Dyamism in the Cosmology of Christian Wolff

Citation preview

r

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

May 15

This dissertation prepared under my direction by R ev. John V. B u rn s , C. M.

entitled

DYHAMISM

m

THE COSMOLOftY OF

CHRISTIM WOLFF

has been accepted in partial fulfilm ent o f the requirements fo r the

Degree o f

Doctor of P hilosophy

F r . John F ly n n ( Faculty A d v is e r)

L

1950

DYNAMISM IN THE COSMOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF

BY REV. JOHN V. BURNS, C.M. A.B., St. Josephus College, *29 A.M., Niagara University, *35

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK 1950

ProQuest N um ber: 10992981

All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is d e p e n d e n t upon the quality of the copy subm itted. In the unlikely e v e n t that the a u thor did not send a c o m p le te m anuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if m aterial had to be rem oved, a n o te will ind ica te the deletion.

uest ProQuest 10992981 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). C opyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o d e M icroform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346

iii r

T TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapt INTRODUCTION .............................

1

I. SUBSTANCE ................................ Essentials Attributes and Modes Simple Substance Attributes of Simple Being Composed Being Attributes of Composed Being

9

II. BODIES ................................ . Essence of Bodies Nature of Bodies Active or Motor Force Varieties of Force Determinants of Active Force

58

III. THE E L E M E N T S ....... ...................... Qualities of the Elements The Elements as a Source of Actuality The Internal State of the Elements

104

IV. CONCLUSION ...............................

129

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................

143

DYNAMISM IN THE COSMOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF

1

r

i DYNAMISM IN THE COSMOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF INTRODUCTION The Man and his Time The history of modern philosophy does not surprise us irhen we find recorded in it the development of the germs and tendencies inherited from the Renaissance.

The

increased interest and marked progress in the natural sciences, which accompanied the Renaissance, and the rationalistic spirit which it generated, had a marked in­ fluence on the philosophical tendencies of the succeeding centuries.^

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century

comprises the first period in the history of Modern Philosophy.

This dissertation does not call for a de­

tailed analysis of the effects of the Renaissance upon this period, hut there can and should be indicated some of the characteristics of this period which had a more marked influence upon Christian Wolff. The first period of the history of Modern Philosophy was an age of decision.

Maritain remarks reflectively

that during that period "was enacted an obscure drama be­ tween physico-mathematical knowledge and philosophical knowledge of sensible nature: its consequences have been capital for metaphysics itself and for the intellect of 1. Cf. Zepherin Gonzales, Historie de la Philosophie. Vol. Ill, Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1891, pp. 14-7-151 •

2

mankind.11

The two centuries following the Renaissance

and preceding Christian Wolff had brought about a stupen­ dous change in the outlook of philosophy, particularly the philosophy of nature.

The scientific discoveries of the

period had thrown Aristotelian and Thom&stie physics into disrepute.

Temporarily, the offensive had completely

out-distanced the defense.

It was difficult alone to keep

up with the discoveries of science, much less to arrange a new explanation to fit them.

"To give a philosophical

account of matters ?/hich had formerly been explained •unscientifically1, ‘popularly1, or ‘figuratively1, be­ came the chief intellectual concern of the age."-^ Just as the Pre-socratic philosophers were interest­ ed in discovering the material cause of the universe, so the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were interested in giving a metaphysical ex­ planation of the new world unfolded to them by the ad­ vance of science. 2. Ja.cques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, (trans. Bernard Wall), New Xork, Scribner*s, 194-0, p. 4-0. 3. Basil Willey in The Seventeenth Century Background, p.l. “Leibniz,” the immediate predecessor of Christian Wolff and his chief teacher, "declares himself for the opinion in which the reformers of philosophy, Bacon, Hobbs, Gassendi, Descartes, and others, in opposition to the Scholastics, all agreed, that the only attributes of bodies are magnitude, figure and motion, and that they contain no occult qualities or forces, nor anything in­ capable of a purely mechanical explanation." Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy (trans. George S. Morris from the 4-th German edition), New Xork, C. Scribner*s Sons, 1892, Vol. II, p. 103.

r

i Coming after the Christian philosophers, Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranehe, and Spinoza found themselves confronted with this new problem: How find a metaphysical justi­ fication for the world of the seventeenthcentury science? As scientists, Descartes and Leibniz had no metaphysics of their own. Just as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas had to borrow their technique from the Greeks, Descartes and Leibniz had to borrow their technique from the Christian philosophers who preceded them. Hence the vast number of scholastic expressions which we meet in the works of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and even Locke. All of them freely use the language of the Schoolmen in order t o 'express non—scholastic views of a non-scholastic world. Yet all of them appear to us as seek­ ing in a more or less traditional metaphysics the ultimate justification of the mechanical world of modern science.11 4 But if these philosophers used Scholastic terminology, they did not follow the traditional Scholastic explana­ tions.

Furthermore the spirit of the age in which they

lived gave them an exaggerated confidence in the com­ petence of human understanding.

They had a firm belief in

the intrinsic orderliness of the processes of nature, without.any magical or supernatural assistance.

The

wonderful progress which science had already made helped enormously to justify these attitudes and to encourage their adoption even in the field of philosophy.

Just as

the revolt against traditional Christianity, and confidence 4* Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy. Hew Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. 110-111.

L

J

A 1

r

in private judgment, had resulted in the various sects of Protestantism, so confidence in private judgment and the rejection of traditional Scholasticism brought forth the dualism of Descartes, the Pantheism of Spinoza, the empiricism of Locke and the idealism of Leibniz.^ Dynamism, that particular feature of Wolff*s doctrine with which this dissertation is concerned, "culminates in the system of Leibniz, who reduced corporeal sub­ stance to units of a spiritual character (monads) analog­ ous to souls.

For Leibniz extension, indeed sensible

reality as a whole, is nothing more than an appearance or a symbol, and the corporeal world as such is absorbed in £ the spiritual." When ffolff was thirty-five years of age he made the acquaintance of Leibniz, of whose philosophy his own system is a modification.

Wolff had been born in Breslau,

Germany, on the twenty-fourth of January, 1679.

At his

birth his father dedicated him by vow to the Lutheran ministry, but the paternal ambition was never realized. At the University of Jena, Wolff first studied mathe­ matics and physics to which he soon added philosophy. From 1703 to 1706 he lectured in the University of Leipsig 5. Cf. Abraham Wolf, A History of Science. Technology and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. New York, Mac­ millan Company, 1939, p. 30. 6. Jacques Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy, (trans. E.I.Watkin), Hew York, Sheed and lard, 1939, p. 166.

L

5 r

'

n

from which he was called to be professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Halle.

At Halle Wolff limited

himself at first to mathematics, but on the departure of a colleague he added physics, and presently included all the main philosophical disciplines.? The philosophy of Wolff enjoyed undisputed sway in Germany until it was displaced by the Kantian revolution. Zeller remarks of Wolff that "when he died on April 9, 1754, the supremacy of his system was well established in Germany." popularity. instructive.

As a teacher, Wolff himself enjoyed great "His presentation was uncommonly lucid and He did not read from a manuscript, he did

not dictate, nor yet declaim, but spoke quite freely with unaffected naturalness.^ As a writer, Wolff scarcely allowed a year of his life to go by without furnishing his contemporaries with a new work.

"A collection of only the most im-

10 portant of his writings fills twenty-six quarto volumes.* "Nothing," writes Gilson, "can give us an idea of the 7. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, "Wolff, Christian," Encyclopedia Brittanica. 11th edition, Vol. 28, Cambridge, England, University Press, 1911, p. 774* 8. Otfried Nippold, "Introduction" (trans. Francis J. Hemelt), Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum. Vol. II, Oxford Clarendon Press, London, Humphrey Milford, 1934, p. xxiii. 9. Nippold, "Introduction," Jus Gentium. Vol. II, p.xix. 10. Ibid., p . xxiv.

L

authority which his (Wolff1s doctrine enjoyed throughout the schools of Europe, and especially in Germany.

To

innumerable professors and students of philosophy, meta­ physics was Wolff and what Wolff had said was meta­ physics."^

This was particularly true of Kant, "Wolffism

had been his philosophical fatherland.11^2

The relation

of Wolff to Kantian thought is not something extrinsic or added on as would be the relation of a man, even a genius, to the teachers of his adolescence or the first influ­ ences of his family and surroundings.

Kant was obliged to

comment for at least forty years at the University on the manuals of philosophy of the Wolffian school.

That Kant

absorbed deeply the concepts and the problems and the Wolffian mentality is proven by the long labors of his precritical period, and has today been made even more manifest by the publication of the countless notes and reflections found for the greater part in the margins of the very copies of those manuals which he used.

It is

usually said that Kant criticizes ancient metaphysics. But in reality it would be more exact to say that he criticizes the metaphysics which was put forth in the dog­ matic rationalism of Christian Wolff.

For this reason

•* alone, it is not only interesting but essential to know 11. Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949,p. 129. 12. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 120. Kant de­ rived his knowledge of Physics from Newton, his Meta­ physics from Wolff. C f . Etienne Gilson, The Unity of L j

more closely this enigmatic mediator between Leibniz and Kant, who represents the ancient heritage of scholastic metaphysics distorted by Cartesian and Leibnizian thought and influence.-^ This dissertation was undertaken at the suggestion of Dr. Anton C. Pegis during his final year as Chairman of the Graduate School of Philosophy at Fordham University. The Reverend John V. Flynn, S.J., with his characteristic generosity, agreed to direct the writer in its develop­ ment.

The majority of the philosophical writings of

Wolff needed for the work were available in the Fordham University Library.

Jn spite of the acknowledged place

which Wolff occupied as the teacher of Germany for almost half a century and his pivotal position as the connecting link between Leibniz and Kant, very little has been written on him in English.

Here was evidently an op­

portunity for graduate work of an original nature 'which gave added assurance of being a possible contribution of practical value.

The writer found it easier to arouse

his interest in the subject because he had been teaching ontology and cosmology during recent years.

He felt

furthermore the need of closer and more thorough scrutiny of Wolff than is usually obtainable in the manuals and Philosophical Experience. Hew York, Scribner1s, 194-1, p. 310. 13. Cf. Mariano Campo, Christiano Wolff e il Rozionalismo Precritico. Milan, Societa Editrice "Vita e Pensario," 1939, Vol. 1, Introduction, p. XVI.

historical summaries of scholastic philosophy.

He feels

at this point that the interest which he has aroused in himself to investigate this subject has been more than repaid by the challenge which a Wolffian analysis pre­ sented and the knowledge which it supplied.

It is to

be hoped that the information thus acquired will prove helpful to others.

L

9 r

*™ 1

CHAPTER I DYNAMISM IN THE COSMOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF Dynamism is the theory that bodies are composed of inextended points of force.

In the manuals of Scholastic

philosophy this theory is listed and refuted as a fal­ lacious attempt to account for the constitution of bodies by explaining away matter.

The theory of Dynamism

"culminates in the system of Leibniz, who reduced corporeal substance to units of a spiritual character (monads) analogous to souls.

For Leibniz, extension, indeed

sensible reality as a whole, is nothing more than an appearance or a symbol, and the corporeal world as such is absorbed in the spiritual."-*• In this dissertation it is our intention to present a study of Christian Wolff's dynamic theory of substance and in particular his metaphysical foundations of the material universe. To realize this purpose sire intend first to treat Wolff's notion of (a) substance, (b) simple substance and its characteristics, and (c) composed being or com­ pound substance and its characteristics, especially as these are in contrast with the characteristics of simple substance. 1. Jacques Maritain, An introduction to Philosophy (trans. E'l. Watkin) New York, Sheed & Ward (n.d.) p. 166.

