The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East 0060118040, 9780060118044

Table of contents :
Contents
Illustrations
Introduction
Nasser's Advice
The First Red Waves
The Beginning of the Great Soviet Offensive
Storm over Iraq
The End of the Honeymoon
Normalization
Grade A
Pigeonholing and New Leadership
Trouble for Everybody
The Trap
One Gap in the Circle
The Puzzled Giant
Doubts, Plots, Hesitations
The Gulf Widens
Double Your Stakes or Quit
The October War
Double Your Stakes and Lose
No Way to Treat a Superpower
Inquest and Forecast
Index

Citation preview

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

By the same author:

THE RO AD T O R A M AD AN

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East

M o h a m e d H e ik a l

1817 HARPER

& ROW,

PU BLISH ERS

N ew York, H agerstown, San Francisco, London

Copyright ° 1978 by Times Newspapers Ltd. and Mohamed Heikal. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address Harper & How, Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022. Till: SFHINX

a nd

THE COMMISSAR

HRST U S EDITION ISBN:

0-06-011804-0

L IB R A R Y O F ( .O N ( i R I .S S C ‘AI A L i >(»( AR D N U M B E R :

78-22440

79 80 81 82 83 84 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Introduction I

Nasser’s A dvice

9 ii

2 ' T he First Red W aves

35

3 T he Beginning o f the Great Soviet O ffensive

56 76

4 Storm over Iraq 5 T he End o f the H oneym oon

i03

6 N orm alization

ii5

7 Grade A

124

8 Pigeonholing and N ew Leadership

13»

9 T rouble for E verybody

148

IO T h e Trap

172

il

190

O ne Gap in the C ircle

12 T he Puzzled Giant

203

13 D oubts, Plots, Hesitations

215

H

T he G u lf W idens

229

15 D ouble Y o u r Stakes or Q u it

242

l6

256

T he O ctober W ar

17 D ouble Y o u r Stakes and Loose

261

i8

267

N o W a y to Treat a Superpow er

19 Inquest and Forecast Index

275 290

Illustrations

These photographs, grouped in a separate section, w ill be fo u n d following page

128.

Heikal and Khruschev Khnischev’s first sight o f E gypt Nasser and Khruschev in the Egyptian M useum , C airo Khruschev between G rom yko and Nasser Mikoyan, Heikal, Sadat and M arshal M alinovsky Heikal and G rom yko Heikal and Podgom y Kosygin and Sadat fioumedienne and K osygin

(United Press International) General Hafiz al-Assad, Syrian Defence M inister and Marshal Gretchko

(Associated Press) Marshal Zakharov and General Fawzi Ali Sabri, Brezhnev and Nasser Nasser and Brezhnev Podgom y, Brezhnev, Nasser, M ahm oud Riad and H eikal Podgomy and Sadat sign the Soviet-E gyptian T reaty

(Photographs supplied by the author except where otherwise stated)

Introduction

I bave called this book 'T h e Rise and Fall o f Soviet Influence in the Arab W orld’, but readers w ill find that there is m uch m ore in it about the Soviet Union’s relations w ith E gyp t than w ith any other A rab country. This is to be explained not so m uch b y the fact that it w as from Egypt that I watched the events o f these tw en ty years as b y the central role in diem w hich history and geography inevitably cast fo r m y country. It was appropriate that E gypt should have been the first A rab country to establish relations w ith the Soviet U n ion and to have dealings with it. It was inevitable that E gypt should have becom e in a sense the gatew ay for the Soviet U nion to the rest o f the A rab w orld and to parts o f A frica. Correspondingly, it was natural that those w h o wished to eliminate the Soviet U n ion from the A rab w orld and A frica should have started this reverse operation w ith E gypt. In preparation o f this b ook I have relied prim arily on m y o w n collection o f documents and on m y m em ories o f the years w hich I spent dose to the centres o f pow er in E gypt, first w ith President Nasser from 1952 to 1970, and then w ith President Sadat from 1970 to 1975. I have not, o f course, relied exclusively on these sources, but have made use o f the testim ony o f others w ho to ok part in the events I have described. I f I do not refer to them b y nam e, this is not through any lack o f gratitude, but in order to avoid any m isunderstanding w hich might be caused b y assodating them openly w ith a b ook in the pre­ paration o f w hich they have not been involved. This book should, in fact, be regarded as a personal narrative, rather than as a w ork o f scholarship or research. Those w ho have been privileged to observe at close range the unfolding o f political and diplomatic affairs have a duty to describe w hat they saw as accurately and dispassionately as th ey can. This is w hat I have tried to do. It has never been m y intention to w rite a b ook w hich could be labelled anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet. T he o n ly point o f view from w hich I write is that o f an A ran, and as an A rab I have alw ays been anxious to see the Arab w orld achieve a balanced relationship w ith the Soviet

IO

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

U nion. A fter all, the Soviet U nion is one o f the tw o superpowers; it is geographically near the Arabs, and it represents one o f the m ain ideologies w hich have shaped the w orld in w hich w e all have to live. This means that the Soviet U nion is not ju st som ething peripheral to d ie Arabs; it is bound to be an essential part o f their experience. It was unfortunately necessary fo r m e to take up a position critical o f the Soviet U nion at the tim e w hen, after the death o f Nasser in Septem ber 1970, 1felt that its influence in the A rab w orld was becom ing to o great. This did not, how ever, m ean that I ever thought it w ou ld be right to replace the influence o f one superpower b y that o f the other. So in due course I found m yself obliged to be critical o f w hat I felt to be undue influence being exercised in the same area b y the U nited States. A t various times I have been the target for fierce attacks b y the Soviet press and radio; at other tim es th ey have praised m e in extra­ vagant terms. I have tried not to let any o f this affect m y account o f the tw en ty years between 1955 and 1975 . 1 believe that the A rab w orld learned a great deal from the Soviet U nion and benefited a great deal from contact w ith it. I think, too, that the Soviet U nion gained m uch, and learned m uch, from its contacts w ith the Arabs. I do not believe, fo r exam ple, that the Soviets’ recent successes in A ngola and in the H orn o f A frica could have been achieved i f it had not been fo r the lessons th ey learned in the M iddle East during the period w hich this b ook covers. H ow ever, w hatever successes there m ay have been in parts o f A frica, this does not alter the fact that the great Soviet offensive in the A rab w orld failed. N ot only was the offensive halted - it was obliged to turn back. B ut this abortive offensive represents on ly one chapter in the story o f relations between the Arabs and the Soviet U nion. It does not mean that the story has ended, for it is out o f the question that the Soviet U nion should ever isolate itself from w hat goes on in the A rab w orld. It w ould be quite w ron g, for obvious historical and strategic reasons, i f it tried to do so. A ccordin gly this b ook should be seen not ju st as a review o f w hat has gone before, but as a pointer to w hat is to com e. I w ould like it to be read as a prospectus rather than as an obituary. O nce again I should like to thank m y friend Edward H odgkin for help in preparation o f m y material. C a ir o

June 1978

I

Nasser s Advice

T he koom in w hich the Soviet Politburo meets is on the second floor o f the Praesidium building in the K rem lin. It is a lon g room , w ith windows on both sides, those in front lookin g over a garden and those on the other side lookin g over a yard. T h e o n ly ornam entation consists o f large portraits o f M arx and Lenin w hich, side b y side, gaze down on the green baize cloth o f d ie conference table, on w hich are laid out supplies o f m ineral w ater, biscuits, chocolates and cigarettes. On a smaller table to one side are arranged books and pam phlets, together w ith models o f rockets, space-craft, and aeroplanes. It is in this room that form al discussions w ith visiting delegations from foreign countries are conducted, each negotiating team occupying similar brown leather chairs, one on each side o f the table. B u t today, which is a day in the summer o f 1977, no foreigners are presfent. T h e nine men now seated at the table are all Soviet citizens. T ogeth er th ey make up a group o f the m ost pow erful m en in one o f the tw o m ost powerful nations o f the w orld. At the head o f the table sits Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary o f the Central Com m ittee o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet U nion and, since June, President o f the Praesidium o f the Suprem e Soviet. Ranged at his side are A lexei K osygin, Chairm an o f the C ou n cil o f Ministen, M ikhail Suslov, the party’s ideologist, Andrei G rom yko, Minister for Foreign Affairs, D m itry U stinov, M inister o f D efence, then tw o o f the rising stars in the Soviet firm am ent, K yril M azarov, whose responsibilities include arranging assistance for national liberation movements abroad, and Y u ri A ndropov, head o f the K G B , w h o sits with his head leaning on one hand w hile w ith the other he scratches with his pen m eticulous lines on a sheet o f foolscap, w hich later he w ill tear into the minutest fragm ents. T he group is com pleted b y tw o o f Suslov’s aides - Boris Ponom arev, Chairm an o f the Internationa] Department o f the Central Com m ittee, and R .A . U lianovsky, an assistant to Ponom arev w ho specializes in ideological questions affecting national liberation m ovem ents.

11

12

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

These men com prise the standing com m ittee o f the Politburo which is concerned w ith all matters o f defence, foreign policy and security. Today it has before it the problems o f the M iddle East, and its members have been considering one b y one the countries there w ith which they, as a government, have been concerned. They have found little in their review to com fort them. Egypt, the country w ith which their association has been longest and most intimate, whose defence forces they modernized and armed, whose H igh Dam, that miracle o f modern engineering, their engineers helped to build, has now turned contemptuously on them while its President daily upbraids them and all their works in the most scathing terms. The Sudan, where once was to be found the most thriving communist party in the Arab world, is hardly less hostile than Egypt. W ith Syria, another outstanding beneficiary from Soviet civil and m ilitary aid, relations are still close, but can hardly be described as easy. Iraq, a country which a few years ago seemed w illing and, indeed, eager, to be w holly dependent on the Soviet Union, is now busily engaged in ‘diversifying*; in other words, the Iraqi government is looking west for technical aid and awarding its fattest contracts to western firms. from Saudi Arabia there is obviously nothing to be expected but active hostility. North Yemen had once looked a favourable prospect, when the huge Antonov planes were shuttling backwards and forwards, bringing supplies o f arms and even food for the troops o f the Yem en Republican Arm y, but now there is not a single Russian technician left in the country. There had been good grounds for hope in Somalia too, but all has gone sour there, and Soviet fortunes in the Horn o f Africa are being ground to nothing by the millstones o f war between Somalia and Ethiopia. O nly the Palestinians remain more or less faith­ ful, but o f what real value are these men w ith a cause but without a country? H ow many divisions has the Pope, asked Stalin. H ow many divisions has Yasser Arafat, his ghost m ight ask his successors in the Kremlin. N o doubt, even as they contemplate this bleak picture, they are reminded o f the numerous occasions in the past when they had serious differences o f opinion even with Nasser. They w ill never forget how Nasser advised Libya’s President, Muammar Ghadaffi, to buy arms from the W est rather than from the Soviet Union, and how this advice was taken and the Mirages were bought. N or, though relations with that other staunchly anti-communist Arab country,

na$ser’s advicb

13

Jordan, have im proved, can th ey forget that it w as Nasser again w h o advised K ing Hussein to continue b u yin g arms from the U n ited States and not sw itch to the Soviet U nion, as he had proposed. ‘ W e must not let the Arab-Israeli conflict becom e polarized betw een the superpowers,’ had been Nasser’s argum ent; ’this is bound to happen i f the Arabs are armed exclusively b y Russia and the Israelis exclu sively by the United States’. O nce again Nasser’s advice w as listened to , and the approach to the Soviets was n ot m ade. In fact, by this sum m er o f 1977, there can be no escaping the reali­ zation that the entire M iddle East p o licy o f the Soviet U n ion is in ruins. There is not a single country in d ie w h ole area w hich can be considered a true friend, let alone a reliable ally. W hereas a fe w years earlier the Soviet U nion had been everyw here regarded as the principal defender o f Arab rights, today it is to W ashington that all roads from the Arab w orld lead. T o rub salt in the Soviets’ w ounds is their realization that if, at this particular m om ent, there is any prospect o f their once again playing a significant role in decision-m aking pro­ cesses in the M iddle East, this w ill on ly com e about as a result o f an American invitation to do so. It is the Am ericans w h o see a useful function for their Geneva conference co-chairm an to perform , even if the Arabs do not. N ot is it sim ply a political disaster that the m en round the K rem lin table have to contem plate. T h e econom ic cost o f failure has to be reckoned up also. A fe w years earlier K osygin had stated that Soviet investment in the A rab w orld am ounted to fifteen billion dollars or more; by 1977 the figure must have risen to at least tw en ty billion dollars. And w hat dividend - political, m ilitary or even econom ic - is there to show for that vast capital expenditure? W h o talks any m ore about the H igh D am or the Euphrates D am , or the electrification o f rural Egypt? Looking around them , the Soviet leaders can see that there is one service, and one service alone, that th ey are called on b y the Arabs to perform, and this is to art as a supplier o f arms. It is really alm ost as though the w hole w orld has accepted the doctrine w hich H enry Kissinger once propounded in an interview he gave m e: ’A ll the Russians can give yo u is arm s; w e Am ericans can give yo u peace.’ But even this role o f arms provider for the Arabs has produced m ore friction than gratitude. N o r is it a role w hich the Soviets can regard with any relish. T h ey k n o w that the Chinese have m ocked them over

14 THE sphinx

and the commissar

it. ‘W hat has happened to the first socialist country in the w orld?’ C hou En-Lai asked me w hen I interview ed him in January 1973. ‘It's becom e nothing but an armaments dealer, m opping up your produce to pay the interest on the arms yo u 've had to buy.’ So it was that in N ovem ber 1975, w hen the Egyptian Foreign M inister, Ismail Fahm y, m et his Soviet counterpart, Andrei G rom yko, he received an unexpected rebuff. Thinking to be the bearer o f good news he told G rom yko that the K uw aitis w ould shortly be turning up in M oscow to b u y arms, bringing w ith them $200 m illion in cash. ‘M r M inister,’ said G rom yko bitterly, ‘do yo u really believe, then, w hat the Chinese say about us?’ B ut gradually the Soviets themselves began to see the execution o f their policies in the M iddle East m ore and m ore in terms o f their ability to supply or w ithhold arms, thus ironically slipping into the role o f arms dealer w hich they so indignantly repudiated. O nce again it was Ismail Fahm y to w hom this was to be brought hom e when he was negotiating w ith Brezhnev in M oscow in 1977. He mentioned some spare parts and replacements for arms that had been promised E gypt but not delivered; 'no doubt,’ he added, ‘ow in g to some bureaucratic hold-up, w hich you, M r Chairm an, w ill be able to overcom e.’ Brezh­ nev looked at him . ‘That was not the result o f any bureaucratic hold­ up,’ he said, 'it was the result o f a political decision.’ ‘W h o took it?’ asked Ismail Fahm y. T did’, said Brezhnev. ‘T he im plication o f the policies pursued b y your governm ent is that in no circumstances is E gypt going to fight. So w hat do you need these arms for?’ T he prospect confronting die men sitting round the long table in die Krem lin is bleak indeed. Ignored, abused, dunned for arms but denied agreed paym ent for them , the Soviet leaders seem to have no assets left to them. Brezhnev m ay ask his colleagues for suggestions as to h ow the situation can be im proved, but w hat consolation can th ey offer? T hey are all w orried and anxious men. G rom yko is w ell aware that Soviet defeats in the M iddle East have weakened his negotiating position w ith the U nited States when it com es to the vital question o f detente and S A L T . U stinov is conscious o f pressure from the marshals and admirals to safeguard the defence pattern in Russia’s southern approaches. A ndropov can argue that everything that has gone w rong is the consequence o f sinister plots concocted b y Am erica and Saudi Arabia, but even i f true that w ould be slight consolation. Som e­ how the M iddle East has proved a minefield in w hich the Soviets w alk

nasser's advice

is

at their p eril ft is a grenade w h ich has b lo w n up in their hands. T h e metaphors m ay vary, but the facts rem ain the same. ★

