Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia 9781685852375

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Map of Colombia
1 Introduction
2 The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia
3 The Roots of Violence in Colombia
4 U.S. Policy During the Samper Administration, 1994-1998
5 U.S. Policy During the Pastrana Administration, 1998-2002
6 Afterword
Bibliography
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

DRIVEN BY DRUGS

DRIVEN BY DRUGS U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA

RUSSELL C R A N D A L L

L Y N N

E

RI E N N E R PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: 1-58826-064-X (alk. paper) ISBN: 1-58826-089-5 (pb : alk. paper) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of A m e r i c a

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 . 5 4 3 2 1

To my mom and dad, for

everything

Contents

List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Map of Colombia

ix xi xiv

1

Introduction

2

The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

15

3

The Roots of Violence in Colombia

53

4

U.S. Policy During the Samper Administration, 1994-1998

101

U.S. Policy During the Pastrana Administration, 1998-2002

143

Afterword

165

Bibliography Index About the Book

169 183 193

5

6

1

vii

Illustrations

TABLES 2.1 U.S. Counternarcotics-Related Assistance to Colombia 2.2 Andean Initiative-Assistance for Colombia 3.1 Major Worldwide Cocaine Seizures Linked to the Cali Cartel 3.2 Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Colombia 3.3 The F A R C ' s Growth 5.1 Total Aid for Plan Colombia 5.2 Plan Colombia-Assistance for Colombia

32 35 83 85 91 154 155

FIGURES 3.1 Coca Cultivation in the Andes

84

PHOTOGRAPHS FARC leader Manuel "Sureshot" Marulanda A U C leader Carlos Castaño Colombian military displaying forty dead FARC troops President Clinton during his August 2000 trip to Cartagena

IX

61 89 92 156

Acknowledgments

This book is a result of the combined efforts of many individuals. I am deeply grateful to all of you. Britta Hillstrom was an indispensable copilot during the life of this book. She was involved in this project from its embryonic stage through the final edits. It is no stretch to say that without her encouragement and collaboration I would still be in graduate school. Her continuous editing smoothed over the manuscript's many rough edges; her intellectual thumbprints are on every page. I o w e gratitude to a number of individuals at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of A d v a n c e d International Studies (SAIS). Riordan R o e t t ' s support and direction were invaluable. T h e debt I owe him is tremendous. Fred Holborn was a wise mentor in the peculiar ways of U.S. foreign policy. Brian Burgoon and Carol Wise also provided important feedback. Guadalupe Paz, Diane Monash, and Anne M c K e n z i e were fantastic in so many ways during my years at SAIS. Allen Wells at B o w d o i n College introduced me to Latin America and taught m e the importance of thinking critically. The Smith Richardson F o u n d a t i o n and Davidson C o l l e g e ' s Dean Rusk International P r o g r a m provided critical financial support during the m a n u s c r i p t ' s final stages. T h e Department of Political Science at Davidson has been a w o n d e r f u l h o m e while I finished the book. Michael Shifter, Diana Pardo, Arlene Tickner, Juan Forero, Daniel García-Peña, and Chris Chivvis read drafts or discussed issues and ideas with me over coffee. xi

xi i

Acknowledgments

Finally, a n u m b e r of U.S. and C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t officials, w h o shall r e m a i n n a m e l e s s d u e to the n a t u r e of their p o s i t i o n s , p r o v i d e d me with f i r s t h a n d p e r s p e c t i v e s on the craft of d i p l o m a c y . —Russell

Cranclall

DRIVEN BY DRUGS

C a r i b b e a n

COLOMBIA

Sea

1 Introduction

In 1982 the United States sent the Colombian government U.S.$2.8 million in order to bolster the fight against illicit drug cultivation and production. In 1988 this figure had increased to just under U.S.$10 million, and by 1994 the figure had risen to U.S.$26 million. In August 2000, President Bill Clinton signed a bill that allocated roughly U.S.$800 million for counternarcotics assistance in Colombia, making Colombia the third leading recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in the world, behind Israel and Egypt. 1 In 2001 the incoming George W. Bush administration followed up on Clinton's request by approving another U.S.$400 million in annual aid for Colombia. Indeed, as this dramatic increase in assistance makes clear, in less than a decade Colombia has become one of the U.S. government's overriding foreign policy concerns. What is most apparent in the story of U.S. policy toward Colombia is that U.S. concerns in Colombia remain inextricably linked with a politically volatile issue that has its roots in the domestic political arena—the war on drugs. Colombia's virtual monopoly on the export of cocaine destined for the United States since the early 1980s made it the prime focus of U.S. international narcotics interdiction efforts in subsequent years. Complicating this foreign policy scenario is that, in addition to the drug traffickers, leftist guerrilla insurgents w h o have been fighting in the countryside and provincial cities since the 1960s are stronger today than ever. 2 Moreover, right-wing paramilitary groups have launched an undeclared war on suspected civilian supporters of the guerrillas, destabilizing an already chaotic situation in Colombia. The issue has been further clouded over the past decade as these guerrilla and paramilitary 1

2

Driven by Drugs

groups have increased their involvement in the drug trade, as well as exp a n d e d their o p e r a t i o n s in n e i g h b o r i n g countries such as E c u a d o r and Venezuela. T h i s increasing violence and drug cultivation in C o l o m b i a has coincided with the evolution of the U.S. war on drugs. At the same time that this war on drugs was e s c a l a t i n g in the 1980s and 1990s, the w a r against c o m m u n i s t s — t h e Cold W a r — w a s winding d o w n . Consequently, the attention of the m a n y U.S. g o v e r n m e n t agencies dealing with intelligence and military issues quickly turned f r o m the Soviet Union to the drug war. This shift resulted in m u c h greater U.S. attention and scrutiny of e v e n t s in d r u g - p r o d u c i n g c o u n t r i e s , especially those located in the A n d e s . By the late 1980s, U.S. international antidrug e f f o r t s began to focus on combating drugs at the source (i.e., the locales where drugs are cultivated) as o p p o s e d to interdicting them when they enter the United States. And since a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9 0 percent of the w o r l d ' s cocaine is produced in C o l o m b i a , this country became ground zero in the U.S. war on d r u g s . M o t i v a t e d by the d o m e s t i c need to solve the d r u g p r o b l e m , the United States increasingly f o u n d itself trying to fight a drug war in the m i d d l e of a country mired in a violent and c o m p l e x civil conflict. T h e term that analysts have used to describe the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s seemingly unyielding focus on pursuing the drug war into C o l o m b i a is "narcotization." That is, virtually all aspects of U.S. involvement in Colombia were in some way linked to drugs. U.S. policy in Colombia has been narcotized since the 1980s, when the international component of the drug war c a m e into full swing. In turn, narcotization has greatly influenced the U.S. stance toward other key issues of its bilateral relationship with Colombia, such as human rights, economic ties, and the Colombian government's ongoing peace process with leftist guerrilla groups. T h i s is not to say that the U.S. policy of n a r c o t i z a t i o n was static; rather, the U.S. drug w a r a g e n d a s w u n g widely b e t w e e n the e x t r e m e policies of isolation to cooperation: when Washington believed that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t was c o o p e r a t i n g on the d r u g f r o n t , relations were strong and the Colombian government was supported; when Washington felt that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t was not acting appropriately, relations quickly chilled or even f r o z e , as was the case during E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s presidency ( 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 8 ) . But regardless of w h e t h e r relations between Washington and Bogotá were warm or cool, the underlying prim a c y of the drug war never wavered. In order to fully understand the nature of U.S. policy in C o l o m b i a , it is necessary to trace the course of U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t in C o l o m b i a all

Introduction

3

the way back to the early nineteenth century, when Colombia won its independence f r o m Spain. W h a t is readily apparent is that, before the United States began its drug war, the normal state of the U.S.-Colombian relationship was relatively cordial in nature, free of m u c h of the suspicion and animosity that often characterized U.S. relations with other Latin American states. W h i l e a n u m b e r of factors explain this unusually high level of cooperation between the two countries, one reason in particular is that both Bogotá and Washington shared the c o m m o n goals of promoting political stability, economic growth, and most important, anticommunism. T h i s m e e t i n g of the m i n d s g r a d u a l l y b r o k e d o w n as the U.S. national interest in C o l o m b i a switched f r o m fighting c o m m u n i s t s to fighting drugs. This meant that during the 1980s and 1990s cooperation was often replaced by suspicion, bilateralism with unilateralism. Today it remains to be seen whether the two countries can return to the cooperative climate that d o m i n a t e d the p r e - d r u g war years. Within this analysis of the evolution of U.S. policy toward C o l o m b i a , this book will f o c u s on the t w o key e p i s o d e s of the c o n t e m p o r a r y bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p : the presidential administrations of Ernesto S a m p e r and A n d r é s Pastrana.

U.S. POLICY DURING THE SAMPER AND PASTRANA ADMINISTRATIONS The Samper Administration: 1994-1998 During the years of E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s presidency, the U . S . - C o l o m b i a n bilateral relationship was deeply strained, and o f t e n a n o r m a l relationship barely existed. T h e drug w a r issue p l a y e d an e s p e c i a l l y integral role in the policy process during this time, since virtually all U.S. officials involved firmly believed that S a m p e r ' s presidential c a m p a i g n had received several million dollars f r o m the Cali drug cartel. T h i s f o c u s on S a m p e r exacerbated an already delicate bilateral relationship as, for the first time since the d r u g w a r b e g a n in the 1980s, the U n i t e d States s h i f t e d its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s strategies f r o m f o c u s i n g on arresting drug kingpins and interdicting drug production to aggressively and publicly attempting to bring d o w n the scandal-ridden but democratically elected president of C o l o m b i a . This conflict m a d e the relationship between the U n i t e d States and the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n one of the m o s t abrasive e p i s o d e s in U . S . - L a t i n A m e r i c a n relations since the end of the C o l d War. T h i s fact is p r o b a b l y best e x e m p l i f i e d w h e n the U n i t e d States

4

Driven by Drugs

r e v o k e d S a m p e r ' s visa in July 1996, m a k i n g him only the s e c o n d head of state to receive this d u b i o u s honor. 3 W h a t also m a k e s this p a r t i c u l a r case i n t e r e s t i n g is that d u r i n g the S a m p e r years the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t did not c o n s i d e r C o l o m b i a a " c r i s i s " f o r e i g n policy c a s e , like that of K o s o v o or Iraq; C o l o m b i a t h e r e f o r e did not receive the attention of h i g h - l e v e l U.S. f o r e i g n policy o f f i c i a l s such as the secretary of state or the national security adviser. In fact, d u r i n g these years there w e r e only a f e w e p i s o d e s w h e n then secretary of state Warren C h r i s t o p h e r publicly a d d r e s s e d an issue related to C o l o m b i a . Instead, U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d C o l o m b i a w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d r i v e n by u p p e r - m i d d l e - l e v e l officials, chief a m o n g t h e m the U . S . a m b a s s a d o r to C o l o m b i a , M y l e s F r e c h e t t e , a n d the assistant s e c r e t a r y of state f o r international n a r c o t i c s and law e n f o r c e m e n t , Robert G e l b a r d . In m a n y w a y s , F r e c h e t t e and G e l b a r d b e c a m e U.S. " v i c e r o y s " in C o l o m b i a — t h e y formulated " C o l o m b i a policy" in a way that at times adhered to their o w n personal political agendas as m u c h as it was any type of clearly f o r m u l a t e d o f f i c i a l U.S. policy originating in F o g g y B o t t o m . T h e s e officials gained, by default, an amount of p o w e r and influence that was inconsistent with the level of their positions. In this sense, the S a m per era s h o w s h o w the U n i t e d States c o n d u c t s policy in a client state w h e n important d o m e s t i c - d r i v e n f a c t o r s such as the d r u g war are involved, but w h e n the country is not considered a foreign policy priority. W h i l e U . S . - C o l o m b i a n r e l a t i o n s were v i r t u a l l y f r o z e n d u r i n g the S a m p e r years, this did not m e a n that the United States w a s unable to exe c u t e its policies. Rather, w e h a v e the interesting p a r a d o x that a l t h o u g h U . S . - C o l o m b i a n r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w e r e at their lowest point in history, the United States w a s able to carry out its f o r e i g n policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a — w h i c h at this time had b e c o m e a l m o s t indistinguishable from U.S. drug policy toward C o l o m b i a — q u i t e succ e s s f u l l y in t e r m s of c o n t i n u i n g to p r o s e c u t e the war on drugs. T h e solution to this p u z z l e is that S a m p e r , lacking credibility on the d r u g issue d u e to the s u s p e c t e d links to the Cali cartel, had little c h o i c e but to coo p e r a t e with U . S . c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s , no m a t t e r h o w m u c h he m i g h t h a v e p e r s o n a l l y d e t e s t e d t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e the bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p b e c a m e so p o l a r i z e d d u r i n g S a m p e r ' s t e n u r e , the U n i t e d States w a s o f t e n able to c i r c u m v e n t S a m p e r and work directly with w h a t it b e l i e v e d w e r e t r u s t e d c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s allies in C o l o m b i a ' s a r m e d f o r c e s a n d n a t i o n a l p o l i c e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s f r e e to p u r s u e its f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s both w i t h i n and o u t s i d e the S a m p e r administration.

Introduction

5

There is no doubt that the U.S. government was uncomfortable working with the Samper administration; but there was much more behind the deterioration in U.S.-Colombian relations than just a moral stand by the United States. Rather, the U.S. stance toward the Samper administration had almost as much to do with U.S. counternarcotics policy as it did with whether Samper did indeed receive money from the Cali cartel. First, many of the most damaging revelations related to Samper's trustworthiness came well after the United States had already decertified Colombia for not doing enough on the drug front. This leads one to believe that if Samper had better satisfied U.S. counternarcotics demands the United States would have been more willing to overlook Samper's links to the drug cartels. Second, confronted with a strategy that had failed to curb the flow of narcotics into the United States, the State Department used the drug-tainted Samper administration as a convenient scapegoat to mollify a now Republican-controlled Congress that was demanding success on the drug front. Conversely, by putting Samper on the defensive the United States was in fact able to exploit Samper's drug links by forcing him to do even more in the antidrug arena than he normally would have done had he never been suspected of receiving payments from the drug cartels. A reflection of the irony of this situation is that Ernesto Samper carried out Washington's wishes on the antidrug front with more vigor and success than any of his predecessors, including President César Gaviria (1990-1994), who was seen by many in Washington to be the archetype of a reliable antidrug ally. After years of pursuing a set of policies that were intended to undermine Ernesto S a m p e r ' s legitimacy as president of Colombia, the U.S. government came to realize that its policies were producing unexpected counterproductive effects. Above all, the United States realized that its anti-Samper policies were weakening the institution of the Colombian presidency at the very time that, due to increased revenues from involvement in the drug trade, guerrilla groups and paramilitary organizations were becoming stronger than ever and were beginning to threaten the very survival of the Colombian state. Indeed, by the end of Samper's term in office the civil conflict was entering into an unprecedented phase of wanton violence and bloodshed. And thus, after four years of focusing almost exclusively on how it could remove Samper from office, Washington now realized that it had to focus on the increasingly unstable situation in Colombia. Colombia had now become a crisis for the United States, mandating the need

6

Driven by Drugs

f o r a s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p with B o g o t á , a m o v e the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d n e v e r d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y d u r i n g t h e S a m p e r y e a r s . F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , by this t i m e E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s term in o f f i c e w a s j u s t a b o u t o v e r a n d C o l o m b i a n law p r e v e n t e d h i m f r o m r u n n i n g f o r r e e l e c t i o n .

The Pastrana Administration:

1998-2002

A n x i o u s to f o r g e t an era that w a s n o w c o n s i d e r e d c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e to the o v e r a l l U . S . o b j e c t i v e in C o l o m b i a a n d e a g e r to e m b r a c e a n e w adm i n i s t r a t i o n that it c o u l d w o r k with in o r d e r to m a n a g e w h a t it n o w perc e i v e d to be a c r i s i s in C o l o m b i a , the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t e a g e r l y a w a i t e d the i n a u g u r a t i o n of C o n s e r v a t i v e Party c a n d i d a t e A n d r é s P a s t r a n a in A u gust 1998. 4 I n d e e d , U . S . o f f i c i a l s w e r e c o n v i n c e d that P a s t r a n a w a s the r e l i a b l e a n d p r o - U . S . p r e s i d e n t that they b a d l y n e e d e d in o r d e r to repair the d a m a g e d o n e to the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p — a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t , to the U . S . - l e d w a r on d r u g s — t h a t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the S a m p e r y e a r s . Yet w h i l e t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e c e i v e d t h e n e w l y e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t w i t h o p e n a r m s , t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g U . S . f o c u s o n d r u g s did not d i s s i p a t e . I n s t e a d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s m a d e P a s t r a n a ' s c o o p e r a t i o n on U . S . - l e d d r u g e f f o r t s a n u n d e r l y i n g c o m p o n e n t of a w a r m e r bilateral rel a t i o n s h i p . S o w h i l e m a n y a s p e c t s of W a s h i n g t o n - B o g o t á r e l a t i o n s w e r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e p o s i t i v e t h a n d u r i n g the S a m p e r y e a r s , n a r c o t i z a t i o n did not e n d . In 1999 the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t p r e s e n t e d the P a s t r a n a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d U . S . $ 1 . 3 b i l l i o n aid p a c k a g e that c o n s i s t e d prim a r i l y of m i l i t a r y - r e l a t e d a r m a m e n t s i n t e n d e d to a s s i s t the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t in r o l l i n g b a c k t h e g a i n s m a d e b y t h e g u e r r i l l a s a n d d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s s e v e r a l y e a r s . W h e n this aid p a c k a g e w a s a p p r o v e d b y t h e U . S . C o n g r e s s a n d s i g n e d i n t o l a w b y P r e s i d e n t Bill C l i n t o n a y e a r later, the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d e m b a r k e d o n t h e m o s t c o s t l y a n d h i g h e s t p r o f i l e i n i t i a t i v e in the h i s t o r y of t h e w a r o n d r u g s . It is u n c l e a r w h a t t h i s d r a s t i c e s c a l a t i o n in i n v o l v e m e n t will u l t i m a t e l y m e a n f o r the s i t u a t i o n in C o l o m b i a a n d f o r the f u t u r e of the bilateral r e l a t i o n ship. W h a t is m o r e c e r t a i n is that t h e r e will be t r e m e n d o u s b u r e a u c r a t i c p r e s s u r e f r o m w i t h i n the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t to c o n t i n u e the d r u g w a r in its p r e s e n t f o r m a n d p l a c e t r e m e n d o u s f o c u s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r d i c t i o n e f f o r t s in the A n d e s . T h i s is m o s t l y d u e to the reality that o v e r the p a s t f i f teen y e a r s the w a r o n d r u g s h a s b e c o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d w i t h i n t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c y p r o c e s s , an o c c u r r e n c e that n e c e s s i t a t e s c o n t i n u o u s a n n u a l f u n d i n g f o r U . S . g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s i n v o l v e d in a n t i d r u g

Introduction

1

efforts. T h e U.S. war on drugs has taken on a life of its o w n , an inertial drive that will continue regardless of its success in actually reducing the amount of illegal drugs that enter the United States. Upon leaving o f f i c e , P r e s i d e n t D w i g h t E i s e n h o w e r w a r n e d the American public of the creeping "military industrial c o m p l e x , " a situation where c o n t i n u o u s e x p e n d i t u r e s on strategic w e a p o n s to counter the threat f r o m the Soviet U n i o n would e v e n t u a l l y require even greater a m o u n t s of spending regardless of the strategic reality. Today, with regard to the war on d r u g s , U.S. policy m i g h t be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as the "military industrial narcotics c o m p l e x " : the budgets of U.S. government agencies involved in the drug war and the billions of dollars in military hardware that the United States sends to the A n d e s have b e c o m e almost self-perpetuating.

COLOMBIA IN POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT Most scholars of U . S . - L a t i n American relations agree that U.S. policies toward Latin A m e r i c a during the Cold War were d o m i n a n t l y concerned with the threat of c o m m u n i s t infiltration and e x p a n s i o n in the region. E v e n if it m e a n t allying itself with authoritarian regimes or h e l p i n g to overthrow democratically elected g o v e r n m e n t s , the United States spent c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t p u r s u i n g its regional security o b j e c t i v e s , a b o v e all p r e v e n t i n g c o m m u n i s m f r o m g a i n i n g a f o o t h o l d in the h e m i s p h e r e . 5 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the c o m p r o m i s e of MarxistLeninist i d e o l o g y largely across the g l o b e , the U n i t e d States can no l o n g e r use this f r a m e w o r k to f o r m u l a t e policy in the region. A c c o r d ingly, there must be a new model for understanding U.S. foreign and security policies in the h e m i s p h e r e . Yet in the decade since the end of the Cold War, it has proved difficult to create convincing new explanatory paradigms. 6 This book argues that the overriding U.S. priorities—including security concerns—in Latin America since the end of the Cold War are increasingly linked to "intermestic" issues (combining international and domestic concerns), such as immigration and the war on drugs. 7 This book addresses how this intermestic-driven context has been especially influential in the case of U.S. policy toward Colombia. Specifically, in intermestic-driven cases such as C o l o m b i a , U.S. foreign policy tends to be characterized by competition a m o n g the involved U.S. agencies, personalized diplomacy, and greater intervention in the domestic political situation of the foreign country.

8

Driven by Drugs

T h e d e b a t e s u r r o u n d i n g U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d C o l o m b i a w a s not as p o l e m i c a l as h a d b e e n t h e c a s e w i t h , f o r e x a m p l e , U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d Central A m e r i c a in the 1980s. If o n e g l a n c e s at the d o z e n s of c o n g r e s sional h e a r i n g s that dealt with C o l o m b i a d u r i n g the past ten years, one m i g h t c o n c l u d e that t h e r e w e r e s h a r p d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h i n the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t o v e r the n a t u r e of U . S . p o l i c i e s , e s p e c i a l l y b e t w e e n C o n gress and the State D e p a r t m e n t . Yet with a c l o s e r look it b e c o m e s clear that t h e s e o s t e n s i b l y a c e r b i c political d i s p u t e s w e r e a c t u a l l y e p i s o d e s in which both sides g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d with e a c h other. W h i l e s o m e U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n o v e r the h u m a n rights i m p l i c a t i o n s and lack of an exit strategy, the m a i n d i s a g r e e m e n t s arose, f o r e x a m p l e , not o v e r whether to send h e l i c o p t e r s to the C o l o m b i a n N a t i o n a l Police, but o v e r how many should be sent. C o e x i s t e n t with this b u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of U . S . p o l i c y toward C o l o m b i a is the fact that the general c o n s e n s u s on the d r u g w a r — that it is a l i g n e d with U . S . n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s — t e n d s to m a k e p o l i c y m o r e realist. s T h u s U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a p r o d u c e s the unusual result of being at once b u r e a u c r a t i c and realist. O n o n e level it is chara c t e r i z e d by i n t e n s e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s , s e e m ingly d e v o i d of any type of o v e r a r c h i n g strategic policy, all r e f l e c t i n g a b u r e a u c r a t i c analysis. At the s a m e time, U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a is m a r k e d by a c o n s e n s u s that crosses ideological b o u n d a r i e s , united in the realist belief that the w a r on d r u g s is both n e c e s s a r y a n d vital to U . S . national interests. T h a t this level of a g r e e m e n t o v e r U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a alm o s t invariably r e v o l v e d a r o u n d c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s issues is yet a n o t h e r indication that d r u g s h a d so o v e r t a k e n o t h e r bilateral issues (e.g., g o v e r n m e n t - g u e r r i l l a p e a c e talks, h u m a n r i g h t s , c o m m e r c i a l ties) as to m a k e t h e m largely n o n e x i s t e n t by c o m p a r i s o n . T h u s , the a n s w e r to w h y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s w i l l i n g to a l l o w its b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with C o l o m b i a to i m p l o d e h a s its r o o t s in the d o m e s t i c - d r i v e n , n a t i o n a l interest c o n c e r n that is the d r u g war. A s we will see in the analysis of U.S. policy in C o l o m b i a , ultimately it is the national interest c o n c e r n , in this case the d r u g war, that o v e r r i d e s the b u r e a u c r a t i c political f a c t o r s , thus m a k i n g U.S. policy s u r p r i s i n g l y realist. T h e s e f i n d i n g s hold i m p o r t a n t r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d current and f u t u r e h e m i s p h e r i c - w i d e trends in U . S . policy, as C o l o m b i a r e p r e s e n t s t h e t y p e of p o t e n t i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y c r i s i s that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s will be c o n f r o n t e d with in t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a . 9 W h i l e t h e s e t y p e s of c r i s e s will not b e c o m m o n , w h e n they o c c u r t h e y will h o l d

Introduction

9

Washington's attention and the threat to regional stability will be considerable. Moreover, the U . S . response to these c r i s e s — w h i l e still highly influenced by domestic political c o n c e r n s — w i l l ultimately be characterized as realist policies, reflecting the dominance of perceived national interest over bureaucratic factors.

CONTEMPORARY U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: OUT OF THE WHIRLPOOL? U . S . policy toward Latin A m e r i c a over the course o f the past decade can be perhaps best characterized by Peter Smith's label "the age of uncertainty." 1 0 T h i s phrase reflects the fact that there is no clear way to characterize the often vague and ill-defined characteristics o f contemporary U . S . policy toward Latin America. What is clear, however, is that the nature o f U . S . policy in the Western Hemisphere has changed dramatically following the end o f the Cold War. 11 Above all, the overriding U . S . security and diplomatic priorities in Latin A m e r i c a are now increasingly linked to these intermestic issues, such as immigration and the war on drugs. 1 2 When the Cold War ended a decade ago, some scholars of U . S . Latin A m e r i c a n relations predicted that a new era would emerge in which multilateralism and dialogue would replace the coercion and unilateralism o f the Cold War; others believed that the U . S . policy toward Latin America in the p o s t - C o l d War era would essentially resemble that of the Cold War, the only difference being that, instead o f communists, the U . S . policymakers would surely devise new enemies to justify U . S . hegemony in the region. 1 3 Lars Schoultz is one o f most vociferous o f these scholars: " [ W ] h e n the Soviet Union disappeared and U . S . security interests no longer required the same level o f dominance, Washington identified new problems—everything from drug trafficking to dictatorship to financial m i s m a n a g e m e n t — a n d moved to increase its control over Latin A m e r i c a . " 1 4 T h e r e are many who might take issue with Schoultz's conspiracy theory depiction of U . S . policy in Latin America in the 1 9 9 0 s , but there is nonetheless wide agreement that the United States no longer has the clear-cut framework o f anticommunism to guide its hemispheric policies. 1 5 T h e key to understanding the nature o f the new phase in U . S . hemispheric relations lies in the analysis o f a crucial causal v a r i a b l e — t h e h e g e m o n i c presumption. T h e h e g e m o n i c presumption is the b e l i e f on

10

Driven by Drugs

the part of the U n i t e d S t a t e s that it has a r i g h t — a n d o f t e n an o b l i g a t i o n — t o i n t e r v e n e in t h e a f f a i r s of its o w n b a c k y a r d , w h e t h e r it be in the n a m e of security, e c o n o m i c interests, or a n t i c o m m u n i s m . 1 6 A s we will see, the case of C o l o m b i a s u g g e s t s that t h e U.S. h e g e m o n i c p r e s u m p t i o n c o n t i n u e s in Latin A m e r i c a , but usually only w h e n i n t e r m e s t i c issues are i n v o l v e d . S e v e r a l scholars of U . S . - L a t i n A m e r i can r e l a t i o n s m a d e the a s s e r t i o n d u r i n g the years f o l l o w i n g the fall of the Berlin Wall that we c o u l d e x p e c t to see d o m e s t i c i s s u e s like d r u g s and i m m i g r a t i o n replace c o m m u n i s m as the U.S. i m p e t u s a n d j u s t i f i c a tion for c o n t i n u e d i n f l u e n c e in Latin A m e r i c a . A b r a h a m L o w e n t h a l , for e x a m p l e , has written: I s s u e s at the h e a r t of U . S . - L a t i n r e l a t i o n s in the 1990s w i l l i n c r e a s i n g l y be " i n t e r m e s t i c " — b a s e d on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p i l l o v e r of d o m e s t i c c o n c e r n s a n d i n v o l v i n g b o t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l and d o m e s t i c a s p e c t s a n d a c t o r s . . . . In s u m , L a t i n A m e r i c a will be of h e i g h t e n e d i m p o r t a n c e to the U n i t e d States. For t h o s e w h o h a v e s e e n the w o r l d a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y in C o l d W a r t e r m s , the e v e n t s of the past y e a r h a v e m a d e L a t i n A m e r i c a s e e m v i r t u a l l y i r r e l e v a n t , likely, as s o m e say, to " f a l l off the m a p " of U . S . c o n c e r n s . But as U.S. interests and e n e r g i e s turn i n w a r d to d o m e s t i c c h a l l e n g e s , L a t i n A m e r i c a m a y w e l l b e i n c r e a s ingly pertinent. Far f r o m b e c o m i n g irrelevant, Latin A m e r i c a ' s probl e m s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s will be i n c r e a s i n g l y our o w n . 1 7

W h i l e L o w e n t h a l is c o r r e c t in p r e d i c t i n g the g r o w i n g i n f l u e n c e of int e r m e s t i c issues in U . S . - L a t i n A m e r i c a n relations, we will still need to dig d e e p e r into the U . S . p o l i c y m a k i n g p r o c e s s to see e x a c t l y w h y and h o w particular i n t e r m e s t i c issues m i g h t d o m i n a t e U . S . - L a t i n A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s in the c o m i n g d e c a d e s . 1 8 R o b e r t P a s t o r ' s w o r k helps o p e n up the " b l a c k b o x " of g o v e r n m e n t d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in o r d e r to p r o v i d e c l u e s to the c o m p o s i t i o n of interm e s t i c issues. 1 9 Specifically, Pastor divides U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s into t w o c a m p s : " c o n s e r v a t i v e s " and " l i b e r a l s . " C o n s e r v a t i v e s u p h o l d the national interest to the e x c l u s i o n of any other and tend to see c h a n g e s in the international s y s t e m as direct threats to the national interest. O n the o t h e r e x t r e m e , liberals d o not b e l i e v e that the national interest is inext r i c a b l y l i n k e d to n a t i o n a l identity and t h e r e f o r e o f t e n d o not see the n e e d for, say, military action to deal with external issues. P a s t o r writes: C o n s e r v a t i v e s f o c u s o n a relatively n a r r o w e r idea of U . S . i n t e r e s t s a n d a m i l i t a r y - b a s e d d e f i n i t i o n of p o w e r . T h e y b e l i e v e that t h e U n i t e d

Introduction

11

States s h o u l d approach p r o b l e m s unilaterally and in a practical and forceful p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g manner. Liberals g i v e higher priority to the moral d i m e n s i o n and to what Joseph S. N y e calls "soft power," which derives from the A m e r i c a n m o d e l . T h e y look at social and e c o n o m i c causes of the crisis, try to understand the issues from the other's perspective, and rely on multilateral, diplomatic approaches. 2 0

The continual shifting of influence between the conservatives and the liberals can be clearly seen in the course of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Cold War. John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, the Organization of American States (OAS), and Jimmy Carter's pro-human rights policies are just a few examples of the liberal approach to hemispheric relations. 2 1 The 1954 CIA-backed overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Richard Nixon's policies toward Socialist president Salvador Allende in Chile, and the Reagan administration's policies in Central America in the 1980s are examples of the conservative approach. 22 The question then becomes one of which policy stance will dominate the post-Cold War era. The case of Colombia definitely points toward the conservative approach, as the U.S. war on drugs in Colombia definitely resembles a unilateral crusade. Yet paradoxically this might not mean that we should expect U.S. policy in Latin America in general to be conservative. Rather, when certain hot-button intermestic issues are involved we should expect the United States to act in a conservative manner; when no intermestic issues are involved, such as arms proliferation or disaster relief, we should expect U.S. policy to be more liberal. As during the Cold War when the policy of anticommunism undoubtedly influenced liberal policies like the Alliance for Progress, conservative viewpoints in the future will have the ability to affect liberal issues. For example, in Colombia we will see how the U.S. war on drugs (a conservative issue) is heavily influencing the manner in which the United States views the current Colombian peace process (a liberal issue). Thus, today, we should expect that intermestic-driven issues— which are often conservative issues—will possess the potential to spill over into other areas where we should normally expect liberalism to hold. Before deliberating whether U.S. policy toward Latin America in the post-Cold War era will be liberal or conservative, we first must ask whether the United States will even care about Latin America. Pastor's framework of "introversion" versus "extroversion" is useful in that it

12

Driven by Drugs

explains h o w the United States tends to fluctuate between the introversion of f o c u s i n g solely on d o m e s t i c issues (isolationism) and the extroversion of f o c u s i n g on i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s such as World War II o r t h e 1991 G u l f War. 2 3 W h e n this c o n c e p t is applied to U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d Latin A m e r i c a , it a p p e a r s that the U.S. position will be o n e of i n t r o v e r s i o n (i.e., neglect), unless a key intermestic issue is involved. If this is indeed the case, and if we a s s u m e that introversion tends to g e n e r a t e liberal foreign policies by d e f a u l t , we can expect U.S. policy t o w a r d Latin A m e r ica to be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by benign neglect and liberal p o l i c i e s , p e r i o d i cally disrupted by e p i s o d e s of conservative interventions. O n c e the l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e f r a m e w o r k is t a k e n into c o n s i d e r a tion, A b r a h a m L o w e n t h a l ' s prediction that U.S. policy in Latin A m e r i c a will be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the "unilateral activist i m p u l s e " b e c o m e s easier to c o m p r e h e n d , as c o n s e r v a t i v e e p i s o d e s will s u r e l y p r o v o k e this type of intervention. 2 4 Still, these impulses will be the e x c e p t i o n and not the rule to U.S. policy in Latin A m e r i c a : and w h e n they o c c u r they usually will be d r i v e n by intermestic issues and will be intense a n d highly unilateral in nature. Tellingly, three of the most p r e s s i n g U . S . a c t i o n s in Latin A m e r i c a s i n c e t h e e n d of the C o l d W a r — t h e 1989 i n v a s i o n of P a n a m a (the only U . S . p o s t - C o l d War i n v a s i o n in Latin A m e r i c a ) , the 1994 i n t e r v e n t i o n in Haiti, and the c o n t i n u e d e m b a r g o a g a i n s t C u b a — can all be d e f i n e d as b e i n g cases of intermestic issues d r i v i n g intermittent "unilateral activist i m p u l s e s " on the part of the U n i t e d States. 2 5 B e f o r e analyzing c o n t e m p o r a r y U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a within this c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k , we must first r e v i e w the e v o l u t i o n of U . S . p o l i c y in C o l o m b i a as well as the roots of C o l o m b i a ' s n a r c o t i c s trade and civil conflict.

NOTES 1. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, 2000. 2. See Russell Crandall, "The End of Civil Conflict in Colombia: The Military, Paramilitaries, and a New Role for the United States," SAIS Review 19, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1999): 223-237; and Marc Chernick, "Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, edited by Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), pp. 159-200. 3. The other head of state to have his visa revoked was Austrian president Kurt Waldheim in 1987.

Introduction

13

4. Andrés Pastrana defeated Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa in June 1998. 5. For an overview of the final years of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Cold War. see Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine: 1945-1993 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994); Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 316-386. 6. See Michael C. Desch, "Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War." in International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by Jorge Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 245-265; and Albert Fishlow, "The Foreign Policy Challenge for the United States," in The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First-Century View, edited by Albert Fishlow and James Jones (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 197-206. 7. See Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," Foreign Affairs 55, no. 2 (1977): 309. For a look at how intermestic issues have been applied to post-Cold War U.S. policy toward Latin America, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States-Latin American Relations at the Century's Turn: Managing the Intermestic Agenda," in The United States and the Americas, pp. 109-136. For more on the U.S. security involvement in Latin America, see Jorge Domínguez, "The Future of Inter-American Relations" (Inter-American Dialogue working paper, Washington, D.C., June 1999), pp. 9 - 1 2 . The two major episodes of concerted U.S. involvement/intervention in Latin America since the end of the Cold War—the 1989 invasion of Panama (drugs) and the 1994 intervention in Haiti (immigration)—can be directly attributed to domestic issues. 8. Here "realism" is defined as U.S. policymakers acting "rationally" and in general agreement in order to pursue the perceived national interest. According to Brian White, in comments he attributes to Joseph Nye, for the realist "the state, rather than any other international actor, is regarded as the foreign policy making unit. More importantly, the state, or rather the government acting on behalf of the state, is treated for analytical purposes as a unitary, monolithic actor; in other words, as a collectivity whose behaviour is broadly analogous to that of a purposeful individual." See Brian White, "Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches," in Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, edited by Michael Clarke and Brian White (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1989), p. 11. 9. For the most recent analysis of contemporary U.S. security policy in the Americas, see Paul Buchanan, "Chameleon, Tortoise, or Toad? The Changing U.S. Security Role in Contemporary Latin America," in International Security and Democracy, pp. 2 6 6 - 2 8 8 . For an overview of U.S. Cold War security policy in Latin America, see Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

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Driven by Drugs

10. See Smith, Talons of the Eagle, pp. 217-248. 11. For a recent analysis of U.S.-Latin American security models, see Augusto Varas, "From Coercion to Partnership: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere," in The United States and Latin America, pp. 46-63. See also Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Changing U.S. Interests and Policies in a New World," in The United States and Latin America, pp. 6 4 - 8 5 . 12. See Desch, "Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War." 13. For the most current discussion of U.S.-Latin American relations, see Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), a special issue on U.S.-Latin American relations. 14. Schoultz, Beneath the United States, p. xiv. 15. See Joseph S. Tulchin, "Hemispheric Relations in the Twenty-first Century." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 33-38; and Jorge Castañeda, "Latin America and the End of the Cold War," World Policy Journal 7, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 4 6 9 - 4 9 2 . 16. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Ending the Hegemonic Presumption: The United States and Latin America," Foreign Affairs 55, no. 1 (Autumn 1976): 199-213. 17. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Rediscovering Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1990): 38. 18. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States-Latin American Relations." 19. Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 20. Ibid., p. 32. 21. For more on the Alliance for Progress, see Smith, Talons of the Eagle, pp. 142-162. 22. For more on the Guatemala case, see Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). For the Reagan administration's policies toward Central America, see Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 5 3 - 2 2 7 . Democratic presidents were more than willing to carry out conservative policies, with Lyndon Johnson's decision to invade the Dominican Republic in 1965 being one such example. 23. Robert Pastor, "The Clinton Administration and the Americas: The Postwar Rhythm and Blues," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 99-123. 24. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Changing U.S. Interests," p. 69. 25. The case of U.S. policy toward Cuba can be classified as an intermestic issue, as it is generally accepted that a significant share of this policy is formulated under consideration of the domestic political influence of the highly influential Cuban exile community.

The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

More startling and less well known, when in 1857 the United Stales was pressing New Granada ¡Colombia] for compensation for the deaths of American citizens in riots in Panama and New Granadan leaders despaired of obtaining British protection. President Mariano Ospina Rodriguez proposed to Washington the anne xation of the entire republic of New Granada by the United States. Ospina reasoned that in view of the United States' inexorable expansion, as demonstrated in the war with Mexico in 1846^f8 and in the filibuster adventures in Nicaragua of the 1850s. New Granada would inevitably be swallowed up sooner or later. Better to get it over with quickly, without unnecessary bloodshed, particularly considering the probability that rule by the United States would bring stability and security of property. — Frank Sajford1

Stephen Randall has written that over the past two centuries there have been several layers to U.S.-Colombian relations. 2 On one layer there has been the traditional antagonism and mistrust that historically has been characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations in general. On another layer, however, there is a unique legacy of bilateral treaties, resolution of disputes, and a general meeting of the minds that ensured cordial relations between Washington and Bogotá. While Randall's notion of several layers to U.S.-Colombian relations is accurate, it is also necessary to emphasize the international context in which these relations take place. Beginning with the many disputes over the ownership and construction of an interoceanic canal and continuing through counternarcotics issues of more recent times, U.S.Colombian relations must be viewed as interaction between a growing superpower and a relatively weak developing country. This uneven relationship was especially acute during the late nineteenth and early 15

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t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s — a time of h e i g h t e n e d concern in the bilateral relat i o n s h i p d u e to i n t e r o c e a n i c c a n a l i s s u e s — a s the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s e m e r g i n g as o n e of the w o r l d ' s strongest p o w e r s and C o l o m b i a was still r e c o v e r i n g f r o m d e c a d e s of d e v a s t a t i n g civil wars. As the twentieth century p r o g r e s s e d , U.S. c o n c e r n s in C o l o m b i a s h i f t e d f r o m the P a n a m a C a n a l to issues of trade ( 1 9 2 0 s ) , a n t i f a s c i s m ( 1 9 3 0 s ) , and most i m p o r tant, a n t i c o m m u n i s m (the C o l d War, 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 9 0 ) . ' I n d e e d , as the C o l d W a r b e g a n to take hold f o l l o w i n g the e n d of World War II, p r e v e n t i n g c o m m u n i s t e x p a n s i o n into Latin A m e r i c a bec a m e the o v e r r i d i n g U.S. policy priority in the region. C o n s e q u e n t l y , as w a s the c a s e in m a n y o t h e r Latin A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . U.S. p o l i c y in C o l o m b i a during these years e m p h a s i z e d national security and ideological issues. H o w e v e r , as w e will see, unlike the o f t e n m o r e c o m b a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s that the U n i t e d S t a t e s held with o t h e r Latin A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s such as M e x i c o and Brazil, U.S. Cold W a r - e r a relations with C o l o m b i a were r e m a r k a b l y c o o p e r a t i v e . Yet s i n c e the a d v e n t of the U.S. war on d r u g s in the 1980s, this legacy of bilateral c o o p e r a t i o n has periodically disintegrated, g e n e r a l l y r e p l a c e d by unilateralism on the part of the United States and suspicion and f r u s t r a t i o n on the part of C o l o m b i a . It is within this context of narc o t i z a t i o n that an analysis of c o n t e m p o r a r y U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m bia m u s t be v i e w e d . M o r e o v e r , tracing the evolution of narcotization all o w s us to b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d w h y the United S t a t e s p u r s u e d a h i g h l y unilateral policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a f o r most of the 1990s. T h i s c h a p t e r will c h r o n i c l e the salient e p i s o d e s of U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations o v e r the past t w o centuries. B e c a u s e c o n t e m p o r a r y U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations can only be u n d e r s t o o d within the context of the war on drugs, special e m p h a s i s will be p l a c e d on t h e c o u r s e of U.S. p o l i c y since the U n i t e d States escalated its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s in the 1980s.

THE EARLY YEARS: 1820-1932 U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations b e g a n in essence in 1821 w h e n Spanish A m e r i c a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e leader S i m ó n Bolívar and his troops d e f e a t e d S p a n ish f o r c e s at the Battle of C a r a b o b o , which resulted in the o v e r t h r o w of S p a n i s h rule in C o l o m b i a . Until this point, f o r a n u m b e r of m o s t l y d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had b e e n a m b i v a l e n t a b o u t g r a n t i n g recognition to the Latin A m e r i c a n rebel m o v e m e n t s . T h u s , during the w a r s of i n d e p e n d e n c e in the I 8 l 0 s and early 1820s, U.S. support

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of Latin American independence m o v e m e n t s was generally limited to rhetorical statements. Yet Bolivar's resounding triumph convinced U.S. president James Monroe that it was now time to recognize the newly independent republics. In 1822 the U.S. Congress agreed with Monroe's decision and appropriated U.S.$100,000 to establish diplomatic missions in several countries in Latin America, including Colombia. 4 But even though the United States had now recognized the new republics, the subsequent Panamanian Congress in Colombia in 1826 revealed a lack of harmony between U.S. and Latin American interests. This conference was of major importance to the newly independent republics in Latin America as many Latin American leaders—including Bolivar—hoped that the meeting would serve to promote cooperation and unity among the participating nations of the hemisphere. However, Bolivar was not in favor of inviting the llnited States, which was ultimately done by C o l o m b i a ' s vice president, Francisco Santander, while Bolivar was away. 5 The United States, not wanting to overtly support activities promoting greater independence, reacted ambivalently and belatedly to this Latin American initiative. While the United States wanted Spain evicted from the region, it was still unsure about the idea of the " L a t i n s " governing themselves, and many Southern U.S. politicians were worried that eventually notions of independence would apply to their slaves. 6 Additionally, the concept of p a n - A m e r i c a n i s m — w h e r e b y the countries of the Americas would form a sort of political and economic confederation—unsettled many in Washington who preferred separate Latin American republics. Also, at this time there was an incipient move to express U.S. dominion over the hemisphere, exemplified by James Monroe's famous "Doctrine" speech that addressed this issue in 1823. While at this time the United States was still too weak to actually replace Spain as the hegemonic power in the Caribbean and South America, the rhetoric served as an indication that the United States was eager to assume a more assertive role in the hemisphere. Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States played little part in the Panamanian Congress; in fact, it only sent two representatives to the conference, a gesture that might have been the first indication that U.S.-Latin American relations would not be always harmonious. To make matters worse, one representative died on the journey to Panama and the other arrived after the Congress had ended. The disagreement over U.S. policy toward the newly independent Latin American republics fell largely along sectional lines—the North supported recognition as a way to promote a potential trading partner;

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the South saw recognition as the b e g i n n i n g of what w o u l d b e c o m e a cheap competitor to its agriculture-based economy. The South, however, was not u n i f o r m l y a n t i - r e c o g n i t i o n , revealed best by p r o - r e c o g n i t i o n Southern politician H e n r y Clay, a l t h o u g h his c o n t r a r i a n position w a s mainly due to his personal anti-Spanish sentiments and his wish to e m barrass the Monroe administration. Referring to the c o n t r o v e r s y — w h i c h included a duel between Clay, then secretary of state, and Virginia senator J o h n R a n d o l p h — o v e r w h e t h e r or not to participate in the P a n a manian Congress, Lars Schoultz writes: Boys will be boys, of course, and everyone recognized that neither this Yankee m a c h i s m o nor the heated Congressional debate had much to do with the w i s d o m of attending an international c o n f e r e n c e . Rather, the debate was an early example of a n o w - c o m m o n aspect of United States policy toward Latin America: the tendency of unconnected U.S. d o m e s tic political disputes to spill over into inter-American relations. This had already been seen in the C l a y - A d a m s dispute over recognition, which was in large measure a struggle for leadership of the Whigs, and which featured both Clay's May 1821 pro-recognition s p e e c h in L e x i n g t o n , Kentucky and Adams's scorching 4th of July response. In the case of the Panama conference, the disputes were over t w o domestic issues: slavery (the Panama agenda included consideration of the recognition of Haiti) and the Adams-Clay "theft" of the White House. 7

While the first U.S. encounters with the newly independent C o l o m bia did not begin auspiciously, relations remained stable for the next several decades. More than anything else, the issue of interoceanic travel c a m e to d o m i n a t e U.S. policy toward C o l o m b i a . 8 In fact, as early as 1850, even though canal-motivated U.S. involvement in Central A m e r i c a would not physically begin for several decades, the United States began laying the groundwork for what it hoped would be an interoceanic canal. T h e C l a y t o n - B u l w e r Treaty, signed in 1850 b e t w e e n the United States and Great Britain, was designed to mitigate competition over any possible canal construction. Most important, the C l a y t o n - B u l w e r Treaty marked the arrival of the United States as a credible international player in the region. While it would only be in the 1890s that the United States would seriously exert p o w e r in Central America, this treaty s h o w e d that the United States was b e c o m i n g more assertive in its diplomacy. 9 The geographic characteristics of C o l o m b i a ' s n o r t h e r n m o s t department (present-day P a n a m a ) m a d e it one of the most desirable sites f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a canal within Central A m e r i c a . 1 0 B e f o r e a canal route had been d e t e r m i n e d , U.S. c o m m e r c i a l involvement in C o l o m b i a

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was largely c o n f i n e d to railroad c o n s t r u c t i o n , w h i c h e v e n t u a l l y f e r r i e d c a r g o and p e r s o n s a c r o s s the i s t h m u s . T h e 1846 B i d l a c k T r e a t y c o m mitted the U n i t e d States to g u a r a n t e e i n g C o l o m b i a ' s s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r the i s t h m u s in the p r o v i n c e of P a n a m a in return f o r p e r m i s s i o n to build a bicoastal road. Increasingly, h o w e v e r , U.S. c o m m e r c i a l interests in the 1860s and 1870s were s u b s u m e d by c o n t i n u e d U . S . - C o l o m b i a n tensions o v e r c a n a l r o u t e n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n d e e d , s e v e r a l a g r e e m e n t s that w o u l d h a v e g r a n t e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s territory f o r b u i l d i n g a c a n a l b r o k e d o w n , usually d u e to C o l o m b i a n o p p o s i t i o n . T h e U n i t e d States that C o l o m b i a n e g o t i a t e d with in the 1860s a n d 1870s barely r e s e m b l e d the United States of the 1890s and 1900s. 1 1 T h e U.S. e c o n o m y g r e w rapidly in the latter half of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y and by 1898 it w a s p r e p a r e d to e x e r t this n e w f o u n d p o w e r in its o w n b a c k y a r d in the C a r i b b e a n as well as in the P h i l i p p i n e s . A f t e r painlessly d e f e a t i n g the i m p l o d i n g S p a n i s h e m p i r e d u r i n g the " s p l e n d i d little w a r " in 1898, the United States, under the firm guidance of President T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t , finally b e g a n to seriously c o n s i d e r the issue of canal c o n struction in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a . 1 2 W h i l e the U n i t e d States increased its p o w e r and its willingness to use this p o w e r abroad, C o l o m b i a r e m a i n e d f r a g m e n t e d and poor, c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the i n t e r n e c i n e civil wars in the late nineteenth century that devastated the d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y . 1 3 T h u s the stage was set f o r the United States to wield its "big stick" against C o l o m bia in its e f f o r t s to obtain the territory n e e d e d f o r canal construction. 1 4 T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m a d e its first a t t e m p t to n e g o t i a t e a c c e s s to a canal route with C o l o m b i a at the start of the t w e n t i e t h century, best exe m p l i f i e d by the H a y - H e r r á n T r e a t y of 1903. 1 5 T h i s treaty w o u l d h a v e g i v e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s the right to c o n s t r u c t a c a n a l t h r o u g h P a n a m a and hold a s i x - m i l e - w i d e strip of territory f o r 100 y e a r s ; C o l o m b i a would receive U . S . $ 1 0 million initially, f o l l o w e d by annual p a y m e n t s of U . S . $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 1 6 O n M a r c h 17, 1903, the U . S . C o n g r e s s a p p r o v e d t h e treaty, but s o o n a f t e r the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s rejected it u n a n i m o u s l y . 1 7 T h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y since T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t had t a k e n o f f i c e and p r o m o t e d his active, unilateral vision of U.S. f o r e i g n policy, q u i c k l y d e c i d e d that if C o l o m b i a w o u l d not n e g o t i a t e U . S . a c c e s s f o r canal c o n s t r u c t i o n , it w o u l d h a v e to take m o r e a g g r e s s i v e m e a s u r e s in o r d e r to s e c u r e the territory f r o m C o l o m b i a . In 1903, local elites in P a n a m a — a region with a historically u n e a s y r e l a t i o n s h i p with the national g o v e r n m e n t in B o g o t á in w h i c h i n d e p e n d e n c e s e n t i m e n t s h a d s i m m e r e d f o r d e c a d e s — s e i z e d c o n t r o l of t h e d e p a r t m e n t in a b l o o d l e s s c o u p . 1 8 In a d i s p l a y of p o w e r p o l i t i c s , t h e

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U n i t e d States e n c o u r a g e d the secessionist leaders to revolt and almost i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i z e d the rebel g o v e r n m e n t as i n d e p e n d e n t . 1 9 Any ideas that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t had of quelling the rebellion were cut short by the presence of the U.S. gunboat Nashville anchored off the P a n a m a n i a n coast. On N o v e m b e r 3, 1903, the Nashville s t e a m e d into the harbor at port of C o l o n , sending a clear message: the United States w o u l d back P a n a m a n i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , e v e n if it had to shed blood to do so. 2 0 The next day P a n a m a declared its independence and three days later the United States established diplomatic relations. Now that the United States finally had its friendly government in place in the form of the Panamanian rebels, it was prepared to negotiate another treaty of access to a canal route. To the surprise of few, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the representatives of the Panamanian "government" in 1903, and received U.S. Senate approval on February 24, 1904, giving the United States a ten-mile-wide zone. 2 1 In return Panama was to receive a U.S.$10 million lump-sum payment and annual payments of U.S.$250,000, as well as a guarantee that the United States would protect its newly acquired national sovereignty. U.S.led construction of the canal started shortly thereafter and concluded in 1914, marking an extraordinary feat of human engineering. T h e m a n n e r in which P a n a m a gained its i n d e p e n d e n c e proved to be a sore point in U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations, c o n t i n u i n g t h r o u g h o u t construction of the canal and well after. 2 2 The matter was finally settled in 1921 with the U r r u t i a - T h o m s o n Treaty, which r e q u i r e d the United States to pay to C o l o m b i a an indemnity of U.S.$25 million. 2 3 Interestingly, T h e o d o r e Roosevelt, while out of the White H o u s e , had f o u n d a n e w vocation as one of the most v o c i f e r o u s and acerbic critics of longt i m e political rival and then president W o o d r o w W i l s o n . N o t surprisingly, Roosevelt was vehemently opposed to any treaty with Colombia. But Wilson, who felt that the United States had a moral duty to settle this issue with C o l o m b i a , supported the concept of a treaty, although it was not officially ratified until after the Harding administration took office. T h e 1920s saw a shift in U.S. policy toward C o l o m b i a , f r o m the canal to c o m m e r c i a l issues. 2 4 Specifically, C o l o m b i a ' s b o o m in c o f f e e production and exports increasingly gave it greater weight on the trade f r o n t ; in turn this e v o l u t i o n served to increase its e c o n o m i c ties to the U n i t e d States, a relationship that endures to the present. 2 5 D r a w n to a m o r e stable C o l o m b i a , U.S. investors m o v e d in, especially in the oil, mining, and agricultural sectors. By the end of the decade, U.S. investors had sent a p p r o x i m a t e l y U . S . $ 1 3 0 million in i n v e s t m e n t , a substantial

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a m o u n t of m o n e y w h e n c o m p a r e d with other A n d e a n countries such as Ecuador and Peru. 2 f t W h i l e the Great Depression of the 1930s greatly diminished U.S. imports of Colombian goods and direct investment, the economic ties created in this era withstood this t r e m e n d o u s shock. Colombia subsequently b e c a m e one of the most reliable and efficient trading partners that the United States had in South A m e r i c a during the Cold War.

GOOD NEIGHBORS F o l l o w i n g the War of 1898, U . S . policy d u r i n g the first thirty years of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y in Latin A m e r i c a ( e s p e c i a l l y in C e n t r a l A m e r i c a and the C a r i b b e a n ) was m a r k e d by its unilateral character, o n e intent on p r e s e r v i n g U.S. e c o n o m i c and political interests in the r e g i o n . Indeed, a c c o r d i n g to P e t e r S m i t h ' s c a l c u l a t i o n s , b e t w e e n 1898 a n d 1933 the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n d u c t e d o v e r thirty i n t e r v e n t i o n s in Latin A m e r i c a , often involving the U.S. Marines. 2 7 W h e t h e r it w a s in N i c a r a g u a ( 1 9 1 2 1933) or the D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c ( 1 9 1 6 - 1 9 2 4 ) , t h e U n i t e d States w a s willing to send in the m a r i n e s in o r d e r to s t a m p out instability, to e n s u r e that U.S. e c o n o m i c interests w e r e not t h r e a t e n e d , a n d , in the w o r d s of W o o d r o w W i l s o n , to teach " t h e South A m e r i c a n r e p u b l i c s to elect good men." 2 * As the d i s p u t e s o v e r P a n a m a and t h e c a n a l r o u t e m a k e clear, C o l o m b i a did not e s c a p e the long arm of U n c l e S a m . T h i s h a b i t u a l policy of i n t e r v e n t i o n b e g a n to c h a n g e in the m i d d l e to late 1920s as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b e g a n to tire of its p r o t r a c t e d inv o l v e m e n t in the d o m e s t i c a f f a i r s of its Latin A m e r i c a n n e i g h b o r s . This w a s e s p e c i a l l y true in N i c a r a g u a , w h e r e n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r A u g u s t o S a n d i n o inflicted h e a v y casualties on m a r i n e s w h o w e r e o c c u p y i n g the c o u n t r y at that t i m e . D i s i l l u s i o n m e n t with i n t e r v e n t i o n w a s c o u p l e d with a g r o w i n g c o n s e n s u s within the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t that it w a s in the national interest to i m p r o v e relations with the n a t i o n s of Latin A m e r i c a . T h i s n e w f o u n d interest in better relations with Latin A m e r i c a s t e m m e d in part f r o m the incipient U.S. e c o n o m i c d e p r e s s i o n that m a n y b e l i e v e d could be helped by better trade relations with Latin A m e r i c a . T h e rise of f a s c i s m in E u r o p e also led W a s h i n g t o n to i n c r e a s i n g l y rely on better relations with L a t i n A m e r i c a n n a t i o n s in o r d e r to c h e c k this w o r r i s o m e e x p a n s i o n . B e g u n d u r i n g the H o o v e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the result of this n e w p e r s p e c t i v e w a s the creation u n d e r F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t of the G o o d N e i g h b o r Policy in the 1930s and 1940s, w h i c h u s h e r e d in a period of relatively strong, c o o p e r a t i v e U . S . - L a t i n A m e r i c a n relations. 2 9

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B e l i e v i n g t h a t N a z i i n f l u e n c e w a s g a i n i n g g r o u n d in t h e r e g i o n , d u r i n g the p e r i o d of the G o o d N e i g h b o r P o l i c y the U n i t e d S t a t e s m a d e s t o p p i n g t h e " G e r m a n t h r e a t " the m o s t p r e s s i n g p r i o r i t y of its C o l o m b i a p o l i c y . T h e h i g h d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C o l o m b i a o n t h i s i s s u e r e v e a l s the w i d e s p r e a d c o o p e r a t i o n that c h a r a c terized relations during this period. T h e United States therefore welc o m e d the 1938 e l e c t i o n of the m o d e r a t e L i b e r a l P a r t y p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e E d u a r d o S a n t o s , w h o h a r b o r e d p r o - U . S . l e a n i n g s and w a s v i e w e d as a m o d e l of the t y p e of S o u t h A m e r i c a n p r e s i d e n t w h o w o u l d h e l p the U n i t e d S t a t e s c h e c k N a z i i n c u r s i o n s into the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e . O n e i n t e r e s t i n g e x a m p l e of h o w the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n v o l v e d itself in C o l o m b i a n a f f a i r s to b a t t l e f a s c i s m r e v o l v e d a r o u n d C o l o m b i a ' s a i r l i n e i n d u s t r y . W i t h w a r a g a i n s t G e r m a n y s e e m i n g l y i n e v i t a b l e as t h e 1930s p r o g r e s s e d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s b e c a m e v e r y c o n c e r n e d with the p r e s e n c e a n d i n f l u e n c e that G e r m a n n a t i o n a l s h a d in t h e a i r l i n e i n d u s t r y in C o l o m b i a . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f e a r e d that G e r m a n y m i g h t t h e n u s e C o l o m b i a as a seat f r o m w h i c h to a t t a c k t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . W h i l e in h i n d s i g h t t h i s s c e n a r i o m i g h t s e e m s o m e w h a t f a r f e t c h e d , at t h e t i m e it w a s seen as a c r e d i b l e threat. In 1919 the a i r l i n e S C A D T A h a d b e e n c r e a t e d as a C o l o m b i a n - G e r m a n c o n s o r t i u m . In the 1930s the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r e s s u r e d the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h i s i s s u e a n d t h e C o l o m b i a n s r e s p o n d e d by c r e a t i n g a n e w n a t i o n a l a i r l i n e — A v i a n c a . S C A D T A w a s a b s o r b e d into A v i a n c a , but not b e f o r e a l m o s t all of the G e r m a n s h a d b e e n p u r g e d f r o m t h e c o m p a n y . 1 0 A s t h i s e x a m p l e shows, the G o o d Neighbor Policy was only partially altruistic: raw g e o s t r a t e g i c c o n c e r n s m a t t e r e d as m u c h to W a s h i n g t o n as did t h e p r o m o t i o n of r e s p e c t f u l b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In t h e a f t e r m a t h of W o r l d W a r II, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d to c o n t i n u e its G o o d N e i g h b o r P o l i c y in L a t i n A m e r i c a . Yet the g r o w i n g f e a r of c o m m u n i s m s o o n r e p l a c e d the " g o o d n e i g h b o r " as t h e m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e in U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d L a t i n A m e r i c a . In an act t h a t w a s d e s i g n e d to c r e a t e m u l t i l a t e r a l yet f i r m l y a n t i c o m m u n i s t h e m i s p h e r i c o r ganizations, the United States b e c a m e the driving force behind the c r e a t i o n of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n of A m e r i c a n S t a t e s ( O A S ) . In o r d e r to illustrate that C o l o m b i a w a s c o n s i d e r e d a s t r o n g ally of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e i n a u g u r a l m e e t i n g w a s h e l d in B o g o t á in 1 9 4 8 in w h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h o p e d w o u l d b e s e e n as a c o m m i t m e n t to p r o m o t e c o o p e r a t i o n and mutual security. C o i n c i d e n t a l l y , d u r i n g the O A S m e e t i n g s in B o g o t á , p o p u l i s t L i b e r a l P a r t y p r e s i d e n t J o r g e E l i é c e r G a i t á n w a s k i l l e d b y an a s s a s s i n ' s b u l l e t .

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The violence that erupted a f t e r w a r d , k n o w n in C o l o m b i a as the Bogotazo, shocked U.S. officials, w h o interpreted the episode as another example of c o m m u n i s t agitation. 3 1 In statements that are indicative of the increasingly rigid view within the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t that c o m m u n i s m was at the root of all evil in Latin A m e r i c a , veteran U.S. d i p l o m a t Averell Harriman stated that "international c o m m u n i s m " had attempted to exploit the a s s a s s i n a t i o n . 3 2 T h e State D e p a r t m e n t called the j u s t m u r d e r e d Gaitán "a d e m a g o g i c Liberal Party leader with an i m m e n s e following."33

COLOMBIA AS COLD WAR PARADIGM T h e s e types of hard-line c o m m e n t s by the United States were repeated for the next forty years throughout Latin A m e r i c a w h e n e v e r the issue of c o m m u n i s m was involved. But relative to m a n y other Latin A m e r i c a n nations that experienced heavy-handed meddling, coercion, and even int e r v e n t i o n s by the U n i t e d States in the n a m e of a n t i c o m m u n i s m , C o l o m b i a was largely i m m u n e f r o m these p r e s s u r e s . T h i s a n o m a l o u s dearth of U . S . - C o l o m b i a n a n t a g o n i s m s was driven p r e d o m i n a n t l y by the fact that s u c c e s s i v e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t s shared the U.S. concern about c o m m u n i s t i n f l u e n c e . T h i s Western H e m i s p h e r e version of the " s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " b e t w e e n the United States and C o l o m b i a is best revealed by the fact that C o l o m b i a was the only Latin A m e r i c a n nation to send troops, including the frigate Almirante Padilla, to support the United Nations ( o v e r w h e l m i n g l y run by the United States) in its efforts on the Korean peninsula in the early 1950s. 3 4 D u r i n g the first f e w d e c a d e s of the Cold War the United States no doubt felt more c o m f o r t a b l e with m o d e r a t e , U.S.-leaning presidents in Latin A m e r i c a — e s p e c i a l l y if they w e r e overtly a n t i c o m m u n i s t — t h a n with the more left-leaning political r e f o r m e r s , such as J a c o b o A r b e n z in G u a t e m a l a in the early 1950s or J o a o G o u l a r t in Brazil in the early 1960s. The same was true for C o l o m b i a . M o d e r a t e presidents f r o m the Liberal Party, such as A l b e r t o Lleras C a m a r g o ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 2 ) or C a r l o s Lleras Restrepo ( 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 0 ) were seen, in a m a n n e r similar to E d u a r d o S a n t o s during the G o o d N e i g h b o r years, as the type of reliable allies that W a s h i n g t o n n e e d e d to stop c o m m u n i s t infiltration in Latin A m e r ica. Indeed, C o l o m b i a during the 1950s and 1960s was the p a r a d i g m of the relatively stable, p r o - U . S . country that W a s h i n g t o n greatly desired to encounter in the region, but that in actuality proved so elusive.

