Dysfunctional leadership and organizations 9781846632419, 9781846632402

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09/11/2006

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ISSN 0268-3946

Volume 21 Number 8 2006

Journal of

Managerial Psychology Dysfunctional leadership and organizations Guest Editor: Dr Alan Goldman

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Journal of Managerial Psychology

ISSN 0268-3946 Volume 21 Number 8 2006

Dysfunctional leadership and organizations Guest Editor Dr Alan Goldman

Access this journal online ______________________________ Editorial advisory board ________________________________ Introduction ______________________________________________ Dysfunctional organization culture: the role of leadership in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors

694 695 696

David D. Van Fleet and Ricky W. Griffin ___________________________

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Dysfunctional culture, dysfunctional organization: capturing the behavioral norms that form organizational culture and drive performance Pierre A. Balthazard, Robert A. Cooke and Richard E. Potter ___________

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High toxicity leadership: borderline personality disorder and the dysfunctional organization Alan Goldman_________________________________________________

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Causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member interactions Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko and Scott C. Douglas _________________

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Internal terrorists: the terrorists inside organizations David D. Van Fleet and Ella W. Van Fleet __________________________

2006 Awards for Excellence ___________________________ Call for papers ___________________________________________

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CONTENTS

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD

Professor Neil Anderson Department of Work and Organization Psychology, University of Amsterdam Professor Chris Argyris Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, USA Professor Yehuda Baruch School of Management, University of East Anglia, UK Professor Frank Bournois Universite´ Panthe´on-Assas, Paris II, France Professor Cary Cooper Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster Martin Euwema Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands Professor Adrian Furnham Professor of Psychology, University College London Professor Hugh P. Gunz Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario Dr Frank Heller Tavistock Institute, UK Professor Geert Hofstede Institute for Research on Intercultura Co-operation, The Netherlands Professor Paul Iles Teesside Business School, UK Professor Jim Jawahar College of Business, Illinois State University, Normal, IL, USA Professor Andrew Kakabadse Cranfield School of Management, UK, Founding Editor of Journal of Managerial Psychology Dr Bruce Kirkcaldy International Centre for the Study of Occupational and Mental Health, Du¨sseldorf, Germany Professor Harold J. Leavitt Stanford University, USA Professor Manuel London Harriman Hall, NY, USA Professor Dr Wolfgang Mayrhofer Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Austria Professor Greg Northcraft Department of Business Administration, College of Business, University of Illinois, USA Dr Francisco Gil Rodriguez Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain Professor Zhong-Ming Wang Hangzhou University, China

Professor Yochanan Altman London Metropolitan University, UK Dr Dean Bartlett University of North London, UK Dr Gayle Baugh University of West Florida, USA Professor Ce´leste Brotheridge De´partment d’Organisation et Resources Humaines, Universite´ Du Que´bec a` Montre´al Dr Adrian Carr School of Applied Social and Human Sciences, University of Western Sydney, NSW Dr Stuart Carr Industrial/Organisational Psychology Programme Poverty Research Group, Massey University, New Zealand Professor Kerry Carson Department of Management, Moody College of Business, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA Alf Crossman The University of Surrey, UK Dr Patricia Hind Ashridge Management College, UK Professor Henry S.R. Kao University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Dr Ute-Christine Klehe Programmagroep A&O Psychologie, Amsterdam Dr Robert Kovach and Brett Seamons RHR International Co., London, UK Dr Peter Liu Verity International Ltd, Toronto Dr Michael Morley University of Limerick, Ireland Dr Chris Rees University of Manchester, UK Dr Ramon Rico Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain Alain M. Roger IAE de Lyon, Universite´ Jean Moulin, Lyon Dr Raymond Saner and Dr Lichia Yiu Centre for Socio-Economic Development, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Rene´ Schalk Tilburg University, The Netherlands Dr Ruth Simpson School of Business and Management, Brunel University, UK Dr Sherry E. Sullivan Bowling Green State University, USA Dr Shay Tzafrir University of Haifa, Israel Dr Daniel Vloeberghs University of Antwerp, Belgium Dr Jacob (Yaacov) Weisberg Bar-Ilan University, Israel

Editorial advisory board

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Introduction About the Guest Editor Dr Alan Goldman’s work focuses on toxic leadership and dysfunctional organizations, management consulting and executive coaching, cross cultural management, US-Japanese management, and organizational psychology. He is the author of seven books, and over 100 presentations and publications. Dr Goldman’s “Leadership pathology as a nexus of dysfunctional organizations” was the 2005 recipient of the inaugural Copenhagen Business School Award, a best paper award in the Management Consulting Division of the Academy of Management.

This special issue of the Journal of Managerial Psychology explores the darker, troubled side of organizations. It is an investigation that spans individual leaders, teams, and organizational systems with the common unifying principles of toxicity and dysfunction. Left undetected, unattended or misdiagnosed, simple interpersonal or team conflict may escalate and morph into a dysfunctional system. Alternately, misguided organizational policies, abrupt restructurings, layoffs and downsizings become inseparable from anxiety, burnout and workplace terrorism. In some instances toxicity originates at the top as leaders suffering from depression, adult ADHD or borderline personality disorder impact their division or company – indicating the fine line between individual and organizational pathology. Whether approached through the micro lenses of trait and personality psychology, or the via macro perspectives of systems theory, toxicity and dysfunction weave a destructive path. Dysfunctional leadership and organizations result in decreased motivation and productivity, turnover, grievances, and a revolving door at employee assistance programs. When internal interventions fall short, consultants and coaches enter as external agents attempting to assess and intervene. In this issue the authors approach dysfunctional leaders and organizations by weaving an interdisciplinary pathway between psychology and management. The articles speak diverse languages of industrial psychology, management consulting, organizational behavior, executive coaching, and counseling psychology. The interdisciplinary venture of this issue is thought to mirror the increasingly broad repertoire of skills required of leaders in complex global organizations. Particularly in a decentralized, theory Y, TQM, Six Sigma influenced era, leadership emerges both vertically and horizontally. Team leaders, middle managers and human resource professionals are increasingly expected to work with the people side of management and participate as emotionally intelligent coaches and facilitators. When leaders turn toxic their people skills degenerate and organizational well being suffers. There is ample reason for organizations to consider the merits of designating toxin detectors and handlers as they attempt to anticipate and strategize their responses to conflict and counterproductive workplace behaviors. Healthy, functional and productive leadership

clearly occupies a primary role in toxicity detection. Conversely, toxic leaders are at the nexus of the dysfunctional organization. It is my hope that this issue will point our academic and professional colleagues in fruitful directions, and generate dialogue and research over the functional and dysfunctional in leadership and organizations.

Introduction

Alan Goldman Guest Editor

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Dysfunctional organization culture The role of leadership in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors David D. Van Fleet School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University at the West Campus, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, and

Ricky W. Griffin Department of Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this article is to expand and extend previous work on the role of organizations in influencing deviant or dysfunctional behavior in those organizations. Design/methodology/approach – Conclusions from previous work on the role of individuals and organizations in influencing dysfunctional behavior is used to lead to a discussion of the interactions between those two especially through organizational culture and leadership. Findings – A model is developed that more carefully identifies how all of these factors come together, resulting in no, little, some, or a lot of dysfunctional behavior. Research limitations/implications – The model developed here can be employed to improve understanding of the role of organization culture and leadership in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors. Both the individual and the organization constructs utilized in the framework need more complete conceptual development. In each instance, a more complex and integrative analysis of diverse literatures needs to be undertaken. Clear messages regarding individual tendencies toward violent behaviors are embedded in the literatures from such diverse areas as psychology, psychiatry, criminal justice, medicine, sociology, organizational behavior, biology, social psychology, and anthropology. A comprehensive review and synthesis could theoretically yield far more insights than currently exist. Practical implications – The proposed manifestations of dysfunctional behavior are most likely to occur as the result of the interactive relationship between an individual displaying a relatively high predisposition for violent behavior and an organization with a relatively high propensity to elicit violence. Clearly, a better understanding of the characteristics of such an organization would assist practicing managers in reducing the likelihood of occurrence of dysfunctional behavior. Originality/value – This paper fills a gap in the literature about the role of organizations in influencing dysfunctional behavior by delineating more fully the role of organizational culture and leadership. Keywords Employee behaviour, Organizational culture, Social interaction, Leadership Paper type Conceptual paper

Journal of Managerial Psychology Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006 pp. 698-708 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0268-3946 DOI 10.1108/02683940610713244

Dysfunctional behavior falls within the broader category of antisocial behavior, which is described as “any behavior that brings harm, or is intended to bring harm, to an organization, its employees, or stakeholders” (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997, p. vii). Dysfunctional/antisocial behavior, then, may range from low levels of inappropriateness (e.g. inappropriate attire, alcohol use, smoking, inappropriate

behaviors, loud talking or radio playing, and tardiness) all the way to sabotage or violent behavior directed toward one or more individuals or the organization as a whole. Scholars who study dysfunctional work behavior typically have focused most of their attention on the specific individual-level behaviors that might potentially comprise this domain. Such behaviors include but are not limited to workplace deviance, theft, aggression, violence, dishonesty, terrorism, sabotage, and an assortment of other dysfunctional behaviors as reflected in the various papers found in this issue. Most of these scholars, however, tend to ignore or downplay the role of organizational factors in instigating dysfunctional behaviors. Organizations should be profoundly interested in preventing dysfunctional workplace behavior, particularly violence, because such behaviors can be very costly or damaging to the organization. Indeed, the organization could face legal action if a violent incident occurs and they can’t prove that they took steps to prevent it. Such legal action could include worker’s compensation claims, OSHA rule violation charges, or even civil liability for negligent hiring. Other costs to an organization include immediate and direct costs of workplace violence – injury or death; clean-up, repair, and replacement; hiring and training of new personnel; increased insurance premiums; lost wages; and the like. There are also less immediate and more difficult to measure costs, including decreased efficiency, productivity, and quality; interruption of business operations; and decreased reputation and credibility of the organization. This paper will develop the argument that organizational cultures vary in their functionality in terms of contributing to or detracting from organizational performance and effectiveness. A dysfunctional organization culture is defined as one that constrains or limits individual- and group-level capabilities and/or that actually encourages and rewards mediocre individual- and group-level performance. The paper will also develop the argument that an organization’s leadership is likely to help create and perpetuate such cultures. Implications for future theory and research will be identified. The role of the individual In general, theorists and researchers who study behavior in organizations direct their attention at how various individual and/or group behaviors benefit and enhance organizations and the antecedent conditions associated with those beneficial behaviors. The theories and models that have been developed, therefore, tend to focus on how processes and factors within organizations affect variables such as job satisfaction, employee motivation, performance, and organizational commitment. Their approaches to the study of leadership typically examine at the group level how the organization might improve leadership effectiveness and the leader’s ability to motivate workers so as to achieve high levels of performance and goal attainment. The dependent variables of interest, then, are usually things like cohesiveness, performance norms, communication patterns, and group-level performance as well as individual responses to a group or team context. These theories and models generally assume that as cause-and-effect relationships among key variables are identified, managers and organizations will be able to increase desired individual and organizational outcomes by manipulating the causes associated with those outcomes. A basic assumption of job characteristics research, for

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example, is that if researchers can identify specific job dimensions or attributes that lead to employee motivation and high performance, managers can then redesign those jobs to increase those dimensions or attributes. This, then, would improve employee motivation and performance. Newer studies of organizational behavior, on the other hand, are investigating behaviors that are considerably less functional in that they relate to negative consequences or involve direct costs to the individuals who make up organizations as well as to the organizations themselves. These behaviors have been called the dark side of organizational behavior (Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly, 2004). While the work of Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly concentrated on violent behavior, it may be readily extended to include all forms of dysfunctional or antisocial behavior in organizations. Clearly, these forms of behavior should be controlled, minimized, or eliminated altogether (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996). Consider, for example, an extreme form of such dark side behavior – murder. Murder in the workplace is among the major causes of employee deaths, and women are often affected to a greater degree than are men. Indeed, ten percent of all workplace fatalities in 2004 were homicides (US Department of Labor, 2005). So prevalent has it become that workplace homicide has been identified as the fastest growing form of murder in the USA (Filipczak, 1993). Less extreme dark-side behaviors may involve physical assault through such actions as pushing or shoving, slapping or hitting, or rap. One study estimated more than two million US workers are physically attacked at work each year (Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, 1993). While individuals frequently may incur the greatest costs from such behaviors, the organization may incur costs as well – decreased productivity, medical and legal expenses, lost work time, lowered quality, and a damaged culture and public image. It has been proposed that all individuals enter organizations with some potential predisposition to exhibit violent behaviors (Griffin and Lopez, 2004; Denenberg and Braverman, 1999). That predisposition can range from very low to very high. The greater the predisposition, the greater the likelihood that the individual will, at some point, display violent behavior. Most scholars in this area focus on individuals with a very high predisposition for violent behavior. The backgrounds and personalities of those individuals with a high predisposition for violent behavior are frequently the focus of attention so that such individuals can be identified by the organization in an effort to prevent or minimize violence. Examining the fundamental underpinnings of predispositions toward violence requires surveying several literatures, particularly biology, psychology, and sociology. A detailed study of those literatures is beyond the scope of this paper, but some general observations are in order. In particular, genetic and biological factors and personality should be considered. The argument for the influence of genetic and biological factors is dependent on an examination of the individual’s mental health. The origins of violent and aggressive behaviors have been linked to endocrine influences and brain structures (Brennan, 1998). The limbic system, biochemistry, genetics, levels of dopamine and serotonin, and mental illness has also been suggested as causally related to violent behavior (Arboleda-Florez et al., 1998; Brennan, 1998). Attempts to establish a link between such factors and aggressive behavior, however, have received only mixed results (Brennan, 1998).

Another area of research with implications for understanding an individual’s predisposition for dysfunctional behavior involves determinants and personality factors. Determinants such as social influences, including family background, and situations are known to greatly impact the exhibition of individual behavior to varying degrees, but those influences are dependent on the individual’s personality (Neuman and Baron, 1998). On the other hand, various personality factors may more directly serve as dispositions for violent behavior (Berkowitz, 1993). Those factors include personality types that are emotionally reactive, that display under-controlled aggression (those who lack the restraint and have weak inhibitions against aggression), and in the extreme sense, those personality types that can be described as finding pleasure in hurting or causing discomfort in others (Berkowitz, 1993). Type A behavior patterns, self-monitoring behavior, and hostile attributional bias may also be involved (Neuman and Baron, 1998). A hostile attributional bias refers to a personality factor where the individual has a tendency to perceive others as behaving aggressively towards him/her, thus resulting in retaliatory behavior from within the individual (Neuman and Baron, 1998). Type A individuals are frequently described as impatient, irritable, and controlling (Neuman and Baron, 1998). Compared with Type B personalities, the A’s may more frequently become angry and lose their tempers, display aggressive behaviors, and experience higher frequencies of conflict (Neuman and Baron, 1998). Thus, genetic and biological factors, personality, values, experiences, and motives are all likely to affect an individual’s predisposition to display dysfunctional behavior. Since most individuals rarely display extreme levels of dysfunctional behavior, this predisposition may be quite low in most people. Being low does not meant that it does not exist, however. One cannot confirm that a trait or predisposition does not exist simply because it rarely or never manifests itself. Rather, the argument for predisposition becomes more compelling where individuals do exhibit extreme levels of dysfunctional behavior. In virtually all cases, for instance, detailed background reviews of violent individuals uncover earlier warning signs such as cruelty toward animals, interpersonal hostility, interests in weapons, proneness to making verbal threats, and so forth. Thus, there is a reasonable basis for the suggestion that every person has a predisposition to display dysfunctional behavior under certain circumstances. The role of the organization While most research in the area of dysfunctional behavior has focused on the individual, it seems quite likely that the organization also plays a pivotal role. For one thing, the organization is important in that it provides a setting in which the individual may display dysfunctional behavior. The individual spends most of his waking hours at the job site, thus increasing the timeframe within which he is displaying his behavior. An organization provides people toward whom the individual may find it easier to display this behavior, rather than toward the family members he loves. And the work setting provides all kinds of stimulants that could provoke individuals who already have a high propensity toward dysfunctional behavior. For another, even though few scholars have considered the context of dysfunctional behavior, it seems reasonable to suggest that organizational factors are often cited as the catalyst for dysfunctional events. For instance, pressure and stress in the

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organization, styles or patterns of supervision, and how termination and demotion are handled by the organization are often cited as triggers for violence. Recently, the organization’s compensation or reward structure, social pressures to conform, the presence of negative and untrusting attitudes, unclear performance feedback, perceived unfair treatment, and violations of trust have been identified as organizational factors leading to deviant behavior (Litzky et al., 2006). Organizational factors that are most influential are its history; the values and vision of its leaders; the shared experiences, beliefs, stories, and rituals of its employees; the reward and incentive system; and organizational norms about performance and behavior, all of which contribute to an organization’s culture (Trice, 1988; Trice and Beyer, 1993). Indeed, an organization’s culture has been shown to be an important influence on both positive and negative consequences within organizations (Guerra et al., 2005). The organization’s culture develops over time and becomes a powerful force for shaping the behavior of those in the organization and for newcomers to the organization. It interacts with characteristics of individuals to create a propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior. The organization itself has some theoretic propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior. Similar to the individual’s predisposition to display dysfunctional behavior, the propensity of an organization’s culture to elicit dysfunctional behaviors can range from very low to very high. This propensity describes the range of potential influence that an organization can have in contributing to and eliciting dysfunctional behavior from individuals who are members of that organization. The organization can contribute to displays of dysfunctional behavior in one of two ways, by “creating social conditions that promote violence by generating aggressive inclinations” or by “lowering restraints against violent actions” (Berkowitz, 1993, p. 281). Even when the individual predisposition is high, the actual display of dysfunctional behavior is “most likely to occur when cognitively based inhibitory restraints are minimal” (Berkowitz, 1993; Carlson et al., 1990, p. 622). The organization can therefore become an important contributing factor to whether or not violent displays of behavior are expressed by the individual, especially when, for example, the threat of punishment from the organization is minimal or absent (Berkowitz, 1993). Organizational influences conceivably can also be enhanced through social reality construction processes as described by the social information processing approach to organizations (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Social information processing suggests that an individual’s behavior in a social environment is guided by the displays of behavior from others within their environment on information about values, norms, expectations, and behavior outcomes (Glomb and Liao, 2003). The individual learns, then, by observing what others do and what they can or cannot “get away with”. The structure, values, norms, and procedures of an organization, therefore, are vital for determining how individuals might respond to organization related situations. In particular, Schein (2004) suggests that an organization’s culture identifies what things members of the organization should pay attention to, how they react emotionally, and what actions they should take. Etzioni (1975) suggests that organizational cultures, then, can be ones in which members of the organization identify with the organization. They tend to be committed to the organization’s goals and need little direct supervision as there is consensus about

what needs to be done and why. But organizational cultures can involve less-consensus and be more transactional in nature. In these cultures, individuals participate only so long as the exchange system is perceived as rewarding their behaviors. On the other hand, in yet other cultures members are alienated and defensive. They view the leaders as enemies and are antagonistic toward the leaders and the organization. Clearly, these latter forms of organizational cultures are the ones more likely to elicit violence. Characteristics of the organization, and particularly its culture, subsequently affect its propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior. Organizational cultures that constrain or limit individual – and group-level capabilities and/or that actually encourage and reward mediocre individual – and group-level performance are termed dysfunctional organizational cultures, and the organizations are hence referred to as dysfunctional organizations.

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Interactions between the individual and the organization Assuming that the constructs of individual predispositions for dysfunctional behavior and organizational propensities to elicit dysfunctional behaviors are, in fact, valid constructs, it then becomes possible to relate them to one another as in Figure 1. In the figure, individual predisposition to engage in dysfunctional behavior is represented on the vertical axis; organizational propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior is represented on the horizontal axis. Moreover, each is presented as a dichotomous construct broken down into high and low levels. The resulting configuration yields four possible situations. Situation 1 exists when there is a high (or strong) predisposition on the part of an individual to engage in dysfunctional behavior but there is a low propensity on the part of the organization to elicit such behavior. We propose that in this case there will be a moderate incidence of dysfunctional behavior derived primarily from the individual’s predisposition. Likewise, situation 3, determined by a low propensity for the individual to engage in dysfunctional behavior but in which there is a high propensity by the organization to elicit such behavior, is also likely to result in a moderate incidence of

Figure 1. A framework of person-situation determinants of dysfunctional behavior in organizations

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dysfunctional behavior this time resulting more from the organizational influences than those of the individual. Situation 2 represents the situation with the highest incidence of dysfunctional behavior. This volatile situation reflects the combination of a high predisposition for dysfunctional behavior coupled with a high organizational propensity to elicit violent behavior. In sharp contrast, if individual predisposition for dysfunctional behavior and organizational propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior are both low, as in situation 4, the lowest incidence of dysfunctional behavior will be present. The role of leaders Organization culture evolves from myriad sources, including the organization’s history, its pattern of successes and failures, its founder, and its policies and practices. Leaders, however, are perhaps the most powerful determinant of organization culture. For example, leaders are the ones who set the tone of the organization, define its values and norms, and create and maintain a persona of what the organization is like. Hence, if the position is taken that a culture with a high propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior by its members is itself a dysfunctional culture, it seems instructive to examine how that culture developed. As previously noted, leaders most likely play a major role. For example, if a top manager is commonly known to be untruthful, if a leader does not respect the rights of others, or if the leader puts profits before all else, others in the organization will likely recognize the signals. As the signals get institutionalized throughout the firm, its culture will become increasingly dysfunctional. In this way, the leader’s values are “taught” to others and shape their behavior in the organization. What leaders pay attention to sends powerful messages throughout the organization. What do leaders seem to notice, what comments do they make, what do they seem to reward and punish? What agendas do they set for meetings? How do they react to problems and/or change? Is there a code of ethics and is it actually followed? How is budgeting handled – top down or bottom up? Who gets promoted or receives special privileges? These are all important actions by which leaders influence an organization’s culture and the behavior of those in the organization. Culture and leadership style are major influences on individuals (Lok and Crawford, 2004). An organization’s culture is shaped by its leaders, but it also shapes the behavior of its leaders (Brown and Thornborrow, 1996). Characteristics of organizations have been shown to influence the ethics or integrity of executives (Tourigny et al., 2003), and qualities of leaders have been shown to be critical in the development of an organization’s culture (Ribie`re and Sitar, 2003). Dysfunctional organizations generally fail to achieve their goals and frequently are notable for poor leaders. Dysfunctions in top management have been shown to prohibit groups from effectively accomplishing their tasks (Paul et al., 2002). Kets de Vries (2004, 1991) suggests that an organization can become dysfunctional because its culture reflects the dysfunctions of top managers (see also Kersten, 2005). Smith (2000) suggests that dysfunctional organizational cultures are likely to result when leaders have poor “people” skills. With a long emphasis on productivity, efficiency, and the “bottom line,” many organizational leaders have not developed strong interpersonal skills and, indeed, may instead have begun to abuse their authority in dealing with subordinates. Skills in handling change and stress, as well as

in dealing with conflict and aggression, communication, motivation and time management have all been relegated to minor roles. Under these conditions, then, leaders may unintentionally contribute to the development of dysfunctional organizational cultures. Burton (2002) has taken this a step further and identified several behaviors associated with leaders who create dysfunctional organizational climates. She suggests that such leaders engage in threatening behaviors toward subordinates; display emotional or verbal abuse and bullying; are likely to harass subordinates in one way or another; and may even use physical assault against subordinates. The social information processing approach clearly demonstrates the strong influence that leaders have as role models. The leader sets the tone for his or her followers through his or her own visible behavior that communicates assumptions and values to others as well as through informal messages (Lewine, 1995). But role models can be models of the wrong kind. For instance, bad examples are set for others by abusive or bullying leaders; those who quickly assign blame and don’t set priorities; those who make the same errors over and over; those who claim that they “don’t know” or have bad information; leaders who worry about “my watch” rather than long-term organizational effectiveness; those who think that apologizing is all that is necessary to “make things right;” and those who cook the books, pad their expense accounts, and behave unethically if not illegally. It should come as no surprise that in organizations whose leaders display those behaviors, dysfunctional behavior will occur more frequently than in organizations whose leaders display more reasonable and ethical behavior themselves. Directions for theory and research The use of the framework presented here can potentially improve our understanding of the role of organization culture and leadership in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors. However, much work remains to be done. Specifically, new theory development work and empirical research are both fully necessary. For one thing, both the individual and the organization constructs utilized in the framework need more complete conceptual development. In each instance, for example, a more complex and integrative analysis of diverse literatures needs to be undertaken. Clear messages regarding individual tendencies toward violent behaviors are embedded in the literatures from such diverse areas as psychology, psychiatry, criminal justice, medicine, sociology, organizational behavior, biology, social psychology, and anthropology. A comprehensive review and synthesis could theoretically yield far more insights than currently exist. Similarly, dysfunctional perspectives on both organizational culture and leadership can obviously be elevated through a focused and in-depth review and analysis. The same literatures noted above, with the addition of organization theory, could yield rich, substantive, and sophisticated frameworks and models of these constructs. We also propose that manifestations of violent behavior are most likely to occur as the result of the interactive relationship between an individual displaying a relatively high predisposition for violent behavior and an organization with a relatively high propensity to elicit violence. Theoretically, then, more complete understandings of the various core constructs could then lead to better and more intricate predictions of interactions and other interrelationships among those constructs.

