Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia: Nexus between State Fragility and Extremism 9811974047, 9789811974045

Table of contents :
Foreword
About This Book
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Tables
1 The Nexus Between State Fragility and Extremism in South Asia
References
2 Differing Trajectories of Salafism in India and Pakistan: State Fragility, Identity and Violence
Introduction
State Fragility and Violence
Salafism: An Introduction
Salafism in India and Pakistan
Shared History and Common Beliefs
Tracing the Divergent Trajectories
Reasons for Differences: Salafist Identity Formation
Pakistan Under Siege
Majority–Minority Dynamics
Geopolitical Factors
How State Fragility and Democratic Rights Can Play a Role in Preventing/Fomenting Violence—Hints for the Future
Conclusion
Note
References
3 State Fragility and Violent Extremism in Bangladesh
Introduction
State Fragility and Bangladesh
Ethnic Extremism
Left-Wing Extremism
Muslim Extremism
Muslim Millat Bahini (MMB)
Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB)
Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Ansar Al Islam (AAI)
Neo JMB
State Fragility and Extremism in Bangladesh
Conclusion
Notes
References
4 State Fragility and Dynamism of Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh: Recruitment Strategies, Women and Prison Radicalization, and Future Trajectories
Introduction
State Fragility and Islamist Extremism
The Arrival of IS and Al Qaeda in Bangladesh
Use of Lethal Weapons
Targeted Killing
Some Worrying Trends
Recruitment
Women Radicalization
Prison Radicalization
Future Trajectories
Conclusion
References
5 State Fragility and Hindu Extremism in India: An Analysis of the Role of the Bharatiya Janata Party
Introduction
State Fragility and Extremism in India
Part One—Hindutva in Indian Political Discourse
Hindutva’s Cultural Nationalism
Hindutva and the Modi/BJP Election Campaign
Politics of Cow Protection
Love Jihad
Ghar Wapsi
Part Two—Hindutva and the 2019 Elections
Conclusion
Notes
References
6 Fragile State Policy and the Rise of Muslim Extremism in Sri Lanka
Introduction
General Remarks on the Sri Lankan Muslims or Moor
Sinhala-Buddhist Violent Mobilization Against Muslims
State Fragility and the Emergence of Extremism Among Sri Lankan Muslims
Decline of Muslims’ Trust in the Sri Lankan Government
Conclusion
Notes
References
7 Fragile Peace, Violent Extremism, and Feminist Solutions in Nepal
Introduction
Feminist Understanding of Violence: ‘Matrices of Domination’ and ‘Continua of Violence’
State Fragility and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal
Poverty and Inequality
Inequality among Social Groups
Are Grievances Enough to Start the Insurgency?
Political Mobilization of Grievances
State Repression
Is Violent Extremism a Possibility in Nepal?
Natural Hazard-Related Disasters and Conflict Nexus
Intersectionality and Positive Peace
Democratic Restructuring of State & Peacebuilding: Stagnation and Frustration
Conclusion
Notes
References
8 State Fragility, Violent Extremism, and Future of Afghanistan
Introduction
Defining State Fragility
State Fragility in Afghanistan
Taliban Take Over Afghanistan
Future of Afghanistan
Conclusion
References
9 State Fragility and the Challenge of Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Introduction
State Fragility and VE in Pakistan
Terrain of VE in Pakistan
Pakistan’s State Fragility and PCVE Measures
Hard Measures
Soft Measures
How State Fragility Has Impacted VE in Pakistan?
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia Nexus between State Fragility and Extremism Edited by Shafi Md Mostofa

Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia

Shafi Md Mostofa Editor

Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia Nexus between State Fragility and Extremism

Editor Shafi Md Mostofa University of Dhaka Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh

ISBN 978-981-19-7404-5 ISBN 978-981-19-7405-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2

(eBook)

The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

This book is dedicated to Dr. John Idriss Lahai who encouraged me editing a volume like this.

Foreword

Blessed innocents believe that ‘everybody wants peace’. Realists know that this is far from being the truth. Arms manufacturers, warlords, and even bored, unemployed young men do not necessarily desire peace which can destroy their opportunities to profit or earn their livings from disorder and the suffering of others. The crucial issue is the incentive system that they are confronted with and much of that system is determined by how states are governed both in terms of the goals of those in power and how effective each government is in achieving its goals. For many elites, their overarching goal is to attain control of the machinery of government so that they can milk the country’s resources to the maximum extent possible, preferably without killing the citizen hens who lay the eggs. An autocratic dictator can head a government that is effective in maintaining the rule of law in his (rarely, her) family’s interests but a chaotic failing state such as Sri Lanka may or may not provide rich pickings for those who can fight their way to the top. As this volume amply and expertly demonstrates the relationship between failing states and terrorism is highly complex—not least because

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terrorism can be both a cause and a consequence of state failure. In the case of Afghanistan, the world is still learning for a second time what can happen when the terrorists take over the reins of government and have to deal with the newly resurgent terrorist groups who follow behind in their train. One of the core characteristics of state failure involves the simple failure or the lack of will of the government to maintain the level of law and order necessary for people at the grassroots to go about their daily business without the fear and the reality of the constant risk of being deprived of their lives and property by apparently random acts of violence. Certainly, the lack of the rule of law and order can facilitate the operations and growth of terrorist groups. However, there are limits and the better organised terrorist groups often prefer to be based in states with a degree of legal laxity which allows them to operate without any fear of arrests that cannot be bought off, but where communications and transport are still functional. If conditions are too disorganised, terrorists also find it difficult to go about their business and achieve their goals, but they may well choose to be based in a moderately failing county but deliver their acts of terror in a nearby more stable state. There can often be a distinction between countries where terrorists choose to hide and countries where terrorists perform their terrorist acts. Terrorists themselves can be divided into two categories: terrorists with clear ideological and political goals and terrorists who are chiefly interested in taking advantage of chaos to seize power and wealth. Terrorists who aim to promote their ideological views are more likely to be found in well-governed and moderately well-governed states because ideologies are unlikely to flourish amidst chaos. Democracies are more likely to be the targets of terrorists rather than their hosts. Autocratic regimes may well be both targets and hosts. Autocratic leaders are also often given to declare their enemies to be terrorists, whether the label is justifiable or not. This is because the label dishonours those named and justifies spying on them and imprisoning them. Where the terrorist label is considered to be justified, this is frequently because the group has publicly claimed responsibility for its violent acts, frequently defending them on the grounds of the overriding importance of their goals.

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Readers of this book will find it to be a challenging introduction to a little-explored topic. They are unlikely to agree with every proposition and every factual account which is written here, but they will be able to agree that the editor has done an excellent job in assembling an expert team of chapter authors who have presented their cases with skill and knowledge and in stimulating debate have well served the cause of greater understanding of the nexus between state fragility and extremism in South Asia. Helen Ware Foundation Professor of Peace Studies University of New England Armidale, Australia

About This Book

This book presents a critical overview of the nexus between violent extremism and state fragility in South Asia. It also sheds light on the dynamics of violent extremism in South Asia, a phenomenon that ostensibly poses critical and unique challenges to the peace, security, and governance not only of the region but also of the world at large. The book brings attention to South Asia due to its diverse religious backgrounds, which at times incite communal violence and tensions with some countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka facing post-civil war dynamics; the Maldives and Bangladesh with political crises in their history; the new rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; the influence of extremist groups and ethnic uprisings in Pakistan; border disputes between India and Pakistan; conflicts in Kashmir; and communal conflicts in India between Hindus and Muslims. This book is distinctive in as much as it constitutes the first-ever attempt to analyse South Asian countries through the lens of the state fragility framework and to examine how issues of state fragility contribute to violent extremism. Through case studies drawn from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, this

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About This Book

collection suggests that fragile states have not only created conditions for extremist groups but that some states at times also adopt violent populist policies to marginalize minorities, pushing those minorities to resort to violent means.

Contents

1 The Nexus Between State Fragility and Extremism in South Asia Shafi Md Mostofa References 2

Differing Trajectories of Salafism in India and Pakistan: State Fragility, Identity and Violence Mohammed Sinan Siyech Introduction Salafism: An Introduction Salafism in India and Pakistan Reasons for Differences: Salafist Identity Formation How State Fragility and Democratic Rights Can Play a Role in Preventing/Fomenting Violence—Hints for the Future Conclusion Note References

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Contents

State Fragility and Violent Extremism in Bangladesh Shafi Md Mostofa Introduction State Fragility and Bangladesh Ethnic Extremism Left-Wing Extremism Muslim Extremism State Fragility and Extremism in Bangladesh Conclusion Notes References State Fragility and Dynamism of Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh: Recruitment Strategies, Women and Prison Radicalization, and Future Trajectories Syed Mahfujul Haque Marjan and Shafi Md Mostofa Introduction State Fragility and Islamist Extremism The Arrival of IS and Al Qaeda in Bangladesh Use of Lethal Weapons Targeted Killing Women Radicalization Prison Radicalization Future Trajectories Conclusion References State Fragility and Hindu Extremism in India: An Analysis of the Role of the Bharatiya Janata Party Stuti Bhatnagar Introduction Part One—Hindutva in Indian Political Discourse Part Two—Hindutva and the 2019 Elections Conclusion Notes References

51 51 52 55 60 63 68 70 71 72

81 81 83 84 85 87 91 92 93 96 96 103 103 106 115 119 121 122

Contents

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Fragile State Policy and the Rise of Muslim Extremism in Sri Lanka A. R. M. Imtiyaz Introduction General Remarks on the Sri Lankan Muslims or Moor Sinhala-Buddhist Violent Mobilization Against Muslims State Fragility and the Emergence of Extremism Among Sri Lankan Muslims Decline of Muslims’ Trust in the Sri Lankan Government Conclusion Notes References Fragile Peace, Violent Extremism, and Feminist Solutions in Nepal Keshab Giri Introduction Feminist Understanding of Violence: ‘Matrices of Domination’ and ‘Continua of Violence’ State Fragility and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal Is Violent Extremism a Possibility in Nepal? Conclusion Notes References State Fragility, Violent Extremism, and Future of Afghanistan Intijamul Islam and Shafi Md Mostofa Introduction Defining State Fragility State Fragility in Afghanistan Taliban Take Over Afghanistan Future of Afghanistan Conclusion References

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127 127 130 133 138 139 141 143 144 147 147 150 151 160 164 166 166 173 173 176 177 180 183 186 187

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State Fragility and the Challenge of Violent Extremism in Pakistan Abdul Basit Introduction State Fragility and VE in Pakistan Terrain of VE in Pakistan Pakistan’s State Fragility and PCVE Measures Hard Measures Soft Measures How State Fragility Has Impacted VE in Pakistan? Conclusion References

Index

191 191 192 193 199 199 205 210 214 214 227

Notes on Contributors

Abdul Basit is a Research Fellow and head of South Asia desk at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He specializes in Af-Pak security issues with a primary focus on terrorism and religious extremism. He is also the Associate Editor of ICPVTR’s open-access quarterly journal Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA). He regularly publishes commentaries and peerreviewed research articles on the mentioned topics. Stuti Bhatnagar (Ph.D.) is an Academic with the University of New South Wales, Sydney, and an adjunct fellow at the University of Adelaide. She also serves as the Executive Officer—South Asian Studies Association of Australia (SASAA) and as the Social Media Editor for South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. With a Ph.D. in politics and international relations from the University of Adelaide, her research has focussed on foreign policy analysis in the context of India and the wider South Asian region. She has several academic publications to her credit including journal articles, book chapters, and opinion pieces. Her recent book

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is titled India’s Pakistan Policy: How Think Tanks Are Shaping Foreign Relations and was published by Routledge in 2020. Keshab Giri (Ph.D.) is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sydney. Dr. Giri’s research have been published in journals like International Studies Review, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Global Studies Quarterly. His research interests include gender and war, civil war, leftist insurgencies, critical security studies, rebel governance of intimacy, geopolitics of South Asia, and digital sovereignty. He is also a researcher at the Gender, Justice and Security Hub at LSE and a visiting fellow at Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Nepal. A. R. M. Imtiyaz (Ph.D.) is an adjunct Professor at the Department of Liberal Arts, Delaware Valley University, USA. His research projects examine ethnic conflict and post-war peace in South Asia and China, and he has published widely in scholarly journals both in the US and the UK. He taught ethnic conflict and nationalism at the Department of Political Science, Temple University, USA, from 2009 to 2017. Intijamul Islam is a resourceful organizational capacity development professional with vivid expertise and hands-on work experience on global andragogical practices, instructional design, and HR capacity development. At present, he’s working in a business consulting firm named Enroute International Limited specialized in B2B service. During his service at Enroute, he has had extensive exposure to and experience working with policy level Government and Semi-government stakeholders and corporate business leaders. A post-grad from the Department of World Religions and Culture, University of Dhaka, Intijamul’s diverse areas of interest include language, literature, regional politics, sociology, and religious studies. Syed Mahfujul Haque Marjan is a Lecturer of Criminology at the University of Dhaka and a doctoral student of Sociology (Criminal Justice track) at Texas Woman’s University. He completed his M.A. in Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University of Texas at Arlington. His Master’s thesis examined the homicide trends in

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the Global South. His research focussed on terrorism, homicides, and policing. He holds an M.A. and B.A. in Mass Communication and Journalism from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Shafi Md Mostofa (Ph.D.) is a theologian and security studies scholar with broad interests in political Islam, authoritarianism, modern South Asian history and politics, and international relations and clash of civilizations. He is an Associate Professor of World Religions and Culture at Dhaka University’s Faculty of Arts and an Adjunct Lecturer of the University of New England, Australia. He has published extensively with Routledge, Springer, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Wiley, and Blackwell; and the journals: Politics and Religion, Politics and Policy, Perspectives on Terrorism, and Asian and African Studies. His recent sole-authored book published with Palgrave Macmillan on “Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Pyramid Root Cause Model ”. Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a doctoral candidate at the University of Edinburgh and a non-resident Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

List of Tables

Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3

Major military operations in Pakistan (2003-present) (Pak institute for peace studies, 8–13) Cases decided by military courts (2015–2018) De-radicalization schools in Pakistan

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1 The Nexus Between State Fragility and Extremism in South Asia Shafi Md Mostofa

Violent extremism poses serious security challenges to states as well as societies in the contemporary world. Since 9/11, the topics of violent extremism and terrorism have attracted attention from academics, journalists, and even policymakers. In the name of a global war on terror, trillions of dollars have been pumped into this sector to combat challenges posed by extremist groups. Yet, extremism’s causes of origin and its ever-evolving dynamics are often little understood and remain underresearched. In the same way, the pathways to respond to, and manage its growth and impact remains without a clear consensus. Therefore, the widespread presence of extremist groups is reflected in the number of people offended by the horror of terrorist attacks across the world claiming around 60 thousand lives, either injured or killed in less than 20 years from 2001 to 2019 (Sulaiman, 2020). S. Md Mostofa (B) University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_1

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South Asia is one of the most violent regions in the world with so many of the longest-running conflicts and a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The security situation in South Asia is expected to further deteriorate because of a combination of multiple factors: the fallout from Afghanistan, the deteriorating situation in Kashmir, the military takeover and political crisis in Myanmar, the pandemic, and the impending climate crisis (The Armed Conflict Survey, 2021). South Asia is also susceptible to the upward global terrorism trend driven by both left-wing and right-wing extremist groups. South Asia hosts 26 per cent of the world’s youths, has been experiencing an economic slowdown, and has been facing rising a tide of illiberalism and radicalism (Hasan et al., 2019). Most of the South Asian countries fall into the category of low- and middle-income countries (Jayaram, 2019), which includes nearly 2 billion people (World Bank, 2018) and more than 33% of the world’s poor (Schafer, 2019). South Asia’s economic deficiencies are reflected in the Human Development Index (HDI) rankings in which South Asian countries sit near the bottom. Despite economic challenges, Hasan et al. (2019, p. 2) contend that ‘democracy in South Asia has never been stronger’. However, India’s democracy which previously was a beacon of light to the region is ‘under serious pressure too’ (Hasan et al., 2019, p. 2). This leads Jayaram (2019, p. 4) to argue that ‘parts of the region are characterized by a high level of political instability and socio-economic backwardness’. That said, this edited volume presents a critical overview of the nexus between violent extremism and state fragility in South Asia. It also aims to shed light on the dynamics of violent extremism in South Asia, a phenomenon that ostensibly poses critical and unique challenges to the peace, security, and governance not only of the region but also of the world at large. This book is distinctive in as much as it constitutes the first-ever attempt to analyse South Asian countries through the lens of the state fragility framework and to examine how issues of state fragility contribute to violent extremism drawing case studies from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. South Asia deserves proper international attention due to its diversity of religious backgrounds, which at times has incited communal violence and tensions; some countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka face post-civil war

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dynamics; the Maldives and Bangladesh have through their history been engulfed in political crises; Afghanistan saw the rise of the Taliban and its re-emergence after Western intervention; extremist groups have fuelled ethnic uprisings in Pakistan; India and Pakistan have been involved in recurrent border disputes; Kashmir becomes the epicentre of conflict within India itself; and there have been communal conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. These conflicts led Jayaram (2019, p. 5) to state that many South Asian countries have faced ‘severe disruptions over the past few decades in the form of political transitions and violent conflict’. Adding to this argument, Howard (2016) supports the same findings: The states that comprise South Asia seem to fare no better. The current political climate within Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka is well known; thus, these fragile states, which represent over half of the eight states in the South Asia region, are embroiled in steady conflict, armed challenges from non-state actors, and must contend with both insurgent groups and terrorist threats from within and across state borders. (Howard, 2016, p. 83)

As she was explaining South Asia’s fragility, Howard (2016) singled out India for its confused national identity; economic disparities among upper and lower classes; its state of continuous conflict with Pakistan and China; and its vulnerability to challenges posed by Islamist forces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir as well as separatist forces in the North-eastern region, and the Maoist insurgency in the Eastern region. Hasan et al. (2019) also agree with Howard (2016) that India has been persistently struggling with Muslim radicalism, Hindu radicalism, and Leftist Radicalism. Afghanistan has been facing economic traumas, political crises, the lack of legitimacy of government, religious insurgency, rampant corruption, ethnic uprisings, and most notably foreign intervention both by the Soviets and the USA. According to Howard (2016, p. 86), ‘Afghanistan has unfortunately been the victim of the world’s major powers’. Both in the Human Development Index and state fragility index, Afghanistan has always been at the bottom of the ratings. Given this situation and after the withdrawal of US forces, the Taliban

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seized control of Afghanistan. We are yet to see how the newly reinstated Taliban government is going to deal with these fragilities, on which the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), a wing of Islamic State and Al Qaeda might well capitalize. Sri Lanka’s vulnerability lies in its recent history. Sri Lanka suffered some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern history during the height of the Tamil Tigers insurgency (Howard, 2016; Wickramasinghe, 2006). Currently, Sri Lanka ranks 55th on the State Fragility Index, despite its success in combatting the Tamil insurgency in 2009. Still, ethnic challenges between the Tamil Hindu minority and the Sinhala Buddhist majority have not yet faded away. Moreover, challenges coming from other minority groups like the National Thowheeth Jama’ath, a Muslim group, have shattered pluralism in Sri Lanka. This has led Ahmed et al. (2022) to argue that the Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian supremacy has caused the rise of radical Buddhist nationalism under the banner of the Bodu Bala Sena or Army of Buddhist Power. Another South Asian country, Nepal witnessed nearly 10 years of civil war which caused the death of over 13 thousand persons. Another 8 thousand people were injured, and 10 thousand were displaced from their homes. Some consider Nepal to have been a ‘monolithic, feudalistic, autocratic, authoritarian, centralized and closed state for centuries’ (Kumar, 2004; Misra, 2004; Thapa, 2003; Upreti, 2004, 2006). Indicators of state fragility like severe poverty, systematic and deliberate exclusion, discriminations based on caste, gender, or ethnicity, and injustices are held responsible for the armed conflict in Nepal (Karki & Seddon, 2003; Raj, 2004; Rana & Sharma, 2004). Upreti (2006) blamed the government for the rise of the Maoist insurgency facilitated by the governing elites’ failure to fulfil people’s expectation. The ‘post-war’ peace has been problematic due to political machinations and insincerity. Human rights violations committed by the security forces, the failure to enforce the rule of law, the restriction of the freedom of expression and association, economic depression, poverty, corruption, group grievances, and political crises have been integral to Nepal’s history, and this is reflected in the state fragility index in which Nepal is listed in the warning category.

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Pakistan has long been identified as an epicentre of global terrorism because of its known ties to Muslim terrorist groups (Ahmed et al., 2022). Sulaiman (2020) has argued that its fragility lies in its foundational infrastructure. ‘Pakistan inherited a weak economic base, little infrastructure, and two conflicted borders on the East and West with India and Afghanistan, respectively’. Additionally, it has faced challenges from separatists in some provinces such as Sindh province. These challenges have forced Pakistan to sit among the top 30 fragile states in the world. Bangladesh, which was part of Pakistan until 1971, gained independence in 1971 and has emerged as a secular nation-state (Mostofa & Subedi, 2020; Mostofa, 2021c). Since its birth, it has been fighting hunger, natural disaster, political violence, and at times the rise of extremism in the country. Bangladesh, the third largest Muslim country, gets international attention for supplying Mujaheedins in Afghanistan and foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, carrying out the Holey Artisan Café attack in 2016 which killed 22 foreigners, killing secular bloggers and publishers, and finally for radicalizing secular educated urban youths (Mostofa, 2019, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c; Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). Very recently, communal tensions in Bangladesh once again highlighted the country in the international media. Some argue that the opportunistic political culture is held responsible for the plight of persecuted minorities (Mostofa, 2021d). Even though Bhutan and the Maldives are South Asian countries, in terms of state fragility index these countries have been consistently making progress and their ranking is fairly stable close to 100, a figure which characterizes stable states. This is the reason why it was decided that they should not be included in the analyses provided in this book, even though these countries show symptoms of the rise of authoritarian style of government (Mostofa et al., 2023). However, the challenges of violent extremism are particularly widespread and complex in South Asia as issues of state fragility are often found inherent within state structures. Extremist groups are often known to form intricate networks and complex associations across countries. They possess international linkages and can tap into a wide variety of resources to sustain their religious and political activities. The fact that the impact of violent extremism in

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South Asia reaches beyond the territorial borders of the region’s individual countries has been well documented. Because of its complex political, social, historical, and legal dynamics South Asia has consistently attracted the attention of sociologists, political scientists, legal and security experts, and concerned policymakers. Some scholars have already examined the rise of extremism in South Asia. Ollapally (2008) published with Cambridge University Press a book entitled ‘The Politics of Extremism in South Asia’ which comprehensively addressed the causes behind the growth of extremism in South Asia, based on individual case studies of a number of South Asian countries. Her book is notable for the way it went beyond the popular perception which argued that ‘politics, inter-state and international relations often play a more important role in the rise of extremism in South Asia than religious identity, poverty, and state repression’ (p. 1). Going against her argument, Hasan et al. (2019) argued in their edited book ‘Radicalization in South Asia: Context, Trajectories and Implications’ that the diversity of faiths, culture, and political ideologies, which the authors characterize as the fault lines of South Asia, has helped trigger radicalism and terrorist attacks in South Asia. The volume offers individual case studies from five South Asian countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. These chapters are mainly concerned with the changing aspects of terrorism, the ways of violent extremism, and how political violence can be countered in the region. D’Souza (2019) edited a similar volume entitled ‘Countering Insurgencies and Violent Extremism in South and Southeast Asia’. The book contained case studies that addressed the patterns, drivers of various insurgent and terrorist groups, as well as their and ideologies and the variety of state responses. Two books published more recently address the same dynamics of violent extremism in South Asia. Izarali and Ahlawat (2021) have a volume on ‘Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications’, which provides analyses of the trajectories of extremism and insurgency in the region. The book examines how South Asian states are countering the challenges posed by terrorism to ensure human security. It also considers the national, regional, and global implications of terrorism. Ahmed et al. (2022) by drawing nine

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case studies from almost all South Asian countries have produced a handbook on ‘Religion, Extremism and Violence in South Asia’. These case studies mainly focus on motivations, recruitment patterns and tools, and historical roots of terrorist organizations in South Asia. Like Hasan et al. (2019), Ahmed et al. (2022) consider South Asia a fault line in terms of religious diversity, which at times challenges the secular nature of south Asia. Religiously inspired extremism poses threats to the South Asian peace and security. Against the backdrop of these scholarly works, the present book exposes a lacuna in the existing literature: examinations of the question of how state fragility provides enabling conditions for the growth of extremism in South Asia. None of the books so far dedicated to the study of political violence in South Asia has yet investigated the nexus between state fragility and extremism. The reality of the dearth of literature led this edited volume to examine the characterization, trajectories, and the internal dynamics of violent extremism in the postcolonial South Asian fragile states, which are typically neglected in the literature. An added benefit of this edited volume is that it takes the study of violent religious extremism in a new direction. Thus, this edited volume focusses on the state fragility and violent extremism nexus. A phenomenal growth in violent extremism amidst violent conflicts around the world could be explained by the existence of an enabling environment that facilitates the extremists to exploit the environment in their own favour. The state’s legitimacy crisis, its weaknesses, and its fragility have become a central issue in today’s world to circumvent extremism. The situation gets worse when states do not accept ‘fragility’ as a potent reality. Now the question might arise to what degree South Asian states are fragile or stable. Panda (2014) wrote a report in the Diplomat that Asia’s most fragile states are in South Asia. Overall, all South Asian countries do not fall under the sustainable or stable category in terms of the state fragility index. Some of the countries even fall under the category of a high alert situation in terms of the state fragility index. Most of the countries’ rankings, apart from the Maldives and Bhutan, are below 60 among the 157 countries in the world. Even though India ranks 66th it is still included in this volume because India has been put among the top

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14 most rapidly worsening countries along with Chile, Libya, Mali, and Colombia. India’s status has become subject to an ‘Elevated Warning’. Globally two books so far have used the framework of state fragility, which is the focus point of this book, to assess violent extremism. In the Post-Conflict Reconstruction: From Extremism to Peaceful Co-Existence, Sadia Sulaiman (2020) used the state fragility framework to understand the rise of violent extremism in some fragile states with individual case studies drawn from Africa and Asia. Howard (2016) also makes use of a similar framework in Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence. This book, however, did not investigate in depth the rise of terrorism in South Asia. Rather, it dedicates only one chapter to deal with South Asia and Southeast Asia and mainly investigates Pakistan and Afghanistan. The rise of violent extremism in South Asia has, to some extent, been overlooked in these two books with their focus on Pakistan and Afghanistan. The term state fragility itself is contested and often misunderstood. We must therefore start by defining it. This term evolved to describe a donor-driven concept in a specific historic and intellectual context of politics and international relations in the post-cold war era. The term state fragility has emerged more recently as an inclusive concept used by scholars to help describe the nature of failing states, of weak states, of collapsed states, and similar concepts. Scholars agree that all states are, to some extent, fragile (Call, 2010; Carment & Samy, 2012; 2020; Gravingholt et al., 2012; Lahai & Koomson, 2020; Lemay-Hébert, 2018; Sulaiman, 2020) and show signs of state weakness at least in one of the three dimensions of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. Powell (2017, p. 23) contends that ‘it is not an absolute condition to which all states are susceptible at some stage of their history. Sulaiman (2020, p. 24) adds that ‘fragility is a process of structural decay and decline within any particular state’. While highlighting structural decay, Alexandra Lewis (2013) and Bertocchi and Guerzoni have listed some structural issues which reinforce state fragility. These issues include challenges over territorial control or disputes, legitimacy crises, authority-based limitations, a lack of service delivery including law enforcement, security, and basic services, poor governance, acute poverty, and being prone to civilian

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conflict (Lahai & Koomson, 2020). Tonwe and Eke (2013, p. 235) put enormous emphasis on legitimacy crises and assert that legitimacy crises and limiting fundamental human rights seem to be the supreme determinant factors of state fragility. The absence of the rule of law is a crucial aspect of state fragility, which is closely linked with the internal security of the state (Lahai & Koomson, 2020). The Department for International Development (DFID) has also identified the following symptoms for fragile states: ‘weak institutions are the central driver of fragility … States whose political systems and institutions are in some forms of transition are more likely to show signs of fragility … Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility’ (Claire & Moreno-Torres, 2005). The above signs of state fragility enable international organizations to define state fragility in the following ways: ...[as the inability] to meet population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process. Fragility thus arises from substantial disequilibrium in state-society relations. It has multiple underlying causes, both chronic and acute, and it can produce multiple consequences, most worryingly vulnerability to internal conflict, inability to cope with humanitarian disaster and a high risk of state collapse. (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) … share a common fragility, in two respects: State policies and institutions are weak in these countries making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. They face risks of conflict and political instability. (The World Bank, 2005) ... the absence or breakdown of a social contract between people and their government. Fragile states suffer from deficits of institutional capacity and political legitimacy that increase the risk of instability and violent conflict and sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks. (The Fragility Study Group of the United States Institute for Peace, 2016)

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Considering the above definitions and the signs of state fragility, Sulaiman (2020) proposes five core attributes, which make a state fragile. These attributes include persistent security dilemma, a dysfunctional economy, institutional weakness, chronic legitimacy crisis, an inability to manage change, and space for external interference. She further contends that Fragility is a long process of the decline of a state, and it is present deep down within a state’s socio-cultural, political, economic and security apparatus since long, which comes on the surface as a result of conflict. It is not something that emerges all of a sudden due to increased violence in any country. Rather it is a long process which keeps going silently and erupts like a volcano in case of a conflict breakout. (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 4)

Considering the above-mentioned indicators of state fragility, the Fund for Peace produces a Fragile State Index annually, based on four types of indicators: cohesion, economic, political, and social, and cross-cutting indicators. The cohesion indicator includes the security apparatus, the existence of functionalized elites, and group grievances. Economic indicators are evaluated based on the economic decline, uneven economic development, human flight, and brain drain. Political indicators involve state legitimacy, public services, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Social and cross-cutting indicators include demographic pressure, the existence of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as external interventions. States’ vulnerabilities or states’ fragilities have consequently become a matter of growing concern especially when it comes to combatting extremism. Some estimates show the gravity of the problem of state fragility. For example, fragile states host 2.3 billion people and will host 60% of the world’s poor by 2030. Thus, the issue of state fragility will become a major challenge for international peace and security. This has led the Fragility Study Group to state that ‘Fragile states lie at the root of today’s global disorder, from chaos in the Arab world to the refugee crisis and from pandemic diseases to economic malaise. Fragility has contributed to the spike in violent conflict since 2010’ (Burns et al., 2016).

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Although it is evident that state fragility provides a breeding ground for the growth of extremism, the pathways to becoming a terrorist do not follow a linear process. What makes an individual terrorist is a longstanding debate. Arguments flow from psychological, social, political, and religious approaches that seek to identify the drivers motivating some people to become terrorists. In the nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso puts emphasis on biological features which encourage some individuals to turn to violence to achieve their goals. According to him, criminals were simply abnormal (Lombroso, 2006). Arguing in a similar vein of thought, in the twentieth century some researchers asserted that violent behaviour is deeply engrained in basic human physiology and consider terrorism to be an extension of violent behaviour (Hubbard, 1983; Oots & Wiegele, 1985). Along the same line of pathological arguments, some other scholars put the emphasis on personality characteristics for violent behaviour such as an ‘authoritarian personality’ (Adorno et al., 1950), ‘narcissism’ (Crayton, 1983; Post, 1998), ‘anomie’ (Awan, 2008), ‘insanity’ (Cooper, 1977; Pearce & Macmillan, 1977; Taylor & Ryan, 1998), lack of ‘cognitive capacity’ (Lezak, 1995), ‘aggressive temperament’ (Pettit, 1997), ‘novelty seeking’ (Hacker, 1983), and ‘thrill and revenge seeking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Other scholars reject these psychological explanations on the grounds that they fail to understand terrorism wholistically and consider terrorist in isolation, separately from their social and cultural context (Brynjar & Skjølberg, 2004; Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). Bordes (2007) and Romero (2007) have also criticized the emphasis on specific psycho-pathological traits and contend that ‘terrorists are like normal human beings, but they are exposed to an abnormal situation’ (Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). Some contemporary terrorism experts (Bjørgo, 2004; Borum, 2011a, 2011b, 2017; Crenshaw, 1981, 1995, 2007, 2011; Davies, 1973; Jenkins, 1979; Johnson, 1978; Lichbach, 1990; Margolin, 1977; Morgan, 2001; Sageman, 2004; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Victoroff, 2005) focus on socio-political and psychological factors to explain the growth of violent radicalization. To some degree, a consensus has emerged that the environment in which an individual has been living has an impact on the radicalization process. Environmental causes include political instability, poor governance, poverty, lack of

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education, and repressions. Mostofa (2021c, 2021e) has clearly demonstrated through his pyramid root cause model of radicalization that local dysfunctional governments must be held responsible for creating a convenient environment for terrorists to grow and find recruitment. Here the nexus lies between state fragility and extremism. The International Crisis Group shows that extremist groups exploit wars and chaotic situations for their own causes (International Crisis Group, 2016). Wilkinson (1974) first pointed out several indicators of state fragility as the reasons for the growth of terrorism. These indicators included ‘ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts, poverty, the negative aftermath of modernization, injustice, revolutionary sentiments among society, weak governments or an internal power struggle’ (Wilkinson, 1974, p. 56). While analysing African state fragility issues he then added that incompetence and venality can be identified as signs of state fragility where terrorism flourishes. Similarly, in the African context, Fanon (1963) and Ukiwo (2003) contended that corruption, brutality, and mismanagement act as catalyst for the growth of terrorism. In a similar fashion, Maiangwa (2012, p. 18) argues that ‘political tyranny, loss of state legitimacy, bad governance, etc. predispose people to acts of terrorism and also create the conducive ambience for terrorist activities’. Considering the above facts of state fragility, Wehrli (2018) contends that state fragility provides ‘opportunities for the extremist networks to grow and sustain’. Arguing along the same line of thought, a plethora of contemporary scholars contends that fragile states have the propensity to become a safe den for extremists to expand their network and find recruitment (Howard, 2016; Ibrahimi, 2018; Kasasbeh, 2015; Lahai & Koomson, 2020; Maiangwa, 2012; Piazza, 2007; Tonwe & Eke, 2013). The recent scholarly work drawing on case studies from both Africa and Asia by Sulaiman (2020) suggests that, among other factors, state fragility enhances extremism or even terrorism and argues that ‘the sharp growth of religious extremist groups amidst ongoing violent conflicts in various countries could be explained by the existence of an enabling environment, which facilitates the extremists to exploit it in their own favour’. She comes up with five parameters of state fragility, which accelerate violent extremism in fragile states. According to Sulaiman, extremist groups fill the security void by taking the place of security forces, which

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is caused by the lack of social cohesion. Socio-economic disparities, lack of legitimacy, lack of the rule of law, and other political grievances help extremist groups with their recruitment. The failure to address popular expectations and the presence of external support for extremist groups also act as catalysts for the growth of extremist groups. In the context of the literature discussed above, this edited volume, a first-ever attempt to analyse solely South Asian countries using the framework of state fragility, examines how fragility issues contribute to violent extremism. The findings of this volume suggest that fragile states have not only created the conditions for the appearance and growth of extremist groups but that some states at times also adopt violent populist policies to marginalize minorities, pushing minorities to resort to violent means. This volume also adds that Countering Violent Extremism programmes do not work properly in fragile states and violent extremist groups take diverse shapes in the fragile states having been influenced by global political trends and currents. The second chapter of this collection investigates a puzzling question: why Salafis in Pakistan turn violent, whereas they remain wholly peaceful in India. Contemporary research on Jihadist and other violent Muslim organizations places a significant amount of blame on ideological drivers within Islam. This chapter seeks to challenge that assertion by comparing Islamic movements in India and Pakistan. It argues that state fragility in Pakistan has played a role in shaping the relation between Salafism and violence. Most importantly, national narratives, minority-majority relations, and geopolitical realities have played a larger role in forming a collective identity that encourages violence, rather than ideology alone. The remaining chapters in this volume scrutinize individual country case studies from South Asia. In Chapter 3, Shafi Md Mostofa explores the rise of violent extremism in Bangladesh looking at the intersection of different political conflicts and the role in these tensions played by various agents and catalysts including non-state actors. Mostofa argues that violent extremism, which is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, takes three forms: left-wing extremism, ethnocentric extremism, and Muslim extremism. Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, extremist groups have used various forms of violence to express their diversified agendas of scientific socialism, self-autonomy, and an Islamic

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state. While the influence of left-wing extremists is on the decrease, religious and ethnic-related acts of violence (measured in terms of the numbers of people who are killed) are on the rise. This chapter focusses on the three forms of violent extremism highlighted above. The goal is to unearth the reasons for, and motivation behind, their historic emergence in Bangladesh. This chapter argues that the inherent state fragility of Bangladesh with regard to legitimacy crises, poverty, violations of human rights, easy access to weapons, and bad governance help to foster extremism in the country. In Chapter 4, Syed Mahfujul Haque Marjan and Shafi Md Mostofa argue that the state fragility of Bangladesh has enabled the adoption by terrorist organizations of new techniques for recruitment and worryingly allows them to use lethal weapons for target killings. Terrorist organizations mainly recruit within the urban youths of middle-and-upper class economic backgrounds. They also argue that Al Qaeda might find traction in Bangladesh, and other terrorist organizations might merge with Al Qaeda in the future. In Chapter 5 responding to the escalation of Indian communal violence against Muslim minorities, Stuti Bhatnagar focusses on statesponsored extremism against Muslim minority groups using the state fragility framework. She argues that the Indian state under the BJP government is actively supporting extremist groups and has provided tacit as well as often direct validation for violence against minorities. While religious violence in India is not a new phenomenon, targeted violence against religious minorities, particularly Indian Muslims has grown significantly. Government legislation in favour of cow protection and a Hindu nationalist political agenda has led to the emergence of new extremist organizations as well as the expansion of existing extremist organizations, either directly or indirectly supported by the BJP and its affiliated political and social groups. Particularly targeting Muslim minorities, vigilante groups with the tacit support of the BJP government have found a new voice and have carried out several acts of violence. Further, the political marginalization of Muslims at the electoral level has also become a contributory factor, visible in both the 2014 election and the most recent Indian elections in 2019. In addition to this, several of the BJP’s Hindu nationalist policies including the National Register of Citizens and the reignited debates over Kashmir’s special

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status in the Indian constitution and the construction of the controversial Ram Mandir in Ayodhya have direct implications for Muslims in India, adding to increasing group grievances. She analyses this growing trend of extremism against Muslim minorities in India. She argues that the use of nationalistic discourse by the BJP and its contribution to exacerbating fault lines on the basis of identity, nationality, and religion have led to a rise in religious radicalization. In Chapter 6, A. R. M. Imtiyaz examines the nexus between state fragility and the rise of Muslim extremism in Sri Lanka. He maintains that in deeply divided societies like Sri Lanka, an inability of the state and institutions to gain the trust of minorities could lead to an essentially fragile polity. This status of the state could trigger tensions and violence if the marginalized continue to lose trust in the democratic institutions and thus seek to settle their differences by bullets over ballots. He argues that the role of state fragility as a condition of the emergence of extremist forces is one of the major trends in Sri Lanka since its independence. The chapter provides some useful notes on the state’s failure to be a neutral agency in deeply divided Sri Lanka. Imtiyaz argues further that there is a strong relationship between state fragility in post-war Sri Lanka and the rise of extremist forces among Muslims in the same context. Keshab Giri in Chapter 7 has adopted a feminist approach to uncover how state fragility contributes to a fragile peace, thereby fostering violent extremism in Nepal. He argues that the ‘post-war’ peace in Nepal remains fragile as it is beset by many continuing challenges including poverty and inequalities, an unequal distribution of power and resources, and natural hazard-related disasters while the democratic restructuring of the state remains an unfinished project. Similarly, the voices of the marginalized population facing multiple oppressions are unheard and their needs remain unaddressed. Moreover, emerging crises like climate change and natural hazard-related disasters have added further vulnerabilities. Thus, the chapter argues that the combination of all these factors can create a perfect environment for the recurrence of violent extremism. Feminist theorizations of oppression and violence in the concepts of ‘matrices of domination’ and ‘continua of violence’ can help better understand and analyse multiple and intersecting forms of oppression and violence in Nepal.