24

Driven by Druss

W h i l e C o l o m b i a ' s a n t i c o m m u n i s t stance c o n t r i b u t e d to a w a r m bilateral relationship, the strong U . S . - C o l o m b i a n ties during the C o l d War w e r e not d u e solely to the fact that C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t s n e v e r v e e r e d t o w a r d H a v a n a or M o s c o w . R a t h e r there w e r e a n u m b e r of d o m e s t i c issues that served to m a k e C o l o m b i a a place u n f a v o r a b l e to c o m m u n i s t i n f i l t r a t i o n . First, g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t s s p r a n g up t h r o u g h o u t C o l o m b i a in the d e c a d e s a f t e r the Bogotazo, but these m o v e m e n t s w e r e relatively u n o r g a n i z e d at this time; they did not c o o p e r a t e with o n e ano t h e r and were m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in the C o l o m b i a n political s c e n e than in p r o m o t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s m . M o r e o v e r , if civil c o n f l i c t in C o l o m b i a since 1946 is seen as the c o n t i n u a t i o n of c e n t u r i e s - o l d disputes and hatreds and not as the b e g i n n i n g s of international c o m m u n i s t revolution, it b e c o m e s clearer w h y such a violent and unstable c o u n t r y w o u l d actually not be an e p i c e n t e r in the struggle against c o m m u n i s m . Since the U n i t e d States c o n s i d e r e d C o l o m b i a to be f i r m l y in the ant i c o m m u n i s t c a m p . W a s h i n g t o n m a d e it a s h o w c a s e f o r capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t and m o d e r n i z a t i o n d u r i n g J o h n F. K e n n e d y ' s v a u n t e d A l l i a n c e f o r Progress, which b e g a n in 1961. 3 5 B e t w e e n 1961 and 1965 C o l o m b i a r e c e i v e d U . S . $ 8 3 3 m i l l i o n in l o a n s f r o m the U n i t e d States; the n e w l y c r e a t e d U.S. P e a c e C o r p s sent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 0 0 v o l u n t e e r s by t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s ; and C o l o m b i a b e c a m e o n e of the h e m i s p h e r e ' s p r i m e recipients of U.S. military aid. U.S. military relations with C o l o m b i a began to increase significantly in the 1950s b e f o r e the advent of the Alliance for Progress. It w a s in that d e c a d e that the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t established army, navy, and air f o r c e attaché o f f i c e s in Bogotá. In 1952 the United States signed a " M i l i t a r y A s sistance A g r e e m e n t " with C o l o m b i a c o m m i t t i n g itself to h e l p i n g t h e C o l o m b i a n military in its e f f o r t s to p r o m o t e h e m i s p h e r i c security. F o l lowing President E i s e n h o w e r ' s 1959 decision to increase i n v o l v e m e n t of the U.S. military in C o l o m b i a ' s "internal security p r o b l e m s , " in 1961 the U n i t e d States sent its first military training team ( M T T ) to C o l o m b i a to help train the c o u n t r y ' s military in areas related to intelligence c a p a b i l i ties. A c c o r d i n g to D e n n i s R e m p e , the arrival of the M T T s signaled a significant increase in U.S. military i n v o l v e m e n t in C o l o m b i a : " E v e r y t h i n g f r o m supply, e n g i n e e r i n g , sanitation, and other civic actions p r o j e c t s , to i n t e l l i g e n c e , to c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n c y , p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e , a n d s p e c i a l operations were taught. Indeed, m o r e M T T s were sent to C o l o m b i a d u r ing this period than a n y w h e r e else in Latin A m e r i c a . " 3 6 A s w a s the c a s e on the p o l i t i c a l side, w h e r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s s o u g h t to c u l t i v a t e its ties with m o d e r a t e p r e s i d e n t s , the U . S . m i l i t a r y

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward

Colombia

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relationship with C o l o m b i a w a s seen as an e f f e c t i v e and a p p r o p r i a t e method through which to bolster the forces against c o m m u n i s m and subversion. T h e reasoning was that if the C o l o m b i a n military could be a respected, pro-U.S. institution, it would surely serve to promote hemispheric security against any threat that diverged f r o m these same values. Interestingly, while c o m m u n i s m no longer p o s e s a threat to the U.S. notion of hemispheric stability, today U.S. military relations with C o l o m b i a are at their highest point in history, but this time over a new threat—drugs. B e c a u s e of the lack of a credible c o m m u n i s t infiltration threat and the general p r o - U . S . p o s i t i o n s of v a r i o u s C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , relations b e t w e e n the two c o u n t r i e s r e m a i n e d strong and p r e d i c t a b l e f r o m the 1960s until the early 1980s. But if the United States did not p e r c e i v e the threat of c o m m u n i s m to be very great in C o l o m b i a , b e g i n n i n g in the 1970s the g r o w i n g c o n c e r n o v e r d r u g p r o d u c t i o n in C o l o m b i a c a u s e d W a s h i n g t o n to d r a m a t i c a l l y alter its policies t o w a r d the country.

THE WAR ON DRUGS U.S.-supported crop control, enforcement, and interdiction efforts in Colombia and Bolivia have not produced major reductions in coca and marijuana production and trafficking, and it is questionable whether major reductions will be achieved in the near future. — U.S. General Accounting Office

P r e s i d e n t R i c h a r d N i x o n is c r e d i t e d with c o i n i n g the p h r a s e " w a r on d r u g s " on M a r c h 24, 1968. But while he w a s m o s t likely r e f e r r i n g o n l y to a d o m e s t i c w a r on drugs, this term is n o w m o s t l y applied to U . S . int e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r d i c t i o n e f f o r t s . U . S . a n t i d r u g a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a f o r m a l l y b e g a n in 1973 w h e n the t w o c o u n t r i e s signed a bilateral a g r e e m e n t a l l o w i n g f o r this type of aid to be t r a n s f e r r e d . T h e issue of d r u g s f o l l o w e d a linear path f r o m the 1970s to the first y e a r s of the t w e n t y first century, i n c r e a s i n g l y g a i n i n g i m p o r t a n c e to the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d increasingly dominating U.S.-Colombian relations.38 Former foreign s e r v i c e o f f i c e r R o b e r t D r e x l e r d e s c r i b e s t h e g r a d u a l but c o n s i s t e n t inc r e a s e in the U . S . f o c u s on the d r u g issue: By 1978 . . . the drug s y n d i c a t e had g r o w n s o p o w e r f u l that the Colombian authorities had insufficient strength to o v e r c o m e them. . . . [ W ] e had not f o r e s e e n it three or four years earlier. . . . A m e r i c a n

26

Driven by Drugs authorities had b e c o m e concerned about drug t r a f f i c k i n g in C o l o m b i a in the early 1970s and the D r u g E n f o r c e m e n t A g e n c y ( D E A ) stationed a s m a l l n u m b e r of a g e n t s in our e m b a s s y in B o g o t á . T h e r e w a s no s e n s e o f c r i s i s in c o n n e c t i o n with the D E A o p e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , and the narcotics issue w a s only one of several diplomatic p r o b l e m s facing the e m b a s s y when Viron P. Vaky w a s the a m b a s s a d o r , never the most important o n e . 3 9

Viron " P e t e " Vaky corroborates this point when he o b s e r v e s that during his ambassadorial tenure in B o g o t á in the 1970s the drug issue was g r o w i n g in importance but never an integral part of the bilateral relationship: "It [the drug issue] w a s there. We had D E A g u y s in the emb a s s y but it was not a central element of our policy. At that time there were no cartels and little to no involvement in the cocaine trade. . . . N o one saw it [U.S. drug policy] reaching the proportions it d i d . " 4 0 The early 1980s marked a fundamental turning point in the new international war on drugs as the arrival of the Reagan administration ushered in a more assertive international drug interdiction policy. The new administration quickly m a d e d r u g s the primary f o c u s of its relations with C o l o m b i a . President Ronald R e a g a n ' s appointment of former Arizona State University p r o f e s s o r L e w i s A. T a m b s as a m b a s s a d o r to C o l o m b i a was one of the first s i g n s that the United States was looking to get tough on the drug issue in Latin America. 4 1 A s a hard-liner on the drug issue, the R e a g a n administration considered T a m b s to be the perfect choice for C o l o m b i a . T h i s b e c a m e an important qualification for subsequent LI.S. a m b a s s a d o r s in C o l o m b i a as a g o o d share of the new U . S . antidrug resolve would be concentrated there, in a country whose involvement in the international drug trade at that time c o n s i s t e d primarily in the production and export of marijuana. 4 2

Colombia Tackles the Drug Issue It w a s first during the administration of Liberal leader Julio C é s a r Turbay Ayala ( 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 ) that the Colombian government raised the stakes in its war against drug t r a f f i c k e r s . 4 3 Turbay w a s the first C o l o m b i a n president to declare war on the traffickers, prompted by the reality that by the late 1970s C o l o m b i a had b e c o m e the primary producer and exporter of m a r i j u a n a to the U . S . market. S o m e 1 0 , 0 0 0 metric tons of m a r i j u a n a were being p r o d u c e d annually by up to 5 0 , 0 0 0 small farmers. 4 4 But even if he realized that he needed to do something about the rapidly e x p a n d i n g m a r i j u a n a cultivation and export p r o b l e m , Turbay

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

27

also realized that drug m o n e y w a s b r i n g i n g an e s t i m a t e d U . S . $ 1 . 5 - $ 4 . 1 billion in b a d l y n e e d e d f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e income. N e v e r t h e l e s s , T u r b a y c r a c k e d d o w n on illicit d r u g c u l t i v a t i o n , a m o v e that u s h e r e d in an e x t e n d e d period of m u t u a l c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n W a s h i n g t o n and B o g o t á with respect to a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s . 4 5 While at this time J a m a i c a and M e x i c o were also m a j o r p r o d u c e r s of m a r i j u a n a d e s t i n e d f o r the United States, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t c h o s e to place its d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e on the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to b e c o m e more involved in antidrug efforts. Specifically, Washington urged the Turbay a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to begin f u m i g a t i n g m a r i j u a n a with the h e r b i c i d e paraquat, which the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t proceeded to do. Turbay also directed the military to increase its involvement in the antidrug c a m p a i g n . T h e c u l m i n a t i o n of T u r b a y ' s d e c i s i o n to b r i n g a reluctant m i l i t a r y that was m o r e c o n c e r n e d with f i g h t i n g the g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n t s into the fight against d r u g s w a s an o p e r a t i o n in the G u a j i r a p e n i n s u l a , in the n o r t h e r n m o s t tip of the country, that targeted m a r i j u a n a p r o d u c t i o n . T h e o p e r a t i o n u t i l i z e d o v e r 10,000 t r o o p s , w h o seized o v e r 6 , 0 0 0 t o n s of m a r i j u a n a , d e s t r o y e d 10,000 m a r i j u a n a plants, and c o n f i s c a t e d 3 0 0 b o a t s and a i r c r a f t . Yet m a r i j u a n a c u l t i v a t i o n m o v e d to o t h e r p a r t s of C o l o m b i a and also q u i c k l y returned to G u a j i r a once the p r o g r a m e n d e d . In a b a c k l a s h that w o u l d b e c o m e c o m m o n f o l l o w i n g a n t i d r u g o p e r ations, the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s operation p r o v o k e d a high level of r e s e n t m e n t f r o m the local p o p u l a t i o n , of w h i c h an e s t i m a t e d 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s w e r e t h o u g h t to be i n v o l v e d in the c u l t i v a t i o n of m a r i j u a n a . 4 6 H o w e v e r , the e n d result of the T u r b a y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e s c a l a t i o n w a s that, in a d d i t i o n to m o v i n g m a r i j u a n a c u l t i v a t i o n to o t h e r a r e a s of t h e country, the d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s f o c u s e d m o r e on c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n , m a k ing it m o r e m o b i l e a n d utilizing s m a l l - s c a l e p r o c e s s i n g labs that w e r e m u c h h a r d e r to detect a n d destroy. 4 7 M o r e o v e r , r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n and i n e p t i t u d e w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y p r o m p t e d the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to shift central a n t i d r u g authority to the N a t i o n a l Police. By 1982 the N a tional Police had e s t a b l i s h e d a special antinarcotics unit, w h i c h has subsequently r e c e i v e d the l i o n ' s share of U . S . antidrug assistance. 4 8 T h e s e initial a t t e m p t s to c l a m p d o w n on d r u g p r o d u c t i o n d i d not translate into s u c c e s s in s t e m m i n g the a m o u n t of d r u g s l e a v i n g C o l o m bia f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s . W h i l e aerial e r a d i c a t i o n of m a r i j u a n a p l a n t s w a s able to cut m a r i j u a n a p r o d u c t i o n by 22 p e r c e n t , total a c r e a g e planted increased soon thereafter. M o r e o v e r , while the U . S . a n d C o l o m bian g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e f o c u s i n g on e r a d i c a t i n g m a r i j u a n a , c o c a cultiv a t i o n and c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n a c c e l e r a t e d , a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n that h a d

28

Driven by Druss

grave consequences for Colombian society—and U.S. drug policy—in the 1 9 8 0 s a n d 1 9 9 0 s . 4 y H o w e v e r , e v e n if the e r a d i c a t i o n e f f o r t s were not e f f e c t i v e , this p e r i o d in the d r u g w a r is o f i m p o r t a n c e in u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y U . S . - C o l o m b i a n r e l a t i o n s , s i n c e by c o o p e r a t i n g in U . S . antidrug e f f o r t s , the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o n c e d i n g that the drug i s s u e had a large s u p p l y c o m p o n e n t . S i n c e that t i m e , there has been surp r i s i n g l y little d e b a t e in either W a s h i n g t o n or B o g o t á a s to whether supply reduction s h o u l d be a f u n d a m e n t a l c o m p o n e n t o f the w a r on d r u g s .

Extradition A n o t h e r s i g n that C o l o m b i a w a s willing to c o o p e r a t e with the incipient U . S . c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s in the A n d e s o c c u r r e d on N o v e m b e r

14,

1979, when the T u r b a y a n d C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s s i g n e d an extradition treaty that o f f i c i a l l y b e c a m e C o l o m b i a n law on N o v e m b e r 3. 1980. 5 0 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , W a s h i n g t o n w a s p l e a s e d with T u r b a y ' s d e c i s i o n and res p o n d e d by s e n d i n g B o g o t á an additional U . S . S 1 6 million in military ass i s t a n c e . 5 1 O n c e a g a i n T u r b a y w a s a m b i v a l e n t , a s he k n e w that such a treaty w a s vital for the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to fight drug traff i c k i n g ; he a l s o knew that the bilateral treaty s i g n a l e d to those both within and o u t s i d e C o l o m b i a that only the U . S . legal s y s t e m w a s c a p a b l e of dealing with C o l o m b i a ' s p r o b l e m s . M o r e o v e r , T u r b a y b e l i e v e d that by signing the treaty C o l o m b i a w a s p r o b a b l y f o r e v e r l o s i n g its s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r d r u g p o l i c y c o n d u c t e d within its b o r d e r s . J u a n T o k a t l i a n writes h o w the extradition treaty p o s e d sensitive i s s u e s for both B o g o t á and Washington: The delicacy of the issue involved was enormous: lo agree on a bilateral juridical instrument that would allow for the extradition of each country's nationals to the other directly affected each country's national sovereignty. . . . At the same time, the recourse to a specific treaty was not a question of mere tactical convenience. Treaties imply binding obligations and long-term commitments. The accord on extradition indicated the choice of a strategic mechanism that was thought to be central to the fight against drugs. The rationale behind it was that such a treaty would contribute to bring justice, to deter the drug lords, to reduce narcotics trafficking, to improve bilateral state-to-state relations and to alleviate the Colombian legal process from the burden of mounting drug offenses. The underlying implications were that tough law enforcement was the best alternative to eliminate drug supply, that the U.S. government had no confidence at all in the Colombian judicial system, and that the U.S. official diagnosis on drugs was the correct one. It also provided the U.S. administration with an instrument (a "stick") to determine unilaterally Colombian collaboration on drugs. 5 2

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

29

Turbay's successor, Conservative leader Belisario Betancur ( 1 9 8 2 1986), refused to enforce the extradition law and instead preferred to test the efficacy of the Colombian judicial system without external interference. 5 1 It would not be long, however, before Betancur became the first Colombian president to utilize the law when on January 5, 1985, he sent four Colombian nationals to be tried in the United States. By June 1987 the U.S. government had made 140 extradition requests, and ultimately the Colombian government sent thirteen C o l o m b i a n s and two foreigners to face trial in the United States. Three drug traffickers were extradited from the United States to Colombia. 5 4 Betancur's change in resolve was prompted by the April 30, 1984, assassination of his minister of justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. Working in tandem with the U.S. DEA, Lara Bonilla led the effort that eventually resulted in the discovery and destruction of a cocaine lab on the Yari River in the department of Guaviare; they captured seven aircraft and some fourteen metric tons of cocaine with an estimated U.S.$1.2 billion market value. 5 5 The narcotics traffickers took revenge by murdering Lara Bonilla. Drug kingpins also placed a U.S.$500,000 bounty on Ambassador Tambs's head, and offered a U.S.$300,000 reward to anyone who captured a DEA agent. In addition to stepping up the extradition efforts, Betancur gave the green light for more extensive uses of herbicides in order to fumigate illicit crops. 5 6 Like Turbay, Betancur's tough stance was not overlooked in the United States: U.S. antidrug assistance tripled from 1983 to 1985, and President Ronald Reagan publicly praised Betancur's efforts during his April 1986 visit to the White House. 5 7 On June 25, 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that the extradition law was unconstitutional, putting an end to the extradition of Colombian nationals. Nevertheless, the August 18, 1989, murder of Liberal Party presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán prompted President Virgilio Barco ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 ) to utilize emergency decrees in order to extradite certain drug traffickers to the United States. 5 8 Between August 1989 and December 1990, the Colombian government extradited twenty-four suspected drug traffickers to the United States. President Barco's decision to extradite drug traffickers prompted the Medellin drug cartel to unleash a brutal campaign of violence against the Colombian state and political class. Upon taking office in 1990, Liberal Party president César Gaviria implemented a policy whereby extradition would be used as a discretionary tool. 59 In practical terms, this meant that the government would reduce the drug traffickers' prison terms by one-third and not extradite them if they agreed to turn themselves in and confess to at least one

30

Driven by Drugs

c r i m e . 6 0 By m i d - 1 9 9 1 a l m o s t all of the t o p l e a d e r s h i p of the M e d e l l i n cartel had a g r e e d to the s u r r e n d e r in return f o r a r e d u c e d s e n t e n c e and a g u a r a n t e e of no extradition. 6 1 In 1991, under intense p r e s s u r e f r o m the drug cartels, the C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y a p p r o v e d Article 35 of the newly p r o m u l g a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n that b a n n e d e x t r a d i t i o n . 6 2 S o o n a f t e r the constitution was a p p r o v e d , M e d e l l i n d r u g lord P a b l o E s c o b a r turned h i m self in, c o r r e c t l y b e l i e v i n g that he n o w w a s n o l o n g e r t h r e a t e n e d with extradition to the U n i t e d States. In 1997 the c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s a m e n d e d to allow f o r n o n r e t r o a c t i v e e x t r a d i t i o n and in 2 0 0 0 the first C o l o m b i a n in nine years was extradited to the U n i t e d S t a t e s . w

Narcotization and Militarization In contrast to the m o r e c o m b a t i v e stance of the 1970s, the early 1980s were m a r k e d by m o r e c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n C o l o m b i a a n d the U n i t e d States on the drug issue. Tired of battling W a s h i n g t o n , the B e t a n c u r adm i n i s t r a t i o n w a s l o o k i n g to f i n d a m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e p o s i t i o n vis-à-vis the U.S. antidrug policies. A c c o r d i n g to Tokatlian: B o g o t á had g o n e full c i r c l e f r o m 1 9 8 3 to 1984: f r o m a d i s t a n t , c o n f l i c t u a l p o s i t i o n v i s - à - v i s W a s h i n g t o n on d r u g s to f r i e n d l y , n o n frictional cooperation with the W h i t e H o u s e on narcotics matters. B o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the U . S . C o n g r e s s p r a i s e d C o l o m b i a f o r its " f r o n t a l " attack o n d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g : t h e t h r e e pillars of the a n t i - n a r c o t i c s o f f e n s i v e — e x t r a d i t i o n , m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , and e r a d i cation—were working.64

W h i l e others place the date at the end of the 1980s with the a d v e n t of the A n d e a n Initiative, Tokatlian b e l i e v e s that it w a s d u r i n g the m i d 1980s that U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations b e c a m e n a r c o t i z e d , w h e n virtually all bilateral i s s u e s b e c a m e d e p e n d e n t on the d r u g issue: if C o l o m b i a w a n t e d g o o d r e l a t i o n s or s u p p o r t f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s on a c e r t a i n issue, it w a s clear to all that it first had to be p e r c e i v e d by W a s h i n g t o n as c o o p e r a t i n g in the w a r on drugs. 6 5 For e x a m p l e , w h e n B e t a n c u r ' s att o r n e y g e n e r a l , C a r l o s J i m é n e z G ó m e z , d e c l a r e d the 1979 e x t r a d i t i o n law to be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , the r e a c t i o n f r o m W a s h i n g t o n w a s o n e of a n g e r and f r u s t r a t i o n , m a n i f e s t e d by C o n g r e s s m a n C h a r l e s R a n g e l ' s m o v e to sanction the i m p o r t of C o l o m b i a n f l o w e r s . Tokatlian writes that by the e n d of the B e t a n c u r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , " D r u g s had p e r m e a t e d every aspect of the B o g o t á - W a s h i n g t o n relationship. M o r e o v e r , the U . S . antin a r c o t i c s p o l i c y w a s , by now, a p e r m a n e n t c o m p o n e n t of C o l o m b i a n

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

31

domestic politics and C o l o m b i a ' s relative international leverage was seriously c o n s t r a i n e d by the centrality of d r u g s in U . S . - C o l o m b i a n narcopolitics." 6 6 Robert Drexler echoes Tokatlian's view w h e n he writes: President Reagan, and, e v e n more, President Bush wanted to d e m o n strate to the American public that they were g o i n g personally (trips to C o l o m b i a ) to what they c o n t e n d e d w a s the source of our narcotics p r o b l e m s — C o l o m b i a — t o press for tough action there. . . . Failing, or declining, to perceive American drug abuse as primarily a social problem, they were naturally unreceptive to their C o l o m b i a n counterparts' e m p h a s i s on the social context of C o l o m b i a ' s narcotics problem and were almost deaf to C o l o m b i a n complaints about the insatiable A m e r ican demand for drugs. 6 7

T h e roots of this rapid escalation in the war on drugs, and subsequent fruition in the 1990s, can be traced back to April 8, 1986, w h e n President R e a g a n issued National Security Directive no. 221, w h i c h stated that drug production and trafficking threatened U.S. security and that the United States needed to place greater e m p h a s i s on source control. 6 8 This directive is also thought to have authorized the CIA's involvement in international drug interdiction efforts. 6 9 Since that time the CIA has significantly increased its presence in C o l o m b i a as it seeks to gather more information on the drug trade as well as on the guerrilla insurgents and paramilitary g r o u p s . In the early 1990s, for e x a m p l e , the a g e n c y played an i n s t r u m e n t a l — a l b e i t highly s e c r e t i v e — r o l e in the search for and eventual killing of M e d e l l i n cartel kingpin P a b l o E s c o bar. 7 0 Also in 1986, the United States launched its A n d e a n m i l i t a r y - b a s e d antidrug p r o g r a m Operation Blast Furnace, which primarily f o c u s e d on counternarcotics efforts in Bolivia. A m o n g other actions, this initiative sent six Black H a w k helicopters and 160 U.S. troops to help the Bolivian narcotics police destroy c o c a i n e laboratories. S e w a l l M e n z e l has written that the small s c o p e and time period of Blast F u r n a c e e n s u r e d that the program was not very effective. In fact, the operation e n d e d up s e r v i n g as a " l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e " f o r d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s i n s o f a r as t h e y c o u l d now better predict the f u t u r e military tactics of the R e a g a n adm i n i s t r a t i o n ' s source-oriented antidrug efforts. 7 1 W h i l e mostly operational in Bolivia, Blast Furnace set a p r e c e d e n t for the increasingly militarized A n d e a n drug policy, a trait that continues to c h a r a c t e r i z e U.S. d r u g p o l i c y — a n d in turn overall p o l i c y — i n C o l o m b i a . Blast F u r n a c e was f o l l o w e d in 1987 by Operation S n o w c a p ,

Driven by Drugs

32

which initially targeted its e f f o r t s in Bolivia and Peru. T h e p r o g r a m was e x t e n d e d to C o l o m b i a in 1989. T h e entire b u d g e t for S n o w c a p ( U . S . $ 2 4 million) was i n s i g n i f i c a n t c o m p a r e d to the 2 0 0 0 b u d g e t f o r c o u n t e r n a r cotics assistance to C o l o m b i a alone ( U . S . $ 8 5 0 million; see Table 2.1), a figure that reveals j u s t h o w m u c h and h o w fast the United States has increased its c o u n t e r n a r o c t i c s e f f o r t s in Latin A m e r i c a — a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y in C o l o m b i a . 7 2

The Bush Administration:

Escalation

By the late 1980s p u b l i c c o n c e r n o v e r the U . S . d r u g p r o b l e m had reached u n p r e c e d e n t e d levels. 7 3 T h e U.S. m e d i a r e p o r t e d on an a l m o s t daily basis h o w the s c o u r g e of crack c o c a i n e w a s i n f e c t i n g U.S. cities and h o w t h o u s a n d s of " c r a c k b a b i e s " w e r e b e i n g born into a life they w e r e p h y s i c a l l y u n p r e p a r e d to s u r v i v e . Tellingly, a C B S N e w s / N e w York T i m e s poll p u b l i s h e d in M a r c h 1988 s h o w e d that 4 8 percent of the U.S. p u b l i c c o n s i d e r e d d r u g s to be the p r i n c i p a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h a l lenge f a c i n g the U n i t e d States, and that 63 percent thought drugs should take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the a n t i c o m m u n i s t struggle. 7 4 G e o r g e B u s h p i c k e d up on this " d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t our drug p r o b l e m " s e n t i m e n t and m a d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d r u g i n t e r d i c t i o n e f f o r t s a f u n d a m e n t a l c o m p o n e n t of his n e w l y d e c l a r e d war on d r u g s . But what w a s n e w w a s the g r o w i n g e m p h a s i s on f i g h t i n g the war on d r u g s in s o u r c e c o u n t r i e s such as B o l i v i a , P e r u , a n d C o l o m b i a . D u r i n g the 1980s, an-

Table 2.1 U.S. Counternarcotics-Related Assistance to Colombia (selected years, U.S.$ millions) 1978 1983 1987 1989 1990 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

2.49 3.49 ll.55 75.01a 11.63 126.00 16.00 13.60 140.00 289.00 850.00

Sources: O f f i c e of N a t i o n a l D r u g C o n t r o l Policy, v a r i o u s years; O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t and B u d g e t , 1999; U S A I D , v a r i o u s years. Note: a. Includes the U . S . $ 6 5 million in e m e r g e n c y c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s aid (506 D r a w d o w n ) sent a f t e r the A u g u s t 1989 a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Luis Carlos G a l á n .

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

33

tidrug e f f o r t s w e r e m o r e f o c u s e d on i n t e r d i c t i n g d r u g s as they w e r e entering the U n i t e d States using a g e n c i e s such as the U.S. C o a s t G u a r d . N o w the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d go a f t e r the r a w m a t e r i a l s of the d r u g trade, and by d e f i n i t i o n this m e a n t the A n d e s . In a 1988 c a m p a i g n s p e e c h B u s h d e c l a r e d , " T h e logic is s i m p l e . T h e c h e a p e s t w a y to e r a d i c a t e n a r c o t i c s is to d e s t r o y t h e m at their s o u r c e . . . . We n e e d to w i p e out c r o p s w h e r e v e r they are g r o w n a n d take out labs w h e r e v e r they e x i s t . " " T h e arrival of the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — a n d t h e c o n c o m i t a n t e n d of the C o l d W a r — u n d e r s c o r e d t h e fact that d r u g s had now r e p l a c e d c o m m u n i s m as the p r i m a r y threat to the United States in Latin A m e r i c a . Tokatlian writes: W h e r e a s f r o m H a r r y T r u m a n to R o n a l d R e a g a n , n o U . S . p o l i t i c i a n w i s h e d to be c o n s i d e r e d " s o f t " on C o m m u n i s m , at t h e e n d of t h e 1980s n o o n e w a n t e d to b e s e e n as f l e x i b l e on t h e issue of d r u g s . W i t h congressional cooperation, neoconservative U.S. think-tanks were c a l l i n g f o r the c r e a t i o n of a m u l t i - n a t i o n a l a n t i - n a r c o t i c f o r c e in L a t i n America, thus promoting regional militarization.76

At the s a m e time that the United States was m a k i n g s o u r c e - c o u n t r y drug interdiction a national security priority, e v e n t s in C o l o m b i a quickly m a d e the c o u n t r y a f o c u s f o r h e i g h t e n e d U.S. a n t i d r u g interdiction. D u e to the partially s u c c e s s f u l p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s d u r i n g the B e t a n c u r a d ministration, m a n y guerrillas laid d o w n their a r m s and integrated t h e m selves into the o r t h o d o x political s y s t e m , with a g o o d n u m b e r of t h e m f o r m i n g a n e w political party U n i ó n Patriótica (UP; Patriotic U n i o n ) . A t the s a m e t i m e , h o w e v e r , the c o c a i n e b u s i n e s s in C o l o m b i a w a s b e g i n ning to e x p l o d e and n e w l y w e a l t h y d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s were d e c l a r i n g w a r on the e x - g u e r r i l l a s , believing that their m o v e s t o w a r d political integration were actually thinly veiled a t t e m p t s to c o n t i n u e their r e v o l u t i o n a r y a g e n d a t h r o u g h s e e m i n g l y legitimate m e a n s . This e x p l o s i v e mix of drug traffickers and f o r m e r guerrillas resulted in the assassination of several ex-guerrillas c u m politicians. For e x a m p l e , on August 27, 1987, f o r m e r U P presidential candidate J a i m e P a r d o Leal was killed by orders f r o m drug traffickers; a f e w years later on M a r c h 22, 1990, U P p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e B e r n a r d o J a r a m i l l o O s s a w a s a s s a s s i nated; and a m o n t h later M o v i m i e n t o 19 de Abril (M-19) presidential cand i d a t e C a r l o s P i z a r r o L e o n g ó m e z was also killed. All told, o v e r 1,000 m e m b e r s of the UP, as well as countless other ex-guerrillas, w e r e killed d u r i n g the 1980s and early 1990s, with the vast m a j o r i t y of the d e a t h s c o m i n g at the h a n d s of the drug t r a f f i c k e r - f i n a n c e d paramilitary g r o u p s .

34

Driven by Drugs

R e g a r d l e s s of h o w m a n y e x - g u e r r i l l a s w e r e killed, it w a s the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of L i b e r a l P a r t y p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e L u i s C a r l o s G a l á n on A u g u s t 18, 1989, that p r o m p t e d the U n i t e d States to get m o r e i n v o l v e d in C o l o m b i a . W a s h i n g t o n v i e w e d G a l á n as a reliable a n d m o d e r n i z i n g p o l i t i c i a n w h o w a s c o m m i t t e d to w a r m r e l a t i o n s with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . His violent death horrified many U.S. government officials, w h o now c a m e to b e l i e v e t h a t m u c h m o r e n e e d e d to be d o n e to s u p p o r t the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t in its f i g h t a g a i n s t the d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s q u i c k l y s e n t an a d d i t i o n a l U . S . $ 6 5 m i l l i o n in c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s aid ( U . S . $ 1 0 m i l l i o n w a s the original b u d g e t e d a m o u n t f o r 1 9 8 9 ) , a n d o n S e p t e m b e r 5, 1989. P r e s i d e n t R u s h a n n o u n c e d his f i v e - y e a r U . S . $ 2 . 2 b i l l i o n A n d e a n I n i t i a t i v e . 7 7 T h i s initiative r e s u l t e d in m a k i n g the A n d e s , r a t h e r than C e n t r a l A m e r i c a ( w h e r e by t h e n m o s t of the civil c o n f l i c t s h a d been r e s o l v e d p e a c e f u l l y ) , the l e a d i n g r e c i p i e n t of U . S . m i l i t a r y aid in the h e m i s p h e r e . T h e U.S. shift in f o c u s f r o m s t o p p i n g c o m m u n i s m to s t o p p i n g d r u g s m a d e it c l e a r to A n d e a n g o v e r n m e n t s that t h e w a r o n d r u g s n e e d e d to b e c o m e a t o p p r i o r i t y in t h e i r c o u n t r i e s , s o m e t h i n g that c a u s e d t r e m e n d o u s f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n W a s h i n g t o n a n d A n d e a n g o v e r n m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t the 1990s. 7 x T h i s f i r m b e l i e f that A n d e a n g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y c o o p e r a t e w i t h U . S . a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s h e l p s e x p l a i n the v i t u p e r a t i v e r e a c t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n w h e n e v e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s p e r c e i v e d that this c o o p e r a t i o n w a s not f o r t h c o m i n g . In the m o s t e x t r e m e i n s t a n c e s the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t d e c e r t i f i e d c o u n t r i e s f o r not a d e q u a t e l y c o o p e r a t i n g in the w a r o n d r u g s . T h i s h a p p e n e d to B o l i v i a in 1 9 9 4 a n d to C o l o m b i a in 1 9 9 6 a n d 1997. T h i s b e l i e f in the n e e d f o r s o u r c e - c o u n t r y g o v e r n m e n t c o o p e r a t i o n a l s o d r o v e t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to u n d e r m i n e P r e s i d e n t E r n e s t o S a m p e r in C o l o m b i a . T h e f i r s t p h a s e of the A n d e a n I n i t i a t i v e sent U . S . $ 6 5 m i l l i o n to C o l o m b i a , c o n s i s t i n g p r i m a r i l y of m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t e v e n t h o u g h t h e Barco administration had requested intelligence devices and technical a s s i s t a n c e f o r the j u d i c i a l s y s t e m . T h i s b e g a n a long t r e n d : s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e A n d e a n I n i t i a t i v e a n d c o n t i n u i n g t h r o u g h the 1 9 9 0 s , a l m o s t all of t h e c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s aid that the U n i t e d S t a t e s has sent to C o l o m b i a h a s been military related (see Table 2.2). T h e Andean Initiative also sent U . S . m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s to t r a i n t h e C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y o n c o u n t e r narcotics efforts.79 In an a t t e m p t to s h o w that as part of the A n d e a n I n i t i a t i v e t h e B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s c o m m i t t e d to a m o r e m u l t i l a t e r a l a p p r o a c h to t h e d r u g i n t e r d i c t i o n i s s u e , in F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 0 the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d s e v e r a l

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

35

Table 2.2 Andean Initiative-Assistance for Colombia (U.S.$ millions)

Military Economic Law e n f o r c e m e n t D E A support Total

FY 89

FY 90

FY 91

FY 92

FY 93

FY 94

Total

8.6 0.0 10.0 4.2 22.8

40.3 3.6 20.0 4.4 68.3

60.5 50.0 20.0 4.4 134.9

60.5 50.0 20.0 4.4 134.9

60.5 50.0 20.0 4.4 134.9

60.5 50.0 20.0 4.4 134.9

290.9 203.6 110.0 26.2

—

Sources: O f f i c e of National D r u g Control Policy, 1990, 1992; Sewall M e n z e l . Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing U.S. Ami-Drug Policy in the Nrth Andes-Colombia ( N e w York: University Press of A m e r i c a , 1997). p. 73. Note: FY = fiscal year.

Latin A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s issued the Declaration of C a r t a g e n a . x 0 It stated that the U n i t e d States w o u l d p r o v i d e r e s o u r c e s to the A n d e a n countries that c o o p e r a t e d in c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s efforts. 8 1 T h e declaration largely consisted of platitudes on multilateral cooperation and how the drug problem was both a supply and a d e m a n d problem. 8 2 Nevertheless, it m a i n t a i n e d that a hard line on drugs w o u l d p r o d u c e a victory. T h i s c o n f e r e n c e was s i g n i f i c a n t since only a f e w m o n t h s earlier the United States had positioned an aircraft carrier off the coast of C o l o m b i a in an attempt to bolster its claim that it was serious about stopping drugs at their source. The response f r o m the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t and public was e x t r e m e l y n e g a t i v e and the carrier was q u i c k l y g i v e n orders to m o v e away f r o m the coast. 8 1 W h i l e the 1990 C a r t a g e n a C o n f e r e n c e did briefly boost G e o r g e B u s h ' s Andean Initiative strategy, by the end of 1992 there was widespread agreement within the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t that the plan had failed in its effort to reduce the a m o u n t of cocaine and heroine entering the country. Indeed, after three years and U.S.$2.2 billion, cocaine was as c h e a p and p l e n t i f u l as e v e r on U.S. streets. 8 4 A c c o r d i n g to C o n g r e s s m a n Charles Schumer, " b y every objective standard, the P r e s i d e n t ' s A n d e a n strategy has f a i l e d . " 8 5 C o m p o u n d i n g this inability to stem the f l o w of d r u g s was the fact that the U.S. m i l i t a r y ' s f o c u s on the d r u g w a r had been diverted due to the 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 Gulf War, which it considered more important than antidrug e f f o r t s in the A n d e s . 8 6

The Clinton Administration Confronts the Drug War T h e subsequent election of Bill Clinton saw a reduction in U.S. antidrug e f f o r t s in the Andes. In early 1993 the Clinton administration conducted

36

Driven by Drugs

an " e x t e n s i v e c l a s s i f i e d r e v i e w " o f drug e r a d i c a t i o n and i n t e r d i c t i o n p r o g r a m s in the A n d e s and c o n c l u d e d that e f f o r t s to date had b e e n ine f f e c t i v e . T h e end result w a s that the planned 1993 fiscal year budget o f U . S . $ 3 8 7 m i l l i o n in antidrug aid for the A n d e a n c o u n t r i e s w a s s l a s h e d to U . S . $ 1 7 4 m i l l i o n . 8 7 T h e staff o f the O f f i c e o f N a t i o n a l D r u g Control P o l i c y ( O N D C P ) w a s reduced from 146 p o s i t i o n s to 25. K 8 Yet any possibility for significant long-term reduction in U.S. countern a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s in the A n d e s w a s e n d e d w h e n the R e p u b l i c a n s took c o n t r o l o f both h o u s e s o f C o n g r e s s f o l l o w i n g the 1 9 9 4 m i d t e r m e l e c t i o n s . W h i l e it is c l e a r that D e m o c r a t s can be as h a w k i s h o n the drug issue

as

their

Republican

counterparts,

the

Republican

majority

n o n e t h e l e s s turned up the heat on the drug war. T h i s fact had g r a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r the n e w president o f C o l o m b i a , E r n e s t o S a m p e r , w h o h a p p e n e d to be taking o f f i c e at about this time. T h e R e p u b l i c a n majority in C o n g r e s s e m b o l d e n e d a n u m b e r of influential l e g i s l a t o r s to take a strong stand on the drug war. C o n g r e s s m e n s u c h as D e n n i s Hastert ( R - I l l . ) , B e n j a m i n G i l m a n ( R - N . Y . ) , and Dan Burton ( R - I n d . ) w e r e bec o m i n g v o c a l critics o f the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s antidrug p o l i c i e s and strong p r o p o n e n t s o f d o i n g m o r e to fight the drug war in C o l o m b i a . T h e s e "drug h a w k s " v i e w e d C l i n t o n ' s antidrug p o l i c i e s as t o o soft and argued that m o r e direct t y p e s o f support for the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s antidrug efforts were needed. Yet f o l l o w i n g Ernesto S a m p e r ' s ina u g u r a t i o n in 1 9 9 4 this strategy b e c a m e m o r e d i f f i c u l t , as support for the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s antidrug efforts m e a n t support f o r Ernesto S a m p e r , w h o by this t i m e w a s anathema to the drug h a w k s in C o n g r e s s . It w a s during this t i m e that, led by the drug h a w k s , the U . S . C o n g r e s s b e g a n to w o r k d i r e c t l y with what it c o n s i d e r e d trusted a l l i e s in the C o l o m b i a n N a t i o n a l P o l i c e s o that it c o u l d c o n t i n u e to f u n d the drug war w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g support to Ernesto Samper. But it w a s not o n l y Ernesto S a m p e r w h o felt the reach o f the drug h a w k s ' wrath; rather, the Clinton administration w a s c o n s t a n t l y o n the d e f e n s i v e o n the drug war, c o n t i n u o u s l y d e f e n d i n g itself against charges f r o m C o n g r e s s that it w a s t o o s o f t . With respect to its s o u r c e - c o u n t r y drug war p o l i c i e s ( w h i c h at this point were increasingly inseparable from its C o l o m b i a p o l i c y ) , the Clinton W h i t e H o u s e spent as m u c h t i m e f o c u s e d o n a n s w e r i n g critics o n Capitol Hill as it did a n a l y z i n g h o w its p o l i c i e s w o u l d i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s in the A n d e s . T h e C l i n t o n administration's fear that the drug h a w k s w o u l d inflict political d a m a g e o n the drug war i s s u e is a l s o a s i g n i f i c a n t reason w h y President C l i n t o n d e c i d e d to s e n d such a m a s s i v e antidrug assistance p a c k a g e to C o l o m b i a in 2 0 0 0 .

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

37

The move toward a scaled-down antidrug program in the Andes during the first year of the Clinton administration proved ephemeral, replaced by the Republican-led belief that the United States needed to continue to fight the war on drugs at its source in Latin America. Any move by Washington toward " d e n a r c o t i z a t i o n " was over, replaced by the revival of the war on drugs. That this shift was coupled with the election of a "narco-president" in Colombia held serious consequences for the bilateral relationship.

Tired of Gaviria, Looking Forward to Samper Although there were suspicions about Ernesto S a m p e r ' s drug involvement during the early stages of his presidency, many of the sparks between the United States and Colombia were not necessarily related to the U.S. view of Samper. Rather, in the last year of his presidency, César Gaviria's antidrug credentials were becoming increasingly suspect in Washington, which in turn cooled the bilateral relationship. This was due mainly to the perception that, after dismantling the Medellin cartel, Gaviria had gone soft on the Cali cartel. Indeed, U.S. DEA agent Joe T o f t ' s revelations in September 1994 on Colombian national television about a country he termed a "narco-democracy" had as much or more to do with Gaviria as they did with Samper. 8 9 Gaviria, who at this point was in Washington settling in at his new post as secretary general of the O A S , did not take these criticisms supinely. He began taking an openly hard line against what he saw as incessant U.S. meddling and censure of Colombian counternarcotics efforts. In one particularly sharp response to U.S. accusations that Colombia had not done enough on the drug issue, Gaviria retorted: "We disqualify as offensive the insinuations that we are not doing enough. The Colombians do much more than what is sufficient. We are practically alone in a war that is not ours but instead that of the international community in general, especially the drug-consuming countries." 9 0 The most contentious issue between Washington and the departing Gaviria administration was over the policies and statements of Gaviria's prosecutor general, Gustavo de Grieff. 9 1 In contrast to the heavy-handed antidrug strategy that Washington promoted (and so admired in President Barco and initially Gaviria), de Grieff advocated a more conciliatory position, one that included offering softer sentences to the Cali cartel if they agreed to surrender and explore the possibility of drug legalization. That de Grieff was willing to go public with such " o u t r a g e o u s "

38

Driven by Druss

policies i n f u r i a t e d top o f f i c i a l s in W a s h i n g t o n , chief a m o n g t h e m Attorney General Janet R e n o , w h o at o n e point e x c h a n g e d heated w o r d s with de G r i e f f . To m a k e m a t t e r s worse, de G r i e f f m e t with three of the Cali c a r t e l ' s top leaders in J a n u a r y 1994. D u r i n g the m e e t i n g he a p p a r e n t l y o f f e r e d the t r a f f i c k e r s as little as a y e a r in p r i s o n in return f o r their s u r r e n d e r . W h e n n e w s of the o f f e r l e a k e d , U . S . o f f i c i a l s c o u l d not c o n t r o l their anger. 9 2 In an e x a m p l e that s u g g e s t s how both sides of the c o n g r e s s i o n a l aisle could be equally h a w k i s h on the drug issue, S e n a t e D e m o c r a t John Kerry w r o t e in the Washington Post that de G r i e f f ' s a n t i c s s e r v e d " t o b r i n g a b o u t his n a t i o n ' s c a p i t u l a t i o n to the Cali c o c a i n e c a r t e l . " 9 3 C o l o m b i a ' s a m b a s s a d o r to the U n i t e d States, G a b r i e l Silva, r e s p o n d e d to K e r r y ' s o p i n i o n editorial in a letter to t h e e d i t o r a r g u i n g that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t " h a s m a d e e n o r m o u s s a c r i f i c e s to d e f e n d its d e m o c r a c y , so it is hasty to say that C o l o m b i a is a n a r c o - d e m o c r a c y . " 9 4 A n o t h e r a c e r b i c e p i s o d e o c c u r r e d on M a y 1, 1994, w h e n the U.S. P e n t a g o n unilaterally declared that it w a s halting its air interception e f f o r t s in the A n d e s (the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d f o u r r a d a r s t a t i o n s — o n e in Peru, one in Bolivia, and t w o in s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a ) . It also a n n o u n c e d that it w o u l d c e a s e p r o v i d i n g r a d a r i n f o r m a t i o n to C o l o m b i a a n d P e r u . T h e s e o p e r a t i o n s w e r e i n t e n d e d to h i n d e r d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s ' e f f o r t s to transport raw coca leaf by p l a n e into C o l o m b i a f r o m Bolivia and Peru. T h e P e n t a g o n ' s d e c i s i o n c a m e a f t e r the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t announced a policy to shoot d o w n planes suspected of transporting drugs. 9 5 T h e r e a s o n f o r such a m o v e w a s that, in a h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e m o o d f o l l o w i n g the accidental b o m b i n g of an Iranian airliner in 1988, Pentagon o f f i c i a l s were worried a b o u t the potential f o r a lawsuit a g a i n s t the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t by relatives of a n y o n e shot d o w n with the a s s i s t a n c e of the U . S . - f u n d e d radar installations. 9 6 So e v e n t h o u g h the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e c i s i o n to s h o o t d o w n p l a n e s w a s a p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t in terms of f i g h t i n g the w a r on drugs, the P e n t a g o n c o n s i d e r e d this p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y to be t o o p o l i t i c a l l y risky. W h i l e it a g r e e d with the P e n t a g o n ' s legal p r e m i s e , the State D e p a r t m e n t was incensed at the h a n dling of the m a t t e r and a nasty i n t e r a g e n c y d i s p u t e e r u p t e d . Predictably, this d e c i s i o n to stop the p r o v i s i o n of r a d a r i n f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r e d as a f o r m of c a p i t u l a t i o n in the w a r on d r u g s to m e m b e r s of both parties in the U.S. C o n g r e s s . C o n g r e s s m a n C h a r l e s S c h u m e r stated: " T h e signal n o w is u n m i s t a k a b l e : an A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l is t a k i n g p l a c e in t h e drug war. . . . T h e U.S. withdrawal f r o m the d r u g war is the m o s t significant retreat since G e o r g e W a s h i n g t o n retreated f r o m N e w York d u r i n g our r e v o l u t i o n . " 9 7

Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Colombia

39

While this incident was essentially a dispute within the U.S. government over antidrug policy, it nevertheless did serve to worsen U.S.Colombian relations, since the unilateral move—the State Department ultimately notified the Colombian government with no prior warning and no official explanation—indicated that Washington was increasingly reluctant to share sensitive antidrug information with its Colombian counterparts. 9 8 A spokesman for President Gaviria retorted that the method through which the United States changed its radar policy was "unilateral, untimely and rude." 9 9 The United States eventually reversed its decision in December 1994. These types of controversies rankled the bilateral relationship and altered the U.S. perception of the Colombian government's willingness to combat drugs; but they never significantly changed Washington's confidence in César Gaviria himself. By the end of his administration, however, this would change, as Washington increasingly realized that Gaviria was not the docile ally they had once believed. In many ways, while for the first few years of his administration he was considered by Washington to be a reliable, effective ally in the war on drugs, Gaviria's increasingly tough, independent stance toward Washington on the drug issue helps to explain why the U.S. government was initially eager to work with Ernesto Samper, even though for years U.S. officials had believed that he had links to the drug cartels. The thinking in Washington was that Ernesto Samper might not be perfect, but that he could not be any worse than Gaviria. Yet the honeymoon between the United States and Samper proved short-lived. The relationship quickly turned into a seemingly counterproductive shouting match. And much of the reason for this deterioration lay in a tightening of the U.S. stance in 1994: fueled by the Republicans in control of Congress, Washington's litmus test for strong bilateral relations with Colombia had become more stringent, a point not lost on the new president of Colombia.

THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY U.S. DRUG POLICY IN COLOMBIA AND THE ANDES The vast majority of the counternarcotics aid sent to Colombia over the past two decades has been directed toward crop eradication. In 1988, James M. Van Wert, executive director of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, defined the goals of U.S. eradication policy:

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Driven by Drugs U . S . g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y o f f i c i a l s still m a i n t a i n that e r a d i c a t i o n of illicit n a r c o t i c s c l o s e s t to t h e s o u r c e of the r a w m a t e r i a l r e p r e s e n t s the m o s t c o s t - e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t a p p r o a c h to n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l within the overall s u p p l y r e d u c t i o n strategy. Illicit c r o p s m a y b e e i t h e r e r a d icated i n v o l u n t a r i l y or d e s t r o y e d t h r o u g h v o l u n t a r y m e a n s . E r a d i c a tion of illicit c r o p s m a y be a c c o m p l i s h e d by p h y s i c a l l y u p r o o t i n g the p l a n t s or by c h e m i c a l or b i o l o g i c a l c o n t r o l a g e n t s . P a y m e n t to the f a r m e r s f o r the labor of willingly u p r o o t i n g the p l a n t s is an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of the s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of e r a d i c a t i o n e f f o r t s . E c o n o m i c s u p p o r t a n d d e v e l o p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e is a l o n g e r - r a n g e c o m p o nent of the o v e r a l l e r a d i c a t i o n strategy. It is b e l i e v e d that illicit c r o p s c o n s t i t u t e the c h e a p e s t link in the n a r c o t i c s c h a i n ; p r o d u c e r s d e v o t e f e w e r r e s o u r c e s to their d e t e c t i o n , a n d it is e a s i e r to locate a n d d e s t r o y c r o p s in the f i e l d than to l o c a t e the s u b s e q u e n t l y p r o c e s s e d d r u g s in the s m u g g l i n g r o u t e s or on the streets of U . S . cities. T h e D e p a r t m e n t of State b e l i e v e s that the s u p p l y of n a r c o t i c s b e i n g s h i p p e d f r o m Latin A m e r i c a to the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d be r e d u c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y if g o v e r n m e n t s a g r e e d to i n s t i t u t e m a s s i v e h e r b i c i d a ! s p r a y i n g to r e d u c e c o c a c u l t i v a t i o n by f i f t y p e r c e n t in 1 9 9 3 . 1 0 0

Van W e r t ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of U . S . d r u g p o l i c y g o a l s f o r C o l o m b i a illustrates the g l a r i n g g a p b e t w e e n the initial stated g o a l s and actual res u l t s of U.S. d r u g p o l i c y o v e r the c o u r s e of the 1990s. In C o l o m b i a specifically, the m a j o r U.S. policy g o a l s were to e n s u r e that " m a r i j u a n a and c o c a i n e cultivation are e l i m i n a t e d and m a j o r c o c a i n e and m a r i j u a n a t r a f f i c k i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s are i m m o b i l i z e d . " 1 0 1 M o r e o v e r , the U n i t e d States a t t e m p t e d to assist the C o l o m b i a n National Police in its e f f o r t s to d e v e l o p better intelligence f o r both e r a d i c a t i o n and interdiction activities; s u b s e q u e n t l y , aerial e r a d i c a t i o n w a s e x t e n d e d a n d n e w h e r b i c i d e s w e r e tested to m e a s u r e their e f f i c a c y on c o c a plants. It w a s at this time in the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s that the U.S. relationship with the C o l o m b i a n National P o l i c e — t h e military o r g a n i z a t i o n that usually c o o r d i n a t e s c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s — b e g a n to g r o w and strengthen. A strong a r g u m e n t can be m a d e that b e t w e e n 1995 and 2 0 0 0 t h e head of the C o l o m b i a n national p o l i c e had as m u c h or m o r e i n f l u e n c e in W a s h i n g t o n than the C o l o m bian a m b a s s a d o r . 1 0 2 A n i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e U.S. w a r on d r u g s h a s b e e n the g r o w i n g i n v o l v e m e n t of the U . S . m i l i t a r y in c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s o p e r a tions. In the early 1980s, the U . S . military had been reluctant to get inv o l v e d in the c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s , since it v i e w e d t h e m as m o r e app r o p r i a t e f o r p o l i c e units. F u r t h e r m o r e , the P e n t a g o n w a s m u c h m o r e c o n c e r n e d with d e a l i n g with the threat of Soviet-led e x p a n s i o n a r o u n d

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the world. M u c h of this initial impetus f o r greater military involvement in the drug w a r c a m e f r o m C o n g r e s s . For e x a m p l e , R e p u b l i c a n Larry J. H o p k i n s of K e n t u c k y , d u r i n g a 1989 h e a r i n g of the H o u s e A r m e d Services S u b c o m m i t t e e on Investigations, stated: " W e are serious about (the military's) active role in this war on drugs, e v e n if it m e a n s we h a v e to drag (them) kicking and screaming every step of the wary. (We) are going to have to straighten out their priorities f o r t h e m . T h i s is war. A n d they are going to have to lace up their c o m b a t boots and get involved." 1 0 1 A d e c a d e later the U . S . m i l i t a r y ' s i n v o l v e m e n t in C o l o m b i a is sign i f i c a n t a n d p e r m a n e n t . In f a c t , the d r u g w a r — w i t h C o l o m b i a ' s inv o l v e m e n t in p a r t i c u l a r — h a s b e c o m e o n e of the overriding priorities for the U.S. S o u t h e r n C o m m a n d ( S o u t h C o m ) , the U.S. m i l i t a r y ' s c o m m a n d center that c o v e r s Latin A m e r i c a and the C a r i b b e a n . A c c o r d i n g to o n e U.S. official in B o g o t a , "it s e e m s like G e n e r a l W i l h e l m [then c o m m a n der of S o u t h C o m ] is h e r e every w e e k . " 1 0 4 Yet it is just as clear that the P e n t a g o n r e m a i n s a m b i v a l e n t about its i n v o l v e m e n t in the war on d r u g s , especially n o w that this war s e e m s increasingly intertwined with C o l o m b i a ' s civil c o n f l i c t . T h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e is d u e m o s t l y to the s t r o n g l y held belief that the U . S . m i l i t a r y ' s resources should be g e a r e d t o w a r d f i g h t i n g a m a j o r war, such as the 1991 G u l f War o r a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l a g r a t i o n in A s i a , r a t h e r than b e i n g distracted by what is e s s e n t i a l l y a law e n f o r c e m e n t issue. W h i l e this a m b i v a l e n c e is p e r v a s i v e w i t h i n the U . S . military, it n o n e t h e l e s s h a s not p r e v e n t e d the military f r o m increasing its c o n t a c t s with the C o l o m b i a n military in recent y e a r s . 1 0 5 T h a t t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y n o w p l a y s a s i g n i f i c a n t role in the w a r on drugs in C o l o m b i a represents new c h a l l e n g e s and potential areas of controversy. T h i s s t e m s f r o m the fact that C o l o m b i a ' s c o c a cultivation and c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n t r a d e — t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n of U . S . a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s — a r e i n e x t r i c a b l y linked with the guerrilla insurgents and p a r a m i l itary g r o u p s . T h u s , in its e f f o r t s to c a r r y out its a n t i d r u g m i s s i o n s the U . S . m i l i t a r y is a l s o s u p r e m e l y a w a r e of the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n in C o l o m b i a a n d h a s s p e n t c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e a n a l y z i n g d i f f e r e n t w a y s that the c o n f l i c t could e v o l v e . N a t u r a l l y t h e r e h a v e b e e n calls w i t h i n s o m e e l e m e n t s of t h e U . S . military f o r it to m o v e a w a y f r o m c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s support and m o r e directly into c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e f f o r t s . A c c o r d i n g to o n e U . S . State D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c e r , " S o m e g u y s in the P e n t a g o n c o m p l a i n to m e that ' t h e y d o n ' t get n o r e s p e c t in the s a n d b o x ' so l o n g as they r e m a i n i n v o l v e d in the d r u g war. W h a t t h e y really w a n t to be d o i n g is a n t i - i n s u r g e n t

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e f f o r t s . " 1 0 6 At present the role of the U.S. military r e m a i n s largely confined to a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s . Yet as the civil conflict c o n t i n u e s to rage, there will be i n c r e a s i n g calls in W a s h i n g t o n f o r the G e o r g e W. B u s h a d m i n istration to c l a r i f y the m i l i t a r y ' s role in C o l o m b i a . I n d e e d , o n e of the b i g g e s t c h a l l e n g e s f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s C o l o m b i a policy will be to d e t e r m i n e the extent and m i s s i o n of the U.S. military in C o l o m b i a .

CERTIFICATION First m a d e into law with the 1986 A n t i - D r u g A b u s e Act a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y m o d i f i e d in the 1988 A n t i - D r u g A b u s e A c t , the a n n u a l d r u g c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s b e c a m e o n e of the m o s t visible (and m a n y w o u l d argue c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e ) aspects of the U . S . - C o l o m b i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p in the 1990s. 1 0 7 W h e n , f o r e x a m p l e , the t w o c o n s e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n s to dec e r t i f y C o l o m b i a w e r e m a d e in 1996 and 1997, it g e n e r a t e d an u n u s u ally hostile reaction and sense of betrayal a m o n g the C o l o m b i a n populace. Ironically, h o w e v e r , t h e s e t w o d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s in m a n y w a y s served to bolster E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s f a l t e r i n g presidency, as he w a s able to c h a m p i o n himself as the d e f e n d e r of C o l o m b i a n sovereignty, an antithetical result. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y use of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s traces back to the l e g i s l a t i o n of t h e t w o A n t i - D r u g A b u s e A c t s , w h e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s b e g a n to link s o u r c e - c o u n t r y c o o p e r a t i o n on c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s with e l i g i b i l i t y f o r U.S. f o r e i g n aid as well as f o r U . S . s u p p o r t w i t h i n international multilateral institutions. 1 0 8 T h e initial c o n c e p t of r e v i e w i n g the c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s of f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s actually predates these t w o acts and b e g a n with the F o r e i g n A s s i s t a n c e A c t of 1961. C e r t i f i c a tion w a s a d d e d to this p r o c e s s in 1986, and the 1988 A n t i - D r u g A b u s e A c t e x p a n d e d a n d a l t e r e d the d e f i n i t i o n of c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h e act also e a r m a r k e d U . S . $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 f o r t h e t e s t i n g a n d u s e of s a f e and e f f e c t i v e h e r b i c i d e s f o r aerial e r a d i c a t i o n of c o c a . For C o l o m b i a s p e c i f i c a l l y , it a u t h o r i z e d U . S . $ 1 5 million in 1989 f o r d e f e n s e e q u i p m e n t and an additional U . S . $ 5 m i l l i o n to p r o t e c t o f f i c i a l s a n d m e m b e r s of the p r e s s a g a i n s t " n a r c o - t e r r o r i s t " a t t a c k s . (At the a d v e n t of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , the U.S. C o n g r e s s v i e w e d n a r c o - t e r r o r i s t s such as P a b l o E s c o bar to be the m a i n threat in C o l o m b i a ; s i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , h o w e v e r , this threat has b e c o m e the " n a r c o - g u e r r i l l a . " ) E v e r y y e a r the president is r e q u i r e d to s u b m i t to C o n g r e s s a list of the c o u n t r i e s that he h a s d e t e r m i n e d to be m a j o r d r u g - p r o d u c i n g or

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drug-trafficking countries (the secretary of state sends recommendations to the president, w h o makes the final decisions as to which countries will be included on the list). At this point in the process, half of most types of U.S. government assistance to these countries is withheld until the president determines whether the country has done enough to combat drugs and thus merits certification. (A major drug-producing country is defined as one in which 1,000 or more hectares of illicit opium poppy are cultivated or harvested during a year; 1,000 or more hectares of illicit coca are cultivated or harvested during a year; or 5,000 or more hectares of illicit cannabis are cultivated or harvested during a year. A major drug-trafficking country is defined as being a significant source of illicit narcotic or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or a country through which such drugs or substances are transported.) 1 0 9 The president is then required to review the antinarcotics efforts undertaken by the countries most involved in these issues (the "majors") and transmit certification decisions to Congress by March 1 of the following year. The president may select from the following certification options for each of the countries on the "majors" list: full certification, denial of certification, or a "vital national interest" certification. If a country receives full certification, all aid that had been withheld is released. If a country receives "national interest" certification, assistance is provided in the same manner as if the country had received full certification. 1 1 0 Congress has thirty calendar days to analyze the list and to enact country-specific resolutions of disapproval. The president can veto these resolutions, which would force Congress to achieve a two-thirds majority to override the veto and alter the president's decisions. If a country is decertified and this decision is not overturned by Congress, mandatory sanctions are imposed, including 50 percent suspension of U.S. assistance for the current fiscal year (humanitarian and narcotics aid are exempted), 100 percent suspension of assistance for subsequent fiscal years (unless the country is certified in the interim), and voting against loans to a country from the multilateral development banks. Discretionary sanctions include denial of preferential treatment to a country's exports under the Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, duty increases of up to 50 percent of value on a country's exports to the United States, curtailment of air transportation and traffic between the United States and the noncertified country, and withdrawal of U.S. participation in any preclearance customs arrangements with the noncertified country. 111

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T h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n law m e a n t a b o v e all that in the 1990s the U . S . C o n g r e s s a s s u m e d a leading role in n a r c o t i c s - r e l a t e d f o r e i g n policy issues. A c c o r d i n g to R a p h a e l Perl: The certification process will continue to serve as an important mechanism through w h i c h the C o n g r e s s can press its o w n a s s e s s m e n t of s p e c i f i c nations in international narcotics policy. . . . This process and the role and i n f l u e n c e of the C o n g r e s s appear likely both to e x p a n d and to b e c o m e more active. A l t h o u g h one can argue that the process may not a l w a y s be e f f e c t i v e in persuading foreign nations to cooperate in the anti-drug fight, it is difficult to argue that the certification process has not proved an e f f e c t i v e v e h i c l e by which the C o n g r e s s has b e e n — a n d i s — a b l e to exert i n f l u e n c e upon the e x e c u t i v e branch. C o n g r e s s will not s o o n g i v e up the p o w e r it has acquired in this policy area, one w h i c h has b e c o m e increasingly important to the United States public. It is also likely that the C o n g r e s s will c o n t i n u e to require n e w types of narco-related certification. N e w c e r t i f i c a t i o n requirements c o n c e r n i n g cooperation on money-laundering issues offer but one e x a m p l e of what may well prove to be an o n - g o i n g t r e n d . " 2

T h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s i n c r e a s e s t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y that, m o r e than any o t h e r g o v e r n i n g b r a n c h in the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , is directly tied to support f r o m its constituents. T h u s c e r t i f i c a t i o n , and the t r e m e n d o u s i m p a c t that it yields on f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s , increased the i n t e r m e s t i c n a t u r e of the U.S. war on drugs. For e x a m p l e , if a local c o n s t i t u e n c y is c o n c e r n e d a b o u t a d r u g a b u s e p r o b l e m in its a r e a , its c o n g r e s s p e r s o n m i g h t very well be quite h a w k i s h on the d r u g war issue a n d t h u s m o r e likely to d e c e r t i f y a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y . T h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s t h e r e f o r e s t r e a m l i n e d the p o l i t i c a l c h a n n e l s t h r o u g h w h i c h m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s , d r i v e n by a d o m e s t i c policy c o n c e r n , c o u l d inf l u e n c e the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t . In an e v e n t that m i g h t s e r v e as an i n d i c a t i o n that W a s h i n g t o n is f i n a l l y s e r i o u s l y c o n sidering an alternative to this c o n t r o v e r s i a l annual ritual, early in his adm i n i s t r a t i o n P r e s i d e n t G e o r g e W. B u s h indicated that he m i g h t s u p p o r t a t w o - y e a r s u s p e n s i o n of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n process.