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The model developed here suggests that an individual in an organization with a dysfunctional culture will either leave the organization, stay with the organization and not display dysfunctional or violent behavior, or will display such behavior perhaps triggered by a stimulus event (i.e. a public reprimand, demotion, or termination). Theoretical advancements could also provide meaningful understandings as to which of these is more likely and under what conditions. Indeed, each of the cells in the proposed model merits careful attention to specify the individual and organization conditions underlying it. More carefully derived categorizations or classifications may also provide greater insight into the nature of triggering events for dysfunctional behavior, particularly those associated with leader behavior. Research is clearly needed to determine whether certain kinds of triggers are more or less likely to stimulate various kinds of dysfunctional behaviors than are others. Beyond the array of theoretical imperatives, there are also numerous empirical issues that warrant attention. Unfortunately, these concepts are sufficiently sensitive that “standard” research methods may be applicable. For instance, longitudinal research could help further our understanding of the role that organizational responses to dysfunctional behavior plays in the organization’s subsequent propensity to elicit such behaviors. It could also be possible to determine and develop protocols for organizations to follow when dysfunctional behavior occurs, so as to decrease the potential for future episodes. However, few organizations would be amenable to hosting a cross-sectional survey or experimental intervention targeted at the key underlying research questions either implied here or to be developed through more rigorous theoretical explication. As a result, researchers will need to be especially creative in their pursuit of answers. For example, methodologies such as retrospective accounts, direct observation, and other qualitative approaches may need to be employed. Hopefully, however, the results will be more than worth the complications from using nontraditional approaches. Conclusions Most of the work on dysfunctional work behavior has concentrated on individual-level behaviors. The organization as a contributor to dysfunctional behaviors has seldom been more than just mentioned. Our work suggests that organizational cultures may contribute to or detract from dysfunctional behavior in a variety of ways. Since leaders are an important determinant of organizational culture, we have argued that they therefore play an important role in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors. Hopefully, the concepts and model presented here will stimulate empirical research to verify or refute our ideas and to further the understanding of the role that organizations and organizational leaders play with regard to dysfunctional behavior in organizations. References Arboleda-Florez, J., Holley, H. and Crisanti, A. (1998), “Understanding causal paths between mental illness and violence”, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, Vol. 33, pp. S38-S46. Berkowitz, L. (1993), Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences, and Control, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA.

Brennan, W. (1998), “Aggression and violence: examining the theories”, Nursing Standard, Vol. 12, pp. 36-8. Brown, A.D. and Thornborrow, W.T. (1996), “Do organizations get the followers they deserve?”, Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 5-11. Burton, J. (2002), “The leadership factor”, Accident Prevention, January/February, pp. 22-6. Carlson, M., Marcus-Newhall, A. and Miller, N. (1990), “Effects of situational aggression cues: a quantitative review”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 58, pp. 622-33. Denenberg, R.V. and Braverman, M. (1999), The Violence Prone Workplace, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Etzioni, A. (1975), Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, Revised edition, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, NY. Filipczak, B. (1993), “Armed and dangerous at work”, Training, July, pp. 39-43. Giacalone, R.A. and Greenberg, J. (1997), Antisocial Behavior in Organizations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks CA. Glomb, T.M. and Liao, H. (2003), “Interpersonal aggression in work groups: social influence, reciprocal, and individual effects”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 46, pp. 486-96. Griffin, R.W. and Lopez, Y.P. (2004), “Toward a model of the person-situation determinants of deviant behavior in organizations”, paper presented at the 64th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, New Orleans, LA, 6-11 August 2004. Griffin, R.W. and O’Leary-Kelly, A.M. (Eds) (2004), The Dark Side of Organizational Behavior, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Guerra, J., Martinez, I., Munduate, L. and Medina, F. (2005), “A contingency perspective on the study of the consequences of conflict types: the role of organizational culture”, European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 157-76. Kersten, A. (2005), “Using sense-making methodology for making sense of insanity”, paper presented at a non-divisional workshop held at the meeting of the International Communication Association, New York City. Kets de Vries, M. (1991), Organizations on the Couch: Clinical Perspectives on Organizational Behavior and Change, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Kets de Vries, M. (2004), “Dysfunctional leadership”, Encyclopedia of Leadership, Berkshire/Sage, Great Barrington, MA. Lewine, N.C. (1995), “Leader-follower dysfunction: follower responses and organizational consequences”, doctoral dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA. Litzky, B.E., Eddleston, K.A. and Kidder, D.L. (2006), “The good, the bad, and the misguided: how managers inadvertently encourage deviant behaviors”, The Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 91-103. Lok, P. and Crawford, J. (2004), “The effect of organisational culture and leadership style on job satisfaction and organisational commitment: a cross-national comparison”, The Journal of Management Development, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 321-38. Neuman, J.H. and Baron, R.A. (1998), “Workplace violence and workplace aggression: evidence concerning specific forms, potential causes, and preferred targets”, Journal of Management, Vol. 24, pp. 391-419. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company (1993), Fear and Violence in the Workplace, Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, Minneapolis, MN. O’Leary-Kelly, A. and Glew, D.J. (1996), “Organization-motivated aggression: a research framework”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 225-53.

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Paul, J., Strbiak, C.A. and Landrum, N.E. (2002), “Psychoanalytic diagnosis of top management team dysfunction”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 381-93. ` Ribiere, V.M. and Sitar, A. (2003), “Critical role of leadership in nurturing a knowledge-supporting culture”, Knowledge Management Research & Practice, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 39-48. Salancik, G.R. and Pfeffer, J. (1978), “A social information processing approach to job attitudes and task design”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, pp. 224-53. Schein, E.H. (2004), Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed., Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Smith, G. (2000), Work Rage: Identify the Problems, Implement the Solutions, Harper Business, Toronto. Tourigny, L., Dougan, W.L., Washburn, J. and Clements, C. (2003), “Explaining executive integrity: governance, charisma, personality and agency”, Management Decision, Vol. 41 No. 10, pp. 1035-49. Trice, H.M. (1988), “Rites and ceremonials in organizational culture”, in Bacharach, S.B. and Mitchell, S.M. (Eds), Perspectives on Organizational Sociology: Theory and Research, Vol. 4, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT. Trice, H.M. and Beyer, J.M. (1993), Cultures of Work Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. US Department of Labor (2005), Bureau of Labor Statistics, in cooperation with State, New York City, District of Columbia, and Federal agencies, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, Table 1: Fatal occupational injuries by event or exposure, 1999-2004. About the authors Dr David D. Van Fleet’s work focuses on management history, leadership, strategy, and workplace violence and terrorism. He has authored or co-authored over 200 presentations and publications. He is a past editor of the Journal of Management and the current editor of the Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management. He is a Fellow of both the Academy of Management and the Southern Management Association and is listed in Who’s Who in America (5th ed.) and Who’s Who Among America’s Teachers (Vol. V). Dr Van Fleet can be contacted at: ddvf@ asu.edu Dr Griffin’s research interests include workplace violence, employee health and well-being in the workplace, and workplace culture. In addition to his research and publications, Dr Griffin has also written several textbooks. He has served as editor of the Journal of Management and as an officer in two regional and two professional divisions of the Academy of Management. He is a Fellow of both the Academy of Management and the Southern Management Association.

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Dysfunctional culture, dysfunctional organization Capturing the behavioral norms that form organizational culture and drive performance

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Pierre A. Balthazard School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA

Robert A. Cooke College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA, and

Richard E. Potter Department of Information and Decision Sciences, College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to describe how organizational culture is manifested in behavioral norms and expectations, focusing on 12 sets of behavioral norms associated with constructive, passive/ defensive, and aggressive/defensive cultural styles. Design/methodology/approach – The organizational culture inventory, a normed and validated instrument designed to measure organizational culture in terms of behavioral norms and expectations, was used to test hypotheses regarding the impact of culture. Data are summarized from 60,900 respondents affiliated with various organizations that have used the instrument to assess their cultures. Also presented is a brief overview of a practitioner-led assessment of four state government departments. Findings – The results of correlational analyses illustrate the positive impact of constructive cultural styles, and the negative impact of dysfunctional defensive styles, on both the individual- and organizational-level performance drivers. The results clearly link the dysfunctional cultural styles to deficits in operating efficiency and effectiveness. Originality/value – The concept of organizational culture is derived from research in the field of organizational behavior characterized by use of qualitative methods. Yet, one of the most powerful strategies for organizational development is knowledge-based change, an approach that generally relies on the use of quantitative measures. Although both methods share the potential for producing cumulative bodies of information for assessment and theory testing, quantitative approaches may be more practical for purposes of knowledge-based approaches for organizational development generally, and assessing cultural prerequisites for organizational learning and knowledge management specifically. Keywords Organizational culture, Organizational behaviour, Performance Paper type Research paper

This paper is based on, and incorporates materials from, the Organizational Culture Inventoryw with permission by the publisher, Human Synergistics International (USA). The authors extend their appreciation to Dr Cheryl Boglarksy, Director of Research and Development at Human Synergistics’ Michigan office, for compiling the data set analyzed in this paper. OCI style descriptions and sample items are from Robert A. Cooke and J. Clayton Lafferty, Organizational Culture Inventory, q Human Synergistics International, Plymouth MI USA. Copyright q 1987, All Rights Reserved. Used by permission.

Journal of Managerial Psychology Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006 pp. 709-732 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0268-3946 DOI 10.1108/02683940610713253

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Introduction The dysfunctional organization, much like a dysfunctional individual, is so characterized because it exhibits markedly lower effectiveness, efficiency, and performance than its peers or in comparison to societal standards. While environmental considerations are important for individuals as well as organizations, internal forces often play a more pivotal role. With the individual, this can be cognition. With the organization, we contend, it is the culture. Consider the following two examples that illustrate how an organization’s culture can foment dysfunction. In the aftermath of the Columbia space shuttle accident, we learned (again) that there were people inside NASA who were discussing critical information with each other, but not with senior decision makers. This life-saving knowledge might have saved the spaceship and its crew. Following the earlier Challenger accident, a nine-year study of NASA’s standard operating procedures regarding risky decision-making – in which technical anomalies were repeatedly considered to be of “acceptable risk” – showed that the organizational culture created an environment in which conformity to the rules led to the fatal errors (e.g. Vaughan, 1996, 2003). The causes of the Columbia and Challenger disasters were not due to intentional managerial wrongdoing, safety rule violations or any type of conspiracy. Rather, the nature of NASA’s organization was such that the decisions to launch Challenger and land Columbia were inevitable – and inevitable mistakes. NASA’s organizational culture, routines and systems are designed to allow for a process of normalizing signals of potential danger. Thus, known technical problems become an operating norm and did not prevent NASA managers from giving the go-ahead to proceed with problematic operations (Vaughan, 1996, 2003). Examining the multi-organization system that oversees the air travel industry, a Gannet company investigation of the American Airlines Flight 587 crash in Belle Harbor, New York, found widespread cultural and structural impediments at Airbus Industrie, the National Transportation Safety Board, and American Airlines. Although these information technology-intensive organizations are components of the nation’s aviation safety system designed to prevent crashes by learning from close calls, the system is dependent on airlines and aircraft manufacturers sharing their knowledge and experience with the same federal regulators charged with their oversight (USA Today, 2003). As critical and fundamental that knowledge sharing might be in an organization, it is not safe to assume that it will occur unless it is a recognized norm or expected behavior as part of the organization’s culture. These two examples, and others like the more recent failures at the Federal Emergency Management Administration, portray how elements of an organization’s culture can lead to dysfunctional outcomes, even when those organizations are peopled with earnest and capable members. In this paper we present a quantitative approach to the assessment of organizational culture based on shared norms and behavioral expectations at the individual and organizational-unit levels. Alternative patterns of norms and expectations are associated with constructive, passive/aggressive, and aggressive/defensive organizational culture styles, each associated with particularly healthy or dysfunctional organizational drivers of performance. We discuss a statistically normed and validated instrument and methodology that accurately assesses the behavioral norms operating within an organization and is used to identify

the type of culture characterizing the organization. We present data from 60,900 respondents in the field along with a brief analysis, the results of which illustrate the linkage between two dysfunctional organizational cultural styles and individual and organizational-level performance drivers. We also present a brief overview of a practitioner-led assessment of four state government departments and results that clearly link dysfunctional cultures to deficits in operating efficiency and effectiveness. Organizational culture Organizational culture has been characterized as the “glue that holds organizations together” (Goffee and Jones, 1996) and “isn’t just one aspect of the game – it is the game” (Gerstner, 2002). Culture can support linkages between technology adoption and organizational growth (Chatman and Jehn, 1994); it can be a critical success factor in implementing manufacturing strategy (Bates et al., 1995) and can play a crucial role in determining the success or failure of mergers and acquisitions (Weber et al., 1996; Javidan, 2001). On a more micro level, researchers have found significant relationships between the “fit” of employees and the prevailing organizational culture and a number of important outcomes such as job commitment and turnover (O’Reilly et al., 1991; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). But many unanswered questions remain regarding the meaning and content of organizational culture (Black, 2003; Martin and Siehl, 1983; Louis, 1983), the methods by which it should be measured (Cooke and Rousseau, 1983; Schein, 1984; Sashkin and Fullmer, 1985) and, more fundamentally, the feasibility of managing culture and change (e.g. Uffal, 1983; Collins and Porras, 1994), especially when attempting to operationalize and attain specific organizational goals. While debates around these issues continue, culture has been accepted as a “fact of organizational life” by managers and has become an integral aspect of many organizational development programs. Much of the research on organizational cultures has focused on descriptors of culture and frequently resulted in dimensions or typologies of culture (Hanges and Dickson, 2002; House et al., 2002; Kreitner and Kinicki, 1998; Schein, 1996; Hofstede et al., 1993; Reichers and Schneider, 1990; O’Reilly, 1989). Certain types of organizational cultures, or certain styles of cultures, have been associated with either positive or negative outcomes for either the effectiveness of the organization (as the introductory discussion of NASA and the American Airlines crash illustrate) or for individual employees within the organization (Schein, 1996; Deal and Kennedy, 1982). Positive outcomes for individual members of organizations potentially include motivation and satisfaction (Cooke and Szurnal, 1993, 2000; O’Reilly, 1989) while negative outcomes might include job insecurity and stress (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1966, van der Velde and Class, 1995). In this paper, we link organizational culture to measures of both individual and organizational outcomes. The concept of organizational culture is derived from research in the field of organizational behavior characterized by use of qualitative methods. To an extent, the use of these methods derives from the issues of interest to scholars who have studied culture in organizations: symbolism, sense-making, and socialization (e.g. Louis, 1980; Martin and Siehl, 1983; Smircich, 1983), issues involving unique individual perspectives highly amenable to qualitative study. Yet, one of the most powerful strategies for organizational development is knowledge-based change, an approach

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that generally relies on the use of quantitative measures (e.g. Huse and Cummings, 1985; Nadler, 1977). Qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary approaches to the study and assessment of organizational processes and attributes. The advantages of qualitative methods include the use of the focal unit’s own terms to describe itself, the intensive and in-depth information that can be obtained about a unit, and the amenability of the method for exploratory research on issues and processes about which little information exists. Alternatively, the advantages of quantitative methods include the ease of cross-sectional assessments and comparisons (across individuals, organizations, or sub-units), the replicability of the assessment in different units and by other researchers or organizational development professionals, and a common, articulated frame of reference for interpreting the collated information. Although both methods share the potential for producing cumulative bodies of information for assessment and theory testing, quantitative approaches may be more practical for purposes of knowledge-based approaches for organizational development generally, and assessing cultural prerequisites for organizational learning and knowledge management specifically. For instance, different subgroups within an organization, such as departments or units, may have the organizational culture in common, but also experience a subculture unique to the individuals within the unit (Trice, 1993; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Shared values and expectations within such units exert pressures leading to a localized variation of the organizational culture for members, and ultimately affect the culture of the organization as a whole. The organizational culture inventoryq At the core of our study is the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), a statistically normed and validated survey used for organizational consulting and change purposes, developed by Human Synergistics International (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987). The OCI is a quantitative instrument that measures twelve sets of behavioral norms associated with three general styles of organizational culture – constructive, passive/defensive, and aggressive/defensive. Since its introduction in prototype form in 1983, the inventory has been used by thousands of organizations and completed by over two million respondents throughout the world. The instrument has been translated into numerous languages – including French (Canadian and Parisian), Spanish (Castillian and Latin American), German, Japanese, Chinese, Dutch, Swedish, Romanian, and Korean – and is, arguably, the most globally used organizational culture assessment instrument in the world. It has been administered for a variety of purposes, including to direct, evaluate, and monitor organizational change (e.g. Gaucher and Kratochwill, 1993); identify and transfer the cultures of high performing units (Human Synergistics, 1986); study and enhance system reliability and safety (Haber et al., 1991; Shurberg and Haber, 1992; Keenan et al., 1998); facilitate strategic alliances and mergers (Slowinski, 1992); promote collaborative relations within and across units (Leeds, 1999); and test hypotheses on the relationship between culture and antecedent variables (Klein et al., 1995a). This wide range of applications has produced an extensive information base regarding the ways in which culture operates in different types of organizations. The OCI measures 12 distinct but interrelated sets of behavioral norms and expectations that describe the thinking and behavioral styles that might be implicitly

or explicitly required for people to “fit in” and “meet expectations” in an organization or sub-unit. The behavioral norms measured by the OCI are defined by two underlying dimensions, the first of which distinguishes between a concern for people versus a concern for tasks. The second dimension distinguishes between expectations for behaviors directed toward fulfilling higher-order satisfaction needs versus those directed toward protecting and maintaining lower-order security needs. Based on these dimensions, the 12 sets of norms measured by the OCI are categorized into three general “clusters” or styles of organizational cultures: constructive, passive/defensive, and aggressive/defensive. Empirical support for these clusters, and therefore the construct validity of the inventory, is provided by the results of principal components analyses presented elsewhere (e.g. Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Cooke and Szumal, 1993; Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). This focus on behavioral norms distinguishes the OCI from other questionnaires which measure more global aspects of culture such as shared beliefs and values (e.g. House et al., 2002; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Sashkin, 1983). While norms and expectations are closely related to beliefs and values, the former have a more direct impact on the day-to-day activities and work situation of organizational members than do the latter (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Thus, norms also have a relatively great impact on individual and organizational outcomes and are potentially indicative of environments that support organizational learning and knowledge management. In short, by measuring norms and expectations, the OCI makes the concept of culture somewhat less abstract and easier for organizational members to understand and manage. The OCI circumplex The 12 sets of behavioral norms measured by the OCI are graphically represented using a circumplex, a circular diagram on which the distance between behavioral norms reflects their degree of similarity and correlation. The collection of behavioral norms, and their placement around the circle, enables respondents to generate a holistic and meaningful profile of the culture of their organizations (Guttman, 1954). The behavioral norms measured by the OCI were identified and positioned around the circumplex on the basis of the interpersonal personality system proposed by Leary (1957) and research on personality by McClelland et al. (1953), Rogers (1961), Horney (1954), and others. Developmental work was especially influenced by research on human needs (e.g. Maslow, 1954, 1959) and the extensive body of literature on leadership styles (e.g. Katz et al., 1959; Stodgill, 1963). As noted above, the location of the behavioral norms on the circumplex is based on the extent to which they emphasize a concern for people versus tasks (Katz et al., 1959; Stodgill, 1963) and promote behaviors leading to the fulfillment of satisfaction versus security needs (Maslow, 1959, 1970). The norms on the right side of the OCI Circumplex reflect expectations for behaviors that are people-oriented; those on the left side reflect expectations for behaviors that are relatively task-oriented. Norms toward the top of the OCI Circumplex promote behaviors that are directed toward the fulfillment of higher-order satisfaction needs; those near the bottom promote behaviors directed toward the fulfillment of lower-order security needs. As shown in Figure 1, each set of norms falls into one of three groups representing the aggregate cultural styles.

