New South Wales criminal law handbook 2017 [2017 Edition] 9780455239590, 0455239592
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Table of contents :
1
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
NSW Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited 19 Harris Street PYRMONT NSW 2009 Tel: (02) 8587 7000 Fax: (02) 8587 7100 [email protected] www.thomsonreuters.com.au For all customer inquiries please ring 1300 304 195 (for calls within Australia only)
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017 by
A M BLACKMORE SC
and
G S HOSKING SC
LAWBOOK CO.
2017
Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters Lawbook Co. 19 Harris Street Pyrmont NSW ISBN 978 0 455 50005 8 © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668 trading as Lawbook Co. This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. © 2017 New South Wales legislation herein is reproduced by permission, but does not purport to be the official or authorised version. It is subject to Crown copyright. Project Editors: Wyn Diong, Vanessa Schlenert Editorial and Production Team: Angela Bandiera, Paul Godwin, Patrick Harper, Jinhong Tang, Sonia Tulse Product Developer: Paul Gye
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This book has been printed on paper certified by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). PEFC is committed to sustainable forest management through third party forest certification of responsibly managed forests.
Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW
PUBLISHER’S NOTE LEGISLATION The legislation content of this book is current as at 20 March 2017. CROSS REFERENCES The contents of this book are drawn from the subscription service Criminal Law NSW, by AM Blackmore and GS Hosking, and therefore reflect the structure of that service. The book contains cross references to content that are not included in this publication. These cross references are retained for the benefit of the reader who may wish to refer to the service, Criminal Law NSW, for that additional information. AUTHORS His Honour Acting Judge Greg Hosking SC Greg Hosking SC is a retired judge of the District Court of New South Wales and continues as an Acting Judge. A solicitor from 1972 and barrister from 1976, he was formerly Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for NSW from 1996–1999. Until 1991, when he became a Crown Prosecutor, he practised in civil law including common law, equity, commercial and administrative law and also in criminal law. From 1995–1999 his court work was appearing before the Court of Criminal Appeal, Court of Appeal and High Court.
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
He is a co-author with Martin Blackmore SC of the subscription service Criminal Law NSW. His Honour Judge Martin Blackmore SC Martin Blackmore SC is a judge of the District Court of New South Wales. He was formerly Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for NSW and had been with the ODPP since 1991 appearing in a large number of criminal trials and in appeals in the Court of Appeal, Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court. Prior to 1991 he was a barrister in private practice specialising in criminal, company, administrative and tax law. In 2002 he was appointed to the Bench. He is a co-author with Greg Hosking SC of the subscription service Criminal Law NSW.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Publisher’s Note ............................................................................................................................. v Table of Cases ............................................................................................................................... ix Criminal Liability Principles ............................................................................................................ 1 Crimes Act 1900 ......................................................................................................................... 125 Crimes Regulation 2015 .......................................................................................................... 1023 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 ............................................................... 1027 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 .................................................................. 1107 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 ..................................................................................... 1147 Summary Offences Act 1988 (Extracts) ................................................................................... 1267 Summary Offences Regulation 2015 ....................................................................................... 1323 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 ..................................................... 1331 Bail Act 2013 ............................................................................................................................ 1537 Bail Regulation 2014 ................................................................................................................ 1611 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ................................................................................................... 1627 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ............................................................................... 2039 Index ......................................................................................................................................... 2173 Important Note: This publication is extracted from Criminal Law NSW (subscription service, Lawbook Co.) and it reflects the paragraphing scheme adopted in that works. Some cross-references in this publication refer to paragraphs which are not reproduced in this book. In these cases, readers should refer to Criminal Law NSW for further information.
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TABLE OF CASES
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A A-G (NSW) v Bindoff (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 489; 70 WN (NSW) 309 ...................................... CA.52A.20, CA.52A.40 A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), Re [2001] 2 WLR 480; [2000] 4 All ER 961 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.2800, CLP.2820, CLP.2860 A (a child) (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 ................................................................................................................... CPA.281.20 A (a juvenile) v The Queen [1978] Crim LR 689 ............................................................................................ CA.195.100 AEL v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 355; [2007] NSWCCA 97 ............................................................. CA.66A.120 AJS v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 505; (2007) 171 A Crim R 436; 81 ALJR 1208; [2007] HCA 27 .................................................................................................................................................................... CA.61I.100 Aaron’s Reefs v Twiss [1896] AC 273 ........................................................................................................... CA.192G.120 Aarons Reefs Ltd v Twiss [1896] AC 273 ........................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Abbott v The Queen [1977] AC 755; [1976] 3 WLR 462; [1976] 3 All ER 140 ............................................... CLP.2640 Aboud v AG (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 671; 31 A Crim R 127 .................................................................... CPA.19.180 Abrahams v Cavey [1968] 1 QB 479; [1967] 3 WLR 1229; [1967] 3 All ER 179 ............................................ CA.56.80 Ackroyds Air Travel Ltd v DPP [1950] 1 All ER 933 ....................................................................................... CA.345.80 Adams v Kennedy (2000) 49 NSWLR 78; [2000] NSWCA 152 ............................................................... LEPRA.99.160 Adams v The Queen (2008) 234 CLR 143; 183 A Crim R 534; [2008] HCA 15 ...................................... DMTA.25.220 Adelaide, City of v A/asian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481 ............................................. CLP.80 Adler v District Court (NSW) (1990) 19 NSWLR 317; 48 A Crim R 420 ......... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 Aggelidis v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 6 ............................................................................ CA.44.120 Agnes Gore’s Case 77 ER 853; (1611) 9 Co Rep 81 .................................................................... CA.19A.400, CLP.1400 Ah-See v Heilpern [2000] NSWSC 627 ............................................................................................................ CPA.281.20 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; (1988) 34 A Crim R 175; [1988] HCA 39 ......................................... CLP.780 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 ............................................................................................... CA.61.260 Akerele v The King [1943] AC 255; [1943] 1 All ER 367 ................................................................................ CA.24.220 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; 78 ALJR 1099; [2004] HCA 37 ............................................... LEPRA.99.60 Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955; (1982) 74 Cr App R 150 ........................ CA.58.200, LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 WLR 1252; [1969] 2 All ER 271 ................... CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.40 Aldridge v Marks (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 69; 61 WN 2 .................................................................................. CA.527C.100 Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; [1952] HCA 3 ......................................................................... CA.23.60, CLP.2280 Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404 .............................................. CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100 Allamby v Medford [1974] 1 WLR 1494; 3 All ER 126 ................................................................................... CA.97.120 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 ............................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Allen v Westley (1629) Het 97 .......................................................................................................................... CA.327.180 Allison v Lowe [1988] Tas R 21 ....................................................................................................................... DMTA.6.20 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475 ...................................... CLP.80 Amery v Solicitor General [1987] 2 NZLR 292 ............................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415; 46 ALJR 638; [1972] HCA 58 ................................................... CA.319.140 Anderson v Ah Nam (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 492 ............................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 ..................... CA.93B.20, CA.93B.80, CA.93B.100, CA.93B.140 Anderson v Judges of District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701; 62 A Crim R 277 ... CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100, CA.527C.140, CLP.80, LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.80 Anderson v Kynaston [1924] VLR 214 ................................................................................................................ SOA.4.20 Anderson v Lynch (1982) 17 NTR 21 ............................................................................................................... CA.188.180 Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 567 .................................................................................................................... CA.344A.100
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TABLE OF CASES
Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34 ................. CA.24.180, CA.24.200, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.54.100, CLP.1300 Andrews v The Queen (1968) 126 CLR 198; 43 ALJR 57; [1968] HCA 84 ...................... CA.178A.100, CA.178A.140 Anglim and Cooke v Thomas [1974] VR 363 .................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Anic v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 223 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204 ........................ CLP.740 Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; (2010) 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18 ..................................... CLP.740 Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18 ................................................. CLP.980 Appeal of Camp [1975] 1 NSWLR 452 ................................................................................................ CA.8.20, SOA.3.60 Appeal of Parsons (unreported, NSWDC, 14 August 1974) ................................................................................ SOA.9.20 Appeal of Ravnjak (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 166 ................................................................................................... CA.58.280 Applin v Race Relations Board [1973] QB 815; [1973] 2 WLR 895; [1973] 2 All ER 1190 ............................. CLP.960 Apted v The Queen [1981] Tas R 140; (1981) 5 A Crim R 141 ..................................................................... CA.19A.660 Arnison v Smith (1889) 41 Ch D 348 ............................................................................................................ CA.192G.120 Arnison v Smith (1989) 41 Ch D 348 .......................................................................................................... CA.178BB.200 Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Arnol v The Queen [1981] Tas R 157; 7 A Crim R 291 ................................................................................... CA.428I.40 Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561; [1963] 2 WLR 856; [1963] 2 All ER 210 ...................... SOA.5.40, SOA.6.40 Arton (No 2), Re [1896] 1 QB 509 ..................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Arulthilakan v The Queen (2003) 78 ALJR 257; [2003] HCA 74 .................................. CA.19A.440, CLP.420, CLP.440 Ashbury v Reid [1961] WAR 49 ............................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Ashby v Tolhurst [1937] 2 KB 242 ..................................................................................................................... CA.125.60 Astor v Hayes (1988) 38 A Crim R 219 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.200 Athens Maritime Enterprises Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) (The Andreas Lemos) [1983] QB 647; [1983] 2 WLR 425 ................................................................................. CA.93B.80 Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795; [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 All ER 277 ..................................... CA.31C.20 Attorney-General v Bradlaugh (1884) 14 QBD 667 ............................................................................................. CLP.1520 Attorney-General v British Museum Trustees [1903] 2 Ch 598 ....................................................................... CA.117.260 Attorney-General v Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696; [1962] 3 WLR 819; [1962] 3 All ER 326 ..................... CA.319.140 Attorney-General v Curran [2004] NSWCCA 234 ............................................................................................. CA.61L.80 Attorney-General v Edwards [1935] IR 500 ..................................................................................................... CA.19A.420 Attorney-General v Mayas Pty Ltd (1988) 36 A Crim R 345 ............................................................................ CA.578.20 Attorney-General v Whelan [1934] IR 518 ...................................................................... CLP.2500, CLP.2540, CLP.2640 Attorney-General (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650; (1990) 50 A Crim R 342 ....................................... CLP.1480 Attorney-General (NSW) v Milat (1995) 37 NSWLR 370; 80 A Crim R 530 ............................ CPA.19.180, CPA.36.20 Attorney-General (NSW) v Whiley (1993) 31 NSWLR 314 ............................................................................. SPA.Pt1.20 Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 ............................................................................ LEPRA.48.160 Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 34 ALJR 18; [1960] AC 432; [1960] 2 WLR 588; [1960] 1 All ER 734 ............................................................................................................. CLP.1120, CLP.1200, CPA.159.20 Attorney-General (SA) v Kitchen (1989) 51 SASR 54 .................................................................................. CPA.154.200 Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557 .......................................... CA.319.140 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Chiuk-Wah (Pat) [1971] AC 835; 55 Cr App R 342 .................................. CA.4.260 Attorney-General of Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; [1961] 3 WLR 619; [1961] 3 All ER 299 ................................................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Attorney-General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (No 3 of 2002), Re (2004) 61 NSWLR 305; 147 A Crim R 546 .................................................................. CLP.1360 Attorney-General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (No 1 of 2002) (2002) 56 NSWLR 146; (2002) 137 A Crim R 180; [2002] NSWCCA 518 ................................ SPA.33.20 Attorney-General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 [No 2 of 2002], Re (2002) 137 A Crim R 196; [2002] NSWCCA 515 .................................................................. CA.60.200 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182; (1984) 79 Cr App R 288 ............................. CA.156.120 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491; (1986) 83 Cr App R 70 ................................. CA.157.60 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1974) [1974] 1 QB 744; (1974) 59 Cr App R 203 ......................... CA.188.160
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TABLE OF CASES
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773; [1975] 2 All ER 684; (1975) 61 Cr App R 118 ....................................................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) (1985) 41 SASR 147; 19 A Crim R 436 ................. CA.173.160, CLP.80 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1988) (1988) 49 SASR 1 .................................................................. CPA.113.40 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1989) [1989] 1 WLR 1117; [1989] 3 All ER 571; (1990) 90 Cr App R 141 ......................................................................................................................................... CA.78A.160 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 1 WLR 274; 2 All ER 190; (1993) 96 Cr App R 298 ....................................................................................................................................................... CA.61P.20 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] 1 QB 624; (1984) 78 Cr App R 131 ......................... CA.173.200 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91; [1993] 4 All ER 683 ........................................... CLP.280 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 ................. CA.93C.100, CA.93C.140, CA.93C.160 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1987) (1987) 48 SASR 1; 30 A Crim R 343 ............... CA.173.200, CPA.17.20 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 WLR 412; 2 All ER 10; 1 Cr App R 351 ............ CA.52A.160, CA.24.120 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245; [1997] 3 WLR 421; [1997] 3 All ER 936 .......................................................................................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1980), Re [1981] 1 WLR 705; [1981] 2 All ER 617; (1981) 73 Cr App R 40 ......................................................................................................... CA.19A.160, CA.19A.420 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 ..... CA.61.160, CA.61.220, CA.61.260, CA.61.320 Attorney General (NSW), Re (2004) 61 NSWLR 305; 147 A Crim R 546; [2004] NSWCCA 303 .............. SPA.10.100 Aubin, Ex parte; Re Munday (1930) 47 WN (NSW) 37 ................................................................................. CA.545C.60 August v Fingleton [1964] SASR 22 ................................................................................................................ CA.52A.180 Auld v Purdy (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 218 .................................................................................... CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Austin v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 374 .................................................................................................. CPA.19.180 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151; 57 ALR 742 ............. LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.40 Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 91 A Crim R 451 .......................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.160 Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Australian Airlines Ltd (1991) 28 FCR 360; 52 A Crim R 464 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CA.31.80 Australian Fisheries Management Authority v Su (2009) 176 FCR 95; (2009) 195 A Crim R 352; [2009] FCAFC 56 ............................................................................................................................................. CLP.1380 Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 29 NSWLR 497; (1992) 66 A Crim R 134 ................................................................................................................ CLP.1360, CLP.1380 Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd v Cooper (1989) 11 NSWLR 277 .................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.240 Australian Slate Quarries Ltd v Commissioner for Taxation (Cth) (1923) 33 CLR 416 .................................. CA.201.20 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395; [1937] HCA 80 ............................................................................................. CLP.1520 Azzi v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 169 ....................................................................................... CA.95.120, CA.96.100 Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; (2001) 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25 .............................. CA.19A.100
B B v The Queen (1958) 44 Cr App R 1 ................................................................................................................... CLP.560 B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599; (1992) 63 A Crim R 225; [1992] HCA 68 ........................................ CA.78A.100 B v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 103 .................................................................................................................. CLP.2820 B, Re [1981] 2 NSWLR 372 .......................................................................................................... CA.319.140, CPA.36.20 B (a child) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428; [2000] 2 WLR 452; [2000] 1 All ER 833 .............................................................................................................................................................. CLP.1380 BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275; 95 A Crim R 400; [1997] HCA 47 ...................................................... CLP.580 Bacon v Salamane (1965) 112 CLR 85 ............................................................................................................ CA.527A.80 Bacon (1663) 1 Lev 146; 83 ER 341 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.880 Bahri Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; 29 A Crim R 12 ...................................................................... CA.7.120 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; 57 ALJR 749; [1983] HCA 39 ............................ LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.48.40, LEPRA.48.160 Balcombe v De Simoni (1972) 126 CLR 576 .............................................................. CA.176A.80, CA.179.300, CLP.80
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TABLE OF CASES
Baldock v Douglas (1953) 56 WALR 82 ................................................................................................................ CA.7.80 Baldwin v Samuels (1973) 6 SASR 144 ......................................................................................................... CA.527C.160 Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN 41 .................................................................................... CA.58.280 Ball v Humphreys, Ex parte Humphreys; Carroll v Hasz, Ex parte Hasz [1903] St R Qd 250 ....................... CA.502.60 Ball v McIntyre (1966) 9 FLR 237 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.4.20 Balogh v The Queen (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 108 ............................................................................................. CA.188.180 Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 .................. CA.4A.40, CA.61HA.100, CA.112.100 Bannister v Clarke [1920] 3 KB 598 ............................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Bannister v The Queen (1993) 10 WAR 484 .................................................................................................... CPA.293.40 Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1; 83 A Crim R 370; [1995] HCA 27 ................................................. CPA.21.80 Barbaro v Quilty [1999] ACTSC 119 ................................................................................................................ CA.199.140 Barber v Harvey (1942) 60 WN (NSW) 32 ................................................................................. CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; 50 ALJR 108; [1975] HCA 42 .......................................... CLP.580, CLP.2260 Barclays Bank Ltd v Milne [1963] 1 WLR 1241; [1963] 3 All ER 663 ........................................................... CA.438.20 Barker v Bremner (1891) 17 VLR 643 .......................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426; [1983] HCA 18 .............................. CA.112.100, CA.117.200 Barker v Wingo (1972) 407 US 514 .................................................................................................................. CPA.19.180 Barnes v Gougousis [1969] VR 1019 .............................................................................................................. CPA.156.140 Barnet LBC v Eastern Electricity Board [1973] 1 WLR 430; [1973] 2 All ER 319 .................................... CA.192F.140 Barnett & Grant v Campbell (1902) 21 NZLR 484 ....................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Barrington v Rochford [1926] VLR 492 ............................................................................................................ CA.91A.40 Barron v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 215; 29 A Crim R 230 ....................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.66.40 Barronet and Allain, Re (1852) 1 Ellis & Blackburn 1 ........................................................................................ CLP.1480 Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451 ........................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75; 55 ALJR 31; [1980] HCA 48 ........... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.21.380, CPA.62.100, CPA.66.40, CPA.113.20, CPA.113.40 Bassell v McGuiness (1981) 29 SASR 508 .............................................................................. CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 Basser v Medical Board [1981] VR 953 ......................................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Bastable v Little [1907] 1 KB 59 ........................................................................................................................ CA.58.160 Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78 ..... CA.38A.20, CA.41A.20, CA.27.20, CA.28.20, CA.29.20, CA.39.20, CA.41.20 Bates v McDonald (1985) 2 NSWLR 89; 17 A Crim R 53 ............................................................................... CPA.19.40 Bauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 ............................................................................................................ CA.178B.120 Baumgarten v Vincent (1930) 33 WALR 50 ................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Bayley v Police (2007) 99 SASR 413; 178 A Crim R 202; [2007] SASC 411 ................................ CLP.2800, CLP.2820 Baynes v Brewster (1841) 2 QB 375; 114 ER 149 ......................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Beak v Thyrwhit (1678) 3 Mod Rep 194; 87 ER 124 .................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Beal v Kelley [1951] 2 All ER 763; 35 Cr App R 128 ..................................................................................... CA.61L.80 Beavan v Rankine (1983) 36 SASR 120 .............................................................................................................. SPA.10.80 Beavan v The Queen (1954) 92 CLR 660; [1954] HCA 41 ....................................................... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.600 Beck v The Queen [1984] WAR 127 ................................................................................................................. CPA.293.40 Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 ......................................................................................................... CA.7.80 Bedelph v The Queen [1980] Tas R 23; (1980) 1 A Crim R 445 ....................................... CLP.260, CLP.340, CLP.1140 Bedi v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 269; (1993) 68 A Crim R 539 .................................................................... CLP.1180 Bedser, Ex parte; Re Kotze (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 53 ...................................................................... CA.52AB.140 Beer v McCann; Ex parte McCann [1993] 1 Qd R 25; 57 A Crim R 101 ........................................................ CA.60.120 Beer v Toms [1952] QSR 116 ........................................................................................................................... CA.546A.40 Beer v Toms; Ex parte Beer [1952] St R Qd 116 .............................................................................................. CA.93X.80 Begley v Police (1995) 78 A Crim R 417 ........................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Bell v Atwell (1987) 32 A Crim R 181 ............................................................................................................ CA.547D.20 Bell v DPP (Jamaica) [1985] AC 937 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Bellino v Clair [1993] 2 Qd R 236; (1992) 63 A Crim R 346 ......................................................................... CPA.160.20
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Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523; 58 A Crim R 1 ........................................................................................................ LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Benford v Sims [1898] 2 QB 641 ........................................................................................................................ CA.345.60 Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court [1994] 1 AC 42; [1993] 3 WLR 90; 3 All ER 138 ............... CPA.19.160 Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237 ................................................................................................................... CA.52A.180 Benson v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [1942] AC 520 .................................................................. CPA.156.40 Benson v Rogers [1966] Tas SR 97 ............................................................................................. CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Bentley v Brudzinski (1982) 75 Cr App R 217 .................................................................................................... CA.60.80 Benzce v The Queen [2015] NSWSC 139 ......................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 Berger v United States 295 US 78 (1935) ......................................................................................................... CPA.160.20 Bergin v Stack (1953) 88 CLR 248; [1953] HCA 53 .......................................................................................... CLP.1380 Berlyn v Brouskos (2002) 134 A Crim R 111; [2002] VSC 377 .................................................................... CA.51A.100 Berton v Alliance Economic Investment Co Ltd [1922] 1 KB 742 ......................................................................... CLP.80 Berwin v Donohoe (1915) 21 CLR 1 .................................................................................................................. CA.345.40 Besey v Mackenzie (1987) 31 A Crim R 347 ..................................................................................................... CPA.64.40 Bibithe’s Case (1597) 4 Co Rep 43b ................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Bilbie v Lumley 102 ER 448; (1802) 2 East 469 ................................................................................................. CLP.1380 Billing v Pill [1954] 1 QB 70 ............................................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Binskin v Watson (1990) 48 A Crim R 33 ............................................................................................................ CLP.1360 Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 671 ......................................................................................................... CA.95.80 Birt v Barlow 99 ER 113; (1779) 1 Doug KB 171 .......................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Bishop v Bishop [1901] P 325 ............................................................................................................................ SOA.13.20 Bishop v Cody [1939] VLR 246 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Bishop v Pentland (1827) 7 B & C 219; 108 ER 705 ........................................................................................ CA.32.100 Black v Corkery (1988) 33 A Crim R 134 ................................................................................. CA.545C.40, CA.545C.60 Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; 69 A Crim R 248; [1993] HCA 71 .............................. CLP.1900, CPA.162.80 Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 1 WLR 1324 ....................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Blackmore v Linton [1961] VR 374 .................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 ...... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.20, CA.19A.600, CA.192E.260, CA.33.180, CA.35.40, CA.35.100, CA.195.80, CPA.162.60 Blades v Higgs (1865) 11 HLC 621 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 .................................................................................................................. CPA.156.280 Blake v Allen (1600) Moore 619 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Blazevski v Judges of The District Court of NSW (unreported, CA (NSW), 10 November 1992) ................. CPA.19.40 Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503; 80 ALR 353; [1988] HCA 43 ..................................................... CPA.150.60 Bloch v Bloch (1981) 55 ALJR 701 .................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Blockburger v United States (1932) 284 US 299 ...................................................................... CPA.156.80, CPA.156.240 Bodna v Deller [1981] VR 183 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.160 Boehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) [1990] VR 475 ...................................................................... CPA.19.180 Bolton, Re; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 ......................................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Bond v Reynolds [1960] VR 601 ........................................................................................................................ SOA.17.40 Booth v Hanley (1826) 2 C & P 288 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Borodin v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 83 ........................................................................................................ CPA.21.20 Boston v The Queen (1923) 33 CLR 386 ........................................................................................................... CPA.17.20 Bottroff v Holland [1965] SASR 397 ............................................................................................................... CA.52A.180 Bou-Simon v Attorney-General (Cth) (2000) 96 FCR 325; 113 A Crim R 320 .............................................. CPA.19.160 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 ...... CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.61L.80, CA.52AB.140, CA.61.120, CA.61.140, CA.199.120 Bourke v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 38; [2010] NSWCCA 22 .............................................................. CA.33.100 Bowden v Box [1916] GLR (NZ) 443 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.80 Bowmaker Ltd v Tabor [1941] 2 KB 1 ................................................................................................................. CLP.1480 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 .............................................................................. CA.529.40, CA.574.20 Bowman, Ex parte (1866) 6 SCR (NSW) 15 .................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Boxer v The Queen (1995) 14 WAR 505; 81 A Crim R 299 .......................................................................... CA.93B.140
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TABLE OF CASES
Boyd v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 111 .................................................................................................... CPA.162.40 Bracey v Read [1963] Ch 88 ................................................................................................................................. SOA.3.40 Bradbury v Staines [1970] Qd R 76 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.5.60 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 ............................................................................................. LEPRA.9.20 Bradrose Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police [1989] 2 Qd R 304; 41 A Crim R 274 ................................ LEPRA.48.120 Brady v Lenthall [1930] SASR 314 ...................................................................................................... CA.8.20, SOA.4.20 Brady v Schatzel [1911] St R Qd 206 ............................................................................................. CA.61.120, CA.61.140 Brady, Re Oram, Ex parte (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 109 .................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Branch v Davison (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 284 .................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 .............................. CA.19A.140, CA.428I.40, CA.61.80 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 ........................................................................... CLP.1140 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 ..... CLP.220, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.300, CLP.320, CLP.340, CLP.1040, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.2260 Brauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 ........................................................................................................... CA.178B.100 Bravery v Bravery [1954] 1 WLR 1169; 3 All ER 59 ....................................................................................... CA.61.260 Braxton v Sugrue [1927] NZ Gas LR 31 ....................................................................................................... CA.546B.100 Brazil v Chief Constable of Surrey [1983] 1 WLR 1155; [1983] 3 All ER 537; (1983) 77 Cr App R 237 .......................................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Brealy v Buckley [1934] ALR 371 .............................................................................................. CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Breen v The Queen (1976) 180 CLR 233 ............................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Brend v Wood (1946) 175 LT 306 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Brend v Wood (1946) 62 TLR 462 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.1280 Brennan v Bass (1984) 35 SASR 311 ................................................................................................................... CLP.1220 Brennan v The King (1936) 55 CLR 253; [1936] HCA 24 ....................................................... CA.19A.160, CA.345.100 Brentwood Justices; Ex Parte Wong (1980) 73 Cr App R 67 .......................................................................... CPA.19.180 Brewer v Castles (1984) 1 FCR 55 ................................................................................................................ LEPRA.76.20 Brian, Ex parte (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 125; 19 WN 123 ........................................................................................... CA.8.20 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34 .............................................. CLP.1440, LEPRA.99.120 Briot v Riedel (1989) 44 A Crim R 29 ................................................................................................................ CPA.63.20 Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929; (1986) 23 A Crim R 254 ... CA.344A.40, CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.344A.140, CA.27.100, CLP.760 Britton v Commissioner for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249 ............................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Broad v Moore [1935] SASR 297 ..................................................................................................................... CA.527C.60 Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588 ...................................................................................................... CLP.80, SOA.17.40 Broadhurst v Paul; Broadhurst v Larkin [1954] VLR 541 ................................................................................. SOA.17.40 Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441; [1964] 2 WLR 38; [1964] 1 All ER 111 .......................................... CLP.1180 Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 .......................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Brooks v Donegan [1953] VLR 90 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.9.20 Broome v Chenoweth (1946) 73 CLR 583 ................................................................................ CPA.113.40, CPA.156.140 Broome v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 587 .......................................................... CA.545B.40, CA.417.20 Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 ............................................................................................. LEPRA.76.20 Brott v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 426; 58 A Crim R 97 ............................................................................... CA.250.40 Brown v Bergan (1991) 53 A Crim R 417 ............................................................................................................ CLP.1360 Brown v Julius [1959] Qd R 385 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837 .......................................................................................................................... CA.9.60 Brown v Robinson (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 297; 76 WN (NSW) 758 .......................................... CA.24.220, CA.52AA.40 Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; [1913] HCA 70 ............................................................... CA.19A.600, CLP.360 Brown v The Queen (1959) 33 ALJR 89 .............................................................................................................. CLP.1120 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 .......................................................................................................... CLP.1840, CPA.36.20 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925 .................................................................................................... CA.179.260 Bruce v The Queen (1987) 61 ALJR 603 ........................................................................................ CA.7.140, CA.117.440 Bruce v Williams (1989) 46 A Crim R 122 ........................................................................................................ CA.351.60 Bryan v Brown [1963] Tas SR 1 ........................................................................................................................ CA.93X.80 Bryan v White [1962] Tas SR 113 ................................................................................................. CA.93X.20, CA.93X.80
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Bryanston Finance v De Vries [1975] 2 WLR 718; [1975] 2 All ER 609 ...................................................... CA.529.240 Bryant v Collector of Customs [1984] 1 NZLR 280 ...................................................................................... CPA.156.280 Buckoke v Greater London Council [1971] Ch 655; [1971] 2 WLR 760; [1971] 2 All ER 254 ...................... CLP.2820 Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635; [1957] 3 WLR 656; (1958) 42 Cr App R 1 ......................... CA.23.60, CLP.2280 Burns v Nowell (1880) 5 QBD 444 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1480 Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56 ................................................................ CA.44.80 Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 168 ............................................................................................................... CA.61.280 Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 ................... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160, CLP.580 Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163 .............................................................. CLP.580 Burrell v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 193 .............................................................. CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160, CLP.580 Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26 ...................................................................................................................... CA.95.80 Burton v Hudson [1909] 2 KB 564 ..................................................................................................................... CA.512.80 Bushel v Barrett 171 ER 1074; (1826) Ry & Mood 434 ................................................................................. CA.319.140 Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408; [1992] HCA 47 ........................................................... CLP.80 Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vict.) (1987) 164 CLR 180; 30 A Crim R 417; 62 ALJR 7; 76 ALR 45; [1987] HCA 58 ..................................................................................................... DMTA.25.200 Byrne v Hebden [1913] QSR 233 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.320
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C C v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 3 WLR 888; [1994] 3 All ER 190; [1995] 1 Cr App R 118 ....................................................................................................................................................................... CLP.560 C v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] AC 1; [1995] 2 WLR 383; [1995] 2 All ER 43 .............................. CLP.560 C (1991) 55 A Crim R 478 .................................................................................................................................. CA.38.120 CB v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWSC 618 ............................................................................... CA.195.80 CTM v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 371; [2007] NSWCCA 131 ................. CA.66A.100, CA.66C.120, CLP.1360 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 ........ CA.66A.100, CA.66C.100, CA.66C.120, CA.66D.100, CLP.1380 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 .............................. CLP.2100, CLP.2260 Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130 .................................................................................................................... CA.327.220 Cain v Doyle (1946) 72 CLR 409; [1946] HCA 38 ........................................................................................... CA.45.120 Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 ...................................................................................................... CPA.64.120 Callaghan v The Queen (1952) 87 CLR 115; [1952] HCA 55 ..................................................... CA.52A.200, CLP.1300 Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v Maritime Services Board (NSW) (1995) 36 NSWLR 552; 78 A Crim 368 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.213.40, CPA.214.40 Calvert v Mayes [1954] 1 QB 342 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Cambridgeshire & Isle of Ely County Council v Rust [1972] 2 QB 426 .......................................................... CA.417.20 Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342; (1980) 54 ALJR 202; [1980] HCA 5 .................................. CLP.1280, CLP.1380 Campbell v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] NSWSC 973 ................................................................... CPA.214.40 Campbell v Rankin [1943] QWN 19 ................................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Campbell v The Queen [1981] WAR 286; (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 ........................... CA.52A.140, CA.24.100, CLP.480 Campbell v Tormey [1969] 1 WLR 189; [1969] 1 All ER 961; (1969) 53 Cr App R 99 ........................... LEPRA.99.40 Can Wiretap Reference [1984] 2 SCR 697 .................................................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co Ltd v Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 1; [1952] HCA 32 .......................................... CA.60.120 Caratti v The Queen [1984] WAR 313; (1983) 10 A Crim R 328; [1984] WAR 313 ...................................... CA.161.20 Cardiff Rating Authority v Guest Keen Baldwin’s Iron & Steel Co [1949] 1 KB 385 ...................................... SOA.3.40 Carlin v Thawat Chidkhunthod (1985) 4 NSWLR 182; 20 A Crim R 332 ............. CPA.62.40, CPA.62.120, CPA.63.20, CPA.64.60, CPA.64.80 Carling v O’Sullivan [1956] SASR 203 ......................................................................................................... CA.546B.120 Carmady v Hinton (1980) 23 SASR 409; 1 A Crim R 312 .............................................................................. CPA.19.160 Carnes v Visser [2000] TASSC 136 ....................................................................................................................... CA.60.80 Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314; 35 A Crim R 387 .................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314; 35 A Crim R 387; [1988] HCA 47 .................................................... CLP.1880 Carroll v Mijovich (1991) 25 NSWLR 441; 58 A Crim R 243 ................ LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Carroll v Woods [1922] SASR 458 ......................................................................................................................... CA.8.20
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TABLE OF CASES
Carruthers v Sydebothom (1815) 4 M & S 77; 105 ER 764 ............................................................................. CA.32.100 Carter v Mace [1949] 2 All ER 714 .................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121; 81 A Crim R 19 .................................... LEPRA.48.160 Carter Patersons and Pickfords v Wessel [1947] KB 849 ................................................................................ CA.188.160 Carusi v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 657 ....................................................................................................... DMTA.26.60 Caruso v Boucher (1975) 10 SASR 71 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Carver v AG (NSW) (1987) 29 A Crim R 24 ................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Carver v Clerk of Blacktown Local Court (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Black AJ, 13 March 1998) ......... LEPRA.48.120 Case Stated by Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1; 70 A Crim R 323 ....................................................................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Cassaniti v Croucher (2000) 48 NSWLR 623 ..................................................................... LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Cassell v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 189; 110 A Crim R 317; [2000] HCA 8 ......................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Cassidy, Ex parte (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 186 ..................................................................................................... CA.502.20 Castle v Olen (1985) 3 NSWLR 26 ................................................................................................................... DMTA.3.80 Castlebar Holding Pty Ltd v Riley (2005) 138 LGERA 338; [2005] NSWCCA 105 ..................................... CPA.214.20 Castro v The Queen (1881) 6 App Cas 229 ................................................................................ CPA.21.180, CPA.21.280 Caygill v Thwaite (1885) 1 TLR 386 .................................................................................................................. CA.512.20 Chadbourne v Ansell [1975] WAR 104 ............................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Chahine v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 179 ......................................................................................................... CLP.580 Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 .............. CA.19A.100, CLP.580 Champion, The [1934] P 1 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.32.80 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168; (1984) 80 Cr App R 117 ........................................................ CA.345.100 Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 1; 113 A Crim R 196; [2000] NSWCA 125 ................................................................................................................................ CA.94.140, CA.94.280 Chapman v Honig [1963] 2 QB 502; [1963] 3 WLR 19; [1963] 2 All ER 513 ............................................. CA.319.140 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; 72 ALJR 1344; [1998] HCA 55 ............................................................... CLP.420 Chappell v Ross & Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 .................................................................................................... CLP.80 Chard v Wallis (1988) 12 NSWLR 453; 36 A Crim R 147 .......................................................................... CA.61HA.100 Charnock v Court [1899] 2 Ch 35 .................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Chatterton v Parker (1914) 111 LT 380 ................................................................................................................. CA.53.80 Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116 ............................................................................................................. CA.35.40 Chenoweth v Broome [1947] VLR 1 ......................................................................................... CPA.154.40, CPA.156.180 Chesney v Newsholme (1908) P.301 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.420 Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611; 36 A Crim R 382 ......................................................................... CA.23A.60 Chesterfield v Fountaine [1908] 1 Ch 243 .......................................................................................................... CA.512.80 Cheung v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 283 ........................................................................................................ CLP.80 Chia Gee v Martin (1905) 3 CLR 649 .............................................................................................................. CPA.156.80 Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; [1968] 2 WLR 201; [1968] 1 All ER 229 ..................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.48.60 Chief Constable of Norfolk v Clayton [1983] 2 AC 473 ................................................................................. CA.93B.100 Chin v Ryde City Council (2004) 133 LGERA 312; [2004] NSWCCA 167 ..................................................... SPA.10.80 Chong v Schultz (2000) 112 A Crim R 59; [2000] FCA 582 ....................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 593; 63 A Crim R 316 ........... CPA.154.100, CPA.154.200 Christianos v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (1992) 9 WAR 345; 69 A Crim R 461 ........................... CPA.66.40 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; [1947] 1 All ER 567 .......................... CA.33.160, LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.160 Christophers v The Queen (2000) 23 WAR 106; (2000) 116 A Crim R 280; [2000] WASCA 308 ................. CA.61I.60 Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Limited (1990) 170 CLR 249; 50 A Crim R 85; [1990] HCA 41 ................................ CLP.360 Chung v The Queen (2007) 175 A Crim R 579 ................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; (1967) 51 Cr App R 212 ......................... CLP.720, CLP.740 Cichon v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1994] Crim LR 918 ................................................................ CLP.2820 Cintana v Burgoyne (2003) 13 NTLR 130; 143 A Crim R 296; [2003] NTSC 106 .................................. LEPRA.99.180 Cioban v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 265; [2003] NSWCCA 304 ....................................................... CA.33A.100 Clapton, Re (1848) 3 Cox CC 126 ...................................................................................................................... CA.155.40
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TABLE OF CASES
Clark v Esanda Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 1 ......................................................................................................... CA.192F.140 Clark v Hunter [1956] SLT 188 ......................................................................................................................... DMTA.3.80 Clark v Johnson [1967] SASR 279 ................................................................................................................... CA.249B.40 Clark v The Queen (1884) 14 QBD 92 .......................................................................................................... CA.546B.120 Clarke v Nelson, Ex parte Nelson [1936] QWN 17 .................................................................... CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Clarke, Ex parte (1895) 15 A Digest (1st ed) 996 .................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Clarkson v Aspinall [1950] QSR 79 .................................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Clarkson v Director of Public Prosecutions [1990] VR 745 ............................................................................... CPA.36.20 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1 .................................................................................................. CA.184.40 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1; [2007] NSWCCA 70 ........................... CLP.2260, CLP.2660, CLP.2820 Clarriss v Lamb; Ex parte Lamb [1910] QWN 28 ................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Clayton v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 347; 26 A Crim R 43 ...................................... CPA.17.20, CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 168 A Crim R 174; [2006] HCA 58 ........................................... CA.19A.200, CA.345.160 Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.320 Cleary v Hammond [1976] 1 NSWLR 111 ..................................................... CA.527C.40, CA.527C.100, CA.527C.120 Cleary v Wilcocks (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 101 ................................................................................................. CA.527C.80 Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 15; [1982] HCA 67 ..................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Clements v The State (1890) 11 SE 505 ............................................................................................................. CA.94.120 Clemesha v The Queen [1978] WAR 193 ......................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Clifford v White [1910] QSR 364 ...................................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Clift v Clift [1964–5] NSWR 1896; (1964) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 298 .............................................................. CLP.1200 Cliftleigh Haulage Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2007] NSWCCA 13 ........................................................ CPA.214.40 Clixby v Weston (1988) 15 NSWLR 35; 38 A Crim R 60 .............................................................................. CA.154A.40 Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139; 11 ALR 32; [1904] HCA 38 .................................................................. CA.316.200 Clout v Hutchinson (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 32; 67 WN (NSW) 203 ................................................ CA.54.100, CLP.1300 Clugston v Roberts [1915] VLR 456 .............................................................................................................. CA.527C.100 Clyne v Bowman (1987) 11 NSWLR 341; 33 A Crim R 280 ............................................................................... CLP.960 Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 ....................................................................................... CPA.19.100 Coal-Heaver’s Case (1768) 1 Leach 64 ............................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257; 43 ALJR 257 ............................ SPA.10.40, SPA.10.80, SPA.10.100, SPA.10.160 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 72 A Crim R 32 ........................ LEPRA.10.40, LEPRA.48.40, LEPRA.76.20 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 72 A Crim R 32; [1994] HCA 15 ................................................... CA.60.120 Coffey, Ex Parte; Re Evans [1971] 1 NSWLR 434 ................................................................................................ CLP.740 Coffill, Ex parte (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 191; 10 WN 222 ................................................................................... CA.512.80 Cohen v Huskisson (1837) 2 M & W 477 ....................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Cohen v March [1951] 2 TLR 402 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 Cole v Turner (1705) 6 Mod 149; 87 ER 907 .................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Coleman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 371; (2000) 114 A Crim R 298; [2000] NSWSC 275 ....................................................................................................................................... SOA.19.20 Coleman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 371; 114 A Crim R 298; [2000] NSWSC 275 ...................................................................................................................................................... CA.26.40 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; 78 ALJR 1166; [2004] HCA 39 ...................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Collett v Bennett (1986) 21 A Crim R 410 ............................................................................................................... CLP.80 Collier v Hicks (1831) 2 B & Ad 663; 109 ER 1290 ......................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 ............ CA.58.200, CA.60.80, CA.60.120, CA.61.100, CA.61.120, CA.61.180 Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 64 NSWLR 645; 155 A Crim R 573 ....... CA.93C.80, CA.93C.120 Combe’s case (1604) Moore 759 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Commonwealth v Bowen (1816) 13 Mass 365 ................................................................................................ CA.19A.380 Commonwealth v Cleary (1898) 172 Mass 175 ..................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527; [1938] HCA 2 ............................ CPA.113.40 Commonwealth Smelting Ltd v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CA.47.80
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Comptroller-General of Customs v D’Aquino Bros Pty Ltd (1996) 85 A Crim R 517; 130 FLR 383 .................................................................................................................................................................. SPA.10.120 Comptroller-General of Customs v Woodlands Enterprises Pty Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 589; (1995) 83 A Crim R 579 ....................................................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254; 2 WLR 1145; 2 All ER 401; (1964) 48 Cr App R 183 ........ CA.19A.20, CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.380, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.120, CPA.156.140, CPA.156.160, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.240, CPA.156.260 Conners v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 ......................................................................................................... SOA.4.40 Connolly v Meagher (1906) 3 CLR 682 .................................................................................... CPA.156.20, CPA.156.240 Connor v Pittaway [1969] VR 335 ................................................................................................................. CA.546B.140 Connor v Sankey [1976] 2 NSWLR 570; 28 FLR 267 ...................................................................................... CPA.65.20 Connors v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 ....................................................................................... CA.316.200, CLP.80 Conroy v Conroy (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 680 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Considine v Kirkpatrick [1971] SASR 73 ................................................................... CA.33B.120, CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 59 ALJR 254; [1985] HCA 6 ............................................................................................................................ CA.316.200 Cooke v Purcell (1988) 14 NSWLR 51; 36 A Crim R 425 .................................. CPA.19.100, CPA.19.180, CPA.156.20 Cooper, Ex parte (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 143 ....................................................................................................... CA.327.220 Coorey, Ex parte (1944) 62 WN (NSW) 167 ...................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Corbett v The King (1932) 47 CLR 317; 33 SR (NSW) 14; [1932] HCA 36 .......................... CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Corbett, Ex parte; Re Kelly (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 51 ................................................................................... CA.546A.40 Corbett re Kelly, Ex parte (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 51 ........................................................................................ CA.93X.80 Corcoran v Gurney (1853) 1 El & Bl 456; 118 ER 507 .................................................................................... CA.32.100 Cording v Trembath [1921] VLR 163 ................................................................................................................. CPA.30.20 Cordwell v Lincoln, Ex parte Lincoln [1914] QSR 186 ..................................................................................... CA.502.60 Cornelius v The Queen (1988) 34 A Crim R 49 ............................................................................................ CA.192E.140 Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; [2007] HCA 12 .............................................. CLP.580 Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley; Commonwealth (Intervener) [1974] 1 NSWLR 391 ...................... CPA.36.20 Corporate Affairs Commission v Papoulias (1989) 20 NSWLR 503 ................................. CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 Cotterill v Penn [1936] 1 KB 53 .................................................................................. CA.510.20, CA.511.40, CA.511.60 Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350; (1988) 30 A Crim R 471; [1988] HCA 3 ................. CA.59.100, CLP.1320 Courtney v Thomson (2007) 170 A Crim R 233; [2007] QCA 49 ............................................................. LEPRA.99.100 Coward v Allen (1984) 52 ALR 320 ............................................................................................................ LEPRA.48.120 Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 ..................... CA.61.140 Cox v Coleridge (1882) 1 B & C 37; 107 ER 15 ............................................................................................. CPA.62.120 Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54 ................................................................................................................. CA.195.100 Crafter v Kelly [1941] SASR 237 ................................................................................................... CA.417.20, SOA.12.20 Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 ................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; (2000) 117 A Crim R 222; [2000] HCA 60 .......................... CA.61N.80, CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CPA.36.20 Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions [1921] 2 AC 299 ....................................................... CPA.21.380, CPA.156.140 Crippen, Re [1911] P 108 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 .............................. CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.560, CA.Pt3.Div10.580, CA.Pt3.Div10.600, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Cronau v Cahill; Ex parte Cahill [1952] QSR 183 .......................................................................................... CA.527C.80 Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326 ................................................................ CA.117.80, CA.117.260, CA.162.40 Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; 41 ALJR 402; [1968] HCA 6 ................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80, SOA.5.60 Crowley v Murphy (1981) 52 FLR 123; [1981] FCA 31 ........................... LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.48.120 Cucu v District Court of NSW (1994) 73 A Crim R 240 ................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Cullen v Meckelenberg [1977] WAR 1 ................................................................................................................. SOA.5.60 Cumberland v Department of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Supreme Court, NSW, Hulme J, 7 June 1996) ..................................................................................................................................................... CPA.212.20 Cumming v The Queen (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 .................................................................................................. CA.7.80
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Cummins, Re (1891) 25 Amer Rep 291 ............................................................................................................ CA.179.220 Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207 ................................................................................................................. CLP.1360 Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237; [1950] 1 All ER 720 ............................................................................. CA.5.120 Cunningham v McFarlane (1881) 1 QLJ 49 ..................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Curry, Ex Parte (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 260 .................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Curyer v Foote (1939) SASR 203 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 ....... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.520, CA.27.100, CLP.1400
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D D v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 1092 .............................................................................. CPA.214.40 D (an infant) v Parsons [1960] 1 WLR 797; [1960] 2 All ER 493 ................................................................... CA.345.80 DJB v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 209 ...................................................................................................... CA.61HA.100 DPP v Aydogan (2006) 67 NSWLR 727; [2006] NSWSC 558 .................................................. CA.317.100, CA.317.120 DPP v Brauer [1991] 2 Qd R 261; (1989) 45 A Crim R 109 .......................................................................... CA.316.160 DPP v Burrow [2004] NSWSC 433 ..................................................................................................................... SPA.98.20 DPP v Cooke (2007) 168 A Crim R 379; [2007] NSWCA 2 ............................................................................. SPA.98.20 DPP v Daley [1980] AC 237; (1979) 69 Cr App R 39 .................................................................................... CA.19A.320 DPP v Kuo (1999) 49 NSWLR 226 ...................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 DPP v Nasralla [1967] AC 238; 3 WLR 13; 2 All ER 161 ............................................................................ CPA.156.140 DPP v Rogers [1953] 1 WLR 1017; [1953] 2 All ER 644; (1953) 37 Cr App R 137 ................. CA.61L.80, CA.61.120 DPP v Vivier [1991] 4 All ER 18 ............................................................................................................................ CA.8.20 DPP, Reference No 1 of 1992 v M (1993) 9 WAR 281; (1993) 65 A Crim R 197 ......................................... CA.61H.20 DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352 ....................................................................................................... CA.61N.80 DPP (NSW) v Sinton (2001) 51 NSWLR 659; 124 A Crim R 317 ................................................................. CPA.167.20 DPP (NT) v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43; (2004) 78 ALJR 1565; [2004] HCA 47 ......................................... CA.61HA.100 DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 .............................................. CA.61.140, CA.61HA.100 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 .................. CA.19A.140, CA.27.120 DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280 ................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186 .................................................................................. CA.23.60, CA.423.100 Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186; 42 ALJR 184; [1968] HCA 51 ................................................... CLP.2280 Daire v Lauss (1984) 35 SASR 508 ................................................................................................................ CPA.154.200 Dalia v US (1979) 441 US 238 ...................................................................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 3 WLR 385; [1964] 2 All ER 610 ........................................ LEPRA.99.60 Daly v Medwell (1986) 40 SASR 281; 17 A Crim R 68 ................................................................... CA.60.20, CA.60.80 Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 ............................................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.160 Dannelly’s Case (1816) Russ & Ry 310 .............................................................................................................. CA.345.80 Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (2004) 61 NSWLR 558; 150 A Crim R 314 ....... DMTA.37.20, LEPRA.30.20 Darkan v The Queen (2006) 227 CLR 373; (2006) 163 A Crim R 80; [2006] HCA 34 ............................... CA.19A.500 Darwiche v The Queen (2011) 209 A Crim R 424; [2011] NSWCCA 62 .......................................................... CLP.2280 Dau v Emanuele (1995) 60 FCR 270; 84 A Crim R 197 ................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Davern v Messel (1984) 155 CLR 21 .......................................... CPA.156.20, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.140, CPA.156.220 Davey v Lee [1968] 1 QB 366 ......................................................................................................................... CA.344A.60 Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150 ..................................................................................................... CLP.580 Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378; [1954] 1 All ER 507; (1954) 38 Cr App R 11 ................................................................................................................................................................. CA.83.120 Davies, Turner & Co Ltd v Brodie [1954] 1 WLR 1364; [1954] 3 All ER 283 ........................... CA.345.80, CA.351.60 Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1924] HCA 56 ........................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Davis v Hayward (unreported, NT Sup Ct, 5 February 1997) .......................................................................... SPA.10.100 Davis v James (1884) 26 Ch D 778 .................................................................................................................... SOA.13.20 Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213 ................... CA.546C.60, CA.546C.100, CA.58.140, CA.58.200, CA.60.120
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Davis v The Queen (1991) 56 A Crim R 340 ..................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Davis v The Queen (1998) 73 ALJR 139 .............................................................................................................. CA.23.80 Davis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 392 ...................................................................................... CA.86.100, CA.86.200 Davis, Ex parte (1897) 18 LR (NSW) 39; 13 WN 148 ...................................................................................... CA.502.60 Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 ............................................................................................................... CLP.360 Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475 ......................................................................................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Day v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 60 ............................................................................................................. CLP.740 Day, Re (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 145 ................................................................................................................. CA.527A.80 De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 ................................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.440 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; (2002) 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 ......................... CA.19A.420 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 ......................... CLP.580, CLP.1400 De Jesus v The Queen (1986) 22 A Crim R 375; [1986] HCA 65 ...................... CPA.21.180, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.240, CPA.21.260 De Kruiff v Smith [1971] VR 761 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 De Varda v Constable Stengord (NSW Police) [2011] NSWSC 868 ............................................................... CPA.214.40 Dean v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 341; [2006] NSWCCA 341 .......................................................... CA.61HA.80 Deane v Telford [1930] SASR 86 ................................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Dearing v Passi (unreported, SC (NSW), 4 November 1994) ......................................................................... CA.546C.60 Dearnley v The King [1947] St R Qd 51 ......................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Deeble v Nott (1941) 65 CLR 104; 58 WN (NSW) 116; [1941] HCA 11 ............. CA.39.100, CA.44.120, CA.196.120, CA.199.120 Delahunty, Ex parte; Re Willis (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 116 ............................................................................ CA.527A.80 Delaney v State 11 Smith (TN) 432; (1932) 51 SW 2d 485 .................................................................................. CLP.720 Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20 ......................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Dennant v Skinner [1948] 2 KB 164 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Dennis v Pight (1968) 11 FLR 458 ..................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Derby Crown Court; Ex parte Brooks (1985) 80 Cr App R 164 ..................................................................... CPA.19.100 Deriz v The Queen (1999) 109 A Crim R 329; [1999] WASCA 267 .............................................................. CPA.160.20 Derriman v Slattery [1982] 1 NSWLR 214 ......................................................................................................... CA.444.40 Derry v Peak (1889) 14 App Cas 377 ............................................................................................................... CA.179.260 Desmond, Ex parte (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 387 ................................................................................................. CA.117.200 Despard v Wilcox (1910) 102 LT 103 ................................................................................................................. CA.58.160 Devine v The Queen (1967) 119 CLR 506 ......................................................................................................... CA.432.20 Devine v The Queen [1982] Tas R 155; (1982) 8 A Crim R 45 .......................................................................... CA.27.80 Devine v The Queen [1982] Tas R 155; 8 A Crim R 45 ...................................................................................... CA.27.80 Devlin v Armstrong [1971] NILR 13 .................................................................................................................. CA.423.80 Dharmasena v The King [1951] AC 1 .................................................................................................................... CLP.780 Di Camillo v Wilcox [1964] WAR 44 ............................................................................................................. CPA.154.100 Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 ............................................................................................. CA.93X.20, CA.93X.80 Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480; [1972] 2 WLR 163; [1972] 1 All ER 275 .............................................. CA.58.160 Dick, Ex parte (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 388 ............................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Dickey v Police [1964] NZLR 503 ........................................................................................................................ CA.60.80 Dickins v Gill [1896] 2 QB 310 .......................................................................................................................... CA.417.20 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; 64 A Crim R 176; 109 ALR 385 ... CPA.19.40, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.180, CPA.36.20 Dillon v O’Brien and Davis (1887) 16 Cox CC 245 ..................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Dillon v The Queen [1982] AC 484; [1982] 2 WLR 538; [1982] 1 All ER 1017 ............................................. CLP.1460 Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101 ........................................................................................... CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1538; 115 A Crim R 558; [2000] HCA 54 ................ SPA.12.20 Director of Public Prosecution Reference (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 8 NTLR 148; 105 A Crim R 489; [1999] NTSC 23 ........................................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander (1993) 33 NSWLR 482; (1993) 69 A Crim R 396 ..................... CLP.1520 Director of Public Prosecutions v Armstrong [2010] NSWSC 885 ............................................................ LEPRA.99.180 Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard [1920] AC 479; (1920) 14 Cr App R 159 ..................... CA.428I.20, CLP.1180
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TABLE OF CASES
Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman [1975] AC 421; [1974] 3 WLR 673; [1974] 3 All ER 887 ................................................................................................................................................................. CPA.21.360 Director of Public Prosecutions v Boykin (unreported, Supreme Court, NSW, Wood J, No 10204 of 1994, 21 June 1994) ................................................................................................................................. CPA.212.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks (PC) [1974] AC 862; [1974] 2 WLR 899; [1974] 2 All ER 840 ........................................................................................................................................... CA.7.80, DMTA.7.40 Director of Public Prosecutions v Carr (2002) 127 A Crim R 151; [2002] NSWSC 194 ........................ LEPRA.99.120, LEPRA.99.140 Director of Public Prosecutions v Daley [1980] AC 237; (1979) 69 Cr App R 39 .............................................. CLP.540 Director of Public Prosecutions v Donaczy [2007] NSWSC 923 .................................................................... CPA.212.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.660, CLP.700, CLP.740, CLP.780 Director of Public Prosecutions v Farr (2000) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 ................................... CPA.281.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 244 ......................................................................... CA.195.100 Director of Public Prosecutions v Gill (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 May 1993) .......................................... CPA.19.180 Director of Public Prosecutions v Harper [1997] 1 WLR 1406 ........................................................................... CLP.1140 Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphreys [1977] AC 1 ..... CPA.19.100, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.200, CPA.156.280 Director of Public Prosecutions v JWH (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hulme J, 17 October 1997) .................... CA.61.120 Director of Public Prosecutions v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067; 1 All ER 331 ....................................... CA.5.180, CA.61.120 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kolalich (1990) 19 NSWLR 520; 47 A Crim R 71 .................................. CPA.19.140 Director of Public Prosecutions v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227; 127 A Crim R 381 ............................... CPA.281.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140 .................................................................... CA.346.80 Director of Public Prosecutions v Merriman [1973] AC 584; [1972] 3 WLR 545; (1972) 56 Cr App R 766 ............................................................................................................................... CA.345.100, CPA.21.160 Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury [1977] AC 500; [1976] 2 WLR 918; (1976) 62 Cr App R 291 ................................................................................................................................... CA.24.120, CA.44.100 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nock [1978] AC 979; [1978] 3 WLR 57; (1978) 67 Cr App R 116 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.660, CLP.720, CLP.760 Director of Public Prosecutions v R (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 ................................................................ CLP.580, CLP.660 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370 ............................................................................... CA.178BA.120 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 WLR 359; [1973] 3 All ER 131 ............ CA.192E.120 Director of Public Prosecutions v Serratore (1995) 38 NSWLR 137; 81 A Crim R 363 ............................ LEPRA.99.60 Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1975] AC 717; [1974] 3 WLR 155; (1974) 59 Cr App R 250 .................................................................................................................................................. CLP.740, CLP.780 Director of Public Prosecutions v Shirvanian (1998) 44 NSWLR 129; 102 A Crim R 180 ........................... CPA.19.100 Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161 ......... CA.19A.520, CA.4.160, CLP.1500 Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909 ........... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.179.320 Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 3 WLR 143; [1977] 2 All ER 909 ............................................................................................................................................................... CA.192E.120 Director of Public Prosecutions v Taylor [1992] 1 All ER 299 ........................................................................... CA.61.20 Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594; 64 ALJR 181; [1990] HCA 5 ............................................................................................................................................. CLP.360 Director of Public Prosecutions v Vella [1999] NSWSC 49 ........................................................................... CA.52AA.40 Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers [1975] AC 842; [1974] 3 WLR 751; (1974) 60 Cr App R 85 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CLP.800 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Barnes [2010] NSWSC 1040 ............................................................ CPA.214.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Bayley (1994) 126 ALR 290 ............................................................ CPA.19.160 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Heng [2015] NSWCCA 333 .............................................................. BA.16A.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Jeffrey (1992) 58 A Crim R 310 ........................................ CLP.2240, CLP.2260 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Best [2016] NSWSC 261 ................................................................... CA.60.80 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Boatswain [2015] NSWCCA 185 ................................................... BA.16A.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Brooks [2015] NSWCCA 190 ........................................................ BA.16A.40
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Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Cakici [2006] NSWSC 454 ........................................................... CPA.177.20 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Campbell [2015] NSWCCA 173 .................................................... BA.16A.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Gribble (2004) 151 A Crim R 256; [2004] NSWSC 926 .............. CA.58.200 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Horwood (2009) 78 NSWLR 32; 208 A Crim R 146; [2009] NSWSC 1447 ................................................................................................................................. LEPRA.11.20 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v King (2000) 49 NSWLR 727; 114 A Crim R 14; [2000] NSWSC 394 ............................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.14.20 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Mawad [2015] NSWCCA 227 ................. BA.16A.20, BA.16A.40, BA.17.80 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Nassif (2002) 135 A Crim R 391 ............................................... LEPRA.10.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66; [2001] NSWSC 523 .......... LEPRA.99.40 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Trudgett (2013) 238 A Crim R 1; [2013] NSWSC 1607 ............... CA.112.80 Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43; (2004) 78 ALJR 1565; [2004] HCA 47 ............................................................................................................................................................... CLP.140 Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566; 101 A Crim R 420; [1998] HCA 45 ............................................................................................................................................. CPA.113.40, CPA.154.20 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 .......... CLP.1280, CLP.1300, CLP.1380, CLP.1400 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Coleman (2001) 120 A Crim R 415; [2001] VSCA 59 .................. CA.51A.160 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Collins (2004) 149 A Crim R 213 .................................................. CPA.156.220 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Olcer (2003) 143 A Crim R 337; [2003] VSC 457 ............................... CLP.320 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1991) (1992) 60 A Crim R 43 .................. CA.423.40, CA.423.140 Director of Public Prosecution’s Reference (No 1 of 1993); R v K (1993) 71 A Crim R 115 ................... CA.546C.100 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 8 NTLR 148; 105 A Crim R 489; [1999] NTSC 23 ................................................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 2 of 1995) (1995) 65 SASR 508; 82 A Crim R 263 ................................................................................................................................................................. DMTA.6.20 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT)K, Re ; (1993) 46 FCR 336; sub nom(1993) 71 A Crim R 115 ......................................................................................................................... CA.58.200 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT) (1993) 71 A Crim R 115 ........................................... CA.60.120 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 1988 (1989) 40 A Crim R 461; [1989] VR 857 ............. CA.198.80 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 ...................................................................................................... CLP.160, CLP.1300, CLP.1400 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 ............................................................................... CLP.2500, CLP.2540, CLP.2620, CLP.2640 Director of Public Prosecutions’ Reference No 1 of 1988 [1989] VR 857; (1989) 40 A Crim R 461 ................................................................................................................................................................. CA.197.100 Dixon v Atfield [1975] 1 WLR 1171; [1975] 3 All ER 265 ................................................................................ SOA.6.40 Dixon & Sons Ltd v Henderson, Craig & Co [1919] 2 KB 778 ..................................................................... CA.546C.60 Dodwell v Burford (1669) 1 Mod 149; 86 ER 703 ............................................................................................ CA.61.120 Doe v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 203 ................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Doe d Hemming v Willets (1849) 137 ER 280; 7 CB 709 .................................................................................. SOA.3.40 Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343 ........................... CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; 60 A Crim R 169; [1992] HCA 13 ............................................. CLP.1880 Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 5 A Crim R 160 .................................................................. LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.120 Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; 50 A Crim R 157; [1990] HCA 51 ................................ CLP.580, CLP.1820 Dong v Hughes [2005] NSWSC 84 ............................................................................................. CPA.213.20, CPA.214.20 Donnelly v Devenish [1926] VLR 235 ........................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 WLR 562; 1 All ER 987 .............................................................. CA.546C.60, CA.61.180 Donoghue v Coombe (1987) 45 SASR 330 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Donoghue v St Luke’s Hospital Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 647 ............................................................................ CLP.1520 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406; [1908] HCA 45 .............................................................................. CA.117.260 Doolan v Edgington (1999) 110 A Crim R 19 .................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Dorman, Ex parte; Re Macreadie (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 271; 76 WN (NSW) 402 .............................................. CLP.560 Dougan v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 135; [2006] NSWCCA 34 ........................................................... CA.94.220
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Douglas v Blackler [2001] NSWSC 901 ...................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Douglass v Radalj (1949) 51 WALR 43 ......................................................................................................... CA.527C.140 Dover v Ridge (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Dunford J, 3 September 1998) ................................................ LEPRA.48.120 Downey v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 371 ............................................ CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.178BB.240 Dowsett, Ex parte; Re Macauly (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 40 ................................................................................ CPA.65.20 Doyle v Harvey [1923] VLR 271 ..................................................................................................................... CA.52A.120 Drake v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1994] Crim LR 855 .............................................................. CA.195.100 Du Cros v Lambourne [1907] 1 KB 40 ................................................... CA.345.60, CA.345.80, CA.346.80, CA.351.60 Du Jardin v Beadman Brothers Ltd [1952] 2 QB 712 ...................................................................................... CA.117.360 Dumbell v Roberts (1944) 1 All ER 326 ..................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.140 Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218 ................................. CA.546C.60, CA.546C.100, CA.58.140, CA.58.160, CA.58.200 Duncan v The Queen (1991) 5 WAR 249; 56 A Crim R 460 ...................................................... CA.351.60, CPA.160.20 Dunesky v Elder (1994) 54 FCR 540; 77 A Crim R 545 .............................................................................. LEPRA.76.20 Dunhamel v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 555; (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 92 .......................................................... CPA.156.280 Dunleavy v Dempsey (1916) 18 WALR 90 .................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Dunn v HM Advocate [1960] JC 55; [1960] Crim LR 182 ................................................................................. CA.24.40 Dunn v Holt (1904) 90 LT 577 ............................................................................................................................. SOA.6.40 Dunn v The Queen (1986) 32 A Crim R 203 .................................................................................................... DMTA.7.40 Dunn, Ex parte (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 38 ................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Duplex Settled Investment Trust Ltd v Worthing Borough Council [1952] 1 All ER 545 ............................... CA.512.80 Durovic v The Queen (1994) 4 Tas R 113; 71 A Crim R 33 ........................................................................... CPA.21.280 Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 ............................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.620 Dyke v Whittleton [1969] 2 NSWR 494 ............................................................................................................. CA.547.20
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E Eade v The King (1924) 34 CLR 154 ..................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Eades v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2010) 77 NSWLR 173; (2010) 203 A Crim R 136; [2010] NSWCA 241 ............................................................................................................................. CA.61L.100 Eager v Smith (1988) 38 A Crim R 272 ............................................................................................................ DMTA.3.40 Earl of Warwick’s Case (1699) 13 State Trials 939 ........................................................................................ CPA.154.320 Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 915; [2000] HCA 29 ..................................................... CPA.154.20 East’s Pleas of the Crown 487 (1806) ................................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Eastwood v Miller (1874) LR 9 QB 440 .............................................................................................................. SOA.3.40 Ebatarinja v Deland (1998) 194 CLR 444; 103 A Crim R 535; [1998] HCA 62 .... CPA.34.20, CPA.66.40, CPA.154.20 Eccles v Bourque (1974) 50 DLR (3d) 753; 19 CCC (2d) 129 .................................................................... LEPRA.10.40 Edebone v Allen [1991] 2 VR 659 ............................................................................................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.180 Edens v Cleary [1975] 1 NSWLR 278 ................................................................. CA.527C.20, CA.527C.100, CA.117.20 Edwards v Macrae (1991) 14 MVR 193 ....................................................................... CA.428I.20, CLP.1040, CLP.1060 Edwards v Raabe (2000) 117 A Crim R 191 ................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Edwards v The Queen [1973] AC 648; [1973] 1 All ER 152; (1973) 57 Cr App R 157 ............... CA.23.60, CA.23.200 Edwards v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 653; 60 A Crim R 100; [1992] HCA 19 ................................................. CLP.80 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349 .................................................................... CPA.150.120 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 ............................................... CLP.580 Elbekkay v The Queen [1995] Crim LR 163 .................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson (1971) 124 CLR 27 ....................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 .......................... CA.192E.200, CA.192G.120, CA.192G.140 Elias v Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164 .................................................................................................................. LEPRA.23.80 Elliott v C [1983] 1 WLR 939; [1983] 2 All ER 1005 ........................................................................................ CA.5.180 Ellis v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 437 ................................................................................................................... SOA.4.20 Ellis v Lawson (1987) 33 A Crim R 69 ......................................................................................... CA.117.20, CA.117.160 Emanuele v Cahill (1987) 30 A Crim R 164; 71 ALR 302 .............................................................................. CPA.19.140 Emanuele v Dau (1996) 87 A Crim R 417 ........................................................................................................ CPA.213.40 Emerson, Ex parte (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 101 ................................................................................................. CA.117.260
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Emmerson v Clarke (1872) 3 QSCR 76 ............................................................................................................ CA.131.120 English & Scottish Co-operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Societies Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440 .......................................................................................................................... CA.179.220 Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275; 95 ER 807 ...................................................... LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.76.20 Environment Protection Authority v Allied Industrial Services Pty Ltd [2005] NSWLEC 501 ...................... SPA.10.120 Environment Protection Authority v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 502 .................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.180 Environment Protection Authority v Fernando (2003) 129 LGERA 416; [2003] NSWLEC 281 ................... SPA.10.120 Environment Protection Authority v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 112 LGERA 1; [2000] NSWLEC 6 ............................................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352; (1992) 59 A Crim R 408 ................ CLP.80, CLP.1360 Erceg v District Court (NSW) (2004) 143 A Crim R 455; [2003] NSWCA 379 .............................................. SPA.43.20 Esquilant v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 421 ............................................................................................. DMTA.25A.40 Esso Australia Resources v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123 ....... LEPRA.48.160 Ethell v Tobin [1927] VLR 371 ...................................................................................................................... CA.527C.140 Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473; [1937] 2 All ER 646 ......................................................................... CLP.40, CLP.1480 Evans v Ewels [1972] 1 WLR 671; [1972] 2 All ER 22 ..................................................................................... SOA.5.80 Evans v Hughes [1972] 1 WLR 1452; [1972] 3 All ER 412; 56 Cr App R 813 ...... CA.4.200, CA.97.120, CA.316.200 Evers, Ex parte; Re Leary (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 146 ....................................................................................... CA.58.280 Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 ................................................................................. CA.52A.200, CLP.1300 Ewart v Fox [1954] VLR 699 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.1220 Expressed need to restrict the defence of necessity – R, The v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 ............................... CLP.2820
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F F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), In Re [1990] 2 AC 1 ...................................................................................... CA.61.260 FP v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 82; [2012] NSWCCA 182 ....................................................................... CLP.360 Fachler v Hyde [1986] 6 NSWLR 487; (1986) 23 A Crim R 429 ..................................................................... CA.177.40 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 ............. CA.61.100, CA.61.120, CA.61.140, CA.61.160, CA.94.220, CLP.1320 Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834; (1951) 35 Cr App R 138 ........................................... CA.61L.80, CA.61.120 Falkner v Barba [1971] VR 332 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.156.180 Falstein, Ex parte; re Maher (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 133 ....................................................................................... CLP.1280 Farey v Welch [1929] 1 KB 388 .......................................................................................................................... CA.511.60 Farley, Ex parte (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 150 ..................................................................................................... CA.527C.80 Farrell v Delaney (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 236; 69 WN 260 ....................................................................................... CLP.80 Farrell, Ex parte (1936) 53 WN (NSW) 140 .................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Farrelly v Little [1970] VR 18 ............................................................................................................................. SPA.10.80 Farrelly, Ex parte (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 236 ..................................................................................................... CA.527.40 Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 WLR 1528; 3 All ER 468; (1981) 74 Cr App R 1 ....... CA.61L.80, CA.61.140, CA.61.160 Featherstone v Fraser (1983) 6 Petty Sessions Review 2962 ............................................................. CA.316.200, CLP.80 Feiler v McIntyre [1974] 2 NSWLR 268 ............................................................................................................ SOA.17.40 Feist v Bonython [1944] SASR 176 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.420 Fenwick v Boucant [1951] SASR 290 .................................................................................................................. SOA.5.40 Ferens v O’Brien (1883) 11 QBD 21 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814; [1951] 1 All ER 412 ............. CA.45.120, CA.345.80, CA.345.180, CA.351.60, CLP.80 Ferrier v Wilson (1906) 4 CLR 785 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Ferris v Police [1985] 1 NZLR 292 ................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 ........................................................... CLP.580 Field v Gent (1996) 67 SASR 122; 87 A Crim R 225 ......................................................................................... CA.60.80 Field v Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 KB 853 ............................................................................... CA.93B.80 Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70 ............................................................................................ LEPRA.21.20, LEPRA.23.80 Fingleton v Bryson (1980) 26 SASR 208 ........................................................................................................... SOA.16.40 Finlayson, Ex parte (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 63 .................................................................................................... CA.502.60
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Firbank v The Queen (2011) 223 A Crim R 301; [2011] NSWCCA 171 .......................................................... CA.112.60 Fisher v Bennett (1987) 85 FLR 469 ................................................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 Fisher v McGee [1947] VLR 324 ................................................................................................................... CA.527C.160 Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 ......... CA.4A.40, CA.61L.80, CA.61.100, CA.61.140, CA.61.160, CA.61.180 Fitzgerald v Montoya (1989) 16 NSWLR 164; 40 A Crim R 105 .............. CA.58.160, CA.316.200, CLP.80, SOA.6.40 Fitzgerald v Police (2000) 113 A Crim R 413; [2000] SASC 168 ............................................................... CA.52AB.160 Fitzgerald v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28 ............................................................................. CLP.580 Flack v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 167 ...................................................................................................... CA.192E.160 Flaherty v Girgis (1987) 162 CLR 574; 61 ALJR 255; [1987] HCA 17 ........................................................... CA.60.120 Flanagan v The Queen (2013) 236 A Crim R 255; [2013] NSWCCA 320 ......................................................... CLP.2280 Flatman v Light [1946] KB 414; 2 All ER 368 ................................................ CA.527C.160, CPA.154.40, CPA.156.180 Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 ............................... LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.120, LEPRA.99.140 Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; 103 A Crim R 121; [1998] HCA 68 ........................................ CPA.133.20 Flower v Shaw (1848) 2 Car & Kir 703 ............................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Folkes v King [1923] 1 KB 282 .................................................................................................. CA.117.360, CA.179.280 Fongold v Farrell [1937] ALR 91; (1936) 10 ALJ 386 ................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Food, Minister of v O’Rourke [1951] NI 97 ................................................................................... CA.345.80, CA.351.40 Foord v Whiddett (1985) 6 FCR 475; 16 A Crim R 464; 60 ALR 269 .......................................... CA.319.120, CLP.660 Ford v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1921] 2 KB 344 ....................................................................... CA.93B.80 Forster v Shire of Mornington [1949] VLR 150 ................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Forsyth v Rodda (1989) 42 A Crim R 197 ........................................................................................................ CPA.64.100 Fosse v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 367 .......................................................................... CPA.214.20 Foster v The Queen (1967) 118 CLR 117 ............................................................... CA.189B.20, CA.117.320, CA.118.20 Foster v The Queen (1982) 6 A Crim R 400; 61 FLR 440; 38 ALR 599; [1982] FCA 2 ........ CPA.19.40, DMTA.25.80 Fowkes v DPP [1997] 2 VR 506; (1996) 88 A Crim R 166 ............................................................................ CA.316.160 Fowler v Kibble [1922] 1 Ch 487 ..................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426 .................................................................................................................... CA.61.180 Fowler v Padget 101 ER 1103; (1798) 7 Term Rep 509 ................................................................. CA.19A.160, CLP.140 Fowler v Pitcher [1918] VLR 424 ........................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Fox v H Wood Ltd [1963] 2 QB 601 .................................................................................................................. SOA.13.20 Frankland v The Queen [1987] AC 576; [1987] 2 WLR 1251; (1988) 86 Cr App R 116 ............................ CA.19A.520 Franks v Franks [2012] NSWCA 209 ................................................................................................................. DPVA.9.40 Fransman v Sexton [1965] Crim LR 556 .................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Fred Wakefield Pty Ltd v Dowd (1979) 20 SASR 328; 39 LGRA 217 ............................................................. CPA.21.20 Freeman, Ex parte (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 111 .................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 Freestone, Ex parte (1856) 1 H & N 93; 156 ER 1131 .......................................................................................... CA.8.20 Frischkorn v Rush [1957] QWN 7 ........................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Frodsham v O’Gorman [1979] 1 NSWLR 683 ............................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Frugtniet v Attorney-General (NSW) (1997) 41 NSWLR 588; 103 A Crim R 1 ......................................... LEPRA.76.40 Fuller v Field and SA (1994) 72 A Crim R 592 ............................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Fuller v Postich (No 2) [1956] QWN 49 ......................................................................................................... CPA.154.100 Fuller & Cummings v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1994) 68 ALJR 611 ....................................... CPA.19.180
G G v The Queen (1984) 35 SASR 349; (1984) 12 A Crim R 189 ........................................................................ CLP.1440 G (An Infant) v Coltart [1967] 1 QB 432; 2 WLR 333; 1 All ER 271 ......................................................... CPA.156.200 GH Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635 .......................................... LEPRA.21.20, LEPRA.23.80 Gabriel v Lenthall [1930] SASR 318 ........................................................................................... CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 Galbraith v The Queen (1989) 6 WAR 12; 39 A Crim R 17 .............................................................................. CPA.21.20 Galea v The Queen (1989) 1 WAR 450; 46 A Crim R 158 ............................................................................... CA.112.80 Galos Hired v The King [1944] AC 149 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 .... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.60, CA.19A.600, CPA.162.80
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TABLE OF CASES
Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1; [1984] 3 WLR 437; [1984] 2 All ER 503 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1280, CLP.1360 Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417 .............. CA.43.80, CA.316.200, CLP.80 Gardenal-Williams v The Queen [1989] Tas R 62; (1989) 43 A Crim R 29 .......................................................... CLP.80 Gardiner v Sevenoaks Rural District Council [1950] 2 All ER 84 ...................................................................... SOA.3.40 Gardner v Mansbridge (1887) 19 QBD 217 ........................................................................................................ CA.521.40 Garrett v The Queen (1978) 139 CLR 437 ..................................................................................................... CPA.156.200 Gauci v Driscoll [1985] VR 428 ........................................................................................................................ DMTA.3.80 Gayford v Chouler [1898] 1 QB 316 ................................................................................................................. CA.195.100 Geitz v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 289; 238 A Crim R 156 ....................................................................... CA.112.140 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 ............................. CPA.19.160 Genner v Sparkes (1704) 1 Salk 79; 91 ER 74 ................................................................................................... CA.61.120 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 48 A Crim R 246 ........... CLP.80, LEPRA.9.20, LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20, LEPRA.99.80 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 ............... CLP.680, CLP.740, CLP.760 Geraldton Fisherman’s Co-operative Ltd v Munro [1963] WAR 129 ................................................................... CLP.120 Getty v Antrim County Council [1950] NI 114 ................................................................................................ CA.195.100 Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693; [1969] 3 WLR 1158; [1969] 3 All ER 1700 .................. LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.48.60 Gherashe v Boase [1959] VR 1 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.1380 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 35 A Crim R 1 ............................................................................... CPA.36.20 Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539; 162 A Crim R 64; [2006] NSWCCA 137 ............................. DPVA.84.20 Gibbs v State of New South Wales (1990) 21 NSWLR 416 ........................................................................... CA.447A.40 Gibson v Barton (1875) LR 10 QB 329 .............................................................................................................. CA.173.80 Gibson v Lawson [1891] 2 QB 545 .................................................................................................................. CA.545B.40 Gibson v Wales [1983] 1 WLR 393; [1983] 1 All ER 869; (1983) 76 Cr App R 60 ......................................... CA.4.200 Gilbert v Gulliver [1918] VLR 185 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15 ........ CA.19A.20, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.600, CPA.162.60 Gilchrist v Gardner (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 184; 8 WN (NSW) 21 ................................................................... CPA.113.40 Gill v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 64 A Crim R 82 ........................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190 ................................................................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 ............ CA.19A.20, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.600, CPA.162.60 Gillett v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 419; [2006] NSWCCA 370 .................. CA.52A.120, CA.52A.200, CLP.160 Gilroy v Jebara (1992) 29 NSWLR 20 ............................................................................................................. CA.527C.80 Gilson v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 353; 53 A Crim R 344 ....................................................... CA.121.40, CA.188.40 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 ..................... CA.19A.200, CA.19A.500, CA.52A.20, CA.344A.60, CA.45.120, CA.117.200, CA.351.40, CA.351.60, CLP.740, CLP.980, CLP.1300, CLP.1360, CLP.1480 Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106 ................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CLP.580 Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; 102 A Crim R 299; [1998] HCA 21 ................................................. CLP.2280 Given v Pryor [1979] 39 FLR 437 ...................................................................................... CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.180 Glamorgan County Council v Glasbrook Bros [1925] AC 270 .......................................................................... CA.58.200 Glover v The Queen (2009) 193 A Crim R 292; [2009] NSWCCA 48 ........................................................... CA.61J.160 Gobbert, Ex parte (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 113 .................................................................................................. CA.249B.40 Goddard v Osborne (1978) 18 SASR 481; (1978) 21 ALR 189 .......................................................................... CLP.1220 Goddard v Smith (1704) 6 Mod 261; 87 ER 1008 ........................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Goffe’s Case 86 ER 146; (1672) 1 Vent 216 ........................................................................................................ CA.18.20 Goldsbrough & Co v MacMahon (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 119 ............................................................................. CA.338.20 Goldsmith v Pinnock (1890) 4 QLJ 17 ............................................................................................................. CA.327.220 Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478; 2 All ER 566 ........................................................................ CPA.19.160 Gollan v Nugent (1987) 8 NSWLR 166 .............................................................................................................. CA.346.80 Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644; [1963] 3 WLR 176; 2 All ER 966 ................................................................ CLP.1400 Gordon v Mangelsdorf (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 438 ............................................................................ CA.327.180, CLP.80
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TABLE OF CASES
Gordon, Ex parte (1893) 9 WN (NSW) 144 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Gore v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 330; 208 A Crim R 353 .......................................................................... CA.35.120 Gorman v Fitzpatrick (1987) 32 A Crim R 330 ..................................................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 Gough v Braden (1991) 5 A Crim R 92 ......................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Gould & Co Ltd v Houghton [1921] 1 KB 509 .......................................................... CA.345.40, CA.345.60, CA.351.60 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435; [1977] 3 WLR 300; [1977] 3 All ER 70 .............. CPA.66.40, CPA.113.40 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 ......................... CA.Pt3.Div10.380, CA.Pt3.Div10.520, CA.Pt3.Div10.540, CA.Pt3.Div10.560 Grandi v Milburn [1966] 2 QB 263 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.3.40 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.160 Grant v Langston [1900] AC 388 .......................................................................................................................... CA.4.120 Grant v Moser (1843) 5 M and G 123 ............................................................................................................. LEPRA.9.40 Grant v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 503 ............................................................................................................... CLP.580 Grant v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 503; 55 ALJR 490; 35 ALR 97 ................................... CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100 Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1; 41 A Crim R 183; [1989] HCA 45 ........................... CPA.19.100, CPA.66.40 Gray, Re [2001] 2 Qd R 35; (2000) 117 A Crim R 22; [2000] QSC 390 ........................................................ CA.81C.40 Gray’s Haulage Co v Arnold [1966] 1 WLR 534; [1966] 1 All ER 896 ................................................................ CLP.80 Green v Bartram (1830) 4 Car & P 308 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Green v Moore [1982] QB 1044; [1982] 2 WLR 671; [1982] 1 All ER 428 ................................................... CA.58.160 Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 545; [1971] HCA 55 ............................................................ CLP.360 Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50 ......... CA.23.20, CA.23.120, CA.23.140, CA.23.160 Green v United States 355 US 184 (1957) ........................................................................................................ CPA.156.20 Greene v The King (1949) 79 CLR 353 ........................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Greenslade v The Queen [2012] NSWDC 255 ............................................................................................ LEPRA.99.140 Gregory v The Queen (1983) 151 CLR 566 ..................................................................................................... CPA.293.40 Griffin v Marsh (1994) 34 NSWLR 104; (1994) 28 ATR 355 ............................................................................. CLP.1380 Griffiths v Hutchinson (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 1 February 1991) ............................................................... SPA.10.140 Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 ................ CA.432.20, CA.441.20, CPA.19.40, CPA.154.160, CPA.154.200 Griffiths v The Queen (1994) 69 ALJR 77; 76 A Crim R 164 ......................................................................... CPA.154.60 Grivelis v Horsnell (1974) 8 SASR 43 ................................................................................................................. SOA.4.20 Grollo v Macauley (1995) 56 FCR 533; 80 A Crim R 175 .......................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Gudgeon v Lewis (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 452 ........................................................................................................ CA.8.20 Guillot v Hender (1998) 102 A Crim R 397 .......................................................................... CA.344A.100, CA.344A.140 Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206 .............................................................................................................. CA.188.100 Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297 ....................................................................................................... CA.51A.100
H HM Advocate v Sheppard [1941] SC (J) 67 ......................................................................................................... CA.18.20 HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 183 A Crim R 159; [2008] HCA 16 .......... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 HML v The Queen (2008) CLR 334; 183 A Crim R 159; [2008] HCA 16 .......................................................... CLP.580 Hackwill v Kay [1960] VR 632 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.21.20 Haggard v Mason [1976] 1 WLR 187; [1976] 1 All ER 337 .......................................................................... DMTA.3.80 Haggarty v Palmer (1974) 5 ALR 53 ................................................................................................ CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Haisman v Smelcher [1953] VLR 625 .............................................................................................................. CA.547C.80 Halberstater v McHugh [1942] QSR 148 .......................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 552 (1736) ................................................................................................................ CA.112.80 Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309 ......................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Hallett v Warren (1929) 93 JP 225 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1520 Hallett, Ex parte (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 234 ........................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Halley v The Crown (1938) 40 WALR 105 .................................................................................. CA.109.140, CA.112.80 Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 13 A Crim R 250; [1984] HCA 80 .......... CA.58.200, CA.60.120, LEPRA.10.40, LEPRA.10.60, LEPRA.48.40, LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.80
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Halliday, Ex parte (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 88 .......................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Halpin v Department Of Gaming and Racing [2007] NSWSC 815 ................................................................. CPA.214.40 Halstead v Patel [1972] 1 WLR 661 ............................................................................................................ CA.178BA.120 Halstead v Patel [1972] 1 WLR 661; [1972] 2 All ER 147; (1972) 56 Cr App R 334 ................................ CA.192E.120 Hammond v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 93 .................................................................................................. CA.195.100 Hampson v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 782 ................................................................................ CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 Hamze v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 104 ....................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 Hanna v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 195 ...................................................................................................... CA.197.120 Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373 .................................................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Hansen v Cole (1890) 9 NZLR 272 .................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Hansford v London Express Newspaper Ltd (1928) 44 TLR 349 ....................................................................... SOA.3.40 Hardgrave v The King (1906) 4 CLR 232; [1906] HCA 47 .................................................................................. CLP.160 Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [1986] Crim LR 330 ...................................................... CA.195.100 Hardman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2003) 57 NSWLR 390; (2003) 138 A Crim R 560; [2003] NSWCA 130 ................................................................................................................... CA.93G.40, CA.93I.20 Harlor v The Queen (1956) 95 CLR 170 ......................................................................................................... CA.52A.140 Harlot’s case, The (1560) Crompton’s Justice 24 ............................................................................................ CA.19A.400 Harman v Vaux (1813) 3 Camp 429; 170 ER 1434 ........................................................................................... CA.32.100 Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590; 43 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 50 ........................ CLP.580, CPA.21.220 Harris v Harrison [1963] Crim LR 497 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.200 Harris v The Queen [1988] Tas R 31; (1988) 37 A Crim R 29 ..................................................................... CPA.150.140 Harris, Ex parte; Re Carne (1936) 53 WN (NSW) 87 .......................................................... CA.527C.160, CA.546B.120 Harrison v Hodgson (1830) 10 B C 445 ............................................................................................................. CA.61.180 Harrison v Trotter (1937) SASR 7 .................................................................................................................. CA.527C.160 Hart v Hudson Bros Ltd [1928] 2 KB 629 ........................................................................................................... CA.10.40 Hartley v Hindmarsh (1866) LR 1 CP 553 ......................................................................................................... CA.556.20 Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141 ..................................................................... CPA.156.160 Harts Australia Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1996) 93 A Crim R 189 ......................... LEPRA.76.20 Harts Australia Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1997) 94 A Crim R 177 ......................... LEPRA.76.20 Harty v Harcourt [1936] QSR 1 ...................................................................................................................... CA.527C.120 Hassett, Re (1994) 76 A Crim R 19 .................................................................................................................... CA.195.20 Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 41 A Crim R 389 ....................................................................... CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.40 Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476; [1974] 2 WLR 1; [1973] 3 All ER 1109 ........................ CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.27.100, CLP.140, CLP.1260 Haughton, Re (1877) 5 QSCR 53 ...................................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; (1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28 .................. CLP.260, CLP.340, CLP.1140, CLP.1160, CLP.1500 Hawkins v The Queen [No 2] (1993) 68 A Crim R 1 .......................................................................................... CLP.1080 Hawthorn v Morcam Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 120; (1992) 65 A Crim R 227 .............................................. CLP.1360 Hayes v Fries (1988) 49 SASR 184; 32 A Crim R 394 .............................................................. CA.117.160, CA.117.420 Hayes v Quinn (1992) 57 SASR 6 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.13.20 Hayes v Wilson [1984] 2 Qd R 114; (1984) 10 A Crim R 409 .................................................................... CA.344A.140 Haynes v Davis [1915] 1 KB 332 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 890 ...................................................................... CA.61.120 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 15 A Crim R 203; 59 ALJR 620 .......................................... CLP.2260 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 ....... CA.4A.40, CA.7.80, CA.7.120, CA.7.140, CA.43.80, CA.60.120, CA.117.200, CA.316.200, CLP.40, CLP.160, CLP.300, CLP.1040, CLP.1260, CLP.1280, CLP.1300, CLP.1360, CLP.1380, CLP.1400, DMTA.7.40, LEPRA.99.100 Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (unreported, NSW Ct of App, Gleeson CJ, Meagher and Handley JJA, 8 August 1997) .............................................................................................. CPA.156.160 Heap v Motorists’ Advisory Agency Ltd [1923] 1 KB 577 ............................................................................. CA.117.360 Heard v Hodgkins [1957] VR 715 ................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Hearne v Edmunds (1819) 1 Brod & B 388; 129 ER 772 ................................................................................. CA.32.100
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Hedberg v Woodhall (1913) 15 CLR 531; [1913] HCA 2 .................................................................. CA.7.80, CA.195.20 Hedges v Grundmann; Ex parte Grundmann [1985] 2 Qd R 263; 19 A Crim R 303 ...... LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Heinze v Burnley and Myers (1992) 63 A Crim R 83 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Hemmings v Perkins (1999) 74 SASR 307; 109 A Crim R 1; [1999] SASC 212 ............................................ SPA.10.80 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 .............................................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.260 Henderson v O’Connell [1937] VLR 171 ...................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Henderson v Surfield [1927] SASR 192 ......................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Henshaw v Mark (1997) 95 A Crim R 115 ............................................................................................................... CLP.80 Herbert v The Queen (1982) 6 A Crim R 1 ....................................................................................................... CA.428I.60 Heron v The Queen (2003) 140 A Crim R 317; [2003] HCA 17 ..................................................... CA.23.60, CA.23.140 Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246; 28 A Crim R 79 .................................................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.180 Herron v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 215 ........................................................................................................ CA.33.200 Hevey v Leonard [1976] VR 624 ............................................................................. CA.39.100, CA.196.120, CA.199.120 Hewson v Gamble (1892) 8 TLR 301 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142 ................................................................... CA.117.20, CA.117.260, CA.117.420 Hickling v Laneyrie (1991) 21 NSWLR 730 ........................................................................................................ CLP.1360 Hilderbrandt v Stephen [1964] NSWR 740 .................................................................................... CA.547C.60, SOA.3.40 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193 .......... CLP.160, CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.320, CLP.1120 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 WLR 1049; [1988] 2 All ER 238 ............................................................................................................................................................ LEPRA.99.180 Hills v Ellis [1983] QB 680; [1983] 2 WLR 234; [1983] 1 All ER 667 ........................................................... CA.58.200 Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (No 2) (1987) 164 CLR 15; 28 A Crim R 155; [1987] HCA 56 ................ CPA.21.360 Hinchliffe v Sheldon [1955] 1 WLR 1207; 3 All ER 406 .................................................................................. CA.58.160 Hird v Grams [1943] QSR 49 ....................................................................................................... CA.527C.60, CA.117.20 Hiron v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 336 ..................................................................................................... DPVA.13.120 Hitchens v The Queen [1962] Tas SR 35 .............................................................................................................. CLP.1200 Hobbs v Tinling & Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 ...................................................................................................... CPA.150.120 Hobson v Impett (1957) 41 Cr App R 138 ....................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 ................................. CLP.580, CPA.21.220 Hocken v Beahr [1955] QSR 406 ...................................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Hoessinger v The Queen (1992) 62 A Crim R 146 .......................................................................................... CA.19A.160 Hoffenberg v District Court (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 142 .......................................... SPA.10.40, SPA.10.80, SPA.10.180 Hofstetter v Thomas [1968] VR 199 ........................................................................ CA.527C.100, CA.527C.120, CLP.80 Hogben v Chandler [1940] VLR 285 ................................................................................................................ CA.546C.60 Hole v Gibb (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 130 .......................................................................................................... CA.249B.60 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660; [1984] 1 All ER 1054 ........................ LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.140 Holland v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 176; 67 ALJR 946; [1993] HCA 43 .... CA.61H.20, CA.61I.60, CA.61I.100 Holloway v Gilport Pty Ltd (1995) 79 A Crim R 76 ....................................................................... CA.45.120, CLP.1360 Hollyhomes v Hind [1944] 1 KB 571 ................................................................................................................... CA.4.120 Holman v The Queen [1970] WAR 2 ................................................. CA.428I.60, CA.61HA.40, CLP.1180, CPA.160.20 Holmden v Bitar (1987) 27 A Crim R 255 ........................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 588; [1946] 2 All ER 124; (1946) 31 Cr App R 123 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.18.20, CA.23.100 Homer, Ex Parte; Re McElligott (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 158 ........................................................................... CPA.19.160 Homes v Thorpe [1925] SASR 286 ................................................................................................................ CA.527C.100 Hong Phuc Truong v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 122; (2004) 78 ALJR 473; [2004] HCA 10 ... CLP.740, CPA.19.160 Honnibal, Ex parte (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 141 ................................................................................................... CA.565.20 Hop Sing, Ex parte (1887) 4 WN (NSW) 59 ............................................................................................................ CLP.80 Horne v Coleman (1929) 46 WN (NSW) 30 .............................................................................. CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Horsfield v Brown [1932] 1 KB 355 .......................................................................................... CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Hortin v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313; 68 A Crim R 381 .................................... CA.33.160, CA.60.120, SOA.4.20 Horton v Gwynne [1921] 2 KB 661 .................................................................................................................... CA.511.40
