habetur materialis identitas et formalis diversitas inter gratiam sanctificantem et creatam in nobis communicationem divinae naturae. Haec enim communicatio est gratia sanctificans non qua talis sed inquantum est principium proportionatum et remotum relate ad operationes quibus attingitur Deus uti in se est. Quare, quaestio disputata, utrum nempe realiter gratia sanctificans a habitu caritatis distinguatur, afficit non substantiam sed modalitatem ordinationis in hoc tractatu: non afficit substantiam doctrinae, nam omnes scholae catholicae admittunt creatam communicationem divinae naturae; afficit modalitatem ordinationis, quia aliter alii intelligibilem materiae ordinationem exponunt.

Adversarii Vide theses quae directe agunt de unione hypostatica, visione beatifica, caritate, gratia sanctificante. Qualificatio 1 Materialiter spectata, thesis sequitur qualificationem datam in singulis

The Robert Mollot Collection

73

The Supernatural Order

of God, and so forth. See the treatise on habitual grace, and db 799–800, ds 1528–31, nd 1932–34. (5) Besides these created communications of the divine nature there are also two uncreated communications of it. The Father communicates the divine nature to the Son, and the Father and Son together communicate it to the Holy Spirit. These communications are eternal, necessary, and uncreated. They are uncreated, since they are really identical with the divine processions, which are really identical with the internal divine relations, which in turn are really identical with the divine essence, which is really identical with the uncreated divine act of existence. See the treatise on the Trinity. What is the created communication of the divine nature within us? Materially, substance and nature are the same; formally, nature differs from substance in that nature is substance not simply as substance but as the remote proportionate principle relative to operations. Similarly, there is material identity but formal diversity between sanctifying grace and the created communication of the divine nature within us. For this created communication is sanctifying grace not simply as such but inasmuch as it is the remote proportionate principle of the operations by which we attain God as he is in himself. Hence, the disputed question whether sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are really distinct does not affect the substance of our treatment but only the way in which the matter is presented. It does not affect the substance of the doctrine, for all Catholic schools of thought admit a created communication of the divine nature; but it does influence the manner of presentation, inasmuch as different authors arrange the matter differently in order to expound it in an intelligible way. Adversaries See the theses which deal directly with the hypostatic union, the beatific vision, charity, and sanctifying grace. Qualification or Theological Note of the Thesis 1 Considered materially, the thesis has the same qualification as that given

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

74

De Ente Supernaturali

thesibus de unione hypostatica, visione beatifica, caritate, gratia sanctificante. 2 Formaliter spectata, thesis est ordinatio huius materiae secundum analogiam naturae et secundum nexum mysteriorum inter se, et sic sequitur doctrinam Vaticani (db 1796). 3 Analogia naturae quae adhibetur est dicta ‘proportio naturae’ inter substantiam et esse, potentias accidentales et operationes. Omnino admittenda est quaedam naturae proportio: secus quis non satisfaceret definitionibus ecclesiae de anima ut forma corporis, ut immortali, etc. (db 481, 738). Illa proportio quae in thesi adhibetur est ad mentem divi Thomae cuius doctrinae, methodo, principiis inhaerere iubemur. 4 Nexus mysteriorum inter se qui adhibetur, est secundum notionem communicationis quae invenitur in ipsa sanctissima Trinitate, in assumptione naturae humanae a Verbo divino, in vita nobis palmitibus gratis data ab eo qui dixit, ‘Ego sum vitis, vos palmites.’

Probatio 1 Ex sacra Scriptura, 2 Petr. 1.4: ‘ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae.’ Saltem verbotenus hic textus idem dicit quod thesis inquantum asserit communicationem (țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ) divinae naturae. Sed etiam re idem dicit, spectatis quae in evangeliis et epistolis inveniuntur de vita per Christum, in Christo, de caritate Dei infusa in cordibus nostris, de futura Dei cognitione. Quod confirmatur ex interpretatione Patrum qui saepe loquuntur de quadam nostrum deificatione.20

The Robert Mollot Collection

75

The Supernatural Order

to the various theses on the hypostatic union, the beatific vision, charity, and sanctifying grace. 2 Considered formally, the thesis is an ordering of this matter according to an analogy with nature and according to the connection of the mysteries among themselves, and thus it follows the teaching of the [First] Vatican Council (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). 3 The analogy with nature we shall use is the aforesaid ‘proportion of nature’ between substance and existence, and between accidental powers and operations. Some proportion of nature must certainly be admitted: otherwise one would not be in accord with what the church has defined regarding the soul as the form of the body, as immortal, and so on (db 481, 738; ds 902, 1440–41; nd 405, 410). That proportion to which this thesis appeals is in accord with the thought of St Thomas, to whose doctrine, method, and principles we are bidden to adhere. 4 The interconnection among the mysteries which we use is that which accords with the notion of communication within the Trinity itself, in the assumption of human nature by the divine Word, and in the life given gratuitously to us, the branches, by him who said, ‘I am the vine, you are the branches’ (John 15.5). Proof 1 From Scripture: 2 Peter 1.4, ‘that through them [these gifts] you … may become participants of the divine nature.’ Verbally at least, this text states the same as our thesis in asserting a participation or sharing (țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ) in the divine nature. But even the reality it speaks of is the same, when one considers what the gospels and epistles tell us about life through Christ and in Christ, about the love of God poured into our hearts, and about our future knowledge of God. This is confirmed by the interpretation of this text by the Fathers, who speak often about our deification.20 20 See M.J. Rouët de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum loci ss. patrum, doctorum scriptorum ecclesiasticorum [ep], 10th and 11th edition (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1937) series 358. [In the 21st edition (Barcinone: Herder, 1959), the listings included in series 358 are found on p. 789.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

76

De Ente Supernaturali

2 Haec divinae naturae communicatio est creata, ex eodem constat: non enim ‘efficimur’ sine quadam mutatione; quae est ens contingens et finitum et ideo creatum sensu theseos. Accedit consensus theologorum et definitio Tridentina (db 799, 821).

3 In hac creata communicatione divinae naturae distinguendum est inter operationes quasdam divini ordinis (visionem et caritatem) et earundem operationum principia cum proxima tum remota. Nam intelligentia theologica est secundum analogiam naturae (db 1796). Sicut ergo philosophus determinat homini inesse non solum actus intelligendi sed etiam intellectum possibilem, animam intellectivam, et animam per se subsistentem, pariter theologus non solum ponit in iusto caritatem et in beato visionem, sed etiam habitum caritatis, lumen gloriae, et horum remotum principium, gratiam sanctificantem.

Obicitur 1 Thesis inutiliter ponitur: nihil enim asserit quod alibi non melius tractetur et clarius demonstretur. Respondeo: Thesis materialiter spectata, concedo; formaliter, nego. Prius enim oportet colligere et ordinare entia quae proprietatem supernaturalitatis habent quam ipsam hanc proprietatem investigare. 2 Thesis ponit fundamentum labile ad investigationem supernaturalitatis. Ponit enim creatam communicationem divinae naturae, principaliter in Christo per unionem hypostaticam, secundario in iustis per gratiam sanctificantem. Sed utrumque est merum placitum cuiusdam scholae, neque plus quam probabile. Scotus enim et Tiphanus aestimant unionem hypostaticam non esse realitatem sed potius negationem. Scotus negat gratiam sanctificantem esse aliam realiter quam habitum caritatis. Respondeo: Ponit fundamentum cum debili censura theologica, concedo; ponit fundamentum labile, nego. Censura theologica fundatur in clara et aperta connectione cum veritati-

The Robert Mollot Collection

77

The Supernatural Order

2 That this communication of the divine nature is created is proven from the same text. For we do not become something without some change, which is the contingent, finite, and hence created being as explained in our thesis. In addition to this there is the general consensus among theologians and the definition of the Council of Trent (db 799, 821; ds 1528–29, 1561; nd 1932, 1961). 3 In this created communication of the divine nature we must distinguish between certain operations of the divine order (beatific vision and charity) and the principles, both proximate and remote, of these operations. The reason is that theological understanding relies on the analogy with nature (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Thus, just as a philosopher determines that in humans there is not only an act of understanding but also a possible intellect, an intellective soul, and a soul that is subsistent per se, similarly the theologian affirms not only charity in the justified and the beatific vision in the blessed, but also a habit of charity, the light of glory, and the remote principle of both of these, sanctifying grace. Objections 1 The thesis is useless, for it simply asserts what is presented more effectively and demonstrated more clearly elsewhere. Reply : If you consider the thesis in its material aspect, that is true, but not if you consider it formally. The reason is that one ought to first collect and arrange in order those beings which possess the property of supernaturality before undertaking to investigate that property. 2 This thesis lays a very shaky foundation for the investigation of supernaturality. For it places the created communication of the divine nature primarily in Christ through the hypostatic union and secondarily in the justified through sanctifying grace. But this is merely the opinion of a particular school and is no more than probable. Scotus and Tiphanus hold that the hypostatic union is not a positive reality but rather a negation. And Scotus denies that sanctifying grace is really anything other than the habit of charity. Reply: We admit that the thesis lays a foundation that has a rather weak theological note, but we deny that this foundation itself is shaky. The theological note of a thesis depends upon how clear and obvious a

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

78

De Ente Supernaturali

bus revelatis;21 signum eiusmodi connectionis est consensus theologorum, quasi non possent theologi consentire nisi clarissima et apertissima esset connectio. Scientia theologica est intelligibilis ordinatio veritatum revelatarum; sapientis autem est ordinare; quare ad scientiam theologicam plus valet unus vere sapiens quam sescenti minus sapientes. Praeterea, oppositio scholarum hac in re non in eo consistit quod alia affirmat et alia negat creatam communicationem divinae naturae; omnis schola hoc affirmat. Oppositio in eo est quod alia schola aliter ipsam naturam eiusque analogiam concipit, et alia aliter; quod non afficit fundamentum investigationis supernaturalitatis sed modum ordinandi intelligibiliter entia supernaturalia.

THESIS II Haec creata divinae naturae communicatio non solum naturae humanae sed etiam cuiuslibet finitae substantiae proportionem excedit ideoque est supernaturalis simpliciter. Scopus Stabilitur proprietas fundamentalis quae in creata communicatione divinae naturae elucet. Haec proprietas fiet regula et fons caeterorum omnium quae in hoc tractatu sunt dicenda. Notiones praeviae naturale: quod iacet intra naturae proportionem; quod ad naturam pertinet sive constitutive, sive consecutive, sive exigitive. Stricte constituitur natura per substantiam (forma pura in angelis, forma substantialis cum materia in materialibus).

The Robert Mollot Collection

79

The Supernatural Order

connection it has with the truths of revelation.21 The sign of this connection is agreement among theologians – as if theologians could not agree unless this connection was perfectly clear and obvious. The science of theology is the intelligible ordering of the truths of revelation. Now it is the mark of wisdom to arrange things in order, and therefore in this science one truly wise theologian is of greater value than six hundred less wise. Besides, the opposition between various theological schools in this matter does not consist in the fact that one affirms and the other denies a created communication of the divine nature; all the schools affirm that. It is rather that schools differ in their way of conceiving nature and its analogy. This, however, does not affect the foundation of an investigation of the supernatural order, but only the manner of ordering supernatural realities intelligibly. THESIS 2 This created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion not only of human nature but also of any finite substance, and thus is absolutely supernatural. Aim of the Thesis The aim of this thesis is to determine the fundamental property to be found in the communication of the divine nature. This property will serve as the guiding principle of all that is to follow in this treatise. Some Preliminary Notions natural: that which lies within the proportion of a nature; that which belongs to a nature either as a constitutive element of it, a consequence of it, or a necessary requirement for it. Strictly speaking, nature is constituted by substance (by pure form in angelic beings, and by substantial form together with matter in material beings). 21 [In the autograph Lonergan had first written: ‘Censura theologica fundatur in clara et aperta connectione cum veritatibus theologicis,’ with the second line beginning at the word ‘cum.’ Then he crossed out ‘theologicis’ and wrote ‘revelatis’ in the margin to replace it.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

80

De Ente Supernaturali

Late constituitur natura per substantiam, esse substantiam sequens, et accidentia quae ex substantia profluunt. Consequuntur naturam principaliter finis, qui est operatio vel operationum complexus, secundario vero ea quae in subiecto recipiuntur in ordine ad finem vel ex fine adepto. Exiguntur a natura conditiones extrinsecae cum tou esse tum tou bene esse, scil., ut sit et in maiore parte finem attingat. Differunt duae definitiones datae, inquantum prima analytice statuit quod altera enumerando describit. Caeterum, idem dicunt, quamvis interdum reflexio requiratur ut identitas perspiciatur. Exemplo sit concursus necessarius ad exercitium causalitatis efficientis: secundum descriptivam enumerationem eiusmodi concursus est naturalis quia a natura exigitur; secundum analyticam definitionem est naturalis quia iacet intra proportionem naturae finitae ut adhiberi possit et de facto adhibeatur tamquam instrumentum ad effectus producendos. supernaturale : quod excedit proportionem alterius naturae, seu superioris est gradus entitatis et perfectionis. Iterum, descriptive, quod ad naturam pertinet neque constitutive neque consecutive neque exigitive. supernaturale secundum quid (relativum): quod huius vel illius naturae proportionem excedit. supernaturale simpliciter (absolutum): quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae (sive creatae sive creabilis). Supernaturale dicitur non per oppositionem sed per comparationem ad naturam: supponit ordinem cosmicum secundum quem alia entia aliis antecellunt in perfectione; nominat ordinem quendam seu gradum sive superiorem sive summum; minime negat huic gradui superiori vel summo inesse obiectivam illam intelligibilitatem, cohaerentiam, proportionem, harmoniam quam per nomen ‘natura,’ ‘naturale,’ indicare solemus; sed negat inferiori ordini vel gradui inesse perfectionem quae superiori sit propria, imo quae facit ut superior vere sit superior. Sensus theseos Determinatur excellentia ontologica creatae communicationis naturae divinae de qua in thesi antecedenti.

The Robert Mollot Collection

81

The Supernatural Order

In a broader sense, nature is constituted by substance, by existence that follows upon substance, and by accidents which flow from substance. The primary consequence of a nature is its end, which is an operation or a complex of operations; the secondary consequences are those things that are received in the subject in view of the end or as a result of the attainment of the end. Requirements for a nature are the conditions extrinsic to it that are necessary both for its existence and for its well-being; in other words, what it needs in order for it to exist and for the most part to attain its end. The two definitions of ‘natural’ given above are different in that the first states analytically what the second describes by way of enumeration. However, they do mean the same thing, although at times it takes some reflection to perceive their identity. Take, for example, the matter of the concurrence necessary for the exercise of efficient causality: according to the definition by descriptive enumeration, such concurrence is natural because it is required by a nature; according to the analytic definition, it is natural because it lies within the proportion of a finite nature that it can be used and actually is used as an instrument for producing certain effects. supernatural : that which exceeds the proportion of another nature and is superior to it in being and perfection. Again, descriptively, it is that which belongs to a nature neither constitutively nor as a consequence nor as a necessary requirement. That which exceeds the proportion of this or that nature is relatively supernatural. That which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatsoever, whether created or creatable, is absolutely supernatural, supernatural without qualification. We do not speak of the supernatural as opposed to nature but rather as compared with it. ‘Supernatural’ supposes a world order in which some beings will excel others in perfection; it denotes an order or level that is higher or the highest; it does not at all deny to that higher or highest order the objective intelligibility, coherence, proportion, and harmony that we customarily indicate by the words ‘nature’ and ‘natural.’ But it does deny to that lower order or level the perfection proper to the higher, the very perfection that causes the higher to be truly higher. Meaning of the Thesis This thesis specifies the ontological excellence of the created communication of the divine nature referred to in the previous thesis.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

82

De Ente Supernaturali

Statuitur haec excellentia excedere perfectionem propriam (1) naturae humanae et (2) cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. Adversarii Contra primam partem adversarius praecipuus atque directus est Baius22 qui damnatus est a sancto Pio v (db 1001–80). Admisit Baius gratuito nobis a Deo conferri communicationem divinae naturae; quam tamen gratuitatem explicare conatus est, non ex supernaturalitate huius doni, sed ex eo quod iuste naturalibus privamur propter peccatum protoparentis. Non docuit caritatem et deinde visionem per se resultare ex ipsis principiis naturalibus debite adhibitis; sed tamen docuit ea a natura innocenti exigi et ideo Deum teneri ea conferre. Errores Baianos renovaverunt: (1) implicite Iansenius,23 db 1092–96; (2) explicite Quesnel,24 db 1351–1421; (3) explicite synodus Pistoriensis,25 db 1516–25. Indirecte et reductive contra primam partem longa haereticorum series enumerari potest; quae tamen enumeratio sicut clarius ita etiam melius omittitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

83

The Supernatural Order

It states that this communication exceeds the ontological perfection that is proper (1) to human nature and (2) to any finite substance whatsoever. Adversaries Against the first part of the thesis, the principal and direct adversary is Baius,22 who was condemned by Pope Pius v (db 1001–80, ds 1901–80). Baius admitted that God’s communication of his divine nature to us was a gratuitous gift; but he tried to explain this gratuitousness not by the supernaturality of the gift but from the fact that we are justly deprived of natural endowments because of the sin of Adam. He did not teach that charity and the consequent beatific vision of themselves result from the proper use of natural principles, but he did hold that they were necessary requirements of a sinless human nature and that therefore God had to confer them. Baius’s errors were repeated implicitly by Jansenius23 (db 1092–96, ds 2001–2005, nd 1989/1–5), and explicitly by Quesnel24 (db 1351–1421, ds 2400–71) and by the Synod of Pistoia25 (db 1516–25, ds 2616–25). Here we could list a lengthy series of heretical opinions that are indirectly and reductively opposed to the first part of our thesis, but for simplicity’s sake we think it better to omit it.

22 [Michael Baius (de Bay) (1513–89). His teachings can be found in Michaelis Baii ... opera cum bullis pontificum et aliis ipsius causam spectantibus … (Ridgewood, nj: The Gregg Press, 1964).] 23 [Cornelius Otto Jansen (Jansenius) (1585–1638), Bishop of Ypres and the author of Augustinus (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964).] 24 [Pasquier (Paschase) Quesnel (1634–1719), the author of Réflexions morales sue le Nouveau Testament. Selections from this work are available via the Internet.] 25 [Held from 18 to 28 September 1786. Its Acts and Decrees were first published in February 1787.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

84

De Ente Supernaturali

Contra secundam partem adversarii sunt scholastici quidam, praecipue Ripalda26 quocum addes Molinam,27 Valentiam,28 Morlaix.29 Hi opinati sunt vel non repugnare vel de repugnantia non constare dicti eiusmodi: Deum posse creare substantiam adeo perfectam ut naturaliter ei deberetur communicatio divinae naturae. Qualificatio 1 Theologice certum est creatam communicationem naturae divinae excedere proportionem naturae humanae. Et quidem dupliciter: primo, ex consensu theologorum inde a saeculo xiii, accedente concilio Vaticano (db 1786: ‘finis supernaturalis’); deinde ex impossibilitate negandi hanc supernaturalitatem quin multi errores logice sequantur.30

The Robert Mollot Collection

85

The Supernatural Order

Among adversaries of the second part are certain Scholastic theologians, especially Ripalda,26 but also Molina,27 Valencia,28 and Morlaix.29 They maintained that it is not absolutely impossible for God to create a substance so perfect as to be naturally owed a communication of the divine nature, or at least that this impossibility is not clearly established. Qualification of the Thesis 1 That the created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of human nature is theologically certain. This is indicated in two ways: first, from the consensus of theologians from the thirteenth century on, as well as Vatican i on the supernatural end of man (db 1786, ds 3005, nd 114); second, from the impossibility of denying this supernaturality without incurring a number of errors that would follow logically from such a denial.30

26 [Juan Martínez de Ripalda (1594–1648), the author of the three-volume work, De ente supernaturali disputationes in universam theologiam (Paris: Apud Victorem Palmbe, 1870–71).] 27 [Luis de Molina (1535–1600), the author of Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis … (Paris: Lethielleux, 1876). Lonergan will discuss later the various positions taken by Molina and his followers. Molina’s thought is also discussed in Grace and Freedom 111, 116, 147–49, 155, 157, 304, 307 n. 154, 328 nn. 29 and 30, 348, 448–49. For some very brief remarks on Molina, see Lonergan’s ‘Luis de Molina,’ in Shorter Papers, vol. 20 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 256–57.] 28 [Grégoire de Valencia (1549?–1603), the author of Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor (Paris: Rolini Theoderici & Petri Chevalerii, 1609).] 29 [Probably the author being referred to here is M. Morlais, and his article ‘Le surnaturel absolu,’ Revue du clergé français 31 (1902) 464–95. The list of names that Lonergan gives here is the same as that given by one of Lonergan’s predecessors at the Collège de l’Immaculée-Conception, Montréal, Paulin Bleau, on p. 25 of his set of notes titled De ente supernaturali (Montréal, September, 1943; these notes are available on www.bernardlonergan.com, at 35000dtl040). The inclusion of the infrequently mentioned Morlais in the list, along with the spelling of his name with an ‘x,’ suggests that Lonergan was following Bleau here in giving this particular list of adversaries.] 30 See the above references to the errors of Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel, and the Synod of Pistoia.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

86

De Ente Supernaturali

2 Probabilius et longe communius est creatam communicationem divinae naturae excedere proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae.

Probatur per partes Prima pars: Creata naturae divinae communicatio excedit proportionem naturae humanae. Haec communicatio est nobis indebita atque gratuita aut quia nostrae naturae proportionem excedit aut quia iuste (v.g., propter peccatum Adami) privamur eis quae intra proportionem nostrae naturae iacent. Atqui alterum membrum admitti nequit. Ergo primum membrum est admittendum, scil., creata naturae divinae communicatio excedit proportionem nostrae naturae. Ad maiorem: Maior est evidens nam asserit enumerationem completam et quidem completam ratione dichotomiae: aut excedit aut iacet intra proportionem nostrae naturae; tertium non datur. Maior utique supponit [illam] communicationem esse nobis indebitam et gratuitam; quod tamen per longum et latum alibi et independenter demonstratur ubi de necessitate gratiae; praeterea, Baius eiusque sequaces nullo modo dubitant de hac gratuitate. At hoc suppositum intrat in argumentum materialiter tantum; tota vis est in disiunctione inter rationes cur communicatio sit nobis gratuita. Ad minorem: Admitti nequit doctrina damnata uti haeretica, erronea, suspecta, temeraria, scandalosa, offensiva respective secundum diversas eius consequentias. Atqui eiusmodi est doctrina fluens ex altero membro. Ergo alterum membrum admitti nequit. Maior haec evidens videtur. Minor probatur deducendo ex altero membro propositiones damnatas Baii, Iansenii, Quesnelli, Synodi Pistoriensis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

87

The Supernatural Order

2 It is the more probable and by far the more common opinion that the created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatsoever. Proof of the Thesis First part: The created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of human nature. This communication is not owed to us and is gratuitous either because it exceeds the proportion of our nature or because we are justly deprived (on account of Adam’s sin, for example) of endowments that are within the proportion of our nature. But the second alternative cannot be admitted. Therefore the first alternative must be accepted, namely, that the created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of our human nature. Substantiation of the major premise: The major premise is evident, since it contains a complete enumeration of the possibilities, complete, in fact, by way of a dichotomy: this communication either goes beyond or it lies within the proportion of our nature; no third alternative is possible. The major premise does presuppose that this communication is not owed to us and is gratuitous. This, however, is abundantly demonstrated independently elsewhere regarding the necessity of grace. Besides, Baius and his followers take this gratuitousness for granted. But this presupposition is only a material element in our argument, the whole force of which lies in the disjunction between the reasons why this communication is gratuitous. Substantiation of the minor premise : No doctrine can be admitted that has been condemned, respectively, as heretical, erroneous, suspect, temerarious, scandalous, or offensive according to its various consequences. But the second alternative leads to such a doctrine. Therefore it cannot be admitted. This major premise is evident. The minor premise is demonstrated by deducing from the second alternative the condemned propositions of Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel, and the Synod of Pistoia.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

88

De Ente Supernaturali

Quia communicatio divinae naturae est debita homini naturaliter, sequitur radicem merendi vitam aeternam non esse supernaturalem qualitatem operum meritoriorum sed eorundem conformitatem ad legem. Et ita Baius damnatus (db 1001–20). Sequitur pariter nullam esse elevationem supernaturalem ad hanc communicationem. Et ita Baius (db 1021–24; 1055; 1078 s.); Quesnel (db 1385); Synodus Pistor. (db 1522).

Sequitur hominem lapsum, qui certo non potest mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia, etiam non posse legem implere sine gratia. Quare omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata (db 1025–30, 1034–38); imponitur necessitas peccandi (db 1046–55; 1074–76; 1092; 1389; 1519); destruitur vera libertas (db 1039–41; 1093 s.; 1388; 1523).

Sequitur radicalem antithesin non esse inter naturale et supernaturale sed inter bonam et malam voluntatem seu inter caritatem divinam et pravam concupiscentiam (db 1031–38, 1061–65). Sequitur aliud esse implere legem seu habere caritatem, et aliud esse habere remissionem peccatorum (db 1042–44, 1056–61, 1069–73). Brevi, aut status cum gratia est supernaturalis, aut status sine gratia est infranaturalis, sine vera libertate, cum necessitate peccandi. Optime Baius pessimas conclusiones ex falso supposito deduxit. Pars altera: Creata communicatio naturae divinae excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae et ideo est simpliciter supernaturalis. Brevitatis et claritatis causa scribetur A loco scribendi ‘creata communicatio naturae divinae,’ B loco scribendi ‘quaelibet substantia finita,’ C loco scribendi ‘Deus uti in se est,’ D loco scribendi ‘Deus prout ad extra imitari potest.’ Si A est superioris ordinis ontologici quam B, A excedit proportionem B.

The Robert Mollot Collection

89

The Supernatural Order

If the communication of the divine nature is something naturally owing to man, it follows that the basis for meriting eternal life is not the supernatural quality of meritorious works but rather their conformity to law. For this Baius was condemned (db 1001–20, ds 1901–20). It likewise follows that there is no supernatural elevation to this communication, a condemned proposition of Baius (db 1021–24, 1055, 1078–79; ds 1921–24, 1955, 1978–79; nd 1984/21–1984/23, 1984/55, 1984/78–1978/79); of Quesnel (db 1385, ds 2435); and of the Synod of Pistoia (db 1522, ds 2622). It follows that man in his fallen state, who certainly cannot merit eternal life without grace, also cannot fulfil the law without grace. Therefore all the actions of non-believers are sins (condemned, db 1025–30, 1034–38; ds 1925–30, 1934–38; nd 514/26, 1987/27–28, 1988/34, 1988/38); sin is necessitated (condemned, db 1046–55, 1074–76, 1092, 1389, 1519; ds 1946– 55, 1974–76, 1992, 2439, 2619; nd 514/46–49, 1986/50, 1986/54, 1984/55, 1986/74, 1990/39); and true freedom is non–existent (condemned, db 1039–41, 1093–94, 1388, 1523; ds 1939–41, 2002–03, 2438, 2623; nd 1987/39– 41, 1989/2–3, 1990/38). It follows that the fundamental antithesis is not between the natural and the supernatural, but between a good will and an evil will, between love of God and vicious concupiscence (condemned, db 1031–38, 1061–65; ds 1931–38, 1961–65; nd 1988/34, 1988/38, 1985/63). It follows that to fulfil the law or have love is one thing, and to have one’s sins forgiven is another (condemned, db 1042–44, 1056–61, 1069–73; ds 1942–44, 1956–61, 1969–73; nd 1985/42, 708). In fine, either one’s state with grace is supernatural, or one’s state without grace is infranatural, lacking true freedom and with a compulsion to sin. Baius deduced very well these dire conclusions from his false supposition. Second part: The created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatever, and thus is absolutely supernatural. For the sake of brevity and clarity, let us write A to stand for ‘the created communication of the divine nature,’ B to stand for ‘any finite substance whatever,’ C to stand for ‘God as he is in himself,’ and D to stand for ‘God as imitable externally, that is, outside himself.’ If A is of a higher ontological order than B, then A exceeds the proportion of B.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

90

De Ente Supernaturali Atqui A est superioris ordinis ontologici quam B. Ergo A excedit proportionem B.

Maior est evidens, nam antecedens et consequens eandem rem diversis nominibus enuntiant. Minor probatur: Si A definitur per C et B definitur per D, A est superioris ordinis ontologici quam B. Atqui A definitur per C et B definitur per D. Ergo A est superioris ordinis ontologici quam B. Maior est evidens, nam Deus, uti in se est, est Deus qua infinitus; et Deus qua infinitus est perfectior quam qui ad extra imitari possit. Minor probatur per partes: A definitur per C: nam creata communicatio naturae divinae definitur in thesi prima, ‘principium creatum, proportionatum, remotum ad actus quibus attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est.’ B definitur per D : nam quaelibet substantia finita definiri potest per rationem secundum quam Deus ad extra imitari potest; vel aliter: si substantia finita definiri posset per Deum uti est in se, non esset finita sed infinita.

Ad assertum additum: Et ideo est simpliciter supernaturalis. Quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet finitae substantiae est simpliciter supernaturale. Atqui creata communicatio naturae divinae excedit proportionem cuiuslibet finitae substantiae. Ergo haec communicatio est simpliciter supernaturalis. Maior est definitio; minor probatur supra. Obicitur 1 Doctrina Baii, Iansenii, etc., est doctrina sancti Augustini. Atqui doctrinam sancti Augustini reici non oportet. Ergo doctrinam Baii, Iansenii, etc., reici non oportet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

91

The Supernatural Order

But A is of a higher ontological order than B. Therefore A exceeds the proportion of B. The major premise here is evident, for its antecedent and conclusion are simply two ways of saying the same thing. The minor premise is proven as follows: If A is defined by C and B is defined by D, then A is of a higher ontological order than B. But A is defined by C and B is defined by D. Therefore A is of a higher ontological order than B. The major of this syllogism is evident, since God as he is in himself is God as infinite; and God as infinite is more perfect than as imitable outside himself. The minor is proved in two parts. A is defined by C. For the created communication of the divine nature is defined in the first thesis as the created, proportionate, and remote principle of acts whereby God is attained as he is in himself. B is defined by D. For any finite substance can be defined by reason of its being an external imitation of God; or, to put it another way, if a finite substance could be defined by God as he is in himself, it would not be finite but infinite. Added assertion: ... and thus is absolutely supernatural. By absolutely supernatural we mean that which exceeds the proportion of any finite nature whatsoever. But the created communication of the divine nature exceeds the proportion of any finite nature whatsoever. Therefore this communication is absolutely supernatural. This major premise is a definition; the minor premise is proven above. Objections 1 The position of Baius, Jansenius, and others is the doctrine of St Augustine. But the doctrine of St Augustine should not be rejected. Therefore neither should their doctrine be rejected.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

92

De Ente Supernaturali

Respondeo: Ad maiorem: Negatur identitas. Baius et Iansenius maxima diligentia et studio opera sancti Augustini investigaverunt; summam similitudinem inter sententias suas et sententias sancti Augustini curaverunt; sed etiam addiderunt systema quod utique ex dictis sancti Augustini sponte consurgere crediderunt. Quod systema est vera additio: propositiones enim damnatae Baii et Iansenii apud Augustinum non inveniuntur; neque haec eorum additio necessario consurgit ex dictis sancti Augustini, cum theologi mediaevales pari zelo opera sancti Augustini investigaverint et ad conclusiones oppositas pervenerint. Differentiae inter sanctum Augustinum, theologos mediaevales, et Baium, Iansenium, etc., sic brevissime describuntur: Sanctus Augustinus theorema de supernaturali omisit sed non exclusit. Theologi mediaevales theorema de supernaturali elaboraverunt et addiderunt ad normam evolutionis speculationis theologicae. Baius et Iansenius systema positive excludens theorema de supernaturali excogitaverunt, et omissionem Augustini tamquam positivam exclusionem falso interpretati sunt.31

The Robert Mollot Collection

93

The Supernatural Order

Reply : As for the major: We deny the identity. Baius and Jansenius studied the works of St Augustine with great diligence and zeal, and took care to follow his opinions as closely as possible. But they also added a system which they believed derived quite naturally from the words of Augustine. This system was really an accretion: the condemned propositions of Baius and Jansenius are nowhere to be found in Augustine. Nor does this addition necessarily follow from Augustine’s thought, since medieval theologians with equal dedication studied his writings and reached opposite conclusions. The differences between St Augustine, the medieval theologians, and Baius, Jansenius, and the others, can be summed up as follows: St Augustine did not have a theorem on the supernatural order, but neither did he exclude it. The medieval theologians worked out a theorem on the supernatural order and added it in accordance with the norms of development proper to theological speculation. Baius and Jansenius worked out a system that positively excluded the theorem of the supernatural order, and wrongly interpreted the absence of it in Augustine as a positive exclusion of it.31

31 [From the Regis edition: A useful commentary (implicit only) on this analysis of Baius and Jansenius and their relation to Augustine is found in Lonergan’s work on gratia operans. See Grace and Freedom 4–7: ‘The division of grace into operative and cooperative arose not from a detached love of systematization but to meet the exigencies of a controversy. ‘St Augustine in the work we are examining does not pay the slightest attention to … future development. ‘… to assert a problem of interpretation here [on liberty and sin] involves the assumption that the mens Augustini was a speculative system on the nature of grace and liberty. Now certainly this view has no support in the work with which we are dealing, for the De gratia et libero arbitrio was concerned not with speculation but with dogma. ‘[True] one must affirm the development of speculative theology already to have begun. But, while we think this to be true, we are also inclined to assert that the most legitimate commentary on this initial speculation, the commentary most free from the endless vices of anachronism, is simply the history of subsequent speculation.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

94

De Ente Supernaturali

Ad minorem: Distinguo. Doctrinam sancti Augustini reici non oportet, concedo; perfici non oportet, nego. Et addo rationem cur perfici oporteat. Sanctus Augustinus erat in genere contentus affirmare quae in deposito fidei inveniuntur circa gratiam et libertatem. At munus theologicum praeterea includit aliquam intelligentiam mysteriorum (db 1796).

2 Qui nimis probat, nihil probat. Atqui argumentum datum ad secundam theseos partem nimis probat. Ergo nihil probat. Et probatur minor: si valeret argumentum, creata communicatio naturae divinae evaderet impossibilis; atqui impossibilis non est, ex thesi prima; ergo argumentum non valet. Et maior proxima probatur: quod definitur per Deum uti in se est, est infinitum; creata communicatio definitur per Deum uti in se est; ergo est infinitum; et tamen dicitur creatum, i.e., finitum.

Respondeo: Ad probationem ultimam seu quae dicitur maioris proximae: ‘Quod definitur per Deum uti est in se, est infinitum.’ Distinguo: substantia definita per Deum uti in se est, est infinita, concedo; aliud praeter substantiam ita definitum est necessario infinitum, subdistinguo: infinitum secundum quid, concedo; infinitum simpliciter, nego. ‘Atqui creata communicatio divinae naturae definitur per Deum uti est in se.’ Contra-distinguo: et est substantia, nego; aliud praeter substantiam, concedo. ‘Ergo creata communicatio est infinita.’ Pariter distinguo: est infinita simpliciter, nego; est infinita secundum quid, scil., inquantum ordinatur ad attingendum Deum uti est in se, concedo.

Explicantur distinctiones : Non omnia possunt definiri per habitudinem ad aliud; secus adesset

The Robert Mollot Collection

95

The Supernatural Order

As to the minor premise, we distinguish as follows: That the teaching of St Augustine ought not to be rejected, we agree; but that it ought not to be further developed, we deny. Let us add here our reason for saying that it ought to be developed. Augustine was generally content to state what are to be found in the deposit of faith concerning grace and freedom; but it is the task of theology to include in addition some understanding of the mysteries (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). 2 To prove too much is to prove nothing. But the argument for the second part of the thesis proves too much. Therefore it proves nothing. The minor premise is proved as follows: if your argument were valid, a created communication of the divine nature would be impossible; but according to the first thesis, it is not impossible, and therefore that argument is invalid. The second major premise is proven thus: what is defined by God as he is in himself is infinite; but a created communication of the divine nature is defined by God as he is in himself, and therefore is infinite; yet it is supposed to be created, that is, finite. Reply : Against this last argument, given as proof of the second major premise, we argue as follows: The above statement, ‘What is defined by God as he is in himself is infinite,’ we distinguish thus: that a substance defined by God as he is in himself is necessarily infinite, we agree; but as to something other than a substance so defined being necessarily infinite, we admit that it is infinite in some respect, but not simply infinite. Concerning the statement, ‘but a created communication of the divine nature is defined by God as he is in himself,’ we point out that this created communication is something other than a substance. Hence the conclusion, ‘Therefore this created communication is infinite,’ we distinguish similarly: it is not simply infinite, but only in a certain respect, namely, in that it is ordered to the attainment of God as he is in himself. Let us explain the above distinctions. Not everything can be defined in terms of a relation to something else;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

96

De Ente Supernaturali

nihil praeter circulum vitiosum. Ergo aliqua saltem definiuntur per se ipsa et sine habitudine ad aliud; et haec sunt substantiae, quae definiuntur essentiae simpliciter dictae, scil., essentiae tantum, essentiae quae non includunt in ratione propria quandam habitudinem ad aliud. Quare, cum substantia definiatur per id tantum quod ipsa est in se, sequitur substantiam definitam per Deum uti in se est esse Deum et infinitum. Proinde, sicut non omnia possunt definiri per habitudinem ad aliud, ita non omnia possunt definiri sine habitudine ad aliud. Et eiusmodi sunt omnia praeter substantiam: ita esse est actus substantiae; accidens est cui competit esse in alio, scil., in substantia; operationes cognoscitivae et appetitivae, praeter divinas, non solum in alio sunt sed etiam aliud (nempe, obiectum) respiciunt. Et de his, si definiuntur per Deum uti in se est, non statim oritur difficultas: non enim definiuntur tantum per id quod ipsa sunt sed etiam per id cui insunt et per id ad quod sunt.

Additur cautio : Ne tentaveris positivam et intrinsecam intelligentiam creatae communicationis naturae divinae. Haec communicatio pertinet ad ordinem fidei et mysteriorum. Primo et maxime quaerenda est exclusio contradictionis; post, quantum fieri potest, aliquam intelligentiam imperfectam ad normam db 1796 quaerere licebit.

THESIS III Quia actus non solum virtutum theologicarum sed etiam aliarum virtutum, inquantum in parte rationali et sicut oportet a Christiano eliciuntur, ab obiecto formali supernaturali specificantur, ideo simpliciter supernaturales sunt quoad substantiam et quidem ratione obiecti formalis.32

The Robert Mollot Collection

97

The Supernatural Order

otherwise there would be nothing but a vicious circle. At least some things, therefore, are defined in terms of themselves without any relation to something else. These things are substances, which are defined as essences simply speaking, that is, as essences only, essences that do not include in their proper definition a relation to something else. Since, then, a substance is defined only in terms of what it is in itself, it follows that a substance defined in terms of God as he is in himself is God and is infinite. Again, just as not everything is definable in terms of a relation to something else, so also not everything can be defined apart from a relation to something else. In this category are everything except substances; thus existence is the act of a substance, an accident is that to which belongs existence in something else, namely, in a substance, and cognitive and appetitive operations (except those in God) not only are in something else but also have an ordination to something else, namely, their respective objects. If these operations are defined in terms of God as he is in himself, no immediate difficulty need arise; for they are not defined only in terms of what they are in themselves but also in terms of that in which they exist and that object to which they are directed. A Cautionary Note Do not try to have a positive intrinsic understanding of the created communication of the divine nature. This communication belongs to the realm of faith and the mysteries of faith. The first and most important thing to look for is the absence of a contradiction; then, insofar as you are able, you may seek that imperfect understanding that is in accordance with db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132. THESIS 3 Acts, not only of the theological virtues but of other virtues as well, inasmuch as they are elicited in the rational part of a person and in accordance with one’s Christian duty, are specified by a supernatural formal object, and therefore are absolutely supernatural as to their substance and are so by reason of their formal object.32

32 [This is the formulation of Thesis 3 that Lonergan dictated in his Regis course of 1947–48 on De gratia. Frederick Crowe’s note in the Regis edition provides the earlier formulation: ‘Actus non solum virtutum theologicarum

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

98

De Ente Supernaturali

Scopus Extenditur campus supernaturalitatis. In prima enim thesi sola principaliora in medium afferebantur, nempe, unio hypostatica, gratia sanctificans, caritas, visio beatifica. Quatenus his constituitur, creata communicatio divinae naturae in secunda thesi demonstrata est esse simpliciter supernaturalis. At creata communicatio divinae naturae totum renovat hominem: vetus enim homo est totus deponendus et novus homo est in Christo induendus. Quae conformatio vitae nostrae ad vitam Christi maxime in actibus virtutum elucet. Quaeritur ergo utrum hi actus sint simpliciter supernaturales et qua ratione supernaturales esse cognoscantur.

Termini actus: scil., secundus. virtus: habitus operativus bonus. virtutes theologicae: fides, spes, caritas. virtutes aliae: prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia, ad quas caeterae virtutes omnes reduci solent. inquantum : nam actus, v.g., temperantiae, dupliciter potest intelligi: (1) ut actus voluntatis imperantis partem sensitivam; (2) ut actus sensitivus imperatus a voluntate. Non dicimus secundum actum esse supernaturalem, sed primum.33

The Robert Mollot Collection

99

The Supernatural Order

Aim of the Thesis This thesis extends the field of the supernatural order. In our first thesis we considered only the major instances of the supernatural order – the hypostatic union, sanctifying grace, charity, and the beatific vision. In the second thesis we demonstrated that, inasmuch as it is constituted by these, the created communication of the divine nature is absolutely supernatural. But it is the whole person who is renewed by this created communication of the divine nature: the ‘old self’ is to be laid aside and the ‘new self’ is to put on Christ [Ephesians 4.22–24]. This patterning of our life on the life of Christ is chiefly apparent in acts of the virtues. We wish to determine, therefore, whether these acts are simply supernatural and how they might be recognized as such. Terminology acts: here, second acts. virtue: a morally good operative habit. theological virtues : faith, hope, and charity. other virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which all the other virtues are reducible. inasmuch as: for an act of, for example, temperance, can be understood in two ways: (1) as an act of the will commanding the sensitive part of a person; (2) as a sensitive act commanded by the will. We say that the first act, but not the second, is supernatural.33

sed etiam aliarum virtutum, inquantum in parte rationali et sicut oportet a Christiano eliciuntur, simpliciter supernaturales sunt quoad substantiam et quidem ratione obiecti formalis.’ Crowe indicates that ‘et quidem … formalis’ perhaps should have been dropped in the new formulation, and it may well be due to a student’s error that it was not deleted. Still, as the editors of the Regis edition kept that phrase, so have the editors of the current edition. One of the versions of the first edition, 11700dtl040, has handwritten corrections to the earlier formulation, so that it reads, ‘Quia actus non solum virtutum theologicarum sed etiam aliarum virtutum, inquantum in parte rationali et sicut oportet a Christiano eliciuntur et obiecto formali supernaturali specificantur, ideo simpliciter supernaturales sunt quoad substantiam et quidem ratione obiecti formalis.’] 33 [This explanation of inquantum was also dictated by Lonergan in the Regis course of 1947–48 to correspond to the new formulation of the thesis and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

100

De Ente Supernaturali

in parte rationali : scil., in intellectu vel in voluntate, non autem in parte sensitiva, uti in concupiscibili vel in irascibili. sicut oportet a Christiano: secundum regulam quae per se lumine fidei cognoscitur et in vitam aeternam ordinat. eliciuntur : scil., fiunt. supernaturale simpliciter: quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. quoad substantiam: scil., quoad essentiam. obiectum formale: obiectum quatenus operatione attingitur. Notiones praeviae Actus secundus: magis indigitatur quam definitur; in linea substantiali est esse; in linea accidentali est moveri, lucere, calefieri, sentire, intelligere, velle. Actus secundus dividitur in actum perfecti et actum imperfecti. Actus perfecti est actus exsistentis in actu. Est operatio proprie dicta. Actus imperfecti est actus exsistentis in potentia prout huiusmodi. Est motus stricte dictus. Descriptive, actus perfecti seu operatio est actus secundus qui in instante perfici potest et totus exsistit quamdiu perdurat; actus autem imperfecti seu motus est actus secundus qui in instanti perfici non potest sed partim exsistit in singulis temporis partibus quamdiu perdurat.34

The Robert Mollot Collection

101

The Supernatural Order

in the rational part: in the intellect or will; not in the sentient part, such as the concupiscible or the irascible appetite. in accordance with one’s Christian duty : in conformity with a norm that is known per se by the light of faith and directs one towards eternal life. elicited: are done, are performed. absolutely supernatural : that which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatever. as to their substance: in their essence. formal object : the object precisely as attained by the operation. Some Preliminary Notions second act: this is something to be indicated by examples rather than defined. In the substantial order, the act of existence is second act; in the accidental order, to be moved, to shine, to grow hot, to feel, to understand, to will, are all second acts. Second acts are divided into acts of what is complete and acts of what is incomplete. An act of what is complete is an act of that which exists in act: it is an operation strictly so called. An act of what is incomplete is an act of that which exists in potency insofar as it is in potency; it is a motion or change strictly so called. By way of description, an act of what is complete, an operation, is a second act which can take place in an instant and which exists in its totality throughout its duration; an act of what is incomplete, on the other hand, motion or change, is a second act which cannot be performed in an instant, but exists partially in each segment of time as long as it goes on.34

to be inserted into the text. It also appears in handwritten form in the first edition, 11700dtl040. Prior to this, the word was not included in the list of terms of the thesis he deemed as needing some clarification. Again, this information is taken from Frederick Crowe’s notes for the Regis edition.] 34 [For more on actus perfecti and actus imperfecti, see Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 110–16. At this point in the first edition, Lonergan writes, ‘Descriptio supponit tempus ut magis notum quoad nos. Definitio motus praesupponitur a definitione temporis quoad se’ (‘Description supposes time as more known to us. The definition of time as it is in itself presupposes the definition of motion’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

102

De Ente Supernaturali

Operatio dividitur in rationalem et nonrationalem. Operatio rationalis est intrinsece reflexa seu attingit obiectum propter motivum sufficiens. Exempla: dico ‘quod quid est’ seu essentiam propter eius intelligibilitatem-in-se; affirmo verum propter eius intrinsecam evidentiam; credo verum propter auctoritatem attestantis; spero bonum futurum propter auxilium promissum; amo Deum amicum propter eius bonitatem. Operatio nonrationalis non est intrinsece reflexa; dici potest attingere obiectum suum propter motivum, inquantum alia operatio reflexa hoc percipit; sed ipsa operatio nonrationalis non attingit suum motivum qua motivum. Ita visus videt colorem propter lumen, sed quamvis visus videat et lumen et colorem, non percipit lumen qua motivum percipiendi colorem.35 Actus primus est principium quo actus secundus specifice determinatus per se inest subiecto. Ita gravitas vel forma gravitatis est actus primus, in physica Aristotelica, quia est principium quo grave per se movetur deorsum. Similiter potentiae sensitivae exteriores (visus, auditus, etc.) sunt principia quibus per se operationes sensitivae (videre, audire, etc.) insunt organis sensitivis. Similiter habitus operativi in intellectu (scientia) et in voluntate (virtus, vitium) sunt principia quibus per se operationes (scientiae, virtutis, vitii) intellectui vel voluntati insunt. Obiectum (antikeimenon) est id quod operationi opponitur. Inter obiectum et operationem viget ratio causalitatis efficientis: sed cave ne confundas operationem in sensu actus secundi cum operatione in sensu exercitii causalitatis efficientis; actus secundus et alia producit (nam unumquodque agit inquantum est actu) et ab alio producitur (nam est ens contingens et finitum).

The Robert Mollot Collection

103

The Supernatural Order

Operations are divided into rational and nonrational. A rational operation is intrinsically reflective; that is, it attains its object because of a sufficient motive. For example: I say what something is, that is, the essence of a thing, because of its intrinsic intelligibility; I affirm what is true because of intrinsic evidence; I believe a truth because of the authority of the one who attests to it; I hope for some future good because of the help promised; I love God as a friend because of his goodness. A nonrational operation is not intrinsically reflective. It can be said to attain its object on account of a motive only if some other operation that is reflective perceives that motive; but the nonrational operation itself does not attain its motive as motive. Thus the operation of seeing sees color because of light, but although it sees light and color, it itself does not perceive light as the motive for perceiving color.35 First act is the principle by which a specifically determined second act is per se in a subject. Thus gravity or the form of heaviness is a first act, according to Aristotelian physics, because it is the principle whereby what is heavy moves downward per se. Similarly, the external sensory powers such as eyesight, the faculty of hearing, etc., are the principles by which sensory operations (seeing, hearing, etc.) occur per se in their respective sensory organs. Again, operative habits in the intellect (knowledge) and in the will (virtues, vices) are principles by reason of which operations (of knowledge, of virtue, or of vice) per se take place in the intellect or the will. Object (DMȞIJȚțİLYȝİȞȠȞ) is what is opposite to operation. The element of efficient causality is operative between the object and the operation. But be careful not to confuse operation in the sense of second act and operation in the sense of an exercise of efficient causality. Second act both produces other things (for everything acts inasmuch as it is in act) and is produced by something else, since it is a contingent and finite being.

35 [Lonergan wrote in pencil in the first edition ‘Imo in sola physica Aristotelica distinguuntur sensibiliter’ (‘In fact, only in Aristotelian physics are they distinguished by the senses’). At the top of the page where this paragraph appears in the first edition, Lonergan writes: ‘lumen distinguitur a colore sicut libertas exercitii a libertate specificationis; lumen est videre prout opponitur “non videre” “tenebris”’ (‘light is distinguished from color as freedom of exercise is distinguished from freedom of specification; light is seeing as opposed to not-seeing and darkness’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

104

De Ente Supernaturali

Obiectum est vel effectus productus ab operatione, vel causa efficiens quae operationem producit.36 Similiter operatio est vel causa efficiens producens obiectum vel effectus ab obiecto productus. ‘... si quidem operatio illa consistat in actione, adest ei principium activum, sicut patet de potentiis animae nutritivae in plantis; si vero operatio illa consistat in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de potentiis sensitivis in animalibus.’37 Attingentia38 est ambivalens haec habitudo quae vel causae efficientis ad effectum vel effectus ad causam efficientem esse potest. Quare operatio dicitur attingere obiectum; et obiectum dicitur attingi ab operatione. ‘Sentire’ productum a sensibili attingit sensibile. ‘Intelligere’ productum a phantasmate illuminato attingit phantasma illuminatum. ‘Intelligere’ producens verbum attingit verbum. Obiectum dividitur in materiale et formale. Obiectum materiale est obiectum in se spectatum. Obiectum formale est obiectum quatenus est obiectum operationis. Obiectum est obiectum operationis quatenus operationi assimilatur.39 Eatenus enim operatio obiectum attingit, quatenus viget ratio causalitatis efficientis inter obiectum et operationem; eatenus viget haec ratio, quatenus datur assimilatio, nam omne agens agit sibi simile. Nihil plane refert utrum efficiens sit operatio an obiectum; in utroque casu, inquantum ha-

The Robert Mollot Collection

105

The Supernatural Order

An object can be either the effect produced by an operation, or the efficient cause that produces an operation.36 Similarly, an operation is either an efficient cause producing an object, or an effect produced by its object. ‘… if the operation consists of an action, it has within it an active principle, as is obvious in the case of the powers of the nutritive soul in plants; but if that operation consists of a passion, a reception, it has a passive principle, as is obvious in the case of the sensory faculties in animals.’37 The attainment38 of an object is this ambivalent relation of either the efficient cause to its effect or of the effect to its efficient cause. An operation, therefore, is said to attain an object, and an object is said to be attained by an operation. Sensation produced by a sensible object attains that object. Understanding produced by an illuminated phantasm attains the illuminated phantasm. Understanding producing an inner word attains that word. Objects are either material or formal. A material object is the object considered in itself. A formal object is the object considered precisely as the object of an operation. An object is the object of an operation insofar as it is assimilated to that operation.39 For an operation attains its object insofar as there is present the formality of efficient causality between the object and the operation, and that formality is present insofar as there is a likeness, for every agent produces an effect having some likeness to itself. It does not matter at all whether that which produces the effect is the operation or the object; in either case, insofar as

36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 3; De anima, a. 13; In II De anima, lect. 6, §305; De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m. The same point, perhaps, is expressed implicitly, though certainly not explicitly, in De veritate, q. 15, a. 2. [See also the discussion of object in Lonergan, Verbum 138–43 and The Triune God: Systematics 561.] 37 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 76, ¶15, §1575. 38 [In the first edition, Lonergan has a handwritten note at Attingentia: ‘attingentia secundum imaginationem est quasi “manu capere,”’ ‘attainment is imagined as a sort of “grasping by the hand.”’] 39 [In the first edition, Lonergan adds by hand, ‘vel ? quatenus operatio obiecto assimilatur’ (‘or ? insofar as the operation is assimilated to the object’.) The question mark is his, as though he were asking himself a question.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

106

De Ente Supernaturali

betur attingentia, intantum habetur assimilatio inter operationem qua operationem et obiectum qua obiectum; et vice versa. Obiectum formale dividitur in ‘quod’ et ‘quo.’ Obiectum formale quod est id quod operatione attingitur. Obiectum formale quo est quo (vel cur) operatio attingit id quod attingit. Proprie haec divisio applicatur operationibus reflexis quae obiectum complexum attingunt, scil. ‘A propter B.’ Similitudinarie applicatur operationibus non rationalibus; exsistit sane cur hae operationes attingant id quod attingunt; sed ipsae operationes qua operationes non attingunt to propter. Quare dici potest: Obiectum formale quod est obiectum operationis rationalis qua operationis. Obiectum formale quo est obiectum operationis rationalis qua rationalis. Una et eadem operatio attingit to ‘A propter B;’ sed qua rationalis et reflexa attingit to ‘propter B’; qua operatio attingit to A. Ita credere qua rationale attingit auctoritatem attestantis, qua operatio attingit verum attestatum. Non unus est omnium auctorum usus: ubi communius dicuntur obiectum formale quod et quo, alii dicunt obiectum formale et motivum formale, et alii dicunt obiectum materiale principale et obiectum formale. Distinguitur operatio quoad substantiam et quoad modum. Quoad substantiam idem dicit ac quoad essentiam, essentialiter; cum esse essentiam sequatur, prorsus aequivalent operatio quoad substantiam, quoad essentiam, operatio essentialiter, operatio entitative. Improprie interdum dicitur ‘operatio quoad substantiam’ quando intenditur non substantia vel essentia specifica sed generica tantum. Quoad modum, stricte, est operatio secundum varias modalitates quae variari possunt eadem manente essentia; cuiusmodi sunt facilitas, promptitudo, delectabilitas, intensitas, duratio, etc. Quoad modum, late, extenditur ad includendum quodlibet accidens vel

The Robert Mollot Collection

107

The Supernatural Order

there is the attainment of an object there is a likeness of the operation as such to the object as such, and vice versa. Formal objects are either formal objects-which or formal objects-bywhich. A formal object-which is that which is attained by an operation. A formal object-by-which is that by which (or why) an operation attains what it does. Properly speaking, this division applies only to reflective operations which attain a complex object, namely, ‘A because of B.’ But because of the similarity between them, this division is applied to nonrational operations as well. There exists, to be sure, a reason why such operations attain what they do; but these operations themselves as operations do not attain that reason, the ‘because-of.’ Hence we may say: A formal object-which is the object of a rational operation as operation. A formal object-by-which is the object of a rational operation as rational. It is one and the same operation that attains A because of B. But only as rational and reflective does it attain the reason, the ‘because-of-B’; as operation it attains A. Thus, believing as rational attains the authority of the person attesting, while as operation it attains the truth attested to. Terminology in this matter differs among different authors. Whereas more commonly the terms are formal object-which and formal object-bywhich, others speak of formal object and formal motive, respectively, and still others use the terms ‘principal material object’ and ‘formal object.’ There is a distinction between operation in its substance and operation in its mode or manner. ‘In its substance’ means the same as ‘in its essence,’ ‘essentially.’ Since existence follows essence, such expressions as ‘operation in its substance,’ ‘in its essence,’ ‘operation essentially,’ and ‘operation entitatively’ all mean the same thing. Sometimes the term ‘operation in its substance’ is used in an improper sense when what is referred to is not a specific but only a generic substance or essence. ‘In its manner’ in the strict sense refers to an operation according to the various modalities which can change while its essence remains the same, such as facility, promptness, pleasurability, intensity, duration, and so on. ‘In its manner’ broadly speaking extends to anything accidental or ex-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

108

De Ente Supernaturali

extrinsecum; ita qui caecus fuit et dein miraculose sanatus, dicitur habere visum quoad modum supernaturalem. De essentia seu substantia operationis cognoscenda Inquantum haec essentia est nobis per se cognoscibilis,40 derivatur cognitio vel ex adiunctis, vel ex fine extrinseco, vel ex motivo extrinseco, vel ex fine intrinseco, vel ex obiecto formali. Alius enim fons ignoratur. Proinde essentia non cognoscitur ex adiunctis quae variari possunt eadem specifice manente operatione; neque ex fine extrinseco, nam finis est extrinsecus inquantum variari potest eadem specifice manente operatione, puta, ambulare ut vires reficiam, ut dormiam, ut laborem, ut cum amico colloquar; neque ex motivo extrinseco quod aliud non est quam finis extrinsecus prout apprehenditur; neque ex fine intrinseco, cum alia sit ipsa operationis essentia, et aliud cuius gratia essentia ex intrinseca necessitate exsistat.41 Relinquitur ergo ut ex obiecto formali cognitio essentiae operationis derivetur. Quod directe etiam manifestatur, cum necessario detur assimilatio inter operationem quatenus obiectum attingit et obiectum quatenus operatione attingitur, uti supra demonstravimus. Porro, quantum operationes intrinsece rationales attinet, earum essentia cum ex obiecto formali quod tum ex obiecto formali quo cognoscitur. Una et eadem res est et operatio et eius intrinseca rationalitas: unum est

The Robert Mollot Collection

109

The Supernatural Order

trinsic. Thus the eyesight of one who was blind and now is miraculously cured is said to be supernatural in its manner. Knowing the essence or substance of an operation Insofar as this essence is per se knowable to us,40 our knowledge of it would be derived from either external circumstances, or extrinsic end, or extrinsic motive, or intrinsic end, or formal object. We know of no other source. Now, an essence is not known from circumstances, which can vary while the operation remains specifically the same; nor from its extrinsic end, for an end is extrinsic in that it can vary while the operation remains specifically the same, such as walking in order to get exercise, or to sleep, or to go to work, or to visit a friend; nor from the extrinsic motive, since this is the extrinsic end as known; nor from the intrinsic end, since the essence of an operation itself and that for the sake of which the essence exists out of intrinsic necessity are two different things.41 It remains, therefore, that knowledge of the essence of an operation is derived from its formal object. This is also directly evident since, as we have seen above, there is necessarily a likeness between the operation in attaining its object and the object in being attained by the operation. Moreover, as far as intrinsic rational operations are concerned, their essence is known both from their formal object-which and their formal objectby-which. An operation and its intrinsic rationality are one and the same

40 [In the first edition, Lonergan underlined ‘per se’ and wrote the following note: ‘cognoscibilis per se: id est adest possibilitas essentiae cognoscendae per debitam analysin scientificam; adeo non dicimus solam analysin facilem ut singulos homines hortemus ne analysi psychologicae indulgeant; colant fidem spem caritatem, profectum in virtutibus, examen conscientiae, et actus erunt supernaturales pro profectu adepto’ (‘knowable per se: that is, there is the possibility of knowing something through a proper scientific analysis – not that we so favor a mere easy analysis as to dissuade people from indulging in psychological analysis. Let them cultivate the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, advance in all the other virtues, examine their consciences, and their acts will be supernatural according to the progress they have made’).] 41 [In the first edition, Lonergan writes, ‘Necessitas est subordinationis, non subordinati; non absoluta sed hypothetica’ (‘Necessity belongs to subordination, not to the subordinated; hypothetical, not absolute, necessity’.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

110

De Ente Supernaturali

obiectum complexum quod operatione rationali attingitur, scil., non tantum obiectum formale quod neque tantum obiectum formale quo sed utrumque prout illud est propter hoc. Praeterea, cum obiectum formale quo se habeat ad formale quod sicut principium ad principiatum, non potest esse minor perfectio ratione principii quam ratione principiati; at non convertitur; potest esse minor perfectio ratione principiati quam ratione principii.

Opiniones Inde a tempore concilii Tridentini communiter a theologis affirmatur omnia opera salutaria esse entitative et simpliciter supernaturalia. Opera salutaria intelliguntur ea quae ducunt quocumque modo in vitam aeternam, sive sint meritoria uti post iustificationem, sive sint non meritoria uti ante iustificationem. Quia entitas operis sequitur essentiam, planum est eos admittere eadem opera esse simpliciter supernaturalia quoad substantiam seu essentiam. Haec doctrina probari solet ex absoluta necessitate gratiae ad opera salutaria perficienda: nisi enim eiusmodi opera sint simpliciter supernaturalia, absoluta necessitas gratiae non intelligatur. Quamvis vero theologi conveniant in asserenda supernaturalitate essentiali horum operum, discrepant de cognoscibilitate eiusdem essentiae. Alii affirmant eam esse qualitatem quae sola revelatione cognoscatur, ideoque haec opera qua supernaturalia non specificari ab obiecto formali. Ita plus minus Scotus, Molina, Ripalda, de Lugo, Franzelin, Billot, Janssens, Beraza, Schiffini, Lange, Lennerz, etc.42

The Robert Mollot Collection

111

The Supernatural Order

thing; what is attained in a rational operation is one complex object, that is, not the formal object-which alone and not the formal object-by-which alone, but both together and the former as being because of the latter. Again, since the formal object-by-which is to the formal object-which as a principle to its resultant, there cannot be less perfection by reason of the principle than by reason of the resultant. But the converse is not true: there can be less perfection by reason of the resultant than by reason of the principle. Opinions Ever since the Council of Trent, theologians have generally maintained that all salutary works are entitatively and absolutely supernatural. By salutary works we mean those that in some way or other lead towards eternal life, either those that are meritorious as is the case after justification, or those that are non-meritorious before justification. Clearly, because the entity of a work follows its essence, theologians acknowledge these works as being absolutely supernatural in their substance or essence. This doctrine is usually proven from the absolute necessity of grace in order to perform works that are salutary; for if such works are not absolutely supernatural, the absolute necessity for grace makes no sense. However, although theologians agree in asserting the essential supernaturality of these works, there is a dispute about the knowability of their essence. Some hold that this is a quality known by revelation alone, and that therefore these works as supernatural are not specified by their formal object. This is more or less the opinion of Scotus, Molina, Ripalda, de Lugo, Franzelin, Billot, Janssens, Beraza, Schiffini, Lange, Lennerz, and others.42

42 [This list of authors and the order in which the authors are mentioned are similar to the list given in Carolus Boyer, De gratia divina synopsis scholastica (Rome: Apud aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1930) 84–85. Lonergan just adds Lange (see Hermannus Lange, De gratia tractatus dogmaticus [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1929] 212–20) and Lennerz (see H. Lennerz, ‘De vero sensu principii “actus specificatur ab obiecto formali,”’ Gregorianum 17 [1936] 143–46) to the list. (In later editions of his book, Boyer will include Lennerz in his list). In his set of notes, Bleau gives a list similar to the list Boyer gives (see p. 44 of Bleau’s notes). His set of notes is dated ‘September 1943,’ so he is able to include Lennerz’s 1936 article in his list; Lange,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

112

De Ente Supernaturali

Alii autem affirmant supernaturalitatem horum operum esse sicut aliam qualitatem cognoscibilem, ideoque haec opera qua supernaturalia specificari ab obiecto formali. Ita Suarez, Salmanticenses, Ioannes a sancto Thoma, Wirceburgenses, Mazzella, Garrigou-Lagrange, Mattiussi, Petazzi, Boyer, etc.43 Ex his dictis elucet quaestionem poni solere in via resolutionis; nobis autem via compositionis procedentibus, alius modus ponendi quaestionem convenit. Quare non quaerimus de actibus meritoriis, neque de actibus salutaribus, sed de actibus virtutum. Praeterea, magis insistimus in ipsa horum actuum analysi, quam in principiis generalibus quae, omissa actuum analysi, plus confusionis quam lucis afferre solent.

The Robert Mollot Collection

113

The Supernatural Order

Other theologians, however, maintain that the supernatural character of these works is just like any other knowable quality, and so these works as supernatural are specified by their formal object. This is the opinion of, among others, Suárez, the Salamanca theologians, John of St Thomas, the Würzburg theologians, Mazzella, Garrigou-Lagrange, Mattiussi, Petazzi, and Boyer.43 From this it is clear that the question usually arises when proceeding analytically. But since in our treatise we are following the synthetic order, it is more suitable to put the question in a different way, and for that reason we are not inquiring into actions as meritorious or salutary, but as acts of virtue. Furthermore, we place greater emphasis on the analysis of these acts than on general principles which, when this analysis is neglected, usually produce more confusion than enlightenment.

however, is not included, and there are some typographical errors in Bleau’s list. It seems likely that Bleau derived his list from Boyer’s later list. Indeed, it seems likely that the list of authors holding this position had become more or less standard in the manuals, and Lonergan simply added Lange to that list. Lonergan gives no references with his list. Boyer gives references to the works of Scotus, Molina, Ripalda, Juan de Lugo (1583–1660), Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–86), and Louis Billot (1846–1931), but not to the works of Henri-Laurent Janssens (1855–1925), Blasio Beraza (1862–1936), and Santo Schiffini (1841–1906). (In the Lonergan Archives, in a set of work notes also titled De ente supernaturali and assigned the listing lp ii/20, a168 [www.bernardlonergan.com, 16800dtl040], Lonergan does quote from §§15 and 68 of Blasio Beraza’s Tractatus de gratia Christi [Bilbao: Apud Elexpuru Hermanos, 1916], and from §§8 and 144 of Sancto Schiffini’s Tractatus de gratia divina [Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1901]. Presumably, then, these are the works of these two authors that Lonergan has in mind.) For the references Boyer does give, see De gratia divina synopsis scholastica 84–85, and the later edition, Tractatus de gratia divina (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1946) 85.] 43 [This is the same list, with the same order, that Boyer gives on p. 85 of De gratia divina synopsis scholastica. Lonergan has just added Boyer’s name to it. Bleau’s list is similar to Boyer’s list (see p. 44 of Bleau’s notes), though his order is slightly different, and he has ‘Thomistae’ at the beginning and includes ‘de la Taille’ and ‘Boyer’ at the end. Again, Lonergan gives no references with his list. In De gratia divina synopsis scholastica, Boyer gives references to the works of Suárez, the Salamanca theologians, Camillo Mazzella (1833–1900), Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964), Guido Mattiussi (1852–1925), and Giusseppi Maria Petazzi (1874–1948), but not to the works of John of St Thomas and the Würzburg theologians. For the references Boyer does give, see De gratia divina synopsis scholastica 85.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

114

De Ente Supernaturali

Qualificatio Quod actus virtutum theologicarum et aliarum sunt simpliciter supernaturales quoad substantiam, sententia communis theologorum inde a Tridentino. Quod hi actus qua supernaturales sunt cognoscibiles ratione obiecti formalis, sententia probabilior. Probatur per partes 1 Quoad actum fidei divinae: Actus fidei divinae est simpliciter supernaturalis quoad substantiam, si eius ‘obiectum formale quod’ est simpliciter supernaturale. Atqui ‘obiectum formale quod’ fidei divinae est simpliciter supernaturale. Ergo actus fidei divinae est simpliciter supernaturale quoad substantiam. Maior: est evidens ex terminis, nam essentia seu substantia actus per se cognoscitur ex obiecto formali quod. Minor: Illud verum est simpliciter supernaturale quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet intellectus finiti. Atqui ‘obiectum formale quod’ fidei divinae est verum eiusmodi. Ergo ‘obiectum formale quod’ fidei divinae est simpliciter supernaturale. Maior haec: est evidens ex terminis, nam est definitio. Minor haec: probatur ex Vaticano, db 1795, 1796, 1816. Asseritur obiectum distinctum fidei correspondens; quod obiectum est verum aliquod, nempe, mysteria divina in Deo abscondita (db 1795), ultra proportionem humani intellectus (db 1816), imo suapte natura excedens intellectum creatum (db 1796). Hoc obiectum est ‘obiectum formale quod:’ primo, quia est id quod credendo attingitur, nempe, veritas revelata; deinde, quia non est obiectum materiale quod est Deus absconditus qua absconditus, neque est ‘obiectum formale quo’ seu motivum formale, nam hoc est auctoritas Dei revelantis (db 1789). Hoc ‘obiectum formale quod’ est supernaturale relate ad hominem (db 1816); imo est simpliciter supernaturale, nam excedit intellectum creatum, non per accidens inquantum intellectus finitus proportionatus de facto

The Robert Mollot Collection

115

The Supernatural Order

Qualification of the Thesis That acts of the theological and other virtues are absolutely supernatural in their substance has been the common opinion among theologians since the Council of Trent. That these acts as supernatural are knowable by reason of their formal object is the more probable opinion. Proof of the Thesis (in three parts) 1 Regarding the act of divine faith: The act of divine faith is absolutely supernatural in its substance if its formal object-which is absolutely supernatural. But the formal object-which of divine faith is absolutely supernatural. Therefore an act of divine faith is absolutely supernatural in its substance. The major premise is evident from its terms, for the essence or substance of an act is known per se from its formal object-which. The minor premise is substantiated as follows. A truth that exceeds the proportion of any finite intellect whatsoever is absolutely supernatural. But the formal object-which of divine faith is that sort of truth. Therefore the formal object-which of divine faith is absolutely supernatural. This second major premise is evident from its terms, since it is a definition. The second minor premise is proven from Vatican i. It is asserted that faith has a distinct object corresponding to it. This object is a truth, ‘the divine mysteries hidden in God’ (db 1795, ds 3015, nd 131), beyond the scope of the human intellect (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137), and indeed by its very nature beyond any created intellect (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). This object is the formal object-which: first, because it is that which is attained through believing, namely, revealed truth; second, because it is not the material object, which is the hidden God as hidden, nor is it the formal object-by-which, the formal motive for believing, since this is the authority of God as revealing (db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118). This formal object-which is supernatural vis-à-vis man (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137); indeed, it is absolutely supernatural, for it exceeds all created intelligence, not just because in actual fact it happens that no finite intellect

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

116

De Ente Supernaturali

non est creatus, sed per se, scil., ‘suapte natura’ excedit intellectum creatum. 2 Quoad actum spei theologicae: Actus spei theologicae est simpliciter supernaturalis quoad substantiam, si eius obiectum formale quod est simpliciter supernaturale. Atqui est. Ergo. Maior: evidens ex terminis. Minor: Obiectum formale quod spei theologicae est illud bonum possibile futurum arduum quod est principaliter ipsa visio beatifica attingenda, secundario actus necessarii ad visionem attingendam. Atqui eiusmodi bonum arduum futurum est simpliciter supernaturale. Ergo obiectum formale quod spei theologicae est simpliciter supernaturale. Haec minor: obiectum principale, nempe visio attingenda, ratione sui est simpliciter supernaturalis; quae necessaria sunt ad visionem attingendam saltem extrinsece seu ratione finis sunt simpliciter supernaturalia; et quaedam inter ea, uti fides et caritas, etiam intrinsece sunt supernaturalia simpliciter, uti iam demonstratum est. 3 Actus aliarum virtutum prout in parte rationali eliciuntur et sicut oportet a Christiano fiunt, sunt simpliciter supernaturales quoad substantiam. Hi actus sunt simpliciter supernaturales quoad substantiam si eorum obiectum formale quo est simpliciter supernaturale. Atqui eorum obiectum formale quo est simpliciter supernaturale. Ergo hi actus sunt simpliciter supernaturales quoad substantiam. Maior: evidens ex terminis. Minor: Horum actuum obiectum formale quo est principium determinans obiectum formale quod et ipsos actus qua rationales motivans. Atqui eiusmodi principium est simpliciter supernaturale. Ergo horum actuum obiectum formale quo est simpliciter supernaturale. Haec minor: Nam hoc principium, ex parte intellectus, est lumen fidei et, ex parte voluntatis, est impulsus spei vel/et caritatis. Atqui fides, spes, et caritas sunt simpliciter supernaturales.

The Robert Mollot Collection

117

The Supernatural Order

proportionate to it has been created, but because per se, ‘by its very nature,’ it is beyond any created intellect. 2 Regarding the act of theological hope: The act of theological hope is absolutely supernatural in its substance if its formal object-which is absolutely supernatural. But the formal object-which is absolutely supernatural, and therefore so also is an act of theological hope. The major premise is evident from the terms themselves. The minor premise is substantiated as follows. The formal object-which of theological hope is that future good, possible yet difficult of attainment, that is primarily the beatific vision but secondarily the acts necessary to attain this vision. Now, such a good is absolutely supernatural. Therefore the formal object-which of theological hope is likewise absolutely supernatural. As to this second minor premise, the primary object, namely the vision to be attained, is in its very essence absolutely supernatural. Those things that are necessary to attain this vision are at least extrinsically, by reason of their end, absolutely supernatural; and some among them, such as faith and charity, are also intrinsically supernatural, as we have shown. 3 Acts of other virtues that are elicited in the rational part of a person and are done in accordance with one’s Christian duty are absolutely supernatural in their substance. These acts are absolutely supernatural in their substance if their formal object-by-which is absolutely supernatural. But their formal object-by-which is absolutely supernatural. Hence so are these acts. The major premise is evident from the terms themselves. As to the minor premise, the formal object-by-which of these acts is the principle that determines their formal object-which and that motivates these acts as rational. But such a principle is absolutely supernatural. Therefore, their formal object-by-which is absolutely supernatural. We substantiate this second minor premise as follows. This principle, on the part of the intellect, is the light of faith, and on the part of the will is an impulse of hope and/or charity. But faith, hope, and charity are absolutely supernatural.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

118

De Ente Supernaturali

Ergo principium hoc est simpliciter supernaturale. Notanda Arguitur hic exclusive ex obiecto formali quo et circa actus intrinsece rationales, puta, de fortitudine prout a voluntate imperatur et non prout in irascibili exsistit. Arguitur exclusive ex obiecto formali quo, quia hoc obiectum respicit actum qua rationalem; actus autem virtutis est virtutis, non quatenus est tale opus, puta, abstinentia a cibo vel tolerantia supplicii, sed quatenus est conformis regulae virtutis; praeterea, haec conformitas ad regulam virtutis pertinet ad intrinsecam rationem actus intrinsece rationalis et reflexi; nam actus reflexus non solum attingit obiectum formale quod sed etiam obiectum formale quo. Non arguitur de actibus virtutum prout in parte nonrationali fiunt. Cum enim hi actus non sint intrinsece rationales, dubium videtur asserere eos essentialiter et modo proportionato assimilari obiecto formali quo, ita ut necessario sint simpliciter supernaturales quoad substantiam. Denique, ex eo quod obiectum formale quo est simpliciter supernaturale, non necessario sequitur obiectum formale quod esse simpliciter supernaturale. Propositio conversa utique tenet, quia principiatum non excedit suum principium. Sed non necessario principiatum adaequat suum principium. Et quantum ad actus virtutum qua actus attinet, planum videtur opera omnia iusta a Christiano facta sicut oporteat non differre quoad obiectum formale quod ab operibus humanae iustitiae; secus quemadmodum lex civilis posset determinare legem iustitiae non solum pro infidelibus sed etiam pro fidelibus? Obicitur 1 Quoad actum fidei: Id quod est simpliciter supernaturale non est quivis assensus mysteriis sed assensus ex perspecta intrinseca evidentia. Atqui fides non perspicit intrinsecam evidentiam. Ergo non est simpliciter supernaturalis. Respondeo: Assensus ex perspecta evidentia intrinseca est simpliciter supernaturalis: etiam, concedo; tantum, nego. Et explico.

The Robert Mollot Collection

119

The Supernatural Order

Therefore this principle is also. Some Observations We have argued here exclusively from the formal object-by-which and about acts intrinsically rational – about fortitude, for example, as elicited by the will and not as existing in one’s irascible passion. We have argued exclusively from the formal object-by-which because this object concerns acts as rational. A virtuous act, however, is virtuous not because it is this or that particular action, such as abstaining from food or patiently bearing torture, but because it conforms to the norm of virtue. Besides, this conformity to a norm of virtue is part of the intrinsic nature of an intrinsically rational and reflective act; for a reflective act not only attains the formal object-which but also the formal object-by-which. Our argument is not about virtuous acts as performed in the nonrational part of a person. For since these acts are not intrinsically rational, it is doubtful that they can be said to be essentially and in a proportionate way likened to the formal object-by-which so as to be necessarily supernatural in their substance. Finally, from the fact that the formal object-by-which is absolutely supernatural it does not necessarily follow that the formal object-which is absolutely supernatural. The converse is true, of course, because a resultant does not exceed its principle. Nor is the resultant necessarily at the same level as its principle. And as far as acts of virtue are concerned, it seems quite clear that all just deeds done by a Christian are not different in their formal object-which from works of human justice; otherwise, how could civil society make laws in matters of justice for believers and unbelievers alike? Objections 1 Regarding the act of faith: Not any assent to the mysteries of faith is absolutely supernatural, but only an assent based upon a grasp of intrinsic evidence. But faith does not grasp intrinsic evidence. Therefore faith is not supernatural. Reply: We agree that an assent to the mysteries based upon a grasp of intrinsic evidence is absolutely supernatural, but we deny that only such an assent is so. Let us explain.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

120

De Ente Supernaturali

Exsistit aliquod verum intellectui nostro proportionatum. Hoc verum nobis proportionatum non mensuratur ex potentia Dei revelantis, ita ut quidquid Deus revelare potest sit verum nobis proportionatum. Verum nobis proportionatum mensuratur non ex Deo revelante sed ex nostro intellectu; et quidem mensuratur ex capacitate nostri intellectus ad perspiciendam intrinsecam evidentiam, nam intrinseca evidentia per se est mensura veri et eius motivum formale. Per accidens enim voluntas imperat assensum. Unde clare et distincte dividuntur visio naturalis et supernaturalis, fides naturalis et supernaturalis. Id videmus vel scimus vel credimus naturaliter cuius intrinseca evidentia naturaliter a nobis perspici potest; sed videmus vel scimus, si perspicimus; et credimus si non perspicientes auctoritati perspicientis obtemperamus. Id videmus vel scimus vel credimus supernaturaliter cuius intrinseca evidentia naturaliter a nobis perspici non potest; sed videmus vel scimus si perspicimus, uti in visione beatifica; et credimus si non perspicientes auctoritati perspicientis obtemperamus, et ita in fide divina.

2 Si obiectum formale quod est simpliciter supernaturale, etiam obiectum formale quo est simpliciter supernaturale. Atqui obiectum formale quo in actu fidei non est simpliciter supernaturale. Ergo obiectum formale quod non est simpliciter supernaturale. Maior: nam principium saltem est aequale principiato. Minor: nam formale quo fidei est auctoritas Dei revelantis, quae naturaliter cognoscitur, uti in motivis credibilitatis quae fidem antecedunt. Respondeo: Conceditur maior et negatur minor. Ad probationem minoris: distinguitur inter auctoritatem Dei revelantis prout est veritas naturaliter et per se nota in motivis credibilitatis et prout est motivum supernaturale sufficiens in ipso actu fidei. De qua re, plura in analysi fidei. 3 Admittendum est in virtutibus Christianis et cardinalibus non solum obiectum formale quo sed etiam obiectum formale quod simpliciter supernaturale.

The Robert Mollot Collection

121

The Supernatural Order

Some truths are proportionate to our intellect. These truths proportionate to us are not measured according to the power of God who reveals, so that whatever God can reveal would be a truth proportionate to us. A truth that is proportionate to us is measured not from God as revealing but from our intellect, measured, that is, from the capacity of our intellect to grasp intrinsic evidence, since intrinsic evidence per se is the measure of truth and its formal motive. That the will should command an intellectual assent is per accidens. Hence there is a clear and distinct division between natural and supernatural vision and between natural and supernatural faith. We see or know or believe in a natural way a truth the intrinsic evidence of which can be naturally grasped by us. But we see or know it if we ourselves grasp it; we believe it if we, though not grasping the evidence, acknowledge the authority of one who does. We see or know or believe supernaturally a truth whose intrinsic evidence cannot naturally be grasped by us. But we see or know it if we grasp it, as in the beatific vision; and we believe such a truth if, without grasping the intrinsic evidence for it, we accept it on the authority of one who does know, as in the case of divine faith. 2 If the formal object-which is absolutely supernatural, the formal object-bywhich is also absolutely supernatural. But the formal object-by-which in the act of faith is not absolutely supernatural. Therefore neither is the formal object-which. As to the major premise, a principle is at least equal to its resultant. As to the minor premise, the formal object-by-which is the authority of God who reveals, and this is known in a natural way, as in the motives of credibility which precede faith. Reply : We answer this objection by admitting the major premise while denying the minor. As to the above proof of the minor premise, one must distinguish between the authority of God who reveals as a truth known naturally and per se in the motives of credibility, and as a sufficient supernatural motive in the act of faith itself. For more on this point, see the treatise ‘Analysis fidei.’ 3 You must admit that in both the Christian and cardinal virtues not only their formal object-by-which but also their formal object-which are absolutely supernatural.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

122

De Ente Supernaturali

Nam principiatum sequitur principium; sed principium admittitur esse simpliciter supernaturale. Praeterea, inutile videtur formale quo simpliciter supernaturale nisi eo fit actus simpliciter supernaturalis quoad obiectum formale quod. Respondeo: Alia est quaestio de ipsis virtutibus quae respiciunt totam quandam actuum seriem; et alia est quaestio de actibus qui singuli prout in se sunt considerari debent. Concedimus multos actus virtutum Christianarum differre quoad obiectum formale quod ab actibus correspondentibus virtutis humanae. Patet hoc de virtute religionis,44 quae est iustitiae annexa, et alia humana, alia prorsus positiva et supernaturalis. Quamvis tamen concedatur speciale esse obiectum formale quod in actibus virtutum Christianarum multis, non statim sequitur hoc speciale obiectum esse simpliciter supernaturale; neque via obvia ad hoc probandum praesto est.

Alia tamen ex parte qui velit adstruere speciale obiectum formale quod in singulis actibus virtutis Christianae, contra factum arguere videtur. Quantum ad rationes datas: Principiatum sequitur principium si in ordine eodem exsistit, concedo; si in ordine inferiori, nego. Opera sensitiva in homine principiantur ab imperio rationis et tamen manent motus coniuncti, entitative materiales. Neque inutile est obiectum formale quo simpliciter supernaturale, nisi etiam formale quod est supernaturale. Nam formale quo respicit actum qua virtuosum, formale quod respicit actum qua actum; si actus qua virtuosus est simpliciter supernaturalis, hoc non est inutile, etiamsi actus qua actus potest fieri ab infideli, puta, abstinentiam a cibo a Gandhi protractam.

Scholion I: De gradibus intra ipsos actus supernaturales Alii actus sunt simpliciter supernaturales quia eis attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est et quidem Deus totus. Et eiusmodi sunt visio beatifica, amor sequens visionem, amor eiusdem speciei (caritas numquam excidit) visionem antecedens.

The Robert Mollot Collection

123

The Supernatural Order

For a resultant follows its principle, and the principle is acknowledged to be absolutely supernatural. Besides, an absolutely supernatural formal object-by-which seems to be pointless unless by it an act is performed that is absolutely supernatural as to its formal object-which. Reply : There are two separate issues here. One is the question of those virtues that regard a whole series of acts; the other is the question of acts that are to be considered separately as they are in themselves. We grant that with respect to their formal object-which, many acts of the Christian virtues differ from the corresponding acts of a human virtue. This is obvious, for example, in the case of the virtue of religion,44 which is connected to the virtue of justice; accordingly, there is one virtue of religion that is human and another that is wholly supernatural and a matter of divine positive law. Nevertheless, although we grant that there is a special formal object-which in many acts of the Christian virtues, it does not immediately follow that this special object is absolutely supernatural, nor does there appear to be any obvious way to prove this. On the other hand, to assign a special formal object-which for each individual act of a Christian virtue would seem to be arguing against the facts. As to the reasons adduced by the objector: It is true that the resultant follows the principle if they are both in the same order, but not if it belongs to a lower order. The sentient operations in a human being originate from a command of one’s reason and yet remain movements of the composite person and are entitatively material. Nor is it true that an absolutely supernatural formal object-by-which is pointless unless the formal object-which is also supernatural. For the formal object-by-which regards an act as virtuous, whereas the formal object-which regards it as an act. If an act as virtuous is absolutely supernatural, this does not mean it is pointless, even if the act as act can be performed by a nonbeliever – Mahatma Gandhi’s protracted fast, for example. Excursus 1: Degrees among the supernatural acts themselves Some acts are absolutely supernatural because through them God, indeed God in his entirety, is attained as he is in himself. Such acts are the beatific vision, love that is consequent upon this vision, and the specifically same love (‘charity never ends’) that precedes the vision. 44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, qq. 81–91.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

124

De Ente Supernaturali

Alii actus sunt simpliciter supernaturales quia eis attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est non simpliciter et totus sed tantum secundum quid. Et eiusmodi est fides, quae attingit quidem mysteria in Deo abscondita, non tamen omnia quae in Deo absconduntur; unde post fidem remanent alia de Deo in visione cognoscenda; quare etiam ratione obiecti formalis quod, fides est imperfecta. Eiusmodi etiam est spes, quae tendit quidem in attingendum ipsum Deum uti in se est, non tamen actu attingit; quando autem ad ipsum Deum attingitur, spes evacuatur. Fides, spes, caritas, et ipsa visio sunt simpliciter supernaturales ratione et obiecti formalis quod et obiecti formalis quo. Sed actus aliarum virtutum, quae respiciunt non ipsam divinam vitam in nobis sed magis transformationem nostrae vitae ex praesentia vitae divinae,45 sunt simpliciter supernaturales qua actus virtuosi ratione obiecti formalis quo, non autem, saltem omnes et singuli, qua actus et ratione obiecti formalis quod.

Haec gradus diversitas intra ipsos actus supernaturales forsitan respiciat alias diversitates actuum supernaturalium. Sola caritas non exercetur nisi adest virtus per se infusa. Actus enim fidei et spei et caeterarum virtutum exerceri possunt ante iustificationem quando virtutes infunduntur. Sola caritas per se est meritoria: caeterae virtutes vel earum actus possunt esse vel formati vel informes; formantur gratia sanctificante et caritate; sed gratia sanctificante abeunte informes fiunt et meritorii esse desinunt. Quare operae pretium esse videtur distinguere inter actus simpliciter supernaturales formaliter et actus simpliciter supernaturales virtualiter; illis attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est; his non attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est nisi secundum quid uti in fide et spe. Quia est supernaturalis formaliter caritas est semper meritoria et necessario supponit habitum vel virtutem infusam. Quia non sunt supernaturalia formaliter, alia non semper sunt meritoria neque necessario supponunt virtutem infusam.

The Robert Mollot Collection

125

The Supernatural Order

Other acts are absolutely supernatural because through them God is attained as he is in himself, not absolutely and in his entirety, however, but only in some respect. Faith is an act of this kind, which attains the mysteries hidden in God, though not everything that is hidden in God. After faith has ended, therefore, there remain other things about God to be learned in the beatific vision, and so even by reason of its formal object-which faith is imperfect. Hope also is this sort of act, which tends towards the attainment of God as he is in himself without actually attaining him. And when God himself is attained, hope comes to an end. Faith, hope, charity, and the beatific vision itself are absolutely supernatural by reason of both their formal object-which and their formal object-bywhich. But acts of the other virtues, which have to do not with the divine life in us but rather with transforming our lives through the presence of this divine life in us,45 are absolutely supernatural as virtuous by reason of their formal object-by-which, but are not absolutely supernatural, or at least not all or individually, as acts and by reason of their formal objectwhich. This difference of degree among these supernatural acts may have a bearing upon other differences among such acts. Only charity is not exercised in the absence of the infused virtue. For acts of faith and hope and of the other virtues can be performed before justification, when those virtues are infused. Only charity is meritorious per se; the other virtues or their acts can be informed or uninformed. They are informed by sanctifying grace and charity, and when sanctifying grace departs they become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. For this reason it seems worthwhile to distinguish between absolutely supernatural acts that are formally supernatural and absolutely supernatural acts that are virtually supernatural. The former attain God as he is in himself, while the latter do not attain God as he is in himself but only in some respect, as in the case of faith and hope. Charity, because it is formally supernatural, is always meritorious and necessarily presupposes the infused habit or virtue. The others, not being formally supernatural, are not always meritorious, nor do they necessarily presuppose an infused virtue.

45 [In the first edition, Lonergan added ‘communicatae’ to ‘ex praesentia vitae divinae.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

126

De Ente Supernaturali

Scholion II: De supernaturalitate mere entitativa Quaeritur quid sentiendum de opinione a multis defensa, actus simpliciter supernaturales esse tales propter qualitatem sola revelatione cognitam, cui qualitati non respondeat obiectum formale supernaturale.46 Primo, respondetur quod ipsa analysis iam facta sufficienter demonstrat actus virtutum supernaturales de facto habere obiectum formale supernaturale. Nam ex exsistentia huiusmodi obiecti probavimus actus esse supernaturales. Secundo, difficile admittitur qualitas per se nobis incognoscibilis nisi ex revelatione divina adesse in actibus secundis elicitis in potentiis intellectivis: quod adest in actu secundo in intellectu est quoddam cognoscere; quod adest in actu secundo in voluntate est quoddam velle; sed cognoscere et velle natura sua sunt cognoscibilia et cognita cognoscenti et volenti. Tertio, eiusmodi assertio qualitatis incognoscibilis nisi ex revelatione vergit in detrimentum fidei. Adstruit enim Christum esse mortuum ut eiusmodi qualitas actibus insit. Adstruit Deum non dare vitam aeternam nisi propter actus non qua bonos sed qua qualitate incognoscibili ornatos. Quarto, inutile videtur recurrere ad mysterium ad haec placita defendenda: potius enim est mysterium a theologis quibusdam opinantibus propositum quam a Deo revelatum.47 THESIS IV Potentia ad supernaturalia simpliciter est obedientialis. Scopus theseos Determinatis utrum sit communicatio creata divinae naturae, qualis sit, et

The Robert Mollot Collection

127

The Supernatural Order

Excursus 2: A note on purely entitative supernaturality What is to be said about the opinion, defended by many, that absolutely supernatural acts are such because of a quality known only by revelation, a quality to which a supernatural formal object does not correspond?46 Our first answer is that the analysis we have now made sufficiently demonstrates that supernatural acts of virtue do in fact have a supernatural formal object. For we have proven the supernaturality of acts from the existence of this sort of object. Second, it is hard to see that there is a quality, in itself unknowable to us apart from divine revelation, that is present in second acts elicited in our intellectual faculties. What is present in a second act of the intellect is some act of knowing, and what is present in a second act of the will is some act of willing. But knowing and willing are by their very nature knowable and known to the person who knows and wills. Third, to assert that this quality is unknowable apart from revelation tends to the detriment of faith. It suggests that Christ died so that these acts might have this quality; it suggests that God grants eternal life because of acts not as morally good but only as endowed with this unknowable quality. Fourth, it seems futile to have recourse to mystery in order to defend these notions. The main mystery here is the opinion advanced by certain theologians rather than something revealed by God.47 THESIS 4 Potency to the absolutely supernatural is obediential. Aim of the Thesis Having determined the existence and the nature of a created communica46 [At the top of the page of the first edition containing this scholion, Lonergan wrote: cur actus iudicatur bonus – in omni actu morali adest explicite vel habitualiter et implicite aliquod iudicium morale vel indifferentismus moralis; analysis psychologica difficilis – praesertim in desolatione, max[ime] in ariditate mystica’ (‘Why an act is judged to be good – in every moral act there is either explicitly or habitually and implicitly some moral judgment or moral indifferentism; difficult psychological analysis – especially in times of desolation, and most of all in mystical dryness’).] 47 [In the first edition 19201dtl040, Lonergan adds two paragraphs: ‘Quinto, admittimus aliquam inconvenientiam per accidens in nostra positione, scil. movet hominem ad actus suos perscrutandos ut videat utrum

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

128

De Ente Supernaturali

ad quales actus ducat, quaeritur quaenam sit potentia substantiae finitae ad hanc communicationem recipiendam et ad hos actus eliciendos.

Notiones praeviae 48 1 Potentia est ordo ad actum. Potentia activa est ordo ad actum producendum. Potentia passiva est ordo ad actum recipiendum. Cum actus qui recipi potest sit vel primus vel secundus, potentia passiva dividitur in accidentalem et essentialem. Circa actum primum et secundum, vide thesin tertiam.46 Potentia passiva accidentalis est ordo actus primi ad actum secundum recipiendum. Exempla: formae substantialis ad esse; formae accidentalis ad

The Robert Mollot Collection

129

The Supernatural Order

tion of the divine nature and the sort of acts it leads to, we turn now to ask what sort of potency a finite substance has to receive this communication and to elicit these acts. Some Preliminary Notions 48 1 Potency is an ordination to act. Active potency is an ordination to the production of act. Passive potency is an ordination to the reception of act. Since an act that can be received is either a first act or a second act, passive potency is divided into accidental and essential. Concerning first and second acts, see Thesis 3.49 Accidental passive potency is an ordination of first act to the reception of a second act. Examples are: substantial form is an ordination to the act of

sint supernaturales. Cum haec analysis sit in se difficilior, et nemo bene faciat analysin psychologicam sui ipsius, sequitur demissio animae indebita. Remedium tamen non est alia theoria sed omissio perscrutationis inutilis et periculosae. Vide db 809; sufficit status gratiae et bonum opus in Deo factum. ‘Sexto, differentia inter actum virtutis humanae et actum virtutis Christianae non est quaedam bona intentio elicita (oblatio matutina); agitur de motivo intrinseco actui, scil. cur actus iudicetur bonus, v.g. quia catholici ita sentiunt, quia ita docetur in scholis catholicis. (In margin): quae est magis – finis operantis forte extrinsecus’ (‘which is greater – the end of the agent is perhaps extrinsic’). (‘Fifth, we admit that there could be some inconvenience in our position, that is to say, that it induces a person to examine his actions to see whether they are supernatural. Since such an analysis in itself is rather difficult and no one is good at conducting psychological analysis of oneself, unwarranted discouragement ensues. The remedy for this, however, is not another theory but the cessation of such futile and dangerous scrutiny. See db 809 [ds 1545]: the state of grace along with good work done in God is sufficient. ‘Sixth, the difference between an act of human virtue and an act of Christian virtue is not the eliciting of a good intention (e.g., the “morning offering”); it is a matter of the motive that is intrinsic to the act, that is, why the act is judged to be good – for example, because that is what Catholics think, because this is what is taught in Catholic schools. ’)] 48 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan has written the following: ‘N.B. Hi termini definiuntur per proportionem ad aliud, non per abstractionem ab aliis rationibus intrinsecis; ideoque possunt denotare concretum (cf. “ens”)’ (‘N.B. These terms are defined by their proportion to something else, not by abstraction from other intrinsic reasons; hence they can denote what is concrete (cf. “being”).’] 49 [See above, pp. 100 and 101.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

130

De Ente Supernaturali

operationem; habitus ad usum habitus; cuiuscumque principii tou per se ad actum secundum qui per se (intelligibiliter et uniformiter ratione ipsius subiecti) subiecto inest. Potentia passiva essentialis est ordo ad actum primum recipiendum. Exempla: materiae primae ad formam substantialem; organorum sensitivorum ad potentias sensitivas; intellectus possibilis ad habitus scientiae; voluntatis ad habitus virtutum. Potentia passiva dicitur accidentalis50 quia per accidens est si actus secundus ei non inest: ita qui habet potentiam visivam, per se videt in actu secundo, per accidens non videt in actu secundo nam sub debitis conditionibus potest videre quandocumque vult. Potentia passiva dicitur essentialis quia ei deest forma vel habitus vel aliud principium simile quo per se actus secundus ei inest.51 Potentia passiva accidentalis est eiusdem proportionis formaliter ac actus secundus. Nam est actus primus, i.e., vel forma vel aliquid ad modum formae. Potentia passiva essentialis dividitur in proximam et remotam. Potentia passiva essentialis et proxima est eiusdem proportionis virtualiter ac actus primus ad quem est. Puta, corpus rite dispositum ad receptionem animae spiritualis non est eiusdem proportionis formaliter ac ipsa anima, nam nihil spirituale in se habet, sed est eiusdem proportionis virtualiter, scil., secundum considerationem alicuius causae, cum finis operis corporis dispositi sit anima recipienda. Potentia passiva essentialis et remota non est eiusdem proportionis (neque formaliter neque virtualiter) ac actus ad quem est. Puta, materia prima relate ad receptionem animae spiritualis: materia prima non est forma, et multo minus forma spiritualis; neque finis operis materiae primae est anima spiritualis, secus tota materia prima exigeret talem informationem. Potentia passiva essentialis et remota dividitur in naturalem et obedientialem.

The Robert Mollot Collection

131

The Supernatural Order

existence, accidental form is an ordination to operation, a habit is an ordination to its exercise, and any principle of what is per se is an ordination to a second act that per se (intelligibly and uniformly by reason of the subject itself) is in the subject. Essential passive potency is an ordination to receiving a first act. Examples are: prime matter is an ordination to substantial form, sentient organs are ordered to sensory faculties, the possible intellect is ordered to habits of knowledge, and the will is ordered to moral habits or virtues. Passive potency is called accidental50 because it is per accidens if there is no second act in it. Thus, for example, one who has eyesight sees per se in a second act, but per accidens does not see in a second act, for, if the requisite conditions are present, he can see whenever he wishes. Passive potency is called essential because it lacks a form or habit or some other similar principle by reason of which it has per se a second act.51 Accidental passive potency is formally of the same proportion as second act; for it is a first act, that is, either a form or something equivalent to a form. Essential passive potency is either proximate or remote. Proximate essential passive potency is virtually of the same proportion as the first act to which it is ordered. For example, a body that is duly disposed for receiving a spiritual soul is not formally of the same proportion as that soul, for there is nothing spiritual about it; but it is virtually of the same proportion, that is, by virtue of the consideration of some cause, since the purpose of a properly disposed body is to receive a soul. Remote essential passive potency is not of the same proportion, either formally or virtually, as the act to which it is ordered. For example, prime matter with respect to the reception of a spiritual soul: prime matter is not a form, much less a spiritual form, nor is its purpose [to receive] a spiritual soul, for otherwise all prime matter would have an exigency to being informed in this way. Remote essential passive potency is divided into natural and obediential.

50 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan wrote here ‘non in oppositione ad substantiam’ (‘not as opposed to substance’).] 51 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan wrote here ‘Aliter: quia est in potentia ad aliquam essentiam constituendam’ (‘In other words: because it is in potency to constituting some essence’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

132

De Ente Supernaturali

Est naturalis quatenus per causam efficientem finitam, quae agit secundum propriam proportionem, actuari potest. Est obedientialis quatenus per solum Deum actuari potest. Notate, primo, neque potentiam obedientialem neque potentiam passivam essentialem remotam et naturalem exigere actum ad quem est (vide definitiones); secundo, differentiam inter potentiam obedientialem et naturalem non esse ipsi passivae potentiae intrinsecam sed extrinsecam, nam fundatur in differentia inter agens proportionatum infinitum et finitum (vide definitiones); tertio, quamvis haec differentia sit extrinseca, tamen haec divisio non est per accidens sed per se, quia potentia passiva ratione sui supponit potentiam extrinsecam et activam (nam actus est prior potentia, et potentia activa dicit actum; praeterea, nulla est potentia ad recipiendum nisi per prius est potentia ad producendum). 2 Potentia activa dicitur et proprie et improprie.52 Potentia activa improprie dicta est eadem ac potentia passiva accidentalis: ita qui habet habitum scientiae vel virtutis per se potest agere secundum illum habitum; quod tamen agere proprie est pati, scil., recipere aliquod intelligere vel velle in actu secundo. Potentia activa proprie dicta est ordo ad actum producendum, scil., ad exercitium causalitatis efficientis. Haec potentia est actus secundus, non quidem in se spectatus seu prout actus secundus est, sed secundum proprietatem suam consideratus, scil., secundum capacitatem actus secundi ad producendum sibi simile. Exemplum: qui habet habitum scientiae sed actu non intelligit, est in potentia passiva accidentali ad intelligere recipiendum in intellectu possibili, sed in potentia activa inquantum etiam habet intellectum agentem; qui vero actu intelligit, ratione huius intelligere est in potentia activa ad producendum verbum interius.

The Robert Mollot Collection

133

The Supernatural Order

It is natural inasmuch as it can be actuated by a finite efficient cause acting according to its proper proportion. It is obediential if it can be actuated by God alone. Note, first of all, that neither obediential potency nor natural remote essential passive potency has an exigency for the act to which they are ordered; see the definitions. Second, the difference between obediential and natural potency is not something intrinsic to this passive potency but is extrinsic to it, for it is based upon the difference between an infinite and a finite proportionate agent; see the definitions. Third, although this difference is extrinsic, this division is not per accidens but per se, because passive potency by its very nature presupposes an extrinsic active potency; for act is prior to potency, and ‘active potency’ implies ‘act.’ Besides, there can be no potency to receive unless there is a prior potency to produce. 2 Active potency can be taken in a proper sense and an improper sense.52 Improperly so called, active potency is the same as accidental passive potency. Thus, one who possesses a habit of knowledge or of a virtue can by himself act in accordance with that habit. But this action is properly speaking a passion or reception, that is, the receiving of some understanding or willing in a second act. Properly speaking, active potency is an ordination to producing an act, that is, to an exercise of efficient causality. This potency is a second act, not, however, considered in itself, that is, as being a second act, but considered according to its characteristic property, namely, the capacity of a second act to produce something that is similar to itself. For example, one who has a habit of knowledge but is not actually understanding something is in accidental passive potency to receiving an understanding in his possible intellect, but in active potency inasmuch as he has an agent intellect. But one who is actually understanding something is by reason of this act of understanding in active potency to producing an inner word.

52 [At this point in the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan wrote: processio → operationis (‘the procession of an operation’) → operati (‘the procession of something produced by an operation’) principium → effectus (‘principle of an effect’) → actionis (‘principle of an action’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

134

De Ente Supernaturali

Unus et idem est actus qui et a potentia activa producitur et in potentia passiva recipitur. Unus et idem est actus ad quem ordinatur potentia activa ad producendum et ad quem ordinatur potentia passiva ad recipiendum. Hic unus et idem actus, inquantum est a potentia activa, est actio (actus huius ut ab hoc), et inquantum est in potentia passiva, est passio (actus huius ut in hoc). Quare actio est ab agente et in passo.53

3 Causa efficiens est id quod aliud producit, seu est subiectum potentiae activae qua actuatae; quae actuatio est actio; quae actio realiter est eadem ac passio et in passo. Causa efficiens proportionatur suo effectui: omne enim agens agit sibi simile. Haec proportio mensuratur secundum perfectionem formae: quare causae efficienti inest potentia activa ratione actus secundi, sed ei inest proportio ad effectum ratione formae (actus primi) quae actu secundo perficitur. Cuius fundamentum est quod actus secundus non de se limitatur ad aliquam proportionem finitam, sed ita limitatur generice a potentia cui inest et specifice54 a forma quam perficit. Causa efficiens dividitur in principalem et instrumentalem. Causa efficiens est principalis inquantum perfectio suae formae vel aequat vel superat perfectionem effectus. Causa efficiens est instrumentalis inquantum perfectio suae formae superatur a perfectione effectus. Unde concludes: nulla causa est instrumentalis simpliciter; ita enim nihil posset in effectum qui omnibus aspectibus superat suam perfectionem; sed si nihil posset in effectum, non esset causa efficiens.

The Robert Mollot Collection

135

The Supernatural Order

It is one and the same act that is produced by an active potency and is received in a passive potency. It is one and the same act to the production of which active potency is ordered and to the reception of which passive potency is ordered. This one identical act, considered as being from an active potency, the agent, is an action (actus huius ut ab hoc), and considered as being in a passive potency is a passion, an effect (actus huius ut in hoc). An action, therefore, is from an agent and in a patient, a recipient.53 3 An efficient cause is that which produces something: it is the subject of an active potency as actuated. This actuation is action, and this action is identical in reality with the effect and is in the recipient. An efficient cause is proportionate to its effect: every agent produces something similar to itself. This proportion is measured according to the perfection of a form. Hence active potency is in an efficient cause by reason of a second act, but its proportion to its effect is in it by reason of a form (first act) that is perfected by a second act. The basis for this is the fact that a second act is of itself not limited to any finite proportion, but is so limited generically by the potency in which it inheres and specifically54 by the form it perfects. Efficient causes are either principal or instrumental. An efficient cause is principal inasmuch as the perfection of its form either equals or surpasses the perfection of its effect. It is instrumental inasmuch as the perfection of its form is surpassed by the perfection of its effect. From this we may draw the following conclusions. First, no cause is purely instrumental. For such a cause could contribute nothing to an effect that would in all aspects surpass its own perfection; on the other hand, if it could contribute nothing to an effect, it would not be an efficient cause. 53 [There is a handwritten note in the first edition, 19201dtl040, referring to the last sentence of this paragraph: ‘N.B. Haec est terminologia Aristotelica. Aquinas praeter “actus” in sensu “operatio” etiam definit actio: habitudo agentis ad passum passio: habitudo patientis ad agentem.’ (‘N.B. this is Aristotelian terminology. Aquinas, besides defining “act” in the sense of “operation,” also has the following definitions: action: relation of the agent to the recipient passion: relation of the recipient to the agent’).] 54 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan wrote by hand here ‘quae species non necessario est ultima’ (‘this species is not necessarily the final one’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

136

De Ente Supernaturali

Etiam concludes: solus Deus est causa principalis simpliciter; nam omnis effectus habet esse; sed solus Deus habet esse secundum perfectionem suae formae; omnis ergo effectus, inquantum habet esse, superat proportionem propriam cuiuslibet causae finitae. Tertio concludes: cum totus effectus procedat ab instrumento, uti ab agente proximo, aliquo modo instrumento inest aliqualis proportio ad totum55 effectum; quae proportio, cum non sit perfectio formae, neque consequens56 ratio actus secundi, nam haec ex forma habetur, necessario ponitur in alia qualitate57 actus secundi. Haec qualitas58 nominatur ‘virtus instrumentalis,’ scil., illa virtus seu potentia productiva quae convenit instrumento qua tali. Haec qualitas illustratur, v.g., in motu bovis qui ita conducitur ut debito modo aratrum trahat, vel in motu machinae dactylographicae, cuius claves tali serie feriuntur ut debito ordine characteres imprimantur et quoddam intelligibile exscribatur.

Qualificatio Quod de facto potentia nostra ad supernaturalia simpliciter est obedientialis, sententia theologorum communis et certa. Quod de iure potentia creaturae ad supernaturalia simpliciter est obedientialis, sententia probabilior. Ripalda enim et alii quidam admittunt possibilitatem substantiae finitae quae natura sua proportionatur ad supernaturalia simpliciter. Probatio Est corollarium thesis secundae. Si nulla substantia finita est agens proportionatum ad producendos actus simpliciter supernaturales, potentia ad eiusmodi actus recipiendos est obedientialis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

137

The Supernatural Order

Second, God alone is a purely principal cause. For every effect has an act of existence, but God alone has existence in accordance with the perfection of his form. Therefore every effect, inasmuch as it has existence, surpasses the proportion that is proper to any finite cause. Third, since the total effect proceeds from an instrument as from its proximate agent, it follows that in some way the instrument has within it a proportion to its total55 effect. This proportion, since it is not the perfection of its form, nor the consequent56 formality of a second act (for this is had from the form), must of necessity be another quality57 of a second act. This quality58 is called ‘instrumentality,’ that is to say, that power or productive potency which is proper to an instrument as such. An illustration of this quality would be the movement of an ox that is being guided in pulling a plough in the right direction, or in the action of a typewriter whose keys are struck in a certain sequence so that the letters are printed in the proper order and some intelligible writing is produced. Qualification of the Thesis It is the common and certain opinion of theologians that de facto our potency to the absolutely supernatural order is obediential potency. That de iure the potency of a creature to the absolutely supernatural order is obediential is the more probable opinion. Ripalda and some others admit the possibility of a finite substance that would be by nature proportionate to a supernatural order. Proof of the Thesis This thesis is a corollary of thesis 2. If no finite substance is an agent proportionate to the production of acts that are absolutely supernatural, the potency to receive such acts is obediential. 55 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan added by hand ‘totum’ before ‘effectum.’] 56 [In both copies of the first edition, Lonergan changed by hand ‘essentialis’ to ‘consequens’ here.] 57 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan changed by hand ‘in modalitate’ to ‘in alia qualitate’ here.] 58 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan changed by hand ‘modalitas’ to ‘qualitas’ here.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

138

De Ente Supernaturali

Atqui nulla substantia finita est agens proportionatum ad producendos actus supernaturales simpliciter. Ergo potentia ad eiusmodi actus recipiendos est obedientialis. Maior: nam potentia est obedientialis si solum agens proportionatum ad eam disponendam vel59 actuandam est Deus. Minor: vide thesin alteram. Scholion I: De naturali desiderio videndi Deum per essentiam 1 In operibus prioribus sanctus Thomas vel silet vel excludit desiderium naturale videndi Deum per essentiam.60 In operibus posterioribus saepius et explicite affirmatur tale desiderium.61 Praeformari videtur posterior doctrina in quibusdam textibus prioribus.62 Nullum prorsus dubium exsistit sanctum Thomam habuisse visionem beatificam tamquam simpliciter supernaturalem. 2 Desiderium naturale videndi Deum per essentiam a theologis communiter vel negatur vel in serium dubium vocatur, propter difficultatem reconciliandi tale desiderium naturale cum supernaturalitate absoluta desideratae visionis. 3 Ad terminos desiderium: appetitus vel actus appetendi obiecti absentis seu non possessi.

The Robert Mollot Collection

139

The Supernatural Order

But no finite substance is an agent proportionate to producing such acts. Therefore the potency to receive them is obediential. As to the major premise, a potency is obediential if the only agent proportionate to disposing or59 actuating it is God. For the minor premise, see Thesis 2. Excursus 1: On the natural desire to see God through his essence 1 In his earlier writings, St Thomas is either silent about or rules out a natural desire to see God through his essence.60 In his later works, however, such a desire is frequently and explicitly affirmed.61 This later position seems to be foreshadowed in a couple of earlier texts.62 There is no doubt whatsoever that St Thomas held the beatific vision to be absolutely supernatural. 2 Theologians generally either deny or have serious doubts about a natural desire to see God through his essence, on account of the difficulty of reconciling such a natural desire with the absolute supernaturality of this desired vision. 3 Terminology desire : a wanting or the act of wanting an object that is absent, or not possessed. 59 [In the autograph, Lonergan originally had simply ‘ad eam actuandam,’ which he later changed by hand to ‘ad eam disponendam vel actuandam.’ In the first edition, 19201dtl040, the ‘vel’ disappeared, perhaps because of a copyist error, and Lonergan added ‘et’ by hand. The editors of the Regis College edition, however, reverted to ‘vel.’ The current editors have followed suit and included ‘vel’ as the preferred reading.] 60 Works in which this topic is not mentioned: Thomas Aquinas, Super II Sententiarum, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2; Super IV Sententarium, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 10, a. 7; De veritate, q. 8, a. 1. Works in which Aquinas rules it out: De veritate, q. 14, a. 2 (see Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 4, a. 1); De veritate, q. 27, a. 2. [Lonergan gives many of the same references in Verbum 48 n. 164.] 61 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 25–63 (especially cc. 25, 48, 50, 57, 63); Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1 and a. 8, ad 4m; q. 62, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; Compendium theologiae, c. 104. [See again Lonergan, Verbum 48 n. 164.] 62 Thomas Aquinas, In Boeth. De Trin., q. 6, a. 4, ad 5m; De veritate, q. 10, a. 11, ad 7m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

140

De Ente Supernaturali

naturale: multipliciter dicitur. (a) est aliquid intra naturae proportionem, aliquid quod constitutive vel consecutive vel exigitive ad naturam pertinet. (b) opponitur non supernaturali sed elicito; scil., non est actus in potentia appetitiva elicitus, sed est ipse potentiae ordo ad actum seu ipsius potentiae tendentia naturalis. videre Deum per essentiam: actus intelligendi Deum uti in se est; cognitio Dei quidditativa, scil., secundum ‘quod quid est’ vel essentiam Dei. Opponitur cognitioni analogicae per vias affirmationis, negationis, eminentiae.

4 Propter ambiguitatem vocis ‘naturale,’ triplex sensus tribui potest dicto ‘desiderio naturali.’ Primo modo, sumi potest ‘naturale’ non tamquam excludens actum elicitum sed tamquam excludens supernaturalitatem actus eliciti. Ita sensus est, homo naturaliter elicit actus desiderandi visionem beatificam. Qui sensus omnino est reiciendus.63 Altero modo, sumi potest ‘naturale’ tamquam excludens actum elicitum sed saltem implicite connotans exigentiam visionis beatificae. Ita sensus est, homo, quamvis sine gratia non possit elicere actus desiderandi visionem beatificam (eiusmodi enim actus est vel spei vel caritatis), tamen naturaliter ordinatur in visionem tamquam in finem et huius visionis consecutionem per se exigit. Pariter hic sensus est reiciendus prorsus. Negat enim supernaturalitatem visionis beatificae. Tertio modo, sumi potest ‘naturale’ non solum ut excludens actum elicitum sed etiam tamquam nullo modo implicans visionem beatificam esse naturalem vel naturae debitam vel secundum exigentias naturae dandam. Et hic sensus probari potest, quamvis hodie non apte exprimatur per nomen ‘desiderium naturale.’ Solus hic tertius sensus sancto Thomae attribui potest; qualis vero sit, ulterius inquiremus. 5 Desiderium naturale videndi Deum per essentiam est naturale dupliciter. Primo modo, inquantum ‘naturale’ opponitur ‘elicito’; hoc primo modo tacetur utrum desiderium sit intra vel supra naturae proportionem; agitur

The Robert Mollot Collection

141

The Supernatural Order

natural : has various meanings. (a) It is something within the proportion of a nature, something that belongs to a nature as either a constituent or a resultant or a requirement of that nature. (b) The opposite of ‘natural’ is not ‘supernatural,’ but ‘elicited’; that is, it is not an act elicited in an appetitive power, but is the very ordering of a potency to its act, the natural tendency of the potency itself. to see God through his essence: the act of understanding God as he is in himself. It is a quidditative knowledge of God; that is, knowing God according to quod quid est, ‘what a thing is,’ God’s essence. Its opposite is analogical knowledge by way of affirmation, negation, and preeminence. 4 Because of this ambiguity of the word ‘natural,’ three meanings can be given to the expression ‘natural desire.’ First, ‘natural’ could be taken not in the sense of excluding an elicited act but as excluding the supernaturality of an elicited act. Here it would mean that man naturally elicits an act of desiring the beatific vision, and this meaning must be rejected.63 Second, ‘natural’ could be taken as excluding an elicited act but at least implicitly connoting the requirement for the beatific vision. Here it would mean that man, although unable without grace to elicit an act of desiring the beatific vision (an act of hope or charity), nevertheless is naturally ordered to the beatific vision as his end and as such requires the attainment of this vision. This meaning also must be utterly rejected, for it denies the supernaturality of the beatific vision. Third, ‘natural’ can be taken as not only excluding an elicited act but also in no way implying that the beatific vision itself is natural or owing to our nature or is to be granted in accordance with the requirements of our nature. This meaning is admissible, although at the present time the expression ‘natural desire’ is not very apt. It is only this third meaning that can be attributed to St Thomas. We shall explore this meaning further. 5 The natural desire to see God through his essence is natural in two ways. First, taking ‘natural’ as the opposite of ‘elicited.’ In this way, nothing is said about whether this desire is within or above the proportion of nature,

63 See the condemnation of the Synod of Pistoia, db 1518, ds 2618.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

142

De Ente Supernaturali

enim de voce aequivoca. Si dico gratiam esse formam non artificialem sed naturalem, non nego supernaturalitatem gratiae sed nego artificialitatem gratiae; quatenus enim naturale opponitur artificiali, nihil dicitur de gradu perfectionis ontologicae. Et similiter quatenus naturale opponitur elicito, nihil dicitur de gradu perfectionis ontologicae. Altero modo, inquantum non habetur intrinseca sed sola extrinseca differentia inter potentiam naturalem et obedientialem. Potentia enim obedientialis nihil reale ponit in ipsa naturali potentia. Tota enim differentia inter potentiam naturalem et obedientialem habetur ex consideratione causae agentis. Quia ergo differentia inter potentiam naturalem et potentiam obedientialem est extrinseca, potest quis inquirere quid in natura hominis exsistat quod, supposito supernaturali Dei auxilio, perveniat ad visionem beatificam. Respondetur sane ‘intellectus humanus.’ Concluditur utique intellectus humanus habere potentiam obedientialem ad visionem beatificam. Sed potentia obedientialis differt non intrinsece sed extrinsece a potentia naturali. Ulterius ergo quaeritur, quid sit potentia naturalis quae, supposito Dei auxilio supernaturali, obedientialis evadat. Eiusmodi quaestio est quaestio de desiderio naturali videndi Deum per essentiam. Nullo modo negat vel implicat negationem circa supernaturalitatem visionis. 6 De naturali desiderio intellectus humani ‘Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant.’64 Naturale hoc sciendi desiderium est duplex; duo enim intellectus quaerit, nempe, ‘an est’ et ‘quid est,’ ad quae reducuntur omnia alia quaeribilia et scibilia.

Quae quaestiones tripliciter considerari possunt: primo modo, prout sunt verba exteriora vel sonantia vel scripta; alio modo, prout sunt verba interiora in ipso intellectu concepta; tertio modo, prout manifestant radicalem ipsius intellectus tendentiam in scientiam acquirendam. Hoc tertio modo, eoque solo, habetur naturale desiderium intellectus, quod desiderium definiri potest: tendentia intellectus in quaerendum et sciendum per quae-

The Robert Mollot Collection

143

The Supernatural Order

for the word is equivocal. To say that grace is not an artificial form but a natural one is not thereby to deny the supernaturality of grace but its artificiality; for in taking ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘artificial,’ nothing is implied about the degree of ontological perfection. And similarly, taking ‘natural’ as the opposite of ‘elicited,’ nothing is said about the degree of ontological perfection. This desire is natural in a second way, in that the difference between natural and obediential potency is merely extrinsic. Obediential potency adds no reality within natural potency itself: the whole difference between the two is a matter of the causal agent. Since, then, the difference between natural potency and obediential potency is extrinsic, one may ask what there is in the nature of man that, given the supernatural assistance of God, attains the beatific vision. The answer, surely, is ‘the human intellect,’ and so we conclude that the human intellect does indeed have obediential potency for the beatific vision. But obediential potency differs from natural potency not intrinsically but extrinsically. A further question arises, then, as to what that natural potency is which, supposing supernatural divine assistance, is also obediential. This is the question about the natural desire to see God through his essence. By no means does it deny or imply a denial of the supernaturality of that vision. 6 The natural desire of the human intellect ‘All men have a natural desire to know,’ Aristotle remarked at the beginning of the Metaphysics.64 This natural desire for knowledge is twofold; for the intellect asks two things, namely, whether something is, and what it is; everything else that can be inquired about and known is reducible to these two questions. These questions can be considered in three ways. First, as external words, whether uttered vocally or written; second, as inner words conceived in the intellect; third, as manifesting the radical tendency of the intellect to acquire knowledge. It is only in this third way that we speak of the natural desire of the intellect, a desire that can be defined as the tendency of the intellect to ask questions and to know that is manifested by the questions

64 [Aristotle, Metaphysics, i, 1, 980 a 22.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

144

De Ente Supernaturali

stiones ‘an est’ et ‘quid est’ manifestata. Uti patet, antecedit haec tendentia omnem explicitam quaestionem sive interius sive exterius expressam. 7 De naturali desiderio cognoscendi Deum Sicut de caeteris rebus, ita etiam intellectus de Deo quaerit et an sit et quid sit. Intra proportionem intellectus humani est demonstrare Dei exsistentiam (db 1806). Intra proportionem eiusdem intellectus est analogicam Dei cognitionem acquirere, uti constat ex theologia naturali ubi attributa Dei determinantur et quantum fieri potest inter se reconciliantur. Porro, exsistit tendentia intellectus humani in quidditatem Dei cognoscendam, in ipsum Deum intelligendum. Secus nullus esset nisus determinandi attributa Dei, nullus esset nisus reconciliandi attributa apparenter opposita. Haec facimus quia desideramus Deum intelligere. Haec facimus naturaliter quia naturaliter in quidditates cognoscendas tendimus. Iam vero quidditativa Dei cognitio est visio Dei beatifica: nam cognoscere quidditatem rei est cognoscere eius essentiam; et cognoscere Dei essentiam aliter non haberi potest quam per beatificam visionem. Cuius rei plenior declaratio et probatio in tractatu de ipsa visione habetur. Iterum quidditativa Dei cognitio est simpliciter supernaturalis; excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. Iterum quamdiu analogice tantum Deus per intellectum cognoscitur, tamdiu redeunt quaestiones intellectus nondum perfecte intelligentis: nam ‘cur’ et ‘quomodo’ continuo exsurgunt usquedum intelligentia sit perfecta et intellectus quiescat; quae quies in sola visione haberi potest.

8 De fine duplici 65 Finis proinde est ultima rei perfectio. In homine haec ultima perfectio principaliter consistit in operatione intellectiva circa Deum. Finis dividitur in naturalem et supernaturalem, prout est operatio iacens

The Robert Mollot Collection

145

The Supernatural Order

‘Is it?’ and ‘What is it?’ Obviously, this tendency exists prior to any explicit questioning, whether expressed interiorly or exteriorly. 7 The natural desire to see God As it does about all other things, the intellect asks whether God exists and what God is. It is within the proportion of the intellect to prove the existence of God (db 1806, ds 3026, nd 115). It is within the proportion of this same intellect to acquire an analogical knowledge of God, as is evident from natural theology wherein God’s attributes are determined and, insofar as possible, are reconciled among themselves. Accordingly, there exists in the human intellect a tendency to know the quiddity, the ‘whatness’ of God, to understand God himself. Otherwise there would be no serious effort to determine the attributes of God and to reconcile attributes that appear contrary to each other. We do this because we want to understand God; and we do it naturally because we have this natural tendency to know quiddities. Now, the quidditative knowledge of God is the beatific vision; for to know the quiddity of something is to know its essence, and knowledge of God’s essence can be had only through the beatific vision. A fuller explanation and proof of this will be found in the treatise on the beatific vision. Again, the quidditative knowledge of God is absolutely supernatural, since it goes beyond the proportion of any finite substance. Also, as long as God is known to the intellect by analogy only, questions will continue to be asked by an intellect that does not have full and complete understanding, for the queries ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ continually arise until one’s understanding is complete and the intellect rests; but in the beatific vision alone is this rest to be found. 8 Two ends 65 The end of a thing is its ultimate perfection. In a human being this ultimate perfection principally consists in one’s intellectual operation concerning God. Ends are either natural or supernatural, depending upon whether the

65 [The subtitle ‘De fine duplici’ was added by hand in the first edition, 19201dtl040.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

146

De Ente Supernaturali

intra proportionem naturae vel eandem proportionem excedens. Finis naturalis hominis est imperfecta et analogica cognitio essentiae divinae. Finis vero supernaturalis est perfecta et intuitiva visio essentiae divinae. Qui finem attingit, in fine adepto quiescit. At quo perfectior est finis, eo perfectior est quies. Quiescere enim in fine, stricte, nihil dicit nisi quod motus ad finem cessat et ipse finis possidetur. Cessatio motus excludit progressum ad alium finem specifice diversum, excludit inquietudinem qua alius finis perfectior desideraretur actu elicito,66 excludit insecuritatem circa finem possessum. At haec motus cessatio non debet confundi cum intrinseca immobilitate Dei: haec immobilitas fundatur in negatione potentiae passivae, in affirmatione actus puri; haec immobilitas intrinseca pertinet ad beatitudinem divinam, principaliter quidem ad beatitudinem divinam qua ipse Deus est beatus, secundario vero ad beatitudinem divinam qua supernaturaliter creaturae efficiuntur beatae. Quare dicendum videtur quod homo quiescit cum in fine supernaturali tum in fine naturali; at perfectior est quies illa quam haec. In fine enim supernaturali habetur participatio quaedam immobilitatis intrinsecae divinae, non quia finis est sed quia supernaturalis est. In fine vero naturali eiusmodi participatio non habetur, neque eiusmodi immobilitas, sed tantum illa quies adest quae excludit motum in aliud tamquam in finem diversum et non possessum. Immo, finis naturalis in quadam mobilitate intrinseca necessario consistere videtur: nam, si haec mobilitas intrinseca negatur67 aut analogica cognitio Dei dat perfectam Dei intelligentiam, aut tollitur impulsus intellectus quaerentis ‘cur’ et ‘quomodo’ circa rem nondum perfecte intellectam; sed perfecta Dei intelligentia habetur per solam visionem supernaturalem; neque convenienter tollitur impulsus intellectus sive per ablationem ipsius intellectus sive per immissam vim soporificam sive per errorem misericorditer inductum; relinquitur ergo ut finis naturalis hominis consistit in continuo quodam progressu et evolutione analogicae cognitionis essentiae divinae. Sicut finis est duplex, alius naturalis et alius supernaturalis, ita etiam po-

The Robert Mollot Collection

147

The Supernatural Order

operation lies within the proportion of nature or beyond it. Man’s natural end is an imperfect and analogical knowledge of the divine essence. His supernatural end is a perfect and intuitive vision of the divine essence. One who attains an end rests in the end attained. But the more perfect is the end, the more perfect is that rest. For to rest in an end, strictly speaking, means simply that movement towards the end ceases and the end is possessed. The cessation of movement towards the end precludes any progress towards any other specifically different end, precludes any restlessness by which a more perfect end is desired in an elicited act,66 and precludes any insecurity regarding the end possessed. This cessation of movement, however, must not be confused with the intrinsic immobility of God. This latter immobility is grounded upon the negation of passive potency and the affirmation of pure act; it belongs to divine beatitude, in the first instance to that divine beatitude by which God is blessed, but secondarily to that divine beatitude by which creatures are supernaturally rendered blessed. It would seem, therefore, that man’s restlessness may be said to cease in both a supernatural and a natural end; however, his rest in his supernatural end is more perfect than in his natural end. In his supernatural end he participates in the intrinsic immobility of God, not because it is an end but because it is supernatural. In a natural end there is no such participation or immobility, but only that sort of quiescence that precludes movement towards something else as an end that is different and not attained. Indeed, a natural end, it seems, necessarily consists in a certain intrinsic mobility. For if there is no such intrinsic mobility,67 then either the analogical knowledge of God provides a perfect understanding of God, or else the drive of the intellect asking ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ about something imperfectly understood ceases. But a perfect understanding of God is had only through a supernatural vision; and it would be wrong to suppress the drive of the intellect, whether by removing the intellect itself or injecting it with some soporific or, out of kindness, indoctrinating it with error. It remains, then, that man’s natural end consists in the continuous progress and development of his analogical knowledge of the divine essence. As man has two ends, natural and supernatural, so also are there two

66 [Lonergan added ‘actu elicito’ in both copies of the first edition.] 67 [The autograph reads: ‘… nam aut analogica cognitio Dei …’ Lonergan added by hand ‘si haec mobilitas intrinseca negatur’ between ‘nam’ and ‘aut’ in both copies of the first edition, 19201dtl040.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

148

De Ente Supernaturali

tentia ad finem est duplex, alia naturalis et alia obedientialis. Sed finis naturalis et finis supernaturalis conveniunt in ratione obiecti cognoscendi, nempe, essentiae divinae, et differunt in modo cognoscendi huius obiecti, nempe, naturaliter et analogice vel supernaturaliter et univoce. Pariter, potentia naturalis et potentia obedientialis conveniunt inquantum intrinsece sunt una et eadem potentia humana, sed differunt ratione agentis proportionati ad actuationem, cum agens finitum proportionetur actuationi potentiae naturalis, sed solum agens infinitum proportionetur actuationi potentiae obedientialis;68 et ex hac diversitate extrinseca oritur diversitas in fine ad quem datur potentia.

9 Remanet ut de exigentia quaedam dicantur. Exigentia proprie respicit conditiones extrinsecas cum relate ad esse tum relate ad bene esse rei. Exigentia ad esse immediate consequitur formam substantialem, mediate vero consequitur materiam rite dispositam ad formae infusionem vel eductionem. Nisi exsistat forma substantialis, nulla est immediata exigentia relate ad esse; nisi exsistat materia rite disposita, nulla est mediata exigentia relate ad esse. Res bene est inquantum finem attingere69 potest, ideoque exigentia ad bene esse est exigentia quae respicit media ad finem necessaria.70

The Robert Mollot Collection

149

The Supernatural Order

potencies to the end, one natural and the other obediential. But the natural and the supernatural ends have the same formal object of knowledge, namely, the divine essence, while they have different ways of knowing this object, naturally and analogically in the one case and supernaturally and univocally in the other. Similarly, natural potency and obediential potency are the same inasmuch as they are intrinsically one and the same human potency, but differ by reason of the causal agent proportionate to their actuation, since a finite agent is proportionate to actuating a natural potency, but only an infinite agent is proportioned to actuating obediential potency;68 and from this extrinsic diversity arises the diversity in the ends for which the potency exists. 9 Finally, some observations about exigency. Exigency, in the proper sense, has to do with the extrinsic conditions required both for the existence and for the well-being of a thing. The exigency for existence is immediately consequent upon substantial form, but mediately consequent upon matter that is aptly disposed for the infusion or eduction of form. Without a substantial form there is no immediate exigency for existence, and without aptly disposed matter there is no mediate exigency for existence. A thing possesses well-being insofar as it can attain69 its end, and therefore the exigency regarding well-being is an exigency that regards the necessary means to the end.70

68 [In the first edition the words naturalis sed solum agens infinitum proportionetur actuationi potentiae were omitted (presumably by the copyist), which Lonergan restored by hand in both copies of that edition.] 69 [In the autograph and in the first edition, Lonergan had written ‘attingit.’ In his handwritten correction of both copies of the first edition, he changed this to ‘attingere potest.’] 70 [In the autograph and in the first edition, Lonergan had: ‘… quae immediate respicit ipsum finem vel mediate respicit media ad finem necessaria vel bona ex fine adepto convenienter profluentia’ (‘… that immediately regards the end itself, or mediately regards the necessary means to the end or the good that properly flows from the attainment of the end.’) In his handwritten correction of both copies of the first edition, Lonergan crossed out parts of this sentence as follows: ‘… quae immediate respicit ipsum finem vel mediate respicit media ad finem necessaria vel bona ex fine adepto convenienter profluentia.’ The editors have followed him in his correction and translated the sentence accordingly.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

150

De Ente Supernaturali

Finis qui exigentias determinat71 iacet intra proportionem substantiae exigentis; neque omnis et singula substantia finita exigit actualem adeptionem finis; nam substantia finita est principium tou per se et admittit to per accidens; unde usus mediorum72 exigi potest non semper sed tantum in maiori parte. Praeterea, ubi actualis adeptio finis pendet ex cooperatione liberi arbitrii, id quod ab alio exigitur relate ad finem non est usus mediorum73 sed media necessaria ut in maiori parte finis attingi possit. Praeterea, ubi supervenit elevatio ad ordinem supernaturalem, super leges ordinis naturalis praevalent leges ordinis supernaturalis; inferior enim superiori cedit. 10 De cognoscibilitate naturalis desiderii 74 Ponitur quaestio de cognoscibilitate visionis beatificae maxime ex eo quod sanctus Thomas arguit ex naturali desiderio cognoscendi causam usque ad possibilitatem et imo, uti videtur, ad actualitatem visionis; nihil enim, ait, in natura frustra.75 Ex his visionem beatificam esse naturaliter cognoscibilem concludi posset. Sed contra, idem sanctus Thomas circa parvulos sine baptismate mortuos ait: ‘quod illud bonum perfectum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem’; imo eiusmodi cognitio est ex revelatione, pertinet ad fidem, non habetur a parvulis qui ideo de carentia visionis non dolent.76

The Robert Mollot Collection

151

The Supernatural Order

The end which determines exigencies71 lies within the proportion of the exigent substance. Not each and every finite substance has an exigency for the actual attainment of its end; for a finite substance is the principle of the per se and admits of the per accidens. Hence it is possible that the actual use of the means72 be an exigency not in every case but only for the most part. Besides, when the actual attainment of the end depends upon the cooperation of a free will, what is required from another regarding the end is not the use of the means,73 but the means necessary in order that the end may for the most part be attained. Moreover, when there is added an elevation to the supernatural order, the laws of the supernatural order prevail over those of the natural order: the lower yields to the higher. 10 The knowability of the natural desire 74 The question about the knowability of the beatific vision arises most of all from the fact that St Thomas argues from the natural desire for knowing a cause to the possibility and even, it seems, to the actuality of the vision. For, he says, in nature nothing is in vain.75 From this one could conclude that the beatific vision is naturally knowable. On the contrary, however, St Thomas has this to say regarding children who die without baptism: ‘It is beyond our natural knowledge to know that that perfect good for which man is made is the glory enjoyed by the saints.’ In actual fact, this knowledge comes from revelation, is a matter of faith, and since it is not had by children [dying unbaptized], they are not sad because of missing out on this vision.76

71 [In the autograph and in the first edition, Lonergan wrote ‘exigi potest.’ In his handwritten correction of both copies of the first edition, Lonergan changed this to ‘exigentias determinat.’] 72 [Lonergan wrote ‘adeptio finis’ in the autograph and in the first edition. He changed this to ‘usus mediorum’ in his handwritten correction of both copies of the first edition.] 73 [Lonergan wrote ‘ipsa adeptio’ in the autograph and in the first edition and changed it to ‘usus mediorum’ in his handwritten correction of both copies of the first edition.] 74 [Lonergan added by hand in the first edition, 19201dtl040, the subtitle ‘De cognoscibilitate naturalis desiderii.’] 75 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1 c. 76 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 5, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

152

De Ente Supernaturali

Quantum ipsam rem attinet, dicendum est visionem esse simpliciter supernaturalem, ideoque a natura non exigi neque ad integritatem naturalis perfectionis pertinere; praeterea, visionem esse mysterium, cuius intrinseca possibilitas naturaliter non potest cognosci, cuius actualitas sola revelatione cognosci potest. Alia ex parte, suppositis revelatione et facto visionis, sequitur cognitio extrinsecae possibilitatis: ab esse enim ad posse valet illatio. Proinde, cognita possibilitate visionis in genere, ad eius possibilitatem in homine exhibendam argumenta convenientiae inveniri possunt. Quantum interpretationem sancti Thomae attinet, duo sunt notanda. In genere sanctus Thomas uti theologus est locutus et ideo nisi de contrario positive constat magis supposuisse veritates fidei quam ab iisdem praescidisse est credendus; imo de facto saepe ita proponit argumenta convenientiae quae incauto legenti viderentur argumenta demonstrativa ex naturaliter notis; exemplo sit quod dicitur de necessitate verbi in omni intelligente77 quamvis idem sanctus Thomas alibi clare docuerit verbum divinum sola revelatione esse cognoscibile. In particulari, circa visionem eiusque cognoscibilitatem, recolendum est sanctum Thomam non elaborasse conceptum de ‘natura pura’ et ideo de actualibus et non de meris possibilibus sermonem fecisse. Circa beatitudinem humanam distinxit inter beatitudinem imperfectam quae in hac vita haberi possit et beatitudinem perfectam quae in visione Dei consistit.78 Beatitudo naturalis humana post hanc vitam systematice quidem praetermittitur, per transennam tantum tractatur, uti de parvulis sine baptismate mortuis.79 Quare sententia sancti Thomae ex loco explicito, De malo, q. 5, a. 3, sumenda videtur, neque attendendum est ad id quod concluditur ex Sum. theol., 1, q. 12, a. 1, et locis similibus; conclusiones enim eiusmodi multipliciter peccant; nam supponunt sanctum Thomam magis philosophum quam theologum; ignorant habitualem eius modum proponendi argumenta convenientiae; ducunt in consequentias impossibiles, v.g., sanctum Thomam habuisse visionem Dei tamquam naturaliter debitam, id quod saepe et explicite negat.

78 Ita, Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 4, aa. 5–8; q. 5, aa. 3–6; cf. 1, q. 62, a. 1, ubi de beatitudine angelorum naturali et supernaturali fit sermo sed de beatitudine humana perfecta et imperfecta qualis in hac vita haberi possit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

153

The Supernatural Order

As to the matter itself, it must be said that the beatific vision is absolutely supernatural and therefore not an exigency of nature nor belonging to the integrity of natural perfection. Furthermore, this vision is a mystery whose intrinsic possibility cannot be known naturally, and whose actuality can be known only through revelation. On the other hand, presupposing revelation and the fact of this vision, knowledge of its extrinsic possibility follows: ab esse ad posse valet illatio – actuality implies possibility. And so, knowing in general the possibility of such a vision, one can find arguments of appropriateness to demonstrate its possibility in the case of man. As to the interpretation of St Thomas, two points should be noted. Generally speaking, Thomas wrote as a theologian, and therefore in the absence of some positive evidence to the contrary we must believe that he was presupposing the truths of faith rather than prescinding from them. In fact, he often brings in arguments of appropriateness that to a careless reader might seem to be probative arguments derived from what is known naturally. You will find an example of this where he speaks of the necessity of an inner word in every intelligent being,77 although elsewhere he clearly states that the divine Word is knowable solely through revelation. In particular, concerning the beatific vision and its knowability, recall that St Thomas did not work out a concept of ‘pure nature’ and so wrote about what actually exists, not mere possibilities. With regard to man’s beatitude, he distinguished between imperfect happiness attainable in this life and that perfect happiness which consists in the vision of God.78 Systematically he omits any reference to natural human beatitude after death, dealing with it only en passant in discussing the fate of children dying without baptism.79 Accordingly, it seems that for St Thomas’s opinion on the matter we must go to his explicit treatment of it in De malo, q. 5, a. 3, and disregard conclusions drawn from Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1, and similar passages. Those conclusions are faulty in many ways: they suppose St Thomas speaking more as a philosopher than a theologian, they do not take into consideration his habitual way of adducing arguments of appropriateness, and they lead to inadmissible conclusions – for example, that he held the vision of God to be naturally owed to man, a position that he often and explicitly denied.

77 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1. 78 See ibid. 1-2, q. 4, aa. 5–8; q. 5, aa. 3–6; also 1, q. 62, a. 1, where he speaks of the natural and supernatural beatitude of the angels, but about man’s perfect beatitude and the imperfect beatitude attainable in this life. 79 Thomas Aquinas, Super II Sententiarum, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2; De malo, q. 5, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

154

De Ente Supernaturali

11 Obici potest: Quod naturaliter desideratur, naturaliter exigitur; atqui visio dicitur naturaliter desiderari; ergo naturaliter exigitur. Respondeo: Naturaliter exigitur quod naturaliter desideratur potentia naturali, concedo; quod naturaliter desideratur potentia obedientiali, nego; et contradistinguitur minor.

Instatur : Naturaliter desiderare per potentiam obedientialem implicat contradictionem. Ergo nulla solutio. Respondeo: Contradictio implicatur si potentia obedientialis non est intrinsece eadem ac potentia naturalis, concedo; si est eadem, nego. Ex eodem naturali desiderio intelligendi idem intellectus tendit in eiusdem essentiae divinae cognitionem, vel analogicam et naturalem, vel supernaturalem et intuitivam, prout causa efficiens extrinseca tantum naturae exigentiis cedit vel gratuito in finem supernaturalem producit.

Instatur : Frustra est naturale desiderium quod naturaliter non expletur. Atqui nihil in natura frustra. Ergo nihil est naturale desiderium quod naturaliter non expletur. Respondeo: Frustra est naturale desiderium quod naturaliter non expletur, si etiam supernaturaliter expleri non potest, concedo; secus, nego. ‘Frustra’ enim dicit totalem negationem finalitatis.80

Instatur : Ergo beatitudo naturalis non explet omne desiderium naturale. Respondeo: Non explet omne desiderium elicitum intra naturae proportionem, nego; non explet omnem tendentiam secundum quam homo perfici potest, concedo. Instatur : Ergo naturaliter beati lugent de perfectibilitate quadam sua quae non perficitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

155

The Supernatural Order

11 Objection : There is a natural exigency for what is desired naturally; but the beatific vision is desired naturally; therefore there is a natural exigency for it. Reply : To this objection we reply that there is a natural exigency for what is desired naturally by a natural potency, but not for what is desired naturally by obediential potency; but the beatific vision is desired by obediential potency, and therefore there is no natural exigency for it. Objection : But to desire something naturally through obediential potency involves a contradiction; therefore this is no solution. Reply : A contradiction is involved if obediential potency is not intrinsically the same as the natural potency; but they are intrinsically the same, and so there is no contradiction here. From the same natural desire to understand, the same intellect tends either to an analogical natural knowledge or to a supernatural intuitive knowledge of the same divine essence, depending on whether its extrinsic efficient cause simply complies with its natural exigencies or gratuitously brings it to a supernatural end. Objection : A natural desire that is not fulfilled naturally is in vain. But in nature nothing is in vain, so there cannot be a natural desire that is not fulfilled in a natural way. Reply: A natural desire that is not fulfilled in a natural way would be in vain if it were not fulfilled supernaturally; but in this case the natural desire is fulfilled supernaturally, and so it is not in vain. ‘In vain’ means a total denial of finality.80 Objection : It follows, then, that natural beatitude does not fulfil all natural desire. Reply : I grant that it does not fulfil all the tendencies according to which a human being can be perfected; but it is not true to say that it fails to fulfil every desire elicited within the proportion of nature. Objection : So, then, those who possess natural beatitude are saddened by the fact that some of their perfectibility is unfulfilled. 80 [Lonergan writes in the first edition here: ‘cf. naturale desiderium conservationis speciei in speciebus biologicis extinctis’ (‘compare the natural desire for conservation among biological species that have become extinct’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

156

De Ente Supernaturali

Respondeo: Si cognoscunt hominis finem supernaturalem quae sola revelatione cognoscitur et adeo sunt irrationabiles ut de bonis sibi mere possibilibus et nullo modo debitis tamquam de lamentabili privatione conquerantur, concedo; si nesciunt vel si sunt rationabiles, nego. Instatur : At supposito naturali desiderio visionis, ex naturalibus concludi potest ad possibilitatem visionis neque requiritur revelatio; ergo saltem ex parte solutio claudicat. Respondeo: Si ipsum naturale desiderium visionis cognosci potest sine revelatione, concedo; secus, nego. Naturale desiderium visionis cognoscitur postquam theologus factum visionis cognovit et inquantum eius convenientiam explicare conatur.

Instatur : Saltem negatur quies in beatitudine naturali. Respondeo: Negatur immobilitas intrinseca quae pertinet ad beatitudinem ipsius Dei et ad beatitudinem supernaturalem quatenus est participatio indebita beatitudinis Dei, concedo; negatur ea quies quae ex ratione finis demonstrari potest, nego. At si quis malit affirmare naturaliter beatos non proficere in analogica cognitione divinae essentiae, omnino affirmet, modo suam positionem tueri possit.81 Notulae de desiderio naturali videndi Deum per essentiam 82 1 Quod haec quaestio, ‘quid sit,’ manifestat desiderium. Distingue (1) ipsum desiderium seu principium inquirendi, admirandi, et (2) manifestationem desiderii per conceptus et voces.