The second chapter will deal with bodies and their

"*

apparent constituents: - matter and motor force, as these are explained by Christian Wolff. The third chapter will be devoted to the "elements,” which Wolff contends are the true and ultimate constituent principles of bodies. SUB ST AM CE One of the difficulties underlying an examination of the philosophy of Christian Wolff arises from the fact that he uses Scholastic terms, but he does not use them with the same meaning as the Scholastics. al meaning of the word, "substance,”

The tradition­

as defined by St.

Thomas is "an essence or thing to the nature of which it 2 is due that it should not exist in another." "Substance," wrote Aquinas, "has two characteristics. The first consists in the fact that it has no need of an extrinsic foundation in which it is sustained, but is sustained in itself and therefore it is said to subsist by itself as it were, and not to exist in another.

The

other (characteristic) consists in the fact that it is the fundament of accidents, sustaining them, and to that extent it is said to support."*^

The Scholastic notion

of substance, traceable through St. Thomas to Aristotle, 2. Saint Thomas Aquinas, "Quodlibeta" Ix, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2um. Opera Omnia Vives edition, Paris, 1875> Vol.XV,p. 553. 3. Saint Thomas Aquinas, "Quaestiones Disputatae" - De fotentia - q. 9, art. 1. Opera Omnia, Paris, Vives

11 is the notion of a reality which exists in such a way that it does not need any other subject (or support) in order to exist.

Its manner of existing is the determining factor

in deciding whether or not a reality is a substance; and a substance is distinguished from an accident because a substance is fitted to exist in itself while an accident exists in another.

Consequently, substance and accidents

can be distinguished in the same subject through their different manner of existing.

While Wolff claims that

his notion of substance agrees with the AristotelianThomistic notion of substance,^ the notion of substance which he has in mind is not distinguished by its manner of existence, but rather by a constant fundamental de­ termination immediately and easily recognizable at all t i m e s . W o l f f ’s notion of substance, therefore, is more properly a notion of ’’e s s e n c e , a n d is based upon an appraisal of what is perceived to be constant and vari­ able in an observable reality.

A substance for Wolff,

edition, 1875, Vol. XIII, p. 259. 4. Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, Frankfort and Leipzig* Officina Libraria, 1736, para­ graph No. 771. (All references to the original sources of Wolff will be given by paragraph numbers). 5. Wolff, Ontologia, No.772. Cf. Mariano Campo, Christian Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico. Milan, Societa Editrice "Vita e Pensario,” 1939, Vol. I, p. 191. 6. Wolff, Qntologia No. 168.

L

JF

.

r in the latest edition of his Latin metaphysics, is a sub­ ject perdurable and modifiable, a reality which is subject 7 to change, but at the same time is fitted to last, Nothing could give a clearer picture of Wolff*s Ontology than this notion of substance; and the analysis of its definition supplies an immediate insight into the structural weaknesses of his metaphysics.

As Gilson re­

marks, wIn the philosophy of Christian Wolff, existence is completely excluded from Ontology11hence his Ontology is “a metaphysics without existence.”^ As Wolfffs notion of substance is really a concept of essence, so the being of his Ontology is exclusively possible being.

Hence, his constant search for sufficient

reasons- to bring possibles into existence, his defini­ tion of existence as the complement of essence, his need of motor force to reduce potency to act.

“Being,”

Wolff says, “is what can exist and, consequently, that with which existence is not incompatible: Bns dicitur quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non renugnat.” In other words, what is possible is a being: quod possible est. ens est. Besides, Wolff adds, this is a metaphysical notion which is accepted by all, and which exactly tallies with common language.

“Being,” “some­

thing,” “possible,” here are so many words that are 7. Wolff, Ontologia No. 768. 8. Etienne GjiSOn, Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 194-9, p. 119.

practically synonomous, and metaphysics does nothing more 9 than bring their implicit meanings out in the open.” Because in Wolff1s Ontology the notion of being is exclusively the notion of possible being, the "ens" of Wolff does not correspond perfectly to the Greek "on" of Aristotle or the Latin "ens" of the Scholastics.*^ Ts'chirnhaus said, ’’There is no difference between being and non-being other than the difference between what is possible and impossible, or between what is able to be conceived and what is unable to be conceived.”

Wolff,

by his own

admission, was a

keen student of and deeply

influenced

by Tschirnhaus.

In the Wolffian metaphysics,

being, possible and conceivable, are exactly the same.

11

Perhaps the clearest explanation of why Wolff re­ stricted the being of metaphysics to possible being is fotmd in th£ alert observation of one of his own contenporaries.

”1 suggest that this must be especially

noted, the objects of theoretical geometry are imaginary (ficta), and require nothing in order that they be thought of except that they do not involve a contradiction, in other words, that they be possible: consequently, Leibniz and Wolff in order that they might advance not only 9. Gilson, Being and SomePhilosophers, pp. 114-115. 10. Campo, Christian Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico. Vol. I, p. 162. Ill.Ibid.. p. 34.

14 r

i

metaphysics, but also all philosophy to the certitude of geometrical truths, transformed being in general, and by this very fact all philosophical objects, into the possible, The man who made that statement was James William Feuerlein, a professor of logic and metaphysics and rector of the University of Altdorf, during the lifetime of Wolff himself.

Feuerlein evidently understood Wolff and per­

haps he had in mind Wolff’s own statement on the matter. nThe notion of the impossible which is that which involves a contradiction, and the notion of the possible which is that which is free from contradiction is. conformable to the practice of the Mathematicians.11-^

(Italics mine).

All this is of capital importance for a proper analysis of Wolff’s notion of substance.

As the notion of being

in Wolff’s Ontology is the notion of possible being, so his concept of substance is really a concept of essence. 14 A substance is a subject modifiable and perdurable. A subject for Wolff is a being considered as having an essence and beyond that capable of other (determinations)^ 12. Jacobi Wilhelmi Feverlini Observationes eclecticae ex controversiis de metaohvsica leibnitio-wolfiana. Altorfii loric, 1737 (2&ed.) specimen ontoiogicum.VIII. quoted by Gampo, Christiana Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico. Vol. I, p. 163, fn. (3). 13. Wolff, Ontologia. H 0 . 100. 14. Wolff, Ontologia. No. 678. 15. Wolff, Ontologia,.ho. 711.

L

j

15 r

i In the Ontology of Christian Wolff — without existence®*^ —

nA metaphysics

the requirements of possible being

are also the requirements of essence.

The negative re-

quirement is the absence of contradiction.

17

The positive

requirement is the presence of parts, or determinations, at once compatible and prime.

These parts are called

essentials and through its essentials a being is possible. The technical language of Wolff is not always selfexplanatory and his terms frequently differ from the traditional names of things; it will be a great help, there­ fore, in analyzing his notion of substance, to recall with him that whatever realities are present in a being are to be classified either as essentials, attributes or modes. ESSENTIALS In Wolfffs terminology, those determinations of being which are not mutually repugnant to one another and nevertheless are not determined through one another are called essentials, and they constitute the essence of a being; for example, the triple number and equality of sides are the essentials of an equilateral triangle.

In

like manner, conformity with the natural law and the habit of will are the essentials of virtue and constitute the essence of virtue.

IS

16. Gilson. Being and Some Philosophers, p. 119. 17. For Wolff that is possible1which does not involve a contradiction, and what is possible is being. Ontologia , No. 135. . IS. Wolff, Ontologia No. 143.

16 i Wolff explains his essentials by declaring that if any being is thoughtof, •there must be postulated in it at the outset such primary constituents as are not mutually re­ pugnant to one another, nor determined by elements foreign to the being, nor even by any of the other constituent elements of the

being.

^9

As Gilson very aptly describes

them, the essentials of a being must be at once "com­ patible and prime. Its essentials, therefore, not only suffice and are required to make the being possible, but they also i furnish the primary determinations to the previously in­ determinate notion of a being.

Genera and species are

determined through the essentials.

For example, the

generic determinations of a straight line triangle are the triple number of sides and the kind of line, name­ ly, that it is a straight line.

The specific deter­

minations of an equilateral triangle are the triple number of sides, the kind of line and the reason for

21 the equality of sides. Because the essentials, by which generic and specific determinations are established are intrinsic determinations distinct from quantity, essentials are qualities. 19. 20. 21. 22.

L

22

Wolff, Ontologia Ho. 14-2. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers. p. 115. Cf. Wolff. Ontologia "No. 236. Any intrinsic determination other than quantity is a quality. Wolff, Ontologia H 0 . ,455.

Hence, genera and species, in,Wolfffs metaphysics, are determined through qualities.2-^ These essentials of which Wolff speaks correspond to what the Scholastic manuals call the essential notes: the mindfs notion of the minimum requirements which must be fulfilled before a reality can qualify as a being of a particular kind.

Hence, Gilson notes that in Wolfffs

concept of being "the essentials obviously are the very core of reality;” and "since they are prime, there is 2/ nothing above them from which they could be deduced.” * Because they are prime, the essentials which Wolff posits in a being constitute its essence, in fact, that is why he calls them essentia'ls.

"Essence,” for Wolff,

"is that fdiieh is conceived of a being in the first place, and in which is to be found the sufficient reason why all the rest either actually belongs to it or is able to be­ long to it.”2^ To estimate or indicate the consequences of this definition on the subsequent history of Philosophy, or to verify Wolfffs claim that his definition of essence "is conformable to the notion of philosophers* the scope of this dissertation.2?

is beyond

Neither is it our

23. Wolff, Ontologia No. 4-56. 24. Gilson, op. cit.. p. 116. 25- Wolff, Ontologia No. 168, Cf. Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy* p. 201, fn. 2. 26. Wolff, Ontologia No. 169. 27. Cf. Wolff, Ontologia Bo. 168.

id r

i

intention at this point to substantiate the charge that Wolff*s notion of essence differs toto coelo from his concept of nature.2^ For Wolff, therefore, essence involves two features: It is that which is first conceived of a being and it is a reason or explanation for the other things that can be found in the being. That which is first conceived of a being in Wolff*s metaphysics are its essentials.

nIf any being is to be

thought of whatsoever, at the outset there must be placed in it those (elements) which are not mutually repugnant to one another and which nevertheless are not determin­ ed through outside elements, nor even by any of its other constituent elements.11^9

The determinations of

a being so described, at once compatible and prime, are its essentials.

These essentials, the conceptual

notes of the being*s essence, are the initial deter­ minations of the indeterminate concept of being.

Its

essentials are necessary and sufficient to establish the intrinsic possibility and the intelligibility of an essence, and they are sufficient and necessary to ac­ count for the further determinations of a being, (namely, its attributes and modes). 28. C f . Campo, Christian Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico. Vol. I, p. 167. In Scholastic philosophy, essence and nature are different- aspects of the same reality - nature is essence in operation. 29. Wolff, Ontologia No. 14-2. L

-1

19 i

r ATTIBUTES ABD MODES

"Essentia-definiri potest per- id, quod primum de ente concipitur et in quo ratio continetur sufficiens, cur 30

caetera- vel actu insint, vel inesse possmt."^

Essence

then, as defined by Wolff and determined by its essentials, is not only that which is first conceived in a being, but is also the basis for the other qualities actually or possibly present in it.

"In the essence of a being is contained

the explanation of those determinations which, over and above the essence, are either constantly present in the 31 being or are able to be present in it." "The essence i then is for any being the sufficient reason for the actual presence of its attributes and of the possible presence of its modes. In the Ontology of Christian Wolff, the determin­ ations of being fall into one of three groups - either they are essentials, attributes or modes.

In Scholastic

philosophy, the proximate genus and specific difference are the determinants of essence; in Wolffian meta­ physics, the "essentials" play a similar role.

Con­

tinuing this parallel, Wolff himself identifies his modes with the predicable accidents of the Scholastics, al­ though he prefers his own terminology.33 30. 31. 32. 33. L

Wolfffs

Wolff, Qptologia No. 168. Ibid.. Ho. 167. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 116. Wolff, Ontologia No. 146. j

20

r attributes in turn bear a striking resemblance to the predicable propria, of Scholastic philosophy. Glassed as predicable properties in the manuals of Scholastic philosophy are the concepts of those qualities which flow by natural necessity from the essence of the subject.