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Horton v Mead [1913] 1 KB 154 ........................................................................................................................ SOA.16.40 Houghton v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 399; 144 A Crim R 343; [2004] WASCA 20 ................................... CA.59.100 Houston v Crannage [1990] WAR 11; (1989) 42 A Crim R 446 ............................ CPA.19.180, CPA.62.100, CPA.66.40 Howard v Pacholli [1973] VR 833 ........................................................................................... CPA.156.120, CPA.156.140 Howe v The Queen (1980) 55 ALJR 5; 32 ALR 478 .......................................................................................... CLP.1440 Howell v Doyle [1952] VLR 128 ........................................................................................................................ CA.351.60 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; 15 ALR 241; [1909] HCA 36 .................. CA.319.140 Hudson v Cox [1952] SASR 168 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Hudson v MacRae (1863) 4 Best and Smith 585 ............................................................................................... CA.512.80 Hudson v United States (US SC 10 December 1997) .................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Hughes v Dempsey (1915) 17 WALR 186 ....................................................................................... CA.527C.100, CLP.80 Hughes v Fingleton (1977) 17 SASR 433 ............................................................................................................ SOA.3.60 Hughes v McFarlane [1983] 2 VR 17 .............................................................................................................. CA.52A.120 Hughes v The Queen (1983) 10 A Crim R 125 ...................................................................... DMTA.25.80, DMTA.29.40 Hui Chi-Ming v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 34; (1992) 94 Cr App R 236 ......................................................... CA.345.140 Hull v Nuske (1974) 8 SASR 587 ................................................................................................ CA.546C.80, CA.33.160 Humes v Townsend (1989) 4 WAR 196 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.140 Hunt v Broome [1973] 1 QB 891 ......................................................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Hunt v The Queen (1825) 1 Moody 93; 168 ER 1198 ....................................................................................... CA.33.120 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; [1981] 3 WLR 906; 3 All ER 727 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.80, CPA.19.160, CPA.156.280 Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942; [1970] 2 WLR 441; [1969] 3 All ER 1626 .......... CLP.80, LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.99.80 Huynh v The Queen (2013) 228 A Crim R 306; [2013] HCA 6 ......................................................................... CLP.1880 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 ..................... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CLP.1400, CLP.1500 Hyder v Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336 ........................ LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.80, LEPRA.99.140
I I v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 285 ...................................................................................... CA.93C.100 ICAL Ltd v County Natwest Securities Aust Ltd (1988) 13 ACLR 129 ............................................................. CA.5.120 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 ................. CA.4A.40, CA.5.120, CA.53.80, CLP.80, CLP.1280, CLP.1380, CLP.1400, CLP.1480, SOA.5.40 Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447; (1987) 27 A Crim R 465; [1987] HCA 46 ............... CA.61H.20, CA.66A.120 Ibbs v The Queen [1988] WAR 91 .................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.40 Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110 .................................................................. CA.117.80, CA.117.160, CA.117.400 Imiyo Wamela v The State [1982] PNGLR 269 ................................................................................................ CA.22A.40 Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs, Minister for v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FCR 348 ........... CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.200, LEPRA.76.20 Ingle v Bell (1836) 1 M & W 516 ................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Inland Revenue Commissioners, Re; Ex parte Rossminster [1980] AC 952 .................................................. LEPRA.9.20 Innes v Weate [1984] Tas R 14; 12 A Crim R 45 ......................... CA.58.160, CA.60.120, LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976] Crim LR 131 .................................................................................................. CLP.960 Ireland v Samuels (1974) 7 SASR 19 ............................................................................................................... CA.154A.40 Irving v Nishimura (1907) 5 CLR 233 .................................................................................................................. CA.7.120 Itaoui v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 233; [2005] NSWCCA 415 ............................................................. SPA.44.40
J JAL and LL, Re (1974) 3 DCR 182 ................................................................................................................. CA.527C.80 JIT Jarden v Thompson (1995) 85 A Crim R 24 ................................................................................................ SOA.16.40 JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 WLR 537; [1983] 3 All ER 230 ................ CA.27.80, CA.96.80, CA.98.180
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TABLE OF CASES
JM v The Queen [2015] NSWSC 978 ......................................................................... BA.16A.20, BA.16A.40, BA.17.80 Jackowitz v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 419 ............................................................................................ DMTA.24A.20 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 ....................................................................................................... CPA.156.260 Jackson v The Queen (1976) 134 CLR 42; 50 ALJR 544; [1976] HCA 16 ................................................... CA.19A.660 Jaffrey v Sanders [1923] SASR 276 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; 41 A Crim R 307 ................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 James v Robinson (1963) 109 CLR 593; 37 ALJR 151; [1963] HCA 32 ....................................................... CA.319.140 James v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 427; [2014] HCA 6 .......................................................... CPA.162.40, CPA.162.60 James & Son v Smee [1955] 1 QB 78; [1954] 3 WLR 631; [1954] 3 All ER 273 ............................................... CLP.80 Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574 ................................................................... CA.178BA.120, CA.178BB.240 Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574; 67 A Crim R 150; [1993] HCA 48 ...................................... CA.192E.120 Jan v Fingleton (1983) 32 SASR 379; (1983) 9 A Crim R 293 ...................................................................... CA.546A.40 Jan v Fingleton (1983) 32 SASR 379; 9 A Crim R 293 .................................................................................. CA.93X.120 Jeffrey v Bamford [1921] 2 KB 351 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Jeffrey v DPP (Cth) (1995) 79 A Crim R 514 .................................................................................................. CA.316.160 Jeffs v Graham (1987) 8 NSWLR 292; (1987) 28 A Crim R 211 ....................................................................... SOA.4.40 Jelson (Estates) Ltd v Harvey [1983] 1 WLR 1401; [1984] 1 All ER 12 ..................................................... CPA.156.160 Jemielita v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 409 .................................................................................................... CLP.520 Jensen v Eleftheriou [1982] VR 184 ............................................................................................................... CA.546C.100 Jephson v Barker (1886) 3 TLR 40 ..................................................................................................................... CA.432.20 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 .................... CA.52A.20, CA.52A.120, CLP.1360, CLP.1380 Joel v Mealey (1987) 27 A Crim R 280 ............................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Johanson v Dixon (1979) 143 CLR 376; 53 ALJR 494; [1979] HCA 23 .................................. CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512; 152 A Crim R 527; [2005] NSWCA 101 ................................................................................................... DPVA.9.40, LEPRA.99.120 John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508; (1987) 27 A Crim R 228; [1987] HCA 42 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.178BB.200 John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508; 27 A Crim R 228; [1987] HCA 42 ................................................................................................................................................................ CA.192G.120 Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3 ............. CA.19A.200, CA.19A.600, CA.45.120, CA.345.140, CA.346.80 Johnson v Collier (1997) 142 FLR 409 ................................................................................................................. CA.60.80 Johnson v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, NSWSC, 26 June 1996) ........................................ CA.52AA.40 Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467 ................................................................................................................. SOA.13.20 Johnson v Phillips [1976] 1 WLR 65; [1975] 3 All ER 682 .......................................................... CA.58.200, CA.60.120 Johnson v Sargant & Sons [1918] 1 KB 101 ........................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 ............... CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.23.140 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544; [1950] 1 All ER 300 ........................... CA.345.80, CA.351.60, CLP.40, CLP.1480 Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70 ..................... CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.120, LEPRA.99.160 Jolliffe v Dean (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 157; 71 WN (NSW) 90 ........................................................................ CA.19A.540 Jolly v Salvitti [1974] VR 484 .......................................................................................................................... CA.546A.40 Jolly v Virgo [1927] SASR 188 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Jones v Daire (1983) 32 SASR 369 .................................................................................................................. CA.546C.60 Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.580 Jones v Morley (1981) 29 SASR 57 ................................................................................................. SPA.10.60, SPA.10.80 Jones v The Queen (1997) 143 ALR 52; 71 ALJR 538 ......................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439; 98 A Crim R 107 ......................................................................... CPA.150.200 Jones v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 307 ...................................................................................... CA.24.220, CA.44.80 Jones, Ex parte (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 57 ........................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Jordan v Gibbon (1863) 8 LT 391 .................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347; (1946) 31 Cr App R 57 .............................................. CLP.180
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Judge v Bennett (1887) 4 TLR 75 .................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Jull v Treanor (1896) 14 NZLR 513 ................................................................................................................... SOA.17.40
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K K, Re (1993) 46 FCR 336 .................................................................................................................................... CA.60.120 K, ReDirector of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT) (1993) 46 FCR 336; sub nom(1993) 71 A Crim R 115 ............................................................................................................................................ CA.58.200 K, Re [2002] NSWCCA 374 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.19.180 KBT v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 417; 99 A Crim R 18 ............................................................................ CPA.150.200 KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; (2001) 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11 ..................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CPA.21.260, CPA.150.200 Kaighin v The Queen (1990) 1 WAR 390 ........................................................................................................ CA.52A.200 Kaine v Strickland [1982] Tas R 37 ................................................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Kaitamaki v The Queen [1985] AC 147; [1984] 3 WLR 137; [1984] 2 All ER 435 ...................................... CA.61H.20 Kalick v The Queen (1920) 55 DLR 104 .......................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Kaliyanda v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 300 ................................................................................................ CA.19A.160 Kamara v DPP [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 ............................................. CA.545C.60 Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 .................................................................................................................................................. CLP.740, CLP.760 Kanan v Australian Postal & Telecommunications Union (1992) 43 IR 257; [1992] FCA 539 ..................... CPA.214.40 Kaporonovski v The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 ............................................................... CLP.120, CLP.300, CLP.1060 Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 50 A Crim R 98 .......................... LEPRA.47.20, LEPRA.76.20 Kassis v Katsantonis [1984] 3 NSWLR 330 .................................................. CA.527A.20, CA.527A.80, CA.178BB.240 Kavanagh v Hiscock [1974] QB 600; [1974] 2 WLR 421; [1974] 2 All ER 177 ............................................ CA.58.160 Kearon v Grant [1991] 1 VR 321 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.1360 Keating v Gresham (1985) 79 FLR 4; 17 A Crim R 234 ............................................................................... CPA.156.140 Keeble v The United States (1973) 412 US 205 ............................................................................................... CPA.162.60 Keil v The Queen (1979) 53 ALJR 525 .................................................................................................................. CLP.360 Keir v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 149 ......................................................................................................... CA.19A.160 Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 ................................................................................................... DMTA.25.200 Kelly v The King (1923) 32 CLR 509; [1923] HCA 46 ..................................... CA.19A.180, CA.19A.600, CPA.162.60 Kelly v The Queen (1989) 23 FCR 463; 90 ALR 481 ....................................................................................... CA.97.140 Kelsey v Hill [1995] 1 Qd R 182; (1994) 74 A Crim R 59 ............................................................................. CA.316.200 Kemp v The King (1951) 83 CLR 341 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.200 Kendal v The Queen [1984] WAR 150 ............................................................................................................... CA.33.160 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1967] 2 WLR 129; [1966] 3 All ER 931 ... CA.546C.60, CA.33.160, CA.58.140 Kennison v Daire (1985) 38 SASR 404 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.360 Keyes, Re (1884) 1 WN (NSW) 17 .................................................................................................................. CA.527C.60 Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179 ........................................................... CLP.1840 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 ............................... CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.380, CA.Pt3.Div10.560 Killick v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565 .................................................................................. CPA.150.20, CPA.150.60 King v Lees (1948) 65 TLR 21 ......................................................................................................................... CA.195.100 King v Stair (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 248 .......................................................................................................... CA.52AA.40 King v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 423; (1986) 21 A Crim R 436; [1986] HCA 59 .............. CPA.21.160, CPA.159.20 King v The Queen (2003) 215 CLR 150; 77 ALJR 1477; [2003] HCA 42 ........................................................ CLP.2260 King v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 833; [2012] HCA 24 .............................................................................. CA.52A.200 King, Ex parte; Re Blackley (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 175 .............................................................................. CA.546B.120 Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264; 19 A Crim R 65 ...................... CA.195.20, CPA.154.60, LEPRA.99.100 Kintominas v AG (NSW) (1987) 24 A Crim R 456 ......................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Kippist v Parnell (1988) 36 A Crim R 18 ............................................................................................................. CA.5.180 Knaggs v Director of Public Prosecutions (2007) 170 A Crim R 366; [2007] NSWCA 83 ........................... CPA.175.20 Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56 ... CA.344A.60, CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100, CLP.580 Knight’s Appeal, Re (1968) 12 FLR 81 .............................................................................................................. CA.33.120
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Knowles v The King [1930] AC 366 .................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Koerner v Bretherton (1995) 128 FLR 291 ......................................................................................................... CA.423.80 Koetsveld v Patrick (1903) 29 VLR 152 .............................................................................................................. SOA.6.40 Kolalich v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1991) 173 CLR 222; 57 A Crim R 237; [1991] HCA 47 ...................................................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.65.20, CPA.66.40 Korp v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1964] VR 563 ........................................................................... CA.117.160 Kowbel v R [1954] 4 DLR 337 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.1220 Krakouer v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 202; (1998) 102 A Crim R 490; [1998] HCA 43 ........ CLP.680, DMTA.26.60 Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81 ...................... CA.19A.280, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.380, CLP.420, CLP.440 Kribs v The Queen [1960] SCR 400 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; [1997] HCA 27 .......................................................................... CPA.36.20 Kunnath v The State [1993] 1 WLR 1315; 4 All ER 30; 98 Cr App R 455 ..................................................... CPA.34.20 Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; (1987) 29 A Crim R 12; [1987] HCA 16 ..................... CLP.1300, CLP.1400, DMTA.7.40 Kurucz v Mayne [1966] SASR 82 ....................................................................................................................... CA.351.60
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L La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; [1976] HCA 52 ................................................. CA.4A.40, CA.19A.500 La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; 51 ALJR 145; [1976] HCA 52 .................................................. CLP.360 Lacis v Cashmarts [1969] 2 QB 400 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.160 Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Lambell v Moore [1929] VLR 149 .......................................................................... CA.117.80, CA.117.360, CA.179.280 Land & Water Conservation, Department of v Greentree (2003) 140 A Crim R 25; [2003] NSWCCA 31 .................................................................................................................................................... CLP.1360 Lane v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 317 ......................................................................................................... CPA.162.60 Langford v Commissioner of Corrective Services (1993) 31 NSWLR 661 ................................................... CA.447A.40 Langley, Ex parte; Re Humphries (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 217 .......................................................................... SOA.16.40 Langman v Valentine [1952] 2 All ER 803 .............................................................................. CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 Langrish v Archer (1882) 10 QBD 44 ..................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Lanham v Brake (1983) 34 SASR 578; 13 A Crim R 293; 74 FLR 284 ..................................... SPA.10.80, SPA.10.100 Lanier v The King [1914] AC 221 ................................................................................................................. CA.178A.180 Latham v The Queen (1864) 5 B & S 635; 122 ER 968; 9 Cox CC 516 ....................................................... CPA.21.180 Latimer v The Queen [2001] 1 SCR 3 .................................................................................................................. CLP.2820 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; (1990) 50 A Crim R 287; [1990] HCA 59 ............... CPA.159.20, CPA.212.20, CPA.213.40 Lawrence v Ridsdale [1968] 2 QB 93; [1968] 2 WLR 1062; [1968] 1 All ER 1191 .................................. CA.344A.140 Lawrie v Muir [1950] SLT 37 ......................................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.80 Le Poidevin v Hudson [1935] SASR 223 ....................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Leach v The King [1912] AC 305 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Leaman v The Queen (1987) 28 A Crim R 104 .......................................................................... CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 Leary v Cohan (1940) 14 LGR 142 .................................................................................................................. CA.249A.20 Leavett v Clark [1915] 3 KB 9 ............................................................................................................................ CA.512.20 Lee v Risdon (1816) 7 Taunton 188 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Lee v Saint [1958] VR 126 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220; [1962] 3 WLR 1461; [1963] 1 All ER 73 ........... CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.120 Legal Services Commission (NSW) v Stephens [1981] 2 NSWLR 697 ............................................................ CPA.36.20 Legg v Pardoe (1860) CBNS 289 ........................................................................................................................ CA.512.80 Leicester & Co v Cherryman [1907] 2 KB 101 .................................................................................................. CA.438.20 Leigh v Cole (1853) 6 Cox CC 329 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Lemesk Pty Ltd v Easterby (1993) 66 A Crim R 337 ............................... LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Lemon v A-G (1932) 50 WN (NSW) 19 ............................................................................................................. CPA.30.20 Lenard v The Queen (1992) 57 SASR 164 ....................................................................................................... CA.117.200
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TABLE OF CASES
Lenfield, Re (1993) 114 FLR 195 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.240 Lenthall v Fimeri [1933] SASR 22 ................................................................................................................. CA.527C.160 Lenthall v Newman [1932] SASR 126 ................................................................................... CA.527C.100, CA.527C.160 Lentin v Reynolds [1966] VR 182 ...................................................................................................................... CA.91A.40 Lenzi v Miller [1965] SASR 1 ............................................................................................................................. CA.351.60 Leonard v Cresswell [1920] SALR 165 ............................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 Leonard v Morris (1975) 10 SASR 528 ............................................... CA.546C.60, CA.546C.80, CA.60.120, CLP.1400 Lergesner v Carroll [1991] 1 Qd R 202; 49 A Crim R 51 ................................................................................. CA.61.160 Letts v King [1988] WAR 76 ............................................................................................................................... CA.60.120 Levine v O’Keefe [1930] VLR 70 .................................................................................................................. LEPRA.23.80 Levinge v Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 NSWLR 546; 27 A Crim R 163 ..................................... CPA.19.160 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 .................................................................................................................. CPA.36.20 Lewis v Arnold (1830) 4 C & P 354 ................................................................................................................ LEPRA.9.40 Lewis v Cox [1985] QB 509; [1984] 3 WLR 875; [1984] 3 All ER 672 ......................................................... CA.58.160 Lewis v Crafter [1942] SASR 30 ......................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Lewis v Morgan [1943] 1 KB 376 ................................................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682; [1984] HCA 26 ............................................................................................ CLP.80 Lewis v Tonkin [1929] SASR 324 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 Li v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 442 ............................................................................................................... CA.59.100 Li Wan Quai v Christie (1906) 3 CLR 1125 ............................................................................. CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100 Liangsiriprasert v United States [1991] 1 AC 225; [1990] 3 WLR 606; (1991) 92 Cr App R 77 ....................... CLP.700 Lichaa v The Queen (1980) 3 A Crim R 355 ................................................................................................... CA.316.200 Lighter (No 3), The (1902) 18 TLR 322 ............................................................................................................... CA.32.80 Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1168; [2012] HCA 37 ..................................... CA.19A.160, CA.19A.200 Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; [1963] 1 All ER 223 ... CLP.80, CLP.1040, CLP.1280, CLP.1360 Limbo v Little (1989) 45 A Crim R 61 ................................................................................................................. CLP.2820 Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660; (1981) 72 Cr App R 1 ................... LEPRA.23.80, LEPRA.31.20 Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 ............................................................ CA.23.20, CA.23.60 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 ............................................... CLP.960 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 ................. CA.10E.20, CLP.700, CLP.740, CLP.780 Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 .... CA.33.160, LEPRA.10.40, LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.99.60 Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521 ................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Livermore v The Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 659; [2006] NSWCCA 334 ....................................................... CPA.160.20 Liverpool Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Jones [1914] 3 KB 813 ................................. CA.43A.80 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206; [1941] 3 All ER 338 ................................. CLP.80, LEPRA.9.20, LEPRA.99.60 Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1992] 1 All ER 982 .............................................................. CA.195.100 Lockyer v Ferryman (1877) 2 App Cas 519 .................................................................................................... CPA.156.260 Lodwick v Saunders [1985] 1 WLR 382; All ER 577; (1984) 80 Cr App R 305 ....................................... LEPRA.23.80 Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121 ................................................................................................................... CA.61.140 Lomas v Peek [1947] 2 All ER 574 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.80 London Jewellers Ltd v Attenborough [1934] 2 KB 206 ................................................................................. CA.117.360 London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd, Re [1903] 1 Ch 728 ................. CA.176A.80, CA.192E.120, CA.176.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.250.100, CLP.80 Long v Rawlins (1874) 4 QSCR 86 ...................................................................................................................... CA.56.80 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60 ................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CPA.150.200 Love v Attorney-General (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 307; 64 ALJR 175; [1990] HCA 4 .............................. LEPRA.76.20 Lovelace v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 1 WLR 1468; [1954] 3 All ER 481 ....................................... CLP.80 Lowe v Hooker (1987) 35 A Crim R 90 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Lucerne v Collins [1967] 1 NSWR 407; (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 247 ................................ CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Ludlow v Burgess (1982) 75 Cr App R 227; [1971] Crim LR 238 ..................................................................... CA.95.80
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Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1971] AC 29; [1970] 2 WLR 521; [1970] 1 All ER 567 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.21.180, CPA.21.260, CPA.21.280 Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237; 123 A Crim R 462; [2001] FCA 1640 ............................... CPA.213.40, CPA.213.60 Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 ............................................................................................................ CA.52A.160 Lyons v Smart (1908) 6 CLR 143 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Lyons v The Queen (1992) 1 Tas R 193; 64 A Crim R 101 ............................................................................ CPA.160.20 Lyons (J) & Sons v Wilkins (No 1) [1896] 1 Ch 811 ...................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Lyons (J) & Sons v Wilkins (No 2) [1899] 1 Ch 255 ..................................................................................... CA.545B.40
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M M v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 6 March 1996) ........................................... CPA.132.20 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 ............................. CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.500, CA.Pt3.Div10.600, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 M v The Queen [2015] NSWSC 138 ................................................................................................................. BA.16A.40 M v West London Youth Court; Ex parte M (unreported, 7 July 1999) ......................................................... CA.93C.100 M & J S Properties Ltd v White [1959] 2 QB 25 ................................................................................................ SOA.3.40 MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; 135 A Crim R 361 ............................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305; 200 A Crim R 433; [2010] VSCA 97 ..................................... CLP.160, CLP.2500 MLP v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 93; [2006] NSWCCA 271 ............................................................. CA.66A.120 MRN v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 155 .......................................................................................................... SPA.11.20 MS2 v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 93; [2005] NSWCCA 397 ................................................................ CA.96.100 Mabbott v The Queen [1990] WAR 323 (1989) 40 A Crim R 243 ................................................................. CA.188.100 MacConnel v Brennan [1908] 2 IR 411 .............................................................................................................. CPA.62.40 MacDonald v Beare (1904) 1 CLR 513 .............................................................................. LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.120 MacDonald v The King (1935) 52 CLR 739; [1935] HCA 18 ................................................... CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70 .................. CA.19A.600, CA.327.20, CA.327.180, CPA.162.80 MacKinlay v Wiley [1971] WAR 3 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.5.60 MacLeod v A-G (NSW) [1891] AC 455 ............................................................................................................. CPA.46.40 MacPherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 .................................................................. CA.61.20, CA.61.100, CA.61.120 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512; 55 ALJR 594; [1981] HCA 46 ............................................ CPA.36.20 Machent v Quinn [1970] 2 All ER 255 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Mackalley’s Case (1611) 9 Co Rep 61 .............................................................................................................. CA.345.180 Mackay v The Queen (1977) 136 CLR 465; 51 ALJR 496; [1977] HCA 22 ................................................. CPA.21.160 Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 ................. CA.117.200, CA.173.200, CA.197.100 Macpherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 .......................................................................................................... CA.95.80 Madden; O’Sullivan v Tregaskis [1948] SASR 12 ........................................................................................... CA.527C.60 Magna Plant Ltd v Mitchell [1966] Crim LR 394 .................................................................................................... CLP.80 Mahadeo v The King [1936] 2 All ER 813 ....................................................................................................... CA.347.100 Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100; [1934] HCA 64 ....................................................................................... CLP.1380 Maher v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 221; 25 A Crim R 261; [1987] HCA 31 ......................... CPA.21.20, CPA.21.380 Maingay v Mansfield [1919] WAR 70 .............................................................................................................. CA.546C.60 Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 659 .................................................................................... CLP.80 Makin v Attorney-General (NSW) [1894] AC 57 ............................................................................................. CPA.21.220 Mallan v Lee (1949) 80 CLR 198; [1949] HCA 48 ................................................................................................. CLP.80 Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125; 157 A Crim R 121; [2005] HCA 68 ............................................. CLP.1800 Malubel Pty Ltd v Elder (1998) 88 FCR 242 ................................................................................................ LEPRA.76.20 Malubel Pty Ltd v Elder (No 2) (1998) 73 ALJR 269 .................................................................................. LEPRA.76.20 Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227; 43 A Crim R 451; [1989] HCA 58 .......................................... CPA.156.20 Mammone v Chaplin (1991) 54 A Crim R 163 .................................................................... LEPRA.21.20, LEPRA.23.80 Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21 ............. CA.19A.360, CA.19A.380, CLP.120
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TABLE OF CASES
Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272; (1943) 28 Cr App R 65 ...................................................................................................... CA.19A.600, CA.18.20, CA.23.140, CLP.2280 Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; 28 Cr App R 65 ........................................................ CLP.1440 Manley v Tucs (1984) 40 SASR 1; (1984) 15 A Crim R 356; (1984) 83 FLR 198 ............................................... CLP.80 Mann v Jacombe (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 635 .................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Manning v Cory [1974] WAR 60 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Mansell v Griffin [1908] 1 KB 947 ..................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Mansfield v Kelly [1972] VR 744 ........................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; [1991] HCA 12 ......... CA.52A.140, CLP.420 Margarula v Rose (1999) 149 FLR 444; [1999] NTSC 22 ............................................................................... CA.117.200 Marinellis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 307 ................................................................................................ CA.319.160 Mark v Henshaw (1998) 85 FCR 555; (1998) 101 A Crim R 122 .......................................................................... CLP.80 Markby v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 108; 52 ALJR 626; [1978] HCA 29 ............................ CA.345.100, CPA.21.220 Markou v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 48; [2012] NSWCCA 64 ......................................... CA.35.100, CA.35.120 Marsh v Vauhan 78 ER 937; (1598) Cro Eliz 701 ................................................................................................. CLP.780 Marshall v Benson (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 151 ........................................................................................................ CA.7.80 Marshall v Szommer (1989) 44 A Crim R 198 ................................................................................................. CA.117.380 Marshall v Szommer [1990] Tas R 210 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.400 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 ......................................................................................... CA.51A.120, CA.83.120 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; [1936] HCA 23 ........................................................................................ CLP.580 Martin v Puttick [1968] 2 QB 82 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.340 Martin v The Queen (1981) 4 A Crim R 302 ................................................................................................... CA.52A.200 Martin v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 579; 202 A Crim R 97; [2010] VSCA 153 ................................................ CLP.2660 Martindale v Falkner (1846) 2 CB 706; 135 ER 1124 ......................................................................................... CLP.1480 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 ..................... CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.23.140, CA.23.160 Matheson v Matheson [1952] VLR 27 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.40 Mattar v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 98 ............................................................................................................ CLP.2820 Matterson; Ex parte Helfenbaum (1993) 2 Tas R 115 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Matthews v City of Prahran [1925] VLR 469 .......................................................................................................... CLP.80 Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045 ........................................................ CA.192E.200, CA.192F.180, CA.178BA.160 Mattingley v Tuckwood (1989) 43 A Crim R 111; 88 ACTR 1 .................................................................... CA.192E.120 Mattingly v Tuckwood (1989) 43 A Crim R 111; (1989) 88 ATCR 1 ....................................................... CA.178BA.120 Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633; 51 ALJR 657; [1977] HCA 30 ........................................... CA.19A.200 Mawji v The Queen [1957] AC 126; [1957] 2 WLR 277; [1957] 1 All ER 385 ............................................... CLP.1220 Maxwell v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 309; (1934) 24 Cr App R 152 .............. CA.188.240, CPA.36.20 Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501; 87 A Crim R 180 ... CPA.66.40, CPA.113.40, CPA.154.60, CPA.154.100, CPA.154.120, CPA.154.140, CPA.154.160, CPA.154.180, CPA.154.200, CPA.154.220 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; [1955] HCA 38 .................................................................... CLP.360, CPA.62.60 May v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 111 ......................................................................................................... CA.19A.200 Maybury v Plowman (1913) 16 CLR 468 ............................................................................................................... CA.3.20 McAneny v Kearney; Ex parte Kearney [1966] Qd R 306 .................................................................................... CA.8.20 McArthur v Williams (1936) 55 CLR 324 ..................................................................................................... LEPRA.76.40 McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 .................. CA.19A.160, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.600, CA.52A.140, CA.345.140, CA.345.160, CLP.520 McAvaney v Quigley (1992) 58 A Crim R 457 .................................................................................................. CA.61.240 McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22 ............ CA.52A.40, CA.52A.200, CLP.1300 McCarthy v The Queen (1984) 13 A Crim R 13 .............................................................................................. CA.117.440 McConnell v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [1990] 1 WLR 364; [1990] 1 All ER 423; (1990) 91 Cr App R 88 .................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 McCullough v The Queen [1982] Tas R 43; 6 A Crim R 274 ......................................................................... CPA.160.20 McCullough v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 439; [2009] NSWCCA 94 ............................. CA.33.100, SPA.21A.20 McDaniel’s Case (1755) 19 State Trials 745 ....................................................................................................... CA.345.80
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TABLE OF CASES
McDermott v The Queen (1987) 45 SASR 335 .............................................................................. CA.45.120, CPA.21.20 McDermott, Ex parte (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 231 .................................................................................................... CLP.80 McDonald v Lucas [1922] VLR 47 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.560 McDonald v Mather (1976) 13 SASR 438 .......................................................................................................... CA.119.40 McDonald v Webster [1913] VLR 506 ........................................................................................................... CA.527C.140 McDonald, Ex parte (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 252 .................................................................................................. CA.131.120 McDonnell v Smith (1918) 24 CLR 409; [1918] HCA 26 ................................................................................ CA.78A.20 McDougle v Royal Exchange Assurance Co (1816) 4 M & S 503; 105 ER 920 ............................................. CA.32.100 McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 53 FLR 55 ....................................................................................................... CA.58.200 McEwen v The Queen (1998) 99 A Crim R 421 .................................................................................................. CLP.2260 McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69 ...................... CA.23.20, CA.27.100, CA.27.120, CA.30.80, CA.30.100, CA.33.40 McGowan v Chief Constable of Kingston Upon Hull [1967] Crim LR 34 ................................................. LEPRA.10.60 McGrath v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 527; [2010] NSWCCA 48 .......... CA.61I.120, CA.61J.100, CA.61JA.100 McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 276; [1973] 1 All ER 503; (1973) 57 Cr App R 424 .................................................................................................................................... CLP.580 McGregor v Benyon [1957] Crim LR 608 .............................................................................................................. CLP.560 McInnis v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 575; 54 ALJR 122; [1979] HCA 65 ............................... CPA.19.40, CPA.36.20 McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112 ...................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.140 McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305 ........... CA.51A.120, CA.53.100, CA.59.100, CA.60.160, CA.86.180 McIvor v Garlick [1972] VR 129 ............................................................................................................................ CA.8.20 McKechnie v Jones (1976) 13 SASR 184 ............................................................................................................ CLP.1480 McKechnie v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 13 .................................................................................................. CA.37.140 McKenzie v McKenzie [1971] P 33; [1970] 3 All ER 1034 .............................................................................. CPA.36.20 McKinna v Connelly [1918] VLR 641 .................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 McLachlan v Mesics (1966) 40 ALJR 204 ..................................................................................................... CA.546C.100 McLeod v Hanrahan (1886) 12 VLR 587 ......................................................................................................... CA.131.120 McLiney v Minster [1911] VLR 347 .............................................................................................................. LEPRA.99.60 McMillan v Reeves (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 126 ............... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.120, CA.27.80, CA.28.80, CA.29.80, CA.30.80 McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718 .... CLP.260, CLP.560, CLP.1020, CLP.1040, CLP.1060, CLP.1140 McPherson, Ex parte; Re Moss (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 25 ....................................................... CA.527C.60, CA.527C.80 Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 ....................................................................... CA.61J.140 Mehemet Ali v The Queen (1957) 59 WALR 28 .................................................................................................. CA.23.60 Meikle v Le Sueur [1932] VLR 190 ............................................................................................................... CA.527C.160 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 ........ CA.319.140, CA.326.20, CPA.154.100, CPA.154.140 Meller v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517; [2000] NSWSC 75 ................................................................................. CA.60.80 Mencarious v The Queen (2008) 189 A Crim R 219; [2008] NSWCCA 237 ..................................................... CLP.2260 Menges v The King (1919) 26 CLR 369 .......................................................................................................... CA.131.240 Merry v Green (1841) 7 Meeson & Welsby 623 .............................................................................................. CA.117.420 Metropolitan Bank v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210 ....................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 ................................ CA.4A.40, CA.5.180, CA.195.80 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Wilson [1984] 1 AC 242; [1983] 1 WLR 356; [1983] 1 All ER 993 .......................................................................................................................................................... CA.35A.120 Meyers v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 1488; (1997) 147 ALR 440; [1997] HCA 43 ........................ CLP.140, CLP.1320 Micallef v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 465 ................................................................................................ SPA.Pt1.20 Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 80 A Crim R 542; [1995] HCA 8 ...................... CA.310D.60, CA.33.160 Middlesex Quarter Sessions; Ex parte DPP [1952] 2 QB 758 ....................................................................... CPA.156.140 Middleweek v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1992] 1 AC 179; [1990] 3 WLR 481; [1990] 3 All ER 662. ...................................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Mifsud v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 313 .................................................................................. CA.94.380, CPA.162.60
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TABLE OF CASES
Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149 ......................................................................................................... CLP.180 Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233 ....................................................................................................................... CA.6.20 Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307; [1975] HCA 20 ................................................................................. CLP.80 Miller v Hilton (1937) 57 CLR 400 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Miller v Hrvojevic [1972] VR 305 .................................................................................................... CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Miller v Page (1982–1986) 6 Petty Sessions Review 2854 .............................................................................. DMTA.3.60 Miller v Ryan [1980] 1 NSWLR 93 ............................................................................................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160 Miller v Samuels (1979) 22 SASR 271 ............................................................................................................... CPA.56.40 Miller v Sweeney (2000) 157 FLR 1; [2000] NSWSC 585 .......................................................................... LEPRA.76.40 Miller v The Queen (1980) 55 ALJR 23 ........................................................................................................... CA.345.140 Miller v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 34 ...................................................................................................... CA.192E.160 Miller v Williams (1990) 53 SASR 82 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Miller, Ex parte; Re Hamilton (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 105 .............................................................................. CA.527C.80 Miller, Ex parte; Re Hamilton (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 23 ................................................................................ CA.527C.60 Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.19.100 Mills v The Queen (1986) 61 ALJR 59 ....................................................................................... CA.345.140, CA.345.160 Minigall v McCammon [1970] SASR 82 .................................................................................... CA.117.320, CA.117.420 Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30 ............................................................... CLP.580 Mirams v Our Dogs Publishing Co [1901] 2 KB 564 ........................................................................................ CA.528.40 Mitchell v Berry (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 363 .................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Mitchell v Norman; Ex parte Norman [1965] Qd R 587 .................................................................................. CA.117.200 Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659; 34 ALJR 307; [1960] HCA 77 ......................................................... CLP.1160 Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 ........................................... CPA.19.80, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160 Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14 ............... CA.23.100, CA.23.140, CA.23.180 Mohan v The Queen [1967] 2 AC 187; [1967] 2 WLR 676; [1967] 2 All ER 58 ................. CA.19A.160, CA.19A.200, CA.43A.120, CA.345.100 Mollenhauer v Lindenmayer [1964] QWN 22 .................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Molloy v McDonald (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 159 ............................................................................................. CA.52A.180 Moloney v Mercer [1971] 2 NSWLR 207 ......................................................................................................... CA.61N.80 Moloney v Whitwell [1924] VLR 454 .................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Money v Leach (1765) 1 Wm Bl 555; 96 ER 320 ........................................................................................ LEPRA.48.60 Montgomery v Stewart (1967) 116 CLR 220 .............................................................................................. CA.178BB.200 Montgomery v Stewart (1967) 116 CLR 220; 40 ALJR 534; [1967] HCA 11 ............................................ CA.192G.120 Moore v Allchurch [1924] SASR 111 ................................................................ CA.527C.20, CA.527C.60, CA.527C.120 Moore v Green [1983] 1 All ER 663 ................................................................................................................... CA.58.160 Moore v Wilson (1911) 28 WN (NSW) 119 ........................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265; [1919] HCA 32 ..................................................... CA.7.80, CA.7.100, DMTA.7.40 Morex Meat Australia Pty Ltd v The Queen [1996] 1 Qd R 418; (1995) 78 A Crim R 269 ......................... CA.319.120 Morgan v Attorney-General (Qld) (1987) 24 A Crim R 342 ............................................................................. CA.23A.60 Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 ................................................................................... CA.249B.40 Morgan v Colman (1981) 27 SASR 334; 4 A Crim R 324 ........................................ CA.61.120, CA.423.40, CA.423.80 Morgan v Smallman (1874) 5 AJR 165 ................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 Car & P 684; 172 ER 1419 ..................................................................................... CA.27.80 Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48 ........................................................................................................... CA.195.100 Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446; [1980] 3 WLR 283; [1980] 2 All ER 753 .................... CA.60.120, LEPRA.10.60 Morris v Miller (1767) 4 Bur 2057 ................................................................................................ CA.78A.100, CLP.1220 Morris v Russell (1990) 100 FLR 386 ............................................................................................................ CA.527C.100 Morris v Tolman [1923] 1 KB 166 ...................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Morse v Ashton (1978) 18 SASR 221 ................................................................................................................. CA.60.120 Morse v Chan [2010] NSWSC 1290 .................................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 Morson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671 ......................................................................................................... CA.529.260 Mortin v Shoppee (1828) 3 C & P 373; 172 ER 462 ......................................................................................... CA.61.120 Moss v Brown [1979] 1 NSWLR 114 ............................................................................................. CPA.19.40, CPA.36.20 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 ...................................................................................................................... CA.125.60
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Moss v McIntyre [1934] ALR 149 .......................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Mount Bischoff Tin Mining Co, Registered v Mount Bischoff Extended Tin Mining Co, NL (1913) 15 CLR 549 ................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.10.60 Mousell Bros Ltd v London & North Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836 ................................................... CLP.1360 Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1341 ............................................................................................... CLP.2820 Mowling v Hawthorn Justices (1891) 17 VLR 150 .............................................................................................. SOA.3.40 Moynes v Cooper [1956] 1 QB 439 ............................................................................................ CA.117.320, CA.117.400 Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493; [1955] HCA 59 ...................... CA.4A.20, CA.19A.540, CA.19A.600, CA.5.80 Mraz v The Queen [No 2] (1956) 96 CLR 62 ................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.200 Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 .......................................................................... CLP.660, CLP.720, CLP.740 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; 212 A Crim R 254; [2011] HCA 39 ............... CA.66A.120, SPA.54B.20 Muller v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1909) 9 CLR 693 ................................................................................................ DMTA.7.20 Mumford v The Queen (1989) 95 FLR 358 ............................................................................ CA.178A.60, CA.178A.180 Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38 .............................................................................................. CA.545C.60, CA.545C.80 Murphy v Director of Public Prosecutions (1985) 7 FCR 55; 16 A Crim R 190 .............................................. CPA.62.40 Murphy v Porter (1984) 12 A Crim R 38 .......................................................................................................... CA.188.180 Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; 63 ALJR 422; 40 A Crim R 361 ......................... CPA.19.40, LEPRA.76.40 Murray v Gunst [1915] VLR 232 ................................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 131 A Crim R 215; [2002] HCA 26 ......................... CA.19A.140, CLP.300 Murray, Re (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 475 .................................................................................................... CA.547.20 Muszkat, Ex parte; Re Casas (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 87 ................................................................ CA.4.260, CA.134.140 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484; (1998) 100 A Crim R 397 ........................................... CA.39.120, CA.43.140 Mutual Life Insurance Co Of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311; [1906] HCA 70 ................................. CA.19A.420 Myers v Simpson (1965) 6 FLR 440; [1965] ALR 1148 ....................................................................................... CA.8.20 Myers v The Queen [2011] VSCA 271 ................................................................................................................. CLP.2660
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N N, Ex parte [1959] Crim LR 523 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.560 NSW Bar Association v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231 .................................................................................... CPA.36.20 NSW Bar Association v Muirhead (1988) 14 NSWLR 173 ............................................................................. CPA.19.100 NSW Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 59 A Crim R 6 ................. CLP.1300 NWL v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 67 ........................................................................................................... CA.61L.80 Nagy v Weston [1965] 1 WLR 280; [1965] 1 All ER 78 .................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [1951] AC 66 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.20 Name withheld [2008] NSWCCA 272 .................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11; (1958) 42 Cr App R 240 .............. CA.345.80, CA.346.80, CA.351.60 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; 35 ALJR 4; [1961] HCA 15 ......................................................................................................................................................... CA.19A.300 Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305; 56 ALJR 848; [1982] HCA 55 ......................................................... CA.61.120 Neilsen, Ex parte (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 4 ............................................................................................................... CLP.80 Neilson v South Australian Police (1994) 62 SASR 583 ................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Nelson v The Queen [1902] AC 250 ................................................................................................................. CA.173.120 New, Ex parte (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 483; 32 WN 163 ...................................................................................... CA.502.60 New South Wales v Canellis (1994) 181 CLR 309; 124 ALR 513 .................................................................. CPA.19.180 New South Wales v Koumdjiev (2005) 63 NSWLR 353; 155 A Crim R 186; [2005] NSWCA 247 ........ LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.160 New South Wales Crime Commission v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 ....................................... LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.80 New Zealand & Australian Land Co Ltd v Salisbury [1920] QSR 63 ............................................................ CA.131.120 Newby v Moodie (1987) 78 ALR 603; (1988) 83 ALR 523 ............................................................................ CPA.19.100 Newman v Paties [1979] Qd R 402 .................................................................................................................... SOA.16.40 Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 557; [2002] NSWCCA 377 ................................................... DMTA.25.200 Nguyen v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; [2008] NSWCCA 22 ............................................. CLP.2540, CLP.2640 Nicholas v The Queen (1989) 45 A Crim R 299 .............................................................................................. CPA.160.20 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173; 72 ALJR 456; 99 A Crim R 57; [1998] HCA 9 ..................... CPA.19.120
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Nicholls v Young [1992] 2 VR 209 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Nicholson v Avon [1991] 1 VR 212 ................................................................................................................. LEPRA.9.40 Nicholson v Morgan [1920] SALR 142 .................................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Niven v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 513; 42 ALJR 306; [1968] HCA 67 ........................................................ CLP.1820 Nkau Majara v The Queen [1954] AC 235 ....................................................................................................... CA.347.100 Noble v Police (1994) 70 A Crim R 560 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429 ...................................................... CA.10.40, CA.33.160, CPA.8.20, LEPRA.99.100 Nolan, Re; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 54 A Crim R 11 .............................................................. CPA.156.160 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 ........................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Norris v Crafter [1935] SASR 170 ................................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Norton v The Queen (2001) 24 WAR 488; 122 A Crim R 104; [2001] WASCA 207 ................................. LEPRA.99.40 Nudd v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 301; [2006] HCA 9 ........................................................................... CLP.2280 Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430 .............. CA.19A.500, CA.24.200, CA.24.240, CA.44.100, CA.54.100, CLP.1300 Nye v Niblett [1918] 1 KB 23 ............................................................................................................................. CA.505.40
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O O’Brien v Hutchinson [2012] NSWSC 429 ...................................................................................................... CPA.214.20 O’Brien v O’Brien (1991) 80 NTR 1 ............................................................................................................. LEPRA.21.20 O’Brien v The Queen [1963] WAR 70 ................................................................................................................ CA.83.120 O’Connor v Hammond (1902) 21 NZLR 573 ............................................................................. CA.93X.80, CA.546A.40 O’Connor v Killian (1984) 15 A Crim R 353 .................................................................................................. CA.344A.60 O’Donnell v Dawe [1905] VLR 538 ................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 O’Donnell v Gardener (1902) 27 VLR 718 ..................................................................................................... CPA.154.100 O’Donnell v O’Brien (1899) 24 VLR 673 ............................................................................................................ SOA.3.40 O’Donoghue v Kordick; Ex parte O’Donoghue [1995] 1 Qd R 278 ............................................................ LEPRA.76.20 O’Garey v King [1972] Tas SR 136 ............................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 O’Halloran v O’Byrne [1974] WAR 45 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286; [1997] 2 WLR 1; [1997] 1 All ER 129 ................................................................................ LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.80 O’Mealy v Newell 103 ER 382; (1807) 8 East 364 ......................................................................................... CA.319.140 O’Sullivan v Arriola [1951] SASR 108 ................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 O’Sullivan v Bastian (No 2) [1948] SASR 17 .................................................................................................... CA.351.60 O’Sullivan v Brady [1954] SASR 140 .................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 O’Sullivan v Fisher [1954] SASR 33 .................................................................................................................... CLP.1220 O’Sullivan v Harford [1956] SASR 109 ................................................................................................................... CLP.80 O’Sullivan v Lunnon (1985) 21 A Crim R 347 .................................................................................................... CA.60.80 O’Sullivan v Lunnon (1986) 163 CLR 545 ........................................................................................................... CA.60.80 O’Sullivan v Thurmer [1955] SASR 76 .............................................................................................................. CA.351.60 O’Sullivan v Tregaskis [1948] SASR 12 .......................................................................................... CA.527C.100, CLP.80 O’Sullivan v Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1957) 96 CLR 220; [1957] HCA 8 ............................................................ CLP.80 O’Toole v Arnold (1982) 61 FLR 372 .................................................................................................................... CLP.560 Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 KB 216 ................................................................................................................... CA.43A.120 Oates v Attorney-General (Cth) (1998) 84 FCR 348; 102 A Crim R 353 ......................................................... CPA.66.40 Oblach v The Queen (2005) 65 NSWLR 75; 158 A Crim R 586; [2005] NSWCCA 440 ................................. CLP.2860 Ockley and Whitlesbye’s Case (1622) Palm 294 .............................................................................................. CA.327.180 Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490 ............................................................. CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Olholm v Clink [1923] VLR 556 .................................................................................................................... CA.527C.120 Olsen v Grain Sorghum Marketing Board [1962] Qd R 580 ............................................................................... CLP.1480 Onuorah v The Queen (2009) 76 NSWLR 1; 197 A Crim R 430; [2009] NSWCCA 238 .............. CA.27.100, CLP.760 Oppenheimer v Attenborough [1908] 1 KB 221 ............................................................................................... CA.117.360 Oppenheimer v Frazer & Wyatt [1907] 2 KB 50 .............................................................................................. CA.117.360 Orbit Mining and Trading Co v Westminster Bank [1963] 1 QB 794 ................................................................. CA.4.260 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 ............................................................................................................. 2.40410 Osborn v Barton (1950) 66 TLR 115 .............................................................................................................. CA.178C.140
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Osborn v Boulter [1930] 2 KB 226 ................................................................................................................... CA.529.240 Osborn v Veitch (1858) 1 F & F 317 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75 ................... CA.19A.200, CA.23.60, CA.45.120, CA.345.60, CA.423.60, CLP.440 Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493; (2004) 78 ALJR 957; [2004] HCA 30 ............ CLP.40, CLP.1280, CLP.1380 Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; 97 A Crim R 195 ........................... CLP.1460, LEPRA.10.40, LEPRA.48.40, LEPRA.48.60, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20, LEPRA.76.40 Owens v Minoprio [1942] 1 KB 193; 1 All ER 30 ........................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Owens (1987) 30 A Crim R 59 ......................................................................................................................... CA.52A.200 O’Brien v MR Norton-Smith Pty Ltd (1995) 83 A Crim R 41; 1 ATR 128 ...................................................... SPA.10.80 O’Shane v Burwood Local Council [2007] NSWSC 1300 .............................................................................. DPVA.19.20 O’Sullivan v Wilkinson [1952] SASR 213 .......................................................................................................... SPA.10.80
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P P Foster (Haulage) Ltd v Roberts [1978] 2 All ER 751 ................................................................................. CPA.154.140 PJE v The Queen (1996) 15 Leg Rep C2 .................................................................................. CPA.293.40, CPA.293.120 Packett v The King (1937) 58 CLR 190; [1937] HCA 53 .......................................................... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.600 Paget Publications Ltd v Watson [1952] 1 All ER 1256 .................................................................................. CA.529.160 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 ....................................................................... CA.61.220, CA.61.240 Pankhurst v Jarvis (1910) 101 LT 946 ................................................................................................................. CA.58.160 Panos v Hayes (1987) 44 SASR 148 ........................................................................................ CA.58.200, LEPRA.99.180 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74 ................. CA.61I.60, CA.61.160, CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 .................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.520 Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 .... CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.20, CA.30.80, CA.30.100 Parker v Alder [1899] 1 QB 20 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.1360 Parker v Churchill (1985) 9 FCR 316 ............................... LEPRA.48.40, LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334 ................................................................................. LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Parker v The King (1915) 17 WALR 96 .......................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 ............... CA.19A.60, CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.100, CA.23.120, CA.23.180, CA.23.200, CLP.1200, CLP.1500 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 ........................... CA.19A.600, CA.23.60, CA.23.80, CLP.2280 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 ...................................................................................... CA.23.60 Parker v Todhunter (1987) 26 A Crim R 169 ................................................................................................. CA.527C.100 Parkes v Prescott (1869) LR 4 Exch 169 ............................................................................................................ CA.346.80 Parkin v Norman [1983] QB 92; [1982] 3 WLR 523; [1982] 2 All ER 583 ...................... LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 Parkin and The Queen, Re (1986) 28 CCC (3d) 252 ........................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Parlement Belge, The (1880) 5 PD 197 .................................................................................................................. CLP.180 Parramatta City Council v Stauffer Chemical Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 500; [1973] 1 NSWLR 229 .................................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Patmoy, Ex parte; Re Jack (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351; 61 WN (NSW) 228 ....................... CA.527C.100, CA.527C.120, CA.527C.140, CA.117.20, LEPRA.21.20 Patten v Justice of the Peace, Redfern Court (1986) 22 A Crim R 94 ......................................................... LEPRA.48.80 Peacock v Bell (1667) 1 Wms Saund 69; 85 ER 81 ................................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66 .................... CA.19A.100, CA.51A.120, CLP.580, CLP.2260 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; 72 ALJR 1416; 103 A Crim R 372; 156 ALR 684 ................. CA.52AA.40, CA.112.160, CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.60, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.200, CPA.156.220, CPA.156.240, SPA.10.40 Pearmine v The Queen [1988] WAR 315; (1987) 37 A Crim R 424 ............................................................. CA.61HA.40 Pearson v Rose and Young Ltd [1951] 1 KB 275 ............................................................................................. CA.117.360 Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59; (1981) 72 Cr App R 193 ............................................................................. CA.58.140 Pelham v The Queen (1995) 82 A Crim R 455 ................................................................................................ DMTA.3.80 Pelvey v Brebner [1963] SASR 36 ...................................................................................................................... CA.97.120
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Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 ................... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.19A.600, CA.24.80, CA.24.120, CA.24.160, CA.61.100, CA.61.120, CA.117.200, CA.423.140, CLP.1400, CPA.133.20, CPA.150.240, CPA.162.60 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107; 45 ALJR 333; [1971] HCA 20 .................. CA.23.60, CLP.1880, CLP.2280 Penney v The Queen (1998) 155 ALR 605 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Penney v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 1316 ........................................................................................................... CLP.580 People v Kirwan [1943] IR 279 ........................................................................................................................ CA.19A.420 People v Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823 .................................................................................................. CLP.2840 Percy v Director of Public Prosecutions [1995] 1 WLR 1383 ........................................................................ LEPRA.9.40 Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR 1; 35 A Crim R 382 .............. CA.7.120, CA.55.80, CLP.80, CLP.1300, DMTA.7.40 Perna v Police (SA) (2007) 174 A Crim R 68 ................................................................................................. CA.527C.80 Perry v Lean (1985) 39 SASR 515; 19 A Crim R 457 ..................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Peters v Attorney-General (NSW) (1988) 16 NSWLR 24; 37 A Crim R 102 ............................................. LEPRA.76.20 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; [1998] HCA 7 .................................................... CA.192E.140 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 .................... CA.176A.80, CA.178BA.140, CA.197.100, CLP.80, CLP.660, CLP.720, CLP.760, CLP.800, CLP.1400 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; (1991) 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 ................. CA.316.80, CPA.150.20, CPA.150.140 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 ..................................................... CLP.1800 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 77 A Crim R 149; [1995] HCA 7 ................................................... CLP.580 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 77 A Crim R 149; 69 ALJR 147; 127 ALR 99; [1995] HCA 7 ................................................................................................................................................ CPA.21.220 Pham v The Queen (2009) 193 A Crim R 190; [2009] NSWCCA 25 ......................................................... DMTA.25.220 Pharmaceutical Society v Delve [1984] 1 QB 71 ................................................................................................. CA.39.80 Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 127 ............................................................................................................... SOA.13.20 Phonographic Performance Ltd v Pontin’s Ltd [1968] Ch 290 ........................................................................... SOA.3.40 Pickup v Dental Board of the United Kingdom [1928] 2 KB 459 ...................................................................... CA.10.40 Piddington v Bates [1961] 1 WLR 162; [1960] 3 All ER 660 ................................................. CA.546C.60, LEPRA.9.40 Piper v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1986) 6 NSWLR 352; 25 A Crim R 407 ..................... LEPRA.99.60 Piro v Boorman [1958] SASR 226 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Pittman v Di Francesco (1985) 4 NSWLR 133 ............................................................................................... CA.547D.20 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 ........................................................... LEPRA.10.40, LEPRA.10.60, LEPRA.48.40 Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44 .... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.420, CA.19A.520, CA.51A.120, CLP.120, CLP.580 Plumb v Rayner (1995) 84 A Crim R 402 ........................................................................................................ CA.545B.40 Poiner v Hans (1987) 22 A Crim R 370 ............................................................................................................. SOA.19.20 Pointer v United States (1894) 151 US 396 .......................................................................................................... CLP.1400 Police v Cunard [1975] 1 NZLR 511 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.200 Police v Drummond [1973] 2 NZLR 263 ............................................................................................................. SOA.5.60 Police v Jackson [1980] 1 NZLR 78 ..................................................................................................................... CA.60.80 Police v KennedyR v Kennedy (1998) 71 SASR 175; sub nom(1998) 100 A Crim R 377 ............................... CA.7.120 Police v Nicholson 19 MCR 44 ............................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Police v Pace (2008) 186 A Crim R 113; [2008] SASC 182 ............................................................................... CLP.1380 Police v Richards 8 MCR (NZ) 99 .......................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Police v Smith [1974] NZLR 32 .......................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Police, Commissioner of v Allen (1984) 14 A Crim R 244 ............................................................................... SOA.25.20 Police, Commissioner of v Atkinson (1991) 23 NSWLR 495; 54 A Crim R 378 ..................................... LEPRA.48.120 Police, Commissioner of v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383 ............................................................................................ CLP.80 Police (NSW), Commissioner of v Gabriel (2004) 141 A Crim R 566 ............................................................. SOA.25.20 Police (SA) v Beukes (2011) 205 A Crim R 406; [2011] SASC 9 ...................................................................... CLP.1360 Pollard v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1992) 28 NSWLR 659; 63 A Crim R 383 ..................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.178BB.220 Pollard v The Queen [2010] VSCA 156 ........................................................................................................ CA.52AB.160
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Polley, Ex parte; Re McLennan (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 391; 64 WN (NSW) 125 .... CA.46.20, CA.195.20, CA.196.140, CA.197.140, DPVA.13.20 Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 ....... CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.23.140 Pong Su (No 21), Re (2005) 202 FLR 1; [2005] VSC 96 ................................................................................. CA.45.120 Poole v The Queen [1961] AC 223; [1960] 3 WLR 770; [1960] 3 All ER 398 ............................................. CPA.113.40 Pope v Minton [1954] Crim LR 711 ................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Port Macquarie – Hastings Council v Lawlor Services Pty Ltd (No 7) (2008) 159 LGERA 87; [2008] NSWLEC 75 ................................................................................................................ CPA.214.20, CPA.214.40 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (1981) 147 CLR 589 .......................................................................... CPA.19.160 Porter v Bryan [1963] Tas SR 41 ........................................................................................................................ CA.93X.80 Posner v Collector for Interstate Destitute Persons (Vic) (1946) 74 CLR 461 ............................................ LEPRA.76.40 Potier v Huber (2004) 148 A Crim R 399 ........................................................................................................... CPA.49.20 Potter v Liddy (1984) 14 A Crim R 204 ......................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Potts v Knox (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 91 .................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Poulterer’s Case 77 ER 813; (1611) 9 Co Rep 55 ................................................................................................. CLP.740 Powch v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 496 ....................................................................................................... CA.310D.60 Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1899] AC 143 ............................................................................... SOA.3.40 Preece v Boyd [2003] NSWSC 172 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.40 Pregelj v Manison (1987) 88 FLR 346; 31 A Crim R 383 .................................................................................. SOA.4.20 Price v Cromack [1975] 1 WLR 988; [1975] 2 All ER 113 .................................................................................... CLP.80 Price v Elder (2000) 97 FCR 218; 111 A Crim R 11 .................................................................................... LEPRA.47.20 Price, Re (1885) 6 LR (NSW) 140 ...................................................................................................................... CA.440.20 Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Tran (2006) 166 A Crim R 393; [2006] NSWSC 118 ..................................................................................................................................................................... CLP.2680 Pringle v Everingham [2006] NSWCA 195 ...................................................................... LEPRA.99.140, LEPRA.99.160 Prior v Sherwood (1906) 3 CLR 1054 .................................................................................................................. SOA.3.40 Pritchard, Ex parte (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 104 ................................................................................................... CA.502.60 Proprietary Articles Trade Association v Attorney-General for Canada [1931] AC 310 ............. CLP.40, LEPRA.99.100 Prosser v Fox (1898) 24 VLR 151 ................................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 .......................................................... CLP.80, CLP.1280, CLP.1360, CLP.1380 Pugh v Griffith (1838) 7 Ad & El 827; 112 ER 681 .......................................................................................... CA.112.80 Pullman v Hill & Co [1891] 1 QB 524 ............................................................................................................. CA.529.240 Purdon v Dittmar [1972] 1 NSWLR 94 .......................................................................................................... CA.527C.100 Purves v Inglis (1915) 34 NZLR 1051 ............................................................................................................. CA.61L.100
Q Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 85 ............................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR 13; [1966] HCA 21 ... LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.80 Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544 ............................................................... CPA.34.20 Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 3 of 1995) (1996) 66 SASR 450; 88 A Crim R 1 ................... CPA.113.40 Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal Pursuant to Section 350(1a) Criminal Law Consolidation Act (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 ................................................................................................. CA.61HA.40 Questions of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223; 101 A Crim R 395 ..... DMTA.37.20, LEPRA.30.20 Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284 ............................................................. CLP.580 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 ...................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40
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v A (1998) 99 A Crim R 491 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 v A/ asian Films Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 195; [1921] HCA 11 ............................................................................. CLP.1360 v AB [1941] 1 KB 454 ........................................................................................................................................ CLP.180 v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (2005) 152 A Crim R 384 ........................................................................... CA.24.40 v AJP (2004) 150 A Crim R 575; [2004] NSWCCA 434 ...................................................... CA.66A.120, SPA.54B.20
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v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288 ............................................... CA.61I.100, CLP.160 v ARS (unreported, CCA (NSW), 25 September 1997) ................................................................................ CPA.293.40 v AW [2009] NSWCCA 1 ................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 v AWL [2003] SASC 416 .............................................................................................................................. CA.61L.100 v Abberton [1931] VLR 237 .......................................................................................................................... CA.158.140 v Abbott (1847) 1 Denison 273 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497; [1955] 3 WLR 369; (1955) 39 Cr App R 141 ............................................... CA.19A.220 v Abbott (1995) 81 A Crim R 55 ................................................................................................... CA.4.160, CA.61.240 v Abbotto (1992) 34 FCR 366; 59 A Crim R 208 ........................................................................................ CPA.64.100 v Abbrederis [1981] 1 NSWLR 530; (1981) 3 A Crim R 366 ............................................................................. CLP.80 v Abdallah (2001) 127 A Crim R 46; [2001] NSWCCA 506 ....................................................................... CPA.159.20 v Abdallah (2005) 157 A Crim R 219; [2005] NSWCCA 365 ......................................................................... CA.29.80 v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 ....................................................... CLP.2500, CLP.2580, CLP.2800, CLP.2880 v Abdul-Rasool (2008) 18 VR 586; 180 A Crim R 556; [2008] VSCA 13 ................................................... CA.44.120 v Abdulraham (2007) 171 A Crim R 419 ........................................................................................................ CA.350.20 v Abela [2007] VSCA 22; 170 A Crim R 244 .................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.480 v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575 .................................................................................................................... CA.61I.100 v Abrahams (1895) 21 VLR 343 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 v Absolon 175 ER 825; (1859) 1 F & F 498 ...................................................................................................... CLP.760 v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 .................... CA.52A.20, CA.423.140, CLP.2500, CLP.2520, CLP.2540, CLP.2560, CLP.2580, CLP.2600, CLP.2660, CLP.2880, CPA.36.20 v Acott [1996] 4 All ER 443; [1996] 2 Cr App R 290 ..................................................................................... CA.23.60 v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 ..................................... CA.33.120, CLP.580, CPA.21.220 v Adams [1932] VLR 222 .......................................................................................................... CA.33.180, CA.345.100 v Adams [1957] Crim LR 365 ...................................................................................................................... CA.19A.380 v Addison (1993) 70 A Crim R 213 .............................................................................................................. DMTA.3.80 v Adler (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 June 1992) ........................................................................................ CPA.19.180 v Adler (unreported, CCA (NSW), 29 September 1994) .............................................................................. CPA.19.180 v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79 .............. CA.24.180, CA.24.200, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.44.100 v Ady (1835) 7 Car & P 140 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 v Affleck (1992) 65 A Crim R 96 .......................................................................................... CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 v Agic (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 May 1992) ....................................................................................... DMTA.25.80 v Agius (2000) 77 SASR 469; 115 A Crim R 387; [2000] SASC 259 .......................................................... CA.94.140 v Ah Tye (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 113 ................................................................................................................ CA.423.80 v Ahearne (1852) 6 Cox CC 6 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.740 v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889; (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 ................................... CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.23.180 v Ahmed Din [1962] 1 WLR 680; [1962] 2 All ER 123; 46 Cr App R 269 ................................................ CA.23A.60 v Ahrenfeldt (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 242 .......................................................................................................... CA.172.80 v Aickles (1784) 1 Leach 294 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 ....... CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127 ......................................... CA.19A.80, CA.19A.140, CA.19A.500, CA.428I.60 v Airey (1801) 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown ................................................................................................. CA.179.200 v Aiton (1993) 68 A Crim R 578 .................................................................................................................. CA.19A.500 v Al Khair (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 June 1994) ............................................................................... DMTA.25.200 v Albu & Gheorghita (1995) 84 A Crim R 11 .............................................................................................. CPA.19.160 v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737; 51 A Crim R 281 ................................................................................ CA.52A.180 v Aldridge (1993) 67 A Crim R 371 ................................................. CA.35A.120, CA.34.20, CPA.21.20, CPA.162.40 v Alexander [1981] VR 277 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 v Alexander (2007) 174 A Crim R 297; [2007] VSCA 178 ................................................... CA.199.100, CA.199.140 v Alexandra (1937) 26 Cr App R 116 ........................................................................................................... CA.179.200 v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 ........................................................................................................ CPA.19.40 v Ali (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 692; [1995] Crim LR 303 .............................................................. CLP.2540, CLP.2620 v Ali [2000] NSWCCA 177 ................................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.540
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v Alison (1838) 8 Carr & P 418 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 v Allamby [1974] 1 WLR 1494; [1974] 3 All ER 126; 59 Cr App R 189 ...................................................... CA.4.200 v Allan [1965] 1 QB 130; (1963) 47 Cr App R 243 ...................................................................................... CA.345.80 v Allan [1995] 2 VR 468 ............................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 v Allard [1988] 2 Qd R 269 ..................................................................................................................... CA.178BA.140 v Allard [1988] 2 Qd R 269; 29 A Crim R 418 ......................................................................................... CA.192E.140 v Allday (1837) 8 Car & P 136 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 v Allen (1862) 1 B & S 850; 121 ER 929 ................................................................................. CPA.66.40, CPA.113.40 v Allen [1988] Crim LR 698 .......................................................................................................................... CA.428I.40 v Allen (1993) 66 A Crim R 376 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 v Alley; Ex parte Mundell (1886) 12 VLR 13 .................................................................................................... CLP.740 v Allingham (1989) 42 A Crim R 175 ........................................................................................................... CPA.293.40 v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 812 ......................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 v Allwood (1975) 18 A Crim R 120 ..................................................................... CA.19A.500, CA.23.100, CA.23.200 v Altass (1844) 1 Cox CC 17 ......................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 v Amanatidis (2001) 125 A Crim R 89 ............................................................................................................. CA.7.100 v Amier 172 ER 1269; (1834) 6 Car & P 344 .............................................................................................. CA.117.140 v Amyouni (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 February 1988) ......................................................................... CPA.150.120 v Anastasiou (1991) 21 NSWLR 394; 52 A Crim R 7 ................................................................................... CPA.36.20 v Anderson (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 153 ..................................................................................................... CA.4.260 v Anderson [1951] 70 NZLR 439 .................................................................................................................... CA.83.100 v Anderson (1973) 5 SASR 256 ...................................................................................................................... CA.83.120 v Anderson (1981) 36 ACTR 30; 50 FLR 401 ........................................................ CA.345.40, CA.345.60, CA.346.80 v Anderson [1986] AC 27; [1985] 2 All ER 962; (1985) 81 Cr App R 253 .................................... CLP.720, CLP.740 v Anderson (2001) A Crim R 116; [2001] NSWCCA 488 ................................................................................. CLP.360 v Anderson (Hilton Bombing Case) (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 ................ CLP.1060, CLP.1140, CLP.1540, CPA.36.20 v Anderson; R v Morris [1966] 2 QB 110 .................................................................................................... CA.345.100 v Andrew [2002] NSWSC 489 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.10.100 v Andrews [1962] 1 WLR 1474; 3 All ER 961; (1962) 47 Cr App R 32 ................................................... CA.347.100 v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857 ............................................. CA.319.80, CA.319.140 v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 ................................................................................................ CA.23.60, CA.82.80 v Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 118; [1972] 1 All ER 65; (1972) 56 Cr App R 31 ...................... CLP.780 v Angus (1895) 16 ALT 205 .......................................................................................................................... CA.188.180 v Anh Tuan Le (2002) 130 A Crim R 256 .................................................................................................... CPA.285.20 v Anic (1993) 68 A Crim R 313 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131 ....... CA.19A.200, CA.19A.500, CA.93C.80, CA.5.140, CA.345.100, CPA.21.80, CPA.21.140, CPA.21.280, CPA.21.320, CPA.21.400, CPA.34.20 v Ansell [1975] QB 215 ................................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 v Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189; [1965] 2 WLR 748; (1965) 49 Cr App R 104 ............... CA.346.80, CLP.680, CLP.740 v Antill (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 50 .................................................................................................................. CPA.160.20 v Apfel (1872) 3 VR (L) 172 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.240 v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; 15 A Crim R 88; [1984] HCA 38 ....................................... CLP.1800, CPA.36.20 v Appleby (1940) 28 Cr App R 1 .................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 v Appleby (1996) 88 A Crim R 456 .............................................................................................................. CPA.21.280 v Archbold (1890) 6 WN (NSW) 104 ........................................................................................................... CPA.21.180 v Ardley [1871] LR 1 CCR 301 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 v Armstrong (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 36 ............................................................................................................ CA.311.20 v Armstrong [1972] 1 NSWLR 559 ............................................................................................................... CA.173.120 v Armstrong (1990) 48 A Crim R 382 ........................................................................................................... CA.188.180 v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207; 48 A Crim R 358 .................................................................................. CPA.21.340 v Armstrong [1998] 4 VR 533 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347 ............................... CA.117.280, CA.125.60, CA.179.80, CA.179.280, CA.180.20 v Arnold; Ex Parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 134 A Crim R 151; [2002] QCA 357 ............................. CA.38.40 v Asamakan [1964] PNGLR 193 .................................................................................................................... CA.22A.40
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v Ashman (1858) 1 F & F 88 ............................................................................................................................ CA.4.160 v Ashman [1957] VR 364 ...................................................................................................... CA.19A.500, CPA.156.140 v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190 ................................................................................................ CA.117.260, CA.117.400 v Ashworth (1911) 6 Cr App R 112 .............................................................................................................. CA.188.160 v Asim (1997) 92 A Crim R 97 ............................................................................................ DMTA.25.80, DMTA.40.20 v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48 .................................................................................... CA.179.160, CA.179.260, CLP.740 v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 ................................................................................................................. CA.93B.60 v Assim [1966] 2 QB 249; [1966] 3 WLR 55; (1966) 50 Cr App R 224 ........ CA.93B.100, CPA.21.80, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.320 v Assistant Recorder of Kingston-Upon-Hull; Ex parte Morgan [1969] 2 QB 58; [1969] 1 All ER 416; 53 Cr App R ........................................................................................................................................ CLP.960 v Astill (No 2) (1992) 64 A Crim R 289 ......................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 v Astley (1792) 2 East PC 729 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.140 v Aston (1987) 44 SASR 436; (1987) 26 A Crim R 128 ................................................................................... CLP.740 v Aston [1998] Crim LR 498 ........................................................................................................................... CA.45.120 v Ately (1985) 9 NSWLR 226 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 v Atkins (1900) 64 JP 361 ................................................................................................................................ CA.173.80 v Atkinson (1837) 7 Car & P 669 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Atkinson (1869) 11 Cox CC 330 ......................................................................................... CA.93B.140, CA.545C.60 v Atonio (2005) 154 A Crim R 183; [2005] NSWCCA 200 .......................................................................... CA.95.120 v Attard [2004] NSWCCA 376 ......................................................................................................................... SPA.22.20 v Attard (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 April 1993) .......................... CA.61J.140, CA.61L.100, CA.95.80, CA.98.160 v Aubrey-Fletcher; Ex parte Thompson [1969] 1 WLR 872 ....................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 v Austin (1995) 84 A Crim R 374 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 v Autey (1857) Dears & Bell 294 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Ay (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 October 1998) ............................................................................................. CA.26.40 v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254 ................................................................ CA.161.20, CA.173.160, CA.179.300, CLP.80 v Ayles (1993) 66 A Crim R 302 ........................................................................................... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80 v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511; (1984) 10 A Crim R 312 .............................................................................. CLP.1140 v Azzopardi (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998) ................................................................................... CA.26.40 v B (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 497; 70 WN 294 ................................................................................................. CA.179.220 v B [1979] 3 All ER 460 ..................................................................................................................................... CLP.560 v B (1993) 66 A Crim R 192 ........................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 v B [1998] 4 VR 621; 102 A Crim R 74 ....................................................................................................... CPA.21.260 v B (unreported CCA (NSW), 21 August 1990) .......................................................................................... CA.52A.140 v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 ........................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.520, CA.Pt3.Div10.540 v BD (2001) 122 A Crim R 28; [2005] NSWCCA 25 ................................................................................ DMTA.24.80 v BK (2000) 110 A Crim R 298; [2000] NSWCCA 4 .............................................................. CPA.19.180, CPA.36.20 v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 ........ CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CA.Pt3.Div10.600, CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 v Baartman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 October 1994) .............................................................................. CPA.21.100 v Baba [1977] 2 NSWLR 502 ....................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 v Bacash [1981] VR 923 ............................................................................................................. CA.19A.520, CA.34.20 v Bacon [1973] 1 NSWLR 87 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.17.20 v Bacon [1977] 2 NSWLR 507 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 v Bacon (2000) 120 A Crim R 28; [2000] NSWCCA 549 ...................................................................... DMTA.25A.20 v Bailey [1800] Russell & Ryan 1 .................................................................................................................... CLP.1480 v Bailey (1871) 12 Cox CC 56 ........................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 v Bailey (1872) LR 1 CCR 347 ................................................................................................. CA.117.320, CA.138.80 v Bailey (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 23 .......................................................................................... CA.117.420, CA.126.200 v Bailey [1924] 2 KB 300; (1925) 18 Cr App R 42 ................................................................... CA.79.20, CPA.21.180 v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760; [1983] 2 All ER 503; (1983) 77 Cr App R 76 .............................................. CA.428I.40 v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129 ........................................................................................................................ CA.346.80 v Baines (1900) 69 LJQB 681 ..................................................................................................... CA.188.220, CLP.1220
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Baird (1915) 11 Cr App R 186 ................................................................................................................ CA.178C.180 Baird (1985) 3 NSWLR 331; 32 A Crim R 67 .......................................................................................... DMTA.7.40 Baker (1783) 1 Leach 290; 168 ER 247 ...................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Baker [1895] 1 QB 797 ............................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 217 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.140 Baker (1923) 17 Cr App R 190 .................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Baker [1999] 2 Cr App R 335 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.2620 Baldessare (1930) 144 LT 185; 22 Cr App R 70 ............................................... CA.345.80, CA.345.100, CA.351.60 Balic (1994) 75 A Crim R 509 ................................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Ball [1842] Carrington & Marshman 249 .................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Ball [1911] AC 47; (1911) 6 Cr App R 31 ............................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Ball [1951] 2 KB 109; (1951) 35 Cr App R 24 .......................................................................................... CA.180.20 Ball (1957) 117 CCC 666 ................................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.400 Ballard (1916) 12 Cr App R 1 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Balls (1871) 24 LT 760 ................................................................................................................................. CA.161.20 Balogh (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 108 ................................................................................................................. CA.7.140 Bamford [1972] 2 NSWLR 261 ................................................................................................................ CPA.154.280 Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 ................................................................... CA.61HA.100 Banks (1873) 12 Cox CC 393 ...................................................................................................... CA.346.80, CLP.960 Banks [1911] 2 KB 1095; (1911) 6 Cr App R 276 ............................................................ CPA.154.40, CPA.156.180 Banks [1916] 2 KB 621; (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 ................................................ CA.77.20, CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 Bannen (1844) 174 ER 818; 1 Car & K 295; 2 Mood 309 .................................................... CA.345.60, SOA.17.40 Barber 174 ER 880; (1844) 1 Car & K 434 .............................................................................................. CPA.160.20 Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256; 82 A Crim R 432 ............... CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.27.100, CLP.660, CLP.760 Barker [1924] NZLR 865 ........................................................................................................................... CA.344A.60 Barlow (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 756 ............................................................................................................ CA.347.100 Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1; 93 A Crim R 113; [1997] HCA 19 .......................................................... LEPRA.99.100 Barnard (1837) 7 Carr & P 784 ............................................................................................ CA.179.200, CA.179.240 Barnard (1884) 18 SALR 54 ............................................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Barnes (1850) 2 Denison 59 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Barnes (1858) 8 Cox CC 129 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Barnes [1940] 2 All ER 229; (1940) 27 Cr App R 154 ............................................................................ CPA.21.120 Barnes (1970) 55 Cr App R 100 ....................................................................................... CPA.154.140, CPA.154.200 Barnett (1829) 3 Car & P 600; 172 ER 563 ........................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Barnett (1848) 2 Car & K 594; 175 ER 248 ............................................................................................... CA.94.240 Barnett [1951] 2 KB 425; (1951) 35 Cr App R 37 ..................................................................... CA.10.40, CPA.8.20 Barnier [2001] NSWCCA 459 ................................................................................................ CA.7.120, DMTA.29.40 Barrass [2005] NSWCCA 131 ..................................................................................................................... CA.61N.80 Barrell (1979) 69 Cr App R 250 ................................................................................................................. CPA.21.200 Barreto (unreported NSWCCA 29 September 1993) ................................................................................... CA.33.120 Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; (2007) 171 A Crim R 315; [2007] VSCA 95 ............................................... CA.19A.500 Barron [1914] 2 KB 570; 10 Cr App R 81 ................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.120 Bartlett (1841) 2 Mood & Robinson 362 ..................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Barton (1931) 25 QJPR 81 ............................................................................................................................. CA.39.80 Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 .................................................... CLP.1700, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.62.100 Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; (1916) 12 Cr App R 81 .................................................................................. CLP.580 Bassey (1931) 22 Cr App R 160 ................................................................................................................ CA.176.120 Bastian [1958] 1 WLR 413; (1958) 42 Cr App R 75 .................................................................................... CLP.1140 Bate (1871) 11 Cox CC 686 ........................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Bateman (1845) 1 Cox CC 186 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 .................. CA.24.180, CA.24.200, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.54.100, CLP.1300 Bates & Pugh (1848) 3 Cox CC 201 ......................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Bathgate (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 281; 63 WN (NSW) 173 ..................................................... CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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Bathurst (1870) 1 AJR 40 ........................................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99; 52 Cr App R 251 ............................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Batiste (1994) 35 NSWLR 437; 77 A Crim R 266 .................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Batty (1842) 2 Mood 257 ............................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Batty (1912) 7 Cr App R 286 ..................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Bauld (1876) 13 Cox CC 282 .................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Bavadra (2000) 115 A Crim R 152; [2000] NSWCCA 292 ........................................................................ CA.97.240 Bavastock [1954] Crim LR 625 ...................................................................................................................... CA.49.60 Baxter (1914) 9 Cr App R 60 .................................................................................................................... CA.19A.660 Baxter [1927] SASR 321 .............................................................................................................................. CA.179.80 Baxter [1972] QB 1 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.179.320 Baynes [1989] 2 Qd R 431; 41 A Crim R 405 .......................................................................................... CPA.21.160 Bazley (1986) 21 A Crim R 19 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Beard (1837) 8 Car & P 143 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.60 Beardsall (1859) 1 F & F 529 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Beattie (1981) 26 SASR 481 ..................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Beaumont (1854) Dears 270 ......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Beavan (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 140 ....................................................................................... CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 Bebbington (1978) 67 Cr App R 285 ....................................................................................................... CPA.154.120 Bebic (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 October 1982) ............................................ CLP.680, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.280 Beck [1985] 1 WLR 22; [1985] 1 All ER 571; (1985) 80 Cr App R 355 ................................................. CA.45.120 Beckett (1836) 1 Mood & R 526; 174 ER 181 ....................................................... CA.27.80, CA.96.80, CA.98.180 Beckford [1988] AC 130 ............................................................................................................................... CA.423.40 Beeby (1999) 104 A Crim R 142; [1999] NSWCCA 30 ........................................................................... CPA.19.160 Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197 ......................... CA.19A.320, CA.54.80, CA.59.80, CLP.500, CLP.540 Beedie [1998] QB 356; [1997] 3 WLR 758 ................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100 Beissel (1996) 89 A Crim R 210 ................................................................................................................. SPA.10.100 Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741; [1976] 3 All ER 46; (1976) 63 Cr App R 59 ....... CA.19A.520, CA.4.160, CA.33.120, CLP.1400 Beljavev [1984] VR 657 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.440 Bell [1982] Qd R 216; (1981) 5 Crim R 347 ............................................................................................ CA.172.120 Bell (1985) 2 NSWLR 466 ............................................................................................................................ SPA.61.20 Bell (1987) 8 NSWLR 311; 28 A Crim R 417 ........................................................................................ CPA.154.200 Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.440 Bellamy (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 February 1993) ................................................................................ CA.94.60 Bellis (1911) 6 Cr App R 283 ...................................................................................................................... CA.66A.80 Bellman [1989] AC 836; [1989] 2 WLR 37; [1989] 1 All ER 22 ............................................................ CPA.21.200 Benbolt (1993) 67 A Crim R 11 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Bennett (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 329 ............................................................................................................... CA.83.120 Bennett [1985] 1 NSWLR 410 ..................................................................................................................... CA.444.40 Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197 ................................... CA.112.60, CA.112.80, CA.112.120 Bennett (Berkeley Bernard) (1914) 9 Cr App R 146 ........................................................... CA.176.120, CA.179.300 Bentley (1850) 4 Cox CC 406 ...................................................................................................................... CA.33.160 Bentley [1923] 1 KB 403 ................................................................................................................................ CA.26.40 Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110; 44 A Crim R 1 ............................................................................................... CPA.156.40 Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110; 44 A Crim R 1; [1989] HCA 64 ........................................................................ CLP.580 Berger (1915) 11 Cr App R 72 ................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Berkshire Justices (1878) 4 QBD 469 ........................................................................................ CA.95.80, CA.98.160 Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137 .................... CA.99.60, CA.117.200, CA.117.320, CLP.1480 Bernthaler (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 December 1993) ..................................................................... CPA.293.120 Berrigan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 October 1994) ............................................................................. CPA.293.120 Berrigan (unreported, High Court, 23 November 1995) .......................................................................... CPA.293.120 Berriman (1854) 6 Cox CC 388 ................................................................................................... CA.42.40, CA.85.20 Berry (1897) 104 L T Jo 110 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.34.20
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
TABLE OF CASES
R v Berry [1984] 1 WLR 824; [1984] 2 All ER 296 ...................................................................................... CA.545D.80 R v Berwick [1979] Tas R 101 .............................................................................................................................. CA.27.80 R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; 66 A Crim R 419 .............. CA.61L.80, CA.61HA.40, CPA.162.40, CPA.293.60, CPA.293.100 R v Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr App R 148 ................................................................................................ CA.345.100 R v Betty (1963) 48 Cr App R 6 ....................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 R v Beveridge (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 676; 26 WN (NSW) 152 ......................................................................... CPA.113.40 R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256; 51 A Crim R 89 ... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.178BB.240, CA.327.220 R v Bicanin (1976) 15 SASR 20 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213; (1920) 14 Cr App R 87 ........................................................................................ CA.18.20 R v Bikic (2000) 112 A Crim R 300; [2000] NSWCCA 106 ........................................................................... CPA.21.380 R v Bikic [2002] NSWCCA 227 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.160.20 R v Billinghurst [1978] Crim LR 553 ................................................................................................................. CA.61.240 R v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469 ........................................................................... CA.19A.300, CA.428I.40, CLP.540 R v Bingley (1833) 5 Car & P 602; 172 ER 1118 ........................................................................ CA.94.100, CA.117.260 R v Bird (1839) 9 Car & P 44; 173 ER 732 ....................................................................................................... CA.112.80 R v Bird (1851) 2 Den 94; 169 ER 431 .................................................................................. CPA.156.140, CPA.156.180 R v Birkett (1805) Russ & Ry 86 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; 48 A Crim R 385 .................................................................. CPA.36.20, CPA.159.20 R v Birlut (1995) 39 NSWLR 1 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.132.20 R v Birt (1899) 63 JP 328 .................................................................................................................................. CA.176.120 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 .................. CA.192G.120, CA.176.120, CA.178BB.200, CA.179.200 R v Bishop (1888) 4 WN (NSW) 107 ................................................................................................................. CA.37.100 R v Bishop (1981) 54 FLR 1 ............................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 R v Black (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 748; 38 WN (NSW) 231 ................................................................................ CA.576.20 R v Black [1963] 1 WLR 1311; [1963] 3 All ER 682; (1964) 48 Cr App R 52 ............................................ CPA.160.20 R v Black [2001] NSWCCA 41 ....................................................................................................... CA.95.120, CA.96.100 R v Blackham (1787) 2 East PC 711 .................................................................................................................. CA.94.140 R v Blacklidge (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 December 1995) ........................................................................ CA.24.280 R v Blackman [2001] NSWCCA 121 .................................................................................................................. SPA.12.20 R v Blade (unreported CCA NSW 1 May 1991) .................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400 R v Blair (2005) 152 A Crim R 462; [2005] NSWCCA 78 ................................................. DMTA.23.160, DMTA.29.40 R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278; [1963] 3 WLR 496; (1963) 47 Cr App R 272 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.680, CLP.740, CLP.760 R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 ................. CA.19A.160, CA.19A.360, CLP.460, CLP.540 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 .............. CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 R v Blenkinsop (1848) 2 Car & Kir 531 ............................................................................................................. CA.250.40 R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65 ................................................................... CA.4.160, CA.5.200, CA.33.120, CLP.1400 R v Bloodworth (1914) 9 Cr App R 80 ............................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 R v Bloomfield [1842] Carrington & Marshman 537 ....................................................................................... CA.179.200 R v Bloomfield (1998) 44 NSWLR 734; 101 A Crim R 404 ............................................................................. SPA.44.20 R v Bloxham (1943) 29 Cr App R 37 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.140 R v Boag (1994) 73 A Crim R 35 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 R v Boardman (1838) 2 Mood & Robinson 147 ................................................................................................ CA.250.60 R v Boatswain [2015] NSWSC 1828 ................................................................................................................. BA.16A.40 R v Boatswain [2015] NSWSC 878 ................................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 R v Bobak [2005] NSWCCA 320 ........................................................................................................................ CA.33.200 R v Boden (1844) 1 Car & K 395; 174 ER 863 ........................................................................... CA.94.240, CA.117.200 R v Bodin [1979] Crim LR 176 ........................................................................................................................... CA.45.120 R v Bogacki [1973] QB 832; [1973] 2 WLR 937; [1973] 2 All ER 864 ....................................................... CA.154A.40 R v Boland [1974] VR 849 .................................................................................................................................... CA.86.80 R v Bolter (1875) Cox CC 440 .............................................................................................................................. CA.4.160
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Bolton (1841) 1 QB 65; 113 ER 1054 ..................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Bolton (1992) 94 Cr App R 74 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.660 Bolton (unreported, District Court, NSW, Cooper J, 14 May 1981) ............................................................ CA.53.80 Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 ................................................................................................................ CA.82.80, CA.83.120 Bond (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 August 1996) .................................................................................... CPA.293.60 Bondareff (1999) 109 A Crim R 23; [1999] SASC 316 ................................................... CA.310D.60, CPA.154.260 Bone [1968] 1 WLR 983; [1968] 2 All ER 644; (1968) 52 Cr App R 546 ................................................. CLP.2660 Bonnyman (1943) 28 Cr App R 131 .............................................................................................................. CA.44.80 Bonollo [1981] VR 633; 2 A Crim R 431 .............................................. CA.192E.140, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140 Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74 .............................................................................. CA.61L.80, CA.61.160, CA.61.180 Booth (1897) 3 ALR (CN) 19 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Booth [1982] 2 NSWLR 847; 8 A Crim R 81 ......................................................................................... CPA.154.260 Boothby (1933) 24 Cr App R 112 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Borinelli [1962] SASR 214 .............................................................................. CA.344A.60, CA.117.80, CA.117.360 Borrett (1833) 6 Car & P 124 .................................................................................................... CA.159.80, CLP.1460 Boseley [1937] 4 All ER 100; (1937) 26 Cr App R 99 ........................................................................... CA.178A.60 Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 ............................................................................................................. CA.192G.120 Boskovitz (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 August 1996) ........................................................................... CPA.154.200 Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386; [1923] HCA 59 ................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Boston [2000] NSWCCA 227 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.167.20 Bottomley (1922) 16 Cr App R 184 ........................................................................................................ CA.178A.180 Bouch [1983] QB 246; [1982] 3 WLR 673; [1982] 3 All ER 918 ............................................................... CA.47.80 Boulden (1957) 41 Cr App R 105 ................................................................................................................ CA.43.100 Boult (1848) 2 Car & Kir 604 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Boulter (1852) 5 Cox CC 543 .................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Bouquet [1962] SR (NSW) 563; [1962] NSWR 1034; 79 WN (NSW) 423 ...................... CPA.63.20, CPA.150.140 Bourke (1993) 67 A Crim R 518 ................................................................................................................ DMTA.7.40 Bourne (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 176 ................................................................................. CA.117.20, CA.117.280 Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 .............................................................................................................................. CA.83.100 Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; [1938] 3 All ER 615 ............................................................................................ CLP.2820 Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 ......................................... CA.79.40, CA.345.80, CLP.1220, CLP.2500, CLP.2640 Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107; [1998] 3 All ER 289 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.2820 v Bow County Court; Ex parte Pelling [1999] 1 WLR 1807; 4 All ER 751 ................................................. CPA.36.20 v Bow Street Magistrates; Ex parte Mackeson (1981) 75 Cr App R 24 ................................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160 v Bowden (1843) 2 Mood CC 285; 169 ER 113 ............................................................................................ CA.148.80 v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 ................................................................... CA.19A.540, CA.19A.600, CA.110.120 v Bowen (1840) 9 Car & P 509; 173 ER 933 ................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 v Bowen (1841) Car & M 149;174 ER 448 .................................................................................................... CA.33.120 v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372; [1996] 4 All ER 837; [1996] 2 Cr App R 157 ................................................ CLP.2580 v Bower (1888) 5 WN (NSW) 28 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 v Bowerman [1891] 1 QB 112 ........................................................................................................................... CA.4.260 v Bowers (1866) LR 1 CCR 41 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 v Bowhay (2000) 111 A Crim R 271; [2000] NSWCCA 54 ............................................................................ CA.23.60 v Bowman [No 2] (1987) 87 FLR 472; 49 NTR 48 ..................................................................................... CA.117.200 v Box (1839) 9 Car & P 126 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 v Boyce (1824) 1 Mood CC 29; 168 ER 1172 ............................................................................................... CA.46.100 v Boyce (1976) 15 SASR 40 ............................................................................................................................. CA.7.120 v Boyd [1984] WAR 236; (1984) 12 A Crim R 20 ..................................................................................... CA.78A.160 v Boyesen [1982] AC 768; [1982] 2 WLR 882; [1982] 2 All ER 161 ........................................ CA.7.80, DMTA.7.40 v Boyle [1914] 3 KB 339; (1914) 10 Cr App R 180 ....................................................................................... CA.99.60 v Boyle [1954] 2 QB 292; [1954] 3 WLR 364; (1954) 38 Cr App R 111 .............................. CA.112.80, CPA.154.20 v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 ................................................................................................ CLP.2260 v Bozikis [1981] VR 587; 5 A Crim R 58 ........................................................................................................ CLP.2280
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Bradford (1860) 8 Cox CC 309 .................................................................................................................... CA.213.20 Bradlaugh (1883) 15 Cox CC 217 ................................................................................................................ CA.529.40 Bradley (1910) 4 Cr App R 225 ................................................................................................................. CPA.150.20 Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83 .................................................................................................................. CA.61.240 Brain (1919) 13 Cr App R 197 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Braithwaite [1983] 1 WLR 385; [1983] 2 All ER 87; (1983) 77 Cr App R 34 ...................................... CA.249B.80 Bramley (1822) Russ & Ry 478 ................................................................................................................... CA.162.40 Braynell (1850) 4 Cox CC 402 ..................................................................................................................... CA.31.100 Brdarovski [2006] VSCA 231; (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 ............................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.420 Bren (1863) Le & Ca 346 ............................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Brennan (1970) 16 FLR 358 ...................................................................................................................... CA.189B.20 Brentford Justices; Ex parte Wong [1981] 1 QB 445; 73 Cr App R 65 ................................................... CPA.19.160 Brereton (1914) 10 Cr App R 201 .............................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Brett (1845) 1 Cox CC 261 ........................................................................................................................ CA.188.160 Brice (1821) Russ & Ry 450; 168 ER 892 .................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Brien (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 154 ............................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Briese; Ex parte Attorney-General [1998] 1 Qd R 487; (1997) 92 A Crim R 75 .................................... SPA.10.100 Brigden [1973] Crim LR 579 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.150.60 Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 ............................................................................................... CA.117.80, CA.117.360 Brightwell [1995] 2 NZLR 435 .......................................................................................... CPA.156.80, CPA.156.220 Brindley (1993) 66 A Crim R 204 ................................................................................................................ SPA.44.20 Bristow [1960] SASR 210 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.540 Britcher (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 121 ............................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Britten (1988) 49 SASR 47; 36 A Crim R 48 ........................................................................................... CA.345.140 Britton (1893) 17 Cox CC 627 ................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Britton [1973] RTR 502 .............................................................................................................................. CA.319.140 Broadbent [1964] VR 733 ......................................................................... CPA.154.100, CPA.154.200, CPA.154.280 Broadfoot [1976] 3 All ER 753; (1976) 64 Cr App R 71 .......................................................................... CA.91A.40 Broadhurst [1964] AC 441 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.150.120 Bromhead (1906) 71 JP 103 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Brookes (1842) Car & M 543; 174 ER 626 ................................................................................................ CA.148.20 Brooks (1838) 8 Car & P 295 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Brooks (1853) Dears 184 ............................................................................................................................ CA.188.220 Brooks (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 502 ................................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Brooks (1902) 5 Can Crim Cas 372 .......................................................................................................... CA.43A.120 Brougham (1986) 43 SASR 187 ............................................................................................... CA.35.120, CA.97.140 Brow [1981] VR 783 ............................................................................... CA.192E.140, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140 Brown (1847) 2 Cox CC 348 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Brown (1852) 17 QBD 833 ...................................................................................................................... CA.546B.120 Brown (1856) Dearsly 616 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Brown (1870) LR 1 CCR 244 ........................................................................................................................ CA.85.20 Brown (1883) 10 QBD 381 ............................................................................................................................ CA.30.80 Brown (1890) LR 24 QBD 357 ...................................................................................................................... CA.79.40 Brown (1899) 63 JP 790 ................................................................................................................................. CA.82.60 Brown [1968] SASR 467 ........................................................................................... CLP.2540, CLP.2560, CLP.2640 Brown (1977) 64 Cr App R 231 .............................................................................................................. LEPRA.21.20 Brown [1978] 2 NZLR 174 ........................................................................................................................ DMTA.3.80 Brown (1984) 13 A Crim R 454 ..................................................................................................................... CA.24.20 Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 ............................... CA.192E.120, CA.192G.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.178BB.200 Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 ................................... CA.316.200, CLP.2600, CLP.2640, CLP.2660 Brown (1989) 17 NSWLR 472; 44 A Crim R 385 ........................................ CPA.19.80, CPA.19.160, CPA.154.180 Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 .................................................... CA.35.100