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Figure 1. The Human Synergistics OCI circumplex

The statistically-normed OCI Circumplex allows members of an organization to compare their results to those of others who have completed the inventory. The bold center ring on the OCI profile reflects the median score for each of the twelve sets. More specifically, the concentric circles (from the center of the profile outward) represent the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentiles, or progressively stronger norms along each of the 12 sets. The impact of organizational culture The culture of an organization is shaped by many factors – some of which can be changed, and some of which might be intractable. Organizations adapt to their external environments by designing responsive structures and systems, adopting relevant technologies, and developing and harvesting members’ skills and qualities (Cooke and Szumal, 2000). Though constrained by its environment, an organization makes a number of “choices” which, collectively, eventually define its culture. These choices are

influenced by the philosophy of the organization, the values of top management, and the “assumptions” of founding principals and succeeding generations of organizational leaders (Schein, 1983; Sathe, 1985). Beyond the assumptions held by leaders, their skills and qualities (including their personal styles and leadership strategies) have a profound impact on organizational culture. This impact can be positive and transformational (e.g. Kouzes and Posner, 2002) – sending signals for achievement-oriented and cooperative behaviors and thereby creating and reinforcing a constructive culture. However, this impact can alternatively be negative and dysfunctional (e.g. Kets de Vries and Miller, 1986; Litzky et al., 2006) – implicitly requiring passive and aggressive behaviors and creating a defensive culture. Our model of the role of organizational culture (see Figure 2) proposes a causal chain –from antecedents, to culture, through to outcomes –that is consistent with earlier models developed for the OCI (Cooke, 1989; Cooke and Szurnal, 2000) and the parallel work of Kilmann et al. (1985). Our model is also consistent with more recent work on organizational culture and related constructs, exemplified by the writings of Collins and Porras (1994), Lawler (1996), Ulrich (1997), and Pfeffer and Sutton (2000). The conceptual and theoretical frameworks that most closely correspond to those developed for the OCI (Cooke, 1989) perhaps are those proposed by Kotter and Heskett (1992). Their descriptive and retrospective study of the effects of “adaptive” versus “non-adaptive” cultures on problem solving, innovation, and organizational performance lend some independent support for the OCI model and the proposition that constructive (as opposed to defensive) norms lead to organizational effectiveness. Though organizational effectiveness is influenced by a myriad of factors, we posit that the norms quantified by the OCI have an impact that is discernable and significant. Specifically, strong norms for constructive behaviors should lead to desirable outcomes and should minimize undesirable outcomes. Constructive norms promote achievement-oriented and cooperative behaviors which should promote individual-level outcomes such as satisfaction, organizational outcomes including

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Figure 2. The organizational culture –performance driver relationship

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quality of service, and ultimately knowledge management processes. Conversely, expectations for defensive behaviors should have the opposite impact according to our model of how culture works. Defensive norms create pressures for dependent and avoidant (passive) and/or power-oriented and internally competitive styles (aggressive) and, in turn, are dysfunctional for both the organization and its members. Specifically, targeting outcomes at the level of organizational members, we predict: H1a. Constructive cultural norms will be positively related to individual outcomes such as role clarity, communication quality, organizational fit and job satisfaction and negatively related to members’ comfort with those norms. H2a. Defensive cultural norms (both passive and aggressive) will be negatively related to individual outcomes such as role clarity, communication quality, organizational fit and job satisfaction and positively related to members’ comfort with those norms. Similar patterns of relationships have been found between the OCI culture styles and individual outcomes, including stress (van der Velde and Class, 1995) and member satisfaction (McDaniel and Stumpf, 1995; Rousseau, 1990; Klein et al., 1995b). Further insight into the impact of operating cultures on employees is provided by other studies that have incorporated the OCI instrument. For example, Haley (1998) found that constructive norms were positively associated with affective commitment (that is, commitment based on emotional attachment to the organization). On the other hand, Lahiry (1994) found that defensive norms (particularly passive/defensive) were positively related to continuance commitment (that is, people staying with their organizations because they feel that the costs of leaving are relatively great). In another study, Weidner (1997) observed a significant and positive relationship between constructive norms and the trust of hospital personnel in their supervisors and the organization. Quality of customer service is a commonly measured organizational outcome in studies of culture. The need for organizations to gain greater knowledge of their cultures to not only improve customer service and preserve customer loyalty but also increase revenue streams has never been stronger. Klein et al. (1995a) analyses suggest that a positive outlook, combined with employees’ perceptions of control led to improved customer service. Quality of customer service has also been considered in a number of cultural analyses of health care organizations (e.g. Shortell et al., 1991; Komoski-Goeffert, 1994; Haley, 1998; Gillett and Stenfer-Kroese, 2003). Haley (1998) is particularly interesting in that it included patient satisfaction data and other quality indicators (e.g. “untoward events” such as medication error rates and patient falls). Consistent with her hypotheses and our model, patient satisfaction was positively related to humanistic (constructive) norms and negatively related to Dependent (passive/defensive) norms. However, rates of medication errors and patient falls unexpectedly appeared to be higher in units with constructive cultures and lower in units with defensive cultures. Based on qualitative data collected on the units and previous research on the discrepancies between the number of untoward events that actually occur in hospitals and the number that are reported, Haley (1998) proposed that constructive norms encourage and permit nurses to report problems; in contrast,

defensive norms may impede organizational transparency by forcing members to look good and please those in positions of authority. Beyond quality of service, cross-sectional studies on culture have considered a number of other organizational-level outcomes (Szumal, 1998). A post-hoc analysis of OCI data on supermarkets (Human Synergistics, 1986) showed that Achievement (constructive) norms were positively related to sales per square foot of selling space as well as to subjective measures of store effectiveness. Klein (1992) found a significant relationship between the strength of constructive norms and sales growth in a study of apparel stores. Thornbury’s (1994) study of 17 units of four European companies showed that effectiveness in dealing with change was positively related to constructive norms and negatively related to passive/defensive norms. Rousseau (1990) study of multiple units of a large fund – raising organization demonstrated that passive/defensive norms were negatively related to the generation of revenues. Evidence that the norms measured by the OCI are causally related to organizational performance is also provided by cultural change programs that have been evaluated longitudinally (Dale, 1997; Human Synergistics, 1998; Sarkis et al., 1992; United Auto Workers, 1990; Workforce, 1998). Such programs were designed to bring about cultural change and performance improvements by means of interventions directed at systems, structures, technologies, and/or members’ skills. Although not based on controlled experimental designs, these practitioner-led field studies lend support to the notion that culture has an impact on effectiveness. Considered together, there is considerable evidence that culture is directly related to organizational-level performance drivers, many of which bear directly on efficiency and effectiveness, and conversely, to dysfunctional consequences. The present study examines a number of these relationships. Consistent with the studies cited above: H1b. Constructive cultural norms will be positively related to organizational outcomes such as commitment to customer service, perceived quality of products and services, organizational adaptability and quality of the workplace and negatively related to members’ intention to leave the organization. H2b. Defensive cultural norms (both passive and aggressive) will be negatively related with organizational outcomes such as commitment to customer service, perceived quality of products and services, organizational adaptability and quality of the workplace and positively related to members’ intentions to leave the organization. To test our hypotheses, we present a secondary analysis of data provided by members of organizations using the OCI and a case study comparison of four state government departments involved in an organizational change program. Method Sample We analyzed data provided by 60,900 individuals whose Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) questionnaires were scored by the Michigan office of Human Synergistics International between 2001 and the second quarter of 2004. These

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respondents represent a small but significant subset of OCI respondents in the field – specifically, those affiliated with client organizations that requested from this particular office a comprehensive computer-generated report on their culture. (Most of the surveys are self-scored or processed by the other offices of Human Synergistics.) The broad sample represents the demographics of organizations in America in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, education, organizational type, profession/occupations of respondents, and organizational or managerial level. The number of men and women in the sample was roughly equal: 54 percent male, 46 percent female. Respondents’ ethnicity was predominantly White/Caucasian (83 percent) with 7 percent identifying themselves as Black/African American, 4 percent as Asian, and 4 percent as Hispanic. Approximately 2 percent of the respondents identified themselves as “other” or opted not to respond to the question regarding ethnicity. The respondents ranged in age from 20 to over 60. The modal age range was 40 to 49, comprising 33 percent of the sample, with those between 30 and 39 comprising the next largest segment at 29 percent of the sample. A majority (82 percent) indicated at least some college education, with 48 percent holding a Bachelor’s or higher-level degree. The participants identified themselves as members of various types of organizations [including manufacturing (22 percent), transportation/distribution (13 percent), financial and insurance (11 percent), health care (8 percent), public sector (7 percent), retail (6 percent), educational (6 percent), and non-profits (3 percent), among others] and occupations [including general management (18 percent), engineering (11 percent), administrative and clerical (9 percent), production (7 percent), sales (6 percent), direct labor (4 percent), among others]. The sample consists of respondents at all organizational levels, including non-management (55 percent), line management (13 percent), middle management (16 percent), senior management (5 percent), executive/senior vice-president (1.4 percent), CEO/president (0.4 percent), and owner (0.3 percent). Independent variables The OCI contains 96 items designed to produce 12 scales of eight items each. Each item describes a behavior or personal style that might be expected of members of an organization. On a scale of 1 to 5, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which each behavior is expected or implicitly required (of them and people like themselves) in their organization. Responses to the items associated with the scales are summed to derive estimates of the strength of each of the 12 behavioral norms within the organization. Descriptions of the 12 cultural norms measured by the OCI, along with illustrative items, are provided below: (1) 1 o’clock position: A Hurnanistic-encouraging culture characterizes organizations that are managed in a participative and people-centered way. Members are expected to be supportive,constructive, and open to influence in their dealings with one another. (Helping others to grow and develop; taking time with people.) (2) 2 o’clock position: An Affiliative culture characterizes organizations that place a high priority on constructive interpersonal relationships. Members are expected to be friendly, open, and sensitive to the satisfaction of their work group. (Dealing with others in a friendly way, sharing feelings and thoughts.)

(3) 3 o’clock position: An Approval culture describes organizations in which conflicts are avoided and interpersonal relationships are pleasant – at least superficially. Members feel that they should agree with, gain the approval of, and be liked by others. (Making sure people accept you; “going along” with others.) (4) 4 o’clock position: A Conventional culture is descriptive of organizations that are conservative, traditional, and bureaucratically controlled. Members are expected to conform, follow the rules, and make a good impression. (Always following policies and practices; fitting into the “mold”.) (5) 5 o’clock position: A Dependent culture is descriptive of organizations that are hierarchically controlled and non-participative. Centralized decision making in such organizations leads members to do only what they are told and to clear all decisions with superiors. (Pleasing those in positions of authority, doing what is expected.) (6) 6 o’clock position: An avoidance culture characterizes organizations that fail to reward success but nevertheless punish mistakes. This negative reward system leads members to shift responsibilities to others and avoid any possibility of being blamed for a mistake. (Waiting for others to act first, taking few chances.) (7) 7 o’clock position: An oppositional culture describes organizations in which confrontation prevails and negativism is rewarded. Members gain status and influence by being critical and thus are reinforced to oppose the ideas of others and to make safe (but ineffectual) decisions. (Pointing out flaws; being hard to impress.) (8) 8 o’clock position: A power culture is descriptive of non-participative organizations structured on the basis of the authority inherent in members’ positions. Members believe they will be rewarded for taking charge, controlling subordinates and, at the same time, being responsive to the demands of superiors. (Building up one’s power base; motivating others any way necessary.) (9) 9 o’clock position: A competitive culture is one in which winning is valued and members are rewarded for out-performing one another. People in such operations operate in a “win-lose” framework and believe they must work against (rather than with) their peers to be noticed. (Turning the job into a contest, never appearing to lose.) (10) 10 o’clock position: A Perfectionistic culture characterizes organizations in which perfectionism, persistence, and hard work are valued. Members feel they must avoid all mistakes, keep track of everything, and work long hours to attain narrowly-defined objectives. (Doing things perfectly, keeping on top of everything.) (11) 11 o’clock position: An Achievement culture characterizes organizations that do things well and value members who set and accomplish their own goals. Members of these organizations set challenging but realistic goals, establish plans to reach these goals, and pursue them with enthusiasm. (Pursuing a standard of excellence; openly showing enthusiasm.)

Dysfunctional culture

719

JMP 21,8

720

(12) 12 o’clock position: A Self-actualization culture characterizes organizations that value creativity, quality over quantity, and both task accomplishment and individual growth. Members of these organizations are encouraged to gain enjoyment from their work, develop themselves, and take on new and interesting activities. (Thinking in unique and independent ways; doing even simple tasks well.) As stated earlier, empirical evidence for the internal consistency of the 12 scales and their association with three different types of cultures (and therefore the construct validity of the OCI) is provided by the results of reliability and principal components analyses presented elsewhere (e.g. Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Cooke and Szurnal, 1993; Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). Means, standard deviation, and Cronbach alpha coefficients for each scale, based on the current sample, are offered in Table I. The table indicates that the mean scores for the four constructive styles (achievement, self-actualizing, humanistic-encouraging, and affiliative) are higher than those for the eight defensive styles. Since social desirability biases (i.e. the tendency to endorse positive or desirable items and descriptions) can operate with respect to the former items and scales, the circumplex profiles on which results are plotted are normatively scaled to correct for such effects.

Constructs

Table I. Constructs, example items, scale reliability, means and standard deviations

Measurement items/first 2 order constructs

Constructive (CC1) Humanistic 2 encouraging scale (e.g. culture: “help others to grow and develop”) (CC2) Affiliative scale (e.g. “use good human relations skills”) (CC3) Achievement scale (e.g. “work on self-set goals”) (CC4) Self-actualizing scale (e.g. “emphasize quality over quantity”) Passive (PC1) Approval scale (e.g. “switch properties culture: to please others”) (PC2) Conventional scale (e.g. “rules more important than ideas”) (PC3) Dependent scale (e.g. “do what is expected”) (PC4) Avoidance scale (e.g. “take a few chances”) Aggressive (AC1) Oppositional scale (e.g. “look for culture: mistakes”) (AC2) Power scale (e.g. “use the authority of their position”) (AC3) Competitive scale (e.g. “turn the job into contest”) (AC4) Perfectionistic scale (e.g. “never make a mistake”)

n

Cronbach Standard alpha Mean deviation

59,878

0.91

3.28

1.30

60,690

0.91

3.53

1.26

60,323

0.85

3.41

1.21

60,005

0.80

3.00

1.32

59,985

0.80

2.71

2.01

60,246

0.84

3.10

1.36

60,391

0.83

3.23

1.36

59,869

0.86

2.36

1.40

59,589

0.73

2.40

1.17

59,829

0.85

2.61

1.51

59,946

0.85

2.51

1.51

60,199

0.77

3.01

1.34

Dependent variables The OCI includes a set of supplementary items that assess some of the outcomes of culture, many of which can drive the performance and long-term effectiveness of an organization. Results along these items provide clients with initial insights as to whether culture change should be considered and in what direction such change should take place. These items, which assess five outcomes pertaining to individual members and five pertaining to the organization, are used here to test our hypotheses. At the individual level, the most immediate drivers are the thinking and behavioral styles exhibited by organizational members. Although it is imperative for all members to be socialized into the culture, when organizational norms and expectations are weak or inconsistent, their impact on members’ personal styles will be minimal and members will report ambiguous roles and norms (Katz and Kahn, 1966). In contrast, organizations with strong, positive cultures and/or effective cultural change programs reinforce the targeted behaviors. People who “fit in” will become a node on the network and gain influence; and those who do not will be disconnected and might eventually leave. Those who do not fit in but stay will experience “person/norm conflict,” a source of stress resulting from inconsistencies between personal predispositions and the demands of the situation. Based on the work of Katz and Kahn (1966) on role conflict, the following individual-level measures were included in the OCI (response options ranged along a five-point Likert scale from (1) not at all to (5) to a very great extent): . Role clarity: The extent to which organizational members know what is expected of them. . Communication quality: The extent to which organizational members exchange clear and consistent messages regarding what is expected. . “Fit” with organization: The extent organizational members comfortably “fit in” the organization. . Behavioral conformity: The extent to which organizational members are required to think and behave differently than otherwise would be the case (person/norm conflict). . Job satisfaction: The extent to which organizational members report positive appraisals of their work situation. Performance drivers at the organizational or sub-unit level, while less direct and more difficult to establish, are nevertheless important to consider. Some of these drivers are due to the aggregated effects of norms and expectations on individual members. For example, “quality of workplace” should be higher in organizations with Constructive cultures than in those with defensive cultures. Similarly, turnover (based on members’ intentions to leave) should be lower in the former organizations than in the latter. The positive drivers translate into members exercising more control at various levels of the organization, making better decisions, and more effectively implementing decisions and solutions. Low levels of these drivers, and intentions to leave, represent a focus on self-protection rather than organizational goals, insularity rather than cooperation and coordination, and rigidity as opposed to adaptability. The following organizational-level measures were collected (response options again ranged along a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all to (5) to a very great extent):

Dysfunctional culture

721

JMP 21,8

.

.

.

722 .

.

Quality of products/services: The extent to which members evaluate positively the quality of their organization’s products or services. Commitment to customer service: The extent to which members make sure customers feel good about the service provided by the organization. Adaptability: The extent to which the organization responds effectively to the changing needs of its customers. Turnover: The extent to which members expect to leave the organization within two years. Quality of workplace: The extent to which members appraise their organization as a good place to work.

Results Correlations were run between the twelve cultural norms and the dependent variables to test the hypotheses. The results, shown in Table II, support our hypotheses. Constructive cultural norms are positively and significantly associated with members’ reports regarding role clarity, quality of communication, “fit,” and job satisfaction. Constructive norms are negatively related to members’ reports of behavioral conformity. Conversely, expectations for defensive behaviors (passive and aggressive) are negatively associated with role clarity, communication quality, “fit,” and job satisfaction and are positively associated with behavioral conformity. Examining the drivers of organizational performance (Table III), constructive norms are positively associated with quality of products and services, commitment to customer service, adaptability, and the quality of the workplace. Constructive norms are also negatively related to turnover intentions. Conversely, expectations for defensive behaviors are negatively related to quality of products and services,

Role Communication “Fit” with clarity quality organization

Table II. Correlations between organizational culture and individual performance drivers

Constructive: Humanisticencouraging Affiliative Achievement Selfactualization Passive: Approval Conventional Dependent Avoidance Aggressive: Oppositional Power Competitive Perfectionistic Number of respondents Note: * Significant p , 0.01

Behavioral conformity

Job satisfaction

0.43* 0.43* 0.42*

0.33* 0.29* 0.28*

0.48* 0.45* 0.43*

20.25* 20.23* 20.20*

0.53* 0.50* 0.48*

0.42* 20.16* 20.17* 20.16* 20.36* 20.13* 20.24* 20.15* 20.03*

0.28* 20.31* 20.37* 20.35* 20.45* 20.27* 20.38* 20.29* 20.26*

0.46* 20.20* 20.27* 20.25* 20.39* 20.17* 20.31* 20.20* 20.11*

20.20* 0.31* 0.33* 0.30* 0.40* 0.29* 0.37* 0.31* 0.26*

0.52* 20.20* 20.29* 20.27* 20.42* 20.17* 20.33* 20.19* 20.14*

60,742

60,693

60,615

60,531

60,670

Quality of products/ services Constructive:

Passive:

Aggressive:

Humanisticencouraging Affiliative Achievement Selfactualization Approval Conventional Dependent Avoidance Oppositional Power Competitive Perfectionistic Number of respondents:

Quality of customer service

Adaptability

Turnover

Quality of workplace

0.46* 0.46* 0.46*

0.40* 0.41* 0.39*

0.42* 0.40* 0.40*

20.31* 20.30* 20.29*

0.54* 0.50* 0.48*

0.44* 20.14* 20.19* 20.17* 20.37* 20.17* 20.26* 20.13* 20.04*

0.41* 20.08* 20.12* 20.12* 20.28* 20.09* 20.20* 20.08* 0.00

0.42* 20.12* 20.18* 20.16* 20.33* 20.10* 20.23* 20.11* 20.04*

20.30* 0.13* 0.14* 0.13* 0.25* 0.12* 0.20* 0.14* 0.08*

0.52* 20.20* 20.30* 20.29* 20.42* 20.17* 20.34* 20.19* 20.14*

60,334

60,391

60,578

60,532

60,651

Note: * Significant p , 0.01

Dysfunctional culture

723

Table III. Correlations between organizational culture and organizational performance drivers

commitment to customer service, adaptability and quality of the workplace and positively related to intention to leave. The results presented in Tables III and IV clearly demonstrate the relationships that exist between the OCI cultural styles and performance drivers. Although correlations do not imply causation, the results suggest that impacting on one variable may cause another to change. This is a key underlying tenet of any cultural transformation initiative. As the culture-outcome frameworks presented here and elsewhere (Cooke and Szurnal, 2000) suggest, alignment of the organization’s structure, systems, technology, Success predictors Individual outcomes:

Organizational outcomes:

Totals:

Role clarity Communication quality “Fit” with organization Behavioral conformity Job satisfaction Quality of prod./serv. Commitment to customer service Adaptability Turnover Quality of workplace

Dept. 1

Dept. 2

Dept. 3

Dept. 4

C C B C C C C B B C 0 “A” 3 “B” 7 “C”

C B A B C C C A C B 2 “A” 3 “B” 5 “C”

C C B C C C C C B C 0 “A” 2 “B” 8 “C”

C B C C C C C B A C 1 “A” 2 “B” 7 “C”

Notes: “A” ¼ at or better than the constructive benchmark; “B” ¼ at or better than the historic average; “C” ¼ not as good as the historical average and constructive benchmark

Table IV. Departments’ performance driver scorecard

JMP 21,8

724

and skills/qualities with organizational values, philosophy, and mission is critical. This alignment cannot be assumed or taken for granted, as the following results illustrate: . Of the respondents, 11 percent in the current sample report little or no role clarity; . Only 55 percent of respondents feel they “fit in” as members of their organization; . A total of 27 percent of respondents do not believe that their organization adapts to the changing needs of their customers; . Only 11 percent would not recommend their organization to potential customers; . A total of 17 percent of respondents are dissatisfied being a member of their current organization; . Of the respondents, 21 percent would not recommend their organization as a good place to work. The case of four state departments A state government involved in an organizational change initiative administered the OCI to members of four different departments to generate baseline data on their cultures. Their results are presented here to demonstrate how the OCI can be used to evaluate operating efficiency and effectiveness. The results also illustrated, for the client organization, that the more effective departments established systems, structures and skills and qualities (particularly at the leadership level) that promoted more Constructive and less defensive cultures. The departments’ OCI results are plotted on the circumplex discussed above. Styles at the top of the diagram (11 o’clock to 2 o’clock positions) are constructive; styles toward the lower right (3 o’clock to 6 o’clock positions) are passive/defensive; and styles toward the lower right (7 o’clock to 10 o’clock positions) are aggressive/defensive. As noted earlier, the bold ring (3rd ring from the center) identifies the 50th percentile. Scores above this ring are higher than those for the median organizations; scores below are lower than the median. The styles that are the most extended from the center of the circumplex are those that best describe the departments’ current operating cultures. Figure 3 shows that Department 3 has the most defensive and least constructive culture of the four departments. On Department 3’s profile, seven of the eight defensive styles extend beyond the 50th percentile and all four of the constructive styles hover around the 25th percentile. More specifically, the culture of Department 3 is passive/defensive, with avoidance and conventional behaviors as the dominant norms. Department 2 has the least defensive culture of the four. While all the other departments exhibit at least three defensive styles at or above the 50th percentile, Department 2 has only two such styles at or above the 50th percentile. In addition, only Department 2 has a constructive style (achievement) as one of its two most extended behavioral norms. While Department 4’s profile shows extensions in the constructive cluster that are even greater than some of those shown in Department 2’s profile, its strongest cultural norms overall are passive/defensive. Based on these OCI profiles and our research model, we would expect Department 2 to perform the most favorably and Department 3 to perform the least favorably in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

Dysfunctional culture

725

Figure 3. OCI profiles of four state departments

A scorecard of the departments’ operating efficiency and effectiveness was constructed by comparing each department’s outcomes to the “Historical Averages” (based on over 1,000 organizational units) and “Constructive Benchmarks” (based on 172 organizational units with predominantly constructive cultures as measured by the OCI). The Historical Average describes the results achieved by the average organization whereas the constructive benchmark defines the results attained by the most constructive and effective organizations in the norming sample. These comparisons are shown in Table IV. Departments received an “A” in areas where their results are the same or better than the constructive benchmark, a “B” where their results are the same as or better than the Historical Average (but not at the level of the Constructive Benchmark), and a “C” where their results are less favorable than both the Historical Average and constructive benchmark.