Hence, the qualities teachable, sociable, gram­

matical and political normally flow from the essence of man.

A body has such properties as extension, divisibility

and measurability, which naturally and inevitably flow from its essence as a material substance. Just as in Scholastic philosophy properties are deter­ mined by the essence, so in Wolffian metaphysics attri­ butes

are determined by the essentials.

Just as in

Scholastic philosophy the attributes invariably and in­ evitably flow from the essence, so for Wolff "if any­ thing is determined by the essentials, it ought to be constantly present in the b e i n g . A s

long as a tri­

angle has three equal sides, it must inevitably follow that it has three angles and these three angles are equal. Wolff divides his attributes into two groups - proper and common.

Their difference is this:

The proper

at­

tributes are determined by all the essentials taken to­ gether, while for common attributes, only some of the essentials are required.^

Once more, unfortunately,

34*. Wolff, Ontologfa Ho. 145. 35. Ibid., Ho. 14.6. L

21 r

-i

Wolff confines himself to mathematical examples on the plea that these are clearer.

It is of the essence of an

equilateral triangle that it have three equal sides - hence the essentials of an equilateral triangle are three sides and all three sides equal.

If a straight line figure has

three sides and these three sides are equal, then its angles m i l be equal.

The equality of the angles is de­

termined by the triple number and equality of the sides, or by all the essentials taken together.

Hence its three

/

equal are a proper attribute of an equilateral triangle. On the other hand, the mere fact that an equilateral triangle is bounded by three sides, regardless of their relative length, makes it necessary that the figure have three angles.

Therefore, the triple number of angles

in an equilateral triangle is determined by the triple number of sides alone, or in W o l f f !s terminology, by some of the essentials of the equilateral triangle, hence its triple number of angles is only a common attribute of an equilateral triangle. It is possible to account for the attributes of a being from its essentials, although no reason is able to be advanced for the presence of the essentials.

Essentials,

are prime and above them there is nothing from which they could be deduced. 36. Wolff, Ontologia Wo. 14-6. L

-j

A sufficient reason why attributes are present is contained in the essentials.

From their essentials we

understand what the attributes are, or, as the Scholastics explain it, the properties of a being are determined by its essence.

Similarly, attributes are determined by their 37

essentials.

A sufficient reason for the presence of common attributes is found in certain essentials.

The triple

number of lines by which an equilateral triangle is bound is a sufficient reason for the triple number of angles. However, a sufficient reason why prox>er attributes are present must be sought in all the essentials taken together.

39

This results from Wolff's previous claim that

proper attributes can be determined only through all the essentials taken together. The difference between modes and attributes is far greater than the difference between "may” and "must.” * Attributes must flow from the essentials; they are properties inseparable from the essence. may not be present —

Modes may or

"they are such ulterior deter­

minations which are neither determined by the essence nor contradictory to it.w^

But the difference between

attribute and mode is more than this.

It verges on the

difference between substance and accident, essence and 37. 38. 39. l40.

Wolff, Ontologla Mo. 157, Cf. Qntolo.gia Mo. 14.6. Ibid., Mo. 158. Ibid.. Mo. 159. Gilson, Being and Some Philosoohers. p. 116.

23 r

i existence, nature and individual. Attributes are inseparable from their essentials, attributes are determined by the essentials, in their essentials is contained the sufficient reason for the presence of attributes.

But the essentials cannot supply

a sufficient reason for the actual presence of modes. ”For, what makes up an essence accounts for the fact that such and such a mode may belong to a certain being; it does not account for the fact that such a mode actually does belong to it.

The reason for the actual presence

of modes in a given being must always be looked for out­ side the being. The key to the understanding of Wolff's doctrine as stated by Gilson consists in recalling once more that Wolff*s Ontology is restricted to possible beings. is a metaphysics without existence.

It

Wolff admits this

in his own explanation of the doctrine referred to. Earlier he had given, as an example of a mode of the 41. Gilson. Being and Some Philosophers, p. 116. HA sufficient reason why modes are able to be pre­ sent is contained in the essentials; but a sufficient reason why modes are actually present must be sought either in antecedent modes, or in some other being different from the one in which they are present, or in many such beings or lastly, partly in antecedent modes, partly in some other being different from the one in which they are present or even in many other such beings.” Wolff, Ontologia No. 160.

L

24 triangle, its division into tmro equal parts by means of a n straight line drawn to the center of its base from the angle opposite.^2

That this is. possible can be demonstrat­

ed from the essentials of the triangle, namely, its triple number of sides. But if a triangle is to be actually divided in this manner, it is necessary that someone draw a strainjt line from the vertex of the angle bisecting the base.

For

although such a division of the triangle can be described, this description alone is not capable of drawing a straight line which will bisect the triangle into two equal parts. For the actual division there is required an existing agent, or being, external to the triangle itself. Similarly, the reason why heat is actually present in a stone must be sought in some other being different from the stone, such as the Sun, to whose rays the stone has been exposed.

For heat is a mode and the example just

given proves that a mode which does not have a sufficientreason in the being which it modifies does have a suffici­ ent reason in another (different being. Those beings are called "external” which constitute the sufficient reason for the actual presence, in a given being, of modes idiich cannot be sufficiently accounted for by its essence alone.

When one passes, therefore, in

Wolff’s Ontology from essentials and attributes to modes, 42. Wolff, Ontologia Ko. 148. L

one feels as though he were in another atmosphere, or had reached a new country.

He meets for the first time ex­

ternal beings, existing realities, — physics, members of a different race.

strangers to meta­ Modes are character

istics of the existing individual; attributes are the pro­ perties of a conceivable essence.

Modes are sensible

qualities; attributes are intelligible determinations: "There are no observable notes.

Modes require outside

causes, attributes are explained through intrinsic essential determinations. EXISTENCE IS A MODE OF FINITE BEINGS Because the being of W o l f f *s metaphysics is possible being, existence is not one of its essential determinants. In fact, Wolff defines existence as ” . . . plement of possibility.

.

The com­

And existence is also called

Actuality. Because existence is neither an essential of being nor an attribute inseparable from it, existence must be regarded as a mode.

Hence, it will depend upon a cause

outside the being which possesses it.

Therefore, as

Gilson observes, in the philosophy of Christian Wolff, "the sufficient reason for the actual existence of any finite being is never to be found in that being itself;

43. Wolff, Qntologia No. 771. 4-4* Ibid.. No. 174.

it always is to be found in another one.M45 All this is necessary for a proper understanding of Wolff*s definition of substance as a subject which is modifiable and perdurable.

Because substance in Wolff*s

ontology is a possible being, it can be readily seen why Wolff calls it a subject whieh is modifiable rather than modified.

The being of Wolff*s metaphysics is possi­

ble being, not actual or existent being.

Modes are

characteristics or determinations of existent being, con­ sequently while a substance is conceived as capable of having modes (capax aliorum), these accidental deter­ minations are never actually possessed by it in its ontological or possible existence. DETERMINATIONS: CONSTANT AM) VARIABLE Essentials, attributes and modes are determinations of being and, therefore, of substance.

Essentials and

attributes are constant determinations in a being of any particular kind, they do not vary; just as the specific difference and proximate genus of man for example: as well as his proper attributes, - teachable, sociable, 45. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 119. MAnd this is why, in the philosophy of Christian Wolff, existence is completely excluded from the field of ontology. There are special sciences to deal with all the problems related to existence and none of them is ontology. Are we interested in finding out the suf­ ficient reason for the existence of God or for that of the world? Natural theology will give the answer. Do we want to know how those beings which make up the

etc. - are regularly present in each member of the human species.

But the individual characteristics or accidents

Wolff*s modes, differ in each existing individual. Form, shape, place, time, Blood, country, name In no two Are all the same. These variable determinants distinguish one individual from others of the same species. The modifiability of a being, and consequently of a substance, is recognized from its intrinsic variable determinations^

Determinations are called variable v

which can be changed either continuously or at intervals. Determinations are constant which remain ever the same while the other features of the being are meaOThile changing either continuously or at intervals.

Intrinsic

constant determinations are classed either as essentials or attributes.

The variable determinations are called

modes. ^ the material world are, though contingent, yet de­ termined? Cosmology will inform us about it. Are we wondering how, in the human mind, the possibles are drawn from potency to act? Psychology holds the key to that problem. When today we make use of the term, ’’ontology,” what it means to us is just the same as ’’metaphysics.” Not so in the philosophy of Wolff, y/ho needed a new word to designate a new thing Strictly speaking, an ontology is a metaphysics with­ out natural theology, because it is a metaphysics existence.” Ibid. 4 6 . Wolff, Qntolo.gia No. 76 5 . 47. Ibid.. Nos. 762-763.

28 n

r

A substance is a subject which is modifiable, i.e., capable of successive intrinsic determinations.

If the

state of a being is constituted by intrinsic changeable qualities, viz., modes, then its state is called internal. If its state is determined by extrinsic modifications, such as its relation to other things, for example the objects around it, then its state is called external. ^ Its external state is changed if the being does not main­ tain the same relations to surrounding beings which it previously had.

Its internal state is changed if its

modes do not remain the s a m e . ^ To

qualify as a substance in Wolff1s metaphysics the

modifiable subject, or essence, must also be able to last. A substance is a subject not only modifiable, but also perdurable.

It is through its essentials that a sub­

stance is rendered perdurable.

Those constant intrinsic

determinations establish and preserve the genera and species of the various substances and render them ever the same amid their changing individual determinants.^ 48. 49. 50.

L

Wolff. Qntologia Mo. 706. Wolff, Qntologia Mo. 710. W,olff, Qntologia Mo. 766. ”The soul,11 Wolff contends, "is modifiable inasmuch as it is able to have successively other and other perceptions, other and other appetites. A stone is modifiable inasmuch as it can be now hot, now cold, now wet, now dry; and various figures are able to be imparted to it.*1 Wolff, Qntologia Mo. 764n.

” . . . .

We call a stone a substance,” notes Wolff,

"because we perceive it is the subject of constant and variable determinations.

Likewise, our soul is regarded

as a substance because we consider it modifiable and per­ durable.

On the other hand, the color of a stone or the

whiteness of marble is called an accident because while it is indeed able to last for some time, it is not modifi able; if it is changed, it perishes completely and in its place another color, such as red, follows . . . ."51 A substance, therefore, is the subject of constant and variable intrinsic determinations.

Because constant

determinations are essentials and attributes while variable determinations are the modes of things, a sub­ stance may also be described as a subject in which there are present the same essentials,and attributes while the modes successively vary.^2

From this it follov^s that

that being is a substance in which we can conceive essentials, attributes and modes. Having once established his notion of substance as modifiable and lasting, Christian Wolff takes great pains to show that this notion of substance is no novelty. Wolff contends that his notion of substance is in agree­ ment with the common notion> and with the Cartesian con­ cept, of substance.

In Wolfffs opinion also, the analy­

sis of his definition of substance has the added advantag

51. Wolff, Qntologia Mo. 768. -52. Ibid. Mo. 769.

of clarifying the misunderstandings, the obscurity and the lack of conviction which have accompanied the presentation of the notion of substance in the past. The common notion of substance is the notion defined in Aristotelian - Scholastic Philosophy as "a being which subsists by itself and also sustains accidents."

Wolff,

however, considers that both aspects of this definition are obscure because there are no observable modes or characteristics in reality whereby we can recognize a being which subsists by itself and which supports ac­ cidents.

The Scholastics, he claims, have attempted to

explain the phase, "subsisting by itself," by making it equivalent to "not subsisting in another as in a subject." But it is evident, contends Wolff, that modes or char­ acteristics are still needed in order to know whether anything does not exist in another as a subject or not. JSranted that in a discussion of bodily substance we have a somewhat clear notion by which we can recognize that certain things exist in another as in a subject, nevertheless even this notion is so confused that nothing can be concluded from it.

