Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education [1 ed.] 9781527519039, 9781527513501

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Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education [1 ed.]
 9781527519039, 9781527513501

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Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education

Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education By

Ya-chen Chen

Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education By Ya-chen Chen This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 by Ya-chen Chen All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-1350-5 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1350-1


Preface and Acknowledgments .................................................................. vii Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Changes in Chinese Language Teaching in US Higher Education: From China’s Feudalist Dynasties to the 21st Century Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 42 Institutional Power Struggles: To Be or Not to Be the “Best (Fit)”? As You Like It! Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 75 Sun Zi’s Strategy of “Covering a Dagger within a Smile and Murdering without Spilling Blood Drops”: Anonymous Students’ Teaching Evaluations and Special Students’ Cases as Personnel Decisions Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 106 Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting: Pinyin, Wade Giles, Yale, and Phonetic Systems of Romanization as well as Etyma and Ancient Chinese Characters in Initial Handwriting Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 161 Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems: Traditional and Simplified Chinese Characters and Ancient Chinese Calligraphy Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 192 Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 217 “Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years” in TCFL/TCSL of US Higher Education: Forty Junior-Level Anonymous Interviewees’ Personal Experiences from 1996 to 2016


Table of Contents

Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 262 Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities, and Their Connections to TCFL/TCSL in US Higher Education: The Glass Ceiling and Conflicts in Chinese Language Programs Index ........................................................................................................ 295


US sociocultural, political, military, financial, and legal attitudes toward Chinese languages teaching in American higher education have been changing over time. Although the number of American people who learn Chinese is boosting, book-length publications to investigate how the sociocultural, political, financial, legal and military conflicts, communications, or connections between innumerable Chinese, American, and Chinese American communities have been influencing Chinese languages teaching in US higher education are not frequently seen. This academic monograph, therefore, aims to be the first or at least one of the earliest book-length research projects exclusively focusing on visible and underthe-table problems about Chinese language teaching in US higher education. My gratitude goes to all the anonymous interviewees, people who referred me to them, and people who offered help to this book project. I would like to also thank people who are willing to open-mindedly listen to all the anonymous interviewees’ experiences and cordially understand these experiences regardless of whether they are too lucky to personally witness anything similar to these anonymous interviewees’ true experiences in their daily life. Ya-chen Chen ഋ໡⌐! 劧໡䬯!


Currently, the earliest history of the Chinese written language can be traced back to archeological discoveries revealing that Neolithic communities in the Danwenkou culture (ε‫ؙ‬αЎϯ about 4100–2600 BC; roughly 6,300–4,000 years ago) had their own marking signals and written language.2 This history may be extended further to the era prior to the Danwenkou culture if earlier archeological records are found. Lüshi chunqiu (ֈМࡾࣿ) said, “Xizhong created vehicles; Cangjie created the written language” (়ҸբًǴঊᎢբਜ). According to oral history regarding Huangdi (໳ࡆ from approximately the second century BC, around 4,000 years ago), Cangjie (ঊᎢ) started the Chinese written language system, and the systematic learning and teaching of Chinese language ensued. In the Qin Dynasty, Li Si (‫׵‬ථ) unified characters based on various types of previous writing styles. Throughout the Chinese feudalist dynasties, one of the most influential records of Chinese language teaching in foreign nations was probably the Tang Dynasty’s teaching of the Chinese language to elite Japanese monks. Even in the twenty-first century, most educated Japanese people can read and write some Chinese characters. Chinese-language teaching was also influential in Korean and Vietnamese sociocultural and literary history. Political, military, and sociocultural differences across national boundaries strongly affected the outcome of the teaching of the Chinese language to various foreign countries, however. Chronologically speaking, US attitudes and policies toward the Chinese and Chinese-language teaching in higher education have varied from racial and linguistic discrimination during Chinese feudalist dynasties, military comradeship against Japanese invaders during WWII, and political alliance of democratic nations against


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communist countries during the Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War, to the current mixture of racism and welcome in the twenty-first century. This chapter aims to chronologically outline the history related to changes of Chinese-language teaching in US higher education by taking political, military, sociocultural, institutional, financial, diplomatic, ethnic, linguistic, educational, and governmental power struggles into serious consideration.3

China’s feudalist dynasties and US discrimination against the Chinese The US government’s earliest official records of Chinese-heritage people arriving in its territory are from 1785; however, Chinese people may have been to America during China’s feudalist dynasties or even before the ancient Chinese dynasties. For instance, Gavin Menzies’s book entitled 1421: The Year China Discovered America kindled archeological and historical firestorms about the “1421 history,” arguing that the royal Ming-Dynasty Chinese ships directed by Zheng He (ᎄ‫ )ک‬discovered America seventy years before Christopher Columbus.4 In 1761, J. de Guignes (1721–1800) thought that Chinese people arrived in America early in the Tang Dynasty because of his equation of the place called Fusang (‫ן‬ਬ) in Yao Silian’s Liangshu (ఉਜ The Book of Liang; published in 626 during the Tang Dynasty) with either Mexico or the west coast of America. Recent archeological and linguistic discoveries imply that Chinese-heritage people probably arrived in America in 1300 BC, nearly 2,800 years before Christopher Columbus.5 Early Chinese-heritage immigrants have been unwelcome in American history, however. The San Francisco gold rush in 1848 and the United States’ first transcontinental railway construction (including the California Central Railroad, the railroad from Sacramento to Marysville, and the San Jose Railway) in 1858–1885 brought southern Chinese men to the Pacific Coast of the US. Their willingness to accept low wages (average monthly earnings: 28 USD; ranging from 24–31 USD per month; roughly one quarter of American laborers’ wages at that time)6 and their hardworking attitude resulted in jealousy and anti-Chinese hostility in US laborers. English language racial slurs against Chinese-heritage people pervade US history, including “Chinese Must Go!,” “John Chinaman” (variations of this phrase: “the ugly Chinaman,” “Chinaman,” “Chinese boy,” or “Chinee”), “the yellow peril” (derived from “Die Gelbe Gefahr” by a German painter named Hermann Knackfuß in 1895), “sinophobia,”

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“pan-face” (variations of this word: “pan-cake” or “flat-face”), “anti-Chinese,” “zipper-head” (variations of this term: “zip” or “zipper”), “dragon lady,” “coolie,” “yellow monkey” (variation of this phrase:ġ “red monkey” after Chinese Communism), “ching chong,” “baby-muncher,” “banana,” “slant eyes” (variations of this phrase: “slant,” “coin slant,” “slot machine,” or “two strokes”), “chink” (variation of this criticism: “chinky” and “chinkie”), “honky,” “gook,” and so on. American legal and political discrimination against the Chinese began in the nineteenth century, with the Commutation Tax and Foreign Miners Tax Law (California law in 1850), Cubic Air law (California law in 1850), Page Act (in 1875), Chinese Exclusion Act (first version in 1882), Chinese Exclusion Act (revised and worsened version in 1884), Scott Act (in 1888), Geary Act (inclusion of the discriminatory word “Chinaman” in US laws in 1892), Scott Act (in 1902), Magnuson Act (in 1943), and so forth.

The period from China’s feudalist dynasties to WWII During the period from China’s feudalist dynasties to WWII, US acceptance of Chinese-language teaching and learning was extremely limited. The possible exception was perhaps American missionaries or politicians who would have had or did have Chinese connections. Prestigious American universities started offering Chinese-language teaching regardless of mainstream American society’s discrimination against Chinese.

Yale University Yale University’s Chinese-heritage employee Addison Van Name,7 who worked as a librarian in 1865–1905, seemed to touch upon “elements” of Chinese and Japanese when teaching Hebrew in 1863–1866, but the university’s first Chinese-language professor Samuel W. Williams (ፁΟ ࣙ), one of the earliest American missionaries who returned from China to the United States, did not begin his teaching job until 1877. Enrollment was a serious problem at that time, however, because nineteenth-century Americans’ discriminatory attitudes could hardly motivate a considerable number of US students to learn Chinese. In 1943, Yale University’s sinologist George Kennedy developed the Yale romanization system. Its original goal was to improve the American army’s communications with front-line Chinese military allies on the


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battlefield. It is more accurate in terms of Mandarin Chinese pronunciations than the Wade-Giles system of romanization. The Yale system of romanization was included in US textbook materials of teaching Chinese as a foreign language (TCFL) and teaching Chinese as a second language (TCSL) from the 1940s to the late 1970s.8

Harvard University In October 1879, Harvard University responded to Francis K. Knight’s request and employed its, and the United States’, first official Chinese-language faculty member Ge Kunhua (Љ㋏ϯ Ko, K’un-hua). With Edward Bangs Drew as his reference person and Huazhi yingwen (๮ ፦मЎ Chinese Verse and Prose) as his first Chinese textbook,9 Ge Kunhua won this teaching position, had Martin Lane, his English teacher, as his first Harvard student, and taught fewer than a dozen Harvard students from October 1879 to his death in February 1892. Always wearing his Qing Dynasty governmental uniform during class time helped Ge Kunhua successfully provide an authentic Chinese flavor to Harvard University’s initial Chinese languages and cultural studies courses. In 1880, Harvard University’s chronicle recorded his participation in the commencement. After Ge Kunhua’s death, Rushoutang shih chao (Εტ୸ ၃໇ Anthology of Poems in Rushou Hall), an anthology of his own poems, was donated to Harvard University as the first Chinese-language item in the library collection. Even in the twenty-first century, a black-and-white photo of Ge Kunhua in his Qing Dynasty governmental uniform remains at the entrance of the Yen-ching East Asian library of Harvard University.

University of California in Berkeley The University of California at Berkeley’s first official Chinese languages faculty member, John Fryer (ഡើ໡ 1836–1928), taught Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese from 1892 to 1914.10 He was also the first, only, and founding faculty member of the East Asian Languages and Cultures Department at UC Berkeley.

Columbia University in the City of New York The first Chinese-language classes at Columbia University began in 1901.11 According to Wm. Theodore de Bary, Dean Lung’s (΍ᓪ) letter

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to Columbia University President Seth Low in 1901 was one of the key points in making Chinese studies possible in Columbia University.12

Stanford University Stanford University’s first appointed instructor of Chinese was Shau Wing Chan (Mandarin Chinese pronunciation of his name: Chen Shou-yung 1907–1986). He finished his PhD in 1937, initiated his Stanford teaching career in 1938, was promoted to Assistant Professor of Chinese and English in the 1939–1940 academic year, and retired as a professor in 1972. 13 Shau Wing Chan’s textbooks included Chinese Reader for Beginners published in 1942 and Elementary Chinese published in 1951. In addition to these two textbooks, Stanford University Press also published Shau Wing Chan’s English-Chinese dictionary in 1946.

University of Chicago The University of Chicago started its first China-related classes in 1936, but it did not substantially begin its Chinese-language courses and Chinese cultural studies classes until the 1950s. According to Tung Ping-cheng’s (ᥤ‫ ҅ޚ‬P. C. Tung) international academic conference presentation, the University of Chicago’s earliest textbook of conversational Chinese was probably Conversational Chinese, authored by Teng Ssu-yu and published by the University of Chicago Press in 1947.14

Initial teaching of Chinese dialects On the western coast of the United States, a colossal number of immigrants from southern China motivated non-prestigious schools, Chinese-language schools, evening classes, and weekend schools to offer various southern Chinese dialect classes, such as Xiguan-style Cantonese (Ջᜢ࿵ᇟ) including the Guangzhou dialect (ቶԀ၉) and Hong Kong style Cantonese (३ෝ࿵ᇟ), or Siyi dialects (ѤٓБ‫ )ق‬including the Taishan dialect (ᆵξ၉) which contains influences of the Southern Min dialect (መࠄᇟ). John Fryer, for instance, taught not merely Mandarin Chinese but also Cantonese at the University of California in Berkeley.


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The US-China/US-Taiwan military comradeship during WWII Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii removed a great deal of US political hostility against the Chinese, although residual animosity remains today. Soong Mei-ling’s southern American accent of English language speech at the US Congress in 1943 did not result in American audience members’ linguistic discrimination against Soong Mei-ling, such as teasing criticism of “ching chong” or “Chinglish,” and confirmed the US-China military friendship. From then on, US mainstream society’s attitude toward the Chinese became a mixture of acceptance and disrespect. The Chinese War Bride Act in 1946, for example, permitted Americans’ Chinese-heritage wives and biracial offspring to enter and live in the United States and seemed to be welcoming of Chinese people yet ideologically locked the image of Chinese American women into the stereotypical vulnerable role of war brides, just like the female protagonist in the opera Madame Butterfly.

The period from WWII through to the Cold War During the period from WWII to the Vietnam War, Japan’s attack of the United States—and Republican China’s and Taiwan’s military friendships with the United States to fight against communist countries, including Russia, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam—encouraged Americans to learn Chinese languages. The American need for Chinese-language teaching in higher education accelerated enormously due to governmental, military, political, ideological, and diplomatic reasons; therefore, college-level Chinese-language teaching served a bodyguard-like role in the United States’ homeland security and in protecting the nation-state. For example, Chinese was one of the United States’ critical languages according to American government’s National Defense Education Act in 1951. This is why, although mainstream American people continued their original bias against Chinese people and the Chinese language on the one hand, the US government made friends with the Republican Chinese government and the Taiwanese government, and sped the growth of Chinese-language teaching in American higher education, on the other.

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The People’s Republic of China’s closed-door policy The People’s Republic of China’s closed-door policy resulted in difficulties for Chinese Mainlanders’ in freely reaching America. The large number of simplified Chinese characters and the pinyin system of romanization, which the Chinese Communist Party created during its closed-door period, did not pervade Chinese language teaching in American higher education during this period. That is to say, the Chinese language taught in the US during and before this period was mainly traditional Chinese characters as well as the Wade-Giles system and phonetic system of romanization.

The Mandarin Training Center Of the Chinese-speaking areas, Taiwan was the top choice for American students’ summer, winter, semester-long, or year-long studies abroad in the period from WWII to the end of Cold War.15 For instance, in 1956 the National Taiwan Normal University established its Mandarin Training Center. According to the Mandarin Training Center’s official records, every semester, around 1500–2000 students from more than 100 countries arrived to sharpen their Chinese-language abilities and personally experience Taiwan. This Mandarin center became Taiwan’s biggest Chinese-language teaching center for American and other foreign students. In 1959, a group of overseas students, university professors, and researchers from Taiwan founded the AACS (American Association for Chinese Studies). At that time, it was “the only academic society in America devoted exclusively to the general area of Chinese studies.”16

Taipei Language Institute The Taipei Language Institute derived from the Taipei branch of the Missionary Language Institute (୷࿎௲ᇟЎᏢଣ), established by Marvin Ho (Ֆඳ፣) and Rev. Egbert W. Andrews in New Jersey in 1956. The name “Missionary Language Institute” was replaced by the TLI (Taipei Language Institute ѠчᇟЎᏢଣ) in 1958. From 1959 to 1979, the TLI offered Mandarin Chinese-language training to non-Chinese-heritage missionaries, diplomats, embassies, governmental officers, or military troops from the US. The Ministry of Education, Taiwan, changed its Chinese name to be “Zhonghua yuwen yanxi suo” (ύ๮ᇟЎࣴಞ‫ )܌‬but


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kept the same English name in 1976. From 1996 on, the TLI founded branches in Toronto, Hong Kong, Shanghai, New York, Beijing, Tokyo, New Deli, and San Francisco. Since then, it has been teaching not merely Mandarin Chinese language but also Chinese culture. It has been including not only US military staff, missionaries, governmental officers, and politicians but also white-collar people who need Mandarin Chinese language and knowledge about Chinese culture from all over the world. Even now, Marvin Ho is proud of his editorial work of the Chinese-language dictionary, which simultaneously contains the phonetic system of romanization, the pinyin system of romanization, traditional Chinese characters, and simplified Chinese characters. He is interested in the possible use of an AI (artificial intelligence) chatbot to help learners practice conversation and strengthen the quality and quantity of drill sessions of Mandarin Chinese-language abilities.

US students’ counter-cultural movements and the rise of area/ethnic studies The sociocultural problems around the period of the US government’s participation in the Korean War and the Vietnam War entailed American college students’, hippies’17 (who were also identified as yippies, flower children, or flower people), and young people’s “counter-cultural” social movements18 and the rise of ethnic studies programs and area studies programs19 on American university campuses in the 1960s. In California, Bay Area Asian American students, for example, had similar kinds of social movements in 1968–1974.20 Chinese-language teaching, Chinese cultural studies, sinological studies, (East) Asian studies, (East) Asian languages and literary studies, Asian American studies, Chinese American studies, and Oriental studies,21 therefore, became rising stars among all the area studies and ethnic studies in American higher education of the 1960s.

The Stanford Center and the IUP In 1961, Stanford University founded the Stanford Center (ўϏᅽύЈ) at the National Taiwan University, bringing American students from Stanford University to the National Taiwan University to advance their Chinese-language abilities and cultural studies. In 1963, the Ivy League22 connected with the National Taiwan University and started the IUP (ऍ୯

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Ӛ ε Ꮲ ύ ୯ ᇟ Ў ᖄ ӝ ࣴ ಞ ‫ ܌‬Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies). The tuition was around 3,500 USD (approximately 12,000 NTD) per semester, and the teacher-student ratio ranged from 1:1 to 1:4.

Taiwanese universities established by Western missionaries Three Taiwanese universities established by Western missionaries initiated their TCFL/TCSL centers early in the 1960s and 1970s. Fu Jen Catholic University founded its language center and included TCFL/TCSL in 1964. Tung Hai University and Feng Chia Christian University also did the same thing in 1971 and 1975.

Mandarin Daily News The Mandarin Daily News (୯ᇟВൔ) started its TCFL/TCSL in 1973. Chang Hsi-wen (஭‫׆‬Ў Zhang Xiwen) was the first expert in charge of the Chinese-language teaching to non-Chinese-heritage learners. The unique teaching methods efficiently strengthened students’ listening and speaking abilities. From 1973 to the middle of the 2010s, the number of its students, who came from 112 nations, was over 130,000.

The US stereotype of the model minority In the 1960s, sociologist William Peterson used the term “model minority” in the New York Times to refer to Asian-heritage Americans, including Chinese-heritage Americans, meaning that the image of Asian Americans had transformed from that of cheap laborers to educated and hardworking middle-upper classes. This term was seconded by US mass media’s reports of Asian American people’s successful life stories. Because of the burden of the model minority, female Chinese American students, for example, tend to be “raced as smart Chinese girls, gendered as the Chinese sorority sitting in the back of the room, and classed as low-income kids at a ghetto school.”23 Some critics pointed out the true reason why this term was popular in mainstream white America at that time, however. For instance, the mainstream white US society aimed to alleviate African Americans’ collective fights against racism; therefore, the creation of the “model minority”24 seemed to help white Americans discourage black Americans’


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social movements against racial discrimination by telling them to have Asian Americans as role models of all the US minorities. This term, in this sense, implied white Americans’ stereotypical belief that most Asian Americans were subservient and tolerant without fighting voices, not as good at uniting to fight for their own rights as black Americans were, and thus labeled as better controllable “models” than African Americans. The word “model” in this term looked honorable and wonderful, but the US definition of the Asian American model minority as people bad at fighting for their own rights and welfare was actually disdainful and terrible. In other words, this term signified the mixture of American mainstream society’s acceptance of and discrimination against the model minority at the same time. Fruit Chan’s death offered a stereotypical example of American whites’ anti-Japanese hostility in US legal history, although mainstream US society praised Asian Americans as their model minorities and would like African Americans to follow in the footsteps of Asian American models. Fruit Chan was biologically Chinese but was mistaken as Japanese and killed in a restaurant by two white American male laborers who worked for a Japanese car factory and hated wealthy Japanese Americans. Regardless of US politicians and Asian American attorneys’ efforts and petitions, the US court never punished these two white American men.

The World Chinese Language Association and the earliest TCFL/TCSL certificates In 1973, Taiwan inaugurated the World Chinese Language Association (Ш ࣚ๮ᇟЎᏢ཮). In 1974, this association issued the world’s first quarterly magazine of TCFL/TCSL. In 1977, this association opened the world’s first “cram school” of TCFL/TCSL qualifications (๮ᇟЎৣၗࣴಞ੤), offering the world’s earliest TCFL/TCSL certificate.25

An American shift from Taiwan to Mainland China: The era after the Cold War and post-Maoist open-door policy During the era after the end of the Cold War and Mainland China’s post-Maoist open-door policy,26 Mainland China replaced Taiwan as the top choice for American students’ Chinese-language studies abroad. In 1997 Beijing’s IUP appeared. It instantly replaced Taiwan’s IUP, turning Taiwan’s IUP into the ICLP (International Chinese Language Program) in

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1999.27 On average, every year, more than 70–80,000 foreign students who had learned some basic Mandarin Chinese or Cantonese traveled to Mainland China to sharpen their Chinese-language abilities.

The growth of the Chinese-heritage population in American universities Since the 1980s, the increase in the arrival of Chinese Mainlanders in the United States has been changing American higher education and academic society. Chinese programs, Asian studies programs, foreign languages departments, and programs related to TCFL/TCSL in the US university setting have been receiving more and more Chinese Mainland students compared to Taiwanese and Hong Kong students. Departments, graduate schools, and colleges related to management, economics, finance, science, and engineering in US universities are full of Chinese Mainland students now. American law schools and medical colleges also have more and more Chinese-heritage students. English language academic journals in the above-mentioned research fields have more and more Chinese-heritage editors, reviewers, and consultants. Current US higher education has a much-larger number of students, researchers, faculty members, and staff who are Mainland Chinese than of other nationalities. More and more on-campus Chinese populations have either attracted Americans to learn and like Chinese languages and dialects or ignited Americans’ anti-Chinese antagonism.

Tuition from and enrollment of on-campus Chinese-heritage students American universities’ and colleges’ attitudes toward their on-campus Chinese populations and Chinese-language teaching are affected not merely by American students’ emotional ups and downs when facing more and more Chinese peers and teachers but also by practical concerns related to budgets. Tuition from Mainland Chinese students and the enrollment of students from Mainland China have become more influential in terms of the budgets of American colleges and universities. In other words, US higher educational institutions are depending financially more and more on Mainland China. If the Mainland Chinese government one day resumes its closed-door policy, US higher educational institutions will probably suffer enormous financial damage because of the loss of enrollment and


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tuition of Mainland Chinese students.

Confucius Institutes Further affecting American college campuses financially is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) governmental funding for TCFL/TCSL via Confucius Institutes. From the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Chinese communists fought severely against Confucianism, but later on, the renaissance of Confucianism 28 took place in Mainland China. The PRC replaced its original communist power struggles against Confucianism with the current honoring of Confucianism and launched more than three hundred and fifty Confucius Institutes in more than one hundred nations, including fifty-five in the United States in 2009. Every Confucius Institute hinted at providing great budgets and (semi-)free faculty resources from the Mainland Chinese government. Some American universities accepted the money and faculty resources that accompanied the agreement to create on-campus Confucius Institutes, but some institutions rejected them. From the late 1990s to the early 2010s, Confucius Institutes seem to have been created in US and Canadian higher educational institutions.29 The “Chinese bridge” (ᅇᇟᐏ) contests, hosted by the PRC governmental branch “Hanban” (ᅇᒤ) office and Confucius Institutes, began in 2002, attracting more than 300,000 non-Chinese-heritage participants outside of Chinese-speaking areas and more than 1,000 non-Chinese-heritage student-level participants who learned Mandarin Chinese in Mainland China. From the early 2010s to the present, however, there came denials of opening or continuing Confucius Institutes on US campuses.30 The University of Chicago, for instance, signed a five-year contract (2009–2014) for a Confucius Institute with the Hanban, but in 2010 more than one hundred faculty members expressed their objection. In 2014, the University of Chicago officially closed its on-campus Confucius Institute.31 Later, Penn State University also shut its on-campus Confucius Institute.32 The AAUP (American Association of University Professors) urged that academic freedom and institutional autonomy were perhaps what managers of Confucius Institutes should have paid attention to. According to news reports outside of Mainland Chinese areas, Confucius Institutes are like a part of the current PRC government’s dreams to “buy up”33 the entire globe, including Bejing-based Superior Aviation Airline’s hope to acquire the Hawker Beechcraft,34 the PRC

Changes in Chinese-Language Teaching in US Higher Education


state-run company’s plan to purchase the Mediterranean port of Pireaus in Greece,35 and so forth.

Other institutes and academies Aside from Confucius Institutes, many organizations, institutes, and academies are related to Chinese-language teaching. The International Han Institute was established in 2005. 36 The IA TCSOL (International Association for Teachers of Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages ӄౚ ᅇᇟ௲Ꮲᕴ཮ͺǶ ᅇᇟ࡫ॣε೽ϩ௦Ҕॣॶ಄ဦǴࡺ‫ॣঁٿ‬નҔ‫ঁٿ‬಄ဦǴࣗԿ‫ܭ‬΋ঁॣનҔ ‫ঁٿ‬಄ဦǶӵͯҔ {iǶ! 4/! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ঁ؂‬നӭΟჄǴѝԖͯёΟჄёѤჄǴӵ΁ѝ΋ჄǴᅇᇟ࡫ॣ ा fohǶ! 5/! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦቪӷਔѝࢂ΋ᅿᡏԄǴᅇᇟ࡫ॣࠅԖӑ‫ڇ‬ЋቪεቪλቪѤᅿᡏ ԄǶቚуᏢғᏢಞ‫ॄޑ‬ᏼǶ! 6/! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦό‫ڙ‬Ѧ୯ᇟวॣ‫ޑ‬υᘋǶ! 7/! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦё኱ӧ୯ӷ‫ޑ‬΢ᜐ‫܈‬ѓᜐǴᅇᇟ࡫ॣѝૈ΢ΠǴ߾୯ӷߚᐉ௨ όёǶ! 8/! ࡫ॣค‫࡫ݤ‬рᡂॣॣॶǶεഌ‫ۓڋ‬ᅇᇟ࡫ॣǴࢂҗ‫ܭ‬ЛᐛܿගрǴЎӷ Ѹ໪‫ׯ‬ॠǴा‫و‬рШࣚӅӕ࡫ॣБӛǴё‫ـ‬Лᐛܿচཀࢂ੃ྐᅇӷҔ࡫ॣ‫ڗ‬ жᅇӷǶ! 9/! ନ୯ሞॣ኱ѦǴؒԖ΋ᅿॣ಄ёа፾ҔҺՖ΋ᅿᇟ‫ق‬Ƕ! ߋᝬ߃Ǻ! ᜢ‫ܭ‬Ҟ߻‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦӸቲ‫ݾޑ‬᝼Ǵ΋૓аࣁ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ߄ॣനࣁᆒዴǴ‫ځ‬௢Չҭ ค౾ᛖᜤՉϐೀǴࢂаό‫ە‬ቲନǶ‫߾ॺך‬аࣁԜᇥόคё᝼ϐೀǴӕਔεഌ ௢Չᅇᇟ࡫ॣǴΨόཀ‫ښ‬ѸฅቹៜύЎวॣ‫ྗޑ‬ዴ‫܄‬Ǵ‫ݾ‬᝼‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦӸቲୢ ᚒǴЬाขᗺᔈӧ‫ܭ‬ᛥଭ࡫ॣค‫ݤ‬ှ،΋಄ӭॣፂँǴࢂаό፾‫ܭ‬୯ΓᏢಞ मᇟ฻ӭᇟЎ௲ᏢǴҭό፾ӝѦ୯ΓᏢಞύЎϐҔǶ! ΋ǵͣ͢͡ဦ኱ॣό୼ᆒྗϐೀǺ! ! ! ΋૓аࣁ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ኱ॣനࣁᆒዴǴՠ٣ჴ΢ǴਥᏵ௲‫ػ‬೽Ⴞ‫཮ہ‬วՉϐ ȠኻऍӦ୔๮ᇟ௲‫׷‬ঋҔᅇᇟ࡫ॣϐёՉ‫܄‬஑ਢࣴ‫ز‬ᕴൔ֋ᄔाȡࡰрǺԖ ٤ྍԾᐕўᡂϯϐ‫ٯ‬Ѧς٬‫࡫ځ‬ቪᆶ᠐ॣό΋ठǴӵͿॣॶࣁȘ!oș Ǵ΃Ϳ౛ ྽࡫᠐ࣁȘj!oșǴՠჴሞࠅ᠐ࣁȘjoșǶ! Βǵᅇᇟ࡫ॣ௲ᏢคཞวॣǺ! ! ! Ȩ಄ဦࣚ‫ڀۓ‬Ԗ࣬ჹҺཀ‫܄‬ȩࢂ౜жᇟЎᏢ္‫ޑ‬΋ঁදၹཷ‫ۺ‬ǴவᏢಞ Ј౛Ꮲ‫ޑ‬ᢀᗺٰ࣮Ǵ಄ဦᆶวॣ໔ӭԛଛჹջё‫׎‬ԋ‫ڋ‬ऊᜢ߯ǴࢂᏢಞ‫ޣ‬ѝ ሡ࣮‫ډ‬੝‫ۓ‬಄ဦߡёϸ৔‫܄‬Ӧวр၀಄ဦ‫߄܌‬ϐॣǴаᅇᇟ࡫ॣ฻ᛥଭ࡫ॣ ‫س‬಍ᏢಞύЎǴό΋‫ۓ‬൩Ꮴठ୯ΓᏢಞ୯ᇟό኱ྗ‫܈‬όၰӦǶ! Οǵᗋচͣ͢͡‫҅੿ޑ‬ሽॶǺှନ΋಄ӭॣፂँ! ! ! ฅ߾Ǵᛥଭ࡫ॣ௲Ꮲ‫ޑ‬ЬाୢᚒࣁՖǻҗ‫ܭ‬ᛥଭΒΜϤӷ҆೏೚ӭᇟЎ ቶ‫ݱ‬ᔈҔǴᏤठӕ΋ӷ҆‫ॶॣ߄܌‬Ӛό࣬ӕǴӭᇟ௲ᏢਔǴ΋಄ӭॣஒഐᏢ

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


ಞ‫ޣ‬य़ჹӕ΋ӷ҆คவղᘐ‫ځ‬วॣ‫ޑ‬௃‫׎‬Ƕऩаᅇᇟ࡫ॣᏢಞύЎǴჹ୯Γ Զ‫ق‬ǴԜᖐஒᏤठВࡕᏢಞमЎਔ‫ޑ‬วॣምᛖǴӵ࣮‫ډ‬मЎ္‫ ޑ‬ti วԋͱॣǶ ࣬ჹ‫ܭ‬ᛥଭ࡫ॣǴͣ͢͡‫ى‬аౢғ୔ᒣբҔǴӧ҂ٰᇟЎ௲‫ػ‬ύǴᛥଭ࡫ॣ ‫ޑ‬ᓬલᗺค໪၅஭ǴԶ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᗨό‫ە‬ቲନǴ‫ځ‬લᗺࠅ୍໪҅ຎǶ! ᎄҏ⍲Ǻ! ‫ך‬൩๱ཥ۫ѱύ҅୯λ‫ޑ‬ϤΜՏભҺԴৣբΑୢ‫ڔ‬ፓࢗǴᢌԋ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ࣁׯ‬ ᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ޑ‬ԖϤՏǴϸჹ‫ޑ‬ԖϖΜѤՏǶϸჹ‫ޑ‬౛җЬाԖǺ! ΋ǵӢࣁ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦԖၨྗዴ‫ޑ‬วॣǶ! Βǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦՉϐԖԃǴᗊฅቲନѸ೷ԋόߡǴόѝ຤ਔ຤ΚǴЪԋਏӵՖ ό‫ޕ‬Ƕ! Οǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦԖշ‫ܭ‬ඓඝᅇӷ‫ޑ‬ᖂॣ੝‫܄‬Ƕ! Ѥǵᇟ‫ق‬όၸࢂ΋ᅿπ‫ڀ‬ǴӵࣁΑБߡᏢಞԶᇸܰ௭క୯ৎᇟЎࡹ฼Ǵჴз ΓᜤаवӕǶ! ᜅԋ‫ޑ‬౛җԖǺ! ΋ǵᇟ‫ྎࢂق‬೯‫ޑ‬π‫ڀ‬Ǵ୷‫ܭ‬Ҟ߻୯ሞϯ‫ޑ‬౜ຝǴλᏢғᔈ၀٬Ҕᛥଭ࡫ॣǶ! ΒǵԖճ‫ܭ‬मᇟ௲ᏢჴࡼǶ! ΟǵԖճ‫ܭ‬ຎም‫ޑޣ‬ᏢಞǶ! ѤǵԖճ‫ੇܭ‬৙‫کޑ۞ٿ‬ѳ಍΋Ƕ! ϖǵ಄ӝ୯ሞ಍΋ǵᇟॣ኱ྗϯǶ! ϤǵගܹѦᇟᙌ᝿ǵ಍΋ϯǶ! Ύǵӷ҆ၨᙁϯǵܰᏢǵܰ୦Ƕ! ഋ҅‫ݯ‬Ǻ! ‫ঁך‬Γаࣁ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦԖаΠ൳ঁ੝ᗺǺ! ΋ǵӳᇡǺ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦҗᅇӷᆒᙁԶٰǴӵ͡ࣁхӷ΢ъ‫׎‬ᡏᄽϯԶٰǶ‫܌‬а ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࢂύ୯‫ޑ‬ౢ‫ނ‬Ƕ! ΒǵӳᏢǺၟᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫࣬ݤ‬ၨǴѬٰ‫ޑ‬ᆒዴਏ݀ӳǴਔ໔޸‫ޑ‬ϿǶ! Οǵӳ௲ǺεഌᏢ‫ޣ‬ම‫߃܄‬௲௤ࡰрεഌ௢Չᅇᇟ࡫ॣ޸Α‫ٿ‬ԃਔ໔ǴᏢѬ ‫ޑ‬λቪᡏǴ೚ӭ‫ډูٽ‬ΑΒԃભᗋค‫ݤ‬ඓඝǴ‫ॣݙޑॺך‬಄ဦѝाΟѤຼջ ёᏢ཮Ƕ! ѤǵӳҔǺ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦҔ‫ܭ‬᎙᠐բЎ௢ቶᇟЎ௲‫ػ‬Ǵਏ݀К࡫ॣӳǶ! ! ! ယቺܴǺ! ‫ঁך‬Γவ௲Ѧ୯Ꮲғ‫ޑ‬ҥ൑Ǵ࣮‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ! 2/! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࢂ໺‫܍‬ύ୯ЎӷᖂᜩԶٰǴς࿶ჴՉΑΖΜΒԃǴ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦಃ ΒԄǴ‫҇ܭ‬୯ΎΜϖԃϦѲਔǴම‫ৣܭ‬ε୯ᇟ௲ᏢύЈ଺ჴᡍǶ่݀߻‫܌ޣ‬ Ꮲਔ໔ၨߏǴՠวॣ҅ዴǴࡕ‫܌ޣ‬Ꮲਔ໔ၨอǴՠ஥ԖѦ୯๚ፓǶ! 3/! ୷‫ܭ‬᝿ॣ಄ဦǴ࠶ᆩԄǵ୯ᇟᛥଭǵओᎹԄǵᅇᇟ࡫ॣၸόΦ൩‫ׯ‬΋঺Ƕ ϸࣣ҅Ѧ୯Ўӷ҆όፕҔҺՖ΋ᅿǴѝा಍΋ջёǶՠ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦόૈቲନǶ! ᖴߎऍǺ! ‫ך‬ჹ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦͣͤ͢͡‫ޑ‬ཀ‫!ـ‬


Chapter Four

! ˞Ƿ஑ࣁύ୯ЎӷԶ೛ीǴЪՉϐӭԃਏ݀‫ؼ‬ӳǶ! ! ˟Ƿ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦё‫ޔ‬௨ǴБߡӑ‫ޔڇ‬ԄᆶᐉԄਜᝤǶ! ! ˠǷӳᇡӳᏢǴӳ௲ӳҔǶ! ! ˡǷᆶԖᜢΓγ୘ፋǴ๊εӭኧΓ֡Ь஭ᆢ࡭Ƕ! ! ! )2*ࣴ‫܌ز‬Ե၂‫ܜ‬ኬፓࢗ! ! ! !)3*֝໔୯λ௲ৣ! ! ! !)4*ৣଣᏢғ! ! ! !)5*୯ᇟჴλਠߏԴৣ! ! ˢǷόܰᆶ bcde ӷ҆షౄǴҭࣁᓬᗺϐ΋ǴεഌλᏢ௲ৣёаࣁ᛾Ƕ! ‫ך‬ᇡࣁಃΒԄ‫܈‬೚ёӆ଺ࣴ‫!ز‬ ! ˞ǷӢ‫ۓڋ‬ςΦǴ߈ٰ௃༈Ԗ‫ׯ܌‬ᡂǴԜёӆࣴ‫ز‬Ǵа੃ࡎ‫ݾ‬᝼Ƕ! ! ˟Ƿ౜ӧШࣚӚӦӭҔᅇᇟ࡫ॣǴࡺёӆࣴ‫ز‬Ƕ! ! ˠǷёӃ଺௲Ꮲࣴ‫ز‬ǴԖ௓‫ڋ‬ಔᆶჴᡍಔǴӚԖ‫ٿ‬ᅿЬ஭ѐ଺ჴᡍǶ! ᙁܴ߿Ǻ! ‫ॣݙۓڋ‬಄ဦǴᔈ‫ݙ‬ཀ൳ঁୢᚒǺ! ΋ǵҔ‫ܭ‬୯ሞ௲Ꮲ‫܈‬୯ϣ௲ᏢǶ! Βǵा௲Ѧ୯ΓᏢ‫܈‬௲୯ΓᏢǶ! Οǵቲక౜Չͣͤ͢͡಄ဦख़ཥ‫ۓڋ‬΋঺಄ဦǴৣၗ୻‫ػ‬ᆶӄ୯ӕझख़ཥᏢ ಞǴ‫ځ‬ԋҁǵਔ໔ᆶ֚ᜤࡋǴॶளԵໆǶ! ѤǵঁΓӧᗬ୯୯ҥ۸ࠄεᏢᖱᏢ΋ԃǴаͣͤ͢͡௲ᗬ୯ΓᏢಞǴ࣬྽ᆒ ྗǴ٠ค౾ᛖᜤՉϐೀǴԖਔҔಃΒ঺ᛥଭ࡫ॣံշǴᡣдॺౣள࣬՟ॣ፦Ǵ ҭคόёǶ‫܌‬аͣͤ͢͡‫ޑ‬಄ဦ௢Չࢂॶளޭ‫ޑۓ‬Ƕ! ϖǵჹ‫҆ܭ‬ᇟ௲ᏢǴҁΓӧ୯Рइ‫ۺ‬ᓔаѠᇟ௲၃ᄺ֗ୠǴ൩ࢂ௦Ҕͣ͢͡ ͤ಄ဦǴᏢ঩ѝाӭᏢ൳ঁ಄ဦǴࡐ‫ז‬൩཮ᔉளวॣǶࣁϙሶόҔ౜ਔ‫ޑ‬ԋ ݀ᙁܰ௲ᏢǴԶ௭߈‫؃‬ᇻǴ௭ܰ‫؃‬ᜤ‫ګ‬ǻԶЪ೭঺಄ဦԖླྀߙᡝӃғ‫ޑ‬୯Ѡ ᚈᇟᜏ‫ڂ‬ё٩ᏵԶ‫ࠠۓ‬ǶȐߕ᝵ၪ‫ۓ‬॥‫ݢ‬ᆶԢࠤηѠᇟͣͤ͢͡‫ୖॣݙ‬ຓǶȑ! ஭ЎரǺ! ΋ǵ൩౛ፕ΢ᢀჸǺ! ! ! ˞Ƿ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦεӭࢂύЎ‫߃ޑ‬ЎǴӢԜӭъᆶύЎӕ‫ࢂޣ܈׎‬λλ‫ޑ‬ᡂ ‫׎‬Ƕคፕࢂ‫׎‬ᡏǵ฽໩ǵॣ᠐Бय़೿ᆶύЎ಄ӝǴӢԜӧᏢಞ΢৒ܰԶค֚ ᜤǶ! ! ! ˟Ƿ൩ၗૻϯԶ‫ق‬Ǵ౜Չ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦϷࣁᏢಞመࠄǵ࠼ৎᇟ‫܌‬ቚ‫ޑ‬೽ϩ಄ ဦǴςӧ JTP ຏнǴԶЪ٬Ҕႝတ‫ޣ‬ǴᗖΕ۳۳٬Ҕ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴӧၗૻϯ΢ ϷჴҔ΢คҺՖ౾ᛖǶ! ! ! ˠǷ൩୯ሞϯԶ‫ق‬Ǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦѝࢂᅇӷ‫ޑ‬ӷॣ಄ဦǴόӕ‫ܭ‬ᅇӷ‫܈‬मЎ Ӛᅿᇟ‫ق‬Ƕନ࡫ॣЎӷѦǴεӭԖ‫ځ‬ԾҔ‫سॣݙ‬಍Ǵᆶ୯ሞϯคᜢǶࣁΑᡣ Ѧ୯Γ৒ܰ᠐ᅇӷԶԖ᝿ॣ಄ဦǴѝࢂБߡ‫ޑ‬π‫ڀ‬Ǵҗ‫ܭ‬όૈᗉխ΋಄ӭॣ ‫ޑ‬ቹៜǴ৒ܰౢғӚᇥӚ၉‫่݀ޑ‬Ƕ! Βǵ൩ჴ፬΢ᢀჸǺ! ! ! ˞ǷѠ᡼௢Չ୯ᇟ‫ޑ‬ԋਏԖҞӅ࿏Ƕ!

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


! ! ˟ǷλᏢғӃᏢಞ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦΜຼǴջё᎙᠐Ԗ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦϐ᠐‫ނ‬Ƕ! ! ! ˠǷѦ୯ΓᏢ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦёаᗉխ΋಄ӭॣୢᚒǴ‫܌‬аᏢಞਏ݀നӳǴҁ ਠ୯ᇟύЈςԖჴᡍ᛾ܴǶ! Οǵ่ፕǺ! ! ! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦόૈᇸ‫ق‬ቲకǴϝ‫ە‬ᝩុ٬ҔǶ! ՖΟҁǺ! ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴѝࢂ΋ᅿ࡫ॣ಄ဦǴࢂ΋ᅿπ‫ڀ‬Ǵ‫܈ׯ‬ό‫ׯ‬Ǵᔈ୲࡭ճӭᄄϿ‫ޑ‬ চ߾ǴόၸᔈவΠӈᢀᗺ๱౳Ǻ! ΋ǵଞჹѠ᡼Γ‫ׯ‬ǴԶό៝ӄШࣚ๮Γ‫ޑ‬ᢀགǶ! Βǵ‫ࢂࡕׯ׳‬௲ύ୯ΓǴ‫ࢂ܈‬௲ੇѦ๮ΓϷѦ୯ΓǶ! ੇѦ๮Γࡐӧཀ୯‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ݾ‬ፕ‫่݀ޑ‬ǴੇѦ๮Γ‫׆‬ఈ୯ϣ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴόा ӆᇙ೷зੇѦ๮Γ֚ᘋ‫ޑ‬ᜤᚒǶ! ߋ़ЎǺ! ΋ǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᗨ௢ՉϖΜӭԃǴՠᗑᡨԾ‫ڬ‬රਔж‫ॣޔޑ‬ǵᔕॣǵϸϪǴ࿶ ၸΒǵΟίԃ‫ׯޑ‬຾Ǵ‫ډޔ‬ύ๮҇୯‫ۈ‬җകࣂᡕǴബ೷аȨ‫ڗ‬ђЎǵጆǵᛟ ৩࣪ϐ‫׎‬ȩ! ‫܌‬ᇙ‫ޑ‬୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴϾηᇥǺȨӵԖ‫៉܌‬ǴѸԖ‫܌‬၂ȩǴ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࢂ၂ҔԖ ԋ‫่݀ޑ‬Ƕϸᢀ‫ך‬୯ᏢಞमЎ‫܌‬Ҕॣ኱ǴϖΜԃٰӃࡕҔΑॡМॣ኱ǵ୯ሞ ॣ኱ǵl/l/ॣ኱Ǵ่݀୯ΓᏢಞमЎԋᕮό౛གྷǴεᏢमᇟ‫س‬ύวॣፐำഖ Ԗ 304 а΢όϷ਱Ǵॣ኱วॣഖӵԜ֚ᜤǶॣ኱วॣόၸࢂᏢಞᇟ‫ޑق‬π‫ڀ‬Ǵ π‫ڀ‬ຫ৒ܰǵຫБߡǵຫӳᏢǴё‫ـ‬Ȩπట๓‫ځ‬٣ǴѸӃճ‫ځ‬Ꮤȩ Ƕё‫ॣݙـ‬ ಄ဦϐᓬຫ‫܄‬Ƕ! Βǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦନΑёᇡ᠐ᜤӷǵжҔᅇӷբЎǵ߄ཀϐѦǴനεਏҔǵന೏ ቶ‫ݱ‬٬Ҕ‫ޑ‬Ǵ൩ࢂႝတѺӷǴᗨฅϞВႝတѺӷ‫ޑ‬БԄԖࡐӭǴӵঊᎢ฻Ǵ ՠа‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᔠӷ‫ޑ‬БԄനࣁБߡǶ! ‫⿐׵‬Ǻ! ΋ǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ޑ‬ჴҔሽॶǺ! ! ˞Ƿ୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦȐচӜ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ȑͣͤ͢͡Ǵ߯҇୯Ύԃ௲‫ػ‬೽‫܌‬ϦѲǴ ӅीΟΜΐঁӷ҆ǴࡕٰΞஒͷϩࣁͷǵ͸‫ٿ‬ӷ҆ǴၱࣁѤΜঁǶ‫ځ‬ύᖂ҆ ΒΜѤঁǴᜩ҆ΜϤঁǶ҇୯Μΐԃ‫ׯ‬ӜࣁȨ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦȩǶ! ! ˟ǷԜ঺಄ဦ߯٩കࣂᡕᔕुϐȨ‫ڗ‬ђЎጆᛟ೵࣪ϐ‫׎‬ȩচ߾Ǵҭջᙁ฽ ϐᅇӷǶ಄ӝᚈᖂ᠄ᜩচ߾Ǵ‫࡫܌‬ϪрٰϐॣനࣁྗዴǶ! ! ˠǷ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ኱ॣБԄനࣁᙁൂԶᡫࢲǴ‫؂‬΋ঁॣѝԖ΋ঁ಄ဦȐόፕᖂ ҆ǵᜩ҆ȑ Ǵ‫؂‬΋ঁӷॣനӭѝԖΟঁ಄ဦǴനϿ΋ঁ಄ဦǴ൩ёа࡫ቪమཱǴ Ѐ‫ځ‬ӑ‫ڇ‬ਔǴคፕ‫ޔ‬Չᐉ௨Ǵ‫؂‬΋ঁᅇӷᆶ‫ૈ֡ॣݙ‬፾Ϫଛ྽Ƕ! ! ˡǷ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫߯ڰ‬ᅇӷᙁϯԶٰǴࡺᏢ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ൩฻‫ܭ‬ς࿶໒‫ۈ‬ᏢᅇӷǴ ჹ‫ܭ‬ᏢಞᅇӷཱུԖշ੻Ƕ! ! ˢǷ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦӧѠ᡼௢ՉςၻϖΜԃǴςԋࣁᏢಞ୯ᇟόё‫܈‬લ‫ޑ‬π‫ڀ‬Ǵ εӭኧ‫ޑ‬Γ೿Ꮲၸ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴჹ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦςԖᐚࠆϐ௃གǴԜᅿ௃ག٠ߚ‫ځ‬ д಄ဦ‫ڗૈ܌‬жǶ!


Chapter Four

! ˣǷ‫ॣݙ‬ѤΜঁ಄ဦჴςхࡴऩυБ‫ॣق‬ӧϣǴѝा೽ϩౣࣁ‫ܰׯ‬Ǵ൩ૈ ፾Ҕ‫ܭ‬ҁβᇟ‫ق‬ɡመࠄᇟǵ࠼ৎᇟǴϷԿ‫ܭ‬ԖΓΨҔٰᏢಞচՐ҇ᇟ‫ق‬ǶѠ ᡼খӀൺਔǴѠ᡼࣪ࡹ۬൩ම࿶ϦѲ΋঺җԙӂ౺‫܌‬ᔕुϐ! ॣ಄ဦǴ൩ࢂ а‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࣁЬǴౣࣁቚ੻‫ׯ‬ᡂǴҔٰ௲መࠄᇟǴϞ୯ᇟВൔဠ٣ߏ݅‫ؼ‬Ӄ ғ൩ම࿶Ҕ೭঺಄ဦӧύቶႝѠ௲ᏤመࠄᇟǶመࠄᇟ஑ৎѠεֆӺᘶ௲௤Ψ ஒ೭঺಄ဦբࣁመࠄᇟॣ኱ǶѠчֆߙᡝӃғǴ໦݅‫׵‬Е‫׻‬Ӄғ‫ޑ‬Ҕаጓᝪ መࠄᇟӷ‫ڂ‬Ǵመࠄᇟ༼ॣӷ‫ڂ‬Ƕ! ! ˤǷλܻ϶Ꮲ཮‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࡕǴࡐ‫ז‬൩ёа࣮୯ᇟВൔǴ‫ูٽ‬ВൔǴࣗԿҔ ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦቪЎകǴό໻Ꮲಞ୯ᇟཱུࣁБߡǴԋਏΨཱུࣁ‫ז‬ೲǴӧৎύР҆Ψ ёаᇶᏤᏢಞǶ! ! ˥Ƿ྽ϞၗૻཱུࣁวၲǴ೚ӭᇟЎ೬ᡏ೿٬Ҕ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᔠӷǴλܻ϶Ӣ༈ ճᏤǴᏢಞଆٰǴߚதِೲǶ! ! ˦Ƿ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦԾ҇୯Βԃ໒‫ुڋۈ‬ǴΎԃϦѲǴ‫ډ‬ΒΜԃωӄय़௢ՉǴ೭ ‫ځ‬ύྗഢჴᡍ೭ᅿ൳߈ΒΜԃǴՖ฻཈ख़Ǵჴࢂ‫ځ‬дঊߦ‫ुڋ‬ᒱᇤԭрϐ೯ Ҕ࡫ॣ಄ဦ‫ڗૈ܌‬жǻ! ! ˞˝Ƿ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫཮ޗ‬ၗྍࡐӭǴࣣࣁኧΜԃٰ‫܌‬ಕᑈǴཱུࣁё຦Ǵ΋ѿ‫ׯ‬ ᡂǴஒбрϐ‫཮ޗ‬ԋҁཱུεǶ! ! ˞˞Ƿനࡕाୢ‫ॣݙۭډ‬಄ဦрΑϙሶୢᚒǻࣁϙሶाቲନǻԜࣁ୯ৎǵ ‫཮ޗ‬ϷΓ҇ϐЎϯ଄Ǵाόा᠋᠋‫཮ޗ‬ε౲ཀ‫ـ‬ǻाόा᠋᠋εӭኧ‫ޑ‬٬Ҕ ‫ޣ܈ޣ‬Ꮲಞ‫ޣ‬ǴӵᏢғǵԴৣॺ‫ޑ‬ཀ‫ـ‬ǻଁࢂϿኧഈߐ೷ًǴԾ‫ڮ‬௲‫ׯػ‬ॠ ‫ૈ܌ޣ‬ҺཀѰѓǻ! Βǵ୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᆶᛥଭ࡫ॣϐКၨǺ! ! ˞Ƿ‫܌‬ᒏᛥଭ࡫ॣѝࢂ᠈಍ӜຒǴ൩୯ᇟ‫سॣݙ‬಍൩Ԗ‫ی‬ӭᅿǴѸ໪ाᇥ ܴࢂٗ΋঺ॣ኱‫س‬಍ǶεৎКၨዕ஼‫ޑ‬Ǵਔ໔КၨΦ‫ޑ‬Ԗ࠶ִᅦМǵਔ໔К ၨ߈‫ޑ‬Ԗᅇᇟ࡫ॣϷ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦಃΒԄǴന߈ΞԖ‫܌‬ᒏ೯Ҕ࡫ॣǶ! ! ˟Ƿ࠶ִᅦМॣ኱ǴԐයӦკаϷΓӜ᝿ॣ฻ε೿௦Ҕ೭΋঺ǶԾவᅇॣ ࡫ॣрٰаࡕǴҗ‫ݯࡹܭ‬ǵ࿶ᔮ฻ӢનǴεࣁࢬՉǴ࠶Мॣ኱ǴၱᅌᅌଏՏǶ ᅇᇟ࡫ॣচҁࢂा٬ύ୯Ўӷ܎΍ϯǴ‫ڬ‬ৱٰ‫ܭ‬΋ΐϖѤԃ୯୍ଣє໒Ўӷ πբ཮ਔϦ໒࠹ҢѝૈբࣁȨᅇӷ‫ॣݙ‬ȩҔǶ! ! ˠǷ‫ुڋ‬ᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫س‬಍ǴҁࢂଞჹѦᝤΓγᏢಞ୯ᇟԶ೛གྷǴ‫׆‬ఈճҔ‫ځ‬ Кၨዕ஼ϐॣ᠐Ǵගଯ‫ځ‬Ꮲಞᑫ፪Ǵቚ຾‫ځ‬Ꮲಞਏ݀ǶՠࢂҭԖคёᗉխϐ ᄄᆄǴҭջ‫ځ‬วॣத཮‫҆ځڙ‬ᇟϐቹៜԶᜤаᆒྗǶҔ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦͣͤ͢͡௲ Ꮲ߾όठ‫҆ځڙ‬ᇟቹៜǶ! ! ˡǷҗ‫ܭ‬ᇟ‫ق‬ЎϯङඳόӕǴBCDE Ԗ‫ځ‬ЎϯङඳǴวॣБԄࡽ҂Ѹ࣬ӕǴ ॷҔ‫׎ځ‬ᡏǴᗋѸ໪‫ׯ‬ᡂ‫ځ‬วॣǴѸฅ཮೷ԋᏢύЎϷᏢमЎϐᚈख़֚ᘋǶ! ! ˢǷ೯Ҕ࡫ॣࢂаᏢ୯ᇟǵመࠄᇟϷ࠼ᇟࣁဦєǴӵ݀೯Ҕ࡫ॣёǴ߾ᅇ ᇟ࡫ॣǵΒԄҭёǶ΋಄ӭॣ‫ځ‬ჴࢂόёૈ‫ޑ‬Ƕ! ጰ‫ے‬໚Ǻ! ! ! ҁ‫س‬ЬᒤȨ୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ޑ‬ӣ៝ᆶ৖ఈȩ০ፋ཮ǴЬᚒԖ‫ٿ‬໨ǴҁΓଞ ჹ‫ٿ‬໨ගрభ‫ـ‬Ǻ!