JMP 21,8

726

Consistent with the research model, Department 3 (which has the most defensive and least constructive culture) is the least efficient and effective of the four departments. Of the ten outcomes measured, Department 3 scored at or better than average along only two outcomes – turnover and “fit” with the organization. Also consistent with expectations, Department 2 (which has the least defensive culture) is the most effective and efficient of the departments surveyed. Of the ten measures, Department 2 scored at or better than the constructive benchmark along two outcomes (“fit” and adaptability) and at or better than the Historical Average along three other outcomes (behavioral conformity, communication quality, and quality of the workplace). Discussion Results of this study, including the secondary analysis of over 60,000 respondents and the comparison of four state government departments involved in an organizational change initiative, illustrate how the OCI can be used to understand the relationship of an organization’s culture to its efficiency and effectiveness. The correlations observed between organizational culture and a set of performance drivers were consistent with our predictions. Also consistent with our model, the governmental department with the least defensive and most constructive culture was more effective in more areas than the other departments. Similarly, the department with the most defensive culture exhibited the weakest performance drivers. More generally, results of the study indicate that normative beliefs and shared behavioral expectations are quantifiable and can be used as indicators of an organization’s or department’s culture. In contrast to the traditional use of qualitative assessments in the study of culture (e.g. Martin and Siehl, 1983), quantitative methods facilitate large-scale studies of organizations and their sub-units, replication, and triangulation of other forms of assessment. Results of this study further suggest that quantitatively assessed behavioral norms and expectations can supplement the qualitative study of more semiotic facets of organizational culture. Beyond facilitating the research process, quantitative devices such as the OCI have important advantages for organization development interventions and other programs directed toward system-wide change. Culture interventions based solely on qualitative data collection techniques tend to be broad, and from the focal organization’s perspective, often somewhat vague. By bringing significantly more structure to the assessment, survey instruments like the OCI can reduce uncertainty on the part of the focal organization and possibly improve upon its dysfunctional nature by decreasing resistance among members to organization development and change. This resistance can be strong given that members of organizations with aggressive/defensive cultures are likely to challenge any type of feedback (oppositional and perfectionistic norms) and members of organizations with passive/defensive cultures may question their ability to effect any type of change (dependent and avoidance norms). From the perspective of a practitioner seeking to oversee or manage the change processes, quantitative assessments of culture such as those made possible by the OCI can be extremely valuable. A culture analysis can identify distinct differences across sub-units and levels, and offer specific information on features of corporate culture, especially subgroup norms and behavior patterns, not readily available from more

global assessments. As with the government agency discussed above, departmental profiles can identify the subcultures of high-performing units, lead to an analysis of the managerial styles and related factors reinforcing those subcultures, and facilitate a “transfer” of those levers to other units. In more extreme (and negative) cases, departmental profiles can alert managers and consultants to dysfunctional subcultures that may be leading to paranoid and avoidant thinking (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1986), corrupt and unethical decisions (Anand et al., 2004), or unduly perfectionistic and “addictive” behaviors (Schaef and Fassel, 1988). Finally, while the OCI is often administered on-line or through the use of machine-scored forms, the survey is also available as a self-scored inventory. In our experience, participants in culture assessments respond very favorably to the self-scoring feature of the OCI, which allows them to get immediate feedback on how they as individuals view the behavioral norms within their organization or sub-unit. This feedback not only facilitates the process of debriefing participants, but also involves them in discussion and interpretation of their profiles in comparison to those of other respondents, a feature useful in both validating and making sense of the data the OCI provides. In this manner, cultural assessment and interpretation can be both public and participative, thereby promoting perceived legitimacy, commitment to change, and battling dysfunctional behavior. Conclusion Political and social realities shape all forms of human conduct within and between organizations and their partners. Regardless of professionalism and professed or assumed goal sharing or congruency, organizational members may not behave in ways that promote efficiency and effectiveness if doing so is inconsistent with their reference prevailing culture. Within any organization there may be a variety of cultures, shaped by characteristic differences in professional orientation, status, history, power, visibility, or other factors. In this paper we have shown that understanding these cultures in terms of expected behaviors and norms can explain why some organizational units (or the entire organization) exhibit dysfunctional behaviors that are counter to the organization’s expressed values or mission, and which hamper efficiency and effectiveness. We have also presented a validated technology for cultural assessment that can be used at many levels, from individual to enterprise, which identifies these underlying cultural components. Clearly, fixing dysfunctional organizations requires first and foremost insights into the relatively tangible aspects of their culture that is reflected in the behaviors that members believe are expected of them. References Anand, V., Ashforth, B.E. and Joshi, M. (2004), “Business as usual: the acceptance and perpetuation of corruption in organizations”, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 39-53. Bates, K.A., Amundson, S.D., Schroeder, R.C. and Morris, W.T. (1995), “The crucial interrelationship between manufacturing strategy and organizational culture”, Management Science, Vol. 41 No. 10, pp. 1565-81.

Dysfunctional culture

727

JMP 21,8

728

Black, R.J. (2003), Organisational Culture: Creating the Influence Needed for Strategic Success, London. Chatman, J.A. and Jehn, K.A. (1994), “Assessing the relationship between industry characteristics and organizational culture: how different can you be?”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 522-54. Collins, J.C. and Porras, J.I. (1994), Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, HarperBusiness, New York, NY. Cooke, R.A. (1989), Organizational Culture Inventory Leader’s Guide, Human Synergistics, Plymouth, MI. Cooke, R.A. and Lafferty, J.C. (1987), Organizational Culture Inventory (Form III), Human Synergistics, Plymouth, MI. Cooke, R.A. and Rousseau, D.M. (1988), “Behavioral norms and expectations: a quantitative approach to the assessment of organizational culture”, Group and Organization Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 245-73. Cooke, R.A. and Szurnal, J.L. (1993), “Measuring normative beliefs and shared behavioral expectations in organizations: the reliability and validity of the organizational culture inventory”, Psychological Reports, Vol. 72, pp. 1299-330. Cooke, R.A. and Szurnal, J.L. (2000), “Using the organizational culture inventory to understand the operating cultures of organizations”, in Ashkanasy, N.M., Widerom, C.P.M. and Peterson, M.F. (Eds), Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 147-62. Dale, M. (1997), “Connecting performance with culture: a case example of change within procurement at British Aerospace Airbus”, Focus on Change Management, July/August. Deal, T.E. and Kennedy, A.A. (1982), Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life, Irwin, Reading, MA. Gaucher, E. and Kratochwill, E. (1993), “The leader’s role in implementing total quality management”, Quality Management in Health Care, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 10-18. Gerstner, L.V. Jr (2002), Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, NY. Gillett, E. and Stenfer-Kroese, B. (2003), “Investigating organizational culture: a comparison of a ‘high’- and a ‘low’-performing residential unit for people with intellectual disabilities”, Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 279-83. Goffee, R. and Jones, G. (1996), “What holds the modern company together?”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74 No. 6, pp. 133-49. Guttman, L. (1954), “A new approach to factor analysis: the radex”, in Lazerfeld, P. (Ed.), Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences, Free Press, Glencoe, IL, pp. 258-348. Haber, S.B., O’Brien, J.N., Metlay, D.S. and Crouch, D.A. (1991), “Influence of organizational factors on performance reliability”, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton NY, (Report to the Division of Systems Research, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Haley, B.R. (1998), “The relationship of unit culture and RN and client outcomes”, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL. Hanges, P.J. and Dickson, M.W. (2004), “The development and validation of the GLOBE culture and leadership scales”, in House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W. and Gupta, V. (Eds), Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 122-51.

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Horney, K. (1954), Our Inner Conflicts, Norton, New York, NY. House, R.J., Javidan, M., Hanges, P.J. and Dorfman, P.W. (2002), “Understanding cultures and implicit leadership theories across the globe: an introduction to Project GLOBE”, Journal of World Business, Vol. 37, pp. 3-10. Human Synergistics (1986), Improving Store Management Effectiveness, Coca-Cola Retailing Research Council, Atlanta, GA. Human Synergistics (1998), New Zealand Developing a Sales Culture in Retail Banking, Human Synergistics/NZ, Auckland. Huse, E. and Cummings, T. (1985), Organizational Development and Change, West, St Paul, MN. Javidan, M. (2001), “The impact of national culture on cross-border mergers: the lessons from GLOBE”, paper presented at the 5th International Management Conference of The Carnegie Bosch Institute for Applied Studies, Berlin, Germany, October 4-6, 2001. Kahn, R.L., Wolfe, D.M., Quinn, R.P., Snoek, J.D. and Rosenthal, R.A. (1964), Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity, Wiley, New York, NY. Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L. (1966), The Social Psychology of Organizations, Wiley, New York, NY. Keenan, G.M., Cooke, R.A. and Hillis, S.L. (1998), “Norms and nurse management of conflicts: keys to understanding nurse-physician collaboration”, Research in Nursing and Health, Vol. 21, pp. 59-72. Katz, D., Maccoby, N. and Morse, N.C. (1959), Productivity, Supervision, and Morale in an Office Situation, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI. Kets de Vries, M.F.R. and Miller, D. (1986), “Personality, culture, and organization”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 266-80. Kilmann, R.H., Saxton, M.J. and Serpa, R. (Eds) (1985), Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Klein, A.S., Masi, R.J. and Weidner, C.K. (1995a), “Organizational culture, distribution and amount of control, and perceptions of quality”, Group & Organization Management, Vol. 20, pp. 122-48. Klein, M.I. (1992), “Corporate culture and store performance: differences among high performance and low performance stores”, unpublished PhD dissertation. Temple University, Philadelphia, PA. Klein, R.L., Bigley, G.A. and Roberts, K.H. (1995b), “Organizational culture in high reliability organizations: an extension”, Human Relations, Vol. 48, pp. 771-93. Komoski-Goeffert, K. (1994), “Effects of registered nurses’ work design on hospital culture, quality, and cost of patient care”, PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL. Kotter, J.P. and Heskett, J.L. (1992), Corporate Culture and Performance, Free Press, New York, NY. Kouzes, J. and Posner, B. (2002), The Leadership Challenge, Jossey Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA. Kreitner, R. and Kinicki, A. (1998), Organizational Behavior, 4th ed., Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA.

729

JMP 21,8

Lahiry, S. (1994), “Building commitment through organizational culture”, Training and Development Journal, Vol. 48, pp. 50-2. Lawler, E.E. (1996), From the Ground Up: Six Principles for Building the New Logic Corporation, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Leary, T. (1957), Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality, Ronald Press, New York, NY.

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Vaughn, D. (2003), “NASA culture, shuttle losses may be linked”, Broadcast Press Briefing, 24 April. Weber, Y., Shenkar, O. and Raveh, A. (1996), “National and corporate cultural fit in mergers/acquisitions: an exploratory study”, Management Science, Vol. 42 No. 8, pp. 1215-28. Weidner, C.K. (1997), “Trust and distrust at work: normative and dyad-exchange influences on individual and subunit performance”, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL. Workforce (1998), “IBM division reborn to motivated productivity”, Workforce, p. 74. Xenihou, A. and Furnham, A. (1996), “A correlational and factor analytic study of four questionnaire measures of organizational culture”, Human Relations, Vol. 49, pp. 349-71. Further reading Tannenbaum, A.S. (1968), Control in Organizations, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. Corresponding author Pierre A. Balthazard can be contacted at: [email protected]

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High toxicity leadership

High toxicity leadership

Borderline personality disorder and the dysfunctional organization Alan Goldman

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Arizona State University, Glendale, Arizona, USA Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to assess highly toxic personality disorders in leaders, implications for organizations, and methods for assessment and intervention. Design/methodology/approach – Action research was used, including a thick description case study narrative and application of the DSM IV-TR. Findings – Personality disorders are a source of a highly toxic and dysfunctional organizational behavior; borderline personality disorder in a leader may serve as a systemic contaminant for an organization. Research limitations/implications – A qualitative, case study approach may not lend itself to replication or quantification; usage of the DSM IV-TR requires clinical training in counseling psychology; the growing incidence of personality disorders in leadership warrants cognizance, ability to assess, the creation of early detection systems and methods of intervention. Practical implications – Through the narrative of a case study researchers and practitioners can obtain a glimpse into the day-to-day operations and nuances of a highly toxic leader and how it impacts an organization; interventions and solutions are provided. Originality/value – This paper calls attention to highly toxic leadership and organizational dysfunction by investigating borderline personality disorder as a prototype. Keywords Personality, Organizations, Leadership, Behaviour Paper type Research paper

Management scholars and practitioners have increasingly identified interrelationships between leadership and organizational dysfunction (e.g. see Frost, 2003; Kellerman, 2004; Levinson, 1972, 1976; Lowman, 2002; Lubit, 2004; Fox and Spector, 2005). Notably absent in the analysis of dysfunction is an explicit, systematic examination of high toxicity leadership and its impact upon organizational systems (e.g. see Goldman, 2005). In this paper I identify borderline personality disorder as a prototype of preexisting toxic behavior centered in an individual leader and permeating throughout an organization. At stake is the ability to assess and provide interventions for what I herein term “high toxicity” or extreme levels of dysfunctional leadership and organizational contamination as epitomized in personality disorders (e.g. see American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Maccoby, 2000, 2003). The farther reaches of dysfunctional and highly toxic behavior was captured in a statement by Kets de Vries when he explained that “some leaders go far beyond the abnormal ways of functioning. . .they go off the deep end” (Kets de Vries, 1995, p. 217). Through the presentation of a clinical case study utilizing the DSM IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) as a tool for assessment, I provide a narrative of a dysfunctional leader and organization suffering from borderline personality disorder (see Appendix for BPD diagnostic criteria). The analysis and description is a product of my position

Journal of Managerial Psychology Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006 pp. 733-746 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0268-3946 DOI 10.1108/02683940610713262

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as an action researcher alternately occupying roles of executive coach, management consultant and psychotherapist. The names of individuals and organizations have been changed in line with the privileged communication status of the consultation. Following presentation of the case study I engage in a discussion of limitations, generalizability and implications for future research and consultations. Borderline personality disordered leadership Dysfunctional background narrative Favio Burnstein is a very strong personality at Sergio Mondo Fashion House in Miami Beach, Florida. As Senior Manager of the Creative Designs R&D Division, Burnstein has achieved legendary status. As some of the designers put it, “when Favio is good, he is very, very good, and when he is bad, he is wicked.” The “good” Favio has brought Sergio Mondo Fashion House (SMFH) from obscurity to international acclaim in a period of five years. When Favio first walked in the door he took on a new wave, punk, hip hop, MTV styled fashion house with a clientele in their late teens and early twenties. Favio brought a sleek international mentality and energy to SMFH, combining the best of high courtier from houses in Milan, Rome, Manhattan, London and Paris. Under the tutelage of Burnstein, SMFH graduated from the MTV genre into a sophisticated, high end, mature, worldclass universe of high fashion and international runways. Within a matter of a few years, Hollywood starlets, European royalty, and players around the globe wanted to step onto the red carpet in Favio’s Fashions. Favio Burnstein made such a splash, that his designs were more associated with “Favio” than with Sergio Mondo. But the CEO and CFO of Sergio Mondo Fashion House were tickled with the newly found status and success and were more concerned with keeping their celebrated leader happy than with questions surrounding who was upstaging whom. This was not about who took the bows and got the recognition. SMFH’s top brass lived and breathed success and they were enamored with Favio Burnstein. Favio was their ticket to be discussed in the same breath with Armani, Versace and the top international fashion houses. Concerning his personal demeanor and physical presence at SMFH, Favio was “hard not to notice”. As stated by Joyce Ferber, one of the designers, “Favio was all business but seemed to wear his personality and private life on his sleeve.” Burnstein made it perfectly clear that he was a frequent gambler. Favio talked of his escapades at the dog track, with the ponies and in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. On some Monday mornings, Favio was on top of the world and other Mondays he was in the dog house. It all depended on how his impulsive and chronic gambling habit went that weekend. And he always bragged about his “speeding tickets” and the “scam of photo radar”. There were some days that Favio shifted into his “soccer identity” and spoke of how he used to play goalie in “the old country” and he questioned “what in the world am I doing in this selfish fashion industry?” It was curious to hear a leader talk that seemed to openly debate what he had made of his life and whether he was in the right profession. There were days when Favio appeared very manly in his dress and manner and other days when he was in the words of Joyce Ferber, “south of a metrosexual.” As Morty, a colleague, put it, “there are days when Favio claims to be a man’s man and other days when he tries to convince everyone that he is bisexual or gay.” It wasn’t so much that anyone in the workplace really cared. It was just that Favio made a spectacle of himself. According to Morty, “Favio is so colorful and full of personality, but he also

seems so unsure of who he really is. Will the real Favio please stand!” In his relationships with staff and designers, one day Favio put subordinates on a pedestal. But according to Morty, “first you walk on water and you’re a saint and a week later Favio speaks to you in front of all your peers like you were a lower life form emerging from middle earth.” There were many times when Favio was the center of attention and kept all conversations going. Other times, he appeared lonely, very depressed, and he had been abandoned by his wife, his best friends, and “booted in the butt” by the company in Rome that “he put on the map”. Any talk about Favio has to recall that infamous “prime time” evening when Favio and everybody were frantically working on designs for a “through-the-roof” client from Paris. The stress level was surreal and Favio pulled an all nighter. The next morning, the workplace discovered that Favio had slit his wrists, turned suicidal and that 911 was called by Charlie Cement, the nighttime janitor. Favio survived that one, but suffice to say, Favio is a load! After that drama, Favio’s reputation became quite dark and legendary around Sergio Mondo. As a leader, Favio was obviously flamboyant, dramatic, deeply troubled and enigmatic. He engulfed, lifted and confused his workforce. In the final analysis, Favio took his employees on a wild, steeplechase ride, through praise, hyper compassion and wild success, to depression, anger and despair. The workplace seemed to take on characteristics of Favio’s personality. Francesca, a former model turned fashion designer, in her late thirties, was initially put on a pedestal by Favio. She was beautiful and brilliantly creative. Favio raved incessantly about Francesca’s designs at SMFH meetings and wrote e-mails to the entire staff inviting them to emulate the “elegant and innovative, Ms. Francesca Jerry,” and follow suit. She was treated as if she was a princess, and a brilliant one at that. Favio clearly idealized Francesca and held her up as a role model. Although other designers might come up with an excellent innovation, it was always a question of “finally reaching Francesca standards”. Favio would say, “for us to break through the fashion industry’s roof and sail toward the sky and rain on the design world, we do as Favio and Francesca does.” But, when it was a bleak day and mood, Favio turned around and trashed his own designs and entire career and pulled Francesca down with him. The workplace was flabbergasted. Ironically, it was Francesca who first spoke up with human resources by expressing her “deep concerns about Favio and what the hell is going on around here”. Francesca later filed an internal grievance against Favio Burnstein for “extreme cruelty and barbarism in the workplace” and for “harassment, sexism and discrimination that I wouldn’t wish on a dog or a pig”. The grievances filed with the human resources department were questionably handled, and according to the plaintiff, Francesca received little if any satisfaction. Ms. Francesca Jarry followed with a civil law suit alleging harassment, workplace discrimination and cruelty against Sergio Mondo Fashion House and Favio Burnstein. At the point where Ms Jarry filed her law suit, the CEO, Calvin Rodriguez attempted to more directly engage HR and the Employee Assistant Program in conflict resolution and in a possible assessment or counseling of Mr Burnstein. Favio appeared to be stigmatized by any questioning of his sanity and made it perfectly clear to the CEO and HR that he did not want “to be seen in EAP or anywhere near the seventh floor or everyone would think that I went postal and I’m a lunatic”. Apparently, the EAP offices were located on the seventh floor and any time spent on this floor of the SMFH building earned you an instant reputation as “loco en la cabeza”. In response to their

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inability to initiate any internal remedies and the escalating grievances and charges against Favio Burnstein, Sergio Mondo was not only concerned, they were very perplexed. Apparently, Ms Jarry’s experiences were not unique. It was reported by HR that Favio Burnstein had a “very erratic personality and way of dealing with employees”. It was stated that Favio alternated between praising employee accomplishments in a grandiose fashion and devaluating and outrageously humiliating and belittling these same designers on other occasions. To make the company crisis even more acute, Favio’s outbursts of adoring adulation and disgust and debunking were always conducted in public. Saving face for employees was not high on Favio Burnstein’s list of leadership skills. Another staff member reported that “Favio turned livid and totally crazy when I was exactly nine minutes late to a meeting due to the fact that they closed part of the highway that I drive on to get to work”. The employee stated that she attempted to tell her reason for being late to Favio but he “refused to hear me and ranted and raved and acted like I killed his father or something by coming late. He was screaming in front of everyone and he scared the holy ghost out of me. He scared everybody! You could hear his wild, screaming, ranting psycho voice 14 miles from here!” In narrative interviews with employees, anecdotal evidence revealed that Favio was equally unpredictable in his socializing with subordinates. Some days Favio would spring for lunch, take two employees out and treat them like they were international movie stars. Three weeks later, the same employees were out at lunch with Favio and he sneered, treated them like inferiors and dogs, and snickered about the “fifth class designs” that they were turning out. Favio humiliated his employees in public. He was widely known for kicking his voice up several octaves and screaming obscenities at the top of his lungs. Francesca Jarry added that Favio got irate with her at a weekly designers’ meeting and cried out in public that she was a “third class human being who should go back to the third world”. Jarry stated that “Favio was so angry that he spit on the floor behind me. I was walking out of the room to get away from him and the whole humiliation”. The “third world” ranting was of particular concern to Francesca since she was originally from Quito, Ecuador, and felt that she “was being demeaned and diversity laws were being trampled on”. Overall, designers and staff interviewed reported that Favio’s personality was “beyond bizarre” and was “unpredictable and erratic in the most dramatic, unbelievable and scariest kind of way”. Initial assessment Sergio Mondo Fashion House is a smaller company with 711 employees. A total of 212 employees were under the leadership of Favio Burnstein’s “design division”. Over a period of approximately ten months, nine complaints and five formal grievances were filed with HR. Some of these employees were also in consultation with the employee assistance program. Of these, two were escalated into pending formal litigation. The majority of the allegations contained references to the type of behavior already referenced. HR and the Sergio Mondo CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, wanted to handle this problem “in the most discreet manner possible”. Rodriguez had been concerned all along about the Americans with Disability Act rights afforded Favio, and the fact that if he had any “official” mental or emotional problems that this was all protected as privileged information. Meanwhile, HR and the EAP attempted on numerous occasions to sit down with disgruntled employees and with Mr Burnstein to attempt to find

reasons and solutions for these workplace conflicts. The disturbances reached a crescendo when there were allegations from a top designer, Miles Berish, that “Favio purposefully gave me six assignments over two days so that I would fall on my face. When I questioned him, he told me, and I quote “you should forget about your personal life, Miles, if you want to be a designer under me. You are lucky I am even giving you three seconds of my time, you gnat”. Once again, Favio got so angry that he spit on the ground near Mr Berish and slammed his fist through a thin wood door, drilling a hole through the wood and fracturing a bone in his right hand. Another grievant alleged that “Favio complemented my work at our weekly meeting and later that same day called me vile names in an e-mail that he sent to about 90 people in our division that I work with everyday!” Still another grievance reported that Favio Burnstein “cursed me out in front of two of our biggest clients and accounts and he set me and our company up for failure. We lost the clients because he had an indignant tantrum! Am I dreaming or is this sucker sick?” HR contacts the consultant/executive coach The HR department contacted me after 13 months of complaints and faced with two potential legal cases. They invited me in for a series of three long talks that included the CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, and a representative of the EAP. They were extremely concerned with internal grievances, pending litigation and a massive, destructive trend in the design division. Clearly making the point that design was their “bread and butter,” CEP Rodriguez disclosed that Sergio Mondo had lost four “very substantial accounts” over the last six months. Over the past year and a half, “since Favio got weird,” they had a net loss of approximately 12 key clients. Their company was “going in the dumpers” and “all roads seemed to point back to Favio Burnstein”. They were convinced that there was no quick solution and they had tried to talk with Favio on numerous occasions and they came up “empty”. They were still struck by his track record and talents and dumbfounded by the downward spiral. Since the Favio problem emerged turnover had reached epidemic proportions. Turnover was always high in the design division but it had “gone through the roof” since Favio “turned psycho”. In the process of conducting a limited organizational needs assessment, including semi-structured narrative interviews of chief officers and the director of HR, I found out that despite everything, Sergio Mondo did not necessarily want to fire Favio. I uncovered little if any client or organizational resistance from executive management and HR, and rather found an extraordinarily high level of support for a consultation. Clearly, the top brass had already conducted their own needs assessment but this turned out to be fairly consistent with my own assessment. CEO Rodriguez and the director of HR, Manny White, felt “strangely stuck with the loco genius” and wanted to see whether they could “salvage his brilliant and innovative side and get his personal garbage out of the picture”. They genuinely wanted to explore and get to the bottom of all the conflicts and see whether Burnstein could be salvaged. CEO Rodriguez made it crystal clear that “Favio is a remarkable yet trouble man. Whatever is going on, I want to save him and make him a fixture at Sergio Mondo. The good and brilliant Favio is absolutely, positively irreplaceable”. Rodriguez was very much swayed by “the first two golden years with Favio when Sergio netted in excess of 55 million dollars under his twisted leadership and brilliance”. I was struck by the “twisted leadership” reference.