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Considering Afghanistan as one of the top-ranked fragile states across the globe, Intijamul Islam and Shafi Md Mostofa in Chapter 8 show that the state fragility has significantly contributed to the rise of ideological extremist groups in the country. For the last 20 years following the overthrow of the Taliban government by the US forces in 2001, the Taliban had been the leading ideological extremist group and the flag bearer of the anti-establishmentarian narrative in Afghanistan. In August 2021, the Taliban successfully replaced the US-backed government in Afghanistan amid extreme public insecurity, fragile economic conditions, and volatile observance of human rights. As the Taliban moves to the centre of the state authority and forms the government, this chapter examines who is going to replace the Taliban as an antiestablishmentarian force in Afghanistan capitalizing on populist Islamist narratives, which were once capitalized on by the Taliban itself. Thus, the chapter argues that the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) might find traction in Afghanistan thanks to its fragile military landscape and extremely volatile socio-economic situation. On the other hand, Al Qaeda led by Zawahiri has also been flourishing under the shade of Taliban as they pledge their allegiance to the former. Pakistan came under the international spotlight especially after the US-led ‘War on Terror’ in 2001. Even though Pakistan has been combating terrorism for a long time now, the country still faces challenges with adopting successful countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes, mostly focussing on the reduction and elimination of VE rather than achieving peace by addressing the root causes of the problem. However, Pakistan’s attempt at adopting CVE programmes is an under-researched topic. In the final chapter of this volume, Abdul Basit contends that Violent Extremism (VE) in Pakistan is both the cause and outcome of state fragility. He further argues that Pakistan’s PCVE framework structured around preventive and corrective approaches also needs to focus on addressing the long-term structural causes of VE in the context of state fragility. Hence, beyond corrective and preventive CVE approaches, Pakistan also needs to focus on the more structural and fundamental sources of VE linked to its efforts to construct religious nationalism while supressing more organic forms of ethnic and regional sub-nationalism.

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2 Differing Trajectories of Salafism in India and Pakistan: State Fragility, Identity and Violence Mohammed Sinan Siyech

Introduction The rise of Al Qaeda in the early 2000s and the Islamic State since 2014 has energized myriad debates on the root causes of terrorism and political violence within various communities. Various authors have pointed to ideology as a major driver of radicalization among Muslim communities (Ariaratnam, 2018; Lahoud, 2010; Mostofa, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d). These authors iterate that some ideologies are more susceptible to divisiveness and violence. Among these, the Salafist ideology—which is an exclusivist Muslim ideology is one that has taken the lion’s share of the blame for causing terrorism across the world (Jacob Zenn, 2013; Rasheed, 2007; Right, 2012; Wictorowitz, 2017). I argue that this argument is tenacious and risks the imposition of problematic policies that will lead to self-fulfilling M. S. Siyech (B) University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_2

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prophecies in the future. Indeed, while ideology plays a role in facilitating violence, it is much smaller than what most news media channels argue. Looking at the case studies of India and Pakistan can greatly inform policymakers about the importance of international politics as well as domestic policies in radicalising communities and ideologies. Both the nations gained their independence from Britain in 1947 and split into two different countries (Khan, 2008). Both the nations are home to various Muslim institutions which have commanded a large number of followers such as (1) The Deobandi Movement, (2) The Ahl e-Hadeeth Movement, (3) The Barelvi Movement, (4) The Ahmadi Movement, the (5) The Shia movement and (6) The Jamaat e-Islami (Ahmed, 2009; Metcalf, 2014). Combined, these movements can account for a large percentage of the nearly 400 million Muslims in India and Pakistan. However, most of these institutions have had different trajectories with a few of the Pakistani groups within these movements witnessing a turn to violent politics. Contrastingly nearly all the Muslim organizations in India have remained peaceful despite various stimuli that would otherwise have brought forward a lot more violent action. This difference was especially pronounced since the 1980s where Islamic movements in Pakistan and India have adopted radically different pathways. Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter to look at all six different movements due to the sheer numbers, this chapter comparatively looks at the growth of a movement which has branches and a significant following in both nations—the Ahl e-Hadeeth, a Salafist movement. Centrally, it seeks to understand why factions within the Pakistani Salafist movement turned violent at some point whereas the Indian Salafist movement has largely eschewed violence. In doing so, it argues that ideology is not as important a factor in radicalizing people as much as political events are. To define the scope, this chapter also demonstrates that while not all factions in the Pakistani Salafist movement have turned violent, many also support violence overtly or covertly. The targets of violence in question encapsulates all sorts of groups such as the Shias, the Ahmadis, the Pakistani government and Indian armed forces based in Kashmir and elsewhere in the nation. As the paper goes on to observe, Indian Salafists organizations have not targeted any of these groups whereas, of all the

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17 different Pakistani groups (Zahab, 2009), a number have attacked the above-mentioned communities, whereas more than one-third have even taken part in political processes in Pakistan (Zahab, 2009). This chapter does not differentiate as to what type of violence is committed by Salafist groups or what target groups are affected by the violence. I also exclude the study of Indian Salafist groups in Kashmir since the political reality which is my main influencing variable is very different and violent in the region as opposed to the rest of India (also referred to as Hinterland India). The last caveat would be that this chapter specifically looks at the collective identity of Salafists across India and the official institutional argument against violence in India. It does recognize that individually, Salafist clerics in India are likely involved in encouraging violence across the nation even if it is not institutionally supported. To harbour a fruitful discussion regarding these organizations, the chapter uses both primary sources including texts as well as speeches and videos by ideologues from both the nations. Secondly, I also conducted numerous interviews with people from Salafist backgrounds or those who have engaged with Salafists in India and Pakistan (the majority being from India) in addition to my own experience with various Salafist groups in India since 2010. Alongside this, I have also used secondary texts such as books and journal articles to better explain the Salafist movements and the differences between the political situations in the two nations.

State Fragility and Violence The theoretical framework in which this chapter is located is the connection between state fragility and violent extremism. State fragility is a concept that measures the level of stability that a nation has politically, based on a set of key indicators such as the loss of physical territory and monopoly over the use of force, inability to deal with other states as well as collect taxes, lack of credibility to control violent crime and many other such factors (Fund for Peace, 2018).

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All of this is encapsulated in the State Fragility Index, an annual report that classifies states based on 12 factors. According to this Index, India is now ranked 68th under the category ‘Warning’, whereas Pakistan is ranked 25th under the category ‘Alert’ (Messner De Latour et al., 2020). This ranking helps provide some context as to why Salafists have engaged more with violence in Pakistan as opposed to India. Many reports have illustrated how such fragility has an impact on violent extremism. The stabilization report for instance documents this in a process with four fluid and overlapping stages being (1) The presence of vulnerabilities, (2) the creation of an ideological narrative, (3) intergroup interactions and finally (4) becoming an extremist. As such, the presence of push factors such as poverty, instability, corruption etc. creates space for violent ideologies to gain dominance over communities within such states (UK Stabilisation Unit, 2018). The next few sections will identify the Salafist movement globally, in India and in Pakistan before discussing the various narratives that led to violence. As the concluding section will show, the reason for such violence can also be located within the context of state fragility thereby, helping predict if the tendency for Salafists to engage in violence can change over time.

Salafism: An Introduction Contemporary Salafism studies as a field globally has largely burgeoned in the early 2000s, although some writing covering it did exist before too. Many popular studies and influential media reports blamed violence and terrorism on the exclusivist ideology propounded by Salafists (Alatas, 2014; Jacob Zenn, 2013; Schlomo Brom, 2016; Wright, 2012). In academia, Salafism was largely analysed using the lens of security studies given its relation to groups like Al Qaeda and later on, the Islamic State (Egerton, 2011). For instance, Quintan Wictorowitz discussed the relation between Al Qaeda and Salafists by highlighting their perspectives on various tactical issues related to violence (Wictorowitz, 2017). Scholars like Haykel, however, argued that contrary to popular beliefs, the linkages between Salafism and violence in many parts of the world are

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weak. He pointed out the heterogeneity of the movement and provided a framework that recognized the various jurisprudential, theological and (relevant to this proposal) political differences within the movement (Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, 2009). Yet, there remain many gaps in understanding Salafist movements especially in regions like South Asia which has very large movements. Historically, many authors have looked at the Salafist movement and its forms in India and Pakistan as standalone movements. WW Hunter (1876) in his book ‘The Indian Musalmans’ conducted the first study of Salafists (whom he termed as Wahabis) and largely wrote from a Eurocentric, Orientalist perspective. Barbara Metcalf is another scholar who wrote about the movement as part of her works on revivalist movements in India (Metcalf, 2014). Apart from her, AQ Naqvi also gave an insider look at the movement, especially the militancy that its members took part in the 1820s alongside its contributions to various Indian causes (Naqvi, 2001). In the south, Roland Miller looked at the Mujahid movement as part of his two monumental works on the Mapilla Muslims of Kerala (Miller, 2016) (Miller, 1976). His works mostly covered the evolution of the movement partly without detailing the movements’ identity formation or general political engagement. Similarly, Ahmadkutty also covered the same movement in India as part of his work on Kerala Muslims (Ahmadkutty, 1995). Apart from the sources mentioned above, there are very few other English-language publications on the topic. Many works have also covered the topic of Salafists in one form or the other in Pakistan. For instance, Mariam Abou Zahab has covered the various shifts in the Ahl e-Hadeeth movement (Zahab, 2009). Similarly, Ayesha Jalal has also spoken on the movement in the nation in her work on Jihad in South Asia. Bizaa Zeynab Ali was another author that covered the movement in Pakistan including its political and militant manifestations across time (Ali, 2010). Christine Fair has covered the Salafi Jihadist militant groups such as Lashkar e-Taiba in Pakistan (Fair, 2015). However, to my knowledge, no work exists that compares the groups in the two nations. Subsequently, this study intends to be the

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first of its kind that looks at the two movements in both nations comparatively. As the next section shows, the myriad commonalities in theology and yet differences in political trajectories warrant this sort of study.

Salafism in India and Pakistan Shared History and Common Beliefs The Salafist presence in Northern India and Pakistan (where the main language spoken is Urdu) can be traced back to the founder of reformist Islam in India, i.e. Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, the eighteenth-century theologian who reinvigorated the study of Hadeeth studies in the subcontinent (Metcalf, 2014). He is considered a revered ideologue by both, the Deoband and the Ahl e-Hadeeth movement, both of whom adopted different aspects of his teachings (Metcalf, 2014). The Ahl e-Hadeeth started out as a reformist movement bent on eradicating what they termed false beliefs. However, due to the political realities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many of their scholars also engaged in political conflicts such as the famous Jihad against the Sikhs in the 1830s where Syed Ahmed, a notable ideologue was killed. In the aftermath of the 1857 revolution of Indians against the British, the Ahl e-Hadeeth (referred to as Wahhabis) were blamed, and numerous scholars of the movement were arrested in what was called the Wahhabi trials. This anti-Salafist trend tapered down by the late nineteenth century and in 1906, various Ahl e-Hadeeth scholars across India joined for a conference that officially started the Markaz Jamiath Ahl e-Hadeeth. Many of these scholars began to engage on the issue of Pakistan and independence with differences when scholars like Sanuallah Amritsari preferred to go to Pakistan instead. However, various Ahl e-Hadeeth members preferred to stay back in India thus, causing a split within the movement leading to an Indian and a Pakistani branch of the movement (Iraqee, 2019). Even in South India where there is a difference in cultural and linguistic approaches to Salafism (and indeed other movements), Salafist

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movements did have significant influence from the Arab world. For instance, in Kerala, the Salafist movement manifested in the form of the Mujahid movement in Kerala which was founded in 1952 (John, 2018). A notable figure for this movement is the luminary Wakkom Maulavi a Keralite reformer who was influenced by Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida’s work via the monthly publication Al Manar. He started a movement called the Aikya Sankhum in the 1920s, which became the Kerala Nadwathul Mujahideen (KNM) post-independence (Abdelhalim, 2016). This movement is the primary Salafist movement for non-Urdu speaking audiences (in South India) whose influence stretches all the way to the parts of South Karnataka as well as parts of Tamil Nadu. Apart from the KNM, Salafists in India a result of this shared history, the Salafist movement in India and Pakistan have similar theological belief systems. Both the groups concentrate on Tawheed (Monotheism) as a central tenet of their belief system. Some other beliefs that both the groups also concentrate on are the commanding of good and forbidding of evil, as well as their insistence on not following any of the four Islamic jurisprudential schools blindly—a practice that distinguishes them as ghair mukallid (non-blind followers) (Meijer, 2009). Moreover, the Salafists in both India and Pakistan are opposed to many issues that are present in both the nations. Firstly, Salafists in both nations condemn the blind following of the Imams of jurisprudence (Meijer, 2009). Secondly, they also lambast Sufis for encouraging and/or accepting Hindu rituals into the religion. In this regard, they are very critical of both the Barelwi movement as well as the Deobandis (although to a lesser extent) both of which also have branches in the two nations (Fasih, 2017; Zahab, 2009). Thirdly, apart from anti-Sufi sentiments, Salafists in both nations have spoken against Muslim minorities such as Shias and Ahmadis. Salafists believe Shias to be deviants with a distorted view of theology and false veneration for the family of the prophet whereas they consider Ahmadis as heretics for believing in the presence of a prophet after Mohammed (Meijer, 2009). It is important to note here that these views are also shared by other movements outside of the Salafist movement but this. The common aspects don’t just stop at theological differences and oppositions to groups alone. The Ahl e-Hadeeth movement in both

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nations as well as the Kerala Nadwathul Mujahideen (KNM) movement in South India have significant ties with Saudi Arabia via the Medina University as well as Umm ul-Qura University in Makkah.1 Moreover, the Salafist movement in both nations has depended on funding from institutions and donors based in Saudi Arabia. According to some reports, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has funded about 100 million USD annually since 2005 and propped up more than 24,000 madrassas in the nation (Dawn, 2011). Similarly, many (unconfirmed) reports have noted that more than 750 million dollars have been pumped into or reserved for funding madrassas in India (Pandya, 2018). My own experience and interaction in India have shown that various institutes are influenced if not directly funded by Saudi institutes in the nation. As this section has shown, there lies a large amount of converging theological beliefs and practises among the Salafists of both India and Pakistan. Yet, these, however, do not translate to political beliefs and practices in which the movements from both nations differ significantly as seen in the following section.

Tracing the Divergent Trajectories (1) Salafism in Pakistan In the partition, a section of the Ahl e-Hadeeth wanted to shift over to Pakistan with the idea that there would be a better future awaiting them in the newly formed nation (Eaton, 2017). Over the years, the group slowly expanded and formed various organizations. Abou Maryam Zahab has documented 17 organizations that belong to the Ahl e-Hadeeth movement. Most of these have seen varying trajectories with six of them engaging in politics, three of them taking part in violent Jihad and the remaining involved in proselytization or building of madrassa networks across Pakistan (Zahab, 2009). Among these, the Markazi Jamiath Ahl e-Hadeeth (MJAH) chose to enter politics although its subsidiary organizations such Tehri-e Mujahideen and others have taken part in violent activities as well. The other well-known Salafist/Ahl e-Hadeeth entity is the Markaz Da’wa wal

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Irshad (MDI) which has supported violence and terrorism through its militant arm the Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) (Zahab, 2009). Apart from a number of activities carried out in India and specifically in Kashmir, the LeT was most infamous for the Mumbai attacks of 2008 that killed almost 180 Indians and foreigners (Tankel, 2011). (2) Salafism in India According to self-proclaimed sources, more than 25–30 million Salafist exist in India (MJAH, 2018). However, unlike their counterparts in Pakistan, they have not mobilized on the lines of violence in India (India, with 180 million Muslims, has produced almost no jihadists. Muslims here see stake in political system, 2017). This happened in both South and North India demonstrating the role of Indian democracy on a whole in the movement. Even after the entry of new-age Saudi ideologies and funding into India—mainly via economic immigrants from the south Indian states who went to these countries since the 70s, mostly, Indian Salafists (both from the North and South) have largely preferred to stay out of the political limelight and remain as peaceful and committed to the democratic process as possible (Siyech, Salafism in India: Diversity and Challenges, 2017). These were best reflected in the comments of Bernard Haykel who remarked about the peaceful nature of Salafists in India (Haykel, 2015). In India, the Ahl e-Hadeeth movement has remained highly nationalistic and encouraging of the state of democracy arguing for its followers to vote as well as to proclaim its role in the freedom struggle of India (Siyech, Salafism in India: Diversity and Challenges, 2017). According to this author’s study, a scrutiny of about 20 different scholars from the North and the South displayed an almost unanimous rejection of violence and terrorism with different reasonings behind it. Indeed, of about 100 members who travelled to join the Islamic state, the number of official Ahl e-Hadeeth followers are almost non-existent with only a few adhering to different types of Salafism emanating from the Middle East (Shreevatsav, 2016).

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Reasons for Differences: Salafist Identity Formation The reasons for radicalization among the above three movements are quite varied in nature. What stands out quite prominently though is the political situation of the states which has fed into the identity of the Muslim community of both nations. Both the nations have undertaken different trajectories in terms of their political, national and religious identity formation. Before beginning the reasons for differences, a short explanation on identity studies is warranted. Social scientists have long debated the various aspects of group identities that have formed over the years and have conducted multiple studies on various communities across the world. Group/collective identity was studied along the lines of ethnicity with social scientists divided into those who considered ethnic identities static and unchanging also called as Primordialists (Isaacs, 1975) and those who considered it quite dynamic and fluid known as the instrumentalists (Croucher, 2004). To further add to the field of group identity studies, later social scientists developed religious and national identities as objects of study. Sub-communities such as the Salafists or the Deobandis fall into the category of religious group identities that are marked by the commonality of rituals and beliefs that help define an in-group and an outgroup (Brubaker, 2012). Instrumentalists point to various instances that push people towards evil. They draw on experiments conducted by Philip Zimbardo who showed that when put in certain pre-defined roles, humans tend to become evil and undertake violent actions that they would otherwise not have taken (Zimbardo, 1975). This is further given credence by Stanley Miligram who showed that when acting under authority, human may engage in violent activities that they normally wouldn’t engage in (Russell, 2014). In addition, Guy Elroth and Stephen Reicher show that a group identity can engage in violence with other groups as and when members of both groups involved in fights/clashes are identified specifically as belonging to these groups and that hatred towards an outgroup is defined as long-standing (even if it is not) (Reicher, 2017). An example of

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this would be how many observers note how the ongoing Sunni-Shia tensions are historic in nature thereby confining these two identities as those always at war with each other, although this is a new narrative propounded by countries like Saudi Arabia to mask political reasons to oppose Iran (Fisher, 2016). Furthermore, under their framework, many factors work hand in hand to draw a certain group towards violence against other groups. Combining the above arguments, it is prudent to note that identity does not become violent or remain non-violent by itself but is influenced by external factors. Therefore, identities are fluid and warrant the study of numerous factors outside of such sub-groups/communities to understand their trajectories. The following section shows how Salafist identities in both nations are a subset of the larger Muslim identity in both nations and a result of the state fragility of the two nations as well. Thus, the factors that have affected and shaped the broad Muslim identity in India and Pakistan are the exact same factors that have helped construct a Salafist identity and dictate whether they would turn to violence or not. The factors are as follows:

Pakistan Under Siege The Pakistani identity has at some points been constructed as a country under siege by India leading to an acceptability towards violence by at least some parts of the nations (Afzal, 2018). That Pakistan and India were born off a violent partition, resulted in Pakistan having a traumatic experience of its birth. The splitting of East and West Pakistan to Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 which was facilitated with Indian armed support further deepened the grievance of the nation towards India (Afzal, 2018). To justify the presence of the Pakistani military despite territorial losses, India (represented largely as a Hindu nation that oppressed its Muslims) was painted as an existential threat to the Pakistani Muslim identity (Paul, 2014). This manifested in the Pakistani state and the intelligence agency— known as the Inter-State Intelligence (ISI)—giving legitimacy to any

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group that harboured Jihadist/militant wings that targeted India and specifically Kashmir (Hussain, 2007). Thus, many Salafist/Ahl eHadeeth groups had active militant wings that targeted India and were given funds and resources to do so. In this way, Salafist groups in Pakistan realized that in its opposition to India (mostly via violence), there was larger scope for the expansion of its organization. Thus, as can be seen, the Pakistani Muslim and (by extension) the Salafist identity has been influenced by the narrative that the nation is under siege by India. As Elrocht and Reicher demonstrate, whether real or imagined, a narrative that represents itself under attack by another group has the potential to help mobilize a certain group towards violence, i.e. in this case, the Salafists/Ahl e-Hadeeth organizations of Pakistan (Reicher, 2017). In addition, this also demonstrates elements of the state fragility index which notes that the power of the military and the sponsorship of violent groups by a government contribute to state fragility as seen in the case of India (Fund for Peace, 2017). In contrast, the Indian Muslim identity was most strongly influenced by the fact that the Deobandi and other religious clerics argued against the formation of religiously divided nations. They argued that if the prophet Mohammed could co-exist peacefully with non-Muslims in Medina, then the same could be followed in India too. According to them, given the right to practice religion, India would always be a neutral nation that does not deserve military action. This understanding of nationalism was termed Composite Nationalism by a prominent Muslim scholar Hussain Madani a few years before the partition of India (Abdelhalim, 2016). Consequently, the Muslims of India have adopted secularism and engaged in democracy quite consistently even in the face of different periods of persecution. This is also present among Indian Salafists. Indeed, this position was reflected by Salafist ideologue Mustafa Tanvir from the KNM who mentioned that as long as India allowed freedom of religion, it was compulsory to take part in the democratic process (Akbar, 2014). And while there have been two major waves of homegrown terrorism in the 1990s–2000s and mid-2000s to 2010s, the stated causes were justice for past grievances on the Islamic community, a move not supported by Islamic clerics (Rasheed, 2018).

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As Irfan Ahmed argued, for Indian Muslims, adopting secularism was a necessary strategy since the alternative was the right-wing political vision propagated by Hindu Nationalists like Golwalkar and Savarkar who argued for an Indian identity that was more Hindu in its orientation (Ahmed, 2012). Pragmatic reasons to support democratic processes was also supported by other Salafist ideologues such as Sheikh Wasiullah Abbasi who resides in Makka, Saudi Arabia and argued for Muslims to vote against the current PM Modi before the 2014 elections. While he did caveat his position by noting the flaw of democracy, he said that it was important to choose the lesser of the two evils and thus, advocated for voting (Umer, 2016). This was also a position chosen by another ideologue Shaikh Maqsood al Hasan Faizi, before the 2019 elections in India (Dawah, 2019). This position of favouring secularism and peace was also reflected among other Ahl e-Hadeeth and Salafist groups in India. For instance, the Markaz Jamiat Ahl e-Hadeeth Hind, i.e. the Indian Ahl- e-Hadeeth have often collaborated with Hindu groups such as the Arya Samaj and others as seen in the presence of these groups in their annual conferences (MJAH, 2010). Moreover, ideologues have specifically pointed to Hindu–Muslim unity as an important feature for Indian Muslims in the nation. For instance, at the 33rd All India Ahl e-Hadeeth Conference held in New Delhi in 2016, Mufti Ataur Rahman Qasmi mentioned: ‘With Hindu-Muslim Unity, India will progress forward’ (Official, 2018). Such messages have contributed heavily to the construction of a more peaceful and harmonious identity in India. Thus, as opposed to the Pakistani Muslim and Salafist Identity, the Indian Muslim and Salafist identity is defined more by its ability to co-exist with Hindu groups as well as the Indian state in a peaceful manner that eschews violence. However, this is not the only factor that has pushed Salafist groups in Pakistan to violence while Indian groups have left it out of their methodology.

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Majority–Minority Dynamics An understanding of Majority–Minority dynamics is another key part of the puzzle to understand the difference between Salafist groups in both nations. Pakistan has the distinction of being a Muslim majority nation which has fallen prey to the phenomenon of Majoritarian Insecurities as propounded by Arjun Appadurai (2006). In brief, Appadurai states that when the majority community in a nation feels that it is under threat, it develops a predatory identity that targets minority communities. This is a process that is done in many steps and aided by politicians and leaders. In Pakistan, the country’s Sunni religious communities have painted Pakistani Sunni Islam as a force under the threat of minority views such as the Ahmadi and Shia conception of religion (Khan, 2011). This narrative was also encouraged by the state since it diverted attention from its own economic and other failures as well as helped to fight its political rivals (Paul, 2014). Again, as per the state fragility index, a factionalized elite (divided along ethnic or religious lines among others) as well as group grievances whereby different groups are at loggerheads with each other are other indicators of state fragility thus, further demonstrating the nexus between the same (Fund for Peace, 2017). Thus, over the years, Deobandi and other Pakistani Muslim groups have encouraged or stayed silent in the face of attacks on their own minorities such as Ahmadis and Shia. This animosity towards such groups was also espoused by Salafist organizations in Pakistan. For instance, one of the Pakistani JAH’s main ideologue labelled the Shias as heretics and agents of Zionism in Pakistan (Ali, 2010). Similarly, the JAH fielded a fatwa that said it is the religious duty of Muslims to ‘dispatch Ahmadis to hell’, i.e. to kill them (Ali, 2010). Such blatant adoption of violent views towards minority communities undoubtedly resulted in Pakistani Salafists to also adopt violence as a tactic to enforce their version of Islam on those who couldn’t, thereby becoming another contributory factor to constructing a violent identity for Pakistani Salafists. In direct opposition to this, the Indian Muslim community is a minority community (despite its large numbers of up to 180 million). Many parts of the nation (including the South which witnessed far

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less partition-based violence) have seen the peaceful co-existence of many Muslim and Hindu communities. The many instances of Hindu– Muslim conflicts have often been criminal and spontaneous in nature and not a result of pre-mediated violent action on the part of Muslims of India (India, 2008). That the minority Muslim community has largely fought to survive and stay away from the political limelight has directed the Muslim community’s identity towards a more pacifist and reconciliatory direction barring a few prominent instances. Given that Indian secularism has largely encouraged pluralistic presence of religions, Muslim groups have gotten space to eschew violence. This is also why various Salafist groups have severely condemned terrorist attacks across India and the world as documented towards the end of this sub-section. This dynamic was quite prevalent for the Salafist groups too. For instance, in trying to legitimize the action of voting and democracy, the KNM ideologue Mustafa Tanvir said that it was anti-national and anti-Islamic to not vote (Akbar, 2014). The Salafist group leader’s usage of the term ‘anti-national’ only underscored how the group found it important to position itself as one that follows the nation. Similarly, the Ahl e-Hadeeth group of North India has also stressed the importance of mingling with the other communities of India. Another interesting point to make in this regard is that while they did condemn violence against Muslims in some scenarios (Salafi, 2019), at least some Salafist organizations have supported the Bharatiya Janata Party’s decision to abrogate Section 370 in Kashmir—a move that reduces special benefits accorded on the state—despite the fact that it was perceived as one with an anti-Muslim bias (Salam, 2019). Similarly, the leader of the Markaz Jamiat Ahl e-Hadeeth, Asghar Ali Mahdi also extended the organization’s support to the implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) across India (Salam, 2019). The NRC has been seen as a tool of the government to deprive Muslims of their citizenship and thus, was protested by Muslim activists across India (Changoiwala, 2020). Yet, in both instances, Imam Asghar Ali cited national interest as the reason for throwing the Jamiat Ahl e-Hadeeth’s weight behind the government signifying that Salafist organizations in India have had to engage strategically with the ruling party.

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Julten Abdel Halim supports this assertion showing that not only did Indian Ulema stay back in India during the partition but they also religiously justified the choice to eschew migration into Muslim Majority Pakistan (Abdelhalim, 2016). This led to the entrenchment of the Indian Muslim identity as one that was necessarily committed to the democratic process in India without much use of violence. This could also be partly due to the history of pre-colonial India where Muslims while having formed the Mughal dynasty were not bent on making it a religious community. During the freedom struggle, those Ulema who supported the Indian National Congress against the British did so due to the INC’s secular goals as opposed to a majoritarian one. Many Salafists were also against the idea of partitioning India into two parts (Eaton, 2017). Even post-independence in 1947, the Indian constitution gave Muslims the right to both, practise and even proselytize their religion gave them a sense of equality and security leading them to be more relaxed in India’s religio-political fabrics (Eaton, 2017). This also feeds into the social contact theory which theorizes that competition between different groups decreases with increased interactions between them. With Indian Salafists being a small minority among a huge number of non-Muslims, their social contact with non-Muslims is much more than their counterparts in Pakistan giving scope to reduce mistrust and hatred. In my observation, the Muslim and Salafist group identity in India is dictated by the (relative) level of equality afforded to them. Thus, as documented by many others, Muslims in India, on account of them being a minority generally adhered to three routes in order to engage with political processes and alleviate their own grievances which were (1) to support secular parties that were in line with their ideals, (2) form a body to endorse candidates who adhered to the best interests of Muslim collectively regardless of their party affiliation and (3) completely disengage from political processes (Abdelhalim, 2016). Nowhere within these three routes was the use of violence advocated by any Muslim group. Salafists too have largely stuck to the same three methodologies with absolutely no fatwas being advocated by Salafist leaders to ever take up arms. Indeed, organizations like the KNM and Jamiat Ahl e-Hadeeth have only spoken against terrorist activities

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and groups like the Islamic State. Moreover, Salafists have been major contributors to the Indian Union Muslim League, a largely dominant Kerala Muslim party demonstrating the various political recourses that Salafists have engaged in (Jr., 1966). It is important to add a caveat here noting that India has always had a strong right-wing Hindu nationalist lobby which was further strengthened after the elections of 2014 with the ascendance of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party. Ever since, various scholars have noted how the BJP has tried to craft a national identity that is Hindu-centric in nature and excludes Muslims (Evans, 2021). While this has not affected Salafist groups yet, it does have the potential to dislodge many of the advances made towards integration by the Muslims and Salafists of India.

Geopolitical Factors The last factor that has dictated the Salafist identity in both nations is the occurrence of geopolitical conflicts in South Asia and beyond. The first of these is the Afghan conflict of the 1980s. Pakistan was one among the many nations that took up an anti-Soviet stance and supported the Mujahideen/rebels fighting the Soviet forces. This anti-Soviet stance in the 80s was in line with its objectives to align with the United States and earn substantial civilian and military aid (Coutto, 2015). Due to this support, Pakistani Salafist groups such as the Lashkar e-Taiba were formed to fight in Afghanistan. Unfortunately for Pakistan, after the defeat of the Soviet Union forces, these groups came back to Pakistan with a vengeance (Tankel, 2011). Many of the groups began to speak against the western influence of the Pakistani government leading to the government having to train these groups’ attention to Kashmir and India whereby they could attack Indian interests (also with the help of the Inter-Services Intelligence). Despite these efforts though, many of these groups developed their identity in a way that adopted violence as a tactic to obtain their objectives. This was aptly put forward by Jessica Stern who named it Pakistani’s jihadi culture whereby madrassas, supported by the government educated generations

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of young Pakistanis on the importance of waging guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Stern, 2000). Of these, Salafist groups have also followed the trend—becoming instigators of violence both in Pakistan and outside of it. For instance, during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, many Ahl e-Hadeeth madrassas contributed fighters to conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan which was facilitated by the ISI. Moreover, the LeT worked closely with the ISI after its formation in 1990, to launch attacks in India. In one of its pamphlets titled: ‘Why we launch Jihad’, it argued that it would re-establish Muslim rule in Kashmir and the rest of India (Hussain, 2007). Despite facing a government ban, it was quite open in its recruitment with Pakistani authorities even declining to crack down on the group internally. This was likely due to its actions in Kashmir (Siyech, 2018). In contrast, India’s pro-Russia stance was an important factor that prevented it from encouraging its Muslims to participate in militancy. The ruling PM Indira Gandhi was an ally of the Soviet Union and it was well charted at the point that India did not condemn Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. In all my interviews with various Muslims across India, the number of Muslims who had travelled to join the Mujahideen in Afghanistan was non-existent. This could have been different had India been in support of the United States and against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Such a stance and the lack of Muslim groups were also most likely evident among the Ahl e- Hadeeth movement of India as well as other Salafist groups such as the KNM in South India although I have not been able to find much documentation of these views. In this scenario, the lack of overt Indian support for war in Afghanistan prevented the Muslim and Salafist identity to take a more violent form. As most studies have shown, countries that had sent in their citizens to fight in the Afghan conflict faced the formation of a larger number of terrorist groups in their own nation (Hafez, 2009). This leads to other conflicts in South Asia. Pakistani tolerance of Ahl e-Hadeeth and Deobandi scholars who espouse violence is rooted in the militant arms of these movements’ (the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish e-Mohammed, respectively) anti-Indian activities. Many scholars

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have documented how Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence has supported these groups to destabilize India in asymmetric warfare (Tankel, 2011). Peaceful tendencies in India have also remained so due to India’s policy of neutrality in conflicts in the Middle East. For instance, despite the international community’s initial opposition to Assad and consequent support of anti-Assad rebels (including by turning a blind eye to its own citizens that travelled to fight Assad), India refused to facilitate travel for such fighters. Part of the reason for this was Syria’s support for India on the Kashmir issue consistently leading to a proportional reaction (Mehta, 2017). This point becomes important because, while a violent identity is dictated by its internal/local ideologues, it can be influenced very strongly by ideological strands coming out of conflict zones. In other words, even if Indian Muslim identity would remain non-violent, the fact that experienced fighters from the Middle East who had sufficiently engaged with global foreign fighters in Syria could help re-direct the ideologies of Indian Salafist clerics in a way that could demand a more violent ideology.

How State Fragility and Democratic Rights Can Play a Role in Preventing/Fomenting Violence—Hints for the Future As this chapter has shown, the Muslim and Salafist identities have been shaped by national narratives, majority–minority dynamics and geopolitical realities in South Asia and beyond. It is important to caveat that not all Salafist groups in Pakistan are violent but the few that have turned violent, have done so for many reasons. Most of these reasons (which can be classified as political externalities) have contributed to forming an identity that is more violent or non-violent depending on the country and the level of fragility in the country as seen in aspects such as control of the military, a factionalized elite and group grievances. Thus, while the Salafists in both nations have had the same origins and the same theological tools at their disposal, they have still taken

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different routes on the question of violence (regardless of the range of targets of violence in Pakistan). This is the strongest proof that political realities are stronger in shaping the identity of a community rather than just ideological strains. That the state of Pakistan built a narrative that it and Islam were under siege and the fact that it turned a blind eye towards a violent narrative propounded by many of its religious schools gave space for Salafism to turn violent. While some levels of this fragility are seen in India, the government has not enabled Salafism the same way the Pakistani government did. Incidentally, this process is taking place in India but with more application for Hindu right-wing groups, thus creating a more muscular version of such groups that are willing to engage in violence (Kazmin, 2020). More importantly, the literature on state fragility and violence also discusses how the lack of provision of essential services allows terrorist groups to gain currency (Messner De Latour et al., 2020). This is something that is commonly seen in Pakistan with Salafist groups like the Lashkar e-Taiba providing aid in times of crisis such as in the aftermath of natural disasters in Pakistan in 2005, 2010 and 2015 (Siyech, 2020). This dynamic has not played out in the Indian sphere given a slightly more stable state—providing another layer of explanation. However, this does not mean that India will continue to perform well in this regard. Indeed, the 2020 State Fragility Index featured a special subsection India for being among the most worsened countries due to state repression of minorities, rollback of democratic freedoms, a neutered media presence and the onslaught of COVID-19 (Messner De Latour et al., 2020). These decreases in various important indices despite India’s huge economic strength classifies it as an awkward power, which is bent on creating a more solid identity (which excludes Muslims) that can create problems for different minority populations too. India’s situation has only grown worse since the report became among the worst affected nations due to COVID-19. In 2020 and 2021, it kept displaying among the greatest number of cases and the fastest growth of COVID-19 infections daily leading to mass unemployment and a contraction of its economy by 24% officially (unofficial estimates

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predict about 40%) (Ghatak, 2020). During this time, the villanization of Muslims has grown quite significantly due to false narratives that Muslims were deliberately spreading the virus (Vetticad, 2020). As such, it is wholly possible that splinter groups within Salafists (as well as other movements) may be affected a bit more negatively leading to violence, although the current situation remains largely normal. Thus, in this situation, it is important for the government to engage more constructively with its Muslim and Salafist populations and reign in Hindu extremists to prevent more radicalization.

Conclusion This chapter has challenged the common understanding that (1) Salafism is the cause of terrorism regardless of its geographical location and (2) Ideology is the most important factor in radicalizing/ propelling movements and organizations towards violence. A brief usage of group identity studies has demonstrated that political events and state narratives have played a larger role in determining if movements will turn violent. As the comparative case studies of the same movement in India and Pakistan have shown, it is political trajectories influenced by state fragility in parts, that play a stronger role in creating a radical or peaceful identity rather than ideological tendencies of the movements in question. If one were to test this concept, they can also look at the case of Deoband, Barelvis, Jamaath e-Islami and the Shia’s in the two nations which are peaceful and violent in India and Pakistan, respectively. Thus, governments should realize that they have an inescapable and powerful role in forming the identity of various communities across the world. The difference between a peaceful and a violent identity then can be seen via the intersection of domestic and international political interests combined with the vested interests of various community members.

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Note 1. Discussions with Keralite Salafists who have worked with many KNM run organizations from Kerala, India, in August 2019.

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3 State Fragility and Violent Extremism in Bangladesh Shafi Md Mostofa

Introduction Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, violent extremist groups have used various forms of violence to express their diversified agendas of scientific socialism, self-autonomy, and an Islamic state. Striegher (2015, p. 76) defines ‘violent extremism’ as a phenomenon that ‘is purely the ideology that accepts and justifies the use of violence to reach a particular ideological goal.’ Consequently, the scope of this chapter has been formulated by including only those extremist groups who adopt ideological reasoning to justify their act of violence in the pursuit of their respective agendas or goals. This chapter identifies and analyzes three dimensions of violent extremism in Bangladesh. First, ethnic insurgency led by some ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region to pursue autonomy for CHT falls under the first category of VE in Bangladesh. S. Md Mostofa (B) World Religions and Culture, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_3

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The second dimension is the emergence of left-wing extremism calling Bangladesh’s independence (gained in 1971) an ‘unfinished revolution’ in the light of Maoist socialist perceptions. The third dimension is the rise of Muslim extremism with the aim of transforming Bangladesh into an Islamic State. Since independence extremist groups have used various forms of violence to promote their diversified agendas. While the influence of left-wing extremists is decreasing, religious- and ethnicityrelated acts of violence (measured in terms of the number of people who are killed) are on the rise. This chapter attempts to uncover reasons for the growth of these three types of extremism and to explore the agendas behind their use of violence. Basically, this chapter argues that the inherent state fragility regarding legitimacy crises, poverty, violation of human rights, easy access to weapons, and bad governance helps foster extremism in the country. Data for this study was collected from both primary (interviews with experts on the subject) and secondary sources, including pamphlets and magazines of extremist groups, policy papers of governments, and reports of think tanks and other organizations.