To illustrate this obscurity

Wolff claims that as a youth he used to think that to subsist by itself was the same as to subsist independent­ ly of any other finite being, and that accidents sub­ sisted dependently upon the substances in which they

r were present.

He dismissed this interpretation at once,

31 n

however, after he studied Physics because he realised that nothing can subsist independently of another. In defining substance, therefore, as a subject modifi­ able and perdurable, Wolff had in mind a very definite purpose.

He was eager to show that a clearer concept of

substance could be presented than the one hitherto employ­ ed.

“Let us see,” he says, “whether or not from the no­

tions developed by us that can be distinctly taught which is present in the obscure notion of the Scholastics.11^ For Wolff, it will be remembered, that being is a substance in which we can conceive essentials, attributes and modes.

The Scholastics, he claims, hold that a being

subsists by itself, or is a substance, inasmuch as it is not in another as in a subject.

As a consequence of

this distinction, the Scholastics regard subsistence as a mode of existing and hence they distinguish the manner of existing of substances from the manner of existing of accidents.

Furthermore, because they think that the

manner in which accidents exist is more evident than the manner in which substances exist, they remove mentally the manner of existing of accidents from substance. ^ Wolff, however, insists that it is better to learn from the realities themselves rather than from the con­ fused notions related concerning them.

Therefore, he in­

sists that we must ourselves determine what difference

53. Wolff, Qntologia Mo. 771. L 54. Ibid.. Mo. 771.

j

r there is betv/een the manner of existing of substances and the manner in which accidents exist. Wolff determines his notion of substance in the follow­ ing manner:

Whatever is present in a being will fall under

one of three classes:

essentials, attributes or modes.

(No intrinsic reason can be given why essentials are present or are able to be present; on the other hand, a reason is given why attributes are actually present and modes, more­ over, can be distinguished from one another as regards their manner of existing.) Essentials are able to exist without presupposing any other characteristics.

Attributes

and modes cannot exist unless other characteristics are presupposed. I!A substance is a subject modifiable and perdurable."55 This subject is a being having an essence and a capacity furthermore for other things.

Since a being cannot ex­

ist if it is assumed to be devoid of all determinations, Wolff contends that his "essentials'1 constitute the subject because prior to them nothing can be conceived in a being.

Since through the essentials the existence

of attributes and the possibility of modes is determined, the subject is recognized as having the capacity for receiving many other characteristics and determinations. Hence, Wolff concludes, that a being subsists by itself when it has an essence such that through it 55. Wolff, Qntologia Ho. 768.

33 there is set up a subject fitted to receive other things. The common notion of substance, which lolff identifies as the Aristotelian - Scholastic notion, implies.not only a being which subsists by itself, but also a being irhich supports accidents.

Indeed, the opinion of St. Thomas

has already been noted that the secondary characteristic of substance nconsists in the fact that it is the funda­ ment of accidents, sustaining them, and to that extent it is said to support."56

Wolff claims that the second­

ary aspect of substance as a support for accidents is a figurative expression ?/hich says, as it were, that sub­ stance is like a bar or a post upon which the accidents lean.

In other words, substance as a support for

accidents. indicates the dependence of the actuality of modes and attributes on the essen.ce of the being, and through this dependence the mode of existing of accidents is different from the mode of existing of the essence.57 It is Wolff’s opinion that the figurative language 56. Saint Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, q. 9, art. I, c. 57. The reasoning which lolff advances for this explana­ tion is interesting since in it we find him making one of his many appeals to the principle of suf­ ficient reason. n!hen a sufficient reason is placed," he argues, "there is at last placed that which rather is than is not." Wolff, Qntologia No. 118. Accidents cannot exist unless an essence pre­ exists or is thought to pre-exist. In fact, if we assume that the essence is taken away, then the accidents cannot any longer survive because the sub­ ject has been removed which is fitted to'receive them. Qntologia No. 771. L

Ji

34 r

1

of the Scholastics does not supply any real help in ex­ plaining the meaning of substance as a support for acci­ dents.

"They reduce,11 he complains, "to an imaginary

notion the dependence of the actuality of attributes and modes upon essence . . . .

They picture to themselves a

substance, a subject fixed in genus and species, as though it were a bar or a post upon which attributes and modes lean heavily and are supported, like weighty bodies whi ch would otherwi se fall.115 8 For a distinct notion and an intelligible explanation of substance, Wolff contends that it should be demonstrat­ ed that substance is a being in which there are present donstant determinations which constitute the subject and which do not demand any prerequisites in order that it may be understood why they are present.

Through these

constant determinations the subject is rendered capable of other succeeding determinations, none of which could CQ

be present unless the first ones had been presupposed. 7 More briefly, substance is the subject of intrinsic determinations both constant and variable.

The variable

determinations to be present presuppose the constant determinations; the constant determinations do not require any others prior to themselves..

60

In a possible attempt to gain a wider following for his notion of substance, Christian Wolff ingeniously 58. Wolff, Qntologia Mo* 771. 59. Ibid. L 60. Ibid.

35 r claims that substance, as he defines it, is the same as the1 Cartesian notion of substance.

"By substance,11 says

Descartes, "we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need.of nothing beyond itself in order to exist.

And in truth, there can be con-

ceived but one substance which is absolutely independent and that is God.

We perceive that all other things can

exist only by the help of the concourse of

God

.11^1

Wolff claims that Descartes in these words is merely trying to clarify the phrase, "per se subsistere," whose meaning is obscure in the Scholastic definition and which to Descartes seems to mean "nulla re alia indigere ad existendum"; a meaning which can fit completely only one being, viz., God.

Therefore, the term substance does not

apply to God and creatures univocally, and no significa­ tion of the term substance can be clearly understood which is common to God and creatures. Wolff admits that Descartes agrees with the Scho­ lastics in this, that substance must be distinguished from accidents by its mode of existence; however, because he thought that "per se subsistere" ¥/as the same as "a se subsistere," Descartes1 efforts to make clearer the obscure definition of the Scholastics brought him to a meaning of substance which fits God alone.

The Scholastics

had intended a meaning of substance which would pro­ perly apply to creatures, and to God only by a certain 61. Rene Descartes, The Method. Meditations and Philosophy (trans. John Veitch) Rew Xork, Aladdin Book Co., 1901, L p. 320, Pr. LI.

36 p

A.

"1

mutation (quadam immutatione facta)* : 2 Substance,

(to the extent that it was common to mind

and body), Descartes defined as a thing which needs only the concurrence of G o d . W h e n he saw clearly that this definition would be useless for what he had in mind, and furthermore, that it could not be proven that a reality was not a substance unless it had been previously shown that for its existence it needed only the concurrence of God, Descartes advises that substance cannot at first be recognized from this alone that it is an existing thing, but it can be easily recognized from some of its attributes because every attribute necessarily pre­ supposes a substance.

"But yet substance cannot be

first discovered merely from its being a thing which exists independently, for existence by itself is not ob­ served by us.

We easily, hovjever, recognize substance

from any attribute of it, by this common notion that of nothing there are no attributes, properties, or quali­ ties; for, from perceiving that some attribute is pre­ sent, we infer that some existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed is also of necessity present

fj

62. Wolff, Qntologia Mo. 772 63. "Created substances, however, whether corporeal or thinking, may be conceived under this common concept; for these are things which, in order to their exist­ ence, stand in need of nothing but the concourse of God." Descartes, The Method. Meditations and Philosophy, p. 320, Pr. LII. 64* Descartes, The Method. Mediations and Philosophy, p. 320, Pr. LII. L

_f

37 Descartes notes finally that there is an outstanding attribute for every substance which constitutes its nature and essence and to which all other attributes are re­ ferred; thus extension constitutes the nature of bodily substance, and thought the nature of the thinking sub­ stance or mind. ^ From Descartes* formula for recognizing created sub­ stances, Wolff is able to claim that a subject modifiable and perdurable is really what Descartes had in mind all along.

’’Because,1’ notes Wolff, ’’from the Cartesian

hypothesis, things which are present in a subject are re­ ferred to a principal attribute and from that attribute the substantiality of the subject ought always to be 65. ”0f every substance there is one. principal attribute, as thinking of the mind, extension of the body. But although any attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge of substance, there is, however, one principal property of every substance, which consti­ tutes its nature or essence, and upon which all the others depend. Thus, extension in length, breadth, and depth, constituted the nature of corporeal sub­ stance; and thought the nature of thinking sub­ stance. For every other thing that can be attribut­ ed to body, presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended thing; as all the properties we discover in the mind are only diverse modes of thinking. Thus, for example, we cannot conceive figure unless in something extended, nor motion un­ less in extended space, nor imagination sensation, or will, unless in a thinking thing.” Descartes, The Method. Meditations and Philosophy. p. 320, Pr. LIII.

L

-I

recognized; therefore, it is necessary that this attribute or determination be c o n s t a n t , C o n s i d e r i n g more clearly sayyWolff, "The confused notion of substance which con­ fronted the mind of Descartes, while from this given de­ finition he explained his method of recognizing sub­ stantiality, it will be apparent without any difficulty that this philosopher represented substance to himself as a subject which is constituted through a certain fixed determination, so that it is impossible without this de­ termination for.it to exist or to be conceived; and from this determination it can be understood why other de­ terminations, whether constant or variable, are present or able to be present.

Consequently, substance ?d.ll be

recognized as a subject perdurable, i.e., fitted to last for some time, and modifiable, or capable of ad­ mitting divers modifications."^ "Therefore," concludes Wolff, "as far as can be gathered from'his (Descartes1) contention, the same notion, though confused, was presented to the mind of Descartes as we have established above."^ Substance, therefore, as Wolff conceives it, does not imply a mode of existence, but rather the recognizability of a constant fundamental determination. 66. Wolff, Qntologia Ho. 772. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid.

Hence,

39 substance for lolff does not involve existence, but only essence, and this essence in turn is reducible to an ob­ servable determination.

Understanding substance in this

way, the objection which Locke urges against the knowability of substance becomes in Wolff's mind irresistible. In supporting his claim that the common notion of substance is imaginary,*^

lolff describes how, according

to him, one commonly arrives at the notion of substance as a subject or a container.

All qualities obvious to

the senses are described as inhering ("insunt"), and are called accidents; consequently we must suppose a subject sustaining them, "which while we are thinking what kind it is, we are able to attribute to it nothing, since we have removed from it all qualities and listed them under 70 accidents.11

Consequently, the more we fix our at­

tention on this imaginary subject, the less are we able to see anything in it.

In fact, it would be a contra­

diction to have listed as accidents and to have removed from a subject all the qualities which are present in it and then pretend to visualize substance in terms of qualities which still inhere in it.

In fact, the more

69. Wolff, Qntologia No. 773. For Wolff, that is an imaginary notion "in which on account of a certain resemblance, that is pictured which does not exist, so that we are able to maintain as standing before our eyes, that which was never presented to them." Wolff, Qntologia No. 110. 70. Wolff,. Qntologia No. 773.

L

-J

40 r

i

we try to picture anything in such a subject, the more obscure becomes the darkness surrounding such an imagina­ tion.

"^ence," concludes Wolff, "we affirm that the sub­

stantial (element or aspect) of things is not known by us.-71 lolff insists that Locke in his 11Essay‘on the Mature of Human Understanding" - Book II, Chapter 23, - rests his case on the common notion of substance and does not advance beyond this while calling substance a sub­ stratum or support for (sensible) qualities which have _ i the power of producing simple ideas in us and are common­ ly called accidents. lolff, as we have noted, also confuses substance and its mode of existence with an observable determina­ tion contained in it.

However, there is this difference

between Wolff and Locke.