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 .............. CA.51A.120, CA.39.100, CA.48.100, CA.53.100, CA.59.100, CA.60.160, CA.61.160, CA.61.240, CA.61.260, CA.61.280, CA.61.300, CA.61.320, CA.95.80 R v Brown [1995] Crim LR 328 ....................................................................................................................... CA.198.100 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994) ................................................... CA.178BA.180, CA.178BB.280 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 December 1998) ................................................................................. CA.316.80 R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994) ............................................................ CA.192E.280, CA.192G.160 R v Brown (Winston) [1994] 1 WLR 1599; [1995] 1 Cr App R 191 ................................................................. CLP.1800 R v Brown 174 ER 522; (1841) Car & M 314 ................................................................................................... CA.58.200 R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278 ................................ CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CA.351.40, CPA.162.40 R v Brownlow (1910) 4 Cr App R 131 .......................................................................................................... CA.178C.120 R v Brummit (1861) Le & Ca 9 .......................................................................................................................... CA.139.60 R v Bryan [1857] Dearsly & Bell 265 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.200 R v Bryan (1861) 2 Fos & Fin 567 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 R v Bryan (1951) 35 Cr App R 121 ...................................................................................................................... CA.10.40 R v Bryant (1899) 63 JP 376 .......................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 R v Bubb (1850) 4 Cox CC 455 ....................................................................................................................... CA.43A.120 R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 ........................................................................................................ CA.52A.180, CA.52A.200 R v Buck and Buck (1960) 44 Cr App R 213 .................................................................................................... CA.346.80 R v Buckett (1995) 79 A Crim R 302; 126 FLR 435 .............................................................. CA.527C.140, CA.117.200 R v Buckmaster (1887) 20 QBD 182 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 R v Bucksath (2000) 114 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 135 ........................................................................ CPA.19.160 R v Bugmy [2004] NSWCCA 258 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.12.40 R v Bull (1877) 13 Cox CC 608 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 R v Bull 173 ER 723; (1839) 9 Car & P 22 ......................................................................................................... CA.18.20 R v Bullock (1825) 1 Mood 324 ......................................................................................................................... CA.148.20 R v Bullock [1955] 1 WLR 1; 1 All ER 15; (1954) 38 Cr App R 157 ............................................................. CA.346.80 R v Bunn (1872) 12 Cox CC 316 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.760 R v Burchell (1987) 34 A Crim R 148 ............................................................................................................. CA.66A.120 R v Burdett 106 ER 873; (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 ............................................................................ CA.19A.420, CLP.1440 R v Burdon (1927) 20 Cr App R 80 ...................................................................................................................... CA.53.80 R v Burgess (2005) 152 A Crim R 100; [2005] NSWCCA 52 ........... CA.195.100, CA.423.40, CA.423.60, CA.423.140 R v Burgiss (1836) 7 Car & P 488; 173 ER 217 ........................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 R v Burgon (1856) Dearsly & Bell 11 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.280 R v Burke (1822) Russ & Ry 496 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 R v Burke (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 336; 35 WN (NSW) 92 .............................................................. CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 R v Burke [1993] 1 Qd R 166; (1991) 56 A Crim R 242 .............................................................. CPA.34.20, CPA.36.20 R v Burles [1947] VLR 392 ............................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 R v Burnett (1994) 76 A Crim R 148 .............................................................................................................. CPA.154.260 R v Burnett (1996) 85 A Crim R 76 ................................................................................................................ DMTA.23.20 R v Burns (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 351; 37 WN (NSW) 77 .................................................................................. CPA.21.20 R v Burns (1928) 45 WN (NSW) 163 ............................................................................................................... CA.131.260 R v Burnside [1962] VR 96 ................................................................................................................................. CA.24.220 R v Burr [1969] NZLR 736 ................................................................................................................................... CLP.1200 R v Burrows [1952] 1 All ER 58; (1951) 35 Cr App R 180 ............................................................................. CA.61L.80 R v Burstow [1998] AC 147 ................................................................................................................................ CA.61.120 R v Burt (2003) 140 A Crim R 555; [2003] NSWCCA 248 ............................................................................. CA.61L.80 R v Burton (1829) 1 Mood 237 ........................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 R v Burton (1854) Dearsly 282 .................................................................................................... CA.117.280, CA.117.340 R v Burton (1875) 32 LT 539; 13 Cox CC 71 ............................................................ CA.345.60, CA.346.80, CA.351.60 R v Burton (1886) 16 Cox CC 62 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 R v Burton (1986) 24 A Crim R 169 ................................................................................................................ CA.19A.100 R v Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298 ............................................................................................................................. CA.7.80 R v Buswell [1972] 1 WLR 64; 1 All ER 75 ....................................................................................................... CA.7.120
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Butcher [1858] Bell CC 6 ....................................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.345.60 R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1 ..... CA.19A.140, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.300, CA.94.60, CA.94.140, CLP.440 R v Butler (1991) 24 NSWLR 66; 56 A Crim R 231 ....................................................................................... CPA.113.20 R v Butt (1884) 15 Cox CC 564 ......................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 R v Butt (1884) 51 LT 607 ................................................................................................................................ CA.158.140 R v Butterfield (1843) 1 Cox CC 39 ................................................................................................................. CA.347.100 R v Butterwick (1839) 2 Mood & Robinson 196 ............................................................................................... CA.250.40 R v Buttle (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 154 ......................................................................................... CA.117.320, CA.126.200 R v Button [1966] AC 591 ............................................................................................ CA.93C.80, CA.93C.140, CA.8.20 R v Button (1991) 54 A Crim R 1 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.260 R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 ........... CA.61J.140, CA.59.120, CA.86.180, CA.97.140, CA.195.140 R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 ............................................. CA.35.120 R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658 ............................................. CA.52A.140, CA.52A.160, CA.52A.200, CLP.1300 R v Buzart (1884) 1 WN (NSW) 73 .................................................................................................................... CA.427.20 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 WLR 440; (1960) 44 Cr App R 246 ............. CA.23A.60, CLP.1040, CLP.1120, CLP.1140 R v Byrne [No 2] [1938] St R Qd 141 .............................................................................................................. CPA.21.100 R v C (1981) 3 A Crim R 146 ............................................................................................................................. CA.86.100 R v C [1982] Qd R 405; (1982) 6 A Crim R 128 ........................................................................................... CA.78A.160 R v C (1994) 75 A Crim R 309 ........................................................................................................................ CA.442B.20 R v C (1997) 93 A Crim R 81 ........................................................................................................................ LEPRA.99.40 R v C [2005] EWCA Crim 2827; [2006] 1 Cr App R 20 ...................................................................................... CLP.960 R v CAL (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 October 1996) ..................................................................................... CA.316.80 R v Ca [1961] 1 WLR 1083; 2 All ER 856; (1961) 45 Cr App R 374 ........................................................... CA.188.160 R v Cabbage (1815) Russ & Ry 292 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.220 R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178 ........................................................................................................ DMTA.25.220 R v Cahill [1978] 2 NSWLR 453; (1978) 46 FLR 453 ......................................................................................... CLP.760 R v Cahill [1998] 4 VR 1 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.1400 R v Caird (1970) 54 Cr App R 499 .................................................................................................................. CA.93B.100 R v Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App R 137 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.2820 R v Cakmak [2002] 2 Cr App R 10; [2002] Crim LR 58 .......................................................... CA.199.100, CA.199.140 R v Calderwood [1983] NI 361 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.2620 R v Caldwell [1976] WAR 204 ............................................................................................................................ CA.61.320 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; [1981] 2 WLR 509; [1981] 1 All ER 961 ..................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808; [1985] 2 All ER 226; (1985) 81 Cr App R 131 ................................................ CA.45.120 R v Callaghan [1942] St R Qd 40 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.120 R v Callaghan [1966] VR 17 .......................................................................................................... CPA.19.40, CPA.21.400 R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300; (1993) 70 A Crim R 350 .......................................................................... CPA.160.20 R v Cambridge [1994] 1 WLR 971; [1994] 2 All ER 760; (1994) 99 Cr App R 142 ...................................... CA.23.120 R v Cameron (1856) 7 A Digest (2nd ed) 449 ...................................................................................................... CA.85.20 R v Cameron (1877) 3 VLR (L) 85 ................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 R v Cameron (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 56 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.280 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466 ....... CA.35A.120, CA.344A.140, CA.33.180, CA.59.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.19.160, CPA.162.40, CPA.162.60 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; 8 A Crim R 466 ................................................................ CA.192E.260, CA.35.140 R v Cameron (1991) 57 A Crim R 406 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.280 R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994) .............. CA.24.100, CA.24.200, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.24.260, CA.54.100 R v Cammilleri [1979] 1 NSWLR 184 .......................................................................................... CA.173.100, CA.175.80 R v Campbell (1792) 2 Leach 564; 168 ER 385 ................................................................................................ CA.148.80 R v Campbell (1827) 1 Moody 179 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 R v Campbell [1981] Qd R 516 ................................................................................... CA.86.100, CA.86.140, CA.86.240
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Campbell 174 ER 722; (1843) 1 Car & K 82 ............................................................................................. CA.19A.20 Camplin 169 ER 163; (1845) 1 Den 89 ................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Cantlon (1868) 5 WW & a’B 24 .................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Cantor [1991] Crim LR 481 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Caple (1984) 14 A Crim R 106 ........................................................................ CA.35A.120, CA.33.180, CPA.162.20 Caplin (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 514; 50 WN (NSW) 189 ....................................................... CA.117.340, CA.117.440 Carey (1990) 20 NSWLR 292; (1990) 50 A Crim R 163 ................................................. DMTA.3.80, DMTA.29.40 Carlile (1819) 3 B & Ald 167 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.8.20 Carlos [1946] VLR 15 ................................................................................................................................... CA.83.100 Carlssen (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 268 ............................................................................................................... CLP.180 Carmichael [1940] 1 KB 630; [1940] 2 All ER 165; (1940) 27 Cr App R 183 ..................................... CA.78A.100 Carn (1982) 5 A Crim R 466 .................................................................................................... CA.428I.40, CLP.1180 Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618 .................................. CA.178C.140, CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.179.300 Carr (1811) Russ & Ry 198 .......................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Carr (1883) 9 VLR (L) 188 .............................................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Carr (1934) 24 Cr App R 199 ......................................................................................................................... CA.24.40 Carr (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 59 ..................................................................................................................... CA.47.100 Carr (1996) 1 VR 585 .................................................................................................................................. CA.23A.60 Carr (2002) 135 A Crim R 171 ................................................................................................................ CA.176A.100 Carr (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 October 1990) ......................................................................................... CA.61.240 Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; (1943) 29 Cr App R 76 .................... CA.178B.120, CA.77.20, CA.417.40, CLP.1440, SOA.12.20 Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 ......................................................................................................... CA.19A.160 Carrion (1993) 69 A Crim R 230 ............................................................................................................... CA.447A.40 Carrion (2000) 49 NSWLR 149; 113 A Crim R 39; [2000] NSWCCA 191 ..................... DMTA.25.220, SPA.44.40 Carroll (1825) 1 Mood CC 89; 168 ER 1197 .............................................................................................. CA.148.80 Carroll [1975] 2 NZLR 474 .......................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; 136 A Crim R 167 .............................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.200 Carruthers (1844) 1 Cox CC 138 ................................................................................................................. CA.31.100 Carter (1867) 10 Cox CC 642 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Carter [1959] VR 105 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.280, CLP.1120 Carter (2003) 141 A Crim R 142; [2003] QCA 515 ....................................................................................... CLP.440 Carter [2003] NSWCCA 243 ......................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371; 47 A Crim R 55 .................................................. CA.45.120 Cartledge [1956] VLR 225 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.162.80 Cartwright (1806) Russ & Ry 106 ................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Carusi (1989) 17 NSWLR 516; 45 A Crim R 165 ............................ CLP.680, CLP.740, DMTA.3.80, DMTA.26.60 Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 ................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 Caruso (1988) 49 SASR 465; (1988) 37 A Crim R 1 ............................................................................... DMTA.3.40 Carver [1917] 2 WWR 1170 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.156.180 Case (1850) 1 Den 580; 169 ER 381 ........................................................................................................... CA.61.160 Casement [1917] 1 KB 98 ........................................................................................................... CA.16.20, CPA.17.20 Casey (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 189; 43 WN (NSW) 51 ................................................................................ CA.117.280 Cash [1985] 1 QB 801; [1985] 2 WLR 735; 2 All ER 128; (1985) 80 Cr App R 314 ........ CA.117.20, CA.188.40, CA.188.160 Caslin [1961] 1 WLR 59; [1961] 1 All ER 246; (1960) 45 Cr App R 47 ... CA.117.360, CA.120.140, CA.179.200 Cassidy [1919] SR (NSW) 48; 36 WN 13 ................................................................................................... CA.121.40 Castiglione (1912) 7 Cr App R 233 .............................................................................................................. CA.311.20 Castiglione (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 393; [1963] NSWR 1; 80 WN (NSW) 537 ......................................... CA.91A.40 Castledine (1792) 2 East PC 645 .................................................................................................................. CA.148.80 Catalano (1992) 61 A Crim R 323 ................................................................................................................... CLP.780 Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41 ............ CA.19A.300, CA.5.200, CA.24.120, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CLP.440 Cattell (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 391 ..................................................................................................... CPA.30.20
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Cawley (1896) 7 QLJR 45 ............................................................................................................................ CA.117.20 Cawthorne [1996] 2 Cr App R (s) 445 ........................................................................................................... CA.24.20 Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 ................................................. CA.27.40, CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100 Chaaban (2006) 166 A Crim R 406; [2006] NSWCCA 352 ......................................................................... CLP.2680 Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 ................................ CLP.780, CLP.2260, CLP.2660, CPA.154.260 Chai [2000] NSWCCA 320 ........................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 Chai (2002) 128 A Crim R 101; [2002] HCA 12 .......................................................................................... CLP.1880 Chainey [1914] 1 KB 137 ............................................................................................................................ SOA.17.40 Chairman, County of London Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Downes [1954] 1 QB 1 ................................... CPA.17.20 Chairman of Parole Board (NT); Ex parte Patterson (1986) 32 A Crim R 266 ....................................... CA.316.200 Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 ............................................................................................. CLP.680, DMTA.26.60 Chamberlain (1833) 6 Car & P 93; 172 ER 1160 ................................................................................... CPA.156.180 Chami (2002) 128 A Crim R 428; [2002] NSWCCA 136 ........................................................................ CPA.21.320 Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R 244 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421; 63 A Crim R 242 ........................ CA.527C.40, CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100, CLP.80 Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689; [1994] 2 All ER 552; (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 ................ CA.35.100, CA.39.100, CA.59.100, CA.95.80 v Chandler [1913] 1 KB 125; (1912) 8 Cr App R 82 ............................................................... CA.112.80, CA.117.340 v Chang (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 October 1998) ....................................................................................... CA.99.60 v Chant (unreported, NSW (CCA), 12 June 1998) .............................................................. CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 v Chapple (1840) 9 Car & P 355 ................................................................................................................... CA.347.100 v Charles (1866) 3 W W & a’B (L) 52 ........................................................................................................... CA.311.20 v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248; [1976] 1 All ER 659 ...................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 v Charlesworth (1861) 1 B & S 460; 121 ER 786 ..................................................................................... CPA.156.140 v Charlesworth (1910) 4 Cr App R 167 ........................................................................................................ CA.179.300 v Chater (1861) 9 Cox CC 1 ............................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 v Chattaway (1924) 17 Cr App R 7 ................................................................................................................... CA.44.80 v Chayna (1993) 66 A Crim R 178 ................................................................................................................. CA.23A.60 v Cheatham (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 20 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.400 v Checconi (1988) 34 A Crim R 160 ........................................................................................................... CPA.154.260 v Chee [1980] VR 303 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.154.260 v Cheeseman 173 ER 202; (1836) 7 Car & P 455 ...................................................................................... CA.19A.360 v Chelmsford Justices; Ex parte Amos [1973] Crim LR 437 ............................................................................ CLP.960 v Cheney [1999] NSWCCA 312 ................................................................................................................... CA.33B.160 v Cheng (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 November 1998) ................................................................................. CA.99.60 v Cheng (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 September 1994) ............................................................................... CA.60.200 v Cherry (1781) 1 Leach 236n; 2 East PC 556 ......................................................................... CA.94.100, CA.117.140 v Cheshire (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 129 ............................................................................................................. CA.94.140 v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844; [1991] 3 All ER 670; (1991) 93 Cr App R 251 ...... CA.19A.300, CLP.460, CLP.540 v Chester [1982] Qd R 252; 5 A Crim R 296 ................................................................................................ CA.23A.60 v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall; Ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] QB 458; [1981] 3 WLR 967; [1981] 3 All ER 826 ............................................ LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2007] 2 AC 105; [2007] 2 WLR 46; [2007] 2 All ER 529 ............................................................................................................................................................ LEPRA.99.180 v Chief Metropolitan Magistrate; Ex parte Choudhury [1990] 3 WLR 986 ............................ CA.529.40, CA.529.100 v Child (1851) 5 Cox CC 197 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; 16 A Crim R 147; [1985] HCA 35 ................................................................... CLP.1820 v Chiron [1980] 1 NSWLR 218 ................................................................... CPA.154.200, CPA.154.220, CPA.154.240 v Chisari [2006] NSWCCA 19 ....................................................................................................... CA.27.80, CA.33.120 v Chivers [1993] 1 Qd R 432; (1991) 54 A Crim R 272 .............................................................................. CA.23A.60 v Chmait [1999] NSWCCA 217 ...................................................................................................................... CA.94.360 v Chonka [2000] NSWCCA 466 ..................................................................................................................... CA.61N.80 v Chow (1987) 11 NSWLR 561; 30 A Crim R 103 ................................................................... CLP.680, DMTA.26.60 v Chrastny (No 1) [1991] 1 WLR 1381; [1992] 1 All ER 189; (1992) 94 Cr App R 283 .............................. CLP.740
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TABLE OF CASES
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Christ (1951) 35 Cr App R 76 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.460 Christian (1913) 23 Cox CC 541 ................................................................................................................. CA.91A.40 Christie (1914) AC 545 ..................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Christopher (1858) Bell CC 27 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Christopher Smith [1997] 1 Cr App R 14 ............................................................................. CA.93C.80, CA.93C.100 Church [1966] 1 QB 59; [1965] 2 WLR 1220; (1965) 49 Cr App R 206 ............................ CA.19A.400, CLP.1320 Churchill [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; [1967] 1 All ER 497 ....................................................... CLP.1480 Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.580 Cicekdag (2004) 150 A Crim R 299; [2004] NSWCCA 357 .................................................................... SPA.21A.20 Cicio (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 449 ..................................................................................................... CPA.21.260 Clare [1984] 2 NSWLR 522; (1984) 14 A Crim R 322 .............................................................................. CA.73.100 Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 ............................................................ CA.4.160, CA.61.120, CA.61.160, CA.61HA.80 Clark (1883) 15 Cox CC 171 ......................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Clark (1918) 82 JP 295; 26 Cox CC 138 ..................................................................................................... CA.184.40 Clark (1963) 47 Cr App R 203 ......................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Clark (1974) 23 FLR 324 ............................................................................................................................. CA.444.40 Clark (1975) 27 FLR 380 ........................................................................................................................... CA.441A.20 Clark (1991) 6 WAR 137; (1991) 52 A Crim R 180 ........................................................................................ CLP.80 Clark (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.2260 Clark (unreported, NSW (CCA), No 60439 of 1997, 17 April 1998) ............................. CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Clarke (1810) 2 Leach 1036 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Clarke (1866) 4 F & F 1040 ........................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227; [1927] HCA 47 ............................................................................................ CA.19A.520 Clarke [1934] QSR 23 ................................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Clarke [1949] 2 All ER 448; (1949) 33 Cr App R 216 ............................................................................... CA.61I.60 Clarke [1959] VR 645 ......................... CA.19A.180, CA.19A.200, CA.43A.80, CA.24.220, CA.44.80, CA.345.100 Clarke [1962] VR 657 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.21.280 Clarke [1976] 2 All ER 696 ......................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Clarke [1986] VR 643; 21 A Crim R 135 .................................................................................................. DMTA.6.20 Clarke (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 ................................................................................................... CA.95.80, CPA.21.20 Clarke (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 ................................................................................................................... CA.121.40 Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Clarkson (1986) 24 A Crim R 54 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Clarkson [1987] VR 962; 25 A Crim R 277 .................... CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120, CPA.19.100, CPA.19.180, CPA.21.20 Clayton (1843) 1 Car & Kir 128 .................................................................................................................. CA.345.80 Clayton (1984) 35 SASR 232 ........................................................................................... CPA.154.160, CPA.154.200 Clayton (1997) 42 NSWLR 268; 98 A Crim R 164 .................................................................................... CA.444.40 Clear [1968] 1 QB 670; (1967) 52 Cr App R 58 .......................................................................................... CA.99.60 Clegg (1868) 19 LT 47 ................................................................................................................................ CA.327.120 Clogher [1999] NSWCCA 397 ..................................................................................... CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.200 Close [1948] VLR 445 ................................................................................................................................ CA.529.160 Close (1992) 31 NSWLR 743; (1992) 65 A Crim R 55 .............................................................................. SPA.44.20 Closs 169 ER 1082; (1858) Dears & B 460 ................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396; 64 A Crim R 451 ............................................................ CA.19A.200, CA.345.100 Clouter and Heath (1859) 8 Cox CC 237 ................................................................................................ CPA.154.200 Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316 ....................................................................................................... CA.178A.180 Clucas [1949] 2 KB 226 ........................................................................................................................ CA.178BA.120 Clucas [1949] 2 KB 226; [1949] 2 All ER 40 ........................................................................................ CA.192E.160 Cobcroft (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 608 ......................................................................... CA.249B.40, CA.249F.20 Cockburn [1968] 1 WLR 281; [1968] 1 All ER 466 ............................................................. CA.117.220, CA.118.20 Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1100 Cogan [1976] QB 217; [1975] 3 WLR 316; [1975] 2 All ER 1059 ........................................................... CA.61I.60 Coggins (1873) 12 Cox CC 517 ................................................................................................................. CA.188.160
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Cogley [1989] VR 799; 41 A Crim R 198 .................................................. CA.61H.20, CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100 Cohen (1851) 2 Denison 249 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Cohen (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 348 ............................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Cohen (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 ..................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 Cole (1847) 2 Cox CC 340 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Cole (1941) 28 Cr App R 43 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 Cole [1965] 2 QB 388; 3 WLR 263; 2 All ER 29 ........................................................... CPA.154.120, CPA.156.220 Cole [1994] Crim LR 582 ............................................................................................................ CLP.2540, CLP.2560 Coleman (1783) 1 Leach 303 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 ................... CA.4A.20, CA.4A.40, CA.19A.560, CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CA.5.80, CA.5.140, CA.5.200, CA.35.100, CA.60.180, CA.195.80, CLP.160 Coleman (1991) 56 A Crim R 369 ........................................................................................................... DMTA.32.40 Coles [1984] 1 NSWLR 726; (1984) 9 A Crim R 419 ............................................. CLP.740, CLP.760, DMTA.3.80 Colgan (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 96; 76 WN (NSW) 41 .................................................................................. CA.66F.60 Collett (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 291 ............................................................................................................ CA.131.120 Collett (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 June 1979) ............................ CA.86.140, CA.86.160, CA.86.220, CA.345.100 Collicott (1812) Russ & Ry 213; 2 Leach 1048 ...................................................................... CA.250.40, CA.250.80 Collie (1991) 56 SASR 302; 55 A Crim R 139 ................................................................... CA.345.100, CPA.21.320 Collier (1831) 5 Car & P 160 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Colling (1847) 2 Cox CC 184 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Collingridge (1976) 16 SASR 117 ................................................ CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80, CA.27.100, CA.29.80 Collins (1844) 1 Cox CC 57 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Collins (1986) 42 SASR 47 ........................................................................................................................ CA.179.320 Collins (1989) 43 A Crim R 170 ................................................................................................................ CPA.21.260 Collins [1996] 1 Qd R 631; 76 A Crim R 204 .................................................................. CPA.21.200, CPA.154.100 Collinson (1931) 23 Cr App R 49 .................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Collis-Smith [1971] Crim LR 716 ................................................................................ CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120 Collister (1955) 39 Cr App R 100 .................................................................................................................. CA.99.60 Colmer (1864) 9 Cox CC 506 ........................................................................................................................ CA.85.20 Colquhoun (unreported, CCA NSW 28 Oct 1992) .......................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.420 Commissioner of Police; Ex p North Broken Hill Ltd (1992) 1 Tas R 99; 61 A Crim R 390 .......... LEPRA.99.180 Compston (unreported, CCA (NSW), 22 April 1993) ................................................................................ CPA.19.120 Compton (1828) 3 Car & P 418; 172 ER 482 ............................................................................................. CA.148.20 Compton (1835) 7 Car & P 139; 173 ER 62 ............................................................................................... CA.112.80 Conde (1867) 10 Cox CC 547 ...................................................................................................................... CA.24.220 Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 ................................................................................. CA.192E.140, CA.178BA.140 Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 ............................................................................................................... CA.197.100 Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 ........................................... CA.545C.60, CA.45.120, CA.61.160, CA.61.240, CA.345.80 Conley (1979) 21 SASR 166 ................................................................................................................. LEPRA.48.120 Conlon (1993) 69 A Crim R 92 ........................................................................... CA.428I.60, CA.423.40, CA.423.60 Connell (unreported, Seaman J, Supreme Court, (WA) 14 September 1992) ............ CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.160 Connell [No 6] (1994) 12 WAR 133 ............................................................................................................ CPA.30.20 Connolly (1829) 2 Lew CC 229 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.1220 Connolly (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 184 ...................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1080, CLP.1180 Connolly (No 2) [1991] 2 Qd R 661 ............................................................................................................ CA.94.100 Constantin Bejenaru (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 October 1991) .......................................................... DMTA.7.40 Conway (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 289 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.80 Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 WLR 1238; [1988] 3 All ER 1025 ..................................... CLP.2540, CLP.2820 Coogan (1787) 1 Leach 449 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Cook (1912) 8 Cr App R 91 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Cook [1954] 1 WLR 125; 1 All ER 60 ....................................................................................................... CA.91A.40 Cook (1963) 48 Cr App R 98 .................................................................................................................. CA.344A.120 Cook [1995] 2 Qd R 77; (1994) 74 A Crim R 1 ...................................................................................... CA.93B.140 Cook (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 May 1990) ............................................................................................ CPA.21.20
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Cooke (1838) 8 Car & P 582 ................................................................................ CA.250.40, CA.250.60, CA.250.80 Cooke (1871) LR 1 CCR 295 ................................................................................................. CA.117.160, CA.125.60 Cooke (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 188 .............................................................................................................. CA.120.140 Cooke (1985) 39 SASR 225; 16 A Crim R 304 ................................................................... CA.19A.500, CA.23.220 Cooke [2007] NSWCCA 184 ........................................................................................................................ SPA.98.20 Cooney (1987) 31 A Crim R 256 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Cooper (1833) 5 Car & P 535 ...................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Cooper (1846) 8 QB 533 .............................................................................................................................. CA.346.80 Cooper (1874) LR 2 CCP 123 .................................................................................................................... CA.166.140 Cooper (1875) 1 QBD 19 ........................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Cooper [1877] 2 QBD 510 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Cooper (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 426; 31 WN (NSW) 164 .................................... CA.117.200, CA.124.40, CA.527.40 Cooper (1978) 17 SASR 472 .................................................................................................... CA.35.120, CA.97.140 Cooper (1979) 69 Cr App R 229 ................................................................................................................ CPA.150.20 Cooper (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 February 1993) ............................................................................... CA.428I.40 Cooper (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 February 1998) .............................................................................. CPA.21.380 Cooper, Shea & Stocks (1908) 24 TLR 687; 1 Cr App R 88 ..................................................................... CA.139.60 Copeland [1842] Carrington & Marshman 516 ......................................................................................... CA.179.200 Corak (1982) 30 SASR 404 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Cordell (1983) 10 A Crim R 475 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Cornelius (1988) 34 A Crim R 49 ......................................................................................................... CA.178BA.140 Cornish (1988) 48 SASR 520; (1988) 33 A Crim R 91 ........................................................................... CA.52A.140 Cornwell [1972] 2 NSWLR 1 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Cosgrove [1948] Tas SR 99 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.154.320 Cosgrove (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 ............................................................................................................ CPA.21.340 Coslet (1782) 1 Leach 236; 168 ER 220 ............................................................ CA.94.100, CA.94.300, CA.117.140 Cosnett (1901) 20 Cox CC 6 ................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 Cosser (1876) 13 Cox CC 187 ................................................................................................................... CA.125.100 Costi (1987) 48 SASR 269 .................................................................................................... CPA.159.20, CPA.160.20 Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 ................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.560 Cotesworth (1704) 6 Mod 172; 87 ER 928 ................................................................................................. CA.61.120 Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 ........ CLP.220, CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.340, CLP.1080, CLP.1120, CLP.1140 Cotton (1990) 48 A Crim R 311 ............................ CPA.21.80, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320, CPA.21.340 Cottrell [1983] 1 VR 143 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.440, CA.188.160 Coughlan (1976) 63 Cr App R 33 ............................................................................................................ CPA.156.180 Coughlan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990) ..................................................................................... CA.95.100 Coughlan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 August 1977) ...................................... CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.162.40 Coulson & Rusting (1850) 1 Denison 592 ................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Coulstock and Summersford (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 October 1991) ............................................... CPA.21.360 Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 ................... CA.61L.80, CA.61L.100, CA.61.100, CA.61.120, CA.61.140 Courtie [1984] AC 463; [1984] 2 WLR 330; 78 Cr App R 292 ................................................................. CA.195.20 Cousins [1982] 1 QB 526; [1982] 2 WLR 621; (1982) 74 Cr App R 363 .................................. CA.31.100, CLP.80 Coutts [2006] UKHL 39; [2006] 1 WLR 2154; [2006] 4 All ER 353 ..................................................... CPA.162.60 Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31 ............................................. CA.52A.20, CA.52A.120, CA.52A.200 Cowan [1955] VLR 18 ............................................................................................ CA.24.220, CA.44.80, CA.44.140 Cowan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 February 1990) ................................................................................ CA.86.220 Coward (1979) 70 Cr App R 70 ............................................................................................................... CPA.154.180 Cowell (1985) 24 A Crim R 47 ................................................................................................................ CPA.154.260 Cowell & Green (1796) 2 East PC ............................................................................................................. CA.188.160 Cox (1818) Russ & Ry 362; 168 ER 846 .................................................................................. CA.4.160, CA.33.120 Cox (1858) 1 F & F 90 ............................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 Cox (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 664; 175 ER 897 .............................................................................. CA.33.120, CA.35.100 Cox [1898] 1 QB 179 ................................................................................................................................... CA.66A.80
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Cox [1923] NZLR 596 .................................................................................................................................. CA.180.20 Cox [1960] VR 665 ....................................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Cox [1968] 1 WLR 308; 1 All ER 386 ....................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Cox [1999] NSWCCA 62 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.21.20 Coxhead (1845) 1 Car & Kir 623 ................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Coyne (1905) 69 JP 151 ........................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 Crab (1868) 11 Cox CC 85 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 .......... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CA.5.140, CA.178BA.120, CLP.80, CLP.1400 Crabbe [1985] 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19; [1985] HCA 22 ........................................................... CA.192E.120 Craig Laing (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 June 1996) ......................................................................... DMTA.23.180 Craig Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 ........................................................................................................ CPA.150.120 Cramp (1817) Russ & Ry 324; 168 ER 827 ................................................................................................ CA.184.40 Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 ................................ CA.41A.80, CA.27.80, CA.29.80, CA.39.80, CA.47.100, CA.82.60 Cramp (1999) 110 A Crim R 198; [1999] NSWCCA 324 ............................................................................ CA.24.20 Crane (1912) 7 Cr App R 113 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Cranston [1988] 1 Qd R 159 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.21.200 Crawford (1845) 2 Car & K 129; 175 ER 54 .............................................................................................. CA.46.120 Crawford (1988) 36 A Crim R 182 .............................................................................................................. CPA.17.20 Crawley (1982) 5 A Crim R 451 .................................................................................................................... CA.4.160 Crawshaw (1860) 8 Cox CC 375 ................................................................................................................... CLP.1480 Creamer [1919] 1 KB 564 ..................................................................................................... CA.117.300, CA.188.100 Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72; (1965) 49 Cr App R 368 ................................................................................... CA.346.80 Creed (1843) 1 Car & Kir 63 ....................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Crespigny (1795) 1 Esp 280 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.180 Cresswell (1876) 1 QBD 446 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Cresswell (1987) 8 NSWLR 56; 26 A Crim R 414 ................................................................................... CA.188.240 Crichton [1915] SALR 1 ............................................................................................................ CA.546C.60, CLP.960 Crick (18 Aug 1993) The Times ................................................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 Cridland (1857) 7 Ellis & Blackburn 853 .................................................................................................... CA.512.80 Crimmins [1959] VR 270 ............................................................................................................................. CA.316.80 Crisologo (1997) 99 A Crim R 178 ................................................................. CA.344A.140, CLP.2260, CPA.162.80 Critchell (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 209 ............................................................................................................. CA.125.60 Crocker (1805) Russ & Ry 97 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.80 Croft [1944] KB 295; [1944] 2 All ER 483; (1944) 29 Cr App R 169 .................................... CA.18.20, CA.346.80 Croft [1981] 1 NSWLR 126; (1981) 3 A Crim R 307 .............................................................................. CPA.162.80 Croft [1981] 1 NSWLR 126; 3 A Crim R 307 .......................................................................... CA.23.20, CA.23.220 Crofts (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 March 1995) .............................................................. CA.316.100, CA.316.200 Cronau (1980) 3 A Crim R 461 ................................................................................................................. CA.19A.140 Crooke (1731) 2 Stra 901 ............................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Crookwell (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 119 ........................................................................................................ CA.345.100 Cross (1995) 84 A Crim R 242 ....................................................................................................................... CA.7.140 Crossley (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 494; 65 WN (NSW) 225 ....................................................... CA.345.40, CA.351.60 Crowden (1911) 6 Cr App R 190 ................................................................................................................... CA.53.80 Crowe [1985] 2 Qd R 389; (1985) 16 A Crim R 478 ............................................................................... CPA.160.20 Crowley (1963) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 238 .................................................................................................. CA.180.20 Crowther (1832) 5 Car & P 316 ................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Croydon Justices; Ex parte Dean [1993] QB 769 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Crozier [1965] Qd R 133 ........................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Crozier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 March 1996) ............................................ CA.61J.140, CA.35.120, CA.59.120 Crump (1825) 1 Car & P 658 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Crump [1966] Qd R 340 ............................................................................................................ CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Crump (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 February 1975) ................................................................................... CA.60.200 Crutchley 173 ER 355; (1837) 7 Car & P 814 ......................................................................................... CA.19A.100
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Cryer (1857) Dears & Bell 324 .................................................................................................................. CA.188.160 Cullen [1951] VLR 335 ............................................................................................................................... CA.78A.20 Cullum (1873) LR 2 CCR 28 ....................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 .............................................................................................. CA.7.100, CA.7.140 Cummings (1994) 12 SR (WA) 172 ........................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; (2004) 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164 .......................................... CA.19A.420 Cumpton (1880) 5 QBD 341 .................................................................................................. CA.546C.60, CA.58.140 Cundick (1822) 1 Dowling & Ryan NP 13 ................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155 ................. CA.4A.40, CA.19A.520, CA.5.100, CA.5.140 Cunningham [1981] 3 WLR 223; 73 Cr App R 253 ..................................................................................... CA.4.160 Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 109 ....................................................................................................................... CA.59.80 Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 96 .................................................................................................... CA.19A.320, CLP.540 Curlija [1967] SASR 1 ................................................................................................................................ CA.188.180 Curran [1983] 2 VR 133 .......................................................................................................................... LEPRA.47.20 Curren (1987) 27 A Crim R 49 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1080 Currie [2002] NSWCCA 126 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.162.80 Curtis (1991) 55 A Crim R 209 ........................................................................... CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Cushing (No 2) 1977 WAR 141 ............................................................................................................... CPA.156.120 Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470; [1980] 3 WLR 89; [1980] 2 All ER 401; (1980) 71 Cr App R 148 ...................................................................................................................................................... CLP.740, CLP.780 v Cutrale [2011] NSWCCA 214 ...................................................................................................................... CA.37.140 v D [1984] 3 NSWLR 29; 14 A Crim R 198 ............................................................................... CA.54.100, CLP.1300 v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186; [1984] 2 All ER 449 ................................................. CA.86.100, CA.86.240 v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 ....................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.540, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 v D’Eon (1764) 1 Black W 510; 96 ER 295 ................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 v DH [1997] NSWSC 259 ............................................................................................................................... CA.61H.20 v DJT [1999] NSWCCA 22 ................................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.540 v DJX (1990) 91 Cr App R 128 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 v DMC (2002) 137 A Crim R 246; [2002] NSWCCA 513 ........................................................ CA.86.140, CA.86.200 v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140; (1997) 99 A Crim R 454 ........................................ CPA.154.100, CPA.154.280 v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 ....................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 v Dabelstein [1966] Qd R 411 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.120 v Dadson 169 ER 407; (1850) 2 Den 35 ........................................................................................................... CA.18.20 v Daher [1981] 2 NSWLR 669; (1981) 5 A Crim R 137 ............................................................................. CA.316.200 v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; (1982) 74 Cr App R 348 ............................. CA.24.120, CLP.420 v Dale (1889) 16 Cox CC 703 ......................................................................................................................... CA.83.120 v Daley (1879) 2 SCR (NS) (NSW) 151 ....................................................................................................... CA.117.260 v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169 ............................................................................................................ LEPRA.76.20 v Dalloz (1909) 1 Cr App R 258 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.1520 v Dally (2000) 115 A Crim R 582; [2000] NSWCCA 162 .............................................................................. CA.24.20 v Dalton (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 4 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 v Daly [1968] VR 257 ................................................................................................................................ CA.61HA.100 v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750; (1982) 6 A Crim R 35 .................................................................................. CLP.1140 v Dang [2005] NSWCCA 430 .................................................................................................................... DMTA.25.220 v Dannelly and Vaughan (1816) Russ & Ry 310 ............................................................................................ CA.345.60 v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668; 56 ALJR 688; [1982] HCA 32 ............. CLP.740, CLP.780, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.160 v Daren [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 .................................................................................................................... CPA.150.140 v Dark (1847) 1 Denison 276 ........................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 v Darling [1974] 2 NSWLR 542 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.6.40 v Darrington [1980] VR 353; (1979) 1 A Crim R 124 ............................................. CA.428I.40, CLP.2520, CLP.2640 v Dat Quoc Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545; [2002] NSWCCA 147 ................................................................... CLP.580 v Dat Tuan Nguyen (2001) 118 A Crim R 479; [2001] VSCA 1 ...................................................................... CLP.580 v Davenport [1954] 1 WLR 569; [1954] 1 All ER 602; (1954) 38 Cr App R 37 ................... CA.156.120, CA.157.60 v David [1939] 1 All ER 782 ........................................................................................................................... CA.432.20
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David (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 October 1995) .............................................................................. DMTA.25.200 Davidson (1934) 25 Cr App R 21 .................................................................................................................. CA.85.20 Davidson [1969] VR 667 .............................................................................................................................. CA.83.100 Davidson (1991) 54 SASR 580; 54 A Crim R 119 .................................................................. CLP.80, LEPRA.21.20 Davies [1913] 1 KB 573 ................................................................................................................................. CA.4.240 Davies [1953] 1 QB 489; (1953) 37 Cr App R 16 .................................................................................... CA.188.240 Davies [1970] VR 27 ........................................................................................................... CA.94AA.20, CA.117.160 Davies (1974) 7 SASR 375 ......................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513 .................................................................................................................. CA.178BA.120 Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513; (1982) 74 Cr App R 94 ................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.192E.160 Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276; 17 A Crim R 297 ........... CA.Pt3.Div10.560, CA.Pt3.Div10.580, CA.Pt3.Div10.600 Davies (unreported, CCA (NSW), 16 December 1993) ........................................................................... CPA.154.200 Davis (1823) Russ & Ry 499; 168 ER 917 .................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Davis (1833) 6 Car & P 177 ........................................................................... CA.188.100, CA.188.160, CA.188.240 Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563 .................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Davis (1883) 15 Cox 174 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.540 Davis [1982] 1 NZLR 584 ................................................................................................ CPA.156.200, CPA.156.280 Davis [1989] 1 Qd R 171 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Davis (1995) 81 A Crim R 156 .................................................................................................................. CPA.19.180 Davis (1998) 100 A Crim R 573 .................................................................................................................... CA.23.80 Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15 ........................................................................................................................ CA.66A.120 Davis and Hall (1806) Russ & Ry 113 ........................................................................................................ CA.345.80 Davison [1992] Crim LR 31 ........................................................................................................................ CA.93C.80 Davison & Gordon (1855) 7 Cox CC 158 ................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Dawson [1960] 1 WLR 163; [1960] 1 All ER 558; (1960) 44 Cr App R 87 ........................................ CA.178C.140 Dawson (1977) 64 Cr App R 170 ................................................................................................................. CA.94.140 Dawson [1978] VR 536 ..................................................... CA.310D.60, CLP.2520, CLP.2540, CLP.2560, CLP.2640 Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 ....................................................................................... CA.19A.320, CA.19A.360 Dawson [2000] NSWCCA 399 ..................................................................................................................... CA.38.120 Day (1844) 8 JP 186 ................................................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Day (1845) 1 Cox CC 207 ............................................................................................................................ CA.61.120 Day (1983) 9 A Crim R 445 ...................................................................................................................... CA.310D.60 Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80; [2000] QCA 313 .................................................................. CPA.159.20, CPA.160.20 Day 173 ER 1026; (1841) 9 Car & P 722 ........................................................................ CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Dayle [1974] 1 WLR 181; [1973] 3 All ER 1151 ..................................................................... CA.4.200, CA.97.120 De Gruchy (2000) 110 A Crim R 271; [2000] NSWCCA 51 ................................................................... CPA.160.20 De Keyzer (1987) 9 NSWLR 709; 89 FLR 105 ....................................................................................... CA.52A.200 De Kuyper [1948] SASR 108 ................................................................................................................... CPA.156.180 De Marny [1907] 1 KB 388 ...................................................................................................... CA.345.60, CA.346.80 De Salvi 10 Cox CC 481n ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.120 De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; 5 A Crim R 329; [1981] HCA 31 ........... CA.52A.240, CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20 De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 ......... CA.23A.60, CA.39.100, CA.44.120, CA.196.120, CA.199.120 DeMunck [1918] 1 KB 635 ......................................................................................................................... CA.91A.40 Deakins (1663) 1 Sid 142 ............................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Dean (1896) 17 LR (NSW) 35; 12 WN (NSW) 80 ..................................................................................... CA.328.20 Dean [1932] NZLR 753 .......................................................................................................... CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 Deana (1909) 2 Cr App R 75 ...................................................................................................... CA.18.20, CA.423.40 Debelis (1984) 36 SASR 1 ......................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Dee (1884) 15 Cox CC 579 .............................................................................................. CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Deighton [1954] Crim LR 208 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Delellis (1989) 4 CRNZ 601 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Deleph Sing (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 81 ...................................................................................................... CA.327.120 Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134 ........ CA.94.140, CA.94.280, CA.94.320
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Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 ........................................................................... CLP.580, CLP.780, CPA.21.80 Deller (1952) 36 Cr App R 184 .............................................................................................. CA.125.60, CA.179.200 Delon (1992) 29 NSWLR 29 ...................................................................................................................... DMTA.7.40 Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441 .............. CA.19A.160, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.400, CA.345.140, CLP.140, CLP.1320, CLP.1400 v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1989) 33 A Crim R 441 ..................................................................................... CA.47.120 v Demirok [1976] VR 244 .................................................................................... CPA.21.80, CPA.21.320, CPA.21.380 v Dendic (1987) 34 A Crim R 40 .................................................................................................................. DMTA.3.80 v Deng (1996) 91 A Crim R 80 ............................................................................................. DMTA.6.20, DMTA.26.60 v Dent (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 544; 29 WN (NSW) 124 ................................................................................ CA.327.160 v Dent [1955] 2 QB 590 ................................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 v Denyer [1926] 2 KB 258; (1926) 19 Cr App R 93 ....................................................................................... CA.99.60 v Deputy Chairman of Inner London Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1970] 2 QB 80; (1969) 54 Cr App R 49 ............................................................................. CPA.17.20 v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 ................................................................... DMTA.3.80, DMTA.6.20, DMTA.25.80 v Derham (1843) 1 Cox CC 56 ......................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 v Deutsch (1986) 30 DLR (4th) 435; 27 CCC (3d) ..................................................................................... CA.344A.60 v Dexter, Laidler & Coates (1899) 19 Cox CC 360 ....................................................................................... CA.172.40 v Dhillon [1997] 2 Cr App R 104 .................................................................................................................. CPA.162.60 v Dhillon (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 April 1989) .......................................................................................... CA.61.20 v Di Duca (1959) 43 Cr App R 167 ............................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 v Diamond (1920) 84 JP 211 ............................................................................................................................. CA.26.40 v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 5; [2002] Crim LR 490 .......................................................................................... CA.39.80 v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64 ......... CA.7.20, CA.7.80, CA.7.100, CA.7.140, DMTA.7.20, DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60 v Dib (2002) 134 A Crim R 329 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.180 v Dickinson (1820) Russ & Ry 420 ......................................................................................... CA.117.220, CA.117.320 v Dickson (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 298 ...................................................................................... CA.117.200, CA.188.180 v Dillon (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 159 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.200 v Dillon [1982] AC 484 ................................................................................................................................. CA.310D.60 v Dimes (1912) 7 Cr App R 43 .................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 .......................................................................................... CPA.293.40, CPA.293.60 v Dimond (2000) 118 A Crim R 188; [2000] NSWSC 1212 .......................................................................... SPA.44.40 v Dimozantos (1991) 56 A Crim R 345 .............................................................................................................. CLP.960 v Dinh (2010) 199 A Crim R 573; [2010] NSWCCA 74 ......................................... CA.47.20, CA.47.120, CA.47.160 v Diru [1963] P & NGLR 115 ............................................................................................................................. CLP.120 v Dittmar [1973] 1 NSWLR 722 ............................................................................................ CA.527A.80, CA.527C.60 v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1140 v Dixon (1855) 7 Cox CC 35 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.420 v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215; (1992) 62 A Crim R 465 ........................................................................ CA.19A.440 v Dixon [1993] Crim LR 579 ........................................................................................................................ CA.93C.100 v Dixon-Jenkins (1985) 14 A Crim R 372 ............................................................ CA.199.100, CA.199.140, CLP.2820 v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; (2000) 115 A Crim R 497; [2000] NSWCCA 317 ........... CA.310D.80, CPA.267.20 v Dobos (1984) 58 ACTR 10; 13 A Crim R 306 ...................................................................... CA.311.20, CA.327.160 v Dodd (1974) 7 SASR 151 ........................................................................................ CA.19A.140, CLP.160, CLP.1180 v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277 .............................................................................................................................. CA.328.20 v Dodd (1991) 56 A Crim R 451 ..................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.240, DMTA.25.80, DMTA.29.40 v Dodd [No 2] [1985] 2 Qd R 282 .................................................................................................................. CPA.36.20 v Dodge [1972] 1 QB 416; (1971) 55 Cr App R 440 .................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Dolan (1855) 6 Cox CC 449 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 v Dolloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273 ................................................................................................................ CA.19A.440 v Domican (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 ....................................................................... CA.26.20, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.320 v Donald (1983) 34 SASR 10; 11 A Crim R 47 ........................................................................................... CPA.19.160 v Donnelly (1779) 1 Leach 193; 168 ER 199 ............................................................................... CA.94.60, CA.94.140
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Donnelly (1835) 1 Mood 438 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Donnelly [1970] NZLR 980 ....................................................................................................................... CA.344A.80 Donohue [1914] VLR 195 .............................................................................................................................. CA.85.20 Donohue (unreported, CCA (NSW), 2 August 1993) .............................................................................. DMTA.29.40 Donovan (1930) 21 Cr App R 20 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 ..................... CA.51A.120, CA.35.100, CA.39.100, CA.48.100, CA.53.100, CA.59.100, CA.60.160, CA.61.160, CA.61.300, CA.95.80, CLP.80 Doody (1854) 6 Cox CC 463 ....................................................................................................................... CA.31A.20 Doorey & Gage [1970] 3 NSWR 351 ........................................................................................................ CA.345.100 Dorain & Francisco (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 August 1995) ............................................................ CPA.19.160 Dorking Justices [1984] 1 AC 743 ........................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Dorrington [1969] 1 NSWR 381 .................................................................................................................. CPA.30.20 Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.21.20 Douglas (1926) 19 Cr App R 119 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.20 Douglas [2000] NSWCCA 275 ................................................................................................................... CPA.21.400 Douglass (1808) 7 Carrington & Payne 785 .............................................................................................. CA.179.200 Douglass (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 157 ........................................................................................................ CPA.156.120 Doulton (1832) 5 Car & P 329 .................................................................................................................. CA.19A.100 Dovey and Gray (1851) 4 Cox CC 428 ..................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Dowdle (1900) 26 VLR 637 ....................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Dowey (1868) 37 LJMC 52 ........................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Downes (1875) 1 QBD 25 .......................................................................................................... CA.24.220, CA.53.80 Downey (1997) 97 A Crim R 41 ............................................................................................................... CA.442B.20 Downing (1844) 1 Den 52; 169 ER 146 .................................................................................................... CPA.21.160 Downs (1985) 3 NSWLR 312; 18 A Crim R 75 ......................... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.60, CA.19A.560, CA.423.80 Doyle [1988] 2 Qd R 434; 30 A Crim R 379 .......................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Doyle (unreported CCA NSW 13 April 1993) ................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Draca [2015] NSWSC 1150 ......................................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 Draper (1870) 1 VR (L) 39 ........................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Draper (1930) 21 Cr App R 147 ................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Drew [1985] 1 WLR 914; [1985] 2 All ER 1061; (1985) 81 Cr App R 190 ......................................... CPA.154.200 Dring 169 ER 1027; (1857) Dears & B 329 .............................................................................................. CA.188.220 Drinkwater (1740) 1 Leach 15 .................................................................................................................... CA.186.100 Driscoll (1841) Car & M 214 ....................................................................................................................... CA.423.40 Drozd (1993) 67 A Crim R 112 .................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Druitt (1867) 10 Cox CC 592 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.760 Drummond (No 2) (1990) 46 A Crim R 408 ............................................................................................. CPA.21.400 Drury (1848) 3 Car & K 190; 175 ER 516 ...................................................................... CPA.156.140, CPA.156.220 Dudley (1884) 14 QBD 273 ..................................................................................... CA.27.120, CLP.2640, CLP.2820 Duell [1964] Qd R 451 ..................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400, CA.Pt3.Div10.480 Duffield (1992) 28 NSWLR 638; 64 A Crim R 18 ................................................................ CPA.66.40, CPA.154.20 Duffill (1843) 1 Cox CC 49 ............................................................................................................................ CA.27.80 Duffy (1880) 6 VLR (L) 430 ........................................................................................................................ CA.24.220 Duffy (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 28 ..................................................................................................................... CA.84.60 Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 ........................................................................................................................... CA.23.120 Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63; [1966] 2 WLR 229; 1 All ER 62; (1965) 50 Cr App R 68 ................................. CA.423.80 Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554 ............................................................................................... CA.114.120, CA.114.160 Dugdale (1853) 1 El & Bl 435; 118 ER 499 ................................................................................................... CA.7.60 Duggan (unreported, WA CCA, 7 May 1997) .......................................................................................... CPA.150.180 Duguid (1906) 94 LT 887 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.740 Dumas (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 November 1995) ............................................................................ CPA.19.160 Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1; (1957) 41 Cr App R 182 ...................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Duncan (1881) 7 QBD 198 ................................................................................................. CPA.156.40, CPA.156.140 Dundas (1853) 6 Cox CC 380 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200
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Dungay (2001) 126 A Crim R 216; [2001] NSWCCA 443 ................................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Dungey (1864) 4 F & F 99; 176 ER 487 ..................................................................................................... CA.61.140 Dunks (1982) 8 A Crim R 267 .................................................................................................................. CA.310D.60 Dunn (1840) 12 A & E 599 ....................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Dunn (1843) 1 Car & K 730; 174 ER 1009 .............................................................................................. CPA.113.40 Dunn (1930) 47 WN (NSW) 79 ................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Dunn (2004) 144 A Crim R 180; [2004] NSWCCA 41 ......................................................................... DPVA.13.120 Dunn (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 April 1992) ........................................................................................ CA.61I.100 Dunn & Smith (1826) 1 Mood 146 ............................................................................................................ CA.188.240 Dunne (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 Mar 1993) ........................................................................................ CA.52A.120 Dunnington [1984] 2 WLR 125 ................................................................................................................. CA.344A.80 Dunston (1824) Ry & Mood 109 ................................................................................................................ CA.327.160 Duong (1992) 61 A Crim R 140 ........................................................................................... CA.345.100, CA.345.140 During [1973] 1 NZLR 366 ........................................................................................................................ DMTA.3.80 Durovic (1994) 4 Tas R 113; 71 A Crim R 33 .......................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151 ..................... CA.178C.140, CA.192E.120, CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120 Dutt (1912) 8 Cr App R 51 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.260 Dutton (1979) 21 SASR 356 ......................................................................................................................... CA.23.100 Dwer [1962] Qd R 84 ................................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Dwerryhouse (1847) 2 Cox CC 446 ............................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Dwyer [1999] NSWCCA 47 ............................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.540 Dyer (1801) 2 East PC 767 ........................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Dykyj (1993) 29 NSWLR 672; (1993) 66 A Crim R 567 ...................................................... CA.188.180, CLP.1300 Dyos [1979] Crim LR 660 ......................................................................................................................... CA.19A.440 Dyson (1823) Russ & Ry 523 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454; (1909) 1 Cr App R 13 ............................................................... CA.19A.360, CA.19A.380 Dziduch (1990) 47 A Crim R 378 .................................................................... CA.423.60, CA.423.100, CA.423.140 EAS (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 July 1990) ........................................................................................ DMTA.29.40 EMJ (2001) 27 SR (WA) 265 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1300 Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 .................... CA.61N.80, CLP.900, CLP.960, DMTA.27.20 Eagleton (1854) Dears CC 515; 169 ER 826 ............................................................................................ CA.344A.60 Earl of Somerset (1616) 2 State Tr 965 ....................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Easom [1971] 2 QB 315 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.320 Eastwood (1998) 114 A Crim R 448; [1998] VSCA 42 .......................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Ebbage (1930) 22 Cr App R 50 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.460 Ebsworth (1854) 1 SCR (NSW) (App) 24 ................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Economou (1989) 51 SASR 421; 44 A Crim R 88 ............................................................ CPA.113.40, CPA.156.140 Edelsten (1989) 18 NSWLR 213; 45 A Crim R 289 ....................................... CA.319.140, CPA.19.100, CPA.30.20 Edelsten (1990) 51 A Crim R 397 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.40 Edgar (1913) 9 Cr App R 13 ........................................................................................................................ CA.547.20 Edigarov (2001) 125 A Crim R 551; [2001] NSWCCA 436 .............................................. CA.60.200, DPVA.13.120 Edmeads (1828) 3 Car & P 390 ................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Edmonds [1963] 2 QB 142; (1963) 47 Cr App R 114 .................................................................................. CA.7.140 Edmunds (1909) 25 TLR 658 .................................................................................................................... CA.19A.360 Edwards (1838) 8 Car & P 611; 173 ER 640 ................................................................................................ CA.44.80 Edwards (1843) 1 Cox CC 32 ...................................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Edwards (1877) 13 Cox CC 384 ........................................................................................... CA.117.260, CA.117.280 Edwards [1913] 1 KB 287; (1912) 8 Cr App R 128 ................................................................................... CA.117.20 Edwards [1956] QWN 16 ............................................................................................................................... CA.80.20 Edwards [1975] QB 27; [1974] 3 WLR 285; [1974] 2 All ER 1085 ....................................................... CA.316.200 Edwards [1998] 2 VR 354; (1997) 94 A Crim R 204 ............................................................................... CPA.19.160 Egan (1897) 23 VLR 159 ............................................................................................................................. CA.24.220 Egan (1985) 15 A Crim R 20 ............................................................. CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CA.5.180, CLP.1180
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TABLE OF CASES
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Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470; (1992) 95 Cr App R 278 ................................................................................ CA.23A.60 El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.760 El-Zeyat (2002) 54 NSWLR 319; [2002] NSWCCA 138 ........................................................................... CA.315.20 El Azzi (2001) 125 A Crim R 113; [2001] NSWCCA 397 ............................................................................. CLP.760 El Masri [2005] NSWCCA 167 ................................................................................................... CA.94.360, SPA.8.10 El Zarw [1994] 2 Qd R 67; (1991) 58 A Crim R 200 ................................................................................ CPA.17.20 Eldershaw (1828) 3 Car & P 396 ................................................................................................................. CA.345.80 Eldridge [1976] 2 NSWLR 449 .................................................................................................................... CA.442.20 Elfar (2000) 115 A Crim R 64; [2000] NSWCCA 255 ................................................... CPA.162.60, DMTA.25.160 Elia [1968] 2 All ER 587 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Elias (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 285 .................................................................................................................. CA.60.120 Ellames (1974) 60 Cr App R 7 ....................................................................................................................... CA.7.120 Ellem [No 2] [1995] 2 Qd R 549; (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 .................................................................... CPA.160.20 Elliot (1777) 1 Leach 175 ......................................................................................................... CA.250.40, CA.250.80 Elliott [1908] 2 KB 452 ................................................................................................................................ CA.438.20 Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238 .............................. CA.23A.60, CA.95.80, CA.98.160, CA.345.100 Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.320, CA.180.20 Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 ................................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Ellis (1973) 57 Cr App R 571 .................................................................................................................... CPA.154.20 Ellis (1993) 68 A Crim R 449 ...................................................................................................................... CA.97.240 Ellis (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 February 1987) ....................................................... DMTA.25.200, DMTA.29.40 Elms (2004) 61 NSWLR 703; [2004] NSWCCA 467 .............................................................................. CA.105A.20 Elrington (1861) 1 B & S 688; 121 ER 870 .................................................................... CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180 Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Elsworth (1780) 2 East PC 986 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Elsworthy (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 ................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Elton [1910] VLR 1 ...................................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Emery (1975) 11 SASR 169 ..................................................................................................... CA.94.100, CA.94.140 Emery (1978) 18 A Crim R 49 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.2520 Emmett [1905] VLR 718 ............................................................................................................................ CA.126.220 Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 .................................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 English (1989) 17 NSWLR 149 ................................................................................................................. CA.527C.80 English (1993) 10 WAR 355; 68 A Crim R 96 ................................................................ CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100 Epps (1864) 4 F & F 81 ............................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Erohin [2006] NSWCCA 102 ........................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.640 Errington (2005) 157 A Crim R 553; [2005] NSWCCA 348 ................................................................... CA.52A.240 Esop (1836) 7 Car & P 456; 173 ER 203 ..................................................................................................... CLP.1480 Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; 105 A Crim R 27 ................................................................................. CPA.281.20 Essex (1857) Dearsly & Bell 369 .................................................................................................................. CLP.1460 Etheridge (1901) 19 Cox CC 676 ................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Etherington (1795) 2 Leach 671; 168 ER 437 ............................................................................................. CA.149.40 Evans (1812) unreported (see Russell on Crime, 12th ed (1964) p 414) ................................................ CA.19A.320 Evans (1916) 12 Cr App R 8 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.460 Evans [1963] 1 QB 412; [1962] 3 WLR 1457; [1962] 3 All ER 1086 ................................................... CA.52A.200 Evans [1964] VR 717 .......................................................................................................... CA.78A.20, CA.178A.180 Evans (1973) 5 SASR 183 .............................................................................................................................. CA.29.80 Evans (1987) 48 SASR 35; 30 A Crim R 262 .................................................................... CA.344A.60, CPA.162.80 Evans & Smith (1842) Car & M 298; 174 ER 515 ....................................................................................... CA.4.220 Evans (No 1) [1976] VR 517 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.2640 Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 ........ CA.19A.160, CA.19A.280, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.340, CA.19A.380, CLP.440, CLP.500 R v Evenett (1987) 24 A Crim R 330 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 R v Everingham (1949) 66 WN (NSW) 122 ....................................................................................................... CA.61.140 R v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922; 176 ER 850 .......................................................................................................... CLP.580
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F (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 543; 74 WN (NSW) 211 .............................................................. CA.52A.180, CA.52A.260 F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245; 89 A Crim R 250 ............................ CA.19A.100, CA.52A.20, CA.52A.160, CA.24.120 F (1996) 90 A Crim R 356 ........................................................................................................................ DMTA.25.80 Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267 ................................................................................................................... DPVA.13.120 Fahey; R v Lindsay (1978) 19 SASR 577 ................................................................................................. CA.423.140 Fairbairn [1949] 2 KB 690 ....................................................................................................................... CA.546B.140 Fairbanks [1986] 1 WLR 1202; (1986) 83 Cr App R 251 ........................................................................ CPA.162.60 Fairbrother (1909) 1 Cr App R 233 ........................................................................................................... CA.19A.660 Fairclough (1997) 95 A Crim R 188 .......................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Fairley (2004) 40 MVR 403; [2004] VSCA 15 ............................................................ CA.52AB.160, CA.52AB.200 Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 .................. CA.19A.140, CA.61.80, CLP.160, CLP.220, CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.300, CLP.320, CLP.340, CLP.1060, CLP.1080, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1160, CLP.1540 v Falkingham (1865-72) LR 1 CCR 222 ......................................................................................................... CA.44.120 v Fallon (1963) 47 Cr App R 160 ................................................................................................................... CA.94.100 v Fallon (1981) 28 SASR 394; 4 A Crim R 411 .......................................................................................... CA.188.180 v Fallows (1948) 65 TLR 93 ......................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 v Farid (1945) 30 Cr App R 168 ..................................................................................................................... CA.83.120 v Farlow [1980] 2 NSWLR 166 ................................................................................................................... CA.310D.60 v Farnborough [1895] 2 QB 484 ............................................................................ CA.428I.60, CA.117.320, CLP.1180 v Farr (1663) T Raym 81; 83 ER 44 ............................................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Farr (1994) 74 A Crim R 405 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10 ............................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 v Farrar [1992] 1 VR 207; 53 A Crim R 387 ................................................................................................... CA.23.20 v Farrar (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 May 1991)) .......................................................................................... CA.24.120 v Farrell (1787) 1 Leach 322 ........................................................................................................................... CA.94.100 v Farrell (1862) 9 Cox CC 446 ........................................................................................................................ CA.576.20 v Farrell [1964] NSWR 1143 .......................................................................................................................... CA.428I.60 v Farrell, Dingle and Woodward (1831) Legge 5 ................................................................... CA.188.100, CA.188.180 v Farrow (1857) Dears & B 164 ........................................................................................................................ CA.83.80 v Faure [1999] 2 VR 537; [1999] VSCA 166 .............................................................................................. CA.19A.500 v Fawcett (1793) 2 East PC 862 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Fedler (1989) 42 A Crim R 5 ..................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 v Feely [1973] 1 QB 530 .......................................................................................................... CA.117.220, CA.117.260 v Feely [1973] QB 530; [1973] 2 WLR 201; [1973] 1 All ER 341 ............................................................ CA.197.100 v Fejsa (1995) 82 A Crim R 253 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.64.60 v Felixstowe Justices; Ex parte Leigh [1987] 1 QB 582; [1987] 2 WLR 380; [1987] 1 All ER 551 ................................................................................................................................................................... CPA.56.40 v Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428; [1970] 3 WLR 513; [1970] 3 All ER 215 ............................... CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 v Fenwick (1953) 54 SR (NSW) 147; 71 WN (NSW) 102 .................................................... CA.345.100, CPA.21.160 v Ferguson (1913) 9 Cr App R 113 ............................................................................................................... CA.179.300 v Ferguson (1974) 75 A Crim R 31 ............................................................................................. CA.61.120, CA.61.160 v Ferguson [1991] 1 Qd R 35; 45 A Crim R 257 ......................................................................................... CPA.113.40 v Ferguson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 May 1986) ...................................................................................... CA.121.40 v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 ................................................................................................................. SPA.44.20 v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 .................................................... CPA.21.80, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231 ........................................................................................................ CPA.154.200 v Ferrers (1666) 1 Sid 278; 82 ER 1104 ......................................................................................................... CA.250.40 v Fetineiai (unreported, CCA (NSW), 16 July 1993) ............................................................... CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60 v Fiak (2005) EWC Crim 2381 ..................................................................................................................... CA.195.100 v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172 ........................................................................................................................ SPA.44.40 v Field (1964) 48 Cr App R 335 ................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 v Fields [1991] Crim LR 38 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.150.60 v Fien [1962] NSWR 134 .............................................................................................................................. CA.188.160 v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153 .............................................................................................................................. CA.23A.60
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
TABLE OF CASES
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Filippetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335 .................................................................... CA.19A.220, CA.7.100, DMTA.7.40 Finch (1834) 1 Mood 418 ............................................................................................................................. CA.139.60 Findlater [1939] 1 KB 594; (1940) 27 Cr App R 24 .................................................................................... CLP.1480 Fing (unreported, CCA (NSW), 4 October 1994) ...................................................................................... SPA.10.100 Finkelstein and Truscovitch (1886) 16 Cox CC 107 ................................................................................. CA.250.120 Finlayson (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 301 ......................................................................................................... CA.126.200 Finnie [2002] NSWCCA 533 ................................................................................................................... CA.176A.100 Finnie (No 2) [2004] NSWCCA 150 ............................................................................................................ SPA.43.20 Firth (1869) LR 1 CCR 172 .................................................................................................... CA.117.260, CA.119.40 Fisher (1865) LR 1 CCR 7 ......................................................................................................................... CA.195.100 Fisher [1910] 1 KB 149 .............................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Fisher (1910) 5 Cr App R 102; 103 LT 320 ........................................................................ CA.117.160, CA.117.360 Fisher (2002) 54 NSWLR 467 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.60 Fisher (2003) 56 NSWLR 625; 138 A Crim R 318 ................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Fitzgerald (1889) 15 VLR 40 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.34.20 Fitzpatrick (1926) 19 Cr App R 91 ................................................................................................................ CA.5.120 Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.2620 Fitzpatrick (1988) 50 SASR 10 ............................................................................. CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220 Flaherty [1968] 3 NSWR 734; (1968) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 141 ............................................................ CPA.21.120 Flaherty 175 ER 328; (1847) 2 Car & Kir 782 ........................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Flanagan (1867) 10 Cox CC 561 .................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576 ............................................................................................................................... CLP.2580 Flattery (1876-77) LR 2 QBD 410 ....................................................................................... CA.61.160, CA.61HA.80 Fleeton (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 72; [1964–5] NSWR 63; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 269 ................. CLP.1100, CLP.1140 Fleming [1989] Crim LR 658 .................................................................................................................... CA.93B.100 Fletcher (1862) Le & Ca 180; 169 ER 1353 ................................................................................................. CA.4.240 Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A Crim R 381 ................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Flood (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) (L) 299 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.20 Flood (1914) 10 Cr App R 227 .................................................................................................................. CPA.162.80 Flowers (1886) 16 QBD 643 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.400 Flynn (1867) 16 WR 319 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.540 Fogg (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 33 ................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Foley (1889) 26 LR Ir 299 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Foley [1963] NSWR 1270; (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 726 .................................................. CPA.154.100, CPA.154.200 Fong (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 November 1996) ............................................................................. DMTA.29.40 Foord (1986) 20 A Crim R 267 .................................................................................................................. CA.319.120 Forbes (1835) 7 Car & P 224 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Forbes and Webb (1865) 10 Cox CC 362 ............................................................................. CA.546C.80, CA.58.180 Ford (1853) 1 Legge 777 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.960 Forde [1923] 2 KB 400; (1924) 17 Cr App R 99 ............................................................ CPA.154.200, CPA.154.220 Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 ............................................................................................................. CPA.293.60 Foreman (1913) 9 Cr App R 216 ............................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Forest of Dean Justices; Ex parte Farley [1990] RTR 228 ........................................................................ CPA.19.160 Forgione [1969] SASR 248 ............................................................................................................................. CA.26.40 Foster (1852) 6 Cox CC 25 ........................................................................................................................ CA.195.100 Foster (1877) 2 QBD 301 ........................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Foster [1985] QB 115; [1984] 3 WLR 401; [1984] 2 All ER 679 ......................................................... CPA.154.320 Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 ................................... CA.19A.540, CA.94.60, CA.94.140, CA.94.280, CA.97.120 Foster [2001] NSWCCA 215 ......................................................................................................................... SPA.12.20 Foulkes (1875) LR 2 CCR 150 ..................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 .................................................................................................................... CPA.154.260 Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 ............................................................................. CLP.580 Fox [1986] 2 Qd R 402; 17 A Crim R 180 ................................................................................................ DMTA.6.20 Foy (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 20 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1140
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TABLE OF CASES
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Foy [1960] Qd R 225 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.1080 Francipane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 December 1998) .......................................... CA.178A.100, CA.178A.160 Francis (1874) LR 2 CCR 128 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Francis (1989) 88 Cr App R 127 ........................................................................................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80 Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300 ....................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Franco (2006) 168 A Crim R 322; [2006] VSCA 302 .................................................................................. CLP.2660 Franklin (1864) 4 Foster & Finlason 94 ..................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Fraser (1923) 17 Cr App R 182 ................................................................................................ CA.179.80, CPA.21.20 Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 ............................................................................. CLP.120, CPA.19.40, CPA.36.20 Free (1983) 9 A Crim R 362 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Freeman (1833) 5 Car & P 534 .................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Freeman [1980] VR 1 ....................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.480, CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Freeman [1981] 2 NSWLR 686; 4 A Crim R 55 ....................................................................................... CA.179.220 Freeman (1985) 3 NSWLR 303; 17 A Crim R 272 .................................................................. CA.319.140, CLP.740 Freeman (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 ..................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Freer (1979) 39 FLR 193 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Freeth (1807) Russell & Ryan 127 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Fretwell (1864) Leigh & Cave 443; 169 ER 1465 ...................................................................................... CA.33.120 Frew (1867) 7 SCR (NSW) 111 ................................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436; 23 A Crim R 147 ......................................................................................... CA.423.60 Friel (1890) 17 Cox CC 325 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.156.100 Frier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 February 1997) ............................................................................... CA.178A.160 Frith [1914] VLR 658 ................................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Frost (1964) 48 Cr App R 284 ................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Fry (1858) Dearsly & Bell 449 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Fry (1992) 58 SASR 424; 63 A Crim R 263 ....................................................................... CA.423.120, CA.423.140 Fry & Webb (1837) 2 Mood & R 42; 174 E.R. 208 ................................................................................... CA.97.120 Fryer (1912) 7 Cr App R 183 .................................................................................................................. CA.178C.140 Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208 ......................................... CA.94.240, CA.117.200, CLP.80 Fuller (1982) 6 A Crim R 424 ............................................................................................. CA.19A.500, CA.345.100 Fuller [2001] NSWCCA 390 ............................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Fuschillo [1940] 2 All ER 489 ................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 G [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 .............................................................................................. CA.319.140, CLP.740, CLP.780 G (1989) 98 FLR 32 ................................................................................................................................... CA.78A.160 G (1997) 42 NSWLR 451 ..................................................................................................... CPA.293.60, CPA.293.80 G [2003] UKHL 50 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.4A.40 G (unreported, Tas CCA, 25 June 1993) .................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; (2000) 109 A Crim R 419; [2000] VSCA 18 .......................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400 GG [2004] VSCA 238; 151 A Crim R 92 ....................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 GG [2010] NSWCCA 230 ................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.640 GJH [2001] NSWCCA 128 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.150.100 GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293 ............................................................................................................................... CA.7.80 GWB [2000] NSWCCA 410 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.360 Gadd [1911] QWN 31 ................................................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Gaffney [1971] 1 NSWLR 511 .................................................................................................................. CA.310D.60 Gagliardi (1987) 26 A Crim R 391 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Galambos (1980) 2 A Crim R 388 ............................. CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CA.24.160, CA.423.140, CLP.1180 Galasso (1981) 4 A Crim R 454 ....................................................... CA.5.140, CA.5.200, CA.200.60, CPA.154.220 Gale (1876) 2 QBD 141 ................................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWCCA 227 ............................................................................... CLP.580 Galey [1985] 1 NZLR 230 ........................................................................................................ CA.35.120, CA.97.140 Gallagher (1929) 21 Cr App R 172 ............................................................................................................ CA.120.140 Gallagher [1986] VR 219; 16 A Crim R 215 ........................................................................................... CPA.154.260 Gallagher (1987) 29 A Crim R 33 ............................................................................................................. CA.249B.40
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TABLE OF CASES
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Gallagher (1989) 44 A Crim R 256 .................................................................................................................. CLP.740 Gallienne [1964] NSWR 919; (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 94 ............................................................. CA.61HA.80 Galvin (No 1) [1961] VR 733 ........................................ CA.546C.80, CA.58.20, CA.58.180, CA.58.300, CA.60.60 Galvin [No 2] [1961] VR 740 .............................. CA.546C.60, CA.58.140, CA.60.20, CPA.156.140, CPA.156.180 Gamble [1947] VLR 491 ................................................................................................... CPA.156.180, DMTA.25.80 Gambling [1975] 1 QB 207 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.100 Gamgee (2001) 51 NSWLR 707; 124 A Crim R 469; [2001] NSWCCA 251 ........................................... SPA.12.20 Gamumu [1963] P & NGLR 1 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.120 Garde-Wilson (2005) 158 A Crim R 20; [2005] VSC 441 ........................................................................... CLP.2640 Gardner (1856) Dearsly & Bell 40 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Gardner (1862) Leigh & Cave 243 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.420 Garlick (1847) 1 Denison 276 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Garlick (1958) 42 Cr App R 141 ............................................................................................................. CA.178C.100 Garlick (1980) 72 Cr App R 291 ................................................................................................................ CA.428I.40 Garlick (1994) 73 A Crim R 433 ............................................................................................................... CA.52A.240 Garner (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 137 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392; 40 A Crim R 213 ...................................................................... CA.61J.140, CA.95.80 Garvey (1887) 16 Cox CC 252 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Garwood [1987] 1 WLR 319; 1 All ER 1032; (1987) 85 Cr App R 85 ...................................................... CA.99.60 Gaston (1981) 73 Cr App R 164 ................................................................................................................... CA.61I.60 Gateshead Justices; Ex parte Smith (1985) 149 JP 681 ............................................................................. CPA.19.180 Gathercole (1838) 2 Lewin 237 .................................................................................................................... CA.529.40 Gaylor [1857] Dears & Bell 288 .................................................................................................................. CA.346.80 Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595 .................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Geach (1840) 9 Car & P 499 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.60 Geddeson (1906) 25 NZLR 323 ................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Gemmell (1985) 1 CRNZ 496 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.720 Geoghegan (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 81 .................................................................................. CA.114.100, CA.345.100 George (1890) 11 LR (NSW)(L) 373 ......................................................................................................... CA.117.200 George [1956] Crim LR 52 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61L.100 George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38; [2004] NSWCCA 247 ........................................................................... CA.24.280 Georgiadis [1984] VR 1030 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18 ................................................................................ CLP.1400 Georgiou [1999] NSWCCA 125 ................................................................................................................. CPA.21.100 German (1947) 89 CCC 90 ........................................................................................................................ CA.52A.180 Gervaise (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 November 1997) .................................................................... CA.178BB.200 Gervaise (unreported, NSWCCA, 13 November 1997) .......................................................................... CA.192G.120 Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 ........................................................................................... CA.178BA.120, CA.178BA.140 Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689 ........................... CA.192E.120, CA.192E.140 Ghosh [1982] QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689 ......................................................... CA.197.100 Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 .................. CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.180, CA.178BB.200, CPA.21.160 Giam (No 2) (1999) 109 A Crim R 348 .................................................................................................. CA.176A.100 Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1 ................................................................................................................. CA.19A.200 Gibb [1983] 2 VR 155; (1982) 7 A Crim R 385 ........................ CPA.21.80, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.120, CPA.150.20 Gibbins (1919) 13 Cr App R 134 .............................................. CA.19A.180, CA.43A.120, CA.24.220, CPA.21.120 Gibbon (1862) Le & Ca 109 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Gibbons (1752) Fos 107 ................................................................................................................................ CA.112.80 Gibbons (1821) Russ & Ry 442; 168 ER 888 ............................................................................................. CA.112.80 Gibbons [1971] VR 79 ................................................................................................................................ CA.188.100 Gibbs (1855) 169 ER 798; Dears 445; 6 Cox CC 455 .............................................................. CA.4.240, CA.155.40 Gibson (1861) 8 Cox CC 436 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Gibson (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 282; 47 WN (NSW) 119 .................................. CA.179.280, CA.179.300, CA.445.20 Gibson (1987) 8 Petty Sess Rev 3901 ........................................................................................................ CPA.154.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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Gibson (1989) 42 A Crim R 265 ............................................... CPA.21.180, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.240, CPA.21.260 Gibson [1990] 2 QB 619; [1990] 3 WLR 595; [1991] 1 All ER 439 ...................................................... CA.529.160 Giddings [1916] VLR 359 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.30.20 Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Gidlow [1983] 2 Qd R 557 ........................................................................................................................... CA.177.40 Giffin [1971] Qd R 12 ................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CPA.160.20 Gilbert (1828) 1 Moody 185 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Gilchrist (1841) Car & M 224; 174 ER 482 .................................................................................................. CA.4.260 Giles (1865) Leigh & Cave 502 ................................................................................................................. CA.179.240 Giles 168 ER 1227; (1827) 1 Mood CC 166 ............................................................................................. CA.250.120 Gilfillan (2003) 139 A Crim R 460 .............................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Gilks [1972] 1 WLR 1341; 2 All ER 280 .................................................................................................. CA.117.400 Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841; [1963] 2 All ER 688; (1963) 47 Cr App R 166 ................................. CLP.2500, CLP.2640 Gillan (1991) 54 A Crim R 475 .................................................................................................................. SPA.10.140 Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189; [1988] Crim LR 531 ................................................................................ CA.39.80 Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21 .................................................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80 Gilles (1818) Russ & Ry 366 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Gillings (1858) 1 Fos & Fin 36 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Gillow (1825) 1 Moody 85; 175 ER 614 ..................................................................................................... CA.33.120 Gilmartin [1983] 1 All ER 829 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Gilmont (unreported CCA NSW 13 April 1992) ............................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Gilson (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.200 Gingell [1980] Crim LR 661 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.240 Giorgi (1982) 31 SASR 299; 7 A Crim R 305 ...................................................................... CA.45.120, DMTA.3.40 Gip (2006) 161 A Crim R 173; [2006] NSWCCA 115 ......................................................................... DMTA.25.220 Girod and Girod (1906) 70 JP 514 ............................................................................................................. CA.188.240 Gittens [1984] 1 QB 698; (1984) 79 Cr App R 272 ................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Gleed (1916) 12 Cr App R 32 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Glen (1899) 9 QLJ 140 .............................................................................................................. CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Glen (unreported, CCA, NSW, 19 December 1994) ............................................................................... DPVA.13.120 Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210 ...................... CA.173.160, CA.178BA.140, CA.179.300, CA.184.40, CA.197.100, CLP.80 Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; 3 A Crim R 210 ................................................................................. CA.192E.140 Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592; 60 A Crim R 18 ... CPA.19.40, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180, CPA.30.20, CPA.156.40 Glover (1987) 46 SASR 310 ................................................................................................... CPA.21.80, CPA.21.320 Glyde (1868) LR 1 CCR 139 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Glynn (1994) 33 NSWLR 139; 71 A Crim R 537 ....................................................................................... CPA.17.20 Gnosil (1824) 1 Car & P 304; 171 ER 1206 ............................................................................................... CA.94.140 Goadby (1847) 2 Car & Kir 782n ............................................................................................................ CPA.156.120 Goate (1700) 1 Lord Raym 737 ................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Goddard [1962] 1 WLR 1282; 3 All ER 582; (1962) 46 Cr App R 456 ................................................. CA.347.100 Goff (2000) 112 A Crim R 485; [2000] NSWCCA 194 ........................................................ CA.24.160, CA.423.140 Gogerly Gogerly and Whitford (1818) Russ & Ry 343 .............................................................................. CA.345.80 Goh [2002] NSWCCA 234 .......................................................................................................................... SPA.10.100 Golathan (1915) 84 LJKB 758; 11 Cr App R 79 ..................................................................................... CPA.154.140 Goldburg (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 February 1993) ........................................................................... CPA.19.180 Goldie; Ex parte Picklum (1937) 59 CLR 254; [1937] HCA 65 ...................................................................... CLP.80 Goldman (2004) 147 A Crim R 472; [2004] VSC 291 ............................................................................... CA.27.120 Gomez (1964) 48 Cr App R 310 ................................................................................................................. CA.23A.60 Gomez [1993] 1 All ER 1 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Gonis (1988) 48 SASR 228 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Gooch & Devonshire (1838) 8 Car & P 293 ............................................................................................... CA.139.60 Goodall (1975) 11 SASR 94 ................................................................................................... CA.161.20, CA.173.140
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TABLE OF CASES
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Goodbody (1838) 8 Car & P 665 ................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Goodison (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 53 ...................................................................................... CA.156.120, CA.157.60 Goodman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 December 1991) ....................................................................... CA.52A.200 Goodwin [1944] KB 518 .......................................................................................................................... CA.546B.100 Goodwin (unreported NSWCCA 10 December 1991 pp 5-6) ...................................................................... CA.4A.40 Goolagong (unreported, CCA (NSW), 28 September 1994) ......................................................................... CA.95.80 Goonan (1993) 69 A Crim R 338 ................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Gordon (1889) 23 QBD 354 ..................................................................................................... CA.4.260, CA.185.100 Gordon (1927) 19 Cr App R 20 ................................................................................................................. CA.78A.100 Gordon [1963] 63 SR (NSW) 631; 80 WN (NSW) 957 ............................................................................... CLP.1180 Gordon [1983] Crim LR 735 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.220 Gordon-King [2008] NSWCCA 335 ................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.520 Gordon 168 ER 359; (1789) 1 Leach 515 ..................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Gorman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 May 1997) ................................................ CA.24.40, CA.24.200, CA.24.220 Gorrie (1919) 83 JP 136 ................................................................................................................................... CLP.560 Goss (1860) Bell 208 .................................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Gott (1922) 16 Cr App R 87 ......................................................................................................................... CA.574.20 Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284; [1992] 1 All ER 832 ......................................... CA.27.120, CLP.2640 Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 .................................................................................................................... CPA.289.20 Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Teja [1971] 2 QB 274; [1971] 1 WLR 459; [1971] 2 All ER 11 ......................................................................................................................................................... CLP.180 v Gower (1991) 56 A Crim R 115 ................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 v Grace (1930) 47 WN (NSW) 51 ............................................................. CA.527C.100, CA.527C.140, CA.527C.160 v Graham (1901) 65 JP 248 .......................................................................................................................... CA.189A.20 v Graham (1913) 8 Cr App R 149 ............................................................................................... CA.4.260, CA.185.100 v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1982] 1 All ER 801; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235 ........ CLP.2500, CLP.2560, CLP.2580 v Graham (1985) 20 CCC 210 ....................................................................................................................... CA.319.120 v Graham (2004) 62 NSWLR 252; [2004] NSWCCA 420 ......................................................... SPA.12.20, SPA.98.20 v Graham & Burns (1888) 16 Cox CC 420 ........................................................................... CA.93B.100, CA.545C.60 v Grainge [1974] 1 WLR 619; [1974] 1 All ER 928 .................................................................................... CA.188.180 v Grand (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 216; 20 WN (NSW) 107 ............................................................................... CA.345.100 v Grant [1975] 2 NZLR 165 ................................................................................................................................ CA.7.80 v Grant [1975] WAR 163 ............................................................................................................................... CPA.154.20 v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 ................................................................................................................. CPA.289.20 v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243 ..... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.80, CA.19A.500, CA.428I.40, CA.61.140, CLP.1400 v Grant-Taylor; Ex parte Johnson [1980] Qd R 387; 2 A Crim R 414 .......................................................... CPA.66.40 v Grantham [1984] 2 WLR 815 .................................................................................................................... CA.176A.80 v Grassby (1988) 15 NSWLR 109; 38 A Crim R 67 ................................................................................... CA.529.240 v Grassby (1991) 55 A Crim R 419 ........................................................................................ CA.344A.40, CA.529.200 v Grassby (1992) 62 A Crim R 351 ............................................................................................................... CA.529.240 v Gray (1891) 17 Cox CC 299 ...................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 v Gray [1977] VR 225 .................................................................................................................................... CPA.154.60 v Greathead (1878) 14 Cox CC 108 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.280 v Greatorex (1994) 74 A Crim R 496 .................................................................... CA.7.140, DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60 v Green (1983) 33 SASR 211; (1983) 9 A Crim R 200 ....................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.154.320 v Green (1983) 9 A Crim R 200 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.320 v Greenberg [1943] KB 381 ............................................................................................................................. CA.444.40 v Greenfield [1973] 1 WLR 1151; [1973] 3 All ER 1050; (1973) 57 Cr App R 849 .................. CLP.760, CPA.17.20 v Greenstein [1975] 1 WLR 1353; [1976] 1 All ER 1; (1975) 61 Cr App R 296 .................................... CA.192E.120 v Greenstein [1976] 1 WLR 1353; [1975] 1 All ER 1 ............................................................................ CA.178BA.120 v Greenwood (1852) 2 Den 453 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 v Greer (1992) 62 A Crim R 442 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 v Gregory (1867) 10 Cox CC 459 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.960
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Gregory (1867) LR 1 CCR 77 .......................................................................... CA.546C.60, CA.117.200, CA.351.60 Gregory [1972] 1 WLR 991; [1972] 2 All ER 861; (1972) 56 Cr App R 441 .................... CA.117.20, CA.117.280 Gregory [1983] 3 NSWLR 172; 10 A Crim R 137 .................................................................................. CA.310D.40 Greig (1996) 89 A Crim R 254 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1140 Grice (1837) 7 Car & P 803 ......................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Griepe (1697) 1 Ld Raym 256 ................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Griffin (1869) 11 Cox CC 402 ...................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Griffis (1996) 67 SASR 170; 91 A Crim R 203 ........................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Griffiths (1858) Dears & Bell 548 ................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Griffiths (1932) 23 Cr App R 153 ............................................................................................................. CPA.154.160 Griffiths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279 ... CLP.680, CLP.740, CLP.760, CLP.780 Griffiths (1999) 103 A Crim R 291 ................................................................................................................ CA.4.160 Grills (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 December 1995) ............................................................................. CPA.293.120 Grimes (1883) 7 QLJ (NC) 109; [1883] QCR 336 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Grimes (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 209; 10 WN (NSW) 211 ........................................ CA.19A.320, CA.59.80, CLP.540 Grimes [1968] 3 All ER 179 ................................................................................................... CA.319.80, CA.319.140 Grimwade (1844) 1 Car & K 592; 174 ER 952 ............................................................................................ CA.31.80 Grimwade (1990) 51 A Crim R 470 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Grimwood [1962] 2 QB 621; [1962] 3 WLR 747; (1962) 46 Cr App R 393 ... CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100 Grocock (1888) 14 VLR 51 .......................................................................................................................... CA.94.120 Grogan (1889) 15 VLR 340 ............................................................................................................................ CA.29.80 Grondkowski [1946] KB 369; [1946] 1 All ER 559; (1946) 31 Cr App R 116 ..................... CLP.1220, CPA.19.40, CPA.21.80, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320, CPA.21.400 Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584; 106 A Crim R 125 ...................................................................................... CA.423.60 Grubb [1915] 2 KB 683; (1915) 11 Cr App R 153 .................................................................................. CA.178A.60 Gruby and Viner (1845) 5 LTOS 538 ......................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Gruncell (1840) 9 Car & P 365 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.140 Guelder (1860) 8 Cox CC 372 ..................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Guldur (1986) 8 NSWLR 12; 25 A Crim R 271 ...................... CPA.21.100, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.380, CPA.21.400 Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 ..................... CA.61HA.100, CPA.162.40, CPA.162.60 Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 12 ............................................................... CPA.162.60 Gulyas (1985) 2 NSWLR 260; 15 A Crim R 472 ........................................ CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.179.80 Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.660 Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336; 47 WN (NSW) 157 .................................................... CLP.680, CLP.740, CLP.780 Gunnell (1886) 16 Cox CC 154 ................................................................................................................... CA.136.40 Gunter (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 282; 38 WN (NSW) 97 ................................................................................ CA.24.220 Gurney (1869) 11 Cox CC 414 .................................................................................................................. CA.176.120 Guthrie (1981) 52 FLR 171; 40 ACTR 27 ................................................................................................ CA.52A.200 H (1980) 3 A Crim R 53 ............................................................................................................................ CA.78A.160 H (1995) 83 A Crim R 402 ................................................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.150.40 H (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; 98 A Crim R 71 .............................................................................................. CPA.21.220 H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 .............................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.500, CA.Pt3.Div10.520 H (2002) 132 A Crim R 551; [2002] NSWCCA 355 ................................................................................ CPA.19.180 HJS [2000] NSWCCA 205 ............................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.540 HM Coroner for East Kent; Ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr App R 10 ....................................................... CA.24.40 HQ [2003] NSWCCA 336 ............................................................................................................................ CA.37.140 Haas [1964] Tas SR 1 .......................................................................................................... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80 Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299 ................................................................................................................ DMTA.23.180 Haas (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 May 1987) ..................................................................................... DMTA.23.180 Hadad (1989) 16 NSWLR 476; 42 A Crim R 304 ................................................................................. LEPRA.14.20 Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Hadfield (1870) LR 3 CCR 253 ................................................................................................................... CA.213.20 Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.1440