★

★

The meeting I have sketched does not have a precise date and the tenor o f its discussions m ust, o f course, be a m atter fo r conjecture, though it is fairly easy to guess at diem . B u t the existence o f the standing committee referred to is a m atter o f com m on kn ow led ge, and it is known too that it held, and holds, regular m eetings to review the situation in the M iddle East. It is kn ow n , fo r exam ple, that it held at least six meetings follow in g President Sadat's expulsion o f the S oviet technicians from E gypt in the sum m er o f 1972. I& as must be assumed, a great deal o f bitterness and frustration where the Arab w orld is concerned w as revealed in the course o f the committee's discussions, that is hardly to be w ondered at. T h e contrast between Soviet prospects in the M iddle East as th ey w ere in the sum m er o f 1977, and as they had been 22 years earlier w hen E gypt's so-called Czech arms deal first sucked the S oviet U nion into the area, w as alm ost unbelievable. Then, it had seemed, th ey had everything goin g fo r them . W o rld W ar II had destroyed the authority o f the tw o pow ers w hich fo r a generation had dom inated the area. France had been defeated; Britain was exhausted and alm ost bankrupt. T h e Soviet U n ion had em erged from the w ar w ith m ilitary strength and prestige equal to , i f n ot greater than, that o f its o n ly rival, the U nited States. Fresh ideas w ere circulating through d ie A rab w o rld ; w inds o f change w ere b low in g. The traditional governm ents left in pow er w hen the w ar ended w ere aware o f these w inds but lacked the skill or the w ill to do anything to adapt to them . Inevitably new leaders em erged in the A rab countries m ore in touch w ith a w orld in w hich radio and air travel w ere opening up lands w hich had been inaccessible fo r centuries, and in w hich atom ic weapons, the cold w ar, and the U nited N ations in their different w a y sym bolized the fact that, fo r good or ill, the w orld w as a v e ry different place from w hat it had been in 1939. In this changed w o rld the revo­ lutionary m ight o f d ie S oviet U n ion w as clearly goin g to have a major role to play. h i Arab countries it w as d ie armies - the o n ly relatively w ell organized

I6

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

and modernized organizations in still largely backward societies which were to provide the new leadership. In one Arab country after another - Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yem en, Algeria, Sudan, Libya - army officers took over. Sometimes their motives were purely selfish, the pursuit o f power for its ow n sake; but at other times they came to power w ith a programme o f reform which they had long been brooding on and which they were determined to implement. Neither the ambitious nor the idealists were to have an easy road. This was the era o f the cold war, when the tw o superpowers confronted each other, but when the unacceptability o f nuclear w ar made them look for other ways o f carrying on the struggle. This was the heyday o f propaganda and psychological warfare, and o f secret agencies, especially the C IA and K G B. The Third W orld became a principle field for open and clandestine rivalry between the tw o armed ideologies, capitalism and communism, which had replaced the simpler colonial rivalries o f expansionist Europe. In this highly charged atmosphere the new leaders o f the Arab w orld were subjected to enormous strains and stresses, whether they liked it or not. The W est was the world they knew. Their hatred for western policies was often m ixed w ith admiration for western institu­ tions. They recognized the w orth o f liberal democracy and would have been happy to see it flourish in their ow n countries, but thought that it was something for which their people were not yet ready. Besides, it was w ith the old classes they had forcibly replaced that the W est main­ tained an open or tacit alliance. So, after first turning almost automati­ cally to the W est for help, the new leaders found themselves in con­ flict with it, and with tormented hearts they addressed themselves to the East, to die world o f communism. Their change o f front was not accomplished without grave mis­ givings. A ll the formative influences in the new leaders' lives - the books they had read, the history they had learned, the films they had seen - had come from the W est. The languages they knew in addition to their ow n were English or French - Russian was, and remained, a m ystery to them. It was impossible for them to remain unaffected b y all that they had heard about the communist world - the closed society, the suppression o f thought, the Stalinist terror. None o f them went to M oscow without the fear - the certainty rather - that all his conversations would be bugged. Later, reports o f the Twentieth Congress o f the C P SU had their effect. The Arabs were determined not to become too

nasser’ s advice

17

involved in this new w orld that w as opening to d iem . W h ile th ey felt that die W est had m uch to teach about political freedom , th ey frit that the East had useful lessons to g iv e w here equality and social justice w en concerned. B u t at the same tim e th ey w anted to keep their distance. There is hardly one o f the n ew lead en in the M iddle East o r black Africa who has not begun his speech o f greeting to S oviet hosts o r guests with die words ’In spite o f ideological differences . . Mos t o f them, in addition, w ere w ell aw are that there existed in their o w n country a communist party w hich ow ed m ore lo y a lty to M oscow than to themselves. But the socialist countries had m uch to offer a nationalist leader. They could, first o f all, be o f great assistance in the prim ary task of ending colonial dom ination b y the W est. A fter that th ey could help in the econom ic developm ent o f his country. A lm ost alw ays he would find that, whereas the W est, w ith its liberal-capitalist system , had litde more to teach him , there was m uch that he could learn from Soviet experience that had relevance to his o w n situation. H e w as attracted by the centralization o f authority and planning. H e discovered that there were areas inside the Soviet U nion w ith clim atic and social conditions similiar to those he w as tryin g to grapple w ith . Thus almost every Arab visitor to the Soviet U n ion w ou ld be taken to Kazakhstan, there to be told that this was a land w here people used to live just as his did n ow , but w hich had, as he w ou ld see, been tram formed out o f all recognition. So these leaders w ere tom betw een real attractions. T h e western doctrine o f individual liberty could not be rejected as worthless, but die East was engaged in the construction o f an egalitarian society which looked in m any w ays like the society th ey w ere themselves trying to build. The pull o f the East w as strong - indeed, before long stronger than they really liked. T h ey therefore hoped to be able to cooperate closely w ith the East but to keep their lines open to the W est. T o do this they had to study the w ays o f the tw o superpowers, which were very different from each other. T h e W est in its dealings with the Third W orld countries, tended to think it already knew m ost, or all, o f the answers. It drew confidently on a past colonial experience, which in the circumstances was a poor guide. T he Am ericans, in particular, too readily assumed that i f th ey could get control over the police and intelligence services o f a country the rest w ould follow .

18

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

The Russians, w ho had studied western methods and come to the conclusion that they could im prove on them, decided that the best w ay in which they could gain the influence they sought was to provide equipment for the armed forces and encourage industrialization, which would produce an industrial proletariat. But the Russians were extrem ely worried when they contemplated the countries w ith which they were becoming involved and realized how much everything depended on the w ill and capacity to survive o f one man. In virtually every new ly independent country they found one man - he m ight or m ight not be the same man w ho had led the struggle for indepen­ dence - w ho made all the decisions, particularly in matters o f foreign policy and defence. This stage in die transition from a traditional society to a more com plex constitutional society m ay be inevitable, but it carries w ith it particular hazards. Aware o f these, the Russians were constantly urging this one man to build up an organization which m ight outlive him . It was their dream that men like Nasser m ight become their country’s Constantine, converting to the new religion o f communism themselves, and by so doing opening the w ay to the conversion o f their whole people. It was, after all, a not impossible dream - Castro had not been a communist when power fell into his hands on the first day o f 1959, yet he had soon seen the light and carried the people o f Cuba w ith him. W h y should not the same story be repeated b y a Nasser or a Qasim? This was not to be, though their hopes received encouragement every time a western leader, such as Dulles, tried to ostracize Nasser b y branding him a communist. For the Soviets the new relationship established in Egypt by the 1955 arms deal was an event o f the utmost importance. It not only provided the entry into the M iddle East which, for strategic reasons, Russia had been seeking for over a century; it also opened the high road to Africa and set a pattem for Soviet relations w ith movements o f national liberation everywhere in the world. So that the setback o f 1972 in the M iddle East must have had far more than local significance for them. B y the summer o f 1977 signs o f how far their authority had been eroded were not wanting. There was, for example, that occasion soon after President Carter took office in 1976 when the Secretary-General o f the U N , Kurt W aldheim, urged him to make more use o f the U N in the pursuit o f his international aims. ’There is no need for you to

nasser’ s advicb

19

be afraid o f the U N / D r W aldheim had insisted; ‘the autom atic T h ird World majority there w hich the Soviet U n ion used to be able to command against you no longer exists.* T h e S oviet leaders kn ew this was so. They knew that m uch o f the m agic that had once attached to their name had evaporated. True, from the outset th ey had had their m isgivings. Success had at times come almost too easily, b u t even w hen their star seem ed m ost dearly in the ascendant the Soviets had w ondered exactly w hat it w as that die Arabs wanted from them . H ad th ey sim ply been called in as a counterweight to the W est? W h en the Arabs felt the em ergency w as passed, would their n ew Soviet friends be placed in the deep freeze? Long before the fiasco o f the years fo llo w in g the 1973 w ar, the Soviets had tried to analyse the M iddle East scene and their role in it. W ith all the resources o f doctrine at their disposal th ey had tried to see the M iddle East in its correct ideological and historical setting, so that th ey m ight thereby be enabled to pursue policies w hich w ere both theoretically correct and practically successful. Leading Arabs too had done their ow n share o f analysis. T h e y were as anxious to understand the Soviets as the Soviets w ere to understand them. T h ey realized h o w m uch hung on achieving a working relationship w ith these n ew and m ysterious partners. T h ey, no less than the Soviets, w anted the partnership to be fru itfu l; th ey wanted to avoid friction and quarrels i f th ey could. ★

*

★

No Arab leader had longer or closer relations w ith the Soviets than Nasser. He had seen them at every level and in all circumstances. He had com e to pow er in the days o f Stalin and the cold w ar; he died in the days o f Brezhnev and detente. In between there had been moments o f glo ry and tim es o f tragedy, there had been w ar and peace, euphoria and near despair. H e had had personal contact w ith Soviet leaders at every level - not sim ply w ith the bosses in the Krem ­ lin, but w ith technocrats like N iporozhny, Skatchkov, N o v ik o v and U stinov; and w ith marshals and admirals like M alinovsky, Gretchko, G orshikov, Patisky, Sokolovsky, R okossovsky, Y akobov, Rodenko and Zakharov. Because o f Nasser’s long and diversified experience o f dealing with the Russians m any Third W orld leaders cam e to ask his advice

20

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

before their first visit to M oscow. As w ell as Arabs, men like the Sudan’s N im eiry and Algeria’s Ben Bella, it was the heads o f new ly independent blade African states, such as Ghana’s Nkrum ah, Congo’s Lumumba and M ali’s M odibo Keita w ho found what Nasser had to say on this subject particularly useful. W hen later, as so often hap­ pened, Nasser saw them facing difficulties in their dealings w ith the Russians, trying to keep a balance between East and W est, or among their ow n people, or w ith neighbouring governments - when some­ times he saw this tightrope act fail, or the leader come to grief - he felt that, as he had learnt the hard w ay, w ith no one except T ito and Nehru to consult and discuss things w ith, there ought to be some method whereby the fruits o f his experience could be made available to others. It was in the evening o f M ay 18, 1964 that the idea first came to Nasser o f putting his thoughts on how to deal w ith the Soviets in written form. The previous days had been historic ones - they had seen the completion o f the first stage o f the H igh Dam , and the diversion o f the waters o f the River N ile, an event w hich had brought to Aswan tens o f thousands o f rejoicing Egyptians and a distinguished gathering o f foreign guests. Am ong these were President Abdel Salam A ref o f Iraq, President Sallal o f Yem en, and President Ahmed Ben Bella o f Algeria. But without any doubt the star o f the occasion was the Prime Minister and First Secretary o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union, Nikita Khruschev, paying his first visit to an Arab country and to the African continent. It was the High Dam ceremonies which had lured the Russian leader to Egypt, and now die occasion was being converted into a festival o f Arab-Soviet cooperation. The H igh Dam was the greatest engineering feat ever to be seen in Africa. A fter the W est had fumbled and failed it was the Soviets w ho had stepped into the breach, and w ith their money and their skills had built the ’new pyramid’ which was finally to harness the waters o f the N ile and, b y providing greatly increased irrigation and electricity, to revolutionize the lives o f the peasants and industrial workers o f Egypt. A fter the exertions, in the stiffing M ay heat, o f the actual ceremonies in Aswan, Nasser had planned a few days’ relaxation. A ll his visitors were to m ove to Berenice on the Red Sea, where the official yacht Hurriyeh was anchored, and where a programme o f boating and fishing had been arranged for them. M ost o f the Arab guests were already on board the yacht b y the

NASSm’s ADVICB

21

time Khruschev arrived on the m orning o f M a y 15, and cam e fo rw ard to greet him. But, w hen President A r e f o f Iraq held o u t his hand, Khruschev scowled and drew bade. T m n ot g o in g to shake hands with people whose hands are stained w ith the blood o f com m unists !’ he shouted. The reason fo r Khruschev s outburst w as that som e days before Baghdad radiohad announced that several com m unists had been shot. A ref tried to explain that these people had been executed, n ot because they w ere communists, but because th ey had conspired against the state. But Khruschev w as n ot to be m ollified, and soon A r e f showed signs o f losing his tem per to o , m uttering protests. 'B roth er Aref/ said Nasser in A rabic, 'don’t say any m ore n o w .’ But the atmosphere w as spoiled. N o b o d y felt in the m ood fo r enjoying themselves. Instead th ey all sat around in chairs on the deck of the yacht, talking around the old fam iliar subjects - nationalism , communism, socialism, religion and so on. Ben B ella w as particularly argumentative, and so o f course w as K hruschev. Nasser, as host, tried to prevent the discussion from getting ou t o f hand, but did not find this easy. At one point, for exam ple, he m ade a valiant effort to get K hruschev to take a more reasonable attitude tow ards A ref. 'Y o u w ere used to dealing w ith Qasim / he said, 'so naturally yo u don’t find it easy to deal with his successor, w hom perhaps yo u still think o f as Qasim ’s number tw o. B ut rem em ber that people used to say N eguib w as the top man in Egypt, and I w as ju st his num ber tw o . T h e same w ith Ferhat Abbas and Ben Bella in A lgeria. Y o u get on w ell enough w ith Ben Bella and me now . W h y not w ith A ref?’ 'Nah, nah,’ said Khruschev. 'It’s not at all the same thing. I’ll tell you a story. A t the tim e o f the w ar betw een Russia and Japan in 1905 the Russian fleet was com m anded b y a prince w h o w as hated b y every­ body. He was incom petent and a brute. B ut his second-in-com m and was liked b y everybody, an efficient sailor and a good m an. T hen the news came that the flagship containing the adm iral and his second-incommand had been sunk, and everyone in it drow ned. T here was general rejoicing in the n avy at the thought that the prince was dead, but sorrow that his deputy w as dead to o . Then cam e a second message, to the effect that after all som e o f those on the sunken ship had been saved, and included am ong these was the com m ander. B ut his deputy was definitely drow ned. A nd I’ll tell yo u w hat d ie sailors said dien. They said, "W e m ight have kn ow n it. G old rinks, but shit floats.’’ ’