The Robert Mollot Collection

157

The Supernatural Order

Reply : If they know about man’s supernatural end which is known only through revelation and are so unreasonable as to complain about being deprived of some good that is a mere possibility and not at all owing to them, that would be true, but not if they know nothing about it or are reasonable. Objection: But in the supposition that there is a natural desire for the beatific vision, one could conclude from naturally known premises to the possibility of this vision without having recourse to revelation; your solution, therefore, is faulty, at least in part. Reply : No, that is not so, because the natural desire for the beatific vision cannot be known except through revelation. The natural desire for this vision is known only after a theologian has come to know the fact of this vision and inasmuch as he attempts to explain its appropriateness. Objection : Well, at least there is no rest in natural beatitude. Reply : It is true that there is not that intrinsic immobility pertaining to the blessedness of God himself and to man’s supernatural beatitude as a gratuitous participation in that blessedness; but there is that rest that can be demonstrated from the notion of end. Now if anyone prefers to assert that those who enjoy natural beatitude do not progress in their analogical knowledge of the divine essence, let him by all means do so, provided he can defend his position.81 Some concluding points on the natural desire to see God in the divine essence 82 1 The question, ‘What is it?’ manifests a desire. Distinguish between (1) the desire itself, the source or principle of inquiring or wondering, and (2) manifestation of a desire through concepts and words. 81 [Lonergan adds by hand in the first edition, 19201dtl040: ‘P. O’Connor: naturaliter desiderium non potest aliquis actus humanus desiderandi visionem Dei: (a) db 1578; (b) actus ab obiecto specificatur, et huius actus obiectum est supernaturale’ (‘Fr [William R.] O’Connor: This natural desire cannot be any human act of desiring to see God: (a) see db 1578; ds 2678; (b) an act is specified by its object, and the object of this act is supernatural’).] 82 [In the Regis course on De ente supernaturali of 1951–52, two years after Lonergan’s address to the Jesuit Philosophical Association at Boston College on ‘The Natural Desire to See God,’ the following concluding points, currently

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

158

De Ente Supernaturali

2 Quod hoc desiderium est naturale. Non enim est acquisitum, nam fortissimum est in parvulis, neque supernaturaliter infusum, nam sine inquisitione nihil intelligitur. Intelligere vero est naturale homini. 3 Quod se extendit ad quidditatem Dei cognoscendum. Nam in theologia naturali inquiritur in attributa Dei determinanda et ordinanda. Quaeritur quid sit Deus. 4 Quod theologia naturalis non explet hoc desiderium. Manet enim obscuritas, manent quaestiones ulteriores. Quaerentibus discipulis respondent magistri, ‘Mysterium est.’ 5 Quod hoc desiderium non expletur nisi per visionem beatificam. Quaerere ‘Quid sit’ est quaerere cognitionem rei per essentiam. Res per essentiam cognoscitur in quantum recipitur species intelligibilis proportionata ipsi rei; unde sola ipsa essentia divina potest esse species ad quidditatem Dei cognoscendum. Sum. theol., 1, q. 12. Et haec est visio beatifica secundum S. Thomam. 6 Exsistit ergo desiderium naturale quod non expletur nisi per visionem Dei beatificam; quae tamen visio est supernaturalis. 7 Tamen hoc desiderium non probat nisi potentiam obedientialem ad visionem Dei. Probat potentiam, nam probat ordinem ad actum. Probat potentiam obedientialem, nam actus produci potest a solo Deo tamquam a causa proportionata. Aliud enim est posse quaerere et aliud est posse scire. ‘A fool can ask more questions than …’ 8 Neque hoc desiderium probat exigentiam ad visionem. Exigentia enim invenitur in potentia accidentali vel in potentia essentiali proxima; unde arguit Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, 2, c. 79, ¶6.83

The Robert Mollot Collection

159

The Supernatural Order

2 This desire is natural. It is not an acquired desire, for it is strongest in children, nor is it supernaturally infused, for unless one asks questions, nothing will be understood. But to understand is natural for a human being. 3 This desire extends also to knowing the quiddity or essence of God. Natural theology seeks to determine and order the attributes of God. It asks, ‘What is God?’ 4 But natural theology does not fully satisfy this desire. Obscurity remains, and so further questions remain. To the questions of the students, the teacher’s answer is, ‘It’s a mystery.’ 5 This desire is fully satisfied only through the beatific vision. To ask, ‘What is it?’ is to seek to know the thing in its essence. A thing is known in its essence by receiving the intelligible species that is proportionate to that thing. Hence, only the divine essence can be the species required for knowing the quiddity of God. And this is the beatific vision, according to St Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12. 6 There exists, therefore, a natural desire that is not fulfilled except through the beatific vision of God; yet this vision itself is supernatural. 7 Still, this desire proves only that there is obediential potency for this vision of God. It proves that there is a potency, for it proves that there is an ordination to act. It proves obediential potency, for the act can be produced only by God as its proportionate cause. It is one thing to be able to ask questions, another thing to be able to know. ‘A fool can ask more questions than …’ 8 But this desire does not prove an exigency for this vision. An exigency is found either in accidental potency or in proximate essential potency; so argues Aquinas in Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 79, ¶6, §1602.83

found in the Lonergan Archives and given the listing lp ii-21/3, a174 (www .bernardlonergan.com, 17400dtl040), were added at this point.] 83 [This paragraph in Summa contra Gentiles has to do with the natural desire of man to remain forever, and it may seem irrelevant to the point Lonergan is making, namely, that an exigency is found either in accidental potency or in proximate essential potency. However, the same reference (along with Summa contra Gentiles 2, c. 55, ¶13, §1309 and Summa theologiae, 1, q. 75, a. 6 c.) is given in the notes to De sanctissima Trinitate of 1955, articulus tertius, no.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

160

De Ente Supernaturali

Exigentia vero non invenitur in potentia essentiali remota et multo minus in potentia obedientiali. V.g., materia lunae posset informari anima rationali sed hoc non exigit. 9 Dices: Ergo non exsistit beatitudo naturalis. Nam beatitudo dicit expletionem omnis desiderii, et naturale hominis desiderium non expletur nisi supernaturaliter. Beatitudo perfecta explet omne desiderium, C; quae perfecta beatitudo est naturalis, Deo, C., creaturae, N. Beatitudo creaturae naturalis est imperfecta sicut et ipsa creatura. 10 Ergo lugent parvuli discedentes sine baptismo. Nemo rationabiliter luget de carentia boni ultra essentialem proportionem suae naturae. Peto probationem ergo parvulos esse irrationales. Etiam peto probationem parvulos sine fide posse certo scire se potuisse habere visionem Dei per baptismum. 11 An potuisset Deus creaturam intellectu praeditam producere quin eam ad visionem ordinet et vocet? Utique. Est doctrina catholica, Humani generis, aas 42 (1950) 570. Probatur: Potest Deus facere quidquid non implicat contradictionem. Et nulla adest contradictio in supposito. Scholion II: De actibus supernaturalibus qua vitalibus 1 Quaeritur quaenam conditiones sint sufficientes et necessariae ut actus supernaturalis subiecto insit. Primo, quaeritur circa receptionem actus supernaturalis. Secundo, quaeritur circa productionem actus supernatu-

The Robert Mollot Collection

161

The Supernatural Order

But there is no exigency to be found in remote essential potency, much less in obediential potency. For example, lunar matter could be informed by a rational soul, but it has no exigency for this. 9 One might object that therefore there is no such thing as natural beatitude. For beatitude means the fulfilment of all desire, and our natural desire [to know what God is] is not fulfilled except supernaturally. We grant that perfect beatitude fulfils all desire; but perfect beatitude is natural only for God, not for any creature. The beatitude that is natural for a creature is imperfect as the creature itself is imperfect. 10 Well then [so it is objected], the children who die without baptism lament their fate. But no one reasonably bewails the lack of some good that is beyond the essential proportion of their nature, and it remains to be proven that these children are unreasonable. It also remains to be proven that children who have no Christian faith can know for certain that they could have enjoyed the vision of God had they been baptized. 11 Could God have produced a creature endowed with intellect without destining and calling that creature to the beatific vision? Certainly; it is Catholic teaching in ‘Humani generis,’ Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 570. Proof: God can do anything that does not imply a contradiction; and there is no contradiction in the above supposition. Excursus 2: Supernatural acts as vital acts 1 The question here is to determine what conditions are necessary and sufficient for a supernatural act to be present in a subject. We will investigate, first, the reception of a supernatural act, second, the production of a su-

24 (available now in Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 644–59; for the references, see 648–51), where Lonergan gives his most thoroughgoing exposition of exigency. And the point becomes clear there too: there is a difference between a natural desire for remaining forever, which is not an added perfection but a continuation of a perfection and one resulting from the essence of the soul, and a natural desire for the vision of God, which vision cannot be concluded logically from the perfection of created intellect nor does it follow naturally from the essence of created intellect. This reference, therefore, seems to be correct, though the argument is telescoped.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

162

De Ente Supernaturali

ralis. Tertio, notantur sententiae speciales circa actus supernaturales qua vitales. 2 In genere ad receptionem actus supernaturalis requiritur et sufficit potentia obedientialis. Haec potentia obedientialis intrinsece est eadem ac ipsa subiecti potentia naturalis, modo subiectum sit intellectualis naturae. Ratio huius asserti est impossibilitas seriei infinitae. Si enim ante receptionem actus supernaturalis requireretur in subiecto elevatio quaedam ad ordinem supernaturalem, tunc haec elevatio esset vel extrinseca vel intrinseca. Si dicitur extrinseca, nihil ponit in subiecto, et cum nihil in Deo immutabili poni possit, videtur esse nihil simpliciter a parte rei. Si vero dicitur intrinseca, aliquid in subiecto ponens, tunc hoc quod ponitur aut est supernaturale aut non; si non est supernaturale, non videtur elevare subiectum ad ordinem supernaturalem; si est supernaturale, statim redit quaestio utrum aliud supernaturale praerequiratur ante huius receptionem et ita in infinitum. Concludendum est universaliter non posse requiri elevationem supernaturalem ante receptionem actus supernaturalis.

3 In specie quidam actus supernaturales non recipiuntur ante aliam receptionem supernaturalem. Visio beatifica non recipitur nisi in remote disposito per gratiam sanctificantem et proxime disposito per receptionem luminis gloriae. Caritas non recipitur nisi in iustificato. Est enim amor amicitiae, qui haberi non potest nisi inter amicos; sed per receptionem gratiae sanctificantis, ex qua fluunt caeterae virtutes infusae, efficimur amici Dei. Praeterea, in utroque casu habetur actus simpliciter supernaturalis formaliter, scil., quo attingitur ipse Deus uti in se est.

4 Ad alios actus virtutum supernaturalium non praerequiritur infusio habitus supernaturalis. Nam alii actus supernaturales eliciuntur in praepara-

The Robert Mollot Collection

163

The Supernatural Order

pernatural act, and third we will take note of particular opinions regarding supernatural acts as vital acts. 2 In general, for the reception of a supernatural act obediential potency is all that is necessary. This obediential potency is intrinsically identical with the natural potency of a subject, provided that subject has an intellectual nature. The reason for this statement is the impossibility of an infinite series. If prior to the reception of a supernatural act some elevation to the supernatural order were required, then such an elevation would be either extrinsic or intrinsic to the subject. If extrinsic, it would add nothing within the subject; and since nothing can be added within God, who is immutable, such an elevation would seem to be simply nothing in reality. If, however, it were intrinsic to the subject, then that elevation added within the subject would be either supernatural or not; if not, it would not seem to elevate the subject to the supernatural order, and if supernatural, the question immediately recurs as to whether some other supernatural entity is required for its reception, and so on ad infinitum. We must conclude, then, to the universal principle that a supernatural elevation cannot be a prerequisite for the reception of a supernatural act. 3 In particular, there are certain supernatural acts that are not received until some other supernatural act has been received. The beatific vision is received only in one who has been remotely disposed for it through sanctifying grace and proximately disposed through the reception of the light of glory. Charity is received only in one who has been justified. For charity is the love that is friendship, which can only exist between friends; but it is through the reception of sanctifying grace, from which flow the other infused virtues, that we become friends of God. Note also that in both of these cases we have an absolutely supernatural act that is formally supernatural, that is, an act by which one attains God as he is in himself. 4 For other acts of supernatural virtues an infusion of a supernatural habit is not a prerequisite. For these other supernatural acts are elicited as preparatory to justification (db 798, ds 1526–27, nd 1930–31), while it is

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

164

De Ente Supernaturali

tione ad iustificationem (db 798); sed in ipsa iustificatione infunduntur habitus supernaturales (db 800).84 Accedit quod hi actus sunt simpliciter supernaturales non formaliter sed virtualiter, scil., non attingunt Deum uti in se est nisi secundum quid, i.e., inquantum revelatur, vel bonum futurum speratur, vel aliter fit regula virtutis. 5 Quare effectus virtutis infusae est duplex. Semper enim infusa virtus facit subiectum connaturale ad receptionem actus secundi eiusdem virtutis: virtus enim est habitus operativus bonus; habitus vero est principium quo actus secundus per se subiecto inest. Interdum etiam virtus infusa facit ut actus secundus subiecto inesse possit; et hoc verificatur circa caritatem quae subiecto non inest sine virtute infusa; sed non verificatur circa alias virtutes quarum actus subiecto inesse possunt ante iustificationem in qua virtutes infunduntur. 6 Postquam de receptione actuum supernaturalium actum est, iam de eorum productione est agendum. Solus Deus est causa efficiens naturaliter proportionata ad actus supernaturales producendos: hi enim actus excedunt naturalem proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. Quare quaecumque substantia finita eatenus producit actum supernaturalem quatenus supra proportionem suae naturae elevatur. Haec elevatio est duplex prout respicit actum primum vel actum secundum. Substantia finita elevatur ad actum primum inquantum recipit virtutes infusas. Substantia finita elevatur ad actum secundum inquantum motio divina producit actum secundum in subiecto. De hac duplici elevatione duo maxime sunt notanda. Actus primus se habet ad actum secundum, sicut perfectibile ad suam perfectionem; ita forma substantialis se habet ad esse, habitus ad usum, forma gravitatis ad motum deorsum, etc. Quare substantia finita ad actum primum elevata non ideo potest producere actum secundum. Eatenus potest producere actum secundum quatenus ad actum secundum iam est ele-

The Robert Mollot Collection

165

The Supernatural Order

only with justification itself that supernatural habits are infused (db 800, ds 1530, nd 1933).84 Also, these acts are absolutely supernatural not formally but virtually: they attain God not as he is in himself but only in a certain respect, that is, as revealed, or as a future good to be hoped for, or, in different ways, as a norm and pattern of virtue. 5 Accordingly, the effect of an infused virtue is twofold. An infused virtue always renders its subject connatural to receiving a second act of that virtue; for virtue is an operative habit that is good, and habit is a principle by which a second act is per se in a subject. Sometimes too an infused virtue makes it possible for a second act to be in a subject. This is so in the case of charity, which is not present in a subject apart from the infused virtue; but this is not the case with other virtues whose acts can be in a subject prior to justification, in which the virtues are infused. 6 Having dealt with the reception of supernatural acts, we now take up the question of their production. Only God is the efficient cause that is naturally proportionate to the production of supernatural acts, since these acts go beyond the proportion of any finite nature. Hence any finite substance produces a supernatural act only insofar as it is elevated above the proportion of its nature. There are two elevations here, one that regards first act and another that regards second act. A finite substance is elevated to first act in receiving infused virtues. A finite substance is elevated to second act inasmuch as divine causality produces a second act in the subject. Concerning this double elevation, there are two very important points to be noted. First act is to second act as the perfectible to its perfection; in this way, substantial form is related to the act of existence, habit is related to its use, the form of gravity to downward movement, and so on. Hence a finite substance elevated to first act is not thereby capable of producing the corresponding second act. It can do this only insofar as it is now elevated to sec-

84 [Lonergan’s handwritten correction to the first edition, 192dtl040, changes this clause to: ‘sed ante ipsam iustificationem non infunduntur habitus supernaturales (db 800)’ (‘but before this justification supernatural habits are not infused, db 800, ds 1530)’.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

166

De Ente Supernaturali

vata. Ita qui movetur a Deo ad actum volendi finem supernaturalem, potest producere actum volendi medium supernaturale. Sed qui non movetur a Deo ad actum volendi finem, etiamsi actu primo (virtute) elevatus sit, non potest producere actum volendi media supernaturalia. Interdum sed non semper praesupponitur receptio actus primi ante receptionem actus secundi. Praesupponitur quoad actum secundum caritatis; sed non necessario praesupponitur quoad actus secundos aliarum virtutum; hi enim actus ante virtutes infusas recipi possunt.

7 Ulterior est quaestio de iisdem actibus prout sunt actus liberi. Actus est liber vel virtualiter vel formaliter vel denominative. Actus est liber virtualiter in cuius virtute subiectum potest producere vel non producere alium actum. Velle finem, ergo, est actus liber virtualiter, scil., ad modum libere efficientis. Actus est liber formaliter cui primo et per se inest ratio libertatis. Ita velle media est actus liber formaliter quia huic actui primo et per se inest ratio libertatis, scil., posse esse vel non esse ad lubitum subiecti.

Actus est liber denominative cui inest ratio libertatis sed non primo vel per se. Ita movere brachium est actus denominative liber; ei inest ratio libertatis, scil., posse esse vel non esse ad lubitum subiecti; sed hoc ei inest non per se, scil., quia est motus brachii, neque primo, nam primo inest actui in voluntate elicito.

Unde concludes actus liberos sive formaliter sive denominative necessario produci ab ipso subiecto eorundem actuum. Contra, actus virtualiter liberi non necessario producuntur ab ipso eorum subiecto: his enim actibus subiectum redditur capax producendi alium actum secundum; ita in doctrina sancti Thomae velle finem producitur quoad exercitium a motore extrinseco qui est Deus.85

The Robert Mollot Collection

167

The Supernatural Order

ond act. Thus, one who is moved by God to the act of willing a supernatural end can produce an act of willing supernatural means, whereas one who is not moved by God to an act of willing the end, even if already elevated by a first act (virtue), cannot produce an act of willing supernatural means. Sometimes, but not always, the reception of a first act is a prerequisite to the reception of second act. It is a prerequisite in the case of a second act of charity, but it is not necessarily a prerequisite in the case of second acts of other virtues, since these acts can be received before the infused virtues. 7 There is a further question concerning these acts as free. An act is free either virtually or formally or by denomination. That act is virtually free which enables its subject to perform or not perform another act. To will the end, therefore, is an act that is free virtually, that is, in the manner of one acting freely. That act is formally free in which the essential note of freedom is present first and by reason of itself. Thus, to will the means is a formally free act, because in this act there is present first and per se the essential note of freedom, namely, the ability to be or not to be, according to the wish of the subject. An act is free by denomination in which the essential note of freedom is present but not present first and per se. To move one’s arm, for example, is an act that is free by denomination; it possesses the essential note of freedom, that is, such a movement can be made or not, according to the wish of the subject. But the note of freedom is not in it per se, that is, because it is the movement of an arm, nor is it in it first, since it is first in the act elicited in the will. From this we conclude that acts that are free formally or by denomination are necessarily produced by the subject of those acts. On the other hand, acts that are virtually free are not necessarily produced by their subject, for these acts render their subject capable of producing a further second act. Thus according to St Thomas the act of willing the end is produced as to its exercise by an extrinsic mover, God.85

85 See De malo, q. 6, a. 1, and Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9; but note that this doctrine is not found in earlier works, such as the Commentary on the Sentences, De veritate, De potentia, Summa contra Gentiles, and Summa theologiae, 1.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

168

De Ente Supernaturali

8 Ultima denique est quaestio de his iisdem actibus, non qua supernaturalibus, neque qua salutaribus, neque qua meritoriis, neque qua liberis, sed qua vitalibus.86 Actus vitalis est actus viventis qua viventis; ita nutriri, sentire, intelligere, velle. Sat communiter his ultimis saeculis actus vitales assimilantur actibus liberis inquantum debent produci ab ipso eorum subiecto; imo assimilantur non tantum actibus denominative sed actibus formaliter liberis, scil., principium quo subiectum est proportionatum ad eorum productionem debet inveniri in ipsa eadem potentia in qua actus vitalis invenitur productus. Fundamentum huius sententiae profertur mirabilis illa qualitas quae in actibus vitalibus invenitur, nempe, vitalitas. Qui dicit vitalitatem, aiunt, dicit activitatem; qui dicit activitatem, dicit productionem, causalitatem efficientem; ergo actus vitalis qua talis necessario a suo subiecto producitur. Prius de ipsa sententia philosophica, deinde de consequentiis theologicis agendum est. 9 Sanctus Thomas sane admisit aliquos actus vitales produci ab eorum subiecto; ita intelligere producitur in intellectu possibili a subiecto per phantasma ab intellectu agente illuminatum. Imo non nullos actus vitales habuit productos a subiecto ratione principii proportionati in eadem potentia in qua actus vitalis recipitur; ita verbum producitur in intellectu possibili ratione actus intelligendi in eodem intellectu possibili; et in doctrina posteriori volitio medii producitur in voluntate ratione actus volendi finem qui actus in eadem voluntate exsistit. Si vero ipse sanctus Thomas auditur, sustineri non potest sententia quae vult omnes actus vitales ab ipso eorum subiecto productos. ‘Velle finem’ est actus vitalis qui, quoad exercitium, producitur a motore extrinseco.87 Praeterea, in doctrina priore de voluntate, quando sine distinctione inter specificationem et exercitium actus dominabatur axioma Aristotelicum ‘appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum,’ non solum exercitium actus voluntatis sed etiam specificatio actus producebatur ab obiecto apprehenso.

The Robert Mollot Collection

169

The Supernatural Order

8 Our final question is about these same acts, considered not as supernatural or salutary or meritorious or free, but as vital.86 A vital act is the act of a living being precisely as living, such as being nourished, sensing, understanding, willing. It has been fairly common in recent centuries to see vital acts as being like free acts, in that they have to be produced by their own subject; in fact, they are likened not only to acts that are free by denomination but also to formally free acts; that is to say, the principle by which the subject is proportionate to producing them must be found in the very same potency in which the vital act is found produced. The basis put forth for this opinion is some amazing quality found in vital acts known as ‘vitality.’ Vitality, they say, means activity; activity means production, efficient causality; therefore a vital act as such is necessarily produced by its own subject. We shall deal first with the philosophical aspect of this opinion, and then with its consequences for theology. 9 St Thomas, it is true, admitted that some vital acts are produced by their subject; thus, the act of understanding is produced in the possible intellect by the subject through a phantasm illumined by the agent intellect. Indeed, he held that several vital acts are produced by the subject by reason of a proportionate principle in the same potency in which the vital act is received; thus, an inner word is produced in the possible intellect by reason of the act of understanding in the same possible intellect; and according to his later doctrine, the act of willing the means is produced in the will by reason of the act of willing the end, an act that is present in that same will. However, according to St Thomas himself, the opinion that all vital acts are produced by their subject cannot be maintained. To will the end is a vital act which, as to its exercise, is produced by an extrinsic mover.87 Besides, according to his earlier doctrine on the will when, in the absence of the distinction between the specification and the exercise of an act, the Aristotelian axiom that ‘the desirable that is apprehended moves the appetite’ was dominant in his thinking, not only the exercise of the act of the will but also its specification was produced by the apprehended object. 86 [For a parallel discussion of vital act in Lonergan’s writings, see The Triune God: Systematics 546–53. See also Lonergan, Verbum 138–43.] 87 Thomas Aquinas, De Malo, q. 6, a. 1; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 4.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

170

De Ente Supernaturali

Deinde ‘sentire,’ ‘cognitio sensus,’ ‘operatio sensus’ est actus vitalis; qui actus semper a sancto Thoma docetur produci ab obiecto sensibili. ‘… cognitio sensus perficitur in hoc ipso quod sensus a sensibili movetur’ (In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol.). ‘Anima igitur sensitiva non se habet in sentiendo sicut movens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur’ (C. gent., 2, c. 57, ¶8, §1333). ‘… si vero operatio illa consistat in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de potentiis sensitivis in animalibus’ (ibid., c. 76, ¶16, §1575). ‘… sentire consistit in moveri et pati’ (In II de An., lect. 10, §350). ‘… substantia uniuscuiusque sensus et eius definitio est in hoc quod est aptum natum pati a sensibili’ (ibid., lect. 13, §387). ‘… sentire consistit in quodam pati et alterari’ (ibid., §393). ‘… sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire’ (Sum. theol., 1, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m). ‘… sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum’ (ibid., q. 27, a. 5 c.). ‘… duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili’ (ibid., q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m). ‘… cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili’ (Quodl. 5, a. 9, ad 2m). Hi textus omne effugium praecludunt: ‘sentire,’ ‘cognitio sensus,’ ‘operatio sensus’ (ergo non actus primus sed secundus), ‘perficitur,’ ‘consistit,’ ‘est’ (ideoque non tantum praeparatur) in ‘moveri,’ ‘alterari,’ ‘pati,’ ‘affici,’ ‘immutari’ ipsius sensus ab obiecto sensibili (ideoque non est actus vitalis ad mentem recentiorum). Effugia quae finguntur consistunt maxime in his duobus: confunditur ‘activa potentia’ prout est principium effectus et prout est actus primus receptivus actus secundi (vide supra, potentia activa proprie et improprie dicta);88

The Robert Mollot Collection

171

The Supernatural Order

Again, sensing, knowing by a sense, the operation of a sense: this is a vital act, and St Thomas always spoke of this act as being caused by the object sensed. ‘… sense knowledge is effected in this, that the sense is moved by a sensible thing’ (Super IV Sententarium, d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol.). ‘… the sentient soul, therefore, in sensing does not function as mover or agent, but is that by which the receiver of an influence receives it’ (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 57, ¶8, §1333). ‘… but if the operation consists in receiving an influence, it possesses a passive principle, as is evident for sentient potencies in animals’ (ibid. c. 76, ¶16, §1575). ‘… sensing consists in being moved and receiving an influence’ (In II De Anima, lect. 10, §350). ‘… the essence and definition of each and every sense consists in this, that it is made for receiving an influence from a sensible thing’ (Ibid. lect. 13, §387). ‘… sensing consists in a certain reception of an influence and undergoing change’ (ibid. §393). ‘… for a sense to be affected is the very sensing of the sense’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m). ‘… sensing is achieved by the action of the sensible thing upon the sense’ (ibid. q. 27, a. 5 c.). ‘… two operations. One consists in alteration alone, and in this way the operation of a sense potency is achieved in this, that it is changed by the sensible thing’ (ibid. q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m). ‘… knowledge in an external sense is constituted by this alone, that the sense is changed by the sensible thing’ (Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 2m). There is no escaping these texts: ‘sensing,’ ‘sentient knowing,’ ‘operation of a sense’ (not first act, therefore, but second), ‘is effected,’ ‘consists,’ ‘is’ (hence is not just prepared for) the ‘being moved,’ ‘being altered,’ ‘receiving an influence,’ ‘being affected,’ ‘being changed’ of the sense itself by the sensible object, and so is not a vital act, in the meaning given to it by more recent authors. Attempts at getting around the problem rest mainly on two things: confusing ‘active potency’ as the principle of an effect with a first act receptive to a second act, that is, active potency in the proper and in the improper sense;88 88 See above, p. 133.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

172

De Ente Supernaturali

confunditur ‘operatio,’ ‘actio,’ prout significat actum secundum et prout significat exercitium causalitatis efficientis. 10 Secundum Scotum actus cognoscitivus producitur a duplici causa efficienti partiali, nempe, ab obiecto vel specie et simul a vi cognoscitiva.89 Caietanus Scotum quandoque secutus post doctior factus correxit suam sententiam.90 Ad claram notionem actionis eum pervenisse haud potest concludi ab eo qui legit commentarium super Sum. theol., 1, q. 79, a. 2, §§xviii ss.91 In commentariis super Summam docet activitatem animae relate ad productionem cognitionis sensitivae92 ubi refert ad Aristotelis De anima.93 Caietanus vero in commentariis suis in De anima clare sese opponit sententiae subsequenti. Reicit sententiam secundum quam datur duplex mutatio, ‘et prima quidem fit ab objecto, et terminatur ad speciem qua sensus fit similis sensibili; secunda autem fit ab anima et terminatur ad ipsam sensationem, qua sensus est formaliter sentiens.’ Contra talem positionem asserit: ‘Non est putandum quod species sensibilis et sensatio sint sic duo entia ut dent duo esse: sed se habent ut forma et esse formae, ut albedo et esse album … et propterea sicut eadem est mutatio ad albedinem et esse album, ita eadem est mutatio ad speciem visibilem et videre.’94 Ferrariensis leviter ex operatione ad productionem concludit.95

93 Hic distingui oportet duplicem quaestionem: num anima remote causat sensationem inquantum est principium ex quo fluit ipse sensus; num anima causat sensationem positive influendo in productionem ipsius actus secundi; priori quaestioni affirmative, posteriori negative est respondendum; vide C. Gent., ii, 57, cit. supra.

The Robert Mollot Collection

173

The Supernatural Order

and confusing ‘operation’ or ‘action’ as referring to a second act and as referring to an exercise of efficient causality. 10 Scotus held that a cognitive act is produced conjointly by two partial efficient causes, namely, the object or species, and a simultaneous cognitive power.89 Cajetan followed Scotus for a while, but later, having acquired more learning, corrected his opinion.90 One who reads his commentary on Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2, §§xviii–xxiv91 can hardly conclude that he arrived at a clear notion of action. In his commentaries on the Summa theologiae he speaks of the activity of the soul in the production of sense knowledge,92 where he refers to Aristotle’s De anima.93 But Cajetan in his commentaries on De anima is clearly against this more recent opinion. He rejects the opinion favoring a double alteration, ‘the first being produced by the object and terminating at the species by which the sense is assimilated to the object, and the second produced by the soul and terminating at sensation, by which the sense is formally sensing.’ Against this position he states, ‘One must not think that the sensible species and sensation are two beings to the extent of having two acts of existence; rather they are as a form and the existence of the form, like whiteness and being white … and therefore just as a change to whiteness is the same as being white, so also is a change to a visible species the same as actually seeing.’94 Sylvester of Ferrara blithely reasons from operation to production.95

89 See, for example, his Opus Oxoniense, 1, d. 3, q. 7 (Editio Vivès, vol. ix, pp. 335–98; in the edition of the Commissio Scotistica: Ordinatio, i, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2: Opera omnia, vol. iii, pp. 245–330.) 90 In Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 2, §xiv, Leonine edition, vol. iv, pp. 118–19. 91 Leonine edition, vol. v, pp. 262–64. 92 In Summa theologiae, 1, q. 82, a. 4, §iv, Leonine edition, vol. v, p. 304. 93 Here we must distinguish two questions: whether the soul is a remote cause of sensation inasmuch as it is a principle from which the sense itself emerges, and whether the soul causes sensation by a positive influence upon the production of the second act itself. The answer to the first question is affirmative, to the second negative. See Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 57, ¶8, §1333, quoted above. 94 See Yves Simon, ‘Positions aristotéliciennes concernant le problème de l’activité du sens,’ Revue de philosophie 33 (1933) 229–58, at 235–36. [Also numbered ‘Nouvelle série: Tome iv,’ though the 1934 volume is likewise numbered Tome iv.] 95 In II Contra gentiles, c. 57, §iii-2, Leonine edition, vol. xiii, p. 408.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

174

De Ente Supernaturali

Sententia Ioannis a sancto Thoma longe exponitur et defenditur ab Yves Simon (articulo supra citato, pp. 228–58). Dicit: ‘Les arguments de Jean de s. Thomas en faveur de l’activité du sens se ramènent tous à faire valoir que la sensation est un acte vital: or qui dit vie, dit activité.’96 Eloquenter suam sententiam proposuit Ioannes: obiectum se habet ut pater, sensus se habet ut mater a patre foecundata, actus vitalis sentiendi se habet ut proles procedens immediate a sola matre. 11 Qui tenent actum vitalem necessario produci a subiecto actus, contenti esse non possunt cum eis quae supra posuimus circa receptionem et productionem actus supernaturalis. Actus supernaturalis sive credendi sive sperandi sive poenitendi est actus vitalis; sed etiam est actus liber, et quia est liber, concedimus eum produci a subiecto. Sed actus liber alios actus supponit vitales quidem sed non liberos; et omnes hos actus necessario a subiecto produci negamus, quia ad actum vitalem97 nobis sufficit mera receptio in subiecto, adversarii vero requirunt non solum receptionem in subiecto sed etiam productionem a subiecto, et quidem productionem a subiecto ratione principii proportionati in eadem potentia recepti. Ut adsit tale principium proportionatum ad productionem actus supernaturalis, ante ipsum vitalem actum praerequiritur in potentia actus supernaturalis non vitalis vel alia elevatio a Deo solo facta et nobis inconscia. Huic principio consentientes, in diversas vias solvendi problema sic inventum abeunt. Banneziani docent duplicem praemotionem physicam: alia respicit actum primum et nominatur gratia sufficiens et excitans; alia respicit actum

The Robert Mollot Collection

175

The Supernatural Order

Yves Simon, on pages 229 to 258 of the article referred to in note 94, has a lengthy exposition of the opinion of John of St Thomas, which he defends. He writes: ‘The arguments of John of St Thomas all lead one to conclude that sensation is a vital act: life means activity.’96 John himself expresses his thought in a rather picturesque way: the sensible object is like a father, the sense is like a mother impregnated by the father, and the vital act of sensing is like the offspring proceeding immediately from the mother alone. 11 Those who hold that a vital act is necessarily produced by the subject of that act can hardly be satisfied with what we have said above with regard to the reception and production of a supernatural act. A supernatural act of believing or of hoping or of repenting is a vital act, but it is also a free act, and because it is free, we grant that it is produced by the subject. But a free act supposes other acts that are vital, but not free; and we deny that all these acts are necessarily produced by the subject, because for a vital act97 its mere reception in the subject is, according to our position, all that is required, whereas our opponents require not only that it be received in the subject but also produced by the subject, and indeed, produced by the subject by reason of a proportionate principle received in the same potency. In order for there to be such a principle proportionate to the production of a supernatural act, prior to that act itself there would be required in the potency some non-vital supernatural act, or another elevation caused by God alone of which we are quite unconscious. Those who admit this principle resort to various ways of solving this problem that they have thus created. The Bannezians teach that there are two physical premotions: the first regards first act and is called sufficient and arousing grace (gratia sufficiens

96 Simon, ‘Positions aristotéliciennes …’ 255–56. 97 [In the autograph and in the first edition the sentence reads: ‘… actus vitalis; quatenus est actus liber, concedimus eum produci a subiecto; quatenus vero actus est vitalis, nobis sufficit …’ (‘… a vital act; insofar as it is a free act, we grant that it is produced by the subject; but insofar as it is a vital act, according to our position, all that is required …’). In both copies of the first edition, however, Lonergan crossed out ‘… quatenus est actus … est vitalis …’ and inserted by hand what we now have in the text. For some reason, the Regis College edition retained the original reading of the autograph and the first edition and did not make the correction. But as Lonergan himself crossed out part of the sentence and indicated the correction in his own hand, the editors have felt warranted in giving the corrected reading of the sentence.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

176

De Ente Supernaturali

secundum et nominatur gratia efficax et adiuvans.98 Prima datur ut homo possit producere vitaliter actum supernaturalem; secunda datur ut homo de facto producat vitaliter actum supernaturalem. Utraque est entitas quaedam physica in potentia recepta, elevans potentiam si habitus desit, non vitalis, suapte natura fluens. Haec sententia dupliciter modificatur: primo modo, uti a L. Billot, admittitur prima praemotio sed negatur secunda;99 alio modo admittitur prima praemotio sed secunda admittitur ante virtutes infusas, negatur post virtutes infusas. Molinistae e contra communiter docent elevationem extrinsecam ante virtutes infusas, concursum simultaneum supernaturalem post virtutes infusas (virtutes infusae concipiuntur non ad modum actus primi qui per actum secundum perficitur, sed ad modum causae efficientis quae actum secundum producit). Arguunt multas esse causas relate ad actum vitalem, nempe, Deum, obiectum, habitum, potentiam; non omnes necessario ipsi subiecto inesse; quare quod Deus per creaturam efficere potest, etiam specialiter assistendo ab extrinseco per creaturam efficere potest; ergo creatura potest producere actum supernaturalem nullo ente in se recepto, sed tantum Deo specialiter ab extrinseco assistente et elevante.

12 Ut huic rei finem imponamus, crisis et iudicium proponi debent.

The Robert Mollot Collection

177

The Supernatural Order

et excitans); the second regards second act and is called efficacious and assisting grace (gratia efficax et adiuvans).98 The first is given so that one may be able to produce vitally a supernatural act, while the second is given so that one does in fact vitally produce a supernatural act. Both are physical entities received in a potency, elevating that potency if it lacks a habit; they are non-vital, and by their very nature transient. This opinion has been modified in two ways: first, as expounded by L. Billot, the first premotion is admitted, the second denied;99 according to the second way, the first premotion is admitted, while the second premotion is admitted prior to the infusion of virtues but not after. Molinists on the other hand generally hold for an extrinsic elevation prior to the infused virtues and a simultaneous supernatural concurrence after their infusion (the infused virtues are conceived not as being like a first act which is perfected by second act, but like an efficient cause which produces second act). They argue that there are many causes involved in a vital act, such as God, the object, habit, potency; that not all are necessarily in the subject itself; and therefore what God can effect through a creature he can also effect through a creature by assisting it in a special way from without; and therefore a creature can produce a supernatural act without having received some entity within itself, needing only a special external help and elevation from God. 12 To bring this discussion to a close, we offer the following critique and judgment.

98 [The autograph reads: ‘… alia respicit actum primum et nominatur gratia sufficiens et excitans; alia respicit actum secundum et nominatur gratia efficax et adiuvans …’ The first edition just has: ‘… alia respicit actum secundum et nominatur gratia efficax et adiuvans …,’ with no mention of gratia sufficiens et excitans. It seems likely that this is just a copyist’s error in the first edition, occasioned by the repeated use of ‘alia respicit.’ In 19201dtl040 Lonergan indicates by hand that a correction needs to be made to the first edition, and goes back to the autograph’s version. As for the next sentence, there is one version of the first edition (11700dtl040) in which Lonergan adds ‘indeliberatum’ before the first ‘supernaturalem’ and ‘deliberatum’ before the second. In the other copy of the first edition, 19201dtl040, that change was not made, and the editors have not added it.] 99 [Lonergan gives no reference here. A suitable reference, however, might be L. Billot, De gratia Christi commentarius in primam secundae S. Thomae, 4th edition (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1928) Thesis x, pp. 148–58.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

178

De Ente Supernaturali

Sententia negans actum vitalem necessario ab ipso subiecto produci (1) clare docetur a sancto Thoma, (2) forte docetur a Caietano, (3) elegantem et simplicissimam solutionem circa actus supernaturales praebet, (4) praetermitti solet a theologis, duce Scoto. Sententia Banneziana (1) cohaerenter resolvit problema actus supernaturalis vitalis, (2) componi non potest cum libertate humana. Sententia P. Billot (1) minus cohaerenter resolvit problema actus supernaturalis vitalis, (2) componi potest cum libertate humana. Sententia communior Molinistarum (1) componi potest cum libertate humana, (2) nihil dicit. Elevatio enim extrinseca nihil est in creatura, nam creaturae est extrinseca; et nihil est in Deo assistente, nam Deus est immutabilis; et inepte identificatur cum ipso actu vitali producto, nam tota quaestio est de praevia proportione subiecti ad productionem. Secunda sententia admitti non potest. Prima et quarta ad idem redeunt: quarta enim nihil dicit, prima vero tenet nihil esse dicendum quia problema est nullum. Qui ergo asserit nihil in subiecto recipi oportere ut actum supernaturalem qua vitalem eliciat, habet secum et sanctum Thomam et Molinistas; quorum auctoritas forte maior est quam Patris Billot.

Scholion III: De concursu divino Concursus divinus est causalitas efficiens divina relate ad effectus quos Deus producit et etiam creatura producit. Cuius rei difficultas ex duplici quaestione oritur: primo, quaenam realitas obiectiva sit causalitas efficiens; deinde, quaenam realitas obiectiva sit causalitas efficiens mediata. Primae quaestioni dupliciter respondetur: primo, causalitas efficiens ex parte rei est quidam influxus; aliter, causalitas efficiens ex parte rei est realis relatio dependentiae ad id a quo effectus dependet.

Tripliciter, si causalitas efficiens dicitur esse influxus, explicatur causalitas efficiens mediata. Primo modo, causalitas efficiens mediata non est tertius quidam influxus; est nomen impositum ad indicandos duos alios influxus. Puta, si A causat B, et B causat C, dantur duo influxus, nempe, ab A in B, et a B in C; sed non datur tertius influxus ab A in C; praeter duos priores influxus causalitatis

The Robert Mollot Collection

179

The Supernatural Order

The opinion that denies that a vital act is necessarily produced by its subject is clearly taught by St Thomas, was perhaps taught by Cajetan, provides a neat and quite simple solution concerning supernatural acts, and, following Scotus, is usually ignored by theologians. The Bannezian position is coherent in the way it solves the problem of a supernatural vital act, but is incompatible with human freedom. Fr Billot’s opinion has less coherence in the solution it offers to the problem of a supernatural vital act, but it can be reconciled with human freedom. The more common opinion among Molinists is compatible with human freedom, but says nothing. For an extrinsic elevation is nothing in the creature, since it is extrinsic to it; nor is it anything in God, since God is immutable; and it is quite wrong to identify it with the vital act already produced, for the whole point at issue is the subject’s prior proportion to its production. Of these opinions, the second cannot be admitted. The first and the fourth come to the same thing: the fourth says nothing, and the first holds that there is nothing to be said, because there is really no problem. Accordingly, whoever maintains that nothing need be received in a subject in order to elicit a supernatural act as a vital act has St Thomas and the Molinists on his side. Their authority, I should say, outweighs that of Fr Billot. Excursus 3: Divine concurrence Divine concurrence is divine efficient causality with respect to the effects produced by God and also by a creature. The difficulty in this matter arises from two questions: what objective reality is efficient causality, and what objective reality is mediate efficient causality? There are two ways of answering the first question: according to the first way, efficient causality in objective reality is a certain ‘influx’ [from one thing to another]; according to the second way, efficient causality in objective reality is the effect’s real relation of dependence to that upon which the effect depends. If efficient causality is said to be an influx, then there are three ways of explaining mediate efficient causality, as follows. 1 Mediate efficient causality is not some third influx; it is a name given to indicate the two other influxes. Thus, for example, if A causes B and B causes C, there are two influxes, namely, of A upon B and B upon C; but there is not a third influx of A upon C. Above and beyond the two prior in-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

180

De Ente Supernaturali

immediatae, causalitas mediata nihil est nisi nomen. Ita haberi potest sententia associata cum Durando: Deus causat creaturam, creatura producit effectum suum, sed Deus non exercet aliam causalitatem praeter eam qua creaturam producit. Altero modo, saltem interdum causalitas efficiens mediata non est nomen tantum sed tertius influxus. Non solum datur influxus ab A in B, et a B in C, sed simul cum influxu a B in C habetur tertius influxus ab A in C. Hic tertius influxus nominari potest concursus simultaneus. Ita habetur sententia similis illi quae Molinae attribuitur. Tertio modo, saltem interdum causalitas efficiens mediata non est nomen tantum sed tertius influxus; neque tamen est tertius influxus immediatus, sicut in secunda sententia quae re vera non salvat causalitatem efficientem mediatam. Oportet distingui inter B prout est effectus A et prout est causa C: primo influxu ab A in B dat B′ (B prout est effectus A); altero influxu ab A in B dat B ″ (B prout est causa C); tertio influxu a B″ in C dat C.100 Hic alter influxus nominari potest causalitas efficiens relate ad praemotionem physicam. Et ita habetur sententia similis illi quae attribuitur Bannezio. Tres hae sententiae errare videntur in conceptu ipsius causalitatis efficientis. Quid enim est influxus ille? Aut est realitas quaedam obiectiva aut non est. Si non, omnis causalitas efficiens est vacuum nomen, et nulla est realitas obiectiva. Sin est realitas obiectiva, tunc et ipse causam efficientem habeat necesse est. Haec causa efficiens debet exercere influxum ad producendum influxum priorem. Hic novus influxus est realitas, habet causam efficientem, tertio influxu producitur. Et ita proceditur in infinitum. Quod est inconveniens. Haec obiectio facile solvitur in altera opinione, nempe, causalitatem efficientem a parte rei esse relationem realem. Nam relatio relationis est ens

The Robert Mollot Collection

181

The Supernatural Order

fluxes, mediate causality is just a label, nothing more. This can be regarded as the opinion associated with Durandus: God causes a creature; the creature produces an effect; but God exercises no causality apart from that by which he produces the creature. 2 Sometimes, at least, mediate efficient causality is not a mere label but a real third influx. Not only is there the influx of A upon B and of B upon C, but simultaneous with the influx of B upon C there is a third influx, that of A upon C. This third influx may be called simultaneous concurrence; this opinion is similar to that attributed to Molina. 3 Again, sometimes mediate efficient causality is not a mere label but a third influx; yet it is not an immediate third influx, as in the second opinion, which really does not save mediate efficient causality. One must distinguish between B as an effect of A and B as the cause of C: a first influx of A upon B produces B′ (B as the effect of A); a second influx of A upon B produces B″ (B as the cause of C); a third influx, that of B″ upon C, produces C.100 The second of these influxes can be called efficient causality with respect to a physical premotion, and so we have an opinion similar to that attributed to Bañez. These three opinions would seem to err in their way of conceiving efficient causality. For, what is that influx? It is either an objective reality or it is not. If it is not, then all efficient causality is but an empty label and there is no objective reality to it. But if it is an objective reality, then it itself has to have an efficient cause, and this efficient cause has to exercise its influx to produce the previous influx. But this new influx in turn is a reality, has an efficient cause, and so is produced by a third influx. This sets up an infinite process, which is inadmissible. This objection is easily solved according to the second way of conceiving efficient causality, namely, that the reality of efficient causality consists of a 100 [In the autograph, the first edition, and the Regis edition, Lonergan does have ‘tertio influxu a B ″ in C dat C.’ But, irrespective of whether the influx theory of efficient causality is correct or not, it is difficult to understand how there can be an influx upon C prior to the production or the giving of C – unless, of course, ‘C ’ in ‘upon C ’ stands for just the matter, the out-of-which that receives the influx from B″ that subsequently produces or gives C. In any event, Lonergan’s formulation of this third way of understanding mediate efficient causality in terms of influx in ‘On God and Secondary Causes’ (Collection 54) avoids this difficulty: ‘… one may say that there is a real difference between B as effect of A and B as cause of C, and this real difference is what explains the reality of mediate efficient causality; first, an influx from A gives B′; second, an influx from A gives B″; third, an influx from B″ gives C.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

182

De Ente Supernaturali

rationis, ideoque causalitas efficiens causalitatis efficientis est ens rationis tantum, quamvis causalitas efficiens sit ens reale, nempe, relatio realis. Sit ergo realitas obiectiva causalitatis efficientis relatio realis dependentiae ad id a quo. Tunc causalitas efficiens mediata facile concipitur: nam omnis causalitas efficiens sive mediata sive immediata est realis relatio dependentiae relate ad id a quo. Utrum habeatur causalitas efficiens mediata necne, determinatur per distinctionem inter causas per se et per accidens ordinatas. Si voluntas movet digitos, et digiti movent machinam dactylographicam, voluntas et digiti sunt causae per se ordinatae; scil., una est intelligibilis processio a voluntate in scriptum. Si Abraham genuit Isaac, et Isaac genuit Jacob, habentur causae per accidens ordinatae: Abraham enim non est causa sed conditio generationis Jacob. Praeterea, distinguitur duplex immediatio, immediatio virtutis et immediatio suppositi. Illa causa est immediata immediatione virtutis quae non agit ut instrumentum alterius. Illa causa est immediata immediatione suppositi quae non usurpat aliam causam tamquam instrumentum.101 Attamen hac in sententia, sicut in priori, triplex habetur divisio sententiarum quatenus haec causalitatis analysis applicatur concursui divino. Applicatio enim pendet ex ratione cur dicantur Deus et creatura esse causae per se ordinatae relate ad aliquem effectum. Et tripliciter eiusmodi ratio assignari potest. Primo modo, relate ad actus vitales. Actus vitalis debet produci a subiecto in quo est. At nullum subiectum potest de suo augere suam perfectionem. Ergo requiritur praemotio physica quae reddit subiectum proportionatum ad actum vitalem producendum. Proinde, universaliter loquendo, Deus solus est causa proportionata ad eiusmodi praemotiones efficiendas. Ergo solus Deus causat praemotiones requisitas ad actus vitales. Secundo modo, relate ad omnem prorsus effectum a creatura productum. Viget realis distinctio inter potentiam agendi et ipsum agere. Creatura naturaliter possidet potentiam agendi. Sed creatura non potest sibi dare

The Robert Mollot Collection

183

The Supernatural Order

real relation. For the relation of a relation is a conceptual being, and therefore the efficient causality of efficient causality is only a conceptual being, while efficient causality itself is a real being, namely, a real relation. Accordingly, then, let the objective reality of efficient causality be the effect’s real relation of dependence to that upon which it depends. Then mediate efficient causality is easy to conceive: all efficient causality, immediate or mediate, is a real relation of dependence by which the effect is really related to that upon which it depends. Whether you have mediate or immediate efficient causality is determined by the distinction between causes that are linked per se or per accidens. When your will moves your fingers and your fingers move your typewriter keys, your will and your fingers are causes that are linked per se; that is, there is but one intelligible process from your will to the typescript. But if Abraham begets Isaac and Isaac begets Jacob, you have causes that are linked per accidens; Abraham is not a cause but a condition of the begetting of Jacob. Moreover, there is a distinction between immediacy of power (immediatio virtutis) and immediacy of the supposit (immediatio suppositi). A cause that does not itself act as an instrument of another is immediate by immediacy of power; and a cause that does not make use of another cause as an instrument is immediate by the immediacy of the supposit. 101 However, in this opinion as in the previous one there is a threefold division when this analysis of causality is applied to divine concurrence. For this application depends upon the reason why God and the creature are said to be causes linked per se in regard to some effect, and there are three such reasons that can be given. First, with respect to vital acts. A vital act must be produced by the subject in which it occurs. But no subject can of itself add to its own perfection. Therefore there is required a physical premotion to render a subject proportionate to producing a vital act. And so, as a universal principle, God alone is a cause proportionate to producing such premotions, and therefore only God causes premotions that are required for vital acts. Second, with respect to absolutely every effect produced by a creature. There is a real distinction between the potency to act and the action itself. A creature possesses by its nature the potency to act. But a creature cannot

101 [On the distinction between immediatio virtutis and immediatio suppositi, see also Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 67, n. 6, and ‘On God and Secondary Causes,’ in Collection 55.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

184

De Ente Supernaturali

ipsum agere: maior enim est actus quam potentia. Ergo creatura ab alio recipere debet ipsum agere ut actualiter effectum producat. Proinde, solus Deus est causa efficiens proportionata ad dandum ipsum agere; nam omnis effectus est ens; sed solus Deus proportionatur ad causandum esse (solus enim Deus est esse secundum perfectionem propriae formae); ergo solus Deus proportionatur ad dandum ipsum agere (vel praemotionem ad ipsum agere) quo actualiter esse effectus producitur. Tertio modo, relate ad omnem prorsus effectum a creatura productum. Omnis causa efficiens finita est conditionata: naturaliter potest agere; sed non actu producit effectum nisi conditiones implentur. Atqui solus Deus est causa proportionata ad efficiendam impletionem conditionum. Ergo solus Deus est causa proportionata eius quod causa finita actu producit effectum. Maior: constat ex eo quod nulla creatura potest creare; ergo omnis causa finita supponit subiectum in quod agat; praeterea, omnis causa finita supponit alias conditiones impletas, scil., debitam proportionem inter se et patiens, debitas habitudines inter se et patiens. Sine his conditionibus impletis, causa finita nihil potest facere.102 Minor: solus Deus est causa proportionata ad efficiendam impletionem conditionum. Primo quia solus Deus creat patiens. Secundo, etiam supposita creatione et supposito quod aliae causae finitae alterius conditiones implere possunt, tamen non actu implent nisi efficienter causando; et earum efficientia est pariter conditionata. Numquam per causas finitas habetur causa proportionata ad impletionem conditionum, sed tantum idem problema ab una causa ad aliam transfertur. Quare applicatio causae finitae ad actionem suam, quamvis per alias causas finitas efficiatur immediate immediatione suppositi, numquam tamen fit nisi a Deo tamquam causa proportionata, principali, immediate agente immediatione virtutis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

185

The Supernatural Order

give itself the action itself: act is greater than potency. Therefore a creature has to receive the action itself from another in order to actually produce an effect. Now only God is an efficient cause proportionate to producing action itself; for every effect is an existing being, and only God is proportionate to conferring existence, for only God is existence according to the perfection of his proper form; therefore only God is proportionate to conferring action itself or a premotion to an action itself by which the existence of an effect is actually produced. Third, with respect to absolutely every effect produced by a creature. Every finite efficient cause is conditioned: by its nature it has the power to act, but it does not actually produce an effect unless certain conditions are fulfilled. But God alone is the cause proportionate to effecting the fulfilment of the conditions, and therefore God alone is the proportionate cause of the fact that a finite cause actually produces an effect. The major premise of this syllogism is clear from the fact that no creature is capable of creating; therefore every finite cause supposes a subject upon which it acts. Besides, every finite cause presupposes the fulfilment of certain other conditions, that is, a due proportion between itself and its subject and appropriate relations between itself and the subject. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, a finite cause can produce nothing.102 As to the minor premise, that God alone is the cause proportionate to effecting the fulfilment of the conditions, we point out, first, that God alone is the creator of the subject acted upon. Second, even supposing its creation and supposing also that some finite causes can fulfil the conditions of another finite cause, they do not actually fulfil them except by exercising efficient causality; and their efficient causality is similarly conditioned. A cause proportionate to the fulfilment of conditions can never be had through finite causes; the same problem is simply transferred from one cause to another. Therefore the application of a finite cause to its causal action, even though it be immediately effected through other causes by the immediacy of the supposit, nevertheless is never brought about except by God as the principal and proportionate cause acting by the immediacy of power.

102 [Handwritten in the first edition at this point: ‘cuius esse limitatur, illius agere limitatur’ (‘limitation in being imports limitation in acting’; more literally, ‘the action of one whose being is limited is likewise limited’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

186

De Ente Supernaturali

Ex quo statim sequitur non solum Deum creare et conservare sed etiam applicare omnem causam finitam ad suam actionem et ulterius habere totam seriem cosmicam causarum tamquam instrumentum. Neque quicquam refert utrum effectus de quo agitur sit naturalis an actus intra ipsam voluntatem elicitus. Hic tertius modus nobis prae caeteris placet. Nam est demonstrabilis et de facto demonstratur. Praeterea gaudet auctoritate divi Thomae, uti alibi stabilitum est.103 Quantum primum modum attinet, distinguitur prima maior. Actus vitalis debet produci a subiecto in quo est: aliquis, concedo; omnis, peto probationem. Vivens movet se ipsum inquantum una pars movet aliam; sed hic motus non est circularis; incipit ab extrinseco. Quantum secundum modum attinet, pariter distinguitur prima maior. Viget duplex realis distinctio inter potentiam agendi et ipsum agere. Potentia agendi potest esse potentia activa proprie dicta et potest esse potentia activa improprie dicta;104 proprie est actus secundus; improprie est actus primus. Iterum, ipsum agere est duplex: est operatio, actus secundus, et sic correspondet potentiae activae improprie dictae seu actui primo; est etiam exercitium causalitatis efficientis, et tunc est relatio realis in effectu relate ad causam efficientem. In utroque casu habetur realis distinctio; sed in utroque casu ipsum agere non addit novam realitatem in subiecto. Unde contradistinguitur minor; creatura non potest sibi dare ipsum agere: scil., creatura in actu primo qua in actu primo non est causa proportionata actus secundi in se recepti, concedo; scil., creatura in actu secundo qua in actu secundo non est causa proportionata relate ad effectum intra suam proportionem, peto probationem. Accedit quod hi duo modi numquam cum libertate sunt conciliati et de facto numquam conciliari poterunt: re vera tollunt causalitatem a creatura; et si creatura non potest causare, non potest libere causare.

The Robert Mollot Collection

187

The Supernatural Order

The immediate conclusion from all of this is that God not only creates and conserves but also applies every finite cause to its action and furthermore has the entire cosmic series of causes as his instrument. And it does not matter whether the effect in question is a natural effect or an act elicited in the will itself. This third way is, in our view, preferable to the others. It is demonstrable and has been actually demonstrated. Besides, it enjoys the authority of St Thomas, as we have shown elsewhere.103 With regard to the first way, we distinguish its first major premise by pointing out that although some vital acts have to be produced by their subject, there is no proof that all of them necessarily are. A living being moves itself in that one part moves another; but this movement is not circular: it begins from the outside. As to the second way, we likewise distinguish the first major premise. A double real distinction exists between the potency to act and the action itself. The potency to act can be active potency properly so called or active potency improperly so called.104 Active potency properly speaking is a second act, improperly speaking it is a first act. Again, action itself is of two kinds: it is an operation, a second act, and thus corresponds to active potency improperly so called, a first act; but action is also an exercise of efficient causality, and then it is the real relation of an effect to its efficient cause. In each case there is a real distinction; but in each case action itself does not add any new reality in the subject. Hence the minor premise, that a creature cannot give itself its own action, we contradistinguish as follows: that a creature in first act precisely as such is not a proportionate cause of a second act received in it, we agree; but that a creature in second act precisely as such is not a proportionate cause of an effect within its proportion, we ask for proof. Furthermore, these two ways have never been reconciled with human freedom and in fact can never be so reconciled. In fact they take away a creature’s causality; and if a creature cannot cause, it cannot cause freely.

103 See ‘St. Thomas’ Theory of Operation,’ Theological Studies 3 (1942) 375–402. [This is the third of a series of six articles with the general title ‘St. Thomas’ Thought on Gratia operans.’ It is published now as part of Lonergan’s Collected Works in Grace and Freedom 66–93. See also in the same volume the more ample discussion of the same material on pp. 252–315.] 104 [See above, p. 133.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

188

De Ente Supernaturali

Scholion IV: De efficacia concursus divini105 1 Efficacia dicitur de causa efficiente; super ipsam efficientiam addit indefectibilitatem; ideoque causa efficiens est efficax quae ab effectu producendo deficere non potest. Interdum dicitur causa esse efficax quae infallibiliter suum effectum producit; quod tamen minus accurate dictum esse videtur; infallibilitas enim pertinet ad certitudinem quae habetur in cognoscente de effectu ex causa; ad ipsam vero causam pertinet non tam infallibilitas quam indefectibilitas, irresistibilitas, efficacia. 2 Efficacia dividitur multipliciter. Efficacia est intrinseca vel extrinseca: efficacia intrinseca dicitur de causa ratione ipsius causae; efficacia extrinseca dicitur de causa ratione alterius. Gratia efficax Banneziana est intrinsece efficax, sed gratia efficax Molinistarum est extrinsece efficax. Efficacia est antecedens vel consequens: efficacia antecedens pertinet ad causam antecedenter ad occurrentiam effectus; efficacia consequens pertinet ad causam solummodo quia de facto effectus occurrit; efficacia consequens est improprie dicta; re vera est inefficacia. Efficacia est praevia vel simultanea: efficacia praevia adaequate distinguitur ab eo quod effectus occurrit; efficacia simultanea non adaequate distinguitur ab eo quod effectus occurrit. Ita in systemate Banneziano efficacia praemotionis est praevia; in systemate vero Molinistico efficacia est simultanea, nam habetur cum praevisione effectus in scientia media.

The Robert Mollot Collection

189

The Supernatural Order

Excursus 4: The efficacy of divine concurrence105 1 Efficacy is predicated of efficient causes. Efficacy adds to efficiency the note of indefectibility, and so an efficient cause is [said to be] efficacious if it cannot fail to produce its effect. Sometimes a cause is said to be efficacious if it infallibly produces its effect. But this is a rather inaccurate way of speaking, since infallibility has to do with the certitude one has in knowing an effect through its cause. It is not infallibility that belongs to a cause, but rather indefectibility, irresistibility, or efficacy. 2 There are various subdivisions of efficacy. Efficacy can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic efficacy is predicated of a cause by reason of the cause itself; extrinsic efficacy is predicated of a cause by reason of something else. Efficacious grace in Bañez’s theory is intrinsically efficacious, while according to the Molinists it is extrinsically efficacious. Efficacy can be antecedent or consequent. Antecedent efficacy is that which belongs to a cause antecedently to the occurrence of its effect; consequent efficacy is that which belongs to a cause only because the effect has actually occurred. Consequent efficacy is efficacy improperly so called; it is really a lack of efficacy. Efficacy can be prior or simultaneous. Prior efficacy is totally distinct from the occurrence of the effect, whereas simultaneous efficacy is not totally distinct from it. Thus in the Bannezian system, the efficacy of the premotion is prior, while for the Molinists it is simultaneous, for it is had along with foreseeing the effect in ‘middle knowledge’ (scientia media).

105 [Curiously, this excursus became displaced from its proper position here and migrated to the end of Thesis 5, where it is found in all the editions of De ente supernaturali prior to the Regis College edition that have come to the attention of the editors. It obviously belongs here as Excursus 4 of Thesis 4. In the autograph, Excursus 3 ends on p. 48 (the numbering is in Lonergan’s hand), and pages 49 to 61 are given to this excursus, followed on pages 62 to 72 by Thesis 5. Further, the sequence of Excursus 3 and 4 is utterly natural: first, ‘De concursus divino,’ and then ‘De efficacia concursus divini.’ Again in Thesis 5 there is a reference (‘Sexta decima proprietas …’) which reads: ‘Vide supra, de efficacia divina.’ This makes no sense in the previous editions, which should have read ‘Vide infra …,’ and were so corrected by some students who noticed the incongruity.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

190

De Ente Supernaturali

Efficacia est absoluta vel relativa: absoluta efficacia generat certitudinem metaphysicam; relativa efficacia generat certitudinem physicam vel moralem. Efficacia relativa est improprie dicta; re vera est inefficacia; nam dicta certitudo physica vel moralis supponit continuationem alicuius ordinis qui cessare potest; haec suppositio habet maximam probabilitatem; sed eo ipso quod ordo naturae cessare potest, plus quam probabilitatem maximam non habet. 3 Concursum divinum esse efficacem constat inter theologos. Systemata saeculo xvi inventa exhibent doctrinam brevem de hac efficacia. Aut Deus dat praemotionem physicam aut non dat; si dat, effectus habetur certo; si non dat, effectus haberi non potest. Iterum aut Deus concurrit aut non concurrit; si concurrit, certo effectus habetur; si non concurrit, certo effectus non habetur. In utroque systemate efficacia gratiae est absoluta et antecedens; sed in Banneziano est etiam praevia et intrinseca; in systemate vero Molinistico est simultanea et extrinseca. Quid vero senserit divus Thomas, breviter est exponendum. 4 Efficacia ipsius Dei et efficacia instrumentorum Dei Docuit Aquinas Deum dare esse, et conservare, et applicare, et tamquam instrumentum adhibere omnes et singulas causas finitas; cumque ‘causa causae est causa causati,’ Deum esse causam efficientem cuiuslibet effectus sive in natura sive in voluntate. Duplex ergo est quaestio de efficacia in hoc systemate: quaenam efficacia ipsis instrumentis sit ascribenda; quaenam efficacia ipsi Deo sit ascribenda.

5 Efficacia instrumentorum Dei in genere Cf. C. gent., 3, c. 94; In VI Meta., lect. 3, §§1202 ss.; In I Peri herm., lect. 13 et 14; Sum. theol., 1, q. 19, a. 6; q. 22, a. 2; q. 103, a. 7; q. 116, a. 1; etc. His in locis arguitur ex natura defectibilitatis. Causa efficiens potest a suo effectu producendo deficere inquantum alia causa intervenit et effectum impedit. Huiusmodi impeditio accidere potest tantummodo causae particulari; nam causa universalis movet et applicat omnes alias causas; si ergo aliqua causa particularis aliam causam particularem impedit, hoc est ex intentione et applicatione causae universalis; et si non impedit iterum hoc est

The Robert Mollot Collection

191

The Supernatural Order

Efficacy can be absolute or relative. Absolute efficacy generates metaphysical certitude; relative efficacy generates either physical or moral certitude. Relative efficacy is not efficacy in the proper sense of the word; in reality it is a lack of efficacy, since physical and moral certitude suppose the continuation of an order that can cease. This supposition has the highest degree of probability; but from the very fact that the natural order can cease, it does not have any more than that. 3 That God’s concurrence is efficacious is the general opinion of theologians. The theological systems developed in the sixteenth century present a brief summary of the thinking on this efficacy. God either gives a physical premotion or he does not; if he does, the effect certainly occurs; if he does not, the effect cannot occur. Again, God either concurs or not; if he does, the effect certainly occurs; if he does not, the effect certainly does not occur. In both systems the efficacy of grace is absolute and antecedent; but in the Bannezian system it is also prior and intrinsic, while in Molina’s it is simultaneous and extrinsic. Let us now briefly outline St Thomas’s thought on this point. 4 The efficacy of God himself and that of his instruments Aquinas taught that God gives existence, conserves in existence, and applies and uses as his instrument each and every finite cause; and that since ‘the cause of a cause is a cause of the effect,’ God is the efficient cause of every effect whatsoever, whether natural or volitional. In this system, therefore, there are two questions concerning efficacy, namely, what efficacy is to be attributed to his instruments and what is to be attributed to God himself. 5 On the efficacy of God’s instruments in general See Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 94; In VI Meta., lect. 3, §§1202 ss.; In I Peri herm., lect. 13–14; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 6; q. 22, a. 2; q. 103, a. 7; q. 116, a. 1, etc. In these passages St Thomas argues from the nature of defectibility. An efficient cause can fail to produce its effect when another cause intervenes and impedes the effect. Such impediment can happen only to particular causes, for a universal cause moves and applies all other causes. If, then, some particular cause impedes another particular cause, this happens by the intention and application of a universal cause. And if it does not im-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

192

De Ente Supernaturali

ex intentione et applicatione causae universalis; in omni ergo casu causa universalis a suo effectu producendo impediri non potest. Sequitur causam universalem simpliciter, nempe Deum, esse indefectibilem et efficacem. Quaeri potest utrum causae particulares omnes simul sumptae sint absolute vel relative efficaces. Respondetur distinguendo ‘omnes.’ Si ‘omnes’ intelligis esse omnes causas creatas actu exsistentes, efficacia est tantummodo relativa; potest enim Deus aliam causam creare et potest haec causa nuper creata impedire effectum quem secus ‘omnes’ causae actu exsistentes producerent. Si ‘omnes’ intelligis non solum omnes causas actu exsistentes sed etiam omnes possibiles quas Deus creare et intervenire et impedire facere posset, habetur efficacia absoluta. Uti patet, haec efficacia absoluta invenitur non in causis creatis qua talibus sed in intentione ipsius Dei. Unde docuit Aquinas nullam certitudinem praeter coniecturalem haberi posse de effectu ex causis contingentibus, e. g., Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, a. 13. Ubi notandum est Aquinatem habuisse ut causas contingentes non solum voluntates liberas sed etiam omnes causas terrestres; cf. loca citata supra, In VI Meta. et In I Peri herm. 6 Efficacia instrumentorum Dei in specie Quae numero praecedente relata sunt, tam de voluntate quam de rebus naturalibus valent. Quae vero voluntatem specialiter respiciunt, addere nunc placet. Docuit Aquinas Deum regere voluntatem. Imo nisi Deus voluntates liberas rexisset, nulla prorsus fuisset exsecutio providentiae divinae; nam ita Deus mundum gubernat ut entia inferiora per entia superiora, rationalia, et libera administrentur.106 Quare continuo citat Aquinas: ‘Cor regis in manu Dei; quocumque voluerit vertit illud.’107 Docet solum Deum immediate in voluntatem agere posse.108 Docet Deum inclinare voluntatem prout vult ipse Deus.109

The Robert Mollot Collection

193

The Supernatural Order

pede the other cause, this is also by the intention and application of the universal cause. Thus in every case the universal cause cannot be impeded from producing its effect. The conclusion is that the absolutely universal cause, namely God, is indefectible and efficacious. One may ask whether all particular causes taken together are absolutely or relatively efficacious. We answer by distinguishing the meaning of ‘all.’ If by ‘all’ you mean all created causes actually in existence, their efficacy is only relative; for God can create another cause, and this newly created cause could impede an effect which otherwise ‘all’ the other actually existing causes would produce. But if by ‘all’ you mean not only all actually existing causes but also all possible causes which God could create and cause to intervene and impede, then they would be absolutely efficacious. Obviously, of course, such absolute efficacy is not in the created causes as such, but in the intention of God. Thus, Aquinas taught that one can have only conjectural certitude about the effects of contingent causes; see, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 3. Note there that he considered as contingent causes not only free will but also all causes on earth; see the passages referred to above in In VI Metaphys., and In I Peri herm. 6 On the efficacy of God’s instruments in particular What we have said in the previous number applies to the will as well as to natural realities. We would add here what applies specifically to the will. Aquinas held that God rules the human will. Indeed, if he did not, divine providence would not be implemented; for God so governs the world that lesser beings are under the direction of those that are superior, rational, and free.106 Hence Aquinas in this connection quotes the saying ‘The heart of the king is in the hand of God; he turns it whithersoever he will.’107 He teaches that only God can act immediately upon the will;108 he teaches also that God inclines the will as he himself wishes.109 106 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 90, ¶3, §2654. 107 Proverbs 21.1, quoted in Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 88, ¶7, §2643]. 108 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 6 c. and ad 1m. 109 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 8; q. 24, aa. 12 and 14; q. 27, a. 5; De malo, q. 6, a. 1; q. 16, a. 5; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, aa. 4 and 6, and a. 6, ad 3m; q. 109, a. 6; q. 111, a. 2; 3, q. 85, a. 5.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

194

De Ente Supernaturali

Breviter ex generali theoria de operatione Dei in omni operatione creaturae, nihil est in intellectu movens voluntatem ad specificationem actus, nihil est in parte sensitiva inclinans hominem in hanc vel illam electionem, nihil est in ipsa voluntate sive per modum actus primi, ut dispositio vel habitus, sive per modum actus secundi, ut volitio finis vel mediorum, quod ipse Deus sive immediate sive mediate non produxerit. Regit ergo voluntatem Deus, quia ex intentione et applicatione Dei est quidquid in voluntatem influit et quidquid in voluntate exsistit. At si haec finita entia sola respicis, non habetur nisi efficacia relativa relate ad actum formaliter liberum. Non solum valet quod supra dictum est de efficacia relativa instrumentorum Dei in genere, sed etiam adest specialis consideratio. Nam voluntas libera a suo effectu deficere potest, non solum quia causa impediens intervenit sed etiam quia ipsa voluntas ex sua culpa deficit. 7 Efficacia ipsius Dei Repugnat ut ipse Deus, ens infinite perfectum, ignorare possit, ut errare possit, ut volendo frustretur, ut nitendo effectum non producat. Ex ipsa ergo infinita Dei perfectione necessario sequitur Deum esse infallibilem in cognoscendo, irresistibilem in volendo, indefectibilem in efficiendo. Si ergo Deus hoc aliquid scit, necessario hoc est; si Deus hoc aliquid vult, necessario hoc est; si Deus hoc aliquid facit, necessario hoc est. Ipsi ergo Deo pertinet efficacia antecedens et absoluta; antecedens, quia ex sola Dei perfectione concluditur; absoluta, quia oppositum metaphysice repugnat. 8 Efficacia ipsius Dei est transcendens. Efficacia est transcendens quae pertinet ad causam efficientem quin intercedat nexus causalis necessarius inter causam et effectum. Efficacia autem est ordinaria quae fundatur in nexu causali necessario inter causam et effectum. E.g., sit A causa finita efficax tou B; tunc posito A, necessario habetur effectus, B; iterum, cognito A perfecte, cognoscitur habitudo tou A ad B; cognita perfecte hac habitudine, cognoscitur eiusdem necessitas. Eiusmodi est efficacia ordinaria ut posito A indefectibiliter oriatur B, et cognito A perfecte, infallibiliter cognoscatur B.

The Robert Mollot Collection

195

The Supernatural Order

To put it briefly, according to the general theory of God’s operation in all the operations of creatures, there is nothing in the intellect moving the will to the specification of its act, nothing in the sentient part of man inclining him to choose this or that, nothing in the will itself either by way of a first act as a disposition or a habit, or by way of a second act as an act of willing the end or willing the means, that God himself immediately or mediately has not brought about. God therefore does rule the will, because whatever influences the will and whatever exists in the will results from God’s intention and application. But if you look at only these finite beings, you will find only relative efficacy with respect to a formally free act. In addition to the fact that what we have said about the relative efficacy of God’s instruments in general holds true, there is also this special point to consider, namely, that a free will can fail in producing its effect not only because of some intervening cause but also because the will itself fails through its own fault. 7 The efficacy of God himself It is absolutely inadmissible that God, an infinitely perfect being, should be able to be ignorant or to err or to be frustrated in what he wills, or that his effort should fail to produce its desired result. From his infinite perfection it follows necessarily that God is infallible in his knowing, irresistible in his willing, and indefectible in his causing. If, therefore, God knows a thing, that thing necessarily exists; if he wills a thing, that thing necessarily exists; and if he produces a thing, that thing necessarily exists. Hence, God’s efficacy is antecedent and absolute: antecedent, because it follows solely from his divine perfection; absolute, because the opposite is metaphysically impossible. 8 God’s efficacy is transcendent. That efficacy is said to be transcendent which belongs to an efficient cause without there being any necessary causal nexus between the cause and its effect. That efficacy is said to be ordinary which is based upon a necessary causal nexus between cause and effect. For example, let A be an efficacious finite cause of B; then, given A, its effect, B, necessarily results. Again, when A is known perfectly, its relation to B is known; and when this relation is known perfectly, this same necessity is known. Ordinary efficacy, then, is such that, given the existence of A, B indefectibly results, and when A is perfectly known, B is infallibly known.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

196

De Ente Supernaturali

Attamen res non ita se habet inter Deum et effectus suos. Deus creat non necessario sed libere; eo quod Deus exsistit, non necessario exsistit quaelibet creatura; eo quod Deus in se perfecte cognoscitur, non necessario cognoscitur quaelibet creatura ut actu exsistens; Deus enim est entitative idem sive creat sive non creat. Inter efficaciam ordinariam et efficaciam transcendentem intercedit differentia quaedam maximi momenti. Efficacia enim ordinaria excludit contingentiam effectus; sed efficacia transcendens non excludit contingentiam effectus. Efficacia ordinaria excludit contingentiam effectus quia efficacia ordinaria supponit nexum causalem necessarium inter causam et effectum, et hic suppositus nexus contradictorie opponitur nexui contingenti. Sed efficacia transcendens non supponit nexum causalem necessarium inter causam et effectum, imo talem nexum potius excludit; quare ex efficacia transcendenti, concludi non potest effectum non esse contingentem. Divum Thomam docere efficaciam divinam esse transcendentem, apertum est.110 9 Efficacia ipsius Dei non est praevia sed simultanea. Hoc apparet ex solutione notae difficultatis. ‘Si Deus hoc aliquid esse scit, vult, facit, hoc aliquid necessario est; atqui omnia in mundo a Deo sciuntur, voluntur, efficiuntur; ergo omnia in mundo sunt necessario.’ Ulterius: ‘Quae sunt necessario, sunt non-contingentia; atqui omnia in mundo sunt necessario; ergo omnia in mundo sunt non-contingentia; i.e., nihil in mundo est contingens.’ Respondetur ad primum argumentum distinguendo maiorem et conclusionem: hoc aliquid necessario est, necessitate absoluta, nego, necessitate hypothetica, concedo; ergo omnia in mundo sunt necessario, necessitate absoluta, nego, necessitate hypothetica, concedo. Respondetur ad secundum argumentum distinguendo maiorem et contradistinguendo minorem: quae sunt necessario necessitate absoluta sunt non-contingentia, concedo; quae sunt necessario necessitate hypothetica sunt non-contingentia, nego; etc.

The Robert Mollot Collection

197

The Supernatural Order

Yet this is not the relationship between God and his effects. God does not create out of necessity, but freely. By the fact that God exists, no creature necessarily exists. And from a perfect knowledge of God as he is in himself no creature is necessarily known as actually existing; for God is entitatively the same whether he creates or not. There is an extremely important difference between ordinary and transcendent efficacy. Ordinary efficacy precludes the contingency of an effect, while transcendent efficacy does not. Ordinary efficacy precludes the contingency of an effect because ordinary efficacy supposes a necessary causal nexus between cause and effect, and such a nexus is diametrically opposed to a contingent nexus. But transcendent efficacy does not suppose a necessary causal nexus between cause and effect; in fact, it precludes such a nexus. Hence, one cannot conclude from transcendent efficacy that its effect is not contingent. It is quite clear that St Thomas taught that divine efficacy was transcendent.110 9 God’s efficacy is not prior but simultaneous. This point is clear from the solution to the following well-known difficulty: ‘If God knows, wills, and causes a particular thing to exist, that thing necessarily exists; but everything in the world is known, willed, and caused by God; therefore everything in the world necessarily exists.’ Further: ‘What exists necessarily is non-contingent; but everything in the world exists necessarily; therefore everything in the world is non-contingent; in other words, nothing in the world is contingent.’ We reply to the first argument by distinguishing the major premise and the conclusion as follows: that that thing exists necessarily with hypothetical necessity, we agree, but we deny that it exists with absolute necessity; we conclude accordingly that everything in the world exists with necessity that is hypothetical, not absolute. We counter the second argument by distinguishing the major premise and contradistinguishing the minor, thus: what exists necessarily with absolute necessity is non-contingent, but not what exists necessarily with hypothetical necessity. Therefore, since nothing in the world exists with absolute necessity, it follows that everything in the world is contingent. 110 [See] Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 94; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 8; In I Peri herm., lect. 14, ¶22, §197; De substantiis separatis, 14 (13); etc.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

198

De Ente Supernaturali

Et distinctiones primo explicantur deinde applicantur. Distinctiones explicantur: necessitas est absoluta quae sine conditione affirmatur; necessitas vero est hypothetica quae ita cum conditione affirmatur ut ipsum consequens in antecedente includatur. E.g., necessitates absolutae sunt ‘necesse est Deum esse’ et ‘necesse est bis bina esse quattuor.’ Sed necessitates hypotheticae sunt ‘necesse est Socratem sedere si sedet’ et ‘necesse est me hoc eligere si hoc eligo.’ Necessitatem hypotheticam cum vera contingentia componi ex ipsis exemplis patet. Forsitan non tam celeriter pateat necessitatem hypotheticam adesse ex efficacia divina, scil., ut consequens propositio ‘hoc aliquid est’ includatur in antecedente propositione, ‘si Deus hoc aliquid vel scit vel vult vel facit.’ Ad cuius ergo evidentiam, recolendum est quod, quidquid de Deo ad extra praedicatur, per denominationem extrinsecam praedicatur. Nihil enim in Deo est contingens; sed quaelibet creatura potest non esse; potest ergo non esse volita a Deo; potest etiam non esse a Deo scita ut actualis. Iam vero eiusmodi scientia et volitio, quae potest non esse, quae contingens est, non potest esse quid entitativum in ipso Deo in quo nulla est realitas contingens. Vere tamen de Deo affirmatur haec scientia et haec volitio, nam Deus vere scit creaturas ut actuales et vere eas vult. Quod vere dicitur de Deo et tamen non dicitur propter entitatem in ipso Deo contingenter receptam, dicitur per denominationem extrinsecam. Unde notissima distinctio inter ‘entitative’ et ‘terminative’ quae forte saepius repetitur quam intelligitur. His positis, habetur intentum. Per denominationem extrinsecam vere affirmatur Deus hoc scire, hoc velle, hoc facere. Sed nulla est vera denominatio extrinseca sine realitate eius quod extrinsece denominat. Ergo ‘hoc realiter est’ includitur in ipso antecedente ‘si hoc Deus scit vel vult vel facit.’ Sed ‘hoc est’ est consequens; ergo consequens in antecedente includitur; ergo necessitas consequentis non est absoluta sed hypothetica.

Per hanc distinctionem inter necessitatem absolutam et hypotheticam divus Thomas solvit difficultatem petitam sive ex scientia Dei sive ex voluntate Dei sive ex efficientia Dei contra contingentiam creaturarum.111

The Robert Mollot Collection

199

The Supernatural Order

First we shall explain these distinctions and then apply them. Absolute necessity is necessity that is affirmed unconditionally, without any condition; hypothetical necessity is that which is affirmed with a condition in such a way that the consequent is included in the antecedent. Examples of absolute necessity are, ‘God necessarily exists,’ and ‘Two times two is necessarily four.’ Examples of hypothetical necessity are, ‘If Socrates is sitting he is necessarily sitting,’ and, ‘If I choose X, I necessarily choose X.’ As one can see from these examples, hypothetical necessity is quite compatible with true contingency. Perhaps it is not so readily evident that hypothetical necessity results from divine efficacy, that is to say, that the consequent proposition ‘This thing exists’ is included in the antecedent proposition, ‘If God knows or wills or causes this thing to exist.’ To demonstrate this, then, recall that whatever is predicated of God ad extra, as extrinsic to him, is predicated by way of extrinsic denomination. Nothing within God is contingent. But any creature can not-be; therefore, it can be willed not to be by God, and can also be known not to be by God as actually existing. Now this knowing and willing by God, which can not-be, which is contingent, cannot be anything entitative in God himself, in whom there is no contingent reality. And yet this knowing and willing is truly affirmed of God, for God truly knows creatures as actually existing and truly wills them. What is truly said of God and yet not said of him because of an entity contingently received in him, is said of him by extrinsic denomination. Hence the famous distinction between ‘entitatively’ and ‘terminatively,’ which is perhaps more often repeated than understood. With the above clarifications, we have arrived at our objective. By extrinsic denomination God is truly said to know this thing, to will this thing, to cause this thing. But there can be no true extrinsic denomination without the real existence of that which denominates God extrinscially. Therefore, ‘This thing really exists’ is included in the antecedent, ‘If God knows or wills or causes this thing.’ But ‘This thing exists’ is a consequent; hence the consequent is included in the antecedent, and so the necessity of the consequent is not absolute but hypothetical. It is through this distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity that St Thomas solved the objection against the contingency of creatures arising from God’s knowledge or will or efficacy.111

111 See Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sententiarum, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; d. 47, q. 1,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

200

De Ente Supernaturali

His dictis, habetur etiam id quod primo intenditur in hac sectione, nempe, efficacia ipsius Dei quamvis antecedens sit, inquantum ex sola divina perfectione infinita concluditur, tamen non praevia est sed simultanea. Haec enim efficacia non adaequate distinguitur ab ipso effectu, siquidem affirmari non potest de Deo relate ad aliquem effectum quin supponatur ipse effectus per modum extrinsece denominantis. 10 Obiecerit quispiam: Deus aeternaliter scit et vult quodcumque scit et vult. Sed denominans extrinsecum est temporale. Aut ergo ante exsistentiam extrinsece denominantis Deus et nescit et non vult, aut tunc non fit praedicatio per denominationem extrinsecam. Et in utroque casu claudicat solutio data. Difficultas oritur ex imaginatione. Imaginatur enim aeternitas esse tempus quoddam infinitum, contemporaneum cum tempore quamdiu habetur tempus, et sine contemporaneo antequam habeatur tempus. Huic difficultati ex imaginatione per alias imagines respondet sanctus Thomas, maxime in Summa, quae novitiis intenditur. Sed ponatur difficultas in forma et quid remanet? Sit propositio ‘Deus ab aeterno scit et vult hoc aliquid tali et tanto tempore exsistere.’ Haec propositio non involvit contradictionem. Veritas huius propositionis per ea quae entitative in Deo inveniuntur non obtinetur, cum nihil in Deo sit contingens, cum nihil entitative sit in Deo quod potest non esse. Requiritur ergo terminus ad extra ut habeatur adaequatio veritatis inter propositionem et realitatem. Sed quinam terminus ad extra requiritur? Num aeternus terminus ad extra requiritur? Certissime non requiritur, quia sic falsa evaderet propositio quae asserit terminum ad extra exsistere non aeternaliter sed tali et tanto tempore.112 11 Efficacia divina et peccatum Quaeritur quemadmodum fieri possit ut Deus, causa omnium universa-

The Robert Mollot Collection

201

The Supernatural Order

In the light of the above, we have reached our first objective in this section, namely, to show that God’s efficacy, although antecedent inasmuch as we conclude to it solely from his infinite perfection, nevertheless is not prior but simultaneous. For this efficacy is not totally distinct from the effect itself, since it cannot be affirmed of God with regard to any effect without supposing that effect as an extrinsic denominator. 10 An objection: Whereas God’s knowing and willing of whatever he knows and wills is eternal, the extrinsic denominator exists temporally, in time. Therefore either prior to the existence of the extrinsic denominator God neither knows nor wills it, or else there is at that time no predication by extrinsic denomination; in either case the above solution is flawed. Our answer is that this difficulty arises from the imagination. That is, eternity is imagined to be an infinite extent of time, contemporaneous with time as long as time lasts, and without contemporaneity before time began. Especially in his Summa theologiae, which is intended for beginners, St Thomas counters this imaginative difficulty with images of his own. Put the difficulty in form, however, and what remains of it? Let it be stated thus: ‘From all eternity God knows and wills this thing to exist at such a time and for such a time.’ This proposition does not involve a contradiction. Its truth does not derive from anything that is entitatively present in God, since in God there is nothing that is contingent: there is no entity in God that can not-be. In order, therefore, for there to be the correspondence of truth between the proposition and reality, an extrinsic term is required. But what sort of term? An eternal extrinsic term? Certainly not, because then the proposition stating that the extrinsic term exists not eternally but at such a time and for such a duration would be false.112 11 God’s efficacy and sin How is it possible that God, the universal and efficacious cause of all

a. 1, ad 2m; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2m, q. 116, a. 3; 3, q. 46, a. 2; In I Peri herm., lect. 14; etc. 112 [Handwritten in the first edition, 19201dtl040, at this point: ‘Aliter: Veritas non est in tempore; sed ipsum tempus et etiam aeternitas per veritatem cognoscuntur. Sufficit denominans temporale ut aliquid sit verum aeternaliter’ (‘In other words: Truth is not in time; but time itself and even eternity are known through truth. A temporal denominator is sufficient for something to be true eternally’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

202

De Ente Supernaturali

lis et efficax, ita hominibus peccatum permittat quin ipsum peccatum in Deum tamquam auctorem principalem reducatur. (a) Quaestio non est de Deo tamquam causa peccati sed de Deo tamquam auctore peccati. Causa est quae positive in aliud influit. Iam vero peccatum non est ens positivum; in peccatum non exsistit influxus positivus; et ideo stricte peccatum non habet causam.113 Sed auctor est agens per intellectum qui non solum in alia influit sed etiam quae potest facere scit et sciens eligit alia et alia omittit. Auctori ergo respondendum est non solum circa ea quae facit sed etiam circa ea quae facere omittit. Quaeritur ergo cur Deus non dicatur auctor peccati: si vellet, omne prorsus peccatum impedire posset; quidquid enim vere vult, irresistibiliter vult; sicut agendo Deus est causa principalis omnium quae sunt inquantum sunt, videtur quod pariter Deus non agendo est auctor omnium quae non sunt inquantum non sunt. (b) Quaestio non est de libertate peccatoris. Haec quaestio iam est soluta supra. Ex scientia enim Dei et voluntate Dei et actione Dei nihil deduci potest nisi necessitas hypothetica quae optime cum contingentia et libertate componitur. Sed suppositis tum peccatum non esse ens positivum tum peccatorem libere peccare, remanet quaestio cur Deus non dicatur vere esse principalis auctor omnium peccatorum. (c) Inprimis de peccato dicendum est. Peccatum ergo est privatio debitae conformitatis inter actum humanum et proxime dictamen conscientiae, remote legem Dei. Privatio est absentia entitatis debitae; quae entitas absens potest deberi vel simpliciter vel secundum quid; unde dividitur privatio in privationem simpliciter (ubi abest quod adesse simpliciter debet) et in privationem secundum quid (ubi abest quod adesse secundum quid debet). Malum naturalis defectus et malum poenae sunt privationes secundum quid. Per haec mala abest quod adesse debet secundum regulam et legem cuiusdam naturae particularis; non tamen abest quod adesse debet secundum legem universalis naturae vel regulam divinae iustitiae. E.g., sit homo

The Robert Mollot Collection

203

The Supernatural Order

things, should permit human beings to sin and yet not be ultimately responsible for sin as its principal author? (a) The question is not about God as cause of sin but as the author of sin. A cause is that which influences another being in a positive way. Now sin is not a positive entity; there is no such thing as a positive influx to sin, and therefore sin in the strict sense has no cause.113 But an author is one who, acting through his intelligence, not only influences other things but also knows what he can do, and with this knowledge chooses to do some things and leaves others undone. An author, therefore, is responsible not only for what he does but also for what he does not do. Why, then, is God not said to be the author of sin? If he willed to do so, he could prevent absolutely every sin, since what he truly wills, he wills irresistibly. Just as God by his positive action is the principal cause of all things that exist insofar as they exist, it would appear that similarly God by not acting is the author of all things that do not exist insofar as they do not exist. (b) The question is not about the freedom of the sinner. We have settled this question above. From God’s knowledge and will and action only hypothetical necessity can be deduced, which is quite compatible with both contingency and freedom. But considering both that sin is not a positive entity and that a sinner freely sins, the question remains why God is not truly said to be the principal author of all sins. (c) First, we must speak about sin itself. Sin is the lack of due conformity between a human act and, proximately, a dictate of conscience, and ultimately the law of God. A lack or privation is the absence of an entity that ought to exist. This absent entity may be due absolutely speaking or in some respect; hence the division of privation into absolute privation, the absence of what absolutely speaking ought to be present, and relative privation, the absence of what relatively speaking ought to be present. The evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment are relative privations. In these evils there is absent what ought to be present according to the norm and law of a particular nature; the absence is not that of what ought to be present according to the law of universal nature or the norm of

113 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan adds by hand, ‘ne in ipso quidem peccatore’ (‘not even in the sinner himself’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

204

De Ente Supernaturali

caecus quia cultellus oculos penetravit: secundum legem naturae humanae huic homini debetur potentia visiva; secundum legem naturae universalis non debetur huic homini suspensio legum naturalium secundum quas cultellus oculos penetrans eos destruit. Malum vero culpae114 seu peccatum formale qua formale est privatio simpliciter. Per malum culpae abest quod debetur naturae humanae adaequate sumptae; abest quod debetur secundum legem universalis naturae et secundum legem supremam Dei. Quare malum culpae est privatio simpliciter. Notandum denique est non solum ontologice sed etiam psychologice peccatum esse privationem. Peccatur enim contra legem sive positivam sive negativam; sed contra legem positivam peccatur non agendo secundum legem; et contra legem negativam peccatur non impediendo motum a lege prohibitum. In utroque casu peccatum consistit in defectu actionis, in privatione actionis debitae. (d) Deinde, fallacia quaedam est amovenda. Quia inter esse et non esse non cadit medium, videtur pariter agere et non agere esse disiunctionem completam. Sed agere dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, agere dicit actum secundum agentis, et ita entitative sumitur; alio modo, agere dicit denominationem agentis ex effectibus, et ita sumitur terminative. Praeter agere entitative et non agere entitative non datur tertium. Sed praeter agere terminative et non agere terminative dantur et tertium et quartum. Tot enim modis dicitur agere terminative quot sunt categoriae denominationis extrinsecae. Et quattuor sunt categoriae: ens positivum, non-ens et carentia, privatio secundum quid, privatio simpliciter.

The Robert Mollot Collection

205

The Supernatural Order

divine justice. Take, for example, the case of a man who has been blinded by a knife that pierced his eyes: according to the norm of human nature, this man ought to have eyesight; but it is not according to the law of universal nature that he is owed a suspension of the laws of nature according to which a knife piercing one’s eyes destroys them. On the other hand, culpable evil,114 or formal sin as formal, is an absolute privation. In culpable evil there is absent what is owed to human nature understood in its totality; there is absent what ought to be present according to the law of universal nature and according to the supreme law of God. Hence culpable evil is an absolute privation. Note here also that sin is a privation not only ontologically but also psychologically. One can sin against either a positive or a negative law. One sins against a positive law by not acting in accordance with what it commands; and one sins against a negative law by not stopping a movement that is forbidden by that law. In either case sin consists in the defect or failure of an action, in the lack of due action. (d) Next, we must get rid of a certain fallacy. Because there is no middle ground between being and non-being, it would seem that there is a complete disjunction between acting and not acting. But acting can be taken in two ways. First, acting refers to the second act of an agent, and in this way it is understood entitatively; second, acting refers to the denomination of an agent from its effects, and in this way it is understood terminatively. There is no middle ground between acting and not acting taken entitatively. But between acting and not acting taken terminatively there is a third position, and even a fourth. For there are as many ways of taking acting terminatively as there are categories of extrinsic denomination. And there are four such categories: positive being, non-being and simple absence, absolute privation, and relative privation. 114 [What Lonergan here calls ‘malum culpae’ corresponds to what in Insight is ‘basic sin’ The translation used here for ‘malum culpae’ will be ‘culpable evil.’ It is clear that Lonergan means the same thing by ‘malum culpae’ and ‘basic sin’ in Insight. But in ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei,’ in section 14, it is also identified with ‘malum morale’ (moral evil), which is thus used in a sense different from that of Insight, where moral evil is the result of basic sin and is distinguished from it. Interestingly enough, however, ‘malum morale’ does not appear aside from this section 14. ‘Malum culpae’ is used throughout after this section. For the Insight texts, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 689–91.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

206

De Ente Supernaturali

Quaecumque ergo positive sunt, haec Deus scit et vult et facit, et quidem scit infallibiliter, vult irresistibiliter, facit indefectibiliter. Quaecumque autem non sunt (sive non-entia sive carentiae), haec non esse Deus scit, eadem non esse Deus vult, neque ut sint Deus facit. Quaecumque vero sunt privationes secundum quid (malum naturalis defectus et malum poenae), haec Deus scit infallibiliter, ea directe non vult (nemo enim directe vult malum) sed indirecte vult volendo bonum legis generalioris, ea directe non facit (nemo enim directe facit privationem) sed ea indirecte facit efficiendo actionem secundum legem generaliorem. Quaecumque denique sunt privationes simpliciter (malum culpae, peccatum formale qua formale), ea Deus scit infallibiliter, sed ea non vult directe (nemo enim directe vult malum) neque ea vult indirecte (nam non exsistit lex generalior et bonum quoddam universalius cui coniunguntur), neque ea facit directe (nemo enim privationem directe facit) neque ea facit indirecte (nam non exsistit actio legis generalioris secundum quam indirecte Deus ea faceret). Dices: Deus saltem indirecte facit (ut causa prima) actionem peccati, puta, actionem physicam occidendi, etc. Respondetur: de ista actione non quaeritur, nam in tali actione non consistit peccatum formale qua formale. Quaeritur de defectu submissionis ad legem, de eo quod occisor sciens motum suum occisivum esse moraliter malum non tamen impedivit talem motum. Hic defectus conformitatis ad legem neque directe neque indirecte a Deo efficitur. Quod Deus indirecte vult malum naturalis defectus et malum poenae sed Deus nullo modo vult malum culpae, est doctrina sancti Thomae: ‘Unde malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, cui coniungitur tale malum.’115 Porro, quod Deus neque directe neque indirecte vult, hoc Deus neque directe neque indirecte facit. Deus enim est agens per intellectum; efficit intelligendo et volendo, ita ut actio sua non sit realiter tertium quid praeter scientiam et volitionem.

The Robert Mollot Collection

207

The Supernatural Order

Accordingly, whatever exists positively, God knows and wills and causes – indeed, he knows it infallibly, wills it irresistibly, and causes it indefectibly. Whatever is non-existent (either non-being or an absence of something), God knows that it does not exist, wills that it not exist, and does not cause it to be. As for relative privations (natural defects and the evil of punishment), God infallibly knows them, does not will them directly (no one directly wills an evil), but wills them indirectly by willing the good of a more general law, and does not cause them directly (no one directly causes a privation), but indirectly causes them by producing an action that is in accordance with a more general law. As for what is an absolute privation (culpable evil, a formal sin as formal), God infallibly knows it, but does not directly will it (no one directly wills evil), nor does he will it indirectly, for there does not exist a more general law and a more universal good connected with it; nor does he cause it either directly (no one directly causes a privation), or indirectly, for there does not exist any action of a more general law according to which God could indirectly cause it. Here one may object: But God at least indirectly, as first cause, is a cause of the sinful activity, such as the physical action of killing, and so on. In answer to this we point out that that activity is not the action in question, for formal sin as formal does not consist in such activity. The point at issue here is the lack of submission to a law, the fact that the murderer, knowing his action of killing to be morally evil, nevertheless does not stay his hand. This lack of conformity to the law is neither directly nor indirectly caused by God. St Thomas teaches that God indirectly wills the evil of natural defect and of punishment, but in no way wills culpable evil: ‘Hence culpable evil, which is a privation of God’s good order, is in no way willed by God. But he does will the evil of natural defect or of punishment, by willing a good that is connected with that evil.’115 Again, what God neither directly nor indirectly wills, he neither directly nor indirectly causes. For God acts through intellect; he causes by understanding and willing, so that his action is not a third reality over and above his knowing and willing.

115 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 9 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

208

De Ente Supernaturali

(e) Tertio dicendum est de permissione divina. Entitative permissio est actus voluntatis. Terminative respicit aliquam exceptionem a lege. Haec exceptio potest esse in se bona, et ita in genere sunt permissiones a superioribus concessae. Iterum, haec exceptio potest esse in se mala sed cum bono praevalente connexa; et eiusmodi sunt exceptiones quae inveniuntur in malo naturalis defectus et in malo poenae. Denique, exceptio quae permittitur potest esse et in se mala et sine bono praevalente connexa; et eiusmodi est exceptio quae in malo culpae invenitur. Triplex ergo est permissio: permissio concessionis quae est directa volitio boni permissi; permissio tolerantis quae directe est volitio boni praevalentis et indirecte est tolerantia mali connexi; permissio prohibentis quae neque directe neque indirecte est volitio mali quod permittitur. De tertio genere permissionis agitur. Deus neque directe neque indirecte vult peccatum formale. Imo Deus positive et sine exceptione prohibet peccatum formale; neque solum prohibet sed peccatori dat lumen rationis naturale ut videat non esse peccandum et dat peccatori naturalem voluntatis motum ut velit bonum bonae conscientiae et ulterius dat lumen supernaturale et bonum motum supernaturalem voluntatis. Numquam vero Deus positive quemquam movet ad peccandum, ubi ‘peccare’ sumitur formaliter, scil., agendo deficere. (f) Quarto dicendum est de bonitate permissionis divinae. Si sumitur entitative, patet permissionem divinam esse bonum; est enim actus voluntatis divinae qui identificatur cum ipso actu puro et ipso summo bono. Si vero sumitur terminative, permissio divina habet bonitatem non in se sed in alio. Deus enim vult gloriam suam per bonitatem suam infinitam in creaturis manifestatam; vult ergo manifestationem suae misericordiae et suae iustitiae; vult ergo permissionem peccatorum ut sua misericordia et sua iustitia manifestentur.116 (g) Quinto alia est fallacia excludenda. Ex antecessis videtur concedi Deum indirecte velle peccata: sicut vult suam misericordiam et suam iustitiam manifestatam propter suam gloriam,

The Robert Mollot Collection

209

The Supernatural Order

(e) Third, we must say something about divine permission. Entitatively considered, permission is an act of the will. Terminatively considered, it is any exemption from a law. This exemption can be good in itself, and such in general are permissions granted by a superior. Again, an exemption can be something bad in itself but connected with an overriding good; such are the exemptions that are found in the evil of natural defect and of punishment. Finally, an exemption permitted can be both evil in itself and without any overriding good connected with it; this is the kind of exemption involved in culpable evil. There are, then, three kinds of permission: the permission of concession, the direct willing of the good permitted; the permission of tolerance, which is directly the willing of the overriding good while indirectly tolerating the evil connected with it; and the permission of prohibition, which is neither directly nor indirectly the willing of the evil that is permitted. We are dealing here with this third kind of permission. God neither directly nor indirectly wills formal sin. On the contrary, God positively and without exception forbids formal sin; and not only does he forbid it, but he endows the sinner with the natural light of reason to enable him to see that sin is wrong and with the natural movement of the will to will the good of a good conscience, and in addition gives him supernatural light and a good supernatural movement to his will. But God never positively moves anyone to sin, where ‘sin’ is taken in its formal sense, that is, a deficiency in some action. (f) Fourth, some remarks on the goodness of divine permission are in order. Taken entitatively, God’s permission is obviously good, for it is an act of the divine will which is one and the same reality as pure act and the supreme good. Taken terminatively, God’s permission possesses goodness not in itself but in something else. God wills his glory through the manifestation of his infinite goodness in his creatures; therefore he wills the manifestation of both his mercy and his justice, and thus he wills to permit sin in order to manifest his mercy and justice.116 (g) Fifth, there is another fallacy that needs to be dispelled. From the foregoing it would seem that we are conceding that God indirectly wills sin: as he wills that his mercy and his justice be manifested for

116 Ibid. 1, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

210

De Ente Supernaturali

ita vult peccata commissa propter suam misericordiam et suam iustitiam manifestandam. Respondetur distinguendo: ita vult peccata commissa, nego; ita vult peccata permissa permissione prohibentis, concedo. Quae tamen distinctio ut intelligatur, ad crucem totius quaestionis est penetrandum. Fiat ergo instantia: qui vult peccata permissa etiam vult peccata commissa; nam saltem hoc de Deo valet ubi scientia permittentis non fallitur neque voluntati permittentis resistitur neque actio permittentis deficit. Respondetur: si datur nexus intelligibilis inter permissionem et commissionem, concedo; si talis nexus non datur, nego. Iam vero non datur eiusmodi nexus intelligibilis: non datur enim identitas formalis, nam aliud formaliter est permittere quod a Deo fit, et aliud formaliter est committere quod a peccatore fit; neque datur nexus causae efficientis, nam permissio divina non influit efficienter in commissionem peccatoris; neque datur nexus causae finalis, nam commissio peccatoris non est sive gratia permissionis divinae sive gratia misericordiae divinae manifestandae sive gratia iustitiae divinae manifestandae; neque datur ullus alius nexus intelligibilis. Datur enim nexus intelligibilis inquantum connexa sunt intelligibilia; sed peccatum formale non est intelligibile; ergo peccatum formale non est subiectum cuiuslibet nexus intelligibilis, sive causae efficientis sive causae finalis sive alterius cuiuslibet. Maior patet. Quod enim intelligibiliter cum alio connectitur, hoc intelligitur; et quod intelligitur, intelligibile est. Minor est evidens. Peccatum enim non est secundum rationem humanam sed contra dictamen rationis; non est secundum ordinationem rerum intelligibilem a Deo conceptam sed contra hanc ordinationem. Quod directe opponitur tum rationi humanae tum intelligentiae divinae est inintelligibile. Quare insinuavit sanctus Thomas malum culpae esse falsitatem quandam obiectivam.117 Dices: sed peccatum saltem aliquo modo est intelligibile; intelligimus enim cur homines peccent.

The Robert Mollot Collection

211

The Supernatural Order

the sake of his glory, it follows that he wills that sins be committed in order to manifest his mercy and justice. In reply to this difficulty we say that it follows that God wills the permission of sins by the permission of one who prohibits, but does not will the commission of sins. Understanding this distinction brings us to the crux of this whole question. Let us state a further objection: One who wills the permission of sins wills also their commission; for this is true at least in the case of God, where the knowledge of the one who permits is infallible and whose will is irresistible and whose action is not without effect. Our response is that this objection holds only if there is an intelligible nexus between the permission and the commission of the sin. Now, there is no such intelligible nexus: there is no formal identity between them, for to permit, which is God’s doing, is formally one thing, and to commit, which is done by the sinner, is formally quite another thing; nor is there the nexus of efficient causality, for God’s permission has no effective influence on the sinner’s commission of sin; nor is there the nexus of final causality, for the commission of sin takes place neither for the sake of God’s permission nor for the sake of manifesting his mercy or justice. And there is no intelligible nexus other than these. The reason is that there is an intelligible nexus inasmuch as intelligible realities are connected; but formal sin is not intelligible; therefore it is not the subject of any intelligible nexus, whether of efficient causality or final causality or anything else whatsoever. The major premise of the above is clear: what is intelligibly connected with something else is itself understood, and what is understood is intelligible. As to the minor premise, sin is something that is not in accord with human reason, but contrary to the dictate of reason; it does not follow the intelligible ordering of reality as conceived by God, but is contrary to this ordering. What directly opposes both human reason and divine intelligence is itself unintelligible. For this reason St Thomas has suggested that culpable evil is, as it were, objective falsity.117 But, one might object, sin is intelligible at least in some way, for we understand why people sin.

117 Ibid. 1, q. 17, a. 1 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

212

De Ente Supernaturali

Respondetur: intelligimus cur homines peccent, inquantum ipsum peccatum invenimus intelligibile, nego, inquantum aliquod bonum apparens sed non verum invenimus, inquantum aliquam intelligibilitatem apparentem sed non veram invenimus, concedo. Ad quaestionem, cur angelus, cur Adamus, cur hic vel ille homo peccet, tandem denique semper est respondendum, Non est cur. Si esset cur, intelligibiliter egisset; si intelligibiliter egisset, secundum lumen rationis egisset; si secundum lumen rationis egisset, non peccasset sed bonum fecisset. Peccare enim est agere contra lumen rationis nostrae et contra lumen increatum Dei. Deus ergo vult permittere peccata, et ita permittere est bonum; sed ita velle nullo modo est velle ipsa peccata sive directe sive indirecte, quia nullus est nexus intelligibilis quo transitur a peccato ad aliud. Et sic solvitur ultimatim totum hoc problema: peccatum non reducitur in Deum tamquam in auctorem quia peccatum non habet illam intelligibilitatem quae supponitur ut in aliud reduci possit. (h) Quaeri potest quid sit ‘intelligibilitas.’ Et respondetur quod multipliciter dicitur. Primo modo, intelligibile est omne id quod concipi potest. Sic nihil absolutum est intelligibile; concipitur enim ut id quod neque est neque esse potest. Alio modo, intelligibile est omne id quod positive intelligendo concipitur, ubi ‘positive intelligere’ est id quod in acuto frequentissime adest sed in stupido rarissime. Positiva vero intelligentia est multiplex: est univoca circa obiectum proportionatum intellectus, et sic natura rei materialis est nobis univoce intelligibilis; est autem analogica circa obiectum adaequatum sed non proportionatum intellectus, et sic his in terris intelligimus Deum, directe intelligendo creaturas et indirecte et per proportionem quandam ad Deum ascendendo.

Iterum positiva intelligentia est vel tou intelligibilis in se vel tou intelligibilis in alio; in se intelliguntur forma et essentia; sed materia intelligitur non in se sed ex consideratione formae; et exsistere contingens non intelligitur in se sed ex dependentia ab exsistere necessario et in se intelligibili.

The Robert Mollot Collection

213

The Supernatural Order

We understand why people sin, not because we find the sin itself to be intelligible, but inasmuch as we find in it an apparent but not a true good, and some apparent but not true intelligibility. As to the question why an angel or Adam or this or that person sins, the short answer always must be, ‘There is no why.’ If there were, these sinners would have acted intelligibly; if they had acted intelligibly, they would have acted in accordance with the light of reason; but if they had acted according to the light of reason, they would not have sinned but would have done a good act. To sin is to act contrary to the light of our reason and contrary to the uncreated light of God. God, therefore, wills to permit sins, and this permission is itself good; but to so will is not at all to will the sins themselves either directly or indirectly, because there is no intelligible nexus linking sin with anything else. This is the ultimate solution to this whole problem: sin is not reducible to God as its author, because sin does not possess that intelligibility required for it to be reducible to something else. (h) Here one may ask, ‘What is “intelligibility?”’ The answer is that it can be understood in several ways. In one way everything that can be conceived is intelligible. In this sense absolute non-being is intelligible, for it is conceived as that which neither exists nor can exist. In another way everything that is conceived through a positive act of understanding is intelligible, where ‘a positive act of understanding’ is what occurs very frequently in an intelligent person and very rarely in one who is stupid. But positive understanding itself is manifold. It is univocal in respect to the proportionate object of the intellect, and it is in this way that the nature of a material thing is univocally intelligible to us; on the other hand, it is analogical in respect to the adequate but not proportionate object of our intellect, and it is in this way that here on earth we have an understanding of God, namely, by directly understanding creatures and from them ascending to God indirectly and according to a certain proportion. Again, positive understanding is an understanding either of what is intelligible in itself or of what is intelligible in something else. Form and essence are understood in themselves; but matter is understood not in itself but from a consideration of form, and contingent existence is not understood in itself but from its dependence upon that act of existence that is necessary and intelligible in itself.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

214

De Ente Supernaturali

Quando ergo dicitur peccatum esse inintelligibile, non dicitur inintelligibile primo modo; peccatum enim sicut et nihilum absolutum concipimus. Sed dicitur inintelligibile secundo modo, ut negetur esse in peccato illa ratio positiva quae per actum intelligendi qua talem cognoscitur. Praeterea, peccatum dicitur non intelligibile esse, non eo modo quo materia dicitur non intelligibilis ut tamen in alio intelligi possit; sicut enim peccatum non positive intelligitur in se, ita etiam non intelligitur vere in alio. Praeterea, peccatum dicitur non esse intelligibile, non eo modo quo nihil non est positive intelligibile, scil., per solam amotionem intelligibilitatis positivae; sed peccatum non est intelligibile non solum contradictorie sed etiam contrarie; peccatum enim opponitur intelligibili rerum ordinationi tum uti a Deo conceptae tum uti per conscientiam manifestatae. Denique, peccatum non dicitur esse inintelligibile eo modo ut etiam apparens intelligibilitas ei denegetur; adest sane apparens intelligibilitas, quae tamen non est vera sed falsa; quare peccatum formale qua formale est falsitas quaedam obiectiva.118

12 Positio sancti Thomae et systemata saeculo xvi inventa In positione sancti Thomae distingui possunt et methodus et doctrina. Quaenam sit doctrina, consideratum est. Quaenam vero sit methodus, ex ipsa doctrina apparet, nempe, sanctum Thomam non construere speciale quoddam systema circa efficaciam divinam sed supposito systemate suo generali adducere speciales distinctiones ad removendas fallacias et solvendas difficultates quae hanc materiam circumvolant. Quare methodus sancti Thomae circa has quaestiones dici potest negativa; consistit non in elaboranda speciali quadam theoria sed in demonstrando efficaciam Dei et deinde omnes obiectiones solvendo. Propius ad methodum sancti Thomae accedunt Banneziani, propius vero ad doctrinam accedunt Molinistae. In genere enim methodus Banneziana etiam est negativa: statuit quas credit veritates generales; deinde quantum fieri potest, difficultates oppositas solvere conatur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

215

The Supernatural Order

When, therefore, we say that sin is unintelligible, we do not mean that it is unintelligible in the first way mentioned above, for we have a concept of it just as we have of absolute non-being. But it is unintelligible in the second way, for we deny that sin has that positive rational element known through an act of understanding as such. Again, sin is said to be not intelligible, not in the same way as matter is said to be not intelligible yet to be intelligible in something else; for just as sin is not positively understood in itself, so also it is not truly understood in something else. Furthermore, sin is said to be nonintelligible, not in the same way as nonbeing is not positively intelligible, that is, by the simple absence of any positive intelligibility; rather, sin is unintelligible not only by way of contradiction but also by way of contrariety, for it is the very opposite of the intelligible ordering of reality both as conceived by God and as made known through conscience. Finally, sin is not said to be unintelligible in the sense that even apparent intelligibility is denied it; it surely does have an apparent intelligibility, which, however, is not a true one but false. For this reason formal sin as formal is a sort of objective falsity.118 12 St Thomas’s position and the systems devised in the sixteenth century In St Thomas’s position one can distinguish between method and doctrine. We have already considered his doctrine. From his doctrine we can see what his method was, namely, that he did not construct some special system regarding divine efficacy, but, presupposing his general system, adduced special distinctions in order to dispel the fallacies and solve the difficulties that swarm around this whole subject. His method in dealing with these questions, therefore, can be said to be negative: it consists not in working out some special theory but in demonstrating the efficacy of God and then solving objections. The Bannezians are closer to Thomas’s method, but the Molinists are closer to his doctrine. In general the Bannezian method is negative: it states the general truths which it believes, then, as far as possible, it tries to solve the difficulties against them. 118 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan wrote two schematic presentations of the meanings of ‘intelligibile’ that correspond to the text given here. He also wrote a possible objection and a response: ‘Obici: quod non potest intelligi non potest concipi. Resp.: possumus concipere et intelligibile et huius negationem’ (‘Objection: what cannot be understood cannot be conceived. Reply: we can conceive both “intelligible” and its negation’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

216

De Ente Supernaturali

Doctrina vero Banneziana in fere omnibus elementis differt a doctrina sancti Thomae. (a) Id quod iure nominatur ‘praemotio physica’ certo docebatur et ab Aristotele et a sancto Thoma. Sed quod ab eis docetur, toto caelo differt a praemotione physica Bannezianorum. Secundum Aristotelem et Aquinatem, si agens interdum agit, requiritur ratio obiectiva cur eo praecise tempore agat quo agit, cur non antea vel postea. Haec ratio obiectiva est motus quidam praevius, sed non praevius natura tantum sed etiam tempore; unde Aristoteles aeternitatem mundi demonstrare voluit.119 Hic motus praevius efficit debitam propinquitatem vel aliam habitudinem inter agens et patiens ut agens in patiens influere possit. Hic motus praevius non necessario afficit agens sed est ‘vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis.’120 Exsistit utique differentia inter Aristotelem et Aquinatem de hac re, sed non differentia quae favet Bannezianis; in eo est quod sanctus Thomas, posita providentia causae universalis, considerat omnem praemotionem tamquam effectum intentum a causa universali; intendere vero et causare praemotionem est applicare agens ad patiens. Unde C. gent., 3, c. 67, et De pot., q. 3, a. 7, demonstrant Deum omnia applicare ex brevi consideratione hierarchiae cosmicae Aristotelicae.

Praemotio physica Banneziana non ponitur ad explicationem ‘quandoque moventium et motorum’ sed ad explicationem causalitatis creaturae; non ponitur ut tempore prior sed tantum ut natura prior; non ponitur sive in agente sive in patiente, sed tantummodo in agente; tandem denique positio sancti Thomae demonstrari potest et demonstratur, sed positio Banneziana nullo valido argumento sive auctoritatis sive rationis umquam est stabilita. Imo, positio Banneziana non concipitur sine serie quadam confusionum. De confusione maxime fundamentali circa duplicem sensum potentiae activae, iam actum est; sed etiam aliae sunt. Dicunt praemotionem esse motum, ens incompletum, ens fluens. Exsistit sane motus in hoc sensu, nempe, actus entis in potentia prout huiusmodi. Sed demonstratur talis motus exsistere non posse nisi in corporibus quantitativis et divisibilibus;121 Banneziani vero eum ponunt in anima spirituali, in intellectu, in voluntate,

The Robert Mollot Collection

217

The Supernatural Order

But the Bannezian doctrine differs from that of St Thomas in virtually all its elements. (a) There is no doubt that Aristotle and St Thomas taught something that can rightly be called ‘physical premotion.’ But what they taught is worlds away from the physical premotion of the Bannezians. As Aristotle and Aquinas understood it, if an agent acts only at certain times, an objective reason is required to explain why it acts as it does at that particular time instead of earlier or later. This objective reason is a kind of prior motion, prior not only in nature but also in time; it was on this basis that Aristotle wanted to prove the eternity of the world.119 This prior motion effects the required closeness or other relation between the agent and the patient for the agent to be able to have an effect upon the patient. This prior motion does not necessarily affect the agent but is ‘either on the part of the mover or on the part of the movable.’120 There is, it is true, a difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on this point, but not a difference that favors the Bannezians; it consists in the fact that, granted the providence of the universal cause, St Thomas considers all premotion as an effect intended by the universal cause; but to intend and cause a premotion is to apply the agent to the patient. Hence, in Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 67, and De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, he demonstrates, from a brief consideration of Aristotle’s cosmic hierarchy, that God applies all things. The Bannezian physical premotion is not postulated as an explanation of ‘things that at times move and are moved’ but as an explanation of the causality of a creature; it is not postulated as being prior in time but only in nature; it is not placed either in the agent or in the patient, but only in the agent; and, finally, St Thomas’s position is demonstrable and demonstrated, whereas the Bannezian position has never been established by any valid argument based either on authority or on rational grounds. Indeed, the Bannezian position rests on a series of confusions. We have already dealt with the most basic confusion concerning the two meanings of active potency; but there are others. The Bannezians state that premotion is a motion, an incomplete and transitory entity. True, such a motion does exist, namely, the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency. But it is proven that this sort of motion is not to be found except in quantified and divisible bodies.121 The Bannezians, however, place it in a spiritual 119 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 31–38. 120 See Thomas Aquinas, In VIII Phys., lect 2, §976. 121 Thomas Aquinas, In VI Phys., lect. 5 and 12.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

218

De Ente Supernaturali

in angelis. Praeterea, eiusmodi motus non est causa sed est ipse effectus in fieri: motus localis est fieri tou esse ubi, alteratio est fieri tou esse quale, augmentatio est fieri tou esse quantum.122 Huic confusioni additur alia confusio de virtute instrumentali. Inter motum et virtutem instrumentalem exsistit analogia, exsistit coincidentia, sed non exsistit identitas. Exsistit analogia: sicut se habet motus ad terminum relate ad esse in termino, ita se habet virtus instrumentalis ad virtutem causae principalis; analogia in eo est quod in utroque casu primum habet rationem incompletam seu esse incompletum secundi. Exsistit coincidentia: simul et eodem actu communicantur et motus et virtus a causa principali ad instrumentum; non una actione moveo claves machinae dactylographicae et alia realiter distincta actione efficio ut tali et tali ordine litterae exscribantur; sed machina accipit virtutem instrumentalem ad aliquid intelligibile exscribendum inquantum accipit illud quo facit ut litterae debito ordine exscribantur; simul ergo machina accipit et motum et virtutem instrumentalem. Non exsistit identitas: quilibet potest movere instrumentum sed non quilibet potest dare instrumento virtutem artis, virtutem instrumentalem; optime possum movere claves organi; sed non possum claves movere secundum artem pulsandi organi. Haec omnia sunt adeo clara ut puerulum ea facile intelligere dixeris. Neque dubitare potest utrum sanctus Thomas haec intellexerit: quid praecise sit illa intentio de qua in De pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m, clare explicatur in quaestione de fato in [Sum. theol.,] 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3; est ipsa seriatio, dispositio, relatio causarum secundarum; non est alia vis causalis praeter id quod causae secundae iam habent; etc.

(b) Praeter has diversitates circa quandoque moventia et mota, circa ipsum motum, circa virtutem instrumentalem, circa fatum, circa potentiam activam, exsistit aliud caput diversitatis circa efficaciam. Uti supra exposuimus, sanctus Thomas docuit Deum infallibiliter omnia scire, irresistibiliter velle quodcumque vult, indefectibiliter efficere quodcumque fit; quibus tamen positis non sequitur omnia esse necessaria et nihil contingens, quia efficacia divina non est ordinaria sed transcen-

The Robert Mollot Collection

219

The Supernatural Order

soul, in the intellect, in the will, and in angels. Moreover, this sort of motion is not a cause but is an effect in process of becoming: local motion is the coming-to-be of being-in-a-place, change is the coming-to-be of a quality, and growth is the coming-to-be of a certain quantity.122 Added to this confusion is another confusion about instrumental causality. There is an analogy between the movement and the power of an instrument; they coincide, but they are not identical. There is an analogy: as movement towards a term is related to existence in the term, so is the power of an instrument related to the power of the principal cause; the analogy is in the fact that in each case the first member possesses the incomplete formality or incomplete existence of the second. They coincide: at the same time and in the same action both movement and power are communicated to the instrument by the principal cause. I do not move the typewriter keys by one action and by another action really distinct from the first effect the printing of letters in a particular order. The machine receives the instrumental power to write something intelligible by the very fact that it receives that by which it brings it about that letters are printed in the proper order; simultaneously, therefore, the machine receives both movement and instrumental power. But there is no identity between these: anyone can move an instrument, but not everyone can communicate to the instrument an artistic power, the instrumental power. I can very easily depress the keys of an organ, but I cannot do so according to the art of playing the organ. This is all so obvious that one might say that a mere child could easily understand it. There is no doubt that St Thomas understood it: the precise meaning of intentio in De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m, is clearly explained in the question on fate in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3; it is the seriation, the arrangement, the relationship of secondary causes; there is no other causality beyond what secondary causes already have; and so on. (b) Besides these differences regarding things that at times move and are moved, and regarding movement itself, instrumental power, fate, and active potency, there is a second point of difference regarding efficacy. As we explained above, St Thomas held that God infallibly knows all things, irresistibly wills whatever he wills and indefectibly effects whatever comes to be; but it does not follow from this that all things exist necessarily and nothing is contingent, because God’s efficacy is not ordinary but tran-

122 See Thomas Aquinas, In V Phys., lect. 2–4; In VII Phys., lect. 4–6.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

220

De Ente Supernaturali

dens. Haec sanctus Thomas, et recte quidem nam haec omnia demonstrari possunt. Sed Banneziani hanc proprietatem transcendentiae transferunt ad creaturam suam, nempe, praemotionem physicam prout est instrumentum divinae voluntatis et divinae virtutis. De qua translatione tria sunt notanda. Primo, proprietas transcendentiae est exclusive divina. ‘Hoc autem non potest dici de voluntate humana, nec de aliqua alia causa: quia omnis alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae; et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens, sed necessarius.’123 Secundo, proprietas transcendentiae divinae est in signo simultaneo cum effectu volito vel effecto a Deo. Nihil enim contingens de Deo praedicari potest nisi per denominans extrinsecum reale; non potest vere dici Deum hoc velle vel hoc intendere vel hoc efficere quin realiter ponatur ipsum hoc. Tertio, Banneziani vel contra primum vel contra secundum supra positum necessario offendunt. Nam ponunt in signo praevio intentionem divinam et praemotionem, in signo subsequenti effectum liberum. Iam vero aut vere habetur intentio divina de effectu per solam positionem praemotionis, et tunc ut praemotio sit denominans extrinsecum sufficiens debet necessario continere ipsum effectum; et sic praemotio, qua creatura est causa, necessaria est et non contingens;124 vel non vere habetur intentio divina de effectu quando ponitur praemotio, et tunc si praemotio est causa necessaria, effectus non est contingens, sin autem praemotio est causa contingens, tunc praemotio non est efficax. (c) Tertium caput diversitatis est circa libertatem. Banneziani arbitrantur sufficere ad libertatem actus voluntatis ut consilium intellectus sit conclusio non necessitata a praemissis; et provocant ad [Sum. theol.,] 1, q. 83, a. 1. Hunc locum ergo interpretantur non solum in sensu affirmativo sed etiam in sensu exclusivo. Quae interpretatio certo est

The Robert Mollot Collection

221

The Supernatural Order

scendent. This is what St Thomas held, and rightly so, for it is all capable of proof. The Bannezians, however, transfer this property of transcendence to that creature of theirs, physical premotion, as an instrument of the divine will and divine power. Concerning this transference, three points should be noted. First, the property of transcendence belongs to God alone. ‘This cannot be said of the human will or of any other cause, because every other cause is already within the order of necessity or contingence; it necessarily follows, therefore, that either the cause itself can fail, or else its effect is not contingent but necessary.’123 Second, divine transcendence is simultaneous with any effect willed and caused by God. For nothing that is contingent can be predicated of God except by reason of a real extrinsic denominator; and it is untrue to say that God wills or intends or causes this thing unless it really exists. Third, the Bannezian position is necessarily opposed to either the first or the second of the above two points. For it places God’s intention and premotion as antecedent and a free effect as subsequent. Now either there is truly a divine intention regarding an effect solely through the mere positing of a premotion, and then if the premotion is to be a sufficient extrinsic denominator it must necessarily contain the effect itself, in which case the premotion by which a creature is a cause is necessary and not contingent;124 or if there is not truly a divine intention regarding the effect when the premotion is posited, then if the premotion is a necessary cause, its effect is not contingent, whereas if the premotion is a contingent cause, then the premotion is not efficacious. (c) A third point of difference is on the question of freedom. The Bannezians consider it sufficient for the freedom of an act of the will that the deliberation of the intellect be a conclusion that is not necessitated by its premises, and for this they appeal to Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83, a. 1. Hence they interpret that passage not only in an affirmative sense but also

123 Thomas Aquinas, In 1 Peri herm., lect. 14, §22; cf. In VI Metaphys., lect. 3, §1222. 124 [Lonergan corrected this part of the sentence in the first edition, 19201dtl040. It had first read, ‘et sic praemotio qua creatura est causa necessaria et non contingens.’ He changed it to, ‘et sic praemotio, qua creatura est causa, necessaria est et non contingens.’ The editors have adopted this change.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

222

De Ente Supernaturali

falsa si totum opus sancti Thomae consideras. Post enim partem primam conscriptam, ut respondere possit Gentilibus Parisiensibus determinismum voluntatis per intellectum praedicantibus, sanctus Thomas doctrinam suam in De malo, q. 6, et [Sum. theol.,] 1-2, q. 9, perfecit. Docuit voluntatem se ipsam libere movere inquantum in actu circa finem producit actum suum circa media. Quae libera sui ipsius motio intra ipsam voluntatem clare requiritur ut evitetur determinismus voluntatis ab intellectu.125 (d) Quartum caput diversitatis inter Bannezianos et sanctum Thomam est circa peccatum. Banneziani admittunt valorem disiunctionis inter Deum agere et Deum non agere. Cur ergo Deus non sit auctor peccati, tandem denique dicunt esse mysterium. Satis constat sanctum Thomam non admittere illam disiunctionem: ‘… sicut creatura decideret in nihilum nisi per divinam potentiam contineretur, ita etiam deficeret in non bonum, si non contineretur a Deo. Non tamen sequitur, quod nisi contineretur a Deo per gratiam, rueret in peccatum.’126 Aliud ergo est Deum agere, aliud Deum non agere, et tertium est Deum permittere peccatum. Ad Molinistas transeamus. Quoad methodum obvia est diversitas inter positionem sancti Thomae et positionem Molinisticam. Sanctus Thomas solvit difficultates; Molinistae vero imaginantur Deum conspicientem omnes mundos futuribiles et eligentem illum mundum in quo Paulus convertitur et Iudas suspenditur; ex hac theoria speciali posita explicare omnia volunt. Finis Molinismi est ut intelligas; finis Thomismi est ut scias obiectiones solvere. Quoad doctrinam autem Molinismus et positio sancti Thomae quoad essentialia fere coincidunt. (a) In utraque enim positione negatur transcendentia cuiuslibet creaturae: positis omnibus finitis requisitis ad agendum, non adhuc ad unum determinatur effectus contingens.

The Robert Mollot Collection

223

The Supernatural Order

in an exclusive sense. But in light of the overall thought of St Thomas, this interpretation is wrong. After he had written the first part [of the Summa theologiae], in order to counter the Averroists in Paris who were teaching the determinism of the will by the intellect, St Thomas refined his teaching in De malo, q. 6, and in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9. Here he taught that the will freely moves itself when, being in act regarding the end, it produces its act regarding the means. This free self-movement within the will is clearly required in order to avoid determinism of the will by the intellect.125 (d) A fourth point of difference between the Bannezians and St Thomas is on the question of sin. The Bannezians admit the validity of the disjunction between God acting and God not acting. Therefore as to why God is not the author of sin, they ultimately confess it to be a mystery. It is quite clear that St Thomas does not admit that disjunction: ‘… just as a creature would fall into nothingness were it not sustained by divine power, so also it would fall into nongoodness if not sustained by God. Yet it does not follow that unless one were sustained by God through grace, one would fall into sin.’126 It is one thing, therefore, for God to act, another for God not to act, and a third for God to permit sin. Let us turn now to the Molinists. With respect to method, there is an obvious difference between St Thomas’s position and that of the Molinists. St Thomas solves difficulties, while the Molinists imagine God looking at all futurible worlds and choosing that world in which Paul is converted and Judas hanged, and they want to explain everything on the basis of this special theory. The aim of the Molinists is to get you to understand; Thomism’s aim is that you know how to solve objections. With respect to their doctrines, however, Molinism and St Thomas’s position fairly well coincide on all essential points. (a) Both positions deny transcendence to any creature whatever: when all the finite conditions required for acting are in place, a contingent effect is still undetermined to this or that.

125 See Dom Odon Lottin, ‘Liberté humaine et motion divine,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 7 (1935) 52–69, 156–73; more briefly in Bernard Lonergan, ‘St Thomas’ Thought on Gratia operans,’ Theological Studies 3 (1942) 533–37 [Grace and Freedom 94–98]. 126 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 16, a. 4, ad 22m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

224

De Ente Supernaturali

(b) In utraque positione gratia efficax et gratia mere sufficiens differunt non intrinsece sed extrinsece: apud Molinistas differentia extrinseca est in scientia futuribilium et electione divina; apud Aquinatem differentia est in intentione Dei volentis bonum actum vel permittentis defectum. (c) In utraque positione requiritur scientia media, scil., alia scientia praeter scientiam simplicis intelligentiae qua cognoscuntur possibilia et scientiam visionis qua cognoscuntur actualia. Sed scientia media Molinistarum est scientia futuribilium; scientia vero media sancti Thomae est scientia illa qua cognoscuntur peccata inintelligibilia.127 (d) Circa futuribilia, distinguendum est inter nomen et rem. Secundum sanctum Thomam nihil potest esse futurum Deo, nam omnia ei sunt praesentia qui in tempore neque est neque esse potest. Sequitur quod nihil potest esse futuribile Deo. Alia ex parte quod nobis est futuribile, Deo est hypothetice actuale, hypothetice praesens. Neque positio sancti Thomae ullo modo excludit Deum cognoscere hypothetice actualia.128 (e) Attamen haec cognitio hypothetice actualium non videtur posse conferre ad solutionem ullius problematis. Si enim exsistit difficultas circa absolute actualia, eadem necessario difficultas exsistit circa hypothetice actualia. V.g., si in ordine actuali Deus nesciret quemadmodum cum homine concurrendum sit nisi habuisset scientiam ordinum hypothetice actualium, sane redit eadem quaestio circa ordinem hypothetice actualem; nam in ordine hypothetice actuali Deus concurreret et sine concursu non haberetur actio hominis ulla; sed antequam concurreret in ordine hypothetice actuali, deberet scire quemadmodum concurrendum sit; ponenda ergo videtur alia scientia de hypothetice-hypothetice actualibus, et ita regreditur in infinitum.

Difficultas haec non est ficta. Videte Lennerz, De Deo uno, p. 227, §334,129

The Robert Mollot Collection

225

The Supernatural Order

(b) In both positions efficacious grace and merely sufficient grace differ not intrinsically but extrinsically: for the Molinists the extrinsic difference lies in God’s knowledge of futuribles and his choice; for Aquinas the difference lies in the intention of God willing a good act or permitting its failure. (c) Both positions require scientia media, middle knowledge, that is, another knowledge besides the knowledge of simple understanding by which God knows possibles and the vision-knowledge (scientia visionis) by which he knows actually existing beings. But for the Molinists this intermediate knowledge is the knowledge of futuribles, whereas for St Thomas it is that knowledge in which unintelligible sins are known.127 (d) Regarding futuribles, one must distinguish between words and things. According to St Thomas, nothing can be future to God, for all things are present to him who neither is nor can be within time. It follows that nothing can be futurible to God. On the other hand, what is futurible to us is hypothetically actual, hypothetically present, to God. And St Thomas’s position in no way denies that God knows hypothetically actual beings.128 (e) Nonetheless, this knowledge of the hypothetically actual does not seem able to contribute to a solution to any problem. For if there exists a difficulty regarding what is simply actual, the same difficulty exists regarding what is hypothetically actual. For example, if in the actual order of reality God did not know how he should exercise concurrence with a person unless he had a knowledge of hypothetically actual orders, the same question surely comes up again regarding a hypothetically actual order, for in a hypothetically actual order God would concur, and without his concurrence there would be no action at all on the part of the person; but before he would concur in a hypothetical actual order he would have to know how his concurrence should go. Therefore it would seem necessary to postulate still another knowledge of the hypothetically hypothetically actual, and so on ad infinitum. This is not a fictitious difficulty. See Lennerz, De Deo uno, p. 227, §334,129

127 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan indicated by hand that the essential points on which Thomist and Molinist doctrine were more or less in agreement were confined to a, b, and c.] 128 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan adds by hand, ‘Neque Molinistae insistunt in ratione future relate ad Deum’ (‘Nor do the Molinists insist on the notion of “future” with respect to God)’.] 129 [This is the reference as Lonergan gave it in the autograph, without any indication as to which edition he was using. In the Regis College edition, Frederick E. Crowe adds the following: ‘In the third edition (1940), pp. 260–61,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

226

De Ente Supernaturali

ubi admittitur Deus caece concurrere sed negatur caecitas haec esse proprie dicta. In hac solutione tria sunt distinguenda: primo, scientia Dei circa contingentia est simultanea cum ipsis contingentibus, nam nihil in Deo est contingens et ideo haec scientia vere quidem dicitur de Deo sed tamen per denominans extrinsecum; secundo, haec simultaneitas dat apparentiam caecitatis solummodo si Deus imaginatur tamquam aliquod ens temporale qui futura et futuribilia vel iam conspicit vel nondum conspicit; quae apparentia utique est falsa, nam Deus est aeternus et omnia sunt ei praesentia, nihil vero futurum et nihil praeteritum; tertio, inquantum Molinismus offert positivam problematis intelligentiam et non meram obiectionum solutionem, uti apud sanctum Thomam, necessaria videtur doctrina de futuribilibus non tantum qua hypothetice actualibus sed etiam qua Deo futuribilibus. (f) Alio fine apud sanctum Thomam, alio fine apud Molinam, ponitur in Deo tertia scientia praeter simplicis intelligentiae et visionis. Apud Molinam habetur haec tertia scientia non solum ut excludatur Deum esse auctorem peccati sed etiam ut excludatur hominem necessario velle quodcumque velit. Apud sanctum Thomam solvitur problema de contingentibus sine recursu ad tertiam scientiam per solam distinctionem inter necessitatem absolutam et necessitatem hypotheticam;130 apud sanctum Thomam necessaria est dicta tertia scientia tantummodo ut excludatur Deum esse auctorem peccati.131

The Robert Mollot Collection

227

The Supernatural Order

where he admits that God concurs blindly, while denying that this is a case of blindness properly so called. In this solution, three things must be kept clearly in mind: (1) God’s knowledge of contingent beings is simultaneous with them, for there is nothing contingent in God and therefore this knowledge is truly attributed to him, though by reason of an extrinsic denominator. (2) This simultaneity gives the appearance of blindness only if God is imagined as a being within time who already sees or does not yet see future or futurible realities; this appearance, of course, is false, for God is eternal and all things are present to him, nothing is past or future to him. (3) Since Molinism offers a positive understanding of the problem and not simply a solution to objections, as in St Thomas, its doctrine about futuribles not only as hypothetically actual but also as futurible to God seems necessary. (f) For different reasons St Thomas and Molina attribute to God a third knowledge besides that of simple understanding and of vision. Molina introduces this third knowledge not only to rule out God as the author of sin but also to deny that man necessarily wills whatever he wills. In St Thomas the problem about contingent realities is solved without recourse to a third knowledge, simply by distinguishing between absolute and hypothetical necessity;130 for him, this third knowledge is needed only to rule out God as the author of sin.131 §365; in the fourth edition (1948), pp. 255–57, §365; both editions published by the Gregorian University Press, Rome.’ Presumably, then, Lonergan was using either the first edition (1929) or the second edition (1931), but more likely the second, and in editions later than these the section number changed. To this information we can now add the following: §365 in the fifth edition (1955), pp. 258–59, also published by the Gregorian University Press, Rome.] 130 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan inserts here: ‘modo intelligas quid sit tempus et quid aeternitas (‘as long as you understand what time is and what eternity is’). He then adds a handwritten addition: ‘Haec sunt historica dicta. Aliis verbis, positiva intelligentia huius problematis ex parte haberi non potest, nam peccatum est falsitas obiectiva, ex parte haberi potest, modo possis intelligere quid sit aeternitas et quid sit tempus. Haec sunt difficiliora: inter non-theologos et inter maximam partem adhuc dep? est positio de futuribilibus’ (‘These are historical words. In other words, a positive understanding of this problem is partly possible and partly not possible, as long as you can understand what eternity is and what time is. They are very difficult: among non-theologians and among the majority of theologians still (?) is a position about futuribles’).] 131 [Lonergan adds by hand in the first edition, 19201dtl040: ‘Magis rigorose procedit S Thomas: vera certitudo praevia necessitat eventum. Molina

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

228

De Ente Supernaturali

(g) Denique ut antea dictum est, alia est doctrina sancti Thomae de concursu, alia doctrina Molinae.132 THESIS V Gratia actualis interna essentialiter consistit in actibus secundis intellectus et voluntatis vitalibus, principalibus, et supernaturalibus. Ad terminos gratia : ens reale, accidentale, homini gratis collatum in ordine ad Deum uti in se est possidendum. actualis : quae respicit non qualitatem permanentem sed operationem transeuntem. interna: recepta in potentiis animae superioribus, non prout hae potentiae ab obiectis moventur, sed prout immediate a Deo gubernantur. essentiale constitutivum : id quo posito habetur (1) ipsa res de qua quaeritur, (2) systematica deductio omnium eiusdem rei proprietatum, (3) nulla consequentia inconveniens. actus: notio primitiva. actus secundus: actus simpliciter; opponitur actui primo qui secundum quid est actus et secundum quid est potentia. vitalis : qui pertinet ad ordinem viventium qua viventium; puta, nutriri, generare (stricte), sentire, intelligere, assentiri, velle. principalis : actus secundus est principalis qui non ex parte obiecti sed ex parte potentiae subiectatae se habet tamquam causa efficiens relate ad alios actus in eadem potentia receptos. V.g., in actum voluntatis quo medium volitur influunt tamquam causae efficientes, ex parte obiecti, consilium intellectus quod actum specificat et, ex parte potentiae subiectatae, ipse actus finem volendi. Quare in voluntate

The Robert Mollot Collection

229

The Supernatural Order

(g) Finally, as we mentioned above, St Thomas and Molina have different doctrines about divine concurrence.132 THESIS 5 Interior actual grace essentially consists in vital, principal, and supernatural second acts of the intellect and the will. Terminology grace: a real accidental being, conferred gratuitously upon a person in order to possess God as he is in himself. actual : not a permanent quality but a transient operation. interior: received in the higher potencies of the soul, not as potencies moved by their objects, but as immediately governed by God. essential constituent : that by reason of which there is had (1) the thing itself that is the object of inquiry, (2) a systematic deduction of all the properties of that thing, (3) without any incongruous consequence. act: a primitive notion second act: act simply so called; it is contradistinguished from first act, which is act in one respect and potency in another respect. vital : pertaining to the order of living things precisely as living; acts such as being nourished, generating (in the strict sense of the word), feeling, understanding, assenting, willing. principal : a principal second act is one which, not on the side of the object but on the side of the faculty of a subject, stands as an efficient cause with respect to the other acts received in that same faculty. For example: two things have a causal influence upon the volitional act of willing the means to an end: (1) on the side of the object, the deliberation of the intellect which specifies the act, and (2) on the part of the subject faculty, the act of willing the end. In the will, therefore, the principal sec-

distingueret: necessitas consequentiae, C, consequentis N’ (‘St Thomas proceeds more rigorously: a prior true certitude necessitates an event. Molina would distinguish, and would agree if the necessity is one of consequence but not one of the consequent’).] 132 [See above, pp. 178–81.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

230

De Ente Supernaturali

actus secundus principalis est volitio finis. Nisi finem vis, media velle non potes. Similiter in actum intellectus qui est verbum sive incomplexum (definitio) sive complexum (iudicium) influunt ex parte obiecti phantasma imo etiam quoad iudicium sensus exteriores, sed ex parte potentiae subiectatae influunt actus intelligendi. Quare in intellectu possibili actus principalis est intelligere. Nisi intelligis, non potes definire vel iudicare.

supernaturalis: sive stricte sive late. stricte: actus cuius obiectum formale est simpliciter supernaturale, uti in actibus virtutum infusarum. late: actus entitative naturalis sed immediate et gratuito a Deo productus, e.g., ut peccator possit totam legem naturalem quoad substantiam observare. Sensus theseos Quaeritur quid sit gratia actualis interna. Respondetur gratiam actualem internam essentialiter consistere non in actibus primis sed secundis; non in actibus solius intellectus vel solius voluntatis sed utriusque; non in actibus incompletis vel fluentibus vel intentionalibus sed in actibus vitalibus, nempe, intelligere et velle; non in motibus primo primis neque in actibus derivatis ab aliis actibus in eadem potentia receptis (qui tamen gratiae esse possunt non essentialiter sed consequenter), sed in ipsis actibus principalibus a quibus omnes alii intra determinatam speciem vel genus efficienter causantur; non in solis actibus entitative supernaturalibus qui per se ordinantur in Deum uti in se est possidendum sed etiam in aliis vere gratuitis qui per accidens ita ordinantur. Respondetur magis positive gratiam actualem internam in intellectu possibili esse quoddam intelligere, puta, lumen fidei in actu secundo, vel illuminatio a Spiritu Sancto fonte intellectus, scientiae, sapientiae, consilii; quod intelligere est actus secundus immediate a Deo in nobis sine nobis causaliter efficientibus productus. Iterum, gratiam actualem internam in voluntate receptam esse actum volendi finem supernaturalem (per accidens, volendi bonum naturale et honestum secus non volitum), qui actus immediate a Deo in nobis et sine nobis causaliter efficientibus producitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

231

The Supernatural Order

ond act is the act of willing the end. Unless you will the end you cannot will the means to that end. Similarly, the intellectual act that is an [inner] word, whether a simple word, a definition, or a compound word, a judgment, is causally influenced on the part of the object by a phantasm and also, in the case of judgment, even by external senses, but on the part of the faculty of a subject it is influenced by acts of understanding. In the possible intellect, therefore, the principal act is the act of understanding. Unless you understand something, you cannot define it or make a judgment about it. supernatural: can be taken in a strict or in a broad sense. Strictly speaking, it means an act whose formal object is absolutely supernatural, as in the case of the infused virtues. Broadly speaking, it is an act that is entitatively natural, but immediately and gratuitously produced by God: for example, that a sinner be able to observe substantially the whole of the natural law. Meaning of the Thesis The question we are asking concerns the nature of interior actual grace. Our answer is that interior actual grace essentially consists not in first acts but in second acts; not in acts of the intellect alone or of the will alone but of both; not in incomplete or momentary or intentional acts but in vital acts, namely, acts of understanding and of willing; not in the very first inclinations nor in acts derived from other acts received in the same potency (which, however, can be graces, not essentially but consequentially), but in those principal acts themselves by which all others within a determinate species or genus are produced by efficient causality; not only in entitatively supernatural acts that are per se ordered to possessing God as he is in himself, but also in other truly gratuitous acts that are per accidens so ordered. Stated in a more positive way, our answer is that interior actual grace in the possible intellect is a certain act of understanding, such as the light of faith as a second act, or an illumination by the Holy Spirit as the source and font of understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and counsel; this act of understanding is a second act produced by God immediately in us without any efficient causality on our part. Again, interior actual grace received in the will is an act of willing a supernatural end (or, per accidens, willing a natural moral good not otherwise willed), which act is produced by God immediately in us without any efficient causality on our part.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

232

De Ente Supernaturali

Sententiae (a) Molinistae Gratia actualis interna consistit in actibus vitalibus supernaturalibus intellectus et voluntatis. Quoad hos actus distinguitur duplex causa efficiens: alia causa est Deus concurrens et producens actum qua gratiam; alia causa est facultas concurrens et producens actum qua vitalem. Hi actus dividuntur in deliberatos et indeliberatos; actus deliberatus est gratia adiuvans; actus indeliberatus est gratia excitans; gratia excitans dat vires tum physicas tum morales ad actum deliberatum ponendum. Actus indeliberatus concipitur, non ut actus principalis, sed ut motus quidam et affectus voluntatis; producitur a voluntate concurrente eo modo quo actus primo primus a voluntate producitur. (b) Suareziani Cum Molinistis concordant quoad caetera; dicunt vero gratiam excitantem dare vires morales quidem ad actum deliberatum, non vero dare vires physicas. (c) Banneziani Gratia actualis interna essentialiter consistit non in actu quolibet vitali sed in praecedente quodam motu qui nominatur praemotio physica. Haec praemotio physica est ens quoddam incompletum, secundum alios in genere qualitatis et secundum alios non in genere qualitatis, secundum alios quid intentionale et secundum alios non quid intentionale. Haec praemotio physica ad actum supernaturalem et ipsa sit supernaturalis necesse est; quare rite gratia vocatur; et a solo Deo in nobis sine nobis sive causantibus sive vitaliter elicientibus producitur. Alia est gratia ad posse ponere actum salutarem, et alia ad ipsum ponere actum salutarem; illa gratia est sufficiens, haec vero est efficax; posita praemotione physica, repugnat non dari id ad quod ponitur, utique in sensu composito.133 Tamen de hac divisione non uno modo omnes auctores huius scholae loquuntur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

233

The Supernatural Order

Opinions (a) Molinists Interior actual grace consists in supernatural vital acts of the intellect and will. For these acts there are two efficient causes: God as concurring and producing the act as a grace, and the faculty concurring and producing the act as a vital act. These acts are divided into deliberate and indeliberate. A deliberate act is a helping or assisting grace; an indeliberate act is an arousing grace, a grace that gives one the capacities both physical and moral to perform a deliberate act. An indeliberate act is conceived not as a principal act but as a certain movement and affection in the will; it is produced by the will concurring in the way in which those very first inclinations are produced by the will. (b) Suarezians They agree with the Molinists on all points except that they hold that arousing grace gives only moral, not physical, capacities to perform a deliberate act. (c) Bannezians Interior actual grace essentially consists not in any vital act but in a certain prior movement called a ‘physical premotion.’ This physical premotion is an incomplete being, placed by some in the category of quality and by others not in the category of quality, and considered by some as an intentional being and by others as not intentional. This physical premotion towards a supernatural act must itself be supernatural. Therefore it is rightly called a grace, and it is produced in us by God alone without our either causing it or vitally eliciting it. The grace to be able to perform a salutary act is one thing and the grace to actually perform such an act is another. The former grace is sufficient, the latter efficacious. When the physical premotion is produced, it is impossible that that for which it is produced should not occur, in sensu composito, of course.133 However, not all the adherents of this school speak in the same way about this division of grace into sufficient and efficacious. 133 [In sensu composito is opposed to in sensu diviso: that is, the will retains its ability to resist the motion of grace until it actually acquiesces to it. See Charles

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

234

De Ente Supernaturali

(d) Semi-Banneziani Cum Bannezianis quoad caetera concordant; sed tamen negant notionem de gratia efficaci et sufficienti; et non requirunt praemotionem physicam ad omnem actum sed tantum ad actus principales; quibus habitis, potest homo agere vel non agere sine ulteriori addito. (e) Sententia quam credimus sancti Thomae Cum Molinistis concordat inquantum reicitur motus ille fluens, et gratia actualis interna dicitur ipse noster actus secundus et vitalis. Cum Suarezianis concordat inquantum negatur omnem actum indeliberatum dare vires physicas; sed differt affirmando actus indeliberatos principales dare tum vires physicas tum morales. Cum Bannezianis concordat inquantum gratia actualis interna sine nobis causaliter efficientibus produci dicitur, sed non inquantum sine nobis vitaliter elicientibus produci dicitur; vitaliter enim elicere, sicut intelligere, est pati quoddam. Cum semi-Bannezianis concordat inquantum insistunt in actibus principalibus. Probatio Probatio triplici gressu perficitur: primo, quod exsistunt actus secundi intellectus et voluntatis vitales, principales, et supernaturales; secundo, quod hi actus habent omnem proprietatem gratiae actualis internae essentialiter consideratae; tertio, quod nullum inconveniens sequitur ex eo quod hi actus ponuntur tamquam essentialia constitutive gratiae actualis internae. 1 Exsistunt actus secundi intellectus et voluntatis, vitales, principales, et supernaturales. Exsistunt eiusmodi actus si exsistit ullus actus supernaturalis formaliter liber. Atqui exsistunt actus supernaturales formaliter liberi. Ergo exsistunt eiusmodi actus, nempe, secundi, intellectus et voluntatis, vitales, principales, et supernaturales.

The Robert Mollot Collection

235

The Supernatural Order

(d) Semi-Bannezians In general they agree with the Bannezians, but they deny their notion of grace as efficacious and sufficient. As well, they do not require a physical premotion for every act, but only for principal acts; when these are posited, a person can act or not act without anything further. (e) The opinion of St Thomas, as we take it to be The Thomist position agrees with the Molinists in that it rejects that transitory movement, and holds that interior actual grace is our own second and vital act. It agrees with the Suarezians in denying that all indeliberate acts confer physical capacities; but it differs in affirming that principal indeliberate acts confer both physical and moral capacities. It agrees with the Bannezians in saying that interior actual grace is produced without any efficient causality on our part, but does not agree that it is produced without any vitally eliciting on our part; for vitally eliciting, like an act of understanding, is a passion, a receiving of something. It agrees with the semi-Bannezians in insisting upon principal acts.