In Locke the properties or

qualities or contents of substance are sensible and receive the name accidents| in Wolff, by a process of abstraction, they are refined into intelligible qualities and receive the name essence. SIMPLE SUBSTANCE The clearest and most consistent feature of Christian 71. Wolff, Qntologia No. 773. 72. Cf. Campo, Christian Wolff e-il Razionalismo Precritico. Vol. I, pp. 190-193. L

J[

Wolff*s teaching on substance is its character of simplici ty.

For Wolff, a subject modifiable and perdurable is

fundamentally simple.

In his opinion, the only true sub­

stances are simple substances.

On the other hand, a

composite substance, which is an aggregate of simple sub­ stances, enjoys title to substantiality solely because of the simple substances entering into its composition. The argument by which Wolff' arrives at this con­ clusion is interesting though fallacious.

It illustrates

clearly the precritical rationalism characteristic of his philosophy.

If compound beings are given, he reasons,

it is necessary also that simple beings be given.

In

other words, without simple beings, compounds cannot exist. another.

Compounds are made up of parts distinct from one If these parts should in turn be composed of

further distinct parts, these will also be compound beings.

Therefore, as long as there are admitted other

smaller parts from which the larger parts are composed, the question continues to arise from what source are these smaller parts composed.

Consequently, in other

words, it is not yet established from what source these smallest compounds arise which enter into the composi­ tion of the other, larger compounds. In the notion of a compound, therefore, no suf­ ficient reason can be discovered why it is composed; on the other hand, without such a reason, (why it is

composed rather than not) a compound could not exist. Since this sufficient reason cannot be found in the comt

pound, it must be sought outside the compound, or in the N.

simple beings comprising it.

“If, therefore," concludes-,

Wolff, "compound beings exist, simple beings must also , exist, or without simple beings, no compound could exist or even be conceived."^ That lolff was influenced by his knowledge of mathe­ matics in reaching this conclusion is emphasized in his comparison betmreen compounds and large numbers.

Any

large number is able to be made up of smaller numbers, this happens in addition where the sum is a number com­ posed of other numbers smaller than itself, just as the whole is made up of parts.

But if the smaller number

should again be made up, by addition, of numbers still smaller, one would not have a sufficient reason why numbers are given.

This is most evident if one should

wish to define a rational number without supposing any other numbers except those which are continuously smaller.

There is no definition of number which says that

number is a multitude of smaller numbers.

In order to

understand what number is or, in Wolfffs terminology, in order that a sufficient reason for number be given, one must eventually come to a unit, devoid of all multitude which every number involves. 73. Wolff, Qntologia Ho. 686.

43 "I

From this example, argues Wolff, it is evident that a compound also cannot he sufficiently understood as long as one postulates that it is composed of smaller com­ pounds.

To explain a compound properly, one must eventually

resort to something which is devoid of all composition, namely, a being truly simple or indivisible in.itself. Both in his argument and example, Wolff succumbs to a common fallacy.

In an effort to give a mathematical

reading to reality, he supposed that unity was indivisi­ bility, when as a matter of fact, a thing knotm to be one may be merely undivided or individual. Unity means the absence of division. In his argument, therefore, Wolff insists that there must be simple because there are compound substances, whereas composition only requires less complex or re­ latively simple elements. On the basis of his assumption that compounds could not exist or even be thought of except for simple beings, Wolff reduces the essence of a composite being to mere accidents.7^ From this he argues that when a compound perishes, 7*5

only the accidents perish, but nothing substantial. J 74* "The essence of a composit being consists only in mere accidents for the essence of a composit consists in the manner in which its parts are combined with one another.” Wolff Qntologia No. 789. ' 75* "Since the essence of a compound being consists only in mere accidents when its essence is taken away or the compound ceases to exist, and, therefore, perishes, only the mere accidents perish, nothing substantial." j Qntologia No. 790.

u 1 Hence he concludes that in a compound the only substantial realities are the simple substances of which it is composed.

76

The simple substances of which e v e r y composite

being is an aggregate, justify both the existence of the Compound and the presence in it of accidents, since with-

out something substantial, accidents could not exist.

77

Wolff* s fallacy in concluding that unity requires indivisibility and composition demands simplicity ?/as (

destined to carry him to a conclusion even more extreme; and that conclusion was to furnish both the metaphysical basis and the logical justification for his dynamism. Any being that can be thought of, argued Wolff, will fall into one of two classes; either it is simple or compound.

But in a compound being it has already been

shown that nothing substantial is given except simple beings;

”it is impossible, therefore, that apart from

simple substances there be given any other or that there be given a substance which is not s i m p l e . O n

the

76. In a compound being there is given nothing substantial apart from simple beings, for the essence of a com­ pound being consists only in mere accidents, conse­ quently nothing is able to belong to the compound ex­ cept that whose reason is contained in the essence (of the compound); the remaining things which belong to the compound are all mere accidents.n Wolff, Ontologia lo. 792. 77. Wolff, Ontologia $lo. 792. 78. Ibid., 23o . 793.

L

-I

45

r

i basis of that contention, Wolff will be in a position to hold that matter and motor force are only the apparent constituents of bodies, whose true components are "the elements”; or simple substances, of which bodies are an aggregate. In Wolff's opinion* therefore, the only substances truly deserving of the name are simple substances.

"No

substances," he insists, "are given except simple sub"VQ stances and compound beings are aggregates of substances. ty

In the interests of terminology however, Wolff makes an immediate concession.

"I prefer," he says, "that ag­

gregates of simple substances, namely, those compound beings of which the material world is composed, he called bodies rather than simple substances . . . .

although any

body whatsoever is not one substance, but rather an.ag­ gregate of innumerable substances."^ But while Wolff is willing to make concessions to the traditional use of terms, he holds that it would be unfitting to attribute to a composite substance that which belongs only to a simple substance; "which substances are always to be understood," he notes, "when we speak of substance 1simpliciter*, since simple and compound sub­ stances are not two species contained under the same genus.11#1

79. Wolff, 80. Wolff, 81. Wolff, L

Ontologia N0 . 793. Ontologia No. 793. Ontologia No. 794.

Italics mine -I

4.6

If the essence of a composite consists merely in accidents, if there is nothing substantial in a compound substance except the simple substances of which it is com­ posed, if there are given no substances in Wolfffs ontology except simple substances, certainly one must concede that a simple substance is a large and very important piece in the mosaic of Wolffian metaphysics, and a section which deserves to be examined closely. What is a simple substance and what are its character­ istics?

”A being is called simple,” says Wolff, “which

82 lacks parts.”

A simple being, therefore, is opposed to

a compound being since the latter is made up of many parts distinct from one another.

The attributes of a simple

being furthermore are quite different from the qualities and characteristics which fit the compound as a compound. The contrast between the characteristics of simple and composed being, and consequently of simple and com­ posed substance, will emphasize the inconsistency in Wolff’s theory of substance.

If there is nothing sub­

stantial in compound substance except the simple sub­ stances of ifhich it is composed, if accurately speaking the only substances, in Wolff’s opinion, are simple sub­ stances, if “bodies” are mere aggregates of simple sub­ stances, - one might reasonably expect compound substance 82. Wolff, Ontologia No. 673 L

-J

to partake of the characteristics of the simple substances of which it is composed.

Such, however, is not Wolff's

opinion. ATTRIBUTES OF SIMPLE BEING By definition, a simple being has no parts and that which has no parts, existing outside of one another, is not extended. ^ Also, because a simple being has no parts, there cannot be distinguished in it many things different from one another, hence Wolff reasons, a simple being is indivisible. ^ Again, the attribute of size or magnitude cannot exist without a multitude of parts, which are lacking in a simple being; consequently a simple being has no size 85 or magnitude. ^

^

Figure or shape is the outline of extension.

But

since a simple being is not extended, it likewise has no shape or figure. Finally, a ■simple being is able to take up no space. Wolff's reason for this claim is that any being fills space inasmuch as in imaginary space there can be pictur­ ed an immobile part with the same extension as the ex­ tension of that being.

Only that which is extended can

83. Wolff, Ontologia No. 675. 8 4 . Ibid..-No. 676 . 85. Ibid., No. 678.

r

fill space.

i

But a simple being does not have any ex-

tension, hence it does not fill any space.

86

COMPOSED BEING OR COMPOUND SUBSTARCE Contrasted with the notion of simple being is the notion of compound or composed being.

The consideration

of compound being is of primary importance in the develop­ ment of this dissertation.

Dynamism is a theory concern­

ing the constitution of bodies and Christian Wolfffs philosophy of bodies and their constitution stems directly from his concept of composite being.

In Wolff's own words,

"The philosophy of composite being furnishes the prini

ciples for philosophising on both natural and artificial bodies . . . .

lhat things, therefore, are demonstrated

of composite being in general, can also be applied both to natural and artificial bodies and hence are the principles for a philosophy of bodies .0

87

Incidentally, Wolff himself uses the word "bodies / 1 and the term, "composite beings, 11 interchangeably.

He

speaks of "bodies or composite being” - "corpora seu entia c o m p o s i t a . " I

prefer,” he says, "that the

8 6 . Wolff, Ontologia No. 679. 87. Ibid.. No. 641. Wolff repeats this advice at the outset of his cosmolo­ gical treatment of the essence and nature of bodies. "Because bodies are composite beings, to bodies are able to be applied all those things which have been dem­ onstrated of composite beings in First Philosophy.” Christian Wolff, Cosmologia Gehgxalxa, M^thodo ScientiPertractata, Yerona, Ramazini, 1736 , No- 1 2 1 . 8 8 . Wolff, Ontologia No. 794.

49 r

-j

aggregates of simple substances, viz., those composite beings from which the material world is made, be called bodies .11 In view of the emphasis and importance previously attached to simple beings and simple substances] one might anticipate a rather brief and cursory treatment of composite being in lolff!s ontology.

He has insisted that the only

true substances are simple substances.

Composite sub­

stances are not even to be regarded as a species of sub­ stance, they contain nothing substantial except simple substances cf which they are merely an aggregate.

And

yet, in spite of these apparent prejudices, Wolff gives rather full consideration to the subject of composed being. "A being is called composed," declares Wolff, '‘which is made up of many parts distinct from each other.

The parts

of which a composit being is composed constitute a composite through the link which makes the many parts taken to89 gether a unit of a definite kind." The essence of a compound being consists in the manner in which its parts are combined with one another. This point is important because through its essence a body is able to act, also the kinds of activity of which a body is capable are determined by its essence, even though the actualization of the bodily activities themselves must be 89. Wolff, Ontologia No. 532. L

50 r

1

attributed, in Wolfffs opinion, to active or motor force* Since the essence of the composite consists in the manner in which the component parts are joined together, anyone knows the essence of a composite if he knows what kind its parts are and how they are joined among them­ selves to produce the composite.

Hence, for example, the

essence of a watch is known by anyone who knows the shape of its individual wheels and remaining parts, together with their relations and connections with one another. Like?/ise, one knows the essence of the human body, ac­ cording to Wolff, if he knows the shape and other quali­ ties of its individual parts and the manner in which they" are joined together, as is taught in anatomy.90 From the structure of the\human body, it can also be gathered how it is arranged in this or that posture, and how it can be subject to this or that disease.

Wolff

used this example to illustrate his claim that the ex­ planation (ratio) of those things which are found in a compound being is contained in the qualities of its parts and the manner in which they are joined among themselves.

Consequently, for example, through their

structure it is also evident how plants grow and how they beget similar plants.

91

Composite beings are similar when the individual parts of one are similar to the individual parts of 90. Wolff, Ontologia Ho. 534. 91. Ibid. Ho. 535. L

J

51 r

1

another and are joined in the same manner.

On the other

hand, composite beings are dis-similar if the parts of one are unlike the parts of another; or if like parts are join­ ed in a different manner .^2 Finally, the qualities of the parts and the manner in which these parts are connected among themselves de­ termine the genera and species of bodies.