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Hagan (unreported, Qld Ct of App, 15 November 1996) .......................................................................... SPA.10.100 Haidley [1984] VR 229; (1983) 10 A Crim R 1 ...................................................................... CA.428I.40, CLP.1180 Haigh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 4 August 1995) ....................................................................................... CA.97.120 Hain [1966] 2 NSWR 142; (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 7 ................................................. CA.4A.40, CA.52A.200 Haines (1821) Russ & Ry 451; 168 ER 892 ................................................................................................ CA.112.80 Haines (2001) 80 SASR 363; 125 A Crim R 126; [2001] SASC 347 ........................................................... CLP.960 Hakim (1989) 41 A Crim R 372 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Hale [1974] 1 QB 819; [1974] 3 WLR 249; 1 All ER 1107; (1973) 59 Cr App R 1 ............................... CA.86.240 Hale (1979) 68 Cr App R 415 ...................................................................................................................... CA.94.100 Hales (1728) 17 State Tr 161 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Hales [1924] 1 KB 602 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Haley (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 550 ................................................................................................................... CA.29.80 Hall (1818) Russ & Ry 355; 168 ER 842 .................................................................................................... CA.112.80 Hall (1828) 3 Car & P 409; 172 ER 477 ................................................................................. CA.117.200, CLP.1480 Hall (1836) 1 Mood 474 ............................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Hall (1849) 2 Car & K 947 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.320 Hall (1875) 13 Cox CC 49 ........................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Hall (1890) 16 VLR 503 ............................................................................................................................. CA.327.200 Hall [1891] 1 QB 747 ................................................................................................................... CA.10.40, CPA.8.20 Hall (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 74 ................................................................................................................... CA.126.220 Hall (1915) 11 Cr App R 221 .................................................................................................................. CA.178A.180 Hall [1964] 1 QB 273; [1963] 3 WLR 482; [1963] 2 All ER 1075 ........................................................... CA.94.120 Hall [1968] 2 QB 788; [1968] 3 WLR 359; [1968] 2 All ER 1009 ........................................................... CPA.21.20 Hall [1987] 1 NZLR 616 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.160.20 Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1140 Hall (1999) 108 A Crim R 209; [1999] NSWSC 738 ................................................................................... CA.44.80 Hall [2001] NSWCCA 202 ............................................................................................................................. CA.23.80 Hallam [1957] 1 QB 569; [1957] 2 WLR 521; [1957] 1 All ER 665 .............................. CA.545D.60, CA.545D.80 Hallett [1969] SASR 141 ............. CA.19A.300, CA.19A.400, CA.19A.500, CLP.440, CLP.500, CLP.520, CLP.540 Hallett 173 ER 1036; (1841) 9 Car & P 748 ........................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Halliday (1868) 5 Wyatt ................................................................................................................................ CA.179.80 Halliday (1889) 61 LT 701 ....................................................................................................... CA.19A.320, CA.54.80 Hallocoglu (1992) 29 NSWLR 67; 63 A Crim R 287 ............................................................ CPA.34.20, SPA.10.100 Hally [1962] Qd R 214 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Halmi [1999] NSWCCA 354 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Halmi (2005) 62 NSWLR 263; 156 A Crim R 150; [2005] NSWCCA 2 ................................................ CPA.126.20 Hamer [1954] Crim LR 209 ..................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 Hamid (2006) 164 A Crim R 179; [2006] NSWCCA 302 ..................................................................... DPVA.13.120 Hamilton (1837) 8 Car & P 49; 173 ER 394 ............................................................................................... CA.148.80 Hamilton (1845) 1 Cox CC 244 ........................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.179.300 Hamilton (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 9 ................................................................................................................. CA.61.320 Hamilton [1901] 1 QB 740 ........................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575 ........................................................................................ CA.33B.120, CA.97.120 Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 ............................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Hamilton [2005] 2 SCR 432; (2005) SCC 47 ................................................................................. CLP.960, CLP.980 Hammersley (1958) 42 Cr App R 207 ................................................................................. CA.319.120, CA.319.140 Hammerson (1914) 10 Cr App R 121 ........................................................................................................ CA.179.300 Hammond (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 42 ................................................................................................. CA.327.120 Hampton (1915) 11 Cr App R 117 ....................................................................................... CA.134.140, CA.156.120 Hampton (1998) 44 NSWLR 729; (1998) 101 A Crim R 399 .................................................................... SPA.44.20 Hamzy (1994) 74 A Crim R 341 .................................................................................... DMTA.25.80, DMTA.25.140 Hancock (1931) 23 Cr App R 16 .............................................................................................................. CPA.154.240 Hancock [1986] AC 455; [1986] 2 WLR 357; [1986] 1 All ER 646 .................................... CA.19A.520, CA.5.120 Hancock [1990] 2 WLR 640 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.260
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Hancock and Baker (1878) 14 Cox CC 119 ........................................................................ CA.188.100, CA.188.160 Hands (1887) 16 Cox CC 188 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Hanias (1976) 14 SASR 137 ......................................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Hansen [1964] Qd R 404 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.120 Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54; (2002) 134 A Crim R 227; [2002] SASC 208 ........................................... CPA.159.20 Hansford [1974] VR 251 ............................................................................................................................... CA.33.120 Hansill (1849) 3 Cox CC 597 ..................................................................................................................... CA.347.100 Hanson (1849) 2 Car & K 912; 175 ER 383 ............................................................................................... CA.61.120 Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.21.80 Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64; [1984] 3 All ER 848; (1985) 80 Cr App R 157 ...... CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Harding (1930) 21 Cr App R 166 ......................................................................... CA.94.60, CA.94.120, CA.117.280 Harding [1976] VR 129 ................................................................................................................ CLP.2500, CLP.2540 Harding (2008) 50 MVR 413; [2008] VSCA 124 .................................................................................. CA.52AB.200 Hardy (1871) LR 1 CCR 278 ....................................................................................................................... CA.213.20 Harker (2002) 128 A Crim R 317; [2002] QSC 61 ..................................................................................... CPA.66.40 Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296 ........................................................................................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80 Harkins [1958] VR 543 ................................................................................................................................ CA.78A.20 Harland (unreported, CCA (NSW), 22 August 1990) .............................................................................. CPA.150.120 Harley (1830) 4 Car & P 369 ....................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 Harling [1938] 1 All ER 307; (1937) 26 Cr App R 127 ........................................................................... CPA.150.20 Harlow [1967] 2 QB 193; (1967) 51 Cr App R 184 ................................................................................... CA.139.60 Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.1200 Harper (1881) 7 QBD 78 .............................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Harrington (1851) 5 Cox CC 231 ............................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Harris (1833) 1 Mood 393 ............................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Harris (1854) Dears 344 ................................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 Harris (1871) LR 1 CCR 282 ........................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Harris (1910) 5 Cr App R 285 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Harris (1924) 18 Cr App R 157 .................................................................................................................... CA.114.80 Harris [1966] 1 QB 184; (1965) 49 Cr App R 330 ................................................................................... CA.250.120 Harris (1988) 17 NSWLR 158; 35 A Crim R 146 ...................................................................................... CA.61H.20 Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409; 121 A Crim R 342; [2000] NSWCCA 469 ........ SPA.21.20, SPA.44.40, SPA.61.20 Harrison (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 58 ............................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Harrison (1931) 22 Cr App R 82 ................................................................................................ CA.94.140, CA.95.80 Harrison [1938] 3 All ER 134; (1938) 26 Cr App R 166 ............................................................................. CA.77.20 Harrison [1957] VR 117 .............................................................................................................................. CA.179.220 Harrison [1961] Crim LR 256 ........................................................................................................................ CA.7.100 Harrison (1995) 79 A Crim R 149 ................................................................................................................... CLP.740 Harry; Ex parte Eastway (1985) 39 SASR 203; 20 A Crim R 63 ................ CPA.19.120, CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180, CPA.62.100 Hart (1837) 1 Mood 486 ............................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Hart (1843) 2 LTOS 248 ............................................................................................................................. CA.186.100 Hart (2002) 131 A Crim R 609; [2002] NSWCCA 313 ................................................................................ CA.95.80 Hartley (1807) Russ & Ry 139 ..................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Hartley [1941] 1 KB 5; (1943) 28 Cr App R 15 ...................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Hartley [1972] 2 QB 1; [1972] 2 WLR 101; [1972] 1 All ER 599 ............................................................ CPA.21.20 Hartley [1978] 2 NZLR 199 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Hartley (1989) 1 WAR 224 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Hartshorn (1853) 6 Cox CC 395 .................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Harvey (1787) 1 Leach 467 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.160 Harvey (1858) 8 Cox CC 99 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Harvey (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 39; 3 WN (NSW) 83 .................................... CA.5.80, CA.5.140, CA.5.160, CA.5.180 Harvey [1993] 2 Qd R 389 ........................................................................................... CA.192E.140, CA.178BA.140 Harvey (unreported, CCA (NSW), 3 October 1985) ................................................................................. CA.52A.240
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 .......... CLP.2500, CLP.2520, CLP.2540, CLP.2620, CLP.2820 R v Haslam (1786) 1 Leach 418 ........................................................................................................................ CA.188.100 R v Hass [1972] 1 NSWLR 589 ........................................................ CA.19A.20, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.260, CPA.21.300 R v Hassall (1861) Le & Ca 56 ........................................................................................................................... CA.125.60 R v Hassan [1970] 1 QB 423 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.150.20 R v Hassard [1970] 1 WLR 1109; 2 All ER 647 .............................................................................................. CA.250.100 R v Hastings [1958] Crim LR 128 ...................................................................................................................... CA.125.60 R v Hatch (1933) 24 Cr App R 100 .................................................................................................................. CA.114.100 R v Hatch [2006] NSWCCA 330 ........................................................................................................................... CA.27.80 R v Hatchard [1999] SASC 111 ....................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.40 R v Hatfield [1999] NSWCCA 340 ................................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 R v Hattam (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 410; 30 WN (NSW) 118 ............................................................................ CA.179.240 R v Hatton [1925] 2 KB 322 ............................................................................................................................. CA.179.220 R v Hauke (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 March 1995) ................................................................................... CPA.162.80 R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 ............................................................................................... CA.117.200, CA.423.60 R v Hawkeswood (1783) 1 Leach 257 ................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 R v Hawkins (1828) 3 Car & P 392 .................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 R v Hawkins (1850) 4 Cox CC 224 .................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430 ....................................................... CA.176A.100, CA.192E.280, CA.178BA.180 R v Hawkins (1993) 67 A Crim R 64 ................................................................................................................. CA.86.220 R v Hawkins 103 ER 755; (1808) 10 East 211 .................................................................................................... CLP.1440 R v Hay [1968] Qd R 459 .............................................................................................................. CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 R v Haycock (1954) 71 WN (NSW) 221 ........................................................................................................ CA.52AA.40 R v Haydon (1845) 1 Cox CC 184 .................................................................................... CA.27.80, CA.29.80, CA.39.80 R v Hayes [1977] 1 NSWLR 364 ........................................................................................................................ CA.444.40 R v Hayes (1987) 29 A Crim R 452 .................................................................................................................. CPA.156.20 R v Hayne (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 September 1998) ............................................................................. CA.195.100 R v Haynes (1614) 12 Coke’s Reports 113 ....................................................................................................... CA.117.260 R v Hayward (1844) 1 Car & Kir 518 ................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 ........................................................................................ CA.19A.320, CA.19A.360 R v Haywood [1971] VR 755 .................................................................... CA.19A.140, CA.428I.60, CLP.160, CLP.1180 R v Hazeltine [1967] 2 QB 857 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.154.120 R v Hazelton (1874) LR 2 CCR 134 ........................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.179.240 R v Healey [1965] 1 WLR 1059; [1965] 1 All ER 365; (1964) 49 Cr App R 77 .................... CA.188.160, CA.347.100 R v Hearne (2001) 124 A Crim R 451; [2001] NSWCCA 37 ............................................................................ SPA.10.80 R v Heath (1810) Russ & Ry 184; 168 ER 750 ..................................................................................................... CA.7.60 R v Heaton (1896) 60 JP 508 ................................................................................................................................ CA.49.60 R v Heaton (1899) 5 ALR (CN) 61 ..................................................................................................................... CA.33.120 R v Heaton (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 33 ........................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.460 R v Heaton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990) ....... CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.162.60, CPA.162.80 R v Heavener (1932) 33 SR (NSW) 101; 50 WN (NSW) 22 ................................................. CA.178A.120, CA.165.100 R v HeaveyR v Hoare (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom[1965] NSWR 1167 ......... CA.33A.100, CA.33.160, CA.58.280 R v Heffernan (1985) 20 A Crim R 122 ............................................................................................................... SOA.3.60 R v Hehir (1895) 18 Cox CC 267 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.400 R v Heinrich (1992) 61 A Crim R 212 ...................................................................................... CA.52A.160, CA.52A.240 R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 103; 42 FLR 53 ......................................................... CA.3.20, CA.27.100, CA.33.40 R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 464 .................................................................................................................... CA.3.20 R v Helmling (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 November 1993) .............................. CA.52A.20, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 R v Hemmings (1864) 4 F & F 50; 176 ER 462 .......................................................................... CA.94.240, CA.117.200 R v Hemmings [1939] 1 All ER 417; (1940) 27 Cr App R 46 ....................................................................... CA.78A.100 R v Hempstead and Hudson (1818) Russ & Ry 344 ........................................................................................ CA.345.100
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Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334 ....................................................................................... CA.4A.40, CA.61HA.100 Henderson [1949] DLR 121; 91 CCC 97 .................................................................................................. CA.344A.60 Henderson (unreported, Court of Appeal UK (Crim Div), 29 November 1984) ...................................... CA.195.100 Hendy (1850) 4 Cox CC 243 ........................................................................................................................ CA.31.100 Henman [1987] Crim LR 333 ....................................................................................................................... CA.86.100 Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547 .................................................................................................... CA.39.80, CA.82.60 Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287; [1989] 2 All ER 9; (1989) 89 Cr App R 10 ............................... CLP.280, CLP.1120 Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133; (1971) 55 Cr App R 262 ....................................................... CA.19A.300, CLP.440 Henning (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 May 1990) .............. CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CA.61HA.100, CPA.293.40, CPA.293.60, CPA.293.80 Henning (unreported, NSWCCA, 11 May 1990) ............................................................................................. CLP.360 Henry [1917] VLR 525 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.154.100 Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 ..... CA.95.120, CA.96.100, CA.97.240, CA.112.160 Henry Allen 173 ER 727; (1839) 9 Car & P 31 .......................................................................................... CA.61I.60 Hensler (1870) 11 Cox CC 570 .................................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Herbert (1873) 4 AJR 89 ............................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Herlihy [1956] St R Qd 18 ........................................................................................................ CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Hermann (1879) 4 QBD 284 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.100 Hermann (1988) 37 A Crim R 440 ............................................................................................................... CA.73.100 Herron [1967] 1 QB 107; (1966) 50 Cr App R 132 .................................................................................. CA.188.240 Heston-Francois [1984] 1 QB 278 .............................................................................................................. CPA.19.100 Hetherington (1841) 4 State Trials (NS) 563 ............................................................................................... CA.529.40 Heuston (1996) 90 A Crim R 213 ............................................................................................ CLP.1820, CPA.150.60 Hewgill (1854) Dearsly CC 315 ................................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Hewitt (1913) 9 Cr App R 192 ................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Hewitt (1925) 134 LT 157; (1927) 19 Cr App R 64 ................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Hewitt [1997] 1 VR 301; 84 A Crim R 440 .............................................................................................. CPA.21.160 Hewitt and Smith 176 ER 923; (1866) 4 F & F 1101 ................................................................. CA.42.40, CA.85.20 Heyes (1950) 34 Cr App R 161 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.20 Heywood (1847) 2 Car & Kir 352 ............................................................................................................... CA.250.80 Hibbert (1875) 13 Cox CC 82 ................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Hibbert (1995) 99 CCC (3d) 193 ................................................................................................................... CLP.2500 Hickey [2002] NSWCCA 474; 137 A Crim R 62 ......................................................................................... CLP.1900 Hicklin (1868) LR 3 QB 360 ...................................................................................................................... CA.529.160 Hickman (1784) 1 Leach 278; 168 ER 241 ............................................................................... CA.94.60, CA.94.140 Hicks (1845) 4 LTOS 453 ........................................................................................................................... CA.186.100 Hicks 174 ER 296; (1840) 2 Mood & R 302 ............................................................................................. CA.19A.20 Hiddilston (1889) 6 WN (NSW) 105 ......................................................................................................... CA.250.100 Higgins (1801) 2 East 5 ............................................................................................................................. CA.546C.60 Higgins (1801) 2 East 5; 102 ER 269 ............................................................................................. CLP.880, CLP.960 Higgins [1952] 1 KB 7; [1951] 2 All ER 758; (1951) 35 Cr App R 130 ................................ CA.10.40, CA.427.20 Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 ............................................................................................................... CPA.21.280 Higley (1830) 4 Car & P 366 ......................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Higson (1984) 6 Cr App R 20; [1984] Crim LR 299 .................................................................................... CA.79.40 Hildebrandt [1964] Qd R 43 ......................................................................................................... CA.8.20, CPA.46.40 Hilder (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.1160 Hill (1811) Russ & Ry 190 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Hill (1838) 2 Mood 30 .................................................................................................................................. CA.250.60 Hill [1914] 2 KB 386 ................................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Hill [1979] VR 311 .................................................................................................................................... CPA.154.100 Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397 ......................................................................................................................... CA.24.280 Hill [1986] 1 SCR 313; 25 CCC (3d) 322 ................................................................................................... CA.23.140 Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 ................... CA.39.100, CA.44.120, CA.196.120, CA.199.120
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Hill (1998) 29 MVR 323 ........................................................................................................................... CA.52A.240 Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397 ......................................................................................................................... CA.23.180 Hilliard (1913) 109 LT 750 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; 81 ALJR 886; [2007] HCA 13 ......................................................................... CLP.580 Hillman (1863) Le & Ca 343 ......................................................................................................................... CA.84.80 Hinckley (1886) 2 QLJ 182 ......................................................................................................................... CA.66A.80 Hind (1995) 80 A Crim R 105 ................................................................................................................... CA.19A.140 Hindmarsh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 31 July 1991) ............................................................................... CA.52A.200 Hindmarsh 168 ER 387; (1792) 2 Leach 569 ........................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Hinds (1957) 41 Cr App R 143 ................................................................................................................. CA.310D.60 Hinton (1999) 103 A Crim R 142 ............................................................................................................... CPA.281.20 Hitchins [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; (1983) 9 A Crim R 238 .................................................. CA.19A.540, CA.61L.100 Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145 ......................................................................................... CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120 Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145; ................................................................................................................... CA.192E.120 Ho (unreported, CCA (NSW), 5 December 1994) ....................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Hoar (1981) 148 CLR 32; 56 ALJR 43; [1981] HCA 67 ......................................... CLP.680, CLP.820, CPA.156.20 Hoare (1859) 1 F & F 647 ............................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 HoareR v Heavey ; (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom[1965] NSWR 1167 ....... CA.33A.100, CA.33.160, CA.58.280 Hoatson (1847) 2 Car & Kir 777 ................................................................................................................. CA.250.60 Hobson (1803) Russ & Ry 56 ...................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Hobson (1823) 1 Lewin’s CC 261 ................................................................................................................. CLP.1440 Hobson (1854) Dears 400 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Hodge (unreported, CCA (NSW), 5 November 1991) ........................................................................... DMTA.23.180 Hodges (1957) 41 Cr App R 218 ................................................................................................................ CA.114.140 Hodgson (1730) 1 Leach 6 ......................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Hodgson (1828) 3 Car & P 422 .................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Hogan [1960] 2 QB 513 .................................................................................................... CPA.156.100, CPA.156.160 Hokin (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 280; 39 WN (NSW) 76 ............................................................... CA.10.40, CA.427.20 Holden (1810) Russ & Ry 154 ..................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Holden (1872) 12 Cox CC 166 ................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Holden (1917) 34 WN (NSW) 78 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Holden (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 444 ............................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Holden (1990) 52 A Crim R 32 .................................................................................................................... CPA.21.80 Holland (1841) 174 ER 313; (1841) 2 Mood & R 351 .................... CA.19A.340, CA.19A.360, CLP.460, CLP.540 Holley [1963] 1 WLR 199; 1 All ER 106; (1962) 47 Cr App R 13 ...................................... CA.347.100, CLP.1220 Holley (1969) 53 Cr App R 519 ................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Hollis (1873) 12 Cox CC 463 ......................................................................................................................... CA.82.60 Holloway (1849) Car & K 942 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Holmes (1853) 3 Car & K 360; 175 ER 589 ................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Holmes (1883) 12 QBD 23 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.320 Holmes (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 6 ........................................................ CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220 Holmes [1958] Crim LR 394 ..................................................................................................................... CA.178C.60 Holmes [1960] WAR 122 ............................................................................................................................... CLP.1200 Holroyd (1824) 2 Mood & R 339; 174 ER 308 .......................................................................................... CA.213.20 Holsworthy Justices; Ex parte Edwards [1952] WN 86 .............................................................................. CA.512.80 Holt (1983) 12 A Crim R 1 ......................................................................................................................... CA.156.120 Holton [2004] NSWCCA 214 ................................................................................................................... CA.52AA.40 Holzer [1968] VR 481 ......................................................................... CA.24.80, CA.24.120, CA.24.140, CA.39.120 Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638; 34 A Crim R 277 .............. CA.93B.100, CA.93C.60, CA.93C.100, CA.423.40, CA.423.60 Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 .............................................................................................................................. CA.428I.40 Hook (1858) Dears & Bell 606 .................................................................................................................. CA.327.200 Hooley (1922) 16 Cr App R 171 ................................................................................................................ CA.176.120
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Hooper [2004] NSWCCA 10 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.280 Hoost (1802) 2 East PC 950 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Hopkins [1924] VLR 484 ............................................................................................................................... CA.99.20 Hopley (1915) 11 Cr App R 248 .................................................................... CA.117.200, CA.179.260, CA.179.300 Hopper [1915] 2 KB 431; (1916) 11 Cr App R 136 ................................................................................... CA.23.120 Hopton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 October 1998) ................................................................................ CA.52A.200 Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 ........................................................................................................................... CA.19A.200 Hornbuckle [1945] VLR 281 ..................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Hornby (1844) 1 Car & Kir 305 ................................................................................................................. CA.156.120 Horne [1994] Crim LR 584 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.2580 Horry [1952] 71 NZLR 111 .......................................................................... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.420 Horseferry Road Magistrates Court; Ex parte K [1997] QB 23; [1996] 3 WLR 68; [1996] 3 All ER 719 ........................................................................................................................................................ CLP.1140 v Horsenail (1919) 14 Cr App R 57 .............................................................................................................. CA.188.240 v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Farquharson [1982] QB 762; [1982] 2 WLR 430; [1982] 2 All ER 269 ............................................................................................................................................................. CPA.56.40 v Horsham Justices; Ex parte Reeves (1980) 75 Cr App R 65 .................................................................... CPA.19.160 v Horsington [1983] 2 NSWLR 72; (1083) 14 A Crim R 118 .......................................................................... CLP.800 v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426; 104 A Crim R 306 ................................................................................. CPA.281.20 v Horvath [1972] VR 533 ............................................................................................................................. CA.52A.200 v Hosgood (1884) 18 SALR 123 .................................................................................................................... CA.66A.80 v Hoskin (1974) 9 SASR 531 ................................................................................. CA.19A.520, CA.33.120, CLP.1400 v Hough (1894) 10 WN (NSW) 205 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.280 v Houlker (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 March 1993) ............................................................................. DMTA.25.200 v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 183 ................................................................................................................ CA.178A.240 v House (1921) 16 Cr App R 49 ................................................................................................ CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 v Houston (1895) 6 QLJ 145 ....................................................................................................... CA.155.40, CA.161.40 v Howard [1966] 1 WLR 13; [1965] 3 All ER 684; (1966) 50 Cr App R 56 ........................................... CA.61HA.80 v Howard [1987] 1 NZLR 347 .................................................................................................... CA.35.120, CA.97.140 v Howard (1992) 29 NSWLR 242 ........................................................................................... CA.345.140, CPA.113.40 v Howard [1993] Crim LR 213 ......................................................................................................................... CA.47.80 v Howard (2005) 152 A Crim R 7; [2005] NSWCCA 25 ........................................................................ DMTA.23.200 v Howarth (1828) 1 Moody 207; 168 ER 1243 .............................................................................................. CA.33.160 v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 ............................................................. CA.83.100, CA.423.40, CA.423.60, CA.423.100 v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448; 32 ALJR 212; [1958] HCA 38 ........................................................................ CLP.2240 v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 ......... CLP.2500, CLP.2620, CLP.2640, CLP.2820 v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; (1987) 85 Cr App R 32 ............... CA.27.120, CA.117.200, CA.346.80 v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 WLR 501; [1981] 3 All ER 383 ............................. LEPRA.9.40, LEPRA.99.180 v Howes (1971) 2 SASR 293 .............................................................................................................. CLP.680, CLP.740 v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141; (2000) 116 A Crim R 249; [2000] VSCA 159 ......................... CA.61H.20, CA.61HA.80 v Howson (1981) 74 Cr App R 172 ................................................................................................................ CPA.34.20 v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685; 56 A Crim R 88 ....................................................................................... CPA.19.160 v Huang (1995) 78 A Crim R 111 ................................................................................................................. CA.442B.20 v Hudson [1943] 1 KB 458 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.320, CA.117.400 v Hudson [1966] 1 QB 448; [1965] 2 WLR 604; (1965) 49 Cr App R 69 ................................................... CA.66F.60 v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 ................... CLP.2540, CLP.2600, CLP.2640 v Hudson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 May 1995) ............................................................... DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60 v Hufflett (1919) 84 JP 24 ................................................................................................................................ CA.58.160 v Huggins (1730) 17 St Tr 309 ..................................................................................................................... CA.19A.320 v Huggins (1866) 2 Str 882; 93 ER 915 ...................................................................................................... CA.43A.120 v Huggins (1866) 2 Str 883; 93 ER 915 ........................................................................................................... CA.44.80 v Hughes (1785) 1 Leach 406; 168 ER 305 .................................................................................................... CA.112.80 v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.1220 v Hughes (1832) 1 Mood 370 .......................................................................................................................... CA.155.40
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TABLE OF CASES
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Hughes (1844) 1 Car & Kir 519 ................................................................................................................. CA.327.200 Hughes (1850) 4 Cox CC 447 ........................................................................................................................ CA.85.20 Hughes (1858) 1 Foster & Finlason 355 .................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Hughes (1860) Bell 242 .............................................................................................................................. CA.188.100 Hughes (1879) 4 QBD 614 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Hughes 173 ER 1038; (1841) 9 Car & P 752 ............................................................................................ CA.61I.100 Hull (1989) 16 NSWLR 385; 41 A Crim R 262 .................................................................... CPA.66.40, CPA.113.20 Hull Prison Board of Visitors [1979] 1 QB 425; 2 WLR 42; 1 All ER 701 .......................................... CPA.156.160 Humphrey [1965] 3 All ER 689 ................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Humphries (unreported, CCA (NSW), 2 December 1997) .......................................................................... CA.208.20 Hundson (1781) 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 611 ..................................................................................... CA.512.100 Hunt (1820) 3 Barnewall & Alderson 566 ................................................................................................ CA.545C.60 Hunt (1838) 8 Car & P 642 .......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Hunt (1918) 13 Cr App R 155 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Hunt [1968] 2 QB 433; [1968] 3 WLR 231; (1968) 52 Cr App R 580 ......................................................... CLP.780 Hunt [1987] 1 All ER 1 ................................................................................................................................ CA.417.40 Hunt (1996) 88 A Crim R 307 .................................... CA.178A.220, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.160, CA.178BB.140 Hunt [1999] NSWCCA 375 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.214.20 Hunter (1867) 10 Cox CC 642 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Hunter (1989) 51 SASR 158; 44 A Crim R 93 ............................................................................................. CA.4.160 Hunter (1999) 105 A Crim R 223; [1999] NSWCCA 5 ...................................................... CPA.159.20, CPA.160.20 Hunter (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 August 1990) .................................................................................. CPA.293.80 Hura (2001) 121 A Crim R 472 ................................................................................................................ CPA.154.240 Hurley [1967] VR 526 ......................................... CLP.1400, CLP.2500, CLP.2540, CLP.2600, CLP.2620, CLP.2640 Hurren (1962) 46 Cr App R 323 .............................................................................................................. CA.178C.180 Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 ........................................................................................................ CLP.2500, CLP.2580 Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567; [1969] 3 WLR 134; [1969] 2 All ER 1117 ........................................................... CLP.80 Hussey (1924) 41 TLR 205; 18 Cr App R 121 ....................................................................................... CPA.154.140 Hussey (1925) 18 Cr App R 160; (1925) 89 JP 28 ................................................................... CA.18.20, CA.423.80 Hutchinson (1677) 3 Keb 785; 84 ER 1011 ............................................................................................. CPA.156.160 Hutchinson (1784) 1 Leach 339 .................................................................................................. CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Hutty [1953] VLR 338 .......................................................................................................... CA.19A.100, CA.22A.40 Huynh [2000] NSWCCA 18 ....................................................................................................................... CA.93C.180 Huynh [2005] NSWCCA 220 ..................................................................................................................... CA.112.160 Huynh (2008) 180 A Crim R 517; [2008] NSWCCA 16 .............................................................................. CLP.2660 Huynh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 May 1996) .................................................................................. DMTA.25.200 Hyams (1836) 7 Car & P 441; 173 ER 196 ................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134 ............................................................................................................................... CA.345.140 Hyland (1898) 24 VLR 101 ............................................................................................................................ CA.84.80 ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551; (1945) 30 Cr App R 31 ............................................................................ CLP.740 Iannelli (2003) 56 NSWLR 247; (2003) 139 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 1 ......................................... CLP.1060 Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278; (2005) 154 A Crim R 55; [2005] NSWCCA 178 ...................................... CA.19A.100 Ignjatic (1993) 68 A Crim R 333 .......................................................................................... CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 Imad Salameh (1986) 26 A Crim R 353 ................................................................................................... CA.33A.100 Infirri (1981) 5 A Crim R 132 ...................................................................................................................... CA.179.80 Ingham (1864) 5 B & S 257; 122 ER 827 ................................................................................................. CPA.154.20 Ingleson [1915] 1 KB 512; (1916) 11 Cr App R 21 ................................................................................ CPA.154.140 Inglis [1917] VLR 672 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.154.100 Ingram [1956] 2 QB 424; (1956) 40 Cr App R 115 ............................................................................... CA.178C.140 Ingrassia (1997) 41 NSWLR 447; 91 A Crim R 383 ........................................ SPA.10.40, SPA.10.100, SPA.10.140 Inns (1974) 60 Cr App R 231 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Instan [1893] 1 QB 450 ........................................................................................ CA.19A.180, CA.24.220, CA.44.80 Ion (1852) 21 LJMC 166 .............................................................................................................................. CA.250.80 Ion (1996) 89 A Crim R 81 ..................................................................................................... CPA.36.20, CPA.133.20
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Iongi (1993) 69 A Crim R 441 .............................................................................................. CPA.21.240, CPA.21.260 Ireland [1998] AC 147; [1997] 4 All ER 225; [1998] 1 Cr App R 177 ................................. CA.59.100, CA.61.120 Irwin (2006) 94 SASR 480; (2006) 161 A Crim R 78; [2006] SASC 90 ...................................................... CLP.760 Isaac (1884) 5 NSWLR 369 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Isaac (1996) 87 A Crim R 513 ..................................................................................................... CA.10E.20, CLP.700 Isaacs (1862) Le & C 220 ............................................................................................................................... CA.82.60 Isaacs (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 369; 1 WN (NSW) 31 ..................................................................................... CA.117.20 Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374; 90 A Crim R 587 .................................................................... CA.24.20, SPA.Pt1.20 Israel (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 138 ................................................................................................................ CA.156.120 Ita (2003) 139 A Crim R 340; [2003] NSWCCA 174 ....................................... CA.61J.140, CA.35.120, CA.59.120 Iuliano [1971] VR 412 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.120 J (1987) 9 NSWLR 615; 30 A Crim R 173 ............................................................................................ CA.178A.180 J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 ................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400, CPA.150.20, CPA.150.120 JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) ............... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CA.Pt3.Div10.460, CA.Pt3.Div10.480 JCW (2000) 112 A Crim R 466; [2000] NSWCCA 209 ........................................................................... CPA.21.280 JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 ......................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Jackson (1783) 1 Leach 267; 168 ER 236 ................................................................................. CA.99.60, CA.149.40 Jackson (1813) 3 Campbell 370 ................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Jackson (1823) 1 Lew 270 .......................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Jackson (1826) 1 Moody 119 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Jackson (1844) 1 Car & Kir 384 .................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Jackson (1857) 7 Cox CC 357 .................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Jackson (1864) 9 Cox CC 505 .................................................................................................................... CA.125.100 Jackson (1881) 7 VLR 313 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Jackson (1890) 17 Cox CC 104 ...................................................................................................................... CA.29.80 Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671 ............................................................................................................................. CA.61.320 Jackson (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 732; 21 WN 241 ............................................................................................ CPA.21.20 Jackson [1953] 1 WLR 591; [1953] 1 All ER 872; (1953) 37 Cr App R 43 ........................................... CPA.159.20 Jackson [1985] Crim LR 442 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.740 Jackson (1987) 11 NSWLR 318; (1987) 30 A Crim R 230 ............................................................................ CLP.780 Jackson (1988) 33 A Crim R 413 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.740 Jackson [2001] NSWCCA 355 ................................................................................................................. CA.176A.100 Jackson [2004] NSWCCA 110 ............................................................................................................... DMTA.25A.20 Jacobs [1993] 2 Qd R 541 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.150.40 Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 ...... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.80, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.540, CA.35.120, CA.94.60, CA.345.160, CPA.162.60 Jakac [1961] VR 367 .................................................................................................................................. CA.19A.500 James (1836) 7 Car & P 553 ........................................................................................................................ CA.250.60 James (1977) 3 QL 359 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 James (1979) 70 Cr App R 215 .................................................................................................................... CA.46.100 James (1983) 36 SASR 215; 11 A Crim R 272 ........................................................................................... CA.316.80 James 173 ER 429; (1837) 8 Car & P. 131 ................................................................................................. CA.201.20 Jamieson [1988] VR 879; (1987) 34 A Crim R 308 ................................................................................. CA.249B.40 Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10; [2005] NSWCCA 281 ............................................................................ CPA.126.20 Janceski (2006) 64 NSWLR 10; [2005] NSWCCA 281 ............................................................................... CLP.1640 Janson (1849) 4 Cox CC 82 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 Japaljarri (2002) 134 A Crim R 261; [2002] VSCA 154 ........................................ CA.27.120, CLP.2640, CLP.2820 Jaques [2002] NSWCCA 444 ....................................................................................................................... CA.322.60 Jarmain [1946] KB 74; [1945] 2 All ER 613; (1946) 31 Cr App R 39 .................................................. CA.19A.140 Jarman (1878) 14 Cox CC 111 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Jarrald & Ost 169 ER 1404; (1863) Le & Ca 301 ...................................................................................... CA.114.60 Jarvis (1837) 2 Mood & R 40 .................................................................................................................... CA.347.100 Jason Roy Richards (unreported, SC (NSW), Common Law Div, 16 February 1998) ............................ CPA.21.360
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TABLE OF CASES
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Jasper (2003) 139 A Crim R 329 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Jeffrey [1967] VR 467 ............................................................................................. CA.428I.60, CLP.1140, CLP.1180 Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284; 64 WN (NSW) 71 ....................................................... CA.58.200, LEPRA.99.60 Jeffries and Bryant (1848) 3 Cox CC 85 ..................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Jell; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 48; 46 A Crim R 261 ............................... CPA.19.160, CPA.113.40 Jenkin (1991) 57 A Crim R 124 ................................................................................................................... CPA.66.40 Jenkins (1877) Knox 295 .............................................................................................................................. CA.33.180 Jenkins (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 20; [1964] NSWR 721; 81 WN (Pt 2) 44 .................................. CLP.1100, CLP.1140 Jenkins [1983] 1 All ER 1000; (1983) 76 Cr App R 313 ............ CA.33.180, CA.35.140, CPA.162.20, CPA.162.40 Jenni Young (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 October 1993) ...................................................................... CA.310D.80 Jennings (1858) 7 Cox CC 397 .................................................................................................................... CA.156.20 Jennion [1962] 1 WLR 317; [1962] 1 All ER 689; 46 Cr App R 212 ...................................................... CA.23A.60 Jennison (1862) Leigh & Cave 157 ............................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Jensen [1980] VR 194 ................................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Jerome [1964] Qd R 595 ............................................................................. CPA.154.60, CPA.154.160, CPA.156.220 Jessop (1858) Dearsly & Bell 442 ........................................................................................ CA.179.200, CA.179.280 Johal [1973] QB 475; [1972] 3 WLR 210; [1972] 2 All ER 449 ............................................................... CPA.21.20 John (1875) 13 Cox CC 100 ........................................................................................................................... CA.4.260 John Cox 172 ER 985; (1832) 5 Car & P 297 ............................................................................................. CA.61I.60 Johns [1978] 2 NSWLR 259 ......................................................................................................................... CA.442.20 Johnson (1786) 2 East PC 488 ...................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 Johnson (1822) Rus & Ry 492 ..................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Johnson (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) 201 ........................................................................................ CA.117.320, CA.118.20 Johnson (1911) 6 Cr App R 218 ................................................................................................................. CA.188.180 Johnson [1961] 1 WLR 1478; [1961] 3 All ER 969; (1961) 46 Cr App R 55 ........................................ CPA.150.20 Johnson [1968] SASR 132 ..................................................................................................... CA.61L.80, CA.61L.100 Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 Johnson (2001) 125 A Crim R 564; [2001] NSWCCA 465 ................................................ CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Johnson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 July 1990) ............................................................... CPA.21.300, CPA.293.60 Johnson (unreported, CCA (Vic), 27 February 1997) ................................. CPA.150.80, CPA.150.100, CPA.150.120 Johnson & Anderson (1864) Leigh & Cave 489 ........................................................................................ CA.117.140 Johnson & Wright (1851) 2 Denison 310 .................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Johnson and Jones (1841) Car & M 218 .................................................................................. CA.345.60, CA.345.80 Johnson 168 ER 999; (1827) 1 Lewin 164 ............................................................................................... CA.19A.360 Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 ... CA.Pt3.Div10.560, CA.Pt3.Div10.600, CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.280 Jolly [1982] VR 46 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.444.40 Jones (1664) Kelyng’s Crown Cases 37 ........................................................................................................ CLP.1220 Jones (1779) 1 Doug 300 .............................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Jones (1834) 6 Car & P 343; 172 ER 1269 ............................................................................................ LEPRA.23.80 Jones (1837) 7 Car & P 834 ......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Jones (1846) 175 ER 98; 2 Car & K 236 .................................................................................................. CA.117.220 Jones (1849) 3 Cox CC 441 ...................................................................................... CA.27.80, CA.96.80, CA.98.180 Jones (1850) 1 Denison 551 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Jones (1851) 2 Car & K 398; 175 ER 164 .................................................................................................... CA.31.80 Jones (1858) Dears & Bell 555 .................................................................................................................... CA.139.60 Jones [1898] 1 QB 119 ....................................................................................................... CA.178C.140, CA.179.200 Jones (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 234 ............................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Jones (1925) 19 Cr App R 39 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Jones (1934) 24 Cr App R 55 .................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Jones [1949] 1 KB 194; (1948) 33 Cr App R 33 ...................................................................................... CA.347.100 Jones [1971] VR 72 ....................................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Jones (1974) 59 Cr App R 120 ..................................................................................................... CLP.680, CPA.17.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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Rv Rv Rv
Jones (1986) 22 A Crim R 42 ...................................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Jones (1995) 38 NSWLR 652; 78 A Crim R 504 ............................ CA.24.60, CA.24.140, CA.24.160, CA.423.140 Jones [2008] QB 460; [2007] EWCA Crim 1118; [2007] 3 WLR 907; [2007] 4 All ER 112 ..... CLP.900, CLP.960 Jones (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 November 1963) ................................................................................ CA.54.100 Jones (No 2) (1972) 56 Cr App R 413 ......................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Jones and Hayes (1877) 14 Cox CC 3 ....................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Jones and Palmer (1785) 1 Leach 366 ......................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Jones 110 ER 485; (1832) 4 B & Ad 345 ....................................................................................................... CLP.660 Jones 170 ER 1105; (1809) 2 Camp 131 ....................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Joon Hong Ra (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 June 1992) ....................................................................... DMTA.26.60 Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.540 Jorgic [1963] NSWR 66; 80 WN (NSW) 761 ........................................................................................... CA.117.440 Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68; 88 A Crim R 399 ................................................................................................ CLP.2240 Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520; 98 A Crim R 1 ........................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Jovanovic (1999) 106 A Crim R 548 .......................................................................................................... CPA.154.20 Joyce [1968] NZLR 1070 .......................................................................................................... CA.35.120, CA.97.140 Joyce [1970] SASR 184 ............................................................................................... CLP.260, CLP.1080, CLP.1140 Juby (1886) 16 Cox CC 160 .................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 Julian (1998) 100 A Crim R 430 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Jura [1954] 1 QB 506 ................................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Jurca [1986] 6 NSWLR 491; 23 A Crim R 439 ............................................................. CA.178BB.240, CA.327.220 Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209; (1998) 101 A Crim R 259; 29 MVR 523 ............................................. CA.52A.240 Justelius [1973] 1 NSWLR 471 ..................................................... CA.117.20, CA.117.80, CA.117.360, CA.179.200 Justices of Galway [1906] 2 IR KB 499 .................................................................................................. CPA.156.140 K (1983) 78 Cr App R 82; [1983] Crim. LR 736 ......................................................................................... CLP.2640 K (1993) 118 ALR 596 ................................................................................................................................. CA.58.200 KNL (2005) 154 A Crim R 268; [2005] NSWCCA 260 .......................................................................... CA.66A.120 KRM (1999) 105 A Crim R 437 ............................................................................................................... CPA.150.200 Kaddour (2005) 156 A Crim R 11; [2005] NSWCCA 303 ..................................................................... DMTA.24.80 Kady (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 June 1993) ........................................... DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60, DMTA.29.60 Kaitamaki [1980] 1 NZLR 59 ...................................................................................................................... CA.61H.20 Kakelo [1923] 2 KB 793; (1923) 17 Cr App R 149 .................................................................... CA.10.40, CPA.8.20 Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 ................................................................................ CLP.680, CLP.780, CLP.1400 Kalajzich (1997) 94 A Crim R 41 .................................................................................................................. CA.26.20 Kaldor (2004) 150 A Crim R 271; [2004] NSWCCA 425 .............................................................................. CLP.580 Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Kalinowski (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 377; 48 WN (NSW) 97 ....................................................................... CA.345.100 Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 ..................................................................................................................... CA.428I.40 Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385 ................... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.600, CA.35.140, CPA.150.100, CPA.162.40, CPA.162.60 Kane [1967] NZLR 60 ................................................................................................................................ CA.319.140 Kane (2001) 3 VR 542; 123 A Crim R 385; [2001] VSCA 153 ............................................................... CPA.162.60 Kane [2001] NSWCCA 150 ................................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.160 Kanwar [1982] 1 WLR 845; [1982] 2 All ER 528; (1982) 75 Cr App R 87 ........................................... CA.188.220 Kapeliotis (1995) 82 A Crim R 300 ....................................................................... CLP.760, CPA.21.60, CPA.21.100 Karageorge (1998) 103 A Crim R 157 ......................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 ................................................................................................................. DMTA.7.40 Kardogeros [1991] 1 VR 269; 49 A Crim R 352 ..................................................................................... CPA.154.220 Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 451; 77 A Crim R 479 ................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 ......... CA.176A.80, CA.192E.140, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140, CLP.80, CLP.800 Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 .................................................................................... CA.197.100 Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613 .................................................................................................................. CA.423.40 Katarzynski [2005] NSWCCA 72 ............................................ CA.19A.80, CA.19A.140, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.500
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Kay (1857) Dearsly & Bell 231 .................................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Kay (1925) 19 Cr App R 42 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Kay (1998) 100 A Crim R 367 ................................................................................................................... CPA.21.320 Kay [2000] NSWSC 716 ............................................................................................................................... CA.86.220 Kay (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 April 1998) ......................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Keane (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 10 ............................................................................................................... CA.249B.40 Keenan (1994) 76 A Crim R 374 ........................................................................................... CA.545B.40, CA.417.40 Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397; 192 A Crim R 566; [2009] HCA 1 .......................................... CLP.580, CPA.162.60 Kellert (1961) 80 WN (NSW) 307 .......................................................................................................... CA.527C.160 Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468 .......................................................... CA.319.140 Kelly (1820) Russ & Ry 421 ........................................................................................................................ CA.345.80 Kelly [1934] VLR 29 ............................................................................................................................... CA.178C.160 Kelly [1958] VR 412 .................................................................................................................................. CA.52A.180 Kelly [1964] 1 QB 173; [1963] 3 WLR 835; (1964) 48 Cr App R 1 ................................... CA.112.80, CA.112.140 Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 ....... CLP.340, CLP.1060, CLP.1080, CLP.1120 Kendall (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 February 1991) ....................................... CA.24.120, CA.24.200, CA.24.220 Kendrick and Smith (1931) 23 Cr App R 1; All ER 851 .......................................................................... CPA.156.80 Kennedy [1923] SASR 183 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Kennedy (1979) 37 FLR 356 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 ..................................................................... CLP.1700, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.180 KennedyPolice v Kennedy ; (1998) 71 SASR 175; sub nom(1998) 100 A Crim R 377 ............................. CA.7.120 Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 ............................. CA.38A.80, CA.38.80, CA.39.80, CA.41.80, CLP.140, CLP.400, CLP.420 v Kenrick (1843) 5 QB 49 ............................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 v Kent-Newbold (1939) 62 CLR 398 .......................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 v Keogh [1964] VR 400 ............................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 v Kerekes (1951) 70 WN (NSW) 102 ..................................................................................... CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 v Kerr (1837) 8 Car & P 176 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 v Kerr [1988] 1 NZLR 270 .............................................................................................................................. CA.61.100 v Kersey (1909) 1 Cr App R 260 ...................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 v Kershaw (1902) 18 TLR 357 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.560 v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.660 v Keyowski (1986) 28 CCC (3d) 553 ............................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 v Keyowski (1988) 40 CCC (3d) 481 ...................................................................................... CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160 v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 v Khazaal (2012) 246 CLR 601; 217 A Crim R 96; [2012] HCA 26 ............................................................. CLP.2900 v Khouzame (1999) 108 A Crim R 170; [1999] NSWCCA 173 .................................................................. CPA.21.160 v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425 ....................................................................................................................... CA.176.120 v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729; [1973] 2 WLR 254; (1973) 57 Cr App R 381 .................................................... CLP.580 v Kilbride (1932) 23 Cr App R 12 ............................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 v Kilham (1870) LR 1 CCR 261 ..................................................................................................................... CA.180.20 v Kilkenny (1890) 16 VLR 139 ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.120 v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118; 3 All ER 316; (1983) 77 Cr App R 225 ................................. CA.61HA.100, CLP.80 v Kinash [1982] Qd R 648; (1981) 5 A Crim R 240 ......................................................................................... CLP.540 v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1 ................................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.400 v Kinder (1800) 2 East 855 .............................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 v Kindon (1957) 41 Cr App R 208 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.320 v King (1817) Russ & Ry 332; 168 ER 830 ........................................................................... CA.94AA.20, CA.345.80 v King (1844) 1 Cox CC 36 .......................................................................................................................... CA.186.100 v King [1897] 1 QB 214 .................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.179.280, CPA.21.280 v King (1908) 25 WN (NSW) 168 .......................................................................................... CA.117.280, CA.126.200 v King (1914) 10 Cr App R 117 ..................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 v King [1938] 2 All ER 662 .......................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 v King (1978) 19 SASR 118 ............................................................................................................................ CA.112.80
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TABLE OF CASES
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King (1985) 17 A Crim R 184 ...................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 King (1986) 15 FCR 427; 22 A Crim R 153 ........................................................................................... CPA.150.120 King [1987] 2 WLR 746 ............................................................................................................................. CA.179.280 King [1992] QB 20; (1991) 93 Cr App R 259 .............................................................................................. CA.4.260 King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 ........... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.400, CA.Pt3.Div10.500 King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; 139 A Crim R 132; [2003] NSWCCA 399 ..... CA.19A.100, CLP.1400, CPA.19.100 King (2004) 59 NSWLR 515; 144 A Crim R 405; [2004] NSWCCA 20 ............................ CA.94.140, CPA.162.60 Kinghorne (1982) 8 A Crim R 41 .............................................................................................................. CA.52A.140 Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355; [1994] 3 WLR 519; [1994] 3 All ER 353 .................................................... CA.428I.40 Kingswell [1984] 3 NSWLR 273; (1984) 14 A Crim R 211 .......................................................................... CLP.760 Kinloch (1746) Fost 16 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.46.40 Kinsey (1836) 7 C & P 447; 173 ER 198 .............................................................................................. LEPRA.23.80 Kirk (1901) 20 NZLR 463 ....................................................................................................................... CA.178A.180 Kirkby (1998) 105 A Crim R 323 ............................................................................................................ CPA.154.260 Kirkland [2005] NSWCCA 130 .................................................................................................................... CA.33.200 Kirkman (1987) 44 SASR 591 ................................................................................................................... CA.19A.600 Kissier (1982) 7 A Crim R 171 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.120 Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696 ..................................................................... CA.4A.40, CA.61HA.100, CLP.1300 Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Kitson (1955) 39 Cr App R 66 .................................................................................................................. CA.52A.120 Klein (1932) 23 Cr App R 185 ..................................................................................................................... CA.189.20 Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 ................................................................................................................ CPA.36.20 Knewland (1796) 2 Leach 721; 168 ER 461 ............................................................................................... CA.94.140 Knight (1823) 1 Carrington & Payne 116 ..................................................................................................... CLP.1220 Knight (1871) 12 Cox CC 102 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 ........................................................................... CA.61.100, CA.61.120, CA.94.220 Knight (1990) 51 A Crim R 323 ......................................................................................... CPA.156.20, CPA.156.160 Knight [2004] NSWCCA 145 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.680 Knill (1822) 2 B & Ald 929n ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Knock (1877) 14 Cox CC 1 ............................................................................................................................ CA.18.20 Knutsen [1963] Qd R 157 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.120 Komljenovic (1994) 76 A Crim R 521 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Komornick [1986] VR 845; (1984) 14 A Crim R 256 ................................................................................ CPA.36.20 Koolmatrie (1989) 52 SASR 482 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Korff (1852) Legge 716 .............................................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Kotish (1948) 93 CCC 138 ............................................................................................................................... CLP.760 Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236 ............................................................................. CA.178BA.120 Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; (1974) 58 Cr App R 412 ..................................... CA.192E.160 Kranz (1991) 53 A Crim R 331 .................................................................................................................. CPA.160.20 Krause (1902) 66 JP 121; 18 TLR 238 .......................................................................................... CA.26.40, CLP.960 Kringle [1953] Tas SR 52 ........................................................................................................ CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 Kristo (1989) 39 A Crim R 86 .......................................................................................... CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100 Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82 .................................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 ................ CA.192E.200, CA.192E.220, CA.192F.180, CA.178BA.140, CA.179.320 Kuckailis [2001] NSWCCA 333 ................................................................................................................... CA.61.160 Kuff [1962] VR 578 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.240, CA.179.280 Kukinoski (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 August 1989) ............................................................................ CPA.154.60 Kumar (2002) 5 VR 193; 133 A Crim R 245; [2002] VSCA 139 .............................................................. CA.23.180 Kupferberg (1918) 13 Cr App R 166 ....................................................................................................... CPA.156.120 Kurtic (1996) 85 A Crim R 57 ..................................... CA.428I.60, CA.5.80, CA.423.60, CA.423.140, CPA.133.20 Kutas (1923) 17 Cr App R 179 .................................................................................................................... CA.189.20 Kwaku Mensah [1946] AC 83 ...................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83 ......... CA.176.120, CA.178BB.200, CA.179.200
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TABLE OF CASES
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L (1989) 43 A Crim R 51 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.30.20 L (1991) 174 CLR 379; 66 ALJR 36; [1991] HCA 48 ............................................................ CA.61I.60, CA.61T.20 LJM (1994) 68 ALJR 208 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.156.40 LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 ......................... CLP.660, CLP.720, CLP.740 LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 523; [2010] HCA 17 ......................................................... CLP.980 LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 ................................................................... CLP.1820 LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354 .......................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 ............................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.560, CA.Pt3.Div10.600 Lackey [1954] Crim LR 57 ........................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 Lagan (2001) 127 A Crim R 262; [2001] ACTSC 131 ................................................................................. CA.39.80 Lake (1976) 64 Cr App R 172 .................................................................................................................... CPA.21.340 Laker (1949) 34 Cr App R 36 .................................................................................................................. CA.178C.140 Lam (1990) 46 A Crim R 402 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Lam (2002) 135 A Crim R 302 .............................................................................................................. DMTA.25.200 Lam (2005) 159 A Crim R 448; [2005] VSC 294 .................................................................................... CA.19A.200 Lam (No 22) (2005) 15 VR 574; 164 A Crim R 445; [2005] VSC 296 ................................. CA.19A.280, CLP.420 Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981; [1967] 3 WLR 888; (1967) 51 Cr App R 417 .................................................... CA.24.120 Lambassi [1927] VLR 349 .......................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Lambert [1919] VLR 205 .......................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.40 Lambie [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294 .......................................................................... CA.178BA.120 Lambie [1982] AC 449; [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294 .......................... CA.192E.120, CA.192E.160 Lanauze (1847) 2 Cox CC 362 ....................................................................................................................... CA.4.260 Landy [1943] VLR 73 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.21.380 Lane [1983] 2 VR 449; 8 A Crim R 182 ..................................................................................................... CA.423.40 Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 ....................................................................................................................... CA.19A.220 Lane (1990) 53 SASR 480; 48 A Crim R 161 ........................................................................................... CPA.154.60 Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 ................................................................................. CLP.580 Lang (1976) 62 Cr App R 50 .................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Lang [2008] NSWCCA 41 .......................................................................................................................... CA.112.100 Langbein (2008) 181 A Crim R 378 ................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.520 Lange (1986) 25 A Crim R 139 .................................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 .................................................................. CA.94.100, CA.117.200 Langlands [1932] VLR 450 ................................................................................... CA.94.120, CA.97.140, CA.97.220 Langmead (1864) 9 Cox CC ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Langridge (1996) 87 A Crim R 1 ................................................................................................................. CPA.17.20 Lansdell (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 March 1995) .................................................................................. CA.322.40 Lanteri (1985) 4 NSWLR 359 ...................................................................................................................... CA.351.40 Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320; 168 ER 263 ............................................................ CA.94.100, CA.94.300, CA.117.140 Lardner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, No 60499 of 1997, 10 September 1998) ............................................................................................................................................ CA.59.100, CA.60.160 v Large [1939] 1 All ER 753; (1940) 27 Cr App R 65 .................................................................................... CA.24.40 v Larkin [1943] 1 KB 174; 1 All ER 217; 29 Cr App R 18 ................................. CA.19A.660, CA.24.80, CA.24.120 v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 ............................................................................. CPA.21.20, CPA.36.20, CPA.154.200 v Latif [1995] 1 Cr App R 270 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359 ....................................................................................................... CA.5.180, CA.35.100 v Lattouf (1980) 2 A Crim R 65 .................................................................................................................... CPA.150.20 v Lauchlan (1999) 103 A Crim R 594 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.200 v Laurie (1986) 23 A Crim R 219; [1987] 2 Qd R 762 .......................................................................... CA.178BA.140 v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762; 23 A Crim R 219 ......................................................................................... CA.192E.140 v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852; 55 CCC (3d) 97 ............................................................................................. CA.423.60 v Lavender [2004] NSWCCA 120 ................................................................................................................... CA.24.240 v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 ....... CA.44.100, CA.54.100, CLP.1300, CLP.1380 v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495 ............................................. CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120
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Lavery [No 2] (1978) 19 SASR 515 ................................................................................... CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.40 Lavey (1850) 3 Car & Kir 26 ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542; 69 A Crim R 115 ......................................... CA.19A.180, CA.19A.500, CA.24.200 Lawrence (1830) 4 Car & P 231; 172 ER 683 ............................................................................................ CA.112.80 Lawrence (1890) 16 VLR 164 ................................................................................................................. LEPRA.23.80 Lawrence [1933] AC 699 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 ..... CLP.2500, CLP.2520, CLP.2540, CLP.2560, CLP.2580, CLP.2600, CLP.2640, CLP.2660 v Lawrence [1982] AC 510; [1981] 2 WLR 524; [1981] 1 All ER 974 ......................................................... CLP.1880 v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; (1996) 86 A Crim R 412 .................................... CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140, CLP.80 v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; 86 A Crim R 412 ....................................................................................... CA.192E.140 v Lawrence (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 September 1994) ........................................................................ CA.428I.40 v Laws (2000) 50 NSWLR 96; 116 A Crim R 63; [2000] NSWSC 880 ........................................................ CA.26.40 v Lawson [1905] 1 KB 541 ............................................................................................................................. CA.173.80 v Lawson [1952] 1 All ER 804; (1952) 36 Cr App R 30 ............................................................................... CA.161.20 v Lawson [1986] VR 515; (1985) 18 A Crim R 360 ..................... CA.24.160, CA.423.40, CA.423.100, CA.423.120, CA.423.140 v Lawson (1996) 86 A Crim R 111 ............................................................................. CA.173.160, CA.180.20, CLP.80 v Lawson [2005] NSWCCA 346 ..................................................................................................................... CA.38.120 v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 ................................................................................................................................ CA.61HA.40 v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 ........................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CA.Pt3.Div10.500 v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 .................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.520 v Le Boursicot (1994) 79 A Crim R 548 ....................................................................................................... CPA.216.20 v Le Broc (2000) 2 VR 43; 114 A Crim R 546; [2000] VSCA 125 ..................................... CA.25A.140, CPA.162.80 v Le Brun [1992] 1 QB 61; [1991] 3 WLR 653; [1991] 4 All ER 673 .......................................................... CLP.1320 v Leaf-Milham (1987) 47 SASR 499; (1987) 30 A Crim R 68 .................................................................. CA.52A.200 v Lean (1993) 66 A Crim R 296 ................................................................................................ CA.423.60, CA.423.100 v Leavitt [1985] 1 Qd R 343; (1984) 12 A Crim R 184 ............................................................................. CA.33A.100 v Ledbitter (1825) 1 Mood CC 76 ............................................................................................. CA.133.80, CA.186.100 v Lee (1834) 6 Car & P 536 .......................................................................................................................... CA.347.100 v Lee [1864] Leigh & Cave 418 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 v Lee (1895) 16 LR (NSW) 6; 11 WN (NSW) 121 ................................................................... CA.426.20, CPA.46.40 v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; [1950] HCA 25 ......................................................................... CPA.156.40, LEPRA.99.60 v Lee (1990) 1 WAR 411; 47 A Crim R 187 ............................................. CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.344A.140 v Lee (1994) 76 A Crim R 271 ........................ CA.52A.40, CLP.740, DMTA.23.160, DMTA.24.120, DMTA.25.140, DMTA.26.80, DMTA.33.20 v Lee (2000) 50 NSWLR 289; [2000] NSWCCA 444 ................................................................................. CPA.296.20 v Lee (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) ..................................................................................... CA.178BB.160 v Lee (unreported, DC (NSW), 26 February 1997) ...................................................................................... CPA.281.20 v Lee (unreported CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) ......................................................................................... CA.192G.120 v Lee Chun-Chuen [1963] AC 220 ................................................................................................................ CA.423.140 v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337; (1916) 11 Cr App R 293 ................................................................................. CPA.34.20 v Lee On Yick (1896) 13 WN (NSW) 86 ....................................................................................................... CA.351.60 v Leece (1995) 78 A Crim R 531 .................................................................................................................... CA.31.100 v Leece (1996) 65 FCR 544; 86 A Crim R 494 ............................................................................................ CPA.113.40 v Leeds Justices; Ex parte Sykes [1983] 1 WLR 132; [1983] 1 All ER 460; (1983) 76 Cr App R 129 ............................................................................................................................................................... CPA.56.40 v Lees [1999] NSWCCA 301 ........................................................................................................................... CA.23.100 v Lefroy (2004) 150 A Crim R 82 ...................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180 v Leicester City Justices; Ex parte Barrow [1991] 2 WLR 974; 3 All ER 935 ............................................ CPA.36.20 v Leigh (1800) 2 East PC 694 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 v Lemon [1979] 1 All ER 898 ......................................................................................................................... CA.529.40 v Lemsatef [1977] 1 WLR 812; [1977] 2 All ER 835; 64 Cr App R 242 ............................................... LEPRA.99.40 v Lenard (1992) 58 A Crim R 123 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.200
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TABLE OF CASES
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Lennard [1973] 1 WLR 483; 2 All ER 831; (1973) 57 Cr App R 542 .................................................... CA.316.200 Leon [1945] KB 136; (1944) 30 Cr App R 128 ..................................................................................... CA.178C.100 Leonard (1848) 1 Denison 304 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Leoni (1892) 18 VLR 469 ............................................................................................................................. CA.311.20 Leoni [1999] NSWCCA 14 ................................................................................... CA.35.120, CA.86.180, CA.97.140 Leontis (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 May 1993) ................................................................................. DMTA.25.200 Lesi [2005] NSWCCA 63 ............................................................................................................................. CA.97.240 Leskinen (1978) 36 FLR 414 ........................................................................................................................ CA.54.100 Lesley [1996] 1 Cr App R 39 ................................................................................................................... CPA.150.120 Lessard (1982) 10 CCC (3d) 61 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.740 Lester (1938) 27 Cr App R 8 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Lester (1955) 39 Cr App R 157 .................................................................................................................. CA.114.100 Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 ......................................................................... DMTA.25.200 Levine and Wood (1867) 10 Cox CC 374 ................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Levy [1912] 1 KB 158; (1911) 7 Cr App R 61 ..................................................................... CA.347.40, CA.347.100 Lewis (1827) 2 Car & P 628; 172 ER 285 .................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Lewis (1869) 11 Cox CC 404 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Lewis (1910) 4 Cr App R 96 ...................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Lewis [1913] VLR 227 ................................................................................................................................... CLP.1520 Lewis (1914) 10 Tas LR 48 ........................................................................................................................ CA.327.160 Lewis [1975] 1 NZLR 222 ........................................................................................................ CA.19A.300, CLP.440 Lewis (1998) 100 A Crim R 361 .................................................................................................................... CA.26.40 Li (unreported, CCA (NSW), No 60610 of 1996, 9 July 1997) .................................................................. CA.61J.20 Liberti (1991) 55 A Crim R 120 ....................................................................................... CPA.154.200, CPA.154.220 Licardy (Unreported CCA (NSW) 26.5.95) .......................................................................................... CA.178BA.100 Liffidge (1853) Legge 793 ............................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 Lilliecrap (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 125 ......................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Lillis [1972] 2 QB 236; [1972] 2 WLR 1409; [1972] 2 All ER 1209 .............. CA.33.180, CA.35.140, CPA.162.40 Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 ............................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.560 Lince (1873) 12 Cox CC 451 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Lindsay (1902) 18 TLR 761 ...................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Lindsay (1916) 30 DLR 417 ...................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Lindsay [1963] Qd R 386 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.20 Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Linehan [1921] VLR 582 ............................................................................................................................ CA.327.200 Linekar [1995] 2 Cr App R 49 ................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 Lines 174 ER 861; (1844) 1 Car & K 393 ................................................................................................... CA.61I.60 Linskey (1986) 23 A Crim R 224 ......................................................................................... CPA.293.40, CPA.293.80 Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152; [1969] 3 WLR 819; [1969] 3 All ER 410 .................................... CA.428I.40, CLP.1180 Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 ............................................................................................... CA.327.160, CA.327.180 List [1966] 1 WLR 9; [1965] 3 All ER 710; (1965) 50 Cr App R 81 ..................................................... CA.188.240 Lister (1856) 7 Cox CC 203 ......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Littleboy [1934] 2 KB 408; All ER 434 ............................................................................... CPA.63.20, CPA.150.140 Littler (2001) 120 A Crim R 512 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Livingstone [2004] NSWCCA 122 ................................................................................................................ CA.4A.20 Lloyd (1923) 17 Cr App R 184 ............................................................................................ CA.113.20, CPA.154.140 Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175; (1965) 50 Cr App R 61 ....................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Lo (2000) 115 A Crim R 53; [2000] NSWSC 714 ...................................................................................... SPA.23.20 Lo [2003] NSWCCA 313 ................................................................................................................................ CA.26.20 Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547; [1957] 2 WLR 524; (1957) 41 Cr App R 100 ..................................................... CA.18.20 Locchi (1991) 22 NSWLR 309 ................................................................................................................. DMTA.25.80 Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 ..................................................................................................................... CA.423.60 Lockett [1914] 2 KB 720; (1913) 9 Cr App R 268 ............................................................... CA.188.40, CPA.21.180 Lockley (1864) 4 F & F 155 ..................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40
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TABLE OF CASES
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R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
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Lockwood; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1981] Qd R 209 ............................................................................................ CLP.80 Logan [1962] QWN 3 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.77.60 Lomas (1913) 9 Cr App R 220 ..................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 London (1871) 24 LT 232 ........................................................................................................................... CA.327.180 Longden 168 ER 774; (1812) Russ & Ry 228 .............................................................................................. CA.18.20 Longford (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 763 ........................................................................................................ CA.441A.20 Longman (1980) 72 Cr App R 121 .................................................................................................................. CLP.780 Longstreeth (1826) 1 Moody 137 ......................................................................................... CA.117.160, CA.117.360 Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.80 Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447 ...................................................................................... CA.117.200 Lord [2001] NSWCCA 533 ........................................................................................................................... SPA.10.60 Lord Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83 ....................................................................... CA.192G.120 Lord and Fraser [1983] Crim LR 191 ........................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Lorkin (1995) 15 WAR 499; 82 A Crim R 196 ................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.113.40 Lotze (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 86 .............................................................................................. CA.179.200, CA.181.40 Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 ............................................................................................... CLP.780, DMTA.26.60 Loughnan [1981] VR 443 ................................................. CA.310D.60, CLP.2820, CLP.2840, CLP.2860, CLP.2880 Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 .......... CA.192E.120, CA.192E.140, CA.192E.180, CA.192F.180, CA.192G.140, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.120, CA.178BA.140, CA.178BA.160, CA.178BB.120, CA.178BB.140, CA.197.100, CLP.80 Lovegrove [1920] 3 KB 643; (1920) 15 Cr App R 50 ................................................................................ CA.83.120 Lovegrove (1983) 33 SASR 332; 9 A Crim R 226 ..................................................................................... CA.316.80 Lovell (1881) 8 QBD 185 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.380 Lovell (1933) 39 ALR 268 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Lovell (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 75 .................................................................................................................. CA.444.40 Lovesey [1970] 1 QB 352 ........................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Lovesey; R v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 ....................................................................................... CA.345.100 Lovett (1839) 9 C & P 462 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Lovett [1975] VR 488 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.5.160 Lowe [1917] VLR 155 .................................................................................................................. CA.327.180, CLP.80 Lowe [1973] QB 702; [1973] 2 WLR 481; [1973] 1 All ER 805 .............................................................. CA.24.220 Lower [1948] SASR 227 ................................................................................................................................. CA.4.260 Lowery [No 3] [1972] VR 939 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1880 Lubienski (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 55; 9 WN (NSW) 159 ............................................................. CA.5.160, CA.42.40 Lucas [1973] VR 693 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.1800 Luke (unreported CCA NSW 22 Oct 1996) ..................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Lumsden [1951] 2 KB 513; [1951] 1 All ER 1101; (1951) 35 Cr App R 57 ............................................ CA.114.80 Lurie [1951] WN 493; 2 All ER 704; (1951) 35 Cr App R 113 ................................................................ CA.180.20 Lushington; Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 QB 420 .......................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Lynch (1846) 1 Cox CC 361 ........................................................................................................................ CA.33.120 Lynch (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 420; 47 WN (NSW) 147 ...................................................... CA.61HA.80, CPA.150.20 Lynn (1788) 2 Term Rep 733; 1 Leach 497 ............................................................................................... CA.117.260 Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654 ......................................................................................................................... CA.61.100 Lyon (1813) Russ & Ry 255 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Lyon (1963) 57 QJPR 133 ............................................................................................................................ CA.177.40 Lyons [1984] 2 NSWLR 476; 10 A Crim R 253 ....................................................................................... CA.250.120 M (1977) 16 SASR 589 .................................................................................................................................... CLP.560 M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 .................................................. CA.192G.120, CA.176.120, CA.178BB.200, CA.179.200 M [1991] 2 Qd R 68 ................................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 ................................................................................................ CPA.293.40, CPA.293.120 MA (2004) 145 A Crim R 434; [2004] NSWCCA 92 ................................................................................ SPA.3A.20 M’Athey (1862) Le & Ca 250 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.220 MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 ............................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.540 MG (2007) 69 NSWLR 20 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Rv Rv Rv R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v
MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368; 130 A Crim R 481; [2002] NSWCCA 129 ............................................... SPA.Pt1.20 M’Kearney (1829) Jebb Cr & Pr Cas 99 ..................................................................................................... CA.112.80 MM (2004) 145 A Crim R 148; [2004] NSWCCA 81 ............................................................ CLP.1780, CPA.159.20 MMK (2006) 164 A Crim R 481; [2006] NSWCCA 272 ........................................................................... SPA.3A.20 MSK (2004) 61 NSWLR 204; 148 A Crim R 453 ................................................................................. CPA.294A.20 MW [2007] NSWCCA 291 ........................................................................................................................... CA.37.140 Mabel (1840) 173 ER 918; 9 Car & P 474 ........................................................................... CA.546C.60, CA.58.140 Mabel (1840) 9 Car & P 474 ..................................................................................................................... CA.546C.60 MacDonald (1861) Le & Ca 85 .................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 MacDonald [1983] 1 NSWLR 729 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.420 MacDonald (1995) 65 SASR 322; 84 A Crim R 508 ............................................................ CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 MacDonald (2000) 110 A Crim R 238 ....................................................................................................... CPA.167.20 MacLeod (2001) 52 NSWLR 389; 125 A Crim R 60 ............................................................................... CA.173.200 Macalister (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 157; 35 WN 60 ..................................................................................... CA.188.100 Macdaniel (1755) Foster 121 ..................................................................................................................... CA.19A.120 Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; [1904] QWN 50 ....................... CA.19A.180, CA.43A.120, CA.24.220, CA.44.80 Machin [1980] 1 WLR 763; [1980] 3 All ER 151; 71 Cr App R 166 ................................. CA.319.80, CA.319.140 Machirus [1996] 3 NZLR 404 .................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Mack (1909) 2 Cr App R 114 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Mackenzie (1911) 6 Cr App R 64 ............................................................................................................... CA.91A.40 Mackey [1919] VLR 39 .............................................................................................................................. CA.158.140 Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 ............................................................................................... CA.19A.320, CLP.540 Mackie [1973] Crim LR 54 .......................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Mackinnon [1959] 1 QB 150 ................................................................................................................. CA.178BB.200 Mackinnon [1959] 1 QB 150; [1958] 3 WLR 688; [1958] 3 All ER 657 ............................................. CA.192G.120 Mackintosh (1800) 2 East PC 942 ................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Macklin (1850) 5 Cox CC 216 ..................................................................................................................... CA.438.20 Maclay (1990) 19 NSWLR 112; 46 A Crim R 340 .................................................................................... SPA.Pt1.20 Macleod [1991] Tas R 144; (1991) 61 A Crim R 465 ....................... LEPRA.48.80, LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.40 Madden (1995) 85 A Crim R 367 ...................................... CA.527C.40, CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100, CA.527C.140 Madden (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 December 1995) ........................................................................ CA.527C.100 Maddocks (1990) 51 A Crim R 376 .............................................................................................................. SPA.45.20 Madercine (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 36; 15 WN (NSW) 235 .......................................................................... CA.576.20 Madox (1805) Russ & Ry 92; 168 ER 700 ................................................................................................. CA.152.60 Maes [1975] VR 541 ................................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.40 Maguire [1992] 1 QB 936; 94 Cr App R 133 .............................................................................................. CPA.36.20 Maguire (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 August 1995) ................................................................................. CA.24.280 Maharaj (1995) 85 A Crim R 374 ........................................................................................................... CA.178A.180 Maher (2005) 154 A Crim R 457 .......................................................................................... CA.93B.80, CA.93B.160 Mahroof (1989) 88 Cr App R 317 ............................................................................................................... CA.93B.20 Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 ... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100, CA.27.80, CA.27.100, CA.28.80, CA.29.80, CA.30.80, CLP.760, CPA.19.120, CPA.159.20 Mainwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82; 12 A Crim R 253 .... CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CA.Pt3.Div10.440, CA.Pt3.Div10.480 Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240 ................................................. CA.23A.60, CLP.1140 Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 ............. CA.4A.40, CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CA.61.140, CLP.1040, CLP.1180, CLP.1260 Majors (1991) 27 NSWLR 624; 54 A Crim R 334 .................................................................................... SPA.Pt1.20 Makin (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 1; 9 WN (NSW) 129 .................................................................................. CA.19A.420 Makisi (2004) 151 A Crim R 245; [2004] NSWCCA 333 .......................................................................... CA.94.240 Malayta (1996) 87 A Crim R 492 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; [1981] 2 All ER 422; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173 ................... CA.19A.300, CLP.540 Malinowski [1946] 1 KB 369 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1220 Mallison (1902) 20 Cox CC 204 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447 ........................................................................................ CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Maloney (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 96 ............................................................................................................ CA.347.100 R v Maloukis [2002] NSWCCA 155 ................................................................................................................... CA.94.360 R v Manchester City Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Snelson [1977] 1 WLR 911; [1978] 2 All ER 62 ............................................................................................................................................................. CPA.62.160 R v Manley [1933] 1 KB 529; (1934) 24 Cr App R 25 ..................................................................................... CA.319.80 R v Manning (1849) 2 Car & Kir 887 ............................................................................................ CA.345.180, CLP.1220 R v Manning (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 129 .......................................................................................................... CA.250.100 R v Manning & Smith (1852) 6 Cox CC 86 ..................................................................................................... CA.117.320 R v Mansfield Justices; Ex parte Sharkey [1985] QB 613; [1984] 3 WLR 1328; [1985] 1 All ER 193 ................................................................................................................................................................... CA.61.100 R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993) .......................................................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80 R v Manton (2002) 132 A Crim R 249; [2002] NSWCCA 316 ........................................................................... CA.60.80 R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.159.20 R v Manwaring (1856) Dearsly & Bell 132 ......................................................................................................... CLP.1460 R v Manwarring (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 April 1994) ........................................................................... CA.52A.240 R v Mapstone [1964] 1 WLR 439; [1963] 3 All ER 930 ................................................................................ CA.93C.160 R v Marchi (1996) 91 A Crim R 112 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 R v Marcus (1846) 2 Car & Kir 356 ................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49 ........... CA.27.80, CA.29.80, CA.39.80, CA.82.60 R v Marijancevic (1991) 54 A Crim R 431 ........................................................................................................... CA.7.120 R v Marijancevic (2009) 22 VR 576; 195 A Crim R 426; [2009] VSCA 135 .................................................. CA.44.120 R v Marinos [2003] NSWCCA 136 ..................................................................................................................... CA.94.360 R v Marinovich (1990) 46 A Crim R 282 ..................................................................................................... DMTA.25.200 R v Mark (1902) 28 VLR 610 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.80 R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 .................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CA.Pt3.Div10.600 R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49 ................................................................................................... CA.82.60, CA.84.60 R v Marlow [1990] Tas R 1 ....................................................................................................... CPA.154.60, CPA.154.160 R v Marriott (1838) 8 Car & P 425; 173 ER 559 .......................................................................... CA.43A.120, CA.44.80 R v Marsden (1868) LR 1 CCR 131 ................................................................................................................. CA.546C.60 R v Marsh (1862) 3 F & F 523 ........................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 R v Marshall (1870) 11 Cox CC 490 .................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 R v Marshall (1987) 49 SASR 133; 26 A Crim R 259 .................................................................. CA.19A.500, CA.29.80 R v Marshall (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 July 1990) ................................................................................... CA.423.140 R v Marsham [1912] 2 KB 362 ........................................................................ CPA.156.140, CPA.156.160, CPA.156.180 R v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 R v Martin (1817) Russ & Ry 324; 168 ER 826 ................................................................................................ CA.184.40 R v Martin (1836) 1 Mood 483 ........................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 R v Martin (1867) LR 1 CCR 56; 36 LJMC 20 ............................................................................................... CA.179.280 R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54 .......................................................................................................... CA.19A.520, CA.54.80 R v Martin (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 720; 21 WN (NSW) 233 ............................................................................. CPA.154.160 R v Martin [1962] 1 QB 221; [1961] 3 WLR 17; [1961] 2 All ER 747 ........................................................... CPA.21.20 R v Martin [1979] Tas R 211; 1 A Crim R 85 .................................................................................................. CA.428I.60 R v Martin (1983) 32 SASR 419; 9 A Crim R 376 ..................................................................... CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60 R v Martin (1984) 16 A Crim R 87; [1984] HCA 23 ........................ CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652; (1989) 88 Cr App R 343 ................................................................................ CLP.2820 R v Martin [2011] NSWSC 1189 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.54B.20 R v Martin (No 4) (1999) 105 A Crim R 390; [1999] SASC 161 ..................................................................... CPA.19.40 R v Martin Secker Warburg Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1138; [1954] 2 All ER 683 ................................................. CA.529.160 R v Martin 172 ER 907; (1832) 5 Car & P 128 ....................................................................... CA.19A.360, CA.19A.380 R v Martindale [1986] 1 WLR 1042; 3 All ER 25; (1987) 84 Cr App R 31 ...................................................... CA.7.120 R v Martyr [1962] Qd R 398 ............................................................................................................ CA.19A.360, CLP.120 R v Mary Queen of Scots (1586) 1 State Trials 1161 ............................................................................................ CLP.180 R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 ................................ CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.200, LEPRA.18.20, LEPRA.76.20
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TABLE OF CASES
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Massey (1994) 77 A Crim R 39 .................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Massie [1999] 1 VR 542; (1998) 103 A Crim R 551; [1998] VSCA 82 ................................................... CA.61N.80 Massie [1999] 1 VR 542; 103 A Crim R 551; [1998] VSCA 82 ................................................................... CLP.960 Masters (1848) 1 Den 332 ............................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; 59 A Crim R 445 ............................... CLP.740, CLP.780, CLP.1880, CPA.21.340 Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185; (1999) 108 A Crim R 223 ........................................................................... CA.7.120 Matheis (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 321; 75 WN (NSW) 328 .......................................... CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1160 Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 ............................................................................................................... CPA.21.120 Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474; [1958] 2 All ER 87; (1958) 42 Cr App R 145 ........................................... CLP.1140 Mathews [1993] 2 Qd R 316; 64 A Crim R 305 ........................................................................................... CA.60.80 Mathieson [1906] 25 NZLR 879 ............................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Mato (1999) 109 A Crim R 121 .............................................................................................................. CA.176A.100 Matthews (1873) 12 Cox CC 489 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Matthews (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 45; 3 WN (NSW) 89 ..................................................................................... CA.4.60 Matthews [1950] 1 All ER 137; (1950) 34 Cr App R 55 .......... CA.117.160, CA.117.320, CA.187.20, CA.188.160 Matthews [1972] VR 3 ................................................................................................................................ CA.319.140 Matthews [1999] 1 VR 534; (1998) 102 A Crim R 269 ................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Matthews [2008] NSWCCA 54 .................................................................................................................. CA.112.100 Matthews and Twigg (1876) 14 Cox CC 5 .................................................................................................. CA.201.20 Matusevich (1976) VR 470 ....................................................................................... CA.345.80, CLP.1100, CLP.1160 Mauai [2005] NSWCCA 207 ........................................................................................................................ CA.95.120 Mauger [2012] NSWCCA 51 ................................................................................................... SPA.10.40, SPA.10.180 Maund (1866) 1 WW & a’B (L) 96 ........................................................................................................... CA.195.100 Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Reports 619 .................................................................................... CA.327.160, CA.327.180 Maxwell (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 139 ............................................................................................................ CA.527.40 Maxwell (1994) 34 NSWLR 606; 74 A Crim R 330 .............................................................................. CPA.154.160 May (1861) Le & Ca 13 ............................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 May (1867) 10 Cox CC 448 ........................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 May [1962] Qd R 456 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Mayall (1986) 43 SASR 258 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311 ................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 Mayfield (1995) 63 SASR 576; 80 A Crim R 294 .................................................................................... CPA.21.260 Mayhew (1834) 6 Car & P 315 .................................................................................................................. CA.327.200 Mayle (1868) 11 Cox CC 150 ...................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309 .......................................................................................... CPA.21.280, CPA.36.20 Mayne (1975) 11 SASR 583 ...................................................................................................................... CA.52A.140 Mayor of Tewkesbury (1868) LR 3 QB 629 ................................................................................................. CLP.1480 Maytum-White (1957) 42 Cr App R 165 ................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Maywhort [1955] 1 WLR 848; [1955] 2 All ER 752; (1955) 39 Cr App R 107 ....................................... CA.136.40 McAuliffe (1993) 70 A Crim R 303 ..................................................................................... CA.345.100, CA.345.160 McBride [1962] 2 QB 167; [1961] 3 WLR 549; (1961) 45 Cr App R 262 ............................................ CA.52A.200 McBride (1983) 34 SASR 433 ................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 McCaffery [1911] VLR 92 .......................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 McCall (1970) 55 Cr App R 175 .................................................................................. CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 McCalla (1988) 87 Cr App R 372 .................................................................................................................. CA.7.120 McCarthy [1954] 2 QB 105; [1954] 2 WLR 1044; [1954] 2 All ER 262 .................................................. CA.23.220 McCarthy [1964] 1 WLR 196; [1964] 1 All ER 95; (1964) 48 Cr App R 111 ........................................... CA.47.80 McCarthy (1984) 14 A Crim R 155 ........................ CA.19A.20, CPA.21.80, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.260 McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 .............................. CA.7.140, CA.117.440, CA.121.40, CA.188.40, CA.345.80 McCarthy (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 August 1994) ............................................................................. CPA.19.180 McCarthy, Holland and O’Dwyer [1903] 2 Irish Reports 146 ...................................................................... CA.26.40 McConnell [1977] 1 NSWLR 714 ............................................................................................. CA.27.120, CLP.2640 McConnell (1993) 69 A Crim R 39 ......................................................................................... CA.188.180, CLP.1300 McCormack [1981] VR 104; (1980) 2 A Crim R 405 ................................... CA.93B.80, CA.93B.160, CA.93C.180
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TABLE OF CASES
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McCoy [1938] QSR 249 ............................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 McCoy (2001) 51 NSWLR 702; 123 A Crim R 81; [2001] NSWCCA 255 .......................................... DMTA.24.80 McCready [1967] VR 325 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.162.80 McCready (1985) 20 A Crim R 32 ............................................................................................................. CPA.21.380 McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 ........................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 McDonald (1885) 15 QBD 323 .................................................................................................... CA.125.60, CLP.560 McDonald (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 25 ......................................................................................................... CA.165.180 McDonald [1933] VLR 214 ............................................................................................... CA.178C.60, CA.178C.140 McDonald (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1716 ..................................................................................................... CA.345.100 McDonnell (1928) 20 Cr App R 163 .......................................................................................................... CPA.21.380 McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926; (1979) 1 A Crim R 242 .................................................................... CA.61HA.100 McFarlane [1994] 2 All ER 283 ................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 McFarlane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 April 1993) ......................................................................... CA.178BA.140 McFarlane (unreported, NSWCCA, 21 April 1993) ................................................................................ CA.192E.140 McGarritty (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 June 1994) .......................................................... CA.19A.20, CPA.21.260 McGarvey (aka Garner) (1987) 10 NSWLR 632; 34 A Crim R 119 .................................. CPA.293.40, CPA.293.60 McGarvie (1986) 5 NSWLR 270; 22 A Crim R 286 ................................................................................. CA.23A.60 McGavaran (1852) 6 Cox CC 64 .............................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 McGill [1967] VR 683 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 McGinness (1870) 11 Cox CC 391 ................................................................................................................ CLP.1220 McGrath (1869) LR 1 CCR 205 ........................................................................................... CA.117.340, CA.117.380 McGrath [1971] 2 NSWLR 181 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.1360 McGregor [1945] 2 All ER 180 .................................................................................................................... CA.432.20 McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; 10 A Crim R 51 ............................................ CA.9.60, CPA.34.20 McIlkenny [1992] 2 All ER 417; (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 ......................................................................... CLP.1800 McInnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600; 3 All ER 295 .............................................................................................. CA.423.40 McIntosh (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994) ..................................................... CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80 McIntyre (1847) 2 Cox 379 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.540 McIntyre (1988) 38 A Crim R 135 ............................................................................................................ CA.52A.240 McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211; [2000] NSWCCA 6 .............................................................................. CLP.580 McIvor (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 57 ................................................................................................................ CA.443.20 McKay [1957] VR 560 ............................................................................................ CA.18.20, CA.83.100, CA.423.80 McKenna [1960] 1 QB 411; [1960] 2 WLR 306; (1960) 44 Cr App R 63 ............................................. CA.347.100 McKenna (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 330 .............................................................................................. CA.117.440 McKenzie (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 219 ........................................................................................................... CA.131.120 McKenzie [1892] 2 QB 519 ....................................................................................................................... CA.545B.60 McKeon [1961] NSWR 249; (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 798 ........................................................................ CA.78A.100 McKimmie [1957] VR 93 .......................................................................................................................... CA.52A.180 McKinney (1999) 29 MVR 355; [1999] NSWCCA 51 ............................................................................ CA.52A.240 McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31 ............................................................................ CA.19A.160, CA.19A.300, CLP.440 McKittrick [1982] VR 637 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.154.260 McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333 ....................................................... CA.5.200, CA.33.120, CLP.520, CLP.1400 McLean (1981) 5 A Crim R 36 .............................................................................................. CA.24.120, CA.345.100 McLellan (1894) 11 WN (NSW) 73 ............................................................................................................. CPA.46.40 McLeod (1890) 11 LR (NSW) L 218; (1890) 7 WN (NSW) 36 ............................................................. CA.78A.100 McLeod (1991) 56 A Crim R 320 ......................................................................................... CA.19A.140, CA.24.120 McLoughlin (1838) 8 Car & P 635; 173 ER 651 ................................ CA.27.80, CA.33.120, CA.96.80, CA.98.180 McLoughlin [1988] 1 Qd R 464 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 McMahon (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 June 1978) ............................................................................ DMTA.25.200 McMakin and Smith and Disting (1808) Russ & Ry 333 ........................................................................... CA.345.80 McManus (1985) 2 NSWLR 448; 20 A Crim R 14 .............................................................. CA.423.40, CA.423.140 McMinn [1982] VR 53; (1981) 57 FLR 206 ................................................................................................ CA.61I.60 McMullen (1990) 54 SASR 55 ..................................................................................................................... CA.161.20 McNally [1954] 1 WLR 933; 2 All ER 372 ............................................................................................ CPA.154.200
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TABLE OF CASES
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McNamara [1917] NZLR 382 .......................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.420 McNamara [1965] VR 372 ........................................................................................................ CA.94.120, CPA.19.40 McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; (2006) 163 A Crim R 381; [2006] NSWCCA 242 .................... SPA.21A.20 McNaughton, Donnelly and Hayes (1881) 14 Cox CC 576 .......................................................................... CA.18.20 McNichol [1916] VLR 350 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 McPhail (1988) 36 A Crim R 390 .............................................................................................................. CPA.21.320 McPhane (1841) Car & M 212 ..................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 McPherson (1916) 33 WN (NSW) 93 .......................................................................................................... CA.441.20 McPherson [1980] 1 NSWLR 612; (1980) 1 A Crim R 349 ...................................................................... CPA.36.20 McQueeney [2005] NSWCCA 168 ............................................................................................................ CA.66B.140 McQueeny (1989) 39 A Crim R 56 ......................................................................................................... CA.178A.140 McReynolds [1935] NZLR 944 .................................................................................................................... CA.180.20 McVitie [1960] 2 QB 483; [1960] 3 WLR 99; [1960] 2 All ER 498 .................................................... CA.545D.100 Meade (1903) 19 TLR 540 ......................................................................................................................... CA.93C.100 Meade 168 ER 1006; (1823) 1 Lewin 184 .................................................................................................... CA.18.20 Meakin (1869) 20 LT 544 ........................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Mears (1991) 53 A Crim R 141 ............................................................................................................... CA.176A.100 Meddings [1966] VR 306 ...................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.280, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1180 Medina (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Medland (1851) 5 Cox CC 292 .................................................................................................................. CA.125.100 Meeres (1685) 1 Show KB 51; 89 ER 441 .................................................................................................. CA.154.40 Meher [2004] NSWCCA 355 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.1880 Mellifont (1992) 64 A Crim R 75 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Mellish (1805) Russ & Ry 80 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572; 30 A Crim R 332 .............................................................................................. CLP.580 Melville (1856) 2 VLT 209 ......................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Melvin [1953] 1 QB 481 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.460 Menage (1862) 3 F & F 310; 176 ER 140 .................................................................................................. CA.31.100 Merriman [1907] VLR 1 ............................................................................................................................. CA.188.180 Merritt (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 ............................................................................................. CPA.21.80, CPA.21.120 Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.580 Merritt [2002] NSWCCA 368 .................................................................................................................. LEPRA.10.40 Messervy (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 221 ............................................................................................................. CA.99.60 Messingham (1830) 1 Mood CC 257 ......................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Metharam [1961] 3 All ER 200; (1961) 45 Cr App R 304 ......................................................... CA.4.160, CA.95.80 Metz (1915) 84 LJKB 1462; (1915) 11 Cr App R 164 ............................................................................... CA.172.40 Mews [1989] WAR 38 (1988) 35 A Crim R 213 ........................................................................................ CA.161.20 Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 ..................................................................................... CLP.660, CLP.740, CLP.760 Michael Assad (unreported, CCA (NSW), 5 October 1994) ..................................................................... DMTA.3.80 Michael Ernest Carter (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 March 1978) ........................................................... CA.527C.40 Michael 173 ER 867; (1840) 9 Car & P 356 ............................................................................................ CA.19A.400 Michaels (1993) 70 A Crim R 78 .............................................................................................................. CA.310D.60 Michalski (1955) 39 Cr App R 22 ................................................................................................................ CA.188.40 Middis (unreported, SC (NSW), 27 March 1991) ................................................................ CPA.21.100, CPA.21.380 Middleton (1873) LR 2 CCR 38 ........................................................................................... CA.117.340, CA.117.400 Milat (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 February 1998) ............................................................. CPA.19.40, CPA.19.180 Milat (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 18 July 1996) ...................................................................... CA.86.100, CA.86.200 Miles (1842) 6 The Jur 243 .......................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Miles (1890) 24 QBD 423 .................................................................................................... CA.556.20, CPA.156.100 Miles (1909) 3 Cr App 13 ................................................................................................... CPA.156.20, CPA.156.240 Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198; 61 WN 128 ........................................................................................... CA.188.240 Miles [1955] QWN 29 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Millar (Robert) Contractors Ltd [1970] 2 QB 54; (1969) 54 Cr App R 158 ............................................. CA.351.60 Millard (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 8 ................................................................................................................ CA.125.100