Proof The thesis is proved in three steps: (1) that there are such things as vital, principal, and supernatural second acts of intellect and will; (2) that these acts possess all the properties of interior actual grace considered essentially; (3) that no incongruous consequence follows from the fact that these acts are stated as essentially constituting interior actual grace. 1 There exist acts of the intellect and will that are vital, principal, and supernatural. Such acts exist if there exists any supernatural act that is formally free. But formally free supernatural acts do exist. Therefore such acts exist, that is, acts that are second acts, that are acts of the intellect and acts of the will, and are vital, principal, and supernatural.

Boyer, Tractatus de Gratia Divina (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946) 247.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

236

De Ente Supernaturali

Maior: Sit actus supernaturalis formaliter liber. Hic actus supponit causam suae specificationis; quae causa est quoddam iudicium practicum in intellectu possibili; quod iudicium practicum est verbum complexum; porro, omne verbum procedit a quodam intelligere tamquam a causa efficienti, et ideo hoc iudicium practicum procedit a quodam intelligere; hoc intelligere aut pendet ab alio intelligere aut non, scil., aut est terminus alicuius ratiocinationis aut non; sed omne ratiocinium supponit aliquod intelligere; et ita tandem denique ad aliquod intelligere primum pervenitur. Proinde nisi hoc intelligere principale esset supernaturale, iudicium practicum non posset esse supernaturale; nisi iudicium practicum esset supernaturale, volitio ab eo specificata non posset esse supernaturalis; sed supponitur volitio esse supernaturalis; ergo si habetur volitio formaliter libera et supernaturalis, necessario etiam habetur quoddam intelligere principale et supernaturale. Denique omne intelligere ex natura sua est actus secundus intellectus et vitalis. Sed actus supernaturalis formaliter liber non solum supponit causam suae specificationis sed etiam causam sui exercitii; quae causa est alia volitio magis generalis; fieri potest ut etiam haec volitio magis generalis ab alia volitione generaliori pendet, sed tandem denique necessario sistitur in primo quodam et principali actu volendi qui est volitio finis. Porro ex natura sua velle finem est actus voluntatis secundus et vitalis; ex argumento est principalis; ex impossibilitate volendi medium supernaturale ad finem naturalem, haec volitio finis est et ipsa supernaturalis. Minor: Constat inter theologos. 2 Actus secundi intellectus et voluntatis, vitales, principales, supernaturales habent omnes proprietates gratiae actualis internae. Probatur per partes, nempe, deducendo proprietates gratiae actualis internae ex conceptu horum actuum. Brevitatis causa, scribetur ‘actus SIVVPS.’ (a) Prima proprietas: gratia actualis realiter distinguitur a virtute infusa.

The Robert Mollot Collection

237

The Supernatural Order

As to the major premise: let us suppose the existence of a formally free supernatural act. This act supposes a cause of its specification. This cause is a practical judgment in the possible intellect, and this judgment is a compound word. Again, every word proceeds from an act of understanding as its efficient cause, and therefore this practical judgment proceeds from an act of understanding. Now, this act of understanding either depends on another act of understanding or it does not; in other words, it itself is either the term of some process of reasoning or it is not. But all reasoning presupposes some understanding, and so ultimately we arrive at some initial act of understanding. Then again, if this initial or principal act of understanding were not supernatural, the practical judgment could not be supernatural; and if the practical judgment were not supernatural, the volitional act specified by it could not be supernatural. But our supposition is that this volition is supernatural, and therefore if there is a formally free supernatural volition, there is necessarily also a principal supernatural act of understanding. Finally, every act of understanding of its very nature is a second act and a vital act of the intellect. But a formally free supernatural act not only supposes a cause of its specification but also a cause of its exercise. This cause is another more general volition. It is possible that this more general volition in turn be dependent upon another still more general volition, but we must ultimately stop at some initial or principal volitional act, which is the willing of the end. Further, of its very nature willing the end is a second act and a vital act of the will. We have shown that it is a principal act; and from the impossibility of willing supernatural means to a natural end, we conclude that this willing of the end is itself supernatural. The minor premise is universally admitted among theologians. 2 Second acts of the intellect and of the will that are vital, principal, and supernatural have all the properties of interior actual grace. The various parts of this statement are proved separately, by deducing the properties of interior actual grace from the concept of these acts. For the sake of brevity we shall refer to these Second Acts of the Intellect and of the Will that are Vital, Principal, and Supernatural as SAIWVPS. (a) First property: actual grace is really distinct from an infused virtue.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

238

De Ente Supernaturali

Actus enim SIVVPS sunt actus secundi; virtutes infusae sunt actus primi; actus secundus realiter distinguitur ab actu primo. (b) Secunda proprietas: ad actum supernaturalem non sufficit virtus infusa. Virtus infusa est actus primus; actus primus non est principium proportionatum ad causalem efficientiam actus secundi, nam minus perfectum non proportionatur magis perfecto.134 (c) Tertia proprietas: ad actum supernaturalem non sufficit motio ex parte obiecti. Obiectum intellectus est per sensum; sed sensus non potest influere in intellectum possibilem sine intellectu agente; et sensus etiam cum intellectu agente non potest influere actum supernaturalem in intellectum possibilem; nam intelligibilitas supernaturalis excedit proportionem intellectus creati (db 1796). Obiectum voluntatis est per intellectum; sed intellectus causat tantummodo specificationem actus voluntatis; exercitium actus volendi medium causatur ab actu volendi finem; et volitio finis causatur ab exteriori principio quod est Deus.135 (d) Quarta proprietas: ad omnem actum supernaturalem requiritur gratia actualis interna. Actus enim supernaturalis aut est ipse actus principalis aut alius a principali productus; et in utroque casu necessario habetur actus principalis.136 (e) Quinta proprietas: gratia actualis interna consistit cum in illuminatione intellectus tum in inspiratione voluntatis. Actus secundus principalis supernaturalis in intellectu est quoddam intelligere; intelligere vero est lumen qua in intellectu possibili receptum. Actus secundus principalis supernaturalis in voluntate est quoddam velle finem; et velle finem est amorem spirari erga finem. (f) Sexta proprietas: gratia actualis interna dat vires cum physicas tum morales.

The Robert Mollot Collection

239

The Supernatural Order

SAIWVPS are second acts, whereas infused virtues are first acts, and so the two are really distinct. (b) Second property: an infused virtue is not sufficient for performing a supernatural act. An infused virtue is a first act; but a first act is not a principle that is proportionate to being the efficient cause of a second act, for the less perfect is not capable of producing the more perfect.134 (c) Third property: a motion coming from an object does not suffice to produce a supernatural act. The object of the intellect comes through the senses; but a sense cannot have an influence upon the possible intellect without the agent intellect. And even with the agent intellect the sense cannot impress a supernatural act upon the possible intellect, for supernatural intelligibility exceeds the proportion of the created intellect (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). The object of the will comes through the intellect; but the intellect causes only the specification of the act of the will. The exercise of the act of willing the means is caused by the act of willing the end, and the willing of the end is caused by that external principle which is God.135 (d) Fourth property: interior actual grace is required for every supernatural act. A supernatural act is either the principal act itself or another act produced by the principal act; in either case a principal act is necessarily required.136 (e) Fifth property: an interior actual grace is either an enlightenment of the intellect or an inspiration of the will. A supernatural principal second act in the intellect is an act of understanding; understanding is an illumination as received in the possible intellect. A supernatural principal second act in the will is a willing of the end; to will the end is the spiration of love towards the end. (f) Sixth property: interior actual grace imparts both physical and moral capacities.

134 [In the first edition, 11700dtl040, Lonergan changed ‘non potest producere magis perfectum’ to ‘non proportionatur magis perfecto’ (‘is not proportionate to the more perfect’). The editors have not made this change.] 135 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 4. 136 [In the first edition, 19201dtl040, Lonergan adds by hand: ‘qui est gratia actualis interna’ (‘which is an interior actual grace’).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

240

De Ente Supernaturali

Actus SIVVPS dant vires physicas inquantum sunt actus secundi proportionati ad productionem aliorum actuum. Actus SIVVPS dant vires morales inquantum sunt et verum supernaturale intelligere et bonum supernaturale velle. (g) Septima proprietas: gratia actualis interna dividitur in auxilium ordinarium (quod ad quemlibet actum supernaturalem requiritur) et auxilium speciale (quod ad posse diu perseverare requiritur, db 832). Actus SIVVPS possunt esse tantummodo actuationes perfectionum quae iam in habitibus et dispositionibus intellectus et voluntatis possidentur; et saltem hoc ad quemlibet actum supernaturalem requiritur. Sed etiam actus SIVVPS possunt esse maioris perfectionis inquantum verum latius vel clarius intelligitur et bonum latius et efficacius volitur in actu secundo quam ex mera actuatione habituum et dispositionum haberetur; et eiusmodi actus SIVVPS recte vocantur auxilia specialia. (h) Octava proprietas: gratia actualis interna includit non solum actus indeliberatos sed etiam actus deliberatos. Ipsi actus SIVVPS sunt indeliberati, non eo sensu quod sunt motus primo primi, sed quia sine his actibus iam exsistentibus impossibile est deliberare; deliberare enim supponit aliquam veri cognitionem et aliquam boni volitionem; deliberare vero ad consilium supernaturale supponit quoddam intelligere ad dicendum verum supernaturale ideoque illuminationem intellectus, et quoddam velle finem supernaturalem ideoque inspirationem voluntatis. Etiam actus deliberati sunt gratiae actuales internae, non quidem essentialiter sed consequenter; effectus enim causae assimilatur; sed causa est actus principalis et gratuitus; ergo etiam effectus erit gratuitus. (i) Nona proprietas: gratia dicitur operans inquantum mens nostra movetur et non movet, praecipue quando quis incipit velle bonum quod prius non volebat.137 Actus SIVVPS non possunt a nobis produci sive per virtutem infusam138 sive per motionem ex parte obiecti;139 et tamen in nobis sunt.140 Relinqui-

The Robert Mollot Collection

241

The Supernatural Order

SAIWVPS impart physical capacities inasmuch as they are second acts proportionate to the production of other acts. They impart moral capacities inasmuch as they are acts of understanding supernatural truth and of willing a supernatural good. (g) Seventh property: interior actual grace is divided into ordinary assistance, which is required for any supernatural act, and special assistance, required for the ability to persevere for a long time (db 832, ds 1572, nd 1972). SAIWVPS can be simply the actuations of perfections already possessed in the habits and dispositions of the intellect and will, and at least this is required for any supernatural act. But SAIWVPS can be acts of a higher degree of perfection, as when a truth is more widely and clearly understood or a good is more extensively and efficaciously willed in a second act than through a simple actuation of habits and dispositions; SAIWVPS of this sort are rightly called special helps. (h) Eighth property: interior actual grace includes not only indeliberate but also deliberate acts. SAIWVPS themselves are indeliberate, not in the sense that they are those very first inclinations, but that without these acts already present it is impossible to deliberate. Deliberation supposes some knowledge of the truth and some willing of the good; deliberation towards a supernatural taking counsel supposes an act of understanding terminating in a true supernatural concept and hence an illumination of the intellect, and an act of willing a supernatural end and hence an inspiration of the will. Interior actual graces can also be deliberate acts, not essentially, however, but as a consequence; for an effect has some similarity to its cause, and so if the cause is a gratuitous principal act, its effect will be similarly gratuitous. (i) Ninth property: grace is said to be operative when our mind is moved but does not itself move, especially in the case where one begins to will a good that he previously did not will.137 SAIWVPS cannot be produced by us either through an infused virtue138 or through a motion on the part of an object;139 yet they exist in us.140 It

137 138 139 140

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c. See above p. 239, under 2 (b). See above p. 239, under 2 (c). See above, the first part of the proof, pp. 235, 237.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

242

De Ente Supernaturali

tur ergo ut in nobis sine nobis a Deo solo producantur; et ideo quoad hos actus mens nostra (et intellectus et voluntas) est mota et non rnovens. Maxime vero actus SIVVPS sunt gratia operans quando sunt auxilia specialia quibus incipimus verum latius et clarius intelligere et bonum latius et efficacius velle. ( j) Decima proprietas: gratia dicitur cooperans inquantum mens nostra et movetur et movet.141 Quoad ipsos actus SIVVPS movemur tantum; sed his actibus receptis, habemus principia activa proportionata ad alios actus supernaturales producendos; et sic etiam nos ipsi movemus ad actus supernaturales efficiendos. (k) Undecima proprietas: eadem gratia est et operans et cooperans sed distinguitur ex diversitate effectus.142 Actus SIVVPS secundum quod recipiuntur in nobis sine nobis sunt gratiae operantes; secundum quod alios actus supernaturales producunt, sunt gratiae cooperantes. (l) Duodecima proprietas: gratia dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem.143 Actus SIVVPS sunt gratiae praevenientes vel subsequentes secundum quod alius alium tempore antecedit vel subsequitur; maxime vero ponitur haec distinctio relate ad tempora specialia, puta, praecedit quod convertimur et subsequitur quod bonum ita volitum per maiores vires physicas et morales144 in praxin deducitur; ita in ultima caena Petrus erat paratus secundum voluntatem pro Domino mori et tamen ter Dominum negavit, sed in fine vitae Petrus habuit non solum gratiam bonae voluntatis praevenientem sed etiam gratiam efficacis voluntatis subsequentem, et ita factus est martyr. (m) Tertia decima proprietas: gratia dividitur in excitantem et adiuvantem. Actus SIVVPS inquantum recipiuntur, nos excitant: illuminati enim verum perspicimus, et inspirati bonum volumus. Actus SIVVPS inquantum in alios actus supernaturales efficiendos influunt, nos adiuvant.

The Robert Mollot Collection

243

The Supernatural Order

remains, therefore, that they are produced in us by God alone without any movement on our part, and thus in respect to these acts our mind, our intellect and will, is moved but does not itself move. SAIWVPS are most of all operative graces when they are those special helps by which we begin to have a broader and clearer understanding of truth and a more extensive and efficacious willing of a good. ( j) Tenth property: grace is said to be cooperative when our mind both is moved and moves.141 With regard to SAIWVPS themselves we are only passively moved; but having received them, we possess active principles proportionate to the production of further supernatural acts, and in this way we ourselves also actively move to performing supernatural acts. (k) Eleventh property: it is the same grace that is both operative and cooperative; they are distinguished only by the diversity of their effects.142 As received in us without any activity on our part, SAIWVPS are operative graces; as productive of further supernatural acts they are cooperative graces. (l) Twelfth property: grace is divided into prevenient and subsequent.143 SAIWVPS are prevenient or subsequent according as to whether one temporally precedes or follows another. This distinction is most of all relevant in the case of special times; for example, the fact that one is converted is prior in time, and the fact that the good thus willed is put into practice through increased physical and moral144 capacities is subsequent. Thus at the Last Supper Peter was ready and willing to die for the Lord, yet he denied him three times; but at the end of his life he possessed not only the prevenient grace of a good will but also the subsequent grace of an efficacious will and so went to his martyrdom. (m) Thirteenth property: grace is divided into arousing and assisting. Inasmuch as SAIWVPS are received in us, they arouse us: when enlightened we perceive the truth, and when inspired we will the good. Inasmuch as SAIWVPS have an influence upon our performance of further supernatural acts, they assist us. 141 142 143 144

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c. Ibid. ad 4m. Ibid. a. 3. [In the first edition Lonergan added by hand ‘physicas et.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

244

De Ente Supernaturali

(n) Quarta decima proprietas: omnis gratia actualis est vere sufficiens. Nam actus SIVVPS sunt principia activa proportionata ad alios actus supernaturales producendos. (o) Quinta decima proprietas: quaedam gratiae actuales sunt efficaces. Possunt esse efficaces omnes, nam omnes sunt efficientes et sufficientes. Si vero ad gratiam vere sufficientem accedit intentio Dei ut homo cooperetur, fieri non potest ut homo non cooperetur; repugnat enim infinitae Dei perfectioni ut sua intentio deficiat. Et sic per intentionem Dei gratia vere sufficiens etiam est gratia efficax. (p) Sexta decima proprietas: gratia actualis potest esse vere et mere sufficiens. Nam actus SIVVPS dant posse agere et quidem complete quin necessario homo cum his actibus gratis datis cooperetur; cooperatio enim hominis est libera; neque semper Deus intendit ut homo cum gratia cooperetur (db 1093).145 Attamen velle finem et non velle media est irrationabile; quae irrationabilitas non reducitur in Deum sive directe sive indirecte agentem vel volentem, nam reductio supponit intelligibilitatem eius quod reducitur; sed haec irrationabilitas praesupponit Deum permittentem, non quidem permissione concessionis sed permissione prohibitionis. Vide supra, de efficacia divina.146 Quare illi actus SIVVPS sunt vere et mere sufficientes gratiae quibus accedit permissio divina ut homo cum eis non cooperetur. (q) Septima decima proprietas: gratia actualis efficax et gratia actualis vere et mere sufficiens differunt non intrinsece sed extrinsece. Gratia enim est efficax quia est principium efficiens vere sufficiens cui accedit intentio Dei ut homo cooperetur. Gratia vero est vere et mere sufficiens quia est omnino simile principium efficiens cui accedit permissio Dei ut homo non cooperetur. Tota ergo differentia in eo est quod alii gratiae accedit intentio divina qua gratia est efficax, et alii gratiae accedit permissio divina qua gratia est mere sufficiens. Per se efficacia et inefficacia non habentur ex viribus sive

The Robert Mollot Collection

245

The Supernatural Order

(n) Fourteenth property: all actual grace is truly sufficient. For SAIWVPS are active principles proportionate to the production of further supernatural acts. (o) Fifteenth property: some actual graces are efficacious. They can all be efficacious, for all are effective and sufficient. But if there is added to a truly sufficient grace the intention of God that the person cooperate, it is impossible that he not cooperate; for it is incompatible with God’s infinite perfection that his intention should fail. Thus through God’s intention a truly sufficient grace is also an efficacious grace. (p) Sixteenth property: an actual grace can be truly and yet merely sufficient. For SAIWVPS impart the power to act, and completely so, without a person necessarily cooperating with these acts gratuitously granted; for human cooperation is free, and God does not always intend that a person cooperate with grace (db 1093, ds 2002, nd 1989/2).145 Nonetheless, it is unreasonable to will the end and not will the means to that end. This unreasonableness is not attributable either directly or indirectly to God’s action and volition, for attribution supposes that what is attributed is intelligible. But this unreasonableness does presuppose divine permission, not, of course, the permission of concession but the permission of prohibition. See above, pp. 209, the discussion on divine efficacy.146 Therefore those SAIWVPS to which is added divine permission that a person not cooperate with them are truly yet merely sufficient graces. (q) Seventeenth property: the difference between efficacious actual grace and truly yet merely sufficient actual grace is not intrinsic to them but extrinsic. A grace is efficacious because it is an efficient and truly sufficient principle to which is added God’s intention that the person cooperate. A grace is truly yet merely sufficient because it is a totally similar efficient principle to which is added God’s permission that the person not cooperate. The whole difference, therefore, lies in this, that to some graces is added God’s intention whereby they are rendered efficacious while to others is added God’s permission whereby they are merely sufficient. Efficacy and 145 [In this number, the proposition ‘In the state of fallen nature interior grace is never resisted’ is condemned as heretical.] 146 [On the relevance of this ‘Vide supra’ for locating in its proper place the excursus ‘De efficacia concursus divini,’ see note 105 above.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

246

De Ente Supernaturali

physicis sive moralibus ipsius gratiae; sic enim tolluntur et libertas et meritum iusti, et Deus fit auctor principalis relate ad peccatum iniusti; quare Deus nulli dat gratias incongruas sed per gratiam facit homines congruos Deo et bonis operibus; nec umquam dat Deus gratias quae dant posse agere et non actu agere, qui enim dat vere posse eo ipso dat virtutem actu agendi.

(r) Octava decima proprietas: quidquid boni supernaturalis vult et facit homo, hoc ex gratia Dei habet; quidquid vero mali vult et facit homo, hoc sine Deo et contra Deum ex se ipso habet homo. Actus SIVVPS sunt actus principales in nobis sine nobis a Deo producti; per hos actus principales facimus quidquid boni volumus et facimus; et sine his actibus nihil supernaturale velle vel facere possumus. Iam vero causa causae est causa causati,147 et prima causa magis influit in effectum quam causa secunda. Ergo quidquid boni vult et facit homo, hoc ex Deo habet; libere quidem cum gratia per gratiam homo cooperatur; sed ipsum eius velle cooperari ex gratia est. Quidquid vero mali vult vel facit homo, hoc sine Deo et contra Deum ex se ipso habet homo. Deus enim per gratiam dat homini et verum intelligere et bonum velle; homo volens finem ex gratia et potens media velle tamen media non vult; quam irrationabilitatem Deus prohibet; neque haec irrationabilitas in Deum tamquam in causam sive directe sive indirecte agentem reducitur; ergo malum culpae fit contra Deum prohibentem et sine Deo agente ut culpa sit. Quare dicitur: ‘… sine me nihil potestis facere’ (Ioan. 15.5) et ‘sufficientia nostra ex Deo est’ (2 Cor. 3.5) et ‘Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere pro bona voluntate (sua)’ (Phil. 2.13) et ‘Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater qui misit me traxerit eum’ (Ioan. 6.44) et ‘Quid autem habes quod non accepisti?’ (1 Cor. 4.7) et ‘Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum’ (db 195).

The Robert Mollot Collection

247

The Supernatural Order

inefficacy in themselves are not derived from either the physical or moral strength of the grace itself; that would take away man’s freedom and the merits of the righteous, and make God the principal author of the sin of the unrighteous. Therefore God does not give anyone incongruous graces, but rather through his grace renders man fit for God and for good works. Nor does he ever give graces that impart the power to act and not the actual acting, for one who gives a person real power to act by that very fact fully enables him to actually act. (r) Eighteenth property: whatever supernatural good man wills and accomplishes comes from the grace of God; but whatever evil man wills and does comes from man himself acting without God and against God. SAIWVPS are principal acts produced by God in us and without us. Through these principal acts we do whatever good we will and do, and without these acts we cannot will or do anything supernatural. Now the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused,147 and the first cause has a greater influence upon the effect than a secondary cause has. Therefore whatever good one wills and does is had from God; through grace one freely cooperates with grace, but one’s very will to cooperate itself comes from grace. But whatever evil a person wills or does he has from himself without God and against God. God gives man the grace both to understand what is true and will what is good. By grace man wills the end and has the power to will the means, yet he does not will the means. This unreasonableness God forbids, nor is this unreasonableness attributable either to God’s direct or indirect causal action. Moral evil, therefore, is perpetrated contrary to God’s prohibition and without God’s action with respect to its malice or evil character. Therefore it is written: ‘… without me you can do nothing’ (John 15.5) and ‘… our sufficiency is from God’ (2 Corinthians 3.5) and ‘For it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure’ (Philippians 2.13) and ‘No one can come to me unless the Father who has sent me draws him’ (John 6.44) and ‘What do you have that you did not receive?’ (1 Corinthians 4.7) and ‘No one has anything of his own except falsehood and sin’ (db 195, ds 392).

147 [The phrase ‘causa causae est causa causati,’ which occurs also twice in ‘God’s Knowledge and Will’ (see below, pp. 322 and 328), is an axiom relevant to mediate causality. The interested reader should also consult the analogous axiom, ‘Quod repraesentat repraesentans, repraesentat primum repraesentatum,’ in ‘The Notion of Sacrifice ’ (see above, p. 14).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

248

De Ente Supernaturali

Nota bene Quaeri potest quemadmodum differat gratia efficax supra descripta a gratia efficaci Bannezianorum. Banneziani enim non dicunt eorum gratiam efficacem qua creaturam et cum praecisione ab intentione divina esse efficacem. Respondetur quod duplex maxime est differentia. Primo, intentio divina efficax Bannezianorum est in signo praevio ad positionem actus liberi; intentio divina efficax sancti Thomae est in signo simultaneo cum positione actus liberi. Quare secundum Bannezianos intentio divina una cum praemotione physica sufficit ad rationem gratiae efficacis, praecisione facta a positione actus liberi. Sed secundum sanctum Thomam non habetur intentio divina ut actus liber ponatur quin realiter etiam habeatur ipse actus liber; nam intentio divina de Deo praedicatur contingenter et ideo per denominans extrinsecum reale. Secundo, Banneziani confundunt duplicem sensum potentiae activae, ita ut eorum gratia sufficiens non sit sufficiens; ita enim concipiunt potentiam activam ut re vera nulla potentia activa haberi possit antequam recipiatur praemotio physica; quare, quamvis dicant eorum praemotionem physicam esse efficacem, non qua creaturam sed qua coniunctam cum intentione divina, tamen re vera secundum ipsum eorum conceptum de potentia activa eorum praemotio physica posset esse efficax etiam inquantum est creatura et sine ullo respectu ad intentionem divinam. 3 Ex hac positione nullum sequitur inconveniens. Inconveniens adesse potest sive positive ex eis quae affirmantur sive negative ex eis quae negantur. Atqui neutrum dici potest. Ergo nullum inconveniens adesse potest. Maior videtur enumeratio completa et minor per partes probatur. (a) Ex ipsa positione actuum SIVVPS nullum inconveniens sequi potest. Nam ex eo quod certo exsistit nullum inconveniens deduci potest. Atqui actus SIVVPS certo exsistere supra est demonstratum. Ergo ex ipsa positione actuum SIVVPS nullum inconveniens sequi potest. (b) Ex eo quod actus SIVVPS dicuntur in nobis sine nobis causaliter efficientibus a solo Deo produci, nullum habetur inconveniens. Potest videri quod inconveniens ita adest: implicite enim negatur quod

The Robert Mollot Collection

249

The Supernatural Order

Note One may ask how efficacious grace as described above differs from that of the Bannezians. They do not say that their efficacious grace as a creature and prescinding from God’s intention is efficacious. Our answer is that there are two main differences. First, in the Bannezian position, God’s efficacious intention is antecedent to the positing of a free act, while for St Thomas it is simultaneous with it. For the Bannezians, therefore, God’s intention along with the physical premotion suffices for a genuinely efficacious grace, prescinding from the actual positing of the free act. But according to St Thomas there is no divine intention that a free act be posited unless there also really exists the free act itself; for the divine intention is predicated contingently of God, hence by reason of a really existing extrinsic denominator. Second, the Bannezians confuse the two meanings of active potency, and so their sufficient grace is not sufficient. They conceive active potency in such a way that no true active potency can be had prior to the reception of a physical premotion. Therefore, although they declare their physical premotion to be efficacious, not as a creature but as joined with God’s intention, nevertheless in actual fact, according to their own concept of active potency, their physical premotion could be efficacious even as a creature and without any reference to God’s intention. 3 No incongruous consequence follows from our position. An incongruity is positive if it follows from what we have affirmed, or negative if it follows from what we have denied; but neither case is possible, and therefore there can be no incongruous consequence resulting from our position. The major premise is evidently a complete enumeration, and we shall prove each part of the minor separately. (a) Positing the existence of SAIWVPS entails no incongruity. That such acts certainly exist has been proven above, and since no incongruous consequence can be deduced from what certainly exists, positing the existence of SAIWVPS entails no incongruity. (b) There is no incongruity in the fact that SAIWVPS are said to be produced in us by God alone without any exercise of efficient causality on our part. It may seem that there is an incongruity here; for there is an implicit

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

250

De Ente Supernaturali

omnis actus vitalis necessario ab ipso actus subiecto efficientia causali producitur. Sed re vera nullum adest inconveniens sive metaphysicum sive physicum sive morale. Nullum adest inconveniens metaphysicum. Nulla enim est lex metaphysica secundum quam actus qui non producitur ab ipsius subiecto non est vitalis; lex enim metaphysica non admittit exceptiones, ideoque ubi certo adest exceptio non adest lex metaphysica. Iam vero certum est actum purum esse vitalem et certum est actum purum non produci causali efficientia a se ipso. Nullum adest inconveniens physicum. Tuto enim quis Aristotelem et Aquinatem concordantes sequitur. Atqui uterque docet sentire produci ab obiecto sensibili, intelligere esse pati, appetitum moveri ab appetibili apprehenso; praeterea in posteriori doctrina Aquinas docuit velle finem quoad exercitium actus produci a principio extrinseco quod est Deus.

Nullum adest inconveniens morale: gratia enim operans est qua movemur et non movemus; est qua incipimus velle bonum quod prius non volebamus; et supposita hac finis volitione, gratia fit cooperans relate ad actus circa media ad finem.148 (c) Contra, si quis vult actus SIVVPS a nobis efficienter causantibus quodammodo produci, vera inconvenientia sequuntur. Si enim quis loquitur in sententia Molinistarum, ponit Deum et hominem ex aequo concurrentes simultanee; iam vero concursus simultaneus intelligitur relate ad effectum materialem et quantitativum ubi totus effectus nihil est aliud quam additio vectoralis partium; ita plures homines eandem navem trahunt. Sed non intelligitur additio vectoralis spiritualis qua homo producit actum qua vitalem et Deus eundem actum producit qua supernaturalem. Quod vero neque in se intelligitur neque aliunde demonstratur, est gratis assertum et gratis negandum. Si autem quis loquitur in sententia Bannezianorum et semi-Bannezianorum, ponit ante actus SIVVPS motum quendam qui est ens incompletum et fluens et quodammodo intentio. Et hoc non solum non intelligitur sed est positiva confusio. Motus enim qui est ens incompletum et fluens est actus exsistentis in

The Robert Mollot Collection

251

The Supernatural Order

denial that every vital act is necessarily produced by the subject of that act as its efficient cause. But in fact nothing incongruous follows here either metaphysically or physically or morally. There is nothing metaphysically incongruous, for there is no metaphysical law according to which an act that is not produced by its subject is not a vital act. A metaphysical law is one that admits of no exceptions, and so where there is certainly an exception, there is no metaphysical law. Now it is certain that pure act is a vital act, and equally certain that pure act is not produced by itself through efficient causality. Nor is there any incongruity in the physical order. It is safe to follow Aristotle and Aquinas when they are in agreement with each other. But both teach that sensation is produced by a sensible object, that an act of understanding is something that is passively received, that the appetite is moved by the apprehension of a desirable object. Besides, in his later works Aquinas taught that, as to its exercise, the act of willing the end is produced by an extrinsic principle, which is God. There is no incongruity in the moral order. By operative grace we are moved and do not ourselves move. It is that by which we begin to will a good that we had not previously willed; and with this willing of the end, grace becomes cooperative with respect to acts of willing the means to the end.148 (c) On the contrary, if you maintain that SAIWVPS are in some way produced by us as efficient causes, really incongruous consequences follow. If you follow the Molinist opinion, you have God and man concurring equally and simultaneously. But in this theory simultaneous concurrence is understood as a material and quantitative effect in which the total effect is but the vectoral addition of its parts, like several men pulling the same boat. But what is not understood here is the spiritual vectoral addition wherein man produces an act as vital and God produces the same act as supernatural. Now what is not understood in itself and not proven from anything else is gratuitously asserted and is to be gratuitously denied. If, however, you follow the Bannezian and semi-Bannezian opinion, you posit prior to SAIWVPS a certain motion that is an incomplete and transitory being and a sort of intention. Not only is this unintelligible in itself, but there is a positive confusion here. For a motion that is an incomplete and transitory being is an act of a be-

148 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c. and ad 3m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

252

De Ente Supernaturali

potentia prout huiusmodi; qui motus exsistere non potest nisi in subiecto materiali qua materiali, quantitativo, divisibili sine fine; et ideo repugnat eiusmodi motum recipi in potentia spirituali sive intellectu sive voluntate. Praeterea, etiamsi per impossibile reciperetur non esset principium activum sufficiens ad productionem actuum SIVVPS a subiecto; nam motus non est causa efficiens tou esse in termino sed est ipsum fieri tou esse in termino; e.g., motus ad qualitatem non est causa efficiens qualitatis sed est ipsa qualitas in fieri. Dices: quamvis motus non sit effectum operans sed ipse effectus in fieri, nihil tamen prohibet unum motum producere alium, unum effectum in fieri producere alium effectum in fieri. Respondetur: nisi prior motus ad terminum pertingit, non potest posteriorem motum producere ad suum terminum; esse incompletum non proportionatur nisi esse incompleto. Praeterea, vanum est effugium ad virtutem instrumentalem, virtutem artis, intentionem de qua De pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. Quid praecise sit ista intentio requisita ut causa creata actualiter agat, clare dicitur in Sum. theol., 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3, ubi de fato quod est participatio providentiae divinae in causis secundis recepta ut effectus producant; hoc fatum est non qualitas neque motus sed relatio (a. 2, ad 3m)149 et non est principium causale superadditum ipsis causis secundis (a. 2, ad 2m). Iam vero gratia actualis non est sola relatio; et certo addit principium causale efficiens super naturam et virtutem infusam. Dices: in sacramentis adest vera causalitas efficiens instrumentalis ad producendam gratiam; haec virtus instrumentalis adest per motum; a pari, Deus producit actus SIVVPS in nobis per gratiam quae est motus et virtus instrumentalis. Respondeo sacramenta esse signa materialia et ideo subiecta possibilia motus stricte dicti; praeterea, sacramenta causare significando, nam virtus instrumentalis in sacramentis est significatio efficax ex imperio divino. Unde nego paritatem: subiectum gratiae actualis non est materiale; et ipsa gratia actualis non agit significando.

The Robert Mollot Collection

253

The Supernatural Order

ing in potency inasmuch as it is in potency. Such a motion can exist only in a material subject as material, quantified, and indefinitely divisible, and thus it is impossible for it to be received in a spiritual potency, whether intellectual or volitional. Besides, even if it were possible for such a motion to be so received, it would not be an active principle sufficient to produce SAIWVPS from their subject; for motion is not an efficient cause of existence in a term, but is the very coming-to-be of existence in a term. For example, motion towards a quality is not an efficient cause of that quality but is the quality itself in the process of becoming. You may object here that although motion is not what produces an effect but is the effect itself in the process of becoming, there is nothing to prevent one motion from producing another, one effect-in-becoming from producing another effect-in-becoming. To this we answer that unless and until a motion has reached its term, it cannot produce a subsequent motion towards its term, for incomplete being is proportionate only to incomplete being. Again, it is futile to take refuge in instrumental power, the power of art, or intention mentioned in De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. What precisely that intention is that is required for a created cause to actually act is clearly explained in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3, where Aquinas says that fate is the participation in divine providence received in secondary causes whereby they can produce their effects; this fate is not a quality or a motion but a relation (a. 2, ad 3m)149 and is not a causal principle added to the secondary causes (a. 2, ad 3m). But actual grace is not a relation alone, and it certainly adds an efficient causal principle to nature and infused virtue. You may object here that in the sacraments there is true instrumental efficient causality in the production of grace, that this instrumental power is present through movement, and so in like fashion God produces SAIWVPS in us through grace that is a movement and an instrumental power. Our response to this objection is that the sacraments are material signs and therefore possible subjects of motion in the strict sense. Besides, the sacraments cause by signifying, for the instrumental power in the sacraments is efficacious signification as a result of a divine decree. We deny the parallel, therefore: the subject of actual grace is not material, and actual grace itself does not act by signifying.

149 [See p. 219 above.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

254

De Ente Supernaturali

Praeterea, contra Bannezianos strictos, qui requirunt hoc ens incompletum, fluens, intentionale ad omnem actum, sequitur sublatio libertatis (nam homo non potest aliter agere), tollitur meritum quod supponit actum liberum (db 1094), et Deus fit auctor peccati (aut dat motum et homo bene agit, aut non dat et homo peccat). Praeterea, contra semi-Bannezianos, qui requirunt hoc ens incompletum, fluens, intentionale ad actus principales sed non ad actus deliberatos, adest hoc inconveniens quod ratio cur requiratur tale ens incompletum, etc., assignari non potest. Lex enim metaphysica non admittit exceptiones; si non requiritur ad omnem actum, cur umquam requiratur?

The Robert Mollot Collection

255

The Supernatural Order

Furthermore, the argument against the doctrine of the strict Bannezians, who require this incomplete, transitory, and intentional being for every act, is that it takes away human freedom (for a person cannot act otherwise), it does away with merit, which supposes a free act (db 1094, ds 2003, nd 1989/3), and it makes God the author of sin (either he gives a motion and man does a good act, or he does not and man sins). Also, the argument against the semi-Bannezians, who require this incomplete, transitory, intentional being for principal acts but not for deliberate acts, is the awkward fact that no reason can be given for such a requirement. A metaphysical law admits of no exceptions; if not required for every act, why is it ever required?

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 3

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei1

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 3

God’s Knowledge and Will1

From the 1973 Introduction to ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei,’ Regis Edition, by Frederick E. Crowe The work here re-edited has been known under two titles: ‘De praedestinatione’ (‘On Predestination’) and (more correctly, I think) ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei’ (‘On God’s Knowledge and Will’). It was written for and during a set of lectures Fr Lonergan gave at Regis College in the second semester of the academic year 1949–1950. The sequence of courses that year in this part of the curriculum was: Trinity in the first semester, and the one God (‘De Deo uno’) in the second. Fr Lonergan had given the course on the Trinity, Fr Peter Mueller lectured for the first half of ‘De Deo uno,’ and Fr Lonergan returned to the classroom for the second half of that course to handle the questions dealing with predestination, divine dominion over men, etc. The text-book used was the manual of H. Lennerz, De Deo uno, recently (1948) issued at Rome in its fourth edition. Fr Lonergan began to lecture around March of 1950 on the third and fourth parts of the book: ‘De scientia Dei’ (pp. 180–259), and ‘De providentia et praedestinatione’ (pp. 260–358). Besides leaving marginal annotations on the manual he used (a habit of his), he began, apparently almost at once, to formulate his ideas

1 [See below p. 259, notes 2 and 3, for information on the sources used to edit this work.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

259

God’s Knowledge and Will

on key questions a bit more systematically and had his typescript ready by March 23; it was faithfully put on stencils by the class ‘beadle’ of that year, John Lepine, and mimeographed at once (48 pages, 8½ × 11) for use in the course as a basis for lectures and study. The correct title is almost certainly ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei.’ The autograph, which was preserved and turned over to the Lonergan Center in 1972, has at the top of the first page two lines which read simply: Supplementum schematicum De scientia atque voluntate Dei.2 In an added title-page the Regis edition of 1950 bears the words: SUPPLEMENTUM SCHEMATICUM DE PRAEDESTINATIONE and continues on the first page with the title of the autograph.3 It seems that this title-page is an addition of the typist, linking the set of notes to the section of theology then being studied, but that it was not part of Lonergan’s own choice for a title. The work itself continues an interest Lonergan had acquired in writing his doctoral dissertation and pursued for over twelve years: the relation of divine will and dominion with human effort and freedom. It is linked most closely of all to the ‘De ente supernaturali’ of 1946, being, one may say, an expansion of two famous Scholia of that work, on the divine concursus and its efficacy. For the general sequence, therefore, of Lonergan’s writings on these questions, we refer the reader to the Editor’s Introduction to ‘De ente supernaturali.’ Here it will be enough to say that the old questions recur (the Molinist scientia media and the Bannezian praemotio physica, divine transcendence and the psychological analysis of human freedom, etc.) and are pushed to new degrees of acute speculation. But some ideas make their appearance here for the first time: the usus purus and usus coniunctus are new, and so is the way of handling the metaphysical analysis of propositions that are simultaneous in truth. Again, there is a feel for history in the conditions of human liberty, a presage of the great concentration on historical consciousness that becomes dominant a decade later. There is also in §16 a hint of attention to the interpersonal, a theme that Lonergan would be slow to take up expressly. 2 [The autograph is available on the website www.bernardlonergan.com at 67700dtl050.] 3 [The 1950 edition may be found on the website www.bernardlonergan.com at 10300dtl050. The Regis edition may be found on the same website at 67701dtl050.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

261

God’s Knowledge and Will

In one important respect the approach of this work differs considerably from that of ‘De ente supernaturali.’ In the latter, Lonergan’s intention, as he indicates in his own introduction, was deliberately systematic: to set up his ideas in the ordo compositorius, i.e., synthetically. In the present work, however, he seems to have opted for a more piecemeal method. Thus we read in the opening paragraphs: In our exposition we shall follow an order that is more pedagogical than logical, first setting forth separately the simpler elements and then bringing them together and ordering them in such a way that the more complex matters can be understood. Again, he says in his concluding summary: Accordingly, it is by covering a range of topics, always addressing different problems in different ways, by eliminating errors more than through a positive grasp of the truth itself, and by an accumulation rather than a synthesis of principles, that we have come to affirm in a coherent way that God is Lord of all, that we are responsible for ourselves, and that the sinner is guilty of his or her sin. The approach makes use at this early date of a device he later discovered in St Thomas and linked with Piaget’s work on grouping of operations: … if one reads a series of successive chapters [of Aquinas’s Contra Gentiles], one finds the same arguments recurring over and over in ever slightly different forms; what was going forward … was the differentiation of operations and their conjunction in ever fresh combinations.4 An example of this is his use of ‘adaequatio veritatis’ and ‘veritates simultaneae,’ defined early in the work and used repeatedly in various contexts later on. His ‘meeting new difficulties with new solutions,’ I think, is often less a new principle than a new application of one already established. But, because the object of inquiry is the mind and will of God, which is mystery,

4 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 30.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

262

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

1

De Fine Huius Operis

(a) Sacra theologia ita dividitur ut primo per viam inventionis ex sacra Scriptura, Patribus, conciliis, theologis quid sit credendum determinetur, deinde per viam doctrinae secundum praeclarum exemplum S. Thomae quaeratur fructuosissima illa intelligentia, etsi limitata, quam laudat concilium Vaticanum.6

The Robert Mollot Collection

263

God’s Knowledge and Will

the principle is not one that allows positive insight and consequent deductive reasoning. It is difficult to convey to a modern generation the fascination exerted on the minds of his students of twenty years ago by the questions handled in this small treatise, or the enthusiasm generated by the study of Lonergan’s views. The topics must appear strange today even to Lonergan’s most diligent students, if they have been brought up on empirical theology and intentionality analysis, knowing only the ‘later’ Lonergan of the Toronto lecture of 1967 on ‘Theology in Its New Context’ or of the book of 1972, Method in Theology. The old questions have been upstaged. Even his readers and students from earlier years will not be as sanguine as perhaps they once were on their ability to penetrate into the mystery of God or speak without incoherence of his knowledge and will. Yet the old questions are still there, in the habitual furniture of the mind for some of us, in the mind’s potency for others. They are not so much eliminated as re-located in the psychological process of learning. The empirical basis of theology leads to truth about the mysterious God, and the truth, being itself mysterious, leads to questions for understanding, questions of the sort handled here. The insertion of the prior step, which relates theology more explicitly to experience, simply postpones their occurrence; they still demand answers. It is the hope of the editor that this work, which I think carried the answers as far as they have ever reached, will be of service still to the people of God in their wrestling with the dark questions of their destiny and relation to his sovereign will.5

1

The Aim of This Treatise

(a) Theology is divided as follows: first, ‘the way of discovery,’ in which from a study of scripture, the Fathers, the councils, and the theologians we determine what we are to believe; and second, ‘the way of teaching,’ wherein, following the outstanding example of St Thomas Aquinas, we seek that very fruitful, albeit limited, understanding [of the mysteries] commended by the [First] Vatican Council.6

5 [See below, appendices 2a and 2b, for additions to the text, explained there.] 6 [db 1769, ds 3016, nd 132.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

264

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(b) Hoc supplementum supponit aliunde haustam non solum determinationem eorum quae ad fidem vel pertinent vel quoquo modo accedunt, sed etiam sententiarum diversarum quaestionumque historiae notitiam. Unice ergo intendimus qua brevitate quantaque cohaerentia fieri possit, ut notionibus apte declaratis et theorematibus stabilitis perspiciat diligentia alumnorum studentium quid hac in vita a nobis intelligi non possit, quid autem intelligi possit et debeat. (c) Expositionis ordo non tam logicus quam paedagogicus est ut primo simpliciora separatim proponantur, deinde eorum cumulatione atque digestione magis complexa intelligi possint. Quare primo de denominatione extrinseca (§2), de comparatione entis aeterni cum temporali (§3), de operatione Dei immanente atque contingente (§4), de actione et passione (§5), de necessario et contingente (§6), de futuris contingentibus (§7) actum est, ut theorema dominii divini transcendentis exponi possit (§8) et circa idem distinctiones tradantur (§9). Deinde de divina scientia (§§10, 11), de obiecto voluntatis (§§12–14), de ipsa Dei volitione (§15), de divina actione (§§16–19), de reductione peccati in causas (§20) quaeritur, ut distinctio efformetur inter voluntatem Dei antecedentem et consequentem (§§21–23). Denique posita distinctione signorum rationis (§24),7 tractatur de praedestinatione et reprobatione (§25), et additur epilogus (§26).8 2

De Natura Analysis Metaphysicae

(a) In sequentibus frequentissime argumentum erit analysis metaphysica, cuius natura statim perspici debet. Processio semper est eadem: de propositionibus veris proceditur ad entia quibus propositio vera sit vera. Quare analysis metaphysica syllogismo declarari potest. Maior praemissa est definitio veritatis, nempe, veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei.

The Robert Mollot Collection

265

God’s Knowledge and Will

(b) This supplementary treatise presupposes that one has learned from other sources not only those matters that have been determined as belonging to faith or in some way relevant to it, but also the history of diverse questions and opinions. Accordingly, our one aim here is to set forth as concisely and coherently as possible such clearly defined ideas and solidly grounded theorems as will enable diligent students to perceive what cannot be understood by us in this life and, on the other hand, what we can and ought to understand. (c) In our exposition we shall follow an order that is more pedagogical than logical, first setting forth separately the simpler elements and then bringing them together and ordering them in such a way that the more complex matters can be understood. First of all, therefore, we shall discuss extrinsic denomination (§2), the comparison between eternal and temporal being (§3), God’s immanent and contingent operations (§4), action and passion (§5), necessity and contingency (§6), and contingent future events (§7), so that we can set forth our theorem on God’s transcendent sovereignty (§8) and make the necessary distinctions concerning it (§9). Next, we shall examine God’s knowledge (§§10, 11), the object of the will (§§12–14), divine volition (§15), divine action (§§16–19), and the reduction of sin to causes (§20), so as to work out the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God (§§21–23). Finally, after distinguishing the various signa rationis (§24),7 we shall treat predestination and reprobation (§25) and add an epilogue (§26).8 2

The Nature of Metaphysical Analysis

(a) Since in what follows we shall be making frequent use of metaphysical analysis, we ought to consider here the nature of that analysis. Our procedure is always the same: from propositions that are true we proceed to those things by reason of which a true proposition is true. Thus, metaphysical analysis can be expressed in a syllogism. The major premise is the definition of truth, namely, that truth consists in the correspondence between the intellect and a thing.

7 [See the note at the beginning of §24, p. 373.] 8 [In fact, §26 is a series of objections, and is so titled. The ‘epilogue’ presumably would be the final §27, entitled ‘A Brief Summary of Principles.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

266

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Minor praemissa est haec vel illa veritas. Conclusio est de entibus quae requiruntur et sufficiunt ut vera sit propositio seu ut adaequatio intellectus et rei exsistat. (b) Distinctio fundamentalis in analysi metaphysica viget inter denominationem intrinsecam et denominationem extrinsecam. Denominatio est subiecto intrinseca si adaequatio veritatis habetur per entitatem subiecto intrinsecam. Ita ‘Socrates est homo’ vel ‘Socrates est albus’ sunt denominationes intrinsecae, quia habent veritatem per entitates ‘humanitatem’ vel ‘albedinem’ ipsi Socrati intrinsecas. Denominatio est subiecto extrinseca si adaequatio veritatis habetur per entitatem subiecto extrinsecam. Ita ‘ignis me calefacit’ est denominatio extrinseca; propositio enim vera non est per calorem igni intrinsecum neque per calorem ex igni transeuntem sed solummodo per calorem qui ex igni in me fit; porro, calor qui in me fit non est in igni. (c) Exinde colligitur clavis fere principalis in tota nostra inquisitione. Simultaneae in veritate sunt propositiones quae per unam eandemque entitatem habent adaequationem veritatis. Exsistunt propositiones simultaneae in veritate quia exsistunt denominationes extrinsecae. E.g., per eundem calorem qui in me ex igni fit duae propositiones sunt verae, nempe, ‘ignis me calefacit’ et ‘ipse ab igni calefio.’ Et similiter quandocumque habetur denominatio extrinseca, habentur propositiones simultaneae in veritate, nempe, propositio quae est vera per denominationem extrinsecam, et alia propositio quae dicit ‘denominans extrinsecum exsistit.’ 3

De Comparatione Entis Aeterni et Temporalis

(a) Notissima est doctrina S. Thomae nihil Deo praeteritum vel futurum esse, omnia autem praesentia. Quod brevi argumento declarari potest. Si enim quid umquam est Deo praesens, semper est Deo praesens. Nam secundum quandam partem seu instans aeternitatis est praesens. Quae pars seu instans semper est, cum aeternitas sit tota simul.

The Robert Mollot Collection

267

God’s Knowledge and Will

The minor premise is some particular truth. The conclusion is about those things that are required and are sufficient for that proposition to be true, that is, to possess that correspondence between the intellect and the thing. (b) Fundamental in metaphysical analysis is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. Denomination is intrinsic to the subject if the above truth-correspondence is had by reason of an entity that is in the subject. Thus the propositions ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is white’ are intrinsic denominations, since their truth rests upon the realities of humanity and whiteness, which are intrinsic to Socrates himself. Denomination is extrinsic to the subject if the correspondence is had by reason of an entity that is outside the subject. Thus the proposition ‘The fire warms me’ is an extrinsic denomination of the subject ‘fire’; for this proposition is true not by reason of the heat that is within the fire nor the heat radiating from the fire, but solely by reason of the heat from the fire and in me; and the heat that is in me is not in the fire. (c) From this we arrive at what is virtually the master key to the whole of our inquiry. Propositions are said to be simultaneous in truth if they are true by reason of one and the same entity. Propositions that are simultaneous in truth exist because of extrinsic denomination. For example, the presence in me of heat from the fire gives rise to two true propositions, namely, ‘The fire warms me’ and ‘I am warmed by the fire.’ Accordingly, whenever there is an extrinsic denomination there are propositions that are simultaneous in truth, namely, a proposition that is true by extrinsic denomination, and another proposition stating that the extrinsic denominator exists. 3

The Comparison between Eternal and Temporal Being

(a) That nothing is past or future to God, but rather that all things are present to him, is a well-known doctrine of St Thomas. This point can be briefly demonstrated as follows. If anything is at any time present to God, it is always present to him; for it is present to God at a certain part or moment of eternity, and that part or moment is everexistent, since eternity is simultaneously whole.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

268

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(b) Quaeres vero quid sit istud ‘simul esse’ quo omnia Deo sunt praesentia et nihil praeteritum vel futurum. Respondetur: ‘est’ duo significat; primo et semper significat ens et verum, et ita non differt ab ‘erat’ vel ‘erit’; deinde connotat comparationem inter tempus rei et tempus iudicantis, et ita differt ab ‘erat’ et ‘erit.’

Porro, ens temporale est in quo fuisse, esse, et fore realiter differunt; quae differentia proxime invenitur in praedicamento ‘quando’ ut tamen ipsum rei esse afficiat; nam antequam ens temporale est, non erat; postquam erat, non est; et quamdiu est, perpetuo transit esse in fuisse et fore in esse.

Ens vero aeternum est in quo fuisse, esse, et fore sunt re et ratione idem; unde aeternitas dicitur esse tota simul; non enim tempore limitatur neque mensuratur esse entis aeterni. Proinde, duplex est comparatio entium; prima comparatio est communis omnium secundum quod sunt entia et vera; altera comparatio pertinet ad sola entia temporalia prout eodem vel diverso tempore esse eorum limitatur et mensuratur. E.g., equus Alexandri et equus Caesaris non erant simul; diversis enim temporibus erant. At equus Alexandri simul erat cum sole, et equus Caesaris simul erat cum sole; utroque enim tempore sol erat, ita tamen ut, quando simul erat sol cum equo Alexandri, futurum erat esse-simul solis cum equo Caesaris. Denique simul erant equus Alexandri et Deus, et simul erant equus Caesaris et Deus; non quod Deus utroque tempore erat, nam Deus in tempore non est; sed quia idem in Deo est fuisse, esse, et fore.

Unde concludes: ‘simul esse’ sequitur ipsam rationem entis nisi praedicamentum ‘quando’ impedit; quare cum Deus tempore non limitetur, simul est cum omnibus quae sunt etiamsi inter se comparata simul non sint. Scilicet, secundum vulgarem aestimationem tempus continet entia, unde eatenus entia simul esse possunt quatenus eodem tempore sunt. At secundum iudicium philosophicum ens continet tempus tamquam partem sui, nempe, praedicamentum ‘quando’; quare entia eatenus simul sunt quatenus entia sunt nisi impedit limitatio temporis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

269

God’s Knowledge and Will

(b) What, you may ask, is this ‘simultaneously whole’ of eternity whereby all things are ever present to God and nothing is past or future to him? We answer this question by noting that ‘is’ can be taken in two different senses: first and always, as denoting being and the true, and as such it is the same as ‘was’ or ‘will be’; second, as connoting a comparison between the time of the reality denoted and the time of the one making the affirmation, and as such it differs from ‘was’ and ‘will be.’ Again, temporal being is that in which ‘was,’ ‘is,’ and ‘will be’ are really distinct. The proximate basis for this distinction is the predicament or category quando, ‘when,’ which nevertheless bears upon the existence of a thing. For before a temporal being exists, it was not, and after it has existed, it is no more; and as long as it is in existence, its ‘is’ is continuously passing into ‘was’ and its ‘will be’ into ‘is.’ But eternal being is that in which ‘was’ and ‘is’ and ‘will be’ are the same both in reality and conceptually. Hence eternity is said to be all simultaneous; for the existence of eternal being is neither limited nor measured by time. Accordingly, beings can be compared in two ways. The first is common to all beings insofar as they are and are true; the second comparison pertains only to temporal beings as those whose existence is limited and measured by their being either at the same time or at different times. Take, for example, Alexander’s horse and Caesar’s horse: they were not simultaneous, for they existed at different times. But Alexander’s horse was simultaneous with the sun, and so was Caesar’s, since the sun was in existence during the lifetimes of both; yet, when the sun was simultaneous with Alexander’s horse, its simultaneity with Caesar’s was still in the future. Finally, God and Alexander’s horse were simultaneous to each other, and so were God and Caesar’s horse – not that God was in existence in each of these times, for God is not in time, but because in God ‘was,’ ‘is,’ and ‘will be’ are all one and the same. To conclude: ‘to be simultaneous with’ follows upon the very nature of being itself, except when the category ‘when’ prevents it. Therefore, since God is not limited by time, he is simultaneous with all things that exist, even if they are not all simultaneous with one another. Of course, the common opinion among people is that all beings are contained in time, and so can be simultaneous only insofar as they exist at the same time. But philosophy asserts that being contains time as a part within itself, namely, the category ‘when,’ and hence beings precisely as beings are simultaneous unless prevented by the limitation of time.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

270

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(c) Cum operari sequatur esse, manifestum est scire Dei et velle Dei sicut esse Dei simul cum omnibus esse.

4

Operatio Immanens et Contingens

(a) Quidquid contingenter de Deo dicitur, per denominationem extrinsecam habet adaequationem veritatis. Aut enim per denominationem intrinsecam, aut per denominationem extrinsecam. Atqui intrinseca denominatio est impossibilis. Ergo per denominationem extrinsecam. Minor patet: nulla enim entitas contingens potest esse intrinseca Deo absolute simplici et necessario. (b) Sunt operationes immanentes quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. Deus enim scit hunc mundum exsistere; praeterea, vult hunc mundum exsistere. At liberrimo consilio creavit. Potuit non creare. Contingenter creavit. Ideoque potuit non scire hunc mundum exsistere; potuit non velle hunc mundum exsistere; ideoque contingenter de Deo dicitur quod scit et vult hunc mundum exsistere. (c) Quamvis sint operationes Deo immanentes quae contingenter et per denominationem extrinsecam habent adaequationem veritatis, tamen ab aeterno de Deo dicuntur.8 Operari enim sequitur esse. Porro, esse Dei est aeternum. Pariter ergo scire Dei et velle eius sunt aeterna. (d) Obicies: Non habetur denominatio extrinseca nisi exsistit denominans extrinsecum. Ergo non habetur denominatio aeterna nisi exsistit denominans extrinsecum et aeternum. Respondetur: Concedo antecedens et distinguo consequens secundum dicta §3; si tempus continet ens et verum, concedo; si ens continet tempus et comparatio cum Deo non est secundum tempus sed secundum rationem entis et veri tantum, nego. Aliis verbis, non transfertur ‘quando’ a denominante in Deum. (e) Corollarium maximi momenti colligitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

271

God’s Knowledge and Will

(c) Since operation is consequent upon being, it is obvious that just as God’s existence is simultaneous with all things, so also is his knowing and willing. 4

Immanent Contingent Operation

(a) Whatever is predicated of God contingently has its truth-correspondence through extrinsic denomination. For a contingent predication has its truth-correspondence through either intrinsic or extrinsic denomination. But intrinsic denomination is impossible in the case of God, and therefore it must have it through extrinsic denomination. The minor premise above is evident: no contingent entity can be intrinsic to God, who is an absolutely simple and necessary being. (b) There are immanent operations that are predicated contingently of God. God knows that this world exists; moreover, he wills it to exist. But he freely chose to create it; he could have not created it; contingently he created it. Therefore he could have not known that this world exists. He could have not willed this world to exist. That God knows and wills this world to exist is therefore predicated contingently of God. (c) Although there are these immanent operations in God that are true contingently and through extrinsic denomination, nevertheless they are predicated of him from eternity.9 For operation is consequent upon being; and since God’s being is eternal, so likewise are his knowing and willing. (d) One may object here that since there can be no extrinsic denomination without an extrinsic denominator, there can be no extrinsic denomination that is eternal without there being an eternal extrinsic denominator. In reply to this, we grant the antecedent but distinguish the conclusion in accordance with what we said in §3. If being and truth are contained within time, we admit the conclusion; but if being contains time and the comparison with God is made not in terms of time but in terms of being and truth, we deny the conclusion. In other words, the category ‘when’ is not to be transferred from the denominator to God. (e) From this there follows an important corollary.

9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 13, a. 7, ad 3m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

272

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Ex hac doctrina de operationibus Dei immanentibus et contingentibus sequitur series quaedam propositionum quae sunt simultaneae in veritate. Per idem enim habetur adaequatio veritatis sive dicitur ‘hoc contingens exsistit’ sive dicitur ‘Deus scit vel vult hoc contingens exsistere’; haec enim posterior propositio habet adaequationem veritatis per denominans extrinsecum cuius exsistentia ponitur in propositione illa priori. 5

De Actione et Passione

(a) Quaestio ponitur de illa actione quae necessario infert passionem, scilicet, de exercitio causalitatis efficientis. Non ergo agitur de actu secundo; si hoc intelligo, hoc non patitur neque in eo est passio; imo, meum intelligere est pati, et ego patior. Non agitur de eo quod est per accidens sed de eo quod per se convenit actioni et passioni et quidem secundum legem metaphysicam quae exceptiones non admittit. Quare non quaeritur de actione prout est in materialibus vel prout est in creaturis sed de actione ut sic. (b) Quaestio est utrum actio et passio sint duo entia an unum tantum. Respondetur quod actio et passio dicunt idem ens sub diversis respectibus, seu quod unus idemque actus est et actio et passio, at actio est inquantum ab agente est, et passio est inquantum in patiente est. (c) Probatio est per reductionem oppositi in absurdum. Supponatur ergo actionem dicere aliud ens quam passio, et quidem ens agenti intrinsecum. Quaeritur deinde de causa prima utrum exsistat, utrum habeat actionem intrinsecam, utrum actio haec ei insit necessitate naturae an aliunde recepta sit. Si dices eum non exsistere, sequitur nihil exsistere. Si dices eum non habere actionem intrinsecam, sequitur eum nihil agere. Si dices eum habere actionem aliunde receptam, negas eum esse causam primam. Si dices eum habere actionem intrinsecam necessitate naturae, sequitur eum non libere sed necessario agere; porro, cum actio esse nequeat sine passione, sequitur omnes effectus causae primae esse necessarios.

The Robert Mollot Collection

273

God’s Knowledge and Will

From the above doctrine about God’s contingent immanent operations there follows a series of propositions that are simultaneously true. The proposition ‘this contingent reality exists’ and the proposition ‘God knows and wills this contingent reality to exist’ are both true through the same thing. For this second proposition is true through the extrinsic denominator whose existence is stated in the first proposition. 5

Action and Passion

(a) We now turn to consider that action which necessarily produces a ‘passion’ or effect, namely, the exercise of efficient causality. Hence, we are not dealing here with second act. When, for example, I understand X, X is not affected: there is no effect produced in X. In fact, it is my act of understanding that is an effect, and I am affected by it. Nor are we dealing here with what belongs to action and passion per accidens but rather with what belongs to them per se, and indeed belongs to them according to a metaphysical law that admits of no exception. Hence we are not inquiring into the nature of action as found in material objects or in created things, but into action as such. (b) The question is, Are action and passion two distinct entities or only one? To this we reply that action and passion denote the same reality under two different aspects: one and the same act is both action and passion, but considered as from the agent it is action, and considered as in the recipient it is passion. (c) We prove this by demonstrating the impossibility of the opposite position. Let us suppose that action is not the same as passion, but an entity intrinsic to the agent. Then, concerning the first cause, we ask whether it exists, whether it possesses intrinsic action, and whether this action is in it necessarily by its very nature or comes to it from without. If the first cause does not exist, then nothing exists. If it does not have intrinsic action, then it simply does not act. If it receives its action from without, then it is not the first cause. If it has its intrinsic action necessarily by reason of its nature, then it acts not freely but by necessity; moreover, since there can be no action without an effect, it follows that all the effects of the first cause are necessary, not contingent.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

274

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(d) Similiter quandocumque ponitur actio agenti intrinseca, tollitur contingentia et libertas, uti communiter obicitur contra ponentes praedeterminationes physicas. (e) Ergo cum Aristotele dicendum est: actio est in passo; actio est actus huius ut ab hoc; passio est actus huius ut in hoc. 6

De Necessario et Contingente

(a) Necessarium est quod non potest non esse. Esse est esse exsistentiae; quare necessarium non potest non exsistere; e contrario, impossibile non potest exsistere. (b) Necessitas est triplex: absoluta, ex suppositione alterius, et ex suppositione sui ipsius. Absoluta est necessitas eius quod non potest non exsistere. Unde solus Deus est absolute necessarius. Ex suppositione alterius, triplex est necessitas, nempe, metaphysica, physica, et moralis. Ipsa haec necessitas viget in ordine essentiali; consistit in nexu quodam necessario inter antecedens et consequens. Prout nexus est lex metaphysica, lex physica, vel lex moralis, fiunt distinctiones. Lex metaphysica est quod substantia finita non potest esse sine accidentibus inseparabilibus; supposita ergo exsistentia substantiae finitae, necessitate metaphysica ponuntur accidentia inseparabilia. Lex physica est quod calor sese diffundit; supposita ergo exsistentia caloris, necessitate physica ponitur diffusio caloris; quod tamen metaphysice non est necessarium. Lex moralis est ut veritatem dicas si loqueris; supposita ergo exsistentia subiecti rationalis, necessitate morali dicit veritatem si loquitur; attamen cum metaphysice tum physice potest loqui et falsum dicere; necessitas moralis excludit compossibilitatem et bonitatis moralis et falsae loquelae, sed non facit ipsam bonitatem moralem necessariam. Ex suppositione sui ipsius oritur minima illa necessitas quae in omni et quolibet invenitur. Omne enim dum est necesse est esse. Socrates dum sedet necessario sedet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

275

God’s Knowledge and Will

(d) By the same token, whenever an action is attributed to an agent as something intrinsic to it, contingency and freedom are negated. This is the objection commonly brought against the proponents of physical predeterminations. (e) With Aristotle, then, we assert: action is in the recipient; action is the act as from the agent; passion is the act as in the recipient. 6

Necessary and Contingent Being

(a) Necessary being is that which cannot not be. To be is the being of existence; hence a necessary being cannot not exist. Its contrary is the impossible, that which cannot exist. (b) There are three kinds of necessity: absolute necessity, that which is necessary upon the supposition of something else, and that which is necessary upon the supposition of itself. Absolute necessity is the necessity of that which cannot not exist. Hence only God is absolutely necessary. The necessity resulting from the supposition of something else is threefold: metaphysical, physical, and moral. This kind of necessity obtains in the order of essences; it consists in some necessary connection between an antecedent and its consequent. The threefold distinction is based upon whether the connection between them is a metaphysical, physical, or moral law. It is a metaphysical law, for example, that a finite substance cannot exist without inseparable accidents. On the supposition, then, that a certain finite substance exists, by metaphysical necessity the existence of inseparable accidents is also posited. It is a physical law that heat diffuses itself. On the supposition that some heat exists, by physical necessity the diffusion of heat is affirmed, which, however, is not metaphysically necessary. It is a moral law that if you speak, you tell the truth. Supposing, therefore, the existence of a rational subject, by moral necessity such a subject tells the truth when speaking. Yet it is both metaphysically and physically possible to speak and be telling a lie. Moral necessity makes moral goodness and lying mutually exclusive, but it does not necessitate moral goodness itself. That which is necessary on the supposition of itself has the minimal necessity found in any and every being. For as long as something is, it necessarily is. While Socrates is seated he is necessarily seated.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

276

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Haec necessitas ex suppositione sui ipsius componitur cum contingentia absoluta, metaphysica, physica, et morali. E.g., sit actus liber et supererogatorius; dum est, necessario est; et tamen neque absolute neque metaphysice neque physice neque moraliter est hic actus necessarius. (c) Contingens est quod potest vel esse vel non esse. Contingentia pariter dividitur ac necessitas. Unde omnes creaturae contingenter exsistunt; accidentia separabilia insunt substantiae contingentia metaphysica; actus liber exsistit contingentia physica; actus supererogatorius exsistit contingentia morali. At nihil exsistit sine necessitate ex suppositione sui ipsius, quod contra principium identitatis seu non-contradictionis esset. 7

De Futuris Contingentibus

(a) Quaeri solet inde ab Aristotele utrum contingentia futura sint determinate vera. E.g., utrum hodie verum iudicium elici possit quod cras fiet proelium navale.10 (b) Primo, respondetur negative circa scientiam humanam. Homo enim secundum esse et cognoscere est ens temporale; quare futurum non est ei praesens. Praeterea, ei non est praesens aliquid aliud quod necessario nexu cum futuro contingente connectitur; secus, futurum illud non esset contingens sed necessarium. Unde colligitur quod iudicium praesens ‘hoc contingens futurum aliquando erit’ non potest habere adaequationem veritatis sive ex parte ipsius futuri contingentis quia non nunc est sive ex parte alterius quocum necessario connectitur futurum contingens. Ergo iudicium ex scientia humana de contingente futuro non potest habere adaequationem veritatis, ideoque nunc non potest esse determinate verum. (c) Deinde cum distinctione respondetur circa scientiam divinam. Deo enim, enti aeterno, nihil potest esse futurum; quod enim umquam est Deo praesens, semper est ei praesens (§3).

The Robert Mollot Collection

277

God’s Knowledge and Will

This latter necessity is compatible with absolute, metaphysical, physical, and moral contingency. Take, for example, an action that is both free and supererogatory. As long as it exists, it necessarily exists; and yet such an action is neither absolutely nor metaphysically nor physically nor morally necessary. (c) Contingent being is that which can exist or not exist. Contingency is divided in the same way as necessity. Thus, all creatures exist contingently. Separable accidents inhere in a substance with metaphysical contingency; a free act exists with physical contingency; a supererogatory act exists with moral contingency. But nothing exists without the necessity resulting from the supposition of itself, for that would be contrary to the principle of identity, or non-contradiction. 7

Contingent Future Realities

(a) From the time of Aristotle the question has been asked whether future contingent events are true determinately. Can one, for example, make a true judgment that a naval battle will occur tomorrow? 10 (b) First of all, in the case of human knowledge the answer is no. For in our mode of existing and of knowing we are situated within the flow of time, and so the future is not present to us. Moreover, there is not present to us any other reality that has a necessary connection with a future contingent event; otherwise that future event would not be contingent, but necessary. From this we conclude that a present judgment, ‘This future contingent thing will occur,’ cannot have the correspondence of truth, whether from a knowledge of the future contingent itself, since it does not exist at this point in time, nor of anything else with which that future contingent is necessarily connected. Therefore a judgment that is based upon human knowledge about some future contingent event cannot possess that correspondence between the mind and reality that would render it true, and so it cannot at the present time be determinately true. (c) Next, in the case of divine knowledge we reply with a distinction. Nothing can be future to God, whose being is eternal; for whatever at any time is present to God is ever present to him; see §3. 10 [Aristotle’s discussion of this issue and his use of the example of a naval battle that will occur tomorrow can be found in On Interpretation ix.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

278

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

At quae nobis sunt futura et Deo praesentia, circa haec Deus potest cognoscere verum determinate. Sicut enim nos de eis quae nobis sint praesentia veram et certam cognitionem habere possumus, pariter Deus de eis quae ei sunt praesentia. (d) Porro mediantibus scientia divina, revelatione, fide, nos possumus habere certitudinem de futuro contingente, v.g., quod antichristus erit. (e) Ex quibus fiat gressus ad principium maximi momenti. Deus certo scit hoc contingens futurum. Atqui impossibile est Deum certo scire et illud contingens non fore. Ergo necessario erit. Respondetur primo quod nihil Deo est futurum. Instatur quod manet difficultas. Impossibile est Deum certo scire et illud contingens non esse. Atqui Deus certo scit. Ergo illud contingens necessario est. Distinguitur minor. Deus certo scit hoc contingens exsistere, per denominationem intrinsecam, nego; per denominationem extrinsecam ex ipso contingente, concedo.Vide §4. Distinguitur conclusio. Illud contingens necessario est, absolute vel ex suppositione alterius, nego; ex suppositione sui ipsius, concedo. Supponitur enim exsistentia contingentis ut habeatur adaequatio veritatis in minore.

8

De Transcendentia Divina

(a) Consideretur hic syllogismus. Si Deus hoc aliquid exsistere sive scit sive vult sive facit, necessario hoc aliquid est. Atqui Deus hoc aliquid exsistere scit, vult, vel facit. Ergo necessario hoc aliquid est. (b) Maior est veritas necessaria necessitate metaphysica. Absolute enim impossibile est ut Deus infinite perfectus vel erret vel frustra velit vel frustra agat. Quidquid ergo Deus scit, infallibiliter scit; quidquid vult, efficaciter vult; quidquid facit, irresistibiliter facit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

279

God’s Knowledge and Will

But God can know as determinately true what is future to us though present to him. Just as we can have true and certain knowledge about what is present to us, so likewise God knows what is present to him. (d) Furthermore, through the mediation of divine knowledge, revelation, and faith, we can have certitude concerning some contingent future event – for example, that there will be an antichrist. (e) From this we now come to a most important principle. [It is elucidated by answering the following objection.] God knows with certainty any future contingent event. But it is impossible that God should know it with certainty and that that contingent event will not occur; therefore it will occur necessarily. Our first reply to this objection is that nothing is future to God. But, says the objector, the difficulty remains. It is impossible for God to know for certain some contingent event without that event occurring. Now God does know it for certain, and therefore that contingent event occurs necessarily. We reply by distinguishing the minor premise as follows: that God knows with certainty the existence of that contingent event is true, not through intrinsic denomination but through extrinsic denomination from the contingent event itself; see §4. We distinguish the conclusion accordingly. That contingent event exists necessarily, not, however, with absolute necessity, nor with the necessity resulting from the supposition of something else, but only with the necessity resulting from the supposition of itself. For the existence of that contingent event is presupposed in order that the minor premise be true. 8

Divine Transcendence

(a) Consider the following syllogism: If God either knows or wills or causes any particular thing, X, to exist, X necessarily exists. But God knows, wills, or causes X to exist; therefore X necessarily exists. (b) The major premise is a metaphysically necessary truth. For it is absolutely impossible that God, who is infinitely perfect, should either err or will in vain or act in vain. Whatever God knows, therefore, he knows infallibly; whatever he wills, he wills effectively; whatever he does, he does irresistibly.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

280

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Sed quod infallibiliter scitur esse, vel quod efficaciter volitur esse, vel quod irresistibiliter efficitur, illud necessario est. (c) Minor est veritas necessaria ex suppositione. Supposito quod hoc aliquid exsistit, necessarium est Deum omniscientem eius exsistentiam scire, sicut necessarium est Deum omnium Dominum eius exsistentiam velle, et necessarium est Deum omnium causam primam eius exsistentiam efficere. At ipsum suppositum non est necessarium; potuit enim Deus nihil creare. Ulterius, de Deo dici non potest quod scit hoc aliquid exsistere vel vult vel facit nisi per extrinsecam denominationem; quod enim contingenter de Deo dicitur, per denominationem extrinsecam dicitur. (d) Conclusio est legitima et certa. At conclusio sequitur praemissam debiliorem. Quare ex minore aestimanda est qualitas huius necessitatis. Iam vero minor potest habere adaequationem veritatis dupliciter; vel ex ipso hoc aliquo extrinsece denominante, vel ex alio exsistente cum quo hoc aliquid nexu necessario metaphysico vel physico connectitur. In casu priori, necessitas conclusionis est minima illa quae est ex suppositione sui ipsius. In casu posteriori, necessitas conclusionis est vel metaphysica vel physica prout hoc aliquid necessitate metaphysica vel physica sequitur ex eo quod extrinsece denominat Deum scientem, volentem, facientem ut hoc aliquid exsistat. (e) Ex quibus colligitur quid sit transcendentia divina. Transcendentia divina in primis dicit scientiam divinam esse infallibilem, voluntatem Dei esse efficacem, actionem Dei esse irresistibilem, ita ut quidquid Deus sciat velit faciat, necessario hoc sit. At transcendentia divina etiam dicit Deum stare extra ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae, hoc sensu quod ex sola infallibilitate scientiae divinae, ex sola efficacitate voluntatis divinae, ex sola irresistibilitate actionis divinae determinari non potest utrum scitum, volitum, effectum sit necessarium necessitate metaphysica, an physica, an morali, an minima illa ex suppositione sui ipsius. 9

Principia Prioritatis et Simultaneitatis

(a) Colliguntur ex antecessis brevia principia quae in subsequenti materia sunt utilissima.

The Robert Mollot Collection

281

God’s Knowledge and Will

But whatever he infallibly knows to exist or effectively wills to exist or irresistibly causes to exist, necessarily does exist. (c) The minor is a truth that is necessary on a supposition. Supposing that X exists, it necessarily follows that God in his omniscience knows its existence, that God, the sovereign Lord of all, wills its existence, and that God as first cause effects its existence. However, this supposition is itself not necessary, for God could have created nothing. Moreover, only by extrinsic denomination can it be said that God knows or wills or causes X’s existence; for whatever is predicated contingently of God is predicated by extrinsic denomination. (d) The conclusion to this syllogism is legitimate and certain. Yet a conclusion is never stronger than its weaker premise, and so the nature of this necessity must be determined from the minor premise. Now, the minor premise can derive its truth-correspondence in two ways: either from the extrinsic denominator itself, the existence of X, or from some other existing being, Y, with which X is metaphysically or physically connected. In the first case the necessity of the conclusion is that minimal necessity resulting from the supposition of itself. In the second case the necessity of the conclusion is either metaphysical or physical according to whether by metaphysical or physical necessity X is a consequence of Y, which extrinsically denominates God as knowing, willing, or causing it to exist. (e) From this we derive our understanding of divine transcendence. First of all, divine transcendence means that God’s knowledge is infallible, his will efficacious, and his action irresistible, so that whatever God knows, wills, or causes necessarily exists. But divine transcendence also means that God stands outside the order of necessity and contingency, in the sense that one cannot determine solely from the infallibility of God’s knowledge or by the efficacy of his will or by the irresistibility of his action whether what he knows, wills, or effects is necessary by metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity, or by that minimal necessity resulting from the supposition of itself. 9

Principles of Priority and Simultaneity

(a) From the foregoing considerations we now set down a couple of brief principles that will prove most useful in our subsequent discussion.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

282

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(b) Principium prioritatis ponitur in ordine causali, secundum illud quod causa est prior suo effectu. Porro, Deus est omnium causa agens, et agit per intellectum et voluntatem. Quare quidquid est, est ex Deo sciente, volente, efficiente. Ergo prius Deus scit, vult, facit ut hoc aliquid exsistat quam hoc aliquid exsistit. Quae prioritas est causalis. (c) Principium simultaneitatis ponitur in ordine veritatis, secundum quod denominationes extrinsecae inducunt veritates simultaneas seu veritates quae habent adaequationem cum re per eandem entitatem. Porro, quidquid contingenter de Deo dicitur, per denominationem extrinsecam dicitur. Omnes ergo veritates contingenter de Deo dictae postulant exsistentiam extrinseci denominantis et ideo alias veritates simultaneas. Alia ex parte quod a Deo scitur, volitur, efficitur aut continetur in alio ente finito et necessitante aut non ita continetur. Si in alio ente finito et necessitante continetur, denominatio Dei extrinseca sumi potest ex hoc alio. Si vero non in alio ente finito et necessitante continetur scitum, volitum, effectum, tunc denominatio Dei extrinseca ex ipso scito, volito, effecto sumi debet. Et hoc in casu valet principium simultaneitatis. Principium ergo simultaneitatis est quod veritates simultaneae sunt quod hoc contingens exsistit et quod Deus scit exsistentiam huius contingentis vel vult hanc exsistentiam vel facit. (d) Ex principio simultaneitatis habetur per modum corollarii thesis 10a apud auctorem (Lennerz, De Deo uno, p. 252, §360 ss.).11 (e) Praeter prioritatem in causalitate et simultaneitatem in veritate, agnosci debent prioritas et simultaneitas circa aeterna et temporalia. De quibus supra, §3.

The Robert Mollot Collection

283

God’s Knowledge and Will

(b) The principle of priority obtains in the order of causality; it states that a cause is prior to its effect. But God is the efficient cause of all things and acts through his intellect and will. Whatever exists, therefore, comes from God as knowing, willing, and causing. Hence God’s knowing, willing, and causing a thing to exist is prior to the existence of that thing. This priority is causal priority. (c) The principle of simultaneity obtains in the order of truth; it states that extrinsic denominations ground truths that are simultaneous, that is, truths that are true through the same entity. Now whatever is predicated contingently of God is predicated by way of extrinsic denomination. Hence all truths predicated contingently about God postulate the existence of an extrinsic denominator and therefore other simultaneous truths. On the other hand, whatever is known, willed, or caused by God is either contained in some other finite and necessitating being or is not so contained. If it is contained in another finite and necessitating being, then the extrinsic denomination of God can be made from that other being. But if that which God knows, wills, and causes is not contained in some other finite and necessitating being, then the extrinsic denomination of God must be taken from that object that is known, willed, and caused. In this case the principle of simultaneity obtains. The principle of simultaneity, therefore, is this: that this contingent being exists and that God knows or wills or causes its existence are simultaneous truths. (d) Thesis 10 in Lennerz, De Deo uno, §§ 360–68, pp. 252–59, is a corollary of the principle of simultaneity.11 (e) Besides priority in causality and simultaneity in truth, we must also recognize priority and simultaneity concerning the eternal and the temporal; see §3.

11 [H. Lennerz, De Deo uno, 4th ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1948) 252–59. Thesis 10 reads: ‘Deus libera condicionate futura non cognoscit in signo antecedente eorum futuritionem.’ In the fifth edition of De Deo uno, published in 1955, the same thesis 10 is found in §§360–68, pp. 254–61.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

284

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

10

De Scientia Dei

(a) Actus scientiae Dei est ipse actus purus intelligendi seu ipsum intelligere;12 quare hic actus est unicus, neque umquam est potentia vel habitu sed semper actu. Obiectum scientiae Dei dividitur in primarium et secundarium; obiectum primarium est ipse actus purus, seu ipsum esse subsistens, seu ipsa divina essentia; obiectum vero secundarium tripliciter dividitur et secundum hanc obiecti divisionem sermo fit de scientia simplicis intelligentiae, de scientia media, et de scientia visionis. (b) Per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae Deus intelligit totam seriem mundorum possibilium cum omnibus suis partibus, eventibus, et nexibus sive necessariis sive contingentibus. Fundamentum huius scientiae est obiectum primarium. Intelligendo enim se ipsum, Deus intelligit virtutem suam; intelligendo virtutem suam, intelligit omnia quae per virtutem suam effici possint, nempe, totam seriem mundorum possibilium. (c) Per scientiam mediam Deus cum omnimoda certitudine scit quid in singulis adiunctis sive necessario sive contingenter eveniret si ipse hunc vel illum mundum creare eligeret. Fundamentum huius scientiae, uti opinamur (vide §11), est ipsa divina transcendentia. Intelligendo enim se ipsum, intelligit Deus se esse transcendentem. Intelligit ergo si ipse eligeret hunc vel illum mundum creare, necessario esset hic vel ille mundus, exacte prout in scientia simplicis intelligentiae esse perspicitur. Et ulterius intelligit nullam inde necessitatem contingentibus imponi, uti supra (§8) expositum est. (d) Differunt obiectum scientiae simplicis intelligentiae et obiectum scientiae mediae. Obiectum illud est possibile; obiectum hoc est hypotheticum, scil., non possibile qua tale sed sub conditione ‘si ipse illum mundum creare eligerem.’ Iterum in utroque obiecto exhibentur alii eventus, motus, actus necessario connexi et alii contingenter connexi inter se. Sed ex sola scientia simplicis intelligentiae, posita una parte mundi possibilis, ad aliam partem contingenter connexam concludi non potest. Ex scientia media vero eiusmodi

The Robert Mollot Collection

285

God’s Knowledge and Will

10

God’s Knowledge

(a) The act of God’s knowledge is the pure act of understanding: it is understanding itself.12 This act, therefore, is unique, never exists potentially or habitually, but is always in act. God’s knowledge has a primary and a secondary object. Its primary object is pure act itself, that is, subsistent being itself, the divine essence; its secondary object is threefold, and according to this threefold division of its secondary object we speak of the knowledge of simple understanding, middle knowledge, and vision-knowledge. (b) Through knowledge of simple understanding, God understands the entire series of possible world orders, with all their parts and events and all the connections among them, both necessary and contingent. The primary object is the foundation of this knowledge. In understanding himself, God understands his power; understanding his power, he understands all that he is capable of doing, in other words, the entire series of possible world orders. (c) Through middle knowledge God knows with perfect certainty all that would happen, necessarily and contingently, in every set of circumstances if he were to create this or that particular world. The foundation of this kind of knowledge is, in our opinion, divine transcendence itself (see §11). Understanding himself as he does, God knows himself to be transcendent. He understands, therefore, that were he to create a particular world, then that world would necessarily exist exactly as understood in his knowledge of simple understanding. Furthermore, he understands that no necessity is thereby imposed upon what is contingent, as we have explained in §8. (d) There is a difference between the object of the knowledge of simple understanding and the object of this middle knowledge. The object of the former is that which is possible, whereas the object of the latter is that which is hypothetical, that is, possible on the condition ‘if I should choose to create that particular world.’ Also, in both objects there are to be found some events, movements, and acts that are necessarily connected to one another and others that are contingently interconnected. But on the basis of the knowledge of simple understanding alone, one cannot conclude from the positing of one part

12 [Latin, ipsum intelligere; ‘itself’ is the intensive, not the reflexive, pronoun.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

286

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

conclusio haberi potest, non quod eventus contingenter connexi fiant necessario connexi, sed quod singuli eventus habitudine infallibili, efficaci, irresistibili ad scientiam, voluntatem, actionem Dei referuntur.

(e) Per scientiam visionis intelligit Deus omnia actualia, nobis quidem praeterita, praesentia, et futura, sed ipsi Deo aeterno praesentia. Supponit haec scientia liberrimum illud consilium quo Deus hunc mundum creare decrevit. Ad adaequationem veritatis requirit haec scientia ipsum mundum exsistentem et Deum extrinsece denominantem. Differt ergo haec scientia ab aliis quae habent adaequationem veritatis sive in ipso Deo comprehenso sive in virtute Dei comprehensa sive in transcendentia Dei comprehensa. 11

De Diversis Radicibus Scientiae Mediae

(a) Duplex semper est quaestio, Quid sit, et An sit. Quaestio de radice scientiae mediae est, non quaestio an sit, sed quaestio quid sit et quidem usque ad ultimum ‘cur.’ Hanc radicem posuimus in ipsa divina transcendentia. Alii aliter faciunt quorum tamen sententiae aut ad nostram revocari possunt aut inconvenientes demonstrantur. (b) Ipse Molina, Bellarminus,13 et forte alii radicem scientiae mediae in divina super-comprehensione voluntatis liberae posuerunt. Ita perfecte ergo creator creabilem voluntatem comprehendit ut clare distincteque perspiciat quid in singulis adiunctis electura esset. Circa quam sententiam haec est difficultas. Aut supponitur nexus necessarius inter ipsam voluntatem comprehensam et suos actus aut non suppo-

The Robert Mollot Collection

287

God’s Knowledge and Will

of a possible world to another part contingently connected to it; whereas on the basis of middle knowledge one can draw that sort of conclusion, not because contingently connected events become necessarily connected to one another, but because each separate event has an infallible, effective, and irresistible relation to God’s knowledge, will, and action respectively. (e) Through vision-knowledge God understands all actual realities, which to us are past, present, and future, but are all present to God in his eternity. This knowledge supposes God’s utterly free decision whereby he has chosen to create this present world. For this knowledge to be true, this world must be actually existing and extrinsically denominating God. Hence this knowledge differs from the others whose truth resides either in God’s self-comprehension or in his comprehension of his power or of his transcendence. 11

The Various Roots of Middle Knowledge

(a) There are always these two questions, ‘What is it?’ and ‘Is it?’ The question about the root of God’s middle knowledge is not ‘Is it?’ but ‘What is it?’, a question to be pursued right to the final ‘Why?’ Our position is that the root of God’s middle knowledge is divine transcendence itself. Other opinions have been advanced, which can either be brought into agreement with ours, or else shown to be inadequate. (b) Molina, Bellarmine,13 and perhaps others locate the root of middle knowledge in God’s supercomprehension of a free will. In this opinion, therefore, the Creator has such a perfect comprehension of a creatable will that he can clearly and distinctly perceive what that will would choose to do in any particular set of circumstances. The difficulty with this opinion is that it either supposes a necessary connection between the fully comprehended will and its acts or it does not

13 [See, for example, Luis de Molina, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis … (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1876), q. 14, a. 13, disp. 49, ¶11 (pp. 290–91) and disp. 52, ¶17 (p. 323). There is a partial English translation of the Concordia: Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia), trans. with an introduction and notes by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988); see p. 119 for his translation of disp. 49, ¶11, and p. 177 for his translation of disp. 52, ¶17. Robert Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, vol. 6 in Opera Omnia, ex editione Venetta (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1873) lib. 4, c. 15.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

288

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

nitur. Si supponitur, tollitur libertas. Si non supponitur, tollitur certitudo scientiae mediae. Responderi potest certitudinem scientiae mediae non tam in voluntate comprehensa quam in Deo comprehendente fundari. Sed hoc aut videtur nihil aut revocatur ad nostram sententiam de Deo comprehendente transcendentiam propriam. (c) Suarez, Ruiz, Mazzella14 et multi alii in ipsa obiectiva veritate futuribilium radicem scientiae mediae posuerunt. Verum enim est Petrum sub talibus adiunctis constitutum sic fuisse acturum. Porro, Deus omne verum cognoscit. Ergo Deus hoc et similiter alia omnia futuribilia cognoscit. Circa hanc sententiam difficultas in maiori invenitur. Dicitur obiective esse verum hoc conditionale: ‘Si Petrus sub talibus adiunctis versaretur, sic eligeret.’ At si supponitur nexus necessarius inter antecedens et consequens, tollitur libertas; sic enim fingeretur determinismus quidam adiunctorum. Si autem non supponitur nexus necessarius inter antecedens et consequens, veritas illa est contingens. Porro veritas contingens habet adaequationem veritatis inquantum exsistit aliquod contingens; quod contingens non potest esse Deus, qui est ens necessarium; neque potest esse ipsum futuribile, quod sane non exsistit. Quare ex hac sententia sequitur vel determinismus adiunctorum quo tollatur libertas vel inadaequatio intellectus et rei unde tollatur veritas scientiae mediae. Responderi potest praeter meras probabilitates triplicem gradum certitudinis inveniri, nempe, certitudinem fundatam in nexu necessario, certitudinem facti fundatam in quodam contingente exsistente, et miram hanc

The Robert Mollot Collection

289

God’s Knowledge and Will

suppose such a connection. If it supposes a necessary connection, there is no freedom; if it does not suppose a necessary connection, then middle knowledge lacks certitude. To this one could say in reply that the certitude had by middle knowledge is grounded not so much on God’s perfect comprehension of his will as on God himself who comprehends it. But either that assertion says nothing, or else is reducible to our opinion, God’s comprehension of his own transcendence. (c) Suarez, Ruiz, Mazzella14 and a number of others locate the root of God’s middle knowledge in the objective truth of futuribles. For it is true that placed in such or such circumstances Peter would act in such or such a way. But God knows all that is true, and so God would know this futurible, and similarly all other futuribles. The difficulty with this opinion lies in its major premise. This conditional assertion is said to be objectively true, namely, ‘If Peter were in these circumstances, he would choose to act thus.’ But if this supposes a necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent, there is no freedom of the will, for this would attribute a certain determinism to the circumstances. If, however, a necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent is not supposed, then that truth is contingent. Now, a contingent truth has its truth-correspondence precisely inasmuch as a contingent being exists; but this contingent being cannot be God, a necessary being, nor can it be the futurible itself, which surely does not exist. The logical consequence of this opinion, therefore, is either a determinism on the part of the circumstances, which would do away with freedom, or a lack of correspondence between God’s mind and reality, hence a lack of truth in God’s middle knowledge. In response one could argue that besides mere probabilities there are three degrees of certitude, namely, certitude based upon a necessary connection, factual certitude based upon some existing contingent thing, and

14 [See, for example, Francis Suarez, De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium, vol. 11 in Opera Omnia, ed. C. Berton (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1858) lib. 1, c. viii; lib. 2, c. vii. Diego Ruiz de Montoya, Commentarii ac disputationes de scientia, de ideis, de veritate ac de vita Dei (Paris: Sébastien Cramoisy, 1629) dist. lxxv. Camillo Mazzella, De gratia Christi: Praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae, third edition (Rome: Ex officina typographica Forzani et Socii, 1892) disp. iii, a. vii, §1, ¶¶667–72, pp. 454–61.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

290

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

certitudinem scientiae mediae quae fundatur neque in nexu necessario, nam est de libero, neque in facto contingente, nam est conditionale quoddam contra factum. De triplici divisione illa, ipsi minime dubitamus. At quaestio non est de facto sed de radice seu de ultimo fundamento veritatis et certitudinis circa conditionalia contingentia et contra factum. Asserere exsistentiam non est reddere rationem. (d) Quare Kleutgen, Perrone, de Régnon,15 alii docent in rem adeo arduam atque obscuram non esse inquirendum. Quae doctrina minus est sententia de radice scientiae mediae quam consilium desperationis. (e) Et ideo auctor acutissimus explicationem quandam exponit.16 Inprimis tenet veritatem futuribilium in ipsa divina essentia esse fundandam. Reducit ergo futuribilem actionem Petri ad futuribilem concursum Dei; et ideo dicit ad idem redire has propositiones: ‘Si Petrus his in adiunctis versaretur, ita ageret’; et ‘Si Deus Petrum his in adiunctis poneret, ita Deus concurreret.’ Quae reductio est valida: concursus enim divinus dupliciter considerari potest; principiative est essentia divina cum relatione rationis ad actum futuribilem; terminative vero est ipse actus futuribilis. Ubi intelligitur concursus simultaneus Molinae. Quae reductio non tollit libertatem Petri: in eodem enim signo est concursus futuribilis et actio Petri futuribilis. Quae reductio fundat scientiam mediam in ipsa essentia divina; concursus enim futuribilis principiative est essentia ipsa cum relatione rationis ad actionem futuribilem. Ultro sane haec omnia admittimus. Ad idem enim redit haec positio ac illa supra exposita de transcendentia actionis divinae. Si enim Deus hoc

The Robert Mollot Collection

291

God’s Knowledge and Will

that amazing certitude enjoyed by middle knowledge, grounded as it is neither upon a necessary connection, since freedom is at issue here, nor upon a contingent fact, since we have here a contrary-to-fact condition. This threefold division is all well and good. But the question here is not about a fact but about the root, the ultimate ground, of truth and certitude in God’s knowledge of contingent beings that are conditional and contrary to fact. Simply asserting the existence of something is not the same thing as accounting for it. (d) Because of this, Kleutgen, Perrone, de Régnon,15 and others hold that one must not delve into a matter so difficult and obscure. But that is not so much an opinion about the root of middle knowledge as a counsel of despair. (e) Therefore, with his customary acumen, Lennerz gives his explanation of this matter.16 He holds first of all that the truth of futuribles is to be grounded on the divine essence itself. Accordingly he reduces Peter’s futurible action to God’s futurible concurrence. Therefore he asserts that these two propositions, ‘If Peter were in these circumstances, he would act in a certain way’ and ‘If God were to place Peter in these circumstances, he would concur with Peter in that way,’ amount to the same thing. This is a valid reduction. Divine concurrence can be considered in two ways: in its principle it is the divine essence with a conceptual relation to a futurible act; in its term it is that futurible act itself. This is Molina’s ‘simultaneous concurrence.’ This reduction does not take away Peter’s freedom: God’s futurible concurrence and Peter’s futurible act are simultaneously true. This reduction grounds God’s middle knowledge on the divine essence; for the principle of any futurible concurrence is that essence itself with a logical relation to the futurible action. We readily grant all this. This position comes down to the position we have expounded concerning the transcendence of divine action. For if God

15 [See Joseph Kleutgen, De ipso Deo, vol. 1 in Institutiones theologicae (Ratisbon and New York: Pustet, 1881) p. 321 n. 548. Ioannes Perrone, De gratia et sacramentis in genere, vol.7 in Praelectiones theologicae (Taurini: Hyacinthi Marietti, 1865) pars. 1, c. iv, n. 329. Th. de Règnon, Bañes et Molina: Histoire, doctrines, critique métaphysique (Paris: H. Oudin, 1883) 114–16.] 16 Lennerz, De Deo uno §§364–68, pp. 254–59. [In the fifth edition, §§364–68, pp. 257–61.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

292

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

aliquid esse facit, necessario est; et tamen ista necessitas consequentis per se non est nisi ex suppositione sui ipsius; manet hoc aliquid contingens, liberum, imo supererogatorium. Patitur tamen haec sententia hanc difficultatem quod in eiusmodi concursibus hypotheticis Deus caece concurrit. Ex enim concursibus hypotheticis Deus acquirit scientiam mediam sicut et nos per conscientiam empiricam cognoscimus actus nostros internos eliciendo ipsos. Quam difficultatem arcere auctor laborat,13 frustra tamen uti opinamur. Analogia enim secundum quam concipiendus est Deus agens ad extra non est nostra conscientia empirica actuum nostrorum internorum sed potius est ars et voluntas artificis opus externum producentis. Porro, si auctor perspexisset in eodem prorsus signo veritatis inveniri non solum actum futuribilem et futuribilem concursum Dei sed etiam scientiam Dei et voluntatem Dei circa exsistentiam actus, potuisset, pari ratione ac theoriam suam, proponere integram doctrinam de Dei transcendentia; et ideo potuisset asserere intellectum divinum dirigere et voluntatem divinam imperare id quod concursu divino efficitur. (f) Manet ut verbum dicamus de celebri obiectione contra doctrinam de scientia media. Appendix ad Concordiam Molinae considerat obiectionem quod Deus per scientiam mediam fingitur non cognoscere ex sua essentia sed accipere cognitionem a rebus.18 Respondet Molina obiecta futuribilia non esse causas cognitionis divinae sed conditiones sine qua non.19 Secundum d’Alès20 et E. Vansteenberghe (auctorem articuli citati) Molina consideravit Deum haurire scientiam futuribilium ex sua essentia.21

The Robert Mollot Collection

293

God’s Knowledge and Will

causes something to exist, it necessarily exists; yet the necessity of the consequence as such is only the necessity resulting from the supposition of itself. It remains contingent and free, even supererogatory. Nevertheless, this opinion labors under this difficulty, that in such hypothetical concurrence God concurs blindly. For God obtains middle knowledge from his hypothetical concurrence, just as we in our empirical consciousness know our interior acts in eliciting them. Lennerz tries hard to get around this difficulty,17 but, in our opinion, he does not succeed. Our reason for saying this is that the analogy according to which God is to be thought of as an agent acting ad extra is not the empirical consciousness we have of our own internal acts, but rather the art and the will of an artisan producing some external artifact. Also, had Lennerz understood that not only a futurible act and God’s futurible concurrence with it, but also God’s knowledge and will concerning the existence of that act, are all simultaneously true, he could have set forth, on the same grounds as his own theory, a unified doctrine on divine transcendence, and could, therefore, have asserted that God’s intellect directs and his will commands whatever is carried into effect with his concurrence. (f) It remains for us to say something about the famous objection against the doctrine of scientia media. The appendix to Molina’s Concordia considers the objection that God in his middle knowledge is depicted as not knowing futuribles from his divine essence but as receiving knowledge of them from things.18 To this, Molina replies that futurible objects are not causes of God’s knowledge but rather necessary conditions for it.19 According to A. d’Alès20 and to Vansteenberghe, Molina held that God derives his knowledge of futuribles from his essence.21

17 Ibid. §365. [In the fourth edition, §365 is on pp. 255–57; in the fifth edition, §365 is on pp. 258–59.] 18 See E. Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme,’ Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (dtc) x (20) 2094–2187, at 2137. 19 Ibid. 2138. [Lonergan is referring to objectio II and the long responsio in the appendix to Luis de Molina, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis … 578–92.] 20 [See A. d’Alès, Providence et libre arbitre (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1927) 98–99.] 21 Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme’ 2169. [See Vansteenberghe’s reference to d’Alès in this column.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

294

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Clare docuit Bellarminus Deum videre et comprehendere voluntatem humanam non accipiendo speciem a rebus sed per divinam essentiam.22 Et tamen usque hodie eadem urgetur obiectio: vide expositionem Molinismi apud dtc, art., ‘Prédestination,’23 ubi P. R. Garrigou-Lagrange ponit suum dilemma utrum scientia divina determinet quid Petrus sit electurus sub adiunctis hypotheticis an ipsa electio Petri determinet quid Deus cognoscat. (g) Circa hoc problema distinguendum esse videtur. Alia est quaestio epistemologica fundamentalis circa naturam radicalem cognitionis; et alia est quaestio de conceptu scientiae mediae. Circa quaestionem epistemologicam duplex est opinio: Secundum Platonem, Plotinum, Augustinum, Avicennam, Scotum, Ockham, et per modernos ut Cartesium et Kantium, radicaliter cognitio est confrontatio quaedam cum obiecto; non dico hanc theoriam esse expolitam apud omnes istos auctores sed in discursu eorum supponi; alia ex parte apud Aristotelem et S. Thomam radicaliter cognitio est identitas quaedam atque perfectio; sensibile in actu est sensus in actu; intelligible in actu est intellectus in actu; in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intelligens et intellectum; et ex hoc fonte sequitur doctrina S. Thomae de Deo omnia intelligendo in sua essentia. Porro probabile non videtur theologos praesertim temporis Renascentiae fuisse peritos in quaestionibus epistemologicis; ideoque in concipienda scientia media facile subiacebat ambiguitas; inquantum principiis S. Thomae inhaeserunt, sub influxu secundae opinionis erant; inquantum vero secundum ea, quae prima facie vera esse videntur, loquebantur, sub influxu primae opinionis erant. Quae ambiguitas et fundavit obiectiones et materiam refutationis praebebat.

Conciliationem scientiae mediae cum vera doctrina epistemologica haberi opinamur ex doctrina S. Thomae de divina transcendentia.

The Robert Mollot Collection

295

God’s Knowledge and Will

Bellarmine clearly taught that God sees and comprehends the human will not by receiving a species from things, but through his divine essence.22 And yet to this day this same objection is raised; see the account of Molinism in the article, ‘Prédestination,’ in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,23 where Garrigou-Lagrange poses his dilemma, that either God’s middle knowledge would determine what Peter would choose to do under hypothetical circumstances, or else Peter’s choice would determine what God knows. (g) To deal with this problem, certain distinctions have to be made. There are two different questions at issue here: the fundamental epistemological question about the radical nature of knowledge, and the question concerning the concept of middle knowledge. As to the epistemological question, there are two opinions. According to Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Avicenna, Scotus, Ockham, and, among modern philosophers, Descartes and Kant, knowledge is radically a confrontation with an object – not that this theory is fully elaborated in all these thinkers, but it does underlie their thought. On the other hand, for Aristotle and St Thomas knowledge radically is an identity and a perfection. The sensible in act is the sense in act; the intelligible in act is the intellect in act; in the non-material order, the understander and the understood are identical. This is the source of St Thomas’s teaching that God understands all things in his essence. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that theologians, especially during the period of the Renaissance, were very well versed in matters epistemological. Thus some ambiguity would easily have underlain their concept of middle knowledge. Inasmuch as they held to the principles of St Thomas, they would have been influenced by the latter opinion; but inasmuch as their teaching was in accordance with what on the face of it seems to be true, they would have been influenced by the former opinion. This ambiguity both served as the basis for objections and provided material for their refutation. It is our opinion that on the basis of St Thomas’s teaching on divine transcendence, God’s middle knowledge can be shown to be quite compatible with a correct epistemology.

22 Ibid. 23 dtc xii (24) 2966 and 2974.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

296

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

12

De Ordine

(a) Totum est unum, intelligibile, completum. Pars est id quod ad totum intelligibiliter refertur et ex quo totum intelligibiliter constituitur. Uti patet, ipsae partes cuiusdam totius maioris possunt esse tota minora ex partibus minoribus constituta. Ita res subsistentes constituuntur entibus quibus, uti potentia, actu, etc.; iterum res subsistentes sunt partes specierum; et species subsistentium sunt partes totius universi. (b) Ordo invenitur tum in toto prout intelligibiliter ex partibus constituitur tum in partibus prout intelligibiliter inter se et ad totum referuntur. Abstracte ordo dicit solas relationes; concrete dicit et relationes et earum subiecta, fundamenta, terminos; agetur praecipue de ordine concrete dicto. (c) Exsistit ordo universi et quidem ordo perfectus. Quaestio est de universitate rerum utrum ipsa sit totum quoddam seu unum, intelligibile, completum.24 Agitur de universitate rerum creatarum, non secundum aliquod nunc temporis sed secundum totum suum esse, seu sub aspectu quater-dimensionali, seu sub specie aeternitatis. Argumentum desumitur ex notione mundi possibilis. Mundus enim possibilis est inquantum Deus prima omnium causa eum efficere potest; at Deus est agens per intellectum; ideoque nihil est possibile quod in sapienti intellectu divino concipi nequit vel a bona et iusta voluntate divina eligi nequit.25 Iam vero sapientis est ordinare; ordinatio est intelligibilis; intelligibile ordinatum est unum saltem unitate ordinis; neque incompletum volitur a bona et iusta voluntate. Quare omnis mundus possibilis est unum, intelligibile, et completum, seu totum quoddam secundum normas divinae sapientiae et bonitatis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

297

God’s Knowledge and Will

12

Order

(a) A whole is one, intelligible, and complete. Parts are intelligibly related to a whole, and out of them the whole is intelligibly constituted. Obviously, the parts of some larger whole can themselves be smaller wholes that are made up of smaller parts. Thus subsistent beings are constituted by components, ‘beings-by-which,’ such as potency, act, and so forth; subsistent beings in turn are parts of a species, and species are parts of the whole universe of being. (b) There is order both in the whole as intelligibly made up of its parts and in the parts as intelligibly related to the whole and to one another. Abstractly speaking, ‘order’ refers only to these relations; concretely it refers both to the relations and to their subjects, foundations, and terms. We shall deal mainly with order taken concretely. (c) There is an order, indeed a perfect order, to the universe. The question about the totality of things, the universe, is whether it is itself a whole, that is, one, intelligible, and complete.24 This has to do with the totality of created things, not with reference to any point in time but according to the totality of its existence, that is, in its four-dimensional aspect, or from the viewpoint of eternity. Our argument is drawn from the notion of a possible world. A world is possible insofar as God, as first cause of all things, can create it. But God acts through intellect, and so nothing is possible if it cannot be conceived in God’s wise intellect or if it cannot be chosen by his good and just will.25 Now it is characteristic of wisdom to arrange things in order. Ordering is an intelligent operation, and what is intelligently ordered is one, at least with the unity of order; nor does a will that is good and just will anything that is incomplete. Hence, every possible world is one, intelligible, and complete, a whole that accords with the norms of God’s wisdom and goodness.

24 [Lonergan discusses this question briefly in Insight 533–34.] 25 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

298

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(d) Cave ne concipias Deum ordinare mundos possibiles secundum analogiam nostrae imperfectionis. Nos enim ex datis sensibilibus per inquisitionem et actus incompletos ad completam rerum intelligentiam progredi nitimur; iterum, supposito fine, discurrimus et inquirimus consiliando de mediis in finem ordinandis. At Deus est ipsum intelligere seu actus purus intelligendi; perfecte se ipsum comprehendit; quare perfecte comprehendit virtutem suam; et ideo eodem actu et eodem intuitu simplici sine discursu, sine motu, sine inquisitione, sine consiliatione conspicit tamquam obiectum secundarium totam seriem omnium mundorum possibilium secundum omnes eorum partes et relationes. 13

De Bono et Fine

(a) Bonum simpliciter est ipsa bonitas divina; bonum per participationem est bonitas creata. (b) Bonum per participationem dicitur vel ratione sui vel ratione alterius. Ratione sui bonum est totum exsistens, seu unum, intelligibile, completum, et exsistens. Ratione alterius bona est pars; et sic principaliter bona est pars illa ultima seu ultima perfectio unde totum completur; secundario vero bonae sunt partes inter se et ad totum ordinatae. (c) Distinguuntur bonum commune et bonum particulare. Bonum commune est bonum totius maioris; bonum vero particulare est bonum totius minoris quod pars est maioris. Unde concludes: bonum commune includit bonum particulare; totum enim maius non est completum sine partibus suis completis; at partes non sunt completae sine bono proprio particulari. Exemplo sit quod bonum est homini habere domum, cibos, occupationem, salarium; at longe excellentius est bonum commune quod est perfecta operatio systematis oeconomici unde omnes homines habeant occupationem, salarium, domos, cibos. Ulterius concludes: maximum bonum inter bona creata est ipse ordo universi qui est totum maximum omnia bona particularia in se includens. (d) Etiam distinguuntur bonum verum et bonum apparens.

The Robert Mollot Collection

299

God’s Knowledge and Will

(d) Be careful not to think of God as ordering possible worlds in a manner analogous to our imperfect way. In our case we proceed with some effort from the data of sense through inquiry and incomplete acts to a complete act of understanding a thing. Again, presupposing the end in view, we cast about and make inquiries in deliberating about ordering the means to that end. But God is intelligence itself, a pure act of understanding. He comprehends himself perfectly, and therefore perfectly comprehends his power. Hence in the one same act and the one same simple intuition, without any discursiveness or movement or inquiry or deliberation, he has, as the secondary object of his knowledge, an overview of the entire series of all possible world orders along with all their parts and relations. 13

The Meaning of Good and End

(a) That which is simply good, goodness itself, is the divine goodness; that which is good by participation is created good. (b) A thing is good by participation either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. That which is good by reason of itself is an existing whole, that is, one, intelligible, complete, and existing. That which is good by reason of something else is a part. Thus the ultimate part or final perfection which completes the whole is primarily good, while the parts among themselves and ordered to the whole are good secondarily. (c) There is a distinction between common good and particular good. Common good is the good of a larger whole; particular good is the good of a smaller whole that is part of the larger whole. Hence common good includes particular good. For the larger whole is not complete without its complete parts, and the parts are not complete without each one’s particular good. For example, it is good for an individual to have a home, food, an occupation, and an income; but the common good of an economic system in perfect working order providing people with a job and income and home and food is a far more excellent thing. Our further conclusion is, therefore, that the greatest good among created things is the order of the universe itself, which is the greatest whole, including within itself all particular goods. (d) There is also a distinction between true good and apparent good.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

300

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Oritur hic conflictus in totis intermediis quae secundum alium aspectum sunt ipsa tota partibus constituta et secundum alium aspectum sunt partes ex quibus totum maius constituitur. Bonum verum ergo est id quod toti intermedio convenit quando consideratur secundum totam suam intelligibilitatem, scilicet prout est totum et prout est pars. Bonum apparens autem est id quod toti intermedio forte conveniret si licita esset consideratio eius prout est totum, omisso quod simul est pars totius maioris. Facillime bono apparenti decipimur: nam bonum maximum creatum, quod est ordo universi, haud intelligimus; partes vero quo sunt minores eo facilius intelliguntur; unde quod totis minimis convenit, perspicimus, sed quod toti maximo convenit, praetermittimus. (e) Finis ultimus est ipsum bonum simpliciter seu bonitas divina. Quod est bonum universo creato extrinsecum. Finis creatus dicitur et ratione sui et ratione alterius. Finis ratione sui est totum exsistens, seu unum, intelligibile, completum, et exsistens. Finis ratione alterius est ultima perfectio unde totum completur. Finis ratione sui praecipue consideratur ut motivum, ut finis intentionis, ut finis operantis; finis vero ratione alterius praecipue consideratur ut finis operationis seu operis. Alius finis creatus est alio altior quo bonum communius totius maioris est. Quare ordo universi est supremus finis mundo creato intrinsecus. (f) Quid senserit S. Thomas de ordine, bono, fine, breviter indico cum alibi hac de re non scripserim. Distinguitur finis extrinsecus et intrinsecus; extrinsecus est Deus; intrinsecus est ipse ordo universi. [Aristoteles,] Metaphysica, Lambda, 10, 1075a 12; [S. Thomas,] In XII Met., lect. 12. Cf. In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 sol.; De verit., q. 5., a. 3; C.G., 1, c. 78, §4; Sum. theol., 1, q. 47, a. 3, ad 1m; q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m. Speciatim C.G., 2, c. 24, §4; Sum. theol., 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m.

Circa finem extrinsecum: bonum simpliciter, contractum, Sum. theol., 1, q. 103, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1, ad 2m; Deus ab omnibus appetitur, Sum. theol., 1, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m; C.G., 3, cc. 16–25; angeli magis Deum quam se appetunt,

The Robert Mollot Collection

301

God’s Knowledge and Will

Here there arises a conflict among intermediate wholes which from one point of view are the wholes constituted by their parts and from another point of view are the parts which make up a larger whole. A true good, therefore, is that which belongs to an intermediate whole when that whole is considered in its total intelligibility, that is, both as a whole and as a part. An apparent good is that which would perhaps belong to an intermediate whole if one were allowed to consider that whole as a whole while disregarding the fact that it is at the same time part of a larger whole. We are very easily deceived by apparent good. For we scarcely understand that greatest created good that is the order of the universe. The smaller the parts are, the more easily we understand them. Thus, we perceive what belongs to these smaller parts, but ignore what belongs to that greatest whole. (e) The ultimate end is that which is goodness itself, the divine goodness. This is the extrinsic end of the created universe. A created end is an end either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. An end by reason of itself is an existing whole, that which is one, intelligible, complete, and existing. An end by reason of something else is the final perfection that completes a whole. An end by reason of itself is chiefly considered as a motive, the intended end, the purpose of the agent; an end by reason of something else is mainly regarded as the end of the operation or the work. The greater the whole, the more common the good, and the loftier will be the created end. Hence the order of the universe is the supreme intrinsic end of the created world. (f) Since I have not done so elsewhere, let me briefly indicate here the passages in St Thomas expressing his thought on order, good, and end. Distinguish extrinsic end and intrinsic end: the extrinsic end is God; the intrinsic end is the order of the universe. [Aristotle], Metaphysics, xii, 10, 1075a 12; [Thomas Aquinas], In XII Metaphys., lect. 12, §§2627–31. See also Thomas Aquinas, In I Sententarium, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, sol.; De veritate, q. 5, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 78, ¶4, §663; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 47, a. 3, ad 1m; q.103, a. 2, ad 3m. Specifically, Summa contra Gentiles 2, c. 24, ¶4, §1005, and Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a.1, ad 3m. On extrinsic end: absolute good, limited good: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2; q. 65, a.1, ad 2m. God desired by all creatures, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 16–25. Angels desire God

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

302

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Sum. theol., 1, q. 60, a. 5; cf. q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m; 1-2, q. 109, a. 3; subordinatio ad finem extrinsecum, 1, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m; C.G., 3, c. 64, §2. Exsistit finis intrinsecus: Sum. theol., 1, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 73, a. 1 c. Inter bona creata optimum: Sum. theol., 1, q. 47, a. 1 c.; q. 22, a. 4 c.; C.G., 1 c. 70, §4; C.G., 1, c. 78, §4 f.; C.G., 1, c. 85, §3; C.G., 2, c. 39, §7; C.G., 2, 42, §3; est fructus sapientiae divinae, C.G., 2, c. 24; C.G., 2, c. 42, §5; C.G., 3, c. 64, §11. Est prius in intentione, formale, praecipue volitum, propinquissimum divinae bonitati: C.G., 2, c. 44, §2; C.G., 2, c. 45, §8; C.G., 3, c. 64, §9 f.; C.G., 3, c. 69, §17.26 Describitur ordo universi: Sum. theol., 1, q. 65, a. 2 c.; C.G., 2, c. 68, §§6–12; C.G., 3, c. 22; C.G., 3, c. 112, §§8–10; cf. §§3–5. Usus systematicus in Summa theologiae : Ordo probat exsistentiam Dei (1, q. 2, a. 3 c.); probat unitatem Dei (q. 11, a. 3 c.); quia Deus scit ordinem, scit ideas partium (q. 15, a. 2 c.; cf. q. 14, a.8); ordo est iustitia Dei (q. 21, a. 1 c.), est veritas ontologica (q. 21, a. 2 c.), est providentia (q. 22, a. 1 c.), praedestinatio (q. 23, a. 1 c.), est gubernatio (q. 103, a. 1 c.), est fatum (q. 116, a. 2 c.), est lex aeterna (1-2, q. 91, a. 1 c.), et lex naturalis (a. 2 c.). Mundus unus unitate ordinis (1, q. 47, a. 3 c.); sine ordine confusio (q. 42, 3, Sed contra); in voluntariis et naturalibus (q. 21, a. 1 c.); quo sensu hic mundus optimus (q. 25, a. 6, ad 3m; q. 47, a. 2, ad lm; q. 48, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 56, a. 2, ad 4m); ratione ordinis habetur multiplicitas (q. 47, a. 1 c.), inaequalitas (q. 47, a. 2 c.; cf ad 3m; q. 65, a. 2, ad 3m; C.G., 2, c. 45, §9); sed non ideo malum (Sum. theol., l, q. 48, a. 1, ad 5m); ratione ordinis sunt corruptibilia27 (q. 48, a. 2 c.), incorporalia (q. 50, a. 1 c.), et corporalia (q. 65, a. 2 c.).

14

De Malo

(a) Malum est boni privatio.

The Robert Mollot Collection

303

God’s Knowledge and Will

more than themselves, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 60, a. 5; see also q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m; 1-2, q. 109, a. 3. Subordination to extrinsic end, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 64, ¶2, §2385. Existence of intrinsic end: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 73, a. 1 c. It is the best of all created goods: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 47, a. 1 c.; q. 22, a. 4 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 70, ¶4, §595; c. 78, ¶¶4–5, §§663–64; c. 85, ¶3, §713; 2, c. 39, ¶7, §1157; c. 42, ¶3, §1183. It is the product of divine wisdom: Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 24; c. 42, ¶5, §1185; 3, c. 64, ¶11, §2394. It is first in the order of intention, willed formally and principally, the closest reality to the divine goodness: Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 44, ¶2, §1204; c. 45, ¶8, §1226; 3, c. 64, ¶¶9–10, §§2392–93; c. 69, ¶17,26 §2447. Description of the order of the universe: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 65, a. 2 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 68, ¶¶6–12, §§1453–59; 3, c. 22; c. 112, ¶¶8–10, §§2863–65; see also ¶¶3–5, §§2858–60. Systematic usage in the Summa theologiae: Order proves the existence of God (1, q. 2, a. 3 c.); it proves the unity of God (q. 11, a. 3 c.); because God knows the order, he knows the ideas of the parts (q. 15, a. 2 c.; see also q. 14, a. 8); order is the justice of God (q. 21, a. 1 c.), is ontological truth (q. 21, a. 2 c.), is providence (q. 22, a. 1 c.), predestination (q. 23, a. 1 c.), governance (q. 103, a. 1 c.), fate (q. 116, a. 2 c.), eternal law (1-2, q. 91, a. 1 c.), and natural law (q. 91, a. 2 c.). The world is one by the unity of order (1, q. 47, a. 3 c.); without order there is confusion (q. 42, a. 3, Sed contra); in things that are voluntary and in those that are natural (q. 21, a. 1 c.); in what sense this is the best world (q. 25, a. 6, ad 3m; q. 47, a. 2, ad 1m; q. 48, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 56, a. 2, ad 4m); by reason of order there is multiplicity (q. 47, a. 1 c.), and inequality (q. 47, a. 2 c.; see also q. 47, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 65, a. 2, ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 45, ¶9, §1227), but not evil (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 48, a. 1, ad 5m); and by reason of order there are beings that are corruptible27 (q. 48, a. 2 c.), incorporeal (q. 50, a. 1 c.), and corporeal (q. 65, a. 2 c.). 14

Evil

(a) Evil is the privation of good. 26 [In the autograph, ‘18’ = §2448. ¶17 fits with the point Lonergan is making, but ¶18 does not.] 27 [Reading corruptibilia for contingentia in the autograph.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

304

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Malum ergo tria dicit: exsistunt partes cuiusdam totius intelligibilis; totum exsistere debet; at quoddam partium exsistentium complementum deficit. (b) Malum dividitur in malum simpliciter et malum secundum quid, prout totum simpliciter vel secundum quid exsistere debet. (c) Malum morale28 (malum culpae, formale peccati formalis) in eo consistit quod appetitus rationalis irrationabiliter ab actione sua deficit. Est ergo defectus actionis. Non est ens sed entis privatio. Contra legem positivam peccatur non agendo. Contra legem negativam peccatur non impediendo motum contrarium ex bono apparente ortum. Est defectus ipsi voluntati intraneus. Sane consequuntur alia mala, nempe, materiale peccati, scandalum, poena peccatori inflicta. Quae tamen mala non sunt moralia sed physica. Est defectus intrinsece irrationabilis. Sicut materiale peccati se habet ad bonum apparens, ita formale peccati se habet ad bonum mere apparens qua mere apparens. Nisi enim peccator scit bonum apparens esse mere apparens et re vera malum, non peccat. Aliis verbis, formale peccati est contra rationem, et nisi contra rationem esset, peccatum non esset. Est malum particulare: bonum enim hominis est secundum rationem esse; pariter bonum appetitus rationalis est ut rationem dictantem sequatur. Est malum simpliciter: peccare enim est agere contra intelligibilem universi ordinationem a Deo conceptam, volitam, et promulgatam. Quod vero est contra universalem rerum ordinationem intelligibilem, illud ad nullum totum intelligibile pertinet, ideoque malum est simpliciter. (d) Malum physicum est malum secundum quid. Scilicet, sub aspectu particulari malum est; sed sub aspectu generaliori consequitur bonum. Ita malum particulare est quod cultellus oculum penetrans visum corrumpit. Sed bonum commune est quod leges naturales exsistunt neque in talibus casibus suspenduntur. Similiter mala particularia sunt materiale peccati, scandalum inde ortum,

The Robert Mollot Collection

305

God’s Knowledge and Will

Evil, therefore, implies three things: there exist parts of some intelligible whole; the whole ought to exist; but the full complement of parts is lacking. (b) Evil is divided into evil without qualification and evil in some respect, according to whether the whole ought to exist without qualification or only in some respect. (c) Moral evil28 (culpable evil, the formal element of formal sin) consists in this, that a rational appetite unreasonably fails in its action. Hence it is a failure in an action. It is not a positive thing, but the lack of something. One sins against an affirmative precept by failing to act, and against a negative precept by failing to resist a contrary movement stemming from an apparent good. It is a failure within the will itself. It is true that other evils result from it, such as the material elements of the sinful act, scandal, and punishment inflicted upon the malefactor; but these are physical, not culpable, evils. It is a failure that is intrinsically unreasonable. As the material element of sin is to an apparent good, so the formal element of sin is to a merely apparent good seen as merely apparent. For unless the perpetrator knows that the apparent good is merely apparent and is in fact evil, he does not sin. In other words, the formal element of sin is contrary to reason; if it were not, there would be no sin. It is a particular evil. For it is good for a person to be in accord with reason; similarly, the good of a rational tendency is that it follow the dictate of reason. It is an evil without qualification. For to sin is to go against the intelligible ordering of the universe conceived, willed, and promulgated by God. But whatever is contrary to the intelligible ordering of the whole of reality is cut off from any intelligible whole, and so is simply evil. (d) Physical evil is an evil in a relative sense. It is evil in a particular respect; but in the overall view, it is a consequence of some good. Thus, for example, it is a particular evil if a knife happens to pierce one’s eye and causes blindness. Yet it is a common good that there be certain physical laws that are not suspended in particular cases such as this. Similarly, the material element of a sin, the scandal thus given, and the

28 [See above, p. 205, note 114. Henceforth, malum morale will be translated ‘culpable evil.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

306

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

poena peccatori inflicta. At bonum commune est exsistentia et exercitium liberi arbitrii; ulterius, bonum commune est ordo iustitiae qui se habet ad moralia sicut leges naturales se habent ad naturalia. (e) Ex quibus colligitur duplex conclusio. Inprimis, quo melius quis ordinem universi intelligit, eo melius explicare potest cur sint mala physica; sub hoc enim aspectu universali apparet eorum bonitas. Deinde, etiamsi quis perfecte ordinem universi intellexisset, nihil intelligeret circa malum morale. Unumquodque enim intelligi potest inquantum intelligibile est; sed de ratione mali moralis est ut sit contra intellectum, contra intelligibilem rerum ordinationem intellectam ab ipso peccatore, et praeconceptam, volitam, et promulgatam a Deo. (f) Quare neque simpliciter affirmare neque simpliciter negare oportet malum morale pertinere ad ordinem universi conceptum atque volitum a Deo. Non pertinet quatenus Deus non consiliat quemadmodum res sint ordinandae ut alii praemium et alii pariter poenam mereantur; consilium Dei est ut omnes salventur; et accidit malum morale contra ordinem rerum a Deo conceptum atque volitum. Quare dicuntur peccatores reniti contra ordinationem divinam.29 Pertinet tamen malum morale ad ordinem universi inquantum Deus per negationem huius intelligibilitatis malum morale praeconcipit et per permissionem malitiae creaturae malum morale voluntate quadam consequente vult. (g) Communiter concipitur malum morale tamquam defectus conformitatis in actu humano comparato ad legem moralem. Scilicet, obiecta voluntatis dividuntur in bona obligatoria et mala prohibita; velle malum prohibitum est actus humanus difformis a lege morali; pariter, velle aliud loco volendi bonum obligatorium est actus humanus difformis a lege morali. Admittimus hanc definitionem atque conceptum esse possibilem et ad alios fines aptam. Invenimus tamen eam esse minus aptam sive secundum analysin metaphysicam sive secundum analysin psychologicam. Primo, obiectum voluntatis est bonum; proinde, bonum non dividitur in bona obligatoria et mala prohibita.

The Robert Mollot Collection

307

God’s Knowledge and Will

punishment of the sinner are particular evils. But the existence and exercise of free will is a common good. Also, the order of justice which is to the moral order as physical laws are to the natural order is a common good. (e) Two conclusions follow from this. First, the deeper the understanding one has of the order of the universe, the better one can explain why physical evils exist; for it is from this overall viewpoint that their goodness becomes apparent. Second, even if one were to understand fully the order of the universe, one would have no understanding of culpable evil. The reason is that everything can be understood only insofar as it is intelligible; but culpable evil is of its very nature contrary to rationality, contrary to the intelligible order of reality as understood by the sinner, and as conceived, willed, and promulgated by God. (f) Accordingly, one must neither simply assert nor simply deny that culpable evil is part of the order of the universe conceived and willed by God. It is not part of it inasmuch as God did not plan to arrange things in such a way that some persons should deserve a reward and others punishment. Rather, it is God’s plan that all should be saved, and culpable evil happens to be contrary to the order of reality conceived and willed by him. Hence, sinners are said to be striving against the divine plan.29 Yet culpable evil does enter into the order of reality inasmuch as God preconceives culpable evil in terms of its lack of intelligibility, and in permiting malice in a creature God wills the existence of culpable evil by a certain consequent will. (g) Culpable evil is commonly conceived as a lack of conformity between a human act and the moral law. According to this, the objects of the will are divided into those that are good and obligatory and those that are evil and forbidden. To will a forbidden evil is a human act that is not in conformity with the moral law, and to will something else instead of willing an obligatory good is likewise a human act at variance with the moral law. We agree that this definition and concept is possible and suitable for some other purposes. Yet we find it less suitable for metaphysical analysis or for psychological analysis. In the first place, the object of the will is the good; and good is not divided into obligatory goods and forbidden evils. 29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 6; q. 103, a. 8, ad 1m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

308

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Secundo, ipse actus volendi malum prohibitum (v.g., comedere cibum die ieiunii tempore vetito) vel ipse actus volendi aliud loco volendi bonum obligatorium (v.g., velle ludere ‘golf’ loco eundi ad missam die dominica) est tantummodo peccatum materiale nisi antecessit advertentia ad legem moralem. Tertio, ipsum malum morale primo, per se, semper, et ubique in eo consistit quod advertentiam intellectus non sequitur conveniens volitio (v.g., volo ieiunare, volo missam adire). Quarto, consequenter ad hunc defectum actionis, qui defectus semper est malum morale, sequitur tamquam consectarium ille defectus conformitatis in positiva volitione comparata ad legem moralem. 15

De Divina Voluntate

(a) Unicus est actus, unica est volitio divinae voluntatis, nempe, ipse actus purus. Deus enim est absolute simplex. (b) Unde statim concludes: non est dicendum Deum hoc velle quia illud vult; sic enim supponitur pluralitas volitionum; et inde oritur pseudo-problema de ordine inter volitiones falso multiplicatas. Deus tamen vult rerum ordinem; et ideo dici oportet Deum velle hoc esse propter illud.30 (c) Iterum concludes: cum actus voluntatis divinae sit actus purus increatus, non est assignanda causa volitionis divinae. Attamen, cum ad perfectionem voluntatis pertineat ut sit appetitus rationalis intellectum sequens, agnoscendus est ordo quidam inter intelligere divinum et divinum velle. Prout sermo est de volitione divina essentiali vel notionali, ordo iste est ens rationis cum fundamento in nostro modo concipiendi, vel est realis ille ordo absque prioritate secundum quem Spiritus Sanctus est amor procedens a Verbo divino. (d) Diversa obiecta distinguuntur unicae divinae volitionis. Primarium et principale obiectum est bonum simpliciter, seu ipsa divina bonitas infinita. Secundarium obiectum est vel possibile vel actuale.

The Robert Mollot Collection

309

God’s Knowledge and Will

Second, the mere act of willing something that is forbidden – for example, eating on a day of prescribed fasting – or the act of willing to do something else instead of some obligatory good – for example, to play golf on a Sunday instead of going to church – is only a material sin unless there has been prior advertence to some moral precept. Third, culpable evil itself consists primarily, essentially, always, and everywhere in this, that the advertence of the intellect is not followed by the appropriate act of the will – in our examples, ‘I will to fast,’ ‘I will to attend church.’ Fourth, the consequence of this failure to act, a failure that is always a culpable evil, is a lack of conformity between the positive act of the will and the moral law. 15

God’s Will

(a) There is only one act of God’s will, one divine volition, and that is pure act itself. For God is absolutely simple. (b) It follows immediately from this that one must not speak of God as willing B because he wills A. That would be to suppose more than one volition, which is the root of the pseudo-problem about the order among such falsely multiplied volitions. Yet God does will the order among things, and so one must say rather that God wills that B should exist because of A.30 (c) A further conclusion is that since the act of the divine will is pure uncreated act, no cause is to be assigned to divine volition. Nevertheless, since it belongs to the perfection of the will to be a rational tendency that follows the intellect, we must acknowledge a certain order between divine understanding and divine willing. In speaking of essential divine volition, that order is a conceptual being with a foundation in our way of understanding; but the order in notional divine volition is that real order according to which, without any priority, the Holy Spirit is Love proceeding from the divine Word. (d) This single divine volition has different objects. Its primary and principal object is absolute good, that is, the infinite divine goodness itself. Its secondary object is either possible being or actual being.

30 Ibid. 1, q. 19, a. 5 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

310

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Secundarium obiectum possibile est omne id quod in scientia simplicis intelligentiae et in scientia media continetur. Secundarium obiectum actuale est id quod Deus praeter se ipsum actu vult, nempe, hic mundus seu hic ordo universi cum omnibus suis partibus et relationibus praeteritis, praesentibus, et futuris. (e) Principale obiectum necessario a Deo volitur; quare secundum hoc obiectum volitio dicitur de Deo per denominationem intrinsecam. Ulterius, principale obiectum dicitur motivum, finis intentionis, finis operantis, non sane quasi causa esset incausatae divinae volitionis, sed secundum illum ordinem de quo supra diximus (§15, c). (f) Inde theorema quoddam maximi momenti ponendum est. Unicum motivum, unicus finis intentionis seu operantis, relate ad unicam Dei volitionem est ipsa divina bonitas. Nos sane possumus velle ea quae ad finem sunt non solum propter finem sed etiam propter se ipsa. Ita volumus medicinam dulcem tum propter sanitatem tum etiam propter medicinae dulcedinem. At hoc fieri potest inquantum bonitas eius quod est ad finem addit super bonitatem ipsius finis. Iam vero bonitas divina est bonum simpliciter; et omnia alia bona sunt bona per participationem eius quod est bonum simpliciter; quia ergo divina bonitas est fons omnis alterius bonitatis, fieri nequit ut alia bonitas addat supra bonitatem divinam; et quia nulla alia bonitas addit supra bonitatem divinam, fieri nequit ut alia bonitas praebeat aliud qualecumque motivum praeter ipsam divinam bonitatem.31 (g) Ex quo sequitur parallelismus inter intelligere et velle divinum. Qui parallelismus eo magis est ponendus quia divinum intelligere et divinum velle sunt idem absolute. Sicut intellectus noster accipit species a rebus, ita nostra voluntas invenit bonitatem in rebus. Sicut cognita causa procedimus in cognitionem effectus, ita volito fine procedimus in volitionem eorum quae ad finem sunt. Deus autem non accipit species a rebus sed intelligendo se ipsum intelligit omnia alia; praeterea non alio actu se intelligit et alio actu alia intel-

The Robert Mollot Collection

311

God’s Knowledge and Will

Its possible secondary object is all that is contained within God’s knowledge of simple understanding and his middle knowledge. Its actual secondary object is all that God actually wills to be, apart from himself; that is, this world, this order of the universe with all its parts and relations, past, present, and future. (e) Its principal object is necessarily willed by God. Hence with respect to this object volition is predicated of God by intrinsic denomination. Moreover, its principal object is the motive, the intended end, the end of the agent – not, of course, as if it were a cause of divine volition, which is uncaused, but according to the order referred to in §15 (c), above. (f) Accordingly we now state a most important theorem: In God’s single act of willing, the sole motive, the sole intended end or end of the agent, is the divine goodness itself. We, of course, can will means to the end not only for the sake of the end but also for their own sake. So, for example, we will to take a sweet-tasting medicine both for the sake of our health and also for its pleasant taste. This is possible because the goodness of the means adds to the goodness of the end. But divine goodness is the absolute good, and all other good things are good through participation in this absolute good. Since, therefore, divine goodness is the source of all other goodness, no other good can add any goodness to it, and since no other goodness adds to divine goodness, it is quite impossible that another goodness could provide any other motive whatsoever over and above the divine goodness itself.31 (g) Thus there is a parallel between God’s understanding and willing. It is all the more important to affirm this parallel since divine understanding and divine willing are absolutely identical. With us, just as our intellect receives species from things, so does our will find goodness in things. Just as we proceed from knowledge of a cause to knowledge of its effect, so do we proceed from willing the end to willing the means to the end. God, however, does not receive species from things, but understands all other realities in understanding himself. Besides, he does not understand

31 Ibid. 1, q. 19, a. 2, ad 2m, 3m, 4m; a. 4, ad 3m; a. 5 c.; q. 20, a. 2 c. P. Donnelly has an excellent and clear article on this matter: ‘Saint Thomas and the Ultimate Purpose of Creation,’ Theological Studies 2 (1941) 53–83. [In the autograph, Lonergan added by hand a reference to a subsequent article by Donnelly, ‘The Doctrine of the Vatican Council on the End of Creation,’ Theological Studies 4 (1943) 3–33.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

312

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

ligit; sed eodem actu, quo se intelligit ut obiectum primarium, etiam in se ipso omnia alia intelligit ut obiecta secundaria. Similiter Deus non invenit bonitatem in rebus sed bonitatem suam amando facit ut alia sint entia et bona; praeterea non alio actu bonitatem suam amat et alio actu diffundit bonitatem suam ut alia sint entia et bona; sed eodem actu, quo se amat ut obiectum primarium, etiam propter suam bonitatem alia amare potest et amat ut obiecta secundaria.32

(h) Ex his colligitur Deum alia velle non ex appetitione finis sed ex amore finis. Non enim Deus alia vult tamquam media quibus ipse finem suum attingat; ipse enim ab aeterno est suus finis. Sed Deus alia vult quia ita erga bonitatem suam amore superabundat ut etiam alia et alios in eundem finem ordinare velit propter ipsum finem. (i) Ponitur obiectum secundarium possibile divinae volitionis, per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam mediam exhibitum (§15, d), non ut sit causa vel motivum divinae volitionis sed ut unicum motivum ei applicari possit. Non enim caece Deus vult alia, sed sicut alia vult propter bonitatem suam et sicut bona sunt per participationem suae bonitatis, ita etiam cognoscit ea posse et esse et bona esse per suam virtutem et propter suam bonitatem. Notandum est scientiam mediam non supponere Deum quicquam velle praeter se ipsum sed supponere hypothesin eiusmodi volitionis; quae sane hypothesis non in voluntate divina sed in divino intellectu est. ( j) Obiectum secundarium actuale est hic ordo universi cum omnibus suis partibus, motibus, relationibus. Quod obiectum liberrimo consilio Deus vult esse; quare hoc velle de Deo dicitur contingenter et ideo per denominationem extrinsecam habet adaequationem veritatis. Quod obiectum est totum quoddam, unum, intelligibile, et completum (§12); quare per modum unius a Deo volitur unica illa volitione quapropter unicum motivum vult.

The Robert Mollot Collection

313

God’s Knowledge and Will

himself in one act and understand all other things in another act; rather, in the same act in which God understands himself as primary object, he also understands in himself all other things as secondary objects. In similar fashion, God does not discover goodness in things, but by loving his own goodness he causes all other things to be and to be good. Again, he does not love his own goodness in one act and in another act communicate his goodness so that other things should exist and be good; rather, in the same act by which he loves himself as primary object he also on account of his goodness can and does love other things as secondary objects.32 (h) From this we conclude that God wills other things not out of desire for an end but out of love for an end. God does not will other things as means whereby he may attain an end, for he himself from all eternity is his own end. Rather, God wills other beings because he so overflows with love towards his own goodness that for this very end he wills other things and other persons to be ordered to this same end. (i) We posit the possible secondary object of God’s will, present to him in his knowledge of simple understanding and his middle knowledge (see §15, d), not that it be a cause or motive of divine volition, but rather that this sole motive may apply to it as well. For God does not will other things blindly. Just as he wills other things on account of his goodness, and just as they are good through participation in his goodness, so also he knows that they can exist and be good through his power and because of his goodness. Note here that his middle knowledge does not suppose that God wills anything besides himself, but supposes a hypothesis of such a volition. This hypothesis, of course, is not in his will but in his intellect. ( j) The actual secondary object of the divine will is this order of the universe together with all its parts, movements, and relations. In a supremely free decision God wills this object to exist. Hence this act of willing is predicated of God contingently and so has its truth-correspondence by extrinsic denomination. This object is a whole, one, intelligible, and complete; see §12, above. It is therefore willed as a unit by that one volitional act by which God wills, motivated solely by the divine goodness itself.

32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 5; q. 20, a. 2; see also q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

314

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Quamvis ergo convenienter sermonem nostrum dividamus, de amore, providentia, gubernatione, permissione mali, praedestinatione, reprobatione separatim disputantes, tamen haec divisio sumitur non ex multiplicata volitione divina neque ex pluralitate obiectorum secundariorum a Deo volitorum sed solummodo ex nostro modo concipiendi qui pedetentim a partibus obiecti in totum progrediatur necesse est. 16

De Amore Divino

(a) Amare est velle bonum alicui.33 Quare quatenus amor dicit bonum velle, redeunt omnia quae dicta sunt de voluntate divina. Addit autem amor super velle quoddam obiectum-cui; quae additio fit non per analysin in magis abstracta sed per reditionem in magis concreta. Bonum enim et ens convertuntur; at omne ens est exsistens; omne ergo bonum est cuiusdam subiecti exsistentis; et ideo velle bonum etiam est velle bonum alicui seu amare. (b) Evitanda est confusio illa per quam obiectum-cui amoris intruditur in ordinem finium. Finis-cui non est finis. Nam finis est bonum quod volitur. Exsistit ordo quidam bonorum secundum quod totum minus includitur in toto maiori usque ad totum maximum creatum quod est ordo universi; et omnia haec bona in ipsam bonitatem divinam tamquam in finem ultimum ordinantur. Porro, secundum ordinem bonorum et finium sumitur etiam ordo obiectorum-quibus. Sicut enim amare est velle bonum alicui, ita plus amare est velle maius bonum alicui.34 Quare maxime amat Deus personas divinas quibus vult maximum bonum quod est esse Deum. Deinde plus amat Christum cui vult communicationem eius quod est esse divinum; deinde amat electos quibus vult communicationem beatitudinis divinae; deinde amat iustificatos quibus vult inhabitationem Spiritus Sancti; et similiter mensura finita Deus amat creaturas secundum mensuram bonitatis eis volitam.

The Robert Mollot Collection

315

God’s Knowledge and Will

Although in our discussion we have to deal separately with God’s love, providence, governance, permission of evil, and predestination and reprobation, this division does not arise from any multiplicity in his willing or from a plurality of secondary objects willed by God, but solely from our way of conceiving, which has to progress step by step from the parts of an object to the whole. 16

God’s Love

(a) To love is to will good to someone or something.33 Therefore, inasmuch as love means willing good, all that we have said about the divine will applies here. Love, however, adds to the notion of willing an object-to-which (obiectumcui). This addition is made not through a more abstract analysis of love but rather by considering it more concretely. For good and being are interchangeable. But every being exists; therefore every good belongs to some existing subject, and hence to will good is also to will good to someone or something, which is to love. (b) Take care to avoid the confusion that results when the object-towhich of love is added to the list of ends. An ‘end-to-which’ (finis-cui) is not an end; the end is the good that is willed. There is an order among goods according to which a lesser whole is included in a greater whole and so on up to the greatest created whole, which is the order of the universe; and all these goods are ordered to the divine goodness as their ultimate end. Again, in accordance with this order among goods and ends there is also an order among objects-to-which. For as to love is to will good to someone or something, it follows that to will a greater good to an object is to love it more.34 God’s greatest love, therefore, is for the divine persons to whom he wills that greatest good, which is to be God. Next in order he loves Christ, to whom he wills the communication of the divine being; next he loves the elect, to whom he wills to communicate divine beatitude; next he loves the justified, to whom he wills the indwelling of his Holy Spirit; and similarly in a finite measure he loves all creatures according to the degree of goodness he wills to them. 33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3m. 34 Ibid. q. 20, a. 3 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

316

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(c) Et sic resolvitur apparens conflictus inter bonum commune et bonum personale. Inter bona creata Deus maxime amat ipsum ordinem universi tamquam obiectum-quod; est enim bonum maximum quod in se includit omne aliud bonum creatum. Ex quo concludi non potest Deum magis amare ordinem universi quam amat personas, puta, Beatae Virginis. Persona enim amatur non ut obiectum-quod sed ut obiectum-cui; et magis amatur persona quo maius bonum ei volitur. (d) Sicut sumitur mensura seu ordo amoris erga personas secundum mensuram et ordinem boni eis voliti, similiter sumitur motivum amoris ex motivo volendi eis bonum. Quare cum ipsa bonitas divina est motivum unicum propter quod Deus alia bona vult, ita etiam est motivum unicum propter quod alias personas amat. Et ideo dicitur quod Deus non invenit amabilitatem in creaturis sed facit eas esse amabiles.35 17

De Causa Efficiente

(a) Antequam de divina operatione in omni operante tractemus, operae pretium esse videtur naturam causae efficientis et eiusdem divisiones exponere. (b) Causa efficiens definitur ea quae actione sua in effectum influit. In causa efficiente distinguuntur ‘posse agere’ et ‘actu agere.’ ‘Posse agere’ tripliciter dividitur: potentia essentialis, habitus, et actus secundus; ita qui habet intellectum possibilem, qui habet habitum scientiae, et qui habet actum intelligendi potest producere verbum; similiter qui habet voluntatem, habitum in voluntate receptum, actum volendi finem potest producere volitionem mediorum. ‘Actu agere’ dicitur de eo qui potest agere per denominationem extrinsecam ab ipso effectu. ‘Actio,’ ‘influxus,’36 nihil est nisi ipse effectus prout realiter dependet ab

The Robert Mollot Collection

317

God’s Knowledge and Will

(c) In this way the apparent conflict between the common good and personal good is resolved. Among created goods God has the greatest love for the order of the universe as the object-which (obiectum-quod), for it is that greatest good which includes all other created goods. One cannot conclude from this, however, that God loves the order of the universe more than he loves persons – the Blessed Virgin, for example. For a person is loved not as an object-which but as an object-to-which, and the greater the good willed to a person, the more that person is loved. (d) As the degree or order of love for persons is measured by the degree and order of the good that is willed to them, similarly the motive of love is commensurate with the motive for willing them good. Therefore, since the divine goodness itself is the sole motive for which God wills other beings, it is also the sole motive for which he loves other persons. That is why we say that God does not discover lovableness in creatures but rather makes them lovable.35 17

Efficient Causality

(a) Before going on to deal with the divine operation in every agent, it will be worthwhile to examine the nature and kinds of efficient causality. (b) An efficient cause is that which by its action ‘flows into’ an effect. In an efficient cause there is a distinction between being able to act and actually acting. The ability to act is threefold: essential potency, habit, and second act. Thus, one who has a possible intellect, a habit of knowledge, and an act of understanding is able to produce an [inner] word; and likewise one who has a will, a habit in the will, and an act of willing an end is able to produce an act of willing the means. By extrinsic denomination from an effect, ‘actually acting’ is predicated of that which is able to act. ‘Action’ and ‘influx’36 simply denote the effect itself considered as re-

35 Ibid. a. 2. 36 [Although Lonergan argued strongly against understanding efficient causality in terms of an ‘influx’ (see, above, Excursus 3 of ‘The Supernatural Order,’ pp. 179, and ‘On God and Secondary Causes,’ in Collection 53–65;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

318

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

agente, prout relationem realem dependentiae ‘ab agente’ habet, prout vere ab extrinseco agentem denominat. Quare ‘actio,’ ‘influxus,’ non est imaginandus quasi accidens vel substantia transiens ab agente in patiens. (c) Proportio causae efficientis definitur per ipsam causae naturam propriam et determinat quales effectus producere possit. Non enim quaelibet causa quemlibet effectum producere potest. (d) Solus Deus est esse per naturam suam; quare solus Deus est causa proportionata ad producendum esse. Sequitur ulterius omnes causas creatas esse causas solummodo in ordine essentiali; scilicet, non sunt causae efficientes ut effectus exsistat, sed tantummodo sunt causae efficientes ut effectus sit talis. Sequitur ulterius causam efficientem et creatam, si effectum exsistentem producat, eum tamquam instrumentum Dei producere. (e) Quaeritur ergo quemadmodum omnis causa creata fiat instrumentum Dei. Respondetur ex simplici rerum analysi hoc fieri per applicationem. Nullum enim agens creatum potest producere patiens in quod agat; neque ullum agens creatum potest producere conditiones praerequisitas ut agat; quare necesse est ut omni agenti creato procurentur ab alio et patiens in quod agat et conditiones praerequisitae ut agat. Quae procuratio est praevia ad actionem agentis creati; est ab alio; et nominatur applicatio.

The Robert Mollot Collection

319

God’s Knowledge and Will

ally dependent upon the agent, as having a real relation of dependency ‘from an agent,’ and truly denominating the agent extrinsically. ‘Action’ and ‘influx,’ therefore, are not to be imagined as some sort of accident or substance passing from the agent to the object acted upon. (c) The proportion of an efficient cause is defined by the nature of the cause itself and determines what effects it can produce. Not any cause can produce any effect. (d) Only God exists by his very nature, and therefore only God is a cause proportionate to the production of existence. From this it follows that all created causes are causes only in the essential order. That is to say, they are not efficient causes causing the effect to exist, but only cause the effect to be such. A further consequence of this is that if a created efficient cause produces an existing effect, it does so as an instrument of God. (e) In what sense, then, is every created cause an instrument of God? A simple analysis of things shows that this takes place by ‘application.’ No created agent can produce the object upon which to act, nor can any created agent produce the prerequisite conditions for its action. Hence, every created agent must necessarily acquire from another both the object upon which to act and those conditions required for its action. This acquisition is prior to the action of the created agent; it comes from another, and is called ‘application.’

see also Insight 563), this did not prevent him on occasion from using language suggestive of an ‘influx’ when discussing efficient causality. Thus, besides the example in the present text, one could cite Lonergan’s later characterization of a cause as ‘id quod influit esse in aliud …’ (The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, translated from the fourth edition of De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica by Michael G. Shields, vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002] 46), which echoes Aquinas’s remark in In V Metaphys., lect. 1, §751: ‘hoc vero nomen Causa, importat influxum quendam ad esse causati.’ In his occasional use of language suggestive of an ‘influx’ when discussing efficient causality, Lonergan is likely following Aquinas’s practice. Aquinas himself, according to Jan Aertsen, uses ‘influx’ language when speaking of efficient causality in deference not to Aristotle but to the Neoplatonic Liber de causis, which he commented on. (See Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988] 11, 115). In the present case, even though Lonergan does say that an efficient cause ‘is that by which its action “flows into” an effect,’ by indicating a few lines later how precisely the reader is to understand ‘action’ and ‘influx,’ he also ensures that the reader not be misled.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

320

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(f) Porro, sola causa per se applicationis est Deus. Et arguitur tripliciter. Nulla causa creata est causa per se applicationis alterius causae; nam ipsa pariter indiget applicatione ut ipsa agat; et nisi agat non potest aliam applicare. Infinita series causarum creatarum, quarum unaquaeque indiget applicatione ut agat, non constituit causam per se applicationis.