State Fragility and Bangladesh State fragility is a post-cold war, donor-driven concept to address failed states, failing states, collapsed states, conflict-prone states, and states with persistent economic, social, and political challenges. An extensive literature on state fragility suggests that all states are to some extent fragile, showing signs of weakness with regard to authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Call, 2010; Carment & Samy, 2012; Gravingholt et al., 2012; Lahai & Koomson, 2020; Lemay-Hébert, 2018; Sulaiman, 2020). Powell (2017, p. 23) contends that fragility ‘is not an absolute condition to which all states are susceptible at some stage of their history’. Sulaiman (2020, p. 24) adds that ‘fragility is a process of structural decay and decline within any particular state’. While pointing to structural decay, Lewis (2013) and Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) have listed some structural issues which trigger state fragility. These issues include challenges over territorial control, legitimacy crises, authority-based limitations, a lack of service delivery including lack of law enforcement, security, and

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basic services, poor governance, acute poverty, and proneness to civilian conflict (Lahai & Koomson, 2020). Tonwe and Eke (2013, p. 235) putting great emphasis on legitimacy crises contend that legitimacy crises and limiting fundament human rights are the supreme determinant factors of state fragility. Lahai and Komson (2020) also allude to the lack of rule of law as a crucial aspect of state fragility, which is closely linked with the internal security of the state. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) also identifies the following symptoms of fragile states: ‘weak institutions are the central driver of fragility … States whose political systems and institutions are in some forms of transition are more likely to show signs of fragility … Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility’ (Clarie & Moreno-Torres, 2005). Many scholars have also contended that a fragile state provides extremist groups with a breeding ground or a convenient environment for building their networks and finding recruits (Howard, 2016; Sulaiman, 2020; Tonwe & Eke, 2013). To study the nexus between state fragility and violent extremism, Bangladesh provides a significant case study. Historically, Pakistan inherited a weak economic base with little infrastructure in 1947. Bangladesh being exploited by Pakistan inherited a more depleted economic foundations and infrastructure than that of Pakistan. Even though Bangladesh did not face any countrywide civil conflict or a war-like situation, it faced enormous economic challenges, poverty, and a lack of public services in the aftermath of independence war in 1971. Banerjee (2019) argues that ‘initial chaos and resource constraints in the immediate post-conflict period severely limited the capacity of the new state to deliver public services and good governance and hindered the establishment of governing authority across the country’. Given the initial economic and governance issues, the post-Mujib era (1975–1990) was marked by the military takeover, and the Middle East Petro-dollar came into play in the political dynamics of Bangladesh. In 1991, Bangladesh again returned to the democratic system of government. This democratic era (1990–2014) with a small exception in 2007–2008 was strongly marked with political violence between two political rivals—the Bangladesh Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. These two parties had been in power one

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after another, and violence had been a way of showing their existence in the political field. Post-2014, Bangladesh has witnessed an authoritarian tendency with marginalizing of the opposition, the introduction of authoritarian policies, and curtailing freedom of speech by extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and arrests (Mostofa & Subedi, 2020). Even though the legitimacy of the government deteriorated over time (Carment et al., 2015), Bangladesh has made steady progress regarding capacity, authority, and economic indicators in state fragility scores. Since the 1980s, Bangladesh’s garment industry and remittance flow started booming, which has positively affected the economic growth of Bangladesh. Bangladesh started moving from being a basket case to a middle-income country at the time of the global economic downturn. These economic, authority, and capacity improvements have been reflected in the fragility index moving from the 12th position in 2008 to the 39th position in 2021. Bangladesh, which started with 100.3 index points in 2008 on the ‘State Fragility Index’, is currently standing on 85 index points in 2021 in the FSI of Fund for Peace. Bangladesh has made stable progress in the fragility index since 2008, but it is still listed as a ‘High Warning’ category due to mainly factionalized elites, lack of public services, and violation of human rights (see Fig. 3.1). 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2008

2009

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Fig. 3.1 State fragility index (adopted from a fund for peace)

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Even though Bangladesh has now made steady progress in the state fragility index, it remains a fragile state in terms of the above indicators.

Ethnic Extremism Ethnic identity and long-time unresolved issues once again gained momentum in post-independence Bangladesh. Where the question of ‘identity’ is unresolved, it seems to persuade ethnic groups to resort to violent means for the pursuit of their agendas (Zariski, 1989). With cultural and political differences high on the agenda, amid the issue of ‘unmet’ economic needs, the possibility of social tension and conflict increases whenever groups divide themselves based on culture and physical appearance (Giddens, 1995). The whole spectrum of ethnic extremism is linked to and limited within, the CHT1 region of the country. This region is primarily a home for 13 ethnic groups in Bangladesh (Yasmin, 2014). These ethnic groups include the Tanchangya, the Tripura, the Pankhu, the Marma, the Mru, the Lushai, the Khumi, the Kheyang, the Chak, the Chakma, the Bawmthe, the Uchais (also known as the Osuies), and the Boms. They originally migrated to this land from Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia. Among these 13 ethnic groups, Chakams and Marmas were the dominant ethnic groups. By the early nineteenth century, their kings dominated two sides of the region over other ethnic groups before the emergence of British colonial rule in that part of the world. And they started pursuing modernization project by introducing a market economy as opposed to jum cultivation and by fostering cultivation by the plough. The Chakmas revolted against the steps of the British. Before the arrival of the British into this land, intra- or inter-ethnic conflict and sudden attacks from outside had been common. To maintain peace and security in this region, a special police force named ‘the CHT Frontier Police’ was created under Regulation III of 1881, and the region was ruled under a special administrative dispensation that was legitimated by the Regulation of 1900. Through this regulation, the uniqueness of this region was recognized with the mention of ‘Excluded Area’; and section 18 of the regulation allowed limited autonomy to them, in which the British entrusted three

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kings with care of local government. In 1935, this area was again termed an ‘Excluded Area’ and thus remained isolated from mainland activities. This remained so up until the division of Pakistan and India in 1947 (Chakma, 2010a). The Chakma leaders on the eve of the decolonization process who were assuming political leadership started discussions with the Congress leaders to determine the status of this region. They had formed the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samity in 1916, whose main objective was to uphold the rights of all ethnic groups within the region—but, in practice, it meant more to Chakma rights. Having arrived in June 1947, both Chakma kings led by the Bhuban Mohan Roy and Jana Samiti leadership were looking for a political decision from the British raj. Chakma kings favored pure monarchy in the CHT region. Jana Samiti leadership was divided into two camps on the issue of the system of government. A party led by President Kamini Mohan Dewan suggested a constitutional monarchy while an extreme part of it, led by its secretary Sneha Kumar Chakma, preferred a republican form of government. Despite their difference of opinion, both kings and the Jana Samity sent two delegations to discuss with the Congress leaders. As a result, Congress sent a special committee2 to CHT to deal with the CHT issue in late June 1947. The Jana Samity requested regional autonomy to ‘remain free from the oppression and exploitation of other developed nations’ although the special committee refused its demands to set up a provincial administration to ‘preserve the distinct national culture, custom, and characteristics’ (Ahmed, 1993). That said, negligence on the part of the Congress leaders and the British Rajs, and economic interest on the side of the Muslim League leaders allowed CHT to be included with Pakistan. This resulted in the creation of an extreme group led by the Jana Samity secretary Sneha Kumar, which refused to pay allegiance to Pakistan. This section of the Jana Samity was pro-Indian. Armed resistance was called for declaring that ‘the CHT shall not abide by the Radcliffe Award3 ’ (Ahmed, 1993). This resistance was soon controlled, and the flag of Pakistan was raised on 21 August 1947. This led Sneha Kumar Chakma to flee to India and the abolition of the CHT Frontier Police which was replaced by the East Pakistan Police.

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The mainstream Jana Samity leaders formed a new political party, the Hill Tracts People’s Organization in December 1950. They participated in the 1954 provincial elections and won two seats. Although the Pakistani government attempted to neutralize the CHT issue by adopting them into the national framework, the influx of businessmen and government service holders to this region, and increased industrialization projects in CHT created resentment among ethnic people. Finally, projects like the Kaptai Hydro-electric Plant, the Karnaphuli paper mill, and the Karnaphuli rayon mill created ‘serious ethnic tensions’. As a result, 40 thousand Chakmas migrated to India claiming that the power plant project destroyed their traditional lifestyle and causes serious economic loss. In January 1964, the Pakistani government changed the special status of CHT—Excluded Area—and this was protested against by all indigenous people (Uddin, 2008, 2010). Having arrived at this point when the independent war of Bangladesh was about to take place, Ahmed argues that ‘the paradise [indigenous people living in CHT region] in general and the Chakmas, in particular, remained indifferent to the traumatic events of 1971. The nationalist movement that swept across Bangladesh from the late sixties neither meant anything to them nor did it much appeal to them’. It was during the nationalist movement in East Pakistan that a new leadership appeared in the CHT region under the leadership of Manabendra Narayan Larma, who founded the underground Parbatya Chattagram Upajati Kalyan Parishad (UKP) in 1966, which provided a broader platform to both radicals and nationalists. Later the radical faction of UKP was led by Manabendra, who formed the underground Rangamati Communist Party (RCP) in 1970. The RCP later formed its armed division—the Gana Mukti Fouz (People’s Liberation Army). After having experienced initial turmoil in the CHT region in independent Bangladesh, a delegation led by Charu Bikash Chakma discussed the issue with the President and with other high-profile politicians and another delegation led by King Moung tried to meet the President but could not meet him due to his busy schedule. They left a memorandum of four-point4 demands including regional autonomy for the CHT region. Amid this situation in a newly formed nation-state, the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) was founded as

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a political party of CHT indigenous people, and Manabendra was made its convener in February 1972 (Uddin, 2010). In March 1972, a police check-post was overrun by the Gana Mukti Fouz. In April 1972, JSS forwarded an application demanding the rights of CHT people to the committee who were assigned to produce a draft constitution. All their efforts came to an end when the constitution was enacted in November 1972 and Article 6 of the constitution stated that ‘citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees’. Meanwhile Mujibur Rahman, the President declared in February 1973 that ‘the Paharis have been promoted to the rank of Bangles’. This statement was humiliating for them and in reaction, Manabendra said: ‘I am a Chakma, I am not a Bangalee’ (Ahmed, 1993). From late 1973, the then-government started settling Bangalees in that region, providing them with free land and police protection. This eventually caused the creation of the Shanti Bahini (SB), an armed wing of PCJSS, and a splinter group, the Tribal People’s Party by the middle of 1974. After the formation of SB, SB started manifesting its resentment by attacking and looting police stations. After creating Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), Mujib formed a special committee led by Abul Ahsan to look after the issue of CHT. But these initiatives were aborted when Mujib was killed in August 1975. By 1976, SB started creating a real threat to independent Bangladesh both militarily and politically through insurrectionary activities. When Ziaur Rahman came to power in 1979 he took several initiatives5 to solve the problem, he focused more on Bangalee settlement in the CHT. General Ershad (1981–1990) continued the policy adopted by Ziaur Rahman’s government. The governments after Ershad’s government formed committees and sub-committees and tribal leaders tried to uphold their points of demand but no significant success was achieved until the peace treaty was signed between the Hasina government and PCJSS in December 1997 (Ahmed, 1993; Mohsin, 2003; Rashiduzzaman, 1998; Yasmin, 2014). Uddin (2008) comments that ‘one of the elements of the Peace Accord was to recognize the rights of indigenous communities to land and other sovereign issues, which have yet to be fully realized and remain a source of tension in the CHT’. Several commentators argue that the post-treaty situation in the region became

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‘even more complex than ever’ (Quamruzzaman, 2010). This resulted in the creation of United People’s Democratic FrontUPDF), rejecting the PCJSS peace accord with the government and claiming the treaty as a compromise. UPDF continued this movement for ‘full autonomy of CHT’ and thus it raised the slogan ‘No full autonomy, No rest’. This created distrust among themselves, which led to division among themselves by dividing PCJSS into two sections and UPDF into two groups. As a result, killings and retaliatory killings have become regular activities and at the same time, security forces and Bengali settlers are involved in the process of conflict. The insurgency in the CHT, comprising 0.7% of the total population and a tenth of Bangladesh’s landmass, claimed more than 25,000 lives (Bhikku, 1987; France-Presse, 2019; SATP, 2002). In recent years between 2016 and March 2019, nearly 80 people were killed in the CHT region (Dhar, 2019; Mahmud & Raju, 2018; The Dhaka Tribune, 2018). The historical background of the CHT indigenous people shows reasons for ethnic extremism. Panday and Jamil (2009), based on historical and political analysis, offered five major causes of ethnic tensions in the CHT region. First, the CHT had special status during the British colonial period due to the declaration of excluded areas and barring of selling and transferring land to non-indigenous people. At that time, they enjoyed a kind of autonomy over the CHT region. It was destroyed in 1963 by the Pakistani government. The successive governments adopted the policy of Bangalee settlement in the CHT region. A report claims that the number of Bangalees amplified more than 400 times between 1872 and 1991 while the Pahari indigenous people augmented less than 10 times (Adnan, 2004). These new settlers started creating problems over land and resources for the Pahari people. As a result, the Pahari people started perceiving ‘their identity, culture, religion, and economic well-being under threat’ (Panday & Jamil, 2009). Second, the Kaptai Hydro-Electric Dam was built by the Pakistani government in 1962. The project forced indigenous people numbering some 0.1 million, especially Chakmas to move elsewhere and drowned 218 sq km, which was nearly 40% of the CHT’s arable land. This affected their livelihoods and meant they saw this dam as a death trap. To date, the effect is still observed among them. Third, the CHT people

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have been facing an identity crisis as they are alienated from mainstream society. As noted, socio-political and cultural domination started with the British and continues till today, which creates a sense of ‘otherness’. They were identified as ‘pro-Indians’ and they were even forced to accept Bengali nationalism. Fourth, the eviction of the Pahari indigenous people and land grabbing by an increased number of new plains land settlers, socio-political discrimination, corruption, and dispossession created further tensions among indigenous people. Finally, the government’s policy of dealing with political and ethnic issues using the military has increased tensions (Panday & Jamil, 2009). Mohsin (2003) argued long before Panday and Jamil (2009) that Bengali nationalistic politics in Bangladesh caused the rise of ethnic extreme organizations in the region based on Jumma nationalism.6 Shahed (2002), a former Army officer positioned in the region, states that Bangladesh is ethnically the most homogenous nation in the world, where 99% is Bengali and only 0.4% is indigenous. He contends that this small group of people cannot wage war without having external linkages: ‘India, the dominant regional power, had used the movement as a lever for favorable bargaining with the Bangladesh government on outstanding issues.’ It is evident that the principal agenda of ethno-nationalist extremist outfits is full autonomy for the CHT. Its other demands expressed through the peace accord in 1997 include protecting cultural identity, establishing rights over lands of CHT, rehabilitation for internal displacement, withdrawal of military camps, and self-government through regional and district councils.

Left-Wing Extremism The jubilation experienced by the people of Bangladesh at the formal surrender of the Pakistan forces to the Indian Army on December 16, 1971, was tempered by fear of a bitter power struggle among the many leaders of the revolution—guerillas, communists, and Awami League workers. Talukder Maniruzzaman

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Despite some achievements of the Mujib government7 immediately after independence in December 1971, the country faced a period of violent conflict and a lack of rule of law. Several reports claimed that within one and a half-year after independence, the country was shocked by more than two thousand clandestine killings, above 300 kidnappings, almost 200 rapes, nearly 5000 dacoities/robberies, and approximately another 5000 deaths by the offenders. These incidents followed police station looting and election violence. According to Maniruzzaman, these problems of lawlessness within the newly emerged nation-state were exploited by left parties to call for a second revolution for a socialist state based on the Maoist-Leninist-Marxist line of thinking. The left parties call the emergence of Bangladesh the first revolution (Maniruzzaman, 1975). Therefore, radical left groups considered the Bangladesh liberation movement to be an unfinished revolution, and as such ‘they considered the new government of the country a petty-bourgeois puppet government which they wanted to overthrow through violent armed struggles’ (Quamruzzaman, 2010). This radical left movement was born out of Bangladesh nationalist movement in the early 1960s, and this is a splinter group of the Awami League’s student wing (the party which led the Bangladesh movement). Some leaders of AL student wing—S. M. Abdur Rab, Serajul Alam Khan, and Shahjahan Siraj—were always in favor of armed struggle for liberating Bangladesh to install socialism. Rab was the first who raised the flag of Bangladesh on 2 March 1971, when Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly on 1 March 1971. The next day, Siraj declared the proclamation of independence in front of Sheikh Mujib. They always pushed Mujib to go for an armed struggle and to stop negotiation with Yahya Khan. They were in fact pioneer members of Mujib Bahini (a section of Mukti Bahini) during the war of independence but it is claimed that they were not interested in the individual cult of Mujib. Rather they preferred a revolutionary government that proclaims the rights of workers and peasants. On the other hand, the other part of the AL student wing supported Mujibism and remained loyal to Mujib. The Rab-Siraj group vowed to a classless society and chose to resort to ‘armed struggle to change the status quo’. The AL student wing fraction

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led fractions within some affiliated organizations of AL—the Association of Freedom Fighters and Labour Front. Finally, a new party—the Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD)—was formed in October 1972 under the leadership of Rab and Major Jalil. JSD was inextricably linked with the Bangladesh Communist League (BCL) led by Serajul Alam Khan and its members were well-trained in guerilla warfare during the independence war. BCL identifies three stages of the struggle for socialism. Of which, two goals were achieved through the independence of Bangladesh but the third goal is yet to be achieved. They claim that a growing contradiction lies between ruling elites—local and global—and the proletariat. They consider parliamentary politics as a means of exploiting classes and AL allowing global imperial agents—the USA, Russia, and India—to exploit our nation in the name of foreign donations (Maniruzzaman, 1975). Another radical left party is the Communist Party of BangladeshLeninist (BCP [L]). This is an alliance of four pro-Chinese communist parties8 in East Pakistan. BCP (L) maintains an open organization led by Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam, and Nasim Ali Khan and also an underground branch led by unknown figures. It opened a student wing named the Bangladesh Biplobi Chatra Union, a labor front named the Bangla Sramik Federation and a peasant organization. Some claim that some of its members are also involved with the National Awami Party-Bhasani (NAP). Its ideological standpoint has many similarities with BCL and it declares Bangladesh an unfinished revolution. Later, a division was noticed within the rank and file of BCP (L). There was another left radical group—the East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)— which did not join the alliance of BCP (L) led by Devan Sikdar and Abdul Bashar. Later, they changed its name to the Banglar Communist Party (BCP), which has both an open and an underground branch together with labor and student fronts. Among these five left parties, three radical underground groups emerged. Another infamous underground radical left party, the Sarbohara Party (Purba Bangla Sarbohara Party) led by Siraj Sikdar grew out of the worker’s movement. Siraj Sikdar was an engineer and most of its leaders are university educated. Maniruzzaman contends that personal animosities, desire for personal aggrandizement, and accidents of geography and history cause divisions

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and branches within left movements (Maniruzzaman, 1975). Kamruzzaman points out that this number grows up to 50 to date (Quamruzzaman, 2010). From 2005 to March 2019, left-wing extremists caused 758 deaths of civilians, security members, and extremists as well (SATP, 2019). That said, the causes of left-wing extremism lie in their understanding of the Bangladesh revolution, which promotes Maoist-LeninistMarxist scientific socialism and undermines Mujibism based on socialistdemocratic principles. Although there is a subtle point of departure from one party to another, they all concur on the issue of calling Bangladesh an unfinished revolution. Maniruzzaman said, ‘some believe that the next step must be class war; others think that even the nationalist phase is not complete while the Awami League government allows the economy of Bangladesh to be dominated by India, Russia, and/or the USA’ (Maniruzzaman, 1975, p. 903).

Muslim Extremism Unlike the other two militant trends, Muslim extremism took a little time to find traction in independent Bangladesh. The Libyan and Palestine wars in the late 1970s inspired some to organize under the banner of the Muslim Millat Bahini in 1986 (Mostofa, 2021b, 2022c). The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute analyzes Muslim extremist groups and divides them into two waves based on their technological prowess. The first wave (1999–2005) was deeply influenced by the traditional Afghan Mujahedins, and the second wave of militants (2013 onwards) are technologically savvy. These groups are the Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT), the Hizbut Tawhid, and the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (BEI, 2015). Following the same line of argument, Rahman (2016) contends that Muslim extremists were in most cases homegrown and influenced by the Taliban ideology before 2006. They recruited primarily madrassa youths with poor backgrounds. On the other hand, the second-wave radicals (2013 onwards) are influenced by Al Qaeda and IS ideology. They target the middle-class urban youths from universities and colleges. Mostofa (2020b, 2021a) argue that Muslim militancy has so far passed through

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six phases. He calls the period spanning from the late 1970s to 1986 the incubation period because no attacks or public activity of militant outfits were reported. Followed by a period of formation (1986–2001), this first period witnessed the formation of a number of militant outfits. The third wave is called the operational phase which started in 2001 with the bombing of a Communist Party of Bangladesh rally and ends in 2007 with the execution of JMB and JMJB leaders. The fourth phase (2007–2013), the silent phase, had been a quiet period in terms of public militant activity but was used for fund-raising and recruitment. The silent phase was followed by a violent wave or period. This violent phase began with the killing of blogger Rajib Haider in 2013 and continued up to a 2017 suicide bombing in Sylhet. The 2018-onward phase has been a dormant phase, which is also being used for recruitment and fundraising. Riaz (2016) divides Muslim extremist groups into five generations of militants based on their strategies and objectives. Riaz’s first generation of militants consists of nearly 3000 Afghan Mujaheddins who returned from the Afghan-Soviet war (1979–1992). The rise of the Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) in 1998 forms the second generation of militants. JMB attracted public attention in 2005 by exploding 459 bombs in 63 out of 64 districts. The international Muslim organization, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) falls under Riaz’s third category due to its global connections with a global agenda of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. The Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) falls under the fourth category, which started operating in 2012 and uses the cyber world for recruitment purposes. Finally, AQ like-minded Ansar Al Islam (AAI) and IS like-minded Neo-JMB fall under the fifth category. These two groups are distinct because they are directly motivated by, and associated with, transnational terrorist groups.

Muslim Millat Bahini (MMB) Matiur Rahman, a dismissed Army major, established the Muslim Millat Bahini (MMB). He was known among his followers as a spiritual leader, Pir. To this effect, he set up a camp in the district of Kishoreganj with 131 rooms, a few tents, and 61 bunkers. This camp was centered around the

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Shimulia Farz-e Ain Madrassa, which was essentially a part of the camp. Jihadism was introduced to the madrassa curriculum as one of the prominent elements. The madrassa managed to get more than 300 students from across the country. An operation by security forces into the camp in December 1989 caused 21 dead and injured 20 others including two policemen. Major Matiur Rahman was arrested, and the group ceased to function. Interestingly, the police recovered 27 passports with visas from several countries, and it is assumed that they supplied fighters to Libya and Palestine (Mostofa, 2021g).

Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) The Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami (HuJI) was originally a Pakistani Muslim militant organization founded by Saifullah Akhtar in 1984. Abdur Rahman Faruqi, a Bangladeshi national, met him in Afghanistan and attempted to bring HuJI ideology to Bangladesh but he died in 1989 in Afghanistan while he was fighting for the Taliban. Later in 1992, the Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) was finally formed by another Afghan veteran, Shafiqur Rahman. HuJIB had been successful in inspiring a number of Afghan veterans to work to install an Islamic state in Bangladesh (Tripathi, 2015). This group, however, became fully operational in 1999 when it carried an attack on the secular poet, Shamsur Rahman (Alam, 2008). Mufti Abdul Hannan was claimed its operation commander, who exploded 13 bombs, which were involved with the killing of 100 people, and injured another 700 people. Mufti Hannan was arrested for his connections with these attacks in October 2005 and executed in 2017 (Islam & Liton, 2017). HuJIB chose the coastal area in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar for their training camps. They established contact with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), a Muslim militant organization in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Alam, 2008). Diverse sources revealed that HuJIB had over 15,000 members and they were mainly recruited from the Deobandi Madrassas. (Banavar & Ahsan, 2010; Barkat, 2018; BEI, 2011; Mostofa, 2021g; Rahman, 2016; Riaz & Fair, 2011; Sultan, 2016).

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Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) The Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is the mother Muslim militant organization in Bangladesh, which was founded by Sheikh Abdur Rahman in 1998. Siddiqur Rahman alias Bangla Bhai and Dr. Asadullah Galib, chief of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB) were among others involved with JMB. JMB initially started its operations in the northern part of Bangladesh but slowly it expanded its network across the country. By 2005, JMB managed to get ten thousand full-time members and another one hundred thousand part-time members. Most importantly, security forces detained nearly 1500 JMB militants after the 2005 series bombings in 63 of the 64 districts (Mostofa, 2021i). The JMB’s agenda for Bangladesh was expressed through leaflets distributed in 2005: We’re the soldiers of Allah. We’ve taken up arms for the implementation of Allah’s law the way Prophet, Sahabis and heroic Mujahideen have done for centuries… It is time to implement Islamic law in Bangladesh. There is no future with man-made law. (Mostofa, 2021g)

With the agenda of establishing sharia law JMB maintains close relations with Pakistan-based Muslim militant organization, the Laskar-e-Taieba, and UK-based organization, the Al Mujaherun. Both Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai were executed in jail in 2007 for their connections with the 2005 bombings. This led Maulana Saidur Rahman to become its leader in 2007 and he was sentenced to seven years and six months on 26 May 2017. In four and a half years (September 2001– December 2005), JMB carried out 26 attacks across the country, which killed 73 persons and injured about 800 people (Mostofa, 2021g).

Ansar Al Islam (AAI) Ansar Al Islam is an Al Qaeda affiliated group in Bangladesh. A source interviewee contends that AAI became fully operational by killing blogger Rajib Haidar in 2013. Some important figures are intrinsically linked with the rise of AAI. Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, imam

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of a mosque in Dhaka, and Anwar al Awlaki, an American AQ leader were spiritual guides. Additionally, Rahmani started using cyberspace for promoting AQ ideology, which actually inspired several targeted killings in Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2021g; The Guardian, 2015). Syed M Ziaul Haq alias Major Zia is another infamous figure who is deemed to be it’s second in command. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was formed in 2014 and claimed its connection with AAI (Riaz, 2016). AAI poses threats to secular voices. It circulates a pamphlet online entitled ‘Who is Next’, in which AAI sends clear messages to curtail freedom of speeches. It states that it has: An identified list of Bangladeshi activists, bloggers and intellectuals worldwide who promote anti-Islamist group [sic]. They must die. Our All Mujahedin, this is our duty to slash their head. (Rahman, 2015)

The same report also highlights that AAI will continue to target people who commit eight specific kinds of offenses against Islam and the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (Mostofa, 2021a). Reports reveal that this group is well advanced in technology and uses cyberspace for radicalizing middle-class urban youths. AAI members were mainly recruited from colleges, universities, and English medium schools having middle-class and upper-class backgrounds. Since 2013 they claimed responsibility for killing 13 secular bloggers (Mostofa, 2021b).

Neo JMB Another contemporary militant outfit is the Neo-JMB, a IS-affiliated group in Bangladesh. Some members from the Bangladeshi diaspora communities around the world seem to have played a significant role in introducing IS to Bangladesh. Saifullah Ozaki (Japan), Taj Uddin (Australia), Aminul Islam (Malayisa), and Tamim Choudhury (Canada) worked together to bring IS ideology to Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2022b). They started operating at the same time as AAI since 2013, even well before the declaration of Caliphate in 2014 (Mostofa & Ware, 2019). They decided to recruit online using Facebook groups like the ‘Ex-cadet Islamic Learning Forum’ and it was evident that they managed to recruit

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a good number of youths and sent them to Syria and Iraq (Labu, 2017). Their activities were not limited to online work, and offline activities were also reported. For example, Tamim Choudhury, a Canadian expatriate established the Jund at Tawhid wal Khalifa (JTK, ‘Soldiers of Monotheism and the Caliphate’) in 2013 to bring all Muslim militant groups under this platform. Choudhury managed JMB’s acting chief Md Kashem to form ‘Neo-JMB’ in 2013 (The Daily Star, 2017). The demography of IS militants shows that majority of its members came from secular educational backgrounds of urban wealthy families (Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). IS also targeted the Bangladesh diaspora community living in different parts of the world for radicalization (Bashar, 2015; Sultan, 2017). Nearly 40 Bangladeshis have traveled to Syria to join IS. It claimed responsibility for 30 operations, which killed approximately 53 individuals. From July 2016 to December 2018, around 90 militants were killed by security forces in different operations and gunfire, and another 200 were arrested (Mostofa, 2021c).

State Fragility and Extremism in Bangladesh The above discussion of Muslim extremism clearly shows that all Muslim groups have their agenda of establishing an Islamic State in Bangladesh based on their understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Now, the question is how state fragility is contributing to the rise and growth of extremism in Bangladesh. It is evident that both ethnic and leftwing extremism began operating immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh, while Bangladesh was facing a war-torn situation. Poverty, famine, lawlessness, natural disaster, and easy access to weapons were identified as catalysts for the growth of militant activities. Siraj Sikder, a prominent leader of a Left-wing militia movement, asked in a leaflet in 1974 to stand against the government, in which he mentioned fragility issues. There is famine in the land. Naked, hungry crowds wander our towns, villages, roads, terminals and stations. Their screams for one mouthful of rice, one piece of bread, tears Bengal’s skies apart. Meanwhile, the Awami

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League traitors, black marketeers, assassins and hoarders are becoming rich overnight. (cited in Quamruzzaman, 2010)

This leaflet clearly indicates a picture of hunger and lawlessness immediately after independence, which persuaded Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to declare a state of emergency in the same year. Left-wing militant groups found traction in the extremely poverty-stricken north-eastern and western Bangladesh. Mass poverty was capitalized on by left-wing extremist groups for recruitment. Equally, ethnic tensions were accelerated by the growth of group grievances caused by, among other factors, the government’s social, political, and cultural discriminatory policies (Panday & Jamil, 2009). Lack of border surveillance and easy access to weapons also continues to accelerate ethnic militancy [Personal Communication: 12 July 2021]. State fragility issues were also put forward by political scientists, terrorism researchers, and experts on political Islam as catalysts for the growth of Muslim extremism in Bangladesh. Other issues such as madrassa education, external linkages and economic support, political patronage, political use of Islam, Muslim victimization, and Islamophobia were highlighted by a myriad of scholars (for details see Ahmad, 2008; Banavar & Ahsan, 2010; Brasted et al., 2020; Datta, 2007; DeVotta & Timberman, 2012; Griffiths & Hasan, 2015; Harrison, 2006; Lintner, 2002a, 2002b; Mostofa, 2019, 2020a, 2021d, 2021e, 2021f, 2022a; Vaughn, 2007). Economic challenges such as poverty, income inequality, and economic injustice have been a long-standing problem for Bangladesh, which has significantly contributed to the growth of militancy in Bangladesh (Akhter, 2010; Mia, 2017; Momen & Begum, 2005; Mostofa, 2021c; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Riaz, 2008, 2017). Even though Bangladesh has been entering into the middleincome country category with recent economic development, a 2017 report suggests that still 38% people live below the poverty line (Mahmood, 2017). Unemployment has also been a persistent problem for the country. Nearly 3 million people do not work at all and about 1.5 million youths are under-employed. Mostofa (2021h) argues that these

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unemployed youths have easily fallen prey to extremist ideology. Furthermore, social injustice and lack of social services have also contributed to the growth of extremism (Ganguly, 2006; Mia, 2017). Violation of human rights is one of the indicators of state fragility. Many scholars contend that violation of human rights provokes militant activities and is linked to the rise and growth of extremism in Bangladesh (Riaz, 2008, 2017). Rahman (2016) also adds that freedom of expression is limited in Bangladesh. Researchers have also identified issues of political instability which have enabled a convenient environment for flourishing extremism. These issues include bad governance (DeVotta & Timberman, 2012), corruption (Griffiths & Hasan, 2015), lack of rule of law (Akhter, 2010; Momen & Begum, 2005), a dysfunctional parliament (Ganguly, 2006), easy access to weapons (Ahmed, 2009; Quamruzzaman, 2010), the legitimacy crisis (Parvez, 2016), a lack of participatory democracy (Rahman, 2016), political unrest (Mia, 2017), extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances (Mostofa & Brasted, 2022). Summing up the above issues and based on extensive fieldwork in Bangladesh, Mostofa (2021b, 2021c, 2021j) argues local dysfunctional governments create grievances among youths, which seem to be capitalized by extremist groups to find recruitment.

Conclusion From the above discussion, it is evident that violent extremism has been an integral part of Bangladesh since its inception in December 1971 although its presence has not massively affected the whole society. The historical legacy of ethnic conflict continues in the CHT region with the ultimate aim of autonomy and self-government. The peace accord in 1997 failed to mitigate the conflict in that region. As a result, the challenge of ethnic conflict remains unresolved. On the other hand, the challenges posed by left-wing extremism are on the verge of elimination and loses its appeal—installing Marxist-Leninist-Maoist socialism—among the masses. This is marked by the rise of Muslim extremism. Since the early 1980s, global issues like Libya, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria inspired the growth of Muslim extremism

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in Bangladesh. Attempts have been made to establish an Islamic State in Bangladesh through a violent religious struggle: Jihad. Recently, the intervention of IS and Al Qaeda since 2013 has made the scenario more complicated with their technological prowess, which fosters online radicalization, hostage killings, suicide bombing, and lone-wolf attacks. This paves way for middle-class radicalization. That said, even though the state is moving toward a middle-income country it still has issues with legitimacy, protection of human rights, provision of public services, lack of rule of law, and factionalized elites. If these issues are not properly addressed, this would make the situation very problematic to deal with the extremist groups. No doubt, the issues of political instability have helped produce a very strong narrative for extremist groups and lack of the rule of law helps them to expand their networks.

Notes 1. The CHT region consists of 3 out of 64 districts of Bangladesh—Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachhari. This is a hilly area of the country comprising of 13,184 sq km (Uddin, 2008). 2. The Special Committee consisted of A.V. Thakkar (head of the committee), Jay Prakash Narayan, Prafulla Kumar Ghosh, Jay Pal Singh, Raj Krishna Bose, and Phulban Saha. 3. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was the chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission. 4. These demands are (1) autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts with its own legislature; (2) retention of Regulation 1900 in the constitution of Bangladesh; (3) continuation of the offices of circle chief; and (4) a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of Regulation 1900 and imposing a ban on the influx of the non-Hill people (Chakma, 2010b, p. 19). 5. Zia rejected their demand for autonomy and adopted a tougher policy towards the armed insurgency. His policies involve promoting economic development in the CHT region, reserving seats for indigenous students in educational institutions, setting up of Tribal Cultural Institutes, introducing special radio programs for the indigenous communities, appointing Rajmata Benita Roy (indigenous women leader) and Shubimal

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Dewan (indigenous leader) as advisors to Zia, appointing Aung Shwe Prue Choudhury as a minister of state, and installing Debashish Roy as the new king of the Chakmas in1977. 6. Jumma is a collective name used to refer to the small ethnic nationalities living in the CHT. 7. Its achievements include providing an unanimously accepted constitution within nine months of liberation war, managing to avoid famine in 1972 and 1973, holding free elections, restoring both railway and road communications, preparing the Chittagong sea port, and initiating business enterprises. 8. These are (1) the Coordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries, (2) East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam, (3) some communists of Khulna led by Maroof Hossain and Sayeddur Dahar, and (4) some communists led by Nasim Ali Khan.

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4 State Fragility and Dynamism of Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh: Recruitment Strategies, Women and Prison Radicalization, and Future Trajectories Syed Mahfujul Haque Marjan and Shafi Md Mostofa

Introduction While the origin of Islamist militancy goes back to the early 1980s, it received public attention in 2005 when Jamaatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) exploded around 500 bombs in 63 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2021a). Their growth was halted by the execution of some leading leaders of JMB, including its Amir, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, and commander in Chief, Siddiqur Rahman alias Bangla Bhai. Some scholars argued that Islamist militancy could not take root due to the secular orientation of Bangladeshi society (Khan, 2011), while S. M. H. Marjan (B) University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Md Mostofa University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_4

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others argue that militant organizations have resurfaced again due to global and ideological undercurrents (Mostofa, 2021d, 2021g, 2022c). A new phase of militancy began in the country with the arrival of IS and Al Qaeda in Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2020b). Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (2011), Bashar (2013), and Rahman (2016) have divided the growth of Islamist militancy into two phases. The first phase can be described as pre-2005 militant outfits, including Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), Jaggrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and JMB. And post-2013 militant outfits fall under the second phase of Islamist militancy, including Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), Ansar Al Islam (AAI), and Neo-JMB. These scholars divided these two categories based on their recruitment prowess and ideological standpoint. For example, the first phase of militants used traditional means of recruitment by going to mosques and madrassas and distributing leaflets. On the other hand, militant outfits of the current wave use cyberspace for recruitment. In terms of ideological difference, the current wave of militants is more prone to transnational agenda as opposed to national goals. Along the same line of argument, Riaz (2016) has examined militant outfits so closely and divided them into five generations of militants. To him, the Afghan returnees formed the first generation of militants. Shafiqur Rahman, an Afghan war returnee created the HuJIB. The group was the hallmark of the first generation. The rise of JMB and JMJB uncovered the arrival of the second generation of militants. Asadullah Galib, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, and Siddiqur Rahman (Bangla Bhai) accelerated the growth of JMB across the country. Because it had international contacts and a global agenda, the HT fits under Riaz’s third generation. Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) members, according to Riaz, are the fourth generation of terrorists since they recruit through the internet. IS and AQ supporters are part of Riaz’s fifth generation of fighters. This group of militants is unique in that they are globally networked and seek to construct a global Islamic state. That said, Islamist militancy has gone through many stages of ideological prowess and recruitment techniques, as evidenced by the discussion. This chapter examines how state fragility leads to the rise of Islamist militarism in Bangladesh, as well as possible future trajectories of Islamist radicalization.

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State Fragility and Islamist Extremism Fragile states seem to create a breeding ground for terrorism (World Bank, 2005). Rotberg (2003) argued that failed states appear to have weak institutions. Proper democratic practices do not exist in these states and the judiciary makes the judgment under the influence of the executive branch of the state. Thus, a broken law and order system enables terrorists to operate successfully. Gurr (2011) argued poverty, the gap between rich and poor, and political violence are the main driving force of terrorism. Bangladesh ranks 39th in the Fragile States Index of 2021, published by a Washington-based nonprofit organization, the “Fund for Peace”. Even though Bangladesh’s economy has been growing slowly, according to the Asian Development Bank, 21.8% of the population of Bangladesh was living under the national poverty line in 2018. Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies published a report which suggests that over 10 million people have become unemployed during the COVID-19 pandemic (The Business Standard, 2020). Another sign of an unstable state is a shaky judicial system. Corruption in the judiciary has been experienced by a large percentage of citizens (Gloppen, 2014). Mollah (2012) explains that despite being separated from the executive branch, the executive branch still retains control over Bangladesh’s judiciary. Fragile states acquire control of democratic institutions, which is another symptom of fragility (Rotberg, 2003). Voting irregularities, marginalization of opposition, and repression of freedom of speech have all occurred in the country (Mostofa & Subedi, 2020). The incumbent ruling party, the Awami League, won 96% of parliamentary seats in 2018. Other totalitarian regimes, such as North Korea, were pitted against this victory. Weakening democracy is making the country more fragile. The ruling party, the Awami League secured three times consecutive victories marked with the above irregularities at least in two elections in 2014 and 2018. Germany-based Bertelsmann Foundation named Bangladesh as one of the new autocracies along with Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda in 2018. That said, human rights violations, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and intimidating mass media seem to be commonplace in Bangladesh. Different cells of police have been accused of serious

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abuse of power and human rights violations (Hossain, 2017). US State Department pointed out that since 2009, the Rapid Action Battalion and other Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies have been involved in over 600 disappearances, almost 600 extrajudicial killings, and torture. These serious human rights abuse led US Treasury Department to slap sanctions on RAB and its six high officials (Mostofa, 2021g). These leanings are similar to other fragile states where religious extremism is overwhelming (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Meyerhoff, 2021; Risse, 2013). Mostofa (2021i), Mostofa (2021f) and Mostofa and Brasted (2022) have argued that these serious human rights abuses have been one of the triggering factors of IS founding traction in Bangladesh. Stewart and Brown (2009) link a lack of free and fair elections, political opposition repression, censored media, human rights, and civil liberties violations, illegal arrests, and a lack of freedom of speech to a condition of fragility. This chapter analyses the dynamics of Islamist extremism and sheds light on its future trajectories considering the aforesaid precarious condition in Bangladesh.