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TABLE OF CASES
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Miller (1842) 2 Mood 249 ............................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 Miller (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 185 ............................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Miller (1879) 14 Cox CC 356 ........................................................................................................................ CA.34.20 Miller [1951] VLR 346 ................................................................................................................................... CA.4.160 Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667; (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 .......................................................... CPA.21.100, CPA.36.20 Miller [1954] 2 QB 282; (1954) 38 Cr App R 1 ....................................................................... CA.59.100, CA.95.80 Miller [1955] NZLR 1038 ....................................................................................................... CA.179.240, CA.180.20 Miller [1972] VR 771 ................................................................................................................................... CA.33.160 Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978 ................................... CA.19A.520, CA.195.80 Miller [1990] 2 Qd R 566; 46 A Crim R 382 .......................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Miller (1992) 95 Cr App R 744 .................................................................................... CA.192E.160, CA.178BA.120 Miller (2001) 127 A Crim R 344; [2001] NSWCCA 209 ....................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Miller (James) [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978 .............................. CLP.140, CLP.1320 Milloy [1993] 1 Qd R 298; (1991) 54 A Crim R 340 .................................................................................. CLP.1080 Mills (1857) Dearsly & Bell 205 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.280 Mills [1963] 1 QB 522; (1963) 47 Cr App R 49 ......................................................................................... CA.84.100 Mills (1985) 16 A Crim R 366 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.60 Mills (1985) 17 A Crim R 411 ................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Mills [1986] VR 179; (1985) 17 A Crim R 214 .......................................................................... CA.10.40, CPA.8.20 Mills (2005) 154 A Crim R 40 ................................................................................................................... CA.203C.20 Millward [1985] QB 519; (1985) 80 Cr App R 280 ................................................................................. CA.327.160 Milnes and Green (1983) 8 A Crim R 61 ........................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.154.320 Minehan [1973] 1 NSWLR 659 ..................................................................................................................... CA.23.60 Ming Yeuk Lam (1998) 100 A Crim R 188 ................................................................................................. CPA.21.20 Minh Quoc Le (2005) 151 A Crim R 564; [2005] NSWCCA 40 ........................................... CLP.80, LEPRA.17.20 Missell (1926) 19 Cr App R 109 .............................................................................................. CA.187.20, CA.189.20 Mitchell (1848) 3 Cox CC 93 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Mitchell [1955] 1 WLR 1125; [1955] 3 All ER 263; (1955) 39 Cr App R 49 ..................................... CA.178C.100 Mitchell [1983] QB 741; [1983] 2 WLR 938; [1983] 2 All ER 427 .......................................................... CA.24.120 Mitchell (2007) 177 A Crim R 94; [2007] NSWCCA 296 ......................................................................... CA.33.200 Mitchell (unreported, NSW CCA, 2 July 1971) (2 Petty Sess Rev 705) ..................................................... CA.61.60 Mitton (2002) 132 A Crim R 123; [2002] NSWCCA 124 .................................................. CA.4A.40, CA.61HA.100 Mobilio [1991] 1 VR 339; (1990) 50 A Crim R 170 ..................................... CA.61I.100, CA.61.160, CA.61HA.80 Mockford (1868) 11 Cox CC 16 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.280 Moffatt (1787) 1 Leach 431 .......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 ........................ CA.19A.160, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.360, CA.19A.380, CLP.440 Moffitt (1990) 20 NSWLR 114; 49 A Crim R 20 .................................................................... SPA.Pt1.20, SPA.44.20 Mogg (1830) 4 Car & P 363; 172 ER 741 .................................................................................................... CA.5.160 Mohan [1976] QB 1 ................................................................................................................. CA.344A.60, CA.5.120 Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 .................................................................................................... CLP.680, CPA.159.20 Moland (1843) 2 Mood 276 .......................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Molloy [1921] 2 KB 364; (1921) 15 Cr App R 170 ................................................................................... CA.139.60 Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025 ............................... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.520, CA.5.200, CLP.1400 Monger [1973] Crim LR 301 ........................................................................................................................ CA.33.120 Moody (1862) Le & Ca 173 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Moon [1967] 1 WLR 1536; 3 All ER 962; (1967) 52 Cr App R 12 .......................................................... CA.250.60 Moore (1861) Leigh & Cave 1 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Moore (1956) 40 Cr App R 50 ................................................................................................................. CPA.154.260 Moore [1986] Crim LR 552 ..................................................................................................................... CA.192E.120 Moore [1988] 1 Qd R 252; (1987) 25 A Crim R 302 .................................................................... CLP.740, CLP.760 Moore (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Moore [2015] NSWCCA 316 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.214.40 Moran (1876) 7 QLJ (NC) 101 ..................................................................................................................... CA.155.40
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
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TABLE OF CASES
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Moran [1952] 1 All ER 803; (1952) 36 Cr App R 10 ................................................................................... CA.99.20 Moran (1991) 52 A Crim R 440 .............................................................................................................. CA.178A.180 Moran (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 November 1973) ............................................................................. CA.345.100 Moranda (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 152 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.20 Moreton (1913) 109 LT 417 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Morgan (1852) 6 Cox CC 107 .................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Morgan [1970] VR 337 ..................................................................................................... CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Morgan (1993) 30 NSWLR 543; 67 A Crim R 526 .......................................................... CPA.293.40, CPA.293.120 Morgan [1994] 1 VR 567; (1993) 70 A Crim R 340 ........................................................... CA.345.100, CA.345.140 Morley [1988] 1 QB 601 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Morpeth Ward Justices; Ex parte Ward (1992) 95 Cr App R 215 ........................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Morris (1840) 9 Car & P 349 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Morris (1848) 2 Cox CC 489 ......................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Morris (1867) LR 1 CCR 90 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.120 Morris [1950] 1 KB 26 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.156.100 Morris [1951] 1 KB 394; 34 Cr App R 210 .................................................................................. CA.9.60, CA.10.40 Morris (1963) 47 Cr App R 202 ....................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Morris [1984] 1 AC 320 .............................................................................................................................. CA.117.160 Morrison (1859) Bell 158; 169 ER 1210 ....................................................................................................... CA.4.260 Morrow [1991] 2 Qd R 309; 48 A Crim R 232 ......................................................................................... CPA.21.160 Mortimer (1908) 1 Cr App R 20 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.320 Moseley [1861] Leigh & Cave 92 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735; 65 A Crim R 452 ............................................................... CPA.19.40, CPA.19.160 Mosley [1924] 2 KB 187 ............................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Moss (1931) 23 Cr App R 132 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Most (1881) 7 QBD 244 ................................................................................................................. CA.26.40, CLP.960 Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97 ........................................................ CA.4A.40, CA.61.100 Mountford (1835) 7 Car & Payne 242; 173 ER 107 ..................................................................................... CA.4.180 Moussad (1999) 152 FLR 373; [1999] NSWCCA 337 ........................................................................... DMTA.25.80 Mowatt (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 146 .............................................................................................................. CA.156.120 Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; [1967] 3 WLR 1192; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 ............................................... CA.35.100 Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 ................................................ CA.4A.40, CA.5.100, CA.5.200 Moy (1995) 65 SASR 117; 81 A Crim R 242 ........................................................................................... CPA.162.80 Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 ............................. CA.61L.80, CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.100 Muirhead (1908) 1 Cr App R 189 ........................................................................................................... CA.178C.120 Muldoon (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 116 ........................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Mullany (1865) Le & Ca 593 ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Mullen (1938) 59 CLR 124; [1938] HCA 12 ........................................................................................... CA.19A.120 Mullins (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 234; [1961] NSWR 303 ........................................................................... CA.19A.600 Munday (1799) 2 Leach 850; 168 ER 524 .................................................................................................. CA.154.40 Munday (2003) 7 VR 423; 143 A Crim R 318 ............................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Mungomery (2004) 151 A Crim R 376 ................................................................................................... CA.176A.100 Munks [1964] 1 QB 304; [1963] 3 WLR 952; (1964) 48 Cr App R 56 ...................................................... CA.49.60 Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67 .................. CA.19A.20, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.540, CA.96.80, CA.98.180, CLP.440 Munro [2000] NSWSC 1168 ........................................................................................................................ CA.423.60 Munro (2001) 51 NSWLR 540 ..................................................................................................................... CA.423.60 Muratovic [1967] Qd R 5 ........................................................................................................................... CA.423.140 Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 ........................................................................................... CA.345.100, CLP.1460 Murdock (1851) 5 Cox CC 360 .................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Murin (unreported, CCA (NSW), 16 August 1985) .................................................................................. CA.52A.240 Murphy (1753) 19 State Trials 693 .............................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Murphy (1837) 8 Car & P 297; 173 ER 502 ................................................................................................. CLP.1460 Murphy (1853) 6 Cox CC 341 ..................................................................................................................... CA.149.40 Murphy (1867) 4 WW & a’B (L) 63 .................................................................................. CA.19A.100, CA.19A.420
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Murphy (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 191 ............................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Murphy (1890) 7 WN (NSW) 21 ................................................................................................................... CA.4.260 Murphy [1965] VR 187 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.154.200 Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50 ........................ CA.319.120, CA.319.140 Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53 ................................................................................................ CA.319.120 Murphy (1986) 5 NSWLR 18; 23 A Crim R 349; 64 ALR 498 ................................................................. CPA.36.20 Murphy (1988) 52 SASR 186; (1988) 37 A Crim R 405 ................................................... CA.61H.20, CPA.154.120 Murray (1830) 1 Mood 276 .......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Murray [1980] 2 NSWLR 526; 2 A Crim R 418 ........................... CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Murray [1982] 1 WLR 475; [1982] 2 All ER 225; (1982) 75 Cr App R 58 ..................... CA.319.120, CA.319.140 Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 ....... CA.66A.80, CA.66C.100, CA.66D.100, CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CA.Pt3.Div10.500, CA.Pt3.Div10.580, CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.61HA.100 Murray (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 September 1986) ............................................................................. CA.94.180 Murton 176 ER 221; (1862) 3 F & F 492 .......................................................................... CA.19A.360, CA.19A.380 Muscot (1713) 10 Mod Rep 192 ................................................................................................................ CA.327.160 Mustafa (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 154 .................................... CA.9.60, CA.10.40, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CA.425.20 Muston (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 357 ........................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Musumeci (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 October 1997) ......................................................................... CA.52A.240 Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 ................................................ CA.23.20, CA.23.80, CA.23.120, CA.23.180 Myall (1986) 43 SASR 258 ............................................................................................................................ CA.7.100 Myers (unreported, CCA (NSW), No 60467 of 1989, 13 February 1990) ................................................. CA.60.200 NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628 .............................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.160 Nai Poon (2003) 56 NSWLR 284; 138 A Crim R 204; [2003] NSWCCA 42 ..................................... DMTA.25.220 Name withheld [2009] NSWCCA 93 ............................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.520 Nanka [1984] 1 NSWLR 722; 71 FLR 391 .............................................................................................. CA.310D.40 Narden (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 160 ............................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Nash (1852) 2 Den 493 ................................................................................................................................. CA.250.60 Nash (1911) 6 Cr App R 225 ..................................................................................................................... CA.19A.420 Nasif (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 March 1995) ....................................................................................... CA.60.200 Naylor (1865) LR 1 CCR 4 ........................................................................................................................ CA.179.300 Naylor (1910) 5 Cr App Rep 19 ................................................................................................................... CA.33.180 Naylor [1979] Crim LR 532 .................................................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Neat (1899) 19 Cox CC 424 ......................................................................................................................... CA.162.40 Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; [1986] 3 All ER 1; (1986) 83 Cr App R 267 .......................................... CA.19A.520 Negline (unreported, CCA (NSW), 5 December 1990), p 7 .................................................................... CA.176A.80 Negus (1873) LR 2 CCR 34 ......................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Neil [1909] QSR 225 ...................................................................................................................................... CA.84.80 Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57; (1991) 52 A Crim R 303 .................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Nessel (1980) 5 A Crim R 374 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.780 Nettleton (1830) 1 Mood 259 ....................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Newall (1852) 6 Cox CC 21 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Newcastle-on-Tyne Justices (1831) 1 Barnewall and Adolphus 933 .......................................................... CA.576.20 Newell (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 274; 44 WN (NSW) 91 ................................................................................ CA.24.220 Newell [2004] NSWCCA 183 ....................................................................................................................... CA.86.220 Newey [2014] NSWSC 1608 ....................................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 Newham (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 November 1993) ........................................................................ CA.61HA.100 Newland [1954] 1 QB 158; [1953] 3 WLR 826; [1953] 2 All ER 1067 ....................................... CLP.660, CLP.740 Newman (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 344 ....................................................................................... CA.117.280, CA.125.60 Newman (1882) 8 QBD 706 ....................................................................................................................... CA.166.140 Newman [1948] VLR 61 ............................................................................................................................... CA.23.200 Newport Justices; Ex parte Wright [1929] 2 KB 416 .................................................................................. CA.61.320 Newton (1844) 1 Carrington & Kirwan 469 .................................................................................................. CLP.1460 Newton [1958] Crim LR 469 ........................................................................................................................ CA.83.100
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
TABLE OF CASES
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Rv R R R R
v v v v
Newton 174 ER 363; (1843) 2 Mood & R 503 ........................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Ngalkin (1984) 71 FLR 264; 12 A Crim R 29 ..................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Ngo (2002) 135 A Crim R 550 ....................................................................................................................... CA.7.100 Ngo (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 151 ......................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Ngoc Pham [2004] NSWCCA 263 ................................................................................................................ SPA.59.20 Nguyen (1992) 60 A Crim R 196 ................................................................................................................. CA.188.40 Nguyen (1995) 36 NSWLR 397 ................................................................................................................... CA.423.40 Nguyen [1998] 4 VR 394; (1997) 99 A Crim R 151 .................................................................................. CA.86.240 Nguyen (2004) 149 A Crim R 343; [2004] NSWCCA 332 ...................................................................... CA.319.160 Nguyen (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 February 1997) ............................................................................... CA.121.40 Nichol 168 ER 720; (1807) Russ & Ry 130 ............................................................................................ CA.61HA.80 Nicholas [1921] VLR 602 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.154.60 Nicholas (1989) 45 A Crim R 299 ............................................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Nicholas (2000) 1 VR 356; 111 A Crim R 490 ...................................................................................... LEPRA.48.60 Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75 .............................................................................. CA.43A.80, CA.24.220, CA.44.80 Nicholls and Clark (1858) 1 F & F 51 ....................................................................................................... CA.188.240 Nichols [1958] Qd R 200 .............................................................................................................................. CA.351.60 Nicholson [1916] VLR 130 ............................................................................................................................. CA.54.80 Nicholson [1956] St R Qd 520 .................................................................................................. CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Nicholson (1984) 12 A Crim R 231 ........................................................................................................ CA.178A.180 Nicholson (1994) 76 A Crim R 187 .................................................................................. CA.344A.60, CA.344A.120 Nicholson (1998) 102 A Crim R 459 .............................................................. CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160 Nicholson, Jones & Chappel (1794) 2 Leach 610 ..................................................................................... CA.117.160 Nicola [1987] VR 1040; 25 A Crim R 467 ................................................................................................ CPA.21.380 Nicolaidis (1994) 33 NSWLR 364; 72 A Crim R 394 ...................................... CLP.1720, CPA.113.40, CPA.154.20 Nielsen (2001) 121 A Crim R 239; [2001] QCA 85 ................................................................................. CA.43A.120 Nielson [1990] 2 Qd R 578; (1990) 47 A Crim R 269 .............................................................................. CA.23A.60 Nifadopoulos (1988) 36 A Crim R 137 .............................................................................................................. CLP.80 Nikolovski (unreported CCA NSW 5 Dec 1990) ............................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.460 Nilon (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Noel [1914] 3 KB 848; (1914) 10 Cr App R 255 .............................................................. CA.178A.180, CA.136.40 Nolan (2012) 83 NSWLR 534; 224 A Crim R 1; [2012] NSWCCA 126 .................................................. CA.45.120 Noor Mohamed [1949] AC 182 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.60 Norfolk Justices; Ex parte DPP [1950] 2 KB 558; 2 All ER 42 ............................................................ CPA.156.140 Norman (1842) Car & Marshman 501 ......................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Norris (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 October 1989) ................................................................................ CA.52A.240 Northcott [1917] 1 KB 347 .............................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.460 Novac (1976) 65 Cr App R 107 ................................................................................................................. CPA.21.280 Nundah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 482 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.200 Nuri [1990] VR 641; (1989) 49 A Crim R 253 .................................................................... CA.19A.500, CA.39.120 O’Brien (1850) 4 Cox CC 400 ..................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 O’Brien (1911) 6 Cr App R 108 .......................................................................................... CA.93B.100, CPA.162.40 O’Brien (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 136; 38 WN (NSW) 10 ................................. CA.117.160, CA.117.320, CA.126.200 O’Brien [1954] SCR 666; 110 CCC 1 ............................................................................................. CLP.720, CLP.760 O’Brien (1974) 59 Cr App R 222 .................................................................................................................... CLP.740 O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 ...... CA.4A.40, CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180, CLP.1400 O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 ......... CLP.160, CLP.1040, CLP.1140, CLP.1180, CLP.1260, CLP.1300 O’Connor [1980] VR 635 ............................................................................................................................ CA.428I.40 O’Donnell (1857) 7 Cox CC 337 ............................................................................................................... CA.186.100 O’Donoghue (1917) 23 CLR 9 ................................................................................................................... CA.159.100 O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397 ................................................................................ CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.40
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TABLE OF CASES
R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62 ....... CA.61L.60, CA.61L.80, CA.95.80, CA.109.20, CA.112.120 R v O’Driscoll [1968] 1 QB 83 ........................................................................................................................... CA.163.40 R v O’Grady [1987] QB 995; [1987] 3 WLR 321; [1987] 3 All ER 420 ........................................................ CA.428I.60 R v O’Leary (1865) 2 WW & a’B (L) 13 ........................................................................................................... CA.94.100 R v O’Loughlin; Ex parte Ralphs (1971) 1 SASR 219 ................... CA.19A.20, CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.60, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.220 R v O’Meagher (1997) 101 A Crim R 196 ................................................................................................... CA.61HA.100 R v O’Neill [1979] 2 NSWLR 582; 1 A Crim R 59 ...................................................................................... CPA.154.100 R v O’Neill [1982] VR 150; 4 A Crim R 404 .................................................................................................... CA.23.220 R v O’Neill (1989) 53 SASR 1; 46 A Crim R 394 ........................................................................................ CPA.156.220 R v O’Neill (2001) 122 A Crim R 510; [2001] NSWCCA 193 .................................................................... LEPRA.10.40 R v O’Neill (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 August 1992) ............................................................... CA.24.120, CA.24.140 R v O’Regan [1961] Qd R 78 .......................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 R v O’Ryan [1974] 2 NSWLR 536 ................................................................................................................... CA.423.140 R v O’Sullivan [1925] VLR 514 .................................................................................................. CA.179.280, CA.179.300 R v O’Sullivan (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 155 ...................................................................................................... CA.545C.60 R v O’Sullivan (2002) 128 A Crim R 371 ...................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 R v Oates (1855) Dearsly CC 459 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 R v Odgers 174 ER 355; (1843) 2 Mood & R 479 .............................................................................................. CA.18.20 R v Ogden; Ex parte Long Ashton Rural DC [1963] 1 WLR 274; [1963] 1 All ER 574 .............. CA.512.80, SOA.6.40 R v Ohar (2004) 59 NSWLR 596; (2004) 145 A Crim R 453; [2004] NSWCCA 83 .................................... SPA.54B.20 R v Okutgen (1982) 8 A Crim R 262 ................................................................................................................. CA.93C.80 R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 .................................................................................................... CA.19A.520, CA.5.120 R v Oldham 175 ER 540; (1852) 3 Car & K 249 ............................................................................................ CA.114.100 R v Olejarnik (1994) 33 NSWLR 567; 72 A Crim R 542 ................................................................................... CLP.1520 R v Oliphant [1905] 2 KB 67 ............................................................................................................................ CA.158.140 R v Oliver (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 6 .................................................................................................................... CA.156.120 R v Oliver (1909) 3 Cr App R 246 ..................................................................................................................... CA.136.40 R v Oliver (1984) 57 ALR 543 ...................................................................................................... CPA.21.80, CPA.21.100 R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 ................................................................................... CA.179.300, CA.188.240, CPA.156.200 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 ...................... CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 R v Ongley (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 116 .................................................................................................. CLP.680, CLP.760 R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 2 WLR 273; (1955) 39 Cr App R 1 ................... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160 R v Orchard (1993) 70 A Crim R 289 ........................................................................................................... DMTA.23.180 R v Orcher (1999) 48 NSWLR 273; NSWCCA 356 ...................................................................... CA.311.40, CA.326.20 R v Ormsby [1945] NZLR 109 ......................................................................................................................... CA.25A.140 R v Orsos (1997) 95 A Crim R 457 .......................................................................... CA.61N.20, CA.61N.80, CA.61O.20 R v Orton [1922] VLR 469 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.740, CLP.780 R v Osborn (1919) 84 JP 63 .................................................................................................................................. CA.82.60 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 ................ CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.460, CA.Pt3.Div10.480 R v Osborne [1970] 1 NSWR 622; 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 625 ...................................................................... CA.19A.600 R v Osborne [1987] 1 Qd R 96 ........................................................................................................................... CA.33.160 R v Osip (2000) 2 VR 595; 116 A Crim R 578; [2000] VSCA 237 ................................................................. CA.24.240 R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636; 95 A Crim R 479 ................................................................................................ CA.23.180 R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170 ...................................................... CA.35.100, CA.59.100, CA.59.140, CA.60.160 R v Overton (1843) 4 QB 83 ............................................................................................................................. CA.327.160 R v Owen (1792) 2 East PC 645 ......................................................................................................................... CA.148.80 R v Owen (1825) 1 Mood 96 ......................................................................................................... CA.188.160, CA.345.80 R v Owen (1827) 1 Lew CC 35 .......................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 R v Owen (1830) 4 Car & P 236; 172 ER 685 ...................................................................................................... CLP.560 R v Owen [1957] 1 QB 174 ............................................................................................................................... CA.250.120 R v Oxenham (1876) 13 Cox CC 349 ............................................................................................................... CA.125.100 R v Oxford (1840) 9 Car & P 525; 173 ER 941 .................................................................................................... CLP.560
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 .................................................................................................... CLP.2560, CLP.2580 O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 .............................................. CA.25A.140 O’Connor [2014] NSWCCA 53 .................................................................................................................... CA.37.140 P [1906] 1 KB 97 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.347.100 P (1909) 3 Cr App R 259 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 P (1993) 69 A Crim R 159 .................................................................................................. CA.52A.120, CA.52A.200 PJE (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 October 1995) ............................................................... CPA.19.100, CPA.293.120 PL (2009) 199 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 256 ....................................................... CA.19A.160, CA.19A.420 Packer [1932] VLR 225 .................................................................................................................................. CA.79.40 Padwick [1959] Crim LR 439 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.560 Page (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 272; 11 WN 28 ................................................................................................ CA.162.40 Page [1933] VLR 351 .......................................................................................................... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80 Page (unreported, CCA (NSW), 25 November 1991) ................................................................................. CA.61N.80 Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 ....... CA.19A.160, CA.19A.260, CA.19A.280, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.320, CLP.400, CLP.420, CLP.440, CLP.460, CLP.540 Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118 ........................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CLP.1820 Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99; 23 A Crim R 86 ........................................................................... CLP.2500, CLP.2520 Palin [1906] 1 KB 7 .................................................................................................................................... CA.158.140 Palm (1910) 4 Cr App R 253 ......................................................................................................................... CA.82.80 Palmer (1804) 1 Bosanquet & Puller (NR) 96 ............................................................................................. CA.250.80 Palmer [1971] AC 814 ..................................................................... CA.423.40, CA.423.60, CA.423.80, CA.423.140 Palmer (1992) 64 A Crim R 1 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1440 Palmer [2005] NSWCCA 349 ....................................................................................................................... CA.94.360 Palmer (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 March 1969) .......................................................................................... CA.9.60 Palmer 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 188 ......................................................................................... CPA.21.120, CPA.21.280 Palu (2002) 134 A Crim R 174; [2002] NSWCCA 381 ............................................................................... SPA.11.20 Panagiotou (1982) 6 A Crim R 174 .............................................................................................................. CA.161.40 Panayotov (unreported, CCA (NSW), 17 December 1991) ..................................................................... DMTA.26.60 Pantano (1990) 49 A Crim R 328 ............................................................................................................ CA.176A.100 Paprounas [1970] VR 865 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.154.240 Paris [2001] NSWCCA 83 ....................................................................................................... SPA.10.80, SPA.10.100 Parish (1837) 8 Car & P 94 .......................................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Parker (1560) 2 Dyer 186 ............................................................................................................................. CA.346.80 Parker (1837) 2 Moody 1 ............................................................................................................................ CA.179.240 Parker (1842) Car & M 639 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.200 Parker (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 217 ........................................................................................... CA.125.60, CA.188.180 Parker (1895) 59 JP 793 .................................................................................................................................. CA.53.60 Parker (1957) 41 Cr App R 134 ................................................................................................................ CA.52A.200 Parker [1969] 2 QB 248 .............................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Parker [1974] 1 NSWLR 14 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.180 Parker (2002) 132 A Crim R 413; [2002] NSWCCA 330 ....................................................................... DMTA.24.80 Parkes (1794) 2 Leach 614 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Parkes and Brown (1797) 2 Leach 775 ........................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Parsons (2000) 1 VR 161; [2000] VSCA 15 .................................................................................................. CA.23.60 Partridge (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 410; 47 WN (NSW) 173 .............................................................................. CLP.680 Partridge (1986) 6 NSWLR 420 ................................................................................................................ CA.447A.40 Pascoe (1849) 2 Car & Kir 927 .............................................................................................. CA.133.80, CA.186.100 Pateman (1821) Russ & Ry 455 ................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 ........................................................................................................................ CA.23A.60 Patmoy (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 127 .............................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Patmoy (1994) 62 WN (NSW) 1 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Patsalis (1999) 107 A Crim R 432; [1999] NSWSC 649 ................................. CPA.21.80, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320 Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340; (1962) 46 Cr App R 106 ................ CA.7.140, CA.114.80, CA.114.140 Pauuwe [1971] 2 NSWLR 235 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Pavitt (2007) 169 A Crim R 452 ...................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.540 Payne (1887) 13 VLR 359 ...................................................................................................... CA.109.140, CA.112.80 Payne [1970] Qd R 260 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.2280 Payne [1976] 2 NSWLR 446 ..................................................................................................................... CA.310D.80 Paynter (1908) 25 TLR 191 ........................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976; [1990] 2 All ER 966; (1990) 91 Cr App R 279 ............................................ CA.327.200 Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 ................................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Pear (1779) 1 Leach 212 ............................................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Pearce [1904] QSR 243 ............................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Pearce [1953] 1 QB 30; [1952] 2 All ER 718; (1952) 36 Cr App R 149 .................................. CA.427.20, CLP.920 Pearl (1942) 28 Cr App R 183 ..................................................................................................................... CA.188.40 Pearson (1910) 4 Cr App R 40 ............................................................................................... CA.109.100, CA.114.60 Pearson (2000) 114 A Crim R 80; [2000] NSWCCA 149 ........................................................................ CA.197.100 Pearson (2002) 137 A Crim R 419; [2002] NSWCCA 429 ........................................................................ CA.33.120 Peat (1781) 1 Leach 228; 168 ER 216 ......................................................................................................... CA.94.100 Pedley (1784) 1 Leach 325 ......................................................................................................................... CA.327.180 Peehi (1997) 41 NSWLR 476; 92 A Crim R 539 ..................................................................................... CA.310D.60 Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 .................................................................................................. CA.23.60, CA.23.120 Pelham (1846) 8 QB 959; 115 ER 1135 ........................................................................................................ CA.44.80 Pellow (1856) 73 WN (NSW) 478 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119 ................................................................................................................... CA.5.100 Pembrey (unreported CCA (NSW), 4 August 1989) .............................................................................. DMTA.25.200 Penn (1989) 44 A Crim R 131 .................................................................................................................... CA.423.140 Pepper [1921] 3 KB 167; (1922) 16 Cr App R 12 .......................................................................................... CLP.680 Pepperill (1981) 54 FLR 327 .................................................................................................. CPA.19.180, CPA.30.20 Percali (1986) 42 SASR 46 ........................................................................................................................... CA.59.100 Percival, Smith & Graham (1905) 69 JP 320 ............................................................................................ CA.114.100 Perka (1984) 14 CCC (3d) 385 .................................................................................................... CLP.2800, CLP.2820 Perkes (1824) 1 Car & P 300; 171 ER 1204 ............................................................................................... CA.112.80 Perkins (1852) 2 Den 459 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201 ............ CA.19A.520, CA.428I.40, CA.4.160, CA.23.220, CLP.1180 Pernich (1991) 55 A Crim R 464 ................................................................................................................ CPA.160.20 Perrott (1814) 2 Maule & Selwyn 379 ....................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Perry (1845) 1 Car & K 725 ....................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Perry (1847) 2 Cox CC 223 ............................................................................................................................ CA.82.60 Perry (1855) Dears 471 ................................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Perry [1909] 2 KB 697; (1909) 2 Cr App R 267 ........................................................................................ CA.83.120 Perry (1945) 31 Cr App R 16 .............................................................................................. CA.178C.40, CA.178C.60 Perry (1993) 29 NSWLR 589; 66 A Crim R 511 ...................................................................................... CPA.132.20 Petch (1878) 14 Cox CC 116 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.280 Petch (1909) 2 Cr App R 71 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.220 Peterkin (1982) 6 A Crim R 351 ........................................................................ CA.19A.500, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Peters (1843) 1 Car & K 245 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Peters & Heffernan (1995) 83 A Crim R 142 ............................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Peters & Heffernan (No 2) (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 August 1996) ................................................. CPA.19.160 Petrie (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 20; 63 WN (NSW) 258 ................................................................................ CA.117.440 Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466 ....................................................................... CA.4.200, CA.97.120 Petrie (2003) 141 A Crim R 396; [2003] NSWCCA 208 ............................................................................ SPA.22.20 Petrinovic [1999] NSWSC 1131 ................................................................................................................... SPA.61.20 Petroff (1980) 2 A Crim R 101 .................................................................................................................. CA.19A.600 Petronius-Kuff [1983] 3 NSWLR 178; (1978) 8 A Crim R 18 ............................................. CA.179.280, CA.180.20 Peuna (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 July 1992) .......................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 171 .................................................................................................. CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; (2001) 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 ..................................... CA.19A.600
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v
Phelan (1993) 66 A Crim R 446 ............................................................................................... CA.439.20, SPA.44.20 Phetheon (1840) 9 Carrington & Payne 552 ................................................................................................ CA.118.20 Philip Bell (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 November 1998) ........................................................................ CPA.19.180 Phillips (1868) 8 SCR (NSW) 54 ................................................................................................................... CLP.1440 Phillips (1938) 26 Cr App R 17 ................................................................................................................. CA.78A.100 Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 ....................................................... CA.19A.180, CA.19A.440, CA.61.140, CA.94.220 Phillips [1973] 1 NSWLR 275 ..................................................................................................................... CA.195.80 Phillips (1988) 86 Cr App R 18 ................................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120, CLP.740 Phillips & Strong (1801) 2 East PC 662 .................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Phillips and Timmons (1830) 1 Craw & D 164 ............................................................................................. CA.4.160 Phillpot 169 ER 686; (1853) Dears 179 .................................................................................................... CA.19A.320 Phillpotts (1851) 5 Cox CC 363 ................................................................................................................. CA.327.160 Phipoe (1795) 2 Leach 673; 168 ER 438 ..................................................................................................... CA.94.120 Phomaranuphong [2001] NSWSC 1157 ......................................................................................................... CLP.1100 Piccin [No 2] [2001] NSWCCA 323 ............................................................................................................ SPA.10.80 Pickup (1931) 22 Cr App R 186 ................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Pierpoint (1993) 71 A Crim R 187 ..................................................................... CA.7.100, CA.114.100, CA.114.140 Pike (1838) 2 Mood 70 ................................................................................................................................. CA.250.40 Pike [1902] 1 KB 552 ................................................................................................................................... CA.136.40 Pilkington [1955] Tas SR 144 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Piller (1995) 86 A Crim R 249 ................................................................................................................... CPA.21.320 Pilley (1991) 56 A Crim R 202 ................................................................................................................ DMTA.33.40 Piltz (2004) 59 NSWLR 538; [2004] NSWCCA 34 ................................................................................... CA.93G.20 Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 ................... CLP.2500, CLP.2540, CLP.2560, CLP.2580, CLP.2660 Pinhorn (1844) 1 Cox 70 ........................................................................................................................... CA.19A.320 Piper (1900) 65 JP 10 .................................................................................................................................... CA.172.40 Pirimona (1998) 7 Tas R 407; 100 A Crim R 137 ....................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Pirrottina (1996) 88 A Crim R 220 ......................................................................................... CPA.19.40, CPA.21.380 Pitts 174 ER 509; (1842) Car & M 284 ................................................................................... CA.19A.320, CLP.540 Plummer (1701) 12 Mod Rep 627 .............................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Plummer [1902] 2 KB 339 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.154.200 Police Complaints Board; Ex parte Madden [1983] 1 WLR 447; 2 All ER 353 ............. CPA.156.20, CPA.156.160 Pollard [1962] QWN 13 .............................................................................................................................. CA.117.200 Pollock [1967] 2 QB 195; [1966] 2 WLR 1145; [1966] 2 All ER 97 .................................... CA.94.100, CA.94.140 Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 ................................................................................................................... CLP.2820 Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435 ................................ CA.112.80, CA.112.100, CA.112.160 Poole (1857) Dearsly & Bell 345 ............................................................................................................... CA.117.320 Popa (1991) 53 A Crim R 102 ............................. CA.7.140, DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60, DMTA.25.80, DMTA.29.60 Pople [1951] 1 KB 53; [1950] 2 All ER 679; (1950) 34 Cr App R 168 .................................................... CPA.21.20 Porter (1864) 9 Cox CC 449 ........................................................................................................................... CA.44.80 Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 ........ CLP.1020, CLP.1040, CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1160 Porter (2004) 61 NSWLR 384; 149 A Crim R 112 .................................................................................. CA.527C.40 Porteus [2003] NSWCCA 18 .................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.40 Post (1806) Russ & Ry 101 .......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389 ................................... CA.117.160, CA.117.260, CA.117.320, CA.117.340, CA.117.400 Potter [1958] 1 WLR 638; 2 All ER 51; (1958) 42 Cr App R 168 .................................... CA.158.140, CA.176.120 Poulton [1974] VR 716 .................................................................................................................................. SPA.10.80 Powch (1988) 14 NSWLR 136; 34 A Crim R 360 .................................................................................... CPA.19.100 Powell (1884) 15 Cox CC 568 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Powell (1997) 4 All ER 545 ................................................................................................... CA.345.140, CA.346.80 Powell [2000] NSWCCA 108 .................................................................................................................. DPVA.13.120 Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.580
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Poynton (1862) Leigh & Cave 247 ............................................................................................................ CA.117.140 Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; 2 A Crim R 45 ................................................................................................ CLP.1820 Pratt (1830) 1 Moody 250 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Pratt (1865) 4 F & F 315 ............................................................................................................................ CA.188.100 Prebble (1858) 1 Fos & Fin 325 ................................................................................................................ CA.546C.60 Preece [1977] QB 370; [1976] 2 WLR 749; [1976] 2 All ER 690 ............................................................ CA.61N.80 Preedy (1888) 17 Cox CC 433 ....................................................................................................................... SOA.3.40 Prentice [1973] Qd R 346 ............................................................................................................................... CA.47.80 Preston (1851) 2 Denison 353 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Preston (unreported, NSW CCA, 9 April 1997) ....................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 ................................................................................................... CA.61H.20, CA.61I.60 Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 .................................................................................................................. SPA.23.20 Price (1913) 9 Cr App R 15 ....................................................................................................................... CA.125.100 Price [1963] 2 QB 1; [1962] 3 WLR 1308; [1962] 3 All ER 957 ............................................................... CLP.1140 Price [1969] 1 QB 541; (1968) 52 Cr App R 295 ....................................................................................... CA.83.120 Price (1982) 8 A Crim R 403 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr App R 198 ................................................................................................................... CA.29.80 Priestley (1922) 16 Cr App R 143 ........................................................................................... CA.78A.60, CA.78F.20 Prince (1868) LR 1 CCR 150 ............................................................................................... CA.117.160, CA.179.200 Pringle (1840) 9 C & P 408; 173 ER 889 ................................................................................................... CA.184.40 Prior (1992) 112 FLR 388; 65 A Crim R 1 ...................................................................... CA.344A.80, CA.344A.100 Pritchard (1913) 9 Cr App R 210 ............................................................................................................... CA.188.220 Privett [1999] NSWSC 1074 ......................................................... CPA.21.80, CPA.21.100, CPA.21.360, CPA.30.20 Promizio (2004) 142 A Crim R 592 ........................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Prosser (1848) 11 Beav 306; 50 ER 834 .................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Proud (1861) Le & Ca 97 ......................................................................................................... CA.155.40, CA.157.60 Pryce (1949) 34 Cr App R 21 .................................................................................................................. CA.178C.140 Pryor (2001) 124 A Crim R 22; [2001] QCA 341 ............................................................... CA.61.160, CA.61HA.80 Ptohopoulos (1967) 52 Cr App R 47 ........................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 ....... CA.24.20, CA.24.120, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.54.100, CLP.80, CLP.1300 Purdy [1975] QB 288; (1974) 60 Cr App R 30 ............................................ CA.93C.100, CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Purdy [1982] 2 NSWLR 964; 7 A Crim R 251 .......................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230 .................... CA.344A.140, CA.94.100, CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CA.117.140, CA.427.20, CLP.1480, CPA.19.160, CPA.159.20, CPA.162.60, CPA.162.80 Pureau at 376 (NSWLR); 234 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.162.60 Putland [1946] 1 All ER 85; (1946) 31 Cr App R 27 ..................................................................................... CLP.760 Pym (1846) 1 Cox 339 ..................................................................................................................................... CLP.540 Quail (1866) 4 F & F 1076; 176 ER 914 ........................................................................................................ CLP.960 Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332; 22 A Crim R 252 ................................................. CA.23.60, CA.23.80, CA.23.220 Quayle [2005] 1 WLR 3642; [2006] 1 All ER 988; [2005] 2 Cr App R 34 ............................................... CLP.2820 Quick [1973] QB 910; [1973] 3 WLR 26; (1973) 57 Cr App R 722 .......................................... CLP.280, CLP.1120 Quillerat [1962] Tas SR 370 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.180 Quinn (1918) 44 DLR 707 ........................................................................................................................... CA.91A.40 Quinn (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 21 ................................................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Quinn (1991) 55 A Crim R 435 ........................ CA.344A.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.300, CPA.162.60 R (1981) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127 ............................................ CA.23.60, CA.23.80, CA.23.180, CA.423.60 R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74; 44 A Crim R 404 .................................................................................................. CLP.1820 R [1992] 1 AC 599; [1991] 3 WLR 767; [1991] 4 All ER 481 .................................................................. CA.61I.60 R (1994) 35 NSWLR 376; (1994) 75 A Crim R 319 .................................................................................. SPA.44.20 R (1995) 63 SASR 417; 79 A Crim R 191 .......................................................................... CA.345.100, CA.345.140 R [1998] 3 VR 580; (1997) 99 A Crim R 327 ............................................................................................. CPA.36.20 R2 (1990) 19 NSWLR 513 ................................................................................................. DMTA.4.20, DMTA.29.40 RJS (1993) 31 NSWLR 649; 69 A Crim R 163 .............................................. CA.61J.140, CA.61K.100, CA.97.120
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RNS [1999] NSWCCA 122 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.21.20 RPS (unreported, CCA NSW 13 August 1997) ............................................................................................. CLP.1840 Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115; 14 A Crim R 381 ........................................................................................... CA.93C.100 Raad [1983] 3 NSWLR 344 ....................................................................................................................... CA.188.180 Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 ............................................................. CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.1120, CLP.1140 Radalyski (1899) 24 VLR 687 ...................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Radford (1845) 1 Den 59 .............................................................................................................................. CA.250.80 Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 ................. CA.19A.140, CA.23.60, CLP.220, CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.300, CLP.340, CLP.1040, CLP.1080, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1160, CLP.1200 Radley (1973) 58 Cr App R 394 .................................................................................................................. CPA.21.20 Rae (1998) 104 A Crim R 348 ....................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 Rafique [1993] QB 843; [1993] 3 WLR 617; [1993] 4 All ER 1 ............................................................. CA.319.140 Ram & Ram (1893) 17 Cox CC 609 ........................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Ramsay (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 43 ................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Ramsey (1883) 15 Cox CC 231 ................................................................................................................... CA.529.40 Randall (1991) 55 SASR 447; (1991) 53 A Crim R 380 ........................................................................... CA.61H.20 Randell (1887) 16 Cox CC 335 .................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Raniga (2009) 193 A Crim R 184; [2009] NSWCCA 35 ............................................................................ CA.97.240 Rankin (1848) 7 State Trials (NS) 711 ...................................................................................................... CA.545C.60 Ransford (1874) 13 Cox CC 9 ....................................................................................................... CA.26.40, CLP.960 Ransom (1812) Russ & Ry 232; 168 ER 776 ................................................................................................ CA.4.260 Rasmussen (1928) 45 WN (NSW) 87 ............................................................................................................ CA.99.60 Rawcliffe [1977] 1 NSWLR 219; 32 FLR 252 ................................................................................................. CLP.80 Raymond [1981] QB 910 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.154.20 Read (1878) 3 QBD 131 ............................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Reading (1794) 2 Leach 590 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Reading 83 ER 784; (1660) 1 Keb 17 ............................................................................................................. CLP.540 Readman (1990) 47 A Crim R 181 ............................................................................................................... CA.97.240 Ready [1942] VLR 85 ................................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Reah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 116; 33 WN 45 ................................................................................................ CA.161.40 Reane (1794) 2 Leach 616; 168 ER 410 ...................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 ...................................................................................... CLP.1820 Reardon & Bloor [1866] LR 1 CCR 31 ............................................................................... CA.188.100, CA.188.160 Reculist (1796) 2 Leach 703 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Reed (1838) 2 Mood 62 ................................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Reed (1854) 6 Cox CC 284 .......................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Rees (1834) 6 Carrington & Payne 606 ......................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Reeves (1892) 9 WN (NSW) 43 ................................................................................................................. CA.347.100 Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.360 Reeves (1994) 122 ACTR 1 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Rehavi [1999] 2 Qd R 640; (1998) 101 A Crim R 569 ........................................................................ DMTA.25.160 Reid [1973] 1 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 1350; (1972) 56 Cr App R 703 .......... CA.86.80, CA.86.100, CA.86.140, CA.86.240 Reid [1992] 1 WLR 793 ................................................................................................................................ CA.4A.40 Reid [1999] NSWCCA 258 ..................................................................................................... CPA.19.40, CPA.281.20 Reid [1999] NSWCCA 355 ........................................................................................................................... CA.323.20 Reid (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 October 1996) .............................. CA.192E.200, CA.192F.180, CA.178BA.140 Reid (No 2) (1981) 2 A Crim R 28 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Reinsch [1978] 1 NSWLR 483 ................................................................................................................... SPA.10.100 Remnant (1807) Russ & Ry 136 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Renton (1925) 19 Cr App R 33 .................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88; (1996) 88 A Crim R 65 ................................................................................. CPA.150.120 Revell (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 December 1976) .................................................................................. CA.61.140 Revuelta [1959] Cr LR 777 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.320
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Reyes [2005] NSWCCA 218 ........................................................................................................................ CA.38.120 Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26 ......... CA.546C.60, CA.546C.80, CA.58.140, CA.58.180, CLP.1320 Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26; [1962] HCA 23 .............................................. CA.60.20, CA.60.120 Reynolds (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 129 ................................................................................................................. CA.79.40 Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 77 ........................................................................................................ CA.179.200, CA.179.300 Rhodes (1959) 44 Cr App R 23 ................................................................................................................ CPA.154.260 Rhodes (1984) 14 A Crim R 124 ............................................................................................. CA.19A.520, CA.4.160 Rice (1859) Bell CC 87 ................................................................................................................................ CA.139.60 Rice [1996] 2 VR 406; (1996) 85 A Crim R 187 ..................................................................................... CA.19A.420 Rice [1996] 2 VR 406; 85 A Crim R 187 ....................................................................................................... CLP.580 Rice (2004) 150 A Crim R 37; [2004] NSWCCA 384 ............................................................................. CA.105A.20 Richards (1844) 1 Car & K 532 ................................................................................................................. CA.117.320 Richards (1844) 1 Cox CC 62 .................................................................................................................... CPA.160.20 Richards [1911] 1 KB 260; (1910) 6 Cr App R 21 ................................................................. CA.139.60, CA.154.40 Richards [1934] QWN 19 ........................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Richards [1974] QB 776; (1974) 58 Cr App R 60 ................................................................ CA.117.200, CA.346.80 Richards (1994) 64 SASR 42; 77 A Crim R 1 ..................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Richards (1999) 107 A Crim R 318 ............................................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160 ............................................................................ CLP.740 Richardson (1834) 6 Car & P 335 .............................................................................................................. CA.188.160 Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 343 ................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Richardson [1989] 1 Qd R 583 ................................................................................................................... CPA.293.40 Richardson [1998] 3 WLR 1292 ............................................................................................... CA.61.160, CA.61.260 Rickards [1922] SASR 269 ........................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Ridgway (unreported, CCA, 6 February 1995) ............................................................................................ CPA.19.40 Ridley (1811) 2 Camp 650; 170 ER 1282 ............................................................................... CA.43A.120, CA.44.80 Ridpath (1712) 10 Mod 152; 88 ER 670 ................................................................................................... CPA.113.40 Rigby (1858) 7 Cox CC 507 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Rigby (unreported, CCA (Vic), No 180 of 1993, 21 October 1993) ......................................................... CA.61H.20 Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 ....................................................................................................................... CA.93B.100 Rigney (1988) 48 SASR 72 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Riley (1853) Dearsly 149 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.160, CA.117.320 Riley [1896] 1 QB 309 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.154.100 Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 ................................................................................. CA.178BB.160, CA.178BB.220 Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605; 68 A Crim R 284 ................................................................................ CA.192G.120 Ring, Atkins & Jackson (1892) 17 Cox CC 491 ....................................................................................... CA.117.140 Ritson (1869) LR 1 CCR 200 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Roach (1990) 54 SASR 491 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 247 ................................................................................. CA.351.60 Roberts (1828) Car CL 293 ........................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 Roberts (1848) 2 Car & Kir 607 ................................................................................................................ CA.327.200 Roberts (1878) 14 Cox CC 101 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Roberts (1886) 12 VLR 135 ......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95 ............................................................ CA.19A.320, CA.61.120, CLP.500, CLP.540 Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 583; (1993) 96 Cr App R 291 ........................................................................... CA.345.140 Roberts (1994) 73 A Crim R 306 ................................................................................................................. CA.97.240 Roberts (1999) 106 A Crim R 67 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Roberts (2001) 53 NSWLR 138; 124 A Crim R 60 ........................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Roberts [2004] NSWSC 325 .................................................................................................................. DMTA.25A.20 Robertson (1864) 10 Cox CC 9 ...................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 Robertson (1914) 9 Cr App R 189 ...................................................................................... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160 Robertson (1936) 25 Cr App R 208 ............................................................................................................. CA.161.20 Robertson Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 262; (1990) 45 A Crim R 408 ....... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CA.Pt3.Div10.440, CA.Pt3.Div10.480
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
TABLE OF CASES
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Robins (1854) Dearsly 418 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Robinson (1831) 1 Mood CC 327; 168 ER 1290 ........................................................................................ CA.112.80 Robinson (1859) Bell CC 34 ...................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Robinson (1864) 4 F & F 43 ...................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 Robinson [1915] 2 KB 342 ........................................................................................................................ CA.344A.60 Robinson [1975] 1 QB 509 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Robinson [1975] QB 508; 2 WLR 117; 1 All ER 360 ............................................................................ CPA.156.140 Robinson [1993] Crim LR 581 .................................................................................................................. CA.93C.100 Robinson [2000] NSWCCA 182 ................................................................................................................ CA.310D.80 Robinson [2003] NSWCCA 188 ................................................................................................................ CA.19A.220 Robinson (2006) 162 A Crim R 88 .................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.620 Robson (1820) Russ & Ry 413 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Robson (1861) Le & Ca 93 .......................................................................................................................... CA.125.60 Robson (1885) 16 QBD 137 ......................................................................................................................... CA.162.40 Robson [1978] 1 NSWLR 73 .................................................................................................... CA.86.140, CA.86.160 Roche (1775) 1 Leach 134; 168 ER 169 .................................................................................................. CPA.156.160 Rochow [1983] 1 Qd R 184; (1982) 8 A Crim R 37 .............................................................................. CPA.156.140 Roddan (No 1) (1995) 86 A Crim R 1 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Roden (1981) 4 A Crim R 166 ................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 Roderick (1837) 7 Car & P 795; 173 ER 347 ...................................................................... CA.344A.40, CA.427.20 Rodway (1841) 9 Car & P 784 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Roe (1870) 11 Cox CC 554 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Roebuck [1856] Dearsly & Bell 24 ................................................................ CA.179.200, CA.179.280, CA.179.300 Roffel [1985] VR 511; (1984) 14 A Crim R 134 ................................................................. CA.117.160, CA.173.200 Rogers (1838) 8 Car & P 629 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Rogers (1868) LR 1 CCR 136 .............................................................................................. CA.188.160, CA.345.180 Rogers (1877) 3 QBD 28 .............................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Rogers (1914) 10 Cr App R 276 .............................................................................................. CA.66A.80, CA.43.120 Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 .................. CA.310D.60, CA.423.60, CLP.2800, CLP.2820, CLP.2840, CLP.2860, CLP.2880, CLP.2900 Rogers [2003] 1 WLR 1374; [2003] 2 Cr App R 10 .................................................................................... CA.39.80 Rogerson (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 234 ......................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 Rogerson (1990) 45 A Crim R 253 .............................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 ............. CA.317.100, CA.319.80, CA.319.120, CA.319.140, CLP.660, CLP.740, CLP.760, CPA.156.40 Rogerson (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 .............................................................................................................. CPA.21.80 Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477; 11 A Crim R 325 ........................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr App R 4 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61L.80 Rolph [1962] Qd R 262 ............................................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Roma [1956] Crim LR 46 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.460 Romano (1984) 36 SASR 283; 14 A Crim R 168 ..................................................................... CA.23.60, CA.23.100 Romeo [1988] WAR 304; (1987) 25 A Crim R 80 .................................................................................. CPA.154.260 Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540 .... CLP.80, LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.17.20, LEPRA.76.20, LEPRA.99.80 Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005; 2 All ER 955; (1993) 97 Cr App R 327 ....................................................... CA.345.140 Roome (1995) 84 A Crim R 1 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.46.20 Rooney (1836) 7 Car & P 515; 173 ER 228 .......................................................................................... LEPRA.23.80 Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540 .......................................................................................................................... CA.18.20 Rose (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 31; 3 WN 77 ........................................................................................................ CA.4.260 Rose [1965] QWN 35 ..................................................................................................................................... SOA.3.40 Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.150.160 Rose (1996) 87 A Crim R 109 ............................................................................................... CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40 Rose [2003] NSWCCA 411 .......................................................................................................................... CA.86.160 Rose (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 May 1996) ......................................................................................... CA.428I.40
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Rosenberg (1906) 70 JP 264 ........................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Ross [1922] VLR 329 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.4.160 Ross [1955] St R Qd 48 ............................................................................................................ CA.83.100, CA.83.120 Ross (unreported, CCA, NSW, 20 November 1996) .............................................................................. DPVA.13.120 Rossborough (1985) 81 Cr App R 139 ....................................................................................................... CPA.150.60 Rossi (1994) 75 A Crim R 411 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752; (1992) 95 Cr App R 326 ............................................................................ CA.23.120 Rothwell and Barton [1993] Crim LR 626 ................................................................................................ CA.93B.100 Roulston [1976] 2 NZLR 644 ................................................................................................. CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 Rouse, Billingsley and Bayes (1849) 4 Cox CC 7 .................................................................................... CA.179.200 Rowe (1859) Bell CC 93 ............................................................................................................................ CA.117.420 Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467 ........................................................................ CA.86.140, CA.86.160, DPVA.13.120 Rowe (2000) 50 NSWLR 510; 118 A Crim R 421 ................................................................................... CPA.281.20 Rowed (1842) 3 QB 180 ............................................................................................................................... CA.576.20 Rowell [1978] 1 WLR 132; [1978] 1 All ER 665; (1977) 65 Cr App R 174 ...................... CA.319.80, CA.319.120 Rowland [1910] 1 KB 458; (1909) 3 Cr App R 277 ................................................................................. CA.188.240 Rowlands (1882) 8 QBD 530 ................................................................................................................... CA.178C.120 Rowlands [1972] 1 QB 424 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.21.160 Rowlands 117 ER 1439; (1851) 17 QB 671 .................................................................................................... CLP.660 Roxburgh (1871) 12 Cox CC 8 ..................................................................... CA.546C.60, CA.546C.100, CA.58.200 Royall (1989) 41 A Crim R 447 ..................................................................................................................... CA.59.80 Royle (1895) 6 QLJ 146 ............................................................................................................................... CA.161.40 Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359 ............................................................................. CA.178BA.120 Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359; (1972) 56 Cr App R 131 ..................................... CA.192E.160 Rudd, Garside and Mosley (1834) 2 Ad & El 266; 111 ER 103 ............................................................ CPA.154.320 Rugari (2001) 122 A Crim R 1; [2001] NSWCCA 64 .......................................................... CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 Ruiz-Avila (2003) 142 A Crim R 459; [2003] NSWCCA 264 ............................................ DMTA.3.40, DMTA.6.20 Rumpf [1988] VR 466; 29 A Crim R 252 ................................................................................................... CA.444.40 Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 ..................................................................... CLP.2560, CLP.2580 Rushbrook [1974] 1 NSWLR 699 ................................................................................................................ CPA.30.20 Russell (1832) 1 Mood 356 .......................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Russell (1833) 1 Mood CC 377; 168 ER 1310 ............................................................................................ CA.112.80 Russell (1878) 1 SCR NS (NSW) 73 ......................................................................................................... CA.117.260 Russell [1933] VLR 59 ......................................................................................... CA.24.220, CA.45.120, CA.345.80 Russell (1944) 29 Cr App R 165 ................................................................................................................ CA.120.140 Russell (1987) 85 Cr App R 388 ............................................................................................................... CA.19A.220 Russett [1892] 2 QB 312 ....................................................................................................... CA.117.160, CA.117.360 Rust (1828) 1 Mood CC 183; 168 ER 1234 ................................................................................................ CA.112.80 Rutter (1908) 25 TLR 73 ................................................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Ryan (1853) Legge Supreme Court Cases 797 ......................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Ryan (1890) 11 LR (NSW) 171; 6 WN (NSW) 162 ................................................................................... CA.33.160 Ryan [1906] St R Qd 15 ............................................................................................................................ CA.19A.100 Ryan (1914) 10 Cr App R 4 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.220 Ryan [1966] VR 553 ............................................................................................................ CA.310D.60, CA.345.100 Ryan [1977] 1 NSWLR 320 ...................................................................................................................... CA.441A.20 Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 .................................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Ryan (2003) 141 A Crim R 403; [2003] NSWCCA 202 ....................................................................... CA.52AB.200 Ryan (2006) 167 A Crim R 241; [2006] NSWCCA 394 ............................................................................. SPA.12.20 Ryder [1995] 2 NZLR 271 ......................................................................................................................... CA.19A.160 Rye (1909) 2 Cr App R 155 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.20, CA.119.40 S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 ........... CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.340, CLP.1040, CLP.1060, CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1140, CLP.1160 R v S (1988) 39 A Crim R 288 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.21.20 R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548; (1991) 53 A Crim R 263 ..................................... CA.52A.140, CA.52A.200, CA.53.100
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Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
S [1998] 3 VR 862; 98 A Crim R 80 ......................................................................................................... CPA.21.380 S and Wife (1851) 5 Cox CC 279 .................................................................................................................. CA.44.80 SDM (2001) 51 NSWLR 530; 127 A Crim R 318; [2001] NSWCCA 158 ............................................... CA.97.240 Sabri Isa [1952] St R Qd 269 ......................................................................................................................... CA.23.60 Sadler (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 380; 17 WN 144 .............................................................................................. CA.5.180 Saffron [No 1] (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; 36 A Crim R 262 ............................................................ CLP.680, CLP.780 Safwan (1986) 8 NSWLR 97; 23 A Crim R 385 ...................................................... CA.4A.20, CA.5.200, CLP.1400 Sagacio (1990) 99 FLR 439 .............................................................................................. CPA.156.140, CPA.156.220 Sagiv (1986) 22 A Crim R 73 ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Saik [2006] UKHL 18; [2007] 1 AC 18; [2006] 2 WLR 993 ........................................................................ CLP.740 Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 ................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.440, CA.Pt3.Div10.480 Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1900 Salameh (1986) 26 A Crim R 353 ................................................................................................................ CA.94.160 Saleam (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 .................................................................................................................. CA.121.40 Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.760 Sales (1989) 42 A Crim R 297 ............................................................................................ DMTA.3.20, DMTA.32.40 Saliba [1973] Qd R 142 .............................................................................................................................. CA.188.160 Salisbury [1976] VR 452 ..... CA.35A.120, CA.27.80, CA.33.180, CA.54.80, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.162.20, CPA.162.40 Salmon (1880) 6 QBD 79 ..................................................................................................... CA.345.100, CPA.21.160 Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1 ................................ CA.192E.140, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140, CA.197.100 Sampson (1885) 52 LT 772 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Sams (1988) 36 A Crim R 245 ........................................................................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 Sanchez [1996] Crim LR 572 ................................................................................................ CA.93C.80, CA.93C.140 Sanders (1867) LR 1 CCR 75 .................................................................................................................... CA.546C.60 Sanders [1919] 1 KB 550 ...................................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.179.280 Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102 ........................ CA.192E.140, CA.94.240, CA.117.200, CA.178BA.140, CA.179.300 Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172; 72 A Crim R 160 ....................... CA.7.140, CLP.1700, CPA.19.40, DMTA.7.60, DMTA.25.200, DMTA.29.40 Sanewski [1987] 1 Qd R 374 ....................................................................................................... CLP.80, DMTA.3.80 Sang [1980] AC 402 ...................................................................................................................................... CPA.19.80 Sara (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 347 ................................................................................................................ CPA.21.180 Saragozza [1984] VR 187; (1983) 9 A Crim R 185 .............. CA.Pt3.Div10.420, CA.Pt3.Div10.440, CA.61HA.100 Saunders (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 200 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 ............................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.420 Saunders (1994) 72 A Crim R 347 .................................................................. CPA.19.100, CPA.21.380, CPA.21.400 Saunders (2002) 133 A Crim R 104; [2002] NSWCCA 362 ................................................................... CA.52A.200 Saunders (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 February 1993) ................................................... CPA.19.120, DMTA.25.80 Saunders & Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473; 75 ER 706 .............................................. CA.5.180, CA.346.80, CLP.1400 Sauzier (1920) 14 QJPR 89 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Savage (1831) 5 Car & P 143 ..................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Savage (1876) 13 Cox CC 178 .................................................................................................................. CA.78A.100 Savage (1906) 70 JP 36 .............................................................................................................................. CA.188.160 Savage [1992] 1 AC 699 ............................................................................................................................... CA.61.140 Savage [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 3 WLR 914; [1991] 4 All ER 698 ........................................................ CA.35.100 Savka (1996) 88 A Crim R 393 ................................................................................................................. CA.52A.240 Savvas (1989) 43 A Crim R 331 .................................................................................................................. CA.578.20 Sawyer [1936] VLR 1 ................................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 Sawyer (1970) 16 FLR 354 ........................................................................................................................ CA.189B.20 Saxon & Morton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 December 1994) .............................................................. DMTA.7.60 Saylor [1963] QWN 14 ................................................................................................................................. CA.346.80 Sbarra (1918) 13 Cr App R 118 ................................................................................................................. CA.188.100 Scaife [1959] Crim LR 295 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.920 Scaramanga [1963] 2 QB 807; (1963) 47 Cr App R 213 ......................................................................... CA.345.100
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v
Scarrow (1968) 52 Cr App R 591 .............................................................................................................. CA.93C.100 Schaffer [2005] NSWCCA 193 ..................................................................................................................... CA.322.60 Scheer [1923] 2 DLR 402 ............................................................................................................................. CA.180.20 Schell [1964] Tas SR 184 .............................................................................. CA.66F.60, CA.61HA.40, CA.61HA.80 Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161 ........................................................................................................... CPA.281.20 Schipanski (1987) 17 NSWLR 618 .......................................................................................... CA.188.180, CLP.1300 Schlesinger (1847) 10 QB 670 .............................................................................................. CA.327.160, CA.327.180 Schloss (1897) QCR 337; (1897) 8 QLJ 21 ................................................................................................ CA.61L.80 Schmidt (1866) LR 1 CCR 15 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Schneidas [No 1] (1980) 4 A Crim R 95 ................................................................................................. CPA.154.220 Schneidas (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 713; (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 ......................................................... CA.19A.600 Schweller (1924) 18 Cr App R 52 ................................................................................................................ CA.189.20 Scofield (1784) Cald Mag Cas 397 ........................................................................................................... CA.344A.40 Scott [1907] VLR 471 ................................................................................................................................ CA.249B.40 Scott [1967] VR 276 .................................................................................................................. CA.310D.60, CLP.140 Scott [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032 ................................................................... CLP.80 Scott (1990) 20 NSWLR 72; 49 A Crim R 96 .......................................................................................... CA.173.180 Scott (unreported, CCA (Vic), 2 June 1987) .............................................................................................. CPA.21.380 Scranton (1920) 15 Cr App R 104 .............................................................................................................. CA.117.360 Scriva (No 2) [1951] VLR 298 ................................................................................................ CA.19A.600, CA.23.60 Scully (1903) 23 NZLR 380 ........................................................................................................................... CA.84.80 Scully 171 ER 1213; (1824) 1 Car & P 319 .................................................................................................. CA.18.20 Seaman (1981) 4 A Crim R 119 ................................................................................................................... CA.423.40 Secombe (1917) 12 Cr App R 275 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Secretary (1996) 107 NTR; 86 A Crim R 119 ............................................................................................. CA.423.60 See Lun (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 363; 49 WN (NSW) 116 ...................................................... CA.117.200, CA.346.80 Seebag (unreported, CCA (NSW), 16 February 1993) ........................................................... CPA.19.40, CPA.19.160 Seiga (1960) 45 Cr App R 26 ..................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Sellen (1991) 57 A Crim R 313 .................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 Sellis 173 ER 370; (1837) 7 Car & P 850 ................................................................................................ CA.19A.100 Selvage [1982] QB 372; [1981] 3 WLR 811; [1982] 1 All ER 96 ........................................................... CA.319.140 Selway (1859) 8 Cox CC 235 ....................................................................................................................... CA.94.120 Semple (1786) 1 Leach 420 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 Senior [1899] 1 QB 283 ..................................................... CA.24.220, CA.44.100, CA.179.220, CLP.80, SOA.5.40 Senior 168 ER 1298 ................................................................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Sepulveda (2006) 167 A Crim R 108 ............................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.620 Sergi [1974] VR 1 ...................................................................................................................................... CA.19A.500 Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 ........... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.200, CLP.580, CPA.21.160 Sessions [1998] 2 VR 304 ............................................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.20, CPA.156.240 Settimio Coviello (1995) 81 A Crim R 293 ........................................................................................... DMTA.25.140 Sewell [2002] NSWCCA 7 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68 ........... CA.117.20, CA.117.460, CA.188.40 Seymour [1976] VR 609 ............................................................................................................................... CA.113.60 Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493; [1983] 3 WLR 349; [1983] 2 All ER 1058 ...................................................... CA.24.40 Shacter [1960] 2 QB 252; (1959) 44 Cr App R 42 ..................................................................................... CA.173.80 Shadbolt (1835) 5 Car & P 504; 172 ER 1073 .............................................................................................. CA.27.80 Shaluga [1958] SR (NSW) 151; (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 120 ..................................................................... SOA.15.40 Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 ................. CA.19A.20, CA.19A.80, CA.19A.140, CA.19A.200, CA.19A.540, CA.96.80, CA.97.120, CA.98.180, CA.98.200, CA.345.140 Sharma (2002) 54 NSWLR 300; 130 A Crim R 238 ................................................................................... SPA.22.20 Sharman (1854) Dears 285 ........................................................................................................ CA.250.60, CA.250.80 Sharp (1847) 2 Cox CC 181 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 Sharp (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 150 .................................................................................................................... CLP.1520
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Sharp [1957] 1 QB 552; 2 WLR 472 ............................................................. CA.93B.100, CA.93C.60, CA.93C.100 Sharp [1987] QB 853; [1987] 3 WLR 1; [1987] 3 All ER 103 ................................................................... CLP.2620 Sharpe (1857) Dearsly & Bell 160 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Sharpe [1938] 1 All ER 48; (1938) 26 Cr App R 122 .............................................................................. CA.319.140 Sharpless & Greatrix (1772) 1 Leach 92 .................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Shaw (1911) 6 Cr App R 103 ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.120 Shaw [1980] 1 WLR 1526; 2 All ER 433; (1980) 70 Cr App R 313 ......................................................... CPA.36.20 Shaw [1981] 2 NSWLR 648; 4 A Crim R 228 ................................................. CA.19A.520, CA.428I.40, CLP.1180 Shaw [1995] 2 Qd R 97 ............................................................................................................................ CA.61HA.80 Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 ............................................................................... CA.61HA.40 Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; 78 A Crim R 150 .................................................................................................. CLP.580 Shaw (2001) 121 A Crim R 25; [2001] NSWCCA 44 .............................................................................. CA.112.160 Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.2540 Shea (1856) 7 Cox CC 147 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 Shea (1988) 33 A Crim R 394 .................................................................................................... CA.23.60, CA.23.180 Sheard (1837) 7 Car & P 846; 173 ER 368 ................................................................................................... CA.27.80 Sheen (1827) 2 Car & P 634 ............................................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.156.180 Sheen (2007) 170 A Crim R 533; [2007] NSWCCA 45 ........................................................................... DMTA.6.20 Sheer Metalcraft Ltd [1954] 1 QB 586; [1954] 2 WLR 777; [1954] 1 All ER 542 ................................... CLP.1480 Sheldon (1680) 2 Strange 748 ...................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Shendley [1970] Crim LR 49 ............................................................ CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220 Shephard (1868) LT 19 ................................................................................................................................. CA.47.100 Shephard [1919] 2 KB 125; (1920) 14 Cr App R 26 .................................................................................... CA.26.40 Shepherd (1862) 9 Cox CC 123 ..................................................................................................................... CA.44.80 Shepherd (1862) Le & Ca 147; 169 ER 1340 ............................................................................................. CA.24.220 Shepherd (1868) LR 1 CCR 118 .................................................................................................................. CA.140.40 Shepherd (1987) 86 Cr App R 47; [1987] Crim. LR 686 ............................................................................. CLP.2620 Shepherd [2003] NSWCCA 351 ..................................................................................................................... CA.27.80 Sheppard (1810) Russ & Ry 169 .................................................................................................................. CA.250.60 Sheppard (1839) 9 Car & P 121 ............................................................................................. CA.117.360, CA.345.60 Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; (1980) 72 Cr App R 82 .............................................. CA.43A.120 Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; (1981) 72 Cr App R 82 ................................................. CA.44.100 Sheridan [1937] 1 KB 223 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.220 Sherlock (1866) LR 1 CCR 20 ..................................................................................................................... CA.58.200 Sherwood [1857] Dearsly & Bell 251 ........................................................................................................ CA.179.200 Shields [1967] VR 706 .............................................................................................................. CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Shields [1981] VR 717; 2 A Crim R 237 ..................................................................................................... CA.54.100 Shivpuri [1987] AC 1; [1986] 2 WLR 988; (1986) 83 Cr App R 178 .............................. CA.344A.100, CA.27.100 Shore (1992) 66 A Crim R 37 .................................................................................................................... CPA.154.60 Shukard (1811) Russ & Ry 200 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.80 Shumack (2008) 191 A Crim R 513; [2008] NSWCCA 311 ................................................................. CA.52AB.200 Silver [1956] 1 WLR 281; [1956] 1 All ER 716 ........................................................................................ SOA.15.40 Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 .......................................................................................................................... CA.179.80 Simmonds (1909) 2 Cr App R 303 ............................................................................................................. CA.179.300 Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685; [1967] 3 WLR 367; (1967) 51 Cr App R 316 ................................................ CLP.740 Simmonite (1843) 1 Cox CC 30 ................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 Simms (1995) 83 A Crim R 1 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Simonds (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 May 1991) .................................................................................... CA.310D.80 Simons (1773) 2 East PC 731 ....................................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Simpson (1854) Dears 421; 169 ER 788 .................................................................................. CA.94.100, CA.94.300 Simpson [1914] 1 KB 66 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Simpson [1983] 1 WLR 1494; [1983] 3 All ER 789; (1984) 78 Cr App R 115 ......................................... CA.4.200 Simpson (1992) 61 A Crim R 58 .................................................................................................................. SPA.44.20 Simpson (2001) 53 NSWLR 704; (2001) 126 A Crim R 525; [2001] NSWCCA 534 .............................. SPA.44.40
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Sims [1946] 1 KB 531; (1946) 31 Cr App R 158 ........................ CA.78A.100, CA.79.20, CA.83.120, CPA.21.180, CPA.21.360, CPA.21.400, CPA.154.60 R v Sims (1995) 83 A Crim R 1 .......................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 R v Simson (1664) Kelyng 31 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.140 R v Sinclair [1968] 1 WLR 1246; [1968] 3 All ER 241; (1968) 52 Cr App R 618 ........ CA.176A.80, CLP.80, CLP.740 R v Sinclair (1989) 44 A Crim R 449 ............................................................................................................... CA.319.140 R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20 ...................................................................................... CA.112.80 R v Singh (Pritam) [1958] 1 WLR 143; 1 All ER 199; (1957) 42 Cr App R 44 ........................................... CA.327.120 R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117 ................................................................................................................ CLP.2560 R v Skeet (1866) 4 F & F 931 ........................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 R v Skewes (1981) 7 A Crim R 276 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.760 R v Skipworth [2006] NSWCCA 37 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.520 R v Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166; [1967] 2 WLR 665; [1967] 1 All ER 483 ......... CA.94.100, CA.94.240, CA.117.200 R v Skuse (unreported CCA NSW 24 Oct 1996) ................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 R v Slack [1989] 1 QB 775; (1989) Cr App R 252 ................................................ CA.345.100, CA.345.140, CA.346.80 R v Slater [1922] SASR 494 .............................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 R v Slator (1881) 8 QBD 267 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.154.20 R v Slattery (1996) 90 A Crim R 519 .......................................................................................... CA.52A.20, CA.52A.240 R v Sloan (1988) 32 A Crim R 366 ............................................................................................. CPA.19.100, CPA.62.100 R v Sloane (1990) 49 A Crim R 270 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 R v Sloane (2001) 126 A Crim R 188; [2001] NSWCCA 421 .......................................................................... CA.60.200 R v Smale (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 August 1986) ................................................................................... CA.117.440 R v Smale (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 November 1987) ........................................................................... DMTA.25.80 R v Small (1837) 8 Car & P 46 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 R v Small (1991) 54 A Crim R 460 ................................................................................................................ DMTA.29.40 R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575; 72 A Crim R 462 .................. CPA.19.40, CPA.19.180, CPA.150.100, CPA.150.240 R v Smalley [1963] Qd R 508 ........................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265; (1982) 6 A Crim R 192 ...................................................................................... CPA.21.280 R v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App R 128 .................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 R v Smith (1820) Russ & Ry 417; 168 ER 874 ................................................................................................. CA.112.80 R v Smith (1827) 1 Mood CC 178; 168 ER 1232 .............................................................................................. CA.112.80 R v Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 173; 173 ER 448 .............................................................. CA.18.20, CA.27.80, CA.33.120 R v Smith (1838) 8 Car & P 153; 173 ER 438 .................................................................................................... CA.44.80 R v Smith (1845) 5 LTOS 393; 1 Cox CC 260 ...................................................................................................... CLP.560 R v Smith (1853) 6 Cox 314 ............................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 R v Smith (1855) Dears 561; 169 ER 845 ............................................................................................................ CA.4.260 R v Smith (1858) Dears & Bell 566 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 R v Smith (1862) 3 F & F 504 ............................................................................................................................ CA.250.60 R v Smith (1865) Le & Ca 607; 169 ER 1533 ..................................................................................................... CA.44.80 R v Smith (1866) 4 F & F 1066 .......................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 R v Smith (1875) 14 SCR (NSW) 195 ................................................................................................................ CPA.21.20 R v Smith (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 419 ................................................................... CA.546C.100, CA.58.200, CA.60.120 R v Smith (1878) 1 SCR NS (NSW) 71 ............................................................................................................... CA.4.260 R v Smith (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 162 ..................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 R v Smith (1898) 62 JP 231 .................................................................................................................................. CA.4.260 R v Smith [1918] 2 KB 415; (1918) 13 Cr App R 157 ................................................................................... CA.188.240 R v Smith [1924] 2 KB 194; (1924) 18 Cr App R 76 ............................................................. CA.178A.180, CA.168.100 R v Smith [1925] 1 KB 603 ................................................................................................................................. CA.432.20 R v Smith (1931) 22 Cr App R 180 .................................................................................................................. CA.179.300 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193 ......... CA.19A.300, CLP.440, CLP.500, CLP.540 R v Smith [1963] 1 WLR 1200; 3 All ER 597 ................................................................................................. CA.345.100 R v Smith [1973] 2 WLR 942; [1973] 2 All ER 896; (1973) 57 Cr App R 666 ............................................ CA.188.180 R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376 ........................................................................................................................... CA.83.100 R v Smith [1974] QB 354; [1974] 2 WLR 20; [1974] 1 All ER 632 ............................................ CA.195.80, CA.417.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Smith [1982] 1 NSWLR 1 .............................................................................................................. CA.5.80, CA.5.200 Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 569 ..................................................................................................................... CA.442A.20 Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 608 ............................................................................... CPA.34.20, CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 Smith (1982) 7 A Crim R 437 ...................................................................................... CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 Smith (1986) 4 NSWLR 689; (1986) 19 A Crim R 404 ............................................................................. CA.444.40 Smith (1986) 7 NSWLR 444; 23 A Crim R 266 ................................................................... CA.94.100, CA.117.440 Smith (1990) 47 A Crim R 43 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.20 Smith [1995] 1 VR 10; (1994) 73 A Crim R 384 .......................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.159.20, CPA.214.40 Smith (2000) 114 A Crim R 8 ................................................................................................................. CA.178A.240 Smith [2001] 1 AC 146; [2000] 3 WLR 654; [2000] 4 All ER 289 ............................................................ CA.23.20 Smith (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 September 1990) ............................................................................... CA.208.20 Smith (unreported CCA NSW 20 December 1990) ......................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Smith (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1; 80 A Crim R 491 .................................................................................... CLP.2640 Smith 169 ER 818; (1855) Dears 494 ........................................................................................................ CA.188.160 Smithers (1977) 75 DLR (3d) 321 ............................................................................................................. CA.19A.360 Smyth (1882) 8 VLR (L) 141 ..................................................................................................................... CA.327.220 Smyth [1963] VR 737 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.5.160 Smythies (1849) 1 Den 498 .......................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Snell (1837) 2 Mood and R 44 ....................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Snelling (1942) 28 Cr App R 117 .............................................................................................................. CA.188.180 Soares (1802) Russ & Ry 25 ........................................................................................................................ CA.345.80 Sobolewski (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 April 1998) ................................................................................. CA.7.100 Solomon [1959] Qd R 123 ............................................................................................................................ CA.351.60 Solomon [1980] 1 NSWLR 321; (1979) 1 A Crim R 247 ................................ CA.19A.500, CA.428I.60, CA.5.140 Solomons (1890) 27 Cox CC 93 ................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 Solomons [1909] 2 KB 980; (1909) 2 Cr App R 288 ........................................................... CA.155.40, CA.158.140 Solway [1984] 2 Qd R 75; 11 A Crim R 449 ................................................................................ CA.7.80, CA.7.120 Somers [1963] 1 WLR 1306; [1963] 3 All ER 808; (1964) 48 Cr App R 11 ......................................... CA.52A.180 Sorby [1986] VR 753; (1986) 21 A Crim R 64 .............................................................................................. CLP.760 Sorlie (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 532; 42 WN (NSW) 152 ............................................................................... CA.61L.80 Sossi [1986] WAR 163; (1985) 17 A Crim R 405 ..................................................................................... CA.327.120 Souter (1997) 93 A Crim R 400 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.180 Southammavong [2003] NSWCCA 312 ........................................................................................................... CLP.360 Southwood (1858) 1 F & F 356 ................................................................................................................. CA.327.160 Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178; 88 A Crim R 194 ........................................................................................... CPA.34.20 Sparks [1964] AC 964 ...................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.380 Spartels [1953] VLR 194 ........................... CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100, CA.43.140, CA.423.80 Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 .......................................................................... CA.19A.20, CA.19A.80, CA.19A.540 Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 .......................................................................... CA.86.160, CA.86.180, CA.86.220 Speer (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 December 1990) .............................................................................. CA.52A.240 Spencer (1783) 2 East PC 712 ...................................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Spencer (1815) Russ & Ry 299 .................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Spencer (1863) 3 Fos & Fin 854 ............................................................................................................... CA.546C.60 Spencer (1873) 4 AJR 29 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.19.40 Sperling (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 August 1992) .......................................................................... CA.178BA.140 Sperling (unreported, NSWCCA, 13 August 1992) ................................................................................. CA.192E.140 Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223 ......................... CA.61HA.80, CA.61HA.100, CPA.21.160 Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189 ..................................................................................................................... CA.83.80 Spiero (1979) 22 SASR 543 ........................................................................................................................ CA.428I.60 Spratling [1911] 1 KB 77 .............................................................................................................................. CA.441.20 Spratt (1990) 91 Cr App 362 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.140 Spriggs (1834) 1 Mood & R 357; 174 ER 122 ........................................................................................... CA.112.80 Spriggs [1958] 1 QB 270; (1958) 42 Cr App R 69 .................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Springfield (1969) 53 Cr App R 608 .......................................................................................................... CPA.162.40
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Squire (1818) Russ & Ry 349 ...................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 St George (1840) 9 C & P 483; 173 ER 921 ........................................................................... CA.61.120, CA.61.140 Stacey (1985) 20 A Crim R 45 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.240 Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 ................................................................................................. CA.33.160, CA.117.440 Stainer (1870) LR 1 CCR 230 ...................................................................................................................... CA.157.60 Staines (1974) 60 Cr App R 160 .................................................................................. CA.192E.120, CA.178BA.120 Stally [1960] 1 WLR 79; [1959] 3 All ER 814; (1959) 44 Cr App R 5 .................................................... CA.345.80 Standley (1816) Russ & Ry 305 ................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 Stanhope (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10.9.87) ...................................................................................... CA.178BA.120 Stanhope (unreported, NSWCCA, 10 September 1987) ......................................................................... CA.192E.160 Stanley (1903) 23 NZLR 1100 .................................................................................................................. CA.78A.100 Stanley [2003] NSWCCA 233 ...................................................................................................................... CA.97.240 Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995) ......................................................................... CA.4.160, CA.61.240 Stanton (1851) 5 Cox CC 324 .................................................................................................................. CPA.156.100 Stanton 174 ER 872; (1844) 1 Car & K 415 ........................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Starecki [1960] VR 141 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.1140 Starkie [1922] 2 KB 275; (1922) 16 Cr App R 61 ................................................................ CA.83.120, CA.179.300 Steane [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813; (1948) 32 Cr App R 61 ....................................................... CLP.2540 Steeden (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 August 1994) ....................................................... CPA.150.100, CPA.150.120 Steel (1910) 5 Cr App R 289 ................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 Steele (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 167 ........................................................................................ CA.189A.20, CA.117.320 Steels (1867) 11 Cox CC 5 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 Steer [1988] AC 111; [1987] 3 WLR 205; [1987] 2 All ER 833 ............................................................. CA.196.120 Steff (1997) 96 A Crim R 1 ....................................................................................................................... CA.310D.80 Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633; 67 A Crim R 506 .............................................................. CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160 Stellino (1966) 85 WN .................................................................................................................................... CA.23.60 Stephens (1839) 3 State Trials (NS) 1189 ................................................................................................. CA.545C.60 Stephens (1888) 16 Cox CC 387 .................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Stephens (1910) 4 Cr App R 52 ............................................................................................ CA.117.320, CA.117.360 Stephenson [1979] QB 695 ............................................................................................................................ CA.4A.40 Stephenson [2010] NSWSC 779 ................................................................................................................. SPA.10.100 Sterling (1773) 1 Leach 99 ........................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Sterling [1981] 2 NSLWR 920 ................................................................................................................ CA.185A.200 Sterne (1787) 1 Leach 473; 168 ER 338 ................................................................................................... CA.345.180 Stevens (1844) 3 LTOS 22 .......................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Stevens (1991) 23 NSWLR 75; (1991) 53 A Crim R 228 .................................................................... DMTA.25.200 Stevens [2004] QCA 99 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.2260 Stevens (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994) ............................................................................. CA.61L.100 Stevenson [1907] VLR 475 ........................................................................................................................ CA.249B.40 Stewart (1818) Russ & Ry 363 ..................................................................................................................... CA.345.60 Stewart (1845) 1 Cox CC 174 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Stewart (1876) 13 Cox CC 296 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Stewart (1886) 12 VLR 567 .................................................................................. CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220 Stewart (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 33 ..................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.460 Stewart [1929] SASR 500 ............................................................................................................................. CA.94.320 Stewart (1932) 97 JP Jo 137 ....................................................................................................................... CA.114.100 Stewart (1959) 44 Cr App R 29 ........................................................................... CA.545D.100, CA.47.80, CA.55.80 Stewart [1995] 3 All ER 159 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Stewart (1995) 4 All ER 999; [1996] 1 Cr App R 229 ................................................................................. CA.23.60 Stewart (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 December 1992) ............................................................................. CA.310D.80 Stimpson (1863) 4 Best and Smith 301 ....................................................................................................... CA.512.80 Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 ..... CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.23.140, CA.23.160 R v Stocker (1695) 5 Mod Rep 137 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Stoddart (1909) 2 Cr App R 217 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.320 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 .......... CA.4A.40, CA.33A.100, CA.41A.100, CA.43A.120, CA.428I.40, CA.5.120, CA.5.140, CA.5.200, CA.24.160, CA.33.40, CA.33.120, CA.33.200, CA.35.100, CA.38.100, CA.41.100, CA.45.120, CA.117.200, CA.423.140, CLP.40, CLP.1360, CLP.1400 R v Stolady (1859) 1 F & F 518 ....................................................................................................................... CA.327.180 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) ...... CA.192F.180, CA.192G.120, CA.192G.140, CA.178BB.120 R v Stone (1858) 1 Fos & Fin 311 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 R v Stone (1911) 6 Cr App R 89 ...................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 R v Stone (1965) 84 WN ....................................................................................................................................... CA.23.60 R v Stone [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 WLR 169; (1977) 64 Cr App R 186 ............... CA.19A.180, CA.24.220, CA.44.80 R v Stone [1981] VR 737 .............................................................................................................. CA.316.80, CA.347.100 R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218 ..................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 R v Stone (1995) 85 A Crim R 436 ..................................................................................................................... SPA.44.20 R v Stone (2005) 64 NSWLR 413; (2005) 157 A Crim R 41; [2005] NSWCCA 344 ................................. CPA.156.220 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465 ................... CA.4A.40, CA.19A.520, CA.428I.60, CA.5.160, CLP.1180 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN 465 ............................................................................................... CA.4A.40 R v Stopford (1870) 11 Cox CC 643 .................................................................................................................. CA.33.120 R v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364; 52 ALJR 737 .................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.200 R v Storey (1985) 19 A Crim R 275 .............................................................................. CA.5.140, CA.5.200, CPA.162.40 R v Storn (1865) 5 SCR (NSW) 26 ..................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 R v Story (1805) Russell & Ryan 81 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645; (1997) 94 A Crim R 525 ...................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.380 R v Strahan, Paul and Bates (1855) 7 Cox CC 85 ........................................................................................... CPA.154.40 R v Strang (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 December 1990) ............................................................................. CA.423.140 R v Street (1888) 3 QLJ 88 ................................................................................................................................... CLP.1520 R v Street [1960] VR 669 ............................................................................................................................... CA.178C.140 R v Stringer [1933] 1 KB 704; (1933) 24 Cr App R 30 ...................................................................................... CA.24.40 R v Stringer (2000) 116 A Crim R 198; [2000] NSWCCA 293 ........ CA.61L.100, CA.61N.80, CPA.19.180, CPA.21.20 R v Stuart [1894] 1 QB 310 ................................................................................................................................. CA.155.40 R v Stuart [1973] Qd R 460 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 R v Stuart (1990) 47 A Crim R 293 ................................................................................................................. CA.310D.80 R v Studer (1915) 11 Cr App R 307 ..................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 R v Subramaniam [2002] NSWCCA 372 .......................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 R v Sugar [1914] 3 KB 1112 ............................................................................................................................. CA.179.200 R v Sugarman (1935) 25 Cr App R 109 .............................................................................................................. CPA.36.20 R v Sullivan (1841) Car & M 209; 174 ER 475 ................................................................................................ CA.46.100 R v Sullivan [1971] 1 QB 253 ........................................................................................................................... CPA.150.20 R v Sullivan (1981) 6 A Crim R 259 ......................................................................... CA.428I.40, CA.34.20, CPA.162.20 R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 ...... CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.1080, CLP.1120 R v Sultana (1994) 74 A Crim R 27 ..................................................................................... DMTA.25.200, LEPRA.14.20 R v Summers (1972) 56 Cr App R 604 ............................................................................................................ CA.93C.100 R v Summers (1986) 22 A Crim R 47 ........................................................................ CA.428I.40, CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 R v Summerskill (1918) 13 Cr App R 170 ................................................................................. CA.179.260, CA.179.300 R v Sumner [1935] VLR 197 ............................................................................................................................. CA.327.200 R v Sunda Khan (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 29 ...................................................................................................... CA.327.200 R v Supple (1870) 1 VR (L) 151 ............................................................................. CA.19A.140, CA.19A.520, CLP.1400 R v Surridge (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 278; 59 WN (NSW) 221 ...................................................... CA.345.80, CA.345.100 R v Susak [1999] NTSC 61; 105 A Crim R 592 .................................................................... CA.344A.60, CA.344A.120 R v Suter and Coulson (1867) 17 LT 177 ......................................................................................................... CA.179.200 R v Sutton (1877) 13 Cox CC 648 ...................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 R v Sutton [1966] 1 WLR 236; 1 All ER 571 .................................................................................................. CA.117.160 R v Sutton (2004) 41 MVR 40; [2004] NSWCCA 225 ...................................................................................... SPA.22.20 R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553; 8 A Crim R 276 .................................................................................... CLP.580
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Sweet [1972] QWN 28 ..................................................................................................................................... CLP.120 Swift (1877) Knox 325 ............................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Swift (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 April 1991) ................................................................. CA.52A.240, SPA.10.100 Swindall 175 ER 95; (1846) 2 Car & K 230 ...................................................................... CA.19A.160, CA.345.100 Swingler [1996] 1 VR 257; 80 A Crim R 471 ..................................................................... CPA.19.160, CPA.113.40 Sydenham (1863) 2 W & W (L) 16 ............................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Symondson (1896) 60 JP 645 ......................................................................................................................... CA.18.20 Szabo [2001] 2 Qd R 214; (2000) 112 A Crim R 215 ................................................................................ CPA.36.20 T (1985) 38 SASR 428 ................................................................................................................................. CPA.21.20 T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29 .................................................................................................... CA.66A.120, CA.78A.160 T [1997] 1 Qd R 623; (1996) 91 A Crim R 152 ........................................................................ CA.19A.500, CLP.80 TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191 ............................. CA.38.120, CA.61HA.80 TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 ............................................................................................................................ CLP.1900 TJ (2009) 76 NSWLR 167; 197 A Crim R 508 .............. CA.Pt3.Div10.300, CA.Pt3.Div10.620, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209; [2001] NSWCCA 127 ............................................................................. CPA.21.400 TJK (unreported CCA NSW 6 Oct 1992) ........................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Taber (2002) 56 NSWLR 443; (2002) 136 A Crim R 478; [2002] NSWSC 1239 ............. CA.19A.180, CA.195.80 Tacey (1821) Russ & Ry 452; 168 ER 893 ............................................................................................... CA.195.100 Taffs [1991] 1 NZLR 69 ............................................................................................................................. CA.319.140 Tahau [1975] 1 NSWLR 479 .......................................................................................................................... CA.4.120 Taib [1999] 2 Qd R 649; (1998) 105 A Crim R 10 ...................................................................................... CLP.1480 Tait [1973] VR 151 .................................................................................................................... CA.19A.140, CLP.160 Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.156.20 Tait [1990] 1 QB 290; [1989] 3 WLR 891; [1990] 3 All ER 682 ................................................................ CA.26.40 Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 ...................... CA.19A.180, CA.24.120, CA.24.180, CA.24.200, CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.44.80 Talia [1996] 1 VR 462; 82 A Crim R 373 ................................................................................................. CPA.154.20 Tamcelik; Ex parte Ozcan [1998] 1 Qd R 330 ................................................ CA.39.100, CA.196.120, CA.199.120 Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350; [1989] 1 All ER 267 ........................................................................................ CA.23A.60 Tang (2000) 113 A Crim R 393 ...................................................................................................................... CA.7.140 Tangye (1997) 92 A Crim R 545 ................................................................... CA.19A.200, CA.345.160, CPA.159.20 Tankard [1894] 1 QB 548 ......................................................................................................... CA.157.60, CA.162.40 Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303; 32 A Crim R 301 ......................................................................................... CLP.80 Taouk [1982] 2 NSWLR 974; 8 A Crim R 349 ..................................................................................... DMTA.23.180 Taouk (1992) 65 A Crim R 387 ........................................................................................... CA.66B.140, CA.319.160 Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69 .................................................................................................................. CPA.281.20 Tasker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 467 .............................................................................................................. BA.16A.40 Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; (2007) 168 A Crim R 95; [2007] HCA 11 ........................................ CA.19A.200 Tawill [1974] VR 84; (1973) 22 FLR 284 ............................................................................... CA.43.80, CA.316.200 Taylor (1803) 2 Leach 974 ............................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 Taylor (1820) Russ & Ry 418; 168 ER 875 ................................................................................................ CA.148.80 Taylor (1843) 1 Car & Kir 213 .................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Taylor (1859) 1 F & F 511 ............................................................................................................................. CA.99.60 Taylor (1870) 1 VR (L) 84 ...................................................................................................... CA.172.40, CA.172.100 Taylor (1875) LR 2 CCR 147 ....................................................................................................................... CA.346.80 Taylor (1883) 15 Cox CC 268 .................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Taylor (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 43 ................................................................................................................ CA.131.120 Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12 ........ CA.94.300, CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CA.117.140 Taylor (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 81 ............................................................ CA.9.60, CA.10.40, CA.33.180, CA.425.20 Taylor [1968] NZLR 981 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.150.20 Taylor [1969] Tas SR 1 ................................................................................................................................ CA.22A.40 Taylor [1973] AC 964 ...................................................................................... CA.93C.80, CA.93C.100, CA.93C.140 Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358 .......................................................... CA.24.220, CA.24.240, CA.44.100, CA.54.100