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


! ! Ȑ΋ȑ୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ޑ‬ᐕўసྍᆶჴҔሽॶǺ҇୯ΒԃǴ௲‫ػ‬೽ӧчѳ є໒᠐ॣ಍΋཮Ǵ᝼‫ۓ‬Ȩ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦȩ Ƕ҇୯ΎԃΜ΋ДΒΜΟВǴ௲‫ػ‬೽҅Ԅ ϦѲǴӅΟΜΐঁǶ҇୯ΖԃѤДΜϤВǴ௲‫ػ‬೽ϦѲ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ॣᜪԛ‫ׇ‬Ƕ ҇୯ΐԃϖДΒΜВǴ௲‫ػ‬೽୯ᇟ಍΋ᝢഢ཮ቩॣ‫ہ‬঩཮Ǵ᝼،ቚуǷͷ҆ Ȑаࡕࣁߡ‫ܭ‬ਜቪǴ‫ע‬ͷ΢ᓐ‫ޑ‬΋ᗺೱΠٰԋ͸ȑ Ǵ‫ॣݙࢂܭ‬ӷ҆ኧҞԋࣁѤ ΜঁǶ‫ځ‬ύԖ! ! ! Οঁ୯ॣόҔǴჴሞ΢ࢂΟΜΎঁǶ҇୯ΜΐԃѤДΒ ΜΐВǴ୯҇ࡹ۬૽зՉࡹଣ‫ۓׯ‬Ȩ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ȩӜᆀࣁȨ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦȩ Ƕ҇୯Β ΜԃǴ௲‫ػ‬೽୯ᇟ಍΋ᝢഢ‫ہ‬঩཮Ǵࣁߡ‫ܭ‬ਜቪၟጓ௨ӷ‫ڂ‬ǵຒ‫ڂ‬Ǵ‫΄΃ע‬ ΅Οঁ಄ဦ౽‫ډ‬നࡕǶ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦࢂਥᏵᅇӷ‫ޑ‬ጆᡏིቪ‫ޑ‬ǴԖ‫ځ‬ჴҔሽॶǴ ԶЪ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᆶᅇӷКၨௗ߈ǴКၨ৒ܰᏢಞǶ‫ٯ‬ӵǺȨ͡ȩǴᆶȨхȩӷК ၨௗ߈ǴࢂҗȨхȩӷᄽᡂԶٰ‫ޑ‬Ƕ Ȩͣȩ ǴᆶȨߵȩӷКၨௗ߈ǴࢂҗȨߵȩ ӷᄽᡂԶٰ‫ޑ‬Ƕ! ! ! ȐΒȑ୯ᇟ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᆶᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ޑ‬КၨǺ߻Һ୯ҥᆵ᡼ৣጄεᏢ୯ᇟ௲ ᏢύЈЬҺယቺܴ௲௤ම࿶଺ၸჴᡍǴ΋੤а‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ௲Ѧ୯ΓᏢ୯ᇟǴ΋ ੤аᛥଭ࡫ॣ௲Ѧ୯ΓᏢ୯ᇟǴჴᡍ่݀ว౜Ǻа‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᏢ୯ᇟǴวॣന ኱ྗǹаᛥଭ࡫ॣ୯ᇟǴวॣࠅό኱ྗǶҞ߻ਓۚӧऍ୯Ջ໡კ‫ޑ‬ᗛ៛ܹ௲ ௤ȐමҺᆵ᡼ৣε୯Ў௲௤ȑ‫҇ܭ‬୯ϖΜѤԃΖДමኗȤ௲Ꮲ๮ᇟᔈ྽Ҕ‫ݙ‬ ॣ಄ဦȥ΋ЎȐ၁‫ـ‬Ƞ୯ᇟВൔǷᇟЎ‫ڬ‬тȡಃΖϤ΋යȑ Ǵ၀Ўᖐჴ‫ٯ‬ᇥܴǺ ᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ޑ‬લᗺǴ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ޑ‬ᓬᗺǶᛥଭ࡫ॣБԄǴ‫ک‬मЎ࡫ॣ࣬ӕ‫࣬܈‬՟Ǵ Ꮲғ᠐ଆٰԴಥό௞ᙑಞᄍǶ‫ٯ‬ӵȨͱȩ‫ִ࠶ޑ‬ᅦԄ‫ޑ‬ᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ ࢂݤ‬tijiǴ Ꮲғ‫ۺ‬ԋȨͮȩ Ǵ‫עࢂܭ‬Ȩच፾ȩ‫ۺ‬ԋȨ‫֎ڥ‬ȩ ǶओᎹԄ‫ޑ‬ᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ ࢂݤ‬tisǴ Ꮲғ‫ۺ‬ԋमЎՁӾय़షӝॣǴԶЪᗋ஥௔ՁᜩǶᛥଭ࡫ॣБԄόѝ΋ᅿǴ࡫ ॣό಍΋Ǵ೭ࢂᛥଭ࡫ॣ‫ޑ‬നεલᗺǶ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦਥᏵᅇӷȐϞᆀ୯ӷȑ೛ीǴ Ꮲ཮‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴᏢғΨ൩ᏢΑ΋٤ᅇӷ‫୷ޑ‬ҁ฽ฝǴёаբࣁஒٰᏢಞᅇӷ ‫ྗޑ‬ഢǴ೭ࢂ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ‫ޑ‬ᓬᗺǶ! ! ! ߃Ꮲ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦᗨฅั༾֚ᜤ΋٤Ǵёࢂ࿶ၸอਔය‫ޑ‬ግಞаࡕǴΨ൩ಞ аࣁதΑǶ៾ᑽճᄄǴᗋࢂҔ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦӳǶ‫׳‬Ֆ‫ݩ‬ᅇӷӷ‫׎‬ᕷӭǴӵ݀ᛥଭ ࡫ॣၟᅇӷֹӄϩ໒Ǵ۶Ԝค‫ྣݤ‬ᔈǴᏢಞᅇӷ൩‫֚׳‬ᜤǶᏢғᏢ཮Αᛥଭ ࡫ॣӷǴӆᏢᅇӷǴᇡӷ‫֚ޑ‬ᜤ٩ฅӸӧǶ୤Ԗ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦਔதၟᅇӷௗ᝻Ǵ ωૈ૶ள‫آ‬Ǵό཮‫ב‬Ƕ! ! ! Ь࡭Γ่ፕǺ! ࡐགᖴӚՏ຦ᇯӧԭԆύǴ‫ୖޜܜ‬уϞϺ‫ޑ‬০ፋ཮ǶϞϺрৢ‫ޑ‬ΓኧǴନΑ ᔈᗎ‫ޑ‬Ꮲ‫ޣ‬஑ৎϐѦǴᗋԖࡐӭ൞ᡏ‫϶ܻޑ‬ǴаϷӣ୯ୖуࣴಞ‫ޑ‬๷ࡓᇯǵ ੀ୯‫ޑ‬ႾਠλᏢԴৣǴӅी΋ԭӭΓǴԖΜϖΓԛ‫ޑ‬ว‫ق‬Ǵ૸ፕߚத዗ਗ਼Ƕ ‫ॺך‬ёаள‫ډ‬Οঁ่ፕǺ! ΋ǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦǴவᏢ౛΢ǵჴᡍ΢ǴѬ‫ޑ‬ჴҔ‫܄‬ǵሽॶǴࢂॶளޭ‫ޑۓ‬ǶӢ Ԝ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦाуаߥ੮Ǵᝩុ٬ҔǴόёᇸ‫ق‬ቲకǶ! Βǵ࣬ჹ‫ܭ‬ҺՖ΋ᅿॣ኱Ǵ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦჹ୯ᇟЎ‫ޑ‬ᏢಞǴёаள‫ډ‬നࣁᆒዴ‫ޑ‬ ਏ݀Ƕ!


Chapter Four

ΟǵԖᜢ‫ܭ‬ၡจǵ‫ܕ‬จ೭٤᝿ॣ‫ޑ‬ୢᚒǴ‫ࢂۭډ‬ाҔ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦಃΒԄǴᗋࢂ Ҕᅇᇟ࡫ॣǴ‫ࢂ܈‬Ҕ‫܌‬ᒏ‫ޑ‬೯Ҕ࡫ॣёаӆբ຾΋‫زࣴޑ؁‬Ƕ!

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


Appendix II 䞄Ϊ㜾߻Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠπբ‫ک‬䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬㟥֋! ΋ΐϖΖԃΒДΟВӧಃ΋㡼ӄ㡚Γ҇ж߄ε㜘ಃϖԛ㜘侠! Ȑ䠁‫ق‬Γ;!ύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ہ‬䠑㜘ЬҺ㞔ҏകȑ! ! ӚՏж߄Ǻ! !䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢǴ䶈㠤㝫ԃ䗂ӄ㡚ӚБय़‫ޑ‬侚侬Ǵ䶈㠤㡚䞼ଣ侰ҥ‫ޑ‬䬙俟 ࡫ॣБਢ䤂侔‫ہ‬䠑㜘‫ޑ‬ϸᯕ䤂侠‫ک‬অ侔Ǵ΋ΐϖΎԃΜД剷Ξ䶈ࡹ㜧ӄ㡚‫ہ‬ 䠑㜘த䞼‫ہ‬䠑㜘䧣ε㜘侠‫ޑ‬侚侬ǴΪ΋ΐϖΎԃΜ΋Д΋Вҗ㡚䞼ଣӄᥟ㜘 侠ಃϤΜԛ㜘侠೯㠤Ǵ䯢ӧග俩ӄ㡚Γ҇ж߄ε㜘侚侬‫ྗץک‬Ƕ‫ך‬䯢ӧж߄ ύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ہ‬䠑㜘൩㜾߻Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠπբ‫ک‬䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ剱匉ӛε㜘բ㟥֋Ǵ 俩ε㜘䤂侠Ƕ! !΋ǵ㜾߻Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ޑ‬Һ䞼‫ک‬Ηԃ䗂‫ޑ‬Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠπբ! !㜾߻‫ך‬㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ޑ‬Һ䞼Ǵӧ䬙҇௼俦䗂Ǵ൩ࢂǺȐ˞ȑ䳾ϯ䬙ӷǴ٬Ѭ‫׳‬ ৒ܰ䜀㚬εΓ҇ඓඝ‫ک‬٬ҔǴаߡӧ㚬εΓ҇ύ‫׳‬ӭǵ‫׳‬ӳǵ‫ז׳‬ǵ‫࣪׳‬Ӧ 䧥ନЎ‫ޓ‬ǴදϷ‫ک‬ගଯЎϯǹ Ȑ˟ȑ௢㚬ද೯俏Ǵа੃ନБ‫ޑق‬႖劅Ǵߦ僳䬙 俟‫ޑ‬僳΋‫؁‬䶘΋Ǵ٬‫ך‬䜹‫ޑ‬俟‫ૈق‬㮅‫׳‬ӳӦ䜀‫ך‬㡚‫ޗޑ‬㜘Ь㚜ࡌ侰ܺ䞼ǹ Ȑˠȑ ‫کۓڋ‬௢Չ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǴ䜀䬙ӷ‫کॣݙ‬㩽շ௢㚬ද೯俏Ƕ! !㤄Ηԃ䗂‫ޑ‬Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠπբǴ൩ࢂᒥྣ΢ॊ‫ޑ‬Б兮僳Չ‫ޑ‬Ƕ! !Ӄ俦䬙ӷ䳾ϯπբǶ! !ӄ㡚ှ‫ܫ‬аӟǴࡹ۬൩䥾‫ۈ‬Α䬙ӷ䳾ϯ‫زࣴޑ‬πբǶ΋ΐϖΒԃύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ ॠࣴ‫ہز‬䠑㜘ԋҥаӟǴ䥾‫ۈ‬૛㢤䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢǶ΋ΐϖϖԃ΋ДǴύ㡚Ў ӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ہ‬䠑㜘䠁߄ȸ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢ૛ਢȹǴ㚬‫ݱ‬۴‫؃‬ཀ佡Ƕӄ㡚ӚӦӚࣚΓ γ㡌у侚侬‫ޑ‬ӧΒΜᢩΓа΢Ƕ૛ਢӧਥ‵㤄٤ཀ佡բΑ߃‫؁‬অ҅ǴԂ䶈㡚 䞼ଣ侰ҥ‫ޑ‬䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢ䤂侔‫ہ‬䠑㜘䤂侔аӟǴΪ΋ΐϖϖԃΜДගҬӄ㡚 Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜘侠侚侬೯㠤Ƕ΋ΐϖϤԃ΋ДǴ㡚䞼ଣϦѲȸ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢȹǶ 㤄㚚БਢхࡴΟ㚚೽ϩǺಃ΋೽ϩջ䬙ӷ䳾ϯಃ΋߄Ǵх֖ΒԭΟΜ㚚䳾ϯ 䬙ӷȐջ‫ע‬ΒԭѤΜϖ㚚ᕷᥟӷ䳾ϯԋΒԭΟΜ㚚䳾ᥟӷǹ‫ځ‬ύԖ㝫㚚‫܈‬Ο 㚚ᕷᥟӷӝԂԋ΋㚚䳾ᥟӷ‫ޑ‬Ǵ‫܌‬а䳾ϯӟ‫ޑ‬ӷ㹠К䳾ϯ߻ϿΜϖӷȑ Ǵ㚸Б ਢϦѲ‫ޑ‬㟭ংଆջς೯ҔǹಃΒ೽ϩջ䬙ӷ䳾ϯಃΒ߄Ǵх֖ΒԭΖΜϖ㚚 䳾ϯ䬙ӷȐջ‫ע‬ΒԭΐΜΐ㚚ᕷᥟӷ䳾ϯԋΒԭΖΜϖ㚚䳾ᥟӷǴҗΪӝԂǴ К䳾ϯ߻ϿΜѤӷȑ Ǵ‫ځ‬ύ‫ޑ‬ΐΜϖ㚚ӷ㚸΋ΐϖϤԃϤДଆ䥾‫ۈ‬俇ҔǹಃΟ ೽ϩջ䬙ӷୃ਒䳾ϯ߄Ǵх֖ϖΜѤ㚚䳾ϯୃ਒ǴςԖΟΜ㚚ਥ‵㤄㚚߄㧵 ௢р䗂‫ޑ‬ӷ㚸БਢϦѲ‫ޑ‬㟭ংଆ䥾‫ۈ‬俇ҔǶΟ勪ӝ侓Ǵ䯢ӧӚ㟥т٬Ҕ‫ޑ‬䳾 ϯ䬙ӷǴӅ侓ΟԭϖΜϖ㚚ǶԜѦǴ㤆Ԗ㳩Ϊ䬙ӷ䳾ϯಃΒ߄‫ޑ‬΋ԭΐΜ㚚 䳾ϯ䬙ӷ‫ک‬㳩ΪಃΟ߄‫ޑ‬䶖ε೽ϩ䳾ϯୃ਒㧵௢ӷ㤆㠀Ԗ٬ҔǶՠࢂӧϿ㹠 р‫ނހ‬΢٬Ҕ‫ޑ‬䳾ϯ䬙ӷǴΨԖຬ㠤ΟԭϖΜϖӷ‫ޑ‬ण䡼‫ޑ‬Ǵ‫ٯ‬ӵӧλ䗄俟 Ў俰ҁ‫ک‬䧥‫ޓ‬௲‫׷‬ύǴ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢ‫ޑ‬Ο㚚߄ৡόӭς䶈ӄ೽٬ҔǶ!


Chapter Four

!䬙ӷ僴ԾҘମЎ㟭ж൩ς䶈Ԗ䳾ᥟǴаӟӚ㚚㟭ж䳾ᥟӷ೿Ԗ䠁৖Ƕ‫ך‬䜹‫ޑ‬ πբѝࢂК働‫س‬䶘Ӧ䗂僳Չ䳾ϯǴԂЪ٬䳾ᥟԋ䜀҅ᥟǶߍҔ䳾ϯ䬙ӷ‫ޑ‬ճ ੻ࢂΜϩ䩒๱‫ޑ‬Ƕ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢಃ΋߄‫ک‬ಃΒ߄‫܌‬䳾ϯ‫ޑ‬ᕷᥟӷϖԭѤΜѤ 㚚Ǵ㬖㣣䦧㹠ࢂΖίΎԭѤΜϖ㣣Ǵѳ֡‫؂‬ӷΜϤ㧀႟Ζ㣣ǹ䳾ϯϐӟ㛶Ԃ ԋϖԭ΋Μϖ㚚䳾ϯ䬙ӷǴ㬖㣣䦧㹠ࢂѤίΒԭ႟Ϥ㣣Ǵѳ֡‫؂‬ӷѝԖΖ㧀 ΋Ϥ㣣Ƕ൩ࢂ俦Ǵ㛙䳾ϯ䬙ӷК㛙ᕷᥟӷёа࣪Κ΋ъǶӧ㤄㝫㚚߄ٚǴΜ 㣣аΠ‫ޑ‬ӷӧ䳾ϯ߻ѝԖΟΜѤ㚚Ǵ䳾ϯӟቚу‫ډ‬Ѥԭ႟ΐ㚚ǴΜ΋㣣‫ޑ‬ӷ ӧ䳾ϯ߻‫ک‬䳾ϯӟ೿ࢂΟΜϖ㚚ǴΜΒ㣣а΢‫ޑ‬ӷǴ䳾ϯ߻ԖѤԭΎΜϖ㚚Ǵ 䳾ϯӟ㭨Ͽ‫ډ‬ΎΜ΋㚚Ƕӵ݀‫ע‬ಃ΋߄‫ک‬ಃΒ߄ύ‫ޑ‬ϖԭ΋Μϖ㚚䳾ϯ䬙ӷǴ ٩ྣಃΟ߄ୃ਒䳾ϯ㚾‫ݤ‬䶠䶦уа䳾ϯǴٗ҃‫؂‬㚚䳾ϯ䬙ӷ‫ޑ‬ѳ֡㬖㣣՗侓 ёа僳΋‫؁‬㭨Ͽ‫ډ‬Ϥ㧀ϖ㣣Ǵѝ՞চ䗂ᕷᥟӷѳ֡㬖㣣‫ޑ‬ԭϩϐѤΜ㳾Ƕ䳾 ϯ䬙ӷ‫ޑ‬௢ՉǴ㛐侬ӧΔู௲‫ػ‬ǵ䧥ନЎ‫کޓ‬΋૓Γ‫ޑ‬䜐㛙Бय़೿Ԗࡐε‫ޑ‬ ճ੻ǴӢԜ‫ډڙ‬㚬εဂ㜚੝ձࢂϿԃΔู‫ޑ‬䮔ਗ਼㝔߆Ƕ! !΋٤ѓࢴϩηճҔӅ䜨ᵫ᏾匞‫ޑ‬ᤵ㜘Ǵ㛱Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ僳ՉΑ䦭ࢥ‫װޑ‬䞤Ǵ俦䬙 ӷ䳾ϯབᕪΑǴा㡚䞼ଣᄖӣ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢǶ䳾ϯ䬙ӷࢂ಄ӝ㚬εΓ҇ճ੻ ‫ޑ‬ӳ٣ǴϸΓ҇‫ޑ‬ѓࢴϩηԾฅाϸ㛱Ǵ‫ע‬Ѭ俦ԋ֥٣Ƕ‫ך‬䜹㚸㚬εΓ҇ճ ੻‫ޑ‬ҥ䢉р䠁Ǵ䥷俗ޭ‫ۓ‬Ǻ䬙ӷ䳾ϯ⍻㡵䜀䜰ᢩΔู‫ک‬Ў‫ޓ‬㚾Α΋ҹӳ٣Ǵ ࢂབӳΑԶόࢂབᕪΑǶ! !ՠࢂӧќ΋Бय़ǴѸ勬ࡰрǴ䬙ӷ䳾ϯπբύ⍻㡵㤆Ԗ΋٤લ㧀Ƕӳ٤ӕ‫ד‬ ӛ‫ך‬䜹ගрΑӝ౛‫ࡌޑ‬侠Ǵ‫׆‬ఈ‫ך‬䜹Ե仵Ƕ㛱Ϊ㤄٤ගཀ佡‫ޑ‬䮔ЈΓγǴ‫ך‬ 䜹ࢂࡐག倔‫ޑ‬Ƕ㝫ԃ䗂‫ޑ‬٣㡵侳ܴǺ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢύ‫⍻ޑ‬ԖϿ㹠䬙ӷ‫ޑ‬䳾ϯ 㚾‫ݤ‬Ǵ੝ձӧӕॣжඹБय़ǴԵ仵ளό㮅‫ډڬ‬ǴӢԜӧ٬Ҕ΢㤆ό㮅ִ๓Ǵ ‫ޣ܈‬ёૈ䠁ғ信ှǶКБаȸѝȹжȸ̰̞Äʙ荛ȹǴ㤄ҁ䗂ࢂԐςࢬՉ‫ޑ‬䜌 䧁Ǵӧ䶖εӭ㹠䢉ӝࢂ࡞㜾‫ޑ‬ǹՠࢂȸ侪ӭಭѝ೯㠤亄Ҳγ僱‫ݞ‬ȹǴ൩Ԗё ૈ೏౛ှ䜀ȸ侪ӭಭ㚶㚶೯㠤亄Ҳγ僱‫ݞ‬ȹǶ㤆Ԗ΋٤ӷǴҗΪӧБਢύ㠀 ԖҬжమཱǴӢԶ೏Γ信ҔǶ‫ٯ‬ӵǴȸቻԏȹȸଳᵱȹ䳾ϯԋ䜀ȸ۴ԏȹȸυ ᵱȹࢂὐ㜾‫ޑ‬Ǵՠࢂ‫ע‬ȸ㥡୘‫ف‬ቻԳȹȸଳໜȹ㛙ԋȸ㥡୘‫ف‬ቻԳȹȸυ ໜȹǴԾฅ൩ࢂ凿信‫ޑ‬ΑǶ! !㡚䞼ଣϦѲ䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢ‫ޑ‬㜞侠ύ佤‫ۓ‬ǺନΑಃ΋߄‫ޑ‬ΒԭΟΜ㚚ӷբ䜀҅ Ԅ௢ՉаѦǴБਢ‫ޑ‬ಃΒ߄ǵಃΟ߄㤆ӧ۴‫؃‬ཀ佡Ǵ㤆㠀Ԗനӟ⍻‫ۓ‬Ƕ൩ࢂ ಃ΋߄ύ‫ޑ‬ӷǴӵ݀⍻㡵Ԗόὐ㜾‫ޑ‬Ǵ‫ך‬䜹Ψྗ䣅Ե仵অ‫ׯ‬Ƕ䯢ӧЎӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ ‫ہ‬䠑㜘҅ӧӛӚБय़۴‫؃‬ཀ佡ǴԂਥ‵㝫ԃ䗂俇Ҕ‫ޑ‬䶈厚Ǵ㛱䬙ӷ䳾ϯБਢ 僳Չ᏾౛অ侔Ƕ! !ՠࢂ㚸᏾㚚䗂俦Ǵ䜀㞇㜥Γ҇‫ޑ‬ճ੻๱གྷǴ䜀Δู‫ک‬ӟжη䣸‫ޑ‬ճ੻๱གྷǴ 䬙ӷ䳾ϯπբѸ勬䶠䶦䲹᫾௢僳Ǵ٬‫܌‬ԖК働தҔ‫ޑ‬ǵ㬖㣣働ᕷ‫ޑ‬ӷ೿ૈ೴ ‫؁‬ள‫ډ‬䳾ϯǶ䯢ӧಃΒ߄‫ک‬ಃΟ߄ύ‫ޑ‬ε೽ϩӷ㤆㠀Ԗ٬ҔǶ㤆ԖࡐӭК働 தҔ‫ޑ‬ӷǴ‫ٯ‬ӵ偰ǵ៙ǵ᝾ǵᛈǵ᏾ǵᙌǵᙒǵᛒǵᔇǵ僥ǵᆸǵགǵቹǵ ሷǵႵ฻฻Ǵ䥷俗䳾ϯǴՠࢂ㠀Ԗ䳾ϯǶԜѦǴ㤆Ԗ΋೽ϩӦӜҔӷǴ‫ޣ܈‬ 㬖㣣働ӭǴ‫ޣ܈‬ғሻ劵侖Ǵ‫ޣ܈‬Β‫ޣ‬ঋԶԖϐǴӵᡢǵឥǵʙ荜Ǵ̞᪰ʙ荝ǵ ᐔǵ劏ǵ५ǵ⑝ǵ∭ǵㆪǵ㎂ǵ⇃ǵ῵ǵ̰̞Û̫ʙ荞̰̞᪤ʙ荟฻฻ǴΨѸ

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


勬уа䳾ϯǴ‫ޣ܈‬ҔӕॣԶ㬖㣣䳾㡇‫ޑ‬ዕӷжඹǶ㤄٤ӷύԖ٤ӧဂ㜚ύς ԖࢬՉ‫ޑ‬䳾ᥟǴёаԵ仵ߍ䵬ǹԖ٤㤆㠀Ԗ೯Չ‫ޑ‬䳾ᥟǴΨёаӧӭБ۴‫؃‬ ဂ㜚ཀ佡‫୷ޑ‬䲈΢佤‫ۓ‬Ѭ䜹‫ޑ‬䳾ᥟǴ䶈㠤΋‫ۓ‬㟭ය‫ޑ‬俇ҔǴεৎ侖䜀ὐ㜾Ǵ ฅӟ҅Ԅ௢ՉǶ䦧ϐǴ䬙ӷ䳾ϯπբࢂ䞄‫س‬ӄ㡚Γ҇‫ޑ‬ε٣Ǵ΋Бय़䥷俗཈ ख़Ǵόё૛౗Ǵՠࢂќ΋Бय़ΞѸ勬ߍ‫ڗ‬䲹᫾‫ޑ‬௛ࡼǴ䶠䶦௢僳Ǵωૈԏ‫ډ‬ ‫׳‬ε‫ޑ‬ԋਏǶҞ߻㚬εဂ㜚㛱Ϊ䳾ϯ䬙ӷࢂ䮔ਗ਼㝔߆‫ޑ‬Ǵՠࢂ䳾ϯ‫ޑ‬ӷ㹠ό ӭǴόૈ䭣‫ى‬д䜹‫ޑ‬ॐϪा‫؃‬ȋȋ㤄ࢂҞ߻ဂ㜚٬Ҕ䳾ӷБय़䜨ғ΋٤䵰‫ݔ‬ 䯢ຝ‫ޑ‬ЬाচӢǶ䜀ΑٛЗ䭦Ҕ䳾ӷаϷ੃ନӷᥟ‫ޑ‬䵰‫ݔ‬Ǵ㜞όࢂ੃᫾‫ޑ‬㚾 ‫ࠩૈ܌ݤ‬ਏǴѸ勬ӧ䬙ӷ䳾ϯπբ΢ߍ‫ڗ‬䲹᫾‫ޑ‬䦞ࡋǶ䳾ӷ䦧ࢂҗΓ҇ဂ㜚 䞫೷‫ޑ‬Ǵ൩ࢂᕷᥟӷΨࢂΓ҇ဂ㜚䞫೷‫ޑ‬Ƕ҅Ӣ䜀㤄㪰Ǵ‫܌‬а㛅䗂Ўӷ೯㠤 㚬εဂ㜚‫ޑ‬٬ҔǴ䦧ࢂό㯑䠁৖‫ک‬䠃ϯ‫ޑ‬Ƕ剱匉ӧΪӵՖ໣ύဂ㜚‫ޑ‬ඵችǴ уа俵᏾᏾౛Ǵ䵬Ε䶘΋‫ޑ‬佤णǴаߡΪ䥷Ҕȋȋ㤄൩ࢂ‫ך‬䜹䯢ӧ䥷俗ոΚ ଺ӳ‫ޑ‬πբǶ! !ӆ俦௢㚬ද೯俏Ƕ! !‫ך‬㡚俦䬙俟‫ޑ‬Γ҇㩲߈Ϥ䜰Ǵ俦๱Ӛᳪόӕ‫ޑ‬Б‫ق‬Ǵ‫؂‬㚚Б‫ق‬㚵೽㤆Ԗ侪ӭ λБ‫ق‬Ƕ٬ҔчБ俏‫ޑ‬ΓαനӭǴ䵟՞٬Ҕ䬙俟‫ޑ‬ӄ೽ΓαԭϩϐΎΜа΢Ƕ 㤄൩俦ܴΑǺ䬙俟ύ΋Бय़Ӹӧ๱䛸ख़‫ޑ‬Б‫ق‬䵰‫ݔ‬ǴനЬा‫ࢂޑ‬俟ॣ΢‫ޑ‬䵰 ‫ݔ‬Ǵՠࢂќ΋Бय़ΨӸӧ๱೴‫؁‬䶘΋‫ޑ‬Ԗճ࠼佢㟵ҹǶ䬙俟僳΋‫؁‬䶘΋‫୷ޑ‬ 䲈൩ࢂач٧俟ॣ䜀䪌ྗॣǵачБ俏䜀୷䲈Б‫ޑق‬ද೯俏Ƕ! !ද೯俏ࢂ䬙҇௼‫ޑ‬Ӆӕ俟‫ق‬ǴԶЪёа俦ǴΨࢂ‫ך‬㡚Ӛ௼Γ҇‫ޑ‬Ӆӕ俟‫ق‬Ƕ ϞϺ‫ך‬䜹‫ޑ‬㡚ৎǴӧࡹ‫ݯ‬ǵ䶈䬵ǵЎϯ΢㡵䯢Α㛅ў΢‫ޑ߻ޜ‬䡺䶌‫ک‬䶘΋Ǵ ӄ㡚Γ҇ӧᵫ‫۬ࡹک‬勷䤐ϐΠ䡺䶌΋ठǴ䜀ࡌ侰‫ޗ‬㜘Ь㚜㤄㚚ӅӕҞ䪌Զ㡧 ЏǴΓ҇ဂ㜚ॐϪሡा΋ᳪӅӕ‫ޑ‬俟‫ق‬Ƕӵ݀㠀Ԗ㤄ᳪӅӕ俟‫ق‬Ǵ൩㜘䶒‫ך‬ 㡚Γ҇‫ݯࡹޑ‬ǵ䶈䬵ǵЎϯғࢲ䥨䗂΋‫֚ޑۓ‬劵ǶӢԜӧӄ㡚Γ҇ύεΚ௢ 㚬ද೯俏Ǵ൩ࢂ΋勪ख़ा‫ݯࡹޑ‬Һ䞼Ƕ! !Ծ㚸˞˦ˢˢԃӄ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜘侠а䗂Ǵ௢㚬ද೯俏‫ޑ‬πբς䶈ԏ‫ډ‬΋‫ޑۓ‬ ԋਏǶନΑύѧ௢㚬ද೯俏πբ‫ہ‬䠑㜘ϐѦǴӧΒΜΒ㚚࣪ѱΨς䶈侰ҥΑ ௢㚬‫ޑ‬ᤵ᫴Ƕ‫˦˞ډ‬ˢˤԃԃۭ䜀ЗǴӄ㡚‫ڙ‬㠤ද೯俏俟ॣ侟䵼‫ޑ‬ύλ䗄‫ک‬ 㝃ण䗄ਠ௲㝃ςԖΎΜΒᢩ΋ίϤԭΓǶ㚸㚬ኞύ䗄䜌㠤ද೯俏‫ॣ࡫ک‬ӷ҆ ‫ޑ‬Γς䶈ԖӳΗԭᢩǶ㚸˞˦ˢˣԃࣿ‫ۑ‬ଆǴӄ㡚λ䗄΋ԃ䵠䥾‫ۈ‬௲䗄ද೯ 俏Ǵύ䗄‫ک‬㝃ण䗄ਠ䗄ғΨӧ䬙俟俰ύ䗄䜌Αද೯俏Ƕ㚸侪ӭБ‫ق‬㛂௲䗄‫ޑ‬ 䶌࣮݀䗂Ǵԋ䶢ࢂѮε‫ޑ‬Ǵ֚劵ࢂֹӄёаլܺ‫ޑ‬Ƕ䜀Αߡճ௲䗄Ǵӄ㡚ӭ 㹠࣪ѱ僳ՉΑБ‫؁߃ޑق‬俵ࢗπբǴਥ‵俵ࢗ‫ޑ‬䶌݀㛙ԋ‫ޑ‬㩽շБ‫ق‬㛂ဂ㜚 䗄䜌ද೯俏‫ޑ‬Ћ㛘ς䶈р‫ހ‬ӭᳪǶ௲‫ػ‬೽ǵЎӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ہ‬䠑㜘‫ک‬Ӛ࣪ѱ䷏‫ޑڋ‬ ද೯俏௲‫׷‬ǵ俭‫ނ‬Ǵ処Չ䵟㠣ϖԭӭᢩ㛘ǶӚᳪ௲䗄ද೯俏Ҕ‫ޑ‬੮㞴Т処Չ ΋ԭӭᢩ䦄Ƕ௲‫ػ‬೽‫ࣽک‬䗄ଣӝ㚾‫ޑ‬ද೯俏俟ॣࣴ‫ز‬੤Ǵς䶈䜀Ӛ࣪ѱ୻䞇 ΑϖԭϖΜӭӜ௢㚬ද೯俏‫ޑ‬ମυǶ! !㝫ԃ䗂‫ޑ‬䶈厚侳ܴǴѝा勷䤐ख़佦Ǵ侖੿πբǴ㝀ᆅӧБ‫کق‬ද೯俏ৡձ働 ε‫ޑ‬Ӧ㛂ǴႽੈԢǵԢ亄ǵ΢ੇǵᅽࡌǵ㚬䛵฻ӦǴ௢㚬ද೯俏‫ޑ‬πբΨૈ ԏ‫ډ‬䩒๱‫ޑ‬ԋਏǶ!


Chapter Four

!௢㚬ද೯俏Ԃόࢂ੃䮀Б‫ق‬ǶБ‫ࢂق‬㜘剟යӸӧ‫ޑ‬ǴѬόૈҔΓ䜀‫ޑ‬Б‫ݤ‬䗂 ੃䮀ǶБ‫ق‬Ψࢂ΋ᳪԖҔ‫ޑ‬Ҭ劤π‫ڀ‬ǴѬࢂ䜀ࢌ΋੝‫ۓ‬Ӧ㛂‫ޑ‬Γ҇ܺ䞼‫ޑ‬Ǵ ՠࢂѬԖӦ㛂‫ֽޑ‬ज़‫܄‬Ǵຬ㠤㤄㚚ज़ࡋ൩䛹ѨҬ劤π‫ޑڀ‬բҔǴԋ䜀ϕ࣬Α ှ‫ޑ‬ም㻁Ƕ௢㚬ද೯俏Ԃόࢂ࿣ЗБ‫ق‬ǴԶࢂ٬俦Б‫ޑق‬Γ䜹ӧԾρ‫ޑ‬䜍ॣ ϐѦǴ䗄㜘俦΋ᳪӄ҇௼Ӆӕ‫ޑ‬俟‫ق‬ǴаߡၟӚӦ㛂‫ޑ‬Γϕ࣬Ҭ劤Ƕ‫ך‬䜹䥷 俗ӧӚ䵠䗄ਠύǴ੝ձࢂλ䗄ǵύ䗄‫ک‬㝃ण䗄ਠύǴεΚ௢㚬ද೯俏Ƕ䥷俗 ӧυ೽ύǴ੝ձࢂ㛂а΢Ӛ䵠ӦБυ೽‫ߙک‬ԃυ೽ύǴεΚගঀ䗄䜌ද೯俏Ƕ ӧќ΋Бय़ǴҗΪБ‫ق‬ӧӦБ‫ࢲ܄‬㜥ύϝฅଆ㰢ख़ा‫ޑ‬բҔǴѦ䗂υ೽㤆䥷 㜾䲹᫾䗄䜌㜾Ӧ‫ޑ‬Б‫ق‬ǴаߡஏϪ世‫س‬ဂ㜚Ǵ଺ӳπբǶ! !௢㚬ද೯俏ό䥷㜾ǴΨό㜘䨆্‫ך‬㡚䤄‫ݤ‬偠ᢳ‫ޑ‬Ӛл‫҇׌‬௼٬Ҕ‫ک‬䠁৖ҁ҇ ௼俟‫ޑق‬䩯ճǶද೯俏ԾฅЬा䥷俗ӧ䬙௼Γ҇ύ௢㚬ǶՠࢂҞ߻Ӛл‫҇׌‬ ௼ύԖ侪ӭΓा‫؃‬䗄䜌䬙俟ǴԶЪёа勵਑Ǵӧ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢϦѲࡼՉϐӟǴ ॷշΪ࡫ॣБਢ䗄䜌䬙俟‫ޑ‬Γ㜘‫׳‬佡ቚӭǶӢԜǴӧл‫҇׌‬௼ύёаԶЪ䥷 俗ගঀ䗄䜌ද೯俏ǴԂЪ㛱Ծᄉ䗄䜌‫ޑ‬Γ䥷俗㝀ໆ䭣‫ى‬д䜹‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬Ǵ㤄ࢂԖ ճΪӚ௼Γ҇ϐ剷‫ޑ‬ϕ࣬䡺䶌‫ک‬ϕ࣬䗄䜌Ǵ಄ӝ‫ך‬㡚Ӛ҇௼‫ޑ‬Ӆӕճ੻‫ޑ‬Ƕ ӧќ΋Бय़Ǵӧл‫҇׌‬௼Ӧ㛂πբ‫ޑ‬䬙௼υ೽Ǵόՠ䥷俗൧ख़л‫҇׌‬௼٬Ҕ ‫ک‬䠁৖҇௼俟‫ޑق‬䩯ճǴԶЪѸ勬ոΚ䗄䜌л‫҇׌‬௼‫ޑ‬俟‫ق‬Ƕ! !௢㚬ද೯俏ࢂ΋勪剟ය‫ޑ‬ဂ㜚‫ޑ܄‬πբǴा‫؃‬όૈ㠤ଯ㠤࡚Ƕ௢㚬ач٧俟 ॣ䜀䪌ྗॣ‫ޑ‬ද೯俏ǴԂόࢂा‫؃‬εৎ‫ע‬ч٧俟ॣ俦ளႽч٧Γ΋㪰Ǵ㤄㪰 ‫ޑ‬ा‫ࢂ؃‬όӝ౛‫ޑ‬ǴΨࢂόѸा‫ޑ‬Ƕч٧俟ॣࢂ㚚䪌ྗǴ㤄ࢂεৎոΚ‫ޑ‬Б ӛǴՠࢂӧ‫ڀ‬ᥟπբύ㛱Ϊόӕ‫ޑ‬㛱ຝ䥷Ԗόӕ‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬Ƕ㛱Ϊ㚬ኞ䠑ǵ俏㩀 ‫ک‬䰃ቹᄽ䠑ा‫؃‬ा䛸٤ǹ㛱㝃णǵύǵλ䗄ਠ俟Ў௲䠑‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬К΋૓Γ䥷俗 䛸٤ǹ㛱Ϊ΋૓Γ‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬䥷俗䤉٤Ƕ㛱ΪΔูǵߙԃ‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬Ǵ䥷俗όӕΪ㛱 ύԃΓ‫ޑ‬ा‫؃‬ǶҺՖ΋㚚ΓǴ䜀Α‫ע‬Ծρ‫ޑ‬俏俦ள‫׳‬уௗ߈ද೯俏΋٤Զբ ‫ޑ‬ҺՖոΚǴ䥷俗ள‫ډ‬εৎ‫܍ޑ‬侖‫ک‬൧ལǴӢ䜀дӧ侖੿僳Չ΋ҹ䛸丝‫ޑ‬π բǶӚӦ௢㚬ද೯俏πբ‫ہ‬䠑㜘‫ک‬௲‫ػ‬೽剫Ǵ䥷俗‫ۓ‬ය䜁㚾ද೯俏ᄽ俦䳣偰 ‫܈‬侶КǴ㛱Ϊද೯俏䗄ளӳ‫ک‬௲ளӳ‫ޑ‬Γ䶒а΋‫ޑۓ‬䣖䟃ǶѝԖ㤄㪰Ǵωૈ ੃ନ勯仵Ǵගଯεৎ䗄䜌ද೯俏‫ߞޑ‬Ј‫ک‬䞅፪Ǵωૈ௪ଆ΋㚚ဂ㜚‫ޑ܄‬௢㚬 ද೯俏僱㜥ǶҞ߻‫ޗ‬㜘΢㤆Ԗ΋٤όճΪ௢㚬ද೯俏‫ޑ‬匞ᣅǶКБǴ䗄俦ද ೯俏‫ޑ‬ΓԖ㟭ள‫ޑډ‬όࢂႴ䟃ǴԶࢂ侗ઢǶ࠸η䜹ӣ‫ډ‬ৎٚ俦ද೯俏Ǵ‫ډڙ‬ Ԗ٤ৎ剟‫ޑ‬Ѿ倸Ǵ侖䜀ࢂȸᄓ٧๚ȹǵȸ‫ב‬ҁȹǶ㤄٤٣㡵俦ܴ‫ך‬䜹‫࠹ޑ‬䝀 πբ଺ளࡐৡǴӧ‫ޗ‬㜘΢㤆ԖόϿΓ㛱Ϊ௢㚬ද೯俏‫ޑ‬ཀ㚜‫ک‬բҔό㮅ΑှǶ 䜀Α傶౽㤄ᳪ‫ޗ‬㜘匞ᣅǴ䜀௢㚬ද೯俏೷ԋԖճ㟵ҹǴ‫ך‬䜹‫׆‬ఈӚՏж߄ૈ 㮅ӛӚБय़ΓγεΚ僳Չ࠹䝀πբǶ! !䜀ΑԖਏӦ௲䗄ද೯俏Ǵ㤆Ѹ勬Ԗ΋঺දၹ೯Չ‫ॣ࡫ޑ‬ӷ҆Ƕ㠤ѐҗΪ䬙俟 ࡫ॣБਢ㠀Ԗ⍻‫ۓ‬Ǵ㤄䶒௢㚬ද೯俏πբ䥨䗂Α΋‫֚ޑۓ‬劵Ƕ䯢ӧ䬙俟࡫ॣ Бਢջ㩲⍻‫ۓ‬ǴԶЪ㤄঺࡫ॣӷ҆ǴҗΪߍҔॣનϯ‫܎ޑ‬΍ӷ҆ǴߡΪБ‫ق‬ 㛂‫ޑ‬Γ䜹㛱КԾρ‫ޑ‬Бॣ䗂䗄䜌ද೯俏Ǵ㩲εεԖճΪϞӟද೯俏‫ޑ‬௢㚬π բǶ! !䯢ӧӆ俦‫کۓڋ‬௢Չ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǶ!

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


!२Ӄ䥷俗俦ܴǺ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢόࢂ䬙俟࡫ॣЎӷǶ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬ЬाҔ೼ ࢂ䶒䬙ӷ‫࡫کॣݙ‬㛙ද೯俏Ǵа㩽շ侸ӷǵ䶘΋俭ॣ‫ک‬௲䗄ද೯俏ǴҞ‫ޑ‬ӧ Ϊߡճ㚬εΓ҇‫ޑ‬䗄䜌‫ک‬٬Ҕ䬙ӷǴаϷߦ僳䬙俟‫ޑ‬僳΋‫؁‬䶘΋ǴԂߚҔ䗂 жඹ䬙ӷǶԿΪ䬙ӷ‫߻ޑ‬೼剱匉ǺѬࢂ҉僴ό䠃㤆ࢂा䠃‫ګ‬ǻѬࢂӧ䬙ӷ‫ڰ‬ Ԗ‫׎ޑ‬ᥟण䡼㚵䠃ϯǴ㤆ࢂ೏࡫ॣЎӷ‫܌‬жඹ‫ګ‬ǻѬࢂ䜀܎΍ӷ҆Ԅ‫ॣ࡫ޑ‬ Ўӷ‫܌‬жඹǴ㤆ࢂ䜀ձ‫׎ޑ‬Ԅ‫ॣ࡫ޑ‬Ўӷ‫܌‬жඹ‫ګ‬ǻ㤄٤剱匉‫ך‬䜹䯢ӧ㤆ё аόԆѐբ䶌侬Ƕ‫ך‬䜹侖䜀Ǻ䬙ӷ䦧ࢂा䠃‫ޑ‬Ǵ৾䬙ӷ㠤ѐ‫ޑ‬䠃ϯ൩ёа侳 ܴǴ㩲䗂䦧ࢂा‫و‬ШࣚӅӕ‫ॣ࡫ޑ‬БӛǶԶЪёа俦ǴШࣚӚ㚚҇௼‫ޑ‬俟‫ق‬ ‫ک‬ЎӷǴ㩲䗂䦧Ԗ΋Ϻ㜘೴䭍ௗ߈‫ک‬䶘΋Ƕՠࢂ㤄٤೿ό㳩Ϊ㜾߻Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ ‫ޑ‬Һ䞼‫ޑ‬ण䡼ǴӢԜ‫ך‬䜹ϞϺ㤆όѸуа侚侬Ƕ! !䞄Ϊ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢ‫ڋޑ‬侔䶈㠤‫ک‬Ѭ‫ޑ‬Ҕ㛪Ǵ‫ך‬䜹ӧΠय़բ働䜀俘䵿‫ޑ‬俦 ܴǶ! !Βǵ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢ‫ڋޑ‬侔䶈㠤‫ک‬Ѭ‫ޑ‬Ҕ㛪! !΋ΐѤΐԃΜДǴύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜧㜘ӧч٧ԋҥǴ൩䥾‫ۈ‬僳ՉԖ䞄‫ڋ‬侔䬙俟 ࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬πբǶ΋ΐϖΒԃΒДǴύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠࣴ‫ہز‬䠑㜘ԋҥǴѬ‫ޑ‬Ь ाπբǴନΑ䳾ϯ䬙ӷϐѦǴ൩ࢂࣴ‫ॣ࡫ز‬БਢǶ㚸΋ΐϖΒԃΒД‫ډ‬΋ΐ ϖѤԃԃۭ߈Ο㚚ԃ㛮‫ޑ‬㟭剷㚵ǴЬाӦ僳ՉΑ҇௼‫׎‬Ԅջ䬙ӷ㬖㣣Ԅ࡫ॣ Бਢ‫کزࣴޑ‬㢤侔πբǶ΋ΐϖѤԃΜΒДǴύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠࣴ‫ہز‬䠑㜘‫ׯ‬䵽 ԋ䜀ύ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ‫ہ‬䠑㜘аӟǴӧ㜘㚵侰ҥΑ࡫ॣБਢ‫ہ‬䠑㜘Ǵ㛱࡫ॣБਢ 僳ՉΑ‫׳‬ӄय़‫سޑ‬䶘‫زࣴޑ‬πբǶ‫ډ‬΋ΐϖϖԃΜДǴ㢤侔рΑѤ㚚䬙ӷ㬖 㣣Ԅ‫ޑ‬Ǵ㝫㚚㡚劤೯Ҕӷ҆Ԅ‫ޑ‬Ȑ‫ځ‬ύ΋㚚ࢂ܎΍ӷ҆Ԅ‫ޑ‬Ǵќ΋㚚ࢂ߮Ў ӷ҆Ԅ‫ޑ‬ȑ࡫ॣБਢ૛ዺǴම䶈ϩ䠁䶒㜾㟭ӧч٧䜁Չ‫ޑ‬ӄ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜘侠 ‫ޑ‬ж߄䜹Ǵ۴‫؃‬ཀ佡Ƕӄ㡚Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜘侠аӟǴਥ‵Ηԃ䗂‫ޑ‬К働ࣴ‫ز‬ǵဂ 㜚‫ޑ‬ཀ佡‫ک‬勷䤐΢‫ࡰޑ‬ҢǴ㜞‫ߍۓ‬Ҕ܎΍ӷ҆Ƕ΋ΐϖϤԃΒДǴ䠁߄䬙俟 ࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬ಃ΋㚚૛ਢǴ㚬‫ݱ‬۴‫؃‬ཀ佡ǶନΑࡹ㜧ӄ㡚‫ہ‬䠑㜘த䞼‫ہ‬䠑㜘є 䥾䧣ε㜘侠僳Չ侚侬аѦǴӚӦӧࡹ㜧‫ہ‬䠑㜘ύ䵽䶀侚侬‫ޑ‬ԖΒΜΒ㚚࣪ǵ Ο㚚ѱǵ㝫㚚Ծ‫ݯ‬㛂ǵΒΜϤ㚚࣪僠ѱǵѤ㚚䟼‫ک‬΋㚚Ծ‫ݯ‬ԀǴ㡌уΓ㹠ӧ ΋ᢩа΢Ƕᢳ࡫ॣӷ҆䞄‫س‬К働ஏϪ‫ޑ‬儌䰃ǵੇ䞎ǵ冧ၰǵ‫ޓ‬Γ௲‫ػ‬฻೽剫 㤆㛱૛ਢ僳ՉΑόӕ佤ኳ‫ޑ‬䛱剫侚侬ǶќѦǴ㚸΋ΐϖϤԃΒД‫ډ‬ΐДǴ‫ך‬ 䜹㤆ԏ‫ډ‬ӄ㡚ӚБय़ΓγϷੇѦ䟠䝒㛱૛ਢ‫ޑ‬䜐य़ཀ佡ѤίΟԭӭҹǶ! !ਥ‵΢ॊӚБय़‫ޑ‬ཀ佡ǴΪ΋ΐϖϤԃΖД‫ך‬䜹ගрΑ㛱㤄㚚૛ਢ‫ޑ‬অ҅ཀ 佡Ǵଌ俩㡚䞼ଣ䤂ਡǶΜДǴ㡚䞼ଣ侰ҥ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ䤂侔‫ہ‬䠑㜘僳Չ䤂侠Ƕ Կ΋ΐϖΎԃΜДǴ䤂侔‫ہ‬䠑㜘䥾㠤ϖԛ㜘侠Ǵӭԛ০俺ǴԂЪම䶈ᗎ俩ӧ ч٧‫ޑ‬俟‫ق‬ǵ௲‫ػ‬ǵЎ乱ǵཥ剾ǵр‫ހ‬ǵࣽ‫מ‬ǵᙌ促ӚࣚаϷ೽功‫ک‬Γ҇䡺 ᥟ‫ޑ‬ж߄΋ԭΎΜΖΓ䜁Չ০俺Ǵӕ㟭ӛ٧ѦΟΜΐ㚚ࠤѱ‫ޑ‬΋ԭՏ俟Ўπ բ‫ޣ‬䜐य़۴‫؃‬ཀ佡Ƕ䶈㠤ϸᯕ侚侬ǵዲ୘‫ک‬অ侔Ǵ䤂侔‫ہ‬䠑㜘Ϊ΋ΐϖΎԃ ΜДගрঅ҅૛ਢǴ䶈ࡹ㜧ӄ㡚‫ہ‬䠑㜘த䞼‫ہ‬䠑㜘‫ޑ‬䧣ε㜘侠侚侬ǴΜ΋Д ΋Вҗ㡚䞼ଣӄᥟ㜘侠ಃϤΜԛ㜘侠բ䜀ȸ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢȹ೯㠤ǴԂЪ 㜞‫ۓ‬ගҬӄ㡚Γ҇ж߄ε㜘侚侬‫ྗץک‬Ƕ!