Ulterius, evidenter nulla causa creata est proportionata ad efficiendam applicationem alterius causae. Ut enim conditiones praerequisitae impleantur, non sufficit ut hoc et illud fiant; praeterea necesse est ut arceatur omnis causa creata quae actionem et effectum impedire possit. Quare causa quae proportionatur ad productionem applicationis est causa proportionata ad gubernium universi; at omnis causa creata est tantummodo pars universi et, cum pars sit toto minor, non proportionatur ad gubernium universi. Iterum ergo reliquum est ut Deus sit sola causa per se applicationis.

Tertio, si causa creata esset causa per se applicationis, etiam esset causa per se effectus exsistentis ut exsistentis; atqui supra demonstravimus consequens esse falsum (§17, d); ergo etiam antecedens est falsum. Ad maiorem: datis enim agente actuato, patiente, et conditionibus omnibus impletis, sequitur effectus exsistens. (g) Notandum est modernos scientiae physicae peritos, qui tamen ‘causam per se’ concipere non possunt, sic enuntiare legem causalitatis efficientis; si A et B sunt duo status universi in duobus momentis distinctis, tunc recurrente statu A etiam recurret status B. Clare ergo et distincte isti vident necessitatem applicationis supra descriptae. (h) Non minus voluntas libera quam causa naturalis indiget applicatione. Actio enim libera voluntatis supponit conditiones praerequisitas; applicantis est ut conditiones impleantur. Praerequiritur enim influxus e medio physico et sociali in sensus, influxus e sensibus in intellectum, ipsa actio intellectus; etiam praerequiritur ut voluntas etiam habitibus ornata moveatur in actualem volitionem finis; his positis voluntas libere se determinat ad volitionem mediorum, ubi determinatio ut entitas est ipsa mediorum volitio. (i) Quaeritur denique quemadmodum Deus omnem virtutem creatam applicet et tamquam instrumentum usurpet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

321

God’s Knowledge and Will

(f) God alone is the cause per se of application. We prove this in three ways. First, no created cause is a cause per se of the application of another cause; for in order to act it likewise needs application, and unless it acts it cannot produce the application of another cause. An infinite series of created causes, each one of which needs application in order to act, does not constitute a cause per se of application. Second, it is obvious that no created cause is proportionate to producing the application of another cause. For in order for the prerequisite conditions to be fulfilled, it is not enough that this or that particular thing be produced. Besides, any created cause that could impede the action and the effect must be removed. Therefore the cause that is proportionate to producing application is that cause which is proportionate to the governance of the universe. But every created cause is but a part of the universe, and since a part is less than the whole, it is not proportionate to the governance of the universe. Again, therefore, it remains that only God is the cause per se of application. Third, if a created cause were a cause per se of application, it would also be a cause per se of an existing effect as existing; but above in §17 (d) we have shown that this is not so; therefore the antecedent is false. As to the major premise of this syllogism: given an activated agent, an object, and the fulfilment of all the requisite conditions, an existing effect results. (g) We must note here that modern scientists, although they have no concept of ‘cause per se,’ state the law of efficient causality thus: If A and B are two states of the universe in two distinct moments, then whenever A happens, B will occur. So they clearly and distinctly see the necessity of application as described above. (h) Free will no less than a natural cause needs application. The action of a free will supposes certain prerequisite conditions, and it belongs to the one who provides application to fulfil those conditions. The prerequisites are the influence upon the senses from a physical and social medium, the influence of the senses upon the intellect, and the action of the intellect itself; a further prerequisite is that the will, along with its array of habits, be moved to actually willing the end. With these conditions in place, the will freely determines itself to willing the means, where this determination as an entity is the act of willing the means. (i) Finally, how does God apply every created power and use it as an instrument?

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

322

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Respondetur per ordinem universi. Sicut scribens machina dactylographica singulas litteras per claves machinae scribit, ubi singulae claves proportionantur singulis litteris scriptis, et tamen solus scribens proportionatur intelligibilitati scripti. Similiter Deus singulis momentis per ordinem universi habet varias causas applicatas ad actiones quibus sua vice aliae causae ad actiones suas applicantur. Quod fit per se et continuo ex praeconceptione divina ipsius ordinis universi. Quare docet S. Thomas Deum omnia movere ad proprios fines per intellectum suum. 18

De Actione Divina

(a) Circa actionem divinam quattuor praecipuae sunt sententiae, nempe, S. Thomae, Durandi, Bañezii, et Molinae. (b) Sententiam S. Thomae tractavimus alibi.37 Secundum hanc sententiam distinguuntur duo aspectus divinae actionis ad extra: aspectus causalitatis efficientis (§§5, 17), et aspectus causae transcendentis (§§8, 9). Secundum aspectum causalitatis efficientis sic proceditur. Causa causae est causa causati.38 Atqui Deus quadrupliciter est causa causae: Deus enim creat, conservat, applicat, et tamquam instrumentum usurpat omnem causam creatam.

The Robert Mollot Collection

323

God’s Knowledge and Will

The answer to this lies in the order of the universe. A typist writes each letter by means of the various keys of the typewriter, each key being proportionate to writing a particular letter, yet only the typist is proportionate to producing an intelligible document. In a similar way God at every single moment throughout the whole order of the universe applies the various causes to their actions, by means of which in turn other causes are applied to their actions. This goes on continuously simply by reason of God’s preconception of the order of the universe. For this reason St Thomas teaches that God through his intellect moves all things to their proper end. 18

God’s Action

(a) There are four main opinions about God’s action: those of St Thomas, Durandus, Bañez, and Molina. (b) We have treated St Thomas’s opinion elsewhere.37 According to the opinion of St Thomas, two aspects of divine external action are to be distinguished: efficient causality (§§5 and 17 above), and transcendent causality (§§8 and 9 above). Regarding efficient causality, the argument runs as follows: The cause of a cause is a cause of that which is caused.38 But God is the cause of causes in four different ways: he creates, conserves, applies, and uses as an instrument every created cause.

37 Bernard Lonergan, ‘St. Thomas’ Theory of Operation,’ Theological Studies 3 (1942) 375–402, 533–53; and ‘Procession and Related Notions,’ Theological Studies 8 (1947) 404–44. [The first article is available now in Grace and Freedom 66–93; see also the longer discussion covering the same material on pp. 252–315 of the same volume. The second article is available now in Verbum 106–51.] 38 [This phrase, causa causae est causa causati, which also occurs below in this section, is an example of a transitive relation. In his work ‘De Notione Sacrificii,’ §15 (see above p. 15 and note 5), Lonergan applies the notion of transitive relation in the field of representation: ‘that which represents a representation represents that which was first represented.’ Transitive relations are discussed very briefly in Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 736–37.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

324

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Ergo Deus est causa causati cuiuslibet. Maior est evidens; minor probata est sectione praecedente (§17); sensus conclusionis est omnem effectum esse actionem Dei ut causae primae et principalis, ubi ‘actio’ dicit actum huius ut ab hoc (vide §5). Secundum aspectum causae transcendentis additur hoc: quia Deus est infinite perfectus, quidquid scit, vult, facit, necessario est; quae tamen necessitas per se est minima illa quae dicitur ex suppositione sui (§8). (c) Circa hanc sententiam notentur sequentia. Ponit Deum causam mediatam mediatione suppositi sed immediatam immediatione virtutis.39 Mediatio suppositi facile intelligitur: qui scribit calamo vel machina, scribit mediatione suppositi; scilicet intervenit suppositum instrumenti.

Immediatio virtutis dicit causam primam et principalem. Sumitur notio ex parallelo logico: praemissa immediata est per se evidens; non indiget termino medio syllogistico inter subiectum et praedicatum ut demonstretur. Sicut ergo praemissa immediata se habet ad conclusiones, ita causa immediata immediatione virtutis se habet ad effectus; in utroque casu non habetur dependentia a quodam superiore. (d) Deinde, aestimare quis potest causam applicationis esse causam occasionalem; nihil influit in effectum; solummodo implet conditiones praerequisitas. Quod aestimatur ex negligentia distinctionis inter causam in ordine exsistentiali et causam in ordine essentiali; causa applicationis est causa in ordine exsistentiali; conditio et occasio distinguuntur contra causam non in ordine exsistentiali sed in ordine essentiali. Aliis verbis, qui influit in effectum implendo conditiones non influit in essentiam effectus sed in eiusdem exsistentiam; Deus influit in essentiam

The Robert Mollot Collection

325

God’s Knowledge and Will

Therefore God is a cause of everything that is caused. The major premise is evident, and the minor was proven in the preceding section. The sense of the conclusion is that every effect is the action of God as first and principal cause, where ‘action’ means the act of an agent considered as being from that agent; see §5. Regarding God as transcendent cause, there is the added point that because of God’s infinite perfection, whatever God knows, wills, or does necessarily is. This necessity in itself, however, is the minimal necessity resulting from the supposition of itself; see §8. (c) Concerning this opinion, note the following points. First, it posits God as a mediate cause by way of instrumentality (mediatio suppositi), but as an immediate cause in the direct exercise of power (immediatio virtutis).39 The notion of instrumentality is easy to understand. A person who uses a pen or a typewriter writes by way of instrumentality; that is to say, the instrument one uses is an intermediary between the writer and what he or she writes. The direct exercise of power refers to the first and principal cause. The notion is taken from a parallel in logic: an immediate premise is one that is self-evident; there is no need of a middle syllogistic term between subject and predicate to prove it. Thus, as an immediate premise is to its conclusions, so an immediate cause in the direct exercise of its power is to its effects. In each case there is no dependence upon a higher factor. (d) Second, one might consider the cause of application to be an occasional cause: it has no influence upon the effect, but merely fulfils necessary conditions. This notion arises from disregarding the distinction between a cause in the existential order and a cause in the essential order. The cause of application is a cause in the order of existence; a condition and an occasion are distinguished from a cause not in the order of existence, but in the order of essences. In other words, what exerts an influence on an effect by fulfilling conditions does not influence the essence of the effect but rather its existence.

39 [In ‘The Supernatural Order’ (see above, p. 183), Lonergan defines immediatio suppositi as referring to a cause that does not make use of another cause as an instrument; hence mediatio suppositi would refer to a cause that does make use of an instrument. Immediatio virtutis is defined there as referring to a cause that does not itself act as an instrument of another cause.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

326

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

effectus creando et conservando causam creatam; influit in exsistentiam effectus applicando; influit in adaptationem effectus ad ordinem universi usurpando causam creatam tamquam instrumentum. (e) Tertio, proprietas divina transcendentiae non potest attribui cuilibet enti creato quantumvis perfecto; sequitur enim haec proprietas ex infinita Dei perfectione; et ideo in perfectione finita esse non potest. (f) Quarto, effectus causae naturalis est necessarius ex suppositione alterius. Notate tamen illud aliud quod supponendum est non consistere in sola causa naturali sed in causa naturali applicata. Necessitas legum naturalium est non in concreto sed in abstracto; gravia non semper cadunt et levia non semper sursum feruntur sed hoc faciunt de facto et in concreto ‘ut in maiori parte,’ seu quando nihil impedit. (g) Quinto, actus voluntatis liber est aut formaliter aut virtualiter; virtualiter quidem in quantum actum formaliter liberum producit; formaliter vero in quantum ipse actus non est necessarius ex suppositione alterius. Virtualiter libera est volitio finis. Formaliter libera est volitio eius quod ad finem est. Quae libertas tripliciter fundatur: ex parte rei inquantum objective pluribus viis ad eundem finem pervenitur; ex parte intellectus inquantum supposito fine nullis argumentis demonstrativis sed solis argumentis suasoriis, dialecticis, rhetoricis, electio huius medii determinate concludi potest; ex parte denique ipsius voluntatis inquantum ipsa voluntas consiliationem terminat et mediante ultimo iudicio practico ipsa se movet ad volitionem medii determinate.40 Neve dicas actum voluntatis liberum esse necessarium, non quidem ex suppositione alterius creati, sed ex suppositione Dei praescientis, volentis, facientis. Nam quod Deus scit, vult, facit hanc electionem, verum quidem est tantummodo in signo simultaneo veritatis, scilicet, ex denominatione extrinseca ab ipsa electione. Quare concludes bene definitam esse libertatem a Molina dicente voluntatem esse liberam quae, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest et agere et non agere.

The Robert Mollot Collection

327

God’s Knowledge and Will

God influences the essence of an effect by creating and conserving a created cause; God influences the existence of an effect by way of application, and influences the adaptation of an effect to the order of the universe by using a created cause as an instrument. (e) Third, the divine attribute of transcendence cannot be predicated of any created being, however perfect. For this attribute flows from the infinite perfection of God, and so cannot reside in any finite perfection. (f) Fourth, the effect of a natural cause is necessary on the supposition of something else. Note, however, that this ‘something else’ that is presupposed consists not in a natural cause alone but in an applied natural cause. Natural laws are necessary not in the concrete but in the abstract: heavy objects do not always fall and light objects do not always rise, but they do so de facto and in the concrete ‘for the most part,’ that is, when nothing prevents them. (g) Fifth, an act of the will is free either formally or virtually. It is virtually free inasmuch as it produces a formally free act, and it is formally free inasmuch as the act itself is not necessary on the supposition of something else. The act of willing the end is virtually free. The act of willing the means to the end is formally free. This freedom is based upon three things: the matter itself, inasmuch as there are objectively several ways to attain the same end; the intellect, inasmuch as, given the end, no apodictic arguments but only suasive or dialectical or rhetorical arguments can determine its decision regarding the means; and the will itself, in terminating its deliberation and through making a final practical judgment, moves itself to determinately willing the means.40 One must beware of thinking that the free act of the will is necessary – not, of course, on the supposition of some other created reality, but on the supposition of God’s foreknowledge, willing, and acting. For the fact that God knows, wills, and causes this decision is true only in simultaneity with the truth of that choice, that is, as predicated by extrinsic denomination from the choice itself. Hence we conclude that Molina’s definition of freedom is a good one, namely, that the will is free when, given all that is needed to act, it can either act or not act. 40 [For parallel passages and a more extensive discussion of the factors that together constitute human freedom, see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 96–98, 318–21.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

328

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(h) Sexto, ut Deus sit certus de effectu causarum naturalium, non necessario considerat suam transcendentiam; hi enim effectus sunt necessarii ex suppositione alterius cuius ipse Deus est causa; quidquid enim impedire posset effectum causae naturalis, illud est effectus actionis divinae tum quoad esse tum quoad agere. Alia ex parte, ut Deus sit certus de effectu causae liberae, necessario considerat suam transcendentiam; nam effectus causae liberae non est necessarius ex suppositione alterius; et sine necessitate obiectiva non habetur certitudo subiectiva. (i) Septimo, quamvis Deum suam transcendentiam considerare oporteat ut certus sit circa actus liberos, nihilominus per applicationem et instrumentalitatem Deus vere gubernat liberum arbitrium sicut et aliam virtutem creatam. Uti enim docet sanctus Augustinus, ‘Praeparatur voluntas a Domino.’41 Uti docet S. Thomas, Deus gubernat ipsam hominis gubernationem sui.42 Uti docet Suarez, sunt gratiae antecedenter congruae.43 Ad cuius rei intelligentiam consideranda sunt tum singuli actus liberi tum tota series actuum liberorum in singulis hominibus; praeterea, circa singulos actus sunt consideranda tria, nempe, exercitium, specificatio, et exceptio quaedam quae est formale peccati. Quoad exercitium cuiusdam actus formaliter liberi, ipse homo est causa per se quatenus, supposita volitione finis et supposita consiliatione ex volitione finis, homo se movet ad volitionem eius quod ad finem est. At etiam Deus est causa per se eiusdem exercitii; causa enim causae est causa causati; atque Deus causat volitionem finis, causat lumen intellectuale sub quo reflectitur homo atque consiliat, causat adiuncta omnia exteriora et habitus dispositionesque interiores. Quoad specificationem eiusdem actus formaliter liberi, ipse homo est causa per se inquantum volendo finem vult hoc iudicium practicum esse ultimum per quod se movet ad volendum bonum illo iudicio exhibitum. At etiam Deus est causa per se eiusdem specificationis si quidem ipsa spe-

The Robert Mollot Collection

329

God’s Knowledge and Will

(h) Sixth, it is not necessary that God consider his transcendence in order to be certain about the effect of natural causes; for these effects are necessary on the supposition of something else, of which God himself is the cause. Whatever could impede the effect of a natural cause would be an effect of divine action as to both its existence and its action. On the other hand, it is necessary that God consider his transcendence in order to be certain of the effect of a free cause; for the effect of a free cause is not necessary on the supposition of something else, and without objective necessity there can be no subjective certitude. (i) Seventh, although God must consider his transcendence in order to be certain about free acts, nevertheless he truly governs a free will through application and instrumentality just as he does any other created power. In St Augustine’s words, ‘The will is prepared by the Lord.’41 As St Thomas puts it, God governs man’s government of himself;42 and according to Suarez, antecedently graces are congruous.43 It will help to understand this if one keeps in mind both each individual free act as well as the whole series of free acts of each individual human being. Besides, with regard to individual acts, three points must be considered, namely, their exercise, their specification, and that exception which is the formal element of sin. In the exercise of a formally free act, a person is the cause per se, inasmuch as having willed the end and deliberated on the basis of this willing of the end, one now moves oneself to willing the means to the end. Yet God too is a cause per se of this same exercise of the will. For a cause of a cause is a cause of the effect; and God causes the act of willing the end, causes the intellectual light by which one reflects and deliberates, and causes all the external circumstances as well as one’s interior habits and dispositions. In the specification of this same formally free act, a person is the cause per se inasmuch as by willing the end one wills this particular practical judgment to be the final one in accordance with which one moves to will the good presented by that judgment. Yet God too is a cause per se of this same specification of the will, since

41 [Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, xvi, 32 (ml 44, 900).] 42 [See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m.] 43 [See Francisco Suarez, Tractatus de gratia Dei, vol. 8 of Opera Omnia, editio nova, ed. Charles Berton (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–78) v, cap. 21, nos. 4–6, pp. 498–500.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

330

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

cificatio intelligibiliter continetur in iis quae actum liberum antecedunt. Atqui44 datur triplex nexus intelligibilis inter antecedentia et ipsum actum liberum. Ergo, quia Deus causat ipsa antecedentia, etiam causat specificationem actus liberi. Primo, ad minorem, triplex exsistit nexus, nempe, ex parte rei, ex parte subiecti, et ex parte gratiae. Ex parte rei exsistit nexus intelligibilis inquantum omne operabile intelligibiliter exsurgit ex adiunctis et ex fine supposito: sicut enim hypothesis scientifica se habet ad data sensibilia intelligenda, ita operabile se habet ad adiuncta in quibus operandum est ad finem; et sine nexu eiusmodi inutilis prorsus esset consiliatio. Ex parte subiecti exsistit nexus intelligibilis inquantum consiliatio et electio se habent ad dispositiones habitusque subiecti sicut operabile se habet ad adiuncta et hypothesis se habet ad data; et sine nexu eiusmodi nulla esset cognitio hominum quales sint, neque ars ulla politica ad eos gubernandos atque ducendos, neque utilitas praxeos asceticae ulla. Ex parte gratiae exsistit nexus intelligibilis inquantum infunduntur habitus supernaturales et superadduntur illuminationes intellectus et inspirationes voluntatis quibus serio reflectamur et finis ultimi amore permoveamur et contra habitus dispositionesque oppositas consiliare atque eligere valeamus. His ergo positis ad maiorem est redeundum. Continetur specificatio huius electionis huius hominis intelligibiliter in lumine sub quo consiliat, in fine ad quem consiliat, in amore finis ex quo consiliat et eligit, in adiunctis exterioribus vel interioribus circa quae consiliat, in dispositionibus et habitibus corporis, sensuum, intellectus, ipsius voluntatis secundum quos sponte fiunt et consiliatio et electio nisi interveniunt impedientia sive ex providentia divina externa sive ex gratiis interne receptis. Qui tamen nexus, quamvis sit intelligibilis et determinatus, tamen non est necessarius. Alius est nexus in syllogismo scientifico et demonstrativo.

The Robert Mollot Collection

331

God’s Knowledge and Will

the specification is itself intelligibly contained in the antecedents of that free act. But44 there is a triple intelligible nexus between this free act and its antecedents; therefore, since God causes the antecedents, he also causes the specification of the free act. First of all, as to the minor premise of this syllogism, there is a triple nexus, namely, on the part of the matter of the act, on the part of the subject, and on the part of grace. On the part of the matter of the act, there is an intelligible nexus inasmuch as any feasible action arises out of circumstances and a presupposed end. As a scientific hypothesis is to the understanding of sensible data, so that which is feasible is to the circumstances in which an action towards an end is to be done. Without this sort of nexus, any deliberation would be quite useless. On the part of the subject, there is an intelligible nexus inasmuch as deliberation and decision are to the dispositions and habits of the subject as that which is feasible is to the circumstances, and as a hypothesis is to data. Without such a nexus we should have no knowledge of what people are like, no political art of government or leadership, nor would there be any utility in the practice of asceticism. On the part of grace, there is an intelligible nexus inasmuch as certain supernatural habits are infused, and the mind receives additional enlightenment and the will additional inspiration, all of which help us to reflect seriously and be moved by love of our ultimate end, and to have the strength to deliberate and decide despite contrary habits and dispositions. With the above points in mind, then, let us return to consider the major premise above. The specification of this choice by a particular individual is intelligibly contained in the light in which one deliberates, in the end towards which one deliberates, in one’s love for the end which motivates one’s deliberation and decision, in the exterior and interior circumstances about which one deliberates, and in one’s habits and dispositions of the body, the senses, the intellect, and the will itself; in accordance with all of these, deliberation and decision will spontaneously be made, unless external divine providence or interior divine grace intervenes. Yet this nexus, although intelligible and determinate, is not a necessary one. The nexus in an explanatory and probative syllogism is not the same as

44 [Reading atqui. The autograph has atque, as do the 1950 and 1973 editions.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

332

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Alius est nexus in syllogismo rhetorico vel dialectico. Uterque est nexus intelligibilis et determinatus; at ille necessarius est, et hic contingens. Quia ergo nexus ille contingens est, manet libertas. Quia autem intelligibilis est atque determinatus, datur causalitas; quae causalitas est ex Deo qui solus est causa per se omnium quae influunt in electionem specificandam. Quoad exceptionem quae est formale peccati, notandum est quod non est ens neque actio sed actionis privatio; in eo enim est quod appetitus rationalis irrationabiliter non agit. Iam vero quod non est ens, in causam reduci non potest. Ideoque quamvis Deus causet et exercitium actus et specificationem actus qua boni, tamen nullo modo causat formale peccati. Iterum quamvis dentur gratiae congruae, nulla est gratia incongrua; semper enim gratia congrua est cum bono consilio et bona electione; at homo irrationabiliter gratiae non consentit. Denique, si non singulos actus formaliter liberos sed ipsam totam seriem omnium actuum liberorum cuiusdam hominis consideramus, elucet Deum esse solam causam per se totius seriei. Abstracte hoc constat ex eo quod tota series est praeter intentionem hominis et ideo solummodo per accidens ab homine est. Iterum constat ex notione causae per se quae est una in se et diversa ab effectu et simul cum toto effectu; at actus hominis sunt multi; praeterea, si ipse totam seriem intendisset et elegisset, hic actus esset pars seriei et ideo pars effectus; denique, nullus actus hominis est simul cum omnibus eiusdem actibus.

Concrete hoc constat quia actus nostri liberi inter se pugnant, quia libertas nostra effectiva est circa hic et nunc (resolutionem enim hodie initam non hodierna libertas sed crastina exsequetur), quia futura ignoramus et praeterita iam immutabilia facta sunt, quia virtute progredimur cuius progressus ipsi non possumus esse causae dum ad eum sumus in potentia, etc.

At Deus summa sapientia omnia ordinat et summa bonitate omnem ordinem omnemque seriem ordinatam vult. Ipse ergo est causa per se totius seriei actuum liberorum singulorum hominum exceptis peccatis. ( j) Octavo, cum numero antecedente (supra, i) constet de ipsa gubernatione liberi arbitrii, iam de modo eiusdem gubernationis est dicendum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

333

God’s Knowledge and Will

the nexus in a rhetorical or dialectical syllogism. Each nexus is intelligible and determinate; but the former is necessary, the latter contingent. Since, therefore, this nexus is contingent, freedom remains. But since it is intelligible and determinate, there is causality, causality on the part of God who alone is the proper cause of all the factors that contribute to the specification of the choice. As to the exception, the formal element of sin, note well that it is not a thing or an action, but a lack of action: it is simply that a rational tendency irrationally fails to act. Now since it is not a being, no cause can be assigned to it. Therefore, although God causes both the exercise of an act and the specification of an act that is morally good, in no way does God cause the formal element of sin. Again, although congruous graces are given, there is no such thing as incongruous grace: grace is always congruous with good deliberation and good choice. But not to yield to grace is to act irrationally. Finally, if we look not separately at each formally free act but at the whole series of all the free acts of a given individual, it is clear that God is the sole proper cause of the whole series. Considered abstractly, this is clear from the fact that the series as a whole lies outside the intention of any individual and so is attributable to him only per accidens. It is clear also from the notion of a cause per se, which is one in itself, different from its effect and simultaneous with the total effect. But an individual’s acts are multiple; and besides, if one had intended and chosen the series as a whole, this act would be part of the series and hence part of the effect. Finally, no one act of a person is simultaneous with all that person’s acts. Considered concretely, the same is clear for several reasons: because there is a conflict among our free acts; because we experience freedom as effective here and now (that is to say, it is not today’s freedom but tomorrow’s that is going to carry out the resolution made today); because we do not know the future and cannot change the past; because we progress in virtue, yet we ourselves cannot be the cause of this progress as long as we are in potency to it; and so on. But God in his infinite wisdom orders all things and in his infinite goodness wills every order and every ordered series. Therefore, he is the cause per se of the entire series of free acts of each and every person, with the sole exception of sin. ( j) Eighth, having established above the fact of divine governance of free will, we must now say something about the manner of this governance, for

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

334

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

In modo enim invenitur et certitudo intellectus et efficacia voluntatis et irresistibilitas actionis. Nam primo in scientia simplicis intelligentiae qua Deus omnes mundos possibiles cum omnibus suis partibus et nexibus cognoscit, conspicit Deus omnes nexus intelligibiles, determinatos, et contingentes qui intercedunt inter liberas hominum electiones et earundem causas proximas; praeterea, pariter conspicit Deus omnes defectus intelligibilitatis ubicumque appetitus rationalis irrationabiliter ab agendo deficit; et nexus quidem intelligibiles intelligendo conspicit, defectus vero intelligibilitatis negando intelligibilitatem cognoscit. Deinde in scientia media intelligit Deus, si ipse quemquam ex mundis possibilibus creare eligeret, omnia futura fuisse prout in scientia simplicis intelligentiae exhibentur; intelligit enim Deus dominium suum transcendens (§8). Tertio, Deus liberrimo consilio quendam mundum e possibilibus, nempe nostrum mundum actualem, creare vult; mundum vult scientia sua exhibitum et prout scientia sua exhibetur; ita tamen ut quae bona sunt et cum bonis intelligibiliter connectuntur, ea voluntate velit quam nominamus dicentes, ‘Fiat voluntas tua,’ formalia vero peccati nullo modo velit sed tantummodo permittat (vide §20). Quarto, ex hoc voluntatis decreto, accedit ad scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam mediam tertia illa scientia visionis. Quinto, cum Deus sit agens per intellectum et voluntatem, efficere mundum hunc, quatenus dicit actum Dei immanentem, nihil dicit nisi scientiam et liberam voluntatem supra iam positas. Pariter, cum transcendentia divina sit proprietas Dei solius (nihil enim aliud infinite perfectum esse potest), illa irresistibilitas divinae efficientiae non addit super infallibilitatem cognitionis et efficaciam voluntatis. Sexto, quatenus agere dicit actum huius ut ab hoc, actio divina dicit ipsos effectus mundo immanentes prout a Deo agente sunt per creationem, conservationem, applicationem, atque instrumentalitatem. Per quam actionem Deus producit effectus necessarios mediantibus causis necessariis et effectus contingentes mediantibus causis contingentibus, prout scientia simplicis intelligentiae exhibet et scientia media infallibiliter certum reddit. At formalia peccati sicut non sunt intelligibilia, sicut non intelligendo sed intelligibilitatem negando cognoscuntur, sicut non volendo sed permittendo decernuntur, ita non per ordinem universi producuntur sed contra istum ordinem irrationabili defectu appetitus rationalis privationes exsistunt.

The Robert Mollot Collection

335

God’s Knowledge and Will

in divine governance the intellect has certitude, the will is efficacious, and the action irresistible. First, in the knowledge of simple understanding by which God knows all possible worlds with all their parts and interconnections, he sees all the intelligible, determinate, and contingent connections between our free choices and their proximate causes; moreover, he likewise sees all the failures of intelligibility that occur whenever a rational tendency irrationally fails in its action. He sees the intelligible connections by understanding them, but knows the failures of intelligibility in judging them to be unintelligible. Second, in his middle knowledge God understands that if he were to choose to create any one of all possible worlds, everything would take place in that world exactly as seen in his knowledge of simple understanding. For God understands his transcendent sovereignty; see §8. Third, in a supremely free decision God has willed to create one of the possible worlds, namely, this present world of ours. God wills the world displayed in his knowledge and precisely as displayed in his knowledge. All things that are good and intelligibly connected with good God wills with that will to which we refer when we say, ‘Thy will be done.’ But the formal element of sin God in no way wills, but only allows it to be. See §20. Fourth, with this decree of his will, God’s knowledge of simple understanding and his middle knowledge are joined by that third knowledge, vision-knowledge. Fifth, since God acts through his intellect and will, the production of this world, as an immanent act of God, is simply his knowledge and free will which we have referred to above. Likewise, since divine transcendence is an attribute of God alone – for nothing else can be infinitely perfect – the irresistibility of God’s causal action is nothing superadded to the infallibility of his knowledge and the efficacy of his will. Sixth, since action refers to the act of an agent as proceeding from that agent, the action of God refers to the effects themselves within the world considered as proceeding from God through his acts of creation, conservation, application, and instrumentality. Through this action God produces necessary effects by means of necessary causes, and contingent effects by means of contingent causes, as exhibited in his knowledge of simple understanding, and as rendered infallibly certain by his middle knowledge. But just as the formal elements of sinful acts, being unintelligible, are known not by understanding them but by a denial of their intelligibility, and just as they are decreed not by God’s willing them but by his permitting them,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

336

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

19

De Divina Actione Sententiae Aliae

(a) Durandi sententia est: Deus immediate non concurrit; causat effectus causarum creatarum solummodo inquantum eas creat et conservat.45 Quae sententia est reicienda (1) quia non agnoscit immediationem virtutis, (2) quia non agnoscit applicationem et instrumentalitatem causae creatae, (3) quia praetermittere videtur divinam transcendentiam. (b) Molinae sententia est: Deus immediate concurrit ad omnem effectum producendum; quae immediatio est suppositi; Deus et causa creata sunt causae partiales et integrantes; Deus producit esse effectus, causa creata producit taleitatem effectus.46 Quae sententia verum dicit inquantum intelligit divinam transcendentiam esse in signo simultaneo; minus tamen placet (1) quia non agnoscit applicationem et instrumentalitatem, (2) quia non agnoscit immediationem virtutis, (3) quia non concipit transcendentiam divinam tamquam modum divinae causalitatis. Etiam vide §20, f. (c) Bañez docet praemotionem physicam; dicit ‘praemotionem’ contra concursum simultaneum; dicit ‘physicam’ contra motionem dictam moralem per intellectum in voluntatem.47 Quae praemotio etiam est praedeterminatio: posita praemotione, fieri non potest ut effectus non sequatur; non posita praemotione, fieri non potest ut effectus sequatur. Quae tamen praedeterminatio libertatem auferre non censetur; Deus enim producit pari infallibilitate, efficacia, irresistibilitate effectus sive ne-

The Robert Mollot Collection

337

God’s Knowledge and Will

so too they are not produced through the order of the universe but rather exist contrary to that order as privations resulting from an irrational failure of a rational appetite. 19

Other Opinions about God’s Action

(a) Durandus held that divine concurrence is not immediate: God causes the effects of created causes only inasmuch as he creates and conserves them.45 This opinion must be rejected, for three reasons: (1) it does not acknowledge the immediacy of power, nor (2) the application and instrumentality of a created cause; and (3) it apparently ignores divine transcendence. (b) Molina held that God concurs immediately in the production of every effect with the immediacy of the supposit; God and the created cause are partial and integrating causes, with God producing the existence of the effect and the created cause producing its particular nature.46 This opinion is correct in that it understands divine transcendence to be simultaneous with its effect. It is less satisfactory, however, in that (1) it does not acknowledge application and instrumentality, (2) it does not acknowledge the immediacy of power, and (3) it does not conceive divine transcendence as the mode of divine causality. See also §20 (f), below. (c) Bañez taught the doctrine of physical premotion. It is called ‘premotion’ as opposed to simultaneous concurrence, and ‘physical’ as opposed to the so-called ‘moral’ movement of the will by the intellect.47 This premotion is also a predetermination: given a premotion, the effect must necessarily ensue, while without a premotion the effect cannot ensue. Yet this predetermination is not regarded as taking away freedom; for God with equal infallibility, effectiveness, and irresistibility produces neces-

45 See P. Godet, ‘Durand de Saint-Pourçain,’ dtc iv (8) 1965. [See also the index to Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom to follow up his earlier assessment of Durandus’s understanding of God’s action.] 46 See Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme,’ dtc x (20) 2110–12. [See also the index to Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom for his earlier assessment of Molina’s understanding of God’s action.] 47 See P. Mandonnet, ‘Bañez,’ dtc ii (3) 145. [See also the index to Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom for his earlier assessment of Bañez’s understanding of God’s action.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

338

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

cessarios per causas necessarias sive contingentes per causas contingentes, uti optime docet S. Thomas. Denique ista praemotio est id quo Deus omnia applicat et tamquam instrumenta usurpat, uti etiam legitur apud Aquinatem. Caeterum, haec sententia non solum auctoritate sed et ratione fulciri creditur. Inprimis circa viventia: cum vivens ideo vivit quia se ipsum movet, sequitur singulas viventis potentias se ipsas movere ad actiones suas; quod sane sine praemotione facere non possunt; nihil enim suam perfectionem augere potest. Deinde circa omnia agentia creata: realis sane distinctio agnoscenda est inter ‘posse agere’ et ‘actu agere’; at ‘actu agere’ dicit augmentum perfectionis agentis; quod ex ipso agente esse nequit; neque ex alia creatura, nam dato ‘actu agere’ sequitur esse effectus ad quod producendum solus Deus proportionatur. (d) Quae sententia multis atque gravissimis laborat defectibus. Primo, indubium est Deum per gratiam suam mutare habitus dispositionesque voluntatis; ideoque plane Deus potest immediate in ipsam voluntatem influere; minime tamen constat Deum singulis vicibus mutare eiusmodi habitus vel dispositiones. Secundo, obiectum intellectu praesentatum per causalitatem efficientem et physicam producit actum voluntatis, et quidem ex propria proportione producit specificationem actus, instrumentaliter vero producit exercitium actus. Vere dicitur ista actio physica: nam ‘natura’ invenitur non solum in materialibus sed etiam in spiritualibus. Neque obstat contingentia effectus seu libertas voluntatis: agit enim intellectus ut instrumentum voluntatis quae in actu est respectu finis, in potentia vero respectu medii; unde explicatur libertas eo quod voluntas facit ut ultimum iudicium practicum sit ultimum. Quantum autem volitionem ipsius finis attinet, voluntas non est libera; tunc agit intellectus ut instrumentum supremi applicantis qui est Deus. Proinde, constat obiectum intellectu praesentatum aut causam aut conditionem esse specificationis actus voluntatis; si mera conditio est, habetur opinio Petri Ioannis Olivi et aliorum Augustiniensium mediaevalium qui reiciebant illud Aristotelis, ‘quidquid movetur ab alio move-

The Robert Mollot Collection

339

God’s Knowledge and Will

sary effects through necessary causes and contingent effects through contingent causes, as St Thomas quite rightly teaches. Finally, this premotion is that by which God applies all things and uses them as instruments, as we also find in the works of Aquinas. Furthermore, this opinion is believed to have the support not only of authority but of reason as well. First of all, with respect to living things: since they are said to be living because they move themselves, it follows that each of the powers of a living creature moves itself to its actions. Now this they could not do without a premotion, for it is impossible for anything by itself to increase its own perfection. Second, with respect to all created agents: there is surely a real distinction between being able to act and actually acting. But ‘actually acting’ denotes an increase in the perfection of the agent which cannot come from the agent itself nor from any other creature; for once this action actually occurs, there follows the existence of an effect for the production of which only God is a proportionate cause. (d) This opinion has many serious flaws. First, there is no doubt that God by means of grace does modify the habits and dispositions of the will. Clearly, then, God can influence the will immediately. Yet it is not at all clear that God modifies these habits and dispositions on each and every occasion. Second, the object presented [to the will] by the intellect produces the act of the will by physical efficient causality; indeed, by reason of its proper proportion it specifies that act, and instrumentally produces the exercise of the act. This action is rightly called ‘physical’: not only material beings but also spiritual ones have a ‘nature.’ The contingency of the effect, the freedom of the will, presents no difficulty: the intellect acts as an instrument of the will which is in act with respect to the end but in potency with respect to the means. Thus, freedom is explained by the fact that the will causes the last practical judgment to be final. As to willing the end, however, the will is not free: in that case the intellect acts as an instrument of the supreme applicator, God. Again, it is clear that the object presented by the intellect is either a cause or a condition of the specification of the act of the will. If it is merely a condition, you have the opinion of Peter John Olivi and other medieval theologians of the Augustinian school who rejected Aristotle’s dictum, ‘Whatever

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

340

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

tur.’48 Si vero obiectum intellectu praesentatum est causa specificationis actus, aut causa partialis est et simultanee concurrit ipsa voluntas ut alia causa partialis, et sic habetur opinio Scoti qui concausas eiusmodi invenit et introduxit; aut tandem denique obiectum intellectu praesentatum est causa instrumentalis, uti supra exposuimus. Tertio, opinio Bañeziana attribuit praedeterminationi proprietatem exclusive divinam, ut praedeterminatio sit infallibilis, efficax, irresistibilis et tamen effectus maneat contingens. Agnoscimus eiusmodi proprietatem transcendentiae in Deo quia ipse est perfectione infinitus; at sicut Deus alium Deum creare non potest, pariter praedeterminationes cum proprietate exclusive divina producere non potest. Quarto, effugium nullum est dicere non intrinsece sed extrinsece pertinere transcendentiam ad praedeterminationes. Perpetuo loquuntur Bañeziani de intrinseca gratiae efficacia. Praeterea, si extrinseca esset ista efficacia, nulla esset. Nam praedeterminatio est in signo praevio ad suum effectum; at ipsa divina transcendentia non est in signo praevio sed in signo simultaneo cum ipso effectu et quidem per denominationem extrinsecam ab effectu. Unde apparet praedeterminationes gaudere perfectione maiori quam ipse Deus. Quinto, S. Thomas per applicationem non intellexit istas praedeterminationes; applicatio S. Thomae cum necessitate deducitur ex eo quod corpus caeleste movet inferiora, et Deus movet corpus caeleste; lege De potentia, q. 3, a. 7 c. Circa illud ‘ut actu agat,’ ibid., ad 7m, lege Sum. theol., 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3, ubi S. Thomas dicit fatum relationibus consistere. Iam vero praedeterminatio non deducitur cum necessitate ex motione corporis caelestis neque relationibus constituitur. Sexto, vivens movet se ipsum secundum Aristotelem et S. Thomam inquantum una pars in actu movet aliam partem in potentia. Illa opinio de potentiis vitalibus sese moventibus est Augustiniensium mediaevalium et derivatur ex opinione S. Augustini de anima sese movente. At Augustinienses reiciebant illud ‘quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.’ Bañez autem, postquam posuit potentias vitales se moventes, invocat principium Aristotelicum ut habeat praedeterminationes physicas.

The Robert Mollot Collection

341

God’s Knowledge and Will

is moved is moved by something else.’48 If, however, the object presented by the intellect is the cause of the specification of the act, either it is a partial cause with the will concurring simultaneously as another partial cause, and then you have the opinion of Scotus who invented and introduced such cocauses; or the object presented by the intellect is an instrumental cause, as we have explained above. Third, Bañez’s opinion confers upon predetermination an attribute that is exclusively divine, in that the predetermination is infallible, efficacious, and irresistible, while the effect remains contingent. We acknowledge this attribute of transcendence in God because he is infinitely perfect; but just as God cannot create another God, so likewise he cannot produce predeterminations endowed with an exclusively divine attribute. Fourth, there is no escaping this difficulty by saying that transcendence belongs to predeterminations not intrinsically, but extrinsically. The Bannezians themselves always talk about the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Besides, if this efficacy were extrinsic, it would be nothing. For predetermination is prior to its effect; but divine transcendence is not prior to but simultaneous with the effect itself, and is so by extrinsic denomination from the effect. On this basis it would seem that predeterminations enjoy a greater degree of perfection than God himself. Fifth, St Thomas did not understand application in terms of these predeterminations. His notion of application is deduced of necessity from the action of a heavenly body moving the ones below it and being moved in turn by God: see De potentia, q. 3, a. 7 c. Concerning the phrase ‘in order to actually act,’ see the same article, ad 7m, and also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 116, aa. 1–3, where St Thomas says that fate consists in relations. But predetermination is not deduced of necessity from the movement of a heavenly body, nor is it constituted by relations. Sixth, according to Aristotle and St Thomas, a living thing moves itself inasmuch as one part that is in act moves another part that is in potency. The opinion about vital powers moving themselves was held by the medieval Augustinian school and was based on St Augustine’s opinion about the soul as self-moving. The Augustinians rejected the dictum ‘Whatever is moved is moved by something else.’ Bañez, however, after positing vital powers moving themselves, invokes this Aristotelian principle in order to have physical predeterminations. 48 [In The Triune God: Systematics 547, Lonergan cites places in Olivi’s writings to support the claim that Olivi rejected Aristotle’s dictum.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

342

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Septimo, semper differunt posse agere et actu agere; diversimode tamen pro diverso sensu tou agere. Inquantum agere dicit actum secundum uti sentire, intelligere, velle, istud agere in agente recipitur. Inquantum agere dicit exercitium causalitatis efficientis, et de hoc nunc est quaestio, actu agere est ipse effectus ut dependens a causa; qui effectus in patiente recipitur et non in agente; vide §5. Porro, actu agere nihil entitatis per se ponit in agente, ita tamen ut diversa sit conditio primi agentis et causae secundae ut actu agant; primum agens applicante non indiget, nam creat; causa vero secunda creare non potest et ideo indiget applicante, ut fusius supra explicatum est (§17). Octavo, ut vitia radicalia huius sententiae aperiantur, duo ulterius sunt addenda. (1) Actio Dei in omni actione creaturae stabilitur pura analysi metaphysica et pura necessitate metaphysica exsistit; ideo Deus in omni operante operatur quod res aliter se habere non potest et non quia homo inveniat motus vel praemotiones praeter eos qui omnibus fatentibus exsistunt; aliis verbis, doctrina S. Thomae de Deo operante creando, conservando, applicando, et usurpando manet integra etiam totaliter omissis atque explosis praemotionibus et praedeterminationibus Bannezianis. (2) Praeterea, Deus est agens per intellectum infallibilem et voluntatem efficacem; irresistibilitas divinae actionis non addit super istam infallibilitatem atque efficacitatem, sicut ipsa divina omnipotentia non addit supra intelligere et velle divinum. At verentur forte Banneziani ne actio per intellectum infallibilem et voluntatem efficacem careat irresistibilitate nisi accedat splendida illorum creatura, nempe, praedeterminatio physica. Nono et decimo, per istam theoriam tollitur libertas hominis, tollitur gratia vere sufficiens, et Deus fit auctor peccati, uti alibi et fusius probantur.49

20

Utrum Formale Peccati in Deum Reduci Possit

(a) Dominium Dei est transcendens. Si enim hoc aliquid esse Deus scit, vult, facit, necessario hoc est (§8). Praeterea, Deus est omnisciens atque omnipotens; quare nihil esse potest nisi Deus scit et volens facit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

343

God’s Knowledge and Will

Seventh, being able to act always differs from actually acting, but in different ways depending on the sense of ‘to act.’ When ‘to act’ refers to a second act, such as to feel, to understand, to will, that act is received in the agent. But when ‘to act’ refers to an exercise of efficient causality – and that is the issue here – the actual act is the effect itself as dependent upon its cause. This effect is received in that which is acted upon, not in the agent; see §5. Again, actually acting adds no entity per se to the agent, yet in order to act, the primary agent and the secondary causes are in different situations: the primary agent needs no applicator, for it creates; but a secondary cause cannot create and so needs an applicator, as we have explained at length in §17. Eighth, in order to expose the fundamental flaws in this opinion, we must add two further points. (1) The action of God in every action of a creature is established by pure metaphysical analysis and exists by pure metaphysical necessity. Hence God operates in every operator because things cannot be otherwise and not because a person discovers movements or premotions in addition to those which everyone agrees exist. In other words, St Thomas’s doctrine about God operating in creating, conserving, applying, and using instruments remains intact even when these Bannezian premotions and predeterminations are totally disregarded and discredited. (2) God acts through an infallible intellect and efficacious will. The irresistibility of divine action adds nothing to that infallibility and efficacy, just as divine omnipotence adds nothing to divine understanding and willing. Perhaps the Bannezians are afraid that action through an infallible intellect and an efficacious will would lack irresistibility without the assistance of that marvelous creation of theirs, physical predetermination. Ninth and tenth, this theory destroys human free will, does away with truly sufficient grace, and makes God the author of sin, as we have shown elsewhere at greater length.49 20

Can God Be Accountable for the Formal Element of Sin?

(a) God’s sovereignty is transcendent. Whatever God knows, wills, and causes to be necessarily is; see §8. Besides, God is omniscient and omnipotent, and so nothing can exist unless he knowingly and willingly produces it. 49 [See Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Supernatural Order,’ in Excursus 4 of Thesis 4, above, pp. 214–23.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

344

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

At hoc in mundo sunt peccata formalia. Iure ergo quaeritur utrum formale peccati in Deum reduci possit. Respondetur formale peccati in Deum reduci non posse sive tamquam in causam sive tamquam in auctorem sive ullo prorsus alio modo. (b) Et imprimis formale peccati in Deum tamquam in causam efficientem vel finalem reduci non potest. Non enim potest fieri reductio in causam nisi exsistit effectus qui reducatur. At formale peccati non est ens quoddam exsistens sed entis privatio (§14, c). (c) Latius vero patet notio auctoris quam notio causae. Quamvis quod non exsistit in causam reduci non possit, in auctorem tamen reduci potest. Respondet enim auctor non solum de iis quae agendo facit sed etiam de iis quae omittendo non facit. Iam vero, praesupposita theoria circa actionem divinam supra exposita (§18), Deus neque causa neque auctor est formalis peccati; imo, Deus est et causa et auctor ut nullum sit formale peccati. In intellectu enim Deus dat lumen rationis et superaddit lumen gratiae quibus homo videat non esse peccandum; in voluntate Deus dat appetitum rationalem boni rationalis et superaddit inspirationem gratiae quibus homo velit facere quod intellectu faciendum esse conspicit. Quatenus ergo agit Deus, facit ut non sit formale peccati. Neque dici potest Deum omittendo non facere quae facienda erant ut homo non peccaret. Actio enim divina est sufficiens per se ut homo non peccet; imo, nulli denegat Deus gratiam sufficientem ad salutem consequendam. Cum ergo Deus neque propter ea quae facit neque propter ea quae omittit dici possit auctor formalis peccati, constat in Deum auctorem formale peccati reduci non posse. (d) At aliter respondendum esset si quis affirmaret theoriam praedeterminationis physicae. Malum enim culpae seu formale peccati formalis est defectus actionis debitae in voluntate. Iam vero aut Deus dat praedeterminationem physicam aut non dat; si dat, actio debita necessario fit; si non dat, actio debita necessario non fit. Quamvis ergo praedeterminatio physica non facit Deum causam peccati formalis, tamen facit eum auctorem. Auctor enim respondet non solum de iis quae agendo facit sed etiam de iis quae omittendo non facit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

345

God’s Knowledge and Will

But in this world there are such things as formal sins. The question, therefore, quite properly arises whether the formal element of sin is in any way reducible to God. Our answer is that the formal element of sin cannot be reducible to God either as its cause or as its author or in any other way whatsoever. (b) To begin with, the formal element of sin is not reducible to God as either its efficient cause or final cause. For no reduction to a cause can be made unless there exists an effect to be reduced. But the formal element of sin is not some existing being but the privation of being; see §14 (c). (c) The notion of author is broader than that of cause. Although what does not exist cannot be reduced to a cause, it can be reduced to an author. For an author is responsible not only for what he does by acting but also for what he fails to do in not acting. Now, therefore, presupposing the theory of divine action as set forth in §18, God is neither cause nor author of the formal element of sin; indeed, he is the cause and author of all that opposes the formal element of sin. God endows the intellect with the light of reason, to which he adds the light of grace enabling us to see that sin ought to be avoided. He endows the will with a rational appetite for rational good, to which he adds the inspiration of grace enabling us to want to do what our intellect shows us ought to be done. Thus, God’s action is to counteract the formal element of sin. Nor can one say that God by omission did not do what had to be done to prevent us from sinning. For God’s action is sufficient by itself to prevent sin. Indeed, no one is denied grace sufficient for salvation. Therefore, since neither because of what God does nor because of what he does not do can God be said to be the author of the formal element of sin, it is clear that the formal element of sin cannot be attributed to God. (d) However, one who would subscribe to the theory of physical predetermination would have to answer this question differently. Culpable evil, the formal element of formal sin, is a lack of due action on the part of the will. Now God either gives a physical predetermination or he does not; if he does, that due action is necessarily done; if not, it is not done. It follows that even though physical predetermination does not make God the cause of the formal element of sin, it does make him its author. For as we said, an author is responsible not only for what he does actively but also for what he fails to do by not acting.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

346

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(e) Quibus positis, concludes ad radicalem differentiam inter theoriam supra (§18) positam et theoriam praedeterminationis physicae. Secundum theoriam propositam, quam reputamus S. Thomae, ex infinita Dei perfectione sequuntur tum infallibilitas divini intellectus tum efficacia divinae voluntatis; proinde cum Deus sit agens per intellectum et voluntatem, ex infallibilitate intellectus et efficacia voluntatis sequitur irresistibilitas actionis. Quae irresistibilitas non addit super infallibilitatem et efficaciam sed cum iis identificatur sicut etiam potentia agendi non addit super intellectum et voluntatem sed cum iis identificatur. At secundum theoriam praedeterminationis physicae, irresistibilitas actionis addit super infallibilitatem intellectus et super efficaciam voluntatis; addit nempe praedeterminationem physicam quae est creatura in creatura recepta. Sed cur additur? Timentne fautores huius sententiae ne sine praedeterminationibus physicis intellectus divinus careat infallibilitate et voluntas divina careat efficacia? Supponuntne illi fautores non sufficere infinitam divinam perfectionem ad fundandam tum intellectus divini infallibilitatem tum voluntatis divinae efficaciam? An somniantur divinam agendi potentiam esse aliud ac divinus intellectus divinaque voluntas? An forte credunt actionem per intellectum infallibilem atque efficacem voluntatem quodammodo non esse irresistibilem? (f) Qua occasione data connexam quaestionem breviter attingo. Quaeri enim potest utrum sufficiat illa actio divina supra exposita (§18) per creationem, conservationem, applicationem, et instrumentalitatem omnis agentis creati, an forte etiam superaddendus sit alius concursus simultaneus quo Deus immediate immediatione suppositi influit in ipsum esse effectus. Inutilem esse eiusmodi additionem concludes ex nuperrime dictis (§20, e). Iam enim per applicationem et instrumentalitatem agentis creati Deus producit esse effectus immediatione virtutis. Porro, quia Deus est agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sufficiunt infallibilitas eius intellectus et efficacia eius voluntatis ut eo ipso actio divina sit irresistibilis in signo simultaneo veritatis. At etiam periculosam eiusmodi additionem duco. Omnino enim cavendum est ne, sicut praedeterminatio physica facit Deum auctorem peccati praevium, ita concursus simultaneus faciat Deum auctorem peccati simultaneum. Homini enim in gravi tentatione versanti aut Deus concurrit ut resistat aut Deus non concurrit ut resistat. Idem ergo est dilemma ac circa

The Robert Mollot Collection

347

God’s Knowledge and Will

(e) From all of this one can see that there is a radical difference between the theory we have expounded above in §18 and the theory of physical predetermination. According to our theory, which we hold to be that of St Thomas, the infallibility of the divine intellect and the efficacy of the divine will follow from God’s infinite perfection. Accordingly, since God acts through his intellect and will, the irresistibility of his action follows from the infallibility of his intellect and the efficacy of his will. This irresistibility adds nothing to that infallibility and efficacy but is identified with them, as also his power to act adds nothing to his intellect and will but is identified with them. According to the theory of physical predetermination, however, this irresistibility of action does add something to the infallibility of God’s intellect and the efficacy of his will: it adds a physical predetermination, which is a creature received in a creature. But why is it added? Are those who favor this opinion afraid that without these physical predeterminations the divine intellect would lack infallibility and the divine will lack efficacy? Do they suppose that God’s infinite perfection is not a sufficient foundation for his infallibility and efficacy? Do they imagine that God’s power to act is something other than his intellect and will? Or do they perhaps believe that action through an infallible intellect and an efficacious will is somehow not irresistible? (f) This affords us an opportunity to touch briefly upon a related question. Is that divine action by way of creation, conservation, application, and instrumentality as described in §18 sufficient, or should there perhaps be an additional simultaneous concurrence in which God immediately influences the existence of an effect with the immediacy of the supposit? From what we have just said [in (e) immediately above], we conclude that such an additional concurrence would be otiose. Through application and the instrumentality of a created agent, God already produces the existence of an effect with the immediacy of power. Again, because God acts through intellect and will, the infallibility of his intellect and the efficacy of his will are sufficient in themselves for it to be simultaneously true that divine action is irresistible. In fact, I also feel that such an addition would be dangerous. We must be very careful lest God’s simultaneous concurrence make God the simultaneous author of sin in the same way as physical predetermination makes him a prior author of sin. For when a person is in the throes of temptation, God either concurs with him to resist the temptation or he does not. It is the same

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

348

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

praedeterminationem physicam, excepto quod ponitur non in signo praevio sed in signo simultaneo. Aliqualem solutionem habes si negas formale peccati consistere in solo defectu actionis debitae in voluntate; sic enim tollitur disiunctio inter esse et non esse, cuius causa est Deus, et introducitur distinctio inter esse peccati formalis et taleitatem eiusdem cuius taleitatis homo est causa. Alia ex parte, sine hac definitione peccati formalis, noli recurrere ad scientiam mediam tamquam ad solutionem. Non enim Deus praevidet50 hominem vel volentem et resistentem sine concursu vel non volentem et non resistentem cum concursu ad volitionem et resistentiam. (g) Remanet probandum ultimum asserti (§20, a) elementum, nempe, nullo prorsus modo formale peccati in Deum reduci potest. Quod methodo critica, iam indicata (§14, e), sic stabilitur. Omnis reductio est secundum aliquem nexum intelligibilem inter id quod reducitur in aliud et aliud in quod reducendum reducitur. Sed nullus nexus intelligibilis intercedit inter malum culpae (formale peccati) et quodlibet aliud ens. Ergo nullo prorsus modo formale peccati in Deum reduci potest. Maior videtur evidens, nam sine nexu intelligibili reductio non est rationabilis sed arbitraria. Minor sic declaratur. Intelligibile proprie dictum est id quod intelligendo cognosci potest. Porro, intelligibile proprie dictum est duplex, nempe, in se vel in alio. In se intelligibile quoad nos est obiectum proportionatum nostri intellectus, nempe, quidditas rei materialis. At in se intelligibilia non sunt neque materia, quam intellectu cognoscimus non intelligendo sed ad phantasmata recurrendo, neque exsistentia contingens quam intellectu cognoscimus non intelligendo sed recurrendo ad sensus ut exsistentia quidditatis verificetur. In alio intelligibilia sunt et materia, quae in forma intelligitur, et exsistentia contingens, quae per reductionem ad causas efficientem et finalem intelligitur. Accidentia denique tum in se tum in alio intelliguntur; in se quatenus sunt quidditates secundum quid; in alio quatenus naturaliter resultant ex forma substantiali vel ab alia causa producuntur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

349

God’s Knowledge and Will

dilemma as with physical predetermination, except that concurrence is not prior but simultaneous. You have a solution of sorts if you deny that the formal element of sin consists only in the lack of due action on the part of the will; for in this way you get rid of the disjunction between being and nonbeing, whose cause is God, and then bring in the distinction between the being of formal sin and the specification of it, the cause of which specification is the sinner. On the other hand, if you do not have this definition of formal sin, do not turn to God’s middle knowledge for a solution. For God does not foresee50 a person either willing and resisting without concurrence, or not willing and not resisting with a concurrence for willing and resisting. (g) There remains now to prove the last part of the assertion in §20 (a), namely, that God can in no way be accountable for the formal element of sin. This is established by way of the critical method indicated above in §14 (e). Every reduction is made according to some intelligible nexus between that which is reduced to another and that other to which it is reduced. But there is no intelligible nexus between culpable evil, which is the formal element of sin, and any other being whatsoever; therefore, the formal element of sin cannot in any way be reduced to God. The major premise is evident. Without some intelligible nexus reduction would not be reasonable but purely arbitrary. We explain the minor premise as follows. The intelligible properly speaking is that which can be known by understanding. Further, the intelligible properly speaking is either intelligible in itself or intelligible in another. That which is intelligible in itself with respect to us is that object which is proportionate to our intellect, that is, the quiddity of a material thing. But neither matter nor contingent existence is intelligible in itself: we know matter not through understanding but by turning to phantasms, and we know contingent existence not through understanding but by turning to our senses to verify the existence of an essence. Both are intelligible in something else – matter, which is understood through form, and contingent existence, which is understood by reference to efficient and final causes. Finally, accidents are understood both in themselves and in another: understood in themselves in that they are essences in a qualified sense, and in another in that they result naturally from a substantial form or are produced by some other cause.

50 [Reading praevidet ; in the autograph, praevidit.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

350

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Iam vero malum culpae neque in se neque in alio est intelligibile; est enim privatio actionis debitae, contra lumen rectae rationis, contra rationabilitatem appetitus rationalis, contra ordinationem mundi intelligibilem a Deo praeconceptam, volitam, et promulgatam. Intellectu quidem cognoscitur, at non intelligendo cognoscitur sed intelligibilitatem negando. Quod vero neque in se neque in alio intelligi potest, omni nexu intelligibili careat necesse est. Quod omni nexu intelligibili caret, in aliud secundum nexum intelligibilem reduci non potest. Et sic probatur intentum quod formale peccati nullo prorsus modo in Deum reduci potest. (h) Quibus positis, elucet quid sit mysterium huius tractatus. Est in primis mysterium divinae transcendentiae; nihil in mundo fieri potest nisi Deus omnisciens scit et Deus Dominus omnipotens vult vel permittit; at sunt formalia peccatorum in mundo; ergo Deus ea permittit. Est deinde mysterium iniquitatis; sunt formalia peccatorum quae neque in se neque in alio intelligi possunt. Primum mysterium excessu intelligibilitatis finitum intellectum excedit. Alterum mysterium defectu intelligibilitatis intelligentiam nullam admittit. Ex his duobus simul sequitur Deum velle permittere peccata, nam permittere illud est actus divinus ideoque bonus et sanctus, et tamen Deum nullo modo velle peccata permissa sed ea tantummodo permittere. Vide §20, e. (i) Dices: ergo formalia peccatorum in Deum permittentem reducuntur; quod est contra assertum huius sectionis. Respondetur: circa permissionem divinam infra disputabitur (§23). Nunc sufficiat dicere: ex defectu actionis in voluntate in signo simultaneo concluditur ad permissionem divinam, non quia defectus est intelligibilis sed quia dominium Dei est transcendens; ex permissione divina dicitur peccatum permitti per denominationem extrinsecam. Gressus ergo sequentes sunt: (1) privatio actionis in voluntate; (2) denominatio Dei extrinseca ut permittentis; (3) ex hac denominatione extrinseca alia denominatio extrinseca peccati ut permissi. Ex his nullo modo concludi potest formale peccati esse intelligibile sive in se sive in alio; habentur enim eo quod formale peccati cognoscitur etsi intelligibilitatem negando cognoscatur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

351

God’s Knowledge and Will

But culpable evil is intelligible neither in itself nor in another. It is the lack of a due action, contrary to the light of right reason, contrary to the reasonableness of a rational appetite, contrary to the intelligible ordering of the world as preconceived, willed, and promulgated by God. True, it is known by the intellect, known, however, not by understanding it but by denying its intelligibility. Now, whatever cannot be understood either in itself or in another necessarily lacks any intelligible nexus. Whatever lacks an intelligible nexus cannot be reduced to something else through an intelligible nexus. Thus do we prove our point, that the formal element of sin is in no way attributable to God. (h) From what we have established, it is clear what the mystery of this treatise is. It is above all in the mystery of divine transcendence. Nothing can take place in this world unless God in his omniscience knows it and in his omnipotence either wills it or merely permits it; but there are formal elements of sin in the world; therefore God permits them. Next, there is the mystery of iniquity: there are formal elements of sin, which cannot be understood either in themselves or in anything else. The first mystery by reason of its excessive intelligibility is beyond the scope of a finite intellect. The second mystery through a total lack of intelligibility admits of no understanding at all. From these two points together it follows that God wills to permit sin, for this permission is a divine act and hence good and holy, and yet at the same time God in no way wills those sins but merely permits them. See §20 (e). (i) One could object here that it follows that the formal element of sin is reducible to God as permitting it, which runs counter to the assertion of this section. In reply we say first of all that the question of God’s permission of sin will be discussed again later, in §23. At this point suffice it to say that from a lack of due action in the will of the sinner we conclude to the simultaneous truth of divine permission, not because this lack is intelligible, but because God’s sovereignty is transcendent; and because of God’s permission, sin is said to be permitted by extrinsic denomination. These, then, are the steps: (1) the lack of due action in the will, (2) the extrinsic denomination of God as permitting it, and (3) on the basis of this extrinsic denomination, a further extrinsic denomination of sin as being permitted. From these steps one may by no means go on to conclude that the formal element of sin is intelligible either in itself or in another: they simply state that the formal

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

352

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

21

De Voluntate Dei Antecedente

(a) Ad fidem pertinet Deum ita alios praedestinare et alios reprobare ut tamen omnes salvos fieri velit. Qua de causa distingui oportet inter antecedentem voluntatem qua omnes salvos vult Deus et consequentem voluntatem qua Deus quosdam reprobare vult. Secus adesset contradictio. Alibi probatum assumimus hanc salvificam et universalem voluntatem antecedentem esse seriam et actuosam, neque fictam sed veram. Illud solum ergo inquirimus qualis sit ista voluntas antecedens et quemadmodum a voluntate consequente differat. (b) Prima conclusio est quaestionem poni non circa volitionem divinam entitative spectatam neque circa ipsa obiecta volita in se considerata sed de volitione divina terminative sumpta seu prout ipsa volitio se habeat ad omnium salutem et quorundam damnationem. Non agitur de volitione divina entitative spectata quacum componitur Deum velle nullam esse creaturam ideoque nullam esse salvam. Non agitur de ipsis obiectis: nulli dubium est salutem dari propter statum gratiae et poenam dari propter peccata. Sed agitur de volitione divina terminative sumpta: quaestio enim ponitur ut defendatur bonitas divina quae omnium salutem ex parte sua vult. (c) Secunda conclusio est voluntatem antecedentem esse ipsam volitionem qua Deus hunc mundum esse vult. Terminatur enim volitio divina sive necessario ad divinam bonitatem sive contingenter ad alia; haec vero alia vel sunt hypothetica vel actualia. Porro praeter quaestionem est volitio circa obiectum necessarium; manet enim haec volitio sive Deus vult creare sive non vult; at non manet pariter voluntas salvifica; si enim nullam esse creaturam Deus voluisset, nullam esse salvam necessario voluisset. Pariter praeter quaestionem est volitio circa obiectum mere hypotheticum; etiamsi verum esset omnes salvos fieri si Deus alium mundum voluisset, logice fieri potuit ut in hoc mundo Deus neminem salvum fieri vel-

The Robert Mollot Collection

353

God’s Knowledge and Will

element of sin is known even though it is known through a denial of its intelligibility. 21

God’s Antecedent Will

(a) It is a matter of faith that God predestines some and condemns others, yet wills that all should be saved. Hence we must distinguish between an antecedent will by which God wills all to be saved and a consequent will by which he wills to condemn some. Otherwise there would be a contradiction here. We assume as proved elsewhere that this universal salvific will is serious and active, not feigned but sincere. Here we intend merely to investigate the nature of this antecedent will and determine how it differs from the consequent will. (b) The first conclusion is that our inquiry has to do neither with the divine will considered as an entity nor with the objects willed considered in themselves, but examines the divine will considered in its term, that is, as related to the salvation of all and the condemnation of some. We are not concerned with the divine volition considered entitatively, which is compatible with a will that no creature should exist and therefore none be saved. Nor are we concerned with the objects of God’s will themselves. No one doubts that salvation is granted on account of the state of grace and punishment meted out because of sin. Our concern is with divine volition considered in its term. We pose the question in order to uphold the goodness of God who on his part wills the salvation of all. (c) The second conclusion is that the antecedent will is the very act of willing in which God wills the existence of this world. Divine volition has as its necessary term the divine goodness and as its contingent term all other things; these latter are either hypothetical or actual. Now, divine willing of its necessary object is outside the scope of our inquiry, for this willing remains whether God wills to create or not. But the same cannot be said of God’s salvific will, for if God had not willed the existence of creatures, he would necessarily not have willed their salvation. The willing of a purely hypothetical object is likewise outside our inquiry. Even if it were true that all would be saved in some other world willed by God, logically it could be that in that other world God would will that no

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

354

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

let; quod contradicit voluntati salvificae seriae et actuosae circa creaturas actuales. Idem aliter concludi potest: volitio divina circa obiectum hypotheticum non tam est volitio quam volitionis hypothesis in intellectu exsistens; at eiusmodi hypothesis non dicit voluntatem seriam et actuosam circa creaturas actuales. Manet ergo quod voluntas Dei salvifica est illa volitio actualis circa actualia qua Deus hunc mundum esse vult. (d) Tertia est conclusio quod distinguendae sunt diversae habitudines divinae volitionis ad diversa elementa huius mundi voliti. Quamvis enim unica sit volitio divina et unum unitate ordinis sit huius volitionis obiectum, nempe hic mundus totus, nihilominus non una est habitudo divinae volitionis ad omnia quae in mundo sunt sed alia erga bona, alia erga mala naturalis defectus, alia erga malum culpae, et alia erga malum poenae. Prima ergo habitudo est divinae volitionis ad bonum creatum; quae est secundum ipsam volitionis rationem intrinsecam; unumquodque enim volitur inquantum bonum est. Secunda vero habitudo est divinae volitionis ad malum naturalis defectus; quae quidem ex priori habitudine nexu intelligibili derivatur. Qui enim vult leones exsistere, vult eos sustentari et ideo vult carnium comestionem; at carnium comestio non habetur sine viventium mactatione, et ita qui vult directe illud bonum quod est leones exsistere, necesse est ut indirecte velit seu permittat malum particulare quod est quaedam viventia mactari. Tertia vero habitudo est divinae volitionis ad malum simpliciter quod est malum culpae seu formale peccati (§14, c). Porro, malum culpae Deus neque directe neque indirecte vult; non enim continetur in quodam bono communi tamquam pars vel consequens sed simpliciter est malum; et ideo, uti docet S. Thomas,51 Deus nullo modo malum culpae vult. Cui consentit tum sensus communis tum sensus ecclesiae. Quando enim oramus Deum Patrem ut ‘fiat voluntas tua,’ non oramus ut peccata ulla fiant sed ut nulla fiant; nemo enim reputat peccata esse secundum volun-

The Robert Mollot Collection

355

God’s Knowledge and Will

one be saved – which is contrary to the serious and active salvific will God has for actually existing creatures. The same conclusion can be arrived at in another way: divine volition concerning a hypothetical object is not so much a volition as the hypothesis of a volition existing in the intellect. But this sort of hypothesis is not a serious and active volition regarding actual creatures. It remains therefore that the salvific will of God is that actual volition regarding actual creatures by which God wills this world to exist. (d) The third conclusion is that we must distinguish between the different ways in which God’s volition relates to the various elements of this world that has been willed. Although there is only one divine volition and the object of this volition, namely the whole universe, is one through the unity of order, nevertheless there is not just one relationship of divine volition to everything that is in the world: it is related in one way to what is good, in another way to what is bad by natural defect, in another way to culpable evil, and in another way to the evil of punishment. The first relationship of the divine volition is to created good. This relationship accords with the intrinsic nature of volition, for everything is willed inasmuch as it is good. The second relationship of the divine volition is to what is bad by natural defect; it is derived from the first relationship through an intelligible nexus. For example, if one wants lions to exist, one has to will their sustenance and hence the eating of meat. But eating meat necessarily involves the killing of a live animal, and so whoever directly wills that good which is the existence of lions necessarily indirectly wills or permits that particular evil which is the killing of certain animals. The third relationship of the divine volition is to evil without qualification, that is, culpable evil, or the formal element of sin; see §14 (c). God wills culpable evil neither directly nor indirectly, for it is not included in any common good as a part or consequence thereof, but is unqualified evil. Hence, as St Thomas teaches,51 God does not will culpable evil in any way whatsoever. Both common sense and the mind of the church agree with this. When we pray to the Father, ‘Thy will be done,’ we are not praying that some sins be committed, but that none be committed. No one considers sin to be

51 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 9 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

356

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

tatem Dei, sed omnes concorditer dicimus peccata esse contra voluntatem eius qui peccata prohibet et peccatores minatur et impoenitentes gravissimis poenis punit. Quamvis autem Deus nullo modo vult formale peccati, tamen formale peccati Deus permittit (§20, h). Permissio ergo haec distinguitur contra illam Dei voluntatem qua Deus peccata nullo modo vult. Quarta denique habitudo divinae volitionis est ad malum consequens formale peccati. Quae quidem habitudo partim similis et partim dissimilis est ei quae supra secundo loco est posita. Et inprimis dissimilis est inquantum supponit et consequitur permissionem mali culpae quod Deus nullo modo vult. Caeterum autem est similis inquantum respicit malum quoddam particulare quod in bono communi continetur; quod discurrendo per singula apparet. Ex malo culpae sequuntur materiale peccati formalis, vitia, scandalum, et nisi homo resipiscat, malum poenae. At materiale peccati continetur in bono communi quod homo est dominus sui actus; vitia consequuntur ex bono communi quod est lex illa psychologica secundum quam actus dispositiones relinquunt unde habitus acquiri possunt; scandala continentur in illo bono communi quo homines ab hominibus docentur et permoventur; malum denique poenae continetur in ordine divinae iustitiae quae bonos praemiat et malos punit; quae sane iustitia magnum quoddam et commune bonum est. (e) Quarta est conclusio quemadmodum distinguantur voluntas Dei antecedens et voluntas consequens. Voluntas ergo consequens dicit unicam volitionem divinam actualem prout omnia prorsus respicit quae in hoc mundo sunt. Circa voluntatem consequentem dicitur nihil posse esse in mundo nisi id Deus velit. Quamvis enim in mundo sint formalia peccatorum, quamvis Deus formalia peccatorum nullo modo velit sed ea omnia vera voluntate prohibeat atque oderit, nihilominus in mundo non essent formalia peccatorum nisi ea fieri permisisset. Quare, inquantum ‘velle’ latius sumitur et ‘permittere’ includit, Deus dicitur velle voluntate consequente. Voluntas autem antecedens pariter dicit unicam volitionem divinam actualem prout omnia respicit quae Deus in hoc mundo esse vult non alienam voluntatem permittendo sed sua voluntate propria utendo. Circa voluntatem antecedentem dicitur Deus nullo modo velle formale peccati. Hanc voluntatem significamus quando oramus: ‘Fiat voluntas tua.’

The Robert Mollot Collection

357

God’s Knowledge and Will

according to God’s will, but we all concur in holding that sins are contrary to the will of God who forbids sins, gives a stern warning to sinners, and severely punishes the unrepentant. Yet while in no way willing the formal element of sin, God does permit it, as we indicated in §20 (h). This allowance, therefore, is to be distinguished from that will by which God wills that sins in no way should occur. The fourth relationship of the divine volition is to evil that is a consequence of the formal element of sin. This relationship is partly similar to and partly different from the second relationship mentioned above. It is different first of all in that it presupposes and follows upon the allowance of those culpable evils which God in no way wills. But otherwise it is similar, in that it regards a particular evil that is included in a common good. This will become clear by going through the various instances of it. From culpable evil there result the material element of formal sin, vices, scandal, and, unless one has a change of heart, the evil of punishment. But the material element of sin is contained within the common good that humans be in control of their actions; vices result from the common good which is the psychological law that actions dispose one towards the formation of habits; scandal is contained within the common good by which people learn from and are influenced by one another; and the evil of punishment is contained within the order of divine justice which rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked – surely a most important common good. (e) The fourth conclusion is how God’s antecedent and consequent wills differ. The consequent divine will refers to the one actual divine volition as related to absolutely everything in this world. It is to the consequent will that we refer when we say that nothing can exist in this world unless God wills it. Although the formal elements of sin do exist in the world and although God in no way wills them but with a sincere will forbids and detests them all, nevertheless they would not exist at all if God had not permitted them to occur. Therefore, in taking ‘to will’ in a broader sense as including ‘to permit,’ we are referring to God’s consequent will. God’s antecedent will, however, likewise refers to the one actual divine volition as it relates to all that God wills to exist in this world, not, however, by his permission of another’s volition, but through the exercise of his own will. It is to this antecedent will that we refer when we say that God in no way wills the formal element of sin and when we pray, ‘Thy will be done.’ This

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

358

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Hanc voluntatem ipse Deus significat quando peccata prohibet, quando poenas minatur, quando peccata commissa odio habet, quando impoenitentes punit. Quare, inquantum ‘velle’ proprie sumitur secundum habitudinem appetitus rationalis ad bonum et ad ea quae cum bono nexu intelligibili connectuntur, ideoque inquantum ‘velle’ non includit illud ‘permittere’ quod respicit formale peccati, dicitur voluntas Dei antecedens. Quibus positis, notandum est Deum voluntate antecedente velle permittere peccata, voluntate autem consequente velle peccata permissa. Ipse enim Deus, infinite bonus, permittit; ergo, ipsa haec permissio, sicut ipse Deus, est bona et ideo voluntate antecedente volita. Alia vero ex parte, peccata permissa sunt simpliciter mala neque ullo modo a Deo volita voluntate antecedente quamvis inquantum permittuntur voluntate consequente voluntur. Quaesierit forte quispiam quemadmodum fieri possit ut tam diversa sint iudicia circa tam similia, nempe, velle permittere peccata, et velle peccata permissa. Admittimus sane nomina verbaque esse simillima; at quantum distant obiecta volita; velle permittere est velle quod cum Deo identificatur; velle permissa est velle quod maxime Deo opponitur, nempe, peccatum. Tandem denique quamvis velle permittere et velle permissa in signo simultaneo veritatis inveniantur, nihilominus nullus exsistere potest nexus intelligibilis secundum quem peccata permissa in Deum quocumque modo reducantur. Vide §20, g, h. (f) Quinta denique conclusione exponitur voluntas Dei antecedens, salvifica, universalis, seria et actuosa, neque ficta sed vera. Quae voluntas duobus praemissis declaratur. Inprimis Deus vult hoc conditionatum, nempe, neminem a regno coelorum excludi nisi peccaverit et impoenitens peccato adhaeserit. Praeterea, Deus vult impletionem conditionis; voluntate enim antecedente nullo modo Deus vult vel aliud formale peccati vel formale peccati impoenitentiae. Unde concluditur absolute Deum velle voluntate antecedente neminem a regno coelorum excludi. Ex obiecto ‘neminem a regno coelorum excludi,’ constat hanc voluntatem esse salvificam et universalem. Ex duobus praemissis mensuratur quam seria, actuosa, atque vera sit haec voluntas. Inprimis quod commune est utrique praemissae, voluntas de qua agitur est illa unica volitio qua Deus hunc mundum actualem actu vult. Deinde maior praemissa declarat divinum propositum gratuitum elevan-

The Robert Mollot Collection

359

God’s Knowledge and Will

is the will that God himself expresses in forbidding sin, threatening sinners, detesting the sins that are committed, and punishing the unrepentant. Therefore, when ‘to will’ is taken in its proper sense as the relation of a rational appetite towards what is good and towards all that is intelligibly connected to good, thus excluding that ‘permitting’ whose object is the formal element of sin, it is called the antecedent will of God. Having said this, however, it should be noted that it is by his antecedent will that God wills to permit sins to be committed, but by his consequent will that he wills the sins that are permitted. For God himself, who is infinitely good, permits them; therefore this permission, like God himself, is good and thus is willed by his antecedent will. On the other hand, the sins that are permitted are simply evil and are in no way willed by God’s antecedent will, although inasmuch as they are permitted they are willed by his consequent will. At this point someone may perhaps ask how phrases that are so similar, namely, ‘to will to permit sins’ and ‘to will the sins that are permitted,’ can be judged so differently. True, these nouns and verbs are very similar, but their objects are quite different. To will to permit is the act of willing that is identical with God himself; to will what God merely permits is to will that which is most opposed to God, namely sin. Finally, although to will to permit and to will what is permitted are simultaneous truths, nevertheless there can be no intelligible nexus by way of which the sins committed can be referred or attributed to God in any way; see §20, g, h. (f) In our fifth and final conclusion we show God’s antecedent will to be salvific, universal, serious and active, and not feigned but sincere. This follows from two premises: First, God wills this conditional fact, namely, that no one is excluded from the kingdom of heaven unless one has sinned and not repented. Also, God wills the fulfilment of the condition: by his antecedent will he in no way wills the formal element of any sin or the formal element of the sin of impenitence. We conclude, therefore, that God by his antecedent will wills without restriction that no one be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. From this object, namely, ‘that no one be excluded from the kingdom of heaven,’ it is clear that this will is both salvific and universal. From the two premises above, one can determine how serious, active, and sincere this will is. First of all, it is common to both premises that the will in question is that one volition in which God wills this present world to exist. Next, the major premise states God’s gratuitous decision to raise rational

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

360

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

di creaturas rationales ad finem supernaturalem easque omnes, nisi peccaverint et peccato adhaeserint, ad ipsum finem consequendum producendi. Quod sane propositum est serium, actuosum, atque verissimum. Denique minor praemissa declarat habitudinem ipsius divinae voluntatis ad formale peccati; quam habitudinem non ficte sed vere Deus manifestat prohibitionibus, minis, atque gravissimis poenis. Dices: At eadem voluntate antecedente Deus vult permittere formalia peccata. Respondeo: Eadem voluntate antecedente Deus vult permittere formalia peccata quae ipse Deus proprio suae volitionis actu vult, nego; quae ipse Deus proprio actu permittit et alieno actu voluntur, concedo. Notes bene voluntatem Dei salvificam non dicere Deum simpliciter velle omnes fieri salvos, quod velle peccatorum malitia frustretur; divinum enim velle frustrari nequit. Sed voluntas Dei salvifica dicit Deum ex parte suae voluntatis velle omnes salvos fieri, permittere tamen quosdam mala sua voluntate perire. 22

Voluntatis Antecedentis Conceptiones Aliae

(a) Quidam afferunt signa seu momenta rationis;52 aliter enim volitur finis et aliter voluntur ea quae ad finem sunt; unde distinguunt priora signa in quibus voluntas Dei est antecedens et posteriora signa in quibus voluntas Dei est consequens. Qui decepti videntur esse ex duplici sensu istius nominis ‘finis.’ Aliter enim dicitur finis qui est ultima rei perfectio seu ultimum complementum cuiusdam totius. Aliter dicitur finis qui est ipsum totum, seu unum, intelligibile, et completum. Porro, finis primo modo dictus est propter finem secundo modo dictum; pars enim est propter totum; et ita docet S. Thomas ordinem universi esse maximum bonum in rebus creatis et finem ultimum mundo intrinsecum (§13).53 Porro obiectum secundarium actuale volitionis divinae est ipse ordo universi qui in se includit omne aliud bonum creatum sicut totum in se includit suas partes. Quare hoc obiecto volito, cum finis per prius volatur,

The Robert Mollot Collection

361

God’s Knowledge and Will

creatures to a supernatural end and to bring them all to the attainment of that end as long as they have not sinned and remained unrepentant. Such a decision is surely serious, active, and utterly sincere. Finally, the minor premise reveals the relationship of this will to the formal element of sin, a relationship which God with unfeigned sincerity makes manifest by his prohibitions, stern warnings, and severe punishments. One could perhaps argue here that it is by this same antecedent will that God wills to allow the formal element of sin. To this we would reply that by the same antecedent will God wills to permit formal sins but does not will the sins themselves by his own volitional act; the formal sins God permits are willed by another’s volitional act. Note well that by God’s salvific will we do not mean that God absolutely wills everyone to be saved and that this will is frustrated by the malice of sinners, for the divine will cannot be frustrated. The salvific will of God means that God by his will wills all to be saved, yet allows some to perish as a result of their evil will. 22

Other Conceptions of God’s Antecedent Will

(a) Some theologians propose various conceptual ‘designations’ or ‘moments’ in God:52 willing the end is not the same as willing the means, and so they distinguish between prior designations in which God’s will is antecedent and subsequent designations in which it is consequent. Their error seems to stem from two different meanings of the word ‘end.’ One meaning of ‘end’ is the final perfection of something, the final completion of a certain whole. The other meaning is the whole itself, the complete intelligible unit. Further, the end in the former sense is for the sake of the end in the latter sense; for the part exists for the sake of the whole, and accordingly St Thomas teaches that the order of the universe is the greatest good in all creation and the ultimate intrinsic end of the world. See above, §13.53 Again, the actual secondary object of divine volition is the order of the universe, which includes every other created good as a whole includes all its parts. Therefore, once this object is willed, since the end is what is first 52 [See the footnote on signa rationis at the beginning of §24 below.] 53 [In the autograph and in the two subsequent editions (1950 and the 1973 Regis edition), the back-reference is to §12. The correct back-reference would seem to be to §13.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

362

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

non superest aliud actu volendum. Non enim totum partibus vacuum per prius volitur et deinde secundum ordinem quendam voluntur ipsae partes ne totum vacuum maneat. Sed totum quod volitur ut finis est totum quod definitur unum, intelligible, completum, et exsistens. (b) Quidam autem distinguunt voluntatem Dei conditionatam et voluntatem Dei absolutam ita ut, conditione impleta, voluntas conditionata eo ipso sine mutatione sui in absolutam transeat. Qui decepti videntur imaginatione temporis. Quia enim decursu temporis alia esse desinunt, alia pergunt, alia incipiunt secundum quod ista omnia sunt entia temporalia et inter se comparantur, simili quodam modo arbitrantur res se habere apud Deum cuius volitio prout determinatum quoddam tempus antecedit dicitur antecedens et conditionata, prout autem in tempore conditiones implentur fit consequens et absoluta. Ne tamen theologi magis in sensibilibus immersi quam ipsi scientiae physicae periti videantur, imaginatio illa est deponenda. Deo enim aeterno pariter sunt praesentia omnia temporalia quamvis haec inter se praesentia non sint (§3). (c) Quidam denique, etiam temporis imaginatione deposita, distinguunt voluntatem Dei antecedentem et consequentem quasi illa sit conditionata et haec absoluta. Quod quamvis pium atque orthodoxum sentimentum exprimere possit, tamen in rigore sermonis accipi non debet. Conditionata enim voluntas Dei aut dicit Deum hypothetice potuisse aliud velle, aut dicit Deum actu sed conditionate velle, aut dicit Deum actu et absolute velle quoddam conditionatum. Iam vero neque in primo sensu neque in altero neque in tertio exprimitur illa voluntas antecedens quae est salvifica, universalis, seria, actuosa, atque vera. Quod sic probatur: Sive enim ponitur volitio hypothetica, sive velle actuale sed conditionatum, sive actualiter volitum conditionatum, semper quaeri potest utrum necne Deus actu velit impletionem conditionis. Si vult impletionem conditionis, cum voluntas Dei sit intrinsece efficax, nulla est conditio et omnes fient salvi, quod est contra Matt. c. 25. Si non vult impletionem conditionis, cum etiam haec voluntas sit intrinsece efficax, nemo erit salvus et voluntas salvifica est ficta. Si quoad alios vult et quoad alios non vult impletionem conditionis, cum

The Robert Mollot Collection

363

God’s Knowledge and Will

willed, there is nothing left to be willed. A whole without its parts is not willed first and then, according to some order or other, are the parts themselves willed so as to complete the whole. Rather, the whole that is willed as the end is the whole that is defined as one, intelligible, complete, and existing. (b) Some others distinguish between the conditioned will of God and his absolute will, such that once the condition is fulfilled, the conditioned will automatically and without change becomes the absolute will. Their error seems to come from imagining time. Since in the course of time some things cease to be, others perdure, and still others come into being, all of them existing in time and temporally related to one another, they imagine that God sees things in a similar way, so that his volition prior to a certain time is said to be antecedent and conditioned, but, as in the course of time the conditions are fulfilled, it becomes consequent and absolute. However, lest theologians appear to be more deeply engrossed in sensible realities than physical scientists, this sort of imagining ought to be eliminated. For, as explained in §3, all things existing in time are present to God in his eternity, although they are not all simultaneously present to one another. (c) Still others, even after abandoning this imagining of time, distinguish between God’s antecedent and consequent will as being, respectively, conditioned and absolute. Although this may express a pious and orthodox sentiment, it ought not to be accepted as strictly correct. The conditioned will of God would mean either that God hypothetically could have willed otherwise, or that God wills actually but conditionally, or that God actually and absolutely wills something that is conditioned. But in none of these three cases is there that antecedent will that is salvific, universal, serious, active, and sincere. We prove this as follows. Whether God’s volition is hypothetical, or is actual but conditioned, or actually wills what is conditioned, one can always ask whether or not God actually wills the fulfilment of the condition. If God wills the fulfilment of the condition, then since God’s will is intrinsically effective, there is no real condition here and so all will be saved, contrary to Matthew 25. If God does not will the fulfilment of the condition, then since this will also is intrinsically effective, no one will be saved and the salvific will is a fiction. If in some cases God wills the fulfilment of the condition and in other

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

364

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

etiam haec voluntas sit intrinsece efficax, voluntas salvifica non est universalis. Si vult impletionem conditionis universaliter quidem sed conditionate, redit quaestio de hac nova conditione. (d) At urgetur gravissima difficultas. Illud totum quod est ordo universi concrete sumptus non exsistit simul quoad omnes suas partes. Nam decursu temporis aliae partes alias succedunt, neque omnes sibi invicem umquam sunt praesentes. Quare absurdum est dicere illud totum esse finem quod numquam exsistit completum, et ita ruit obiectio contra ponentes signa rationis. Pariter necessaria est consideratio temporis cum tempus sit de ipsa ratione istius ordinis, et ita ruit obiectio contra ponentes voluntatem conditionatam quae debito tempore et impletis conditionibus vel non impletis transit in absolutam voluntatem. Respondetur: partes universi non sunt omnes sibi invicem praesentes, concedo; partes universi non sunt omnes pariter praesentes enti aeterno, nego. Iam vero quaestio ponitur non de ipsis volitis sed de ipsa Dei volitione prout volita sua respicit; quae volitio est ens aeternum, ideoque partes universi sunt considerandae non prout inter se comparantur, neque prout ad nostrum intellectum comparantur, sed prout ad divinam volitionem comparantur. Quare non ruunt obiectiones supra positae. Denique non est reputanda scientia divina inferior quia non potest dividi secundum partes temporis sicut dividitur cognitio nostra sensibilis. Etsi enim ens temporale habeat partes suae exsistentiae post partes, nihilominus est idem ens cuius nulla exsistentiae pars est totum. Deus verius cognoscit per substantiam rei identicam quam nos per divisas exsistentiae partes successivas.

23

Cur Deus Malum Culpae Permittat

(a) Distinguitur duplex usus divini dominii transcendentis, nempe, usus coniunctus et usus purus. Usus coniunctus est ille secundum quem dicitur Deus velle agere per causas secundas. Ita Deus est causa prima omnium quae per virtutes creatas

The Robert Mollot Collection

365

God’s Knowledge and Will

cases does not, then since this will also is intrinsically effective, his salvific will is not universal. If God wills the universal but conditional fulfilment of the condition, then the question returns concerning this new condition. (d) But the following is the most serious difficulty of all. That whole which is the order of the universe taken in its concreteness does not exist simultaneously with all of its parts. For in the course of time some parts come after others, and they are never present to one another all at the same time. Hence it is absurd to say that a whole which at no time is complete is an end, and so the argument against those who place conceptual designations in God is not valid. It is likewise necessary to take time into consideration, since time is an essential element in this world order, and so the argument against those who hold for a conditioned will which in due time, with either the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the conditions, becomes God’s absolute will, is also invalid. To this difficulty we reply that while it is true that the parts of the universe are not all simultaneously present to one another, they are so present to an eternal being. The question here is not about those things that are willed but about God’s will in relation to what he wills. This will is an eternal being, and therefore the various parts of the universe are not to be considered according to the way they are related to one another, but according to the way they are related to divine volition. Hence the above objections still stand. As a final point, we must not regard God’s knowledge as less than perfect because it cannot be parceled out according to various periods of time as our sense knowledge is. Even though a temporal being has parts of its existence after other parts, it is nevertheless the same being, no part of whose existence is the whole of it. God has a truer knowledge of a thing through its substance which is identical with it than we have in knowing it through the discrete successive parts of its existence. 23

Why God Permits Culpable Evil

(a) There are two ways in which God uses his transcendent power, namely, conjoint use and pure use. The conjoint use of divine power is that in which God wills to act through secondary causes. God is the first cause of all things that come into being

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

366

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

fiunt inquantum omnes istas virtutes creat, conservat, applicat, usurpat; per usum coniunctum dominii transcendentis Deus infallibiliter scit et efficaciter vult et irresistibiliter facit idem quod per applicationem et instrumentalitatem virtutis creatae et conservatae producitur. Intra ambitum usus coniuncti includuntur etiam media salutis gratuita et supernaturalia, uti humanitas Domini nostri Iesu Christi, gratiae habituales et actuales, revelatio, redemptio, ecclesia, sacramenta, et omnia alia quae entia finita atque creata sunt et per oeconomiam divinae sapientiae ordinantur. (b) Usus autem purus dominii transcendentis est quo Deus sua voluntate vult et facit aliquid esse praeter ordinem omnium causarum secundarum. Quare hic usus purus reduci potest ad hoc quod Deus non vult agere per causas secundas sed per immediatam interventionem suae voluntatis aliud facit ac per causas secundas facturus esset. (c) Porro, quod Deus malum culpae permittit, ex duplici praemissa concludimus; nempe, ex eo quod sunt mala culpae et ex eo quod nihil in mundo esse potest nisi id Deus et Dominus omnipotens aut velit aut saltem permittat. Quarum praemissarum altera sane invocat dominium Dei transcendens, ideoque quaerendum est ad quemnam usum dominii pertineat. Quae quaestio haud obscura est. Si Deus usus esset suo dominio, cum nullo modo malum culpae velit, certissime nullum peccatum formale commissum esset. Ideo de facto adest malum culpae quia Deus voluit per causas secundas agere et noluit purum usum sui dominii adhibere ne malum culpae fieret. Aliis verbis, per purum usum dominii transcendentis potest Deus impedire quominus ullum umquam peccatum committatur. Quatenus autem Deus non vult istum purum usum sed vult agere per causas secundas, dicitur quandoque permittere malum culpae. (d) En ergo prima responsio. Deus permittit malum culpae inquantum vult agere per causas secundas, inquantum vult usum coniunctum dominii sui transcendentis, inquantum non vult usum purum eiusdem dominii. (e) At ulterius quaeritur cur Deus velit agere per causas secundas et nolit agere per purum usum sui dominii. Respondetur iustitiam Dei esse veritatem. Veritas enim rei seu ontologica est eiusdem conformitas ad intellectum divinum; ita res creatae quoad

The Robert Mollot Collection

367

God’s Knowledge and Will

through created powers, in that God creates, conserves, applies, and uses all these powers. Through this conjoint use of his power he knows infallibly, wills efficaciously, and irresistibly causes the very reality that is produced through the application and instrumentality of a power that is created and conserved. Included in this conjoint use are the gratuitous supernatural means of salvation: the humanity of Christ, habitual and actual graces, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and all the other finite realities created and ordered by the dispensation of divine wisdom. (b) The pure use of transcendent power is that whereby God wills to create something outside the order of secondary causality. This pure use can thus be reduced to God’s unwillingness to act through secondary causes. Instead, through the immediate intervention of his will God does something different from what he would have done through secondary causes. (c) Furthermore, that God permits culpable evil we deduce from two premises, namely, the fact that there are culpable evils and the fact that nothing can exist in this world unless willed or at least permitted by an omnipotent Lord and God. Of these premises, the second surely involves a use of his transcendent power, and so we have to ask to which use this exercise of power belongs. The matter is quite clear. If God were making [pure] use of his power, then since he in no way wills culpable evil, most certainly no formal sin would ever be committed. Therefore, in actual fact there is culpable evil because God has willed to act through secondary causes and at the same time has refused to exercise the pure use of his power in order to prevent culpable evil from occurring. In other words, through the pure use of his transcendent power God could prevent any sin from ever being committed. But in refusing to use his power in that way and in choosing to act through secondary causes, God is said to sometimes permit culpable evil. (d) This, then, is our first answer to the question. God permits moral evil inasmuch as he wills to act through secondary causes, opts for the conjoint use of his transcendent power, and rejects the pure use of his power. (e) But we can ask the further question, why God wills to act through secondary causes and is unwilling to act through the pure use of his power. Our answer is that God’s justice is truth. The truth of a thing, ontological truth, is its conformity with the divine intellect; thus the existence of

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

368

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

esse suum conformantur ideis divinis, et agere rerum sequitur eorum esse.54 Inquantum ergo Deus vult agere per causas secundas, inquantum nolit agere per purum usum sui dominii, intantum vult Deus suam iustitiam quae est veritas. Illud enim agere quod sequitur esse rei non est agere per purum usum divini dominii introductum sed est agere quod usum coniunctum sequitur. (f) Dices: qui nimis probat, nihil probat. Porro, cum Deus semper vult suam iustitiam quae est veritas, numquam vult purum usum sui dominii. At consequens videtur falsum. Respondetur: ‘… dicendum quod, cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis, impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet.’55 Quare Deus vult hunc mundum esse sicut scientia simplicis intelligentiae scit eum possibilem esse et scientia media scit eum futuribilem esse. Nihilominus ordo universi non sequitur essentias rerum sicut conclusio praemissas; per prius enim Deus scit ordinem universi quam rerum essentias in isto ordine inclusas; nam omnia uno intuitu simplici intelligit, non procedendo a minoribus totis in maiora excogitanda, sed tota maxima comprehendendo in eis videt rerum essentias tamquam partes. Porro, tota maxima seu series omnium mundorum possibilium conspiciuntur a Deo in propria essentia infinita tamquam manifestationes possibiles eiusdem essentiae, sapientiae, atque bonitatis. Quare nihil impedit quominus ordo universi divina sapientia conceptus utrumque exhibeat, nempe, et purum usum dominii divini in miraculis physicis atque moralibus secundum oeconomiam specialem divinae sapientiae, et usum coniunctum eiusdem dominii secundum quem Deus suam iustitiam rerumque veritatem per ipsas causas secundas agendo facit.

(g) Quibus positis sequitur duplex corollarium. Quorum primum est incitamentum zeli ad maiorem Dei gloriam promovendam. Quod Deus permittit malum culpae, hoc idem est quod Deus vult agere per causas secundas. Quodsi nobis displicent et Dei offensa malo culpae illata et animarum perditio aeterna consequens, pro virili parte agamus Deoque cooperemur ut divina volitio agendi per causas secundas non

The Robert Mollot Collection

369

God’s Knowledge and Will

created things is patterned upon the divine ideas, and their action follows upon their existence.54 Therefore, insofar as God wills to act through secondary causes and refuses to exercise his power independently, he wills his justice that is truth. For that action which follows upon the existence of a thing is not an action performed by the pure use of divine power but one that follows upon its conjoint use. (f) At this point one may interject that to prove too much is to prove nothing. Now, since God always wills his justice which is truth, he never wills to make pure use of his power; but this is evidently false. To this we answer with St Thomas that, ‘since the good as apprehended by the intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything that is not in accord with his wisdom.’55 Hence God wills this world to exist exactly as in his knowledge of simple understanding he knows it as possible and in his middle knowledge knows it to be futurible. However, the order of the universe does not follow from the essences of things as a conclusion follows from its premises. God’s knowledge of the order of the universe is prior to his knowledge of the essences of things contained within that order; for God understands all things in one simple intuition, not by proceeding from knowing lesser wholes to thinking of greater ones, but rather in comprehending the greatest wholes he sees in them the essences of things as parts thereof. Also, the greatest wholes, the series of all possible worlds, are seen by God in his own infinite essence as possible manifestations of that same essence, wisdom, and goodness. Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent the order of the universe as conceived by divine wisdom from exhibiting both uses of his power, pure use of divine power in physical and moral miracles by a special dispensation of divine wisdom, and conjoint use of this same power through which God, acting through secondary causes, produces his justice and the truth of things. (g) Two corollaries follow from this. The first corollary is an incentive to promote with enthusiasm the greater glory of God. For God to allow moral evil means that he wills to act through secondary causes. Now if we are distressed by the offence given to God through moral evil and the resulting eternal loss of salvation, we should cooperate strenuously with God so that his will to act through secondary

54 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 2. 55 Ibid. q. 21, a. 1, ad 2m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

370

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

aequivaleat lugubri illi permissioni sed verae illi voluntati Dei quam nominamus dicentes, ‘Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in coelo et in terra.’ Quemadmodum vero nostram actionem actioni divinae cooperari oporteat, ex supra dictis coniici licet. Nam per creaturas agit Deus applicando atque usurpando; quae applicatio atque usurpatio per ordinem universi a Deo ut causa totali et universali procedunt (§17, f, g, h, i), et triplici nexu ipsas hominum electiones attingunt (§18, i). Quatenus ergo electio humana cum antecedentibus donis gratiae habitualibus atque actualibus nectitur, agere possumus flagitando bonum Patrem per orationes et poenitentias ut gratias abundantes Corpori Christi perficiendo atque augendo largiatur. Quatenus autem electio humana cum antecedentibus dispositionibus atque habitibus corporis, sensuum, intellectus, ipsiusque voluntatis nectitur, agere possumus in has dispositiones habitusque cum per alia media nota tum maxime per educationem catholicam. Quatenus denique electio humana cum adiunctis externis oeconomicis, politicis, socialibus, historicis nectitur, agere possumus etiam in haec influendo. Omnis enim motus historicus quantumvis magnus, profundus, diuturnus ex ‘minoritate creativa’ ortum sumpsit: minoritas enim inquirit, cogitat, intelligit, vult, ducit; maioritas docetur, commovetur, ducitur. Saeculo decimo nono vixit Marx et deridebatur; saeculo vigesimo doctrina Marxiana magnam telluris partem regit. Pauci erant graeci philosophi, pusillus grex erant apostoli Domini, nec numerosi primi monachi, nec multi erant scholastici profundi, nec caterva magna primi socii Ignatii, nec multitudo erat sive Lutherus sive Calvinus sive Cartesius sive Galilei sive Rousseau sive Kant. Unum est necessarium: ut rerum et mentium status qualis sit perspicias, et quid fieri possit et debeat invenias. Quod si Domino dirigente atque adiuvante feceris, ad maiorem Dei gloriam actione externa promovendam vere contuleris.

(h) Aliud corollarium est perperam eos S. Thomam interpretari qui dicant finem rerum a Deo intentum esse occupationem omnium stationum cum honoris et gloriae in coelis tum damnationis et poenae in infernis, et hanc ob causam Deum velle alios praedestinare et alios reprobare. Imaginatione quadam decipiuntur. Quod docet S. Thomas (vide Sum. theol., 1, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3m) est Deum velle manifestationem suae iustitiae atque suae

The Robert Mollot Collection

371

God’s Knowledge and Will

causes is seen not as a grudging tolerance of evil but as that true will of God we refer to when we pray, ‘Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.’ How we ought to cooperate with God’s activity can be inferred from the points we have made above. God acts through creatures by applying and using them as instruments. Throughout the whole universe this application and instrumental use emanate from God as the total and universal cause (§17, f, g, h, i), and bear upon our free choices through a threefold nexus (§18, i). Insofar as our human choices are connected with the antecedent gifts of grace, both habitual and actual, we can cooperate by imploring the Father by prayer and penance to bestow abundant graces to strengthen and increase the Body of Christ. Insofar as our choices are connected with the antecedent dispositions and habits of body, senses, mind, and will, we can work on these dispositions and habits by many obvious means, especially through Catholic education. Finally, insofar as our choices are connected with external economic, political, social, and historical circumstances, we can cooperate by exerting an influence upon them also. Every historical movement, however great, however profound, however long-lasting, began with a ‘creative minority.’ For it is the minority that asks questions, thinks, understands, makes decisions, leads; the majority are taught, are persuaded, are led. In the nineteenth century Karl Marx was laughed at during his lifetime; in the twentieth Marxist doctrine holds sway over much of the world. The Greek philosophers were few in number, the first disciples of the Lord were a ‘little flock,’ the first monks were not numerous, nor were the best of the medieval Schoolmen; the first companions of Ignatius Loyola were not a large company, nor were those of Luther or Calvin or Descartes or Galileo or Rousseau or Kant a multitude. One thing is necessary: understand the social, intellectual, and cultural state of society and you will discover what can and ought to be done. If, with God’s guidance and help, you do this, you will have truly contributed by your cooperation to the promotion of God’s greater glory. (h) The second corollary is that it is a wrong interpretation of St Thomas to say that according to him God’s intention in creating was to fill all the places of honor and glory in heaven and also those of damnation and punishment in hell, and that for this reason he wills to predestine some and condemn others. Those who so interpret Aquinas have been led astray by their imagination. What he teaches in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3m,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

372

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

misericordiae; quaenam vero sit ista iustitia et quaenam ista misericordia, antea exposuit (ibid., q. 21, aa. 1–4); quam expositionem intelligendo quae supra scripsimus invenimus. (i) Dices: Ex praemissis sequitur reductio mali culpae in Deum. Nam Deus vult rerum veritatem ideoque per causas secundas agere vult; hac de causa non vult purum usum sui dominii transcendentis ideoque malum culpae permittit. Propter bonum commune, ergo, quo ordo universi est verus et realis neque quoddam somnium seu ‘fairyland,’ permittit Deus malum culpae, sicut propter veritatem leonum permittit viventium mactationem.

Ex praemissis sequitur reductio divinae permissionis in volitionem boni communis, concedo; sequitur reductio ipsius mali culpae permissi, subdistinguo: si malum culpae reduci potest in voluntatem divinam agendi per causas secundas, concedo; si reduci non potest, nego. Porro, nullo modo reduci potest, uti supra §20 stabilitur.

24

De Signis Rationis56

(a) Sapientis est ordinare. Qui vero res ordinat aliud ponit primum, aliud secundum, et ita porro. Quare secundum quod aliud alteri praeintelligitur, ponuntur signa rationis. Hanc ob causam sex signa rationis et singulorum in duas partes divisionem distinguimus ad ordinandam hanc materiam circa providentiam divinam. Quae omnia siglis A, A′, A″, B, B′, B″, C, C′, C″, D, D′, D″, E, E′, E″, F, F ′, F ″ convenienter designantur. (b) Primo signo ponimus scientiam simplicis intelligentiae secundum quam Deus totam seriem mundorum possibilium in sua virtute omnipotente intelligit, A.

The Robert Mollot Collection

373

God’s Knowledge and Will

is that God wills to manifest his justice and his mercy, and in the first four articles of Question 21 he already explained what is meant by this justice and this mercy. This explanation can be found in what we have written above. (i) One may object that from what we have been saying it follows that culpable evil is reducible to God. For God wills the truth of things and therefore wills to act through secondary causes; hence God rejects the pure use of his transcendent power and so allows culpable evil to occur. On account of the common good, therefore, whereby the order of the universe is true and real and not some dream or fairyland, God allows culpable evil in the very same way as on account of the truth of lions he allows the killing of animals. In answer to this objection, we grant that from what we have said, God’s allowance of culpable evil is reduced to his willing the common good. But that it follows from this that culpable evil itself is similarly reduced, we distinguish: if culpable evil can be reduced to God’s will to act through secondary causes, we would agree; but if it cannot be so reduced, we deny. In fact, it cannot be reduced to God in any way whatsoever, as we have established in §20. 24

Conceptual Designations in God (Signa Rationis)56

(a) It is characteristic of the wise to put things in order. Now, to order things means to place one first, another second, and so on. Therefore, according to the order in which one thing is prior to another in our understanding of them, we posit certain conceptual designations in God. Accordingly, to put order into this matter of God’s providence, we distinguish six designations and divide each of them into two parts. We indicate all these as follows: A, A′, A″, B, B′, B″, C, C ′, C ″, D, D′, D″, E, E′, E″, F, F ′, F ″. (b) By the first designation, A, we indicate the knowledge of simple understanding according to which God understands the entire series of possible worlds in his omnipotent power. 56 [What is meant by signa rationis? They are conceptually distinct formalities in one subject among which one is understood as being logically prior to another. The distinctions among them are necessitated by our way of conceiving; hence the qualifier, rationis. See I.M. Dalmau, De Deo uno et trino, in vol. 2 of Sacrae theologiae summa (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1955) §147, p. 123.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

374

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Et in primo signo distinguimus inter ipsam intelligibilem rerum ordinem, A′, et mala culpae quae contra ordinem intelligibilem sunt et negando intelligibilitatem cognoscuntur, A″. (c) Secundo signo ponimus scientiam mediam secundum quam Deus in sua transcendentia intelligit omnia fore prout praecedente scientia exhibentur si ipse quendam e mundis possibilibus vellet, B. Et in secundo signo distinguimus inter hypothesin propriae divinae voluntatis, B′, et hypothesin divinae permissionis, B″. (d) Tertio signo ponimus liberrimum decretum divinae volitionis secundum quam Deus actu vult hunc mundum esse, C. Et in tertio signo distinguimus inter hanc volitionem prout antecedens dicitur, C′, et prout est permissio mali culpae, C″. (e) Quarto signo ponimus scientiam visionis secundum quam Deus actu scit hunc mundum esse secundum omnes suas partes atque nexus, D. Et hoc in signo distinguimus inter ea quae Deus scit intelligendo, D′, et malum culpae quod scit intelligibilitatem negando, D″. (f) Quinto signo ponimus actionem divinam ad extra secundum quam Deus creat, conservat, applicat, atque usurpat omnia in mundo ut sint et agant, E. Et hoc in signo distinguimus inter ea quae ex divina actione producuntur, nempe, omnia bona, E ′, et id quod minime ex ista actione sequitur, nempe, malum culpae, E ″. (g) Sexto signo ponimus totum hunc mundum secundum omnes suas partes atque nexus exsistentem, ita quidem ut totus mundus sit semper Deo praesens, et tamen partes mundi sibi invicem non sint omnes praesentes, F. Et iterum distinguitur inter intelligibilia in se et in alio, F ′, et malum culpae quod est irrationabilis defectus appetitus rationalis, F ″. (h) Quae signorum distinctio videtur conveniens. In primis duobus ponuntur necessaria atque aeterna, in tertio et quarto ponuntur aeterna sed contingentia, in quinto et sexto ponuntur temporalia et contingentia. Quod videtur manifeste conveniens. Porro, scientia media supponit scientiam simplicis intelligentiae; scientia visionis supponit liberam Dei voluntatem creandi; et exsistentia mundi sup-

The Robert Mollot Collection

375

God’s Knowledge and Will

And in this first designation we distinguish between the intelligible order of reality, A′, and culpable evils, which are contrary to intelligible order and are known in denying their intelligibility, A″. (c) By the second designation, B, we indicate middle knowledge according to which God understands in his transcendence that if he were to will any of those possible worlds, everything would occur just as it appears in the preceding knowledge. And in this second designation we distinguish between the hypothesis of God’s proper will, B′, and the hypothesis of God’s permission [of culpable evil], B″. (d) By the third designation, C, we indicate that totally free decree of God’s will according to which he actually wills this world to exist. And in this third designation we distinguish between that act of will referred to as antecedent, C′, and as the permission of culpable evil, C″. (e) By the fourth designation, D, we indicate the vision-knowledge according to which God actually knows the existence of this world in all of its parts and interconnections. And in this designation we distinguish between what God knows through understanding, D ′, and culpable evil, which God knows through a denial of its intelligibility, D″. (f) By the fifth designation, E, we indicate God’s action outside himself according to which he creates, conserves, applies, and uses everything in this world in order that they may exist and act. And in this designation we distinguish between what is produced by God’s action, that is, all that is good, E ′, and that which in no way results from his action, namely, culpable evil, E ″. (g) By the sixth designation, F, we indicate this entire world order as it exists in all its parts and interconnections and as being ever present to God, even though not all its parts are present to one another. And in this designation we distinguish between those things that are intelligible either in themselves or in another, F ′, and culpable evil, which is the unreasonable failure of a rational appetite, F ″. (h) This distinction of designations seems to be appropriate. In the first two we indicate necessary and eternal realities, in the third and fourth eternal but contingent realities, and in the fifth and sixth temporal and contingent realities. This seems obviously quite appropriate. Further, middle knowledge presupposes the knowledge of simple understanding, vision-knowledge presupposes God’s free decision to create, and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

376

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

ponit actionem Dei. Et hac de causa convenienter ponuntur primum ante secundum, tertium ante quartum, et quintum ante sextum. Denique in singulis signis fit distinctio secundum quod scientia vel volitio vel actio vel realitas respicit vel non respicit malum culpae. Quod conveniens est cum malum culpae intelligibilitate careat et in aliud reduci non possit. (i) Iam vero alia signa non videntur admittenda. Si enim alia admitterentur, fundamentum distinctionis sumeretur secundum partes mundi sciti, voliti, facti, et exsistentis. At Deus scit mundum per modum unius; vult mundum per modum unius; et agit per intellectum suum atque voluntatem. Quare cum mundus consideretur prout terminus est divinae scientiae, volitionis, et actionis (nam de divina providentia et gubernatione quaestio est), ineptum videtur partes distinguere ubi unum scitur, volitur, et efficitur. ( j) Quantum ad adaequationem veritatis attinet: Quae primo et secundo signo ponuntur, dicuntur de Deo per necessitatem et ideo per denominationem intrinsecam. Quae quinto et sexto signo ponuntur, dicuntur de mundo per denominationem intrinsecam tum secundum quod in se est, F, tum secundum quod in Deum ut causam reducitur, E′, vel non reducitur, E″. Quae tertio, quarto, et quinto signo ponuntur, dicuntur de Deo contingenter (potuit enim non creare) et ideo per denominationem extrinsecam dicuntur. (k) Quantum ad realitatem distinctionum signorum attinet: Duo sunt realiter distincta, nempe, Deus et mundus. Proinde, quae necessario de Deo dicuntur non supponunt aliud praeter Deum; quae vero contingenter de Deo dicuntur, includunt in ratione veritatis exsistentiam mundi extrinsece denominantis. Parva est distinctio inter scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam mediam; Deus enim absolute simplex est. Pariter parva est distinctio inter volitionem liberam et scientiam visionis; idem in Deo realiter est scire et velle; et haec scientia atque volitio veritatis adaequationem habent per idem denominans extrinsecum. Addit scientia visionis super scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam mediam tum quatenus scit obiectum actu exsistens tum quatenus ipsa

The Robert Mollot Collection

377

God’s Knowledge and Will

the existence of the world presupposes God’s action. Hence we quite properly place the first before the second, the third before the fourth, and the fifth before the sixth. Finally, in each of these designations we make a distinction according to which knowledge or will or action or reality is or is not related to culpable evil. These distinctions are quite appropriate, since culpable evil lacks intelligibility and cannot be reduced to anything else. (i) There are apparently no further designations to be admitted. If there were, the basis for the distinction would be derived from various parts of the known, willed, created, and existing world. But God knows the world as a unit, wills the world as a unit, and acts through his intellect and will. Since, then, the world is the term of divine knowledge, volition, and action – for our concern here is divine providence and governance – it seems inappropriate to distinguish parts when it is one whole unit that is known, willed, and caused. ( j) What is the correspondence of truth in these designations? What are stated in the first and second designations are predicated of God by necessity, and thus by intrinsic denomination. What are stated in the fifth and sixth designations are predicated of the world by intrinsic denomination, both as to what it is in itself (F), and as to its reduction to God as its cause (E ′), or non-reduction, as in the case of E″. What are stated in the third, fourth, and fifth designations are predicated of God contingently, and thus by extrinsic denomination. God could have not created. (k) As to the reality of the distinctions among these designations: These two are really distinct, God and the world. Whatever is necessarily predicated of God presupposes nothing other than God himself; but what is predicated of him contingently includes the existence of the world as extrinsic denominator in order for it to be true. The distinction between knowledge of simple understanding and middle knowledge is minimal, since God is an absolutely simple reality. The distinction between God’s free volition and his vision-knowledge is similarly minimal, for in God knowing and willing are the same reality; and this knowledge and volition have their truth-correspondence through the same extrinsic denominator. Vision-knowledge is superadded to the knowledge of simple understanding and middle knowledge, both insofar as its object is something that ac-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

378

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

est illa scientia quae adiecta voluntate est causa rerum57 et quae supposita voluntate est praeceptiva ordinis rerum.58 Realis omnino est distinctio inter ea quae in mundo sunt et illam privationem quae est malum culpae. Denique distinctiones quae parvae dicuntur fundamentum suum habent in nostro modo concipiendi. 25

De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione

(a) Providentia divina est ratio ordinis rerum in finem prout in mente divina exsistit.59 Praedestinatio est pars providentiae, nempe, ratio transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae.60 Reprobatio est praevisio et permissio culpae et praeparatio poenae aeternae.61 Quae omnia pertinent ad quartum signum rationis seu ad scientiam visionis quae liberam volitionem hunc mundum creandi supponit. Vide §24, d, k. (b) Dilectio divina dicit affectum divinae volitionis erga praedestinatos.62 Electio dicit eundem affectum quatenus hi prae aliis eliguntur ad vitam aeternam. Odium denique dicit affectum eiusdem volitionis erga reprobos. Quae omnia pertinent ad tertium signum rationis, nempe ad liberrimam volitionem qua Deus hunc mundum totum creare voluit. Vide §24, c. Antecedit ergo dilectio praedestinationem et odium reprobationem; quae tamen antecedentia in parva distinctione fundatur. Vide §24, k. (c) Providentia, praedestinatio, reprobatio, dilectio, electio, odium distinguuntur ab eorum effectibus seu consectariis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

379

God’s Knowledge and Will

tually exists and insofar as it is itself that knowledge which, in conjunction with the will, is the cause of created things57 and which, presupposing the will, determines the order of reality.58 Quite real, however, is the distinction between things existing in the world and that privation which is culpable evil. Finally, those distinctions we have called minimal have their basis in our way of conceiving things. 25

Predestination and Reprobation

(a) Divine providence is the plan existing in the mind of God for the ordering of things to their end.59 Predestination is that part of providence that is the plan according to which a rational creature is brought to that end which is eternal life.60 Reprobation is the foreseeing and permission of culpable evil and the preparation of eternal punishment.61 All of the above belong to the fourth conceptual designation, that is, to the vision-knowledge that presupposes God’s free act of the will to create this world. See above, §24, d, k. (b) Divine love refers to the attitude of divine volition towards the predestined.62 Election refers to the same attitude inasmuch as some are chosen for eternal life in preference to others. Detestation refers to the attitude of the same volition towards the condemned. All of the above belong to the third designation, namely, to the totally free volition by which God has willed to create this entire universe. See above, §24, c. Thus, love precedes predestination and detestation precedes reprobation. Both of these antecedents, however, are based upon a minimal distinction: see §24, k. (c) Providence, predestination, reprobation, love, election, and detestation are distinct from their effects or consequences. 57 58 59 60 61 62

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 8. Ibid. q. 22, a. 1 c, ad 1m, ad 3m. Ibid. q. 22, a. 1 c. Ibid. q. 23, a. 1 c. Ibid. q. 23, a. 3 c. Ibid. q. 23, a. 2 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

380

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Ita providentia distinguitur a gubernatione rerum, quae est providentiae exsecutio.63 Similiter praedestinatio distinguitur a donis gratiae, meritis, et collatione gloriae; et pariter dilectio et electio ab eisdem effectibus. Similiter reprobatio distinguitur a culpa praevisa et permissa et a poena inflicta; et pariter odium ab iisdem distinguitur. Interdum praedestinatio vel reprobatio sumuntur sensu restricto et cum praecisione ab aliquibus effectibus vel consectariis. Quae praecisio toties quoties annuntiabitur. (d) Distinguuntur praedestinatio et dilectio eodem modo quo distinguuntur obiectum-quod et obiectum-cui amoris. Vide §16. Praedestinatio ergo dicit rationem transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae. Dilectio autem dicit affectum divinae voluntatis erga creaturam transmittendam vel transmissam. Pariter distinguntur odium et reprobatio. (e) Cum obiectum-cui amoris non dicatur finis nisi abusive, non est intrudenda consideratio obiectorum-cui in considerationem finium, sicut iam explicatum est. Vide §16, b. (f) Assertum primum. Divina dilectio, electio, odium, praedestinatio, reprobatio sunt praescitis possibilibus futuribilibusque meritis et peccatis; at nullo modo sunt propter ea, neque proprie ex eis. Sunt praescitis futuribilibus, nam voluntas divina non caece eligit hunc mundum; adest obiectum secundarium secundum quod vult. Vide §15, d,64 i. Non sunt propter merita vel peccata futuribilia, nam unicum motivum divinae volitionis est bonitas divina. Vide §15, f; §23, f. Non proprie sunt ex praescitis futuribilibus: primo, quia non realiter distinguuntur divinum scire et divinum velle; vide §15, g; deinde etiamsi

The Robert Mollot Collection

381

God’s Knowledge and Will

Thus providence is distinct from governance, which is the implementation of the plan of providence.63 Similarly, predestination is distinct from the gifts of grace, merits, and the conferring of glory; and love and election are likewise distinct from these same effects. In the same way, reprobation is distinct from sin that is foreseen and permitted and from the punishment imposed; and detestation is similarly distinct from these. Sometimes predestination and reprobation are taken in a narrower sense as prescinding from certain effects or consequences. This usage will be noted each time it occurs. (d) Predestination and love are distinguished from each other in the same way as the object-which of love and its object-to-which are distinguished; see §16. Thus predestination means the plan for bringing a rational creature to that end which is eternal life. Love, on the other hand, refers to the attitude of the divine will towards the creature who either is to be or already has been brought to that end. Reprobation and detestation are distinguished in the same way. (e) Since it is incorrect to speak of the object-to-which of love as an end, a consideration of objects-to-which ought not to be introduced into a consideration of ends; see the explanation given above, §16, b. (f) First Assertion: Divine love, election, detestation, predestination, and reprobation exist with the foreknowledge of possible and futurible merits and sins. But they do not in any way exist for the sake of these merits and sins, nor, properly speaking, as a result of them. They exist with the foreknowledge of futuribles, for the divine will does not blindly choose this world, which is present to it as the secondary object of its volition; see §15, d,64 i. They do not exist for the sake of futurible merits or sins, since the sole motive of divine volition is the divine goodness; see §15, f; §23, f. Properly speaking they do not result from these foreseen futuribles: first, because there is no real distinction between divine knowing and divine will-

63 Ibid. qq. 103, 104. 64 [In the autograph, Lonergan referred back to §15, c, but it is in §15, d that he speaks of the secondary objects of divine volition. Accordingly, the editors have changed the back reference here to §15, d.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

382

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

anthropomorphice supponatur divina volitio specificari a divino intellectu, volitio esset specificata divino consilio, divina praeconceptione mundi totius et non ex parte quadam praeconcepta. (g) Assertum alterum. Aliter se habent dilectio et odium; aliter pariter se habent praedestinatio et reprobatio. Dilectio enim dicit ipsam Dei volitionem secundum quam dicimus, ‘Fiat voluntas tua’; quae quidem voluntas est salvifica erga omnes at efficaciter salvifica erga dilectos. Vide §21. Odium autem dicit divinam permissionem culpae praevisae quam culpam Deus ipse nullo modo vult. Est enim malum simpliciter. Vide §14, c; §21, d; §23. Praedestinatio dicit Deum summa sapientia sua mundum ordinare ut praedestinatis gratiae conferantur, merita sequantur, mors opportuno tempore interveniat, et praemium vitae aeternae largiatur. Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, Rom 8.28 ss. Reprobatio autem minime dicit Deum excogitare laqueos quibus reprobi irretiantur. Malum enim culpae est contra ordinem mundi, et fit contra nisus divinos ut omnes salventur.65 Unde dicit reprobatio praevisionem culpae et permissionem.66 Vide §14, f. (h) Assertum tertium. Neque dilectio neque praedestinatio neque odium neque reprobatio etiam praecisive sumptae de sola gloria vel poena, sunt propter merita vel peccata absolute praevisa per scientiam visionis. Admittitur sane quod ipsa gloria est proper merita, et ipsa poena est propter peccata. At quaestio ponitur de motivo divinae volitionis. Alia quaestio infra ponetur utrum merita vel peccata sint conditiones divinae volitionis. Dicimus ergo ipsam divinam volitionem aliud motivum non habere nisi ipsam divinam bonitatem (§15, f) neque divinam volitionem unius esse propter divinam volitionem alterius, nam divina volitio est unica (§15, b), sed Deum velle ordinem rerum seu velle hoc esse propter illud, uti gloriam propter merita vel poenam propter peccata.

The Robert Mollot Collection

383

God’s Knowledge and Will

ing; see §15, g; second, even if by a certain anthropomorphism one were to suppose that divine volition is specified by the divine intellect, that volition would be specified by the overall divine plan, the divine preconception of the world as a whole and not of any preconceived part. (g) Second Assertion: Love and detestation have a different reference, and predestination and reprobation likewise. Love refers to that will of God about which we say, ‘Thy will be done.’ This will is salvific for all and efficaciously salvific for those who are loved. See §21. Detestation, on the other hand, refers to the divine permitting of sin foreseen but by no means willed by God, for it is evil without qualification; see §14, c; §21, d; §23. Predestination refers to the fact that God in his supreme wisdom orders the world in such a way that grace is given to the predestined, their merits follow, death occurs at an opportune time, and the reward of eternal life is bestowed upon them. ‘For those who love God, all things work together for the good …’ (Romans 8.28–30). Reprobation, however, certainly does not mean that God devises snares to trap the reprobate. For culpable evil is contrary to the order of the world, and is perpetrated despite God’s strenuous efforts to save all.65 Hence reprobation refers to the foreseeing and permitting of sin.66 See §14, f. (h) Third Assertion: Neither love nor predestination nor detestation nor reprobation, even in the restricted sense as referring only to glory or punishment, is because of merits or of sins foreseen absolutely through God’s vision-knowledge. We admit, of course, that glory is received because of merits and punishment because of sins. But the question here is about the motive of divine volition. Later we shall raise the question whether merits or sins are conditions of divine volition. We say, therefore, that divine volition has no other motive than the divine goodness (§15, f), and that God does not will one thing because he has willed another, since there is but one divine volition (§15, b); rather, God wills the order of things, that is, wills that one thing should exist because another exists, such as glory because of merit or punishment because of sin.

65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, q. 19, a. 6 c., and q. 103, a. 8, ad 1m. 66 Ibid. q. 23, a. 3 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

384

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Praeterea, cum ipsa scientia visionis supponat divinam volitionem, ipsa volitio non potest habere causam vel motivum ex praescitis absolute. (i) Assertum quartum. Divina dilectio et praedestinatio sunt causa effectiva gratiarum, meritorum, atque gloriae. Servi inutiles sumus. Uti enim constat ex tractatu de gratia, Deus facit tum ut bonum velimus tum ut ita velimus ut etiam faciamus. ( j) Assertum quintum. Divinum odium et reprobatio non sunt causa peccati formalis; at supposito peccato sunt causa poenae inflictae. Non sunt causa, etc.: vide §20. Est causa poenae inflictae, etc.: vide §21, d, ‘Quarta denique habitudo …’ (k) Assertum sextum. Divina dilectio, praedestinatio, odium, reprobatio sunt actus immanentes divinae voluntatis et intellectus; ideoque sunt aeterni, infallibiles, efficaces; eorumque causalitas est irresistibilis, inquantum causant. Vide §3; §4, c, d; §8. (l) Assertum septimum. Divina dilectio, praedestinatio, odium, reprobatio sunt actus contingentes ideoque adaequationem veritatis habent per denominationem extrinsecam. Sunt contingentes, nam potuit Deus nolle creare. Habent adaequationem veritatis per denominationem extrinsecam; vide §4. (m) Assertum octavum. Secundum legem generalem denominans extrinsecum sufficiens et necessarium ut divina dilectio, praedestinatio, odium, reprobatio habeant adaequationem veritatis est mors electi vel reprobi in statu gratiae vel peccati gravis. Loquimur secundum legem generalem; scilicet, aliter est dicendum de Christo Domino qui peccare non potuit, de confirmatis in gratia, de peccatoribus excaecatis et induratis qui iam certo ultimam gratiam acceperunt, etc. Mors in statu convenienti est extrinsecum denominans sufficiens. Uti enim probatur in tractatu de novissimis, status viae morte finitur. At etiam est extrinsecum denominans necessarium. Per se enim usque ad mortem manet possibilitas ut iusti non perseverent et ut peccatores accepta

The Robert Mollot Collection

385

God’s Knowledge and Will

Besides, since vision-knowledge presupposes God’s volition, that volition itself cannot be caused or motivated by things that are foreseen absolutely. (i) Fourth Assertion: God’s love and predestination are the effective causes of graces, merits, and glory. We are useless servants [Luke 17.10]. As demonstrated in the treatise on grace, God enables us both to will what is good and to will to do it. ( j) Fifth Assertion: God’s detestation and reprobation are not the cause of formal sin; but presupposing sin, they are the cause of the punishment inflicted. That they are not the cause of sin, see §20. That they are the cause of the punishment, see §21, d, ‘The fourth relationship …’ (k) Sixth Assertion: Divine love, predestination, detestation, and reprobation are immanent acts of the divine will and intellect. Hence they are eternal, infallible, efficacious, and insofar as they cause, their causality is irresistible. See §3; §4, c, d; §8. (l) Seventh Assertion: Divine love, predestination, detestation, and reprobation are contingent acts and hence have truth by extrinsic denomination. They are contingent, for God could have not willed to create. That they are true by way of extrinsic denomination, see §4. (m) Eighth Assertion: According to the general rule, the extrinsic denominator necessary and sufficient for divine love, predestination, detestation, and reprobation to be true is the death of either the elect in the state of grace or the reprobate in the state of grave sin. This assertion states a general rule. The case is different with Christ, who could not sin, with those confirmed in grace, and with blinded and hardened sinners who certainly have already received their last grace, and so on. Death in the respective states is a sufficient extrinsic denominator. As is explained in the treatise on eschatology, the state of a person as wayfarer on this earth ends with death. But it is also a necessary extrinsic denominator. For up to the moment of death it remains possible for the virtuous to fail to persevere and for the sin-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

386

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

gratia poenitentiam agant. Iam vero eiusmodi non-perseverantia vel poenitentia est actus liber qui non continetur de necessitate in alio ita ut usque ad mortem sors incerta maneat. Vide §9, c, d. (n) Assertum nonum. Divina dilectio et praedestinatio sunt absolute gratuitae.67 Vita enim aeterna est finis supernaturalis; media quibus ad vitam pervenitur pariter sunt supernaturalia et indebita. Denique divina dilectio et praedestinatio non habent causam vel motivum vel conditionem ex meritis dilectorum et praedestinatorum. Causa et motivum iam exclusa sunt, §25, f, h. Conditio sic excluditur: causa non conditionatur ab effectu suo. Atqui divina dilectio et praedestinatio sunt causa meritorum (§25, i). Ergo non conditionantur a meritis. Aliis verbis: ut adsit adaequatio veritatis in illa propositione, ‘Deus hunc diligit atque praedestinat,’ requiritur exsistentia mortis in statu gratiae ideoque cum meritis. Quae conditio est veritatis propositionis et non ipsius dilectionis vel praedestinationis. Nam dilectio et praedestinatio causant impletionem conditionis, et quidem infallibiliter, efficaciter, irresistibiliter. Et haec est veritas quam tueri velint ii qui dicunt praedestinationem esse ante praevisa merita. (o) Assertum decimum. Divinum odium et reprobatio non sunt absolute gratuita. Sicut dictum est non habent causam vel motivum ex peccatis. Pariter, prout sunt actus divini non proprie habent conditionem ex parte creaturae. Dominium enim divinum est transcendens. Vide §22, c. Attamen ista propositio, ‘Deus hunc odio habet atque reprobat’ non habet adaequationem veritatis sine morte reprobi in statu peccati; at non habetur mors in isto statu, nisi reprobus peccat; quod peccatum Deus nullo modo voluit, neque intellectu sollerter res ordinavit ut fieret, neque sua actione effecit. Quantum ad impletionem huius conditionis, Deus non est causa. Quare dicitur, ‘Perditio tua ex te Israel.’68 Et haec est veritas quam ii tueri velint qui asserant praedestinationem esse post praevisa merita.

The Robert Mollot Collection

387

God’s Knowledge and Will

ner to receive grace and repent. Such a failure to persevere and such repentance are free acts that are not necessitated by anything else, and so one’s destiny remains uncertain right up to the time of death. See §9, c, d. (n) Ninth Assertion: Divine love and predestination are absolutely gratuitous.67 Eternal life is a supernatural end, and the means to arrive at it are similarly supernatural and not owed to anyone. God’s love and predestination are neither caused nor motivated nor conditioned by the merits of those who are loved and predestined. We have already excluded them as cause and motive; see §25, f, h. We exclude them as a condition: a cause is not conditioned by its effect; but as noted in the Fourth Assertion (§25, i), divine love and predestination are the cause of merits and therefore not conditioned by them. In other words, for the truth of the proposition, ‘God loves and predestines this person,’ the existence of one’s death in the state of grace and therefore with merits is required. This is a requisite condition for the truth of the above proposition, not for the love or predestination itself. It is love and predestination that cause the fulfilment of the condition, and do so infallibly, efficaciously, and irresistibly. This is the truth that those who assert that predestination precedes foreseen merits want to safeguard. (o) Tenth Assertion: Divine detestation and reprobation are not absolutely gratuitous. As noted above, they are not caused or motivated by sin. Similarly, as divine acts they are not properly speaking conditioned by creatures, for God’s dominion is transcendent; see §22, c. Nevertheless, the proposition, ‘God detests and reprobates this person,’ has no truth unless that person dies in the state of sin. But no one dies in that state unless he or she has sinned; and this sin God has not willed in any way, nor has God by his intellect cleverly contrived that it be committed or caused it by his action. Hence the saying, ‘Your perdition is your own doing, Israel’ [Hosea 13.9].68 This is the truth that those who assert that predestination follows foreseen merits want to safeguard.

67 [Sunt … gratuitae – in the autograph: est … gratuita.] 68 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 23, a. 3, ad 2m. [In the Vulgate: Perditio tua, Israel; in St Thomas: Perditio tua, Israel, ex te.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

388

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(p) Assertum undecimum. Divina dilectio, praedestinatio, reprobatio, odium non imponunt necessitatem dilectis vel reprobis. Dicuntur enim hi actus divini atque aeterni per denominationem extrinsecam et sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis cum exsistentia extrinseci denominantis. Vide §8. (q) Noli confundere signum simultaneum veritatis et instans simultaneum temporis. Aut praedestinatus es aut reprobus. Quamvis enim tua mors adhuc tibi futura sit, tamen eadem mors semper Deo aeterno est praesens. Porro sumitur denominatio extrinseca Dei ex morte semper Deo praesente. Vide §3; §4, d. 26

Obiectiones

(a) Inconvenienter dicuntur actus quidam divini et aeterni esse contingentes, e.g., §4, et passim. Quod enim est absolute simplex et absolute necessarium, nullo modo est contingens. Respondetur: pari inconvenientia dicitur liberrimum consilium quo Deus creare decrevit esse actus necessarius. Ad rationem allatam distinguo: actus purus entitative consideratus nullo modo est contingens, concedo; terminative consideratus nullo modo est contingens, nego. (b) Instas: ista adverbia, nempe, ‘entitative,’ ‘terminative,’ nihil esse videntur nisi effugium verbale. Respondetur: Si ens, actus, realitas cognoscuntur sensu, imaginatione, nominibus, concedo; si cognoscuntur per veritatem tamquam medium in quo, nego. Aliter enim alia veritas habet adaequationem veritatis. Quod Deus necessario exsistit, etc., habet adaequationem veritatis per actum purum entitative; quod Deus libere hoc vult et libere volitum exsistere scit habet adaequationem non per solum actum purum sed per hunc actum simul cum termino volito et scito; et sic dicitur actus purus terminative sumptus. (c) Non vera et realis est illa divina scientia vel volitio quae actui puro nihil addit nisi terminum ad extra. Atqui secundum doctrinam traditam scientia visionis, providentia, voluntas salvifica, praedestinatio, reprobatio, etc., nihil addunt nisi terminum ad extra; immo, Deus est idem prorsus en-

The Robert Mollot Collection

389

God’s Knowledge and Will

(p) Eleventh Assertion: Divine love, predestination, reprobation, and detestation impose no necessity upon those loved or those reprobated. These divine and eternal acts are predicated by extrinsic denomination, and are simultaneous in truth with the existence of an extrinsic denominator; see §8. (q) Do not confuse simultaneity in truth with simultaneity in time. You are either predestined or reprobated. For although your death is future to you, it is ever present to God in his eternity. This extrinsic denomination of God is grounded upon that event, your death, which is ever present to him. See §3 and §4, d. 26

Objections

(a) It is surely incongruous to say, in §4 and elsewhere, that some divine eternal actions are contingent. An absolutely simple and necessary being is in no way contingent. Response: It is equally incongruous to say that God’s free decision to create was a necessary act. As to the reason given by the objector, we make the following distinction: pure act considered entitatively is in no way contingent, but is so when considered terminatively. (b) But ‘entitatively’ and ‘terminatively’ seem to be a purely verbal escape. Response: That would be true if being, act, and reality are known through the senses and imagination and words; but it is not true if they are known through truth as a medium-in-which. There are different ways in which propositions can have their truth. The proposition ‘God exists necessarily’ has its truth by reason of an entitatively pure act. But the proposition ‘God freely wills a certain thing and knows the existence of this freely willed reality’ has its truth not by reason of pure act alone but by reason of this act along with the term willed and known. And that is what we mean by pure act considered terminatively. (c) Divine knowledge or volition that adds nothing to pure act except an external term would not be true and real. But according to what has been said about vision-knowledge, providence, God’s salvific will, predestination, reprobation, and so on, all add nothing but an extrinsic term; and, in fact,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

390

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

titative sive creat sive non creat. Ergo secundum doctrinam traditam scientia visionis, etc., non sunt vera scientia neque realis volitio divina. Respondetur: minor conceditur et maior negatur cum explicatione sequenti. Aliud est id quo Deus scit et vult, et aliud est quo propositio circa Deum scientem et volentem habet adaequationem veritatis. Ipso actu puro Deus scit et vult quaecumque scit et vult; qui actus cum sit verissimus atque maxime realis demonstrat falsitatem maioris negatae. Attamen adaequatio veritatis necessariae circa Deum per solum actum purum habetur; sed adaequatio veritatis contingentis ultra actum purum requirit terminum ad extra exsistentem. Exemplum habes in igni qui me calefacit. Suo sane calore proprio atque intrinseco ignis calefacit quodcumque calefacit. Et tamen fieri nequit ut ignis me calefaciat quin ipse calefiam, et fieri nequit ut ipse calefiam calore qui non in me sed in igni est. (d) Instas: Haec forte sufficiunt circa actionem Dei ad extra, uti creationem, conservationem, applicationem, etc. At scire et velle dicunt actus immanentes, ideoque adveniente novo termino, aut mutatur ipsum scire ipsumque velle, aut novus terminus neque scitur neque volitur. Respondetur: aut mutatur aut non scitur neque volitur, distinguo: in ente finito, concedo; in ente infinito, nego. Neque solum est mutatio impossibilis in ente immutabili, sed prorsus supervacanea est in ente infinito. Considera exemplum. Si vos docere conarer bis bina esse quattuor, possem vobis terminum proponere et occasionem eliciendi actus secundi praebere, at numquam vestram intellectualem perfectionem habitualem augerem; iam dudum scitis bis bina esse quattuor. At Deus est perfectione infinitus, neque solum perfectione habituali sed etiam actuali; novus terminus adesse potest suae scientiae vel volitioni; sed perfectio eius sive habitualis sive actualis augeri non potest. (e) Instas: saltem haec stare non possunt cum vera libertate divina. Ex concessis enim constat eum eodem actu puro absolute necessario se ipsum necessario amare et creaturas contingenter, imo liberrimo consilio, velle. Aut Deo inest novus actus contingens aut Deo deest volitio vere libera.

The Robert Mollot Collection

391

God’s Knowledge and Will

God is entitatively the very same whether he creates or does not create. Therefore, according to the above doctrine about his vision-knowledge and the rest, his knowledge and volition are not true and real. Response: We grant the minor premise but deny the major. Let us explain. That by which God knows and wills and that by which a proposition about God’s knowing and willing is true are two different things. By reason of pure act itself God knows and wills everything that he knows and wills; and the fact that this act is the truest and most real thing there is demonstrates the falsity of the above major premise. However, while the truth of a necessary proposition about God is had by reason of pure act alone, the truth of a contingent statement about God requires the existence of an extrinsic term in addition to pure act. To illustrate this, consider a fire that warms me. It is surely by virtue of its own intrinsic heat that a fire warms whatever it warms, and yet it is impossible for a fire to warm me unless I myself am being warmed, and I cannot have warmth by heat that is not actually in me but only in the fire. (d) Well, this may be all right in the case of God’s action outside himself, such as creation, conservation, application, and so on; but knowing and willing refer to immanent acts, and therefore when a new term arrives on the scene, either that knowing and willing are changed or else that new term is neither known nor willed. Response: This objection holds true in the case of a finite agent, but not in the case of an infinite agent. Not only is change impossible in an immutable being, but in an infinite being it would be utterly superfluous. Consider this example. If I were to try to teach you that two times two equals four, I could set this truth before you as a term for your understanding and give you the opportunity to elicit a second act; but to do so would not increase your intellectual perfection, since you have already known for quite some time that two times two equals four. Now, God is infinite in perfection, not just in habitual perfection but in actual perfection also. God’s knowledge and volition can have a new term, but his perfection, both habitual and actual, cannot be increased. (e) But surely, at least this is incompatible with true divine freedom. For from what you have conceded it is clear that God by reason of one and the same absolutely necessary pure act loves himself necessarily and wills creatures contingently, and indeed wills them by an entirely free choice. In

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

392

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Respondetur: eligo primum membrum disiunctionis et distinguo. Inest novus actus contingens, entitative, nego; terminative, concedo. (f) Instas: atqui novus actus contingens terminative non sufficit ad veram Dei libertatem. Respondetur: distinguo. Si vera Dei libertas consistit in eo quod Deus in se producit atque recipit volitionem contingentem entitative, non sufficit, concedo; si vera Dei libertas consistit in eo quod Deus libere producit ad extra terminum volitionis suae, non sufficit, nego. (g) Instas: atqui ad veram Dei libertatem non sufficit Deum libere producere ad extra terminum volitionis suae. Imo, hoc laborat circulo vitioso. Nam illud libere producere est velle quoddam divinum, nam Deus sua voluntate producit. Porro, non est velle necessarium, quia dicitur liberum; neque est velle liberum, quod non habetur ex termino producendo sed solummodo ex termino producto. Scilicet, productio est prior producto; at praerequiritur terminus libere productus ut sit productio libera. Respondetur: primo, sufficit ad veram Dei libertatem libera productio termini volitionis suae; deinde, haec libera productio non laborat circulo vitioso. Ad primum proceditur ex comparatione libertatis humanae in qua distinguuntur sequentia: A est volitio finis; quae est actus secundus in voluntate ab applicante receptus. B est volitio medii; quae est actus secundus realiter actu distinctus et pariter in voluntate receptus. B′ est eadem volitio ac B, sed consideratur prout actio cum relatione dependentiae ad causam efficientem. B ″ est eadem volitio ac B, sed consideratur prout passio cum relatione inhaesionis in ipsa voluntate. A′ est eadem volitio ac A, sed consideratur secundum virtualitatem suam, nempe, prout est actus quo suppositum potest producere vel non producere hanc vel illam medii volitionem. A″ est eadem volitio ac A, sed consideratur ut actu producens hanc medii volitionem, seu ut est id quo suppositum actu producit hanc medii volitionem; quae consideratio non addit entitatem actui A intrinsecam sed solummodo addit denominationem a sua actione, nempe, B′. Iam vero ad veram hominis libertatem constituendam nihil facit possibi-

The Robert Mollot Collection

393

God’s Knowledge and Will

God, then, there is either a new contingent act or else he lacks a truly free volitional act. Response: To this we reply that in this instance there is in God a new contingent act terminatively but not entitatively. (f) But a new act terminatively contingent does not suffice for God to be truly free, does it? Response: If God’s true freedom consists in producing and receiving in himself an entitatively contingent volition, it would not suffice. But if his freedom consists in his freely producing outside himself a term of his volition, it does suffice. (g) Nevertheless, for God to be truly free it is not enough that he freely produce an extrinsic term of his volition. In fact, there is a vicious circle here, for since God produces by his will, his free creative act is a divine act of willing. Now, it is not a necessary act of willing, because it is said to be free; on the other hand, it is not a free act of willing, because it is had not from the production of a term but only from the term produced. But production is prior to what is produced; yet in your supposition a freely produced term is a prerequisite to the free act of producing. In reply to this we have two points to make: first, that the free production of a term of God’s volition does suffice to safeguard his freedom; second, that this free production does not involve a vicious circle. Regarding the first point, we make a comparison to human free will, in which we distinguish the following: A is the act of willing the end; it is a second act, received in the will from the applicator. B is the act of willing the means; it is a second act really distinct from the previous act and also received in the will. B ′ is the same act as B but considered as an action, related to its efficient cause by a relation of dependence. B″ is the same act as B but considered as a passion or effect with a relation of inherence in the will itself. A′ is the same volitional act as A but considered as to its virtuality, that is, as an act by virtue of which the subject can produce or not produce this or that act of willing the means. A″ is the same volitional act as A but considered as actually producing this willing of the means, that is, as being that by which the subject actually produces this act of willing the means. This consideration adds no entity intrinsic to A, but only a denomination from its action, namely B′. Now, the passive possibility to receive this or that volition contributes

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

394

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

litas passiva recipiendi hanc vel illam volitionem; secus dicenda esset aqua libera quia passive potest recipere sive frigus sive calorem. Sed ratio libertatis habetur ex actu A′ et exercitium libertatis habetur ex eodem actu ut A″. At haec relinquunt actum A intrinsece immutatum. Quibus positis ad libertatem Dei veram redeamus. Deus est suum velle quod est amor infinitus bonitatis infinitae; unde in eo habetur volitio finis, A. Hoc actu Deus potest producere vel non producere quemcumque mundum; unde in eo etiam habetur virtualitas, A′. Porro, quod Deus actu producit hunc mundum dicitur quatenus actus purus denominatur a mundo producto, et sic habetur A″ et pariter habetur exercitium libertatis. Denique, eodem signo Deus denominatur non solum ut actu producens sed etiam ut actu volens hunc mundum, et ita in Deo invenitur volitio eius quod ad finem est seu quod correspondet actui B. Ad secundum vero quod adest circulus vitiosus, nego eum adesse. Sicut in homine posse producere natura antecedit actu producere, pariter in Deo. Sicut in homine eodem actu B, B′ habentur et actu velle medium et actu producere volitionem medii, pariter in Deo in eodem signo sunt actu producere mundum et velle mundum productum. (h) Instas: solutio est nulla. Causa indifferens ad utrumque non agit donec determinetur. Atqui in analysi ponitur causa indifferens ad utrumque, nempe, actus A′ et additur actio ante determinationem, nam A″ est causa immutata et ideo prior effectu qui est B, B′, B″. Respondetur: causa specificationis indifferens non agit donec determinetur, concedo; causa exercitii, nego. Requiritur determinatio causae specificationis, quia secus specificatio effectus esset incompleta; quam ob rem praeter intellectum cuius scientia se habet ad utrumque, ulterius requiritur voluntas tamquam causa exercitii. Si autem hoc principium applicatur pariter ad causam exercitii, aut abitur in infinitum aut tandem denique agnoscitur principium sic applicari non posse. Ita Banneziani secundum unum principium metaphysicum requirunt determinationem causae exercitii in libera hominis voluntate, et secundum principium contradictorium non requirunt determinationem eandem in libera voluntate divina. Iam vero aut determinatio est metaphysice necessaria

The Robert Mollot Collection

395

God’s Knowledge and Will

nothing towards one’s true freedom; otherwise water would have to be said to be free because it can passively receive heat or cold. Rather, the essential element of human freedom is rooted in A′, and the exercise of that freedom is that same act as A″. But all this leaves A intrinsically unchanged. With these observations in mind, let us now return to consider God’s true freedom. God is his act of willing, which is infinite love of infinite goodness. Hence in him there is A, the act of willing the end. By virtue of this act God can produce or not produce any world whatsoever. Hence there is in God also the virtuality of A′. Furthermore, the statement ‘God actually produces this world’ is true insofar as pure act is denominated from the world produced; thus A″ is also had, and likewise the exercise of freedom. Finally, by the same designation God is denominated not only as actually producing but also as actually willing this world, and so there is in God the act of willing the means to the end, which corresponds to B. Regarding the second point, we deny that there is a vicious circle here. As in a man, so also in God, the ability to produce is naturally prior to actual production. Again, as in a man by the same act B and B′ there are the actual willing of the means and the actual producing of the willing of the means, so likewise in God there is in the same designation the act of producing the world and that of willing the world produced. (h) But this is no solution. A cause that is indifferent to alternatives does not act until it is determined. But in the above analysis you posit a cause, the act A′, that is indifferent to the alternatives, and add an action prior to a determination, since A″ is an unchanged cause and thus prior to its effect, B, B′, B ″. Response: It is true that an indifferent cause of specification does not act until it is determined, but this is not true of a cause of exercise. The determination of a cause of specification is required because otherwise the specification of the effect would be incomplete. It is for this reason that in addition to the intellect which has knowledge of both alternatives, the will is needed as a cause of exercise. But if this principle is similarly applied to the cause of exercise, one must either go to infinity in this causal series or ultimately come to acknowledge that this principle does not apply here. Thus, the Bannezians according to one metaphysical principle require a determination of the cause of exercise in a human free will, and according to a contradictory principle do not require this same determina-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

396

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

in causa exercitii aut non; si est, Deus non est liber; si non est, non requiritur determinatio in homine. Dicere quod causa infinita non indiget, causa finita indiget, est fallacia accidentis; si causa finita indiget, indigentia non est ex ratione causae exercitii, sed ex ratione finitudinis; et ex hac ratione probatio est proferenda; non profertur, neque proferri potest; si enim posset proferri, tolleretur libertas humana.