22

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

Then, suddenly realizing that the implications o f this story were not particularly flattering to some o f those he was w ith, Khruschev tried to excuse himself. ‘O f course/ he said, ‘none o f that applies to present com pany/ But the day was not a pleasant one. Host and guests sat around for about six hours, the conversation flow ing on but getting nowhere. The fisherman in their boats waited idly for customers who never came. A t last it was agreed that w e should all go back. This, the next day, w e did. Three days later, when w e were back in Cairo and talking over Khruschev’s visit, Nasser's thoughts returned to the A ref incident. ‘These people don’t know how to deal w ith the Russians,' he said. ‘I would like to write a book about it - an instruction manual, o f the sort you get for a new car.’ I thought this was a very good idea, and said so: ‘W hy don’t w e go to w ork on it?’ In fact w e did have one meeting in which we discussed the project, but then w e decided that it had better wait until Nasser got down to w riting his memoirs - it was always his dream that he w ould occupy him self w ith these memoirs when he retired. Nasser was quite clear in his ow n mind about the form his projected handbook should take. It would have nothing to do w ith policy. He was not concerned w ith whether a country should or should not cultivate relations with the Soviet Union, or how close these relations ought to be. That obviously was not for him to say. A ll he was con­ cerned about was the question o f technique, o f style. Nasser thought he would start by defining the stages through which the relationship between a Third W orld country and the Soviets must be expected to go, and that he would then proceed to list a series o f dos and don’ts which should guide the Third W orld leaders in their behaviour towards their Soviet counterparts. Looking at the notes o f the conversations which I made at the time, I am reminded that it was Nasser’s belief that every Third W orld leader should expect his relations w ith the Soviets to go through five distinct phases, though these would not necessarily always follow each other in the same order. He listed them as follows :i i Mistrust First comes a period o f mistrust. A ny new ly emerged Third W orld leader is initially regarded by the Soviets with grave suspicion. He w ill

nasser’ s advice

23

either be ignored, or attacked b y the S oviet press and radio. A lth o u gh the declared policy o f the Soviet U n io n is to support national liberation movements wherever th ey are to be fou nd , in fact the ideas and emotions which inspire the leaders o f such m ovem ents are treated with scepticism. In Soviet eyes nationalism has to be seen o n ly in the context o f the class struggle and the dynam ics o f history. I f the nationalist movement em erges from the arm y it is all the m ore suspect, since they believe most armies have show n them selves to be upholders of the status quo, counter-revolutionary rather than revolu tion ary, and so potentially fascist. T h eir thinking has been largely influenced b y the long history o f right-w ing coups organized b y the arm ed forces in Latin America, and b y the early arm y coups in Syria, w hich th ey itgarded, with a good deal o f reason, as being the outcom e o f rivalries between the big British and Am erican o il com panies in the area. (So it was that to begin w ith th ey persisted in seeing Nasser as sim ply a pawn in the struggle betw een the colonial rivalries o f Britain and America in the M iddle East. Even after B andung1 the Soviet radio continued to describe Nasser as a tool o f im perialism . O n ly m ore recently have Soviet ideas about armies in the T hird W o rld begun to change.)8

2

Interregnum

However, eventually som ething happens to convert phase one into phase tw o. T he Soviets discover that the new leader is in fact opposed to the old colonial pow ers. Perhaps he quarrels w ith the Am ericans and tries to associate him self w ith som e o f the progressive T hird W orld groupings - A fro-A sian solidarity, for exam ple, the non-aligned grouping, or the O rganization fo r A frican U n ity. Phase tw o can be described as an interregnum betw een the period o f distrust and the period o f total acceptance. D uring this interregnum the Soviets assess the leader’s record to date. T heir radios and newspapers neither attack him nor praise him . H e is, so to speak, on trial. It is up to him to prove himself. D uring this period lim ited dealings o f a practical nature, such as trade exchanges, arc possible.*

1 The first Afro-Asian conference was held in the Indonesian town o f Bandung in April 1955. * In 'Nasser's Handbook' m y ow n comments are included in brackets.

24

the sphinx an d the comm issar

3 Honeymoon Then comes the third phase - die breakthrough. This fellow s some obviously revolutionary action on the part o f the new leader. (In Nasser’s case the breakthrough came w ith the nationalization o f die Suez Canal and the events leading up to the Suez W ar.) It w ill be greeted at first b y a short period - say four or five days - o f silence, during which the Soviet leadership tries to subject what has happened to scientific analysis. W hen this silence is broken, the new leader may find him self overwhelmed b y a wave o f adulation. He is the hero o f the hour, a pet, a superman. He w ill be cultivated and pampered; noth­ ing w ill be too good for him . Unlimited political and economic backing w ill be his, and direct channels o f communication w ith the Kremlin w ill open for him. In other words, this is the honeymoon period in relations between the tw o countries, and like all honeymoons it must come to an end. (Others beside Nasser to enjoy their honeym oon period have been Cuba’s Castro, Iraq’s Qasim, Algeria’s Ben Bella, Zaire’s Lumumba, Sheikh M ujibur Rahman o f Bangladesh, Agostinho N eto o f Angola, Siad Barre o f Somalia and Mengistu Haile Mariam o f Ethiopia.) But one consequence o f phase three is that the new leader comes to be regarded in the W est as a communist, or, at best, as a communist stooge. Because o f this, and because also he begins to find Soviet patronage heavy-handed, he tries to assert his independence. He makes a point o f stressing the ideological differences which separate him from M oscow. He m ay even attack the communists within his ow n borders. 4 Quarrels So the petted superman turns out to be human after all. The Soviets retreat into their shell. This is the fourth phase, and it is critical, since in it the next round o f the game w ill be decided. The new leader w ill either be dropped completely, or be established on a more realistic footing, according to the degree o f the Soviets’ disappointment and the amount that they have already invested in his country. (In Nasser’s ow n case the honeymoon ended, and phase four began, after his attacks on the Iraqi communists at the end o f December 1958 and his subsequent angry exchange o f letters w ith Khruschev.) 5 Pigeonholing So w e come to the fifth and final phase, which could be called the phase o f normalization or pigeonholing. (To appreciate what goes on in

nasser’s a d v i c e

25

this phase I think that som e understanding o f S oviet society is essential. The Russia o f the Tsars and the O rth o d o x C hu rch w as a rig id ly stratified society in w hich everyone had an identifiable place. O n to this society has been grafted the C om m unist Party, w ith the result that today Russia is perhaps the m ost precisely organized country in the world. It is the steps in the party hierarchy w h ich really count in Russia, for these determine exactly the sort o f life a m an and his fam ily can expect. (Ihe base o f the Russian pyram id consists, as it alw ays has done, o f the general mass o f the people, but from them em erges d ie C om m unist Party, itself divided into tw o tiers, fu ll m em bers and candidate m em ­ bers. Elected from the party m em bers is the A ll U nion Congress, from which in turn is draw n the C entral C om m ittee. T h e Praesidium o f die Central Com m ittee, since 19 66 called the P olitburo, is the highest body in the party, the apex o f the pyram id being the First Secretary o f the Party. (On a person's position in the pyram id depends his style o f livin g. A minister w ill autom atically receive a three-room flat in M oscow , a a Shaika car and a dacha in the country. B ut if, in addition to being a minister, he is a mem ber o f the Politburo, he w ill receive a five-room fiat, a Zim car (w ith curtains) and tw o dachas, one in the country near M oscow and one b y the sea.) This same precision and sense o f hierarchy extends to the Soviet treatment o f foreign countries. T h e Russians grade countries, as th ey grade party members, because it is alien to their nature to do other­ wise. Broadly speaking, T hird W o rld countries m ay expect to find themselves in one o f three categories, and it is m ost im portant fo r them that they should be placed, during this phase, in the highest category possible, because it is alm ost im possible to m ove from one category to another. The top category - Nasser called it category A - carries w ith it a sort o f most-favoured nation status. O nce in it a country receives a great deal o f political support and econom ic aid, but this is no longer auto­ matic or unconditional, as it w as during the honeym oon. In the in­ ternational field, Soviet support can g o as far as threatening to intervene on the country’s behalf, whereas during the honeym oon phase the Soviets w ould have been prepared to back it to the brink. As far as aid goes, category A has m any advantages. In it a country w ill be sold arms at tw o-thirds cost price, w ith the b ill payable over

2 6 THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

20 years at 2.5 per cent interest, with a period o f grace before the interest payments begin. A ll transactions for a country in category A are carried out at the highest level. Even though requests are sent to M oscow through normal diplomatic channels the answer w ill come back from the top Kremlin leadership. In cultural exchanges, there w ill be visits from die top ranking stars o f the premier Bolshoi company, w ho in the 1950s were Galina Ulanova and M aya Plisetskaya. (Nasser was in category A from 1962 to 1965, and again after 1968.) A country in category B likewise receives reasonable aid from the Soviets. It w ill be sold arms at cost price, still carrying 2.5 per cent interest, but repayable over 12 years instead o f 20 and with no period o f grace before the first instalment falls due. Requests for aid initiated by the country w ill normally be dealt with through the machinery o f joint committees, and may very probably be slashed b y half. Subsequent negotiations may, w ith luck, get this raised to tw othirds o f the amount originally requested, but never more. The government o f a country in Category C w ill find that it is dealing entirely with the M oscow bureaucrats. Their decisions are irrevocable, so no amount o f pleading w ill make diem budge. In cultural relations the best that can be looked for is a third-class ballet from Baku. It is not unusual for a country, after the first shock o f Soviet dis­ appointment, to find itself consigned to category C . It then depends on what the leaders o f the country do, whether it ever struggles up again into category B, or even category A . But nobody should have illusions about the difficulty o f the task. It involves getting the whole machinery o f party, government and Kremlin leadership m oving again. A government may plead to be upgraded, but it w ill plead in vain until events take a hand and force the Soviets to reconsider. Perhaps a fourth category - category D - should be added. This is a stage o f cold form ality and scarcely concealed hostility. (After the row with Khruschev in 1959, when there were delays in the supply o f arms and other equipment that Egypt was expecting from the Soviet Union, I remember saying ‘W e seem to be in category D now.* This too was the category Egypt found itself in when the Soviets were excluded from Geneva after the October war o f 1973.)

NASSERS ADVICE

27

Now we come to w hat w ould have been the m ain part o f Nasser*s instruction manual - dos and don ts fo r T hird W o rld leaders about to negotiate with the Soviet U nion. T his was, he alw ays insisted, some­ thing not to be lightly undertaken, and careful attention to his advice might have spared them - perhaps m ight still spare them - m uch frus­ tration and disappointment. DOS 1. Ensure that you negotiate w ith them in a language that both sides understand, since bad translation can cause endless trouble. T h e Russians will insist on using their ow n interpreters w h o never adm it the p os­ sibility o f error. Their interpreters in the m ain languages, like English and French, are faultless, but those in less fam iliar languages, like Burmese, Swahili or A rabic, are to be avoided. (The Egyptians started with Arabic/Russian interpreters w h o had been taught locally in schools o f oriental studies and w ere terrible. Nasser’s first quarrel with Khruschev was largely caused b y a failure o f translation. So stick to English or French.) 2. Go to M oscow provided w ith a good stock o f anecdotes, jokes, proverbs and folk sayings. These can greatly help in sm oothing over difficult moments in the negotiating process. It is im portant to re­ member die differences betw een the leaderships in W est and East whereas those w ith w hom yo u negotiate in the W est usually com e from privileged classes, the Soviet leaders have all com e up through party cadres and most o f them have never been outside the Soviet U nion. A man like Brezhnev w ill spend a great deal o f tim e telling you jokes or proverbial stories or rem iniscing about the tim e w hen he was a political commissar in the arm y. Y o u must be able to cap jokes and stories w ith some o f your ow n. 3. Go w ell briefed on the history o f W orld W ar II and the fundam ental part in it played b y the Soviet U nion. It is im portant that yo u kn ow details - w hich general served in w hich com m and on w hich front, and so on. Y o u must resign you rself to hearing over and over again about the experiences o f yo u r interlocutors in the ’great patriotic w ar', which is far and aw ay the m ost m em orable period in the lives o f the present generation o f Soviet leadership.

4* Y ou w ill need a strong digestion and a strong head to survive all the toasts that are drunk b y the Russians, and not ju st at form al banquets.

26

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

20 years at 2.5 per cent interest, w ith a period o f grace before the interest payments begin. A ll transactions for a country in category A are carried out at the highest level. Even though requests are sent to M oscow through normal diplomatic channels the answer w ill com e back from the top Krem lin leadership. In cultural exchanges, there w ill be visits from die top ranking stars o f the premier Bolshoi com pany, w ho in the 1950s were Galina Ulanova and M aya Plisetskaya. (Nasser was in category A from 1962 to 1965, and again after 1968.) A country in category B likewise receives reasonable aid from die Soviets. It w ill be sold arms at cost price, still carrying 2.5 per cent interest, but repayable over 12 yean instead o f 20 and w ith no period o f grace before the fin t instalment falls due. Requests for aid initiated b y the country w ill norm ally be dealt w ith through the machinery o f jo in t committees, and m ay very probably be slashed b y half. Subsequent negotiations m ay, w ith luck, get this raised to tw othirds o f the amount originally requested, but never more. The governm ent o f a country in C ategory C w ill find that it is dealing entirely w ith the M oscow bureaucrats. Their decisions are irrevocable, so no amount o f pleading w ill make them budge. In cultural relations the best that can be looked for is a third-class ballet from Baku. It is not unusual for a country, after die first shock o f Soviet dis­ appointment, to find itself consigned to category C . It then depends on w hat the leaders o f the country do, whether it ever struggles up again into category B , or even category A . But nobody should have illusions about the difficulty o f the task. It involves getting the w hole machinery o f party, governm ent and Krem lin leadership m oving again. A governm ent m ay plead to be upgraded, but it w ill plead in vain until events take a hand and force the Soviets to reconsider. Perhaps a fourth category - category D - should be added. This is a stage o f cold form ality and scarcely concealed hostility. (After the row w ith Khruschev in 1959, when there were delays in the supply o f arms and other equipment that Egypt was expecting from the Soviet U nion, I remember saying ‘W e seem to be in category D now .' This too was the category Egypt found itself in when the Soviets were excluded from Geneva after the O ctober war o f 1973.)

nasser’ s advice

37

N o w w e com e to w hat w ould have been the main part o f Nasser's instruction manual - dos and don’ts for Third W orld leaders about to negotiate w ith the Soviet Union. This was, he always insisted, some­ thing not to be lightly undertaken, and careful attention to his advice m ight have spared them - perhaps m ight still spare them - m uch frus­ tration and disappointment. DOS i . Ensure that you negotiate w ith them in a language that both sides understand, since bad translation can cause endless trouble. The Russians w ill insist on using their ow n interpreters w ho never adm it the pos­ sibility o f error. Their interpreters in the main languages, like English and French, are faultless, but those in less fam iliar languages, like Burmese, Swahili or Arabic, are to be avoided. (The Egyptians started w ith Arabic/Russian interpreters w ho had been taught locally in schools o f oriental studies and w ere terrible. Nasser’s first quarrel w ith Khruschev was largely caused b y a failure o f translation. So stick to English or French.) 3. G o to M oscow provided w ith a good stock o f anecdotes, jokes, proverbs and folk sayings. These can greatly help in sm oothing over difficult moments in the negotiating process. It is im portant to re­ member the differences between the leaderships in W est and East whereas those w ith w hom you negotiate in the W est usually com e from privileged classes, the Soviet leaders have all com e up through party cadres and most o f them have never been outside the Soviet U nion. A man like Brezhnev w ill spend a great deal o f tim e telling you jokes or proverbial stories or reminiscing about the tim e when he was a political commissar in the arm y. Y o u must be able to cap jokes and stories w ith some o f your ow n. 3. G o w ell briefed on the history o f W orld W ar II and the fundamental part in it played b y the Soviet U nion. It is important that you know details - w hich general served in w hich command on w hich front, and so on. Y o u must resign yourself to hearing over and over again about the experiences o f your interlocutors in the ’great patriotic w ar’, w hich is far and aw ay the most memorable period in the lives o f the present generation o f Soviet leadership. 4. Y o u w ill need a strong digestion and a strong head to survive all the toasts that are drunk by the Russians, and not just at form al banquets.