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TABLE OF CASES
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Taylor [1992] 1 All ER 299 .......................................................................................................................... CA.61.100 Taylor [2000] NSWCCA 442 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.360 Taylor (2002) 129 A Crim R 146 ................................................................................................................. CA.423.40 Teague (1802) 2 East PC 979 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Telford Justices; Ex parte Badhan [1991] 2 All ER 854 ........................................................................... CPA.19.100 Templeton [1956] VLR 709 ..................................................................................................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Teng and Sing (1987) 30 A Crim R 203 ...................................................................................................... CPA.30.20 Teremoana (1990) 54 SASR 30; (1990) 49 A Crim R 207 ....................................................................... CA.198.100 Terry [1955] VLR 114 ................................................................................................................................... CA.61.320 Terry [1961] 2 QB 314; (1961) 45 Cr App R 180 ...................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Terry [1964] VR 248 ....................................................................................................................................... CA.23.80 Tevendale [1955] VLR 95 ........................................................................................................................... CA.347.100 Thallman 169 ER 1416; (1863) Le & Ca 326; 9 Cox CC 388 ....................................................................... CA.8.20 Thatcher (1985) 37 SASR 597 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Thatcher [1987] 1 SCR 652; (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 ........................................................................... CA.19A.160 The County Court Judge [1905] 2 IR 510 ............................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Theodoulou [1963] Crim LR 573 ..................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Thiele [1928] SASR 361 ........................................................................................................... CA.428I.60, CLP.1180 Thind [1999] Crim LR 842 ........................................................................... CA.93B.120, CA.93C.100, CA.93C.140 Thomas (1827) Car CL 295 .......................................................................................................................... CA.148.80 Thomas (1841) 9 Car & P 741 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.160 Thomas (1853) 6 Cox CC 403 ..................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Thomas (1863) Leigh & Cave 313 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.260 Thomas (1931) 23 Cr App R 21 ............................................................................................ CA.178C.40, CA.179.80 Thomas [1950] 1 KB 26 .............................................................................. CPA.156.20, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.240 Thomas (1953) 37 Cr App R 169 ......................................................................................... CA.117.140, CA.117.400 Thomas [1957] 1 WLR 747; [1957] 2 All ER 181 ..................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Thomas [1964] VR 607 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.156.100 Thomas [1979] QB 326; [1979] 2 WLR 144; [1979] 1 All ER 577 ........................................................ CA.319.140 Thomas (1981) 6 A Crim R 66 ....................................................................................................................... CA.7.120 Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App R 331 ................................................................................................................. CA.61.120 Thomas [1985] QB 604; [1984] 3 WLR 321; 3 All ER 34 ............................................. CPA.156.160, CPA.156.220 Thomas (1992) 65 A Crim R 269 ................................................................................................................. CA.423.80 Thomas (1993) 67 A Crim R 308 ....................................................................................... DMTA.6.20, DMTA.24.80 Thomas [2007] NSWCCA 269 ..................................................................................................................... CA.96.100 Thomas (unreported, CCA (NSW), 28 May 1996) .................................................................................. DMTA.29.40 Thompson (1825) 1 Mood CC 78; 168 ER 1192 ............................................... CA.94.100, CA.94.300, CA.117.140 Thompson (1869) 21 LT 397 ...................................................................................................................... CA.114.100 Thompson (1910) 5 Cr App R 9 .............................................................................................................. CA.178C.140 Thompson [1914] 2 KB 99; (1913) 9 Cr App R 252 ............................................................. CA.78A.20, CA.117.20 Thompson [1918] AC 221(HL) ................................................................................................................... CPA.154.60 Thompson (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 250; 42 WN (NSW) 71 .......................................................................... CPA.21.20 Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151 ........................................................................ CA.117.20 Thompson [1976] 2 NSWLR 453 ............................................................................................................. CA.52AA.40 Thompson [1980] Crim LR 188 ............................................................................................................... CPA.154.120 Thompson [1984] 1 WLR 962 .............................................................................................................. CA.178BA.120 Thompson [1984] 1 WLR 962; [1984] 3 All ER 565; (1984) 79 Cr App R 191 .................................. CA.192E.120 Thompson (1988) 36 A Crim R 223 ..................................................................................... CA.19A.540, CA.23A.60 Thompson (1992) 58 A Crim R 451 ........................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Thompson (1998) 104 A Crim R 510 ........................................................................................................... SPA.70.20 Thompson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 May 1986) ............................................................................... CA.310D.80 Thompson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 June 1976) .............................................................................. CPA.154.120 Thomson (1966) 50 Cr App R 1 ...................................................................................... CLP.720, CLP.740, CLP.760 Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; 115 A Crim R 104 ........................................................ CPA.154.300, SPA.22.20
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TABLE OF CASES
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Thomson (2002) 134 A Crim R 252; [2002] NSWCCA 400 .................................................................... CPA.21.200 Thorland (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 412; 1 WN 78 ....................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.182.20 Thorne (1977) 66 Cr App R 6 .................................................................................................................... CPA.21.140 Thornley (1981) 72 Cr App R 302 .......................................................................................................... LEPRA.10.60 Thornton [1964] 2 QB 176; (1962) 47 Cr App R 1 .......................................................... CA.178C.100, CA.185.100 Thornton (No 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1174; [1996] 2 All ER 1023; [1996] 2 Cr App R 108 .......................... CA.23.180 Thorpe (1858) Dears & Bell 562 .................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 Thorpe [1972] 1 WLR 342; [1972] 1 All ER 929; (1972) 56 Cr App R 293 ......................................... CA.52A.200 Thorpe (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 719; [1999] VSCA 172 ......................... CA.23.60, CA.23.140, CA.23.160, CA.23.200 Threlfall (1914) 10 Cr App R 112 .............................................................................................................. CA.327.200 Thurborn (1849) 1 Denison 387; 2 Car & K 831 ................................................................ CA.117.320, CA.117.420 Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98 .............................................................................................. CA.19A.80, CA.19A.540 Tideswell [1905] 2 KB 273 ............................................................................... CA.117.20, CA.117.160, CA.156.120 Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114 ........................................................................ CA.33.180, CA.97.220, CA.98.220 Tikomaimaleya [2015] NSWCA 83 ............................................................................................................. BA.16A.40 Tikos (No 1) [1963] VR 285 ........................................................................................................................ CA.83.100 Tikos (No 1) [1963] VR 285 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.2260 Tillett; Ex parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101 ..................................... LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.40, LEPRA.99.80 Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 ............................................................................... CA.19A.540, CA.115.20, CLP.580 Tillott (1995) 83 A Crim R 151 .................................................................................................................. CA.345.160 Timmins [1913] QWN 44 ........................................................................................................................... CA.546C.60 Timperon (No 2) (1976) 15 SASR 1 ............................................................................................................ CA.181.40 Tindall (1994) 74 A Crim R 275 .................................................................................................................. CA.432.20 Tindall (2002) 133 A Crim R 119; [2002] NSWCCA 364 ........................................................................... SPA.11.20 Tindall & Gunton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 July 1994) ...................................................................... CPA.19.40 Tite (1861) Le & Ca 29 ................................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 Titley (1880) 14 Cox CC 502 ......................................................................................................................... CA.84.80 Tobin [1978] 1 NZLR 423 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.1100 Todd [1957] SASR 305 ............................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Todd [1976] Qd R 21; (1977) 6 A Crim R 105 ............................................................................................. CA.7.120 Todd and Trussler (1844) 2 LTOS 378 ......................................................................................................... CA.250.60 Toksoz [2015] NSWSC 1234 ....................................................................................................................... BA.16A.40 Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293 ........................................... CA.4A.40, CA.61HA.100, CLP.1300 Tolmie (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 December 1994) ................................... CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.19.180 Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 ........................................................................................ CLP.1040, CLP.1260, CLP.1300 Tomes [1917] VLR 78 .................................................................................................................................. CA.66A.80 Tomlin [1954] 2 QB 274; (1954) 38 Cr App R 82 .................................................................. CA.161.20, CA.161.40 Tomlinson [1895] 1 QB 706 ........................................................................................................................... CA.99.60 Toney [1993] 1 WLR 364; [1993] 2 All ER 409; (1993) 97 Cr App R 176 ........................................... CA.319.140 Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 ................................................................................................................................. CA.345.100 Tonks [1963] VR 121 ................................................................................ CPA.154.100, CPA.154.160, CPA.156.220 Toohey (1973–76) 3 Petty Sessions Review 1337 ............................................... CA.86.160, CA.86.220, CA.86.240 Torr [1966] 1 WLR 52; [1966] 1 All ER 178; (1965) 50 Cr App R 73 .................................................. CA.178C.60 Tortell [2007] NSWCCA 313 ........................................................................................................................ CA.95.120 Tortomano [1981] VR 31 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.66.40 Toshack (1849) 1 Den 492 ............................................................................................................................ CA.250.60 Tout (1987) 11 NSWLR 251; (1987) 32 A Crim R 358 ..................................................... CA.61J.140, CA.61K.100 Towers (1874) 12 Cox CC 530 .................................................................................................................. CA.19A.320 Towle (1816) Russ & Ry 314 ....................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Towle (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 338 .............................................................................................................. CPA.21.340 Townley (1871) LR 1 CCR 315 ............................................................................................ CA.117.260, CA.117.280 Townley (1986) 24 A Crim R 76 ................................................................................................................ CA.327.200 Townsend (1841) Carrington & Marshman 178 ............................................................................................ CLP.1460 Townsend (1874) 8 SALR 72 .................................................................................................................... CA.19A.100
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Townshend (1884) 15 Cox CC 466 ................................................................................................................ CA.4.240 Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473; 27 A Crim R 271 ................ CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.200, CA.327.40, CA.327.160 Trainor [2003] VSCA 200 ................................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.180 Tralka [1965] Qd R 225 .................................................................................................................................... CLP.120 Tranby (1991) 52 A Crim R 228 .................................................................................................................... CA.4.160 Treadgold (1878) 14 Cox CC 220 ................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 Trebilcock (1858) Dearsly & Bell 453 ......................................................................................................... CA.118.20 Treble (1810) 2 Taunt 328 ............................................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Treeve (1796) 2 East PC 821 .......................................................................................................................... CA.44.80 Trim [1943] VLR 109 ................................................................................................................................... CA.83.100 Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451; 49 WN (NSW) 157 ................................................ CA.19A.120, CA.19A.600 Trindall [2005] NSWCCA 446 ..................................................................................................................... CA.94.360 Tripodi [1961] VR 186 ..................................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Tripodina (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 .............................................................................................................. CPA.36.20 Trotter (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 ......................................................................................................................... CPA.21.20 Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428; 68 A Crim R 536 ................................................................... CA.23A.60, CLP.1140 Trotter [1999] NSWCCA 90 ................................................................................................... CA.7.140, DMTA.29.40 Trudgeon (1988) 39 A Crim R 252 .................................................... CLP.660, CLP.740, DMTA.3.80, DMTA.26.60 True (1922) 16 Cr App R 164 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.1120 Trusty (1783) 1 East PC 418 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.240 Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 .... CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.280, CLP.320, CLP.340, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1160 Tucker (1824) 3 B & C 544; 107 ER 835 ................................................................................................. CPA.156.40 Tucker (1826) 1 Moody 134; 168 ER 1214 ................................................................................................. CA.31.100 Tucker (1844) 1 Cox CC 73 ......................................................................................................................... CA.112.80 Tucker (1984) 36 SASR 135; 13 A Crim R 447 ................................................ CA.428I.60, CA.94.160, CA.94.240 Tucker (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 November 1991) ............................................................................ DMTA.29.40 Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872; [2000] 2 Cr App R 361 .................................................................................. CLP.1860 Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 ...................................................... CA.23A.60, CA.23.60, CA.23.80, CLP.1140 Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70 ......... CLP.40, CLP.1260, CLP.1280, CLP.1340, CLP.1380, CLP.1480 Turnbull [1977] QB 224; [1976] 3 WLR 445; [1976] 3 All ER 549 .............................. CPA.150.120, CPA.150.180 Turner (1832) 1 Mood 347 ......................................................................................................................... CA.188.100 Turner (1839) 8 Car & P 755 ......................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Turner (1849) 3 Cox CC 304 ........................................................................................................................ CA.97.120 Turner (1870) 11 Cox CC 551 ...................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Turner (1917) 34 WN (NSW) 106 .............................................................................................................. CA.117.460 Turner [1962] VR 30 ..................................................................................................................................... CA.24.120 Turner [1980] 1 NSWLR 19 ..................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163; 113 A Crim R 160; [2000] SASC 27 .............................................................. CLP.580 Turrall [1968] NZLR 312 .......................................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Turvey [1946] 2 All ER 60 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.340 Tuttle (1929) 45 TLR 357; 21 Cr App R 85 ................................................................................................ CA.136.40 Tween [1965] VR 687 .................................................................................................................. CA.545D.80, CLP.80 Twiss [1918] 2 KB 853; (1919) 13 Cr App R 177 ...................................................................................... CA.83.120 Twist [1954] VLR 121 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.150.140 Twose (1879) 14 Cox CC 327 .................................................................................................. CA.117.200, CLP.1480 Tyler (1835) 1 Moody Cr C 428; 168 ER 1330 .......................................................................................... CA.31.100 Tyler (1838) 173 ER 643; (1838) 8 Car & P 616 ....................................................................................... CA.345.80 Tyler (1993) 96 Cr App R 332 ..................................................................................................................... CA.93B.60 Tyree (1869) LR 1 CCR 177 ........................................................................................................................ CA.155.40 Tyrone County Justices (1905) 40 Ir LT 181 ............................................................................................. CPA.156.40 Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710 ............................................................................................................... CA.345.80, CLP.560 Tyson (1867) LR 1 CCR 107 ...................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 Udechuku (1981) 3 A Crim R 343 ........................................................................................................... CPA.156.140
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Udod [1951] SASR 176 ................................................................................................................................ CA.576.20 Uhrig (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 October 1996) ............................................................ CPA.293.40, CPA.293.60 Ulman-Naruniec (2003) 143 A Crim R 531 ............................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Umanski [1961] VR 242 ............................................................................................................................ CA.78A.100 VCH (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 September 1992) ............................................................................... CPA.293.40 VHP (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 July 1997) ........................................................................ CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 VPH (unreported, CCA (NSW), 4 March 1994) ........................................................................................ CPA.19.180 Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim R 238 .................................................................................................................... CPA.21.180 Valence (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 138; (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 137 .......................................... CA.61L.80, CA.61L.100 Valentine (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 113 .............................................................................................................. CLP.180 Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 23 ................................................................................................................. CA.94.180 Vallett [1951] 1 All ER 231; (1950) 34 Cr App R 251 ............................................................................... SPA.10.80 Vamplew (1862) 3 Fos & Fin 520; 176 ER 234 ............................................................................................. CLP.560 Van (2002) 129 A Crim R 229 .................................................................................................................. CPA.154.220 Van Bao Nguyen (2002) 130 A Crim R 447; [2002] NTSC 38 ........................................................... LEPRA.99.180 Van Bay Che (1988) 50 SASR 1 ................................................................................................................ CPA.19.160 Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.580 Van Den Bemd (1994) 179 CLR 137; 70 A Crim R 494 ................................... CA.19A.360, CLP.120, CPA.156.40 Van Jager (1992) 59 A Crim R 124 .......................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 Van Nam Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 183 ................................................................................................... SPA.10.100 Van Thanh Huynh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 May 1996) ............................................................... DMTA.25.200 Vanderstein, Harris and Somerville (1865) 10 Cox CC 177 ....................................................................... CA.345.80 Vandine [1970] 1 NSWR 252 ..................................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Vanecek (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 72 ................................................................................................................... CA.3.20 Varley [1973] 2 NSWLR 427 .................................................................................................................... CA.19A.100 Varley [1982] 2 All ER 519 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.21.120 Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 .................................................................................................................. CA.7.140 Velardi (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 May 1996) ................................................................................... DMTA.25.80 Venables (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 612; 25 WN 190 .................................................................. CA.117.420, CA.126.200 Venna [1976] QB 421 ................................................................................................................................... CA.61.140 Verelst (1813) 3 Campbell 432 ....................................................................................................................... CLP.1460 Verma (1987) 30 A Crim R 441 .......................... CPA.21.220, CPA.21.300, CPA.21.360, CPA.21.380, CPA.21.400 Vernell [1953] VLR 590 ................................................................................................................................ CPA.34.20 Vibert [1985] 1 NSWLR 518 ..................................................................................................................... CA.185A.60 Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] 3 WLR 326; [1957] 2 All ER 741 .............. CA.19A.140, CA.19A.520, CLP.160 Villa [2005] NSWCCA 4 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.281.20 Villar [2004] NSWCCA 302 ................................................................................................... CA.86.180, CPA.293.40 Villensky [1892] 2 QB 597 ......................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Vincent (1839) 9 Car & P 91 ..................................................................................................................... CA.545C.60 Vinh Ngoc Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; (2001) 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 ................... CPA.160.20 Viola [1982] 3 All ER 73 ............................................................................................................................ CPA.293.40 Visser (unreported, CCA (NSW), 29 July 1994) ...................................................................................... CPA.150.120 Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360 ................................................................................. CA.319.80, CA.319.120, CA.319.140 Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498; 22 A Crim R 10 ........................................................................................ CPA.19.160 W (1993) 32 NSWLR 348; (1993) 70 A Crim R 517 .................................................................................. CLP.1320 W (1993) 32 NSWLR 348; 70 A Crim R 517 ....................................................................................... DMTA.23.160 W [1998] 2 Qd R 531; (1997) 101 A Crim R 453 .................................................................................... CPA.159.20 WRC (2003) 59 NSWLR 273; 143 A Crim R 503; [2003] NSWCCA 394 ....................... CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160 Wade (1844) 1 Car & Kir 739 .................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Wade (1869) 11 Cox CC 549 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Waganeen (1989) 38 A Crim R 187 ........................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Wagner (No 2) (1993) 68 A Crim R 81 ..................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Waite [1892] 2 QB 600 ........................................................................................................... CA.61I.60, CA.78A.140 Wakeman (1912) 8 Cr App R 18 ................................................................................................................ CA.125.100
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TABLE OF CASES
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Wald (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25 .................................................................................................................... CA.83.100 Walden (1986) 19 A Crim R 444 .............................................................................................. CA.423.40, CA.423.60 Walden (1986) 41 SASR 421; 23 A Crim R 242 ....................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Walkden (1845) 1 Cox CC 282 .................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Walker (1843) 2 M & Rob 446; 174 ER 345 ........................................... CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.220 Walker (1858) 8 Cox CC 1 ........................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 Walker (1934) 24 Cr App R 117 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.220 Walker (1978) 19 SASR 532 ........................................................................................................................ CA.112.80 Walker (1994) 35 NSWLR 384; (1994) 77 A Crim R 236 ........................................................................... CLP.1360 Walkington [1979] 1 WLR 1169; [1979] 2 ER 716; (1979) 68 Cr App R 427 ......................................... CA.112.80 Walkley (1829) 4 Car & P 132 ................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Wall (1800) 2 East PC 953 ........................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Wall (1907) 21 Cox CC 401 ...................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Wall (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 41 ......................................................................... CA.120.120, CA.120.140, CA.125.60 Wallace [1978] 7 A Crim R 317 .................................................................................................................. CA.23A.60 Waller (1865) 10 Cox CC 360 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Walls (1845) 2 Car & K 214; 175 ER 89 .................................................................................................... CA.94.140 Walne (1870) 11 Cox CC 647 ............................................................................................... CA.179.200, CA.179.240 Walsh (1824) 1 Mood CC 14; 168 ER 1166 .......................................................................... CA.94.300, CA.117.140 Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 .......... CA.192E.200, CA.192F.180, CA.192G.140, CA.178BA.160, CA.178BB.140 Walters (1992) 62 A Crim R 16 .................................................................................................................... CA.121.40 Waltham (1849) 3 Cox CC 442 ...................................................................................................................... CA.27.80 Walton (1999) 113 A Crim R 308; [1999] NSWCCA 452 .................................................... CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20 Walton & Ogden (1863) 9 Cox CC 268 ........................................................................................................ CA.99.60 Wampfler (1987) 11 NSWLR 541; 34 A Crim R 218 ................................................................................... CLP.1360 Wan (2003) 140 A Crim R 513; [2003] NSWCCA 225 ............................................................................ DMTA.7.60 Wannan (2006) 161 A Crim R 465 .................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.460 Ward (1872) LR 1 CCR 356 ......................................................................................................................... CA.35.100 Ward [1915] 3 KB 696; (1915) 11 Cr App R 245 ..................................................................................... CA.114.140 Ward (1928) 20 Cr App R 167 ..................................................................................................................... CA.125.60 Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80 ....... CA.178A.200, CA.117.80, CA.117.260, CA.117.340, CA.125.60, CA.125.100, CA.179.280, CA.180.20, CA.183.40 Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 ...................................................................................................................... CA.23A.60 Ward (1996) 88 A Crim R 159 ......................................................................................................................... CLP.800 Ward (2000) 118 A Crim R 78 .......................................................................................... CPA.150.120, CPA.150.220 Ward & Hollister [1995] Crim LR 398 ...................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Ward 93 ER 824; (1726) 2 Str 747 .......................................................................................... CA.250.40, CA.250.60 Wardrope (1987) 29 A Crim R 198 .............................................................................................. CA.23.60, CLP.2260 Warner (1991) 25 NSWLR 382; (1991) 58 A Crim R 54 ..................................................... CA.52BA.40, CLP.1300 Warner [1996] 1 Qd R 573; (1995) 78 A Crim R 383 .................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Warren (1861) 22nd March 1861. Argus ........................................................................................................ CA.4.260 Warren (1985) 15 A Crim R 317 .................................................................................................................. CA.33.120 Warren (1996) 88 A Crim R 78 ...................................................................................................................... CLP.2540 Warry [1959] Qd R 486 .............................................................................................................................. CPA.21.160 Waskin (2003) 141 A Crim R 1 .................................................................................................................... CA.323.20 Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 WLR 946; (1963) 48 Cr App R 42 .... CA.546C.60, CA.58.140, CA.60.120 Waterhouse (1911) 28 WN (NSW) 61 ........................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Waterhouse (1992) 62 A Crim R 59 ....................................................................................... CPA.17.20, CPA.19.180 Waters (1848) 1 Den 356; 169 ER 278 ............................................................ CA.19A.320, CA.43A.120, CA.44.80 Watson (1794) 2 Leach 640; 168 ER 422 .................................................................................................... CA.148.80 Watson [1916] 2 KB 385; (1916) 12 Cr App R 62 ................................................................................... CA.188.160 Watson (1986) 22 A Crim R 308 .................................................................................................................. CA.61.320 Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684; [1989] 2 All ER 865; (1989) 89 Cr App R 211 .................. CA.19A.320, CA.19A.360 Watt (1905) 20 Cox CC 852 ......................................................................................................................... CA.333.20
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Watt [1912] VLR 225 ...................................................................................................................................... CA.10.40 R v Watt (unreported NSWCCA 2 April 1997) .................................................................................................. CA.33.200 R v Watts (1980) 71 Cr App R 136 ................................................................................................................... CPA.150.60 R v Wauchope (1957) 2 FLR 191 .................................................................................................... CA.4.260, CA.117.260 R v Waudby [1895] 2 QB 482 ..................................................................................... CA.345.60, CA.346.80, CA.351.60 R v Waugh [1909] VLR 379 .......................................................................................................... CA.179.320, CA.180.20 R v Way [1981] 2 NSWLR 653; 3 A Crim R 465 .......................................................................................... CA.310D.60 R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; [2004] NSWCCA 131 .............................................................. CLP.2680, SPA.54B.20 R v Weatherstone (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 August 1987) ....................................................................... CA.117.220 R v Weaver (1873) LR 2 CCR 85; 12 Cox CC 527 ...................................................................... CA.66A.80, CA.43.120 R v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321; [1931] HCA 23 ............................ CLP.680, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.140, CPA.156.220 R v Webb (1835) 1 Moody 431 ......................................................................................................................... CA.117.320 R v Webb [1964] 1 QB 357; (1963) 47 Cr App R 265 ................................................................. CA.91A.40, SOA.15.40 R v Webb (1977) 16 SASR 309 .......................................................................................................................... CA.23.220 R v Webb [1986] 2 Qd R 446; (1986) 3 MVR 302 ........................................................................................ CA.52A.200 (1992) 59 SASR 563 ............................................................................................................................................ CPA.30.20 R v Webb (1992) 64 A Crim R 38 ................................................. CPA.30.20, CPA.154.200, CPA.154.240, CPA.160.20 R v Webb 174 ER 140; (1834) 1 Mood & R 405 ........................................................................................... CA.19A.380 R v Webb; Ex parte A-G [1990] 2 Qd R 275; 47 A Crim R 97 .............................................................................. CLP.80 R v Webbe [1926] SASR 108 .............................................................................................................................. CA.346.80 R v Webber [1921] St R Qd 8 .......................................................................................................................... CA.78A.100 R v Webber (1988) 15 NSWLR 49; 38 A Crim R 210 .................................................................................... CA.158.100 R v Webster (1861) Le & Ca 77 .......................................................................................................................... CA.162.40 R v Webster [1995] 2 All ER 168; [1995] 1 Cr App R 495 ............................................................................ CA.196.120 R v Weeding [1959] VR 298 ............................................................................................................ CA.4.160, CPA.19.160 R v Weeks (1866) 10 Cox CC 224 .................................................................................................................... CA.125.100 R v Weeks (1993) 66 A Crim R 466 ..................................................................................................................... CLP.1040 R v Wegener [1999] NSWCCA 405 ....................................................................................................................... SPA.6.20 R v Weise [1969] VR 953 ...................................................................................................................................... CLP.1160 R v Welch (1851) 2 Den 78 ................................................................................................................................. CA.250.80 R v Welker [1962] VR 244 ............................................................................................................................. CA.344A.140 R v Wellard (1884) 14 QBD 63 ........................................................................................................... CA.8.20, CA.576.20 R v Wellard [1978] 1 WLR 921; [1978] 3 All ER 161; (1978) 67 Cr App R 364 ....................... CA.86.100, CA.86.240 R v Wells (1880) QCR 112; 5 QSCR 181 ............................................................................................................ CA.96.80 R v Wells (1981) 28 SASR 63; 3 A Crim R 453 .............................................................................. CA.27.120, CA.33.40 R v Welman (1853) Dearsly 188 ....................................................................................................................... CA.179.280 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336 ....................................................................................................................... CA.23.140 R v Wenmouth (1860) 8 Cox CC 348 ................................................................................................................. CA.112.80 R v West (1858) Dearsly & Bell 575 ................................................................................................................ CA.179.200 R v West (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 329 .................................................................................................................... CA.131.120 R v West [1964] 1 QB 15; [1962] 3 WLR 218; 2 All ER 624 ...................................................................... CPA.156.140 R v West [1992] 1 Qd 227; (1990) 51 A Crim R 317 ........................................................................................ CPA.34.20 R v West 175 ER 329; (1848) 2 Car & K 784 ................................................................................................ CA.19A.100 R v Westerman (1991) 55 A Crim R 353 ...................................................................................... CPA.21.20, CPA.150.40 R v Westie (1971) 2 CCC (2d) 315 ..................................................................................................................... CA.60.120 R v Weston (1879) 14 Cox CC 346 ...................................................................................................................... CA.18.20 R v Wheatland (1838) 8 Car & P 238 ............................................................................................................... CA.327.200 R v Wheeldon (1839) 8 Car & P 747; 173 ER 700 ...................................................................... CA.109.140, CA.112.80 R v Wheeldon (No 1) (1978) 33 FLR 402; 18 ALR 619 ................................................................................... CA.442.20 R v Wheeler (1829) 3 Car & Payne 585; 172 ER 556 ......................................................................................... CA.4.220 R v Wheeler (1844) 1 Cox CC 106 ..................................................................................................................... CA.33.120 R v Wheeler [1917] 1 KB 283; (1916) 12 Cr App R 159 ................................................................................ CA.327.160 R v Whelan [1921] 1 IR 310 ................................................................................................................................. CLP.1460 R v Whelan [1937] SASR 237 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.1220
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TABLE OF CASES
R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 ................................................................................................................ CLP.320 Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 ........................................................................................................... CA.52A.180 White (1839) 8 Car & P 742 ........................................................................................................................ CA.157.60 White (1840) 9 Car & P 344 ................................................................................................. CA.117.160, CA.156.120 White (1853) Dearsly 203 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.260 White (1859) 1 F & F 665 .......................................................................................................................... CA.188.180 White (1865-72) LR 1 CCR 311 .................................................................................................................. CA.44.120 White (1875) 13 SCR (NSW) 339 ............................................................................................................... CA.432.20 White (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 379; 21 WN 104 ......................................................... CA.4.100, CA.4.260, CA.134.120 White [1910] 2 KB 124; (1910) 4 Cr App R 257 .................... CA.19A.660, CA.344A.60, CA.344A.80, CA.30.80, CA.427.20 White (1912) 7 Cr App R 266 .............................................................................................. CA.117.260, CA.117.280 White (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 188; (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 195 ..................................................................... CLP.1300 White (1987) 9 NSWLR 427; 31 A Crim R 194 .......................................................................................... CLP.2820 White (1989) 17 NSWLR 195; (1989) 43 A Crim R 283 ........................................................................ CA.19A.500 White (1989) 18 NSWLR 332; 46 A Crim R 251 ............................................................... CPA.293.40, CPA.293.60 White (1989) 41 A Crim R 237 ........................................................................................... CA.19A.160, CPA.21.160 White [1999] 1 AC 210 .................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.400 White and Richardson (1806) Russ & Ry 99 ............................................................................................. CA.345.100 Whitehead [1960] VR 12 ................................................................................................................................ CA.5.160 Whitehouse (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 118 ............................................................ CA.546C.100, CA.58.200, CA.60.120 Whitehouse [1977] QB 868; [1977] 2 WLR 925; [1977] 3 All ER 737 .................................................... CA.45.120 Whitehouse [1977] QB 868; [1977] 3 All ER 737; (1977) 65 Cr App R 33 ................................................. CLP.960 Whiteley (1991) 93 Cr App R 25 ............................................................................................................... CA.195.100 Whiteman (1854) Dears 353; 169 ER 757 ................................................................................................... CA.140.40 Whitfield [2002] NSWCCA 501 ................................................................................................................ CA.19A.140 Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51 ................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.540 Whittaker (1993) 68 A Crim R 476 .......................................................................................... CA.24.120, CA.24.140 Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437; (1987) 31 A Crim R 453 ....................................................... CA.23A.60, CLP.1040 Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 ........................... CA.344A.60, CA.27.100, CA.28.100, CA.29.100, CA.30.100 Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252; (2002) 134 A Crim R 53; [2002] NSWCCA 343 ................................ CA.52A.240 Wickham (1839) 10 Adolphus & Ellis 34 .................................................................................................. CA.179.280 Wicks (1809) Russ & Ry 149 ....................................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Wicks (1936) 25 Cr App R 168 ...................................................................................... CA.178BB.200, CA.179.260 Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280 ................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Wild (1837) 2 Lew 214 ................................................................................................................................... CA.18.20 Wiley (1850) 2 Den 37 ............................................................................................................................... CA.188.160 Wilford (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 465 ............................................................................................................. CA.155.40 Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334 ......................................... CA.38.80, CA.39.80, CA.41.80 Wilkes (1948) 77 CLR 511; [1948] HCA 22 ................................................ CPA.19.160, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.260 Wilkes [1965] VR 475 ............................................................................................................................... CA.61HA.40 Wilkins (1789) 1 Leach 520 ........................................................................................................................ CA.117.360 Wilkinson (1598) 1 Hale’s PC 508 ............................................................................................................. CA.117.140 Wilkinson (1985) 20 A Crim R 230 .......................................................................................................... CA.19A.160 Wilkinson [1999] NSWCCA 248 ................................................................................................................. CA.43A.80 Wilkinson [2004] NSWCCA 468 ................................................................................................................ SPA.54B.20 Wilks (1914) 10 Cr App R 16 ............................................................................................... CA.117.360, CA.179.280 Willersdorf [2001] QCA 183 ....................................................................................................................... CPA.162.60 Williams (1834) 6 Car & P 390 .............................................................................................. CA.117.360, CA.161.20 Williams (1836) 7 Car & P 354; 173 ER 132 ...................................................................... CA.117.200, CA.179.300 Williams (1844) 1 Carr & Kir 589 ............................................................................................................... CA.345.60 Williams (1871) 11 Cox CC 684 .................................................................................................................... CA.85.20 Williams (1878) 14 Cox CC 59 .................................................................................................................... CA.97.120 Williams (1899) 79 LT 739 ......................................................................................................................... CA.158.140
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TABLE OF CASES
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v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
R R R R R
v v v v v
Williams [1908] QWN 33 ............................................................................................................................. CA.33.120 Williams (1910) 4 Cr App R 89 ................................................................................................................... CA.43.100 Williams (1916) 12 Cr App R 6 ................................................................................................................... CA.114.60 Williams [1923] 1 KB 340; (1924) 17 Cr App R 56 ........................................................... CA.61.160, CA.61HA.80 Williams (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 504; 49 WN (NSW) 144 ................................. CA.346.80, CA.347.40, CA.347.100 Williams [1953] 1 QB 660 .............................................................................. CA.117.220, CA.117.400, CA.179.300 Williams [1954] VLR 134 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.440 Williams [1975] 1 NSWLR 645 ................................................................................................................ CA.441A.20 Williams [1978] QB 373 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.154.20 Williams [1980] VR 1 ....................................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Williams [1982] 3 All ER 1092 .................................................................................................................... CA.432.20 Williams (1982) 7 A Crim R 46 ................................................................................................................ CA.310D.80 Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411; (1984) 78 Cr App R 276 ........................................................................... CA.58.200 Williams [1988] 1 Qd R 289; 21 A Crim R 460 ....................................................................................... CA.117.200 Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 ............... CA.35.80, CA.59.100, CA.60.160, CA.61.120, CA.61.140, CLP.1320 Williams [1992] 1 WLR 380; [1992] 2 All ER 183; (1992) 95 Cr App R 1 .......................................... CA.19A.320 Williams (1999) 102 A Crim R 260 ................................................................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.500 Williams [2000] VSC 20 ............................................................................................................................. CA.423.140 Williams (2004) 148 A Crim R 325; [2004] NSWCCA 246 ....................................................................... CA.33.200 Williams (No 3) [1962] Crim LR 111 ........................................................................................................ CA.117.200 Williamson (1869) 21 LT 444 ..................................................................................................................... CA.179.200 Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 ............................................................................ CLP.2540, CLP.2600, CLP.2640 Williamson (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 428; (1996) 92 A Crim R 24 ............................................. CLP.300, CLP.1060 Willis (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 September 1988) ............................................................................. CA.52A.240 Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 ....................... CA.19A.520, CA.5.140, CA.5.200, CLP.1400 Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 .......................................................................................... CA.24.240, CA.54.100, CA.423.60 Wilson (1848) 2 Car & Kir 527; 1 Den 284 ................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Wilson (1856) Dears & B 127 ........................................................................................................................ CA.83.80 Wilson (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 258 .............................................................................................................. CA.117.80 Wilson (1879) 5 QBD 28 .................................................................................................................................. CLP.560 Wilson (1892) 9 WN (NSW) 32 ................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Wilson (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 7; 31 WN (NSW) 12 ................................................................................... CA.66A.80 Wilson [1955] 1 WLR 493; 1 All ER 744; (1955) 39 Cr App R 12 ...................................... CA.58.300, CA.61.120 Wilson [1969] SASR 218 .............................................................................................................................. CA.112.80 Wilson [1983] 1 WLR 356; [1983] 1 All ER 993; (1983) 76 Cr App R 255 .......................................... CPA.162.20 Wilson [1983] 1 WLR 356; 1 All ER 993; (1983) 76 Cr App R 255 ...................................................... CPA.162.40 Wilson [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 WLR 686; [1983] 3 All ER 448 ........................................ CA.33.180, CA.35.140 Wilson [1995] 1 VR 163; 73 A Crim R 190 .............................................................................................. CPA.21.280 Wilson [1996] 1 WLR 125 ........................................................................................................................... CA.61.280 Wilson (2001) 125 A Crim R 450; [2001] NSWCCA 399 .......................................................................... CA.94.360 Wilson [2007] 2 Cr App R 411 .................................................................................................................... CA.27.120 Wilson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 August 1994) ....................................................................................... CLP.720 Wilson & Martin (1837) 8 Car & P 111 .................................................................................................... CA.117.360 Wilton (1889) 6 WN (NSW) 6 ................................................................................................................... CA.250.100 Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 ............................................................................................................ CA.439.20 Windle (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 110; 75 WN (NSW) 63 ............................................................................. CA.52A.260 Windsor [1982] VR 89; (1980) 4 A Crim R 197 ...................................................................................... CA.19A.500 Wines [1954] 1 WLR 64; [1953] 2 All ER 1497; (1953) 37 Cr App R 197 .................... CA.158.140, CA.176.120, CA.250.100 Winkworth (1830) 4 Car & P 444; 172 ER 775 .......................................................................................... CA.94.140 Winnall (1851) 5 Cox CC 326 .................................................................................................. CA.155.40, CA.157.60 Winner (1989) 39 A Crim R 180 ................................................................................................................ CPA.162.40 Winsor (1866) LR 1 QB 390 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Witchell (1798) 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown ............................................................................................. CA.179.200
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TABLE OF CASES
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
v Withers (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 382; 42 WN (NSW) 113 ............................................................................. CA.23.100 v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 ................................................................................................................... CLP.1200 v Wollaston (1872) 12 Cox CC 180 ............................................................................................................ CA.61HA.40 v Wong Chey (1911) 6 Cr App R 59 ....................................................................................... CA.93B.80, CA.93B.100 v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271 ........................................ CA.4.160, CA.27.80, CA.96.80, CA.98.180 v Wood (1911) 7 Cr App R 56 ................................................................................................... CA.107.100, CA.114.60 v Wood [1987] 1 WLR 779 (1987) 85 Cr App R 287 ................................................................................. CA.188.240 v Wood [2000] WASC 64 ............................................................................................................................... CPA.21.160 v Woodhall (1872) 12 Cox CC 240 ............................................................................................. CA.97.220, CA.98.220 v Woodhead (1836) 1 Mood & R 549; 174 ER 189 ...................................................................................... CA.150.40 v Woodhouse [1919] VLR 736 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 v Woodhurst (1870) 12 Cox CC 443 ........................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 v Woodland [2007] NSWCCA 29 .............................................................................................................. CA.52AB.200 v Woodman [1974] QB 754 ...................................................................................................... CA.117.260, CA.117.420 v Woodman [2001] NSWCCA 310 ............................................................................................................. CA.176A.100 v Woodrow 153 ER 907; (1846) 15 M & W 404 ............................................................................................. CLP.1360 v Woods (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 638; 74 WN (NSW) 420 .............................................................................. CA.24.220 v Woods (2009) 195 A Crim R 173; [2009] NSWCCA 55 ......................................................................... CA.66A.120 v Woodward (1838) 8 Carrington & Payne 561 ............................................................................................... CLP.1220 v Woodward [1944] KB 118; (1944) 29 Cr App R 159 ................................................................................. CPA.36.20 v Woodward 169 ER 1329; (1862) Le & Ca 122 ......................................................................................... CA.188.220 v Woolley (1850) 1 Denison 559 ............................................................................................. CA.179.200, CA.179.280 v Woolley (1980) 3 Carrington & Kirwan 98 ............................................................................................... CA.179.200 v Worland [1964] 607 ................................................................................................................................... CPA.156.100 v Worrall (1836) 7 Car & P 516 ...................................................................................................................... CA.139.60 v Wort [1927] VLR 560 ................................................................................................................................. CA.117.360 v Worthington [1921] VLR 660 ................................................................................................. CA.133.80, CA.186.100 v Wortley (1851) 5 Cox CC 382 ...................................................................................................................... CA.155.40 v Wozniak (1989) 16 NSWLR 185; 40 A Crim R 290 .................................................................................. CA.316.80 v Wright (1828) Carrington’s Supplement 278 (173 ER 953n) ...................................................................... CA.118.20 v Wright (1858) Dears & Bell 431 .................................................................................................................. CA.157.60 v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 ..................................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 v Wright [2000] Crim LR 510 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.2540 v Wright (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 July 1986) ................................... DMTA.25.80, DMTA.25.140, DMTA.29.40 v Wuyts [1969] 3 WLR 1; 2 All ER 799 ........................................................................................................ CA.417.20 v Wyatt [1904] 1 KB 188 ...................................................................................................... CA.178C.180, CA.179.300 v Wyatt (1921) 16 Cr App R 57 ........................................................................................................................ CA.99.60 v Wynn (1849) 2 Car & K 859 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.220 v Wynn (1887) 16 Cox CC 231 ..................................................................................................................... CA.125.100 v XHR [2012] NSWCCA 247 ........................................................................................................................... CLP.1820 v XY [2010] NSWCCA 181 ................................................................................................................ CA.Pt3.Div10.520 v Xi [2015] NSWSC 1575 .............................................................................................................................. BA.16A.20 v Yamamoto Hidesalriro (1921) 24 WALR 54 ................................................................................................ CPA.30.20 v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208; (1997) 98 A Crim R 51 ................................................................................... CPA.30.20 v Yassien [2006] NSWCCA 15 ........................................................................................................................ CA.94.360 v Yasso (2004) 10 VR 466 ............................................................................................................................... CA.23.200 v Yates (1827) 1 Mood 170; 168 ER 1229 ....................................................................................................... CA.4.260 v Yates (1841) Car & M 132 ......................................................................................................................... CA.327.160 v Yates (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 477; 80 WN (NSW) 744 ........................................................ CA.546B.100, CA.114.80 v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 .......................................................................................................................... CA.95.120 v Yau Leung Wong (1988) 37 A Crim R 385 ..................................................................................................... CLP.680 v Yee Kam Lau (1998) 105 A Crim R 167 ............................................................................................... DMTA.23.160 v Yenice (1994) 72 A Crim R 234 ................................................................................................................ CA.442B.20 v Yigwai [1963] PNGLR 40 ............................................................................................................................ CA.22A.40
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TABLE OF CASES
R v Yorke (1848) 2 Car & K 841 ...................................................................................................................... CA.117.420 R v Young (1838) 8 Carr & P 644 ...................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 R v Young (1878) 14 Cox CC 114 .................................................................................................................. CA.61HA.80 R v Young (1923) 17 Cr App R 131 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.20 R v Young [1923] SASR 35 ................................................................................................................................ CA.66A.80 R v Young (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 46; 64 WN (NSW) 193 .................... CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100, CA.140.40, CLP.80 R v Young [1953] 1 All ER 21; (1952) 36 Cr App R 200 ............................................................................... CA.188.100 R v Young (1996) 90 A Crim R 80 ................................................................................................................. CPA.156.200 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 ......... CA.19A.120, CA.19A.520, CA.43A.100, CA.52A.20, CA.43.80, CA.44.100, CA.61.80, CA.117.200, CA.199.160, CA.423.140, CLP.40, CLP.240, CLP.260, CLP.300, CLP.320, CLP.340, CLP.360, CLP.2100, CLP.2260 R v Yuill (1993) 69 A Crim R 450 ................................................................................................ CPA.19.40, CPA.19.180 R v Yule [1964] 1 QB 5; (1963) 47 Cr App R 229 .......................................................................................... CA.166.140 R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 .................................................................................................................... CA.61H.20 R v Zaiter [2004] NSWCCA 35 .............................................................................................................................. CLP.580 R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17 ..................................................................................................................... CA.33.200 R v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 ............................................................................................................. CA.7.140 R v Zerafa (2003) 139 A Crim R 439; [2003] NSWCCA 101 ..................................................................... LEPRA.14.20 R v Zhan Yu Zhong (2003) 139 A Crim R 220; [2003] VSCA 56 ................................................... CA.61N.80, CLP.960 R v Zhang [2004] NSWCCA 358 ........................................................................................................................ CA.33.200 R v Zischke [1983] 1 Qd R 240 ........................................................................................................................ CA.195.100 R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 .................................................. CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.560, CA.61HA.100 R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; 47 A Crim R 211 ............................ CLP.1880, CPA.36.20, CPA.160.20, DMTA.3.80 R v de Munck [1918] 1 KB 635 ......................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 R (a child) v Whitty (1993) 66 A Crim R 462 ....................................................................................................... CLP.560 RB v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 248 ................................................................ CPA.214.40 RJA v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 178; [2008] NSWCCA 137 ............................................................ CA.66A.120 RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 113 A Crim R 341; [2000] HCA 3 .................................. CLP.1840, CLP.1880 RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147 ................................................................ CLP.360 Radenkovic v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 623; 51 A Crim R 451; [1990] HCA 54 ...................................... SPA.Pt1.20 Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16 ................................................................................................................. CA.61.320 Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510; [1974] HCA 35 ............................................................................ CPA.160.20 Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510; 48 ALJR 380; [1974] HCA 35 ......................................................... CLP.580 Raven v Fisher [1964] AC 210; (1963) 47 Cr App R 174 ............................................................................ CA.178C.140 Raynal v Samuels (1974) 9 SASR 264 ........................................................................................................... CA.527C.160 Rayner v Godmond (1821) 5 B & Ald 225; 106 ER 1175 ................................................................................ CA.32.100 Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850; 138 ER 1437 ................................................................................................. CA.61.120 Reardon v O’Sullivan [1950] SASR 77 .............................................................................................................. CA.93X.80 Redbridge LBC v Jacques [1970] 1 WLR 1604; [1971] 1 All ER 260 .............................................................. SOA.6.40 Redford v Birley (1822) 1 State Trials (NS) 1071 ........................................................................................... CA.545C.60 Reece v Taylor (1835) 4 Nev & M 469 ........................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Rees v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 83; [2010] NSWCCA 84 ...................................................................... CLP.580 Reg v Tao [1976] 3 All ER 65; [1977] QB 141; 63 Cr App R 163 ................................................................ DMTA.6.20 Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 ....................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Rew’s Case (1662) Kel 26 ....................................................................................................................................... CLP.540 Rex v Grave (1930) 30 SR 158 ......................................................................................................................... CA.527C.40 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17; [1966] 2 All ER 649 ...... CA.546C.100, CA.58.160, CA.60.120 Rich v A-G (Vic) [1999] VSCA 14; (1999) 103 A Crim R 261 ........................................................................ CPA.19.40 Richards v The Queen [1993] AC 217; [1992] 3 WLR 928; [1992] 4 All ER 807 ................ CPA.113.40, CPA.156.220 Richardson v Pullen (1998) 28 MVR 488 ............................................................................................................ CLP.1360 Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116 ................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116; 48 ALJR 181; [1974] HCA 19 ................................................ CLP.1800 Ricketts v Laws (1988) 14 NSWLR 311 .................................................................................. CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 Riddell v Earl of Strathmore (1887) 3 TLR 329 ................................................................................................ SOA.13.20
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TABLE OF CASES
Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; 69 ALJR 484; 78 A Crim R 307; 129 ALR 41 ....................... CPA.19.80, CPA.19.120, CPA.19.160 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; 78 A Crim R 307; [1995] HCA 66 ............................................. CLP.2500 Ridley v Hanney [1962] WAR 157 ................................................................................................................... CA.52A.180 Rigg v Earl Lonsdale (1857) 1 Hurl & Norm 923 ............................................................................................ CA.117.260 Riseley v The Queen [1970] Tas SR 41 .............................................................................................................. CA.61L.80 Ritchie, Ex parte (1896) 12 WN (NSW) 109 ............................................................................................................ CLP.80 Roach v Rogers [1923] VLR 184 ..................................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Robbins v Horton (1980) 3 NTR 1 ...................................................................................................................... CPA.21.20 Roberts v O’Sullivan [1950] SASR 245 .................................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Roberts v Thomson [1963] QWN 36 ................................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85; 116 A Crim R 492; [2000] SASC 405 ............................................. CA.25A.140 Robinson v Gilmore (unreported, SC (NSW), 11 December 1985) .............................................................. CA.546C.100 Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 .......................... CA.Pt3.Div10.180, CLP.1880 Robinson v The Queen [No 2] (1991) 180 CLR 531; (1991) 55 A Crim R 318; [1991] HCA 38 ................ CPA.160.20 Robson v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939; (1967) 51 Cr App R 307 .................................................. CA.58.160, LEPRA.10.60 Roche v The Queen [1988] WAR 278; 29 A Crim R 168 .............................................................. CA.23.180, CA.27.120 Rochford Rural Council v Port of London Authority [1914] 2 KB 916 ............................................. CLP.80, SOA.17.40 Rockdale Municipal Council v Harvey (1965) 11 LGRA 344 ............................................................................. SOA.6.40 Roddan v Walker (1997) 94 A Crim R 170 .............................................................................................................. CLP.80 Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735 ............................................................................................................... CA.195.100 Roger Johns v The Queen (1979) 141 CLR 409 ................................................................................................. CPA.34.20 Rogers v Chandler (1922) 18 Tas LR 38 .......................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Rogers v Fenton [1962] Tas SR 28 ................................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; 74 A Crim R 462 ...... CPA.19.80, CPA.19.160, CPA.156.40, CPA.156.200, CPA.156.220, CPA.156.260, CPA.156.280 Rohde v DPP (1986) 161 CLR 119 ................................................................................................................... CPA.156.20 Rona v District Court (SA) (1995) 63 SASR 223; 77 A Crim R 16 .................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160, CPA.113.40 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 .................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Roos v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) 34 NSWLR 254; 74 A Crim R 138 ........................................ SPA.45.20 Roper v Knott [1898] 1 QB 868 ........................................................................................................................ CA.195.100 Rose v Kempthorne (1910) 22 Cox CC 356 ....................................................................................................... CA.61.180 Rose v Matt [1951] 1 KB 810 ........................................................................................................................... CA.117.280 Rose v The Queen [1961] AC 496; (1961) 45 Cr App R 102 .......................................................................... CA.23A.60 Rose v Wilson (1823) 1 Bing 353 .................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246; [1922] HCA 4 .................................................................................... CA.19A.600 Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] 1 QB 435; [1974] 2 WLR 436; [1974] 2 All ER 287 ...................................... CLP.80 Rosza v Samuels [1969] SASR 205 .................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 Rous v Government Insurance Office (NSW) [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-289 ............................................... CA.60.80 Rowe v Conti; Threlfall v Panzera [1958] VR 547 ............................................................................................ CA.97.120 Rowell v Larter (1986) 6 NSWLR 21; 24 A Crim R 222 ............................................................................. LEPRA.48.80 Roy v Briggs (1987) 25 A Crim R 229 ................................................................................................................. SOA.6.40 Royal College of Nursing v Dept Health and Social Security [1982] AC 800 ................................................. CA.83.100 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 ........................ CA.19A.160, CA.19A.260, CA.19A.280, CA.19A.300, CA.19A.320, CA.19A.400, CA.19A.440, CA.19A.500, CA.19A.520, CA.52A.140, CA.5.140, CA.24.100, CA.24.260, CA.54.80, CLP.140, CLP.440, CLP.480, CLP.500, CLP.520, CLP.540, CLP.1320 Rubie v Faulkner [1940] 1 KB 571 ..................................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48 ......................... LEPRA.11.20, LEPRA.99.80 Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377 ..................................................................................................... CA.117.160, CA.117.320 Russell v Smith [1958] 1 QB 27 ........................................................ CA.117.20, CA.117.320, CA.117.400, CA.117.420 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 ................... CA.4A.20, CA.19A.20, CA.19A.140, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.280, CA.19A.540, CA.5.80, CA.61.80, CA.96.20, CA.96.80, CA.98.180, CLP.140, CLP.160, CLP.220, CLP.300, CLP.1060, CLP.1140, CLP.1320, CPA.154.280
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TABLE OF CASES
Ryan, Ex parte; Re Johnson (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 12; 61 WN 17 ................................................................... SOA.13.20 Ryder v Morley (1986) 12 FCR 438; 25 A Crim R 24 ...................................................... LEPRA.48.120, LEPRA.76.20 Ryder v Morley (1987) 16 FCR 257; 27 A Crim R 470 ............................................................................... LEPRA.76.20
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S S v McC [1972] AC 24 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.61.260 S v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 266; 45 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 66 .............. CA.9.60, CPA.21.160, CPA.150.200 S v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275; 95 A Crim R 400; [1997] HCA 47 ..................................................... CPA.21.220 S (an Infant) v Recorder of Manchester [1971] AC 481 ................................................................................ CPA.154.200 SBF v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 219; [2009] NSWCCA 231 ............................................................ CA.52A.240 SZ v The Queen (2007) 168 A Crim R 249; [2007] NSWCCA 19 .................................................................... SPA.23.20 Saad v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 20; 61 ALJR 243; [1987] HCA 14 .......... CA.7.120, DMTA.7.40, DMTA.7.60, DMTA.29.60 Saddler v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 452; [2009] NSWCCA 83 ......................................................... SPA.21A.20 Saffron v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1989) 16 NSWLR 397; 43 A Crim R 1 ....... CPA.62.40, CPA.64.60, CPA.64.100 Saibu v The Queen (1993) 10 WAR 279 ......................................................................................................... CA.61HA.80 St Mary Newington Vestry v Jacobs (1871) LR 7 QB 47 ................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Sako v Anthony (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Badgery-Parker J, 8 March 1991) ................................................. CA.61.20 Saltergate Insurance Co Ltd and the Companies Act, Re (1980) 4 ACLR 733 ................................................. CA.178.20 Sam v The Queen (2011) 206 A Crim R 67; [2011] NSWCCA 36 .................................................................. CA.43A.80 Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 .......................................................... CA.38.120 Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458 .............................. CPA.156.200, CPA.156.260 Sampson v Crafter [1940] SASR 427 ............................................................................................................. CA.527C.140 Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 ................................................................................................................... CLP.80 Samuels v Hall [1969] SASR 296 ......................................................................................................................... SOA.4.20 Samuels v Nicholson (1973) 6 SASR 479 ................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Samuels v Stubbs (1972) 4 SASR 200 .............................................................................................................. CA.195.100 Sanderson v Allchurch [1922] SASR 7 ................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Sandon v Jervis (1859) El Bl & El 942; 120 ER 760 .......................................................................................... CA.95.80 Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1; 65 ALJR 402; 54 A Crim R 183; 100 ALR 193 ... CA.61N.80, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180, CPA.156.220 Saunders v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1998) 86 FCR 51 .................................................... LEPRA.48.80 Saunders v Herold (1991) 105 FLR 1 ................................................................................................................... SOA.4.20 Saunders v The Queen [1980] WAR 183; (1980) 3 A Crim R 471 ........................................... CA.345.100, CA.345.140 Savage’s Case (1647) Style 12; 82 ER 491 ........................................................................................................ CA.250.40 Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29 ........ CLP.740, CLP.780, CLP.820, DMTA.26.100 Sawtell v Regan (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 362 .............................................................................................................. CA.8.20 Sayce v Coupe [1953] 1 QB 1 ............................................................................................................................. CA.345.80 Saycell v Bool [1948] 2 All ER 83; [1948] WN 232 ...................................................................................... CA.52A.120 Scarfe v Wood (1969) 113 Sol J 143 .................................................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Scatchard v The Queen (1987) 27 A Crim R 136 ............................................................................................... CA.59.100 Schagen v The Queen (1993) 8 WAR 410; 65 A Crim R 500 ........................................................................... CPA.36.20 Schiffmann v The King (1910) 11 CLR 255 ..................................................................................................... CA.117.280 Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424; 24 A Crim R 36 ....................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Schofield v Betts [1936] 31 Tas LR 32 ........................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Schubert v Lee (1946) 71 CLR 589; [1946] HCA 28 .......................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR 171; (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 ....................................................................... CLP.1500 Schulz v Paige [1961] SASR 258 ........................................................................................................................ CA.351.60 Scofield (1784) Cald Mag Cas 397 ................................................................................................................. CA.344A.100 Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659 ...................................................................................................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032; (1974) 60 Cr App R 124 .......................................................................................................................... CLP.800
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TABLE OF CASES
Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Black W; 96 ER 526 ................................................................................................ CA.61.120 Seamark v Prouse [1980] 1 WLR 698; [1980] 3 All ER 26; (1980) 70 Cr App R 236 ..................................... CA.60.80 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 ................................................................................................................... CA.61.100, CA.61.160 Secretary of State for Trade v Markus [1975] 1 All ER 958 ........................................................................... CA.179.320 See v Milner (1980) 2 A Crim R 210 ............................................................................................. CA.7.80, LEPRA.23.80 Seidler, Re [1986] 1 Qd R 486 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.160 Seiler v The Queen [1978] WAR 27 .................................................................................................................. CPA.21.400 Selbeck v McDonald [1978] 1 NSWLR 1 ................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Selby v Pennings (1989) 19 WAR 520 ........................................................................................... CA.310D.60, CLP.1460 Self’s Case (1776) 1 East PC 226 ......................................................................................................................... CA.44.80 Semaan v Poidevin (2013) 228 A Crim R 363; [2013] NSWSC 226 ................................................................ CA.60.120 Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Co Rep 91a; 77 ER 194 ....................................................................................... LEPRA.48.60 Semmens v Police (unreported, SA Sup Ct, Perry J, 18 September 1998) ........................................................ SPA.10.80 Semple v Carson (1984) 35 SASR 589 ................................................................................................................. SOA.3.60 Seneviratne v The King [1936] 3 All ER 36 ........................................................................................................ CLP.1800 Sepulveda v The Queen (2006) 167 A Crim R 108; [2006] NSWCCA 379 .............................................. LEPRA.99.120 Sergi v The Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, CA (NSW), 10 September 1991) ......................... DMTA.6.20 Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206 ......................................................... CLP.1820 Sharman v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2006) 161 A Crim R 1 ............................ CPA.172.20, CPA.177.20 Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220; [1961] 2 WLR 897; [1961] 2 All ER 446 ......................................................... SOA.15.40 Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] AC 220; [1961] 2 WLR 897; [1961] 2 All ER 446 ................. CLP.760 Shaw v Shaw (1862) 6 LT 477 .......................................................................................................................... CA.319.140 Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365; [1952] HCA 18 ................................................................................... CLP.1820 Shearer v Shields [1914] AC 808 .......................................................................................................................... CA.5.100 Sheehan v Piddington [1955] QSR 574 .......................................................................................................... CA.546B.100 Sheen v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 208; [2011] NSWCCA 259 .......................................................... CPA.162.60 Sheen v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 259 ....................................................................................................... CA.112.100 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; (1990) 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 ..... CA.19A.520, CA.51A.120 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 .............................................. CLP.580 Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 ................................................................................. CLP.80, CLP.1040, CLP.1280 Shubley v The Queen (1990) 52 CCC (3d) 481 ............................................................................................. CPA.156.160 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 .............................................. CA.61.260 Siedler, Re [1986] 1 Qd R 486 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656; 105 A Crim R 184; [1998] HCA 74 ......................................... CPA.154.60 Simpson v Hill (1795) 1 Esp 431; 170 ER 409 .................................................................................................... CA.95.80 Simpson v Sinclair [1917] AC 127 ................................................................................................................... CA.19A.300 Simpson v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 228; 103 A Crim R 19; [1998] HCA 46 ...................................... CA.52AB.140 Sinanovic v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 1050; 103 A Crim R 452 .................................................................. CPA.36.20 Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316; [1946] HCA 55 .................................................................................. CLP.1140 Sinclair, Ex parte (1947) 65 WN (NSW) 44 ......................................................................................................... SOA.6.40 Sissinghurst House Case (1673) 1 Hale PC 462 ............................................................................................... CA.345.100 Slader v Smalbrooke (1664) 1 Lev 138 ............................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Slater v Marshall [1965] WAR 222 ................................................................................................................. CPA.154.100 Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 .......................... CA.117.80, CA.117.160, CA.117.260, CA.117.280, CA.125.60 Sloane, Ex parte (1983) 8 A Crim R 424 ............................................................................................................ CPA.19.40 Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187 ......................................................................................................... CA.179.260 Smith v Cooke (1914) 84 LJKB 959 ................................................................................................................... CA.512.80 Smith v Corrective Services Commissioner of New South Wales (1980) 147 CLR 134; 55 ALJR 68; [1980] HCA 49 .................................................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Smith v Dear (1903) 88 LT 664 ......................................................................................................................... CA.511.120 Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 .......... CA.94.60, CA.94.100, CA.94.120, CA.94.380, CA.95.100, CA.97.220, CA.98.220, CPA.162.40 Smith v Elder [1955] NZLR 12 ......................................................................................................................... CA.179.240
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Smith v Leurs [1944] SASR 213 ........................................................................................................................... CA.60.80 Smith v The Queen (1957) 97 CLR 100; [1957] HCA 3 .............................................................................. LEPRA.99.40 Smith v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 532 ........................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Smith v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 706 ......................................................................................................... CA.345.140 Smith v Thomasson (1890) 62 LT 68 ............................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Smith, Re (1858) 3 Hurl & Norm 227 .......................................................................................... CA.345.180, CA.351.60 Smyth v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 163; [1957] HCA 24 ....................... CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CLP.1400, CLP.1500 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 .................. CA.178B.120, CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1120, CLP.1140, CLP.1200, CLP.1440 South v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 117 .................................................................................................... CA.61HA.100 Southam v Smout [1964] 1 QB 308 .................................................................................................................... CA.61.180 Southon v Plath (2010) 181 LGERA 352; [2010] NSWCCA 292 ............................................. CPA.213.40, CPA.214.40 Southport Corporation v Morriss [1893] 1 QB 359 .............................................................................................. CA.32.80 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 WLR 467; [1971] 2 All ER 175 .............................................................................................................................................................. CLP.2820 Sparks v The Queen (1964) AC 964 ....................................................................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320 Sparks, Ex parte (1879) 2 SCR NS (NSW) 218 ............................................................................................... CA.131.120 Sparre v The King (1942) 66 CLR 149; [1942] HCA 19 ..................................................................................... CA.77.20 Spautz v Gibbs (1990) 21 NSWLR 230 ............................................................................................................ CPA.19.100 Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506 ......................................................................................................... CPA.19.100 Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43 ... CA.176A.80, CLP.800 Stamp v United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd [1967] 1 QB 418 ............................................................ CA.438.20 Standish v The Queen (1991) 60 A Crim R 364; [1991] TASSC 83 ................................................................. CA.35.100 Stanford v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 474; 179 A Crim R 541; [2007] NSWCCA 370 ........................... CA.112.80 Stanley v Powell [1891] QB 86 ........................................................................................................................... CA.61.180 Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247 ...................................................... CA.Pt3.Div10.540 Stanton v Dawson (1987) 31 A Crim R 104 ................................................................................................... CPA.154.200 Stanton v The Queen (2003) 77 ALJR 1151; [2003] HCA 29 ....................................................... CLP.1880, CPA.162.80 Stanton, Ex parte (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 516; 45 WN 118 ...................................................... CPA.154.100, CPA.154.200 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 ................. CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1500 State v Barry 45 Mont 598 (1912) ....................................................................................................................... CA.61.120 State Pollution Control Commission v Hunt (1990) 72 LGRA 316 ........................................................................ CLP.80 State Pollution Control Commission v Tallow Products Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 517; 65 A Crim R 509 .............................................................................. CPA.19.160, CPA.156.80, CPA.156.100, CPA.156.180 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Hunter Water Board (1992) 28 NSWLR 721; (1992) 65 A Crim R 101 .................................................................................................................................................. CLP.1360, CLP.1380 State of New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303 ........................................................................................................................................ CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.160 Steele v Lewis (1883) 1 QLJ 137 ............................................................................................................................ CA.8.20 Stefani v John [1948] 1 KB 158; [1947] 2 All ER 615 .................................................................................. CPA.156.140 Steinberg v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 134 CLR 640 .............................................................. CPA.150.120 Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349; 172 ER 735 ......................................................................................... CA.61.120 Stephens v The Queen (1978) 139 CLR 315 ................................................................................................. CA.178A.180 Stevens v Gourley (1859) 141 ER 752; 7 CBNS 99 ............................................................................................ SOA.3.40 Stevens v Gourley (1859) 7 CB (NS) 99; 141 ER 752 ................................................................ CA.547C.60, CA.112.80 Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319; (2005) 156 A Crim R 487; [2005] HCA 65 ............................ CA.19A.600 Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319; 156 A Crim R 487; [2005] HCA 65 ............................................. CLP.2260 Stevens v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 260 ........................................................................... CA.192E.280, CA.192G.80 Stimac v Nicol [1942] VLR 66 ........................................................................................................................ CPA.156.140 Stockton v The Queen (1981) 3 A Crim R 384 ................................................................................................. CA.23A.60 Stone v Ford (1992) 65 A Crim R 459 ................................................................................................................. SOA.4.20 Storer v Murphy [No 2] (1991) 104 FLR 303 .................................................................................................. CPA.62.140 Strathfield Municipal Council v Elvy (1992) 25 NSWLR 745; (1992) 58 A Crim R 352 ................................. CLP.1380
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Streat v Bauer (unreported, SC (NSW), 16 March 1998) .............................................................................. CA.546C.100 Stuart v The Queen (1974) 134 CLR 426 ......................................................................................................... CA.345.100 Stubbs, Re (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 329; 64 WN (NSW) 53 .................................................................................. SPA.10.80 Stutsel v Reid (1990) 20 NSWLR 661 ................................................................................................................. SOA.4.20 Subramaniam v Attorney-General (NSW) (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Barr J, 2 July 1997) ...... CA.319.80, CA.319.120 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 ........................................................................................ CLP.2540 Subramaniam v The Queen (2004) 79 ALJR 116; [2004] HCA 51 ................................................................. CPA.19.160 Sugar City Municipal District Council No 5 v Bennett and White [1950] DLR 81 .......................................... SOA.3.40 Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 ...................... CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.360, CA.Pt3.Div10.500, CA.Pt3.Div10.600 Surujpaul called Dick v The Queen [1958] 1 WLR 1050; 3 All ER 300; (1958) 42 Cr App R 266 .............. CA.346.80 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; 11 A Crim R 331; [1984] HCA 5 ........ CLP.580, CPA.21.200, CPA.21.240, CPA.21.260, CPA.21.360 Swansson v The Queen (2007) 69 NSWLR 406; 168 A Crim R 263; [2007] NSWCCA 67 ......... CLP.1720, CPA.21.60 Sweeney v Astle [1923] NZLR 1198 ..................................................................................................................... CA.26.40 Sweeney v Denness (1954) 56 WALR 52 ...................................................................................... CA.66A.80, CA.43.120 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; [1969] 2 WLR 470; [1969] 1 All ER 347 ................ CLP.1260, CLP.1300, SOA.17.40 Sweetman v Industries and Commerce Department [1970] NZLR 139 ............................................................. CA.345.80 Sydney Catchment Authority v Bailey (2006) 164 A Crim R 263 ............................................................. LEPRA.99.120 Sydney City Council v Paul Dainty Corporation Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 104 ........................................... CPA.19.160 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 ............................ CA.316.80
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T TS, Re [2002] ACTSC 102 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.66.40 Tahmindjis v Brown (1985) 7 FCR 277; 60 ALR 120 ....................................................................................... CPA.56.40 Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 ........... CLP.2500, CLP.2520, CLP.2540, CLP.2600, CLP.2660, CLP.2900 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; [1996] HCA 28 ........................................... CA.43A.100 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 ..... CA.43.80, CA.44.100, CA.93FB.20, CA.93FB.40, CA.316.200, CLP.80 Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 241 A Crim R 381; [2014] HCA 35 .................................... CA.93X.20, CA.93X.80 Tan v The Queen [1979] WAR 149 ................................................................................................................... CA.179.300 Tannous v The Queen (1989) 64 ALJR 141 .................................................................................................... DMTA.26.60 Taufahema v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 152 ........................................................................................ CA.546C.60 Taxation (Cth), Commissioner of v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568; 164 FLR 375; [2001] NSWCCA 332 ......................................................................................................... SPA.10.60, SPA.10.80, SPA.10.100 Taylor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2004] EWCA Civ 858; [2004] 1 WLR 3155; [2004] 3 All ER 503 ................................................................................................................................ LEPRA.99.160 Taylor v Clemson (1844) 11 Cl & F 610; 8 ER 1233 ................................................................................. LEPRA.48.120 Taylor v Goodwin (1879) 4 QBD 228 ................................................................................................................... CA.53.60 Taylor v Guilfoyle [1925] VLR 213 ................................................................................................................. CA.546B.20 Taylor v Newman (1863) 8 LT 424 ................................................................................................................... CA.117.200 Taylor v Phelan (1869) 6 W ..................................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 .............................................................................................................. CLP.1140 Tegge v Caldwell (1988) 15 NSWLR 226 ............................................................................... CA.527C.40, CA.527C.140 Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v Wilson & Co Ltd [1917] AC 495 ...................................................................... CA.546C.60 Terbutt v Holmes (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 223 .................................................................................................. CA.546C.60 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228; 1 All ER 373 ................................ CA.19A.400, CA.19A.520, CLP.1320 Thambiah v The Queen [1966] AC 37; [1966] 2 WLR 81; [1965] 3 All ER 661 ........................ CA.45.120, CA.346.80 Thames Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371; 2 All ER 1219 ....................................... CPA.19.40 Thomas v Lindop [1950] 1 All ER 966 ........................................................................................... CA.345.80, CA.351.60 Thomas v Sawkins [1935] 2 KB 249 ......................................................................................... CA.545C.60, LEPRA.9.40 Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279; [1937] HCA 83 .......................................... CA.117.200, CLP.1040, CLP.1380 Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; [1960] HCA 2 ..................................... CA.19A.520, CA.5.120, CA.33.120
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Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2 ..................... CLP.360, CLP.1180, CLP.1400 Thompson v Mastertouch TV Service Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 38 FLR 397; 19 ALR 547 .............................. CPA.156.40 Thompson v Nixon [1966] 1 QB 103; (1965) 49 Cr App R 324 ................................................. CA.117.420, CA.125.60 Thompson v The King [1918] AC 221 ................................................................................................................. CLP.2240 Thompson v Vincent (2005) 153 A Crim R 577; [2005] NSWCA 219 ...................................................... LEPRA.99.180 Thomson v C (1989) 95 FLR 116 ....................................................................................................................... CA.60.120 Thornberry v The Queen (1995) 69 ALJR 777 ................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; (1937) 26 Cr App R 51 ..................................................... CA.99.60 Thorneloe v Filipowski (2001) 52 NSWLR 60; 123 A Crim R 92; [2001] NSWCCA 213 ....... SPA.10.40, SPA.10.100, SPA.10.120 Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339 ........................................................................................................... CA.345.80 Threlfall v Panzera [1958] VR 547 ....................................................................................................................... CA.4.200 Thwaites v O’Sullivan [1965] SASR 34 ........................................................................................................... CA.527C.60 Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 25 NSWLR 715; (1992) 58 A Crim R 428 ................................................................................................................................................... CLP.1360 Tiknius v The Queen (2011) 221 A Crim R 365; [2011] NSWCCA 215 ............................................................ CLP.2680 Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47; 42 ALJR 295; [1968] HCA 66 ............................. CLP.120, CLP.1060 Timmings, Ex parte; Re Jones (1921) 38 WN (NSW) 41 ............................................................................... CA.527C.60 Tink v Francis [1983] 2 VR 17 ................................................................................................. CA.52A.120, CA.52AB.80 Tobin v City Bank (1878) 1 SCR (NSW) 267 .................................................................................................. CA.529.240 Tomarchio v Pocock [2002] WASCA 156 ........................................................................................................ LEPRA.9.40 Toronto City Corporation v The King [1932] AC 98 ......................................................................................... CA.555.40 Towers & Co Ltd v Gray [1961] 2 QB 351 ............................................................................................................ CA.7.80 Tracey, Re; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 ............................................................................................ CPA.156.160 Trade, Board of v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; (1956) 41 Cr App R 11 ...................................... CLP.880 Trade, Board of v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; [1957] 1 All ER 411 .... CA.176.120, CLP.660, CLP.700 Trade Practices Commission v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd [1994] ATPR 41-286 ........................................... SPA.10.120 Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50 .................. CA.117.20, CA.117.280, CA.117.340, CA.117.440 Tran v The Queen (2000) 105 FCR 182; (2000) 118 A Crim R 218; [2000] FCA 1888 ........... CPA.36.20, CPA.159.20, CPA.160.20 Tran v The Queen (2000) 105 FCR 182; 118 A Crim R 218; [2000] FCA 1888 ............................................... CLP.1780 Tran Nominess Pty Ltd v Scheffler (1986) 42 SASR 361 ............................................................................. LEPRA.76.40 Tregilgas v Howie [1926] SASR 122 .................................................................................................................. CPA.21.20 Trimboli v Onley (No 2) (1981) 56 FLR 317 .............................................................................................. LEPRA.48.120 Trimboli v Onley (No 3) (1981) 56 FLR 304; 37 ALR 38 ......................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1; 35 ALJR 72; [1961] HCA 22 .............................................................. CLP.780 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 .......................................................................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147; [1955] HCA 68 ...................................................................................... CLP.580 Trollope and Sons v London Building Trades Federation (1895) 11 TLR 280 .............................................. CA.545B.40 Truman (Frank) Export Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1977] QB 952; (1977) 64 Cr App R 248 .................................................................................................................................................. LEPRA.48.80 Tuck v Robson [1970] 1 WLR 741; [1970] 1 All ER 1171 ........................................................... CA.346.80, CA.351.60 Tucker v Noblet [1924] SASR 326 .................................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Tucs v Manley (1985) 62 ALJR 460 ................................................................................................................ CA.527C.40 Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192 .............................. CA.Pt3.Div10.640, CA.Pt3.Div10.660 Tunnicliffe v Tedd (1848) 5 CB 553; 136 ER 995 ......................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Turberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684 ................................................................. CA.61.120, CA.61.180
U UK Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952 ...................................................... LEPRA.48.40 Ugle v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 171; 76 ALJR 886; [2002] HCA 25 .................... CA.19A.140, CA.Pt3.Div10.320, CA.Pt3.Div10.380 Underhill v Murden (2007) 173 A Crim R 336 ............................................................................................... DPVA.57.20 United States v Dixon 509 VS 688 (1993) ........................................................................................................ CPA.156.80
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United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 ............................................. CPA.36.20 United Telecasters Sydney v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323 ............................................................................. CA.578.20
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V Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 .......... CA.4A.20, CA.4A.40, CA.19A.520, CA.5.80, CA.27.80, CA.61.140, CLP.80, CLP.120, CLP.300, CLP.1060, CLP.1280, CLP.1400, CLP.1500 Van Beelen’s Petition, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 ................................................................................................. CPA.62.100 Van Den Berg v The Queen [1984] WAR 162; 12 A Crim R 113 ..................................................................... CA.97.120 Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 .................. CA.23.20, CA.23.60, CA.23.120, CA.24.160, CA.423.140, CLP.2280 Van Der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656; 35 A Crim R 232; [1988] HCA 56 .......... CA.33.160, LEPRA.99.40 Van Rassel and Cummings, Re (1986) 31 CCC (3d) 10 ................................................................................ CPA.156.160 Van der Lubbe, Re (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 309; 66 WN (NSW) 140 ............................................................... CA.545B.40 Vardy, Ex parte (1875) Addison’s Digest (1907) 349 ............................................................................................. CA.8.20 Varley v The Queen (1976) 51 ALJR 243 ........................................................... CA.19A.100, CA.19A.600, CPA.162.60 Varney v Kowald (1976) 14 SASR 12 .............................................................................................................. CA.547C.80 Vaughan v McKenzie [1969] 1 QB 557 .............................................................................................................. CA.61.180 Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458; 53 ALJR 305; [1979] HCA 7 ......................................................... CA.23A.60 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; 33 A Crim R 230 .......................................... CA.23A.60, SPA.21A.20 Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 22; [2002] HCA 4 ................................................................................... CLP.580 Vella v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 156 A Crim R 113; [2005] NSWSC 897 ............... CA.60.20, CA.60.80 Verdon v The Queen (1987) 30 A Crim R 388 ............................................................................................... CA.61HA.40 Verran v Roberts [1938] SASR 256 ..................................................................................................................... SPA.10.80 Verrier v Director of Public Prosecutions [1967] 2 AC 195; [1966] 3 WLR 924; (1966) 50 Cr App R 315 .......................................................................................................................................................... CLP.680 Vickers v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 195 .............................................................................................. CPA.289.20 Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 ............. CA.51A.120, CA.35.100, CA.39.100, CA.48.100, CA.53.100, CA.59.100, CA.60.160 Vilmont v Bentley (1886) 18 QBD 322 .............................................................................................................. CA.438.20 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; [1978] HCA 9 ............................................................... CLP.2260 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; 18 ALR 257 .................. CA.19A.520, CA.428I.20, CA.428I.40, CA.27.100, CA.423.40, CA.423.60, CA.423.100, CA.423.120, CA.423.140, CLP.1180, CPA.150.240 Von Lieven v Stewart (1990) 21 NSWLR 52 ..................................................................................... CLP.1380, CLP.1480 Von Starck v The Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1270 .................................................................................................. CPA.162.60 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 ............................................................................. CPA.19.160
W W A Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 175 .................................................................................... LEPRA.9.20 WW v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 165 ...................................................................................................... CA.52AB.160 Wai Yu-Tsang v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 269; [1991] 3 WLR 1006; [1991] 4 All ER 664 ................................ CLP.800 Wakeley v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 321 ....................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 ............. CA.94.240, CA.117.200, CA.194.20, CLP.1480, SPA.10.80 Walker v Crawshaw [1924] NZLR 93 ..................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Walker v The Queen (1998) 101 A Crim R 152 ................................................................................................. CPA.36.20 Walker v Thompson (1896) 22 VLR 529 ......................................................................................................... CA.527A.80 Walker v West [1981] 2 NSWLR 570 .......................................................................................................... LEPRA.48.120 Wallace v Major [1946] KB 473; [1946] 2 All ER 87 .................................................................................... CA.52A.120 Wallis v Lane [1964] VR 293 .................................................................................... CA.94.100, CA.94.300, CA.117.140 Walsh v Loughnan [1991] 2 VR 351 ................................................................................................................ LEPRA.9.20 Walsh v Sainsbury (1925) 36 CLR 464; [1925] HCA 28 .................................................................. CA.45.120, CLP.960 Walsh v Tattersall (1996) 188 CLR 77; 70 ALJR 884; 88 A Crim R 496; 139 ALR 27; [1996] HCA 26 .................................................................................................................................. CPA.21.160, DMTA.25.80
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TABLE OF CASES
Walsh v Tattersall (1996) 188 CLR 77; 88 A Crim R 496; [1996] HCA 26 ....................................................... CA.60.20 Walters v Green [1899] 2 Ch 696 ..................................................................................................................... CA.545B.40 Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; (1951) 35 Cr App R 94 .................................. CA.117.420, CA.188.100, CLP.560 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 ................................................................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160 Walton v Salmon 10 Petty Sessions Review 4530 (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 24 April 1992) ..................... CA.195.120 Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788; [1977] 3 WLR 902; [1978] 1 All ER 542 .......................... CA.23A.60, CLP.1140 Walton, Ex parte (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 141 ...................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Wang v Farkas (2014) 85 NSWLR 390; [2014] NSWCA 29 ............................... CPA.211.20, CPA.213.60, CPA.215.20 Ward v Hodgkins [1957] VR 715 .................................................................................................................... CPA.156.140 Ward v Marsh [1959] VR 26; [1958] ALR 724 ................................................. CA.8.20, LEPRA.36A.20, LEPRA.26.20 Ward v The Queen [1972] WAR 36 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.120 Ward v The Queen (2007) 168 A Crim R 545; [2007] NSWCCA 22 ............................................................. SPA.21A.20 Ward, Lock & Co Ltd v The Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society (1906) 22 TLR 327 ........................... CA.545B.40 Wark, Ex parte (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 125 ......................................................................................................... CA.131.120 Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 ...................................................................... CA.7.80, CA.7.120, CA.61HA.100, CLP.1040, CLP.1280 Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CBNS 180; 140 ER 1052 ...................................................................................... CA.95.80 Wassef v The Queen [2011] VSCA 30 .......................................................................................................... CA.52AB.200 Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 ........................................................................................ LEPRA.48.160 Watkins v Major (1875) LR 10 CP 662 ................................................................................................................ CLP.1480 Watkins v O’Shaughnessy [1939] 1 All ER 385 ....................................................................................................... CLP.80 Watson v AG (NSW) (1987) 8 NSWLR 685; 28 A Crim R 332 .......................... CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.180 Watson v Clarke [1990] 1 NZLR 715 ............................................................................................................... CPA.19.180 Weare, Re [1893] 2 QB 439 ............................................................................................................................. CPA.156.160 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 ...................................................................................... CA.192G.120, CA.178BB.160 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41; 68 ALJR 582; 73 A Crim R 258; 122 ALR 41 ........ CPA.21.80, CPA.21.120, CPA.21.320, CPA.21.400 Webley v Buxton [1977] QB 481 ................................................................................................................... CA.344A.140 Webster v McIntosh (1980) 3 A Crim R 455; [1980] FCA 128 .................................................................... LEPRA.99.60 Webster v Watts (1847) 11 QB 311 .................................................................................................................. LEPRA.9.40 Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 WLR 362 .................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Weeks v Lahood (unreported, SC (NSW), 31 July 1992) ....................................................... CA.546C.60, CA.546C.100 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 ................................... CLP.2260 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 ALJR 23; 68 A Crim R 251 ............. CA.19A.100, CA.19A.160, CA.19A.420 Weisz v Monahan [1962] 1 All ER 664; [1962] 1 WLR 262 ............................................................................ SOA.16.40 Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; [1960] 2 WLR 669; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124 ........................................................................................................................................................... CA.192E.120 Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124 ........... CA.176A.80, CA.176.120, CA.178BA.120, CA.250.60, CLP.80 Wellington v Lake George Mines Pty Ltd (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 326; 79 WN (NSW) 74 ............................. CPA.159.20 Wells v Hopwood (1832) 3 B & A 20; 110 ER 8 ............................................................................................... CA.32.100 Welton v Taneborne (1908) 21 Cox CC 702 ..................................................................................................... CPA.19.160 Wemyss v Hopkins (1875) LR 10 QB 378 .............................................................................. CPA.156.180, CPA.156.220 Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635 .......................................................................................................... CA.529.240 Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422; 15 A Crim R 376 ............................... CPA.62.40, CPA.62.60, CPA.62.120 Wershof v Commissioner of Police [1978] 3 All ER 540; (1978) 68 Cr App R 82 ......................................... CA.58.160 Wesley-Smith v Balzary (1977) 14 ALR 681 ................................................................................................. CA.344A.140 West v Lawday (1865) 11 HLC 375 ............................................................................................................... LEPRA.76.20 West v Perrier [1962] QWN 5 ............................................................................................................................. CA.351.60 West v Suzuka [1964] WAR 112 ......................................................................................................................... CA.351.60 Western Australia v Dick (2006) 161 A Crim R 271; [2006] WASC 8 ............................................................. CA.35.120 Whan v McConaghy (1984) 153 CLR 631; 12 A Crim R 147 ........................................................................... SPA.70.20 Wheeler v Whiting (1840) 9 Car & P 262 ....................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40
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TABLE OF CASES
Wheeley v Western Australia (2007) 173 A Crim R 436; [2007] WASCA 168 .................................................. CA.47.80 Whelan, Ex parte (1872) 11 SCR (NSW) 88 .......................................................................................................... CA.8.20 White v Cassidy (1979) 40 FLR 249 ................................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 White v Cubitt [1930] 1 KB 443 ............................................................................................................................. CA.8.20 White v Garden (1851) 10 CB 919 .................................................................................................................... CA.117.360 White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342; 52 ALJR 724; [1978] HCA 38 ........................................... CA.19A.160, CLP.140 White v The King (1906) 4 CLR 152; [1906] HCA 53 ................................................................................... CA.319.140 White v Weller [1959] Qd R 192 ........................................................................................................................ CA.61.320 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; 9 A Crim R 107 ....................................................................... CPA.36.20 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; 9 A Crim R 107; [1983] HCA 42 ............................................ CLP.1800 Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463 .............................................................................. CA.117.160, CA.117.360 Whitley v Stumbles [1930] AC 544 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.3.40 Whittaker v Campbell [1984] 1 QB 318; [1983] 3 WLR 676; (1983) 77 Cr App R 267 ............................. CA.154A.40 Whitten v Hall (1993) 29 NSWLR 680 ............................................................................................................. CPA.19.160 Wicks v DPP [1947] AC 362 ................................................................................................................................. CA.10.40 Wicks, Ex parte; Re Cameron (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 144 ................................................................................ SOA.15.40 Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472; 38 A Crim R 358 ............................................. CPA.34.20 Wiffin v Kincard (1807) 2 Bos & PNR 471; 127 ER 713 ................................................................................. CA.61.180 Wightman v The Land Board of Canterbury District and Quirk (1912) 31 NZLR 799 ................................ CA.19A.540 Wilcox v Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464 ................................................................................................................. CA.345.80 Wilkins v Condell [1940] SASR 139 ........................................................................................................................ CLP.80 Wilkinson v Banking Corporation [1948] 1 KB 721 ............................................................................................ CA.10.40 Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5 .................. CLP.280, CLP.1080, CLP.1100, CLP.1120, CLP.1160 Williams v DPP [1991] 3 All ER 651 ............................................................................................................. CPA.156.140 Williams v Director of Public Prosecutions (2011) 210 A Crim R 554; [2011] 1085 ............................... LEPRA.99.140 Williams v Douglas (1949) 78 CLR 521; [1949] HCA 40 ............................................................... CA.7.80, DMTA.7.40 Williams v Morrison (1982) 59 FLR 473 ........................................................................................................ CPA.156.160 Williams v Osborne (1975) 61 Cr App R 1 ...................................................................................................... CA.316.200 Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App R 5 ........................................................................................................ CA.117.260 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 61 A Crim R 431; [1992] HCA 34 ...... CPA.19.80, CPA.19.100, CPA.19.140, CPA.19.160, CPA.66.40 Williams v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 591; 53 ALJR 101; [1978] HCA 49 .............................. CA.7.120, DMTA.7.40 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 28 A Crim R 1; [1986] HCA 88 ..................... CA.58.280, LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.140 Williams v The Queen (1996) 17 WAR 17; 90 A Crim R 200 ........................................................................... SPA.10.80 Williams v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 26 ......................................................... CA.86.100 Williams v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 286 ................................................................................................. CA.52AB.80 Williams; Ex parte Minister for Justice and A-G [1965] Qd R 86 ................................................................. CA.344A.60 Williamson v Freer (1874) LR 9 CP 393 .......................................................................................................... CA.529.240 Willis v Burnes (1921) 29 CLR 511 ........................................................................................ CA.527C.40, CA.527C.140 Willmott v Atack [1977] QB 498; [1976] 3 WLR 753; 3 All ER 794; (1976) 63 Cr App R 207 ............... CA.546C.60, CA.58.160 Wills v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 208; [2007] NSWCCA 160 ................................................................. CLP.580 Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 .................................................................................................................... CPA.62.40 Wilson v Dobra (1955) 57 WALR 95 .................................................................................................................. CA.351.60 Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 ......................................................................................................... CA.61.120, CA.97.120 Wilson v Pringle [1987] 1 QB 237 .................................................................................................. CA.61.100, CA.61.140 Wilson v Skeock (1949) 65 TLR 418 .................................................................................................................. CA.547.20 Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334; 44 ALJR 221; [1970] HCA 17 ............. CA.19A.60, CA.19A.520, CLP.120 Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 .......... CA.4.160, CA.24.20, CA.24.60, CA.24.80, CA.24.120, CA.24.140, CA.24.200, CA.24.240, CA.39.120, CA.54.100, CLP.120, CLP.1300 Wilson, Ex parte (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 71 .................................................................................... CA.502.20, CA.502.60 Wilson’s Case (1856) Dears & Bell 127 ............................................................................................................. CA.346.80
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TABLE OF CASES
Wiltshire v Barrett [1966] 1 QB 312; [1965] 2 WLR 1195; [1965] 2 All ER 271 ......... LEPRA.99.100, LEPRA.99.160 Wimble v Foulsham [1908] VLR 98 ................................................................................................................. CA.131.120 Windsor, Ex parte (1865) 10 Cox CC 118 .......................................................................................................... CA.250.40 Winkle v Wiltshire [1951] 1 KB 684 .................................................................................................................. CA.417.20 Winter v Woolfe [1931] 1 KB 549 ...................................................................................................................... SOA.15.40 Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 KB 167 .................................................................................................................... LEPRA.9.40 Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297; [1969] 3 WLR 706; [1969] 3 All ER 275 .......................................... CPA.66.40 Wolverton UDC v Willis [1962] 1 WLR 205; [1962] 1 All ER 243 ................................................................... SOA.6.40 Wong Pooh Yin alias Kwang Sin alias Kar Sin v Public Prosecutor [1955] AC 93 ......................................... CA.417.20 Wooby, Ex parte; Re Robinson (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 85 ............................................................................ CA.546B.120 Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1986] 1 WLR 796; [1986] 2 All ER 570; (1986) 83 Cr App R 145 .................................................................................................................................. CA.4.200 Wood v Galea (1996) 84 A Crim R 274 ............................................................................................................. SPA.Pt1.20 Wood v Galea (1997) 92 A Crim R 287 ............................................................................................................... CLP.2680 Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 ...................................................................... CLP.580 Woodbridge v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 503; [2010] NSWCCA 185 .................................................... CLP.2260 Wooding v Oxley (1839) 9 Car & P 1 ............................................................................................................. LEPRA.9.40 Woodley v Boyd [2001] NSWCA 35 .................................................................................. LEPRA.99.40, LEPRA.99.140 Woods v Lindsay [1910] SC (J) 88 ......................................................................................................................... CA.8.20 Woods v Rogers; Ex parte Woods sub nom R v Rogers [1983] 2 Qd R 212; (1983) 9 A Crim R 209 ................................................................................................................................................................... CPA.36.20 Woodward v Koessler [1958] 1 WLR 1255; 3 All ER 557 ................................................................................ CA.97.120 Woodworth v The State (1881) 20 Tex App 375 .................................................................................................... CLP.720 Woolley v Bomford [1969] Tas SR 127 ......................................................................................................... CA.527C.140 Woolley v Fitzgerald [1969] Tas SR 65 .............................................................................................................. CA.61.160 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 ................................................ CA.19A.120, CA.19A.140 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 .................. CLP.40, CLP.160, CLP.300, CLP.360, CLP.1140, CLP.1360, CLP.1440, CLP.1540, CLP.2240 Wootton v Sievier [1913] 3 KB 499 ................................................................................................................... SOA.13.20 Wormsley v Aitken (unreported, SC (NSW), 16 March 1990); 10 Petty Sessions Review 4074 .................. CA.546C.60 Wornes v Rankmore [1976] Qd R 85 .................................................................................................................. CA.33.160 Wrigglesworth v The Queen (1987) 37 CCC (3d) 385 ................................................................................... CPA.156.160 Wright v Morton (1997) 95 A Crim R 125 ........................................................................................................... CLP.1520 Wright v Nicholson (1970) 54 Cr App R 38 ..................................................................................................... CPA.150.40 Wunsch v SA Police (1995) 80 A Crim R 562 ............................................................................ CPA.19.100, CPA.19.160
Y Yager v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 28; 51 ALJR 367 .................................................................................. CA.19A.660 Yates v Wilson (1989) 22 FCR 397; 40 A Crim R 113 .................................................................................... CA.316.180 Yeates v Hoare [1981] VR 1034 .............................................................................................................................. CA.7.80 Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48; (1989) 45 A Crim R 1 .................................................... CA.338.20, CLP.660 Yeo v Capper [1964] SASR 1 ................................................................................................... CA.527C.60, CA.527C.100 Yip Chiu-Cheung v The Queen [1995] 1 AC 111; [1994] 3 WLR 514; [1994] 2 All ER 924 ............................ CLP.760 Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; [1985] HCA 65 .............................................. CA.19A.200, CLP.80 Young v Bryan [1962] Tas SR 323 ..................................................................................................................... CA.93X.80 Young v Cassells (1914) 33 NZLR 852 ....................................................................... CA.61N.80, CA.546C.60, CLP.960 Young v Owen (1972) 19 FLR 70 .................................................................................................................... CA.546C.60 Young v Peck (1912) 23 Cox CC 270 .............................................................................................................. CA.545B.40
Z Zanetti, Re (1985) 16 A Crim R 126 ................................................................................................................... CPA.19.40 Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 ....................................................................................................... CA.61.120
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Zaravinos v New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; 151 A Crim R 24; [2004] NSWCA 320 .............. LEPRA.99.60, LEPRA.99.140 Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; (1987) 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26 ............... CA.19A.120, CA.423.40, CA.423.60, CA.423.80, CA.423.100, CA.423.120, CA.423.140 Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26 ........................................................................................................................................... CLP.2240, CLP.2260 Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310; 71 ALJR 32; [1996] HCA 31 ...................... CA.60.120 Zierenberg v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 183 ........................................................................................................ SOA.13.20 Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234; 112 A Crim R 114 ..................................................................... CPA.150.120
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DIRECTORY Criminal Liability Principles
Quick Reference Crimes Act 1900
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This directory should be used to locate material in New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017. To use the directory, place the right thumb on the outer edge of this page against the required subject area. Then fold back the remaining page edges to align the directory edge mark with the corresponding page edge mark.