Chapter Four

!ӧ㤄ٚǴ‫ך‬䜹Ѹ勬ࡰрǴӧ㢤‫ڋ‬Бਢ‫ޑ‬᏾㚚㠤ำύ剷Ǵ‫ך‬䜹㤆ள‫ډ‬Α΋ίӭ Տ䮔Ј࡫ॣӷ҆‫ޑ‬ӕ‫ޑד‬㜧շǶ㚸΋ΐѤΐԃЎӷ‫ׯ‬ॠ㜧㜘‫ޑ‬㟭යଆ‫ډ‬΋ΐ ϖΎԃΜДЗǴ‫ך‬䜹ԏ‫ډ‬Αӄ㡚ӚӦΓγ‫ੇک‬Ѧ䟠䝒஌䗂‫ޑ‬ӚԄӚ㪰‫ޑ‬䬙俟 ࡫ॣБਢӅ侓΋ίΒԭӭ㚚Ƕ㝀ᆅ‫ځ‬ύ‫ޑ‬εӭ㹠Ǵբ䜀ֹ᏾‫ޑ‬БਢǴ㤆όૈ 俦ࢂԋዕ‫ޑ‬Ǵՠࢂ‫ځ‬ύ‫ޑ‬΋٤侰侓‫ࡌک‬侠Ǵ䶒Α‫ך‬䜹όϿ‫ޑ‬㞛䠁‫ک‬㩽շǶ䬙 俟࡫ॣБਢ‫ڋޑ‬侔ֹԋǴࢂၟ㤄΋ίӭՏӕ‫ޑד‬㜧շϩό䥾‫ޑ‬Ƕ! !а΢൩ࢂ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢ‫ڋ‬侔‫ޑ‬䶈㠤Ƕ٣㡵侳ܴǺ㤄㚚૛ਢࢂ䶈㠤䛱ৎ剟 යࣴ‫ز‬ǵӚБϸᯕ侚侬‫ک‬ӭԛঅ侔‫ޑ‬ǴѬ⍻㡵ϸࢀΑ㡌у侚侬‫ޑ‬εӭ㹠Γ‫ޑ‬ ཀ佡Ƕ䥷俗俦Ǵࡹ۬㛱ࡑ㤄勪πբ‫ޑ‬䦞ࡋࢂ侖੿倴倸‫ޑ‬Ǵ‫؁ޑڗߍ܌‬厲Ψࢂ ཈ख़‫ޑ‬Ƕѓࢴϩηകդ再俦㤄ࢂΗ㚚Γ䞄ଆ剫䗂བ‫ޑ‬Ǵȸѝ䶈Ͽ㹠䮔Јϩη 侚侬ȹǴ㤄ԾฅࢂձԖҔЈ‫ޑ‬ԦጮǶ! !㚸‫ך‬㡚䬙ӷ‫ޑॣݙ‬㛅ў䠁৖䗂࣮Ǵ㤄㚚䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ૛ਢࢂ䶠‫ך܍‬㡚ȸ‫ޔ‬ ॣȹǵȸϸϪȹǵ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆‫ޑ‬䝀䶘ǴࢂӧѬ䜹‫୷ޑ‬䲈΢䠁৖ଆ䗂‫ޑ‬Ƕ䬙ӷ㳩 Ϊ߄ཀЎӷᥟ‫س‬Ǵӷ‫׎‬΢࣮όр俭ॣǴӢԶ䜨ғ࡛㪰䶒䬙ӷ‫ޑॣݙ‬剱匉Ƕ㛅 䗂Ԗ㝫ᳪЬा‫ޑ‬㚾‫ݤ‬Ǵ΋㚚ࢂȸ‫ॣޔ‬ȹǴ΋㚚ࢂȸϸϪȹǶ‫ॣޔ‬൩ࢂҔӕॣ ӷ䗂‫ॣݙ‬ǹ㤄㚚㚾‫֚ޑݤ‬劵Ǵ҅ӵమර劧ᐝ‫܌‬俦Ǻȸ‫܈‬㛐ӕॣϐӷ䞩‫ݤځ‬䳓Ǵ 㨏ԖӕॣϐӷԶ劲ሻ劵侸Ǵ䞩‫ݤځ‬Ξ䳓Ƕȹ䬙҃䠁ܴΑϸϪǴ൩ࢂҔ㝫㚚ӷ 䗂࡫΋㚚ॣǺ΢ӷ‫ڗ‬㞴ǴΠӷ‫ڗ‬㼿ǶϸϪ‫ޑ‬ӳ㛪ࢂ㛐侬ϙΧӷॣ೿࡫Ϫளр 䗂ǴѬ‫ޑ‬લ㧀ࢂ࡫Ϫଆ䗂όБߡǴ΋૓Γόܰ勷㜘ǹԶЪၟ‫ݤॣޔ‬΋㪰Ǵ೿ Ѹ勬Ӄ侸όϿӷωՉǶٌҮॠ‫ڮ‬ϐӟ䜨ғΑ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆Ǵѝा侖侸ΟΜΎ㚚ӷ ҆൩ёа࡫рҺՖч٧俟ॣ䗂Ƕ㤄Ծฅࢂ΋㚚ࡐε‫ޑ‬僳‫؁‬ǶՠࢂКଆ܎΍ӷ ҆䗂Ǵ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ԖѬ劵а伲௱‫ޑ‬લ㧀Ƕ२ӃѬନΑ‫ॣݙ‬аѦǴࡐϿ‫ځ‬дҔ㛪Ǵ ӢԜ劵а௢㚬Ƕ܎΍ӷ҆ӧࣽ䗄‫מ‬㛼΢දၹ٬ҔǴҔ㛪ӭǴௗ⛃ᤵ㜘ӭǴ䗄 Αό৒ܰ‫ב‬侢ǶߍҔ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆Ǵ΋૓ύ䗄ғϝ㛻ा䗄܎΍ӷ҆ǹߍҔ܎΍ӷ ҆Ǵ㞊όѸӆ䗄‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆Ƕ‫ځ‬ԛǴ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ύ΋೽ϩ㼿҆όࢂॣનӷ҆ǴӢ Ԝ㛱ΪҔբϿ㹠҇௼䞫೷Ўӷ‫୷ޑ‬䲈Ǵ㛱Ϊॣ促Ѧ䗂俟ǴΨόӵ܎΍ӷ҆㠆 ࢲǶ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢߍҔ܎΍ӷ҆Ǵ൩К‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆Ξ߻僳Α΋‫؁‬Ƕ! !㚸ߍҔ܎΍ӷ҆㤄㚚Бय़䗂࣮Ǵ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬㛅ў㯻ྍǴёаଓྉ‫ډ‬Οԭ ϖΜӭԃа߻Ƕ僴ӧܴරᢩ㛅ΟΜΟԃǴջ΋Ϥ႟ϖԃǴ൩䜨ғΑಃ΋㚚Ҕ ܎΍ӷ҆࡫㛙䬙俟‫ޑ‬БਢǶԾԜаӟǴම䶈劥䶦р䯢㠤ӚᳪӚ㪰‫܎ޑ‬΍ӷ҆ Ԅ‫ޑ‬䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǶΜΐШ䵣҃㛥аӟǴ㜾㟭䮫㡚‫ޕޑ‬侸ϩηǴဂଆගঀЎ ӷ‫ׯ‬ॠǴ䞫‫ॣ࡫ڋ‬БਢǶ‫ځ‬ύ㢤侔㠤܎΍ӷ҆Ԅ࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬Ԗ䟤䧘കǵԙЎ ᅜǵ㜤‫ۏ‬䧦ǵ㲢㱢қǵٔ䤱ǵ㜤䶠๓฻ΓǶԿ΋ΐΒϤԃǴ䜨ғΑҗ冗Ҏӕǵ Ꮏ刌ᅚǵ偺ϡҺ฻‫ڋ‬侔‫ޑ‬ȸ㡚俟䷶卺ӷȹǴමҗ㜾㟭ࠄ٧‫ޑ‬ε䗄ଣΪ΋ΐΒ Ζԃ҅ԄϦѲǶௗ㰢Ǵ΋ΐΟ΋ԃ䜨ғΑҗᘲࣿқǵ㞔ҏക฻‫ڋ‬侔‫ޑ‬ȸ܎΍ ϯཥЎӷȹǶ܎΍ϯཥЎӷ‫ک‬㡚俟䷶卺ӷࢂ܎΍ӷ҆Ԅ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢύК働 ֹ๓‫ޑ‬㝫㚚БਢǴεεຬຫΑѬ䜹ϐ߻‫ޑ‬ӚᳪБਢǶ䯢ӧ㤄㚚䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ ֎‫ڗ‬Αа۳Ӛᳪ܎΍ӷ҆Ԅ࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬ᣮ㧀ǴࢂӧѬ䜹‫୷ޑ‬䲈΢䠁৖Π䗂‫ޑ‬Ƕ ёа俦ѬࢂΟԭӭԃ䗂࡫ॣӷ҆僱㜥‫ޑ‬䶌඲ǴΨࢂϤΜԃ䗂ύ㡚Γ҇䞫೷࡫ ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬䶈厚䦧䶌Ƕ!

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


!‫ך‬䜹ߍҔ܎΍ӷ҆Ǵࢂόࢂёа俦‫ך‬䜹‫ޑ‬䮫㡚Јό㮅‫ګ‬ǻόૈ㤄㪰俦Ƕ܎΍ ӷ҆ࢂ䯢ӧШࣚ΢ϤΜӭ㚚㡚ৎӅӕ٬Ҕ‫ޑ‬ӷ҆ǴԶЪࢂӄШࣚҺՖ΋㚚҇ ௼ύ‫ڙ‬ύ฻௲‫ޑػ‬Γӧж㹠ǵΗՖǵϯ䗄ǵ‫ނ‬౛俰΢‫܌‬Ѹ勬䗄㜘‫ޑ‬΋঺Ӆӕ ಄㛦ǶႽߓ܎դ㹠ӷǵϦ㛅䵣ϡǵϦ‫ࡋڋ‬ໆᑽǵϖ䵸倣΋㪰ǴѬόࢂࢌ΋㚚 㡚ৎ䛱Ԗ‫ޑ‬䛵ՋǴԶࢂӄΓ㧵ӅԖ‫ޑ‬Ϧ‫ނ‬Ƕ҅ӵचถȐѬၟ܎΍ӷ҆΋㪰Ǵ όࢂ䬙҇௼‫ڰ‬Ԗ‫ޑ‬ȑૈ㮅ὐ䥷‫ך‬䜹‫҇ޑ‬௼‫ޑ‬ሡाԶԋ䜀‫ך‬䜹‫҇ޑ‬௼䜇Ꮤ΋㪰Ǵ ܎΍ӷ҆Ψૈ㮅ὐ䥷䬙俟‫ޑ‬ሡाԶԋ䜀‫ך‬䜹‫҇ޑ‬௼ӷ҆Ǵȋȋό㚶ࢂૈ㮅Ǵ ԶЪӧ‫ך‬䜹‫ޑ‬Бਢύς䶈㤄㪰଺‫ډ‬ΑǶҔ㤄঺䬙俟࡫ॣӷ҆࡫㛙р䗂‫ࢂ҅ޑ‬ Ӧၰ‫ޑ‬䬙俟ȋȋач٧俟ॣ䜀䪌ྗॣ‫ޑ‬ද೯俏ǶѬ䛶డό㜘䨆্‫ך‬䜹҇௼俟 ‫ޑق‬䵨ᲑǴӢԜΨ൩ό㜘ၟ҅㜾‫ޑ‬䮫㡚ག௃ԖҺՖ‫⛃ܢ‬Ǵ㤄ࢂΜϩܴқ‫ޑ‬ၰ ౛Ƕ! !‫ځ‬ԛǴ俦΋俦䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ‫ޑ‬Ҕ㛪Ƕ! !ಃ΋ࢂҔ䗂䶒䬙ӷ‫ॣݙ‬Ǵаගଯ௲䗄䬙ӷ‫ޑ‬ਏ౗Ƕ२ӃёаҔ䗂ӧλ䗄俟Ў 俰ҁ‫ک‬чБ俏㛂‫ޑ‬䧥‫ޓ‬俰ҁ΢‫ॣݙ‬ǶԜѦǴӵΔู俭‫ނ‬ǵ僶㣞䡾㣣ǵ೯߫㟥 тΨёаҔ䗂‫ॣݙ‬Ƕ㤄㪰Ǵ߃䗄Ўӷ‫ޑ‬Δู‫ک‬Ў‫ޓ‬Ǵ൩ёа٩᎞࡫ॣӷ҆䗂 劈俭䜐㟥ǴԂЪ僳΋‫؁‬侖侸‫׳‬ӭ䬙ӷǶӷ‫کڂ‬㼙‫ڂ‬ԾฅΨ䥷俗Ҕ࡫ॣӷ҆‫ݙ‬ ॣǶ΋૓㟥т䜐ᝤ΢ǴёаҔ䗂䶒հሻ‫ޑ‬ӷ‫ک‬৒ܰ俭凿‫ޑ‬ӷ‫ॣݙ‬Ƕ! !ಃΒࢂҔ䗂㩽շ௲䗄ද೯俏Ƕ௲䗄ද೯俏Ӏ㠾αԸ䝀௤Ǵ䗄Α৒ܰ‫ב‬侢ǴѸ 勬Ԗ΋঺࡫ॣӷ҆Ǵ䷏ӑද೯俏‫ޑ‬௲‫׷‬ǵ俭‫ނ‬ǵӷ߄‫ک‬㼙‫ڂ‬Ǵ‫ٮ‬䗄䜌‫ޑ‬Γ㼸 㟭㡌ԵǴਠ҅䠁ॣǴωૈԏ‫ډ‬ԋਏǶ࡫ॣӷ҆ࢂ௲䗄ද೯俏‫܌‬όёલϿ‫ޑ‬π ‫ڀ‬Ǵ㤄ࢂӧ俟‫ق‬௲䗄ύς䶈ள‫ډ‬кϩ侳ܴ‫ޑ‬Ƕ! !ಃΟࢂҔ䗂բ䜀‫ך‬㡚Ͽ㹠҇௼䞫೷Ўӷ‫ޑ‬Ӆӕ୷䲈Ƕ‫ך‬㡚侪ӭл‫҇׌‬௼ǴԿ Ϟ㤆㠀ԖԾρ‫҇ޑ‬௼ЎӷǴԖ٤㨏ฅςԖЎӷǴՠࢂ㤆Ԗલ㧀Ǵሡा‫ׯ‬ॠǶ л‫҇׌‬௼䞫೷‫ׯک‬ॠЎӷǴӵ݀Ӛབ΋঺ӷ҆ǴѺӷǵ௨ӷǵ䰃㟥฻侰䣅‫ޑ‬ ‫ٮ‬䥷㜘䠁ғ΋‫֚ޑۓ‬劵Ǵ㛱ΪӚ҇௼Ўϯ௲‫ޑػ‬䠁৖㩲䠁ғόճ‫ޑ‬ቹ㥀Ƕ䬙 俟࡫ॣБਢ҅Ԅ⍻‫ۓ‬ϐӟǴ൩ёаӧӚϿ㹠҇௼Ծᄉ‫ޑ‬㟵ҹΠǴҔ䗂բ䜀䞫 ೷Ўӷ‫ޑ‬Ӆӕ୷䲈Ƕ㤄㪰ǴӚ҇௼Ўӷ֎ԏ䬙俟便䬗䗂䠁৖‫ک‬ώ൤Ծρ‫ޑ‬俟 ‫ق‬аϷ‫ך‬㡚Ӛ௼Γ҇ϐ剷‫ޑ‬ϕ࣬䗄䜌‫ک‬Ҭ劤Ǵ೿㩲ள‫ࡐډ‬ε‫ޑ‬БߡǶ! !ಃѤǴёаҔ䗂ှ㜞ΓӜǵӦӜ‫ࣽک‬䗄㛼俟‫ޑ‬ᙌ促剱匉ǶҗΪ‫ך‬䜹㤆㠀Ԗ΋ 㚚㡚ৎ佤‫ޑۓ‬䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǴύ㡚ΓӜǵӦӜ‫ॣޑ‬促Ǵӧ㛱ѦЎҹ‫ک‬䜐тύ ԿϞ‫ݮ‬Ҕ࠶ִ䯠Ԅ฻࡫‫ݤ‬Ǵࡽό҅⍻ǴΨόӝ౛Ƕ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢ⍻‫ۓ‬ϐӟǴ 㤄㚚剱匉൩ёаள‫ډ‬ှ㜞Ƕќ΋Бय़Ǵᙌ促Ѧ㡚ΓӜǵӦӜ‫ࣽک‬䗄‫מ‬㛼㛼俟 ‫ޑ‬剱匉ǴΨԖёૈճҔ࡫ॣӷ҆೴䭍‫؃‬ள΋㚚ӝ౛‫ޑ‬ှ㜞Ƕ! !ಃϖǴёа㩽շѦ㡚Γ䗄䜌䬙俟Ǵаߦ僳㡚劤ЎϯҬࢬǶှ‫ܫ‬а䗂ǴҗΪ‫ך‬ 㡚‫ޑ‬㡚劤ӦՏВ੻ගଯǴШࣚӚ㡚ᄉཀ䗄䜌䬙俟‫ޑ‬Γࢂຫ䗂ຫӭΑǶ‫ך‬䜹ё аҔ࡫ॣӷ҆䗂䷏ӑӚᳪ䬙俟俰ҁǵ俭‫کނ‬㼙‫ڂ‬Ǵ㩽շд䜹䗄䜌䬙俟Ƕ฻д 䜹ඓඝΑ䬙俟ϐӟǴ࡫ॣӷ҆㤆ёа㩽շд䜹僳΋‫؁‬䗄䜌䬙ӷ䬙ЎǶ! !ಃϤǴёаှ㜞䷏઩Ї‫ޑ‬剱匉Ƕ䬙ӷ㠀Ԗ䛸ஏ‫ޑ‬௨ӈ勫‫ׇ‬ǴӢԜό侬ࢂ௨΋ 㚚Ӝ㡇Ǵӧӷ‫ڂ‬ٚࢗ΋㚚ӷǴ‫ޣ܈‬ӧ䰃俏ᛛٚ‫פ‬΋㚚㛦䱼೿ࢂࡐ偎㟭剷‫ޑ‬٣ ௃ǶΒΜϤ㚚܎΍ӷ҆Ԗ‫ޑۓڰ‬௨ӈ勫‫ׇ‬Ǵࡪྣ܎΍ӷ҆‫ޑ‬勫‫ׇ‬䗂䷏઩ЇǴ


Chapter Four

䷏ӷ‫ڂ‬Ǵ䷏䜐ҞǴ䷏ьТаϷ௨ӈ䪠ਢǵ偙਑ǵੰ㛅฻฻Ǵࡽ䳾ߡǴΞ䛸ஏǴ 䪰ࢗଆ䗂ࡐБߡǶ䪰ӷ‫ݤ‬ёа俦ࢂ‫؂‬㚚ᤵ䞄ǵ䡺ᥟǵ䗄ਠǵπᢨǴࣗԿࢂ‫؂‬ 㚚Γ೿ाҔ‫ޑ‬ǴߍҔ㤄঺࡫ॣӷ҆‫ޑ‬勫‫ׇ‬Ǵёаගଯπբਏ౗Ǵӳ㛪ࢂࡐ䩒 ฅ‫ޑ‬Ƕ! !ಃΎǴ俟Ўπբ‫ޣ‬ёаҔ࡫ॣБਢ䗂䶠䶦僳ՉԖ䞄䬙ӷ࡫ॣϯ‫ޑ‬Ӛ勪ࣴ‫کز‬ 㡵厚πբǶ! !ନΑ΢ॊӚ勪К働䩒๱‫ޑ‬Ҕ㛪аѦǴ࡫ॣӷ҆ӧ㩲䗂㤆ёаҔ䗂ှ㜞䰃㟥ǵ ᄡ俟аϷπ䛳䜨ࠔ‫ޑ‬ж㛦฻剱匉ǶҞ߻‫ך‬㡚٬Ҕ‫܌ޑ‬倅ȸѤ䱼䰃㟥ȹǴा䶈 㠤ԏ䠁㝫ၰᙌ促Ћ䶦Ǵ৒ܰр凿ǴԶЪӧ䰃䝀Ѻӷᤵ΢٬ҔΨόߡճǶᄡ俟 ‫׳‬㛐‫ݤ‬٬Ҕ䬙ӷǶԖΑ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǴ䶈㠤΋‫ۓ‬㟭ය‫کزࣴޑ‬俇厚Ǵ䰃㟥‫ک‬ ᄡ俟ճҔ࡫ॣӷ҆‫ޑ‬剱匉೿ёૈள‫ډ‬ှ㜞Ƕπ䛳䜨ࠔᳪ㧵ӭǴӕ㧵䜨ࠔΞԖ Ӛᳪόӕ佤਱ǴሡाҔӷ҆у㹠䱼բ䜀ж㛦Ƕ㠤ѐӢ䜀㠀Ԗ҅Ԅ‫ॣ࡫ޑ‬ӷ҆Ǵ ж㛦ԖҔ‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆‫ޑ‬ǴԖҔ߮Ўӷ҆‫ޑ‬ǴΨԖҔमЎӷ҆‫ޑ‬Ǵ࣬㜾ష㝬Ƕ‫ך‬ 䜹ԖΑ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢϐӟǴ㤄㧵剱匉൩৒ܰှ㜞ΑǶ! !ਥ‵а΢‫܌‬俦Ǵёа࣮рǺ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢӧ‫ך‬㡚ࢂԖ剟僴‫ޑ‬㛅ў㯻ྍ‫ޑ‬Ǵࢂ ϞϺ㚬εΓ҇‫܌‬ॐϪा‫ޑ؃‬Ƕ㛐侬侸ӷ௲‫ػ‬ǵද೯俏௢㚬πբаϷϿ㹠҇௼ Ўӷ‫ޑ‬䞫೷Ǵ೿ӧॐϪӦ฻ࡑ䬙俟࡫ॣБਢϷԐ⍻‫ۓ‬Ƕ㤄㚚Бਢ䶈㠤䛱ৎ䜹 ‫ޑ‬剟යࣴ‫ز‬Ǵ䶈㠤ӄ㡚ӚБय़Γγ‫ޑ‬㚬‫ݱ‬侚侬ǴΞ䶈㠤΋ԃ‫ޑ‬䤂侠‫ک‬অ侔Ǵ Ѭ⍻㡵ࢂКа۳ӚᳪБਢ‫׳‬䜀ִ๓ǴԶЪӧϞӟ‫ޑ‬㡵傂ύǴ㤆ёа‫؃‬ள僳΋ ‫ֹ؁‬๓Ƕ䜀ԜǴ‫ך‬䜹‫׆‬ఈε㜘䶈㠤侚侬ϐӟǴ‫ྗץ‬㤄㚚БਢǶ! !㤄㚚Бਢ䶈㠤ε㜘‫ྗץ‬ϐӟǴ‫ך‬䜹‫׆‬ఈѬӧӄ㡚ण䡼㚵೴‫؁‬௢ՉǶ२ӃϞԃ ࣿ‫ޑۑ‬λ䗄俟Ў俰ҁ‫ک‬чБ俏㛂‫ޑ‬䧥‫ޓ‬俰ҁύ䥷俗൩Ҕ䗂‫ॣݙ‬Ǵӳ٬ίᢩΔ ู‫ک‬Ў‫ޓ‬ӧ侸ӷ΢㭨Ͽ֚劵Ƕ‫ך‬䜹‫׆‬ఈӚ䵠ᤵ䞄ǵ䡺ᥟӧ΋૓υ೽ύεΚග ঀճҔ࡫ॣӷ҆䗄䜌ද೯俏Ǵ䜀‫ޗ‬㜘΢௢㚬ද೯俏բрᄦ㪰Ƕ࡫ॣӷ҆৒ܰ ௲Ǵ৒ܰ䗄Ǵ΋૓ѝाΒΟΜλ㟭൩ёа䗄㜘Ǵ㜘俦ද೯俏‫ޣ܈‬Ԗ࡫ॣ‫ޕ‬侸 ‫ޑ‬ΓǴ䗄ଆ䗂൩‫ז׳‬Ƕӵ݀‫ך‬䜹εΚ௢ՉǴӧಃΒ㚚ϖԃ侓ӊය剷㚵Ǵ供ӄ 㡚䗄ғ‫ک‬ӭ㹠ߙԃ೿䗄㜘࡫ॣӷ҆Ǵࢂֹӄёа଺‫ޑډ‬Ƕ㤄㛱Ϊ㩽շ侸ӷǵ 䧥ନЎ‫ޓ‬ǵ䶘΋俭ॣǵ௢㚬ද೯俏೿㩲ଆѮε‫ޑ‬௢僳բҔǴ㛱Ϊගଯ‫ך‬㡚Γ ҇ЎϯНѳ‫ߦک‬僳‫ޗ‬㜘Ь㚜ࡌ侰٣䛳Ԗࡐε‫ޑ‬ճ੻Ƕ‫׆‬ఈӚࣚΓγӅӕуа 䲹᫾‫࠹ޑ‬䝀‫ک‬ගঀǼ! !ߕ‫!ݙ‬ !Ș‫ॣޔ‬ș‫کॣޔ‬ϸϪ೿ࢂ‫ך‬㡚ђж䶒䬙ӷ‫ޑॣݙ‬Б‫ݤ‬Ǵ䯢ӧ΋೽ϩӷ‫ڂ‬ύ㤆 ӧ٬ҔǶҘӷ‫ک‬ΌӷӕॣǴҔҘӷ䗂䶒Όӷ‫ॣݙ‬Ǵћ଺‫ॣޔ‬Ǵ‫ٯ‬ӵȸ㥡Ǵॣ ψȹǶ㤄㚚Б‫ݤ‬தத㜘䠁ғ֚劵ǺԖ٤ӷӵҧǵცǵऑ฻൩㠀Ԗӕॣ‫ޑ‬ӷё ‫ݙ‬ǹԖ٤ӷ‫ޑ‬ӕॣӷࢂ٤ғሻ劵侖‫ޑ‬ӷǴ‫ݙ‬Α฻Ϊό‫ݙ‬Ǵ‫ٯ‬ӵȸ࠹Ǵॣ̮̫¢ ̤ʙ荠ȹǶ! !ȘϸϪșϸϪࢂҔ㝫㚚ӷ䗂࡫Ϫ΋㚚ӷ‫ॣޑ‬Ǵ‫ٯ‬ӵȸଯǴђ‫آ‬ϪȹǶ‫ځ‬ύ‫ޑ‬ ȸђȹӷջϸϪ΢ӷǴȸ‫آ‬ȹӷࢂϸϪΠӷǶ΢ӷ‫ک‬Πӷ࡚ೲ僶俭Ǵ൩ૈ࡫ Ϫр‫܌‬ा‫ॣޑ‬䗂ǶѬ‫ޑ‬চ౛ࢂ㤄㪰‫ޑ‬Ǻȸђȹӷ‫ޑ‬俭ॣࢂ̝̫Ǵ̝ࢂ㞴Ǵ̫ ࢂ㼿ǹȸ‫آ‬ȹ‫ޑ‬俭ॣࢂ̢̗̥Ǵ̢ࢂ㞴Ǵ̗̥ࢂ㼿ǹ࡫Ϫ‫ޑ‬㟭ংǴȸђȹӷ

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


ѝ‫ڗ‬Ѭ‫̝ޑ‬㞴Ȑ΢ӷ‫ڗ‬㞴ȑǴȸ‫آ‬ȹӷѝ‫ڗ‬Ѭ‫̥̗ޑ‬㼿ȐΠӷ‫ڗ‬㼿ȑǴ̝‫̗ک‬ ̥࣬࡫Ǵ൩ёа࡫рȸଯȹȐ̝̗̥ȑӷ‫ॣޑ‬䗂Ǵа߻㠀Ԗ࡫ॣӷ҆ǴϸϪ ‫ޑ‬চ౛΋૓Γό৒ܰ勷㜘ǴӢԜࡐ劵僱ҔǶ! !Ș࠶ִ䯠Ԅș࠶ִ䯠ࢂम㡚ΓǴΪ΋ΖϤΎԃ㢤侔΋঺䬙俟࡫ॣБਢǴаӟ த䜀Ѧ㡚Γ࡫㛙䬙俟‫ߍ܌‬ҔǴԿϞ㤆К働ࢬՉǶд‫ޑ‬Бਢ٬ҔΑϤ㚚ӗᣅ಄ 㛦ǴԜѦ㤆Ԗ΋٤ձ‫ޑ‬಄㛦ǴࡐόБߡǴӧ㡵Ҕ㟭㤄٤಄㛦தத࣪ౣǴаठ ԙǵ䝶ǵۚǵᘲѤ㚚ֹӄόӕ‫ॣޑ‬೿࡫բ̙̞̫Ƕ‫ך‬䜹䯢ӧ㤄㚚Бਢ‫ע‬㤄Ѥ 㚚ॣ㛂ձளࡐమཱǺԙȐ̰̞̫ȑǵ䝶Ȑ̙̞̫ȑǵۚȐ̠̫ȑǵᘲŖ̫̏ȑǴ К࠶ִ䯠ԄाБߡӝ౛ளӭǶ! !ȘѤ䱼䰃㟥ș䬙ӷόૈ‫ޔ‬ௗӧ΋૓䰃㟥ᤵ΢䝀㲏ǴӢԜӧ䠁㟥‫ޑ‬㟭ংǴѸ勬 Ӄ‫؂ע‬㚚䬙ӷ促ԋ˝˝˝˞Ǵ˝˝˝˟ǾǾ㤄㪰‫ޑ‬㹠䱼Ǵӧԏ㟥‫ޑ‬㟭ংǴा ‫ע‬㹠䱼ӆ促ԋ䬙ӷǶ㤄ᳪ䰃価䝀㲏Б‫ݤ‬Ǵ‫ך‬㡚䯢ӧ㤆ӧ٬ҔǴ㬏䜀ȸѤ䱼䰃 㟥ȹǶ! !ӷ䥶҂Ӹӷ‫ݙ‬儫Ǻ! !ʙ荛চӷѝ‫ޑ‬ᕷᥟӷ! !ʙ荜চӷജу㚱! !ʙ荝চӷഔу㚱! !ʙ荞চӷ۩уΤΠуҝ! !ʙ荟চӷᢨ㚵уԿ! !ʙ荠চӷЦу࠹! !ȐȠΓ҇В㟥ȡ2!:!6!9!1!3!2!5!ಃ 3!‫ހ‬ȑ!


Chapter Four

References Barlow, John S. Contemporary Brain Research in China: Selected Recent Papers from Eletrophysiological Topics. New York and London: Consultant, 1971, p. vi. Cooley, James. T. F. Wade in China: Pioneer in Global Diplomacy 1842-1882. Leiden: Brill, 1981. Davids, Thomas William Rhys. Sacred Books of the East. (Translation of Buddhist sutra from Sanskrit to English). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899. DeFrancis, John. Nationalism and Language Reform in China. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. —. The Chinese Language: Facts and Fantasy. Honoloulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Dragunov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Untersuchungen zur Grammatik der modernen chinisischen Sprache. (written in the 1932). Berlin: Academic Verlag, 1960. Giles, Herbert Allen. A Chinese-English Dictionary. London: B. Quaritch, 1892. —. How to Begin Chinese: The Second Hundred Best Characters. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1922. Gordon-Cumming, C. F. Inventor of the Numeral-Type for China: By Use of Which Illiterate Chinese Both Blind and Sighted Can Very Quickly be Taught to Read & Write Fluently (written in 1898). Los Angeles: HardPress (AbeBooks), 2013. Huang, Parker Po-fei and Gerald T. Kok. Speak Cantonese. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1958. Huang, Parker Po-fei. Speak Cantonese: Book II. New Heaven: Institute of Far Eastern Languages, Yale University, 1962. —. Cantonese Dictionary: Cantonese-English, English-Cantonese. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1970. —. Speak Cantonese Pronunciations. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1970. Kaske, Elisabeth. The Politics of Language in Chinese Education: 1895-1919. Leiden: Bill, 2008, p. 68. Kennedy, George A. Selected Works of George A. Kennedy. Tien-yi Li edt. New Haven: Far Eastern Publications, 1964. Lam, Yan-yan. “Xianggang yueyu biaoyin de xianzhuang” (३ෝ࿵ᇟ኱ॣ‫ޑ‬౜‫ރ‬ The Current Situation of Hong Kong Sound Notation). Zhongguo yuwen yanjiu (ύ୯ᇟЎࣴ‫ ز‬Studies of Chinese Languages) 27.1 (2009): 59-66. Li, Jinxi (Ꮏᒸᅚ).“Miner duyin tongyi dahui shimo ji” (҇Β᠐ॣ಍΋ε཮‫҃ۈ‬ ૶ Record of the Committee Meeting to Unite Chinese Pronunciations in 1912). Guoyu zhoukan (୯ᇟ‫ڬ‬т Mandarin Chinese Weekly) 133 & 134 (April 14 & 21, 1934). Li, Shuhua (‫׵‬లᐇ). “Zhuyin fuhao youlai, zhengui shougao chongxian” (‫ॣݙ‬಄ ဦҗٰǴࣔ຦Ћዺख़౜ The Origin of the Zhuyin Signifiers: Reappearance of

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


Valuable Original Copies). Taipei: The CNA (Central News Agency ύѧ೯ૻ ‫)ޗ‬, February 1, 2014. This news report is available at the following web-page: http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201402010017-1.aspx (retrieved in September 2015). Liu, Mengyang (ቅ‫ۏ‬ඦ). Zhongguo yinbiao zishu (ύ୯ॣ኱ӷਜ Chinese Romanization Book). Written in the Republican era. Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua, 2008. Meyer, Bernard F., and Theodore Wempe. The Student’s Cantonese-English Dictionary. Hong Kong: St. Louis Industrial School Printing Press, 1934. Morrison, Robert. A Dictionary of the Chinese Language. (written in the early 19th century). Zhengzhou (ᎄԀ): Daxian (εຝ), 2008. —. A Grammar of the Chinese Language & a Grammar of the English Language (೯Ҕᅇ‫ق‬ϐ‫کݤ‬मӓճЎ၉ϐΥ‫)ٯ‬. (written in the early 19th century). Zhengzhou (ᎄԀ): Daxian (εຝ), 2008. Norman, Jerry. Chinese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 268. Rossiter, David, Gibson Lam, and Vivying Cheng. "The Gong System: Web-Based Learning for Multiple Languages, with Special Support for the Yale Representation of Cantonese" (PDF). Advances in Web-Based Learning—ICWL 2005. Springer Verlag. pp. 209–220: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11528043_20# (online PDF retrieved in August 2016). Shin, Kataoka, and Cream Lee. “A System without a System: Cantonese Romanization Used in Hong Kong Places and Personal Names.” Hong Kong Journal of Applied Linguistics 11.1 (2008): 79-98. Shin, Kataoka. “Xianggang zhengfu pinyin: yi ge luanzhongyouxu de xitong” (३ ෝ ࡹ ۬ ࡫ ॣ Ǻ ΋ ঁ ໶ ύ Ԗ ‫ س ޑ ׇ‬಍ ġ Finding Order in Disorder: An Investigation into the Hong Kong Government Cantonese Romanization System). Zhongguo yuwen tongxun (ύ୯ᇟЎ೯ૻ Newsletter of Chinese Language) 93.1 (2014): 9-25. Shou, Wen (Ӻྕ). Gui sanshi zimu li (ᘜΟΜӷ҆‫ ٯ‬Examples of Thirty Vowels). Written in the Tang Dynasty. Manuscripts cherished in the British Museum. Taipei: Xinwenfeng (ཥЎᙦ), 1984. Shu, Zhaomin (๤ӂ҇ Shu Chao-min) and Lin Jinxi (݅ߎᒴ Lin Chin-hsi). Huayuwenjiaoxue zhi hanyu yuyanxue ganlun (๮ᇟЎ௲Ꮲ‫ޕ‬ᅇᇟᇟ‫ق‬Ꮲཷ ፕ Chinese Languages Teaching: An Introduction to Chinese Linguistics). Taipei: Xinxuelin (ཥᏢ݅), 2013, pp. 67-75. Tan, Huiying (᛿ችᑉ) . Xiru ermu zi yuanliu bianxi (ՋᏂԸҞၗྍࢬᒣ‫ ݋‬On the Formation and Effect of An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars). Beijing: Foreign Languages Teaching and Research Publication, 2008. Trigault, Nicolas. Xiru ermu zi (ՋᏂԸҞၗ An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars), 1626. Currently available version: Beijing: Peking University Press, 1933. Wade, Thomas Francis. Yuyan zier ji ( ᇟ ‫ ق‬Ծ ᙱ ໣ A Progressive Course


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Designed to Assist the Student of Colloquial Chinese, as Spoken in the Capital and the Metropolitan Department). Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs; London: W. H. Allen, 1886. —. Yuyan zier ji: shijiu shiji de Beijing hua (ᇟ‫ق‬Ծᙱ໣;!ΜΐШइ‫ޑ‬ч٧၉ Self-Collection of Language: The Peking Language of the Nineteenth Century). Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002. Wang, Musong (Ц݊Е). Xiru ermu zi suo fanying de mingmo guanhua yinxi (Ջ ᏂԸҞၗ‫܌‬ϸࢀ‫۔ܴ҃ޑ‬၉ॣ‫ س‬The Phonetic System of the Official Language in the Late Ming Dynasty in An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars). Jiayi, Taiwan: Graduate Institute of Chinese Language and Literature, National Chung Cheng University, 1994. Wiedenhof, Jeroen. "Purpose and effect in the transcription of Mandarin". Proceedings of the International Conference on Chinese Studies 2004 (ᅇᏢࣴ ‫ز‬୯ሞᏢೌࣴ૸཮ፕЎ໣). Yunlin, Taiwan: National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, 2004. pp. 387-402. Wang, Yinglin (Цᔈᡕ). Yuhai (ҏੇ Ocean of Jade). Written in the Song Dynasty. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2009. Xu, Shen (೚཈). Shuowen jiezi (ᇥЎှӷ Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters). Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan (Ѡ᡼୘୍ӑਜᓔ), 1971. Xue, Guixiang (৪຦౺). Lishi de tiankong (ᐕў‫ޑ‬Ϻ‫ ޜ‬The Sky of History). Wuhan (㬎㻊): Changjiang wenyi publishing house (ߏԢЎ᛬р‫)ޗހ‬. 2012. Yu, Jinen (Ϊᒸৱ). Minguo zhuyin zimu zhengceshi lun (҇୯‫ॣݙ‬ӷ҆ࡹ฼ўፕ On the History of the Symbols in the Phonetic System of Romanization During the Republican Era). Beijing: Zhonghua Bookstore, 2007. Zhao, Yuanren (ᇳϡҺ Chao Yuan-jen). Readings in Sayable Chinese. San Francisco: Asian Languages, 1969.

Notes 1

For details, consult Shou Wen’s Gui sanshi zimu li (Examples of Thirty Vowels). For details, consult Wang Yinglin’s Yuhai (Ocean of Jade). 3 For details, see Thomas William Rhys Davids’ English translation from Sanskrit. 4 For details, consult Nicolas Trigault’s An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars. Also see Wang Musong’s The Phonetic System of the Official Language in the Late Ming Dynasty in An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars and Tan Huiying’s On the Formation and Effect of An Audio-Visual Aid to Western Scholars. 5 For details, consult Robert Morrison’s dictionary and books. 6 In Chinese (published by Cambridge University Press in 1988), Jerry Norman regards Wang Zhao as the first person to initiate the Romanization system of Chinese language (Norman, 258). 7 For details, see Liu Mengyang’s book about Chinese Romanization. 8 For details, consult Elisabeth Kaske’s The Politics of Language in Chinese Education: 1895–1919. Also consult the video entitled “Chinese Language Transliteration Systems: Wade-Giles” by the UCLA Film and Television Archive: 2

Power Struggles of Romanization Systems and Initial Handwriting


http://web.archive.org/web/20070128065433/ http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/skozerow/wadegiles.htm (retrieved in September 2015). 9 Consult George A. Kennedy’s Selected Works of George A. Kennedy. 10 See Parker Po-fei Huang’s books about Cantonese published by Yale University Press during the period of the 1950s-1970s and compare them with Bernard R. Meyer and Theodore Wempe’s The Student’s Cantonese-English Dictionary in 1934. For modern use of Romanization to record Cantonese pronunciations, consult Kataoka Shin and Cream Lee’s “A System without a System: Cantonese Romanization Used in Hong Kong Places and Personal Names” in Hong Kong Journal of Applied Linguistics, Yan-yan Lam’s “Xianggang yueyu biaoyin de xianzhuang” (३ෝ࿵ᇟ኱ॣ‫ޑ‬౜‫ )ރ‬in Zhongguo yuwen yanjiu (ύ୯ᇟЎࣴ‫)ز‬, and Kataoka Shin’s “Xianggang zhengfu pinyin: yi ge luanzhongyouxu de xitong”(३ෝࡹ۬࡫ॣǺ΋ঁ໶ύԖ‫سޑׇ‬಍! Finding Order in Disorder: An Investigation into the Hong Kong Government Cantonese Romanization System) in Zhongguo yuwen tongxun (ύ୯ᇟЎ೯ૻ Newsletter of Chinese Language). Also consult David Rossiter, Gibson Lam, Vivying Cheng’s “The Gong System: Web-Based Learning for Multiple Languages, with Special Support for the Yale Representation of Cantonese” (PDF). Advances in Web-Based Learning — ICWL 2005. Springer Verlag. pp. 209–220: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11528043_20# (online PDF retrieved in August 2016). 11 Consult Jeroen Wiedenhof’s conference paper in the Proceedings of the International Conference on Chinese Studies hosted by National Yunlin Univeristy of Science and Technology in 2004. 12 For details, consult Xue Guixiang’s Lishi de tiankong. Also consult Yu Jinen’s Minguo zhuyin zimu zhengceshi lun and the online article entitled “Minguo chunian nazhong fangyan zhi ‘chia yi piao’ chengwei guoyu?” (҇୯߃ԃবᅿБ ‫ق‬ѝ“ৡ΋౻”ԋࣁ୯ᇟǻ Which Dialect Would Have Almost Become the National Language with Only One More Vote in Early Republican Era?). This article is available at the following web-page: http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1012/8/4/4/101284426.html?coluid=6&kindid=30&docid= 101284426&mdate=0409092833 (retrieved in September 2015). 13 For details, consult the online blog: https://louisiskiller.wordpress.com/2011/08/29/ፔวܴΑ‫ॣݙ‬಄ဦ-bopomofo ‫ޑ‬ ᐕўసྍ/ (retrieved in September 2015). 14 For details, consult Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Dragunov’s book entitled Untersuchungen zur Grammatik der modernen chinisischen Sprache (written in the 1932). 15 Curtis Dean Smith (ў୯ᑫ) teaches neither pinyin, zhuyin, nor Wade-Giles systems of Romanization in his Mandarin language courses at California State University in Sacramento. See the online introduction to his own teaching system of Mandarin pronunciations by the NTNU (National Taiwan Normal University), Taiwan:


Chapter Four

http://pr.ntnu.edu.tw/news/index.php?mode=data&id=13007 (retrieved in 2013). 16 Check page vi in John S. Barlow’s edited book. John S. Barlow even mentioned Zhao Yuanren’s Mandarin language textbook materials: Readings in Sayable Chinese published by Asian Languages in San Francisco in 1969. 17 This list comes from the following website: http://www.pinyin.info/romanization/compare/yale.html (retrieved in August 2016). Also see the following online PDF file: http://catweb.ncl.edu.tw/cmarc/2-1-15-a02.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 18 See C. F. Gordon-Cumming’s book in 1898. Also double-check the online PDF diagram: http://writing-system.tumblr.com/post/43084972216/murray-numeral-type-systemfor-blind-source (retrieved in August 2016). 19 For reference, consult the section of foreign languages job advertisements in the official website of the Chronicle of Higher Education: https://chroniclevitae.com/job_search?job_search%5Bposition_type%5D=47 (retrieved in December 2015).


The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed a global fever to learn the Mandarin Chinese language, including simplified Chinese characters, because of the rise of Mainland Chinese economic power and international influence. Since the White House of the US government launched the 100K Strong initiative to enable 100,000 American students to learn Chinese language and culture in Chinese-speaking areas, most US students have been rushing to Mainland China, where simplified Chinese characters are written and used in daily life. However, it is a pity that most TCFL (Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language) or TCSL (Teaching Chinese as a Second Language) courses or textbooks in American higher education fail to inform US students of the correct history of simplified Chinese characters, traditional Chinese characters, the art of ancient Chinese calligraphy, and the power struggles between them. Even native speakers of Mandarin Chinese in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, or Chinatowns all over the world may not understand them correctly. Currently, the most frequently-seen misconception is that simplified Chinese characters did not appear until Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong’s national policy in 1958. Power struggles between traditional characters and simplified characters seemed to follow worldwide political conflicts between communist countries, which include Chinese communists who use simplified Chinese characters in Mainland China, and democratic nations, which contain non-Mainland Chinese-speaking people who insist on traditional Chinese characters in Taiwan and Hong Kong.


Chapter Five

This chapter aims to elucidate the above-mentioned misconception. It clarifies that feudalist dynasties simplified Chinese characters early in the pre-Qin era yet did not fully replace traditional characters with simplified counterparts, confirming that Chinese communist rulers were not the earliest politicians to simplify Chinese characters. Chronologically offering an overall blueprint or a bird’s eye view to highlight the ups and downs of traditional characters and simplified characters, this chapter also points out that languages inevitably change over time, underscoring the fact that political or individual power does change, simplify, or create Chinese characters. As a matter of fact, traditional Chinese characters are neither lost nor completely replaced by simplified counterparts. The rumor about the post-1950s loss of traditional Chinese characters is unnecessarily convincing even in Mainland China during the twenty-first century. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top-rank advisory body in the People’s Republic of China, for instance, even repetitively lobbied to restore traditional Chinese characters and gradually replace simplified Chinese characters with traditional characters, especially because all Asian-heritage users of Chinese characters in the vicinity, including Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, write traditional Chinese characters and also because traditional characters can better preserve the centuries-long culture than simplified characters. In 2009, the CPPCC “made a calling to abolish the use of current simplified Chinese characters within ten years.”1 In 2015, Director Feng Xiaogang said on Wednesday in Beijing that he is ready to raise a joint proposal with actor Zhang Guoli to suggest the return of traditional Chinese characters to schools. Feng, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), is attending the third session of the 12th National Committee of the CPPCC, the country's top political advisory body. A total of 2,153 members of the CPPCC National Committee will discuss major issues concerning the country’s development during the annual session until March 13. “This is about cultural inheritance,” Feng said, and he hopes China can restore some of the traditional Chinese characters.2

Some fashionable coffee shops, such as the Classic Code Café3 currently in Beijing City, advocate handwriting of traditional Chinese characters. Many Beijing people like it. 4 Learning to write traditional Chinese characters becomes fashionable and trendy for more than 1,300 million

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


Chinese Mainlanders.5

Lives and deaths of languages Similar to the life and death of human beings, animals, or plants, languages can be kept alive, face crises of extinction, or even die. When the number of native speakers or users is zero, languages are usually defined as dead languages. Theoretically speaking, this is termed linguicide, language genocide, physical language death, or biological language death. Languages might die either gradually or radically. They might die from bottom to top if the dearth of native speakers appears in a low-level environment, such as tribal households in which aboriginal languages are spoken. They might die from top to bottom if the disappearance of native speakers starts in a high-level environment, such as nation-state or government. Sometimes researchers in the academic field of linguistics rescued audiovisual records of the last native speakers of moribund or dying languages.

Languages change over time Languages that are not dead, experience natural evolution, socio-historical changes, cultural revisions, and influences of political power. Examples include the linguistic transformation from Old English to Middle English and Modern English, Latin to Romance languages, and so on. Natural evolution, socio-historical changes, and cultural revisions of languages may result from the invention of something new, such as new high technology. For example, the English word “selfie” was naturally created because of the technological convenience of taking photographs and videos with cellphones in the twenty-first century. Changes may take place because of mutual relations between different people, cultures, trends, or areas. For instance, Taiwanese phrases, such as “dapin” (Ѻ࡫ efforts) and “laogong” (ԴϦ literal meaning: the old man; indication: husband), were added to Mandarin Chinese after constant exchanges of languages, dialects, and sociocultural elements on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the late twentieth century, yet the original Mandarin phrases, such as “fandou” (Ꮯର efforts), “nuli” (ոΚ efforts), and “zhangfu” (Ρϻ husband), harmoniously co-existed with the Taiwanese-style phrases in Mandarin Chinese without crises of extinction. Socio-historical changes and cultural revisions of languages might happen to sociocultural


Chapter Five

movements, such as the sociocultural movement of vernacular Chinese along with the May Fourth movement in modern Chinese history.

The natural evolution of simplified Chinese characters since the Feudalist Dynasties The appearance of some simplified Chinese characters occurred within the natural evolution of the Chinese language, instead of power struggles or national policies. Simplified Chinese characters started before the Qin Dynasty in the pre-221 BC era. In 1930, Liu Fu (ቅൺ) and Li Jiarui (‫׵‬ৎ ྷ) in the Institute of History and Philology (ᐕўᇟࣴࣴ‫)܌ز‬, Academia Sinica (ύѧࣴ‫ز‬ଣ), co-edited a book entitled Song Yuan yilai suzibiao (ֺϡа䗂߫ӷ᛼ Vulgar Words since the Song and Yuan Dynasties, also translated as A Glossary of Popular Chinese Characters since the Song and Yuan Dynasties) to highlight the existence of at least 6,240 vulgar words popularly used by ordinary people since the Song and Yuan Dynasties. That is to say, Chinese communists were not the earliest simplifiers, revolutionists, or modernizers of traditional Chinese characters at all.

Anthropological or archeological evidence Anthropologists or archeologists corroborated the existence of simplified Chinese characters in ancient dynasties, such as the Northern Dynasties, Southern Dynasties, Tang Dynasty, Song Dynasty, and Yuan Dynasty. Inscriptions on tablets in the Northern and Southern Dynasties during the fourth to sixth centuries contained simplified Chinese characters.6 People in the Tang Dynasty frequently used a large number of tujing (კ࿶ picturesque encyclopedia), and Shazhou tujing (؅ࢪკ࿶ Picturesque Encyclopedia of the Sandy State), produced in the Tang Dynasty, included simplified Chinese characters.7 Poetry and calligraphy of both traditional and simplified Chinese characters were also found on porcelain and ceramics of the Tang Dynasty. The block printing of Chinese characters was invented in the Sui and Tang Dynasties. It enhanced the simplification of traditional Chinese characters. Bi Sheng ( ౥ ܹ 970–1050) invented the technology of typography in 1041–1048 during the Northern Song Dynasty, 8 and strengthened the simplification of traditional Chinese characters.