CONCLUSION Until recently, U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations d u r i n g this c e n t u r y w e r e relatively s t r o n g , best c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e c o u n t r i e s ' s h a r e d a n t i c o m m u nist p o s i t i o n s d u r i n g t h e C o l d War. H o w e v e r , by the late 1980s, U . S .

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international counternarcotics efforts had b e c o m e "militarized" and "Andeanized" and, f o l l o w i n g the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 and the arrival of Ernesto Samper to the presidency, U.S. policy toward Colombia became "hypernarcotized." One integral—and highly controversial—component of this new relationship was the issue of U.S. certification of whether or not certain countries were cooperating sufficiently in the area of counternarcotics. Certification b e c a m e the most visible symbol of the highly unilateral, intermestic politics-driven crusade against drugs. By the mid-1990s, after Bill Clinton had replaced George Bush Sr. in the White House, the U . S . - l e d Andean source-country strategy and the concomitant certification process had b e c o m e a regular and integral component of U.S. foreign policy, especially for the intelligence and def e n s e agencies. But while the war on drugs might have been good for the budgets of the relevant government agencies, it was not achieving the desired e f f e c t of reducing the amount of drugs f l o o d i n g into the United States. Not surprisingly, frustration began to set in. Eventually, the U . S . drug war failures—and the resulting disillusionment in Congress and participating government agencies—provided the impetus for Washington to substantially m o d i f y its p o l i c i e s toward C o l o m b i a foll o w i n g the election of President Andrés Pastrana in 1998. But, as will be shown, much of the new U.S. policies toward Colombia looked quite similar to the old ones, reflecting the continued reality that drugs remain the overriding U.S. priority in the region.

NOTES 1. Frank Safford, "Politics, Ideology, and Society in Post-Independence Latin America," in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 3, edited by Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 413. 2. Stephen Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), p. 6. 3. For an overview of the evolution of nineteenth-century U.S.-Colombian relations, see E. Taylor Parks, Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1935). 4. Robert Drexler, Colombia and the United States: A Failed Foreign Policy (London: McFarland, 1997), p. 12. See also George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952), pp. 269-271. 5. See David Bushnell, "The Independence of Spanish South America," in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 3, pp. 140-151.

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6. L a r s S c h o u l t z , Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998), pp. 1 0 - 1 2 . 7. S c h o u l t z , Beneath the United States, p. 12. 8. At that t i m e , w h a t a r e n o w the g e o g r a p h i c b o u n d a r i e s of m o d e r n C o l o m b i a w e r e l o c a t e d w i t h i n w h a t w a s k n o w n as G r a n C o l o m b i a . S h o r t l y a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , G r a n C o l o m b i a split a p a r t and " C o l o m b i a " b e c a m e N e w G r a n a d a . T h e 1 8 8 6 c o n s t i t u t i o n c r e a t e d t h e m o d e r n R e p u b l i c of C o l o m b i a . T o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n , this b o o k u s e s the t e r m Colombia in r e f e r r i n g to the c o u n t r y b o t h b e f o r e and a f t e r 1886. 9. S e e F a r e e d Z a k a r i a , From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1998). Z a k a r i a a r g u e s that by t h e m i d d l e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d bec o m e a " w e a l t h y " n a t i o n , b u t that f i f t y y e a r s w o u l d p a s s b e f o r e it b e c a m e a " p o w e r f u l " n a t i o n , e x e m p l i f i e d by e v e n t s s u c h as its v i c t o r y o v e r S p a i n in 1898. 10. N i c a r a g u a w a s the o t h e r c o v e t e d location for a canal r o u t e . 11. S e e Z a k a r i a , From Wealth to Power, pp. 1 6 5 - 1 6 8 . 12. S h o u l t z , Beneath the United States, pp. 1 5 2 - 1 7 5 . S e e a l s o D a v i d M c C o l l o u g h , The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal. 1870-1914 ( N e w York: S i m o n a n d S c h u s t e r , 1977). 13. D a v i d B u s h n e l l , The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . 1993), pp. 1 4 0 - 1 5 4 . 14. S e e R i c h a r d L. L a e l , Arrogant Diplomacy: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia, 1903-1922 ( W i l m i n g t o n , D e l . : S c h o l a r l y R e s o u r c e s , 1987). 15. J o h n H a y w a s T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t ' s s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . T o m â s H e r r â n w a s the C o l o m b i a n c h a r g é d ' a f f a i r e s in W a s h i n g t o n . 16. S e e D w i g h t C . M i n e r , The Fight for the Panama Route: The Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herrân Treaty ( N e w York: O c t a g o n , 1966). S e e a l s o P a o l o E. C o l e t t a , " W i l l i a m J e n n i n g s B r y a n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s - C o l o m b i a n I m p a s s e , 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 2 1 , " Hispanic American Historical Review 4 7 , no. 4 ( N o v e m b e r 1967): 4 8 6 - 5 0 1 . 17. P r e s i d e n t T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t r e s p o n d e d to the C o l o m b i a n l e g i s l a t u r e ' s r e j e c t i o n of t h e t r e a t y by w r i t i n g l e t t e r s t h a t r e f e r r e d to C o l o m b i a n s as " c o n t e m p t i b l e little c r e a t u r e s , " " j a c k r a b b i t s , " a n d " f o o l i s h a n d h o m i c i d a l c o r r u p t i o n i s t s . " S e e S c h o u l t z , Beneath the United States, p. 164. 18. S e e B u s h n e l l , The Making of Modern Colombia, pp. 148-154. 19. S e e R i c h a r d H . C o l l i n , Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context ( B a t o n R o u g e : L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1990); a n d H o w a r d C . Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o Press, 1927). 20. It d e s e r v e s n o t e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s i g n e d t h e H a y - P a u n c e f o r t e T r e a t y w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n in 1901. T h i s treaty a b r o g a t e d t h e b i l a t e r a l t e n e t s of the 1850 C l a y t o n - B u l w e r T r e a t y , v i r t u a l l y e r a s i n g any s e m b l a n c e of British inf l u e n c e in t h e i s t h m u s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s n o w the sole i m p e r i a l p o w e r in Central America.

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21. P h i l i p p e B u n a u - V a r i l l a w a s a F r e n c h n a t i o n a l w i t h v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s in c a n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d c o n c e s s i o n s w h o w a s a c t i n g on b e h a l f of the P a n a m a n ian g o v e r n m e n t . 22. S e e J o s e p h L. A r b e n a , " T h e I m a g e of an A m e r i c a n I m p e r i a l i s t : C o l o m b i a n V i e w s of T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t , " West Georgia College, Studies in the Social Sciences 6, n o . 1 ( J u n e 1967): 3 - 2 7 . 23. S c h o u l t z , Beneath the United States, p. 257. 24. S e e S t e p h e n J. R a n d a l l , The Diplomacy of Modernization: ColombianAmerican Relations, 1920-1940 ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1977). 25. In 1925 c o f f e e c o n s t i t u t e d 8 0 p e r c e n t of t h e v a l u e of total g o o d s exported. 26. R a n d a l l , Colombia and the United States, pp. 1 1 2 - 1 1 4 . 27. P e t e r S m i t h , Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1996), p. 52. 28. C i t e d in S c h o u l t z . Beneath the United States, p. 2 4 4 . T h e l o n g - t e r m c o n s e q u e n c e s on the e c o n o m i e s a n d political s y s t e m s in the c o u n t r i e s that exp e r i e n c e d U . S . i n t e r v e n t i o n s d u r i n g this p e r i o d c o n t i n u e to b e a s u b j e c t of deb a t e . W h i l e U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s at t h e t i m e a r g u e d that U . S . i n t e r v e n t i o n w a s b e n e f i c i a l f o r d e m o c r a c y , the f a c t is that the L a t i n A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s that s a w the h i g h e s t level of U . S . i n t e r v e n t i o n ( H a i t i , D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c , N i c a r a g u a ) t u r n e d out to be s o m e of the m o s t r e p r e s s i v e , e c o n o m i c a l l y b a c k w a r d c o u n t r i e s in the r e g i o n in s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e s . S e e E l i h u R o o t , " T h e R e a l M o n r o e D o c t r i n e , " North American Review ( J u n e 1 9 1 4 ) : 8 4 1 - 8 5 6 ; N a n c y M i t c h e l l , " T h e Height of the G e r m a n C h a l l e n g e : T h e V e n e z u e l a B l o c k a d e , 1 9 0 2 - 1 9 0 3 , " Diplomatic History 2 0 , n o . 2 ( S p r i n g 1 9 9 6 ) : 1 8 5 - 2 0 9 ; a n d L e s t e r L a n g l e y , The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century ( A t h e n s : U n i v e r s i t y of G e o r g i a P r e s s , 1982), pp. 7 7 - 8 8 . 29. It r e m a i n s a d e b a t e a m o n g s c h o l a r s o v e r the e x t e n t to w h i c h the G o o d N e i g h b o r P o l i c y r e p r e s e n t s a d e p a r t u r e f r o m the early U . S . t e n d e n c y t o w a r d int e r v e n t i o n a n d c o n t r o l . P e t e r S m i t h b e l i e v e s that the G o o d N e i g h b o r P o l i c y w a s basically nothing more than imperialism through different m e a n s . See Smith, Talons of the Eagle, pp. 6 5 - 8 7 ; a n d S c h o u l t z , Beneath the United States, pp. 2 9 0 - 3 1 5 . T h e genesis for the G o o d N e i g h b o r Policy began during the Hoover a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , but w a s m o s t l y i m p l e m e n t e d d u r i n g t h e R o o s e v e l t y e a r s a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n h a s c o m e t o b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s t e r m in o f f i c e . S e e a l s o D a v i d B u s h n e l l , Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1938-1942 (Gainesville: U n i v e r s i t y of F l o r i d a P r e s s , 1967). 30. S e e D a v i d G . H a g l u n d , " D e - L o u s i n g S C A D T A : T h e R o l e of P a n A m e r i c a n A i r w a y s in U . S . A v i a t i o n D i p l o m a c y in C o l o m b i a , 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 , " Aerospace Historian 30, no. 3 ( S e p t e m b e r 1983): 1 7 7 - 1 9 0 . 31. A y o u n g C u b a n i d e a l i s t n a m e d F i d e l C a s t r o w a s in C o l o m b i a d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , a d d i n g to t h e i n t r i g u e b e h i n d w h a t c a u s e d t h e v i o l e n c e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h El Bogctazo. H o w e v e r , m o s t h i s t o r i a n s a g r e e that C a s t r o had n o t h i n g to d o w i t h the a s s a s s i n a t i o n or e n s u i n g e v e n t s . 32. C i t e d in R a n d a l l , Colombia

and the United

States,

p. 191.

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33. Ibid. 3 4 . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of C o l o m b i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the K o r e a n War, see D r e x l e r , Colombia and the United States, pp. 6 3 - 7 7 . 35. C o l o m b i a e a r n e d s p e c i a l g r a t i t u d e f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s w h e n it ident i f i e d w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g t h e 1962 C u b a n M i s s i l e C r i s i s . C o l o m b i a r e m a i n e d c o o l t o w a r d H a v a n a in e n s u i n g d e c a d e s . 36. D e n n i s R e m p e , " G u e r r i l l a s , B a n d i t s , a n d I n d e p e n d e n t R e p u b l i c s : U . S . C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y E f f o r t s in C o l o m b i a , 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 5 , " Small Wars and Insurgencies 6. no. 3 ( W i n t e r 1995): 3 1 3 . 37. U.S. G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e ( G A O ) , " D r u g C o n t r o l : U . S . - S u p p o r t e d E f f o r t s in C o l o m b i a and B o l i v i a . " G A O / N S I A D 8 9 - 2 4 . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., S e p t e m b e r 1988, p. 2. 38. See J o h n F i s h e l , " D e v e l o p i n g a D r u g W a r S t r a t e g y : L e s s o n s f r o m O p e r a t i o n Blast F u r n a c e , " Military Review 71, no. 6 ( J u n e 1991): 6 1 - 6 9 . 39. D r e x l e r , Colombia and the United States, p. 96. 40. A u t h o r interview with Viron Vaky, U.S. a m b a s s a d o r to C o l o m b i a ( 1 9 7 4 1976). W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., April 1999. 4 1 . S e e Iván O r o z c o A b a d , " L o s d i á l o g o s c o n el n a r c o t r á f i c o : H i s t o r i a d e la t r a n s f o r m a c i ó n f a l l i d a d e un d e l i n c u e n t e c o m ú n en un d e l i n c u e n t e p o l í t i c o . " Análisis Político 11 ( S e p t e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1990): 38. 42. S e e K e n n e t h S h a r p e , " T h e D r u g War: G o i n g A f t e r S u p p l y , " Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 0 . n o s . 2 - 3 ( S u m m e r - F a l l 1988): 77-85. 4 3 . F o r m o r e on t h e T u r b a y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s t a n c e t o w a r d (he U n i t e d S t a t e s , see R o d r i g o P a r d o a n d J u a n G a b r i e l T o k a t l i a n . " T e o r í a y p r á c t i c a d e las r e l a c i o n e s i n t e r n a c i o n a l e s : El c a s o d e C o l o m b i a , " Estudios Internacionales ( J a n u a r y - M a r c h 1988): 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 . 4 4 . S e w a l l M e n z e l , Cocaine icy in the North Andes-Colombia 1997), p. 19.

Quagmire: Implementing U.S. Anti-Drug Pol( N e w York: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s of A m e r i c a ,

4 5 . J u a n G a b r i e l T o k a t l i a n , " N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and D r u g s : T h e i r I m p a c t on C o l o m b i a n - U . S . R e l a t i o n s , " Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 1 ( S p r i n g 1988): 145. 46. S h a r p e , " T h e D r u g W a r , " pp. 7 7 - 8 5 . 4 7 . J u a n G a b r i e l T o k a t l i a n , " T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y of C o l o m b i a n - U . S . N a r c o d i p l o m a c y : A C a s e S t u d y of C o l o m b i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 9 0 " ( P h . D . t h e s i s , P a u l H . N i t z e S c h o o l of A d v a n c e d I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , J o h n s H o p k i n s U n i v e r s i t y , B a l t i m o r e , 1990). 4 8 . U . S . G A O , " D r u g C o n t r o l , " p. 18. 4 9 . T o k a t l i a n , " T h e P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y , " pp. 6 0 - 9 3 . 5 0 . M a r c C h e r n i c k , " C o l o m b i a ' s ' W a r on D r u g s ' vs. t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' ' W a r on D r u g s , ' " W O L A B r i e f i n g S e r i e s no. 3, W a s h i n g t o n O f f i c e on L a t i n A m e r i c a , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , M a y 3 0 , 1991. 51. A r n a l d o C l a u d i o , " U n i t e d S t a t e s - C o l o m b i a E x t r a d i t i o n T r e a t y : F a i l u r e of a S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y , " Military Review 7 1 , no. 12 ( D e c e m b e r 1991): 71.

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52. Tokatlian, " T h e Political E c o n o m y , " p. 95. 53. Claudio, "United S t a t e s - C o l o m b i a Extradition Treaty," p. 71. 54. U.S. G A O , " D r u g Control," p. 26. 55. At the drug laboratory there was an airstrip large e n o u g h for jet aircraft, a dormitory that housed sixty people, six generators, and heavy tractors. See Robert Filippone, " T h e Medellin Cartel: Why We C a n ' t Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17, no. 4 (1994): 331. 56. Tokatlian, "National Security and Drugs," p. 145. 57. Ibid., p. 146. 58. Rensselaer W. Lee III, " C o c a i n e M a f i a , " Social Science and Modern Society 27, no. 2 ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1990): 61. 59. Rensselaer W. Lee III, " C o l o m b i a ' s Cocaine Syndicates," Crime, Law, and Social Change 16, no. 1 (1991): 15. 60. See Orozco Abad, "Los diálogos con el narcotráfico," pp. 2 8 - 5 8 . 61. Chernick, " C o l o m b i a ' s 'War on D r u g s . ' " 62. Claudio, "United S t a t e s - C o l o m b i a Extradition Treaty," pp. 7 1 - 7 3 . 63. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 2000. 64. Tokatlian, " T h e Political E c o n o m y , " p. 136. See also Pilar Lozano, "Los grandes ' c a p o s ' colombianos del narcotráfico escapan a la extradición pretendida por EEUU: La r e f o r m a constitucional adoptada el martes no tendrá carácter retroactivo," El País, N o v e m b e r 27, 1997. 65. Author interview with Charles Gillespie, U.S. ambassador to Colombia ( 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 8 ) , Washington, D.C., September 1999. 66. Tokatlian, " T h e Political E c o n o m y , " p. 148. 67. Drexler, Colombia and the United States, pp. 135-136. 68. William Walker III, " D r u g Control and U.S. H e g e m o n y , " In United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge, edited by John D. Martz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 2 9 9 - 3 1 9 . 69. Ibid. 70. See Mark B o w d e n , Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). 71. Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, pp. 39—41. 72. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on G o v e r n m e n t Operations, " S t o p p i n g the Flood of C o c a i n e with Operation S n o w c a p : Is It Working?" August 15, 1990. 73. For an overview of the Bush administration's policies in Latin America, see Robert Pastor, " G e o r g e Bush and Latin America: T h e Pragmatic Style and the Regionalist O p t i o n , " in Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War World, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 74. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Latin American Reaction to U.S. Policies on Drugs and Terrorism," in Security. Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin Relations, edited by Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and A u g u s t o Varas (Miami: University of Miami North-South Center, 1994), p. 123.

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75. Cited in Peter Andreas et al., "Dead-End Drug Wars," Foreign Policy, no. 85 (Winter 1991-1992): 108. See also Raphael Perl, "The U.S. Congress, International Narcotics Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, nos. 2 - 3 (Summer-Fall 1988): 19-52. 76. Tokatlian, "Latin American Reaction," p. 123. 77. U.S. GAO, "The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Anti-Drug Programs. but Impact Is Uncertain," GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Washington, D.C., August 10. 1993, p. 10. 78. Eva Bertram and Bill Spencer. "Democratic Dilemmas in the War on Drugs in Latin America" (case study for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington. D.C.. 2000). 79. In October 1988. Thomas McNamara, a former director of antiterrorism and narcotics at the National Security Council, was named ambassador to Colombia in a move to bolster counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. 80. See U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, "The Andean Summit Meeting, February 15, 1990," March 7. 1990. 81. See Michael Reid, "Bush. Latin Leaders Seek Drug Pact," The Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1990; and Michael Isikoff, "Colombian President Complains to Bush About U.S. Policies," The Washington Post, February 13, 1990. 82. See Richard Benedetto, " B u s h ' s Colombia Trip Still O n , " Gannett News Service, December 9, 1989; and Douglas Jehl, "Drug Strategy May Face Hard Road," The Times, February 12, 1990. 83. See Peter Grier, "No Carrier off Colombia—For Now," The Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1990. 84. Spencer Reiss et al., "Adios to the Andean Strategy," Newsweek, September 10, 1990. 85. Cited in Joseph Treaster, "Seven Nations to Broaden Battle Against Drugs," The New York Times, February 26, 1992. 86. Chris McGreal and Tim Ross, "Drug War Loses Ground As America Turns Its Back," The independent, February 10, 1991. 87. "Andean G o v e r n m e n t s Face Cut in U.S. Anti-Drug Aid," Notimex (Mexico), April 6, 1993. 88. Ibid. 89. "Enérgico rechazo de Samper y E E U U , " El Tiempo, September 30, 1994. See also "Revisarán papel de DEA en Colombia," El Tiempo, October 6, 1994. 90. "Estamos solos contra narcos," El Tiempo, July 12, 1994. For more on Gaviria's tough stance on the antidrug issue, see "Las explicaciones de EEUU, insuficientes," El Tiempo, July 13, 1994. 91. See Douglas Farah, "U.S. Teamwork with Colombia Against Drugs Comes Unstuck," The Washington Post, June 12, 1994. 92. Robert T. Buckman, "The Cali Cartel: An Undefeated Enemy," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 3, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 439.

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93. John S. Kerry, "Law Enforcement a Kingpin Could Love," The Washington Post, April 6, 1994. S e e also Pamela Constable, "Charges Strain Ties Between U.S., Colombia," The Boston Globe, June 26, 1994. 94. Cited in Buckman, "The Cali Cartel," p. 441. 95. James Brook, "U.S. Halts Flights in A n d e s Drug War Despite Protests," The New York Times, June 4, 1994; and "U.S. Rethinking Radar Ruling," Associated Press, June 5, 1994. 96. Buckman, "The Cali Cartel," p. 441. 97. Cited in Farah, "U.S. Teamwork." 98. Buckman, "The Cali Cartel," p. 441. 99. Ibid., p. 442. 100. James M. Van Wert, "The State Department's Narcotics Control Policy in the Americas," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, nos. 2 - 3 (Summer-Fall 1988): 8. 101. Ibid. 102. For more on the beginnings of the relationship between the U.S. g o v ernment and the C o l o m b i a n National Police, see U.S. G A O , "Drug Control." For more on the evolution of U.S. drug policy in C o l o m b i a , see U.S. G A O , "Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to C o l o m b i a , " G A O / N S I A D - 9 1 - 2 9 6 , Washington, D.C., September 30, 1991; U.S. G A O , "The Drug War: C o l o m b i a Is Undertaking Anti-Drug Problems"; and U.S. G A O , "The Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy," G A O / N S I A D - 9 5 - 1 8 2 , Washington, D.C., June 27, 1995. 103. Cited in John Dillon, "Congress Drafts Military to Battle Drug Traffickers," The Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 1989. See also Morris Blachman and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The War on Drugs: American D e m o c r a c y Under Assault," World Policy Journal 7, no. 1 (Winter 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 ) : 1 3 5 - 1 6 7 . 104. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department o f f i c i a l , Bogotá, June 1999. 105. Confidential author interview with U.S. Department of D e f e n s e official, Washington, D.C., N o v e m b e r 2000. 106. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department o f f i c i a l , Washington, D.C., April 2001. 107. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the benefits and detriments of the certification process, see Coletta Youngers, "The Process Has B e c o m e an Annual Charade," The Washington Post, March 21, 1999. It is safe to say that most o b s e r v e r s — e s p e c i a l l y those in Latin A m e r i c a — b e l i e v e that the certification process is a counterproductive procedure that should be revised, if not abolished. There is current d i s c u s s i o n — m o s t l y at the OAS—regarding the adoption of a multilateral certification process. 108. See Perl, "The U.S. Congress." 109. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "The Certification Process," January 4, 1999. 110. Ibid. 111. Perl, "The U . S . Congress." 112. Ibid., p. 42.

The Roots of Violence in Colombia

The traditional use of violent means to accomplish personal or political ends has evidently set an example which, unfortunately, some Colombians continue to follow to this day. It is a characteristic which has become embedded in Colombian society and political culture, and it poses some of the most difficult challenges to the country's democratic institutions. — Jorge P. Osterling1

To u n d e r s t a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d C o l o m b i a o n e m u s t first study the e v o l u t i o n of C o l o m b i a ' s d e c a d e s - o l d a r m e d c o n f l i c t . We k n o w that U . S . p o l i c y in C o l o m b i a in the last f e w d e c a d e s h a s b e e n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d r i v e n by c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s c o n c e r n s . T h e r e f o r e , the fact that there are l i n k s — a t times inextricable and at other times l o o s e — b e t w e e n a r m e d b e l l i g e r e n t s a n d d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s m e a n s that U . S . d r u g p o l i c i e s in C o l o m b i a are a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y f o r m u l a t e d with the a r m e d c o n f l i c t in m i n d . T h i s reality has b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y g e r m a n e to U.S. p o l i c y c o n c e r n s , e s p e c i a l l y n o w that guerrilla and p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s h a v e r e c e n t l y i n c r e a s e d their i n v o l v e m e n t in the c u l t i v a t i o n and p r o d u c t i o n of illicit d r u g s . To study the e v o l u t i o n of C o l o m b i a ' s c u r r e n t political d y n a m i c s is to study violence. C o l o m b i a shares m a n y cultural, e c o n o m i c , social, and h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s with its n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h m a k e s e x p l a i n i n g its u n p r e c e d e n t e d l e g a c y of v i o l e n c e all the m o r e d i f f i c u l t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , m o s t o b s e r v e r s a g r e e that, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , C o l o m b i a ' s h e r i t a g e of f a m i l y f e u d s and interparty rivalries, w h i c h first f l a r e d u p f o l l o w i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e in the early n i n e t e e n t h century, h a s m u c h to d o with t h e s h o c k i n g level of b l o o d s h e d that h a s p l a g u e d C o l o m b i a t h r o u g h o u t its history. Yet e v e n as C o l o m b i a s u f f e r e d t h r o u g h o v e r a

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century of protracted civil conflicts and disputes, its economic performance has been almost unequaled among Latin American nations. For example, as any proud Colombian will readily tell a foreigner, Colombia was the one major Latin American country not to experience negative growth during the "lost decade" of the 1980s. Colombia represents an interesting paradox where prolonged violence has been matched by concomitant economic dynamism. Thus in many ways there are two contemporary Colombias: one is characterized by indiscriminate violence that resembles past conflicts such as Kosovo in 1999 or Rwanda in 1994: the other is an economically diverse and forward-thinking country that has been the economic envy of many other countries throughout the hemisphere.

THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE Most Colombian political analysts, or violenlólogos, who study the country's tumultuous identity trace the current armed conflict back to the violence that erupted throughout rural Colombia in the 1930s and 1940s. 2 More often than not, the violence during this time was the continuation of age-old hereditary quarrels between members of the country's two dominant political parties—the Liberals and the Conservatives. During the 1930s and 1940s the violence between these two factions seemed senseless, at least to the untrained eye. Liberals would attack Conservatives; Conservatives would attack Liberals. Most of the serious disputes revolved around landownership, especially in the Andean regions and eastern plains (llanos orientales); the conflicts often involved land invasions or the removal of squatters. What distinguishes the violence during this era and earlier decades is that it became more "official" as the Liberal and Conservative parties began directly encouraging their members to become involved in the fighting. 3 Since one of these two parties was always in power, violence increasingly began to resemble a battle between the government and its opponents. 4 Between 1930 and 1946 the Liberals controlled the presidency and, by extension, the political spoils, which in turn fueled Conservative resentment. Consequently, when the opposition Conservatives finally regained the presidency in 1946 with the election of Mariano Ospina Pérez, they vented their frustrations against Liberals in the traditional violent Colombian manner. Not surprisingly, the Liberals responded to these attacks with their own reprisals, and eventually went on to form

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their o w n g u e r r i l l a g r o u p s , w h i c h r e m a i n e d a c t i v e d u r i n g the next e l e v e n y e a r s of C o n s e r v a t i v e r u l e — a n d w h i c h w o u l d g r o w i n t o t h e m o d e r n guerrilla insurgents. R i c h a r d S h a r p l e s s ' s p o r t r a y a l of a b a t t l e t h a t b r o k e out in t h e d e p a r t m e n t of B o y a c a is i n d i c a t i v e of the t y p e of v i o l e n c e that w a s e r u p t ing d u r i n g t h i s era. In this p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e , w h a t b e g a n as a p a r t i s a n c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n L i b e r a l s a n d C o n s e r v a t i v e s s o o n b e c a m e a b a t t l e of g o v e r n m e n t a n d its o p p o n e n t s : T h e t e c h n i q u e s of the C o n s e r v a t i v e r e c o n q u e s t [ r e f e r r i n g to the rec o n q u e s t of the d e p a r t m e n t f r o m the L i b e r a l s f o l l o w i n g O s p i n a P e r e z ' s 1946 v i c t o r y ) w e r e d i r e c t , s i m p l e , and brutal. In s w i n g - v o t e areas the National Police ranks filled with C o n s e r v a t i v e s y m p a t h i z e r s willing to carry out the o r d e r s of C o n s e r v a t i v e o f f i c i a l s . L i b e r a l j o b holders were d i s m i s s e d , h o l d e r s of Liberal identity c a r d s intimidated, Liberal p e a s a n t s w e r e d i s p o s s e s s e d of their lands, saw their property d e s t r o y e d , and o f t e n w e r e k i l l e d . In this a t m o s p h e r e , old f e u d s o v e r water, land, and local interest flared up and took on a partisan c h a r a c ter. . . . N a t u r a l l y , L i b e r a l s r e s o r t e d to s e l f - d e f e n s e and a t t a c k s upon C o n s e r v a t i v e s ; thus the spiral of t e r r o r and c o u n t e r - t e r r o r c o n t i n u e d u p w a r d in intensity, with the political parties a d d i n g their quotient of hatred with heated rhetoric. 5

T h e p o w d e r keg that was the escalating v i o l e n c e b e t w e e n Liberal a n d C o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e s e x p l o d e d f o l l o w i n g t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n of p o p ulist L i b e r a l P a r t y l e a d e r J o r g e E l i é c e r G a i t á n o n A p r i l 9, 1 9 4 8 . 6 F o r m a n y C o l o m b i a n s , G a i t á n w a s s e e n as a p r o g r e s s i v e ,

modernizing

l e a d e r c o m m i t t e d to e n d i n g C o l o m b i a n s o c i e t y ' s g r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s a n d i n j u s t i c e s . In 1 9 4 6 , G a i t á n r a n f o r p r e s i d e n t t h r o u g h a s p l i n t e r g r o u p w i t h i n the L i b e r a l P a r t y in w h i c h h e p r o m o t e d t h e c o n c e p t of " G a i t a n i s m o " — a brand of populist policies that received support f r o m the working class. U n w i l l i n g to w o r k within the Liberal Party m a c h i n e , Gaitán instead c l a i m e d that both the C o n s e r v a t i v e s and the Liberals w e r e o n l y i n t e r e s t e d in s e r v i n g the i n t e r e s t s of t h e " o l i g a r c h y , " a w o r d t h a t b e f o r e t h i s t i m e h a d n o t b e e n u s e d m u c h in C o l o m b i a . T h i s split w i t h i n the L i b e r a l P a r t y f u r t h e r s e r v e d t o p o l a r i z e C o l o m b i a ' s a l r e a d y fractious and violent political arena. B u t t h i s d r e a m of c r e a t i n g a " w o r k e r s p a r a d i s e " a l o n g t h e l i n e s of J u a n P e r ó n in A r g e n t i n a o r G e t u l i o V a r g a s in B r a z i l w a s p u t to an e n d w i t h an a s s a s s i n ' s b u l l e t . T h e n e w s of G a i t á n ' s m u r d e r s p a r k e d v i o l e n t c l a s h e s in B o g o t á — k n o w n as t h e Bogotazo—as

w e l l as in o t h e r c i t i e s .

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In B o g o t á , Liberal m o b s d e v a s t a t e d the city center, and C o n s e r v a t i v e president Ospina barely escaped with his life. Sharpless describes well the atmosphere in Bogotá: B o g o t á r e s e m b l e d a E u r o p e a n city a f t e r a W o r l d War II b o m b i n g att a c k . T h e c a p i t a l ' s a r m y g a r r i s o n d i d not a p p e a r in f o r c e until t w o h o u r s a f t e r the initial s h o o t i n g . B u t the t a n k s and a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s of the s o l d i e r s s o o n p r o v e d to b e m u r d e r o u s l y e f f e c t i v e . D e s p i t e suic i d a l c h a r g e s by t h e r i o t e r s a g a i n s t a r m o r e d units a n d h e a v y street f i g h t i n g in s o m e s e c t o r s b e t w e e n t r o o p s and a r m e d c i v i l i a n s , the m i l itary p r e v a i l e d . By n i g h t f a l l the r i o t i n g had p e a k e d as a result of b o t h the a r m y ' s a c t i o n s a n d a s t e a d i l y f a l l i n g f r e e z i n g rain. F l a r e - u p s c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the night a n d into the f o l l o w i n g S a t u r d a y , and t h e r e w a s c o n t i n u e d f i g h t i n g b e t w e e n t h e s n i p e r s and s o l d i e r s , as well as a b r i e f b a t t l e in f r o n t of the U . S . e m b a s s y at e l e v e n o ' c l o c k , but the a r m y g r a d u a l l y r e g a i n e d c o n t r o l of the city. T h e arrival of m o r e t r o o p s on April 10 m e a n t the final c o n t a i n m e n t of the u p r i s i n g in B o g o t á . 7

But even as the level of violence subsided in Bogotá, it increased in the countryside. Indeed, although the escalation in rural Liberal versus C o n s e r v a t i v e violence actually began in the m i d - 1 9 4 0 s , the Bogotazo proved to be the catalyst that sparked even more killing and destruction in rural C o l o m b i a . T h i s era f r o m the m i d - 1 9 4 0 s to the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s is k n o w n as La Violencia. One particularly g r u e s o m e e x a m p l e illustrates the brutality of this era. In the town of Puerto Tejada, on the Cauca River near the southern city of Cali, a Liberal m o b captured some prominent Conservative political leaders, decapitated them, and then proceeded to play soccer in the main plaza using their severed heads as soccer balls. 8 T h i s p r o l o n g e d era of u b i q u i t o u s violence lasted through the c o u p by General G u s t a v o R o j a s Pinilla in 1953 and finally came to an end in 1957 with the a d v e n t of the N a t i o n a l Front. W h i l e La Violencia undoubtedly stems f r o m age-old Liberal versus Conservative antagonisms, there are additional, m o r e specific motives that expl ain the carnage that was inflicted, including l a n d o w n e r s ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n of violence as a m e a n s to increase their l a n d h o l d i n g s and right-wing publicity that an international c o m m u n i s t conspiracy was at work in Colombia.

THE NATIONAL FRONT Although a fair a m o u n t of the violence subsided after the 1953 coup by G e n e r a l R o j a s Pinilla, La Violencia continued in rural C o l o m b i a , and

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elites in both parties increasingly began to realize that such violence was not in their interests. 9 Thus, in order to bring some semblance of stability and normality back to Colombia, they decided to enter into a power-sharing agreement—the National Front—in which they would alternate the presidency every four years, and equally divide the important political appointments. 1 0 The National Front pact was ironed out between Conservative Laureano Gomez and Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo in Sitges, Spain, in 1957, ultimately producing the Pact of Sitges on July 20. A plebiscite on the pact was held later that year in which voters' options were to accept or reject the proposition. Powerful factions within both parties urged their supporters to vote in favor of the agreement. The final tally was 4,169,294 votes in favor, with 206,864 votes against and 20,738 blank ballots." The National Front was thus codified and served to shape the course of Colombian politics for more than twenty years. Robert Dix writes: The National Front was to venture beyond all previous agreements. In conception it was more than just an "agreement from above" as a convenient political tactic, more than a device to reestablish by constitutional fiat a role for both contending parties, more than an instrument of the elite to resist change and combat leftist ideas. The National Front was all these things, and a good deal more. In its extent and purpose it was a new departure without a real precedent, either in Colombia or elsewhere. 1 2

The National Front established that, beginning in 1957 for a period of twelve years, all seats in the Senate and Chamber of Representatives, departmental assemblies, and municipal councils were to be divided equally between the Liberal and Conservative parties, and only those parties. Further, all cabinet positions (except military appointees) and positions on the Colombian Supreme Court were to be equally divided, and all government officials and employees in the branches of public administration were to be appointed on a system of parity between the two parties. Dix writes: With its adoption, and with the simultaneous extension of the term of the National Front to sixteen years, the constitutional basis for Colombia's experiment in institutionalized coalition government was essentially complete. Its three pillars, constituting a unique form of bipartisanship, were to be: parity in all public elective bodies and in all executive departments and administrative posts; alternation in the

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p r e s i d e n c y e v e r y f o u r y e a r s ; a n d the r e q u i r e m e n t that d e c i s i o n s m a d e by p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n be by two-thirds votes, t h u s p r e s u m a b l y f o r c i n g b i p a r t i s a n c o o p e r a t i o n on all l e g i s l a t i o n . 1 3

The National Front lasted until 1974, when the presidency once again became more freely contested. This power-sharing agreement was quite successful in its primary goal of putting an end to the rural violence. But while violence in the countryside dropped precipitously during the period of the National Front, guerrilla groups born during the era of La Violencia (1946-1957) or the National Front (1957-1974) continued their struggle, which as of today shows few signs of letting up. The next significant step in C o l o m b i a ' s political evolution came in 1991, when a constituent assembly introduced a new constitution. In what was seen as a critical step in moving Colombia away f r o m the qualified democracy of the National Front years and toward a consolidated democracy, the new constitution instituted a variety of channels for democratic participation, a bill of rights, and a restructured judicial system. Yet while the 1991 constitution did succeed in ushering in an era of political and social r e f o r m in C o l o m b i a , it was unable to imm u n i z e C o l o m b i a against the e f f e c t s from what turned out to be a significant increase in narcotics-, guerrilla-, and paramilitary-related violence.

EVOLUTION OF THE GUERRILLA GROUPS The First Generation C o l o m b i a ' s first modern guerrilla groups can trace their roots back to the time of La Violencia. When the Conservatives took power in 1946, many Liberals—as well as members of the Communist Party—decided it was better to organize as types of rural self-defense groups to protect against Conservative attacks than to remain in the traditional political party system. These groups then evolved into "semi-autonomous rural c o m m u n i t i e s " intended to serve as self-contained "islands" free f r o m the coercion of the Colombian state. Of the two major parties, only the Liberals formed guerrilla groups, as from 1946 to 1953 the Conservatives were in power. In an attempt to quell the carnage of La Violencia and rein in these incipient guerrilla groups, on June 19, 1953, General Rojas Pinilla, who had taken power in a military coup, offered amnesty to any and all

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guerrillas w h o would lay d o w n their w e a p o n s . Nearly 6 , 5 0 0 guerrillas took a d v a n t a g e of this o f f e r in the f o l l o w i n g three m o n t h s alone. Shortly thereafter, the R o j a s Pinilla r e g i m e p a s s e d the first of two amnesty laws that ultimately benefited close to 2 0 , 0 0 0 C o l o m b i a n s . But while the amnesty laws p r o m p t e d the Liberal guerrillas to give up their arms, the guerrilla groups linked to the C o m m u n i s t Party were more reluctant, and many of these groups evolved into the m o d e r n guerrilla ins u r g e n t s w h o still exist today. Not surprisingly, these g r o u p s saw the National Front as nothing m o r e than a political charade intended to preserve the privilege of the elites at the e x p e n s e of the m a s s e s . Marc C h e r n i c k describes the c h a n g i n g characteristics and goals of the guerrilla groups during the era of the National Front and afterward: P e a c e at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , as h a p p e n e d in 1 9 5 7 - 5 8 w i t h t h e f o u n d ing of the N a t i o n a l F r o n t , did not f u l l y b r i n g p e a c e at the local level or p a c i f y t h e m y r i a d of s o c i a l a c t o r s w h o w e r e at w a r w i t h e a c h o t h e r . M o r e o v e r , the fact that the o n s e t of the N a t i o n a l F r o n t c o i n c i d e d with t h e f i r s t y e a r s of t h e C u b a n r e v o l u t i o n g a v e n e w l i f e to t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p t i o n of a r m e d o p p o s i t i o n . Yet in C o l o m b i a , u n l i k e in o t h e r S o u t h A m e r i c a n n a t i o n s , g u e r r i l l a s w e r e a b l e to c o n s o l i d a t e their p r e s e n c e in s e v e r a l r u r a l a r e a s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t d e c a d e s of t h e N a t i o n a l F r o n t . D e s p i t e e n o r m o u s o b s t a c l e s a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h the C o l o m b i a n military, s t u d e n t r e b e l s , d i s s i d e n t L i b e r a l g u e r r i l l a s , a n d l o n g t i m e p e a s a n t c o m m u n i s t s f o u n d s o m e of t h e m o s t p r o p i t i o u s soil for r e v o l u t i o n a r y activity . . . a n y w h e r e in the A m e r i c a s . T h e n e w C o l o m b i a n g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t s — s o m e c o n s c i o u s l y o r g a n i z e d as C u b a n - s t y l e focos m o d e l e d o n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e a s of C h e G u e v a r a , o t h e r s w i t h r o o t s d e e p in e a r l i e r p e r i o d s of p e a s a n t o r g a n i z i n g — w e r e a b l e to insert t h e m s e l v e s into r e m o t e c o m m u n i t i e s that h a d a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d s e v e r a l d e c a d e s of r e b e l l i o n a n d a r m e d social c o n f l i c t . 1 4

T h e first national c o n f e r e n c e of " P o p u l a r L i b e r a t i o n M o v e m e n t s " took place in 1952 in the d e p a r t m e n t of C u n d i n a m a r c a and served as a signal that these incipient guerrilla groups were serious about their comm i t m e n t to armed struggle. But although they normally operated in remote, sparsely populated areas of the country far away f r o m the reaches of the state, these guerrillas would not be able to operate with impunity f r o m the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t forever. E v e n t u a l l y the C o l o m b i a n state attacked the g u e r r i l l a s , p r o m p t i n g the c o n s o l i d a t i o n and institut i o n a l i z a t i o n of w h a t w o u l d b e c o m e the " f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n g u e r i i l l a g r o u p s . " As Daniel P r e m o has pointed out, the C o l o m b i a n state's decision to d e c l a r e war on the a u t o n o m o u s z o n e s d r a m a t i c a l l y altered the

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nature of the guerrilla insurgents. In the 1960s, after the attacks on the i n d e p e n d e n t republics, a u t o n o m y w a s no longer the g u e r r i l l a s ' only goal: " U n l i k e the L i b e r a l - C o n s e r v a t i v e banditry, the existence of selfc o n t a i n e d ' i n d e p e n d e n t r e p u b l i c s ' and the short-lived actions of the M O E C and F U A R [two small guerrilla groups] during the early years of the National Front, the E L N and F A R C placed primary f o c u s on the seizure of national power." 1 5 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC,Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). O n e of the m a j o r s e m i - a u t o n o m o u s c o m munities, Marquetalia, was located in the southern department of Tolima, an isolated part of the country. Marquetalia was an area in which c o m munist guerrillas ( n u m b e r i n g about 200) w o r k e d side-by-side with farmers in order to build what they believed would be a better, more just society. The guerrillas considered Marquetalia to be an independent "rep u b l i c " in which guerrilla leaders held cabinet positions d e t e r m i n e d by their military experience and Marxist education. T h e C o l o m b i a n state, h o w e v e r , saw the institutionalization of aut o n o m o u s zones like Marquetalia as a direct threat to its legitimacy. In 1964, President G u i l l e r m o L e o n Valencia, under pressure f r o m a congress that m o c k e d him for his inability to do s o m e t h i n g about these m o v e m e n t s , ordered the C o l o m b i a n military to attack M a r q u e t a l i a , s p a r k i n g a b l o o d y battle. 1 6 T h e C o l o m b i a n military utilized a p p r o x i mately 3,500 g o v e r n m e n t soldiers, including 170 troops f r o m the elite Batallón C o l o m b i a (which had specific orders to capture the guerrillas' leader, Manuel M a r u l a n d a (see Photo 3.1), w h o still controls the F A R C today) as well as scores of Paez Indians, w h o served as guides for the troops. 1 7 T h e seemingly easily e n s u r e d victory proved m u c h m o r e difficult to a c h i e v e . W h i l e the g o v e r n m e n t ' s t r o o p s prevailed, that they struggled to defeat a few hundred guerrillas was an embarrassment. T h e attack also g a l v a n i z e d the guerrillas, b o l s t e r i n g their belief that p r o f o u n d political, social, and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e in C o l o m b i a c o u l d only c o m e through a r m e d struggle. 1 8 Shortly after the incident, and despite the fact that virtually all of the "republics" had been recovered by the C o l o m b i a n military, the guerrillas escaped to a nearby communist autonomous community called Rio Chiquito. A f e w days later the Fuerzas A r m a d a s Revolucionarias de C o l o m bia was formally organized. 1 9 In July 1964 the "First Convergence of the Nation's Southern Bloc" took place. Taken to be the F A R C ' s first official c o n f e r e n c e , the FARC declared its identity by announcing: " B e g i n n i n g

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F A R C leader Manuel "Sureshot" Marulanda. Photo by Marcelo Salinas.

today, July 20, we are a guerrilla m o v e m e n t . " In 1965, C o l o m b i a n a r m y intelligence reported that the total n u m b e r of guerrillas active in C o l o m bia was b e t w e e n 7 0 0 and 8 0 0 p e r s o n s . 2 0 At that time, the F A R C had m u c h in its f a v o r as it d r e w u p o n its org a n i z a t i o n a l and logistical roots in the c o m m u n i s t s e l f - d e f e n s e o r g a n i zations active in the 1940s and 1950s. T h e F A R C also m a i n t a i n e d links with the C o m m u n i s t Party, a l t h o u g h the ties b e t w e e n the t w o g r o u p s w e r e n e v e r n e a r l y as i n t i m a t e as s o m e in C o l o m b i a a n d the U n i t e d States h a v e s u g g e s t e d . T h e n , as is the case today, the F A R C resorted to k i d n a p p i n g , e x t o r t i o n , and w a r t a x e s to f u n d its i n s u r g e n t s , p r o v i d i n g t h e m with cash to k e e p t h e m s e l v e s w e l l - a r m e d o v e r the c o u r s e of several d e c a d e s . As J o r g e O s t e r l i n g m a k e s clear, the F A R C h a s utilized a variety of m e t h o d s to g e n e r a t e r e v e n u e :

62

Driven by Drugs T h e s y s t e m a l l e g e d l y w o r k s as f o l l o w s : the Estado Mayor (senior s t a f f ) of a frente b u d g e t s its e c o n o m i c n e e d s a n d p l a n s a s e r i e s of f u n d r a i s i n g o p e r a t i o n s u s i n g v a r i o u s t a c t i c s . O n e of t h e c l a s s i c o n e s i n v o l v e s t h e t e m p o r a r y s e i z u r e of a s m a l l t o w n f o r p r o p a g a n d a p u r p o s e s , u s u a l l y i n c l u d i n g the r o b b e r y of all local b a n k s a n d c r e d i t u n i o n s , a tactic w h i c h is said to h a v e d e c r e a s e d use s i n c e the s i g n i n g of the 1984 a g r e e m e n t s . A s e c o n d tactic, a l l e g e d l y still u s e d , has b e e n the k i d n a p p i n g of the w e a l t h y , b o t h in u r b a n and rural areas, d e m a n d ing e x o r b i t a n t a m o u n t s of r a n s o m m o n e y in e x c h a n g e for the v i c t i m ' s s a f e r e t u r n , t h r e a t e n i n g his life if the n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r v e n e . [ A n o t h e r ] f u n d r a i s i n g t a c t i c , k n o w n as gramaje ( p a y m e n t b a s e d on g r a m s ) has a l l e g e d l y d e v e l o p e d in t h e E a s t e r n P l a i n s in the f o r m of p r o t e c t i o n s e r v i c e s to the o w n e r s of c o c a i n e p l a n t a t i o n s , l a b o r a t o r i e s , a n d n a r c o t r a f f i c k e r s in e x c h a n g e for a p e r c e n t a g e of the g r a m s of coc a i n e paste p r o d u c e d in the a r e a . 2 1

K n o w i n g that it was not nearly p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to overthrow the C o l o m b i a n government, over the years the FARC decided to disperse its forces throughout the country, believing that more frequent attacks in a greater n u m b e r of areas would be the best strategy to c o m p e n s a t e for their n u m e r i c a l d i s a d v a n t a g e vis-á-vis the C o l o m b i a n military. T h e s e d i s p e r s e d g r o u p s , called frentes, have operated in a s e m i - a u t o n o m o u s m a n n e r since their inception, and doubtless, at times, have little or no idea what type of operations—or even specific ideologies—other frentes are i m p l e m e n t i n g . M o r e o v e r , there r e m a i n s a great debate today in C o l o m b i a as to w h e t h e r the central hierarchy of the F A R C is a l w a y s able to effectively control all of its frentes, which now n u m b e r roughly 100. As will be d i s c u s s e d later in this chapter, in the fall of 1998 the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t granted the F A R C a 16,000-square-mile liberated zone in the d e p a r t m e n t of Caquetá. The FARC continued to control this region through February 2002. 2 2 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN; National Liberation Army). C o l o m b i a ' s s e c o n d m a j o r guerrilla g r o u p is the E L N . Unlike the F A R C , with its p r o - M o s c o w - o r i e n t e d origins, the E L N began in 1964 more as a traditional Latin A m e r i c a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p , along the lines of Fidel C a s t r o ' s m o v e m e n t in Cuba in the 1950s. The E L N believed that it could repeat the foco strategy—in which a group of committed, educated leaders over time wins the trust of the local, rural population and turns them into revolutionaries—that Fidel Castro had used so successfully in the Sierra Maestra in Cuba in the 1950s. In fact, during the early 1960s a n u m b e r of the E L N ' s leaders traveled to C u b a to study methods

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of f o m e n t i n g r e v o l u t i o n . On N o v e m b e r 11, 1962, f r o m H a v a n a , the ELN leadership f o r m e d the Brigada Pro Liberación Nacional de C o l o m bia José Antonio Galán. This brigade soon dissolved, but its C u b a n - i n f l u e n c e d p r i n c i p l e s and tactics n e v e r t h e l e s s b e c a m e e m b e d d e d in the E L N ' s ideology. Upon returning f r o m Cuba, the leadership of the E L N chose to establish itself in the d e p a r t m e n t of S a n t a n d e r in the eastern A n d e s , mainly because this area had an incipient rural labor f o r c e that seemed c o n d u c i v e to political mobilization. The E L N was formally f o u n d e d in Santander on July 4, 1964. The group gained notoriety when in 1966 a w e l l - k n o w n B e l g i a n - t r a i n e d C a t h o l i c priest n a m e d C a m i l o Torres left the National University in B o g o t á and j o i n e d the E L N . Torres was killed in c o m b a t soon thereafter, but his i n v o l v e m e n t with the g r o u p brought it greater recognition and legitimacy. T h e 1970s w a s a period of military c o n s o l i d a t i o n for the E L N , as the group was experiencing a relative degree of success in its operations in and around Santander. T h i s g r o w i n g strength p r o m p t e d President Misael Pastrana (father of president Andrés Pastrana) to call for a total war against the E L N in 1972. In less than two m o n t h s the C o l o m b i a n military almost c o m p l e t e l y d e s t r o y e d the E L N , e x e m p l i f i e d by the d e a t h s of several of their top military c o m m a n d e r s . For the rest of the 1970s the E L N was mired in a d e e p crisis as it a t t e m p t e d to r e b o u n d f r o m this defeat as well as deal with a myriad of internal disputes. During the 1980s the E L N m o v e d away f r o m the foco strategy and more toward an ideology of e c o n o m i c nationalism, best seen by targeting f o r e i g n oil e x e c u t i v e s , b o m b i n g oil p i p e l i n e s , and a c c u s i n g the state-owned oil c o m p a n y — E C O P E T R O L — o f selling the nation's patrimony. The E L N particularly targeted oil c o m p a n i e s that were operating the C a ñ o L i m ó n - C o v e ñ a s pipeline, which runs between the department of A r a u c a and the C a r i b b e a n coast. It is e s t i m a t e d that b e t w e e n 1986 and 1997 there were 79 million barrels of crude oil spilled in pipeline attacks. 2 3 For most of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, the E L N did not g o m u c h beyond what had c o m e to be routine pipeline b o m b i n g s or the occasional k i d n a p p i n g of a multinational c o m p a n y executive. In recent years, however, the E L N has stepped up the f r e q u e n c y of its attacks, and increasingly these actions seem to have very little to do with e c o n o m i c nationalism. For e x a m p l e , in April 1999, E L N c o m m a n d o s h i j a c k e d an A v i a n c a Airlines flight f r o m B u c a r a m a n g a to B o g o t á and took the passengers hostage. As of late 2001 three passengers f r o m that flight were still being held captive. 2 4 A m o n t h later, the guerrilla

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o r g a n i z a t i o n k i d n a p p e d an entire c h u r c h c o n g r e g a t i o n w h i l e it was att e n d i n g m a s s in a w e a l t h y n e i g h b o r h o o d in Cali; in 2 0 0 0 , the E L N also b o m b e d the C a ñ o L i m ó n - C o v e ñ a s p i p e l i n e an e s t i m a t e d t w e n t y - t h r e e times. 2 5 S o m e o b s e r v e r s suspect that as the g o v e r n m e n t h a s o n c e again entered into peace n e g o t i a t i o n s with the F A R C , the E L N has u n d e r t a k e n such brazen o p e r a t i o n s in order to r e i n f o r c e the point that it too d e s e r v e s a seat at the negotiating table. In 2001 the E L N c o n t i n u e d to insist that s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s w o u l d only o c c u r a f t e r its r e c e i v e s a liberated zone along the lines of what the F A R C received in 1998. U n d e r the auspices of several E u r o p e a n countries and C u b a , n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t and the E L N o v e r the g r a n t i n g of a 1,000s q u a r e - m i l e liberated zone in north central C o l o m b i a c o n t i n u e . 2 6

Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL; Popular Liberation Army). Smaller than either the F A R C or the E L N , the third m a j o r f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n guerrilla g r o u p is the E P L . F o u n d e d in April 1967, it w a s o r i g i n a l l y a M a o i s t - o r i e n t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , a l t h o u g h like the E L N it a d m i r e d the succ e s s and t a c t i c s of the C u b a n r e v o l u t i o n . O v e r t i m e the g r o u p turned a w a y f r o m this orientation and f o c u s e d m o r e on a c o m b i n e d urban-rural strategy. By the late 1970s a n d early 1980s, the E P L had b r o k e n c o m pletely f r o m its links with C h i n a and instead a t t e m p t e d to d i v e r s i f y both its ideologies and its military strategies. T h e E P L signed a p e a c e agreem e n t with the B e t a n c u r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in 1984, but this b r o k e d o w n a little o v e r a y e a r later. T o d a y the E P L is an e x t r e m e l y s m a l l g u e r r i l l a group, a l t h o u g h the exact n u m b e r of m e m b e r s is d i f f i c u l t to estimate. Its activities are c o n c e n t r a t e d in the d e p a r t m e n t s of A n t i o q u i a , U r a b á , and S a n t a n d e r , and its ability to carry out m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s pale in c o m parison to that of either the F A R C or the E L N .

The Second

Generation

Movimiento 19 deAbril (M-19; April 19 Movement). Beginning in the 1970s, a n o t h e r s e r i e s of g u e r r i l l a g r o u p s took u p a r m s in C o l o m b i a , m a n y of w h i c h w e r e small, r e g i o n a l l y f o c u s e d g r o u p s e m e r g i n g in the " n a r r o w institutional s p a c e a n d r e b e l l i o u s g r e e n h o u s e of C o l o m b i a n politics." 2 7 Chief a m o n g t h e s e n e w m o v e m e n t s w a s the M - 1 9 , f o u n d e d a f t e r the 1970 presidential election, in w h i c h it w a s alleged that f o r m e r c o u p l e a d e r a n d p o p u l i s t p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e G u s t a v o R o j a s Pinilla f r o m the political p a r t y A l i a n z a N a c i o n a l P o p u l a r ( A N A P O ; N a t i o n a l

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P o p u l a r A l l i a n c e ) h a d v i c t o r y s t o l e n f r o m h i m t h r o u g h f r a u d ( A p r i l 19 w a s the d a y of the e l e c t i o n ) . W h i l e it n e v e r s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n e d to s e i z e p o w e r f r o m the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t , the M - 1 9 n o n e t h e l e s s did c a r r y out a n u m b e r of f l a m b o y a n t o p e r a t i o n s that b r o u g h t it a g r e a t d e a l of attention. T h e s e included: •

T h e J a n u a r y 17, 1974, t h e f t of S i m ó n B o l i v a r ' s s w o r d . T h i s o p e r a t i o n h a d s y m b o l i c s i g n i f i c a n c e , f o r in c o m m i t t i n g it the M - 1 9 laid c l a i m as the l e g i t i m a t e h e i r s to B o l i v a r ' s l e g a c y . T h e M - 1 9 said that t h e y w o u l d o n l y r e t u r n the s w o r d o n c e B o l i v a r ' s i d e a l s h a d b e e n i n t r o d u c e d into t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . T h e y a l s o p a i n t e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y s l o g a n s o n the w a l l s of B o g o t á ' s city hall.

•

T h e N e w Y e a r ' s E v e 1979 t h e f t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 , 0 0 0 w e a p o n s from a Bogotá army arsenal using a hand-hewn tunnel. T h e F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 0 s e i z u r e of the e m b a s s y of the D o m i n i c a n R e public. T h e M - 1 9 held the e m b a s s y with fifteen foreign ambass a d o r s i n s i d e f o r t w o m o n t h s . F i d e l C a s t r o b e c a m e i n v o l v e d in the n e g o t i a t i o n s , a n d t h e M - 1 9 r e c e i v e d a U . S . $ 1 m i l l i o n c a s h p a y m e n t a n d its c o m m a n d o s w e r e g i v e n s a f e p a s s a g e to H a v a n a .

•

•

T h e 1981 " i n v a s i o n " of C o l o m b i a n e a r t h e A t l a n t i c C o a s t t o w n of T u m a c o . T h i s o p e r a t i o n w a s a m i l i t a r y d i s a s t e r a n d m a r k e d the M - 1 9 ' s s h i f t f r o m an u r b a n to a m o r e rural m o v e m e n t .

•

T h e N o v e m b e r 6, 1985, s e i z u r e of the P a l a c e of J u s t i c e in B o g o t á . T h e C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y s t o r m e d t h e p a l a c e a n d in t h e f i g h t i n g e l e v e n ( o u t of t w e n t y - f o u r ) s u p r e m e c o u r t j u s t i c e s w e r e k i l l e d , a l o n g with s e v e r a l c i v i l i a n s a n d a l m o s t all of the c o m m a n d o s .

T h e raid o n t h e P a l a c e of J u s t i c e p r o v o k e d w i d e s p r e a d c o n d e m n a t i o n t h r o u g h o u t C o l o m b i a , a n d w a s o n e of t h e c a t a l y s t s t h a t led to t h e M - 1 9 ' s d e c i s i o n to t r a n s f o r m itself i n t o a p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t . A m e r i cas Watch has written: Public reaction against the M-19 for attacking the Palace of Justice was massive. Moreover, the episode confirmed many Colombians' worst fears about the M-19. For the right, the attack was conclusive proof that the M-19 is no more than a group of assassins and terrorists to whom no quarter should be given. For those who were more neutral towards the group or even sympathetic, the attack was an enormously costly strategic error that indicates how isolated from political and military realities the M-19 has grown, and how far it has fallen from the group that once offered the possibility of a non-Marxist left-wing in Colombia. 2 8

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It has also been reported that the M-19 received U.S.$1 million from the Medellin cartel in order to carry out the palace attack. Since the supreme court justices had just declared their support for a U.S.Colombian extradition treaty, some observers believe the objective of the attack was to destroy the documents that linked drug traffickers to several pending extradition efforts. 2 9 The attack was the last gasp for the M-19. In 1990 it became one of the few serious guerrilla groups to permanently lay down its arms and enter the mainstream political system. Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL, Qumtin Lame Armed Movement). The other major second-generation guerrilla group was the MAQL. It was founded in March 1985 in the department of Cauca as an indigenous guerrilla force seeking to promote indigenous rights and provide defense against hostile landowners. During the two decades leading up to the formation of the M A Q L , the Paez and Gambiano Indians, most of w h o m reside in the departments of Cauca, Tolima, and Huila, had established ties with the FARC. Yet as some of the Indian groups became more militant, they clashed with elements in the FARC who believed that any armed indigenous group should be subordinate to their own organization. This brewing tension culminated in February 1981 when FARC members in the department of Cauca murdered seven Paez leaders. This growing competition with the FARC prompted the armed indigenous groups to form their own independent guerrilla group. In April 1985 the newly formed M A Q L kidnapped a group of journalists in the southern city of Popayan and took them to a remote location, where they were told about the new guerrilla group. M A Q L members described themselves as a self-defense group created "because the Indians had been left alone in a cross-fire between the landlords, the Colombian armed forces, and the FARC-guerrilla forces." 3 0 The M A Q L remained a relatively small organization, and it eventually laid down its arms and participated in the 1991 Constituent Assembly. Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera (CNG; National Guerrilla Coordinating Group). With many guerrilla groups active in Colombia over the past few decades, it is not surprising that they eventually decided to unify themselves under a national coordinating body. Created in June 1985, the C N G consisted of those armed groups such as the ELN that never signed an agreement with the Betancur administration, as well as those such as the EPL and the M-19 that signed agreements only to soon

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a f t e r w a r d return to a r m e d activity. T h e M A Q L , as well as a f e w o t h e r e v e n s m a l l e r guerrilla g r o u p s , w e r e also m e m b e r s . T h e F A R C did not p a r t i c i p a t e , as at this t i m e it w a s still o b s e r v i n g the c e a s e - f i r e it h a d signed with the Betancur a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e idea b e h i n d the c r e a t i o n of the C N G w a s that by i n c r e a s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g the various guerrilla g r o u p s they w o u l d be able to i m p r o v e the c o o r d i n a t i o n — a n d in turn s u c c e s s — o f their a r m e d activities. T h e body w a s initially o r g a n i z e d by the M - 1 9 , w h o thought that by uniting the guerrilla g r o u p s they w o u l d be in a strong position to defeat the C o l o m b i a n military. Yet while the C N G w a s able to c o o r d i n a t e attacks (it a v e r a g e d roughly o n e per week in the late 1980s), its lack of a g g r e g a t e military p o w e r vis-à-vis the military p r e v e n t e d it f r o m achieving its u l t i m a t e goal of a c o m p l e t e military victory. A n d as the f o l l o w ing e x c e r p t m a k e s clear, like most of the individual guerrilla g r o u p s , the C N G had its share of internal p r o b l e m s . In A u g u s t 1986 a C N G c o n f e r e n c e w a s held in n o r t h e a s t e r n A n t i o q u i a u n d e r the m o t t o " U n i t y Is Part of Victory": T h e c o n f e r e n c e w a s attended by the c o m m a n d e r s of the E L N , EPL, M - 1 9 , PL, and PRT [the PL and the PRT were t w o of the smaller guerrilla groups]. Absent w a s the d e l e g a t i o n of the C o m m a n d o Quintín Lame. Six reporters of the nation's most important n e w s p a p e r s and m a g a z i n e s were invited. A c c o r d i n g to B o g o t á ' s Semana, the c o n f e r e n c e consisted of a disorderly d i s c u s s i o n of a variety of issues w h i c h included w a y s of h u m a n i z i n g the war, attempts to j u s t i f y personal threats, and condemnation of extortion, blackmail, ransom, but not of kidnapping. Media p e o p l e w h o attended were i m p r e s s e d by the inability o f the guerrilla c o m m a n d e r s to d i s c u s s clearly and p r e c i s e l y and to j u s t i f y their political goals, objectives, and actions. For e x a m ple, w h e n the guerrilla c o m m a n d e r s were invited to d i s c u s s the 1985 attacks against General S a m u d i o [then army commander, later minister of d e f e n s e ] or against Jaime Castro Castro [then minister o f g o v ernment, later temporarily c o m p e l l e d to leave C o l o m b i a ] , or the w h o l e peace process, their answers were vague and e v a s i v e . 3 1

In 1986 t h e C N G c h a n g e d its n a m e to C o o r d i n a d o r a G u e r r i l l e r a S i m ó n B o l í v a r ( C G S B ) , bolstered by the recent inclusion of the F A R C f o l l o w i n g the b r e a k d o w n of its c e a s e - f i r e a g r e e m e n t w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t . Quickly, h o w e v e r , the M - 1 9 , the M A Q L , a n d a f a c t i o n of the E P L e n t e r e d into p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s with the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e F A R C , t h e E L N , and parts of the E P L thus b e c a m e the g r o u p s that n o w c o m p o s e d t h e C G S B . S i n c e this t i m e , the C G S B h a s b e e n largely i n e f f e c t i v e ,

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exemplified by the guerrilla groups' intermittent battles with each other. The body has now virtually disappeared, leaving each guerrilla group to operate and negotiate on its own. 3 2

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE The Betancur Administration.