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The consultation may have been initiated by a series of internal organizational crises within the fashion division of Sergio Mondo, a condition that spread to HR and the grievance system, but our collective needs assessment pointed toward a single, primary source – Favio Burnstein. The next issue in the consultation strategy was how to make initial contact with Favio. Was this going to be “required” by the CEO and/or HR that Favio see me as a client? The decision was that HR would make a “strong recommendation” that Favio consider “talking with an outside expert”. Since I alternatively wear hats of psychotherapist, management consultant and executive coach, how would I identify myself to Sergio Mondo, Favio and other members of the organization? Would I risk stigmatizing Favio by referring to myself as a psychotherapist, and positioning him as “patient?” Or would it be more comforting to identify myself as “executive coach” or “management consultant” with Favio occupying the role of a “client?” We collectively decided on the “executive coach” hat. But HR had some reservations, however. In the event that my clinical psychology background pointed in the direction of a psychopathology, then this would have to be appropriately addressed and might entail a changing of hats. These concerns were due to the company’s preoccupation over the Americans with Disability Act. In the event that Favio did have “official mental or emotional problems” and “there was a psychological diagnosis” they recognized that the coaching might morph into a therapeutic consultation bound by privileged communication and the fact that Favio had significant “rights” as a mentally disabled worker who just happened to be functioning in a leadership role. HR and the CEO asked a number of questions concerning whether Favio would wind up being a “protected class of employee” if he was “mental”. I referred these very delicate issues to their company lawyers and stayed closely in the loop. I assured Rodriguez and HR that everything would remain completely confidential and that we would consider options once we got further down the road into the coaching situation. Inasmuch as I approached coaching with a strong thrust of trust and relationship building and therapeutic dialogue, I anticipated that any conversion into the psychotherapeutic realm would be fairly seamless. Executive coaching consultations with Favio Burnstein Mr Burnstein contacted me via e-mail and we set up a first appointment in my professional office, miles away from Sergio Mondo. Favio was candid and savvy. He knew something was really the matter. Favio felt “empty” and in rapid fashion disclosed some of his concerns in the workplace and in his private life. Favio was graphic about his substance abuse history, reckless driving record, sexual escapades with numerous “love partners” and what he himself labeled as a “somewhat reckless and unstable past history”. Burnstein had a pattern of very hot and cold workplace and personal relationships, fleetingly intense and then out the door. He idealized lovers and workers and alternatively shattered them in public, bringing them down in fits of anger. Favio’s world was very “black and white”. His real self or identity was very shaky and he gravitated toward extremes in his personality. You were either completely on his side or a mortal enemy and to be scorned and shunned. Favio felt very vulnerable in the workplace and in his personal life. He claimed that “everyone walks out the door on me. I can’t trust that anyone will stay”. He went on to disclose this pattern in his love and family life, and also at Sergio Mondo. Clearly, there was a pattern of turnover and instability throughout the fashion industry and particularly in

the design division of SMFH. He said it “made him feel insecure”. He confessed that “I read in a paperback romance book about SAD, you know, separation anxiety disorder, and I bet I have that”. Favio desperately wanted stability in his workplace and this was connected to his “feelings of emptiness” and several incidents where he “slit his wrists” because “it was all crap and I couldn’t stand the stress and I desperately wanted everyone to salute Favio and tell him I will stay with you forever”. When he suspected that there was going to be a revolving door at Sergio Mondo, he subconsciously empowered himself to be abrasive and abusive and kick designers and staff out the door before they would have a chance to abandon him. Favio wanted to beat his subordinates to the punch. Working with Favio’s psychological issues as cues and prompters I gradually made the transition from coach to psychotherapist explaining to Favio that I “wore both hats” and that the “therapy hat would allow me to do a better, more comprehensive job”. Favio was a bit baffled but pretty much unconcerned. I explained that in the event that it was necessary, I might come up with a psychological diagnosis at some point in time. Favio was agreeable. I officially announced my identity as psychotherapist. I believe that the business, workplace and leadership “persona” of initially dealing with an executive coach allowed Favio to open up, take down his defenses and let the personal issues gush out. At that later point, it was not difficult to transition to therapist inasmuch as the territory had already been entered and it was for Favio only a slight alteration in the semantics and identity of the professional he was disclosing to. DSM IV-TR diagnosis: individual and organizational Over the course of several months of sessions conducted two to three times per week, I increasingly recognized that Favio Burnstein’s erratic and destructive style of leadership, and deeply troubled intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior was centered in a pre-existing (prior to Sergio Mondo) “borderline personality disorder”. This disorder (DSM IV-TR 301.83) is characterized by: [. . .] a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts . . . (American Psychiatric Association, p. 706).

Favio had a longstanding pattern of undermining his achievements just when he was about to reach his goal. His borderline personality disorder was prevalent when he first dropped out of high school in the last month of his senior year and returned to obtain his GED some five years later. Similarly, he dropped out of his Bachelor’s degree program in college in the last semester of his senior year and returned later to obtain that degree. This predictable pattern was repeated yet again in his MFA program when he withdrew his senior year and returned some seven years later to complete the degree. Ironically, after his first two years at Sergio Mondo, Favio was reaching his goals and was very successful, exceeding all personal and company expectations in innovation, design, expansion into an international client base, world markets and profitability. But in typical, undermining, borderline personality disordered fashion, Favio jumped ship and started to sabotage his efforts and the workings of his designers and staff. His troubling and self-defeating interpersonal patterns of destructive behavior, severe doubts regarding identity, self-worth and abandonment, and lethal driving, gambling and promiscuity took over. The once again active

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borderline personality disorder was boldly expressed throughout the Sergio Mondo workplace and Favio emanated dysfunctionality. In addition to his pre-existing borderline personality disorder, there were precipitating factors in the organizational environment that contributed to the reappearance of Favio’s older symptoms. The center of the “triggering” is the instability of the designer world and how this played into the many insecurities and abandonment issues faced by Burnstein. Clearly, Favio’s personality disorder made him a poor fit for a transient organizational culture. Favio was desperate for stability, for a workplace that was not in constant upheaval. Although Favio was a worldclass innovator in design and thrived on constant change in the clothing industry, a closer examination revealed that he always did favor the “classics that never go out of style”. In the interpersonal realm, Favio was extraordinarily vulnerable to turnover. In examining the interface between individual leader and organizational system it is fairly clear that in cases of leaders with pre-existing personality disorders, extremely stressful and disruptive forces in the daily workings of company life will necessarily fuel the pathology. The coach or consultant addresses the issues of “organizational fit” and “triggers” and attempts to negotiate more favorable conditions alongside treatment of the personality disorder. It is an example of blending individual differences research with a more systems dynamics approach (e.g. see Senge, 1990; Von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968). In this case, Favio is extraordinarily valuable as a leader to his company and Sergio Mondo was amenable to become more of a “learning organization” in order to preserve their eccentric and troubled meal ticket. The fact that Favio suffered from a long-term personality disorder in no way diminished the severity of the abusive and harassing behavior dished out by the leader. Many of Favio’s subordinates viewed themselves as targets of emotionally abusive behavior characterized by “hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors (excluding physical contact)” (e.g. see Keashly and Harvey, 2005, p. 203). Some anecdotal reports of the effects of emotionally abusive behavior by Favio’s subordinates included: negative mood, anger and resentment (see Ashforth, 1997; Richman et al., 1999); anxiety (see Tepper, 2000); decreased psychological well-being and lowered self esteem (e.g. see Cortina et al., 2001); reduced organizational functioning and decreased job satisfaction (e.g. see Keashly and Jagatic, 2000); job tension and greater turnover; work withdrawal behaviors and greater intention to leave (see Harvey, 1996); increased absenteeism; decreased productivity (e.g. see Ashforth, 1997); and decreased organizational commitment (Duffy et al., 2002). Through a high impact, incremental approach to executive coaching (see Schaffer, 2002) and rational-emotive psychotherapy (e.g. see Ellis, 1993), I increasingly understood some of Favio’s internal locus of control issues and how his disordered world is ordered. We were still left with decisions regarding individual and organizational interventions for both Favio and Sergio Mondo Fashion House. After diagnosing Favio with borderline personality disorder and referring him to his internist, medication was prescribed for his personality disorder and he began a drug treatment regiment conducted in concert with an agenda of talk therapy. At Favio’s urging and as a result of extensive communication with Sergio Mondo’s HR department and CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, he wanted to “open up a dialogue about his borderline personality disorder” with key employees who had filed grievances against him. He said that he “wanted to be a man, not give excuses, but face the facts

and clear up the mess and move on to greater things”. There was a month long delay due to ADA, Title I issues handled by the attorneys. Finally, Favio “received clearance to communicate and open up”. In a series of meetings and group sessions, Favio, myself, and at times members of HR and the CEO, all participated in some key “psychological” and “management consulting” issues aimed at reinstating the “golden era of Favio’s first two years at Sergio Mondo”. Improvement in the mental and emotional health of Favio Burnstein was anecdotally tied to an increase in overall Sergio Mondo motivation and profits, and a decrease in hostility, turnover and retaliation from his staff. I viewed the coaching and psychotherapy with Burnstein and employees as part of a broader systems consultation with Sergio Mondo. Assuming that Sergio Mondo Fashion House was a living organizational organism and an open system (e.g. see Von Bertalanffy, 1950), I perceived Favio as a pathological part and nexus of a systemic problem engulfing a significant number of employees. My continuing work with Favio led to more systems consultations with Sergio, in an effort to integrate both the part-problems and the organization’s processes (see Levinson, 1981, 1987, 1991, 2002). I worked on the assumption that the individual progress made with Favio Burnstein alleviated not only mental and emotional pain and anguish but gradually cleared the way for personal productivity in his position as a leader within his company. In essence, it is not too much of a stretch to hear the executive consultant or organizational psychotherapist reflect on the treatment and successes with an individual leader and state that “this increased productivity is potentially leverageable for the increased productivity of the entire organization” (Lowman, 2002, p. 153). Interventions and postscript In a series of “escalations” I moved from a more individually focused coaching and psychotherapy orientation to a more companywide, systemic consultation. Once Favio convincingly came out of the closet, loud and proud about his “disorder”, a series of team consultations followed. After several months of healing talks and group sessions, I attempted to strategically propose significant organizational change in the form of a plan to consider a “dual leadership” approach to the design division. As Favio felt progressively stronger and his symptoms went further into remission, I came up with a conflict resolution and systemic change strategy initially pitched to Rodriguez and then to HR. Francesca Jarry’s litigation was still pending with a court date rapidly approaching – but her persistence and drive was dissipating due to the progress being made with Favio and the entire division. Healing was underway. Francesca was at first reluctant to attend our management consultation sessions (later to be termed “conflict resolution meetings”), but finally did check in for a few breakthrough sessions. The ice was broken and she began a minimal dialogue with Favio. Influenced by the fact that Francesca had been in leadership positions in the past and that Favio was wounded but improving, my proposal was that Francesca would serve as a co-leader with Favio. I hoped to approach some conflict resolution first via our consultations and dialogues and secondly through our new therapeutically guided partnership in leadership. I drafted, with the assistance of HR and the attorneys, a plan for a six month trial period of dual leadership. Meanwhile, HR and the CEO further negotiated with Jarry’s attorney that if this co-leadership experiment was successful and Burnstein satisfied Jarry’s request for apologies, that the lawsuit be dropped. In addition, for a period of six

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months, team consultations and conflict resolution meetings with the division would precede enroute to a longer term and deeper healing. During this period of time I was also engaging two counselors from the employee assistance program of Sergio Mondo, in a train-the-trainer agenda as a vital part of the consultation is long-term organizational follow-up, commitment and implementation. Following best practices of high impact consulting (Schaffer, 2002), I was engaged in an incremental, sub project of a larger systemic and organizational consultation. We were collaborating in the individual and group healing process and were all emerging out of dysfunctionality and into a more functional and learning organization (Senge, 1990). The fatally flawed Favio showed strong signs of improvement. He realized that this company was in it for the long haul. Half of his healing was due to the fact that his CEO and his company were committed to him. He had never experienced a boss like CEO, Calvin Rodriguez. Instability was slowly replaced with hopes of a stabile career. He was surrounded by caring, compassionate individuals and it appeared to Favio that he had gotten to the root of his old problems that were destroying him and Sergio Mondo. Sergio Mondo was extremely pleased to have a newer, improved model of Favio on board, and one-by-one they were able to amiably resolve all but two of the grievances and successfully settled the two formal litigations (both resolved out of court). The dysfunctional behavior characterized by plunging motivation, productivity and profits, widespread instability, loss of key clients and a myriad of workplace conflicts was gradually subsiding and we were on an upswing. A fatally flawed Favio was reinvented as a merely flawed and “mildly toxic” Favio. He was brilliant and innovative and even learned how to share the stage and stress of leadership with Francesca. Curiously, the co-leadership strategy is still in operation, some seven years later. Discussion and limitations In the course of disclosing the Favio Burnstein case my agenda has been to “utilize extreme cases to develop rich theory” (Elsbach, 2005, p. 10). The extreme case of a borderline personality disorder (BPD) is an example of what the DSM IV-TR describes as “Cluster B Personality Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, pp. 701-717)”. As illustrated in the narratives of Favio Burnstein, characteristic behaviors of Cluster B leaders include: highly dramatic and emotional in the workplace; conflict and crisis prone in social and organizational life; their behavior repeatedly violates cultural norms and players in the organization; they suffer from pervasive, inflexible mental, emotional and interpersonal disturbances that are stable over time; and they experience repetitive patterns of distress or impairment in social and work life. Personality disorders affect as much as 10-15 percent of the adult population in the US at some point during their life. There are no reliable data available, however, for the prevalence of personality disorders among US leaders within organizations in part due to therapist-client confidentiality and the privileged communication status afforded individuals with psychological or psychiatric conditions as protected by the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). Lacking data, I am working on the assumption that personality disorders in leaders and organizations will roughly mirror the data generated in the general US adult population.

The BPD case study investigates a “preexisting” personality disorder thought to be at the eye of the high toxicity organizational storm. The DSM guided diagnosis of the BPD is not viewed as a mere by-product of a dysfunctional organizational culture but rather a primary result of a “pre-existing” individual pathology. This determination was in part based on reports of Favio Burnstein’s history of conflicts with other employers – all pointing toward a long-term pattern of BPD separate and apart from Sergio Mondo. As indicated in the case study, systems variables do interact with the BPD leader, at times triggering and aggravating seemingly dormant or remissive dysfunctional behaviors. The Sergio Mondo organization clearly triggered or activated dimensions of Burnstein’s BPD by bringing some separation anxiety issues to the forefront as a result of the Sergio Mondo turnover turnstile. Although another researcher may have focused more on the organizational system as a precipitator of dysfunction, in the Sergio Mondo case I found that the high toxicity disturbances were far more pronounced and centered in the leader than at the systems level of analysis. In essence, the nexus of dysfunction and highest toxicity was in my clinical judgment traceable to the BPD of Favio Burnstein. Curiously, the systems dynamics of any personality disorder or high toxicity behavior is always in relation to and operant within a larger system. Individual toxicity ultimately cannot be separated from a family or organizational system. Accordingly, the BPD of Favio Burnstein at some point lends itself to a far more complex and all encompassing entertaining of a BPD diagnosis for the entire Sergio Mondo Fashion House. This was manifest in the response of subordinates and colleagues to Burnstein’s erratic behavior as a leader. In essence, the work force immediately surrounding Burnstein was necessarily engaged in dimensions of a borderline personality disordered system of interaction. The anecdotal reports of the effects of Favio’s allegedly emotionally abusive leadership led to a myriad of dysfunctional worker responses as exemplified in escalating leave taking behaviors (e.g. see Harvey, 1996), absenteeism, decreased productivity (e.g. see Ashforth, 1994, 1997); and decreased commitment to the organization (e.g. see Duffy et al., 2002). Conclusion As a researcher and consultant trained in both the management and psychology disciplines I have increasingly employed a growing number of interdisciplinary tools including a recent increased usage of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Bringing the psychological and psychiatric standard for assessment into executive coaching and management consulting assignments I have been able to extend my repertoire into the further reaches of toxic leadership and organizational behavior. Particularly in cases characterized by a more “911” state of pathology or “high toxicity”, I have found the DSM particularly useful in sorting out the lighter or milder forms of toxicity from those cases red flagged by Kets de Vries and characterized by leaders who “go far beyond the abnormal ways of functioning. . .they go off the deep end” (Kets de Vries, 1995, p. 217). Favio Burnstein was going off the deep end as a leader – attempting to productively function, despite a borderline personality disorder. Without an ability to appropriately diagnose and treat the leader, the high toxicity inevitably encompasses and contaminates a growing number of players within the organizational system

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culminating in something roughly approximating a borderline personality disorder Organization. In the event of an extreme level of leader toxicity as signified by Favio Burnstein’s BPD, this case suggests that the intervention of an outside third party may be necessary for recovery. Falling outside the expertise of most managers and human resource specialists, psychopathology is best delegated to psychological and psychiatric trained EAP therapists and external specialists. Left undetected, toxicity escalates and permeates organizations. As indicated by Goldman (2005), Lipman-Blumen (2005), and Frost (2003), the threat of highly toxic leadership requires advanced scouts or toxin detectors within the organization who are able to initially distinguish whether an individual may require further assessment by an outside third party. Clearly, high toxicity leadership presents a complex challenge for management to incorporate psychological and psychiatric expertise into an organization’s repertoire. References American Psychiatric Association (2000), DSM IV-TR: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, Arlington, VA. Ashforth, B. (1994), “Petty tyranny in organizations”, Human Relations, Vol. 47, pp. 755-78. Ashforth, B. (1997), “Petty tyranny in organizations: a preliminary examination of anecdotes and consequences”, Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, Vol. 14, pp. 126-40. Cortina, L., Magley, V., Williams, J. and Langhout, R. (2001), “Incivility in the workplace: incidence and impact”, Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, Vol. 6, pp. 64-80. Duffy, M., Ganster, D. and Pagon, M. (2002), “Social undermining in the prediction of workplace aggression”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45, pp. 331-51. Ellis, A. (1993), “Reflections on rational-emotive therapy”, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 61, pp. 199-201. Elsbach, K. (Ed.) (2005), Qualitative Organizational Research, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich, CT. Fox, S. and Spector, P. (2005), Counterproductive Work Behavior: Investigations of Actors and Targets, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Frost, P. (2003), Toxic Emotions at Work, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. Goldman, A. (2005), “Leadership pathology as a nexus of dysfunctional organizations”, paper presented at the Academy of Management, Honolulu, Hawaii, August. Harvey, S. (1996), “Bosses’ negative interpersonal behaviors: a latent variable test of personal and organizational outcomes”, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. Keashley, L. and Harvey, S. (2005), “Emotional abuse in the workplace”, in Fox, S. and Spector, P. (Eds), Counterproductive Work Behavior, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Keashley, L. and Jagatic, K. (2000), “The nature, extent, and impact of emotional abuse in the workplace: results of a statewide survey”, paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Toronto, Canada, August. Kellerman, B. (2004), Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.