28

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

I f you do not think you w ill be able to cope, make your position very dear from the start. T ell your hosts at the outset that you don’t drink, for reasons o f health or religion. 5. The leader o f your delegation must be in frill control o f its other members. During negotiations die w hole delegation w ill be under scrutiny from the Soviet leaders facing them, w ho w ill be trying to discover w ho tanks where in your hierarchy. In particular they w ill want to find out w ho is number tw o. (There was a tim e when they dedded that number tw o in Egypt was Field-Marshal Abdel Hakim Am er, Minister o f W ar, and they began referring to ‘Nasser and Am er’.) So it is important that the w hole delegation should speak w ith a united voice. 6. It is most important that you should get to recognize the different languages talked in the Soviet Union. W e tend to look on it as a monolithic government but there is always an interplay o f forces going on inside it in which you m ay find yourself unw ittingly caught up. Y ou w ill hear different things - or things put in different ways according to whether you talk with the leadership, w ith the m ilitary, or with the technocrats or bureaucrats. W hat really matters is what you hear from the leadership; i f you place too much reliance on what you hear from others you m ay be heading for disaster. (For example, when the Egyptian Minister o f W ar was leaving M oscow on the eve o f die 1967 war, his Soviet opposite number, Marshal Gretchko, w ho had come to see him off, said: ‘Stand up to them ! The moment they attack you, or i f the Americans make any m ove, you w ill find our troops on your side.’ O ur ambassador in M oscow later asked Gretchko i f he really meant what he had said. Gretchko said: 'It was just one for the road.’) W hat you hear from soldiers or technocrats or bureaucrats m ay be perfectly valid, but it m ay equally be the expression o f one opinion in a debate about policy which is still going on. It would be a grave mistake to build too much on it. Y et these people can be used at times as legitimate channels o f communication. It is not just in offices that business in the Soviet Union is conducted. Particularly at parties and receptions you may hear many significant indications o f the w ay things are m oving. Y ou may, for example, have been trying for some time without success to get wheat from the Russians; then someone at a reception says to your ambassador or to a member o f a visiting delegation: ‘Perhaps this is the moment when your leadership should

nasser' s ad vice

29

ask for wheat’ - here is probably a hint that should be taken. B u t where major policy or planning decisions are involved trust on ly what you are told b y die First Secretary o f the Party. 7. You must appreciate that there are some elements w ithin the Soviet leadership which have put their bets on you and w ill accordingly feel that their fate is to some extent bound up w ith yours. T h ey have a vested interest in your success, and so w ill speak up for you even inside the Politburo; i f you fail, you fail them too. So try to find out who your friends are, and w atch how they are treated. I f they show signs o f slipping it m ay be that you are slipping too. (For exam ple, many o f us who had been to M oscow watched w ith anxiety die decline and fill o f Alexandr Shelepin, w ith w hom w e had had m any fruitful dealings, from Deputy Prime Minister through a succession o f less and less important posts to Secretary o f the Association o f Professional Trade Unions. A signal o f his impending fall was given when some o f his proteges like Garim ov, the head ofT ass, and Vladim ir Semichastny, one o f the directors o f intelligence, began to fall out o f favour. W e discovered that it is sometimes from the fite o f these proteges that you can learn the relative standing o f the men at the top.) 8. The Soviet leadership, as has been seen, finds it essential to fix people firm ly in categories. O n the w hole they w ill refer in quite a friendly w ay to those they have got to know through negotiations, but they mistrust those w ho have been educated in America or w ho have had anything much to do w ith international institutions. (Thus they mistrust all those w ho have had anything much to do w ith the World Bank or the International M onetary Fund; in other words, they have mistrusted virtually all Egypt’s Ministers o f Finance and Economics. They have a tendency to over-sim plify - to label people as friends or enemies. Nasser once tackled them on this: *1 know you think Ali Sabri is your man, and Zakaria Mohieddin is Am erica's man,’ he said. ’But it’s not true. It so happens that I sent A li Sabri to deal with you and Zakaria Mohieddin to deal w ith the Americans. But they are both m y men.’) 9- I f you want something specific in the w ay o f aid from the Soviets, give diem plenty o f time. T hey don’t like being surprised by last minute demands. Everything has to be planned, and their planning processes are extremely rigid. So if, for example, you ask for a factory to be

30

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

set up, this w ill have to find a (dace in their next five-year plan, or, i f it is to be supplied sooner, somewhere in the Soviet Union w ill have to go without. 10. Remember that agriculture is the Soviets* Achilles heel. Y ou can ask them for arms, or for factories, but, unless you are in a real crisis, never ask for wheat. T hey w ill almost certainly be unable to provide it. This w ill make them feel apologetic and embarrassed. 11. Remember that the Soviets assess any political problem w ith their eyes on the United States. America is an obsession w ith them. The American element affects every decision, even those decisions which apparently have no connection w ith the United States. (Their evalua­ tion o f each American president colours their policy. Thus, they had an understanding o f a sort w ith N ixon; they looked back to Kennedy w ith a certain nostalgia; but Johnson really scared them. ‘The man would start any adventure,* Brezhnev told U Thant. ‘The world must beware o f him.*) 12. Remember that the Soviets think on a different time-scale from yours. Your problems are probably urgent; they see things in terms o f historical and revolutionary processes. W hen, for example, they were talking about the Arab-Israeli problem with the Arabs, they would often bring up the example o f die treaty o f Brest-Litovsk as an argument for compromise. Lenin, they would point out, was prepared to yield large tracts o f the motherland to the aggressor, and even to allow three new states to be carved out o f the Soviet Union, but he saw all this as a temporary sacrifice which could be w on back in due time. 13. Alw ays remember that the Soviets look on the prospect o f another war with horror. They w ill never fail to remind you that the Soviet Union lost tw enty m illion people in the Great Patriotic W ar, and w ill insist d u t only those w ho do not know what war means can contemplate with equanimity die thought o f a nuclear confrontation. 14. Y ou must realize that for all their pragmatism, the Soviet leader­ ship is made up o f Slav peasants, easily moved to laughter and tears. T hey are fascinated b y the attributes o f power. In the W est, a politician as a rule becomes gradually acquainted with the secrets o f govern­ ment and the realities o f power, but in the Soviet Union the g u lf

nassbr’s advice

31

between the Central Com m ittee and the Politburo is w ide indeed. When anyone crosses that g u lf the shock o f w hat he learns is enough to throw him o ff his balance. His new responsibilities fill him w ith awe. D O N ’T S 1. The Soviets w ill not permit any discussion o f their errors or short­ comings, past or present. Even Stalin is not permissible as a target. Brezhnev has said: T can criticize Stalin, but you cannot.’ In a w ay, criticism raises doubts about die legitim acy o f the revolution and the whole Soviet experiment. 2. If you must quarrel w ith the Soviets, see that your quarrel does not last longer than a year, or 18 months at die outside. W hen differences arise between the Soviet leaders and die leader o f a country w hich has enjoyed category A status, they are, to begin w ith, anxious to play these differences down as far as possible. T hey naturally hope that the quarrel w ill be resolved, and do not want to expose themselves to criticism on the ground that their judgem ent has been at fault. But i f the quarrel persists, and they com e to the conclusion that there is nothing to be looked for from the leader w ith whom they are dealing, they w ill eventually give the signal that he is to be regarded as an enemy. This signal w ill be passed dow n through every level o f the Soviet hierarchy, from the Central Com m ittee to the party rank and file, and once this has happened the process o f rehabilitation w ill have been rendered almost impossible. 3. It is absolutely taboo to equate them w ith the US as a superpower. (‘I must warn you again,’ Brezhnev said to me, ’not to write about “the two superpowers’’. H ow can you equate us w ith the Americans?’) Anyone who does this w ill be accused o f falling victim to Chinese propaganda. 4. On no account try to defend China. China has become an even bigger phobia than Am erica for the Soviets. They w ill insist that China is a backward country and demand to know what China has done to help you econom ically, m ilitarily or in any other w ay. J. Don’t take offence at w hat may seem to be their interference in your internal affairs. They are free w ith advice and warnings - that a coup in your country is likely, that such and such o f your fellow countrymen are reactionary and not to be trusted, and so on. (There

28

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

I f you do not think you w ill be able to cope, make your position very dear from die start. T ell your hosts at die outset that you don’t drink, for reasons o f health or religion. j . T he leader o f your delegation must be in full control o f Its other members. D uring negotiations the w hole delegation w ill be under scrutiny from the Soviet leaders facing them, w ho w ill be trying to discover w ho ranks where in your hierarchy. In particular they w ill w ant to find out w ho is number tw o. (There was a tim e when they decided that number tw o in Egypt was Field-Marshal Abdel Hakim Am er, M inister o f W ar, and they began referring to ‘Nasser and Am er’ .) So it is important that the w hole delegation should speak w ith a united voice. 6. It is most important that you should get to recognize die different languages talked in the Soviet U nion. W e tend to look on it as a m onolithic governm ent but there is always an interplay o f forces going on inside it in w hich you m ay find yourself unw ittingly caught up. Y o u w ill hear different things - or things put in different w ays according to whether you talk w ith the leadership, w ith the m ilitary, or w ith the technocrats or bureaucrats. W hat really matters is what you hear from the leadership; i f you place too much reliance on w hat you hear from others you m ay be heading for disaster. (For example, when the Egyptian M inister o f W ar was leaving M oscow on the eve o f the 1967 war, his Soviet opposite number, Marshal Gretchko, w ho had com e to see him off, said: 'Stand up to them ! The moment they attack you, or i f the Americans make any m ove, you w ill find our troops on your side.’ O ur ambassador in M oscow later asked Gretchko i f he really meant w hat he had said. Gretchko said: 'It was just one for the road.’) W hat you hear from soldiers or technocrats or bureaucrats m ay be perfectly valid, but it m ay equally be the expression o f one opinion in a debate about policy w hich is still going on. It w ould be a grave mistake to build too much on it. Y et these people can be used at times as legitim ate channels o f communication. It is not just in offices that business in the Soviet U nion is conducted. Particularly at parties and receptions you m ay hear m any significant indications o f the w ay things are m oving. Y ou m ay, for example, have been trying for some tim e without success to get wheat from the Russians; then someone at a reception says to your ambassador or to a member o f a visiting delegation: ‘Perhaps this is the moment when your leadership should

NASSDt’s ADVICB

2Q

ask for wheat* - here is probably a hint that should be taken. B u t where m ajor p olicy or planning decisions are involved trust on ly w hat yo u are told b y the First Secretary o f the Party. 7. Y o u must appreciate that there are some elements w ithin d ie Soviet leadership w hich have put their bets on yo u and w ill accordingly feel that their fate is to some extent bound up w ith yours. T h ey have a vested interest in your success, and so w ill speak up fo r yo u even inside the Politburo; i f yo u fail, yo u fail diem too. So try to find out w ho your friends are, and w atch h ow they are treated. I f they show signs o f slipping it m ay be that yo u are slipping too. (For exam ple, m any o f us w h o had been to M oscow watched w ith anxiety die decline and fall o f Alexandr Shelepin, w ith w hom w e had had m any fruitful dealings, from D eputy Prim e M inister through a succession o f less and less im portant posts to Secretary o f the Association o f Professional Trade Unions. A signal o f his im pending fall was given w hen som e o f his proteges like Garim ov, the h ead o f Tass,and Vladim ir Semichastny, one o f the directors o f intelligence, began to fall out o f favour. W e discovered that it is sometimes from the fate o f these proteges that you can learn the relative standing o f the m en at d ie top.) 8. T h e Soviet leadership, as has been seen, finds it essential to fix people firm ly in categories. O n the w hole they w ill refer in quite a friendly w ay to those they have go t to kn ow through negotiations, but they mistrust those w ho have been educated in Am erica or w ho have had anything m uch to do w ith international institutions. (Thus they mistrust all those w ho have had anything m uch to do w ith the W orld Bank or the International M onetary Fund; in other w ords, they have mistrusted virtually all E gypt’s M inisters o f Finance and Econom ics. T h ey have a tendency to over-sim plify - to label people as friends or enemies. Nasser once tackled them on this: T kn ow yo u think A li Sabri is your man, and Zakaria M ohieddin is Am erica’s man,’ he said. ’B ut it’s not true. It so happens that I sent A li Sabri to deal w ith you and Zakaria M ohieddin to deal w ith the Americans. B ut they are both m y men.*) 9. I f yo u w ant som ething specific in the w ay o f aid from the Soviets, give them plenty o f tim e. T h ey don’t like being surprised b y last minute demands. Everything has to be planned, and their planning processes are extrem ely rigid. So if, for exam ple, you ask for a factory to he

30

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

set up, this w ill have to find a place in their next five-year plan, or, i f it is to be supplied sooner, somewhere in the Soviet U nion w ill have to g o without. io . Remember that agriculture is the Soviets* Achilles heel. Y o u can ask them for arms, or for factories, but, unless you are in a real crisis, never ask for wheat. T h ey w ill almost certainly be unable to provide it. This w ill make them feel apologetic and embarrassed. n . Remember that die Soviets assess any political problem w ith their eyes on the United States. Am erica is an obsession w ith them. The Am erican element affects every decision, even those decisions which apparendy have no connection w ith the United States. (Their evalua­ tion o f each American president colours their policy. Thus, they had an understanding o f a sort w ith N ixon; they looked back to Kennedy w ith a certain nostalgia; but Johnson really scared them. ‘T he man w ould start any adventure,* Brezhnev told U Thant. ‘The w orld must beware o f him .’) 12. Remember that the Soviets think on a different time-scale from yours. Y ou r problems are probably urgent; they see things in terms o f historical and revolutionary processes. W hen, for example, they were talking about the Arab-Isracli problem w ith the Arabs, they w ould often bring up the example o f die treaty o f Brest-Litovsk as an argument for compromise. Lenin, they w ould point out, was prepared to yield large tracts o f the motherland to the aggressor, and even to allow three new states to be carved out o f die Soviet U nion, but he saw all this as a tem porary sacrifice which could be w on back in due tim e. 13. A lw ays remember that the Soviets look on the prospect o f another w ar w ith horror. T hey w ill never fail to remind you that the Soviet U nion lost tw enty m illion people in the Great Patriotic W ar, and w ill insist that only those w ho do not know w hat w ar means can contemplate w ith equanim ity the thought o f a nuclear confrontation. 14. Y o u must realize that for all their pragmatism, the Soviet leader­ ship is made up o f Slav peasants, easily m oved to laughter and tears. T hey are fascinated b y the attributes o f power. In the W est, a politician as a rule becomes gradually acquainted w ith the secrets o f govern­ ment and the realities o f power, but in the Soviet Union the g u lf

nasser’s advice

31

between the Central Com m ittee and the Politburo is w ide indeed. W hen anyone crosses that g u lf the shock o f w hat he learns is enough to throw him o ff his balance. His new responsibilities fill him w ith aw e. D O N ’T S 1. T he Soviets w ill not perm it any discussion o f their errors or short­ com ings, past or present. Even Stalin is not permissible as a target. Brezhnev has said: T can criticize Stalin, but you cannot.' In a w ay, criticism raises doubts about the legitim acy o f the revolution and the w hole Soviet experim ent. 2. I f you must quarrel w ith the Soviets, see that your q u an d does not last longer than a year, or 18 months at the outside. W hen differences arise between the Soviet leaders and the leader o f a country w hich has enjoyed category A status, they axe, to begin w ith, anxious to play these differences dow n as far as possible. T hey naturally hope that the q u a n d w ill be resolved, and do not w ant to expose themselves to criticism on the ground that their judgem ent has been at fault. B ut i f the quarrel persists, and they com e to the conclusion that there is nothing to be looked for from the leader w ith w hom they are dealing, they w ill eventually give the signal that he is to be regarded as an enem y. This signal w ill be passed dow n through every level o f the Soviet hierarchy, from the Central Com m ittee to the party rank and file, and once this has happened the process o f rehabilitation w ill have been rendered almost impossible. 3. It is absolutdy taboo to equate them w ith the U S as a superpower. (‘I must warn you again,' Brezhnev said to me, 'not to w rite about "the tw o superpowers". H ow can you equate us w ith the Americans?’) Anyone w ho does this w ill be accused o f falling victim to Chinese propaganda. 4. O n no account try to defend China. China has becom e an even bigger phobia than Am erica for the Soviets. T h ey w ill insist that China is a backward country and demand to know w hat China has done to help you econom ically, m ilitarily or in any other w ay. 5. D on’t take offence at w hat m ay seem to be their interference in your internal affairs. T hey are free w ith advice and warnings - that a coup in your country is likely, that such and such o f your fellow countrym en are reactionary and not to be trusted, and so on. (There

32

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

was one occasion when Podgom y asked Nasser to sack me from m y jo b as editor o f A i Ahram, but neither o f us held this against him.)

6.