7 982-1986

In what seemed to be a good omen for peace in Colombia, several guerrilla groups greeted the 1982 election victory of Conservative Party candidate Belisario Betancur with an undeclared suspension o f armed activity. On August 7, 1982, the day of his inauguration, Betancur offered a "white flag o f t r u c e " to the guerrillas and established an all-party peace c o m m i s s i o n that quickly got the guerrillas talking with senior government officials. At his inauguration, Betancur declared: "I am extending my hand to the rebels in arms so that they may j o i n in the full exercise of their rights. . . . I declare peace to my fellow citizens without any distinction . . . to this priority I am c o m m i t t e d . " 3 1 In a gesture signifying that the guerrillas were pleased with B e t a n c u r ' s seemingly open-ended offer for peace, F A R C leader Manuel Marulanda personally praised Betancur's commitment to a negotiated settlement. Betancur's first substantive overture to the guerrillas was a sweeping amnesty law that, in its most important effect, did not require disarmament as a prerequisite for qualification. As J o r g e Osterling has pointed out, for Betancur " p e a c e was to be obtained by any means, and amnesty was seen as an invitation for dialogue and for a c e a s e - f i r e . " 3 4 According to official Colombian government figures, this amnesty law benefited 1 , 0 8 9 guerrillas, o f whom 8 1 8 were members o f the M - 1 9 , 152 were of the F A R C , and 7 5 were o f the E L N . 3 5 B e t a n c u r ' s efforts began to produce results a few years later when in 1984, after negotiations with the government in the F A R C ' s stronghold o f La Uribe, the F A R C agreed to a one-year cease-fire and agreed to end any type o f terrorist activity such as kidnapping or e c o n o m i c extortion. This did not, however, force the F A R C to relinquish its arms. 3 6 Shortly after the accord was signed with the F A R C , the M - 1 9 and the E P L also reached agreements with the government; these also did not require them to give up their arms (the M - 1 9 unilaterally withdrew eight months later). T h e refusal o f splinter factions within these two groups (as well as within the F A R C ) to negotiate revealed the weaknesses of

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these a g r e e m e n t s . The Betancur g o v e r n m e n t secretly met with leaders of the M - 1 9 in Spain (October 1983) and in M e x i c o ( D e c e m b e r 1984), but these m e e t i n g s did not lead to a lasting peace agreement. The E L N participated in n e g o t i a t i o n s in the early 1 9 8 0 s , but n e v e r s i g n e d an agreement with the g o v e r n m e n t . T h r o u g h o u t the B e t a n c u r years, guerrilla d i s a r m a m e n t w a s the major s t i c k i n g point during m o s t o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s with the various guerrilla groups. A c c o r d i n g to A m e r i c a s Watch: " B y not requiring the guerrillas to disarm, the a c c o r d s tacitly r e c o g n i z e the guerrillas as o n g o i n g armed organizations. But the a c c o r d s fail to clarify what should f o l l o w from this fact. . . . The ambiguity created by the a c c o r d s ' silence on arms has m u d d i e d — a n d b l o o d i e d — t h e p e a c e process." 3 7 A year later, on March 30, 1985, the F A R C announced that it would reorganize itself as a political party, the U n i ó n Patriótica (UP; Patriotic Union), marking the first time since its inception in the 1 9 6 0 s that this group w o u l d try its hand in the mainstream political s y s t e m . Yet in the years f o l l o w i n g the creation of the UP, over 1,000 of its m e m b e r s were assassinated (mostly by drug traffickers and paramilitary groups), including its presidential candidates in 1986 (Jaime Pardo Leal) and 1990 (Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa). (On May 24, 1999, Chief Prosecutor A l f o n s o G ó m e z charged paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño for masterminding the murder of Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, as well as the murder of 1990 M - 1 9 candidate Carlos Pizarro.) 3 8 In light of g r o w i n g attacks on the UP, the FARC gave up on the idea of political integration and instead r e n e w e d its effort to promote its armed struggle, leaving the orphaned U P to fend for itself. A 1986 letter that U P legislators sent to President Betancur describes the position that these political leaders found t h e m s e l v e s in:

Throughout the electoral campaign, detachments from the Armed Forces have attacked FARC camps, and, with the pretext of carrying out military campaigns, repress the peasant population in order to sow panic and threaten them if they vote for the Patriotic Union. Paramilitary groups, and even detachments from the Army and the police distribute propaganda, paint party slogans on walls, pass out bulletins and flyers, put up posters, and draw up false statements, among which they propagate the most infamous calumnies against the Patriotic Union. . . . These criminal actions are multiplied by the paramilitary groups that sow death and insecurity in the broad regions of influence of the Patriotic Union, including urban centers. . . . This is not a matter of occasional excesses on the part of the troops. These are truly plans prepared in advance and executed with care. 39

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In 1985 the t r u c e b r o k e r e d with the M - 1 9 also b r o k e d o w n as the g r o u p a c c u s e d the g o v e r n m e n t of failing to i m p l e m e n t the political ref o r m s that it c l a i m e d had been p r o m i s e d as part of the p e a c e a g r e e m e n t . Just three d a y s b e f o r e the M - 1 9 signed its August 1984 a c c o r d with the g o v e r n m e n t , f o r m e r c o n g r e s s m a n and M - 1 9 leader C a r l o s T o l e d o Plata w a s m u r d e r e d in the provincial oil town of B a r r a n c a b e r m e j a . To m a k e m a t t e r s w o r s e , in N o v e m b e r 1985 drug t r a f f i c k e r - f i n a n c e d paramilitary g r o u p s l a u n c h e d a g r e n a d e attack at a Cali restaurant, w h e r e along with s e v e r a l o t h e r s , M - 1 9 leader A n t o n i o N a v a r r o Wolff w a s s e r i o u s l y inj u r e d . T h e s e acts of violence m a d e the M - 1 9 rethink its a g r e e m e n t with the g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y since the g o v e r n m e n t n e v e r p r o d u c e d c o n v i n c i n g a n s w e r s as to w h o w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for these a c t i o n s . It w a s in this s a m e year that the M - 1 9 launched its disastrous attack on the Palace of Justice in B o g o t á .

The Barco, Gavina, and Samper Administrations:

1986-1998

As e x e m p l i f i e d by the failure of the UP, p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s brokered bet w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the F A R C d u r i n g the B e t a n c u r a d m i n i s t r a tion did not result in any lasting type of d e m o b i l i z a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s u b s e q u e n t C o l o m b i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s w o u l d have g r e a t e r s u c c e s s negotiating with the guerrillas, especially the s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n g r o u p s . In 1990, f o r e x a m p l e , the M - 1 9 , led by their c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r C a r l o s P i z a r r o , o n c e again e n t e r e d into n e g o t i a t i o n s with the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s time it was the B a r c o administration that a d o p t e d a m u c h less f l e x i b l e n e g o t i a t i n g strategy. S p e c i f i c a l l y , B a r c o p u s h e d f o r the g u e r r i l l a s ' e x p l i c i t d i s a r m a m e n t and r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n into the o r t h o d o x political s y s t e m in return f o r the g o v e r n m e n t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to negotiate with t h e m . T h i s s t r a t e g y w a s m a r k e d l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m B e t a n c u r ' s b r o a d e r - b a s e d , m o r e f l e x i b l e tactics, w h i c h included the n e g o t i a t i o n of structural issues such as land r e f o r m . Still reeling a f t e r their attack on the Palace of Justice f i v e years earlier, in M a r c h of 1990 the M - 1 9 signed an a g r e e m e n t that led to its dem o b i l i z a t i o n and incorporation into the political process. 4 0 A m o n t h later Pizarro, n o w the leader of an M - 1 9 that was recognized as a legal political party, A c c i ó n D e m o c r á t i c a M-19, w a s assassinated w h i l e a p a s s e n ger on an A v i a n c a airliner, a g r u e s o m e r e m i n d e r that p e a c e in C o l o m b i a w a s f a r f r o m consolidated e v e n though " p e a c e " had been negotiated. M a i n t a i n i n g the n a r r o w e r f o c u s of the Barco a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , which a b o v e all r e f u s e d to n e g o t i a t e the s o v e r e i g n right of t h e C o l o m b i a n

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g o v e r n m e n t to g o v e r n the country, the administration o f César Gaviria ( 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 4 ) s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s with the M A Q L and the EPL. Both groups participated in the Constituent A s s e m b l y that ultimately produced a n e w constitution in 1991. 4 1 Gaviria used the ass e m b l y as a "carrot" to e n t i c e the guerrilla g r o u p s to lay d o w n their arms and participate in this opportunity to construct a "new C o l o m b i a . " Gaviria also took the bold step o f inviting M - 1 9 presidential candidate A n t o n i o Navarro W o l f f ( W o l f f took o v e r the presidential candidacy after the assassination o f Pizarro and c a m e in third in the 1 9 9 0 e l e c t i o n ) to be his minister o f health. But w h i l e Gaviria w a s able to broker a deal with the E P L , the M A Q L , and the M - 1 9 , as w e l l as with a f e w other small guerrilla g r o u p s w h o a l s o took up his o f f e r , the F A R C and the E L N did not sign an agreement. Gaviria responded by stepping up military efforts to crush these "recalcitrant" guerrilla groups. W h i l e progress w a s m a d e during the Barco and Gaviria administrations to get the s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n g r o u p s to lay d o w n their arms, the t w o largest guerrilla g r o u p s — t h e F A R C and the E L N — d i d not f o l l o w such a path. T h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t did in fact c o n d u c t n e g o t i a tions with t h e s e g r o u p s in Caracas, V e n e z u e l a ( 1 9 9 0 ) , and T l a x c a l a , M e x i c o ( 1 9 9 1 ) . Yet these n e g o t i a t i o n s did not get very far due partly to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e m a n d that the guerrillas lay d o w n their arms before the talks b e g a n . T h e guerrillas in turn i n s i s t e d on security g u a r a n t e e s that the military f o u n d unacceptable. T h e F A R C and the E L N d e m a n d e d a broad a g e n d a ( e . g . , land reform, i n c o m e distribution, regional a u t o n o m y ) and the Gaviria administration, although it did c o n s i d e r this type of approach, b e g a n to s w i n g back to a narrower f o c u s first introduced by the B a r c o g o v e r n m e n t . T h e w i l l i n g n e s s of the guerrillas to negotiate w a s further undermined by the d i s m a l p e r f o r m a n c e o f the p o l i t i c a l parties f o r m e d by the e r s t w h i l e guerrillas in the current e l e c t i o n . A s Marc C h e r n i c k has p o i n t e d out, "the o u t c o m e o f the p e a c e initiatives o f the G a v i r i a administration [were]: partial peace a g r e e m e n t s , major constitutional reform, e x p a n d e d guerrilla activity, higher l e v e l s o f v i o l e n c e , and dirty war." 4 2 A m a z i n g l y , the Gaviria years are c o n s i d e r e d to be o n e o f the high points o f g o v e r n ment-guerrilla n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r the past t w o d e c a d e s . Gaviria e v e n t u ally called o f f the talks in 1992 and m o r e "normal" hostilities b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the guerrillas r e s u m e d and c o n t i n u e today. President Ernesto S a m p e r tried to r e v i v e the p e a c e efforts that were started by Betancur and c o n t i n u e d through the B a r c o and Gaviria years. Early into his term o f o f f i c e , he appointed former minister o f education

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C a r l o s H o l m e s T r u j i l l o as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r P e a c e a n d i n s t r u c t e d h i m to o p e n u p d i s c r e e t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the g u e r r i l l a s . T h e E L N a n d t h e E P L r e s p o n d e d p o s i t i v e l y to t h e s e f e e l e r s , but in M a y 1 9 9 5 t h e F A R C l a u n c h e d a c o u n t r y w i d e o f f e n s i v e that m a d e m a n y in t h e S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , the m i l i t a r y — b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e w a s n o u s e in p u r s u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a n y f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i v e p e a c e t a l k s d i e d w h e n the m i l i t a r y v e t o e d S a m p e r ' s plan to w i t h d r a w the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y f r o m t h e r e g i o n of L a U r i b e , the site w h e r e the s c h e d u l e d t a l k s w i t h t h e F A R C w e r e to t a k e p l a c e . T h i s is not to m e n t i o n the f a c t that S a m p e r ' s p r o f o u n d lack of c r e d i b i l i t y b e c a u s e of the d r u g i s s u e m a d e t h e g u e r r i l las e v e n m o r e r e l u c t a n t to n e g o t i a t e . I n s t e a d , they p r e f e r r e d to w a i t until S a m p e r ' s s u c c e s s o r w a s f i r m l y in p o w e r , as t h e y k n e w h e w o u l d m o s t likely h a v e the a u t h o r i t y to a c t u a l l y i m p l e m e n t a n y p o t e n t i a l s e t t l e m e n t . D u r i n g t h e s e s t a g e s of the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b a r e l y p a i d a n y a t t e n t i o n to the c o n f l i c t in C o l o m b i a . In t h e m i d d l e to late 1 9 8 0 s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s still b e g i n n i n g the A n d e a n s o u r c e c o u n t r y c o m p o n e n t of its w a r o n d r u g s . T h u s g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n t s in C o l o m b i a w e r e not s e e n as p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e y were m u c h w e a k e r than they are today. Moreover, during these years, g r o u p s l i k e t h e F A R C w e r e m u c h l e s s i n v o l v e d in t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d t r a f f i c k i n g of c o c a i n e a n d h e r o i n e a n d t h u s W a s h i n g t o n d i d not s e e t h e m as an e n e m y in t h e d r u g war. T h i s n e g l e c t , h o w e v e r , e v a p o r a t e d , as the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t n o w v i e w s the C o l o m b i a n g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n t s as o n e of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t p i e c e s of the c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s s t r u g g l e . A n d s i n c e t h e s e g r o u p s are c u r r e n t l y i n v o l v e d in p e a c e t a l k s w i t h t h e P a s t r a n a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s t a k e n a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d interest in t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s , w h i c h h a s i n c l u d e d v i s i t s to F A R C - c o n t r o l l e d a r e a s b y c o n g r e s s i o n a l delegations and secret talks between State Department and F A R C offic i a l s in C o s t a R i c a in late 1998.

Andrés Pastrana's Peace Efforts P r e s i d e n t - e l e c t A n d r é s P a s t r a n a ' s J u l y 1998 v i s i t to F A R C - c o n t r o l l e d territory to meet with Manuel M a r u l a n d a was received with great ent h u s i a s m in C o l o m b i a . 4 3 A f t e r y e a r s of d e l a y a n d f r u s t r a t i o n at t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , it w a s n o w w i d e l y b e l i e v e d that P a s t r a n a w a s t h e p e r s o n w h o could finally bring h o m e a peace agreement with the F A R C . A few m o n t h s a f t e r t h i s w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d v i s i t , the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t

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and the FARC entered into talks pertaining to the establishment of a liberated zone (or despeje) in a Switzerland-size area of south central Colombia that was one of the FARC's traditional strongholds (see M a p 3.1). On November 7, 1998, the Colombian government granted the FARC the despeje for a period of ninety days. This a g r e e m e n t extracted all Colombian military forces from the area, giving the FARC effective control; it has also allowed the FARC to set up a parallel local government, including its own judicial system and police force. Serious peace negotiations—the ostensible quid pro quo for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s enormous conc e s s i o n — b e g a n with the F A R C in the despeje in early January 1999. In what would turn out to be the first of countless insults and upstages, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda failed to show up to greet President Pastrana for the opening ceremony. Over the course of the next three years numerous peace dialogues were frozen and cease-fires were broken. A d d i n g insult to the P a s t r a n a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s already f a l t e r i n g p e a c e strategies, reports started e m a n a t i n g f r o m the despeje that the FARC was using the zone to cultivate coca and train troops, two things that were expressly f o r b i d d e n when the deal was negotiated. But while the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t and military were clearly f u r i o u s about the F A R C ' s apparent lack of faith at the peace talks, as time went by it bec a m e increasingly e v i d e n t that the C o l o m b i a n military could not take back the despeje even if it wanted to. Aware that its military could not defeat the F A R C militarily, it is not surprising that the C o l o m b i a n government has continuously extended the despeje's deadline for over three y e a r s without an end in sight. O n e e x t e n s i o n c a m e in D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 fifteen minutes before the agreement was to expire, indicating that President Pastrana had p r o f o u n d difficulties in j u s t i f y i n g another extension of the deadline with virtually no F A R C concessions as c o m p e n s a t i o n . 4 4 In early M a r c h 2001, s o m e thirty a m b a s s a d o r s f r o m a r o u n d the w o r l d traveled to the despeje to meet with the F A R C in h o p e s that the international p r e s e n c e w o u l d h e l p to j u m p - s t a r t the peace talks. It is likely that no s i g n i f i c a n t m o v e m e n t on the p e a c e f r o n t will be m a d e b e f o r e P a s t r a n a ' s successor is inaugurated in August 2002. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g of the g o v e r n m e n t - F A R C peace talks in 1998, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t m a d e a point of m a i n t a i n i n g d i s t a n c e f r o m the process, stating that it was a C o l o m b i a n issue and not one in which the U n i t e d States should get involved. U.S. o f f i c i a l s did discuss the p e a c e p r o c e s s with F A R C o f f i c i a l s d u r i n g secret talks in C o s t a Rica in Dec e m b e r 1998, but any d i a l o g u e quickly e n d e d a f t e r the F A R C killed three U.S. e n v i r o n m e n t a l activists in early 1999.

Caribbean Se

V E N E Z U E L A

Sincelejo FARC executes eight men and torches town

Proposed site of despeje. or "cleared-out zone," for the ELN rebel group

A'ouca

Government shelter houses 14- to 17-year-olds who saw front-line duty as members of the FARC.

Town where FARC ;; founder Manuel Marulanda grew up. j ^ '

fílw

Military base where Brazilian drug kingpin Luiz Fernando Da Costa was detained

Puerto Inirida

Birthplace of the FARC

1 PHtia \ ffijgr Site of peace negotiations between the FARC and the government

A zone in southern Colombia ceded to the FARC by the government

ADOR Quito

BRAZIL SAN ANDRES STATE Small island in Ihe Caribbean. The only one of Colombia s 32 stales where FARC guerrillas are not active

PERU

Amazon River

M a p 3.1

The FARC's

Despeje

Copyright 2 0 0 1 Houston Chronicle Publishing Company. Reprinted with permission. A l l rights reserved.

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While the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to m a k e h e a d w a y with the FARC have gone n o w h e r e , there have b e e n interesting d e v e l o p ments in the negotiations with the ELN. 4 5 This scenario is complicated, however, by the E L N ' s continued policy of e c o n o m i c terrorism and kidnapping as well as the g r u e s o m e reality that a peace deal b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the E L N will not necessarily prevent right-wing paramilitary groups f r o m continuing their all-out assault on the E L N . Over the past few years the E L N ' s pipeline b o m b i n g s have resulted in an average loss of U.S.$3 million per day and a drop in total annual production f r o m 2.2 to 1.9 million barrels. This is especially significant now that C o l o m b i a earns an estimated U.S.$3.7 billion f r o m oil exports each year, replacing c o f f e e as the c o u n t r y ' s leading source of f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e . C o l o m b i a is also c o n s i d e r e d to be a p r i m e location for increased oil exploration, as potential areas have not been analyzed for oil content due to the armed conflict. Not surprisingly, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t now c o n s i d e r s C o l o m b i a ' s oil to be a "strategic r e s o u r c e " and issues such as the E L N ' s oil-related violence are receiving increased attention in Washington. Many o b s e r v e r s attribute the E L N ' s o n g o i n g strategy of pipeline bombings to its long-standing policy of e c o n o m i c nationalism and antiA m e r i c a n i s m . Yet while the E L N ' s rhetoric has not noticeably c h a n g e d f r o m p r e v i o u s d e c a d e s , there are g r o w i n g indications that the g r o u p ' s actions m i g h t be as m u c h about p a v i n g the way to a peace s e t t l e m e n t with the g o v e r n m e n t as they are a s y m b o l of its hatred of f o r e i g n oil c o m p a n i e s . This shift in strategy is due in part to the series of military defeats that the E L N has suffered at the hands of the military, paramilitaries, and e v e n its current guerrilla rival the F A R C . T h e E L N is desperate: it n e e d s a p e a c e deal with the g o v e r n m e n t or it risks c o m p l e t e annihilation, most likely at the hands of paramilitary g r o u p s that have m o v e d into the E L N ' s strongholds in recent years. T h u s the E L N ' s recent increase in attacks can be seen as a sort of saber-rattling exercise intended to demonstrate to the g o v e r n m e n t that it is still a f o r m i d a b l e force that, like the FARC, should be respected at the n e g o t i a t i n g table. B o l s t e r i n g this v i e w is that in recent years the E L N has branched out f r o m oil pipeline attacks into operations that are m u c h m o r e difficult to j u s t i f y as p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c nationalism. D u r i n g the P a s t r a n a years, n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t and the E L N have b e e n c e n t e r e d a r o u n d the idea that the E L N w o u l d be g r a n t e d a despeje along the lines of that g r a n t e d the F A R C in 1998. In this case, the despeje n e g o t i a t e d was slated to be

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approximately 1,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of the U.S. state of Delaware. Colombian army and police forces were to be withdrawn, replaced with civic police forces organized by and under the control of local mayors. The ELN made repeated pledges that it would respect the jurisdiction of these civic forces during the initial ninemonth period that the despeje would be in operation. The ELN has also stated that it would use the despeje period to conduct its National Convention, at which various sectors of Colombian society would join in a dialogue with the ELN about the peace process. The E L N ' s end game was most likely to use the National Convention and concomitant peace talks in order to insert itself into the orthodox political system, along the lines of the M-19's political incorporation in the early 1990s. While it was clearly committed to going ahead with the agreement, in 2001 the Colombian government remained ambivalent about an ELN despeje. Most of this hesitation was fear that the area would become another "FARC-landia," the derisive term used to describe the reality in the FARC's despeje in south central Colombia. To ensure that there was no new "ELN-landia," the government has recruited a number of countries now named the "Group of Friends" (Spain, France, Norway, Switzerland, and Cuba) to be part of a verification commission that would monitor activities inside the ELN's zone. There has been a mixed response f r o m local residents who live inside the proposed despeje. Some have voiced support for the initiative, as they believe that the despeje would provide the necessary jump-start to a long-delayed peace process. On the other hand, many residents have felt abandoned by Bogotá, as if their welfare is being negotiated away in a feeble attempt to broker peace with a terrorist organization. Yet no matter how local sentiment leans, it is clear that the proposed despeje is still far from reality. For example, in March 2001 the ELN suspended talks with the government via an e-mail message to the government's High Commissioner for Peace; most believe this was due to the E L N ' s visceral dislike of U.S.-sponsored illicit crop fumigation efforts in areas where it operates. Further complicating this matter is that the paramilitary groups active in the region have responded to the potential ELN despeje with brutal force, stating that they would never recognize its "sovereignty." To the paramilitaries, the new despeje would be nothing more than a sanctuary that the guerrillas could use to bolster their fighting capability. Indeed, when the idea of another despeje was first announced in 2000, paramilitary forces responded by going on a drunken rampage, killing forty-five f a r m e r s — m a n y were

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h a c k e d to d e a t h a n d s o m e w e r e b e h e a d e d . In A p r i l 2 0 0 1 , in an a r e a loc a t e d j u s t o u t s i d e t h e p r o p o s e d despeje, 8 0 0 p a r a m i l i t a r y f i g h t e r s attacked ELN positions, preventing some E L N c o m m a n d e r s from attendi n g p e a c e t a l k s w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e E L N is e n g a g e d in a c r i t i c a l e p i s o d e in its e v o l u t i o n . It is j u g g l i n g its p e a c e t a l k s w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t w i t h t h e t h r e a t of a n n i h i l a t i o n f r o m the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , all t h e w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g to m a i n t a i n its c l a i m t h a t it is f i g h t i n g f o r C o l o m b i a ' s e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l soul a g a i n s t i m perialist foreign multinational c o m p a n i e s and their domestic collaborat o r s . T h e r e r e m a i n s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y that the E L N will n o t e x i s t in a f e w y e a r s , e i t h e r d u e to a s u c c e s s f u l p e a c e a g r e e m e n t that p r o m o t e s its i n s e r t i o n i n t o c i v i l s o c i e t y o r d u e to m i l i t a r y d e f e a t b y t h e p a r a m i l i t a r i e s . W h i l e at t h i s p o i n t it is i m p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t w i t h a n y c e r t a i n t y the E L N ' s f u t u r e , what is m o r e certain is that the E L N ' s c o n t i n u e d policy of e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m of p i p e l i n e a t t a c k s , e x t o r t i o n , a n d k i d n a p p i n g s w i l l e n s u r e w i d e s p r e a d e c o n o m i c d i s r u p t i o n to C o l o m b i a ' s e c o n o m y f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . O n S e p t e m b e r 10, 2 0 0 1 , the E L N a n n o u n c e d that it w a s p u l l i n g o u t of p e a c e t a l k s w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t a n d a n y p o t e n t i a l for a liberated zone or peace agreement during Andrés Pastrana's term in o f f i c e w a s e f f e c t i v e l y e n d e d . 4 6

THE ROOTS OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS T h e c o c a i n e - e x p o r t i n g b u s i n e s s f i r s t b e g a n in a n y s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m in C o l o m b i a in t h e 1970s. 4 ^ B u t d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g at t h i s t i m e w a s n o t the s o p h i s t i c a t e d , m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t i t y that it h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as s i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . R a t h e r , i n c i p i e n t c o c a i n e t r a f f i c k i n g c o n s i s t e d of o n l y a few

individuals

with

rudimentary

technology,

with

many

of

the

m a k e s h i f t l a b o r a t o r i e s l o c a t e d in p r i v a t e h o m e s . R e n s s e l a e r L e e a n d Patrick C l a w s o n write: Human couriers—"mules"—smuggled small quantities of cocaine—a few grams or a few pounds in luggage as personal effects. Trafficking organizations typically were simple, comprised of a Colombian buyer, a smuggler-courier, and a point of contact in the United States who received the merchandise and sold it to a U.S. wholesaler. Trafficking entrepreneurs sometimes acted as their own mules. At one time most pioneers of the Colombian cocaine industry—Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Carlos Lehder, the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers—personally carried small amounts of cocaine to the United States. 48

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A s the p r o f i t s f r o m the c o c a i n e t r a d e c o n t i n u e d to f l o w i n t o t h e i r p o c k ets, the drug cartels d i s c a r d e d the m u l e system and a d o p t e d a m u c h m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d s t r a t e g y that u t i l i z e d m a r i t i m e f l e e t s o r a i r c r a f t that c o u l d c a r r y l o a d s of 4 0 0 to 1 , 0 0 0 k i l o g r a m s of c o c a i n e . 4 9 In 1976, f o r m e r c a r t h i e f C a r l o s L e h d e r b e c a m e the first C o l o m b i a n to i m p l e m e n t s u c h a strategy. H e c a r r i e d 5 5 0 p o u n d s of c o c a i n e o n his first s m u g g l i n g f l i g h t into the U n i t e d S t a t e s , e a r n i n g h i m a U . S . $ 1 m i l l i o n p r o f i t . 5 0 A m a z i n g l y , L e h d e r s t a r t e d u s i n g his d r u g p r o f i t s to l a u n c h his o w n political m o v e m e n t , called the M o v i m i e n t o Latino Nacional ( M L N ; Nat i o n a l L a t i n o M o v e m e n t ) . It w a s a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t , a n t i - Z i o n i s t , a n d a b o v e all, a n t i - e x t r a d i t i o n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , in the 1986 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c tion the M L N e n d o r s e d the l e f t i s t , f o r m e r g u e r r i l l a U P party. 5 1 L e h d e r ' s i n g e n i o u s d r u g - t r a f f i c k i n g s t r a t e g y c a u s e d U.S. a t t o r n e y a n d c h i e f p r o s e c u t o r R o b e r t M e r k l e to c o m m e n t : " L e h d e r w a s to c o c a i n e t r a f f i c k i n g w h a t H e n r y F o r d w a s to a u t o m o b i l e s . " 5 2 L e h d e r w a s c a p t u r e d n e a r M e d e l l i n in 1987 a n d e x t r a d i t e d to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h e r e he is s e r v ing a l i f e s e n t e n c e p l u s 135 y e a r s . 5 3 Q u i c k l y , the t w o m a j o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n v o l v e d in the c o c a i n e t r a d e — t h e Cali and M e d e l l i n c a r t e l s — b e c a m e h o u s e h o l d n a m e s in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , as t h e s e t w o g r o u p s w e r e blamed for the rapidly g r o w i n g and seemingly out-of-control cocaine (or " c r a c k " ) e p i d e m i c in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 5 4 S u c h a n e x t e n s i v e a n d l a r g e - s c a l e " b u s i n e s s " like t h e d r u g t r a d e c o u l d n e v e r stay out of sight f o r e v e r . A clash b e t w e e n the c a r t e l s a n d the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s i n e v i t a b l e , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e it i n v o l v e d t h e i s s u e of e x t r a d i t i o n to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A s the 1 9 8 0 s w o r e o n , t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t t i r e d of t h e c a r t e l s ' a b i l i t y to act w i t h v i r t u a l i m p u n i t y a n d b e g a n t o c r a c k d o w n o n t h e i r illicit a c t i v i t i e s . T h e r e s p o n s e f r o m the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l w a s p r e d i c t a b l e : v i o l e n c e . 5 5 D u r i n g t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d e a r l y 1990s, c l o s e to 5 0 0 p o l i c e m e n w e r e k i l l e d b y d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s ; b e t w e e n 1984 a n d 1 9 9 0 a m i n i s t e r of j u s t i c e , the d i r e c t o r of t h e n e w s p a p e r El Espectador, a s u p r e m e c o u r t j u s t i c e , a l e a d e r of t h e UP, a g o v e r n o r of the d e p a r t m e n t of A n t i o q u i a , a n a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , a n d t h e l e a d i n g L i b e r a l P a r t y p r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e in 1 9 9 0 w e r e all a s s a s s i nated by the cartels.56 V i o l e n c e t o o k off b e g i n n i n g in 1989 w h e n the M e d e l l i n " E x t r a d i t a b l e s " — a n a m e they a s s u m e d to signal their opposition to extradition to the U n i t e d S t a t e s — d e c l a r e d " a b s o l u t e a n d total w a r " a g a i n s t the g o v e r n m e n t . 5 7 N o w the c a r t e l s w o u l d e n a c t v i o l e n c e t h r o u g h o u t C o l o m b i a ' s u r b a n areas, best seen b y their i n d i s c r i m i n a t e car b o m b o p e r a t i o n s (forty b e t w e e n 1989 and 1993) that left o v e r 5 0 0 civilians d e a d . 5 8 T h e M e d e l l i n

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cartel's P a b l o E s c o b a r also w e n t a f t e r s o m e of C o l o m b i a ' s most p r o m i nent citizens, k i d n a p p i n g D i a n a Turbay, a d a u g h t e r of the f o r m e r president. and F r a n c i s c o Santos, n e w s editor of the B o g o t á daily El Tiempo?^ T h e cartels and related p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s also targeted the leftist political g r o u p s , killing a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,000 m e m b e r s of the UP. T h e c a r t e l s ' v i o l e n c e e x t e n d e d b e y o n d the g o v e r n m e n t and p r o m i nent civilians: the guerrillas also b e c a m e targets of the t r a f f i c k e r s . T h e t r a f f i c k e r s ' p u r c h a s e of rural land with their p r o f i t s put t h e m into c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the m a n y i n s u r g e n t g r o u p s w h o had r o a m e d in t h e s e areas f o r d e c a d e s . T h e drug cartels r e s p o n d e d by f o r m i n g p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s in o r d e r to c o m b a t the g u e r r i l l a s and their c i v i l i a n s y m p a t h i z ers. By m i d - 1 9 8 9 , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 11,000 p a r a m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d o s were o p e r a t i n g in C o l o m b i a , most u n d e r the control of the M e d e l l i n cartel. 6 0 In an e x a m p l e of its bold tactics, the M e d e l l i n cartel also a t t e m p t e d to e n t e r the political a r e n a . In 1982, P a b l o E s c o b a r w a s e l e c t e d to the C o l o m b i a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s as the Liberal Party alternate f r o m the d e p a r t m e n t of A n t i o q u i a . In 1986, C a r l o s L e h d e r ran u n s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r the S e n a t e e v e n t h o u g h he w a s c o n s i d e r e d a f u g i t i v e . F u r t h e r m o r e , in his t r a d e m a r k R o b i n H o o d f a s h i o n . E s c o b a r c o u r t e d M e d e l l i n ' s large d i s f r a n c h i s e d p o p u l a t i o n by b u i l d i n g t h e m h o u s e s and s o c c e r fields, as well as p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s to electricity and water. h l Not surprisingly, this largess e a r n e d E s c o b a r strong support within these poor c o m m u n i t i e s .

Negotiations with the Medellin Cartel At o n e point in the early 1980s it l o o k e d as t h o u g h the B e t a n c u r administration w a s on the verge of striking a deal with the t r a f f i c k e r s . Foll o w i n g the 1984 a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Justice M i n i s t e r Lara Bonilla, the g o v e r n m e n t d e c l a r e d a state of e m e r g e n c y a n d b e g a n to go a f t e r the cartel, seizing assets and d e c l a r i n g that military (not civilian) c o u r t s w o u l d try s u s p e c t e d t r a f f i c k e r s . T h e s e m o v e s f r i g h t e n e d the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l ' s leaders, w h o a b o v e all else f e a r e d extradition to the U n i t e d States. T h e y thus p r e s e n t e d the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t with a plan that, in return f o r their r e m o v a l f r o m the c o c a i n e b u s i n e s s , w o u l d h a v e essentially granted t h e m the s a m e sort of a m n e s t y that w a s b e i n g o f f e r e d to the guerrillas. W h i l e this quid p r o q u o m i g h t h a v e b e e n the one true o p p o r t u n i t y to d o s o m e t h i n g lasting about t h e d r u g - t r a f f i c k i n g p r o b l e m , it w a s f i r m l y r e j e c t e d by t h e C o l o m b i a n political e s t a b l i s h m e n t , w h o v i e w e d it as a thinly d i s g u i s e d f o r m of c a p i t u l a t i o n to c o m m o n c r i m i n a l s . O n July 19, 1984, P r e s i d e n t B e t a n c u r issued a s t a t e m e n t s t a t i n g : " T h e r e h a s not

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been, there is not now, nor will there be any kind of understanding between the government and signers o f the memorandum—drug trafficke r s . " T h e flirtation was over and the Medellin cartel continued its involvement in the drug-trafficking business. 6 2 Several years later, following the August 18, 1989, assassination of Liberal Party presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, one of three presidential candidates murdered before the 1990 presidential election, the Barco administration declared its own war on the Medellin cartel. Negotiations with the cartels had been attempted throughout the 1980s without any lasting result; the government felt it had no choice but to pursue a more aggressive strategy. Spurred on by the United States, the Colombian government approved an emergency law that now allowed Colombians to be extradited to the United States, resulting in the extradition of more than twenty drug traffickers. 6 3 The Barco administration set up a special counternarcotics unit within the National Police headed by General Rosso José Serrano and supported by British and U.S. intelligence services. Serrano's unit targeted the drug traffickers' pocketbooks by confiscating their assets, such as property, weapons, and bank accounts. After a while, however, with all o f the violence that erupted following B a r c o ' s hard-line stance toward the cartels, the Colombian public began to yearn for a return to negotiations, motivated mainly by the fear and disgust of the levels of violence unleashed by the cartels against the Colombian government and society. S o even though newly elected president César Gaviria had ruled out negotiations during his campaign, once in office he quickly reversed his stance and offered to talk with the cartels. 6 4 Gaviria initiated a "surrender p o l i c y " whereby those drug traffickers who surrendered to government officials were assured that they would receive shortened sentences and not be extradited. 6 5 T h i s new policy at first proved e f f e c t i v e , as it resulted in the surrender o f many of the Medellin cartel's top leaders, including Pablo Escobar, who "surrendered" in June 1 9 9 1 . 6 6 Yet after revelations about the plush conditions o f the kingpins' imprisonment b e c a m e public, there was growing pressure to take a more militant line. 6 7 This view was given even greater weight when in July 1992 Pablo Escobar and a dozen other prisoners bribed their guards and walked out o f their prison, where the bathtubs were reportedly made of gold and Escobar was able to handpick his guards, an act that no doubt embarrassed Gaviria, made a mockery of his appeasement strategy, and infuriated the U.S. government. Gaviria responded by c r a c k i n g down hard, creating an elite antidrug force called the Bloque de Búsqueda. After seventeen months o f

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s e a r c h i n g , C o l o m b i a n o f f i c i a l s i n t e r c e p t e d a c e l l u l a r p h o n e call o n D e c e m b e r 2, 1993, that E s c o b a r h a d m a d e to his son, e n a b l i n g the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s to t r a c k h i m to a M e d e l l i n r o o f t o p , w h e r e he w a s t h e n k i l l e d . 6 8 W h i l e it a c h i e v e d t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s , G a v i r i a ' s s t r a t e g y of a p p e a s e m e n t h a d c o s t s . In o r d e r to get at the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l , G a v i r i a a n d his c h i e f a n t i d r u g o f f i c i a l , G e n e r a l V a r g a s S i l v a , r e l i e d u p o n t h e h e l p of t h e C a l i k i n g p i n s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . A n d w h i l e this m i g h t h a v e b e e n vital f o r the e f forts a g a i n s t the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l , m a n y b e l i e v e that G a v i r i a in r e t u r n did not s e r i o u s l y p r o s e c u t e the C a l i c a r t e l . 6 9 T h u s , o n c e the M e d e l l i n cartel h a d b e e n d i s m a n t l e d a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s b e g a n to f o c u s o n the C a l i c a r t e l , W a s h i n g t o n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the G a v i r i a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n q u i c k l y s o u r e d . Ironically, U.S. g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s initially g r e e t e d the e l e c t i o n of E r n e s t o S a m p e r w i t h e n t h u s i a s m , as t h e y t h o u g h t h e w o u l d be m o r e e f f e c t i v e t h a n G a v i r i a in d e a l i n g w i t h the Cali c a r t e l ' s l e a d e r s . G a v i r i a ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s did s e r v e to e v e n t u a l l y r e d u c e the level of vio l e n c e in C o l o m b i a , but t h e y did little to m o l l i f y the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o n c e r n s a b o u t o v e r a l l d r u g p r o d u c t i o n a n d e x p o r t s to the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s d i s c o r d c l e a r l y e x e m p l i f i e s h o w t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t (reducing violence through negotiations with the cartels) w e r e not t h e s a m e as, a n d at t i m e s c o n f l i c t e d w i t h , t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s ) . T h i s i s s u e will be d i s c u s s e d in d e t a i l , e s p e c i a l l y the c a s e of t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s a c t i o n s t o w a r d the C a l i c a r t e l , in C h a p t e r s 4 a n d 5.

The Cali

Cartel

T h e v a c u u m in t h e d r u g t r a d e c r e a t e d b y the g r a d u a l d i s m a n t l i n g of t h e M e d e l l i n c a r t e l , w h i c h r a p i d l y e x p a n d e d f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h of P a b l o E s c o b a r at t h e h a n d s of the B l o q u e d e B u s q u e d a , w a s q u i c k l y f i l l e d by a n i n c r e a s e in a c t i v i t y f r o m d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s o p e r a t i n g in a n d a r o u n d the s o u t h e r n p r o v i n c i a l city of C a l i . T h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d b u s i n e s s s t r u c t u r e of t h e C a l i c a r t e l m e a n t that t h e i r b r a n d of d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g w a s m o r e d i s p e r s e d a n d t h e r e f o r e m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c i a l s to m o n i t o r . A c c o r d i n g to R o b e r t B u c k m a n , t h e C a l i c a r t e l c a n b e s t b e e n s e e n as a f r a n c h i s e o p e r a t i o n t h a t o f f e r s its s e r v i c e s to t h e i n d e p e n d e n t groups, providing logistical support and protection f r o m the Medellin c a r t e l in r e t u r n f o r a s h a r e of the p r o f i t s . 7 0 T h i s g r o u p of y o u n g c r i m i n a l s , led b y d r u g k i n g p i n s s u c h as M i g u e l a n d G i l b e r t o R o d r i g u e z O r e j u e l a a n d J o s é R o d r i g u e z L o n d o n o , w a s not n e a r l y as f l a m b o y a n t o r v i o l e n t as its c o u n t e r p a r t f r o m M e d e l l i n a n d

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w a s g e n e r a l l y k n o w n t o p r e f e r to i n f l u e n c e p o l i t i c i a n s t h r o u g h b r i b e s r a t h e r t h a n b o m b s . It is e s t i m a t e d that o n e of the C a l i c a r t e l ' s l e a d e r s , M i g u e l R o d r i g u e z O r e j u e l a , s p e n t s e v e r a l b i l l i o n s of the c a r t e l ' s a n n u a l income bribing judges, police officers, politicians, and other governm e n t o f f i c i a l s . O n e e x a m p l e in p a r t i c u l a r r e v e a l s the d i s t i n c t a p p r o a c h e s of the M e d e l l i n a n d C a l i c a r t e l s . M e d e l l i n ' s P a b l o E s c o b a r o f f e r e d a r e w a r d of U . S . $ 4 , 0 0 0 f o r e a c h p o l i c e o f f i c e r slain: 4 0 0 o f f i c e r s w e r e m u r d e r e d w h i l e t h e r e w a r d w a s in e f f e c t . T h e C a l i c a r t e l , in c o n t r a s t , a p p a r e n t l y p r o v i d e d f u n d s f o r p o l i c e p r e c i n c t s t a t i o n s to b e b u i l t in t h e city in an e f f o r t to c o m b a t c o m m o n c r i m e . 7 1 T h e Cali c a r t e l a l s o utilized f e w e r p e o p l e — a b o u t 5 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n n e l in 1991. c o m p a r e d to 7 0 , 0 0 0 f o r the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l at its a p e x . 7 2 T h e C a l i c a r t e l ' s k i n g p i n s — i n p a r t i c u l a r the R o d r i g u e z O r e j u e l a b r o t h e r s , J o s é S a n t a c r u z L o n d o i i o . a n d " P a c h o " H e r r e r a — h a v e been lab e l e d the " w o r l d ' s m o s t s u c c e s s f u l b u s i n e s s m e n . " c o l l e c t i v e l y r e a p i n g h i g h e r a n n u a l p r o f i t s t h a n B o e i n g or P e p s i - C o l a . 7 1 T h r o u g h a v e r y e f fective c o c a i n e distribution n e t w o r k and w i d e s p r e a d i n f l u e n c e within the C o l o m b i a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , the Cali cartel b e c a m e , in the w o r d s of D E A c h i e f D o n n i e M a r s h a l l , " t h e m o b l e a d e r s of t h e ' 9 0 s . H o w e v e r , they were far wealthier, far m o r e dangerous, far m o r e influential, and h a d a m u c h m o r e d e v a s t a t i n g i m p a c t on the d a y - t o - d a y lives of the citi z e n s of o u r c o u n t r y than e i t h e r their d o m e s t i c p r e d e c e s s o r s or the c r i m e f a m i l i e s f r o m M e d e l l i n . " O n J u l y 9, 1997, M a r s h a l l r e f l e c t e d : M i g u e l O r e j u e l a and his c o n f e d e r a t e s set up an e x t r e m e l y well discip l i n e d s y s t e m of c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z a t i o n that s p a n n e d and i n s u l a t e d e v e r y f a c e t of their d r u g b u s i n e s s . T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s t e n t a c l e s r e a c h e d in to the cities and t o w n s of the United S t a t e s t h r o u g h their U . S . - b a s e d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e or their s u r r o g a t e s w h o sold c r a c k c o c a i n e on the streets of l o c a t i o n s as v a r i e d as C h i c a g o . Illinois and R o c k y Mount, North Carolina.74

C o c a i n e s e i z u r e s l i n k e d to t h e C a l i c a r t e l i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a n d the m a n n e r in w h i c h the d r u g s w e r e b e i n g s m u g g l e d r e f l e c t e d the c a r t e l ' s " c r e a t i v e " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( s e e T a b l e 3.1). T h e C a l i c a r t e l ' s rise to p r o m i n e n c e — a n d s u b s e q u e n t p e r s e c u t i o n f r o m t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t — c o i n c i d e d with the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of E r n e s t o S a m p e r , w h o h i m s e l f w a s a c c u s e d of k n o w i n g t h a t m o n e y f r o m t h e c a r t e l h a d e n t e r e d h i s c a m p a i g n . B u t e v e n if t h e C a l i c a r t e l w a s less v i o l e n t t h a n its c o u n t e r p a r t in M e d e l l i n , the U n i t e d S t a t e s still w a n t e d it d e s t r o y e d . To this e n d , the U n i t e d States p r e s s u r e d the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o a r r e s t t h e C a l i k i n g p i n s a n d e x t r a d i t e t h e m to t h e

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Table 3.1 Major Worldwide Cocaine Seizures Linked to the Cali Cartel

Date

A u g u s t 199I April 1992 J u l y 1992 F e b r u a r y 1993 O c t o b e r 1993 N o v e m b e r 1993 M a r c h 1994 June 1994 A u g u s t 1994

Location

United States United States Panama Russia Mexico Mexico Italy Mexico Colombia

Amount (metric tons)

12.2 6.7 5.4 1.1

8.0 6.8 5.5 4.0 5.6

Concealment

Method

Concrete fence posts Frozen broccoli C e r a m i c tiles Canned meat False wall of vessel Open marine cargo S h i p m e n t of s h o e s F a l s e w a l l of v e s s e l C o c a i n e storage sites

Simire: U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e . " T h e C a l i C a r t e l : T h e N e w K i n g s o f C o c a i n e , " D E A D r u g I n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t . N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 4 , p. 7.

United States for prosecution. Furthermore, the Cali cartel's less violent strategy had its limits, reflected in its brutal response to the notion that its m e m b e r s might be extradited to the United States. Like the Medellin " E x t r a d i t a b l e s " f r o m 1988 to 1991, the Cali cartel created its own brand of " E x t r a d i t a b l e s " and m a d e it painfully clear that it too would resist extradition at all costs. In one potentially grues o m e episode in N o v e m b e r 4, 1996, a f e w days b e f o r e the C o l o m b i a n S e n a t e was s c h e d u l e d to d e b a t e the issue of e x t r a d i t i o n , a van loaded with 360 p o u n d s of explosives was discovered in front of an industrial plant owned by a senator who was in f a v o r of extradition. M a n y believe that the R o d r i g u e z O r e j u e l a b r o t h e r s s p e a r h e a d e d this action f r o m within their prison cells. Unlike the drug w a r ' s current f o c u s on crop eradication, U.S. antidrug policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s was formulated around the "kingpin strategy." As the name suggests, the strategy involved pursuing the leaders of the m a j o r drug-trafficking cartels: Medellin and Cali. The hope was that by capturing the kingpins, a leadership and logistical vacu u m would f o r m , forcing the cartels to implode. 7 5 This did not happen. Instead of reducing the a m o u n t of cocaine and heroine p r o d u c e d in Colombia, the kingpin strategy actually caused the production to shift to small- and medium-size traffickers. This in turn has " a t o m i z e d " drug production and trafficking: drug-processing labs and s h i p m e n t s are now smaller, more dispersed, and much more difficult to locate and interdict. 7 6 Another significant transformation in the nature of the drug war was the massive shift of c o c a cultivation f r o m Bolivia and Peru to Colombia (see Figure 3.1). During the 1980s and through the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , most of

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Figure 3.1

Coca Cultivation in the Andes

Bolivia Peru Cnlonilm

Sowrc:

U . S . D e p u r i m e l i ! of S i a l e . B u r e a u I'm l i i l e i n a l M n . i l \ . : i . ,>li. - a n d L.aw

Enforcement. 2000.

the c o c a w a s c u l t i v a t e d in B o l i v i a a n d P e r u a n d t h e n t r a n s p o r t e d i n t o Colombia for processing. Under pressure from Washington, governm e n t s in B o l i v i a a n d Peru a d o p t e d r i g o r o u s p r o g r a m s of c r o p f u m i g a tion a n d s u b s t i t u t i o n that d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d the a m o u n t of c o c a u n d e r c u l t i v a t i o n . Yet C o l o m b i a n d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s c o m p e n s a t e d f o r t h e d r o p in the s u p p l y of c o c a f r o m B o l i v i a a n d Peru by i n c r e a s i n g c o c a c u l t i v a t i o n in C o l o m b i a ( s e e T a b l e 3 . 2 ) . T h e e x p l o s i o n of c o c a c u l t i v a t i o n in C o l o m b i a h a s s e r v e d to f u e l t h e a r m e d c o n f l i c t , as t h e m a i n a r e a s o f c u l t i v a t i o n — e s p e c i a l l y in t h e s o u t h e r n d e p a r t m e n t of P u t u m a y o — a r e l o c a t e d in t r a d i t i o n a l g u e r r i l l a a r e a s . M o r e o v e r , p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s h a v e i n c r e a s e d t h e i r a c t i v i t y in t h e s e r e g i o n s , such as t a x i n g c o c a f a r m ers, as they t o o are e a g e r to c a p i t a l i z e on the t r e m e n d o u s r e v e n u e s g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t in the d r u g trade.

THE ROOTS OF THE PARAMILITARIES A s the F A R C , t h e E L N , a n d o t h e r g u e r r i l l a g r o u p s g a i n e d s t r e n g t h in rural C o l o m b i a in the 1960s a n d 1970s, t h e y b e g a n to d e m a n d " r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a x e s " f r o m l a n d o w n e r s w h o lived in these a r e a s in o r d e r to c o n t i n u e f u n d i n g t h e i r i n s u r g e n t s . T h i s p r a c t i c e c o n t i n u e d m o r e o r less u n a b a t e d t h r o u g h t h e 1 9 8 0 s , but in s o m e c a s e s l a n d o w n e r s o r p e a s a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s c r e a t e d s e l f - d e f e n s e g r o u p s in an a t t e m p t to c o u n t e r t h e

85

The Roots of Violence in Colombia Table 3.2

Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Colombia (1994-2000, hectares) Total Coca Cultivated

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

44.700 50,900 67.200 79,500 101.800 122.500 137,600

Coca Sprayed

Coca Killed

3.696 24.046 19.306 41,847 N/A 42.000 61.000

4,910 8,750 5.600 19.265 N/A N/A N/A

Sonne: U.S. Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. 2000.

influence of the guerrillas. This brand of paramilitary group was initially institutionalized by the C o l o m b i a n state in the 1960s. 7 7 T h e s e militias received official g o v e r n m e n t sanction and o f t e n military assistance. 7 8 W h i l e these p e a s a n t s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e s c o m p o s e o n e type of paramilitary g r o u p , the last d e c a d e has seen the rise of o t h e r t y p e s of paramilitary g r o u p s that are m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l and influential. T h e s e new f o r m s of p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s w e r e born out of d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s ' resistance to guerrilla h a r a s s m e n t ; today they are n o longer directly related to the d r u g cartels, but instead consist of q u a s i - a u t o n o m o u s , d r u g reve n u e - s u p p o r t e d g r o u p s c o m m i t t e d to c l e a r i n g the C o l o m b i a n c o u n t r y side of guerrilla i n f l u e n c e . A s d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g — e s p e c i a l l y in c o c a i n e — b r o u g h t i m m e n s e p r o f its to C o l o m b i a in the 1980s, m a n y i n v o l v e d in the d r u g b u s i n e s s b e g a n b u y i n g up land in rural areas. In fact, m a n y l e g i t i m a t e l a n d o w n e r s w e r e m o r e than h a p p y to sell their land a f t e r so m a n y y e a r s of h a r a s s m e n t by the guerrillas. It is e s t i m a t e d that 5 - 6 million h e c t a r e s of land c h a n g e d h a n d s b e t w e e n rural l a n d o w n e r s and d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s in the 1980s and early 1990s. 7 9 A n d since these n e w " n a r c o - l a n d o w n e r s " had the m o n e y to b u y s o p h i s t i c a t e d w e a p o n r y , they w e r e o f t e n r e l u c t a n t to c o n t i n u e p a y i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a x e s to the guerrillas. C o n s e q u e n t l y , w a r s e r u p t e d w h e n l a n d o w n e r s b e g a n r e c r u i t i n g , e q u i p p i n g , a n d t r a i n i n g their o w n local a r m i e s (i.e., p a r a m i l i t a r i e s ) and used t h e m to rid the areas of guerrilla i n f l u e n c e . Sewall M e n z e l writes: A s fate w o u l d have it, the trafficker landowners, finding t h e m s e l v e s to be the v i c t i m s o f exorbitant guerrilla tax increases, struck back. Fortified with considerable m o n e y , w e a p o n s and British and Israeli m e r c e n a r i e s to

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Driven by Drugs train them, the traffickers formed s e l f - d e f e n s e groups, w h i c h , in time, were converted into the paramilitary death squads similar to those of M A S . T h e s e groups u n m e r c i f u l l y hunted d o w n the F A R C guerrillas, s y m p a t h i z e r s , and e v e n c a m p e s i n o peasant organizations and union leaders l o b b y i n g for land reform and higher w a g e s . . . . This left the majority of the population in the region in relative peace without having to pay any taxes at all. A g a i n , what the army and p o l i c e could not do, the narcotrafficker-sponsored, paramilitary sicarios |hired assassins] did. s ( )

T h e most notorious of these first paramilitary g r o u p s was called Muerte a Secuestradores ( M A S ; Death to Kidnappers). X 1 It was f o u n d e d on D e c e m b e r 2, 1981, by the Medellin cartel in response to the M - 1 9 ' s k i d n a p p i n g of Martha Nieves O c h o a , w h o s e brother Jorge O c h o a was a cartel member. In the weeks f o l l o w i n g the kidnapping, M A S c o n d u c t e d a brutal campaign against the M-19, which resulted in the deaths of several guerrillas and the release of M a r t h a Nieves O c h o a . M A S quickly succeeded in d e c i m a t i n g the M - 1 9 ' s entire M e d e l l i n - b a s e d urban unit, which not surprisingly resulted in the M - 1 9 ' s decision to no longer target drug traffickers or their families for kidnappings. M o r e relevant to c o n t e m p o r a r y issues in C o l o m b i a is that, e v e n after it had exacted revenge against the M - 1 9 , M A S stayed in business and c o n t i n u e d its c a m p a i g n of terror, over the years e x p a n d i n g its inf l u e n c e and t r a n s f o r m i n g itself into what are now called p a r a m i l i t a r y groups. A m e r i c a s Watch has written: "In the Middle M a g d a l e n a region, w h e r e people with land or businesses faced increased d e m a n d s f r o m socalled ' w a r taxes,' supplies, and f o o d f r o m the FARC, and were plagued by kidnapping for ransom, the M A S model represented a violent, yet effective m e a n s for fighting back." 8 2 It has not a l w a y s b e e n just the narcotics t r a f f i c k e r s w h o h a v e utilized p a r a m i l i t a r y groups in C o l o m b i a . T h e l a n d o w n e r s w h o cultivate legitimate crops or herd cattle have also relied upon paramilitary groups for e c o n o m i c ends, expelling c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m areas where l a n d o w n ers w o u l d like to graze cattle or e x p a n d crop plantation, o f t e n c a u s i n g incredible disruption to the targeted rural c o m m u n i t i e s . It is e s t i m a t e d that over the past several years, c l o s e to 1 million C o l o m b i a n s have been displaced internally, with m a n y of the more recent cases being directly linked to paramilitary activities. T h e s e private paramilitary groups often e n j o y e d tacit or overt support f r o m the C o l o m b i a n military, since the latter preferred to have the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s against the guerrillas (and their

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suspected civilian sympathizers) and thus take the blame for committing human rights abuses. 8 3 For example, in 1998 local residents in the oilproducing city of Barrancabermeja complained bitterly that the military never hindered the actions of the paramilitary groups, as evidenced by the fact that the paramilitaries were rarely stopped at military checkpoints. 8 4 At the time, many believed that without support from the Colombian military, the paramilitaries would not have been nearly so effective. 8 5 The result of the rise of this type of paramilitary group has meant that many previously guerrilla-ruled areas have become safe for ranching and other economic activities, but remain deadly for anyone suspected of having connections to or sympathies for the guerrillas.

CURRENT PARAMILITARY-GUERRILLA DYNAMICS In recent years the paramilitaries have aggressively increased their presence in the armed conflict, seeking to eliminate the guerrillas' hegemony by terrorizing their social base within the civilian population. No longer content to sit idle while the guerrillas roam with impunity, the paramilitaries have enacted a brutal strategy of killing anyone who is even remotely linked—or purported to be linked—to guerrilla groups. Their strategy is that if the civilian population refuses to have any contact with the guerrillas for fear of retribution by the paramilitaries, then the guerrillas will eventually lose support and fade away. Catholic Church workers and human rights activists, who used to be regarded as unbiased mediators between the military and guerrillas, have become targets of the paramilitaries, who view them as apologists for the guerrillas. 86 In February 1998, for example, in the southern state of Putumayo, paramilitary groups entered a town and listed the names of priests and other activists to signal that they had been marked for death. In July 2000, 300 armed paramilitary soldiers entered the town of El Salado and initiated a "trial" of suspected guerrilla sympathizers on the main square, an activity that resulted in a "rampage of torture, rape, and execution." According to one local resident, "They drank and they danced and cheered as they butchered us like hogs." Thirty-six residents were killed, including a six-year-old girl and an elderly woman. 8 7 One major consequence of the paramilitaries' methods has been to further weaken an already extremely fragile civil society in the Colombian countryside. This practice continues to be repeated throughout Colombia today.

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In recent years the paramilitary groups have been gaining a life of their o w n , and their intermittent reliance on military support might not be as important as it was in p r e v i o u s years. Most of the p a r a m i l i t a r y groups are now united under an umbrella group called the A u t o d e f e n s a s Unidas de Colombia ( A U C ; United S e l f - D e f e n s e s of Colombia). Led by f o r m e r drug trafficker Carlos Castaño, the A U C has its headquarters in n o r t h w e s t C o l o m b i a . In recent years the A U C has acquired sophisticated weaponry, making it increasingly less reliant on the military. Most o b s e r v e r s believe that d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g p r o v i d e s the m a j o r i t y of the g r o u p ' s funding, a vital source of income for a war effort that reportedly requires U.S.$40 million per month to fund.** C a s t a ñ o ' s fighting force has been effective at confronting the guerrillas—or better said, at c o n f r o n t i n g putative civilian supporters of the guerrillas. T h e rise of the A U C — i t s n u m b e r s increased f r o m 8 , 0 0 0 to 14,000 between 2 0 0 0 and 2 0 0 1 — p r o v e s that the paramilitaries do not always work on behalf of the military.* 1 ' Increasingly, the paramilitaries have their o w n a g e n d a s , using military support when it b e n e f i t s t h e m and fighting alone when it does not. 4 0 Ironically, the f r i g h t e n i n g escalation of paramilitary violence might force the b e g i n n i n g of legitimate negotiations sooner rather than later. As m a n i f e s t e d by the recent increase in raids, the FARC and the E L N have been able to withstand the C o l o m b i a n military's counterinsurgency e f f o r t s . F r o m 1995 to 2 0 0 0 the guerrillas killed well over a t h o u s a n d soldiers and took h u n d r e d s more hostage. 9 1 Yet only with the paramilitaries' recent successes at expelling the guerrillas f r o m m a n y areas (the paramilitaries call this practice limpieza, or "cleaning") have the guerrillas been put into any type of d e f e n s i v e . It is estimated that paramilitary groups exercise i n f l u e n c e in roughly 4 0 percent of the country. In 2 0 0 0 the A U C killed a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,000 civilians in its c a m p a i g n to cleanse areas under guerrilla control. C o m p o u n d i n g this p r o b l e m is that many C o l o m b i a n civilians, even if they personally abhor the violent methods, are increasingly c o m i n g to see the paramilitaries as the only e f f e c t i v e counter to the guerrillas. T h e continued strength of the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s — a n d their growing political leg i t i m a c y — m i g h t e n c o u r a g e the guerrillas to seriously consider a negotiated settlement; yet this is f a r f r o m certain given that the g u e r r i l l a s ' overall i n f l u e n c e has i n c r e a s e d in recent years despite the i n c r e a s e d threat f r o m the paramilitaries. This scenario is c o m p l i c a t e d by the fact that the guerrillas are adamantly opposed to any legitimized political role for the paramilitaries.

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A U C leader Carlos Castaño. Photo by Marcelo Salinas.

T h e F A R C a n d the E L N see t h e m s e l v e s as the rightful a d v e r s a r i e s to the g o v e r n m e n t and thus any "third p a r t y " only takes a w a y f r o m their ability t o g a i n c o n c e s s i o n s . Yet c o n t i n u e d s u c c e s s a g a i n s t t h e

guerrillas

c o u l d v e r y w e l l m e a n t h a t t h e p a r a m i l i t a r i e s w i l l h a v e a s e a t at a n y e v e n t u a l n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e w h e t h e r t h e g u e r r i l l a s l i k e it o r not. 1 ' 2 Another interesting development

is t h a t in 2 0 0 1 C a r l o s

Castaño

s t a t e d t h a t h e w o u l d c e a s e h i s i n v o l v e m e n t in m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s a n d i n s t e a d f o c u s o n p r o m o t i n g t h e A U C ' s p o l i t i c a l a g e n d a . 9 3 It is u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h i s w a s a s i n c e r e d e c l a r a t i o n . Yet e v e n if C a s t a ñ o m o v e s i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a , t h e r e is l i t t l e e v i d e n c e t o s u g g e s t t h a t a s u c c e s s o r l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d a l t e r i t s p a r a m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s . In S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 , U . S . S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e C o l i n P o w e l l a n n o u n c e d that t h e U n i t e d Stater, h a d p l a c e d t h e A U C o n its list o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s , a list t h a t a l ready includes the F A R C and the E L N .