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


In the Northern Song Dynasty, Mi Fu ( ԯ ޿ 1051–1171), a well-reputed expert of traditional Chinese calligraphy, included sixteen simplified characters in his inscription of “Huajintang ji” (ฝᒸ୸૶ Record of the Huajin Hall).9 Simplified characters prospered in warring eras and dynasties established by non-Han governors, such as the Yuan Dynasty founded by the Mongols. In 1961, a couple in Inner Mongolia happened to dig out a metal plate on their farm. They did not pay special attention to it until their son’s business had problems and needed to pay debts. The message on this metal plate said, “Huangdi shengyu, buke qinfan, ruobu zuncong, shizui chusi” (ࣤࡆဃᒑǴόёߟҍǴऩόᒥவǴࢂ࿾ೀԝ The royal decree from the Emperor cannot be disobeyed. People who disobey the royal decree should be put to death). On the top of this metal plate, a phrase said, “Zhang zi wan shiliu hao” (஭ӷΤΜϤ㛦), and the final Chinese character of this phrase was exactly the simplified version of the character “hao.”10 Some well-anthologized literary masterpieces contained simplified Chinese characters. For instance, in Shi Naian’s (ࡼऐ஫) Shuihuzhuan (Н⠪໺ three versions of English translation of the same book title: Water Margin, Outlaws of the Marsh, or All Men Are Brothers),11 the traditional Chinese character “liu (ቅ)” is simplified as “liu (㜤).”

Natural evolution of Chinese handwriting styles Chinese writing styles also changed over time. Some of the changes in Chinese writing styles were due to natural evolution. For example, jiaguwen (ҘମЎ characters carved on oracle bones) in the Shang Dynasty was followed by zhongdingwen (ដႳЎ) or jinwen (ߎЎ), which meant written characters on bronze containers, and shiguwen (ҡႴЎ), which referred to written characters on stone drums, in the Zhou Dynasty. Among all the remaining records, the zhongdingwen or jinwen on Duke Mao’s Pot (ЛϦႳ) was deemed the masterpiece of ancient Chinese calligraphy.12 Zhongdingwen, jinwen, and shiguwen belong to the zhuan script. Later on, Chinese characters began to be written using writing brushes on bamboo slices, and Chinese calligraphy started to become popular because of the availability and affordability of bamboo and brushes.13 The zhuan script evolved as the li script in the Han Dynasty. The cao script appeared when people wrote quickly in the Han Dynasty. The Zhang Emperor of the Han Dynasty (ᅇകࡆ) loved the cao script,


Chapter Five

and people called his cao script “zhang cao” (ക૛). The counterpart of “zhang cao” is “jin cao” (Ϟ૛), created by Zhang Zhi (஭޲). The xing script and kai script also emerged. The kai script was famous in the Tang Dynasty. Some people asserted that some simplified Chinese characters are probably derived from the cao script, but the earliest simplified character truly appeared before the cao script prospered.

Examples of simplified Chinese characters Liu Leyi (ቅ኷ኾ) and Zhang Shuyan (஭ਜ۟) published books which traced the origins of simplified Chinese characters.14 Zhou Youguang’s (‫ڬ‬ԖӀ) book mentioned that the traditional Chinese character “cai” (ᠽ) was simplified as “cai” (ω) early in the pre-Qin era before 221 B.C.; however, the traditional version of this Chinese character was neither fully replaced with nor metaphorically assassinated by its simplified counterpart because both of these characters have been coexisting in Chinese-speaking areas. 15 Other dictionaries and etymological records showed that the Chinese character “cai” (ω), as not only the simplified version of “cai” (ᠽ) but also a pictograph or hieroglyph to indicate the initial growth of grass, existed early in the jiaguwen (ҘମЎ handwriting via carving on oracle bones) of the Shang Dynasty. Except for these meanings, the Chinese character “cai” (ω) also indicates talent, such as the “cai” of the Chinese phrase “caineng” (ωૈ talent and abilities). Although Communist China lost the centuries-old cultural legacy of this traditional Chinese character “cai” (ᠽ) after Mao Zedong’s post-1958 simplification of Chinese characters and replaced the simplified version with the traditional version as if there were conflicts, tensions and power struggles between the traditional format and simplified edition of the same Chinese character in Mainland China, the traditional Chinese character “cai” (ᠽ) has been metaphorically “getting along” with its simplified counterpart in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas from the pre-Qin era to the present in the twenty-first century. Currently both of these two characters can mean either “just now” or “merely.” The official online dictionary of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education enlists the appearance of the traditional Chinese character “cai” (ᠽ) in highly-esteemed and dynasties-old dictionaries, such as Xu Shen’s (೚཈) Shouwen jiezi (ᇥЎှӷ Analytical Dictionary of Characters), and cites how the traditional Chinese character “cai” (ᠽ) was utilized in literary masterpieces or historical records of post-Qin dynasties:16

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


The biography of Cheng Cuo (⓪ᒱ) in the forty-ninth volume of Han shu (ᅇਜ The Book of Han) said, “yuanxian caizhi, ze hu you yiqu” 炷ᇻ ᑜᠽԿǴ߾चΞςѐġ The weapons did not arrive until long-distance transportation, but will soon be gone because of the military fight against Hu炸. Female Tang Dynasty poet Yu Xuanji’s (ങҎᐒ) kvetched in her lament of boudoir (ሗ࡜၃), “bieri nanhong cai beiqu, jinzhao beiyan you nanfei” (ձВࠄᗶᠽчѐǴϞරч໠Ξࠄ० A few days ago Southern swan geese just flew Northward, this morning Northern cackling geese flew Southward). “Cai” (ᠽ) in these two citations refers to “just now” or “not long ago.” The biography of Jia Shan (ၘξ) in the fifty-first volume of Han shu (ᅇਜ The Book of Han) mentioned, “shensi cai shuyue er” (‫ي‬ԝᠽኧД Ը He died merely a few months ago). Yuan Dynasty playwright Guan Hanqing (ᜢᅇঙ) also used the traditional character “cai” (ᠽ) in the fourth chapter of his well-anthologized tragedy entitled Doue yuan (ᝠে ঌ Snow in Midsummer), “zhi shiqi sui yu fu peihe, caide liangnian, buxing erfu wanghua” (ԿΜΎྃᆶϻଛӝǴᠽள‫ٿ‬ԃǴό۩‫ٽ‬ϻΫϯ Unfortunately her son and husband passed away merely two years after she married her husband at the age of seventeen). “Cai” (ᠽ) in these two citations signifies “merely.” In addition to the above-mentioned pair of “cai” (ᠽ) and “cai” (ω), Zhou Youguang’s book enlisted the following pairs: sixty-seven pairs, such as “Bu” (թ) and “bu” (Ѳ), in the pre-Qin era before 221 B.C., ninety-two pairs, such as “ai” (ᛖ) and “ai” (㻁) or “ban” (ᒤ) and “ban” (㚾), in the Qin and Han Dynasties between 221 B.C. and 220 A.D., thirty-two pairs, such as “ai” (ང) and “ai” (䮫) or “bi” (฽) and “bi” (㬖), during the era of three-Kingdoms, Jin Dynasty, and the Northern and Southern Dynasties in 220–581 A.D., twenty-nine pairs, including “can” (ୖ) and “can” (㡌) or “can” (ᡠ) and “can” (Ἥ), during the Sui and Tang Dynasties in 581–960 A.D.; eighty pairs, including “bian” (ᜐ) and “bian” (㝨) or “biao” (኱) and “biao” (䪌), during the Song, Liao, Jin, and Yuan Dynasties in 960–1368 A.D.; fifty-three pairs, like “ba” (ጝ) and “ba” (㬞) or “biao” (ᒮ) and “biao” (߄), during the Ming Dynasty, Qing Dynasty, and Heavenly Kingdom in 1368–1911 A.D.; fifty-seven pairs, like “ba” (ᡘ) and “ba” (䢍) or “ao” (᛹) and “ao” (㭄), during the Republican era between 1911 A.D. and 1949 A.D.; and one hundred and eleven pairs, like “angzang” (ሮᠢ) and “angzang” (᭢丳) or “yonghu” (Ᏹៈ) and “yonghu” (䧱䧭), from Chinese communist pre-1949 era to 1956 A.D.


Chapter Five

Individuals’ power to change or create written characters In addition to natural evolution, socio-historical changes, or cultural revisions, individuals or groups may artificially change languages. These creations of Chinese written language started centuries ago. Hunan women’s boudoir laments were written in nüshu ( ζ ਜ women’s written language), a secret language created by women via embroidery on fabrics. Scholars researched this secret language more than three decades ago and confirmed that the current evidence about the history of nüshu could be at least more than three hundred years old. Zhou Shuoyi’s (‫ڬ‬ᅺ‫ )؝‬Nüshu zidian (ζਜӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Nüshu) was published in 2002. Chen Qiguang’s (ഋ‫ځ‬Ӏ) Nühan zidian (ζᅇӷ‫ڂ‬ Dictionary of Nüshu) and Wang Chengxi’s (Цዂྛ) Zhongguo nüshu shufa dazidian (ύ୯ζਜਜ‫ݤ‬εӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Chinese Nüshu Calligraphy) were published in 2006. There were two possible sources of nüshu though none of them confirm the accurate starting time of this secret language. First, a woman pretended to be a man, became jailed, and smuggled her boudoir laments from jail to the external world via the secret language that she created. Second, in the eleventh century, Hu Yüxiu (चҏ‫ )ذ‬married into the royal palace as a concubine of the Hui Emperor of Song (ֺᔇ‫)ے‬, wrote her boudoir laments in nüshu via embroidery to avoid the eunuchs’ check, and sent it back to her female friends in her Hunan hometown.17 .

р‫ډ‬රύҁࢂӳ! It was originally wonderful to come to the royal palace. ёКლΓΕи୸! My arrival at the royal palace is like ordinary people’s entrance to the Heavenly Hall. ξࣔੇ‫ښ‬ӞόΑ! Yet I was fed up with luxurious foods. ํᛥ࿨጖଺Պᇔ! I had fabrics of unequaled quality for tailor-made dresses. ѰѓΨԖ৐েζ! Maidservants also surrounded me. Ⴔ኷ಅᘼᎵ዗ᇿ! Distant sounds of drums and flutes were loud. ঁঁᇥ‫ך‬ӭ൤຦! Everybody said that I enjoyed the wealth. ፔ‫ך্ޕ‬ԭԃࡾ!

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems Who knew that this destroyed my hundred-year youth? ٰ‫ډ‬රύΎԃᅈ! It has been seven years since my arrival at the royal palace. ѝᆶ։ЦΟ‫!઀ڹ‬ I slept with the emperor for only three nights. ନԜϐѦؒ٣଺! Except for this, no missions were assigned to me. ‫ي‬ӧࣤ৐ЈόӼ! My heart was unsettled though I was physically located here. In her secret language on the embroidery, she warned Hunan women not to marry into the royal family: ৎύऩԖआ޸ζ!ί࿤ό༬Εරύ! Make sure that my townsmen do not marry daughters at marriageable age into the royal family, ༬‫ډ‬රύӭधཱ!όӵ‫׫‬ҡୢߏԢ! I’d rather throw stones into the Long River than answer questions about how difficult it is to marry into the royal family. In the Jiangyong (Ԣ҉) area of Hunan, women exchanged their boudoir laments with one another in this secret language, which they invented when achieving art works of embroidery.18 ζΓၸѐ‫ڙ‬ᓸॐ! Women suffered in the past Ш໔٠คੵெΓ! Without anybody’s understanding in the human world. ѝԖζਜ଺ளӳ! As long as the nüshu is well-done, ΋Βவᓐቪϩܴ! All the women’s suffering could be clearly recorded. ଺рӳӭਜર৻! Nüshu is included in a number of books, papers, and fans. കകѡѡՈరర! Women’s suffering is like blood staining sentences and articles. ӳЈϐΓ৾ଆ᠐! Kind-hearted people read it, ؒঁόᇥ੿ёኇ! None of them commented on it without pities. ଲઓऩૈ৾ଆ᠐! Even if ghosts and divine deities read it,



Chapter Five ҂Ѹ᠐Αόఽࢬ! They would not be tearless. ૛Еऩૈ৾ଆ᠐! If trees and grass can read it, ҂Ѹ᠐Αό໾Ј! They would not feel unhurt. υЉऩૈ৾ଆ᠐! If spears and weapons can be personified and read it, ᘋளШ΢໶઱઱! They would surely cause worldwide chaos.

Some authoritative individuals with political power do change languages, while ordinary people without sufficient political authorities would be regarded as either being not well educated, writing incorrect characters, leaving secret messages, or inventing underground codes if they created their own Chinese characters according to their own preferences. For example, Wu Zetian (‫߾ݓ‬Ϻ), the only female emperor in Chinese history, invented a brand-new Chinese character “zhao” (Ⲟ) in order to name herself. She purposefully mixed two well-known and frequently used characters “ming” (ܴ bright and clear) and “kong” (‫ ޜ‬sky) in the way that other native speakers of Mandarin Chinese never did. Her invention of such a Chinese character signified her royal self-identity to see through the entire empire from the above. Du Dingyou (‫ ϶ۓ׹‬1898–1967) created a Chinese character by merging two characters “shu” 炷ਜ books炸 and “wei” (α surround) and turning them into “tuan” or “tushuguan” (㸪 library) in 1924. In July 1924, Du Dingyou traveled to Japan and introduced his invention of this Chinese character to experts of library science in Japan and won a lot of praise. In 1926, Japan’s first professional journal of library science was entitled “tuan” (㸪). In 1946, Du Dingyou designed a stamp for the Guangdong Provincial Library and two traditional Chinese characters “guang tuan” (ቶ㸪 literal meaning: Guangdong Library) appeared on this stamp. The Taiwanese government initiated the Golden Library Award, which is pronounced as “jin tuan jiang” or jin tushuguan jiang” (ߎ㸪ዛ) in Mandarin Chinese, in 2009.19 In 1953, Cai Fangyin ( ጰ Б ጬ 1901–1963) created a Chinese character by combining three characters “ren” (Γ), “gong” (π), and “shi” (ҡ), and turning them into “tóng” (䟤).20 This new Chinese character refers to concrete and is sometimes seen when the phrase “shuini” (Н‫)ݝ‬, which signifies cement, appears in expressions related to architectural

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


construction. Hewen (ӝЎ Compound of characters) abounds in Chinese calligraphy or works of art. The history of hewen can be traced back to the era of jiaguwen (ҘମЎ written language on oracle bones) or carved characters on bronze containers early in the Zhou Dynasty. For instance, the combination of two characters of “wu” (‫ )ݓ‬and “wang” )Ц) appeared as 㵯 on some bronze containers to represent Jifa (ৃว), Emperor Wu of the Zhou Dynasty.21 During the Qin and Han Dynasties, some compounds of traditional Chinese characters had military implications. Every one of some generals or military administrative heads took a part of the bamboo pieces which included compounds of characters. When they put these bamboo pieces with compounds of characters together, the military message hidden in the compounds of characters would help these generals or military administrative heads make sure that the military decree from the royal palace or the emperor would be true and effective in the front line. In the Han Dynasty, the compound of “wei wu zhi zu” (୤ր‫ ىޕ‬I am the only person who enjoys the satisfaction) on coins to pray for the future auspices and avoid bad luck began to be popular.22 “Wei wu zhi zu” refers to the advice to stay away from greed and live a contented life which was believed to be a good method to avoid troubles that resulted from greed and approach the good omen which followed contentment. The coins which contained the compound of these four characters were usually used as decorations or as best wishes for good omens, not true money to exchange for products or goods. In current non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, some people combine different traditional Chinese characters and make them look like one complicated traditional Chinese character. For instance, the four traditional Chinese characters “zhao cai jin bao” (‫ܕ‬଄຾ᝊ Welcome the wealth and bring in valuable treasure) are mixed and turned into one Chinese character “thàn.” When the final emperor of the Qing Dynasty was in Russia, he wrote this compound of traditional Chinese characters “zhao cai jin bao” (‫ܕ‬଄຾ᝊ Welcome the wealth and bring in valuable treasure). A museum in Hong Kong exhibited it. The compound of these characters existed a long time ago and was not created by this emperor.23 The combination of traditional Chinese characters “ri ri you jian cai” (ВВԖ‫ـ‬ω!0!ВВԖ‫ـ‬଄) is pronounced as “mao.” It was created by Tang Bohu (ঞդ߁). He originally meant to encourage himself to advance his talents every day. Because the pronunciations of “cai” (ω talent) and “cai” (଄ wealth) are the same, other people interpret this combination of


Chapter Five

traditional Chinese characters as their welcome of the everyday arrival of wealth. Other combinations are also seen from time to time, yet their pronunciations are usually unknown, such as combinations of “xue hao kong meng” (ᏢӳϾ‫ ۏ‬Learning about Confucius and Mencius well) or “kong meng hao xue” (Ͼ‫ۏ‬ӳᏢ Confucius and Mencius study hard), “huang jin wan liang” (໳ߎ࿤‫ ٿ‬ten thousand Chinese kilograms of real gold), “ri jin dou jin” (В຾Џߎ cans of real gold everyday), “ji xiang ru yi” (ӓ౺ӵཀ good luck and everything as what one wishes), “sheng guan jia xin” (ϲ‫۔‬уᖒ additional salary and promotion in the workplace), and so on.24 These compound words of traditional Chinese handwriting usually appear in the spring couplets written by traditional-style Chinese writing brushes on red paper during celebration periods of the Chinese Lunar New Year. In 2015, a news report of the New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) showed the following examples of hewen: A work of art combined seven characters “yi pian bing xin zai yu hu” (΋ТӇЈӧҏ൙ literal meaning:ġ a piece of crystal icy heart in the jade bottle; metaphorical meaning: undoubted dignity and righteousness like the transparent ice within the jade bottle) at the Pavilion of Jade Bottle (ҏ൙ߜ) of the Hibiscus Hall (޳ᆺኴ) in Qianyang (ᓩ໚) County of Hunan (෫ࠄ). These seven characters derive from Tang Dynasty poet Wang Changling’s (Цܱស 698–756) poem entitled “Furong lou song Xin Jian” (޳ᆺኴଌٌᅌ Seeing Xin Jian off at the Hibiscus Hall). A carved stone combined four characters “tian ren he yi” (ϺΓӝ΋ union of the sky and men) in the Doumaodao (ର൰৞), Sanduao (Ο೿ᐞ) of Ningde (ჱቺ). Other examples included the following: “kui xing ti men” (ሱࢃ፮ߐ God of literary talent arrives at the gate), “luan feng he ming” (ᢢስ‫ک‬ሳ harmonious union), well-anthologized Tang Dynasty writer Han Yu’s (ᗬ ཇ 768–824) famous couplet “shushan youlu qin wei jing, xuehai wuya ku zuo zhou” (ਜξԖၡ༇ࣁ৩ǴᏢੇคఱधբՃ), “zhengyi” (҅က justice), “zhizu change” ( ‫ ى ޕ‬த ኷ everlasting joy resulted from satisfaction), “fulu shouxi” (ᅽ࿢ტ഻ happiness, wealth, long life, and joy), “pinzhi rugui” ( ᇯ Կ ӵ ᘜ comfort of guests just like homecoming).25 Unique compounds of characters also appeared in either Chinese dialects-speaking places or various Chinese-speaking areas. For instance, this is a brief list of examples: “bong” (ࣘ unnecessariness), “fiao” (⚺ no willingness to own something), “biao” (䘖 reluctance), “jiao” (㽽 only wish), “nao” (ᶱ not good), and so forth. Even some units of measurement are also represented by compounds

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


of characters. Most of them appeared when Chinese-speaking people translated Western-style units of measurement into the Chinese language during the Qing Dynasty. They were either continuously used, impacted by the kanji (ᅇӷ) in Japanese language, or changed in the Republican era and the period after the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For example, the writing structure of the word “li” (੊ Nautical miles or NM) is exactly the compound of the radical or etymon of “shui” (ΟᗺН water) and the word “li” (mile). Its literal meaning is clearly the watery mileage. Similar cases using compounds of characters include “chua” or “qian wa” (ʰ thousand watts) as the combination of “qian” (ί thousand) and “wa” (ґ watt). Numerous similar examples include “qian ke” (ʪ) or (ίլ thousand kilograms)26 and the following list of compound words.27 In 1928, Hu Huaishen (चᚶธ) published a book entitled Jianyi zishuo ( ᙁ ܰ ӷ ᇥ On Easy Characters), which involved more than three hundred compounds of characters. Many units of measurement, which derived from compounds of characters, are included in this book by Hu (see Table 5-1).28 Table 5-1 Chinese characters of units of measurement

ԐයҔӷ! Earlier compounds



Influenced by

Later-on compounds

Units of measurement


ߏࡋ Measurement of Length






ԭԯȐϦЇ炸100 meters

Chapter Five




ΜԯȐϦΡ炸10 meters






ϩԯȐϦκ炸10 centimeters






డԯȐϦᙶ炸1/10 centimeter

Ӧᑈ Measurement of Area



Ϧഘ hectare



Ϧ੫ acre



ѳБԯȐϦᙶ炸square meter

৒ᑈ measurement of volume




Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems









Ϧϲ liter











ख़ໆ Measurement of Weight


ίϦАȐϦ㎉ȑ1000 kilograms


ԭϦАȐϦᏼ炸100 kilograms



ΜϦАȐϦᑽ炸10 kilograms



ίլȐϦА炸1000 grams

Chapter Five




ԭլȐϦ‫ٿ‬ȑ100 grams



ΜլȐϦᒲȑ10 grams













Political/governmental power to change or create Chinese characters Throughout Chinese history, there were at least three major political or governmental forces who collectively changed or created Chinese characters: first, the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty; second, the Nationalist Party; third, the CCP. Xu Shen (೚཈) and Wang Guowei (Ц୯ᆢ) believed that the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty ( છ ‫ ) ࣤ ۈ‬exerted his political or governmental force to turn the diverse written languages in the pre-Qin era into the same format. Tan Shibao’s (᛿Шߥ) “Qinshihuang de ‘chetonggui shutongwen’ xinping” (છ‫!ޑࣤۈ‬ȸًӕॉਜӕЎȹ!ཥຑ) argued that the written languages that the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty unified were limited to the written language in political verdicts, legal regulations, governmental messages, public announcements, or executive laws only.29 Han Fuzhi (ᗬൺඵ), Yu Weichao (߲଻ຬ), and Gao Minghe (ଯܴӝ) stood by Xu Shen and Wnag Guowei’s side, however. They cited

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


academic books about linguistic diversities during the ruling period of the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty30 to testify that the Qin kingdom preserved the ancient written language of the Western Zhou Palace yet all the other kingdoms during the era of warring states created more diversity of written languages in abundant aspects; therefore, they insisted that the written language that the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty tried to unify was the written language for various communication purposes, not simply legal documentation, public announcements, or governmental remits. Prior to the political rise of the CCP during the post-1949 era, the Republican era witnessed elites’ advocacy to popularize vulgar words.31 For example, in 1909 Lu Feikui (ഌ຤ົ) published an article entitled “Putong jiaoyu yingdang caiyong sutizi” (ද೯௲‫ػ‬ᔈ྽௦Ҕ߫ᡏӷ Vulgar Words Should Be Adopted in General-Level Education) in the opening issue of Jiaoyu zazhi (௲‫ػ‬ᚇᇞ Journal of Education). Qian Xuantong (ᒲҎӕ) advocated simplification of Chinese characters in the journal entitled Xin qingnian (ཥߙԃ The New Youth) in 1920. His proposal won strong support from two famous Chinese communists: Lu Xun (Ꮉِ), whose real name is Zhou Zuoren (‫ڬ‬բΓ), and Di Qiubai (ᆩ ࣿқ). Qian Xuantong (ᒲҎӕ), Li Jinxi (Ꮏᒸᅚ), Yang Shuda (ླྀᐋၲ), and Lu Ji (ഌ୷) collaboratively proposed a project to simplify the strokes of traditional Chinese characters (ᙁ࣪౜Չᅇӷ‫ޑ‬฽Ⴤਢ) in 1922. Chen Guangyao (ഋӀᯒ) published Jianzi lun ji (ᙁӷፕ໣ Collections of Essays on Simplified Chinese Characters) in 1931. Xu Zemin (৪߾௵)32 made a list of 550 vulgar words (550 ߫ӷ߄) in the Lunyu banyuekan (ፕ ᇟъДт Fortnightly of Confucian Analects) in 1934. During the same year, Du Dingyou (‫ )϶ۓ׹‬published Jianti biaozhunzi biao (ᙁӷ኱ྗӷ ߄ Standardized List of Simplified Chinese Characters) and included 353 simplified characters in this book. Qian Xuantong’s (ᒲҎӕ) repetitive proposal to simplify Chinese characters concerned Chiang Kai-shek ( ጯ ϟ ҡ ). He consulted the Minister of Education, Wang Shijie (ЦШണ). Wang Shijie advised Chiang Kai-shek that the pace to simplified Chinese characters must be slow and ordered Li Jinxi ( Ꮏ ᒸ ᅚ ) to enlist simplified characters. Li Jinxi simplified more than 1,000 traditional characters; however, Wang Shijie felt that Li Jinxi’s simplification of more than 1,000 traditional Chinese characters was too rapid. He decreased the number of Li Jinxi’s simplified characters from more than 1,000 to 324. On August 12, 1935, the Minister of Education, Wang Shijie ( Ц Ш ണ ), publicized the announcement encoded 11,400, and issued a list of vulgar words and placed 324 vulgar words or simplified Chinese characters in Diyipi jiantizi biao (ಃ΋‫ץ‬ᙁ


Chapter Five

ᡏ ӷ ߄ The First List of Simplified Characters). The original Chinese-language wording in this announcement was as the following: ΥλᏢǵอයλᏢǵ҇౲ᏢਠӚፐҁǵ‫ูٽ‬Ǿ֡ᔈ௦Ҕ೽ႧᙁᡏӷǶ! ! All the elementary schools, short-term primary schools, textbooks for continuing education of ordinary folks, children… should adopt the simplified version of Chinese characters announced by the Ministry of Education (my translation from Chinese to English).

This governmental list in the Republican era was severely criticized by people who insisted on traditional characters, such as the then Minister of Examination Yuan Dai Jitao ( Ե ၂ ଣ ߏ ᔎ ‫ ۑ‬ഏ ). Although Chiang Kai-shek (ጯϟҡ) tried to promote the adoption of some vulgar words or simplified strokes of characters in elementary school textbooks, no influential reforms ensued.33 During the same year, Rong Geng (৒۪ September 5, 1894–March 6, 1983) created and taught a class about the simplification of the radicals and strokes of traditional Chinese characters at the Yen-ching University (ᐪ٧εᏢ). In 1936, Rong Geng included 4,445 simplified characters in his Jianti zidian (ᙁᡏӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Simplified Characters).34 In February 1936, the Ministry of Education abolished the previous decree to simplify Chinese characters.35 In November 1936, Chen Guangyao’s (ഋ Ӏᯒ) Changyong jianzi biao (தҔᙁӷ߄ List of Frequently Used Simplified Characters) contained 3,150 simplified characters, half of which were vulgar words, and the other half derived from the cao script of traditional Chinese calligraphy. In 1937 The Research Committee of Characters at the Beiping Research Institute (чѳࣴ‫܌ز‬ӷᡏࣴ‫)཮ز‬ published Jiantizi biao (ᙁᡏӷ߄ List of Simplified Characters) and included 1,700 simplified characters. The Sino-Japanese Wars mired the Nationalist Party’s attempt to simplify Chinese characters. During the Sino-Japanese Wars, Chinese communists adopted the simplified version of traditional Chinese characters by taking advantage of the cao script (૛ਜ) of Chinese calligraphy. The cao script is an age-old tradition to artistically write traditional Chinese characters with antique-style writing brushes. Because it aims to create a work of art, experts of the cao script of Chinese calligraphy were never restricted in terms of how to creatively and artistically write traditional Chinese characters, how to eliminate or combine some strokes of traditional Chinese characters, or how to reshape or simplify the originally standardized appearance of traditional Chinese characters. After the

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP’s political or governmental push to simplify the traditional styles of Chinese Mainlanders’ character-writing was successful. In 1950, the Ministry of Education of the PRC Government announced the Changyong jiantizi dengjibiao (தҔᙁᡏӷฦ૶߄ Registration List of Frequently Used Simplified Characters). In 1951, the PRC government issued its Diyipi jiantizibiao ( ಃ ΋ ‫ ץ‬ᙁ ᡏ ӷ ߄ The First Set of Simplified Chinese Characters), which involved 555 simplified characters. In February 1951, the PRC governmental committee of character-reforms was established. This committee based its project to simplify Chinese characters (ᅇӷᙁϯ Бਢ) on the Diyipi jiantizibiao (ಃ΋‫ץ‬ᙁᡏӷ߄ The First Set of Simplified Chinese Characters), included 798 simplified characters, and simplified fifty-six pianpang (ୃ਒ components of traditional Chinese characters), etyma, or radicals at the end of 1954. The project to simplify Chinese characters (ᅇӷᙁϯБਢ) was officially announced on February 2, 1955. Of the 798 simplified Chinese characters, 261 were divided into three groups and published in more than fifty kinds of newspapers throughout Mainland China. On July 13, 1955, the Committee to Examine and Decide the Simplification of Chinese Characters (ᅇӷᙁϯБਢቩु ‫ ہ‬঩ ཮ ) was initiated. This committee held its first meeting of character-reforms throughout the entire Mainland China in October 1955. Participants of this meeting agreed with one another on the project to simplify Chinese characters (ᅇӷᙁϯБਢ); however, the number of simplified Chinese characters was limited to 515, and the number of simplified pianpang (ୃ਒ partial components of Chinese characters), etyma, or radicals was decreased to fifty-four. Chen Guangyao (ഋӀᯒ) published Changyong jianzi pu (தҔᙁӷ᛼ Notation of Frequently Used Simplified Characters) in 1955. On January 31, 1956, the PRC State Council (୯୍ଣ) published the project to simplify Chinese characters (ᅇ ӷᙁϯБਢ) on Renmin ribao (Γ҇Вൔ People’s Daily News). In May 1964, the Committee to Examine and Decide the Simplification of Chinese Characters published three sets of Jianhuazi zongbiao ( ᙁ ϯ ӷ ᕴ ߄ The Collective List of Simplified Chinese Characters). The first set contained 352 simplified Chinese characters, which did not serve as radicals, etyma, or partial components of Chinese characters. The second set contained 132 simplified Chinese characters, which could serve as radicals, etyma, or partial components of Chinese characters, and fourteen simplified components of Chinese characters, simplified etyma, or simplified radicals. The third set had 1754 simplified Chinese characters, which originated from radicals, etyma, or partial


Chapter Five

components of Chinese characters. These three sets claimed to involve a total of 2,238 simplified Chinese characters—in fact, only 2,236 simplified Chinese characters because of the repetition of two simplified characters “qian” (䳼) and “xu” (勬). In the 1990s, the PRC government requested that major Mainland Chinese mass media, such as Xinxi shibao (ߞ৲ਔൔ Information Times Report) or Yuegang xinxi ribao (࿵ෝߞ৲ В ൔ Guangdong and Hong Kong Information Daily News) which became Minying jingjibao (҇ᔼ࿶ᔮൔ Private Economy Newspapers) in 2004, remove traditional Chinese characters. Except for these 2,236 simplified Chinese characters, the Chinese communist government never officially publicized any other simplified Chinese characters; therefore, all the other characters written, printed, or used throughout Mainland China are supposed to be exactly the same as the antique styles of the kai script (ིਜ) of Chinese calligraphy or traditional Chinese characters. The CCP’s success to simplify Chinese characters in the 1950s, however, was not sufficiently satisfactory for at least two groups of people. The first group was ambitious Russian Communists whose ultimate goal was to eventually replace the pinyin system of Romanization, traditional Chinese characters, and simplified Chinese characters with Russian and turn Russian into a universally shared and thus the most dominant language in the entire world. The second group was people who continued and insisted on traditional Chinese characters outside of Mainland China in the post-1950 era. What Russian Communists, including Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), desired was not merely the simplification of Chinese character-writing but the Russian-style Romanization system to replace all the Chinese characters in order to enable Russian to be the globally dominant language adopted by all the people in the whole world. ߮ЎԶѦǴ‫ځ‬дЎӷѝόၸࢂၸ෠‫ޑ܄‬ЎӷᡂᡏǴाуаЇᏤ٬‫ځ‬ᖿ ӛ಍΋Ƕ߮ᇟाԋࣁШࣚӚ҇௼‫ޑ‬Ӆӕᇟ‫ق‬Ƕ! Except for Russian, all the other languages are nothing but temporary metamorphosis during transitional periods. The ultimate goal is to unify all the languages in the entire world and enable Russian to be the universal language commonly shared by the whole world (my translation from Chinese to English).36

Russian Communists motivated the CCP to simplify Chinese characters and tried to turn the simplification of traditional Chinese characters during the 1950s into a method or scheme to achieve the Russian Communists’

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


ultimate goal to eventually Romanize all the Chinese characters and replace Chinese characters with the Russian-style Romanization. Zhang Shuyan (஭ਜ۟), Wang Tiekun (Ц៓ܲ), Li Qingmei (‫ߙ׵‬ఘ), and An Ning (Ӽჱ) recorded this truth of how Russians initiated the CCP’s simplification of traditional Chinese characters in their collaborative book entitled Jianhuazi suyuan (ᙁϯӷྉྍ Tracing the Origin of Simplified Chinese Characters) in 1956. The Publishing house of Character-Reforms (Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠр‫ )ޗހ‬published Diyici quanguo wenzi gaike gongzuo huiyi wenjian huibian ( ಃ ΋ ԛ ӄ ୯ Ў ӷ ‫ ׯ‬ॠ π բ ཮ ᝼ Ў ҹ ༊ ጓ The Collection of Meeting–Minutes about Character-Reforms) and recorded the same truth of Russian Communist power behind the CCP’s simplification of traditional Chinese characters in 1957. The CCP’s political and governmental change of traditional Chinese characters by simplifying them was originally only a byproduct before the ultimate goal to abolish all the Chinese characters and replace them with pinyin only. From the 1930s to 1950s, Di Qiubai (ᆩࣿқ), Lu Xun (Ꮉِ), Wu Yuzhang (ֆҏക), and Mao Zedong (Лᐛܿ) mentioned their desires to Romanize Chinese characters and replace all of them with only Latin alphabets or phonetic signifiers, especially the pinyin system of Romanization. Even in 2011, Hugh Grigg reported that Yu Renjie, head of the People's Redesign and Normalization Committee, called for the nationwide abolishment of Chinese characters. Some people may think this is a joke, but it’s a very serious business. Having fifty-thousand buttons on computer keyboards just isn't feasible any more.37

However, this goal would not be effortlessly put into practice. A non-vernacular article can serve as a persuasive example to convincingly corroborate the impasse to reach this goal: ҡ࠻၃ўࡼМǴ༐ྰǴᇣ१ΜྰǶМਔਔ፾ѱຎྰǴМ፾ѱਔǴ፾Μ ྰ፾ѱǶМࡢҠ༈Ǵ٬ࢂΜྰೳШǴМ‫ۈ‬१ࢂΜྰǶ१ਔǴ‫ۈ‬᛽ࢂΜ ྰჴΜҡྰǶ၂ញࢂ٣Ƕ! According to the history recorded in poetry, Mr. Shi in the stone room loves lions and swears to eat ten lions. He frequently travels to markets to view lions. When he arrives at markets, ten lions happen to simultaneously arrive at markets. He shoots the ten lions and kills them. Later on, he starts to eat these ten lions. When he eats the ten lions, he begins to be aware that the ten lions are actually ten stone lions. Please try your best to explain this matter (my English translation from the Chinese version).


Chapter Five

Every Chinese character in this story shares the same pronunciation though their tones are different; therefore, the pinyin of the entire story will be fifty-nine repetitions of the same pinyin signifier “shi” with different tone marks and undoubted stalemate to clearly illuminate what the fifty-nine repetitions of the same Latin alphabets “shi” truly mean.38 Following the post-1950s worldwide conflicts between communist nations and democratic countries, the dichotomy between simplified characters and traditional characters became involved in vehement ideological wars and incredible power struggles between pairs of political nemeses, such as the hostile pair of Communist China and Democratic China (including Taiwan, Hong Kong, or other non-Communist Chinese-speaking areas) or the antagonistic pair of the CCP in Mainland China and the Nationalist Party in Taiwan. Simplified Chinese characters were frequently used in post-1950s Mainland Chinese daily life and hence represent Communist China, yet traditional Chinese characters were frequently adopted in pre-1950s and post-1950s non-Communist Chinese-speaking areas and thus stand for non-Communist Chinese-speaking areas. Nonstop debates about simplified Chinese characters and traditional Chinese characters have been overwhelming from the 1950s to the present. If political power struggles can truly stay away from academic professions, the purely scholarly standpoint of Chinese etymology and the Chinese art of calligraphy may help specify some merits and drawbacks of simplified Chinese characters and traditional Chinese characters. Traditional Chinese characters are undoubtedly more time-consuming than simplified Chinese characters, and they inevitably burden the rapid pace of a bustling lifestyle. This appears in not only Chinese language but almost all the other languages, such as the words “MC” or “emcee” as the simplification in unofficial documents of the formal phrase “master of ceremony” in English. In other words, even people who never know or learn any Chinese language can easily understand and probably permit unofficial use of simplified writing, especially on private occasions such as speedy note-taking. However, the post-1950s unnaturally swift simplification unquestionably sacrificed scholarly pursuits of ancient Chinese etymology and the art of calligraphy. For instance, the traditional Chinese character “mian” (រ noodles) is composed of the ingredient-oriented character “mai” ( ഝ wheat) and the pronunciation-indicating character “mian” (य़ face). After the post-1950s simplification of traditional Chinese characters, this character disappears, it is now replaced by the pronunciation-indicating character “mian” (य़

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


face) and shares exactly the same meaning with the character that refers to “face.” Etymologically speaking, this loss of the ingredient-oriented character “mai” (ഝ wheat) violates the ancient Chinese etymological rules and deprives the character “mian” (រ noodles) of its original etymological value and cultural heritage of calligraphy. Without contexts, it is absolutely impossible for readers to figure out whether the simplified character य़ refers to noodles or faces. Even people in Mainland China experienced the post-1950s simplification of characters. People in Mainland China still write traditional Chinese characters, instead of simplified characters, with writing brushes in works of Chinese calligraphy. Post-1950s Mainland Chinese writers who are able to write traditional Chinese characters in art works of calligraphy but do not recognize traditional Chinese characters or their meanings are severely teased and critically labeled as wenmang shufajia (Ў‫ޓ‬ਜ‫ݤ‬ৎ illiterate experts of calligraphy).39 On October 31, 2000, the PRC government announced a brand-new law: Guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi fu (୯ৎ೯Ҕᇟ‫ق‬Ўӷ‫ ݤ‬the Law of Nation-Widely Used Language). This law allows traditional Chinese characters to be adopted in the following aspects: historical spots, antiques with historical values, surnames, works of art, stamps, calligraphy, titles of artistic works, hand-written characters on marks, publications, research, teaching materials, items with special governmental approval, and so on.40 Feng Zhaohua (໱ӂ๮), also named Hua Ge (๮Љ), is a senior expert of Chinese calligraphy in Hong Kong and thus a well-known writer of titles of numerous Chinese-language films, mentioned that he would stop his calligraphy and fengbi (࠾฽ sealing one’s writing brush) if Chinese communists prohibited traditional Chinese characters from being written in works of calligraphy.41


Chapter Five

Conclusion This chapter demystified the frequently-seen misconception that Chinese communists invented all the simplified Chinese characters in the 1950s and that people in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas know nothing about simplified Chinese characters. It highlighted the natural evolution of Chinese handwriting styles, specified examples of individual power to change, revise, or create Chinese characters, and pointed out the political or governmental forces to unify, simplify, or reshape Chinese characters.

References Chen, Guangyao (ഋӀᯒ). Changyong jianzi pu (தҔᙁӷ᛼ Notation of Frequently Used Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing & Shanghai: Zhonghua Books (ύ๮ਜֽ), 1955. Chen, Qiguang (ഋ‫ځ‬Ӏ). Nühan zidian (ζᅇӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Nüshu). Beijing: Central Ethnic University Press (ύѧ҇௼εᏢр‫)ޗހ‬, 2006. Cheng, Huanwen (ำྨЎ). “Du Dingyou wenji xu: Weida de tushuguan xuejia Du Dingyou”炷‫϶ۓ׹‬Ў໣‫଻!;ׇ‬ε‫ޑ‬კਜᓔᏢৎ‫϶ۓ׹‬ġ Preface to the Collection of Writings by Du Dingyou: The Great Expert of Library Science, Du Dingyou炸. Du Dingyou wenji (‫϶ۓ׹‬Ў໣ Collection of Writings by Du Dingyou). Guangzhou: Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) Library, 2012. Du, Dingyou (‫)϶ۓ׹‬. Jianzi biaozhun zi biao (ᙁӷ኱ྗӷ߄ Standardized List of Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing: Zhongguo tushu fuwushe (ύ୯კ ਜ୍ܺ‫ ޗ‬Service of Chinese Publications), 1934. Du, Zijing (‫׹‬ηࠂ). Zhongguo wenzi gaike lunwen ji (ύ୯Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠፕЎ໣ Collection of Essays on Reforms of Chinese Characters). Beijing: Dazhong Books (ε౲ਜֽ), 1950, p. 184. Geng, Hongwei (ઽआፁ). Gegu yu dingxin—kexue zhuyi shiye xia de zhongguo jinxiandai yuwen jiaoyu gaige yenjiu (ॠࡺᆶႳཥȋࣽᏢЬကຎഁΠ‫ޑ‬ύ୯ ߈౜жᇟЎ௲‫ׯػ‬ॠࣴ‫ ز‬Revolution and Creation—Academic Reforms of Modern and Contemporary Chinese Language in Scientific Visions). Jinan (ᔮ ࠄ): Shandong Education (ξܿ௲‫)ػ‬, 2008. Grigg, Hugh. “China to Abolish Chinese Characters, Replace with Pinyin.” BBC News. April 1, 2011. Guo, Moruo (೾‫ݣ‬ऩ). “Gudai wenzi zhi bianzheng de fazhan” (ђжЎӷϐ៏᛾ ‫ޑ‬ว৖ Dialectical Developments of Ancient Languages). Nulizhi shidai (ѩ ᗧ‫ڋ‬ਔж Eras of Slave Systems). Beijing: Renmin (Γ҇р‫)ޗހ‬, 1973, p. 261. Guo, Zhikun (೾‫)ڷד‬. Qinshihuang dazhuan (છ‫ࣤۈ‬ε໺ The Great Biography of the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty). Shanghai: Sanlian (Οᖄ), 1989, pp. 208–211.

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


Han, Fuzhi (ᗬൺඵ). “Dui ‘Qinshihuang de chetonggui shutongwen xinping’ de xinping” (ჹȸછ‫ޑࣤۈ‬ȶًӕॉਜӕЎȷཥຑȹ‫ޑ‬ཥຑ “New Criticism on the Policy of ‘Wheels with the Same Size and Writing in the Same Language’ by the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty.” Guoli Taiwan daxue lishixi xuebao (୯ҥε᡼εᏢᐕў‫س‬Ꮲൔ Journal of History at National Taiwan University) 17 (December 1992): 19–41. Hu, Huaishen (चᚶธ). Jianyi zishuo (ᙁܰӷᇥ On Easy Characters). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan (୘୍ӑਜᓔ Commercial Press), 1928. Hua, Linfu (๮݅‫)ة‬. “Suitang tujing jikao” (໙ঞკ࿶ᒠԵ Investigation of Tujing in the Sui and Tang Dynasties). Academic Journal of History at the National Cheng Chi University (୯ҥࡹ‫ݯ‬εᏢᐕўᏢൔ) 27 (May 2007): 141–213. Li, Shigong. “Should China Resume the Use of Traditional Chinese Characters?” Beijing Review, October 8, 2009. Li, Yimin (Ꮏ΋҇). “Jiang Jieshi ceng zhishi tuixing jiantizi Dai Jitao qianglie fandui cheng huanmiou” (ጯϟҡමࡰҢ௢Չᙁᡏӷ!ᔎ‫ۑ‬ഏ㳾ਗ਼ϸჹᆀ૖ ᙤ Chiang Kai-shek Ordered to Advocate Simplified Characters, yet Dai Jitao Strongly Objected and Regarded it as a Ridiculous Decree). Yangcheng wanbao (Բࠤఁൔ Evening News of the Yang City). February 28, 2012: http://culture.ifeng.com/3/detail_2012_02/28/12830558_0.shtml (Both the news report and photos were retrieved in July 2017). Lin, Qibo (݅‫)࢙ڻ‬. “Fantizi qiaoran fashao guoxuere shisanyi ren jiti buke” (ᕷᡏ ӷ৳ฅวᐨ!୯Ꮲ዗Ǵ24 ሹΓ໣ᡏံፐ Traditional Chinese Characters Are Secretly in Fever; 1300 Million People Take Make-up Classes to Learn about Traditional Chinese Classics). Yuanjian zazhi ( ᇻ ‫ ـ‬ᚇ ᇞ Global Views Monthly). 247 (January 2007): https://www.gvm.com.tw/Boardcontent_12686.html (retrieved in July 2017). Lin, Xiaoyun (݅᐀໦). “‘Tuan’ yao zeme nian? Zheng Ruicheng ye buhui” (Ȩ㸪ȩ ा࡛ሶ୦!ᎄྷࠤΨό཮ How to Pronounce the Chinese Character ‘tuan’? Even Zheng Ruicheng Doesn’t Know It.) Ziyou shibao (冒䓙㗪⟙ Liberty Times). March 19, 2009. Liu, Fu (ቅൺ) and Li Jiarui (‫׵‬ৎྷ). Song Yuan yilai suzibiao (ֺϡаٰ߫ӷ᛼ Vulgar Words since the Song and Yuan Dynasties, also translated as A Glossary of Popular Chinese Characters since the Song and Yuan Dynasties). Beijing: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. Liu, Leyi (ቅ኷ኾ). Jianhuazi yuan (ᙁϯӷྍ Origins of Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing: Chinese Language Teaching (๮ᇟ௲Ꮲ), 1996. Lu, Feikui (ഌ຤ົ). “Putong jiaoyu yingdang caiyong sutizi” (ද೯௲‫ػ‬ᔈ྽௦ Ҕ߫ᡏӷ Vulgar Words Should Be Adopted in General-Level Education). Jiaoyu zazhi (௲‫ػ‬ᚇᇞ Journal of Education) 1, 1909. Lu, Mingjun (ഌܴ։). Weijin nanbeichao beibiezi yanjiu (᚟ਕࠄчර࿞ձӷࣴ ‫ ز‬Research of Inscriptions on Tablets in Wei, Jin, Northern, and Southern Dynasties). Beijing: Wenhua yishu (Ўϯ᛬ೌ Culture and Art), 2009.


Chapter Five

Rong, Geng (৒۪). Jiangti zidian (ᙁᡏӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing: Harvard Yen-ching (ࠖՕᐪ٧Ꮲ‫)ޗ‬, 1936. Shen, Kuo (؇ࡴ). Mengxi bitan (ფྛ฽ፋ Notes of Scientific Study by the Side of Dream Brook). Vol. 18 Technology and Skills. Taipei: Xinxing (ཥᑫ), 1984. “Shufa yiding yong fanti, pianming tizi dashi: yong jianti wo fengbi” (ਜ‫ݤ‬΋‫ۓ‬Ҕ ᕷᡏ! ТӜᚒӷεৣǺҔᙁᡏ‫࠾ך‬฽!Traditional Chinese Characters in Art Works of Calligraphy, Expert Writer of Titles of Chinese-Language Films: I’ll Seal My Writing Brush if Only Simplified Characters Can Be Used). Hong Kong Apple Daily News, March 24, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og3_jUmzwsA (retrieved in July 2017). Sui, Shi (໙၃). “Zhongguoren, ni hui nian zhexie zi ma” (ύ୯ΓǴգ཮‫ۺ‬೭٤ӷ ༏@ Chinese People, Are You Able to Read These Characters?). New Tang Dynasty TV News, January 3, 2015. Tan, Shibao (᛿Шߥ). “Qinshihuang ‘chetonggui shutongwen’ de xinping” (છ‫ۈ‬ ࣤȹًӕॉਜӕЎȹ‫ޑ‬ཥຑ New Criticism on the Policy of “Wheels with the Same Size and Writing in the Same Language” by the Initial Emperor of the Qing Dynasty). Zhongshan daxue xuebao (ύξεᏢᏢൔ Sun Yat-sen Journal of Humanities) (4) 1980: 48. Tong, Enzheng (ูৱ҅). Gudai de pashu (ђж‫ޑ‬Ѓါ The Pa and Shu Areas in Ancient Era). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin (ѤοΓ҇), 1978, pp. 131–133.ġ —. Zhongguo xinan minzu kaogu lunwenji ( ύ ୯ Ջ ࠄ ҇ ௼ Ե ђ ፕ Ў ໣ Collections of Archeological Research Articles on Southwestern Tribes in China). Beijing: Wenwu (Ў‫)ނ‬, 1990, pp. 219–223.ġ The MOE (Ministry of Education) Committee to Unify the Official Pronunciations (௲‫ػ‬೽୯ᇟ಍΋ᝢഢ‫ہ‬঩཮). Guoyin changyong zihui (୯ॣதҔӷ༼ Frequently Used Vocabulary with Mandarin Pronunciations). Fifth Edition. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan (୘୍ӑਜᓔ Commercial Press), February 1938: 276–277. The Publishing house of Character-Reforms (Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠр‫)ޗހ‬. Diyici quanguo wenzi gaike gongzuo huiyi wenjian huibian (ಃ΋ԛӄ୯Ўӷ‫ׯ‬ॠπբ཮᝼ Ўҹ༊ጓ The Collection of Meeting-Minutes about Character-Reforms), 1957, p. 68. Wang, Chengxi (Цዂྛ). Zhongguo nüshu shufa dazidian (ύ୯ζਜਜ‫ݤ‬εӷ‫ڂ‬ Dictionary of Chinese Nüshu Calligraphy). Beijing: Central Ethnic University Press (ύѧ҇௼εᏢр‫)ޗހ‬, 2006. Wang, Zizhou (ЦηՃ). Du Dingyou he zhongguo tushuguan xue (‫ک϶ۓ׹‬ύ୯ კਜᓔᏢ Du Dingyou and Chinese Library Science). Beijing: Beijing Library, 2002, p. 1 & & p. 161. “Wei wu zhi zu zuizao chuxian yu hanchao guqianbi” (୤ր‫ىޕ‬നԐр౜‫ܭ‬ᅇර ђᒲჾ The characters of “wei wu zhi zu” first appeared on coins in the Han Dynasty). Jiangsu shibao (Ԣ᝵ਔൔ Jiangsu Times) September 17, 2014: http://collection.sina.com.cn/cqyw/20140917/1808164984.shtml (retrieved in July 2017).