Genera and

species as we have seen are determined through essentials, but the essentials of composite beings are the qualities of their parts and the determinations of the manner in which these parts are joined together.

For example,

among animals, quadrupeds, although composed of parts, of the same kind, are nevertheless divided into different species through their diverse qualities.

In attempt­

ing, therefore, to establish the difference between one animal and another, recourse is had to the differences of the parts which meet the e y e . ^ While. Christian Wolff insists that a compound being is nothing else than an aggregate of simple beings, he is equally insistent that the characteristics and qualities of composed being differ radically from the attributes of the simple beings composing it.

»\ CO

9 2 . Wolff, Ontologia No. 537. 93. Cf. Wolff, Ontologia No. 539 By species here Wolff seems to mean sub-species. Cf. mortimer Jerome Adler, The Problem of Species. New York Sheed & Ward, 194-0, p. 218. Obviously, the bodily part of animals and other composed beings to which Wolff re­ fers here are not to be identifiedwith thesimple subL stances of which every composed being is an aggregate, j

52 r

“I

THE ATTRIBUTES OF COMPOSED BEING A composed being has extension because it is made up of parts which, though united, are distinct from one an­ other.

For Wolff, parts which are distinct from one an­

other exist outside of one another, and that which has parts outside of parts is extended. While this might seem at first glance to conform to the Scholastic description and understanding of ex­ tension, a more careful scrutiny will disclose quite the opposite.

Wolff's dynamism is clearly manifested in

even the briefest analysis of what he means by “extended .11 To begin with, Wolff does not speak of extension, which is a property and an abstract quality, but he speaks rather of something which is extended (extensum), a being to which this property is attributed. Furthermore, that which is extended is a phenomenon, \¥hich for Wolff means that while obvious to the senses it is confusedly perceived.

As we shall see later, Wolff

classes not only extension but motion, figure, velocity and all sensible qualities as phenomena. Ordinarily one conceives the bulk or extension of an object prior to the force which it exercises.

In

fact, a body!s force is partially estimated in terms of its extension and density. W o l f f rs notion. L

This however, is not

Following Leibniz, Wolff conceives -I

53 f"

i extension as the resultant effect of striving and resisting substances, which have been aggregated into bodies.

To

strive and resist, to act and to act against, presuppose nelements 11 already endo¥?ed with force, and this force must be conceived prior to and as the cause of the phenomenon which Wolff calls extended reality. How does the impression of extension arise?

How

is it that the aggregate of inextended ‘'elements’1 becomes itself extended?

Wolff's reasoning or explanation can

be summarized as follows.

The "elements ,11 or simple sub­

stances of which each extended reality is an aggregate exist outside of one another.

Furthermore they cannot

coincide with one another because they enjoy intrinsic differences and hence they are not reducible to mathe­ matical points. On the general principle that those things which are different from one another exist outside of one another, Wolff passes from the diversity of the "elements" to their existence outside of one another, and from this he arrives at the conclusion that a composite is extended or that it has "parts outside of parts." The fallacy of this argument, however lies in the claim that because the simple., substances or elements do not coincide in the ideal order (since the internal state of each element is conceived to be intrinsically different from the others) therefore they cannot coincide L

j

in the real order.

In other words, because the concepts

of no two elements coincide in our minds therefore Wolff argues that no two elements can coincide in reality.

They

are distinct in thought, hence they must be distinct in reality.

From spiritual and ideal non-coincidence Wolff

reasons to a non-coincidence in the physical order. By a continuum is usually understood a particle of matter which enjoys unbroken extension.

Christian Wolff,

however, calls a composite being a continuum if its parts are arranged among themselves in such a way that it is absolutely impossible for other parts to be placed be­ tween or among them. While a simple being is indivisible, Wolff regards a composite being as divisible in many ways.

A compound

substance, for example, is divisible if one part can exist even if another part were annihilated; or if its parts are able to be placed at some distance from each other.

If the parts of the composit are not continuous,

it is not repugnant that other extended parts be inter­ spersed among them.

This can involve no conceivable

difficulty so long as the original parts, i.e. the ele­ ments, are at some interval from one another. When a composite being is continuous it may still be divisible if its continuous parts do not exist joined necessarily to one another. redundant.

Wolff's reasoning is rather

!fParts not joined together necessarily, exist

alongside one another contingently, hence it is not repugnant that these he rearranged so that some extended 9L

reality be placed between or among them.” ^ Unlike simple beings, a composit is not only divisible and extended, but is. endowed with figure or shape,

has a

i

determined size, and is said to fill space.

The size and

shape of a composite are intimately linked with the space \ which it occupies. Because it is extended, every composite being is endowed with a certain figure or shape.

The size of a

composite being is the same as the size of the imaginary space which v/ould be determined with the same surface figure.

Moreover, if a composite is made up of parts

which are not continuous but separate, Wolff insists that in computing its size, ”there must also be taken into consideration the intervening space, whether with Gassendi and Democritus these are considered to be vacua, or with Descartes and Aristotle they are considered to be filledl’95 The resume and description of the opposing character­ istics of compound and simple being emphasize by contrast how a simple being differs from a compound being.

There

is, hoT wever, a still further difference, peculiar to Wolff*s Ontology, bet¥/een simple and compound being.

In

a simple being there is no internal motion (motus intestinus); in a composit being internal motion is present. 94-. Wolff, Ontologia So. 638. 95. Ibid.. So. 624-.

56

r

n This difference stems directly from Wolff*s opinion that the essence of a composite consists in the manner in which its parts, distinct from one another, are joined together. "We call that motion internal," declares Wolff, "by which those things which are in any being change their location in reference to one another.

Internal motion

does not belong to the being but to those things which QA exist in it ."7 Ih a simple being internal motion cannot exist because a simple being has no parts, consequently there cannot b e ;found in a simple being many things whose locations in reference to one another are able to vary. On the other hand, in a composite being the location or arrangement of parts can be changed, hence certain parts are able to be moved in relation to others.

"For

example," writes Wolff, "if any liguid is fermented, even though all of it is at rest in the glass, its parts are carried hither and thither by internal motion.

This

internal motion is able to be stimulated by fermentation because the liquid is a compound being. The usually dull pages of Wolfffs ontology throws i no further light on this brief but interesting distinc­ 4

tion.

He refers to it again in his Psychology, showing

9 6 . Wolff, Ontologia No. 680n. 97. Ibid. s 1 L

-I

57 r

that he has not altered his position on this point, hut he adds nothing to the doctrine as already stated in his Ontology.9#

98.

L

Cf, Tlilolff, Ontologia No. 640 n.

CHAPTER II BODIES The sensible and material universe examined in the Cosmology of Christian Wolff is a world make up of composed beings called bodies.-*-

To bodies as composed

beings can be ascribed all that has been demonstrated of composed beings in the previous chapter.

Hence, p for example, each body is endowed with shape, occupies o / a fixed spaee^ and has a definite size. 0 f course, all bodies also are extended.5 ESSENCE OF BODIES Christian Wolff is emphatic in stating that he does not agree with Descartes that the essence of bodies £ is extension. For Wolff, the essence of a body consists in the manner in which its given parts are joined together.^

This is one of his basic metaphysical concepts

relating to composed substance to which Wolff adheres 1. Christian Wolff, Cosmologia Generalis. Methodo Scientifica Pertractata. Verona, Ramazini, 1736, No. 119. 2 . Wolff, Cosmologia No, 119. 3. Ibid.. No. 1 2 4 . 4. Ibid., No. 123. 5. Ibid., No. 12 2 , 6 . Ibid., No. 1 2 2 . 7. Christian Wolff, Prima Philosonhia sive Ontologia. Frankfort and Leipzig, Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1736 , No. 533, Cf. Wolff, Cosmologia. No. 140.

strenuously and constantly throughout his treatment of "bodies.

It cannot be too frequently recalled.

The arrangement of parts which constitutes the essence of a body determines also that of which a body is capable.

From the bodily essence so conceived arises the

$ active potency of the body ,0 not only its ability to act, but also its ability to act in one particular way rather than in another.*^

Although the composition of parts,

and not extension, constitutes the essence of a;tbody, extension does result from that composition.. All bodies are necessarily extended.^* tension is parts.

A prerequisite for ex­

The notion of extension in the mind

of Christian Wolff involves the diffusion and congre12 gation of parts. An extended reality requires parts existing outside of one another and united among them­ selves.

The Wolffian concept of extension is predicat­

ed on the supposition of a plurality of parts at once dis tinct and united.

The union of the many parts makes

the extended reality continuous and has been already il­ lustrated by the example of the rapid ringing of a bell 8. 9* 10. 11. 12.

Wolff, Cosmologia No. 143. Ibid..No. 1 4 2 . Ibid..No. 143n. Ibid..No. 223 Friedrich Christian Baumeister, Institutiones Metaphysicae, Wurttemberg, Zimmermann, 1743, No. 436.

60 r

n in which the end of the sound of the preceding stroke coincides with the beginning of the sound of the stroke following so that the listener receives the impression of one prolonged peal. J

It is hard, however, to see how

Wolff can base the phenomenon of extension on such an example because extension requires the simultaneous co­ existence of many parts, whereas in the ringing of the bell,^ the individual sounds are successive and each pre­ ceding sound is on the point of perishing when its suc­ cessor begins to be h e a r d . ^ Because, as Wolff himself contends, those parts from which the compound arises and of which it is composed lc are simple substances, J and because simple substances

^

have no extension,

16

"each body has its origin in that

which is not extended, although* it is itself ext ended.

17

It will be helpful to recall this latter observation when we come to examine Wolff*s charge that extension is only confusedly conceived^** and hence is a phenomenon. 13. Cf. Wolff, Ontologia Mo. 568 . 14. Wolff, Ontologia S p t789. 15. Wolff, Ontologia Wo. 793. 16. Wolff, Ontologia Mo. 675. 17. Wolff, Cosmologia No. 223, Cf. Baumeister, Institu­ t i o n s Metachvsicae Mo. 455, also Mariano Campo, Christiano Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico. Milan, Societa Editrice "Vita e Pensiero,” 1939, Vol.I, p. 226 , n. 2 . 18. Wolff, Cosmologia Mo. 2 2 4 . 19. Ibid.. Mo. 2 2 6 .

L

61

That charge would seem to make Wolff*s notion of matter either spiritual or ideal.

20

NATURE OF BODIES All that has been previously stated concerning the essence of bodies and their extension is easily traceable to the general notions of composed being stated in Wolff*s first philosophy.

It is also logically consistent with

W o l f f »s general metaphysics of composed being outlined in the previous chapter. The complexity of Wolff*s theory of the constitution of bodies becomes apparent, however, when we attempt to pass with him from his notion of essence to nature.

In

Scholastic philosophy there is very little difficulty in making the transition from essence to nature. of a thing is its essence,in operation.

The nature

It is the dif­

ference between the same reality viewed as static and as dynamic.

Wolff himself folloirs this view in distinguish­

ing between the essence and the nature of the soul for him these are but two aspects or functions of the same reality.

But when he considers bodies his viewpoint

Is quite different.

In the Cosmology of Christian Wolff,

the nature of a body is not its essence considered in operation.

The nature of the body adds over and above to

20. Cf. Campo, Christian Wolff e 11 Razionalismo Prescritico. Vol. I, p. 2 2 6 .

62 its essence a new factor called force.

For Wolff the

nature of a body is its principle of acting and being aeted^ upon and involves not only the potency of acting and being acted upon, but also active or motor force and passive force or the force of inertia.2-*- In Wolff’s opinion, before the bodily essence can operate, it must be endowed with force.

Through its essence a body is able to act

and is fitted to perform certain special actions or to act in a special way, but that a body actually operate, it must be endowed with force. In building up his metaphysics of bodies, Wolff was obviously influenced more by the notions of Leibniz than of Aristotle.