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GUERRILLA AND PARAMILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE F e w o b s e r v e r s d i s p u t e the c l a i m that the past d e c a d e has w i t n e s s e d a m a r k e d i n c r e a s e in g u e r r i l l a i n v o l v e m e n t in the c u l t i v a t i o n a n d p r o d u c t i o n of illicit drugs. 9 4 M o r e o f t e n than not, guerrilla i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e d r u g t r a d e c o n s i s t s of e i t h e r t a x i n g d r u g s h i p m e n t s or c h a r g i n g rural c o c a a n d p o p p y f a r m e r s protection m o n e y . T h e g u e r r i l l a s c h a r g e an e s t i m a t e d 1 0 - 1 5 percent f o r each transaction b e t w e e n the c r o p f a r m ers a n d the d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s . T h i s activity g e n e r a t e s h u n d r e d s of m i l lions of d o l l a r s in a n n u a l i n c o m e f o r the guerrillas (mostly the F A R C ) ; w h e n c o m b i n e d with the r e v e n u e s f r o m " r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a x e s , " k i d n a p pings, and o t h e r illicit activities, it is c l e a r that the guerrillas p o s s e s s a f o r m i d a b l e " w a r c h e s t , " w h i c h is e s t i m a t e d at a l m o s t U . S . $ 5 0 0 m i l l i o n annually. 9 5 T h i s in turn has e n a b l e d the guerrillas to dramatically e x p a n d their i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h o u t C o l o m b i a since the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s (see Table 3.3). In 1985 there w a s s o m e type of guerrilla activity in 17.2 percent of all m u nicipalities; in 1995 the f i g u r e had risen to 59.8 percent of all m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 9 6 T o d a y the f i g u r e is e v e n higher. In o n e e p i s o d e a l o n e t h e F A R C a p p a r e n t l y r e c e i v e d o v e r 7 , 5 0 0 w e a p o n s that w e r e p u r c h a s e d f r o m P e r u a n d a i r - d r o p p e d into F A R C - c o n t r o l l e d territory, s o m e t h i n g that w a s n o d o u b t m a d e p o s s i b l e by the F A R C ' s sizable n a r c o t i c s r e v enues. 9 7 In addition, F A R C c o m m a n d e r Jorge Briceno a n n o u n c e d that all C o l o m b i a n s w o r t h over U . S . $ 1 million should pay the F A R C a " p e a c e t a x " or risk b e i n g taken h o s t a g e . It is unclear to what extent the F A R C ' s drug profits have influenced its military strategies. While the group had normally shied away f r o m direct c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with the C o l o m b i a n military, by 1998 this strategy had changed as m o r e recruits and sophisticated weapons allowed the F A R C to attack the military head on. Taken by surprise, the Colombian military was slow to react to these new tactics, but more recently the military has f o u n d its footing and has scored a n u m b e r of victories against the guerrillas (see Photo 3.3). Due to the military's renewed ability to check these frontal assaults, the F A R C has gradually moved back to its more traditional strategy of isolated attacks on army and police installations, often firing gas cylinders filled with explosives. 9 8 There is also evidence that the F A R C might be c o n s i d e r i n g increasing its urban terrorist activities such as car b o m b ings. Most of this concern revolves around the August 2001 arrest of three Irish R e p u b l i c a n A r m y ( I R A ) operatives w h o had apparently visited the

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Table 3.3 The FARC's Growth (1986-1999)

1986 1995 2000

N u m b e r of Fronts

N u m b e r of M e m b e r s

32 60 85 (est.)

3,600 7,000 18,000

Source: R i c a r d o Vargas M e z a , " T h e R e v o l u t i o n a r y A r m e d F o r c e s of C o l o m b i a ( F A R C ) and the Illicit Drug T r a d e " ( C o c h a b a m b a . Bolivia: A c c i ó n A n d i n a , J u n e 1994).

F A R C ' s despeje and are suspected of being b o m b experts. C o l o m b i a n newspapers have also reported that twelve other alleged IRA m e m b e r s have visited the F A R C ' s despeje since 1 9 9 8 . " A l t h o u g h d u r i n g the early 1980s the drug cartels and guerrillas were e n g a g e d in a fierce war with each other, in the 1990s the guerrillas b e c a m e directly involved in the d r u g trade, p r o v i d i n g t h e m with t r e m e n d o u s f i n a n c i a l p r o f i t s . T h e r e is also no q u e s t i o n that narcotics traffickers also b e n e f i t f r o m the insurgents, as they view the guerrillas and paramilitaries as the muscle necessary to keep the C o l o m b i a n state far away f r o m their illicit operations. A l f r e d o Rangel writes: " B o t h illegal [guerrilla and drug trafficker] organizations need each other. T h e cash-short 35-year-old organization [FARC] protected narco-plantations, laboratories, a i r c r a f t , and airstrips f r o m g o v e r n m e n t incursion in exc h a n g e for a p e r c e n t a g e of the profit g e n e r a t e d by the d r u g s . T h i s led to the coining of the term ' n a r c o - t e r r o r i s t . ' " 1 0 0 But guerrilla involvement in the drug trade does n o t — a n d did n o t — m e a n that all of the guerrillas are actually narco-guerrillas, in e s s e n c e indistinguishable f r o m the drug traffickers. In fact, while the guerrillas undoubtedly do participate in the drug trade, they maintain a distinct political and e c o n o m i c ideology, even if it d o e s seem quite anachronistic now that the Cold War is over and M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m has been largely discredited w o r l d w i d e . S o m e guerrillas are disgusted by the drug trade and view their involvement in it as a necessary but evil m e a n s in order to achieve a better end of social and political transformation. This vision of the guerrilla-narcotics relationship m i g h t be c h a n g ing, however, as m o r e recent reports have directly linked the F A R C to d r u g - t r a f f i c k i n g o p e r a t i o n s . In the fall of 2000, f o r e x a m p l e , a j o i n t U . S . - C o l o m b i a n drug interdiction operation c o n f i s c a t e d a cocaine-filled sea vessel containing a variety of F A R C paraphernalia, suggesting that this was a F A R C - c o n t r o l l e d operation f r o m start to finish. 1 0 1

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Colombian military displaying forty dead F A R C troops / Granada Military Base, Department of Meta. Photo by Marcelo Salinas.

W h i l e F A R C i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e d r u g t r a d e has r e c e i v e d m o s t o f t h e a t t e n t i o n , it is c l e a r that t h e p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s a r e a l s o f i n a n c i n g t h e i r w a r e f f o r t s b y d r u g p r o f i t s . C r i t i c s of U . S . a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s h a v e c h a r g e d that W a s h i n g t o n p r e s s u r e s the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to f u m i g a t e c o c a c r o p s a n d d e s t r o y d r u g l a b o r a t o r i e s in g u e r r i l l a - h e l d a r e a s , b u t i n t e n t i o n a l l y o v e r l o o k s o t h e r a r e a s w h e r e t h e p a r a m i l i t a r i e s a r e i n v o l v e d in d r u g a c t i v i t i e s . In r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a s s t e p p e d u p a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s in p a r a m i l i t a r y s t r o n g h o l d s , a l t h o u g h t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s c o n t i n u e in a r e a s w h e r e g u e r rillas are active. It is w i t h i n t h i s u n c e r t a i n a n d v i o l e n t e n v i r o n m e n t of p r o t r a c t e d paramilitary and drug trafficker-sponsored violence, a flourishing drug trade, and a stronger, m o r e a g g r e s s i v e guerrilla insurgency, that the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s c o n d u c t e d its p o l i c i e s in C o l o m b i a s i n c e t h e 1 9 9 0 s . T h e p a r a m i l i t a r i e s a n d g u e r r i l l a s — e s p e c i a l l y t h e F A R C — a r e m o r e inv o l v e d in t h e d r u g t r a d e t o d a y t h a n e v e r b e f o r e , an i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r tant c o n c e r n f o r U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s .

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T h e n e x t t w o c h a p t e r s d e s c r i b e h o w the U n i t e d States h a s c o n d u c t e d its p o l i c i e s in such an e n v i r o n m e n t . We will see that it o f t e n f o r m u l a t e d its p o l i c i e s not to a d d r e s s the c o m p l e x a n d e v e r - c h a n g i n g d y n a m i c s of the civil c o n f l i c t a n d r e l a t e d v i o l e n c e in C o l o m b i a , but r a t h e r to p u r s u e its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s p o l i c y , o f t e n t o the e x c l u s i o n a n d m i n i m i z a t i o n of o t h e r i s s u e s . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this n a r c o t i z e d p o l i c y f o r m o s t of the 1990s w e r e c o n s i d e r a b l e a n d e v e n t u a l l y d r o v e a g r a d u a l but i m p o r t a n t s h i f t in p o l i c y f o l l o w i n g A n d r é s P a s t r a n a ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n in 1998.

NOTES 1. Jorge Osterling. Democracy in Colombia: Clientalist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick. N.J.: Transaction, 1989), p. 261. 2. For an excellent overview of the Colombian political system, see Harvey F. Cline, "Colombia: Building Democracy Amidst Violence and Drugs," in Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, edited by Jorge Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 21MM; and Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations Among Gentlemen: Oligarchic Democracy in Colombia," in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 28-81. 3. Robert Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 361. 4. Richard Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), pp. 158-173. 5. Ibid., p. 161. The victory of Ospina in 1946 caused great alarm among the Liberals, with several Liberal mobs in Bogotá marching to demand that the election results be modified. Most of the violence before the Bogotazo in 1948 took place in areas of rural Colombia where Gaitán's support was the weakest. 6. Gaitán was shot while leaving his office in Bogotá by a man who was known to be mentally unstable. 7. Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia, p. 178. 8. David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 202. 9. See Bruce Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and Economic Development," in Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America, edited by Robert Wesson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 124-160. 10. For an analysis of the National Front, see Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See also Daniel L. Premo, "Coping with Insurgency: The Politics of Pacification in Colombia and Venezuela," in Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela, edited by Donald L. Herman (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 2 2 8 - 2 3 0 ; and Robert Dix, "Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia," Comparative Politics 12, no. 3 (April 1980): 303-321.

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11. Dix, Colombia, pp. 133-134. 12. Ibid., p. 130. 13. Ibid., p. 136. 14. Marc Chernick, "Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, edited by Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), pp. 163-164. 15. Premo, "Coping with Insurgency," p. 230. 16. See Americas Watch, The Cent ral-Americanization of Colombia? Human Rights and the Peace Process (New York: Americas Watch, 1986), p. 19. 17. Dennis Rempe, "Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Counterinsurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965," Small Wars and Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 321. 18. For more on the g o v e r n m e n t ' s attack on Marquetalia, see Eduardo Pizarro, "Revolutionary Groups in C o l o m b i a , " in Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. edited by Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and G o n z a l o Sánchez (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1992), pp. 169-193. 19. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, p. 99. 20. Rempe, "Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics," p. 321. 21. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, pp. 298-299. 22. Juan Forero, "Rebel Control of Large Zone in Colombia Is Extended," The New York Times, December 7, 2000. 23. Gabriel Marcella and Donald E. Schulz, "Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 11. 24. "Secuestro masivo en Cali," El Tiempo, September 18, 2000. 25. "Kidnapped in Colombia," The Economist, September 23, 2000. 26. Juan Tomayo, "Colombians Torn over Plan to Let Rebels Control a Region," The Miami Herald, January 14, 2001. The FARC's liberated zone consists of 16,000 square miles. 27. Chernick, "Negotiating Peace," p. 165. 28. Americas Watch, The Central-Americanization of Colombia? p. 72. 29. Sewall Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing the U.S. Anti-Drug Policy in the North Andes-Colombia (New York: University Press of America, 1997), pp. 3 7 - 3 8 . 30. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, pp. 324-325. 31. Ibid., p. 319. 32. See Chernick, "Negotiating Peace," p. 199. 33. Americas Watch, The Central-Americanization of Colombia? p. 24. 34. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, p. 285. 35. Ibid. 36. Americas Watch, The Central-Americanization of Colombia? pp. 32-33. 37. Ibid., p. 41. 38. El Tiempo, May 24, 1999.

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39. Americas Watch, Human Rights in Colombia as President Barco Begins (New York: Americas Watch., 1986), p. 14. 40. See Chernick, "Negotiating Peace," pp. 196-199. 41. Ibid., pp. 180-182. A small group from the Atlantic Coast, the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores (PRT; Revolutionary Workers Party), also signed an agreement with the Gaviria administration. 42. Chernick, "Negotiating Peace," p. 182. 43. The incipient peace process begun by Pastrana provoked a tremendous amount of public enthusiasm and hence intense media coverage. See, for example, "Paras aceptan iniciar diálogos," El Tiempo, January 14, 1999; and "ELN, tema en Estados Unidos y Venezuela," El Tiempo, February 18, 1999. 44. Forero, "Rebel Control." 45. See Russell Crandall, " B o m b s Litter Colombia's Road to Peace," Jane's Defence Weekly Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 2001. 46. "ELN definitivamente no dialoga con Gobierno de Andrés Pastrana," El Tiempo, September 11, 2001. 47. For an overview of the initial Colombian narcotics trade, see Bruce Bagley, "The Colombian Connection: The Impact of Drug Traffic in Colombia," in Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policy in Latin America, edited by Deborah Pacini and Christine Franquemont (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cultural Survival, 1986), pp. 89-100; and Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics Control and United States-Colombian Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 23, no. 3 (August 1981): 2 4 3 - 2 7 0 . 48. Rensselaer W. Lee III and Patrick L. Clawson, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 37. 49. Ibid., p. 38. 50. Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17, no. 4 (1994): 325. 51. Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Colombia's Cocaine Syndicates," Crime, Law, and Social Change 16, no. 1 (1991): 9. 52. Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel," p. 325. 53. Lee, "Colombia's Cocaine Syndicates," p. 10. 54. For a general analysis of the drug w a r — b o t h inside and outside the United States—see Michael Massing, "The War on Cocaine," The New York Review of Books, December 22, 1988. 55. For more on the Medellin cartel, see Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen, Kings of Cocaine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). See also Iván Orozco Abad, "La guerra del presidente," Análisis Político 8 ( S e p t e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1989): 73-78. 56. For a chronicle of Pablo E s c o b a r ' s kidnapping of several prominent Colombians, see Gabriel García Márquez, News of a Kidnapping (New York: Knopf, 1997). 57. See Iván Orozco Abad, "Los diálogos con el narcotráfico: Historia de la transformación fallida de un delincuente común en un delincuente político," Análisis Político 11 (September-December 1990): 4 4 - 4 8 .

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58. L e e and C l a w s o n , The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 51. 59. S a n t o s was eventually released and Turbay was killed along with Maria M o n t o y a , the d a u g h t e r of C o l o m b i a ' s a m b a s s a d o r to C a n a d a . See Lee, " C o l o m b i a ' s C o c a i n e S y n d i c a t e s , " p. 13. 60. Ibid., p. 53. 61. See F i l i p p o n e , " T h e M e d e l l i n C a r t e l . " pp. 3 3 6 - 3 3 7 . 62. Lee, " C o l o m b i a ' s C o c a i n e M a f i a , " pp. 6 0 - 6 2 . 63. In J u n e 1987 the C o l o m b i a n S u p r e m e Court had struck d o w n a 1979 extradition treaty with the United States, although e x c e p t i o n s were m a d e due to g o v e r n m e n t - d e c l a r e d " s t a t e s of s i e g e . " A r t i c l e 35 of the 1991 c o n s t i t u t i o n b a n n e d e x t r a d i t i o n . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n was a m e n d e d to allow e x t r a d i t i o n in N o v e m b e r 1997. 64. See R e n n s e l a e r W. Lee III. " M a k i n g the Most of C o l o m b i a ' s Drug N e g o t i a t i o n s , " Orhis 35, no. 2 ( S p r i n g 1991): 2 3 5 - 2 5 2 . 65. S t a t e - o f - s i e g e d e c r e e s 2 0 4 7 . 2 1 4 7 . 2 3 7 2 . 3 0 3 0 . of 1990, and 3 0 3 of 1991, " o f f e r e d reduced s e n t e n c e s and immunity from extradition to t h o s e w h o t u r n e d t h e m s e l v e s in and c o n f e s s e d to a c r i m e . " A m e r i c a s W a t c h , Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues ( N e w York: A m e r i cas W a t c h . 1992), p. 11. T h e f a m o u s phrase "better a grave in C o l o m b i a than a prison in the United S t a t e s " m a n i f e s t s their firm resistance to e x t r a d i t i o n . For a g r i p p i n g a c c o u n t of the v i o l e n c e enacted by the Medellin c a r t e l ' s " E x t r a d i t a b l e s , " see M á r q u e z , News of a Kidnapping; and " L o s E x t r a d i t a b l e s p r e f i e r e n t u m b a en C o l o m b i a , " Novedades, N o v e m b e r 16, 1996. 66. See Lee, " M a k i n g the Most of C o l o m b i a ' s Drug N e g o t i a t i o n s , " p. 237. 67. R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III and Patrick C l a w s o n write: " T h e c o n d i t i o n s of E s c o b a r ' s i n c a r c e r a t i o n , e s t a b l i s h e d after m a r a t h o n n e g o t i a t i o n s with the g o v e r n m e n t , w e r e q u i t e f a v o r a b l e to him. Of c o u r s e , the one c o n d i t i o n w a s that the prison be located in a city w h e r e the trafficker e n j o y e d great i n f l u e n c e . . . . A n o t h e r c o n d i t i o n w a s that E s c o b a r and his r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s be a l l o w e d to screen the guard w h o w o u l d be responsible for internal security in the p r i s o n . " L e e and C l a w s o n , The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 112. See a l s o D o u g l a s F a r a h , " T o C o l o m b i a n D r u g L o r d s , T h e r e ' s No Place Like P r i s o n , " The Washington Post, S e p t e m b e r 26, 1993. Escobar was killed sixteen m o n t h s later on a r o o f t o p in M e d e l l i n , e n d i n g o n e of the most extensive m a n h u n t s in C o l o m b i a n history. S e e J a m e s B r o o k , " D r u g Lord Is Buried as C r o w d W a i l s , " The New York Times, D e c e m b e r 4 , 1983. F o r m o r e on the O c h o a b r o t h e r s ' r e l e a s e f r o m p r i s o n , see " F a b i o O c h o a , u l t i m o i n t e g r a n t e del ' C l a n O c h o a ' del cartel de M e d e l l i n , r e c o b r a su l i b e r t a d , " Crónica, S e p t e m b e r 17, 1996. 68. For m o r e on the U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t and position toward the d r u g cartels, see M e n z e l , Cocaine Quagmire, pp. 7 9 - 1 0 3 . 69. A f t e r leaving o f f i c e G a v i r i a m o v e d to Washington, D.C., in o r d e r to ass u m e the position of s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l of the O A S . 70. R o b e r t T. B u c k m a n , " T h e Cali Cartel: An U n d e f e a t e d E n e m y , " Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 3, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 4 3 4 . 71. Ibid., p. 4 3 5 .

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72. Ibid., p. 4 3 4 . 73. S e e U.S. S e n a t e . C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , " C o r r u p t i o n and D r u g s in C o l o m b i a : D e m o c r a c y at R i s k , " F e b r u a r y 27, 1996. 74. T e s t i m o n y by D o n n i e M a r s h a l l , D E A chief of o p e r a t i o n s , b e f o r e the H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t R e f o r m and O v e r s i g h t , S u b c o m m i t t e e on National Security, International A f f a i r s , and Criminal Justice. July 9, 1997. 75. M e n z e l , Cocaine Quagmire, p. 89. 76. For a look at the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to d i s m a n t l e the Cali cartel, see U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Justice, " T h e Cali Cartel: T h e N e w K i n g s of C o c a i n e . " D E A Drug Intelligence report. N o v e m b e r 1994. 77. In 1968 the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s e n a c t e d Law 48, w h i c h a l l o w e d the g o v e r n m e n t "to m o b i l i z e the p o p u l a t i o n in activities and t a s k s " in order to prom o t e n o r m a l c y . T h i s legislation p a v e d the w a y for what c a m e to be k n o w n as self-defense groups. 78. T h e s e g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d g r o u p s , the convivirá, were officially disb a n d e d in 1997 after m a n y w e r e a c c u s e d by h u m a n rights o r g a n i z a t i o n s of unj u s t i f i e d v i o l e n c e . A strong case can be m a d e that the 1994 institutionalization of t h e s e g r o u p s c o n t r i b u t e d to the g r o w t h of the c o n t e m p o r a r y p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s . By p r o v i d i n g g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t for s o m e t y p e s of p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s , the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t left the impression that it was c o n d o n i n g all types of p a r a m i l i t a r y activity. 79. C h e r n i c k , " N e g o t i a t i n g P e a c e , " pp. 1 7 0 - 1 7 4 . 80. M e n z e l , Cocaine Quagmire, p. 61; "El ejército d e s m i e n t e v i n c u l a c i ó n c o n el m a s , " El Tiempo, J a n u a r y 12, 1983; and "El M A S : T o c a n d o f o n d o ? " El Espectador, J a n u a r y 13, 1983. For m o r e on the roots of the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , see A m e r i c a s W a t c h , The Drug War in Colombia: The Neglected Tragedy of Political Violence ( N e w York: A m e r i c a s W a t c h . O c t o b e r 1990), pp. 1 1 - 3 0 ; "El N a r c o - A g r o , " Semana. N o v e m b e r 2 9 - D e c e m b e r 5, 1988; and L a u r a R e s t r e p o . Historia de un entusiasmo ( B o g o t á : G r u p o Editorial N o r m a , 1998), pp. 55-58. 81. C y n t h i a W a t s o n , "Political V i o l e n c e in C o l o m b i a : A n o t h e r A r g e n t i n a ? " World Quarterly 12, nos. 3 - 4 ( 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 ) : 31. 82. A m e r i c a s Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States ( N e w York: A m e r i c a s Watch, 1996), p. 17. 83. F o r m o r e on the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y ' s links to p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s , see U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , Annual Human Rights Report—Colombia, 1998, 1999, 2000. 84. C o n f i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i n t e r v i e w s with a local h u m a n r i g h t s t e a m in the city of B a r r a n c a b e r m e j a , O c t o b e r 1997 and F e b r u a r y 1998. 85. F o r m o r e on the m i l i t a r y - p a r a m i l i t a r y link, see A m e r i c a s W a t c h , Colombia's Killer Networks. 86. I first m a d e t h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s in " C o l o m b i a N e e d s a S t r o n g e r M i l i tary," The Wall Street Journal, J u n e 12, 1998. 87. Larry Rohter, " C o l o m b i a n s Tell of M a s s a c r e as A r m y S t o o d B y , " The New York Times, July 14, 2000. Third

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88. An e x c l u s i v e interview with C a r l o s C a s t a ñ o w a s c o n d u c t e d by M a r i a Cristina C a b a l l e r o and p u b l i s h e d in " E s t a G u e r r a no da m a s , " Cambio 16 (Bogotá), D e c e m b e r 15, 1997; C a s t a ñ o g a v e a n o t h e r interview to Washington Pox! r e p o r t e r Scott W i l s o n in M a r c h 2 0 0 1 . See " C o l o m b i a ' s O t h e r A r m y , " The Washington Post, M a r c h 12, 2001. For m o r e on the rise of Carlos C a s t a ñ o and the p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s , see " N o P e a c e . " The Economist, O c t o b e r 11, 1997; " K i l l i n g in C o l o m b i a . " The Economist. N o v e m b e r 29. 1997; and " C o l o m b i a ' s O t h e r A r m i e s , " The Economist, N o v e m b e r 29. 1997. 89. Scott W i l s o n , " P a r a m i l i t a r y A r m y S e e k s Political Role in C o l o m b i a , " The Washington Post, S e p t e m b e r 19, 2001. 90. M o s t C o l o m b i a n s are tired of this s e e m i n g l y s e n s e l e s s v i o l e n c e (one l e a d i n g m a g a z i n e . Cambio 16. p l a c e d on its c o v e r : " S o W h a t A r e T h e y All F i g h t i n g A b o u t ? " — r e f e r r i n g to i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d with the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s and g u e r r i l l a s r e v e a l i n g that both g r o u p s had s i m i l a r l y stated g o a l s ) . C o l o m bians also f i r m l y believe that a n e g o t i a t e d solution is the b e s t — a n d p r o b a b l y o n l y — w a y that the conflict can be r e s o l v e d . U n d e r l y i n g this view is a societal c o n s e n s u s that n o n e of the belligerent g r o u p s will e v e r be able to gain a military victory. 91. " C a m b i o de frente en la g u e r r a . " El Tiempo, A u g u s t 25, 1998. In J a n u ary 2 0 0 0 the C o l o m b i a n military r e p o r t e d that 4 3 6 soldiers w e r e killed by the guerrillas in 1998 and 330 in 1999. T h e military also reported that it had killed 1,019 g u e r r i l l a s in 1999. " F a r e no ha r e s p e t a d o la t r e g u a : M o r a , " El Tiempo, J a n u a r y 7, 2000. 92. For a m o r e i n - d e p t h a n a l y s i s of the p o t e n t i a l p a t h s that the c u r r e n t C o l o m b i a n p e a c e p r o c e s s m i g h t t a k e , see C h e r n i c k , " N e g o t i a t i n g P e a c e . " In M a y 1999, C a r l o s C a s t a ñ o ' s f o r c e s k i d n a p p e d S e n a t o r P i e d a d C ó r d o b a a n d then released a s t a t e m e n t d e c l a r i n g that the act w a s d o n e in o r d e r to h a v e t h e g o v e r n m e n t a c c e p t the p a r a m i l i t a r i e s ' political p l a t f o r m , w h i c h a b o v e all e l s e d e m a n d e d a seat at the n e g o t i a t i n g table. See El Espectador, M a y 2 3 - 2 4 , 1999. 93. W i l s o n , " P a r a m i l i t a r y A r m y . " 94. For m o r e on g u e r r i l l a i n v o l v e m e n t in the d r u g t r a d e , s e e A l e j a n d r o R e y e s P o s a d a , " D r u g T r a f f i c k i n g and the Guerrilla M o v e m e n t in C o l o m b i a , " in Drug Trafficking in the Americas, edited by B r u c e Bagley and W i l l i a m W a l k e r ( M i a m i : U n i v e r s i t y of M i a m i N o r t h - S o u t h Center. 1994), pp. 1 2 1 - 1 3 1 . 95. T h e C o l o m b i a n D e p a r t m e n t of N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g has e s t i m a t e d that f r o m 1990 to 1994 guerrilla g r o u p s raised U . S . $ 7 0 1 million f r o m i n v o l v e m e n t in the d r u g t r a d e , c o m p a r e d to U . S . $ 4 8 2 m i l l i o n f r o m r o b b e r y a n d U . S . $ 3 2 8 million f r o m k i d n a p p i n g . See L e e and C l a w s o n , The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 93. 96. C h e r n i c k , " N e g o t i a t i n g P e a c e , " p. 167. See also Daniel G a r c í a - P e ñ a J a r a m i l l o , Building Tomorrow's Peace: A Strategy for Reconciliation, report by the P e a c e E x p l o r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e , B o g o t á , 1997. 97. " T h e G r i n g o s L a n d in C o l o m b i a , " The Economist, S e p t e m b e r 4, 2 0 0 0 . 98. Ibid.

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99. Warren H ö g e , "Sinn Fein Spurns U.S. o v e r Arrests in C o l o m b i a , " The New York Times, S e p t e m b e r 19, 2 0 0 1 . 100. Alfredo Rangel Suárez, Colombia: Guerra en elfin de siglo (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo. 1998), p. 125. Rangel also estimates that one in three guerrilla combatants is s o m e h o w linked to the drug trade. He also e s t i m a t e s that drugrelated revenues make up half of the F A R C ' s income. Author translation. 101. " E E U U acusa," Cambio,

November 11-18, 2000.

4 U.S. Policy During the Samper Administration, 1994-1998

Washington hated the idea of Samper. Short of one of the Cali cartel leaders becoming president of Colombia, Samper's election was the worst scenario. —Myles Frechette, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (1994-1997)1 Samper was one of the most unscrupulous politicians I had ever met, and I've met a lot of people in a lot of countries. . . . U.S. policy toward Colombia during this time was a depressing performance. —Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (1992-1996)2

The U.S. view of Ernesto Samper as a reliable ally in the war on drugs soured well before he took office in August of 1994. Beginning in 1982, when Samper was the campaign manager of Liberal Party presidential candidate Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, the U.S. government had suspected Samper of taking bribes from drug traffickers. 3 This suspicion was compounded on November 14, 1984, when Cali cartel kingpin Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela was arrested in Spain and officials found Samper's unlisted, unpublished phone number in Rodriguez Orejuela's address book. 4 A decade later, when Samper was contending for the presidency himself, Washington wasted no time informing him that he was suspected of drug links. This came to a head on November 19, 1993, when Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gelbard met with Samper, w h o at that point was a contender for the Liberal Party's presidential nomination. 5 Gelbard, who as ambassador to Bolivia in the late 1980s took a controversial highly public stand against what he deemed to be Bolivian government involvement in the drug trade, squarely told Samper that there would be serious consequences if the drug f u n d i n g continued: 101

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" W e h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n , we b e l i e v e it, and the m o n e y m u s t stop if y o u want to have any kind of d e c e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " 6 As this was one of the first reported m e e t i n g s b e t w e e n U.S. o f f i c i a l s and c a n d i d a t e E r n e s t o S a m p e r , the logical c o n c l u s i o n is that the U n i t e d States initially c o o l e d to S a m p e r , since U.S. o f f i c i a l s were certain that d r u g m o n e y w a s f u n d i n g — o r h a d the p o t e n t i a l to f u n d in the n e a r f u t u r e — h i s c a m p a i g n . W h i l e this revelation altered the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s v i e w of S a m p e r , s o m e U.S. o f f i c i a l s h a d a c t u a l l y m e t with S a m p e r a f e w m o n t h s b e f o r e G e l b a r d and, at that time, were c o m p l e t e l y u n a w a r e of any i n f o r m a t i o n that linked S a m p e r to the Cali cartel. I n s t e a d , because of S a m p e r ' s prior a d v o c a c y of d r u g legalization in the late 1970s and early 1980s. U . S . o f f i c i a l s v i e w e d h i m as p o t e n t i a l l y soft on the d r u g issue. S a m p e r w a s k n o w n as " M r . L e g a l i z a t i o n " by m a n y in the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t . 7 This fact s u g g e s t s that the n e g a t i v e view of S a m p e r might h a v e had as m u c h to d o with his ideological view of the d r u g issue as it did with the p o s s i b i l i t y that he r e c e i v e d p a y m e n t s f r o m the Cali cartel. Phil M c L e a n , then d e p u t y assistant secretary of state f o r i n t e r - A m e r i c a n affairs, met with S a m p e r at the W a s h i n g t o n Hotel in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , in July 1993. x He r e c o u n t e d : I said, " E r n e s t o , you have a m a j o r , m a j o r p r o b l e m with the United States: y o u ' r e p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g s o f t on n a r c o t i c s . T h i s is the p r o b l e m and t h e r e ' s o n l y o n e w a y to fix i t — y o u ' v e g o t t a s h o w that y o u ' r e ser i o u s a b o u t t h i s i s s u e a n d to d o this y o u ' r e g o n n a h a v e to d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t this p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e . . . ." At that t i m e t h e r e w a s n o s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n that I k n e w o f , a n d I w a s s u p p o s e d l y in the c e n t e r of all the " i n " in i n t e l l i g e n c e on a n y t h i n g that i m p l i c a t e d S a m p e r . 9

R e g a r d l e s s of the exact m o t i v a t i o n s f o r the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ' s decision to take a hard stance against S a m p e r , the m e s s a g e that it w a n t e d S a m p e r to r e c e i v e w a s that he w o u l d h a v e to f o l l o w t h r o u g h on c o u n ternarcotics e f f o r t s as if he h a d n e v e r r e c e i v e d f u n d s f r o m the Cali cartel. State D e p a r t m e n t official M i c h a e l Skol c l a r i f i e d this m e s s a g e w h e n he stated, " O u r point of v i e w is that no m a t t e r what has h a p p e n e d in the past f e w m o n t h s , t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t t h i n g f o r o u r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f o r president-elect S a m p e r is what b e g i n s to h a p p e n a f t e r he takes o f f i c e on A u g u s t 7 t h . " 1 0 If S a m p e r c o m p l i e d , t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d in r e t u r n act as t h o u g h it k n e w very little a b o u t his links to the Cali c a r t e l . " As w e will see, starting first with the " n a r c o - c a s s e t t e " s c a n d a l a n d c o n t i n u i n g

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through many other events that were seen as evidence of Samper's soft stance on drugs, the United States publicly targeted Samper's suspected drug links even though Samper's administration all but destroyed the Cali cartel in 1995. 12

THE "NARCO-CASSETTES" Whatever evidence the U.S. government had of Ernesto Samper's links to the Cali cartel was corroborated on June 16, 1994, when Conservative Party candidate Andrés Pastrana's campaign manager, Luis Alberto Moreno, walked into the U.S. embassy in Bogotá and delivered to Ambassador Morris Busby tapes of police intercepts that he had received on June 15. 13 On one of the tapes, Cali drug leader Miguel Rodriguez apparently tells journalist Alberto " L o c o " Girardo that he has made arrangements to move U.S.$3.5 million into Samper's campaign. 1 4 Moreno, knowing that if the Conservatives released the tapes it would look like a ploy to steal the election, hoped that the U.S. embassy would make the tapes public. However, senior officials in the U.S. State Department thought that the issue was too delicate and instead directed Busby not to leak the tapes to the press. A few days later, on June 19, Samper narrowly defeated Pastrana, with many observers believing in hindsight that the badly needed funds the Samper campaign received from the Cali cartel probably made the difference between victory and defeat. Fed up with what he believed was a whitewash of a candidate who was in the pocket of drug traffickers, Bogotá-based U.S. DEA agent Joe Toft leaked the narco-cassettes to the press. 1 5 Even though Toft resigned from the DEA only six weeks later, the firestorm that he created by leaking the tapes left an indelible legacy on the Colombian political system. 1 6 The narco-cassettes ignited a far-reaching investigation of those Colombian government officials believed to have ties to drug traffickers. 1 7 The investigation came to be called the "Proceso 8000" case, and before it was over, Samper's attorney general, defense minister, and campaign treasurer, along with several legislators, were convicted of drug money-related crimes. 1 8 The controversy over the narco-cassettes continued not so much because of their content, but rather because of the accusations against Samper that the release of the tapes set off. 1 9 The Miami Herald, for example, wrote that unnamed sources in the U.S. government had more evidence than just the narco-cassettes regarding Samper's links to the

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C a l i c a r t e l . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , S a m p e r q u i c k l y d e n i e d the a c c u s a t i o n s , and since the cassettes only recorded drug traffickers discussing paym e n t s to S a m p e r , he w a s c o r r e c t to s t a t e that t h e y did not d i r e c t l y i m plicate him. Nevertheless, for most U.S. officials these tapes alone were m o r e t h a n e n o u g h e v i d e n c e to c o n v i n c e t h e m that S a m p e r w a s c o r r u p t . A c c o r d i n g to S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l M i c h a e l S k o l . "If y o u listen to the t a p e s it r e a l l y d o e s n ' t s a y t o o m u c h a b o u t S a m p e r . Yet, I s u s p e c t that f e w p e o p l e in the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t a c t u a l l y e v e r listened to the t a p e s . " 2 0 S a m p e r q u i c k l y r e s p o n d e d to the a c c u s a t i o n s by s e n d i n g a letter to the Miami Herald in w h i c h he w r o t e : "I h a v e n e v e r r e c e i v e d m o n e y f r o m a n y t y p e of c r i m i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n in o r d e r to p r o m o t e m y p o l i t i c a l a c tivities, a n d m y c a m p a i g n b o o k s c a n p r o v e this, that I c o m p l i e d w i t h a strict i n t e r n a l a c c o u n t i n g of the o r i g i n of the f u n d s . " 2 1 S a m p e r a l s o s e n t a l e t t e r to m e m b e r s of the U . S . H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in w h i c h h e p r o m i s e d that t h e C a l i k i n g p i n s w o u l d g o to jail and that his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d c r e a t e an elite p o l i c e unit s p e c i f i c a l l y to c o n f r o n t the c a r t e l — s o m e t h i n g he i n d e e d did. 2 2 S a m p e r a l s o p r o m i s e d to m a k e the s e n t e n c e s a g a i n s t c o n v i c t e d d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s m o r e s e v e r e a n d p r o p o s e d the c r e a t i o n of a b i n a t i o n a l c o m m i s s i o n w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s in o r d e r to adopt joint antidrug strategies.21 W h i l e g e n e r a l l y c o n v i n c e d that S a m p e r w a s g u i l t y , t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t tried t o play d o w n the g r o w i n g c o n t r o v e r s y in o r d e r not to taint r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e n e w p r e s i d e n t b e f o r e h e h a d e v e n t a k e n o f f i c e . In c o m m e n t s that a l m o s t s e e m e d to e x c u s e S a m p e r e v e n if h e h a d c o m m i t t e d i l l e g a l a c t s , A l e x a n d e r W a t s o n , a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e f o r inter-American affairs, stated: I h a v e k n o w n S a m p e r for many y e a r s and c o n s i d e r him a f r i e n d , and f o r that t h e s e r e v e l a t i o n s have g i v e n m e p e r s o n a l pain. But I b e l i e v e that the i m p o r t a n t thing is to clarify these things as q u i c k l y as possible. . . . T h e Cali cartel is very p o w e r f u l now, and they have been trying to use their m o n e y in these elections. It would not be the first time that t h e s e m e n h a v e d o n e this type of t h i n g , and this is not the o n l y c o u n t r y w h e r e they do these things. R e m e m b e r that in the past P a b l o E s c o b a r of the M e d e l l i n cartel was d o i n g these things and had a p o w erful influence.24

U . S . a m b a s s a d o r to C o l o m b i a - d e s i g n a t e M y l e s F r e c h e t t e a l s o s o u n d e d c o n c i l i a t o r y a n d not o v e r l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h the g r o w i n g n a r c o - s c a n d a l : " M y i n s t r u c t i o n s are to w o r k as h a r d as p o s s i b l e with the n e w p r e s i d e n t

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o n c e he takes o f f i c e on A u g u s t 7 in o r d e r to increase c o o p e r a t i o n and I will do this. T h e s e are the i n s t r u c t i o n s that I like." 2 5 President Bill C l i n t o n took a similar position, m a n i f e s t e d in a letter he w r o t e to p r e s i d e n t - e l e c t S a m p e r in w h i c h he p r o m o t e d a s t r o n g bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d m a d e n o m e n t i o n of the n a r c o - c a s s e t t e s , alt h o u g h he did state that the d r u g w a r w a s the n u m b e r - o n e priority. 2 6 In a n o t h e r political m o v e s u g g e s t i n g that the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s l o o k i n g to s m o o t h o v e r the g r o w i n g s c a n d a l , a State D e p a r t m e n t s p o k e s m a n c a t e g o r i c a l l y d e n i e d the verity of a U n i t e d P r e s s I n t e r n a tional n e w s article that c l a i m e d the W h i t e H o u s e had c o n c l u d e d that S a m p e r had r e c e i v e d U . S . $ 3 million f r o m the Cali cartel: " [ T h e article] is false, it's not o f f i c i a l and it d o e s not reflect President C l i n t o n ' s policy toward Colombia."27 But w h i l e the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h m i g h t h a v e d e c i d e d not to m a k e a big issue out of the a c c u s a t i o n s against S a m p e r , there w e r e s o m e influential v o i c e s in C o n g r e s s — e s p e c i a l l y S e n a t o r Jesse H e l m s ( R - N . C . ) — w h o were already c l a i m i n g that the United States could not d o b u s i n e s s with the tainted S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . On July 16, H e l m s i n t r o d u c e d an a m e n d m e n t to the 1994 Foreign A s s i s t a n c e Act that w o u l d have only a l l o w e d U.S. assistance to C o l o m b i a if its g o v e r n m e n t better c o m p l i e d with U . S . - l e d c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s , a m o v e that s i g n a l e d h o w s o m e in the U . S . C o n g r e s s w e r e w a t c h i n g S a m p e r very c l o s e l y . 2 8 H o w e v e r , part of the m o t i v a t i o n f o r H e l m s ' s a m e n d m e n t w a s a g r o w i n g f r u s t r a tion not with S a m p e r , but with C é s a r G a v i r i a ' s d r u g e f f o r t s . 2 9 T h i s a m e n d m e n t w a s o p p o s e d by the W h i t e H o u s e and did not b e c o m e law; the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t w a s a l s o u n w i l l i n g to go a l o n g with H e l m s ' s t o u g h stance. R o b e r t G e l b a r d r e s p o n d e d to the p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t by stating: " L e t there be no d o u b t w h a t w o u l d o c c u r as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the actions that w e are taking in the legislature. We are g o i n g to deny, to o n e of o u r critical allies in the w a r on d r u g s , a c c e s s to the e q u i p m e n t a n d i n f o r m a t i o n that they n e e d to c o n t i n u e their w a r a g a i n s t d r u g s . " 3 0 But G e l b a r d ' s s t a t e m e n t w o u l d q u i c k l y c e a s e to be S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t policy. In fact, by the t i m e of C o l o m b i a ' s first d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n in 1996, G e l b a r d ' s c o n g r e s s i o n a l t e s t i m o n y e s s e n t i a l l y m i m i c k e d H e l m s ' s 1994 position, a point that r e i n f o r c e s the g r o w i n g a n t i - S a m p e r n a t u r e of U . S . policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a d u r i n g t h o s e years. L e a d i n g up to E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n day, t h e State D e p a r t m e n t c o n t i n u e d to feel out S a m p e r in o r d e r to see if he w o u l d be an ally on the d r u g front. 3 1 T h e first pivotal m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d then p r e s i d e n t - e l e c t E r n e s t o S a m p e r t o o k p l a c e in early July 1994

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in N e w York City and lasted f o r close to three hours. 3 2 Led by State Department officials Michael Skol and C r e s c e n i o Arcos, the U.S. delegation once again told S a m p e r that if he w o u l d act as if he were not receiving m o n e y f r o m the Cali t r a f f i c k e r s — t h a t is, if he would take a tough stance on d r u g s — t h e United States would act as if the links did not exist. 1 3 S a m p e r a g r e e d to the U.S. d e m a n d s , w h i c h included that he replace police c o m m a n d e r General O c t a v i o Vargas Silva, w h o s e n a m e w a s also m e n t i o n e d on the narco-cassettes, with G e n e r a l R o s s o José Serrano. 3 4 In S k o l ' s w o r d s , " w e m a d e a g e n t l e m e n ' s a g r e e m e n t ; he n e v e r a c c e p t e d the c h a r g e s , but a g r e e d that he w o u l d g o a l o n g with a t o u g h a n t i d r u g p o l i c y . " 3 5 Yet in return f o r c e d i n g to U . S . w i s h e s on the d r u g issue, S a m p e r asked that the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t issue a p u b l i c statement noting that t h e r e w a s no basis f o r the c l a i m that the S a m p e r c a m p a i g n had taken m o n e y f r o m the c a r t e l s . T h e State D e p a r t m e n t t e a m r e f u s e d to grant his wish, and what m i g h t h a v e b e e n an a g r e e m e n t to let sleeping d o g s lie regarding S a m p e r ' s d r u g c o n n e c t i o n s c a m e to n o t h i n g . Interestingly, while U.S. o f f i c i a l s m a y have not been fully a w a r e at that t i m e of its eventual i m p a c t , their s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t to bring in G e n eral S e r r a n o to head the N a t i o n a l P o l i c e w o u l d turn out to be a key m o v e — a n d victory f r o m the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e — i n that it a l l o w e d the U n i t e d States to c o n t i n u e its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s e v e n while increasingly isolating the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 3 6 A l t h o u g h G e n eral S e r r a n o w a s still t e c h n i c a l l y u n d e r the c o m m a n d of S a m p e r , U.S. p o l i c y — w h i c h w a s essentially U . S . c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s p o l i c y — g r a d u a l l y d e v e l o p e d a b i f u r c a t e d nature w h e r e b y the U n i t e d States w o u l d support and c o o p e r a t e with the " g o o d g u y s " such as G e n e r a l S e r r a n o and Chief P r o s e c u t o r A l f o n s o Valdivieso, while a t t a c k i n g the " b a d g u y s " such as S a m p e r and his interior minister, H o r a c i o Serpa. It surprised few, theref o r e , w h e n Interior Secretary B r u c e B a b b i t , a relatively low-level o f f i cial, led the U . S . d e l e g a t i o n to S a m p e r ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n w h i l e the presid e n t s of eight Latin A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s were p r e s e n t . 3 7

THE LEAHY AMENDMENT At the s a m e t i m e that J e s s e H e l m s w a s t o u g h e n i n g his s t a n c e a g a i n s t S a m p e r , Senator Patrick L e a h y ( D - V t . ) introduced legislation that would bar U.S. assistance to any e l e m e n t s within the C o l o m b i a n A r m e d Forces suspected of committing h u m a n rights abuses, a m o v e revealing that C o n gress w a s not in c o m p l e t e h a r m o n y r e g a r d i n g C o l o m b i a policy. 3 8 T h i s

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c o n c e r n o v e r the n a t u r e of U.S. military a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a was eventually addressed in the Leahy A m e n d m e n t to the 1996 international affairs budget, which b a n n e d assistance to any military unit "if the Secretary of State has credible e v i d e n c e to believe such unit has c o m m i t t e d gross violations of h u m a n rights unless the Secretary determines and reports to the C o m m i t t e e on Appropriations that the G o v e r n m e n t of such country is taking steps to bring the responsible m e m b e r s of the security forces to justice." 3 9 The Leahy A m e n d m e n t was intended to cover U.S. assistance to militaries a n y w h e r e in the world; one of its first true tests would c o m e in C o l o m b i a . The end result of the Leahy A m e n d m e n t ' s application to the Colombia case was that b e g i n n i n g in fiscal year 1997, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t was forced to credibly certify that the C o l o m b i a n military units receiving U.S. military assistance were not involved (or suspected of being involved) in h u m a n rights violations. While the impact this legislation had on U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a should not be d i s c o u n t e d , the L e a h y A m e n d m e n t never c a m e close to even suggesting that U.S. antidrug assistance to C o l o m b i a should be stopped or r e d u c e d . 4 0 Rather, it just made clear that aid could not go to abusive military units. In fact, counternarcotics assistance actually increased during this time as the United States cultivated partners outside the C o l o m b i a n military, a b o v e all the C o l o m b i a n National Police. 4 1 In M a r c h 1997 a Leahy A m e n d m e n t - d r i v e n controversy erupted bet w e e n m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s and the W h i t e H o u s e over the delivery of antidrug assistance to the C o l o m b i a n National Police. T h e point of contention centered on the fact that the 1996 and 1997 decertification decisions m e a n t that certain types of counternarcotics aid were being held up, thus n e c e s s i t a t i n g a presidential w a i v e r for t h e s e f u n d s to be released. 4 2 T h e Clinton administration delayed issuing this waiver, arguing that it was better to delay the release of these f u n d s in order to c o m ply with the "spirit of the L e a h y A m e n d m e n t . " T h i s m o v e i n f u r i a t e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l R e p u b l i c a n s and c o u n t l e s s hours and r e s o u r c e s were spent in hearings quibbling over these issues. T h i s i n f i g h t i n g n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the crux of the d e b a t e b e t w e e n C o n g r e s s and the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was not o v e r w h e t h e r these f u n d s should be released, but instead w h e n they should be released: the State D e p a r t m e n t w a n t e d to wait until the spirit of the L e a h y A m e n d ment had been assured, and the drug h a w k s wanted the materials delivered i m m e d i a t e l y . A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of State J e f f r e y D a v i d o w e x plained the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s thinking:

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T h e fact of the m a t t e r is, by a standard of c o m m o n sense . . . if w e ' r e putting the s a m e k i n d s of e q u i p m e n t into a country, under v a r i o u s authorities, that are g o i n g to be used b y — p e r h a p s by the s a m e units, if that unit gets its left boot under one authority and its right boot u n d e r another authority, if w e ' r e going to m a i n t a i n any sort of c o n s i s t e n c y in t e r m s of e n d - u s e m o n i t o r i n g , then w e ought to have a c o n s i s t e n c y in the s t a n d a r d s that are a p p l i e d . 4 1

These disputes over the composition of U.S. assistance to Colombia came to characterize a large part of "U.S. policy" toward Colombia at this time. The attention of the U.S. State Department was focused as much on mollifying Congress as it was on implementing policy in Colombia. Yet the true level of disagreement between the State Department and Congress was relatively slim, a point reinforcing the idea that the bureaucratic battle that was "Colombia policy" at this time was one in which most of the major players basically agreed with each other. In this sense, the seemingly large divide on Colombia policy between Senators Leahy and H e l m s — o r the more general debate in the House of Representatives between the Republican drug hawks and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party—was much narrower than first apparent. Patrick Leahy himself argued in a letter to the editor of the New York Times—in which he reiterated the importance of human rights in U.S. policy toward Colombia—that "[t]here should be no mistake that Congress and the Administration are committed to combating the drug trade." 4 4 The Leahy Amendment served as a reminder that for some in Congress, issues such as human rights needed to be incorporated into the war on drugs. According to one Democratic staff member on the Senate Appropriations Committee, "Our intention [with the Leahy Amendment] was to ensure that if we were going to fight the 'war on drugs' that we wouldn't disregard human rights in the process." 4 5 Yet the thrust of the congressional focus over Colombia policy nonetheless remained with the drug hawks, who constantly put the Clinton administration on the defensive, even though there is little to suggest that the White House was in any way soft on Colombia policy.

1994 COMES TO AN END The U.S. war on drugs increasingly became a war against Ernesto Samper. The transfer of the congressional majority from the Democrats to

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the Republicans in 1994 meant that Congress would press a hard line on the drug issue. Thus, c o m p a r e d to his predecessor, César Gaviria, w h o governed while the Democrats ruled the House of Representatives, Ernesto Samper would have to deal with a Republican C o n g r e s s — a n d by extension with a brand of U.S. policy that was m u c h more inclined to take a hard stand against any suspected lapses in fighting the war on drugs. W h i l e E r n e s t o S a m p e r was e v e n t u a l l y forced to do m o r e on the drug war issue than had any of his p r e d e c e s s o r s in order to have the semblance of good relations with the United States, for the rest of 1994 U.S.-Colombian relations were cordial. The U.S. g o v e r n m e n t remained deeply suspicious of Samper, but it was generally pleased with the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , m o s t l y b e c a u s e it s e e m e d that E r n e s t o S a m p e r was going to be tougher on drugs than had been César Gaviria. For example, in D e c e m b e r 1994, S a m p e r launched Operation Splendor, which c o n sisted of fumigating illicit crops in the southern departments of Guaviare and Putumayo. The f u m i g a t i o n efforts infuriated the campesinos in these areas w h o m a d e their livelihood f r o m g r o w i n g illicit crops. Soon a f t e r the operation started, t h o u s a n d s of c a m p e s i n o s m a r c h e d d e m a n d i n g an end to the spraying, o c c u p i e d seven oil p u m p i n g stations, and b o m b e d 4 0 , 0 0 0 barrels of oil c o m i n g f r o m Ecuador. S a m p e r ordered the military to f o r c i b l y r e m o v e the p r o t e s t e r s and also set up a U . S . $ 1 5 0 million f u n d for crop substitution. 4 6 T h e s e types of sporadic yet unprecedented counternarcotics actions c a m e to characterize Ernesto S a m p e r ' s presidency, and often took place right b e f o r e or a f t e r key U.S. d e c i s i o n s on C o l o m b i a policy such as drug c e r t i f i c a t i o n or the r e v o c a t i o n of S a m p e r ' s visa, s u g g e s t i n g that U.S. a r m - t w i s t i n g on the drug issue was h a v i n g the desired e f f e c t — a t least for the U n i t e d States. T h e s e actions also revealed S a m p e r ' s prof o u n d lack of credibility on the drug issue in Washington. K n o w i n g that critics both in C o l o m b i a and W a s h i n g t o n w e r e highly d u b i o u s a b o u t S a m p e r ' s willingness to fight the war on drugs, S a m p e r was forced to go f u r t h e r than either he or the United States had ever imagined. T h u s we h a v e the p a r a d o x i c a l situation w h e r e b y this s u p p o s e d l y n a r c o c o m p r o m i s e d president e n d e d up, w h e t h e r he liked it or not, being a reliable and predictable ally with Washington vis-à-vis the drug war. Ernesto S a m p e r ' s credibility gap, stemming f r o m his earlier p r o m o tion of drug legalization and c o m p o u n d e d by the narco-cassette revelations, forced him to g o v e r n C o l o m b i a with one e y e f o c u s e d on Washington. From the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s perspective, this concern with U.S. opinion served its interests: they knew that S a m p e r had to prove himself,

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so t h e y c o n s t a n t l y put p r e s s u r e o n h i m to e s c a l a t e his a n t i d r u g p o l i c i e s . A s will be s e e n , w h i l e S a m p e r did i n d e e d t a k e a s t r o n g e r s t a n c e on the d r u g issue, it w a s still not e n o u g h to a p p e a s e the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e cially s o m e vocal m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s . T h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a r o s e d e s p i t e the f a c t that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t w e n t to g r e a t l e n g t h s in W a s h ington to c o n v i n c e the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t that C o l o m b i a s h o u l d r e c e i v e full c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 4 7 In F e b r u a r y 1995. f o r e x a m p l e , S a m p e r sent yet a n o t h e r letter to the U.S. C o n g r e s s that listed the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s a c h i e v e m e n t s . T h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t k n e w that S a m p e r w a s critically w o u n d e d on the d r u g issue a n d t h e r e f o r e saw n o r e a s o n not to e x a c t as m a n y c o n c e s s i o n s out of his d e b i l i t a t e d p o s i t i o n as p o s s i b l e , n o m a t t e r what d a m a g e it m i g h t d o to the bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p . 4 8

COLOMBIA PASSES 1995 DRUG CERTIFICATION O n M a r c h 1, 1995, t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t d e c l a r e d C o l o m b i a — a l o n g with P e r u , B o l i v i a , P a r a g u a y , P a k i s t a n , a n d L e b a n o n — " u n c o o p e r a t i v e " o n the d r u g w a r , but it i s s u e d a n a t i o n a l interest w a i v e r to a v o i d full d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . W h a t is i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s m o v e is not that it g r a n t e d C o l o m b i a a n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t w a i v e r , b u t r a t h e r its r e a s o n s f o r d e c l a r i n g C o l o m b i a u n c o o p e r a t i v e . In a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n that would c h a n g e dramatically the f o l l o w i n g year, w h e n E r n e s t o S a m p e r h i m s e l f w o u l d be t h e r e a s o n f o r C o l o m b i a ' s d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , U . S . o f f i cials cited i n a d e q u a t e e f f o r t s to c r a c k d o w n on the Cali cartel as the b a s i s f o r their d e c i s i o n . 4 9 R o b e r t G e l b a r d stated in c o n g r e s s i o n a l t e s t i m o n y : Three countries were given national interest waivers for the first time: Colombia, primarily for its failure to take actions promised against the Cali cartel. We applaud the positive steps C o l o m b i a took last year against narcotics trafficking, most notably the d e c i s i o n to eradicate coca cultivation through aerial spraying. Our concern with Colombia, however, is its failure to address the most serious c h a l l e n g e — t h e kingpins and their vertically integrated trafficking organizations. Police and other o f f i c i a l s on the front lines s h o w e d considerable determination to bring drug traffickers to justice. . . . Nevertheless, the trafficking organizations and their leaders continue to operate with virtual impunity. 5 0

In spite of the State D e p a r t m e n t ' s f r u s t r a t i o n with the lack of p r o g r e s s on the d r u g f r o n t , a n d the s u b s e q u e n t " u n c o o p e r a t i v e " label, G e l b a r d a n d

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others believed that the pressure being applied by Washington was having the d e s i r e d e f f e c t . A s G e l b a r d testified, " T h i s y e a r ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n message is already h a v i n g an impact. C o l o m b i a has p r o m i s e d to m a k e significant p r o g r e s s i n c a r c e r a t i n g the leaders of the Cali c o c a i n e networks and eradicating all of the c o u n t r y ' s coca and o p i u m poppy cultivation." 5 1 T h i s belief was also shared by S e n a t o r Jesse H e l m s ' s staff, who wrote in a report: " M a n y C o l o m b i a n s in the public and private sector told the S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e that U.S. pressure, specifically Senator H e l m s ' July 1994 a m e n d m e n t and the 1995 HelmsM a c k - H a t c h C o l o m b i a bill, acted as a catalyst for the C o l o m b i a n gove r n m e n t ' s actions against Cali kingpins last year." 5 2 Based on the e v e n t s that transpired over the next y e a r — w h i c h included the arrest of six of the top seven Cali k i n g p i n s — a strong case can be made that U.S. pressure did greatly help to bring down the Cali cartel, especially the U.S. m o v e to bring in G e n e r a l S e r r a n o . But this fact did not prevent E r n e s t o S a m p e r f r o m issuing a sharp r e s p o n s e to the c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n , w h i c h he v i e w e d as u n a c c e p t a b l e and as a "unilateral decision of a foreign country." 5 3 R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the S a m p e r g o v e r n m e n t and W a s h i n g t o n worsened during a May 27, 1995, meeting in C o l o m b i a between Robert Gelbard and Foreign Minister R o d r i g o Pardo. T h e meeting was apparently going well until the issue of D E A agents o p e r a t i n g in C o l o m b i a c a m e up. A couple w e e k s earlier, on May 15, P a r d o had sent M y l e s Frechette a letter that listed nine new conditions limiting D E A a g e n t s ' conduct in C o l o m b i a , including the specification that D E A agents i n f o r m C o l o m bian o f f i c i a l s of their activities. 5 4 T h e reaction f r o m the U.S. g o v e r n ment had been predictably negative. So w h e n this issue surfaced in the m e e t i n g b e t w e e n G e l b a r d and P a r d o , it s p a r k e d a heated e x c h a n g e in which Gelbard stated that Pardo "could not talk to the United States that way." Pardo replied that "in C o l o m b i a we can." 5 5 T h e ill will generated f r o m the d i s a g r e e m e n t over the D E A controversy e s c a l a t e d later in 1995 w h e n i n d e p e n d e n t C o l o m b i a n c o n g r e s s man Carlos Alonso Lucio, w h o m the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t suspected of having links to the Cali cartel, p r o d u c e d tapes of r e c o r d e d c o n v e r s a t i o n s b e t w e e n D E A a g e n t s in C o l o m b i a and a g e n t s in their h e a d q u a r t e r s in Washington. T h e s e D E A agents apparently m a d e disparaging c o m m e n t s a b o u t the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t and, a c c o r d i n g to L u c i o , included mention of a plot to u n d e r m i n e the S a m p e r administration. 5 6 T h e s e accusations in turn p r o v o k e d a strong response f r o m the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , which v i e w e d any secret recordings of conversations m a d e

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b e t w e e n U . S . g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s to be illegal. S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s p o k e s m a n N i c h o l a s B u r n s s t a t e d : " W e are not h a p p y w i t h the c o n s i s t e n t l i t a n y of d e n u n c i a t i o n s m a d e b y c e r t a i n C o l o m b i a n o f f i c i a l s r e g a r d i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s of the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t . " 5 7 But m o r e t h a n R o b e r t G e l b a r d o r a n y o n e e l s e in the State D e p a r t m e n t , it w a s the d r u g h a w k s in C o n g r e s s w h o w e r e d e m a n d i n g that the U n i t e d S t a t e s t i g h t e n the s c r e w s o n C o l o m b i a , and this t o o w o u l d i n c r e a s i n g l y r e v o l v e a r o u n d Ernesto Samper himself. P r e s s u r e f r o m C a p i t o l Hill p i c k e d u p in the s p r i n g a n d s u m m e r o f 1 9 9 5 as s e v e r a l i n f l u e n t i a l c o n g r e s s m e n , S e n a t o r J e s s e H e l m s c h i e f a m o n g t h e m , s a w the i s s u a n c e of the n a t i o n a l interest w a i v e r as an a p p e a s e m e n t on the d r u g w a r a n d an e n d o r s e m e n t of a c o r r u p t p r e s i d e n t . H e l m s s t a t e d t h a t " t h e e f f e c t of t h i s d e c i s i o n is to d o n o t h i n g a b o u t C o l o m b i a ' s a b y s m a l r e c o r d , with our bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n t i n u i n g as if n o t h i n g is w r o n g . T h i s is a g r a v e m o r a l and political mistake." 5 1 4 H e l m s o n c e a g a i n p r o p o s e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s cut o f f all a n t i n a r c o t i c s aid a n d c o m m e r c i a l c o n c e s s i o n s to C o l o m b i a if its g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t a r r e s t a n d j a i l the C a l i c a r t e l ' s l e a d e r s . 5 9 H e l m s a l s o a n n o u n c e d t h a t he w o u l d p r e s e n t t h e m u c h a n t i c i p a t e d w i t n e s s " M a r i a , " w h o s u p p o s e d l y w o r k e d with the C a l i c a r t e l and w h o w o u l d t e s t i f y regarding the cartel's relationship with Ernesto Samper.60 " M a r i a " event u a l l y t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e the S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e o n J u l y 3 0 , 1 9 9 6 , a n d s t a t e d t h a t s h e w a s p r e s e n t at a m e e t i n g in 1989 w h e n E r n e s t o S a m p e r r e c e i v e d p a y m e n t s f r o m the Cali cartel in r e t u r n f o r his e x p e c t e d c o m m i t m e n t to o p p o s e a n y p o s s i b l e r e t u r n of e x t r a d i t i o n t o the United States.61

THE CRACKDOWN O N THE CALI CARTEL T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n of p r e s s u r e f r o m b o t h the State D e p a r t m e n t a n d C o n g r e s s n o d o u b t h a d an i n f l u e n c e o n S a m p e r ' s s u b s e q u e n t d e c i s i o n to crack d o w n on the Cali cartel. Not long after C o l o m b i a received the s t e r n w a r n i n g in t h e f o r m of a n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t w a i v e r as w e l l as t h e s t r o n g w o r d s f r o m G e l b a r d a n d H e l m s , S a m p e r a n n o u n c e d that he w a s d e p l o y i n g 6 , 0 0 0 elite t r o o p s to C a l i to s e a r c h f o r d r u g l e a d e r s . H e a l s o v o w e d to m a k e m o n e y - l a u n d e r i n g a c r i m e f o r the first t i m e , a p r o m i s e that b e c a m e law on M a y 31, 1995. 6 2 M o r e o v e r , in July, S a m p e r sent a letter d i r e c t l y to H e l m s stating that he w a s t a k i n g a s t r o n g role in the d r u g war. 6 3 B u t t h e s e a c t i o n s did not p r e v e n t C o l o m b i a f r o m b e i n g d e c e r t i f i e d

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the f o l l o w i n g year, f u r t h e r suggesting that U.S. policy in C o l o m b i a , beginning in the latter part of 1995 and continuing through 1996, had bec o m e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y obsessed with Ernesto S a m p e r himself. 6 4 W h e n General Serrano returned f r o m his post in Washington to take over as head of the C o l o m b i a n National Police, e v e n his most loyal supporters could not have imagined how effective he would be in bringing d o w n the Cali cartel. Upon a s s u m i n g o f f i c e , Serrano quickly fired s c o r e s of o f f i c e r s he believed to be c o r r u p t , i n c l u d i n g three c o l o n e l s , thirteen lieutenant colonels, t w e n t y - f i v e m a j o r s , and t w e n t y - s i x other mid-level o f f i c e r s . He also fired several t h o u s a n d r a n k - a n d - f i l e police o f f i c e r s . 6 5 E q u i p p e d with u p - t o - t h e - m i n u t e intelligence i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m the CIA and the D E A , 6 6 the C o l o m b i a n security f o r c e s then set sight on the Cali cartel, most notably in early 1995 w h e n they f o r m e d an elite Cali-based police squad m o d e l e d a f t e r the Bloque de Búsqueda, w h i c h had ultimately w o r k e d e f f e c t i v e l y against P a b l o Escobar. T h e s q u a d consisted of 6 , 0 0 0 special f o r c e s and c o n d u c t e d o v e r 2 0 0 raids against the Cali cartel and related criminal organizations. Six m o n t h s later this elite s q u a d — h a v i n g m o v e d its base to Bogotá and now flying into Cali u n a n n o u n c e d to reduce the c h a n c e s that corrupt officials in Cali would c o m p r o m i s e its o p e r a t i o n s — b e g a n raiding the b u s i n e s s e s and h o m e s of the Cali drug leaders. T h e y seized files, c o m p u t e r disks, and other e v i d e n c e and used t h e m to i m p l i c a t e the kingpins, as well as to uncover connections between the traffickers and politicians or other g o v e r n m e n t officials. G e n e r a l S e r r a n o ' s results w e r e u n p r e c e d e n t e d in the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s decades-long fight against drug traffickers. S e r r a n o ' s unit had arrested the very kingpins w h o s e jailing the United States had earlier d e m a n d e d . 6 7 W a s h i n g t o n ' s r e a c t i o n to the arrests w a s p r e d i c t a b l y f a v o r a b l e ( w a r r a n t s w e r e issued by the n e w chief prosecutor, A l f o n s o Valdivieso, w h o along with G e n e r a l S e r r a n o was seen to be an ally to the U n i t e d States). 6 8 President C l i n t o n ' s d r u g policy adviser, Lee P. B r o w n , stated: " C o l o m b i a gets t w o t h u m b s up f r o m m e for this. . . . T h e y h a v e m a d e a g o o d start." 6 9 A n e m o t i o n a l M y l e s F r e c h e t t e c o m m e n t e d that "this was a triumph of the S a m p e r administration and one that without d o u b t is going to i m p r o v e the relation b e t w e e n C o l o m b i a and the United States." 7 0 Nevertheless, m u c h to his frustration, Ernesto S a m p e r did not receive credit for the successful c r a c k d o w n on the Cali cartel; rather, the resolve to do something against the traffickers quickly b e c a m e personified in the f o r m of General Serrano, w h o s e success was seen in Washington to be taking place in spite of Ernesto Samper.