(i) Atqui saltem scientia visionis et libera Dei volitio non sunt aeternae. Nam terminus ad extra est temporalis, ideoque dicere eum semper esse Deo praesentem aut facit terminum aeternum aut facit terminum qui non exsistit praesentem. Respondetur: nego antecedens; ad rationem allatam, admitto terminum esse temporalem; ad disiunctionem, nego suppositum, nempe, aeternitatem esse tempus quoddam infinitum. Res iam est explicata, §§3, 4.

( j) Doctrina adeo complexa atque intricata melius omittitur ut mysterium simpliciter agnoscatur. Respondetur: adhuc nulla difficultas est mota quae in philosophia moveri non potest. Potius ergo inertia humana quam mysterium divinum agnosci debet. (k) Secundum S. Thomam (Sum. theol., 1, q. 23, a. 2 c.) praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato. Secundum doctrinam propositam praedestinatio ponit in praedestinato mortem in statu gratiae. Respondetur: Secundum S. Thomam prophetia praedestinationis non completur sine nostro arbitrio consentiente (ibid., 3, q. 30, a, 1, ad lm); et ita est circa prophetiam, quia ita est circa divinam scientiam ex qua prophetia procedit (ibid., 2-2, q. 171, a. 6, ad 3m); iam vero idem ordo universi in divino intellectu exsistens sub aliis respectibus est praescientia, praedestinatio, providentia (ibid., 1, q. 22, a. 1; q. 23, a. 1); ergo secundum S. Thomam praedestinatio aliquid ponit in praedestinato. Aliter tamen et aliter: prout enim praedestinatio dicit actum quo Deus praedestinat, dicit actum purum et sic in praedestinato nihil ponit; prout autem praedestinatio dicit hanc veritatem, Deum hunc hominem praedestinare, adaequatio veritatis exigit aliquid in praedestinato positum. (l) Videtur quod voluntas salvifica antecedens est conditionata. Nemo enim reprobatur nisi peccaverit; quod peccatum Deus non causat; usque

The Robert Mollot Collection

397

God’s Knowledge and Will

tion in the divine free will. Now, the determination in a cause of exercise is either metaphysically necessary or it is not; if it is, God is not free; if it is not, then no such determination is required in humans either. To state that an infinite cause does not need it while a finite cause does need it is a fallacia accidentis: if a finite cause needs it, it is not by reason of its being a cause of exercise, but by reason of its being finite. Proof of the statement should rest upon this reason; but no proof is forthcoming, nor can it be; for if such a proof could be produced it would do away with human freedom. (i) But at least God’s vision-knowledge and free volition are not eternal. For a term extrinsic to God is temporal, and therefore to say that it is ever present to God either makes that term itself eternal or renders present to God a term that does not exist. Response: First of all, we deny the premise that God’s vision-knowledge and free volition are not eternal. Then, as to the reason adduced, we grant that the extrinsic term is temporal; but as to the disjunction, we deny its underlying supposition, namely, that eternity is an infinite extent of time. We have explained this above in §§3 and 4. ( j) It would be better to forget about such a complex and convoluted doctrine as this and simply acknowledge that the whole matter is a mystery. Response: But so far no difficulty has been raised that cannot be raised in philosophy. One suspects it is human laziness rather than divine mystery that needs to be acknowledged. (k) According to St Thomas (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 23, a. 2 c.) predestination adds nothing to the predestined. But according to what has been proposed in this treatise, to the predestined it adds death in the state of grace. Response: According to St Thomas a prophecy of predestination is not fulfilled without the consent of our free will (ibid. 3, q. 30, a. 1, ad 1m); this is true of prophecy because it is true of divine knowledge upon which prophecy is based (ibid. 2-2, q. 171, a. 6, ad 3m). But the same order of the universe as known by God is in various respects foreknowledge, predestination, and providence (ibid. 1, q. 22, a. 1; q. 23, a. 1); therefore according to St Thomas predestination does add something to the predestined. Still, this is not so in every respect. Inasmuch as predestination refers to the act by which God predestines, it refers to pure act and so adds nothing to the predestined. But inasmuch as predestination means this truth, ‘God predestines this person,’ such a predication requires for its truth that something be added to the one predestined. (l) God’s antecedent salvific will seems to be conditioned. For no one is condemned unless he or she has sinned; but God does not cause sin, and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

398

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

ergo ad peccatum impoenitentiae finalis, voluntas salvifica manet antecedens et conditionata; at hoc peccato peracto, transit eadem voluntas in absolutam et consequentem. Respondetur: quod ‘videtur,’ transeat; ad argumentum, nego suppositum, nempe, Deum esse in tempore. Verum est volitionem divinam non esse consequentem et absolutam sine conveniente termino ad extra; eiusmodi tamen terminus non est conditio volitionis divinae sed conditio adaequationis veritatis. Quod non est conditio ipsius divinae volitionis, patet; nihil enim est in mundo nisi Deus voluerit; porro, volitio divina est unica; et nihil potest esse conditio sui ipsius. (m) Videtur malum culpae reduci in Deum permittentem idem malum culpae. Aut enim ista permissio est volitio efficax, et sic cum ea componi non potest hominem non peccare; aut non est volitio efficax, et sic tollitur dominium Dei transcendens. Respondetur: admitto disiunctionem et eligo membrum primum; quoad membrum primum admitto cum volitione Dei efficaci componi non posse ut homo non peccet; sed nego consequens quod subauditur, nempe, hominem ad peccandum necessitari; nam veritates simultaneae sunt et quod hic homo hic et nunc peccat et quod Deus hunc hominem hoc peccatum patrare permittit; per eandem enim entitatem utraque veritas habet adaequationem. (n) Instas: ergo admitttur nexus intelligibilis inter Deum permittentem et hominem peccantem. Respondetur: admittitur identitas inadaequata inter has veritates simultaneas, nempe, hominem peccare, et Deum hoc peccatum permittere; per eandem enim entitatem habent adaequationem veritatis. Sed negatur nexus intelligibilis inter actum quo Deus permittit et defectum actionis quo homo peccat. Caeterum, in contextu stricte sumitur ‘intelligibile’; non enim dicit id quod cognosci potest et multo minus id quod concipi potest; sed dicit id quod positive intelligendo cognoscitur.

(o) Instas: explicatio est nulla quae recurrit ad rationem inintelligibilitatis. Respondetur: si ita recurritur sine fundamento in re, concedo; si cum fundamento in re, nego. Explicatur enim quid possit et debeat intelligi et quid neque possit neque debeat intelligi.

The Robert Mollot Collection

399

God’s Knowledge and Will

therefore right up to the sin of final impenitence his salvific will remains antecedent and conditioned. But once this sin is committed, that same will changes to absolute and consequent. Response: This argument is based on a false supposition, namely, that God is in time. It is true that the divine will is not consequent and absolute without the appropriate extrinsic term; but that sort of term is not a condition of God’s volition but a condition of the truth of a predication. It is quite evident that it is not a condition of divine volition. There is nothing that exists in the world unless God has willed it to be. Besides, there is only one divine volition, and nothing can be a condition of itself. (m) It seems that culpable evil is being reduced to God permitting it. For either his permitting it is an efficacious volition, which would be incompatible with the fact of someone not sinning, or else it is not an efficacious volition, which denies God’s transcendent power. Response: We admit the disjunction and opt for the first member of it. We admit that the fact of a person not sinning would be incompatible with an efficacious volition on the part of God. But we deny the unstated conclusion, namely, that a person would thereby be compelled to sin. For the fact that this person here and now is sinning and the fact that God is permitting this person to commit this sin are simultaneous truths, since each statement has its truth through the same reality. (n) So then, you admit that there is an intelligible nexus between God permitting sin and the one committing it. Response: We admit that there is an incomplete identity between these simultaneous truths, ‘a person is sinning’ and ‘God permits this sin,’ for simultaneous truths have their complete truth through the same entity. But we deny that there is an intelligible nexus between the act by which God permits sin and the morally defective action by which one sins. Besides, in this context, ‘intelligible’ is taken in the strict sense of the word: it does not mean that which can be known, much less that which can be conceived, but it means that which can be known through a positive act of understanding. (o) But an explanation that has recourse to the notion of unintelligibility is no explanation at all. Response: That would be true if such recourse is had without any foundation in reality, but not if there is such a foundation. We explain both what can and ought to be understood, and what cannot and ought not to be understood.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

400

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

(p) Saltem non oportet derelinqui definitionem traditionalem boni, nempe, id quod omnia appetunt. Respondetur: ponitur quid nominis ut ad quid rei procedatur. Secundum quid nominis bonum est id quod omnia appetunt, et appetitus est tendentia in bonum. Secundum quid rei ens et bonum convertuntur; iam vero omne ens est unum et intelligibile; omne ens actu est exsistens; omne ens-quod completum est totum; unde bonum ratione sui est totum exsistens, et bonum ratione alterius est pars totius. (q) Non assignatur terminus quem antecedit voluntas antecedens. Respondetur: assignatus est terminus sine quo non habetur voluntas consequens, v.g., mors in statu peccati. At nullus est assignandus terminus quasi umquam cessat voluntas Dei antecedens; haec enim non est volitio conditionata, sed est ipsa volitio divina actualis qua hunc mundum vult inquantum terminatur ad ea quae ex parte sua Deus vult, nempe, bona omnia. (r) Nulla est distinctio inter actionem divinam immediatione virtutis et immediatione suppositi. Deus enim est sua virtus. Si ergo Deus agit immediatione virtutis, eo ipso agit immediatione suppositi. Vide De pot., q. 3, a. 7.69 Respondetur: immediatio suppositi sequitur immediationem virtutis, concedo; non potest Deus agere nisi per causas secundas, nego. Vide Sum. theol., 1, q. 105, aa. 1-3. (s) Theoria proposita circa divinam scientiam futuribilium coincidit cum Banneziana. Respondetur: Theoria Banneziana duobus constat: Deus cognoscit futuribilia in decretis suae voluntatis; quae decreta subjective absoluta et objective conditionata respiciunt praedeterminationes physicas talibus adiunctis dandas. Vide Billuart apud Lennerz, §362, p. 253.70 Theoria proposita negat possibilitatem praedeterminationum physicarum, et affirmat scientiam mediam constitutam ante omne decretum

The Robert Mollot Collection

401

God’s Knowledge and Will

(p) At least the traditional definition of good, ‘that which all things desire,’ should not be abandoned. Response: We state a nominal definition of something in order to proceed to its reality. According to the nominal definition, good is that which all things desire, and desire is a tendency toward what is good. In terms of reality, being and good are interchangeable. Now every being is one and intelligible, every being in act is existent, and every complete being-which is a whole; therefore that which is good in its own right is an existing whole, and that which is good by reason of something else is a part of a whole. (q) You assign no terminal point before which the antecedent will is antecedent. Response: A terminal point was assigned without which there would not be a consequent will – death in a state of sin, for example. But there is no terminal point to be assigned as if God’s antecedent will at some point ceases. For that will is not a conditional volition; it is the actual divine volition by which God wills this world inasmuch as the term of that act is that which God on his part wills, namely, everything that is good. (r) There is no distinction between God’s acting with the immediacy of power and with the immediacy of the supposit. God is his power; hence if God acts through the immediacy of power, by that very fact he acts with the immediacy of the supposit. See De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.69 Response: We grant that the immediacy of the supposit follows the immediacy of power; but this does not mean that God can act only through secondary causes. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 105, aa. 1–3. (s) The theory you have set forth concerning God’s knowlege of futuribles is really the same as that of Bañez. Response: The Bannezian theory consists of two points: (1) God knows futuribles in the decrees of his will, and (2) these subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned decrees refer to the physical predeterminations to be given in certain circumstances. See Billuart, quoted in Lennerz, De Deo uno, §362, p. 253.70 Our theory denies the possibility of physical predeterminations and asserts that God’s middle knowledge is constituted prior to all absolute de-

69 [On immediacy of power and immediacy of the supposit, see §18 (c) and footnote.] 70 [In the fifth edition, §362, pp. 255–56. Lennerz is quoting from F.C.-R. Billuart, Summa Sancti Thomae: Hodiernis academiarum moribus accomodata, ninth edition, vol. 1 (Paris: V. Palmé, 1876) diss. 6, a. 6, §10, pp. 229–30.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

402

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

absolutum divinae voluntatis. In sua virtute comprehensa Deus conspicit totam seriem mundorum possibilium; in sua transcendentia comprehensa Deus cognoscit quemlibet mundum, si crearetur, futurum fuisse prout concipiatur priori scientia simplicis intelligentiae. Illud ‘si crearetur’ non est decretum divinae volitionis sed hypothesis decreti quae in solo intellectu perficitur. Si Molinam legeris,71 profecto videbis totam vim suae positionis in eo consistere quod contra Scotum non facit transitum a possibilibus ad actualia per determinationes divinae voluntatis sed post possibilia cognita et ante omne decretum voluntatis absolutum interponit futuribilia cognita. Unde ad mentem D. Thomae exsistentiam rerum actuumque ex divina voluntate repetit, rationem vero seu specificationem seu determinationem (si A, tunc B) ex solo divino intellectu. Et hoc non solum facimus sed etiam quemadmodum fieri possit explicamus.72 Contra, theoriam Bannezianam aperte impossibilem reputamus. Nam ista decreta libera dicuntur contingenter de Deo; at nullum exsistit extrinsecum denominans quo adaequationem veritatis habere possunt; futuribilia enim non exsistunt. 27

Principiorum Summula

(a) Circa divinum dominium Cum ipse Deus sit fons omnis intelligibilitatis, veritatis, bonitatis, entitatis, fieri non potest ut ex alio scientiam acquirat, vel praeter actionem eius quicquam producatur. Imo, cum spiritus sit, cumque per intellectum et voluntatem agat, non solum ut causa prima et principalis omnia producit, sed eadem omnia etiam intellectu praeconcipit et liberrima volitione vult. Cum denique Deus sit perfectione infinitus, necessario est scientia eius infallibilis, volitio eius efficax, et actio eius, scientiam volitionemque exsequens, irresistibilis. (b) Circa ordinem universi

The Robert Mollot Collection

403

God’s Knowledge and Will

crees of his will. In comprehending his power, God views the entire series of possible worlds, and in comprehending his transcendence he knows that any one of these worlds, if it were created, would exist exactly as conceived in his prior knowledge of simple understanding. That condition, ‘if it were created,’ is not a decree of the divine will but the hypothesis of a decree, which hypothesis exists in the intellect alone. If you read Molina,71 you will surely see that the whole thrust of his position consists in the fact that, contrary to Scotus, he does not make the transition from possible beings to actual beings by means of determinations of the divine will, but rather he places God’s knowledge of futuribles after his knowledge of possible beings and before any absolute decree of his will. In accord with the thought of St Thomas, therefore, he places the existence of things and actions in the divine will, but their essence or specification or determination – if A, therefore B – in the divine intellect alone. And we have not only done this, but also explained how it can be so.72 On the contrary, we consider the Bannezian theory to be patently impossible. For those free decrees are predicated of God contingently; but no extrinsic denominator exists whereby they can have truth-correspondence, for futuribles do not exist. 27

A Brief Summary of Principles

(a) Divine Sovereignty Since God is himself the source of all intelligibility, truth, goodness, and being, it is impossible that he acquire knowledge from any other source, or that anything be produced apart from his action. Indeed, since God is pure spirit and acts through intellect and will, he is not only the first and principal cause of all things, but also preconceives all these things in his intellect and wills them in a sovereignly free volitional act. Finally, since God is infinite in perfection, his knowledge is necessarily infallible, his volition is necessarily efficacious, and the action that implements his knowledge and volition is necessarily irresistible. (b) The Order of the Universe 71 See Lennerz, De Deo uno, §357, pp. 249–50. [In the fifth edition, §357, pp. 251–53.] 72 [In the autograph, §26 ended at this point. The additional paragraph was added later. See Appendix 2.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

404

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Cum omnis mundus possibilis necessario sapientiam divini intellectus et divinae voluntatis bonitatem repraesentet, exsistit ordo universi concretus, spatio temporeque divisus, omnia continens quae sunt, erant, vel erunt, omnia relationibus religans sive necessariis sive contingentibus, unus, intelligibilis, completus. Qui cum bonus sit et alia bona finita omnia in se includat, summum est bonum creatum, et finis rebus creatis immanens, et gloria Dei externa et obiectiva. At idem universi ordo potest abstracte considerari prout est relationum quidam complexus, et potest dynamice sumi prout singulis momentis successivis exsistit. Quo sub aspectu ordo universi est virtus illa instrumentalis qua Deus singulas causas a se creatas conservatasque ad actiones determinatas applicat et applicatas usurpat secundum praeconceptum consilium suae providentiae et secundum modum suae gubernationis generalem. (c) Circa necessitatem et contingentiam Quicquid contingenter de Deo dicitur, per denominationem extrinsecam dicitur. Et eiusmodi omnia sunt quae pertineant sive ad scientiam visionis sive ad liberam Dei volitionem sive ad actionem Dei creantis, conservantis, et gubernantis. Neque desunt ipsa extrinseca denominantia, cum Deo aeterno omnia sunt praesentia, neque quicquam ei praeteritum vel futurum esse potest. Non enim imaginatione fingendus est Deus quasi nunc his contemporaneus exsistens et quandoque illis contemporaneus; sed ipse est sine temporis limitatione, et alia sunt etiam quamvis tempore limitentur. Qua de causa veritates simultaneae sunt, quippe quae per eandem entitatem adaequationem veritatis habeant, et ‘hoc contingens exsistit’ et ‘Deus hoc contingens exsistere scit, vult, facit.’ Ex quo factum est ut neque divina scientia infallibilis, neque volitio efficax, neque actio divina propter infallibilitatem efficaciamque irresistibilis ullam possit necessitatem rebus imponere praeter eam quae ex suppositione ipsius rei sequatur. Reliquum ergo est ut ex causis finitis solis mensuretur rerum sive necessitas sive contingentia, ut ille effectus sit necessarius cuius causa applicata non potest non agere, et ille effectus sit contingens cuius causa applicata et agere et non agere potest.

The Robert Mollot Collection

405

God’s Knowledge and Will

Since every possible world order is necessarily a representation of the wisdom of the divine intellect and the goodness of the divine will, the order of the universe exists as a concrete reality, divided both spatially and temporally, containing within itself all that is and has been and will be, binding together all things by relations both necessary and contingent, an intelligible and complete unit. Since this order is good and embraces all other finite goods, it is the supreme created good, the immanent end of created things, and the external objective glory of God. But this same order of the universe can be considered abstractly as a complex of relations, and can be understood dynamically as existing in successive moments. Under this aspect, the order of the universe is that instrumentality whereby God applies each and every cause created and conserved by him to their particular actions, and uses these causes so applied in accordance with the preconceived plan of his providence and general manner of governance. (c) Necessity and Contingency Whatever is predicated contingently of God is predicated by extrinsic denomination. In this category are all that pertain to God’s vision-knowledge, free volitional acts, and acts of creating, conserving, and governing. The fact that all things are present to God and nothing can be past or future to him does not mean that there are no extrinsic denominators. One must not imagine God as being at one time contemporaneous with some things and at another time with other things. For God exists without the limitation of time, and other beings also exist, though limited by time. For this reason those truths are simultaneous that have their truth through the same existing entity: ‘this contingent being exists’ and ‘God knows, wills, causes this contingent being to exist.’ The consequence of this is that neither God’s infallible knowledge nor his efficacious will nor his action that is irresistible because of this infallibility and efficacy can ever impose a necessity upon things beyond that necessity that belongs to the supposition of the existence of the thing itself. A final point is, therefore, that the necessity or the contingency of things is to be determined from finite causes only, so that that effect is necessary whose cause, when applied, cannot fail to act, and that effect is contingent whose applied cause can either act or not act.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

406

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Quam ob causam frivolos recte reputavit Aquinas esse eos qui divinum dominium absolutum et rerum contingentiam inter se pugnare arbitrarentur.73 (d) Circa malum culpae Exsistunt, prout privationes exsistere dicuntur, irrationabiles defectus actionis in appetitu rationali. Qui defectus, cum contra naturam rationalis appetitus, contra dictamen rectae rationis, contra dona gratiae in contrariam partem nitentia, contra intelligibilem rerum ordinem a Deo praeconceptum atque volitum, contra praecepta Dei et minas iusti iudicis, contra actionem Dei in omni agente operantis, nihilominus modo privativo fiant, sane secundum nullum nexum intelligibilem in aliud reduci possunt.

Quare Deus non intelligendo ea praeconcipit sed intelligibilitatem negando cognoscit, neque ullo modo ea vult sed tantummodo permittit, neque sua actione facit sed, ipso agente ut fiant, irrationabiliter non fiunt.

(e) Circa voluntatem Dei antecedentem et consequentem Alio sensu voluntas dicit velle, alio et latiori sensu dicit permittere; quod enim Deus malum culpae permittit, nullo tamen modo malum culpae vult. Dicitur ergo voluntas Dei antecedens quatenus volendo eligit; consequens autem quatenus non solum volendo eligit sed etiam nolendo permittit. Cuius distinctionis radix sic forte declarari potest. Vult Deus iustitiam suam seu rerum rationem intelligibilem seu rerum veritatem ontologicam; vult igitur creaturarum actiones secundum proprias naturas propriasque voluntates lege saltem generali fieri; vult ideo Deus per causas secundas agere et usum non purum sed coniunctum sui dominii adhibere; et quia haec vult Deus, Verbum caro factum est ut creata humanitas per Humanitatem creatam salva fiat. Potuit Deus alium mundum eligere ubi per causas secundas ageret et tamen nullum fieret peccatum. Potest Deus per usum purum sui dominii

The Robert Mollot Collection

407

God’s Knowledge and Will

Hence Aquinas rightly dismissed as frivolous the opinion of those who think God’s absolute sovereignty to be incompatible with the contingency of things.73 (d) Culpable Evil There exist – insofar as privations may be said to exist – certain unreasonable failures on the part of a rational appetite. These defects, contrary though they are to the nature of a rational appetite, contrary to the dictate of right reason, contrary to the gifts of grace urging them in the opposite direction, contrary to the intelligible order of reality as conceived and willed by God, contrary to the commandments of God and the stern warnings of a just judge, and contrary to the action of God who operates in every agent, nevertheless occur only as privations and are certainly not reducible to anything else according to any intelligible nexus. Accordingly, God does not have a preconception of them through an act of understanding but knows them only in denying their intelligibility; nor does God will them in any way whatever, but merely permits them to occur. God does not produce them by his action; on the other hand, when God acts causally, the effects are not produced unreasonably. (e) The Antecedent and Consequent Will of God In one sense God’s will means to will, but in a broader sense it means merely to permit. For although God permits culpable evil to occur, he does not in any way will it. Hence God’s will is said to be antecedent when he chooses by an act of willing, but consequent when he not only chooses by an act of willing but also permits by not willing. The root of this distinction can perhaps be elucidated in the following way. God wills his justice, which is the intelligible reason of things, the ontological truth of all beings. Therefore, he wills that the actions of creatures should be done in accordance with their proper natures and wills, at least as a general rule. Hence, he wills to act through secondary causes, that is, to make conjoint use and not pure use of his power. And because God so wills, the Word was made flesh, so that created humanity might be saved through the created Humanity of Christ. God could have chosen to create some other world where he might also act through secondary causes but without culpable evil, sin, being commit-

73 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 94, ¶15, §2699.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

408

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

immediata interventione semper impedire quominus creatura peccatura peccet.74 At alium mundum non elegit, et volendo hunc mundum vult usum sui dominii coniunctum et non vult usum illum purum. At quamvis dominium pure adhibitum nolit, nihilominus Dominus omnium manet. Quare ex suppositis necesse est ut peccata fieri permittat. Quae permissio non est velle malum culpae: ne peccator quidem ipsum malum culpae vult. Neque eadem permissio est velle aliud, sed nolle quoddam est, nempe, nolle usum purum divini dominii quo hoc in mundo tolleretur veritas rerum ontologica. Quia hunc mundum Deus voluit, gratias Deo agere nos oportet; quia huius mundi veritatem ontologicam voluit, laudandus sane est Deus; quod homines peccant, ipsi viderint, cum sua voluntate contra voluntatem Dei peccent; quod tot tantique sunt errores, quod tam graves tamque frequentes occurrunt tentationes, quod gratiae abundantiores non conceduntur, viderint ipsae causae secundae per quas impetrantes atque laborantes Deus agere vult. (f) Circa rationem mysterii Quod in patria uno simplici intuitu intelligendum manet, his in terris per rationem fide illuminatam intelligere aliqualiter valent qui pie, sobrie, sedulo quaerant. Quare per multa discurrendo, rationibus semper aliis alias difficultates obviando, per errorum magis exclusionem quam ipsius veritatis perspicientiam, per principiorum potius cumulationem quam synthesin, ea sunt proposita quibus cohaerenter affirmatur et Deus omnium Dominus, et homo sui dominus, et peccator peccati reus. Vera ergo est voluntas Dei salvifica cum nullo modo velit vel faciat Deus id quo non salvandi pereunt. Iusta est impoenitentium reprobatio cum ea conditione reprobantur quam non Deus sed ipsi impleant. Gratuita est electorum praedestinatio quorum nullum est meritum quod non acceperint ab eo qui infallibiliter praeconceperit, et efficaciter voluerit, et irresistibiliter produxerit cum totum universi ordinem tum singulas eiusdem partes etiam minimas.

The Robert Mollot Collection

409

God’s Knowledge and Will

ted. Through the pure use of his power it is always possible for God to intervene directly to prevent a creature from sinning.74 But God did not choose some other world, and in willing this one he wills the conjoint, not the pure, use of his power. Yet, even though he withholds this pure use, he still remains Lord of all. This being the case, then, we must necessarily conclude that God simply permits sins to occur. Such permission is not the same as willing culpable evil: not even the sinner wills the evil of his sin. Nor is this permission a different sort of willing; rather, it is a non-willing, a refusal on the part of God to exercise the pure use of his power by which in this world the ontological truth of things would be negated. Because God has willed this world to exist, he deserves our gratitude; because he has willed the ontological truth of this world, he surely deserves our praise. As for the fact that people sin, that is their problem, since they do so by their own will against the will of God. And as for the fact that so many grave errors abound, that there are so many serious temptations around, and that graces are not granted in greater abundance, let this be the concern of those secondary causes through whose prayers and efforts God wills to act. (f) The Meaning of Mystery What is in store for us in heaven to be understood in one simple intuitive gaze can in some small way be understood here below through reason enlightened by faith by those who seek after it reverently, judiciously, and diligently. Accordingly, it is by covering a range of topics, always addressing different problems in different ways, by eliminating errors more than through a positive grasp of the truth itself, and by an accumulation rather than a synthesis of principles, that we have come to affirm in a coherent way that God is Lord of all, that we are responsible for ourselves, and that the sinner is guilty of his or her sin. Therefore God’s salvific will is genuine, since he in no way either wills or causes the condemned to perish. The reprobation of the unrepentant is just, since they are reprobated on a condition which they, not God, fulfil. The salvation of the elect is gratuitous, since there is no merit of theirs which they have not received from the one who has infallibly foreknown, efficaciously willed, and irresistibly brought into existence the whole order of the universe down to its very smallest parts.

74 [Peccet – in the autograph: non peccet.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

410

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

‘Cum omnia feceritis quae praecipiuntur vobis, dicite quia servi inutiles sumus.’ ‘Homo non habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum.’75 ‘Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.’ ‘Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei.’ ‘Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti. Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui.’ ‘Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat.’ ‘Obsecro igitur primum omnium fieri obsecrationes, orationes, postulationes, gratiarum actiones pro omnibus hominibus … Hoc enim bonum est et acceptum coram Salvatore nostro Deo, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire.’ ‘Argue, obsecra, increpa in omni patientia et doctrina.’ ‘Quomodo autem audient sine praedicante?’ ‘Perditio tua ex te, Israel.’76 ‘O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei: quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius! Quis enim cognovit sensum Domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? Aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula. Amen.’ Scribebam Torontini, in seminario Patrum Societatis Iesu, xxiii mart., MCML Bernardus Lonergan.

The Robert Mollot Collection

411

God’s Knowledge and Will

‘When you have done all that was commanded you, say, “We are useless servants”’ [Luke 17.10]. ‘All that man can claim as his own are falsehood and sin’ [St Augustine, In Joannis evangelium tractatus, v, 1].75 ‘In the beginning God made man, then left him free to make his own decisions’ [Ecclesiasticus 15.14]. ‘… not attributable to man’s willing or striving, but to God’s mercy’ [Romans 9.16]. ‘… For those who love God, all things work together for the good of those whom by his choice he has called holy. For these are the ones he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son’ [Romans 8.28–29]. ‘Thus God is merciful to those whom he wishes and hardens the hearts of those whom he wishes’ [Romans 9.18]. ‘I beg you first of all to offer prayers and petitions and thanks on behalf of all … This is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who wills all to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth’ [1 Timothy 2.1–4]. ‘… convince, rebuke, exhort, with all patience and sound doctrine’ [2 Timothy 4.2]. ‘How will they hear if there is no one to preach?’ [Romans 10.14]. ‘Your perdition is your own doing, Israel’ [Hosea 13.9].76 ‘O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God: how incomprehensible are his judgments and unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Who has been his advisor? Who has first given a gift to him to receive one in return? From him, through him, and in him are all things: to him be glory for ever. Amen’ [Romans 11.33–36]. Bernard Lonergan Jesuit Seminary, Toronto 23 March 1950

75 [ml 35, 1414: Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum. See also db 195, ds 392.] 76 [See above, note 68.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 4

Analysis Fidei

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 4

Analysis of Faith

From the 1973 Introduction to ‘Analysis Fidei,’ Regis Edition, by Frederick E. Crowe Bernard Lonergan is listed as having taught the course ‘De fide’ in fundamental theology, during the first year of his professorial career, 1940–41, at the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal. But he does not seem to have returned to this treatise till 1947–48 at Regis College in Toronto. In that year he taught ‘De gratia’ and ‘De virtutibus’ in sequence and as a kind of unit that lasted throughout the academic year. There exist some reportationes of the course. The work ‘De ente supernaturali’ was used as a manual for the part on divine grace, but no special notes were issued for the students. However, the cycle came round again at Regis in 1951–52; that year Fr Lonergan shared responsibility for the double course with Fr Elmer O’Brien, and ‘Analysis fidei’ was written in the second semester; it is dated precisely from the notation of the student typist W[alter] A. N[iesluchowski] at the end of the mimeographed edition: ‘March 8, 1952.’1 This does not appear

1 [The mimeographed edition can be found in the Lonergan Archives as A153 and on the website www.bernardlonergan.com as 15300dtl050. The autograph, A154 (15400dtl050), contains Lonergan’s own typescript, with his handwritten corrections and three concluding pages that were not included in the mimeographed edition distributed to the students. This latter document was the basis for editing the text presented here. A155

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

414

Analysis Fidei

1

Processus Logicus

Processus logicus duos syllogismos complectitur: (a) Quidquid Deus sciens homini veraciter revelat est homini credendum. Atqui hoc est quod Deus sciens homini veraciter revelat. Ergo hoc est homini credendum. (b) Si illud quod homini est credendum naturalem intellectus humani proportionem excedit, tunc homo de facto ad finem supernaturalem ordinatur et destinatur. Atqui illud quod homini est credendum naturalem intellectus humani proportionem excedit. Ergo homo de facto ad finem supernaturalem ordinatur et destinatur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

415

Analysis of Faith

in the ‘autograph’ and is presumably the date on which the typist finished making the stencils for the mimeographed edition. (Fr Lonergan would hardly have written the text in Latin and put place and date in English, in any case.) … It should perhaps be mentioned that Lonergan was hard at work in the period from 1949 to 1953 on Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (though it did not appear in print till 1957), and the strong emphasis on the cognitional element and cognitional analysis contained in that work shows up also in ‘Analysis fidei.’ Still, even in the days of his concentration on cognitional theory, Lonergan does not seem ever to have forgotten the subjective conditions of knowledge, and ‘Analysis fidei’ too is saved from intellectual onesidedness by repeated reference to the psychological conditions of the act of faith, the sharp rejection of any merely logical analysis, and the like.

1

The Logical Process

The logical process comprises two syllogisms: (a) Whatever God knows and truthfully reveals to humankind is to be believed by us. But this is something that God knows and truthfully reveals. Therefore this is to be believed by us. (b) If that which is to be believed by us exceeds the natural proportion of the human intellect, then we are in fact ordered and destined to a supernatural end. But that which is to be believed by us exceeds the natural proportion of the human intellect. Therefore we are in fact ordered and destined to a supernatural end.

(15500dtl050) contains a set of notes on faith, some or all of which can be dated by means of internal indications to the year 1948. The precise relation of these notes to the manuscript is not known. However, as Lonergan taught a course, ‘De [fide et] virtutibus’ at Regis College in the academic year 1947–48, it seems a plausible conjecture that he produced this set of notes as part of his preparation for this course and subsequently drew upon them when composing the present manuscript. These notes need to be put into some order, at which point a translation of them will appear on www. bernardlonergan.com. The Regis College edition of ‘Analysis Fidei’ can be found on the same website as 15401dtl050.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

416

Analysis Fidei

(c) Sensus huius alterius syllogismi sic exponitur. Quod est homini credendum est bonum humani intellectus; scilicet, est bonum, non tantum absolute (sicut omne ens est bonum) sed etiam relative ad intellectum humanum (sicut cibus est bonum animali). Iam vero quod est bonum relative ad intellectum humanum aut iacet intra naturalem eiusdem proportionem aut supponit humanum intellectum et ideo etiam ipsum hominem de facto ad finem supernaturalem ordinari. Nam bonum relative ad potentiam dicit perfectionem ipsius potentiae; perfectio autem potentiae advenit aut qua naturali aut qua obedientiali. Quare maior secundi syllogismi est propositio analytica. Sensus minoris non respicit sive analysin, sive credibilitatem, sive veritatem mysteriorum. Agitur de facto omnibus aperto, nempe, revelationem non proponi more Euclidiano, imo ita proponi ut per prius sit credenda quam intelligenda, quia hac in vita adaequate intelligi non possit (db 1796).

(d) Duo syllogismi per modum unius sic exprimi possunt: Quidquid Deus sciens homini veraciter revelat est homini credendum; quod si credendum naturalem humani intellectus proportionem excedit, homo de facto ad finem supernaturalem ordinatur et destinatur. Atqui hoc est quod Deus sciens homini veraciter revelat; quod sane continet ea quae naturalem humani intellectus proportionem excedunt. Ergo homo de facto ad finem supernaturalem ordinatur, et ideo totum revelatum, mysteriis inclusis, ei est credendum. 2

Processus Psychologicus

Processus psychologicus in duas dividitur partes. Alii enim actus remote fidem antecedunt: alii proxime in ipsam fidem ducunt. Actus principales, qui remote fidem antecedunt, sunt quattuor iudicia quibus quis affirmat veras esse quattuor praemissas supra recitatas. Actus secundarii, qui remote fidem antecedunt, sunt omnes quibus ad haec quattuor iudicia proferenda pervenitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

417

Analysis of Faith

(c) Explanation of this second syllogism: That which is to be believed by us is a good of the human intellect; that is to say, it is a good not only absolutely speaking, in the sense that every being is good, but also a good in relation to the human intellect, just as, for example, food is a good for an animal. Now, that which is a good for the human intellect either lies within its natural proportion or else presupposes that the human intellect, and therefore also human beings themselves, are in fact destined to a supernatural end. The reason is that a good that is related to a certain potency is a perfection of that potency; a perfection, however, comes to a potency as that potency is either natural or obediential. The major premise of the second syllogism, therefore, is an analytic proposition. The meaning of the minor premise has nothing to do with either analysis or credibility or the truth of the mysteries of faith. It refers to a fact that is clear to everyone, namely, that revelation is not set forth like a theorem in Euclidean geometry; indeed, it is proposed as a truth primarily to be believed rather than understood, since in fact it cannot be adequately understood in this life (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). (d) These two syllogisms can be combined into one, as follows: Whatever God knows and truthfully reveals to humankind is to be believed by us; and if that which is to be believed exceeds the natural proportion of the human intellect, then we are in fact ordered and destined to a supernatural end. But this is something that God knows and truthfully reveals to humankind, and it certainly contains truths that are beyond the natural proportion of the human intellect. Therefore we are in fact ordered to a supernatural end, and hence all of divine revelation, including the mysteries, is to be believed by us. 2

The Psychological Process

There are two parts to the psychological process. Some acts remotely precede faith, while others more immediately lead to faith. Of those acts which remotely precede faith, the principal ones are the four judgments by which one affirms the truth of the four premises stated above. The secondary acts are all those that lead one to make these four judgments.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

418

Analysis Fidei

Actus qui proxime ipsam fidem respiciunt sunt sex sequentes. Primus est ipsum initium fidei supernaturale. Consistit in actu intelligendi reflexo quo quis perspicit evidentiam sufficere ut rationabiliter eliciat quinque actus sequentes. Secundus est iudicium practicum credibilitatis mysteriorum. Consistit in eo quod quis affirmat se in finem supernaturalem de facto ordinari et destinari, ideoque mysteria credere bonum sibi esse. Tertius est iudicium practicum credenditatis.2 Hoc iudicio affirmatur totum revelatum, mysteriis inclusis, esse credendum. Quartus est volitio finis. Hoc actu homo vult finem supernaturalem ad quem ordinatur, eumque prosequi intendit. Quintus est volitio medii seu ipse pius credulitatis affectus.3 Homo consentit obligationi credendi, et assensum fidei imperat. Sextus est ipse fidei assensus, in intellectu elicitus, a voluntate libere imperatus. 3

Quid Sit Actus Intelligendi Reflexus

Incrementum cognitionis humanae tribus gradibus perficitur.4 Primus gradus est experientia. Consistit in actibus sensuum externorum et internorum. Alter gradus est intelligentiae. Incipit ab admiratione illa quae exprimitur per quaestionem, Quid sit. Consistit in duobus actibus: primo ipsa quidditas sive rei sive nominis intelligitur; deinde eadem per definitionem,

The Robert Mollot Collection

419

Analysis of Faith

The acts which are more immediate to faith itself are these six: First, there is the supernatural beginning of faith. It consists of a reflective act of understanding in which one grasps that there is sufficient evidence for reasonably eliciting the next five acts. Second, there is a practical judgment on the credibility of the mysteries. This consists in affirming that one is in fact ordered and destined to a supernatural end and that therefore belief in the mysteries of faith is a good for oneself. Third, there is a practical judgment on the ‘credendity’2 of the mysteries. By this judgment one affirms that the whole of revelation, the mysteries included, ought to be believed. Fourth, there is willing the end. In this act one wills the supernatural end to which one is destined, and intends to pursue it. Fifth, there is willing the means. This is the ‘devout readiness to believe.’3 One acknowledges one’s obligation to believe, and commands an assent of faith. Sixth, there is the assent of faith itself, elicited in the intellect and freely commanded by the will. 3

The Reflective Act of Understanding

Growth in human knowledge is acquired in three steps:4 The first step is experience, which consists in acts of the external and internal senses. The second step is understanding. It begins from that wonder which is expressed in the question, What is it? It consists of two acts: first, the very quiddity, the ‘whatness,’ either of a thing or of a word, is understood; this

2 [A nonce word, formed from the Latin credendum, ‘that which ought to be believed.’] 3 [‘pius credulitatis affectus’; the expression ‘credulitatis affectus’ originates, it seems, from canon 5 of the Council of Orange (529 ad) see db 178, ds 375, nd 1917.] 4 [Frederick Crowe notes in the Regis edition, p. 27, ‘The doctrine of the three levels in the structure of human cognitional operations, already implicit in the verbum articles published in Theological Studies from 1946 to 1949, became thematic in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. This work was in progress and nearing completion when ‘Analysis fidei’ was written, a fact that surely has a bearing on the cognitional theory expressed in this section.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

420

Analysis Fidei

cogitationem, considerationem, vel suppositionem, verbo interiori incomplexo dicitur. Tertius gradus est reflectionis. Incipit ab inquietudine critica quae exprimitur per quaestionem, An sit. Pergit ad totam evidentiam colligendam atque ordinandam sive in sensibus invenitur, sive in memoria, sive in definitionibus, sive in hypothesibus, sive in iudiciis anteactis. Quibus omnibus collectis et ordinatis, incipit ponderatio quaedam atque mensuratio ad determinandum utrum evidentia ad iudicium fundandum proportionetur necne. Quae reflectio, ponderatio, mensuratio terminatur ad actum intelligendi reflexum quo perspicitur evidentia certo, probabiliter, possibiliter, dubie, nullo modo sufficere ut iudicium eliciatur. Denique, perspecta evidentia, oritur necessitate quadam rationali ipsum iudicium seu verbum interius complexum. 4

Quod in Processu Fidei Psychologico Cardo Est Actus Intelligendi Reflexus

Cardo cuiusdam processus in illo actu est ponendus in quo omnia antecedentia in unum colliguntur et omnia subsequentia anticipantur et quodammodo fundantur. Iam vero in actu intelligendi reflexo omnia antecedentia in unum colliguntur. Actus enim remote fidem antecedentes constituunt quandam evidentiae apprehensionem. Quae apprehensio aliter fit in doctis et aliter in incultis, aliter in fidem habentibus et aliter in iis qui ad fidem procedunt. Multos et diversos actus includit circa quaestiones philosophicas, historicas, physicas, apologeticas. In quibus pervestigandis atque perscrutandis facile tota vita humana consumi potest, nisi quis ponit quaestionem reflexam de proprio fine ac credendi obligatione. Quae sane quaestio manebit infructuosa, nisi incipitur labor colligendi et ordinandi omnia ita ut perspici possit quemadmodum ad quaestionem sit respondendum. Quod si perspicitur, actu intelligendi reflexo perspicitur.

Praeterea, idem actus reflexus anticipat et quodammodo fundat omnia quae subsequentur. Fides enim non est caecus animi motus (db 1791). In eo enim differt natura rationalis a natura caeca et spontanea quod haec certis legibus gubernatur, illa vero se gubernat hac lege generalissima, nempe, principio rationis sufficientis obtemperandum est. Quod principium ut valeat, necesse est ut actus futuri anticipentur, ut anticipati secundum hoc

The Robert Mollot Collection

421

Analysis of Faith

is then expressed in a simple inner word, through a definition, a thought, a consideration, or a supposition. The third step is reflection. It begins from a critical uneasiness that is expressed in the question, Is it? It proceeds to gather and marshal all the evidence, whether found in sense data or in the memory, in definitions or hypotheses, or in previous judgments. When this evidence has all been collected and marshaled, it is, so to speak, weighed and measured, in order to determine whether or not it is adequate for grounding a judgment. This reflection, weighing, and measuring terminates in a reflective act of understanding in which one grasps that the evidence is either certainly or probably or possibly or doubtfully or not at all sufficient for making a judgment. Finally, upon the grasp of the evidence there emerges by a kind of rational necessity the judgment itself, a compound inner word. 4

In the Psychological Faith Process the Reflective Act of Understanding Is Pivotal

In any process, the pivotal act is that in which everything that precedes comes together and everything that follows is anticipated and in some way grounded. Now, in this reflective act of understanding everything that went before comes together. For those acts which remotely precede faith constitute a certain apprehension of the evidence for it, an apprehension which varies with different persons, being different in those who are learned and those who are not, and in those who have faith and those moving towards faith. It embraces many different acts concerning matters of philosophy, history, physics, apologetics. An entire lifetime could easily be spent in investigating and examining all these matters, unless one puts to oneself the reflective question about one’s end and one’s obligation to believe. But this question will surely remain fruitless unless one begins the laborious task of gathering and marshaling everything so as to be able to grasp how this question is to be answered. And if this is grasped, it is grasped in a reflective act of understanding. Also, this same reflective act anticipates and in a way grounds all that follows. Faith is by no means a blind inner impulse (db 1791, ds 3010, nd 120). A rational nature differs from a blind and spontaneous nature in that the latter is governed by fixed laws while the former governs itself according to this absolutely universal law, namely, that the principle of sufficient reason must be obeyed. In order for this principle to be effective, future

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

422

Analysis Fidei

principium mensurentur, ut anticipati et mensurati ideo denique fiant quia huic principio satisfaciunt. Actus enim humani eatenus sunt rationabiles quatenus ex perspecta eorum rationabilitate procedunt. Ita iudicium rationabile est, quia ex perspecta evidentiae sufficientia procedit. Ita pariter volitio est rationabilis, quia eius obiectum per prius iudicatur bonum seu secundum rationem (nam bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse).

Qua de causa in processu fidei psychologico et rationabili, actus intelligendi reflexus non solum antecedentia in synthesin redigit sed etiam eadem ponderat atque mensurat secundum eorum proportionem ad actus subsequentes, nempe, ad iudicia practica credibilitatis et credenditatis, ad volitiones finis et medii supernaturalis, denique ad ipsum fidei assensum imperandum atque eliciendum. Quibus dictis satis elucet actum intelligendi reflexum (1) supponere transitum a quaestionibus mere scientificis et philosophicis in quaestionem practicam et religiosam, (2) addere unitatem actibus remote fidem antecedentibus, (3) eorum fructum colligere et percipere, (4) perspicere rationabilitatem omnium actuum subsequentium usque ad fidei assensum inclusive, et (5) fundare eosdam actus omnes quatenus rationabiliter in homine fiunt.5 5

Quantum Differunt Processus Logicus et Psychologicus

Processus logicus est abstracta quaedam repraesentatio processus psychologici. Ita syllogismus logicus continet tres propositiones quae repraesentant obiecta iudiciorum possibilium. Syllogismus vero psychologicus continet tres iudicandi actus quibus homo rationabiliter verum affirmat.

The Robert Mollot Collection

423

Analysis of Faith

acts must be anticipated and then measured in accordance with this principle, so that thus anticipated and measured they may then be performed as having satisfied this principle. Human acts are reasonable to the extent to which they proceed from an intelligent grasp of their reasonableness. Thus a judgment is reasonable because it proceeds from a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence. Volition is likewise reasonable because its object has been judged to be good, that is, in accord with reason; for the human good is to be in accord with reason. Thus, in a reasonable psychological faith process the reflective act of understanding not only brings into a synthesis those acts preceding it but also weighs and measures them according to their bearing upon subsequent acts, namely, the practical judgments of credibility and credendity, the willing of a supernatural end and means, and finally the actual commanding and eliciting of the act of faith itself. From all this it is sufficiently clear that the reflective act of understanding (1) supposes a transition from purely scientific and philosophical questions to a practical religious question, (2) gives unity to those acts that remotely precede faith, (3) collects and derives fruit from them, (4) grasps the reasonableness of all subsequent acts down to and including the assent of faith itself, and (5) grounds those same acts insofar as they are reasonably performed by a person.5 5

Difference between the Logical and the Psychological Process

The logical process is an abstract representation of the psychological process. Thus, the logical syllogism contains three propositions which represent the objects of possible judgments. The psychological syllogism contains three acts of judging by which one reasonably affirms what is true.

5 [In the course of Lonergan’s analysis of the process of true belief in Insight at 729–30, the reflective act understanding that, in virtue of preliminary judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition, is similarly said to be ‘the key act’ in the process. For this reflective act is the goal towards which the preliminary judgments head and in which they are resumed; and at the same time it anticipates the subsequent acts included in the analysis and constitutes the guarantee of their validity and of their rationality.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

424

Analysis Fidei

Syllogismus logicus continet vocem illam, Ergo, quae repraesentat obiectum cuiusdam possibilis actus reflexi intelligendi. Syllogismus vero psychologicus continet actualem actum intelligendi reflexum quo quis sub influxu reflexionis criticae modo synthetico evidentiam in diversis actibus dispersam apprehendit eamque sufficere perspicit ad iudicium rationabiliter proferendum.6 At processus fidei psychologicus addit super syllogismum non solum logicum sed etiam psychologicum. Nam in actu intelligendi reflexo qui ad fidei assensum ducit, non solum iudicium credenditatis anticipatur, sed etiam libera volitio et ipse assensus imperandus. Fides enim non est caecus animi motus. Praeterea, ita actus anticipantur, non ut abstracte describi possint, sed ut concrete fiant. Anticipantur ergo novae obligationes per fidem affirmandae, nova vita inchoanda, novae habitudines ad alios homines caritate diligendos, nova submissio intellectualis ad magisterium ecclesiae subeunda, et maxime nova habitudo ad Deum per virtutem fidei theologicam incipienda. Quibus perspectis, vehementer sane errare est ille dicendus, qui totum processum psychologicum ignorans vel omittens, processum fidei ex sola analysi logica aestimet atque iudicet. 6

Quid Sit Coactio Intellectus et Quid Rationalizatio

Obiectiva intellectus coactio est ab ipsis rebus vel rerum testimoniis cognoscendis, quae contradictorie se opponant ad iudicia falsa. Subiectiva intellectus coactio (1) ex ipsa experientia oritur, (2) per claram intelligentiam et distinctam conceptionem augetur, and (3) per ipsam intellectus legem, nempe, principium rationis sufficientis imponitur. Daemones ergo, qui valde perspicaces sunt per naturam, maximam intel-

The Robert Mollot Collection

425

Analysis of Faith

The logical syllogism contains the word ‘therefore,’ which represents the object of a possible reflective act of understanding. The psychological syllogism contains the actual reflective act of understanding by which a person, in a spirit of critical reflection, apprehends by way of synthesis all the evidence to be found throughout those various acts and grasps that that evidence is sufficient to reasonably pronounce judgment.6 The psychological faith process, however, adds something to both the logical and the psychological syllogisms. For in the reflective act of understanding that leads to the assent of faith, not only is the judgment of credendity anticipated but also the free act of the will and the assent itself that is to be commanded. Faith is no blind inner impulse. Besides, these acts are anticipated, not so that they can be abstractly described, but that they be concretely performed. One anticipates, therefore, new obligations to be assented to through faith, a new life to be begun, new relationships of love towards one’s neighbor, a new submission of the mind to the magisterium of the church, and above all a new relationship with God to be entered into through the theological virtue of faith. All of this clearly shows how gravely mistaken one would be who, being unaware of or ignoring this whole psychological process, would evaluate and judge the faith process solely on the basis of a logical analysis. 6

Constraint of the Intellect and Rationalization

Objective intellectual constraint comes from the evidence of things themselves, which are contradictorily the opposite of false judgments. Subjective intellectual constraint (1) arises from experience, (2) is augmented by a clear insight and distinct conception, and (3) is brought to bear upon the intellect by reason of the law of the intellect, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence demons, who by nature are extremely intelligent, experience the

6 [‘… the function of syllogistic expression is not to eliminate but to facilitate the occurrence of the reflective act of understanding … [W]hen a man pronounces a judgment on the value of deciding to believe, it is not because of a syllogism nor even because he accepts the premises of a syllogism but only because the syllogism has helped him grasp the virtually unconditioned in his acceptance of the premises.’ Ibid. 732.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

426

Analysis Fidei

lectus coactionem subeunt. Qui tamen cum ad finem supernaturalem non ordinentur, sciunt mysteria revelata non esse bonum relate ad proprios intellectus, et ideo in fidei assensum progredi non possunt.7 Homines vero qui fidem iugum grave ducunt eamque amplecti nolunt, ipsam intellectus coactionem evitare conantur. Qua de causa, rationes quaerunt cur falsum iudicetur verum, et verum pro falso habeatur. Qui processus rationalizatio nominatur, unde ecclesia novos perpetuo errores invenit refutandos. 7

Quid Sit Analysis Fidei

Cum scientia sit certa rei cognitio per causas suas, analysis fidei intendit assensum fidei resolvere in causas omnes, intrinsecas et extrinsecas, proximas, medias, et immediatas seu primas. Agitur ergo de analysi ontologica, psychologica, typica: ontologica, quia de rebus et de actibus agitur; psychologica, quia res sunt cognoscendae et volendae, actus vero sunt intellectus et voluntatis; typica, quia de necessariis vel saltem communiter contingentibus tractatur. Haec igitur quaestio non est apologetica (quaenam sit vera fides), neque practica (quemadmodum vera fides suadeatur), neque logica (e quibusnam praemissis quaenam sequantur conclusiones validae). Sed actus verae fidei exsistere supponitur, et quaeritur per rationem fide illustratam quid sit. 8

Brevis Conspectus

Omne ens finitum est in finem; habet formam per quam fini proportionatur; est ab agente seu movente; et exsistit in quodam subiecto. Subiectum fidei seu causa materialis est homo viator. Finis est terminus per fidem cognoscendus, nempe, ipse Deus unus et trinus, praesens oeconomia salutis, Christus incarnatus, ecclesia, etc. Obiectum formale est verum, nempe, verum a Deo revelatum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

427

Analysis of Faith

greatest degree of intellectual constraint. However, since they are not actually destined to a supernatural end, they know the revealed mysteries but not as a good for their intellects, and so cannot progress towards the assent of faith.7 But human beings who find the yoke of faith heavy and refuse to accept it do their best to avoid this intellectual constraint. So they look for reasons for asserting as false what is true and vice versa. This process is called rationalization, and as a result of it the church is continually faced with new errors to refute. 7

What Is the Analysis of Faith?

Since science is the certain knowledge of a thing through its causes, the analysis of faith aims at resolving the assent of faith into all of its causes, intrinsic and extrinsic, proximate, mediate, and immediate or first causes. This analysis, therefore, will be ontological, psychological, and typical: ontological, since it deals with things and acts; psychological, since these things are to be known and willed, and these acts are acts of the intellect and of the will; and typical, in the sense that it deals with what happens necessarily or at least contingently as a general rule. Hence this question is not a matter of apologetics (What is the true faith?), nor a practical question (How to promote the true faith), nor a question about logic (What premises lead to valid conclusions?). Rather, supposing the existence of an act of true faith, we ask, by reason illumined by faith, what that act is. 8

A Brief Overview

Every finite being exists for an end. It has a form by which it is made proportionate to its end, it comes into being by an agent or mover, and it exists in a subject. The subject, or material cause, of faith is homo viator, ‘man the wayfarer,’ that is, mortals during their course of life on earth. Its end is the term to be known through faith, namely, the one God in three persons, the present economy of salvation, Christ the incarnate Word, the church, and so forth. Its formal object is truth, namely, truth revealed by God. 7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 5, a. 2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

428

Analysis Fidei

Notandum est verum esse in intellectu, in ipso assensu. Bonum et malum sunt in rebus; verum et falsum sunt in intellectu. Iterum, veritas logica formaliter est in solo iudicio seu assensu. Quod verum est quodammodo forma per quam actus fidei suo termino seu fini proportionatur; veritas enim est adaequatio intellectus et rei. Aliis verbis, per verum cognoscimus rem. Porro, obiectum formale fidei est illud verum quod est totum revelatum. db 1789: ab eo (Deo) revelata vera esse credimus. db 1792: omnia credenda quae in verbo Dei continentur et qua revelata ab ecclesia proponuntur. Quare obiecta materialia sunt singula quae in obiecto formali continentur. Ita qui quaerit utrum hoc vel illud sit de fide, quaerit de obiecto materiali. Pariter haereticus, qui alios articulos credit et alios reicit, obiecta materialia fidei attingit sed obiectum formale reicit. Similiter schismaticus qui revelatum magisterium vivum reicit, haeretico est aequiparandus. Quantum ad causam agentem attinet, recolendum est fidem produci in intellectu rationali ideoque non secundum caecam quandam causalitatis legem sed secundum principium rationis sufficientis. Qua de causa sermo fit non de causa agente sed potius de motivo. Quod motivum est duplex. Motivum fidei in facto esse est ipse Deus sciens et veraciter revelans. Fides enim est illa cognitionis species cuius ultimum ‘cur’ est scientia alterius. Motivum fidei in fieri est fundamentum processus psychologici quo quis ad ipsum fidei assensum pervenit. Uti videbimus, invenitur in actibus remote et proxime fidem praeparantibus.

9

Motivum Fidei in Facto Esse

Non agitur de processu psychologico qui in assensum fidei ducit. Sed quaeritur de ipso fidei assensu, qui est actus naturae rationalis qua rationalis, et ideo non solum obiectum attingit (sicut visus colorem) sed etiam dicit habitudinem ad rationem, causam, motivum, fundamentum cur obiectum attingat.8

The Robert Mollot Collection

429

Analysis of Faith

Note here that truth is in the intellect, in the assent itself. Good and evil are in things; the true and the false are in the mind. Also, logical truth is formally only in the judgment, the assent. This truth is in a way the form by which the act of faith is made proportionate to its term or end; for truth is the correspondence between the intellect and being. In other words, it is through truth that we know a thing. Moreover, the formal object of faith is that truth which is the whole of revelation. ‘We believe that what God has revealed is true’ (db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118); and ‘all things contained in the word of God and taught by the church as revealed are to be believed’ (db 1792, ds 3011, nd 121). The material objects of faith, therefore, are all those particular truths that are contained in the formal object. Thus to ask whether this or that is a matter of faith is to ask about the material object. By the same token, a heretic who believes some articles of faith while rejecting others attains material objects of faith but rejects the formal object. Similarly, a schismatic who rejects the revealed living magisterium of the church is equivalently heretical. As to its efficient cause, remember that faith is produced in a rational intellect and therefore not by way of some blind law of causality but according to the principle of sufficient reason. This is why we speak of the motive rather than the agent or efficient cause of faith. This motive is twofold. The motive of faith as acquired, faith in facto esse, is God himself as knowing and truthfully revealing. For faith is that kind of knowledge whose ultimate ‘why’ is to be found in the knowledge possessed by another. The motive of faith as a process towards assent, faith in fieri, is the foundation of the psychological process by which one comes to make the assent of faith. As we shall see, it is found in those acts that constitute the remote and the proximate preparation for faith. 9

The Motive of Faith as Acquired

We are not concerned here with the psychological process that leads to the assent of faith. We are inquiring into the assent of faith itself, which is an act of a rational nature precisely as rational, and hence not only attains its object, as for example ocular vision attains color, but also imports a relationship to the reason, cause, motive, and ground for attaining its object.8

8 [‘A rational operation is intrinsically reflective; that is, it attains its object

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

430

Analysis Fidei

Porro illud est fidei proprium quod ultimum suum motivum est scientia non credentis sed eius in quem credit. Cur revelatum credis? Quia est verbum Dei. Cur verbum Dei credis? Quia Deus veraciter loquitur, imo fallere non potest. Cur Deo veraciter loquenti credis? Quia veraciter loquens dicit id quod in mente habet, et de eo quod Deus in mente habet, nulla potest esse quaestio. Est enim omnisciens. Falli non potest. Quare ipsa Dei scientia seu ipsa prima veritas est ultimum fidei motivum, fundamentum, causa, ratio. Quod aperte docet Vaticanum: ‘propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest’ (db 1789, 1811). Cui consentiunt fideles. Si enim obiectiones vel dubia proponis, non respondent ex propria scientia sed Deum scientem et veraciter revelantem invocant. Imo retorquent, An tu arbitraris te melius scire quam Deus? Quare dubia de fide sunt dubia de scientia vel veracitate divina et tamquam tentationes sunt repellendae. Quare fides est infallibilis et firma super omnia. Deus enim infallibilis est et super omnia stat omniscientia. Etiam fides est essentialiter obscura ratione motivi; Deum enim scientem non perspicimus. Unde concludes assensum fidei in facto esse non fundari in propria cognitione sive per rationem sive per ipsam fidem acquisita. Non enim docet Vaticanum nos vera credere quia scimus vel credimus Deum scire et veraciter revelare; sed docet ‘propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest.’ Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Quare si fides esset propter aliquam nostram cognitionem, ex illa cognitione esset mensuranda; firmior esse non posset; certior esse non posset.

Neque dici potest assensus fidei esse propter illam cognitionem nostram

The Robert Mollot Collection

431

Analysis of Faith

It is of the very nature of faith that its ultimate motive is knowledge that is possessed not by the one who believes but by the one in whom one believes. Why do you believe what has been revealed? Because it is the word of God. Why believe the word of God? Because God speaks truthfully; indeed, God cannot lie or deceive. Why do you believe God who speaks truthfully? Because one who speaks truthfully expresses what one has in one’s mind, and there can be no question about what God has in his mind. He is omniscient; he cannot be deceived. God’s knowledge, therefore, first truth itself, is the ultimate motive, ground, cause, and reason for faith. This point is clearly stated by the First Vatican Council: ‘… because of the authority of God who reveals, who can neither be deceived nor deceive’ (db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118; see db 1811, ds 3032, nd 126). The faithful agree with this. If you propose objections or doubts to them, they do not answer from what they know themselves but appeal to God who knows and truthfully reveals. They will even retort, ‘Do you think you know better than God?’ Doubts about faith, therefore, are doubts either about God’s knowledge or about his truthfulness and so must be resisted as one would resist temptations. Hence faith is infallible and absolutely firm, for God is infallible and supremely omniscient. Yet there is also an essential obscurity in faith by reason of its motive, since the motive of faith is God’s knowledge, and we do not have God’s knowledge. We conclude, therefore, that the assent of faith as already possessed is not based on one’s own knowledge, whether this was acquired through reason or through faith itself. Vatican i does not state that we believe truths because we either know or believe that God has knowledge and truthfully reveals them; it states that we believe ‘because of the authority of God who reveals them, who can neither be deceived nor deceive.’ Moreover, according to the Latin tag, ‘that which produces a certain perfection in another possesses that perfection all the more.’ If we had faith, therefore, because of some knowledge of ours, that knowledge would be the measure of our faith, and our faith could not possibly be any more solidly grounded or more certain than that knowledge. Nor can the assent of faith be made because of any knowledge of ours

because of a sufficient motive.’ Lonergan, ‘De ente supernaturali’ (‘The Supernatural Order’), p. 103 above.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

432

Analysis Fidei

quae ipsa fide attingitur. Haec enim esset vana circulatio in causis seu rationibus. Dices: assensus fidei aut est propter scientiam Dei cognitam aut est propter scientiam Dei incognitam. Respondeo: assensus fidei est propter scientiam Dei quae cognoscitur et assignatur tum ratione tum ipsa fide; at assensus fidei non est quia scientia Dei cognoscitur sive ratione sive fide; neque est quatenus cognoscitur sive ratione sive fide. Quaestio quae tractatur non est de obiecto sed de motivo. Obiectio supponit vel supponere videtur eatenus obiectum attingi quatenus motivum cognoscitur. Quod valet de scientia sed non de fide. Fides enim in eo consistit quod ultima sua ratio est scientia non propria sed alterius. Quibus perspectis elucet quid sit problema rationabilitatis fidei, nempe, quemadmodum fieri possit ut quis cognoscat propter scientiam non suam sed alterius.

10

De Obiecto Formali Supernaturali

Notum est principium Aristotelico-Thomisticum: actus cognosci ex obiectis; habitus ex actibus; potentias ex habitibus; et ipsam animae essentiam ex potentiis.9 Notum est axioma theologicum: supernaturalia secundum analogiam naturae aliqualiter intelligi (db 1796). Unde analysis theologica et Thomistica ponit gratiam sanctificantem in ipsa animae essentia; ex gratia fluunt virtutes infusae sicut potentiae ex essentia animae; ex virtutibus fluunt actus sicut actus naturales ex habitibus naturaliter acquisitis; denique per actus attinguntur obiecta ex quibus ipsi actus speciem ducunt. Quare dicendum est doctrinam de obiecto formali supernaturali fundari in principiis methodologicis cum philosophicis tum theologicis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

433

Analysis of Faith

that is had through faith itself; this would involve circularity in reasoning, leading nowhere. Here one may object that the assent of faith is made either on account of God’s knowledge that is known or on account of God’s knowledge that is not known. In reply we say that the assent of faith is made on account of God’s knowledge that is known and acknowledged as true both by reason and by faith itself; but the assent of faith is not made because God’s knowledge is known, whether by reason or by faith, nor is it made insofar as it is known, whether by reason or by faith. The question here is not about the object but about the motive of faith. This objection supposes or seems to suppose that the object of faith is attained only insofar as the motive is known. This is valid for science, but not for faith. Faith consists in this, that its ultimate ground is not one’s own knowledge but another’s. Here one can clearly see the problem of the reasonableness of faith, namely, how it can be that a person can know something not because of knowledge that that person possesses, but because of knowledge possessed by someone else. 10

The Supernatural Formal Object

It is a well-known principle in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that acts are known from their objects, habits from their acts, potencies or faculties from habits, and the essence of the soul itself from potencies.9 Well known also is this theological axiom: supernatural realities are to some extent understood by analogy from natural realities (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Accordingly, Thomistic theological analysis situates sanctifying grace in the essence of the soul; from grace flow the infused virtues just as potencies arise from the essence of the soul; from the virtues flow acts just as natural acts flow from habits naturally acquired; and acts attain the objects from which the acts themselves derive their species. We conclude, then, that the doctrine on the supernatural formal object is based on methodological principles, both philosophical and theological.

9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

434

Analysis Fidei

Obicit tamen P. Lennerz, §327:10 Quamvis obiecta specifice diversa fundant diversas actuum species, non tamen convertitur. Fieri potest ut diversae sint actuum species quin differant obiecta. Et ponit exemplum. Videre in equo et videre in homine habent obiectum formale commune, nempe, colorem.11 At sunt actus diversae perfectionis ontologicae. Nam videre in equo ab anima materiali procedit, sed videre in homine ab anima spirituali. Unde concludit perperam diversitatem obiecti formalis deduci ex ontologica diversitate inter actum naturalem et supernaturalem. Respondetur: argumentum fundatur in exemplo quod rem probaret nisi falsum supponeret; at falsum supponit; quare nihil probat. Dicimus eandem esse perfectionem ontologicam ubi idem est obiectum formale. Videre in equo et videre in homine sunt operationes materiales, motus coniuncti, i.e., motus et organi et potentiae sensitivae seu visus. Sicut anima et corpus formant compositum hylemorphicum, ita visus et oculus formant compositum accidentale; videre, sive in equo sive in homine, est motus istius coniuncti seu compositi ex oculo et visu.

Verum sane est visum humanum fluere ex anima spirituali, et visum equinum fluere ex anima materiali. Sed verum non est visum humanum esse independentem a materia sive secundum esse sive secundum operari; et ideo verum non est visum humanum esse potentiam spiritualem. Ipsa anima humana est spiritualis quia est forma subsistens quae exsistere potest sine corpore et operari habet independens a corpore. Sed potentia sensitiva humana non est forma subsistens; operari suum est motus coniuncti et in hoc differt ab intelligere quod fit sine organo; esse suum est esse in materia et ideo in anima separata non actu exsistunt potentiae sensitivae sed tantum virtute.12 Instat tamen P. Lennerz, §333, obiectum formale supernaturale non cla-

The Robert Mollot Collection

435

Analysis of Faith

Lennerz, however, makes this objection,10 that although specifically different objects determine the different species of acts, the reverse is not true. One can have different species of acts without having different objects. And he gives this example: a horse’s act of seeing and a human’s act of seeing have the same formal object, namely color.11 But these acts are of different degrees of ontological perfection, since equine vision proceeds from a material soul while human vision proceeds from a spiritual soul. Therefore, he concludes, it is wrong to deduce the diversity of formal objects from the ontological diversity between natural and supernatural acts. To this objection we reply that an argument based on an example containing a false supposition proves nothing, and the above objection contains a false supposition. Our position is that there is the same ontological perfection where there is the same formal object. A horse’s act of seeing and a human’s act of seeing are both material operations, the movements of a composite, that is, movements of an organ and a sensitive faculty, sight. As body and soul form a hylomorphic composite, so do sight and the eye form an accidental composite. Thus the act of seeing, whether in a horse or in a human, is a movement of that composite, namely, that which is composed of the eye and sight. It is quite true, of course, that human seeing flows from a soul that is spiritual while that of a horse flows from a soul that is material. But it is not true that human seeing either exists or operates independently of matter; hence human sight is not a spiritual faculty. The human soul itself is spiritual since it is a subsistent form that can exist without the body and can operate independently of the body. But a human sensitive faculty is not a subsistent form: its operation is the movement of a composite and in this respect it differs from the act of understanding, which takes place without a bodily organ. Its proper existence is to exist in matter, and so in a separated soul the senses do not exist actually but only virtually.12 In a supplementary objection, Lennerz maintains that no supernatural

10 Heinrich Lennerz, S.I., De virtutibus theologicis (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 4th edition, 1938) 177–80, §327 [5th edition (1947) 177–80, §327; the text in §327 is unchanged in the 5th edition]. 11 [The reference to equine vision is actually found in a text from John of St Thomas which Lennerz cites in §327. Lennerz himself just speaks of vision in irrational animals.] 12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 8.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

436

Analysis Fidei

re assignari, imo fautores opinionis obiectum derelinquere et ad motivum confugere.13 Quare haec quaestio elucidanda manet. Et cum alibi de aliis actibus supernaturalibus tractaverimus,14 nunc de obiecto formali fidei pauca sunt dicenda. 11

Quod Qui Credit Sicut Oportet Obiectum Formale Supernaturale Attingit

Absolute supernaturale est quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. Quare supernaturale quoad actus cognoscitivos est id quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet intellectus finiti. Porro duplex est operatio intellectus. Prima operatio est qua intelligitur rei essentia seu quidditas; et secundum hanc operationem obiectum proportionatum intellectus humani est quidditas rei materialis. Unde beati Deum uti in se est videntes attingunt obiectum formale supernaturale. Viatores autem concipientes sive ipsum Deum sive bona supernaturalia per negationem, analogiam, et excessum, nihil faciunt quod excedit naturalem proportionem intellectus finiti. Altera intellectus operatio est qua attingitur verum et ens. Quae rationes cum transcendentales sint, omnia prorsus includunt. Attamen a diversis naturis diverso lumine attingitur verum et ens. Verum enim naturaliter ab homine attingitur naturali humani intellectus lumine. Verum naturaliter ab angelo attingitur naturali angelici intellectus lumine. Verum denique naturaliter a Deo attingitur naturali divini intellectus lumine. Quid per illud nomen, lumen, dicitur? Dicitur illa mentis virtus ex qua oritur critica reflexio et quaeritur circa essentiam intellectam et conceptam, An sit? Dicitur illa mentis virtus quae, cum sufficientia evidentiae sit perspecta, facit iudicium rationabiliter necessarium et, cum sufficientia evidentiae non sit perspecta, facit iudicium rationabiliter impossibile. Dici-

The Robert Mollot Collection

437

Analysis of Faith

object is clearly identified, and that in fact those who favor that opinion forsake the object to take refuge in the motive.13 This question, therefore, needs a fuller explanation. And having treated other supernatural acts elsewhere,14 we must now make a few observations here about the formal object of faith. 11

Those Who Believe Properly Attain a Supernatural Formal Object

The absolutely supernatural is defined as that which exceeds the proportion of any and every finite substance. In the case of cognitive acts, therefore, that act is supernatural which exceeds the proportion of any finite intellect. Further, the intellect has two operations. The first operation is that by which the essence or quiddity of a thing is understood; and in this operation the object proportioned to the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. Hence the blessed in heaven attain a supernatural formal object through seeing God as he is in himself. But in this present life those who conceive either God or other supernatural goods by way of negation, analogy, and preeminence, do nothing that exceeds the natural proportion of a finite intellect. The second intellectual operation is that which attains truth and being. Since these notions are transcendental, they include absolutely everything. However, beings of different natures attain truth and being through different kinds of light. Humans arrive at truth in accordance with their nature through the natural light of the human mind, angels through the natural light of angelic minds, and God through the natural light of the divine mind. What is meant by this word ‘light?’ It refers to that power of the mind which gives rise to critical reflection and asks the question, Is it so? about an essence it has understood and conceived. It is that power of the mind which, upon grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, makes judgment reasonably necessary, and which, when the evidence is grasped as insufficient,

13 Lennerz, De virtutibus theologicis 184–85, §§333–34 [5th edition (1947) 184–85, §§333–34; the text in §§333–34 is unchanged in the 5th edition]. 14 [Apparently a reference to ‘De ente supernaturali’ (‘The Supernatural Order’; see pp. 96–127 in this volume, where the theological and other supernatural virtues in general are dealt with in Thesis 3.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

438

Analysis Fidei

tur illa mentis virtus quae, cum bonum quoddam obligatorium iudicetur, deliberantem moraliter compellit, volentem pace donat, nolentem inquietudine pungit. Dicitur illa mentis virtus sine qua non quaeritur de vero, sine qua evidentiae non assentitur, sine qua obligationi morali non ceditur. Non est vanum vacuumque nomen in homine; et multo minus in angelo; minime vero in Deo ad cuius imaginem et similitudinem facta est creatura rationalis.15 Quibus perspectis concluditur illud verum esse supernaturale quod (1) nulli intellectui finito naturaliter innotescere possit, et (2) lumine proportionato attingitur. Iam vero mysteria sunt vera quae, nisi divinitus revelata, innotescere non possunt (db 1795), quae excedunt intellectum creatum (db 1796), quae per rationem, etiam rite excultam, neque intelligi neque demonstrari possunt (db 1816). Quae vera lumine proportionato attinguntur per ipsum Deum, cui lumen divinum est naturale, per beatos qui ipsum Deum immediate vident et lumine gloriae gaudent, et denique per eos qui credunt sicut oportet et ideo neque proprio lumini neque propriae scientiae inhaerent vel innituntur sed lumini divino et scientiae divinae. Uti enim vidimus, fides est illa cognitionis species cuius ultima ratio est lumen scientiaque alterius. Uti vero videbimus, lumen fidei est illud in nobis receptum quo possimus lumini scientiaeque divinis inhaerere. Contra, qui credunt sicut non oportet, veritatem mysteriorum attingunt quidem sed non lumine proportionato. Daemones enim propriae ingenii perspicuitati innituntur, et propter eam mysteria ducunt vera. Haeretici vero et schismatici lumini humano cedunt, cum ex veris a Deo revelatis ea seligunt quae propriae indoli vel culturae nationali vel temporibus modernis convenire arbitrentur.

12

Quod Iterum Aliter Ponitur

(a) Actus fidei est absolute supernaturalis. Fieri enim non potest ut quis credat sicut oportet sine gratia Dei (db 179, 180, 813).

The Robert Mollot Collection

439

Analysis of Faith

makes judgment reasonably impossible. It is that power of the mind which, when one has judged some good to be obligatory, exerts a moral constraint upon him as he deliberates, and fills him with peace when he wills so to act and with remorse when he refuses to do so. It is that power of the mind without which there is no inquiring about what is true, no assenting to evidence, no yielding to moral obligation. In humans it is no vain and empty word, is much less so in an angel, and least of all in God in whose image and likeness rational creatures are made.15 We conclude, therefore, that that truth is supernatural which (1) is naturally unknowable by any finite mind, and (2) is attained through a proportionate light. Now, the mysteries of faith are truths that cannot be known apart from divine revelation (db 1795, ds 3015, nd 131), that are beyond the created intellect (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), and that cannot be understood or demonstrated even by a well-trained mind (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). Such truths are attained through a proportionate light, attained by God himself to whom divine light is natural, by the blessed in heaven who have an immediate vision of God and enjoy the light of glory, and by those who believe in the proper way and so do not cling to or rely upon their own light and their own knowledge but upon God’s light and God’s knowledge. For as we have seen, faith is that sort of knowing whose ultimate ground is someone else’s light and knowledge. But as we have yet to see, the light of faith is that light given to us to enable us to adhere to God’s light and knowledge. On the contrary, those who do believe but not in the proper way do in fact attain the truth of the mysteries but not by a proportionate light. Demons rely on their own penetrating intelligence by which they come to recognize the mysteries as true. Heretics and schismatics yield to a purely human light in selecting those revealed truths which they consider to be more suited to their own personal bent or national culture or the spirit of the age. 12

An Alternative Exposition of the Above

(a) The act of faith is absolutely supernatural. It is impossible for one to believe in the proper way without the grace of God (db 179, ds 376, nd 1918; db 180, ds 377, nd 1919; db 813, ds 1553, nd 1953). 15 [On intellectual light, see Lonergan, Verbum 76–77, 85–86, 90–101.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

440

Analysis Fidei

Quae gratia requiritur, non propter solam fidem quae per caritatem operetur (db 1814) sed propter ipsam fidem quae in se est donum Dei (db 1791). Quare fides est virtus supernaturalis (db 1789). (b) Actus supernaturalis per obiectum formale supernaturale specificatur. Nam supernaturalia aliqualiter intelligi possunt; et haec intelligentia habetur ex analogia eorum quae naturaliter cognoscuntur (db 1796). Naturalis cognitio actuum est ex obiectis secundum methodum AristotelicoThomisticam, Sum. Theol., 1, q. 87. Ergo inquantum theologia de actibus supernaturalibus tractat, eorum specificationem ex obiecto formali et supernaturali quaerit. (c) Id quod est formale in actu fidei est verum. Actus enim fidei est assensus (db 1791). Id quod attingitur in iudicio vel assensu est verum, nam caetera iam in ipsa quaestione adsunt. E.g., An bis bina sunt quattuor? Sunt. An Deus est trinus? Est. Id quod per iudicium vel assensum quaestioni additur est (1) inquantum est actus, adhaesio uni parti contradictionis, et (2) inquantum actus cognoscitivus est, vera adhaesio, seu adhaesio illi parti quae rei correspondet. (d) Verum supernaturale contra verum naturale dividitur, non per speciem rei quae cognoscitur, sed per lumen intellectuale quo cognoscitur. Verum enim est transcendentale, et omnia vera in se includit. Quare naturalis proportio intellectus finiti non exceditur eo quod quis hanc vel illam rem vere cognoscit. Nam verum transcendentale includit omne verum, sicut ens transcendentale includit omne ens. Et sicut ens ita etiam verum transcendentale est obiectum adaequatum intellectus. E contra, id quod excedit proportionem cuiuslibet intellectus finiti est attingere verum non per lumen ei naturaliter inditum, neque per lumen alteri creaturae naturaliter inditum, sed per lumen quod cuiuslibet finiti intellectus excedit proportionem. (e) Quibus perspectis concluditur: actum fidei esse supernaturalem (ex a), obiecto formali supernaturali specificatum (ex b), quod obiectum qua formale esse verum (ex c) et qua supernaturale esse verum lumine supernaturali fundatum (ex d). Iam vero lumen ipsum divinum (1) excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae, (2) facit ut Deus falli non possit inquantum concipitur ut principium iudicii divini, (3) facit ut Deus fallere non possit inquantum concipitur ut principium rationabilis volitionis divinae, (4) ideoque iden-

The Robert Mollot Collection

441

Analysis of Faith

This grace is necessary not only for faith that is operative through love (db 1814, ds 3035, nd 129), but for faith itself, which is in itself a gift of God (db 1791, ds 3010, nd 120). Faith is therefore a supernatural virtue (db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118). (b) A supernatural act is specified by a supernatural formal object. For supernatural realities can be understood in some way; and this understanding is had through an analogy from realities that are known naturally (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Natural knowledge of acts is obtained from their objects, according to Aristotelian-Thomistic methodology. Hence in treating supernatural acts theology will look for their specification from a supernatural formal object. (c) The formal element in the act of faith is truth. The act of faith is an assent (db 1791, ds 3010, nd 120). But that which is attained in a judgment or assent is truth, for the other elements of knowledge are already present in the question itself. For example, Do two and two make four? They do. Is God a Trinity? Yes. To any question the act of judgment or assent (1) as an act adds adherence to one alternative of a contradiction, and (2) as a cognitive act adds a true adherence, an adherence to that alternative of the contradiction which corresponds to reality. (d) Supernatural truth is distinguished from natural truth not by the species of that which is known but by the intellectual light by which it is known. Truth is transcendental, and so contains all truths within itself. Therefore the natural proportion of a finite intellect is not exceeded simply because one truly knows this or that. For the truth that is transcendental includes all that is true, just as being, which is transcendental, includes all that is. And as transcendental being is the adequate object of the intellect, so also is transcendental truth. On the other hand, what does exceed the proportion of any finite intellect is the attainment of truth, not through the light it possesses naturally, nor through the light possessed by another creature, but through that light which exceeds the proportion of any finite intellect. (e) From all this we draw the following conclusions: from (a) above, that the act of faith is supernatural, from (b) that it is specified by a supernatural formal object, from (c) that its object as formal is truth, and from (d) that its object as supernatural is truth founded upon supernatural light. Now this divine light (1) exceeds the proportion of any finite substance, (2) conceived as the principle of divine judgment makes it impossible for God to be deceived, (3) conceived as the principle of divine rational volition makes it impossible for God to deceive, (4) is therefore to be identified

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

442

Analysis Fidei

tificatur cum ipsa auctoritate Dei revelantis qui nec falli nec fallere potest, et (5) secundum Vaticanum est motivum proprium fidei in iis qui credunt sicut oportet. 13

De Actibus Qui Proxime Fidem Antecedunt

(a) Proxime actum fidei antecedunt quinque actus supra (§2) enumerati, nempe, actus intelligendi reflexus, iudicia practica credibilitatis et credenditatis, et volitiones finis et medii supernaturalium. (b) Qui actus exsistunt, si exsistit assensus fidei liber et rationabiliter ortus. Si enim assensus fidei est proxime liber, imperatur a libero actu voluntatis. At fides est medium ad iustificationem et salutem. Quare si rationabiliter volitur, ut medium volitur. Et nemo vult medium qua medium, quin finem velit. Exsistit ergo volitio finis supernaturalis. Exsistunt pariter iudicia practica circa hunc finem et hoc medium; nihil enim volitur nisi praecognitum. Quae iudicia ut rationabilia sunt, ex perspecta evidentiae sufficientia procedant necesse est. Et perspicere evidentiam esse sufficientem est actus intelligendi reflexus. (c) Qui actus sunt supernaturales ab obiecto formali supernaturali specificati. Supponitur quod nuper probatum est, nempe, assensus fidei esse actus specificatus ab obiecto formali supernaturali. Etiam supponitur quod supra (§4) dictum est, actus subsequentes inde ab actu intelligendi reflexo anticipari. Quibus compositis habetur id quod intenditur. Quod enim obiectum attingitur credendo sicut oportet, idem obiectum attingitur volendo credere sicut oportet, et iudicando se debere credere sicut oportet, et perspiciendo evidentiam sufficere ut ipse ita iudicet, et velit, et credat. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Iam vero dependent volitio et assensus fidei a volitione finis et volitio finis dependet a iudicio de fine. Sed volitio et assensus fidei sunt actus supernaturales. A fortiori, supernaturales sunt actus in quibus virtualiter praecontinentur et tamquam e causis proximis et proportionatis fluunt.

The Robert Mollot Collection

443

Analysis of Faith

with the authority of God who in revealing cannot be deceived or deceive, and (5) is according to Vatican i the proper motive of faith in those who believe in the proper way. 13

Acts Which Immediately Precede Faith

(a) The acts which immediately precede the act of faith are the five acts listed in §2 above: the reflective act of understanding, the practical judgments of credibility and of credendity, and the acts of willing a supernatural end and means. (b) These acts exist if there exists an assent of faith that is free and has emerged reasonably. For if the assent of faith is proximately free, it is an act commanded by a free act of the will. But faith is a means to justification and salvation. Hence if reasonably willed it is willed as a means; and no one wills a means as a means without willing the end. There exists, therefore, the willing of a supernatural end. There likewise exist practical judgments concerning this end and this means; nothing is willed unless it is already known. For these judgments to be reasonable, they must proceed from a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence, and this grasping that the evidence is sufficient is a reflective act of understanding. (c) These acts are supernatural, being specified by a supernatural formal object. We suppose what we have proven just prior to this, that the assent of faith is an act specified by a formal object that is supernatural. We also suppose what we stated in §4, that the reflective act of understanding anticipates the acts that follow upon it. Putting these two suppositions together, we have our objective. For the object that is attained in believing properly is the very same object that is attained by willing to believe properly, by judging that one ought to believe in the proper way, and by grasping that there is sufficient evidence for one so to judge, will, and believe. Again, that which produces a certain perfection in another possesses that perfection all the more. Now, the willing and the assent of faith depend upon the willing of the end, and the willing of the end depends upon the judgment about the end. But the willing and the assent of faith are supernatural acts; all the more so, then, are the acts in which they are virtually

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

444

Analysis Fidei

(d) Quemadmodum differunt iudicium de fine supernaturali et naturale desiderium videndi Deum per essentiam. Primo, iudicium est actus cognoscitivus; desiderium autem non est cognitio sed cognoscendi desiderium. Consistit desiderium in illa admiratione quae oritur post cognitam Dei exsistentiam et sponte manifestatur illa quaestione, Quid sit Deus. Secundo, iudicium respicit statum hominis actualem seu actualem ordinationem hominis in Deum videndum. Desiderium autem respicit eundem finem non ut actualem sed ut possibilem. Tertio, iudicium est actus supernaturalis qui campum philosophicum excedit (db 1669). Desiderium est mere naturale. 14

De Actibus Qui Remote Fidem Antecedunt

(a) Actus qui remote fidem antecedunt sunt alii principales et alii secundarii. Principales sunt quattuor actus iudicandi quibus affirmantur praemissae duorum syllogismorum sub numero primo (§1) recitatorum. Secundarii sunt qui in principales ducant, puta, philosophiam sanam et theologiam fundamentalem.16 (b) Actus principales non excedunt naturalem intellectus humani proportionem. Quod per partes probatur. (1) Quidquid Deus sciens veraciter homini revelat est homini credendum. Pius ix, ‘Quis enim ignorat vel ignorare potest, omnem Deo loquenti fidem esse habendam, nihilque rationi ipsi magis consentaneum esse, quam iis acquiescere firmiterque adhaerere, quae a Deo, qui nec falli nec fallere potest, revelata esse constiterit’ (db 1637).

The Robert Mollot Collection

445

Analysis of Faith

precontained and from which they flow as from their proportionate proximate causes. (d) There is a difference between the judgment about one’s supernatural end and the natural desire to see God in his essence. First of all, this judgment is an act of knowing; this desire is not a knowing but a wanting to know. It consists in that wonder which arises when one has come to know that God exists and which is spontaneously expressed in the question, What is God? Second, this judgment regards the present state of humanity, that is, the actual ordering of human beings towards the vision of God. The desire regards the same end, not as actual, however, but as possible. Third, this judgment is a supernatural act that goes beyond the purview of philosophy (db 1669, ds 2851), whereas this desire is purely natural. 14

Acts Which Remotely Precede Faith

(a) Of the acts that remotely precede faith, some are principal acts and others secondary. The principal acts are the four acts of judging by which the premises of the two syllogisms in §1 are affirmed. Secondary acts are those that lead to the principal acts, such as, for example, a sound philosophy and fundamental theology.16 (b) The principal acts do not exceed the natural proportion of the human intellect. We shall prove this, taking each premise separately. (1) Whatever God knows and truthfully reveals is to be believed. In the words of Pius ix, ‘There is no one, surely, who does not know, no one, indeed, who cannot know, that whenever God speaks he is to be entirely believed, and that nothing is more in accord with reason itself than to acknowledge and firmly hold to those truths which one has recognized to

16 [The later Lonergan, of course, indicates some of the shortcomings of fundamental theology as traditionally conceived. See, for example, ‘Variations in Fundamental Theology,’ in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 240–58. It may well be that his later reservations about fundamental theology as traditionally conceived would involve at least some adjustments in his understanding of how the secondary acts that remotely precede faith and lead to the principle acts function.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

446

Analysis Fidei

At quod nemo ignorare potest, non excedit naturalem rationis humanae proportionem. (2) Hoc est quod Deus sciens veraciter homini revelat. Pius ix, ‘sed quam multa, quam mira, quam splendida praesto sunt argumenta, quibus humana ratio luculentissime evinci debet, divinam esse Christi religionem’ (db 1638). Si ratio evinci omnino debet de divina origine religionis christianae, hoc factum cognoscere non excedit naturalem rationis proportionem. Pius xii, ‘… tam multa ac mira signa externa divinitus disposita sint quibus vel solo naturali rationis lumine divina christianae religionis origo certo probari possit.’17 Pius xii, ‘In comperto est quanti Ecclesia humanam rationem faciat, quod pertinet ad exsistentiam unius Dei personalis certo demonstrandam, itemque ad ipsius christianae fidei fundamenta signis divinis invicte comprobanda …’18 Vaticanum, db 1812, 1813, 1790, 1794. Etiam db 1799: recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret. (3) Homo ad finem supernaturalem de facto ordinatur, si Deus ei credendum imponit quod naturalem intellectus proportionem excedat. Est propositio analytica. Vide §1, c. (4) Illud quod revelatum est excedit naturalem intellectus proportionem. Sensu quo dicitur, est obvium in praedicatione fidei. Vide §1, c. (c) Cum actus principales non sint supernaturales quoad substantiam, a fortiori idem est dicendum de actibus secundariis in quantum in principales ducant. E.g., exsistentia Dei quae est totius negotii fundamentum (db 1806).

The Robert Mollot Collection

447

Analysis of Faith

have been revealed by God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive’ (db 1637, ds 2778, nd 109). Now, whatever no one can be ignorant of does not exceed the natural proportion of human reason. (2) This is what God knows and truthfully reveals. Pius ix again: ‘How many wonderful and luminous arguments are there all around us by which human reason ought to be quite clearly convinced that the religion of Christ is divine …’ (db 1638, ds 2779, nd 110). If reason ought to be thoroughly convinced of the divine origin of the Christian religion, knowing this fact does not exceed the natural proportion of human reason. Pius xii, Humani generis: ‘… so many marvelous external signs have been displayed by God through which the divine origin of the Christian religion can be demonstrated with certitude even by the natural light of reason alone’ (db 2305, ds 3876, nd 146).17 Pius xii again: ‘It is obvious how highly the church regards human reason, since it can even demonstrate with certitude the existence of a personal God, and also prove irrefutably the foundations of the Christian faith from the indications given by God …’ (db 2320, ds 3892).18 See also Vatican i, db 1812, ds 3033, nd 127; db 1813, ds 3034, nd 128; db 1790, ds 3009, nd 119; db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124; and db 1799, ds 3019, nd 135: ‘… right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith …’ (3) Human beings are in fact ordered to a supernatural end if God obliges them to believe what is beyond the natural proportion of the human intellect. This is an analytic proposition; see §1, c. (4) What has been revealed goes beyond the natural proportion of the intellect. In the sense in which it is stated, this is obvious from the preaching of the faith; see §1, c. (c) Since the principal acts are not supernatural as to their substance, the same is all the more true about the secondary acts inasmuch as they lead to the principal acts – the existence of God, for example, which is the foundation of this entire matter (db 1806, ds 3026, nd 115).

17 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 562. 18 Ibid. 571.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

448

Analysis Fidei

15

De Gratia Conversionis ad Fidem

(a) Requiritur gratia supernaturalis quoad substantiam (gratia elevans) ad actus eliciendos qui proxime ipsam fidem respiciunt. Nam hi actus sunt supernaturales et specificati ab obiecto formali supernaturali. Cf. supra, §13, c. (b) Pro diversa singulorum indigentia requiritur gratia ad actus eliciendos qui remote in fidem ducunt. Quae gratia per se est gratia sanans seu supernaturalis quoad modum. Quod requiritur gratia, sic arguitur: Pius ix: Humana ratio est peccato originali vulnerata et extenuata. Unde quaerit Pontifex: ‘ecquis satis esse rationem ducat ad assequendam veritatem?’ (db 1643, 1644). Pius xii: ‘Quin immo mens humana difficultates interdum pati potest etiam in certo iudicio “credibilitatis” efformando circa catholicam fidem, quamvis tam multa ac mira signa externa divinitus disposita sint quibus vel solo naturali rationis lumine divina christianae religionis origo certo probari possit. Homo enim sive praeiudicatis ductus opinionibus, sive cupidinibus ac mala voluntate instigatus, non modo externorum signorum evidentiae, quae prostat, sed etiam supernis afflatibus, quos Deus in animos ingerit nostros, renuere ac resistere potest.’19 Vaticanum: ‘… voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus sancti auxiliis externa iungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina, atque imprimis miracula et prophetias …’ (db 1790). Sicut ipsa fides fideles docet ea quae naturaliter cognosci possint ut omnibus expedite, firma certitudine, et nullo admixto errore innotescant (db 1786), ita etiam conveniens est Deum infideles adiuvare per suam gratiam ut naturales veritates addiscant. Quod huius gratiae indigentia non est eadem in omnibus. Quamvis enim peccatum originale originatum sit omnibus commune, diversa tamen in diversis sunt indoles, errores, opiniones praeiudicatae, mala voluntas, etc. Quod per se haec gratia est sanans seu supernaturalis quoad modum. Nam id quod intenditur directe est naturale. Actus enim remote fidem antecedentes, uti vidimus supra §14, b, non excedunt naturalem intellectus humani proportionem.

The Robert Mollot Collection

449

Analysis of Faith

15

The Grace of Conversion to Faith

(a) Grace that is supernatural in its substance (‘elevating grace’) is required for eliciting those acts that are proximately related to faith itself. The reason is that these acts are supernatural and specified by a supernatural formal object. See above, §13 (c). (b) According to the different needs of individuals, grace is required to elicit those acts that remotely lead to faith. In itself, this grace is ‘healing grace,’ supernatural in its manner. Grace is required. Pius ix: Human reason is wounded and weakened by original sin. And so the Pope asks, ‘Is there anyone who would think that reason is sufficient to arrive at truth?’ (db 1643, 1644). Pius xii: ‘Indeed, the human mind can sometimes labor under difficulties even in reaching a certain judgment of “credibility” concerning the Catholic faith, even though so many marvelous external signs have been displayed by God through which the divine origin of the Christian religion can be demonstrated with certitude, even by the natural light of reason alone. For people are so led by prejudice and so driven by desires and bad will that they can reject those external evidences in front of their eyes and even resist those inspirations from above that God sends into our hearts’ (db 2305, ds 3876, nd 146).19 Vatican i: ‘… God has willed to supplement the interior assistance of the Holy Spirit with external proofs of his revelation, that is, with divine acts, especially miracles and prophecies …’ (db 1790, ds 3009, nd 119). Just as faith itself teaches believers truths which can be known naturally so that all may know them readily, with firm certitude, and without any admixture of error (db 1786, ds 3005, nd 114), so also it is only fitting that God through his grace should help unbelievers to learn such natural truths. The need for this grace is not the same for everyone. Although originated original sin is common to all, it is present in people in different ways according to differences in personality, in erroneous and biased opinions, in bad will, and so on. In itself this grace is healing grace, supernatural in its manner. The reason is that what is directly intended is natural. As we have seen in §14 (b), those acts that remotely precede faith do not exceed the natural proportion of the human intellect. 19 Ibid. 562.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

450

Analysis Fidei

(c) Quibusnam gressibus infidelis ad fidem producitur. Primo modo, praeter intentionem suam sed secundum intentionem divinae providentiae. Et sic infidelis elicit actus singulos propter finem quendam naturalem qui tamen, cum simul sumentur, in ipsam fidem remote ducent. Ita addiscere potest scientias, philosophiam, theologiam naturalem, historiam, bonos mores, etc. Secundo modo, secundum intentionem suam non tamen salutarem sed tantum in ordine ad verum naturaliter cognoscibile attingendum. Ita potest instituere inquisitiones in vetus et novum testamentum, in miracula et prophetias, in historiam ecclesiae et conciliorum, etc. Si quis ab eo quaerit cur hisce rebus det operam, respondet se verum investigare. Si obicitur quod sic in fidem perveniet, respondet, Si fides est vera, bonum erit pervenire; si est falsa, non perveniam. Si instatur quod mysteria erunt credenda, respondet rationabiliter credi quidquid Deus revelaverit. Si obicitur impossibile esse homini ex naturali rationis lumine ad mysteria affirmanda rationabiliter pervenire, respondet naturale obiectum intellectus adaequatum esse ens et verum; quae cum transcendentalia sint, omnia prorsus includere. Brevi, quaerit verum naturaliter cognoscibile, totum, et nihil aliud.

Tertio modo, secundum intentionem suam salutarem. Nondum apud eum de facto revelationis constat. Tamen quaerit utrum salus invenienda sit apud catholicos. Intendit et vult salutem. Vult salutem neque fictam neque falsam sed veram. Perspecta veritas est conditio ut velit, et ideo voluntatem habet conditionatam. At quantum ad voluntatem attinet, res iam deciditur; nam conditione intellectuali impleta, statim absolute volet. Si quis ei mysteria credenda obicit, non tam invocabit verum transcendentale quam verum supernaturale. Hypotheticus quidam sed supernaturalis ei inest pius credulitatis affectus quo mysteria propter auctoritatem Dei credere vult modo Deus de facto ea revelaverit.

Quarto modo, ad actus proxime fidem antecedentes pervenitur. Gratia illuminationis intellectui inest non solum ut quaerat sed etiam ut perspiciat evidentiam sufficere ad iudicia elicienda circa actualem finem supernatu-

The Robert Mollot Collection

451

Analysis of Faith

(c) Steps by which the unbeliever is led to faith. The first step is unintentional on the part of the unbeliever but is intended by divine providence. Here the unbeliever elicits all acts for some natural end, which, however, when taken all together, will be remotely conducive to faith. Thus one can learn various natural sciences, philosophy, natural theology, history, ethical conduct, and so forth. The second step is in accordance with the unbeliever’s intention – not, however, a salutary intention, directed towards salvation, but only towards attaining naturally knowable truth. In this way a man, for example, who is an unbeliever may begin to study the Old and New Testaments, investigate miracles and prophecies, the history of the church and the councils, and so on. And if someone asks him why he is interested in these things, his reply would be that he is seeking truth. If one then objects that these studies will bring him to faith, his reply will be that if the faith is true, then it will be good for him to come to faith, but if false, he will not do so. If one further objects that he will have to believe the mysteries of faith, his reply will be that it is reasonable to believe whatever God has revealed. And finally, if his objector says that it is impossible for a person by the natural light of reason to arrive at making a reasonable affirmation of the mysteries of faith, his reply will be that the adequate natural object of the human intellect is being and truth, and that since these are transcendentals they include absolutely all of reality. In a word, he seeks all naturally knowable truth, nothing more. The third step is in accordance with his salutary intention. As yet our unbeliever is not convinced of the fact of revelation; nevertheless, he wonders whether salvation is to be found among Catholics. He intends and wants salvation, and he wants a salvation that is true and genuine, not spurious or false. He wants it on condition that the truth be clearly seen, and so his will is conditioned. But as far as the will itself is concerned, the matter is already decided; for once that intellectual condition is fulfilled, he will immediately will unconditionally. If it is objected to him that he will have to believe the mysteries of faith, he will appeal not so much to transcendental truth as to supernatural truth. He possesses that hypothetical yet supernatural ‘devout readiness to believe’ by which he wants to believe the mysteries of faith on account of the authority of God, provided that God has in fact revealed them. In the fourth step, he comes to those acts that immediately precede faith. His intellect is enlightened by grace not only to inquire into but also to perceive that there is sufficient evidence for making a judgment about

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

452

Analysis Fidei

ralem et circa obligationem credendi. Gratia inspirationis inest voluntati ut finem supernaturalem velit et ideo ut medium in hunc finem velit. Ex perspecta evidentia rationabiliter sequuntur iudicia. Ex iudiciis et volitione finis rationabiliter sequuntur consensus in obligationem credendi, imperium revelatis assentiendi, et ipse fidei assensus.

(d) Quae gratia ad singulos gressus requiritur Ad primum et secundum sufficiunt divina motio providentialis exterior et interior una cum gratiis sanantibus quae singulorum indigentiis respondeant. Ad tertium et quartum gressum requiruntur gratia illuminationis et inspirationis absolute supernaturalis (db 178, 179, 180). Sed ad tertium gressum gratia illuminationis est ad quaerendum salutariter, et ideo gratia inspirationis est ad volendum hypothetice seu conditionate. Ad quartum gressum gratia illuminationis est non solum ad quaerendum sed etiam ad perspiciendum, et ideo gratia inspirationis est ad volendum et prosequendum finem supernaturalem absolute et sine conditione. (e) Quae omnia sunt recte intelligenda. Non enim directe impugnamus opinionem eorum qui tenent omnem gratiam quae de facto datur esse gratiam elevantem et absolute supernaturalem. Quando dicimus gratiam sanantem ad tales actus sufficere, de casibus hypothetice exsistentibus et abstracte definitis tractamus. Qui volunt omnem gratiam esse elevantem, hoc suum assertum probare possunt demonstrando istos casus hypotheticos numquam de facto exsistere. 16

De Proprietatibus Fidei

(a) Fides est rationabilis cum in fieri tum in facto esse. In fieri est rationabilis quia evidentia ipsa solo rationis lumine certo cognosci potest et evidentiae sufficientia perspicitur ut rationabiliter eliciantur iudicia practica, volitiones, et ipse fidei assensus. In facto esse est rationabilis secundum ipsam fidei naturam. Fides enim est illa cognitionis species cuius ultimus ‘cur’ est scientia alterius. In fide vero divina haec scientia est ipsa Dei scientia. Quare fide divina nihil rationabilius esse potest. (b) Assensus fidei est liber.

The Robert Mollot Collection

453

Analysis of Faith

his actual supernatural end and about the obligation to believe. His will is inspired by grace to will that supernatural end and therefore to will the means to that end. Judgments follow reasonably upon the perceived sufficiency of the evidence, and these judgments and this willing of the end are in turn followed reasonably by an acknowledgment of the obligation to believe, by the command to assent to what has been revealed, and by the assent of faith itself. (d) The graces needed for each of these steps. For the first and second steps, the action of divine providence, both exterior and interior, is sufficient, along with the healing graces that respond to the needs of each individual. For the third and fourth steps, the absolutely supernatural graces of enlightenment and inspiration are required (db 178–80; ds 375–77; nd 1917– 19). In the third step, however, the grace of enlightenment is needed for an inquiry that is salutary, and so the grace of inspiration is needed for an act of the will that is hypothetical or conditioned. In the fourth step, the grace of enlightenment is needed not only for inquiry but also for the acknowledgment, and so also is the grace of inspiration needed both to will and to pursue absolutely and unconditionally a supernatural end. (e) All this must be correctly understood. We do not directly reject the opinion of those who hold that all grace that is actually given is elevating grace, which is absolutely supernatural. When we say that healing grace is sufficient for certain acts, we are speaking of cases that are hypothetical and abstractly defined. Those who maintain that all grace is elevating can prove their assertion by showing that those hypothetical cases never actually exist. 16

The Properties of Faith

(a) Faith, both as faith-in-process and as acquired, is reasonable. Faith-in-process is reasonable because by the light of reason alone the evidence for it can be known with certainty and grasped as being sufficient to reasonably elicit practical judgments, acts of the will, and the assent of faith itself. Faith as acquired is reasonable from its very nature. For faith is that kind of knowing whose ultimate ‘why’ is someone else’s knowledge. But in divine faith this knowledge is God’s knowledge; nothing, therefore, could possibly be more reasonable than divine faith. (b) The assent of faith is free.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

454

Analysis Fidei

Proxime enim ipse assensus a libero imperio voluntatis producitur. Neque deest libertas in processu psychologico remotiori, cum omnis intellectualis operatio quoad exercitium actus a voluntate dependeat. Notandum est ideo fidem esse liberam quia ad eam per rationem boni acceditur. Ad verum formale, quod in solo iudicio invenitur, dupliciter proceditur: aut per rationem intelligibilis sive descriptionis sive explicationis aut per rationem boni intellectualis; in priori casu attingitur notitia descriptiva vel scientifica; in posteriore casu attingitur fides. Quare omnis fides secundum propriam suam rationem est libera. Ulterius notare oportet rationabilitatem et libertatem fidei non inter se pugnare. Quamvis enim rationabilitas imponit obligationem moralem, obligatio moralis, uti patet, non tollit libertatem. (c) Assensus fidei est supernaturalis. Ipse assensus attingit verum supernaturale, nempe, primam veritatem propter primam veritatem, seu ea quae a Deo sciuntur et veraciter revelantur propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis. Proximus processus ad fidem est absolute supernaturalis. Inde enim a cogitatione salutari per gratiam absolute supernaturalem illuminationis et inspirationis homo a Deo movetur in ipsam fidem, iustificationem, salutem. Vide §15, d. Remotus processus de se gratia non indiget; sed in concretis hominum adiunctis gratia sanans requiritur et datur. Vide §15, b. Notandum est gratiae necessitatem cum fidei rationabilitate non pugnare. Gratia enim sanans datur ut homo sit rationabilis; nisi homo enim rationabilis de facto efficitur, per rationabilitatem fidei ad ipsam fidem non ducitur. Gratia vero elevans datur ut homo ad rationabilitatem fidei in facto esse pervenire possit; haec enim rationabilitas qua homo divinae scientiae inhaereat et innitatur supra naturam est. (d) Assensus fidei est obscurus. Est obscurus ratione motivi: motivum enim fidei in facto esse est scientia qua Deus scit; quam scientiam homo non habet. Est obscurus ratione obiecti principalis: hoc enim est ipse Deus mysteriis obvolutus quae per solam visionem beatificam penetrantur (db 1796, 1816). At de se non est obscurus ratione motivi processus psychologici quo ad

The Robert Mollot Collection

455

Analysis of Faith

This assent is immediately produced by the free command of the will. Nor is freedom lacking in the more remote phase of the psychological process, since every intellectual operation depends upon the will as to its exercise. Note that faith is free because one comes to faith under the aspect of good. One proceeds to formal truth, which is found only in a judgment, in two ways: either under the aspect of intelligible description or explanation, or under the aspect of intellectual good. In the former case one attains descriptive or scientific knowledge; in the latter case one attains faith. Therefore all faith is free by its very nature. Note further that the reasonableness and the freedom of faith cannot be in conflict. Although reasonableness imposes a moral obligation, moral obligation obviously does not take away one’s freedom. (c) The assent of faith is supernatural. This assent attains supernatural truth, namely, first truth on account of first Truth; that is, it attains what God knows and truthfully reveals on account of the authority of God who reveals. The proximate phase in the process towards faith is absolutely supernatural. From the entertaining of salutary thoughts to the assent of faith itself and to justification and salvation one is moved by God through the absolutely supernatural graces of illumination and inspiration. See §15 (d). The remote phase in the process does not in itself require grace; but in the concrete circumstances of human life, healing grace is needed and given. See §15 (b). Note that there is no conflict between the necessity of grace and the reasonableness of faith. Healing grace is given for one to be reasonable, for unless a person is actually rendered reasonable, he or she will not be led to faith by the reasonableness of faith. On the other hand, elevating grace is given to enable one to see the reasonableness of faith as acquired; for this reasonableness by which a person adheres to and relies upon God’s knowledge is above nature. (d) The assent of faith is obscure. The assent of faith is obscure by reason of its motive; for the motive of faith as acquired is the knowledge by which God knows, and humans do not have this knowledge. It is obscure by reason of its principal object; this object is God himself enshrouded in those mysteries that only the beatific vision can penetrate (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132; db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). But in itself faith is not obscure by reason of the motive of the psychologi-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

456

Analysis Fidei

fidem pervenitur. Fundatur enim in praemissis quae solo rationis lumine innotescere possunt. (e) Assensus fidei est infallibilis. Motivum enim est ipsa divina scientia; obiectum vero est id quod Deus scit et veraciter revelat. (f) Assensus fidei est firmus super omnia. Primo ratione infallibilitatis quae in motivo et in obiecto inveniuntur. Secundo ratione gratiae divinae per quam ad eam pervenitur et in ea perseveratur. Tertio ratione voluntatis quae Deo summum obsequium praestare tenetur. (g) Assensus fidei est irrevocabilis. Quamdiu homo credit, fides sua motivo supremo innititur, nempe, ipsi lumini divini intellectus qui nec falli nec fallere potest. Praeterea, per ipsum fidei obiectum docetur Deum exsistere, Deum revelasse, Deum ea revelasse quae per magisterium ecclesiae vivum proponuntur. Quare nullum dubium, stante fide, admittere potest. Quod si dubium venit ei utrum fides stare debeat, praesto ei est argumentum ex signo levato inter nationes, nempe, ipsa ecclesia (db 1794), et accedit gratia Dei qua intellectus illuminatur ad sufficientiam evidentiae perspiciendam et ad ipsam fidem volendam. Deus enim non deserit nisi prius deseratur (db 1794, 1815).

17

De Necessitate Fidei

(a) Obligatio credenda, db 1789, 1810. (b) Necessitas medii: ‘… fidei, sine qua nulli contingit iustificatio’ (db 799); ‘fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum et radix omnis iustificationis, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo et ad filiorum eius consortium pervenire’ (db 801). Vide etiam db 1793, 1645, 1172, 1173.

(c) Obiectum minimum explicite credendum: Hebr. 11, 6: ‘quia Deus est et inquirentibus se remunerator est.’ Vide db 1172. N.B. Cum id quod implicite creditur in alio contineri debeat, fieri non potest ut omnia implicite credantur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

457

Analysis of Faith

cal process by which one comes to faith, since it is founded upon premises that can be known by the light of reason alone. (e) The assent of faith is infallible. The assent of faith is infallible because its motive is divine knowledge itself, while its object is that which God knows and truthfully reveals. (f) The assent of faith is supremely firm. In the first place, the assent of faith is firm by reason of the infallibility inherent in its motive and in its object. Second, it is firm by reason of divine grace, which leads to it and enables one to persevere in it. Third, it is firm by reason of the will, which is duty-bound to give God absolute service. (g) The assent of faith is irrevocable. As long as a person believes, faith rests upon the highest motive, namely, the light of the divine mind, which can neither be deceived nor deceive. Besides, through the object of faith one learns that God exists, that God has revealed certain truths, that God has revealed those truths that are set forth by the living magisterium of the church. So long as there is faith, therefore, there is no room for doubt. But if a doubt causes one to waver in one’s faith, there is available as a counter-argument the ‘sign raised aloft among the nations,’ namely, the church herself (db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124), supplemented by God’s grace enlightening one’s intellect to grasp the sufficiency of the evidence and to will to have faith. God abandons no one unless he is first abandoned (db 804, ds 1537, nd 1938; see also db 1815, ds 3036, nd 130). 17

The Necessity of Faith

(a) On the obligation to believe: db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118; db 1810, ds 3031, nd 125. (b) On the necessity of means: ‘… faith, without which no one ever receives justification’ (db 799, ds 1529, nd 1932); ‘faith is the beginning of salvation, the root and foundation of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and be numbered among his children’ (db 801, ds 1532, nd 1935; see also db 1793, ds 3012, nd 122; db 1645; db 1172, ds 2122; db 1173, ds 2123.) (c) The minimal object of faith must be explicitly believed: ‘… that God exists and rewards those who seek him’ (Hebrews 11.6). See db 1172, ds 2122. Note that since what is implicitly believed must be contained in something else, it is impossible for everything to be believed implicitly.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

458

Analysis Fidei

(d) Motivum est auctoritas Dei revelantis (db 1811). db 1173 damnat hanc propositionem: ‘Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad iustificationem sufficit.’ (e) Utrum obiectum minimum sit verum supernaturale. Quod Deus est et inquirentes se remunerat, dupliciter intelligi potest. Primo modo, ut thesis philosophica, et sic non est obiectum minimum. Alio modo, ut implicite continens totum quod Deus revelavit, et sic est obiectum minimum. Quod implicite omnia revelata continet, ex motivo habetur, nempe, propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis. Denique, hoc motivum facit verum supernaturale; uti enim vidimus, verum dividitur in naturale et supernaturale non secundum rem quae cognoscitur, sed secundum lumen quo cognoscitur. §§10, 11. 18

De Necessitate Praeambulorum

(a) Per praeambula intelligimus illa fidei fundamenta quae certo sed non fide divina cognoscuntur. Vide Vaticanum: ‘firmissimo niti fundamento fidem’ (db 1794); ‘recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret’ (db 1799). Vide Pium ix, db 1637. (b) Praecipue agitur de facto revelationis, cuius facti ipsa Ecclesia est ‘magnum quoddam et perpetuum motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile’ (db 1794). (c) Primus casus est eorum qui ex infidelitate ad fidem producuntur. Quo in casu satis patet per prius factum revelationis est aliunde cognoscendum quam fide divina credendum. Nam motus ad terminum antecedit termini adeptionem. In motu ad terminum nondum habetur fides divina, et tamen requiritur certa cognitio facti revelationis ut quis ad terminum pervenire possit. (d) Alter casus est eorum qui iam fidem sub Ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt. Illi fide divina factum revelationis credunt, nam ipsum hoc factum revelatum est. Unde quaeritur primo utrum ipsum idem factum aliunde co-

The Robert Mollot Collection

459

Analysis of Faith

(d) The motive of faith is the authority of God who reveals (db 1811, ds 3032, nd 126). A decree of the Holy Office (db 1173, ds 2123) condemns the following proposition: ‘Faith in the broad sense, based upon the testimony of creation or some similar motive, is sufficient for justification.’ (e) Is the minimal object of faith a supernatural truth? That God exists and rewards those who seek him can be understood in two ways. In the first way, it is understood as a philosophical statement, and as such it is not the minimal object of faith; in the second way, understood as implicitly containing all that God has revealed, it is the minimal object. That which implicitly contains all that is revealed has as its motive the authority of God the revealer. This motive renders truth supernatural; for as we have seen, truth is natural or supernatural, not according to what is known, but according to the light by which it is known. See §§10 and 11. 18

The Necessity of the Preambles of Faith

(a) By the ‘preambles’ we mean those foundations of faith that are known with certitude but not by divine faith. Vatican i: ‘… faith rests on a most firm foundation’ (db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124); ‘… right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith’ (db 1799, ds 3019, nd 135). See also Pius ix, db 1637, ds 2778, nd 109. (b) What is mainly at issue here is the fact of revelation, a fact of which the church herself is ‘a powerful and permanent motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony to its own divine commission’ (db 1794, ds 3013, nd 123). (c) There are two cases to consider. The first case is of those who go from being unbelievers to believers. In their case it is sufficiently clear that the fact of revelation has to be known first from other sources before being believed by divine faith, for motion to a term precedes the attainment of that term. In moving towards the term one does not yet have divine faith, and yet certain knowledge of the fact of revelation is required for one to reach the term. (d) The second case is of those who have already accepted the faith on the teaching authority of the church. These persons accept by divine faith the fact of revelation, for this fact is itself revealed. Hence three questions

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

460

Analysis Fidei

gnoscere debeant; deinde unde hanc aliam cognitionem hauriant; et tertio, si eam non habeant, utrum de ipsa fide dubitare debeant. Ad primam quaestionem dicitur: primo, Pium ix sine distinctione requirere diligentem inquisitionem in factum revelationis ut ipsa fides sit rationabile obsequium20 (db 1637); deinde, C. Vat. easdem assignare causas tum veram fidem amplectendi tum in ea constanter perseverandi (db 1794); tertio, idem Concilium nominare eiusmodi praeambula fidei fundamenta (db 1794, 1799), ubi innuitur etiam post fidem susceptam fundamentum manere oportere. Cuius rei ratio sic exponi potest. Ideo actus iudicandi vel assentiendi est rationabilis quia alius actus antecedit in quo sufficientia evidentiae ad iudicandum vel assentiendum perspicitur. Sicut primus fidei assensus est rationabilis propter perspectam evidentiae sufficientiam, pariter assensus subsequentes rationabiles sunt propter perspectam evidentiae sufficientiam. Quando credimus, propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis vero supernaturali assentimur. Sed ut credamus, ut talem assensum eliciamus, perspicere debemus sufficere evidentiam ut rationabiliter talem actum ponamus. Quare iterum valet argumentum de motu et de termino adepto.

Ad alteram quaestionem dicitur secundum Vaticanum, primo, ipsum factum revelationis innotescere per signa externa, miracula, omnium intelligentiae accommodata (db 1790, 1812, 1813) et etiam per ipsam ecclesiam signum et motivum perpetuum (db 1794), secundo, in utroque casu accedere gratiam Dei (db 1790, 1794).

Ulterius dicimus ipsum factum revelationis naturali rationis lumine innotescere posse sed gratiam Dei requiri ad cogitationem salutarem qua quaerimus et perspicimus evidentiam hanc sufficere ad rationabiliter eliciendum actum fidei. Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum numquam esse fide dubitandum. Primo, quia vera est. Deinde, quia ad salutem est necessaria necessitate medii. Tertio, quia est donum Dei et nobis inest magis per gratiam quam per pra-

The Robert Mollot Collection

461

Analysis of Faith

arise: (1) whether they have to know this same fact from other sources, (2) where they are to get such knowledge, and (3) whether in the absence of this knowledge they ought to doubt about faith itself. As to the first question we note, first, that Pius ix, without making any distinction, insists upon a diligent inquiry into the fact of revelation so that faith itself might be a ‘reasonable worship’20 (db 1637, ds 2778, nd 109); second, that Vatican i gives the same reasons for persevering in the faith as for embracing it (db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124); and third, that the same council refers to such preambles as foundations of the faith (db 1794, ds 3013–14, nd 123–24; db 1799, ds 3019, nd 135), implying that they ought to remain as a foundation even after one has accepted the faith. The reason for this can be explained as follows. An act of judging or assenting is reasonable because it is preceded by another act in which one grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for making that judgment or assent. As the first assent of faith is reasonable because one has grasped the sufficiency of the evidence for it, so also are subsequent assents reasonable because of one’s grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for them. When we believe, we give assent to supernatural truths on account of the authority of God who reveals them. But in order to believe, in order to elicit such assent, we must grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for reasonably doing so. Hence, the above argument concerning motion to and arrival at a term also applies here. As to the second question, we note that according to Vatican i, first, the very fact of revelation is known through external signs, miracles, which everyone can understand (db 1790, ds 3009, nd 119; db 1812, ds 3033, nd 127; db 1813, ds 3014, nd 124), and also through the church herself as a sign and permanent motive (db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124); and second, in both cases God’s grace is also present (db 1790, ds 3009, nd 119; db 1794, ds 3014, nd 124). We affirm, moreover, that the fact of revelation can be known by the natural light of reason, but that the grace of God is required for that salutary thought process whereby we examine the evidence and grasp that it is sufficient for reasonably eliciting an act of faith. Regarding the third question it must be said that faith is never to be doubted. First, because it is true; second, because it is necessary for salvation as a necessary means; third, because it is a gift of God, and is our pos-

20 [Romans 12.1; Vulgate, rationabile obsequium.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

462

Analysis Fidei

eambula naturaliter nota. Quare difficultates in materia fidei dubium generare non debent (‘Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt’).21 Sed solutiones sunt quaerendae et auxilium Dei est implorandum tum ut ratio sanetur ad evidentiae apprehensionem tum ut mens illuminetur ad evidentiae sufficientiam perspiciendam. Vide db 1794, 1815.22

(e) Obicitur: Sufficientia evidentiae perspici non potest, nisi ipsa evidentia apprehenditur. Sed pauci evidentiam apprehendere videntur. Pueri enim catholici, adulti inculti, ipsi docti in aliis materiis sed philosophiae et theologiae fundamentalis ignari, quid revera cognoscunt de demonstrata Dei exsistentia, de deductis attributis divinis, de authentia Novi Testamenti, de miraculorum possibilitate et probatione, de admirabili Ecclesiae propagatione, de eximia eius sanctitate, de catholica unitate et invicta stabilitate? Imo, ipsi seminariorum alumni probationibus adumbratis sunt contenti. Ipsi professores non totam rem sed hanc vel illam partem plus minus compertam habent.

Primo distinguendum est inter cognitionem rei et difficultatum solutionem. Exemplo sit certa cognitio exsistentiae divinae. Facile est probare quod Deus exsistit. At difficile admodum est penetrare mentem Spinozae, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, eorumque errores exacte accurateque refutare. Deinde distinguendum est inter ipsam cognitionem et eius expressionem. Quam distinctionem clare illustravit Newman cum illud protulerit, nempe, nos omnes esse certissimos Angliam esse insulam, qui nihilominus rem arduam atque molestissimam dixerimus probationem claram, efficacem, obiectionibus nullis obnoxiam praestare huius obviae insularitatis. Cuius rei causa est iudicium ab actu intelligendi reflexo procedere, hunc vero actum synthesin multorum diversorumque efficere secundum eorum proportionem ad iudicium anticipatum; quae synthesis atque perspecta proportio neque verbum incomplexum est neque verbum complexum ide-

The Robert Mollot Collection

463

Analysis of Faith

session more by his grace than by our natural knowledge of the preambles. In matters of faith, therefore, difficulties should not engender doubt: ‘Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt.’21 But solutions to difficulties ought to be sought, while imploring God’s grace that one’s reason may be corrected to help it know the evidence, and that one’s mind may be enlightened to help it grasp the sufficiency of that evidence. See db 1794, ds 3014; db 1815, ds 3036, nd 130.22 (e) Here one might make the following objection. The sufficiency of evidence cannot be grasped unless the evidence itself is known. But very few people seem to know this evidence. Catholic children, uneducated adults, persons learned in other fields of knowledge but ignorant of philosophy and fundamental theology – what do they really know about the proofs of God’s existence, about deductions concerning the divine attributes, about the authenticity of the New Testament, about the possibility of miracles and proofs of their occurrence, about the extraordinary spread of the church, the outstanding instances of holiness in her, and her unity and unshakeable stability? Why, seminarians themselves are quite content with sketchy outlines of such proofs, while their professors have a more or less thorough knowledge of one or other part of this material but not the whole of it! In answering this objection, we must first of all distinguish between the knowledge of something and the solution of difficulties. Take, for example, the certain knowledge of God’s existence. It is easy enough to prove that God exists; but it is quite difficult to enter into the mind of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, or Heidegger, and refute their errors fairly and accurately. Next, we must distinguish between knowledge itself and the way it is expressed. This distinction is aptly illustrated by Newman’s observation that although we are all absolutely certain that Britain is an island, we should nevertheless consider it a most arduous and troublesome task to produce a clear, cogent, and incontrovertible proof of its obvious insularity. The reason for this is the fact that judgment proceeds from a reflective act of understanding, and that this act brings into synthesis many different elements according to their proportion to the judgment anticipated. This synthesis and this perceived proportion is neither a simple word nor a com-

21 [A well-known saying of Cardinal Newman. See Apologia pro Vita Sua, part vii (chapter 5 in some editions), init.)] 22 On Hermes’ doubt, see Lennerz, De virtutibus theologicis 17, note; on the errors opposed to this definition, ibid. 231 [5th edition (1947) 17, note, and 231; the relevant text is unchanged in the 5th edition].

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

464

Analysis Fidei

oque directe dici non potest sive interius in mente neque exterius per os et linguam; sed mediantibus huiusmodi expressionibus indirecte communicari potest et de facto secundum recipientis intelligentiam, scientiam, sapientiam, et prudentiam recipitur. Tertio, animadvertere oportet similem vigere difficultatem cum quis sibi rationem suae cognitionis dare velit. Rationem dari potest in quantum quaerit utrum necne res ita se habent et simpliciter respondet secundum illud Domini, Est, Est et Non, Non. Si vero quaerit quemadmodum ipse sciat quod verum reputet, in perdifficili analysi psychologiae rationalis involvitur, et illud Aquinatis recolere debet, nempe, diligentis et subtilis inquisitionis esse, quid sit anima, cognoscere.23 Quibus positis, ad argumentum, conceditur maior et negatur minor; ad probationem minoris, conceditur indoctos nescire difficultates subtiliter excogitatas; conceditur tam doctos quam indoctos totam suam cognitionem exterius proferre non posse, et negatur eos non eam evidentiam certo cognoscere in qua sufficientia ad iudicia practica efformanda perspici possit. (f) Addi oportet quod in iudicium vel assensum proferendum aliter evidentia apprehensa et aliter eiusdam perspecta sufficientia influunt. Apprehensa enim evidentia se habet ad modum materiae vel instrumenti; perspecta vero sufficientia se habet ad modum formae vel causae principalis. Evidentia enim, quantumvis magna, accurata, elaborata, nisi sufficiens esse perspicitur, nihil facit. Evidentia autem, quantumvis parva vel indigesta, si sufficit et sufficere perspicitur, valide et necessitate quadam rationali iudicium fundat et gignit. Qua de causa idem est proximum fidei fundamentum in omnibus sive doctis sive indoctis, sive adultis sive pueris, nempe, perspecta evidentiae sufficientia quae per gratiam illuminationis a Deo habetur. Id quod in aliis aliud est, non haec perspicientia sed evidentiae apprehensio est. (g) Ulterius concludi potest cur criteriis externis est innitendum. Primo, quia gratia Dei nos illuminat ad inquirendum et ad perspiciendam evidentiae sufficientiam. Alia ergo est gratia Dei, et aliud id in quod inquiritur et in quo sufficientia perspicitur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

465

Analysis of Faith

pound word and hence cannot be directly expressed either interiorly in the mind or exteriorly in speech; but by means of such expressions it can be indirectly communicated and is actually received in proportion to the intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, and prudence of the one receiving it. Third, note that a similar difficulty arises when we wish to account for some knowledge that we have. We can do this by asking whether the thing is so or not, and simply answering, as the Lord said, Yes, yes, or No, no. But if we ask how we come to know what we consider to be true, we get involved in the extremely difficult analysis of rational psychology, and would do well to recall Aquinas’s dictum that it requires a painstaking and subtle inquiry to come to know what the soul is.23 With the foregoing observations in mind, we make our argument against the objection by conceding the major premise but denying the minor. As to the minor premise, while granting that uneducated persons are unaware of subtly contrived difficulties, and granting also that both the learned and the unlearned are unable to explain in words the whole of what they know, we deny that they do not know with certainty that evidence the sufficiency of which can be grasped in order to make practical judgments. (f) Here we must add that apprehension of the evidence and the grasp of its sufficiency enter into the production of a judgment or assent in different ways. Apprehension of the evidence is as the material or as an instrument; and the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence is as the form or as the principal cause. For evidence, however abundant and accurate and detailed it may be, is of no avail unless it is grasped as being sufficient. On the other hand, even scanty and scattered evidence, as long as it is sufficient and its sufficiency is grasped, validly grounds and by a certain rational necessity engenders a judgment. It is for this reason that everyone, adults and children, and learned and unlearned alike, have the same proximate foundation for their faith, namely, a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence which is had through God’s grace of enlightenment. What is different in different persons is not this grasp of sufficiency but apprehension of the evidence. (g) We may further conclude to the reason why we need to rely upon external criteria. The first reason is because God’s grace enlightens us to inquire into and grasp the sufficiency of the evidence. The grace of God, therefore, is one

23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

466

Analysis Fidei

Deinde, convenienter hoc aliud est quid externum, puta, miracula, prophetias, ipsum signum inter nationes elevatum. Eiusdem enim res sunt clarae, obviae, fere palpabiles. Sed de elevatione doctrinae quisque iudicat secundam propriam intelligentiam, scientiam, et sapientiam, quae alia in aliis esse solet. De factis vero internis psychologicis, etsi miraculose esse possent, a mera abnormalitate non facile discernuntur. Tertio, uti in tractatu de gratia stabilitur, ipsa gratia supernaturalis non subest scientiae humanae. Quamvis enim coniecturare possimus de proprio statu supernaturali, eundem statum esse supernaturalem non possumus scire; actus enim supernaturales sunt tales propter obiecta supernaturalia quae imperfecte tantum intelligimus (db 1796).

19

Circa Fidem in Haereticis, Diabolis, et Scientibus

(a) Quaeritur primo utrum haereticus fide divina credere possit. Supponamus ergo haereticus affirmare veritatem divinitatis Domini Nostri Iesu Christi. Quaestio est utrum fide divina hanc veritatem affirmare possit. Primo, hoc affirmat fide divina inquantum revelato divinitus assentitur propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis. Secundo, si hoc facit, arduum non videtur eum ab haeresi revocare; non enim propriae scientiae vel naturali indoli vel culturae nationali innititur sed ipsi divinae scientiae; unde aperta est via qua ad omnia revelata amplectenda procedere possit. Tertio, ideo haereticus non est dicendus fide divina credere, quia veritates fidei veras habet; hoc facere potest non propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis sed propter traditionem familiarem vel nationalem aliasve causas humanas.

(b) Quaeritur deinde de diabolis qui secundum Iacobum (2.19) credunt et contremiscunt. Quod Aquinas de coactione eorum intellectus interpretatus est.24 Adest coactio obiectiva ex ipsis rebus rerumque testimoniis. Adest co-

The Robert Mollot Collection

467

Analysis of Faith

thing, but quite another is the evidence into which we inquire and whose sufficiency we grasp. Next, what we inquire into are, appropriately, external realities, such as miracles, prophecies, and the sign raised aloft among the nations, since such things are clear and evident, almost palpable. But concerning the loftiness of the doctrine, each one makes a judgment in accordance with his or her intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom, which are different in different persons. Interior psychological facts, although they could be miraculous, are not easily distinguishable from what is simply abnormal. Third, as is established in the treatise on grace, supernatural grace itself is not within the scope of human knowledge. Although we may form a conjecture about our own supernatural condition, we cannot know that this same condition is supernatural; for acts are supernatural by reason of their supernatural objects, and these we understand only imperfectly (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). 19

The Faith of Heretics, of Demons, and of Those Who Have Knowledge

(a) First, can heretics believe by divine faith? Let us take the case of a man who is a heretic but affirms the truth of Christ’s divinity. The question then is whether he can affirm that truth by divine faith. In the first place, he affirms this truth inasmuch as he assents to what is divinely revealed on account of the authority of God who has revealed it. Second, if he does this, it would seem fairly easy to retrieve him from heresy, for his belief does not rely upon his own knowledge or natural inclination or his national culture but upon God’s knowledge itself, and so the way is open for him to go on to embrace all the revealed truths. Third, however, a heretic must not be said to believe by divine faith simply because he accepts the truths of faith as true; for he could be doing so not on account of the authority of God as revealing them but because of family or cultural tradition or other human motives. (b) Next, what about the demons who, according to James 2.19, ‘believe and tremble’? Aquinas interprets this as referring to the constraint of their intellect.24 Objective constraint comes from things themselves and the evidence for

24 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 5, a. 2 and parallel passages.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

468

Analysis Fidei

actio subiectiva propter ipsam perspicuitatem ingenii diabolici: daemones enim puri spiritus sunt; neque inanioribus rationalizationibus humanis indulgere possunt. Quae coactio sequitur syllogismos ex quibus incepimus et ad ipsam fidei veritatem pervenit. Ex analysi fidei enim constat rationabiliter homines ex signis externis per gratiam et libertatem ad affirmandum verum supernaturale pervenire. Quod non solum nobis sed etiam diabolis est perspicuum. Quare daemones, proprio intellectus lumini inhaerentes, per rationem veri transcendentalis mysteria affirmare possunt. Quia vero non credunt propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis, verum supernaturale non attingunt, quamvis notionem veri supernaturalis (quae notio non excedit proportionem intellectus naturalem) attingant. (c) Fides denique quae scientifica dicitur, eiusdem generis est. Innitur enim in hoc asserto, nempe, credendum esse verum. Quod assertum stabilitur in scientia de natura fidei sive naturalis sive supernaturalis.

20

Circa Illud, ‘Recta Ratio Fidei Veritatem Demonstrat’

(a) Invenitur in encyclica Pii ix, db 1635. Error contra quem scripsit S.P. exponitur db 1634, nempe, eorum qui ita sibi philosophorum nomen arrogant ut palam publiceque edocere non erubescant, commentitia et hominum inventa esse sacrosancta nostrae religionis mysteria. Adeo S.P. a mente Hermesiana aberat ut data occasione post aliquot menses damnationem Gregorii xvi (db 1618–21) renovarit. Denzinger, p. 457, nota 1. Quare hic locus non est interpretandus quasi assensus fidei non sit liber, quasi rationibus necessariis producatur, vel quasi gratia non requiratur ad ipsam fidem (db 1814). Neque ‘recta ratio’ est simpliciter identificanda cum illa ‘ratione humana’ quam S.P. peccato originali vulneratam et extenuatam describit (db 1643 f.). (b) Sensus S. Pontificis satis patet ex ipsis suis verbis: db 1636: religio catholica totam suam vim ex auctoritate Dei acquirit, neque ab humana ratione deduci aut perfici umquam potest.

The Robert Mollot Collection

469

Analysis of Faith

them. Subjective constraint results from the keenness of the diabolic mind; for demons are pure spirits and cannot indulge in absurd human rationalizations. This constraint follows upon the syllogisms with which we began our analysis of faith and leads to the truth of faith itself. By this analysis we have established that we come to an affirmation of supernatural truth from external signs through grace and in freedom. This is clear not only to us but to the demons also. They therefore by their own intellectual light can acknowledge the mysteries under the aspect of transcendental truth; but because they do not believe on the authority of God who reveals them, they do not attain supernatural truth, even though they may arrive at the notion of supernatural truth, a notion that does not exceed the natural proportion of the intellect. (c) Finally, what is called ‘scientific’ faith, is the same kind of faith. For it rests upon the assertion that what is true must be believed, and this assertion is based upon a knowledge of the nature of belief, both natural and supernatural. 20

The Meaning of ‘Right Reason Demonstrates the Truth of Faith’

(a) This statement is found in an encyclical of Pius ix (db 1635, ds 2776, nd 107). The error the Pope was refuting (db 1634, ds 2775, nd 106) was that of those self-styled philosophers who had the effrontery to teach openly and publicly that the sacred mysteries of our religion were fabrications and human inventions. So much opposed was the Pope to the opinion of Georg Hermes that a few months later he took the occasion to reaffirm the condemnation of Hermes by Gregory xvi in 1835 (db 1618–21, ds 2738–40). See db 1639, note 1. This passage, therefore, is not to be understood as if the assent of faith were not free or were arrived at by compelling reasons, or as if grace were not required for the act of faith itself (db 1814, ds 3035, nd 129). Nor is ‘right reason’ to be taken as simply identical with that ‘human reason’ which the Pope describes as having been wounded and weakened by original sin (db 1643). (b) The Pope’s meaning is quite clear from his very words: db 1636, ds 2777, nd 108: the Catholic religion derives its entire validity from the authority of God, and can never be deduced or perfected by human reason.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

470

Analysis Fidei

db 1637: ponitur principium credenditatis. db 1638: applicatur principium ad factum revelationis. db 1639: concludit quod credendum est. Ex quibus satis elucere videtur S.P. loqui de processu logico qui veram conclusionem ex veris praemissis deducit. Toronto, 8 March 1952 Opiniones.25 S. Harent, dtc 6, art., ‘Foi.’ 1 Suarez26 Dupliciter cognoscimus Deum esse veracem et revelasse, primo, per rationem, deinde, per revelationem ipsam et fidem. Motivum fidei est cognitum et quidem, prout secundo modo cognoscitur, ipsam fidem fundat. dtc 472. 2 Arriaga, Mazzella, Viva, Lahousse27 Tripliciter cognoscimus Deum esse veracem et revelasse, primo per rationem ante fidem, tertio, per revelationem et fidem, sed secundo modo has veritates immediate affirmamus. Quae immediata affirmatio praescindit a probatione rationali, imperatur a voluntate, antecedit ipsam fidem tamquam fidei motivum. dtc 476–79.

3 Rassler, Ulloa28 Tripliciter cognoscimus Deum esse veracem et revelasse, primo per rationem ante fidem, secundo per apprehensionem suasivam, tertio per ipsam fidem. Apprehensio suasiva (1) praescindit a probatione rationali, (2) habetur ex illuminatione suasiva, (3) antecedit voluntatis actum quo fides imperatur, (4) exhibet motivum quod fidem fundat. dtc 480 f.

The Robert Mollot Collection

471

Analysis of Faith

db 1637, ds 2778, nd 109: the Pope states the principle of credendity. db 1638, ds 2779, nd 110: he applies this principle to the fact of revelation. db 1639, ds 2780, nd 111: he concludes that it is to be believed. From this it seems sufficiently clear that the Pope was speaking about the logical process in which a true conclusion is deduced from true premises. Toronto, 8 March 1952 Opinions.25 S. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi.’ 1 Suarez26 We know in two ways that God is truthful and has revealed truths to us; first, through our reason, and second, through revelation itself and faith. The motive of faith is known, and indeed, according as it is known in this second way, it grounds faith itself. See S. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 472. 2 Arriaga, Mazzella, Viva, Lahousse27 We know in three ways that God is truthful and has revealed truths to us, first through reason antecedently to faith, third through revelation and faith, but second we immediately affirm these truths. This immediate affirmation prescinds from rational proof, is commanded by the will, and precedes faith itself as the motive of faith. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 476–79. 3 Rassler, Ulloa28 We know in three ways that God is truthful and has revealed truths, first, through reason antecedently to faith, second, through some persuasive experience, and third through faith itself. A persuasive experience (1) prescinds from rational proof, (2) is experienced in a persuasive illumination, (3) precedes the act of the will that commands faith, (4) reveals the motive that grounds faith. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 480–81. 25 [The section headed ‘Opiniones’ consists of three pages that were added to the autograph (A154). See above, p. 413, note 1.] 26 [Francisco Suarez, s.j. (1548–1617).] 27 [Rodrigue de Arriaga, s.j. (1592–1667); Camillus Mazzella, s.j. (1833–1900); Dominique Viva, s.j. (1648–1726); Gustave Lahousse, s.j. (1846–1928).] 28 [Christoph Rassler, s.j. (1654–1723); Jean Ulloa, s.j. (1639– ca. 1725).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

472

Analysis Fidei

4 de Lugo, Haunold, Franzelin, Mastrius29 Dupliciter cognoscimus Deum esse veracem et revelasse. Primo modo ante fidem per rationem et sic inclinatur voluntas ad fidem imperandam. Secundo modo, quando per fidem verum revelatum affirmatur, simul per modum unius immediate affirmamus Deum hoc dicentem, signis confirmantem, parrocho praedicante utentem. Haec affirmatio est immediata, quasi vi terminorum elucet Deum omniscientem et veracem revelasse incarnationem et eam per os parrochi docere. Propter hanc motivi affirmationem fit assensus fidei. dtc 482 ff.

5 Egger, Stentrup, Hurter30 Sequitur Lugonem, sed omittit immedietatem affirmationis motivi. Mediate per rationem cognoscitur Deus sciens et veraciter revelans. Nova cognitio non est addenda. dtc 488.

6 Salmanticenses, Thyrsus Gonzalez, Billot, Schiffini, etc.31 Ratione cognoscitur quod Deus sciens veraciter revelavit. Fide creditur propter ipsam Dei scientiam et veracem revelationem prout haec sunt a parte rei. dtc 491.

Ambroise Gardeil. Aubert 395–450. dtc 3, 2201 ff.

(a) Revelatum est credibile quadrupliciter:

The Robert Mollot Collection

473

Analysis of Faith

4 de Lugo, Haunold, Franzelin, Mastrius.29 We know in two ways that God is truthful and has revealed. In the first way, through reason prior to faith, and thus the will is moved to command faith. In the second way, when through faith a revealed truth is affirmed, we immediately and simultaneously affirm God as saying this, confirming it by signs, and using the preaching of the parish priest. This affirmation is immediate, as if by reason of the terms it is clear that an omniscient and truthful God has revealed the incarnation and teaches this truth through the words of the parish priest. The assent of faith is effected through the affirmation of this motive. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 482–88. 5 Egger, Stentrup, Hurter30 They follow de Lugo, but omit the immediacy of the affirmation of the motive. Mediately and through reason God is known as knowing and truthfully revealing. No further knowledge is to be added. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 488. 6 The Salamanca theologians [Carmelites], Thyrsus González [s.j.], Billot [s.j.], Schiffini, etc.31 Through reason we know that God who knows and is truthful has revealed certain things. Through faith we believe because of God’s own knowledge and truthful revelation that what has been revealed actually exists in reality. Harent, dtc vi (11) s.v. ‘Foi’ 491. Ambroise Gardeil, dtc iii (6) s.v. ‘Crédibilité’ 2201–2310. Roger Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi: Données traditionnelles et résultats des controverses récentes, 2nd ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1950) 395– 450. (a) What has been revealed has a fourfold credibility:

29 [Jean de Lugo, s.j. (1583–1660); Christoph Haunold (1610–89); Johann Baptist Franzelin (1816–86); Barthélemy Mastrius de Meldola (1602–73). On de Lugo, see Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For: A Theology of Christian Faith (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 56–57. Dulles remarks (p. 57) that ‘De Lugo’s position on the analysis of faith continued to have great influence for several centuries.’] 30 [Franz Egger (1836–1918); Ferdinand Stentrup (1831–98); Hughes de Hurter (1832–1914).] 31 [Thyrse González de Santalla, s.j. (1624–1701); Louis Billot, s.j. (1846–1931); Santo Schiffini, s.j. (1841–1906).]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

474

Analysis Fidei

Simpliciter inquantum signis confirmatur; unde est rationi consentaneum. Mediante voluntate fundat fidem scientificam secundum Aubert, p. 397. Conditionate obligatorium inquantum refertur ad finem. Absolute obligatorium post illuminationem intellectus supernaturalem. (Aubert, p. 422: haec duo in unum conflantur in 2a editione). Imperatum: in ipso actu fidei. (b) Magnum meritum: analysin exponit secundum analysin actuum psychologicam apud S. Thomam. Aubert, p. 396. (c) Obiectio P. Harent: cur credibilitas externa separatur. Aubert, p. 430. (d) Obiectio communis Secundum P. Gardeil credibilitas admittit demonstrationem quae tamen a perpaucis habetur. Hugueny (Aubert 418–22) negat talem demonstrationem quam ipse P. Gardeil (per 25 annos apologeticam docens) fatetur se non habere. Rousselot: an 4 vel 5 tantum in tota ecclesia possident rationes validas credendi. (Aubert, p 431). In reliquis agnoscit supplementa subiectiva; gratia non facit videre sed facit visum superfluum. Huby (Aubert, p. 431) Hanc obiectionem solvit docendo ‘certitudinem probabilem’ quae ad certitudinem moralem reduci potest.

Garrigou-Lagrange. Aubert, pp. 442–50. (a) Admittit schema P. Gardeil. (b) Insistit in obiecto formali supernaturali fidei theologicae. (c) Ponit hoc obiectum in Deo auctore gratiae et g1oriae. (d) Dicit et motivum et obiectum credi: motivum ut quo; obiectum ut quod; unde nulla vana circulatio. (e) Male concipit differentiam quam hoc obiectum facit, quasi sensum profundiorem obiecti materialis daret.

The Robert Mollot Collection

475

Analysis of Faith

It is simply credible inasmuch as it is confirmed by signs; hence it is consonant with reason. Through the mediation of the will it grounds scientific faith; Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 397. It is conditionally obligatory inasmuch as it refers to faith. It is absolutely obligatory after the supernatural illumination of the intellect. (Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 422: these two are combined in the second edition.) It is commanded: in the act of faith itself. (b) Its great merit: it expounds the analysis [of faith] according to the psychological analysis of acts in St Thomas. Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 396. (c) The objection of Fr Harent: why external credibility is separate. Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 430. (d) A common objection According to Fr Gardeil [1859–1931], credibility admits of demonstration, which, however, is attainable by very few. E. Hugueny [1868–1942] denies such a demonstration, which Fr Gardeil himself, who taught apologetics for 25 years, confesses that he does not have. (Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 418–22). P. Rousselot [1878–1915] wonders whether there are four or five people in the whole church [who] have valid reasons for believing. (Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 431). As for the rest, he acknowledges subjective helps; grace does not make one see but makes seeing superfluous. J. Huby [1878–1948]: (see Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 431). He solves this objection by positing ‘probable certitude,’ which is reducible to moral certitude. R. Garrigou-Lagrange [1877–1964]. (Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 442– 50.) (a) Accepts Fr Gardeil’s outline. (b) Insists on the supernatural formal object of theological faith. (c) Places this object in God as author of grace and glory. (d) Says that both the motive and the object are believed: the motive, as that because of which, the object as that which; hence there is no false circularity. (e) He has an erroneous conception of the difference that this object makes, as if it gave a deeper understanding of the material object.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

476

Analysis Fidei

(f) Non capit differentiam inter motivum tou fieri et motivum tou in facto esse. Illud est cur assentimur propter scientiam divinam prout in se est et ideo ignotum.32

P. Rousselot. Aubert, 151–411. (a) Miraculum dupliciter apprehenditur: ut factum naturaliter notum; ut signum divinae revelationis. Haec secunda apprehensio est per ‘oculos fidei’: hi sunt non principium quod apprehenditur sed quo apprehenditur. Oriuntur ex gratia, libertate, statu morali. Ipsa apprehensio miraculi ut signi etiam est affirmatio veritatum revelatarum. (b) Sequitur (1) factum revelationis non posse cognosci ante ipsam fidem, a fortiori, non sine gratia et non sine libertate, (2) assensum fidei non proxime imperari a voluntate. (c) Defectus radicalis: non distinguit inter cognitionem quae respondit ad Quid sit (intelligentia miraculi ut signi) et cognitionem quae respondit ad An sit (est signum). Praeterea, non distinguit inter iudicium credenditatis ante pium credulitatis affectum, et assensum fidei imperatum.