The Arrival of IS and Al Qaeda in Bangladesh Since 2013, the Al Qaeda-affiliated group AAI has been operating in Bangladesh (Mostofa, 2022a). However, there were a few occurrences before 2013 that signaled the emergence of a new terrorist organization in Bangladesh. This group was founded by Anwar al-Al Awlaki’s Al Qaeda recruiters. Members were recruited from a variety of English medium schools, colleges, and private universities (Mostofa, 2019; Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). The assassination of blogger Razib Hyder signaled the rise of AAI. Razib, a blogger from Mirpur, was assassinated in front of his home. On the same day as the attack on Razib, another attack on Asif Muhiuddin, an online atheist campaigner, was carried out. He was stabbed, but he managed to escape the onslaught. Four suspects were apprehended after confessing to being motivated by Al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki’s YouTube talk (The Daily Star, 2013). Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, who was convicted of murdering Rajib Hayder, is regarded as the organization’s founder. Zia, a former

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Bangladesh Army Major, was named as the AAI’s commander in chief, but he has yet to be identified. Even though security authorities have carried out several operations, only a handful of AAI supporters have been apprehended thus far. The advent of Neo-JMB, an IS-affiliated group in Bangladesh, is part of the current wave of militancy. Although it is apparent that terrorist groups in Bangladesh have ties to ISIS, the Bangladeshi government remains in denial. The group has some characteristics that indicate it is closely linked to the IS. The Neo-JMB promised to establish an Islamic Caliphate, or Shariah Law (Mostofa & Ware, 2019). IS has issued acknowledgment videos in response to many attacks. There have been many cases of funding being routed to Bangladesh from Middle Eastern countries. IS has been observed to have targeted security troops. Bangladesh has also experienced suicidal attacks in several places, which is unusual in Bangladesh’s militancy history (Routray, 2017). IS, on the other hand, has made several attempts to infiltrate Bangladesh. IS primarily targeted the Bangladeshi diaspora in this way. Since 2013, certain Bangladeshi expats, such as Tamim Chowdhury and Saifullah Ozaki, have used the internet to recruit young people. Apart from these attempts, a group from Syria visited Bangladesh in June 2015 to establish contact with Bangladeshi militant groups before the declaration of the Caliphate (Mostofa, 2022b). As a result, it is evident as day that Bangladesh has seen an increase in AQ and IS-affiliated groups, particularly since 2013, owing to a lack of security surveillance.

Use of Lethal Weapons It seems that the militants of Bangladesh have got access to lethal weapons, which is a new dimension for Bangladesh’s militant activities. The earlier breakout of Islamist militancy was mainly dominated by JMB and JMB focused mainly on “near enemy” or the supporters of democracy in the country rather than “far enemy.“ From the very beginning, JMB focused on bombing and attacking notable people of the country. In 2004, JMB carried out a machete attack on writer and university professor Dr. Humayun Azad. They assassinated Professor Muhammad

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Yunus of Rajshahi University in the same year by machete. In addition to machete attacks, the group exploded bombs in cinema halls and jatras (folk theatres) in Mymensingh and Satkhira in 2002. These attacks killed around 30 people. They coordinated 500 synchronized bomb blasts across the country in 2005, but these attacks reported no fatal casualties (Mostofa, 2021h). JMB members have expertise in bombs and machete attacks. On the other hand, AAI and Neo-JMB use lethal weapons and firearms for assassination and suicidal attacks. AAI relies on the traditional mode of attacking with a machete or knives. AAI used machetes in their assassination while the IS-affiliated outfit, Neo-JMB, used machete attacks to butcher its targets since 2013. In 2016, Neo-JMB used sharp weapons, small IEDs, and firearms to attack the Holey Artisan Cafe. They butchered several victims, threw IEDs, and used firearms on police and law enforcement agencies. The police seized two 7.62 caliber pistols, two 9 mm pistols, and AK-22 Rifle (Rana, 2018). However, after this attack, continuing operations of different law enforcement agencies pushed them back. This crackdown on militants brought changes to their use of weapons. For example, they use the improvised explosive device (IEDs) on separate targets. Nevertheless, another dimension has been added recently where the group attacked the ruling Awami League party office in Khulna, the Southern district of Bangladesh. This is the firsttime investigators found an intact remote control circuit with an IED (Khan, 2019). So, the scenario of using weapons is subject to constant changes with time. These days Neo-JMB uses remote control circuit IED in attacks. This can bring a catastrophic impact on the panorama of terrorist attacks in Bangladesh. This can also lead to suicide IED attacks, which have been IS’s most powerful and versatile weapons in different countries of the world (Kaaman, 2019). It can be a matter of great concern for Bangladesh. Access to weapons, an indicator of state fragility, has always been a security challenge for Bangladesh.

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Targeted Killing The arrival of new militant outfits and their use of updated weapons are reflected in the series of target killings. Both AAI and Neo-JMB carried out targeted killings across the country. Neo-JMB carried out target killings being inspired by IS’s ideology (for details see Brasted et al., 2020; Mostofa, 2021c). For example, Neo-JMB tries to “purify the Islamic Community” by assassinating Shia and other Islamic minorities like Qadiani, Bahá’í, and other infidels. It is similar in Iraq and Syria; IS has a long history of butchering Shia, Hezbollah, and the Yazidis as they label them infidels. In Bangladesh, it is presumed that Neo-JMB carried out the first attack in 2013. The group butchered a religious leader Taibur Rahman and his teenage son on 8 August 2013 in Khulna. After this, the group slaughtered self-proclaimed religious leader Lutfur Rahman and five others on 21 December 2013. After two years, another religious leader Khizr Khan was slaughtered in the same way as the previous two attacks. Not only these attacks but it is also assumed that Neo-JMB is behind a few more attacks for its modus operandi. On 4 September 2015, miscreants butchered Langta Fakir and his fellow in Chittagong. On 27 August 2014, an anonymous group slaughtered Islamic preacher Nurul Islam Farooqi. Though police are unable to find any clue behind these murders, they assumed that NeoJMB carried out these attacks (The Daily Prothom Alo, 2015). All these attacks portrayed the same group behind these attacks because of the similar killing pattern. From 25 September 2015 to 20 September 2016, IS carried out 24 attacks around the country, according to an infographic compiled by Amaq News Agency, the IS’s official propaganda news site. Sixteen attacks were carried out with a machete or sharp weapon, five attacks were carried out with small arms such as pistols, and one attack was carried out with a medium ranged AK-22 rifle. The group employed both weaponry and sharp weapons in one attack. The infographic also included target statistics. From 2015 to 2016, 42% of the assassinations were Hindu and Buddhist, 27% were Christian, 19% were Murtad (Muslim who rejects Islam) and Nonbelievers, and 12% are Rafida or Shia believers. The attack on Holey Artisan Bakery on 1 July 2016 is

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the most horrific terrorist strike in Bangladesh’s history. Nine Italians, seven Japanese, three Bangladeshis, and one Indian captive were slain when a group of five militants took the Holey Artisan restaurant (Roy, 2016). After an operation spearheaded by the Bangladesh Army, the restaurant was later reclaimed. After a few hours, the assailants uploaded many images to Amaq News Agency, the IS propaganda news website. It portrayed apparently that the attackers were not homegrown, they were representing IS (The Daily Star, 2016). After the Holey Artisan Bakery attack, there is a paradigm shift in Neo-JMB’s strategy of attack. They now attack law enforcement agencies and the political office of the ruling Awami League. Until September 2019, there have been three attacks on police claimed by IS (Swapan, 2019). It appears that the group has now targeted law enforcement agencies and the ruling party, the Awami League from targeting religious minorities and near enemies. AAI, an Al Qaeda-affiliated group, was also operating at the same time as Neo-JMB. This group was heavily influenced by Anwar al Awlaki and Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In a video message, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged the people of Bangladesh to stand against un-Islamic practices in Bangladesh. He said, My dear Muslim brothers, thousands of people are being killed in the streets of Bangladesh without any guilt, except that they have come out to protest against the collusion of the anti-Islam secular government with a bunch of transgressing secularists who are heaping insults and vulgar abuses on Islam and the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). (Hashmi, 2014)

From the beginning, the group murdered at least seven bloggers, writers, and book publishers with a machete (The Daily Samakal , 2016). The group carried out another attack in 2013 on Asif Muhiuddin. He was largely criticized by the terrorist groups for his critics of Islam. For similar reasons, blogger Sanniur Rahman was stabbed by a machete in March 2013. Professor Shafiul Islam was killed with a machete in November 2014 due to his remark about wearing Burqa (Veil) (Roul, 2016). The killing mission of AAI received more public attention when Bangladeshi American online activist Dr. Avijit Roy was hacked to death on 26 February 2015 at the University of Dhaka. Dr. Avijit and his wife

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were attacked by a machete. AAI claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that Avijit criticized Allah, Prophet Mohammad, and spreading atheism in Bangladesh through the website muktomona. The group also hacked to death three bloggers- Ananta Bijoy Das, Washiqur Rehman Babu, and Niloy Chatterjee and two book publishers Faisal Arifin Dipan and Mashiur Rahman Utsho with the same manifold machete stabbing (Roul, 2016). Nazimuddin Samad was stabbed to death on 16 October 2016. Ansar al Islam claimed responsibility for the attack. The group claimed that they assassinated him for his atheist ideology. Nazimuddin wrote against religious fundamentalism and growing terrorism on Facebook (Tipu & Rabbi, 2016). In 2016, the group killed Xulhaz Mannan along with his friend, a famous LGBT activist in the country. The group said, its members butchered Xulhaz Mannan for promoting homosexuality in the country (Hammadi & Gani, 2016). The group assassinated nine bloggers and publishers, according to law enforcement agencies (Moniruzzaman, 2017). While it appears that AAI targets those who oppose Islam and advocate secular ideals, the organization does not appear to target Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies. The group realizes that security personnel may retaliate against them if they are attacked (Barr, 2017). Along with these two terrorist organizations, the JMB remains active in the country. On 17 August 2005, the gang exploded 500 synchronized bombs across Bangladesh. The special unit Rapid Action Battalion’s massive crackdown resulted in the hanging of most of the group’s top commanders. JMB’s current coordinator is thought to be Shaikh Salahuddin Salehin. On 23 February 2014, he and two other JMB commanders escaped from the prison vehicle. Salehin later crossed the border and began operating from India. He was one of the masterminds of the Burdwan blast in India’s West Bengal state in 2014. The house later yielded 55 improvised explosive devices, according to authorities (Azad, 2014). This group is believed to be capable of carrying out strikes in both Bangladesh and India in the future.

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Some Worrying Trends Recruitment Militant groups’ recruitment strategies have also changed throughout time. Since the strike on Xulhaz Mannan in April 2016, AAI has not conducted any visible field operations. After the Neo-JMB attacked the Holey Artisan Bakery in July 2016, the organization was quiet. Because of the threat of military retaliation, the group changed its policy. The organization relies on the virtual world to acquire and propagate members. The gang has roughly 300 members throughout the country, according to law enforcement agencies. Rather than recruiting members, the organization focuses on expanding its ideology (Alam, 2019). On the other hand, Neo-JMB has a different strategy compared to AAI. At the micro-level, Old JMB recruits members from the less affluent class of the society. On the other hand, Neo-JMB recruits members from the affluent class of society. Neo-JMB focuses on students from English medium school, colleges, and expensive private universities (Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). Bangladesh experiences a boom in terrorism through online platforms. Neo-JMB and AAI follow a sophisticated method of recruiting members. Both groups targeted young people through interpersonal networks and online platforms. Bangladesh Police has researched and arrested 250 terrorists. The result of the survey was presented at a conference in 2017. The study found that 82% of the arrested terrorists were hired from Social Networking Sites like Facebook, and Twitter. Among 250 terrorists, 80% of them used different encrypted messaging services like Telegram, WeChat, and Threima (Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). It is believed that Neo-JMB and AAI have access to the deep web, which allows them to communicate with the group members more easily and secretly. According to the Telecommunication Authority of Bangladesh, BTRC, Bangladesh has 119.11 million internet users until October 2021. Nearly 80% of them are young people. Thus, Bangladesh is at a great threat from online radicalization. Law enforcement agencies in many countries can overhear the communication of their citizens. This leads terrorist groups to adopt encrypted

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messaging (Crawford, 2016). IS and AQ use these apps not only for “selfpromotion, brand development, and propaganda dissemination” but for private messaging too. These two usages make it a “dual-use weapon” for Al Qaeda and ISIS (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). This mode of communication is another threat in the arena of terrorism in the country. In previous times, terrorist activities were based on the classical model of communication, like verbal communication or preaching. Nowadays, there has been a paradigm shift in the mode of communication. Sometimes it gets difficult for law enforcement agencies to track them down for encrypted messaging systems (Islam & Liton, 2016).

Women Radicalization Women’s participation in militant activities is not a new phenomenon. Female suicide attackers carried out more than 220 attacks across the world from 1985 to 2006. There were 75 attacks in Sri Lanka, 67 attacks in Israel and Palestine, and 47 attacks in Russia and Chechnya (Turner, 2015). Some scholars predict that this number will be rising shortly (Von Knop, 2007). This prophecy got a bearing when Bangladesh witnessed the first woman suicide bomber in Dhaka (Khan et al., 2016). The role of women in militant organizations changed over time. Their roles are being evolved from being wives of jihadists and raising children to more prominent roles such as participating in combat activities, facilitating the transmission of operational details, and contributing to social media to radicalize, mentor, and recruit other would-be female jihadists (Mostofa, 2020a; Wara, 2018). Roul (2016) argues that an alarming number of women are joining militant groups. He went on to argue that some militant organizations such as JMB, AAI, and HT have used women for teaching and disseminating information but since mid-2016 women have been used for violent combat operations (Roul, 2018). Media reports revealed that at least 20 female extremists were arrested by December 2016. Another research paper claims that at least 7 women militants were either killed by security forces or committed suicide blasts to avoid arrest (Mostofa & Doyle, 2019).

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Not only these figures are worrying but it was also revealed that security forces arrested Humayra alias Nabila who oversaw the sister wing of the IS-affiliated group, Neo-JMB (The Daily Star, 2018). This is indicative of the organized women’s radicalization movement in Bangladesh. While the flames of women’s radicalization skyrocketed, two attacks were carried out by two blood-sisters attacks in Melbourne and Dhaka (The Daily Prothom Alo, 2018). These incidents attracted national and international media attention and academic examination. So, Jihadism in Bangladesh has also been experiencing the participation of female fighters in terms of training, suicide attack, and the dissemination of Jihadi ideology.

Prison Radicalization Prison radicalization is another threat. The country has been facing challenges with its prison management and criminal justice system. Security analyst Major General (retd) ANM Muniruzzaman said to the Daily Prothom Alo that there are major flaws in our current jail system. The way militants should be kept inside the prison is not properly followed. There are also limitations of our financial capacity, as well as the knowledge of the resources. We see the militants going to jail and converting others to extremism. They are spreading their ideology in the prison. Going to prison, a lower profile militant becomes a leader of militant outfits. In prison, he creates his followers (Muniruzzaman, 2018). One of the greatest challenges of the prison system is overcrowding (Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research, 2021; Kashem, 1996; Tarzid, 2015). Currently, this situation has worsened drastically due to the rise of drug prisoners and political prisoners (United News Bangladesh, 2018). Therefore, the prison authority has asked the government to construct makeshift sheds in all prisons to accommodate an increasing number of inmates. Prisons are overcrowded with around 87,000 inmates in 68 prisons as against the normal capacity of 36,614 inmates. So, the total number of inmates is three times of normal capacity in Bangladesh’s prisons (Rashid, 2018). This overcrowding situation leads to inadequate

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facilities and a lack of proper sanitation, which causes custodial deaths of a total of 53 in 2016. The German Agency for International Cooperation published a report in 2016, which revealed that Bangladeshi prisons do not meet the least standards for sufficient light, air, decency, and privacy (United States Department of State, 2017). As prisons are overcrowded, 65 inmates are housed in the same room, which can only hold 20 people. The Jail Code does not allow them to sleep, and they are only allowed to sit with their legs practically touching their chest, yet the jail code, the regulating law for the prisoners in Bangladesh, says that each convict is given 45 square feet of floor space (Bin Kashem, 1996; Rahaman, 2017). This is a clear violation of a prisoner’s human rights (Tarzid, 2015). Not only that but this has also allowed extremists to have a chat with other extremists or other people, which essentially paves the way for prison radicalization. The Daily Prothom Alo, the leading Bangladeshi newspaper reported on 2 July 2019 that the leaders of AAI have established an effective relationship with the leaders of JMB. The leaders of both groups are in custody for a long time. The report also stated that Jasimuddin Rahmani, the ideological leader of AAI pledged his allegiance or bay’ah to Shaikh Salahuddin Salehin, the emir of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, or vice versa (Sultan, 2019). Both AAI and JMB are relatively closer in comparison to Neo-JMB. The lack of de-radicalization programs in prisons pushes other prisoners to get involved with violent extremism.

Future Trajectories In Bangladesh, the death of Bagdadi, the fall of the Caliphate, and the demise of IS’s apocalyptic ideology caused Neo-JMB to have an identity crisis. The recent increase of IS in Bangladesh was owing to their ideological machinery, as was evident (Mostofa, 2021b, 2021d, 2021e). According to a study, almost 100 Bangladeshi non-residents fought for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Seventy-one male and female Bangladeshi terrorists have been profiled by law enforcement agencies. There are 37 Bangladeshis and 34 non-resident Bangladeshis among them. During the combat, 19 terrorists were reported dead. There

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is a chance that these terrorists will attempt to infiltrate Bangladesh in a variety of ways. That said, IS followers suffered a huge challenge from security forces which killed nearly 80 members of Neo-JMB (Mostofa, 2021b; Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). Therefore, Neo-JMB has been suffering both an ideological crisis and a leadership crisis. On the other hand, JMB has been facing the challenges of a leadership crisis since its amir was sentenced to jail in 2009. So, it appears that the whole militant blog is either suffering a leadership crisis or ideological crisis. So, what is next? While searching for an answer, AAI could be a viable option. The Bangladeshi branch of Al Qaeda began operations before Neo-JMB, a pro-IS organization. AAI continues to operate in the country. The organization appears to be putting a greater emphasis on its internet presence. The group intends to spread its philosophy to the next generation. There are 119.11 million internet users in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, 2021). In the future, there is a significant possibility of extremist ideology spreading among the country’s internet users. Two AAI members were detained with a weapon, a flash drive, al Qaeda instructions on how to construct explosives, and religious documents on the importance of Jihad in 2017 at Kolkata Railway Station. Some observers believe the group is preparing for future operations as well (The Dhaka Tribune, 2017). AAI may gain traction in Bangladesh for a variety of reasons. First, AAI’s parent organization, AQIS, declared Myanmar to be the group’s next focus. AQIS may exploit the Rohingya situation by using Bangladesh’s territory because AQIS is closer to the center of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, both organizationally and geographically. AAI pushed Rohingyas and Bangladeshi youngsters to join them in many of their online pamphlets (Mostofa, 2019). Second, the continuous oppression of the opposition groups in Bangladesh by the ruling Awami League government has widened the risk of youths joining AQISaffiliated Ansar al Islam in the country. AAI has also addressed popular causes of youth discontent such as extrajudicial killings, the rise of rape and divorces, moral degradation in society, corruption, and economic inequality (Mostofa, 2022a). Third, the division between secular activists and conservative Muslims has widened the chance of rising Al Qaeda

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affiliation in the country. This gap has challenged the portrayal of Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim country to a radicalized Islamic nation (RESOLVE Network Compendium, 2018). Four, AAI focuses on the Ghazwat-ul-Hind ideology (fighting against India), which is tailormade for Bangladeshi youths. This can be another threat for Bangladesh in the upcoming days in the context of South Asia (Reed, 2016). Five, the operational mode of Ansar al Islam is another threat to countering extremism in Bangladesh. The group operates in a small sleeper cell, which consists of four to seven people. Sometimes, it becomes difficult to trace them and their hierarchy (Khan, 2017). Six, AAI has a very active online presence. The group is agile in all types of social media, which has brought the group to a greater number of young people in the country. The online presence has brought a big threat to the future of Bangladesh. Even, during this Covid-19 pandemic, they have been trying to reach out to the audience. One of their YouTube channels receives more than five hundred thousand subscriptions (Mostofa, 2020c). This clearly shows the risk of online radicalization provoked by AAI. Seven, the country has been facing issues of state fragility, such as lack of rule of law, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, corruption, poverty, lack of public service delivery, fractionalized elites, and legitimacy crises. Due to these structural issues, some youths might resort to violent means and militant organizations may use the youth’s discontent and frustration over the state. Finally, the biggest threat for Bangladesh lies in the possible merger of AAI with the JMB. From the very beginning of the commencement, AQIS has been trying to bring various functioning jihadi groups into a single umbrella (Soufan Center, 2019). So, it would not be surprising if AAI, JMB, and Neo- JMB get merged for the sake of violent radicalization in Bangladesh. These challenges can be mitigated if proper attention is paid to restoring good governance, addressing issues of popular youth disaffection, countering ideology with an alternative ideology, and getting cyberspace under security surveillance.

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Conclusion The arrival of IS and Al Qaeda has changed the militant landscape of Bangladesh. This is for the first time Bangladeshi militants have directly aligned with international militant organizations by posing live pictures on militant networks and thereby featuring themselves in the journal of international militant organizations. Bangladeshi militants have always had a kind of global connection and this global trend has made Bangladesh vulnerable to violent extremism. Online radicalization is the gravest of all that has completely overtaken the traditional method of propagation. This current trend has effectively made youths and women from the middle and upper classes with urban and secular backgrounds vulnerable to Islamist radicalization. While security forces have been sending some of them behind bars, extremists made prisons a safe den for propagating their ideology and aligning with other militant groups. Worryingly, this generation of militants uses lethal weapons for operations and target killings. Most importantly, AAI has managed to capitalize cyberspace by addressing issues of youth disaffection. Due to the ideological and leadership crises of JMB and IS, AAI might find traction in Bangladesh. These terrorist organizations may merge with AAI as well. In this case, issues of state fragility may rationalize their ideological standpoint and help them to expand their network.

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Mostofa, S. M., & Brasted, H. (2022). Islamic State’s recruitment strategies: The case study of Bangladesh. In Religion, Extremism and Violence in South Asia (pp. 121–142). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. Mostofa, S. M., & Doyle, N. J. (2019). Profiles of Islamist militants in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(5), 112–129. Mostofa, S. M., & Subedi, D. B. (2020). Rise of competitive authoritarianism in Bangladesh. Politics and Religion, 14 (3), 431–459. https://doi.org/10. 1017/S1755048320000401 Mostofa, S. M., & Ware, H. (2019). Development of Daesh’s ideology. Peace and Security Review, 8(18), 12–22. Muniruzzaman, A. N. M. (2018). Jongibad birodhi Ovijaner Safollo Solpomeyadi [The success of the anti terrorism operations is a short term measure]. https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/interview/ Rahman, M. A. (2016). The forms and ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. Journal for Deradicalization, 7 , 68–106. Rahaman, M. (2017). Prison radicalization in Bangladesh present scenario and threats (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3086125). Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3086125 Rana, S. (2018). The Dhaka attack: Lessons for Bangladesh. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 23(2), 16–24. Rashid, M. (2018, August 20). Makeshift sheds proposed as jails overcrowded [News Site]. The New Age. https://www.newagebd.net/article/48895/mak eshift-sheds-proposed-as-jails-overcrowded Reed, A. G. (2016). Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A new frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement? International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Policy Brief, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.19165/2016.2.02 RESOLVE Network. Compendium. (2018). Bangladesh and Violent Extremism. RESOLVE Network. https://www.resolvenet.org/research/ compendium-bangladesh-and-violent-extremism-resolve-network-research2016-2017 Riaz, A. (2016). Who are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism, 10 (1), 1–17. Risse, T. (2013). Governance without a state?: Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood . Columbia University Press. Rotberg, R. I. (2003). Failed states, collapsed states, and weak states: Causes and indicators. Roul, A. (2016, May). How Bangladesh became fertile ground for al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 9 (5), 27–34.

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Roul, A. (2018). The shifting narrative of women’s role in Jamaat-ulMujahideen Bangladesh’s Islamic Jihad. Terrorism Monitor, 16 (22), 7–9. Routray, B. P. (2017). Special report: Bangladesh’s Unique War on the Islamic State. Mantraya. http://mantraya.org/special-report-bangladeshs-uni que-war-on-the-islamic-state/ Roy, S. (2016). Bangladesh cafe attack: Indian among 20 killed in Dhaka’s night of terror. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/ world/world-news/bangladesh-cafe-attack-indian-among-20-killed-in-dha kas-night-of-terror-2890521/ Soufan Center. (2019). Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia (p. 54). Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Al-Qaeda-in-the-Indian-Subcontinent-AQIS.pdf Stewart, F., & Brown, G. (2009). Fragile states (Working Paper No. 51; Crise Working Paper, p. 117). University of Oxford. https://gsdrc.org/documentlibrary/fragile-states-crise-overview-3/ Sultan, T. (2019). Abaro Humki Hoe Uthche ISISponthi Jongighosti [Pro-ISIS group has become a threat again]. The Daily Prothom Alo. Swapan, H. U. R. (2019). Policer Upor Hamla Jongider Dress Rehearsal [Attack on police is dress rehearsal of terrorists]. Deutsche Welle. Tarzid, S. (2015). Gross violation of human rights at prisons in Bangladesh: A critical analysis. ASA University Review, 9 (9), 233–245. The Business Standard. (2020). Deshe Notun Kore 1 koti 64 Lakh Manush Daridrosimar Niche-gobeshona [1 Crore 64 Lkah People are now under poverty line]. The Business Standard . The Daily Prothom Alo. (2015). Khizr Khan Soho Char Hottha Aki Dhoroner [Four assassinations are similar with Khizir Khan Murder]. The Daily Prothom Alo. https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/648496 The Daily Prothom Alo. (2018). Bangladeshi girl pleads guilty to knifing Australian. The Daily Prothom Alo. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/ Bangladeshi-girl-pleads-guilty-to-knifing The Daily Samakal. (2016). Ansarullahr Hathe Chapatir Por Boma [Now IED in the Hand of Ansarullah after Machate]. The Daily Samakal . https://sam akal.com/capital/article/1602194616/ The Daily Star. (2013). 4 held over attempt to kill blogger. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/4-held-over-attempt-to-kill-blogger The Daily Star. (2016). Bloody end to Dhaka hostage crisis. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/online/security-forces-begin-offens ive-end-hostage-crisis-1249219

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The Daily Star. (2018). ‘Financier’ of August 15 National Mourning Day attack plot arrested. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/country/ financier-august-15-national-mourning-day-in-bangladesh-attack-plot-arr ested-1558552 The Dhaka Tribune. (2017). Two Bangladeshi Ansar al-Islam operatives detained in Kolkata. The Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/ world/south-asia/2017/11/21/bangladeshi-ansar-al-islam-kolkata Tipu, M. S. I., & Rabbi, A. R. (2016). Killer regrets blogger Nazim murder. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/10/18/kil ler-regrets-blogger-nazim-murder Turner, K. (2015). Femme Fatale: The rise of female suicide bombers. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/node/69456 United News Bangladesh. (2018). Over a third inmates in overpopulated jails linked to drug cases. Over a third inmates in overpopulated jails linked to drug cases. Theindependentbd.Com. https://www.theindependentbd.com/ arcprint/details/142499/2018-03-22 United States Department of State. (2017). 2017 country reports on human rights practices: Bangladesh. United States Department of State. https:// www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ban gladesh/ Von Knop, K. (2007). The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 (5), 397–414. https://doi.org/10.1080/105761007 01258585 Wara, U. (2018). National Conference on prevention of violent extremism from a gender perspective. Conference Report. National Conference on Prevention of Violent Extremism from a gender perspective, Dhaka. http://bipss.org.bd/pdf/ Conference%20Report%20(Gender).pdf World Bank. (2005). Development in an insecure world & fragile states: The Low Income Countries Under Stress (LINUS) initiative. The World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/458871468328 174684/pdf/34789.pdf

5 State Fragility and Hindu Extremism in India: An Analysis of the Role of the Bharatiya Janata Party Stuti Bhatnagar

Introduction While religious violence is not a new phenomenon in India, it has certainly taken up a prime place in India today. Cases of violence against religious minorities, especially Muslims and Christians have risen since 2014. The violence has also affected other communities from lower caste Hindus, to women, and social groups that stand against the dominant political perspective of the day. Violent incidents are followed by vitriolic rhetoric by political leaders, and social analysts, often seen in television studios across India. The use of the internet for political debate, analysis and propaganda has also been popularised with the active and targeted use of social media as a tool to provide information, run election campaigns and create awareness about government policy. Social media has also contributed to deepening polarisation, misinformation S. Bhatnagar (B) Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_5

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about religious minorities and their alleged disregard for ‘Hindu’ traditions and recruitment of India’s youth as vigilantes for the protection of ‘Hindu honour’. The analysis of Indian politics since 2014 has focused on the increase in populism and authoritarianism. There has been significant attention to the growth of right-wing populism, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership style, the use of media and symbolism (particularly Hindu religious symbolism) and the increasingly reduced space for dissent under the current BJP government (Chacko, 2018; Manor, 2015; Ruparelia, 2015; Sen, 2016). The populist trend is also understood with regard to the political and social marginalisation of religious minorities. There has been it is argued a gradual ‘banalisation’ of Hinduism in Indian society that refers to a more public display of Hindu religiosity (Harriss et al., 2017). The BJP has employed symbols and political slogans to ‘reduce the heterogeneous particularistic content of social identity in the project of creating a homogeneous people’ (Sinha, 2017, p. 4160). This form of Hindu nationalism has been ‘readily mobilised for violence and discrimination against those seen as being outside of the nation for political consolidation’ (Chacko, 2018, p. 555). Specific targets have been the minority Muslim population and the Hindu lower castes. While there exist several records of the rise of religious extremism since the BJP came to power, I argue that the party and its affiliates have provided both tacit and direct support and recognition of incidents of religious violence. There is a correlation between the rising political fortunes of the BJP and the propagation of a Hindutva narrative in the popular discourse, both of which have played a role in the increase in violence. The significance of political agency, therefore, warrants a closer examination of policies and campaigns that have been instituted since 2014 with a direct impact on the rising violence against minorities.

State Fragility and Extremism in India The analysis in this chapter is informed by the theoretical debates on state fragility. State fragility is widely characterised as ‘the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, systems

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and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks’ (OECD, 2020). Often measured across the economic, political, social and societal dimensions, fragility can create negative outcomes including but not limited to ‘violence, poverty, inequality, displacement, and environmental and political degradation’. This chapter considers specific state fragility indicators including group grievances; state legitimacy—especially with regard to the openness of government, representation and willingness to accept criticism; social cohesion—the fault lines between groups in society based on religion, caste, language and race and; human rights abuse—particularly violence against specific groups and the curtailment of basic freedoms. In the Indian case, the rising incidents of religious violence have exposed significant societal differences and state complicity in failing to mitigate these challenges. The Indian state under the BJP government has provided tacit as well as direct validation to violence against minorities. This can be seen in the lack of police response as well as nationalistic political rhetoric by BJP leaders in support of/for the rationale for violence. While on the one hand, it raises questions about the state’s capability to deal with growing violence and its detrimental value for democratic ideals in India, on the other hand, the Indian state, owing to the BJP’s parliamentary position, is perhaps at its strongest, with a high level of control over state institutions, particularly those that are responsible for maintaining law and order. With the significant repression of dissent against government policies, the role of the BJP and its affiliated Hindu nationalist groups in providing agency to extremist violence and the continued use of divisive rhetoric for political gains is more prominent than ever. The increase in incidents of religious violence in India, further exacerbate social grievances and bring into focus India’s status and ambitions to become a leading global power representing a nexus between state fragility and extremism in India. Democratic backsliding in India must also be considered within the larger geopolitical ambitions and India’s quest to be a champion of democracy in the world. The resurgence in extremist violence in India was documented in a 2015 report by the Pew Research Centre on global restrictions on religion. The Social Hostilities Index, ranked India fourth with an index value of 8.7 out of 10, after Syria, Nigeria and Iraq (Manzar, 2018).

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In addition, by the Indian government’s own account, during 2017, ‘822 communal incidents were reported in the country wherein 111 persons lost their lives and 2384 persons were injured’ (Ministry of Home Affairs). This represents a rise of nearly 28% as compared to 2014. Religious violence in India has also negatively impacted India’s performance on the Fragile States Index of 2020, reflected also in a ‘significant worsening in the country’s Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator, and ultimately leading to India rating at the world’s 11th most worsened country overall’ (Fragile States Index, 2020). The analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts. Part One highlights the BJP’s role in mainstreaming Hindu nationalism with a focus on the election of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister and the increase in violence against minorities provoked by government policies initiated since 2014. Part Two considers the consolidation of the Hindu nationalist agenda in the 2019 election followed by bolder initiatives against minorities. The chapter employs the indicators provided by the Fragile States index (2020), particularly those that consider group grievances and focus on social and political divisions between different groups in society; social cohesion indicators; state legitimacy particularly the openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry; as well as the abuse of human rights and basic freedoms. The nexus between state fragility indicators and Hindu extremism is explored through a critical discourse analysis of government policy and the active pursuit of a political agenda driven by Hindutva.

Part One—Hindutva in Indian Political Discourse The wounds inflicted by religious violence in the aftermath of the partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947, anti-Sikh violence following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the targeted violence against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 are just a few examples of religious violence in Indian history. There has been an increase in violent incidents perpetrated by extremist Hindu groups, brought to international attention for the first time with the murder of Graham

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Staines, an Australian missionary in Orissa in 1999 (Marshall, 2004). This and the 2002 Gujarat violence brought global attention to growing Hindu extremism in India (Berenschot, 2012). The role of the state in communal violence and religious polarisation in India has been examined in detail by several empirical studies (Basu, 2015; Brass, 2003; Engineer, 1984; Wilkinson, 2004). Rather than repeating the analysis from what is a rich collection, this chapter restricts itself to the period since 2014, highlighting the political agency of the BJP government in power keeping the state fragility indicators in mind.

Hindutva’s Cultural Nationalism The ideology of Hindutva is central to the agendas of Hindu nationalist groups including the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP, Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena and others, collectively referred to as the Sangh Parivar. The essentials of Hindutva are set forth by ideologues including Veer Savarkar who advocated for ‘a common nation (rashtra), a common race (jati) and a common civilization (sanskriti)’ and elaborated in the writings of M.S. Golwalkar, whose conception of the Indian nation excluded all non-Hindus (Panikkar, 2004). The Hindutva philosophy promotes a conception of cultural nationalism based on Hindu religious identity. Its emphasis is on ‘Hinduizing the polity and the nation’ and the inclusion of Muslims and other non-Hindu groups is premised upon assimilation and the acceptance of the centrality of Hinduism (Varshney, 1993, p. 228). Hindu nationalists also argue that ‘religious minorities benefit from the traditional tolerance in a Hindu-dominated polity’ (Jaffrelot, 2007, p. 314). This aspect of social and economic concessions to minorities has been emphasised extensively by Hindu nationalist groups and the BJP. According to the ideology of M. S. Golwalkar (1966), the failure to assimilate the Muslims into the national society was a major blunder by the leaders of the national liberation movement who believed, ‘that by giving concessions to Muslims at the cost of the majority, they could win them over!’ For the Hindu nationalist groups, questions of assimilation

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and the opposition to minority concessions have continued to be a dominant thread. This was aided by the policies of the INC that appeased minority communities for electoral reasons, a criticism that was used to a very effective degree during the 2014 BJP election campaign. Established after the dissolution of the Janata Party and the Jana Sangh in 1980, closely affiliated with the RSS and the VHP, the Hindutva identity is a raison d’etre for the BJP (Ogden, 2010, p. 220). Its links with the Sangh Parivar have remained strong and the RSS has continued to have an impact on its ideological content, decision-making, personnel and leadership (Anderson & Damle, 1987; Hansen & Jaffrelot, 2001). The BJP has agreed with the majoritarian ideological position, ‘characterized by two dimensions—one, a deep-seated suspicion of diversity and minorities and two, a fluctuating belief in conservative Hindu tradition as the ideological basis for Indian nationalism’ (Palshikar, 2015a, 2015b). In attempting to set itself apart, the Jana Sangh and subsequently the BJP continually challenged the idea of India that the INC, under Nehru and Indira Gandhi, had sought to invent including crucial aspects of Indian identity including secularism and the nature of representative democracy (Singh, 2013, p. 94). As the primary ideological challenger to the INC, the BJP’s reading of India’s history has been ‘through the prism of humiliation and subjugation’ (Singh, 2013, p. 97). Ideas such as secularism and non-alignment have been viewed as factors that have weakened India’s global standing, hence justifying the need to reclaim India’s civilisational strength. In its first election manifesto, for instance, the Jana Sangh outlined the idea ‘the need for cultural rejuvenation (in deference to the RSS) but also the need for a strong state, and liberties and rights for its (Hindu) citizens without concessions to minorities’ (cited in Behera, 2002, p. 344). Over the years, the BJP has remained dedicated to these goals of the forging of ‘one nation, one people and one culture’ (BJP, 1996, 2005, p. 248). Developing this norm, Indianisation and Hindutva became increasingly referred to as ‘cultural nationalism’— a unifying principle of ‘timeless cultural heritage’ (BJP 1998, 2005, p. 146). The BJP’s rise to power has gradually brought Hindutva ideals into the mainstream, wherein the ‘state has become identified, increasingly with Hinduism and plays a significant role in regard to the communal conflict’

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(Harriss et al., 2017, p. 19). The use of nationalistic political rhetoric has exacerbated fault lines between identity groups based on religion, language, race, leading to significant internal social grievances. There is also an inherent political economy dimension to the BJP’s rise in power. While Nanda (2009, p. 140) points to a ‘state-temple-corporate complex’ that has emerged from the processes of globalisation, thereby making Hindu religiosity more apparent in public life, for Chacko (2019), the BJP-led government ‘seeks to insulate neo-liberal policies and practices from dissent while also building consent for neoliberalisation and authoritarian statist practices through a populist discourse that pits a “people,” encompassing the poor, the newly urbanised “neo-middle classes” and middle-class Hindus’. Cumulatively, what it means is that the separation between state and religion in India has now diminished.