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W h i l e t h e r e is little d o u b t that m u c h of the c r e d i t f o r the c r a c k d o w n lies in the e f f o r t s of G e n e r a l S e r r a n o a n d his m e n , s o m e C o l o m b i a n o f f i c i a l s w h o w o r k e d with S a m p e r b e l i e v e that he truly w a s c o m m i t t e d to c o n f r o n t i n g t h e d r u g i s s u e in o r d e r to d e m o n s t r a t e his r e s o l v e t o the Colombian populace. As Samper's second High Commissioner for P e a c e , D a n i e l G a r c í a - P e ñ a J a r a m i l l o w a s o n e of s e v e r a l h i g h - l e v e l C o l o m b i a n o f f i c i a l s w h o s h a r e d t h i s v i e w . A c c o r d i n g to G a r c í a - P e ñ a , " S a m p e r w a s t o u g h o n the d r u g i s s u e b e c a u s e he w a n t e d to p r o v e his e n e m i e s w r o n g . " 7 1 N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , the v i e w f r o m the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w a s m u c h d i f f e r e n t . O n e U . S . o f f i c i a l r e m a r k e d in an i n t e r v i e w that S a m p e r " t o o k the c r e d i t f o r e v e r y t h i n g , but he h a d n o input. It w a s S e r r a n o b a c k e d u p b y us that did the trick w i t h C a l i . " 7 2 T h e s e c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of S a m p e r ' s i n t e g r i t y on the d r u g w a r r e v e a l h o w b o t h s i d e s s a w the i s s u e so d i f f e r e n t l y : W a s h i n g t o n v i e w e d S a m p e r as an o b s t a c l e ( a l t h o u g h an i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n v e n i e n t o n e ) to its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s ; the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a w itself a s t h e c h a m p i o n of t h e s e s t r e n g t h e n e d a n t i d r u g o p e r a t i o n s . U . S . p o l i c y t o w a r d C o l o m b i a a l s o b e c a m e e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y p e r s o n a l i z e d . L e d by R o b e r t G e l b a r d , a n d to a l e s s e r e x t e n t M y l e s F r e c h e t t e , W a s h i n g t o n w a s a t t e m p t ing to u n d e r m i n e E r n e s t o S a m p e r — a n d t r a d i t i o n a l l y o n e of its m o s t rel i a b l e a l l i e s in L a t i n A m e r i c a — a t all c o s t s . T h i s b a s e , p e r s o n a l s t a n c e t o w a r d S a m p e r c o n t i n u e d f o r the r e m a i n d e r of his p r e s i d e n c y .

1995 COMES TO A N END B y t h e m i d d l e of 1 9 9 5 the s t a t e of the d r u g w a r s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s g e t t i n g w h a t it w a n t e d in C o l o m b i a , e x e m p l i f i e d by the r a p i d d i s m a n t l i n g of the C a l i c a r t e l . M o r e o v e r , that the D E A a n d the C I A w e r e a c t i v e l y a s s i s t i n g in t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e c a r t e l ' s l e a d e r s m a d e m a n y in W a s h i n g t o n b e l i e v e that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d w o r k w i t h t h e n e w C o l o m b i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . E v e n if m o s t of the c r e d i t f o r t h i s p r o g r e s s w a s g o i n g to G e n e r a l S e r r a n o a n d n o t E r n e s t o S a m p e r , it did s e e m as t h o u g h a n y initial a v e r s i o n that the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t h a d to w o r k i n g w i t h S a m p e r w a s a b a t i n g . B u t t h i s i n c i p i e n t t h a w in t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o s i t i o n t o w a r d S a m p e r w a s p u t o n h o l d w h e n in late 1 9 9 5 n e w r e v e l a t i o n s e m e r g e d a b o u t his i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h the C a l i c a r tel d u r i n g his 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4 c a m p a i g n f o r the p r e s i d e n c y . 7 3 F u r t h e r m o r e , the e u p h o r i a and o p t i m i s m g e n e r a t e d by the crackd o w n on the Cali cartel was m o r e than offset by the smaller, seemingly

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tangential issues such as the controversies over the role of the D E A in C o l o m b i a or the p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s leaked in the C o l o m b i a n C o n gress. T h i s frustration continued into the 1996 certification process, in which, g i v e n the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s virtual d i s m a n t l i n g of the Cali cartel, full certification should have been e n s u r e d . Yet rather than being r e w a r d e d for its e f f o r t s , C o l o m b i a was instead d e c e r t i f i e d . T h i s suggests that, unlike the Gaviria years when B o g o t á could disagree with W a s h i n g t o n on c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s issues and still e n j o y w a r m relations (and receive certification), now S a m p e r had to provide full and unconditional cooperation with the United States. With a tainted president like S a m p e r in o f f i c e , dismantling the Cali cartel w o u l d not be e n o u g h . E v e n though it had a c c o m p l i s h e d what it wanted regarding the Cali cartel, the United States was willing to let the bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p d e t e r i o r a t e b e c a u s e there were issues on w h i c h C o l o m b i a was less than fully cooperative. The United States would not tolerate such a f f r o n t s f r o m a corrupt president, an act m a d e easier given that there were f e w c o n s e q u e n c e s for treating C o l o m b i a with such contempt. A n d u n f o r t u n a t e l y for the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t , the r e m a i n der of 1995 saw a variety of new revelations that caused the U.S. government to sour on the S a m p e r administration, no matter how successful it was in tearing d o w n the Cali cartel. 7 4

THE SAMPER SCANDAL ERUPTS T h e P r o c e s o 8 0 0 0 s c a n d a l , w h i c h w o u l d r a v a g e C o l o m b i a for the next f e w y e a r s , started in e a r l y 1995. N e w chief p r o s e c u t o r A l f o n s o Vald i v i e s o b e g a n to b u i l d a m o u n t a i n of c a s e s that r e v o l v e d a r o u n d the drug m o n e y - r e l a t e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of nine p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r s of the L i b e r a l Party. T h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n e v e n t u a l l y i n v o l v e d a c c u s a t i o n s and indictments against more than twenty-five legislators and executive b r a n c h o f f i c i a l s . 7 5 V a l d i v i e s o ' s investigative p e r s i s t e n c e b e g a n to pay off in April 1995 w h e n his t e a m revealed e x t e n s i v e lists, seized d u r i n g the n o w i n c r e a s i n g r a i d s on d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s ' h o m e s and b u s i n e s s e s , that d o c u m e n t e d the n a m e s of p o l i t i c i a n s , p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , and o t h e r s w h o h a d s u p p o s e d l y r e c e i v e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m the Cali c a r t e l . 7 6 T r u e to f o r m , s e e i n g h o w violently the M e d e l l i n cartel had reacted to the i s s u e of e x t r a d i t i o n in the late 1980s and e a r l y 1990s, in A u g u s t 1995 the C o l o m b i a n p o l i c e f o u n d a b o m b a l o n g V a l d i v i e s o ' s r o u t e to w o r k .

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V a l d i v i e s o ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w h i c h o v e r time publicly i n f i l t r a t e d the inner circles of E r n e s t o S a m p e r ' s c a m p a i g n team, r e c e i v e d a n o t h e r big b r e a k on July 26, 1995, w h e n S a m p e r ' s c a m p a i g n t r e a s u r e r , S a n t i a g o M e d i n a , w a s a r r e s t e d on c h a r g e s of illegal e n r i c h m e n t . D u r i n g the arrest, p r o s e c u t o r s f o u n d a copy of a c h e c k f r o m a cartel f r o n t c o m p a n y given to the Liberal Party and e n d o r s e d by Medina, f u r t h e r implicating the S a m p e r c a m p a i g n . 7 7 In S e p t e m b e r , M e d i n a stated that not only did U . S . $ 6 m i l l i o n c o m e into the c a m p a i g n f r o m the Cali c a r t e l , but also that S a m p e r k n e w a b o u t the transaction. 7 8 Ultimately, M e d i n a p r o v i d e d p r o s e c u t o r s with a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 0 0 d o c u m e n t s that linked the S a m p e r c a m p a i g n to the Cali cartel. M e d i n a r e c e i v e d a s e n t e n c e of s i x t y - f o u r m o n t h s in prison. 7 9 S o o n a f t e r M e d i n a ' s arrest and c o n f e s s i o n , on A u g u s t 15, S a m p e r ' s f o r m e r presidential c a m p a i g n m a n a g e r , F e r n a n d o B o t e r o — t h e n d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r — w a s arrested f o r illegal e n r i c h m e n t . T h e impetus for the arrest c a m e directly f r o m M e d i n a ' s c o n f e s s i o n , in which he stated that B o t e r o had solicited d r u g f u n d s . Botero f o l l o w e d M e d i n a ' s e x a m p l e and agreed to c o o p e r a t e with the P r o s e c u t o r ' s O f f i c e . His s u b s e q u e n t t e s t i m o n y w a s e v e n m o r e d a m a g i n g to S a m p e r than M e d i n a ' s had b e e n . 8 0 In t w o interviews f r o m jail. B o t e r o said that S a m p e r knew about the c o n t r i b u tions; he also r e v e a l e d the e x i s t e n c e of an O c t o b e r 1994 letter f r o m the Cali c a r t e l ' s R o d r i g u e z b r o t h e r s to S a m p e r in w h i c h t h e b r o t h e r s rem i n d e d S a m p e r that they had " g l a d l y j o i n e d the cause at an o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t , a n d h a d m o d e s t l y tried to h e l p w i t h o u t any t y p e of g u a r a n t e e . " 8 1 T h a t the U . S . C o n g r e s s a n d o t h e r a g e n c i e s in W a s h i n g t o n had seen B o t e r o as an ally g a v e e v e n g r e a t e r weight to the v e r a c i t y of his t e s t i m o n y , e v e n if he t o o w a s n o w b e i n g a c c u s e d of r e c e i v i n g d r u g m o n e y . 8 2 B o t e r o w a s s e n t e n c e d to sixty-three m o n t h s in jail and given a U . S . $ 2 million fine. T h e r e v e l a t i o n s of both M e d i n a and B o t e r o o n c e a g a i n f o c u s e d W a s h i n g t o n ' s attention on Ernesto S a m p e r ' s links to the Cali cartel. T h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g s u s p i c i o n s that S a m p e r w a s r e c e i v i n g d r u g m o n e y , a n d e v e n the i n f a m o u s narco-cassettes, had not provided c o n c l u s i v e proof of his i n v o l v e m e n t . B u t n o w t w o of his t o p c a m p a i g n o f f i c i a l s w e r e both r e v e a l i n g the e x t e n t to w h i c h d r u g m o n e y f r o m the Cali cartel h a d inf i l t r a t e d S a m p e r ' s c a m p a i g n . For m a n y in the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , M e d ina's and B o t e r o ' s t e s t i m o n y was proof positive that S a m p e r ' s c a m p a i g n w a s i n e x t r i c a b l y tied to d r u g m o n e y . T h i s s c a n d a l , they b e l i e v e d , h a d c o m p r o m i s e d his ability to g o v e r n C o l o m b i a a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , to p r o s e c u t e the d r u g war.

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O n D e c e m b e r 14, 1995, the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s ' s C o m m i t t e e of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s a n d A c c u s a t i o n s — w h i c h h a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to investigate the p r e s i d e n t — d e c i d e d in a 1 4 - 1 vote that there were i n s u f ficient g r o u n d s f o r p u r s u i n g a l l e g a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g S a m p e r ' s d r u g c o n nection. 8 3 This w a s decided despite M e d i n a ' s testimony; most o b s e r v e r s attributed the s h o c k i n g decision to the fact that S a m p e r ' s Liberal Party d o m i n a t e d the c h a m b e r . T h e c o m m i t t e e ' s d e c i s i o n s o l i d i f i e d U.S. aversion to S a m p e r personally. In turn, this d i s g u s t d o m i n a t e d U . S . p o l i c y a n d the bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the r e m a i n d e r of his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . R o b e r t G e l b a r d r e s p o n d e d to the c o m m i t t e e ' s decision by stating: "It is evident that this w a s not a serious investigation. T h e c o m m i t t e e ' s e f f o r t s s h o w that there are still certain p e o p l e in p o w e r linked to drug t r a f f i c k e r s . " M y l e s F r e c h e t t e b a c k e d up G e l b a r d by c o m m e n t i n g that G e l b a r d ' s s t a t e m e n t " r e p r e s e n t e d the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o i n t of v i e w . . . this is a fact, not a c r i t i c i s m . " 8 4 A l o n g with the g r o w i n g scandal s u r r o u n d i n g the Cali c a r t e l ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to S a m p e r ' s e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n , o t h e r e v e n t s in the fall of 1995 s e r v e d to w o r s e n U . S . - C o l o m b i a n r e l a t i o n s . 8 5 At the s a m e t i m e that the C o m m i t t e e of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s and A c c u s a t i o n s d e c i d e d to halt its investigation into S a m p e r ' s election f i n a n c e s , a law that w o u l d h a v e dec r i m i n a l i z e d " i l l e g a l e n r i c h m e n t , " a p p a r e n t l y w r i t t e n with the h e l p of l a w y e r s r e p r e s e n t i n g the Cali c a r t e l , p a s s e d in the C o l o m b i a n S e n a t e ( 5 6 - 3 2 ) , m a k i n g it the third t i m e in t w o y e a r s that this " n a r c o - r i d e r " l e g i s l a t i o n h a d p a s s e d in at least o n e of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h o u s e s . W h i l e this bill did not pass the l o w e r c h a m b e r and thus did not b e c o m e law, it i n f u r i a t e d U.S. officials, w h o were c o n v i n c e d that S a m p e r w a s the driving f o r c e behind the a m e n d m e n t . S a m p e r also floated the idea that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t should a t t e m p t to r e d u c e the role of " f a c e l e s s j u d g e s , " a j u d i c i a l c o n c e p t that m a n y , i n c l u d i n g those in W a s h i n g t o n , b e l i e v e d w a s crucial in the f i g h t a g a i n s t the d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s . 8 6 A m b a s s a d o r M y l e s F r e c h e t t e stated that " a n e n d to the f a c e l e s s j u s t i c e s y s t e m w o u l d h a v e a t e r r i b l e i m p a c t on d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g a n d t e r r o r i s m . . . . W i t h o u t it, j u d g e s will begin to be s l a u g h t e r e d like b e f o r e the law e x i s t e d . " 8 7 W h e n the o u t c r y f r o m the U n i t e d States r e a c h e d S a m p e r , he r e v e r s e d his p o s i t i o n a n d stated that he did not s u p p o r t such an i d e a , but the i m p r e s s i o n h e m a d e with his initial b a c k i n g r e m a i n e d f i r m in the m i n d s of U.S. o f f i c i a l s in W a s h i n g ton a n d B o g o t á . A n o t h e r m a j o r issue that c a u s e d g r e a t a n n o y a n c e w i t h i n the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w a s the realization that m a n y of the recently arrested Cali

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k i n g p i n s w e r e a c t u a l l y l i v i n g q u i t e w e l l in p r i s o n a n d , at t i m e s , e v e n c o n t i n u i n g to r u n t h e i r d r u g - t r a f f i c k i n g o p e r a t i o n s f r o m w i t h i n the p r i s o n c o m p o u n d s . U . S . o f f i c i a l s w e r e e s p e c i a l l y d i s g r u n t l e d by the fact that the R o d r i g u e z b r o t h e r s w e r e h a v i n g c e l l u l a r p h o n e s s m u g g l e d to t h e m in the L a P i c o t a p r i s o n , w h i c h p r e s u m a b l y a l l o w e d t h e m to c o n t i n u e r u n n i n g their d r u g e m p i r e s . M o r e o v e r , s e v e r a l of the c a r t e l l e a d e r s w e r e n o w e l i g i b l e to r e c e i v e r e d u c e d s e n t e n c e s , d u e in p a r t to l e g a l t e c h n i c a l i t i e s c o d i f i e d in t h e C o l o m b i a n p e n a l s y s t e m . D E A c h i e f T h o m a s C o n s t a n t i n e s t a t e d t h a t " [ t ] h e w h o l e t h i n g will be a s h a m if t h o s e g u y s f t h e R o d r i g u e z b r o t h e r s ] d o not stay l o c k e d up. . . . If t h e y w a l k out or get little or n o t i m e , it is ridiculous." 1 * 8 C o n t r a r y to the g e n e r a l p e r c e p t i o n that the n e w l y a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e of S a m p e r ' s d r u g l i n k s c a u s e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to v i r t u a l l y b r e a k off r e l a t i o n s , it is c l e a r that the C a l i c a r t e l ' s c o m f o r t a b l e p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s f u e l e d W a s h i n g t o n ' s p e r c e p t i o n that the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s b a c k t r a c k i n g in its f i g h t a g a i n s t the C a l i cartel. O v e r the c o u r s e of o n l y a f e w m o n t h s , the r e l a t i v e d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n W a s h i n g t o n a n d B o g o t á w a s r e p l a c e d by a n i m o s i t y , a c c u s a t i o n s , a n d m i s t r u s t on b o t h sides. A s o n e U . S . o f f i c i a l c o m m e n t e d , " T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n that S e r r a n o a n d V a l d i v i e s o are d o i n g t h e i r b e s t , a n d that is a lot. . . . T h e p r o b l e m is, a f t e r t h e m , w h o c a n y o u t r u s t ? It is f a i r to s a y t h i n g s are at their worst level ever."89 Samper, w h o himself was b e c o m i n g fed up w i t h U . S . a r m - t w i s t i n g , s t a t e d at a y e a r - e n d n e w s c o n f e r e n c e that C o l o m b i a w o u l d n o t b e a d o c i l e p a r t n e r w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d that he c e r t a i n l y did not f e a r a n y t h r e a t of d r u g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Yet it w o u l d i n d e e d be the 1996 d r u g c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , set to t a k e p l a c e in o n l y a f e w m o n t h s , that w o u l d r e f l e c t h o w c r i t i c a l l y d a m a g e d the b i l a t e r a l relationship had become.

THE 1996 DECERTIFICATION DECISION If t h e 1 9 9 6 d r u g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n t o w a r d C o l o m b i a h a d b e e n e v a l u a t e d o n t h e c r i t e r i a laid o u t b y t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g t h e 1995 c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s (i.e., g a i n s a g a i n s t the C a l i c a r t e l ) , t h e r e is little d o u b t t h a t f r o m a n o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d C o l o m b i a s h o u l d h a v e rec e i v e d f u l l c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Yet t h e r e w a s little o b j e c t i v i t y in t h e 1996 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of C o l o m b i a . w T h e c r i t e r i a h a d s h i f t e d f r o m a n e m p h a s i s o n t h e C a l i c a r t e l t o t h e p e r s o n a l c o n d u c t of E r n e s t o S a m p e r . R o b e r t G e l b a r d ' s t e s t i m o n y o n M a r c h 7 , 1 9 9 6 , in w h i c h he j u s t i f i e d t h e S t a t e

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Department's d e c i s i o n to decertify C o l o m b i a , clearly s h o w s the c h a n g e in U . S . p o l i c y : The decision to deny Colombia certification was not made lightly. We work with some extremely dedicated Colombian officials who, in spite of tremendous odds, have continued to attack the drug syndicates. . . . During mid-1995, the situation appeared to be improving— the Colombian National Police arrested a number of the leading Cali kingpins and the country's top prosecutor launched a sweeping corruption investigation that left no branch of the government untouched. . . . [T]hese efforts have been undercut at every turn, however, by a government and a legislature not only plagued by corruption, but which are fostering corruption in order to protect themselves. The Cali traffickers have been running their operations from prison, and the Prosecutor General has been the target of a public campaign to undermine and discredit his efforts. 9 1 Gelbard's position w a s similar to that o f the drug h a w k s in the U.S. C o n g r e s s , s u c h as J e s s e H e l m s . B y the t i m e o f the 1 9 9 6 c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , U . S . p o l i c y toward C o l o m b i a w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y characterized by a sense of agreement that the U n i t e d States should take a firm stance against the S a m p e r administration, e x c e p t for its trusted allies such as General Serrano and V a l d i v i e s o . In a letter to S e n a t e Majority Leader Robert D o l e a f e w days b e f o r e the certification d e c i s i o n , H e l m s wrote: Based on the clear evidence presented by President Samper's closest personal confidants and collaborators, and the firsthand information obtained in this report, I recommend that the United States decertify Colombia this year with no national interest waiver. . . . No government can be completely committed to obliterating the drug cartels, drug corruption, and drug-related violence, nor effective in the achievement of these goals, if its senior officials owe fealty to drug kingpins. The Colombian government will never be dedicated to fighting drugs or drug corruption as long as Ernesto Samper is its leader, and its politicians, police, and judiciary are all guided by the money of drug kingpins. 9 2 E c h o i n g Gelbard, Marc T h i e s s e n , a m e m b e r of H e l m s ' s staff on the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , m a d e it c l e a r that d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w a s about Ernesto Samper: "This is a decertification not o f C o l o m b i a , but o f President Samper. This is a vote o f no c o n f i d e n c e for him, not the c o u n try." 93 S o o n after the decertification d e c i s i o n , H e l m s a n n o u n c e d that the

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U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d be w i l l i n g a n d a b l e to work with C o l o m b i a (and p o s s i b l y m o v e t o w a r d c e r t i f i c a t i o n ) if S a m p e r were not p r e s i d e n t . 9 4 It is also clear that U.S. d o m e s t i c political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were driving C o l o m b i a policy. T h e 1996 c e r t i f i c a t i o n process took p l a c e d u r i n g a U . S . election year, a n d f e w C o n g r e s s m e m b e r s w a n t e d to be p o r t r a y e d as s o f t on d r u g s . 9 i In an i n t e r v i e w with N a t i o n a l P u b l i c R a d i o , M y l e s F r e c h e t t e m a d e this p o i n t c l e a r l y : "I b e l i e v e that the c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s f o r the b e h a v i o r in 1995 is g o i n g to be m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l t in W a s h i n g t o n this year b e c a u s e , first of all, the c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s policies of the U n i t e d States n o w m a k e up a part of the d i s c u s s i o n s of the presidential c a m p a i g n . " 9 6 An additional f a c t o r that sealed the decision to d e c e r t i f y C o l o m b i a w a s that R o b e r t G e l b a r d had in e f f e c t d e c i d e d to " o u t - r a d i c a l i z e " the drug h a w k s in C o n g r e s s . U p until this point C o n g r e s s had used the certification p r o c e s s as a sort of saber-rattling exercise through which they a p p e a r e d c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the w a r on d r u g s . D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s w e r e a l m o s t a l w a y s r e s e r v e d f o r " r o g u e s t a t e s " like A f g h a n i s t a n and Nigeria and not f o r m o r e " u p s t a n d i n g " c o u n t r i e s like M e x i c o or C o l o m bia. B u t n o w G e l b a r d , in what i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p e a r e d a s e l f - a p p o i n t e d role as " A m e r i c a ' s N u m b e r - O n e D r u g C o p , " w a s p u s h i n g e v e n h a r d e r than C o n g r e s s on the c e r t i f i c a t i o n issue. T h i s stance w a s c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that W a s h i n g t o n was g o i n g to c e r t i f y d r u g - r i d d l e d M e x i c o , w h i c h put p r e s s u r e on the State D e p a r t m e n t to d e c e r t i f y at least o n e m a j o r d r u g - p r o d u c i n g c o u n t r y in o r d e r to soothe its critics in C o n g r e s s . With E r n e s t o S a m p e r in o f f i c e , the easy c h o i c e was C o l o m b i a . 9 7

SAMPER DEFENDS HIMSELF T h e shared f r u s t r a t i o n s t e m m i n g f r o m both C o n g r e s s a n d the State Dep a r t m e n t w a s not d u e solely to M e d i n a ' s and B o t e r o ' s c o n f e s s i o n s about S a m p e r ' s d r u g links, but also to S a m p e r ' s positions on f a c e l e s s j u d g e s a n d the n a r c o - r i d e r bill. U.S. o f f i c i a l s n o w were c o n v i n c e d that S a m p e r h a d g o n e soft on d r u g s . A c c o r d i n g to o n e U.S. official, " S a m p e r , on the o n e h a n d , w a s saying he w a s c o o p e r a t i n g with us, but u n d e r the table he w a s c o o p e r a t i n g with C o l o m b i a ' s c o n g r e s s to pass laws, so i m p u n i t y is e v e n m o r e total. T h a t w a s u n t e n a b l e . " 9 8 T h i s fact brings up a key chara c t e r i s t i c of the U . S . v i e w of S a m p e r : the U.S. h a d b e c o m e p a r a n o i d a b o u t S a m p e r ' s c r e d i b i l i t y to the p o i n t that it a l m o s t a u t o m a t i c a l l y ass u m e d that he w a s not d o i n g e n o u g h on the d r u g w a r or that he w a s

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s o m e h o w s u b v e r t i n g U . S . - l e d antidrug e f f o r t s . N o w that W a s h i n g t o n was unalterably convinced that S a m p e r was a narco-president, there was nothing that S a m p e r could do short of c o m p l e t e cooperation to c h a n g e this perception. But the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n did not take these actions lying d o w n . A r m e d with the k n o w l e d g e that the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t in 1995 spent U . S . $ 9 0 0 million on antidrug e f f o r t s and that 500 of its security agents were killed in the process, S a m p e r responded quickly and forcefully to the U.S. decertification decision. In one nationally broadcast speech, for e x a m p l e , S a m p e r lambasted the decision: "We put the m o n e y and the deaths in the drug war. And others reserved the right to sit and j u d g e us." Earlier, at a year-end (1995) n e w s c o n f e r e n c e , Samper had stated that he was "not losing any sleep over the possibility of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . . . . C o l o m b i a is too g r o w n up to have to pass e x a m s every year. . . . I am not going to allow this country to have to be passing e x a m s set by any country in the world, but at the same time, we are not going to lower our guard in the fight against d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g , bec a u s e it is in our national interest to fight." 9 9 On M a r c h 20, 1996, S a m p e r c o n t i n u e d his o f f e n s i v e during an interview with j o u r n a l i s t C h a r l e s K r a u s e on P B S ' s News Hour with Jim Lehrer in which he reiterated his c o m m i t m e n t to fight drugs as well as his innocence in the c a m p a i g n scandal. S a m p e r ' s defiant stance reveals that on the d o m e s t i c level he d e f t l y stood up to what he believed were s a n c t i m o n i o u s and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e policies on the part of Washington. But no matter how m u c h S a m p e r stood up to the United States for domestic political reasons, he nonetheless had to cooperate with Washi n g t o n ' s c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s p r e d i l e c t i o n s or f a c e c o m p l e t e isolation, s o m e t h i n g that he felt C o l o m b i a c o u l d not a f f o r d to do. To that end, S a m p e r soon m u t e d his d e f i a n t stance and instead g a v e a s p e e c h in w h i c h he hinted that he might resign if it would serve to improve relations with the United States, although his s p o k e s p e r s o n s quickly denied that this was the intended m e a n i n g .

THE COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT LOSES HIS VISA F o l l o w i n g the M a r c h 1996 d e c i s i o n to d e c e r t i f y C o l o m b i a , f e w observers would have imagined that U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relations could possibly get any worse. T h e y did. F o l l o w i n g B o t e r o ' s incriminating revelat i o n s against S a m p e r , on F e b r u a r y 14, 1996, the P r o s e c u t o r ' s O f f i c e

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f o r m a l l y accused S a m p e r of illegal activities, paving the way for another vote in the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s . 1 0 0 Several months later, on June 12, the Liberal P a r t y - d o m i n a t e d l o w e r c h a m b e r decided once again not to pursue the c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t the C o l o m b i a n president in a 1 1 1 - 4 3 vote. 1 0 1 T h e vote m e a n t that the p r e s i d e n t could not be tried by the C o l o m b i a n Senate or be investigated by the C o l o m b i a n S u p r e m e Court. In a reaction that by this time had b e c o m e routine, the United States railed a g a i n s t the d e c i s i o n . State D e p a r t m e n t s p o k e s m a n N i c h o l a s Burns said that the vote " w a s not based on an e x h a u s t i v e review of the e v i d e n c e . " ' 0 2 B u r n s also m a d e it quite clear to the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a tion that it e i t h e r d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the drug issue or risk f a c i n g severe c o n s e q u e n c e s : " [ T h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ] has the next m o n t h or t w o or so to c o n v i n c e the U n i t e d States that it is going to be a more serious, m o r e e f f e c t i v e , more c o m m i t t e d partner in the fight against narc o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g . . . . C o l o m b i a w o u l d , in e f f e c t , be a pariah state, should we c h o o s e to go d o w n this r o a d . " 1 0 1 And while still d e f i a n t , in a c h a n g e of tactics S a m p e r c u l t i v a t e d a c o n c i l i a t o r y r e s p o n s e and o n c e a g a i n a n n o u n c e d n e w a n t i d r u g m e a s u r e s : "We are f o r c e d to w o r k tog e t h e r . . . . N o n e of t h e s e m e a s u r e s I a n n o u n c e d can be c a r r i e d out w i t h o u t the c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e U n i t e d States. We need e a c h o t h e r to k e e p w o r k i n g , we have an u n b r e a k a b l e marriage, and I h o p e w h e n this storm is past we can j o i n t l y e v a l u a t e w h e r e we are in the fight against drug trafficking."104 A l s o r e f e r r i n g to the v o t e , P r e s i d e n t Bill C l i n t o n said that " t h e U n i t e d States j u d g e s its r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the two c o u n t r i e s by one standard: w h e t h e r they are c o o p e r a t i n g with us in the fight against narc o t i c s . " 1 0 5 W h i l e it is c e r t a i n that t h e r e w a s g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t within the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t that the l o w e r h o u s e ' s vote was u n a c c e p t a b l e , the d r i v i n g f o r c e b e h i n d taking g r e a t e r steps to isolate S a m p e r c a m e f r o m A m b a s s a d o r M y l e s F r e c h e t t e . 1 0 6 A m e m o r a n d u m written by F r e c h e t t e , first p u b l i s h e d on J u n e 30 by the Washington Post, urged the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t to " i s o l a t e and d e b i l i t a t e " S a m p e r , including the revocation of his visa. T h e p u b l i c a t i o n of F r e c h e t t e ' s m e m o c a u s e d an u p r o a r in C o l o m b i a , r e v e a l i n g h o w f a r the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t was willing to go in o r d e r to p u n i s h S a m p e r a f t e r t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v o t e . 1 0 7 T h i s u p r o a r started a highly p e r s o n a l f e u d b e t w e e n Frechette and S a m p e r that lasted until F r e c h e t t e left C o l o m b i a in the fall of 1997. 10 » On July 11, 1996, the United States followed Frechette's advice and stripped C o l o m b i a ' s democratically elected president of his visa to enter the United States. 1 0 9 While the United States intended this m o v e to further

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isolate S a m p e r and even bring him d o w n , it actually had the e f f e c t of galvanizing public support in his favor. S a m p e r was now seen, and able to portray h i m s e l f , as a victim of U.S. bullying. T h e r e is no q u e s t i o n that the decision to revoke his visa was p r o v o k e d by the congressional vote absolving S a m p e r of any illegal activities. With the strength of the evidence implicating Samper, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t believed only a corrupt c o n g r e s s could have possibly exonerated him. Since U.S. officials could not get the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s to implicate Samper, they would do the next best thing. S a m p e r played this victim card deftly, responding to the U.S. slight by once again t a k i n g steps on the d i p l o m a t i c f r o n t , m a n i f e s t e d by his naming of the respected Liberal Party ally Maria E m m a M e j i a to be his foreign minister. M e j i a i m m e d i a t e l y traveled to W a s h i n g t o n with the stated intent to denarcotize the bilateral relationship. W h e n M e j i a was asked how she would deal with the United States, she replied, "We have to try to o v e r c o m e the mistrust. C o l o m b i a has s h o w n important gains in the fight against drugs, including o p e n i n g the debate on extradition. We should say to the United States that we have a c o m m o n e n e m y — n a r c o trafficking." 1 1 0 S a m p e r ' s appointment of Mejia sheds light on a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect on the nature of the U . S . - C o l o m b i a n relationship. W h i l e S a m p e r could attack the visa issue at h o m e , he still had to take a conciliatory stance on the international front, m a n i f e s t e d in this instance by his selection of Mejia. By the time of the visa episode, C o l o m b i a had already been humiliated f o l l o w i n g the 1996 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , k n o w i n g that as a s u b o r d i n a t e state C o l o m b i a c o u l d not f u r t h e r j e o p ardize its r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U n i t e d States, S a m p e r was f o r c e d to adopt a c o n c i l i a t o r y stance in order to h o p e f u l l y m e n d f e n c e s with its d o m i n a n t northern neighbor. S a m p e r c o n t i n u e d to step up the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o u n ternarcotics e f f o r t s , including m o r e v i g o r o u s e f f o r t s to f u m i g a t e illicit c r o p s . T h i s i n c l u d e d the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of O p e r a t i o n C o n d o r , w h i c h utilized thirty-eight helicopters and t w e n t y - o n e aircraft. During the operation the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t also e x p e r i m e n t e d with the controversial herbicide Imazapyr. 1 1 1 As had been the case the year b e f o r e with O p e r a t i o n Splendor, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s antinarcotics e f f o r t s sparked violent p r o t e s t s f r o m those c a m p e s i n o s w h o were b e i n g a f f e c t e d by the aerial f u m i g a t i o n . In A u g u s t 1996, 3 0 , 0 0 0 f a r m e r s b e g a n protesting in the s o u t h e r n d e p a r t m e n t of P u t u m a y o in order to stop the p l a n n e d f u m i g a t i o n of the area. The situation e v e n t u a l l y c a l m e d d o w n a f t e r the

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government agreed to let the farmers destroy their own coca crops and handed out payments so that they could grow rubber, yuca, and other cash crops. 112 While the revocation of Samper's visa continued to be the major issue of contention between the United States and Colombia for much of 1996, it was not the only controversial pressure exerted by the U.S. government on the Samper administration that year. Instead, the issue of extradition—and its retroactive application—came to dominate the bilateral relationship from the end of 1996 through most of 1997.

EXTRADITION On June 26, 1996, shortly before the United States revoked President Samper's visa, and eleven days after Samper was absolved of wrongdoing by the Colombian Congress, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno formally demanded the extradition of four principal leaders of the Cali cartel—the Rodriguez brothers, Juan Carlos Ramirez, and Helmer "Pacho" Herrera—asserting that the 1979 U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty still held. 113 Reno also hinted that the United States would consider applying sanctions against Colombia if the Samper administration rejected the petition. 114 The Colombian government responded by asserting that its 1991 constitution negated the treaty and that extradition was thus illegal under Colombian law. 115 Nevertheless, Samper took the lead on this issue and began to actively push for an amendment to the 1991 constitution that would allow for extradition. He also presented before the Colombian Congress a law that would increase sentences against drug traffickers. The timing of Samper's tough antidrug stance suggests that the U.S. influence did play an important part in his decisions. Robert Gelbard responded to these moves by stating emphatically before the U.S. Congress what, along with the principal goal of obtaining retroactive extradition, the United States wanted to see done in Colombia: We have outlined for the Colombian government a set of specific, realistic objectives and actions we expect it to pursue, and upon which we will evaluate its cooperation. These include the enactment of tough asset forfeiture and sentencing laws; the strengthening of Colombia's inadequate 1995 money laundering statute; effective eradication of coca and opium poppy fields; reconsideration of Colombia's policy of not extraditing its nationals; support for investigations and prosecutions

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targeting corrupt public o f f i c i a l s ; and the s i g n i n g of a bilateral maritime interdiction a g r e e m e n t . " 6

First and f o r e m o s t in the push for extradition of d r u g k i n g p i n s to the United States was the issue of its r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n . " 7 S i n c e many of the Cali leaders were arrested in 1995, any new extradition law that did not allow for retroactivity would not apply to them. S o m e have suggested that one central reason the United States wanted retroactivity was so that the Rodriguez brothers could be extradited and compelled to divulge their dealings with S a m p e r . " 8 It is difficult to k n o w if this was the underlying motivation for the push for e x t r a d i t i o n , but what is certain is that U.S. policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a b e c a m e a l m o s t singularly o b s e s s e d with this issue. M y l e s Frechette stated: " [ T ] h e position of my g o v e r n m e n t is c l e a r — r e t r o activity is very important. T h e Rodriguez brothers are m a j o r criminals. If they a p p r o v e the proposal [extradition w i t h o u t retroactivity] t h o s e m e n will end up s a f e and s o u n d . " " 9 In O c t o b e r 1996, the C o l o m b i a n Senate voted in c o m m i t t e e to begin exploring the issue of redressing the constitution, which was eventually a m e n d e d in D e c e m b e r 1997 to allow for nonretroactive extradition. 1 2 0 In m a n y w a y s extradition was the n e w litmus test f o r the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W e a k e n e d by the o n g o i n g accusations of narco-related corruption, S a m p e r k n e w that he had to look strong on the drug f r o n t . Washington also k n e w this and, given the fact that S a m p e r was not easily going a w a y a n y t i m e soon, s o u g h t to e x p l o i t S a m p e r ' s credibility problem in order to extract as m a n y concessions on the counternarcotics f r o n t s as p o s s i b l e . As o n e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l stated, " T h e g o o d thing about S a m p e r was that we c o u l d d o w h a t e v e r we w a n t e d on the drug front. T h e extradition issue was another instance w h e n we m o v e d the 'goal posts b a c k ' in order to see how far w e could push S a m p e r on the drug stuff." 1 2 1 T h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s push for e x t r a d i t i o n had c o n s e quences. As had been the case with Pablo E s c o b a r and the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel was terrified just by the prospect of being extradited to the United States to stand trial. In the fall of 1996 it looked as though the " E x t r a d i t a b l e s " were being revived, this time by the Cali drug lords instead of those f r o m Medellin. In N o v e m b e r , C o l o m b i a n legislators received a note purportedly f r o m drug t r a f f i c k e r s — t h e y called themselves the " N e w E x t r a d i t a b l e s " — t h a t read: " W e h a v e 4 0 y e a r s to f u l f i l l this p r o m i s e — w e c o n d e m n you to death and all of y o u r f a m i l i e s . " 1 2 2 In

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M a r c h 1997 a p r o - e x t r a d i t i o n regional n e w s p a p e r editor was killed and several m o n t h s later a quarter-ton b o m b killed noted Cali journalist G e r a r d o B e d o y a , w h o also had s u p p o r t e d e x t r a d i t i o n . In total, seven anticartel j o u r n a l i s t s w e r e killed in 1997. 1 2 3 In M a y 1997 the C o l o m b i a n m e d i a reported that the narcotics leaders had t a r g e t e d both S a m p e r a n d F r e c h e t t e f o r a s s a s s i n a t i o n , w h i c h s u g g e s t s they b e l i e v e d that S a m p e r w a s f i r m l y c o m m i t t e d to the antidrug e f f o r t . T h i s issue n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the m e d i a report reveals h o w c o m m i t t e d the " N e w E x t r a d i t a b l e s " w e r e to i n t i m i d a t i n g e x t r a d i t i o n supporters. 1 2 4 O n S e p t e m b e r 16 the C o l o m b i a n Senate voted to r e m o v e the c l a u s e that w o u l d have m a d e the law of e x t r a d i t i o n apply retroactively. This vote c a m e just ten d a y s after a massive b o m b was d e f u s e d o u t s i d e the o f f i c e s of the M e d e l l i n n e w s p a p e r El Mundo, a s c a r e that served as a f i r m r e m i n d e r of what m i g h t be the c o n s e q u e n c e s if retroactivity w e r e p a s s e d . Finally, w h e n the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s did pass a f o r m of n o n r e t r o a c t i v e e x t r a d i t i o n in D e c e m b e r 1997, S a m p e r ' s chief press s p o k e s m a n w a s k i d n a p p e d and o n c e again most believed that the " N e w E x t r a d i t a b l e s " were r e s p o n s i b l e . S o m e in t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , were not so sure that the " N e w E x t r a d i t a b l e s " were really as prevalent as s o m e in the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d m e d i a m a d e t h e m out to be. O n e u n n a m e d State Dep a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l r e m a r k e d , " I ' m not c o n v i n c e d additional violence w a s kicked up by the retroactive extradition issue." I 2 S Yet it is also clear that U.S. o f f i c i a l s did not w a n t to a t t r i b u t e the n e w r o u n d of v i o l e n c e to their long fight f o r e x t r a d i t i o n policy. In a d d i t i o n to t h e m o v e t o w a r d e x t r a d i t i o n ( a l t h o u g h w i t h o u t t h e c o v e t e d r e t r o a c t i v i t y ) , there w e r e o t h e r e v e n t s that should have p l e a s e d the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t . In D e c e m b e r 1996, S a m p e r s u c c e s s f u l l y p a s s e d an asset f o r f e i t u r e law t h r o u g h the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s ; he also w o r k e d to r e t r o a c t i v e l y r a i s e the s e n t e n c e s f o r d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s , m a k e t h e m f o r f e i t t h e i r p r o f i t s , a n d p u n i s h t h o s e w h o c o l l a b o r a t e with t h e m . 1 2 6 In F e b r u a r y 1997 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and C o l o m b i a s i g n e d a m a r i t i m e s h i p - b o a r d i n g a g r e e m e n t i n t e n d e d to c o m b a t drug r u n n i n g at sea, s o m e t h i n g that R o b e r t G e l b a r d h a d m a d e a priority in the bilateral relationship. D u r i n g this s a m e m o n t h , the C o l o m b i a n National Police claimed to have captured and destroyed a cocaine laboratory of industrialsize p r o p o r t i o n s . 1 2 7 But n o n e of t h e s e a c h i e v e m e n t s w o u l d be able to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the ill will and f r u s t r a t i o n on the part of the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t w h e n on

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January 17, 1997, a Cali j u d g e sentenced Miguel and Gilberto R o d r i g u e z to t w e n t y - o n e a n d e i g h t e e n y e a r s r e s p e c t i v e l y , but then i m m e d i a t e l y h a l v e d the s e n t e n c e s b e c a u s e , a m o n g o t h e r legal p a r t i c u l a r s , they had c o n f e s s e d their c r i m e s . U . S . D r u g C z a r Barry M c C a f f r e y called the decision "totally u n a c c e p t a b l e " and M y l e s F r e c h e t t e a c c u s e d the C o l o m bian g o v e r n m e n t of " b a c k i n g d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g . " 1 2 8 P r e s i d e n t S a m p e r also railed a g a i n s t the d e c i s i o n , but it w a s not e n o u g h to d i s a b u s e the newly k i n d l e d p e r c e p t i o n s in W a s h i n g t o n that the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a tion was s o m e h o w r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the decision. For C o l o m b i a the timing could not h a v e b e e n w o r s e as, o n c e again, the a n n u a l d r u g c e r t i f i cation decision date was only a f e w m o n t h s away. T h e d e b a t e in C o l o m b i a o v e r extradition has c h a n g e d substantially since the S a m p e r y e a r s . O n O c t o b e r 13, 1999, the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n ment a n n o u n c e d that it had arrested thirty-one s u s p e c t e d d r u g t r a f f i c k ers. including the M e d e l l i n c a r t e l ' s F a b i o O c h o a . C o l o m b i a ' s a m b a s s a d o r to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Luis A l b e r t o M o r e n o , stated: " T h e y will be certainly extradited to the U n i t e d States. . . . I think p e o p l e c a m e to reco g n i z e that e x t r a d i t i o n is a v e r y u s e f u l tool in f i g h t i n g t h e w a r on d r u g s . " 1 2 4 In S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 , O c h o a w a s indeed e x t r a d i t e d and, at the t i m e of this w r i t i n g , w a s a w a i t i n g trial on c h a r g e s of s h i p p i n g thirty tons of c o c a i n e a m o n t h into the U n i t e d States.

THE 1997 DECERTIFICATION DECISION T h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t f u l l y d e c e r t i f i e d C o l o m b i a f o r a s e c o n d straight y e a r on M a r c h l, 1997, this t i m e j o i n e d by N i g e r i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , B u r m a , Iran, and S y r i a . 1 3 0 T h e U n i t e d States did, h o w e v e r , leave o p e n the option that it w o u l d not apply e c o n o m i c sanctions, a l l o w i n g f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v e r s i n g t h e r u l i n g o v e r the c o u r s e of t h e year. B u t in o r d e r f o r the United States to reverse its decision, C o l o m b i a w o u l d h a v e to r e e s t a b l i s h e x t r a d i t i o n (at this p o i n t in 1997 it w a s still b e i n g d e bated), i m p l e m e n t r e c e n t l y p a s s e d a n t i d r u g legislation, a c c e p t use of a m o r e e f f e c t i v e h e r b i c i d e to f u m i g a t e illicit crops, tackle c o r r u p t i o n , a n d c r a c k d o w n on the d r u g d e a l e r s w h o did b u s i n e s s w h i l e in p r i s o n . A c c o r d i n g to G e l b a r d , " T h e s e steps, which are r e a s o n a b l e , can be a c h i e v e d o v e r the c o u r s e of the n e x t s e v e r a l m o n t h s . T a k i n g t h e m , t h e g o v e r n m e n t of C o l o m b i a can s h o w the international c o m m u n i t y that it is c o m mitted to putting an e n d to the era of n a r c o - d o m i n a t i o n . " 1 3 1

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A n d as w i t h the 1 9 9 6 c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , G e l b a r d w a s c o n f i d e n t t h a t W a s h i n g t o n ' s h e a v y - h a n d e d t a c t i c s , w h e r e b y it w o u l d c o n t i n u e to support Serrano and Valdivieso while isolating Samper, were creating t h e d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . A s he t e s t i f i e d in F e b r u a r y 1997: " I b e l i e v e that o u r s t r a t e g y h a s p r o d u c e d results, and w e h a v e b a l a n c e d o u r r e j e c t i o n of c o r r u p t i o n in the S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h i n c r e a s e d s u p p o r t d i r e c t l y t o the C o l o m b i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s that are c o m b a t i n g the d r u g s c o u r g e . " 1 3 2 G e l b a r d d i d not fail to m e n t i o n that he b e l i e v e d S a m p e r to be " a t r u l y c o r r u p t p r e s i d e n t w h o h a s a c l e a r h i s t o r y of c o - o p e r a t i n g with the d r u g dealers."133 B y t h i s t i m e , m o r e t h a n with a n y o t h e r C o l o m b i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d c o m e to e q u a t e its s u c c e s s in C o l o m b i a w i t h c o o p e r a t i o n on the d r u g f r o n t . T h e a n n u a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s l o o k on the c h a r a c t e r of a n a n n u a l r e v i e w of h o w w e l l the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d f u l f i l l e d U . S . d e m a n d s . A n d this e v a l u a t i o n p r o c e s s — b a s e d s o l e l y o n the d r u g i s s u e — d r o v e the overall b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . C e r t i f i c a t i o n m e a n t r e l a t i o n s w e r e g o o d ; d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i g n a l e d that r e l a t i o n s w e r e b a d . I n d e e d , r e l a t i o n s w e r e at their m o s t n a r c o t i z e d l e v e l , and the d r u g c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s w a s the g l a r i n g m a n i f e s t a t i o n of this fact. A s 1997 c a m e to an e n d , E r n e s t o S a m p e r c o n t i n u e d to tout his a p p a r e n t t o u g h s t a n c e on e x t r a d i t i o n , c o n s i s t e n t l y u r g i n g that r e t r o a c t i v ity be i n c l u d e d . In D e c e m b e r , c o n v e n i e n t l y a f t e r the C o l o m b i a n C o n gress passed nonretroactive extradition, he announced: " f W ] e would h a v e p r e f e r r e d an e x t r a d i t i o n w i t h o u t c o n d i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e g a r d t o the r e t r o a c t i v i t y . W e ' r e d o n e w i t h the ' t a b o o ' of e x t r a d i t i o n . . . . [ A ] f t e r t o d a y n o o n e in C o l o m b i a will be a b l e to c o n t i n u e u s i n g t h i s c o u n t r y to h i d e f r o m a c t s c o m m i t t e d in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . " 1 3 4 It is d i f f i c u l t to k n o w w h e t h e r S a m p e r w a s t a k i n g this t o u g h s t a n c e o n r e t r o a c t i v i t y k n o w i n g that the C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s w o u l d n e v e r a p p r o v e it. A c c o r d i n g to o n e U . S . e m b a s s y o f f i c i a l , " S a m p e r k n e w that retroactive extradition would never go anywhere. Thus, he could paint h i m s e l f as the t o u g h guy. In reality, he n e v e r w a n t e d it." 1 3 5 N e v e r t h e l e s s , his s t a n c e did s e r v e to d e f l e c t s o m e of the p r e s s u r e he h a d b e e n r e c e i v ing f r o m W a s h i n g t o n . B u t w h i l e S a m p e r a p p e a r e d c o m m i t t e d to c o n t i n u i n g his v e r s i o n of the w a r o n d r u g s , b y the e n d of 1997 a n d i n t o 1998 it w a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s that h a d b e g u n to tire of the c o m b a t i v e , i n c r e a s i n g l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e p o l i c y of i s o l a t i n g S a m p e r . M o r e o v e r , S a m p e r w a s n e a r i n g t h e e n d of his p r e s i d e n c y , a n d m a n y U.S. o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d that ties to the i n c o m i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d be p r e e m p t i v e l y r u p t u r e d u n l e s s t h e y u n d e r t o o k to b e g i n r e p a i r i n g r e l a t i o n s with C o l o m b i a .

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U.S. POLICY SOFTENS In the fall of 1997, U.S.-Colombian relations began to improve somewhat, exemplified by Ernesto Samper's talk of a "new climate." This apparent thaw was driven by the fact that U.S. officials knew he was leaving office in less than a year. 136 From the U.S. side, a number of events signaled this change in policy. These included an October visit from O N D C P director Barry McCaffrey, who while still emphasizing the need for the Colombian Congress to pass unconditional extradition, spoke of cooperation and suggested that Washington was serious about adopting a more conciliatory tone. 137 The departure of Myles Frechette in November was another sign that Washington was looking to defuse tensions, although this did not stop Frechette from boasting, "My job was to change Colombia. I have done that, and Colombia is better off for it." 138 In another signal that relations had become less narcotized, before Frechette left Bogotá he made an important speech in which he singled out the Colombian military's infamous Twentieth Brigade for human rights abuses. 1 3 9 The speech caused a sensation in Colombia, as heretofore the United States had not made many public statements regarding human rights. Ernesto Samper officially disbanded the brigade the following year. Well before the next annual certification of drug efforts in March 1998, the tone of the State Department and the drug hawks in Congress had changed significantly. Interestingly, now there was a growing concern that the two-time decertification of Colombia had been counterproductive and was actually harming U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In particular, the U.S. government's concern focused on how the two decertification decisions, along with the Leahy Amendment, had slowed the delivery of antidrug assistance to the Colombian National Police. According to Benjamin Gilman, chair of the House International Relations Committee: "[T]he ill-advised decertification of Colombia two years in a row without a national interest waiver has cut the life line for our allies in the professional antidrug police. These real drug fighters are sorely in need of ammunition, of explosives, of helicopter spare parts, chopper upgrades along with armaments." 1 4 0 Myles Frechette, speaking on behalf of the State Department, shared a similar view: "While fully implementing the intent of the law, denial of certification for Colombia had the unfortunate effect of cutting off significant military financing funds—that's F M F [Foreign Military Finance] and IMET [International Military Education Training]—for counternarcotics purposes." 141

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Responding to the fact that U.S. firms had lost an estimated U.S.$875 million in potential business to the decertification decisions, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote in a memorandum to President Clinton that the decision to decertify Colombia for two consecutive years "has demonstrated to be an unintentional disadvantage for the commercial interests of the United States. . . . [T]he continued interruption of this [some types of military] assistance would mean the continuation of serious d a m a g e to the vital interests of the national security of the people of the U n i t e d States." 1 4 2 A m a j o r u n e x p e c t e d c o n s e q u e n c e of the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s was the s u s p e n s i o n of antidrug f u n d i n g , even though the c e r t i f i c a t i o n legislation was generally understood to provide for continued assistance in such cases. The controversy over whether antidrug aid should be susp e n d e d along with other f o r m s of U.S. assistance s t e m m e d f r o m the v a g u e language of the certification law. The suspension lasted for several m o n t h s until a new ruling decided in favor of continuing antidrug aid to d e c e r t i f i e d c o u n t r i e s . This dilatory process pleased virtually no one in either C o n g r e s s or the State Department. In its e f f o r t s to punish so-called bad g u y s like Samper, the United States realized that its policy of isolation had inadvertently hurt allies like G e n e r a l Serrano. A n d since the o v e r w h e l m i n g priority of the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t was to continue its war on drugs in Colombia, decertification b e c a m e c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e if it m e a n t impeding antidrug efforts. It is not surprising, therefore, that in M a r c h 1998 Colombia received a national interest waiver during the certification process so that the United States could continue to slap its hand but not have to e n d u r e the m o r e c o m p l e t e cutoff of assistance, including s o m e types of a n t i d r u g assistance, that full decertification required. 1 4 3 Yet the decision not to fully decertify C o l o m b i a did not m e a n that the United States would now publicly c o n d o n e Ernesto S a m p e r for his efforts. T h e r e was even talk a m o n g U.S. officials that the United States should decertify C o l o m b i a and then reinstate certification on A u g u s t 7, the day that S a m p e r ' s successor would take office. 1 4 4 Secretary of State M a d e l e i n e Albright stated that C o l o m b i a n government f o r c e s have conducted an effective eradication and interdiction effort. But the current government has not demonstrated full political support for counternarcotics efforts. . . . Coming on the eve of that country's congressional and presidential elections, the waiver decision is intended to lay the groundwork for increased cooperation and to support those

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w h o are striving to strengthen the rule o f law and buttress their e m battled d e m o c r a c y . 1 4 5

THE END OF SAMPER'S TERM By the time Ernesto Samper was preparing to leave office it had become readily apparent to U.S. government officials that by isolating Samper the United States had helped to weaken the Colombian state at precisely the most inopportune time. 146 indeed, while the discredited Samper administration was governing Colombia, the country's guerrilla groups were increasing their activity throughout the countryside. Ironically, a good part of the guerrillas' increased strength actually resulted from the U.S. government's successful efforts to better eradicate and interdict coca production and trafficking in Bolivia and Peru. This crackdown in Peru and Bolivia ended up encouraging greater coca cultivation in Colombia. 1 4 7 In light of these new realities, Washington realized that a diplomatically isolated Samper did not have the political capital or international legitimacy requisite for dealing with Colombia's rapidly escalating civil conflict. And with so much attention—both from the Samper administration and from the Colombian media—focused on the tumultuous relations with the United States, the growth of both guerrilla and paramilitary strength was at least initially overlooked. The massive increase in coca production in Colombia in the mid1990s provided the guerrilla groups—mainly the FARC—with substantially higher revenues as they began to tax cocaine production and demand protection money from coca farmers. When this revenue is combined with revenues from revolutionary taxes, kidnappings, and other illicit activities, the guerrillas now earn approximately U.S.$500 million annually from the illicit drug trade. This has enabled the guerrillas to dramatically expand their influence throughout Colombia in the last few years. A significant amount of this expansion occurred during Samper's tenure in office. In several interviews with involved officials in both the Colombian and U.S. governments there was a general consensus that one effect of Samper's discredited presidency was the Colombian state's inability to adequately deal with the rapid increase in guerrilla strength. Nor was the Samper administration prepared to confront the rapidly escalating paramilitary problem, revealed by the increase in indiscriminate paramilitary attacks on civilian populations throughout Colombia. In fact,

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it w a s d u r i n g S a m p e r ' s tenure that f o r m e r M e d e l l i n cartel m e m b e r C a r los C a s t a n o c o n s o l i d a t e d his p a r a m i l i t a r y n e t w o r k , w h i c h is n o w c l a i m e d to h a v e an a r m e d f o r c e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12,000 m e n . While the United States is clearly not responsible f o r this rapid escalation in p a r a m i l i t a r y and guerrilla activity, U.S. o f f i c i a l s n o n e t h e l e s s c a m e to realize that a politically and diplomatically isolated C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d not be able to e f f e c t i v e l y deal with the increasingly c o m p l e x and violent situation in C o l o m b i a . This d y n a m i c would c o m p e l a shift in C o l o m b i a p o l i c y as the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t said g o o d b y e to E r n e s t o S a m p e r and a w a i t e d the u p c o m i n g presidential e l e c t i o n .

CONCLUSION What e m e r g e s f r o m the analysis of the S a m p e r era is that U.S. policy can be characterized as "overt n a r c o t i z a t i o n . " That is, since the United States d e c i d e d to isolate S a m p e r a n d instead c u l t i v a t e ties with o t h e r g o v e r n ment officials w h o m it better trusted, the U.S. d e m a n d that C o l o m b i a cooperate and o b e y on the drug front was quite explicit. As we will see in the next c h a p t e r , this c o m e s in stark c o n t r a s t to U.S. p o l i c y d u r i n g the Pastrana administration, in w h i c h the United States, p e r c e i v i n g Pastrana to be m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e on the d r u g issue, has been more implicit about its antidrug r e q u i r e m e n t s of the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s in turn has a l l o w e d f o r a m u c h b r o a d e r bilateral a g e n d a that better a c c o m m o d a t e s the pursuit of n o n d r u g issues like the p e a c e process, h u m a n rights, and e c o n o m i c ties. In other w o r d s , C o l o m b i a n cooperation on the d r u g front has d e t e r m i n e d the nature of the broader bilateral relationship. B e c a u s e the current state of implicit narcotization m e a n s that relations are m a r k e d by a greater d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n than u n d e r the overt n a r c o t i z a t i o n that c h a r a c t e r i z e d the S a m p e r years, certain sectors of the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t — e s p e c i a l l y the e m b a s s y in B o g o t á — h a v e g r e a t e r flexibility to deal with c o m p l e x issues such as the current p e a c e p r o c e s s a n d the h u m a n rights crisis. It is d u r i n g this time that w e see the e m e r g e n c e of certain n o n d r u g c o m p o n e n t s of U . S . policy in C o l o m b i a . T h e U . S . S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s f o r c e f u l h u m a n r i g h t s r e p o r t s b e t w e e n 1998 a n d 2 0 0 0 , as well as the s e v e r a l S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t - s p o n s o r e d h u m a n rights c o n f e r e n c e s , are but a f e w of the signs that the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w a s m a k i n g its policy t o w a r d C o l o m b i a m o r e than d r u g s . Tacit s u p p o r t f o r A n d r é s P a s t r a n a ' s p e a c e e f f o r t s is a n o t h e r area w h e r e U . S . p o l i c y w a s s o f t e n i n g . In m a n y w a y s , f o l l o w i n g the S a m p e r y e a r s , the w a r on

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drugs d o m i n a t e d U . S . policy, but it did not c o m p l e t e l y o v e r w h e l m any other c o m p o n e n t of the bilateral relationship. W h i l e a fair amount of this c h a n g e in p o l i c y w a s related to the change of presidents in C o l o m b i a , it also stemmed from Washington's realization that it could not f o c u s on counternarcotics-related issues to the extent that other important issues were essentially forgotten or ignored. That said, all indicators c o n f i r m e d that drugs remained the primary f o c u s o f U.S. policy in C o l o m b i a .

NOTES 1. Author interview with Myles Frechette. Washington, D.C., June 1999. 2. Author interview with Alexander Watson, Washington, D.C., October 1999. 3. Ibid. 4. See ''Samper Scandal a History of C o l o m b i a ' s Drug History," The Miami Herald. November 5, 1995; and "Rodriguez tenia en 1984 número privado de Samper," El Tiempo. November 8, 1995. 5. For an insightful, if melodramatic, account of the initial U.S. overtures to Ernesto Samper, as well as the ensuing narco-cassette controversy, see Douglas Farah, "The Crackup," The Washington Post, July 21, 1996. See also "Advertimos sobre narcodineros," El Tiempo, June 6, 1996. 6. With concrete documents still classified, it is unclear exactly how much and when the United States knew about Samper's narco-connection to the Cali cartel. See "A menudo, el gobierno colombiano miente: Robert Gelbard," El Tiempo. August 21, 1996. 7. By the time he became president, Samper had backed away from his support of legalization, arguing that his view was directed solely toward marijuana and did not relate to either cocaine or heroine. For S a m p e r ' s earlier involvement in the issue of drug legalization, see Iván Orozco Abad, "Los diálogos con el narcotráfico: Historia de la transformación fallida de un delincuente común en un delincuente político," Análisis Político 11 (September-December 1990): 2 8 - 5 8 ; and Ernesto Samper Pizano, Legalización de la marihuana (Bogotá: ANIF, Fondo Editorial, 1980). 8. McLean was deputy chief of mission in Colombia from 1987 to 1990. 9. Author interview with Phil McClean, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs (1990-1993), Washington, D.C., May 10, 1999. There is purported to be a July 1994 CIA report stating that Samper not only received money from the Cali cartel, but also solicited it. McClean was unaware of this report at the time of his meeting with Samper. 10. "La descertificación era el final lógico," El Tiempo, March 3, 1996. 11. Author interview with Alexander Watson, former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1999.