[Page on the Necessity for the Preambles]33 Analysis fidei 18 De necessitate praeambulorum fidei (a) Pius ix: ‘Humana quidem ratio, ne in tanti momenti negotio decipiatur et erret, divinae revelationis factum diligenter inquirat oportet, ut certo sibi constet, Deum esse locutum, ac eidem, quemadmodum sapientissime docet Apostolus, rationabile obsequium exhibeat’ (db 1637). (b) Quantum ad fidem in fieri attinet, ex ipsa psychologici processus

The Robert Mollot Collection

477

Analysis of Faith

(f) He does not understand the difference between the motive tou fieri [of progress towards faith] and the motive tou in facto esse [of faith as acquired]. The former is why we assent on account of divine knowledge as it is in itself and therefore as something unknown to us.32 P. Rousselot (Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de foi 451–511). (a) A miracle can be taken in two ways: as a fact known by natural reason, and as a sign of divine revelation. This second way of taking it is had through ‘the eyes of faith.’ These are not the principle that is apprehended, but that by which [a miracle] is apprehended [as a sign]. They result from grace, freedom, and moral status. The apprehension of a miracle as a sign is also an affirmation of revealed truths. (b) It follows (1) that the fact of revelation cannot be known prior to faith itself, and a fortiori, not without grace and not without freedom, and (2) that the assent of faith is not immediately commanded by the will. (c) A fundamental flaw: he does not distinguish between knowledge that answers the question, What is it? (the understanding of a miracle as a sign) and the knowledge that answers the question, Is it? (it is a sign). Also, he does not distinguish between the judgment of credendity preceding the ‘devout readiness to believe’ [pius credulitatis affectus], and the assent of faith that has been commanded. Page on the Necessity for the Preambles33 Analysis of Faith 18 The necessity for the preambles of faith (a) Pius ix: ‘It is incumbent upon human reason, lest it be deceived and err in a matter of such importance, to diligently inquire into the fact of divine revelation in order that it may be certain that God has spoken and that it may render him “reasonable worship,” as the Apostle wisely teaches’ [Romans 12.1] (db 1637, ds 2778, nd 109). (b) As regards faith-in-process, it is clear from the very nature of the psy-

32 All of this paragraph (f ) was handwritten. 33 A single page, a carbon copy, on the back of a handwritten page (page 2) of (15500dtl050).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

478

Analysis Fidei

natura constat motum ad terminum antecedere ipsum terminum ideoque fieri non posse ut per fidem divinam ad fidem divinam perveniatur. Qua de causa qui ex infidelitate in fidem procedit, necesse est ut antequam credat (1) certo cognoscat factum revelationis, et (2) haec certa cognitio non ex fide divina habeatur. Qualis in genere sit hic processus, iam dictum est. In specie tamen addere oportet cur ex signis externis (miraculis, prophetiis, ispa ecclesia, db 1790, 1794, 1812, 1813) incipiendum sit. Vide Lennerz §§267, 271 ff., ubi agitur de ratione cognoscendi. Quae sequuntur rationem assendi respiciunt.

Prima ratio est quod gratia illuminationis est ut quis inquirat et deinde ut evidentiam inquisitione apprehensam sufficere perspiciat. Haec ergo gratia supponit alia facta in quae inquirendum est et in quibus sufficientia evidentiae invenienda est. Quae alia facta omnium intelligentiae accomodata sunt miracula, etc. (db 1790, 1794). Secunda ratio est quia ipsa gratiae experientia, quam quis habere potest, non fundat nisi coniecturalem gratiae cognitionem. Verum est eum qui per gratiam in vitam aeternam moveatur, ad finem supernaturalem ordinari. Verum est eum qui per gratiam divinam ad affirmandam credenditatem moveatur, re vera credere debere. Sed verum non est eum qui ita moveatur ex ipsa motione certum esse se a Deo moveri. Non solum res psychologica valde est complexa; non solum imprudentis est de suo statu psychologico iudicare; sed actus supernaturales qua supernaturales excedunt campum scientiae humanae nam ideo sunt supernaturales quia ad Deum uti in se est referuntur. (c) At ulterius quaeritur de eo qui iam credit, qui fidem sub magisterio ecclesiae suscepit, utrum ille debeat factum revelationis certo cognoscere non solum per fidem divinam sed etiam per aliam cognitionem. De fide definitur parem non esse conditionem fidelium et infidelium ideoque catholicos nullam umquam iustam causam habere posse ut assensum fidei suspendant donec demonstrationem scientificam credibilitatis et veritatis fidei absolverint (db 1815). Quare assensus fidei non solum potest sed etiam debet stare, dum catho-

The Robert Mollot Collection

479

Analysis of Faith

chological process that movement towards the term precedes the term itself and hence that it is impossible to arrive at divine faith through divine faith. Therefore, in the case of one who is proceeding from unbelief to faith, it is necessary, before coming to believe, first, that he or she know for sure that revelation is a fact, and second, that this knowledge has not been derived from divine faith. We have already spoken about the nature of this process in general terms. Specifically, however, we must also say why it must begin from external signs (miracles, prophecies, the Church herself, db 1790, 1794, 1812, 1813; ds 3009, 3013, 3033, 3034; nd 119, 123, 127, 128). See Lennerz, De virtutibus theologicis, §§267, 271–73 [pp. 144, 148–49], where he speaks of the reason for this knowledge. What follows has to do with the reason for making the assent [of faith]. The first reason is that the grace of illumination is given in order that one should investigate the matter and then come to understand that the evidence found through this investigation is sufficient. This grace, therefore, supposes other facts to be investigated in which a sufficiency of evidence is to be found. These other facts, suited to the intelligence of all, are miracles, etc. (db 1790, 1794; ds 3009, 3013; nd 119, 123). The second reason is that the experience of grace, which one can have, grounds only a conjectural knowledge of grace. It is true that one may be moved by grace to eternal life, be directed towards a supernatural end. It is true that through God’s grace one may be moved to affirm ‘credendity,’ that he or she truly ought to believe. But it is not true that one who is so moved can be certain that this movement comes from God. Not only is the psychology here extremely complex, and not only is it imprudent to make a judgment about one’s own psychological state, but supernatural acts as supernatural lie outside the field of human knowledge, since they are supernatural for the very reason that they regard God as he is in himself. (c) But it may be further asked about the one who already has faith, who has accepted to believe in accordance with the church’s teaching, whether he or she ought to have certain knowledge of the fact of revelation not only from divine faith but also from other knowledge. It is defined as being of faith that the condition of the faithful is not the same as that of non-believers, and therefore that Catholics can never at any time have just cause for suspending belief until a scientific proof of the credibility and truth of the faith has been established (db 1815, ds 3036, nd 130). The assent of faith, therefore, not only can but also must stand while

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

480

Analysis Fidei

licus scientificam credibilitatis demonstrationem quaerit. Unde concludes necessitatem praeambulorum in catholico non esse conditionem sine qua non potest credere. Nulla enim est iusta causa cur assensum fidei suspendat vel in dubium revocet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

481

Analysis of Faith

Catholics are seeking a scientific proof of credibility. Hence we conclude that the necessity for preambles is not a necessary precondition for being able to believe. For there is no valid reason for suspending the assent of faith or calling it into question.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 5

De Ratione Convenientiae Methodus Theologica ad Finem Incarnationis Applicata1

1

Quid Sit Convenientia

(a) Conveniens est quoddam intelligibile proprie dictum quod tamen necessarium non est, sive quoad exsistentiam, sive quoad essentiam, et in materia theologica hac in vita a nobis perfecte perspici non potest.

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 5

The Notion of Fittingness The Application of Theological Method to the Question of the Purpose of the Incarnation1

1

The Notion of Fittingness

(a) ‘Fitting’ is said of something that is intelligible in the proper sense of the word and yet not necessary as to either its existence or its essence, something that, in a theological context, cannot be perfectly understood by us in this life. 1 [Lonergan’s title is what appears here below the rule. It was typewritten in Latin (sometimes abbreviated) at the top of all 20 pages of his autograph typescript, except pages 17 and 20. When the students in Rome transcribed this opusculum from Lonergan’s typescript, they omitted this title, taking instead as a title the following description which Lonergan typed on a single sheet of paper placed before the first page: Supplementum schematicum. De ratione convenientiae eiusque radice, de excellentia ordinis, de signis rationis systematice et universaliter ordinatis, denique de convenientia, contingentia, et fine Incarnationis (A schematic supplement on the concept of fittingness and its root, on the excellence of order, on the systematic and universal order of conceptual designations in God, and on the fittingness, the contingency, and the purpose of the Incarnation). The manuscript has since come to be better known as ‘De ratione convenientiae,’ that is, ‘The Notion of Fittingness.’ The autograph typescript, which is in the archives at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, file 519, A 2355, can be found on www.bernardlonergan.com, at 23550dtl050. A short and incomplete piece entitled ‘De fine Incarnationis’ can be found at 31900dtl050, with an English translation by Michael G. Shields at 31900dte050. For introductory comments, see Frederick E. Crowe, Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982 (Ottawa: Novalis, 2005) 65–68.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

484

De Ratione Convenientiae

(b) Intelligibile dicitur dupliciter: Improprie est quidquid concipi potest. Ita Deus, angelus, homo, privatio, nihil, peccatum concipiuntur, et ideo dicuntur intelligibilia. Proprie est id quod intelligendo cognoscitur, seu est id ipsum quod ‘intus legitur.’ Puta Archimedem, primo quidem problemate suo penitus perplexum, at deinde currentem atque exclamantem, ‘Inveni!’ ‘Eureka!’2

(c) Intelligibile proprie dictum dividitur tripliciter: Potentia intelligibile est sensibile, empiricum, materiale, nudum datum conscientiae internae, et generaliter id de quo apprehenso fit quaestio, investigatio, id in quo exstat problema, id ex quo exsurget intelligibile formaliter, solutio. Formaliter intelligibile est id quod empirico, materiali, sensibilibus accedit per ipsum actum intelligendi, id quod frequenter ab acutioribus et raro a tardioribus perspicitur, id quod deest quamdiu nondum respondetur quaestionibus, Quid? Cur? Cave ne confundas formaliter intelligibile cum ipso conceptu, cum verbo incomplexo interiori. Sic enim evanescit distinctio inter intelligibile proprie et improprie dictum. Primo enim res est intelligenda et deinde concipienda, definienda. Nam aliud est definitionem memoriter repetere sine intelligentia, et aliud est ita rem intelligere ut eam definire possimus, etiamsi nomina et verba definitionis non meminerimus. Praeterea, non exsistit communiter correspondentia unius ad unum inter actus intelligendi et conceptus, sed sufficit unus actus intelligendi ad plures conceptus efformandos; ita unus actus intelligendi perspicit habitudinem quae per duos conceptus substantiae et accidentis (vel essentiae et exsistentiae, vel potentiae et actus, vel materiae et formae) exprimitur. Unus actus intelligendi exprimitur per infinitatem conceptuum numerorum positivorum et integrorum (1, 2, 3 …). Unde longe di-

The Robert Mollot Collection

485

The Notion of Fittingness

(b) ‘Intelligible’ can be taken in two ways. In an improper sense, whatever can be conceived is intelligible. In this sense, God, angel, man, privation, nothing, and sin are conceived and so are said to be intelligible. Properly speaking, however, a thing is said to be intelligible if known through an act of understanding. The Latin for ‘is understood’ is intelligitur < intus legitur, expressing what is ‘grasped inwardly’ or ‘seen into.’ A good example of such an insight is Archimedes, who after puzzling over a problem finally hit upon its solution and ran through the streets exclaiming, ‘Eureka!’ ‘I’ve got it!’2 (c) ‘Intelligible’ in the proper sense is threefold: potentially, formally, and actually intelligible. The potentially intelligible is that which is perceptible to the senses, experiential, material, a pure datum of interior consciousness and, generally speaking, that which, when perceived, one asks a question about or inquires into – that which presents a problem and from which there emerges the formally intelligible, the solution. The formally intelligible, then, is what is added to the experiential, material, sensible data through an act of understanding, an event that happens frequently in the case of intelligent persons but more rarely with duller minds. It is what is still lacking when there is not yet an answer to the questions, What? Why? Be careful not to confuse the formally intelligible with the concept itself, the simple inner word; otherwise the distinction between the properly and the improperly intelligible would vanish. For a thing has first to be understood and then conceived and defined. It is one thing to repeat a definition from memory without understanding it, and quite another to understand it and so be able to define it even if you do not remember the terms of its definition. Besides, there is ordinarily no one-to-one correspondence between acts of understanding and concepts, but one act of understanding is enough to produce several concepts. Thus, one act of understanding grasps the relation expressed through the two concepts of substance and accident, or essence and existence, or potency and act, or matter and form. A single act of understanding is expressed through an infinity of concepts of positive integers, 1, 2, 3 … Hence there

2 [Lonergan used the example of Archimedes to describe the occurrence of an insight in a dramatic instance in the first chapter of Insight 27–31.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

486

De Ratione Convenientiae

stat theoria S. Thomae a theoria Scoti: Scotus enim identificat conceptum cum specie impressa, sed S. Thomas ponit primo speciem impressam, deinde actum intelligendi, et tertio speciem expressam quam identificat cum conceptu. Actualiter intelligibile est perspecta evidentiae sufficientia ad iudicandum. Sicut formaliter intelligibile fundat responsum ad quaestiones, Quid, Cur, ita actualiter intelligibile fundat responsum ad quaestiones, An, Utrum. Sicut formaliter intelligibile oritur ex sensibilibus et in eis primo perspicitur, ita actualiter intelligibile oritur ex totalitate actuum praecedentium, sive sensuum externorum et internorum, sive apprehensionis quidditatum et proprietatum, sive iudiciorum anteactorum. Quid sit perspecta evidentiae sufficientia. Breviter est inconditionatum quoddam. Inconditionatum autem est duplex, aliud formaliter quod nullas prorsus conditiones habet, et aliud virtualiter quod conditionibus quidem subset, quae tamen omnes de facto implentur. Formaliter inconditionatum est solus Deus. Virtualiter inconditionatum illustratur per syllogismos, per propositiones analyticas, per iudicia particularia de factis concretis. (d) Proinde, conveniens non est necessarium, neque quoad exsistentiam neque quoad essentiam. Necessarium, seu id quod aliter esse non potest, dicitur tripliciter. Absolute necessarium est idem quod formaliter inconditianatum. Necessarium ex suppositione connectitur cum virtualiter inconditionato, et est duplex, nempe necessarium ex suppositione alterius et necessarium ex suppositione sui ipsius. Necessarium ex suppositione alterius, sive agentis, sive finis, quatenus necessarium est, opponitur convenienti. Attamen cum aliud quid supponatur semper contingens sit (Deus enim libere agit ad extra et nullo alio indiget), absolute loquendo, etiam consequens est contingens. Praeterea, saepissime fit ut eadem res propter diversos fines ex diversis causis esse possit. Nam leges necessariae etiam abstractae esse solent; ipsae vero res sunt concretae; et ideo generatim convenientiam non excedit quod haec res ex his causis propter hunc finem exsistit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

487

The Notion of Fittingness

is a world of difference between St Thomas and Scotus on this point: Scotus identifies the concept with the impressed species, whereas St Thomas first posits the impressed species, then the act of understanding, and third the expressed species which he identifies with the concept. The actually intelligible is evidence that is grasped as being sufficient for making a judgment. Just as the formally intelligible grounds the answer to the questions, What?, Why?, so the actually intelligible grounds the answer to the questions, Is it?, or Is it so? And just as the formally intelligible arises from sense data and is first grasped in those data, so does the actually intelligible arise from the totality of prior acts, either acts of the external and internal senses, or acts of apprehending quiddities and properties, or previous acts of judging. What is a grasp of the sufficiency of evidence? Briefly, it is an unconditioned. The unconditioned is of two kinds: the formally unconditioned, which has no conditions whatsoever, and the virtually unconditioned, which is subject to conditions that, however, have all been actually fulfilled. The formally unconditioned is God alone. The virtually unconditioned is exemplified by syllogisms, by analytic propositions, by particular judgments about concrete facts. (d) Again, that which is fitting is not necessary as to either its existence or to its essence. ‘Necessary’ is that which cannot be otherwise. ‘Necessary’ can be predicated in three ways. The absolutely necessary is the same as the formally unconditioned. The hypothetically necessary, that is, necessary on some supposition, is connected with the virtually unconditioned and is of two kinds, necessary on the supposition of something else, and necessary on the supposition of itself. That which is necessary on the supposition of something else, whether that other be an agent or an end, insofar as it is necessary is the opposite of fitting. Nevertheless, since that other that is presupposed is always something contingent (for God is free in acting ad extra and needs nothing else), then, absolutely speaking, any consequent being is also contingent. Moreover, it happens quite often that the very same reality can exist for different ends and from different causes. For necessary laws are usually also abstract; but things themselves are concrete, and so it is generally no more than a matter of fittingness that this particular thing exists as a result of these causes and for this end or purpose.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

488

De Ratione Convenientiae

Necessarium denique ex suppositione sui ipsius non addit super principium contradictionis; sicut contingenti non opponitur, ita tantum conveniens esse potest; e.g., Socratem, dum sedeat, necessario sedere. Breviter, exsistentia rei est tantum conveniens, si contingenter exsistit. Et convenienter tantum ex hac causa agente vel propter hunc finem exsistit, si ex alia causa vel propter alium finem esse posset. (e) Conveniens, denique, in materia theologica non potest perfecte perspici a nobis hac in vita. Quod quidem rationem mysterii tangit. Mysterium vero dupliciter dicitur: Aliud est mysterium quod intelligibile non est secundum quid, quoad nos, ex excessu intelligibilitatis. Et eiusmodi sunt mysteria fidei, quorum intelligibilitas fundatur in ipso Deo, non prout Deus ad extra modo finito imitari potest, sed prout Deus in se modo infinito realiter est. Aliud est mysterium quod intelligibile non est simpliciter, quoad se, ex defectu intelligibilitatis proprie dictae. Et eiusmodi sunt peccata formalia qua talia. Consistunt enim in oppositione ad dictamina rectae rationis; recta vero ratio fundatur in intelligibilitate proprie dicta; ideoque peccata consistunt in oppositione ad intelligibilitatem proprie dictam. Quaerenti igitur quare angeli peccaverint, cur Adamus, respondendum est proprie non esse cur. Si enim vera ratio formalis assignari posset, ipsa peccati formalis natura tolleretur, quippe qui in oppositione ad veram rationem et intelligibilitatem proprie dictam consistat. Concedi quidem oportet quod a peccatoribus allegantur excusationes, rationalizationes, etc. Praeterea, concedendum est quod ex uno peccato aliud explicari potest, puta, inobedientia ex superbia. Sed excusatio veri et formalis peccati non potest esse vera ratio, secus peccatum non contra sed secundum rationem esset. Et explicatio unius peccati per aliud relinquit primum sine explicatione; ita si inobedientia ex superbia explicatur, tamen ipsa superbia non explicatur; et ideo ultimatim in irrationali, in falsitate quadam objectiva,3 standum est. Unde concludes quod non est simile de praevisione divina bonorum ac-

The Robert Mollot Collection

489

The Notion of Fittingness

That which is necessary on the supposition of itself is no more than the principle of contradiction. And just as it is not the opposite of contingent, so it can only be fitting: Socrates, for example, as long as he is sitting, is necessarily sitting. In fine, the existence of a thing is fitting only if it exists contingently. And it exists fittingly from this cause and for this end only if it could exist from some other cause or for some other end or purpose. (e) Fittingness, in a theological context, cannot be perfectly grasped by us in this life. This, then, touches upon the notion of mystery. ‘Mystery’ can be taken in two ways. First, there is that kind of mystery that is relatively speaking not understandable – relatively, that is, to us – because of its excess of intelligibility. Such are the mysteries of faith, whose intelligibility is grounded upon God – not as God is imitable in creation in a finite way, but as God really is in himself in an infinite way. The other kind of mystery is that which is absolutely unintelligible, unintelligible in itself because of a lack of intelligibility in the proper sense. In this category are formal sins as such. Sins consist in that which is opposed to the dictates of right reason; but right reason is grounded upon intelligibility in the proper sense, and therefore sins consist in an opposition to intelligibility properly so called. If someone asks why the angels sinned or why Adam sinned, the only answer is that in this case there is no proper reason why. For if a true formal reason could be assigned to their sin, the essential element of formal sin would cease to be, consisting as it does in being contrary to true reason and to intelligibility in the proper sense. It is quite true, of course, that sinners allege excuses and rationalizations and the like. It is true, moreover, that one sin can be explained in terms of another, as, for example, disobedience can be explained as rooted in pride. But an excuse for a true formal sin cannot be a true reason, for otherwise sin would not be something contrary to but in accordance with reason. And explaining one sin in terms of another leaves that other still to be explained. If disobedience is explained as being rooted in pride, that pride itself remains unexplained, and so ultimately we arrive at the irrational, something that is objectively false.3 It follows, then, that God’s foreknowledge of good deeds, predestination,

3 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 17, a. 1 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

490

De Ratione Convenientiae

tuum et peccatorum, de praedestinatione et reprobatione, de gratia efficaci et sufficienti. Aliud enim irrationale in sua ratione excludit, et aliud irrationale directe vel indirecte dicit. Quae differentia si praetermittitur, in disputationes sine fine ducit.

2

De Radice Convenientiae

(a) Si radicem convenientiae breviter inquirimus, non solum perspiciemus cur theologi ad dicta signa rationis4 confugere soleant, sed etiam quemadmodum eiusmodi signa investigare oporteat. (b) Radicem ergo convenientiae in divine sapientia invenire est facillimum. Deus enim omnipotens omnia facere potest quae rationem entis habeant seu quae contradictionem internam non involvant. Possibile enim apud Deum5 est omne verbum, et solum quod contradictionem continet non est verbum.6 Sed ‘divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit.’7 ‘In Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius et in intellectu sapiente eius.’8 Unde concludes: quamvis possibile non dicat nisi non-repugnantiam, nihilominus cum tam late pateat divina sapientia quam divina potentia, constat omnia possibilia ita esse ordinata ut nihil reapse exsistere possit quin divinae sapientiae et divinae bonitati congruat.

The Robert Mollot Collection

491

The Notion of Fittingness

and efficacious grace is different from his foreknowledge of sins, reprobation, and sufficient grace, respectively. Those in the first series exclude irrationality in their very meaning, while those in the second directly or indirectly include an irrational element. Overlooking this difference leads to interminable disputes. 2

The Root of Fittingness

(a) A brief inquiry into the root of fittingness will enable us to understand not only why theologians customarily have recourse to what may be called ‘conceptual designations’4 but also how those formalities ought to be investigated. (b) It is quite easy, then, to locate the root of fittingness in the divine wisdom. For God in his omnipotence can do every thing that has the note or formality of being, anything that does not involve an internal contradiction. For every thing is possible for God,5 and only that which contains a contradiction is not a thing.6 But ‘God’s wisdom extends to all that his power is capable of.’7 ‘In God, power and essence and will and intellect and wisdom and justice are one and the same reality; hence there can be nothing within the divine power that cannot be in God’s just will and wise intellect.’8 From this we conclude that although ‘possible’ means merely what is non-repugnant or non-contradictory, nevertheless since divine wisdom is coextensive with divine power, it is clear that all things possible are ordered in such a way that nothing in fact could exist without being consonant with divine wisdom and divine goodness.

4 [See above, p. 373, note 56.] 5 [Latin, Possibile enim apud Deum est omne verbum. See Luke 1.37, Non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum (Vulgate; Greek: pan refma). This text is precisely what Aquinas is referring to in the passage mentioned in the next note.] 6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 3 c. [For Aquinas, ‘id quod contradictionem implicat verbum esse non potest, quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere,’ ‘a contradiction in terms cannot be a word, for no mind can conceive it.’ Thus, ‘thing’ here is used in the sense of something that can be conceived.] 7 Ibid. a. 5 c. 8 Ibid. ad 1m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

492

De Ratione Convenientiae

Quod sane non est intelligendum quasi aliqua essent possibilia secundum non-repugnantiam internam, sed impossibilia secundum comparationem ad divinam sapientian vel bonitatem. Sic enim latius pateret divina potentia quam sapientia et bonitas. Sed potius dicendum est, secundum nostrum modum concipiendi, alium esse ordinem in cognitione nostra et alium in cognitione divina. Nos enim a sensibilibus incipimus, ad intelligentiam quidditatum et proprietatum progredimur, et ad aliquam comprehensionem ordinis universi denique pertingimus. Deus autem quasi incipit ab intelligentia sui ipsius; in sua essentia perspicit totam seriem ordinationum secundum quas omnes mundi possibiles secundum omnes prorsus suas determinationes exsistere possunt; et in ista totalitate ordinationum omnes possibiles naturas, proprietates, actus, circumstantias, aliasque determinationes perspicit. Sic enim tam late patet divina sapientia quam divina potentia. Nam omne quod est possibile secundum rationem non-contradictionis invenitur in saltem uno quodam ordine mundorum possibilium. (c) Ad confirmandam hanc solutionem atque ad pleniorem familiaritatem cum scriptis S. Thomae fovendam, sequentia notare iuvabit. 1, 42, 3, Sed contra: ‘ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio.’ Sed confusio admittenda non est in ipsa mente divina. Ideoque asserendum est possibilia esse a Deo cognita intra eorum ordines possibiles. 1, 14, 7; CG, 1, 55: Deus omnia cognoscit uno simplici intuitu sine ullo discursu. Ergo non primo cognoscit res, naturas, proprietates, et deinde ordinationes possibiles excogitat ad modum hominis. Sed simul et ordinationes et res cognoscit. Neque cognosci possunt ordinationes sine rebus ordinatis, ideoque dicendum quod cognoscit ordinationes modo concreto, scilicet una cum rebus ordinatis. 1, 47, 1; CG, 3, 64, §10: Ordo universi propinquior est divinae essentiae et perfectius participat et repraesentat eam quam quaelibet alia creatura. Sed Deus omnia alia in sua essentia cognoscit. Unde concluditur quod quodammodo per prius in essentia perspicit ea quae propinquiora sunt ipsi essentiae, nempe, ordinationes rerum possibiles. 1, 15, 2; CG, 2, 42, §6: Ex eo quod Deus cognoscit ideam ordinis universi, S. Thomas concludit quod Deus cognoscit ideas particularium rerum quae in idea universi necessario continentur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

493

The Notion of Fittingness

This, of course, is not to be understood as if some things were possible as being non-contradictory and at the same time impossible as to their relation to God’s wisdom and goodness. If that were so, divine power would extend beyond divine wisdom and goodness. But rather we should say that according to our way of conceiving things there is one order in our knowledge and another in God’s knowledge. We begin from sensible data, proceed to an understanding of the essences and properties of things, and ultimately arrive at some comprehension of the order of the universe. God, however, begins, as it were, from an understanding of himself; in his essence he grasps the whole series of orderings according to which all possible worlds in every single detail can exist; and in this totality of orderings he grasps all possible natures, properties, acts, circumstances, and other determinations. Thus divine wisdom is coextensive with divine power. For everything that is possible as being non-contradictory is to be found in at least one order of possible worlds. (c) The following references will confirm the above solution and at the same time increase our familiarity with the writings of St Thomas. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 3, Sed contra: ‘Whenever there is multiplicity without order, there is confusion.’ But confusion in the mind of God is inadmissible. It must be said, therefore, that the possibles are known by God within their respective orders. Ibid. q. 14, a. 7; Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 55: God knows all things in one simple gaze without any discursive reasoning. Therefore he does not first know things, natures, properties, and subsequently think of possible orderings, as human beings do; he knows both orderings and things simultaneously. Orderings cannot be known apart from the things that are ordered, and therefore it must be said that God knows orderings in a concrete way, that is, along with the things so ordered. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 47, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 64, ¶10, §2393: The order of the universe is closer to the divine essence and participates in it and reflects it more perfectly than any particular created thing. But God knows all other things in his essence. Hence, we conclude that in a sense God first grasps in his essence those realities that are closer to that essence, namely, the possible orderings of things. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 42, ¶6, §1186: From the fact that God knows the idea of the order of a universe, Aquinas concludes that God knows the ideas of the particular things that are necessarily contained in the idea of that universe.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

494

De Ratione Convenientiae

1, 13, 4, c. ad fin.: Voluntas divina concipitur tamquam exsequens quod in divino intellectu continetur. De Ver., 23, a. 6: Blasphemum reputatur negare divinam voluntatem sequi ordinem sapientiae divinae. Quare concludere possumus ex modo volendi divino ad modum intelligendi divinum. CG, 2, 42, §2: Ordo universi est prior in intentione divina. CG, 1, 78, §4: Deus probatur velle singularia bona quia vult bonum ordinis universi quod singularia bona continet. 1, 19, 5: Deus non vult hoc quia vult illud, sed vult hoc esse propter illud. Scilicet, ipse ordo rerum est id quod Deus vult, et per consequens vult id quod ordinatur et id ad quod ordinatur. 1, 19, 9: Deus nullo modo vult malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum; vult autem malum naturalis defectus et malum poenae indirecte tantum inquantum vult bonum quod cum tali malo connectitur. CG, 2, 23 et 24; 3, 97, §§13 ss.: Quia omnia ordinantur a sapientia divina, ratio assignari potest pro unaquaque re; sed quia totus ordo libere eligitur, ultima ratio cuiuscumque rei est libera Dei voluntas. Et sic evitatur tum error eorum qui dicunt omnia ex necessitate fieri, tum etiam error eorum qui dicunt omnia ex simplici Dei voluntate sine ratione evenire.

3

De Excellentia Ordinis

Mirum forte videtur quod bonum ordinis universi adeo laudatur ut perfectius quam alia quaelibet creatura repraesentet divinam essentiam et participet divinam bonitatem. Qua de causa, breviter de excellentia ordinis disserendum videtur. Ab Aristotele bonum definitur id quod omnia appetunt, ideoque ex hierarchia appetibilitatis ad hierarchiam bonorum statuendam procedere possumus. In primis ergo bona dicuntur ipsae satisfactiones appetitus; sic alii voluptates, alii divitias, alii honores, alii sapientiam, alii virtutes desiderant; et cum haec bona acquisita sint, appetitus quiescit, gaudet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

495

The Notion of Fittingness

Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 4 c.: The divine will is conceived as being that which puts into effect what is contained in the divine intellect. De veritate, q. 23, a. 6: It is considered blasphemous to deny that the divine will follows the order of divine wisdom. For this reason we can conclude to God’s way of understanding from his manner of willing. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 42, ¶2, §1182: In God’s intention, the order of the universe is prior. Ibid., 1, c. 78, ¶4, §663: The proof that God wills particular goods is that he wills the good of the order of the universe in which those particular goods are contained. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 5: God does not will B to exist because he wills A; rather, he wills that B exist because of A. That is to say, it is the order of things that God wills, and consequently he wills both that which is ordered and that to which it is ordered. Ibid. a. 9: God in no way wills the evil of sin, which excludes ordination to the divine good; but God does will the evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment, though only indirectly, insofar as he wills the good connected to these evils. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 23–24; 3, c. 97, ¶¶13–17, §§2735–39: Because all things are ordered by divine wisdom, a reason can be assigned to each individual thing; but because the order as a whole is freely chosen, the ultimate reason for each and every thing is the free will of God. In this way we avoid both the error of those who maintain that everything happens out of necessity, and the error of those who hold that all things come into existence by the simple will of God apart from reason. 3

The Excellence of Order

It may seem strange that the good of the order of the universe is extolled as representing the divine essence and participating in the divine goodness more perfectly than any other creature. Hence a brief comment on the excellence of order will be helpful here. Aristotle defines ‘good’ as that which is desired by anything, and so we may proceed from the hierarchy of desirability to establish a hierarchy among goods. First of all, then, good is said to be whatever satisfies an appetite or desire. Thus some people desire pleasures, others wealth, others honors, others wisdom, and others virtue; and when these various goods have been obtained, the appetite rests in the enjoyment of them.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

496

De Ratione Convenientiae

Attamen, vera quies non obtinetur per quaslibet appetitus satisfactiones. Nam praeter materiales satisfactiones, etiam desideratur mensura quaedam conveniens, recta earum consecutio, ordinatio, convenientia cum natura hominis. Intellectus enim sicut ordinem in aliis rebus perspicit, ita etiam ordinem et mensuram satisfactionibus imponit. Ideoque praeter bonum quod in satisfactionibus consistit, etiam est aliud bonum quod dici potest bonum ordinis. Quanti vero bonum ordinis faciendum sit, elucet cum in singulis individuis tum in tota communitate. In singulis individuis elucet inquantum conceditur nihil esse vere bonum nisi etiam sit moraliter bonum; sed bonitas moralis consistit in ordinatione actuum quae imponitur per dictamen rectae rationis. Ideoque concludendum est quod bonum ordinis moralis est bonum formaliter et satisfactiones sunt tantum bonum materialiter. Ad eandem conclusionem pervenimus si consideramus ordinem in tota communitate. E.g., quid deest in depressione oeconmica? Manent materiae. Manent operarii et laborare volunt. Manent conductores qui vellent operarios conducere. Manent appetitus humani qui satisfieri desiderant. Materialiter omnia sunt eadem ac in expansione rerum oeconomicarum. Sed formaliter adest maxima diversitas, nam in expansione ordo oeconomicus viget, et in depressione idem ordo disrumpitur, disaggregatur. Unde concludes: bonum ordinis est id quod formaliter est bonum, nam accedente ordine bona apparentia fiunt bona vera, et bona disaggregata et inutilia conflantur in maximum illud bonum commune, nempe, in ordinem oeconomicum fructuosum et in ordinem politicum pacificum. Quibus perspectis, ad profunditatem mentis D. Thomae ascendere possumus, qui saepissime affirmavit bonum ordinis totius universi esse maximum bonum in rebus creatis.9

The Robert Mollot Collection

497

The Notion of Fittingness

Still, the human heart does not attain true rest through any and every satisfaction. For we desire not only material satisfactions, we also desire a certain fitting measure of them, that is, the proper and orderly acquisition of them and their suitability to our nature. Just as the intellect grasps order in other things, so also does it impose order and due measure upon satisfactions. Therefore, besides the good that consists in various satisfactions there is another good that can be termed ‘the good of order.’ How highly the good of order is to be prized is clearly seen both in single individuals and in a community as a whole. The value of the good of order can be seen in individuals when it is granted that nothing is truly good unless it is also morally good; but moral good consists in an ordering of actions imposed by the dictate of right reason. We conclude, therefore, that the good of the moral order is formally good, whereas satisfactions are good only materially. We come to the same conclusion if we look at order in a community as a whole. Take, for example, an economic depression. What is missing in a time of depression? The materials are there, workers are there and want to work; contractors are there and want to hire workers. Human desires are there which seek satisfaction. Materially all the same things are present as when the economy is growing. But formally the two situations are very different, for in a period of growth the economic order is strong while in a depression this same order is disrupted and disorganized. Our conclusion is that the good of order is that which is formally good, for when this order is present apparent goods become true goods, and disparate and useless goods are brought together to serve the greatest common good, namely, a productive economic order and a stable political order. From the foregoing considerations we may now enter more deeply into the profound wisdom of St Thomas’s repeated assertion that the good of the order of the entire universe is the greatest good among all created things.9 9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 70, ¶4, §595; 1, c. 85, ¶3, §713; 2, c. 39, ¶7, §1157; 2, c. 42, ¶3, §1183; 2, c. 44, ¶2, §1204; 2, c. 45, ¶8, §1226; 3, c. 64, ¶¶9–10, §§2392–93; 3, c. 69, ¶17, §2447; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 22, a. 4; 1, q. 47, a. 1; 1, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m. The various texts of St Thomas on this matter have been collected in Robert Linhardt, Die Sozialprinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin: Versuch einer Grundlegung der speziellen Soziallehren des Aquinaten (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1932), §10, ‘Die Universumidee,’ pp. 67–80.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

498

De Ratione Convenientiae

Attamen difficultates quaedam ex ipso S. Thoma proferri possunt contra assertum, nempe, ordinem universi esse optimum in rebus creatis. (a) Primo, obici potest ad mentem personalistarum quod Christianus non debet amplecti opinionem Aristotelicam et paganam secundum quam creatura rationalis est tantum pars in toto et pars propter totum. Quod confirmatur ex ipso S. Thoma, qui asseruit creaturas rationales esse propter se.10 Praeterea, servus est propter dominum, sed liber est qui causa sui est. Sed creatura rationalis est essentialiter libera, ideoque propter se est, et non propter aliud. Responsio. Id ipsum quod creatura rationalis est propter se est pars quaedam seu elementum in ordine universi, ideoque illud ‘propter se’ adeo non opponitur ordini universi ut ex ipso ordine oriatur et per ipsum ordinem confirmetur. Praeterea, ordo universi non solum facit ut creaturae rationales sint propter se, sed etiam determinat quo sensu sint propter se. Scilicet, sunt partes principales in universo, et ideo eorum natura maxime confert ad determinationem ordinis qui universo conveniat. Iterum, sunt propter se quatenus non sunt propter speciem, sicut animalia et plantae. Iterum, sunt propter se quatenus non caeca lege naturali sed per legem moralem intellectu conspectam et voluntate amplexam gubernantur.

Quae omnia non excludunt subordinationem creaturarum rationalium ad ordinem universi, sed potius explicant quemadmodum ordini subordinentur.11 (b) Secundo, obicitur ex 1-2, q. 113, a. 9 c.: maius bonum est quod ex impio iustus fiat quam creare coelum et terram. Et ibid. ad 2m: bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum totius naturae. Ergo bonum gratiae est multo melius quam bonum ordinis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

499

The Notion of Fittingness

Nevertheless, there are some difficulties arising from the writings of St Thomas himself that can be brought against this assertion that the order of the universe is that which is best among created things. (a) First, in line with a personalist way of thinking, the objection can be made that a Christian ought not to embrace the pagan Aristotelian opinion that a rational creature is only a part in a whole and a part for the sake of the whole. This objection gets support from Thomas himself, who states that rational creatures exist for their own sake.10 Also, slaves exist for the sake of their master, but free human persons exist for their own sake. But rational creatures are free by virtue of their essence and hence exist for their own sake and not for the sake of anything else. In reply to this, we point out that the very fact that rational creatures exist for their own sake is a part or element in the order of the universe, and therefore their being ‘for their own sake’ is not only not opposed to the order of the universe but in fact results from that order and is confirmed by it. Moreover, the order of the universe is not only accountable for the fact that rational creatures exist for their own sake, but even determines the sense in which they so exist. That is, they are the preeminent parts in the whole universe, and accordingly their nature plays a major role in determining the order that is fitting for this universe. Again, they exist for their own sake in the sense that they do not exist for the sake of the species, as is the case with plants and animals. Furthermore, they exist for their own sake in that they are not governed by some blind law of nature but by a moral law grasped by the intellect and embraced by the will. All of this does not rule out the subordination of rational creatures to the order of the universe, but rather explains the way in which they are subordinated to it.11 (b) The second objection is taken from Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 113, a. 9 c.: the conversion of someone from sin to righteousness is a greater good than the creation of heaven and earth; and in the same article, ad 2m: one grace is a greater good than the whole of nature. Therefore the good of grace is much greater than the good of order.

10 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 112, ¶4, §2859. Also cc. 113–16. 11 Ibid. ¶10, §2865; also 3, cc. 113–16.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

500

De Ratione Convenientiae

Responsio. Bonum ordinis supernaturalis est maius quam bonum ordinis naturalis. Sed bonum ordinis universi in ordine actuali includit utrumque. (c) Tertio, obicitur quod imago Dei invenitur in parte hominis rationali, quod in caeteris invenitur non imago Dei sed tantummodo vestigium. Ergo ordo universi non perfectius repraesentat divinam bonitatem quam quaelibet alia creatura. Responsio. Ordo dicitur dupliciter, praecisive de complexu quodam relationum, concrete et de relationibus et de rebus ordinatis. Quare si concrete sumitur, ordo universi est melior quam pars rationalis in homine, quia includit omnes homines et addit super eos caeteras creaturas.12

(d) Quarto, obicitur quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum genus humanun, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem creaturarum. Ideoque, cum Deus plus amet quae meliora sunt, melior est solus Christus quam tota universitas. Responsio. Eo magis quis aliquem diligit quo maius bonum ei velit. Quare qui bonum finitum alicui vult, mensura finita diligit; et qui bonum infinitum alicui vult, mensura infinita diligit. Iam vero Deus Christum infinite diligit, nam dedit ei ‘nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset.’13 Et universitatem creaturarum Deus finite diligit, nam eis dedit bonum finitum, nempe, ipsum universi ordinem, qui tamen est res optima inter creaturas. (e) Optimum in rebus creatis est quod habet dignitatem infinitam. Sed dignitas infinita invenitur in Christo qui Deo unitur, in visione beatifica qua beati Deo fruuntur, in divina maternitate Beatae Virginis Mariae. Ergo optimum non est bonum ordinis universi. Responsio. Bonum ordinis est optimum tantummndo in rebus creatis qua creatis. Unio hypostatica, visio beatifica, maternitas divina dicuntur infinita, non qua creaturae, sed qua in sua ratione ipsum Deum aliquo modo includunt.14

The Robert Mollot Collection

501

The Notion of Fittingness

To this objection we reply that the good of the supernatural order is indeed greater than the good of the natural order; but the good of the order of the universe in the present order of things includes both. (c) The third objection is to the effect that the image of God is to be found in the rational part of human beings, and that in other creatures there is not the image of God but only his footprint. Therefore, the order of the universe does not more perfectly reflect the divine goodness than does any other creature. Our answer to this objection is that we can speak of order in two ways: abstractly, as referring only to a certain complex of relations, or concretely, as referring both to the relations and to the things related. Taken in this concrete sense, the order of the universe is a greater good than the rational part of a human person, since it includes all humans and other creatures as well.12 (d) The fourth objection is that God loves Christ not only more than the whole human race but even more than the totality of creatures. Therefore, since God’s love is proportionate to the goodness of what he loves, Christ alone is a greater good than the whole created universe. Our answer here is that the more someone wishes well to a person, the more he or she loves that person. Hence, one who wishes a finite good to someone loves that person to a finite degree, and one who wishes an infinite good loves to an infinite degree. Now God loves Christ infinitely, for God gave him ‘the name that is above every name [Philippians 2.9], so that he is true God.’13 God loves the totality of creatures in a finite way, for he has given them a finite good, namely, the very order of the universe itself, which nonetheless is the very best thing in all creation. (e) A final objection is as follows. The best thing in creation is that which is of infinite dignity. But infinite dignity is to be found in Christ who is united with God, in the beatific vision that the blessed enjoy, and in the divine maternity of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Therefore, the greatest good is not the order of the universe. Against this we respond that the good of order is what is best only among created things qua created. The hypostatic union, the beatific vision, and the divine maternity are said to be infinite, not as created realities but inasmuch as God is in one way or another essentially included in them.14 12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 2, [arg.] 3 and ad 3m. 13 Ibid. 1, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1m. 14 Ibid. 1, q. 25, a. 6, ad 4m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

502

De Ratione Convenientiae

4

De Signis Rationis

Circa intellectum et voluntatem divinam, signa rationis semper eodem modo sunt assignanda, ita ut omnis quaestio quae communiter fit de signis reduci possit ad quaestionem circa ordinem rerum a divina sapientia efformatum et a divina bonitate electum. Semper enim et requiruntur et sufficiunt sex signa, nempe: (1) Deus ipse se cognoscit; (2) Deus necessario divinam bonitatem amat; (3) Deus per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae inspicit in sua essentia omnia possibilia a divina sapientia omnibus modis possibilibus ordinata; (4) Deus quia optime cognoscit infallibilitatem proprii intellectus, efficaciam propriae voluntatis, irresistibilitatem propriae potentiae, ideo cognoscit ante omnem actum liberae suae voluntatis quod, si ordinem quendam elegerit, omnia prorsus procederent eodem modo ac per suam sapientiam iam sunt ordinata; (5) Deus eligit aliquem ordinem, nempe, ordinem mundi actualis; (6) qua electione adiecta, transit electa pars scientiae simplicis intelligentiae in scientiam visionis. Requiruntur haec signa: quia Deus cognoscit et vult et se et alia quae sunt, et praeterea cognoscit ea quae esse possunt et, supposita electione divina, essent. Sufficiunt haec signa: quia secundum nostrum modum concipiendi (1) ordinant actus divini intellectus et voluntatis et (2) praebent fundamentum ad determinandam convenientiam cuiuslibet rei creatae. Quod alterum assertum declaratur. Cum ordo actualis rerum a divina sapientia praeconcipiatur et a divina bonitate eligatur, possumus arguere sive ex revelata intentione divina ad ordinem rerum, sive ex ordine rerum a nobis perspecto ad ordinem divinae sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde sequitur conclusio magni momenti. Solent enim multi asserere quod quaestiones de convenientia sine fine disputantur et sine fructu, quippe quae a vana quadam speculatione humana procedant. At si revelatur divina intentio, certissime cognoscitur ordo a divina sapientia efformatus et a divina voluntate electus. Quod nullum locum relinquit speculationi et rationibus mere probabilibus. Iterum, ut ex ipso actuali ordine perspecto ad ordinem a Deo praeconceptum et volitum legitime procedatur, minime sufficit mera speculatio de ordine actuali. Actualis enim ordo inest rebus actu exsistentibus et actu or-

The Robert Mollot Collection

503

The Notion of Fittingness

4

Conceptual Disignations

Concerning God’s intellect and will, the conceptual designations are always to be assigned in the same way, so that any questions that commonly arise concerning them can be reduced to the question about the order of things as devised by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness. There are always six designations that are required and are sufficient. They are: (1) God knows himself; (2) God necessarily loves the divine goodness; (3) God, through his ‘knowledge of simple understanding,’ beholds in his essence all possible things that are ordered in all possible ways by divine wisdom; (4) God, because he knows perfectly the infallibility of his intellect, the efficacy of his will, and the irresistibility of his power, knows antecedently to any free act of his free will that if he were to choose a certain order, absolutely everything would unfold exactly as ordered by his wisdom; (5) God chooses a certain order, namely, the order of the actually existing world; (6) once this choice has been made, that part of God’s knowledge of simple understanding regarding what has been chosen becomes God’s ‘vision-knowledge.’ These designations are required, because God knows and wills both himself and all other things and also knows those things that can exist and those that, presupposing his choice of them, would exist. These designations are sufficient, because in accordance with our way of conceiving, (1) they put in order the acts of the divine intellect and will and (2) they provide a basis for determining the fittingness of any created thing. Let us clarify this second statement. Since the present order of reality is preconceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness, we can argue either from God’s revealed intention to the order of things or from the order of things as understood by us to the order of divine wisdom and goodness. The conclusion from this is most important. For one often hears it said that questions about fittingness are argued about endlessly and fruitlessly, as the result of futile human speculation. But if God’s intention is revealed, then the order devised by divine wisdom and chosen by the divine will is known with complete certitude. There is no room here for any speculation or merely probable reasons. Again, in order to argue legitimately from our grasp of the present order of reality to the order preconceived and willed by God, mere speculation about this present order is by no means sufficient. For the existing order

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

504

De Ratione Convenientiae

dinatis, et per cognitionem methodicam legum quae de facto vigent in hoc mundo, ad solidam cognitionem ordinis actualis procedi potest. Ordo divinae sapientiae : electio libera Dei :: hypotheses scientiae empiricae : verificatio.15 Porro, ut haec de signis rationis confirmemus et simul ut maiorem familiaritatem cum scriptis S. Thomae foveamus, iuvat addere sequentia. In primis, de fine universi quaesivit Aristoteles, Met. Lambda, 10, 1075a, 12 ss. Quem locum exposuit S. Thomas, In XII Met., lect. 12, §§2627–31. Distinxit ergo Aristoteles inter finem intrinsecum (e.g., forma ad quam tendit alteratio vel generatio) et finem extrinsecum (e.g., locus ad quem tendit motus localis). Cum vero universum sit totum quoddam partibus ordinatis constitutum, habet et finem extrinsecum (nempe, Deum, cuius amore omnia moventur) et finem intrinsecum (nempe, ipsum ordinem partium ad invicem et ad totum, qui est et forma universi et bonum ipsius et finis eius intrinsecus). Quae doctrina saepius a S. Thoma citatur.16 Omnino enim congruit cum principiis suis. Nam ‘sicut Deus alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo essentiam suam, bonitatem suam.’17 At alia intelligit et vult ut ordinata. Unde id quod Deus vult est ordo universi seu finis universo intrinsecus, et id propter quod Deus vult est bonitas sua divina, seu finis universo extrinsecus. Quam profunde vero intret haec notio ordinis in totum systema thomisticum, exinde apparet quod docet S. Thomas: mundum esse unum unitate ordinis (1, q. 47, a. 3); ex quo ordine demonstratur exsistentia Dei (1, q. 2, a. 3); et ex qua unitate ordinis demonstratur unicitas Dei (1, q. 11, a. 3); praeterea, iustitia Dei distributiva identificatur cum ordine universi (1, q. 21, a. 1) et cum veritate rerum ontologica (1, q. 21, a. 2; cf. q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 1); praeterea, ordo universi a Deo praeconceptus est divina providentia (1, q. 22, a. 1), exsecutioni mandatus est divina gubernatio (1, q. 103), et

The Robert Mollot Collection

505

The Notion of Fittingness

of reality is present in things actually existing and actually ordered, and through a methodical knowledge of the laws that are actually operative in our world we can come to acquire a solid knowledge of the present order. The order of divine wisdom is to God’s free choice as hypotheses in the empirical sciences are to verification.15 In order to have a better grasp of these conceptual designations and at the same time to become more familiar with the writings of St Thomas, the following additional notes will be of help. First of all, Aristotle brought up the question about the purpose of the universe in Metaphysics, xii, 10, 1075a 12–25; see St Thomas’s commentary on this text, In XII Metaph, lect. 12, §§2627–31. Aristotle drew a distinction between an intrinsic end (e.g., the form to which alteration in or generation of a living thing tends) and an extrinsic end (e.g., the place to which a local motion tends). But since the universe is a whole made up of ordered parts, it has both an extrinsic end, God, by whose love all things are moved, and an intrinsic end, namely, the order of its parts among themselves and in relation to the whole, which is the form of the universe, its good, and its intrinsic end. St Thomas makes frequent reference to this doctrine.16 It agrees entirely with his principles; for ‘just as God understands things other than himself through an understanding of his essence, so does he will other things by willing his goodness.’17 But these other things God understands and wills as being in an order; hence what God wills is the order of the universe or the intrinsic end of the universe, and that for the sake of which he wills it is the divine goodness, the extrinsic end of the universe. How deeply this notion of order enters into the whole Thomistic system is apparent from the teaching of St Thomas as follows: The world is one by reason of the unity of order (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 47, a. 3). The existence of God is demonstrated from this order (1, q. 2, a. 3). The unicity of God is demonstrated from the oneness of this order (1, q. 11, a. 3). God’s distributive justice is identified with the order of the universe (1, q. 21, a. 1) and with the ontological truth of things (1, q. 21, a. 2; see also 1, q. 16, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 1). The order of the universe as preconceived by God is divine provi-

15 [This sentence is a handwritten insertion between these two paragraphs.] 16 See, for example, Super 1 Sententiarum, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1; De veritate, q. 5, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles, 2. c. 24, ¶4, §1005; 1, c. 78, ¶4, §663; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 47, a. 3, ad 1m; q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m. 17 Ibid. q. 19, a. 2, ad 2m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

506

De Ratione Convenientiae

in ipsis rebus exsistens est fatum (1, q. 116, aa. 1–3); unde Deus se habet ad res creatas sicut artifex ad artificiata (1, q. 14, a. 8); praeterea, ordo universitatis in Deo tamquam principe est lex aeterna (1-2, q. 91, a. 1) et a creatura rationali participata est lex naturalis (1-2, q. 91, a. 2); praeterea, quo sensu hic mundus dicendus sit optimus, ex ratione ordinis elucet (1, q. 25, a. 6, ad.3m; q. 47, a. 2, ad lm; q. 48, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 56, a. 2, ad 4m); denique, propter perfectionem universi exsistit rerum multiplicitas (1, q. 47, a. 1), inaequalitas (1, q. 47, a. 2), creaturaram defectibilitas (1, q. 48, a. 2), spiritualitas (1, q. 50, a. 1), et materialitas (1, q. 65, a. 2).

5

De Convenientia Incarnationis

(a) Vide auctorem, p. 45 ss.18 (b) Quod magis systematice exponi potest, inquantum rationes rerum plenius continentur in ordine universi et quidem, quoad res humanas, in ordine universi historico. Proinde ordo historicus dupliciter considerari potest. Primo modo, in quantum efficitur synthesis omnium quae per scientiam historicam determinantur. Alio modo, in quantum per analysin actionis humanae stabiliuntur principia sub quorum luce totum motum historicum in brevi complecti et intelligere possimus. Quae principia ad tria reduci possunt, nempe, natura hominis intellectualis, voluntas humana defectibilis, et adiutorium Dei miserentis. Attamen, ut ad finem intentum procedatur, minime sufficit horum principiorum consideratio abstracta, sed singula principia per modum approximationum succesivarum in concreta actionum expansione sunt attendenda. Qua de causa quaeretur (1) quid esset historia humana si omnis homo dictamen rationis semper exsequeretur, (2) quemadmodum historia humana immutetur eo quod homines contra rationis dictamen eligant et agent, et (3) quemadmodum fieri possit ut tale regnum peccati destruatur et homo ad vitam rationi conformem revocetur.

The Robert Mollot Collection

507

The Notion of Fittingness

dence (1, q. 22, a. 1), as put into effect is divine governance (1, q. 103), and as actually existing in things themselves is fate (1, q. 116, aa. 1–3). Hence, God is to creation as artisan to his artifacts (1, q. 14, a. 8). The order of the universe as it is in God as its principle is the eternal law (1-2, q. 91, a. 1) and as participated in by a rational creature is the natural law (1-2, q. 91, a. 2). The sense in which this world must be said to be the best is evinced by the notion of order (1, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3m; q. 47, a. 2, ad 1m; q. 48, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 56, a. 2, ad 4m). Finally, it is for the sake of the perfection of the universe that there exists a multiplicity of beings (1, q. 47, a. 1), inequality among them (1, q. 47, a. 2), defectibility in creatures (1, q. 48, a. 2), spirit (1, q. 50, a. 1), and matter (1, q. 65, a. 2). 5

The Fittingness of the Incarnation

(a) Charles Boyer, s.j., has set forth numerous reasons why the Incarnation, while not necessary, was and is fitting. 18 (b) This topic can be treated more systematically, since the reasons for things are to be found more fully in the order of the universe, and indeed, as far as human affairs are concerned, in the historical order of the universe. The historical order can be considered in two ways: first, inasmuch as there is effected a synthesis of all that is determined through historical knowledge; second, inasmuch as through an analysis of human activity principles are established in the light of which we are able to grasp in a comprehensive view the entire movement of human history. These principles can be reduced to three: our intellectual nature, the defectible human will, and the help of a merciful God. Still, in order to achieve our aim it is by no means enough to consider these principles abstractly; rather, each principle must be carefully looked at by way of successive approximations in the concrete unfolding of events. Hence, we ask the following questions: (1) What would human history be like if every human being always followed the dictates of reason? (2) How is the course of human history changed as a result of the fact that people choose to act contrary to the dictates of reason? (3) How can the reign of sin be destroyed and the human race brought back to living in conformity with reason? 18 De Verbo incarnato ad usum auditorum (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1948) 45–59 [in 2nd ed. (1952) 46–61].

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

508

De Ratione Convenientiae

(c) Ad primam quaestionem respondetur quod, si omnes homines semper dictamen rationis cognitum exsequerentur, historia humana esset progressiva intellectus actuatio. Nam homo est in genere intelligibilium ut potentia, ita tamen ut longe facilius unusquisque addiscat quod iam ab aliis intellectum est, quam ut ipse nova et hucusque incognita inveniat. Praeterea, animadvertendum est hanc progressivam intellectus actuationem per circulum quendam effici. Nam actio humana per cognitionem humanam dirigitur et informatur; cognitio autem a sensibilibus incipit, ad eorum intelligentiam progreditur, in consilia practica ducit quae, cum per electionem voluntatis exsecutioni mandantur, nova et commutata ‘data’ sensibilia producunt. Unde omnis nova rerum intelligentia ipsam rerum situationem concretam immutare solet; et vicissim omnis immutatio situationis concretae ad novas quaestiones et ad pleniorem rerum intelligentiam ducit. Qui circulus progressivus tripliciter evolvitur. Primo modo, ut perficiantur artes mechanicae et liberales et virtus prudentiae; et sic omnis homo per experientiam addiscere solet. Altero modo, inquantum idem circulus per reflexionem perspectus in methodum scientificam elevatur; solent enim scientifici (1) data empirica observare et mensurare, (2) per actus intelligendi leges, hypotheses, theorias emittere, (3) ex huiusmodi legibus, hypothesibus, theoriis deducere consequentia logica, (4) secundum haec consequentia actiones experimentales dirigere, et (5) in ipsis experimentis nova data empirica observare et mensurare ita ut leges, hypotheses, theoriae aut confirmentur aut corrigantur. Tertio denique modo, idem circulus sive ordinarius sive methodicus a philosopho examinatur; et ita pervenitur ad analysin generalem omnis entis proportionati, nempe, quod tale ens componitur elemento empirico quod sensibus innotescit, elemento formali quod intelligentia perspicitur, et elemento actuali quod iudicio affirmatur.

(d) Ad secundam quaestionem respondetur quod, cum homines dictamina rationis non exsequantur, circulus ille progressivus corrumpitur et in regnum quoddam peccati immutatur. In primis, enim, animadvertendum est omne peccatum non solum in se intelligibilitate carere et irrationale quoddam seu surdum constituere, sed etiam omnem actionem peccaminosam eiusmodi inordinationem et irrationabilitatem in situationem objectivam transferre. Scilicet, situatio

The Robert Mollot Collection

509

The Notion of Fittingness

(c) To the first question we answer that if all people at all times knew and followed the dictates of reason, human history would be a progressive actualization of the intellect. For the human mind is in potency with respect to the range of the intelligible, yet in such a way that it is much easier for individuals to learn what others have understood than to find out for themselves what is new and still unknown to them. Moreover, it should be noted that this progressive actualization of the intellect takes place in a sort of circular manner. Human activity is directed and informed by human knowledge; but knowledge begins from sensible data, proceeds to understand them, and leads to the formation of practical policies which, when implemented by the decision of the will, give rise to new and altered sensible data. Thus, every new understanding of things tends to change the concrete situation, and in turn every altered set of concrete circumstances leads to new questions and so to a fuller understanding of reality. This progressive circular movement evolves in three ways. First, it contributes to the development of both the mechanical and the liberal arts and also of the virtue of prudence; it is in these areas that people usually learn by experience. Second, it evolves as this same circle, when understood reflectively, is raised to the level of scientific method. For scientists regularly (1) observe and measure empirical data, (2) propose laws, hypotheses, and theories as a result of insight into these data, (3) deduce the logical consequences from these laws, hypotheses, and theories, (4) direct their experiments in accordance with these consequences, and (5) in these experiments observe and measure new empirical data and so either confirm or correct those laws, hypotheses, and theories. Third, this same circle, whether in its ordinary or in its methodical form, is subjected to a philosophical critique and so arrives at a general analysis of all proportionate being into three components: an empirical element known through the senses, a formal element grasped by the understanding, and an actual element affirmed in a judgment. (d) To the second question we answer that when people fail to follow the dictates of reason, that progressive circle is corrupted and changes into the reign of sin. To begin with, note that every sin is not only unintelligible in itself, constituting an irrationality, a surd, but also that every sinful action introduces a corresponding disorder and unreasonableness into the objective situation. After all, it is human beings who produce a social situation, and there-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

510

De Ratione Convenientiae

socialis producitur ab hominibus et, sicut situatio intelligibilis producitur inquantum homines secundum intelligentiam et rationem agunt, ita pariter situatio objective inintelligibilis et irrationalis producitur inquantum homines contra intelligentiam et rationem agant. Deinde, ex situationibus concretis hauriuntur data empirica; secundum data empirica fiunt actus intelligendi, iudicandi, consiliandi; et secundum consilia fiunt actiones. Iam vero inquantun data empirica sunt vere intelligibilia, sequitur, ut iam dictum est, progressiva humani intellectus actuatio. E contra, inquantum data empirica non sunt intelligibilia, inquantum sunt sequelae irrationalitatis, gravissimam ambiguitatem continent. Ex una parte, sunt de facto; ex alia parte, esse non debent. Ab iis homo non potest praescindere, nam de facto sunt. At si homo ea intelligere conatur, quaerit intelligibilitatem ubi nulla intelligibilitas est et facillime in errorem vergit. Porro, haec ambiguitas objectiva et suum circulum habet, qui tamen non progressivus, sed regressivus est. Praeterea, sicut circulus progressivus est triplex, nempe, vulgaris, scientificus, et philosophicus, pariter circulus regressivus est triplex. Circulus regressivus vulgaris est notissima antinomia inter theoreticum et practicum, ubi theoreticum dicit id quod esse debet, quod homo facere tenetur, et practicum est ad facta concreta attendere, fortiter et audacter potius quam scrupulose agere, easque tantum agendi normas observare quae de facto communiter recipiuntur. Iam vero quo magis homines sunt practici hoc sensu peiorativo, eo magis augetur corruptio situationis socialis atque semper crescit irrationale seu surdum obiectivum. At idem circulus non solum praxin humanam corrumpit sed etiam ipsam theoriam. E.g., illud novum invexit Niccolò Machiavelli quod, ubi antecessores de statu iuridice concepto disseruerunt, ipse de arte seu technica potestatem supremam acquirendi et conservandi investigavit. Caeteri de eo quod esse debet tractaverunt; at ipse de eo quod fit. Neque illud omittendum est quod per eiusmodi doctrinam mala praxis humana systematizationem et organizationem quandam theoreticam acquisivit. Longe ante Macchiavelli exsistebat quod vocatur ‘power politics,’ ‘Realpolitik,’ ‘la raison d’état.’ At post eum scripta sunt multa opera politica, oeconomica, sociologica, psychologica, quae semper magis ab omni consideratione morali praescindunt, quae hominem uti de facto est et operatur exhibent, imo quae non solum scientias humanas empiricas laudant et evolvunt, sed etiam hominem uti de facto est tamquam normam moralitatis praedicant.

The Robert Mollot Collection

511

The Notion of Fittingness

fore, just as an intelligible situation is produced by people acting according to intelligence and reason, so an objectively unintelligible and irrational situation will likewise result from actions contrary to intelligence and reason. Next, empirical data are drawn from concrete situations. Acts of understanding, judging, and deliberating are made in accordance with those data, and actions are carried out in accordance with those deliberations. Now, as we have said, a progressive actualization of the human intellect follows upon empirical data that are truly intelligible. Conversely, insofar as empirical data are not intelligible and lead to irrational consequences, they contain a serious ambiguity. On the one hand, they exist in actual fact; on the other hand, they should not exist at all. One cannot prescind from them, for they do exist; but if one tries to understand them, one is looking for intelligibility where none exists, and thus very easily slips into error. This objective ambiguity, moreover, has its own circularity, one that is not progressive, however, but regressive. Again, just as the progressive circle has three levels, ordinary, scientific, and philosophical, so also has this regressive circle. The regressive circle at the ordinary level is the well-known conflict between the theoretical and the practical, where the theoretician says what ought to be, what one is obligated to do, while the ‘practical man’ looks at concrete facts, acts forcefully and with boldness rather than with scruple, and follows only those norms of conduct which enjoy de facto acceptance by people generally. And the more people become ‘practical’ in this pejorative sense of the word, the greater the corruption of the social situation along with the ever-increasing irrational element or objective surd. This same circle corrupts not only human praxis but even theory itself. A good example of this is Niccolò Machiavelli: when previously people discoursed about the juridical concept of the state, he investigated the art or technique of gaining and holding on to supreme power. The others had discussed what ought to be; he talked about what is actually done. What is to be noted here is how through that kind of doctrine bad human praxis acquired systematization and a certain theoretical organization. ‘Power politics,’ Realpolitik, la raison d’état existed long before Machiavelli’s time; but ever since then, many works on politics, economics, sociology, and psychology have been written which prescind more and more from all moral consideration, which represent humanity as it de facto is and operates, and which not only advocate and foster the empirical human sciences, but even go so far as to proclaim the actual state of society to be the norm of morality.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

512

De Ratione Convenientiae

Ita ad tertium circulum philosophicum et religiosum acceditur. Quo magis enim praxis humana mala et theoria ad praxin adaptata vigent, eo magis de vita hominum concreta extruditur philosophia vera et religio vera. Haec enim non loquuntur de rebus uti de facto sunt nisi ut eas reprehendat; applicationes concretas sine heroismo non admittunt; et heroismus est rarus. Stoici laudabant sapientem; at quaerebant Epicuri sequaces ubi terrarum degat ille sapiens. Composuit, ni fallor, Fourier philosophiam quandam paupertatis; at Marx respondens scripsit de paupertate philosophiae.19 Sicut homo vulgaris, sicut homo scientificus, ita etiam philosophus a factis irrationalibus praescindere non potest. At longe profundius corrumpit vitam humanam circulus regressivus philosophicus et religiosus. Ita aetas moderna ab unitate mediaevali incepit; propter abusus qui in Ecclesia fiebant, potuerunt novatores haeresim propagare in nationes fere integras; at divisiones religiosas sequebantur bella religiosa, et ideo potuerunt rationalistae multis persuadere omnem religionem revelatam esse reiciendam et hominem per solum naturale rationis lumen esse regendum; proh dolor! lumen illud rationis multa et diversa concludebat, unde de rationalismo in liberalismum factus est transitus, ita ut singuli lumen proprium sequerentur et lumina aliorum tolerarent; at bonum commune, omnibus diversa opinantibus, haud facile consulitur et, cum unitas religiosa desit, cum unitas rationalistica non sit speranda, cum unitas sentimenti nationalistici non sufficiat, quaeritur unitas vel totalitariana per mythos plus minusve conscie fabricatos, vel communistica secundum placita materialismi dialectici. Ita pergit homo modernus in illum statum, ubi de rationabilitate hominum

The Robert Mollot Collection

513

The Notion of Fittingness

Thus we come to the third level of the regressive circle, the philosophical and religious level. The more widespread in human society are bad human praxis and theory adapted to such praxis, the more will true philosophy and true religion be eased out of people’s lives. True philosophy and true religion do not speak about things as they are, except to criticize them. It takes heroism to make concrete applications, and heroism is rare. The Stoics used to praise the Sage; but the Epicureans kept asking where on earth the Sage lived. Fourier, if I am not mistaken, composed a philosophy of poverty; to this Marx responded by writing about the poverty of philosophy.19 The philosopher no more than the ordinary person or the scientist can prescind from irrational facts; but the corruption of human life brought about by the philosophical and religious form of the regressive circle is much deeper. Thus the modern age began from the medieval unity. Because of abuses in the church, the reformers were able to spread their heresies throughout whole nations; religious divisions led to the wars of religion, and so the rationalists were able to persuade many that all revealed religion should be discarded and that human beings were to be governed solely by the natural light of reason. Alas, that light of reason led to many different conclusions, and so rationalism gave way to liberalism, in which each one followed his or her own personal light while tolerating the lights of others. With such a welter of opinions it is not easy to work for the common good; and when religious unity is absent, and rationalistic unity is unlikely, and unity derived from nationalistic sentiment is inadequate, unity is sought either in a totalitarianism founded upon myths more or less consciously invented, or in communism based upon the tenets of dialectical materialism. Thus has modern man reached a sorry state in which there seems little or no hope

19 [Lonergan typed ‘Fournier’ in the autograph, but he seems to have had in mind François Marie Charles Fourier (1772–1837). His remark ‘if I am not mistaken’ (‘ni fallor’) probably indicates that he was relying on memory here, and in this instance, it seems, his memory was doubly unreliable. For it was not Fourier who ‘composed a philosophy of poverty’ but Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865). And it was Proudhon’s Système des contradictions économiques ou Philosophie de la misère (1846) that Marx attacked in his Misère de la philosophie (1847). For a brief account of the ideas of Fourier and of Proudhon, see Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 9: Maine de Biran to Sartre (Mahwah, nj: Paulist Press, 1975) 52–55 and 64–71. As for Marx’s attitude to Fourier, Copleston remarks (p. 52) that Marx regarded him ‘as a well-meaning and myth-creating utopian socialist …’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

514

De Ratione Convenientiae

desperandum videtur, quod descripsit S. Paulus in primis tribus capitibus epistolae ad Romanos.20 (e) Quibus perspectis, oritur tertia quaestio, nempe, quemadmodum fieri possit ut hoc regnum peccati destruatur et homo ad vitam rationi conformem revocetur. In primis, illud notandum est quod solutiones possibiles sunt multae et diversae; omnipotentia enim divina sese extendit ad omne quod contradictionem non involvit. Cum tamen nos divinam sapientiam minime comprehendimus, illas solutiones considerare oportet quae solutioni actu exsistenti similiores sunt. Ideoque primum elementum solutionis consistere videtur in revelatione quadam per fidem divinam accepta. Alia enim via non apparet qua homo clare, expedite, et cum certitudine ad veritates essentiales cognoscendas perveniat. Nam non solum sunt falsa principia late divulgata et communiter recepta, sed etiam hi errores speciem quandam veritatis prae se ferunt propter eorum convenientiam cum mala praxi humana et cum irrationali obiectivo et sociali. Sane qui ab aliis laboribus vacant, qui puro et sincero corde inquirunt, ad veritates essentiales pervenire possunt. Sed id quod requiritur non est veritas a paucis agnita post longum laborem, sed veritas omnibus accesibilis. Aliud elementum est spes alterius vitae. Minime enim sufficit veritas agnita nisi accedit voluntatis vigor. At quantus requiritur vigor. Renovatio enim societatis non per societatem corruptam sed per regeneratos individuos est perficienda, et quidem per individuos qui non solum iudicent sed etiam agant contra erronea principia communiter agnita, contra materialisticum illum determinismum, qui eo latius se extendit quo magis a ductu rationis homines recedunt, contra omnem exspectationem mere humanam quae obiectivum surdum sociale non solum ut factum agnoscit, sed etiam tamquam normam actionis ‘prudentis.’ Quibus perspectis, sat facile elucet homines multos et ordinarios ad requisitum voluntatis vigorem non esse perventuros nisi per spem alterius vitae animi eorum erigantur. Tertium praeterea elementum est caritas. Ubi situatio obiectiva est intelligibilis, sufficit regula rationis rectae ad eandem intelligibilitatem perpe-

The Robert Mollot Collection

515

The Notion of Fittingness

for reasonableness, a state of affairs such as described by St Paul in the first three chapters of the letter to the Romans.20 (e) The third question therefore arises, how it is possible for this reign of sin to be destroyed and the human race brought back to live in conformity with reason. It should be noted first of all that there are a number of different solutions to this problem, all of which are possible; for God’s power extends to everything that does not involve a contradiction. But since we have a very minimal comprehension of divine wisdom, we must be content to consider those solutions that more closely resemble the solution that actually exists. The first element of the solution, therefore, would seem to consist in a revelation accepted through faith in God. There appears to be no other way for us to arrive at knowledge of essential truths with clarity, facility, and certainty. For not only are false principles widely disseminated and commonly accepted, but also these errors have the appearance of truth because of the way they fit in with bad human praxis and the objective irrationality in society. Certainly those who are free from other labors and seek answers with a pure and sincere heart can arrive at essential truths. But what is needed is not truth that a few arrive at after lengthy toil but rather truth that is accessible to all. Another element is hope of a life to come. The acceptance of truth is not nearly enough unless to it is added strength of will. But how much strength is needed! For the renewal of society is not going to be accomplished by that corrupt society itself but by renewed individuals, and indeed, by individuals who not only make judgments upon but also act against commonly accepted errors, against that materialistic determinism which continues to spread as people go on refusing to follow reason, and against all purely human expectation which accepts the objective social surd not only as a fact but even as a norm of ‘prudent’ action. This being so, it is quite obvious that the generality of ordinary human beings will never attain the requisite strength of will unless inspired and encouraged by the hope of another and better life. A third element is charity. When the objective situation is intelligible, the rule of right reason suffices to perpetuate this intelligibility. But when

20 [This brief description of ‘the modern age emerg[ing] out of the medieval unity’ echoes that given of ‘[t]he development of our Western civilization’ in Lonergan, Insight 256–57.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

516

De Ratione Convenientiae

tuandam. At ubi situatio obiectiva iam per cumulata peccata et inveteratos errores est corrupta, recta ratio quae iustitiam praedicat minime sufficit ad irrationale exstirpandum. Iustitia enim ad aequalitatem tendit neque odia inimicitiasque tollit nisi caritate transformatur. Si individui infelici sorte laborantes, si classes depressae, si nationes iniustitiam perpessae erigi debent, aliud nescio remedium praeter illam caritatem quae propriis iuribus non insistit, quae ultro bonum facit ubi bonum fieri potest, quae inimicos amare et pro amatis animam ponere vult. Quartum denique elementum est mysterium late dictum. Stricte enim et technice mysterium dicit obiectum fidei divinae, quod propter excessum intelligibilitatis intellectum creatum superat. At latius dicitur idem nomen cum in recitatione coronae marianae vel in exercitiis spiritualibus meditamur super mysteria vitae Domini Nostri Iesu Christi. Iam vero mysteria eiusmodi late dicta in primis per repraesentationes sensibiles innotescunt, deinde ea significant quae iam intellectu perspeximus, tertio ad pleniorem intelligentiam invitant, quarto affectus, emotiones, sentimenta commovent, erudiunt, confortant. Quae omnia quanti sint momenti ex eo elucet quod sicut omne quod cognoscimus a sensibilibus originem ducit, ita omne quod ratione decernimus et voluntate eligimus eo promptius et facilius in actiones externas procedit quo magis parata est pars sensibilis ad imagines et affectus convenientes evocandos. (f) At profundius rem considerare oportet. Hactenus enim de ordine rerum intrinseco disseruimus, sed ipse hic ordo, sicut a Deo omnium rerum primo principio derivatur, ita per respectum ad Deum rerum omnium finem ultimum stabilitur. Iam vero peccatum non solum est actus contra dictamen rectae rationis, sed etiam est offensa Dei. Fides non solum est remedium rationis aberrantis, sed etiam est obsequium Dei veritatis et veracitatis. Spes non solum excessivum amorem boni sensibilis corrigit, sed etiam ad vitam immortalem eiusque bona mentem revocat. Neque homo ab inordinato amore boni privati ad amorem proximi convertitur nisi prius in Deum, qui etiam super omnia diligi debet,21 convertatur. Mysterium denique maximum, quod per omnem creaturam innuitur, est ipse Deus in omnibus praesens et operans et sua bona communicans, et super omnia diligibilis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

517

The Notion of Fittingness

the objective situation has already been corrupted through accumulated wrongs and deep-rooted errors, right reason calling for justice hardly suffices to eradicate the irrational element. For justice is directed towards equality, and unless transformed by charity it will not wipe out enmity and hatred. When individuals suffering under wretched conditions, or oppressed classes of society, or subjugated nations have to be raised up again, I know of no other remedy than that charity that does not insist on its rights, that voluntarily does good when that is feasible, and that is ready to love its enemies and to lay down its life for those whom it loves. The fourth element is mystery, in the broad sense of the word. In the strict and technical sense, ‘mystery’ refers to an object of divine faith which because of its excessive intelligibility is above and beyond any created intellect. But this same word is used in a broader sense in connection with the ‘mysteries’ of the Marian rosary and in the Spiritual Exercises [of St Ignatius Loyola] where one meditates upon the ‘mysteries’ of the life of Christ. Mysteries in this sense are first entered into through sensible representations, then express what we have already understood, third invite us to a deeper understanding, and finally arouse, refine, and strengthen our affections, emotions, and feelings. The importance of all this is clear from the fact that as all our knowledge derives from sensible data, so all that we decide by our reason and choose by our will passes the more quickly and easily into action the more our sensibility is ready to summon up the appropriate images and affections. (f) Let us now go more deeply into this matter. So far we have been discussing the intrinsic order of things; but this order itself, as it proceeds from God as the first principle of all things, so it is maintained through its orientation towards God as the ultimate end of all things. Sin is not only an act that is contrary to the dictate of right reason; it is also an offense against God. Faith is not only an antidote to the aberrations of reason, but is also a humble service to the God of truth and veracity. Hope is not only a check upon the excessive love of material goods but also reminds us of eternal life and its attendant goods. One does not turn from an inordinate love of one’s own personal good to love of neighbor unless first turned towards God, who even from a purely natural motive deserves to be loved above all things.21 The greatest mystery of all, discernible throughout all creation, is God himself, present in and operating in all

21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

518

De Ratione Convenientiae

Praeterea, ad regnum peccati destruendum, sufficeret fides per quam veritates tantum naturales crederentur, sufficeret spes immortalitatis et beatitudinis naturalis, sufficeret naturalis amor Dei super omnia. At in ordine actuali homo dirigitur in finem absolute supernaturalem ut Deum ipsum per essentiam in aeternum videat. In hunc finem exsequendum adiuvatur auxiliis divinis quae proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae creatae superant. Ut Deum convenienter amet, diffunditur in corde caritas Dei per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom 5.5). Brevi, a Deo Patre diligitur sicut et Filius proprius, secundum illud ‘dilexisti eos, sicut et me dilexisti’ (Io 17.23). (g) Quibus perspectis, iam ad finem properemus breviter recolentes quibus criteriis de convenientia Incarnationis iudicare possimus, et quemadmodum haec criteria applicentur. In genere stabilitum est convenientiam esse (1) intelligibilitatem proprie dictam, (2) non necessariam sive quoad exsistentiam sive quoad essentiam, (3) in materia theologica mysteriosam, (4) in divina sapientia quae omnia possibilia ordinat radicatam, et (5) liberrimo Dei consilio electam propter ipsam divinam bonitatem manifestandam. Quare qui convenientiam Incarnationis perspicit, duo intelligit, nempe, quemadmodum ipsa Incarnatio se habeat ad actualem omnium rerum ordinem, et quemadmodum hic ordo se habeat ad divinam bonitatem manifestandam. Quae duo minime sunt separanda, cum universitas creaturarum internam suam intelligibilitatem eo attingit quod in Deum communem omnium finem ultimum tendat. Unde dicitur: ‘Quaerite ergo primum regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et haec omnia adicientur vobis’ (Mt 6.33). Proinde tripliciter rerum ordo nobis innotescit: (1) inquantum ex principiis generalibus ad ea pervenimus quae omni ordini sunt communia, e.g., ordinem esse intelligibilem, ordinatis excellentiorem, exigentiis divinae sapientiae et bonitatis conformem, (2) inquantum Deus nobis revelat intentionem suam in ordine actuali condendo et restaurando, et (3) inquantum ipse ordo actu exsistens a nobis empirice investigatur et vere etsi imperfecte intelligitur. Iam vero in actuali rerum ordine tria maxime inveniuntur, nempe, (1) ipsae rerum naturae quae modo finito divinam essentiam ad extra participant et obiectum nostro intellectui proportionatum constituunt, (2) com-

The Robert Mollot Collection

519

The Notion of Fittingness

things and bestowing his riches upon them, and lovable above all created things. Furthermore, in order to destroy the reign of sin, faith in natural truths, hope for natural immortality and happiness, and a natural love of God above all things would suffice. But in the actual order of reality we are destined to an absolutely supernatural end, the eternal vision of God through the divine essence. We are helped towards this end by the assistance of God’s graces, which exceed the proportion of any created being. In order to love God in an appropriate manner, ‘the love of God is poured into hearts by the Holy Spirit given to us’ (Romans 5.5). In short, we are loved by the Father as his own Son, according to the words of Jesus, ‘You have loved them as you have loved me’ (John 17.23). (g) Let us now quickly conclude by recalling the criteria according to which we can make a judgment upon the fittingness of the Incarnation and how to apply these criteria. In general, we established that fittingness was (1) intelligibility in the proper sense, (2) not necessary as to either existence or essence, (3) a mystery in a theological context, (4) rooted in divine wisdom which orders all possible beings, and (5) chosen in a supremely free decision of God in order to manifest his divine goodness. Whoever, therefore, grasps the fittingness of the Incarnation understands these two points, namely, how the Incarnation itself is related to the actual order of all reality, and how this order is related to the manifestation of divine goodness. These two should by no means be separated, since the entire created universe attains its internal intelligibility by the fact that it tends towards God, the common end of all things. Hence, the words of the Lord, ‘Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things will be given to you besides’ (Matthew 6.33). There are three ways by which we come to know the order of reality: (1) by reasoning from general principles we arrive at knowing what are common to every order – for example, that order is intelligible, that it is more excellent than its ordered parts and conforms to the requirements of God’s wisdom and goodness; (2) by God’s revelation to us of his intention in creating and restoring the present order; and (3) by our own empirical investigation of this actually existing order and our genuine, albeit imperfect, understanding of it. Now, there are three salient features in the present order of reality: (1) the natures of things, which in a finite degree are outward participations of the divine essence and constitute the object proportionate to the human

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

520

De Ratione Convenientiae

municationes ipsius Dei infiniti qui suam bonitatem ad extra manifestat per donum sui ipsius et quidem tripliciter, cum in Incarnatione sit idem et Deus et homo, in iustificatione conferatur donum increatum, Spiritus Sanctus inhabitans, et in patria ipse Deus, vice fungens speciei intelligibilis, mentibus beatorum illabatur, et (3) peccatum cum originale tum illud actuale quod in regnum quoddam irrationale adversus Deum et adversus verum hominis bonum exsurgere contendit. Porro secundum haec tria convenientia Incarnationis declarari potest. Nam in primis, in quantum ipse Deus se communicat, Incarnatio invenitur fundamentum et ratio aliarum communicationum. Nam beati quidem Deum per essentiam vident propter merita sua, et merita habere potuerunt quia Christus eis meritus est participationem suae gratiae et gloriae; et Christus ipse habuit et gratiam et gloriam et potestatem merendi propter dignitatem personae divinae quae incarnata est. Quae declaratio secundum ordinem iustitiae exposita iterum exponi potest secundum legem amoris divini. Sicut enim Deus creaturas amat propter bonitatem suam, ita Deus Pater Filium suum qua incarnatum eodem amore diligit quo Filium ut Deum diligit; et iterum idem Pater amicos Filii incarnati eodem amore diligit quo ipsum Filium incarnatum diligit, secundum illud ‘dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti’ (Io 17.23). Quod quidem in mysterio baptismatis Iesu exprimitur. Nam tunc audita est vox paterna affirmans, ‘Hic est Filius meus dilectus,’ et sub specie columbae Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor procedens, visus est descendere; quod suo modo in nostro baptismate repetitur in quantum per gratiam efficimur filii Dei adoptivi et templa Spiritus sancti. Deinde, hae ipsius Dei communicationes quam maxime naturam rationalem perficiunt non solum quatenus ipsae sunt maxime perfectae, sed etiam quatenus conferunt perfectionem quae ita a natura desideratur ut per naturam attingi non possit; nam cognita Dei exsistentia naturaliter quaerimus quid sit Deus, quam quidditatem positive cognoscere non possumus nisi per visionem Dei;22 et iterum naturaliter omnis appetitus Deum super omnia diligit,23 at voluntas humana in natura lapsa ad bonum privatum declinat24

The Robert Mollot Collection

521

The Notion of Fittingness

intellect; (2) communications of the infinite God who outwardly manifests his goodness in the threefold gift of himself – in the Incarnation, where the same person is both God and man, in the act of justification, which bestows the uncreated Gift, the indwelling Holy Spirit, and in heaven, where God himself, acting as an intelligible species, enters into the minds of the blessed; (3) sin, both original and that actual sin which strives to emerge as an irrational regime against God and against true human good. The fittingness of the Incarnation can be clearly seen in these three features. First of all, regarding God’s self-communication, the Incarnation is found to be the basis and the reason for the other communications. For the blessed behold God’s essence by reason of their merits, but they were able to merit because Christ merited for them a participation in his grace and glory; and Christ himself possessed grace and glory and the ability to merit by reason of his dignity as a divine person incarnate. This explanation expressed in terms of the order of divine justice can also be expressed in terms of the law of divine love. Just as God loves creatures because of his goodness, so does God the Father love the Son as incarnate with the same love as that with which he loves the Son as God; and the same Father also loves the friends of his incarnate Son with the same love as that with which he loves his incarnate Son, according to the words of the gospel, ‘You have loved them as you have loved me’ (John 17.23). Indeed, this was revealed in the mystery of the baptism of Jesus, when the voice of the Father was heard declaring, ‘This is my beloved Son’ (Matthew 3.17), and the Holy Spirit, who is proceeding Love, was seen descending upon Jesus in the form of a dove. This is what happens at our own baptism when we are made adopted children of God and temples of the Holy Spirit. Next, these communications of God himself bring a rational nature to the highest possible perfection. This they do not only because they are most perfect in themselves, but also because they confer a perfection desired by a rational nature yet unattainable by that nature itself. For once we know that God exists, we naturally wonder what God is, and this quiddity we cannot know in a positive way except through the beatific vision of God.22 Again, every appetite naturally loves God above all things,23 but in a fallen nature the human will tends to pursue its own private good,24 and this tendency is 22 Ibid. 1, q. 12; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8. 23 Ibid. 1, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m; q. 60, a. 5; q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m. 24 Ibid. 1-2, q. 109, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

522

De Ratione Convenientiae

neque rectificatur25 nisi per gratiam et caritatem qua in amicitiam cum Deo unimur.26 Tertio, quantum ad peccatum attinet, Verbum incarnatum est agnus Dei, qui tollit peccata mundi. Et primo quidem inquantum peccatum est offensa Dei, per passionem suam nos redemit et pro peccatis satisfecit.27 Deinde vero inquantum peccata in quoddam regnum coalescere solent, aliud instaurat regnum Dei aptum natum ad destruendum regnum peccati, inquantum mysteria vitae Christi in NT, olim in VT praefigurata et post a sanctis imitata, sensibilitatem nostram erudiunt atque inflammant, inquantum fides nostram falsitatem expellit, inquantum spes nostram debilitatem erigit, inquantum caritas irrationale obiectivum eradicat. Cui regno Christi nostris temporibus valde evolutum regnum peccati opponitur, quod in atheismo fundatur, per mendacia utilia propagatur, in spe boni dumtaxat temporalis confirmatur, et per discordia in odia et invidias fovetur. Quae cum ita sint, elucent illa duo quae intelligenda erant ut convenientia Incarnationis perspiceretur, nempe, quemadmodum se habeat Incarnatio ad ordinem universi, et quemadmodum ordo universi se habeat ad divinam bonitatem manifestandam. Incarnatio enim est principium ipsius ordinis restituendi, cum per eam et peccatores cum Deo reconcilientur et regnum peccati vincatur et natura ad summam perfectionem elevetur et ipse Deus suis creaturis iuste et amantissime communicetur. Proinde, ordo ita restitutus maxime divinam bonitatem ad extra manifestat, tum quia ipsa bonitas infinita creaturis communicatur, tum quia naturam ultra vires naturae perficit, tum quia haec communicatio summa misericordia fit peccatoribus atque indignis.

6

De Necessitate Incarnationis

(a) vide auctorem: p. 51 sq. (b) Incarnatio necessaria est (1) non ratione sui, nam Deum non incarnari non continet contradictionem, et omne est possibile apud Deum quod contradictionem non continet,28 (2) neque ratione divinae sapientiae vel

The Robert Mollot Collection

523

The Notion of Fittingness

not rectified except by grace25 and by charity which unites us with God in friendship.26 Finally, as regards sin, the incarnate Word is the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. First, considering sin as an offence against God, Jesus has through his suffering redeemed us and made atonement for sin.27 Then, since sins tend to coalesce to form a certain regime, he inaugurated the reign of God well equipped to destroy the reign of sin, as the mysteries of the life of Christ in the New Testament, which were prefigured in the Old Testament and subsequently imitated by the saints, educate and enkindle our sensibility, as faith drives out our false notions, as hope invigorates our weakness, and as charity roots out the objective irrationality in our lives. The reign of sin, which has become highly sophisticated in our day, is hostile to the reign of Christ, for it is founded upon atheism, propagated by the effective use of lies, strengthened by the hope of merely temporal good, and fomented by discord, envy, and hate. Considering all this, therefore, those two points now become clear which needed to be understood in order to grasp the fittingness of the Incarnation, namely, how the Incarnation is related to the order of the universe, and how the order of the universe is related to the manifestation of God’s goodness. For the Incarnation is the principle of the restoration of order, since by it sinners are reconciled with God, the reign of sin is overthrown, human nature is raised to the highest perfection, and God himself is communicated to his creatures in a most just and loving manner. Accordingly, the order thus restored is the greatest outward manifestation of divine goodness, since it is infinite goodness itself that is communicated to creatures, since this communication enhances nature beyond nature’s powers, and since in God’s infinite compassion it is made to unworthy sinners. 6

The Necessity of the Incarnation

(a) See Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 51–52 [2nd ed. 51–53]. (b) The Incarnation is (1) not necessary by reason of itself, since for God not to be incarnate does not contain a contradiction, and God can do anything that is not self-contradictory.28 (2) Nor is the Incarnation necessary by 25 26 27 28

Ibid. q. 113. Ibid. 2-2, q. 23. Ibid. 3, q. 48. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

524

De Ratione Convenientiae

bonitatis, nam quidquid Deus facere potest etiam sapientissime et summa bonitate facere potest, cum eadem in Deo sit potentia et sapientia et bonitas,29 (3) neque ratione peccati sive originalis sive actualis, nam peccatum non est titulus necessitans gratiam et multo minus est titulus necessitans Incarnationem, (4) neque ex suppositione gratiae restituendae, nam aliis viis potest Deus sapientissime ordinare donum vel restitutionem gratiae, (5) sed solummodo ex suppositione sive explicita sive implicita ipsius Incarnationis nam, supposita ipsa Incarnatione, contradictorium esset eam non fieri; quae suppositio fit sive supponitur satisfactio condigna pro peccato, sive supponitur Deum velle restitutionem ordinis primitivi per agentem proportionatum.30 (c) Quibus dictis, elucet quanti momenti theologo est perspectam habere rationem convenientiae. Nam cum convenientia dicat intelligibilitatem proprie dictam et tamen minime necessariam, theologus potest et rationes rerum convenientes investigare atque intelligere quin ullo modo libertatem Dei et gratuitatem ordinis supernaturalis infringat.

7

Circa Finem Incarnationis31

(a) Non agitur de fine personae divinae vel naturae divinae quae sane minime est propter aliud. Sed agitur de fine humanitatis assumptae, scilicet, cur Deus homo, vel cur divinitati quae nullo prorsus indiget accesserit humanitas. (b) Finis dicit bonum, et quidem illud bonum propter quod aliud est vel fit. Clarificatio diversorum aspectuum maxime repetenda videtur ex voluntate, nam bonum dicit ens cum habitudine ad voluntatem.32 Iam vero voluntas, cum sit potentia rationalis, vult obiectum propter mo-

The Robert Mollot Collection

525

The Notion of Fittingness

reason of divine wisdom or goodness, for whatever God can do, he can do with the utmost wisdom and goodness, since in God power and wisdom and goodness are all the same reality.29 Again, (3) the Incarnation is not necessary by reason of either original or actual sin, for sin has no necessary claim upon grace, much less upon an Incarnation. Finally, (4) it is not necessary on the supposition of the restoration of grace, for God could in other ways with supreme wisdom decree the gift of grace or its restoration. It remains, then, (5) that the Incarnation is necessary only on the explicit or implicit supposition of itself, for, supposing the Incarnation to be, it would only be contradictory for it not to be; and this supposition obtains whether one supposes condign satisfaction for sin or supposes that God wills the restoration of the primeval order by a proportionate agent.30 (c) From the foregoing it is clear how important it is for a theologian to have a good grasp of the notion of fittingness. For since fittingness implies intelligibility in the proper sense and yet an intelligibility that is in no way necessary, a theologian can inquire into the appropriate reasons for things and understand them without in any way infringing upon God’s freedom and the gratuitousness of the supernatural order. 7

The Purpose of the Incarnation31

(a) What is at issue here is not the purpose of the divine person or of the divine nature, which certainly do not in the least exist for the sake of something else. Our question has to do with the purpose of the assumed humanity, in other words, cur Deus homo, ‘why the God-man,’ why humanity was added to a divinity that has no need of anything else whatsoever. (b) ‘Purpose’ denotes ‘good,’ that good for the sake of which something exists or is made or done. To clarify the various aspects of this, it seems we must look to the will, for the notion of good denotes being in its relation to the will.32 The will, being a rational potency, wills an object on account of a motive;

29 Ibid. a. 5. 30 [For perhaps a useful further clarification , see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 1, a. 1] 31 Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 52–59 [2nd. ed. 52–61]. 32 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

526

De Ratione Convenientiae

tivum. Unde obiectum est id quod volitur, et motivum est id propter quod volitur. Praeterea, propter idem motivum diversa obiecta inter se ordinata interdum voluntur. Unde distinguuntur obiectum principale, obiecta secundaria, et media. Obiectum principale est id cuius volitio ex motivo sequitur directe et immediate. Obiecta secundaria sunt alia bona quae necessario vel contingenter oriuntur ex suppositione obiecti principalis. Media denique sunt quae voluntur non propter se sed tantummodo propter aliud, ideoque conferunt ad obiectum principale vel ad obiecta secundaria quoad fieri sed non quoad esse permanens. Denique, actus fundamentalis voluntatis est amor; sed amare est velle bonum alicui; et is cui bonum volitur dicitur finis cui. Praeterea, cum amor mensuretur secundum bonum quod amato volitur, iidem sunt gradus amoris ac gradus boni voliti. Unde nulla nova quaestio umquam oritur legitime circa varia obiecta amoris, nam eo semper ordine et gradu amantur quo ordine et gradu bonum maius vel minus eis volitur.

(c) Proinde, ad quaestionem, et quidem systematice: Motivum Dei est unicum, nempe, ipsa divine bonitas. Obiectum voluntatis divinae principale etiam est eadem divina bonitas. Sicut enim in actu puro idem est esse et essentia et idem est intelligere essentiam et affirmare exsistentiam, ita etiam idem est motivum et obiectum voluntatis principale. Obiectum divinae voluntatis secundarium aut hypotheticum est aut actuale: hypotheticum vero est quilibet ordo possibilis; actuale vero est ordo rerum actu exsistens. Iam vero, uti vidimus, Deus vult alia a se volendo suam bonitatem, et vult res ordinatas volendo ipsum ordinem et proinde res intra ordinem contentas. Ideoque quaestio de fine Incarnationis est quaestio de habitudinibus inter Incarnationem et (1) totum ordinem, (2) caeteras ordinis partes, (3) peccatum praesertim Adae.

(d) Prima ergo conclusio est Incarnationem esse propter ordinem universi, et quidem propter hunc ordinem secundum omnes suas determinationes concretas, et speciatim qua peccato disruptum et divina misericordia reparandum.

The Robert Mollot Collection

527

The Notion of Fittingness

hence the object is that which is willed, and the motive is that on account of which it is willed. Furthermore, different objects that are interrelated are sometimes willed for the same motive – hence the distinction between the principal object, secondary objects, and means. The principal object is that whose being willed follows upon the motive directly and immediately. Secondary objects are other goods which either necessarily or contingently result on the supposition of the principal object. The means are those things that are willed not for their own sake but only for the sake of something else, and therefore contribute to the principal object, or to secondary objects, with respect to their production but not to their permanence in existence. Finally, the fundamental act of the will is love. But to love is to will good to another. And the one to whom a good is willed is the finis cui, the ‘endfor-whom.’ Besides, since love is measured according to the good willed to the beloved, the degree of love is equal to the degree of good willed. No further question, therefore, can legitimately arise concerning the various objects of love, for the order and degree of their being loved is always the same as the order and degree of the greater or lesser good that is being willed to them. (c) We shall now address the question, and do so systematically. God has but one motive, namely, the divine goodness. The principal object of the divine will is also this same divine goodness. For as in pure act essence and existence are identical, and understanding the essence and affirming existence are also identical, so also the motive and the principal object of the divine will are identical. The secondary object of the divine will is either hypothetical or actual. The hypothetical object is any possible order, while the actual secondary object is the actually existing order of reality. Now, as we have seen, God wills other beings by willing his goodness, and wills ordered beings by willing the order itself and accordingly the things contained within that order. Therefore the question about the purpose of the Incarnation is a question about the relations between the Incarnation and the order as a whole, the other parts of the order, and sin, especially the sin of Adam. [From this we draw the following conclusions.] (d) First, the Incarnation is for the sake of the order of the universe, and indeed for the sake of this order according to all its concrete details, and in a special way as an order disrupted by sin and needing to be repaired by the mercy of God.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

528

De Ratione Convenientiae

Nam pars est propter totum. Sed Incarnatio, prout hic intelligitur – vide supra sub (a) – est eventus quidam contingens in tempore factus. Et ordo universi est optimum in rebus creatis et perfectius participans et repraesentans divinam bonitatem quam alia quaelibet creatura; ordo enim concrete sumptus includit omnem bonitatem omnium creaturarum et addit formale bonum ordinis. (e) Altera conclusio est Incarnationem esse modo prorsus singulari partem principalem intra ordinem universi. Nam partes dicuntur principales in toto quatenus ordinem totius fundant atque determinant. Sed per Incarnationem totus ordo supernaturalis fundatur tum secundum legem iustitiae tum etiam secundum legem amoris, uti supra determinatum est. Praeterea, ille ordo supernaturalis per Incarnationem fundatus etiam est ordo supernaturalis primitivus et restitutus; Christus enim per propitiationem et satisfactionem et meritum ita peccata delevit ut plenam cum Deo reconciliationem effecerit. Praeterea, ille ordo supernaturalis est regnum Dei quod aptum natum est vincere regnum peccati et omnes suos effectus auferre. (f) Tertia conclusio est Incarnationem ita esse summum beneficium singulis hominibus ut tamen homines Christo et non Christus hominibus subordinetur. Est summum beneficium. Sicut enim ille qui ordinem oeconomicum disruptum reparat, omne bonum oeconomicum in ordine reparato quodammodo causat, ita etiam Christus, fundamentum et restitutor ordinis supernaturalis, omne bonum supernaturale et omnem peccati destructionem causat. Quod beneficium non subordinat Christum hominibus. Sicut enim Deus secundum illud ‘bonum sui diffusivum’ causat omne bonum finitum quin ipse subordinetur ulli creaturae, ita etiam Christus intra ordinem divinae beneficientiae peccatum destruit et dona supernaturalia confert quin ipse ulli homini subordinetur. Imo, caeteri homines Christo subordinantur. Sicut enim milites duci subordinantur et tamen per ducem victoriam et salutem sperant, ita omnes homines subordinantur Christo per quem victoriam et salutem sperant. Unde Christus est in omnibus primatum tenens. Et ‘omnia vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei,’ ubi genitivum possessionis denotat finem.33

The Robert Mollot Collection

529

The Notion of Fittingness

This is so because a part exists for the sake of the whole. But the Incarnation – see above at (a) – is a contingent event that has taken place in time. And the order of the universe is that which is best in all creation and which more perfectly participates in and reflects the divine goodness than any other created thing; for this order, considered in its concreteness, includes all the good of all creatures and adds to it the formal good of order. (e) Second, the Incarnation is in an absolutely unique way the principal part in the order of the universe. The principal parts of a whole are those that establish and determine the order of that whole. But through the Incarnation the whole supernatural order is established in accordance with both the law of justice and the law of love, as we have explained. Besides, the supernatural order established through the Incarnation is the primeval supernatural order restored; for Christ by his work of propitiation, satisfaction, and merit has wiped away sin to effect full reconciliation between humanity and God. Moreover, that supernatural order is the kingdom of God which by its very nature is equipped to overthrow the reign of sin and eliminate all its evil effects. (f) Third, the Incarnation is the supreme benefit for each human being, though in such as way that all are subordinate to Christ and not vice versa. It is the supreme benefit. Just as the one who repairs a broken economic order is, as it were, the cause of all the economic good in that repaired order, so is Christ as the foundation and restorer of the supernatural order the cause of all supernatural good and of all the destruction of sin. This benefaction does not subordinate Christ to human beings. For just as God, according to the dictum bonum sui diffusivum, ‘good is self-communicating,’ causes all finite good without being subordinate to any creature, so also Christ acting within the order of divine beneficence destroys sin and bestows supernatural good without himself being subordinated to anyone. Indeed, it is the rest of mankind that is subordinate to Christ. As soldiers are subordinate to their commander and yet hope for their victory and safety through him, so all persons are subordinate to Christ through whom they hope for victory and salvation. Thus Christ ‘has first place in all things’ (Colossians 1.18); and again, ‘all things are yours and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s’ (1 Corinthians 3.22–23), where the possessive genitive denotes purpose.33 33 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

530

De Ratione Convenientiae

(g) Quarta conclusio est quod, vi praesentis decreti, non futuram fuisse Incarnationem nisi Adam peccasset. Quod conditionale debet recte intelligi. Non enim dicit considerationem aliorum ordinum praeter actualem, nam solus ordo actualis est vi praesentis decreti. Ideoque non dicit quid fuisset in alio ordine ubi Adamus non peccaret. Neque supponit falsum, nempe, Adamum in hoc ordine non peccantem. Neque facit peccatum sive causam sive veram conditionem sive veram occasionem Incarnationis. Nam et causa et vera conditio et vera occasio dicunt aliquid proprie intelligibile. Sed peccatum ratione sui excludit intelligibilitatem proprie dictam. Neque supponit peccatum quocumque modo volitum sive .a Deo sive a Christo sive a iustis sive a beatis. Nam Deus nullo modo vult malum culpae, quod est oppositum ordinis divini.34 Et sicut Deus, ita Christus et iusti et beati nullo modo malum culpae volunt. Sed conditionale illud supponit unum et unum dicit. Supponit quidem Deum permittere peccatum Adae. Deus enim neque vult mala fieri neque vult mala non fieri sed vult permittere malum, et hoc est bonum.35 Cuius permissionis bonitas arcana sane est mysteriosa; unde admiratione aeterna canunt angeli: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus; aliquatenus tamen forte declarari potest inquantum ipsa infinitas divinae bonitatis, quae directe et positive in ente finito repraesentari non potest, indirecte per oppositionem infinitam inter volitum regnum Dei et permissum regnum peccati indicatur. Dicit denique illud conditionale ordinem qui viget inter finem et id quod ad finem est. Sublato enim fine, tollitur id quod ad finem est. Sed finis Incarnationis, vi praesentis decreti, est ordo universi restituendus; at nulla est restitutio nisi prior sit amissio; nulla amissio nisi per peccatum Adami; et ideo nulla Incarnatio nisi Adamus peccasset.

(h) Quibus perspectis, ad radicem aliarum sententiarum facile attingi-

The Robert Mollot Collection

531

The Notion of Fittingness

(g) The fourth conclusion is that in the present dispensation there would have been no Incarnation had Adam not sinned. This conditional sentence has to be correctly understood. It does not imply a consideration of some other order than the actually existing one, for in the present dispensation only this actual order exists. Therefore it does not say what would have happened in some other order in which Adam did not sin. Nor does it suppose what is false, that is, that in this actual order Adam did not sin. It does not make sin either a cause or a true condition or a true occasion of the Incarnation. A cause and a true condition and a true occasion state something that is properly intelligible, whereas sin in its very meaning excludes intelligibility properly so called. Finally, it does not suppose sin to have been in some way or other willed either by God or by Christ or by the just or by the blessed. God in no way wills the evil of sin, which is contrary to the divine order.34 And just as God does not will it, neither do Christ or the just or the blessed. But this conditional sentence makes one supposition and one statement. It supposes that God merely permits the sin of Adam. God neither wills evil to happen nor does he will evil not to happen, but he does will to permit evil, and that is something good.35 The goodness of this permission is surely an arcane mystery; hence with unceasing awe the angelic choirs sing, ‘Holy, holy, holy!’ Still, some light may perhaps be thrown upon it from the fact that the very infinity of divine goodness, which cannot be directly and positively represented in a finite being, is indirectly intimated through the infinite opposition between God’s willing his kingdom and his permitting the reign of sin. This sentence states the order that exists between a purpose and that which exists for that purpose. For if the purpose ceases to exist, so also does that which exists for that purpose. But the purpose of the Incarnation, in this present dispensation, is the restoration of the order of the universe. Yet there can be no restoration unless there has been a previous loss; and since there was no loss except through the sin of Adam, so there would have been no Incarnation had Adam not sinned. (h) In the light of all this, then, we can easily discern the root of other

34 Ibid. q. 19, a. 9 c. 35 Ibid. ad 3m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

532

De Ratione Convenientiae

tur. Id enim quod eas omnes fugit est differentia inter bona particularia et bonum ordinis. Si quis enim intellexerit bonum ordinis esse verum bonum et quidem formale respectu bonorum particularium, dubitare non potuit Christum esse propter ordinem quem fundat et reparat. Si quis vero bonum ordinis tamquam formale et distinctum bonum non perspexerit, sola bona particularia consideret necesse est; et tunc cum Scoto opinatur Deum per prius velle optimum bonum particulare, nempe, animam Christi, vel cum Suarezio Deum quasi ex aeque velle aut animam Christi aut animas redimendas, vel cum Molina Deum velle et animam Christi et animas redimendas. Quantum denique attinet ad ‘finem cuius’ et ‘finem cui,’ si quidem ‘finis cuius’ dicit finem proprie seu bonum cuius gratia, et ‘finis cui’ dicit obiectum amoris cui volitur illud bonum quod est finis, dicendum omnino videtur ‘finem cuius’ Incarnationis esse non Christum sed ordinem universi reparatum, et ‘finem cui’ esse et Christum et redimendos, at longe magis Christum qui quo caeteris melior est, eo plus caeteris a Deo diligitur.36

The Robert Mollot Collection

533

The Notion of Fittingness

opinions on this question. What eludes them all is the difference between particular goods and the good of order. One who has grasped the idea that the good of order is a true good and indeed the formal element of all particular goods cannot have any doubt that Christ exists for the sake of the order which he has founded and repairs. But one who has not perceived the good of order as a formal and distinct good can only consider particular goods, and then, with Scotus, hold that God first wills the best particular good, the soul of Christ, or, with Suárez, hold that God wills equally, as it were, either the soul of Christ or the souls to be redeemed, or, with Molina, hold that God wills both the soul of Christ and the souls to be redeemed. Finally, with regard to the ‘end-of-which’ (finis cuius) and the ‘end-forwhom’ (finis cui): if indeed the end-of-which means an end or purpose in the proper sense, that is, the good for the sake of which something exists or is made or done, and the end-for-whom means the object of the love for whom is willed the good that is the end, then it would seem we must maintain that the end-of-which of the Incarnation is not Christ but the repaired order of the universe, and the end-for-whom is both Christ and those to be redeemed – though Christ much more than they, inasmuch as God’s love for him is greater in proportion to his far greater excellence.36

36 Ibid. q. 20, a. 4, ad 1m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 6

De Conscientia Christi1

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 6

The Consciousness of Christ1

From Frederick E. Crowe, ‘Note on the Context of De conscientia Christi ’ This set of notes was written in the fall semester of 1952 as a help to students following Lonergan’s course that year, De Verbo incarnato, at Regis College (College of Christ the King), Toronto. There is little in the way of prior context. Lonergan had taught the same course in 1948–49, taking as text-book Adhémar d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato, 2nd ed., Paris, Beauchesne, 1930. That book has nothing on our topic; two pages on the Messianic consciousness are irrelevant. Nor was the topic raised by Lonergan during his lectures. But student notes on the course do record a lecture (or part of one) on the related problem of Christ having consciousness of his everyday experiences along with the immediate knowledge of God. The Regis four-year cycle brought the same course around again in 1952–53. By this time Lonergan had become aware of the new problem of the consciousness of Christ, especially through the book by P.Galtier, to which the notes refer; presumably wartime and post-wartime conditions had prevented its arrival in Toronto for the 1948–49 course. Unfortunately, 1 [This essay was mimeographed for students in Lonergan’s course in Christology at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto in the fall term of the 1952–53 academic year. For introductory comments, see Frederick E. Crowe, Christ and History 59–61.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

536

De Conscientia Christi

1 Conscientia est quaedam sui cognitio in qua (1) cognoscens et cognitum sunt idem, (2) identitas cognoscentis et cogniti cognoscitur, (3) haec identitas viget, non inter duos terminos qui pariter sub ratione obiecti cognoscuntur, sed inter duos terminos quorum alius est ipse cognoscens sub ratione subiecti manens et alius est idem cognoscens sub ratione obiecti positus. Aliter. Qui dicit ‘ego’, dicit ipsum dicentem. Inquantum dicit ‘ego’ ponit et constituit se sub ratione obiecti. Ut dicat ‘ego,’ rationem dicendi sufficientem iam habere debet. Conscientia est illa possessio cognitae rationis sufficientis ut quis ‘ego’ dicere possit.2

The Robert Mollot Collection

537

The Consciousness of Christ

however, apart from these notes De conscientia Christi, there are no data on Lonergan’s Christology lectures for the year 1952–53. But there are student notes (by Thomas Hanley) on a set of lectures Lonergan gave the same year on his book-in-preparation, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, and pages 68–70 of Hanley’s notebook deal with what would become chapter 11 of Insight and so with consciousness. The book itself had been completed between June 1949 and September 1953, though it was not published till 1957, so we have the interesting conjunction around 1951–52 of three sources on Lonergan’s thinking at the time on the topic of consciousness: the notes De conscientia Christi, the lectures on Insight in preparation, and chapter 11 of Insight itself – the precise order of the three is an interesting little task for some future researcher. That opens up the question of the ongoing context of De conscientia Christi, to be found in the data on his later courses and writings. Courses: the seven times he taught this course at the Gregorian University in Rome, 1953–65, as well as his courses on Christology in the early 1970s at Harvard University and Regis College. Writings: the 1956 volume De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica; the three editions of his De Verbo incarnato, 1960, 1961, 1964; and a few lectures and single articles – all part of that ongoing context. But it is enough in this short note on De conscientia Christi to have indicated those areas for future tasks. 1 Consciousness is a kind of knowledge of oneself in which (1) the knower and the known are the same, (2) the identity of the knower and the known is known, (3) this identity exists, not between two terms that are known alike under the formality of object, but between two terms, of which one is the knower present under the formality of subject, and the other is the same knower considered under the formality of object. In other words: to say ‘I’ is to refer to oneself as the one speaking. In saying ‘I,’ one situates and constitutes oneself under the formality of object. In order to say ‘I,’ one must already have sufficient grounds for saying it. Consciousness is that possession of grounds known as sufficient to enable one to say ‘I.’2 2 [The perspective from which Lonergan begins his account of consciousness is perhaps dictated by the theological purpose of this piece, where the issue is to indicate how Christ, with ample justification from his own beatific self-consciousness, can come to express the true judgment ‘I am God.’

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

538

De Conscientia Christi

2 Christus una persona est, eaque divina, in duabus naturis hypostatice unitis subsistens. Cum nulla in Christo exsistat persona humana, moveri non potest quaestio de conscientia personae humanae sive per naturam divinam sive per naturam humanam. Cum3 Christus sit persona divina ab aeterno in natura divina subsistens, moveri posset quaestio de conscientia personae divinae per naturam divinam. Quae quaestio difficultatem suam habet sed hic non tangitur. Quaerimus ergo de conscientia personae divinae per naturam humanam. Cumque in Christo homine exsistat scientia beata, non est dubium Christus homo sciat personam Verbi sub ratione obiecti; neque dubium quin Christus homo sciat personam Verbi incarnatam sub ratione obiecti. Quod tamen in omni scientia beata invenitur, neque ad rationem conscientiae sufficit. Deest enim illud quod in conscientia principale videtur, nempe, illa cognitio sui sub ratione subiecti unde procedit interius dictum verbum ‘ego.’ 3 Difficultas quaestionis est duplex. Prima est ut clare et distincte concipiatur ipsa conscientia; quae res quam sit difficilis ex problemate episte-

The Robert Mollot Collection

539

The Consciousness of Christ

2 Christ is one person – a divine person – subsisting in two natures hypostatically united. Since there is no human person in Christ, one cannot raise the question of the consciousness of a human person either through his divine nature or through his human nature. Since3 Christ is a divine person subsisting from eternity in a divine nature, the question of consciousness of his divine person through his divine nature could be raised. This is a difficult question and will not be dealt with here. Hence the question here is about the consciousness of a divine person through a human nature. Since Christ as man possesses beatific knowledge, there is no doubt that Christ as man knows the person of the divine Word under the formality of object; nor is there any doubt that Christ as man knows the incarnate person of the Word under the formality of object. But this is true of all beatific knowledge and does not fulfil the requirements for consciousness. For it lacks that which is the key element in consciousness, namely, that knowledge of oneself under the formality of subject whence the word ‘I’ spoken interiorly proceeds. 3 There are two difficulties in this question. The first is to have a clear and distinct concept of consciousness; the difficulty in this matter can be

Lonergan is considering human consciousness not simply as such, not as the preliminary and unstructured awareness of oneself and one’s acts (see Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 156–69) that is ‘just experience’ (Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003] 106), nor again as the ‘awareness immanent in cognitional acts’ (Lonergan, Insight 344), but quite specifically as the ‘obscure yet familiar awareness’ of the concrete unity of consciousness that enables one to say ‘I,’ with a view to the expression that would manifest that unity (ibid. 352). It may be that Lonergan has in mind here the empirical self-knowledge that is discussed in Verbum (88–90; see below, note 7) and in the present piece in §9, where he speaks of an ‘easy and ordinary selfknowledge that begins from interior experiences as individual data,’ where ‘there is grasped a certain concrete unity’ that is truly affirmed. His account of consciousness at least from Insight forward would avoid attributing to consciousness as such this much ‘self-knowledge.’ For two other pertinent discussions of the ‘I’ in Lonergan’s writings, see The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 168–81 and De Verbo Incarnato, 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 287–88.] 3 [Reading Cum for Dum in the original.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

540

De Conscientia Christi

mologico aestimari potest. At ulterius sunt difficultates speciales in Christo homine: quaeritur enim de conscientia humana ubi nulla est persona humana; et mirum videtur quod conscientia potest esse et finita et infiniti. 4 Positio quaestionis videtur recens esse. Maxime hac in re elaboravit P. Galtier, L’unité du Christ.4 His notulis tractatur pars speculativa et, primo, de ratione obiectivitatis, deinde, de obiectiva sui cognitione, tertio, de experientia, quarto, de conscientia, quinto, de experientia conscientiaque Christi hominis. 5 Primo, agitur de obiectivitate quae distinguitur in actualem, potentialem, similitudinariam, et erronee conceptam. Actualis obiectivitas est vel absoluta, vel consequens, vel normativa, vel materialis. Obiectivitas absoluta est quae convenit iudicio qua virtualiter inconditionato. Ideo enim iudicare possumus quia in praecedente actu intelligendi reflexo apprehenditur ratio sufficiens ita iudicandi; quae ratio sufficiens est quoddam virtualiter inconditionatum, i.e., conditionatum cuius conditiones sunt impletae. Obiectivitas consequens est ubicumque dantur plura iudicia eodem modo inter se relata ac sequentia, A est, B est, C est, …; A non est B neque C neque …; B non est C neque …; Ego sum A, ego haec iudicia profero. Tunc enim A, B, C, … absolute in campo entitatis ponuntur, inter se realiter distinguuntur, et inter haec obiecta exsistit quoddam A quod est subiectum et se ipsum ut subiectum cognoscit. Obiectivitas normativa consistit in eo quod inquisitio et reflectio fiunt praeter omnem influxum indebitum sive appetitus sensitivi sive voluntatis perversae. Obiectivitas materialis est quae habetur sive in datis externis sive in datis internis eo ipso quod dantur. 6 In ordine cognitionis genetico primo habetur obiectivitas materialis, deinde normativa, tertio absoluta, et quarto consequens. Primo enim sentimus seu experimur, deinde inquirimus et reflectimur, tertio iudicamus, et quarto per plura iudicia campum entitatis contemplamur. Obiectivitas potentialis dicit priorem quemque gradum, non prout in se consideratur, sed prout potentiam ulterioris vel ultimi gradus continet.

The Robert Mollot Collection

541

The Consciousness of Christ

gauged from the epistemological problem. But in the case of Christ as man there are also special difficulties: the problem of a human consciousness where there is no human person, and the marvel that a consciousness can be both finite itself and a consciousness of what is infinite. 4 This question has arisen rather recently. A very thorough treatment of it has been that of Paul Galtier in his book L’unité du Christ.4 In these notes we shall treat of the speculative aspect of this question under the following headings: (1) the notion of objectivity, (2) objective self-knowledge, (3) experience, (4) consciousness, and (5) the experience and consciousness of Christ as man. 5 First, objectivity. We can distinguish actual objectivity, potential objectivity, representational objectivity, and misconceived objectivity. Actual objectivity is divided into absolute, consequent, normative, and material. Absolute objectivity is that which belongs to a judgment as virtually unconditioned. For we are able to make a judgment because by a prior reflective act of understanding we have grasped the sufficient reason for so judging. This sufficient reason is something that is virtually unconditioned, that is, something conditioned whose conditions have been fulfilled. There is consequent objectivity whenever there are several judgments related to one another in the same way as the following: A is, B is, C is, …; A is not B nor C nor …; B is not C nor …; I am A, I make these judgments. For then A, B, C, … are posited absolutely in the field of existence, are really distinct from one another, and among these objects there exists an A who is a subject and knows himself or herself as subject. Normative objectivity consists in this, that inquiry and reflection are made without any undue influence from either the sense appetite or a perverse will. Material objectivity is that which is had both in exterior data and in interior data by the very fact that they are data, i.e., given. 6 In the order in which knowledge is considered genetically, first there is had material objectivity, then normative, third absolute, and fourth consequent objectivity. For first we sense or experience, next we inquire and reflect, third we judge, and fourth, through several judgments, we contemplate the field of existence. Potential objectivity refers to each prior stage considered not as it is in itself but as containing the potentiality for a further or a final stage. 4 Paul Galtier, L’unité du Christ, 2nd ed. (Paris: Beauchesne, 1939).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

542

De Conscientia Christi

7 Eodem quodam modo inter se referuntur entia quae obiectivitate consequente cognoscuntur et, alia ex parte, sensibilia sensus moventia et animal (seu homo sensibilibus immersus). Sicut enim A et B sunt, pariter sensus in A moventur et sensibilia in B movent. Sicut A non est B, pariter in campo mere sensibili diversa loca occupantur per sensus A et per sensibilia B. Propter hanc similitudinem adest in campo mere sensibili obiectivitas quaedam similitudinaria. Quae sane distinguenda est tum ab obiectivitate potentiali tum ab obiectivitate materiali. Obiectivitas enim potentialis est obiectivitas non actu sed potentia; dicit id quod erit obiectivum et ut tale cognitum si accedit iudicium recte elicitum. Sed obiectivitas similitudinaria est quaedam obiectivitas actualis; ad eam habendam sufficit ipsa perceptio sensitiva. Iterum, obiectivitas materialis pariter habetur tum in sensationibus veridicis tum in illusionibus et hallucinationibus; haec enim omnia dantur et pariter explicatione indigent. At in illusionibus et hallucinationibus non adest obiectivitas similitudinaria nam deest similitudo inter tales experientias et campum entitatis. 8 Obiectivitas denique erronee concepta oritur ex defectu distinctionum necessariarum. Initio enim intellectus humanus est quasi tabula rasa in qua nihil describitur; celerius plerumque et plenius evolvitur pars animalis quam pars rationalis in homine; ex quo fit ut homo cognoscat per experientiam, per inquisitionem et actus intelligendi, per reflectionem et iudicia, quin tamen clare et distincte sciat quemadmodum cognoscat. Qua de causa cum de homine vulgari vel de philosopho parum acuto5 quaeratur quid per illud nomen ‘obiectivitas’ intelligat, confuse respondet. Maxime evidens ei videtur obiectivitas similitudinaria; nec tamen a ratione entis et veri omnino praescindere consentit. Qua de causa dicere solet ens reale esse, non id quod est, sed id quod est ibi extra mentem, quasi ipsa mens non esset realis. Unde oritur notum problema criticum.6

The Robert Mollot Collection

543

The Consciousness of Christ

7 Beings known by consequent objectivity are related to one another in the same way as, in another case, sensible data that activate the senses are related to the sensing animal (or a human immersed in sensible data). For just as A and B exist, similarly the senses in A are activated and the sensible data in B activate. And just as A is not B, so in the field of mere sensation different places are occupied by the senses of A and the sensible data of B. Because of this similarity there is already in the field of mere sensation a certain representational objectivity, which must certainly be distinguished from both potential and material objectivity. For potential objectivity is objectivity not in act but in potency: it refers to what will be objective and known as such once a judgment is correctly made. But representational objectivity is a kind of actual objectivity: all that is required for it is sense perception itself. Again, material objectivity is had in true sensations and likewise in illusions and hallucinations; all these things occur and all alike need explanation. But in illusions and hallucinations there is no representational objectivity, since there is no similitude between such experiences and the field of existence. 8 Finally, there is misconceived objectivity, which arises from a failure to make certain necessary distinctions. The human mind at first is a tabula rasa, as it were, a blank page on which nothing has been written; as a general rule the animal part in humans develops more quickly and more fully than the rational part. Hence we know through experience, through inquiry and insights, and through reflection and judgments without, however, knowing clearly and distinctly how we come to know. Thus if you ask an ordinary person – or a less perceptive5 philosopher – what the word ‘objectivity’ means, their answers are rather vague. It is representational objectivity that seems most obvious to them, yet they are not willing to prescind entirely from the formalities of being and truth. For this reason they will usually say that real being is, not ‘that which is,’ but ‘that which is there outside the mind’ – as if the mind itself were not real. This is the source of the famous critical problem.6 5 [Reading acuto for cauto in the original.] 6 [There are some obvious similarities between Lonergan’s discussion of objectivity here and his discussion of objectivity in Insight, but there are also some differences. First, there is no terminological equivalent in Insight to the distinction between actual and potential objectivity, though what is meant by ‘potential objectivity’ is easily accommodated within the account of objectivity given in Insight.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

544

De Conscientia Christi

9 Deinde de obiectiva sui cognitione sunt pauca dicenda. Alia est sui cognitio facilis et communis quae ab experientiis internis incipit tamquam a datis individualibus, in iis intelligitur unitas quaedam concreta (unum per se, ens per se, substantia), et denique haec unitas esse vere affirmatur. Alia vero est sui cognito subtilis et difficilis. Incipit ab experientiis internis, non qua individualibus sed qua talibus; distinguit eas per obiecta sua; ex obiectis procedit ad actus; ex actibus ad habitus et potentias; et ex potentiis ad essentiam animae. Qua inquisitione peracta et quidditate animae concepta, sequitur reflectio et iudicium de natura sui ipsius.

The Robert Mollot Collection

545

The Consciousness of Christ

9 Second, a few remarks about objective self-knowledge are in order. On the one hand, there is that easy and ordinary self-knowledge that begins from interior experiences as individual data; in these there is grasped a certain concrete unity (one in itself, being per se, substance), and finally this unity is truly affirmed. On the other hand, there is a self-knowledge that is difficult and subtle. It begins from interior experiences, considered not as individual data but as experiences as such. It distinguishes them by reason of their objects, and from objects one proceeds to acts, from acts to habits and potencies, and from potencies to the essence of the soul. Having completed this inquiry and arrived at a concept of the soul, reflection and judgment about one’s own nature follow.

Second, the division of actual objectivity here into absolute, consequent, normative, and material objectivity does not quite correspond to the distinctions mentioned in Insight, though there are some equivalences. With respect both to what is meant and to terminology, absolute objectivity and normative objectivity here correspond to absolute objectivity and normative objectivity in Insight. With respect just to what is meant, consequent objectivity corresponds to principal objectivity in Insight, and material objectivity corresponds to experiential objectivity in Insight. Unlike the division of actual objectivity here into absolute, consequent, normative, and material objectivity, in Insight absolute objectivity, normative objectivity, and experiential objectivity are said to be the three ‘partial aspects’ or ‘components’ of the ‘principal and complete notion of objectivity’ (see Insight 399–409). Third, there is no category in Insight that unambiguously corresponds to what here is called ‘representational objectivity’ (obiectivitas similitudinaria). It would seem that representational objectivity, which is said to require only sense perception, refers to the realism of the extroverted animal. It is constituted completely on the level of experience. It is the knowing that does not inquire but finds one’s environment ‘as already constituted, already offering opportunities, already issuing challenges’ (Insight 276). Such knowing involves a kind of actual objectivity that is largely unquestioned. Such knowing is not concerned with mere appearance. Finally, misconceived objectivity has to do with the basic counterposition on objectivity as this is portrayed in Insight: ‘Against the objectivity that is based on intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, there stands the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness and its uncritical survival not only in dramatic and practical living but also in much of philosophic thought’ (410). Such ‘objectivity’ is conceived ‘as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction’ (413). The misconception to which Lonergan refers here arises ‘from a failure to make certain necessary distinctions,’ that is, from confusing the criteria of fully human knowing and those of the animal knowing here alluded to in talking of obiectivitas similitudinaria.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

546

De Conscientia Christi

Utraque haec cognitio est sui ipsius: per priorem cognoscitur subiectum in individuali; per posteriorem cognoscitur idem subiectum per naturam universalem.7 Praeterea, haec sui cognitio habet obiectivitatem materialem inquantum experientiae dantur, normativam inquantum debito modo inquiritur et reflectitur, absolutam inquantum recte iudicatur, et consequentem inquantum cum aliis iudiciiis comparatur.8 10 Tertio, de experientia agendum est. In processu cognoscitivo, non solum exhibentur ea quae sentiuntur, imaginantur, intelliguntur, concipiuntur, affirmantur, sed etiam ipsae operationes sentiendi, imaginandi, intelligendi, concipiendi, affirmandi quodammodo adsunt. Quae operationum praesentia est duplex: si enim operatio consideratur inquantum dicit subiecti mutationem, passionem, operationis receptionem, operationis praesentia dicitur experientia; si vero operatio consideratur inquantum dicit subiecti attentionem, intentionem, nisum, actionem, operationis praesentia dicitur conscientia. Quare, late et improprie dicimur experiri res exteriores ut colores, sonos, etc. Praeterea, conscientia prout experientiam comitatur non dicit rationem illam specialem quae nominatur conscientia sui vel conscientia personae sui consciae. Sed experientia aspectum passivum, conscientia aspectum activum eiusdem operationis interioris dicit.9

The Robert Mollot Collection

547

The Consciousness of Christ

Each knowledge above is a knowledge of oneself. Through the first the subject is known in its individuality; through the second the same subject is known through a universal nature.7 Moreover, this self-knowledge possesses material objectivity inasmuch as experiences are had, normative objectivity inasmuch as there is due inquiry and reflection, absolute objectivity inasmuch as judgments are correctly made, and consequent objectivity inasmuch as comparisons are made with other judgments.8 10 Third, we consider experience. In the cognitional process not only the objects of sensation, imagination, understanding, conception, and affirmation are involved, but also the very operations of sensing, imagining, understanding, conceiving, and affirming are present in some way. The presence of these operations is twofold. If the operation is considered as referring to a change in the subject, a ‘passion,’ the reception of an operation, then the presence of the operation is called ‘experience’; but if the operation is considered as referring to the attention or intention or effort or action of the subject, its presence is called ‘consciousness.’ Hence broadly and improperly speaking we are said to experience external things such as colors, sounds, and so on. Moreover, consciousness considered as accompanying experience does not have a special reference to what is called self-consciousness, or the consciousness of one who is self-conscious. Rather, experience refers to the passive aspect, consciousness to the active aspect, of the same interior operation.9

7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 87, a. 1. 8 [For an earlier and more extensive discussion of the two kinds of self-knowledge in Aquinas, see Lonergan, Verbum 87–99.] 9 [Nowhere else in his published writings does Lonergan distinguish experience and consciousness in the way he does here. Indeed, as Frederick Crowe remarks in Christ and History 60, the distinction is not included in the discussion of similar problems four years later in De constitutione Christi. Although, as Crowe goes on to indicate, there is one later reference to consciousness as meaning ‘that one is doing the thinking’ (Topics in Education 81), he says that the account of consciousness in terms of ‘the effort or action of the subject’ is ambiguous when compared to the definition of consciousness in De constitutione Christi as the interior experience of oneself and one’s acts. It would seem that Lonergan came to conclude that distinguishing experience and consciousness in the way he does here was not useful for expressing what he had in mind. It might be added that there is a later discussion of the

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

548

De Conscientia Christi

11 Obiectivitas quae experientiae vel conscientiae competit est materialis. Ex operationibus praesentibus proceditur ad inquirendum et reflectendum, et sic oritur obiectivitas normativa; ex inquisitione et reflectione oritur iudicium, et sic habetur obiectivitas absoluta; ex iudiciis comparatis oritur entis et veri contemplatio, et sic habetur obiectivitas consequens. Qua de causa omnino evitandus est error vulgaris et communis qui conflatur ex facto introspectionis et ex notione obiectivitatis inadequata et erronea. Introspectio habetur inquantum fit transitus ex obiectis in actus, ex eo quod sentitur in actum sentiendi, ex eo quod imaginatur in actum imaginandi, ex eo quod intelligitur in actum intelligendi, ex eo quod concipitur in actum concipiendi, ex eo quod affirmatur in actum affirmandi. Quo transitu peracto, habetur obiectivitas materialis, i.e., habetur materia unde per inquisitionem, intelligentiam, conceptionem, reflectionem, et iudicium ad ens et verum pervenitur. Qui autem obiectivitatem perperam concipiunt, falso autumant introspectionem dicere miram quandam neque exsistentem inspectionem inspectionis vel inspectionem inspicientis; unde alii ad rationem conscientiae et experientiae fingendum procedunt, et alii contradicentes ipsam conscientiam et experientiam exsistere negant. Brevi, nulla exsistit inspectio inspectionis; et nulla exsistit inspectio inspicientis. Sed in ipso actu introspiciendi, inquantum hic actus ut activus consideratur, habetur conscientia, et inquantum idem actus ut passivus consideratur, habetur experientia. 12 Ulterius, evitandus est error Kantianus, qui experientiam internam ad sensum quendam interiorem restringit, quasi actus intelligendi, reflectendi, iudicandi quodammodo extra campum experientiae et conscientiae procederent. Archimedes sane experiebatur se intellexisse; haec enim experientia causa fuit unde exsiliit atque Eureka exclamavit. Adeo positio Kantiana factis non fulcitur ut magis ex placitis sui syste-

The Robert Mollot Collection

549

The Consciousness of Christ

11 The objectivity of experience or consciousness is material objectivity. The presence of operations leads to inquiry and reflection, and thus there arises normative objectivity; inquiry and reflection result in a judgment, and here there is absolute objectivity; from the comparison of judgments there arises the contemplation of being and truth, and here there is consequent objectivity. Therefore one must by all means avoid the common error that arises from the fact of introspection combined with an inadequate and mistaken notion of objectivity. Introspection is had inasmuch as one proceeds from objects to acts, from that which is sensed to the act of sensing, from that which is imagined to the act of imagining, from that which is understood to the act of understanding, from that which is conceived to the act of conceiving, from that which is affirmed to the act of affirming. When this process is completed there results material objectivity, that is, there is had the material from which through inquiry, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, and judging one arrives at being and truth. But those who have a false concept of objectivity will erroneously maintain that introspection means a marvellous but nonexistent looking at looking or a taking a look at oneself looking. Hence some are led to give a fictitious explanation of consciousness and experience, while others on the contrary deny the very existence of consciousness and experience. Briefly, there is no such thing as looking at looking, nor is there such a thing as looking at oneself looking. Rather, in the very act of introspection, insofar as this act is considered as an activity, it is consciousness, and insofar as this same act is considered as a passivity, it is experience. 12 Furthermore, one must avoid the error of Kant, who restricts interior experience to some internal sense, as if the acts of understanding, reflecting, and judging went on somehow outside the field of experience and consciousness. Archimedes surely experienced the fact that he had understood something. It was this experience that caused him to jump up and exclaim, Eureka! Kant’s position is so far from resting on a factual basis that it is more un-

same theological issue as is treated here in The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 204–19.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

550

De Conscientia Christi

matis intelligitur: eiusmodi enim erat systema Kantianum ut obiectivitatem similitudinariam vel erroneam reiceret quin ad obiectivitatem absolutam perveniret; at cum desunt distinctiones inter obiectivitatem actualem et potentialem, inter materialem, normativam, absolutam, et consequentem, facillime errores circa experientiam et conscientiam exsurgunt. Quare, sicut dantur obiecta quae sentiuntur et obiecta quae intelliguntur et obiecta quae rationabiliter affirmantur, pariter datur experientia sensitiva, intellectualis, et rationalis, et pariter datur conscientia sensitiva, intellectualis, et rationalis. 13 Quarto, de conscientia sui agendum est. In primis, agnoscenda est unitas ex parte obiecti, scilicet, id quod sentitur est idem ac id de quo inquiritur; id de quo inquiritur est idem ac id de quo intelligitur; id quod intelligitur est idem ac id de quo reflectitur; id de quo reflectitur est idem ac id in quo invenitur ratio inconditionati virtualis; id in quo haec ratio invenitur est idem ac id quod rationabiliter affirmatur. Quae unitas ex parte obiecti pariter invenitur sive incipitur ex datis exterioribus ut coloribus vel figuris sive incipitur ex datis interioribus. Ulterius, eadem unitas ex parte obiecti habetur cum incipitur ex datis interioribus, sive haec passive considerantur ut obiecta experientiae sive active considerantur ut conscia. Denique, quando incipitur ex datis interioribus sive ut expertis sive ut consciis, inceptio est non tantum ex experientia vel conscientia sensitiva sed etiam est ex experientia vel conscientia intellectuali et rationali. Possumus enim intelligere quid sit intelligere vel quid sit reflectere; possumus affirmare exsistentiam illius quidditatis quae essentiam intelligentiae vel reflectionis exhibet. 14 At praeter unitatem ex parte obiecti, etiam requiritur unitas ex parte subiecti. Si idem est quod sentitur et quod intelligitur, idem pariter debet esse qui sentit et qui intelligit. Si alius sentiret et alius intelligeret, tunc sentiens non intelligeret quid sentit; et quod peius est, qui reputatur intelligere intelligere non posset, cum sensibile non haberet in quo intelligibile perspiceret.

Proinde, eodem argumento stabilitur identitas non solum sentientis et intelligentis, sed etiam imaginantis, inquirentis, concipientis, reflectentis, inconditionatum perspicientis, et iudicantis. Sicut enim idem verum et ens pedetentim cognoscitur inquantum ex sensibilibus et imaginariis per inqui-

The Robert Mollot Collection

551

The Consciousness of Christ

derstandable from the tenets of his system. For the Kantian system rejected representational or erroneous objectivity without arriving at absolute objectivity. But when the distinction between actual and potential objectivity and between material, normative, absolute, and consequent objectivity is not made, errors about experience and consciousness very easily arise. Therefore just as there are objects that are sensed, objects that are understood, and objects that are rationally affirmed, so there is experience that is sentient, intellectual, and rational, and likewise consciousness that is sentient, intellectual, and rational. 13 Fourth, on consciousness of oneself. First of all, we must acknowledge the unity on the side of the object: that is, what is sensed is the same as what is inquired into; what is inquired into is the same as what is understood; what is understood is the same as what is reflected upon; what is reflected upon is the same as that in which the virtually unconditioned is found verified; and that in which the virtually unconditioned is found verified is the same as that which is rationally affirmed. This unity on the side of the object is equally present whether one begins from exterior data such as colors and shapes or from interior data. Again, this same unity on the side of the object is had when one begins from interior data, whether these are considered in a passive sense as objects of experience or in an active sense as conscious. Finally, when one begins from interior data, whether these are considered as experienced or as conscious, the starting point is not only sense experience or sense consciousness, but can also be intellectual and rational experience or consciousness. For we can understand what understanding is and what reflection is; and we can affirm the existence of the quiddity that exhibits the essence of understanding or reflection. 14 But besides the unity on the side of the object, unity on the side of the subject is also a requisite. If it is the same thing that is sensed and is understood, then the one who senses and the one who understands must likewise be one and the same. If one person were to sense and another understand, then the one sensing would not understand what he or she was sensing; and what is worse, one who is supposed to understand would not be able to understand, since such a person would lack sensible data in which to grasp the intelligible. And so by the same reasoning we can establish the identity not only of the one sensing and understanding, but also of the one imagining, inquiring, conceiving, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. For just as the same thing gradually comes to be known as true and as being inas-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

552

De Conscientia Christi

sitionem et intelligentiam et conceptionem pervenitur ad reflectionem et iudicium, pari ratione necesse est ut idem sit qui varias operationes incompletas et alias ex aliis complendas ponat.

15 Iam vero haec unitas ex parte subiecti multipliciter considerari potest. Ontologica est inquantum exsistit homo cum potentiis sensitivis et intellectualibus, sive homo ille vigilat sive dormit. Conscia est inquantum homo exsistens potentias cognoscitivas actuat. Aliter tamen et aliter. Inquantum enim homo ad sola sensibilia attendit, non tota unitas fit conscia sed tantum pars sensitiva. Inquantum vero homo intelligibile in sensibilibus quaerit vel invenit vel inventum concipit, magis conscia fit illa unitas, quippe quae simul in ordine sensitivo et intellectuali versatur. Inquantum denique homo super intelligibile inventum et conceptum reflectitur an sit, plene conscius est, quippe qui simul ad sensibilia, intelligibilia, et rationalia attendit et ideo conscientiam sensitivam, intellectualem, et rationalem habet.

Aliud tamen est conscium esse et aliud hanc conscientiam concipere. Omnis homo plus minus est conscius modo vigilet. At pauciores sunt qui ad rationem conscientiae clare et distincte concipiendam perveniant. Distinguenda enim est conscientia ab experientia, et per unitatem ex parte obiecti ad unitatem ex parte subiecti procedendum est. Ultimus denique gressus habetur cum quis se sui conscium esse affirmat. Qui enim est et sui conscius est, debet ulterius quid sit conscientia concipere et ulterius reflectere utrum hoc quod concipitur ratione inconditionati gaudeat. Quae inconditionati ratio eatenus perspicitur quatenus quis conscientiam conceptam in materiali obiectivitate propriae conscientiae verificat. Quae verificatio in omni dubitante perfici possit necesse est, nec quicquam refert de quo dubitet. Si enim dubitat, reflectitur et quaerit de quopiam An sit. Habet ergo conscientiam rationalem. Praeterea, illud de quo quaerit, aliquomodo concipit. Habet ergo conscientiam intellectualem per quam inquisivit et intellexit et concepit illud de quo quaerit An sit. Denique, nulla est inquisitio nisi per prius adest id de quo quaeritur; sicut ergo reflectio, An sit, supponit conceptionem, pariter inquisitio, Quid sit, unde

The Robert Mollot Collection

553

The Consciousness of Christ

much as from what is sensed and imagined one proceeds to reflection and judgment through inquiry, understanding, and conception, so in the same way one who performs various incomplete operations and other operations to be completed from further operations must necessarily be one and the same person. 15 Now this unity on the side of the subject can be considered in several ways. It is ontological inasmuch as a person is in existence with sentient and intellectual faculties, whether that person is asleep or awake. It is conscious inasmuch as an existing human being actuates his or her cognitive faculties. This, however, can take place in different ways. Inasmuch as one attends only to sensible data, not one’s total unity but only the sentient component of one’s being becomes conscious. But inasmuch as one seeks the intelligible in sensible data or finds it or, having found it, conceives it, that unity becomes more conscious, since it is present in both the sentient and intellectual orders simultaneously. Finally, inasmuch as one reflecting upon the intelligible that one has found and conceived asks the question ‘Is it so?’ one is fully conscious because of attending simultaneously to the sensible, the intelligible, and the rational, and thus has a consciousness that is sentient, intellectual, and rational. However, it is one thing to be conscious and quite another to have a concept of consciousness. Anyone who is awake is more or less conscious. But those who have come to have a clear and distinct idea of consciousness are rather few. For consciousness must be distinguished from experience, and one must proceed through the unity on the side of the object to the unity on the side of the subject. The final step in this process occurs when one affirms that one is conscious of oneself. For whoever is and is conscious of self must further conceive what consciousness is and further reflect whether this concept possesses the formality of the unconditioned. The unconditioned is grasped as one verifies one’s concept of consciousness in the material objectivity of one’s own consciousness. This act of verification must necessarily be able to be performed by anyone who has a doubt, and it does not matter what one is doubtful about. For if you doubt, you reflect and ask ‘Is this so?’ about whatever you are doubtful about. Thus you have rational consciousness. Moreover, you have some sort of concept about what you are seeking to understand. Thus you have intellectual consciousness by means of which you inquired into and understood and formed a concept of that about which you are asking, ‘Is it so?’

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

554

De Conscientia Christi

orta est conceptio, supponit experientiam sensitivam. Habet ergo conscientiam sensitivam. Et ex argumento iam facto de unitate conscientiae ex parte subiecti, conscientia illa sensitiva, intellectualis, et rationalis non sunt tres conscientiae sed una; secus nihil intelligeretur vel dubitaretur.

16 Quo clarius et facilius inter conscientiam et experientiam distinguatur, iuvat illud Aristotelicum considerare, nempe, qui cum sceptico tractat, efficere oportere ut scepticus loquatur. Vis huius consilii in eo reponitur quod de facto ille qui scepticus est etiam intelligens et rationabilis est. Iam vero ipsa conscientia intellectualis et rationalis subest legibus suis necessariis. Intelligens potest se fingere stupidum, sed ipsa sua fictio cum intelligenter fiat intelligentiam trahit. Rationalis potest se fingere non rationalem, sed rationes cur non-rationalis appareat et quaerebit et habebit. Porro, hoc consilium Aristotelicum fundatur non in experientia interna sed in conscientia. Non ex eo procedit quod scepticus experitur suam intelligentiam et suam rationabilitatem. Sed ex eo procedit quod scepticus intelligens non potest agere et loqui quasi prorsus stupidus esset; et scepticus rationabilis non potest agere et loqui quasi prorsus non-rationabilis esset. Fundatur ergo consilium in adspectu activo actuum interiorum, et ideo in conscientia potius quam experientia nititur. 17 Ad conscientiam Christi tandem pervenimus. In primis, clarum videtur maximas et fere insolubiles oriri difficultates si quis conscientiam erronee concipit, quasi quandam inspectionis inspectionem vel inspicientis inspectionem. Si enim conscientia est inspectio inspectionis, cum haec et illa finitae sint, nulla habetur conscientia finita infiniti. Si autem conscientia est inspectio inspicientis, verificatur ratio haec in visione Christi beata; quae tamen visio non est conscientia proprie dicta, nam in visione exhibetur quidem inspiciens in ratione obiecti, sed non liquet illud quod in ratione obiecti exhibetur esse terminum qui ideo cum subiecto identificatur quod ex obiecto procedit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

555

The Consciousness of Christ

Finally, there can be no inquiry unless there is first something to inquire into; thus just as reflection (‘Is it so?’) presupposes conception, so inquiry (‘What is it?’), from which conception results, presupposes sense experience. Therefore, you have sentient consciousness. And from our previous argument concerning the unity on the side of the subject, we conclude that sentient consciousness, intellectual consciousness, and rational consciousness are not three consciousnesses but one; otherwise nothing would be understood or doubted. 16 In order to distinguish more clearly and easily between consciousness and experience, it will help to consider Aristotle’s suggestion, namely, that one who is dealing with a skeptic should get the skeptic to say something. The point of this advice is that in fact one who is a skeptic is also intelligent and rational. Now intellectual and rational consciousness are subject to their own necessary laws. An intelligent person could pretend to be stupid, but that very pretence, since it is done intelligently, manifests intelligence. A rational person could pretend to be non-rational, but that same person will look for and will find reasons for appearing to be nonrational. Moreover, this advice of Aristotle’s is not based upon inner experience but upon consciousness. For it is not taken from the fact that a skeptic experiences intelligence and rationality, but rather from the fact that a skeptic who is intelligent cannot act and speak as if totally stupid, and one who is rational cannot act and speak as if totally non-rational. This advice therefore is based upon the active aspect of interior acts, and therefore upon consciousness rather than experience. 17 Finally, we come to the consciousness of Christ. First of all, it seems clear that great and virtually insoluble difficulties arise if one has a mistaken notion of consciousness, as if it were a kind of looking at looking or looking at the looker. For, if consciousness is a looking at looking, since both ‘lookings’ are finite realities, there can be no such thing as finite consciousness of what is infinite. If, however, consciousness is a looking at a looker, such a consciousness would be verified in the case of the beatific vision of Christ. But this vision is not consciousness properly speaking, for in this vision the looker is indeed present under the formality of object, but it is not clear that that which is presented under the formality of object is that term which, because it proceeds from the object, is identified with the subject.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

556

De Conscientia Christi

18 Ulterius, in Christo distinguere oportet inter unitatem naturae et unitatem personae. Unitas naturae constituitur per animam humanam quae corpus informat et principium est quo Christus homo vivit, sentit, intelligit. Unitas vero personae constituitur per esse personale Verbi, quo communicato exsistit anima unde exsistunt corpus et operationes. Porro, sicut forma intelligendo perspicitur et esse reflectendo affirmatur, ratio naturae praecipue innotescit in actu qui versatur circa quaestionem, Quid sit, et ratio personae praecipue innotescit in actu qui versatur circa quaestionem An sit. Quare, unitas naturae est unitas quaedam intelligibilis, seu unitas illa quae innotescit cum identitas in multis datis perspicitur. At unitas personae est unitas quae reflectendo et affirmando innotescit, illa nempe quae per principia identitatis et non-contradictionis exprimitur. Et secundum hanc unitatem dicitur unum indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio. (A est A; A non est non-A). 19 Porro, attendenda est differentia quae intercedit inter scientiam Christi beatam et eandem scientiam in quolibet alio. Quamvis enim scientia beata in Christo est et dicitur gratia relate ad naturam humanam Christi, non tamen pariter gratia est relate ad personam Christi quae est infinita et aeterna. Si enim operari sequitur esse, sane scire Deum sequitur esse Deum; at Christus est Deus, et ideo ratione eius esse sequitur in Christo scientia beata. In aliis vero beatis, qui non sunt Deus, scientia beata per gratiam et per participationem meritorum Christi communicatur. Sub aspectu ontologico non resultat visio in iis sive ex natura propria sive ex esse proprio. 20 Iam vero, experientia dicitur in quantum operatio recipitur, conscientia vero in quantum operatio ex ipso subiecto procedit. Hac de causa magis conspicua est ratio experientiae in actu hominis, quem actum magis patimur quam facimus, et magis conspicua est ratio conscientiae in actu humano, quem actum per prius facimus quam patimur.10 Quibus perspectis, conveniens esse videtur distinguere inter conscien-

The Robert Mollot Collection

557

The Consciousness of Christ

18 Furthermore, in Christ one must make a distinction between unity of nature and unity of person. The unity of nature is constituted by his human soul, which informs his body and is the principle by which Christ as man lives, senses, understands. The unity of person is constituted by the personal act of existence of the Word, by the communication of which the soul exists whence in turn the body and its operations exist. Moreover, as form is grasped in an act of understanding and existence is affirmed by reflection, the meaning of nature is known mainly in that act which has to do with the question ‘What is it?’ while the meaning of person is known mainly in that act which has to do with the question ‘Is it?’ Thus, unity of nature is an intelligible unity, a unity that is known when identity is grasped in a multiplicity of data. Unity of person, by contrast, is a unity which is known by reflection and affirmation, that is, which is expressed through the principles of identity and non-contradiction. And it is according to this unity that a thing is said to be undivided in itself and divided from everything else (A is A; A is not non-A). 19 Also, we must note the difference between Christ’s beatific knowledge and the beatific knowledge had by anyone else. Although Christ’s beatific knowledge is, and is called, grace with respect to his human nature, it is not likewise grace with respect to the person of Christ, who is infinite and eternal. For if operation follows being, then surely God’s knowing follows upon God’s being; but Christ is God, and therefore in Christ the beatific knowledge is had by reason of his being. But in the case of the other blessed, who are not God, beatific knowledge is received through grace and through participation in the merits of Christ. Ontologically speaking, this vision in them is not consequent upon either their own nature or their own being. 20 Now, an operation is said to be ‘experience’ inasmuch as it is received [in a subject], but ‘consciousness’ inasmuch as the operation proceeds from the subject. For this reason the element of experience is more prominent in an ‘act of a man,’ in which we are more passive than active, while the element of consciousness is more prominent in a ‘human act,’ in which we are primarily active rather than passive.10 In view of this it seems appropriate to distinguish between experience

10 [For the distinction between human act (actus humanus) and act of a man (actus hominis), see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 1, a. 1 c.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

558

De Conscientia Christi

tiam et experientiam visionis beatificae cum in Christo tum in aliis beatis. Pariter enim et Christus et alii beati experiuntur visionem; pariter enim in utrisque mediante lumine gloriae quodammodo illabitur divina essentia ad modum speciei intelligibilis et necessario sequitur visio. At aliter Christus et aliter beati sunt conscii visionis: ita enim visio ex beatis procedit tamquam essentialiter gratuitum et indebitum et per merita Christi collatum; at in Christo ille qui est est persona divina et infinita; ex eo procedit visio non ut prorsus indebita et gratuita sed, ut supra habitum est, tamquam resultans ex esse infinito quod est.