It is true he mentions the name of Aristotle

frequently and pays at least lip Y^orship to Aristotle’s teaching on matter and form; but it is Leibniz’s notion of a ”striving and a resisting substance1’ that dorainates his thinking on bodies and he is irrevocably attached to the Leibnizian ideal that there is no body without motion and no substance without effort. Wolff considers the metaphysical make-up of bodily nature from the standpoint of appearance and reality.

In

reality, he claims the ultimate constituent principles of bodies are the inextended points of force, the atoms of nature, the irreducible elements, which act and at least appear to be acted upon .22

i~

21. Wolff, Cosmologia No. 145. 22. Ibid.. No. 300, also Cosmologia No. 192n.

63 r

-i

In appearance, bodies seem to be composed of matter and motor f o r c e , w h i c h are to be conceived after the matter of substances.

Matter and motor force, similar to

the matter and form of the Scholastics and to the matter and motion of the Mechanicists

2L

are represented as passive

and active principles£ eventually, however, Wolff insists that they are not real beings or substantial principles distinct from each other, but only phenomena, whose common source is the elements from which alone bodies derive their 25 substantiality. Viewed as of

a source of activity and as thesubject

change,2 ^* a Wolffian body is a being composed of matter

and endowed with motor force. the passive principle.

27

In appearance matter is

Wolff defines matter as extension

endowed with the force of inertia.2 ^

The striving and

resisting substance of Leibniz is made resisting in Wolff*s Co'smology by the force of inertia.

The zenonic

points, from which as parts each body takes its rise, certainly need something to reinforce them and give rise to the impression of bulk and stability. inertia does just that.

The force of

The force of inertia is the

23. Wolff, Cosmologia Mo. 170. 24. Ibid.. Mo. 299. 25* Ibid.. Mo. 316 26. Cf. Wolff, Cosmologia Mo. 136. 27. Cf. Baumeister, Institutiones letaphvsicae Mo. 4 4 2 . 26. Wolff, Cosmologia Mo. 141.

L

Jf

64 r

i principle of resistance to motion in bodies.

Through its

force of resistance a body is rendered sluggish or slow 29 to motion. In the Wolffian metaphysics of bodies, the force of inertia explains the fact that no action follows even when force is used to move a body. w Matter is extension endowed with the force of in­ ertia.

The force of inertia is not determined by ex­

tension, however, but is supposed in extension.^

It is

not a consequence of extension, but a prerequisite for extension .-^2

If the force of inertia were dependent on

extension, then that body which had the greatest ex­ tension would have the greatest force of inertia and would offer the strongest resistance. to experience.

This is contrary

A pound of lead, for example offers just

as much resistance as a pound of paper when one attempts to lift it, although in extension it is much smaller.

On

the other hand, those who construct stage scenery know that there is far less resistance in an imitation wall of paper than in a wall of natural stone with the same extension. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Wolff, Cosmologia No. 130. Ibid., No. 130. Ibid., N 0 . 131. This sequence is adopted from Leibniz, Cf. Campo, Christiano Wolff e il Razionalismo Precritico, Vol.I p. 210 . 33. Cf. Baumeister.- Institutiones Metaphvsicae. No. 435.

L

-3

r In the metaphysics of Christian Wolff, the only bodily changes which can be legitimately accounted for by extension are changes of figure, size, the arrangement of parts and location.

3L

Through the force of inertia, a

body resists all change, because inertia resists motion and in bodies change is brought about mainly through motion.

Ho changes take place on account of inertia, on

the contrary, because of its force of inertia a body resists all change.

35

On the other hand, the cause of

motion and hence the most prolific source of change in bodies is their active or motor force.

A body is a

being composed of matter and endowed with active force. For Wolff, as for Leibniz, there is no body without movement, no substance without effort.

Matter, in

Vtfolfffs opinion, cannot be conceived without motion. Obviously then, the notion of active or motor force is a prominent factor in his metaphysics of bodies. To justify the need and trace the origin of motor force and its opposing force of resistance will be the gist of the following pages of this chapter. ”Substance," wrote Leibniz, "cannot be without action

34. 35. 36. 37.

Wolff, Cosmologia Ho. 127. Ibid.. M o 7 T 2 2 t Ibid.. Mo. 170. Cf. Hobert Latta, "Introduction," Leibniz. The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1898, p. 90.

For Leibniz, according to Wolff, "a body at rest is 2g abhorrent to the nature of things ,11 On the other hand, 39 to be kept in motion, a body must be endowed with force. Force produces a striving (conatus) and unless that striving is resisted, there is continuous motion.

Since

the function of active force is to produce local motion, active force is also termed by Wolff, motor force. Wolff defines motor force as that “which is the principle of changes in bodies since indeed without motor force, no change could take place in an extended reality."' It will become more clearly apparent as this chapter unfolds that the basis for Wolff*s justification and development of the theory of motor force is found in his Ontology or first philosophy and to motor force in its relation to bodies is to be applied all that has been pre­ viously demonstrated of motor force in general in first 41 philosophy. Wolff himself attributes his interest in the de­ velopment of the notion of active force to two factors: first, his admiration for the manner in which Leibniz explains it, and, secondly, his dissatisfaction with the “inadequate explanation" offered by Aristotle and the 38. 39. 40. 41.

Wolff, Cosmologia Mo. 170. Ibid.. Ho. 135. Ibid.. Ho. 137. Cf. Wolff, Cosmologia Ho. 137.

67 r

"i

Scholastics to account for the transition from potency to act in bodies.

"The Scholastics and other philosophers

did not sufficiently distinguish potency and force from each other, while Leibniz more accurately investigated this difference and publicly explained i t ."^2 Wolff insisted that the most important of the philo­ sophers who failed to distinguish between active potency and active force was Aristotle and his failure was shared by his followers. If potency were all that is required for act, then from active potency alone action would continuously folio?/.

This, of course, is contrary to experience and

to the metaphysical principle that potency cannot actu­ alize itself, but must be actualized by something actual. According to Wolff, Aristotle attributed operation to potency when act followed potency.

But Aristotle did

not explain how potency was rendered effective for operat­ ing so that from it there now followed an act which pre­ viously did not result.

Aristotlefs deficiency was per­

petuated by his followers with the result that for them also potency is at one time joined with operation and at another time devoid of operation

This failure to give

an intelligible explanation of why activity on certain oc­ casions is added to potency "is not to be wondered at," *4.2 . Wolff. Ontologia No. 761.

L

68 r

I complains Wolff, "since the Aristotelian-Scholastics have admitted things (before) which could not be explained in an intelligible manner.1' ^ On the other hand, Leibniz’s explanation seemed to Wolff most clear and satisfying.

Openly critical of

what he considered the inadequacies of the Scholastic ex­ planation, Wolff wholeheartedly accepts the theory of Leibniz that active force is the go-between bridging the ga; p bet'ween faculty and operation and explaining how potency is stimulated to act. Adopting this position of Leibniz,^ Wolff claims that there is this difference bet¥\reen active potency and active force.

The active potency of the Scholastics,

which Wolff also calls faculty, is merely the proximate possibility of acting which must be aroused and stimulat­ ed by something: else before it can pass into act.

Active

force, on the other hand, is a medium between the faculty or potency of acting and the action itself. Active force contains action in itself, it involves striv­ ing (conatus) and it is carried into action by itself without the need of any external aid or stimulus.

The

requirement for active force to act is purely negative, namely, the removal of any impediment.

In the terminology

43. Wolff, Ontologia ho. 761. 4 4 . Cf. Latta, ”Introduction .11 Leibniz. The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. p. 91, fn. 2 . L

69

r

i of Wolff-’s metaphysics, that which impedes active force or prevents it from acting is called the force of resist­ ance or the force of inertia.

As will he explained later,

because of the active force which they enjoy, bodies and elements tend continuously to change unless impeded.

nThe

notion of force ,11 says Leibniz, “is as clear as that of activity or passivity, for it is that from which activity follows when nothing prevents i t . " ^ Leibniz*s notion of active force as a medium be­ tween potency and act, together with the purely negative requirement demanded for the presence of action, was so thoroughly acceptable to Wolff that he even used Leibniz*s illustrations to explain it.

In demonstrating his notion

of active force, Leibniz used as examples a heavy hanging body stretching the rope which sustains it, and a bent or drawn bow in which the force of elasticity can be perceived.

The heavy weight exercises a continuous ef­

fort (conatus) to fall, and pulls on the rope, ivhich it stretches.

The bent bow strives continuously to restore

itself to the state which it enjoyed before it was bent. In each case action follows 7/hen the impediment is.re­ moved.

The hanging body falls if the rope is either

broken or cut.

The bow straightens when that is removed

which previously had prevented it from straightening. 4-5. Cf. Latta l?Introduction." Leibniz The Monadology and Other Philosophical .Writings, p. 91. L

-J

The difference between active force and the power of acting, which according to Wolff, Aristotle and the Scholastics did not sufficiently distinguish and which Leibniz "accurately disclosed," receives a very orderly treatment in the metaphysics of Christian Wolff.

An

analysis of the notion of active potency furnishes his starting point in attempting to indicate clearly the dif­ ference between active potency and active or motor force. The order in which the analysis is made follows the directive issued by Wolff himself:

"Anyone wishing to

understand the definition of active and passive potency must resolve them into the definition of action, passion and possibility."^ Possible, for Wolff, is thatk which involves no contradiction.^-?

Action is a change of state, the

reason or explanation of which is contained within the subject whose state is changed. ^

"While writing,"

observes Wolff, "the state of the one writing is changed and the reason for the change is contained in the writer 49 himself." By contrast, Passion or being acted upon is a change of state the explanation of which is found outside the 46. 47. 48. 49.

Wolff, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid..

Ontologia, Mo. 71 6 . Mo. 85. Mo. 713. M 0 . 713.

subject whose state is changed. quite interesting.

50

Wolff 1s. illustration is

When a sponge is compressed, certain

changes take place in it.

Its size becomes smaller, the

parts draw closer together and may even be contiguous. The reason for this compression is not in the sponge, but outside of it, in the one who compresses it.

The

sponge is said to be acted upon, therefore, when it is compressed, and its compression is called Passion.^I (Compression in this example can also indeed be con­ sidered an action if it denotes the motion of the hand by which the sponge is compressed, but this compression is regarded as passive when it indicates the state of the sponge now reduced to less volume so that it fills less space than it formerly

occupied

^ 2

The possibility of being acted upon is called passive potency. ^

The notion of passive potency indicates that

in the subject acted upon there are modifications by means of which its passions can be clearly explained and the changes brought about in it by external causes can be understood.^

In a subject acted upon there should be

found some explanation why such action is possible.

f,A

stone ,11 notes Wolff, "which can be turned into chalk does not have the passive potency of being hardened by fire.f,55 50. 51. 52. 53. 5 k. 55.

Wo-lff, Ibid.. Ibid.. Ibid.. Ibid., Ibid..

Ontologia Mo, 71k. ho. 71k. ho. 71k. ho. 716. ho. 716. ho. 71k.

72 r

T The sponge referred to in the previous illustration could not have been actually compressed unless it was able to be compressed.

Compression had to be possible before it

could actually take place.

Because the parts of the sponge

were soft and gave easily to the touch,'because the pores between the parts were quite large and judged able to be diminished, the compression of the sponge was considered possible before it was attempted.

A sufficient reason

or explanation for the possibility of the sponge being acted upon is found in the essence of the sponge, in its texture for instance, and because its parts when soaked in v/ater become softer. 56 The possibility of acting is called by Wolff Active Potency, or simply Potency.

In Wolff!s metaphysics,

active potency is also termed Faculty.5?

Wolff's notion

of active potency implies that in the subject acting there are present realities through which the subject's activities can be clearly explained and it can be understood how they are able to happen.

58

Active potency is a

necessary pre-requisite for action since without it there can be no prospect of action taking place in the subject, just as without passive potency the subject cannot be acted

upon.