Crimes Regulation 2015
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007
Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control ) Act 2012
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985
Summary Offences Act 1988 (Extracts)
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Summary Offences Regulation 2015
Law
Enforcement (Powers Responsibilities) Act 2002
and
Bail Act 2013
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Bail Regulation 2014
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Index
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CLP
CRIMINAL LIABILITY PRINCIPLES [CLP.20]
Introduction
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This section deals with some principles of criminal liability which are not specifically relevant to a particular Act but which are matters of general application. Subjects are dealt with as follows: Criminal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
liability, capacity and related matters Criminal liability – an overview [CLP.40]. Criminal Defences [CLP.60]. Meaning of particular terms in statutes: [CLP.80]. Accident: [CLP.120]. Actus reus: [CLP.140]. Actus reus – voluntariness: [CLP.160]. Aliens: [CLP.180]. Automatism and involuntary acts: [CLP.200]. Causation – general principles: [CLP.380]. Novus actus interveniens: [CLP.540]. Children and infants: [CLP.560]. Conspiracy: [1.265] Proof of conspiracy: [CLP.780] Types of conspiracy: [CLP.800] Corporations: [CLP.840]. Duress: [CLP.860]. Incitement: [CLP.880]. Indictment/charge: [CLP.900]. Jurisdiction, penalty and cross references: [CLP.920]. Elements of incitement: [CLP.940]. Element (1) Incitement to commit an offence – actus reus: [CLP.960]. Element (2) Mens rea of incitement: [1.310.120]. Insanity or mental illness: [CLP.1020]. Intoxication: [CLP.1180]. Irresistible impulse: [CLP.1200]. Marital coercion: [CLP.1220]. Mens rea, strict liability and intent: [CLP.1240]. Mens rea – the requirement of a guilty mind: [CLP.1260] Presumption that mens rea must be proved: [CLP.1280] The various forms of mens rea: [CLP.1300] Coincidence with the actus reus and partial mens rea: [CLP.1320] Mens rea – abnormal and particular mental states: [CLP.1340] Mens rea and strict and absolute liability offences: [CLP.1360] Mens rea – “defence” of honest and reasonable mistake of fact: [CLP.1380] Intention: [CLP.1400] Necessity: [CLP.1420]
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Criminal Liability Principles • • • • •
[CLP.20]
Accomplices: [CLP.100] Claim of right: [CLP.600] Common purpose: [CLP.620] Complicity: [CLP.640] Joint criminal enterprise: [CLP.1000].
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Proof of criminal liability • Burden and standard of proof: [CLP.360]. • Beyond reasonable doubt – jury direction: [CLP.480]. • Circumstantial evidence: [CLP.580]. • Presumption of innocence: [CLP.1440]. • Presumption of regularity: [CLP.1460]. • Presumption of knowledge of law: [CLP.1480]. • Presumption that natural consequences intended: [CLP.1500]. • Presumption of continuance: [CLP.1520]. • Presumption of sanity: [CLP.1540]. • Presumption of death: [CLP.1560]. • Wife acting under husband’s coercion: [CLP.1580]. Trial process • Arrest, charge and committal: [CLP.1600]. • The finding of a bill of indictment: [CLP.1640]. • Case management provisions and listing for trial: [CLP.1660]. • Trial by jury and judge alone trial: [CLP.1680]. • Pre-trial applications: [CLP.1700]. • Arraignment of the accused before a jury panel: [CLP.1720]. • Jury empanelment: [CLP.1740]. • Judge’s introductory remarks: [CLP.1760]. • Crown and defence opening addresses: [CLP.1780]. • Presentation of the prosecution case: [CLP.1800]. • Closing of the Crown case: [CLP.1820]. • Defence case: [CLP.1840]. • Closing addresses: [CLP.1860]. • Trial judge’s summing up: [CLP.1880]. • Retirement and deliberation of the jury: [CLP.1900]. • Return of the jury and the taking of the verdict: [CLP.1920]. Exculpations from criminal liability • Criminal defences: [CLP.2100] • Defences of lack of understanding and capacity: [CLP.2120] • Defences involving lack of intent: [CLP.2140] • Defences involving questions of voluntariness or compulsion to act: [CLP.2160] • Partial defences to murder: [CLP.2180] • Special pleas and related matters: [CLP.2200] • Situations that do not give rise to a legal defence: [CLP.2220] • Prosecution must usually disprove defence: [CLP.2240] • Evidentiary onus, threshold required: [CLP.2260] • Trial judge’s duty to direct on available defences not sought by the defence: [CLP.2280]
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[CLP.40]
Criminal liability – an overview
What is a crime? A primary feature of criminal liability is the liability to punishment whether by way of imprisonment or a fine or even, for example, loss of a driver’s licence. Because of the diversity of acts or omissions that may lead to punishment of some kind, there is no generally accepted definition of what a crime is. In Proprietary Articles Trade Association v Attorney-General for Canada [1931] AC 310 at 324, Lord Atkin said: … the domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the State and that those who commit them are punished. There was at common law and in New South Wales until 1999, a distinction drawn between felonies and misdemeanours, see [CA.9.20]–[CA.10.40]. An older description of a crime is this: A crime or misdemesnor [sic] is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemesnors which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms; though, in common usage, the word “crimes” is made to denote such offences are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler names of “misdemesnors” only.1
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Liability for punishment is common to a whole range of acts and omissions broadly categorised as criminal. Some acts or omissions are “truly criminal” in character: see He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 533 (CLR); 209 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ. Many serious statutory offences or offences defined by statute were originally crimes at common law. Other acts or omissions, statutory offences of a regulatory kind, are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which are prohibited under a penalty in the public interest. Categories of offences – offences are generally classified into three categories, that is: 1. serious offences requiring proof not only of an actus reus, but also of mens rea (a guilty mind), see [CLP.1260] and following; 2. statutory offences where the prosecution needs only to prove the actus reus, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability if an honest and reasonable mistake of fact can be shown, see [CLP.1360], [CLP.1380]; and 3. statutory offences of absolute liability, again where the prosecution needs only to prove the actus reus, but where it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault, see [CLP.1360]. Requirements for criminal liability – concerning a truly criminal charge, for criminal liability to be incurred, there must be (within the jurisdiction of the criminal law of New South Wales): 1. a prohibited act or omission (actus reus); 2. coinciding with a wrongful (guilty) state of mind (mens rea); 3. by a person of legal capacity or a corporation; 4. in the absence of a defence, excuse or justification for that act or omission; 5. where there is any issue of identification, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person charged was the person responsible. New South Wales criminal jurisdiction – the geographical jurisdiction of the criminal law of New South Wales is governed by Pt 1A of the Crimes Act 1900. As to the application of laws of the State to the coastal waters of the State and airspace above those waters, see Pt 10 of the Interpretation Act 1987 at [6.26860]ff. Prohibited act or omission – this is known as the actus reus or conduct element. For detailed commentary on actus reus, see [CLP.140]–[CLP.160]. Such an act must be a voluntary act, see [CLP.160]. The prosecution bears the onus of proving that an accused’s act was voluntary; but in the absence of some contrary evidence, it is presumed that an act done by a person who is apparently conscious is a voluntary act, see [CLP.160] Actus reus – voluntariness.
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CLP
[CLP.40]
Criminal Liability Principles
Criminal Liability Principles
[CLP.40]
Inchoate offences – criminal liability may be incurred even when the contemplated crime has not yet been committed. These so called “inchoate” crimes are conspiracy [CLP.780], attempt s 34AA of the Crimes Act 1900 and incitement [CLO.660]. Criminal liability for the actions of others – an accused may be criminally liable for the actions of another or others through the doctrine of common purpose (or joint criminal enterprise as it is often called) or extended common purpose, see [CA.19A.200]. An accused may also be liable as an accessory before the fact of a crime or as an accessory after the fact of a crime, see [CA.19A.200] and ss 345–351B of the Crimes Act 1900. Wrongful state of mind – for offences of a truly criminal character (by comparison to regulatory type offences), there is a presumption that an element of such an offence is a wrongful (guilty) state of mind. This is known as mens rea or the fault element. Intention is not the only form of mens rea. Mens rea may consist also of recklessness, knowledge and sometimes negligence, see [CLP.1300]. Particular statutory offences may specify other fault elements such as causing, permitting or possessing. Some statutory offences (called strict liability offences) presume mens rea in the absence of evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact, see [CLP.1360], [CLP.1380]. Other statutory offences create absolute liability, where mens rea plays no part, see [CLP.1360].
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Ignorance of the law – the requirement of a wrongful state of mind does not require that the prosecution prove that the accused knew that his act or omission constituted an offence. Ignorance of the law will not excuse an offence: the many authorities include Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473; [1937] 2 All ER 646 at 479 (AC); R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70; Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544; [1950] 1 All ER 300 at 546 (KB); Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493; (2004) 78 ALJR 957; [2004] HCA 30 at [1] per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J. Mental illness – an accused’s sanity is presumed by law, see [CLP.1140] and [CLP.1540]. There is a defence of mental illness based upon a lack of moral blame arising from an intellectual failure of understanding (but not through an emotional inability to control actions), see [CLP.1020]–[CLP.1160]. An accused who seeks to establish mental illness to avoid criminal responsibility bears the legal onus of proving mental illness on the balance of probabilities, see [CLP.1140]. Children – it is conclusively presumed that no child under the age of 10 years can be guilty of an offence, see [CLP.560]. A child between the ages of 10 and 14 is presumed to be incapable of crime (doli incapax) but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the child knew that what he or she was doing was wrong, see [CLP.560]. Corporations – criminal offences may be committed by corporations as well as by individuals, see [CLP.840]. Absence of a defence, excuse or justification – there are various defences or excuses or justifications, some of which entitle an accused to a verdict of not guilty or, in the case of mental illness, to a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, [CLP.1060]. These are the defences etc of mental illness [CLP.1020], automatism [CLP.200] and the “self-help” defences of self-defence s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 , duress [CLP.860] and necessity [CLP.1420]. Others, being the defences of provocation [2.1890] and substantial impairment by abnormality of mind (formerly diminished responsibility) s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 , together with infanticide [2.1830], can operate as partial defences where murder is charged so as to reduce that charge to manslaughter (or infanticide if applicable). With statutory offences, sometimes legislation creating the offence itself provides a defence (for example s 29 of the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985, possession of more than the traffickable quantity of a prohibited drug otherwise than for supply – [DMTA.29.40]). With statutory offences which do not involve proof of mens rea, honest and reasonable mistake of fact may be a defence, [CLP.1380]. Intoxication, of itself, is not a defence, see sub-heading Intoxication. Defences and burden and standard of proof – a person accused of a crime has the presumption of innocence, see [CLP.1440]. Apart from mental illness, the prosecution bears the legal burden of proof in a criminal trial: Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72
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(HL), [CLP.360]. However, an accused can bear an evidentiary onus to point to some evidence capable of raising some defence, excuse or justification before the prosecution is obliged to negative that issue beyond reasonable doubt: R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA), [CLP.360]. Any issue to be proved by the prosecution must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, see [CLP.360]. Where an accused bears a legal burden of proof, this needs only to be proved on the balance of probabilities, see s 141(2) of the Evidence Act 1995. Intoxication – voluntary intoxication by alcohol or drugs is not a defence as such. Intoxication is governed by Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1990. Part 11A makes a distinction between offences of specific intent and other offences. By s 428C, intoxication may be taken into account in determining whether the accused had the specific intent necessary for an offence of specific intent. Otherwise, if the intoxication was self-induced, it cannot be taken into account, s 428D. By s 428G, self-induced intoxication cannot be taken into account in determining whether an accused’s conduct was voluntary. Although where relevant, the prosecution bears the legal onus of eliminating an issue of intoxication. An accused who wishes to rely on intoxication as a defence bears an evidentiary onus to raise or point to evidence that there is a reasonable possibility that intoxication affected his ability to form the necessary specific intent: R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA), [CA.428I.40]. Identification – where an issue of identification arises, the trial judge must give special directions to the jury. The issue of identification is dealt with in Pt 3.9 of the Evidence Act 1995, see [6.11880] and following. 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries (5th ed, 1776) Vol 1, p 5, quoted in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd ed, 1952.
[CLP.60]
Criminal Defences
See Exculpations from criminal liability at [1.1300].
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Meaning of particular terms in statutes
This section considers the meaning of, or provides cross-references to, the meaning of the following frequently used expressions in sections creating criminal offences: Allow(s) Attempt(s) Cause(s) Custody, lawful Dishonestly Excuse Fraudulently Knowingly Knowingly concerned Knowingly permit Lawful custody Lawful excuse Maliciously Permit(s) Possess, possession Reasonable Reasonable cause Reasonable excuse Reasonably suspects (or reasonable suspicion) Recklessly Suffers Suffers or permits
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Unlawful, unlawfully Wilfully “Allow(s)” Ordinarily speaking, before a person can be said to “allow” anything, there must be something in the nature of actual knowledge or connivance, or in some cases, extensive delegation of authority in circumstances where the person alleged to have allowed the thing has delegated his power to prevent it from being done.1 The question of when a person who delegates to another can be said to have “allowed” an act or omission by the other has been considered.2“Allow” may mean negligently permit.3“The word ‘allow’ involves the concept of knowingly permitting or suffering [a] state of affairs to exist, and an owner could not be said to allow something to happen when he did not know in fact that it was happening or had happened or was likely to happen.”4 Other cases have considered the meaning of “allow”.5 For authorities in relation to owners or occupiers of premises “allowing” things therein, see [20.65802]. The prosecution must prove the mental element implied in “allows”.6 Provisions proscribing the “allowing” of things often use the term “shall not suffer or permit”, as to which see “Suffers or permits” below. General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Attempt(s)” See s 344A and [CA.344A.20]–[CA.344A.140].
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“Cause(s)” Used in penal provisions, “causes” may operate in two ways. More commonly, the accused causes some other person to act in a way which is proscribed.7 Less commonly, the accused may bring about a proscribed outcome without the involvement of anyone else.8 As to the former, where it was an offence to cause certain goods to be offered for sale, it was held that one person does not, within the meaning of the provision, “cause” another to do the prohibited act. The exception is where he or she contemplates or desires that it will ensue and it is done on his or her actual authority, express or implied, or in consequence of him or her exerting some capacity which he or she possesses in fact or law to control or influence the acts of the other.9 The word “cause” contemplates a direction for something to be done, or at all events some active influencing agency, and not mere permission.10 In cases of this kind, it has been held that the offence of causing an unlawful act requires proof of mens rea in the form of knowledge of facts by the accused rendering the act of the other party unlawful.11 The general law requirement in “causing” cases is that knowledge is necessary.12 The prosecution must prove the mental element.13 In the latter case, ie where an accused is connected with a proscribed outcome without directing or involving anyone else, the courts have put more emphasis on the outcome itself and less on the intention which preceded it. Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475 was an environmental prosecution where it was held that a person who “causes or knowingly permits” any poisonous etc matter to enter a stream commits an offence. The defendants had installed equipment at their works to prevent water overflowing into a river. The equipment had never given trouble and was regularly inspected. A pump became blocked without the defendants’ negligence and, without their knowledge, pollutants flowed into a river. Lord Wilberforce (at 834) said that “caused” should be given a common sense meaning. Similarly, Lord Salmon expressed the view (at 847) that what or who has caused a certain event to occur is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than by abstract metaphysical theory. Lord Salmon (at 847) said:
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… [i]f they did not cause it, what did? There was no intervening act of a third party nor was there any act of God to which it could be attributed. … It seems plain to me that the appellants caused the pollution by the active operation of their plant. They certainly did not intend to cause pollution but they intended to do the acts which caused it. Viscount Dilhorne said (at 839–840): … what, then, is meant by the word “caused” in the subsection? If a man, intending to secure a particular result, does an act which brings that about, he causes that result. If he deliberately and intentionally does certain acts of which the natural consequence is that certain results ensue, may he not also be said to have caused those results even though they may not have been intended by him? I think he can, just as he can be said to cause the result if he is negligent, without intending that result.14 In a similar case, it was held that to establish a case of “causing” a polluting discharge, it was not necessary to establish that the defendant was active in putting the pollutant into the water.15 General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Custody” (lawful custody) See [CA.310D.60]. “Dishonestly” See [CA.178BA.140]. “Excuse”
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See “Lawful excuse” and “Reasonable excuse” below. “Fraudulently” In the context of offences concerning the misappropriation of property, “fraudulently” means and is interchangeable with “dishonestly”.16 The test of whether an accused has acted dishonestly is wholly subjective; according to the “current standards of ordinary decent people”.17 The words “fraudulently” and “defraud” ordinarily have a very similar meaning.18 There is a distinction between an intent to defraud and an intent to deceive. “To deceive is (…) to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury.”19 It has been noted in the High Court however, that this definition is not exhaustive and that there is a “great reluctance amongst lawyers to attempt to define fraud”.20 In R v Kastratovic, King CJ said: The essential notion of defrauding is dishonestly depriving some person of money or property, or depriving him of, or prejudicially affecting him in relation to, some lawful right, interest, opportunity or advantage which he possesses. As Lord Radcliffe pointed out in Welham v DPP [1961] AC 103 at 123 (…): “although in the nature of things it is almost invariably associated with the obtaining of an advantage for the person who commits the fraud, it is the effect upon the person who is the object of the fraud that ultimately determines its meaning”. The detriment suffered by the person defrauded is usually economic but is not necessarily so. To defraud must involve something more than the mere inducing of a course of action by dishonest means: Welham v DPP, per Lord Radcliffe at 127. In offences constituted by obtaining money or property with intent to defraud, that something more may be found in the mere parting by the victim of the fraud with money or property which he is entitled to retain and which he would not have parted with but for the use of the dishonest means: Balcombe v De Simoni (1972) 126 CLR 576. In other cases, the defrauding may consist of deceiving a person responsible for a public duty into doing something that he would not have done but for the deceit, or not doing
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something that but for it he would have done. In all cases, the element of intent to defraud connotes the intention to produce a consequence which is in some sense detrimental to a lawful right, interest, opportunity or advantage of the person to be defrauded, and is an intention distinct from and additional to the intention to use the forbidden means (…).21 Dishonesty is an essential ingredient in every case of intent to defraud.22“[F]raud involves deliberate dishonesty and nothing short of deliberate dishonesty amounts to fraud.”23 In many cases, the deception itself will be powerful evidence of dishonesty.24 It is not necessary to define dishonesty for a jury – it is sufficient if a jury is told that in deciding the question of dishonesty, they should apply the current standards of ordinary people.25 However, if the accused raises a claim of right, a test simply expressed in terms of the standards of ordinary people will leave a jury with inadequate instruction.26 The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 contains provisions as to the pleading of fradulent intent. By Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 13, it is sufficient to allege that the accused did an act with intent to defraud without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person and it is not necessary to state the fraudulent intent or purpose, see [4.15990]. By Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 8, if property has been stolen, embezzled, fraudulently applied etc as to amount to a serious indictable offence, any number of receivers at different times of the property, and of different parts of the property, may be charged in the same indictment, and tried together, even if the principal offender is not included in the indictment, see [4.15990]. General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used.
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“Knowingly”, “knowingly concerned”, “knowingly permit” The term “knowingly” imports guilty knowledge as the required mens rea. The requirement of knowledge was dealt with by the High Court in Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR 1; 35 A Crim R 382 where the court said at 385 (A Crim R): [W]here (…) actual knowledge is either a specified element of the offence charged or a necessary element of the guilty mind required for the offence, it may be established as a matter of inference from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offence. However, three matters should be noted. First, in such cases the question remains one of actual knowledge: Giorgianni (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 504–507; 16 A Crim R 163 at 186–189; He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523; 15 A Crim R 203 at 570; 237. It is never the case that something less than knowledge may be treated as satisfying a requirement of actual knowledge. Secondly, the question is that of the knowledge of the accused and not that which might be postulated of a hypothetical person in the position of the accused, although, of course, that may not be an irrelevant consideration. Finally, where knowledge is inferred from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offence, knowledge must be the only rational inference available. All that having been said, the fact remains that a combination of suspicious circumstances and failure to make inquiry may sustain an inference of knowledge of the actual or likely existence of the relevant matter. In a case where a jury is invited to draw such an inference, a failure to make inquiry may sometimes, as a matter of lawyer’s shorthand, be referred to as wilful blindness. Where that expression is used, care should be taken to ensure that a jury is not distracted by it from a consideration of the matter in issue as a matter of fact to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.27 In the case of an offence governed by “knowingly”, the prosection must prove knowledge of the relevant facts not knowledge that those facts constituted a criminal offence.28 In terms of being “knowingly concerned” in some act, a person cannot become criminally involved in an act made unlawful by mere knowledge or inaction on his or her part – some act or conduct on his or her part is necessary.29 While the expression “knowingly concerned” is not used to define criminal liability in the Crimes Act 1900 or the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985, it is used in penal provisions of some regulatory legislation.30
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The meaning of the expression “knowingly concerned in” has been considered in a number of cases.31 The High Court has held that the words “knowingly concerned” in s 75B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) required that the person charged must have knowledge of the essential elements constituting contravention of the Act.32 Where officers of a company were charged with “knowingly and wilfully” permitting a company not to keep proper books of account, it was held that the prosecution has to prove that the accused knew that the thing was not done and in the free exercise of will, permitted the “non-doing” of it.33 It has been said that it is doubtful that the expression “knowingly permits” is any different from simply “permits”, see footnote under heading “Permit(s)” below. General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Lawful custody” See [CA.310D.60]. “Lawful excuse” Section 417 provides that wherever, by the Act, doing a particular act or having a specified article or thing in possession without lawful authority or excuse, is made or expressed to be an offence, the proof of such authority or excuse shall lie on the accused. For commentary on lawful excuse, see [CA.417.20]. “Maliciously”
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This expression was defined in s 5 of the Crimes Act 1900 (it has since been repealed). For commentary, see [CA.5.100]. “Permit(s)” In general, both Australian authorities34 and English authorities35 have construed the word “permits” as meaning “to intentionally allow”. “[A] permitting offence in general (…) require[s] knowledge of all the facts constituting the principal offence for a conviction on the permitting count to be supported.”36“Permit” can mean either to authorise something to be done, or alternatively, to fail to act to prevent something happening.37 As to the latter, one meaning of “permit” is, “to abstain from taking reasonable steps to prevent the act where it is within a man’s power to prevent it.”38 Whether failing to prevent an occurrence constitutes “permitting”, it is a question of fact. In one case, the High Court said that on the particular facts there, “mere inactivity or failure to take some steps (…) does not necessarily establish permission (…) It is a question of fact in each case what is the true inference to be drawn (…)”.39 In a case of failure to act, the accused must have had not only the power to have intervened, but the duty to have done so as well.40 Some cases (particularly older cases41) have construed “permits” as not requiring knowledge and, rather, imposing strict liability.42 The line of English authorities espousing this view have been described as “anomalous”.43 The best known such Australian case is Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 where on a charge of permitting an unlicensed person to drive a motor vehicle, proof that the defendant knew that the driver was unlicensed was held unnecessary. McTiernan J at 543 said that guilt did not depend on whether the defendant knew or believed that the driver was not the holder of a licence; mens rea justifying the conviction consisted in the intent to do a prohibited act, ie to give an unlicensed person permission to drive. Whether intention or knowledge is required depends upon the provision under consideration. The Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; [1963] 1 All ER 223 held that there is a presumption of the requirement of mens rea in offences created by statute or statutory instrument but that this presumption can be displaced by the language of the statute or the subject matter with which it deals and both must be considered.44 The knowledge required does not have to be actual knowledge – “a belief that a contravention is highly likely or probable will suffice”.45 In City of Adelaide v A/asian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40
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CLR 481 at 487, Knox CJ said that there is mens rea where a defendant “knows or has reason to anticipate or suspect that the particular act is to be or is likely to be done”. But intention to commit a breach of the statute is not required.46 The prosecution must prove the mental element implied in “permits”.47 It has been said that it is doubtful that the expression “knowingly permits” is any different from simply “permits”.48 Sometimes the expression “suffers or permits” is used in provisions creating offences. The words “permit” or “suffer” are sometimes used as synonymous49 but there are some slight differences in their meaning.50 It has been remarked that “suffering” is less positive than “permitting” and means passively or implicitly allowing an act to take place as distinct from actively or expressly allowing it.51 The distinction has been considered elsewhere.52 General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Possess”, “Possession” Section 7 contains a definition of “possession”. For commentary on possession, see [CA.7.80]. “Reasonable”
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In the High Court Dawson J has said: … [r]easonableness provides a test which is well-known in both criminal and civil law and, though it may involve a judgment of degree, has a ready application in widely differing circumstances. The fact that the test of reasonableness frequently involves a question of degree so that minds may differ upon the answer does not relieve a tribunal of the duty to apply the test where that is the test laid down (…).53 In another case, “[t]he word ‘reasonable’ is widely used in the law. Great issues are often resolved by reference to it. It is not, however, a term of art. It is an ordinary word having the meaning attributed to it by ordinary people. (…) Inherent in all of [its] meanings is the element of judgment. This inevitably implies the possibility that reasonable people will differ in their judgments without departing from the bounds of reasonableness.”54 The meaning of the expression “reasonable hypothesis” has been considered.55 “Reasonable excuse”, “reasonable cause” In their joint judgment in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 (a case concerning possession of a prohibited article in a public place), Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, after noting that the term “reasonable excuse” has been used in many statutes and is the subject of many reported decisions,56 said at 464 (CLR); 331 (A Crim R): “But decisions on other statutes provide no guidance because what is a reasonable excuse depends not only on the circumstances of the individual case but also on the purpose of the provision to which the defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ is an exception”. The comment is made in the joint judgment that, in the context of “reasonable excuse”, the courts will have to make value judgments. [T]he reality is that when legislatures enact defences such as “reasonable excuse” they effectively give, and intend to give, to the courts the power to determine the content of such defences. Defences in this form are categories of indeterminate reference that have no content until a court makes its decision. They effectively require the courts to prescribe the relevant rule of conduct after the fact of its occurrence.57 Dawson J in Taikato at 470 (CLR); 336 (A Crim R) said that a reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person and is different from a lawful excuse. The authorities however, do provide some general guidance in relation to “reasonable excuse”. In Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417 (concerning a provision providing that
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witness before the Commission should not, without reasonable excuse, refuse or fail to answer a question), Kirby P (Meagher JA and O’Keefe AJA agreeing) said (at 436 (NSWLR); 429 (A Crim R)) that in a provision which imposes a criminal sanction for its breach, these words would not be given a narrow meaning and (at 437 (NSWLR); 431 (A Crim R)), that, the issue was not whether the objecting witness expressed a reasonable excuse, but whether he or she in fact had a reasonable excuse at the time of the refusal or failure to answer a question. In a case of trespass onto a poultry farm as a protest, it was held that the question of whether the trespass was with a reasonable excuse was to be determined by reference to an objective assessment of the particular facts including both the trespassers’ beliefs and the application of community standards.58 As to the onus of proof, where by the terms of the section absence of reasonable excuse is an element of the offence, the prosecution must prove that element beyond reasonable doubt.59 For further commentary on reasonable excuse, see [CA.316.200] Defence of “reasonable excuse”. As to “reasonable cause”, it has been held that a mistake of law, if reasonable, can constitute reasonable cause,60 and that a bona fide mistake of fact or law based on reasonable grounds can amount to reasonable excuse as well as reasonable cause.61 “Reasonable cause” for an action or a belief is just as much a positive fact capable of determination by a third party as is a broken ankle or a legal right (…) the plain and natural meaning of the words “has reasonable cause” imports the existence of a fact or state of facts and not the mere belief by the person challenged that the fact or state of facts existed (…) this meaning of the words has been accepted in innumerable legal decisions for many generations (…) “reasonable cause” for a belief when the subject of legal dispute has been always treated as an objective fact to be proved by one or other party and to be determined by the appropriate tribunal.62 General note:
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With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Reasonably suspects”, “reasonable suspicion” The meaning of the term “reasonably suspects” may not be materially different from the expression “with reasonable cause suspects”.63 In the context of s 352 of the Crimes Act 1900, the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540 at [53] made the following statement with respect to “reasonable suspicion”: (a) A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility. There must be something that would create in the mind of a reasonable person an apprehension or fear of one of the state of affairs covered by s 357E. A reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence. (b) Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. A suspicion may be based on hearsay material or materials that may be inadmissible in evidence. The materials must have some probative value. (c) What is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle or making the arrest at the time he did so. Having ascertained that information, the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the police officer formed. In answering that question, regard must be had to the source of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances. In Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942; [1970] 2 WLR 441; [1969] 3 All ER 1626, it was said that: … [s]uspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking; “I suspect but I cannot prove”. Suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. Lord Devlin there said at 949:
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… [t]here is another distinction between reasonable suspicion and prima facie proof. Prima facie proof consists of admissible evidence. Suspicion can take into account matters that could not be put in evidence at all.64 The suspicion need not prove to be correct; it need only be reasonable.65 Whether a suspicion is reasonable depends on the circumstances of each case.66 When a statute prescribes that there must be “reasonable grounds” for a state of mind – including suspicion and belief – it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person. That was the point of Lord Atkin’s famous, and now orthodox, dissent in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206.67 The question of who must entertain the suspicion has been considered.68 In relation to police searches of suspects, it has been said that, “[u]nfortunately the law and the cases have never been exhaustively discussed to demonstrate what circumstances must exist before a court will hold a suspicion to be a reasonable one, or upon reasonable grounds”.69 For authorities on goods reasonably suspected of being stolen, see [CA.527C.100]. General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Recklessly” For commentary on recklessly, see [CA.5.140].
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“Suffers”, “suffers or permits” The word “suffer” when used in a penal provision implies that the thing suffered was willingly suffered or at least connived at.70 Normally, knowledge of the occurrence “suffered” is required.71 A person cannot be said to “suffer” a thing if he or she is not in a position either physically to prevent it or if by law he or she ought not to prevent it.72 As to strict liability, see “Permits” above. “Suffers” has a very similar meaning to “permits”. The words “permit” or “suffer” are sometimes used as synonymous but there are some slight differences in their meaning.73 It has been said that “suffering” is less positive than “permitting” and means passively or implicitly allowing an act to take place as distinct from actively or expressly allowing it.74 The meaning of “suffers” has been considered elsewhere.75 The prosecution must prove the mental element implied in “suffers”.76 General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Unlawfully”, “unlawful” The term “unlawfully” is used in two senses. The first means contrary to law; forbidden by law. The second means without lawful excuse. An act or omission may be contrary to law because it is inherently wrong and widely recognised as such and therefore proscribed by law, or merely because a legislature has chosen to proscribe it. [T]he word “unlawfully” is a word commonly used in Statutes creating crimes, misdemeanours and minor offences, and (…) it is used in two shades of meaning, one when referring to an act which is wrong or wicked in itself – recognised by everybody as wicked (…); the other when referring to some prohibition of positive law.77 Penal provisions tend to use “unlawfully” to indicate an act or omission proscribed by law (but not necessarily inherently criminal), done without lawful excuse. For commentary on lawful excuse, see [CA.417.20]. The meaning of “lawful” depends on its context.78 It has been judicially observed that in the
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context of “lawful excuse”, the word “lawful” does not mean “positively authorised by law”, but means “not forbidden” by law.79 Thus, a proscribed act governed by the word “unlawfully” will not be unlawful if there is some lawful excuse, authorisation or justification for it, as for example, self-defence, consent to some form of assault (provided consent may be lawfully given) or a claim of right.80 Where “unlawfully” is used in this sense, a jury can be directed that the act or omission will not be unlawful if the accused had a lawful excuse for it.81 In a case of unlawful wounding, the intent which must be proved is not simply an intent to do an act which causes an injury of a particular kind – the intent must extend to the injury as well as the act.82 Unless otherwise indictated by the terms of the section itself, where proscribed conduct is governed by “unlawfully”, the Crown must prove that the accused acted without lawful excuse.83 Conversely, if “without lawful excuse” is appended to the proscribed conduct, proof of the lawful excuse lies upon the accused, see s 417. As to particular uses of “unlawful” or “unlawfully”, the nature of the unlawfullness to establish an unlawful and dangerous act for manslaughter has been considered,84“unlawfully obtained” is ejusdem generis with “stolen”.85 A claim of right in the context of an act said to have been done unlawfully has been considered.86 With a charge of indecent assault on a woman, the unlawfulness can be proved by evidence that the accused intended to cause bodily harm.87
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General note: With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. “Wilfully” “Wilfully” describes a mental state. However, the word “wilfully” when appearing in a statute is not always given the same meaning.88“Wilfully” was considered by the High Court in Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14. Barwick CJ (in the minority as to the result) (at 95 (CLR)), said that “wilfully” connotes intention and knowledge, but acknowledged that what is to be intended and what is to be known must vary with the nature of the act proscribed. The Chief Justice said (at 93, 95 (CLR)), that the meaning of “wilfully” depends upon its context and the subject matter of the provision in which it is found. Windeyer J (also in the minority as to the result) (at 107 (CLR)), said that “wilfully” comprehends all that is meant by voluntary in the sense of both an act done of one’s own accord and intentional, and that it goes further so as to carry a sense of contumacy. Also (at 108 (CLR)), Windeyer J remarked that the importance of “wilfully” is in the meaning which it gives to (rather than takes from) its context. Later (at 109 (CLR)), Windeyer J said that, when “wilfully” forms part of an offence description, what is meant is an act done with knowledge of all the facts which make it an offence. As to the majority in Iannella v French, McTiernan J (at 98 (CLR)) said that the word meant “with wilful intent” and Taylor J (with whom Owen J agreed) (at 101 (CLR)) appears to have equated “wilfully” simply with “intentionally”. In England, it has been said that “‘[w]ilfully’ means that an act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it.”89 In the context of an offence of one who “wilfully insults a judge”, it was held that “wilfully” means “intentionally” or “deliberately” in the sense that what is said or done is intended as an insult; it does more than negative the notion of “inadvertently” or “unconsciously”, and imports the notion of purpose.90 Thus, an accused charged with having wilfully made a false statement could not be convicted if he made the statement mistakenly.91 Similarly, a man who did nothing to prevent thirsty sheep from trespassing onto a dam off a stock route was held not guilty of wilfully causing them to trespass.92 Observing that “wilfully” (like “intentionally”) is not a word of precise denotation uninfluenced by its context, Fitzgerald P in R v T [1997] 1 Qd R 623; (1996) 91 A Crim R 152 (Qld CA) at 155 (A Crim R), in an appendix to his judgment, listed various meanings assigned to “wilfully” in some of the cases. In the context of “wilfully and unlawfully” setting fire to a shop, R v T dealt with likelihood and foresight of consequences. A 15-year-old youth was convicted (confirmed on appeal) after he flicked a lighted cigarette onto papers in a shop he had broken into, as a result of which the papers caught fire and the shop itself was
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destroyed. The trial judge found that the youth, aware of the likelihood of fire, deliberately disposed of his cigarette, reckless as to the fire risk. Fitzgerald P held that for the relevant purpose of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), “wilfully” is more extensive than “intentionally” and that “wilfully” should also embrace “a result not positively desired but foreseen as a likely consequence of the relevant act”.93 In New South Wales, it has been held that the offence of wilfully preventing free passage in public place94 requires that the act complained of must not only have been done deliberately, but with the knowledge and intention that it would have the effect of preventing the free passage of some other person and without any lawful excuse.95 It has also been held in New South Wales that where “wilfully” is used in circumstances importing mens rea in an environmental offence, knowledge by a defendant of circumstances which make the doing of an act an offence may be established by wilful blindness or reckless indifference to the facts.96 A number of older English authorities were considered by the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Gardenal-Williams v The Queen [1989] Tas R 62; (1989) 43 A Crim R 29 where the court said that in the great majority of cases, “wilful” implies something blameworthy in the state of mind accompanying the conduct said to be wilful. For commentary in relation to wilfully false promises, see [CA.179.220]. For commentary in relation to wilfully false statements, see [CA.327.180]. General note:
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With terms used in penal provisions, it is the context in which a term is used which governs its meaning. Judicial statements as to the meaning to be given to a term in a particular context may not necessarily apply to every context in which the term is used. 1 Gilbert v Gulliver [1918] VLR 185 (Cussen J). 2 Caruso v Boucher (1975) 10 SASR 71 at 75 per Bray CJ. 3 Potts v Knox (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 91 (Cohen J); Jaffrey v Sanders [1923] SASR 276 (Angas Parsons J); Caruso v Boucher (1975) 10 SASR 71 (Bray CJ). 4 Farrell v Delaney (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 236; 69 WN 260 at 242 (SR (NSW)) per Street CJ. 5 Ferrier v Wilson (1906) 4 CLR 785; Jaffrey v Sanders [1923] SASR 276 (Angas Parsons J); Matthews v City of Prahran [1925] VLR 469 (FC); Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383. 6 Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 at 260 per Bright J (FC). 7 Examples are found in O’Sullivan v Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1957) 96 CLR 220; [1957] HCA 8 and Ex parte Hop Sing (1887) 4 WN (NSW) 59. 8 A leading example is Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475. See also Price v Cromack [1975] 1 WLR 988; [1975] 2 All ER 113. 9 O’Sullivan v Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1957) 96 CLR 220; [1957] HCA 8. At 228 (CLR), Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ agreed with the following proposition, “before a man can be convicted of causing he must be in a position of dominance and control so as to be able to decide whether the act should be done or not, and it must be established that he gave some order, command, direction, or authority to the person doing the act.” Similarly, in Lovelace v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 1 WLR 1468; [1954] 3 All ER 481 at 1471 (WLR), Lord Goddard (with whom the other members of the court agreed), said, “the fact is that if a man is charged with causing or permitting something, it follows that that must result by reason of some act of his which is equivalent to causing, such as command or direction to do the act.” See also Watkins v O’Shaughnessy [1939] 1 All ER 385 at 386–387. 10 Ex parte Hop Sing (1887) 4 WN (NSW) 59 (Innes J). 11 Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] 1 QB 435; [1974] 2 WLR 436; [1974] 2 All ER 287 (where the authorities are extensively reviewed) at 446–447 (QB) per May J. 12 Miller v Hilton (1937) 57 CLR 400 at 413 per Rich J and at 415 per Dixon J who said, “I think the word ‘cause’ does not extend beyond acts or omissions of a person who does or makes them either for the purpose of bringing about the doing of the things which amount to the principal offence, or at least contemplating or foreseeing that they will or may have that result”. 13 Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 at 260 per Bright J (FC).
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14 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475 has been followed in the New South Wales cases of Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 659 at 663 (McClemens CJ at CL) and Environment Protection Authority v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 112 LGERA 1; [2000] NSWLEC 6 (Lloyd J). 15 Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 659. 16 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210. See also R v Scott [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032 at 839 (AC); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) (1985) 41 SASR 147; 19 A Crim R 436; R v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254; R v Lawson (1996) 86 A Crim R 111; R v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; (1996) 86 A Crim R 412 at 466 (VR), 419 (A Crim R); Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 per Kirby J at [114]. 17 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210. 18 R v Scott [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032 at 839 (AC) per Viscount Dilhorne. 19 Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732 per Buckley J. In Balcombe v De Simoni (1972) 126 CLR 576 at 593, Gibbs J referred to Buckley J’s definition with qualified approval. See also R v Clark (1991) 6 WAR 137; (1991) 52 A Crim R 180 at 188 (A Crim R) per Kennedy J. 20 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ at [20]. See also Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124 at 123–124 (AC) per Lord Radcliffe. In that case, the phrase “with intent to defraud” was analysed. 21 R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 per King CJ at 62–63 (SASR); 30–31 (A Crim R). 22 R v Scott [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032 at 841 (AC). 23 R v Sinclair [1968] 1 WLR 1246; [1968] 3 All ER 241; (1968) 52 Cr App R 618 at 245 (All ER) per James J. 24 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 (CCA) at 615 (NSWLR). 25 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210. 26 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 (CCA) at 615 (NSWLR). For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. 27 See also Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 96 (CLR) per Barwick CJ; Comptroller-General of Customs v Woodlands Enterprises Pty Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 589; (1995) 83 A Crim R 579 (Qld CA) at 591 (A Crim R) per Pincus J (acting with one’s “eyes closed to the obvious”). 28 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14; Manning v Cory [1974] WAR 60 (Sup Ct, Burt J). 29 R v Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303; 32 A Crim R 301 at 308 (NSWLR) per Lee J (Street CJ and Finlay J agreeing); R v Nifadopoulos (1988) 36 A Crim R 137 (NSW CCA); R v Lam (1990) 46 A Crim R 402 at 405 per Gleeson CJ. 30 For example, s 62 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 and s 51 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. 31 R v Goldie; Ex parte Picklum (1937) 59 CLR 254; [1937] HCA 65; Mallan v Lee (1949) 80 CLR 198; [1949] HCA 48; Ashbury v Reid [1961] WAR 49; R v Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567; [1969] 3 WLR 134; [1969] 2 All ER 1117; R v Rawcliffe [1977] 1 NSWLR 219; 32 FLR 252; R v Kennedy (1979) 37 FLR 356; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; [1985] HCA 65; R v Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303; 32 A Crim R 301 (NSW CCA); R v Haddad (1988) 33 A Crim R 400 (NSW CCA); R v Nifadopoulos (1988) 36 A Crim R 137 (NSW CCA); Edwards v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 653; 60 A Crim R 100; [1992] HCA 19; Cheung v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 283 (WA CCA). 32 Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; [1985] HCA 65. 33 Manning v Cory [1974] WAR 60 (Sup Ct, Burt J). 34 Ex parte McDermott (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 231; Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588 at 595 per Starke J; Miller v Williams (1990) 53 SASR 82 at 87–92; R v Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 at [87]ff. 35 James & Son v Smee [1955] 1 QB 78; [1954] 3 WLR 631; [1954] 3 All ER 273; Fransman v Sexton [1965] Crim LR 556; Gray’s Haulage Co v Arnold [1966] 1 WLR 534; [1966] 1 All ER 896; Magna Plant Ltd v Mitchell [1966] Crim LR 394; Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475 (HL); Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] 1 QB 435; [1974] 2 WLR 436; [1974] 2 All ER 287. 36 Collett v Bennett (1986) 21 A Crim R 410 at 414 per Zelling J (SA FC). See also Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] 1 QB 435; [1974] 2 WLR 436; [1974] 2 All ER 287 where May J said, at 446 (QB) “permits” as used in the Act there in question, required prior knowledge of the facts constituting the unlawful act. 37 See for example Jolly v Virgo [1927] SASR 188 (SA Sup Ct, Napier J).
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38 Berton v Alliance Economic Investment Co Ltd [1922] 1 KB 742 at 759 per Atkin LJ, referred to by Higgins J in City of Adelaide v A/asian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 498–499. 39 City of Adelaide v A/asian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 504 per Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ; R v Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 per Smart J at [89]–[90]. 40 City of Adelaide v A/asian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481; Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588 at 594 per Starke J; Miller v Williams (1990) 53 SASR 82 at 90. 41 See Collett v Bennett (1986) 21 A Crim R 410 at 414 per Zelling J (SA FC). 42 Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536; Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588. 43 Collett v Bennett (1986) 21 A Crim R 410 at 414 per Zelling J (SA FC). 44 Applying Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918. 45 Miller v Williams (1990) 53 SASR 82 at 90 per Cox J. See also Chappell v Ross & Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 (FC). 46 Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588 at 595 per Starke J; Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14. 47 Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 at 260 per Bright J (FC). 48 In Lomas v Peek [1947] 2 All ER 574, Lord Godard CJ at 575 said, “[i]f a man permits a thing to be done, it means that he gives permission for it to be done, and if a man gives permission for a thing to be done, he knows what is to be done or is being done, (…)”. See also Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320; [1972] 2 All ER 475 (HL) per Viscount Dilhorne at 840 (AC) and Lord Salmon at 849 (AC); Environment Protection Authority v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 112 LGERA 1; [2000] NSWLEC 6 per Lloyd J. 49 R v Sanewski [1987] 1 Qd R 374; R v Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 per Smart J at [92]. 50 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814; [1951] 1 All ER 412 at 820 (KB) per Lord Goddard CJ; Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 at 268 per Bray CJ (FC). 51 R v Sanewski [1987] 1 Qd R 374 at 378. 52 Piro v Boorman [1958] SASR 226 (FC). 53 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 470 (CLR), 336 (A Crim R). 54 R v Julian (1998) 100 A Crim R 430 at 448 per Dowsett J (Qld CA). 55 Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408; [1992] HCA 47 at 413–414 (CLR) per Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ. 56 A number of which are referred to in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386. 57 Taikato at 466 (CLR); 332 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 58 Mark v Henshaw (1998) 85 FCR 555; (1998) 101 A Crim R 122 (Fed Crt FC). See also Connors v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 (NSW Sup Crt Dunford J). 59 Henshaw v Mark (1997) 95 A Crim R 115 (ACT Sup Crt Miles CJ); Connors v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 at 506 (NSW Sup Crt Dunford J). 60 R v Bacon [1977] 2 NSWLR 507 at 512 per Street CJ (CCA). 61 Featherstone v Fraser (1983) 6 Petty Sessions Review 2962 per Yeldham J. 62 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206; [1941] 3 All ER 338 at 227–228 (AC) per Lord Atkin. 63 R v Minh Quoc Le (2005) 151 A Crim R 564; [2005] NSWCCA 40 at [11]. 64 See also Hughes v Dempsey (1915) 17 WALR 186; R v Tween [1965] VR 687 at 693; George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 48 A Crim R 246 at 115 (CLR), 253 (A Crim R); Anderson v Judges of District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701; 62 A Crim R 277 at 714–715 (NSWLR); 289 (A Crim R) per Kirby P. 65 R v Tween [1965] VR 687 at 693 per Sholl J. 66 Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521; O’Sullivan v Tregaskis [1948] SASR 12 at 16; R v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421; 63 A Crim R 242 (NSW CCA). 67 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 48 A Crim R 246 at 112 (CLR), 251 (A Crim R). Also Anderson v Judges of District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701; 62 A Crim R 277 at 714–715 (NSWLR); 289 (A Crim R) per Kirby P; Manley v Tucs (1984) 40 SASR 1; (1984) 15 A Crim R 356; (1984) 83 FLR 198 (SA Sup Crt, Olsson J). 68 Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307; [1975] HCA 20 at 321 (CLR) per Jacobs J; R v Abbrederis [1981] 1 NSWLR 530; (1981) 3 A Crim R 366 (NSW CCA); Anderson v Judges of District Court (NSW) (1992) 27 NSWLR 701; 62 A Crim R 277 at 714–715 (NSWLR); 289 (A Crim R) per Kirby P.
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69 R v Davidson (1991) 54 SASR 580; 54 A Crim R 119 at 123 (A Crim R) per Legoe J (SA Sup Crt). 70 Brown v Julius [1959] Qd R 385 per Philp J. 71 Ex parte Neilsen (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 4 (Pring J). See also Ex parte Dunn (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 38 (Cohen J); Rochford Rural Council v Port of London Authority [1914] 2 KB 916 at 922–924, per Darling J. 72 Rochford Rural Council v Port of London Authority [1914] 2 KB 916 at 922–924, per Darling J. 73 R v Lonie [1999] NSWCCA 319 per Smart J at [92]. 74 R v Sanewski [1987] 1 Qd R 374 at 378. 75 Piro v Boorman [1958] SASR 226 (FC); Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 (FC). 76 Samuels v Centofanti [1967] SASR 251 at 260 per Bright J (FC). 77 Lyons v Smart (1908) 6 CLR 143 at 147 per Griffith CJ. See also R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222. 78 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 460 (CLR), 327 (A Crim R). 79 Roddan v Walker (1997) 94 A Crim R 170 (WA Sup Crt, Steyler J) referring to Taikato at 460–461 (CLR); 327–328 (A Crim R). 80 This same concept is found in the definition in s 1 of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) which defines “unlawful” and “unlawfully” as meaning “without authorisation, justification or excuse”. This same definition appears in s 4 of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld). 81 Wilkins v Condell [1940] SASR 139 at 142 per Murray CJ; Samuels v Nicholson (1973) 6 SASR 479. 82 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 63–64 per Kitto J. 83 R v Cousins [1982] 1 QB 526; [1982] 2 WLR 621; (1982) 74 Cr App R 363. 84 R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 (CCA). 85 R v Young (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 46; 64 WN (NSW) 193; Hofstetter v Thomas [1968] VR 199 (Vic Sup Ct, Menhennitt J). Nicholls v Young [1992] 2 VR 209 at 214–215 per Smith J. 86 Director of Public Prosecution Reference (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 8 NTLR 148; 105 A Crim R 489; [1999] NTSC 23 where Martin CJ reviewed many of the authorities on claim of right. See also R v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208. 87 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1; R v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118; 3 All ER 316; (1983) 77 Cr App R 225 at 1121 (WLR); 319 (All ER); 228 (Cr App R). 88 Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352; (1992) 59 A Crim R 408 at 410 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL. Also Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 per Barwick CJ at 95 (CLR) and Windeyer J at 108 (each in the minority as to the result); R v T [1997] 1 Qd R 623; (1996) 91 A Crim R 152 (Qld CA) per Fitzgerald P at 155 (A Crim R). 89 R v Senior [1899] 1 QB 283 at 291 per Lord Russell. 90 Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682; [1984] HCA 26. See also Gordon v Mangelsdorf (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 438 (NSW Sup Ct, Brereton J). 91 R v Lowe [1917] VLR 155 at 162 per Cussen J. 92 Ex parte Ritchie (1896) 12 WN (NSW) 109 (NSW Sup Ct, Simpson J). 93 Quoting R v Lockwood; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [1981] Qd R 209 (per Lucas ACJ at 216A) and R v Webb; Ex parte A-G [1990] 2 Qd R 275; 47 A Crim R 97. See also O’Sullivan v Harford [1956] SASR 109 at 115 per Napier CJ. 94 Contrary to the Offences in Public Places Act 1979 (NSW), s 7. 95 Fitzgerald v Montoya (1989) 16 NSWLR 164; 40 A Crim R 105 (CA). 96 State Pollution Control Commission v Hunt (1990) 72 LGRA 316 (NSW Land & Environment Ct, Bignold J). As to wilful blindness, see R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 and Lanham D, “Wilful blindness and the criminal law” (1985) 9 Crim LJ 261.
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Accomplices
See commentary at [CA.19A.200].
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Accident
The general rule is that a person is not criminally responsible for an act which is done independently of the exercise of his or her will or by accident. It has been succinctly stated that “any event that is unintended, unforeseen and unforeseeable occurs by accident”.1 If a person kills or injures another by a “willed” blow with his or her fist, although the death or particular injury is not reasonably foreseeable, the death or injury is not an event which occurs by accident. The event occurs by reason of something which is intended and is not merely accidental. It is the direct and immediate result of an intentional act.2 However, a person may not be criminally responsible for an event which is caused by his or her “willed” act but which is an accidental consequence of it.3 Where the defence of accident is raised, evidence of the relationship between the accused and the victim is admissible.4 1 Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21 at 84 per Windeyer J applying Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56. See also Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47; 42 ALJR 295; [1968] HCA 66; Kaporonovski v The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257; R v Van Den Bemd (1994) 179 CLR 137; 70 A Crim R 494. 2 R v Martyr [1962] Qd R 398 at 417 per Townley J. 3 R v Tralka [1965] Qd R 225; R v Callaghan [1942] St R Qd 40; R v Gamumu [1963] P & NGLR 1; R v Knutsen [1963] Qd R 157; Geraldton Fisherman’s Co-operative Ltd v Munro [1963] WAR 129; R v Hansen [1964] Qd R 404; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; R v Diru [1963] P & NGLR 115; R v Dabelstein [1966] Qd R 411; Ward v The Queen [1972] WAR 36; R v Sweet [1972] QWN 28. Compare R v Kissier (1982) 7 A Crim R 171. 4 Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334; 44 ALJR 221; [1970] HCA 17; R v Iuliano [1971] VR 412. See also R v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208.
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[CLP.140]
Actus reus
Cross references: Accident ...................................................................................................................... Causation – this aspect of actus reus is dealt with at ............................................... Duress ......................................................................................................................... Intention ...................................................................................................................... Mens rea ..................................................................................................................... Sane automatism and proof of voluntariness ............................................................ Voluntariness – this aspect of actus reus is dealt with at .........................................
[CLP.120] [CLP.380] [CLP.860] [CLP.1400] [CLP.1240] [CLP.300] [CLP.160]
Serious crimes have traditionally been divided into actus reus and mens rea.1 Although these terms have been criticised as misleading,2 they are useful generic shorthand expressions and are used legislatively.3 As alternatives to actus reus, the more descriptive phrases “physical element” or “external element” are often used instead.4 Many statutory offences consist of an actus reus without any expression of mens rea. Some are offences of strict liability where mens rea is presumed in the absence of evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. Others are offences of absolute liability where mens rea plays no part. As to these two categories of offences, see [CLP.1360]. Actus reus is not an expression that lends itself to accurate definition. Although the core concept is the doing of a prohibited act, the expression is wider. A practical definition is: “The expression ‘actus reus’ means the act, omission or other event indicated in the definition of the crime charged as being proscribed by the criminal law.”5 One formulation is that actus reus constitutes all elements of an offence other than the mens rea.6 An extension of this is that actus reus includes the absence of any ground of lawful
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justification or excuse.7 A slightly different view is that a crime is made of up three ingredients, actus reus, mens rea and (as a negative element) absence of a valid defence.8 Usually the actus reus of a crime will be an act, simple or complex.9 Usually the act is proscribed if it causes a particular result, for example murder. Occasionally, the act itself is proscribed, for example perjury. Sometimes an act is proscribed if done with particular knowledge, for example sexual intercourse without consent. Sometimes, the actus reus will be an omission, see [CA.19A.180]. This is so particularly in statutory offences, for example industrial health and safety or environmental protection offences. Also, the actus reus may be a state of affairs, such as having possession of a prohibited drug. The common law concept of actus reus is reflected in the terms of s 4.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which provides: 4.1 Physical elements (1) A physical element of an offence may be: (a) conduct; or (b) a result of conduct; or (c) a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, occurs. (2) In this Code: conduct means an act, an omission to perform an act or a state of affairs. engage in conduct means: (a) do an act; or (b) omit to perform an act.
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For a person to be guilty of a criminal offence, the actus reus and the mens rea must exist at the same time, see [CLP.1320].10 In cases involving complex acts, it is important for the isolation of the act upon which the prosecution relies. In White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342; 52 ALJR 724; [1978] HCA 38 at 359 (CLR), Stephen J observed that, “… [w]hile it is generally true that ‘the intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime’ [referring to Fowler v Padget] it is always necessary, if there is said to be any lack of temporal coincidence between the act and intent, accurately to identify the relevant act”.11 Identification of the relevant act(s) or omission(s) can be important to the question of intent and to voluntariness or causation. See also [CA.19A.140]. In R v Kennedy, a manslaughter case involving causation, the House of Lords observed that: Much of the difficulty and doubt which have dogged the present question has flowed from a failure, at the outset, to identify the unlawful act on which the manslaughter count is founded. … [I]t would focus attention on the correct question, and promote accurate analysis of the real issues, if those who formulate, defend and rule on serious charges … were obliged to consider how exactly, in law, the accusation is put.12 1 These terms come from the Latin aphorism: “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” which Lord Hailsham LC observed in Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476; [1974] 2 WLR 1; [1973] 3 All ER 1109 at 491 (AC) properly translated, means “an act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also guilty.” 2 In R v Miller (James) [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978 at 174 (AC), Lord Diplock remarked: My Lords, it would I think be conducive to clarity of analysis of the ingredients of a crime that is created by statute, as are the great majority of criminal offences today, if we were to avoid bad Latin and instead to think and speak … about the conduct of the accused and his state of mind at the time of that conduct, instead of speaking of actus reus and mens rea. 3 In Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 concerning intoxication. 4 The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 4.1 uses the phrase “physical element”. 5 Cross R and Jones P A, An Introduction To Criminal Law 4th ed (Butterworths, 1959), p 31.
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6 Professor Williams G, Textbook of Criminal Law (1978), p 30, quoted by Gummow and Heydon JJ in Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43; (2004) 78 ALJR 1565; [2004] HCA 47 at [39]. 7 Professor Williams G, Criminal Law: The General Part 2nd ed (1961), p 20. 8 Lanham D J, Larsonneur Revisited [1976] Crim LR 276. 9 Stroud D A, in his book Mens Rea (Sweet & Maxwell, 1914) defined a simple act as “a voluntary movement of the body” (at p 1). Of a complex act, Stroud said (at p 2): A complex act may be defined as a series (or several series) of simple acts and their consequences, artificially considered as grouped together, and as separate from all other acts and events. Those facts and events which, though not forming part of a complex act, are connected with it and affect its character or tendency, are usually referred to as its circumstances. 10 Fowler v Padget 101 ER 1103; (1798) 7 Term Rep 509 at 1106 (ER) and 514 (Term Rep); R v Scott [1967] VR 276 at 289 per Gillard J (discussed with authorities cited); Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 217–218; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 393–401 (CLR), at 63; 69 (A Crim R); Meyers v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 1488; (1997) 147 ALR 440; [1997] HCA 43. 11 See also Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669. 12 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [26].
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[CLP.160]
Actus reus – voluntariness
A person is not criminally responsible for an act “done independently of the exercise of his will or by accident”.1 The notion of “will” imports a consciousness in the actor of the nature of the act and a choice to do an act of that nature.2 The existence of a willed act, often called a voluntary act, is an essential element in criminal liability.3 The question of “what is a voluntary act?” was addressed by Stephen J in Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 244–246 and has been discussed elsewhere.4 An example of an involuntary act is a driver charged with dangerous driving who experienced a stroke or an epileptic fit.5 Sane automatism is an aspect of voluntariness. As to automatism and voluntariness, see [CLP.300] and also [CLP.200] and [CLP.220]. Section 4.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is illustrative of the law’s approach to voluntariness: 4.2 Voluntariness (1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary. (2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is the product of the will of the person whose conduct it is. (3) The following are examples of conduct that is not voluntary: (a) a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement; (b) an act performed during sleep or unconsciousness; (c) an act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will to act. The notion of a willed act here has been judicially recognised as separate and different from the intent requirement of mens rea.6 In Ryan, a murder case, Barwick CJ noted that intent usually relates to consequences, whereas will relates to the act done.7 The traditional view is that voluntariness is part of the actus reus. But in R v O’Connor, Stephen J observed: If the conventional division into actus reus and mens rea is to be adhered to, the relevant mental element in crime will not be found exclusively in the mens rea, since there will be no actus reus if the conduct of which it consists was involuntary: only voluntary conduct can constitute the actus reus.8 As has been noted by the Court of Appeal in Victoria, there are competing views amongst jurists, writers and academics as to whether the voluntariness of an accused’s conduct should be regarded as part of the actus rea or as part of the mens rea.9
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Ordinarily, the voluntary nature of an accused’s act will not be in question.10 The onus of proving that the accused’s act was voluntary is on the prosecution. But in accordance with common experience, in the absence of some contrary evidence, it is presumed that an act done by a person who is apparently conscious is willed or done voluntarily.11 In a joint High Court judgment in Falconer, it was said: When an act is done by an apparently conscious actor, an inference that the act is willed must be drawn – not as a matter of law but as a matter of fact – unless it be shown that the actor, being of sound mind, has been deprived of the capacity to control his actions by some extraordinary event or unless the actor, being of unsound mind, has thereby lost the capacity to control his actions. The accused bears no ultimate onus of proving that his act was not willed, but he bears the evidential onus of rebutting the inference that his act was willed, and there is no occasion for the jury to consider the possibility of an unwilled act unless that evidential onus is discharged.12
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Appropriate jury directions concerning voluntariness were considered in a Victorian case of a man charged with the sexual assault of his 13 year old daughter where he claimed that his act was not intentional, but occurred during the course of a dream. The trial judge gave directions on intent but not on voluntariness. On appeal, it was held that the trial judge should have instructed the jury, not merely that the accused must have intended the act of sexual penetration, but that it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that act was a “conscious, voluntary and willed act”.13 Directions on voluntariness in the context of intoxication have been considered.14 1 Hardgrave v The King (1906) 4 CLR 232; [1906] HCA 47 at 237 (CLR) per Griffith CJ. 2 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 39 (CLR); 249 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; Brennan and McHugh JJ. 3 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 216 per Barwick CJ; R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 108 (CLR); 378 (A Crim R) per Mason J; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 582 (CLR); 246 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 4 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 per Lord Sankey at 482 (AC); R v Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] 3 WLR 326; [1957] 2 All ER 741 at 672 (QB); R v Haywood [1971] VR 755; R v Tait [1973] VR 151; R v Dodd (1974) 7 SASR 151; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 689 (AC) per Lord Simon. 5 An example given by Goddard CJ in Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193 at 283 (QB). However, such a driver may be criminally liable if he knew of his risk of an epileptic fit, see Gillett v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 419; [2006] NSWCCA 370. 6 Falconer at 39 (CLR); 249 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; Brennan and McHugh JJ. In Ryan at 213, Barwick CJ observed that “there has not been any frequent need to express with technically expressed precision the difference between that element of mens rea which relates to the will to act to the deed in question and that element which relates to it the general intent with which that will was exercised.” 7 Ryan at 216 per Barwick CJ. See also Falconer at 38 (CLR); 248 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; Brennan and McHugh JJ. 8 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 97 (CLR); 371 (A Crim R). 9 R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288, the Court at [24]. 10 Ryan at 213 per Barwick CJ. 11 Falconer at 40 (CLR); 250 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; Brennan and McHugh JJ. 12 Falconer at 43 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; Brennan and McHugh JJ. 13 MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305; 200 A Crim R 433; [2010] VSCA 97, the Court at [22] and [25]. 14 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 324 (A Crim R).
[CLP.180]
Aliens
An alien resident in the country is protected by the law, and owes allegiance to the Crown. If he commits an offence within the country he is answerable to the same laws and in the same way as a British subject; unless, indeed there is some special legislation in his favour.1
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Criminal jurisdiction is territorial; therefore aliens are liable for criminal offences committed in the country, within its territorial waters or on its ships.2 The criminal law does not apply to acts committed by aliens abroad, except in the case of treason committed abroad by an alien who has resided in the country and still owes allegiance here.3 By the comity of nations, a reigning sovereign of another State is treated as exempt from the criminal as well as the civil jurisdiction of all other countries.4 An alien charged with a criminal offence in New South Wales is not entitled to a jury de medietate linguae (ie half the jury being aliens).5 The question of diplomatic and consular immunity is dealt with at length in O’Connell, International Law in Australia 1965, pp 441ff.6 As to jurisdiction over visiting forces, see the Defence (Visiting Forces) Act 1963 (Cth).7 1 2 3 4 5 6
R v Valentine (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 113. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 11, at [40]. Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347; (1946) 31 Cr App R 57. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 11, at [37]. Cf R v Mary Queen of Scots (1586) 1 State Trials 1161. R v Valentine (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 113; R v Carlssen (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 268. See also The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197; Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149; R v AB [1941] 1 KB 454; R v Governor of Pentonville Prison; Ex parte Teja [1971] 2 QB 274; [1971] 1 WLR 459; [1971] 2 All ER 11. 7 For an extended examination, see O’Connell, International Law in Australia, 1965, pp 420–440.
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[CLP.200]
Automatism and involuntary acts
Automatism outlined: 1. Automatism is conduct that is either involuntary or unconscious – it may be a defence; 2. Where automatism is not caused by mental illness, it provides a defence that can lead to an outright acquittal; 3. Where automatism is caused by mental illness, the relevant defence is insanity, not automatism – the verdict is not guilty by reason of mental illness; 4. Automatism is therefore divided into two categories, viz sane automatism (sometimes called non-insane automatism or, more generally, simply automatism) and insane automatism (insanity); 5. If there is evidence of sane automatism, the prosecution must prove that the conduct was voluntary; 6. If there is evidence of insane automatism, the accused must prove insanity on the balance of probabilities; 7 The division of automatism into sane and insane automatism and the differing onus of proof and standard of proof can create difficulties in directing a jury. [CLP.220]
Meaning of and basis of automatism
Meaning of and basis of automatism ......................................................................... Sane automatism and insane automatism distinguished ......................................... Automatism caused by mental illness is classed as insanity ................................ Determining whether automatism is caused by mental illness ............................. Sane automatism and proof of voluntariness ........................................................... Evidence of automatism is necessary ........................................................................ Practical aspects, jury directions and difficulties where automatism is raised ..
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Cross references: Mental illness (insanity) and criminal liability ............................................. [CLP.1020] A person is not guilty of a crime if the relevant deed was not done voluntarily, that is, in exercise of a will to act – if the relevant actions are performed automatically and not subject to the control and direction of the person’s will, no crime is committed.1 “The notion of ‘will’ [voluntariness] imports a consciousness in the actor of the nature of the act and a choice to do an act of that nature.”2 An involuntary act may take one of two forms – Lord Denning’s definition: … an involuntary act in this context – some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as “automatism” – means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleep-walking.3
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More concisely, automatism means action without conscious volition.4 Automatism does not mean the doing of what is involuntary in the sense that the doer, while knowing what he is doing, cannot resist the impulse to do it.5 Automatism is not to be confused with irresistible impulse, see [CLP.1200] “Irresistible impulse”. 1 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 272 (SASR); 394 (A Crim R) per King CJ, referring to Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 216 per Barwick CJ; quoted in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 41–42 (CLR); 251 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 2 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 39 (CLR); 249 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 3 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 409 (AC) per Lord Denning. 4 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1007 per Gresson P. 5 Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1, see 390 (AC).
[CLP.240]
Sane automatism and insane automatism distinguished
As a “defence”,1 the expression “automatism” first began to appear in reports of criminal cases in the early 1950s. In a 1957 English case, the alleged automatism was noted to be “akin to insanity”.2 However, in a 1958 New Zealand case, Gresson P said that automatism may be quite different from insanity – it may be due to some disease of the mind or it may not. Gresson P noted that it may happen with a healthy mind, for example, somnambulism or where the mind is temporarily affected as the result of a blow, or by the influence of a drug or alcohol – or it may be caused by an abnormal condition of the mind capable of being called a mental disease.3 With this distinction, based upon whether the aetiology of the condition is mental illness or not,4 the law came to recognise two types of automatism, sane automatism and insane automatism. Although criticised,5 this distinction is nevertheless now well established.6 Encapsulated, “[t]he significant distinction is between the reaction of an unsound mind to its own delusions or to external stimuli on the one hand [insane automatism] and the reaction of a sound mind to external stimuli, including stress-producing factors, on the other hand [sane automatism].”7 References to “automatism” in the authorities are generally references to sane automatism. It has been remarked that the defence of automatism exists as a middle ground between criminal responsibility and legal insanity.8 Evidence of automatism (involuntary or unconscious conduct) may therefore be relevant to two different issues, that is, to the defence of insanity (mental illness), and alternatively, to whether the Crown has
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proved that the accused’s actions were voluntary.9 But, as will be seen in the next paragraph, where the evidence indicates only insane automatism, the evidence is not to be considered in determining whether the accused’s act was voluntary. 1 In R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6, Hunt J pointed out that the frequently used term “defence” is misleading as it is the prosecution which must prove ingredients of an offence including voluntariness – insanity is an exception to the rule. 2 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193 at 285 (QB) per Devlin J. 3 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1007. 4 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 48 (CLR); 256 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 5 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6 per Hunt J who described it as “an intellectually unhappy and artificial distinction which at times produces both unsatisfactory and inconvenient results and a distinction which is often difficult of application” (Wood and Finlay JJ agreeing). 6 New South Wales authorities include R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 56–60; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6. 7 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 276 (SASR), 397–398 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 8 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 71 (CLR); 274 (A Crim R) per Toohey J quoting R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 522 per Dickson J. 9 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 4–5 per Hunt J (NSW CCA).
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[CLP.260]
Automatism caused by mental illness is classed as insanity
Although the defence of insanity (defined by the McNaghten Rules – see below) was not expressed to cover an incapacity to control actions caused by mental illness, the cases have held that, once mental illness appears to be a cause of an incapacity to control actions, an accused who relies on automatism must be acquitted, if at all, on the grounds of insanity.1 In these circumstances, automatism is “subsumed in the defence of insanity”.2 The rationale is this: … [f]or the purposes of the criminal law there are two categories of mental irresponsibility, one where the disorder is due to disease and the other where it is not. The distinction is not an arbitrary one. If disease is not the cause, if there is some temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But if disease is present, the same thing may happen again, and therefore, since 1800 …, the law has provided that persons acquitted on this ground should be subject to restraint.3 If the evidence is that automatous conduct was the result of mental illness, its relevance is only to the defence of insanity (insane automatism) and not to the question of whether the prosecution can prove voluntariness.4 Where psychiatric opinion conflicts as to the cause of automatous conduct, the evidence may be relevant to both insanity and voluntariness, so that it is necessary for both sane automatism and insane automatism to be left to the jury.5 The McNaghten Rules concerning insanity state that: … [T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.6 For an explanation of the McNaghten Rules and the defence of insanity, see [CLP.1020] “Mental illness (insanity) and criminal liability” and following. Although the McNaghten Rules pre-supposed at least voluntary and conscious behaviour, even if the nature or wrongness of it was not properly comprehended, and not an involuntary or unconscious action – nevertheless, a person who acts unconsciously is treated under the first limb of McNaghten as one who is incapable of understanding the “nature and quality” of his
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or her act.7 If there is a finding of insanity (insane automatism), then by reason of s 38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, the verdict will be not guilty by reason of mental illness. 1 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1013 per Gresson P; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629; R v Joyce [1970] SASR 184; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 47 (CLR); 255–256 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 2 R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 524 per Dickson J (Canada SC) quoted by Toohey J in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 71 (CLR); 273 (A Crim R). 3 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193 at 285–286 (QB) per Devlin J, quoted in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 47–48 (CLR); 256 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. See also Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 410 (AC) per Lord Denning; R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 172 per Lord Diplock; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6 per Hunt J (Wood and Finlay JJ agreeing). 4 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffitt J; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 61 per O’Brien J (Street CJ and Slattery J agreeing); R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 11 per Hunt J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 56 (CLR); 262 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ, at 82 (CLR); 282 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; (1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28 at 510; 517 (CLR), 293–294; 298–299 (A Crim R). 5 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1015 per Gresson P; Bedelph v The Queen [1980] Tas R 23; (1980) 1 A Crim R 445 (Tas CCA); R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6. 6 McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718. 7 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1009 per Gresson P; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6 per Hunt J.
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[CLP.280]
Determining whether automatism is caused by mental illness
What constitutes a disease of the mind is discussed in detail at [CLP.1020] “Mental illness (insanity) and criminal liability”. A temporary disorder or disturbance of an otherwise healthy mind caused by external factors is not disease of the mind within the McNaghten Rules.1 It has been judicially observed that the distinction between temporary mental illness and temporary irrationality is not always easily drawn.2 One test is the “external factor” test, which excludes mental disease where the defect of reason derives from some cause originating outside the accused’s body.3 A physical blow comes within this external factor test,4 as can the administration of an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes.5 However, the “external factor” test is not a comprehensive test because sleepwalking and the diabetic condition hypoglycaemia stem from internal malfunctioning and, nevertheless, have traditionally been treated as instances of sane automatism.6 Recurrent states are unlikely to be classed as instances of sane automatism7 – stress, anxiety and depression can be the result of external factors, but these constitute states of mind which are prone to recur, and thus lack the novelty necessary for sane automatism.8 Similarly, any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur will be classified as mental illness and not as sane automatism.9 The condition of gross psychopathy causing a gross lack of self-control and diminution of conscience, will not raise the issue of automatism (or qualify as mental illness).10 The question whether evidence raises a mental state involving a disease of the mind or a natural mental infirmity is a question of law for the trial judge.11 A psychological blow resulting from external events may also result in a finding of non-insane automatism.12 However, it has been observed that particular difficulties are raised when a temporary mental disorder or disturbance is precipitated by psychological trauma – “Psychological trauma and the strength of the individual mind to withstand it are reciprocal factors, on the balancing of which mental malfunction depends. It may be difficult for an accused who raises automatism to show that psychological trauma has not acted upon some underlying infirmity of mind to produce the automatism.”13 There is a standard of
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mental strength the law demands in the face of a given level of psychological trauma, that is, the objective standard of the ordinary person – if the strength of an accused’s mind is below that standard, the mind is infirm.14 In the High Court, the question of determining whether automatism is caused by mental illness has been stated in this way: … [w]hen an accused raises automatism and assigns some malfunction of the mind as its cause, he raises a defence of unsoundness of mind or insanity unless the malfunction of his mind was (1) transient (2) caused by trauma, whether physical or psychological, which the mind of an ordinary person would be likely not to have withstood and (3) not prone to recur.15 It has been held in England that the defence of automatism requires the total absence of voluntary control by the accused and merely reduced or partial control is insufficient.16 An example of automatism from psychological trauma was the leading case of R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 where a woman shot her estranged husband after he entered her house unexpectedly, sexually assaulted her and reached out as if to grab her hair. During the marriage, he had been violent to her and she had discovered that he had sexually interfered with her daughters. The accused remembered nothing of the shooting itself. Psychiatric evidence suggested that the incident may have triggered a dissociative state in which she acted without awareness, or of a psychological conflict in which she was capable of acting in an automatic way. It was held on appeal that this evidence was admissible on the question of sane automatism.
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In relation to self-induced intoxication by alcohol or drugs, see Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and in particular, ss 428G and 428H. 1 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274 (SASR); 396 (A Crim R) per King CJ approved in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 54 (CLR); 260 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 2 R v Carter [1959] VR 105 at 110 per Sholl J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 74 (CLR); 276 (A Crim R) per Toohey J quoting Fisse B, Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed, (1990 Lawbook Co). 3 R v Carter [1959] VR 105; R v Meddings [1966] VR 306; R v Quick [1973] QB 910; [1973] 3 WLR 26; (1973) 57 Cr App R 722; R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673; R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287; [1989] 2 All ER 9; (1989) 89 Cr App R 10; R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 52–55 (CLR); 259–261 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ; at 73–76 (CLR); 275–277 (A Crim R) per Toohey J; at 84–85 (CLR); 284 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 4 R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 172 (AC) per Lord Diplock; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 76 (CLR); 277 (A Crim R) per Toohey J; at 84–85 (CLR); 284 (A Crim R). 5 R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 172 (AC) per Lord Diplock. 6 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 75 (CLR); 277 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 7 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 54 (CLR); 260 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 8 R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287; [1989] 2 All ER 9; (1989) 89 Cr App R 10 at 16 (Cr App R) per Lord Lane CJ. 9 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 412 (AC) per Lord Denning. 10 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 409 (AC) per Lord Denning; Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5. 11 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 (CA) at 1013 per Gresson P; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 51 (CLR); 258 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 84 (CLR); 284 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J.
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12 R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 per Dickson J (for the minority), approved in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 54–55 (CLR); 261 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 76 (CLR); 277 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 13 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 54 (CLR); 261 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 14 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 55 (CLR); 261 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 85–86 (CLR); 284–285 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 15 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 56 (CLR); 262 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 16 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91; [1993] 4 All ER 683.
[CLP.300]
Sane automatism and proof of voluntariness
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The prosecution has the legal onus of establishing that the acts said to constitute a crime were performed in consequence of the exercise of the accused’s will, that is to say, was a voluntary act.1 However, in the absence of some contrary evidence, there is an evidentiary presumption, in accordance with ordinary experience, that an apparently conscious act is performed voluntarily.2 As there is an assumption that an apparently conscious person has the capacity to control his or her actions, an inference is drawn that the person acts by choice, and there must be good grounds for refusing to draw this inference.3 It has been remarked that the important principle of voluntariness, largely hidden, is best illustrated by automatism – however, automatism is merely a fact going to voluntariness and when automatism is raised, the real question is whether the acts of the accused were voluntary.4 Voluntariness is liable to be confused with intent.5 But the proof requirement of a voluntary act does not involve showing the accused’s intention or desire to bring about the consequences of the act, but merely a conscious choice to do the act itself.6 While it is only in rare cases that the precise identification of the act that must be shown to be voluntary will give rise to difficulty,7 that is not always so, particularly in cases of murder by shooting.8 So, in a case of a deliberate murder, while the accused must have a specific intention to cause the death, death is not the “act” but the intended consequence.9 In relation to “act” and murder, see [CA.19A.120] – [CA.19A.160]. 1 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72; Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 215–216; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 272 (SASR); 394 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2 per Hunt J (NSW CCA); R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 40–41 (CLR); 250–251 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ, at 63 (CLR); 267 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ, at 68 (CLR); 271 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 2 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 413 (AC) per Lord Denning; Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 213; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 40–41 (CLR); 250 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ, at 83 (CLR); 283 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 3 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 40–41 (CLR); 250 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 4 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 72–73 (CLR); 275 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 5 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 236–239 (A Crim R); 569–572 (CLR) per Brennan J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 39 (CLR); 249 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 6 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 40 (CLR); 250 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 7 R v Williamson (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 428; (1996) 92 A Crim R 24 at 29 (A Crim R) per Doyle CJ (SA CCA). 8 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 is a good example of the difficulty that may arise in identifying the relevant act. See also the discussion in Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 131 A Crim R 215; [2002] HCA 26.
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9 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 38 (CLR); 248 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. See also Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; Kitto J and Menzies J in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64; 71–72 and Gibbs J and Stephen J in Kaporonovski v The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 at 231; 241.
[CLP.320]
Evidence of automatism is necessary
Claims of “black outs” and loss of memory are easily asserted and the courts treat claims of automatism with caution.1 Some evidence of automatism beyond the accused’s own evidence will be required. … [I]t will not be enough for an accused merely to assert that his acts were involuntary or that he suffered a loss of memory. Evidence of his condition at the time of the alleged offence supported by some expert medical opinion will be required before an issue of sane automatism can realistically be said to be raised. Moreover, those conditions which will admit of involuntariness that is not the product of disease or natural mental infirmity will be quite confined. The few suggested instances would seem to include: sleepwalking in some circumstances, some cases of epilepsy, concussion, hypoglycaemia and dissociative states.2
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“Medical opinion” in this context has been held to include the opinion of a psychologist.3 While medical evidence may not be an absolute requirement in every single case, “[i]n practical terms a claim of automatism will almost certainly be frivolous unless supported by medical evidence that identifies a mental state in which acts can occur independently of the will, assigns a causative explanation for that state and postulates that the accused did or may have experienced that state.”4 It has been held that if an automatistic act was induced by a medical or pharmacological condition then the evidence supporting that proposition must come from an expert in the relevant field.5 Evidence admissible to raise or support the issue of non-insane automatism may consist of evidence from those who observed the accused’s conduct at the time.6 In R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1, Hunt J (Wood and Finlay JJ agreeing) pointed out (at 3) that some English authorities have held that concerning voluntariness, the accused bears an evidential onus of pointing to evidence which is capable of supporting an inference that the relevant act was in fact involuntary. Hunt J suggested that this puts the matter too high. Referring to a situation where the medical evidence is that the accused could have been in a state of automatism at the relevant time, Hunt J said (at 4): … [i]f the accused is able to point to or to produce evidence from which it could be inferred that there is at least a reasonable possibility that his act was involuntary as a result of a state of automatism, the Crown in effect bears the onus of removing the reasonable doubt thereby raised, by establishing that the act was voluntary. Thus an accused who relies on the defence of automatism must show some evidence, not only that his or her actions were autonomic, but also that they were not the result of mental illness – as to this, see the following subheading. 1 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 409, 413–414 (AC) per Lord Denning; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1609 per Walsh J, at 1620–1621 per Taylor J and 1630–1631 per Moffitt J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 61 (CLR); 251 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 2 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 61 (CLR); 266 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ. 3 R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 at 463 per Hampel J (Teague J agreeing) (Vic CCA). 4 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 83 (CLR); 283 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 5 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Olcer (2003) 143 A Crim R 337; [2003] VSC 457 at 342 (A Crim R) per Nathan J. 6 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 71 (CLR); 275 (A Crim R) per Toohey J.