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12. See "Ernesto Samper, sin visa para gobernar?" El Tiempo, July 14, 1996. 13. Moreno is the current Colombian ambassador to the United States. 14. For more on the events surrounding the beginning of the narco-cassette scandal, including a transcript of the taped conversations, see Luis M. Cañón, La Crisis: Cuatro años a bordo del gobierno de Samper (Bogotá: Planeta, 1998), pp. 2 3 - 5 5 . 15. "Colombia, a desvirtuar acusación de EEUU." El Tiempo, July 11. 1994. 16. See "Drug Abuse," The Economist, July 2, 1994. At that point The Economist presciently argued that the disclosure of the narco-cassettes would force Samper to take a tough stance on the drug issue in order to bolster the belief that drug traffickers had not compromised him. On September 30, Toft appeared on national television in Colombia and denounced what he believed was a "narco-democracy." Interestingly, much of Toft's comments were directed toward the Gaviria administration and not Ernesto Samper. See "La descertificación era el final lógico," El Tiempo, March 3. 1996; and Sewall Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing U.S. Anti-Drug Policy in the North Andes-Colombia (New York: University Press of America. 1997). pp. 148-150. 17. See "Fiscal promete juicio a jefes del narcotráfico." El Tiempo. July 27, 1994. 18. See "En qué va el Proceso 8000," El Tiempo, October 6, 1996. 19. See "Whose Fault?" The Economist. October 22, 1994. 20. Author interview with former U.S. State Department official Michael Skol, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1999. 21. See The Miami Herald, June 23, 1999; and "Samper pide rectificar," El Tiempo, June 24, 1994. For more on the narco-cassette controversy, see "Prensa mundial destaca caso de narco-cassette," El Tiempo, June 24, 1994. 22. "Guerra a fondo contra narcos," El Tiempo, July 22, 1994. 23. "Samper to Propose U.S.-Colombian Anti-Drugs Commission," Agence France-Presse, June 22, 1994. 24. "Watson pide acladar caso de narcocassete," El Tiempo, June 28. 1994. Author translation. 25. "El embajador Frechette," El Tiempo, August 8, 1994. Author translation. 26. See "Relaciones con EU," El Tiempo, July 14, 1994; "Clinton le desea éxitos a Samper," El Tiempo, July 4, 1994. 27. "Es irresponsable, el informe sobre Samper," El Tiempo, July 15, 1994. Author translation. 28. See "Colombia rechazaría ayuda," El Tiempo, July 16, 1994; and "Jesse Helms, duro y radical," El Tiempo, July 17, 1994. 29. "Avanza distensión con E E U U , " El Tiempo, July 28, 1994. 30. "Comienza distensión con E E U U ? " El Tiempo, July 22, 1994. Author translation. 31. "Más condiciones para la ayuda de E E U U , " El Tiempo, July 18, 1994. 32. Before he was inaugurated, Samper also met with Ambassador Busby for ninety minutes. Samper apparently told Busby that "there was no campaign with better and stricter controls than ours." See David Adams, "Colombia in

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Gloom over Drugs Accusation," The Times, June 25, 1994. White House spokesman Mike McCurry stated at the time that the tapes were discussed and that Busby expressed concern over them. McCurry stated, "We expect that there should be a full and prompt investigation of those types of allegations that can lead to understanding of what the truth is." See "Colombia President-Elect Meets with U.S. Ambassador; Envoy Troubled by Drug Cartel Allegation," The Washington Post, June 25, 1994. 33. Author interview with Michael Skol, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1999. 34. Because many of the meetings between Samper and U.S. officials were confidential, it is hard to know exactly what was discussed. Shortly after the meeting, Samper announced to the press that the results were "very favorable" and that "my campaign was absolutely transparent, that I would respond to any evidence that they presented." See "Carta Bill Clinton a Ernesto Samper," El Tiempo, July 1, 1994. Author translation. 35. Author interview with Michael Skol, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1999. 36. Samper initially confirmed Vargas Silva as commander of the National Police and sent Serrano to Washington as an attaché. U.S. pressure quickly reversed this and brought Serrano back to Bogotá to head the National Police. 37. Robert T. Buckman, "The Cali Cartel: An Undefeated Enemy," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 3, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 444. For a transcript of S a m p e r ' s inauguration speech, see Ernesto Samper Pizano, "Tiempo de la gente," Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, August 7, 1994. 38. See "American Drug Aid Goes South," The New York Times, November 25, 1996. 39. See Gabriel Marcella and Donald E. Schulz, "Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads" (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). 40. See "Bad Precedent on Arms Sales," The Washington Post, September 20, 1996. 41. The Colombian military and National Police are both components of the Colombian Armed Forces, whose civilian commander is the minister of defense. In reality, the National Police is a quasi-autonomous organization. 42. U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, "Drug Control Policy and Colombia," July 9, 1997. 43. Ibid., comments by Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Davidow. 44. Patrick Leahy, "Drug Aid to Colombia Must Carry the Rule of Law," letter to the editor, The New York Times, December 5, 1996. 45. Author interview with Tim Reiser, Democratic Staff member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Washington, D.C., October 1999. 46. "Standing Guard for Uncle Sam," The Economist, January 14, 1995. 47. See "Difícil situación de Colombia en EIJ," El Tiempo, February 9, 1995; and "Canciller se reúne con representante Torricelli," El Tiempo, February 10, 1995.

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48. See "La certificación condicionada no existe," El Tiempo, February 16, 1995. 49. See "Captura de otro narco de Cali es fundamental," El Tiempo, March 22, 1995. 50. Testimony by Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 29, 1995. 51. Ibid. 52. Letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 27, 1996. 53. "La certificación, una decisión unilateral," El Tiempo, March 8, 1995. Author translation. 54. "DEA está estudiando condiciones." El Tiempo, June 5, 1995. 55. The U.S. embassy released a statement regarding the DEA controversy; the Colombian government countered with its own statement. 56. Andrés Cavelier Castro, "Otra dura advertencia de E E U U , " El Tiempo, October 6, 1995. 57. Ibid. 58. Thomas W. Lippman, "Colombian Warrants Suggest Drug Money Trail Leads to Prominent Officials," The Washington Post, April 28, 1995. 59. Thomas W. Lippman, " C o l o m b i a Eases U.S. Concern on Antidrug Drive; Cali Cartel Crackdown, L e a d e r ' s Arrest Gets 'Two T h u m b s U p ' f r o m White House Aid," The Washington Post, June 18, 1995. 60. D'Artagnan, "Por qué Helms es asi?" El Tiempo, April 21, 1995. 61. "Lo de ' M a r í a ' es una vergüenza—Serpa," El Tiempo, July 31, 1996. 62. See Douglas Farah, "Colombian Defends Efforts to Crimp Drug Trade; President Denies U.S. Charge of Cartel Link, Addresses DEA Dispute," The Washington Post, June 3, 1995; and "La extradición no es pecado," El Tiempo, April 8, 1995. 63. See El Tiempo, March 6, 1995. 64. See Farah, "Colombian Defends Efforts to Crimp Drug Trade." 65. For more on General Serrano's efforts to cleanse the ranks of the Colombian National Police, see Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, pp. 146-149. 66. James Risen, "U.S. Played Key Role in Arrest of Drug Lord," The Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1995. 67. For more on the arrests of the Cali cartel's leaders, see "La primera entrega después de la captura," El Tiempo, June 13, 1995. 68. See Buckman, "The Cali Cartel," p. 444. 69. Lippman, "Colombia Eases U.S. Concern." 70. "El Valle brindó con Frechette," El Tiempo, June 10, 1995. Author translation. 71. Author interview with Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo, former High Commissioner for Peace, Washington, D.C., April 1999. Carlos Holmes Trujillo was Ernesto Samper's first High Commissioner for Peace.

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72. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Bogotá, May 1999. 73. For more on the U.S. government's reaction to the arrests of the Cali cartel's leaders, see "Hay malas interpretaciones en relación con EU—Pardo," El Tiempo, October 7, 1995; and "Clinton está muy satisfecho," El Tiempo, August 8, 1995. 74. See "Categórico rechazo de E E U U , " El Tiempo, September 29, 1995. 75. It is estimated that at the height of the 1994 electoral campaign several million dollars were given by the Cali cartel to political candidates in both parties. See "El Golpe," Semana, April 25, 1995; El Tiempo, May 22, 1995; and F.I Espectador, June 4, 1995. A plethora of analysis has been conducted on Ernesto S a m p e r ' s putative links to the Cali cartel, the Proceso 8000 case, and other related issues. Most of these have been written by either journalists or individuals who were directly involved in these events. 76. Transcripts of interviews with the Rodriguez brothers regarding the Proceso 8000 case can be found in "Lo de Medina fue novela: Samper," El Tiempo, December 9, 1995; and Ana Maria Jaramillo, "Que los Rodríguez den la plata," El Tiempo, August 26, 1997. 77. For Medina's version of events, see Santiago Medina Serna, La verdad sobre las mentiras (Bogotá: Planeta, 1997). See Menzel, Cocaine Quagmire, p. 149. 78. "Till W h e n ? " The Economist, December 16, 1995. See also "Los últimos pasos del 8000," El Tiempo, December 29, 1996. 79. See "Tribunal nacional confirmó condena a Santiago Medina," El Tiempo, September 27, 1996; and Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio, Si sabía: Viaje a través del expediente de Ernesto Samper (Bogotá: Temas de Hoy, 1996), pp. 23^7. 80. The major difference between the testimonies of Medina and Botero is that Medina claimed Botero received money from the Cali cartel, while Botero maintained he knew nothing until a few days before the second round of the election. The growing scandal resulted in the protest resignations of Samper's health minister and two more Colombian ambassadors (two had already resigned). Botero was eventually released f r o m jail for good behavior in early 1998 after serving three years. See "Former Colombian Minister Implicated in Drugs Money Scandal Set Free," BBC News, February 23, 1998. See also "Crisis en Colombia es un asunto i n t e r n o — E U , " El Tiempo, August 4, 1995; and "Gobierno confiscó documentos—Botero," El Tiempo, February 26, 1996. 81. Letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole f r o m the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 27, 1996. For more on Botero's revelations about the Samper campaign's links to the Cali cartel, see Cañón, La Crisis, pp. 3 1 9 - 3 4 7 . 82. Several U.S. government officials who were interviewed for this book stated that they held admiration and fondness for Botero while he was still minister of defense. 83. "Till W h e n ? " The Economist, December 16, 1995.

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84. Douglas Farah, "U.S.-Colombia Ties Strained Over Drugs; Americans See Pervasive Cartel Influence," The Washington Post, January 7, 1996. 85. Other issues also served to worsen relations between Washington and Bogotá, including accusations made by Interior Minister Horacio Serpa that the U.S. DEA had formulated a plot to hurt the Colombian government. 86. In the faceless judges system, the accused do not see their accusers (or judges) so that the judges can be protected from any type of retribution should a defendant be found guilty. In 1999 the faceless judges system was modified to be used only in extreme cases. See El Tiempo, June 10, 1999. 87. Farah, "U.S.-Colombia Ties." 88. Douglas Farah, "Drug Lord's Escape Hurts U.S.-Colombian Relations," The Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1996. 89. Farah, "U.S.-Colombia Ties." 90. The 1996 decertification decision resulted in the cancellation or delay of U.S.$35 million in counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. It eventually took the State Department eight months to fully determine what aid could be provided under the decertification decision. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in 1998 that the decertification decision had "unclear" operational impact on U.S.-sponsored antidrug efforts. The G A O also concluded that the decertification decision had little impact on the Colombian economy mainly because discretionary sanctions were not applied. See U.S. GAO, "Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges," Washington, D.C.. February 26, 1998. 91. Testimony by Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, March 7, 1996. 92. Report to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 27, 1996. 93. Douglas Farah, "What Went Wrong? This Is a Certification Not of Colombia, but of President Samper," The Washington Post, March 3, 1996. For more on the 1996 certification of Colombia, see "Proceso de certificación de EEUU sería más severo en 1996," El Tiempo, November 6, 1995. 94. See "Motes, Beans, and Drugs," The Economist, February 17, 1996. 95. Andres Franco, "La certificación, el circo de 1996," El Tiempo, December 24, 1995. See also Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Descertificar le cuesta a E E U U , " El Tiempo, December 24, 1995. 96. "Certificación no depende de Colombia," El Tiempo, December 14, 1995. 97. Confidential author interview with U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1999. 98. Farah, "What Went Wrong?" 99. Farah, "U.S.-Colombia Ties." 100. "Los últimos pasos del 8000," El Tiempo, December 29, 1996. 101. See "Colombia, the Escapers," The Economist, June 15, 1996. If the lower chamber had voted to pursue the charges, the issue would have gone to

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the Señale and Samper would have had to resign while the Senate conducted the trial. ¡02. Douglas Farah, "U.S. Weighs Response to Clearing of Colombian Leader; Samper, Absolved of Drug Connection, Calls on Washington to Show 'Mutual Respect,'" The Washington Post, June 14, 1996. 103. Douglas Farah, "Colombian President Says U.S. Sanctions Would Aid Drug Traffickers," The Washington Post, June 16, 1996. 104. Ibid. 105. Mary Matheson, "Exoneration of Samper Draws Heat from U.S.," The Houston Chronicle, June 14, 1996. 106. Tim Brown, "Colombia Warns U.S. of Crisis in Ties." The Washington Post, July 3, 1996. 107. "EU plantea las bases de recertificación," El Tiempo, July 10, 1996. 108. Brown, "Colombia Warns U.S." In November, Interior Minister Horacio Serpa accused Frechette of seeing himself as the "viceroy" of Colombia. See "Action Man." The Economist, November 23, 1996. 109. "Los últimos pasos del 8000," El Tiempo, December 29, 1996. For more on the visa controversy, see "Relaciones con EEUU," El Tiempo, July 22, 1996. 110. "Al congreso colombiano, la enmienda para extraditar a capos," La Jornada. July 18, 1996. Author translation. 111. According to General Serrano, in 1996 the Colombian government seized over 55 tons of cocaine and 193 kilograms of opium paste, morphine, and heroin. In that same year the military and police arrested more than 2,500 persons on drug-trafficking charges. Thirty-six Colombian policemen were killed and sixty-one were injured. Prepared statement by General Rosso José Serrano, director of the Colombian National Police, before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, February 14, 1997. 112. "Coca Clashes," The Economist, August 17, 1996. Coca yields three to four harvests a year. Farmers often begin the processing procedure that turns raw coca into cocaine by mixing the coca leaves with gasoline and chemicals to make a paste. It is estimated that farmers get one cent for each dollar of cocaine sold on the street. 113. For more on the U.S. request for extradition, see "EU examina ley de extinción," El Tiempo, December 14, 1996; and Ana María Jaramillo, "Gaviria: Valdría la pena revivir la extradición," El Tiempo, December 11, 1996. 114. "EEUU pide en extradición a los Rodríguez O.," El Tiempo, June 27, 1996. 115. In Colombia a simple majority in both houses, in two legislative periods, is needed to amend the constitution. 116. Testimony by Robert Gelbard before the House Committee on International Relations, September 11, 1996. 117. See Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Extradición: Derecho o política?" El Tiempo, September 1, 1996.

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118. See "Unextraditable?" The Economist, September 20, 1997. In November 1997, Senator Ingrid Betancourt stated, "We need to be clear—the retroactivity is called the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers." See El Pais. November 27, 1997. Author translation. 119. El Pais, October 24, 1996. Shortly before the initial extradition vote, 3.7 kilograms of heroin were found in the plane that President Samper used to fly to a UN conference in New York. See La Jornada, September 24, 1996. 120. "Al congreso colombiano, la enmienda para extraditar a capos," El País, July 18, 1996. 121. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Bogotá, June 1999. For some insightful comments on the U.S. motives for pursuing the extradition treaty, see Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. "El mensaje de Frechette," El Tiempo, August 18. 1996. 122. "Bombazo en Colombia," Novedades, November 19, 1996. Author translation. 123. "The Mob Fights Back," The Economist. December 13. 1997. 124. La Jornada, May 20. 1997. On May 23. 1997. the Senate approved a bill to reintroduce retroactivity. On that same day the National Police intercepted a document from Cali kingpins that threatened to kill, in addition to Samper and Frechette, General Serrano and Justice Minister Carlos Medellin Forero. See "Colombia Contemplates Extraditing Its Drugsters," The Economist, May 31, 1997. 125. Author interview with unnamed U.S. government official, Bogotá, June 1999. 126. "The President Struggles On," The Economist, February 8, 1997. The law was passed on December 16, 1996. 127. "Colombia and the United States: Allies or Enemies?" The Economist, February 22, 1997. In an extraordinary session on February 14, 1997, Samper reiterated his call to increase penalties for drug trafficking, organized crime, and money-laundering. 128. "Latin America's Other Hostages," The Economist, January 25, 1997. 129. Barry Meier, "Pledges of Extradition Accompany Colombian Drug Arrests," The New York Times, October 14, 1999. 130. See Douglas Farah, "Colombia Suspends Anti-Drug Crop Effort; Actions Further Erode Relations with U.S.," The Washington Post, March 6, 1997. See also Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Hacia una nueva descertificación de Colombia," El Tiempo, September 15, 1996. 131. Novedades, March 1, 1997. Author translation. 132. Testimony by Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, February 14, 1997. 133. "Colombia and the United States: Allies or Enemies?" The Economist, February 22, 1997. 134. Notimex (Mexico), December 16, 1997. Author translation.

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135. Confidential author interview with U.S. government official, Bogotá, June 1999. 136. See "EU estudia bajar presión a relaciones con Colombia," El Tiempo, September 23, 1997; and "La ultima visita al Tío Sam," El Tiempo, September 21, 1997. 137. See Andrés Cavelier Castro, "Serpa no es nuestro tipo—McCaffrey," El Tiempo, October 28, 1997. 138. "The Ambassador Says Good-bye," The Economist, November 15, 1997. 139. Author phone interview with Robin Kirk, Colombia Officer for Human Rights Watch, November 22, 1999. 140. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, hearings on counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, July 9, 1997. 141. Ibid. For more on the 1998 certification process, see "Sigue amenaza de descertificación," El Tiempo, November 28, 1997. 142. Andrés Cavelier Castro, "Descertifiación fue un bumeran para EU," El Tiempo, May 27, 1997. 143. See Serge F. Kovaleski, "Colombia Hails Lifting of Sanctions; Samper Government Continues to Assail U.S. Certification Process," The Washington Post, February 27, 1998. 144. See Andrés Cavelier Castro, "EU se inclina por descertificación III," El Tiempo, January 30, 1998. 145. Rudolf Hommes, "Certificación," El Tiempo, February 28, 1998; and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Descertificación silenciosa," El Tiempo, January 11, 1998. 146. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Bogotá, May 1999. 147. The United States responded to the massive increase in coca cultivation in Colombia by escalating its fumigation efforts. So far, these increased efforts have been ineffective in slowing the growth in coca cultivation in Colombia. In 1998, for example, the U.S.-led efforts resulted in the fumigation of 135,000 hectares of coca plants, but total coca under cultivation still increased by 25 percent.

U.S. Policy During the Pastrana Administration, 1998-2002

By the summer of 1999 the U.S. government responded to the perceived deteriorating situation in Colombia, as well as to the recognition that its past policies had been failures, by reformulating its policies in Colombia. Almost overnight Colombia went from a mid-level concern to one of Washington's foremost foreign policy priorities; in 2000 it became the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. Yet most of the Clinton administration's new Colombia policies reflected many of the same considerations that drove policy during the 1990s: fighting the war on drugs remained the overriding U.S. priority; policy decisions were often formulated to please domestic constituents such as the U.S. Congress and defense contractors; and Washington continued to formulate its policies in a highly unilateral manner, without significant consultation with the Andean countries or European allies. For the United States, the arrival of the Pastrana administration represented a convenient opportunity to implement a substantial change in its antidrug policies. First, the U.S. government now realized that the ostensibly successful kingpin strategy had done nothing to reduce the supply of cocaine leaving Colombia; a new approach was needed. Second, Washington admitted that its efforts to publicly undermine Ernesto Samper had resulted in an undermining of the C o l o m b i a n state at the very time that guerrilla and paramilitary groups were becoming stronger than ever. Indeed, Washington considered the Pastrana government to be a reliable antidrug ally, a transition that allowed the United States to a d j u s t its drug policy strategies without h a v i n g to admit that its previous policies had been failures. W h i l e W a s h i n g t o n k n e w that it

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n e e d e d to m o d i f y its p o l i c i e s , it w a s not s u r e w h a t t h i s n e w d i r e c t i o n should be.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PASTRANA ADMINISTRATION W a s h i n g t o n s p e n t t h e f i r s t half of 1998 a w a i t i n g the a r r i v a l of a n e w p r e s i d e n t , w i t h m a n y U . S . o f f i c i a l s h o p i n g that it w o u l d be C o n s e r v a tive P a r t y c a n d i d a t e A n d r é s P a s t r a n a a n d not S a m p e r ally H o r a c i o S e r p a of the L i b e r a l Party. A f t e r the r e s u l t s of the J u n e 21 e l e c t i o n w e r e tallied, it w a s a n n o u n c e d that P a s t r a n a h a d w o n with just o v e r 5 0 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e ; S e r p a r e c e i v e d 4 6 . 5 p e r c e n t . ' B e f o r e l e a v i n g o f f i c e , P r e s i d e n t S a m p e r a c k n o w l e d g e d f o r the f i r s t t i m e that d r u g m o n e y h a d e n t e r e d his c a m p a i g n , a l t h o u g h he m a i n t a i n e d that he did n o t k n o w the s o u r c e of the f u n d s : " W e h a v e s e e n h o w d r u g m o n e y h a s f i n a n c e d v i o l e n c e a n d c o r r u p t e d o u r i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . . A s is k n o w n , I w a s v i c t i m of t h e i n v a s i o n [of d r u g m o n e y ] in the c a m p a i g n that w o n m e the p r e s i d e n c y , as h a s b e e n c o n f i r m e d b y the c o n f e s s i o n s of t h o s e w h o a d m i n i s t e r e d the c a m p a i g n . " 2 W h i l e t h e e l e c t i o n of A n d r é s P a s t r a n a w o u l d m e a n a n e w f a c e in the Casa de Nariño (Presidential O f f i c e ) , there also was a substantive c h a n g e of p e r s o n n e l a m o n g U . S . o f f i c i a l s w o r k i n g on t h e C o l o m b i a i s s u e . A f t e r M y l e s F r e c h e t t e ' s d e p a r t u r e in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 7 , in e a r l y 1 9 9 8 A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e R o b e r t G e l b a r d w a s r e a s s i g n e d to w o r k o n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e U . S . - b r o k e r e d p e a c e a c c o r d s in B o s n i a . F r e c h e t t e ' s r e p l a c e m e n t in B o g o t á , K u r t i s K a m m a n , w h i l e a l s o a h a r d - l i n e r o n the d r u g issue, w a s m u c h less a b r a s i v e ( e s p e c i a l l y p u b l i c l y ) t h a n his p r e d e c e s s o r . In f a c t , a m a j o r r e a s o n K a m m a n w a s c h o s e n w a s to e n s u r e that W a s h i n g t o n did not h a v e " a n o t h e r F r e c h e t t e " r u n n i n g the e m b a s s y . 3 R a n d y B e e r s t o o k G e l b a r d ' s p o s i t i o n a n d he t o o w a s n o t e d f o r t a k i n g a m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y a p p r o a c h in d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t . In a s e n s e , k n o w i n g that the a r r i v a l of a n e w p r e s i d e n t w o u l d p r o v i d e an o p p o r t u n e t i m e f o r a d e n a r c o t i z a t i o n of t h e b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i s e l y r e m o v e d its o w n r e m i n d e r s ( m a i n l y F r e c h e t t e a n d G e l b a r d ) of t h e p r i o r e r a — a n e r a t h a t m o s t w e r e n o w e a g e r to f o r g e t . T h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t — w h e t h e r it w a s C o n g r e s s , the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , o r e v e n the J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t — d i d not w a n t L i b e r a l c a n d i d a t e a n d S a m p e r ally H o r a c i o S e r p a to w i n the J u n e 21, 1998, e l e c t i o n . 4 N o t o n l y did the U n i t e d S t a t e s loathe S e r p a f o r his c o m b a t i v e r e m a r k s t o w a r d U.S. officials, which included statements about Myles Frechette being

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an " u g l y g r i n g o , " but it a l s o s u s p e c t e d h i m of h a v i n g ties to the d r u g cartels. In that sense, the g e n e r a l f e e l i n g a m o n g U . S . o f f i c i a l s w a s that a S e r p a v i c t o r y w o u l d i m p l y a n o t h e r f o u r y e a r s of S a m p e r - l i k e relations. M o r e o v e r , unlike S a m p e r , S e r p a had not b e e n p u b l i c l y linked to the drug cartels, w h i c h m e a n t that he did not h a v e nearly the credibility p r o b l e m on the d r u g issue that S a m p e r h a d . T h u s the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d not h a v e been able to push S e r p a on c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s issues the w a y it had d o n e with S a m p e r . F r o m the U . S . p e r s p e c t i v e , a S e r p a adm i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d h a v e h a d all the n e g a t i v e e l e m e n t s of the S a m p e r y e a r s w i t h o u t a n y of the b e n e f i t s to U . S . c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s p o l i c y that c a m e with the p u b l i c l y d i s c r e d i t e d S a m p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In this reg a r d , Serpa m i g h t have b e e n similar to C é s a r G a v i r i a — s o f t on d r u g s (at least s o f t e r than S a m p e r h a d b e e n ) , but not a f r a i d and m o r e able to stand up to the U n i t e d States. T h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t w a s e a g e r to w o r k with t h e P a s t r a n a a d m i n istration, r e f l e c t e d by high praise f r o m the W h i t e H o u s e and State Dep a r t m e n t , as well as by an i n v i t a t i o n f o r P r e s i d e n t P a s t r a n a to visit W a s h i n g t o n only a f e w m o n t h s a f t e r he took o f f i c e . This did not m e a n , h o w e v e r , that the U n i t e d S t a t e s f a i l e d to m a k e it c l e a r to P a s t r a n a that he t o o w o u l d h a v e to c o m p l y with U . S . - l e d c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s e f f o r t s . 5 Not surprisingly, m u c h of this p r e s s u r e c a m e f r o m C a p i t o l Hill, w h e r e m a n y C o n g r e s s m e m b e r s w e r e c o n c e r n e d that P a s t r a n a ' s m o v e s to initiate p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s with the F A R C m i g h t u n d e r m i n e a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s . To that e n d , the U.S. C o n g r e s s p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n that w o u l d cut off c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a if P a s t r a n a ' s p e a c e initiat i v e s — e s p e c i a l l y the p r o p o s e d plan to grant the F A R C a d e m i l i t a r i z e d z o n e — i n t e r f e r e d with c o c a e r a d i c a t i o n e f f o r t s . 6 B u t t h e s e c r i e s f r o m C o n g r e s s a s i d e , there is n o d o u b t that t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o m mitted to g i v i n g A n d r é s P a s t r a n a m u c h m o r e r o o m to m a n e u v e r on the issue of p e a c e than it had e v e r c o n s i d e r e d g r a n t i n g to E r n e s t o S a m p e r . Taken at f a c e value, U . S . policy d u r i n g the P a s t r a n a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m i g h t s e e m less n a r c o t i z e d , a n d to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t this is true. B u t a large part of this d e n a r c o t i z a t i o n e v o l v e d only b e c a u s e P a s t r a n a a g r e e d to i m p l e m e n t a n d s u p p o r t the b a s i c t e n e t s of U . S . d r u g p o l i c y . 7 I r o n i cally, t h o u g h , P a s t r a n a ' s c o o p e r a t i o n did not t r a n s l a t e into i n c r e a s e d e a s e or s u c c e s s of p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . In f a c t , m a n y U . S . o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d that the U n i t e d States h a d b e e n better able to p u r s u e its c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s strategy d u r i n g the S a m p e r era, as S a m p e r h a d b e c o m e so w e a k e n e d a n d d i s c r e d i t e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d act v i r t u a l l y u n i m p e d e d . A c c o r d i n g to o n e U . S . e m b a s s y o f f i c i a l : " I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h it w a s b e t t e r to h a v e S a m p e r f o r the d r u g i s s u e — w e c o u l d

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totally ignore him and work directly with General Serrano. N o w w e ' v e got to work through P a s t r a n a ' s o f f i c e . It was the same with G a v i r i a — G e o r g e Bush loved him so we had to work with him e v e n though w e thought he was soft on drugs. We got so much out of S a m p e r because he had to do what we wanted." x This attitude suggests that if Andrés Pastrana were to suddenly reverse course on drug policy, there is a good chance that the U.S. would begin a renewed effort to force him to continue a tough antidrug stance. T h e c o n t i n u e d uncertain and half-hearted U.S. support for the current Pastrana-led peace process would no doubt be a f f e c t e d . We can therefore characterize U.S. policy during the Pastrana administration as "implicit narcotization." Andrés Pastrana well understood the message from W a s h i n g t o n : he must c o o p e r a t e with the United States on d r u g s or he would b e c o m e another Ernesto Samper.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO PASTRANA'S PEACE EFFORTS A number of events in late 1998 signaled that the Clinton administration was eager to work with the Colombian government. For example, in Dec e m b e r 1998 working groups headed by U.S. Secretary of D e f e n s e William Cohen and Colombia's Defense Minister Rodrigo Lloreda signed an agreement that promoted greater cooperation between the two countries' militaries. The accord also called for the establishment of a new Colombian counternarcotics military battalion, which would soon become the cornerstone of U.S.-Colombian relations vis-à-vis the drug war. In an even stronger indication that the United States was firmly behind the Pastrana administration, on D e c e m b e r 13-14, 1998, State Department representative Phil Chicola secretly met with the F A R C ' s Raul R e y e s in C o s t a Rica. 9 D u r i n g this m e e t i n g , w h i c h the F A R C had requested via the C o l o m b i a n government, Chicola pushed antidrug issues, the p e a c e process, and the status of several A m e r i c a n s w h o had been m i s s i n g in C o l o m b i a for years. 1 0 That the U n i t e d States a c c e p t e d the o f f e r to meet was seen as evidence that it was considering doing business with the FARC. However, this notion was suddenly and tragically discarded only a f e w m o n t h s later. On February 25, 1999, three U.S. ind i g e n o u s rights activists w o r k i n g with the U ' w a Indian tribe in the northeastern department of Arauca were abducted by the F A R C . Their dead bodies were found two weeks later. While it initially denied any involvement, the FARC soon took responsibility for the killings, although

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there w a s c o n t i n u e d u n c e r t a i n t y o v e r e x a c t l y w h o w i t h i n the F A R C hiera r c h y h a d o r d e r e d the e x e c u t i o n s . " T h e F A R C s u b s e q u e n t l y a n n o u n c e d that it w o u l d c o n d u c t an internal i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the k i l l i n g s a n d p u n i s h t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e , but t h i s w a s not e n o u g h f o r the U . S . a n d C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , w h i c h d e m a n d e d that the F A R C h a n d o v e r the p e r p e t r a t o r s . T h e F A R C n e v e r m e t this d e m a n d , a n d the c a s e of the t h r e e m u r d e r e d A m e r i c a n activists served to u s h e r in a h a r d e r U.S. line t o w a r d the F A R C . T h e m u r d e r s a l s o f u r t h e r e d t h e p e r c e p t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n that the P a s t r a n a - l e d p e a c e s t r a t e g y w a s t u r n i n g o u t to be m o r e n a i v e a n d less credible than m a n y had believed just a f e w m o n t h s earlier. The event a l s o f u e l e d W a s h i n g t o n ' s g r o w i n g s u s p i c i o n s that the F A R C w a s u n w i l l i n g to c o o p e r a t e a n d n e g o t i a t e in g o o d f a i t h . T h e d o u b t s a b o u t the g u e r r i l l a s ( b o t h the F A R C a n d the E L N ) w e r e c o m p o u n d e d on April 12, 1999, w h e n t h e E L N h i j a c k e d the A v i a n c a A i r l i n e s f l i g h t en r o u t e f r o m B u c a r a m a n g a to B o g o t á . A b o u t six w e e k s later the E L N s t r u c k a g a i n , k i d n a p p i n g 143 c h u r c h g o e r s in C a l i . W h i l e m a n y s u s p e c t e d that this w a s the E L N ' s w a y of g e t t i n g e n o u g h a t t e n t i o n to w a r r a n t a g r e a t e r say at the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e ( e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of its o w n liberated z o n e ) , in W a s h i n g t o n it s e r v e d to e m p o w e r t h o s e w h o b e l i e v e d that m o r e sticks a n d less c a r r o t s s h o u l d be u s e d in d e a l i n g s with the g u e r r i l l a s . T o m a k e m a t t e r s w o r s e , the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s c r e d i b i l i t y o n the n e g o t i a t i n g f r o n t b e g a n to f u r t h e r e r o d e in M a y 1999 w h e n D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r R o d r i g o L l o r e d a a b r u p t l y r e s i g n e d o v e r w h a t he d e e m e d to be u n a c c e p t a b l e c o n c e s s i o n s at the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s as w e l l as u n d u l y h e a v y - h a n d e d d e m a n d s f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s that c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s be f i r e d f o r s u s p e c t e d l i n k s to p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s . 1 2 F o l l o w i n g Lloreda's lead, more than fifty high-ranking C o l o m b i a n military offic e r s s u b m i t t e d their r e s i g n a t i o n s to C o m m a n d e r F e r n a n d o T a p i a s of the Colombian Armed Forces. While Tapias quickly rejected these resignat i o n s , the u n r e s t w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y r a n k s a f f e c t e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of the Pastrana-led peace process.

COLOMBIA AS A CRISIS CASE D u e to the c o m b i n a t i o n of A m e r i c a n a c t i v i s t m u r d e r s , stalls in the p e a c e talks, s e e m i n g l y d a i l y g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s a n d k i d n a p p i n g s , a n d a n e x p l o s i v e i n c r e a s e in c o c a c u l t i v a t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y in t h e s o u t h e r n d e p a r t m e n t of P u t u m a y o , w h e r e t h e F A R C is e x t r e m e l y a c t i v e a n d h a s u s e d d r u g p r o f i t s to f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e its c o n t r o l in t h a t a r e a ) , b y t h e s u m m e r of 1999 C o l o m b i a had b e c o m e a crisis case f o r the United States. Indeed,

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the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n o w c o n s i d e r e d that C o l o m b i a ' s i n s t a b i l i t y p o s e d a s e r i o u s risk to U . S . n a t i o n a l security. A s o n e m i g h t e x p e c t , this c h a n g e in p e r c e p t i o n w a s m a t c h e d by a g r e a t e r f o c u s by s e n i o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f f i c i a l s in the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . In w h a t c a m e to be the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n that the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s c o n s i d e r i n g a d r a s t i c a d j u s t m e n t to its p o l i c i e s t o w a r d C o l o m b i a , on J u l y 13. 1999, the o f f i c e of D r u g C/.ar B a r r y M c C a f f r e y l e a k e d a S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t m e m o that c a l l e d f o r a m a s s i v e i n c r e a s e in a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a of n e a r l y U . S . $ 1 billion. T h e State D e p a r t m e n t h a d a p p a r e n t l y p r e p a r e d t h r e e m e m o s listing v a r y i n g levels of a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a , the m o s t a m b i t i o u s of w h i c h w a s l e a k e d by M c C a f f r e y ' s o f f i c e . 1 1 B e c a u s e B a r r y M c C a f f r e y w a s well liked by P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n , he had the b u r e a u c r a t i c b a c k i n g to f o r c e the issue in W a s h i n g t o n , a n d the f i g u r e of U . S . $ 1 b i l l i o n q u i c k l y b e c a m e the b e n c h m a r k in the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for the u p c o m i n g year.14 M c C a f f r e y ' s call f o r s u c h an u n p r e c e d e n t e d i n c r e a s e in aid a l s o s e r v e d to t a k e the w i n d out of the sails of R e p u b l i c a n critics in the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w h o had b e e n c l a i m i n g that the C l i n t o n W h i t e H o u s e had not b e e n d o i n g e n o u g h to f i g h t the d r u g war. I n d e e d , the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d o u t f l a n k e d the d r u g h a w k s , a m a n e u v e r that w o u l d b e c o m e r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t by J a n u a r y of the f o l l o w i n g year. In e a r l y A u g u s t , U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e T h o m a s P i c k e r i n g b e c a m e the h i g h e s t - r a n k i n g U . S . g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l to visit C o l o m b i a in s e v eral y e a r s . P i c k e r i n g r e t u r n e d to W a s h i n g t o n c o n v i n c e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s n e e d e d to d o m o r e to s t o p the b l e e d i n g , a p o i n t of v i e w that put h i m in a g r e e m e n t with B a r r y M c C a f f r e y ' s e a r l i e r call f o r a m a s s i v e inc r e a s e in aid. I n d e e d , the P i c k e r i n g - M c C a f f r e y p a r t n e r s h i p w o u l d f o r m t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g s of t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s n e w p o l i c i e s t o w a r d C o l o m b i a . 1 5 A n o t h e r s i g n a l that the W h i t e H o u s e w a s t a k i n g a g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t in C o l o m b i a c a m e o n A u g u s t 10, 1999, w h e n S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e M a d e l e i n e A l b r i g h t p u b l i s h e d an o p - e d in the New York Times t i t l e d " C o l o m b i a ' s S t r u g g l e s , a n d H o w W e C a n H e l p . " All t h e s e a c t i o n s w e r e i n t e n d e d to s e n d a s t r o n g m e s s a g e not o n l y to C o l o m b i a but a l s o to the U . S . C o n g r e s s t h a t it w a s the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t a n d t h e W h i t e H o u s e that w o u l d be c o o r d i n a t i n g C o l o m b i a p o l i c y .

PLAN COLOMBIA T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d e s i r e to i m p l e m e n t a n e w s t r a t e g y t o w a r d C o l o m b i a w a s c o n v e n i e n t l y m e t b y A n d r é s P a s t r a n a ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t of

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a U.S.$7.5 billion plan to revive the C o l o m b i a n e c o n o m y , p r o m o t e social d e v e l o p m e n t , eradicate illicit crops, and jump-start the stalled peace talks. 1 6 L a b e l e d "Plan C o l o m b i a , " P a s t r a n a ' s initiative called for the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to f u n d U . S . $ 4 billion, with the r e m a i n i n g U.S.$3.5 billion to be provided by the international c o m m u n i t y . Within the U.S.$3.5 billion f r o m international sources, the plan specified that the United States would provide primarily military assistance, while the European Union would provide aid of a more humanitarian nature. In strictly political terms, Plan C o l o m b i a was brilliant for the Clinton administration. The g r o w i n g perception in Washington that C o l o m bia was imploding led m a n y officials to believe that something needed to be done. Yet b e c a u s e the o v e r r i d i n g policy priority for the United States in C o l o m b i a remained antidrug efforts, W a s h i n g t o n ' s solution for saving C o l o m b i a (i.e., the c o m p o n e n t of Plan C o l o m b i a provided by the United States) was c o m p o s e d o v e r w h e l m i n g l y of counternarcotics measures. The United States could therefore j u s t i f y a new and urgent need for its original antidrug policy. Given the potential for c o n g r e s s i o n a l opposition, driven mainly by the c o n c e r n that the a s s i s t a n c e p a c k a g e w o u l d lead the U n i t e d States into " a n o t h e r V i e t n a m , " the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i s e l y p r e s e n t e d the plan as being primarily an antidrug e f f o r t . T h e W h i t e H o u s e k n e w that f e w m e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s would be willing to o p p o s e assistance to help fight the drug war, and t h e r e f o r e took p a i n s t a k i n g e f f o r t s to distinguish b e t w e e n c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y and c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s initiatives. As Assistant Secretary of D e f e n s e Brian S h e r i d a n testified in S e p t e m ber 2000: The targets are the narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are involved in the cultivation of coca or opium poppy and the subsequent production and transportation of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. Only those armed elements that forcibly inhibit or confront counterdrug operations will be engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent organizations, or illegal self-defense forces. I know that some are concerned that we are being drawn into a quagmire. Let me assure you, we are not. 17

T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s attempts to distance itself f r o m C o l o m b i a ' s internal c o n f l i c t by f o c u s i n g solely on d r u g s h e l p e d to e n s u r e a relatively quick and c o n t r o v e r s y - f r e e approval through C o n g r e s s . The ostensibly c o m p r e h e n s i v e " C o l o m b i a n " Plan C o l o m b i a was basically a W a s h i n g t o n c r e a t i o n . In fact, m a n y U . S . o f f i c i a l s readily admitted that it was essentially d e v i s e d by the U n i t e d States and that a

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c o p y in S p a n i s h d i d n o t e x i s t u n t i l m o n t h s a f t e r a c o p y in E n g l i s h w a s available.IX N o n e t h e l e s s , Pastrana's statement that this w a s truly a Col o m b i a n p l a n a l l o w e d t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o a c t a s if w e r e s e l f lessly f i l l i n g the r e q u e s t of a r e l i a b l e h e m i s p h e r i c ally. T h e

Clinton

W h i t e H o u s e a t t e m p t e d to sell the a s s i s t a n c e not as a u n i l a t e r a l i n f u s i o n of U . S . a s s i s t a n c e , but rather as o n e c o m p o n e n t of a larger, C o l o m b i a n d r i v e n p r o g r a m . Yet as w e w i l l s e e . W a s h i n g t o n ' s a t t e m p t t o c l o a k its policy desires p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l , as Plan C o l o m b i a increasingly c a m e to be seen as a W a s h i n g t o n creation. On

January

11, 2 0 0 0 , t h e C l i n t o n

administration

announced

U . S . $ 1 . 6 billion p a c k a g e to f u n d Plan C o l o m b i a , w i t h r o u g h l y

a

U.S.$1

b i l l i o n of t h e t o t a l s l a t e d f o r m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i c e a i d . 1 4 T h e m i l i t a r y c o m p o n e n t of the aid c o n s i s t e d p r i n c i p a l l y of a c o m b i n a t i o n of H u e y a n d Black Hawk helicopters designated for antidrug operations. The proposal a l s o called for the creation of t w o m o r e m i l i t a r y c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s b a t t a l i o n s to b e u s e d in t h e d e p a r t m e n t of P u t u m a y o . w h e r e d r u g c u l t i v a t i o n h a d i n c r e a s e d s o g r e a t l y in t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r s . Secretary of Slate M a d e l e i n e Albright traveled to C o l o m b i a a few d a y s a f t e r the a n n o u n c e m e n t to sell the p r o p o s a l to the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d p e o p l e . 2 " In o r d e r t o c r e a t e a s e n s e o f u r g e n c y t h a t w o u l d e n h a n c e the p r o s p e c t s of the p a c k a g e b e i n g q u i c k l y a p p r o v e d by C o n g r e s s , t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o l d t h e n e w p r o p o s a l a s if t i m e w e r e of the e s s e n c e . 2 1 A n e x a m p l e of this t o n e of u r g e n c y c a m e f r o m S e n a t o r Joseph Biden ( D - D e l . ) , w h o b e c a m e a key supporter of the administration's policy: N e v e r b e f o r e in recent history has there been such an o p p o r t u n i t y to strike at all a s p e c t s of the d r u g trade at the s o u r c e . . . . T h e United States should seize this rare e n f o r c e m e n t o p p o r t u n i t y by p r o v i d i n g assistance to Plan C o l o m b i a . . . . T h e r e are c o n s i d e r a b l e costs associated with C o n g r e s s ' d e l a y in a p p r o v i n g the C o l o m b i a s u p p l e m e n t a l . . . . Helping C o l o m b i a is squarely in A m e r i c a ' s national interest. It is the source of m a n y of the drugs p o i s o n i n g our p e o p l e . It is not s o m e faroff land with w h i c h the United States shares little in c o m m o n . It is an established d e m o c r a c y in A m e r i c a ' s b a c k y a r d — j u s t a f e w hours by air from Miami.22 W h i l e the W h i t e H o u s e ' s initial p r o p o s a l d i d set a s i d e a f e w h u n d r e d million dollars for h u m a n rights issues, the peace process, and judicial r e f o r m , t h e p a c k a g e c o u l d still b e s e e n a s a n e s s e n t i a l l y a n t i d r u g p l a n .

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THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE OVER PLAN COLOMBIA The House of Representatives Unlike the Senate version of the assistance package, which included relatively s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s in the l a n g u a g e of the a s s i s t a n c e p a c k a g e regarding h u m a n rights, the H o u s e version closely r e s e m b l e d the plan s u b m i t t e d by the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e r e w e r e s o m e m o v e s to drastically r e v a m p the package, such as R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Nancy Pelosi's ( D - C a l i f . ) unsuccessful a m e n d m e n t (by a 2 3 - 3 1 vote) in the Appropriations C o m m i t t e e calling for the proposed U.S.$1.3 billion to be shifted from Colombia to domestic drug treatment and rehabilitation programs. 2 3 In the full H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , N a n c y Pelosi once again attempted to reintroduce her domestic drug-treatment f u n d i n g . W h i l e the Rules C o m m i t t e e denied this request, Pelosi's m a n e u v e r allowed her to open up the debate on the H o u s e floor, a l l o w i n g t w e n t y - t w o representatives to m a k e s p e e c h e s s u p p o r t i n g the a m e n d m e n t . 2 4 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Jim Ramstad ( R - M i n n . ) submitted an even more aggressive a m e n d m e n t that would h a v e cut the entire U.S.$1.6 billion of counternarcotics aid. It failed by a 1 5 9 - 2 6 2 margin, but it too served to indicate that the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p a c k a g e would not e m e r g e f r o m C o n g r e s s without at least a f e w bruises. C r i t i c i s m f r o m s o m e of the liberal w i n g of the D e m o c r a t i c Party aside, the H o u s e p a c k a g e passed 2 6 3 - 1 4 6 , a vote that signaled strong support for the Clinton proposal. 2 5

The Senate Discussion over the merits of the White H o u s e ' s plan to support Colombia m o v e d to the Senate in M a y 2000. W h a t b e c a m e immediately apparent, and somewhat surprising to some administration officials, was that a sizable force within the Senate wanted to soften the assistance package to deemphasize the military component and allow for more funding of human rights, alternative crop development, and judicial reform. 2 6 Senator Slade Gorton ( R - W a s h . ) put forth an ultimately u n s u c c e s s f u l a m e n d m e n t (defeated in an 11-15 vote) that would have reduced U.S. aid to U . S . $ 1 0 0 million. T h e Senate Appropriations C o m m i t t e e reduced the military and police c o m p o n e n t of the aid to U . S . $ 4 5 0 million, U . S . $ 3 5 0 million less than the H o u s e version. The thirty U H - 6 0 Black H a w k helicopters were

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s c r a t c h e d a n d r e p l a c e d w i t h s e v e n t y - f i v e of t h e less e x p e n s i v e U H - 1 H Super Hueys.27 H u m a n rights c o n c e r n s also r e c e i v e d s i g n i f i c a n t a t t e n t i o n in the del i b e r a t i o n s of the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e . L o n g t i m e h u m a n r i g h t s p r o p o n e n t S e n a t o r Patrick L e a h y s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t r o d u c e d a c o n d i t i o n that the s e c r e t a r y of state w o u l d h a v e to c e r t i f y that C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s a c c u s e d of c o m m i t t i n g h u m a n rights v i o l a t i o n s w e r e b e i n g tried in c i v i l i a n c o u r t s , a n d that the C o l o m b i a n A r m e d F o r c e s w a s t e r m i n a t i n g l i n k s b e t w e e n the m i l i t a r y a n d p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s . If t h e s e c r e t a r y of state c o u l d not issue the c e r t i f i c a t i o n s , aid to the m i l i t a r y c o u l d not c o n tinue. W h i l e this certification was ultimately w a i v e d , and then proven not legally b i n d i n g to c e r t a i n c o m p o n e n t s of the aid p a c k a g e , it sent an i m p o r t a n t signal that h u m a n rights c o n c e r n s w o u l d not be o v e r l o o k e d . W h i l e h u m a n rights aid w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d a n d m i l i t a r y aid w a s s l i g h t l y d e c r e a s e d , t h e r e w a s a g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s in the S e n a t e that the W h i t e H o u s e p a c k a g e , with its s t r o n g f o c u s o n p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to b o l s t e r C o l o m b i a n a n t i d r u g c a p a c i t y , s h o u l d b e a p p r o v e d . S e n a t o r P a u l W e l l s t o n e ( D - M i n n . ) , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t r o d u c e d an a m e n d m e n t to e l i m i n a t e the " p u s h into s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a " a n d i n s t e a d invest the r e s o u r c e s s a v e d into d o m e s t i c d r u g t r e a t m e n t . 2 8 T h e a m e n d m e n t w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d e f e a t e d in an 1 1 - 8 9 v o t e , s u g g e s t i n g that w h i l e t h e r e m i g h t h a v e b e e n s o m e m o v e m e n t w i t h i n the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e f o r a s o f t e r v e r s i o n of the aid p a c k a g e , the f u l l S e n a t e w a s s t r o n g l y b e h i n d a v e r s i o n s i m i l a r to the o r i g i n a l C l i n t o n p r o p o s a l . T h e real t e n s i o n in the S e n a t e a c t u a l l y r e s t e d w i t h t h e type of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e that C o l o m b i a s h o u l d r e c e i v e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a d e b a t e e r u p t e d o v e r w h e t h e r to p r o v i d e h i g h - t e c h B l a c k H a w k h e l i c o p t e r s , m a n u f a c t u r e d b y the S i k o r s k y C o m p a n y in C o n n e c t i c u t , or the less s o phisticated and less e x p e n s i v e H u e y s , m a n u f a c t u r e d by Bell-Textron. T h e initial S e n a t e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e v e r s i o n r e p l a c e d all of t h e B l a c k H a w k s r e q u e s t e d b y the W h i t e H o u s e w i t h S u p e r H u e y s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , it w a s S e n a t o r C h r i s t o p h e r D o d d ( D - C o n n . ) , a v o c a l o p p o n e n t of the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s u p p o r t f o r the N i c a r a g u a n c o n t r a s in t h e 1980s, w h o p r o p o s e d that the B l a c k H a w k s be i n c l u d e d in the p a c k a g e . M a n y b e l i e v e that t h e f a c t t h a t B l a c k H a w k s a r e m a n u f a c t u r e d in D o d d ' s h o m e s t a t e of C o n n e c t i c u t i n f l u e n c e d h i s s t a n c e . K n o w i n g t h a t the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t coveted the high-tech Black H a w k s , D o d d w i s e l y s u g g e s t e d t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d a l l o w C o l o m b i a ' s m i l i t a r y a n d n a t i o n a l p o l i c e to s e l e c t the t y p e of h e l i c o p t e r s t h e y w i s h e d to r e c e i v e . W h i l e D o d d ' s p r o p o s a l lost 4 7 - 5 1 , it w o u l d not b e l o n g b e f o r e

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the H o u s e v e r s i o n r e s u r r e c t e d the B l a c k H a w k s , e n s u r i n g that they w o u l d be i n c l u d e d in t h e f i n a l c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e r s i o n of the l e g i s l a t i o n . T h e f i n a l S e n a t e v e r s i o n of t h e p a c k a g e p a s s e d 9 5 - 4 . A f t e r l e a v i n g the S e n a t e , the bill w e n t to the H o u s e - S e n a t e C o n f e r e n c e C o m m i t t e e f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of its t w o c o m p e t i n g v e r s i o n s . P e r h a p s the c o m m i t t e e ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n w a s to m a i n t a i n the S e n a t e ' s t o u g h h u m a n r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s , but to g i v e the p r e s i d e n t the ability to issue a " n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y w a i v e r " that c o u l d o v e r r i d e a n o n c e r t i f i c a tion d e c i s i o n . T h e c o m m i t t e e a l s o r e s o l v e d the B l a c k H a w k v e r s u s H u e y d i s p u t e , d e c i d i n g that the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y w o u l d r e c e i v e f o r t y - t w o H u e y s a n d e i g h t e e n B l a c k H a w k s , w i t h t w e l v e of the H u e y s a n d t w o of the B l a c k H a w k s set a s i d e f o r the N a t i o n a l P o l i c e .

CLINTON SIGNS PLAN COLOMBIA INTO LAW O n J u l y 13, 2 0 0 0 , P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n s i g n e d H . R . 4 4 2 5 i n t o l a w . ^ T h i s bill p r o v i d e d U . S . $ 8 6 0 . 3 m i l l i o n of aid to C o l o m b i a ( s e e T a b l e 5.1), in a d d i t i o n to the U . S . $ 3 2 9 m i l l i o n that h a d b e e n a p p r o v e d in f i s c a l y e a r 2 0 0 0 ( t h e total U . S . $ 1 . 3 b i l l i o n a l s o i n c l u d e d a n t i d r u g a s s i s t a n c e f o r B o l i v i a , P e r u , a n d E c u a d o r ) , m e a n i n g that C o l o m b i a w o u l d r e c e i v e r o u g h l y U . S . $ 1 . 2 b i l l i o n o v e r t w o y e a r s . In that t h e f i n a l c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e r s i o n c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e d C l i n t o n ' s initial p r o p o s a l , P l a n C o l o m b i a r e p r e s e n t e d a c l e a r v i c t o r y f o r the his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In f a c t , b e c a u s e t h e R e p u b l i c a n s s e e m e d to b e e v e n m o r e e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t the p a c k a g e t h a n t h e D e m o c r a t s , t h e C l i n t o n W h i t e H o u s e h a d p r e e m p t e d a n y c r i t i c i s m t h a t it w a s n o t d o i n g e n o u g h to f i g h t t h e w a r o n d r u g s . B u t at t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e t r e m e n d o u s e m p h a s i s that w a s a n d c o n t i n u e s to b e p l a c e d o n P l a n C o l o m b i a — e s p e c i a l l y the p u s h i n t o s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a — m e a n s t h a t t h e r e is n o w t r e m e n d o u s p r e s s u r e o n the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t to s h o w results of this e x t r e m e l y costly s u p p o r t p a c k a g e . A n d in t h e e v e r v i o l e n t a n d u n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t of C o l o m b i a , this will b e v e r y d i f f i c u l t to a c h i e v e . T h e p a c k a g e s i g n a l e d an i m p o r t a n t U . S . p o l i c y c h a n g e in a n u m b e r of a r e a s . D a t i n g b a c k to t h e i s o l a t i o n of E r n e s t o S a m p e r , the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t had w o r k e d almost exclusively with the C o l o m b i a n National Police on antidrug e f f o r t s ; but n o w the p a c k a g e signaled that the C o l o m b i a n A r m e d F o r c e s w o u l d be brought into the antidrug arena, esp e c i a l l y w i t h the c r e a t i o n of the c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s b a t t a l i o n s . T h i s m o v e r a n into t r o u b l e in t h e fall of 2 0 0 0 as l o n g t i m e N a t i o n a l P o l i c e s u p p o r t e r

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154 Table 5.1

Total Aid for Plan Colombia (U.S.$ millions)

U p g r a d e s io o v e r s e a s " F o r w a r d - O p e r a t i n g L o c a t i o n s " (Hcuador. A r u b a . C u r a s a o )

116.5

Defense Department Andean-ridge intelligence gathering

62.3

Antidrug radar upgrades "Drug Kingpin" program

6K.0 2.0

Defense Department aircraft Aid for Peru Aid for Bolivia Aid for E c u a d o r Aiti f o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s Aid for C o l o m b i a Total Stmn-e:

30.0 32.0 110.0 20.0 IX.0 860.3 1.319.1

O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t a n d B u d g e t . 2 0 0 0 .

C o n g r e s s m a n B e n j a m i n G i l m a n b e g a n to v o i c e his c o n c e r n that the N a tional P o l i c e had been m a r g i n a l i z e d by C l i n t o n ' s p l a n . S e c o n d , the p a c k a g e r e v e a l e d that W a s h i n g t o n h a d g r o w n w e a r y of the P a s t r a n a p e a c e p r o c e s s . O n l y U . S . $ 3 m i l l i o n w a s a p p r o v e d to s u p port the C o l o m b i a n p e a c e p r o c e s s ( s e e T a b l e 5 . 2 ) , an a l m o s t i n s i g n i f i c a n t s u m c o m p a r e d to t h e h u n d r e d s of m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s that the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s s p e n d i n g f o r the p u s h i n t o s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a . W a s h i n g t o n ' s t h i n k i n g b e h i n d t h i s m e a g e r s u m w a s that P l a n C o l o m b i a s h o u l d be a s s o c i a t e d solely w i t h a n t i d r u g e f f o r t s a n d not w i t h e i t h e r the civil c o n f l i c t or the p e a c e p r o c e s s , as b o t h w e r e c o n s i d e r e d t o o c l o s e to the c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y q u e s t i o n . T h i r d , the s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e s in h u m a n r i g h t s a n d a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e e n a b l e d t h e W h i t e H o u s e to d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m s that the a s s i s t a n c e c o n s i s t e d of s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y c o m p o n e n t s . W h i l e h e l i c o p t e r s a n d the p u s h into s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a c l e a r l y d o m i n a t e d the ass i s t a n c e p a c k a g e , t h e r e w e r e n e v e r t h e l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e s in n o n m i l i t a r y aid to C o l o m b i a . T h e bill p r o v i d e d U . S . $ 5 1 m i l l i o n f o r a b r o a d r a n g e of h u m a n r i g h t s i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g p r o g r a m s t o p r o t e c t h u m a n rights workers and establish h u m a n rights units within the C o l o m b i a n military. Although Senator L e a h y ' s h u m a n rights certification language w a s l o o s e n e d to i n c l u d e a n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y w a i v e r , it n o n e t h e l e s s still r e q u i r e d the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t to issue a c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n b e f o r e the aid c o u l d be d e l i v e r e d . T h e issue of h u m a n r i g h t s c e r t i f i c a t i o n a r o s e a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y , as the State D e p a r t m e n t w a s r e q u i r e d to issue its f i r s t c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n in A u g u s t 2 0 0 0 . O f the six c o n d i t i o n s that w e r e listed f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t did n o t c e r t i f y the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y o n f i v e of

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Table 5.2 Plan Colombia-Assistance for Colombia (U.S.$ millions) Military assistance Police assistance Alternative development Aid to the d i s p l a c e d H u m a n rights Judicial reform L a w e n f o r c e m e n t / r u l e of l a w Peace process Total

519.2a 123.1 68.5 37.5 51.0 13.0 45.0 3.0 860.3

Sou/res: C e n t e r f u r I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i c y , 2 0 0 0 ; O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t a n d B u d g e t , 2 0 0 0 . Note: a. U . S . S 4 1 6 . 9 m i l l i o n w i l l f u n d t h e " p u s h i n t o s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a . "

them. Not surprisingly, President Clinton quickly signed the waiver so that aid could begin to flow to Colombia. According to President Clinton, "I signed the waiver because I think that President Pastrana is committed to the issue of human rights, something that we are very worried about." 3 0 Alternative development assistance for Colombia, resources aimed at balancing the disruptive effects of what would be the newly aggressive fumigation efforts, was surprisingly low at U.S.$68.5 million, less than the U.S.$106.5 million requested by the Clinton administration and the U.S.$108 million requested by the House. In fact, the legislation provided more alternative development assistance to Bolivia (U.S.$85 million) than to Colombia. 3 1 The soft side of Plan Colombia initially c o m p o s e d approximately 18 percent of the administration's total request. This included resources earmarked for alternative economic development to provide basic social infrastructure; credit and technical assistance to communities committing to voluntary eradication; the provision of social services to internally displaced persons; and h u m a n rights strengthening, judicial reform, and other justice-related projects. T h e final bill that was signed into law actually increased the amount of soft programs to approximately 20 percent of the package, namely due to the quadrupling of alternative development aid to Bolivia. The nondrug aspects of the plan were never the focus of the administration's request for supplemental funds. One need only look at the inception of the p l a n — B a r r y M c C a f f r e y ' s declaration of a "drug emerg e n c y " — t o realize that the essence of the plan was to reduce drug cultivation and traffic. Further, even if the soft side had been regarded

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President Clinton during his August 2 0 0 0 trip to Cartagena, Colombia. Daughter Chelsea is to his right. Photo by Marcelo Salinas.

w i t h t h e s a m e p r i o r i t y as c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s , d e m o c r a c y a n d h u m a n r i g h t s are n o t b i g - t i c k e t i t e m s . In that p o l i c y a t t e n t i o n naturally c e n t e r s o n w h e r e t h e m o n e y is, h e l i c o p t e r s a n d i n t e r d i c t i o n by d e f i n i t i o n r e c e i v e d m o r e att e n t i o n in t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s s u p p l e m e n t a l r e q u e s t . In f u l l , f u n d i n g f o r s o f t i s s u e s w a s an i n e x p e n s i v e , s e c o n d a r y c o m p o n e n t of t h e p r o p o s a l , a n d v i e w e d as a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t to a p p e a s e U . S . n o n governmental organizations and congressional Democrats.