59

On the other hand, from active potency alone no action 56. 57 . 58. , 59. L

Wolff, Qntologla No. 716. Ibid.,Bo. 716 ,Cf.Qntologia Bo. 761. Ibid..Bo. 716. Ibid.. Bo. 719. '

_I

73 r

-I

follows.^**

What is possible does not on that account

exist,

and Wolff notes the Scholastic axiom nA posse Lp ad esse non valet consequentia.“D Apart from its possi­ bility, something else is required in order that a being exist.

“W’e have,” says Wolff, “the potency for writing,

nevertheless, we do not write; otherwise, there must needs be continuous writing."^

Consequently, if over and above

active potency something else is not postulated in the subject which determines the actuality of action, no action can ever f o l l o w . ^ The subject of the action is called the agent, (“Agens11) .

The agent, therefore, is that being in whom

the action actually occurs.

65

Wolff argues that there

must be admitted something over and above active potency which contains in itself a sufficient reason for the actuality of action. ACTIVE OR MOTOR FORCE l?olfffs justification, therefore, for the presence of motor force in bodies is based on the principle of sufficient reason.

“Force ,11 says Wolff, “is that which

contains in itself the sufficient reason for the actuality

60. 61. 62* 63. 64. 65. L.

Wolff, Qntologia ^o. 717. Ibid.. Mo. 171. Ibid., Mo. 171. Ibid.. No. 717. Ibid.. Mo. 717. Ibid., Mo. 720.

74 r

“i

of action.

Wolff hastens to add that this is only a

nominal definition and he attempts immediately to explain how force should be understood so that action follows from it.

fjrj

'

His explanation would seem to be based on the

traditional axiom that for every effect there must be a proportioned and adequate cause, or, in his terminology, a sufficient reason. THE HECESSARY CORRECTION BETWEEN FORCE AND ACTION Through the placing of a sufficient reason there results that which rather is than is not, in this instance, action.

Force being postulated, a sufficient reason is

immediately given for the actuality of action; hence force being placed, action is also placed.

6&

uIt is evident, therefore ,11 says Wolff, nthat force ought so to be conceived that from it action is under­ stood to follow- as soon as it is placed in the agent. Thus, for example, as soon as motor force is placed in something able to move, in it likewise is conceived motor action on which its passage through space

d e p e n d s . 11^

,fSimilarly,,! notes Wolff, “if we conceive the force of writing in the one writing, the act of writing also is understood to be present, i.e., the one writing actually 66. 67. 68. 69. L

Wolff, Ibid.. Ibid.. Ibid..

Ontolosia No. 722. M0 . 722. Ho. 723. Ho. 723.

75 r

i

writes.

Take away this necessary connection between force

and action and there will still be need of another prin70 ciple in order that action actually follow.” While agreeing with the general principle that every effect demands an adequate cause, one might still be pardon­ ed his failure to see how the cause of motion has to be motor force as conceived by Christian Wolff,

Braving the

consequences of disagreeing with him, it might still be true that some principle other than Wolfffs active force may be needed to account for the fact that bodily activity actually follows. By-passing for the moment an analysis of Wolff’s notion of active force, it may be well to emphasize at once the most glaring weakness in his whole theory. Bluntly, Wolfffs explanation of the origin of this force is a sample of a priori reasoning, divorced from experi­ ence and common sense, which is unconvincing to the reader and obscure even to its author. The sequence of thought by which Wolff develops his theory on the source of active force is as follows:

The

essence of a body consists in the manner in which its given parts of such a kind are joined together.

71

The

active potency of a body results from its essence .^2 For this reason what a body is'able to do is determined, 70. Wolff, Qntologia No.723. 71. Ibid.. No. 14-0, Cf. Qntologia No. 533. 72. Ibid.. No. 143. L

_J

76

and even limited, by its essence.

"Through its essence a

body is disposed to certain actions only ..."^3

n

Because

a body has one kind of an essence rather than another, from it are able to proceed one set of actions rather than another.

Hence, mere active potency, which is incapable

by itself of producing any action, consists in a disposi­ tion towards actions of such a kind.

"Why the hands of a

man are able to move in a certain manner can be understood from the structure of the body, which the study of ana/> tomy brings to light. Hence the actions which are perform­ ed by the hand are ultimately possible because of the structure of the body, that is, its e s s e n c e . T h e

ex­

planation, therefore, of why an action of such a kind is able to be placed is found in the essence of the subject, . 75 not m its motion or motor force. But while the ^gssence of the subject determines the kind of action t ha# can be placed, the essence itself is powerless itself to plape such an action.

The active

if'

force actually places the action and when the subject acts it must be endowed with force.

On the basis of this

distinction between^essence and active force, Wolff esta­ blishes the need of

admitting active force as aprinciple

thoroughly distinct

from the essence of thebody

73. Wolff, Cosmoloeia No. 14.3 . 74. J M A - , No. 142 , Cf. Cosmoloeia No. 140. 75. Ibid.. No. 143.

L

(and

77 from matter).

This admission, he claims, will have the

*1

added advantage of leading us to the source of active force and consequently to an investigation of the true elements of material t h i n g s . ^ What is the source of the active force which Wolff postulates in bodies?

If motor force is not determined

through matter nor through the essence of a body, what is its front?

In the Cosmology of Christian Wolff, active

force is the dominant principle of bodies.

Whence does

this active force arise? In answering these questions one must recall again that for Wolff simple substances and compound substances are not two species of substance.^

In Wolff's meta­

physics the only valid and true substances are simple sub stances.*7^

Furthermore, without simple substances

compound beings, and consequently bodies, could not exist.

79

It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that

Wolff insists that the active or motor force of bodies is traceable directly to simple substances.

His argu­

ment is a'negative one since the conclusion is arrived at by eliminating other possible sources.

This is how

Wolff explains it. In the essence of a being is found the explanation 76. 77. 78. 79. L

Wolff, Wolff, Ibid.. Ibid..

Cosmologia H0 . 147. Qntologia No. 794. Ho. 793..... H 0 . 687.

of those qualities which are invariably present in it.s^ Consequently, those qualities which would belong to the compound as a compound should be traceable to the essence of the compound, and a sufficient reason for their ex­ istence should be detected in the essence of a compound. The essence of a compound, it will be remembered, is de­ termined by the manner in which its parts are joined to­ gether.

Therefore, if active force was an immediate

quality of the compound as such, the explanation why force is present in a compound should follow from the type of its parts and the manner in which these parts are joined together. But it is evident, Wolff claims, that active force can by no means be inferred from that source.

Indeed,

on such a basis Descartes, (and some others), refuse to admit active force in bodies. Therefore, since in a body, apart from its essence and those things which result from it, nothing else is given except the simple substances of which it is an aggregate, if force is given in a body this force must result from the forces of the simple substances com­ posing it.^While the expression may be commonplace, the adage is sound that a chain is as strong as its weakest link. Wolff1s argument for deriving the active force of a body

80). Wolff, Qntologia -No. 167 81. Ibid., Ho. 795.

79 .r

from the simple substances composing it depends on his earlier claim that the essence of a compound consists merely in accidents and there is nothing substantial in a compound substance except the simple substances of which it is composed .**2 The fallacy underlying this claim has already been noted, namely, identifying unity math indivisibility and insisting that there must eventually be simple substances wherever there are compound substances, when as a matter of fact a compound substance merely demands parts which are potentially substances. Furthermore, the argument that if force is given in bodies it must result from the forces of simple substances is merely a negotive argument or a proof by exclusion or elimination.

There is no positive evidence advanced at

this time by Wolff to link force with simple substances. Moreover, it may be argued that even Wolff himself un­ intentionally implies that there may not be any active force in bodies at all, for his opening sentence is pure­ ly conditional;

lfIf M, he says, 11force" is given in a

composite substance it ought to result from the forces of the simple substances."^ In his Ontology, Wolff sidesteps a most obvious diffi­ culty in his theory with the promise of a future explana­ tion, which incidentally never clearly materializes. 82. Wolff, Qntologia No. 7 9 2 . 83. Wolff, Qntologia No. 795.

80 r

“i

"How,B he notes, “the force in a compound substance re­ sults from the forces of simple (substances) which enter into the same, cannot be taught here yet.

Howver, just as

extension is able to arise from that irhich is not extended, so also it is not repugnant that the force ?/hich is in a compound differs from the simple substances.

forces which are detected in

But from those things which have been

demonstrated so far, nothing yet can be clearly taught concerning the forces of simple substances."^ Wolff claims that without approving the theory of any individual concerning the

forces of simple substances,

one

should nevertheless admit

a certain active force in bodies

on the basis of the changes that have taken place in them, and (one ought) to derive this force from the forces pre­ sent in simple substances.^ The nature of the active force which lolff attributes to the simple substances, or elements entering into the compound, is proper subject matter for the following chapter on the elements.

However, even this far in ad­

vance, it should be noted that Wolff never fully explains the exact nature of the force in a simple substance which, when multiplied in an aggregate of simple substances, i.e., a body, manifests itself as motor f o r c e . ^ 84-. lolff, Qntologia No. 795, Cf. Qntologia No. 737, Cosmologia No. 183. 85. lolff, Qntologia Mo. 795n. 8 6 . Cf. lolff, Cosmofogia No. 294-n. L

J

81 r

i

Wolff admits from the outset that he is unable to de­ fine the specific difference x¥hieh distinguishes the simple substances entering into compounds

87

from the remaining

88 simple substances which are included under the same genus. Wolff claims as a reason for this inability that simple substances entering into composition only then are endowed with active force. ^ When Wolff does finally commit himself to a statement on the manner in which the active force of bodies is de­ rived from the forces of the simple substances entering into its composition, his explanation is still clouded by this unknown .specific difference.

"The manner," he notes,

"is now apparent in which the active force of bodies re­ sults from simple substances, ... this is, because the active froces of the simple substances conspire in some certain way so as to appear as one, that which cannot be more clearly explained," he lamely concludes, "as long as active force supposes an unknown specific difference .07 In spite of his admittedly imperfect knowledge of the exact nature of simple substances when entering into composition, because the distinguishing feature of their active force is unknown, Wolff finds no difficulty. 87. Wolff, Qntologia Nos. 792-793, Cf. Cosmologia. h o . 294n. 8 8 . Cf. Wolff, Cosmologia. Preface. 89. Ibid.. No. 194. 90. Ibid.. No. 294* Cf. Campo, Christiano Wolff e il

L

82 i

in analyzing motor force, indicating its modes and determin­ ing the objective reality of its concept. The motor or active force of bodies - traceable to the simple substances making up the compound - and determined neither by the essence nor the matter of the body - "con­ sists in a continuous striving to change place."91 Wolff endeavors to show by an example of common experi­ ence that force must be recognized as a continuous urge to act .^2

This illustration is the only demonstration which

he considers necessary.

"We, ourselves, recognize," says

lolff, "while acting, for instance in trying to close doors, that if anyone attempting to prevent us resists' our efforts, we strive continuously to force the doors; from this, somewhat obscurely, it can be understood that force consists in a continuous urge for act."

93

Wolff then considers the same operation from another point of view.

"Take away," he continues, "the striving

(or effort) to close the door, and (doors) will not be closed even though no one is resisting.

This is evident

also in other examples ... Let us suppose that some one forcibly restrains the hand of another who is writing so that (his hand) cannot be moved; the writing will cease though he is constantly striving to move his hand.

As

91. Wolff, Cosmologia M0 . 149. 9 2 . Cf. Latta, "Introduction," Leibniz The Hpnadology and Other Philosophical Writings, p. 90 and footnote, 93. Wolff, Qntologia Mo-. 724, Cf. Cosmologia Mo. 149.

83 r

i

soon as the hand is free and nothing else is present but the urge for writing, which also was present previously, he will actually write.

When the effort which he uses for

writing ceases by his wish, he will cease also to write.n