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


Xu, Shen (೚཈). Showen jiezi (ᇥЎှӷ Analytical Dictionary of Characters Language). Online book ႝηਜ: http://ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi/zh (retrieved in July 2017). Xu, Zhongshu (৪ύ๤). Hanyu guwenzi zixingbiao (ᅇᇟђЎӷӷ‫ ߄׎‬List of Ancient Chinese Characters). Taipei: Wenshizhe (㔯⎚⒚↢䇰䣦), 1982. Yan Nong (ᝄၭ). “Shenqi de nüshu” (ઓ‫ޑڻ‬ζਜ The Magic Nüshu). Lishi yuekan (ᐕўДт Monthly Magazine of History) 205 (December 2005): www.education.ntu.edu.tw/school/history/News/2005/Jan-Mar/news20050303 _2.htm (retrieved in February 2017). Yang, Yifan (ླྀ΋ԁ). "Dalu wangmin ‘shouxiere’ daidong mingzhong xue fantizi” (εഌᆛ҇ȨЋቪ዗ȩ஥୏҇౲Ꮲᕷᡏӷ Mainland Chinese Website Surfers’ Fever for Handwriting of Traditional Chinese Characters). Epoch Times, February 2, 2017. Yin, Junjie (ϑߪണ). “Taiwan ren zai Beijing kai de fantizi sishu” (Ѡ᡼Γӧч٧ ໒‫ޑ‬ᕷᡏӷ‫د‬მ Taiwanese School of Traditional Chinese Characters in Beijing). Central Agent News (ύѧ‫ޗ‬೯ૻ). January 11, 2017. Yu, Weichao ( ߲ ଻ ຬ ) and Gao Minghe ( ଯ ܴ ӝ *. “Qinshihuang tongyi duliangheng he wenzi de lishi gongji” (છ‫ࣤۈ‬಍΋ࡋໆᑽ‫ک‬Ўӷ‫ޑ‬ᐕўф ᕮ The Historical Contributions to Unify Units of Measurement and Written Language by the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty). Wenwu (㔯䈑 Cultural Objects) 12 (1973): 10. Yuan, Zhongyi (૲Ҹ΋). Qindai taowen (છжഏЎ The Written Language on Chinas of the Qin Dynasty). Xian (ՋӼ): Sanqin (Οછ), 1987, pp. 1–2 & 85– 89. Zhang, Rui. “Feng Xiaogang Wants Traditional Chinese Characters Back.” China.org.cn March 5, 2015: http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2015/2015-03/05/content_34965 513.htm (retrieved in March 2017). Zhang, Shuyan (஭ਜ۟). Jianhuazi yuanyuan (ᙁϯӷసྍ Origins of Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing: Yuwen (ᇟЎ Languages and Literature), 1997. Zhang, Shuyan (஭ਜ۟), Wang Tiekun (Ц៓ܲ), Li Qingmei (‫ߙ׵‬ఘ), and An Ning ( Ӽ ჱ ). Jianghuazi suyuan ( ᙁ ϯ ӷ ྉ ྍ Tracing the Origin of Simplified Chinese Characters). Beijing: Yuwen ( ᇟ Ў Languages and Literature), 1956, p. 18. Zhang, Xizhen ( ஭ ৢ ࣔ ). “Wengai neimu” ( Ў ‫ ׯ‬ϣ ჿ Inner Secrets of Character-Reforms). Zhongguo yuwen yuekan ( ύ ୯ ᇟ Ў Д т Monthly Journal of Chinese Language and Literature) 8.2 (October 1961): 16. Zhao, Weidong (ᇳፁܿ) and Zhuang Mingjun (ಷܴै). Shandong daojiao beikeji (ξܿၰ௲࿞‫څ‬໣;!ߙԀܱ኷‫ ڔ‬Taoist Inscription in Shandong: Volumes of Qingzhou and Changyue). Jinan (ᔮࠄ): Qilu (ሸᎹ), 2010. Zhao, Weidong (ᇳፁܿ) and Gong Dejie (৐ቺണ). Shandong daojiao beikeji (ξ ܿ ၰ ௲ ࿞ ‫ څ‬໣ ;! ᖏ ! \ Д ѡ ^ ‫ ڔ‬Taoist Inscription in Shandong: Linju Volumes). Jinan (ᔮࠄ): Qilu (ሸᎹ), 2010.


Chapter Five

Zhou, Shuoyi (‫ڬ‬ᅺ‫)؝‬. Nüshu zidian (ζਜӷ‫ ڂ‬Dictionary of Nüshu). Taipei: Yuelu (ۢ᜾), 2002. Zhou, Youguang (‫ڬ‬ԖӀ). Zhongguo yuwen de shidai yanjin (ύ୯ᇟЎ‫ޑ‬ਔжᄽ ຾ The Historical Evolution of Chinese Languages and Scripts). Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2009, pp. 66–67. Zhou, Zhenhe (‫ )៪ਁڬ‬and You Rujie (ෞԟ݇). Fangyan yu zhongguo wenhua (Б‫ق‬ᆶύ୯Ўϯ Dialects and Chinese Culture). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin (΢ੇΓ҇р‫)ޗހ‬, 1986, pp. 6 and 79–84. Zou, Xiaoming (ၽ᐀ܴ) and Kang Xinzhong (நߞύ). “Hanzi jiantizi zai jiubainian qian jiu chuxian” (ᅇӷᙁᡏӷӧΐԭԃ߻൩р౜ Simplified Chinese Characters Appeared More than Nine Hundred Years Ago). Guangming ribao (ӀܴВൔ Bright Daily News). November 18, 1995.

Notes 1

For details, see Li Shigong’s news report in Beijing Review on October 8, 2009. Consult Zhang Rui’s news report on March 5, 2015. 3 See the weibo web-page of this café: http://weibo.com/u/1749265752?is_hot=1 (retrieved in March 2017). 4 See Yin Junjie’s (ϑߪണ) news report in Central Agent News on January 11, 2017. 5 Consult Yang Yifan’s (ླྀ΋Υ) news report in Epoch Times on February 2, 2017. Also see Lin Qibo’s (݅‫ )࢙ڻ‬report in Yuanjian zazhi (ᇻ‫ـ‬ᚇᇞ Global Views Monthly) in January 2007. 6 For details, see Lu Mingjun’s book on inscriptions on tablets in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. Also see Zhao Weidong’s books about Taoist inscription in Shangdong. 7 For details, consult Hua Linfu’s journal article. 8 Consult Shen Kuo’s (؇ࡴ) Mengxi bitan (ფྛ฽ፋ Notes of Scientific Study by the Side of Dream Brook). 9 See Zou Xiaoming and Kang Xinzhong’s article on newspapers. 10 For details, consult the following information: http://www.360doc.com/content/16/0409/14/30463026_549200539.shtml (retrieved in April 2017). 11 Pearl Sydenstricker Buck (1892–1973), as the winner of Pulitzer Prize because of her fiction entitled The Good Earth in 1932 and the winner of Nobel Prize in literature in 1938, translated the Chinese title of this book into English: “All Men Are Brothers.” This translation derived from the sentence, “Sihai zhinei jie xiongdi ye” (Ѥੇϐϣࣣл‫׌‬Ψ literal translation: All men within the parameter of the four oceans are brothers), in Lunyü (ፕᇟ Confucius’s Analects). In the 1970s, Sidney Shapiro (1915–2014) also translated the Chinese title of this book into English: “Outlaws of the Marsh.” His original translation was “Heroes of the Marsh,” however, it sounded contrary to the Chinese Communist Party’s criticism of major roles in this fiction and thus became replaced by the current translation 2

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems


“Outlaws of the Marsh.” 12 Li Ruiqing (‫ྷ׵‬మ), Qing-Dynasty expert of Chinese calligraphy, commented that calligraphy-learners’ neglect of the zhongdingwen or jinwen on Duke Mao’s pot is like literary researchers’ ignorance of Shang shu (ۘਜ). 13 The initial emperor of the Qin Dynasty simplified the large zhuan script, turned it into the small zhuan script, and politically defined it as the nationwide official script. This is Chinese government’s first-time use of its political power to change Chinese characters nationwide. The later part of this article will explore details of how Chinese governmental power changed or created Chinese characters. 14 Consult Liu and Zhang’s books to trace the origins of simplified Chinese characters. 15 Zhou Youguang made a list of when the simplified version of traditional Chinese characters were published. For details, consult Zhou Youguang’s Zhongguo yuwen de shidai yanjin ( ύ ୯ ᇟ Ў ‫ ޑ‬ਔ ж ᄽ ຾ The Historical Evolution of Chinese Languages and Scripts). Although Zhou Youguang enlisted the publication time only, he did not mean that the publication time was the same as the earliest appearance of simplification because the simplified format in written documents appeared before it was officially published. 16 For details, consult the online dictionary of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education: http://dict.variants.moe.edu.tw/yitib/frb/frb03491.htm (retrieved in January 2017). 17 See the website report: kknews.cc/zh-tw/culture/evxozr.html (retrieved in February 2017). Also consult Yan Nong’s (ᝄၭ)“Shenqi de nüshu” (ઓ‫ޑڻ‬ζਜ The Magic Nüshu). Lishi yuekan (ᐕўДт Monthly Magazine of History). 18 For details, consult Liu Feiwen’s (ቅත‫ )ފ‬research records in the digital archive of Academia Sinica: http://www.ianthro.tw/p/5929 (website retrieved in February 2017). 19 Consult Lin Xiaoyun’s (݅᐀໦) news report in Liberty Times on March 19, 2009. Also see Wang Zizhou (ЦηՃ) and Cheng Huanwen’s (ำྨЎ) articles. 20 For details, see the information: http://mt.sohu.com/20150922/n421821723.shtml (retrieved in April 2017). 21 For details, consult the Kangxi dictionary (நᅚӷ‫)ڂ‬: http://www.zdic.net/z/1e/kx/73F7.htm (retrieved in April 2017). This character means jade-like stones. It shares similar meanings with the character ☉. A politician in the Ming Dynasty was named Chen Wu (ഋ㵯). He passed the highest nationwide level of imperial examination and won the honorary title of jinshi (຾ γ) in 1469. Also consult the following information from the International Encoded Han Character and Variant Database in Academia Sinica: http://chardb.iis.sinica.edu.tw/meancompare/7894/73f7 (retrieved in July 2017). 22 See the news report in Jiangsu Times (Ԣ᝵ਔൔ) on September 17, 2014. 23 See the following online news report: http://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20161011/bkn-20161011060035200-1011_00822_ 001.html (retrieved in July 2017). 24 For details, consult the news report in the SET News on June 8, 2006:


Chapter Five

http://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=121808 (website retrieved in March 2017). 25 See Sui Shi’s (໙၃) news report at the New Tang Dynasty TV in 2015. 26 See pages 276–277 in Guoyin changyong zihui (୯ॣதҔӷ༼ Frequently Used Vocabulary with Mandarin Pronunciations). 27 This list derived from the Nationalist government’s laws about units of measurement in 1929. 28 The following chart comes from the web-page information: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A8%88%E9%87%8F%E7%94%A8%E6%BC %A2%E5%AD%97 (retrieved in July 2017). 29 See Tan Shibao’s article in Sun Yat-sen Journal of Humanities (ύξεᏢᏢൔ). 30 See Fanyan yu Zhongguo wenhua (Б‫ق‬ᆶύ୯Ўϯ Dialects and Chinese Culture), Hanyu guwenzi zixingbiao (ᅇᇟђЎӷӷ‫ ߄׎‬List of Ancient Chinese Characters), Gudai de pashu (ђж‫ޑ‬Ѓါ The Pa and Shu Areas in Ancient Era), Zhongguo xinan minzu kaogu lunwenji (ύ୯Ջࠄ҇௼ԵђፕЎ໣ Collections of Archeological Research Articles on Southwestern Tribes in China), Qindai taowenġ (છжഏЎ The Written Language on Chinas of the Qin Dynasty), Qinshihuang dazhuan (છ‫ࣤۈ‬ε໺ The Great Biography of the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty), and Nulizhi shidai (ѩᗧ‫ڋ‬ਔж Eras of Slave Systems). Also consult Yu Weichao ( ߲ ଻ ຬ ) and Gao Minghe’s ( ଯ ܴ ӝ ) “Qinshihuang tongyi duliangheng he wenzi de lishi gongji” (છ‫ࣤۈ‬಍΋ࡋໆᑽ‫ک‬Ўӷ‫ޑ‬ᐕўфᕮ The Historical Contributions to Unify Units of Measurement and Written Language by the Initial Emperor of the Qin Dynasty) in Wenwu (Ў‫ ނ‬Cultural Objects). 31 For details, consult Geng Hongwei’s (ઽआፁ) book. 32 The middle Chinese character of this name was written as ߾ in Geng Hongwei’s book but ᐛ in other records. Geng Hongwei (ઽआፁ) did not specify which Chinese character is correct. 33 For details, consult the news report in Yangcheng wanbao (Բࠤఁൔ Evening News of the Yang City). 34 See Rong Geng’s Dictionary of Simplified Characters. This book derived from Rong Geng’s work on Pingmin zidian (ѳ҇ӷ‫ ڂ‬Ordinary Folk’s Dictionary), which was popular during the 1930s. In February 1936, Rong Geng designed and offered a brand new course to simplify hand-written Chinese characters (ᙁ฽ӷፐ ำ). He simplified some radicals and then discussed how to simplify strokes of traditional Chinese characters with twenty enrolled students at the Yen-ching University (ᐪ٧εᏢ). Here is the Chinese version of Rong Geng’s own preface to his dictionary: ր୯ӷᡏᡂᎂҭኧ‫خ‬ǺҗђЎԶλጆǴԶᗧǴԶིǴԶՉ૛Ƕຝ‫ࡰ׎‬٣ϐЎ ςᏰᡂࣁ಄ဦǴᓫᆶങӕᓐǴചᆶଭӕ‫ى‬Ǵٓϐୃ਒ӕբ㚱ǴԺՃϐୃ਒ӕ բДǶրΓ᛽ӷǴଁൺԖ௢‫ځ؃‬ӵՖຝ‫׎‬ӵՖࡰ٣‫ࠌޣ‬Ƕ!

Power Struggles of Handwriting Systems



Du Zijing (‫׹‬ηࠂ) recorded this on page 184 of his book. For details, see Zhang Xizhen’s record. 37 For details, consult Hugh Grigg’s news report in BBC News on April 1, 2011. A Chinese computer keyboard’s inclusion of fifty thousand buttons is an inaccurate expression for how people type Chinese. People who deal with Chinese-language information on computer keyboards do not need fifty thousand buttons at all. 38 This example appeared in the publication of Taiwanese government’s Western Canadian branch of the Overseas Chinese Committee: (retrieved from http://olddoc.tmu.edu.tw/Taiwanese-3/Tai-go-0006.htm in March 2017). 39 See Lin Qibo’s (݅‫ )࢙ڻ‬report in Yuanjian zazhi (ᇻ‫ـ‬ᚇᇞ Global Views Monthly). 40 For details, consult the PRC governmental web-page about the law: http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/31/content_27920.htm (retrieved in July 2017). 41 See the news report in Hong Kong Apple Daily News. 36


In the early twenty-first century, one of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government’s most influential impacts on TCFL (teaching of Chinese as a foreign language) or TCSL (teaching Chinese as a second language) in US higher education was probably the worldwide establishment of Kongzi xueyuan (ϾηᏢଣ Confucius Institute). Approximately fifteen years after the rise of Confucius Institutes, on-campus roars of objection appeared, and numerous Confucius Institutes were abolished. The Taiwanese government attempted to establish some Taiwan academies in the US; however, the influence and financial power of Taiwan academies were not as strong as Confucius Institutes and no high-pitched voices of demurral were audible because Taiwan academies, similar to Alliance Française (‫ݤ‬୯Ўϯ‫ ཮ڐ‬established on July 21, 1883, with branch offices in 133 nations), Portugal’s Instituto Camões, Italy’s Società Dante Alighieri, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, Germany’s Goethe-Institut, or the British Council (म୯Ўϯ‫ ཮ڐ‬established in 1934, with branch offices in 109 countries), did not deeply step into the on-campus territory of US higher education. 1 This chapter aims to portray diverse aspects of Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies. This chapter also demystifies some frequently-seen misconceptions, such as the Chinese Communist Party’s admiration for Confucius and its invention of—or creative proposal for—Confucian Institutes.

Confucius and Confucianism Confucius is the Western homophonic term for Kong fuzi (Ͼϻη literal meaning: Professor Kong), a respectful salutation to Kong Qiu (ϾЫ 551–479 B.C.) or Kong Zhongni (ϾҸѭ). With ancestry from the royal family of the Shang Dynasty (୘ж) and the Song Kingdom (ֺ୯) during the Era of Spring and Fall (ࡾࣿਔж), Confucius’s father Shuliang He (‫ژ‬

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


ఉउ) worked as a governmental officer at the rank of daifu (εϻ) in Zouyi (഑ٓ) of the Lu Kingdom (Ꮉ୯), which is currently named Qüfu (Ԕߑ) in Shandong (ξܿ) Province of China. Historical records showed that he was tall and strong enough to hold up the gate of his castle. His first wife gave birth to nine daughters and his second wife produced a crippled son; therefore, he married his third wife Yan Zhengzai (ᚑቻӧ) in order to have a healthy son as his heir. Yan Zhengzai prayed in a temple on a hill and made a wish to have a son before getting pregnant and giving birth to Confucius. This is believed to be at least one of the reasons why Confucius’s personal name is Qiu (Ы literal meaning: hill). Inheriting his father’s genetic trait of being tall, Confucius was approximately 186 cm or between six foot one inch and six foot two inches tall. Shuliang He passed away when Confucius was only three years old. Yan Zhengzai passed away when Confucius was seventeen years old. In his twenties Confucius studied under Tanzi (⇀η). Laozi (Դη) taught Confucius about courtesy and decorum. Shixiangzi (ৣᖪη) taught Confucius about drums and music. Chang Hong (๽Ѷ) taught Confucius about musicology. In his thirties Confucius began his teaching. The number of his disciples was around 3,000, and seventy-two of the 3,000 students became well-known sages good at the six Confucian skills, including etiquette, musicology, charioting, literacy, and mathematic reckoning. Confucius initiated the popularization of education and powerfully extended his educational influences from the royal families and wealthy households to ordinary people. The notes that his students took during Confucius’s teaching sessions became Lunyü (ፕᇟ Analects of Confucius). The Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty began to glorify Confucius and Confucianism and this tradition has continued to the present day.

Respect for Confucius Respect for Confucius and educators ensued. Since the Han Dynasty, emperors in almost every dynasty deeply bowed or kowtowed to Confucius in the religious rituals although the Qin Dynasty, 2 Yuan Dynasty, 3 and Chinese Communist government had undeniably anti-Confucian records. Table 6-1 shows a brief list of the posthumous titles which emperors awarded to Confucius in order to highlight their royal reverence for Confucius:4

Chapter Six


Table 6-1 Titles awarded to Confucius


Emperor and Dynasty

Posthumous Title for Confucius

479 BC

Aigong of the Lu Kingdom during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty

The Honorable Ni ѭР

1 AD

Ping Emperor of the Han Dynasty

Duke of Baocheng Xuanni ፅԋ࠹ѭϦ

92 AD

He Emperor of the Han Dynasty

Marquis of Boazun ፅ൧ߠ

492 AD

Xiaowen Emperor of the Northern Wei Dynasty

Ni, the Sage of Literature ЎဃѭР

580 AD

Jing Emperor of the Northern Zhou Dynasty

Duke of the Zou Kingdom ၽ୯Ϧ

581 AD

Wen Emperor of the Sui Dynasty

Ni, the Pioneer Educator ӃৣѭР

624 AD

Gaozu Emperor of the Tang Dynasty

Pioneer Educator Ӄৣ

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


628 AD

Taizong Emperor of the Tang Dynasty

Pioneer Sage Ӄဃ

637 AD

Taizong Emperor of the Tang Dynasty

The Honorable Xuan ࠹Р

666 AD

Gaozong Emperor of the Tang Dynasty

Ancestral Educator ϼৣ

690 AD

Wu Zetian

Duke of Longdao (literal implication: the duke who advocates philosophical thoughts of life) ໜၰϦ

739 AD

Xuanzong Emperor of the Tang Dynasty

King of Wenxuan (literal indication: the King who promotes literature) Ў࠹Ц

1008 AD

Zhenzong Emperor of the Song Dynasty

Virtuous Sage of Wenxuan (literal meaning: the virtuous sage who promotes literature) ҎဃЎ࠹Ц

1012 AD

Zhenzong Emperor of the Song Dynasty

The Greatest Sage of Wenxuan (literal reference: the greatest sage who promotes literature) ԿဃЎ࠹Ц

1055 AD

Renzong Emperor of the Song Dynasty

Duke of Yensheng (literal implication: the duke who advocates and popularizes the holy virtues) ़ဃϦ


Chapter Six

1146 AD

Renzong Emperor of the Western Xia Dynasty

The Mingzong Emperor Wenxuan of the Great Zhou Dynasty ε‫ےܴڬ‬Ў࠹ࣤࡆ

1307 AD

Chengzong Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty

Wenxuan King as the Greatest Achievements and the Greatest Sage εԋ ԿဃЎ࠹Ц

1530 AD

Shizong Emperor of the Ming Dynasty

The Greatest Sage and Pioneer Educator Կ ဃӃৣ

1645 AD

Shizu Emperor of the Qing Dynasty

Wenxuan, the Pioneer Educator and Greatest Sage of Greatest Achievements ε ԋԿဃЎ࠹Ӄৣ

Confucius’s forest graveyard is more than 2,400 years old. It is the oldest graveyard in the world. Confucius’s old house is the world’s oldest architecture with compounds of not only the Kong family’s private household but also governmental offices. The earliest Confucian temple was established in 478 B.C., and later on more and more Confucian temples were founded. Many of them are more than 2,400 years old now. Confucian temples are the oldest temples in Chinese-speaking areas. Confucianism influences not only Chinese-speaking areas but also Japan, Korea, Singapore, Macao, Vietnam, Hong Kong, worldwide places where overseas Chinese-heritage people live, and so on.

Confucius Institutes Confucius has been influencing not only Chinese people’s education but also worldwide education. Since 2004, Confucius has played the role of the Mainland Chinese government’s educational supermodel in global TCFL, TCSL, or higher education since the PRC government established its first Kongzi xueyuan (ϾηᏢଣ Confucius Institute) in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2004. Later on, more and more Confucius Institutes

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


appeared. Confucius Institutes, legally speaking, were registered as NGOs (non-governmental organizations); however, they were politically under the administrative umbrella of the PRC government and Chinese Communist Party. September 27, 2014 was the tenth anniversary of Confucius Institutes, and the first “Confucius Institute Open-House Day” to celebrate the ten-year success. The multi-dimensional styles assisted Confucius Institutes match diversifying academic environments. For example, the Confucius Institute for Traditional Chinese Medicine (CITCM)5 London, offers traditional Chinese medicine teaching, Chinese-language courses, and Chinese martial arts classes. Copenhagen Business Confucius Institute 6 in Denmark and the Business Confucius Institute at the University of Leeds in England 7 feature Chinese language and cultural teaching sessions related to business, trade, finance, and economics. The Online Confucius Institute was founded in Beijing in 2010. 8 Research-Based Confucius Institutes emerged on various continents. The first Research-Based Confucius Institute appeared in Waseda University, Japan, in 2007. The Free University of Brussels, Belgium, initiated the sixth Research-Based Confucius Institute in 2016.9 From November 2004 to October 2015, 493 Confucius Institutes and 998 Kongzi xuetang (ϾηᏢ୸ Confucius Classes) were founded in more than 113 countries. At the end of 2016, there were 513 Confucius Institutes and 1,073 Confucius Classes in more than 140 nations. Every year more than 10,000 volunteers or instructors taught China-related courses in foreign countries, and on average, each taught more than 200 students. According to the PRC government’s official reports from the Ministry of Finance in the 2007–2008 academic year, the start-up fee of every Confucius Institute outside the Mainland Chinese territory was around 150,000 USD and for every Confucius Class outside the Mainland Chinese territory the fee was around 30,000 USD. The fee to run every Confucius Institute was around 150,000–200,000 USD per year, and that for every Confucius Class was around 50,000 USD per year. According to the most frequently-seen information on websites, the start-up fee that the PRC government offers is around 500,000 USD for every Confucius Institute, and the total fee of 500,000 USD is divided into five annual payments of 100,000 USD. From the sixth year on, every Confucius Institute takes its own independent responsibility for financial sources.10 The financial support from the PRC government or Chinese Communist Party to every Confucius Class in Australian elementary schools and high


Chapter Six

schools is around 8,000 USD per year.11 In 2010, the financial payments to establish the Online Confucius Institute were almost 100,000,000 RMB (around 14,992,500 USD).12

The earliest proposal to establish Confucius Institutes Although the widespread appearance of Confucius Institutes reminds the world of Communist China’s veneration for Confucius in the twenty-first century, the earliest proposal to establish Confucius Institutes did not originate from the PRC or Chinese Communist Party at all. On the contrary, the Nationalist Party in Taiwan proposed the idea of Confucius Institutes early in the 1970s. Mao Songnian (Л݊ԃ Mao, Sung-nien 1911–2005) initiated the world’s earliest proposal to establish Confucius Institutes in 1978. He admired Confucius, studied Confucianism for decades, and published articles about Confucianism.13 He also enabled the establishment of the World Chinese Language Association and located it in Taipei City in 1973.14 Sun Famin ( ৊ ‫ ҇ ݤ‬Sun, Fa-min), a wealthy businessman and founding father of the SOGO department store, Pacific Electrical Wire and Cable Company ( ϼ ѳ ࢩ ႝ ጕ ႝ ᢑ ި ҽ Ԗ ज़ Ϧ љ ), and Lunghwa Industrial College (ᓪ๮π཰஑ࣽᏢਠ current name: Lunghwa University of Science and Technology) in Taiwan, wanted to establish a school in his empty building to avoid the waste of such a building in Los Angeles. He won the support from Mao Songnian, who served as the administrative head of the Overseas Chinese Committee for the Taiwanese government. He wanted to name this school “Kongzi xueyuan” (ϾηᏢଣ Confucius Institute) and tried to hire Marvin Ho (Ֆඳ፣) to establish this school. Marvin Ho saw through the geographical drawbacks of Sun Famin’s empty site, which was at least a two-hour drive from residential areas. Marvin Ho switched the possible address of the Confucius Institute from Sun Famin’s empty building in Los Angeles to San Francisco. His friends in San Francisco believed that San Francisco would be an appropriate location for the school; however, they felt that the word “Confucius” of “Confucius Institute” would be an eye-catching contrast to Communist China’s anti-Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution in the 1967–1976 period. Because most Chinese-heritage people in San Francisco were connected to Canton, where Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born, Zhongshan—Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s other name—was selected as the new

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


name of the school to replace the originally-proposed name of Confucius Institute. Marvin Ho added the phrase “culture” to the name and turned the new name of the school into “Zhongshan Cultural Institute” (ύξЎϯᏢ ଣ) in order to alleviate the strong political implication in the phrase “Zhongshan.” Zhongshan Cultural Institute was officially established in San Francisco on October 1, 1979.15 In 2002, the Zhongshan Cultural Institute was re-registered as Zhongshan Institute of International Studies (уԀύξᆕӝࣴ‫ز‬ଣ Chungshan Institute of International Studies) in Sacramento according to Marvin Ho’s oral history.16 The historical fact of the earliest proposal to establish Confucius Institutes is currently not well-known throughout the entire world. It is a pity that most people all over the world mistake Communist China as the earliest creator or founding father of Confucius Institutes without a vivid memory of the anti-Confucian social movements in Communist China during the same decade when the earliest proposal to establish Confucius Institutes was made. If there had been no discouragement to stop the earliest proposal of Confucius Institutes by Mao Songnian in the 1970s, Communist China’s establishment of Confucius Institutes in the twenty-first century would have been different from what is shown to the world now.

The Chinese Communist Party’s anti-Confucian past During the 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC government terribly downgraded Confucius and forcefully fought against Confucianism in Mainland China before the end of the Cultural Revolution. One of the targets of its Cultural Revolution was Confucius and Confucianism. From January to June in 1974, Mao Zedong (Лᐛܿ 1893–1976) initiated the Anti-Confucius and Anti-Lin Social Movement (‫ץ‬Ͼ‫݅ץ‬ၮ୏). The “Lin” of this social movement refers to Lin Biao (݅ ು 1907–1971). This social movement is also known as the Anti-Confucius and Honoring-Qinshihuang (છ‫ ࣤۈ‬the initial emperor of the Qin Dynasty 259–210 B.C.) Social Movement (‫ץ‬Ͼඦછၮ୏). Mao Zedong stated that both Lin Biao and the Nationalist Party deeply admired Confucius and cordially respected Confucianism; therefore, he believed that everyone involved in the Cultural Revolution should fight against Lin Biao and Confucius. Insisting on the positive value of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong regarded himself as the same revolutionist as Qinshihuang ( છ ‫ ࣤ ۈ‬the initial emperor of the Qin Dynasty) and


Chapter Six

strengthened political power struggles against people who doubted whether the Cultural Revolution was truly good for Communist China at that time, including Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai (‫ڬ‬ৱٰ 1898–1976). In 1973–1974, the real target of Mao Zedong’s Anti-Confucius and Anti-Lin Social Movement was Zhou Enlai because Lin Biao died on September 13, 1971, and thus Mao Zedong did not truly need to target Lin Biao. One of Mao Zedong’s famous poetic lines compared Confucianism to disposable chaff: The spirit of the Qinshihuang remains alive in people’s hearts though its ancestral dragon died ઒ᓪᗨԝછซӧ The reputation of Confucianism is well-known, yet it is nothing but disposable chaff ϾᏢӜଯჴᳩᕦ17

Jiang Qing (Ԣߙ 1915–1991) edited a book entitled Lin Biao yu Kong Meng zhidao (݅ುᆶϾ‫ۏ‬ϐၰ Lin Biao and Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius). Pamphlet-length or booklet-length publications to chastise Confucius and Confucianism ensued. Confucius was his father’s second son; therefore, Confucius was deprecated and impolitely called Kong Laoer (ϾԴΒ the second in the Kong family) in Mainland China at that time. Zhang Leping (஭኷ѳ) and Wu Jinglu (ֆ⦻ᝳ) edited Kong Laoer (ϾԴΒ) and Liaoning Renmin press (ᒩჱΓ҇р‫ )ޗހ‬published Kongnonbing henpi konglaoer (πၭծ࣎‫ץ‬ϾԴΒ Laborers, Farmers, and Army Troops’ Vigorous Criticism of Kong Laoer) in 1974. Shannxi Renmin press (努ՋΓ҇р‫ )ޗހ‬published Zhang Yiqian’s (஭ကወ) Kong Laoer lieguo pengbiji (Ͼ Դ Β ӈ ୯ ࿘ Ꮫ ૶ Records of Kong Laoer’s Experience in Being Rejected throughout the Kingdoms) in 1974. Shandong Renmin press (ξܿΓ҇р‫ )ޗހ‬published Zhou Shen’s (‫ڬ‬ҙ) Liuxia Tuo tongma Kong Laoer ( ࢛ Π ⑀ ภ ጜ Ͼ Դ Β Liuxia Tuo’s Vigorous Criticism of Kong Laoer) in 1975. As Confucius’s descendant, Kong Lingpong (Ͼзܻ) recorded this social movement in his book.18 Wu Fakong’s (ֆ‫ )ޜݤ‬book, Mao Zedong Lin Biao Enchouji (Лᐛܿ݅ ುৱϜ૶ Records of Grace and Hatred between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao), also mentions this social movement. Chinese Communists’ anti-Confucian force impacted not only politics but also education at all levels, from kindergartens to universities. For instance, some college students and elites initiated the anti-Confucian slogan of “dadao kongjiadian” (ѺॹϾৎ۫ defeat the stores) during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, but what effectively paved the way for such an Anti-Confucianism and Anti-Lin Social Movement in 1973 was

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


the fanji youqing huichao yundong (ϸᔐѓ໼ӣዊၮ୏ Anti-Rightists Social Movement) or sangeyue yundong (ΟঁДၮ୏ Three Months Movement) on the campuses of Peking University (ч٧εᏢ Beijing University) and Tsinghua University (మ๮εᏢ Qinghua University) in Beijing,19 whose high school20 was the earliest cradle of red guards in Communist China. Cheng Jinkuan’s (ำਕቨ) book regarded this as a part of Communist China’s educational revolution ( ௲ ‫) ׯ‬, and Tsinghua University Press also published Liu Bing’s memoir about how the Cultural Revolution impacted Tsinghua University. During the period of the Anti-Confucius and Anti-Lin Social Movement, a volume of comics for children at the levels of pre-school education, kindergarten, and elementary school, was published in order to guarantee the denigration of Confucius and Confucianism: Kong laoer zuie de yisheng (ϾԴΒ࿾ൾ‫ޑ‬΋ғġ The Evil Life of Confucius). This volume of comics defined Confucius as a malevolent example of disreputable capitalists with royal ancestry. Analects of Confucius was interpreted as sinful quotations of anti-revolutionists’ words. Chunqiu (ࡾ ࣿ The Spring and Autumn Annals), Confucius’s historical chronicle of the Zhou Dynasty, was deemed a wicked twist of anti-slave socialist revolutionists’ power struggles against royal authorities, wealthy landlords, owners of slaves and servants, and so forth according to this volume of comics. Except for Kong laoer zuie de yisheng (ϾԴΒ࿾ൾ‫ޑ‬΋ғġ The Evil Life of Confucius), hundreds of comics shared the same theme in Mainland China during the 1970s. In 1974, Guangxi Renmin press (ቶՋΓ҇р‫ހ‬ ‫ )ޗ‬published Lin Biao yü Kong laoer (݅ುᆶϾԴΒ Lin Biao and Kong Laoer). In 1975, Ren Mei (Һఘ) edited Lishishang laodong renmin fankong douzheng de gushi (ᐕў΢മ୏Γ҇ϸϾର‫ࡺޑݾ‬٣ Stories of Laborers’ Power Struggles against Confucius throughout History). Composers with music talents created songs for children to deepen children’s lifelong anti-Confucianism beginning in their preadolescence or preteen childhood. Rebels Lin Biao and Kong Laoer ࠇ২݅ುǵϾԴΒ Both are debauched creatures ೿ࢂᚯܿՋˤ Although talking about virtues ቏΢ᖱϘက炻 They hide wicked schemes behind the scenes ‫္غ‬ᙒ။ीˤ Promoting the Confucian teaching contents of “limiting oneself to advocate etiquette,” Ⴔ֌Ȭլρൺᘶ˯炻 They cordially wish to resume feudalism only ΋Јགྷൺၬˤ


Chapter Six Little red guards should collaboratively rush to the front line आλծሸ΢ ତ炻 And powerfully criticize them α၊฽ҵ࣎࣎‫ץ‬ˤ21

Pairs of binary opposites throughout the world Communist China’s anti-Confucianism in the Chinese Mainland and Democratic China’s advocacy of Confucianism in Taiwan during the post-war era were not an accidental pair of binary opposites at all. This pair of binary opposites echoed the frequently-seen pattern of binary opposites throughout the world during the era of the Cold War: Russia vs. US, North Korea vs. South Korea, Eastern Germany vs. Western Germany, North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, communist nations vs. democratic countries, iron curtains of red Communists vs. freedom outside of the iron curtains of red Communists, socialism vs. capitalism, and so on. The US climax of anti-Communism was probably named after US Senator Joseph “Tail Gunner Joe” McCarthy. The center of the McCarthy era in US history was anti-communism. The anti-communist phrase, McCarthyism, also became well-known nationwide. Equally famous was the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Following in US footsteps, democratic nations, including Taiwan that powerfully advocated Confucianism, shared similar sorts of anti-communist fever. At that time, the leader of communist countries was Russia. For instance, the Russian derogatory term, “pindos” or “pendos” ( ɉɢɧɞɨɫ), referred to Americans. Russia’s communist followers included Communist China, North Korea, Eastern Germany, North Vietnam, Cuba, and so forth. Their anti-American fever was as austere as Americans’ anti-communist fever at that time. Within the worldwide ideological wars of binary opposites during the 1960s and 1970s, Confucius and Confucianism became one of the flamboyant icons to underscore the borderline between the binary opposites composed of Communist China’s hostility toward Confucian traditions and Taiwan’s reverence of Confucianism. Because of this pair of binary opposites, Taiwan had been identifying itself as having the authentic and real Chinese Confucian cultural traditions while its Mainland Chinese counterpart abandoned centuries of ancient Chinese Confucian cultural roots at that time.

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


Forgotten pairs of binary opposites Some of the above-mentioned pairs of binary opposites have been gradually forgotten although the pair of North Korea (Communist Korea) and South Korea (Democratic Korea) remains obvious even in the 2010s. For instance, the United States of America used to be the strongest anti-communist nation in the “Cold War” period; however, the US President Donald Trump and the USSR administrative leader Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin are good friends and Moscow’s popularity in the US increased in the 2010s. Though most Americans view Russia negatively, Moscow’s overall popularity in the United States has risen since 2014, when it plummeted after the country annexed Crimea. Twenty-nine percent of Americans now have a favorable view, compared with nineteen percent in 2014…22

The US attitude toward Communist China also changed. After Henry Kissinger arranged US President Richard Nixon’s Chinese trip to shake hands with Zhou Enlai (‫ڬ‬ৱٰ) on February 21–28, 1972, the US tended to unite itself with the CCP in Mainland China in order to cooperatively fight against the USSR. “Nixon in China” or “Nixon goes to China” became a popular American idiom to refer to politicians’ risky actions. In December 1978, the US terminated its official ties with Taiwan, which was Democratic China or the democratic counterpart of Communist China. On January 1, 1979, the US initiated its official diplomatic relation with the PRC, which was Communist China or the nation established by the CCP. In January 1979, Deng Xiaoping (ᎅλѳ 1904–1997) visited the US. On August 17, 1982, US President Ronald Wilson Reagan (1911– 2004) and PRC President Zhao Ziyang (ᇳ๋໚ 1919–2005) completed the United States-China Joint Communiqué (Ζ΋ΎϦൔ). This document aimed to have the PRC’s collaboration with the US to fight against Russia. In 1995, the US government permitted Lee Tung-hui’s (‫׵‬ฦ፵ b. 1923) speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, and resulted in the PRC military threats to the safety of Taiwan. US military forces traveled across the Pacific Ocean to the Taiwan Strait. In the 2000s, the White House started the 100K Initiative, hoping to bring 100,000 American young people to learn about Chinese language and culture by 2020.


Chapter Six Announced in 2015 by Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping (ಞ຾ѳ), the goal of One Million Strong is to grow the next generation of leaders who have a deeper understanding of China by creating a pipeline of China-savvy employees in a range of critical industries and ensuring that US students from all backgrounds have the opportunity to gain China-related skills. The campaign’s three pillars include: Endorsing widely-accepted Mandarin curricular norms at the K-12 level; increasing by more than double the number of Mandarin language teachers in the United States through expanded teacher training and teacher certification. Engaging technology platforms to ensure the accessibility of Mandarin language learning, particularly in underserved communities around the country. One Million Strong is the second presidential initiative led by the US-China Strong Foundation, building on 100K Strong, President Obama’s effort to dramatically expand US study abroad to China. The president’s initial goal of seeing 100,000 Americans study in China by 2014 was not only achieved, but also surpassed.23

The US government also started its National Security Language Initiative (NSLI)24 and Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) Program, officially defining Chinese as one of its critical languages. According to the CLS archive on March 22, 2011, the CLS program was one of the most competitive programs because only 575 of more than 5,200 applicants were successful winners of the CLS award in 2011 and less than ten percent with 631 of over 5,200 applicants won the Critical Languages Scholarship in 2012.25

Binary opposites: Confucius Institute vs. Taiwan Academy In the era between the 1950s and the 1990s, Taiwan was the priority choice for worldwide learners of Chinese languages and culture, especially during the “Cold War” period and the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. In a meeting in National Taiwan Normal University in July 2017, Zheng Jinquan (ᎄᒸӄ Cheng Chin-chuan) verbally mentioned that a group of linguists and senior experts of TCFL or TCSL were invited to meet with the CCP administrative head in the Zhongnanhai (ύࠄੇ), the location of the PRC’s top-rank central government office, and talk about the PRC’s loss of foreign students coming to learn about the Chinese language and culture in Mainland China after the Tiananmen Square Incident. The decade of the 1990s witnessed the PRC government’s strong efforts to “shake hands” with the US and non-Communist nations across the world. The Bejing City’s hosting of the United Nations World Women’s Congress

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


in 1995, for instance, was the first time that the PRC government restarted its friendship with the non-Communist world after the Tiananmen Square Incident. Most American learners of the Mandarin Chinese language and Chinese culture have been rushing to Mainland China after the 2000s. Taiwan has been losing its old reputation as the globally top-ranked location and the dreamland for Americans who would like to study Chinese language and culture. Taiwan’s golden age of TCSL or TCFL was gone after the 2000s. In other words, Taiwan vs. Mainland China and Taiwan Academies vs. Confucius Institutes became eye-catching pairs of binary opposites in terms of TCFL or TCSL though the political and financial power of Taiwan Academies are weaker than Confucius Institutes. In the 2000s, Taiwanese government’s reactions to the PRC government’s establishment of Confucius Institutes included the initiation of the Taiwan Academy in three American cities: New York City, Houston, and Los Angeles. When Ma Ying-jeou (ଭमΐ) served as the President in Taiwan, he emphasized the above-mentioned pair of binary opposites, stressed that the important values of Taiwan’s old position in the worldwide TCFL or TCSL should not be ignored, and highlighted the CCP’s past abolition of Confucianism and Taiwan’s preservation of traditional Chinese culture. For example, the argument about the Taiwan Academy highlighted that Taiwan cherishes traditional Chinese characters more than Mainland China. Taiwan is the major Chinese cultural center where Confucianism, Buddhism, Zen, literature, architecture, arts and crafts, and traditional customs are promoted and preserved more completely as compared to the many regions influenced by Chinese culture…The most prominent example of how Chinese culture has been preserved in Taiwan is the continual use of traditional Chinese characters. Understanding traditional Chinese characters, which have been used for over 3,000 years since the Shang Dynasty, is part and parcel of understanding Chinese culture. Home to the vast majority of traditional character users, Taiwan plays a significant role in preserving and promoting the use of traditional Chinese characters.26

Underscoring the strongly sarcastic contrast and logical self-contradiction between the CCP’s past negation of Confucianism and the current PRC government’s establishment of Confucius Institutes, Ma Ying-jeou argued that Taiwan’s age-old efforts to preserve traditional Chinese culture and the establishment of the Taiwan Academy are more politically correct,


Chapter Six

more culturally authentic, more logically flawless, and thus better than Confucius Institutes.

History of overseas Chinese education before Taiwan Academy As a matter of fact, before the initiation of the Taiwan Academy in three American cities in the 2000s, the Nationalist Party’s overseas Chinese education began in the late Qing Dynasty.27 Early in the seventeenth century, overseas Chinese began the employment of private tutors to teach their descendants about Chinese classics, such as Sishu (Ѥਜ The Four Books) or Wujing (ϖ࿶ The Five Classics). The earliest written record might be traced back to the Mingcheng Academy (ܴ၈ਜଣ) in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1690.28 Sun Yat-sen paid special attention to overseas Chinese in order to promote his anti-Qing plans, win financial donations from overseas Chinese, and eventually replace the Qing Dynasty with the Republic of China. 29 He established the Sino-Western Academy ( ύ Ջ Ꮲ ୸ ) in Yokohama, Japan, in 1887. Nowadays it is called Yokohama Overseas Chinese School (ύ๮Ꮲਠ). He published the Young China Morning Paper in California in August 1910. After Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of China, the Republican government continued and broadened the overseas Chinese education.30 From the late Qing Dynasty to 1926, 2,495 overseas Chinese schools educated more than 111,807 overseas Chinese students.31 In 1935, the number of overseas Chinese schools was 2,519; 2,390 of them were located in Asia and 118 of them were located in America.32 In 1940, the number of overseas Chinese schools was 3,231 and 2,605 of them were located in Southeastern Asia.33 After WWII, the Republican government, Nationalist Party, and Taiwanese government established the Taipei Academy (ѠчᏢଣ) or Taiwan School (Ѡ᡼Ꮲਠ) in various countries, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea. The Chinese-language teaching materials in Taipei Academies or Taiwan Schools were the same as the textbook materials that Taiwanese students had at kindergartens, elementary schools, and high schools in Taiwan.34 In 1949, the number of overseas Chinese schools was more than 4,860.35 In 1967, the number of overseas Chinese schools in Southeastern Asia was 5,240.36 The number of Nationalist Party and Republican government’s overseas Chinese schools in 1967 was around ten times more than the number of the CCP

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


and PRC government’s Confucius Institutes in 2016. When the CCP and PRC government’s 512 Confucius Institutes caught the entire world’s eye in 2016,37 little global attention was paid to the fact that the Nationalist Party and Republican government’s 5,240 overseas Chinese schools around half a century before 2016 numbered ten times more than the CCP and PRC government’s 512 Confucius Institutes. The enormous number of Nationalist Party and Republican government’s overseas Chinese schools in Southeastern Asia decreased after the late 1960s because of grassroots nationalist movements in Indonesia, Myanmar (or Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—especially the anti-Chinese social movements in Indonesia in 1998.38 Currently in the 2010s, some overseas Chinese schools survived in Southeastern Asia. According to overseas Chinese parents’ information, Vietnam has only one Taipei Academy in South Saigon. The tuition is paid once per semester. Elementary school tuition is around 1,500 USD per semester. Junior high school tuition is a little bit more than 1,800 USD. Senior high school tuition is about 2,000 USD.39 Jinan Academy ( ᄤ ࠄ Ꮲ ୸ ) was the Chinese government’s first national academy to teach Chinese-heritage students with overseas experience, not including local Chinese students without an overseas background, inside Chinese territory. The late Qing government initiated it in 1906. The first thirty-two Chinese-heritage students, who had an overseas background, started their first class at Jinan Academy in spring 1907. The Nationalist Party’s revolutions against the Qing Dynasty prevented the smooth continuation of this academy. The Republican government resumed the academy in 1927 and named it National Jinan University ( ୯ ҥ ᄤ ࠄ ε Ꮲ ). During the Sino-Japanese wars, this university moved to Fujian. It returned to Shanghai in 1946. The PRC government re-established it in 1958, stopped it during the 1967–1976 period because of the Cultural Revolution, and restarted in Guangzhou in 1978. 40 The Taiwanese government did not restart this university in Taiwan until 1995. Now this university is called National Chi Nan University in Nantou (ࠄ‫)׫‬, Taiwan.41 In the major cities of the US, some Chinese-heritage parents established weekend Chinese schools to teach each other’s children about the Chinese language and culture. For instance, in Minnesota, the Chinese School in Rochester 42 offers different levels of Mandarin Chinese-language classes and courses related to Chinese culture, such as traditional Chinese-style dancing or musical instruments, during weekends. Celebrations of important Chinese festivals taught overseas Chinese


Chapter Six

children about how people celebrated Chinese festivals in Chinese-speaking areas. Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York City, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Houston, and Chicago have numerous unofficial weekend Chinese schools. Most Taiwanese-heritage parents bring their American-born children to weekend Chinese schools established by Taiwanese-heritage people, and Mainland Chinese parents bring their American-born children to the weekend Chinese schools managed by people with Mainland Chinese backgrounds.

Academic freedom Confucius Institutes, Taiwan Academies, Taipei Academies, Taiwan Schools, Jinan University (or National Chi Nan University), and weekend Chinese schools in the US are all public or private educational institutions to assist non-Chinese-heritage learners or overseas Chinese students learn Chinese language and Chinese culture. Among them, Confucius Institutes encountered the strongest criticism because of the possible damage of academic freedom. In June 2014, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) announced a public statement to discourage higher education institutions in the US and Canada from forming partnerships with Confucius Institutes financed by the PRC because the Mainland Chinese budgets damaged academic freedom. Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom… Their academic activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the PRC. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.43

McMaster University canceled its on-campus Confucius Institute in 2013 after its faculty member filed a lawsuit against its permission of discrimination against allies of Falungong (‫ݤ‬፺ф), which the CCP regarded as an evil enemy. In 2014, the University of Chicago followed and abolished its connections with Confucius Institute after more than one

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


hundred faculty members’ negative votes. In fall 2014, the Toronto District School Board terminated its partnership with the Confucius Institute, and returned 225,000 USD to China. According to Ross King, various departments in the University of British Columbia rejected the proposals about Confucius Institute. The refusal was repeated at least three times.44 Canadian news reports commented that Confucius Institutes would colonize their higher education. 45 This negative impression probably continued after dozens of US universities closed their on-campus Confucius Institutes, especially when the PRC censorship attempted to harm the academic freedom of which China-related articles Cambridge University Press should publish.

Cambridge University Press and the PRC censorship Similar to the case of the CCP’s threats to academic freedom, the PRC government threatened to block Cambridge University Press’ sales profit in its territory if China-related articles in its academic journal, China Quarterly, were not under the PRC governmental censorship. The CCP government wanted Cambridge University Press to remove 315 China-related articles from its publication lists. Cambridge University Press confessed its initial obedience. We can confirm that we received an instruction from a Chinese import agency to block individual articles from The China Quarterly within China… We complied with this initial request to remove individual articles, to ensure that other academic and educational materials we publish remain available to researchers and educators in this market.46

James A. Millward wrote an open letter to Cambridge University Press about its initial decision to kowtow to the PRC governmental censorship of China-related articles in China Quarterly. 47 He underscored that governmental censorship should not hinder academic freedom and numerous scholars followed his footsteps to emphasize the value of academic freedom.48 On August 21, 2017, Cambridge University Press announced its decision to discard the PRC governmental censorship. All the 315 China-related articles would re-appear regardless of the CCP’s wish to abolish them. As well as Cambridge University Press, other publishers have probably also kowtowed to the same CCP censorship—how many publishers faced the same PRC governmental pressure? Except for the


Chapter Six

above-mentioned 315 China-related articles in China Quarterly, how many China-related academic journal articles have already been removed from other academic journals because of the same PRC pressure? Journal of Asian Studies… has confirmed that the Chinese authorities also asked it to block access to about 100 articles in its online archives… China is currently detaining more than 100 journalists and cyber-journalists.49

How many China-related research books have already been blocked because of the same political censorship? How many open letters to other publishers and journal editors should still be written after James A. Millward’s open letter to Cambridge University Press? Will all the blocked articles and books return to the original publication lists?

References “Beijing Book Fair: RSF Urges Publishers to Reject Chinese Censorship.” Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information. August 28, 2017: https://rsf.org/en/news/beijing-book-fair-rsf-urges-publishers-reject-chinese-ce nsorship (online news report retrieved in September 2017). Bradley, Paul and John Law. “Chinese Colonization of Canada's Education.” Council of European Canadians April 18, 2015. Cai, Surong (ጰનᆺ Tsai, Su-jung). “Lu kongzi xueyuan chuanqiu jia hanyu ye gaochang yidai yilu” (ഌϾηᏢଣӄౚ௲ᅇᇟΨଯୠ΋஥΋ၡ Mainland China’s Confucius Institutes Offer Worldwide Classes of Mandarin Chinese Language and Promote the One Belt One Road Initiative). Taipei: Financial Version of the United News (ᖄӝ଄࿶ཥᆪ), June 10, 2017. “Cambridge University Press Reverses China Censorship Move.” BBC News. August 21, 2017. Cao, Yufen (ఆॕ޹ Tsao, Yu-fen). “Buzai qufu zhongguo yali, jianqiao daxue shubanshe chongxin jiang wenzhang shangwang” (όӆۙܺύ୯ᓸΚ!ቆᐏ εᏢр‫ޗހ‬ख़ཥஒЎക΢ᆛ No Longer Kowtow to Chinese Oppression, Cambridge University Press Will Put Articles onto Its Website Again). Ziyou shibao (Ծҗਔൔ Liberty Times), August 22, 2017. Chang, Chih-shan (஭෌࣑!Zhang, Zhishan). “Mao Songnian yu shijie huayuwen jiaoyu xuehui” (Л݊ԃᆶШࣚ๮ᇟЎ௲‫ػ‬Ꮲ཮ Mao Songnian and the World Chinese Language Association). Huawen shijie (๮ЎШࣚ Chinese Language World), 2013, p. 40. Cheng, Jinkuan (ำਕቨ). Jiaoyu keming de lishi kaocha 1966–1976 (௲‫ػ‬ॠ‫ޑڮ‬ ᐕ ў Ե ჸ 1966-1976 Historical Investigation of Educational Revolution 1966–1976). Fuzhou (ᅽԀ): Fujian Education (ᅽࡌ௲‫)ػ‬, 2001, p. 443.