Hindutva and the Modi/BJP Election Campaign Advocates of Hindutva were emboldened by Modi’s successful campaign in 2014, described as the BJP’s ‘golden moment’ and a new phase in Indian politics identified with the creation of a ‘neo-Hindu democracy’ wherein a ‘normative regime is poised to popularize a political imagination that would have a majoritarian emphasis as its basis’ (Palshikar, 2015a). The campaign relied heavily on support from other Hindu nationalist organisations including the RSS and VHP and volunteers played an important role in the election campaign (The Economist, 2015). The campaign adopted a multilayered strategy, creating a distinction between the development, nationalist and Hindutva constitutency and addressing each of them differently (Palshikar, 2015b). Hindu religious traditions and symbolism were used to campaign in states with substantial minority populations and a history of communal dispute, for instance in UP. The apparent polarisation was evident when sectarian strife was stoked by BJP MLAs escalating a small local dispute into violent Jat-Muslim riots in Muzzafarnagar in August 2013 (Jaffrelot, 2015).1 The BJP’s choice of state leaders, particularly the ascendance of Yogi Adityanath, a Mahant (chief priest) of the Gorakhnath temple and vocal

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proponent of Hindutva was also indicative of this strategy. As a BJP MLA, Adityanath started the Hindu Yuva Vahini, a youth organisation implicated in communal violence in Gorakhpur and neighbouring districts (Harriss et al., 2017, p. 6). He represents, it is argued, ‘the institutionalisation of rabble-rousing and brute force over informed debate and showcases a distinctly pugnacious strain of public activity and politics’ (Katju, 2017). While Modi attempted to distance himself from Hindutva in the national campaign, other BJP leaders adopted a communally charged narrative in their campaign speeches, including Giriraj Singh’s ‘go to Pakistan’ charge against those critical of Modi (The Times of India, 2014). Singh also targeted religious minorities at a rally in April 2014, when he said: at present, a subsidy is being doled out to those indulging in cowslaughter, but those who are raising cows are not getting any benefit. You have to decide whether to live with those who rear cows or those who slaughter them. (quoted in The Times of India, 2014)

There were incidents of Modi using similar language and rhetoric, representing an ‘intersection of Hindu nationalism and populism’.2 In one of his speeches, Modi said, This country wants a Green Revolution [an expansion of food grain production]. But now those at the Centre want a ‘Pink Revolution’. Do you know what it means? When animals are slaughtered, the colour of their flesh is pink. Animals are being slaughtered and being taken to Bangladesh. The government in Delhi is giving subsidies to those who are carrying out this slaughter. (cited in Chacko, 2018, p. 16)

The BJP’s views of minorities were also reflected in the lack of Muslim representation with only 7 Muslim candidates among the BJP’s 482 candidates and not a single Muslim among ‘its 282 members in the Lok Sabha’ (Sardesai et al., 2014; Vishnoi & Chishti, 2014). Hindutva’s growth since 2014 has gone beyond the electoral victory. While the Prime Minister promoted a development message through various government programmes, a growing atmosphere of fear and

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intimidation against minority groups and others who question or critique government policy also occurred.3 Long-standing Hindutva demands such as the uniform civil code; article 370 on Kashmir and the completion of the Hindu temple on the disputed site in Ayodhya in UP received renewed attention (Harriss, 2015, p. 714). Modi in several speeches referred to the need to revive and ‘redress India’s “twelve hundred years of servitude”’ (Rafiq, 2017). This is a reference to correcting and changing the legacy of Islamic Mughal history visible in rewriting textbooks and constant references to India’s past glory (Flåten, 2017). Violence against vocal critics of government policies also grew, often terming opposition groups as anti-national and seditious. Several government campaigns undertaken since 2014 emanate directly from Hindutva’s cultural nationalism and have been used to popularise the narrative further.

Politics of Cow Protection Considered sacred for the Hindus, the protection of the cow was given new meaning by Hindu nationalists. Argued to be central to the formation of Hindu nationalism as far back as the late nineteenth century, it became a key focus of the BJP government since 2014, particularly in states where it held power (Zavos, 2000). It was also a visible strand of the election campaign with one of the slogans being, ‘BJP ka sandesh, bachegi gai, bachega desh (BJP’s message, the cow will be saved, the country will be saved) (cited in Adcock, 2018, p. 347). Following Modi’s election pronouncements, BJP governments in Maharashtra and Haryana passed laws banning cow slaughter in 2014–2015. While aimed specifically at slaughterhouses, the policy had a clear Hindutva overtone as it responded to a common perception regarding the Muslim consumption of beef. Although opposed by beef-eating states in India’s North East and the South, the beef ban affected most directly, poor Muslims who were engaged in the $10 billion leather, meat production and related industries across India (Kim, 2017, p. 362). The aftermath of the ban has been the creation of a new category of violence referred to as ‘bovine related mob lynchings’ against alleged cow slaughterers

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or smugglers. Such lynchings were aimed at ‘enforcing a majoritarian ethnic/racial/religious political order’ (Varshney, 2017). The first and perhaps the most popularised incident was the lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq in Dadri in UP on September 28, 2015, on suspicion that he was storing beef in his home. In response to his killing, BJP MP Sakshi Maharaj said, ‘we won’t remain silent if somebody tries to kill our mother. We are ready to kill and be killed’ (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Since then, there have been numerous such cases, fueled by suspicion and a direct result of the growing atmosphere of distrust within religious communities. Gau raksha (cow protection) gangs numbering in thousands have now been created to patrol highways and country roads at night, hunting down cow smugglers with several recorded cases of violence (Safi, 2016). With support from the state, formal ministries and departments exclusively for cow protection, were established by the BJP governments in Rajasthan and UP, in addition to a cow protection tax that is now being levied by the UP government for a corpus for cow shelters in the state. Cow-related violence is, however, not restricted to Muslim minorities alone. Lower caste Hindus have also been targets. In a famous incident, four members of a Dalit family in Una, Gujarat were brutally flogged by gau rakshaks when they were skinning a dead cow (Chauhan, 2017). Government response to these incidents has either been delayed or one of dismissal. Modi’s public statement condemning the violence in 2017 was a variation from his usual silence on the issue, yet even in denouncing the violence, he invoked the sacred status of the cow.4 Police investigations following these lynching incidents ‘have moved glacially; victims’ families are sometimes threatened with counter-charges of cow slaughter’ (Nair, 2017). Further, faced with criticism over the lynchings, former Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said that while there was ‘no justification’ for the violence, opposition party workers advocating for beef-eating would have to understand that ‘by doing this they do as much damage to the country as the gau rakshak [or cow protector] on a train’ (ibid). In continuation of BJP policy to characterise criticism of Hindutva as pseudo-secularism particularly that practised by the INC, he also raised the question, ‘have we twisted the definition of secularism?’

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calling out the opposition for ‘selective morality’ (Indian ). UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath also said, There is only one way to protect Indian culture: to protect gau (cows), Ganga, and (goddess) Gayatri…Only the community that can protect this heritage will survive. Otherwise there will be a huge crisis of identity, and this crisis of identity will endanger our existence. (Human Rights Watch, 2019)

In a blatant display of support, BJP’s Minister of State for civil aviation Jayant Sinha was seen garlanding eight convicts out on bail in a lynching and murder case in Ramgarh in July 2018 (Deccan Chronicle, 2018).

Love Jihad Love Jihad as an idea argues that there is an Islamist conspiracy to seduce Hindu women and to convert them to Islam. UP Chief Minister Adityanath has been a vocal proponent of this concept and has allegedly, ‘exhorted Hindus to convert a hundred Muslim women to Hinduism for every one Hindu woman converted to Islam’ (Firstpost, 2014). In another rally in 2014, he promised that ‘only a BJP-led state government can stop forceful conversions of Hindu girls’ and categorised ‘love jihad as a national and social problem’ (Indian Express, 2014a). Love Jihad also represents a distinct gender perspective with women considered a Hindu’s honour and thus needing protection. The issue was also raised in election campaigns by BJP President Amit Shah, for which he was reprimanded by the Election Commission (Election Commission of India, 2014). Several attacks against minorities have been influenced by this idea. In Rajasthan in December 2017, a migrant worker was murdered and the video posted on YouTube. Further, pro-Hindutva groups have created Facebook pages publishing lists of inter-faith couples with links to their Facebook profiles exhorting followers to ‘hunt down the men’ mentioned in the list (Kohli, 2018). In another widely popular case, the marriage of Hadiya, a student from Kerala to a Muslim man, was annulled by

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the Kerala High Court after her parents alleged that she had been brainwashed and forced to convert. The case was escalated to the Supreme Court which in a judgement in March 2018 restored the marriage. In this instance too, the government response has been skewed in favour of the perpetrators of violence. While Home Minister Rajnath Singh assured minorities of protection (The Hindu, 2014), the BJP’s MP from Unnao, Sakshi Maharaj, alleged that ‘madrasas across the country are imparting “education of terror” and “love jihad”’. He claimed that ‘Muslim youth in madrasas are being motivated for “love jihad” with offers of cash rewards—Rs 11 lakh for an “affair” with a Sikh girl, Rs 10 lakh for a Hindu girl and Rs 7 lakh for a Jain girl’ (Indian Express, 2014b). While the BJP distanced itself from these comments, several such cases regarding the connection of women’s honour with Hinduism have emerged over the years.

Ghar Wapsi Another campaign that has received support from Adityanath and other Hindu nationalists is the ghar wapsi (homecoming) campaign driven by the VHP, that sought the conversion of Muslims and Christians to Hinduism. This shuddhi (purification) movement, started in the 1920s and was advocated by Savarkar and Golwalkar. It argues that ‘since most Muslims and Christians in India were “originally” Hindus and were converted either fraudulently or through intimidation, converting them to the Hindu religion is not conversion but simple a return to the fold’ (Palshikar, 2015b, p. 728). The idea was subsequently adopted by the RSS with the formation of specialised outfits called the Dharm Jagran Manch (DJM), the Hindu Jagran Samiti and the Dharam Jagran Samiti (DJS). According to one report, more than 8000 people in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana were converted to Hinduism in 2014 (Deccan Chronicle, 2014). There are also reports that the ‘RSS and its affiliates are engaged in a massive “ghar wapsiGhar wapsi” programme to get Christians back— not just to Hinduism, but also to Sikhism, in Punjab’ (Indian Express, 2014c). The VHP’s Pravin Togadia, is reported to have said,

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there was a time when Hindus accounted for 30 per cent of the population in Bangladesh, which was just 8 per cent now. In Pakistan, the number of Hindus has come down to 1 per cent from 10 per cent. This process has got cemented in Kashmir too and is spreading in States such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. It is the duty of patriotic Hindus to unleash efforts to stop this process. (Indian Express, 2014c)

It has also been alleged that several of these reconversions are carried out by force or by bribing victims. In one such case, it was alleged that, ‘350 Muslims who were converted to Hinduism in the slum areas of Agra by the Bajrang Dal and the other RSS front DJM were lured with promises of BPL [Below Poverty Line] and Aadhaar cards’ (Noorani, 2015). In another statistic, it is argued that ‘the ghar wapsi campaign has reconverted at least 200 Christians in Gujarat, 300 Muslims in Agra, and more than 100 Christians in Kerala’ (Kim, 2017, p. 363). Echoing the narrative regarding rising Muslim populations in India, the Maharashtra government in 2015 passed a law making religious conversion extremely difficult. ‘The aim in each case is to thwart the activities of Christian missionaries and to a lesser extent the movement by certain groups (tribes or lower castes) to adopt Islam’ (Jaffrelot, 2018, p. 54). Collectively these policies have contributed to bringing Hindutva into the mainstream political discourse leading to rising violence against minority groups.

Part Two—Hindutva and the 2019 Elections While the 2014 election campaign ostensibly emphasised development as a dominant narrative, as the previous section demonstrates, the ideals of Hindutva were skillfully woven into the campaign strategy. In the five years of its administration, the first Modi government instituted several policy initiatives aimed at fulfiling both these narratives. Some economic reforms were instituted but after an initial spurt, India’s economic growth rate has slowed. In August 2020, India’s GDP contracted by 23.9% with crucial parameters including manufacturing, construction, trade and the

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hotel industry significantly impacted (Paliwal, 2020). The Modi government’s promise of extensive job creation also remains largely unfulfilled, adding to further unemployment. To deviate attention from its economic shortfalls, in the 2019 election campaign the BJP government relied on a campaign strategy that placed national security concerns at the forefront and used Hindutva as a more visible platform.5 Heightened Indian tensions with Pakistan were also used as a key election issue by the Modi administration, emphasising the need to secure India’s national security and projecting Modi as the only strong and wilful leader who would be able to achieve this. As it happens in Indian political discourse, the question of Pakistan is often extended to India’s vast Muslim community, raising questions about loyalty to the Indian state. Without expressly making these linkages, Hindu nationalist groups using their extensive organisational capacity created an atmosphere driven by national security as the key focus of the 2019 elections. The BJP won the election by a massive majority. In terms of Muslim representation, the 2019 election too saw a marginalisation of the community with only 6 Muslim candidates from the BJP and a total of 27 seats in the Lok Sabha in 2019. The BJP also continued to endorse prominent Hindutva voices including Yogi Adityanath in UP and Sadhvi Pragya Thakur in Madhya Pradesh, a prime accused in the 2008 Malegaon terror bombings near a mosque in Maharashtra and a vociferous Hindutva supporter. Since its win in 2019, the newly empowered Modi government has introduced several controversial policy decisions with repercussions for the minority populations in India. In August 2019, the BJP government fulfilled one of the main Hindu nationalist promises—the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that promised Kashmir’s autonomy. Through two presidential orders, the Modi government revoked the ‘special rights’ and autonomy for the state and announced the bifurcation of the state into two union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. The party’s opposition to Article 370 was first raised by its founding leader Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. Mukherjee along with former BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee had led a protest in 1953 to build national awareness for J&K’s complete integration. However, Mukherjee was arrested by the J&K Police and died in custody in June

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1953. A popular slogan coined at the time—‘Ek desh mein do Vidhan, do Pradhan aur do Nishan nahi chalenge [There cannot be two Constitutions, two Prime Ministers and two flags in one nation]’ was to become the cornerstone of the BJP’s political approach to Kashmir. The BJP’s opposition to Kashmir’s special status was also driven by its desire to rehabilitate the Hindu Kashmiri Pandit community back to the valley. The Kashmiri pandits were displaced in the early 1990s from Kashmir with the rise in Islamist extremism and their cause has been at the heart of the BJP’s political campaign ever since. Another controversial decision by the Modi government was the updated list of citizens popularly known as the National Register of Citizens (NRC) pertaining to the north-eastern state of Assam that borders Bangladesh. Though it had been in existence since 1951, the list has been updated over the past few years. To demonstrate that they belonged on the register, residents of Assam had to show that they or their forefathers were in India before 1971. A draft version of the list was published in July 2018 and created significant controversy for leaving out nearly 1.9 million people in Assam with no state. Those excluded from the NRC were given 120 days to prove their citizenship at so-called ‘foreigner’s tribunals’. The BJP and other Hindu nationalist groups have a particular interest in the NRC that seems to exclude the Muslim and Christian communities. In its 2019 election manifesto released in April, the BJP also promised to extend the NRC to other states in India, targeting illegal immigrants in the states of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh in particular. Addressing an election rally in West Bengal, BJP President Amit Shah said, Mamata didi thinks infiltrators will help her win the election this time. But we will bring NRC in West Bengal and drive out infiltrators one by one. They (TMC) are now scaring refugees. They are saying that if NRC is implemented, refugees will be driven out. But I want to assure all refugees that bringing Citizenship Amendment Bill is our commitment. Sikh, Buddhist and Hindu refugees will not have to leave the country. We will give them their right to live here with dignity. Mamata didi can use all the powers she has, but infiltrators will be out of this country. (Indian Express, 2019)

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In leaving out Muslims and Christians in his speech, Shah made the BJP’s position on this issue very clear. Closely related to the NRC project is the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed in December 2019. The law ‘offers citizenship to non-Muslims fleeing religious persecution from three nearby countries’ and prompted outrage and protests across India for attempting to marginalise Muslims in India and for linking Indian citizenship with religious identity in contravention of India’s secular identity. Shah also controversially referred to ‘illegal migrants as termites’—a statement that provoked a strong reaction from neighbouring Bangladesh (NDTV, 2018). Within India, student groups and opposition leaders protested both these controversial decisions and the police force in Delhi and other BJP-led states retaliated strongly against dissent. Communal clashes in New Delhi in February 2020 led to further violence and the direct targeting of Muslim neighbourhoods supported actively by BJP leaders who blamed anti-CAA protesters for inciting violence. Eyewitness accounts and other reports however have placed the blame on BJP leaders and the Delhi Police for their failure to prevent the rioting and for inciting violent mobs against anti-CAA protestors (The National Herald , 2020). Other Hindutva agendas of the BJP have also been a feature in recent years including the resolution of the Ayodhya/Ram Mandir dispute in the Supreme Court. Further, in its second avatar, in July 2019, India’s parliament approved a bill that makes the Muslim practice of ‘instant divorce’ a criminal offence. While Prime Minister Modi and the BJP leadership have hailed this bill as a ‘victory of gender justice’, the bill remains controversial. The initiative has generated debate around the rights of Muslim women as the issue of divorce, marriage, and inheritance come under the purview of Muslim Personal Laws, yet it is also seen as the Indian state’s interference in religious affairs of the minority Muslim population and linked to the BJP’s attempts to establish a Uniform Civil Code. The violence against minorities in India has continued, taking on new forms with significant restrictions on press freedom and dissent. More recently, several incidents of violence have been sparked leading to tensions, the demolition of mosques and contentions with regard to

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the practice of Muslim religious traditions. In 2021, the Freedom in the world, 2021 report published by Freedom House downgraded India from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ (Freedom House, 2021). In another critical report, the Varieties of Democracy project based in Gothenburg, Sweden characterised the Modi government as an ‘electoral autocracy’ (V-Dem., 2021). Both these reports highlighted declining civil liberties in India along with the rising intimidation of journalists, growing pressure on human rights organisations and increasing attacks on Muslims as matters of significant concern. In another recent incident, in May 2022, Nupur Sharma, a BJP spokesperson, made disparaging remarks about the Prophet Muhammad in a television interview, amplified by other BJP officials. The statements reflected the mainstreaming of Hindutva in popular discourse but also raised questions about India’s status as a responsible democratic state. The comments upset governments in the Middle East, many of whom lodged formal protests with New Delhi and reflected the dangers of violent extremism extending and damaging India’s quest to be a rising power (Ganguly & Blarel, 2022). Rising attacks on people and places of worship also brought scrutiny from the Secretary of State of the United States, Anthony Blinken (2022).

Conclusion Using the framework of state fragility, this chapter critically examined increasing violent extremism in India since 2014. It uncovers the support and recognition by the government in India of acts of violence against religious and social minorities. The chapter considered the correlation between the rising political fortunes of the BJP and the propagation of a Hindutva popular narrative, both of which have played a role in the increasing radicalisation and polarisation in India. It examined the BJP’s political agency through a closer examination of policies and campaigns that have been instituted since 2014 with a direct impact on rising extremist violence. Playing on religious sentiments for political use is not necessarily a strategy employed by the BJP and the Hindu nationalists alone, other

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political parties have also been equally complicit. However, since 2014, there has been a marked increase in religiously motivated violence, creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, particularly for religious minorities. The BJP and the Sangh Parivar have been successful in mainstreaming Hindutva and the significant display of everyday religiosity in public life in India. Further, in the absence of state action against perpetrators of violence against minorities, the situation remains volatile. Structural violence while deeply rooted in Indian history has reached new heights under the BJP government with policies including new cow protection norms and support to Hindutva projects such as Ghar Wapsi and Love Jihad giving impetus to violence against minorities and exacerbating internal social grievances. Structural reforms that reflect the BJP and the Sangh Parivar’s position on secularism and questions of citizenship have also been raised through the NRC and the CAA, triggering further violence in different parts of the country and raising concerns regarding state fragility and democratic backsliding. The 2019 campaign reflected a concerted attempt by the BJP to mainstream Hindutva. The campaign centred heavily on a national security discourse and the promotion of Modi’s image as a capable leader, carefully avoiding references to India’s struggling economy or the problems associated with religious violence. The BJP is also unapologetic about the growing linkages between state and religion, visible in public pronouncements in support of Hindutva goals and promoting individuals who have been directly implicated in religious violence including Yogi Adityanath and the more recent endorsement of Pragya Thakur. While construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya has now begun, the questions with regard to the NRC and Kashmir’s status within the Indian union continue to be controversial, likely to exacerbate already fraught relations between different political, religious and social groups within India. As internal grievances become more pronounced, India’s status as a functioning democracy adhering to democratic values of free speech and dissent has come to be questioned. There are questions if these indicators of state fragility and democratic backsliding will hinder India’s transformation into a leading power. Geopolitical dynamics, however, for now, place the Modi and BJP-led government at an advantage. While India’s partners in

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the West and the Middle East have urged the Modi government to reaffirm its commitment to democracy and pluralism, there is little pressure on New Delhi as India remains important for the geopolitical contest against China. A long-term view, however, indicates warning signs and the need for the government to take measures to build social cohesion and address internal grievances. Violent extremism is also likely to impact India’s reputation as a vibrant and diverse democracy and as the recent reactions by India’s international partners show, such violence would be detrimental to the country’s reputation beyond its borders.

Notes 1. The riot caused the death of 55 people and the displacement of 51,000 others and BJP MLAs who had been formally implicated in the riots by the police were ‘felicitated by the BJP at an Agra rally addressed by Narendra Modi, where they were hailed as “heroes” who had “ensured the safety of Hindus” at the time of riots’, including Sanjeev Balyan, who became Minister of State in Modi’s government in May 2014. For more see Jaffrelot (2015). 2. At a rally in Hiranagar in Jammu and Kashmir on March 26, Modi called his political rivals ‘agents of Pakistan, enemies of India (Chacko 2018, p. 15; Mody, 2014). 3. This is reflected in the targeting of individuals, journalists, particularly with a liberal left leaning perspective. In February 2016, students at Jawaharlal Nehru University were charged with sedition for allegedly shouting ‘anti-India’ slogans at a rally marking the execution of Afzal Guru in 2013. For more see Chacko (2018). 4. Modi stated: ‘I have asked states to take strict action against those violating laws in name of cow protection. It should not be given political or communal colour; the nation [does not] benefit from it. There is a widespread belief that cow is like mother but this should not let people take law in their own hands,’ (Indian Express, 2017a). 5. In February 2019, following an attack on paramilitary forces in Indianadministered Kashmir, India carried out an air strike inside Pakistani territory to destroy alleged terror camps. While Islamabad denied any casualties, it retaliated with its own air force across the Line of Control in divided Kashmir. An Indian plane was downed, the pilot captured, only

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to be subsequently released. While the crisis was defused somewhat in the weeks and months that followed, there was a rise in ceasefire violations along the border, while diplomatic tensions remained high.

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6 Fragile State Policy and the Rise of Muslim Extremism in Sri Lanka A. R. M. Imtiyaz

Introduction On 21 April 2019, a group of Muslims launched a coordinated and wellplanned suicide bombing that ripped through Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka and Batticaloa, a major city in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a state of approximately 20 million people that was previously considered a model of democracy in Asia. A simple answer blames the Arabization of Sri Lankan Muslims, but violent mobilization from the below is usually the response to the state’s inability to be a neutral actor, to supply economic and social goods as well as to address the grievances of ordinary people. State fragility occurs in separate ways in different democratic societies. In deeply divided societies, an inability of the state and institutions to A. R. M. Imtiyaz (B) Department of Liberal Arts, Delaware Valley University, Doylestown, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_6

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gain the trust of minorities could lead to fragile polity. This status of the state could trigger tensions and violence if marginalized continue to lose trust in the democratic institutions and thus would look to settle the differences by bullets over ballots. The state fragility can also be understood as whether the state and its institutions provide reasonable and impartial public services to all its citizens (Constellations of State Fragility Explained). Fragile states, therefore, pose a serious threat to democracy, political reconciliation, and peace. In this chapter, the author attempts to analyze the post-war Sri Lanka condition. Sri Lanka’s gruesome ethnic war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated security forces ended in May 2009 with the killing of an estimated 80,000–100,000 people between 1982 and 2009, including kids (Boyle, 2016). The deaths include 27,639 Tamil fighters, more than 21,066 Sri Lankan soldiers, 1000 Sri Lankan police, 1500 Indian soldiers, and tens of thousands of civilians (Ibid.). Sri Lanka Sinhala-Buddhist political leaders’ use of ethnicity and religion to win power helped to marginalize Tamils, and some Tamils eventually resorted to violence as they lost trust in the state and its institutions. There was an expectation Sri Lanka will find a peaceful way to address the grievances of Tamils and Muslim communities in post-war Sri Lanka. Instead, evidence suggests that in post-war Sri Lanka, the state and its institutions continue to be a major source of tensions, by its inability to fight Sinhala-Buddhist extremists who believe that Sri Lanka belongs to Sinhala-Buddhists (Ekanayaka, 2019). Sri Lanka’s new generation of Sinhala-Buddhist extremists adopted their predecessor’s political Buddhism that Sri Lanka belongs to Sinhala-Buddhists. Their political activism appeared on the part of a new generation of Buddhist monks not only aggravated by the conflict but also by the political and social climate in Sri Lanka, becoming more militant, violent, and ultimately intolerant toward other ethnicities and religions (Deegalle, 2004). Thus, the emergence of new generational Sinhala-Buddhist extremists is a manifestation of ethno-religious identity mobilization and polarization which have blurred ethnic and religious differences causing a ‘repressionreaction pathway.’ Hence, in the post-conflict reality that Sri Lanka faces, contemporary political developments coupled with the emergence of

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extremist religious forces, such as the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS), which has handled inciting hatred, evident in June 2014 attacks on Muslim businesses in Aluthgama, Beruwala, Shargatown and Dehiwala (Aluthgama Under Siege). The Sinhala-Buddhist forces that backed the state and its institutions during the war against the LTTE wanted to consolidate the gains they made in pre-war Sri Lanka and thus exerted pressure on the state not to be a neutral actor to provide peace and justice to all people. The new generation of Sinhala-Buddhists wanted to maintain the unitary structure of Sri Lanka where Buddhism plays a crucial role in guiding the state and its institutions. These forces believe: Religious and ethnic minorities are welcome to peacefully live and work as Sri Lankans provided, they know their limits. They may even be treated with every kindness and consideration like the way we lavish attention on our pet cats and dogs provided they know their place in the overall scheme of things. But if they were to ever step out of line and resist submitting to the overarching paternalistic hegemony of Sinhala Buddhism, they would need to be sharply chastised and brought to heel. Those are the terms. (Ekanayaka, 2019)

Article 9 of the Constitution guarantees the foremost place to Buddhism and that for all the guarantees in Articles 10 and 14(1)(e) it will be naturally perceived by many as a way of saying that Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhala-Buddhists. This chapter’s scope would not warrant examining the pre-war relationship between the state and Tamils from the below and how the state decay opened the way for the growth of extremist forces among Tamils and Sinhalese at the popular level. I have discussed the issue extensively elsewhere (Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008). The chapter will first provide some useful information about Sri Lanka Muslims’ history and their identity formation. It will then discuss anti-Muslim violence by Sinhala-Buddhist extremists and this section will also attempt to provide some thoughts as to why the state and its institutions such as security forces do not act against the Sinhala-Buddhist extremist forces. The Muslim response to the growth of anti-Muslim violence and Islamophobia will be analyzed to

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explain how appeals to violence can be consumed when the state does not win the trust of the minority. A group consisted of 25 Muslims between the ages 18–55 from Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, Galle, a key city of Sinhala-Buddhist dominated Southern Sri Lanka, Jaffna district, Tamil dominated Northern Sri Lanka and Sammathurai, Muslim dominated farming village in the Eastern province selected for interview form of questionnaire. interviews conducted from September 2021 to December 2021 through skype and WhatsApp. Selected Muslims have political loyalty to Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the United National Party (UNP), and the All-Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC). The primary goal of interviews is to study the fears and mobilizations of Muslims as new generational Sinhala-Buddhists continue to seek mobilization in post-war Sri Lanka. Given the numerous cleavages and tensions in post-colonial societies, the factor that influences whether and how the state responds to the real and perceived grievances of different communities is critical to study the state’s role in building peace and setting up justice. Sri Lanka experiences suggest that communal violence breaks out is the way when state and its institutions fail to act impartially (see, Dharmadasa, 1992; Jayawardena, 1986; Rajanayagam, 1995; Uyangoda, 1986; Wickeremeratne, 1995). Hence, it is imperative to find answers to the questions to understand both the state’s delivery in a divided society and responses from marginalized communities: do political leaders aggravate the tensions until they explode in violence? Do they recruit people to instigate acts of violence and then condone and protect them? Or do they seek non-violent resolution of problems and ensure that proponents and initiators of violence are punished?

General Remarks on the Sri Lankan Muslims or Moor The Muslims, who practice Islam and speak Tamil, are a significant section of the minorities in Sri Lanka. They formed 7.9% of the island’s total population in 2001 (Department of Census and Statistics, 2020) The term Moors was used by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century

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to refer to people they regarded as Arab Muslims and their descendants. The term was applied based on religion and had no role in naming their origin (Mohan, 1987, p. 9). Muslims were scattered along the coastal areas of Sri Lanka but some of them had moved into the interior. Most of the Muslims (62%) live outside the North and East of Sri Lanka in the South region, amidst the Sinhalese. Thirty-eight percent of them, however, have long established themselves in the Tamil-dominated North and East, the region the Tamils claim as their traditional homeland (Department of Census and Statistics, 2020). The Muslims from the Northern region made up only about 4% of the Northern Province. They were engaged in trade, agriculture, fisheries, teaching, and skilled trades like tailoring to earn their living. The Muslim destiny of the North was intertwined with that of the Tamils. In the East, the Muslims claim to be a majority in the Amparai district of the Eastern Province which is part of this region (Ibid.). The demographic complexity of the Eastern Province—once predominantly Tamil speaking—is today a volatile mix of Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim populations. Despite religious and cultural differences between the Tamils and Muslims, many Muslims were members of the Tamil Federal Party, and a few did take part in the armed uprising. This was alarming to the Sinhalese government. Therefore, pushing a policy of divide et impera, President J.R. Jayawardene sent one of his southern Muslim ministers, accompanied by his henchmen, to attack Tamils in Karaitivu village south of Batticaloa, and the two communities fell into the trap. With their prejudice against Muslims, the Tigers reacted with extreme violence. Too late, the presence of outside Muslims was exposed by Minister S. Thondaman who represented the hill-country Tamils. Muslim leaders of the east like A.L.A. Majeed protested, but to no avail (Hoole, 2001) As the violence continued, the communities—seemingly inexorably—went their different ways. A central aspiration of the Muslims in contemporary Sri Lanka, according to McGilvray, is their desire to develop a non-Tamil identity based on Islam (McGilvray, 1997). Radically shifting political developments ‘have made them realize that their interest lies in holding fast to the religion of Islam and not to any ethnic category (Ali, 2006a). But

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the Muslims of the north and east blame the Tamils for pushing them in this direction. Gripped by demographic anxiety and locked in competition with the Tamils for control over economic and land resources, they turned to religion as a way of bolstering their cohesion.1 This was a key factor in the formation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in the mid-1980s (at a time when the Muslims had established informal and formal contacts with the Sri Lanka state forces with a view to fighting against the Tamil Tigers). This makes it a veritable ethnic tinderbox. Since approximately 38% of the country’s Muslims live in the East, it made them a significant opposition group to the Tamil Tigers’ homeland campaign. The Muslim identity in contemporary Sri Lanka developed a nonTamil identity based on Islam (McGilvray, 1997). The radically shifting political development and ‘political fortunes throughout the course of Sri Lankan history have made them realize that their identity lies in holding fast to the religion of Islam and not to any ethnic category’ (Ali, 2006b, p. 375). This was a key factor in the formation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in the mid-1980s (at a time when the Muslims had established informal and formal contacts with the Sri Lanka state forces with a view to fighting against the Tamil Tigers). However, the Muslims living in the South and West regions, have not shown any such inclination to support an exclusive Muslim party, despite being increasingly marginalized by the majority Sinhalese. There are two major reasons for this: (1) the Muslims outside the North and East believe that the Sinhalese-dominated United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) accommodate the needs of Muslims and its political elites by offering some significant and not-so-significant ministerial portfolios and positions, in addition to substantial business benefits enjoyed by the elites; and (2) unlike their brethren in the North and East, these Muslims were not confronted organized violence and intimidation by the Sinhala-Buddhist extremist groups (until 2011), targeting their identity and existence. As expected, Muslims living outside of the North and East faced a similar reality as their brethren did after the end of the ethnic civil war between the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese-dominated state. Sri Lanka’s post-independence history suggests that the Sinhalese-Buddhist

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extremists are ideologically committed to establishing complete Sinhalese dominance over the entire island. For instance, in the presidential elections of January 2010, the only two serious candidates were the president, Mahinda Rajapakse, and his one-time commander of the Sri Lankan army, Sarath Fonseka. Both hold hardline views on the ethnic question. Fonseka said: I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities, and we treat them like our people... We are being most of the country, 75%, we will never give in, and we have the right to protect this country. We are also a strong nation. . .. They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things. In any democratic country the majority should rule the country. This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community which is the majority representing 74% of the population. (Patranobiso, 2008)

It seems there is little space for minorities in the ruling mentality. Moreover, there is a concerted move to marginalize the minorities politically, by bracketing them ideologically with global jihadi movements. According to the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a militant Buddhist party which is still part of Rajapakse’s coalition government, the ‘Malik Group, Osama Group, Deen Malik Group and Mujahideen Group are some of the Muslim terrorist groups operating in Maligawatte (in Colombo).’2 Several Sinhala-Buddhist extremists have claimed that Muslims outside the North and East express sympathies to the ideology3 of violent Muslim groups which are strategically and ideologically linked to global Jihadi movements.

Sinhala-Buddhist Violent Mobilization Against Muslims The state’s inability to broker peace between the different ethno-religious groups and the state dependence on Sinhala-Buddhist extremist groups for popular support led to the erosion of trust among minorities in the

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impartiality of the state, and thus further contributed to the state fragility in post-war Sri Lanka. The emergence of anti-Muslim actions by Sinhala-Buddhist groups such as BBS and the Sinhala Ravaya who want to launch campaigns aimed at soliciting a reaction from Muslims threatens the future of community trust. The campaign both online and on the ground has manifested in multiple forms, ranging from calls to boycott Muslim companies and Halal products, and women’s clothing, to protests outside Muslim-owned retail outlets and the Bangladeshi Embassy to protest violence in Bangladesh against Buddhists. Interestingly, a sizable portion of the members and supporters for BBS not only hail from middle- and upper-class backgrounds in urban areas that have a decent education and are affiliated with good moneymaking professional jobs, but there is also a lot of support from Sri Lankan expatriates living abroad. In addition, a leading Member of Parliament, Udaya Gamanpilla, who belongs to an equally extremist Sinhala-Buddhist political organization, has predicted a repeat of earlier Sinhala-Muslim violence, saying that ‘As someone who has studied the Sinhala – Muslim clashes in 1915, I strongly feel a repetition of that disaster is imminent’ (Gamanpilla, 2012). Statements like this only served to generate fears and anxiety among Muslims, particularly those Muslims living in urban areas such as Colombo. It is worth recounting some of the incidents that have happened to date. On 9 September 2011, a Muslim shrine, which had stood for 300 years in Anuradhapura, was destroyed by a mob reportedly led by monks. The police, though present, did not intervene. On 20 April 2012, a mosque in Dambulla, the area which many Buddhists regard as a sacred town located in the Matale District, Central Province of Sri Lanka had been forced to abandon Friday prayers. About 2000 Buddhists, including monks, marched to the mosque and held a demonstration demanding its demolition. Overnight, a firebombing had targeted the mosque. Shortly after the protest, the mosque was evacuated, and its Friday prayers were canceled. TV footage showed monks engaged in violence, including one monk disrobing and exposing himself to the mosque. Two days after the Dambulla mob protest, former Prime

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Minister D.M. Jayaratne, who was also in charge of Buddhist affairs, issued an order to relocate the mosque to another area. Anti-Muslim attacks took a new turn in 2013 when the BBS and its affiliated organizations launched a campaign of agitation against Halal certification. Coupled with the campaign have been anti-Islamic slogans and placards with drawings of pigs with Arabic letters saying ‘Allah.’ These activities are not only considered to be offensive to Muslims but in the case of Sri Lanka Muslims, go to the heart of attacking the sense of identity and values they have been practicing. In addition, the campaign against Halal certification has been seen as attacking the fundamentals of identity for Muslims. Many Muslims in the area and elsewhere in Sri Lanka considered the actions and demonstrations by these protesters as part of or at least influenced by global Islamophobia. The conversations this author had with selected Muslims during the violence against the Muslims in 2013 suggest that ‘some young Muslims wanted to retaliate’ (Communications with the selected Muslims in 2019); however, the majority opinion among Muslims did not approve any of the retaliation and in fact, have been commended for their patience in the face of such provocation. The major reason for not reacting to protests comes from not only a sense of vulnerability Muslims experience in areas where Sinhala-Buddhist are the majority, but also that it is widely believed that the BBS is a vocal minority and most Sinhalese Buddhists do not subscribe to these extremist views. This is evident from the facts on the ground that most of the local Sinhala-Buddhist residents of areas where these demonstrations have been taking place, clearly disapprove of the demonstration and did not in any way participate or encourage it. They were however unable to do anything constructive to curb it because of the inactive Police and the belief that it was being sanctioned at prominent levels. The public success of organizations such as the BBS is attributed to several factors. First, they were able to be successful because they launched effective campaigns across the country where the Sinhalese were not only a majority but where there was a small Muslim community living and were able to capitalize on existing local problems either it be economic or social. Second, the BBS was able to win support

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both from local and state media for their campaign as well as capitalize on social media, attracting support from outside the country. Though the ruling party and its members do not openly support the BBS campaign, there is recognized sympathy among the government coalition members, especially from the JHU—(A Buddhist Political Party) for the BBS campaign. The JHU is an interesting entity in the current ruling alliance in the government. The JHU was founded by Buddhist monks in February 2004. Buddhist monks were keen to promote the interests of the Sinhala-Buddhists and to make Buddhism a guiding principle of state affairs, as well as to wipe out Tamil violence. The JHU ‘has fielded over 200 Buddhist monk candidates for the Parliamentary elections held on 2 April 2004 to elect 225 members of Parliament (Gamanpilla, 2012).’ The spread of BBS is something that cannot be ignored. The report suggests that ‘many parts of the North-Western Province have been in recent times a hotbed of BBS activity. Areas such as Kuliyapitiya, Narammala, Mawathagama, Dambadeniya and Kurunegala town have seen anti-Muslim actions in the form of demonstrations, rallies, poster, and leaflet campaigns. Threatening letters have been sent in some places to Muslim businesses. Some shops too have been attacked in the night.’ (Jayaraj, 2013) These activities (the carrying of placards depicting Allah as a pig and burning of an effigy marked as Allah) are not only considered to be offensive to Muslims but also in the case of Sri Lanka Muslims, go to the heart of attacking the sense of identity and values they have been practicing. In Puttalam (the north-west central province, where there is a sizeable population of Muslims), the abduction of two students studying at Zahira College shocked Muslims of the region and elsewhere in Sri Lanka. The abducted students were later released after being severely assaulted but is a shocking incident that does not bode well for the future. The BBS then subsequently expanded their anti-Muslim campaign by focusing on Muslim dress. BBS President Ven. Kirama Vimalajothy Thera stated that ‘the BBS will announce in Kandy the commencement of a fresh campaign against the long garment covering the body’ worn by many Muslim women known as ‘Abaya’ in Arabic, ‘Burqa’ in Urdu and ‘Purdah’ in Farsi (Persian). The BBS, however, does not draw a distinction between the Abaya and the Hijab (which denotes

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scarf or veil covering the head rather than the whole body), describes the former as ‘Hijab’ which sends dangerous signals to Muslim women who adopt the hijab (and not the abaya). It is important to note that while Muslims have been the main target of the violence, there has on the whole, a rise of violence against different religious sites and members of different religious communities, with a number of incidents including mob attacks on places of worship; robberies and vandalism; the killing of clergy; protests against communities and the proliferation of hate speech on social media, the Internet and via the audiovisual media (Center for Policy Analysis, 2015). Unfortunately, these incidents have received little or no attention, either locally or internationally. The Sri Lankan government dominated by Sinhala-Buddhist lawmakers demonstrated no interest to take action against the BBS partly because some prominent lawmakers and politicians from the ruling party have a good relationship with the BBS to gain support from Sinhala-Buddhist voters. To maximize the votes from Sinhala-Buddhists, Sri Lanka’s experiences suggest that the state and ruling politicians indirectly supported the extremist forces among Sinhala-Buddhists, who launched anti-Muslim violence and spread hatred against Muslims of Sri Lanka. As I wrote elsewhere (Imtiyaz & Mohamed-Saleem, 2015) that substantial portion of the Muslims surveyed drew a link between the rise of the Sinhala-Buddhist forces and Sinhala-Buddhist traders in the areas where Sinhalese are the majority, but Muslim traders pose serious trade rivalry against the Sinhalese traders. Hence, the problem becomes more of an economic dispute over territory than because of religion. It is also the reason attributed to the inability of the government to take any solid action because of these economic forces. Because of this and a lack of action by the security forces and judiciary to bring people to justice, the confidence in the state and state apparatus has weakened leading some to conclude that they are the next target of ethnic violence following the defeat of the LTTE. This is not helped by the focus on markers of Muslim identity being particularly targeted in the form of attacks on mosques, the Halal certification issue and the challenge on women’s clothing. Thus, it appears that people felt that their very existence was being called into question.