Kets de Vries, M. (1995), Life and Death in the Executive Fast Lane, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Levinson, H. (1972), Organizational Diagnosis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Levinson, H. (1976), Psychological Man, Levinson Institute, Boston, MA. Levinson, H. (1981), Executive, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Levinson, H. (1987) in Lorsch, J.W. (Ed.), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Levinson, H. (1991), “Consulting with top management”, Consulting Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 10-15. Levinson, H. (2002), Organizational Assessment: A Step-by-Step Guide to Effective Consulting, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Lipman-Blumen, J. (2005), The Allure of Toxic Leaders, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. Lowman, R. (Ed.) (2002), Handbook of Organizational Consulting Psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Lubit, R. (2004), Coping with Toxic Managers, Subordinates and Other Difficult People, Prentice Hall Financial Times, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Maccoby, M. (2000), “Narcissistic leaders: the incredible pros; the inevitable cons”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 78, pp. 68-78. Maccoby, M. (2003), The Productive Narcissist: The Promise and Peril of Visionary Leadership, Broadway, New York, NY. Richman, J., Rospenda, K., Nawyn, S., Fendrich, M. and Drum, M. (1999), “Sexual harassment and generalized workplace abuse among university employees: prevalence and mental health correlates”, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 89, pp. 358-63. Schaffer, R. (2002), High Impact Consulting, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Senge, P. (1990), The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, Doubleday, New York, NY. Tepper, B. (2000), “Consequences of abusive supervision”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 178-90. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1950), “An outline of general systems theory”, British Journal of Philosophical Science, Vol. I, pp. 134-63. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1968), General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications, Brazillier, New York, NY.

Further reading Fuqua, D. and Newman, J. (2002), “The role of systems theory in consulting psychology”, in Lowman, R.L. (Ed.), Handbook of Organizational Consulting Psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, pp. 76-105. Kets de Vries, M. (1984), The Irrational Executive: Psychoanalytic Explorations in Management, International Universities Press, Madison, CT. Kets de Vries, M. (1989), Prisoners of Leadership, Wiley, New York, NY. Kets de Vries, M. (1991), Organizations on the Couch: Clinical Perspectives on Organizational Behavior and Change, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Kets de Vries, M. (1993), Leaders, Fools and Imposters: Essays on the Psychology of Leadership, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Kets de Vries, M. (2001), The Leadership Mystique: An Owner’s Manual, Pearson, London.

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Kets de Vries, M. and Miller, D. (1984), The Neurotic Organization: Diagnosing and Changing Counterproductive Styles of Management, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Lipman-Blumen, J. (2001), “Why do we tolerate bad leaders? Magnificent uncertitude, anxiety, and meaning”, in Bennis, W., Spreitzer, G. and Cummings, T. (Eds), The Future of Leadership: Today’s Top Leadership Thinkers Speak to Tomorrow’s Leaders, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, pp. 125-38. Schein, E. (2000), “The next frontier: Edgar Schein on organizational therapy”, The Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 31-48. Van Fleet, D. and Van Fleet, E. (2006), “Internal terrorists: the terrorists inside organizations”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 21 No. 8. .

Appendix. Diagnostic criteria for 301.83 – Borderline personality disorder A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following: (1) Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. (2) A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternative between extremes of idealization and devaluation. (3) Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. (4) Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g. spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). (5) Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior. (6) Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g. intense episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days). (7) Chronic feelings of emptiness. (8) Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g. frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights). (9) Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 710).

Corresponding author Alan Goldman can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member interactions

Dysfunctional leader-member interactions

Paul Harvey and Mark J. Martinko Department of Management, College of Business, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA, and

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Scott C. Douglas Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, USA Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this article is to develop a conceptual model predicting the influence of biased causal explanations for subordinate behaviors and outcomes on a leader’s functionality and the quality of leader-member relationships. Design/methodology/approach – Attribution theory is used to analyze the effect of leader perceptions and emotions on the functionality of leader-member relationships. It is predicted that the negative emotions and expectancies stemming from biased leader attributions will promote dysfunctional leader behaviors. These dysfunctional behaviors, in turn, are believed to reduce the quality of leader-member relationships. Research limitations/implications – Although much of the proposed model is based on empirical evidence, it is acknowledged that some key relationships have not been tested directly in past research. It is suggested that future research can seek to validate these aspects of the model. It is also suggested that future research explore the role of subordinate, as well as leader, attributions in dysfunctional relationships. Practical implications – Several implications of the model for promoting functional leadership in organizations are described. The importance of leaders being aware of their attributional biases is indicated and information provided on how to assess one’s attribution style. Also discussed are implications for reducing situational ambiguity and increasing causal feedback in the workplace. Originality/value – This paper builds on past attribution theory research to address a shortage of research on the cognitive, interpersonal aspects of functional and dysfunctional leadership. Keywords Leadership, Management effectiveness, Organizational behaviour Paper type Conceptual paper

The role of causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member interactions A leader’s ability to interact effectively with subordinates is generally held to be crucial in creating or maintaining an effective organization. The study of leader-member relationships has developed as a means of increasing our understanding of how leaders form productive bonds with their subordinates to achieve this goal. Past research in this area indicates that functional leadership and high quality leader-member relationships result in desirable outcomes such as citizenship behaviors (Townsend et al., 2000), heightened organizational commitment (Kinicki and Vecchio, 1994), and decreased turnover (Townsend et al., 2000) on the part of subordinates. At present, however, our knowledge of leader-member relationship outcomes such as these is considerably more developed than our understanding of the individual and interpersonal antecedents that can influence the functionality of leader-member

Journal of Managerial Psychology Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006 pp. 747-762 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0268-3946 DOI 10.1108/02683940610713271

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relationships. Several researchers have made note of this fact in the past. For instance, Bourantas and Papalexandris (1990), Gillespie and Mann (2004), Kinicki and Vecchio (1994), Phillips and Bedian (1994) and others, have indicated that the predictive role of individual-level variables on the effectiveness of leader-member relationships requires more attention. This appears to be particularly true in the context of dysfunctional relationships (Townsend et al., 2000). Drawing on past attribution theory research, we argue that an examination of the causal reasoning process can provide insight into how the cognitions and emotions of functional and dysfunctional leaders can influence the quality of their working relationships. A number of researchers have examined the impact of causal attributions on the leader-member dynamic (e.g. Barry and Crant, 2000; Fadil, 1995; Dobbins and Russell, 1986; Douglas and Martinko, 2001; Green and Mitchell, 1979; Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Martinko and Gardner, 1987; Wilhelm et al., 1993) and have generally concluded that biased and/or inaccurate attributions (i.e. causal explanations) for subordinate behaviors and outcomes are detrimental to leader-member relationship quality. Specifically, biased attributions are thought to deteriorate working relationships by negatively influencing leaders’ emotions and expectancies concerning subordinates’ future behaviors. Our goal is to build on this research by suggesting that functional leadership is, to an important degree, an outcome of the attributions leaders make in response to workplace outcomes. We suggest that the behaviors of dysfunctional leaders are frequently driven by biased causal perceptions, creating a situation in which conflict, negative emotions, and unproductive behaviors are likely. Conversely, we argue that functional leaders create situations in which the negative influence of attributional biases on leader-member relationships is minimized. In these situations, the emotions and expectancies of leaders and subordinates are thought to be congruent and to serve as a source of motivation. To develop this argument, we begin with a review of past research on dysfunctional leadership and its influence on the quality of leader-subordinate dyads. In this review, we focus on the individual and interpersonal factors thought to promote dysfunctional leadership. We then introduce a theoretical model in which attributional biases are predicted to reduce the functionality of leader-member relationships by promoting attributional conflict, particularly in situations characterized by high levels of ambiguity and psychological distance. Following this discussion, we suggest steps leaders can take to shape working environments in order to neutralize the influence of attributional biases and to promote attributional concordance with subordinates. We conclude with implications for future research in this area. Dysfunctional leadership and the leader-subordinate relationship Past research on the various factors that can positively or negatively influence the quality of leader-member relationships has frequently focused on the role of leadership styles and behaviors (see House and Aditya, 1997 for a review). One construct that has emerged from this research is the notion of dysfunctional leadership, defined as counterproductive leadership behaviors that undermine trust and effectiveness in a leader-member relationship (Hall et al., 2004; Johnson and Huwe, 2002). Hall et al. (2004)

noted that dysfunctional behaviors can take the form of illegal activities, but also include behaviors that are simply inappropriate and unproductive. Given the recent corporate scandals around the world, and the media attention these scandals have received, a great deal of research attention has been given to illicit forms of dysfunctional leadership (e.g. Hall et al., 2004; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Tepper et al., 2004). Our focus, however, is on the cognitive antecedents of unproductive leader behaviors that are not necessarily scandalous or illegal, but still undesirable from an organization’s perspective. In this section we briefly summarize research on dysfunctional leadership at the individual and interpersonal levels of analysis describing factors that can promote either functional or dysfunctional relationships. We then develop a theoretical model explicating the possible role of causal attributions and emotions in determining the functionality of leader behaviors. Individual and interpersonal factors affecting the functionality of leadership In response to a number of high-profile ethical lapses among organizational leaders, several researchers have sought to identify individual level factors that might promote dysfunctional leadership behaviors. For instance, Hall et al. (2004) recently argued that factors such as leadership style, leader accountability, and leader reputation could influence the functionality of leader behaviors as well as followers’ perceptions of these behaviors. Specifically, they argued that the functionality of a leader-member relationship is largely dependent on the extent to which followers trust their leaders and that effective leadership styles and behaviors are necessary to establish trust. Similarly, in a discussion of dysfunctional mentorship, Johnson and Huwe (2002) noted that leaders’ characteristics such as incompetence and perceptual bias could negatively affect their functionality. Again, the authors explain that the trustworthiness of a leader is fundamental to his or her functionality and the quality of leader-member relationships. Because competence and objectivity can both increase trustworthiness, the authors argue that they are key requirements of functional leadership. Related research by Lord and Alliger (1985) identified factors that can promote leadership behaviors that are perceived as being functional by subordinates. These factors include fit between leader behaviors and situational norms and, to a lesser degree, the extent to which leader behaviors are appropriate to the demands of the task at hand. More recently, a study by Morgan (2005) concluded that supportive coaching by leaders and leader preparedness were positively associated with members’ perceptions concerning leader effectiveness. In terms of dysfunctional leadership, then, these findings suggest that an absence of these characteristics is likely to promote dysfunctional leader-member relations by reducing members’ confidence in the ability of leaders and the appropriateness of their leadership behaviors. From a leader-member exchange (LMX) perspective, research indicates that factors such as members’ levels of effort and their attitudes toward their job and their leader can promote functional leadership behaviors that help foster high quality relationships (e.g. Dienesch and Liden, 1986). A study by Paul et al. (2002) also highlights the role of subordinate attitudes. Their findings indicate that when subordinates hold passive-aggressive attitudes or are overly dependent on leaders, the ability of

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leaders to behave in a functional manner is diminished. Additionally, Johnson and Huwe (2002) argued that poor fit between a leader and a subordinate, in terms of personality, communication style, work patterns, or any other interpersonal factor, could reduce a leader’s functionality. Johnson and Huwe (2002) also noted that conflict between leaders and members can diminish a leader’s functionality and the overall quality of the relationship. They explained that while major conflicts can have an immediate impact on leader functionality, even minor conflicts can escalate to the point that a working relationship becomes unmanageable and disintegrates. Of particular relevance to the model we present, Hall et al. (2004) argued that conflict between leaders and followers could be driven by the attributions subordinates make for leader behaviors. They argued that when subordinates form negative attributions concerning the intent of leader behaviors, their belief in the leader’s effectiveness and the quality of the leader-subordinate relationships decreases. Similarly, Green and Mitchell (1979), Martinko and Douglas (1999), and others have argued that the effectiveness of a leader and the quality of leader-member relationships can be affected by the attributions leaders make in response to subordinate behaviors. For instance, the attribution of leader behaviors to self-serving causes (e.g. greed) or to incompetence is thought to reduce the trust that subordinates place in their supervisors. As noted above, this lack of trust is believed to reduce supervisors’ ability to act as functional leaders (Hall et al., 2004; Johnson and Huwe, 2002). Building on this notion, we seek to examine the impact of leader attributions for subordinate behaviors and outcomes on the functionality of leader behaviors and the quality of leader-member relationships. In the next section we develop a theoretical model describing the factors that can influence leaders’ attributions, and the affect of these attributions on emotional responses and functional or dysfunctional leader behavior. A causal perception model of dysfunctional leadership Our conceptualization of the role of attributions in predicting leader functionality or dysfunctionality is shown in Figure 1. To help illustrate this process, it is helpful to consider a typical workplace situation where the relationship between a leader and members might be strained. For instance, a situation in which members fail to meet a leader’s deadline might cause tension between the two parties and, ultimately,

Figure 1. An attributional model of dysfunctional leadership and leader-member relationship quality

deteriorate the quality of the relationship if a functional leadership solution to the problem is not implemented. We suggest that an examination of leaders’ attributional processes in the context of such situations can help to illustrate the relationship of attributions and functional leadership behaviors. As Figure 1 indicates, a leader’s attributional process begins with the experience or observation of subordinate outcomes or behaviors (e.g. missing a deadline). A causal search process (i.e. the attribution process) is then initiated in order to determine the cause of the outcome or behavior. This process is a function of information obtained from interpersonal feedback and situational factors, as well as individual factors such as attributional biases. The resulting attribution is argued to influence the leader’s emotions toward the subordinate in question. These emotions are thought to help shape the leader’s functional or dysfunctional response. The attributional process depicted in Figure 1 is therefore an episodic model in which leader behaviors responding to specific subordinate-related events are influenced by attributions and emotions. Over time, we suggest that attributional biases held by leaders can consistently lead leaders toward inaccurate attributions and dysfunctional behaviors. We now discuss each step of this process in turn. Subordinate outcomes/behaviors Attribution theory holds that individuals form attributions in order to understand the causes of behaviors and outcomes that are relevant to their lives (Heider, 1958). Weiner (1985a) explained that individuals are therefore most likely to engage in a thorough attributional search when they encounter negative and/or unexpected outcomes or behaviors. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, we expect that leaders will engage in a detailed causal search process when subordinates behave in an unusual way, such as arriving at work late, or when a negative workplace outcome, such as falling short of productivity goals or missing a deadline, occurs. As we explain below, the ensuing causal search involves both an information gathering process and a cognitive appraisal of this information. The attribution process As mentioned, the purpose of the attribution process is to form a perception regarding the cause of relevant outcomes. Research by Weiner et al. (1971) and Abramson et al. (1978) concluded that the causal factors identified in the attribution process could be classified as internal or external, as stable or unstable, and as controllable or uncontrollable. Internal causes are those thought to be inherent in the individual, such as skill or effort whereas external causes are those that are not directly related to an individual, such as luck or chance. Stable causes of outcomes or behaviors are perceived to be constant over time, such as one’s gender or intelligence, whereas unstable causes, such as effort level or luck, are variable over time (Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, 1985b). Finally, controllable causes are those that an individual has direct influence over, such as effort level, as opposed to causes an individual has no control over, such as their intelligence level (Abramson et al., 1978). Thus, in the aforementioned example in which members fail to meet a deadline imposed by their leader, the leader might form a number of different attributions. The leader might attribute the missed deadline to members’ lack of effort (an internal, unstable, and controllable cause) or lack of intelligence (an internal, stable, and

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uncontrollable cause), or to bad luck (an external, unstable, and uncontrollable cause), for instance. Weiner’s (1985b) achievement-motivation model explains that the type of attribution an individual makes can ultimately influence their behavioral response to an outcome, via the affect of attributions on emotions. Before explaining the implications of this attribution-emotion-behavior relationship for dysfunctional leadership, it is important to understand the sources and types of information used to form attributions and the individual factors that can influence the way this information is interpreted. Sources of causal information As shown in Figure 1, we argue that three sources of causal information are particularly important to the process by which leaders form attributions concerning subordinate behaviors and outcomes. First, the situational context of the outcome or behavior must be considered. Second, the actual behavior of the subordinate is analyzed. Third, causal information in the form of feedback from the subordinate might also influence the leader’s attributional process. The situation. The situational context is important because it can provide a significant amount of causal information. In fact, Weiner (1985a) noted that in many instances the situation can give perceivers enough information that a thorough causal search is not needed. For instance, in the example where members have missed a deadline, it may be that an overtly obvious causal factor, such as a power outage, is to blame. In more ambiguous situations, however, there is less causal information available to the leader. In these cases, research indicates that leaders will focus on causal information from the subordinates themselves when forming attributions (Mitchell and Kalb, 1981; Wood and Mitchell, 1981). Subordinate behavior. Kelley’s (1973) model indicates that a subordinate’s behavior provides leaders with three types of information that can be used to form attributions. The first, consensus, describes the extent to which a subordinate’s behavior is similar to others in a given situation. Behaviors that are high in consensus are typically attributed to external situational factors whereas low consensus behaviors are commonly attributed to the subordinate himself or herself. Thus, if one subordinate misses a deadline while each of his peers meets the deadline, Kelly’s model suggests that a leader will attribute the missed deadline to some internal aspect of the subordinate (e.g. lack of effort or ability). Conversely, if every subordinate misses the deadline, it is argued that the outcome will be attributed to a situational factor (e.g. a power outage) that affected everyone’s performance. The second source of information concerns the consistency of a subordinate’s behavior over time. Highly consistent behaviors are logically attributed to stable factors whereas inconsistent behaviors are more likely to be attributed to unstable causes (Kelly, 1973). Thus, if subordinates are consistently punctual in meeting deadlines, missing a single deadline would likely be viewed as an inconsistent behavior and could logically be attributed to some external cause. If subordinates are consistently late with their work, on the other hand, it might be concluded that a missed deadline is a reflection of an internal characteristic that causes subordinates to be inefficient.

Third, the distinctiveness of a subordinate’s behavior across situations can also influence a leader’s causal attribution. Highly distinct behaviors are generally attributed to a specific and unique interaction of the situation with the individual, whereas behaviors that are low in distinctiveness are generally attributed to a global characteristic of the person (e.g. low intelligence) or situation (e.g. poor working conditions) (Martinko and Thomson, 1998). Thus, if an employee is a generally punctual person but always missed deadlines at work, it might be assumed that some unique aspect of the work situation is causing the distinct behavior (i.e. lateness). Conversely, an employee that regularly misses deadlines in every aspect of his or her life, leaders might logically attribute missed deadlines to an internal aspect of the employee (Kelly, 1973). This research suggests that subordinates unintentionally communicate information about the causes of their behavior to their supervisors. Past research also suggests, however, that subordinates frequently attempt to deliberately communicate causal information in form of feedback. Subordinate feedback. Research on impression management indicates that employees frequently attempt to influence their supervisors’ opinions through the use of verbal feedback (Yukl and Tracey, 1992). Attribution theory research suggests that a primary goal of this impression management technique is to manipulate the causal attributions leaders make concerning subordinates’ behaviors and performance. Thus, feedback can be used to guide leaders toward attributing positive outcomes and desirable behaviors to internal, stable, and controllable factors. Conversely, feedback can be used to sway leaders toward attributing negative subordinate outcomes and behaviors to external and uncontrollable factors (Mezulis et al., 2004; Wood and Mitchell, 1981). For instance, if employees miss a deadline they might explain, accurately or inaccurately, that external factors such as competing demands or a lack of resources are to blame, with the intention of avoiding the blame associated with the attribution of such outcomes to internally controllable factors. Leader attributional biases There are a number of individual-level characteristics that are related to an individual’s attribution style. These include gender (e.g. Feldman-Summers and Kiesler, 1974), age (e.g. Ferris et al., 1985; Mezulis et al., 2004), and ethnicity (e.g. Diener and Diener, 1995; Morris and Peng, 1994), among others. However, to keep the focus of our model manageable, we focus on the influence of attributional biases that can influence individuals regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, or other personal characteristics. Attributional biases are defined as tendencies toward erroneously attributing outcomes and behaviors to specific types of causes (Martinko and Gardner, 1987). These biases are important because they can ultimately cause leaders to respond to workplace situations in a dysfunctional manner. Our model focuses on two attributional biases that have been shown to influence leaders’ attributions for subordinate outcomes and behaviors: actor-observer bias and self-serving bias. Actor-observer bias. Jones and Nisbett (1972) defined actor-observer bias as a tendency for observers to consistently attribute the behaviors and outcomes of actors to internal and stable (i.e. dispositional) factors. In the context of our dysfunctional leadership model, leaders represent the observers making the attributions whereas

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subordinates represent the actors. In the case of subordinate behaviors and outcomes, the actor-observer bias can predispose leaders to inaccurately place too much blame on subordinates when failures occur, creating conflict between the two parties (Bernardin, 1989). Self-serving bias. Self-serving attributional bias denotes a tendency to attribute positive outcomes to internal, stable, and possibly controllable aspects of one’s self while attributing negative outcomes to external factors beyond one’s personal control (Zuckerman, 1979; Dobbins and Russell, 1986). Evidence indicates that this bias is especially common in individualistic Western cultures (Mezulis et al., 2004), but has been identified in subjects across the world (Al-Zahnrani and Kaplowitz, 1993; Islam and Hewstone, 1993; Mezulis et al., 2004; Taylor and Jaggi, 1974). Like the actor-observer bias, self-serving attributional tendencies are argued to promote dysfunctional leadership behaviors and to reduce the quality of leader-member relationships. In the case of negative workplace outcomes, leaders exhibiting a self-serving bias are apt to blame subordinates for negative outcomes such as missed deadlines without considering their own personal responsibility for the outcome. Conversely, the self-serving bias can cause leaders to inaccurately attribute positive workplace outcomes to their own internal, stable, and/or controllable factors while overlooking the contributions subordinates made to the outcome. Thus, leaders might attribute desirable subordinate behaviors, such as high levels of productivity, to their own management skills while blaming low levels of subordinate productivity on insufficient subordinate effort. As noted by Martinko and Douglas (1999), either of these situations is likely to frustrate employees, reducing the ability of leaders to interact with subordinates effectively (Medina et al., 2005). Attributional bias and leader emotions Our discussion of attributional biases alluded to the role of emotions in dysfunctional leader-member relationships. In this section we expand on the predicted role of emotions in these relationships by examining the effects of biased attributions in the context of Weiner (1985b) achievement-motivation model. This model predicts that an individual’s emotional response to a behavior or outcome is influenced by one’s causal explanation for the outcome. This relationship is indicated in Figure 1. Weiner predicted that the attribution of negative behaviors or outcomes to externally controllable causes (e.g. a subordinate’s lack of effort toward meeting a deadline) would provoke feelings of anger whereas internally controllable attributions (e.g. the supervisor’s personal lack of effort) for the same behaviors or outcomes would promote feelings of guilt. His model also predicted that feelings of shame are likely when negative outcomes or behaviors are attributed to internal, stable, and uncontrollable factors, such as a lack of intelligence. Given this attribution-emotion framework, we predict that the attributional biases described above will influence both the causal explanations and emotions leaders form in response to subordinate behaviors and outcomes. Specifically, we expect that because leaders demonstrating an actor-observer bias will tend to attribute subordinate behaviors and outcomes to dispositional characteristics of the subordinates, these same leaders will experience feelings of anger in response to negative subordinate outcomes (Weiner, 1985b). We also predict that these attributions

and emotions will be exacerbated by self-serving attributional biases that also influence leaders to attribute negative outcomes to the internal characteristics of their subordinates. Thus: P1.

Leaders whose attribution styles are biased toward either or both actor-observer or self-serving tendencies will experience anger toward their subordinates more frequently than will those with unbiased attribution styles.