Remember that the Soviets are highly sensitive about the publication o f any information concerning themselves. T hey w ill not tolerate any violation o f the secrecy w ith which they insist on surrounding all their transactions. T hey are always shocked when reports o f negotiations injwhich they have been taking part come back to them via a third party. (For example, they were furious w ith the Egyptians when they found that they had disclosed to the Syrian leadership the special discount which Egypt had been allowed on its arms purchases. The publication o f news for the sake o f news strikes then as pointless and irresponsible. Brezhnev once asked me w hy I had reported something in A l Ahram. I told him ‘It’s for m y readers.’ ‘They don't need to know all that/ he said. The Soviet point o f view is that what appears in Pravda is enough. The purpose o f the media is to act as propaganda for com­ munism and the revolution. N orm ally when Brezhnev spoke to me he would address me as ‘Gospodin HeikaT, but when he wanted to be particularly friendly he would call me ‘Gospodin Propaganda.* This would make me tear m y hair, but he meant it as a compliment.) 7. Don’t underestimate the Soviet leadership’s sensitivities about die status o f local communist parties. T hey themselves w ill not deal directly with local parties but they are upset i f these are the object o f attack. They w ill never complain officially about the treatment to which your communists m ay be subjected, though they m ay say something at a party, like ‘W hy are you treating your communists in this way?* 8. Be careful in your choice o f gifts. N ever offer them jewels. Cultural objects - antiquities - are best. (W hen Nasser gave Khruschev a vase from the Sakkara excavations, and told him it was 5,000 years old, Khruschev took it to a meeting o f the Supreme Soviet and put it on the table in front o f him.) ★

★

*

That was an outline o f Nasser’s manual. It represented his carefully thought out attempt to provide a basis for reaching understanding w ith one o f die tw o superpowers on whose decisions the fate o f the smaller countries o f the w orld must depend. It has, o f course, to be

nasser’ s advicb

33

remembered that the only tim e Nasser and I discussed the manual was in 1964, and Nasser lived for six years after that. Had he been able at some later stage to turn his attention to the manual again he m ight well have wished to make additions or alterations. But, rather than try to guess what these changes w ould have been, I have thought it best to present the manual as it emerges from the notes w hich I made after our discussion in 1964. Whether any similar manual for the guidance o f those w ho have to deal with die Arabs has been produced b y the Soviets w e do not know . But we know that they did try w ith almost desperate earnestness to understand the Arabs. T hey failed. The Arabs failed. Instead o f the 'historic compromise* w hich is sometimes referred to as a solvent between the points o f view o f nations w e saw a 'historic misunder­ standing.* At the time when the hypothetical Politburo m eeting referred to earlier in this chapter took place its members m ay have had before them the report o f an incident w hich must have seemed to them to sum up the depths which this misunderstanding had now plumbed. One day early in the summer o f 1977 President Sadat summoned the ambassador o f South Yem en. He explained to him that there was an island o ff the coast o f South Yem en on w hich he wished to place a contingent o f Egyptian forces for the com m on defence o f the Arab world. The ambassador reported this request back to Aden and in due course received a reply from President Salim Robaya A li, to the effect that it was impossible to give Egypt the facilities asked for because there were already Soviet experts on the island. 'Y o u r reply*, said President Sadat, 'has made m y mission easier. T ell your President it’s not the island itself that interests me. It’s the experts. I want to see Soviet experts out.’ W hen this was reported Aden naturally wanted to know w hy. President Sadat explained. He wanted, he said, to be able to go to Geneva, for the projected M iddle East conference, knowing that the Red Sea was free o f any Russian presence. He was sure that die Israelis w ould claim they had to hang on to Sharm elSheikh on the grounds that this was an essential counter to the Russian presence at the other end o f the Red Sea, round Bab el-Mandeb. 'I want to deprive die Israelis o f this argument,* said Sadat. When the Soviets heard o f this exchange they must have seen it not so much as part o f the Egyptian government’s preparation for en international conference but sim ply as one more step in a campaign

34

THE sphinx and the commissar

to drive the Soviet U nion out o f the Arab w orld lock, stock and barrel. A nd once out o f the Arab w orld, w h y should they not be driven from A frica and the Indian Ocean? W hat, they must have asked themselves, is the purpose o f it all? W h o engineered it? H ow did it com e about that they were being hounded into an ignominious retreat? The answers to these questions are m ore com plex than the guidelines Nasser laid dow n about the Russians or any guidelines the Russians m ay have drawn up about the Arabs. T he w hole story o f this strange friendship, this uncomprehending alliance, has to be told i f w e are to see how and w h y 1955 led to 1977. The story covers only a little over tw enty years - no more than a flicker o f tim e in the immense history o f the M iddle East. Even in the narrower context o f SovietArab relations it represents only one chapter in what is bound to be a long book. But the chapter w ill have a profound effect on those that com e after.

2

The First Red Waves

B efore 1917 Russia’s drive for a warm water outlet in the south took

two main directions - through Turkey and the Straits to the M edi­ terranean, and through Iran to the Indian Ocean. In all this period the Arab world was treated sim ply as part o f the Ottom an Empire. There was, however, one small incident which foreshadowed what was to come, and which is often forgotten. In 1768 the M am luk ruler, A li Bey el-Kebir, proclaimed the independence o f Egypt. The Porte ordered the navy to Alexandria, but A li B ey had some contact w ith the Russians and they sent him a supply o f arms and ammunition as well as provisions. This was Egypt’s first arms deal w ith Russia. Alter 1917 Russia continued to be interested in the M iddle East, but now the approach was two-pronged ; to the same territorial calculations which had dictated policy under the Tsars was added the concern o f Russia as the homeland o f w orld revolution. Sometimes over the past sixty years the interests o f state and revolution have coincided, but sometimes also they have been in conflict. From the point o f view o f Russia as a state the first considerations must be that o f geography - o f proxim ity. W henever Brezhnev or any o f the other Soviet leaders talks about the ‘legitim ate interests’ o f the Soviet Union in the M iddle East he always begins by mentioning the word ‘proximity’ . Second, there are the natural resources o f the area, principally o f course oil, and the sea routes (though the Soviets do not openly talk much about the latter). Third, there has been the presence o f colonial - or what Soviet leaders would call neo-colonial - forces in the area. Fourth, there is the consciousness o f Russia’s ow n Islamic minorities and their links w ith other Moslems. The Russians know that when the Americans were toying w ith the idea o f an Islamic Pact one o f the considerations they had in mind was the influence that such a pact might be expected to exert on Moslems in the Soviet U nion. Revolutionary Russia naturally took notice o f what was going on south o f its borders. In 1918 the Union for the Liberation o f the Orient was formed. B y 1919, w ith the ending o f the war in Europe and the 35

36

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

M iddle East, Egypt and India were in ferment, and their struggle for independence attracted the attention o f Lenin. The Baku Congress o f the Peoples o f the East met in September 1920, under the presidency o f Grigori Zinoviev, and was attended by, among other, 235 Turks, 192 'Persians and Parsees’, 157 Armenians, eight Kurds, and three Arabs. Zinoviev called for 'a holy war against English imperialism*, and dele­ gates debated how the revolutionary situation in Egypt could be transformed into a general trend, so that the peoples in Africa and Asia under colonial rule could fulfil the role Lenin and Trotsky had laid dow n for them - to become, w ith Soviet Russia and the proletariat o f the industrialized world, one o f the three pillars o f w orld revolution. This friendly attention from one o f the great powers was naturally very welcom e, particularly since the Arabs had been favourably im­ pressed by the Bolsheviks* action in releasing to the w orld the text o f the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which they had found in the imperial archives and which gave the first public indication o f h ow Britain and France were planning to divide up the Arab w orld between themselves. The active support which revolutionary Russia gave to Atatürk was also seen b y most Arabs as very much to its credit, for, though he shocked conservatives when he abolished the Caliphate, the masses found Atatürk a nationalist liberator after their ow n heart. There is a legend among communist parties in the Arab w orld that Lenin sent a telegram to Saad Zaghlul, the leader o f the W afd Party which spearheaded the agitation for independence, expressing support for the Egyptian revolution and offering to aid the Egyptian people in their struggle in every w ay, including the supply o f arms. After the Egyptian Communist Party quarrelled w ith Zaghlul in 1924 its mem­ bers claimed in their leaflets to have seen this telegram, which had, they said, been sent from M oscow and confiscated b y the British censors. But there has never been any proof that such a telegram existed. W hat is certain is that in M ardi 1919 the First Congress o f the Com intern referred to the ‘open risings and revolutionary unrest in all colonies*, and ended w ith a call to ‘the colonial slaves o f Africa and Asia’ pro­ mising them that 'the hour o f the proletarian dictatorship in Europe w ill strike for you as the hour o f your deliverance*. Lenin did make a statement about the necessity for India and Egypt to achieve their independence, and Mohammed Farid, successor to Mustafa Kam il as leader o f the Egyptian Nationalist Party, w ho was then in exile in Switzerland, sent him a telegram o f thanks.

THE FIRST RED WAVES

37

When Lenin contemplated the M iddle East he was, as M ikoyan was to explain to Ben Bella m any years later, much affected b y w hat he had read about Islam while he was in London. O n numerous occasions he expressed the opinion that Islam was capable o f being a progressive religion: it had once created a social revolution and still influenced the daily lives o f its adherents. He looked on Islam and Buddhism as religions o f the oppressed, and Christianity as the religion o f the oppressor. T-min also showed a much more practical understanding o f the needs and potentialities o f oriental countries. T w o remarks o f his at die Second Congress o f the Com intern illustrate his common-sense approach. First, he rejected the thesis o f those w ho argued that, be­ cause underdeveloped countries had no proletariat the best thing for diem would be to remain under imperialist domination, w hich w ould speed up their industrialization and hasten the day when they possessed a deprived and disaffected proletariat. Lenin argued that backward countries might, i f supported by the 'victorious revolutionary prole­ tariat' elsewhere, be able to 'm ake the transition to the Soviet order, and thence through defined stages to communism, avoiding the capi­ talist stage o f development*. Secondly, he expressed the opinion that revolutions in the East would almost certainly exhibit special character­ istics o f their own, and it was up to revolutionaries in die W est to be on die lookout for these and to recognize them when they appeared. ★

★

★

hi 1919 a distant observer o f the Egyptian scene, even one so acute as Lenin, might be excused for thinking that the Egyptian people were poised to follow the revolutionary path marked out by the Russian people, but anyone closer to the scene w ould have been bound to make a different assessment. T o explain w h y this should be so it is necessary to take a quick look at the social and intellectual forces that had been at work in Egypt and the Arab w orld. In the first h a lf o f the nineteenth century almost all the Arabs stagnated under the Ottom an rule; only in Egypt and Lebanon were there any stirrings. Some members o f the large Christian com m unity in Lebanon, reacting against Ottom an domination, began to cherish the dream o f a secular state w hich would give them a measure o f equality. A few o f the more enterprising spirits migrated to the freer

38

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

atmosphere o f Egypt, where they took a prominent part in the intellec­ tual life o f the country, virtually creating the Egyptian press. The opening o f Egypt to the ideas and inventions o f western Europe is usually, and w ith much justice, attributed to Napoleon and the savants he brought w ith him when his arm y invaded the country in 1798. But shortly before Napoleon’s arrival there had occurred the incident which many Egyptians regard as their Magna Carta, when the ulamas and merchants o f Cairo compelled the tw o ruling Mamluks, Murad B ey and Ibrahim B ey, to issue a declaration on human rights, taxation, consultation w ith the people, etc. After Napoleon came Mohammed A li, w ho was determined to build up an arm y to secure his independence against his nominal suzerain, the Sultan o f Turkey. W ith this in view he sent, during the 1820s and 1830s, hundreds o f young men to France to study a wide range o f civil and m ilitary subjects, including shipbuilding, arms manufacture, engineering, irrigation, textiles and so on. W ith them went, as imam to look after their spiritual welfare, Rifaa Tahtawi. O n his return to Egypt in 1831 Tahtawi, through his direction o f the Cairo School o f Languages and his translation o f French classics, including works b y Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu, introduced a generation o f young Egyptians to new and exciting ideas. But the W est was to become more directly involved in Egypt. The magnificences and extravagances o f Mohammed A li’s grandson, the Khedive Ismail, led to the intervention o f European powers, at first financially, but in 1882 m ilitarily, and by Britain alone. B y the end o f the nineteenth century the impact o f the W est on the traditional fabric o f Egyptian society had given rise to a wide variety o f schools o f thought. Four main trends can be identified, their influence being by no means confined to Egypt and Egyptians, but spreading through most o f the Arab and Islamic worlds. First there were the conservatives, whose attitude towards new ideas was to say that every­ thing was in fact already there in traditional Islam. Secondly, there were the reformists, like Jamal el-Din el-Afghani (who, in spite o f his name was probably bom in Persia) and Mohammed Abduh, w ho believed that Islam must reform itself i f its influence was to survive. Thirdly there were those, like Ahmed Lutfi cl-Sayyid and Taha Hussein, w ho thought that a compromise between Islamic tradition and European political and educational ideas was possible. Finally there were the secularists, like Shibly Shumail, a Lebanese, w ho argued

THE FIRST RED WAVES

39

that die old must be sw ept aw ay before the n ew rational and scientific society could be built. It was this group w hich prepared the ground in w hich the seeds o f Marxist thought w ere later to be sow n. A t the end o f W o rld W a r I, which with its legacy o f shortages, inflation and conscripted labour had caused considerable unrest, a group calling itself a socialist party came into existence in the port o f A lexandria, largely through the efforts o f a Jewish jew eller, Joseph Rosenthal. T he aims and allegiance o f the party were at first far from clear, but Rosenthal w as in touch with an English Jew , V icto r Stein, w h o was serving in the arm y o f occupation and was a devout com m unist. Stein helped to push the party in the direction o f the T hird International, and 1921 saw the creation in Alexandria o f an Egyptian Com m unist Party, w ith a central committee com posed o f Rosenthal, Husni el-O rabi, a lon ely intellectual, and A nton M aroun, a law yer, resident in E gypt but o f Lebanese origin. A year later O rabi subm itted the party's application for membership o f the Com intern, and this was granted. It w as at about the same tim e (1921) that the first com m unist cell was form ed in Beirut under the leadership o f tw o Arm enians, A rtin M adoyan and Hikazan Boyaegian, and given the code name o f Spartacus. One o f the great weaknesses o f these early stages o f the com m unist movement everyw here in the A rab w orld was the prom inent role played in it by foreigners and members o f the m inorities, especially Jews. In Egypt this was to a large extent explained b y the capitulations w hich, until their abolition in 1937, gave anyone w ith a foreign passport (and many Egyptian Jews had these) special privileges. Thus, their houses were immune from search b y the police except w ith the permission o f their consul, and they could only be tried in the special m ixed courts on which foreign judges sat. These foreign communists tended to stick together, w ith the result that there w ere to be found in E gypt separate cells o f Greek com ­ munists, Armenian communists, Italian communists and so on. Each cell looked abroad to fellow communists o f its ow n nationality and tended to im port from them advice and literature. N aturally enough, this encouraged the fragm entation o f the com m unist m ovem ent. Another weakness, shared b y both socialist and com m unist parties, was that they had no audience. There was practically no industrial proletariat, and the intelligentsia w ere, on the w hole, loyal to the wealthier fro m w hich they w ere drawn. T he most these activists

40

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

could do was produce a few clandestine newspapers or try to achieve some lim ited contact w ith the workers. Newspapers have always been o f great importance in the Arab w orld, where the w ritten w ord has, b y tradition, becom e an almost sacred sym bol, Arabic being the orig­ inal language o f the H oly Koran. Newspapers acted as a legal facade for an illegal political organization, or as a substitute for such an organ­ ization, or as a recruiting agent, or as a main channnel for the organ­ ization’s activities. Both the Egyptian and the British authorities w ere w ell aware o f the activities o f the socialists and communists and refused to give them licences. T h ey tried to get round this ban b y buying out people w ho had a licence to print a paper, but the authorities shut each paper dow n as it came out. For exam ple, an item in AlAhram o fju ly 7, 1922 reports that the Egyptian Socialist Party has applied for licence to produce a paper and that the request has been refused b y the m inistry o f the Interior. Later the party acquired the licence o f an obscure w eekly magazine and produced it w ith a hammer and sickle on the masthead and an article about Lenin inside. T he magazine was prom ptly closed dow n. W hen both socialist and communist parties w ere w ithout newspaper outlets they turned to printing leaflets in the form o f open letters - to the workers o f Egypt, to Zaghlul, to intellectuals and so on - w hich they sold for one piastre, then w orth little more than one penny. T o begin w ith the Egyptian Com m unist Party gave broad support to Zaghlul and the nationalist m ovem ent. Stalin w rote in 1924: ‘The struggle o f the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intelligentsia for the independence o f Egypt is an objectively revolutionary struggle in spite o f the bourgeois origin and bourgeois status o f die leaders o f the Egyptian national m ovem ent, in spite o f the fact that they are against socialism.' H ow ever, in the same year Zaghlul, w ho was b y then Prime Minister, cracked dow n on the Egyptian Com m unist Party follow ing a workers' strike in Alexandria. He m ay have been influenced in this b y the Palace or the British, but his ow n convictions were strongly anti­ communist. The party was dissolved, its entire Central Com m ittee was brought to court, and, in O ctober 1924, sentenced to terms o f imprisonment. A policy o f suppression was continued b y die Ahm ed Z i w ar govern^ ment, form ed after the assassinarion o f the Sirdar (the British general com m anding the Egyptian army) and the resignadon o f Zaghlul in N ovem ber 1924, follow ing a British ultimatum. T he new govern­ ment even tried to prevent all Soviet ships from entering Egyptian