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State Fragility and the Emergence of Extremism Among Sri Lankan Muslims Though Sri Lanka Muslims would claim they are a peace-loving community and thus do not pose any threat to any community, or to the state and its institutions, the terrorist bombing by highly coordinated and well-planned suicide bombing by nine Sri Lankan Muslim men on Easter Sunday morning, 21 April 2019 that ripped through Colombo, capital of Sri Lanka and Batticaloa, a major city in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka critically challenged the Muslims’ claim to be a peaceful community in Sri Lanka. But the question was ‘Why?’ such a highly coordinated and well-planned terrorist bombing was launched by some Muslims? A simple answer blames the Arabization of Sri Lankan Muslims, but there are some socio-political factors that contributed to the Easter bombing, which is now dubbed Sri Lanka’s ‘September 11.’ Fragile state literature suggests that the ungovernable status of states, the inability of states to function as impartial entities, and the state’s direct or indirect support for popular extremist groups contribute to violence and thus the state opens a way for polarization. In deeply divided societies when the state and its institutions act partially in favor of a particular group or groups, a marginalized may resort to violence or extremism. Islamophobia has been one of the major trends in post-war Sri Lanka since 2009. There has been a wave of Islamophobic rhetoric and acts of violence against the Sri Lankan Muslim community being undertaken by extreme Sinhala-Buddhist groups (led by Buddhist monks), with tacit support from politicians, attacking places of worship and Islamic practices such as Halal food certification, cattle slaughter and dress code. Despite some high-profile cases such as a 2012 attack on a mosque in Dambulla, most incidents have received little or no attention locally or internationally. Of the accounted reports, there have been 65 cases of attacks on places of religious minority worship bearing the brunt of the violence, be they Christian, non-Theravada Buddhist, Hindu temples, or Muslim mosques (Center for Policy Alternatives, 2015). This is seen as

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part of a coordinated hate campaign developed by an extreme SinhaleseBuddhist organization called Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS), which has been responsible for inciting hatred, evident in the June 2014 attacks on Muslim businesses in Aluthgama, Beruwala, Shargatown, and Dehiwala.

Decline of Muslims’ Trust in the Sri Lankan Government Political violence is often a by-product of socio-economic tensions. Given the numerous cleavages and tensions in fragile states in postcolonial societies, the factor that influences whether and how political violence breaks out is the way in which the political system deals with the tensions. Do political leaders and/or their supporters aggravate the tensions until they explode in violence? Do they recruit people to instigate acts of violence and then condone and protect them? In many cases, elite political leaders and/or their supporters believe they can win support and strengthen their positions by mobilizing along ethnic cleavages by resorting to violence or aggressive campaigns of hatred against others. They anticipate that appeals to ethnic or religious hatred will be particularly effective in expanding or winning their power. Leaders sometimes encourage followers to use crude violence—pogroms or ethnic cleansing—or to exploit ethnic tensions in electoral politics. Outbidding opponents along ethnic lines is one of the strategies to win votes in (fragmented) societies that hold elections. This process often results in a polarization of the political system into ethnic divisions and a possible breakdown into violence. Marginalized minorities may suffer, emigrate or fight back with the weapons of the weak—terrorism and/or guerrilla activities (Brass, 1985). In this theoretical understanding, it is important to raise the question: what has motivated some Muslims to pursue violence. Has the rising tide of anti-Muslim campaigns in the island made some young and educated Muslims willingly turn themselves into suicide bombers?

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Since the end of the ethnic civil war in Sri Lanka in May 2009, one of the major trends in Sri Lanka is the emergence of anti-Muslim actions by Sinhala-Buddhists groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBStranslated as the Buddhist Power Force). The campaign both online and on the ground has manifested in multiple forms, ranging from calls to boycott Muslim companies and Halal products, and women’s clothing, to protests outside Muslim-owned retail outlets (Imtiyaz & Mohamed-Saleem, 2015).4 The wave of violence against Muslims since 2012 helped polarize the Sri Lankan polity while eroding the trust of Muslims in general in Sri Lanka’s state and its institutions. This trend challenged Sri Lanka’s stability because it resulted in polarization and a possible breakdown into violence by some Muslims. The statement from Sri Lanka Thowheed Jamath (SLTJ) President A.K. Hisham during his testimony before the Parliament Select Committee (PSC) appointed to probe the circumstances behind the Easter Sunday attack suggested that the 21 April terrorists ‘may have resorted to terrorism after the Beruwala and Digana incidents’ (‘Zaharan came to Akkaraipattu a month prior to April 21 attack,’ Onlanka, 2019). My communications in May 2019 with some Muslim university students from the Southeastern University and some lecturers suggested that Muslims were frustrated with the violence targeted against the Muslims by Sinhala mobs (Personal Communication, 2019). Some of them shared concerns that some Muslims might mirror the Tamil Tigers to punish the state and its institutions. It is theoretically expected that the violence unleashed on Muslims by Sinhala-Buddhist extremist forces, which had a closer connection with the state and its institutions, could provoke a strong response from Muslim youth. It could be a triggering factor for radicalizing Muslim youth. Though the Muslim community in Sri Lanka has kept itself busy with business and trade, carefully planned violence by Sinhala mobs could have pushed some Muslims to resort to violence by marginalizing Muslim moderates and democratic political representations.

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Conclusion State fragility is one of the main sources of instability in developing countries. Ethno-political differences could be used by political forces and the state to win and/or consolidate power. Sri Lanka’s post-independence history suggests that the politicization of ethnic relations has been an obstacle to effective, sustainable efforts to negotiate peace and combat poverty. Soon after the elections in 1956 S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake, declared Sinhala as the ONLY official language and provided state protection to Buddhism. The move from the state and Prime Minister of Ceylon was interpreted as concessions to the Sinhala-Buddhist constituencies and Sinhala-Buddhist extremists in general. In November 2020, Gotabaya Rajapaksa after assuming power as an executive President of Sri Lanka took early steps to politicize the state institutions; he appointed his own brother and former President of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa Premier of the island. Both Rajapaksas enjoy popularity among Sinhala-extremist forces such as BBS. In addition, he filled the state media institutions with anti-peace journalists. The politicization of the state institution by the Sinhalese leaders further encouraged the minorities in general and Muslims in particular. Also, such politicization in the south popularizes violent ideologies among Tamils, as Muslims increasingly lose trust in the Sinhala polity. In electoral politics, parties need to compete for the votes. When a particular party in ethnically divided societies attempts to politicize ethnic identities by directly or otherwise supporting anti-other actions such as violence and propaganda for electoral gains, it is likely that other parties will follow a similar strategy to win votes and marginalized lose the trust in the system. As a result, the political leaders of the minorities/weaker sections may adopt similar electoral strategies, which may lead to an increase in violence among the people, particularly the marginalized. This explains some key reasons for the rise of Sinhala extremism and Tamil and Muslim violence in Sri Lanka, particularly during election time. Sri Lanka’s anti-Muslim violence highlights the violence that can result from the politicization of ethnic differences, particularly when one party

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systematically reacts to another’s violence through retaliation. Though the majority of Muslims do not associate themselves with the violent movements among Muslims, a section of Muslims believes that some Muslim youth are compelled to employ violence because the successive Sri Lanka governments since the end of the war against the LTTE have reacted violently, and even terrorized the community. Equally, the Sri Lanka government, controlled by the majority Sinhalese, did not take any meaningful measures against the Sinhala extremists. A unique window exists to challenge the state fragility. That requires commitments from politicians, ruling elites, and pressure from global democratic institutions. Sri Lanka needs cooperation with democratic societies, including India. Extremism thrives in an absence of moderate forces in all ethno-religious groups. Therefore, Sri Lanka civil societies need to be trained to promote inclusive leaders in all ethno-religious groups. It is important to point out that not all Sinhala-Buddhists support Sinhala-Buddhist extremist forces or politicians who would resort to anti-Muslim campaigns. For Muslims, the question is how does the community defend itself against hegemonies while not seeming to embrace the global Islamist agenda? Muslims have struggled and continue to struggle to articulate Muslim grievances from the conflict in a manner that brings confidence to the other two parties of a sincerity of goals for the benefit of the whole country and in a manner that perhaps changes the current misconceptions regarding Muslims’ place in the conflict. This study has attempted to identify and understand the fears, anxiety, and problems among Muslims caused by the recent political mobilization by the Sinhala-Buddhist extremist groups. It has shown a growing uncertainty and apprehensiveness about community relations and their future in Sri Lanka. Muslims living in areas where Sinhalese are the majority have legitimate grievances, which deserve both local and global attention. While Muslims are aware of the challenges they are facing, they are also able to understand where they have gone wrong. There is a realization that exclusive social practices and values practice among Muslims themselves must be curtailed. This allows the beginning of a potential conversation in ensuring that tensions can be alleviated.

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There is equally a responsibility on the government and state agencies like the security forces and the judiciary to restore confidence in them. The rule of law must be ensured, and perpetrators of hate speech and violence must be brought to book, something that has not happened yet. Sri Lanka needs to win reconciliation, justice, and peace to build the nation and its economy. For this to happen, the state, ruling politicians, and the minorities, including the Muslim community should work together to reach political settlements. This would help Sri Lanka to gain stability and prosperity.

Notes 1. The older Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged under the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 into the Northeast Province, and then broken up again in October 2006 under the orders of the Supreme Court which described the merger as ‘unconstitutional, illegal and invalid’. Thus, the terms Eastern Province, Northern Province and Northeast Province are to be understood in this context. See ‘Judgment on Northeast Demerger’ [http://www.asiantribune.com/index. php?qode/2578, accessed 15 Mar. 2011]. 17. ‘President Outlines Peace Strategy’ [http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ ca200709/20070920president_outlines_peace_strategy.htm, accessed 12 December 2021]. 2. We Want Muslim Terrorism Probed—JHU Front’ [http://www.mus limguardian.com/pls/portal/mpnews.mp_gl_sum.set_newsid?p_news_id? 10995, accessed 9 December 2008]. The JHU was founded by Buddhist monks in February 2004 and is inherently pro-Sinhalese in its ideology. The party’s major goal is ‘to promote the interests of the SinhalaBuddhists and to make Buddhism a guiding principle of state affairs, as well as to wipe out Tamil violence by force. The JHU shuns non-violence to seek political alternatives for the Tamil national question and has been urging young Sinhala-Buddhists to sign up for the army’. The party has broad appeal among Sinhalese, particularly urban Sinhalese, and thus was able to form an electoral coalition with the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance led by the SLFP. See A.R.M. Imtiyaz, ‘Politicization of Buddhism and Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka’, in Ali Riaz (ed.), Religion

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and Politics in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2010), pp.146–78. Furthermore, the JHU completely opposes the United Nation panel report on the Sri Lanka war which highlights ‘credible allegations’ that the Sri Lanka military and the LTTE had both committed violations that could constitute crimes against humanity. The report claims that the Sri Lankan military ‘knowingly shelled in the vicinity of humanitarian actors’ and systematically killed some tens of thousands of Tamil civilians. The report also alleges that between January and May 2009, the Sri Lanka military forces indiscriminately shelled civilian hospitals located in the government-established no-fire zone. See ‘Reports of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (31 March 2011). [http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_ Full.pdf, accessed 3 November 2021]. 3. To many scholars, ideology deems to be a central cause for radicalization (Ariaratnam, 2018; Mostofa, 2020; Mostofa, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d; Mostofa & Doyle, 2019). 4. BBS is a radical Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist organization based in Colombo, Sri Lanka that was formed during 2012. BBS seeks the enforcement of Buddhist predominance in Sri Lanka. It has organized various campaigns against the country’s minority Muslim and Christian communities which, according to the organization, pose a threat to Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese-Buddhist identity. BBS engages in hate speech and attacks against minority religions. Its headquarters are located at Sri Sambuddha Jayanthi Mandira in Colombo. Sri Sambuddha Jayanthi Mandira is owned by the Buddhist Cultural Center, an organization founded by Kirama Wimalajothi.

References Ali, A. (2006a). The Muslims of Sri Lanka: An ethnic minority trapped in a political quagmire. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 5 (3), 372–383. Ali, A. (2006b). The Muslims of Sri Lanka: An ethnic minority trapped in a political Quagmine. Inter- Asia Cultural Studies, 5 (3), 372–383. Ariaratnam, K. (2018, January 22). The impending threat of Islamic radicalization: A look at assimilation. Retrieved December 01, 2019, from NATO

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McGilvray, D. B. (1997) Tamils and Muslims in the shadow of war: Schism or continuity? South Asia, XX (Special Issue), 239–253. Mohan, V. R. (1987). Identity crisis of Sri Lankan Muslims. Mittal Publications. Mostofa, S. M., & Doyle, N. J. (2019). Profiles of Islamist militants in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(5), 112–129. Mostofa, S. M. (2020). Key drivers of female radicalization in Bangladesh. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 12(4), 27–31. Mostofa, S. M. (2021a). Understanding of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Journal of Asian Politics and Policy, SAGE. https://doi.org/10.1177/002190 96211004630 Mostofa, S. M. (2021b). Islamist militancy in Bangladesh: A pyramid root cause model. Critical studies of the Asia-Pacific. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-79171-1 Mostofa, S. M. (2021c). Explaining islamist militancy in Bangladesh: A pyramid root cause model. In: Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783-030-79171-1_6 Mostofa, S. M. (2021d). Ideological and global factors of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. In: Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Critical Studies of the AsiaPacific. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79171-1_5 Onlanka. (2019). Zaharan came to Akkaraipattu a month prior to April 21 attack, 21 June. Available at https://www.onlanka.com/news/zahrancame-to-akkaraipattu-a-month-prior-to-april-21-attack.html. Accessed 23 December 2021. Patranobiso. (2008). Whom does the country belong? https://www.hindustan times.com/world/to-whom-does-the-country-belong/story-Yjl0ciOnDl68 GTNmIxs7bM.html. Accessed on 4 December 2021. Rajanayagam, D. H. (1995). Tamil “Tigers” in Northern Sri Lanka: Origins, factions and programmes. International Asian Forum, 7 (1 & 2), 63–85. Uyangoda, J. (1986). “Special issue on the national question in Sri Lanka”, South Asia Bulletin, No. 6 , 1–47. Wickeremeratne, A. (1995). Buddhism and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: A historical analysis. International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

7 Fragile Peace, Violent Extremism, and Feminist Solutions in Nepal Keshab Giri

Introduction South Asia is the most violent region in Asia with so many longestrunning conflicts and a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape (The Armed Conflict Survey, 2021). Even though war is mostly absent in the region, the peace is still fragile and shallow. The end of the civil war in Sri Lanka has not eliminated the exclusion and discrimination against the minority population which led to the war in the first place. The peace process in Northeast India has not led to the formal conclusion of a long-standing civil war against the Indian state. Similarly, the usurpation of the power by the Taliban in Afghanistan has not resulted in peace and security. Various long-standing armed conflicts in South Asia further complicate the security landscape of the region. Three of them—the civil war K. Giri (B) University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_7

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in Afghanistan (although one might suggest the absence of war after the Taliban takeover of the country), Pakistan’s struggle with ethnic insurgency and anti-state terrorist groups, and the dispute over Kashmir— have a significant impact on both regional and global security, primarily due to the transnational actors involved and the potential of the Kashmir dispute to escalate into a conventional war between nuclear powers India and Pakistan (The Armed Conflict Survey, 2021). The region’s other conflicts are more localized with a lower impact on regional dynamics. At the outset, the situation in Nepal seems to have bucked the larger trend of political violence in South Asia in terms of bringing a conclusion to war through the peace process, stemming re-occurrence of the conflict, and writing a new constitution. Out of many conflicts, only a handful have experienced rare peaceful resolutions in the region, i.e., the armed conflict between Mizo National Front (MNF) and the Indian government in 1986 and The Chittagong Hill Tract and Bangladeshi government in 1997 to name a few. Nepal has been exemplary in diffusing any possibility of relapsing into war as the rebels relinquished the politics of violence to embrace peaceful mainstream politics. This is particularly significant when existing research shows that countries that experience armed conflict previously are more likely to see the recurrence of it (Walter, 2004, 2015). What is less discussed though is the way different forms of violence continue unabated even when there is a formal conclusion of the war. Existing mainstream theoretical frameworks rarely account for various forms of violence other than war (Bara et al., 2021). Mainstream social science conceptualizations of violence often elide the analysis of how different systems of oppression intersect simultaneously to create multiple vulnerabilities for women and marginalized social groups (Collins, 2009). Similarly, feminist scholars highlight various systemic violence and violence in the private realm and interlinkages among various types of violence (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018; Cockburn, 2004). The ‘continua of violence’ in feminist scholarship refers to the continuity between various forms of violence from small acts to largescale institutional and structural violence (Bayard de Volo & Hall, 2015). Similarly, the interlinkage and continuity could be across temporal and spheric dimensions (Cockburn, 2004) and between violence in the

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private and the public, the personal and the political, and war and peace (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018). In the case of Nepal, many forms of systemic violence remain intact. Although poverty and social inequality have lessened, economic and political subordination of marginalized groups continues unabated (Rai, 2021) and political grievances still fester (Lawoti, 2019). Similarly, the 2015 deadly earthquake and the pandemic have exacerbated the existing grievances (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018). With the right opportunity and political mobilization, unconsolidated peace can descend into political violence. It is important to analyze what factors led to the previous armed conflict in Nepal and whether there is a possibility for the recurrence of similar conflict in the future. This chapter draws from my fieldwork in Nepal (2017–2018) including thirty-nine semi-structured interviews with the Maoist combatants, their leaders, Nepalese Army officers, and experts on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. I also utilize archival research of key Maoist documents (statements, speeches, proclamations, and interviews of the top-most leaders). This is supplemented by the analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources. This book chapter begins with various feminist insights on oppression and violence through ‘matrices of domination’ and ‘continua of violence’ to better understand the challenges to peace in Nepal. Feminist understanding of state fragility can provide much rounded and nuanced understanding of state fragility and its manifestation in violent extremism. This is followed by an overview of the various elements of state fragility that led to the ten-year-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1996–2006). Next, the chapter discusses challenges to peace and stability at present to explore whether there is a possibility of conflict recurrence in Nepal. The final section will conclude the chapter.

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Feminist Understanding of Violence: ‘Matrices of Domination’ and ‘Continua of Violence’ Feminist understanding of violence can broaden our understanding of insecurities and vulnerabilities which is essential for building a foundation for positive and sustainable peace. Particularly, ‘matrices of domination (Collins, 2009) within the intersectional feminist theoretical framework and ‘continua of violence’ can capture the various forms of everyday and systematic insecurities which impact women (and men) to enable thinking about justice and peace holistically by questioning insecurity only in the context of active war. A feminist intersectional lens highlights interlocking, complex, and dynamic axes of race, class, and gender interacting with each other and working towards oppressing Afro-American women in the USA (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 139). Intersectionality as a ‘matrix of domination’ incorporates into analysis how the intersecting oppressions are actually organized and operate in various domains of power (Collins, 2009, p. 18). Any crisis (natural/manmade) creates different forms of vulnerabilities for people based on different intersecting identities and social backgrounds despite various underlying common themes of the crisis experience. Similarly, feminist scholars problematize the binary understanding of war by highlighting the continual connection between various forms of violence. ‘Continua of violence’ concept in feminist scholarship shows how various forms of violence (systemic/everyday, public/private, temporal, and spheric) are linked together to produce experiences of oppression, discrimination, and injustices for particular social groups (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018; Cockburn, 2004). These two prominent concepts in feminist scholarship question the ‘exceptionality’ of war (MacKenzie, 2012; Parashar, 2014) and the binary frame of war and peace. The definition of war in mainstream security studies, with its focus on events and temporal demarcation between a start date and an end date, not only draws disproportionate attention and research positing it as the paramount existential source of insecurity but also relies on creating oppositional relations with other forms of violence

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(Cockburn, 2004; Gilmartin, 2019, pp. 3–4; Shepherd, 2008). Insecurity in the world today comes not just from extremist violence and war, there are many sources—climate change, systematic violence, marginalization, and exclusionary state structure. Peace and security can only be understood properly if the ‘exceptionality’ of war is problematized and sources of state fragility are re-examined.

State Fragility and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal To understand the threats of violent extremism in Nepal, we need to understand why the Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) occurred in Nepal in the first place and whether similar conditions exist in Nepal for the reoccurrence of the armed conflict. It is also important to explore why the revival of democracy in 1990 didn’t capacitate the state enough to fulfill hope of many people for better lives, justice, and equality. Many traditional explanations on the state fragility and the onset of armed conflict also fit in the Nepalese context. Sadia Sulaiman (2020) identifies five core features of state fragility, namely persistent security dilemma, dysfunctional economy, institutional weakness and legitimacy crisis, inability to manage change, and space for external interference (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 4). Similar to the idea of state fragility by Sulaiman (2020), Tiffiany Howard (2016) discusses state failure in relation to the eruption of violence. Fragility in the state can also lead to state failure. Howard highlights the low quality of democratic institutions, poor social capital, lower overall quality of material life, lack of trade openness, and lack of tangible human security as contributing to state failure (2016, pp. 12–14). These indices are not mutually exclusive. The case of Nepal requires a more nuanced approach when applying the idea of state fragility concerning its connection to violent extremism. While the quality of material life, weakness of democratic institutions, human security issues, and legitimacy crisis were responsible for the Maoist insurgency, their interaction was more complex, and their mere presence did not always result in the onset of the armed conflict.

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The explanatory currency of grievance model—poverty and inequality—hold greater currency in explaining the onset of Maoist insurgency in Nepal (see Acharya, 2010; Basnett, 2009; Lawoti & Pahari, 2010; Mahat, 2005; Murshed & Gates, 2005; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). However, it is equally puzzling that armed conflict in Nepal did not occur when poverty and inequality were acute and the political system in the country oppressed people the most. Rather they occurred when economic growth in Nepal was the highest in recorded history then and coincided with the revival of democracy. Yet, as mentioned above, growth and democracy contributed little to reducing inequality and poverty in society (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010). Therefore, the openness and erosion of the monopoly of coercion by the state because of the re-establishment of democracy is another factor that contributed to the onset of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. This allowed Maoists to politicize the grievances and mobilize the populace in preparation for the insurgency (Thapa, 2012, pp. 47–54). Similarly, the unity and ideological refinement in the Maoist leadership helped to maintain cohesion within the rebel group throughout the insurgency (Lawoti, 2010, pp. 12–14). Finally, police brutality alienated the rural population in Mid-Western Nepal making them believe in the armed struggle for a dignified life.

Poverty and Inequality Poverty and inequality in society—be it relative deprivation or the perceived gap between expected and achieved well-being—can breed discontent, frustration, and even violent aggression (Gurr, 1970, p. 326). Despite the revival of democracy in 1990, Nepal saw a series of shortlived unstable governments1 failing to advance aspirations for prosperity through economic development and good governance (Hutt, 1994). During the Panchayati era (the autocratic rule of the king, 1960–1990), the absolute monarchy was using the state for rentier purposes without initiating much development. For thirty years from the King’s takeover in 1960 to the return of the democracy in 1990, Nepal’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) grew at an average of meager 1.5% per annum

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(Muni, 2010, p. 4). In 1990, at the time of the arrival of democracy, Nepal was the poorest country in South Asia. This position stayed the same even after ten years of democratic governance, 12 and despite the decent growth GDP rate as mentioned before. The marginal peasants that constituted an even much larger population were far worse off (Deraniyagala, 2005, p. 55). It reflected the level of poverty in Nepal when around eighty percent of the population was employed in the agricultural sector in the 1990s. Considering the boom in population and finite land, the poverty rate further expanded. Similarly, the absolute number of poor people doubled between 1977 and 1996 (Mishra, 2004, p. 22). Poverty and inequality was predicted to bring armed conflict in Nepal even in the peaceful years predating the Maoist insurgency. Blaikie et al. (1980) were the first to predict the political crisis in Nepal due to structural contradictions stemming from the ‘semi-colonial experience’ and forced stagnation in production and productivity in WestCentral Nepal. Nearly two decades later, Maoist insurgency erupted with Western Nepal being the epicenter. Similarly, Baburam Bhattarai’s Ph.D. Thesis (1985/2003) also emphasized the poverty, unemployment, and inequality because of the deteriorating condition of the rural economy dependent on agriculture as the ‘prima facie’ for the armed rebellion by the peasants (Bhattarai, 2003, p. i). Poverty and inequality in Nepal was further exacerbated by the deeply rooted corruption in each level of governance which accompanied the return of democracy in 1990. There was a momentous surge of expectations on development and good governance in people following the revival of democracy, but massive disappointment soon followed at the dismal performance of politicians and administrators (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005, p. 164). State power was abused and each level of state was mired in corruption (Einsiedel et al., 2012, pp. 16–17). The image of political parties as, ‘tools of high caste, corrupt and nepotistic Kathmandu elite’ became endemic in the general population (International Crisis Group Report, 2003, p. 4). The Maoists mobilized and incorporated the disaffected section of society, the most marginalized groups, with rewards and recognition of their plight (Pettigrew, 2003).

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Moreover, economic growth in Nepal fueled inequality and the democratic system in Nepal became ineffective at mitigating the inequality. Such inequality was prevalent along class, caste, regional, and ethnic lines. Despite the decent economic growth, Nepal remained very poor and the number of absolute poor increased in the 1990s indicating that the growth only benefitted the few on top. With a Gini Index of 0.426, Nepal had become the most unequal country in Asia in the 1990s (Einsiedel et al., 2012, p. 10; Wagle, 2007). As mentioned before, in many cases, the relationship between land ownership and wealth is stronger in Nepal (Whelpton, 2005, p. 51). Macours (2006) finds that the rise in inequality, measured by the unequal ownership of land, has a significant correlation with Maoist recruitment. The promise of progressive land distribution by Maoists drew popular support among peasants or at least prevented the resistance against Maoists despite excessive violence and coercion. Land ownership patterns also contributed to poverty and inequality. Often the rich people in Nepal are the ones whose ancestors gained land revenue collection rights during the eighteenth and the twentieth century. Forty-four percent of households own up to a half hectare of agricultural land only constitutes fourteen percent of the privately owned agricultural land. On the other hand, five percent of households who own more than three-hectare agricultural land cover twenty-seven percent of the total agricultural land (Lawoti, 2010, p. 9). Similarly, regional inequality also contributed to the onset of armed conflict in Nepal. International development activities were limited to the capital and other urban centers around the country leaving rural and remote areas with less infrastructure and lesser opportunities. With fewer opportunities available for the poorer people away from urban centers, The Maoists exploited this sense of deprivation for mass mobilization and recruitment in the run-up to the People’s War. Although data for uneven development is unavailable for the 1990s, Nepal was placed among the worst ten countries for uneven development in 2007 (Fund for Peace, 2007). Moreover, the confluence of regional, cultural, linguistic, and religious discrimination and deprivation is concentrated in the most remote and underdeveloped areas where indigenous and

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ethnic groups are the majority (Gautam et al., 2001, p. 218; Manchanda, 2004, p. 240). Unequal growth between the urban and rural areas has been attributed to the inequality between the urban and rural (and remote) areas. The lack of opportunities and sense of deprivation allowed rural areas to be a breeding ground for the radical left wing in the rural remote areas to fight the flawed political system and economic policies (Sharma, 2006). Deraniyagala (2005) pinpoints the lingering economic ‘deprivation’ in Mid-West and Far-Western regions as the reason these regions turned out to be a hotbed for armed rebellion. Not surprisingly, the Maoists were able to consolidate their base areas in the mid-western and far-western regions of the country where poverty and malnutrition were concentrated (Einsiedel et al., 2012, pp. 10–11). Furthermore, Nepal et al. (2011) find that more unequal villages and districts in Nepal suffered more violence and killings during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

Inequality among Social Groups Corresponding to poverty and economic inequality, for many scholars, horizontal inequality (inequality along the ethnic groups and social groups) remained one of the primary reasons for the armed conflict in Nepal. The horizontal inequality created a conducive environment for Maoists to garner support among the marginalized population. Frances Stewart (2000) finds that horizontal inequality has more explanatory power over vertical inequality (inequality within the ethnic or social group) in explaining the start of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Horizontal inequality, particularly the spatial and caste inequality, explains the start of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Murshed & Gates, 2005). Nepal has one of the highest levels of horizontal inequality in the world prevalent along the ethnic, linguistic, religious, racial, gender, caste, and regional line (Einsiedel et al., 2012, p. 10). The Caste Hill Hindu Elite Males (CHHEM) concentrated the political, economic, social, and cultural power into its hands (Lawoti, 2010, p. 10). In general, not only people from a lower caste, indigenous, Muslims, and

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Dalits (untouchable caste group) are poorer, but the decrease in the poverty rate among them is also slower. HDI (Human Development Index) of Brahmin, the caste group at the highest rank of the caste hierarchy, was 135 in 1996 compared to the national average of 100. The Indigenous population, Dalit (the lowest caste group), Madhesi (a marginalized ethnic group living in the plains), and Muslim (a minority religious group in Nepal) had HDI scores of ninety-two, seventy-four, ninety-six, and seventy-four, respectively (NESAC, 1998 in Lawoti, 2010, p. 10). Similarly, poverty decreased by 46% within Brahmin and Kshetri (higher caste groups) while the reduction was only 6, 10, and 21%, respectively, for the Muslims, hill indigenous nationalities, and Dalits (Tiwari, 2010). Similarly, even after the democratic revival, the dominant CHHEM (Caste, Hill Hindu Elite Males) held positions of power and influence further marginalizing lower caste, indigenous nationalities, Dalits, and Muslims. The democratic mobilization of 1990 had seen the mass participation of Nepal’s Dalits and indigenous nationalities but democratic change failed to integrate them into the power structure (Gellner and Bhattachan, 1999 in Manchanda, 2004, p. 240). Since the return of democracy in Nepal, only Brahman and Kshetriya have dominated the mainstream civil society (Lawoti, 2010, p. 10). Similarly, Brahman and Kshetriya were politically dominant and, also held key positions in the 12 influential sectors in 1999: the executive, judiciary, constitutional councils, civil administration, parliament, political party leadership, local government heads, and leadership of industrial and commercial, academic, professional, cultural, science and technology, and civil society associations (Neupane, 2000 in Lawoti, 2010, p. 10). Marginalized groups in Nepal also face structural and historic discrimination from the state. The declaration of the Hindu nation in the constitution of Nepal (year) meant favorable treatment of Hindus that constituted 80% of the population according to the 2001 census (Thapa, 2012). After the unification, Hindu rulers imposed a caste system based on Hindu scriptures as the unifying framework to facilitate political control over the newly acquired territories ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse populations. Almost a century after the unification in 1854, a legal and cultural code for the country, known as Muluki Ain

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(Country Code), was promulgated to homogenize the country into a strict caste hierarchy (Einsiedel et al., 2012, p. 12). Khas-Nepali was declared the national language and official language, making it difficult for other native language speakers to improve their socio-economic and political status without proficiency in the Nepali language (Jha, 2017, p. 45). The Panchayat system that came in 1960 relied on the proliferation of the idea of Nepali nationalism for its survival. Nationalism heavily relied upon the role of the monarchy as the symbol of national unity and updated legal codes based on high-caste Hindu norms (Burghart, 1994). Likewise, a Citizenship Commission formed in the 1990s refused citizenship to more than three million adult Nepalese, mostly Madhesi but also Dalit and indigenous nationalities (Upadhaya, 1995).

Are Grievances Enough to Start the Insurgency? However, the literature on relative poverty and inequality as a cause of Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency (1996–2006) does not focus on how the grievances arising from poverty and inequality turn into the collective perception of the grievances. Similarly, they do not explain how this collective perception of grievance, in turn, enables collective action against poverty and inequality in the form of violent resistance. As mentioned in the beginning, the forms of inequality and grievances, albeit in varying degrees of magnitude and intensity, were omnipresent since the inception of Modern Nepal but were not enough to produce violent civil war. Therefore, extant causal explanations on the onset of Maoist insurgency in 1996 (and not in an earlier period) and how poverty and inequality translated into political violence are not adequate Therefore, the transmission mechanism that transmits grievances into conflict needs more research. In other words, a suitable conceptual framework to explain the timing and process of the civil war in Nepal (1996–2006) is necessary (Basnett, 2009). In this respect, Skocpol (1979, p. 115) explains:

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What is at issue is not so much the objective potential for revolts on the grounds of justifiable grievances. It is rather the degree to which grievances that are always at least implicitly present can be collectively perceived and acted upon…the really important question is what transforms the peasantry, if only at local levels, into a collective force capable of striking out against its oppressors.

In other words, the development of grievances should be followed by the politicization of grievances in a way the mass perceives the grievance collectively and identifies itself as a victim. Furthermore, the collective perception of grievances mostly morphs into collective action when the countervailing force is weakened and divided. Put otherwise, even if the grievance is collectively perceived, as long as the oppressor or the state is unified, powerful, and uses institutions for suppression, the armed movement can easily be quashed. The weakening of the state characterized by the reduction of its coercive enforcement and oppressive power, and the development of the dissident organization is imperative to understand how violence actualized in the context of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The Maoists in Nepal effectively politicized the grievances so that most of the poor, oppressed and marginalized people collectively identified with the grievances that Maoists claimed to fight against. Moreover, Basnett (2009, p. 9) postulates that the monopoly of coercion before 1990 by various political configurations in Nepal and the lack of dissident organization and unified voice of those oppressed in the pre-1990 period. In contrast, the weaker democracy, the development of the Maoist rebel organization, and the ability of the Maoists to unify peasants and other oppressed and marginalized groups to band together against the state were key in explaining the onset of Maoist insurgency in the 1990s but not before (Lawoti, 2010).

Political Mobilization of Grievances In addition, rapid change in the Nepalese society brought by modernization, ideological resilience, and strategic pragmatism within Maoist leadership, external factors, and the excessive repression of dissent by the state is thought to have also played a key role in the onset and growth of

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the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010). The modernization after political and economic liberalization in Nepal since 1990 facilitated a general political consciousness in the people and germinated a sense of deprivation. The revival of democracy in Nepal in the 1990s brought many changes because of the spread of education, the growth of communication networks and globalization, and mass media. While modernization changed societal conditions and introduced uncertainty and fluidity (Fujikura, 2003), it also brought self-awareness to society while facilitating division in society (Joshi & Mason, 2007). Amid rapid change and heightened expectations of the citizen, the state failed to match expectations with better service delivery. Similarly, adequate preparation within Maoist leadership with greater emphasis on strategic pragmatism, ideological discipline, and organizational efficiency had a durable impact on the growth of the rebellion. The highly educated Maoist leadership, highly educated, closely studied the leftist revolutions around the world and learned from the mistakes of the past revolutions to adopt strategic pragmatism (Muni, 2010, pp. 10– 12). Before declaring the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in 1996, Maoist leadership went through five years period of intense debate, discussion, indoctrination, and purging to adopt a correct ideological line suitable to the conditions of Nepal (Mishra, 2004, p. 10). Along with the military wing, the Maoists established civilian organizations to further their cause in both peacetime and war. Maoists built a party organization with an army (People’s Liberation Army), a united front (United Revolutionary People’s Council Nepal), and many sister organizations and fronts to assist the party and army (Lawoti, 2010, p. 12).

State Repression Finally, the state repression and police brutality further precipitated the impending armed insurgency in (year). Two years running up to the launch of the armed rebellion, UPF (United People’s Front), the predecessor of the Maoists, was using peaceful political, cultural, and development activities for mass mobilization. The idea was to strengthen the potential for class struggle as they saw class struggle only as means

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to eliminate poverty and cure developmental ills. However, the state employed brutal repression in response (Gautam et al., 2001, p. 219). The police targeted the UPF supporters by filing false cases and putting them in jail. The Maoists retaliated by targeting the politicians and the elite. The government launched police operation named ‘Operation Romeo’ in November 1995, resulting in thousands of men fleeing to India or into the jungle to escape the police atrocities (Gautam et al., 2001, p. 219; Muni, 2010, p. 8). Hundreds of members of left-of-center parties were arbitrarily arrested, put in detention, disappeared, raped, tortured, and executed (International Centre for Transnational Justice, 2010, p. 21). Furthermore, another police operation in 1998 named Kilo Sera-2 exhibited further atrocities and brutality driving many people to the Maoist fold (Gautam et al., 2001, p. 228; Muni, 2010, p. 9). In turn, police brutality and violent repression were key to strengthening the Maoist movement.

Is Violent Extremism a Possibility in Nepal? Peace is not merely an absence of war. The links between long-standing conflict, insecurity, and poverty are well recognized (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Walter, 2015). Abject poverty, especially when associated with disparities, underlies many of the known conflicts worldwide. While social and ethnic inequalities can contribute to domestic terrorism (Olzak, 1994), economic inequalities and grievances are stronger drivers of rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Murshed & Gates, 2005). Despite robust economic growth and progress on many technological fronts in many countries in the region, South Asia still has the world’s largest concentrations of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and preventable maternal and child deaths outside sub-Saharan Africa (Akseer et al., 2017). Climate change is another major security concern in South Asia in the future with the real risk of interstate war over water (Biswas, 2011; Sahni, 2006). Indeed, South Asia now faces a range of possibilities for intrastate armed conflicts, with real risks of these spilling over into interstate conflict. While Nepal is also plagued by the same ills that have besieged the South Asia region (poverty, deprivation, social

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and ethnic inequality, climate change), the nexus between natural hazardrelated disasters and conflict, marginalization of certain social groups, and the unfinished project of state rebuilding can present an additional threat to the peace and stability in Nepal.