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Graham, Edward J. “Confucius Institutes Threaten Academic Freedom.” Academe (September-October 2014): https://www.aaup.org/article/confucius-institutes-threaten-academic-freedom#. WaOvbT4jHcs (retrieved in August 2017). Ho, Marvin (Ֆඳ፣). Hanjiao zhifu He Jingxian koushu lishi (ᅇ௲ϐРՖඳ፣α ॊᐕў Pioneer of Mandarin Language Education—Biography of Dr. Marvin Ho). Taipei: Zhonghua Books (ύ๮ਜֽ), 2015, pp. 170–171 and p. 285. Hope, Alan. “Free University of Brussels to Open Confucius Institute.” Flanders Today, August 22, 2017: http://www.flanderstoday.eu/education/free-university-brussels-open-confucius -institute (online news report retrieved in August 2017). “Hua wenming zhongguo duzun rushu de zhuifeng kongzi” (၉Ўܴύ୯Ǵᐱ൧Ꮒ ೌ ‫ ޑ‬ଓ ࠾ Ͼ η Discussions on Honorable Names for Confucius in the Chinese Civilization that Respects Confucianism). KK News (July 19, 2017): https://kknews.cc/culture/ognoy5m.html (online news report retrieved in August 2017). Huang, Rong (໳৒) and Xue Li (ᖙಹ).“Shishang zuigui wangzhan wangle kongzi xueyuan” (ў΢ന຦ᆛઠ..ᆛၡϾηᏢଣ The Most Expensive Website in Human History—the Online Confucius Institute). The New Tang Dynasty TV News, February 11, 2010. Jiang, Qing (Ԣߙ). Lin Biao yu Kong Meng zhidao (݅ುᆶϾ‫ۏ‬ϐၰ Lin Biao and Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius). Yinchuan: Ninxia renmin (ჱহΓ ҇), 1975.ġ Kong, Lingpong (Ͼзܻ). Kongyi tan Kong (ϾဴፋϾ Confucius’s Descendent Talks about Confucius). Beijing: Chinese Literary History Press (ύ୯Ўўр ‫)ޗހ‬, 1998. Lin, Huizeng (݅ችම). Haishi huikui zhonghua: zhongguo yu zhoubian de guoqu, xianzai, yu weilai (ᗋࢂख़ᘜύ๮;!ύ୯ᆶ‫ڬ‬ᜐ‫ޑ‬ၸѐǵ౜ӧǵᆶ҂ٰ Better out of the China). Taipei: Shijie huawen zuojia (Шࣚ๮Ўբৎ Worldwide Chinese-Language Writers), 2014, p. 41. Lin, Putian (݅ᇀҖ Lin, Pu-tien). Huaqiao jiaoyu yu huawenjiaoyu gailun (๮Ⴞ ௲‫ػ‬ᆶ๮Ў௲‫ཷػ‬ፕ Overseas Chinese Education and General Introduction to Chinese Language Education). Xiamen: Xiamen University (༺ߐεᏢ), 1995, p. 61. Liu, Bing (ቅӇ). Fengyu suiyue: qinghua daxue wenhua dageming yishi (॥ߘྃ Д;!మ๮εᏢЎϯεॠ‫ڮ‬Ꮻჴ The Stormy Era: Memories of Truth in the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University). Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1998. Liu, Yusheng (ቅ༿ғ). Shizaigang zayi: Kongzi lidai fengshi (Шၩ୸ᚇᏫ¸Ͼη ᐕж࠾ⷈ Miscellaneous Memories in the Shizai Hall: Posthumous Titles for Confucius in Past Dynasties). Taipei: Xiuwei (‫)࠶ذ‬, 2010. Mao, Songnian (Л݊ԃ Mao, Sung-nien). Xiansheng kongzi yijiao yandu cungao (ӃဃϾηᒪ௲ࣴ᠐Ӹዺ Remaining Reading Notes of Instructions from


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Confucius as the Pioneer Sage). Taipei: World Chinese Language Association (Шࣚ๮Ў௲‫ػ‬Ꮲ཮), 2000. —. “Kongzi daode jiaoyu zai xianshidai de zhongyaoxing” (Ͼηၰቺ௲‫ػ‬ӧ౜ਔ ж‫ޑ‬ख़ा‫ ܄‬The Significance of Confucius’s Moral Education in Modern and Current Periods). Kongmeng yuekan (Ͼ ‫ ۏ‬Дт Confucius and Mencius Monthly) 35.2 (October 1996): 4-8. —. “Cong EQ tan kongzi daode jiaoyu de zhongyao” (வ EQ ፋϾηၰቺ௲‫ޑػ‬ ख़ा From EQ to the Importance of Confucian Moral Education). Jiaoyu ziliao wenzhai (௲‫ػ‬ၗ਑Ўᄔ Readers’ Digest of Educational Information) 250 (November 1998): 11–24. Ministry of Education. “1946 nian zhi qiaoxiao shuju” (1946 ԃϐႾਠኧᏵ Statistical Data of Overseas Chinese Schools in 1946). Dierci zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian (ಃΒԛύ୯௲‫ػ‬ԃ᠘ Yearbook of Chinese Education, Volume II). Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1948, p. 1257. National Academy for Educational Research ( ୯ ৎ ௲ ‫) ܌ ز ࣴ ػ‬. Taiwan huayuwen jiaoyu fazhanshi (Ѡ᡼๮ᇟЎ௲‫ػ‬ว৖ў History of Taiwan’s TCSL Education). Taipei: National Academy for Educational Research, 2013, p. 453. Norrie, Justin. “Confucius Says School's in, but Don't Mention Democracy.” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 20, 2011. Nussbaum, Matthew. “Poll: Republicans Confidence in Russia’s Putin on the Rise.” Politico, August 16, 2017: http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/16/poll-republicans-putin-russia-confid ence-241701 (news report retrieved in August 2017). Overseas Chinese Encyclopedia Editorial Committee (๮Ⴞ๮Γԭࣽӄਜጓᒠ‫ہ‬ ঩཮). Overseas Chinese Encyclopedia: Volume of Science and Technology (๮ Ⴞ๮Γԭࣽӄਜ;௲‫)ڔמࣽػ‬. Beijing: Overseas Chinese Press, May 1999, p. 99. Qiaoweihui (Ⴞ‫ ཮ہ‬Overseas Chinese Committee). Qiaowu wushi nian—qiaowu weiyuanhui chengli wushi zhounian jinian (Ⴞ୍ϖΜԃ..Ⴞ୍‫ہ‬঩཮ϖΜ‫ڬ‬ ԃइ‫ ۺ‬Fifty Years of Overseas Chinese Affairs—Fiftieth Anniversary of the Overseas Chinese Committee). Taipei; Overseas Chinese Committee, 1982, p. 140. Ren, Mei (Һఘ). Lishishang laodong renmin fankong douzheng de gushi (ᐕў΢ മ୏Γ҇ϸϾର‫ࡺޑݾ‬٣ Stories of Laborers’ Power Struggles against Confucius throughout History). Beijing: Renmin painting art (Γ҇ऍೌ), 1975. Rong, Youe (ᄪѴে Jung, You-eh). Zhengdang lunti hou de haiwai qiaojiao zhengce ( ࡹ ល ፺ ඹ ࡕ ‫ ੇ ޑ‬Ѧ Ⴞ ௲ ࡹ ฼ ! Policies of Overseas Chinese Education after the Alternation of Power, 2000-2010). Master Thesis at National Taiwan University, 2010, p. 46. Salins, Marshall. "China U." The Nation. October 29, 2013. “Shishang zuigui wangzhan wangle kongzi xueyuan huafei jin yiyi” (ў΢ന຦ᆛ

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ઠ!ᆛၡϾηᏢଣ޸຤߈ 1 ሹ The Most Expensive Website in Human History, The Online Confucius Institute Cost Almost $100,000,000 RMB). Epoch Times, February 14, 2010. Tang, Zhaoyun (෯ ӂ ໦ Tang, Chao-yun). “The Supervision System of the Republican Government” (ፕ҇୯ࡹ۬‫ޑ‬ຎᏤ‫)ࡋڋ‬. Republican Archive (҇ ୯ᔞਢ) 1 (2006): p. 117. Wei, Shizhe (᚟гণ Wei, Shih-cheh). “Meiguo jinshan guofu jinianguan zhi baodao” (ऍ୯ߎξ୯Рइ‫ۺ‬ᓔϐൔᏤ Report of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in San Francisco, U.S.A.). Guankan (ᓔт Chronicle of Historical Memorial Hall) 21, May 16, 2008, p. 158. Wu, Fakong (ֆ‫)ޜݤ‬. Mao Zedong Lin Biao Enchouji (Лᐛܿ݅ುৱϜ૶ Records of Grace and Hatred between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao). Taipei: Haye (ࠖओ), 2016. Xiao, Gan (ᑵҒ).ġ Kong laoer zuie de yisheng (ϾԴΒ࿾ൾ‫ޑ‬΋ғġ The Evil Life of Confucius).Shanghai: Shanghai renmin (΢ੇΓ҇), 1974. Yang, Zhao ( ླྀ ྣ ), Ma Jiahui ( ଭ ৎ ፵ ), and Hu Hongxia ( च ࢫ ߢ ). Duizhaoji@1963: ershier ge richang shenghuo cihui (ჹྣ૶@1963:ΒΜΒ ঁ В த ғ ࢲ ຒ ༼ Comparisons and Contrasts@1963: Twenty-Two Vocabulary Units in Daily Life). Taipei: Yuanliu (ᇻࢬ), 2012, p. 5. “Yinni 98 paihua 19 nian zhouguo shangtong jiqu lishi” (ӑѭ 98 ௨๮ 19 ԃ!‫و‬ၸ ໾ ภ ૶ ‫ ڗ‬ᐕ ў 19 Anti-Chinese Years since 1998 Healing Scars and Remembering the History). United Daily (ᖄӝВൔ), May 13, 2017. Yu, Hanliang (ॕᅇ‫ ؼ‬Yu, Han-liang). Huaqiao jiaoyu fazhanshi (๮Ⴞ௲‫ػ‬ว৖ ў History of Overseas Chinese Education). Taipei: National Compilation Hall (୯ҥጓ᝿ᓔ), 2001, pp. 12, 13, 16, 196. Zhang, Leping (஭኷ѳ) and Wu Jinglu (ֆ⦻ᝳ). Kong Laoer (ϾԴΒ). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin (΢ੇΓ҇), 1974. Zhang, Xizhe (஭‫׆‬ণ Chang, Hsi-cheh). Wushinian lai de huaqiao yu qiaowu (ϖ Μԃٰ‫ޑ‬๮ႾᆶႾ୍ Overseas Chinese and Affairs in the 50 Years). Taipei: The Headquarter of the Overseas Chinese Association (๮Ⴞ‫཮ڐ‬ᕴ཮), 1963, p. 201. Zhang, Yiqian (஭ကወ). Kong Laoer lieguo pengbiji (ϾԴΒӈ୯࿘Ꮫ૶ Records of Kong Laoer’s Experiences in Being Rejected throughout the Kingdoms). Xi’an (ՋӼ): Shannxi renmin (ଧՋΓ҇), 1974. “Zhongguo ‘kongzi xueyuan’ ranhong aozhou xingtan jiazhang chunqi dizhi” (ύ ୯ȨϾηᏢଣȩࢉआᐞࢪ‫׶‬Ꮭ!ৎߏဂଆ‫ ڋܢ‬The Red Color of China’s Confucius Institutes Pollutes the Education Shrine in Australia and Parents Collaboratively Resist it). Ziyou shibao (Ծҗਔൔ Liberty Times). June 2, 2016: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/1716179 (online news report retrieved in August 2017). Zhou, Shen (‫ڬ‬ҙ). Liuxia Tuo tongma Kong Laoer (࢛Π⑀ภጜϾԴΒ Liuxia Tuo’s Vigorous Criticism of Kong Laoer). Jinan: Shandong renmin (ξܿΓ҇), 1975.


Chapter Six

Notes 1

Check Justin Norrie’s news report in Sydney Morning Herald on February 20, 2011 and Marshall Sahlins’s article in The Nation on October 29, 2013. 2 The initial emperor of the Qin Dynasty was famous for his nationwide policy of burning Confucian books and burying Confucian scholars. 3 During the Yuan Dynasty, the royal authorities divided all citizens into ten levels. Confucian scholars belonged to the second lowest level, only a little bit better than the level of beggars. 4 For details, consult the report in KK News. Also consult Liu Yusheng’s (ቅ༿ғ) book. 5 Here is the official website of the CITCM: http://lsbuci4tcm.uk.chinesecio.com (retrieved in June 2017). 6 Here is the official website of the Copenhagen Business Confucius Institute: http://www.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_6759.htm (retrieved in July 2017). 7 Here is the official website of the Business Confucius Institute at the University of Leeds in England: http://bciul.uk.chinesecio.com (retrieved in July 2017). 8 Here is the official website of the Online Confucius Institute: http://college.chinese.cn (retrieved in June 2017). 9 Check Alan Hope’s news report in Flanders Today on August 22, 2017. 10 Consult the news report in the financial version of United News on June 10, 2017. 11 See the news report in Liberty Times on June 2, 2016. 12 For details, check the news report in the New Tang Dynasty TV News on February 11, 2010, and the news report in Epoch Times on February 14, 2010. 13 Check Mao Songnian’s various publications about Confucius and Confucianism. 14 For details, consult Chang Chih-shan’s article. 15 Check pages 170–171 in Marvin Ho’s oral history. 16 Check page 285 in Marvin Ho’s oral history. 17 For details, consult page 41 in Lin Huizeng’s book. 18 Kong Lingpong’s (Ͼзܻ) book is entitled Kongyi tan Kong (ϾဴፋϾ Confucius’s Descendants Talk about Confucius). It was published by Chinese Literary History Press on September 1, 1998. 19 See books written by Cheng Jinkuan and Liu Bing. 20 This high school is named Tsinghua University High School in Beijing (ч٧మ ๮εᏢߕ೛ύᏢ). Its official web-page is: http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/thfz/785/index.html (retrieved in August 2017). 21 For details, consult page 5 in Yang Zhao, Ma Jiahui, and Hu Hongxia’s book. 22 See Matthew Nussbaum’s news report on July 16, 2017. 23 Check the online information about the US-China 100K Strong Initiative: http://100kstrong.org/initiatives/1-million-strong (web-page retrieved in August 2017). 24 For details, see the NSLI website:

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies


https://languagepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/National%20Security%20 Language%20Initiative%20Information.pdf (website retrieved in August 2017). 25 For details, consult the CLS Program Archive dated March 22, 2011: https://web.archive.org/web/20111031141040/http://newsletter.clscholarship.org/2 011/03/cls-updates-2011-program-recipients.html (archive data retrieved in August 2017). Also check the CLS Program website: https://web.archive.org/web/20120915135910/http://exchanges.state.gov/academic exchanges/sli2.html (web page retrieved in August 2017). 26 See the argument about Taiwan Academy and traditional Chinese characters in Taiwan: http://english.moc.gov.tw/article/index.php?sn=2721 (online information retrieved in August 2017). 27 For details, consult pages 12 and 16 in Yu Hanliang’s book. 28 Check the book by the Overseas Chinese Encyclopedia Editorial Committee. 29 See Wei Shizhe’s article. 30 For details, consult Tang Zhaoyun’s book. 31 See page 196 in Yu Hanliang’s book. 32 For details, consult page 1257 in the statistical data of overseas Chinese schools from the Ministry of Education. 33 Check page 61 in Li Putian’s book. 34 Overseas Chinese parents’ information was retrieved from the following website: https://tw.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100309000010KK07107 (retrieved in July 2017). 35 For details, consult page 201 in Zhang Xizhe’s book. 36 See the statistical data from the Overseas Chinese Committee and History of Taiwan’s TCFL Education. 37 See the official website information from the Hanban Office of the PRC Government: http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm (web page retrieved in September 2017). 38 Check page 46 in Rong Youe’s master’s thesis. Also see the news report about Indonesia’s anti-Chinese social movement in the United Daily. 39 Overseas Chinese parents’ information was retrieved from the following website: https://tw.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100309000010KK07107 (retrieved in July 2017). 40 For details, consult the official website of Jinan University in the PRC: http://www.jnu.edu.cn/2514/list.htm (website retrieved in August 2017). 41 See the official website of National Chi Nan University: http://www.ncnu.edu.tw/ncnuweb (website retrieved in August 2017). 42 For details, consult the official website of Chinese Language School in Rochester: https://www.csrochester.net (retrieved in June 2017). 43 See Edward J. Graham’s article. 44 Check the interview video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_xGvS-Gry4 (website retrieved in August 2017). 45 See Paul Bradley and John Law’s article.



Chapter Six

Check the news report in BBC News on August 21, 2017. The open letter can be access on the website: https://medium.com/@millwarj/open-letter-to-cambridge-university-press-about-it s-censorship-of-the-journal-china-quarterly-c366f76dcdac (website information retrieved on August 22, 2017). 48 Check the news report in Liberty Times on August 22, 2017. 49 For details, consult the news report entitled “Beijing Book Fair: RSF urges publishers to reject Chinese censorship.” 47


Wu Yanren’s (ֆࣴΓ) Strange Events of the Past Twenty Years (ΒΜԃҞ ࿏ϐ‫܁‬౜ຝ) was one of the late Qing Dynasty’s four greatest novels of exposure (ះೢλᇥ), and this article borrows this title of Wu Yanren’s well-anthologized fiction. This article aims to unveil strange events of the most recent twenty years (from 1996 to 2016) in TCFL (Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language) or TCSL (Teaching Chinese as a Second Language) in US higher education. The research subjects are strange events that junior-level instructors of TCFL/TCSL encountered in US higher education from 1996 to 2016. To protect these forty junior-level instructors, they are treated as anonymous interviewees in this article. Except for unavoidable words, such as senior scholars’ non-pinyin romanization of Chinese-language names, “Mainland Chinese” or “non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas,” details that may help readers identify these interviewees are either replaced with pseudonyms or erased as much as possible. In this article, the phrase “junior-level” refers to the levels of teaching assistants, lecturers, or assistant professors. The major research methodology was to anonymously interview forty junior-level instructors or applicants for teaching jobs in TCFL/TCSL in US higher education to collect their personal experiences in TCFL/TCSL at American college-level or postgraduate-level academic institutions from 1996 to 2016. According to the forty anonymous interviewees, at least two categories of strange events stood out. First, native-level Mandarin Chinese-language


Chapter Seven

instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas became the poor minority after the number of Chinese Mainlanders increased. Second, some non-Chinese-speaking people’s anti-Chinese animosity increased, and some non-native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructors were anxious about the pressure of being outshined by an increasing number of native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructors in the same job market. Needless to say, competition between non-Chinese-language programs and Chinese-language programs in US higher education became stronger and stronger after the number of Chinese-speaking people and the importance of TCFL/TCSL increased.

Ratio changes From the 1950s to the 1980s, the number of non-Mainland instructors of TCFL/TCSL and applicants for TCFL/TCSL teaching positions in US higher education was larger than that of people from Mainland China or the PRC (People’s Republic of China). Before the 1980s, most junior-level instructors or applicants for junior-level teaching positions in TCFL/TCSL in US higher education were mainly chosen by senior-level faculty members, committee members, or administrative heads who had learning or living experience in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas from the 1950s to the 1980s. In the 1990s to the 2000s, however, everything turned upside down. The United States of America was the world’s largest anticommunist country, especially during the period of the Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s; however, after the Chinese Communists turned Mainland China into the world’s strongest and richest nation and played a more and more influential role in international interactions in the post-1990s era, the United States abandoned her original anticommunist insistence, stretched her arms to passionately embrace the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), and was no longer the same anticommunist country it had been previously when facing the CCP. After the CCP’s “open-door” policy in the late 1980s and the 1990s, the number of Chinese Mainlanders in US higher education began to increase. Around the middle of the 2010s, US higher education had more than 340,000 students from Mainland China. However, while US higher education has included more and more Chinese Mainlanders, the number of Taiwanese-heritage people has been decreasing. Take departments related to engineering or economics for example. Currently, in the 2010s, they have a considerable percentage of Chinese Mainlanders as faculty members and students.

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


The China that administrative and personnel heads in twenty-first century US higher education keenly desire to approach is now Mainland China, Communist China, or the PRC. They no longer feel the same love for anticommunist non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas with whom the American government made friends from the 1950s to the early 1990s. In US higher education after the late 1990s or the 2000s, junior-level instructors of TCFL/TCSL are chosen mainly by senior-level Mainland-Chinese-heritage or Caucasian-heritage faculty members, committee members, and administrative heads who have learning or living experience in the Mainland of the PRC. The above-mentioned ratio changes certainly resulted from Mainland China’s post-1990s Chinese boost in economic and international power. The ratio changes resulted in the strange events of the most recent twenty years in TCFL/TCSL of US higher education. This article aims to reveal these strange events by honestly reporting forty anonymous junior-level interviewees’ personal experiences from 1996 to 2016.

First-hand information from anonymous interviewees Anonymous Interviewees 1 to 4 disclosed true examples of US universities employing people with doctoral degrees in the wrong research fields and excluding other people with terminal degrees, teaching experience, or administrative positions in the correct academic fields. Interviewee 1 highlighted two official websites of an American university. The first official website was dated April 23, 2014. This website clearly announced that this US university had hired a Mainland Chinese man with a doctoral degree in architecture—not in Chinese linguistics, Chinese- language education, classical or modern Chinese literature, or TCFL/TCSL (see Appendix I). The second official website, dated July 2016, shows that the Mainland Chinese man with a PhD in architecture had been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor sometime before July 2016 (see Appendix II). According to interviewee 1, the previous chancellor of the university that had hired this Mainland Chinese man with a terminal degree in architecture to be its visiting (thus non-tenure-track) instructor of Chinese language had said that this Mainland Chinese man had been hired mainly because his Japanese-heritage wife taught Japanese language courses in the same department. The employment of this man started early in 2010. The initial position was for a temporary and non-tenure-track instructor of


Chapter Seven

Chinese language from 2010 to 2013 (see Appendix III). This man’s previous teaching experience included no administrative directorship and a one year temporary post teaching architecture courses in an Australian university. In the 2013–2014 academic year, people in this department began to help turn this man toward a tenure-track Chinese-language teaching position. A nationwide search was announced in fall 2013 and early spring 2014. The chancellor of this university mentioned to interviewee 1 that people in the department even showed this man’s book about ancient Chinese architectural art—not linguistics, literary criticism, or literary theories—to the chancellor to help him win this tenure-track position, but nothing written by other candidates was shown to the same chancellor. Two of interviewee 1’s female friends applied for this tenure-track teaching position at the same time. One of them was from Mainland China and had a PhD in linguistics from an American research university. The other was from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area and had a doctoral degree in literature from a US research university. The candidate with a doctoral degree in literature was interviewed via phone on Wednesday, March 19, 2014 (see Appendix IV), but the candidate with a PhD in linguistics did not have any opportunity for telephone interview. One of the candidates’ reference people disclosed that the university requested reference people to submit opinions to the search committee before the deadline of April 4, 2014 (see Appendix V). On April 9, 2014, the search committee emailed to notify that the search was complete. The arrangement of out-of-state candidates’ flights to campus interviews usually takes time, and less than one week is usually too short to schedule such flights and arrange details of campus interviews. This meant that there had been no time for on-campus interview of out-of-state candidates and thus no such interviews had been completed in the search. The Mainland Chinese man with a PhD in architecture was hired as the tenure-track Assistant Professor of Chinese by this university, and other candidates with doctoral degrees in linguistics, literature, and education had no telephone interviews or campus interviews. Interviewee 2 agreed with interviewee 1 and offered a similar story about another university’s employing someone in the wrong academic field. Interviewee 2 unveiled the fact that around the 2007–2008 academic year another American university employed a Mainland Chinese man with a PhD in journalism and mass communication—not Chinese linguistics, literature, or language education—to teach Chinese-language courses and chair the Chinese program (see Appendix VI). Even in departments of English in most American universities, it is now rare for someone with a

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


doctoral degree in journalism and mass communication to teach English linguistics, literature, or language education (including TESL, teaching English as a second language). It goes without saying that someone with a PhD in mass communication or journalism cannot usually compete with candidates in the academic field of linguistics or literature of a target language as an instructor, but this person with a doctoral degree in mass communication was given the Chinese-language teaching position. What is more ridiculous is the fact that years later this candidate was promoted to associate professor from assistant professor in the same position of Chinese-language teaching when other candidates with doctoral degrees in literature or linguistics had either no telephone interview or no campus interview. Interviewee 2 said that there were three search committee members, and among these three, only one was a native speaker of the Mandarin Chinese language from Mainland China with a PhD in English language teaching pedagogy, not Chinese literature, linguistics, or China-related studies. The other two search committee members had never learned any Chinese language and therefore had no ability to compare candidates’ Chinese-language abilities. Interviewee 2 was extremely puzzled by the choice of someone not in the research field of Chinese linguistics, literature, comparative literature, sinology, or education, and this interviewee double-checked the search committee members’ candidate evaluation forms. Interviewee 2 was stunned by the fact that the search committee member from Mainland China had given a grade of “0” for simplified Chinese characters for a job candidate from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area with a PhD in Chinese literature without arranging any tests or question sessions to double-check whether this candidate really knew nothing about simplified Chinese characters. This search committee member ignored the fact that American students that had been taught by this person successfully learned to write simplified Chinese characters and had given the person excellent teaching evaluations, and simply assumed that people from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, such as Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and Taiwan, deserve the score of “0” for their knowledge of and language abilities with simplified Chinese characters. Interviewee 3 nodded when listening to what Interviewees 1 and 2 divulged. Interviewee 3 highlighted a true story about cochairs of the search committee in the wrong academic fields making personnel decisions. Interviewee number 3 knew that one of the cochairs specialized in Spanish and had never learned any Chinese language, and the other cochair had limited Chinese-language abilities and a PhD in Chinese


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history, not literature, linguistics, or language education (see Appendix VII). One of the job candidates from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area showed an audio file of the Mandarin Chinese version of two popular children’s songs with the same melody—“London Bridge is Falling Down” and the body parts song—during a teaching demonstration, but the cochair, who spoke some Chinese and worked on modern Chinese history, did not believe anything was wrong about the personnel decision she made after she honestly confessed that she did not understand all the Chinese-language lyrics in the audio file. The other cochair, who did not speak any Chinese and specialized in Spanish literature, did not even physically go to the teaching demonstration but felt nothing was wrong in simply voting this job candidate off the final list. The other search committee members had never learned about Chinese language or Chinese culture and also did not feel that there was anything wrong about the personnel decision they made. Interviewee 4 highlighted that language differences should be taken into serious consideration even when deciders do have doctoral degrees in linguistics. According to interviewee 4, an American university hired someone from Mainland China with a PhD in German linguistics to chair its Chinese-language program and make personnel decisions about candidates with doctoral degrees in Chinese linguistics, literature, comparative literature, and language education (see Appendix VIII). Interviewee 5 revealed that a job candidate from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area highlighted that they had co-teaching experience of Mandarin Chinese-language courses at an Ivy League university and two MA degrees in Chinese/comparative/foreign literature when applying for a teaching assistant position. However, the Chinese program director, who was a Chinese Mainlander with a PhD in non-Chinese linguistics and had never studied or taught in any Ivy League university, rejected this job candidate. Interviewee 5 reportedly witnessed this program director’s ridiculous excuse for refusing this job candidate: “I’ve never heard about this Ivy League university.” This job candidate asked whether TA evaluation records might help, and the answer was positive. The Chinese program director requested that the job candidate return to that Ivy League university and obtain a copy of the candidate’s TA evaluation records. The job candidate did so and provided a copy of good TA evaluation records, but this Chinese program director still insisted that he or she had never heard this Ivy League university’s name. It is illogical for this job candidate’s Mandarin Chinese language and teaching abilities to be good enough at an Ivy League university but not good enough for a non-Ivy

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League university just one summer later. Except for the differences between native speakers of Mandarin Chinese language from Mainland Chinese areas and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, interviewee 5 personally guessed that this Chinese program director was probably too jealous and too afraid that this job candidate’s Ivy League experience might outshine the program director to accept and employ this job candidate. Interviewee 6 told a story about another job candidate from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area. This job candidate emphasized experience in co-organizing the TOP (Test of Proficiency)—Huayu (๮ᇟ Mandarin Chinese language) examination with the TECO (Taipei Economic and Cultural Office) in New York. It should have been a positive; however, this positive immediately became a negative after a committee member from Mainland China with a PhD in Chinese history indifferently commented, “I’ve never heard about that kind of examination. I know the HSK (๮ᇟНѳԵ၂ Huayu shuiping kaoshi) examination only.” The HSK examination is hosted by the PRC government, and the TOP-Huayu examination is hosted by the TECO offices of Taiwan. This job candidate naively thought that emphasis on collaboration with the TECO office of Taiwan would be of great help, yet it turned out to impair her opportunity to be hired because the Mainland Chinese committee member knew only of the examination hosted by the PRC government. Politics overpowered the unbiased evaluation of the job candidates’ experience in this case. Interviewee 7 described a unique experience in seeing the teaching demonstration of a job candidate who came from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area. Around two weeks before the campus interview, the instructor of the Mandarin Chinese-language course, who came from Mainland China, notified the job candidate about which lesson and which pages of the textbook would be taught during the teaching demonstration in the campus interview. This instructor also provided a PDF of textbook materials and the syllabus to the job candidate; however, just two hours before the teaching demonstration began, the instructor told the job candidate that it was the wrong lesson and all the pages in the PDF file were the wrong pages, and that what was to be taught in the teaching demonstration should be another lesson and different pages of the textbook. This meant that the Taiwanese-heritage job candidate was unavoidably unprepared for demonstrating the correct lesson using the correct pages of the textbook. This also meant that there would be insufficient time for the job candidate to prepare for the correct content of


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the teaching demonstration, because every hour of the candidate’s campus interview was full of activities, meetings, conversation sessions, and campus visits. Although during the breakfast period of the next day, the job candidate honestly told the department chair about what the instructor had done regarding the teaching demonstration, the department chair did not do anything about it. Interviewee 8 also knew of the trick that interviewee 7 described and also unveiled the cruel fact that sometimes Chinese Mainlanders use other tricks to exclude job candidates from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. One of the other tricks, according to interviewee 8, was to suddenly announce an unexpected test to the students so that they would be too worried about the unexpected test to cooperatively attend the teaching demonstration session. Interviewee 8 described a true example. At the beginning of the teaching demonstration, the instructor, who came from Mainland China, gracefully and politely introduced the job candidate, who came from a non-mainland Chinese-speaking area, to the students. The instructor kindly reminded the students and job candidate that the teaching demonstration would begin at 2:05 pm that day, but just at the end of the introduction of the job candidate, the instructor said that he or she would return to the class to give the students a five minute test around 2:45 pm. From 2:05 pm to 2:45 pm, students were under the pressure of this unexpected test, and they became too anxious to actively participate in the teaching and learning activities during the teaching demonstration. The job candidate’s teaching ended up being ineffective because of the students’ anxiety about the unexpected test. Interviewee 9 compared and contrasted Chinese Mainlanders’ and non-Mainlanders’ teaching approaches. Chinese Mainlanders tended to teach simplified Chinese characters because most current Chinese Mainlanders do not write, read, or use traditional Chinese characters frequently; however, non-Mainlanders from Chinese-speaking areas tend to teach both traditional and simplified Chinese characters because numerous non-Mainlanders, such as people from Hong Kong or Taiwan, have learned traditional Chinese characters since childhood, especially in traditional Chinese calligraphy courses at the third level of elementary school. Learning traditional Chinese characters is more difficult and time-consuming than learning simplified Chinese characters; it is therefore difficult for people who know only simplified Chinese characters, such as most current Chinese Mainlanders do, to learn traditional Chinese characters, but it is not very difficult for people who know traditional Chinese characters to simplify traditional Chinese characters and learn

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


simplified Chinese characters. Interviewee 9 observed that some instructors who were Chinese Mainlanders denigrated instructors who are non-Mainlanders by telling American students that instructors who are non-Mainlanders from Chinese-speaking areas are mean and tough (as if they were unkind and thus bad teachers), teach traditional Chinese characters, and make it difficult for US learners without a Chinese-heritage background to earn an easy grade “A.” When instructors who are Chinese Mainlanders and instructors who are non-Mainlanders from Chinese-speaking areas teach different sessions of the same Mandarin Chinese-language courses, sometimes US students choose to enroll in the classes taught by Chinese Mainlanders to avoid traditional Chinese characters and to enjoy an opportunity to obtain an easy grade “A”; hence, instructors who are Chinese Mainlanders win better enrollment records and teaching evaluations from students than do instructors who are non-Mainlanders from Chinese-speaking areas. Gradually, instructors who are non-Mainlanders lose enrollment numbers and teaching evaluations from US students. Eventually, they feel it is difficult to continue their teaching jobs, leave their positions, and let the remaining instructors, who are Chinese Mainlanders, hire new teachers who are also Chinese Mainlanders. The final outcome is that the entire Chinese-language program becomes full of instructors who are Chinese Mainlanders. Take the undeniable corroboration about the current faculty webpage of an American university in Appendix IX for example. In the 2002–3 academic year, this university’s East Asian Languages department chair, who was a Caucasian with learning experience in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas before the late 1980s, insisted that traditional Chinese characters must be taught by every instructor in the Chinese-language program and that every instructor who was a non-Mainlander included simplified Chinese characters in teaching content, as every Japanese language instructor covered kanji (ᅇӷ traditional Chinese characters used in the Japanese language system), katakana, and hiragana in Japanese language courses. Years later, however, the above-mentioned phenomenon of Chinese Mainlander instructors criticizing non-Mainlander instructors took place, and instructors who were non-Mainlanders and taught traditional Chinese characters gradually left. Now, according to this web page, all the enlisted faculty members in the Chinese-language program are Chinese Mainlanders. Interviewee 10 strongly concurred with what interviewee 9 disclosed and also underscored the use of traditional Chinese calligraphy to stress the importance and value of traditional Chinese characters. According to


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interviewee 10, whoever teaches traditional Chinese calligraphy and helps non-East-Asian-heritage students learn to use traditional-style Chinese writing brushes must make sure that learners write traditional Chinese characters with their traditional-style Chinese writing brushes, regardless of whether the traditional Chinese calligraphy classes take place in the US, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, or even post-1950s Mainland China. Even though Chinese Mainlanders in the post-1950s era wrote simplified Chinese characters with ball-point pens, fountain pens, pencils, crayons, markers, and other non-traditional writing tools, they must write traditional Chinese characters or copy the traditional Chinese characters, which calligraphy copybooks demonstrate, when using traditional-style Chinese writing brushes. Interviewees 11–14 were concerned with the Wade-Giles system of romanization. Interviewee 11 emphasized that non-Mainlanders’ non-pinyin romanization of Chinese-language names should have been well respected by Chinese Mainlanders. To provide an example, this interviewee told a story about a non-Mainland native speaker of Chinese who used both the Wade-Giles romanization system and the Chinese characters of his or her name in application materials when applying for a Chinese-language teaching position. The search committee included only one native speaker of the Mandarin Chinese language, and unfortunately, none of the other search committee members were native speakers of a Chinese language. The department chair specialized in French and had never learned any Chinese. The native Chinese-speaking search committee member came from Mainland China. After this Mainland Chinese search committee member saw the Chinese characters of the job candidate’s name and the Wade-Giles romanization of the candidate’s name, he or she immediately told the French-speaking department chair that this candidate did not know the correct romanization of his or her own name and thus the candidate’s fluency in the Chinese language was undoubtedly problematic. The department chair knew nothing about Chinese language, including the Wade-Giles and pinyin systems of romanization, and decided to believe the information provided by this Mainland Chinese search committee member. This department chair responded, “If the job candidate mis-spelled his or her own name, how can he or she teach American students the correct Chinese pronunciations?” This poor job candidate was inevitably unemployed. Interviewee 11 also offered some senior scholars’ non-pinyin romanization of Chinese-language names for example: Yip Wai-lim (ယᆢ ༹),1 Yu Ying-shih (էमਔ),2 Cheng Chin-chuan (ᎄᒸӄ), and so on.

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


Interviewee 11 stressed that these senior scholars had not encountered such an employment problem because there had not been many Chinese Mainlanders on search committees in US higher education when they had applied for jobs in the US before the 1990s. If there had been, Yu Ying-shih, Cheng Chin-chuan and Yip Wai-lim would not have been hired to teach in American universities without letting their names appear as Yu Yingshi, Zheng Jinquan, and Ye Weilian. Interviewee 12 cordially seconded interviewee 11’s comparisons and contrasts of pinyin and non-pinyin systems of romanization. Interviewee 12 accentuated examples of Chinese-language locations: Peking University (instead of Beijing University),3 Tsinghua University (instead of Qinghua University), 4 Hong Kong (instead of Xianggang), Macau (instead of Aumen), or Taipei (instead of Taibei). This interviewee commented that sufficient respect for the non-pinyin system of romanization, such as the way people respect how the above-mentioned locations appear to be in English or other alphabetic languages should follow a sort of common sense or politeness. Ge Jianxiong (လቆ໢), Chair of the History and Geography Department in Fudan University, did not personally know interviewee 12, but he coincidentally published an article to emphasize the importance of respecting the history of old geographical names. Although he did not touch upon the old-style romanization systems of Chinese geographical names, he meant exactly the same reverence and honor that Mainland Chinese or non-Mainland geographical names deserve.5 Interviewee 13 underlined that some non-pinyin systems of romanization should never have been replaced by the post-1950s pinyin system of romanization because these non-pinyin systems represent a long history, social traditions, and cultural legacy. For instance, currently, most people around the world use the non-pinyin phrases “Peking opera,” “Peking roasted ducks,” “tai chi,” “toufu,” and “kung fu,” instead of the pinyin of “Beijing opera,” “Beijing roasted ducks,” “taiji,” “doufu,” and “gongfu” because these non-pinyin words better represent the valuable history, social traditions, and cultural legacy than the pinyin versions, although after the 1950s some Chinese Mainlanders might still prefer the pinyin system and criticize the non-pinyin systems as “outdated.” Interviewee 14 delineated their personal experience: they drafted a book chapter that was a chronological overview of Chinese-language teaching in US higher education from the eighteenth century to the twenty-first century and non-pinyin systems of romanization were therefore inevitably mentioned as historical facts; however, two


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anonymous reviewers, one of whom was a Chinese Mainlander, according to the publisher’s editor, criticized the non-pinyin systems of romanization as outdated as if they deserved no memory or written record as historical facts in the chronological overview. Interviewee 15 implied that instructors competed for enrolled students in the same Chinese-language program. Before the 1990s, Taiwan was the global center of TCFL/TCSL; therefore, it was unquestionably easy for US students to be attracted to faculty members from Taiwan. At that time, most American students took Taiwanese-heritage instructors’ Chinese-language courses; learned traditional Chinese characters, traditional Chinese culture preserved in Taiwan that had never experienced Chinese Communists’ Cultural Revolution, and traditional-style Chinese calligraphy; listened to and sang Mandarin Chinese-language popular songs created by musicians, composers, and singers in Taiwan; and chose Taiwan as the best location for their abroad studies. In the post-1990s era, however, Mainland China replaced Taiwan as the world center of TCFL/TCSL. More and more US students took Chinese-language courses taught by instructors from Mainland China, learned simplified Chinese characters, selected Mainland China as the most desired location for their abroad studies, and viewed non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, such as Taiwan, Tibet, Macau, Mongolia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as merely places to stop by as if non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas were nothing but decorative side dishes or minor by-products of abroad studies in Mainland China. Interviewee 16 agreed with interviewee 15. The above-mentioned competition for student numbers or student enrollment in Chinese-language courses taught by instructors from Mainland China and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas resulted in competition among instructors who came from Mainland China and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Interviewee 17 nodded in agreement with the fact that interviewee 15 expressed. In the post-1990s era, Mainland China has become most American students’ dream of Chinese-language abroad studies and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas appeared to be unimportant vicinities to stop by during Mainland Chinese abroad studies. Because post-1950s Chinese Mainlanders use simplified Chinese characters, their American students learned simplified characters from them in their US classes, and tended to prefer Mainland China, where simplified characters are popular and frequently used, to non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, where traditional characters are the major writing system, when deciding locations for their Chinese-language studies abroad.

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


There have been a few exceptions in US higher education in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, however, such as Columbia University’s insistence on first-year level learning traditional Chinese characters and military colleges’ teaching of both simplified and traditional Chinese characters, but the tendency to teach only the simplified characters remains largely unchanged. Interviewee 18 added examples of exceptions besides Columbia University and military colleges and stated that some universities in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas signed official documents with American institutions to be corresponding hosts of US students’ 100K strong initiative project or CLS (Critical Language Scholarship) program. However, administrative staff members in these universities tended to offer no detailed information to scholars who tried to research these matters by utilizing the legal protection of personal information (ঁၗߥ ៈ ) as excuses as if everything about these universities’ roles as non-Mainland-Chinese hosts was top secret. Interviewee 19 focused on comparing and contrasting the Mainland Chinese government’s hundreds of Confucius Institutes and the Taiwanese government’s three Taiwan Academies in the US. The number of Confucius Institutes is many times higher than the number of Taiwan Academies. The size, pedagogical domination, economic-political controls, and governmental ambitions of Confucius Institutes are also very much larger than those of Taiwan Academies. The voices of Interviewees 20 and 19 harmonized. Interviewee 20 accentuated that the budgets that Confucius Institutes bring into US college-level and postgraduate-level institutions are much larger than the financial support provided by Taiwan Academies to American higher education. Interviewee 21 compared the Mainland Chinese population and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking population in US universities and colleges during the 2010s. They indicated that in the early 2010s, a male American Caucasian faculty member in the Department of Electronic Engineering at a big public university in New York had so many Mainland Chinese colleagues, students, and assistants that he was forced to take Mandarin Chinese-language courses. They also implied that two to three years before the middle of the 2010s around eighty percent of international students in the Graduate Program of Business Management at a private university on the US Eastern Coast came from Mainland China. According to news reports, the number of students from Mainland China was around one third of the entire college and the postgraduate-level student


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population and US higher education gradually became academic “Chinatowns” in the mid-2010s. Interviewee 21 also cited Roger Graham’s calculation in a Chinese-language news report: Mainland Chinese graduate students outnumbered American graduate students in the Graduate Program of Statistics at the University of Oregon in May 2016.6 The US encountered a serious nationwide economic depression in 2008 that deeply affected US higher education. Many searches for instructors were canceled because of financial problems in numerous American schools at that time. The tuition fees from a considerable number of students from Mainland China to American universities and colleges provided influential support for US higher education. Around the middle of the 2010s, one third of the student population in US higher education were Mainland Chinese. Problems ensued. For instance, students from Mainland China brought their bad habit of cheating to US campuses, 7 and their dearth of sufficient academic compatibility in prestigious American universities influenced US faculty’s teaching. Interviewee 22 let slip the fact that some outsiders served as administrative leaders of connoisseurs. This interviewee witnessed that people who specialized in Chinese history, Asian—but not Chinese—political science, or non-Chinese linguistics and thus lacked real experience in Chinese-language teaching or TCFL/TCSL felt that there was nothing improper in making administrative decisions for Chinese-language programs or China-related departments or programs, and they showed no uneasiness in terms of being outsiders to serve as administrative leaders of connoisseurs. Interviewee 23 agreed with interviewee 16 in terms of competition among instructors from Mainland China and from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Interviewee 23 witnessed an instructor from Mainland China abuse his or her administrative power as an advisor of undergraduates, stop some US undergraduate-level students from directly communicating with their instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, and sign these students’ documents to move them from their original classes taught by non-Mainland-Chinese-heritage instructors to classes taught by instructors from Mainland China after noticing that these US students desired an easy “A” grade and requested no traditional Chinese characters in teaching content and a slower teaching pace. Interviewee 24 was on the same page as interviewee 10. For instance, at the same level of elementary Mandarin Chinese-language courses, different classes might be taught by instructors from various Chinese-speaking areas. When instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas taught

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both simplified and traditional Chinese characters but instructors from Mainland China taught only simplified Chinese characters, students inevitably compared these classes, instructors, writing systems, and teaching contents. Some students took advantage of the differences between simplified characters and traditional characters, argued with instructors who insisted on including traditional characters in their teaching content as if instructors teaching traditional characters were mean, demanding, tough and unkind to students and instructors teaching only simplified characters were nice, kindhearted, and good people. Although the grading policy treated simplified characters and traditional characters equally by offering no partial grades as long as simplified characters or traditional characters were miswritten in tests, some unruly students fought for partial grades when they made mistakes in traditional characters, not simplified characters, in tests or examinations because traditional characters are more difficult and complicated. Instructors who taught only simplified characters stood by these students and corrected instructors who insisted on including traditional characters in their teaching, as if it were a mistake or crime not to give partial grades for both miswritten traditional characters and miswritten simplified characters. Even though instructors used the above-mentioned grading policy to treat miswritten simplified characters and miswritten traditional characters equally, made efforts to persuade students by highlighting the undeniable fact that standardized language placement examinations, such as the HSK examination of Mandarin Chinese language8 and the GRE verbal reasoning examination of English language, usually provide no partial grades for miswritten Chinese characters or English words, students and the instructors from post-1950s Mainland China who taught no traditional characters continued the hostility against the grading policy and became obstacles that could not be overcome (see Appendices X and XI). Interviewee 25 mentioned that some students were deeply affected by differences between Mainland China and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. For example, many American universities had their own Chinese students and scholars associations (CSSA), which included students and scholars from not only Mainland China but also non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. In some US universities, however, people from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas would like to establish their own associations, such as the Hong Kong students association (HKSA) in New York University (NYU), University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, University of Washington, and Indiana University in Bloomington as Chinese Mainlanders might not


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represent non-Mainlanders well and the CSSA might not serve as a perfect and “authentic” home for non-Mainlanders. See NYU HKSA 2011–2012 President Wilson Chu’s emphasis on the phrase “authentic Hong Kong experience” that Chinese Mainlanders and the CSSA lacked: NYU’s Hong Kong Student Association is a culture club [whose] mission is to provide an authentic Hong Kong experience for NYU students and friends. We hold events that represent Hong Kong culture by holding game shows, game nights, and socializing events that incorporate different themes. Of course, every event always includes Hong Kong Style Cuisine that gives our members a taste of what Hong Kong has to offer. So whether you are from Hong Kong or just interested in learning what Hong Kong is about, NYU HKSA welcomes you to come enjoy a great time and make new friends as you experience Hong Kong in the heart of NYC.9

Politically speaking, the HKSA on US university campuses after 1997 had no political problems with Chinese Mainlanders because the British returned Hong Kong to Mainland China in 1997. Even the HKMSA (Hong Kong and Macau Students Association) on post-1999 campuses of American universities, such as the HKMSA at the University of Minnesota in Twin Cities, seemed problem-free after Portuguese colonizers returned Macau to Mainland China in 1999. On some US university campuses Chinese Mainlanders’ political issues with the independence of Taiwan, Mongolia, or Tibet sometimes followed the establishment of the TSA (Taiwan Students Association), MSA (Mongolian Students Association),10 MASA (Mongolian American Students Association) and TASA (Tibetan American Students Association), however. According to interviewee 25, some Chinese Mainlanders mistook the establishment of the TSA, MSA, MASA and TASA as Taiwan’s, Mongolia’s, or Tibet’s political independence from Mainland China on American university campuses. Of course, some US schools did contain Chinese Mainlanders’ CSSA and Taiwanese people’s TSA at the same time without problems, including Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Texas at Austin, and Winona State University. The University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign had the MASA. Indiana University, MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Missouri State University allowed the co-existence of the MSA and CSSA. The University of Minnesota permitted the establishment and simultaneous co-existence of the CSSA, TSA, and TASA. Interviewee 26 was sympathetic to what Interviewees 24 and 25

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revealed. Interviewee 26 mentioned that sometimes obstacles were not students or instructors but teaching assistants. They once encountered a teaching assistant, who came from Mainland China, taking advantage of political differences between Mainland China and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas and occupied hour-long TA sessions with Chinese Mainlanders’ political hostility against non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas without any teaching of Mandarin Chinese language at all. This teaching assistant furthermore warned instructors who came from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas of how forceful the Chinese Communist army troops were and told them to be careful of the CCP army. Interviewee 27 gave an account of people who taught only content courses while lacking sufficient knowledge of the cultural elements added to language courses. This interviewee witnessed a Latino-heritage department chair who taught Hispanic literary and cultural studies classes only (no language courses) commenting that the popular songs and festival cuisine that instructors added to Mandarin Chinese-language classes were “low-level teaching” but praised other instructors’ proposals to take students to a Latino cultural museum. According to the BCC (Broadcasting Cooperation of China) news report on November 9, 2013, two senior and well-established Harvard professors of East Asian studies, William C. Kirby and Peter K. Bol,11 re-arranged the Mandarin language lyrics of a popular children’s song in order to help US students memorize ancient Chinese dynasties. 12 Interviewee 27 sarcastically teased that the above-mentioned Latino-heritage department chair should have traveled to Harvard University campus and checked whether William C. Kirby and Peter K. Bol should have been unemployed because of their teaching via songs as “low-level teaching.” Volume 16.3 of the well-reputed academic journal entitled Education about Asia, hosted by the AAS (Association for Asian Studies), was a special issue about food, culture, and Asia in 2011.13 Interviewee 27 taunted that the Latino-heritage department chair should have been reeducated by being required to read that volume. Interviewee 28 corroborated what interviewee 11 had unsealed, attesting that early in the 2000s some junior-level non-Mainland Chinese-speaking faculty members’ Wade-Giles romanization of their Chinese-language names were replaced with the pinyin system of romanization by senior-ranking faculty members, librarians, staff members, and administrative heads from Mainland China. Sometimes even the


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hyphens between different syllables of non-pinyin Chinese-language personal names were erased to turn the non-pinyin representations into the pinyin forms. Interviewee 28 agreed with interviewee 11 that William Wai-lim Tay and Yu Ying-shih luckily had not suffered from Chinese Mainlanders’ irreverent changes of their non-pinyin names into the pinyin system because they were already older and better-reputed scholars with better academic recognition than junior-level people, who did not use the pinyin system of their Chinese-language names. Interviewees 28 and 11 guessed that some Chinese Mainlanders probably wished to do so in the depths of their hearts but did not dare to publicly do so because their academic status and scholarly power were not higher than those of William Wai-lim Tay, Cheng Chin-chuan, and Yu Ying-shih. Interviewee 29 commented on the observation reports provided by Interviewees 28, 26, and 11. They thought that what these interviewees had observed were simply political reflections of what Chinese Mainlanders or the Mainland Chinese government cordially hoped to do to non-Mainland Chinese-speaking people and their use of non-pinyin representations in non-mainland Chinese-speaking places. Interviewee 30 interpreted interviewee 27’s observation as meaning that the Hispanic/Latino/Spanish language program’s intention was to compete with the Chinese-language program in order to jockey for the position of power: Any reasonable person knows that cuisine, songs, and festival celebrations are involved in both Spanish and Mandarin Chinese language and cultural courses, yet the administrative head who specialized in Spanish language and Latino/Hispanic cultural studies purposefully degraded Chinese-language instructors’ efforts to do so in order to let Spanish-language instructors’ proposal of a field trip to the Latino cultural museum win higher priority for financial support and to appear to be at a higher level than their Chinese-language counterparts. Interviewee 31 recalled that in a Chinese-language program a large number of faculty members who came from Mainland China had pursued two instructors who were a couple with learning and living experience in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. The couple ended up with an unhappy departure from that Chinese-language program. After the couple’s exodus, that Chinese-language program hired nobody from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, that taught non-simplified Chinese characters, or worked on US students’ abroad studies in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking places. Interviewee 32 recollected a Mainland Chinese search committee member’s comment on a Taiwanese job applicant’s resume and application