Attribution-based emotions and workplace behaviors Weiner’s (1985b) model predicts that individuals’ behavioral reactions to negative behaviors and outcomes are shaped by the attribution-based emotions discussed in the previous section. A number of empirical studies have provided support for the emotion-behavior relationship, indicating the importance of understanding emotional drivers of behavior. Of particular importance to dysfunctional leadership, research by several authors has established a link between feelings of anger and dysfunctional behaviors such as aggression (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997), sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002), and theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 2002; Mars, 1973, 1974). The link between anger and dysfunctional behavioral responses such as these is thought to be a function of expectancies and the desire to alleviate feelings of anger. In terms of expectancies, Weiner et al. (1971) explained that when individuals attribute negative outcomes or behaviors to stable factors under someone else’s control, the perceiver is likely to feel that he or she is unable to prevent a recurrence of the outcome or behavior. This expectation of future helplessness is thought to provoke anger toward the individual or individuals controlling the negative outcome or behavior. Research on workplace deviance also suggests that the relationship between anger and dysfunctional behaviors is driven by revenge motives and the desire to restore equity to a situation. For example, Skarlicki and Folger’s (1997) findings indicated that that employees engage in deviant workplace behaviors such as verbal and physical aggression in response to externally controlled, stable factors such as adverse working conditions as a form of revenge. Kemper (1966) reasoned that these vengeful behaviors are often used to alleviate feelings of anger. Similarly, Mars’ (1973, 1974) findings indicated that employees often engage in dysfunctional behaviors such as theft or sabotage against individuals to whom they attribute a workplace equity imbalance. In the context of dysfunctional leadership, we therefore expect that leaders are most likely to respond to negative subordinate outcomes and behaviors in a counterproductive manner when these outcomes and behaviors are attributed to stable and externally controllable factors. For example, a supervisor might feel angry and become aggressive with subordinates (e.g. yell at them or threaten them) that miss a deadline if the leader believes that the subordinates are lazy and refuse to work hard. This type of response is generally not consistent with effective leadership behaviors (Bennett, 1998), and is likely to be especially harmful if the subordinates are not actually at fault. P2.

The tendency to attribute negative outcomes to the stable and controllable characteristics of subordinates results in anger and leads to dysfunctional leadership behaviors.

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Biased attributions and leader-member relationship quality Perhaps most important to our discussion of dysfunctional leadership and leader-member dyads is the fact that biased attributions can cause conflicts between leaders and subordinates. As noted above, both self-serving and actor-observer biases can cause leaders to incorrectly attribute negative outcomes or behaviors to subordinate characteristics. On the other hand, because of these same biases, subordinates are likely to rely more heavily on situational factors when explaining their undesirable behaviors and outcomes (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). Medina et al.’s (2005) study indicated that this form of relational conflict is associated with negative affective reactions by both leaders and subordinates. As noted above, negative emotions on the part of leaders are predicted to promote dysfunctional behaviors (e.g. yelling at subordinates instead of working with them to remove situational problems). Further, when subordinates themselves feel angry or frustrated, it is likely that even generally successful leadership techniques will be ineffective due to the resentment they might feel toward their leader (Bennett, 1998). Put differently, we suggest that subordinates will become less receptive to motivational leadership behaviors when they experience anger that is directed toward their leaders. A research finding from the LMX literature appears to provide some indirect support for this argument. Specifically, Fairhurst’s (1993) study indicated that as subordinates become detached from their leaders (i.e. become out-group members), they acted and communicated in ways that exacerbated this detachment. As a result, it appears that these members may act in ways that perpetuate their out-group status. In the context of the present discussion, it may be argued that the negative subordinate emotions resulting from attributional conflict with leaders can promote subordinate behaviors that further contribute to dysfunctionality in the leader-member relationship. It therefore appears that leaders who are biased toward attributing negative subordinate behaviors and outcomes to stable and externally controllable factors are likely to introduce conflict into relationships with subordinates. This conflict is expected to produce negative leader emotions that promote dysfunctional leadership behaviors, as well as negative subordinate emotions that reduce their receptiveness to leadership behavior. We therefore predict that the quality of leader-member relationships will be lower as a consequence of biased leader attribution styles. P3.

Leaders demonstrating self-serving or actor-observer attribution styles will experience lower quality relationships with subordinates than will leaders that do not demonstrate these biases.

Reducing attributional bias and promoting functional leadership Based on the preceding explanation of the attributional model shown in Figure 1, we now suggest several techniques leaders can use to manage their biases so that they can foster high quality leader-member relationships. Our suggestions stem from the influence of leader biases, situational factors, and subordinate feedback on leader attributions indicated in our conceptual model.

Awareness of attributional biases It is important to note that individuals are often unaware of the attributional biases they possess. As such, it is likely that many leaders might base their behavioral reactions to subordinate behaviors and outcomes on biased, consistently inaccurate attributions without being aware of this tendency. It is possible, however, for individuals to assess their own attribution styles using publicly available attribution style measures (i.e. Kent and Martinko, 1995; Martinko, 2002). By becoming aware of their attributional biases, we argue that leaders can consciously reevaluate their initial attributions by deliberately taking into account a larger quantity and variety of causal information. Situational considerations As noted above, a detailed causal search is most frequently needed when a high degree of causal ambiguity is present in a situation. Martinko and Gardner (1987) explained that it is in these situations that attributional biases are most likely to negatively affect the accuracy of causal perceptions. We therefore suggest that leaders take steps to reduce the ambiguity present in their workplace situations as a means to reducing the impact of any attributional biases they possess. Reducing ambiguity in this way could involve forming a clear understanding of the exact responsibilities of each subordinate so that employees are not blamed for negative outcomes for which they are not responsible. It is also important that leaders develop an understanding of the causal situational factors that might influence subordinate behaviors. Both the self-serving and the actor-observer biases have the potential to make leaders discount the importance of situational factors in determining the causes of subordinate behaviors and outcomes. Past research has demonstrated this tendency among leaders and has indicated that in order to fully understand the situational causes of employee behavior, leaders must have some level of experience in their subordinates’ work environment (Mitchell and Kalb, 1981). As such, we encourage the implementation of hands-on training programs that require future managers to gain experience performing subordinates’ jobs before acting as a manager. We argue that this experience will give future leaders the familiarity with situational factors facing employees needed to form objective attributions for subordinate behaviors and outcomes. Feedback in the attribution process Finally, we suggest that leaders consider feedback from subordinates and other knowledgeable sources before forming conclusions about workplace outcomes and behaviors. In terms of subordinate feedback, although it is important for leaders to take into account the possibility of subordinates using impression management techniques to influence their leaders’ attributions (Wood and Mitchell, 1981; Martinko, 2002), we argue that subordinate feedback can be beneficial in forming accurate attributions. The logic behind this argument again relates to the tendency of biased managers to overlook situational factors when forming causal explanations for subordinates’ behaviors and outcomes. Because subordinates are more likely to be aware of these situational factors than their supervisors are (e.g. Bernardin, 1989), it is reasonable to predict that they can communicate important causal information that leaders might otherwise overlook.

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For instance, a supervisor might assume that a low consensus behavior such as one employee missing a deadline is due to a lack of effort and experience negative emotions toward that employee. The employee, however, might be able to provide information regarding mitigating situational information such as defective equipment that might have contributed to the outcome. With this information, the leader can form a more accurate attribution and respond in a functional manner (fixing or replacing the equipment in this example). Similarly, feedback from other individuals that are familiar with a subordinate’s working conditions and performance may also be helpful in promoting unbiased leader attributions. A number of recent studies have indicated that multi-source feedback (e.g. “360-degree” feedback) promotes thorough and accurate performance data (Luthans and Peterson, 2003). As such, we suggest that soliciting performance information from numerous sources will allow leaders to base their causal attributions on accurate data as opposed to biased perceptions. Limitations and suggestions for future research To the extent possible, we have based our model and recommendations on empirically supported arguments. Some aspects of our model, however, are supported by logical arguments and theories but have not been subjected to direct empirical study in leadership contexts. This specifically applies to the attribution-emotion link proposed by Weiner (1985b) and other researchers. We suggest that future research attempt to verify this component of our model in an experimental setting. We also suggest that future research expand upon the model presented here by considering the impact of attributional biases among subordinates on the functionality of leader-member relationships. This suggestion is in line with that of several scholars who have argued that conceptualizations of leadership should include the attributions of followers (Hollander and Offerman, 1990; House and Aditya, 1997). In the context of dysfunctional leadership, we have argued that negative subordinate emotions caused by conflicts with leaders can reduce the motivational effectiveness of leadership behaviors. Following the logic of P1, subordinates might also form negative leader-focused attributions in response to their own biased attributions for undesirable leader behaviors and outcomes. Although a full discussion of this potentially complex interaction between leader and subordinate attributions and biases was beyond the scope of the present paper, we hope that our conceptual model can serve as a starting point for building our understanding of the perceptual dynamics involved with functional and dysfunctional leader-member relationships. Conclusion In this paper we have tried to identify, explain, and integrate some of the factors that we believe to be most salient in promulgating dysfunctional leadership. In particular, we have stressed that although objective information often provides a stimulus for leader behavior, it is the leader’s cognitive appraisal of these factors that is crucial in determining whether or not the leader’s reactions to the situational factors and subordinate behavior are functional or dysfunctional. In particular, we have stressed that leaders’ susceptibility to the actor-observer and self-serving biases can precipitate dysfunctional leader behaviors with biases toward internal and stable attributions for

subordinate failure that lead to unjustified anger as the most debilitating type of attributions. Most importantly, we believe and have explained that the negative effects of dysfunctional leader behaviors can be ameliorated through attributional training as well as informational strategies that help leaders become aware of and attenuate the tendencies to act upon the attributions resulting from the self-serving and actor-observer biases. References Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E. and Teasdale, J.D. (1978), “Learned helplessness in humans: critique and reformulation”, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 87, pp. 49-74. Al-Zahnrani, S.S. and Kaplowitz, S.A. (1993), “Attributional biases in individualistic and collectivistic societies: a comparison of Americans and Saudis”, Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 56, pp. 223-33. Ambrose, M.L., Seabright, M.A. and Schminke, M. (2002), “Sabotage in the workplace: the role of organizational injustice”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 89, pp. 947-65. Barry, B. and Crant, J.M. (2000), “Dyadic communication relationships in organizations: an attribution/expectancy approach”, Organization Science, Vol. 11, pp. 638-44. Bennett, R.J. (1998), “Perceived powerlessness as a cause of employee deviance”, in Griffin, R.W., O’Leary-Kelly, A. and Collins, J.M. (Eds), Dysfunctional Behavior in Organizations: Violent and Deviant Behavior, Vol. 23, Part A, JAI Press, Stamford, CT, pp. 221-40. Bernardin, H.J. (1989), “Increasing the accuracy of performance measurement: a proposed solution to erroneous attributions”, Human Resource Planning, Vol. 12, pp. 239-50. Bourantas, D. and Papalexandris, N. (1990), “Sex differences in leadership: leadership styles and subordinate satisfaction”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 7-11. Diener, E. and Diener, M. (1995), “Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 68, pp. 653-63. Dienesch, R.M. and Liden, R.C. (1986), “Leader-member exchange model of leadership: a critique and further development”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, pp. 618-34. Dobbins, G.H. and Russell, J.M. (1986), “Self-serving biases in leadership: a laboratory experiment”, Journal of Management, Vol. 12, pp. 475-83. Douglas, S.C. and Martinko, M.J. (2001), “Exploring the role of individual differences in the prediction of workplace aggression”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 86, pp. 547-59. Fadil, P.A. (1995), “The effect of cultural-stereotypes on leader attributions of minority subordinates”, Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 7, pp. 193-208. Fairhurst, G.T. (1993), “The leader-member exchange patterns of women leaders in industry”, Communication Monographs, Vol. 60, pp. 1-31. Feldman-Summers, S. and Kiesler, S.B. (1974), “Those who are number two try harder: the effect of sex on attributions of causality”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 30, pp. 846-55. Ferris, G.R., Yates, V.L., Gilmore, D.C. and Rowland, K.M. (1985), “The influence of subordinate age on performance ratings and causal attributions”, Personnel Psychology, Vol. 38, pp. 545-57. Gillespie, N.A. and Mann, L. (2004), “Transformational leadership and shared values: the building blocks of trust”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 19, pp. 588-607.

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Mars, G. (1973), “Chance, punters, and the fiddle: institutionalized pilferage in a hotel dining room”, in Warner, M. (Ed.), The Sociology of the Workplace, Halsted Press, New York, NY, pp. 200-10. Mars, G. (1974), “Dock pilferage: a case study in occupational theft”, in Rock, P. and McIntosh, M. (Eds), Deviance and Social Control, Tavistock Institute, London, pp. 209-28. Martinko, M.J. (2002), Thinking Like a Winner: A Guide to High Performance Leadership, Gulf Coast Publishing, Tallahassee, FL. Martinko, M.J. and Douglas, S.C. (1999), “Culture and expatriate failure: an attributional explanation”, International Journal of Organizational Analysis, Vol. 7, pp. 265-93. Martinko, M.J. and Gardner, W.L. (1987), “The leader/member attribution process”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, pp. 235-49. Martinko, M.J. and Thomson, N. (1998), “A synthesis of the Kelley and Weiner attribution model”, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 20, pp. 271-84. Medina, F.J., Munduate, L., Dorado, M.A., Martı´nez, I. and Guerra, J.M. (2005), “Types of intragroup conflict and affective reactions”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 20, pp. 219-30. Mezulis, A.H., Abramson, L.Y., Hyde, J.S. and Hankin, B.L. (2004), “Is there a universal positivity bias in attributions? A meta-analytic review of individual, developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias”, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 130, pp. 711-47. Mitchell, T.R. and Kalb, L.S. (1981), “Effects of outcome knowledge and outcome valence on supervisors’ evaluations”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 66, pp. 604-12. Morgan, F.P. (2005), “The external leadership of self-managing teams: intervening in the context of novel and disruptive events”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 90, pp. 497-508. Morris, M.W. and Peng, K. (1994), “Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for social and physical events”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 67, pp. 949-71. O’Leary-Kelly, A., Griffin, R.W. and Glew, D.J. (1996), “Organization-motivated aggression: a research framework”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, pp. 225-53. Paul, J., Strbiak, C.A. and Landrum, N.E. (2002), “Psychoanalytic diagnosis of top management team dysfunction”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 17, pp. 381-93. Phillips, A.S. and Bedian, A.G. (1994), “Leader-follower exchange quality: the role of personal and interpersonal attributes”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 990-1001. Skarlicki, D.P. and Folger, R. (1997), “Retaliation in the workplace: the roles of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 82, pp. 434-43. Taylor, D.M. and Jaggi, V. (1974), “Ethnocentrism and causal attribution in a south Indian context”, Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 162-71. Tepper, B.J., Duffy, M.K., Hoobler, J. and Ensley, M.D. (2004), “Moderators of the relationships between coworkers’ organizational citizenship behavior and fellow employees’ attitudes”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 89, pp. 455-65. Townsend, J., Philips, J.S. and Elkins, T.J. (2000), “Employee retaliation: the neglected consequences of poor leader-member relations”, Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 457-63. Weiner, B. (1985a), “‘Spontaneous’ causal thinking”, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 97, pp. 74-84. Weiner, B. (1985b), “An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion”, Psychological Review, Vol. 97, pp. 548-73.

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Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S. and Rosenbaum, R.M. (1971), Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure, General Learning Press, Morristown, NJ. Wilhelm, C.C., Herd, A.M. and Steiner, D.D. (1993), “Attributional conflict between managers and subordinates: an investigation of leader-member exchange effects”, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 14, pp. 531-44. Wood, R.E. and Mitchell, T.R. (1981), “Manager behavior in a social context: the impact of impression management on attributions and disciplinary action”, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 28, pp. 356-78. Yukl, G. and Tracey, J.B. (1992), “Consequences of influence tactics used with subordinates, peers, and the boss”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77, pp. 525-35. Zuckerman, M. (1979), “Attribution of success and failure revisited, or the motivational bias is alive and well in attribution theory”, Journal of Personality, Vol. 47, pp. 245-87. Further reading Martinko, M.J., Douglas, S.C., Ford, R. and Gundlach, M.J. (2002), “Dues paying: a theoretical explication and conceptual model”, Journal of Management, Vol. 30, pp. 49-69. Corresponding author Paul Harvey can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Internal terrorists: the terrorists inside organizations

Internal terrorists

David D. Van Fleet School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University at the West Campus, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, and

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Ella W. Van Fleet Professional Business Associates, Scottsdale, Arizona, USA Abstract Purpose – The paper aims to expand and extend previous work on the role of employees who act in non-violent ways to achieve their personal ends through inducing fear in others in organizations. Design/methodology/approach – The literature surrounding internal terrorists is reviewed and preliminary survey results are presented to support the conclusions derived from that literature. Findings – A model is developed that more carefully identifies how the role of internal terrorists comes about and why they are more likely to engage in non-violent as opposed to violent behavior. Research limitations/implications – Research is needed to identify those aspects of organizations that seem to foster or “bring out” violent and non-violent internal terrorists. Given the differences between internal terrorists and other terrorists, more careful study of those two groups is clearly needed. Since most terrorists express feelings of injustice, stronger links should be attempted between the research on organizational justice and internal terrorism. Just as employee theft has been linked to perceived injustice, so, too, internal terrorism may be linked to higher levels of such perceived injustice. Practical implications – Research is needed to indicate how terrorism evolves over time as well as what measures seem to be most effective in countering such developments within organizations. Of particular interest to practitioners would be determining the extent to which profit-seeking versus non-profit organizations accommodate internal terrorists and the extent to which gender matches between the internal terrorist and the target person are common. Originality/value – This paper fills a gap in the literature about the role of internal terrorists by delineating more fully the dysfunctional role those individuals play in organizations. Keywords Terrorism, Violence, Fear, Organizations, Internal conflict Paper type Conceptual paper

Terrorism in the business world was previously an issue that dealt with a few companies operating overseas who occasionally had to deal with political and criminal terrorists of foreign countries (Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998; O’Hare, 1994). However, our shrinking world is leading to a growing “collision of cultures, political ideologies, religious doctrines, economic struggles, and national-security measures” that increase the likelihood of terrorism for all organizations (Bowman, 1994, p. xvii). Thus, terrorism is rapidly becoming a domestic problem for a potentially large number of organizations (Blair et al., 2004; Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1996; O’Hare, 1994). This situation plus the fact that dysfunctional leaders can foster terrorists within their organizations (internal terrorists) makes it imperative that managers everywhere develop their knowledge of terrorism in general, as well as internal terrorists in particular.

Journal of Managerial Psychology Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006 pp. 763-774 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0268-3946 DOI 10.1108/02683940610713280

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Terrorism has been studied relatively infrequently by academics, except for international political terrorism for which a growing body of literature now exists (see, e.g. Alexander and Swetnam, 2001; Alexander, 1992; Cooley, 1999; Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman, 1992; Jenkins, 1978; Laqueur, 1987; Merkl, 1986; and Pillar, 2001). The newness of the topic in academic literature is reflected in the fact that the Psychological Abstracts had “no reference to terrorism or to related terms, such as ‘hostages’ or ‘hijacking’, until the end of 1981” (Merari, 1991, p. 91). While terrorism had been studied by psychologists for some time (e.g. Gurr, 1970), articles reporting research on terrorists or terrorism in journals that are indexed by the Psychological Abstracts did not appear with any substantial frequency until the 1980’s (Merari, 1991, p. 91). The primary reason for the scarcity of research in this area is that it is difficult to conduct research on a phenomenon that is highly diverse, very unpredictable, and relatively infrequent, even if its consequences are lasting and, in some cases, quite substantial (Merari, 1991). It is also clearly dangerous to conduct field studies of actual terrorists or terrorist organizations, yet some of that kind of work has been done (Jamieson, 1990; Soule, 1989), including a study of terrorist finances (Adams, 1986). Some forms of terrorism can be linked to other forms of dysfunctional behavior such as workplace violence, but that is not true of all forms of terrorism (Reich, 1990). Additionally, the definition of terrorism is changing to encompass more forms of dysfunctional behavior (Cooper, 2001). A few new journals are focusing on terrorism, although most of those are devoted primarily to international political terrorism, and little theoretical development has occurred. The potential for theory development and research will expand as the definition expands.

A definition of terrorism The practice of terrorism is quite old (Geifman, 1992), but the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” are only about 200 years old (Laqueur, 1987). Even though the terms are relatively new, there were “109 different definitions [of terrorism and/or terrorist] provided by various writers between 1936 and 1981” (Laqueur, 1987, p. 143). Those definitions include anyone who attempts to further his or her views by a system of coercive intimidation (Johnson, 1986, p. 31); and a person who commits an act of violence, be it sabotage, murder, or kidnapping, against an organization’s facilities or personnel (Scotti, 1986, p. 5). Some definitions include only “politically motivated” acts of violence (Bowman, 1994, p. 11) while others include any act of violence or the threat of violence coupled with an intention to create fear (Scotti, 1986, p. 3). The word “terror” means extreme fear, and virtually all definitions include coercion and/or fear. Terrorism, then, involves the use of fear to intimidate or coerce, to influence policy, or to affect the operation of governments or organizations and generally, although not always, will involve violent or dangerous actions. From these various attempts to define terrorism, we developed this definition (Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998): Terrorism refers to intentional, premeditated, and sometimes retaliatory, actions on the part of one or more individuals to create extreme stress or fear among others that lasts long enough to accomplish the purpose of furthering the perpetrator’s own views.