THE FIRST RED WAVES

41

ports, ideas being considered as contagious as disease. W h en a Soviet ship, the Shiskrin, arrived in Alexandria in June 1925, guards w ere placed on board and neither cargo nor passengers w ere allow ed to be landed. (The authorities later relented in respect o f the cargo, but not for the passengen.) N o com m unist books w ere allow ed to be sold in Egypt, and L'Humanité, w hich had been com ing in since 1919, w as banned. So the Com m unist Party w as forced underground. T h e day o f die sentencing o f the Central Com m ittee saw the appointm ent o f a n ew Central Com m ittee, w ith a Lebanese as First Secretary. Although Zaghlul was the man w ho had crushed them , the Egyptian communists felt they had no choice but to back him w hen he m oved into opposition again. T h ey tried to convince the W afd leadership o f die need to create a new political party aim ed specifically at the w ork­ ing classes; they argued in the leaflets w hich th ey printed around this time that the 1919 Egyptian revolution had been made possible b y the participation in it o f the w orkers and peasants but that control o f it had been stolen b y the bourgeoisie. T h e com m unists tried, too, w ith limited success, to infiltrate W afdist newspapers. M eanw hile a debate went on inside the miniscule party on tw o m ain topics : is the bour­ geoisie really capable o f confronting colonialism ; and is it better for the Party to try to w ork legally or underground? W hile this debate w as going on a Syrian-Lebanese Com m unist Party was formed in Beirut, headed b y Y u sef Yazbak and Fuad Sham ali, who had been influenced b y w hat th ey saw o f the French tobacco workers in Bakfrya, am ong w hom w ere some party members w ho spread the doctrine. T h e form ation o f the party was attended b y a representative o f the Com intern, Joseph Berger, and a sub-com m ittee was set up in Damascus headed b y a man called Shatila. A year later, on May i, 1925, a cerem ony took place in the Cinem a C rystal in Beirut at which the creation o f the party was form ally anounced as w ell as the intention to start a newspaper in French to be called L’Humanité. There was a call for unity and the tw o originators o f the Spartacus cell, Madoyan and Boyaegian, w ere included in the new Central Com m ittee o f the party, together w ith Yazbak and Shamali. Significantly there was also a delegate from Palestine on the Central Com m ittee, intended to demonstrate that, in spite o f the post-w ar carve-up b y the imperialist powers, Palestine was still regarded as an integral part o f Syria. This was a man called Jacob Tepper, belonging to a cell com posed entirely o f Jewish immigrants from Russia. He was given the code name A bu 7 -a»«n

40

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

could do was produce a fe w clandestine newspapers or try to achieve some lim ited contact w ith the w orkers. Newspapers have alw ays been o f great im portance in the A rab w orld, where the w ritten w ord has, b y tradition, becom e an almost sacred sym bol, A rabic being the orig­ inal language o f the H oly Koran. Newspapers acted as a legal facade for an illegal political organization, or as a substitute fo r such an organ­ ization, or as a recruiting agent, or as a main channnel for the organ­ ization’s activities. B oth the Egyptian and the British authorities w ere w ell aware o f the activities o f the socialists and communists and refused to give them licences. T h ey tried to get round this ban b y buying out people w h o had a licence to print a paper, but the authorities shut each paper dow n as it came out. For exam ple, an item in A l Ahratn o f July 7, 1922 reports that the Egyptian Socialist Party has applied for licence to produce a paper and that the request has been refused b y the m inistry o f the Interior. Later the party acquired the licence o f an obscure w eekly m agazine and produced it w ith a hammer and sickle on the masthead and an article about Lenin inside. T he m agazine was prom ptly closed dow n. W hen both socialist and com m unist parties w ere w ithout newspaper outlets they turned to printing leaflets in the form o f open letters - to the w orkers o f E gypt, to Zaghlul, to intellectuals and so on - w hich th ey sold for one piastre, then w orth little m ore than one penny. T o begin w ith the Egyptian Com m unist Party gave broad support to Z aghlul and the nationalist m ovem ent. Stalin w rote in 1924: ’T he struggle o f the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intelligentsia for the independence o f E gypt is an objectively revolutionary struggle in spite o f the bourgeois origin and bourgeois status o f d ie leaders o f the Egyptian national m ovem ent, in spite o f the fact that they are against socialism.* H ow ever, in the same year Zaghlul, w h o was b y then Prim e M inister, cracked dow n on the Egyptian Com m unist Party follow in g a w orkers’ strike in Alexandria. H e m ay have been influenced in this b y the Palace or the British, but his ow n convictions w ere strongly anti­ com m unist. T he party was dissolved, its entire Central Com m ittee w as brought to court, and, in O ctober 1924, sentenced to terms o f imprisonment. A policy o f suppression was continued b y the Ahm ed Z i w ar govern­ m ent, form ed after the assassination o f the Sirdar (the British general com m anding the Egyptian arm y) and the resignation o f Zaghlul in N ovem ber 1924, follow in g a British ultim atum . T he new govern­ m ent even tried to prevent all Soviet ships from entering Egyptian

THB FIRST KBD WAVES

41

ports» ideas being considered as contagious as disease. W hen a Soviet ship, the Shishritt, arrived in Alexandria in June 1925, guards w ere placed on board and neither cargo nor passengen w ere allow ed to be landed. (The authorities later relented in respect o f the cargo, but not for the passengen.) N o com m unist books w ere allow ed to be sold in E gypt, and L’Humanité, w hich had been com ing in since 1919, w as banned. So the Com m unist Party was forced underground. T he day o f the sentencing o f the Central Com m ittee saw d ie appointm ent o fa n ew Central Com m ittee, w ith a Lebanese as First Secretary. A lthough Zaghlul was the man w ho had crushed them , the Egyptian communists felt th ey had no choice but to back him w hen he m oved into opposition again. T h ey tried to convince the W afd leadership o f the need to create a new political party aimed specifically at the w ork­ ing classes; d iey argued in the leaflets w hich they printed around this tim e that the 1919 Egyptian revolution had been made possible b y the participation in it o f the w orkers and peasants but that control o f it had been stolen b y the bourgeoisie. T he communists tried, too, w ith lim ited success, to infiltrate W afdist newspapers. M eanwhile a debate w ent on inside the m iniscule party on tw o main topics: is the bour­ geoisie really capable o f confronting colonialism ; and is it better for the Party to try to w ork legally or underground? W h ile this debate w as going on a Syrian-Lebanese Com m unist Party was form ed in Beirut, headed b y Y u sef Yazbak and Fuad Sham* ali, w ho had been influenced b y w hat th ey saw o f the French tobacco workers in Bakfaya, am ong w hom w ere some party members w ho spread the doctrine. T he form ation o f the party was attended b y a representative o f the Com intern, Joseph Berger, and a sub-com m ittee was set up in Damascus headed b y a man called Shatila. A year later, on M ay i , 1925, a cerem ony took place in the Cinem a Crystal in Beirut at w hich the creation o f the party was form ally anounced as w ell as the intention to start a newspaper in French to be called V Humanité. There was a call for unity and the tw o originators o f the Spartacus cell, M adoyan and Boyaegian, w ere included in the new Central Com m ittee o f the party, together w ith Yazbak and Shamali. Significantly there w as also a delegate from Palestine on the Central Com m ittee, intended to demonstrate that, in spite o f the post-w ar carve-up b y the imperialist powers, Palestine was still regarded as an integral part o f Syria. This was a man called Jacob Tepper, belonging to a cell com posed entirely o f Jewish im migrants from Russia. H e was given the code name A bu Zaim .

42

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

The Iraqi Com m unist Party was also form ed in 1925, headed b y four Jews - Y u sef Salman, Sadiq Yehuda, Sassoon Dallai and Yacoub Cojm an. There was a communist party in Algeria, but it was entirely French. In fact, when a recommendation came from the Com intern that an approach should be made to the M oslem masses, the answer o f the party leaden was that the idea was quite unacceptable since die M oslem masses had no understanding o f the situation. T he Algerian Communist Party, they said, did not wish to accept the responsibility before history o f stirring up the M odem population. The first agitation am ong the Algerian Arabs was to com e from another direction, when some communists infiltrated the Red Star o f N orth Africa movement w hich had been created b y Messali Haj in Paris. A ll these parties were in contact w ith foreign elements, h i Egypt one such was a strange character called Constantine Vance, a Swiss, w ho introduced him self as a representative o f w hat he called the ‘Inter­ national Press'. He was extrem ely active and probably an agent o f the Com intern. Another agent, w ho operated for some years at this period, was a man called Bahil Cosi, w ho used the code name A vigdor and reported to the M iddle Bast department o f the Com intern. M ost o f the leaden from the Syrian-Lebanesc and Iraqi Com ­ munist Parties were sent to Com intern cadre schools in the Soviet U nion, one o f the most promising o f these being a young man called Khaled Bakdash, o f w hom much was to be heard later. In the early 1920s a few Egyptians attended an institution in M oscow called the University o f T oilen o f the East, a modest forerunner o f the present Lumumba U nivenity. In 1931 documents published in M oscow b y the Com intern re­ vealed the results o f discussions said to have been held w ith members o f the new ly created Egyptian Communist Party in w hich a threephase strategy for Arab countries had been w orked out. The first phase was to be the expulsion o f the colonial powers b y means o f a national liberation movement, leading to independence. Strangely enough the Com intern seemed to have been sufficiently taken in by the 1922 declaration o f independence (made unilaterally b y the British Government and not, o f course, ending British occupation o f Egypt) to assert that Egypt had already passed through this phase. In the second phase the task o f local communist parties was said to be to convince the people that political sovereignty is not enough, and that genuine independence involves a social revolution as w ell as a political one; the

TUE FIRST RED WAVES

43

people must be freed from the yo ke o f capitalism and landowners as well as from the yoke o f the im perialists. T h e party program m e in this {hase was to call for the overthrow o f the old bureaucracy, and the nationalization o f banking, industry and irrigation schemes, and the establishment o f a regim e o f w orkers and peasants. T he third phase would see the seizure o f pow er b y the Com m unist Party and the formation o f an alliance w ith the U SSR , w ith the revolutionary pro­ letariat in other countries, and w ith those still to ilin g under the colonialist yoke. Whoever concocted this program m e was livin g in a dream w orld. This was in fret a tim e w hen the Soviet leaders w ere having a good deal o f difficulty in m aking up their m ind about the correct attitude to adopt towards nationalist m ovem ents in the East, such as the K uom in­ tang, the Indian Congress and the W afd. B y 1923-4 hopes that Eastern as well as European countries w ere on the eve o f revolution had largely evaporated, and M oscow was prepared to support strong nationalist governments like A tatiirk’s T u rkey and Reza Shah’s Iran w hich had been bora out o f opposition to W estern im perialism . But there was also a tendency to believe that the bourgeoisie could never be anything but a vehicle for a new form o f colonialism because it would always be prepared to collaborate w ith imperialists to get a share o f the loot. T he com m unists, both in M oscow and outside, seemed to assume that once a country had got rid o f the imperialists there was nothing to stand in the w ay o f the revolution except a flabby bureaucracy and a few unim portant political parties. T h ey under­ estimated - as for a m atter o f fact they still do - the strength o f the small and middle bourgeoisie and the pull w hich property and religion exercise on it. T h ey also underestimated the appeal o f nationalism for newly independent countries and for countries aspiring to independence. During the late 1920s the com m unist parties in the M iddle East declined into a state o f alm ost total im potence and insignificance; these were w hat Egyptian communists refer to as ‘the bleak years*. There were quarrels between Stalinists and Trotskyists; their news­ papers were almost non-existent - the Egyptian party’s paper, Ruh elAsr (Spirit of Our Times), com m itted hara-kiri b y publishing an article which its editors knew w ould result in closure rather than adm it that it had no funds left w ith w hich to carry on. T he best indication o f how completely at sea the Egyptian Com m unist Party was at this tim e is die ludicrous ««a d ent w hen the Labour M ovem ent, w ith w hich it was

44

THE

s p h in x a n d t h e c o m m is s a r

actively collaborating at the tim e, appointed Prince Abbas Halim leader o f the M ovem ent fo r life. This colourfiil figure belonged to a rival - and in his view senior - branch o f the M oham m ed A ll fam ily to that represented b y K ing Fuad and K in g Farouk. He had beat a dashing and courageous officer in the German arm y in W orld W ar I, and used to attend metings o f the Federation o f W orkers, a monocle in his eye, a riding-w hip in his hand and accompanied b y an enormous A part from its continuing concern w ith its nearest neighbours, T urkey and Iran, the only other areas where M oscow showed any real initiative during this period w ere, oddly enough, Saudi Arabia and Yem en. The Soviets offered aid to Ibn Saud, the creator o f the King* dom o f Saudi Arabia, after his conquest o f the Hejaz and sent him wheat. His son, later K ing Feisal, visited the Soviet U nion in 1931 and negotiated some agreements w ith the Soviet governm ent. Imam Yehya o f Yem en also sent a mission to M oscow , though little is known about what, i f anything, it achieved. ★

★

★

The dramatic change in Soviet policy during the thirties caused b y the rise o f Hitler to pow er, Italy’s invasion o f Abyssinia, the Spanish Q v il W ar and the threat o f another w orld w ar, affected Soviet atti­ tudes towards countries o f the East as w ell as towards Europe. In Europe communist policy, directed b y the Com intern, advocated collective security and the form ation o f Popular Front governments embracing all ’progressive forces’ - liberals and social democrats as w ell as, o f course, communists. In Asia too there was a call for a closing o f the ranks to meet the threat o f fascism and w ar, and as a result com ­ munists found themselves summoned to make another somersault. W hereas at the Sixth Congress o f the Com intern in 1928 A . Vassiliev had described the W afd as the ’deadly enem y’ o f the Egyptian workers and peasants, these workers and peasants were now called on to treat it as an ally. Those w ho had to execute the new party line in E gypt w ere almost entirely foreign nationals or o f foreign origin. Thus there was a C ypriot poet, Theodosis Pendes, and his w ife w ho w ere active in Alexandria, and a girl called Anna Caenco w ho taught history at a Jewish school in the same city and w ho started a special course in

THB FUST RED WAVES

45

Marxism. Then there was a Swiss called Jacob Descombes, and a group called 'Bread and Freedom* led b y M arcel Israel. Descombes* father was a Swiss contractor livin g in Egypt w ho sent bis son to Germany to complete his studies, where he came into contact w ith German communists. O n his return to Egypt young Descombes was sent to work for his father's firm in Aswan. T he miserable conditions which he found there affected him deeply, but he had no means o f communicating w ith the oppressed workers. W hen he came back to Cairo he joined, rather surprisingly, a cell composed o f Greek contmunists. Marcel Israel was the first Egyptian communist to contact com­ munists in other Arab countries. Just before W orld W ar II started he went to Lebanon, where he met Farajallah H elou and N ikola Shawi, two leading members o f the Lebanese Com m unist Party at the tim e. With Shawi he met a member o f the French party and he was also introduced to Khaled Bakdash and an Armenian communist. A ll combined to urge M arcel Israel to intensify party activity am ong the Egyptian workers and intellectuals. There was also a Trotskyist group in Cairo, almost entirely com ­ posed o f Copts. In 1938 Henri Curiel, member o f a rich Jewish banking family (to be assassinated in Paris in 1978 b y French right-w ing ex­ tremists), opened a library o f M arxist literature in Mustafa Kam il Square in Cairo, w hich in the 1940s became virtually the head* quarters o f the communist movement. The leading part played b y Jews in the communist movement was embarrassing both to non-communist Jews and to non-Jewish com ­ munists. It gave colour to the accusation that communism was an imported alien doctrine. M oreover, the shadow o f Zionist colonial­ ism in Palestine was causing anger and dismay in the Arab w orld. Jewish communists tried to argue that the Zionist colonists were poor Jews whom the rich assimilated Jews o f Europe wanted to get rid of, so that the Arab workers should feel solidarity w ith them. But w ealthy Jews in Egypt were afraid that events in Palestine m ight stimulate anti­ semitism in neighbouring countries, and after the 1939-45 w ar evidence came out that one o f them, Y u su f Kattawi Pasha, had paid large amounts to some members o f the Student Federation to prevent diem from making any link between the situation in Egypt and what was happening in Palestine. W hen the outbreak o f w ar became imminent, there was a frantic