Natural Hazard-Related Disasters and Conflict Nexus Nepal offers an important foreshadowing into the future fraught with the impending impact of climate change amplified by larger infrastructure development in the region (Davis et al., 2021), and unresolved ethnic tensions even after the promulgation of a ‘new and inclusive’ constitution in 2015 (Strasheim, 2019). Many scholars suggest a linkage between post-disaster and post-conflict by exploring how armed conflicts and natural hazard-related disasters could exacerbate the conditions for each other from a vulnerability perspective (Duffield, 1994; Godschalk, 2003). This nexus between the two phenomena creates a ‘negative cycle’ in which conflict-induced fragility increases vulnerability to climate change and natural hazard-related disasters, which in turn negatively affects human security and may lead to conflict (Vivekananda et al., 2014). Natural disasters in combination with lower income, inequality, mixed political regimes, and low rate of economic growth significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and mediumterm (Nel & Righarts, 2008). At the same time, violent conflict-afflicted countries are less prepared to prevent, mitigate, and respond to disasters, exacerbating the vulnerabilities that turn hazards into disasters (Peters & Budimir, 2016; Twigg, 2009). The most vulnerable groups in society are often affected by a ‘layering’ of natural hazard-related disasters and social conflict or ongoing violence (Godschalk, 2003). Most importantly, lack of proper and adequate response to natural hazard-related disasters and armed conflict fester anger, frustrations, and disaffection among marginalized and vulnerable populations leaving the door open for armed conflict recurrence. Nepal was still struggling to get a broad consensus on implementing the raft of measures and reforms

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aimed at the structuring of the state after the Maoist insurgency (1996– 2006) when it was hit by two massive earthquakes, triggering a second reconstruction process (Thapa & Ramsbotham, 2017).

Intersectionality and Positive Peace Although violent conflict and natural disasters impact everyone in the afflicted territory, not everyone feels its impact in the same way. Some populations are more prone to loss, death, and destruction than others. Therefore, the impact of conflict and natural disasters on the vulnerable population can be worsened by the lack of reconstruction and rebuilding programs sensitive to the needs and priorities of a vulnerable and marginalized population. In the context of Nepal, peacebuilding and reconstruction programs lacked sensitivity to people in terms of gender, class, caste, ethnicity, and geographical location. In the aftermath of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) program designs for the Maoist excombatants lacked enough attention to the intersectional identity of the combatants. ‘Matrices of domination,’ multiple cross-section systems of oppression (e.g., gender, class, caste, ethnicity, ability, and geographical location) impacted the possibility of ex-combatants to reintegrate back into the society and lead dignified lives (Giri, 2021). Maoist female excombatants were particularly vulnerable to stigma and faced reduced political and socio-economic opportunities after the war (Manchanda, 2004). In a focus group discussion during my fieldwork, Kamala BK, a female ex-combatant from an untouchable caste and lower-class family, stressed: Some of our friends got married to higher caste men during the war thinking that the caste discrimination was over as the progressive change was taking place. Most of my friends from Dalit family, who are also excombatants, have been abandoned by their higher caste husbands because their in-laws did not accept them. They don’t have land or money. They don’t have decent jobs. They cannot go back to their own community because the community is still backward and vilifies them. The government has consistently ignored our voices.

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Similarly, post-earthquake relief and reconstruction projects were based on the presumption of the indiscriminate nature of the natural disaster that impacts everyone uniformly. Harrowell and Özerdem (2018, p. 191) quote a Nepali NGO representative involved in the relief and reconstruction project who argued, ‘It [the 2015 earthquake] did not recognize who is well off, who is poor, who is marginalized […] excluded people, it doesn’t recognize, the earthquake didn’t recognize.’ Since the earthquake is a natural phenomenon, it was seen as devoid of politics, and blind to various forms of inequalities. To many, the earthquake was an apolitical force that took no notice of the fault lines of caste, gender, ethnicity, or wealth that define life, and opportunity, for many Nepalese citizens (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018, p. 191). When there is a lack of recognition of various systems of oppression and forms of vulnerabilities impacting people in conflict and disaster-prone countries and regions, the chances for justice and positive peace are swiftly diminished.

Democratic Restructuring of State & Peacebuilding: Stagnation and Frustration One of the primary aims of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was to bring about a restructuring of the state (Karki & Seddon, 2003; Strasheim, 2019; Thapa & Sharma, 2009). The restructuring of the state into a federal model became a highly contentious issue in the aftermath of the conflict. While the contestation over the federal model resulted in the failure of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–2013) to write a constitution, the contestation resulted in intense violence during the second Constituent Assembly (2014–2017) (Lawoti, 2019; Strasheim, 2019). Nepalese authorities seized on the earthquake in 2015 as an opportunity to refocus attention away from the difficult political issues of the post-conflict settlement and restructuring of the state. The new constitution was ‘fast-tracked’ through in the aftermath of the earthquake, after nearly a decade of wrangling in the Constituent Assembly which did not resolve completely the key issues of state restructuring and the nature

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of federalism in an ethnically and culturally diverse country like Nepal (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018, p. 193; Strasheim, 2019). Moreover, some scholars have characterized the current situation as ‘dysfunction by design’—the idea that the government has a vested interest in making the reconstruction process as opaque and slow as possible in order to reinforce their control over the power and resources of the center (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018, p. 196). While it is necessary to highlight the achievement of the peace process in bringing a lot of changes towards greater democratization of the Nepali state, the key political challenges of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2007—land, identity, inequality, rights, and power—are still not addressed adequately and holistically. This might be one of the major reasons why Nepal experienced a significant flare in violence in the Southern Terai region even when Nepal was reeling from a devastating earthquake in 2015 (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018, p. 193). Despite the incomplete peacebuilding process, the official narrative of the Nepalese government is that the conflict/crisis is over (see National Planning Commission, 2015; Paudel & Billon, 2020). Therefore, the state should be focusing on growth and prosperity. However, this narrative runs counter to the idea of peace as cyclical and continuously remade, rather than something that could be declared ‘done’ (Lederach, 2005).

Conclusion This chapter discussed various symptoms of state fragility behind the onset of Maoist insurgency in Nepal some of which were poverty and inequality, disparity among social groups in terms of distribution of power and resources, adroit political mobilization of grievances for the insurgency, and the police brutality and repression. While the democratic-republican political system established after the war sought to address these structural inequalities, injustices, and systematic discriminations, progress has been slow, and many expectations remain unmet. In the current situation, climate change and natural hazard-related disasters, lack of sensitivity to the voices and needs of marginalized populations, incomplete and inadequate state restructuring, and peacebuilding have

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created a necessary condition for the brewing of violent extremism. Recently, the pandemic has exacerbated existing issues with governance, social inequality, and poverty in Nepal (Eck, 2021). The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal (1996–2006) took place at a time when the violent communist rebellions failed or stagnated elsewhere.2 Democracy, economic growth, and an overall improvement in the quality of life, which are essential to sustain peace and prosperity (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Hegre, 2014), coincided with the onset of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Democracy was restored in Nepal in 1990. The Nepalese economy enjoyed a decent rate of growth in the following years, spurted by economic liberalization in the country.3 Yet, around this time Nepal plunged into the ten-year-long bloody Maoist insurgency. Nepal remains a perfect case to substantiate the theoretical claim that if the structural and systematic inequalities and discriminations are not carefully addressed, democracy and growth alone are ineffectual in stemming violent extremism. To comprehend the systematic forms of oppression and violence as well as their various visible manifestations in everyday lives, feminist conceptualizations of violence are useful. Particularly, ‘matrices of domination’ help to understand how multiple forms of simultaneously intersecting dominations create unique vulnerabilities for the marginalized population. Similarly, the conceptualization of violence into war/peace and private/public binaries or their compartmentalization into different spheres (social, cultural, epistemic, economic, and political) only offer a partial understanding of violence. To make sure that Nepal is not going to be surprised by yet another puzzling occurrence of violent extremism, Nepal needs to move beyond reliance upon economic and political indices of peace. While they provide a useful outlook, they cannot always capture various systematic and everyday forms of violence. As some of the key political issues remain to be completely resolved, structural and systemic violence persist, marginalized people get further neglected, and climate changeinduced vulnerability heightens insecurity for the vulnerable population, violent extremism, and armed conflict remains an ever-present possibility in Nepal. Feminist conceptualizations of violence and oppression can provide the necessary lenses to understand and analyze this violence which is vital for building positive and sustainable peace.

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Notes 1. Instability was so rife that between 1991 and 2002, Nepal saw no less than 12 governments—disarray that the Maoists justified as one of the key reasons to resort to arm and their contempt for the democratic process (Einsiedel et al., 2012, p. 17). 2. Such as Shining path Peru, communist insurgency in Malaya, and Naxalites in India to name a few. 3. The average GDP growth of Nepal was 3% in the decade preceding the revival of democracy (1976–1977 to 1986–1987). The GDP saw an uptick in the period 1987–1988 to 1994–1995 with average GDP 4.1% (Sharma, 2006, p. 1242). Similarly, roads, schools, health facilities, universities, banks, and other development infrastructure and service sectors grew in the 1990s (Mahat, 2005).

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8 State Fragility, Violent Extremism, and Future of Afghanistan Intijamul Islam and Shafi Md Mostofa

Introduction Afghanistan, one of the South Asian landlocked states, suffers a high fragility rate positioning itself 9th out of 157 countries measured globally by the Fund for Peace in 2021 (Fragile States Index, 2021). The country has been torn apart by foreign interventions, group grievances, political instability, and serious economic challenges. Throughout its history, the state had witnessed constant uprisings of a wide range of ideological extremist groups. This leads to a strong hypothesis that Afghanistan I. Islam (B) Department of World Religions and Culture, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] S. Md Mostofa University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected]

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has become a strong case to study the nexus between state fragility and violent extremism. With the hypothesis under consideration, the idea of state fragility is also a contested concept especially because it doesn’t offer any uniform definition or a consensus of scholars. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), fragility originates from “substantial disequilibrium in state-society relations” (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 25) as a result of the state’s inability to meet or manage the population’s ever-changing expectations through political interventions. The World Bank defines state fragility as the weakness of state policies and institutions that make the state vulnerable in its capacity to “deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability” (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 25). The Fragility Study Group of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) also considers fragility as a phenomenon that “saps the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks” (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 25). So, this chapter identifies some common attributes of a fragile state. These attributes include (a) the state’s inability to manage people’s expectations, (b) failure to provide for people’s sufficient voice and accountability, and (c) and a phenomenon that sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks. Having said that, such fragile conditions provide a fertile breeding ground for violent extremist groups as evident from the socio-political patterns of the emergence of extremist groups across the globe. Along this line of argument, Wilkinson attributed some social-political fragile conditions as the common reasons that contribute to the development of the breeding ground for terrorism. These are “ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts, poverty, negative aftermath of modernization, injustice, revolutionary sentiments among society, weak governments or an internal power struggle” (Wilkinson, 1974, p. 56). A fragile state essentially offers an open ground for extremist groups to rise and thrive mainly due to a void in the power structure to maintain security protocol within the state. The economic disparity also provides a solid reason for the extremist propaganda to reach out to the less privileged segment of society with a sacred mission to stand up for justice against the “exploiting establishment.” Another important concern with regard to the rise of extremism is the seemingly “everlasting” hopelessness

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in terms of a change or betterment in political structure. This hopelessness provides a strong ground for extremist propagandists to incite people toward doing something promising for a greater cause. Adding to Wilkinson’s indicators of state fragility which led to violent extremism, the International Crisis Group argues that radical groups exploit the war-torn and chaotic situation for expanding their network and recruitment (International Crisis Group, 2016). A myriad of scholars in the African context suggests that issues of state fragility such as incompetence, corruption, brutality, lack of legitimacy, and bad governance help foster extremism in Africa (Fanon, 1963; Jackson, 2007; Maiangwa, 2012; Ukiwo, 2003). Other reputed scholars also argue that this kind of fragile situation allows extremist groups to expand their network to transform the particular country into a safe den for extremists (Howard, 2016; Ibrahimi, 2018; Kasasbeh, 2015; Lahai & Koomson, 2020; Maiangwa, 2012; Tonwe & Eke, 2013; Wehrli, 2018). Taking the above-mentioned indicators into consideration, Afghanistan has been evidently one of the leading fertile lands for mass production and growth of extremism over the years. A nation historically accustomed to political turmoil and the rise and fall of regimes, Afghanistan quickly became a hotspot of a proxy war between the US-led coalition and the former USSR by the beginning of the 1980s. The Mujahideen started a guerrilla warfare against the invading Soviet forces in 1978 and continued their fight till they finally drove the Soviet force out of Afghanistan in 1992. A faction of these Mujahideen fighters constituted the Afghan Taliban in 1994 and successfully established a self-styled Sharia government in 1996. However, they were driven out of their rule by the US-led coalition’s invasion with the accusation of “failure to handover Al-Qaeda terrorists” following 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Since then, the Taliban turned out violent and continued to carry on guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, mass killing against the US-backed Afghan government and the US military forces until they finally drove the US force out of Afghanistan and rose to power once again in August 2021. That said, this chapter examines the current post-war fragility status of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and how the contemporary extremist ecosystem will shape within the country. Before their takeover of the

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Afghan government, the Taliban was the popular anti-establishmentarian group with their strong Afghan narrative of driving the invaders out of their homeland. It is high time to examine how this populist “antiestablishmentarian” void is going to be filled, and who is going to take the space recently left vacant by the Taliban.

Defining State Fragility The concept of “state fragility” has been given shape gradually over the last two decades as the international academia took interest in the term following the frequent use of the term by leading donor nations like the G7 and development Forums like World Bank, OECD, European Union and the like (Engelherdt, 2018). According to the British Department for International Cooperation (DfID), fragile states are the states whose “government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor”. The Canadian government defines fragile states as having governments that “lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad” (ibid.). In the 2020 issue of States of Fragility, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation characterized fragility as: ...the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, systems and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, poverty, inequality, displacement, and environmental and political degradation. (OECD, 2020)

According to the World Bank, a fragile state is characterized by weak policies and institutions, making it vulnerable in terms of delivering promised services to citizens, controlling corruption, or providing sufficient voice and accountability. Such a state faces risks of conflict and political instability (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 25). The Fragility Study Group

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of the United States Institute for Peace defines fragility as a vulnerable phenomenon that “saps the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks (Burns et al., 2016).” Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna Kassab argued that, although a fragile state might still have an established government in power, it has more than one center of authority (Jonathan & Hanna, 2016) that practices unchecked power within the geographic territory. These groups could range from political rivals to organized crime networks, terrorist groups or otherwise (Monika & Inder, 2006). So, what constitutes a state as fragile? How and why a state becomes fragile? The available literature is not strong enough to offer theories that can explain these critical questions. Nonetheless, there are few theoretical approaches (Andersen, 2008; Eriksen, 2005) that attempts to address the concept of state fragility. The first approach attempts to explain fragile states in terms of human rights violations, social exclusion, and reluctance toward achieving MDGs. According to this approach, parallel bodies exercise authority over the state’s jurisdiction alongside the established government, and as such, the government fails to ensure basic human rights. This gradually leads the state toward losing political legitimacy (Andersen, 2008). The second approach proposes the explanation of fragility in the securitydevelopment nexus, claiming that poor governance causes state fragility, which in turn fertilizes the land as a source of transnational threat (Andersen, 2008). A third approach explains fragility in terms of liberal peace thesis, arguing that the lack of neo-liberal values like human rights, participation, inclusion, transparency, and accountability is the key that led a state toward fragility (Eriksen, 2005).

State Fragility in Afghanistan As mentioned in an earlier section, Afghanistan is one of the countries with a high fragility rate. This led us to examine what actually causes state fragility in Afghanistan. To begin with, Afghanistan’s poor social cohesion and fragile security system come first on the list. A strong nation is tied with a common thread that every individual holds

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on to. The thread could be a belief system, cultural practices, sociopolitical cohesion, languages, or anything that ties the entire nation together with a common ground. Such a common ground is absent in the case of Afghanistan (Sulaiman, 2020). The country didn’t have a formal state structure and the state was divided into tribal factions prior to the first-ever unification attempt by Emir Abdur Rahman in the early 1880s. He gave Afghanistan the shape of a formal state, determining a border and introducing various state institutions. He attempted to introduce Western cultures by promoting Western dress code and behavior patterns, especially within the Afghan Army (Howard, 2016). His reformation attempts only worsened the social cohesion of the Afghan people as they radically renounced reform movements unleashed by Emir Abdur Rahman. Later on, King Amanullah, who assumed power in 1926, suppressed the feelings of tribal communities as he ignored their centuries-old traditional norms and values. These attempts alienated them from his own society as his attempts were anti-popular Afghan sentiment (Tanner, 2002). These unpopular rulers were dependent upon foreign intervention to strengthen their unsteady regime. As such, the nation has never seen stable governance to rely upon and to build a common Afghan narrative to stand up for. This tendency of shattered social cohesion seems inherent in Afghan society, as the contemporary political rise and fall seem to follow a similar pattern as it did a century ago. Economic challenges have been extremely pervasive and persistent in Afghanistan throughout history. It lacks economic stability for several reasons including its scarcity of skilled human resources, dependency on an illegal drug-based economy, excessive dependency upon foreign aid, and poor domestic production (Byrd, 2021). The World Bank estimated that Afghanistan will remain heavily burdened with an excessive population ratio against available resources up until 2030. The report mentioned that approximately 400,000 youths enter the Afghan labor force every year, increasing the ratio of dependency upon meager economic resources (Aljazeera, 2021). The situation aggravated following the withdrawal of US forces and the Taliban takeover of the Afghan government in August 2021. Many international donor organizations have frozen Afghan assets abroad due to ambiguity regarding the new

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ruler of Afghanistan. After the official withdrawal of US troops, international analysts have been warning of a sheer economic meltdown and massive humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan. Legitimacy crisis leads to political instability in the country, which deems to be an important factor for state fragility. A political institution is considered authentic when it reflects the expectations of the citizens, usually expressed through elections in a democratic setting (Relief Web, 2009). Assuming a vote follows standardized processes and strategies and offers people the chance to voice their choices, the winner would probably be considered authentic. Another way to gain legitimacy as a state-level authority is to offer comforting public services to the people once elected. If the authority works for promoting the feeling of individual security and prosperity, the government is most likely to get legitimized among the laymen (Relief Web, 2021). Unfortunately, none of the rulers of Afghanistan has managed to convey to a great extent expanded social prosperity or feeling of individual security to most of its citizens. The US-backed governments were mostly considered to be the puppets of foreign invaders in the popular Afghan mindset, and as such, these governments never actually managed to gain genuine popularity apart from the fact that they brought about some positive changes with the help of US troops. On the other hand, the Taliban have been the major reason for the shattered public security system in Afghanistan in the last two decades. Gaining legitimacy among the Afghan people remains to be a big question for the Taliban now that they’ve established a government. Foreign intervention causes state fragility. Afghanistan is located in a geographically significant region, making it a hub of connectivity in the surrounding regions, and as such, the center of attention for the global players of power politics in the region. Since the very beginning of Afghanistan as a modern nation-state, it has been directly or indirectly invaded by foreign nations by means of proxy wars, direct military interventions, and puppet government elections. It all started with the British and Russian empires declaring Afghanistan as a buffer state. The British controlled the Afghan foreign policy by supplying money and weapons. When Amanullah declared

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independence in 1919, the British declined the supply, which gradually weakened the Amanullah regime, resulting in his fall in 1929. A similar pattern was followed by the US and Soviet Union during the cold war. The two rivals continued to provide support to rival groups to maintain their influence in Afghanistan. This cold proxy duel ultimately resulted in the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US then backed the Mujahideen with training and weapon supplies to fight off the Soviet troops. The Soviet forces were driven out of Afghanistan by the Mujahideen, but within a few years, the US forces invaded Talibanled Afghanistan following the 9/11 attack. This consecutive surge of foreign invasion never allowed the native Afghan people to mainstream a political narrative of their own (Tanner, 2002).

Taliban Take Over Afghanistan Afghanistan has been a hub of diverse cultures and a roundabout of the major civilizations throughout the ages, mostly because of its geopolitical location. The country has been colonized by two great ancient civilizations, namely, the Persians and the Greeks. In the Bamiyan region, a Buddhist civilization flourished and reigned for nearly a thousand years. Islam was introduced in the Afghan region through a raid on Kandahar at the outset of the eighth century, and gradually became predominant as the Turks grew stronger in Iran, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent over the following centuries (Tanner, 2002). The Mongol emperor Chenghis Khan invaded Afghanistan in the thirteenth century, resulting in the mass killing in the present-day cities of Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. In the late fourteenth century, Afghanistan became the part of Timurid empire when Timur, the leader of neighboring Transoxiana region, invaded Afghanistan and drove out the then-ruling Mongol Khanate. At the very outset of the sixteenth century, Zahir Uddin Muhammad Babur, the to-be founder of the Mughal Empire, raided Kabul and established his rule there. Over the following centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by Persian Safavids, Indian Mughals, and native Afghan tribal chiefs, until a group of Pashtun tribes under the leadership of Mirwais Hotak led a successful revolution against the

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Persian Safavid dynasty. Over the following half a century, Afghanistan witnessed continuous civil war fought over the throne until finally, an Abdali Pashtun confederacy established a consolidated Afghan empire under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali halfway through the eighteenth century (Barfield, 2010). Throughout the nineteenth century, Afghanistan turned out to be a hotbed of power politics among global power players. The Great Game, a power struggle between imperial Britain and Russia, broke out in Afghanistan as the imperials attempted to bring Afghanistan under their direct rule. The British suffered a defeat to the Afghan forces in the first Anglo-Afghan war that lasted 4 years from 1839 to 1842. In their second attempt in 1879–1880, the imperial British forces won a significant amount of territory and gained control over the external affairs of Afghanistan. At this point forward, the British started to patronize some selected pro-imperial Afghan rulers to keep British India safe by utilizing the Afghan borders as a shield against the Russian threat. In the third Anglo-Afghan war (1918–1921), the Afghan forces defeated the imperial British forces and Amanullah started to rule Afghanistan as an independent state. Amanullah formed the first-ever constitution for Afghanistan. He introduced tax reforms and extended mass-level education in Afghanistan. However, his attempt toward shifting power away from village leaders and the authority away from religious establishment resulted in a revolt that overthrew him in 1938. The following half a century was a phase of ethnic conflict and internal tensions in Afghanistan (Barfield, 2010; Tanner, 2002). In the year 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power through a coup. The PDPA was established in 1965 with communist principles and claimed their support mainly from Kremlin. As the events unfolded, the mass people and a faction of the Afghan military couldn’t accept the Russian supremacy in the Afghan government, and as such, the PDPA regime went through mass oppositions as they introduced their pro-communist policies in the country. At one point, when the Soviet Union sensed that their long-cherished influence in Afghanistan was on verge of decline, they decided to conduct a military intervention in Afghanistan to “protect the PDPA regime from decline,” as they call it, or “to invade,” as the world calls it. The Soviet

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forces made Babrak Karmal from the Parcham faction of PDPA the President and remained in Afghanistan to safeguard his regime for the next decade (Tanner, 2002). The Soviet Union started their invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. This invasion led to the 10-year war between the Soviet forces and the Islamist resistance groups within Afghanistan. An Islamist militant resistance group named Mujahideen was formed, attracting Muslim militants not only from Afghanistan but also from Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Mujahideen, after 10 years of guerilla warfare, finally drove out the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan had many positive and negative consequences. The most notable consequence was that it gave rise to the Taliban as a political entity in Afghanistan. The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist political movement of Afghanistan that emerged mainly on religious and social grounds on the heels of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1994. The organization was formed by a group of Islamic students who were educated in madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Basit, 2021). They wanted to overthrow the government of Afghanistan and establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban took over most of the country with support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban lost popularity over the years because of the strict rules and policies that they enforced on the people. They even went as far as to prohibit women from working outside the home, going to school, or wearing clothes other than a burqa. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan for five years before they were overthrown by the US forces in 2001 following the subsequent turmoil after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The US Military forces officially overthrew the Taliban government on October 07, 2001. Although the Taliban was toppled by the government, they remained evasive for a few years following the US invasion and began reorganizing within a couple of years after the west-backed Karzai government was formed. The US-led invasion brought about some significant changes in the lives of the Afghan people. Public healthcare system, education,

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economy, and overall quality of life took a sharp upward turn following the formation of the Karzai government. During this 20 yearlong USbacked rule, reconstruction and development works boomed across the country. Entrepreneurship and new business institutions flourished in the capital. The nation’s per capita income rose from $170 in 2000 to $570 in 2021 (Byrd, 2021). On the other side of the coin, the Taliban quickly reorganized themselves and established their strong ground across the country, leaving Kabul to the strong control of US military forces. They began guerrilla warfare against the US forces in the second half of the 2000s, marked by frequent suicide bombings causing a massive blow to public security, law, and order. The 20 yearlong US-backed rule in Afghanistan finally came to an end on August 30, 2021, which was marked by the withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan. The reasons for the US failure lie in the history of Afghanistan. The occupiers had never been able to successfully rule in the country. Besides, the US forces had to encounter a monster of their own creation, the Mujahideen (Tanner, 2002). After experiencing 20 years of US-backed rule, the Afghan people preferred the government of their own land over the rule and influence of a foreign nation. The Taliban took hold of the Afghan government for a second time. The new mindset of Afghan people that has been shaped during the 20 years USbacked rule and how the comparatively liberal Taliban will take Afghan politics forward will be the center of focus for fragility study as the events unfold in post-US Afghanistan.

Future of Afghanistan The rise of the Taliban as Afghan state authority has, on one hand, imposed a massive burden on the Afghan people on multiple dimensions, and on the other hand, significantly impacted the ecosystem of the radical Islamist organizations in Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban was marked by broad-scale retaliation of the Taliban from the proAmerican political and media activists in Afghanistan. A Human Rights Watch report states that nearly 70% of media outlets in Afghanistan were closed (HRW, 2022) following the Taliban’s ascension to state

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authority. A number of religious leaders from different factions, media activists, and numerous civilians were killed by the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) during this retaliation process (HRW, 2022). That the international communities have frozen the incoming funds worth millions of dollars following the Taliban ascension to power put millions of Afghan people on verge of starvation and possible longlasting famine. They are also at risk of scarcity of physical and mental health care services across the country. The rights of women to education and jobs, one of the major achievements of the past 20 yearlong US-backed government, was torn apart by the new Afghan government (HRW, 2022). Moreover, a significant number of Afghan scholars have deemed it difficult and threatening to stay and continue their scholarly works in Taliban-led Afghanistan as evident from their statements to international media and the number of Afghan scholars looking for placement in European academic institutes and research firms (Nature, 2021). This massive tendency of the relocation of Afghan scholars will cause a broad-scale brain drain, resulting in the intellectual imparity of Afghan society at large in the long run. As the Afghan laymen appear to be losing their faith in a state system under the Taliban rule, the extremist organizations are unfolding to their full potential with new formations and strategies in Afghanistan. Evidently, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) seems to take the anti-establishment Islamist militant stance in Afghanistan (Kapur, 2022) as the Taliban, the flag-bearer of the aforementioned stance till this point, rises to established state authority. Historically, there has been a strong rivalry between Islamic State Khorasan and the Taliban since the very beginning of ISKP’s entrance to Afghanistan. When the ISKP declared their presence in 2015, the Taliban leader Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor warned ISKP to stay out of Afghanistan in a public letter. This rivalry has become more and more prominent as the events unfolded in the Taliban-led Afghan landscape. The latest evidence of the rivalry and the emergence of ISKP as the potential major threat to the Taliban establishment is the declaration of a violent campaign of ISKP against the Taliban after the later signed Doha agreement with the US in 2020, with the allegations of compromising Jihadist principles to raise to power (Basit, 2021; Fuard,

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2021). The ISKP is pressurizing the Taliban with both verbal and physical attacks, putting the Taliban in a dilemma. As of January 2022, the ISKP claimed responsibility for 127 attacks in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover of the Afghan government, of which 79% were directed toward the Taliban (Amira et al., 2022; Doxsee et al., 2021). The group is constantly trying to put the Taliban in legitimacy crisis as a state actor by mainly following a strategy of economic warfare that includes nearly three dozen of attacks on electricity pylons and oil tankers in Afghanistan after the Taliban established government in 2021 (Amira et al., 2021; Fuard, 2021). With the constant threats from the ISKP to remain loyal to puritan Islamist ideological values, and the expectations from the part of Western forces to maintain a liberal and modernist state system, the Taliban is to encounter a challenging future ahead. The ISKP seems to be filling the void left out by the Taliban in the Afghan landscape. They are already attracting the ideological purist factions of the Taliban who were not in favor of compromising any deal with the Westerners (Fuard, 2021). Besides, as the unemployment rate is increasing day by day in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, the ISKP has the potential to manipulate this situation to recruit human resources from within Afghanistan thanks to their strong cash flow and global brand value (Johnson et al., 2016). The Taliban has repeatedly reassured the global community that terrorist activities will not be allowed in Afghanistan and abroad using Afghanistan as a center of command (Basit, 2021). This statement includes two major terrorist organizations grounded in Afghanistan, namely, ISKP and Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has historically had close ties with the Taliban. In the past, the top leaders of the Taliban including Mullah Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mansur, and Hebatullah Akhundzada took the oath of allegiance from the Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri (Basit, 2021). Although AlQaeda is neither as strong nor as influential as it was in 2001, it seems that Al-Qaeda will also rise under the shade of the ruling Taliban during the Taliban regime, considering the positive attitude of Al-Qaeda toward the Afghan government and also the fact that the Taliban still defends Osama Bin Laden and denies his involvement in 9/11 attacks. As it turns out, the leaders of Al-Qaeda issued a statement congratulating

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the Taliban following their ascension to state authority that reads: “On this historic occasion, we would like to offer our congratulations to the leadership of the Islamic Emirate, specifically Haibatullah Akhundzada” (Basit, 2021). The statement and the organization’s attitude toward the Taliban show that Al-Qaeda does and will continue to enjoy a working relationship under the Taliban regime. But the Zawahiri killing by US drones has already caused a big blow in the AQ strategy. Only time will tell how AQ will be reorganized amid this leadership crisis.

Conclusion Being one of the top-ranked fragile states and also a popular breeding ground for several ideological extremist organizations, Afghanistan has become a center of attention for understanding the nexus between state fragility and the rise of extremism. The chapter acknowledges Afghanistan to be a fragile state under some common criteria, i.e., (a) state’s inability to manage people’s expectations, (b) failure to provide for people’s sufficient voice and accountability, and (c) and a phenomenon that sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks. That said, the chapter argued that the ascension of the Taliban as the state authority of Afghanistan will bring about some major shifts in the violent extremist ecosystem that has been long rooted in the country. The Taliban had been the major anti-establishmentarian ideological extremist group in Afghanistan. As they move on to become the state authority, Islamic State Khorasan Province will take over their position as the key ideologically driven anti-establishmentarian force in Afghanistan. Besides, Al-Qaeda will also get stronger under the shade of the Taliban thanks to their ideological coherence and historical ties amid the contrasting liberal expectations of the global community from the Taliban government.

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9 State Fragility and the Challenge of Violent Extremism in Pakistan Abdul Basit

Introduction Though Pakistan has made great strides against violent extremism (VE), the challenges remain (Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2019, p. 6). In August 2021, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan had a rejuvenating effect on Pakistani jihadist groups, resulting in an uptick in violence and more aggressive extremist propaganda against Pakistan. In retrospect, the Army Public School (APS), Peshawar attack in December 2014, was a turning point in the country’s fight against VE (Ghani, 2019). It brought all the stakeholders, political parties, civil society, security agencies, and the public, on the same page to go after the VE groups indiscriminately (Rashid, 2015). Following the APS attack, Pakistan launched a range of hard and soft measures to Preventing and Counter Violent Extremism (PCVE) with mixed results. At any rate, the A. Basit (B) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2_9

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post-APS attack environment in Pakistan resulted in: (a) an unequivocal consensus to tackle VE, (b) and the much-needed structural framework to harmonize a plethora of PCVE measures (Weaver & Doherty, 2014). Despite a decline in terrorism and the uprooting of terrorist groups from Pakistan, VE has expanded in the country (Hanif, 2018). In the past, extremist and terrorist groups carried out attacks in Pakistan. However, recent incidents of mob killings in different parts of Pakistan over alleged blasphemy charges point to a lowered threshold for religiously motivated violence in the society (Farhan, 2017). Vandalizing worship places of religious minorities, murdering their scholars, and marginalizing them in the national mainstream are other examples of ideologically driven VE in Pakistan. So, VE is not only entrenched in Pakistan but it is also expanding to other segments of society (Henitz, 2018). Against this backdrop, this chapter contends that Pakistan’s PCVE framework structured around preventive and corrective approaches also needs to focus on addressing the long-term structural causes of VE in the context of state fragility. This chapter has three sections. The first section conceptualizes VE and its terrain in Pakistan. The second section outlines Pakistan’s hard PCVE measures, while the final section discusses soft PCVE initiatives and how they can tackle the deeper factor incubating VE in the country. The chapter has adopted a descriptive-analytical approach using a host of primary and secondary sources.

State Fragility and VE in Pakistan Pakistan is a unique case study of the nexus between state fragility VE. Ranked as the 29th most vulnerable state on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index (FSI), Islamabad is not a stranger to VE (Fragile State Index, 2021, p. 7). The FSI places Pakistan under the “Alert” category with a score of 90.5. In FSI, the higher score indicates greater state fragility and vice versa. VE is both the cause and outcome of state fragility in Pakistan, i.e., VE and state fragility have a reverse causal relationship. Fragility is a contested notion, in the context of VE in Pakistan, given that the state has shown extreme vulnerability in some respects such

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as the inability to confront the growing ideological influence of radical actors, while in other respects the state has coercively suppressed nonstate militarism of jihadist and ethno-separatist groups. For instance, both the terrorist attacks and resultant casualties have declined in Pakistan since 2010 (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2022, p. 18). At the same time, since 2018, Pakistan has been on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s “gray-list” on account of its non-compliance on terrorism financing and money laundering, indicating that the country remains vulnerable to VE. Furthermore, despite decline in terrorism and related casualties, extremism has grown in Pakistan. Nabi and Javed (2018) frame the contested notion of state fragility in Pakistan as “heterogenous fragility,” i.e., the state is extremely vulnerable in some aspects and tremendously resilient in other areas (Nabi & Javed, 2018, p. 5). Since 2001, the country has sacrificed as many as 85,000 human lives, incurred US $ 126.79 billion in economic losses, and suffered serious damage to its pluralistic socio-cultural ethos (Ministry of Finance, 2019).

Terrain of VE in Pakistan A plethora of local, regional, and global militant groups with similar and varying ideological agendas have operated in and out of Pakistan. According to some estimates, at one time, more than 100 militant groups operated in Pakistan. Presently, around 73 militant groups are on the NACTA’S list of proscribed organizations (NCTA, 2018). While these groups may not have the organizational infrastructure in the country following several military operations, still they maintain some form of operational presence, and their VE narratives resonate with those sympathetic to their agendas (Warraich, 2018, pp. 165–176). The advent of social media has given these VE groups an added advantage to keep their ideological agendas alive and continue to recruit people online (Susarla, 2019). Pakistan’s VE landscape is complex and notwithstanding varying ideological narratives of various groups, most of the Sunni militant outfits,

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sans the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), have coexisted (Rana, 2003, p. 65). The history of VE groups in Pakistan is well-documented, the following section provides an overview of their ideological narratives to highlight the magnitude of the challenge. i. Global Militant Discourses Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS)—jihadist arch-rivals—have a footprint in Pakistan (Zahid, 2017a, 2017b, pp. 9–12). AQ was formed in Peshawar in 1988 (Weinbaum & McNally, 2016, p. 2), while ISK, IS’s regional franchise, emerged in 2015 when some breakaway factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) pledged their oaths of allegiances to the group. Later, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) also joined ISK. Both AQ and IS have ideological footprints in Pakistan (Pervez, 2016, p. 2). AQ being the older group has a more entrenched presence along with enjoying the respect and loyalties of major militant groups such as TTP, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), among others (Groll, 2015). On its parts, ISK has captured the imagination of anti-Shia sectarian outfits like Jandullah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Tehreek Khilafat (TK) along with creating a rapport with radical youth of educated, urban middle and upper-middle classes in Pakistan (Jadoon, 2018). IS’ brand value is more powerful than AQ’s old-school approach to global jihadism. IS has used the so-called Caliphate narrative to spread its ideological tentacles in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2019). The Caliphate narrative has found more traction with educated youth who suffer from an identity crisis. IS has provided them with a sense of belonging, purpose, and empowerment (Yusuf, 2016, pp. 4–8). Despite territorial and leadership losses to IS in recent years, ISK still has an active presence in Pakistan (Seldin, 2019). Caliphate refers to a Sunni-dominated global Muslim empire and has a greater pull for young Sunni radicals. This ideological narrative is equally famous among females who have assumed a more prominent role in militancy under the IS banner in Pakistan (Gul, 2018, pp. 79–92). IS’ sharp sectarian narrative (Takfiri Salafism) not only ex-communicates

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Shias from Islam but also apostatizes Sufi Muslims (Heery, 2016). This is consistent with ISK’s patterns of attacks in Pakistan where it has targeted Sufi shrines and the Shia community, among others (Hawley, 2017, pp. 160–181). On the other hand, AQ in recent years has localized its jihadist narrative in Pakistan by passing on the leadership positions to the locals, supporting local militant movements such as the anti-India insurgency in Kashmir and atrocities against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. AQ, which helped the Taliban by providing strategic guidance and training, celebrated the US exit from Afghanistan as a victory for the jihadists. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, both AQ and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), group’s South Asian franchise, have been proliferating Ghazwat-ul-Hind discourse to justify their ideological narrative (Haqqani, 2015). Ghazwat-ul-Hind or the “Battle of India” refers to an Islamic eschatological end-of-times narrative describing one of the final battles that will occur in the Indian subcontinent. This concept is premised primarily on three hadiths (Prophetic Sayings) which glorify the status of those who will participate in this battle (Mostofa, 2021, 2022). ii. Local Militant Discourses There are two broad categories of local militant groups in Pakistan: Pan-Islamists and sectarian organizations. Neither category of these militants is neat, nor are their narratives mutually exclusive (ICG, 2009, pp. 6–15). Groups in both categories have cooperated in different circumstances by de-emphasizing their primary agendas and prioritizing other more immediate concerns. For instance, after the September 2001 attacks, militant groups of all stripes in Pakistan focused their attention on the US intervention in Afghanistan (Australian Immigration Review Tribunal, 2013). In any case, TTP and its affiliated groups, such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA) are among the leading Pan-Islamist militant groups in the country (The Mackenzie Institute, 2016). These groups have waged a militant struggle to topple what they consider a secular-liberal order and replace it with their own version of Sharia

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system inspired by the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate model. These groups not only consider democracy as un-Islamic, but they also believe that killing the political, military, and community leaders representing this system is legitimate (Siddique, 2010, p. 20). Anti-Shia militant groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)— renamed as Ahl-e-Sunnat Waljamaat (ASWJ), LeJ and Jandullah spearhead the anti-Shia narratives in Pakistan (Khan, 2013a, 2013b). In turn, the Shia militancy and discourse in Pakistan have been shaped by anti-Shia violence and ideological rebuke of their religious beliefs (Iqbal & Azam, 2017). Militant Shia groups like Sipah-e-Muhammad (SeM), Mehdi Force, Imamia Student Organization (ISO) and Liwa alZainabiyoon (Followers of Zainab’s Brigade, fourth Caliph Ali’s daughter whose shrine is in Syria) have been instrumental in shaping the Shia militant discourse in Pakistan (Zahid, 2016a, 2016b, pp. 5–6). In recent years, geo-sectarian developments in the Middle East involving renewed Saudi-Iran tensions and the Syrian conflict have profoundly impacted the Sunni-Shia rivalry in Pakistan (Shams, 2017). The Sunni sectarian militant groups consider Shias as non-Muslim or deviants for disrespecting the first three Caliphs. The Sunni militant groups publish anti-Shia commentary, attacks Shia worship places, gatherings, mourning processions during Muharram, and target kill Shia scholars and professionals (Fair, 2011; Hussain, 2012). On the contrary, Shia groups accuse the Sunni militant groups of promoting Saudi-funded Wahhabism in Pakistan and destroying traditional Sufi Muslim practices in the country (Rafiq, 2014). Furthermore, Sunni militant groups are deemed responsible for the growing intolerance and radicalization in Pakistan (BBC, 2004). Another important aspect of Pakistan’s sectarian militant discourse is the intra-Sunni rivalry between Sufi-practicing Barelvi organizations and Wahabi-influenced Deobandi groups (Jackson, 2013, p. 460). Both Barelvis and Deobandis belong to the Sunni-Hanafi school of jurisprudence. Though the differences between these two groups are as old as their existence in the Indian subcontinent, they have become more pronounced and violent in Pakistan in recent years (Jackson, 2013). Deobandi militant groups such as LeJ and ISK have targeted major Sufi shrines in Pakistan including the shrines of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in

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Karachi (Syed & Popalzai, 2010), Imam Bari in Islamabad, Data Darbar in Lahore, Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan Sharif and Shah Noorani in Khuzdar, Balochistan. In the 2006 Nishtar Park bombing, LeJ eliminated the entire top leadership of Sunni Tehreek (ST), a Barelvi extremist group, in Karachi (Walsh, 2006). In retaliation, ST targeted Deobandi scholars, took up arms in self-defense to guard Barelvi mosques, shrines, and communal interests (Khan, 2011). Due to the state’s apathy towards the Barelvi grievances, a new radical group Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) emerged in 2015 and performed impressively in the 2018 general elections (The Nation, 2018). TLP has further politicized the Barelvi identity along sharp sectarian lines against Deobandis and the heterodox Ahmadiyya community by positioning itself as the self-appointed guardian of the finality and love of the Prophet Muhammad (Arab News, 2018). On their part, Deobandis criticize Barelvis for bringing impurities into Islam and consider them heretics (Hashmi, 2016, pp. 135–140). Arguably, the intra-Sunni schisms are more dangerous than any other form of VE in Pakistan as they involve mainstream communal groups. Pakistan is a Sunni-majority country. At least 80% of the country’s Muslim population is Sunni, of which around 65% are Barelvis and approximately 15% are Deobandis (Jones, 2018, pp. 459–465). If the intra-Sunni fissures in Pakistan continue to deteriorate, they will have catastrophic consequences on Pakistan’s already fragile sectarian makeup (Basit, 2020, pp. 374–389). iii. Ethno-political Narratives Five Baloch separatist groups, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Lashkare-Balochistan or the Baloch Republican Guard, and Baloch Student Organization-Azad (BSO), have shaped the Baloch separatist discourse in recent years (Basit et al., 2010, pp. 33–35). In August 2006, the killing of noted Baloch elder and politician Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was a turning point in the current phase of insurgency which has been the longest and most lethal of the previous four insurgent waves (Baloch, 2017).