Internal terrorism versus other dysfunctional/antisocial behaviors Internal terrorism is different from most other forms of dysfunctional behavior in that it always involves the intent to evoke fear or extreme stress for the purpose of bringing about change that reflects the perpetrator’s own views. It is intended to evoke fear in members of the organization in general or its management in particular in an effort to achieve the terrorist’s goals. Single, isolated incidents of criminal or aggressive behavior or workplace violence are unlikely to create a climate of fear sufficiently longlasting and strong enough to bring about the change necessary to accomplish the terrorist’s goal. Consequently, terrorism generally involves repeated actions that require planning (intentional, premeditated actions) to some degree. Antisocial behavior is generally regarded as the broadest category of dysfunctional behavior, referring to “any behavior that brings harm, or is intended to bring harm, to an organization, its employees, or stakeholders” (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997, p. vii). Deviant or dysfunctional behavior thus falls within the broader category of antisocial behavior. Many of the behaviors associated with dysfunctional/antisocial behavior involve violence, but not all of them do (e.g. alcohol use, smoking, and inappropriate tardiness). Violent behavior, then, is a subset of dysfunctional/antisocial behavior (see, e.g. Lopez and Griffin, 2004). Terrorism is yet another subset, one that overlaps both the violent behavior set and the non-violent behavior set. Although all terrorism is obviously dysfunctional, most forms of dysfunctional/antisocial behavior clearly do not involve terrorism. No set of definitions can eliminate all overlap among categories of such behavior, so it is important that each researcher clearly articulates the definition being employed. The dimensions of terrorism The different definitions suggest variation along the several dimensions of terrorism, including the following: . The degree of harm associated with the fear and stress that the terrorist intentionally creates. Some terrorists do not care who lives or dies or what is damaged as a result of their acts while others use only psychological warfare – no physical harm to people or property – to pursue their goals. . The victim(s) who will be sacrificed to help achieve the terrorist’s goals. The intended victim could be an organization (Planned Parenthood, a logging company, a university), a part of an organization (an agency, department, or bureau), a local branch or other physical facility of an organization (an office, plant). The intended victim(s) could also be either a group of individuals (formal or informal) or a single individual who is a pivotal or powerful person perceived to be interfering with or blocking the accomplishment of the terrorist’s goals. In addition, one or more individuals could be “innocent” bystanders with no connection to the issue at hand but who nevertheless are injured or harmed by the terrorist’s actions. . The nature of the terrorist’s goals. The goals themselves could be lofty, superordinate goals such as world peace, disarmament, ecological balance, the betterment of social processes, or the like. Or they could be far more mundane like getting money, a promotion, a favorable transfer or assignment, the removal of a coworker, and so on. In the latter cases, invariably the motives are couched

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in terms of helping others, although it usually does not take a careful investigation to discern that the primary beneficiary is the perpetrator. Terrorism inside an organization can thus be differentiated from employee or occupational crime, which is generally regarded as a subset of white-collar crime which in turn is different from corporate crime (Holtfreter, 2005; Sutherland, 1940). Corporate crime refers to those crimes committed by members of an organization to benefit the organization. White-collar crime refers to those crimes committed by higher-ranking members of an organization to benefit themselves. Occupational or employee crime refers to those crimes committed by members of an organization (generally lower ranking) that are intended to benefit the perpetrators to the detriment of the organization. While some overlap may exist between internal terrorism and occupational crime, they do differ. Occupational crime usually is committed to benefit the perpetrator immediately and directly whereas internal terrorism consists of repeated acts or behaviors conducted to create fear in others in the organization that will eventually benefit the terrorist: Occupational crimes include: . espionage, defined as the theft or unauthorized acquisition of secret or restricted information; . kickbacks or payments or favors given clandestinely to decision-makers in return for selecting the offender’s products or services; and . fraud of one or more of three broad types – asset misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent statements. Related to these are: . embezzlement, pilferage, and theft of services; . sabotage, robbery, burglary, larceny; and . crimes involving or using computers. Categories of terrorists Based on the above, then, the following are categories of terrorists (derived from Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998). It should be noted that the categories overlap as does membership: . Political terrorists and religious fanatics – the oldest type of terrorists. . Average citizen turned terrorist – Related to political terrorists, the ordinary citizens who frequently turn terrorist are members of environmental, anti-nuclear, animal rights, anti-abortion, anti-government, or religious groups who have come to feel that “working within the system” is unsatisfactory, so the only recourse is violent action. . Criminals acting as terrorists – While propounding political views, criminals as terrorists create fear and intimidation through their terrorist acts for the purpose of obtaining large sums of money quickly. In other words, these are criminals who use political excuses to mask their criminal motivations.

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Insane terrorists – Aptly named, insane terrorists are individuals suffering from psychological disorders and are frequently “copy cats” desiring attention more than making a point or seeking money (Scotti, 1986). Acting irrationally, they use violent tactics such as shooting, bombing, or kidnapping, and their goals may be only remotely or strangely related to the targets they choose (or to the people who become the inadvertent victims). Internal terrorists or psycho-terrorists – Internal terrorists (also sometimes termed “organizational terrorists”, see, for example McCurley and Vineyard, 1998) or psycho-terrorists are members, former members, or other constituents of an organization who use gossip, political tactics, harassment, intimidation, and threats to create a climate of fear that will enable them to further their own objectives within an organization (Kinney, 1995, p. 96). More colloquially, they are referred to as cancers within organizations although they frequently present such a positive face to many that they may have many supporters.

Because this latter form of terrorism is generally nonviolent, it gets little attention in either the academic literature or the press. Nevertheless, it is a formidable and growing aspect of organizational life with which managers must learn to cope. The purpose of this paper is to focus on this latter group, hopefully to provide a better understanding of it. The internal terrorist Griffin and Lopez (2004) have proposed that all individuals enter organizations with some potential predisposition to exhibit violent behaviors (see also Denenberg and Braverman, 1999). Those predispositions could range from very low (even zero) levels to very high ones that could easily lead to violent behavior. Further, they suggest that organizations (or parts of organizations or particularly dysfunctional leaders within organizations) create internal environments (cultures or climates) that either diminish or hold in check such predispositions or inflame them (see also Litzky et al., 2006). Thus, a 2 £ 2 conceptual scheme underlies their work and that of others. Indeed, because most of the literature focuses on workplace violence or terrorism itself, it is really focusing only on the cell consisting of individuals with a high predisposition toward violence in organizations that engender or inflame such violence or terrorism (see also Van Fleet and Griffin, 2006). We propose that it would be useful to expand that model from a 2 £ 2 to the 3 £ 2 model shown in Figure 1. In this modelthe two columns represent the organizational predispositions as proposed by Griffin and Lopez (2004), and that the first and third rows correspond to the two types of individuals described above. The main difference, then, is that a middle row is now added. That middle row represents individuals who, while they have a low predisposition toward violence, have a high willingness to engage in non-violent behaviors that cause fear in others as a way of achieving their own particular goals. These are the individuals identified earlier as internal terrorists, and they are the focus of this paper. Internal terrorists prey upon the fears of managers trying to cope with ever-changing task and general environments as well as a maze of legal constraints. Typically, these terrorists are intelligent and creative individuals who understand the line between behavior that is legally permissible and that which is not. They may try to

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Figure 1. A framework of person-situation determinants of violent behavior in organizations

get others to speak up while they remain quietly behind the scenes, thus minimizing their own risk. They will attempt to mask their real goals by hiding behind a legitimate issue that they anticipate the group will support. They may use anonymous letters, notes, and/or memos to lend credence to their ideas or to discredit others. In like manner, they may simply spread malicious gossip to discredit ideas or people. They may perform favors for others in an attempt to co-opt those other workers to support the terrorist’s goals. In any event, their goal is personal gain, and their tactic is to create a climate of fear – to terrorize the organization – in a relatively low-key, non-violent manner, and without bringing undue legal attention upon themselves (Kinney, 1995, p. 96). An example of this sort of internal terrorist is an employee who threatens legal action when his or her unjustified requests are turned down, whether they be relatively simple requests such as a change in procedure or time off for personal business, or larger demands such as a change in assignment, a promotion, or a salary increase that would most likely constitute favoritism or reverse discrimination. Similarly, an individual who possesses vital information or company secrets that, if divulged, would significantly harm the company may attempt to use that knowledge for personal purposes and hence become a terrorist within the organization. These terrorists may also be employees in powerful positions within the organization who are “bullies” and

accustomed to using such tactics in all of their interpersonal interactions to “get their way”. Yet another example of the internal terrorist is the employee who attempts to discredit someone or some organization by intentionally spreading false or misleading information. The use of slander and misinformation campaigns, especially through the use of computers, is increasing (Naylis, 1996). For example, a disgruntled employee may threaten to discredit the company in the eyes of customers so that they will not buy the company’s products or services. If the objective is to create fear in management, the act is clearly terrorism; if not, it is “only” yet another form of workplace violence, sabotage, or dysfunctional behavior in organizations. All of these acts could be accomplished by e-mail or the internet. The internet already is a powerful tool as a means of instilling fear in individuals and organizations. A simple message or suggestion posted online can cause a public-relations nightmare or worse for an organization. Because of its speed, considerable damage can be done before the organization even knows something has been said. Therefore, companies are beginning to learn that they must monitor the internet sometimes more zealously than they monitor their physical premises. Disgruntled individuals simply raise a question or pass along an alleged comment, e.g. “I’ve heard that XYZ’s new Product X is good on Criterion A but is severely lacking on Criterion B. Has anybody out there tried it?” Readers tend to focus on Product X’s suggested weakness, posting questions and concerns at other sites. Another tactic, “mailbox stuffing” or “bombing,” can effectively shut down a company’s online operations, costing it both dollars and goodwill. Unfortunately, the company learns about this only when it attempts to use its e-mail. This tactic seems to be one of the more common forms of internet revenge. In February 1997, the nation’s largest e-mail provider, America Online (AOL), was itself the threatened victim of vindictive hackers (CNET Staff, 1997). In a potential St. Valentine’s Day cyberspace massacre, electronic intruders warned AOL customers that their accounts would be canceled if they attempted to go online on February 14. Cryptic e-mail messages also warned that computer viruses would be planted and chat rooms would be paralyzed, apparently through an electronic attack technique called “scrolling,” which moves the on-screen text so rapidly that it is unreadable. While this particular attempt was unsuccessful, this is a type of attack that internal terrorists could use. Perhaps the more frightening kind of internal terrorist is the one who makes phone calls or leaves threatening notes implying violence, lawsuits or other legal actions, or other actions potentially harmful to the organization. Threat management and security firms can work with mental health providers to investigate and monitor these individuals (Kinney, 1995, p. 96), but because of the more obvious possibility of violence many organizations react to these individuals more rapidly and with greater concern than those that seem to present no violent threat. In today’s complex, global world, organizations are becoming more difficult to control. The phone, e-mail, and the internet have given managers the illusion that they can control far-flung empires. But modern communications and the growth of web logs and web bulletin boards in particular, have also given power to bitter or disgruntled employees, customers, and suppliers. Think of it as a proliferation of weapons to internal terrorists.

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Most people perceive themselves as paid too little, promoted too slowly, passed over, humiliated, easily replaceable, and generally not particularly well thought of or rewarded for their loyalty. They haven’t realized their dreams, and they blame everyone around them and above them in particular. Asymmetric warfare has come to the workplace – managers may sometimes have the power to hire and fire, but employees have the internet. Is that a good thing? Possibly not. Large organizations may well become more conservative, bureaucratic, and/or paranoid – so concerned about maintaining a happy workplace that they avoid necessary change and fall behind markets or technological developments. Smaller organizations, on the other hand, may be able to take advantage of this and develop through growth in the marketplace. In like manner customers and suppliers frequently feel that they are getting squeezed – asked to pay more or provide more or do it faster without any corresponding benefit to them. They, too may turn to anonymous letter writing or blogging (participating in web logs) on the internet to try to harm the organization, again to create an atmosphere of fear so that they can accomplish their objects through fear and intimidation – internal terrorism. A survey In a preliminary effort to ascertain the reality of internal terrorism, a simple questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample of members of organizations. That questionnaire asked if the individual had ever observed an individual or group attempting to use fear to “get their way” in the organization and, if so, to describe the incident and then provide some minimal (and non-disclosing) demographic information about those involved. A total of 361 people were contacted, most of whom could think of bosses who used fear as a motivational “whip” (usually termed “bully bosses”) and 162 of whom identified non-managerial individuals or groups attempting (and sometimes succeeding) in using fear to get their way in organizations. Interestingly, 72.8 percent of the respondents observed or experienced the event in a non-profit organization; whether this reflected the distribution of employing organizations or the distribution of such behavior could not be determined in this preliminary study. The person using the tactic was slightly more likely to be a male (54.9 percent) and the target also was more likely to be a male (62.3 percent), which may be simply a function of the larger number of male employees in the organizations. The gender of the parties involved generally matched (51.2 percent of the events involved the same gender on both sides). Those responding to the questionnaire were frequently involved (53.1 percent) and were somewhat likely to be the recipients (42.0 percent), although some respondents did not indicate whether or not they were involved. Consider these examples from among those surveyed: . A member of a country club was upset with an employee and demanded he be fired. The club manager would not fire the employee so the member threatened to sue the club to recover his membership fees. I observed the confrontation between the manager and member. It was successful because the threat of a lawsuit got the club’s attention and they worked out a compromise. . I observed a bookkeeper help to get her manager to quit because she did not like how he was changing things. She did so using her connections to corporate

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management and passive aggressive behavior. When the manager tried to change a procedure or practice, she continued to follow the old proceedings, causing a loss in efficiency due to lack of uniform process. She then went absent for two weeks leaving the manager to do her job as well as his own. Finally, when she returned, it was with news that corporate management fully supported her actions. A coworker of mine used fear to get promoted. He accidentally saw one of the top managers in the company with a lady who was not his wife. The manager was afraid for his marriage, so when my coworker asked for a promotion and reminded him that he has seen him with another woman, the boss promoted him right away. All of the people working in my department are of the same race except one lady who is of a different ethnic group. She is not working as hard as she is supposed to. She misses deadlines and leaves work early. As a result the other people in the department have to work harder and do part of her job. When my supervisor tried to fire her, she said that the supervisor is racist and that she will sue him if he goes through with it. The manager decided to let her keep her job because he is afraid that she will win in court since she is the only one of a different race to work for the company.

Research needed There have been calls for research on international terrorism that could help to “break the cycle whereby successive generations of terrorists follow each other into prolonged, bloody, and pointless struggles” (Hoffman, 1992, p. 29). Similar research is needed to identify those aspects of organizations that seem to foster or “bring out” violent and non-violent internal terrorists. Merari (1991, p. 89) suggests that “the heterogeneity of the terroristic phenomena makes descriptive, explanatory and predictive generalizations, which are the ultimate products of scientific research, inherently questionable.” Nevertheless, research is needed to indicate how terrorism evolves over time as well as what measures seem to be most effective in countering such developments within organizations. Crenshaw’s (2000) research on terrorist decision-making is clearly in this direction. Research needs to be carefully focused – “circumscribed” and “carefully delineated” – to be more useful than large, complex models have been (Rule, 1988, p. 268). Crenshaw (1992, p. 10) has called for research that has “more precision and specification”. She enumerates several suggestions for such research among which are: . focusing on only one category or classification of terrorism rather than trying to cover all of them in a single study; . studying the mix of instrumental and expressive or emotional motives used by terrorists; and . the identification of turning points from nonviolent to violent action. The differences between internal terrorists and other terrorists are significant enough to suggest that findings for other terrorists are not likely to be true for internal terrorists. Given the differences in apparent motivations among the types of terrorists, more careful study of those motivations is also clearly needed. Furthermore, since most

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terrorists express feelings of injustice, stronger links should be attempted between the research on organizational justice (Greenberg, 1990) and internal terrorism. Just as Greenberg (1996) has linked employee theft to perceived injustice, so, too, internal terrorism may be linked to higher levels of such perceived injustice. Indeed, most if not all of the forms of antisocial organizational behaviors (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997) for which research is on-going – arson, blackmail, bribery, espionage, extortion, fraud, interpersonal violence, lying, sabotage, and theft, for example – could be forms of internal terrorism if the motivation underlying them is to evoke fear in an effort to achieve the terrorist’s goals. Finally, the turning points from nonviolent to violent action could be studied through expanding already existing research on topics such as revenge (Barreca, 1995), “reaching the breaking point” (Bies et al., 1997), and “snapping” (Conway and Siegelman, 1995) to establish the point (set of conditions) at which anti-social behavior becomes terrorist behavior. Developing linkages between research on other forms of dysfunctional behavior and terrorist behavior will greatly expand our understanding of internal terrorism, leading to better theoretical and practical information. Finally, the tentative findings from the survey reported here need replication over a broader range of organizations and people. Particularly worth determining would be the extent to profit-seeking versus non-profit organizations accommodate internal terrorists and the extent to which gender matches between the internal terrorist and the target person are common. References Adams, J. (1986), The Financing of Terror, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY. Alexander, Y. (Ed.) (1992), International Terrorism: Political and Legal Documents, M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht/Boston, MA. Alexander, Y. and Swetnam, M.S. (2001), Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY. Barreca, R. (1995), Sweet Revenge: The Wicked Delights of Getting Even, Harmony Press, New York, NY. Bies, R.J., Tripp, T.M. and Kramer, R.M. (1997), “At the breaking point: cognitive and social dynamics of revenge in organizations”, in Giacalone, R.A. and Greenberg, J. (Eds), Antisocial Behavior in Organizations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 18-36. Blair, J.D., Fottler, M.D. and Zapanta, A.C. (2004), Bioterrorism, Preparedness, Attack and Response, Elsevier, Amsterdam. Bowman, S. (1994), When the Eagle Screams, Birch Lane Press Book/Carol Publishing Group, New York, NY. Conway, F. and Siegelman, J. (1995), Snapping, 2nd ed., Stillpoint Press, New York, NY. Cooley, J.K. (1999), Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, Pluto Press, London. Cooper, H. (2001), “Terrorism: the problem of definition revisited”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 44 No. 6, pp. 881-93. CNET Staff (1997), available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1023-270979.html?legacy=cnet Crenshaw, M. (1992), “Current research on terrorism: the academic perspective”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, pp. 1-11.

Crenshaw, M. (2000), “The psychology of terrorism: an agenda for the 21st century”, Political Psychology, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 405-20. Denenberg, R.V. and Braverman, M. (1999), The Violence Prone Workplace, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Geifman, A. (1992), “Aspects of early twentieth-century Russian terrorism: the socialist-revolutionary combat organization”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 4, Summer, p. 223. Giacalone, R.A. and Greenberg, J. (1997), Antisocial Behavior in Organizations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. Greenberg, J. (1990), “Organizational justice: yesterday, today, and tomorrow”, Journal of Management, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 399-432. Greenberg, J. (1996), The Quest for Justice on the Job, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. Griffin, R.W. and Lopez, Y.P. (2004), “Toward a model of the person-situation determinants of deviant behavior in organizations”, paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA. Gurr, T.T. (1970), Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Hoffman, B. (1992), “Current research on terrorism and low-intensity conflict”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, pp. 25-37. Hoffman, B. (1998), Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, NY. Holtfreter, K. (2005), “Employee crimes”, in Salinger, L.M. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime, Vol. 1, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 284-8. Jamieson, A. (1990), “Identity and morality in the Italian Red Brigades”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 508-20. Jenkins, B. (1978), International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. Johnson, P. (1986), “The cancer of terrorism”, in Netanyahu, B. (Ed.), Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Straus Giroux, Farrar, NY, pp. 31-7. Kinney, J.A. (1995), Violence at Work, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Laqueur, W. (1987), The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, MA. Litzky, B.E., Eddleston, K.A. and Kidder, D.L. (2006), “The good, the bad, and the misguided: how managers inadvertently encourage deviant behaviors”, The Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 91-103. Lopez, Y.P. and Griffin, R.W. (2004), “A person-situation model of organizational violence”, Proceedings of the Southern Management Association, San Antonio, pp. 3-8. McCurley, S. and Vineyard, S. (1998), Handling Problem Volunteers, Heritage Arts Publishing/VMSystems, Downers Grove, IL. Merari, A. (1991), “Academic research and government policy on terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 88-102. Merkl, P. (1986), Political Violence and Terror, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Naylis, G.J. (1996), “Corporate terrorism: managing the threat”, Risk Management, Vol. 43 No. 6, pp. 24-48. O’Hare, D. (1994), “The rise of kidnap and ransom risk”, Risk Management, Vol. 41 No. 7, pp. 83-90. Pillar, P.R. (2001), Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.

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Reich, W. (Ed.) (1990), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. Rule, J.B. (1988), Theories of Civil Violence, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Scotti, A.J. (1986), Executive Safety and International Terrorism: A Guide for Travelers, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Soule, J.W. (1989), “Problems in applying counterterrorism to prevent terrorism: two decades of violence in Northern Ireland reconsidered”, Terrorism, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 31-46. Sutherland, E.H. (1940), “White-collar criminality”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 5, pp. 1-12. Van Fleet, D.D. and Griffin, R.W. (2006), “Dysfunctional organization culture: the role of leadership in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 21 No. 8, pp. 118-29. Van Fleet, D.D. and Van Fleet, E.W. (1996), Workplace Violence: Moving toward Minimizing Risks (Curriculum Module 96-002), Minerva Education Institute, Cincinnati, OH. Van Fleet, E.W. and Van Fleet, D.D. (1998), “Terrorism and the workplace: concepts and recommendations”, in Griffin, R.W., O’Leary-Kelly, A. and Collins, J. (Eds), Dysfunctional Behavior in Organizations: Violent and Deviant Behavior, Vol. 23, Part A, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, pp. 165-201. About the authors Dr David Van Fleet’s work focuses on management history, leadership, strategy, and workplace violence and terrorism. He has authored or co-authored over 200 presentations and publications. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Management and the Southern Management Association and is listed in Who’s Who in America (5th ed.) and Who’s Who Among America’s Teachers (Vol. V). Dr Van Fleet can be contacted at: [email protected] Dr Ella Van Fleet, a business consultant in Phoenix, Arizona, spent 20 years teaching, training, managing, and consulting before health problems forced her into semi-retirement. She focuses on entrepreneurship and on workplace violence and terrorism. She received regional and national recognition for an innovative course she designed at Texas A&M, won a university teaching award, and was honored by the Texas House of Representatives for outstanding professional contributions. She also served as Associate Director of the Texas innovation center, Institute for Ventures in New Technology.

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2006 Awards for Excellence The following article was selected for this year’s Outstanding Paper Award for

Journal of Managerial Psychology

‘‘Multi-source perspectives of self-esteem, performance ratings, and source agreement’’ Judy P. Strauss California State University, Long Beach, California, USA Purpose – To examine the relationship between self-esteem and job performance using others’ perceptions of self-esteem and to examine agreement in ratings of self-esteem across sources. Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 143 sales representatives, 113 supervisors, 420 peers, 435 customers, and 510 family and friends completed Rosenberg’s measure of self-esteem and a measure of acquaintanceship. Peers and supervisors rated the subjects’ job performance. Correlations and hierarchical regression were used to explore the relationships. Findings – Customer, peer, and supervisor perceptions of subjects’ self-esteem related significantly to peer and supervisor performance ratings, whereas self and family/friends perceptions did not. There was limited support for the acquaintanceship effect (greater agreement across sources when familiarity is greater), while context affected agreement (same context sources had greater agreement). Practical implications – The study highlights the importance of looking at an employee from a variety of perspectives. Also, training employees to develop self-enhancing behaviors may enhance their outcomes. Finally, training raters that their perceptions of co-workers’ self-esteem may influence evaluations of performance could reduce unconscious errors. Originality/value – If this had been a traditional study measuring self-esteem’s impact on performance ratings, no significant relationships could have been reported since individuals’ perceptions of their own self-esteem were not valid predictors of performance ratings. It may be the individual’s public self-esteem (e.g. impression management skills) that influences performance ratings. In particular, workplace sources perceived high self-esteem as being important to job performance. The validity of self-esteem may be understated through reliance on the self-report method alone. Keywords Performance appraisal, Performance measures, Self esteem www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/02683940510615424 This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 6, 2005, pp. 464-82, Journal of Managerial Psychology

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The following articles were selected for this year’s Highly Commended Award

‘‘Positive affect and feedback-giving behavior’’ Susan M. Adams This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 1, 2005, Journal of Managerial Psychology

‘‘Managers’ cognitive maps and intra-organisational performance differences’’ Geoffrey W. Goodhew Peter A. Cammock Robert T. Hamilton This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 2 2005, Journal of Managerial Psychology

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