46

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

scramble b y foreign communists to recruit native Egyptians to take their place. Perhaps not surprisingly the first three Egyptian citizens to be thus recruited were all Jews, but they decided it would be tactically better for them to becom e Moslems, and accordingly effected the change. In Syria and Lebanon the party managed a good deal better than in Egypt. The Syrian-Lcbancsc Com m unist Party reorganized itself w ith a Central Com m ittee composed o f Khaled Bakdash, Ahmed Zaza and Fawzi Zaim for Syria; Rafiq Ridha, Farajallah Helou, Nikola Shawi and Fuad Kazan for Lebanon. The Palestinian delegate, Tepper, vanished from the scene. The French language paper, L'Humanité, was stopped, and an Arabic language paper, Fajr el-Ahmar (Red Dawn), was started in its place. T he Syrian-Lebanese party benefited considerably from the coming to pow er o f the Popular Front governm ent in France in 1936, which was vigorously supported by the French Com m unist Party, though die communists were not actually represented in it. Communists in Syria and Lebanon were able to operate in the open, and Bakdash even found him self in a strong enough position to confront the authorities in Damascus w ith the threat o f a direct appeal to Paris, should they be difficult. He was, how ever, sometimes forced b y M oscow’s new line into positions w hich were in direct conflict w ith the general mass o f Syrian opinion. H ius he supported the cession b y France to Turkey o f the Sanjak o f Alexandretta (the Hatay) on the ground that France was justified in making sacrifices for die purpose o f gaining Turkish support in the com ing struggle against fascism. Other Syrians not unnaturally failed to see w h y this support should be bought at the expense o f Syrian territory. Then came the N azi-Soviet Pact o f August 1939, w ith another turnabout for the communists, follow ed b y the German invasion o f Russia in June 1941, w ith yet another. So, whereas in August 1939 the communists were praising the W afd for keeping Egypt out o f the war, tw o years later they were attacking it for doing precisely the same thing. These continual shifts o f policy, combined w ith the nature o f the leadership, did nothing to enhance communist prestige. *

*

*

Russia’s entry into the war was to have a profound effect on the politi­ cal scene in the M iddle East. The British occupation authorities relaxed

THE FIRST RED WAVES

47

their vigilance over left-w ing groups in Egypt. T hey even, as Egyptian police reports disclosed, contacted some communist groups and tried to enlist their support in spreading anti-Nazi propaganda. Strong M arxist dements emerged among some o f the Allied troops stationed in the area - die mutiny o f left-w ing troops in the R oyal Hellenic arm y in Cairo early in 1944 had a considerable impact. But the slogan 'the enemy o f m y enemy (i.e. Britain) is m y friend’ had an appeal for m any petit bourgeois nationalists w ho were attracted b y N azi propaganda, and again it was the Jews, shocked b y N azi persecution o f their co­ religionists, w ho headed all the principal groups in war-tim e Egyptian communism. Henri CurieTs Egyptian M ovem ent for National Liberty, w ith the code name Hadeto, was less doctrinaire, more flexible and more Egyptian than the others. It drew recruits from the w orking classes rather than from intellectuals, concentrating particularly on Nubians and Sudanese students. It was from among these that the Sudanese Communist Party under Abdel Khalek M ahgoub was later to be formed. O ddly enough, when M ahgoub, together w ith his fellow students Abdu Dhahab and Shafi’ah A hm ed, returned from C airo to Khartoum with the intention o f starting up a Sudanese Com m unist Party, they found a small one already in existence. This was the creation ofa British army officer serving in the Sudan w ho operated under what was presumably the cover name o f 'A stor'. Iskra (The Spark), called after Lenin's newspaper o f the same name, under Hillel Schwarz was aimed in the first place at the Jewish com­ munity and then at Egyptian intellectuals and students. Schw arz, when asked w hy he did not pay more attention to the workers, countered with his idea o f a 'three-stage' revolution - that Marxism should first be introduced to those w ho could best digest its theory (i.e. the foreign intellectuals), that these would then transmit it to Egyptian intellectuals, who would in turn transmit it to the Egyptian workers. Jacob Descombes* N ew D aw n Group (this was also the name o f their review, Fajr ebjedid) declared that the communist party must not dissociate itself from the main nationalist party, the W afd - which, as has been seen, had been the M oscow line o ff and on since the early 1920s. But in fact very little was known to the authorities about the com ­ munist movement in Egypt, as far as can be seen from a telegram from the British ambassador, Lord Killearn, to the Foreign Office, in April 1945, in which he referred to fears expressed by K ing Farouk at

48

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

die spread o f com m unism , w hich had been reported b y A m r Pasha, the Egyptian ambassador in London. ‘T he Oriental Secretary to the em bassy,' K illeam stated, ‘has discussed this problem w ith the D irectorGeneral o f Public Security, w h o was astonished, but w ho assured us that he had no definite inform ation about com m unist activities.* In this telegram K illeam recom m ended die appointm ent o f a Labour Attache at the embassy ‘to contact the w orking class and always be in contact w ith labour affairs’. I f the British embassy thought that such com m unist activities as there w ere in E gypt w ere based on die labour m ovem ent, it was sadly mistaken. In the M iddle East as elsewhere die greatest stimulus for com m unism cam e from d ie victories o f Soviet arms, but parties operating in the open, like those in Syria and Lebanon, w ere better able to capitalize on these victories than w ere the ones w hich w ere still underground, such as those in E gypt and Iraq. In Syria and Lebanon w here the jo in t party was n ow divided into tw o , com m unist candidates stood at the 1946 elections, the first to be held after independence, some doing rem arkably w ell. Thus Farajallah H elou go t 10,000 votes in M ount Lebanon and N ikola Shaw i 7,000 votes in T ripoli, though this was not enough for either o f them to be elected. B ut in Damascus Khaled Bakdash, w ith 11,000 votes, became the first com m unist deputy in the Cham ber. B y contrast the same year in E gypt saw a mass arrest o f communists on the order o f the Prim e M inister, Ismail Sidqi, and in Iraq the attempts o f the illegal Com m unist Party to establish itself in the oil centre o f K irkuk and the port o f Basra m et w ith little success. T he charge brought against die Egyptian communists b y Sidqi was that they w ere in collusion w ith Zionism - a charge made plausible b y the equivocal attitude to Zionism w hich some Jews had adopted. T he dilem m a in w hich Egyptian Jews found themselves in the im­ mediate post-w ar w orld was particularly acute am ong left-w in g sympathisers. O ne o f the most im portant Zionist centres in E gypt between the wars had been the M accabee club in Zaher, in the Abbasiyah quarter o f C airo. O ne o f the club's officials, Y u su f Hazan, trained young members not on ly in sport (the M accabee m ovem ent’s official function) but also as recruits fo r Hashomer Hatzair (‘T he Y ou n g W atchm an’), a M arxist group favouring a bi-national state in Palestine. B ut some Egyptian communists felt that even left-w ing Zionism could do them nothing but harm , so b y 1947 the ‘League for Com batting Zionism ' had been

THE FIRST RED WAVES

49

formed. This body even w ent so far as to issue a ‘Proclam ation to Jewish Mothers’ w hich warned them that Zionist propaganda was aiming to take their children to Palestine w here they w ould find themselves surrounded b y the enm ity o f the mass o f the population and living under a regim e o f tyranny and racism. T he proclam ation ended: *OJew, O Jewess, the Zionists w ant to isolate the Jews from the toiling masses o f the Egyptian people. Zionism is the enem y o f the Jews ! D ow n w ith Zionism ! Long live the brotherhood o f Arabs and Jews!' hi fret by far die greatest mistake made b y Arab communists was their failure to understand w hat was happening in Palestine. This was not just because o f the long involvem ent o f Jews in Arab communist parties and their am bivalent feelings towards Zionism ; most o f the blame must rest w ith the Soviet U nion, w hich made a totally erroneous analysis o f the situation. Stalin seems to have believed that the creation o f a Jewish state m ight help to solve the Jewish problem in Russia and m ight also inject into the backward area o f the Middle East a new progressive element. This thinking was probably influenced b y a superficial know ledge o f the kibbutz m ovem ent, b y the number o f Zionist leaders w ho came from Russia, and b y the prominent positions held b y Jews in the new communist regimes then stablishing themselves in eastern Europe. M oscow saw everything in terms o f the struggle between communism and western imperialism. Jewish groups were in arms against British imperialism in Palestine, and it was easy to argue that, w hen imperialism was swept aw ay, Jewish and Arab proletariats w ould march forward shoulder to shoulder towards the new red dawn. As so often before and since, theorizing in M oscow bore no relation to die realities o f the situation. W hen, only a matter o f hours after the announcement on M ay 15, 1948 that Israel had been bom , Russia became the second country to recognize the new state, the Egyptian communists obediently issued a statement that the w ar w hich was then erupting between Israel and the Arab armies was one imposed b y British imperialism on behalf o f the Arab bourgeoisie w ith the aim o f suppressing the grow ing proletarian forces in Palestine (by w hich presumably the kibbutzim were meant). The communist faithful w ere also obliged to devote a lot o f their propaganda to w hat was happening in places like Greece and Azerbaijan, all much more remote than the war in Palestine, and to refer to nationalist leaders in Asia like Gandhi,

JO

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

N ehru and Sukarno w ho, after all, did seem to be freeing their countries o f foreign occupation, as ‘accepters o f fake independence*. It is not to be wondered at i f communists in the Arab w orld were regarded as no m ore than the rather inept agents o f a foreign power and treated accordingly. A ll the same, in spite o f its apparently total failure, by 1948 the communist m ovem ent had achieved something in the Arab world. It had helped to raise the level o f political debate and propaganda, and had benefited the nationalist m ovem ent b y injecting some social ideas into it. But the communists themselves remained for most o f the time a small coterie o f squabbling and secretive theoreticians. ★

*

★

In the post-war period, Soviet involvem ent w ith the Arab world m oved onto an official governm ental level. W hen, as a result o f Hitler’s invasion o f Russia in 1941, the Soviets joined the ‘free world* alliance, Britain put pressure on the Arab governments to establish diplomatic relations - a prospect w hich clearly alarmed most o f them, particularly the more right-w ing and religious regimes, w hich talked ominously o f the contagious dangers o f atheism and socialism. H owever, Egypt opened up relations at legation level in 1943, to be follow ed a year later by Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. In Egypt the appointment o f diplo­ mats was a royal prerogative, and K ing Farouk chose as Egypt's first minister to M oscow Kamal Abdel Rahim, w ho was married to a daughter o f Mohammed M ahm oud Pasha, a form er Prime Minister belonging to one o f the leading feudal families. W hen Rahim had an audience w ith Farouk before leaving he was told that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union had only been opened up because o f British insistence, and his task would not be to stimulate good relations between the tw o countries but to block them . O n their side, the Russians sent to Cairo as charge d'affaires a M oslem and an Arabist, Abdel Rahman Sultanov. The first thing Sultanov did after his arrival was to pay a call on the Sheikh o f Al-Azhar. Som e tim e afterwards he was invited to address the Society o f M oslem Youth. He was asked a number o f questions about communism and life in the Soviet Union, to which he replied: ‘T o all the questions that I have been asked I w ill give but one answer - read the Koran !' The Russians showed themselves in their early days very inexperi­

TUB FIRST RED WAVES

31

enced in their dealings w ith the press. T h ey started a regular Tass bulletin in Arabic in 1946, w hich later, w hen I was editing A l Ahram, they offered to me. I told them I doubted w hether 1 should find it o f much value, to w hich their answer was that it was goin g to be im ­ proved. I asked h ow m uch the service w ou ld cost, and th ey said it would be provided free. I told them in this case it w ou ld be im possible for me to accept it, because it w ould be bound to be regarded as propaganda rather than a genuine news service. 'V e ry well,* th ey said, 'you suggest a suitable am ount fo r us to charge you.* So in the end a price was fixed, about a fifth o f w hat w e w ere paying agencies like A P o rU P . The Russians proved extrem ely generous hosts to A rab diplom ats. Though this was still the im m ediate afterm ath o f w ar and a tim e o f terrible shortages, each diplom at received seven kilos o f proteins, including smoked salmon and caviar, a m onth. For most A rab diplo­ mats this was their first introduction to these delicacies, and as there were no refrigerators th ey sometimes had to be consum ed in a hurry, with unfortunate consequences. W henever scarce vegetables w ere available the Arab diplom ats go t m ore than their fair share. Y e t th ey found their life extrem ely hard. There w ere none o f the distractions they were used to - parties, restaurants, night clubs. There w ere theatres and ballet, but not m any, apart from the first Egyptian minister, Kamal A bdel Rahim , his counsellor, M oham m ed el-K ouni, and their w ives, took an interest in these. There w as nothing to buy, no m ixing w ith the Russians or visiting their hom es, no adventures for the young. W orse than anything, there w as alw ays the danger that when the diplom at returned hom e it w ould be assumed that he must have been contaminated b y his sojourn in the com m unist w orld and would find him self placed under police surveillance. T o fore­ stall this fate the reports sent back from M oscow b y Arab diplom ats tended to be extravagantly anti-Soviet. As can be im agined, there was not m uch business to transact. T he counsellor at the Egyptian legation, M oham m ed el-K ouni, had some discussions about d ie problem s o f Iran, a country in w hich E gypt naturally took an interest, both because o f its M iddle East setting and because the Shah was dien m arried to K in g Farouk’s sister. O ne day in late 1946 el-K ouni, then chargé d'affaires, was asked to call on the head o f the M iddle East department at the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, who enquired h ow negotiations w ith Britain w ere going. El-Kouni

52

THE SPHINX AND THE COMMISSAR

go t the impression that he was being given a hint that the Russians thought Egypt should take its case to d ie Security C ouncil. This was at a tim e w hen the Council was discussing Iran's com plaint against the Soviet U nion, w hich had refused to carry out its obligation to w ith­ draw its troops from Azerbaijan. T he im plication was that, though the Russians m ight not feel any particular enthusiasm fo r E gypt's case, they could see some advantage i f it helped to distract attention from that o f Iran - 'help to keep the presure o ff us and w e’ll keep the pressure up on Britain'. T he Egyptian chargé d'affaires was radier impressed b y this argum ent, but die M inister o f Foreign Affairs, Ahm ed Lutfi elSayed, sent a telegram instructing him not to discuss the subject again and not to send any m ore telegrams about it. A ll the same, the Soviets continued to drop hints along the same lines, and the next Egyptian minister to M oscow , Kam el Bendari Pasha (known as 'd ie red Pasha*) took up die idea enthusiastically. W hen eventually, in die summer o f 1947, E gypt did take its case against Britain to the Security Council d ie Soviets gave it backing o f a sort. B ut the general impression was that they w ere m ore anti-British than pro-Egyptian. *