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Moreover, unlike the previous insurgent waves which were limited to a particular area and involved one tribal elder, this insurgent wave has its roots in Balochistan’s educated middle class, particularly college and university students (Khan, 2009, pp. 1071–1019). Also, unlike previous insurgent waves which demanded political autonomy, the goal of the current wave is separatism. Areas in Balochistan like Gwadar, Makran, and Lasbela have formed the backbone of the insurgent movement. Three Baloch separatist leaders Brahumdagh Bugti of BRA (the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti), Hyrbair Marri of BLA, and Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch of BLF are the faces of the separatist movement (Tanner, 2019, p. 19). The Baloch separatist groups have inculcated strong anti-Pakistan sentiments among the Baloch youth by highlighting age-old grievances of political alienation, socio-economic deprivation, and exploitation of Balochistan’s mineral resources without providing the province its due rights (Iqbal, 2012, pp. 79–99). It is a fact that Balochistan is the least developed of Pakistan’s all provinces (Iqbal, 2012). Balochistan’s geostrategic position at the cross-section of South and Central Asia, long coastal belt, and untapped mineral resources have entrenched the separatist position of Baloch militants (Kowalski, 2019). They know that they have nothing to lose by breaking away from Pakistan. However, the absence of top separatist leaders (Brahumdagh Switzerland, Hyrbair in London and Allah Nazar in Iran) from the province, the onset of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)— flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—and Pakistan’s successful counter-insurgency campaign have weakened the insurgency. However, the separatist narrative still exists and the failure of successive Pakistani governments to win the hearts and minds of the Baloch masses has only strengthened this narrative (Wani, 2021, pp. 479–500). Muhajir sub-nationalism represents the demand of Karachi’s Urduspeaking community for more political rights in the port city. To achieve these demands, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)—now splintered into three political factions, the Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP), MQM-London and MQM-Pakistan—constructed an exclusivist identity of the Urdu speaking community in Karachi and some parts of urban Sindh (Pakistan Today, 2015).

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Until recently, the Muhajir movement considered MQM’s founder Altaf Hussain as its messiah and the ultimate guarantor of its rights. Altaf enjoyed a cult-like following in the Muhajir movement (Hussain, 2016). Over the years, MQM’s militant wing became notorious for targeted killings, street crimes, and money extortion. The paramilitary Ranger’s operation which started in Karachi in 2013 has neutralized the militant wing and the party has splintered into three factions mentioned above. The more moderate and pro-Pakistan factions of PSP and MQMPakistan have parted ways with more radical and anti-Pakistan MQMLondon. Yet, the narrative of Muhajir alienation persists at the social level. The incorporation of the Urdu-speaking community by accepting its legitimate demands and addressing genuine grievances remains a work in progress (Sareen & Shah, 2019).

Pakistan’s State Fragility and PCVE Measures The majority of Pakistan’s PCVE measures remain corrective and preventive which have been adopted in response to some security incidents. For instance, NAP was implemented after the 2014 APS attack. Moreover, Pakistan’s PCVE measures lack a more structural response that addresses the root causes of VE in Pakistan in the context of state fragility (Elahi et al., 2020, pp. 1–18). The primary aim of any PCVE program is to persuade people not to use violence to achieve their ideological goals (Bauman, 2918, p. 12). In this respect, Pakistan’s PCVE measures have achieved mixed results (Maroof et al., 2019, pp. 83–99). For instance, despite the precipitous decline in terrorism, the proclivity to use violence for religiously motivated radicalism in Pakistan remains high (Shaheen et al., 2019, pp. 1–16).

Hard Measures i. Military Operations Since 2003, Pakistan’s army and other security forces have conducted eleven major military operations and dozen small-scale operations against

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a slew of militant groups across Pakistan (Abbasi & Khatwani, 2018, pp. 1–14). The majority of these operations targeted TTP—the most lethal anti-Pakistan militant group, AQ, and anti-Shia sectarian militant groups (Siddiqa, 2010, pp. 149–162). The military operations carried out between 2003 and 2008 in different areas of the formerly Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, targeted foreign militants who relocated to these areas as a result of the US intervention in Afghanistan (Nawaz, 2017, pp. 19–20). The operations conducted between 2009 and 2014 in Swat, South and North Waziristan areas dislodged TTP and restored the physical writ of the state (See Table 9.1). The ongoing operation Rad-ul-Fasad (Elimination of Discord) is nationwide and focuses on the residual terrorist threat. Cumulatively, these operations have reduced the militant threat to a large extent in Pakistan and contributed to the restoration of normalcy in Table 9.1 Major military operations in Pakistan (2003-present) (Pak institute for peace studies, 8–13) No

Name

Year

Area

Target

1

Waziristan Operation Wana Operation

2003

North Waziristan, Darra Adamkhel Wana, South Waziristan

Al-Qaeda

April 2004

North Waziristan

January 2008 August 2008

South Waziristan Bajaur Agency

6 7

Shakai Operation No name Operation Sherdil Rah-e-Rast Rah-e-Nijat

Swat South Waziristan

8

Bia Darghalam

May 2009 September 2009 2009

9

2013

Karachi

10

Karachi operation Zarb-e-Azb

2014

North Waziristan Agency

11

Rad-ul-Fasad

2016

Nationwide

2

3 4 5

2004–05

Bara, Khyber Agency

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Gul Bahadur Group TTP TTP-Bajaur chapter TTP-Swat chapter TTP-central Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) MQM Militant wing Gul Bahadur Group, Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda All groups

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the country. However, challenges persist particularly in countering and preventing extremist ideologies (Jawaid, 2018). ii. Military Courts Military courts were enacted in Pakistan because of the 21st Constitutional Amendment in January 2015 for two years. In 2017, their constitutional term was extended for another two years (Hashim, 2017). The military courts ceased to function in early 2019 (Express Tribune, 2019). These courts were a stopgap measure to expedite the trials of detained militants in Anti-Terror Courts (ATCs). The slow-moving judicial process, and lack of sufficient evidence due to the poor investigation, and prosecution resulted in high acquittal rates of arrested militants who re-joined militancy after their release (Guardian, 2015). Pakistan’s security institutions, after the Peshawar APS attack 2014, argued that the high acquittal rate of militants through ATCs eroded deterrence against the use of violence (Yusuf, 2010, pp. 22–25). Hence, there was a need to punish arrested militants according to the nature of their offense to resurrect the fear of punishment. As many as 11 military courts were set up across Pakistan, including three each in Punjab and KP, two in Sindh, and one in Balochistan (Hashim, 2015). Another purpose of creating the military courts was to allow Pakistan’s overworked criminal-justice system some breathing space to carry out the much-needed reforms (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 10). Unfortunately, despite the elapse of four years, these reforms have not been carried out (International Commission of Jurists, 2019). The trials by military courts also raised questions about human rights violations and fair trials. In these courts, the army was the judge, executioner, and prosecutor (International Commission of Jurists, 2016). The denial of the right to counsel of choice, failure to disclose charge sheets of the accused, denial of public hearing, and conviction of 97% of cases on confessions undermined the spirit of free and fair trials (Omer, 2016). No detailed written judgments, which are the cornerstone of free and transparent trials, after trials were made available (Hashim, 2016).

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Table 9.2 Cases decided by military courts (2015–2018) Total number of trials Convictions Death penalties Life sentences Acquittals Executions of convicts Rigorous Imprisonments Cases dropped on technical grounds

717 641 274 296 05 56 192 54

In any case, the military courts decided on 717 cases giving 641 convictions of which 296 were death penalties and 296 life sentences (See Table 9.2). The largest number of convictions (115) were given against militants whose group affiliations are not known. Likewise, the second-highest number of convictions (88) are against militants whose categorization is “other banned militant organizations.” The third-largest number of convictions have been given against TTP (See Graph 9.1). iii. Countering Terrorist Finances (CTF) According to FATF, the global financial watchdog for terrorism financing (TF) and money laundering (ML), “due to Pakistan’s porous borders Not disclsoed

115

Other banned organizations

88

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

35

Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)

6

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

3

Jasih-e-Muhammad (JeM)

1

Tehrik-e-Taliban (Swat)

1

Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami

4

Tawheed Wal Jiahd Group

6

Sipah-e-Sahab

7

Al-Qaeda

8 0

20

40

60

Graph 9.1 Convictions in military courts (2015–2018)

80

100

120

140

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(with Afghanistan and Iran), it faces greater vulnerability to TF and increases TF risks associated with cash smuggling (Asia Pacific Group, 2019, pp. 7–8).” Presently, at least 66 organizations and 7,600 individuals are sanctioned in Pakistan under the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). Pakistan has established a multi-agency approach to CTF and ML. However, there are serious operational coordination and interagency cooperation gaps including the implementation of the National AML/CFT Strategy 2018 (Rana, 2019). Various government agencies working on TF/ML in Pakistan operate in isolation and their objectives are inconsistent with existing and evolving national and global ML/TF risks (Iqbal, 2019). Given the above, Pakistan has been “gray-listed” by FATF. To get off FATF’s “gray-list,” NACTA has set up a Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating statutory regulations and other reports related to TF/ML and predicate offenses (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). Likewise, Counter-Terrorism Finance Units (CTFUs) have been established in Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) of the provinces to investigate TF risk as a core and not as an ancillary task. FMU also carries out asset-tracing and temporary freezing of accounts along with the detection and investigation of financial crimes (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). However, FMU cannot spontaneously or upon request, disseminate the information and results of its analysis to provincial CTDs. Also, CTDs are minimally accessing the FMU informational and financial intelligence during TF investigations (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). To overcome these shortcomings, NACTA is focusing on capacity-building and training of CTDs in TF/ML and asset-tracing (NCTA, 2019). To date, Pakistan has registered 228 TF cases and convicted 58 individuals which are not consistent with the country’s overall level of TF risk (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). Most of the investigations and all convictions were obtained at provincial levels including 49 in Punjab and 9 in all other provinces (Asia Pacific Group, 2019). iv. Banning Militant Groups Under Schedule-I of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997, NACTA has proscribed around 73 militant organizations, as of July 2019. Another

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four groups have been outlawed under Schedule-II of ATA, while two outfits have been banned under the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 (NCTA, 2019). The law banning militant groups was implemented in 2003 after militant groups tried to assassinate then-president and army chief General Pervez Musharraf. Under ATA 1997, it is illegal for any group to run a private militia or engage in violent armed struggle in Pakistan (Ministry of Law, 2019). The proscription also includes office closures, freezing of bank accounts, confiscation or dismantling of physical infrastructure, and a restriction on public preaching or bringing out any promotional material. Initially, militant groups such as JeM, LeT, HuA, SSP, and SM were banned. However, in a short time, these groups re-emerged with new names. For instance, LeT renamed itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), JeM as Khudam-ul-Quran, SSP as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), etcetera. More importantly, despite the bans, these groups continued their activities unabated (Tankel, 2013, pp. 6–7). The ban was theoretical and was never practically implemented. In fact, within the extremist fraternity, respect for a militant group increased if it was banned by the government. So, instead of working as a deterrent, the government’s ban became a badge of honor for militant groups in Pakistan (Kermani, 2019). v. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) NACTA, Pakistan’s central counter-terrorism agency, was created in 2009 as an administrative wing of the Interior Ministry (NCTA, 2019). However, in 2013, NACTA was placed under the Prime Minister of Pakistan as a corporate body with a Board of Governors (BoG), which provides a strategic vision and policy overview of NACTA. The BoG’s members are representatives of different ministries, intelligence agencies, and the parliament (NACTA, 2019). Currently, NACTA is staffed by more than 300 employees from different government ministries and law enforcement agencies (NACTA, 2019). Under Article 4 of the NACTA Act 2013, the counter-terrorism body’s Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) is mandated to collect, collate and review information from civil and military intelligence institutions and develop a threat matrix (NACTA, 2019). Moreover, JID serves as a

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coordination platform for information-sharing for counterterrorism and extremism. Furthermore, NACTA develops action plans against terrorism and extremism and periodically updates the central government about their implementation (NACTA, 2019). NACTA also carries out research; liaises with international institutions for cooperation; and reviews relevant laws and proposes amendments to the central government (NACTA, 2019). The creation of NACTA and the steps taken by the government in the last few years to make it a functional organization is an achievement in itself. Despite inherent flaws and gaps, NACTA has been instrumental in creating operational awareness in public discourse against VE.

Soft Measures i. National Security Policy In January 2022, Pakistan inaugurated its National Security Policy (NSP) which reorients the focus of the country’s security framework from geopolitics to geo-economy under a “citizen-centric” approach (National Security Policy, 2022, p. 6). NSP focuses on non-traditional aspects of security in addition to traditional security keeping in view the evolving security environment, internally and externally. NSP envisions the economy as the mainstay of its security framework to address structural imbalances which render Pakistan vulnerable to a host of internal and external challenges, including VE (National Security Policy, 2022, p. 6). NSP considers peace with neighboring countries, regional connectivity, and integration as prerequisites for achieving economic prosperity. This is a welcome development in terms of addressing the long-term structural factors that incubate and sustain VE in Pakistan. Hence, in addition to PCVE policies, NSP provides an overall umbrella where root causes of VE would be tackled alongside corrective and preventive strategies.

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ii. National Internal Security Policy (NISP) To date, two National Internal Security Policies (NISP, 2014–2018 & 2019–2023) have been formulated in Pakistan. Both policies are quite comprehensive and encapsulate the overall challenges to Pakistan’s internal security. However, implementation of these policies due to poor capacity, resource scarcity of the civilian law enforcement institutions, inadequacies of the criminal-justice system, and poor prosecution and investigation techniques remains a challenge (Naeem, 2014). The first NISP (2014–2018), launched on February 24, 2014, had three main components: dialogue with all stakeholders, isolating terrorists from their support base, and improving deterrence through capacitybuilding to enable security apparatus to negotiate threats (NCTA, 2019, p. 29). The policy framework also contained kinetic and nonkinetic measures. The former comprised research and understanding and winning hearts and minds. The latter included Composite Deterrence Plan (NACTA, 2019, p. 40). The second NISP (2018–2023) announced in June 2018 consisted of a 6-R framework that expanded the notion of internal security under a Whole of Nation” approach. It envisioned reshaping both state and society to achieve sustainable peace (Interior Ministry, 2019, pp. 9–10). The 6-R strategy is: (i) reorient the security apparatus through modernization, enhanced capacity and a people-centric approach, (ii) reimagining society making it moderate and democratic, (iii) reconcile with repentant and ready-to-quit violence militants by de-radicalizing, rehabilitating and reintegrating them in society, (iv) redistribute resources to ensure social, economic and political uplift of marginalized communities, (v) recognize the importance of quality research to identify factors that push people towards extremism, (vi) and, regional collaboration to address external threats related to internal security (Interior Ministry, 2019, pp. 9–10). iii. National Action Plan (NAP) The National Action Plan (NAP) is a 20-point guideline for countering terrorism and extremism which was formulated in the aftermath of the APS attack (NCTA, 2019). With the initiation of NAP, NISP

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(2014–2018) receded in the background along with its implementation body NACTA. Apex committee which implemented a NAP at central, provincial, and district levels took their place (Express Tribune, 2015). NAP was agreed upon in an All-Parties Conference (APC) which mandated the government to eliminate the VE group from Pakistan. NAP offered a comprehensive security framework except for youth engagement. The implementation of NAP was less than impressive barring Zarb-e-Azb. Critical components of NAP such as madrassa reforms, and countering terrorist finances, among others, remained neglected (Ramay, 2016). According to NACTA, around 5,06,072 combing operations were undertaken under NAP and 2,28,640 suspected militants were arrested across Pakistan (NCTA, 2019). Likewise, 1351 cases of hate speech were registered and 2525 people were detained under the same charges. Similarly, to deny cyberspace to militants around 937 websites were blocked by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (NCTA, 2019). In sum, NAP was a stopgap measure to address deficiencies in the criminal-justice system by introducing military courts to fast-track cases against terrorists. Likewise, in some places, paramilitary institutions such as Rangers were given special policing powers (Zahid, 2016a, 2016b). While these short-term measures reduced violence but militarized police. More importantly, the structural issues of the non-performative criminaljustice system and police remained unaddressed. This gave the military an outsize role in different aspects of the internal security framework (Mehmood et al., 2019, pp. 147–163). iv. National Counter Extremism Policy Guideline (NCEPG) & Paighame-Pakistan NACTA has also announced a National Counter Extremism Policy Guideline (NCEPG) in January 2018 that provides a strategic framework for policy responses. NCEPG aims to limit and eventually eradicate avenues that promote intolerance violence in Pakistani society. In the Pakistani context, NCEPG has defined VE as: “absolute belief in one’s truth with an ingrained sense of self-righteousness that enables the holder

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of belief to grow judgmental attitude towards other people’s beliefs followed with intolerance (NCTA, 2018, p. 9).” NCEPG adopts a multi-disciplinary and a whole of government and society approach to tackling VE. It has identified six key areas for PCVE policy interventions: (i) rule of law and service delivery, (ii) citizen engagement, (iii) media management (not to over-sensationalize terrorism reporting), (iv) integrated education reforms, (v) reformation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and renunciation (of former militants), (vi) and promotion of culture (NACTA, 2018). These areas are not only resource-efficient i.e., implementable and actionable for policy intervention but they do not require any special legislation or constitutional amendments to carry out their work. Above all, NCEPG aims for peace as its outcome rather than just limiting its focus to eliminating VE (NACTA, 2018). The overall thrust of the NCEPG framework is to rebuild and strengthen citizen-state trust. Moreover, the policy framework is flexible, and it can be amended for course correction based on monitoring and evaluation (NCTA, 2018). Meanwhile, Paigham-e-Pakistan (Message of Pakistan) is a national narrative against VE endorsed by 1800 religious scholars in the line with the teachings of the Holy Quran, the Sunnah, and Pakistan’s constitution. It declares all religiously motivated acts of violence framed as “Jihad” unlawful in Pakistan (Paigham-e-Pakistam, 2018, pp. 34–36). It clearly states that Pakistan is a Muslim state where people are free to live their lives according to the teachings and guidelines of Islam and that no law repugnant to Islamic principles can be legislated or implemented in the country. Hence, there is no room for any violent struggle in the name of “Jihad (Paigham-e-Pakistan, 2018).” v. De-radicalization Centers Since 2009, various de-radicalization centers aimed at de-radicalizing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating detained militants who volunteered to revisit their extremist beliefs have been set up in Pakistan. The basic principle followed in these de-radicalizing centers is “no blood on hands (Basit, 2018, pp. 6–28).” Any militants who have been involved in

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violent offenses have to go through court trials and serve prison sentences before reintegration in the society (Khan, 2015). At the height of militancy in Pakistan, jails and internment centers across the country were overcrowded with militant detainees including teenagers who were not ideologically hard-core. Rather, they were compelled to join militancy due to peer or family pressure, poor socio-economic conditions, or revenge factors. A need was felt to give repentant and ready-to-leave violence militants a second chance to become normal citizens (Basit, 2015a, 2015b, pp. 10–17). Before de-radicalization, a comprehensive psychological screening of all the militants is carried out to deconstruct the mindsets and trajectories of their radicalization. Then based on the assessment of their psychological screening, their ideological de-radicalization and rehabilitation through counseling, formal education, and vocational training are carried out (Basit, 2015a, 2015b). As many as four de-radicalization schools are operating in Swat and Mingora districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (Basit, 2018, p. 12). Of these, two schools Sabaoon (Ray of Dawn) and Rastoon (Place of Right Path) are for children between 12 and 18 years (Basit, 2018). While Mashal center (Torch of Light) is for youth between 19 and 25 years of age, and Sparlay is for militants’ families to create awareness about the aftercare of rehabilitated former militants (Basit, 2015a, 2015b). Two militant centers were set up in the former FATA’s Bajaur and Khyber districts. The Bajaur program was jointly managed by the Pakistan army and paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC). It provided religious and psychological counseling, formal education, and vocational training. Similarly, the program in Khyber tribal districts had three branches and it rehabilitated around 600 former militant detainees. The de-radicalization program launched in Punjab in 2011 was discontinued due to funding issues. This program was co-managed by the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) and the Punjab government (Ghuman, 2014). Approximately 313 militants were deradicalized, rehabilitated, and reintegrated into society. The Punjab government provided interest-free loans to militants to open up small businesses or set up workshops based on the vocational training they received at these centers

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Table 9.3 De-radicalization schools in Pakistan De-radicalization schools

Target audience

Area

Sabaoon and Rastoon Mashal FEAST Sparlay

Juveniles Adults Females Families of detainee militants Adults Adults

Swat Mingora Swat Tank, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Bajaur Agency Khyber Agency

Adults

Punjab (dysfunctional)

Navai Sahar Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Programme (3 centers) Punjab Rehabilitation Programme

(Khan, 2015). Vocational courses like carpentry, welding, electrician courses, and refrigerator repairing were offered to the militants brought to these centers (Table 9.3).

How State Fragility Has Impacted VE in Pakistan? The notion of VE is complicated since, in the context of fragile states, the underlying causes are many, and contested. Notwithstanding the positive correlation between state fragility and VE, not all fragile states are incubators of VE. Types and levels of VE within fragile states vary According to varying contexts, internal conditions of weakness (political, socio-economic, human development, or the lack of it, insecurity) and the nature of political. Furthermore, VE in and itself involves multiple processes and stages from pre-radicalization to active participation (Borum, 2011, pp. 7–36). There is no fixed template, pathways, or set(s) of characteristics that explain a would-be radical’s trajectory within the fragile state towards VE (Khalil, 2017, pp. 40–48). The motivation to join militancy, at the individual and community levels, is as many, as there are people. Moreover, the underlying reasons and motivating factors pushing people towards VE can simultaneously overlap and contradict each other (Schmid, 2013, p. 9).

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Paradoxically, fragile states are both victims and producers of VE. As such, not all fragile states promote an equal amount of VE. The relationship between state fragility and VE is not linear, rather it is complex and mediated by local contexts and external factors (Plummer, 2012, p. 416). Various aspects of state fragility differ in the effects of VE. Hence, determining the nature of fragility is important (Piazza, 2008, p. 473). Not all types of state fragility are positively linked to VE regardless of their regime type, size, age, level of economic development and degree of ethno-religious diversity, and whether they are experiencing an international war. Arguably, fragile states which are not properly considered imploded or collapsed are more prone to incubate VE. The VE risk is higher in states transitioning from authoritarian regime to democracy, coupled with violence and political instability (Pašagi´c, 2020, p. 20). Those fragile states which are ruled by corrupt structures incapable of detecting and eliminating VE groups afford them a permissible environment to create safe havens to recruit, radicalize, and plan attacks. On the contrary, when weak state structures are opposed to violent extremist causes, they become the victims and targets of terrorism (Pašagi´c, 2020). Within weak states, those marred by political instability and violence might be more susceptible to terrorism and terrorist groups. Contrarily, fragile states with relatively strong economic and human development performance contain major terrorist groups (Pašagi´c, 2020). Pakistan presents a unique case of state fragility and violent extremism nexus. The seeds of fragility in Pakistan lie in the weak governance structures and violent colonial past of the state. Parts of Pakistan have encountered sporadic bouts of insurgency in Balochistan since its formation in 1947. Balochistan witnessed insurgencies in 1948, 1958–1959, 1973– 1977, and from 2002 to the present. Likewise, since 9/11, Pakistan’s ex-FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, has been a scene of Islamist militarism. Both jihadist militarism and ethnno-separatism play a significant role in making the country fragile (Sulaiman, 2020, p. 163). Pakistan’s heterogenous fragility is rooted in the colonial processes of nation-building, lack of coherence among the elite and ethnic groups, state’s efforts to seek legitimacy through the promotion of religious

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nationalism while suppressing more syncretic forms of ethnic and regional sub-nationalism. Likewise, the inheritance of an India-centric security dilemma that diverted scarce resources from socio-economic developments to defense expenditure also kept the state fragile and vulnerable to VE. Finally, Pakistan’s geostrategic location in a hostile and volatile neighborhood where the use of non-state militant proxies during the Afghan jihad and their subsequent interjection in Kashmir sustained VE to the detriment of Pakistan’s internal peace and stability (Sulaiman, 2020). At the same time, conceptually, VE is not a static phenomenon so the reasons can evolve. A set of factors pushing a would-be radical towards VE may differ from reasons which may keep him (transient factors) in militancy (Horgan, 2009, p. 20). Likewise, anyone’s reasons to quit VE may be different from what brought or kept him in militant life. Given the above, having a contextual definition of VE is more important than a consensual definition. In Pakistan’s context, grievances against the state, inequality, and exposure to violence, a plethora of internal and external push factors (US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Indian occupation of Kashmir, sectarian conflict in Syria), presence of a large number of militant groups (local, regional and international) contribute to different forms of VE in Pakistan (Basit, 2015a, 2015b, p. 47). Pakistan is a Muslim-majority country with a traditional religious framework where Islam is the most defining factor of communal and national life (Orakzai, 2019, pp. 755–770). So, the framing and language around PCVE should respect the religious and cultural sensitivities of the country (Peace Direct, Year Unknown, pp. 7–8). Certain PCVE terminologies such as violent jihadism, Islamist extremism, and Islamo fascism, among others, are highly offensive and should be avoided. Such language is considered an attack on Muslim identity and an effort to indirectly secularize the country. Such jargon proves counter-productive, and its receptivity becomes very low (Peace Direct, Year Unknown). Hence, approaching PCVE discussions in local language and proposing local models can prove too much more effective and long-lasting (UNDP, 2016, p. 21). In Pakistan, given its traditional religious framework, certain notions such as growing religiosity, increasing number of females donning the

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hijab, young males sporting beards, and people expressing their religious identity over their national identity in public surveys cannot be taken as signs of radicalization. Such signs tell us nothing about radicalization in a society like Pakistan (Basit, 2015a, 2015b, p. 46). In the digital era, most of the VE narratives are shaped and proliferated through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Telegram (Butt & Warraich, 2017, pp. 119–128). Hence, their discourse is informal, simple, and not boring. Generally, VE narratives reflect the wishes, fears, and expectations of the people (Khan, 2013a, 2013b, p. 2). So, the PCVE narratives have to adopt a public language instead of using technical policy terms or heavy academic jargon that people fail to understand. Another linked but separate issue is the legitimacy of the PCVE messengers. Renowned scientist Albert Einstein said, “Problems cannot be solved with the same mind that created them.” Pakistani state which spearheaded the campaign of promoting a culture of militancy in the country in the 1980s lacks credibility to reverse-engineer the same process (Greer, 2016). In this situation, the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) becomes critical. In the Pakistani context, another important dimension in the PCVE debate is its Islam-centric discourse. This issue is just not specific to Pakistan but the worldwide discourse on VE is Islam-heavy and there is little focus on Right-Wing Extremism (RWE) in the West, the rising threat of Hindutva in India, and growing Buddhist extremism in Sri Lank, Myanmar, and Thailand. Pakistan’s PCVE framework should be expanded to include other forms of politically and ethnically motivated VE as well, so a balance is achieved. This will address the twin purpose of keeping a concerted focus on religiously inspired VE but address other forms of extremism as well. In essence, various forms of extremism proliferate to form a general sense of alienation, intolerance, and realization that violence in a non-responsive and non-performative system is an effective way of achieving stated goals (Basit et al., 2010, p. 1532).

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Conclusion Paradoxically, heterogenous state fragility and resilience in Pakistan has produced mixed results against VE. This study has shown that Pakistan’s state fragility is simultaneously both the cause and outcome of various forms of VE. In recent years, Pakistan’s state fragility has increased, due to a plethora of reasons, and its resilience has decreased, negatively impacting the country’s hard-earned gains against VE. The Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021 has emboldened different extremist groups targeting Pakistan as well. This study has discussed various hard and soft measures adopted by Pakistan against VE in the context of state fragility. How Pakistan can continue its struggle against violent extremism despite increasing state fragility would require a different study. Pakistan’s efforts against VE need to move beyond corrective and preventive strategies to consolidate existing PCVE gains and address the more structural factors rooted in the nation-building efforts of promoting religious nationalism over other more organic forms of linguistic and ethnic sub-nationalism. Incorporating such diverse notions of sub-nationalism in a more pluralistic conceptualization of nation-building would strengthen the state’s resilience and weaken the centrifugal force of non-state militarism. Recently initiated NSP 2022– 2026 which tries to reorient Pakistan’s security architecture from traditional to non-traditional security through a citizen-centric approach is a step in the right direction. NSP aims to strengthen Pakistan’s ethnic and religious diversity with an inclusive mindset. If these aims of NSP are implemented judiciously, they will go a long way in curbing VE while strengthening the state’s resilience.

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Index

A

Adityanath, Yogi 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 120 Afghanistan 39, 40, 173, 175, 177–186 Afghan Jihad 40 Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) 204 Allah 135, 136 Al Qaeda 23, 26, 63, 66, 67, 71, 82, 84, 88, 91, 94, 96, 185 Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) 195 Amaq News Agency 87, 88 Ansar Al Islam (AAI) 64, 66, 67 Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) 63, 64 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 203 Anwar al Awlaki 88 Arabic 135, 136

Asia 127 Asian Development Bank 83 Authoritarianism 104 Awami League 83, 86, 88, 94 Ayodhya 111, 118, 120

B

Bahá’í 87 Bajrang Dal 107, 115 Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 197, 198 Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) 197 Baloch Republican Army (BRA) 197 Baloch Student Organization (BSO) 197 Bangladesh 81–96 Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) 58 Barelvi Movement 24

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Md Mostofa (ed.), Dynamics of Violent Extremism in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7405-2

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Index

Barelvis 196, 197 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 198 Bharatiya Janata Party 37, 39 Blasphemy 192 Bodu Bala Sena 4 Buddhists 134 Burqa 136

C

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 198 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 51 Chowdhury, Tamim Ahmed 85 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 118 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 213 Civil war 4, 132, 140 Communal riots 109, 110, 118 Communal violence 2, 14 Continua of violence 148–150 Countering Terrorism Finances (CTFs) 203 Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) 203, 209 Counter-Terrorism Finance Units (CTFUs) 203 COVID-19 83, 95

D

Deen Malik Group 133 Democracy 2, 151–153, 156, 158, 159, 165 Deobandis 24, 29, 32, 40, 196, 197 De-radicalization 208, 209 Dissent 104, 105, 109, 118, 120

E

Enforced disappearances 83 Ethnic conflict 12 Ethnic extremism 55, 59 Ethnicity 162, 163 Exceptionality of War 150, 151 Extrajudicial killings 83, 84, 94, 95

F

Far enemy 85 Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) 207 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 200, 211 Feminist Solution to Violence 148–150, 165 Feminist Theorization of Violence 150, 165 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 193, 202, 203 Foreign intervention 173, 178, 179 Fragile States Index 83 Fragility 128, 141, 142 Frontier Corps (FC) 209

G

Gau raksha 112 Ghar wapsi 114, 120 Ghazwat-ul-Hind 95, 195 Golwalkar, M.S. 107, 114 Grievances 149, 152, 157, 158, 160

H

Halal 134, 135, 137, 138, 140 Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) 65

Index

Hezbollah 87 Hijab 136, 137 Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA) 195, 204 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) 82 Holey Artisan Cafe 86 Human Development Index (HDI) 2, 3 Human rights 105, 106, 119

229

Jandullah 194, 196 Jihad 208, 212 Jihadi movements 133 Jihadism 92 Jum cultivation 55 Jund at Tawhid wal Khalifa (JTK) 68

K I

Illiberalism 2 Imamia Student Organization (ISO) 196 Improvised explosive device (IED) 86 Indian National Congress (INC) 108, 112 Inequality 152–155, 157, 161, 164 Intersectionality 150, 162 Islamic fundamentalist 182 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 194, 200 Islamic state 23, 26, 31, 39, 182, 184 Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) 184, 186 Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) 4, 16, 194–196 Islamist extremism 84 Islamophobia 129, 135, 138

J

Jadoon, Amira 185 Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) 194, 204 Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) 204 Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) 195 Jamath 140

Kerala Nadwathul Mujahideen (KNM) 29, 30

L

Land Reform 154 Langta Fakir 87 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 194 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 194, 204 Leftist Insurgency 159 Left-wing extremism 52, 68, 70 Legitimacy 52–54, 70, 71 Legitimacy crisis 179, 185 Lone-Wolf attack 71 Love Jihad 113, 114, 120 Lynching 112, 113

M

Majoritarian Insecurities 36 Malik Group 133 Maoist Insurgency in Nepal 149, 151, 152, 155, 158, 159, 162–165 Matrices of domination 149, 150, 162, 165 Mujahideen 93, 175, 180, 182, 183 Mujahideen Group 133 Mujib Bahini 61

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Index

Mujibism 61, 63 Muktomona 89 Muslim Millat Bahini (MMB) 63, 64 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) 198, 199 N

National Action Plan (NAP) 199, 206, 207 National Counter Extremism Policy Guideline (NCEPG) 207, 208 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) 204, 205, 207, 208 National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 206 National Register of Citizens (NRC) 117, 118, 120 National Security Policy (NSP) 205, 214 National Thowheeth Jama’ath 4 Natural hazard-related disasters 161, 164 Near enemy 85 Neo-JMB 82, 85–88, 90, 92–94 Nepal 148, 149, 151–162, 164–166 9/11 1 O

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 174, 176 Osama Group 133 P

Paharis 58

Pakistan 116 Pakistan Sarzameen Party (PSP) 198, 199 Parbatya Chattagram Upajati Kalyan Parishad 57 Partition 30, 33, 34, 38 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 181, 182 Peshawar attack 191 Political Mobilization of Grievances 158, 164 Post-conflict 161, 163 Post-disaster reconstruction 161 Poverty 149, 152–157, 160, 164, 165 Preventing and Counter Violent Extremism (PCVE) 191, 192, 199, 205, 208, 212–214 Prison radicalization 92, 93 Puttalam 136

Q

Qadiani 87

R

Radicalization 196, 209, 213 Ram Mandir. See Ayodhya Rapid Action Battalion 84, 89 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 107–109, 114, 115 Recurrence of conflict 148, 149 Religious insurgency 3 Restructuring of State 163 Riots. See Communal riots Rohingya 94, 195

Index

S

Shah, Amit 113, 117 Sharia law 182 Shia 87 Sinhala Buddhist 4 Sinhalese-dominated 132 Sipah-e-Muhammad (SeM) 196 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) 196, 204 Social cohesion 105, 106, 121 South Asia 2, 3, 5–8, 147, 148, 153, 160 State fragility 25, 26, 33, 34, 36, 42, 43, 52, 53, 68–70, 82, 86, 95, 96, 104–107, 119, 120, 149, 151, 164, 174–177, 179, 186, 192, 199, 210, 211, 214 State fragility index 3–5, 7, 54 State repression 159

T

Tamil Tigers 4 Targeted killing 87 Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) 197 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 194, 195, 200 Tehreek Khilafat (TK) 194 Terrorism 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, 16 Terrorism financing (TF) 193, 202 Thakur, Sadhvi Pragya 116, 120 the Bangladesh Communist League (BCL) 62 the Bawmthe 55 the Boms 55 the Chak 55 the Chakma 55–57

231

The Harkat-ul-Jihad Al Islami (HuJI) 65 the Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) 63 the Jamaatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) 64, 66 the Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) 62 the Kaptai Hydro-electric Plant 57 the Kheyang 55 the Khumi 55 the Lushai 55 the Marma 55 the Mru 55 the National Awami Party-Bhasani (NAP) 62 the Pankhu 55 the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) 57 the Sarbohara Party 62 the Shanti Bahini (SB) 58 The Soviet Union 181, 182 The Taliban 175, 176, 178, 179, 182–186 the Tanchangya 55 the Tripura 55 the Uchais 55 Thowheed 140 Transparency International Bangladesh 5

U

United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) 59 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) 174, 177

V

Vigilante 104

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Index

Violence 23–26, 31, 33–35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 128–132, 134, 135, 137–143 Violent extremism (VE) 1, 2, 5–8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 51, 53, 70, 93, 96, 174, 175, 191, 211, 214

Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) 107

W

Women Radicalization 91 World Bank 83, 174, 176, 178