21 Quibus positis, quodammodo elucet quemadmodum Christus homo ex sui conscientia affirmare potuit quod Deus sum. Scit enim Christus homo omnia quae theologi sciunt de ratione indebiti et supernaturalis. Scit ulterius Christus quae theologi ignorant de differentia inter conscientiam visionis in aliis beatis et conscientiam visionis in Deo homine facto. Praeter hanc scientiam, quae intelligendo et affirmando constituitur et ex ratione obiecti Christo exhibetur, etiam Christo homini inest conscientia propria visionis. Quam conscientiam non cuiusvis beati Christus invenit sed eam qualis Verbo incarnato conveniat. Conscius est enim Christus propriam visionem ex se et ratione sui esse procedere. Unde ille qui est Deus ita est conscius propriae visionis Dei ut certo possit affirmare et certo affirmat se ipsum cognoscentem esse eundem ac Verbum visione cognitum. 22 Ulterius, Christus homo non solum visionis est conscius sed etiam aliarum operationum. In quantum harum operationum intelligibilem unitatem perspicit et affirmat, cognitionem suae humanae naturae pervenit. In quantum eadem persona est conscia operationum quae ita excedunt proportionem naturae humanae ut tamen proportionem esse personae non excedant, perspicit et affirmat Christus se habere aliam naturam praeter humanam et hanc aliam naturam esse divinam. Denique utraque natura affirmata, minime impeditur affirmatio unitatis personae. Haec enim unitas alia est ac unitas naturae, uti supra §18 habi-

The Robert Mollot Collection

559

The Consciousness of Christ

and consciousness in both Christ’s beatific vision and that of the other blessed. Christ and the other blessed alike experience the vision; for in all alike, through the ‘light of glory,’ the divine essence is somehow received in the manner of an intelligible species, and the vision necessarily follows. However, are Christ and the blessed are conscious of this vision in different ways. In the case of the blessed, the vision proceeds from them as something essentially gratuitous and unowed and conferred through the merits of Christ. But in the case of Christ, he who is is a divine and infinite person; from him the beatific vision proceeds not as something unowed and gratuitous but, as indicated above, as consequent upon the infinite act of existence which he is. 21 From all this we get some clarity as to how Christ as man could from his own self-consciousness make the affirmation, ‘I am God.’ Christ as man knows all that theologians know about the concept of gratuitousness and the supernatural. But Christ also knows what theologians don’t know about the difference between the consciousness of the beatific vision in the blessed and the consciousness of this vision in the God-mademan. In addition to this knowledge, which is constituted by understanding and affirmation and is presented to Christ as object, he also in his humanity has his own proper consciousness of the vision. This consciousness that Christ has is not the same as that of any of the blessed but is such as is appropriate to the incarnate Word. For he is conscious that his vision proceeds from himself by reason of his act of existence. Hence he who is God is conscious of his own vision of God in such a way that he can affirm with certainty and does affirm with certainty that he, the knower, is the same as the Word known in this vision. 22 Furthermore, Christ as man is conscious not only of his beatific vision but also of his other operations. Inasmuch as he grasps and affirms the intelligible unity of these operations, he attains a knowledge of his human nature. Inasmuch as this same person is conscious of operations that exceed the proportion of human nature yet without exceeding the proportion of the existence of his person, Christ grasps and affirms that he has another nature beyond the human and that this other nature is divine. Finally, his affirmation of both natures does not prevent his affirming the unity of his person. For this unity is different from the unity of nature, as

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

560

De Conscientia Christi

tum est. Idem qui affirmat ‘Deus sum’ etiam affirmat ‘homo sum’; affirmans humanitatem suam, affirmat unitatem cuiusdam essentiae; et affirmans unitatem personae, affirmat unitatem quae principiis identitatis et contradictionis innotescit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

561

The Consciousness of Christ

we have seen (§18 above). It is the same one who says ‘I am God’ and who says ‘I am a man.’ In affirming his humanity, he affirms the unity of an essence; in affirming the unity of his person, he affirms a unity that is known through the principles of identity and contradiction.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

PA R S 7

De Gratia Sanctificante. Supplementum1

The Robert Mollot Collection

PA R T 7

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace1

Introductory Comments to ‘Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace’ The following document is a portion of a series of notes that Lonergan wrote for a course on sanctifying grace at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto in 1951–52. The notes are divided into three sections: (1) a set of historical points, (2) a treatment of the biblical basis of the doctrine of sanctifying grace, and (3) a systematic synthesis regarding that doctrine. In the historical section, Lonergan is concerned with connecting the steps that led to the Lutheran and Reformed positions on justification. He roots these positions in Scotus. For Lonergan that means they are rooted in confrontationalism and conceptualism, and in subsequent nominalist and voluntarist doctrine. His concern in the section seems to be almost exclusively to set up a context that calls for a review of what the scriptures say about justification and salvation, which, he claims, cannot support the Lutheran and Reformed positions. That review follows immediately, and then leads him into the systematic treatment of the issue. The scriptural notes begin with a synthetic statement of the biblical basis for the notion of habitual or sanctifying grace, which as such does not ap-

1 [Lonergan’s handwritten insertions in the Latin text and his marginal notes are too many to indicate in footnotes. Note also that Lonergan uses the words transcendens and transcendentalis interchangeably; here they are translated throughout as transcendent, the more usual antonym for immanent.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

564

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

[1

Adlineamenta historica] [1.1] De gratia habituali. Initia

Ipsum nomen, gratia habitualis, non invenitur in Sacra Scriptura neque in scriptis Patrum. Ipsa notio pedetentim recepta est sub influxu aristotelico in theologos mediaevales. Ita Innocentius iii (db 410) duas sententias recitat circa parvulos baptizatos, quarum una S. Anselmum sequebatur, altera gratiam habitualem agnoscebat. At conc. Viennense (db 483) laudans theologos recentiores affirmat probabiliorem esse sententiam quae in parvulis ponebat habitualem gratiam. De hac notionis evolutione quasdam notas contexui, ts ii 1941 294 ff.2 Tria recolo. Primo, praeter problema de gratia in parvulis qui actus fidei et caritatis non eliciebant ideoque iusti ad mentem S. Pauli esse non posse videbantur, erat longe profundius problema circa notionem entis supernaturalis. Haec notio inventa est in forma systematica (1) opponendo gratiam

The Robert Mollot Collection

565

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

pear in scripture. The point of the biblical section in the context of these course notes is to present a basis for the Catholic understanding of justification, over against Lonergan’s interpretation of the Lutheran and Reformed traditions. The section begins with a synthetic statement of biblical doctrine in ten points, each of which is then given quite thorough explication using many scriptural texts. In the systematic portion of the document, following an early exposition of the so-called four-point hypothesis regarding divine relations and created supernatural participations in those relations, each of the ten points of the biblical synthesis is shown to be a formal effect of the created gift of sanctifying grace. The item is catalogued as A205 in the Bernard Lonergan archive of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. It can now be found on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, at 20500dtl040. Translator’s and editors’ interpolations are in brackets. [1

Historical Sketch] [1.1] Habitual Grace: Preliminary Notes

The term ‘habitual grace’ is not found in Scripture or in the writings of the Fathers. The notion itself came in gradually through the influence of Aristotle on medieval theologians. Thus Innocent III (db 410, ds 780, nd 1409) mentions two opinions about the baptism of children, one of which followed St Anselm and the other acknowledged habitual grace. But the Council of Vienne (db 483, ds 904), quoting with approval the more recent theologians, declared as more probable the opinion affirming the presence of habitual grace in children. I put together some notes on the development of this notion in Theological Studies 2/3 (1941) 294–307.2 I repeat three of them here. First, besides the problem of grace in children who have not elicited acts of faith and charity and thus apparently could not be just according to the mind of St Paul, there was a far more profound problem concerning the notion of the supernatural order of being. This notion was found in systematic form (1) by opposing grace to

2 [Available now in Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 7–20; see also 205–22.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

566

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

ad naturam, fidem ad rationem, caritatem ad dilectionem naturalem, et meritum vitae aeternae ad opera humana bona, et (2) discernendo duos diversos gradus perfectionis ontologicae, alium naturalem, alium supernaturalem.3 Secundo, gratia habitualis deinde concipiebatur tamquam principium primum intrinsecum quo simus viva membra corporis Christi mystici; ex hoc principio fluunt tum virtutes infusae tum etiam meritum supernaturale informans opera bona. Tertio non statim inventa est notio gratiae actualis. In primis enim nitebantur theologi omnia per gratiam habitualem explicare. Postea, maxime auctore S. Thoma, ipsa res systematica concipiebatur tamquam motus quo Deus nos dirigit in vitam aeternam. [1.2] Nominales 1 Dupliciter nominalismus in novatores saec. xvi influebat: primo, directe inquantum nominalium doctrina erat terminus a quo aberrabant; deinde, indirecte inquantum nominales per suas aridas et vacuas disputationes etiam mentes hominum piorum a theologia arcebant. 2 Duo de doctrina nominalium sunt dicenda: primo, de radice huius doctrinae; secundo, de eius applicatione ad gratiam habitualem. Proinde, radix doctrinae triplici gressu exponitur: primo, de cognitione humana, secundo, de cognitione divina, tertio, de consequente methodologia scientifica. 3 Circa cognitionem humanam vigebat confrontationismus, seu empirismus translatus. Axioma principale erat quod obiectum est prius actu circa obiectum. (Ar. Aq. distinxerunt sensibile, intelligibile, sensus, intellectus, in potentia, in actu; ponebant identitatem cognoscentis in actu et cogniti in actu; Scotus vero eiusque antecessores et sequaces docebant identitatem cogniti in potentia et cogniti in actu.) Unde dari non potest ‘intelligibile in sensibilibus,’ ‘quidditas in materia corporali’; et si intelligitur, illusio est.

The Robert Mollot Collection

567

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

nature, faith to reason, charity to natural love, and meriting eternal life to human good works, and (2) by distinguishing between two different degrees of ontological perfection, one natural and the other supernatural.3 Second, habitual grace was considered next as the first intrinsic principle whereby we become living members of the mystical body of Christ; and from this principle flow both the infused virtues as well as supernatural merit informing good works. Third, the notion of actual grace did not immediately emerge. Theologians first tried to explain everything through habitual grace. Later, mainly through the influence of St Thomas, actual grace was conceived systematically as a movement whereby God directs us towards eternal life. [1.2] The Nominalists 1 Nominalism influenced the sixteenth-century reformers in two ways: first, directly, inasmuch as nominalism was the starting point of their erroneous opinions; second and indirectly, inasmuch as the dry and empty disputations of the nominalists turned the minds of the devout against theology. 2 Two points are to be noted concerning the teachings of the nominalists: first, the root of their doctrine, and second, its application to habitual grace. Accordingly, we shall lay bare the root of this doctrine in three steps: (1) on human cognition, (2) on divine cognition, and (3) on the consequent scientific methodology. 3 In the area of human cognition, confrontationism, or transferred empiricism, was flourishing. Its principal axiom was that an object is prior to an act concerning that object. (Aristotle and Aquinas distinguished between the sensible, the intelligible, sense, intellect, in potency, in act; they asserted the identity of the knower in act and the known in act; but Scotus and his predecessors and followers taught the identity of the known in potency and the known in act.) From this there can be no ‘intelligible in sensible data,’ no ‘quiddity in corporeal matter’; and if there is understanding [of the intelligible in the sensible], it is an illusion.

3 [Lonergan calls this the ‘theorem of the supernatural’; see, for example, Grace and Freedom 14–20, 50, 54, 164–65, 179, 181–91.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

568

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Unde restringitur intelligibile ad nexum necessarium inter conceptus universales. Unde tollitur differentia inter distinctionem et abstractionem: pes potest distingui ab animali sicut pars a toto; sed pes non potest intelligi sine animali, unde nec abstrahi potest ab animali quando fit sermo de pede.4 4 Sicut de cognitione humana, ita etiam opinabantur de cognitione divina. Deus in sua essentia videt omnes ideas rerum possibilium, videt nexus necessarios, videt separationes necessarias, et videt nihil aliud, nam caetera sunt quasi neutralia; possunt coniungi et possunt separari, sicut numerus stellarum potest esse paris vel imparis. Haec omnia alia Deus cognoscit in decretis suae liberae voluntatis. Unde tollitur sapientia divina. Sapientis enim est ordinare. Secundum S. Thomam impossibile est omne quod opponitur divinae sapientiae, ideoque impossibile est mundus a Deo creatus nisi sit infinita sapientia ordinatus. Quare hic ordo rerum, quamvis alius esse posset, tamen si alius esset, eadem divina sapientia ordinaretur. Unde concordant S. Thomas et Scotus de potentia Dei absoluta: respicit enim omne quod contradictionem non implicat. Differunt vero de potentia Dei ordinata; pro S. Thoma, haec potentia respicit in primis hunc, deinde alium quemlibet ordinem rerum ab infinita sapientia excogitatum et libera Dei voluntate electum; pro Scoto, potentia respicit divinam voluntatem quae praebet ultimum fundamentum omnis connectionis contingentis; unde pro Scoto quilibet ordo rerum esset bonus et iustus, non propter praevenientem divinam sapientiam, sed propter liberam divinam voluntatem. 5 Consequentiae methodologicae erant gravissimae. Omnis enim quaestio poni poterat dupliciter: secundum absolutam Dei potentiam, et secundum potentiam Dei ordinatam. At quaestio circa potentiam Dei ordinatam minus scientifica erat; ultimum enim fundamentum non erat intellectus divinus sed libera Dei voluntas. Responderi potest rem ita se haberi. At si quaeris cur ita se habeat, confitendum est non esse cur, non esse rationem. Stat pro ratione voluntas.

The Robert Mollot Collection

569

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Thus the intelligible is restricted to a necessary nexus between universal concepts. This eliminates the difference between distinction and abstraction: a foot can be distinguished from an animal as a part from the whole; but a foot cannot be understood apart from the animal, hence one cannot abstract from ‘animal’ when one talks about a foot.4 4 They had the same theory about divine cognition as about human cognition. God sees in his essence all the ideas of possible beings, sees the necessary nexuses, sees the necessary separations, and sees nothing else, for everything else is, as it were, neutral; they can be joined together or separated, just as the number of the stars can be either even or odd. All these other things God knows in the decrees of his free will. This eliminates divine wisdom. The proper task of the wise is to put things in order. According to St Thomas, anything that is opposed to divine wisdom cannot be, and therefore it is impossible for a world to be created by God unless it has been so ordered by infinite wisdom. This present order of reality, therefore, could be otherwise, but if it were it would still have been ordered by the same divine wisdom. Hence St Thomas and Scotus agree concerning God’s absolute power: it extends to everything that does not involve a contradiction. But they differ regarding the ordered power of God. For St Thomas, this power is directed first to this present order and then to any other order of reality that might be devised by God’s infinite wisdom and chosen by his free will. For Scotus, this power is directed to the divine will which produces the ultimate foundation for all contingent connection; hence for Scotus any order of reality at all would be good and just, not because of God’s foreordaining wisdom but because of his free will. 5 The methodological consequences of this were very serious. Every question could be posed in two ways: with respect to God’s absolute power and with respect to God’s ordered power. But the question about God’s ordered power was less scientific; for its ultimate foundation was not the divine intellect but God’s free will. Their answer could be that that is the way things are. But if you ask why things are so, they can only confess that there is no ‘why,’ no reason to be sought:

4 Thomas Aquinas, In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

570

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Et ita tollitur tota theologia speculativa quae tractat de intelligibili sed contingenti rerum ordine. Si vero quaestio ponebatur secundum potentiam Dei absolutam, nihil fere dici poterat. Deus enim potest omnia quae contradictionem non implicant. At contradictio haberi potest solummodo circa idem, eodem tempore, eodem modo. Nulla ergo est connectio necessaria inter diversa, inter diversa tempora eiusdem rei, inter diversos modos eiusdem rei. Sequebatur atomismus vel realis, uti apud Ockham, vel apparentium, uti apud Nicolaum de Ultricuria. Nam voluntarismus destruxit ipsum fundamentum totius positionis, nempe, confrontationismum. Si habetur cognitio, necessario habetur rei apparentia, secus adesset contradictio. Si autem habetur cognitio, non necessario habetur res cognita, nam non adest contradictio aperta; illusiones sunt possibiles; et de potentia Dei absoluta potest esse cognitio sine re. 6 Cuius doctrinae effectus in materia de gratia habituali ad haec capita reduci possunt. Primo, gratia habitualis non concipiebatur cum nexibus suis intelligibilibus. Gratia non se habebat cum in psychologia individuali tum in corpore mystico sicut pes se habet in animali, ita ut gratia a tota oeconomia nt totoque rerum ordine abstrahi non poterat. E contra, erat ens quoddam accidentale, spirituale, in anima a Deo positum; si aderat, opera erant meritoria; si non, opera non erant meritoria; et ex meritis Deus decrevit de salute aeterna. Secundo, haec connectio gratiae cum meritis erat tantummodo de potentia Dei ordinata. Sicut Pelagius erravit affirmando hominem posse salvari viribus naturae, ita Aureolus errat affirmando Deum absolute necessitari ad salutem dandam iis qui in statu gratiae moriuntur. Hac ergo in doctrina duo ad meritum vitae aeternae erant necessaria absolute: primo, ut homo sit liber, non enim adest meritum sine libertate; secundo, ut Deus opus acceptet tamquam meritorium; nisi enim acceptat Deus opus pro sua libera omnipotentia et misericordia, nihil facere potest ens quoddam creatum, spirituale, absolute supernaturale. Eiusmodi enim ens plus quam conventio quaedam esse non potest saltem sub aspectu potentiae Dei absolutae.

The Robert Mollot Collection

571

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

stat pro ratione voluntas: ‘Let will stand for reason.’ This does away with virtually all speculative theology, which treats of the intelligible but contingent order of reality. If the question is posed in the context of God’s absolute power, there is practically no answering it. God can do everything that does not involve a contradiction. But you can have a contradiction only concerning one and the same thing at the same time and in the same mode. There is no necessary connection, therefore, between different things, between different times of the same thing, or between different modes of the same thing. The result was atomism, either about reality, as in Ockham, or about appearances, as in Nicholas of Autrecourt. For voluntarism destroyed confrontationism, the very foundation of the entire position. If there is cognition, necessarily there is the appearance of a thing; otherwise there would be a contradiction. But if there is cognition, there is not necessarily a thing that is known, for there is no obvious contradiction in this; illusions are possible, and it is within God’s absolute power that there be knowledge without a [corresponding] reality. 6 The effects of this doctrine in the matter of habitual grace can be reduced to the following points. First, habitual grace was not conceived together with its intelligible nexuses. Grace, both in individual psychology and in the mystical body, was conceived not as a foot is in an animal; if it were, it could not be abstracted from the whole economy of the New Testament and the entire order of reality. On the contrary, it was conceived as something accidental, spiritual, placed in the soul by God. If it was present, works were meritorious; if not, works were not meritorious; and God’s decision about one’s eternal salvation was based upon one’s merits. Second, this connection of grace with merits concerned only the ordered power of God. Just as Pelagius erred in stating that we could be saved by our natural efforts alone, so [Peter] Aureolus errs in stating that God is absolutely compelled to grant salvation to those who die in the state of grace. According to this doctrine, therefore, two conditions were absolutely necessary to merit eternal life: first, that a person be free, for there is no merit without freedom; second, that God accept one’s work as meritorious; for unless God accepts a work in accordance with his free omnipotence and mercy, no created spiritual and absolutely supernatural entity can be of any avail. For that sort of entity can be no more than a convention, at least in the context of God’s absolute power.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

572

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

[1.3] Novatores saec. XVI 1 Antequam systematica distinctio inter naturale et supernaturale, habituale et actuale, inventa sit, loquebantur Sacra Scriptura et Patres et antiqui scholastici de gratia Dei. Loquebantur in terminis psychologicis de fide, de caritate, de concupiscentia, de libertate. Uti vidimus, systematizatio scholastica enormes difficultates solvebat (si gratia necessaria est ad opera bona, homo non est liber, et si liber est, gratia non est necessaria), ita tamen ut influxu nominalium totum systema in vanum vacuumque entitatularum aedificium abibat. At renascente et florente humanismo classico, duplex erat impetus: alius negativus, uti apud Erasmum qui scholasticos arridet et vituperat, alius positivus et religiosus qui ipsos homines prouti exsistunt ad puritatem evangelii convertere volebat. 2 Inter quos eminebat Lutherus. Scandalum ei erat cum curia papalis tum venditio indulgentiarum ad aedificandam basilicam romanam S. Petri. Porro, sicut in ecclesia non videbat immaculatam Christi sponsam, ita in se ipso novum hominem Christo indutum non experiebatur.5 (a) Peccatum originale idem est ac concupiscentia, et concupiscentia manifeste non tollitur baptismo. db 741 s., 792. (b) Infectione huius peccati etiam iustus in omni opere etiam bono peccat. db 771, 835, 775 s. (c) Tamen haec iustorum peccata Deus tegit in iustis nam iis imputat iustitiam Christi propter merita Christi. (d) Quae imputatio fit inquantum homo credit se esse iustificatum. db 820–24. 3 Calvinus hanc doctrinam de fide fiduciali est amplexus, et suam addidit de praedestinatione et de iustitia inamissibili; qui semel iustificatur, semper iustificatur; at homo potest videri iustus cum de facto sit reprobus.6

The Robert Mollot Collection

573

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

[1.3] The Sixteenth-Century Reformers 1 Before the systematic distinction between the natural and the supernatural and between the habitual and the actual was hit upon, scripture and the Fathers and the earlier Scholastic theologians spoke about the grace of God. They spoke in psychological terms about faith, about charity, about concupiscence, about freedom. As we have seen, the Scholastic systematization solved enormous difficulties (if grace is necessary for performing good works, man is not free, and if man is not free, grace is not necessary), yet nevertheless through the influence of the nominalists the whole system ended up as an empty and vacuous edifice of ‘thinglets’ [entitatularum]. But with the Renaissance and the flowering of classical humanism, there came two impulses: one was negative, as in Erasmus who derided and vilified Scholastic theologians; the other was positive and religious, which wanted to take people as they are and bring them back to the purity of the gospel. 2 Among these, Luther was the most prominent. He was scandalized both by the papal curia and the selling of indulgences to finance the building of St Peter’s basilica in Rome. Accordingly, just as he could not see in the church the spotless bride of Christ, so also did he fail to experience himself as the new man who has put on Christ.5 [Luther’s teaching:] (a) Original sin is the same as concupiscence; and concupiscence obviously does not cease by baptism. (See db 741,742, 792; ds 1451, 1452, 1515; nd 1309, 1923/2, 512.) (b) Infected by this sin, even the just sin in every work, even good works. (See db 771, 835, 775, 776; ds 1481, 1575, 1485, 1486; nd 1923/31,1923/36.) (c) Nevertheless God covers over these sins of the just by imputing to them the justice of Christ on account of the merits of Christ. (d) This imputation takes place when a man believes himself to be justified. (See db 820–24, ds 1560–64, nd 1960–64.) 3 Calvin embraced this doctrine of fiducial faith and added his own doctrine about predestination and about justice that cannot be lost; one who is once justified is justified forever; but a person can seem to be just who in fact is condemned.6 5 See Carolus Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1946) 147–49; Hermanus Lange, De gratia: tractatus dogmaticus (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1929), pp. 222–23, §314; Henricus Lennerz, De gratia redemptoris (Rome: Pontificia Gregoriana, 1940) 28–45. 6 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 149.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

574

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

4 Hac in doctrina notantur: (a) Quod maxime insistitur in acceptatione divina, sicut et nominales; at negat liberum arbitrium (si enim gratia est necessaria ad bona opera, homo non est liber; db 814–16). (b) Ponit nexum intelligibilem inter merita Christi et statum iusti. Nominales negant connectiones intelligibiles. (c) Quoad statum hominis iustificati magis experientia quam fide ducitur: magis enim experimur collucationem carnis adversus spiritum quam gratiam Dei. [1.4] Modus procedendi 1 Materia exhibetur apud Boyer tribus articulis pp. 147, 165, 186. Eadem fere materia apud Lange 7 thesibus pp. 221–366.7

2 Finis noster erit (1) ut intelligatis SScr et (2) ut per hanc intelligentiam quid sit gratia habitualis intelligatis. Qua de causa, primo, ponitur assertum praevium in quo exponitur (1) generalis notio iustitiae et (2) id in quo facile conveniunt catholici et novatores. Deinde reicitur opinio Lutheri de fide fiduciali. Tertio, ordine synthetico positive exhibetur quid in Sacra Scriptura de statu iusti contineatur. Quarto, ponuntur quaestiones scholasticae de natura gratiae habitualis.

[1.5] De notione iustitiae 1 Doctrina Lutheri erat de iustitia seu sanctitate imputata, quam doctrinam ex S. Paulo se hausisse affirmabat. Primo, ergo, aliquid de hac notione dicendum venit.8

The Robert Mollot Collection

575

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

4 In this doctrine, the following points are to be noted: (a) It places very great stress on divine acceptance, as did the nominalists; but it denies free will (for if grace is necessary for good works, man is not free; db 814–16, ds 1554–56; nd 1954–56). (b) It places an intelligible nexus between the merits of Christ and the state of the just. The nominalists deny intelligible connections. (c) The state of one who is justified is to be judged more from experience than from faith; for we experience the struggle of the flesh against the spirit more strongly than we do the grace of God. [1.4] The Way of Proceeding 1 This material is found in Boyer [Tractatus de gratia divina], in three articles, pp. 147–65 [article 1: Utrum gratia habitualis sit aliquid animae inhaerens], 165–85 [article 2: Utrum Deus per gratiam habitualem in iustis inhabitet], 186–94 [article 3: Utrum gratia habitualis sit in essentia animae ad modum habitus]. Largely the same material will be found in Lange, De gratia, seven theses, pp. 221–366, §§311–487.7 2 Our aim will be (1) that you may understand what Scripture says, and (2) that through this understanding you may understand what habitual grace is. First, then, we shall make a preliminary statement explaining (1) the general notion of justice, and (2) that point on which Catholics and reformers can easily agree. Second, we shall reject Luther’s opinion about fiducial faith. Third, we shall make a positive synthesis of what is contained in scripture concerning the state of the just. Fourth, we shall raise the Scholastic questions about the nature of habitual grace. [1.5] The Notion of Justice 1 Luther taught the doctrine of imputed justice or holiness, asserting that he derived this doctrine from St Paul. First, then, something must be said about this notion.8 7 [For a convenient listing of these seven theses, see the Index thesium in Lange, De gratia, pp. xi–xii.] 8 See Lange, De gratia, pp. 221–30, §§311–21.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

576

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

2 In genere iustitia dicit quandam ordinis rectitudinem9 et multipliciter dividitur. (a) Ratione normae secundum quam quis dicitur iustus; quae norma in quadam lege poni potest; quare iustus est quis secundum legem naturalem vel positivam, positivam et humanam, vel positivam et divinam, divinam vt vel divinam nt. (b) Ratione originis unde quis factus est iustus; unde habetur iustitia acquisita, quae viribus naturae generatur; et iustitia gratis a Deo collata per mediatorem Domini Nostri Iesu Christi. (c) Ratione effectus formalis quo quis constituitur iustus et ut talis manifestatur. Unde habetur iustitia externa, forensis, imputata; v.g., omnis praesumitur innocens donec contrarium probetur; potest quis esse iustus in foro interno, iniustus in foro externo. At etiam iustitia interna, quae tripliciter dicitur: Ratione cuiusdam actus iusti, vel plurium actuum. Ratione habitus specialis, vg., iustitia commutativa, distributiva, legalis. Ratione habitus generalis seu status, v.g., ipse homo fit rectus inquantum corpus subordinatur rationi, et ratio subordinatur Deo.

Quod vera iustitia et sanctitas coram Deo (1) neque ex lege est, (2) neque ex operibus legis, (3) neque ex carne, (4) neque ex testimonio humano sive alieno sive propriae conscientiae, (5) neque ex voluntate hominum, sed (6) per evangelium, fidem, et baptismum. (1) Gal 2.21: Si enim per legem iustitia, ergo gratis Christus mortuus est; 3.11: Quoniam autem in lege nemo iustificatur apud Deum, manifestum est: quia iustus ex fide vivit. (2) Rom 3.20: quia ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis (quaelibet) caro coram illo. 3.28: Arbitramur enim iustificari hominem sine operibus legis. (3) Phil 3.3–14, Col 3.11, Gal 3.28. (4) 1 Cor 4.3 s.: Mihi autem pro minimo est ut a vobis iudicer, aut ab humano die: sed neque meipsum iudico. Nihil enim mihi conscius sum: sed non in hoc iustificatus sum: qui autem iudicat me, Dominus est.

The Robert Mollot Collection

577

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

2 In general, justice refers to a certain rightness of order9 and it is divided in a number of ways. (a) By reason of a norm according to which one is said to be just; this norm can be expressed in a law; therefore one is just according to a natural or a positive law, a human positive law or a divine positive law, a divine law in the Old Testament or a divine law in the New. (b) By reason of the source from which one is made just; thus there is acquired justice, which results from one’s natural powers, and justice that is given gratis by God through the Mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ. (c) By reason of the formal effect whereby one is rendered just and is shown to be so. Hence there is the external, imputed, justice of the courts of law. For example, one is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven; one can be just in the internal forum while unjust in the external forum. But internal justice also can be taken in three ways: [1] by reason of a just act or several acts; [2] by reason of a special habit; for example, commutative, distributive, and legal justice; [3] by reason of a general habit or state; for example, one becomes upright inasmuch as one’s body is subordinated to reason and one’s reason is subordinated to God. True justice and holiness in the eyes of God is (1) not derived from the law, (2) nor from the works of the law, (3) nor from the flesh, (4) nor from human testimony whether someone else’s or that of one’s own conscience, (5) nor from human will, but (6) through the gospel, faith, and baptism. (1) Galatians 2.21: ‘If justification comes through the law, then Christ has died for nothing’; 3.11: ‘It is evident that no one is justified before God by the law, for the just one lives by faith.’ (2) Romans 3.20: ‘No one will be justified in God’s sight by deeds prescribed by the law; 3.28: ‘We hold that a person is justified apart from works prescribed by the law.’ (3) Philippians 3.3–14; Colossians 3.11; Galatians 3.28. (4) 1 Corinthians 4.3–4: ‘It matters little to me that I should be judged by you or by any human court; I do not even judge myself. I am not aware of

9 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 113, a. 1 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

578

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(5) Rom 10.3: Ignorantes (Iudaei) iustitiam Dei, et suam quaerentes statuere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti. 9.30: Quia Gentes, quae non sectabantur iustitiam, apprehenderunt iustitiam: iustitiam vero quae ex fide est. Israel vero sectando legem iustitiae, in legem iustitiae non pervenit. Quare? Quia non ex fide sed quasi ex operibus. (6) Rom 1.16 s.: Non enim erubesco evangelium. Virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti, Iudaeo primum et Graeco. Iustitia enim Dei in eo revelatur ex fide in fidem (Hebraismus: ex fide semper crescente) sicut scriptum est: Iustus autem meus ex fide vivit. Cf. Gal 3.11; Heb 10.38. Rom 3.21 s.: Nunc autem sine lege iustitia Dei manifestata est, testificata a lege et Prophetis. Iustitia autem Dei per fidem Iesu Christi in omnes et super omnes qui credunt in eum. Tit 3.3–5: Eramus enim aliquando et nos insipientes, increduli, errantes, servientes desideriis et voluptatibus variis, in malitia et invidia agentes, odibiles, odientes invicem. Cum autem benignitas et humanitas apparuit Salvatoris nostri Dei: non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordian salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus sancti, quem effudit in nos abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum: ut iustificati gratia ipsius, haeredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae. Fides quae ad iustificationem disponit est dogmatica neque ipsa sola sufficit. (a) Fides disponit. De fide definita, db 798, Rom 3.28–30, 5.1; Gal 3.8, 3.24; Phil 3.9. Fide, per fidem, ex fide. pp, rj, ser. 362

(b) Reicienda est inanis haereticorum fiducia. db 802, 822, 824. Phil 2.12: Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini. 2 Pet 1.10: Magis satagite ut per bona opera certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

579

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me.’ (5) Romans 10.3: ‘(The Jews) being ignorant of the justice that comes from God, and seeking their own justice, they have not submitted to God’s justice’; 9.30–32: ‘Gentiles, who did not strive for justice, have attained it, that is, justice that comes through faith. But Israel, who did strive for justice from the law, did not obtain it. Why not? Because it did not come through faith, but supposedly from the works of the law.’ (6) Romans 1.16–17: ‘I am not ashamed of the gospel. It is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and then to the Greek. For in it the justice of God is revealed from faith to faith (a Hebraism: from ever-increasing faith); as it is written, the just one lives by faith.’ See Galatians 3.11, Hebrews 10.38. Romans 3.21–22: ‘Now, apart from the law, the justice of God has been made manifest, as attested by the law and the prophets; for the justice of God comes through faith in Jesus Christ to all and for all who believe in him.’ Titus 3.3–7: ‘For we were once foolish, self-willed, wayward, slaves to various desires and pleasures, spending our days in wickedness and envy, hateful ourselves and hating one another. But when the goodness and kindness of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of the works of the law that we had done but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out abundantly upon us through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that having been justified by his grace we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.’ Faith that disposes one to justification is dogmatic faith; but it alone does not suffice. (a) Faith disposes [to justification]. This is de fide definita, db 798, 801; ds 1526, 1532; nd 1930, 1935. Romans 3.28–30, 5.1; Galatians 3.8, 3.24; Philippians 3.9: by faith, through faith, from faith. Church Fathers: see [M.J.] Rouët de Journel, Enchiridion Patristicum: loci SS. Patrum, doctorum scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, 21st ed. (Barcinone: Herder, 1959; [henceforth ep]), series 362. (b) The ‘fiduciary’ faith of the heretics is to be rejected as futile. db 802, 822, 824; ds 1533, 1562, 1564; nd 1936, 1962, 1964. Philippians 2.12: ‘Work out your salvation with fear and trembling’; 2 Peter 1.10: ‘Strive all the more through good works to confirm your call and election.’

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

580

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(c) Fides disponens est dogmatica. De fide divina et catholica. Fides dogmatica est qua ea vera esse creduntur quae a Deo sunt revelata. db 1789. Nullibi dicitur in Sacra Scriptura hominem esse salvum quia se salvum esse credat vel hominem non esse salvum nisi se salvum esse credat. Rom 10.9: Si confitearis in ore tuo Dominum (esse) Iesum et in corde tuo credideris quod Deus illum suscitavit a mortuis, salvus eris. Heb 11.6: Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est et quod inquirentibus se remunerator est. Io 20.31: Haec scripta sunt ut credatis quia est Christus Filius Dei, et ut credentes (hoc dogma) vitam habeatis in nomine eius. Mc 16.15 s.: Praedicate evangelium … Qui crediderit salvus erit. Rom 1.16: Non enim erubesco evangelium. Virtus enim Dei est omni credenti. (d) Neque sola sufficit. Iac 2.14–26, speciatim vv. 17, 19, 24, 26. 1 Cor 13.2: et si habuero omnem fidem (etiam fiducialem) ita ut montes transferam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Gal 5.6: In Christo Iesu neque praeputium aliquid valet neque circumcisio, sed fides quae per caritatem operatur. 2

Positiva Sacrae Scripturae Doctrina10

[THESIS 1] Quos diligit Deus Pater [1]11 sicut Iesum Filium suum unigenitum diligit, (2) dono eos increato ipsius Spiritus sancti donat, ut (3) in novam vitam (4) renati (5) viva Christi membra efficiantur; quare (6) iusti, (7) Deo amici, (8) filii Dei adoptivi, et (9) haeredes secundum spem vitae aeternae, (10) consortium divinae naturae ineunt.

The Robert Mollot Collection

581

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(c) Disposing faith is dogmatic faith. This is de fide divina et catholica. Dogmatic faith is that by which one believes as true that which has been revealed by God. db 1789, ds 3008, nd 118. Nowhere in Scripture does it say that a person is saved because he believes himself to be saved, or that a person is not saved unless he believes that he is. Romans 10.9: ‘If you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God has raised him from the dead, you will be saved.’ Hebrews 11.6: ‘Whoever would approach God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him.’ John 20.31: ‘These things have been written that you may believe that he is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing (this truth) you may have life in his name.’ Mark 16.15–16: ‘Preach the gospel … Whoever believes will be saved.’ Romans 1.16: ‘I am not ashamed of the gospel. It is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith.’ (d) But dogmatic faith alone is not sufficient. James 2.14–26, especially vv. 17, 19, 24, and 26. 1 Corinthians 13.2: ‘And if I have all faith [even fiducial faith] so as to move mountains and yet do not have love, I am nothing.’ Galatians 5.6: ‘For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor the lack of it counts for anything, but only faith that is productive through love.’ 2

The Positive Doctrine of Sacred Scripture10

[THESIS 1] To those whom God the Father loves [1]11 as he loves Jesus, his onlybegotten Son, (2) he gives the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so that (3) into a new life they may be (4) born again and (5) become living members of Christ; therefore as (6) just, (7) friends of God, (8) adopted children of God, and (9) heirs in hope of eternal life, (10) they enter into a sharing in the divine nature.

10 [The section division here follows that given in Lonergan’s own table of contents.] 11 [In the autograph, the numeral ‘1’ does not appear in the enunciation of the thesis. But as the first numeral to appear is ‘2,’ it would seem that Lonergan inadvertently omitted the ‘1.’ The editors have therefore included it in brackets.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

582

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Termini : eo sensu adhibentur quo in nt usurpantur. Partes: sunt undecim. Prima pars asserit eos exsistere quos ita Deus Pater diligit. Altera usque ad decimam in ipsa theseos enuntiatione numerantur. Undecima pars asserit haec omnia simul in singulis iustis verificari. Censura: In singulis partibus probandis exhibetur. Scopus: Ut fundamentam positivum doctrinae de gratia sanctificante clare et synthetice proponatur. Cum natura iustitificationis vel essentia gratiae habitualis quaeritur, periculum est ne quis abstractam quandam notam vel rationem abstrusam exspectet. Hoc minime verum est. Intelligere est multa per unum intueri. E.g., anima intelligitur in toto corpore organico et in omnibus operationibus vitae, sentiendi, intelligendi, volendi; in corpore quidem ut forma, in operationibus vero ut primum principium intrinsecum. Similiter gratia habitualis est quo sumus membra Christi, templum Spiritus sancti, ad novam supernaturalem vitam elevamur, et capaces sumus actuum meritoriorum coram Deo.

[(1)] Sunt qui a Deo Patre diligantur sicut ab Eo diligitur Filius suus unigenitus. Censura: de fide divina ex SScr. Argumentum: Io 17.20–26. Agitur de apostolis et de eis qui per verbum apostolorum in Christum erant credituri, v. 20. Asseritur: v. 23: dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti; v. 26: ut dilectio qua dilexisti me in ipsis sit et ego in ipsis. Est dilectio prorsus singularis. V. 24: aeterna Patris dilectio erga Filium fundat donum claritatis. V. 22: et ego claritatem, quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis: ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus. Vv. 21, 22, 23: repetitur assertio mirae huius unitatis qua Pater est in Filio et Filius in fidelibus.

Notantur . 1 Secundum Patrem Mersch (The Whole Christ), hic textus videtur fundamentalis in doctrina de corpore mystico.12

The Robert Mollot Collection

583

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Terms : used in the sense in which they are used in the New Testament. Parts: there are eleven parts to this thesis. The first part states that there are those whom God the Father so loves. Parts two to ten are those listed in the above statement of the thesis. An eleventh part states that all these are together verified in each of the just. Qualification [theological note] of the thesis : as will be indicated in proving each part of the thesis. Aim of the thesis: to set forth clearly and synthetically the positive teaching on sanctifying grace. When one is inquiring about the nature of justification or the essence of habitual grace, there is a danger that one may expect some abstract note or abstruse reason. But this is by no means the case. To understand is to have an insight into many things through one. For example, the soul is understood in the organic body as a whole and in all the operations of living, sensing, understanding, and willing; in the body as its form, but in the operations as the first intrinsic principle. In a similar way, habitual grace is that whereby we are members of Christ and temples of the Holy Spirit, are raised up to a new supernatural life, and are capable of acts that are meritorious in the sight of God. [(1)] There are persons who are loved by God the Father as his only-begotten Son is loved by him. Qualification: of divine faith from scripture. Argument: taken from John 17.20–26. This refers to the Apostles and to those who are destined to believe in Christ through the words of the Apostles. V. 23: ‘You have loved them even as you have loved me’; v. 26: ‘That the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.’ This is an absolutely unique love. V. 24: the eternal love of the Father for his Son is the basis for the gift of glory. V. 22: ‘and I have given to them the glory that you have given to me, so that they may be one as we are one.’ Vv. 21, 22, 23 repeat the assertion of this marvelous unity by which the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the faithful. Note the following : 1 According to Fr Mersch, The Whole Christ, this text is seen as fundamental to the doctrine of the mystical body.12 12 [See Emile Mersch, The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

584

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

2 Secundum S. Thomam: (a) i, 20, 1, 3m: ‘actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, et in eum cui vult bonum.’ (b) In divinis distinguuntur amor essentialis et amor notionalis. Amor essentialis dicit ipsam divinam essentiam: et hoc modo Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus pariter amant se ipsos et nos eo amore qui est divina essentia. Amor notionalis addit relationem realem processionis amoris: et sic Spiritus sanctus est Amor procedens (i, 37, 1); et eodem modo Pater et Filius amant et se et nos Spiritu sancto, i.e., amore procedente (i, 37, 2 c. ad fin.).

(c) i-ii, 110, 1 c.: distinguitur duplex dilectio divina: alia communis qua Deus omnia diligit ut sint; alia specialis qua Deus ‘trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturae ad participationem boni divini’; et cum amor divinus non invenit amatum esse bonum quin prius eum bonum faciat, haec dilectio ponit gratiam sanctificantem in anima. 3 Secundum S. Paulum gratiae semper aguntur Deo Patri qui opus nostrae salutis initium dederit. Rom 8.29 s.: Nam quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitun in multis fratribus. 30: Quos autem praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit; quos autem iustificavit, illos et glorificavit. Cf. Gal. 4.4–7; Eph 1.3–14, 2.4–10; Col 1. 3, 1.12.

(2) Dono eos increato ipsius Spiritus sancti donat. Spiritus sanctus: tertia persona SS. Trinitatis. Donum increatum : non negatur simul dari dona creata, sed ab his hoc in asserto praescinditur. De fide divina (ex Sacra Scriptura) et catholica (ex traditione). db 13, 799, 898, 904, 1013, 1015. aas 29 (1897) 644–58, spec. 652 ss. Lange, p. 331 s., §446.

The Robert Mollot Collection

585

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

2 According to St Thomas: (a) Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3m: ‘an act of love always tends towards two things, the good which a person wishes to another, and the one to whom he or she wishes that good.’ (b) In the Godhead there is a distinction between essential love and notional love. Essential love refers to the divine essence itself; and in this way the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the same way love themselves and us with that love that is the divine essence. Notional love adds the real relation of the procession of love. It is thus that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love (ibid. q. 37, a. 1); and in the same way the Father and the Son love both themselves and us in the Holy Spirit, that is, by proceeding Love (ibid. q. 37, a. 2 c. ad fin.). (c) Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 1 c.: there are two distinct divine loves: one is common, by which God loves all things into existence; the other is the special love by which God ‘draws a rational creature above its natural condition to share in the divine nature’; and when divine love finds that the beloved is not good unless it first renders him or her good, this love places sanctifying grace in its soul. 3 According to St Paul, thanks are always given to God the Father for having begun the work of our salvation. Romans 8.29–30: ‘For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family. And those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.’ See Galatians 4.4–7, Ephesians 1.3–14 and 2.4–10, Colossians 1.3 and 1.12. (2) He gives them the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit: the third person of the Trinity. Uncreated gift: we do not deny that created gifts are given at the same time, but we prescind from them in this assertion. This part of the thesis is of divine faith (from Scripture) and of catholic faith (from tradition). db 13, 799, 898, 904, 1013, 1015; ds 44, 1528, 1678, 1690, 1915; nd 1932, 1624, 1631. Leo xiii, Divinum illud, in Acta Sanctae Se-

of the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition, trans. from the 2nd French edition by John R. Kelly (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1938; London: Dennis Dobson, 1949, 1962) 182–205.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

586

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Io 14.17: (Paraclitus, Spiritus veritatis) apud vos manebit et in vobis erit. Rom 5.5: quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. Rom 8.8–11, 15 s., 26 s. Gal 4.6. 1 Cor 3.16, 6.19, 12.13. 2 Cor 6.16. Eph 1.13 (arrha, ‘down payment,’ not pignus = ‘pledge to be redeemed’). Eph 4.30 (nolite contristari); 5.18. 2 Tim 1.14; 1 Thess 4.8.

pp, rj ser. 357; Lange, p. 334, §450 Liturgia: ‘altissimum donum Dei’; ‘dulcis hospes animae.’ Alia, Lange, p. 332, §447. st, i, 38, 1; a 2; 43, 6; Cf. i, 21, 1, 3m, ‘esse alicuius.’13

Notantur: (1)14 Simul inhabitant Pater et Filius: Io 14.23: Si quis diligit me, et Pater meus diligit eum et ad eum veniemus, et mansionen apud eum facie-

The Robert Mollot Collection

587

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

dis (ASS) 29 (1897) 644–58, especially 652–58. Lange, De gratia, pp. 331–32, §446. John 14.17: The Paraclete, Spirit of truth, will remain with you and will be in you. Romans 5.5: ‘… because the love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.’ Romans 8.8–11, 15–16, 26–27; Galatians 4.6; 1 Corinthians 3.16, 6.19, 12.13; 2 Corinthians 6.16. Ephesians 1.13–14 (arrha, down payment, not pignus = pledge to be redeemed [see 2 Corinthians 1.22]). Ephesians 4.30: do not grieve [the Holy Spirit of God]. 2 Timothy 1.14; 1 Thessalonians 4.8. Fathers: ep, series 357; Lange, De gratia, pp. 334–36, §450. Liturgy: ‘the most high gift of God,’ ‘sweet guest of the soul.’ Other texts, Lange, De gratia, p. 332, §447. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a, 6. See 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m, ‘to belong to one.’13 Note the following : (1)14 The Father and the Son together indwell at the same time: John 14.23: ‘whoever loves me, the Father also loves and we will come to him and make

13 [The reference to the expression ‘esse alicuius,’ as explained in q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m, is due to the occurrence of the same expression in q. 38, a. 1, the principal text from Aquinas in this reference: ‘The word “gift” conveys the idea of being givable. Something given has a relation both to the donor and to the recipient. The donor would not give unless a gift were his to give; and it is given to the recipient for it to belong to her. A divine person is said to belong to someone (“esse alicuius”) either because of origin, as the Son is the Son of the Father, or because the divine person is possessed by someone. Now, “to possess” means to have something at one’s disposal to use or enjoy as one wishes, and a divine person can be possessed in this sense only by a rational creature joined to God. Other creatures can be acted upon by a divine person, but not in such a way that they have it in their power to enjoy the divine person or to use his effect. In some cases the rational creature, however, does reach that state, wherein she becomes a sharer in the divine Word and in the proceeding Love, so that she has at her disposal a power to know God truly and to love God rightly. Only a rational creature, then, has the capacity to possess a divine person. She cannot, however, come to this by her own resources; it must be given to her from above; for we say that something is given to us that we have from someone else. This is the way that to be “given” and to be “Gift” are terms applicable to a divine person.’] 14 [These numerals from ‘1’ to ‘5’ were inserted by hand. The ordering of the items here follows the ordering of these handwritten insertions not the original typed ordering of the items as found in the autograph.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

588

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

mus. Unde sine distinctione personarum, 2 Cor 6.16: vos estis templum Dei.15 (2) Donum est id quod est alicuius et gratuito fit alterius. (Gratuito: sine retributione, et ita Spiritus Sanctus est donum quamvis necessario procedat; sine necessitate, et ita Spiritus Sanctus nobis datur.) (3) Donum dicitur quadrupliciter secundum quod est vel fit alicuius per modum finis, ordinatur in finem, ita servus est domini et non e converso [st] i, 21, 1, 3m; ratione originis: Filius est Patris quia a Patre i, 38, 1 c.; ratione identitatis: ‘quid tam tuum est quam tu.’ Ibid 1m; ratione habentis, tou posse frui: et ita in rationalibus qui possunt vere cognoscere et libere amare, i, 38, 1. (4) Essentialiter Pater, Filius, et Spiritus dant donum increatum et efficienter et formaliter. Notionaliter Pater et Filius dant Spiritum sanctum. (5) Datur nobis Spiritus inquantum a nobis habetur: quod ponit mutationem non in Spiritu Sancto neque in Deo sed in nobis. Quidquid enim de Deo contingenter dicitur, veritatem habet per denominationem extrinsecam. Utrum datur Spiritus sanctus in omni iustificatione Opiniones: A J.H. Oswald, Die dogm. Lehre von den Sakramenten der kath. Kirche, i, ed. 5, Münster, 1894, p. 353 s. Karl Adam, ThQS, Tübingen, 101 (1920) 408.

Dicunt ex Sacra Scriptura et Patribus prioribus constare Spiritum Sanctum dari dynamice tantum in baptismo, substantialiter vero in confirmatione; contra hanc singularem opinionem vide J.B. Umberg, Die Schriftlehre vom Sakrament der Firmung, Freiburg, 1920; Eph theol Lovan 1 (1924) 508. B Petavius et nonnulli alii: Differt gratia vt et nt inq. in vt non dabatur Spiritus Sanctus.

The Robert Mollot Collection

589

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

our home with him.’ Hence, without the distinction of persons, 2 Corinthians 6.16, ‘you are the temple of God.’15 (2) A gift is that which belongs to one and comes to belong to another gratuitously. (‘Gratis,’ ‘gratuitously’: without repayment, and so the Holy Spirit is a gift, although he proceeds necessarily; but without necessity, and in this way the Holy Spirit is given to us.) (3) ‘Gift’ is used in four ways according as it is or becomes someone’s as an end, ordered to an end (as a slave is for his master and not vice versa; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m); by reason of origin (the Son is the Father’s because he is from the Father: ibid. q. 38, a. 1 c.); by reason of identity (‘what is as much yours as you,’ ibid. ad 1m); by reason of the possessor, of the ability to enjoy something; thus in rational creatures, who can truly know and freely love, ibid. q. 38, a. 1. (4) Essentially, the Father and the Son and the Spirit give the uncreated gift by efficient causality and formally. Notionally, the Father and the Son give the Holy Spirit. (5) The Spirit is given to us inasmuch as he is possessed by us. This posits a change, not in the Spirit nor in God but in us. For whatever is predicated contingently of God has its truth by extrinsic denomination. Is the Spirit given in every justification? Opinions: A. J[ohann] H[einrich] Oswald, Die dogmatische Lehre von den heiligen Sakramenten der Katholischen Kirche, vol. 1, 5th ed. (Münster: Aschendorff, 1894) 353–54. Karl Adam, in his book review of J.B. Umberg, Die Schriftlehre vom Sakrament der Firmung [see below for full bibliographic information on the book] in Theologische Quartalschrift 101 (1920) 407–408, at 408. They hold that it is clear from scripture and the earlier Fathers that the Holy Spirit is given only dynamically in baptism, but substantially in confirmation; against this singular opinion, see J[ohann] B[aptist] Umberg, Die Schriftlehre vom Sakrament der Firmung (Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 1920); Joh. B. Umberg, ‘Confirmatione Baptismus «perficitur,»’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 1 (1924) 505–17, at 508. B. Petavius and many others: Old Testament grace and New Testament

15 [Lonergan is quoting from the Vulgate. The Greek has ‘we.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

590

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Doc. eccl.: Leo xiii, ‘Divinum illud,’ ass 29 (1897) docet Spiritum Sanctum dari etiam iustis vt, conferri per baptismum.

Sacra Scriptura: Rom 5.5: caritas Dei per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Omnis et solus iustus habet caritatem (db 799: amicus); atqui ex textu caritas habetur per donum Spiritus Sancti; ergo omnis et solus iustus habet donum Spiritus Sancti. Rom 8.9: Si quis autem Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Qui non est Christi, non est iustus (omnis enim iustificatio est per Christi merita); atqui qui non habet Spiritum Sanctum non est Christi; ergo qui non habet Spiritum Sanctum non est iustus.

Patres: clare loquuntur posteriores inde ab Aphraate, rj 683. Theologi: communiter. Obicitur: Petavius sequitur sententiam S. Cyr Alex; vide J Mahé, Rev d’hist eccl 10 (1909) 485–92. Resp: non omnes hoc concedunt;16 in omni casu S. Cyr Alex manifeste suam opinionem proponit non ut testis traditionis sed ut quaerens explicationem variorum textuum Sacrae Scripturae. (3) In novitate vitae (a) cuius norma, lex, regula est ‘assimilari Deo’ per Christum Dominum; a′ Mt 5.48: Estote ergo vos perfecti sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est. Eph 5.l s.: Estote ergo imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi: et ambulate

The Robert Mollot Collection

591

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

grace are different inasmuch as the Holy Spirit was not given in the Old Testament. Teaching of the Church: Leo XIII, ‘Divinum illud,’ in Acta Sanctae Sedis 29 (1897) 644–58, teaches that the Holy Spirit was also given to the just in the Old Testament, and is conferred in baptism. Scripture: Romans 5.5: The love of God through the Holy Spirit who is given to us. All and only the just have love (db 799, ds 1528, nd 1932, ‘friend’); but according to this text love is had through the gift of the Holy Spirit; therefore all and only the just have the gift of the Holy Spirit. Romans 8.9: ‘Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.’ One who does not belong to Christ is not just (for all justification is through the merits of Christ). But whoever does not have the Holy Spirit does not belong to Christ. Therefore whoever does not have the Holy Spirit is not just. Fathers: The later Fathers beginning with Aphraates state this clearly. ep 683. Theologians: the common opinion. Objection : Petavius follows the opinion of St Cyril of Alexandria; see Joseph Mahé, ‘La sanctification d’après saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,’ Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 10 (1909) 485–92. Reply: Not all grant this;16 in any case, St Cyril clearly expresses his opinion not as a witness to tradition but as one seeking an explanation of various biblical texts. (3) Into a new life (a) The norm, law, rule of this new life is ‘to become like God’ through Christ the Lord. a′ Matthew 5.48: ‘Be therefore perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.’ Ephesians 5.1–2: ‘Be therefore imitators of God, as beloved children, and

16 See Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 183–84.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

592

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

in dilectione, sicut et Christus dilexit nos, et tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. b′ Io 15.12: Hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem sicut dilexi vos. Io 13.15: Exemplum dedi vobis ut quemadmodum ego feci vobis ita et vos faciatis. 1 Pet 2.21: Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum ut sequamini vestigia eius. Phil 2.5: Hoc enim sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Iesu. Heb 12.1–7; v. 2 aspicientes in Auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum … 1 Cor 1.18–31, 2.2, 2.9–16: sapientia Dei et stultitia mundi. c′ 1 Cor 11.1: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi. 1 Cor 4.16: Imitatores mei estote. Phil 3.17: ȈȣȝȝȚȝȘIJĮȓ ȝȠȣ ȖȓȞİıșİ, DMįİȜijȠȓ (Socii mei sitis in imitatione Christi). 1 Thess 1.6: Et vos imitatores nostri facti estis et Domini. Phil 4.9: Quae et didicistis, et accepistis, et audistis, et vidistis in me, haec agite: et Deus pacis erit vobiscum. Gal 4.19: Filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec formetur Christus in vobis.

d′ 1 Pet 5.2 s.: pascite qui in vobis est gregem Dei, providentes non coacte sed spontanee secundum Deum: neque turpis lucri gratia, sed voluntarie: neque ut dominantes in cleris, sed forma facti gregis ex animo (IJȪʌȠȚ ȖȚȞȩȝİȞȠȚIJȠȪʌȠȚȝȞȓȠȣ). e′ Rom 8.29: Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui. Exinde vocatio iustificatio gloria. (b) quae elucidatur per comparationes prorsus singulares: Rom 5.12 ss.: Adam Christus; peccatum gratia; mors vita; duplex regnum; v. 21: sicut regnavit peccatum in mortem, ita et gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam per Iesum Christum Dominum Nostrum. Rom 1.18 – 3.20: describitur regnum peccati. 3.10: Quia non est iustus quisquam. Col 1.12– 14: gratias agentes Deo Patri, qui dignos nos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine: qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum filii dilectionis suae, in quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius, remissionem peccatorum. 1 Cor 6.9–11: cf. Tit 3.3; Eph 2.1–3; Rom 5.6–9. Rom 6.10–23: mors vita; peccatum iustitia; servitus liberatio. Rom 8.5–18: caro spiritus. Eph 4.17 ss: vetus homo; novus homo. Cf. Rom 12.2.

The Robert Mollot Collection

593

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

live in love as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God.’ b′ John 15.12: ‘This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.’ John 13.15: ‘I have given you an example that you also should do as I have done to you.’ 1 Peter 2.21: ‘Christ suffered for us [var., you], leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps.’ Philippians 2.5: ‘Let this mind be in you that is in Christ Jesus.’ Hebrews 12.1–7; v. 2: ‘… looking to Jesus the pioneer and finisher of our faith.’ 1 Corinthians 1.18–31; 2.2, 9–16: the wisdom of God and the foolishness of the world. c′ 1 Corinthians 11.1: ‘Be imitators of me as I am of Christ.’ 1 Corinthians 4.16: Be imitators of me.’ Philippians 3.17: ȈȣȝȝȚȝȘIJĮȓ ȝȠȣ ȖȓȞİıșİ, DMįİȜijȠȓ: ‘Brothers and sisters, join in imitating me (in imitating Christ).’ 1 Thessalonians 1.6: ‘And you became imitators of us and of the Lord.’ Philippians 4.9: ‘Keep on doing the things you have learned and received and heard and seen in me. And the God of peace will be with you.’ Galatians 4.19: ‘My little children, for whom I am again in the pangs of childbirth until Christ is formed in you.’ d′ 1 Peter 5.2-3: ‘… tend the flock of God that is in your charge, exercising oversight not under compulsion but willingly. Do not lord it over those under you, but be examples to the flock (IJȪʌȠȚ ȖȚȞȩȝİȞȠȚ IJȠȪ ʌȠȚȝȞȓȠȣ).’ e′ Romans 8.29: ‘For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.’ Hence vocation, justification, glory. (b) … which is clarified through altogether singular comparisons Romans 5.12–20: Adam, Christ; sin, grace; death, life; two dominions; v. 21: ‘… so that, just as sin exercised dominion in death, so grace might also exercise dominion through justification leading to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.’ Romans 1.18–3.20: The reign of sin is described. Romans 3.10: ‘… because no one is just.’ Colossians 1.12–14: ‘… giving thanks to God the Father for enabling us to share in the inheritance of the saints in light. He has rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins.’ 1 Corinthians 6.9–11; see Titus 3.3; Ephesians 2.1–3; Romans 5.6–9. Romans 6.10–23: death, life; sin, justice; servitude, liberation. Romans 8.5–18: flesh, spirit. Ephesians 4.17–24: the old man, the new man. See Romans 12.2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

594

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(c) quae est Christus, in Christo, cum Christo. In Christo: 164 times in Paul.17 2 Cor 5.17: Si qua ergo in Christo, nova creatura; vetera transierunt; ecce facta sunt omnia nova.18 Phil 1.21: Mihi enim vivere Christus est et mori lucrum. Gal 2.19 s.: Ego enim per legem, legi mortuus sum, ut Deo vivam. Christo confixus sum cruci. Vivo autem, iam non ego: vivit vero in me Christus. Quod (acc. neut. rel.) autem nunc vivo in carne: in fide vivo filii Dei qui dilexit me et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Gal 3.27 ss.: Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Non est Iudaeus neque Graecus: non est servus, neque liber: non est masculus, neque femina. Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Iesu. Rom 8.29: Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes (ıȣȝȝȩȡijȠȣȢ) fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Eph 3.6: Gentes esse coheredes, et concorporales, et comparticipes promissionis eius in Christo Iesu per Evangelium. Rom 6.4–11: ıȣȞİIJȐijȘȝİȞ … ıȪȝijȣIJȠȚ … ıȣȞİıIJĮȣȡȫșȘ … ıȣȗȒıȠȝİȞ. Eph 2.5 s.: et cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo … et conresuscitavit, et consedere fecit in caelestibus in Christo Iesu. Col 2.12 s.: consepulti ei in baptismo, in quo et resurrexistis per fidem operationis Dei, qui suscitavit illum a mortuis. Et vos cum mortui essetis in delictis et praeputio carnis vestrae, convivificavit cum illo, donans vobis omnia delicta. Rom 8.17: Si autem filii, et heredes: heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi: si tamen compatimur, ut et conglorificemur. 2 Tim 2.11 s.: Fidelis sermo: Nam si commortui sumus, et convivemus: si sustinebimus, et conregnabimus: si negaverimus, et ille negabit nos. Eph 2.21 s., 4.16; Col 2.19 – aedificatio Christi. 2 Cor 5.14 s.; Col 1.24, 3.1-4; Phil 3.10, 21 - amor Christi. 1 Cor 12.26: membra inter se compatiuntur et congaudent.

The Robert Mollot Collection

595

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(c) … which is Christ, in Christ, with Christ ‘In Christ’: 164 times in Paul.17 2 Corinthians 5.17: ‘If anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation; everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new.’18 Philippians 1.21: ‘For me to live is Christ and to die is gain.’ Galatians 2.19–20: ‘For through the law I died to the law so that I might live for God. With Christ I am nailed to the cross; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life (accusative singular neuter of the relative pronoun) I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me.’ Galatians 3.27–28: ‘As many of you as were baptized in Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.’ Romans 8.29: ‘For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed (ıȣȝȝȩȡijȠȣȢ) to the image of his Son, so that he might be the firstborn in a large family.’ Ephesians 3.6: ‘… the Gentiles have become fellow heirs, members of the same body, and sharers in the promise of Christ Jesus through the gospel.’ Romans 6.4–11: ıȣȞİIJȐijȘȝİȞ … ıȪȝijȣIJȠȚ … ıȣȞİıIJĮȣȡȫșȘ … ıȣȗȒıȠȝİȞ. Ephesians 2.5–6: ‘… even when we were dead through our trespasses, [God] made us alive again in Christ … and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.’ Colossians 2.12–13: ‘… buried with him in baptism, you were also raised with him through faith in the power of God who raised him from the dead. And when you were dead in trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made you alive together with him, forgiving all your trespasses.’ Romans 8.17: ‘But if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ – if, in fact, we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him.’ 2 Timothy 2.11–12: ‘The saying is sure: if we have died with him, we shall also live with him; if we endure, we shall also reign with him; if we deny him, he will also deny us.’ Ephesians 2.21–22, 4.16; Colossians 2.19: building up into Christ. 2 Corinthians 5.14–15; Colossians 1.24, 3.1–4; Philippians 3.10, 21: the love of Christ. 1 Corinthians 12.26: the members [of Christ’s body] suffer together and rejoice together with one another.

17 F[ernand] Prat, La théologie de saint Paul, deuxième partie (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, Éditeur, 1929) 476 [note m]. [In English: The Theology of Saint Paul, vol. 2, trans. John L. Stoddard, from the 10th (French) edition (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1952) 391, note m.] 18 (Punctuation of Greek.) [It is not clear what Lonergan is referring to.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

596

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(4) Renati De fide divina et catholica (a) Io 1.13: quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius: qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri sed ex Deo nati sunt. Io 3.5: nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei;19 quod natum est ex carne, caro est; et quod natum est ex spiritu, spiritus est. 1 Io 2.29, 3.9, 4.7, 5.1, 5.4, 5.18. 1 Petr 1.3, 1.23. (b) Tit 3.5: lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus Sancti. Rom 8.16 s., 8.21, 9. 8: IJȑțȞĮ IJȠXC ĬİȠXC. Rom 8.29: primogenitum in multis fratribus. Gal 6.15, 2 Cor 5.17: nova creatura, țĮȚȞȒ țIJȓıȚȢ. Eph 2.10: Ipsius enim sumus factura (ʌȠȓȘȝĮ), creati (țIJȚıșȑȞIJİȢ) in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis quae praeparavit Deus ut in illis ambulemus. (c) Iac 1.17 s: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est transmutatio vel vicissitudinis obumbratio. Voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis, ut simus initium aliquod creaturae eius (İLMȢ IJR İLMȞĮȚ K-ȝDCȢ DMʌĮȡȤȒȞ IJZCȞ ĮXMIJȠXC țIJȚıȝȐIJȦȞ); genuit, initium creaturae. (d) pp, rj ser 356. (e) Ex [S.T.] i 27 2 c. colligitur: generatio est origo viventis e vivente principio coniuncto in similitudinem naturae. Regeneratio igitur est nova origo viventis e vivente principio coniuncto in similitudinem altioris naturae. Verificatur inquantum coniungimur viventi Spiritui, unde in cordibus diffunditur similis amor unde pergimus ad imitationem Christi et in visionem Dei.

Quod in iustificatione homo regeneratur spiritualiter ex Deo in novum hominem, novamque creaturan, ut novitate vitae ambulet. 1 De fide divina (Sacra Scriptura) et catholica (mag ord); cf db 799 s.

The Robert Mollot Collection

597

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(4) Born again [Qualification:] of divine and catholic faith. (a) John 1.12–13: ‘But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God, who were born not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God.’ John 3.5: ‘No one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and the Holy Spirit;19 what is born of the flesh is flesh, what is born of the Spirit is spirit.’ 1 John 2.29, 3.9, 4.7, 5.1, 5.4, 5.18. 1 Peter 1.3, 1.23. (b) Titus 3.5: water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit. Romans 8.16–17, 8.21, 9.8: IJȑțȞĮ IJȠXC ĬİȠXC, ‘children of God.’ Romans 8.29: ‘… first in a large family.’ Galatians 6.15; 2 Corinthians 5.17: țĮȚȞȒ țIJȓıȚȢ, ‘new creation.’ Ephesians 2.10: ‘We are his work (ʌȠȓȘȝĮ), created (țIJȚıșȑȞIJİȢ) in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life.’ (c) James 1.17–18: ‘Every generous act of giving, with every perfect act of giving, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change. In fulfilment of his own purpose he gave us birth by the word of truth, so that we would become a kind of first fruits of his creatures (İLȢ IJR İLMȞĮȚ K-ȝDCȢ DMʌĮȡȤȒȞ IJȚȞĮ IJZCȞ ĮXMIJȠXC țIJȚıȝȐIJȦȞ).’ (d) Fathers: ep, series 356. (e) From St Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 2 c., we deduce: generation is the origin of a living being from a conjoint living principle towards similarity in nature. Regeneration, therefore, is a new origin of a living being from a conjoint living principle towards similarity in nature. This is verified inasmuch as we are joined to the living Spirit, whereby a similar love is poured into our hearts by which we progress to the imitation of Christ and the vision of God. In justification a person is reborn spiritually from God to become a new person, a new creature, so as to walk in the newness of life. 1 [Qualification:] of divine faith (from scripture) and Catholic faith (from the ordinary magisterium; see db 799–800, ds 1529–30; nd 647).

19 [Vulgate reading; the Greek has simply ‘Spirit.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

598

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

2 Regeneratur, nascitur ex Deo. Io 1.13: quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius: qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri sed ex Deo nati sunt. Io 3.5 s.: nisi quis renatus fuerat ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto non potest introire in regnum Dei; quod natum est ex carne caro est; et quod natum est ex spiritu spiritus est. 1 Io 2.29: omnis qui facit iustitiam, ex ipso natus est. 1 Io 3.9: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo peccatum non facit: quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare quia ex Deo natus est. 1 Io 4.7: Omnis qui diligit ex Deo natus est. 1 Io 5.1: Omnis qui credit quoniam Iesus est Christus ex Deo natus est. 1 Io 5.4: Omne quod natum est ex Deo vincit mundum: et haec est victoria quae vincit mundum, fides nostra. 1 Io 5.18: Scimus quoniam omnis qui natus est ex Deo non peccat; sed generatio Dei conservat eum, et malignus non tangit eum. 1 Petr 1.3: Benedictus Deus et Pater Domini nostri Iesu Christi, qui secundum misericordiam suam magnam regeneravit nos in spem vivam, per resurrectionem Iesu Christi ex mortuis, in hereditatem incorruptibilem … 1 Petr 1.23: renati non ex semine corruptibili, sed incorruptibili per verbum Dei vivi et permanentis in aeternum.20 V. 25: hoc est autem verbum quod evangelizatum est in vos.

(5) viva Christi membra De fide divina et catholica db 842 800 809. aas 35 (29 Iun 1943) 193ss.

(a) oecononia salutis Io 17.23: Ego in eis et tu in me: ut sint consummati in unum: et cognoscat mundus quia tu me misisti, et dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti. V. 26 ut dilectio qua dilexisti me in ipsis sit, et ego in ipsis. Io 15.9 s.: Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos. Manete in mea dilectione. Si praecepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione mea, sicut et ego Patris mei praecepta servavi, et maneo in eius dilectione. Io 14.20 s.: In illo die vos cognoscetis

The Robert Mollot Collection

599

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

2 Is regenerated, is born of God. John 1.12–13: ‘But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God, who were born not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God.’ John 3.5–6: ‘No one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and the Holy Spirit; what is born of the flesh is flesh, what is born of the Spirit is spirit.’ 1 John 2.29: ‘… everyone who does right has been born of him.’ 1 John 3.9: ‘No one who has been born of God sins; because God’s seed remains inside him, he cannot sin since he has been born of God.’ 1 John 4.7: ‘Everyone who loves is born of God.’ 1 John 5.1: ‘Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ has been born of God.’ 1 John 5.4: ‘Whatever is born of God conquers the world. And this is the victory that conquers the world, our faith.’ 1 John 5:18: ‘We know that those who are born of God do not sin, but the one who was born of God protects them, and the evil one does not touch them.’ 1 Peter 1.3: ‘Blest be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! By his great mercy he has given us a new birth into a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, into an inheritance that is imperishable …’ 1 Peter 1.23: ‘You have been born anew not of perishable but of imperishable seed through the word of the living and eternal God’20 V. 25: ‘That word is the good news that was announced to you.’ (5) and become living members of Christ [Qualification:] of divine and catholic faith. db 842, 800, 809; ds 1582, 1530– 31, 1545–47; nd 1982, 1933–34, 1946–47. Pius xii, Mystici corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 193–248. (a) The economy of salvation John 17.23: ‘I in them and you in me that they may become completely one, and that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me.’ V. 26: ‘… that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.’ John 15.9–10: ‘As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s

20 [This is the reading of the Vulgate, which Lonergan follows. The nrsv reads: ‘through the living and enduring word of God.’ The original Greek can be taken either way.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

600

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

quia ego sum in Patre meo, et vos in me, et ego in vobis. Qui habet mandata mea, et servat ea: ille est qui diligit me. Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo: et ego diligam eum et manifestabo ei me ipsum. Io 14.23 s.: Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et Pater meus diliget eum, et ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus ... Et sermonem quem audistis non est meus: sed eius qui misit me, Patris. Io 14.15–17: Si diligitis me: mandata mea servate. Et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium paraclitum dabit vobis, ut maneat vobiscum in aeternum, Spiritum veritatis, quem mundus non potest accipere, quia non videt eum, nec scit eum. Io 15.26: Cum autem venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me. Io 16.13–25: Cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Non enim loquetur a semetipso; sed quaecumque audiet loquetur, et quae ventura sunt annuntiabit vobis. Ille me clarificabit: quia de meo accipiet et annuntiabit vobis. Omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt. Propterea dixi: quia de meo accipiet et annuntiabit vobis.

Principium oeconomiae: st ii-ii, 23, 1, 2m: amicus amat amicos amici; est principium diffusionis dilectionis et amicitiae. Deus Pater amat Christum Deum dilectione speciali quae est Spiritus. Deus Pater amat Christum hominem eadem dilectione: Lc 4.18 s., 21. Christus homo diligit homines et homines Christum hominem diligent. Deus Pater et Deus Filius diligunt homines dilectione speciali et mittunt Spiritum sanctum clamantem Abba, Pater. NB: Noli cogitare aliquem influxum physicum vel morale a dilectione humana in Deum Patrem, sed cogitate hoc oeconomiae principium tamquam ordinem a Deo Patre intentum et volitum, nempe, Pater facit Christum esse hominem et facit eum diligere homines et facit homines diligere Christum hominem ut ipse homines diligat amore speciali. Io 15.1–9: Vitis est Christus, vos palmites. Io 15.12: (corollarium diffusionis amicitiae): Hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos. (b) oeconomia salutis in Ecclesia quae est Corpus Christi, Christus mysticus Rom 11.16–24: analogia oleastri in olivam inserti; Rom 12.5: multi unum corpus sumus in Christo, singuli autem alter alterius membra. Cf. vv. 4–8.

The Robert Mollot Collection

601

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

commandments and abide in his love.’ John 14.20–21: ‘On that day you will know that I am in my Father and you in me and I in you. They who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father, and I will love them and reveal myself to them.’ John 14.23–24: ‘Those who love me will keep my word, and my Father will love them and we will come to them and make our home with them … and the word that you hear is not mine but from the Father who sent me.’ John 14.15–17: ‘If you love me, keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate to be with you forever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him.’ John 15.26: ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, he will testify on my behalf.’ John 16.13–15: ‘When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you.’ The principle of the economy [of salvation]: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 23, a. 1 ad 2m: a friend loves the friends of one’s friend. It is the principle of the diffusion of love and friendship. God the Father loves Christ as God with that special love that is the Holy Spirit. God the Father loves Christ as human with the same love: Luke 4.18–19, 21. Christ as human loves humans and humans love the human Christ. God the Father and God the Son love humans with a special love and send the Holy Spirit crying out, ‘Abba, Father.’ Note : Do not suppose there to be some physical or moral influx from human love towards God the Father; rather, consider this principle of the economy as the order intended and willed by God the Father, namely, that the Father makes Christ to be human and makes him love humans and makes humans love the human Christ so that he loves humans with a special love. John 15.1–9: Christ is the vine, you the branches. John 15.12: (corollary of the diffusion of friendship): ‘This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.’ (b) The economy of salvation in the church, which is the body of Christ, the mystical Christ. Romans 11.16–24: analogy of the wild olive shoot grafted onto the olive tree; Romans 12.5: ‘… so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

602

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

1 Cor 12 & 13, v. 3: cf. K- țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ IJȠXC D-ȖȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ: 2 Cor 13.14; Phil 2,1; cf. Rom 8.9: Si quis autem spiritum Christi non habet, hic non eius est; vv. 4–11: divisiones gratiarum a Spiritu; vv. 12 s.: Christus unum; vv. 14–26: analogia unionis ex corpora; vv. 27–31: divisiones functionum in ecclesia; cap. 13: caritas et finis. Gal 3.28: Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Iesu; vv. 21–29: lex paedagogus impotens vivificare; iustitia per fidem; per baptismum Christus induitur, et caeterae differentiae absolvuntur. Rom 6.3–11: baptismo induimus mortem et resurrectionem Christi. 2 Cor 5.14 s. 1 Cor 10.16 s.: Calix benedictionis cui benedicimus, nonne communicatio sanguinis Christi est? et panis quem frangimus, nonne participatio corporis Domini est? Quoniam unus panis, unum corpus multi sumus, omnes qui de uno pane participamus. 1 Cor 6.15 ss.: Nescitis quonian corpora vestra membra sunt Christi? Tollens ergo membra Christi, faciam membra meretricis? Absit. An nescitis quoniam qui adhaeret meretrici unum corpus efficitur? Erunt enim, inquit, duo in carne una. Qui autem adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est ... ; v. 19: An nescitis quoniam membra vestra templum sunt Spiritus sancti, qui in vobis est, quem habetis a Deo, et non estis vestri? Empti enim estis pretio magno. Glorificate et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Rom 16.25 s.: evangelium Pauli, annuntiatio Christi, revelatio mysterii (a) taciti, (b) revelati, (c) cogniti. Eph 1.3–14: consilium aeterni Patris; vv. 15– 23: oratio ut sciamus mysterium Christi. Eph 2.1–10: quales eramus et quid fecerit Pater per Christum in nobis; vv. 11–22: repetitur et amplificatur. 3.2–12: intelligentia mysterii a Paulo habita et evangelizata; v. 6: Gentes esse coheredes et concorporales et comparticipes promissionis eius (promissae salutis) in Christo Iesu per evangelium (ȈȣȞ … ȋȡȚıIJZC);21 v. 8: in Gentibus evangelizare investigabiles divitias Christi. v. 9: illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti (ȠLMțȠȞȠȝȓĮ IJȠXC ȝȣıIJȘȡȓȠȣ). vv. 10–11: ut innotescat … per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia Dei, secundum praefinitionem saeculorum quem fecit in Christo Iesu; vv. 14–21: oratio ut sciamus mysterium in Christo. Eph 4.1–6: unitas in uno corpore, Spiritu, spe, Domino, fide, baptism; vv. 11–16: augmentum corporis; vv. 22–24: deponere veterem hominem, renovamini; 4.30–5.2: Nolite contristari Sp …. imitatores Dei estote. Col 1.12–14: Pater qui dignos nos fecit, eripuit, transtulit in regnum filii dilectionis sui in quo habemus remissionem peccatorum, redemptionem per sanguinem eius, remissionem peccatorum; vv 15–17: Christus Deus; vv. 18–25: Christus caput ecclesiae; vv. 26 ss.: mysterium … absconditum …

The Robert Mollot Collection

603

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

individually we are members one of another.’ See vv. 4–8. 1 Corinthians 12 and 13: v. 3: See K- țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ IJȠXC D-ȖȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ: 2 Corinthians 13.14; Philippians 2.1. See Romans 8.9: ‘Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him’; vv. 4–11: various graces from the Spirit; vv. 12–13: one Christ; vv. 14–26: analogy of union from the body; vv. 27–31: division of functions in the church; chapter 13: charity and the end. Galatians 3.28: ‘… for you are all one in Christ Jesus’; vv. 21–29: the law as disciplinarian incapable of life-giving; justice through faith; clothed in Christ through baptism, and all other differences are dissolved. Romans 6.3–11: in baptism we put on the death and resurrection of Christ. 2 Corinthians 5.14–15. 1 Corinthians 10.16–17: ‘The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of Christ? The bread that we break, is it not a sharing in the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.’ 1 Corinthians 6.15–17: ‘Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! Do you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute becomes one body with her? For it is said, “The two shall become one flesh.” But anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him’; v. 19: ‘Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a great price; therefore glorify God in your body.’ Romans 16.25–26: gospel of Paul, announcement of Christ, revelation of the mystery (a) kept secret, (b) revealed, (c) known. Ephesians 1.3–14: the plan of the eternal Father; vv. 15–23: pray to know the mystery of Christ. Ephesians 2.1–10: what we were like, and what the Father has done in us through Christ; vv. 11–22: repeated and amplified. Ephesians 3.2–12: Paul’s understanding of the mystery, and preaching of it; v. 6: the Gentiles are co-heirs with Christ, members of the same body, sharers in the promise (ȈȣȞ … ȋȡȚıIJZC);21 v. 8: ‘… to bring to the Gentiles the good news of the unfathomable riches of Christ’; v. 9: ‘… to enlighten all concerning the plan of the mystery’ (ȠLMțȠȞȠȝȓĮ IJȠXC ȝȣıIJȘȡȓȠȣ); vv. 10–11: ‘… so that through the church the wisdom of God in its rich variety might now be made known … in accordance with the eternal purpose that he has carried out in Christ Jesus our Lord’; vv. 14–21: prayer that we might know the mystery in Christ. Ephesians 4.1-6: unity in one body, Spirit, hope, Lord, faith, baptism; vv. 11–16: growth of the body; vv. 22–24: put away the old self, 21 See Prat, La théologie de saint Paul, deuxième partie, 21 [The Theology of St Paul, vol. 2, 18–19].

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

604

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

manifestatum … divitias gloriae sacramenti huius in Gentibus, quod est Christus in vobis, spes gloriae (ȋȡȚıIJRYȢ HMȞ X-ȝLCȞ, K- HMȜʌLȢ IJKCȢ įȩȟȘȢ; cf. Eph 2.12, ȤȦȡLȢ ȋȡȚıIJȠXC … HMȜʌȓįĮ ȝK H>ȤȠȞIJİȢ). Col 1.28: ut exhibeamus omnem hominem perfectum in Christo Iesu: 2:2 s., 6 s., 9–15, 19; 3:1–4, 9–11.

Prat, note m, ii, 479: in Christo, in Spiritu, quandonam aequivaleant? Tromp, De Spiritu Sancto anima corporis mystici, Textus et Doc, ser. theol. 1&7, pug.

st, iii, 8, 1–6 (de instrumentalitate humanitatis, Boyer, 287 s.)

(6) iusti De fide definita. db 792, 799 s., 807, 821.

(a) ex fide disponente, uti supra: Rom 3.21–30, 5.1; Gal 3.8, 24. (b) ex baptismo et Spiritu sancto: Tit 3.5–7; Io 3.5. (c) ex incorporatione in Christo: Rom 5.19, 8.1. (d) ex nova creatura in Christo: 2 Cor 5.14–21; v. 21: Eum, qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit, ut nos efficeremur iustitia Dei (įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ ĬİȠXC) in ipso. (e) in nomine Domini Nostri Iesu Christi et in Spiritu Dei nostri: 1 Cor 6.11. Scholion: De vera peccatorum remissione 22 (a) De fide definita: db 792.

The Robert Mollot Collection

605

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

be renewed; 4.30–5.2: ‘Do not grieve the Spirit …, be imitators of God …’ Colossians1.12–14: ‘… the Father, who has made us worthy … has rescued us … and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of our sins’; vv. 15–17: Christ as God; vv. 18–25: Christ head of the church; vv. 26–27: ‘… mystery … hidden … revealed … riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory’ (ȋȡȚıIJRYȢ HMȞ X-ȝLCȞ, K- HMȜʌLȢ IJKCȢ įȩȟȘȢ; cf. Eph 2.12, ȤȦȡLȢ ȋȡȚıIJȠXC … HMȜʌȓįĮ ȝK H>ȤȠȞIJİȢ). Colossians 1.28: ‘… so that we may present everyone mature in Christ Jesus’: 2.2–3, 6–7, 9–15, 19; 3.1–4, 9–11. Prat, La théologie de saint Paul, deuxième partie, note m, 479–80. [The Theology of Saint Paul, vol. 2, note m, 394–95]: ‘in Christ, in the Spirit,’ when are they equivalent? Sebastian Tromp, De Spiritu Sancto anima corporis mystici: Testimonia selecta e patribus Graecis. Textus et documenta, Series theologica 1 (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1932). De Spiritu Sancto anima corporis mystici: Testimonia selecta e partibus Latinis. Textus et documenta, Series theologica 7 (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1932). Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, aa. 1–6 (on the instrumentality of the humanity [of Christ], see Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 287–88). (6) The just [Qualification:] defined as being of faith: db 792, 799–800, 807, 821; ds 1515, 1528–1530, 1542–43, 1561; nd 512, 647. (a) From disposing faith, as above: Romans 3.21–30, 5.1; Galatians 3.8, 24. (b) From baptism and the Holy Spirit: Titus 3.5–7; John 3.5. (c) From incorporation in Christ: Romans 5.19, 8.1. (d) From a new creation in Christ: 2 Corinthians 5.14–21; v. 21: ‘… him who knew no sin, he made sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God’ (įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ ĬİȠXC). (e) ‘In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God’: 1 Corinthians 6.11. Excursus: On the true remission of sins 22 (a) [Qualification:] defined as being of faith: db 792, ds 1515, nd 512. 22 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 322–23; Lange, De gratia, pp. 254–59, §§350– 58.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

606

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(b) Rom 8.1: Nihil nunc damnationis. Rom 5.19: si vere peccatores, tunc vere iusti. Act 3.19: Convertimini ut deleantur (HMȟĮȜİȚijșKCȞĮȚ) peccata vestra. (c) Rom 7.17: Nunc autem non ego operor illud sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Ergo manet. Manet id quod ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat, C. db 792. Manet quidquam damnationis, N. Rom 8.1. (d) Rom 4.7 s.: (Remissa quia tecta et non imputata). 2 Cor 5.19: Non reputans illis delicta. Concedimus facta praeterita non mutari: quod semel factum est, transit immutabiliter in ‘factum fuisse.’ Negamus reatum culpae et etiam poenae non vere auferri.23 Notamus Paulum nullibi docuisse iustum coram Deo manere peccatorem coram Deo cum iustitia mere externa et imputata. (e) Rom 8.32: Qui etiam proprio filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum: quo modo non etiam cum illo omnia nobis donavit? Col 1.14–21 s.; 2.9 s.: quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter: et estis in illo repleti. pp, rj ser 355, 475 (7) amici Deo De fide definita. db 799: ex inimico amicus.

(a) Deus diligit, uti supra. Rom 5.6–11. (b) nos diligimus. Rom 5.5, 8.35–39; 1 Cor 13.13; 2 Cor 5.14 ss. st ii-ii, 23, 1: amicitia est mutuus amor benevolentiae fundatus in communicatione cuiusdam boni. Scilicet, amare est velle bonum alicui. Amicos esse est alterum alteri bonum quoddam velle. Amicitia nostra cum Deo in eo est quod nos illi volumus bonum suum infinitum et ille nobis suam beatitudinem communicare vult. Cf ii-ii, 23, 1; i, 26, 1–4; i-ii, 3, 8; 5, 1; 5, 5.

The Robert Mollot Collection

607

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(b) Romans 8.1: no condemnation now. Romans 5.19: if truly sinners, now truly just. Acts 3.19: ‘Turn to God so that your sins may be wiped away’ (HMȟĮȜİȚijșKCȞĮȚ). (c) Romans 7.17: ‘But in fact it is no longer I that do it but sin that dwells within me.’ There remain the effects of sin and what incline to sin, yes. db 792, ds 1515, nd 512. There remains something of condemnation, no. Romans 8.1: ‘no condemnation now.’ (d) Romans 4.7–8: ‘… forgiven because covered over and not imputed.’ 2 Corinthians 5.19: ‘… not imputing their sins to them.’ We grant that past deeds are not changed: what was once done becomes unchangeably into ‘has been done.’ We deny that sin and also liability to punishment are not truly taken away.23 We note that Paul nowhere taught that one who is just before God remains a sinner before God with a justice that is merely external and imputed. (e) Romans 8.32: ‘He who did not withhold his own son but gave him us for us all, will he not with him also give us everything else?’ Colossians 1.14, 22-23; 2.9-10: ‘For in him the fullness of divinity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him.’ Patristic texts: EP series 355, 475. (7) friends of God [Qualification:] defined as being of faith. db 799, ds 1528, nd 1932: ‘from enemy to friend.’ (a) God loves: as above. Romans 5.6–11. (b) We love. Romans 5.5, 8.35–39; 1 Corinthians 13; 2 Corinthians 5.14– 15. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 23, a. 1: friendship is the mutual love of benevolence founded upon sharing in something that is good. That is to say, to love is to will good to someone. To be friends is to will something that is good to each other. Our friendship with God consists in this, that we will to him his infinite good and he wills to communicate to us his own happiness. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 23, a. 1; 1, q. 26, aa. 1–4; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 1; q. 5, a. 5. 23 Agitur de vera et perfecta cum Deo reconciliatione: This refers to true and perfect reconciliation with God. Romans 5.10; 2 Corinthians 5.17–21; Colossians 2.12–14.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

608

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

pp, rj ser 361. (8) filii Dei adoptivi (a) Adoptio est gratuita assumptio personae extraneae in statum et in iura filii. Supponit (vel facit) aliquam communitatem naturae. Inter iura filii maxime attenditur ius hereditatis. (b) Distinguitur triplex adoptio in nt: perfecta, quae includit resurrectionem corporis, Rom 8.23; vti seu remota, quae in Israelitis habebatur, Rom 9.4; proxima, de qua in thesi. (c) De fide divina et catholica. (d) Filii Dei: vide supra, ‘renati.’ (e) adoptivi: Io 17.23: dilexisti eos, sicut et me dilexisti. Quos Deus Pater diligit sicut Filium suum, eos in statum et iura filii assumit. Atqui … Gal 4.5 s.: misit Deus Filium suum ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Quoniam autem estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum filii sui in corda vestra clamantem, Abba, Pater; v.7: Quod si filius, et heres per Deum. Eph 1.5: Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum; vv. 13–14: signati estis Spiritu promissionis sancto, qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae. Rom 8:15–17.

pp, rj ser 359. (9) haeredes secundum spem vitae aeternae db 799: de fide definita. (a) uti supra, ‘filii adoptivi.’ (b) Tit 3.7: ut iustificati gratia ipsius, heredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae; tt. scdm spem: (c) Rom 8.17: Si autem filii, et heredes; heredes quidem Dei, coheredes

The Robert Mollot Collection

609

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Patristic texts: EP series 361. (8) adopted children of God (a) Adoption is the gratuitous acceptance of an unrelated person into the state and with the rights of a child. It supposes (or effects) a commonality in nature. Among the rights of the child the most important is the right of inheritance. (b) There are three kinds of adoption in the New Testament: perfect, which includes the resurrection of the body, Romans 8.23; that of the Old Testament, or remote, which was in effect among the Israelites, Romans 9.4; proximate, which this thesis is concerned with. (c) [Qualification:] of divine and catholic faith. (d) Children of God: see ‘reborn,’ above. (e) Adopted: John 17.23: ‘… you have loved them as you have loved me.’ But those whom the Father loves as his Son he accepts into the state of and with the rights of a son; therefore … Galatians 4.4–7: ‘But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!” So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir, through God.’ Ephesians 1.5: ‘He destined us for adoption as his children through Jesus Christ, according to the good pleasure of his will’; vv. 13–14: ‘In him you also, when you had heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, and had believed in him, were marked with the seal of the promised Holy Spirit; this is the pledge of our inheritance toward redemption as God’s own people, to the praise of his glory.’ Romans 8.15–17. Patristic texts: EP series 359. (9) heirs in hope of eternal life [Qualification:] of divine faith. db 799, ds 1528, nd 1932. (a) ‘Children by adoption,’ as above. (b) Titus 3.7: ‘… that justified by his grace we may be heirs in hope of eternal life.’ Just taking the words, ‘in hope’: (c) Romans 8.17: ‘… and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

610

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

autem Christi: si tamen conpatimur, ut et conglorificemur. Rom 8.23: adoptionem filiorum Dei exspectantes, redemptionem corporis nostril; v. 24: Spe enim salvi facti sumus. Rom 11.22–24: oleaster insertus excidi potest. 1 Cor 9.27: sed castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo: ne forte cum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar. 1 Cor 10.12. Itaque qui se exsistimat stare, videat ne cadat. Apoc 3.11.

pp, rj ser 360. (10) consortium divinae naturae ineunt (a) de fide ex SScr et Trad. db 1042.24 (b) 2 Petr 1.4 (exegesis difficilior, Lange, p. 300 f., §408). L^ȞĮ įȚD IJȠȪIJȦȞ ȖȑȞȘıșİ șİȓĮȢ țȠȚȞȦȞȠL ijȪıİȦȢ. a′ promissa vel promissiones iam sunt data ut, postquam corruptionem concupiscentiae fugeritis, efficeretis consortes divinae naturae; b′ quandonam eritis consortes: post dispositiones ad iustificationem an post mortem? non determinatur per aoristum subiunctivum, ȖȑȞȘıșİ, quod modum et non tempus actionis dicit; c′ ex generali contextu nt, concluditur ad aliquod consortium in ipsa iustificatione: sumus enim filii, IJȑțȞĮIJȠXC ĬİȠXC, nati ex Deo, regenerati, adoptati in statum et iura filii.

(c) pp, rj ser 358 (11) astruitur nexus, i.e., non separantur quae hic enumerantur sed et simul fiunt et, si quis peccat, omnia abeunt. Tit 3.4–7: Cum autem benignitas et humanitas apparuit Salvatoris nostri Dei, non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum (4) regenerationis et (3) renovationis Spiritus sancti (2) quem effudit in nos abunde (5) per Iesum Christum

The Robert Mollot Collection

611

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

heirs with Christ – if, in fact we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him.’ Romans 8.23–24: ‘… while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies. For in hope we were saved.’ Romans 11.22–24: The wild olive that has been grafted on can be cut out. 1 Corinthians 9.27: ‘… but I punish my body and enslave it, so that after proclaiming to others I myself should not be disqualified.’ 1 Corinthians 10.12: ‘So if you think you are standing, watch out that you do not fall.’ Revelation 3.11. Patristic texts: ep series 360. (10) sharing in the divine nature (a) [Qualification:] of divine faith from Scripture and Tradition, db 1042, ds 1942, 1985/42.24 (b) 2 Peter 1.4 (more difficult exegesis, Lange, De gratia, pp. 300–301, §408): L^ȞĮ įȚD IJȠȪIJȦȞ ȖȑȞȘıșİ șİȓĮȢ țȠȚȞȦȞȠL ijȪıİȦȢ. a′ The promises or guarantees have already been given so that, after you have fled the corruption of concupiscence, you will be made sharers in the divine nature. b′ When will you be sharers? After disposition for justification, or after death? This is not determined by the aorist subjunctive, ȖȑȞȘıșİ, which indicates the manner, not the time, of an action. c′ From the overall context of the New Testament, we conclude to some sharing [in the divine nature] in justification itself; for we are children, IJȑțȞĮIJȠXC ĬİȠXC, born of God, reborn, adopted into the state and rights of a child. (c) Patristic texts: ep series 358. (11) There is a nexus, that is, what are presented here are not separated, but all of them take place at the same time and, if one sins, all vanish together. Titus 3.4–7: ‘When the kindness and generosity of God our Savior has appeared, it is not by the just works that we have done but out of his mercy that we are saved through the water of rebirth (4) and renewal in the Holy Spirit (3), which he has poured upon us abundantly (2), through Jesus

24 See Lennerz, De gratia redemptoris 87–88; Lange, De gratia, p. 299, §406.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

612

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

salvatorem nostrum, ut (6) iustificati gratia ipsius (9) heredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae. Membrum Christi vivum et donum Spiritus: Rom 8.9: Vos autem in carne non estis, sed in spiritu: si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis. Si quis autem Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Donum Spiritus, filii Dei, adoptio, hereditas: Rom 8:14–17; Gal 4:4–7. Donum Spiritus, caritas: Rom 5:5. Si amor Christi, inhabitatio Patris et Filii: Io 14:23. 11(b) astruitur nexus negativus: Quod haec iustitia et sanctitas coram Deo amitti potest, et quidem omni et solo peccato mortali amittitur.25 1 Contra Calvinum, qui statuit iustitiam Dei inamissibilem; ideoque docuit eos qui post baptismum peccant mortaliter numquam vere et realiter fuisse iustos sed tantum falso reputatos esse iustos. Contra Lutherum, qui statuit hominem iustificari fide fiduciali, ideoque docuit hominem Deo fidit non mortaliter sed tantum venialiter peccare quidquid faciat. 2 Amitti potest: db 805–807; 833 cf. 839; 1393. Rom 11.22 ss.; 1 Cor 9.27; 1 Cor 10.12; Apoc 3.11. rj ser 365.

3 Omni peccato mortali amittitur: db 808 837 862. 1 Cor 6.9; Gal 5.19–21; Eph 5.5; Apoc 21.8; Rom 2.13; 2.6 (Rom 2:13 = Iac 1.22); Iac 1.15. rj ser 364.

4 Solo peccato mortali amittitur: db 804 (linea 12a: Licet enim …); 107; 899 lin. 22, Nam venialia … Iac 3.2: In multis offendimus omnes; sed non vult dicere omnes esse iniustos; secus frustra ‘Deus genuit nos verbo veritatis ut simus initium aliquod creaturae eius’ (Iac 1.18). Mat 6.12: Dimitte nobis debita nostra; est oratio iusti, secundum Carthag db 107.

The Robert Mollot Collection

613

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Christ our Savior (5), so that, justified by his grace (6), we are heirs in the hope of eternal life (9).’ Living member of Christ and gift of the Spirit: Romans 8.9: ‘But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.’ Gift of the Spirit, children of God, adoption, inheritance: Romans 8.14– 17; Galatians 4.4–7. Gift of the Spirit, love: Romans 5.5. If love for Christ, then indwelling by the Father and Son: John 14.23. (11b) – There is a negative nexus: this justice and sanctity before God can be lost, and in fact is lost only and solely by mortal sin.25 1 Against Calvin, who stated the justice of God to be impossible to lose; therefore he taught that those who after baptism sin mortally were never really and truly just but were only falsely reputed to be so. Against Luther, who stated that one was justified through fiducial faith, and therefore taught that one who trusts in God sins not mortally but only venially, whatever he does. 2 It can be lost: db 805–807, 833, and see also 839; 1393; ds 1540–42, 1573, and see also 1579, 2443; nd 1940–43, 1973, and see also 1979. Romans 11.22– 24; 1 Corinthians 9.27, 10.12; Revelation 3.11. Church Fathers: ep series 365. 3 It is lost by any mortal sin: db 808, 837, 862; ds 1544, 1577, 1619; nd 1945, 1977, 1425. 1 Corinthians 6.9; Galatians 5.19–21; Ephesians 5.5; Revelation 21.8; Romans 2.13, 2.6 (Romans 2.13 = James 1.22); James 1.15. Church Fathers: ep series 364. 4 It is lost only by mortal sin: db 804 (line 12: ‘Licet enim …’), 107, 899 (line 22, ‘Nam venialia …’); ds 1537 (line 1), 229; 1680 (line 6); nd 1938 (‘For although …’), 1905, 1626 (‘As regards venial sins …’). James 3.2: ‘For we have all offended in many things’; but this does not mean that all are unjust; otherwise it would be in vain that ‘[God] gave us birth by the word of truth that we might be a kind of first fruits of his creatures,’ James 1.18.

25 Lennerz, De gratia redemptoris 252–58. [Lennerz’s Thesis 13: ‘Iustus omni et solo peccato mortali iustitiam amittit.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

614

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Quod haec coram Deo iustitia et sanctitas augeri potest et debet per observationem mandatorum et conformationem cum Christo Iesu, neque perfecte comprehenditur antequam ad resurrectionem occuramus et bravium a iusto iudice accipiamus. A Augeri potest et debet: db 803. B Per observationem mandatorum: db 804; Rom 2.13; Iac 1.22. C Per conformationem cum Christo Iesu. Rom 8:28 ss. Cf. iustitiam esse secundum normas divinas nobis per Christum revelatas. D Neque perfecte comprehenditur: Phil 3.11–14.26 (Cf. Rom 8.35 ss.; 2 Cor 6.4–10; 1 Cor 9.24–27; Rom 8.23). E A iusto iudice: 2 Cor 5.10; Rom 2.6; Mt 25.31–46. 3

Intelligentia Fidei27 3.1 Gratia Sanctificans: Problema

Gratia sanctificans est accidens in genere qualitatis ad speciem habitus reducendum; non est virtus sed in essentia animae subiectatur.28 Quid sit? Specialissma quaedam participatio divinae naturae. Est enim absolute supernaturalis, neque enim promeretur (db 801) neque a substantia finita promereri potest.29 Eo quod hoc ens habemus, sumus consortes divinae naturae.

The Robert Mollot Collection

615

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Matthew 6.12: ‘Forgive us our sins’ is a prayer of a just person, according to the Council of Carthage [ad 418], db 107, ds 229, nd 1905. Because this justice before God and this holiness can and ought to be increased through the observance of the commandments and conformation to Christ Jesus, it is never completely attained until we come to the resurrection and receive the award from the just judge. A It can and ought to be increased: db 803, ds 1535, nd 1937. B Through observance of the commandments: db 804, ds 1536, nd 1938; Romans 2.13; James 1.22. C Through conformation to Christ Jesus. Romans 8.28–30. Justice according to divine norms revealed to us through Christ. D Nor is it completely attained: Philippians 3.10–14.26 (See also Romans 8.35–39; 2 Corinthians 6.4–10; 1 Corinthians 9.24–27; Romans 8.23). E From the just judge: 2 Corinthians 5.10, Romans 2.6, Matthew 25.31–46. 3

Understanding the Faith27 3.1 Sanctifying Grace: The Problem

Sanctifying grace is an accident in the genus of quality reducible to the species of habit; it is not a virtue, but is in the essence of the soul as in its subject.28 What is it? It is a very special participation in the divine nature. For it is absolutely supernatural, is not merited (db 801, ds 1532, nd 1935), nor can it be merited by any finite substance.29 By the very fact that we possess this being we are participants of the divine nature. 26 [Lonergan originally had ‘Phil 3.11–14,’ but it seems preferable, given his point, to take the reference back to verse 10.] 27 [Lonergan’s own table of contents indicates that a third section should begin at this point, and that the main heading for this third section should be ‘Intelligentia fidei,’ with ‘Problema’ as the first subheading. In the text at this point, however, ‘Gratia sanctificans’ is the only heading that appears. The editors have sought to take into account all of Lonergan’s indications in settling upon the heading and first subheading for this section.] 28 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 186. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 110, aa. 1–4. 29 See Lange, De gratia, pp. 307-12, §§415–19.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

616

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

1 Videtur adesse contradictio. Aut ista participatio est finita vel infinita. Si infinita est, non est participatio sed ipse Deus. Si finita est, non divina est, nam Deus natura sua est infinitus; neque absolute supernaturalis est, quia finito accidenti, finita substantia proportionatur. 2 Praeterea, nullum ens finitum potest constituere donum infinitum et increatum. Et hoc constat inspiciendo theorias propositas. Deus inhabitat inquantum producit hoc ens supernaturale. Scilicet, Deus est ubique, quia ubique operatur. Ergo producendo ens absolute supernaturale, est magis praesens; quae maior praesentia dicitur inhabitatio. Apparet inhabitare hoc ens finitum; apparet Deum esse magis praesentem quam in producendis vermibus; non apparet Deum esse hospitem inhabitantem et manentem imo donum datum. Unde alii dicunt Deum inhabitare per maiorem assimilationem: secundum Neoplatonicas spatium non facit absentiam inter spiritus puros sed sola diversitas; quia ergo per gratiam anima Deo assimilatur, Deus dicitur inhabitans, et ideo donum. Apparet imaginem dari et inhabitari; non apparet auctorem imaginis dari nisi in similitudine et non in re. Unde alii dicunt Deum inhabitare inquantum habetur; habetur vero inquantum cognosci et amari potest. At videtur etiam absens et non datum potest cognosci et amari. Unde alii dicunt duas vel tres ex his viis simul esse sumendas. 3 Praeterea Patres non ponunt nostrum consortium divinae naturae in dono creato sed increato. Athan: rj 766, 770, 780 (780: si Spiritus qui nobis datur esset creatura, non essemus participes Dei sed creaturae). Did Alex: rj 1071: ipse Spiritus substantialiter participatur; ȠXMıȚȦįZYȢ. Cyr Alex: rj 2107: quia Spiritus est Deus et non creatura, sumus ex Deo nati, deiformes, consortes divinae naturae 4 Ulterius Patres faciunt filiationem adoptivam ex Christo et Spiritu Sancto. Athan, rj 766, 788; Cyr Hier, rj 813; cf. Clem Alex, 407; cf. etiam 948, 1273, 1433, 1777, 2106. 5 Ulterius PP admittunt effectum in creatura, nempe imaginem Dei Ada-

The Robert Mollot Collection

617

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

1 There seems to be a contradiction here. This participation is either finite or it is infinite. If infinite, it is not a participation but God himself. If it is finite, it is not divine, for God by his very nature is infinite; nor is it absolutely supernatural, since a finite substance is proportionate to a finite accident. 2 Besides, no finite being can constitute an infinite and uncreated gift. This is clear by looking at the theories proposed. God dwells within us inasmuch as he produces this supernatural entity. Now, God is omnipresent, because he operates everywhere. Therefore in producing this absolutely supernatural being, he is more present; and this further presence is called inhabitation or indwelling. It is apparent that he dwells in this finite being. It is apparent that God is more present in it than [he is] in producing worms; it is not apparent that God is a guest dwelling and remaining, indeed, a gift that has been given. Hence some say that God indwells through a greater assimilation: according to the Neoplatonists, distance does not create an absence among pure spirits, but only diversity does; since, therefore, through grace the soul is assimilated to God, God is said to dwell within it, and therefore as a gift. It appears that it is an image that is given and indwells; it is not apparent that the author of the image is given except in a likeness and not in reality. Hence others say that God indwells inasmuch as he is possessed by someone; but God is possessed inasmuch as he can be known and loved. But it seems that even what is absent and not given can be known and loved. Hence still others say that two or three of these ways must be taken together. 3 Besides, the Fathers place our sharing in the divine nature not in a created but in an uncreated gift. Athanasius: ep 766, 770, 780 (780: if the Spirit given to us is a creature, we should not be participants of God but of a creature). Didymus of Alexandria: ep 1071: the Spirit is participated substantially, ȠXMıȚȦįZYȢ. Cyril of Alexandria: ep 2107: Since the Spirit is God and not a creature, we are born of God, are godlike, are sharers in the divine nature. 4 Further, the Fathers take adoptive sonship as being from Christ and the Holy Spirit. Athanasius, ep 766, 788; Cyril of Jerusalem, ep 813; see also Clement of Alexandria, ep 407. See also ep 948, 1273, 1433, 1777, 2106. 5 Again, the Fathers admit of an effect in the creature, namely, the im-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

618

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

mo impressam et peccato obscuratam. Gen 1.26. Cuius restauratio est iustitia et sanctitas. rj 31, 253, 361, 746, 973, 1282, 1698, 2080, 2106.

6 Unde secundum Petavium docuerunt [1]30 Patres Graeci habitum caritatis esse vinculum seu nexum quo Spiritui Sancto unimur, (2) ipsum Spiritum nos facere filios adoptionis, (3) ita quidem ut nullo vinculo exsistente solus Spiritus per suam substantiam nos faceret filios Dei, (4) quamvis tres personae inhabitent, tamen solum Spiritum adesse tamquam formam vel quasi formam nostrae iustificationis.31

7 Unde variae theologorum sententiae. Ante aetatem auream saec xiii, P. Lombardus docuit caritatem nostram in nobis non esse creatam virtutem sed ipsum Spiritum.32 L. Lessius distinxit inter nudam entitatem gratiae et eiusdem habitudinem ad Spiritum Sanctum; negavit necessariam connectionem; docuit nos iustificari per nudum entitatem creatam, fieri filios adoptionis et participes divinae naturae per nexum cum Spiritu Sancto.33 S[cheeben] docet iustificationem constitui non per solam entitatem finitam sed etiam per donum increatum tripersonale quod est quasi forma. Ubi desinit metaphora, non clarum.34 D[onnelly] docet Spiritum Sanctum adesse non per solam appropriationem neque exclusive proprie sed proprie; quod explicat per imaginem

The Robert Mollot Collection

619

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

age of God imprinted upon Adam and darkened by sin. Genesis 1.26. The restoration of this image is justice and holiness. ep 31, 253, 361, 746, 973, 1282, 1698, 2080, 2106. 6 Thus, according to Petavius, the Greek Fathers taught [1]30 that the habit of charity is the bond or nexus by which we are united to the Holy Spirit, (2) that it is the Holy Spirit who makes us children by adoption, (3) that in fact even without any bond the Holy Spirit alone through his own substance would make us children of God, and (4) that although the three Persons dwell in us, only the Spirit is present as the form or quasi form of our justification.31 7 Hence the various theological opinions. Before the golden age of the thirteenth century, Peter Lombard taught that our charity was not a virtue created in us but the Holy Spirit himself.32 Leonard Lessius distinguished between the mere entity of grace and its relation to the Holy Spirit; he denied any necessary connection [between the two]; he taught that we are justified through the created entity by itself, and become children by adoption and participants of the divine nature through a nexus with the Holy Spirit.33 S[cheeben] teaches that justification is constituted not only through a finite entity but also through the uncreated gift of the three Persons, which is its quasi form. Where the metaphor leaves off is not clear.34 D[onnelly] teaches that the Holy Spirit is present not by

30 [In the autograph, Lonergan inadvertently omits the ‘1’ and begins with the numeral ‘2.’] 31 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 167–68. On the Greek Fathers: Joseph Mahé, ‘La sanctification d’après saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,’ Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 10 (1909) 30–40, 469–92. 32 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 166. 33 See Lennerz, De gratia redemptoris 121–24. 34 Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, ed. Josef Höfer, vol. 2 in Gesammelte Schriften (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941–; date of volume consulted, 1958) §30, pp. 141–47. [In English: The Mysteries of Christianity, trans. Cyril Vollert (St Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1946) §30, pp. 165–72.] Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik iii: Schöpfungslehre, ed. Josef Höfer, vol. 5 of Gesammelte Schriften (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941–; date of volume consulted, 1961), §169, nn. 832–84, pp. 393–421. [In the autograph, Lonergan had simply ‘Dogmatik ii §832ff.’ This reference to Scheeben’s writings may have been taken from Boyer, who in Tractatus de gratia divina (p. 168, n. 10) has ‘Dogmatik ii, n. 832 sqq.,’ which seems to be a misprint for ‘Dogmatik iii, n. 832 sqq.’ Accordingly, the editors have

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

620

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

quandam trium personarum. Similia apud Passaglia, Schrader, de Regnon, Wallefaert.35

8 Boyer insistit donum gratiae et donum Spiritus non esse duo dona separatim consideranda, et citat i, 43, 3.36 Lange similiter vult unum donum totale.37 Pesch ii, 678, approbante Lennerz, p. 124, note 130, docet unicum errorem Lessii esse in separabilitate gratiae et doni increati.38

9 Communiter docetur donum Spiritus dici de Spirito per appropriationem.39

The Robert Mollot Collection

621

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

appropriation alone nor exclusively properly, but properly; this he explains through an image of the three Persons. Similar opinions in [Carlo] Passaglia [1812–87], [Clement] Schraeder [1820–75], [Theodore] de Regnon [1831–93], [Bishop Gustave-Joseph]Waffelaert [1847–1931].35 8 Boyer insists that the gift of grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit are not two gifts to be considered separately, and quotes Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q.43, a. 3.36 Lange likewise opts for one total gift.37 Pesch, approved by Lennerz, teaches that Lessius’s only error is in holding the separability of grace and the uncreated gift.38 9 The common doctrine is that the gift of the Spirit is predicated of the Spirit by appropriation.39

35

36 37 38

39

changed the reference from ‘Dogmatik ii’ to ‘Dogmatik iii’ and specified the page range from the beginning of §169, n. 832 on p. 393 to its end at n. 884 on p. 421.] Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 168. Lange, De gratia, pp. 342–43, §455. Malachi Donnelly, ‘The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit according to M.J. Scheeben,’ Theological Studies 7 ( June 1946) 244–80; Malachi Donnelly, ‘The Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit,’ Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America (1949) 39–77. [Donnelly article ends on p. 77, but Lonergan gives the page range as ‘39–89.’ It seems, then, that he meant to include the response to Donnelly’s article by William R. O’Connor, ‘Discussion of “Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit,”’ ibid. 77–87, and ‘Digest of General Discussion,’ ibid. 88–89. This last item includes a one-paragraph report of Lonergan’s critical response to Donnelly’s article.] See J. Van der Meersch, ‘Grâce,’ dtc vi (12) 1615. [Donnelly’s ‘The Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit,’ 72–73, can serve to explain Lonergan’s remark: ‘… created habitual grace, as an accidental communication of divine life and being (communicated by each divine Person modo relative diverso), appears as a current, or flame, of light-flood of divine being flowing from the one Godhead, but distinguished relatively by its passage through the three divine and distinct Persons. The reality communicated by each Person is, absolutely speaking, the one, indivisible, finite, accidental, created communication of their common Trinitarian life. Nevertheless, each Person communicates this one reality wholly and entirely, and that as a Person distinct from the other two divine Persons.’ This position goes by the name ‘The non-exclusively proprium theory of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just.’] Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 180. Lange, De gratia, pp. 342–43, §455. See Christian Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, tomus ii: De Deo Uno secundum naturam. De Deo Trino secundum personas, 2nd ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1899–1903) 355, n. 678; text quoted in Lennerz, De gratia redemptoris 124, n. 130. Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 175.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

622

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

10 Conc Flor, db 703: ‘omniaque sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.’ 11 Conc Trid, db 799: ‘unica causa formalis est iustitia Dei non qua ipse iustus est sed qua ipse nos iustos facit.’40

12 Non videtur explicari posse vivum Christi membrum, corpus mysticum vivens, per ens in anima absolute consideratum. Et tamen filiatio adoptiva inter effectus formales secundarios gratiae reputatur.41

[3.2] De Natura Gratiae Sanctificantis: Praenotamina42 [3.2.1] De Causa Formali et Effectibus Formalibus 1 Veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei. 2 Methodus metaphysica in eo consistit quod, supposita intellectus veritate, determinatur quaenam entia ad rem constituendam et requirantur et sufficiant. Ita, supposito verum esse Socratem esse hominem, quaeritur quid requiratur et sufficiat ut homo sit; respondetur vero requiri et sufficere formam substantialem humanam. 3 At etiam ordine inverso procedi potest. Supposito enim Socratem habere formam substantialem humanam, quaeri potest quaenam iudicia intellectus adaequationem veritatis habeant in ista forma fundatam. Quae quaestio est de effectu formali. 4 Proinde effectus formales quadrupliciter dividuntur: sunt enim vel primarii vel secundarii; sunt praeterea vel immanentes vel transcendentes. (a) Effectus formalis primarius et immanens est id quod vere dicitur de

The Robert Mollot Collection

623

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

10 The Council of Florence, db 703, ds 1330, nd 325: ‘All things [in the Trinity] are one where there is no distinction by relational opposition.’ 11 The Council of Trent, db 799, ds 1529, nd 1932: ‘The sole formal cause [of justification] is the justice of God, not by which he is just but by which he makes us just.’40 12 It does not seem possible to explain a living member of Christ, or the mystical body as something alive, by way of an entity in the soul considered by itself. And yet adoptive sonship is numbered among the secondary formal effects of grace.41 [3.2] Preliminary Notes on the Nature of Sanctifying Grace: Notions42 [3.2.1] Formal Cause and Formal Effects 1 Truth consists in the correspondence between the intellect and reality. 2 Metaphysical method consists in this, that, supposing a truth in the intellect, one determines what things are both required and sufficient to constitute the reality. Thus, supposing it to be true that Socrates is a human being, one asks what is required and suffices that he be so; the answer is that what is required and suffices for this truth is a human substantial form. 3 But one can also proceed in the opposite direction. For supposing Socrates to have a human substantial form, one can ask what intellectual judgments possess a correspondence to truth that is grounded on that form. This is the question about a formal effect. 4 Now there are four kinds of formal effects: there are primary and secondary formal effects, and also immanent and transcendent formal effects. (a) A primary immanent formal effect is one that is truly predicated of

40 On this twofold justice, Lange, De gratia, pp. 260–62, §§359–62; pp. 342–43, §455. 41 Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 185. 42 [These subheadings combine the subheading that Lonergan’s own table of contents indicated should appear at this point in the text and the subheadings that actually appear.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

624

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

subiecto propter intrinsecum ipsius subiecti constitutivum. Ita propter formam substantialem humanam in Socrate, vere dicitur de Socrate quod est homo. (b) Effectus formalis secundarius et immanens est id quod vere dicitur de subiecto propter consectarium distinctum et necessarium quod fluit ex intrinseco ipsius subiecti constitutivo.43 Ita quia intellectus possibilis est consectarium distinctum a forma substantiali humana, quia necessario fluit ex forma substantiali humana, ideo intellectus possibilis est effectus formalis secundarius et immanens in forma substantiali humana fundatus. (c) Effectus formalis primarius et transcendens est id quod vere dicitur de alio subiecto propter intrinsecum alterius subiecti constitutivum. Ita propter realem dependentiae relationem in creatura, non solum habetur effectus formalis immanens quod haec res est a Deo creata, sed etiam effectus formalis transcendens quod Deus hanc rem creavit. Ex quo provenit nota distinctio inter ea quae entitative et terminative de Deo dicuntur: entitative enim dicuntur effectus formales immanentes, v.g., Deum esse sapientem; terminative dicuntur effectus formales transcendentes, v.g., Deum creare, conservare, cooperari, esse finem totius creationis, et eiusmodi. (d) Effectus formalis secundarius et transcendens est id quod vere dicitur de alio subiecto propter distinctum et necessarium consectarium constitutivi intrinseci in alio subiecto recepti. Ita, qui primario dicitur causa animae, secundario dicitur causa potentiarum ex anima profluentium.

[3.2.2] De Amore Divino 1 In divinis alia sunt essentialia et alia notionalia. Essentialia sunt quae pariter de tribus personis vel affirmantur vel negantar. Ita Pater, Filius, Spiritus et sunt et intelligunt et amant et creant et conservant et omne attributum divinum et absolutum aequaliter possident. Notionalia sunt quae de alia persona divina affirmantur et de alia negantur. Ita Pater generat, at Filius

The Robert Mollot Collection

625

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

a subject on account of an intrinsic constitutive element in that subject. Thus, on account of Socrates’ human substantial form, it is truly said of Socrates that he is a human being. (b) A secondary immanent formal effect is one that is truly predicated of a subject on account of a distinct and necessary reality consequent upon an intrinsic constitutive43 element in that subject. Thus, because the possible intellect is a distinct reality consequent upon a human substantial form, since it necessarily flows from such a form, therefore the possible intellect is a secondary immanent formal effect grounded upon a human substantial form. (c) A primary transcendent formal effect is one that is truly predicated of one subject on account of an intrinsic constitutive element in another subject. Thus, on account of the relation of dependence in a creature, there is not only the immanent formal effect that is this particular thing created by God, but also the transcendent formal effect that God has created this thing. This gives rise to the well-known distinction between what are predicated of God entitatively and what are predicated of God terminatively. What are predicated of God entitatively are called immanent formal effects – for example, that God is wise; what are predicated of God terminatively are called transcendent formal effects – for example, that God creates, conserves, cooperates, is the end of all creation, and so on. (d) A secondary transcendent formal effect is one that is truly predicated of one subject on account of a distinct and necessary reality consequent upon an intrinsic constitutive element received in another subject. Thus, that which is primarily said to be the cause of the soul is secondarily said to be the cause of potencies flowing from the soul. [3.2.2] Divine Love 1 In God, some things are essential and others notional. Essential are those which are equally affirmed or denied of all three persons. Thus, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist and understand and love and create and conserve and possess equally every absolute divine attribute. Notional are those which are affirmed of one divine person and denied of another. Thus

43 [Reading constitutivo for constitutivum.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

626

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

non generat neque Spiritus sanctus. Similiter Filius generatur, at Pater non generatur neque Spiritus sanctus. 2 Quod de una persona divina dicitur, aliis omissis, per appropriationem dicitur aut proprie. Per appropriationen dicitur quod essentiale est, v.g., Pater est omnium creator. Proprie dicitur quod notionale est, v.g., Pater Filium generat, vel Pater et Filius Spiritum spirant.

3 Simplici regula discernuntur essentialia et notionalia. Essentialia enim praescindunt a relationibus trinitariis. Notionalia in sua ratione relationem trinitariam includunt. Unde regula conc. Florentini: ‘omniaque unum sunt, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.’44

4 Amor divinus dupliciter sumitur: essentialiter et notionaliter. Amor divinus essentialis est ipse actus purus seu divina essentia. Secundum hunc amorem pariter amant Pater, Filius, Spiritus. Quod si de una aliave persona praedicatur, alia aliisve omissis, per appropriationen dicitur. Amor divinus notionalis est ipse Spiritus sanctus. Secundum hunc amorem Spiritus non tam amat quam est; est enim ipse Amor procedens. Secundum hunc amorem Pater et Filius amant eo sensu quod huius amoris principium sunt atque fons. 5 Cum radix donationis sit amor, virtualiter in amore omnis donatio iam continetur. Ergo primum donum est ipsius amoris unde omnia alia dona fluunt. Quare cum Spiritus sanctus sit ipse amor divinus procedens, etiam proprie nominatur donum.45 6 Quidquid dicitur contingenter de Deo, postulat terminum convenientem ad extra. Quod enim vere dicitur, habet adaequationen veritatis. Quod contingenter de Deo dicitur, non potest habere totam veritatis adaequationen in solo Deo, nam Deus est ens simplicissimum et absolute necessarium et ideo per se solum non praebet fundamentum veritatis contingentis. Aliis verbis, quod contingenter dicitur de Deo secundum quod contingens est, effectus formalis transcendens est cuiusdam termini ad extra.

The Robert Mollot Collection

627

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

the Father begets, but neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit begets. Similarly, the Son is begotten but neither the Father nor the Spirit is begotten. 2 What is stated of one divine person while prescinding from the others is stated of that person either by appropriation or properly. That which is essential is stated by appropriation; for example, that the Father is the Creator of all things. That which is notional is stated properly; for example, that the Father begets the Son, or that Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit. 3 There is a simple rule for distinguishing between what is essential and what is notional. The essential prescind from the trinitarian relations, while the notional include in their meaning a trinitarian relation. Hence the rule of the Council of Florence: ‘All things are one where there is no distinction by relational opposition.’44 4 Divine love can be taken in two ways, essentially and notionally. Essential divine love is pure act itself, the divine essence. By this love Father, Son, and Spirit love equally. But if it is predicated of one of the persons without reference to either one of the others, it is stated of that person by appropriation. Notional divine love is the Holy Spirit. This love means not so much that the Holy Spirit loves as that he is, for the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love. And it is by this love that the Father and the Son love, in the sense that they are the principle and source of this proceeding Love. 5 Since the root of giving is love, all giving is already virtually present in love. The first gift, therefore, is the gift of love itself whence all other gifts flow. Since, then, the Holy Spirit is himself divine proceeding Love, his proper name is ‘Gift.’45 6 Whatever is contingently predicated of God requires an appropriate extrinsic term. For a statement that is true possesses the correspondence of truth [to reality]. What is stated about God contingently cannot have its entire truth-correspondence within God alone, for God is a totally simple and absolutely necessary being and therefore by himself alone does not provide the grounds for a truth that is contingent. In other words, what is

44 db 703 [ds 1330, nd 325], at the end. 45 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, aa.1 and 2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

628

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

7 Idem terminus ad extra potest habere multos effectus formales transcendentales. Supposito enim quodam bono finito, verum est (1) Deum id produxisse, nam omnium est causa prima, (2) Deum id ex amore produxisse, nam motivum actionis divinae est bonitas divina amata et imitanda, (3) Deum id amare, nam iustus est Deus et ideo quae bona sunt ut bona amat. Quare distinguendum est inter aspectum effectivum amoris divini et aspectum constitutivum. Amor effectivus est qui aliquid producit. Amor constitutivus est qui aliquid amat. 8 Statuitur theorema fundamentale. [THEOREMA I] Essentialiter et ideo pariter de tribus personis dicitur omnis amor divinus inquantum est principium effectivum. db 704: Sed Pater et Filius non sunt duo principia Spiritus sancti, sed unum principium; sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non tria principia creaturae sed unum principium. aas 35 (1943) 231: ‘Ac praeterea certissimum illud firma mente retineant, hisce in rebus omnia esse habenda communia, quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam efficientem causam respiciant.’

Ratio est: divina essentia est una; principium vero est ipsa divina essentia; ergo principium est unum. Ad min. Principium dicit perfectionem proportionatam principiato. Porro Deus proportionatur effectibus producendis quia est ipsum esse, seu esse per essentiam suam. Quare principium dicit ipsam essentiam communem tribus personis in creatione vel productione, sicut dicit ipsam essentiam communem Patri Filioque in processione Spiritus sancti.

Corollarium: Omnis prorsus gratia, inquantum respicit amorem divinum ut principium effectivum, eo ipso respicit amorem non notionalem sed essentialem.

The Robert Mollot Collection

629

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

contingently stated about God inasmuch as it is contingent is a transcendent formal effect of an extrinsic term. 7 The same term can have multiple transcendent formal effects. Supposing the existence of some finite good, it is true (1) that God has produced it, for he is the first cause of all things, (2) that he produced it out of love, for the motive of God’s action is his divine goodness as loved and to be imitated, and (3) that God loves it, for God is just and therefore that which is good he loves as good. Therefore one must distinguish between the effective aspect of divine love and its constitutive aspect. Effective love is that which produces something; constitutive love is that which loves something. 8 Statement of the fundamental theorem: [THEOREM 1] All divine love as an effective principle is predicated essentially and thus equally of the three divine Persons. db 704, ds 1331, nd 326: ‘But the Father and the Son are not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but one principle; just as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three principles of creation but one principle.’ Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 231: ‘And moreover it must be kept firmly in mind as absolutely certain, that in these matters all things are to be considered as common …, inasmuch as they are related to God as their supreme efficient cause’ [db 2290, ds 3814, nd 1996]. The reason is that the divine essence is one; but the principle is the divine essence itself, and therefore the principle is one. As to the minor premise of this syllogism: A principle indicates a perfection that is proportionate to that which results from it. Now God is proportionate to the effects to be produced since he is existence itself, existence by reason of his very essence. Therefore the principle indicates the essence that is common to the three persons creating or producing, just as it indicates the essence that is common to the Father and the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. Corollary [to Theorem 1] Absolutely all grace, inasmuch as it is related to divine love as its effective principle, by that very fact is related not to notional but to essential divine love.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

630

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Si vero eiusmodi amor de una persona praedicatur, aliis omissis, haec praedicatio non est propria sed per appropriationem. 9 Statuitur theorema complementarium. [THEOREMA II] Non omnia quae contingenter de divinis personis dicuntur, per appropriationem dicuntur. Nam solus Deus Filius incarnatus est: Pater non est factus homo; Spiritus sanctus non est factus homo. Tamen contingens est quod Filius factus est homo, nam non evenit necessitate absoluta. 10 Imo, non omnia quae de divinis personis in materia gratiae dicuntur, per appropriationem dicuntur. Ex S. Thoma, i, 43, 3; missio personae divinae dicitur non per appropriationem sed proprie, nam alia persona mittit et alia mittitur ita ut qui mittat non mittatur et qui mittatur non mittat; proinde sunt missiones personarum divinarum secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis. Ex eodem, i, 38, aa. 1 et 2: donum est nomen personale et proprium Spiritus sancti; et hoc donum dicitur datum creaturae secundum effectus temporales: a 1, 3m, 4m: a 2, 3m. Ex eodem, i, 37, 2, 3m: Sicut Pater dicit se et omnem creaturam Verbo quod genuit …, ita diligit se et omnem creaturam Spiritu sancto … Et haec sunt non essentialia sed notionalia; nam agitur de Verbo qua genito et de Spiritu qua procedente; et solum Verbum generatur sicut solus Spiritus procedit.

[3.2.3] De Fundamento Gratiae Ontologico 1 Quattuor sunt gratiae quibus eminentius hoc nomen competit, nempe, gratia unionis, lumen gloriae, gratia sanctificans, et virtus caritatis. Gratia enim unionis est illud ens finitum in humanitate Christi receptum ut exsistat per esse personale Verbi divini. Haec ergo gratia est terminus ad extra secundum quem vere dicitur ‘Verbum caro factum est.’46

The Robert Mollot Collection

631

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

But if this love is predicated of one person, prescinding from the others, it is predicated not properly but by appropriation. 9 Statement of a complementary theorem. [THEOREM 2] Not everything that is stated contingently about the divine persons is stated by appropriation. For only God the Son has become incarnate: the Father did not become man, nor did the Holy Spirit. Yet it is a contingent fact that the Son became man, since that event did not occur by absolute necessity. 10 Indeed, not everything that is stated about the divine persons in the matter of grace is stated by appropriation. See St Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 3: the sending of a divine person is predicated not by appropriation but properly, for one person does the sending and another is sent, so that the one who sends is not sent and the one who is sent does not send; this applies to the missions of the divine persons in connection with the gift of sanctifying grace. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, aa. 1 and 2: ‘Gift’ is the personal and proper name of the Holy Spirit; and this Gift is said to be given to a creature according to its temporal effects (ibid. a. 1, ad 3m and ad 4m; a. 2, ad 3m). See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3m: As the Father utters himself and all creation by the Word which he has begotten …, so he loves himself and all creation by the Holy Spirit … And these are not essential but notional propositions for the reference is to the Word as begotten and to the Spirit as proceeding; and only the Word is generated, just as only the Spirit proceeds. [3.2.3] The Ontological Foundation of Grace 1 There are four graces that are preeminently qualified to be called such; these are the grace of union, the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the virtue of charity. The grace of union is that finite entity received in the humanity of Christ so that it exists through the personal act of existence of the divine Word. This grace is therefore the extrinsic term whereby one may say, ‘The Word was made flesh.’46 46 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 17, a. 2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

632

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Lumen gloriae est illud ens finitum quo disponitur intellectus creatus ad recipiendum divinam essentiam tamquam speciem intelligibilem et ita ad videndum Deum sicuti in se est.47 Gratia sanctificans est illud ens finitun quo renascitur et regeneratur substantia finita ad participandam ipsam vitam divinam. Caritas vero est illud ens finitum quo substania finita et regenerata habitualiter possidet veri nominis amicitiam cum Deo. 2 Caeterae vero gratiae sunt magis dispositiones ad gratias supra memoratas vel consectaria ex iis profluentia. Fides enim et spes desunt tum in Christo homine tum in beatis. Dona Spiritus sancti pertinent non ad ipsam vitam supernaturalem sed ad operationes huic vitae consentaneas. Temperantia et fortitudo, resurrectio corporis eiusque glorificatio, desunt in angelis. Prudentia et iustitia specialis, v.g., commutativa, distributiva, et legalis, adaptant naturam elevatam consequenter ad suam elevationem.

3 Quare hic agitur non de fundamento ontologico cuiuslibet gratiae sed de fundamento quattuor supra nominatarum. Explicandum enim est, quantum fieri potest, cur hae gratiae tantae perfectionis sint ut ipsam esse subsistens quodommodo tangant. 4 Porro, ipsa divina essentia est prima causa exemplaris quam imitatur secundum aspectum quendam vel rationem omne prorsus ens finitum sive creatum sive creabile, sive substantiale sive accidentale est. At divina essentia dupliciter considerari potest. Primo modo, prout absoluta est et tribus personis divinis communis. Alio modo, prout re identificatur cum hac vel illa reali relatione trinitaria, sive cum paternitate, sive cum filiatione, sive cum spiratione activa, sive cum spiratione passiva. Proinde cum omnis substantia finita sit quaedam res absoluta, conveniens videtur dicere eam imitari divinam essentiam secundum quod illa essentia absolute sumatur. Cum vero quattuor gratiae eminentiores cum ipsa vita divina intime connectantur, conveniens videtur dicere eas divinam essentiam secundum quod re identificetur cum hac vel illa reali relatione trinitaria. Et sic gratia unionis divinam paternitatem, lumen gloriae divinam filiationem, gratia sanctificans spirationem activam, virtus vero caritatis spirationem passivam imitantur et modo finito participent.

The Robert Mollot Collection

633

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

The light of glory is that finite entity by which a created intellect is disposed to receiving the divine essence as an intelligible species and thus see God as he is in himself.47 Sanctifying grace is that finite entity by which a finite substance is reborn and regenerated for participating in the very life of God. Charity is that finite entity whereby a regenerated finite substance habitually possesses genuine friendship with God. 2 The other graces are rather dispositions towards the above-mentioned graces or consequent upon them. Faith and hope are not present either in Christ as man or in the blessed. The gifts of the Holy Spirit pertain not to the supernatural life itself but to operations that are consonant with it. Temperance and fortitude as well as bodily resurrection and glorification are not found in the angels. Prudence and special justice, i.e., commutative, distributive, and legal, further form an elevated nature after it has been elevated. 3 Our concern here, therefore, is not with the ontological foundation of any grace but with the foundation of the four referred to above. We have to explain, as far as possible, why these graces are of such a high degree of perfection that they touch, in a way, subsistent being itself. 4 Further, the divine essence itself is the primary exemplary cause which absolutely every finite being, created or creatable, substantial or accidental, imitates in some aspect or quality. But the divine essence can be considered in two ways: first, as absolute and common to the three divine persons; second, as being really identical with one or other real trinitarian relation – with paternity, filiation, active spiration, or passive spiration. Now since every finite substance is something absolute, it seems appropriate to say that it imitates the divine essence considered as absolute. But since these four eminent graces are intimately connected with the divine life, it seems appropriate to say that they imitate the divine essence considered as really identical with one or other real trinitarian relation. Thus the grace of union imitates and participates in a finite way the divine paternity, the light of glory divine filiation, sanctifying grace active spiration, and the virtue of charity passive spiration.

47 Ibid. 1, q. 12, a. 2 c.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

634

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

548 Quae convenientia, cum sit multiplex, brevius inprimis est declaranda ut postea plura circa ipsam gratiam sanctificantem dicantur. (a) Prima ergo convenientia est quod exhibetur nexus qui viget inter has gratias et ipsam vitam Deo propriam. (b) Altera convenientia est quod clare et distincte exponitur radix absolutae supernaturalitatis. Substantia enim finita imitatur divinam essentiam secundum quam absoluta est. Hae vero gratiae quae proportionem cuiuslibet finitae substantiae excedunt divinas relationes trinitarias imitantur. (c) Tertia est convenientia quod quattuor diversis gratiis clare et distincte assignatur quattuor diversa fundamenta ontologica. (d) Quarta convenientia est quod fundatur nexus inter gratiam sanctificantem et virtutem caritatis. Gratia enim sanctificans et virtus caritatis sunt (1) distincta, (2) eiusdem mensurae, (3) eiusmodi ut, gratia infusa, profluit caritas, et sublata caritate, tollitur gratia. Cuius connectionis fundamentum est quod imitantur spirationem activam et passivam quae sunt (1) distincta, (2) correlativa, (3) aequalia, (4) inseparabilia. (e) Quinta convenientia est quod fundatur nexus inter Incarnationem et visionem beatificam. Ipse enim Christus homo per totam vitam mortalem visionem beatificam habuit.49 Ita gloria nostra e nostris meritis pendet, ut nostra merita nobis adveniant quatenus viva Christi membra sumus. db 809, 842. Rom 8:17: heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi; si tamen compatimur, ut et conglorificemur. Etiam angelorum caput est Christus. Eph 1.10: instaurare omnia in Christo, quae in caelis et quae in terris sunt, in ipso. Ibid. v. 21: supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem.50 Cuius connectionis fundamentum est quod, sicut paternitas est principium et filiatio principiatum, ita etiam gratia unionis est principium et lumen gloriae est principiatum. (f) Sexta convenientia in ipsa Incarnatione inspicitur. Divina enim paternitas est divinus intellectus qua dicens Verbum suum et ita intellectualiter Filium suum generans. Quam generationem quodammodo imitatur eiu-

The Robert Mollot Collection

635

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

548 First, a brief explanation of this appropriateness should be given, since it is manifold, so that later on it may be treated more fully. (a) The first appropriateness, then, is that it shows the nexus between these graces and God’s own life. (b) The second appropriateness is that it clearly and distinctly lays bare the root of absolute supernaturality. For a finite substance imitates the divine essence in its absoluteness. But these graces, which exceed the proportion of any finite substance, imitate the divine trinitarian relations. (c) The third appropriateness is that four different ontological foundations are clearly and distinctly assigned to four different graces. (d) The fourth appropriateness is that the connection between sanctifying grace and the virtue of charity is founded. For sanctifying grace and the virtue of charity are (1) distinct, (2) commensurate, and (3) such that when grace is infused, charity flourishes, and when charity ceases, grace ceases. The foundation of this connection is that these graces imitate active spiration and passive spiration, which are (1) distinct, (2) correlative, (3) equal, and (4) inseparable. (e) The fifth appropriateness is that the connection between the incarnation and the beatific vision is founded. Christ as man possessed the beatific vision throughout his entire mortal life.49 Thus, our glory depends upon our merits, in that we merit to the extent that we are living members of Christ. db 809, 842; ds 1545–47, 1582; nd 1946–47, 1982. Romans 8.17: ‘heirs of God, coheirs with Christ – if, in fact, we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him.’ Christ is also head of the angels. Ephesians 1.10: ‘to gather up all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.’ Ibid. v. 21: ‘above all rule and authority and power and dominion.’50 The foundation of this connection is that, just as paternity is the principle and filiation the resultant, so also the grace of union is the principle and the light of glory is the resultant. (f) The sixth appropriateness is to be seen in the Incarnation itself. For divine paternity is the divine intellect as speaking his Word and thus intellectually generating his own Son. The Incarnation of the Son imitates, in a

48 [The remainder of this section, numbered ‘3.2.3’ here, was found, not in this archival document, A205, but as the first page in the archival document A160. But judging by the numbering as well as the context and content, there is no doubt that it belongs here.] 49 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2; q. 10, aa. 1–4. 50 Ibid. 3, q. 8, a. 4.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

636

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

sdem Filii Incarnatio: Incarnatio enim regeneratio quaedam est in qua non oritur nova persona sed personae exsistenti advenit nova natura. Praeterea, cum gratia unionis imitetur divinam paternitatem, specialem relationem habet ad divinam filiationem; et ita gratia unionis est ens finitum quo humanitas creata exsistat per esse personale Verbi divini. (g) Septima convenientia in lumine gloriae invenitur. Cum enim lumen gloriae imitetur divinam filiationem, seu Verbum a Patre dictum, specialem relationem habet ad Deum Patrem intelligentem et intellectualiter generantem. Et ita fundat receptionem essentiae divinae tamquam speciei et ipsam visionem. [3.3] Secundum effectus formales et immanentes 51 1 Effectus formalis immanens et primarius gratiae sanctificantis est quod facit habentem divinae naturae participem. Haec enim gratia imitatur ad extra divinam essentiam secundum quod identificatur cum spiratione activa. Iam vero spiratio activa pertinet ad ipsam naturam vitamque divinam et trinitariam. Et secundum hunc aspectum cum relativus sit, nulla substantia finita, quippe res absoluta, divinam essentiam imitari potest. 2 Alius effectus formalis, immanens, et primarius gratiae sanctificantis est quod facit hominem Deo gratum atque amabilem amore divino speciali. Cum spiratio activa sit principium Spiritus sancti, etiam est principium ipsius amoris divini procedentis. Iam vero principium amoris est amabilitas, ideoque spiratio activa est Deus qua amabilis, qua amoris principium. Quia ergo gratia sanctificans imitatur spirationem activam, imitatur Deum prout Deus est amabilis, ideoque facit habentem Deo gratum et speciali divino amore amabilem.

The Robert Mollot Collection

637

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

way, this generation; for the Incarnation is a certain re-generation in which, not a new person is born, but rather a new nature comes to an already existing person. Moreover, since the grace of union imitates divine paternity, it has a special relation to divine filiation; and thus the grace of union is a finite entity whereby a created humanity exists through the personal act of existence of the divine Word. (g) The seventh appropriateness is to be found in the light of glory. For since the light of glory imitates divine filiation, the Word as spoken by the Father, it has a special relation to God the Father as intelligent and intellectually generating. And thus it founds the reception of the divine essence as a species and the vision itself. [3.3] The Immanent Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace 51 1 The primary immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace is that it makes one who has it a participant of the divine nature. For this grace imitates the divine essence considered according to its being identical with active spiration. Now active spiration belongs to the very nature and life of the divine Trinity. But no finite substance, being something absolute, can imitate the divine essence according to this aspect, which is a relation. 2 Another primary immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace is that it makes a person pleasing to God and lovable by a special divine Love. Since active spiration is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it is also the principle of proceeding divine Love itself. Now the principle of love is lovableness, and therefore active spiration is God as lovable, as the principle of love. Hence because sanctifying grace imitates active spiration, it imitates God as lovable, and therefore makes its possessor pleasing to God and lovable by a special divine Love.

51 [In the autograph this subsection is numbered ‘iv,’ in continuity with the previous subsection iii. But with this subsection, the main subheading, ‘De Natura Gratiae Sanctificantis’ ceases to have ‘Praenotamina’ appended to it. Add to this the further complication that in Lonergan’s own table of contents he has simply ‘Effectus formales et immanentes.’ The editors have sought to accommodate both facts by having as the heading for this subsection, ‘The Immanent Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace,’ and by treating this subsection as a main and not a nested subsubsection under ‘Understanding the Faith.’]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

638

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

3 Effectus formalis, immanens, sed secundarius gratiae sanctificantis est virtus infusa caritatis. Ex enim gratia sanctificante profluit virtus caritatis, sicut et potentiae ex essentia animae.52 Nam sicut spiratio activa se habet ad passivam, ita etiam gratia sanctificans se habet ad virtutem caritatis. Sicut enim gratia sanctificans imitatur spirationem activam, ita virtus caritatis imitatur spirationem passivam. Iam vero spiratio activa sed habet ad passivam sicut principium ad principiatum. Ideoque gratia sanctificans se habet ad virtutem caritatis sicut principium ad principiatum. Praeterea, spiratio activa et passiva sunt realiter distincta, correlativa, inseparabilia, et aequalia. Ideoque gratia sanctificans et virtus caritatis sunt realiter distinctae. Infusa gratia, infunditur et caritas; sublata caritate, tollitur gratia; et mensura gratiae est eadem in eodem ac mensura caritatis.

4 Pro diversis statibus alii sunt effectus formales, immanentes, et secundarii gratiae sanctificantis. In viatoribus adsunt fides et spes. In dirigendis ad normas divinas sunt dona Spiritus sancti. In perficiendis in parte rationali sunt prudentia et iustitia specialis, nempe, iustitia commutativa, distributiva, legalis. In perficiendis in parte sensitiva sunt fortitudo et temperantia.

5 Effectus formalis immanens et mixtus gratiae sanctificantis est regeneratio vel renascentia in novam vitam. Regeneratio enim est qua personae exsistenti advenit nova natura, scilicet, novum principium primum et remotum operandi et nova principia proxima operandi. Iam vero per gratiam sanctificantem advenit creaturae rationali exsistenti, primario quidem ipsa gratia quae est principium primum et remotum operandi supernaturalier et meritorie, secundario vero virtutes infusae et dona quae sunt principia proxima vitae supernaturalis. 6 Alius effectus formalis, immanens, et mixtus gratiae sanctificantis est ut creatura rationalis sit iusta illa Dei iustitia qua nos iustos facit. Iustitia ipsius Dei inprimis est veritas,53 non tamen prout est in ipso intellectu solo sed prout in intellectu exsistens dirigit et movet voluntatem. Et sic iustitia Dei est Verbum spirans amorem seu spiratio activa.

The Robert Mollot Collection

639

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

3 An immanent and formal but secondary effect of sanctifying grace is the infused virtue of charity. For charity flows from sanctifying grace as potencies flow from the essence of the soul.52 For as active spiration is to passive spiration, so is sanctifying grace to the virtue of charity. Just as sanctifying grace imitates active spiration, so does the virtue of charity imitate passive spiration. Now active spiration is to passive spiration as the principle to its resultant. Therefore sanctifying grace is to charity as the principle to its resultant. Moreover, active and passive spiration are really distinct, correlative, inseparable, and equal. Therefore sanctifying grace and charity are really distinct. With the infusion of grace, charity is also infused; when charity is lost, so is grace; and the measure of grace in the same person is the same as the measure of charity. 4 According to various states of life, there are other secondary immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace. In those living on earth, there are faith and hope. In those that are being guided according to divine norms, there are the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In those that are being perfected in their rationality, there are prudence and special justice, that is, commutative, distributive, and legal justice. In those that are being perfected in their sentience, there are fortitude and temperance. 5 A mixed immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace is one’s regeneration or rebirth into a new life. Regeneration or being born again is the coming of a new nature to an existing person, a new first and remote principle of operation and new proximate principles of operation. Through sanctifying grace there comes to an existing rational creature primarily that grace itself which is the first and remote principle of operating supernaturally and meritoriously, but secondarily the infused virtues and gifts which are the proximate principles of a supernatural life. 6 Another mixed immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace is that a rational creature be just by reason of that justice of God by which he makes us just. The justice of God himself is primarily truth,53 not as truth is in his intellect alone but as existing in the intellect and directing and moving

52 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 3 c.; a. 4, ad 1m. 53 Ibid. 1, q. 21, a. 2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

640

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Ulterius vero iustitia ipsius Dei sumi potest prout est non solum in intellectu dirigenti et moventi sed etiam in voluntate attracta et volente. Et sic iustitia Dei est per coniunctionem spirationis activae et passivae. Tertio denique iustitia Dei sumi potest secundum quod intellectui et voluntati divinae accedit divina omnipotentia exsecutrix. Secundum primam considerationem iustitia Dei qua nos iustos facit est sola gratia sanctificans. Secundum alteram considerationem eadem iustitia est gratia sanctificans cum caritate. Secundum tertiam considerationem est gratia sanctificans cum omnibus virtutibus et donis infusis. Et haec est illa iustitia secundum quam homo interne rectificatur ut corpus rationi et ratio Deo subdatur.54

[3.4] Secundum effectus formales et transcendentales 1 Gratia sanctificans exserit effectus formales transcendentales. Quodcumque enim contingenter de Deo dicitur, non entitative sed terminative dicitur. Iam vero multa contingenter de Deo dicuntur secundum gratiam sanctificantem, puta, quod Deus hunc hominem gratum facit, quod Deus eum amore speciali diligit. Exsistunt ergo effectus formales et transcendentales gratiae sanctificantis. 2 Qui effectus formales et transcendentales sunt duplicis generis. Nam gratia sanctificans considerari potest tum ut effectus amoris divini (nam ex amore Deus gratiam in homine producit) tum etiam ut terminus amoris divini (nam Deus amat hominem gratum factum). 3 Effectus formales transcendentales gratiae sanctificantis ut effectus respiciunt amorem divinum essentialem. Uti enim vidimus, omnes tres personae pariter sunt unum principium effectivum omnis et cuiuscumque creaturae. Pariter ergo de tribus personis praedicatur hic amor divinus effectivus. Amor denique qui pariter de tribus personis praedicatur est amor essentialis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

641

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

the will. Thus the justice of God is the Word spirating love, which is active spiration. Again, the justice of God himself can be taken as being found not only in his directing and moving intellect but also in his will that has been drawn and is willing. And in this way the justice of God exists through the combination of active and passive spiration. Third, the justice of God can be taken according as divine executive omnipotence is added to his intellect and will. According to the first consideration above, the justice of God whereby he makes us just is sanctifying grace alone. According to the second consideration the same justice is sanctifying grace along with charity. According to the third consideration it is sanctifying grace along with all the infused virtues and gifts. And this is that justice by which a man is interiorly made righteous so that his body is subject to his reason and his reason subject to God.54 [3.4] The Transcendent Formal Effects of Sanctifying Grace 1 Sanctifying grace gives rise to transcendent formal effects. Whatever is stated of God contingently is stated, not entitatively, but terminatively. But there are many statements made about God in connection with sanctifying grace, such as that God makes a person pleasing to him, that he loves that person with a special love. Therefore there exist transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace. 2 These transcendent formal effects are of two kinds. For sanctifying grace can be considered both as an effect of divine love (since it is out of love that God produces grace in a person) and as a term of divine love (since God loves a person who has been made pleasing to him). 3 These transcendent formal effects as effects are related to essential divine love. As we have seen, all three persons equally are one effective principle of each and every creature. Equally, therefore, is this effective divine love predicated of the three persons. Love that is predicated equally of the three is essential love.