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This strategy worked. While some Democrats demanded that more funds be allocated toward the soft side, Congress ended up passing the bill with minimal change to the administration's request. Interestingly enough, however, the United States is only now seeing the full importance of the soft side of Plan Colombia. The ability of the United States to point to substantive democracy and economic growth programs has been imperative in selling the plan to both the international community and the Colombian people. Indeed, in light of growing criticism of the plan's military and drug focus, the United States has highlighted the importance of democracy and justice at the expense of the counternarcotics element. While the United States has not avoided severe criticism for the military dominance of the package, the existence of soft issues has clearly diffused greater condemnation. The United States can accurately highlight that USAID's program in Colombia has been increased more than tenfold. 3 2 Hence, in terms of placating opponents, nonmilitary programs have ironically become the linchpin of the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia. Soon after President Clinton signed the U.S. component of Plan Colombia into law, he led a bipartisan delegation to visit Colombia. There is little doubt that Clinton's deft political abilities put a strong face on the assistance package, serving to reinforce to the Colombian people that this was a Colombian initiative to which the United States and many other countries were just contributing. 3 3 He also chose to hold a press c o n f e r e n c e from one of C o l o m b i a ' s U S A I D - f u n d e d casas de justicia in the attempt to de-emphasize the controversial narcotics focus of the plan. In a press c o n f e r e n c e in the Caribbean port city of Cartagena (Clinton only spent eight hours in Colombia and did not visit Bogotá for security reasons), Clinton stated: [A] condition of this aid is that we are not going to get into a shooting war. This is not Vietnam; neither is it Yankee imperialism. Those are the two false charges that have been hurled against Plan Colombia. You have a perfect right to question whether you think it will work or whether w e ' v e properly distributed the resources. But I can assure you that a lot of the opposition to this plan is coming from people who are afraid that it will work. 3 4

CRACKS APPEAR IN PLAN COLOMBIA Almost before the first U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia had been even dispersed there were already signs that the package was running

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into d i f f i c u l t i e s . A U . S . G A O r e p o r t i s s u e d in O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 s t a t e d that Plan C o l o m b i a ' s e f f i c a c y w a s b e i n g h i n d e r e d by d e l a y s in t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d d e l i v e r y of the h e l i c o p t e r s as w e l l as by the o v e r a l l l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g the i n v o l v e d U . S . g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s . I n d e e d , the full d e l i v e r y of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s w o u l d n o t o c c u r until late 2 0 0 2 or e v e n into 2 0 0 3 , w h i c h w a s n o t the t y p e of d e l i v e r y s c h e d u l e that w o u l d bolster the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s c l a i m that t i m e w a s of the e s s e n c e in C o l o m b i a . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p o r t : U.S. a g e n c i e s , i n c l u d i n g the D e p a r t m e n t s of State and D e f e n s e and U S A I D , are still d e v e l o p i n g c o m p r e h e n s i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n s for e r a d i c a t i o n and i n t e r d i c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s a n d alternative d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . H o w e v e r , n e g o t i a t i n g for the m a n u f a c t u r e and d e l i v e r y of m a j o r e q u i p m e n t , such as the h e l i c o p t e r s , is o n g o i n g , and s t a f f i n g new p r o g r a m s in C o l o m b i a will take time. As a result, agencies d o not expect to have m a n y of the p r o g r a m s to s u p p o r t Plan C o l o m b i a in place until late 2001. . . . In addition, a l t h o u g h State e x p e c t s to initiate pilot p r o j e c t s such as a l t e r n a t i v e and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and j u d i c i a l r e f o r m in S e p t e m b e r or O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 , S t a t e and the U . S . E m b a s s y c a u t i o n e d that it will take y e a r s to s h o w m e a s u r a b l e results. 3 5

T h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ' s a d m i s s i o n t h a t d e l i v e r y of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s w o u l d t a k e s i g n i f i c a n t l y l o n g e r t h a n e x p e c t e d s e r v e d to p r o v o k e s o m e of the d r u g h a w k s in C o n g r e s s w h o h a d s u p p o r t e d the p a c k a g e but still h e l d out r e s e r v a t i o n s as to w h e t h e r t h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d be a b l e to a d e q u a t e l y i m p l e m e n t it. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e D a n B u r t o n ( R - I n d . ) s t a t e d that " t h i s is a w a r t h a t ' s g o i n g to b e lost if w e w a i t t w o or t h r e e y e a r s . " 3 6 S o n n y C a l l a h a n ( R - A l a . ) , c h a i r m a n of the H o u s e F o r e i g n O p e r a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , i s s u e d t h i s s t a t e m e n t t h r o u g h his c h i e f of s t a f f : " J u s t a f e w m o n t h s a g o t h e y w e r e b l a m i n g us f o r d r a g g i n g o u r f e e t . N o w w e ' d like to k n o w w h y t h e p r e s i d e n t a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a r e d r a g g i n g their f e e t . " 3 7 But the m o s t d a m a g i n g dissent c a m e f r o m R e p r e s e n t a t i v e G i l m a n w h e n he sent a letter to B a r r y M c C a f f r e y s t a t i n g that the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d r e d i r e c t its aid (at l e a s t f o r t y B l a c k H a w k s ) a w a y f r o m C o l o m b i a ' s m i l i t a r y a n d t o w a r d its n a t i o n a l p o l i c e . 3 8 T h e p r i n c i p a l c a t a l y s t to G i l m a n ' s a s s e r t i o n w a s t h e d e l a y in t h e d e l i v e r y s c h e d u l e , but it w a s a l s o m o t i v a t e d by the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y ' s m a j o r d e f e a t at the h a n d s of the F A R C . T h e casualties of this battle included the loss of a Black H a w k — the very s y m b o l of U . S . s u p p o r t f o r C o l o m b i a — a n d the t w e n t y - t w o C o l o m b i a n soldiers a b o a r d it. 3 9 In m a n y w a y s , the bipartisan c o n s e n s u s o v e r

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Plan C o l o m b i a that h a d s e e m e d so s t r o n g o v e r the s u m m e r of 2 0 0 0 w a s q u i c k l y e r o d i n g , with m a n y f o r m e r s u p p o r t e r s n o w l o o k i n g to b l a m e the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r the m i s t a k e s it w a s m a k i n g in c a r r y i n g o u t the n e w C o l o m b i a policy. T h e Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d i s c o u r a g i n g n e w s on the d o m e s t i c political f r o n t w a s m a t c h e d by g r o w i n g r e p o r t s out of s o u t h e r n C o l o m bia that the F A R C h a d s t e p p e d u p its m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s in o r d e r to p r e p a r e itself f o r the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y ' s U . S . - b a c k e d p u s h into s o u t h e r n C o l o m b i a . In N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 t h e F A R C b l o c k e d r o a d s in a n d a r o u n d the c o m m e r c i a l c e n t e r of P u e r t o A s í s in P u t u m a y o , p r o v o k i n g the b e g i n n i n g s o f a h u m a n i t a r i a n c r i s i s as t h e r e g i o n w a s cut o f f f r o m f o o d a n d m e d i c a l s u p p l i e s . 4 0 T h e b l o c k a d e lasted f o r n e a r l y six w e e k s a n d ult i m a t e l y f o r c e d the C o l o m b i a n m i l i t a r y to airlift 1.300 t o n s of s u p p l i e s i n t o the a r e a . 4 1 It w a s e s t i m a t e d that 2 , 0 0 0 F A R C s o l d i e r s w e r e in the r e g i o n . 4 2 P a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s h a v e a l s o b e e n a c t i v e in the r e g i o n s i n c e 1998; r e c e n t l y t h e y h a v e b e c o m e m o r e a c t i v e a n d h a v e c a r r i e d o u t a n u m b e r of a t t a c k s against s u s p e c t e d g u e r r i l l a s y m p a t h i z e r s . 4 1 T h e r e h a v e a l s o b e e n a c c u s a t i o n s that the p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s a c t i v e in P u t u m a y o h a v e b e e n r e c e i v i n g a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the C o l o m b i a n military. T h e B B C ' s J e r e m y M c D e r m o t t , f o r e x a m p l e , r e p o r t e d in A u g u s t 2 0 0 0 that the p a r a militaries were operating just a few miles from a m a j o r military base:

I was looking to contact the paramilitaries w h o control the town itself and s o m e of the neighboring hamlets. . . . Finding them was not as hard as I had thought. Despite the fact that the Colombian state denies that there are any links between them and the right-wing death squads, their headquarters in Puerto A s í s is f i v e minutes drive past the local army base, in a luxurious villa. To get there I just hailed a taxi and asked the driver to take me to the paramilitary headquarters, as if I knew where it was and something I did every day of the week. He did not even blink, simply put the car in gear and sped d o w n the potholed streets, passing the army checkpoint and into the countryside outside the town. 4 4

Colombid's Neighbors Respond C o l o m b i a ' s n e i g h b o r s h a v e b e e n o n e d g e e v e r s i n c e the U n i t e d States ann o u n c e d that the m a i n g o a l of its n e w a s s i s t a n c e p a c k a g e to the C o l o m bian government would revolve around pushing increased fumigation and m i l i t a r y activities into the s o u t h e r n part of the c o u n t r y . W i t h the real a n d o n g o i n g t h r e a t that i n c r e a s e d a n t i d r u g a n d c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e f f o r t s in

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C o l o m b i a ' s s o u t h e r n d e p a r t m e n t s will p r o v o k e both c i v i l i a n s a n d bell i g e r e n t s to spill o v e r i n t o n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of E c u a d o r , P e r u , a n d B r a z i l e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n a n d took m e a s u r e s to d e a l with this potential p r o b l e m . A c c o r d i n g to E c u a d o r ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r H e i n z M o e l l e r , " O u r w o r r y is that t h e r e m o v a l of this c a n c e r o u s t u m o r will c a u s e it t o m e t a s t a s i z e i n t o E c u a d o r . " 4 5 T h e B r a z i l i a n m i l i t a r y d e c i d e d to i n c r e a s e its p r e s e n c e a l o n g its b o r d e r w i t h C o l o m b i a ; it a l s o d e c i d e d to p u r c h a s e f o u r C o u g a r A S - 5 3 2 h e l i c o p t e r s f r o m F r a n c e t o i n c r e a s e its a i r m o b i l i t y in t h e r e g i o n . T h e P e r u v i a n g o v e r n m e n t m o v e d a f l e e t o f its h e l i c o p t e r s f r o m its b o r d e r w i t h E c u a d o r to its b o r d e r w i t h C o l o m b i a . E v e n t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to publicly a d m i t that the p u s h into southern C o l o m b i a

might

p r o v o k e a r e g i o n a l c r i s i s . A c c o r d i n g to T h o m a s P i c k e r i n g d u r i n g a N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 v i s i t t o C o l o m b i a : " T h e i s s u e of s p i l l o v e r is r e a l . . . . I h a v e t a l k e d of t h e b a l l o o n e f f e c t , a n d o t h e r s h a v e : that is, if y o u p u s h in o n e e n d , it is b o u n d t o b u l g e o u t o n o t h e r s . . . . S o , in f a c t , t h e r e is alr e a d y a b a l l o o n e f f e c t , a n d it is h a v i n g its i m p a c t in C o l o m b i a . " 4 6 A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s w e n t to t h e e x t e n t of p r o m o t i n g a n e w " A n d e a n R e g i o n a l I n i t i a t i v e " in f i s c a l y e a r 2 0 0 2 . T h i s r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y inc l u d e s b o t h h a r d a n d s o f t p r o g r a m s a i m e d t o e n s u r e that t h e s p i l l o v e r o f a n t i n a r c o t i c s a c t i v i t i e s is m i n i m i z e d a n d t h a t d r u g c u l t i v a t i o n d o e s n ' t s p r i n g u p in C o l o m b i a ' s n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . It is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e r o u g h l y U . S . $ 8 0 0 m i l l i o n A n d e a n Initiative will r e p r e s e n t a d r a m a t i c c h a n g e of c o u r s e in U . S . p o l i c y ; r a t h e r , it will s e r v e as an e x t e n s i o n of p r e e x i s t i n g U . S . a n t i d r u g p r o g r a m s , e n h a n c e d by U S A I D c o n t r i b u t i o n s . B u t at t h e m i n i m u m , t h e p r i o r i t y t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t n o w p l a c e s o n this initiative reflects the a c k n o w l e d g m e n t that the United States c a n n o t have a policy toward one country without considering external effects, a n d t h a t b o t h its d r u g p o l i c i e s a n d its f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s m u s t b e r e g i o n a l in s c o p e .

The International Community Responds In o r d e r to r e i n f o r c e t h e i d e a o f P l a n C o l o m b i a as a c o m p r e h e n s i v e , multilateral plan, both the Pastrana and Clinton administrations wasted n o o p p o r t u n i t y in r e m i n d i n g o b s e r v e r s t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of t h e f u n d i n g w a s s c h e d u l e d to c o m e f r o m the E u r o p e a n U n i o n and J a p a n . But they r e f r a i n e d f r o m publicly a c k n o w l e d g i n g the strong p e r c e p t i o n in E u r o p e t h a t P l a n C o l o m b i a w a s a t h i n l y v e i l e d U . S . a n t i d r u g p l a n a n d t h a t E u r o p e a n s u p p o r t w o u l d s e n d t h e w r o n g m e s s a g e to t h e C o l o m b i a n

U.S. Policy During the Pastrana Administration

161

people. T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n did d e c i d e to p r o v i d e a p p r o x i m a t e l y U . S . $ 3 2 1 m i l l i o n in d i r e c t a s s i s t a n c e to C o l o m b i a ; h o w e v e r , this a m o u n t was f a r b e l o w w h a t B o g o t á and W a s h i n g t o n w e r e h o p i n g for. 4 7 A s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of the aid is in t h e f o r m of c o n c e s s i o n a l loans, m a k i n g the a s s i s t a n c e less v a l u a b l e than the U . S . - s t y l e g r a n t s , and app r o x i m a t e l y U . S . $ 2 0 0 m i l l i o n is e a r m a r k e d e x c l u s i v e l y f o r n o n - P l a n C o l o m b i a p r o g r a m s , r e f l e c t i n g the E u r o p e a n a m b i v a l e n c e to the p r o gram. 4 8 This l o w e r c o n t r i b u t i o n f r o m the E u r o p e a n U n i o n served to provoke a p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n in both C o l o m b i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y w a s not on b o a r d with Plan C o l o m b i a . M a n y posed a legitimate q u e s t i o n : If Plan C o l o m b i a is i n d e e d a nationwide initiative that a d d r e s s e s social-, e c o n o m i c - , a n d j u s t i c e - r e l a t e d needs, why is related international aid not i n c l u d e d ? T h e fact that h u n dreds of millions of dollars of international grants and loans existed outside Plan C o l o m b i a c o n f i r m e d f o r m a n y critics that Plan C o l o m b i a w a s indeed just a U . S . - i m p o s e d a n t i n a r c o t i c s plan. T h e Pastrana a d m i n i s t r a t i o n also h o l d s part of the responsibility f o r Plan C o l o m b i a ' s c u r r e n t p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s crisis. W h i l e the plan w a s touted as a c o m p r e h e n s i v e n a t i o n w i d e initiative to m o v e the c o u n t r y f o r w a r d , no one in C o l o m b i a , aside f r o m a small circle of P a s t r a n a ' s advisers, w a s e v e r c o n s u l t e d . N e i t h e r m a y o r s n o r h e a d s of n o n g o v e r n mental o r g a n i z a t i o n s w e r e a s k e d their o p i n i o n on h o w they e n v i s i o n e d a c o u n t r y d e v e l o p m e n t strategy, d e s p i t e the fact that both the soft a n d hard a s p e c t s of the plan rely on the a c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n of m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t s . Plan C o l o m b i a w a s not c r e a t e d as a c o h e s i v e C o l o m b i a n vision; it is t h e r e f o r e quite d i f f i c u l t to present it as s u c h , d e s p i t e the e f forts on behalf of both the C o l o m b i a n and U.S. g o v e r n m e n t s .

NOTES 1. "U.S. Sees New Era in Relations with Colombia," BBC News, June 23, 1998. 2. "Samper Admits Drug Money Used for Polls," BBC News, July 21, 1998. 3. See Cesar A. Sabogal, "Kamman, adiós al tunel negro?" El Tiempo, March 22, 1998. 4. This point was made in several interviews with U.S. government officials. See also Thomas Vogel, "Cuanto mejorarán sus relaciones con EEUU?" El Tiempo, June 19, 1998. 5. For more on the arrival of Andrés Pastrana and the seemingly positive relationship with the United States, see Enrique Santos Calderón, "Andrés—A

162

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lidiar una vez." El Tiempo. August 6, 1998; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Pastrana y Washington." El Tiempo, July 5, 1998; and "Esperamos dar vuelta a la página— EU." El Tiempo, June 23, 1998. 6. "Colombia's Drug-Bedevilled Hopes of Peace." The Economist, October 3, 1998. 7. For U.S. government comments on the Pastrana administration's efforts on antidrug issues, see U.S. House of Representatives, record briefing on the release of the annual International Narcotics Strategy report, Washington. D.C.. February 26. 1999; and "Perspectives on the Politics of Peace in Colombia," distributed notes from a seminar hosted by the Inter-American Dialogue. Washington. D.C., January 26, 1999. 8. Confidential author interview with U.S. government official, Bogotá, 1999. 9. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official. Bogota, December 2000. 10. "EU cierra la puerta a futuros contactos con Fare." El Tiempo. March 26. 1999. 11. Ibid. 12. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department officials, Bogotá, May 1999. 13. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., November 2000. See also Tim Golden and Steven Lee Meyers. "U.S. Plans Big Aid Package to Rally a Reeling Colombia." The New York Times. September 15, 1999. 14. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., November 2000. 15. Ibid. 16. A copy of Plan Colombia can be found in "Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State," attached as an appendix to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing. October 6. 1999. See also Larry Rohter, "Plan to Strengthen Colombia Nudges U.S. for $3.5 Billion," The New York Times, September 18, 1999. 17. Testimony by Brian Sheridan, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, before the House Committee on International Relations, September 21, 2000. 18. Confidential author interview with U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., November 2000. 19. Statement by the President of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, January 11, 2000. 20. Steven Dudley, "Albright Discusses Anti-Drug Aid in Colombia," The Washington Post. January 15, 2000. 21. "Clinton le apuesta a Colombia," El Tiempo, January 24, 2000. 22. "Aid to 'Plan Colombia': The Time for U.S. Assistance Is Now," report to the House Committee on Foreign Relations from Senator Joseph Biden, May 2000.

U.S. Policy Dunns the Pastrana Administration

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23. For an excellent summary of the congressional deliberations over Plan Colombia, see Adam Isacson and Ingrid Vaicius, "Plan Colombia: The Debate in Congress," Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., December 2000. 24. Ibid. 25. For more on this point, see Russell Crandall, " D e e p e r Into the AntiDrug Mire," The Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2000. 26. "El Plan Colombia: El debate en los Estados Unidos," Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C., August 2000. 27. Isacson and Vaicius, "Plan Colombia." 28. Later in 2000, Senator Wellstone published an op-ed in the New York Times urging the incoming Bush administration to rethink U.S. policy toward Colombia. See Paul Wellstone, "Bush Should Start Over in C o l o m b i a , " The New York Times, December 26, 2000. 29. Statement by the President of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 13, 2000. 30. "Colombia, certificada por excepción," EI Tiempo, August 24, 2000. Author translation. 31. The alternative development assistance included U.S.$30 million for voluntary crop eradication, U.S.S12 million in assistance to local governments, and U.S.$2.5 million for environmental programs to protect frail lands and watersheds. 32. U S A I D is the agency that funds and manages all the soft elements of Plan Colombia. Its annual allocation for Colombia increased from $6.3 million in fiscal year 1999 (not including disaster earthquake assistance) to $119.5 million for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. 33. Remarks by the President of the United States in Video Address to the People of Colombia, the White House, August 29, 2000. 34. Press C o n f e r e n c e by President Clinton in Cartagena, Colombia, the White House, August 30, 2000. 35. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia," GAO-Ol-76T, Washington, D.C., October 12, 2000. 36. "U.S. Black Hawks for Colombia May Be Delayed Until 2002," Associated Press, September 22, 2000. 37. Juan Tamayo, " C o l o m b i a Drug Aid Runs Into Delays," The Miami Herald, October 10, 2000. 38. Juan Forero and Christopher Marquis, "Key House Leader Withdraws Support for Colombia Aid Plan," The New York Times, November 17, 2000. Barry M c C a f f r e y replied to Benjamin Gilman in the Washington Post on December 15, 2000. 39. "Colombia's Military Suffers Heavy Blows in Three Days of Fighting Against Rebels," Associated Press, October 23, 2000. 40. Juan Forero, "To Make a Point, the Rebels Are Strangling a Town," The New York Times, November 3, 2000. 41. Juan Forero, "Key Roads Taken from Rebels, Colombia Says," The New York Times, November 14, 2000.

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42. Adam Isacson and Abbey Steele, "U.S. Aid to Colombia." Center for International Policy. Washington, D.C., December 14, 2000. 43. "Parálisis total en la zona de Putumayo," El Tiempo, November 11, 2000; "Cruz roja suspende evacuación de combatientes heridos," El Tiempo, October 4, 2000. 44. Isacson and Steele, "U.S. Aid to Colombia." 45. Clifford Krauss, "Neighbors Worry About Colombian Aid," The New York Times, August 25, 2000. 46. U.S. Department of State, record briefing of Thomas Pickering, undersecretary of state, November 27, 2000. 47. Spanish president José María Aznar is the only European leader who openly backed Plan Colombia. He organized a donors meeting in Madrid in July 2000 in order to promote support for the assistance package. At this meeting the Spanish government pledged U.S.$100 million for Plan Colombia; other contributions totaling over U.S.$1 billion were announced, but most of this assistance was not actually going to Plan Colombia. See "Is Plan Colombia Dead?" Center for International Policy, Washington. D.C.. October 27, 2000. 48. Juan Forero, " E u r o p e ' s Aid Plan for Colombia Falls Short of Drug War's Goals." The New York Times, October 25, 2000.

6 Afterword

O n e of the g r e a t e s t i r o n i e s of the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s m a s s i v e i n c r e a s e in s u p p o r t f o r the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t is that m o s t of the actual d e l i v e r y a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the a s s i s t a n c e is s c h e d u l e d to o c c u r d u r i n g P r e s i d e n t G e o r g e W. B u s h ' s t e r m in o f f i c e . I n d e e d , the v e r y h a l l m a r k s of the U . S . c o m p o n e n t of Plan C o l o m b i a — t h e t w o c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s b a t t a l i o n s and the sixty h e l i c o p t e r s — w i l l all be put into use well into P r e s i d e n t B u s h ' s first t e r m . F o r that r e a s o n , w h i l e Plan C o l o m b i a m i g h t be Bill C l i n t o n ' s baby, it has n o w b e c o m e President B u s h ' s a d o l e s c e n t a n d f o r that r e a s o n the n e w R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n istration n e e d s to look long and hard b e f o r e it signs off on its p r e d e c e s s o r s ' plan to " s a v e " C o l o m b i a . L e a d i n g up to G e o r g e W. B u s h ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n in early 2 0 0 1 w e r e hints that the i n c o m i n g R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n might take a d i f f e r e n t tack on C o l o m b i a policy. A b o v e all, this e n t a i l e d m a k i n g the c a s e that the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d no longer c o u c h its strategic o b j e c t i v e s within t h e b r o a d e r f r a m e w o r k of the w a r on d r u g s ; rather, it s h o u l d m o r e overtly s u p p o r t the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t in its e f f o r t s to establish the rule of law t h r o u g h o u t the n a t i o n ' s territory, e v e n if this m e a n s m o r e direct c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y a s s i s t a n c e . A c c o r d i n g to R o b e r t Z o e l l i c k , a t o p c a m p a i g n f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s e r to G e o r g e W. B u s h a n d s u b s e q u e n t U . S . trade r e p r e s e n t a t i v e : We cannot c o n t i n u e to make false distinctions b e t w e e n counteiinsurg e n c y and counter-narcotics efforts. . . . The narcotraffickers and guerrillas c o m p o s e o n e dangerous network. . . . If the legitimately elected

165

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166

l e a d e r s of C o l o m b i a d e m o n s t r a t e t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o t a k e t h e i r c o u n try b a c k f r o m k i l l e r s a n d d r u g l o r d s , a n d if t h e C o l o m b i a n p e o p l e a r e w i l l i n g to fight f o r their o w n c o u n t r y , then the U.S. s h o u l d o f f e r serious. sustained and timely financial, material and intelligence support.'

But w h i l e t h e B u s h c a m p a i g n m a d e o v e r t u r e s t h a t il w o u l d s h i f t p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s in C o l o m b i a , s o f a r m o s t i n d i c a t o r s s u g g e s t that t h e B u s h administration has endorsed the Clinton-era A n d e a n Regional Initiative. T h u s the C o l o m b i a p o l i c y of m o r e r e g i o n a l s u p p o r t and s o f t - s i d e a s s i s t a n c e that is c u r r e n t l y b e i n g a t t r i b u t e d to t h e B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is actually

one

inherited

from the Clinton

presidency.

Therefore

the

b i g g e s t d e v e l o p m e n t to d a t e r e g a r d i n g P r e s i d e n t B u s h ' s C o l o m b i a p o l icy is that t h e r e is r e a l l y n o n e w p o l i c y . It is still t o o s o o n to tell w h e t h e r this is a result of b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e r t i a o r the B u s h t e a m ' s g e n u i n e s u p p o r t f o r Bill C l i n t o n ' s p o l i c i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d e c i s i o n to e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t i n u e t h e s e p o l i c i e s e n s u r e s that t h e P l a n C o l o m bia m o d e l of U . S . a s s i s t a n c e will c o n t i n u e well i n t o t h e f u t u r e . O n e clear indication that the Bush team w a s strongly considering a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e P l a n C o l o m b i a m o d e l o c c u r r e d in late A u g u s t 2 0 0 1 w h e n a h i g h - l e v e l U . S . d e l e g a t i o n led by U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e MarcG r o s s m a n v i s i t e d C o l o m b i a t o g e t a f i r s t h a n d i d e a o f t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e c o u n t r y and the policy d e c i s i o n s that the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

would

n e e d to c o n s i d e r . G r o s s m a n c o m m e n t e d : " W e s p e n t t w o h o u r s r e v i e w ing w h a t w e a r e g i v i n g t o C o l o m b i a a n d w h a t o u r p l a n s a r e f o r t h e f u t u r e . W e will s u p p o r t all o f t h e e f f o r t s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e t o P l a n C o l o m b i a a n d n o t h i n g is g o i n g t o c h a n g e . " 2 T h e m o s t l i k e l y p a t h is t h a t f u t u r e U . S . p o l i c y in C o l o m b i a w i l l t e n d t o r e m a i n n a r c o t i z e d ,

resembling

the policy initiatives i n t r o d u c e d by the C l i n t o n administration. T h e w a r on d r u g s will r e m a i n the o v e r r i d i n g priority; the state of the bilateral r e l a t i o n s h i p will largely d e p e n d on B o g o t a ' s c o o p e r a t i o n on a n t i d r u g efforts. T h e B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l still h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to m o d i f y t h e C l i n t o n - e r a s t r a t e g y ; t h e d i f f i c u l t y , h o w e v e r , is t h a t t h e r e is t r e m e n d o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s s u r e w i t h i n t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t to k e e p C o l o m b i a p o l i c y o v e r w h e l m i n g l y f o c u s e d o n w h a t it h a s b e e n f o r t h e p a s t d e c a d e : f i g h t i n g t h e w a r o n d r u g s . T h i s p o l i c y i n e r t i a that is t h e w a r o n d r u g s t h r e a t e n s t o o v e r w h e l m t h e B u s h t e a m as it a t t e m p t s to d i s a g g r e g a t e t h e w a r o n d r u g s f r o m t h e m y r i a d of o t h e r p r e s s i n g s e c u r i t y i s s u e s in C o l o m b i a , s u c h as t h e g r o w i n g t h r e a t f r o m g u e r r i l l a i n s u r g e n t s a n d illegal p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s .

Afterword

167

It is a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e d e v a s t a t i n g t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n S e p t e m b e r 11, 2 0 0 1 , w i l l i n f l u e n c e h o w p o l i c y m a k e r s in W a s h i n g t o n v i e w e v e n t s in C o l o m b i a . T h e r e is n o d o u b t that W a s h i n g t o n will v i e w the F A R C a n d t h e E L N w i t h a m u c h m o r e c r i t i c a l e y e , c o n s t a n t l y l o o k i n g to s e e if t h e s e g r o u p s ' a c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e t e r r o r i s t b e h a v i o r . T h i s c h a n g e of s t a n c e c o u l d h a v e s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s f o r U . S . p o l i c y a n d e v e n t s in C o l o m b i a m o r e b r o a d l y . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y less w i l l i n g to s u p p o r t a p e a c e p r o c e s s that it v i e w s as l e g i t i m i z i n g a t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s c o u l d in t u r n lead W a s h i n g t o n to p r e s s u r e the C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t to t a k e a h a r d e r line in t h e t a l k s o r e s c a l a t e its m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s . A t o u g h e r g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t o r y or m i l i t a r y s t a n c e v i s - à - v i s t h e F A R C is a l i k e l y s c e n a r i o w i t h or w i t h o u t a c h a n g e of U . S . p o l i c y , b u t s t r o n g w o r d s f r o m W a s h i n g t o n w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s b e i n g m a d e in B o g o t á . N o m a t t e r w h a t f u t u r e s c e n a r i o s p l a y out in C o l o m b i a , let us h o p e that p o l i c y m a k e r s in W a s h i n g t o n h a v e l e a r n e d f r o m p a s t m i s t a k e s a n d b a d h a b i t s . For e x a m p l e , t h e U . S . p o l i c y to i s o l a t e E r n e s t o S a m p e r h a d u n i n t e n d e d but s e v e r e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p : it s e r v e d to a n t a g o n i z e o n e of W a s h i n g t o n ' s c l o s e s t r e g i o n a l allies as well as to w e a k e n the C o l o m b i a n s t a t e at a c r i t i c a l t i m e in its f i g h t a g a i n s t armed belligerents. Relations have improved significantly since Andrés Pastrana took office, but this does not m e a n that narcotization has e n d e d . In f a c t , t h e r e c o u l d e a s i l y be a r e t u r n to a h y p e r n a r c o t i z e d state of r e l a t i o n s if W a s h i n g t o n o n c e a g a i n p e r c e i v e s that a C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t is not c o o p e r a t i n g o n t h e d r u g war. T h i s s c e n a r i o is u n l i k e l y , as b o t h s i d e s r e a l i z e h o w c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e this r o u t e is, b u t it r e m a i n s in the r e a l m of p o s s i b i l i t i e s as l o n g as the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t i n u e s to m a k e the d r u g w a r the o v e r r i d i n g f o c u s of its p o l i c i e s t o w a r d C o l o m b i a .

NOTES 1. "Bush Mulls Activist Colombia Stance," Associated Press, December 27, 2001. 2. "EU asegura que no cambiará frente al Plan Colombia," El Tiempo, August 30, 2001. See also Alan Sipress, "U.S. Reassesses Colombia Aid," The Washington Post, September 10, 2001.

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Index

A c t i o n Democràtica M-19, 70 Activists, kidnap and murder of, 146-147 Afghanistan, 127 Age of uncertainty, 9 Agriculture: e c o n o m i c ties to the U.S. through, 2 0 - 2 1 Aid. counternarcotics, 1, 2 5 - 2 6 ; B u s h ' s Andean Initiative, 34, 35(table); certification process and, 4 2 ^ 1 4 , 130, 138(n90); C l i n t o n ' s increase in, 148; C l i n t o n ' s reduction of, 3 5 - 3 6 ; during the Pastrana administration, 6 - 7 ; Plan C o l o m b i a , 148-153; total aid for, 154(table); U.S. counternarcotics-related assistance to C o l o m b i a , 32(table) Aid, military, 24; Alliance for Progress, 24; A n d e a n Initiative as military rather than technical aid, 3 4 - 3 5 ; bilateral extradition treaty, 28; impact of decertification on, 129-130; Plan C o l o m b i a , 155(table); total aid for, 154(table) Aircraft, use of for drug traffic control: early use of, 78; political risk involved, 38; U.S. contribution to Plan C o l o m b i a , 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 , 158 Airline industry, 22 Albright, M a d e l e i n e , 130, 148, 150 Allende, Salvador, 11 Alliance for Progress, 11, 24

Almirante Padilla (Colombian frigate), 23 Alternative d e v e l o p m e n t assistance, 163(n31). See also Crop alternatives and subsidies Americas Watch, 69, 86 Amnesty: Betancur administration's, 68; to cartels, 7 9 - 8 0 ; for early guerrillas, 5 8 - 5 9 A n d e a n g o v e r n m e n t s , 34 Andean Initiative (1989), 34, 35, 35(table) A n d e a n Regional Initiative (2002), 160, 166 Anti-Drug A b u s e Act, 42 Antifascist activities, 16 A p p e a s e m e n t strategy, 7 9 - 8 1 April 19 M o v e m e n t . See M - 1 9 Arbenz, Jacobo, 11, 23 Arcos, Crescenio, 106 Assassinations: ex-guerrillas, 3 3 - 3 4 ; Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 22, 55; Galán, Luis Carlos, 29, 32, 34; Lara Bonilla, Rodrigo, 29; by Medellín cartel, 78; Pizarro, Carlos, 70; U P m e m b e r s , 69-70 Asset forfeiture law, 126 Atomization, of drug production and distribution, 83 A U C ( A u t o d e f e n s a s Unidas d e C o l o m b i a ) , 88, 89

183

184

Index

Avianca Airlines, 22, 63, 147 Aznar, José Maria, 164(n47) Babbit, Bruce, 106 Barco, Virgilio, 2 9 , 37 Barco administration, 70, 8 0 Bedoya, Gerardo, 126 Beers, Randy, 144 Bell-Textron company, 152 Betancourt, Ingrid, 140(n 118) Betancur, Belisario, 29 Betancur administration, 6 8 - 7 0 , 7 9 - 8 0 Biden, Joseph, 150 Bidlack Treaty ( 1 8 4 6 ) , 19 Bilateral cooperation: Cold War struggle against communist expansion, 2 3 - 2 5 ; countemarcotics policy and, 5; demise during the Clinton administration, 3 7 - 3 9 ; deterioriation during drug war, 16; extradition policy, 2 8 - 3 0 ; marijuana crackdown, 2 6 - 2 7 ; narcotization and militarization, 3 0 - 3 2 Black Hawk helicopters, 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 Blast Furnace, Operation, 31 Bloque de Busqueda, 8 0 - 8 1 Bogotazo, 2 3 , 4 7 ( n 3 1 ) , 5 5 - 5 6 Bolivar, Simon, 1 6 - 1 7 , 65 Bolivia: Coca Cultivation in the Andes, 84(fig); government cooperation with U.S. drug policy, 34; Operation Blast Furnace, 31; Operation Snowcap, 3 1 - 3 2 ; Plan Colombia aid money, 154(table), 155 B o m b threats, 126 Botero, Fernando, 116, 137(nn80, 82) Brazil: concerns over Plan Colombia, 159-160 Briceno, Jorge, 9 0 Brown, Lee P., 113 Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, 4 7 ( n 2 1 ) Burma, 127 Burns, Nicholas, 112 Burton, Dan, 36, 158 Busby, Morris, 103, 134(n32) Bush, George, 31, 146 Bush, George W., 1, 4 4 , 165 Bush (George) administration, 3 2 - 3 5 Bush (George W.) administration, 42

Cali drug cartel, 8 1 - 8 4 ; campaign contributions, 137(n75); dismantling Medellin cartel, 81; Gaviria's softening position towards, 3 7 - 3 8 ; growth of drug trade in the U.S., 78; Major Worldwide Cocaine Seizures Linked to, 83(table); Proceso 8 0 0 0 scandal. 115-118; retroactive extradition, 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 ; Samper and the narco-cassette scandal, 1 0 3 - 1 0 6 ; Samper's cooperation with U.S. in crackdown, 1 1 0 - 1 1 4 ; Samper's ties to, 3, 5, 102 Callahan, Sonny, 158 Canal. See Panama Canal Cannabis. See Marijuana cultivation and export Capitalist development, 24 Car bombings, 7 8 - 7 9 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 43 Cartagena Conference ( 1 9 9 0 ) , 35 Cartels. See Cali drug cartel; Medellin drug cartel Cassette tapes. See Narco-cassette scandal Castaño, Carlos. 69, 8 8 - 8 9 , 89(fig), 98(n92), 132 Castro, Fidel, 4 7 ( n 3 1 ) , 6 2 - 6 3 , 65 Catholic Church, 87 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 31 Certification process, 4 2 ^ 4 , 5 1 ( n l 0 7 ) ; 1995 national interest waiver, 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 ; 1996 decertification, 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 , 115, 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 138(n90); 1997 decertification, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 ; human rights certification, 1 5 4 - 1 5 5 ; Leahy amendment, 107; softening o f U.S. policy in 1998, 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 C G S B (formerly CNG), 6 7 - 6 8 Chernick, Marc, 59 Chicóla, Phil, 146 Christopher, Warren, 4 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Civil conflict, 1 - 2 , 5 - 6 , 4 1 , 5 3 - 5 6 Civilians, 8 6 - 8 8 Civilians, reaction to guerrillas and paramilitaries, 9 8 ( n 9 0 )

Index Clay, Henry, 18 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850), 18, 46(n20) Clinton, Bill, 1, 156(fig); aid to the Pastrana administration, 6; on Colombian cooperation, 122; h u m a n rights certification waiver, 155; position on Samper, 105 Clinton administration, 3 5 - 3 7 ; cooperation with Pastrana administration, 146-147; increased funding to Colombia, 148; Leahy amendment, 106-108; Plan Colombia. 148-151; Serrano's crackdown on Cali cartel, 112-114 C N G (National Guerrilla Coordinating Group), 6 6 - 6 8 Coalition government: National Front, 56-58 Coast Guard, U.S., 33 Coca cultivation, 2 7 - 2 8 , 139(nl 12); certification process and, 43; Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Colombia, 85(table); C o c a Cultivation in the Andes, 84(fig); eradication policy, 40; guerrilla g r o u p s ' profiting f r o m , 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 ; ineffectiveness of f u m i g a t i o n , 141 (n 147); shift from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia, 8 3 - 8 4 Cocaine production and export, 2 7 - 2 8 , 32, 7 7 - 7 9 C o f f e e production, 20, 4 7 ( n 2 5 ) C o h e n , William, 146 Cold War, 2, 7 - 9 Colombian National Police, 126, 135(n41); Cali cartel c r a c k d o w n , 113; Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 107; Plan C o l o m b i a involvement, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 , 155(table); U.S. relations with, 36, 40,158-159 C o m m i t t e e of Investigations and Accusations (Colombian Congress), 117 C o m m u n i s m , 3; bilateral cooperation in fighting, 3, 16; drugs replacing c o m m u n i s m as security concern, 7 - 1 0 , 33; fighting c o m m u n i s t expansion into Latin A m e r i c a , 2 2 - 2 5

185

C o m m u n i s t Party, 5 8 - 5 9 , 61 Condor, Operation, 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 C o n g r e s s , U.S.: certification process, 43, 118-120; hawkish Republican stance on drugs, 36, 112; increasing military involvement in eradication programs, 4 0 - 4 1 ; Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 1 0 6 - 1 0 8 ; Pastrana policy, 145; Plan Colombia, 150-151, 151-153; S a m p e r administration and, 105, 108-110, 112-114, 1 2 1 - 1 2 4 ; State Department and, 8 C o n s e r v a t i v e approach, to policymaking, 1 0 - 1 2 , 14(n22) Conservative Party, 5 4 - 5 6 , 5 7 - 5 8 Conspiracy theory, of U.S. policy, 9 Constantine. T h o m a s , 118 Convivir s (government-sanctioned militia groups), 97(n78) C o o r d i n a d o r a Guerrillera Simón Bolivar ( C G S B , formerly C N G ) , 67-68 C o o r d i n a d o r a Nacional Guerrillera. See C N G Córdoba, Piedad, 9 8 ( n 9 2 ) Counterinsurgency efforts, 4 1 - 4 2 ; Bush administration's equating with drug war, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; Plan C o l o m b i a , 149 Crack cocaine, 32, 78 Crop alternatives and subsidies: coca production, 1 3 9 ( n l l 2 ) ; Plan C o l o m b i a , 155(table), 163(n31); results of Operation Condor, 123-124 Crop eradication. See Eradication policy C u b a , 14(n25); C u b a n Missile Crisis, 48(n35); C u b a n Revolution, 59; m o n i t o r i n g E L N despeje, 76; U.S. e m b a r g o against, 12 Davidow, Jeffrey, 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 D E A . See Drug E n f o r c e m e n t A g e n c y Death to Kidnappers. See M A S Decapitation, of political leaders, 56 De Grieff. G u s t a v o , 3 7 - 3 8 D e m a n d , versus supply, 3 0 - 3 2 Depression, Great, 21

186

Index

Despeje (liberated zones). 73, 74(fig), 75-77,91 D i s a r m a m e n t , of guerrillas, 6 8 - 6 9 , 71 Dix, Robert, 5 7 - 5 8 Doctrine speech, 17 Dodd, Christopher, 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 Dole, Robert, 119 Domestic concerns. 13(n7); influencing policy. 8 - 9 ; U.S. involvement in the Panamanian Congress, 1 6 - 1 8 Dominican Republic, 14(n22), 21, 47(n28) Drexler, Robert, 2 5 - 2 6 , 3 ! Drug E n f o r c e m e n t Agency (DEA), 29; bounty on agents. 29; conspiracy accusations. 138(n85); limiting conduct in C o l o m b i a , 111 Drug hawks, 36 Drug squads, C o l o m b i a n : Bloque de Búsqueda, 8 0 - 8 1 ; S e r r a n o s ' elite squad. 113 Drug war: U.S. aid to C o l o m b i a , 2 5 - 2 6 . See also Narcotization E c o n o m i c issues: e c o n o m i c nationalism, 63, 75; e c o n o m i c sanctions, 30; growth during Latin American d o w n t u r n , 54; growth under Plan C o l o m b i a , 155 The Economist, 134(n 16) E C O P E T R O L , 63 Ecuador: Plan C o l o m b i a , 154(table), 159-160 Eisenhower, Dwight, 7, 24 Ejército de Liberación Nacional. See ELN Ejército Popular de Liberación. See E P L E L N (National Liberation A r m y ) , 6 2 - 6 4 , 66, 67; B e t a n c u r ' s amnesty negotiations, 68; failure to conciliate U.S. during Pastrana administration, 147; impact of September 11 attacks on U.S. policy, 167; opposition to paramilitaries, 8 8 - 8 9 ; peace negotiations with Pastrana, 7 5 - 7 7 ; peace negotiations with Samper, 71 Enrichment allegations, 115-118 E P L (Popular Liberation A r m y ) , 64, 6 6 - 6 7 , 71

Eradication policy: Clinton's review of, 3 5 - 3 6 ; Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Colombia, 85(table); defined, 39—40; Operation Condor. 123-124. See also Herbicide use on illicit crops; Plan Colombia Escalation, of drug war, 3 2 - 3 5 Escobar. Pablo: avoiding extradition. 30; bounty on police officers. 82; cocaine smuggling. 77; election to C h a m b e r of Deputies. 79; surrender, escape, and death of, 31, 80- 81. 96(n67) European Union (EU): Plan Colombia, 160-161

Extraditables, 7 8 - 7 9 . 83. 125-126 Extradition policy, 2 8 - 3 0 ; Barco's war on Medellin cartel, 7 9 - 8 0 ; cartel Extraditables. 7 8 - 7 9 ; cartels' resistance to. 96(n65); Colombian Supreme Court and, 96(n63); death threats to supporters of, 140(n 124); early smugglers; U.S. push for retroactive extradition, 124-127 Extroversion, 11-12 Faceless j u d g e s system, 117, 138(n86) FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), 6 0 - 6 2 . 92(fig); Betancur's amnesty negotiation. 6 8 - 6 9 ; Colombian military's defeat by, 158-159; competition with paramilitary groups, 66, 8 8 - 8 9 ; despeje and other zones of activity, 74(fig); drug trade involvement, 9 0 - 9 2 , 9 9 ( n l 0 0 ) ; failure to conciliate U.S. during Pastrana administration, 146-147; formation of C G S B , 6 7 - 6 8 ; government negotiations and E L N , 64; growth of, 91 (table); impact of September 11 attacks on U.S. policy, 167; M A Q L competition, 66; peace negotiations with Pastrana, 7 2 - 7 5 ; peace negotiations with Samper, 71 Fascism, 16, 2 1 - 2 2 First C o n v e r g e n c e of the Nation's Southern Bloc, 6 0 - 6 1 Foco strategy. 6 2 - 6 3

Index Foreign Assistance Act (1961), 42 Foreign Assistance Act (1994), 105 Foreign Military Finance, 129 France. 76 Frechette, My les, 4, 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 , 111; on C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s soft stance, 117: death threats, 1 4 0 ( n l 2 4 ) ; departure of, 129; isolating Samper, 122-123; personal stance on Samper, 114; retroactive extradition, 125; on S e r r a n o ' s c r a c k d o w n on Cali cartel. 1 13; U.S. push for retroactive extradition. 126, 127 Frentes (dispersed guerrilla groups), 62 Fuerzas A r m a d a s Revolucionarias de C o l o m b i a . See FARC Fumigation. See Herbicide use on illicit crops Gaitán. Jorge Eliécer, 22, 55, 9 3 ( n 6 ) Galán, Luis Carlos, 29, 32. 34. 80 G a m b i a n o Indians. 66 García-Peña Jaramillo, Daniel, 114 Gaviria, César, 96(n69); appeasement strategy, 8 0 - 8 1 ; cooperation with U.S. policy, 5; extradition, 2 9 - 3 0 ; increasing dissatisfaction with, 39; narco-cassette scandal, 134(n 16); peace negotiations with guerrillas, 71; s o f t e n i n g on drug policy, 37 Gelbard, Robert: 1995 national interest waiver and decertification, 110-111; 1996 decertification, 118-120; 1997 decertification, 128; C o l o m b i a n C o n g r e s s ' s refusal to prosecute Samper, 117; H e l m s ' s policy and, 105; personal agenda in policy f o r m a t i o n , 4; reassigning of, 144; S a m p e r and, 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 , 114; U.S. push for retroactive extradition, 124, 126 G e n e r a l i z e d System of Preferences, 4 3 G e r m a n y : spread of fascism to Latin A m e r i c a , 22 G i l m a n . B e n j a m i n , 36, 154, 158 G i r a r d o , Alberto " L o c o , " 103 G o m é z , A l f o n s o , 69 G ó m e z , Laureano, 57 G o o d N e i g h b o r Policy, 2 1 - 2 2 , 4 7 ( n 2 9 )

187

Gorton, Slade, 151 Goulart, Joao, 23 Gramaje (revenue raising tactic), 62 Great Britain: C l a y t o n - B u l w e r Treaty, 18; Hay-Pauncefort Treaty, 46(n20) Grossman, Marc, 166 G r o u p of Friends, 76 Guajira peninsula, 27 Guerrillas, 1 - 2 ; as cartel targets, 79; Cold War era, 24: drug trade involvement, 4 1 - 4 2 , 9 0 - 9 3 , 98(n95), 9 9 ( n l 0 0 ) : FARC, ELN, and EPL. beginnings, 6 0 - 6 4 ; growth during U.S. crackdown, 131; integration into political system, 33; national coordinating body, 6 6 - 6 8 ; political roots of, 5 4 - 5 6 , 5 8 - 6 0 ; relations with paramilitary groups, 8 7 - 8 9 : Samper administration. 5; second generation groups, 6 4 - 6 8 ; suspension of activity during Betancur administration, 68 Gulf War, 35 Haiti, U.S. intervention in. 12, 13(n7), 47(n28) Harriman, Averell, 23 Hastert, Dennis, 36 Hay, John, 20, 4 6 ( n l 5 ) Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty (1904), 20, 47(n21) Hay-Herran Treaty (1903), 19, 4 6 ( n n l 5 , 17) Hay-Pauncefort Treaty (1901), 46(n20) H e g e m o n i c presumption, 9 - 1 0 Helms, Jesse, 105, 108, 111-112, 119 H e l m s - M a c k - H a t c h Colombia bill (1995), 111 Herbicide use on illicit crops, 40, 141(nl47); certification process and, 42; Operation Condor, 123-124; Operation Splendor, 109; paraquat, 27; R e a g a n ' s support for, 29. See also Plan C o l o m b i a Heroin, 35 Herran, Tomas, 4 6 ( n l 5 ) Herrera, H e l m e r " P a c h o , " 82, !24 Hijacking, 147 H o l m e s Trujillo, Carlos, 72

188

Index

Hopkins, Larry J., 41 Huey helicopters, 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 H u m a n rights issues, 2; abuses by guerrilla and paramilitary groups, 8 7 - 8 8 ; Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 106-108; Plan C o l o m b i a funding, 151-155, 155(table); Twentieth Brigade, 129 Ideology, influencing U.S. policy, 8 Imazapyr, 123 Immigration, 13(n7) Independence, Latin American, 16-18 Indigenous guerrilla organization, 6 6 - 6 7 . 71 Indigenous rights activists, 146-147 Insurgencies. See Guerrillas Interdiction efforts, 6 - 7 Intermestic issues, 7, 9 - 1 1 . 14(n25) International community: response to Plan C o l o m b i a , 160-161 International Military Education Training, 129 Interoceanic travel. See P a n a m a Canal Intervention, U.S. military. See Military, U.S. Introversion, 11-12 Investment, in Colombia, 2 0 - 2 1 Iran, 127 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 9 0 - 9 1 Isolationism, 2, 12 Jamaica, 27 Jaramillo Ossa. Bernardo, 33, 69 J i m é n e z G ó m e z , Carlos, 30 J o h n s o n , Lyndon, 14(n22) Journalists, kidnapping and murder of, 66, 79, 126 K a m m a n , Kurtis, 144 Kennedy, John F., 23 Kerry, John, 38 Kidnappings and murders: by E L N , 6 3 - 6 4 , 147; formation of M A S , 86; f u n d i n g guerrilla insurgents, 62; journalists, 66, 79, 126; by Medellin cartel, 96(n59); paramilitary groups entering the political arena, 98(n92) Kingpin strategy, 83, 110, 112-114 Korean War, 23

Krause, Charles, 121 Landownership, 5 4 - 5 6 , 8 5 - 8 6 Lara Bonilla, Rodrigo, 29, 79 Layered relations, 15-16 Leahy, Patrick, 106-108, 152 Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 1 0 6 - 1 0 8 Legalization of drugs. 133(n7) Lehder, Carlos, 7 7 - 7 9 Liberal approach, to policymaking. 10-12 Liberal Party, 5 4 - 5 6 , 93(n5); guerrilla group formation, 5 8 - 6 0 ; National Front, 5 7 - 5 8 ; Proceso 8000 scandal, 115-118; Samper as candidate, 101 Liberated zone. 73 Lleras Camargo, Alberto. 23, 57 Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 2 3 Lloreda, Rodrigo, 146, 147 Londoño, José Rodríguez, 8 1 - 8 2 Lowenthal, Abraham, 10, 12 Lucio, Carlos Alonso, 111 M-19 (April 19 Movement), 6 4 - 6 6 , 67, 6 8 - 7 0 , 86 Majors list, 43 M A Q L (Quintín L a m e Armed Movement), 66, 67, 71 " M a r í a " (witness against S a m p e r and Cali cartel), 112 Marijuana cultivation and export, 2 6 - 2 8 , 40, 43 Marines, U.S., 21 Marquetalia, 60 Marulanda, Manuel, 60, 61 (fig), 68, 72-73 M A S (Death to Kidnappers), 86 M c C a f f r e y , Barry, 127, 129, 148, 158 McCurry, Mike, 134(n32) McDermott, Jeremy, 159 M c L e a n , Phil, 102, 133(n8) M c N a m a r a , Thomas, 50(n79) Medellin drug cartel, 37, 78; founding of M A S , 86; Gaviria's appeasement strategy, 7 9 - 8 1 ; M-19 attack on Palace of Justice, 66; response to extradition, 2 9 - 3 0 ; violence by cartel Extraditables, 7 8 - 7 9 Medellin Forero, Carlos, 1 4 0 ( n l 2 4 )

Index

189

Medina, Santiago, 116, 137(n80) Mejía. María Emma, 123 Menzel, Sewall, 8 5 - 8 6 Merkle, Robert, 78 Mexico, 27, 120 Miami Herald, 103-104 Military, Colombian, 135(n41); antiguerrilla actions, 90; death of FARC troops, 92(fig); destruction of ELN, 63; FARC's control of despejes, 73; human rights violations trials, 152; involvement in Plan Colombia, 153-155; Leahy amendment, 106— 108; officers' resignations through U.S. pressure, 147; Operation Splendor, 109; paramilitary groups and. 8 6 - 8 7 , 88, 97(n78); Plan Colombia aid money, 155(table); rise of guerrilla insurgency, 6 0 - 6 1 ; U.S. preference to National Police over military, 158-159 Military, U.S.: Colombian cooperation with U.S., 30-32; conservative versus liberal view of, 10-11; Good Neighbor policy, 21-23; growing military involvement in crop eradication, 4 0 - 4 2 ; impact on democratization, 47(n28); Increasing focus on drug trade, 25-27; interagency disputes over policy, 3 8 - 3 9 ; Leahy amendment, 106-108; military assistance through Plan Colombia, 149-153; Operation Blast Furnace, 31 Military aid. See Aid, military Military Assistance Agreement (1952), 24

Muerte a Secuestradores. See M A S Mules (human drug couriers), 77 El Mundo newspaper, 126 Narco-cassette scandal, 103-106, 134(nnl6, 32) Narco-democracy, 3 7 - 3 8 Narco-guerrillas, 42 Narco-rider legislation, 117 Narco-terrorism. See Terrorism Narcotization, of U.S. foreign policy, 2; causing deterioration of bilateral cooperation, 16; denarcotization during Pastrana administration, 145-146; military intervention in Colombia, 3 0 - 3 2 ; Pastrana administration, 6 - 7 ; Samper era, 132-133 Nashville (U.S. gunboat), 20 National Front, 5 6 - 5 9 National Guerrilla Coordinating Group. See C N G National interest waiver, 110-112, 130 National Latino Movement. See MLN National Liberation Army. See ELN National Security Directive no. 221, 31 Navarro Wolff, Antonio, 70, 71 Nazism, 22 New Extraditables, 125-126 News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS program), 121 New York Times, 108, 148, 163(n28) Nicaragua, 21, 4 6 ( n l 0 ) , 47(n28) Nigeria, 127 Nixon, Richard, 11, 25 Norway, 76 Nye, Joseph, 13(n8)

Military industrial narcotics complex, 7 MLN (National Latino Movement) Party, 78 Moeller, Heinz, 160 Money-laundering, 112 Monroe, James, 17 Montoya, Maria, 96(n59) Moreno, Luis Alberto, 103, 127 M o v i m i e n t o Armado Quintín Lame. See M A Q L M o v i m i e n t o 19 de Abril. See M-19 Movimiento Latino Nacional. See MLN

OAS. See Organization of American States Ochoa, Fabio, 77, 127 Ochoa, Jorge, 77, 86 Ochoa, Martha Nieves, 86 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 36 Operation Blast Furnace, 31 Operation Condor, 123-124 Operation Snowcap, 3 1 - 3 2 Operation Splendor, 109

190

Index

Opium poppy cultivation, 4 3 Organization of A m e r i c a n States (OAS), 11, 22 Ospina Pérez, Mariano, 54, 56, 93(n5) Pact of Sitges (1957), 57 Paez Indians, 66 Palace of Justice, seizure by M-19 group, 6 5 - 6 6 , 70 Panama, 12, 13(n7). 19-2Ü Panama Canal, 15-16, 18-20, 4 6 ( n l 0 ) Panamanian C o n g r e s s (1826), 17, 18 P a n - A m e r i c a n i s m , 17 Paramilitary groups, 1 - 2 ; assassinations of ex-guerrillas, 3 3 - 3 4 ; drug trade involvement, 84. 9 0 - 9 3 ; E L N ' s proposed despeje, 7 6 - 7 7 ; entering the political arena, 8 8 - 8 9 , 98(n92); g o v e r n m e n t position on, 97(n78); growth during U.S. crackdown, 131-132; guerrilla groups and, 79, 8 4 - 8 9 ; potential military support of, 159; S a m p e r administration, 5 Paraquat, 27 Pardo, Rodrigo, 111 Pardo Leal, Jaime, 33, 69 Parties, political: Acción Democrática M-19, 70; C o n s e r v a t i v e Party, 5 4 - 5 8 ; F A R C ' s f o r m a t i o n of UP, 33, 6 9 - 7 0 , 78; history of conflict between, 5 4 - 5 6 ; Liberal Party, 5 4 - 6 0 , 93(n5), 101, 115-118; M o v i m i e n t o Latino Nacional, 78 Pastor, Robert, 10-11 Pastrana, Andrés, 13(n4); anticipated and actual cooperation with U.S., 6, 144-146; defeat by Samper, 103 Pastrana, Misael, 63 Pastrana administration, 6 - 7 ; denarcotization of U.S. policy during, 1 4 4 - 1 4 6 ; need for U.S. policy modification, 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 ; peace negotiations with guerrillas, 7 1 - 7 7 ; Plan C o l o m b i a , 1 4 8 - 1 5 1 Patriotic Union. See U P Party Peace Corps, 23 Pelosi, Nancy, 151 Perl, Raphael, 4 4

Peru: coca cultivation in the Andes, 84(fig); Operation S n o w c a p , 3 1 - 3 2 ; Plan Colombia, 154(table), 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 Petroleum industry, 6 3 - 6 4 , 75 Pickering, Thomas, 148, 160 Pipeline bombings, 6 3 - 6 4 , 75 Pizarro Leongómez, Carlos, 33, 69, 70 Plan Colombia, 148-151; alternative aid moneys. 163(n31); assistance package, 155(table); C l i n t o n ' s signing into law, 153-157; f u t u r e under Bush administration, 165-166; initial proposal, 157-161; international support for, 164(n47); total aid for, 154(table); U.S. congressional debate over, 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 ; U S A I D allocation, 163(n32) Popular Liberation Army. See EPL Powell, Colin, 89 Prison conditions, of kingpins, 8 0 - 8 1 , 96(n67), 118 Proceso 8000 scandal, 103, 115-118, 137(n75) P u t u m a y o department, 84, 87; increase in coca cultivation, 1 4 7 - 1 4 8 ; increase in paramilitary and guerrilla activity, 159; Operation Condor, 123-124; Plan C o l o m b i a , 150 Quintín L a m e A r m e d M o v e m e n t . See MAQL Radar information, 38, 39 Ramírez, Juan Carlos, 124 Ramstad, Jim, 151 Randall, Stephen, 1 5 - 1 6 Randolph, John, 18 Rangel, A l f r e d o , 91 Rangel, Charles, 30 Reagan, Ronald, 26, 29 Reagan administration, 1 1 , 3 1 Realism, 8, 13(n8) Rempe, Dennis, 24 Reno, Janet, 38, 124 Revolutionary A r m e d Forces of Colombia. See FARC Reyes, Raul, 146 Rio Chiquito, 6 0 - 6 1

Index Rodríguez Orejuela, Gilberto and Miguel, 8 1 - 8 2 ; cocaine s m u g g l i n g , 77; prison conditions, 118; Proceso 8000 scandal, 116; Samper connection, 101, 103; sentencing of, 127; U.S. d e m a n d for extradition, 124-125 Rojas Pinilla, G u s t a v o . 56, 5 8 - 5 9 , 64-65 Roosevelt, Franklin, 47(n29) Roosevelt, T h e o d o r e . 19, 20, 4 6 ( n l 7 ) Samper, Ernesto, 2, 34; admission of drug f u n d i n g , 144; death threats, 140(nl24); drug legalization stance, I33(n7); heroin smuggling, 140(nl 19); impact of Republican hawkishness on, 36; increasing U.S. dissatisfaction with, 39; narcocassette scandal, 103-106; national interest waiver and decertification, 110-112; personal element in 1996 decertification, 118-120; Proceso 8000 scandal, 115-118; response to the certification process, 4 2 - 4 4 ; response to U.S. antagonism, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 ; retroactive extradition stance, 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 , 128; Serrano's c r a c k d o w n on Cali cartel, 112-114; suspected links to drug trade, 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 , 137(n75); visa revocation, 4, 1 2 1 - 1 2 4 Samper administration: decertification in 1996, 115, 118-120; evolution of U.S. policy, 3 - 6 ; hawkish Republican C o n g r e s s and, 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 ; Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 106-108; overt narcotization during, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 ; peace negotiations with guerrillas, 7 1 - 7 2 ; softening of U.S. policy in 1998, 129-131 Sandino, Augusto, 21 Santander, Francisco, 17 Santander department, 63 Santos, Eduardo, 22, 23 Santos, Francisco, 79, 96(n59) S C A D T A airline, 22 Schoultz, Lars, 9, 18 Schumer, Charles, 35, 38

191

Security concerns, post Cold War shift in, 7 - 9 Serpa, Horacio, 13(n4), 106, 138(n85), 144-145 Serrano, Rosso José, 111; Cali c r a c k d o w n , 113; on C o l o m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s antidrug efforts, 139(n 111); counternarcotics unit, 80; death threats against, 1 4 0 ( n l 2 4 ) ; decertification and, 130; U.S. bilateral cooperation, 106, 135(n36) Sharpless, Richard, 55, 56 Sheridan, Brian, 149 Sikorsky C o m p a n y , 152 Silva, Gabriel, 38 Skol, Michael, 102, 104, 106 Slavery, 1 7 - 1 8 S n o w c a p , Operation, 3 1 - 3 2 Source-oriented policy, 3 0 - 3 2 ; Bush (George) administration, 3 2 - 3 5 ; certification process, 4 2 - 4 4 ; Clinton's stance, 3 6 - 3 7 ; guerrilla involvement, 71. See also Plan Colombia S o u t h C o m , 41 Sovereignty issues, C o l o m b i a , 2 8 - 2 9 Soviet Union, 2 Spain, 1 6 - 1 7 , 76, 164(n47) Splendor, Operation, 109 State Department, U.S.: C o l o m b i a ' s 1996 decertification, 119; competition with Congress, 8; d e m a n d s on Samper, 105-106; h u m a n rights certification of C o l o m b i a , 154-155; interagency disputes over policy, 3 8 - 3 9 ; Leahy a m e n d m e n t , 107-108; retroactive extradition, 126; S a m p e r ' s Cali c r a c k d o w n , 112-114 Super Huey helicopters, 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 , 152 Switzerland, 76 Syria, 127 Tambs, Lewis A., 26, 29 Tapias, F e r n a n d o , 147 Taxation on coca crops, by guerrilla groups, 84, 86, 90, 131 Terrorism, 91; guerrillas as terrorist groups, 89; impact of S e p t e m b e r 11

192

Index

attacks, 167; by M - 1 9 group, 6 5 - 6 6 , 70; narco-terrorists, 91; pipeline b o m b i n g s , 6 3 - 6 4 , 75 Thiessen, Marc, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 Toft, Joe, 37, 103, 1 3 4 ( n l 6 ) Tokatlian, Juan, 28, 30, 33 Toledo Plata, Carlos, 70 Torres, Camilo, 6 3 Trade issues, 16 Turbay, Diana, 79, 96(n59) Turbay Ayala, Julio César, 2 6 - 3 0 Twentieth Brigade, 129 Unilateral activist impulse, 12 Unilateralism. U.S., 16, 2 1 - 2 3 Unión Patriótica. See UP Party United S e l f - D e f e n s e s of C o l o m b i a . See AUC Unity Is Part of Victory C o n f e r e n c e (1986), 67 UP Party, 33, 6 9 - 7 0 , 78 Urrutia-Thomson Treaty (1921), 20 U.S. counternarcotics-related assistance to Colombia, 32(table) U.S. Southern C o m m a n d . See SouthCom U S A I D , 157, 163(n32) Vaky, Viron " P e t e , " 26

Valdivieso, Alfonso, 106, 113, 115 Valencia, G u i l l e r m o Leon, 60 Van Wert, James M „ 3 9 ^ 1 0 Vargas Silva, Octavio, 81, 106, 135(n36) Violence: after G a i t a n ' s assassination, 23; after Operation Splendor, 109; Bogotazo, 23, 47(n31), 5 5 - 5 6 ; Cali cartel's resistance to extradition, 8 2 - 8 3 . 125-126; kidnappings and murders, 6 2 - 6 4 , 66, 79, 86, 96(n59), 98(n92), 126, 147; National Front. 5 6 - 5 8 ; political roots of, 5 4 - 5 8 La Violencia, 5 6 - 5 8 Violentólogos (political analysts). 54 Visa revocation, 4, 12(n3). 1 2 1 - 1 2 4 Waiver, national interest, 110-112. 130 Waldheim, Kurt, 12(n3) Watson, Alexander, 104 Weaponry, 90 Wellstone, Paul, 152, 163(n28) White, Brian, 13(n8) Wilson, Woodrow, 20, 21 World War II, 2 1 - 2 2 Yari River raid, 29 Zoellick, Robert, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6

About the Book

In recent years. Colombia has become the recipient of the third largest amount of U.S. foreign aid—most of it slated for antidrug efforts. Russell Crandall offers a clear and concise analysis of the evolution and present dynamics of U.S. policy toward Colombia, a policy that since 1990 has been driven overwhelmingly by factors related to the "war on drugs" within the United States. Crandall shows how, in pursuing its drug w a r - d r i v e n policies, the United States succeeded primarily in weakening the Colombian state at the very time that guerrilla groups and paramilitary forces were gaining strength in rural areas. He also considers the roots of those groups and discusses efforts to bring peace to the country. He concludes by assessing current U.S. policy toward Colombia and suggesting directions for future policy. Driven by Drugs tells a story that is essential for understanding the complexity of the U.S.-Colombian relationship—and that is equally significant as a case study of U.S. foreign policy. Russell Crandall is MacArthur Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College.

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