*

*

There was indeed no real com m unity o f interest between E gypt and die Soviet U nion. W hen in M ay 1948 Britain w ithdrew from Palestine and the first Arab-Israeli w ar broke out, one o f die reasons N okrashy Pasha, the Prim e M inister, gave in parliament w hen asking for a declaration o f w ar was that Israel was the vanguard o f w orld co n n munism. H e cited the kibbutz m ovem ent to press his point. B oth houses o f parliament, in fret, voted fo r w ar against Israel 'in defence o f A rab rights and against Com m unist atheism and nihilism*. Som e support for this point o f view was to be found in the speed w ith w hich the Soviet U nion hastened to recognize the new state o f Israel and die w ay in w hich the Israeli forces w ere enabled to regroup w ith Czecho­ slovak arms during the first truce in the fighting. It seems probable that the Soviet U nion believed at this tim e that Israel could becom e a progressive, and therefore sym pathetic, elem ent in an area o f generally reactionary and unsympathetic governm ents. I f this was so, it proved to be a colossal miscalculation. H ie Soviets view ed w ith a good deal o f suspicion the various m inority governm ents put together in E gypt b y the Palace after the

TUE HBST KBD WAVES

53

disaster o f the Palestinian w ar. This w as not surprising. Ibrahim A bdel Hadi Pasha, w ho became Prim e M inister after the assassination o f Nokrashy Pasha on Decem ber 29,1948, not o n ly did his best to crush the Moslem Brotherhood, but im prisoned a num ber o f radicals and communists as w ell. T h e W afd , w hich cam e back into pow er under Nahas Pasha in January 1950, seemed an im provem ent from Russia's point o f view w hen it refused to have anything to do w ith the M iddle East Defence O rganization, sponsored b y the British, Am erican, French and Turkish governm ents, and w hen it refused to participate in the Korean w ar. But the situation w as rapidly m oving beyond the control o f the traditional political forces. T he K in g, surrounded b y a group o f upstart courtiers, had forfeited all respect. C orruption had permeated all levels o f public life. There w ere attem pts b y groups o f peasants to take over some o f the enorm ous private estates, such as those belonging to Prince Mohammed A li. B lo od y clashes betw een British troops and Egyptian police in the Canal zone led to the burning o f C airo on January 26,1952. E gypt w as clearly on the verge o f revolution o f som e sort, and there w ere those in authority w h o w ere prepared to see the hand o f communism at w ork everyw here. (O ne high official in the Royal Palace submitted a report to the K in g w hich accused the Polish embassy o f bringing in lorry-loads o f dynam ite and other explosives for use b y the m ob in d ie burning o f Cairo.) Then, on July 23, the revolution did in fact take place, but it was not one that the Soviets had expected or relished. T o them it seemed ju st another m ilitary coup d’etat like that o f C olonel Husni Zahn in Damascus on M arch 30, 1949, or the one b y C olonel Sami H innawi four and a h a lf months later w hich ousted Zaim - or like any o f the Latin American coups d’etat on w hich the tw o Syrian ones seemed to have been m odelled. T h ey thought it m ight be som ething to do w ith Anglo-Am erican rivalries in the M iddle East, or even be a cunning American plot to abort a genuine popular revolution. Soviet suspicions increased w hen the Free Officers m oved sw iftly to impose order. O n A ugust 13 at K afr el-D aw ar, near Alexandria, the workers, probably prom pted b y communists, seized control o f a,, textile factory. T h e tw o ringleaders w ere tried b y a m ilitary court, sentenced and hanged. T h e o n ly reference to E gypt to be found in the great S oyi^ E n cyclop aedia for io ,1 3 7 - 8

300

INDEX

Qasim, General Abdel Karim, 2 r, 24; leads Iraqi army in revolution, 93-4. 1 0 0 - 1 , 104; attempt on his life, 108; dependent on opportunists, 116; death, 118 , 134 Qasim, Abdul Hashim, 232

Rahim, Kamel Abdel, minister to Moscow ( 1943 ), 50-51 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur (Bangladesh), 24 Reza Shah, 43 Riad, Mahmoud, 228, 233 Riad, Mohammed, 234, 271 Richardson, Elliot, 2 15 Ridha, Rafiq, 46 R oad to Ramadam (H eikal) 1900, 2380, 2580, 2590 Rogers, W illiam , states U SA plan on Egypt-Israel situation, 198; Nasser tells Brezhnev of his acceptance, 2 0 1-2 ; 218, 228, 234,239 Roosevelt, Kermit, brings special message from USA to Nasser, 60-2 Rosenthal, Joseph, 39 Rostow, Eugene, 182 Rountree, W illiam , 100 Roy, M. N ., 164 R u b el-A sr ( Spirit o f O ur T im e s ) , 43 Russia, Politburo, conjectural meeting on Middle East, 1 1 -1 5 ; sale of arms to Kuwait, 14; refuses arms to Egypt ( 1977 ), 14; methods with Arab visitors, 17; Nasser's ideas on its relationship with Third World, 22-7; and his instructions on how Third W orld should negotiate with Russia, 2 7 -3 2 ; her desire for warm water outlet, 35; offers aid to Saudi Arabia, 44; effect in M iddle East of entry into war, 46-50; Arab countries recognize, 50 -2; Iran's complaint, 5 1 -2 ; recognizes Israel ( 1948), 53attitude to Egyptian revolution, 5 3 -4 ; breaks relations with Israel • ( 1 9 5 3 ) .5 5 ; nuclear development effect, 56; Nasser’s desire for Russian arms, 5 7 -9 ; arms deal with Egypt ( 1955 ), 59-60; not interested in H igh Dam, 6 4 -5 ; intervention in Hungary ( 1 9 5 6 ), 72 -3; aid agreement with Syria, 7 6 - 7 ; uncertain policy in Middle East, 77; purge of 'anti-party group', 78; Khruschev on post-Stalin era, 90-92; trade agreement ( 1 9 5 9 ) with Iraq, 107; May Day ( i9 6 0 ) and Egyptian delegation, 1 1 1 - 1 4 ; aid to Yem en, 124; quarrel with China, 150-51; under pressure, 154; Zionism attacked, 155; Kosygin discussions in Egypt ( 1 9 6 6 ), 1 6 2 -5 ; G haleb’s analysis of Russia’s problems, 167-8; mood in 196 7, 173 ; worry over U SA influence in Egypt, 173; attitude in Egypt-Israel war, 17 8 -8 9 ; resolution in U N on the war, 183-4; criticizes Egypt’s conduct of war, 184; begs Nasser to halt 'war of attrition’, 193; installs S A M -3 in Egypt, 19 7; suspicions of Egypt’s contact with U SA , 202; intervention in Czechoslovakia, 203—8; attitude to Palestinians, 2 0 9 -1 1 ; Russia’s reply to Sadat during 19 7 1 visit to

INDEX

301

Moscow, 223-4; relations with Sudan, 2 3 1-3 ; Moscow talks with Sadat (O c t 1971 ), 233-9; advisers withdrawn from Egypt ( 1972 ), 2 4 1-6 ; fear of Arab alliance with USA, 233; attitude to Arabs during October war, 259; Geneva conference ( 1973 ), 264-6; Egypt abrogates treaty, 269-70; Russia’s reply, 270 -72; objectives of new partnership with Arabs, 276-9 ; failure to understand Somalia, 281; insensitivity in dealing with Third W orld, 282—4; arms contributions to Arabs, 28; Rumyantsev, Alexei, 138

Sabri, A li, 29, 3 9 ,1 6 1 , 219; opposes extension of ceasefire, 223; 226; arrested, 228 Sadat, President Anwar, expulsion of Russian technicians ( 1972 ) , 15; request to S. Yemen to expel Russian experts, 33; delegate to Russian May Day ( i9 6 0 ), 1 1 1 - 1 4 ; discusses Russian arms to Iran, 174; succeeds Nasser, 217; five phases of presidency, 2 1 7 -1 8 ; proposes reopening of Canal to shipping, 219; sends Gomaa to Moscow, 220; secret visit to Moscow, 220-21 ; tells Russians Egypt’s future lies with Russia, 2 2 1-4 ; seeking help from Saudi Arabia, 226; suggests formal Egypt-Soviet treaty, 227; in Moscow (O c t 1971 ) , 233-39; discusses deterioration in Middle East with Podgorny ( April 1972 ) , 240; again asks Russia for arms, 241; his decision to expel Russian advisers, 2 4 1 -2 ; replies to Brezhnev following expulsion, 246 -52 ; In Search o f Identity, 2520; relationship with Kissinger, 264; abrogates Russian treaty (M ay 5, 1 9 7 6 ), 269-70; begins memoirs in Egyptian magazine, 272 Sadiq, General Mohammed, 233, 238, 241 Sadiq, Brigadier Yusuf Mansur, 1 1 1 Said, N uri, 95, 254 Sallah, Abdullah, 20 Salman, Yusef, 42 Sarraj, Abdel Hamid, 77 , 86, 9 3 ,1 0 6 Satiakov ( editor o f P r a v d a > , 1 1 7 Saud, K in g , 7 6 , 1 7 3

^

Saudi Arabia, 12; offered Russian aid, 44; American planes in, 173 ; neutrality to Egypt, 235 Schwarz, H illei, founds Iskra, 47 SE A T O , 56, 2 75 .2 7 9 Semyonov, Vladim ir, 6 0 ,7 1 —2 ,1 6 2 —3, 1 7 4 - 6 Serov, G eneral, 9 6 ,1 0 0 Shamali, Fuad, forms Syrian-Lebanese Com m unist Party, 41 Sharaf, Sami, 18 2, 225; hints at rivalries in Egypt, 226—7 Sharon, G eneral, 259 Shawi, N ik o la, 45, 46, 48 Shawwaf, A bdel W a h ab , 106; assassinated, 107 Shelepin, Alexandr, decline and fa ll, 29; in E gypt, 1 3 9 , 1 4 4

302

INDEX

Shelest, Petr, 127 Shepilov, Dmitry, assessment of Nasser, 59-60; on the High Dam, 64; 68; goes in purge, 78; 90,91» 92 S h is h r tn incident, 41 Shumail, Shibly, 38 Shuqair, Labib, 225 Siddiq, Brigadier Yusuf Mansour, alleged death, 111 Sidqi, Ismail, orders arrests of communists in Egypt, 48 Sisco, Joseph, 198, 263 Skachkov, Semen, and Egypt’s oil, 212 Sobolev, Khruschev's Arabic interpreter, 96 Society of Moslem Youth, 50 Solod, Daniel, 59-60 Somalia, asks Russia for aid, 281 South East Asia Treaty Organization, 56 Stalin, criticism of, 31 ; on Egyptian independence ( 1924), 40; on creation of Jewish state, 49; advocates popular fronts ( 1952), 54; death, 54; Khruschev on, 90-91,132; Mikoyan’s reflections on, I45~6 Stein, Victor, 39 Stepanovski, guide to Heikal in Moscow, 78-81 Sudan, 12; army leadership, 16; Communist Party of, 47; Mahgoubousted, 208; internal troubles, 229-30; Nimeiry captured, 231; freed, 23*; coup leaders.executed, 232; Russia tries to interfere, 232-3 Suez Canal Company, Nasser's preparations to nationalize, 67-9; Canal reopened, 74 Suez war, 24; 71—2 Sukarno, 50 Suleiman, Ahmed, 208 Suleiman, Sidqi, r6i Sultan, Prince, 262 Sultanov, Abdel Rahman, Russian Minister ( 1943 ) to Egypt, 50 Suslov, Mikhail, 11-15; 155,189 Sykes-Picot treaty (1916), 36 Syria, 12; army leadership, 16; Syrian-Lebanese CP, 46; elections (1946), 48; revolution (1949), 53; president sees Khruschev in Moscow ( 1956), 70-71; Egypt/Iraq conflict, 76-8; communist strength there, 86; union with Egypt, 86-7; reactionary forces, 116; lip service to Arab unity, 149; Baath Party in power, 156; Moscow visit, 162; Russian aid to, 162; Russia refuses tobacco surplus, 170; left-wing deviation, 174; delegation to Moscow ( 1969 ), 194; and Hafez Assad, 226; October war ( 1973 )» 256-60; boycotts Geneva conference, 267 Tahtawi, Rifaa, 38 Tajjir, Mahdi, 261 Tashkent meeting, 280

INDEX 303

Templer, General Sir Gerald, 64 Tepper, Jacob, 41 Thant, U., 167; on UN in Sinai, 176; goes to Cairo (May 2 3 , 1967 ), proposes 13 days’ moratorium, 176-8 Third World, field for capitalism v. communism, 16; Russians and West's dealings with, 17-18; Waldheim on, 18; Nasser’s ideas on its relation­ ship with Russia, 22-7; and his instructions how it should negotiate with Russia, 27-32; effect of Sue2 war, 75; block at UN ( i 9 6 o ) , i i 4 ; trade turnover and Ulianovsky’s analysis, 1 1 9 - 2 1; debts to Russia, 163; Russian insensitivity in dealing with, 282-4 Thompson, Llewellyn, 180 Thomson, Lord, 152 Tito, President, 37; warns Nasser about danger in returning by sea to Cairo, 94-3; 104,114, proposes meetings on Middle East situation, 182-3; Heikal interviews on Czech crisis, 204-5; 208, 279 Tlas, General Mustafa, 194 Togli&tti, Palmiro, his report (’will') on communist movement, 152-4; 160 Touré, Sekou, 114 Tula, workers of, 130 Ulanova, Galina, 26, 65 Ulianovsky, R., 11, 75,117,119, 157; replies to Bakdash’s article, 158-60; 211 Union for Liberation of the Orient, 35 United Arab Republic, founded, 86-7; Syrian Communist Party calls for its dissolution, 102; Khruschev on, 103-4; delegation to May Day ( i960) celebrations, 111-14; five-year plan, 115; break-up, 115-16 United Nations, and Third World majority, 19; condemns Russian intervention in Hungary, 72-3; General Assembly (i960), 114; force in Sinai ( 1967 ), 176; Security Council meeting on Egypt-lsrael war ( 1967 ), 183—4; Russia’s attitude on Resolution 242, 211 United States, policy coloured by evaluation of presidents, 30; Brezhnev on comparison with Russia, 31 ; hears of Egypt's arms deal with Russia, 60-65; withdraws offer to finance High Dam, 67; Eisenhower Doctrine, 74; supplies arms to Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, 77; wheat aid to Egypt, 101; takes students from Egypt, 109; Khruschev on Cuban crisis, 128-9; Soviet fear of USA missile threat in Middle East, 167—8; evidence of collusion with Moscow in Egypt-lsrael war, 181—3; backing of Israel, 183—4; aim to preserve Middle East stalemate, 192; leak on Adham's fear of Russia in Egypt, 226; Sadat’s discussion in Moscow on USA policy in Middle East, 234-5; role at Geneva conference (1973), 264-6 University of Toilers of the East ( Moscow), 42 Ustinov, Dmitry, 11—15,19 Vance, Constantine, 42 Vassiliev, A, denounced the Wafd, 44

304

INDEX

Vietnam, 194; Russian aid to, 164 Vinogradov, Vladimir, 228, 233-5, 257 Wafd party, 36; denounced by Vassliev ( 1928 ), 44; 46; and New Dawn Group, 47; bode in power, 53 Waldheim, Kurt, on Third World majority, 18 Woods, George, 166 World War II, effects on great powers, 15; Russian losses, 30; effect on Middle East of Russia’s entry, 46-50 Yazbalc, Yusef, forms Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party, 41 Yehuda, Sadiq, 42 Yehya, Imam, mission to Moscow, 44 Yemen, North, Russia supply of arms, 12; army leadership, 16; revolution, 118; guerrilla war, 148; and CIA, 154 Yemen, South, Sadat’s request for her to expel Russian experts, 33 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, 65 Yugoslavia, 57; Nasser’s visit to, 67 Zaghlul, Saad, Lenin’s telegram to, 36; dissolves Egyptian Communist Party, 40; resigns, 40 Zaim, Fawzi, 46 Zaim, Husni, 46 Zaitsev, Grigory, 81,101 Zakharov, Marshal Matvei, helps to reorganize Egyptian army, 191-2; helps Egyptians after ceasefire, 218 Zawar, Ahmed, forms government in Egypt, 40 Zaza, Ahmed, 46 Zhiporin, 185 Zhukov, Marshal, 70-1, 78, 92 Zinoviev, Grigori, presidency of Baku Congress ( 1920), 36 Zionism, 45; in Egypt, 48-9; Russian attacks, 155; Russia underestimates its expansion, 280 Zuayin, Yusuf, Moscow visit, 162 Zubeiri, Colonel Taher, 185