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materials to a Chinese-language program where the number of instructors from Mainland China was many times more than the number of instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas: “We have already hired too many Chinese now. It is Americans’ turn.” This comment demonstrated several logical errors: First, the comment was a judgment on the job applicant’s ethnic background only. The job candidate was unable to choose his or her ethnic background, and it was therefore unfair to exclude the job candidate only because of his or her ethnic background. Second, in the program where the number of instructors from Mainland China was very much larger than the number of instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, employment of a Taiwanese—namely, non-Mainland Chinese-speaking—job candidate could actually help alleviate the disproportion that the committee member mentioned; however, the Mainland Chinese committee member deliberately ignored the alleviation of the disproportion and purposefully mistook the Taiwanese job candidate for a “Chinese” or Mainland Chinese job candidate. Third, the Taiwanese job candidate’s fluency of Mandarin Chinese was native level, but the American job candidates’ fluency of Mandarin Chinese was merely near-native-level, not yet native level. This Mainland Chinese committee member pretended to know nothing about the different levels of Mandarin language fluency and suggested that the American job candidates’ near-native-level fluency should replace the Taiwanese job candidate’s native-level fluency in this teaching position. Interviewee 33 and interviewee 34 shared experiences similar to that of interviewee 32 in terms of Mainland Chinese search committee members’ opinions against job candidates from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking places. Interviewee 33 also witnessed a Mainland Chinese search committee member finding fault with a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking job candidate’s inclusion of the non-pinyin romanization of Sun Yat-sen, the Republic of China’s national father’s name, in application materials as if the name’s representation as “Sun Yat-sen” was wrong and only the pinyin “Sun Yixian” was correct. This search committee member turned to the department chair, who specialized in Spanish and knew nothing about Mandarin Chinese, and said, “I’ve never heard about Sun Yat-sen.” Interviewee 34 imparted the following story: A private liberal art college in the rural Midwest had only two on-campus Chinese-speaking faculty members in the early 2000s. They were a couple from Mainland China. Both of them were pianists in the Department of Musicology without professional academic backgrounds in language teaching, linguistics, education, or literary research. They were the only two


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faculty-level search committee members who could speak Mandarin Chinese, however. All the other faculty-level decision makers in the search listened to them in terms of job candidates’ Mandarin Chinese-language fluency and teaching demonstrations. These two Mainland Chinese pianists’ linguistic lack of traditional characters and the non-pinyin system of romanization undoubtedly caused them to exclude job candidates from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Interviewee 35 endorsed what interviewee 34 brought up. Take the currently most popular nationwide Chinese-language newspapers in the US for example. These are World Journal, whose Canadian Chinese-language branch in Vancouver was replaced by Apple Daily News on January 1, 2016,14 and Tsing Tao Daily News. Started in 1976, World Journal was the forty-year-old North American overseas branch of the United Daily News. Tsing Tao Daily News was initiated in Hong Kong in 1938. World Journal, Apple Daily News, and Tsing Tao Daily News use traditional Chinese characters, not simplified Chinese characters. Interviewee 35 stated that they witnessed that many personnel decision makers from Mainland China lacked sufficient Mandarin Chinese-language abilities to even read these three newspapers because of their dearth of knowledge about traditional Chinese characters. Interviewee 36 professed that sometimes Caucasian-heritage faculty members with either non-native-level or no Mandarin Chinese-language abilities had the administrative power to dominate the careers and professional destinies of native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructors in terms of personnel preference or financial distribution of resources. For instance, interviewee 36 had seen a Caucasian-heritage faculty member with near-native-level Mandarin Chinese-language abilities replace the idiomatic Chinese-language phrase, yishushi (᛬ೌў) with her non-idiomatic wording, yishu lishi (᛬ೌᐕў), and mistook heroines in Zhang Yimou’s martial arts film, House of Flying Daggers, to be martial arts ladies in the Qing Dynasty like those in Ang Lee’s Oscar winning kung fu movie Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon. US students might be misled by this Caucasian-heritage instructor’s non-idiomatic Chinese and incorrect knowledge of ancient Chinese dynasties, but this Caucasian-heritage faculty member served as the Chinese-language program director and ironically utilized her administrative authority to not reappoint a native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructor from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area and had published academic journal articles and book chapters about Zhang Yimou’s House of Flying Daggers and Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon. The teaching position

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was later given to an instructor from Mainland China who had never published as well as (in terms of the quality and quantity of academic research outcome) the previous non-mainland Chinese-speaking instructor. Following this personnel decision was a brief verbal—neither written nor official—explanation from another Caucasian-heritage department chair, who specialized in Spanish and lacked Mandarin Chinese-language abilities: Reasons for every personnel decision were deemed secret and hence were not disclosed at all by the department. This phenomenon demonstrated at least two layers of problems. First, it is unreasonable and illogical for evaluators and decision makers to be less professional or less skilled than the people they are evaluating or judging. Second, the ideal Chinese-speaking areas in these Caucasian-heritage faculty members’ minds had changed from the 1950s–1990s era to the 1990s–2010s period. Before the 1990s, the ideal Chinese-speaking area and the world’s center of TCFL/TCSL for American learners was Taiwan. After the 1990s, Mainland China replaced Taiwan’s status as the ideal Chinese-speaking area for American students’ Mandarin Chinese-language studies abroad and the world’s focus of TCFL/TCSL. The geographical, sociocultural, economic, and political shift of the global TCFL/TCSL midpoint from Taiwan to Mainland China really influenced authoritative Caucasian-heritage people’s decisions about instructors from Mainland China and instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Interviewee 37 assented to what interviewee 36 had authenticated. Interviewee 37 provided the following example that they personally experienced: Although sometimes in US higher education Chinese-language programs were placed under the administrative umbrella of World Languages Departments, Departments of East Asian Languages, Asian Studies Programs, or Departments of Foreign Languages and Literature, the department chairs might specialize in non-Asian or non-Mandarin languages, not be fluent in Mandarin Chinese language, and lack professional qualifications to fairly evaluate Mandarin Chinese-language instructors. One day a native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructor from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area used Integrated Chinese as the major teaching materials in an elementary-level Mandarin Chinese-language class. Because Integrated Chinese published by Cheng and Tsui15 included not only a textbook but also a grammar exercise book and a character workbook, all the homework of grammar drills and character-writing practice was already included and well-printed in the grammar exercise book and character workbook. In other words, no other homework book was necessary. The department chair, who specialized in


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Spanish language and literature, however, did not understand how unnecessary it was for instructors who used Integrated Chinese as the textbook series to burden students with an extra homework book, and therefore accused this instructor of not including homework for students in the elementary-level Mandarin Chinese-language class for an entire academic year, terminating this instructor’s teaching contract. Interviewee 38 exposed an on-campus incident about a non-Chinese-speaking faculty member’s misuse of greeting cards on holidays as an excuse to terminate a junior-level Chinese-language instructor from a non-Mainland Chinese-speaking area. This junior-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructor did a good job in research, teaching, and administrative service, so nothing could be used as an excuse to get rid of them. A non-Chinese-speaking faculty member did not receive Christmas or New Year cards from this junior-level instructor and used this lack of cards as evidence of the junior-level instructor’s lack of collegiality, friendliness, decorum, good citizenship, and personality. This Mandarin Chinese-language instructor explained that the cards had probably been lost by the post office staff members and immediately replaced the cards with emails of greetings. A few months later, however, the lack of greeting emails was again used as an excuse to say this junior-level instructor lacked collegiality, friendliness, decorum, good citizenship, and personality. This instructor emphasized that the greeting emails had truly been sent a few months before by forwarding those old greeting emails to receivers; however, the same misinterpretation continued. This incident took place in a public university when one third of the student population in this school came from Mainland China. Mandarin Chinese voices could be easily heard almost every minute in the building of business management. Interviewee 39 also personally experienced anti-Chinese people’s bias against Chinese language and Chinese-speaking instructors. They cited the online AAUP (American Association of University Professors) file16 that mentioned that sometimes negative twisting or misinterpretation of the personalities, politeness, or collegiality of those instructors emerged. A Chinese-speaking instructor was trying to take an elevator from the third floor of their office building to teach a morning class in another building. When the elevator door opened on the third floor, this Chinese-speaking instructor saw a Portuguese-speaking staff member coming out from the elevator and immediately said “Hi!” in English and waved their hand. The Portuguese-speaking staff member responded with another English greeting phrase “Good morning!” Because the class time was approaching,

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this Chinese-speaking instructor rushed into the empty elevator and pressed the button for the ground floor. Suddenly, the Portuguese-speaking staff member stretched arms, put fingers on this Chinese-speaking instructor’s shoulder, and expressed dissatisfaction that the Chinese-speaking instructor did not return the response of “Good morning!” This became the staff member’s reason for accusing this Chinese-speaking instructor of having poor personality, politeness, and collegiality. After finishing teaching the morning class, the Chinese-speaking instructor tried to explain everything and recorded this in an e-mail in order to protect themselves, explaining that because they had started with the greeting of “Hi!” to the Portuguese-speaking staff member and the Portuguese-speaking staff member had responded to the initial greeting with the phrase “Good morning!” they completed their “round trip” greeting and it had therefore been unnecessary for the Chinese-speaking instructor to say “Good morning!” to the Portuguese-speaking staff member. Unfortunately, after the Chinese-speaking instructor’s explanation, the administrative staff member refused to communicate and replied, “I have, nor time nor interest in extending this,” as if the accusation were a fixed label that the Portuguese-speaking staff member had deliberately attached to the Chinese-speaking instructor’s forehead and could no longer be erased (see Appendix XII). This story of a morning greeting reminded interviewee 39 of another accusation against Chinese-speaking instructors’ collegiality, decorum, and personality. One day, a Chinese-speaking instructor was requested to meet with their department chair, who specialized in Spanish language, in the department chair’s office. This Chinese-speaking instructor arrived on time and noticed that the department chair’s office door was widely open, but saw another faculty member, who also specialized in Spanish language, having a meeting with the department chair, the two of them speaking Spanish with each other. This Chinese-speaking instructor did not dare to disturb the meeting of these two Spanish-speaking faculty members although they did not understand what they were talking about in Spanish; this Chinese-speaking instructor therefore courteously waited outside the department chair’s office door, sitting on a chair against the wall across the hall way at the corner, which was clearly visible from the department chair’s office doorway. The Chinese-speaking instructor assumed that the department chair could see this Chinese-speaking instructor sitting and waiting, but the meeting of the two Spanish-speaking faculty members lasted for one hour. That is to say, this Chinese-speaking instructor waited for one hour. Finally, the Spanish-speaking meeting was over. The


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department chair walked to the office doorway. The Chinese-speaking instructor thought the department chair would happily say “Hello!” and praise their patience and decorum; however, the department chair harshly interrogated why this Chinese-speaking instructor had not entered the office on time. The department chair even said that the Spanish-language conversation had included discussions about why this Chinese-speaking instructor had not shown up on time. This incident ended with the department chair’s conclusive comment that the Chinese-speaking instructor lacked decorum and had failed to show up on time.

Conclusion about the two categories of what anonymous interviewees reported What the forty anonymous interviewees reported might be divided into two categories: first, the suffering of native-level instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas in US higher education after the arrival of a colossal number of Chinese Mainlanders, and, second, serious acrimony from non-Chinese-speaking people, non-native-level Mandarin Chinese-language instructors, and non-Chinese-language programs after the size of Chinese-speaking populations and Chinese-language programs grew. Table 7-1 is a list of the forty anonymous interviewees and a brief summary of their first-hand information. Table 7-1 List of anonymous interviewees Category Number 1: suffering of native-level instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas Alias Assigned to Anonymous Interviewees

Brief Summary of Strange Events Experienced by Anonymous Interviewees

Interviewee 1

Chinese Mainlander with a PhD in architecture to teach Chinese-language courses with promotion to tenured associate professor

Interviewee 2

Chinese Mainlander with a PhD in mass communication and journalism to teach Chinese-language courses with promotion to tenured associate professor

Interviewee 3

PhD in History with limited Chinese-language abilities to make personnel decisions about Chinese-language teaching positions

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Interviewee 4

Chinese Mainlander with a PhD in non-Chinese linguistics to chair the Chinese-language program

Interviewee 5

Never heard about the Ivy League university

Interviewee 6

Never heard about the TOP-Huayu Examinations

Interviewee 7

Untrustworthy information in pre-notifications and sudden change of teaching contents

Interviewee 8

Unexpected test in the final five minutes of teaching demonstration

Interviewee 9

Traditional Chinese characters are more difficult than simplified characters

Interviewee 10

Traditional Chinese characters and Chinese calligraphy

Interviewee 11

Romanization systems of names

Interviewee 12

Romanization systems of locations

Interviewee 13

Romanization systems of objects with long history

Interviewee 14

Outdated systems of romanization

Interviewee 15

Competition of student population

Interviewee 16

Competition among colleagues from Mainland China and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas

Interviewee 17

Stop by non-Mainland areas while Mainland China is the major destination

Interviewee 19

Confucius Institutes and Taiwan Academies: size and governmental ambitions

Interviewee 20

Comparison of budgets

Interviewee 21

Comparison of population

Interviewee 23

Stop students from direct communication with instructors

Interviewee 24

Struggles for partial grades

Interviewee 25

Mainland Chinese students association and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking students associations

Interviewee 26

Chat about political conflicts during class time

Interviewee 28

Wade-Giles system turned into the pinyin system

Interviewee 29

Political reflections

Interviewee 31

Pursue faculty-level couple in the same department


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Interviewee 32

The comment on “too many Chinese”

Interviewee 33

Never heard about Sun Yat-sen

Interviewee 34

Chinese-speaking pianists from Mainland China made the personnel decision

Interviewee 35

No abilities to smoothly read Chinese-language newspapers in the US

Category Number 2: rancor from non-Chinese-speaking people, non-native-level Chinese instructors, or non-Chinese-language programs Alias Assigned to Anonymous Interviewees

Brief Summary of Strange Events Experienced by Anonymous Interviewees

Interviewee 22

Outsiders as administrative leaders of connoisseurs

Interviewee 27

Chinese songs and foods mistaken as non-academic and “low levels”

Interviewee 30

Fights for the positions of power among different languages

Interviewee 36

Non-native fluency and incorrect cultural history

Interviewee 37

Mistake of no homework

Interviewee 38

Greeting cards on holidays

Interviewee 39

Good Morning!

Interviewee 40

One hour polite waiting period outside the office door

Category Number 3: others Interviewee 18

Obstacles resulted from the Personal Information Protective Law in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas

Native-level instructors of Mandarin Chinese and Chinese dialects are crucial to TCFL/TCSL in US higher education, but sources of them have varied over time. From feudalist dynasties to the 1940s, major sources were Mainland Chinese areas. In the 1950s through to the 1980s, Taiwanese people and other native-level Mandarin speakers from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas were the mainstream population of college and postgraduate-level faculties in the US. From the 1990s on, US higher education included more and more Mainland Chinese people at student, faculty, researcher, and administrative staff levels. Thanks to the CCP’s one child policy, almost every wealthy student from Mainland China had one pair of parents and two pairs of grandparents competing to

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pay incredible amounts of tuition fees to American universities and colleges, which suffered financially from the nationwide economic depression in 2008–2009 and keenly desired as much tuition fees as possible. Different sources of native-level Chinese-language instructors have been affecting teaching methods, teaching philosophy, romanization systems, writing systems of Chinese characters, Chinese sociocultural traditions, and worldviews related to East Asian and Sinophone culture in US higher education.

References American Association of University Professors. “On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Evaluation.” https://www.aaup.org/report/collegiality-criterion-faculty-evaluation (online article retrieved in August 2016). Fox, Justin. “How Chinese Students Saved America's Colleges?” Bloomberg View. June 30, 2016. Ge, Jianxiong (လቆ໢). “Zunzhong diming jiushi zunzhong wenhua lishi” (൧ख़ ӦӜ൩ࢂ൧ख़Ўϯᐕў The Respect for Geographical Names is the Same Respect for Cultural History). Beijing qngnian bao (ч٧ߙԃൔ Beijing Youth News). November 19, 2015. Lin, Yan (ְ݅). “Zhongguo liuxuesheng zuiduo de meiguo ershi suo daxue paiming” ( ύ ୯ ੮ Ꮲ ғ ന ӭ ‫ ޑ‬ऍ ୯ 20 ‫ ܌‬ε Ꮲ ௨ Ӝ The Twenty US Universities with the Largest Number of Students from Mainland China). Epoch News. January 5, 2016. —. “Zhongguo liuxuesheng zuobi duo meiguo daxue: yao yancheng budai” (ύ୯ ੮ Ꮲ ғ բ ᄄ ӭ ऍ ୯ ε Ꮲ Ǻ ा ᝄ ᚵ ό ສ Numerous Mainland Chinese Students Cheated US Universities: Severe Punishment without Forgiveness). Epoch News. June 7, 2016. “Mei daxue bian ‘zhongguo cheng,’ lusheng taiduo yingxiao jiaoxue”(ऍεᏢᡂ Ȩύ୯ࠤȩഌғϼӭቹៜ௲Ꮲ American Universities Became“Chinatowns,” and the Excessive Number of Mainland Chinese Students Influenced the Teaching). Pingguo ribao (᝴݀Вൔ Apple Daily News). May 1, 2016. “Mei Harvard daxue jiaochang zhongguo chaodai gequ wangyou tiaoti” (ऍࠖՕ εᏢ௲ୠύ୯රжᄺԔ ᆛ϶ࡷক Harvard University’s Teaching of Ancient Chinese Dynasties via Songs Resulted in Online Fault-Finding). BCC News Network (Broadcasting Cooperation of China: News Network ύቶཥᆪᆛ). November 9, 2013. Ning, Cheng-yue (ჱԋД). “Zuobi de taiduo meiguo daxue shiping mienshi zhongguo dalu xuesheng” (բᄄ‫ޑ‬ϼӭ ऍ୯εᏢຎᓎय़၂ύ୯εഌᏢғ Too Many Cheating Cases: US Universities’ Audiovisual Interviews of Mainland Chinese Students). Aboluo News Network (ߓ‫ݢ‬ᛥཥᆪᆛ). January


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30, 2016: http://tw.aboluowang.com/2016/0130/684385.html (retrieved in August 2016). Wang, Hsin-I ( Ц ‫ ݒ‬ሺ Wang, Xinyi).“Jianada Shijie ribao tingkan, duzhe zhengjing” (у৾εȠШࣚВൔȡଶт! ᠐‫ޣ‬᎜ᡋ The Canadian Branch of World Journal Stopped, and Shocked Readers). Pingguo ribao (᝴݀Вൔ Apple Daily News). December 24, 2015. Wu, Yanren (ֆࣴΓ). Strange Events of the Late Twenty Years (ΒΜԃҞ࿏ϐ‫܁‬ ౜ຝ). Taipei: Laureate (ਦ߷), 1995. (The author is also named Wu Wuoyao ֆؔ൏). Zhao, Zhenzhen and Lee Wing On. China’s Mongols at University: Contesting Cultural Recognition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, p. 194.

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Appendix I Note: The following website was retrieved in July 2016. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, book titles, publishers, photos, position numbers, addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, time zones, zip codes, or email addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. http://X.X.edu/keaohou/2014/04/23/X-chinese/ Name X, Chinese studies: Researches the interplay of Chinese architecture and literature Humanities, View All Apr 23, 2014 Photo X Name X X is an assistant professor of Chinese at the University of X at X. X also serves as Chinese studies program coordinator in the humanities division. X’s research interests include the history of Chinese art and architecture, the interplay of architecture and literature, and the transmission of technical knowledge. Some of X’s most important research demonstrates a new approach to traditional Chinese technical works. X’s book, X (U of X Press in association with X University Press, 2012) explores distinctive social and cultural phenomena as reflected from the 12th-century imperially-commissioned architectural treatise X (Chinese-language title of the Book, 1103). X Details of the book about ancient Chinese-style architecture: skipped to prevent the possible identification of who the author of this book might be. Education X received X’s master of engineering in architecture from X University, City X, China, master of arts in Asian and Middle Eastern studies from the University of X, and master of arts and doctor of philosophy in history of art and architecture from X University.


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Appendix II Note: This website was retrieved in July 2016. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, position numbers, addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, time zones, zip codes, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. http://x.x.edu/academics/languages/ Languages X Home > Academics > College of Arts and Sciences The Department of Languages offers instruction in Chinese, Filipino (Tagalog), Japanese, Korean, and Spanish, as well as related courses in literature, culture, and language studies. Each program is comprehensive in approach, developing the functions of speaking, comprehension, reading, and writing and enhancing knowledge of the target area’s culture, history, society and the people. The Department’s course offerings in languages can be found under the following course prefixes: x Chinese: CHNS x Filipino: FIL x Japanese: JPNS x Korean: KOR x Spanish: SPAN x Language Studies: LANG Hawaiian Language courses offered by Ka Haka ‫ދ‬Ula O Ke‫ދ‬elikǀlani College of Hawaiian Language are listed under HAW and KHAW in the Catalog. Faculty and Staff Teaching CHNS Courses 1. A, Associate Professor, Chinese; Program Coordinator, Chinese Studies Certificate Faculty and Staff Teaching FIL Courses B, Assistant Professor, Filipino; Program Coordinator, Filipino Studies Certificate Faculty and Staff Teaching JPNS Courses C, Associate Professor, Languages (Performance Studies); Liberal Studies Coordinator D, Lecturer E, Chair & Associate Professor, Japanese, Languages & Linguistics F, Professor, Japanese Faculty and Staff Teaching LANG Courses G, Lecturer Faculty and Staff Teaching SPAN Courses H, Lecturer, European Languages I, Associate Professor, Spanish; Program Coordinator, Spanish Studies Certificate Faculty and Staff Contact the Department of Languages

“Strangee Events of the Last Twenty Ye Years” [email protected] (xxx) xxx--xxxx Mail: Department oof Languages University off X at X 200 W. X St.,, X, X State, Zipp Code X Request inforrmation Make a gift



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Appendix III Note: This online job announcement was retrieved in 2010. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, position numbers, addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, time zones, zip codes, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. Position number XT, U of X, (Campus X), temporary, non-tenure-track, College of Arts Sciences; general funds; full-time, nine-month appointment to begin August 2010 with the possibility of renewal for a maximum of three years pending availability of funds. Duties: Teach Chinese language, literature, linguistics and culture. Teaching responsibility includes language courses (all levels of Chinese and introductory level of Japanese in the first years of the appointment) and content courses (an Introduction to East Asian Civilization and the upper-division elective in the candidate's area of expertise). Actively develop and promote the U of X's China-U.S. Relations and Japanese Studies. Pursue his/her own professional/creative development at a level commensurate with ranking. Serve as academic advisor to students. Serve on university, college and/or departmental committees. Engage scholarly activities. Minimum qualifications: Native or near-native fluency in modern Mandarin Chinese and English, and experience in teaching Chinese language, literature and culture at the undergraduate level. Also rudimentary knowledge and ability to teach introductory Japanese. Instructor: Master's degree from an accredited university. Assistant Professor: Doctorate in Chinese from an accredited university, conferred by the beginning of the Fall 2010 semester. Desirable qualifications: Doctorate in Chinese with an emphasis in Literature or Cultural Studies. Demonstrated experience in program building and student recruitment. Evidence of interest and/or experience in teaching in a diverse multi-cultural environment. Pay range: Competitive. To apply: Submit a letter of application that addresses the specific qualifications, official transcripts, CV, sample syllabi of courses taught, and three current letters of reference (which may be mailed independent of the other materials). Applicants who wish to have any of their personal materials returned to them should include a self-addressed stamped envelope. Successful finalists may be asked to submit further documentation of their conducting and/or teaching activities. Application address: Dr. X, Chair, China Search Committee, Humanities Division, University of X at X, 200 W. X Street, X, X State, Zip Code X. Electronic submissions are also welcome, named with the position number and candidate's last name (e.g. 86490Tsmith) and emailed to [email protected] Inquiries: Dr. X, [email protected] or Closing Date: 3/15/10.


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Appendix IV Note: In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, time zones, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. On Sunday, March 16, 2014 8:08 AM, wrote: Dear Dr. X, Thank you for your prompt response. The Search Committee will introduce themselves on the day of the interview, which will be on Wednesday, March 19 from 2:00–2:30 p.m. (Z Standard Time). We will contact you on this phone number: 1-xxx-xxx-xxxx. We are looking forward to the interview. Best regards, Name Z


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Appendix V Note: In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. Dear Dr. Y, Dr. X has listed you as a reference for her application for a position as Assistant Professor of Chinese at University of X at X. The Search Committee kindly requests that you provide us with responses to the following questions by typing your comments below each of the questions. Your responses are greatly appreciated and will help us evaluate the candidate. We would be grateful if you complete the questionnaire by Friday April 4, 2014. Sincerely, Name Z Search Committee Chair Phone: XXX-XXX-XXXX Fax: XXX-XXX-XXXX E-mail: [email protected] 1. How long have you known Dr. X? 2. How would you rate Dr. X’s overall performance on a scale of one to five with five being the highest score? 3. What are Dr. X’s strengths and weaknesses? 4. In what areas do you think this individual could develop? 5. On a scale of one to five, with five being the highest, how would you rate Dr. X's interpersonal skills? Why did you select this rating? 6. Describe the candidate’s teaching skills, including Dr. X’s ability to handle pressure and / or conflict. 7. What three words would you use to describe Dr. X’s behavior in the workplace? 8. Is there anything else you can tell us that will help us evaluate Dr. X’s suitability for this position?

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Appendix VI Note: The following website was retrieved in July 2016. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. https://www.x.edu/gswl/x.asp XU Home Global Studies and World Languages Faculty and Staff Dr. X Global Studies and World Languages Global Studies World Languages Faculty and Staff Student Resources Dr. X photo Associate Professor Education PhD Mass Communication (Cultural Studies)--University of X MA Asian Studies/ Asian Civilizations--University of BA Chinese/Journalism--X University, P.R. China Teaching & Research Interests Chinese language & pedagogy Cultural studies (media, culture & Chinese society) Ethnicity & Identity in China Discourse analysis Small-town America


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Appendix VII Note: The following online job announcement was retrieved in 2007. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. The X University Asian Studies Program and Modern Languages Department invite applications for a joint position in Mandarin Chinese Language and Chinese Studies. The position is tenure-track at the assistant professor level, and involves teaching six courses a year, including elementary and upper-level language classes and Chinese Studies classes. The Chinese Studies courses will be taught in English and can be in any discipline or field. PhD (in any field) in hand or near completion; native or near-native fluency in Chinese and good command of English; college teaching experience preferred. The candidate must show pedagogical excellence and leadership in curricular development. A commitment to curricular innovation in the teaching of Chinese language and culture and to excellence in undergraduate education in Chinese language is expected. Experience in computer assisted language teaching is a plus. Must be willing also to contribute to sustaining our interdisciplinary Asian Studies Program and to work with our Center for International and Intercultural Studies office with its study abroad opportunities in China. Position begins August 200x. Send application letter, a statement of teaching philosophy discussing the teaching of Chinese language and Chinese studies in the context of a liberal arts college, CV, and three recommendation letters to: Chinese Search Committee Chair, Department of Modern Languages and Literatures, X University, X, State X, Zip Code X. Review of applications will begin on November 1, 200x. Over the past 10 years X University has invested over $180 million, and has specific plans for greater levels of support, to achieve excellence across the curriculum, a commitment to the quality and increased size of the faculty, a focus on well-balanced, learning-centered campus life and new or renovated facilities, all aimed to assure the University its place among the best institutions in the nation. X University has a number of vibrant interdisciplinary programs, one of which is our nationally recognized team-taught program required of all first-year students. For more information please visit X University's homepage at http://x.edu/. We welcome applications from candidates who bring diverse cultural, ethnic and national perspectives to their scholarship and teaching. X University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity employer. Women, minorities, veterans, and persons with disabilities are encouraged to apply.

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


Appendix VIII Note: The following website was retrieved in 2016. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, key-words, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. Name X photo Professor of Applied Linguistics Ph D. - X University Department Information Languages and Cultures // Faculty Asian Studies // SIS // Faculty Chinese // SLC // Faculty Office Information Office: X Office Phone: (xxx) xxx-xxxx Office Hours: By appt. E-mail:[email protected] Specialization Chinese Business Language, Culture, Linguistics Dr. X is Professor of Applied Linguistics, and the Director of Chinese Language Program in the School of Languages and Cultures at X University. Since year X, she has been also serving as the Director of the Confucius Institute at X University. Dr. X received her MA in German in X from X University, China, and PhD in Linguistics from X University in X. She joined X University in X as an Assistant Professor of Chinese. She has published two books with the titles of X in X and Y in Germany. Her major publications include studies on requests in German, English and Chinese, intercultural pragmatics of X and Y, teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, multimedia-assisted learning of Chinese and Business Chinese. Dr. X is a frequent speaker to business community, MBA classes, K-12 community and at academic conferences on business culture and etiquettes in Chinese, research in Business Chinese and cross-cultural communication. In 2010, Dr. X was elected to the Board of Advisors of X language Association in the US. Dr. X has been frequently invited to review academic manuscripts for major publishers such as A,B,C, and D. Since 2010, Dr. X has been serving as the faculty reviewer for US Chinese language programs for the X Council.


Chapter Seven

Appendix IX Note: The following website was retrieved in 2016. In order to protect anonymous interviewees and people involved in this incident, real names, locations, phone numbers, fax numbers, key-words, or e-mail addresses were replaced with alphabetic letters. http://eastasian.x.edu/faculty-and-staff/ College of Arts and Letters East Asian Languages and Cultures Contact Home › Faculty and Staff Faculty and Staff

Department Chair: Name A (on leave AY 2016-17) Associate Professor and Chairperson Chinese Language Coordinator Office Phone: xxx-xxx-xxxx [email protected] Acting Chair: Name B (AY 2016-17) Professor and Acting Chairperson Chinese Literature and Culture Office: (xxx)xxx-xxxx [email protected] Director of Undergraduate Studies: Prof. C Drop-in Advising Hours: TBA Appointments [email protected]

Chinese Program Faculty Japanese Program Faculty Korean Program Faculty Foreign Teaching Assistants Library Faculty Concurrent Faculty Administrative Support

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”

Chinese Program Faculty Name D, Language instructor Visiting Professional Specialist Office: TBA

Name E, Literature Professor Interests: Literature Office: XX Hall, xxx-xxxx [email protected]

Name F Research Professor Interests: x Office: XX Hall, xxx-xxxx [email protected]

Name G, Literature and Culture Professor, Chinese Literature Director, Institute for Asia and Asian Studies Interests: Modern Chinese literature and language Office: xx Hall [email protected] Name H Associate Professor Interests: Chinese X History Office: XX Hall [email protected]

Name I, Language



Chapter Seven

Visiting Professional Specialist Office: TBA

Name J, Language Visiting Professional Specialist Office: TBA

Name K, Language Assistant Professional Specialist Office: XX Hall [email protected] Name L, Language (on leave) Assitant Professional Specialist Office: X Hall [email protected] Name M, Literature Associate Professor Director of Undergraduate Studies Interests: Chinese Literature Office: X X Hall, Room X [email protected]

Name N, Chinese Language Program Coordinator Assistant Professional Specialist Interests: Chinese Language Pedagogy Office X Hall [email protected]

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


Appendix X http://kpfu.ru/docs/F949543134/HSK____.pdf HSK 侶ϩ俦ܴ! 匉ࠠ侶ϩ俦ܴ! ֹԋѡη匉! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қǶ! ե䪠ϩǺ҂х֖‫܌‬ග‫ޑٮ‬ӄ೽便俟ǹ便‫ׇ‬௨ӈό҅⍻ǹԖ 4 㚚‫ ܈‬4 㚚а΢凿 㞄ӷǶ! ύ䪠ϩǺ便‫ׇ‬௨ӈ୷ҁ҅⍻ՠቚуΑ҂ග‫ٮ‬便ǹ便‫ׇ‬௨ӈ҅⍻ՠԖ 2.3 㚚凿 㞄ӷǶ! ଯ䪠ϩǺх֖ӄ೽便俟Ъ便‫ׇ‬௨ӈ҅⍻Ǵ㛐凿㞄ӷǶ! 3Ƿ㛙䬙ӷ匉! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қ‫܈‬㛙Αᢳเਢֹӄό࣬䞄‫ޑ‬ӷǶ! ύ䪠ϩǺᢳเਢ࣬߈Ǵࢂ凿ӷǶ! ଯ䪠ϩǺᢳเਢ΋ठǶ! 4Ƿ࣮䡾Ҕ便೷ѡ! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қǶ! ե䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳ䡾ТϷ‫܌‬ග‫ޑٮ‬便俟㛐䞄ǹԖ 4 㚚‫ ܈‬4 㚚а΢凿㞄ӷǹѡη όֹ᏾ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信Ƕ! ύ䪠ϩǺѡηֹ᏾ǵ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信ՠԖ 2.3 㚚凿㞄ӷǹ! ѡηֹ᏾ǵ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信ՠ㚵৒䳾㡇Ƕ! ଯ䪠ϩǺѡηֹ᏾ǵ㛐凿㞄ӷǵ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信Ъ㚵৒ώ൤Ƕ! 5Ƿ㛙อЎ! ಃ :: 匉! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қǶ! ե䪠ϩǺ҂ӄ೽٬Ҕ 6 㚚便俟Ǵ㚵৒ό僶偄ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹԖ働ӭ凿㞄ӷǶ! ύ䪠ϩǺ㚵৒僶偄Ъӝ㷺僛ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹ㚵৒僶偄Ъӝ㷺僛ǴԖϿໆ凿㞄 ӷǹ㚵৒僶偄Ъӝ㷺僛Ǵጇ൯ό㮅Ƕ! ଯ䪠ϩǺ6 㚚便俟ӄ೽٬ҔǴ㛐凿㞄ӷǴ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信Ǵ㚵৒ώ൤ǵ僶偄Ъӝ㷺 僛Ƕ! ಃ 211 匉! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қǶ! ե䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳ䡾Т࣬䞄‫܄‬όεǹ㚵৒ό僶偄ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹԖ働ӭ凿㞄ӷǶ! ύ䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳ䡾Т࣬䞄Ъӝ㷺僛ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹ㚵৒ᢳ䡾Т࣬䞄Ъӝ㷺僛Ǵ ԖϿໆ凿㞄ӷǹጇ൯ό㮅Ƕ! ଯ䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳ䡾Т࣬䞄Ǵ㛐凿㞄ӷǴ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信Ǵ㚵৒ώ൤ǵ僶偄Ъӝ㷺 僛Ƕ! 6Ƿ䷢㛙! 1 ϩǺ‫ޜ‬қǶ! ե䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳග‫׷ٮ‬਑࣬䞄‫܄‬όεǹ㚵৒ό僶偄ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹԖ働ӭ凿


Chapter Seven

㞄ӷǶ! ύ䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳග‫׷ٮ‬਑୷ҁ࣬಄ǴԖ俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǹ㚵৒ᢳග‫׷ٮ‬਑୷ҁ࣬಄Ǵ ԖϿໆ凿㞄ӷǹጇ൯ό㮅Ƕ! ଯ䪠ϩǺ㚵৒ᢳග‫׷ٮ‬਑࣬಄Ǵ䶌᫴ӝ౛Ǵ߄㠣㟵౛ǵ僶偄Ǵ㛐俟‫ݤ‬凿信ǵ 凿㞄ӷǶ

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


Appendix XI https://www.ets.org/gre/revised_general/scores/how/ How the Test Is Scored Score Scales Three scores are reported on the GRE® General Test: a Verbal Reasoning score reported on a 130–170 score scale, in 1-point increments a Quantitative Reasoning score reported on a 130–170 score scale, in 1-point increments an Analytical Writing score reported on a 0–6 score scale, in half-point increments Any section in which you answer no questions at all will be reported as a No Score (NS).


Chapter Seven

Appendix XII Subject: Re: Hi & Good Morning From: [email protected] To: [email protected] I have, nor time nor interest in extending this… ----------------- Original Message---------------From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Time: Friday, November 30, 2012, 3:17PM Subject: Hi & Good Morning This morning, I did not anticipate that my initiation of the greeting by saying "Hi" to you would result in anything problematic. I did not mean anything negative, either. Otherwise, I would not have initiated the greeting BEFORE you said "Good Morning." Again, I was the person to politely initiate the greeting between us. I started the greeting by saying "Hi". Responding to my "Hi ," you replied "Good Morning"-not "Hi." So I thought that you chose the phrase "Good Morning" and did not use the same word "Hi" when you responded to my greeting. I assumed that the mutual greeting was over at that moment when you responded to my "Hi" with your "Good Morning". (I don't understand the meaning of "three times" because at that short moment when I entered the elevator and when you went out of the elevator, I said "Hi" only once and I heard your "Good Morning" only once. It was not very possible for me to say "Hi! Hi! Hi!" three times and for you to say "Good Morning! Good Morning! Good Morning" three times because that short moment was extremely short.) I hope that this clarifies the condition. Name of Alias Y

“Strange Events of the Last Twenty Years”


Notes 1

Consult the website about Yip Wai-lim (ယᆢ༹): http://www.idref.fr/035749903 (website retrieved in July 2016). 2 Consult the Facebook page of Yu Ying-shih (էमਔ): http://www.idref.fr/035749903 (online information retrieved in July 2016). 3 See the official website of Peking University: http://english.pku.edu.cn (website retrieved in July 2016). 4 See the official website of Tsinghua University: http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/newthuen/ (website retrieved in July 2016). 5 Consult Ge Jianxiong’s article in Beijing qngnian bao (ч٧ߙԃൔ Beijing Youth News) on November 19, 2015. 6 “Mei daxue bian ‘zhongguo cheng,’ lusheng taiduo yingxiao jiaoxue” (ऍεᏢᡂ Ȩύ୯ࠤȩഌғϼӭቹៜ௲Ꮲ American Universities Became “Chinatowns,” and the Excessive Number of Mainland Chinese students Influenced the Teaching). Pingguo ribao (᝴݀Вൔ Apple Daily). May 1, 2016: http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20160501/850643/ (online news report retrieved on May 1, 2016). 7 See Lin Yan’s news reports on January 1, 2016 and June 7, 2016. Also consult Justin Fox’s news report in Bloomberg View on June 30, 2016. 8 Except for Appendix X, also consult the grading policy of the HSK examination: http://www.chinesetest.cn/userfiles/file/HSK-pingfen.pdf (online file retrieved in July 2016). 9 The phrase, “authentic Hong Kong experience” appeared in the following HKSA official website: http://www.nyu.edu/clubs/hksa/about.html (webpage retrieved in July 2016). 10 Consult Zhao Zhenzhen and Lee Wing On’s coauthored book entitled China’s Mongols at University: Contesting Cultural Recognition, p. 194. 11 These two Harvard professors are not anonymous interviewees in this article. Journalists reported their names on newspapers. 12 See the news report in the BCC (Broadcasting Cooperation of China) on November 9, 2013. 13 See the official PDF file publicized by the AAS (Association for Asian Studies): http://www.niu.edu/cseas/outreach/pdfs/eaa_magazine.pdf (online file retrieved in August 2016). 14 Consult Wang Hsin-I’s news report on December 24, 2015. 15 Consult the official website about Integrated Chinese by Cheng & Tsui: http://ic.cheng-tsui.com (web-page retrieved in July 2016). 16 Consult the AAUP’s article entitled “On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Evaluation”: https://www.aaup.org/report/collegiality-criterion-faculty-evaluation (online article retrieved in August 2016).


The decision as to whether Mandarin and Chinese non-Mandarin dialects are important and deserve large investments from US universities, military departments, education departments, chambers of commerce, and governments depends on multiple layers of global power struggles, not necessarily on the individuals who teach these target languages in US higher education. Power struggles outside of classrooms determine the destiny of Chinese-language and other foreign-language teaching in US higher education before instructors and learners enter their classrooms. In US higher education, it is not unknown for departments of East Asian, Asian, foreign, or world languages and literature to place multiple Eastern- and Western- language teaching and literary or cultural studies under the same administrative umbrella. Such an administrative arrangement turns departments of East Asian, Asian, foreign, or world languages and literature into places similar to the United Nations, full of power struggles as members compete for power positions in global interactions. However, Eastern and Western languages reflect different national origins, racial, ethnic, and linguistic self-identities, religious beliefs, sociopolitical history, military concerns and cultural differences. Sometimes even gender issues affect language teaching and cultural studies. Currently, most Eastern or Asian languages are more vulnerable than Western languages, such as Spanish, in US higher education even though the Japanese language was popular after the Pearl Harbor Incident and the rise of the Japanese economy, and even though Mandarin Chinese is now popular after Mainland China’s economic boom. Resources and administrative power tend to always be occupied by stronger languages.

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Sometimes these departments give tenure-line positions only to Western languages and forever only temporary resources or lecturer-level positions to Asian languages because of unspoken fears that the rise of Chinese language or other Eastern languages might share or take the resources that the Western languages have enjoyed. It is not a blessing for the so-called weaker languages, including Chinese-language teaching in US higher education, to always reach this glass ceiling in the long run.

Theoretical buttress The theory of the five Cs, communication, cultures, connections, comparisons, communities (Table 8-1), which the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) proposes, forcefully buttresses this book’s research into multiple layers of power struggles among the five Cs, especially communities, connections, comparisons, and cultures. According to the ACTFL, The World-Readiness Standards for Learning Languages define the central role of world languages in the learning career of every student. The five goal areas of the Standards establish an inextricable link between communication and culture, which is applied in making connections and comparisons and in using this competence to be part of local and global communities. The World-Readiness Standards for Learning Languages create a roadmap to guide learners to develop competence to communicate effectively and to interact with cultural competence and to participate in multilingual communities at home and around the world. (https://www.actfl.org/publications/all/world-readiness-standards-learninglanguages)


Chapter Eight

Table 8-1 The theory of the five Cs Global Areas Communication Communicate effectively in more than one language in order to function in a variety of situations and for multiple purposes

Cultures Interact with cultural competence and understanding

Connections Connect with other disciplines and acquire information and diverse perspectives in order to use the language to function in academic and career-related situations

Standards Interpersonal Communication: Learners interact and negotiate meaning in spoken, signed, or written conversations to share information, reactions, feelings, and opinions. Interpretive Communication: Learners understand, interpret, and analyze what is heard, read, or viewed on a variety of topics. Presentational Communication: Learners present information, concepts, and ideas to inform, explain, persuade, and narrate on a variety of topics using appropriate media and adapting to various audiences of listeners, readers, or viewers. Relating Cultural Relating Cultural Products to Practices to Perspectives: Perspectives: Learners use the Learners use the language to language to investigate, explain, investigate, explain, and reflect on the and reflect on the relationship between relationship between the products and the practices and perspectives of the perspectives of the cultures studied. cultures studied. Acquiring Making Information Connections: Learners build, and Diverse reinforce, and expand Perspectives: their knowledge of Learners access and other disciplines while evaluate information using the language to and diverse perspectives that are develop critical available through the thinking and to solve language and its problems creatively. cultures.

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities

Comparisons Develop insight into the nature of language and culture in order to interact with cultural competence

Communities Communicate and interact with cultural competence in order to participate in multilingual communities at home and around the world

Language Comparisons: Learners use the language to investigate, explain, and reflect on the nature of language through comparisons of the language studied and their own. School and Global Communities: Learners use the language both within and beyond the classroom to interact and collaborate in their community and the globalized world.


Cultural Comparisons: Learners use the language to investigate, explain, and reflect on the concept of culture through comparisons of the cultures studied and their own. Lifelong Learning: Learners set goals and reflect on their progress in using languages for enjoyment, enrichment, and advancement.

(https://www.actfl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/World-ReadinessStandardsforLearnin gLanguages.pdf)

Among the five Cs, communities face the most serious conflicts or multiple layers of power struggles. As long as diversity of people and communities exists, conflicts between diverse sorts of people or communities become inevitable. Multiple layers of power struggles unquestionably result from conflicts between different kinds of people, including native-level Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (TCFL) or Teaching Chinese as a Second Language (TCSL) instructors from Mainland China or non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, non-native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors as well as Western-heritage, Chinese-heritage, non-Chinese Eastern-heritage, or biracial-heritage faculty members who make personnel or other administrative decisions about TCFL/TCSL in US higher education of the twenty-first century. Once there are conflicts or power struggles among various communities, problems indubitably ensue regarding connections to different communities, as do comparisons and contrasts of sociocultural differences and cultural legacies.


Chapter Eight

Diverse communities from the TCFL/TCSL standpoint From the TCFL/TCSL standpoint the following important communities may have harshly influenced US students enrolled in Mandarin Chinese-language classes: (1) native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China, (2) native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, (3) non-native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors, (4) instructors of non-Chinese languages, and (5) non-Chinese-speaking administrative heads deciding personnel matters and other TCFL-related things.

Four influential TCFL-related communities before 1949 When prestigious US universities began their earliest Mandarin Chinese-language courses during China’s feudalist dynasties and the Republican era, before Chinese Communists’ establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, they had native-level students and TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China as well as non-native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors with experience as China-related missionaries, diplomats, governmental officers, and businessmen. Non-Chinese-speaking people making decisions regarding personnel matters and other TCFL-related details were also playing dominant roles. With reference to the competition between instructors of non-Chinese-language programs and TCFL/TCSL instructors, Japanese-language programs tended to win competitions with Chinese-language programs in terms of US governmental attention, resources, and sponsorship because Japan’s attack of the US territory in Hawaii during WWII turned Japanese into the most important Asian language for the American government. For instance, Stanford University began Yamato Ichihashi’s courses about Japanese language and culture in 1913 (twenty-five years before the first Mandarin Chinese-language course at that university in 1938), provided its first endowed professorship to Yamato Ichihashi early in 1920, where Yamato Ichihashi was in a teaching position until 1950. Samuel Wells Williams (ፁΟࣙ) at Yale University and John Fryer (ഡើ໡) at the University of California, Berkeley, for instance, were non-native TCFL/TCSL instructors. Samuel Wells Williams had experience of being a US missionary and governmental diplomat in Chinese-speaking, Cantonese-speaking, and Japanese-speaking areas before Yale University hired him as America’s first TCFL/TCSL professor

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


in 1877. John Fryer had good connections with Western missionaries and worked as an interpreter and a translator in the Qing Dynasty government before the University of California, Berkeley, employed him to teach Mandarin Chinese-language courses. His life story is included in the current online version of Biographical Dictionary of Chinese 1 Christianity. Ge Kunhua (Љ㋏ϯ Ko K’un-hua) at Harvard University and Shau Wing Chan ( ഋ ტ ҉ Chen Shou-yung) at Stanford University were native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China. Ge Kunhua was born and brought up in Anhui (Ӽᔇ). He had experience of working with Western diplomats from the US and England as well as successful experience in teaching several Caucasian-heritage students Mandarin Chinese before Harvard University offered him a three-year teaching contract. Shau Wing Chan had a Cantonese background: In 1938, Shau Wing Chan (1907–1986) was appointed Instructor of Chinese and Literature for a program established by the School of Letters. Chan graduated with a BA in English from Lingnan University in Canton in 1927 and then taught English in China for several years until he saved enough money for graduate study abroad. He chose to come to Stanford (rather than Sorbonne), where he completed his MA (1932) and PhD (1937) in English. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War preventing him from accepting a professorship in China, Chan returned to California to teach. In 1939-1940, Chan was promoted to Assistant Professor of Chinese and English.2

Before 1949, most native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors’ field of academic expertise was literature, and most non-native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors also learned some Chinese-language literature. For instance, Harvard University never questioned whether Ge Kunhua had a PhD in literature but simply believed in his traditional-style Chinese training in literature. John Fryer mentioned Chinese-language literature when designing his teaching plans. Below is the list of teaching contents that he specified in 1894: Language (1) The Chinese language, its nature, origin, growth, extent, history, structure, modifications and prospects. (2) The literary style of book language of China, common to the whole Chinese Empire and Japan. (3) The Mandarin or Court language which is the common language of the


Chapter Eight official and educated classes, and has a literature of its own. (4) The Cantonese dialect, spoken by nearly all the Chinese in America being an entirely different language from the Mandarin, and having no literature. (5) Chinese philology, showing the connection between the Chinese and Western or Aryan languages. Literature (1) General Chinese literature, in its different branches, both ancient and modern. (2) The Confucian Classics and philosophy. (3) The Taoist and Buddhist literature and philosophy. (4) The literature of the Arts and Sciences, as known to the Chinese. (5) The history and present condition of the Chinese Empire and Japan.3

Non-Chinese-speaking administrative heads possessed the authoritative power to make TCFL/TCSL personnel and other decisions. For example, the non-Chinese-speaking administrative head who decided Ge Kunhua’s Mandarin Chinese-language teaching position was Harvard University’s President Charles W. Eliot, persuaded by Francis P. Knight炷ⰸቺ炸, a Caucasian-heritage businessman in Boston. Those who decided Shau Wing Chan’s TCFL/TCSL teaching position were Ray Lyman Wilbur, then President of Stanford University, and William Dinsmore Briggs, then 4 Chair of the English Department at Stanford University. Columbia University President Seth Low, who got Dean Lung’s (΍ᓪ) letter in 1901, was the non-Chinese-speaking administrative head who decided the earliest TCFL/TCSL courses and teaching contracts at Columbia University. John Fryer’s TCFL/TCSL job resulted from Edward Thompkins’ endowment. Before 1949, native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas were not as influential as the above-mentioned communities—namely, native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China—in US higher education. The overall Chinese-heritage population in the US was limited. The San Francisco gold rush in 1848 and California railroad construction from 1858 through 1885 brought the largest number of Chinese-heritage laborers to the US during this era. Mainstream American society was unfriendly to and actually discriminatory against Chinese-heritage people in the US at the time.

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Pre-1949 glass ceiling: Conflicts among the four influential communities In this era, the most globally famous conflicts among US and Chinese communities took place in the American government’s discrimination against Chinese-heritage people in the US. For instance, in the 1870s and 1880s there were more than 150 anti-Chinese riots in the US. Unfortunately, almost no Caucasians who killed Chinese-heritage people in these uprisings were sent to jail or sentenced to death. Chinese-heritage survivors of these anti-Chinese displays moved to live together to help one 5 another, which is how Chinatowns began in American history. Below is a brief list of some anti-Chinese laws: Commutation Tax and Foreign Miners Tax Law (California Law in 1850) Cubic Air Law (California, 1850) Anti-Coolie Act, 1862 Page Act, 1875 Chinese Exclusion Act (first version, 1882) Chinese Exclusion Act (revised and worsened version, 1884) Scott Act, 1888 Geary Act, 1892 Scott Act, 1902 Magnuson Act, 1943

During this period, all TCFL/TCSL instructors suffered from crises of enrolment. According to the Center for East Asian Studies of Stanford University, in “1958 there were five students in First-Year Chinese and 6 eight students in First-Year Japanese.” The University of California, Berkeley, shared the same crisis of enrolment: Although a few students tried hard, the majority were discouraged and dropped out. Fryer said, “It [had] therefore been only by dint of my perseverance and persuasion on my part, that these study courses in language and literature [had] been kept at all.”7

Except for missionaries, governmental officers, businessmen, politicians, and diplomats whose careers required them to learn Mandarin Chinese or Chinese dialects, most American people had little motivation to learn anything about Chinese language or cultural elements, especially when the anti-Chinese attitude was extremely popular among US laborers and


Chapter Eight

law-making communities. In terms of people who won positions of authority and power in this era, most administrative decision makers with the power to dominate TCFL/TCSL instructors’ teaching positions and careers were non-Chinese-speaking Caucasian-heritage men who worked as university professors, businessmen, or attorneys in US higher education, such as Seth Low, a university president, Francis P. Knight, a businessman, and Edward Thompkins, an attorney. Native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors obtained no power to make decisions about TCFL/TCSL in pre-1949 US higher education; therefore, they had to administratively listen to what Caucasian-heritage people who usually lacked professional backgrounds in Mandarin Chinese, Chinese dialects, or China-related studies said. Nobody, including non-Chinese-speaking people themselves, publicly said there was anything wrong with non-Chinese-speaking people making TCFL/TCSL-related decisions. TCFL/TCSL teachers’ academic careers were decided by non-Chinese-speaking and thus unprofessional Caucasian-heritage people with wealth and political or administrative power, rather than professionals or experts of TCFL/TCSL. The logical flaw hidden in this phenomenon was the fact that nonprofessional laymen led experts. Because of their lack of expertise in native-level Mandarin Chinese, Chinese dialects, and Chinese literature, these Caucasian-heritage authorities depended heavily on their China-related connections and acquaintances or on other China-related people’s evaluation of the expertise of candidates rather than on their own independent judgments or 8 comparisons of different job candidates’ Chinese-language abilities. As a non-native-level teacher of Mandarin Chinese and Cantonese at the University of California, Berkeley, John Fryer lamented that his courses “could therefore only rank as of secondary character and were taken up by a few enterprising students, either out of curiosity, or as novel and eccentric additions to the ordinary means of general culture.” 9 It was quite discouraging to observe that the inducements to carry on East Asian studies were too small, and “few students can have the courage or the means to undertake this heavily handicapped, up-hill work, or to continue long enough to make it of any practical value.”10

The decision about text book materials in college and post-graduate-level classes resulted in almost no disputes, conflicts of interest, or power struggles because TCFL/TCSL teachers with both literary and non-literary

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


backgrounds enjoyed a lot of freedom in terms of their own preferences and choices at that time. Ge Kunhua, for example, had no problems when including his own creative writing and poetic works in his course reading lists. Traditional characters in pre-1949 teaching contents encountered no hostility from instructors or learners. The Wade-Giles, phonetic or zhuyin (‫)ॣݙ‬, and Yale system of romanization were all created in this period.