54 On different concepts of justice, see Lange, De gratia, pp. 290–91, §396.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

642

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

4 Effectus formales transcendentales gratiae sanctificantis ut termini respiciunt amorem divinum notionalem. Hoc assertum proponitur ut probabile probabilitate intrinseca; ea enim quae in Sacra Scriptura et in Patribus dicuntur circa habitudines diversas divinarum personarum ad iustos postulare videntur ut gratia sit terminus amoris divini notionalis. Quod vero in contrarium a theologis adducitur non plus probat quam quod ultro concedimus, nempe, gratiam non ut terminum sed ut effectum respicere amorem divinum essentialem. 5 Effectus formalis transcendentalis gratiae sanctificantis in Christo homine est quod Deus Pater diligit Filium ut hominem amore notionali qui est Spiritus sanctus et donum. (a) Arguitur ex baptismo Christi: Mt 3.13 ss.; Mc 1.9 ss.; Lc 3.21 s.; Io 1.3. (b) Praenotantur: a′ Christus ut homo habuit gratiam sanctificantem (iii, 7, 1) a primo instante suae conceptionis (iii, 34, 1) et quidem modo illimitato (iii 7, 9–12). b′ Baptismus Christi manifestat externe illam gratiam quam interne semper habuit. Nam (1) semper habuit dilectionem Patris et donum Spiritus Sancti quae externe manifestantur per vocem et columbam, et (2) finis baptismi Christi erat externe demonstrare quid baptizatis advenit. Ita Clem Alex, Cyr Hier, Ambr, Aquin, rj 407, 813, 1273; iii, 39, 8 c.

c′ Omnia quaecumque producuntur, a tribus personis producuntur; cuiusmodi sunt (1) columba, (2) vox de caelo, (3) corpus, anima, et gratia Christi. iii, 39, 8, 2m. d′ Id quod significatur est personale et proprium. iii, 39, 8, 2m. Solus Pater habet Filium, ideoque solus Pater dicere potest Filius meus dilectus. Solus Filius est incarnatus. Solus Spiritus repraesentatur sub specie columbae. e′ Ab aeterno et necessario Pater diligit Filium ut Deum Spiritu sancto. i, 37, 2 c. f′ Ex tempore et contingenter Pater diligit Filium ut hominem Spiritu sancto. Quod, quia contingens est, postulat terminum ad extra convenientem. Qui terminus conveniens est sola gratia sanctificans. Nam imitatur ad extra spirationem activam qua Pater diligit.

The Robert Mollot Collection

643

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

4 These transcendent formal effects as terms are related to notional divine love. This assertion is proposed as probable by intrinsic probability; for what scripture and the Fathers say about the various relations of the divine persons to the just seem to postulate that grace be a term of notional divine love. Arguments to the contrary put forth by theologians do no more than prove what we willingly concede, namely, that grace not as a term but as an effect is related to essential divine love.

5 A transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace in Christ as man is that the Father loves the Son as man with that notional love that is the Holy Spirit and Gift. (a) We argue from Christ’s baptism: Matthew 3.13–17; Mark 1.9–11; Luke 3.21–22; John 1.31–34. (b) Preliminary remarks: a′ Christ as man possessed sanctifying grace (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a.1) from the first moment of his conception (ibid. q. 34, a. 1) and indeed without limit (ibid. q. 7, aa. 9–12). b′ Christ’s baptism was an external manifestation of the grace which interiorly he always possessed. For (1) he always had the Father’s love and the gift of the Spirit which are externally manifested through the voice from heaven and the dove, and (2) the purpose of his baptism was to show externally what happens to those who are baptized. Thus Clement of Alexandria, ep 407; Cyril of Jerusalem, ep 813; Ambrose, ep 1273; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 39, a. 8 c. c′ Everything that is produced is produced by the three persons: the dove, the voice from heaven, and Christ’s body, soul, and grace. d′ What is signified there is proper to the persons: ibid. 3, q. 39, a. 8, ad 2m. Only the Father has a Son, and so only the Father can say, ‘My beloved Son.’ Only the Son is incarnate. Only the Holy Spirit is represented in the form of a dove. e′ The Father eternally and necessarily loves the Son as God by the Holy Spirit: ibid. 1, q. 37, a. 2 c. f′ In time and contingently he loves the Son as man by the Holy Spirit. This fact, being contingent, requires an appropriate extrinsic term. This appropriate term is sanctifying grace alone. For it imitates extrinsically that active spiration whereby the Father loves.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

644

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

g′ Ab aeterno et vi suae processionis Spiritus sanctus est donum. i, 38, aa. 1 et 2. h′ Ex tempore et contingenter Spiritus sanctus huic homini datur. Quod, quia est contingens, postulat convenientem terminum ad extra et hic terminus conveniens est gratia sanctificans. Imitatur enim spirationem activam et ideo habet relationem specialem ad ipsam passivam spirationem quae est Spiritus sanctus. (c) Proponitur argumentum. Gratia sanctificans in Christo homine est terminus amoris divini notionalis si ipse Pater diligit, ipse Filius ut homo diligitur, et ipse Spiritus sanctus est donum Christo homini collatum. Atqui secundum Sanctam Scripturam Filius proprie et non per appropriationem diligitur; Pater proprie et non per appropriationem diligit; Spiritus proprie et non per appropriationem dono confertur. Ergo gratia sanctificans in Christo homine est terminus amoris divini notionalis, quo Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto.

6 Effectus formalis et transcendentalis gratiae sanctificantis in iustis est ut Deus Pater eos diligat simili dilectione qua Filium ut hominem diligit. (a) Arguitur ex Io 17.23: dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti. (b) Praenotatur: a′ Ex ipso textu, ex contextu, et ex antecessis (5) constat ipsum Patrem proprie et non per appropriationem diligere ipsum Filium ut hominem proprie et non per appropriationem. b′ A pari, ipse Pater proprie et non per appropriationem diligit eos qui credituri erant in Christum. c′ Haec dilectio est contingens ideoque postulat convenientem terminum ad extra. Qui terminus conveniens est gratia sanctificans. (c) Proponitur argumentum. Gratia sanctificans est in iustis terminus amoris notionalis si Pater iustos diligit sicut et Filium diligit. Atqui Pater iustos diligit, sicut et Filium diligit. Ergo … Maior: nam ex asserto antecedente, Pater Filium amore notionali diligit. Minor: ex textu Io 17:23. 7 Ideoque per gratiam sanctificantem efficimur filii Dei adoptivi. (a) Factum iam constat: Rom 8.15 s.; Gal 4.5 s.; Eph 1.5–13.

The Robert Mollot Collection

645

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

g′ Eternally and by reason of his procession the Holy Spirit is Gift: ibid. 1, q. 38, aa. 1 and 2. h′ In time and contingently the Holy Spirit is given to this particular person. This fact, being contingent, requires an appropriate extrinsic term; and this appropriate term is sanctifying grace, for it imitates active spiration and therefore has a special relation to that passive spiration which is the Holy Spirit. (c) Our argument is as follows: Sanctifying grace in the man Christ is the term of notional divine love if the Father himself loves him, if the Son as man is loved, and if the Holy Spirit is a gift conferred upon Christ. But according to Scripture the Son is loved properly and not by appropriation: the Father loves properly and not by appropriation; and the Spirit is properly and not by appropriation conferred by way of a gift. Therefore sanctifying grace in the man Christ is the term of notional divine love whereby the Father loves the Son in the Holy Spirit. 6 A transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace in the just is that God the Father loves them with a love that is similar to that by which he loves the Son as man. (a) We argue from John 17.23: ‘You have loved them as you have loved me.’ (b) Preliminary remarks: a′ From this text and its context and from what we have said above (no. 5), it is clear the Father properly and not by appropriation loves the Son who is man properly and not by appropriation. b′ Likewise, the Father properly and not by appropriation loves those who would come to believe in Christ. c′ This love is contingent and thus requires an appropriate extrinsic term; this term is sanctifying grace. (c) Our argument is as follows: Sanctifying grace in the just is a term of notional love if the Father loves the just as he loves his Son; but the Father loves the just as he loves his Son; therefore … The major premise is the preceding assertion, that the Father loves the Son by notional love. The minor premise is John 17.23. 7 Therefore by sanctifying grace we become adopted children of God. (a) This truth is clear: Romans 8.15–16; Galatians 4.5–6; Ephesians 1.5–13.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

646

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(b) Ille est filius adoptivus qui (1) non est filius naturaliter genitus et (2) diligitur a Patre sicut ab eodem Patre Filius suus proprius. Atqui (1) iusti non sunt naturaliter filli Dei sed ‘natura filii irae’ (Eph 2.3), et (2) diliguntur a Deo Patre sicut Filius suus proprius, Io 17.23. Ergo ...

8 Ideoque sumus heredes secundum spem vitae aeternae. (a) Nam qui vere adoptatur, haeres efficitur. Ex ipsa notione adoptionis. Pariter ex Rom 8.17; Gal 4.7. (b) Tantum secundum spem. Tit 3.7. Quia adoptio alia est incompleta, Rom 8.15 s., et alia completa, Rom 8.23. (c) Quod sic exponi potest. Secundum S. Thomam adoptiva filiatio est assimilatio ad Filium naturalem, iii, 23, 3 c. Per gratiam sanctificantem assimilamur Filio inquantum est Verbum spirans amorem. Per lumen gloriae assimilamur Filio inquantum est Filius seu Verbum a Patre genitum. 9 Quaeritur utrum filiatio adoptiva sit entitas quaedam in nobis recepta an denominatio extrinseca ex amore paterno adoptante. Respondetur adoptionem tria dicere: (1) mutatio et conservatio in nobis a tribus divinis personis producta; (2) ipse effectus productus; (3) ipse amor paternus in filios adoptatos. Quae omnia dicuntur secundum gratiam sanctificantem, aliter tamen et aliter. Mutatio enim et conservatio dicuntur secundum relationem gratiae ad causam efficientem. Ipse effectus productus dicitur secundum assimilationem ad Filium naturalem. Ipse amor paternalis qua erga nos dicitur secundum effectum transcendentalem gratiae sanctificantis.

10 Effectus formalis et transcendentalis gratiae sanctificantis in iustificatis est ut vivant ad modum membri Christi. (a) Praenotantur: a′ Corpus mysticum est ecclesia. Col 1.18–24. aas 35 (1943) 199 ss. (NB: Quamvis saepius haec encyclica S. Thomam citat et laudet, non tamen citat iii, q. 8, neque eo modo quo Angelicus corpus mysticum concipere videtur. Aquinas enim de Christo capite hominum et angelorum loquitur; encyclica vero praesertim de corpore quod est ecclesia his in terris militans et hierarchice organizata loqui intendit. P. 193.)

The Robert Mollot Collection

647

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(b) [The Argument:] One is a child by adoption if (1) he has not been begotten in a natural way, and (2) is loved by the Father just as the Father loves his own Son; but (1) the just are not naturally God’s children but rather ‘by nature children of wrath’ (Ephesians 2.3), and (2) they are loved by the Father as he loves his own Son ( John 17.23); therefore … 8 Therefore we are heirs with the hope of eternal life. (a) From the very meaning of adoption a person who is truly adopted is made an heir; see also Romans 8.17, Galatians 4.7. (b) Only with hope: Titus 3.7. Because one adoption is incomplete (Romans 8.15–16) and another is complete (Romans 8.23). (c) This can be expressed as follows: According to St Thomas, adoptive sonship means being made to be like God’s natural Son (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 23, a. 3 c.). Through sanctifying grace we are made like the Son as the Word spirating love. Through the light of glory we are like the Son as Son, the Word begotten by the Father. 9 The question arises whether adoptive sonship is an entity received in us or an extrinsic denomination grounded upon the adopting love of the Father. Our answer is that adoption means three things: (1) a change and a conservation produced in us by the three divine persons; (2) this effect itself; (3) the Father’s love for his children by adoption. All of these statements are made with reference to sanctifying grace, though in different ways. The change and conservation are stated in terms of the relation of grace to its efficient cause. The effect produced is stated in terms of our being made like the natural Son. The Father’s love for us is stated in terms of a transcendent effect of sanctifying grace. 10 A transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace in those who have been justified is that they live as members of Christ. (a) Preliminary remarks: a′ The mystical body is the church: Colossians 1.18–24; Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 199–248. (Although St Thomas is very frequently quoted with approval in this encyclical, it does not refer to Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, nor to the way the Angelic Doctor seems to conceive the mystical body. Aquinas speaks of Christ as the Head of men and angels, whereas the encyclical intends to speak especially of the body that is the hierarchically organized Church Militant [p. 193].)

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

648

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

b′ omnes et soli sunt membra qui (1) baptizati (2) veram fidem profitentur neque (3) apostatae neque (4) excommunicati sunt. Ibid. 202. c′ qui peccato mortali infecti sunt, non omnem vitam amiserunt, si quidem fidem et spem retinent et gratiis actualibus ad poenitentiam moventur. Infirmi sunt sed non simpliciter demortui ut membra. Ibid. 203. d′ viva tamen Christi membra proprie dicuntur quae sana sunt, caritatem habent, et mereri vitam aeternam possunt. db 842. Ibid. 203. e′ quae vita dupliciter considerari potest: primo modo, ut vita est; alio modo, prout est vita quae membro competit. Proinde, inquantum vita est, est effectus formalis et immanens gratiae sanctificantis; in eo enim consistit quod principium intrinsecum primum seu remotum recipitur ex quo profluunt virtutes infusae et dona Spiritus Sancti e quibus per adiutorium gratiae actualis eliciuntur operationes huic vitae consentaneae. Attamen, inquantum est vita ad modum membri, hanc vitam in nobis habemus propter Christum et in Christo et cum Christo. f′ Membrum corporis mystici et membrum corporis organici non sunt eodem modo concipienda. In corpore organico membrum non habet propriam subsistentiam et unice destinatur in bonum totius. In corpore vero mystico membrum retinet propriam subsistentiam neque membra sunt propter corpus sed corpus propter membra. aas 35 (1943) 221 s. Membra sunt personae; personae sunt propter se (cg, iii, 112); manent supposita distincta, et actiones sunt suppositorum. Ibid. 231: ‘omnem nempe reiciendum esse mysticae huius coagmentationis modum quo Christi fideles quavis ratione ita creatarum rerum ordinem praetergrediantur atque in divina perperam invadant ut vel una sempiterni Numinis attributio de iisdem tamquam propria praedicari quaeat.’

(b) Declaratur qualis sit vita ad modum membri. a′ Quamvis corpus sit propter membra, tamen membra sunt propter Christum; imo sunt Christi. 1 Cor 3.23: ‘omnia enim vestra sunt; vos autem Christi; Christus autem Dei.’ aas 35 (1943) 222. Cf. ‘esse alicuius’ i, 21, 1, 3m. 1 Cor 6.15 s.: membra nostra sunt membra Christi, unde fornicator tollit membra Christi facit ea membra meretricis. 1 Cor 6.19 s.: non estis vestri. Empti enim estis pretio magno. Rom 14.8: Sive enim vivimus, Domino

The Robert Mollot Collection

649

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

b′ All the members and only members are those who are (1) baptized, (2) profess the true faith, (3) not apostates nor (4) excommunicated (ibid. 202). c′ Those who are in a state of mortal sin have not lost all life, since they retain faith and hope and are being stirred to repentance by actual graces. As members they are sick but not simply dead (ibid. 203). d′ Yet those who are healthy, have charity, and can merit eternal life are properly said to be living members of Christ (db 842, ds 1582, nd 1982; Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 [1943] 203). e′ This life can be considered in two ways: first, simply as life; second, as life lived by a member of Christ. Thus, inasmuch as it is life, it is an immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace; for it consists in the fact that a first or remote intrinsic principle is received from which flow infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as a result of which operations consonant with this life are elicited through the help of actual grace. However, inasmuch as it is the life of a member of a body, we have this life in us because of and in and with Christ. f′ Being a member in the mystical body and a member in an organic body are not to be conceived in the same way. In an organic body, a member is not subsistent in the proper sense and is uniquely ordered to the good of the whole. In the mystical body, on the other hand, a member remains subsistent, and members are not for the sake of the body but the body is for the sake of the members. Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 221–22: Members are persons; persons exist for their own sake (Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 3, c. 112); they remain distinct supposits, and actions are attributed to the supposit. Piux xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 231: ‘Every form of this mystical union is to be rejected in which the faithful would in any way so go beyond the order of creation and improperly encroach upon the divine that even one attribute of the eternal Deity could be predicated of them as properly theirs’ [db 2290, ds 3814, nd 1996]. (b) The nature of this life. a′ Although the Body exists for the sake of the members, the members exist for the sake of Christ; indeed, they belong to him. 1 Corinthians 3.22–23: ‘All things belong to you, and you belong to Christ and Christ belongs to God.’ Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 222. See ‘belonging to someone’ [esse alicuius], Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m. 1 Corinthians 6.15–16: ‘Do you not know that your

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

650

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

vivimus: sive morimur, Domino morimur. Sive ergo vivimus sive morimur, Domini sumus.

b′ Quia sumus Christi, nobis ipsis mori debemus. Lc 9.23: Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semetipsum, et tollat crucem suam cotidie, et sequatur me. Qui enim voluerit animam suam salvam facere, perdet illam: nam qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, salvam faciet illam. Cf. Lc 17.33. Io 12:24 s.: Amen amen dico vobis, nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet. Si autem mortuum fuerit, multum fructum affert. Qui amat animam suam in hoc mundo, perdet eam: et qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam aeternam custodit eam. Rom 6.4: consepulti enim sumus cum illo per baptismum in mortem; v. 5: complantati facti sumus similitudini morti eius; v. 8: mortui sumus cum Christo; v. 11: mortuos quidem esse peccato, viventes autem Deo; v. 18: liberati autem a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiae; v. 22: liberati a pecato, servi autem facti Deo. 2 Cor 5.14 ss.: Caritas enim Christi urget nos: aestimantes hoc quoniam si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt: et pro omnibus mortuus est Christus: ut et qui vivunt iam non sibi vivant, sed ei, qui pro ipsis mortuus est et resurrexit. Gal 2.19 ss.; 3.27 ss.; Phil 1.20s. c′ Sibi mortui, Christo vivimus vita Christo propria et nobis gratuito propter Christum collata. Col 3.3: Mortui enim estis, et vita vestra est abscondita cum Christo in Deo. Quia Christus est Filius naturalis, ei soli debetur dilectio paterna, donum Spiritus, gratia sanctificans, et caetera consectaria; quia ei soli haec vita debetur, ei est propria. Quia sumus filii irae, haec vita nobis est indebita. Imo, cuilibet creaturae est indebita etiamsi numquam peccet, peccaverit. Io 14.21: Qui habet mandata mea et servat ea, ille est qui diligit me. Qui autem diligit, diligetur a Patre meo. Io 6.58: Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo propter Patrem, et qui manducat me, et ipse vivet propter me.

d′ Quae vita nobis confertur secundum coniunctionem cum Christo. Io 15.l ss.: vitis et palmites. Manete in dilectione mea. Compati, commori,

The Robert Mollot Collection

651

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

bodies are members of Christ? Should I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! Do you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute becomes one body with her? For it is said, ‘The two shall be one flesh’; vv. 19–20: ‘Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought at a price; therefore glorify God in your body.’ Romans 14.8: ‘If we live we live to the Lord and if we die we die to the Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s.’ b′ Because we are Christ’s, we must die to ourselves. Luke 9.23: ‘If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me.’ John 12.24–25: ‘Very truly I tell you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains a single grain; but if it dies, it bears much fruit. Those who love their life will lose it, and those who hate their life in this world will keep it for eternal life.’ Romans 6.4: ‘… we have been buried with him by baptism into death’; v. 5: ‘For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his’; v. 11: ‘dead to sin and alive to God’; v. 18: ‘having been freed from sin, you have become slaves to justice’; v. 22: ‘… freed from sin and enslaved to God.’ 2 Corinthians 5.14–15: ‘For the love of Christ urges us on because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, so that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who died and was raised for them.’ Galatians 2.19–21; 3.27–29; Philippians 1.20–21. c′ Having died to self, we live for Christ with Christ’s own life, conferred upon us gratis because of Christ. Colossians 3.3: ‘… for you have died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God.’ Since Christ is God’s natural Son, to him alone are owed his Father’s love, the gift of the Spirit, sanctifying grace, and all the consequences thereof; and because to him alone is this life owed, it belongs to him as his own. Since we are children of wrath, this life is not owed to us. In fact, it is not owed to any creature even if that creature never sins or has sinned. John 14.21: ‘Those who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father.’ John 6.58: ‘As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me.’ d′ This life is conferred upon us in accordance with our union with Christ. John 15.1–5: the vine and the branches; v. 9: ‘… abide in my love.’

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

652

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

concorpora1es, complantati, convivificare, conresuscitare, consedere. Rom 8.29 conformes, primogenitus in multis. e′ Meritum et finis attinguntur quatenus sumus viva membra Christi. db 809, 842. Rom 8.17: Si tamen compatimur, ut et conglorificemur. f′ Quod ideo est quia haec vita est perfectionis divinae. Mt 5.48: necessitas donorum i-ii, 68, 2; gratiae actualis De Ver 24, 7–9; De Ver 27, 5, 3m. (c) Declaratur habitudo Christi capitis ad membra. a′ Utrum Christus qua homo sit caput an Christus qua Deus. aas 35 (1943) 236: ‘Christus enim, ut proprie accurateque loquimur, secundum utramque naturam una simul, totius ecclesiae est caput (De Ver 29, 4); ac ceteroquin ipse solemniter asseveravit “Si quid petieritis in nomine meo, hoc faciam.”’ Io 14.14. b′ Utrum Xtus qua Deus diligit nos amore notionali. Io 15.9: Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos, Io 15.26; 16.7: ipse mittit Spiritum sanctum ad nos. Porro, missio dicit originem missi a mittente (i, 43, 1), et Christus ut Deus (iii, 8, 1, 1m) est origo Spiritus quatenus est et ipse spiratio activa. i, 37, 2 c. fin: ‘et Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto vel Amore procedente et se et nos.’ Cf. ad 2m, 3m.

c′ Utrum Christus diligit nos ut filios adoptionis. Diligit nos uti sumus; atqui sumus filii adoptionis, assimilati ad filiationem naturalem, uti dictum est. Non tamen diligit nos ut filios suos per adoptionem, nam ei simus non filii sed fratres. Rom 8.29: primogenitus in multis fratribus. d′ Quemadmodum fieri possit ut Christus nos diligens amore notionali non diligit ut filios suos. Quia spiratio activa est Patris ut principii sine principio; at eadem spiratio est Filii ut principii de principio. db 704. e′ Christus, non qua Deus sed qua homo est Mediator. iii 26 2 c. NB: Christus qua homo dicit personam divinam ut in natura humana; numquam fit abstractio a persona. f′ Oeconomia salutis (propositum Dei, secundum Paulum) est ille ordo divinae sapientiae libere a Deo electus et volitus. Ordo concrete sumptus dicit (1) ordinata (2) inter se intelligibiliter connexa. Deus non vult hoc

The Robert Mollot Collection

653

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

Suffer with, die with, one body with, planted with, vivify with, resurrect with, sit with. Romans 8.29, ‘… conformed [to the image of the Son], the firstborn of a large family.’ e′ Our merit and end are attained insofar as we are living members of Christ. db 809, 842; ds 1546, 1582; nd 1947, 1982. Romans 8.17: ‘… if we suffer with him, so that we may also be glorified with him.’ f′ This is so because this life is a life of divine perfection: Matthew 5.48. The necessity of gifts: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 68, a. 2; of actual grace, De veritate, q. 24, aa. 7–9; q. 27, a. 5, ad 3m. (c) The relation of Christ the Head to his members. a′ Whether Christ as man or Christ as God is Head. Pius xii, Mystici Corporis in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 236: ‘For, accurately and properly speaking, Christ is Head of the whole Church according to both his natures together (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 29, a. 4); and besides, as he himself stated, “If you ask anything in my name, I will do it”’ ( John 14.14). b′ Whether Christ loves us with notional love. John 15.9: ‘As the Father has loved me, I have loved you’; see John 15.26 and 16.7. Also, sending implies that the one sent originates from the sender (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 1), and Christ as God (ibid. 3, q. 8, a.1, ad 1m) is the origin of the Holy Spirit inasmuch as he is active spiration. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 2 c. at the end: ‘And the Father and Son are said to love both themselves and us by the Holy Spirit, or proceeding Love.’ See ibid. ad 2m and ad 3m. c′ Whether Christ loves us as adopted children. He loves us as we are; but we are children by adoption, made to be like natural children, as we have said. But Christ does not love us as his own children by adoption, for we are not his children but his brothers and sisters. Romans 8.29, ‘firstborn in a large family.’ d′ How it is possible that Christ in loving us does not love us with notional love as his children? Because active spiration is attributed to the Father as the principle without a principle; but the same active spiration is attributed to the Son as a principle from a principle. db 704, ds 1331, nd 326. e′ Christ is Mediator not as God but as man. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 26, a. 2 c. Note: ‘Christ as man’ means the divine person as incarnate in a human nature; there is never abstraction from the person. f′ The economy of salvation (God’s purpose, propositum Dei, as Paul terms it) is that order of divine wisdom that has been freely chosen and willed by God. Considered in the concrete, an order consists of items (1) that are or-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

654

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

quia vult illud, sed vult ut hoc sit propter illud.55 Proinde Deus voluit ut omnia sint propter Christum, ‘ut sit in omnibus ipse primatum tenens.’ Col 1.18. 1 Cor 3.22–2356: omnia enim vestra sunt; vos autem Christi; Christus autem Dei. Agitur de fine: i, 21, 1, 3m. Christus instrumentum (iii, 7, 1, 3m; 18, 1, 2m), potentia (iii, 13), operatio (iii, 19), efficientia (iii, 8, aa. 2 & 6; iii, 48, 6; iii, 56).

Cf. Tridentinum, db809; Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, aas 35 (1943) 216f. g′ Est oeconomia amoris. Nos sumus Christi, nobis mortui, Christo viventes per gratiam et caritatem. Christus est Dei, satisfaciens et salvans, per amorem: Io 15.13. Maiorem dilectionem nemo habet. Pater nos diligit quia Christum diligimus. Io 14.21: Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo. Io 14.23. 11 Effectus formalis et transcendentalis gratiae sanctificantis in iustis est quod Spiritus sanctus, ab aeterno donum increatum exsistens, ex tempore fit donum huic iusto datum. (a) Secundum Sacram Scripturam, Spiritus sanctus mittitur eisque datur. Gal 4.6: clare distinguuntur missio Filii et missio Spiritus; clare distinguuntur Pater mittens et Spiritus missus. Haud dici potest non Spiritum mitti sed Deum; Deum vero missum per appropriationem dici Spiritum missum. Rom 5.5: agitur de Spiritu s; et dicitur datus vobis. 1 Thess 4.8: IJRȞ ĬİRȞ IJRȞ țĮL įȚįȩȞIJĮ IJR ʌȞİXCȝĮ ĮXMIJȠXC IJR D^ȖȚȠȞ İLMȢ X-ȝDCȢ.

NB Secundum usum Pauli ‘IJRMȞ ĬİRMȞ’ dicit Deum Patrem. Pater ergo dat Spiritum suum; et Spiritus suus est divinus. (b) Ex tractatu de Deo Trino: Donum est nomen personale et proprium Spiritus sancti. Quod nomen eodem titulo dicitur de Spiritu quo dicitur amor procedens; ideo enim Spiritus est donum quia est amor procedens.57 Proinde, sicut gratia sanctificans est terminus ad extra secundum quem iustus diligitur amore notionali,

The Robert Mollot Collection

655

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

dered, and (2) that are interconnected in an intelligible way. God does not will B because he wills A, but wills that B exist because of A.55 Thus God has willed that all things should be because of Christ, ‘that he might come to have first place in everything,’ Colossians 1.18. 1 Corinthians 3.22–23:56 ‘All things are yours, etc.’ Refers to the end: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m. Christ is instrument (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 18, a. 1, ad 2m), power (ibid. q. 13), operation (ibid. q. 19), efficient cause (ibid. q. 8, aa. 2 and 6; q. 48, a. 6; q. 56). Cf. Trent, db 809, ds 1546, nd 1947; Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 216 –17. g′ It is an economy of love. We are Christ’s, dead to ourselves, living for Christ through grace and charity. Christ belongs to God, makes atonement and saves, through love: John 15.13, ‘Greater love than this …’ The Father loves us because we love Christ: John 14.21, ‘Who loves me will be loved by my Father.’ John 14.23. 11 A transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace in the just is that the Holy Spirit, existing from eternity as uncreated Gift, in time becomes the Gift given to the just. (a) According to scripture, the Holy Spirit is sent to the just and given to them. Galatians 4.6 clearly distinguishes between the sending of the Son and the sending of the Spirit; there is a clear distinction between the Father who sends and the Spirit who is sent. One certainly cannot say that it is not the Spirit but God who is sent, and that God’s being sent is said of the Spirit by appropriation. Rom 5.5 refers to the Holy Spirit; and the Spirit is said to be ‘given to you.’ 1 Thessalonians 4.8: IJRȞ ĬİRȞ IJRȞ țĮL įȚįȩȞIJĮ IJR ʌȞİXCȝĮ ĮXMIJȠXC IJR D^ȖȚȠȞ İLMȢ X-ȝDCȢ: ‘God, who also gives his Holy Spirit to you.’ Note : According to Pauline usage, IJRMȞ ĬİRMȞ refers to God the Father. Therefore the Father gives his Spirit, and his Spirit is divine. (b) From the treatise on the Trinity. ‘Gift’ is the proper personal name of the Holy Spirit. This name is given to the Spirit for the same reason as he is said to be proceeding Love; therefore the Spirit is Gift because he is proceeding Love.57 Accordingly, just as sanctifying grace is the extrinsic term according to which the just are loved

55 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 5 c. 56 [Correcting Lonergan’s ‘1 Cor 3 27.’] 57 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, q. 38, aa. 1 and 2.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

656

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

ita etiam gratia est terminus ad extra secundum quem donum increatum, Spiritus sanctus, amor notionalis, datur iusto. (c) Accedit auctoritas S. Thomae. i, 43, 3; i, 38, 1, 3m, 4m; 2, 3m. (d) Quod alicui datur, ab eo habetur. Habetur Spiritus a iusto quatenus donum increatum per gratiam fit iusto datum. Porro, ideo gratia est terminus conveniens huius dationis quia ad extra imitatur spirationem activam et hac de causa possidet propriam relationem ad increatam spirationem passivam. Participative vero habetur Spiritus per caritatem infusam; virtus enim caritatis ad extra imitatur spirationem passivam quae est Spiritus sanctus. In ordine denique ad fruitionem habetur Spiritus quatenus per gratiam iustus habitualiter Deum vere cognoscit et recte diligit.58

12 Effectus formalis et transcendentalis gratiae sanctificantis in iustis est quod Pater et Filius Spiritum huic iusto mittunt atque dant. (a) Gal 4.6: Pater mittit in corda. Io 14.16 (Pater dabit) 14.26 (Pater mittet in nomine meo) 15.26 (ego mittam a Patre) 16.7 (quem mittam ad vos). (b) Quae missio et datio dicunt (1) aeternam originem Spiritus a Patre Filioque et (2) terminum ex tempore secundum quem Pater et Filius dicuntur mittentes et dantes, Spiritus vero missus vel datus. (c) Porro, cum gratia sit terminus Amoris procedentis, conveniens est terminus secundum quem Pater et Filius dicuntur mittentes et dantes.

13 Quare tres divinae personae animas iustorum inhabitant. (a) aas 35 (1943) 231 s.: ‘Inhabitare quidem divinae personae dicuntur, quatenus creatis animantibus intellectu praeditis imperscrutabili modo praesentes, ab iisdem per cognitionem et amorem attingantur, quadam tamen ratione omnem naturam transcendente ac penitus intima et singulari.’

(b) Omnes tres personae inhabitant. Io 14.23: ad eum veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus (i.e., Pater et Filius). Rom 8.9 ss.

The Robert Mollot Collection

657

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

by notional love, so also is grace the extrinsic term according to which the uncreated Gift, the Holy Spirit, notional love, is given to the just. (c) We add here the authority of St Thomas: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 3; q. 38, a. 1, ad 3m and ad 4m; a. 2, ad 3m. (d) What is given to someone is possessed by that person. The just possess the Spirit insofar as this uncreated Gift is given to them through grace. Further, grace is the appropriate extrinsic term of this donation because it externally imitates active spiration and therefore has a proper relation to uncreated passive spiration. But the Spirit is had by participation through infused charity. For the virtue of charity externally imitates passive spiration which is the Holy Spirit. Finally, with regard to fruition, the Spirit is possessed insofar as through grace the just habitually have a true knowledge of God and a proper love for him.58 12 A transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace in the just is that the Father and Son send and give them the Holy Spirit. (a) Galatians 4.6, ‘The Father sends into the hearts …’; John 14.16, ‘The Father will give ...’; 14.26, ‘The Father will send in my name’; 15.26, ‘I will send from the Father …’; 16.7, ‘… whom I will send to you.’ (b) This sending and giving express (1) the eternal origin of the Spirit from both Father and Son, and (2) the temporal term according to which the Father and Son are said to be sending and giving, and the Spirit sent or given. (c) Further, since grace is the term of proceeding Love, it is the appropriate term according to which the Father and Son are said to be sending and giving. 13 Therefore the three divine persons dwell in the souls of the just. (a) Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 231–32: ‘The divine persons are said to indwell insofar as they are present in a quite unfathomable manner in creatures endowed with intellect and are attained by them through knowledge and love, albeit in an utterly intimate and extraordinary way that is absolutely above every natural order’ [db 2290, ds 3815, nd 1997]. (b) All three persons indwell. John 14.23: ‘we will come to them and make our home with them’; Romans 8.9–11.

58 See ibid. q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

658

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

(c) Secundum quod tres pariter gratiam in iustis producunt. Et sic adsunt secundum eandem normam secundum quam Deus est in omnibus praesens. i 8 1–4. (d) Secundum quod gratia est terminus amoris essentialis. Et sic omnes se dant, inquantum ‘dare’ dicit liberalem sui communicationem. i 43 4. (e) Secundum quod est terminus amoris notionalis. Et sic Pater est praesens ut mittens et dans, Filius est praesens ut missus (i, 43, 5) et dans; Spiritus est praesens ut missus et datus. (f) Secundum quod gratia est primum principium intrinsecum vitae supernaturalis. Et sic divinae personae habentur ad fruitionem inquantum habitualiter vere cognoscuntur et recte diliguntur. i, 38, 1; 43, 3.

14 Ideoque viget veri nominis amicitia inter Deum et iustos. ii-ii, 23, 1 c.: amicitia est mutuus amor benevolentiae in quadam communicatione boni fundatus. Fundatur haec amiticia in communicatione divinae naturae ipsiusque Dei. Est amor benevolentiae ex parte Dei. Gratia enim est terminus dilectionis divinae et essentialis et notionalis. Est amor benevolentiae ex parte nostra. Caritas enim Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est vobis.

15 Spiritus sanctus est anima Corporis Mystici. Spiritus Sanctus: tertia persona SS. Trinitatis. Corpus mysticum: Christus et ecclesia sua. anima: dicitur per analogiam imperfectam. analogia: sicut se habet anima ad corpus quod informat, ita se habet Spiritus Sanctus ad corpus mysticum. Ergo aequalitas proportionum. non metaphora: corpus mysticum non est merum corpus morale in quo solum unitatis principium est communis finis et communis omnium in eundem finem per socialem auctoritatem conspiratio.59 non analogia perfecta: corpus mysticum non est idem quod corpus naturale. Membra huius propriam subsistentiam non habent et unice destinantur

The Robert Mollot Collection

659

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

(c) Accordingly, the three persons equally produce grace in the just. And so they are present according to the same norm as that by which God is present in all things. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 8, aa. 1–4. (d) Accordingly, grace is a term of essential love. And so all give themselves, inasmuch as ‘to give’ means a free communication of oneself. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 4, ad 1m. (e) Accordingly, it is a term of notional love. And so the Father is present as sending and giving; the Son is present as sent (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 5) and giving; and the Spirit is present as sent and given. (f) Accordingly, grace is the first intrinsic principle of supernatural life. And so as to fruition the divine Persons are possessed insofar as they are truly known and rightly loved. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3. 14 Therefore there is genuine friendship between God and the just. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 23, a. 1 c: Friendship is a mutual love of benevolence founded upon an exchange of good(s). This friendship is founded upon the communication of the divine nature and of God himself. It is benevolent love on the part of God, for grace is the term of both essential and notional divine love. It is also benevolent love on our part, for the love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. 15 The Holy Spirit is the soul of the mystical body. Holy Spirit: third person of the Holy Trinity. mystical body: Christ and his Church. soul: This is said here by way of an imperfect analogy. by analogy: as the soul is to the body which it informs, so is the Holy Spirit to the mystical body. Hence there is an equality of proportions. not a metaphor: the mystical body is not a merely moral body in which the sole unifying principle is a common end and the common intention of all the members towards attaining that end through the authority of that society.59 not a perfect analogy: the mystical body is not the same as a natural body. The members of a natural body do not properly subsist on their own and

59 Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 222.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

660

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

in bonum totius. Membra illius propriam subsistentiam retinent, et membra non sunt propter corpus sed corpus propter membra.60 Nam Christus propter homines (propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de caelis); ecclesia propter homines; sacramenta propter homines. sed analogia imperfecta; et ita quidem ut imperfectius analogatum sit corpus naturale. Ratione materiae uniendae: nam corpus mysticum est unio personarum. Ratione principii unionis: nempe ipse increatus Spiritus.61 Eph 4.4: solliciti servare unitatem Spiritus in vinculo pacis. Unum corpus et unus Spiritus … Corpus est corpus mysticum. Spiritus est Spiritus Sanctus. Iuxtapositio suadet SpSm esse animam seu Spiritum corporis mystici. Et ita PP.62 Leo xiii ass (29) 650; Pius xii 35 (1943) 220 illum laudans et citans: ‘Hoc affirmare sufficiat, quod cum Christus Caput sit Ecclesiae, Spiritus sanctus sit eius anima.’63 aas 35 (1943) 219. Spiritus Sanctus est principium unionis. Quoad caput ut Deum: est procedens de Filio et consubstantialis cum Filio et missus a Filio. Quoad caput ut hominem: in eo inhabitat per prius; eum ducit. Quoad membra ut singula: idem omnes gratos factos inhabitat; omnes movet sive ad fidem et poenitentiam sive ad progressum, 1 Cor 12.3; db 898 linea 12; Rom 8.14. Quoad membra ut consociata: dirigit ecclesiam.

[3.5] Corollaria 64 [1] Utrum effectus formales gratiae sanctificantis per omnipotentiam divinam separari possint. Cf. Beraza qui thesin statuit: ‘De potentia Dei abso-

The Robert Mollot Collection

661

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

are uniquely ordered to the good of the whole. The members of the mystical body retain their subsistence, and they do not exist for the sake of the body but the body exists for the sake of the members.60 For Christ is for the human race: ‘For us and for our salvation he came down from heaven’ [Nicene Creed]; the Church and the sacraments are for people. but an imperfect analogy : and as such, it is a natural body that is the more imperfect analogate, both by reason of the subject matter for union, for the mystical body is a union of persons, and by reason of the principle of union, which in the case of the mystical body is the uncreated Spirit himself.61 Ephesians 4.3–4: ‘Be solicitous to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is one body and one Spirit …’ The body is the mystical body, the Spirit the Holy Spirit. The juxtaposition suggests that the Holy Spirit is the soul or spirit of the mystical body. This is the interpretation of the Fathers.62 Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 220, quotes with approval this statement of Leo xiii: ‘Let it suffice to say this, that since Christ is the Head of the Church, the Holy Spirit is its soul.’63 Pius xii, Mystici Corporis, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 219 [db 2288, ds 3807–08, nd 851–52]: the Holy Spirit is the principle of unity. As to the Head as God: the Spirit proceeds from the Son, is consubstantial with him and sent by him. As to the Head as man: dwells primarily in him; leads him. As to the members: dwells in all who have been made pleasing to God; stirs them all either to faith and repentance or to spiritual progress: 1 Corinthians 12.3; db 898, line 12; ds 1678; nd 1624]; Romans 8.14. As to the members considered as a society: the Holy Spirit guides the church. [3.5] Corollaries 64 [1] Whether the formal effects of sanctifying grace can be separated from God’s omnipotence. Beraza states this thesis: ‘By God’s absolute power ha-

60 Ibid. 221–22. 61 Ibid. 222. 62 See Tromp, De Spiritu sancto anima corporis Christi mystici. (Latin series and Greek series.) 63 See Leo xiii, Divinum illud, in Acta Sanctae Sedis 29 (1897) 650. 64 [This heading is found in Lonergan’s table of contents but does not appear in the text.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

662

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

luta gratia habitualis et peccatum mortale in eodem subiecto simul exsistere possunt.’65 Fundamentum est distinguere inter entitatem gratiae ut animae qualitatem physicam et, alia ex parte, connaturalem gratiae exigentiam ad amicitiam divinam quae exigentia maior non est quam ut accidens sit in subiecto etc. Scilicet, Beraza tenet hominem gratum factum non eo ipso esse Dei amicum sed tantum habere ius ad amicitiam ex divina promissione. Dicimus effectus formales gratiae sanctificantis et immanentes et transcendentales non esse separabiles. Immanentes enim primarii eo ipso habentur quod gratia habetur. Immanentes vero secundarii ex gratia habituali sequuntur secundum divinam sapientiam: sunt varii pro variis statibus et subiectis; non tamen omittuntur in grato facto sapienter; quod vero contradicit divinae sapientiae vel bonitati est impossibile.66 Transcendentales autem non sunt concipiendi ad modum consectariorum: sed supposito Deo uno et Trino, eo ipso quod habetur gratia, etiam habentur filiatio adoptiva, fraternitas cum Filio, donum Spiritus, Trium Personarum inhabitatio, amicitia cum Deo amico. Quae cum ita sint, sicut repugnat eundem simul esse amicum et inimicum, ita repugnat eundem habere gratiam et peccatum mortale. Circa fundamentum ultimum Beraza, vide In Boet de Trin 5 3 circa distinctionem, abstractionem, separationem. Distinguuntur sane animal et pes animalis. At pes sine animali non est pes. Abstrahi potest animal a pede, totum a partibus; nam animal sine pede manet animal. Abstrahi non potest pes ab animali, nam pes sine animali non est pes. Gratia vero huius ordinis est gratia Christi: est mera ineptitudo et nullo modo metaphysica profunditas inquirere de gratia prout est ens physicum seorsum sumptum a Christo capite.

[2] Utrum ipse Deus se habeat ad iustum per modum formae vel actus eminentioris vel assistentis.

The Robert Mollot Collection

663

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

bitual grace and mortal sin can exist at the same time in the same subject.’65 The basis for this opinion is the distinction between the entity of grace as a physical quality of the soul and, on the other hand, the connatural exigency of grace for divine friendship, which exigency is no greater than that it be an accident in the subject, etc. In other words, Beraza maintains that a person made pleasing to God is not by that very fact a friend of God but only has a right to God’s friendship based upon God’s promise. Our position is that the formal effects, both immanent and transcendent, of sanctifying grace are not separable. The primary immanent effects are had by the very fact that grace is had. The secondary effects are consequent upon habitual grace in accordance with divine wisdom: they vary according to the various states and subjects; yet it is not wise to omit them in one made pleasing to God, and what is contrary to divine wisdom or goodness simply cannot be.66 Transcendent effects, however, are not to be conceived as consequences; but supposing God as one and as a Trinity, by the very fact of having grace one also has adoptive sonship, brotherhood with the Son, the gift of the Spirit, the indwelling of the Three, and mutual friendship with God. Such being the case, then, just as it is impossible for the same person to be a friend and an enemy at the same time, so it is impossible for the same person to have grace and be in the state of mortal sin. With regard to the ultimate basis of Beraza’s opinion, see St Thomas, In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3 [lect. ii, q. 1, a. 3], on distinction, abstraction, and separation. There is certainly a distinction between an animal and the foot of an animal. But a foot apart from the animal is not a foot. Animal can be abstracted from foot, as the whole from the part, for an animal without a foot is still an animal. But foot cannot be abstracted from animal, for a foot apart from the animal is not a foot. Now grace in this order of reality is the grace of Christ. It is sheer incompetence and by no means an exercise of metaphysical profundity to try to understand grace as a physical entity apart from Christ the Head. [2] Whether God is related to the just by way of a form or an eminent or assisting act.

65 Blasio Beraza, Tractatus de gratia Christi (Bilboa [España]: El Mensajero del Corazón, 1929) 760–70, §§862–76. [For the page number Lonergan mistakenly had ‘p. 706 ff.’] 66 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologia, 1, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1m.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

664

De Gratia Sanctificante: Supplementum

Eiusmodi doctrina invenitur in Petavio, Lessio, de la Taille, Malachi Donnelly. Dicimus eiusmodi doctrinam esse convenientem ubi agitur de gratia unionis (humanitas Christi exsistit per esse personale Verbi) vel de visione beatifica (divina essentia se habet ut species intelligibilis). His in casibus Deus ipse implet quodammodo vices actus vel formae. Negamus eiusmodi doctrinam esse convenientem ubi agitur de iustis. Nam omnia salvari possunt per effectus formales transcendentales. De facto, nihil dicitur de iusto quod requirit Deum ut formam vel Deum ut actum. Tridentinum docet unicam causam formalem nostrae iustificationis esse iustitiam Dei qua nos iustos facit, scil., gratiam sanctificantem et sua consectaria.

The Robert Mollot Collection

665

Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace

This doctrine is found in Petavius, Lessius, de la Taille, and Malachi Donnelly. We hold that this doctrine is appropriate where one is discussing the grace of union (the humanity of Christ exists through the personal act of existence of the Word) or the beatific vision (the divine essence is to the intellect of the Blessed as an intelligible species). In these cases God himself in some way fulfils the function of act or form. We deny that this doctrine is appropriate in the case of the just. For everything can be explained by transcendent formal effects. In fact, nothing is stated about the just that requires God to be a form or an act. The Council of Trent teaches that the sole formal cause of our justification is the justice of God whereby he renders us just, namely, sanctifying grace and its consequences.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

APPENDIX 1

The Notion of Sacrifice: Three Drafts on Theological Method in Connection with the Idea of Sacrifice1

The Idea of Sacrifice [1] After ploughing through the somewhat rocky soil of multitudinous opinions on the nature of sacrifice, it was to me at once a relief and an inspiration to study what St Augustine has said on the subject. Nor was I unimpressed by the fact that the notion of sacrifice as symbol, so little emphasized in any modern works, was central to his thought. Further reflection led me to believe that, with the aid of a few simple theorems, one might construct a satisfactory unification of Christian doctrine on sacrifice and sacrifices. And, as I happen also to hold that the goal of theology – sapientis est ordinare – is to be attained by genius, when we have it, and by collaboration, when we have to look back through centuries to see genius at work, I have in this paper set down the grounds of my opinion in a hope that others, in due course of time, may effect what I suspect to be possible. Sacrifice as Reality By ‘sacrifice as reality’ I would denote what St Augustine called verum sacrificium and what modern writers, from controversial exigency, have had to name and, from the insidious influence of words, have not always avoided conceiving as sacrificium improprie dictum.

1 [See above, p. 4.]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

668

Appendix 1: The Notion of Sacrifice (Three Drafts)

The Idea of Sacrifice [2] It would be strange if the methodological criteria resulting from positivist philosophy did not at this or that point exert some influence on theological thought. For in scientific circles positivism is dominant and it reduces the human mind to a link, of no intrinsic worth, between, say, pointer readings that have been observed and pointer readings that may be predicted. Of course, however great this dominance, there is no tendency of Catholic theology as a whole to submit to positivist criteria. On the other hand, I do not think one can deny the existence of such a tendency with regard to the particular issues that go by the name of disputed questions. For in this field the theologian finds himself under circumstances quite analogous to those that lead scientific theorists to an acceptance of positivism. Where the scientist has quite indisputable pointer readings, the theologian has the indisputable truths of revelation. Where the scientist is confused by a maze of abstract theoretical issues, the theologian is confronted by an array of irreconcilable and unsatisfactory theoretical opinions. Where the scientist sees in positivism a shortcut that eliminates all theoretical issues with damaging immediate practical interests, so the theologian can be tempted to disregard, to deprecate, even to rule out as hopeless, the whole range of conflicting opinions and so confine his attention to the solid and substantial certitudes of faith. Finally, just as positivism in science eliminates science as science, so positivism in theology eliminates theology as theology: for science becomes the humble handmaid of technology, and theology, insofar as it yields to positivism, doffs the robes of queen of the sciences to become a somewhat too elaborate collection and collation of materials for catechetics and preaching. In the extraordinarily erudite article ‘Messe’ in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, a long exposition of opinions is followed by a discussion of method (dtc x [19] 1246).2 The manifold diversity of opinions on the nature of the eucharistic sacrifice is asserted to have a single root, namely, mistaken method. What theologians have been doing is to lay down a definition of sacrifice in general and then attempt to verify this definition in the mass.

2 [The long and variously authored article or entry in DTC that Lonergan refers to goes from dtc x (19) 795 to dtc x (20) 1403. The particular column Lonergan mentions, which is a part of the article or entry that is authored by A. Michel – Lonergan’s reference should include part of column 1247 – has the heading ‘1. La méthode à suivre.’]

The Robert Mollot Collection

669

Appendix 1: The Notion of Sacrifice (Three Drafts)

That procedure is described as interpreting the certain in the light of the doubtful. It is certain that some rites of the Old Law, the passion and death of our Saviour, the Eucharist, are true and proper sacrifices. But what is a sacrifice? That is uncertain: theologians do not agree, the Church has made no official pronouncement, and neither Holy Scripture nor the Fathers attempted to work out a theory of sacrifice. Inevitably, doubtful opinions on the nature of sacrifice have led to nothing but doubtful opinions on the nature of the mass. On the other hand, correct procedure would begin from revealed data, and in particular from the affirmations and negations of the Council of Trent, to arrive at a definition not of sacrifice in general but of the sacrifice of the mass. Now all of this is unobjectionable inasmuch as it is advocated not as a permanent canon of method but simply as a temporary expedient. I do not suppose that anyone would desire a writer in a general dictionary to proceed otherwise. But perhaps it is not irrelevant to insist that the expedients which suit special circumstances need not coincide with the proper orientation of theological inquiry. To interpret the certain in light of the doubtful – éclairer le certain par l’incertain – is not a vice but a virtue. All empirical science is interpretation of certain sense data through less certain theories. Are we, therefore, to drop empirical science as science and to become positivists? Again, it is possible for human reason, guided by faith, to arrive at some understanding, quite limited yet most fruitful, even of mysteries. But what is to be understood is certain with the certitude of faith. On the other hand, the understanding itself is had through the internal coherence of the mysteries and the analogy of nature; and that coherence, that analogy, are not revealed; often, indeed, they are not self-evident, not obvious, not easily demonstrable; and so there is needed a painstaking, loyal, and sober inquiry (db 1796, [ds 3016, nd 132]), an inquiry that extends not over mere years but over dozens of centuries, from a Clement of Alexandria to an Aquinas, from an Aquinas to the next great integration of theological achievement. In this perspective the faltering opinions of theologians on the nature of the mass do not prove the need of any Copernican revolution of method. It may have been desirable that some theologians of the past possessed a fuller realization of what they were about and of the limitations of their achievement. But refinement of method is one thing and revolution quite another. And it is revolutionary to object to the interpretation of the certain in the light of the doubtful, a revolution that, pressed to its logical consequences, eliminates speculative theology in its entirety. As was remarked of a certain

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

670

Appendix 1: The Notion of Sacrifice (Three Drafts)

professor’s treatise on grace: ‘Had he lived before the Council of Trent, he would have had very little to say.’ That remark, if too piquant to be just, still was just enough to be piquant. For there is a modesty of speculative opinion and a devotion to truths that are absolutely certain which, in the concrete, may often be both the only practicable course and, at the same time, an unconscious yielding to positivist methodology. The Augustinian Concept of Sacrifice The article mentioned above was quite right in affirming that none of the Fathers worked out a complete theory of sacrifice. It remains that St Augustine’s somewhat scattered reflections are a mine of inspiration and, with a few additional theorems, admit development into a theory that to me seems to meet the data, to be coherent, to be illuminating, and to carry a heavy weight of traditional thought in its train. The key-piece of Augustinian thought here is a distinction between ‘sacrifice as reality’ and ‘sacrifice as symbol.’ Sacrifice as symbol is what today is meant by true and proper sacrifice, the sensible and normally social act of religious worship. On the other hand, sacrifice as reality is roughly what today is meant by sacrifice improperly so called. As the fundamental, though not the sole, relation between the two is that sacrifice as symbol symbolizes sacrifice as reality, necessarily one begins with an account of the latter. The Idea of Sacrifice [3] There is a preliminary question of method, for it is erroneous method, according to A. Michel writing in the dtc, that accounts for the manifold diversity of theological opinion on the nature of the sacrifice of the mass (dtc x [19] 1246). One is interpreting the certain in the light of the doubtful, he urged, if one lays down a definition of sacrifice in general and then attempts to verify this definition in the mass; and theologians have ended up with such contrary views precisely because they have been attempting to establish their systems by their a priori definitions. On the other hand, the church has no official definition of sacrifice in general; neither scripture nor the Fathers worked out a speculative system on the nature of sacrifice; and, in a word, correct procedure is to begin from the Council of Trent and, through a method of elimination, arrive at a definition not of sacrifice in general but of the sacrifice of the mass. I am not concerned to exculpate theologians from this charge of mis-

The Robert Mollot Collection

671

Appendix 1: The Notion of Sacrifice (Three Drafts)

taken method. Indeed, I should be more ready to support than to oppose such a charge. But my present purpose is to advance that the method proposed by the erudite author of the article in question is at least as unsatisfactory as any other. For theology has a twofold concern: it aims at truth; it also aims at understanding. These two are distinct: one can know the truth without understanding it; one can understand mistakenly. Insofar as theology aims at truth, it begins with the data of revelation to end with their coherent formulation and with their integration with a human culture, say, Thomist philosophy. But this aim cannot be attained without understanding. Granted that the understanding will inevitably be deficient, so long as we are pilgrims walking not by vision but by faith, nonetheless there is an understanding to be attained, and, as the [First] Vatican Council insisted, its attainment is most fruitful (db 1796, [ds 3016, nd 132]); for one thing, that understanding conditions the positive coherence of the theological formulation of revealed truth and the possibility of its intelligible integration with the rest of human thought and life. The defect, then, I would find in the method proposed lies in a one-sided attention to truth that defeats itself by a neglect of understanding. It makes possible the formulation of a number of propositions, but it rules out interest in the explanatory unity of the propositions and so is tantamount to a reduction of content and meaning even in the terms. If one can define the sacrifice of the mass without being able to define sacrifice, then one deals with the specific difference between the mass and a generic unknown; moreover, this central blind spot will reproduce itself in the content of every technical term, for, if sacrifice is generically unknown, then sacrificial oblation or immolation or the divine acceptance of sacrifice will contain blanks as parts of their meaning. It should seem, then, that the objection raised against the methodology of theologians has to be met not with assent but with a distinction. It is mistaken to find fault with theologians who ‘interpret the certain in the light of the uncertain.’ That is inevitable, if they are theologians according to the mind of the Church. For revealed truths are certain. But it is part of the theologian’s function to attain some understanding of them. Now such understanding cannot attain the certitude of revealed truth. It may not attain, over centuries, any certitude. For it is born of the analogy of nature and the internal coherence of the mysteries themselves; and what this analogy is, what this coherence is, that is not self-evident nor obvious nor, often, readily demonstrable. It demands sedulous, sober, and loyal inquiry. To object that in some field or other the inquiry has so far born little fruit and on that

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

672

Appendix 1: The Notion of Sacrifice (Three Drafts)

ground to suppress it, is a defeatist distortion of theological method. On the other hand, one must agree with M. Michel in his condemnation of any theologian who offers to justify a system by the system’s definitions. That is a patent vicious circle. The justification of theological system lies in its success in systematizing, in taking revealed truths from the state of separate truths to the state of interconnected and luminous truths. Sapientis est ordinare. Systems are mistaken when they contain or imply any error. Systems are defective when they fail to take into account any relevant datum. Systems are fruitful, to use again the term of the Vatican Council, in the measure that they bring some limited human light upon the too bright secrets God has revealed to man.

The Robert Mollot Collection

This page intentionally left blank

APPENDIX II

De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

The Robert Mollot Collection

APPENDIX 2

God’s Knowledge and Will

Editors’ Introduction The following is based on a note provided by Frederick Crowe to the Regis edition. In the 1950 mimeographed edition of ‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei,’ there was a blank half-page at the end of §26, the list of objections. In a set he received of these mimeographed notes, Lonergan used this blank space to insert two items of great interest, a brief additional paragraph to objection (s), which we have now added to it above, p. 403, and a further objection, (t), given here (appendix 2a). The point and occasion of this addition to the mimeographed notes we may surmise from the following bit of history. During Lonergan’s 1950 lectures on scientia media in this same course on God, classroom discussion centered one day on the New Testament text which was regarded as a stock proof for the fact of scientia media: ‘If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes’ (Matthew 11.21). The objection was put to Lonergan that while there might be scientia media of this futurible, there was equally scientia media of its contradictory: ‘If these miracles had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would not have repented.’ That is, if God knows ‘miracles in Tyre with consequent repentance’ as a possibility and so a futurible in some order, he also knows ‘miracles in Tyre without consequent repentance’ as a possibility and so a futurible in some other order; both propositions pertain to God’s eternal scientia media, which does

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

677

Appendix 2: God’s Knowledge and Will

not therefore give sufficient grounds for the determination of one as true and of the other as false. Shortly after the discussion, Lonergan delivered to his questioner the following page, reproduced with minor editing: Scientia simplicis intelligentiae (a) In the divine essence God knows all possible world orders; their criterion is divine wisdom and goodness. (b) In each world order God knows everything that is or occurs from the first instant of creation to the final end; it is a knowledge of essences and existences, of potentialities and actuations. (c) In knowing these potentialities (see b), God knows the possibles in the familiar sense, i.e., everything that could be in any possible world. (d) E.g., in many possible world orders it would be possible for me to own a dog and feed him steak; but there need be no possible world order in which I actually feed my dog steak. Hence there is no necessity that the possible series of world orders include the actuation of all possibilities. Scientia media (a) Every possible world order is also futurible. From the nature of the proof of scientia media as divine reflection on divine transcendence. (b) There are real possibilities that are not actuated actually in any possible world order. Meaning: see (d). Proof: ‘miracles worked in Tyre and Sidon without repentance following’ is a real possibility but yet is an occurrence that pertains to no possible world order. Abstract proof: from the difference of criteria of possibility (non-contradiction, positive coherence of terms) and of actuality in possible world order (divine wisdom and goodness). Presumably the additions to §26 in Lonergan’s own set of the mimeographed notes were made on the occasion of this exchange and belong therefore to the period March–May in 1950. Appendix 2b to ‘God’s Knowledge and Will’ is a transcript of a single page, certainly typewritten by Lonergan himself, found in the Archives of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto (lp ii-23, in item a181 (www.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

678

Appendix II: De Scientia atque Voluntate Dei

Appendix IIa (t) At quomodo explicatur textus de Tyriis et Sidoniis: si fierent miracula, eos poeniteret; at possibile est ut factis miraculis eos non poeniteret. In ordine A′ eos poenitet; in ordine A″ eos non poenitet; in utroque ordine fiunt miracula.

Aut verum non est obiective quod a Domino dicitur; in ordine A′ eos poenitet; in ordine A″ eos non poenitet; in utroque ordine fiunt miracula. [Respondetur:] Verum est dictum Domini; nullus est ordo universi in quo factis miraculis non poeniteret eos; et tamen possent non poenitere, nempe, in eo ordine in quo eos poenitet. Nisi enim in eo ordine potuerunt poenitentiam non agere, frustra invocantur alii Tyrii in alio ordine qui potuerunt. Denique, quod est possibile est possibile in aliquo ordine; at non solum possibile sed etiam futuribile est quod non solum possibile sed etiam actuale esset in quodam ordine.

The Robert Mollot Collection

679

Appendix 2: God’s Knowledge and Will

bernardlonergan.com, at 18100dtl040, p. 12). It is a further discussion of the matter treated in Appendix 2a.

Appendix 2a Objection (t): But how to explain the text about the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon [Matthew 11.21]? If miracles were performed there, they would repent; but it is also possible that they would not repent. In the order A′ they would repent; in the order A″ they would not; but in both orders miracles were performed. Either the Lord’s statement is not objectively true, or else there is no order A″ and hence they could not refuse to repent, which is contrary to freedom. Response: The Lord’s statement is true. There is no order of the universe in which upon the performance of miracles they would not repent; and nevertheless they could refuse to repent, that is, in that world order in which they do repent. For if in this order they could refuse to repent, there is no point in appealing to other Tyrians in another order who could so refuse. Finally, whatever is possible is possible in some order. But that which in a certain order is not only possible but also would be actual is not only possible but also futurible.

Appendix 2b Scientia media All world orders are also futurible; with respect to any world order God can consider the hypothesis of its creation and reflect on his own transcendence. But it is true that ‘were miracles worked at Tyre and Sidon, the inhabitants would have done penance’; hence it is false that they would not have done penance; hence there is no world order in which there would have been miracles at Tyre and Sidon without repentance following. Still, even when the miracles were worked, it would have been possible for the Tyrians not to do penance. (a) A world order is a measure not only of possibility but also of futur-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

681

Appendix 2: God’s Knowledge and Will

ibility; it represents not only what could be but also what under given circumstances would be. (b) The possible is what can be; it must be really possible in some world order; but there is no necessity of its being actuated in any world order. Unless the Tyrians could fail to do penance in the world order in which they witnessed miracles, then the supposition that they would fail in some other world order is quite irrelevant; the Tyrians of the former order ex hypothesi could not fail; the Tyrians of the latter order, since they could and did fail, must be different fellows. (c) In the total series of world orders God grasps all that could and would be, all that could or would occur in each of the respective orders. But such texts as that concerning the Tyrians show that every ‘could’ in the total series is not met with a corresponding ‘would’ in some order. (d) It is useless to appeal to the Bannezian free decrees, subjectively absolute, objectively conditioned. For a free decree is contingent; it cannot be affirmed without an extrinsic denominator; and the futuribles do not exist and so do not provide any extrinsic denominator.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

This page intentionally left blank

Index

Ab esse ad posse valet illatio, 153 Act: and active and passive potency, 135; as being-by-which, 297; derives species from object it attains, 433, 435; as primitive notion, 229. See also Action; First act; Operations; Potency; Second act Acting (and not acting): ‘actually a.’ predicated by extrinsic denomination, 317; really distinct from potency to act, 183 (see also 187); taken entitatively and terminatively, 205 Action: as actuation of active potency, 135; as exercise of efficient causality, 173, 187, 273, 343; follows upon existence, 369; and influx, 319; is from agent and in patient, 135, 273, 275; as operation (a second act) corresponding to active potency improperly so called (a first act), 187. See also Efficient causality; Efficient cause Actual grace (interior): acts of understanding as, 237, 239; adds efficient causal principle to nature and infused virtue, 253; as arousing and assisting, 243; Bannezian opinion on,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

233; deduced properties of coincide with SAIWVPS, 237–47; divided into ordinary assistance and special assistance, 241; divided into prevenient and subsequent, 243; efficacy of, through God’s intention, 245, 247; imparts physical and moral capacities, 239, 241; includes indeliberate acts and consequent deliberate acts, 241; Molinist opinion on, 233; as movement whereby God directs us towards eternal life, 567; as operative and cooperative, 241, 243; is per se and per accidens ordered to possessing God as he is in himself, 231; is produced in us by God immediately and without our efficient causality, 231; is really distinct from an infused virtue, 237, 239; is required for every supernatural act, 239; semi-Bannezian opinion on, 235; Suarezian opinion on, 233; sufficiency of and God’s intention, 245, 247; is transient operation, not permanent quality, 229; as vital, principal, and supernatural second acts of intellect and

684

Index

will, 229–47; willing end as, 237, 239. See also SAIWVPS Adam, 63, 71, 83, 87, 213, 489, 527, 531, 593, 619 Adam, Karl, 589 Adoption: and being heirs in hope of eternal life, 581, 609, 647; and being made to be like God’s natural Son (St Thomas), 647; and gift of Holy Spirit, 581, 609; as incomplete and complete, 647; in New Testament, 609; and sanctifying grace, 645, 647 Aertsen, Jan, 319 n. 36 Ambrose, 643 Analogical proportion: and causality, 21; and definition of a proper symbol, 9; and Eucharistic sacrifice, 15; and proper and improper objective manifestation, 9; and sacrifice of cross, 13; and sacrificial attitude of church, 19, 23 Analogy with nature: 75; as applied to mystical body, 659; and theological understanding, 75 (see also 433, 441, 669, 671). See also Proportion of nature Analytic order: in treatise vs. synthetic order, 63, 113 Anselm, 565 Antecedent will of God: and consequent will, 357, 359, 407, 409; and culpable evil, 355, 357; difficulties and errors connected with conception of, 361–65; and existence of whole universe as contingent term, 353–55, 359 (see also 401); is not conditioned, 399, 401; and natural defect, 355, 357; and permission of sins, 359, 361; and salvation of all, 353–61. See also Consequent will of God Aphraates, 591 Application: and Bañez’s premotion,

337, 339; cause of a. is cause in order of existence, 325, 327; and cause of another cause, 321; and freedom of will, 321; and God acting by immediacy of power, 185; God alone is per se cause of, 321; and God’s governance of free will, 195, 329–37; and God’s use of every created cause as instrument in producing effect, 319, 325, 327; and law of efficient causality as stated by modern scientists, 321; and order of universe, 323, 327; Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on, 191, 193, 341 Archimedes, 485 and n. 2, 549 Argumentation, two ends of (Aquinas), 63 Aristotle, 143 and n. 64, 174, 217, 251, 275, 277 and n. 10, 295, 301, 319 n. 36, 339, 341 and n. 48, 495, 505, 555, 565, 567 Arriaga, (Rodrigue de), 471 and n. 26 Athanasius, 617 Attain/Attainment: as either relation of efficient cause to effect or of effect to efficient cause, 105; as relation of act to its object, 67. See also Formal object; Object; Operation Attitude: as habits and acts of both intellect and will, 5. See also Sacrificial attitude Aubert, Roger, 473, 475, 477 Augustine, 7, 15, 49, 91, 93 and n. 31, 95, 295, 329 and n. 41, 341, 411 and n. 75, 667, 670 Aureolus, (Peter), 571 Author: as distinct from cause, 203, 343 Avicenna, 295 Baius (de Bay), Michael, 83 and n. 22, 85 n. 30, 87, 89, 91, 93 and n. 31 Bañez, Domingo/Bannezian(s): 323, 341, 401; and actual grace, 233; and

The Robert Mollot Collection

685

Index

cause of exercise in human free will and in divine free will, 395, 397; confusion over incomplete motion and physical premotion, 217, 219, 251–55; distinguish two physical, non-vital, transient premotions received in a potency, 175, 177; and efficacy of efficacious grace, 189, 191 (see also 249, 341); flaws on physical premotion, 337–43; and futuribles, 401, 403; and mediate efficient causality as influx, 181; position incompatible with human freedom, 179 (see also 255, 343); position on SAIWVPS incongruous, 251–55; and prior efficacy of premotion, 189, 249; reason for physical predetermination, 343; and Thomas, 215–23, 249; and transcendence, 221 (see also 341); and truly sufficient grace, 343; versus simultaneous concurrence, 337 and n. 47; understanding of premotion, 175, 177, 189, 217, 221, 233, 249, 337, 339. See also Semi-Bannezians Beatific vision (sometimes Beatific knowledge): absolutely supernatural, 123, 139, 145, 153, 159, 163; in blessed, 69, 71, 125, 437, 557, 559, 635); in Christ, 69, 557, 559 (see also 635); as infinite, 501; and light of glory, 163; as major instance of supernatural order, 99; and natural exigency and order, 141, 153, 155; and obediential potency, 143, 159; possibility of known only by revelation, 153, 157; and quidditative knowledge of God, 145; and sanctifying grace, 163. See also Beatitude Beatitude: divine b., 147, 161; human b., 153, 161; natural human b. and fulfilment of natural desire, 155, 157, 161 Being: as complete being-which, whole,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

401; eternal b. vs. temporal b. 269–71; is interchangeable with good, 315, 401; is one and intelligible, 401; and predicament quando (‘when’), 269–71; and simultaneity, 269 (see also 381, 383); and time, 271 Bellarmine, Robert, 287 and n. 13, 295 Beraza, Blasio, 111 and n. 42, 661, 663 and n. 65 Billot, Louis, 111 and n. 42, 177 and n. 99, 179, 473 and n. 31 Billuart, F.C.-R., 401 Bleau, Paulin, 85 n. 29, 111 n. 42, 113 n. 43 Blessed Virgin Mary: 317; maternity of is infinite inasmuch as God is essentially included in, 501 Bonum sui diffusivum, 529 Boyer, Carolus, 111 and n. 42, 113 n. 43, 235 n. 133, 507 and n. 18, 523, 525 n. 31, 573 and nn. 5–6, 575, 605 and n. 22, 615 n. 28, 619 nn. 31, 32, and 34, 621 and nn. 36 and 39, 623 n. 41 Bread and wine, 15, 39 Cajetan, 173 and nn. 90–92 Calvin, (John), 371, 573, 613 Carthage, Council of, 615 Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini … (Roman Catechism), quoted, 39, 41 Causa causae est causa causati, 15 n. 5 (see also 191, 247 and n. 147, 323 and n. 38) Cause per se, 31, 321, 333 Charity: act of (is formally and absolutely supernatural, 125; in act of, God attained as he is in himself, 69 (see also 125); in blessed, both angelic and human, in our first parents before fall, in justified in this life, and in souls in purgatory, 71; as ele-

686

Index

ment in God’s destroying reign of sin, 515–19; habit of and act of, 71; is intrinsically supernatural, 117; is not exercised in absence of infused virtue, 125, 165); as love that is friendship, 163 (see also 633); as major instance of supernatural order, 99; as meritorious per se, 125; and nontheological virtues, 117; and passive spiration, 633, 635, 657; as preeminent grace, 631, 633; and sanctifying grace, 163, 633, 635, 639 Christ (our Lord Jesus): 13, 21, 23, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 71, 75, 77, 99, 127, 315, 367, 371, 385, 407, 427, 447, 465, 467, 501, 517, 519, 523, 529, 531, 533, 555, 559, 567, 573, 577, 579, 581, 583, 591, 593, 595, 597, 599, 601, 603, 605, 609, 611, 613, 615, 617, 623, 631, 635, 643, 645, 647, 649, 651, 653, 655, 659, 661, 663; consciousness of, 559, 561; as divine person subsisting in two natures hypostatically united, 539; and economy of salvation, 653, 655; as foundation and restorer of supernatural order, 529; as Head of mystical body or church, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25, 27, 29, 45; is Mediator as man not as God, 653; knows person of Word from beatific knowledge, 539, 559, 561; is loved by God to an infinite degree, 501 (see also 521); loves us (as adopted children of God and as his brothers and sisters, 653; with notional love, 653); and operations of knowledge and love that attain God as he is in himself, 69; possesses grace, glory, and merit by reason of dignity as divine person incarnate, 521; possesses sanctifying grace, 643, 645; as principle of sacrificial attitude

of church and of union of its members with him and with one another, 25; and unity of nature distinguished from unity of person, 557, 559. See also Beatific vision; Conscious/Consciousness; Incarnation; Sacrificial attitude of Christ Christian duty, 101 Clement of Alexandria, 569, 617, 643 Coghlan, Daniel, 49 and n. 18 Communication: that by which something which otherwise would be proper becomes common or shared, 67. See also Created communication of divine nature; Uncreated communication of divine nature Conscious/Consciousness: distinct from concept of c. and affirmation that one is c., 553; and experience, 547 (see also 555, 557); as grounds known as sufficient to say ‘I,’ 537; and introspection, 549; as a kind of knowledge characterized by a known identity between knower (under formality of subject) and known (under formality of object), 537; objectivity of is material objectivity, 549; and unity on side of object as regards both exterior and interior data, 551; and unity on side of subject, 551, 553; and verification, 555. See also ‘I’ Consequent will of God: and death, 401; distinguished from God’s antecedent will, 357, 359, 407, 409; and permission of sins, 359 (see also 407, 409) Contingency/Contingent being: and conceptual designations, 377 (see also 385); distinguished as metaphysical, physical, and moral c., 277; and divine transcendence, 279, 281 (see also 405); and fittingness, 487; and

The Robert Mollot Collection

687

Index

necessity upon supposition of itself, 275, 277; of things is determined only from finite causes, 405. See also Necessity/Necessary Being Contingent future realities: God’s knowledge of and necessity, 279; and human knowledge, 277 Copleston, Frederick, 513 n. 19 Created communication of divine nature: absolutely supernatural, 79–97; defined, 65–79, 91; defined by God as he is in himself, 91; as God’s threefold gift of himself, 521; is gratuitous, 87, 89; is infinite is some respect but not simply infinite, 95; is materially identical with sanctifying grace but formally distinct from it, 73; and mysteries of faith, 97; primary and secondary principle in, 71, 73; and proportion of nature, 71 Croken, Robert C., 85 n. 27, 445 n. 16 Crowe, Frederick E., 15 n. 5, 53, 55 n. 1, 57 nn. 3 and 5, 59 n. 12, 85 n. 27, 97–99 n. 32, 101 nn. 33 and 34, 159 n. 82, 205 n. 114, 225 n. 129, 257, 297 n. 24, 317 n. 36, 323 n. 37, 413, 419 n. 4, 483 n. 1, 535 and n. 1, 547 n. 9, 675 Cyril of Alexandria, 591, 617 Cyril of Jerusalem, 617, 643 D’Alès, A., 59, 293 and n. 20, 591 Dalmau, I.M., 373 n. 56 Death: as an extrinsic denominator with respect to divine love, predestination, detestation, and reprobation, 385, 389 (see also 387); as terminal point in relation to God’s consequent will, 401 De la Taille, Maurice, 25 n. 7, 113 n. 43, 665 De Lugo, Juan, 47 n. 12, 111 and n. 42, 473 and n. 29

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Demons: attain truths of mysteries of faith, 425, 427, 439, 467, 469 De Régnon, Theodore, 291 and n. 15, 621 Descartes, René, 295, 371 Desire: and beatitude, 155–61; of human intellect (distinction between d. itself and its manifestation, 157; extends to knowing quiddity or essence of God, 157–59; is natural, not acquired or supernaturally infused, 159; as manifested in questions ‘Is it?’ and ‘What is it?’ 143); and wanting an object that is absent, or not possessed, 139. See also Human intellect; Natural desire to see God Detestation: as attitude of divine volition, 379; as contingent, and extrinsic denomination, 385; eternal, infallible, efficacious, and irresistible as a cause, 385; minimally distinct from and precedes reprobation, 379 (see also 381); and necessity, 389; not absolutely gratuitous, 387; not conditioned by creatures, 387; and punishment, 385; and sin foreseen and permitted, 381, 383, 385 Didymus of Alexandria, 617 Discovery: way of in theology, 263 Divine concurrence: defined, 179; efficacy of, 189–215; and various understandings of efficient causality, 179–87. See also Efficacy; Efficacy of God; Efficient cause; Efficient causality Divine essence: considered as absolute and common to three divine persons or as identical with one or other real trinitarian relation, 633; and divine love as essential, 625, 627; and four eminent graces, 633; imitation of d.e. by finite substance, 633; as primary

688

Index

exemplary cause, 633; as primary object of God’s knowledge, 285 (see also 503) Divine goodness: and communication of existence and goodness to others, 313; is simply good, goodness itself, 299; is ultimate, extrinsic end of universe, 301, 505; as primary, principal, necessary object, and sole motive of divine volition, 311, 317, 353, 381, 383, 527 (see also 503, 629) Divine light: exceeds proportion of any finite substance, 441; as God’s authority motivating faith, 441, 443; and light of faith, 439; as principle of divine judgment and volition, and God’s not being deceived or deceiving, 441, 443 Divine love: as absolutely gratuitous, 387; as contingent, and extrinsic denomination, 385; distinct from gifts of grace, merit, and conferring of glory, 379; effective aspect of distinguished from constitutive aspect of, 629; as effective principle is predicated essentially of three divine Persons, 629 (see also 641); as essential is pure act itself, divine essence, 627; eternal, infallible, efficacious, and irresistible as a cause, 385; grace has essential d.l. as its effective principle, 629; imposes no necessity on those who are loved, 389; minimally distinct from and preceding predestination, 379 (see also 381); motive of and merits, 383 (see also 387); not conditioned by but cause of merit, 387; as notional is Holy Spirit (proceeding love), 627; and possible and futurible merits, 381; and predestination, 379, 385; as predicated by appropriation, 627; reference of distinct from reference

of detestation, 383; sanctifying grace distinguished as a transcendent effect as effect of d.l. (and related to essential d.l.), or as a transcendent effect as term of d.l. (and related to notional d.l.), 641 Divine permission: considered entitatively (act of the will) and terminatively (any exemption from a law), 209; considered entitatively, is good in itself, 209; considered terminatively, is good not in itself but in something else, 209; and distinction between permission of concession, of tolerance, and of prohibition, 209; and manifestation of God’s mercy and justice, 209; of prohibition, 211 Divine Persons: are possessed insofar as they are truly known and rightly loved, 659; and divine essence as absolute, 633; and divine love as effective, 629 (see also 641); dwell in souls of just and give themselves, 657, 659 (see also 663); equally produce grace in the just, 659 Divine transcendence: and Bannezian physical premotion, 221, 341; and God’s infinite perfection, 327; is foundation of middle knowledge, 285; meaning of, 279, 281, 325; and necessity and contingency in creation, 221, 281, 285, 291, 293, 325 (see also 405); property of belonging to God alone, 221, 223, 327, 335; simultaneous with effect by extrinsic denomination, 341 Donnelly, Malachi, 621 nn. 34 and 35, 665 Donnelly, P(hilip J.), 311 n. 31 Doran, Robert M., 15 n. 5, 57 nn. 3 and 5, 59 n. 8, 85 n. 27, 101 n. 34; 159 n.

The Robert Mollot Collection

689

Index

82; 205 n. 114, 297 n. 24, 317 n. 36, 323 n. 37, 445 n. 16 Dowd, Edward F., 47 n. 12, 49 nn. 13–20, 51 n. 22 Dulles, Avery, 473 n. 29 Durandus (Durand de Saint Pourçain), 181, 323, 337 and n. 45 Éclairer le certain par l’incertain: as a proper procedure in theological inquiry, 669 Economy of salvation, 599–605, 653, 655 Efficacy: distinguished as absolute or relative, antecedent or consequent, intrinsic or extrinsic, prior or simultaneous, 189; distinguished as ordinary or transcendent, 197; of God’s instruments in general as relatively and as absolutely efficacious, 191, 193; of God ruling instruments in particular (specifically will), 193, 195; as indefectibility of efficient cause, 189 Efficacy of God: and extrinsic denomination, 199, 249; is antecedent and absolute, 195; not totally distinct from effect itself, 201; simultaneous, not prior, 197–201; and sin, 201–15; and Thomas’s negative method and doctrine compared to Bannezians and Molinists, 215–29; as transcendent, not ordinary, precludes necessary causal nexus, 195, 197. See also Divine transcendence Efficient causality: and application, 185, 319, 325, 327, 343; and correct understanding of ‘action’ and ‘influx,’ 317 and n. 36, 319; as finite, is conditioned and instrumental in actual production of effect, 185 (see also 319); and immediacy of power and immediacy of supposit, 183 and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

n. 101, 185 (see also 401); as influx or as real relation of dependence in effect, 179–87; and modern scientists, 321; and principle of priority, 283 Efficient cause: active potency is in by second act, 135; as contingent, and conjectural certitude about effects, 193; created e.c. is cause only in the essential order, 319; created e.c. is instrument of God by ‘application’ in producing its effect, 319, 321 (see also 371); created e.c. is neither cause per se of application of another cause nor proportionate to producing application of another cause, 321; defined, 317; and distinction between being able to act and actually acting, 317, 343; distinguished as principal and instrumental, 135; effect of natural e.c. is necessary only on supposition of something else, 327; and producing something, 135; proportionate to its effect, 135; proportion of defined by nature of cause and determines what cause can produce, 319; proportion of measured according to perfection of a form (first act) perfected by a second act, 135; subject of active potency as actuated, 135. See also Efficacy; Efficient causality; Instrumental cause Egger, (Franz), 473 and n. 30 Election: and attitude of divine volition towards those chosen for eternal life in preference to others, 379; distinct from gifts of grace, merit, and conferring of glory, 381; and foreknowledge of possible and futurible merits and sins, 381 Elicited: as opposed to natural, 141 End(s): act of willing e., as to its exercise, produced by God, 167,

690

Index

169; created e. as e. either by reason of itself (an existing whole) or by reason of something else, 301; as determining exigencies, lies within proportion of exigent substance, 151; and distinction between object-which and object-to-which of love, 315, 381; divine goodness as ultimate, extrinsic e. of universe, 301, 505; eternal life as supernatural e. not owed to anyone, 387; final perfection as e. by reason of something else (the e. of the operation or the work), 302; and form, 427; intended e. or purpose of an agent (motive) is an e. by reason of itself, 301; man’s attaining of natural e. and its intrinsic mobility, 147; man’s e. distinguished as natural and supernatural, 147, 149; man’s e. and intellectual operation concerning God, 147; man’s e. and natural and obediential potency, 147, 149; man’s e. and rest in attaining it, 147, 157; man’s natural and supernatural e. have same formal object of knowledge (the divine essence) but different ways of knowing this object, 149; order of universe is supreme intrinsic e. of world, 301, 361; e. of rational creatures is supernatural through God’s gratuitous decision, 359, 361; some texts of Thomas Aquinas on, 301, 303; supernatural e. known only by revelation, 157; two meanings of, 361; and ultimate perfection of thing, 145; and well-being, 149 Erasmus, Desiderius, 573 Essential constituent: meaning of, 229 Eternity, imagined (misleadingly) as an infinite extent of time, 201, 397 Eucharistic sacrifice/Eucharist: as absolute and relative, 47; applies

sacrifice of cross, 23; and assimilation of attitude of members of church to sacrificial attitude of Christ, 23; and definition of sacrifice, 13–29; differs from sacrifice of cross only in manner of offering, 17, 23, 33, 35, 37, 39; dynamic unity between symbol and symbolized in, 25; hidden element and visible element of, 33; identity and difference between E.s. and sacrifice of cross, 37–47; as incapable of defilement, 31; is (propitiatory) sacrifice, 39, 41, 43, 45; is to sacrifice of cross as sacrifice of cross is to sacrificial attitude of Christ at his death, 47; as originating and proper symbol of sacrificial attitude of church considered in its origin, 19, 21; properly represents sacrifice of cross, 15, 17; as proper symbol of sacrifice of the cross, 13–17, 29, 45; as proper symbol of sacrificial attitude of Christ, 13–17, 21, 23, 29, 43, 45; as proper symbol of sacrificial attitude of members of mystical body, 13, 17, 19, 23–27, 29, 45; represents sacrificial attitude of members of church, 19, 27; and sacrifices of old law, 35; substantial formal cause and modal formal cause of, 33, 35; substantial material cause in E.s. numerically the same as in sacrifice of cross, 43; substantial material cause and modal material cause of, 33 Evil: culpable e. absolute privation, 205, 207; culpable e. contrary to God’s prohibition, 247, 361, 407, and to rationality and intelligible order, 305, 375, 377, 383, 407; culpable e. and moral law, 307, 309; culpable e. permitted by God opting for conjoint use of transcendent power, 367, 369,

The Robert Mollot Collection

691

Index

409; culpable e. not reducible to God’s will to act through secondary causes, 373; culpable e. an unreasonable failure in action of rational appetite or will, 305, 309, 375, 407; culpable e. willed by a person without God and against God, 247, 409; culpable e. would not exist if God were making pure use of his transcendent power, 367, 407; distinguished as e. without qualification and e. in some respect, 305; formal sin as e. without qualification, 305; God indirectly wills e. of natural defect and of punishment, 207 (see also 355); God in no way wills culpable e., 207, 247, 355, 359, 367, 407, 531; is privation of good, not a positive thing, 303, 305; and lack in the parts of an intelligible whole, 305; of natural defect and of punishment are relative privations, 203, 207; and objective falsity, 211, 215; particular e. and material element of sin (vices, scandal, and punishment) as contained within a common good, 305, 307; physical e. is relative e. and consequence of some good, 305. See also Sin; Privation Exigency: end which determines exigencies lies within proportion of exigent substance, 151; and extrinsic conditions required for existence and well-being of a thing, 149; for existence (is immediately consequent upon substantial form), 149; found in accidental potency or in proximate essential potency, not in obediential potency or in remote essential potency, 155, 161; and means to attain end, 149, 151; mediately consequent upon aptly disposed matter, 149 Experience: and ‘act of a man,’ 557;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

and consciousness, 547 (see also 555, 557); and material objectivity, 549 Extrinsic denomination: and becoming adopted children of God, 647; and conceptual designations in God, 377; and contingent, free decrees of God in Bannezian theory, 403; and contingent predications about God, 199, 201 and n. 112, 221, 271, 281, 283, 313, 385, 389, 405, 589 (see also 627, 641); contrasted with intrinsic denomination, 267; death as, 385, 389; and divine intention, 249; and divine love, predestination, detestation, and reprobation, 385, 389; four categories of, 205; and God’s knowledge of contingent future realities, 279; and God’s permitting of sin, 351; and God’s vision-knowledge, 287, 405; and metaphysical analysis 265, 267; and predication of ‘actually acting’ of an efficient cause, 317, 319; and propositions simultaneous in truth, 267, 283, 327 (see also 341, 389, 399, 405) Faith: absolutely supernatural, 115, 117, 119, 121, 439–43; assent of elicited in intellect and freely commanded by will, 419, 443, 455; and attaining God as he is in himself, 125; and demons, 425, 427, 439, 467, 469; difficulties in and doubt, 461, 463; as free, 453, 455; formal object of as supernatural is truth founded upon supernatural light, 441, 459; formal object-which of exceeds proportion of any finite intellect, 115 (see also 437, 439); four judgments as principal acts which remotely precede, 417, 445; and grace, 439, 441 (see also 449–53, 455); and graces of illumination (enlight-

692

Index

enment) and inspiration, 453; as informed or uninformed, 125; as infallible and absolutely or supremely firm, 431, 457; as irrevocable, 457; is in truth that is whole of God’s revelation, 429; and justification, 443, 457, 459, 579, 581; light of, 117, 439; material cause of, 427; material object of, 429; as meritorious or not meritorious, 125; motive of as acquired (in facto esse) and as process (in fieri), 429; mysteries of beyond created intellect and cannot be known apart from divine revelation, 439; as obscure, 431, 455; preambles of, 459–63, 477–81; and principal acts remotely preceding f., 446, 449; and reflective act of understanding, 419, 443, 465; and sanctifying grace, 639; as ‘scientific,’ 469; secondary acts which remotely precede, 417, 445, 447, 449; truth as formal element in act of, 441; truth of as revealed by God is form in intellect by which act of f. is made proportionate to its term or end, 429; various theological opinions on, 471–77; and willing supernatural end and means to attain it, 419, 443. See also Faith process Faith process: analyzed as a logical process, 415, 417, 423, 425; analyzed as a two-part psychological process, 417, 419; elevating grace required for acts proximately related to faith in psychological f.p., 449–53 (see also 455, 465); four steps in leading unbeliever to faith, and graces involved in each step, 451, 453; healing grace required and sufficient for acts remotely related to faith in psychological f.p., 451, 453; and principle of sufficient reason, 423; and reflective

act of understanding as pivotal, 421, 423, 425; and ‘right reason,’ 469, 471. See also Faith Father: active spiration as principle without a principle, 653; gives uncreated gift of Holy Spirit to those he loves as he loves Jesus, 581, 585–89; loves Jesus, his only-begotten Son, 581, 583; loves other persons (the just) as he loves Jesus, his onlybegotten Son, 581, 583, 645; necessarily loves Son as God by Holy Spirit, 643; present in just as sending and giving, 659; special love of for Christ as God and as human and principle of economy of salvation, 599–605; in time and contingently loves Son as man by Holy Spirit, 643, 645. See also Paternity (divine) Filiation/Sonship (divine): identical with divine essence, 633; and light of glory, 633, 637. See also Son First act: as act in one respect and potency in another, 229; as active potency improperly so called, 187; and first Bannezian physical premotion (sufficient and arousing grace), 175; infused virtues as, 239; is principle by which a specifically determined second act is per se in a subject, 103; as less perfect than second act is not a principle proportionate to being efficient cause of a second act, 239; stands to second act as perfectible to its perfection, 165. See also Second act First Vatican Council (Vatican i), 75, 85, 115, 263, 431, 443, 447, 449, 461, 671, 672 Fitting/Fittingness: and conceptual designations (signa rationis), 503, 505; God’s wisdom is root of, 491, 519; of Incarnation, see Incarnation; is what

The Robert Mollot Collection

693

Index

is intelligible in proper sense, not necessary, and (in a theological context) not perfectly understandable in this life, 483, 487, 519; as manifesting God’s free decision and divine goodness, 519; and mystery, 489; questions about not futile speculation, 503, 505 Florence, Council of, 623, 627 Formal effect(s): distinguished as primary and secondary, and as immanent and transcendent, 623, 625; in metaphysical method, 623; mixed immanent f.e. of sanctifying grace, 639, 641; not separable, 663; not to be conceived as consequences, 663; primary immanent f.e. of sanctifying grace, 637; same term can have multiple transcendent f.e., 629 (see also 663); of sanctifying grace, 641–61; secondary immanent f.e. of sanctifying grace, 639; transcendent f.e. (and contingent predications about God), 627, 641, 643; and what are predicated of God entitatively (immanent f.e.) and terminatively (transcendent f.e.), 625, 641 Formal object: distinguished as f.o.which and f.o.-by-which, 107, 111; f.o.-by-which of an act as regarding act as virtuous, 123; f.o.-which regards act as act, 123; is object precisely as attained by an operation, 101, 107 (see also 433–37). See also Attain/Attainment; Object; Operation Fourier, François Marie Charles, 513 and n. 19 Franzelin, (Johann Baptist), 111 and n. 42, 473 and n. 29 Freddoso, Alfred J., 287 n. 13 Free act(s): in all possible worlds, and God’s knowledge of simple under-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

standing, 335 (see also 503); aspects of distinguished f.a. and compared with God’s free volition, 393, 395; of a creature and distinction between potency to act and action itself, 183, 185, 187; distinguished as free virtually or formally, 327; distinguished as free virtually or formally or by denomination, 167; explained by will causing last practical judgment to be final, 339; as formally free (is only relatively efficacious, 195; is not necessary on supposition of something else, 327); formally free supernatural act (and cause of its exercise, 237, 329, 331; and cause of its specification, 237, 329, 331); as free formally or by denomination are necessarily produced by their subject, 167; is not necessary on supposition of God’s foreknowledge, willing, and acting, 327; and nexus to antecedents, 331; as a series are outside intention of any individual, 333; virtually f.a., 327; and vital acts, 169, 175 (see also 183, 187); and willing means to an end, 327. See also Freedom; Willing the end Freedom: basis of f. of will, 327; essential note of as ability to be or not to be, according to wish of subject, 167; and need for application, 321. See also Free act(s); Willing the end Friendship: between God and just founded upon communication of divine nature, 659; and charity, 163 (see also 633); and God’s benevolent love of just and benevolent love on our part, 659; is mutual love of benevolence founded upon exchange of good(s), 607; with God, 71, 73, 163, 581, 607 (see also 581, 633, 663)

694

Index

Galileo, 371 Galtier, Paul, 535, 541 and n. 4 Gandhi, Mahatma, 123 Gardeil, Ambroise, 473, 475 Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald, 59, 113 and n. 43, 295 and n. 23, 475 Gift, meaning of, and four ways in which the term is used, 589 God: as absolutely universal cause (applies and uses each and every finite cause as his instrument, 191, 371; is indefectible and efficacious, 193); action of (and contingent and necessary causes and effects, 335; is not a third reality over and above his knowing and willing, 207; refers to effects themselves as proceeding from G. through creation, conservation, application, and instrumentality, 335); acts through his intellect and will, 283, 297, 335, 347, 377, 403; alone, is cause per se of application, 321; alone, is efficient cause naturally proportionate to production of supernatural acts, 165; alone, is the formally unconditioned, 487; alone, has existence in accordance with perfection of his form, 137 (see also 319); alone, is proper cause of (all the factors that contribute to the specification of a choice, 333; the whole series of formally free acts of each and every person, 333); alone, is proportionate cause of a finite cause producing an effect, 185; alone, is proportionate to production of existence, 319 (see also 629); alone, is a purely principal cause, 137 (see also 325); antecedent will of, see Antecedent will of God; applies every finite cause to its action, 187; as applying, and order of universe, 321 (see also

325, 327, 371); cause and author of all that opposes formal element of sin, 345; cause per se (along with a person) of specification and exercise of free acts of the will, 329; and conjoint and pure use of his transcendent power, 367, 407 (see also 369); consequent will of, see Consequent will of God; and contingent future realities, 279; creating, conserving, and governing contingently predicated of, 405; endows sinner with natural and supernatural light to move will naturally and supernaturally to good, 209; essential attributes and notional attributes in, 625, 627; everything (past, present, future) ever present to G. in vision-knowledge, 267, 287 (see also 227, 277, 363, 365, 375); existence and operation of (knowing, willing, and causing) simultaneous with all things that exist, 269, 283; as external principle causing willing of end, 239; as final cause of created universe, absolutely, horizontally, and vertically, 29, 31; as first agent effects all sacrifices, 31; forbids formal sin, 209, 357; foreknowledge of good deeds, predestination, and efficacious grace as excluding human irrationality differs from foreknowledge of sins, reprobation, and sufficient grace as including an irrational element, 489, 491; freedom of (compared to aspects involved in human free will, 393, 395; consists in his freely producing outside himself a term of his volition, 383, 395); free volitional acts contingently predicated of, 405; governs free will through application and instrumentality, 329–33; immanent act of in produc-

The Robert Mollot Collection

695

Index

ing world is simply his knowledge and will, 335; immanent operations contingently predicated of G. are predicated as being from eternity, 271; in infinite goodness wills every order and every ordered series, 333 (see also 527); in infinite perfection (is not changed because his knowledge and will can have a new term, 391; in infinite wisdom, orders all things, 333; influences essence, existence, and adaptation of an effect, 327; intrinsic immobility of and man resting in the attainment of his end, 147; irresistibility of his causal action is infallibility of his knowledge and effectiveness of his will, 335, 343, 347; is absolutely necessary, 199, 275, 627; is efficient cause of causes in four ways (creation, conservation, application, instrumentality), 323; is efficient cause of every effect whatsoever, 191, 283; is eternal, 227, 267–71, 277 (see also 399, 405); is immediate cause in direct exercise of power (immediatio virtutis), 325; is infallible in knowing, irresistible in willing, and indefectible in causing, 195, 207, 219, 221 (see also 279, 281, 287, 335, 343, 403); is transcendent cause, 325); justice of, 641; knowing and willing are the same reality in, 377 (see also 381, 383); knows (absolute privation but does not will or cause it directly or indirectly, 207; culpable evil through a denial of its intelligibility, 335, 375, 407; every possible world order, its essences and existences, potentialities and actualities, and all of its occurrences, 667, 681; relative privation, 207; world as a unit, 377); love of G. for creatures as common and special,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

585 (see also 601); love (essential and notional) in, 585; loves (all creatures to the degree of goodness he wills for them, 315; Christ and wills to communicate divine status to him, 315, 501; divine persons with greatest love, 315; divine goodness necessarily, 503; elect, 315; justified, 315); makes creatures lovable, 317; is mediate cause by way of instrumentality (mediatio suppositi), 325; moves all things to proper end through his intellect, 323; as necessarily operating in every operator by creating, conserving, applying, and using instruments, 343; no contingent reality in, 199, 227; no passive potency in, 147; no willing or causing culpable evil, 207, 333, 335, 345, 355, 357, 359, 367, 407, 495, 531; not author of sin, 201–15, 345, 349, 351; possible worlds as object of G.’s knowledge of simple understanding, 285, 335, 493, 495, 503; power of (coextensive with wisdom and justice of, 493; identical with his intellect and will, 347); as primary agent, needs no applicator, 343; primary object of G.’s knowledge (is pure act, subsistent being itself, the divine essence, 285; is foundation of knowledge of simple understanding, 285); is principal cause of all things that exist insofar as they exist, 203; is prior in his knowing, willing, and causing a thing to exist, 283; providence of, see Providence; raises rational creatures to a supernatural end by a gratuitous decision, 359, 361; rules and acts immediately on human will, 193, 195, 339; secondary object of G.’s knowledge distinguished as knowledge of simple understanding, middle

696

Index

knowledge, and vision-knowledge, 285, 287 (see also 335, 377, 379 and Middle knowledge); sovereignty of is transcendent, 279, 281, 343, 351; is total and universal cause applying and making use of our cooperation through free choices in promoting his greater glory, 371; transcendence of (and certainty about effect of natural causes, 329; and certainty of effect of a free cause, 329; follows from G.’s infinite perfection, 327; foundation of middle knowledge, 285); understanding and willing absolutely identical in, 311; is understanding itself (the pure act of understanding), 285, 287, 299; understands himself (as primary object) and all else (as secondary objects) in one act, 313 (see also 369, 493); vision-knowledge of (is contingently predicated of G., 405; as true and extrinsic denomination, 287, 377); will of (follows upon divine understanding in our conception, 309; and primary and secondary objects, 309, 311, 313, 317, 361, 527); wills and causes indirectly evil of natural defect and punishment, 207 (see also 355, 495); wills intrinsic end of universe for the sake of its extrinsic end (the divine goodness), 505; wills order among things, 309, 311, 313, 383, 505; wills other things neither blindly nor as a means to an end but out of overflowing love for an end (divine goodness), 313; wills permission of sins with permission of one who prohibits, but not commission of sins, 211 (see also 351, 357, 359, 531); wills salvation of all actively and sincerely, but not absolutely, by his antecedent will, 353, 355, 359,

361; wills to act through secondary causes because his justice is ontological truth and he wills ontological truth of things of this world, 367, 369, 407, 409; wills universe as a whole together with its parts, 361. See also Divine concurrence; Divine essence; Divine goodness; Divine love; Divine permission; Divine Persons; Divine transcendence; Efficacy of God; Father; Holy Spirit; Son God, predications about: analogical understanding of, 213; conceptual designations (signa rationis), 373–79, 503–507; contingent predications about (and extrinsic denomination, 199, 227, 271, 279, 281, 283, 385, 389, 405; and transcendent formals effects, 627, 641); essential attributes of as stated by appropriation, 627; propositions contingently said of divine person in G. can be notional, 631; quidditative knowledge of distinguished from analogical knowledge of, 141, 145, 149, 155; what is said of G. ‘entitatively’ distinguished from what is said of G. ‘terminatively,’ 199, 389, 393, 625, 641 Godet, P., 337 n. 45 Goetzmann, Wilhelm, 447, 447 n. 13 González de Santalla, Thyrse, 473 and n. 31 Good(s): Aristotle’s definition of, 495; created g. as g. by reason of itself or by reason of something else, 299; denotes being in its relation to will, 525; distinguished as common and particular, 299; distinguished as that which is simply g. and g. by participation, 299, 311, 313; distinguished as true g. and apparent g., and intermediate wholes, 299, 301; in ends

The Robert Mollot Collection

697

Index

and means, 311; hierarchy among, 495–501; interchangeable with being, 315, 401; moral g. as formally g., 497; no conflict between common g. and personal g., 317; nominal definition of, 401; order among, 315; as satisfaction (what is materially g.) distinguished from the g. of order (that which is formally g.), 495, 497 (see also 356); texts of Thomas Aquinas on g. and end, 301, 303; as a whole (a complete being-which), or as part of a whole, 401 Grace(s): absolute supernaturality of four eminent g. and imitations of trinitarian relations, 633; always congruous with good deliberation and good choice, 331; arousing and assisting, 243; assists towards absolutely supernatural end, 519; and avoidance of sin, 345; in children, 565; as disposing towards or consequent upon four preeminent g., 633; distinguished extrinsically in terms of before and after fall, 71; effective causes of g., 385; as elevating and healing and leading to faith, 449–53; enables us to will and accomplish supernatural good, 247; and essential divine love as effective principle, 629, 631; gift of distinct from predestination, 381; is gratuitous gift, 63; God modifies habits and dispositions by, 339; of illumination/enlightenment and inspiration, and faith, 453 (see also 479); as interior, 229; is g. of Christ the Head, 663; necessary for faith, 439 (see also 449–53, 465); operative and cooperative, 241, 243, 251; and our free choices cooperating to promote God’s greater glory, 369, 371; prevenient and subsequent,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

243; real accidental being, 229; sanctifying g. and created communication of divine nature, 73; state of g. and salvation, 353; as supernatural is not itself within the scope of human knowledge, 467 (see also 479). See also Actual grace (interior); Charity; Grace of Union; Habitual grace; Light of glory; SAIWVPS; Sanctifying grace Grace of union: appropriately said to be a finite imitation of and participation in paternity, 634, 635, 637; and doctrine that God is related to just by way of a form or eminent act, 663, 665; a preeminent grace, 631; primary remote principle of operations by which God is attained as he is in himself, 71. See also Hypostatic union; Incarnation Greek philosophers, as a creative minority, 371 Gregory xvi, 469 Habit: as ability to act, 317; is principle by which a second act is per se in a subject, 165 Habitual grace: as conceived in voluntarism and nominalism, 571; factors in development of notion of, 565, 567; is first intrinsic principle in being living member of mystical body, 567; is that through which we are (children of God, sharers in the divine nature, justified, and friends of God, 71, 73; members of Christ, temples of Holy Spirit, raised to supernatural life, capable of meritorious acts, 583). See also Sanctifying grace Harent, S., 471, 473, 475 Haunold, Christoph, 473 and n. 29

698

Index

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 463 Heidegger, Martin, 463 Hermes, Georg, 463 n. 22, 469 Historical order: can be considered in two ways, 507; corruption of, 509–15; developments within, 509; elements through which God destroys the reign of sin within, 515, 517; objectively unintelligible situations within give rise to regressive circle in h.o., 511–15; progressive actualization of intellect within h.o. through progressive circular movement, 509; three principles of (our intellectual nature, defective human will, help of God), 507 Holy Spirit: active spiration is principle of H.S as proceeding divine Love, 637; and fruition through knowledge and love of God, 657 (see also 659); gift of (and becoming adopted children of God, 581, 609; and becoming friends of God, 581, 607; and becoming heirs in hope of eternal life, 581, 609, 611; and becoming living members of Christ within economy of salvation, 581, 599–605; and being born again, 581, 597, 599; and being made just, 581, 605, 607; and entering into a sharing in divine nature, 581, 611; and our new life in which we become like God through Christ, 581, 591–95); gifts of (are secondary immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace, 639; pertain to operations consonant with supernatural life, 633); as Gift given to just in time, is transcendent formal effect of sanctifying grace, 645 (see also 663); is given (essentially by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by efficient causality, 589; in every justification, 589, 591;

notionally by Father and Son, 589; in time and contingently to Christ, 643, 645); is Love proceeding from Divine Word, 309; is notional divine love (proceeding Love), 627 (see also 521, 585, 637, 653, 655); is possessed by participation by just through infused charity which imitates passive spiration, 657; is present in just as sent and given, 657; proper name of is ‘Gift,’ 627, 631, 655 (see also 645); is soul and principle of union of mystical body, 659, 661; is uncreated gift given by Father to those he loves as he loves Jesus, 581, 585–91 Hope: act of theological h. (as absolutely supernatural in its substance, 117; as element in destroying the reign of sin, 515, 517; as informed or uninformed, 125; as meritorious or not, 125; tends towards attainment of God as he is in himself, without actually attaining him, 125; as virtually absolutely supernatural, 125); formal object-which of theological h. is absolutely supernatural, 117; and non-theological virtues, 117; as secondary immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace, 639 Huby, J., 475 Hugueny, E., 475 Human acts: and consciousness as distinct from experience, 557; as reasonable or rational, 423 Human intellect: desire of defined as tendency to ask questions, and distinguished from its manifestation, 143, 145, 157, 159; has tendency to know God quidditatively, 145; object proportionate to is quiddity of a material thing, 437; objective intellectual constraints upon come from

The Robert Mollot Collection

699

Index

evidence of things themselves, 425; subjective intellectual constraints upon and principle of sufficient reason, 425; twofold natural desire of (whether something is, what it is), 143; two operations of, 437. See also Natural desire to see God Human knowledge: and act of judging proceeding from grasp of sufficient evidence, 461; growth in as three-step process (experience-understandingreflection), 419, 421; informs human activity in progressive circular movement, 509; and its expression, 463; judgment or assent in and truth, 441; reflective understanding in and anticipated judgment, 463, 465; Scotus’s teaching on as distinct from Aristotle and Aquinas, 567 Hurter, Hughes de, 473 and n. 30 Husserl, Edmund, 463 Hypostatic union: is infinite inasmuch as God is essentially included in, 501; is primary remote principle of operations by which God is attained as he is in himself, 71; as major instance of supernatural order, 99. See also Grace of Union; Incarnation ‘I’: and consciousness, 537, 539 Ignatius Loyola, 371, 571 Immediacy of power: defined and distinguished from immediacy of supposit, 183; in divine action, 347 (see also 401); and God’s application of a finite cause to its causal action, 185 Immediacy of supposit: defined and distinguished from immediacy of power, 183; and divine action, 347 (see also 401) Incarnation: basis and reason for other self-communications of God, 521;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

end-for-whom (finis cui) of is Christ and those to be redeemed, 533; is necessary only on explicit or implicit supposition of itself, 523, 525; is supreme benefit for each human being as subordinated to Christ, 529; and order of universe, 523, 527, 529, 531; in present dispensation would not have occurred if Adam had not sinned, 531; as re-generation is appropriately said to imitate divine paternity generating Son, 637; whole supernatural order is established through, 529 Infused virtue(s): is first act, 239; not sufficient for performing supernatural act, 239; as proximate principles of a supernatural life are immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace, 639; really distinct from actual grace, 239; renders subject connatural to receiving second act of that virtue, 165; sometimes (i.e., with charity) is prerequisite for second act of virtue to be present in subject, 165 Innocent iii, 565 Instrument: God uses every created cause as i., 319, 321, 323, 327; is intermediary, 325; movement and power of i. coincide but are not identical, 219; our free choices as i. in promoting God’s greater glory, 371; in some way, has within it a proportion to its total effect, 137; total effect proceeds from i. as from its proximate agent, 137 Instrumental cause, 135, 137 Instrumentality, 137 Intelligible/Intelligibility: and accidents, 349; and analogical understanding of God, 213; and contingent existence, 349; distinguished as

700

Index

(potentially i., formally i., and actually i., 485; what is i. in itself and what is i. in another, 213, 349); formal sin as i. neither in itself nor in another, 215, 351, 375 (see also 377, 509); in improper sense is whatever can be conceived, 485; and matter, 349; and surd in objective situation, 511; as that which can be known by understanding (strict or proper sense), 349, 399, 485 Interior: and actual grace, 229. See Actual grace; SAIWVPS Intrinsic denomination: and conceptual designations in God, 377; and metaphysical analysis, 265, 267; and primary and principal object of God’s will, 311 ‘Is’: and quando (‘when’), 269, 271; two different senses of, 269 John of St Thomas, 113 and n. 43, 175, 435 n. 11 Jansenius, Cornelius Otto, 83 and n. 23, 85 n. 30, 87, 91, 93 and n. 31 Janssens, Henri-Laurent, 111 and n. 42 Judgment: and actual element in being (act), 509; as compound inner word, 231; and faith, 417, 419, 421, 451, 453; and future contingents, 277; practical j. and formally free act, 237, 327, 329, 339; and sufficiency of evidence, 423, 425, 437, 461, 463, 465, 487; and supernatural end, 445; and truth, 429, 441, 443, 455; and virtually unconditioned, 487, 541 Justice: divided by reason of formal effect whereby one is rendered just, a norm expressible in a law, a source from which one is made just, 577; as external and internal, 577; and right-

ness of order, 577; of God, see God, justice of Justification: and being reborn spiritually from God, 597; and doctrine that God is related to just by way of a form or eminent act, 663, 665; and dogmatic faith, 579, 581; and holiness before God (can and ought to be increased, 615; can be lost only by mortal sin, 613; is completely attained in resurrection, 615); Holy Spirit is given in every, 589, 591; is mixed immanent formal effect of sanctifying grace, 640 Kant, Immanuel, 295, 371, 463, 549, 551 Kleutgen, Joseph, 291 and n. 15 Lahousse, Gustave, 471 and n. 27 Lamiroy, Henri, 47 n. 12 Lange, Hermannus, 111 and n. 42, 573 n. 5, 575 and nn. 7 and 8, 587, 605 n. 22, 611 and n. 24, 615 n. 29, 621 and nn. 34 and 37, 623 n. 40, 641 n. 54 Lebreton, Jules, 49 and n. 17 Lennerz, Heinrich, 111 and n. 42, 225, 257, 283 and n. 11, 291 and n. 16, 293, 401 and n. 70, 403 n. 71, 435 and nn. 10 and 11, 437 n. 13, 463 n. 22, 479, 573 n. 5, 611 n. 24, 613 n. 25, 619 n. 33, 621 and n. 38 Leo xiii, 585, 591, 661 and n. 63 Lepin, M., 49 nn. 13, 15, 16, 17 Lesêtre, Henri, 49 and n. 16 Lessius, Leonard, 47 n. 12, 619, 621, 665 Light (intellectual): different natural kinds of (human, angelic, divine), 437, 439; and finite intellect’s attainment of truth exceeding its proportion, 441; is power of mind to attain truth and moral obligation, 437, 439. See also Divine light

The Robert Mollot Collection

701

Index

Light of faith. See Divine light; Faith Light of glory: and beatific vision, 71, 77, 163, 633; and connection to grace of union as imitating divine paternity, 635; has special relation to Father and so appropriately founds reception of divine essence as a species, 637; and immediate vision of God, 439; is appropriately said to be a finite imitation of and participation in divine sonship, 633 (see also 647); is preeminent grace, 631 Linhardt, Robert, 497 n. 9 Lombard, Peter, 619 Lonergan, Bernard, 15 n. 5, 47 n. 12, 51 nn. 21 and 22, 53 n. 1, 69 n. 18, 79 n. 21, 85 nn. 27 and 29, 93 n. 31, 97 n. 32, 99 n. 33, 101 n. 34, 103 n. 35, 105 nn. 36, 38, and 39, 109 nn. 40 and 41, 113 nn. 42 and 43; 125 n. 45, 127 nn. 46 and 47, 129 n. 48, 131 nn. 50 and 51, 133 n. 52, 135 n. 54, 137 nn. 55–58, 139 nn. 59–61, 147 nn. 66–67, 149 nn. 68–70, 151 nn. 71–74, 155 n. 80, 157 nn. 81–82, 159 n. 83, 165 n. 84, 169 n. 86, 176 n. 97, 179 nn. 98–99, 181 n. 100, 183 n. 101, 187 n. 103, 189 n. 105, 203 n. 113, 205 n. 114, 215 n. 118, 221 n. 124, 223 n. 125, 225 nn. 127–29, 227 nn. 130–31, 239 nn. 134 and 136, 243 n. 144, 259 nn. 2–3, 261 n. 4, 293 n. 19, 298 n. 24, 303 n. 26, 311 n. 31, 317 n. 36, 323 nn. 37–38, 325 n. 39, 327 n. 40, 337 nn. 45–47, 341 n. 48, 343 n. 49, 413 n. 1, 419 n. 4, 423 n. 5, 425 n. 6, 431 n. 8, 437 n. 14, 439 n. 15, 445 n. 16, 483 n. 1, 485 n. 2, 513 n. 19, 515 n. 20, 535 n. 1, 537 n. 2, 543 n. 6, 547 nn. 8–9, 563 n. 1, 565 n. 2, 567 n. 3, 581 nn. 10–11, 589 n. 15, 595 n. 18, 599 n. 20, 615 nn. 26–27, 619 n. 30,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

621 nn. 34–35, 623 n. 42, 637 n. 51, 661 n. 64, 668 n. 2 Lottin, Dom Odin, 223 n. 125 Love: degree of l. for persons measured by degree of good willed to them, 315, 527; is first gift, 419; is fundamental act of will, 352; is willing good to someone or something, 315, 527; and object-to-which (obiectum-cui, finis-cui), 315, 527; and persons as objects-to-which, not as objects-which, 315 (see also 527); tends towards good which a person wills to another and to person to whom one wishes that good, 585. See also Divine Love Luther, Martin, 371, 573, 575, 613 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 511 Mahé, Joseph, 591, 619 n. 31 Mandonnet, Pierre-Marie, 337 n. 47 Manifestation: defined, 5; as transitive relation, 15. See also Objective manifestation Marx, Karl/Marxist doctrine, 371, 513 and n. 19 Mastrius de Meldola, Barthélemy, 472 n. 29 Mattiussi, Guido, 113 and n. 43 Mazzella, Camillo, 113 and n. 43, 289 and n. 14, 470 n. 27 Mersch, Emile, 582 and n. 12 Metaphysical analysis: establishes that God operates in every operator, 343; and intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, 265, 267 Metaphysical method: and formal effects, 623; as proceeding from a truth in the intellect to the constituents in reality required and sufficient for that truth, 623. See also Formal effect(s) Michel, A., 9 n. 3, 668 n. 2, 670, 672

702

Index

Middle knowledge (scientia media): constituted prior to all absolute decrees of God’s will, 401, 403; and divine governance, 335; and divine transcendence, 285; and knowledge as confrontation vs. knowledge as identity and perfection, 295; minimally distinguished from God’s knowledge of simple understanding, 377; object of differs from object of God’s simple understanding, 285 (see also 377); and possibility of concluding from one event contingently connected to another in a possible world, 287; and possible secondary object of God’s will, 311; root of not in objective truth of futuribles, 289; supposes only hypothesis of divine volition, 313; Thomas Aquinas’s position on, 223, 225 Molina, Luis de/Molinists: 59, 85 and n. 27, 111 and n. 42, 177, 179, 181, 189, 191, 215, 223, 225 and nn. 127–28, 227, 229, 233, 235, 251, 259, 287 and n. 13, 291, 293 and nn. 18–19 and 21, 295, 323, 327, 337 and n. 46, 403, 533 Monsabré, J.M.L., 47 n. 12 Monsour, H. Daniel, 15 n. 5, 59 n. 8, 85 n. 27 Morlais (Morlaix), M., 85 and n. 29 Mystery: and fittingness, 489, 491; in strict sense and in a broader sense, 517; two kinds of (excess of intelligibility, absolute unintelligibility), 489; understanding of through reason enlightened by faith, 409, 411 Mystical body: being member of and being member of organic body, 649; Christ is Head of, see Christ: as Head; church as, 649; and habitual grace, 567; Holy Spirit is soul and principle of union of, 659, 661; life as member

of, 649–53; not a mere moral body, 659; and transcendent and immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace, 647–55 Mystical symbols: as external objects and words proportionate to the mystical body, 15 Natural: defined and described, 79, 141; opposite of is ‘elicited,’ not ‘supernatural,’ 141 Natural desire to see God: clarified and argued for, 139–61. See also Human intellect Nature: in broader and stricter senses, 79, 81; primary and secondary consequence of a n., 81; rational n. and principle of sufficient reason, 421; requirements of a n., 81; as substance considered as remote proportionate principle relative to operations, 65, 73 Necessity/Necessary Being: and conceptual designations in God, 375, 377; contrary of is the impossible, 275; distinguished as absolute n., n. upon supposition of something else, and n. upon supposition of itself, 275, 487; distinguished as absolute or hypothetical, 197, 199, 227, 487; and divine transcendence, 279, 281, 325; and formally unconditioned, 487; hypothetical n. (compatible with contingency, 199, 203, 277; and fittingness, 487); is that which cannot be otherwise, 487; and natural laws in abstract, 327; of things is determined only from finite causes, 405; n. upon supposition of something else distinguished as metaphysical n., physical n., and moral n., 275. See also Contingency/Contingent Being

The Robert Mollot Collection

703

Index

Neoplatonists, opinion of on God’s indwelling, 617 Newman, John Henry Cardinal, 463 and n. 21 New Testament: positive doctrine of nt on grace and justification presented synthetically, 599–615 Nicholas of Autrecourt, 571 Nominalists: and reformers with respect to grace, 567–75 Obediential potency: actuated by God alone, 133, 139, 159; human intellect has o.p. for beatific vision, 143; as intrinsically the same as natural potency but distinguished extrinsically, 131, 133, 143, 149, 155, 163; no exigency for what is desired by o.p., 155, 161; and potency to absolutely supernatural, 127–39; and reception of supernatural act, 163. See also Potency Object: attained by operation, 103, 105; distinguished as the effect produced by operation or efficient cause that produces operation, 105; distinguished as material and formal, 105; motion from does not suffice to produce supernatural act, 239. See also Attain/Attainment; Formal object; Operation Objectivity: distinguished as actual, potential, representational (in the field of mere sensation), and misconceived, 541–45; divided into absolute, consequent, normative, and material, 541; and Kant, 549, 551; misconceived o. and critical problem, 543; mistaken notions of and mistaken notions of introspection (looking at looking), 549; o. of experience or consciousness is material o., 549; and self-knowledge, 547

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Ockham, William of, 295, 571 O’Connor, William R., 157 n. 81, 621 n. 34 O’Donovan, Conn, xvi, 55 n. 1, 59 n. 12 Olivi, Peter John, 339, 341 n. 48 Operation(s): attains object, 105; consequent upon being, 271; defined not only in terms of what they are in themselves but also in terms of that in which they exist and that object to which they are directed, 97; as directly experienced and first in order of knowing, 65, 67; distinguished as o. in its substance and o. in its mode or manner, 107; divided into rational and non-rational, 103; knowledge of essence of o. derived from its formal object-which and formal object-bywhich, 109, 111; non-rational o. not intrinsically reflective, 103; rational o. attains one complex object, 107, 109, 110, 119; rational o. as intrinsically reflective, 103, 107, 119 (see also 429); as second act, 65; o. in sense of second act not to be confused with o. in sense of exercise of efficient causality, 103; two o. through which God is attained as he is in himself, 69. See also Attain/Attainment; Formal object; Object Orange, Council of, 419 n. 3 Order: considered concretely consists of items intelligibly interconnected, 653, 655; and parts and wholes, 297; and possible worlds, 297, 299; some texts of Thomas Aquinas on, 301, 303; taken abstractly and concretely, 297, 501 (see also 405); universe, from viewpoint of eternity, is a perfect o., 297. See also Universe Originating symbol: and Eucharistic sacrifice, 19, 21; as proper symbol of

704

Index

attitude considered in its origin, 19; and sacrificial attitude of the church, 19 Oswald, J. H., 589 Parts: exist for whole, 361, 529; and order, 297; as primarily and secondarily good, 299; and wholes, 297 Paternity (divine): grace of union is finite imitation of and participation in, 633, 635; identical with divine essence, 633; is divine intellect as speaking Word, 635; principle with filiation as resultant, 635. See also Father Paul, 17, 41, 69, 223, 515, 565, 575, 585, 595, 603, 607, 653, 655 Passaglia, Carlo, 621 Pelagius, 571 Perrone, Ioannes, 291 and n. 15 Pesch, Christian, 621 and n. 38 Petavius, Dionysius, 589, 591, 619, 665 Petazzi, Giusseppi Maria, 113 and n. 43 Physical predetermination (Bannezian): and divine attribute of transcendence, 221, 341; does away with truly sufficient grace, 343; and freedom, 275, 337, 339, 343; makes God author of sin, 343, 345, 347; premotion as a, 337; prior to and not simultaneous with effect, 341; subjectively absolute and objectively conditional decrees of God’s will, 401; supposedly needed for irresistibility of God’s action, 343, 347; and Thomas’s understanding of application, 341 Physical premotion: Bannezian view of vs. those of Aristotle and St Thomas, 217, 219, 341; difference between Aristotle and St Thomas on, 217; meaning of terms ‘physical’ and

‘premotion’ for Bañez, 337. See also Physical predetermination. Pius v, 83 Pius ix, 445, 447, 449, 459, 461, 469, 478 Pius xii, 447, 449, 599, 629, 647, 649, 653, 655, 657, 659 n. 59, 661 and nn. 60 and 61 Plato, 295 Plotinus, 295 Positivist philosophy: dominant in scientific circles, 568; influence on theology, 568–70 Possible worlds: are wholes (one, intelligible, and complete) that accord with God’s wisdom and goodness, 297 (see also 405); criteria of and real possibilities in some world order not actuated actually in any world order, 677, 679, 681; and divine governance, 333, 335; divine wisdom and goodness are the criteria of, 677; entire series of as secondary objects of God’s knowledge (of simple understanding), 285, 297 Potency: accidental passive p. (first act) is formally of same proportion as second act, 131; active p. (is in an efficient cause by reason of a second act, 135; is ordered to production of the same act to which passive p. is ordered to receive, 135; is second act considered as having capacity to produce something similar to itself, 133; taken in improper and proper sense, 133, 187); defined as ordination to act, 129; distinguished as active p. and passive p., 129; essential passive p. distinguished as proximate and remote, 131; essential p. as an ability to act, 317; is being-by-which, 297; natural remote essential passive p. actuated by a finite efficient cause

The Robert Mollot Collection

705

Index

acting according to its proper proportion, 133; obediential p. actuated by God alone, 133, 139, 159; passive p. (distinguished as accidental passive p. and essential passive p., 129, 131; presupposes an extrinsic active p., 133); proximate essential passive p. is virtually of same proportion as first act towards which it is ordered, 131; remote essential passive p. (distinguished extrinsically but per se as natural and obediential, 131, 133, 143, 149; has no exigency for act to which it is ordered, 131, 133, 161; not of same proportion as act towards which it is ordered, 131). See also Act; Action; Obediential potency Prat, F., 595 n. 17, 603 and n. 21 Predestination: as absolutely gratuitous, 387; as contingent, and extrinsic denomination, 385; and death (in the state of grace) as extrinsic denominator, 385, 387, 389, 397; distinct from gifts of grace, merits, and conferring of glory, 381; exists with foreknowledge of possible and futurible merits, but not for the sake of them or as a result of them, 381; as immanent act of divine will and intellect, eternal, infallible, efficacious, and irresistible as a cause, 385; imposes no necessity on those who are predestined, 389; is not because of merits foreseen absolutely through vision-knowledge, 383; as minimally distinct from and following upon divine love, 379; narrower sense of, 381; not conditioned by but cause of merit, 387; part of divine providence as plan according to which a rational creature is brought to eternal life, 379, 381; p. and preceding divine love are effective cause

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

of graces, merits, and glory, 385; reference of, 383; stands to divine love as object-which of love stands to its object-to-which, 381; and whether it adds or does not add something to predestined, 397 Principle: defined as that which is first in some order, 65; distinguished as remote and proximate, 67, 71; primary p. (hypostatic union or grace of union) in created communication of divine nature, 71; p. in order of knowing distinguished from p. in order of being, 65, 67; proportionate to that which results from it, 629; secondary p. (sanctifying or habitual grace) in created communication of divine nature, 71, 73 Priority: principle of and God’s knowing, willing, and causing, 283 Privation: culpable sin is absolute p., 205 (see also 345, 407); distinguished as absence of what ought to be present according to norm of a particular nature, of universal nature, and of divine justice, 203, 205; distinguished as absolute or relative, 203; evil as p. of good, 303, 305; God knows (absolute p. infallibly but does not will or cause directly or indirectly, 207, 209; natural defect and punishment as relative p., 203; relative p. infallibly but only indirectly wills and causes it, 207, 209). See also Evil; Sin Proper: as that which has degree of perfection that it ought to have, 7. See Proper symbol Proper symbol: as analogically proportionate to perfection to be symbolized, 19; defined abstractly, 9, 11; notion of explains why real presence is required for Eucharistic sacrifice to

706

Index

be true and proper sacrifice, 49; and originating symbol, 21; sources of greater propriety of p.s., 11, 13 Proportion: as parity of relations, 67. See Proportion of nature Proportion of nature: as analogy with nature, 75; is objective intelligibility of the nature itself, 67; as parity of relations between substance and existence, and between accidental potencies and operations, 67 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 513 n. 19 Providence: defined, 379; is distinct from divine governance, 381; and order of universe, 405; predestination as part of, 379 Purpose: as end-of-which (finis cuius), 533; of Incarnation, see Incarnation; is that good for the sake of which something exists or is made or done, 533 Quesnel, Pasquier, 83 and n. 24, 85 n. 30, 87, 89 Rassler, Christoph, 471 and n. 28 Reality: actual order of is known three ways, 519; and God’s threefold gift of himself, 521; and natures as finite, outward participations of divine essence, 519, 521; and sin, 521 Representation: Eucharistic sacrifice as r. of sacrifice of cross, 15; and formal cause of sacrifice, 33, 43, 45; is transitive relation, 15; propriety of a r. depends on that which is represented and also on manner in which it is represented, 43 Reprobation: as contingent, and extrinsic denomination, 385; defined, 379; distinct from sin that is foreseen and allowed, and from punishment

imposed, 381; exists with foreknowledge of possible and futurible merits and sins, but not for the sake of them or as a result of them, 381, 383; as immanent act of divine will and intellect, is eternal, infallible, efficacious, and irresistible as a cause, 385; imposes no necessity on the reprobate, 389; is not absolutely gratuitous, 387; is not because of sins foreseen absolutely in vision-knowledge, 383; is not cause of formal sin but (with detestation) is cause of punishment inflicted because of formal sin, 385; is not strictly speaking conditioned by creatures, 387; as minimally distinct from and following upon detestation, 379; narrower sense of, 381; reference of distinct from the reference of predestination, 383; of unrepentant is just, 409 Revelation: and destroying reign of sin, 515; fact of r. and external signs, 449, 459, 461, 465, 467, 477–81; goes beyond natural proportion of intellect, 447; is a truth primarily to be believed by faith rather than understood, 417 (see also 439); and preambles of faith, 459–67, 477–81; and unbeliever coming to accept fact of r., 459 (see also 451, 453) Rickaby, Joseph, 49 and n. 19 Ripalda, Juan Martínez de, 85 and n. 26, 111 and n. 42, 137 Rouët de Journel, M.J., 75 n. 20, 579 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 371 Rousselot, Pierre, 475, 477 Ruiz de Montoya, Diego, 289 and n. 14 Sacrifice(s): Augustinian as compared with modern notion of, 667, 670;

The Robert Mollot Collection

707

Index

cause of worthiness of, 31; compendious symbol of finality of all things towards God, 31; considered materially and formally, 31; defined, 5; definition of (applied to Eucharistic s., 13–29; applied to s. of cross, 13); effects or fruits of (primary and secondary), 37; efficient cause(s) of, 31; exemplary cause of, 29; final cause of, 29, 31; formal cause of, 33, 43; invisible s., 7, 29, 35, 41, 47, 51; material cause of, 33; visible s. as sacrament of invisible s., 7, 35, 51. See also Eucharistic sacrifice/Eucharist; Sacrifice of cross Sacrifice of cross: absolutely perfect, 13; and definition of s., 13; and external objects and words of Eucharistic s., 15–17; identity and difference between s. of c. and Eucharistic s., 37, 37–47; is proper symbol of sacrificial attitude of the dying Christ, 13; meaning in as manifesting and manifested, 43, 45; principal meaning and secondary meanings in, 45; and physical unity between symbol and symbolized, 25 Sacrifice of mass. See Eucharistic sacrifice/Eucharist Sacrificial attitude: as an exemplary sacrifice, 29; and holiness, 23, 29; as an invisible sacrifice, 29, 35; is latreutic, propitiatory, eucharistic, and impetratory, 5; is numerically the same in sacrifice of cross and in Eucharistic sacrifice, 43, 45; and proper stance of mind and heart towards God, 5; as sacrifice in an eminent sense, 29; as sacrifice in an improper sense, 29; and virtue of religion, 5. See also Sacrificial attitude of Christ; Sacrificial attitude of church

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Sacrificial attitude of Christ: Eucharist sacrifice is proper symbol of, 15–17; as invisible sacrifice, 41, 47; not superadded as something different from sacrifice of cross, 47; numerically same s.a. of C. at his death is represented immediately on cross and mediately in the Eucharist, 43; sacrifice of cross is proper symbol of, 13 Sacrificial attitude of church: considered in its origin, properly and essentially represented by analogical proportion in Eucharistic sacrifice, 19–23; considered in its origin and in its term, 19–29; considered in its term (actual s.a. of members of c. enter only incidentally into Eucharistic sacrifice, 27; Eucharist is originating and proper symbol of, 19–23; is represented properly but per accidens in Eucharistic sacrifice, 19); is symbolized not directly but as consequence in sacrifice of Mass, 43 SAIWVPS: means ‘Second Acts of the Intellect and of the Will that are Vital, Principal, and Supernatural,’ 237; are active principles proportionate to production of further supernatural acts, 243, 245; as actuations of perfections already possessed in habits and dispositions, or as acts of a higher degree of perfection (special helps), 241; as arousing and assisting, 243; impart physical and moral capacities, 239, 241; as indeliberate and deliberate, 241; as operative and cooperative, 241, 243; as prevenient and subsequent, 243; produced by God alone, 243, 247. See also Actual grace (interior) Sala, Giovanni, xv, 55 n. 1, 59 n. 12

708

Index

Salamanca theologians (Carmelites), 113 and n. 43, 473 Salutary works: are works that in some way lead towards eternal life, 111; distinguished as meritorious before and after justification, 111; as entitatively and absolutely supernatural in essence, 111; and grace, 111; views on knowledge of supernaturality of, 111–13, 127. See also Virtue(s) Salvation: and faith, 443; and God’s conjoint use of his transcendent power, 367; is gratuitous, 409. See also Economy of salvation Sanctifying grace: and active spiration, 633, 637, 643, 657; and becoming adopted children of God and heirs in hope of eternal life as transcendent formal effects of, 645, 647 (see also 663); charity flows from, 163 (see also 633); difficulties in conceiving s.g. in relation to participation in divine nature and gift or indwelling of the Holy Spirit, 617–23; faith and hope are secondary immanent formal effects of, 639; Father’s love of just with a love similar to his love of Son as man is a transcendent formal effect of, 645; Father’s love of Son as man with that notional love that is Holy Spirit and Gift is a transcendent formal effect of, 643, 645; Father and Son sending and giving Holy Spirit is a transcendent formal effect of, 657; gifts of Holy Spirit are secondary immanent formal effects of, 639; Holy Spirit as Gift given to just in time is a transcendent formal effect of, 655; infused virtues as proximate principles of a supernatural life are immanent formal effects of, 639; as imitating active spiration provides

appropriate foundation for connection with virtue of charity as imitating passive spiration, 635; as informing virtues, 125; is in essence of soul as absolutely supernatural habitual, qualitative accident, 615; is extrinsic term (according to which just are loved by notional love, 655, 657; whereby Father loves Son as man by Holy Spirit and confers Holy Spirit upon him, 643); is first and remote principle of operating supernaturally and meritoriously, 639; is a preeminent grace, 631; is remote disposition for reception of beatific vision, 163; is remote, secondary principle of operations by which God is attained as he is in himself, 71, 73, 77; is a term of essential love and of notional love, 659; is a very special participation in divine nature, 615 (see also 637); justification is a mixed immanent formal effect of, 639; living as members of Christ is a transcendent formal effect of, 647–55; as major instance of the supernatural order, 99; materially identical with but formally distinct from created communication of divine nature, 73; not owed to any creature, 651; primary immanent formal effects of are to make one (a participant of the divine nature, 637; pleasing to God and lovable by a special divine Love, 425–26); regeneration (being born again) is a mixed immanent formal effect of, 539; as a transcendent formal effect of divine love can be considered (as an effect of divine love and related to essential divine love, 641; as a term of divine love and related to notional divine love, 643); virtue of charity is

The Robert Mollot Collection

709

Index

a secondary immanent formal effect of, 639. See also Habitual grace Šanda, Adalbert, 49 and n. 20 Sapientis est ordinare: 51, and goal of theology, 667, 572 Scheeben, Matthias Joseph, 619 and n. 34 Schepens, P., 49 and n.15 Schiffini, Sancto, 111 and n. 42, 473 and n. 31 Schraeder, Clement, 621 Scotus, John Duns: 111 and n. 42, 295, 341, 403, 533; denies that sanctifying grace is really other than habit of charity, 77; identifies concept with impressed species, 487; position on production of cognitive act as vital act, 173 and n. 89; restricts intelligibility to necessary nexus between universal concepts, 569; taught identity of known in potency and known in act, 569; and vital acts, 173, 179; voluntarism of eliminates role of God’s foreordaining wisdom in present order in favor of divine free will exercising divine power in any order, 569 Second act: as ability to act, 317; as active potency properly so called, 187; as act simply so called as distinct from first act, 229; is divided into acts of what is complete (operations) and acts of what is incomplete (motions or changes), 101; is limited generically by potency in which it inheres and specifically by form it perfects, 135; is, of itself, not limited to any finite proportion, 135; and operation, 65; a principal s.a. distinguished and defined, 229; and second Bannezian premotion (efficacious and assisting grace), 177; in substantial order and

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

in accidental order, 101. See also First act; Operation Self-knowledge: easy and ordinary vs. difficult and subtle, 545; and material, normative, absolute, and consequent objectivity, 547 Semi-Bannezians: opinion of actual grace, 235, 251, 255; position on SAIWVPS incongruous, 251–55 Shields, Michael G., xv, xvi, 3, 15 n. 5, 59 n. 8, 319 n. 36, 483 n. 1 Simon, Yves: 173 n. 94, 175 n. 96 Simultaneity: principle of and contingent predications about God, 283; s. in truth not to be confused with s. in time, 389 (see also 399, 405). See also Extrinsic denomination Sin: contrary to reason, to reasonableness of a rational appetite, and to God’s intelligible ordering of universe, 351 (see also 305, 407); as culpable evil (formal s. as formal) is absolute privation with respect to law of universal nature and supreme law of God, 205; as evil without qualification, 305, 355, 383; in its formal sense is permitted but not willed by or reducible to God, 335, 337, 345, 349, 351, 383, 409, 531 (see also Divine permission); is deficiency in some action, 209 (see also 305, 333, 349, 351); is known through a denial of intelligibility, 351, 375 (see also 407); is objective falsity, 211, 215; is offense against God, 517; is ontological and psychological privation, 205 (see also 407); as lack of conformity to a law (formal s. as formal) is neither directly nor indirectly caused by God, 207; as original s. and actual s. is irrational feature of present order of reality, 521; as particular evil, 305; and pro-

710

Index

duction of objectively unintelligible and irrational situations, 509–15; and question, ‘Why?’ 213 (see also 489); reign of s. vs. reign of Christ, 523; specification of caused by sinner, 349; in strict sense, has no cause, 203, 333 (see also 345); true remission of, 605–607. See also Evil; Privation Socrates, 199, 267, 275, 489, 623, 625 Son: with Father communicates divine nature to Holy Spirit, 73; Father necessarily loves S. as God by Holy Spirit, 643; Father in time and contingently loves S. as man by Holy Spirit, 643, 645; is active spiration as a principle from a principle, 653; is present in just as sending, sent, and giving, 657 Sorokin, Pitirim A., 9 and n. 4 Souben, Jules, 49 and n. 14 Soul: is form in organic body and in all operations as first intrinsic principle, 583 Spinoza, Baruch, 462 Spiration: active s. (is God as lovable, 637; and justice of God, 641; is identical with divine essence, 633, 637; is principle of Holy Spirit and so of proceeding divine Love, 637); active s. and passive s. are really distinct, correlative, inseparable, and equal, 635, 639; Father is active s. as principle without a principle, 653; passive s. is identical with divine essence, 633; relation of active s. to passive s. as foundation of relation between sanctifying grace and charity, 635, 639; sanctifying grace and active s., 633, 637, 657; Son is active s. as a principle from a principle, 653; virtue of charity is a finite imitation of and participation in passive s., 633, 657 Stentrup, Ferdinand, 473 and n. 30

Suárez, Francisco, and Suarezians, 113 and n. 43, 233, 235, 289 and n. 14, 329 and n. 43, 471 and n. 26, 533 Substance: defined properly only in terms of what it is in itself and does not include a relation to something else, 97; and exigency, 151; finite s. as absolute imitates divine essence as absolute, 633; finite s. as elevated to first and second acts in production of supernatural acts, 165, 167; material identity but formal diversity between s. and nature, 73; two definitions of, 65 Supernatural: absolutely s. as that which exceeds the proportion of any created or creatable finite substance or nature whatsoever, 81, 91, 101, 437; acts of faith, hope, and charity and beatific vision are absolutely s. by reason of both formal object-which and formal object-by which, 125; cognitive acts are s. if exceed proportion of any human intellect, 437; descriptively, is that which belongs to a nature neither constitutively nor as a consequence nor as a necessary requirement, 81; different degrees among s. acts, 123, 125; four eminent graces as absolutely s. because they imitate trinitarian relations, 633; intelligibility of exceeds proportion of created intellect, 239; major instances of s. order (hypostatic union, sanctifying grace, charity, beatific vision), 99 (see also 631, 633); order (different in degree of ontological perfection from natural order, 567; as established through Incarnation is primeval s. order restored, 529); production of s. acts, 165, 167; reception of s. acts, 163, 165; relatively s.

The Robert Mollot Collection

711

Index

as that which exceeds proportion of this or that nature, 81; spoken of not as opposed to nature but compared with it, 81; s. acts distinguished as acts that are absolutely and formally supernatural (beatific vision and charity) and acts that are absolutely and virtually supernatural (faith and hope), 123, 125; s. acts and elevations that regard first act and second act, 165, 167; s. act is either a principal act or another act produced by principal act, 239; s. act is specified by s. formal object, 441; s. act as s. lies outside field of human knowledge, 479 (see also 467); s. habits (infused only with justification, 165, 167; not a prerequisite for absolutely s. acts that are virtually s., 167); s. principal second act in will is willing end and spirating love towards end, 239; supposes a world order in which some beings surpass others in perfection, 81; taken in strict and a broad sense, 231; virtually s. acts attain God only in a certain respect, 165 Supernatural truth: distinguished from natural truth by intellectual light by which it is known, 441; is naturally unknowable by any finite intellect, and attained through a proportionate light, 439. See also Faith Sylvester of Ferrara, 173 and n. 95 Symbol(s): defined, 5; propriety of a s., 9, 11; twofold foundation of in human nature (in our sentient and corporeal nature and in our social nature), 7. See also Proper symbol Symbolization: and transitive relations, 15 n. 5 Synod of Pistoia, 83 and n. 25, 85 n. 30, 89, 141 n. 63

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Synthetic order in a treatise vs. analytic order, 63, 263 Teaching: way of in theology, 263 Theology: aims at truth and at understanding, 671; goal of, 667, 672; as intelligible ordering of truths of revelation, 79 (see also 571–72); way of discovery and way of teaching in, 63, 263 Thomas Aquinas, 7, 15, 23, 29, 51, 63 and n. 15, 65 n. 16, 67 n. 17, 69 n. 19, 75, 105 nn. 36 and 37, 123 n. 44, 135 n. 53, 159, 167 and n. 85, 193 and nn. 106–109, 197 and n. 110, 199 and n. 111, 207 and n. 115, 209 n. 116, 211 and n. 117, 215, 217 and nn. 119–21, 219 and n. 122, 221 and n. 123, 223 and n. 126, 239 n. 135, 241 n. 137, 243 and nn. 141–43, 249, 251 and n. 148, 253, 263, 267, 271 n. 9, 295, 297 n. 25, 307 n. 29, 309 n. 30, 311 n. 31, 313 n. 32, 316 nn. 33 and 34, 317 n. 35, 319 n. 36, 323 and n. 37, 329 and n. 42, 339, 341, 347, 355 and n. 51, 361, 369 and nn. 54 and 55, 371, 379 nn. 57–62, 381 n. 63, 383 nn. 65 and 66, 387 n. 68, 401, 403, 407 and n. 73, 427 n. 7, 433 n. 9, 436 n. 12, 465 and n. 23, 467 and n. 24, 475, 489 n. 3, 491 nn. 6–8, 493, 495, 497 and n. 9, 499 and nn. 10 and 11, 501 nn. 12–14, 505 and nn. 16–17, 517 n. 21, 521 nn. 22–24, 523 nn. 25–28, 525 nn. 30 and 32, 529 n. 33, 531 nn. 34 and 35, 547 nn. 7 and 8, 557 n. 10, 567, 569 and n. 4, 577 n. 9, 587 and n. 13, 589, 597, 605, 607, 615 n. 28, 621, 627 n. 45, 631 and n. 46, 633 n. 47, 635 nn. 49 and 50, 639 nn. 52 and 53, 643, 647, 649, 653, 655 and nn. 55 and 57, 657 and n. 58, 659, 663 and n. 66, 669; agree-

712

Index

ments and disagreements with Bannezians, Molinists, Semi-Bannezians, and Suarezians on actual grace, 235; differs from Scotus (in positing, first, impressed species, then act of understanding, and thirdly expressed species or concept, 487; on ordered power of God, 569); distinguishes essential and notional love in God, 585; does not understand application in terms of Bannezian predetermination, 341; and efficacy of divine concurrence, 191–215; and extrinsic difference between efficacious grace and sufficient grace, 225; position on God’s knowledge of hypothetical actual order vs. Molinist doctrine of futuribles, 223–29; and middle knowledge (scientia media), 223–29; and natural desire to see God through his essence, 139 and nn. 60–62, 141, 151 and nn. 75–76, 153 and nn. 77–79 Tiphanus, Claude, 77 Transcendence. See Divine Transcendence Trent, Council of: 9 n. 3, 15, 17, 23, 35, 41, 51, 77, 111, 115, 623, 655, 665, 669, 670 Tromp, Sebastian, 605, 661 n. 62 Ulloa, Jean, 471 and n. 28 Umberg, Johann Baptist, 589 Unconditioned: distinguished as formally u. and as virtually u., 487 Understanding: act of as having insight into many things through one, 583; and concepts, 486; is inward grasping, 485 Universe: Aristotle on the extrinsic and intrinsic end of, 505; divine goodness is ultimate, extrinsic end of, 301, 505; and fate, 507; order of, 29, 81, 297,

299, 301, 303, 305, 307, 311, 313, 315, 317, 323, 327, 337, 355, 361, 363, 365, 369, 371, 373, 397, 401, 403, 405, 409, 493, 495, 497, 499, 501, 503, 505, 507, 517, 519, 523, 527, 529, 531, 533, 569, 571, 679 Valencia (Valentia), Grégoire de, 85 and n. 28 Van der Meersch, 621 n. 35 Vansteenberghe, E., 293 and nn. 18, 19, and 21, 337 n. 46 Vásquez, Gabriel: 47 and n. 12, 49, 51 Vienne, Council of, 565 Virtue(s): acts are virtuous because they conform to the norm of v., 119; acts of Christian v. (as informed or uninformed, 125; as meritorious or not meritorious, 125); distinguished as theological v. (faith, hope, charity) and other v. (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, and others reducible to these), 99; is a morally good operative habit, 99, 165; theological and other v. absolutely supernatural as to their substance, 97–127; v. other than faith, hope, and charity absolutely supernatural because their formal object-by-which or principle is absolutely supernatural, 117, 125. See also Charity, Faith, Hope; Infused virtue(s) Virtue of religion: connected to the virtue of justice, 123; distinguished as human and as wholly supernatural and a matter of divine positive law, 123; regulates the relationship of one’s mind and heart to God, 5. See also Sacrificial attitude Vital act(s): and confusion regarding meaning of ‘active potency,’ and meaning of ‘operation’ or ‘action,’

The Robert Mollot Collection

713

Index

171, 173; is act of a living being precisely as living, 169, 229; mere reception in a subject all that is required for, 175; Thomas’s position on, 169–73, 179; and ‘vitality,’ 169 Viva, Dominique, 471 and n. 27 Waffelaert, Gustave-Joseph, 621 Whole(s): and common and particular goods, 299; constituted as one, intelligible, and complete, out of intelligibly related parts, 297, 299; greater w. (and more common goods, 299; order of universe is greatest created w., 313, 315) Will: and intellect, 239, 339, 341; object of distinguished as principal object,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

secondary objects, and means, 527; as a rational potency wills an object on account of a motive, 527. See also Free act(s); Freedom; Willing the end Willing the end: and actual grace, 239; caused by God as external principle, 239; as not free when intellect is an instrument of God as supreme applicator, 339; as spiration of love towards end, 239; as virtually free, 327; and willing means, 169, 229, 231, 239, 251, 327, 339. See also Free Act(s); Freedom Würzburg theologians, 113 and n. 43 Worship, as latreutic, propitiatory, eucharistic, impetratory, 5. See also Sacrificial attitude