Four significant communities of 1950s to 1990s TCFL/TCSL in US higher education The most influential communities of 1950s to 1990s TCFL/TCSL in US higher education were native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China played no important role for several reasons: First, Chinese Communists began the “closed-door” policy after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Almost everybody important in TCFL/TCSL in US higher education in the 1950s to 1990s therefore connected himself or herself with non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas regardless of which community he or she belonged to. Second, a colossal number of native-level Chinese-speaking students and scholars came to the US from Taiwan and Hong Kong in this era. They resulted in mainstream American society’s concept of Asian immigrants as the “model minority” of the US. Third, the global conflicts between democratic countries and communist nations in this period strengthened the mutual ties between the US and non-Communist non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Finally, Taiwan overpowered the pre-1949 Mainland China to become the world’s top-ranking center of TCFL/TCSL from the 1950s to the 1990s. Replacing Mainland China’s Canton (Guangdong) as the global base of Cantonese teaching and learning in this era was Hong Kong. In this period, the number of non-native-level Western-heritage TCFL/ TCSL instructors increased. Owing to military, political, immigration-related, and diplomatic concerns, Japanese, Spanish, and Russian language programs competed with Chinese-language programs for administrative attention, resources, and financial sponsorship. Western-heritage non-Chinese-speaking administrative heads continued to have the power to decide TCFL/TCSL-related affairs, yet a small number of Chinese-heritage native-level Chinese-speaking people and Western-heritage non-native-level Chinese-speaking people successfully


Chapter Eight

gained administrative positions and obtained some power to decide TCFL/TCSL matters. Shau Wing Chan, Tien Chang-lin (Җߏᓄ 1935– 2002), Ross King (ߎऩࡘ), William Kirby (࢒଻݅), and Curtis Smith 11 (ў୯ᑫ), for instance, were persuasive examples. The communities that these people belonged to incontestably produced tight connections with non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas and non-Communist Chinese cultures. Shau Wing Chan chaired the Department of Asian Languages at Stanford University from 1958 to 1962. Because of his administrative leadership and his help in training the US Army in Chinese and Japanese-language abilities, Stanford University became a federally-funded institution for East Asian languages. Shau Wing Chan utilized his administrative power to hire a Caucasian-heritage non-native-level TCFL/TCSL teacher, David Nivison, when he chaired the department. This changed the phenomenon of non-Chinese-speaking unprofessional laymen deciding the careers of Chinese-speaking experts. Thanks to Shau Wing Chan’s connections with non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, Stanford University established the Stanford Center at National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, in 1962. Tien Chang-lin was the first Chinese-heritage university president in American history. He was the president of the University of California, Berkeley from 1990 to 1997. Although he was born in Huhan, Mainland China, in 1935, he and his family moved from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949 and he attended high school and college in Taiwan before his arrival in the US; he was therefore deemed a native-level Mandarin-speaking Chinese-heritage person from Taiwan, one of the non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas. Ross King (ߎऩࡘ), William C. Kirby (࢒଻݅), and Curtis Dean Smith (ў୯ᑫ) benefitted incredibly from their learning of Mandarin Chinese language in Taiwan during the 1980s. After their TCFL/TCSL learning experience in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas as Caucasian-heritage students, they returned to North America and became near-native-level Chinese-speaking administrative heads. William C. Kirby served as dean of letters and science at Harvard University and 12 currently chairs the Harvard China Fund. Curtis Dean Smith finished his PhD in Chinese literature at National Taiwan Normal University 13 (NTNU) in 1996. In fact, he was the first Western-heritage holder of an NTNU doctoral degree. He currently serves as a TCFL/TCSL instructor, teaching traditional Chinese characters and no pinyin system at California State University, Sacramento. Ross King learned Mandarin Chinese at

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


UCLA in 1980 and NTNU for seven months from November 1984 to June 1985. He chaired the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of British Columbia, Canada, for nine years. These people belonged to the communities of non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas and connected US learners with those areas. For instance, Curtis Dean Smith arranged his American students’ summer abroad studies in Taiwan almost every year after his graduation from Taiwan. William C. Kirby even met with Taiwan’s political leader at the Presidential Palace of Taiwan. In a Skype communication on August 16, 2016, Ross King vividly recalled Li Cheng-ching (‫ਁ׵‬మ), who chaired the 1980s Mandarin Training Center of the NTNU and emphasized that the University of British Columbia had extremely good connections with at least four sister schools in Taiwan. In terms of the Chinese culture that people related to North America’s 1950s to 1990s TCFL/TCSL endeared themselves to, it was unquestionably traditional non-Communist Chinese culture, such as centuries-old Confucianism and traditional-style Chinese calligraphy and traditional Chinese characters, without the impact of Chinese Communists’ Cultural Revolution. An anti-communist aura filled North America and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking places in this period. In both the US and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas from the 1950s through the 1990s, communist supporters were severely criticized, as in the case of the US attack on John King Fairbank, a well-established Caucasian-heritage American expert of China studies, after his support of Chinese Communists. White American learners of Chinese language, such as Ross King and Megan Ferry, mentioned that their Mandarin Chinese-language textbooks, which contained simplified Chinese characters and were published and edited in Mainland China, were confiscated by Taiwanese governmental institutions in the 1980s, although they did not personally experience the severe attacks that John King Fairbank did.

The 1950s to 1990s glass ceiling: four major conflicts among communities From the 1950s through to the 1990s, there were at least four major conflicts in TCFL/TCSL in US higher education: (1) worldwide communist-democratic conflicts, (2) decade-long US debates about the Yale and pinyin systems of romanization, (3) Chinese-language programs’ competition with Japanese, Spanish, and Russian language programs, and (4) the continuation of anti-Asian discrimination in mainstream American


Chapter Eight

society. Communist-democratic conflicts, which expanded during WWII, did not stop with the end of the war. They continued to pervade the globe through the 1950s to 1990s era. The Cold War period witnessed military and political conflicts between the US, which represented all the democratic countries, and Russia, which represented all the communist nations, accelerating not only Taiwan’s TCFL/TCSL connections with the US but also the growth of Russian language programs. Chinese Communists had the “closed-door” policy, Cultural Revolution, one-child policy, and countless power struggles among almost all Chinese Mainlanders; American learners’ direct and convenient communication, including Mandarin Chinese-language communication, with Chinese Mainlanders, most of whom became Chinese Communists, therefore turned out to be impossible before the 1980s. The Russian political leader’s visit to Beijing in 1989 motivated Mainland Chinese college students’ social movement in Tiananmen Square to request democracy. This broke Chinese Communists’ friendly connections with almost all the democratic Euro-American nations from the end of the 1980s to 1995, when the United Nations hosted the World Women’s Congress in Beijing. Even in the twenty-first century, numerous Americans still recall the unforgettable news report about the Beijing college student who stretched out his arms to stop the military tank on the road in Tiananmen Square. Currently Chinese Communists interpret the Tiananmen Square Incident in a way completely contrary to how Euro-American democratic nations and non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas interpret it. The Yale system of romanization was popular from the 1940s through much of the 1970s era but encountered questioning in the late 1970s. Numerous debates between TCFL/TCSL-related communities appeared in the late 1970s, and the pinyin system of romanization replaced the Yale system. The Wade-Giles system was popular in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas in the period when the Yale system was popular; the pinyin system was powerful in post-1950s Mainland China; and, as noted above, the Yale system was widely used in US higher education from the 1940s through to the 1970s. Different kinds of textbooks, instructors, and learners created and utilized these different romanization systems. For instance, after being a faculty member at the University of California from 1947 to 1965 with the global reputation as the father of Chinese linguistics, Zhao Yuanren (ᇳϡҺ Chao Yuan-jen, 1892–1982) published A Grammar of Spoken Chinese with the University of California Press in Berkeley in 1968 and

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Readings in Sayable Chinese with Asian Language Publications, Inc., in 1969. The latter “has three volumes, each with text in Chinese characters and the Gwoyeu Romatzyh system of romanization.” Explanatory notes and introductory material are in English. Each of these books is also 14 available on cassette, as read by the author and members of his family.” The contents of the volumes are shown below (Table 8-2). Table 8-2 Contents of the volumes of the Gwoyeu Romatzyh system of Romanization CONTENTS Volume 1 Doanpian Guhshyh, Hueyhuah, gen Charngjou-huah Hueyhuah: Short Shyueshuh Luennwen Stories, Conversations, & Learned Articles Beeifeng gen Tayyang

The North Wind and the Sun

Hwu Jea Huu Uei

The Fox Borrows the Tiger’'s Prestige

Jyupyi Shianq

Orange Peel Lane

Tzoou Daw Bihhuall Lii

Through the Painted Wall

Jiannchyau Hueyhuah

Cambridge Conversations

Farngtz gen Tianchih

Houses and Weather

Tarn Luh-in

On Recording Speech

Shyue Jongwen de Shyuesheng

Students of Chinese

Wuushya Sheaushuo

Adventure Stories

Jihcherng Chihche Daw Huei Jie

Taxi to Gray Street

Yeang Mhau

Keeping Cats

Her Wey Hannshyue? Jou Faagau juh

What Is Sinology? by Fa-Kao Chou

Chapter Eight


Luenn Hannshyue-jieh de Daybeau Renwuh, Jou Faagau juh Tzyhjuann Piannduann

Representative Personages in Sinology, by Fa-Kao Chou Fragments of an Autobiography

Tzaonian Hweiyih

Early Reminiscences

Dong i-piall Shi i-duall

Earliest Scenes and Episodes

Woode Jia gen Woo Juh de Jia

My Family and My Home

Woo Sheaushyrhowl Shuo de Huah

My Early Speech

Shanq-shyue Niann-shu

Going to School

Biannluann gen Biannguh

Eventful Years in the Country and at Home

“Hwei” Nanbian

“Returning” to the South

Dawle Charngjou

Arriving in Changchow

Charngjou-huah Hueyhuah

Conversations in the Changchow Dialect Volume 2

Tzoou Daw Jinqtz Lii Gen Alihsy Kannjiann Liitou Yeou Shie Sherme

Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There by Lewis Carroll

Luhyihsy Jialeheel Yuanjuh Juhjee Yuan Shiuh

Author’s Preface

Jinqtz Lii de Farngtz

Looking-Glass House

Hwo Hual Huayual

The Garden of Live Flowers

Jinqtz Lii de Gehjoong Chorngl

Looking-Glass Insects

Toeidelduen gen Toeideldih

Tweedledum and Tweedledee

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities

Mianyang gen Chyrtarng

Wool and Water

Huendih Duendih

Humpty Dumpty

Shytz gen Dwuj eau Maa

The Lion and the Unicorn

Jeh sh Woo Tzyhgeel de Faming

It's My Own Invention

Alihsy Hwanghow

Queen Alice





Sh Sheir Tzuoh de Menq ne?

Which Dreamt It?




Volume 3 1. 2.

Roantii Donqwuh -- Day 1. Weisy yuanjuh, Jaw Yuanrenn bianyih 2. Yee Meiguey, Chern Chyuan juh

The Mollusc, by H. H. Davies, adapted by Y. R. Chao The Wild Rose, by Ch’en Ch’üan

In the 1950s to 1990s era, the US government paid special attention and provided strong sponsorship to Japanese and Russian language programs because of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and Russia’s status as the US’s sturdiest archrival. After Japan gave way to China and the US in the 1940s, Japan’s post-WWII economic boom attracted American learners’ attention to Japanese-language courses and indirectly used up potential enrolment in Chinese-language classes. Spanish language programs thrived after more and more immigrants moved from Spanish-speaking Latin-American areas. Spanish-speaking and Latino-heritage immigrants produced many more descendants in US territories than did Caucasian-heritage Americans and thus increased the Spanish-speaking population in the US. Chinese-language programs were hence put into a difficult position of competing with Japanese, Russian, and Spanish language programs for administrative attention, resources, and sponsorship. A considerable number of departments of foreign languages and world languages were chaired by Spanish-speaking


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administrative heads without any background knowledge or professional training in Chinese language or culture. Sometimes even Russian-speaking administrative heads had better opportunities to chair multilingual departments, such as at George Mason University in Washington, D.C., and New School in Manhattan, New York City. Under these circumstances, resources, priorities, and preferences usually went to Spanish or Russian language programs. Mainstream US society’s anti-Asian discrimination did not reduce. Chinese-heritage and Asian-heritage people in the US have been defined as the “model minority” by mainstream American society since the 1960s. Sounding as though it praises Asian-heritage people in the US, the phrase “model minority” implies that white Americans define Asian-heritage Americans as weak, controllable, able to be bullied, and docile, never uniting and strengthening themselves to cooperatively fight back against discriminators in the same ways that African-heritage Americans had organized so many parades, protests, petitions, and social movements against discriminators. This is the true reason why the overall image of African-heritage Americans was as uncontrollable, unable to be bullied, and untamable, and they were not counted in the category of a model minority.

Four important TCFL/TCSL communities in US higher education from the 2000s to the present From the 2000s to the present, TCFL/TCSL in American higher education has witnessed a dramatic increase in Mainland Chinese communities. This phenomenon is attested via the increase in native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China, Confucian Institutes sponsored by the Chinese Communist government, and around one-third of the student population being from Mainland China on numerous post-2015 American 15 university campuses. In the 2013–2014 academic year, the number of students from Mainland China in American higher education was more 16 than 300,000 and has been increasing ever since (see Figure 8-1).

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Figure 8-1 Number of Chinese students enrolled in US universities

Chinese Mainlanders in US higher education have been affecting all of the other three important TCFL/TCSL communities in US higher education: non-native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors; non-Chinese-speaking and Chinese-speaking administrative decision makers; and Spanish language programs which remain the largest among all the foreign and world language programs in American higher education. After the US experienced a rapid increase in the Chinese-heritage population on the west coast—such as in California and Washington—in the post-2000s period, the Chinese-heritage and Asian-heritage communities of the model minority eventually became communities of the model majority. Currently, the Asian-heritage population in the US is around twenty-six per cent, but this proportion will become thirty-six to thirty-eight per cent in the next fifty years according to Pew Research Center’s census statistics.17

Money talks Although the US was the world’s fiercest anti-Communist leader from the 1950s through the 1980s, in terms of future economic connections with Mainland China, the American government has been becoming pro-Communist and has been almost anti-Communist since the 2000s. It is not an over-exaggeration to contend that since the 2000s, almost the entire world, including the US, has been stretching its arms, waiting to embrace economic benefits from connections with communities related to


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Mainland China. Money talks. Below is a discussion of the practical financial reasons that US higher education has been so attracted to Chinese Mainlanders. After a few decades of Mainland China’s one-child policy, almost all students from Mainland China are the only children or one of very few children in their homes, with abundant resources from one pair of parents and two pairs of grandparents. This presents the undeniable fact that most students from Mainland China in US higher education from the 2000s to the present are full of resources: “The wealth that enables Chinese families to pay the high prices of US degrees is also beneficial for university 18 budgets.” In the post-2000s period, more and more US schools have gained the ability to discern rich students from Mainland China from other Asian-heritage students. Many colleges may now treat Asian Americans interchangeably with Chinese nationals. But underrepresented minorities overall still face competition from wealthy Chinese students. “The difference between those Chinese nationals and many American applicants, Asian and otherwise, is that the former can pay their way and the latter will often need institutional aid to do so,” says Andrea van Niekerk, a college admissions consultant. “I think that is why many American kids of all ethnic backgrounds who share the burden of needing financial aid, are at risk of being squeezed out by rich Chinese applicants.”19

Many American universities have desperately wanted the tuition and other money from Mainland Chinese students as well as financial connections with Mainland China after the US economic problems that began in the 20 2008–2009 academic year. Even after the 2008 economic problems gradually faded away, American schools’ acceptance of students from Mainland China has not lowered at all. On the contrary, this welcoming of tuition fees from students with Mainland Chinese backgrounds accelerated in the 2010s. For instance, the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC) “boasts the largest number of international students of any public higher education institution in the US, nearly 5,000 of whom are Chinese 21 [Mainlanders].” Students from Mainland China brought more than 9.8 22 billion USD to the US in the 2014–2015 academic year. In addition to students with a Mainland Chinese background, Confucius Institutes, hosted by the Chinese Communist government, offer immense amounts of money to American schools. They have also been

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


importing a large number of free native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors, pro-PRC administrative policies, and Mandarin Chinese-language teaching materials from Mainland China to US universities. The Chinese Communist government defines Confucius Institutes as a part of Mainland China’s soft power. In answer to China’s Soft Power Initiative, the Chinese Communist government’s Ministry of Education aimed “to boost Chinese-language teaching in American universities and 23 language institutes around the world.” In the post-2000s era, Mainland China has been taking a big slice of TCFL/TCSL in US higher education away from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, especially Taiwan. America’s first Confucius Institute was established at the University of Maryland, College Park, in 2004. In addition, “in 2006, a new institute was established every four 24 days and Hanban hopes to have 1,000 institutes by 2020.” Every host university in the US, on average, received an annual payment of 25 100,000-150,000 USD from Mainland China —not including free native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China and free Mandarin Chinese-language teaching materials approved by the Chinese Communist government. According to information from the Mainland Chinese radio channel Sounds of Hope, the PRC government’s annual budget for worldwide Confucius Institutes was around 160,000,000 RMB (around 24,045,000 USD) in 2008, and Ge Jianxiong (လቆ໢), Chairman of History and Geography Department at Fudan University, assessed that the PRC cost to establish each Confucius Institute, on the average, was 26 approximately 500,000 USD.

TCFL/TCSL-related glass ceiling and conflicts among communities after the 2000s Nils Göran David Malmqvist (ଭ৹ฅ) published comments in Minbao yuekan (ܴൔДт Mingpao Monthly) suggesting that a Chinese-language department or program’s acceptance of a Confucius Institute would lower its original academic level of sinology research or China studies to nothing 27 more than a Mandarin Chinese-language school. Yu Yingshi (էमਔ Yu Ying-shih) frankly unveiled the cruel fact that the PRC tried to “buy up” 28 (ວ) universities in the US and other countries via Confucius Institutes. At these institutes, Chinese-language students will be taught simplified Chinese characters, which are used on the Mainland, instead of the


Chapter Eight classical Chinese characters used by Taiwan. “There’s no doubt there’s an element of competition” between China and Taiwan, Economy says. “Beijing is trying to supplant the influence of Taipei around the world.” Some experts say China is also trying to set itself up as a leader on the world stage, in opposition to the West and the United States.29

According to the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), Confucius Institutes “function as an arm of the [Communist] Chinese state” and “advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic 30 staff, the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.” Unavoidable questions ensue: “Are the Chinese teachers in Confucius Institutes free from Communist Party control? …. Do the contracts, under which China prohibits its teachers from being members of the banned spiritual organization Falun Gong, give the party power to decide who can or 31 cannot work on Western campuses on the grounds of religious belief?” Regardless of PRC governmental representatives’ responses to these questions, a number of American professors with professional expertise in China-related studies loudly testified to the Chinese Communist political control and purposeful violation of academic freedom. Some of them were blacklisted and were not allowed to enter Mainland China and were therefore unable to collect sufficient first-hand research information, carry out field studies for academic research, or establish connections with Chinese Mainlanders. For instance, the PRC government prohibited some American contributors to Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, such as Justin Rudelson, from entering Mainland Chinese territory, and “Dartmouth almost fired Rudelson because he couldn’t go to [Mainland] 32 China.” As a near-native-level Chinese-speaking professor teaching Chinese literature at a well-reputed American university, Perry Link, for example, was blacklisted and has been unable to enter Mainland Chinese territory since 1995 because his viewpoints about college students’ initiation of and participation in the Tiananmen Square in 1989 are 33 opposed to the view that the Chinese Communist Party permits. More and more American universities, such as the University of Chicago, started to vote Confucius Institutes off their campuses in the late 2000s and early 2010s. In 2016, the US government requested the closure 34 of more than sixty Confucius Institutes. Most of the Confucius Institutes’ free native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China were also required to leave the US. They will be permitted to reenter American higher education only after passing through the filter of having credentials appropriate for US university faculty. These conflicts between

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


American academic communities and Mainland Chinese communities have so far been gaining the understanding of more and more of the young Mainland Chinese generations, as indicated in the following website discussion in Mainland China: This time the reason the US required Confucius Institutes’ TCFL/TCSL instructors to leave is that the number of nominally, but not truly qualified, instructors provided by Confucius Institutes is almost the number of faculty members in a large college. These nominal instructors are the second generation of PRC governmental officers, the third generation of the Red/Communists, and a lot of wives of governmental officers. These people can be permitted to reenter the US after they pass the academic filtering or screening system of university faculty’s academic credentials.35

Except for the PRC budgets for Confucius Institutes, Communist China has been trying to “shape the discussion at American universities, stifle criticism and influence academic activity by offering funding, often 36 through front organizations closely linked to Beijing.” However, American universities gradually noticed this problem and showed their rejection of such a Chinese Communist financial power. The Taiwanese government established only three Taiwan Academies in the US: in Houston, Los Angeles, and New York. The Council for Cultural Affairs, Taiwan, listed Taiwan Academy’s three major goals: (1) to promote Taiwan’s TCFL/TCSL, including traditional Chinese characters, (2) to export and spread the traditional or authentic Chinese culture preserved in Taiwan, and (3) to strengthen research about sinology and 37 Taiwan studies. What is Taiwan Academy? Ma Yingjiu’s White Book of Culture clearly specified, “Taiwan is Chinese-heritage people’s cultural capital. It preserves Confucianism, Buddhism, Zen Taoism, literature, architecture, crafts, art, and traditional customs better than other Chinese-speaking areas. Taiwan Academies need to be systematically established via collaboration with Euro-American communities in order to offer courses related to philosophy, literature, or art.” The main goal is to “counter-balance the Confucius Institutes founded by Mainland China.”38

The chairman of Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Los Angeles, Jian Xubang (ᙁ೚ٖ Chien Hsu-pang), compared Taiwan Academies and Confucius Institutes. He pointed out two main differences. First, Taiwan Academies offer courses about traditional Chinese


Chapter Eight

characters, but Confucius Institutes provide classes about simplified Chinese characters only. Second, Confucius Institutes give money directly to host universities in the US, yet Taiwan Academies establish 39 scholarships. Taiwan Academies were supposed to be the Taiwanese counterparts of Mainland China’s Confucius Institutes, yet they ended up being very much weaker than Confucius Institutes. According to Taiwan governmental announcements, the budget to found and run Taiwanese Academies was 360,000,000 NTD (around 11,376,600 USD) per four-year cycle. Each Taiwan Academy’s annual expense was estimated to be 10,000,000 NTD 40 (around 315,800 USD). Financially, politically, diplomatically, and administratively speaking, Taiwan Academies are no match for Confucius Institutes. This is certainly Taiwanese Academies’ glass ceiling; however, Taiwan Academies have also not been as disreputable as Confucius Institutes in terms of their impacts on US academic freedom from the view point of mainstream Americans since the 2000s precisely because they are not as oversized, numerous, influential, wealthy, and dominant as Confucius Institutes. Native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, such as Taiwan or Hong Kong, did not disappear in the US, but the shrinking ratio of non-Mainland Chinese-speaking to Mainland Chinese-speaking populations resulted in the loss of the dominant position of power that non-Mainland native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors held in the 1950s to 1990s era in US higher education after the arrival of a large Mainland Chinese population at American schools. In the 2000s and 2010s, students in several non-Mainland Chinese-speaking places, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, suffered from a serious reluctance to study in the US. Although the average number of students going from Taiwan to the US was around 50,000 per year three decades ago, an incredible decline in the number of students going from Taiwan to the US began in the 2007–2008 academic year. The number fell from 37,581 in the 1993–1994 academic year, to 24,818 in the 2011–2012 academic year, 21,867 in the 2012–2013 academic year, and 20,993 in the 2014–2015 academic year. That is to say, the number of students traveling from Taiwan to the US was less than one fourteenth of the number of students traveling from Mainland China to the US in 2015. In addition, Taiwanese higher education has been strongly encouraging students to take TOEIC (Test of English for International Communication) examinations since the 2000s and thus indirectly decreased Taiwanese students’ participation in the TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Language) and GRE (Graduate Record Examination) examinations, which acted as a gate-keeper for US schools’ admission and financial support of, as in teaching assistantships and research assistantships, for students from Taiwan going to America. Because most Taiwanese-heritage instructors and faculty members in US higher education got their American teaching jobs after studying in America and graduating from American schools, fewer students from Taiwan study in the US, fewer Taiwanese people finish terminal degrees in the US, and fewer Taiwanese-heritage instructors and faculty members get teaching positions in US higher education. This is probably the major reason that the number of TCFL/TCSL instructors from Taiwan became so much smaller than the number of their Mainland Chinese counterparts in the 2000s and 2010s. Although students and TCFL/TCSL instructors from Taiwan in the US were counted as Chinese-heritage students and native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors by the US government, more and more American schools were to see the differences between those from Taiwan and those from Mainland China. A small number of American schools even started to offer courses in Taiwanese dialects and southern Min dialects, such as the southern Min dialect classes at Stanford University, Harvard University, Williams College, or City College of New York. As the nine-year chair of the East Asian Languages Department at the University of British Columbia, Canada, Ross King said in a Skype dialogue session on August 16, 2016 he felt that native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Taiwan, on average, have been teaching better than their Mainland Chinese counterparts. Administrative heads in most American universities and colleges in the post-2000s era have chosen the Mainland Chinese side, however, because Mainland China’s economic developments, TCFL/TCSL abroad studies programs, political connections, and other aspects seem to be “sexier” and more attractive than their Taiwanese counterpart. The number of Hong Kong students in US schools started to rise in the 1980s and 1990s. It reached a peak of 14,000 in the 1992–1993 academic year, but in the 2000s and 2010s, it dropped, down to only 8,012 people in 41 the 2014–2015 academic year. Because most Hong-Kong-heritage instructors or faculty members in US higher education got their American teaching jobs after studying in the US and graduating from American schools, fewer students from Hong Kong studied in the US, fewer people from Hong Kong finished terminal degrees in the US, and fewer Hong-Kong-heritage instructors and faculty members got teaching positions in US higher education. This is probably the major reason why the number of TCFL/TCSL instructors from Hong Kong became so much

Chapter Eight


smaller than the number of Mainland Chinese counterparts in the 2000s and 2010s. In addition to the ratio of Chinese-speaking people from Mainland China to non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas in American higher education, the proportion of Latino-Heritage and Chinese-Heritage populations in the US also had a lot to do with the glass ceiling and conflicts of interest that Chinese-language programs and Chinese departments have been facing in the 2000s and 2010s. Latino-heritage Spanish-speaking people and Chinese-heritage Mandarin-speaking people became probably the US’s largest groups of immigrants in the post-2000s era who do not speak English as their first language (see Table 8-3). The US’s large number of Latino-heritage Spanish-speaking people and Chinese-heritage Mandarin-speaking people would certainly motivate Americans to learn Spanish and Mandarin more instead of other non-English languages. Table 8-3 US population by race based on the 2000 and 2010 US Census. Subject





Race One race


97.1 274,595,678




72.4 211,460,626



12.6 34,658,190


Black or African American American Indian and Alaska Native Asian

2,932,248 14,674,252




4.8 10,242,998


Asian Indian































Japanese Korean Vietnamese Other Asian


Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities

Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Native Hawaiian Guamanian or Chamorro Samoan Other Pacific Islander


















6.2 15,359,073




Some other race


Two or more races



Race alone or in combination with one or more other races: White




74.8 216,930,975


Black or African American


13.6 36,419,434


American Indian and Alaska Native


Asian Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Some other race

17,320,856 1,225,195 21,748,084




5.6 11,898,828





7.0 18,521,486


(Source: US Census Bureau, Census 2000: www.census.gov.)

Aside from Spanish- and Japanese-language programs, Chinese-language programs have encountered almost no archrivals in non-English languages and have won a lot more administrative attention, resources, and sponsorships than almost all the other foreign-language programs. Japanese-language programs gradually lost their 1950s to 1990s position of power in the overall foreign/world language departments after the rise of Mainland China’s economy and Japan’s economic depression. Russian language programs also suffered from a similar loss of “power” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Middle East language programs grew in American higher education after the Gulf War, battles between Israel and Muslims, and the rise of ISIS, but so far, their number has been no match for that of Chinese-language programs. In addition to the ratio of the Chinese-heritage population to the overall US population, money, especially RMB (renminbi, the official currency of the PRC), also strongly motivated Americans to learn about Mandarin


Chapter Eight

Chinese language and culture. Thanks to Mandarin courses, native-level TCFL/TCSL instructors from Mainland China, studies abroad in Mainland China rather than in non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas, Mainland China’s durable and robust money-making role in international markets, and US business connections with Mainland China’s “red supply chain,” Chinese-language programs undoubtedly bring more financial income and non-financial benefits to Americans than do Spanish, Japanese, and other non-Mandarin language programs. The more Chinese-language programs benefit Americans, the more conflicts of interest, jealousy, and even hostility Spanish, Japanese, and other non-Mandarin language programs have when facing Chinese-language programs. The post-2000s boost of Chinese-language programs has been using up enrolment numbers, resources, administrative attention, and sponsorship of Spanish, Japanese, and other non-Mandarin language programs, if the total number of American students willing to learn foreign languages and the total amount of resources and sponsorships for foreign-language teaching and learning remain the same. Under these circumstances, if administrative decision makers at the department level, college level or university level are Spanish-speaking, Japanese-speaking, Latino-American-heritage, Japanese-heritage, pro-Japanese, or pro-Spanish, such conflicts of interest, jealousy, and antagonism would certainly result in these people’s unfair decisions against Chinese-language programs. For instance, some department chairs who did not support Chinese probably tried to protect their own non-Mandarin language programs from being outshone by Chinese-language programs in post-2000s US higher education. They did this by hiring people with academic degrees in the wrong fields, (such as PhDs in architecture, German, history, journalism, mass communication, or only master’s degrees in economics) to teach Mandarin Chinese-language classes and direct Chinese-language programs without employing people with doctoral degrees in China-related literature, linguistics, or education in order to prevent good development of the Chinese-language programs to compete poorly with non-Mandarin language programs in their departments of foreign/world languages.

Conclusion Regardless of whether linguists cordially welcome research about language-related power struggles, conflicts of interests, the glass ceiling, and even gender politics, or hostilely exile such research to other academic

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


fields (such as cultural studies, educational administrative policies, international diplomatic studies, political science, comparative studies, and women’s studies), outside of the parameter of linguistics, different TCFL/TCSL-related communities have indisputably faced various types of conflict, connection, power struggles, and glass ceilings. This chapter has outlined both the ACTFL theoretical framework of the five Cs and a chronological historical overview from China’s feudalist dynasties to the 2010s. The varieties of community, (sub)cultural difference, connection, conflict, power struggle, comparison, contrast, and glass ceiling will definitely continue to permeate the ceaseless complexity of TCFL/TCSL-related mutual communication in the post-2010s era.

References Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Chinese Students in America: 300,000 and Counting.” Foreign Policy. November 16, 2015. Castets, Rémi. “Book Review of S. Frederick Starr’s Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland.” China Perspectives 65 (May–June 2006): http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/644. Chen, Fangyu (ഋ‫ ྆ޱ‬Chen Fang-yu). “Shiniannei sanfenzhiyi daxue jiaoshou bao tuixiuchao que kupinbudao xin laoshi” (21 ԃϣ 1»3 εᏢ௲௤ᛈଏҶዊ! ࠅधငό‫ډ‬ཥԴৣ 1/3 of Professors will Retire within 10 Years but No New Hires). Yuanjian zazhi (ᇻ‫ـ‬ᚇᇞ Global View Monthly). January 1, 2016. Chongsheng, Lin (݅஖യ). “Taiwan shuyuan ruhe zuo xiang shijie” (Ѡ㵈ਜଣӵ Ֆ‫و‬ӛШࣚ How Can Taiwan Academies Step toward the World?). Guoji xianqubao (୯ሞӃ០ൔ International Herald Leader). November 1, 2011. Chun, Doris Sze. “John Fryer, the First Agassiz Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature, Berkeley.” http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/publications/chronicle/ Fryer.pdf (online article retrieved in August 2016). Golden, Daniel and Oliver Stanley. “China Banning U.S. Professors Elicits Silence from Colleges.” Bloomberg. August 11, 2011. Goyette, Braden. “How Racism Created America’s Chinatowns.” Huffington Post. November 11, 2014. Gu, Mengren (ђᆾϘ Ku, Meng-jen). “Kangheng kongzi xueyuan? Taiwan shuyuan youdedeng” (‫ל‬ᑽϾηᏢଣǻѠ᡼ਜଣԖள฻ To Counter-Balance the Power of Confucius Institute? Taiwan Academy Is Yet Not a Match). Minsheng zhanxian (҇ғᏯጕ The Battlefield of People’s Needs in Daily Life). February 20, 2010: http://city.udn.com/54543/3870541#ixzz4Hmo9BKXf (retrieved in August 2016). Huang, Elaine. “’Ted Supply Chain’ Threat Buying up the World.” CommonWealth


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Magazine. December 13, 2015. Huang, Huiling (໳ඁ࣓ Huang Hui-ling). “Wenjianhui zhuwei Sheng Zhiren tan Taiwan shuyuan” (Ўࡌ཮Ь‫ہ‬౰‫ݯ‬ϘፋѠ᡼ਜଣ The Chairman of the Council for Cultural Affairs Sheng Chih-jen Talks about Taiwan Academies). World News. October 21, 2011. Institute of International Education, National Center of Education Statistics. “Chinese Students Enrolled in American Universities from the 1980s to the 2010s.” This statistical data can be also found in L. Kuo’s “Are US Universities Choosing Rich Chinese Students over Asian-Americans?” Quartz. April 27, 2014: http://qz.com/203273/are-us-universities-are-choosing-rich-chinese-students-o ver-asian-americans/ (retrieved in 2014). Jian, Lixin (ᙁҥ‫ ݒ‬Chien Li-hsin). “Wuo liuxue renshu huisheng chang wunian lai xingao” (‫ך‬੮ᏢΓኧӣϲ!ബ 5 ԃٰཥଯ The Number of Taiwan’s Overseas Students Revived, and Reached the 5-Year Climax). Wangbao (‫ܮ‬ൔ Want Daily). October 10, 2015. Kuo, L. “Are US Universities Choosing Rich Chinese Students over Asian-Americans?” Quart. April 27, 2014. Li, Ming (‫)ܴ׵‬. "Taiwan liumei xuesheng zhunian jianshao you dier jiang wei diwu” (Ѡ᡼੮ऍᏢғ೴ԃ෧ϿҗಃΒफ़ࣁಃϖ The Number of Taiwan’s Overseas Students Is Decreasing, Ranking Dropped from Number Two to Number Five). Epoch News. May 26, 2012. Lin, Shuyuan (݅లൟ Lin Shu-yuan). “Meimeng buzai Taiwan liumei renshu lian liu jiang” (ऍფόӆ!Ѡ᡼੮ऍΓኧೱ 6 फ़ No Longer any American Dream, Six-Year Decrease of Students from Taiwan to the US). News of the Central Agency (ύѧ‫ޗ‬ཥᆪ). November 12, 2013. Lin, Xiaohe (݅ਏ಻ Lin Hsiao-ho). “Jiaoyu tongji jianxun” (㔁做䴙妰䯉妲 Newsletter from the Statistic Office in the Ministry of Education). Taipei: The Statistic Office in the Ministry of Education, Taiwan (Ѡ᡼௲‫ػ‬೽಍ीೀ). 2 (January 15, 2014): page 1. Lin, Weizhen (Lin Wei-chen). “Uvjepoh!{ifohuj{j!Ubjxbo!tivzvbo!tijzvf! nfjhvp!lbjcboȹ!)௢୏҅ᡏӷ!Ѡ᡼ਜଣ 10 Дऍ୯໒ᒤ To Promote Traditional Chinese Characters, Taiwan Academies will Begin in the US in October). Epoch News. August 5, 2011. Liu, Zhen (ቅ੿ Liu Chen). “Meiguo jingji dimi gaoxiao qiangzhao zhongguo xuesheng liumei renshu zai chuang gaofeng” (ऍ୯࿶ᔮե଎!ଯਠཟ‫ܕ‬ύ୯ Ꮲ ғ ! ੮ ऍ Γ ኧ ӆ ബ ଯ ঢ় ! During the American Economic Depression, Universities Fight for Admissions of Students from China. The Number of Chinese Overseas Students in the US Will Reach One More Climax). Mingpao (ܴൔ). October 2, 2008. Ma, Wen and Guofang Li. Chinese-Heritage Students in North American Schools: Understanding Hearts and Minds beyond Test Scores. London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 16.

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities


Malmqvist, Nils Göran David (ଭ৹ฅ). “Sidegeermo daxue zhongwenxi de wenhua dageming” ( ථ ቺ ঢ ᅟ ነ ε Ꮲ ύ Ў ‫ ޑ س‬Ў ϯ ε ॠ ‫) ڮ‬. Mingbao yuekan (ܴൔДт Mingpao Monthly). December 2011: http://mingpaomonthly.com/ථቺঢᅟነεᏢύЎ‫ޑس‬Ўϯεॠ‫ڮ‬ġ 炷ଭ৹ ฅ炸/(retrieved in December 2011). Nolan, Peter. “Is China Buying the World?” The World Financial Review. November 12, 2013. Pan, Esther. “China’s Soft Power Initiative.” Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations. May 18, 2006. Rogin, Josh. “University Rejects Chinese Communist Party-Linked Influence Efforts on Campus.” Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/university-rejects-c hinese-communist-party-linked-influence-efforts-on-campus/2018/01/14/c454 b54e-f7de-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html?utm_term=.26b59dce896f (online news report retrieved in March 2018). Starr, S. Frederick. Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland. London, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Sudworth, John. “Confucius Institute: The Hard Side of China's Soft Power.” BBC News. December 22, 2014. Svoboda, Sarah. “Why Do So Many Chinese Students Choose US Universities?” BBC News. June 2, 2015. Volodzko, David. “China's Confucius Institutes and the Soft Power.” The Diplomat. July 8, 2015. Zhao, Yuanren (ᇳϡҺ Chao Yuan-jen). A Grammar of Spoken Chinese. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. —. Readings in Sayable Chinese. San Francisco: Asian Languages, 1969. Zhong, Zhenghui ( ᗛ ҅ ች Chung Cheng-hui). “Waiguo liuxuesheng zuobi fengkuang meiguodaxue chao touting” (Ѧ୯੮Ꮲғբ뚀‫!ئ‬ऍ୯εᏢຬᓐ ภ Foreign Students Love Cheating and Become a Super Headache of US Universities). New Tang Dynasty TV. June 8, 2016.

Notes 1

See the website: http://www.bdcconline.net/en/stories/f/fryer-john.php (retrieved in August 2016) 2 For details, consult the online introduction of the Center for East Asian Studies in Stanford University: https://ceas.stanford.edu/about/index.php.html (website retrieved in August 2016). 3 Consult Doris Sze Chun’s online article: http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/publications/chronicle/Frye r.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 4 See details in the following web page: https://ealc.stanford.edu/about/history (retrieved in August 2016).



Chapter Eight

See Braden Goyette’s news report in Huffington Post on November 11, 2014. For details, consult the online introduction of the Center for East Asian Studies in Stanford University: https://ceas.stanford.edu/about/index.php.html (website retrieved in August 2016). 7 John Fryer’s letter to President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, March 7, 1904. President’s records, CU-5 Ser. 1, Box 18:31. Also consult Doris Sze Chun’s online article: http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/publications/chronicle/Frye r.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 8 In the final decades of this era, John King Fairbank (຤҅మ) appeared as an exception. In the 1940s, he was a flamboyant Caucasian-heritage American with not merely near-native-level Mandarin language abilities but also accurate prediction of what Chinese Communists and Nationalists would end up with. His political prophecy matched the fact that Chinese Communists won the civil war against Nationalists. This resulted in the US accusation of his friendliness with Chinese Communists during the period of Cold War. 9 Consult John Fryer’s letter to President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, March 7, 1904 and February 1911. President’s records, CU-5 Ser. 1, Box 18:31 and 40:98. Also consult Doris Sze Chun’s online article: http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/publications/chronicle/Frye r.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 10 See John Fryer’s letter to President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, December 6, 1905. President’s records, CU-5 Ser. 1, Box 21:60. Also consult Doris Sze Chun’s online article: http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/publications/chronicle/Frye r.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 11 There are many more examples. It is impossible for this chapter to list every example. 12 For details, consult the news report about William C. Kirby’s visit of Ma Yingjiu (ଭमΐ Ma Ying-jiu) in Taiwan: http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33397 (retrieved in August 2016). 13 For details about Curtis Dean Smith’s TCFL/TCSL experience in Taiwan, consult the following online file: http://pr.ntnu.edu.tw/archive/file/102 ৣεണр 2.ў୯ᑫ.pdf (retrieved in August 2016). 14 For details, see the websites: http://www.pinyin.info/readings/sayable_chinese.html (retrieved in August 2016). http://pro.spidergraphics.com/spo/spo_START.taf?_function=list&catID=16&_Use rReference=A9476E1DE65377EE414A5354 (retrieved in August 2016). 15 In the statistic data, the phrase “Chinese students” mainly refers to students from Mainland China because the number of students from non-Mainland Chinese-speaking areas has been shrinking. 16 For details, consult Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian’s “Chinese Students in America: 300,000 and Counting” in Foreign Policy on November 16, 2015. 6

Multi-Layered Power Struggles among Communities



See the online information about the census data from the Pew Research Center: https://tw.news.yahoo.com/ ཥ ࣴ ‫ ز‬Ǻ ٥ ဴ ஒ ៌ ۚ ऍ ന ε ౽ ҇ ௼ ဂ -080741672.html (retrieved in 2015). 18 See Sarah Svoboda’s news report in the BBC News June 2, 2015. 19 Consult L. Kuo’s news report in Quartzin 2014. Also consult Ma Wen and Li Guofang’s Chinese-Heritage Students in North American Schools: Understanding Hearts and Minds beyond Test Scores. 20 Consult Liu Zhen’s news report in Mingbao on October 2, 2008. 21 See Sarah Svoboda’s news report in the BBC News June 2, 2015. 22 Mainland Chinese students also brought bad habits of academic cheating into US higher education. For instance, a Mainland Chinese student posted an advertisement of 500USD to cheat in examinations and obtain an “A-level” letter grade in Ohio during the 2015–2016 academic year. The PRC social culture has been full of numerous nationwide incidents of injustice, hypocrisy, fraud, distrust, power struggles, and law-breaking from 1949 to the present; therefore, students who were born and brought up in Mainland China grew up with too many samples or role models of larceny and dishonesty that many of them claimed that cheating in tests and academic larceny in research papers were completely okay as long as doers were not caught in Mainland Chinese academic culture. For details, see Zhong Zhenghui’s news report in the New Tang Dynasty TV on June 8, 2016. 23 For details, consult Esther Pan’s report entitled “China’s Soft Power Initiative” for the Council on Foreign Relations on May 18, 2006. 24 See David Volodzko’s report in The Diplomat on July 8, 2015. 25 The information about the PRC funding from Confucius Institutes to American host universities came from the following website: http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat13/sub82/item1904.html (retrieved in August 2016). 26 See the website information: http://big5.soundofhope.org/node/713587 (retrieved in May 2016). 27 ଭ৹ฅ௲௤ 2011 ԃӧ३ෝ‫ޑ‬ȠܴൔДтȡኗЎǺȸऍ୯εᏢ㚊‫ޑ‬ύЎ‫س‬ӵ ݀ௗયΑϾηᏢଣǴ၀‫س‬வεᏢள‫ံޑډ‬շߎ൩཮෧ϿǴቹៜ௲ᏢНѳǶୢ ᚒ‫ޑ‬ਡЈࢂϾηᏢଣ‫܌‬ග‫ޑٮ‬ᅇᇟ௲Ꮲᆶ੿҅‫ޑ‬ᅇᏢࣴ‫ز‬΋ᗺᜢ߯೿ؒԖǶ ӢԜၸѐჹᅇᏢࣴ‫ࡐز‬Ԗଅ᝘‫ޑ‬εᏢύЎ‫س‬ǴᄌᄌӦ཮ᡂԋ௲ද೯၉‫ޑ‬Ꮲ ਠǶȹ 28 Consult Beiming’s (чܴ) interview of Yu on March 22, 2012: http://city.udn.com/57476/5204859 (retrieved in August 2016). Also see Peter Nolan’s article in The World Financial Review on November 12, 2013 and Elaine Huang’s article in CommonWealth Magazine on December 13, 2015. 29 For details, consult Esther Pan’s report entitled “China’s Soft Power Initiative” for the Council on Foreign Relations on May 18, 2006. 30 See John Sudworth’s news report in BBC News on December 22, 2014. 31 Ibid. 32 Consult Daniel Golden and Oliver Staley’s “China Banning U.S. Professors Elicits Silence from Colleges” in Bloomberg on August 11, 2011. Also see S.


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Frederick Starr’s Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland and Rémi Castets’s book review in China Perspectives. 33 Ibid. 34 See the website information: http://big5.soundofhope.org/node/713587 (retrieved in May 2016). 35 See the website information: https://www.zhihu.com/question/20256120?rf=20255780 (retrieved in August 2016). Here is the Chinese-language citation: 㤄ԛऍ㡚ा‫؃‬Ͼη䗄ଣύ㡚௲㝃 ⃾ნ‫ޑ‬চӢࢂ΋㚚Ͼη䗄ଣࡸӜ‫ޑ‬Դ㝃ӭ‫ޑ‬὇΢Γৎ΋㚚ε䗄ଣΑǴࡸӜ‫ޑ‬ Դ㝃ٚय़ӄࢂ‫۔‬ΒжǴ䵛ΟжаϷࡐӭ‫۔‬ϼϼ䜹Ǿ೏ᇾ߇‫ޑ‬Γёа೯㠤Եਡ ӆӣ䗂Ƕ 36 For details, consult Josh Rogin’s news report in Washington Post. 37 Consult Li Weizhen’s news report in Epoch News on August 5, 2011. 38 See Gu Mengren’s article in Minsheng zhanxian (҇ғᏯጕ) on February 20, 2010. Also consult the following citation: ˬѠ᡼ਜଣȩࢂϙሶǻқҜਜ΢మཱ ࣚ‫ۓ‬ǺȨѠ᡼ࢂ๮ΓЎϯख़ᙼǴᖐΥᏂ௲ǵՕᏢǵᕝ‫ے‬ǵЎᏢǵࡌᑐǵπ᛬ǵ ໺಍҇߫฻Ǵ֡ள‫ډ‬ၨ‫ځ‬д๮ЎӦ୔ၨࣁֹ᏾‫ߥޑ‬ӸᆶวඦǶԖ‫س‬಍Ӧᆶኻ ऍ୯ৎ‫୔ޗ‬ӝբ೛࿼ȬѠ᡼ਜଣȭ Ǵ໒೛ণᏢǵЎᏢǵ᛬ೌ฻࣬ᜢፐำǶȩԶ ЬाҞ‫ޑ‬ǴջࢂࣁΑȨ‫ל‬ᑽύ୯εഌ‫ޑ‬ϾηᏢଣ˭ ˤ 39 Consult Lin Chongsheng’s news report in International Herald Leader on November 1, 2011. 40 See Huang Huiling’s news report in World News on October 21, 2011. 41 Consult Lin Xiaohe’s statistic report on January 15, 2014, Jian Lixin’s news report in China Times on October 10, 2015, Chen Fangyu’s article in Global View Monthly on January 1, 2016, and Li Ming’s news report in Epoch News on May 26, 2012. Also consult the statistic data from the Institute of International Education in the US (http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Stu dents/Leading-Places-of-Origin/2011-13) (retrieved in January 2014). The number of students from Taiwan to the United Kingdom (UK), however, increased from 4,625 people in 2012 to 16,000 people in 2013 according to Lin Shuyuan’s news report in News of the Central Agency on November 12, 2013. The increase was around four times more students from Taiwan to England within only one year. For the information about students from Hong Kong to the US, see the website: http://www.hotcourses.hk/study-in-usa/applying-to-university/usa-study-trend-repo rt-in-hk/ (retrieved in August 2016).


100K 40, 161, 203, 204, 214, 229

210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 229, 241, 253, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 289, 291, 293

AAUP 12, 23, 75, 100, 103, 208, 211, 238, 243, 261, 282

Conspiracy Theory 43, 44, 70, 71, 72

ACTFL 263, 265, 289 Bamboo Ceiling 18, 19 Calligraphy v, 22, 24, 25, 28, 60, 106, 107, 112, 115, 120, 121, 161, 164, 165, 168, 171, 178, 180, 182, 183, 186, 189, 224, 225, 226, 228, 241, 273 Cantonese 4, 5, 11, 17, 26, 28, 47, 48, 108, 111, 112, 156, 157, 159, 266, 267, 268, 280, 271 Chinese Bridge 12 CCTV 86, 104 Ching Chong 3, 6, 91, 92, 105 Confucius Institute 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 26, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209,

CPPCP 162, 187 CPT 17 Cultural Revolution 12, 26, 80, 198, 199, 200, 201, 207, 211, 228, 273, 274 EEOC 82 Etymology 24, 182 Etymon 25, 118, 173 Five Cs 263, 264, 265, 289 Hanban 12, 17, 40, 208, 214, 215, 281 Handwriting v, 22, 24, 25, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 135, 137, 129, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167,



169, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 191

ICA 17

123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 200, 201, 202, 262, 263, 265, 267, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 281, 283, 285, 287, 288, 289, 291, 293

IUP 8, 9, 10, 39

PSC 16

Mandarin Training Center 7, 35, 37, 273

Romanization v, 3, 4, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25, 28, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 180, 181, 217, 226, 227, 228, 233, 235, 236, 241, 243, 271, 273, 274, 275

HSK 16, 223, 231, 257, 261

McCarthyism 202 National Research Council 77 Old Boys’ Club 44, 50, 58 One Child Policy 242, 247, 280 One Belt One Road 210 Pinyin v, 7, 8, 15, 16, 22, 24, 25, 67, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 134, 135, 136, 157, 159, 160, 180, 181, 182, 184, 217, 226, 227, 228, 233, 234, 235, 236, 241, 272, 273, 274, 292 Power struggles i, iv, v, vi, 2, 12, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 106, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121,

ROTC 14, 40 Script 15, 16, 19, 29, 33, 35, 36, 49, 62, 66, 67, 74, 81, 97, 108, 112, 157, 158, 164, 165, 166, 178, 180, 185, 187, 188, 189, 248, 253 Simplified characters 14, 15, 24, 25, 115, 161, 162, 165, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 190, 228, 229, 231, 241 Stanford Center 8, 28, 272 Taiwan Academy 204, 205,206, 215, 283, 284, 289

Early 21st-Century Power Struggles of Chinese Languages Teaching in US Higher Education TCFL v, vi, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 73, 112, 122, 161, 192, 196, 204, 205, 215, 217, 218, 219, 228, 230, 237, 242, 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 278, 279, 281, 282,283,284, 285, 288, 289, 292 TCSL v, vi, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 22, 26, 30, 31, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 73, 122, 161, 192, 196, 204, 205, 212, 217, 218, 219, 228, 230, 237, 242, 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 288, 289, 292 TCSOL 13, 17 TECO 223, 283


TLI 7, 8 Tones 24, 106, 107, 113, 114, 182, 189 TOP 16, 28, 223, 241 Traditional characters 14, 15, 24, 25, 106, 115, 161, 162, 177, 178, 182, 228, 231, 236, 271 Wade-Giles 4, 7, 22, 24, 25, 28, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 123, 134, 135, 158, 159, 226, 233, 241, 271, 274 Yale v, 3, 4, 19, 22, 28, 39, 52, 71, 74, 106, 111, 112, 123, 156, 157, 159, 160, 266, 271, 273, 274 Zhuyin 24, 25, 28, 107, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 123, 156, 158, 159, 271