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[CLP.340] Practical aspects, jury directions and difficulties where automatism is raised The following matters are relevant in relation to directing a jury on automatism (some have already been referred to in the preceding commentary): (a) Although the prosecution must prove voluntariness, evidentially, voluntariness is presumed until there is evidence to suggest the reasonable possibility of involuntariness;1 (b) Where an accused seeks to raise the reasonable possibility of involuntariness caused by sane automatism, this raises the whole issue of his or her mental state, including the question of whether the accused in fact was suffering from mental illness – in a case where the accused claims to have been acting under sane automatism, it is open to the prosecution to submit that the evidence shows in fact that the accused, if acting involuntarily at all, did so because of mental illness (insane automatism);2 (c) If the evidence raises the issue of mental illness, the law precludes consideration of mental illness for the purpose of determining whether the accused’s act was voluntary;3 (d) Instead of (c), because of the presumption of sanity, once the prosecution establishes facts which in the case of a sane accused would prove all the elements of the offence, the onus passes to the accused to establish (on the balance of probabilities) that his or her act was not voluntary by reason of a mental malfunction;4 (e) Once there is evidence of involuntariness because of a mental malfunction, prima facie the mental malfunction is presumed to be a consequence of mental illness until proven otherwise by the accused;5 (f) If the accused seeks to rely upon sane automatism, then he or she must prove that the cause of his or her mental malfunction is from sane automatism, that is, was (i) transient, (ii) caused by trauma, either physical or psychological, which the mind of an ordinary person would not have withstood and (iii) not prone to recur – casting this onus on the accused does not infringe the rule that the prosecution must prove all elements of the accused’s guilt including voluntariness, because at this point, the issue is not that of criminal responsibility, but only the cause of the condition which deprived the accused of his or her ability to control his or her actions;6 (g) If an accused demonstrates a mental malfunction, not caused by mental illness, and a reasonable possibility that he or she acted in a state of sane automatism, the onus shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt either that this did not happen or, that this did not affect the accused’s control of his or her actions. If the evidence raises this reasonable possibility, and the prosecution cannot eliminate it, the accused is entitled to an outright acquittal;7 (h) If the evidence shows an involuntary act by the accused caused by a mental malfunction, but the accused fails to prove sane automatism, he or she is entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness;8 (i) It is for the trial judge to determine whether the evidence raises the issue of involuntariness from either mental illness and/or sane automatism for determination by the jury;9 (j) If the judge does allow the issue of involuntariness to go to the jury, the jury should be directed that they should not acquit on account of possible involuntariness attributable to a mental malfunction unless they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the mental malfunction either was the result of sane automatism or mental illness.10 (k) If mental illness is advanced as the only cause for an allegedly involuntary act and this is rejected by the jury, there is no room for the alternative defence of sane automatism;11 (l) If the evidence is capable of demonstrating an involuntary act caused by either mental illness or sane automatism, then both must be left to the jury.12 These cases are said to be rare.13 (m) Where a jury must consider both mental illness and sane automatism, the jury should be directed that if they are satisfied that the accused’s mental malfunction falls into one category or the other, but are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the cause was sane automatism, they should return a verdict of not guilty on the ground of mental illness;14
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[CLP.340]
(n) In directing the jury on sane automatism, the judge must distinguish between the evidence relevant to the question whether the act was in fact accompanied by an exercise of the will and the evidence relevant to the question whether the cause of the alleged mental malfunction is of the severity which would cause the mind of an ordinary person to lose the capacity to control an action of the kind charged. The personality and the state of mind of the accused before being subjected to the physical or psychological trauma which caused the alleged mental malfunction is relevant to the first question but not to the second;15 (o) Where there is evidence capable of demonstrating either mental illness or sane automatism, this can cause real problems for the trial judge in directing the jury. This is particularly so because of the different onuses of proof and different standards of proof.16 The authorities give some guidance on how this difficult area should be addressed by judges.17
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1 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–4 per Hunt J (Wood and Finlay JJ agreeing); R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244. 2 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 411 (AC) per Lord Denning; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 62 (CLR); 267 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ, at 69–70 (CLR); 273 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 3 See authorities quoted at [CLP.260]. 4 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 61 per O’Brien J (CCA); R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 11 per Hunt J (NSW CCA). 5 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 56 (CLR); 262 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 6 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 56–57 (CLR); 262 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 7 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1015 per Gresson P; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 4 per Hunt J (NSW CCA). Concerning possibility as distinct from affirmative proof, see also R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 43 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R); 57–58 (CLR); 263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 86 (CLR); 285 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 8 By s 38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 “Special verdict”. 9 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1015 per Gresson P; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 57–58 (CLR); 263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 84 (CLR); 284 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 10 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 58 (CLR); 263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 11 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 403–404 (AC) per Viscount Kilmuir LC and at 418 per Lord Morris; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 61 per O’Brien J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 45 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 12 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1015 per Gresson P; Bedelph v The Queen [1980] Tas R 23; (1980) 1 A Crim R 445 (Tas CCA); R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 6. 13 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 62 (CLR); 266–267 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ and at 70 (CLR); 273 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 14 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 57–58 (CLR); 263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 15 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 57–58 (CLR); 263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ; Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; (1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28 at 509–510 (CLR), 292–293 (A Crim R). 16 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273–274 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 9–12 per Hunt J (NSW CCA).
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17 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 275 (SASR); 396–397 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 10–11 per Hunt J (NSW CCA); R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 56–58 (CLR); 262–263 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ and at 86 (CLR); 285 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J.
[CLP.360]
Burden and standard of proof
Burden (onus) of proof The general rule – the prosecution bears the legal burden of proving all the elements of a charge and, except for mental illness and statutory exceptions, the legal burden to rebut defences raised in the evidence. Apart from these two exceptions, an accused person has no onus of proof at all. As to the prosecution’s obligation to rebut most defences, see commentary at [CLP.2240]. The classic statement of the onus of proof in criminal cases was made by Viscount Sankey LC in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481 (AC): Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. There is no shifting of the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt which rests on the prosecution from first to last and, even though the defendant remains silent after a prima facie case has been launched against him, it may be that he ought to be acquitted.1
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Legal and evidential burdens of proof – the position was set out in R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–3 by Hunt J (with whom Wood and Finlay JJ agreed): It is clear law that the Crown bears the onus of establishing each ingredient of the offence which has been charged. That is the “golden thread” which runs throughout the web of the criminal law: Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481–482 (AC). That obligation of the Crown is subject to exception only in relation to the defence of mental illness (an exception to which I will return), and in cases where the onus of proof in relation to a particular issue is placed upon the accused by statute (at 475, 481 (AC)); Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; 28 Cr App R 65 at 11 (AC). In relation to every other issue which may arise at the trial, the Crown bears the onus of proof; many such issues are frequently (but misleadingly) called “defences”. The Crown must therefore remove any reasonable possibility that the act of the accused was accidental (Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions at 482 (AC)), or that it was involuntary as a result of a state of automatism (Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 407, 414, 415 (AC); 14, 22, 23 (Cr App R); Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 215–216), or as a result of duress: R v Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841; [1963] 2 All ER 688; (1963) 47 Cr App R 166 at 171–172 (Cr App R); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122at 131. The Crown must also remove any reasonable doubt raised by the accused’s intoxication in determining whether the accused had formed the state of mind required for the offence charged: R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 71, 88, 118 (CLR); 351–352, 36–365, 386 (A Crim R); R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 3 06 at 486 (NSWLR); 323–324 (A Crim R); as well as any reasonable possibility that the act of the accused was provoked: Moffa v the Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14 at 607, 612, 628 (CLR); or done in self-defence: Zecevic v Director Of Public Prosecutions Vic (1987) 162 CLR 645, 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26 at 654, 657, 681, 686 (CLR); 168, 170–171, 188, 192 (A Crim R). That legal onus upon the Crown does not mean, however, that the Crown must bring evidence to meet every such “defence” which could possibly arise in relation to the offence charged. In every case, the accused bears an evidentiary onus to point to or to produce evidence (or material in an unsworn statement) from which it could be inferred that – as I would prefer to put it – there is at least a
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reasonable possibility that, for example, the act of the accused was accidental, or that it was provoked or done in self-defence: cf Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123; [1965] HCA 34 at 168, 171 (CLR). The authorities make it clear that such a reasonable possibility must be shown by admissible evidence. As to the evidentiary burden that an accused bears to point to evidence raising a defence for the prosecution to attempt to negative, see commentary at [1.1480].
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Statutory exceptions to the general rule – some statutory provisions cast an express onus of proof on an accused person. Examples are s 417 of the Crimes Act 1900, proof of lawful authority or excuse and s 417A, proof of exceptions etc. Section 29 of the Drugs Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 provides a specific example, ie where a person, who possesses more than the traffickable quantity of a prohibited drug, is deemed to possess it for supply unless he or she proves otherwise. Some statutory exceptions to the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proof of every element of a charge are implied rather than express. Of the former, in Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594; 64 ALJR 181; [1990] HCA 5, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 600–601 (CLR) stated: The rule laid down in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481 (AC), that the burden of proving every element of an offence charged rests at all times upon the prosecution, was expressed to be “subject to … the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception”. It is made clear in R v Edwards [1975] QB 27; [1974] 3 WLR 285; [1974] 2 All ER 1085 and R v Hunt [1987] AC 352; [1986] 3 WLR 1115; [1987] 1 All ER 1 that the statutory exceptions referred to are not confined to those which expressly cast the burden of proof upon the accused (see, eg Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 417), but extend to cases in which an intention to do so is necessarily implied. Such cases will ordinarily occur where an offence created by statute is subjected to a proviso or exception which, by reason of the manner in which it is expressed or its subject matter, discloses a legislative intention to impose upon the accused the ultimate burden of bringing himself within it. That burden may, of course, be discharged upon the balance of probabilities. The question of where a statutory onus of proof lies was further considered in Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Limited (1990) 170 CLR 249; 50 A Crim R 85; [1990] HCA 41 in the judgment of Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (at 257-259 (CLR)): For the purpose of assigning the onus of proof, a distinction is made between a requirement which forms part of the statement of a general rule and a statement of some matter of answer, whether by way of exception, exemption, excuse, qualification, exculpation or otherwise (called an “exception”), which serves to take a person outside the operation of a general rule. See Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512; [1955] HCA 19 at 519–520 (CLR). The distinction does not depend on the rules of formal logic: Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; [1952] HCA 63. Rather, the categorization of a provision as part of the statement of a general rule or as a statement of exception reflects its meaning as ascertained by the process of statutory construction. Where some matter is said to be an exception to an offence, the question is whether there is to be discerned a legislative intention “to impose upon the accused the ultimate burden of bringing himself within it”: Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594; 64 ALJR 181; [1990] HCA 5 at 183 (ALJR). The intention may be discerned from express words or by implication. See R v Edwards [1975] QB 27; [1974] 3 WLR 285; [1974] 2 All ER 1085 and R v Hunt [1987] AC 352; [1986] 3 WLR 1115; [1987] 1 All ER 1. Standard of proof Proof beyond reasonable doubt – to justify a conviction, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required: Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; [1913] HCA 70; at 584–586, 594–596 (CLR). This “time-honoured formula” is used by ordinary people and is understood well enough by the average person in the community.2 “A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertains in the circumstances. Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances.”3 Judicial attempts to explain or expand upon “beyond reasonable doubt” are unwise and usually end badly on appeal.4 In La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; 51 ALJR 145; [1976] HCA 52 at 71 (CLR), Barwick CJ
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pointed out: This Court has clearly laid it down that it is both unnecessary and unwise for a trial judge to attempt explanatory glosses on the classical and, as I think, popularly understood formula which expresses the extent of the onus resting on the Crown in its attempt to establish the commission of a crime: see Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 545; [1971] HCA 55. Ordinarily, there should be no embellishment of “beyond reasonable doubt” at all. In R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 at 117, Hunt CJ at CL said: It appears to be an ineradicable misconception on the part of some trial judges that, simply because the High Court has on many occasions said that the phrase beyond reasonable doubt is a well understood expression, and that whether a doubt is reasonable is for the jury to say by setting their own standards, it is necessary to tell the jury just that. It is not necessary; nor is it desirable to do so unless something is said by counsel during the course of the trial, or unless the jury asks a question, which warrants elaboration or explanation beyond the conventional direction …. The phrase beyond reasonable doubt needs neither embellishment nor explanation.5
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A number of judicial attempts to embellish beyond reasonable doubt were reviewed in the judgment of Simpson J in RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147. Simpson J in RWB at [49]–[55] pointed out that there are two instances where the “total prohibition on expanding upon the formulaic direction” is permitted. The first is where counsel’s address calls for some remediation, see, inter alia, Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2 and Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 545; [1971] HCA 55 at 33 (CLR) (where counsel for the accused possibilities which are in truth fantastic or completely unreal). The second is if the jury sends a note asking for an explanation of the meaning of the phrase. Even in this second instance, the explanation cannot safely go far.6 A trial judge can say that the words are ordinary English words and have their ordinary meaning.7 Whether a particular attempt to embellish beyond reasonable doubt constitutes a miscarriage of justice depends upon whether its effect is to diminish the standard of proof or was misleading or confusing.8 Proof by accused on the balance of probabilities – in any case, where an accused bears a legal burden of proof, this need only be proven on the balance of probabilities: s 141(2) of the Evidence Act 1995. Circumstantial evidence See further commentary for circumstantial evidence at [CLP.580]. 1 May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; [1955] HCA 38. 2 Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1, 35 ALJR 360; [1961] HCA 74 at 18 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. Also Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; [1913] HCA 70 at 584 (CLR) per Barton ACJ. 3 Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 545; [1971] HCA 55 at 32–33 (CLR). 4 Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; [1913] HCA 70 at 584 (CLR) per Barton ACJ; Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2; Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1, 35 ALJR 360; [1961] HCA 74 at 18 (CLR) per Barwick CJ; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 545; [1971] HCA 55. 5 The same point was made in Keil v The Queen (1979) 53 ALJR 525; R v Henning (unreported, NSWCCA, 11 May 1990); RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147. 6 R v Anderson (2001) A Crim R 116; [2001] NSWCCA 488; R v Southammavong [2003] NSWCCA 312 at [28]. 7 R v GWB [2000] NSWCCA 410 at [44] per Newman J. 8 RWB v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 209; [2010] NSWCCA 147; FP v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 82; [2012] NSWCCA 182 at [178].
[CLP.380]
Causation – general principles
Causation summary: 1. Causation is regarded as part of the actus reus. 2. The prosecution bears the onus of proving legal causation. 3. In most cases, causation is not an issue and requires no jury direction.
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4. When causation is an issue, this is most often in the context of murder or manslaughter. Causation questions may arise in other cases including, for example, offences against the person, dangerous driving cases causing death or serious harm and environmental pollution cases. 5. Legal causation involves more than factual causation. 6. Legal causation is a question of fact; the purpose of the inquiry being to attribute criminal responsibility to a proscribed result. 7. Unlike factual causation, legal causation can involve questions of moral culpability and value judgment. 8. For legal causation, while it is not necessary that an accused’s act or omission be the sole or main cause of the proscribed result, it must be at least a substantial cause of that result. 9. Where causation is an issue, the usual test to determine causal liability is the commonsense test. But this test may not provide an answer in some cases, including cases of an act by a third party or even by the victim, in which case other tests are used. 10. Foreseeability marks the outer limit of criminal causal liability. 11. An accused’s state of mind is not relevant to determining legal causation, except sometimes concerning foreseeability. 12. The chain of causation can be broken by a novus actus interveniens. [CLP.400]
Causation generally
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Cross references: Accident ...................................................................................................................... Actus reus ................................................................................................................... Mens rea ..................................................................................................................... Murder .........................................................................................................................
[CLP.120] [CLP.140] [CLP.1240] s 19A of the Crimes Act 1900 Manslaughter ............................................................................................................... [CA.24.20] Editor’s note In the commentary following, where appropriate, “act” should be read as “act or omission”. While the prosecution bears the onus of proving that the act of the accused legally caused the proscribed result, in most cases the causal connection is so obvious that there is no issue about causation. Generally, it is unnecessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on the question of causation.1 Where for any reason causation is not obvious, the prosecution must clearly identify the act(s) or omission(s) said to have caused the proscribed result2 and ask: (1) whether the proscribed result would not have occurred “but for” that act or omission, and if “yes”, (2) whether that act or omission was at least the substantial cause of that proscribed result. In R v Kennedy, a manslaughter case involving causation, the House of Lords observed that: Much of the difficulty and doubt which have dogged the present question has flowed from a failure, at the outset, to identify the unlawful act on which the manslaughter count is founded. … [I]t would focus attention on the correct question, and promote accurate analysis of the real issues, if those who formulate, defend and rule on serious charges … were obliged to consider how exactly, in law, the accusation is put.3 1 R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 288 (Cr App R). 2 The authorities concerning the need to identify the relevant act(s) or omission(s) are cited in the footnotes at [CLP.140].
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[CLP.420]
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[CLP.420]
CLP
3 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [26].
Factual causation and legal causation
Factual causation is broader than legal causation. Factual causation involves an enquiry whether there is in fact a connection between an act and a proscribed event. Factual causation is sometimes described as sine qua non1 or “but for” causation. Usually, the question is simply answered by asking whether the event would have occurred but for the conduct in question.2 But, as Kirby J pointed out in Arulthilakan (2003), at most the “but for” test can only constitute a “threshold test for determining whether a particular act or omission qualifies as a cause.” The problem of the “but for” test is that, on its own, it casts the net of causation too widely. It includes acts of a remote and peripheral or purely temporal connection which have no part to play in the determination of the “legal cause”.3 Additionally, as pointed out by Mason CJ in a civil case: The “but for” test gives rise to a well-known difficulty in cases where there are two or more acts or events which would each be sufficient to bring about the plaintiff’s injury. The application of the test “gives the result, contrary to common sense, that neither is a cause”.4 The purpose of the doctrine of legal causation is not to determine the factors which played a part in the happening of the proscribed result; it is to attribute legal responsibility for that result.5
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Legal causation raises more difficult questions of criminal responsibility – whether the factual connection between the conduct in question and the event is sufficient to justify the attribution of moral culpability and, hence, legal responsibility.6 Legal causation can involve questions of fairness and involve value judgments and policy.7 One description is “blameable” causation.8 The difference between factual and legal causation is illustrated by the English cases of Dalby (1982) and Kennedy (2007). In each case, the accused supplied heroin to another willing adult for the purpose of self-administration, leading to the latter’s death from overdose. The accused in each case at trial was convicted of manslaughter, but on appeal each conviction was overturned. While there was factual causation, there was no legal causation because the voluntary self-administration of the drug by the deceased was regarded as a novus actus interveniens.9 1 “[Latin ‘without which not’] An indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily depends.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 2 Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81 at [22] per Steytler P (Wheeler and McLure JJA agreeing). 3 Arulthilakan v The Queen (2003) 78 ALJR 257; [2003] HCA 74 per Kirby J at [57], the quoted words in turn are from the leading civil case of March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; [1991] HCA 12 at 530 (CLR) where the High Court said that while the “but for” test has been recognised as having an important role in civil cases, but it is not the exclusive test of causation. 4 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; [1991] HCA 12 at 516–517 (CLR). 5 Royall per Mason CJ at 387 (CLR); 59 (A Crim R), per Deane and Dawson JJ at 411–412 (CLR); 77 (A Crim R), per Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 423 (CLR); 86 (A Crim R), per McHugh J at 440 (CLR); 99 (A Crim R). 6 Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81 at [23] per Steytler P (Wheeler and McLure JJA agreeing). The difficulty sometimes involved was acknowledged by Robert Goff LJ in R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 288 (Cr App R) with the observation: “Problems of causation have troubled philosophers and lawyers throughout the ages”. 7 R v Lam (No 22) (2005) 15 VR 574; 164 A Crim R 445; [2005] VSC 296 at [8] per Redlich J citing, inter alia McHugh J in the civil case of Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; 72 ALJR 1344; [1998] HCA 55 at 243 (CLR). 8 Professor Williams G, Textbook of Criminal Law (1978), p 381. This term is also employed by Professor Yeo S in Blamable Causation (2000) 24 Crim LJ 144. 9 R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; (1982) 74 Cr App R 348; R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19.
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[CLP.40]
Legal causation requires substantial causation
Criminal legal causation does not require the accused’s act to be the sole cause, or even the main cause of the proscribed result.1 There may be multiple causes. There may be multiple actors. There may be intervening acts or omissions of third parties or even of the victim. But the wrongful act must be at least “a substantial cause”.2 Thus, a legal cause must at least have substance. Something more than “de minimus”.3 Some judgments speak instead of “significant” cause4 and, in at least one (joint High Court) judgment, of “substantial or significant”.5 If there is any difference in meaning between these two adjectives,6 the preponderance of authority seems to favour substantial causation.7
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The Western Australian murder case of Krakouer is an example of substantial causation. There, the accused got into a fight with the deceased. During the fight, his co-accused joined in and struck the deceased’s chin with a mallet with sufficient force to kill him without more, albeit not immediately. The deceased was felled by this blow and while on the ground, was struck by the accused to the back of his head with a post, crushing the deceased’s skull. The evidence showed that the blow with the post too without more, could have been fatal. The deceased died in hospital. As the Court of Appeal noted, acceleration of death is sufficient to establish legal causation. The Court said that extinguishment of the least spark of life is as much homicide as the killing of the most vital being. It is enough to satisfy the requirement of causation for the purposes of attributing legal responsibility in a criminal matter if the act of the accused makes a significant contribution to the death of the victim, whether by accelerating the victim’s death or otherwise.8 As to acceleration of death, see [CA.19A.360]. 1 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 440 (CLR); 99 (A Crim R) per McHugh J citing R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 290 (Cr App R). Also R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193; R v Lewis [1975] 1 NZLR 222; R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523; R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41; R v McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31; R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67; R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1. 2 R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 149; Royall at 398 (CLR); 66 (A Crim R) per Brennan J; at 423 (CLR); 86 (A Crim R) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ and at 444 (CLR); 102 (A Crim R) per McHugh J. In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ all spoke of substantial contribution to death. In a joint judgment in Arulthilakan v The Queen (2003) 78 ALJR 257; [2003] HCA 74, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ found no fault in a trial judge’s direction of substantial cause. In R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 at [71], Wood CJ at CL (with whom Foster AJA and Adams J agreed) in speaking of whether significant is interchangeable with substantial, said he was “content to accept … the latter”. 3 R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133; (1971) 55 Cr App R 262 at 264–265 (Cr App R), per Lord Parker CJ, cited by McHugh J in Royall at 442 (CLR); 100 (A Crim R). 4 R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 288 (Cr App R) per Robert Goff LJ; Royall at 398 (CLR); 66 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 5 Royall at 411 (CLR); 77 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ. In R v Carter (2003) 141 A Crim R 142; [2003] QCA 515 at [8], McPherson JA commented “Their Honours appear to have used those expressions not with the intention of differentiating between them, but, in the context in which their observations were made, as synonyms.” 6 Odgers S J and Yeo S M H in “Semantics and the Threshold test for Imputable Causation”, (2000) 24 Crim RL 73 point out that the two terms are by no means synonymous. 7 See Hallett; Royall; Osland; Arulthilakan and Moffatt as cited above. 8 Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81 at [33] reviews a number of authorities dealing with acceleration of death, including some United States cases.
[CLP.460]
Legal causation in particular cases
The law on the subject of causation has largely been formulated in the context of homicide cases and the great majority of examples come from homicide cases. Complete categorisation is difficult, but categories of cases where legal causation has not been excluded include:
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(a) indeterminate causation. It is immaterial that the prosecution cannot prove which of several acts on the part of the accused caused death if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that one or other of them did, see [CA.19A.300], [CA.19A.420]; (b) indirect causation where there is no direct or immediate physical contact between the accused and the victim, as where the accused induces fright, shock or mental suffering causing death or injury, or “escape cases” where the victim dies or is injured during the course of trying to escape from threatened violence by the accused, see [CA.19A.320]; (c) delayed causation, an example of which is where death results from a delayed complication of the original injury, see [CA.19A.340]; (d) conduct accelerating death. The example of Krakouer has already been given, and see [CA.19A.360]; (e) a pre-existing condition in the victim. The policy of the law is that those who use violence on others must take their victims as they find them, see [CA.19A.380]; (f) death by unexpected means. If an accused intends to kill and does kill, it is no answer to a charge of murder that death was caused at a time or in a way that was to some extent unexpected, see [CA.19A.400]; (g) intervention by a third party. An example is the case of R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 where a girl who was being used as a shield by the accused in a shoot out with police, was shot dead by the police who could not see her; (h) failure by the victim to obtain adequate medical treatment. In R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271, the accused was convicted of manslaughter after he stabbed a girl to her lung. In hospital, although she was correctly told a blood transfusion and surgery were necessary to save her life, she refused because of her belief as a Jehovah’s Witness. The accused argued on appeal that the victim’s refusal of treatment was unreasonable and broke the chain of causation. This contention was rejected, it being held that those who use violence towards others must take their victims as they find them, including their beliefs and that what caused the victim’s death was the stab wound. A similar case was R v Holland (1841) 174 ER 313; (1841) 2 Mood & R 351 where the victim ignored medical advice and died. (i) failure of others to give proper medical treatment. In R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844; [1991] 3 All ER 670; (1991) 93 Cr App R 251, the accused shot the victim in the leg and abdomen. The injuries caused respiratory problems requiring a tracheotomy. The victim’s windpipe became narrowed at the site of the tracheotomy from a rare but not unknown complication which medical staff failed to diagnose and treat. The victim suffered further respiratory problems and infection leading to his death from cardio-respiratory arrest two months after the shooting. At the time of death, the wounds from the shooting had healed. The accused was convicted of murder. On appeal, his conviction was confirmed, it being held that only in the most extraordinary case will sub-standard medical treatment break the chain of causation because it is too common to be considered abnormal. This topic is considered further at [CLP.540]. [CLP.480]
The commonsense test of causation
The question of whether the prosecution has proved legal causation will often be answered by a commonsense test. In Royall, after referring to the purpose of the doctrine of legal causation as being to attribute legal responsibility for a result, McHugh J observed: It is for this reason that the common law doctrine of causation has not accepted that a person is criminally responsible for an event or occurrence simply because his or her act or omission was a causa sine qua non of that event or occurrence. If, as a matter of common sense, an ordinary person would not hold an accused’s act or omission to be a cause of the event or occurrence, it is irrelevant that it was a causa sine qua non of that event or occurrence.1 Three members of the High Court have endorsed this proposition:
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It would seem to me to be enough if juries were told that the question of cause for them to decide is not a philosophical or a scientific question, but a question to be determined by them applying their common sense to the facts as they find them they appreciating that the purpose of the inquiry is to attribute legal responsibility in a criminal matter.2 1 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 441 (CLR); 99 (A Crim R) per McHugh J. 2 Campbell v The Queen [1981] WAR 286; (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 at 290 (WAR), 161 (A Crim R), Burt CJ (Jones and Smith JJ agreeing), approved in Royall by Mason CJ at 387 (CLR); 59 (A Crim R), and by Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 423 (CLR); 86 (A Crim R).
[CLP.500]
Other legal causation tests
The commonsense test does not always provide the answer as to whether there is legal causation. In Royall, McHugh J observed: But there are two cases where the invocation of common-sense principles of causation often provides little assistance to the jury. The first is the case where an accused’s act would not have brought about the event or occurrence without the intervention of a subsequent act of the victim or a third party. The second is the case where, notwithstanding the accused’s act or omission, the event or occurrence could have been prevented if the victim or a third person had taken action to avoid the consequences of the act or omission.1 McHugh J noted in Royall that in these circumstances common law judges have used at least four tests to determine causal liability: (1) the operating and substantial cause test;
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(2) the natural consequence test; (3) the reasonable foresight of the consequences test; and (4) the novus actus interveniens test, “which is used sometimes in conjunction with and sometimes independently of one of the other three tests.” McHugh J then remarked, “Unfortunately, the cases show no consistent pattern in applying these tests.”2 The reasonable foresight of the consequences test is considered in the next paragraph, and the novus actus interveniens test at [CLP.540]. In Royall, the natural consequence test was favoured by Mason CJ (at 389–390 (CLR); 60 (A Crim R)) and by Deane and Dawson (at 410 (CLR); 76 (A Crim R)).3 Of this, McHugh J said (at 449 (CLR); 105 (A Crim R)) “The balance of authority favours the reasonable foresight test over the ‘natural consequence’ test. Moreover, the word ‘natural’ is ambiguous.” The operating and substantial cause test asks if the original proscribed result is still an operating cause and a substantial cause of the ultimate proscribed result. This test has been applied in various cases.4 In Royall, McHugh J said of this test (at 449 (CLR); 106 (A Crim R)) that in most cases it is the “but for” test “applied under another label”, and (at 449 (CLR); 105 (A Crim R)), that the reasonable foresight test is to be preferred to it. 1 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 441 (CLR); 100 (A Crim R) per McHugh J. 2 Royall at 441 (CLR); 100 (A Crim R) per McHugh J. 3 The natural consequence test was applied in R v Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197 and a similar test in R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95. 4 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193 at 42–43 (QB); 131 (Cr App R); R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 149; R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 at 531.
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Criminal Liability Principles Reasonable foresight of consequences test – act or omission of victim or third party
Foresight of consequences may be relevant to intent, see [CLP.1400], but causation concerns the actus reus and not the mens rea.1 While an accused’s intention or other state of mind is highly relevant to the question of guilt, it is not relevant to the question of whether the accused caused a proscribed result as a matter of fact.2 Nevertheless, an accused’s mental state is not always irrelevant when it comes to the question of legal causation. One judicial view is that foresight by the accused of a proscribed result flowing from his act has nothing to do with the question of causation.3 But the High Court in Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 took a somewhat different view. Royall involved the death of a woman who either was pushed, or fell or jumped from a 6th storey bathroom window following, or in the course of, a violent attack upon her in the bathroom. In an unsworn statement at trial, the accused claimed the victim jumped out of the window. One real possibility was that she jumped to escape the accused’s violence. The Court considered whether this act was enough to break the chain of causation and held it did not. Deane and Dawson JJ at 412 (CLR); 78 (A Crim R) said that to say that foresight can never be relevant to causation is “going too far”. Brennan J at 398–399 (CLR) said: … an accused cannot be held criminally responsible for a death that has been caused in fact by his conduct if the final step taken by the victim was neither foreseen nor reasonably foreseeable. Foresight or reasonable foreseeability marks the limit of the consequences of conduct for which an accused may be held criminally responsible.
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(emphasis added) McHugh J in a detailed analysis of the question of causation, took a similar view at 450 (CLR); 105 (A Crim R): … for the purposes of the criminal law, causation cannot be separated from questions of moral culpability. And a person should not be regarded as morally culpable in respect of harm which he or she did not intend and which no reasonable person could foresee. (emphasis added) and at 451 (CLR); 107 (A Crim R): … in a case such as the present, an accused should not be held to be guilty unless his or her conduct induced the victim to take action which resulted in harm to him or her and that harm was either intended by the accused or was of a type which a reasonable person could have foreseen as a consequence of the accused’s conduct. In determining whether a reasonable person could have foreseen the harm suffered by the victim, any irrational or unreasonable conduct of the victim will be a variable factor to be weighed according to all the circumstances of the case. (emphasis added) Mason CJ at 390 (CLR); 61 (A Crim R) said much the same when, in alluding to the danger of directing a jury in terms of foreseeability on the issue of causation, he remarked: In many cases, for much the same reason, I see no point in linking that issue to the accused’s state of mind. On the other hand, in some situations, the accused’s state of mind will be relevant to that issue as, for example, where there is evidence that the accused intended that injury should result in the way in which it did and where, in the absence of evidence of intention, the facts would raise a doubt about causation. From these passages it seems that foresight can be relevant to legal causation in one of two ways: (a) against the accused, if there is evidence of an actual intent to cause harm in the way it was caused; (b) for the accused, if he or she did not intend to cause that harm and a reasonable person would not have foreseen that harm as a consequence of what the accused did.4
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Because of the risk of producing confusion between the question of causation and the question of intent, Royall contains warnings to trial judges against inviting juries to consider the question of foreseeability in determining legal causation.5 In McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26, the High Court said at 119 (CLR); 237 (A Crim R): It was observed in this Court in Royall that in directing a jury on causation of death in fright, escape or self-preservation cases, it is ordinarily undesirable to focus attention upon foreseeability. The idea of importing concepts of blame into questions of causation where an intervening event has a causal impact between the time of the accused’s act or omission and the occurring of the proscribed result is endorsed by Professor Yeo S in his article Blamable Causation (2000) 24 Crim LJ 144.
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1 2 3 4 5
R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 149. Fisse B, Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed, (1990 Lawbook Co), p 35. R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 148–149 (FC). See also Jemielita v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 409 at 431 per Murray J (CCA WA). Royall at 390 (CLR); 61 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; at 412–413 (CLR); 78 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ; and at 425 (CLR); 87 (A Crim R) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. See also R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333 at 345 (NSW CCA).
[CLP.540] Novus actus interveniens – breaking the causal chain Where, although an act of the accused constitutes a necessary condition for (a causa sine qua non) a proscribed result, nevertheless the intervention of a third person, event or occurrence may be regarded as the sole cause of the proscribed result, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility. This is a novus actus interveniens, a term that conveys to lawyers the crucial feature that there has not merely been an intervening act of another person or intervening event, but that that act or event was so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the proscribed result to the exclusion of the act of the accused.1 In a case of stabbing followed by incompetent treatment, then death, it was said, “only if it can be said that the original wounding is merely the setting in which another cause operates can it be said that the death does not result from the wound.”2 Generally, an act done by a victim for self preservation in the face of violence or threats of violence by an accused, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens. However, many authorities impose a requirement of reasonableness on the victim’s part.3 In Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669, Mason CJ at 388 (CLR); 59–60 (A Crim R) and McHugh J at 450 (CLR); 106–107 (A Crim R) discuss the requirement of reasonableness and whether it is the act done by the victim or, alternatively, merely the victim’s apprehension of danger which must be reasonable. Equally, a choice made by a victim which impedes self-preservation will not usually operate as a novus actus interveniens – an example is the refusal to undergo medical treatment necessary to preserve life.4 If a victim suffers a dangerous wound which results in death, the person who inflicted the wound will be responsible even though the victim failed to seek proper treatment or refused to undergo a necessary operation.5 Similarly, an accused cannot, in general, avoid liability for his or her own actions by pleading that the victim’s medical treatment was incompetent;6 although it may be otherwise if death results from the incompetent treatment of a minor wound which could not be foreseen as leading to death.7 “The act of the [accused] causing injuries from which the victim dies does not cease to be a causative act because the victim thereafter acts to his detriment or because some third party is negligent.”8 A proscribed result from intervention by a third party not acting in concert with the accused may or may not break the causal chain. This question was considered in R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 where, as earlier mentioned, the accused shot at armed police while using a girl as a shield. The police returned the fire, in the course of which the girl was shot and killed. The accused’ conviction for manslaughter was confirmed on appeal.9 An extraordinary natural occurrence may constitute a novus actus interveniens. This was discussed in R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 where the accused was charged with murder after the victim drowned having
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been violently assaulted and left unconscious near the water’s edge by the accused. It was held that the action of the sea upon the deceased did not break the chain of causation. The court said that in exposure cases the ordinary operation of natural causes has never been regarded as preventing the death from being caused by the accused; however there may be cases where the extraordinary operation of natural forces might break the chain of causation, eg, an earthquake or a tidal wave.10 1 R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 288. 2 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193 at 43 (QB), (a soldier who having been stabbed with a bayonet in a barrack room fight was twice dropped while being carried to the medical station where he was given incorrect treatment). 3 R v Pitts 174 ER 509; (1842) Car & M 284; R v Grimes (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 209; 10 WN (NSW) 211; R v Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 96; R v Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197; R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95; R v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453; Director of Public Prosecutions v Daley [1980] AC 237; (1979) 69 Cr App R 39; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669. 4 For example, R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 (CA) involving the death of a woman who because of her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness refused a blood transfusion which she was told was necessary to save her life following a stabbing wound to her lung. 5 R v Holland (1841) 174 ER 313; (1841) 2 Mood & R 351 (see “Delayed causation” at [CA.19A.340]); R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271; R v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469 at 480. Also 1 Hale PC 428; 1 East PC 344; Rew’s Case (1662) Kel 26; R v Flynn (1867) 16 WR 319, CCR (Ir). Compare R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152; R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193. 6 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193; R v Bristow [1960] SASR 210; R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844; [1991] 3 All ER 670; (1991) 93 Cr App R 251. See also R v Reading 83 ER 784; (1660) 1 Keb 17; R v Pym (1846) 1 Cox 339 (where it was said that to admit evidence concerning incorrect treatment would raise in every case a collateral question of the degree of skill of the medical practitioner); R v McIntyre (1847) 2 Cox 379; R v Davis (1883) 15 Cox 174. Cf R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152. 7 1 Hale PC 428; 1 East PC 344–345; R v Flynn (1867) 16 WR 319, CCR (Ir). 8 R v Bingapore [1975] 11 SASR 469 at 480. 9 See also R v Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; [1981] 2 All ER 422; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173 and R v Kinash [1982] Qd R 648; (1981) 5 A Crim R 240 where decisions by medical practitioners to turn off a victim’s life support machine were held not to break the causal chain. 10 R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 149–150.
[CLP.560]
Children and infants
Section 5 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, provides that it shall be conclusively presumed that no child under the age of 10 years can be guilty of an offence.1 Where a person receives from a child under 10 property which the child has unlawfully acquired such person cannot be guilty of receiving,2 but he or she may be guilty of larceny as a bailee or larceny by finding.3 A child between the ages of 10 and 14 is presumed to be doli incapax (incapable of crime).4 This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the accused knew that what he or she was doing was wrong. Thus, the maxim malitia supplet aetatem (malice supplies the want of age); the capacity to commit crime, do evil, or incur guilt, is not so much measured by years and days as by the strength of the accused’s understanding and judgment.5 Evidence of a previous conviction of the accused may be given to rebut the presumption.6 On the question of the accused’s knowledge, evidence may be given of his or her family background,7 and of his or her statements to a police officer.8 Even though the accused may know the act is wrong, he or she may not have the maturity of intellect to appreciate the natural and probable consequences of his or her act.9 Knowledge cannot be presumed merely from the commission of the crime,10 but it may be presumed from the circumstances under which the crime was committed.11 It has been said that for a child to be guilty of a crime, it must be shown that he or she understood that the act in question would subject the child to punishment.12
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The common law presumed that a boy under 14 was physically incapable of having carnal knowledge. However, see Crimes Act 1900, s 61S. All persons over the age of 14 are presumed to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for crimes, unless the contrary is proved.13 A girl under the age of 16 does not commit a crime by inciting a male person to have carnal knowledge of her.14 An infant cannot be guilty of a crime where a person is required to be of full age, eg bankruptcy offences.15 However, an infant, though incapable of making a contract, may be convicted of larceny as a bailee.16 The Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 contains special provisions for the trial and punishment of children under 18. See also the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987, the Children (Community Service Orders) Act 1987, the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 and the Children’s Court Act 1987.
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Provision for the giving of evidence by children is made by the Evidence (Children) Act 1997. Legislation concerning children is collected in Volume 2 in Tab 10. 1 This section had no relevance to a charge under former law to have a child under 10 declared to be a neglected child: Ex parte Dorman; Re Macreadie (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 271; 76 WN (NSW) 402. See also C v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 3 WLR 888; [1994] 3 All ER 190; [1995] 1 Cr App R 118. 2 Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; (1951) 35 Cr App R 94. 3 Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; (1951) 35 Cr App R 94 applied in McGregor v Benyon [1957] Crim LR 608. 4 R v Owen (1830) 4 Car & P 236; 172 ER 685; R v Smith (1845) 5 LTOS 393; 1 Cox CC 260; R v Gorrie (1919) 83 JP 136; B v The Queen (1958) 44 Cr App R 1; McDonald v Lucas [1922] VLR 47. See also O’Toole v Arnold (1982) 61 FLR 372; C v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] AC 1; [1995] 2 WLR 383; [1995] 2 All ER 43. 5 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 23; 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 25, 27; R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589. 6 R v B [1979] 3 All ER 460. 7 B v The Queen (1958) 44 Cr App R 1; R v Padwick [1959] Crim LR 439. 8 Ex parte N [1959] Crim LR 523. 9 R v Vamplew (1862) 3 Fos & Fin 520; 176 ER 234. 10 R v Kershaw (1902) 18 TLR 357; R v Smith (1845) 5 LTOS 393; 1 Cox CC 260. 11 R v Smith (1845) 5 LTOS 393; 1 Cox CC 260; R v Owen (1830) 4 Car & P 236; 172 ER 685; R v Gorrie (1919) 83 JP 136. 12 R (a child) v Whitty (1993) 66 A Crim R 462. 13 R v Oxford (1840) 9 Car & P 525; 173 ER 941; McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718. 14 R v Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710. 15 See R v Wilson (1879) 5 QBD 28. 16 R v McDonald (1885) 15 QBD 323.
[CLP.580] Circumstantial evidence Definition – facts may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence here means perception of a relevant fact by one of the senses of a witness. In Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [5], Gleeson CJ commented that: Direct evidence is evidence which, if accepted, tends to prove a fact in issue. … Circumstantial evidence is evidence which, if accepted, tends to prove a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred.1 In Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 (CLR); 184 (A Crim R), Dawson J said: Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a basic fact or facts from which the jury is asked to infer a further fact or facts. It is traditionally contrasted with direct or testimonial evidence, which is the evidence of a person who witnessed the event sought to be proved. The need for and quality of circumstantial evidence – “It is of the nature of many crimes that their perpetrators perform the deeds in secret. They do so in the hope of avoiding observation, detection and consequent prosecution and conviction. In such cases, a prosecutor must necessarily rely upon
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circumstantial evidence to prove the case against the accused. Circumstantial evidence ‘can, and often does, clearly prove the commission of a criminal offence’.”2 Circumstantial evidence is very often the best evidence – it is capable of proving a proposition with mathematical accuracy.3 Sometimes, circumstantial evidence sworn to by many witnesses of undoubted credibility can actually be stronger than disputable positive eyewitness evidence.4 Inferences and the exclusion of all other reasonable hypotheses – a circumstantial case depends upon inferences drawn from facts, events and circumstances. Inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence can prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt only if all other reasonable hypotheses are excluded.5 In Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; 50 ALJR 108; [1975] HCA 42 at 104 (CLR), Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ observed that: When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are “such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused”: Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66 at 634 (CLR). To enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be “the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw”; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44 at 252 (CLR); see also Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2 at 605–606 (CLR). However, “an inference to be reasonable must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence.” (Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66 at 661 (CLR)). These principles are well settled in Australia.
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This direction is not required in every case and is no more than the amplification of the rule that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt: R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397; 192 A Crim R 566; [2009] HCA 1 at [126] per Kiefel J, and see other authorities referred to in the footnotes. Hypothesis consistent with innocence – as stated in Peacock and other authorities, a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence involves more than mere speculation or conjecture.6 The jury does not have to be able to actually infer a particular event to support such a hypothesis, but it must have some reasonable basis in evidence.7 In Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [165], the Court of Criminal Appeal said: … the law is that a jury may infer that an alternative hypothesis consistent with innocence is reasonably possible, even though that hypothesis has not been established as a fact. This inference, however, must be reasonably open on the facts. It cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture that has no basis in the evidence. It is common and proper for a trial judge to tell a jury that they must not speculate or guess; operations of the mind quite different from the drawing of inferences.8 Notwithstanding evidence tending against the prosecution case, where a circumstantial case is a very strong and where the jury is appropriately directed, it is open for the jury to deliver a verdict of guilty.9 The fact that a police investigation was either less than perfect or defective does not necessarily weaken a prosecution case or mean, of itself, that a hypothesis consistent with innocence has been established.10 Circumstantial evidence is evaluated as a whole – consideration of a circumstantial case involves a common sense assessment of the evidence in the light of the common experience of human affairs.11 A jury must consider the prosecution case as a whole, not piecemeal.12 In R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; 81 ALJR 886; [2007] HCA 13, it was said in a joint judgment: It is of critical importance to recognise … that in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence: Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 (CLR) per Dawson J.13
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In Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 22; [2002] HCA 4 at [44], Gleeson CJ and Hayne J pointed out that a jury does not consider evidence in a circumstantial case “in separate and isolated compartments”. “Circumstantial evidence works cumulatively. Its persuasive force increases as individual items of evidence increase in number and their cumulative weight progressively eliminates the reasonable possibility of potential explanations …”.14 A description sometimes given is “the concatenation of probabilities”.15 The totality of evidence may be such that reason rejects the hypothesis of mere coincidence.16 In R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553; 8 A Crim R 276, Wells J commented that the united force of a body of circumstantial evidence may attain a high degree of cogency, notwithstanding that its constituent items are, individually, “colourless” and that there may be cases in which the relevance and cogency of no single piece of evidence becomes apparent until the very last item of evidence is locked into place, whereupon the relevance and cogency of all items are demonstrated.17 In Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 at 535, Gibbs CJ and Mason J observed that the jury “may find that one piece of evidence resolves their doubts as to another”.
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Strands in a cable and links in a chain – the metaphor used to describe most circumstantial evidence cases is “strands in a cable”,18 that is, a number of pieces of evidence taken together to allow the conclusion of guilt to be drawn by inference. By comparison, some circumstantial evidence cases depend on a chain of reasoning – the contrasting metaphor being “links in a chain”.19 These metaphors have some history.20 Proof of a “strands in a cable” circumstantial case – links in a chain case apart, individual items of evidence do not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.21 In Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106, 102 A Crim R 299; [1998] HCA 21 at [79], McHugh and Hayne JJ pointed out that it “is the charge, not the surrounding facts, that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt”. Because the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, it is pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately.22 McHugh J pointed out that ordinarily, jurors “are not under a duty to find any particular fact beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, absent any statutory direction to the contrary, they are under no duty to find any particular fact …”.23 The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt relates only to the final stage of a jury’s deliberations and the jury is not required to split up the various steps in the reasoning process and to apply some particular standard of proof to each of those steps.24 Proof of indispensable links in a circumstantial “chain” case – proof of a links in a chain case is different. In the context of what was actually stated in Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7, in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 (CLR); 184 (A Crim R), Dawson J (with whom Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) said: … it may sometimes be necessary or desirable to identify those intermediate facts which constitute indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt. Not every possible intermediate conclusion of fact will be of that character. If it is appropriate to identify an intermediate fact as indispensable it may well be appropriate to tell the jury that that fact must be found beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference can be drawn. This direction has become known as a “Shepherd direction”. On this same topic, Brennan J in Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 per at 203 (CLR); 357 (A Crim R) said: … Chamberlain (No 2) requires that no element of the offence be inferred adversely to an accused unless the intermediate facts, from which the inference is drawn be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But, as Shepherd holds, Chamberlain (No 2) imposed no requirement that the jury accept beyond reasonable doubt every piece of inculpatory evidence relevant to the existence of an intermediate fact. Basic, intermediate and ultimate facts – circumstantial evidence “necessarily calls upon processes of reasoning that involve the drawing of inferences from a jigsaw of established facts”.25 A distinction is drawn between basic (or primary) facts, intermediate facts and inference based on intermediate facts,26 although it has been commented that the term “primary facts” is apt to confuse when referring to basic facts.27 Of these categories, McHugh J in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 observed:
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Except in simple cases, the evidence in a circumstantial case will rarely establish facts from which the jury can directly draw an inference of guilt. More often than not, the evidence will establish facts which lead to the proof – by inference – of “further facts” which are the basis of the inference of guilt. Quite often, however, the inference of guilt will depend upon a combination of “further facts” and some primary facts. Sometimes it aids exposition to call the “further facts” intermediate facts and the other facts – whether used to infer intermediate facts or as a basis for inferring guilt directly – primary facts. But the terminology is of no importance. The relevant difference is not between primary facts and intermediate facts but between the facts from which the inference of guilt is drawn and the facts which prove the facts which are the basis of that inference.28 Then there are ultimate facts, that is, those which constitute the elements of the offence charged which may be inferred from intermediate facts.29 Distinguishing a strand case from a link case – while useful as legal shorthand, the metaphors of “strands in a cable” and “links in a chain” are imperfect.30 In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373, Barr and Hall JJ said at [667]: The danger of the metaphor, noted in R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29, is that a rope need not consist of a multitude of strands, but may have a discrete and relatively small number of cords. Further, each cord need not be of the same strength. If one cord provides the bulk of the load-carrying capacity, the rope may begin to look more like the chain. And even if the various elements of the evidence are each of comparable weight, their overall persuasiveness may result from the fact that they all tend in the same direction, a concept which is not fully captured by the metaphor of strands in a rope.
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In some cases it can be difficult to determine whether the evidence represents one or the other.31 The test is stated in Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150, 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150 by Simpson J (with Spigelman CJ and James J concurring) at [74]: Whether a fact on which the Crown relies as part of a circumstantial case is or is not “indispensable” may be tested by asking whether, in the absence of evidence of that fact, there would nonetheless be a case to go to the jury. If the answer is in the affirmative, even if the Crown case is weakened, even considerably, the fact is not “indispensable”. Where the answer is in the negative, the fact is “indispensable” and the jury should be directed accordingly.32 Similarly, in R v Zaiter [2004] NSWCCA 35 at [8], Ipp JA considered that if when one particular factual matter was removed from the list of facts relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case, one was “left with an empty shell”, a direction should be given that that was an indispensable intermediate fact that had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As a rule of thumb, the more basic or intermediate facts there are, the less likely a Shepherd direction will be required.33 In a case of only a few intermediate facts, a Shepherd direction may be called for.34 Examples of circumstantial evidence – “There are no categories of circumstantial evidence, and no attempt should be made to force any particular example of it into a mould. The criteria by which its cogency as proof is to be evaluated are drawn from life itself, and not from the law.”35 Nevertheless, many types of evidence are commonly used as circumstantial evidence including motive (sometimes as evidence of the doing of the act charged, sometimes as evidence of intent)36, similar fact or propensity evidence37, and post-offence conduct38, including lies39, flight40, going into hiding41, absconding on bail or from a correctional centre42 and concealment or disposal of a body43. Then there is physical evidence such as injury, fingerprints, shoe prints, blood and DNA. A description of a person as similar to the accused or identifying the accused near the scene of the crime can be used as circumstantial evidence.44 In conspiracy cases, conversations between alleged co-conspirators or actions by them is routinely used as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy alleged, see [CLP.780]. Absent a confession, the state of an accused’s mind is proved by circumstantial evidence.45 Circumstantial evidence can constitute corroboration.46 In Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; [2007] HCA 12, these simple examples of circumstantial evidence were given:
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Assume that a man’s body is found in a locked room. The cause of death is a single bullet fired into his head. … [the issue] on a defendant’s trial for murder is whether the defendant shot the deceased. Evidence [is] that the defendant was outside the room just before the time of death in possession of a fully loaded revolver …. [E]vidence [is] that the defendant was outside the room just after the time of death in possession of a revolver fully loaded save that one shot had been fired. … [E]vidence [is] that the defendant was the only person possessing a key to the room. … [E]vidence [is] that the defendant had a motive for killing the deceased. All of these matters of fact … are items of circumstantial evidence tending to establish that the defendant had the opportunity, the means and the motive to shoot the deceased.47
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Application for a verdict by direction – in a jury trial based upon circumstantial evidence, a judge should not direct a verdict of acquittal if there is evidence in support of the prosecution case upon which an accused could be convicted, even though a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence can be advanced.48 It is not for the trial judge to choose between competing inferences.49 Jury directions in circumstantial evidence cases – the authorities cited make it clear that: 1) where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove guilt, for the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty, it is necessary not only that guilt should be a rational inference but the only rational inference that the circumstances enable them to draw. If the jury considers that there is any reasonable explanation for the relevant circumstances consistent with the innocence of the accused, the jury is bound to find the accused not guilty. 2) this direction is no more than an amplification of the rule that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.50 3) while it is not necessary to give a circumstantial evidence direction in every case where circumstantial evidence is involved51, it should be given when the case against an accused rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence. 4) a circumstantial evidence direction should not be given where it would be unnecessary or confusing to do so.52 5) in a “links in a chain” circumstantial case, the jury must be satisfied of each indispensable individual link beyond reasonable doubt. 1 Quoting Cross on Evidence (6th ed, 2000) (Aust) by JD Heydon at p 14. See also Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; [2007] HCA 12 at [153] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ. 2 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [46] per Kirby J quoting Brennan J in Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 at 599 (CLR). 3 R v Donovan (1930) 21 Cr App R 20 at 21 per Hewart LCJ. 4 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [48] per Kirby J. 5 Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; [1936] HCA 23; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; 50 ALJR 108; [1975] HCA 42; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; 50 A Crim R 157; [1990] HCA 51. 6 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33; Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65. 7 R v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211; [2000] NSWCCA 6 at [31]; Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [164]; Fitzgerald v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28. 8 R v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211; [2000] NSWCCA 6 at [30] per Hulme J (Sully and Hidden JJ agreeing). 9 Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163. 10 Penney v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 1316, 155 ALR 605; [1998] HCA 51 per Callinan J at 609–610 (ALR) (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ agreeing); R v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220; [2004] NSWCCA 227; Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [171]–[174]. 11 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; [1936] HCA 23 at 375 (CLR) per Dixon J; R v Kaldor (2004) 150 A Crim R 271; [2004] NSWCCA 425 at [2] per Dunford J; Chahine v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 179 at [88]; Burrell v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 193 at [64]; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [51].
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12 Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 at 535–536 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J; Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 22; [2002] HCA 4 at [44] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; 81 ALJR 886; [2007] HCA 13; Wills v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 208; [2007] NSWCCA 160 per Beazley JA (James and Hidden JJ concurring); R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397; 192 A Crim R 566; [2009] HCA 1 per Kiefel J at [128] (Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ agreeing). 13 R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; 81 ALJR 886; [2007] HCA 13, joint judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ (Gleeson CJ agreeing) at [46]. 14 R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110; 44 A Crim R 1; [1989] HCA 64 at 141 (CLR); 25 (A Crim R), per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. Also R v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729; [1973] 2 WLR 254; (1973) 57 Cr App R 381 at 758 (AC); 420–421 (Cr App R) per Lord Simon of Glaisdale quoted by McHugh J in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 592 (CLR); 194 (A Crim R). 15 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 at 203 (CLR); 356 (A Crim R) per Brennan J; R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26, 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263, the Court at [44]. 16 Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98 at 104 per Napier CJ. 17 R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553; 8 A Crim R 276 at 562 (CLR); 286 (A Crim R) per Wells J (Sangster and Mohr JJ agreeing). 18 A metaphor used in Wigmore on Evidence and quoted by Dawson J in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 (CLR); 184 (A Crim R) and applied by Brennan J in Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 at 202 (CLR); 355 (A Crim R). 19 Quoted by Dawson J in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 579 (CLR); 184 (A Crim R) and applied by Brennan J in Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 at 202 (CLR); 355 (A Crim R). 20 R v Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922; 176 ER 850 at 929 (F & F); 853 (ER) per Pollock B. 21 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 585 (CLR); 189 (A Crim R) per Dawson J; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 per Brennan J at 204 (CLR); 357 (A Crim R). 22 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 580 (CLR); 185 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 23 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 594 (CLR); 195 (A Crim R). 24 R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 (CCA) at 374 cited by Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 at 537–538 (CLR). 25 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [46] per Kirby J. 26 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 584 (CLR); 188 (A Crim R) per Dawson J; Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 per Brennan J at 204 (CLR); 357 (A Crim R). 27 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 per Dawson J at 584 (CLR); 188 (A Crim R). 28 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 per McHugh J at 589 (CLR); 192 (A Crim R). 29 Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63 per Brennan J at 203 (CLR); 357 (A Crim R). 30 R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 at [69]; Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373; Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30. 31 R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 at [69]; Minniti v The Queen (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30. 32 Applied in Rees v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 83; [2010] NSWCCA 84 and Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21. 33 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 per McHugh J at 593 (CLR); 195 (A Crim R); Burrell v The Queen (2009) 196 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 163, the Court at [89]. 34 R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29; Davidson v The Queen (2009) 75 NSWLR 150, 195 A Crim R 406; [2009] NSWCCA 150. 35 R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553; 8 A Crim R 276 at 562 (CLR); 286 (A Crim R) per Wells J.
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CLP
[CLP.580]
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[CLP.580]
36 Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44 at 242 (CLR) per Dixon CJ; R v Price (1982) 8 A Crim R 403 (NSW CCA) per Lee J at 409; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 at 59 (CCA); Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7 at 535–536 (CLR) per Gibbs CJ and Mason J; De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [46] per Kirby J; HML v The Queen (2008) CLR 334; 183 A Crim R 159; [2008] HCA 16 at [4] per Gleeson CJ. 37 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; 11 A Crim R 331; [1984] HCA 5 at 563–564 (CLR) per Dawson J; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; 35 A Crim R 47; [1988] HCA 50 at 294–295 (CLR) per Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590; 43 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 50 per McHugh J at 630–631 (CLR), 251–252 (A Crim R); Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461; 77 A Crim R 149; [1995] HCA 7; HML v The Queen (2008) CLR 334; 183 A Crim R 159; [2008] HCA 16 at [22] per Gleeson CJ, at [181], [244] per Hayne J, [274], [454] per Heydon J and [489] per Kiefel J. 38 R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26, 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263, the Court at [44]. 39 R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 (CCA); Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; 68 A Crim R 349; [1993] HCA 63; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [55]; R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 at [55] (NSW CCA); R v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 at [56]–[58] per Simpson J. 40 R v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 per White J; R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [126] per McHugh J; R v Dat Tuan Nguyen (2001) 118 A Crim R 479; [2001] VSCA 1 at [20] per Winneke P; R v Dat Quoc Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545; [2002] NSWCCA 147; Quinlan v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 106; [2006] NSWCCA 284. 41 R v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572; 30 A Crim R 332. 42 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; 78 A Crim R 150. 43 Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66; R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406; 85 A Crim R 187 collecting a number of authorities on the topic. 44 R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163; 113 A Crim R 160; [2000] SASC 27 at [20]; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; 76 ALJR 291; [2001] HCA 72 at [54] per McHugh J. 45 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147; [1955] HCA 68 at 155 (CLR) per Fullagar J; McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 276; [1973] 1 All ER 503; (1973) 57 Cr App R 424; R v Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 at 50 (NSW CCA); Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56. 46 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; (1916) 12 Cr App R 81; R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 at 190–191; R v May [1962] Qd R 456 at 459 per Gibbs J; Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510; 48 ALJR 380; [1974] HCA 35; R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 117; Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7; Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; 50 A Crim R 157; [1990] HCA 51 at 211 (CLR); 159–160 (A Crim R); BRS v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 275; 95 A Crim R 400; [1997] HCA 47 per Kirby J at 439 (CLR); 324 (A Crim R). 47 Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260; 169 A Crim R 89; [2007] HCA 12 at [79] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ. 48 Director of Public Prosecutions v R (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 (NSW CCA); R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 at 130 (NSWLR) per Dunford J. 49 Case Stated by Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1; 70 A Crim R 323. 50 Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; 50 ALJR 108; [1975] HCA 42; Grant v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 503, 55 ALJR 490; [1981] HCA 32; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56 at [21] per Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ; R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397; 192 A Crim R 566; [2009] HCA 1 at [126] per Kiefel J. 51 Grant v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 503, 55 ALJR 490; [1981] HCA 32 per Barwick CJ. 52 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 per Dawson J at 579 (CLR); 184 (A Crim R).
[CLP.600]
Claim of right
See detailed commentary at [CA.117.200].
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[CLP.660] Common purpose
CLP
[CLP.620]
Criminal Liability Principles
See commentary at [CA.19A.200]. [CLP.640]
Complicity
See commentary at [CA.19A.200]. [CLP.660]
Common law conspiracy – outline
Definition – the accepted definition of conspiracy was stated in Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 at 317 per Willes J: A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.1 As pointed out by McHugh J, “[t]he second limb of this celebrated description, however, adds nothing: agreeing to use unlawful means necessarily involves agreeing to do an unlawful act.”2 Aspects of conspiracy – sometimes imprecise; conspiracy has been described as “a difficult branch of the law, difficult in itself, and sometimes even more difficult in its application to particular facts or allegations.”3 As an indictable common law misdemeanour,4 conspiracy is a common law offence in New South Wales. Like attempt, it is an inchoate offence, that is to say, incomplete in terms of a criminal or unlawful result. But while attempt requires the doing of some act, conspiracy is simply the making of an agreement to do something criminal, or at least unlawful.
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Rationale of conspiracy – the object of making conspiracy agreements punishable is to prevent the commission of the substantive offence before it has even reached the stage of an attempt.5 “Conspiracy is an inchoate crime for which the essential act is slight. It involves an intent to commit a further act. It is the commission of that act which the state desires to prevent …. The essence of the crime thus lies in the intent.”6 Also, it is said that organised criminal action is more dangerous to society than an individual breach of the law.7 Conspiracy is simply agreement – as will be seen at [CLP.740], actual performance of the agreement is not a requirement. “In the case of conspiracy as opposed to the substantive offence, it is what is agreed to be done and not what was in fact done which is all important.”8 But evidence of acts following the agreement is often the only available proof that the agreement was ever made. While the law recognises a number of different kinds of conspiracy, in practice in New South Wales, the ones commonly prosecuted are conspiracy to commit a crime, conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, see [CLP.800]. The following commentary focuses on these conspiracies; most importantly the first. 1 Quoting Lord Denman in R v Jones 110 ER 485; (1832) 4 B & Ad 345. This definition is quoted in numerous cases including R v Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336 at 338 (the Court); Director of Public Prosecutions v Nock [1978] AC 979; [1978] 3 WLR 57; (1978) 67 Cr App R 116 at 994 (AC) per Lord Scarman; R v Trudgeon (1988) 39 A Crim R 252 at 260 per Lee CJ at CL; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 281 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R) per Brennan and Toohey JJ; R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256; 82 A Crim R 432 at 268 (NSWLR); 443 (A Crim R) per Smart J; Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [51] per McHugh J; R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [62] per French CJ (HC). 2 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [51]. 3 R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 at 99 (CCA). 4 R v Rowlands 117 ER 1439; (1851) 17 QB 671 at 686 (QB); 1445 (ER) per Lord Campbell CJ; R v Newland [1954] 1 QB 158; [1953] 3 WLR 826; [1953] 2 All ER 1067 at 166 (QB) per Lord Goddard; Foord v Whiddett (1985) 6 FCR 475; 16 A Crim R 464; 60 ALR 269 at 468 (A Crim R) per Sheppard J (FCA); Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48; (1989) 45 A Crim R 1 at 21 (A Crim R) per Hope AJA (NSW CA); Director of Public Prosecutions v R (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 (NSW CCA). 5 Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; [1957] 1 All ER 411 (HL) at 626 (AC) per Lord Tucker. In practice, many conspiracies are prosecuted only after they have been completed.
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[CLP.660]
6 Harno D, “Intent in Criminal Conspiracy” (1941) 89 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 624 at 646, quoted with approval in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [64] per McHugh J. 7 Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 817–818 (AC); 606 (Cr App R), per Lord Wilberforce; R v Wasson [2004] NSWCCA 200 at [21]. 8 R v Bolton (1992) 94 Cr App R 74 at 80 per Woolfe LJ.
[CLP.680]
Indictment – conspiracy to commit a criminal offence
Single accused – two party conspiracy That AB between (about) .......... and (about) .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did conspire with CD to commit a criminal offence, namely the offence of ......................... (specify offence). Multiple accused – multi-party conspiracy That AB, CD and EF between (about) .......... and (about) .......... at .................................................. (and elsewhere) in the State of New South Wales did conspire together and amongst themselves and with GH and IJ (and/or other persons unknown) to commit a criminal offence, namely the offence of ......................... (specify offence).
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Procedural rules – indictments for conspiracy are governed by cl 21 of Sch 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.15990] which provides that it is not necessary to state any overt act of conspiracy, that only one other conspirator need be nominated by name and proved to have unlawfully conspired with the accused, that particulars may be ordered to be given, that no more than three counts may be included in the one indictment against an accused and that if substantially different conspiracies are charged, the prosecutor may be put to election as to the one on which to proceed. Otherwise, an accused may be charged with conspiring with “persons unknown”.1 The prosecution is not called upon to define the exact time when a conspiracy began.2 Advantages of charging conspiracy – there are a number of advantages for the prosecution in charging conspiracy rather than substantive charges. These advantages can result in corresponding unfairness to people accused. With multiple crimes, conspiracy avoids many separate charges. Particularisation is easier. Proof is easier – the prosecution can take advantage of the co-conspirators rule by which evidence of the acts and declarations of a conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is admissible against his co-conspirators, see [CLP.780]. Where there is the potential of significant unfairness, the defense may consider an application for a separate trial, see [CPA.21.40]. Conspiracy and substantive charges – the co-conspirators rule means that the rules of evidence operate differently in conspiracy cases. The High Court has said that generally speaking, it is undesirable that conspiracy should be charged when a substantive offence has been committed and there is a sufficient and effective charge for this offence available.3 The addition of a charge of conspiracy to a substantive charge tends to prolong and complicate a trial.4 So too does the “rolled up” charge, that is, adding a conspiracy charge to a number of charges of substantive offences, particularly with more than one accused.5 These practices have been deprecated.6 But, judicial criticism notwithstanding, there is no actual objection in law to the charging of separate offences out of the same set of facts, or to adding a count for conspiracy to substantive counts.7 It has been noted that, “where charges of substantive offences do not adequately represent the overall criminality it may be appropriate to include a charge of conspiracy”.8 Caution has been judicially expressed about charging both a conspiracy and an attempt to commit the same crime based on the same facts, where a substantive charge is available.9 Conspiracy cannot be charged where the substantive offence itself involves an agreement.10 A count must charge only one conspiracy – a count in conspiracy must comply with the general rule of charging one offence only,11 and see “Single and multiple conspiracies” at [CLP.760]. Where the
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prosecution charges conspiracy, it is “essential indeed fundamental – that the precise nature of the conspiracy be carefully analysed prior to the commencement of the proceedings”.12 There is a need for a conspiracy to be precisely delineated, to avoid any attempt during the trial to widen the case so as to include an independent conspiracy and for the evidence affecting each count and each accused to be carefully segregated, not only in the prosecution’s presentation but also in the summing up.13
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Particulars – those accused of conspiracy are entitled to, and should be furnished with, the precise particulars of the overt acts relied upon by the prosecution to establish the conspiracy charged so that there may be clearly defined issues before the court and the jury.14 Also, an accused is entitled to know precisely with whom it is going to be alleged that he conspired and the scope of the conspiracy alleged.15 1 R v Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189; [1965] 2 WLR 748; (1965) 49 Cr App R 104 at 192–193 (QB); 107–108 (Cr App R); R v Howes (1971) 2 SASR 293; R v Carusi (1989) 17 NSWLR 516; 45 A Crim R 165 at 538 (NSWLR); 187 (A Crim R) per Enderby J (dissenting in the result). 2 R v Pepper [1921] 3 KB 167; (1922) 16 Cr App R 12 at 19 (Cr App R); R v Ongley (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 116 at 117 per Jordan CJ; R v Saffron [No 1] (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; 36 A Crim R 262 at 419 (NSWLR); 283 (A Crim R) per Hope JA, at 436 (NSWLR); 300 (A Crim R) per Clarke JA (CA). 3 R v Hoar (1981) 148 CLR 32; 56 ALJR 43; [1981] HCA 67 at 38 (CLR) per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Aickin and Brennan JJ. See also R v Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336; 47 WN (NSW) 157 at 345 (SR (NSW)); 160 (the Court); R v Partridge (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 410; 47 WN (NSW) 173 at 413, 414 (SR (NSW)) per Ferguson J. 4 R v Hoar (1981) 148 CLR 32; 56 ALJR 43; [1981] HCA 67 at 38 (CLR), referring to Verrier v Director of Public Prosecutions [1967] 2 AC 195; [1966] 3 WLR 924; (1966) 50 Cr App R 315 at 223–224 (AC); 326–327 (Cr App R). 5 R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279 at 594 (QB); 283–284 (Cr App R); R v Knight [2004] NSWCCA 145 at [27] per Howie J. 6 Including R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279 at 593–594 (QB); at 282 (Cr App R); R v Jones (1974) 59 Cr App R 120 at 124; R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 (NSW CCA); R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 (NSW CCA) (where the court was critical of the prosecution for bringing charges of conspiracy to murder, attempted murder and murder in relation to one homicide). 7 R v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321; [1931] HCA 23 at 333–334 (CLR); R v Bebic (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 October 1982); R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 (NSW CCA) the Court at 180. 8 R v Jones (1974) 59 Cr App R 120 at 124 per James LJ (CA); R v Saffron [No 1] (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; 36 A Crim R 262 at 462 (NSWLR); 328 (A Crim R) per Hope JA (CCA). 9 Krakouer v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 202; (1998) 102 A Crim R 490; [1998] HCA 43 at [34] per McHugh J. 10 R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278; [1963] 3 WLR 496; (1963) 47 Cr App R 272 at 284 (QB); 277–278 (Cr App R); R v Chow (1987) 11 NSWLR 561; 30 A Crim R 103 (CCA). 11 R v Ongley (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 116 at 117 per Jordan CJ. 12 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 333 (CLR); 66 (A Crim R) per Deane J. 13 R v Yau Leung Wong (1988) 37 A Crim R 385 at 394 per Wood J (NSW CCA). See also Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 333 (CLR); 66 (A Crim R); R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 (NSW CCA) at 442–443 (A Crim R) per Hunt J (McInerney and Allen JJ agreeing). 14 R v Partridge (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 410; 47 WN (NSW) 173, approved by the High Court in R v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321; [1931] HCA 23 at 333 (CLR); R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 (NSW CCA) at 442–443 per Hunt J. 15 R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 (NSW CCA) at 441 per Hunt J; R v Saffron [No 1] (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; 36 A Crim R 262 at 447–448 (NSWLR); 311–312 (A Crim R) per Hunt AJA (CA).
[CLP.700]
Jurisdiction and cross references
Summary jurisdiction and summary offences – conspiracy is generally prosecuted on indictment. However, if the object of a conspiracy is to commit any offence listed before cl 28A in Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, a charge for that conspiracy is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see s 260 at [4.10960] and Table 1 at [4.13810]. Conspiracy has been charged where the object was a summary offence, see [CLP.760].
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[CLP.700]
Criminal Liability Principles
[CLP.700]
Trans-jurisdictional conspiracies – in Lipohar, the High Court considered the question of individual state jurisdiction in the context of conspiracies having trans-jurisdictional formation and operation.1 The joint judgment of Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that a court of a particular state has jurisdiction of over conspiracies entered into in other states, if there is a sufficient connection with that particular state. The requirement of nexus should be liberally applied and a real connection with the particular state should suffice. A real connection will be if the substantive offence is to be committed in the particular state.2 However, if only the agreement is made within a particular state to be carried out outside it, this is not sufficient to give that particular state jurisdiction.3 Related provisions Section 26 – conspiracy to murder. Section 341 – abolition of the common law offence of conspiring to pervert the course of justice. Section 342 – offence of conspiring to commit an offence against Pt 5 of the Crimes Act 1900 still permitted including s 319, the offence of perverting the course of justice. Section 344A – attempts. 1 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65. 2 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 at [122], [123]. 3 Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; [1957] 1 All ER 411 (HL); Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 818 (AC); 606 (Cr App R) per Lord Wilberforce; Liangsiriprasert v United States [1991] 1 AC 225; [1990] 3 WLR 606; (1991) 92 Cr App R 77; R v Isaac (1996) 87 A Crim R 513 (NSW CCA) (agreement in New South Wales to commit robbery in the ACT).
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[CLP.720]
Elements of conspiracy
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) agreed with another or others; (2) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. Actus reus and mens rea – the two elements of conspiracy are less straightforward than first appearance suggests. It is said that that element 1 above is the actus reus of conspiracy and element 2 the mens rea. For example, in R v LK (concerning conspiracy under the Commonwealth Criminal Code), French CJ said “The common law defines the elements of the offence by reference, albeit not without some diffıculty, to the agreement as the actus reus and the intention to do an unlawful act pursuant to the agreement as the mens rea.” (emphasis added)1 But becoming party to an agreement itself necessarily includes an element of intention too.2 In Churchill v Walton, the House of Lords held that mens rea was only an essential element to conspiracy in so far as there must be an intention to be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act.3 In Peters, McHugh J, referring to the fact that conspiracy is so predominantly mental in composition, said, “A real question arises … whether dividing the elements of conspiracy into an actus reus and a mens rea serves any useful purpose.”4 Duality of intention – the civil law of contract requires simply an agreement, not an intention to carry it out. By contrast, the law of conspiracy requires both agreement and an intention to carry out its object.5 In terms of the commonly quoted definition in Mulcahy v The Queen,6 (quoted at [CLP.660]) various authorities make it clear that, as McHugh J stated in Peters, it “was not sufficient that the accused had intended to agree to commit the offence. He had to have intended to put the common design, the commission of the offence, into effect.” (emphasis added)7 This duality of intention is reflected in the High Court decision in R v LK where the following proposition was quoted with approval in a joint judgment: The mental element necessary to constitute the crime of conspiracy has been said to be the intention to do the unlawful act which was the subject of the agreement, but it seems more accurate to say that what is required is an intention to be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act and that such an intention must involve also an intention to carry out the unlawful purpose.8
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[CLP.740]
Criminal Liability Principles
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The High Court in R v LK said that concerning conspiracy under the Commonwealth Criminal Code which is derived from the common law, in terms of intention, the prosecution must prove that an accused intended (1) to agree to commit an offence and (2) that the agreed offence be actually committed.10 1 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [53] per French CJ, referring at [64] to Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; (1967) 51 Cr App R 212 and to the restatement of these elements by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Nock [1978] AC 979; [1978] 3 WLR 57; (1978) 67 Cr App R 116. 2 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [55] per McHugh J. 3 Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; (1967) 51 Cr App R 212. 4 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [52] per McHugh J. 5 R v Wilson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 August 1994) per Gleeson CJ at 8–10. 6 Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 at 317 per Willes J. 7 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [56] per McHugh J; R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [64] per French CJ. These authorities include the Canadian case of R v O’Brien [1954] SCR 666; 110 CCC 1; the English case of R v Thomson (1966) 50 Cr App R 1 and the United States cases of Woodworth v The State (1881) 20 Tex App 375 and Delaney v State 11 Smith (TN) 432; (1932) 51 SW 2d 485 and the New Zealand case of R v Gemmell (1985) 1 CRNZ 496 as quoted in Peters at [52] and [60] per McHugh J. There is also R v Anderson [1986] AC 27; [1985] 2 All ER 962; (1985) 81 Cr App R 253 at 37–39 (AC); 964–966 (All ER); 257–259 (Cr App R) (HL) per Lord Bridge. 8 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [105] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ quoting Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report: Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters (1990) by Sir Harry Gibbs at [40.1]. 9 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [127] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ. 10 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [141] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ.
[CLP.740]
Conspiracy: Element (1) Agreement with another or others
Agreement completes the offence – conspiracy is complete upon reaching agreement with the necessary intention; no action to put it into effect is required.1 While acts done under the agreement often furnish the evidentiary foundation for inferring its existence, such acts are not themselves elements of the offence.2 The term “agreement” tends to suggest a process of formality often lacking in reality.3 Sometimes “acting in concert” is a better description.4 There must be at least a conscious understanding by each conspirator of a “common design”.5 A conditional agreement can amount to a conspiracy.6 A subsequent withdrawal from the agreement does not negate liability.7 A conspiracy does not end with the making of the agreement – it continues so long as there are two or more parties to it intending to carry out the object of it.8 Intention is the necessary state of mind – as conspiracy involves agreement, the prosecution must prove an intention to agree – by both law and logic, no lesser mental state such as recklessness will suffice.9 There must be evidence of an actual intention to agree – a common design – and not just a mere coincidence of intentions.10 Merely discussing the possibility of committing an unlawful act will not constitute a conspiracy.11 A fine line may separate these two situations. Of itself, the fact two accused were pursuing the same unlawful object at the same time is not sufficient to establish a conspiracy.12 Mere knowledge of a crime is about to be committed by another does not make a person a conspirator either.13 An accused must actually intend to achieve the unlawful act – recklessness is not sufficient – “it is not sufficient proof of a
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(emphasis supplied) The same joint judgment later included this reservation: Under the common law, identification of the particular mental state that the prosecution is required to prove in order to establish the mens rea (the fault element of the offence) may be the subject of controversy.9 (emphasis added)
Criminal Liability Principles
[CLP.740]
conspiracy that the person realised that the probable consequences of the agreed conduct might result in the performance of an unlawful act.”14 However, intention need not necessarily be the mens rea required by the substantive offence. The 2010 High Court decisions of Ansari and LK, and Ansari in the Court of Criminal Appeal, support the proposition that if an accused has the actual intention to achieve the unlawful object, then it does not matter that the substantive offence can be proven by some lesser mental state such as recklessness.15 Or the substantive offence may be one of strict liability or of absolute liability.16 As explained in the English House of Lords case of Saik, this is because conspiracy has “its own mental elements” which “subsume” any lesser mental element component of the substantive offence and that “in this respect the mental element of conspiracy is distinct from and supersedes the mental element in the substantive offence” (which becomes otiose on a charge of conspiracy).17 Analogous to the terms of s 5.4(4) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code that was instrumental in the reasoning in both Ansari (2007) and Ansari (2010),18 by s 4A of the Crimes Act 1900, if an element of an offence is recklessness, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. Knowledge required – a conspirator need not know a proposed act is unlawful, but must know the facts that make it unlawful.19 In contrast, “while a mistake of law is not a good defence, a sincere belief in a state of facts which if true would render the illegal conduct legal would be a good answer to any charge of conspiracy”.20 An accused does not have to know how the unlawful act is to be committed.21
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Parties – obviously, there must be at least two parties to a conspiracy.22 An accused can be liable if he conspired with only one other named conspirator.23 A husband and wife can be charged with conspiracy, see s 580D. A corporation may be a party.24 There may be many parties, perhaps joining at various times and with various states of knowledge. In the English case of Griffıths it was said: … in law all must join in the one agreement, each with the others, in order to constitute one conspiracy. They may join in at various times, each attaching himself to that agreement; any one of them may not know all the other parties but only that there are other parties; any one of them may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself.25 Communication between all parties is not essential.26 This will be so in a “wheel” conspiracy, where individual parties communicate with one person at the centre but not with each other.27 It can also be so in a “chain” conspiracy.28 Liability of conspirators – all parties to a conspiracy are liable as long as the agreement is for the performance of an unlawful act by any one of them,29 or by a third party.30 One party to a conspiracy may be convicted without the others being convicted or even charged.31 A party may be charged with conspiracy with a named person who has died or who has not been apprehended or cannot be found.32 Often some parties cannot be identified, in which case a party may be charged with conspiring “with persons unknown”.33 A party may be convicted of conspiracy to commit the substantive offence even though he could not be convicted of the substantive offence itself.34 One party may be exempt from liability for the substantive offence.35 1 The authorities for this are many and include Poulterer’s Case 77 ER 813; (1611) 9 Co Rep 55; R v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48 at 58–59; Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 827 (AC); 618 (Cr App R) per Lord Pearson; Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 at 119 (AC); 895 (Cr App R) per Lord Hailsham; R v Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470; [1980] 3 WLR 89; [1980] 2 All ER 401; (1980) 71 Cr App R 148 at 481 (AC); 92–93 (WLR); 403 (All ER); 152 (Cr App R) per Lord Diplock; Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8; R v Trudgeon (1988) 39 A Crim R 252 at 254 per Gleeson CJ; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 281 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R) per Brennan and Toohey JJ; Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29 at 8 (CLR); 543 (A Crim R 538). 2 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 281 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R) per Brennan and Toohey JJ. 3 In R v Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336; 47 WN (NSW) 157 at 339 (SR (NSW)), Street CJ observed that conspirators do not “formulate their design in terms of an agreement”.
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4 R v Newland [1954] 1 QB 158; [1953] 3 WLR 826; [1953] 2 All ER 1067 at 166 (QB); 164 (Cr App R) Lord Goddard CJ. A good example is R v Lee (1994) 76 A Crim R 271 (NSW CCA). 5 R v Orton [1922] VLR 469 at 473 per Cussen J; R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94. 6 R v Jackson [1985] Crim LR 442 – where there was an agreement that one party facing trial would be shot in the leg if convicted to try to get a lighter sentence. 7 R v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48 at 58 per Brett LJ. However, a change of mind is relevant on sentence: Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29. 8 Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29 at 8 (CLR); 543 (A Crim R) (the Court). See also Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 827 (AC); 618 (Cr App R) per Lord Pearson; R v G [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 at 43–44; R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; 59 A Crim R 445; Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 at [14]; Hong Phuc Truong v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 122; (2004) 78 ALJR 473; [2004] HCA 10 at [35] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh J and Heydon JJ. 9 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 506 (CLR); 187–188 (A Crim R) per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ; Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204 (CCA) per Howie J at [61] (quoting R v Lessard (1982) 10 CCC (3d) 61), confirmed by the High Court in Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; (2010) 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18. 10 Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 at 317 per Willes J; R v Moore [1988] 1 Qd R 252; (1987) 25 A Crim R 302 at 255 (Qd R); 304 (A Crim R) per Macrossan J. 11 R v O’Brien (1974) 59 Cr App R 222 at 225 (CA). 12 Day v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 60 (WA CCA). 13 R v Trudgeon (1988) 39 A Crim R 252 at 255 per Gleeson CJ. 14 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [110] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ (Heydon J agreeing). 15 Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; (2010) 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18; R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17; Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204 per Howie J at [76] (Simpson and Hislop JJ agreeing). See also Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163. 16 Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; (1967) 51 Cr App R 212; Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204 per Howie J at [76]. 17 R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18; [2007] 1 AC 18; [2006] 2 WLR 993 at [8] per Lord Nichols (Lord Steyn agreeing). 18 Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204 per Howie J at [88]; Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; (2010) 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18 at [59] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ. 19 R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [114] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ; R v Thomson (1966) 50 Cr App R 1 at 2; Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; (1967) 51 Cr App R 212; Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 at 119 (AC); 895 (Cr App R) per Lord Hailsham; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 282 (CLR); 435–436 (A Crim R) per Brennan and Toohey JJ. 20 Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 at 119 (AC); 895 (Cr App R) per Lord Hailsham; R v Freeman (1985) 3 NSWLR 303; 17 A Crim R 272 (CCA). 21 R v Aston (1987) 44 SASR 436; (1987) 26 A Crim R 128. 22 R v Alley; Ex parte Mundell (1886) 12 VLR 13; Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 333–334 (CLR); 66–67 (A Crim R) per Deane J; R v Phillips (1988) 86 Cr App R 18. 23 R v Coles [1984] 1 NSWLR 726; (1984) 9 A Crim R 419 (CCA) at 734–735 (NSWLR); 430 (A Crim R); R v Chrastny (No 1) [1991] 1 WLR 1381; [1992] 1 All ER 189; (1992) 94 Cr App R 283 (CA) at 1384 (WLR); 192 (All ER); 285 (Cr App R). 24 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551; (1945) 30 Cr App R 31; R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278; [1963] 3 WLR 496; (1963) 47 Cr App R 272; R v Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685; [1967] 3 WLR 367; (1967) 51 Cr App R 316; R v Sinclair [1968] 1 WLR 1246; [1968] 3 All ER 241; (1968) 52 Cr App R 618. 25 R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279 (CCA) at 597 (QB); 290 (Cr App R).
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[CLP.740]
26 R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 (CCA) at 101–102; R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279; R v Chrastny (No 1) [1991] 1 WLR 1381; [1992] 1 All ER 189; (1992) 94 Cr App R 283 (CA) at 1384 (WLR); 192 (All ER); 285 (Cr App R) per Glidewell LJ. 27 R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 (CCA) at 101–102; Ex Parte Coffey; Re Evans [1971] 1 NSWLR 434 at 446. 28 R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 at 101–102 (CCA); R v Jackson (1988) 33 A Crim R 413 (NSW CCA); R v Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160. 29 R v Orton [1922] VLR 469 at 474 per Cussen J; R v Anderson [1986] AC 27; [1985] 2 All ER 962; (1985) 81 Cr App R 253 (HL) at 37 (AC); 964 (All ER); 258 (Cr App R) per Lord Bridge. 30 Ansari v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 89; (2007) 173 A Crim R 112; [2007] NSWCCA 204, confirmed by the High Court in Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; (2010) 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18, see in particular [53]. 31 R v Ahearne (1852) 6 Cox CC 6; R v Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189; [1965] 2 WLR 748; (1965) 49 Cr App R 104; R v Phillips (1988) 86 Cr App R 18; R v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668; 56 ALJR 688; [1982] HCA 32; Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8. 32 Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1975] AC 717; [1974] 3 WLR 155; (1974) 59 Cr App R 250 at 754 (AC) per Lord Morris (Lord Reid agreeing). 33 In Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 334 (CLR); 67 (A Crim R) per Deane J; R v Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189; [1965] 2 WLR 748; (1965) 49 Cr App R 104 at 192–193 (QB); 107–108 (Cr App R); R v Howes (1971) 2 SASR 293; R v Carusi (1989) 17 NSWLR 516; 45 A Crim R 165 at 187 (A Crim R) per Enderby J (dissenting in the result); R v Harrison (1995) 79 A Crim R 149 per Gleeson CJ at 150. 34 R v Gallagher (1989) 44 A Crim R 256 (NSW CCA) where a prisoner was convicted of conspiracy to effect his own rescue from lawful custody, when clearly he could not be charged with effecting his own rescue. 35 For example, in R v Duguid (1906) 94 LT 887, the accused was convicted of conspiracy to take a child, despite the other party to the conspiracy being the child’s parent who was exempt from the offence of child stealing.
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[CLP.760]
Conspiracy: Element (2) Intention to do an unlawful act
Intention to do an unlawful act – as noted at [CLP.740], the prosecution must prove not only an accused’s intention to agree, but also an intention that an unlawful act will be done (by at least one conspirator or by a third party). Speaking of the accepted description of conspiracy in Mulcahy1, Brennan and Toohey JJ explained in Rogerson: As the “very plot” is the actus reus of the offence, the offence is complete before any further unlawful act is done or any further lawful act is done to carry the unlawful object into effect. When Willes J spoke of an “unlawful act”, he was speaking of an act which has not occurred when the conspiracy is formed. He must have meant an act which, if done in circumstances contemplated by the conspirators, would be unlawful.2 Unlawful act – an unlawful act is not necessarily criminal, although generally it is.3 In New South Wales, apart from conspiracies to defraud (the object of which may or may not be criminal, see [CLP.800]), the criminal object is usually an indictable offence. A summary offence is sometimes the object of a prosecuted conspiracy, at least in other jurisdictions.4 A conspiracy is identified not by the parties to it,5 but rather, by its subject matter and purpose.6 Single and multiple conspiracies – conspirators must have a common intention to achieve the same unlawful object or objects.7 Different objects among conspirators may mean that there is more than one conspiracy. So in Gerakiteys, Brennan J observed that: If two conspirators agree to effect several unlawful objects and a third person agrees with them to effect some only of those objects, there are two conspiracies not one: the original conspirators are parties to both conspiracies, the third person is a party only to the conspiracy with the more limited objects.8 A “wheel” type conspiracy with a number of parties may sometimes be one conspiracy, or may be a series of separate conspiracies, each involving the party at the centre with one other party at the periphery.9 A jury cannot find two conspiracies under a count which charges one only, or find an accused guilty of a conspiracy that is a distinct and different conspiracy from that which the count alleges.10 However, a trial
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upon an indictment charging a single count of conspiracy does not miscarry when evidence is led which shows that an accused is or may be a member of another conspiracy.11 Pretence conspirator – because liability for conspiracy depends upon not only an intention to agree, but also an intention to carry out the unlawful object of the agreement, a person who agrees to an unlawful purpose but with no intention of effecting that purpose will not be liable for conspiracy.12 Impossibility – notwithstanding English authority to the contrary,13 the fact that the object of a conspiracy is factually impossible does not mean that the parties to it are not liable for conspiring to achieve that object.14 Some of the authorities in this area are cases of attempt rather than conspiracy.15 In one such case, it was said that “[t]he concept of a defence of factual impossibility is flawed and has been resoundingly condemned by judges, legislatures and commentators alike in numerous jurisdictions.”16 Some examples illustrate the point. It was not a defence to a charge of conspiracy to manufacture a particular prohibited drug that the chemicals chosen were incapable of making that drug.17 Where there was a conspiracy to import a prohibited drug, it was held not to be a defence that the supplier of the drug to be imported was in fact an undercover police officer.18 Where two men attempted to rob a young man waiting for a bus, it was held not to be a defence that the intended victim had no money.19
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1 Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 at 317 per Willes J. 2 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 281 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R). 3 For example Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] AC 220; [1961] 2 WLR 897; [1961] 2 All ER 446 (conspiracy to corrupt public morals); Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 104; [1973] 3 WLR 198; (1973) 57 Cr App R 880 (conspiracy to commit a tort). See also R v Cahill [1978] 2 NSWLR 453; (1978) 46 FLR 453. 4 There are a number of instances where the indictable charge of conspiracy has been brought for conspiring to commit a summary offence, including R v Absolon 175 ER 825; (1859) 1 F & F 498; R v Druitt (1867) 10 Cox CC 592; R v Bunn (1872) 12 Cox CC 316; R v Putland [1946] 1 All ER 85; (1946) 31 Cr App R 27; R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278; [1963] 3 WLR 496; (1963) 47 Cr App R 272; R v Skewes (1981) 7 A Crim R 276 (Vic Sup Ct FC). 5 R v Coles [1984] 1 NSWLR 726; (1984) 9 A Crim R 419 (CCA). 6 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 334 (CLR); 62 (A Crim R) per Deane J. 7 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8; R v Moore [1988] 1 Qd R 252; (1987) 25 A Crim R 302 at 254 (Qd R); 303 (A Crim R) per Macrossan J; Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [65] per McHugh J. 8 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 327 (CLR); 61–62 (A Crim R). 9 R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279; R v Sorby [1986] VR 753; (1986) 21 A Crim R 64 (FC) at 791–792 (VR); 104 (A Crim R). 10 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 333–334 (CLR); 66–67 (A Crim R) per Deane J, and at 327 (CLR); 61–62 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. See too R v Meyrick (1930) 21 Cr App R 94 (CCA); R v Ongley (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 116 at 117 per Jordan CJ; R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279. 11 Gerakiteys v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 317; 12 A Crim R 54; [1984] HCA 8 at 329 (CLR); 63 (A Crim R) per Brennan J, citing R v Greenfield [1973] 1 WLR 1151; [1973] 3 All ER 1050; (1973) 57 Cr App R 849 at 1156–1157 (WLR); R v Sorby [1986] VR 753; (1986) 21 A Crim R 64 (FC) at 792–793 (VR); 105 (A Crim R). 12 R v O’Brien [1954] SCR 666; 110 CCC 1; R v Thomson (1966) 50 Cr App R 1; Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [56] and [63] per McHugh J. For example in R v Kotish (1948) 93 CCC 138, it was held that a person could not be guilty of conspiracy or attempted conspiracy to procure an abortion where his alleged co-conspirator, the woman in the case, was a detective who was not pregnant and who stated that she had no intention of having an abortion. 13 Director of Public Prosecutions v Nock [1978] AC 979; [1978] 3 WLR 57; (1978) 67 Cr App R 116 (HL). 14 R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256; 82 A Crim R 432; R v El Azzi (2001) 125 A Crim R 113; [2001] NSWCCA 397. In each of these cases, R v Kingswell [1984] 3 NSWLR 273; (1984) 14 A Crim R 211 which applied Nock, was expressly disapproved. Also R v El Azzi (2001) 125 A Crim R 113; [2001] NSWCCA 397. In Onuorah v The
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15 16 17 18 19
[CLP.760]
Queen (2009) 76 NSWLR 1; 197 A Crim R 430; [2009] NSWCCA 238, a five judge bench confirmed the judgments in R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256; 82 A Crim R 432 of Gleeson CJ (who dissented in the result) and Dunford J. Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929; (1986) 23 A Crim R 254; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49. R v Irwin (2006) 94 SASR 480; (2006) 161 A Crim R 78; [2006] SASC 90 at [30] per Bleby J (Duggan and Anderson JJ agreeing). R v El Azzi (2001) 125 A Crim R 113; [2001] NSWCCA 397; R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455. R v Kapeliotis (1995) 82 A Crim R 300 (NSW CCA). See also Yip Chiu-Cheung v The Queen [1995] 1 AC 111; [1994] 3 WLR 514; [1994] 2 All ER 924; R v Salem (1997) 96 A Crim R 421 (NSW CCA). R v Irwin (2006) 94 SASR 480; (2006) 161 A Crim R 78; [2006] SASC 90.
[CLP.780]
Proof of conspiracy
Proof of agreement by inference – conspiracy can seldom be proved by direct evidence of the making of an agreement and must in almost all cases be proved as a matter of inference from other facts, that is to say, by circumstantial evidence.1 Overt acts are merely acts involving or directed to the commission of a criminal offence from which a conspiracy may be inferred.2 They are not themselves component elements of a conspiracy.3 There is a danger of misunderstanding this unless the distinction is clearly pointed out to a jury.4 It is not necessary for the Crown to prove all overt acts particularised or sought to be proven.5 A trial judge need not give a direction concerning the intention of an alleged conspirator in relation to each of the overt acts relied upon – it is the overall intention of the alleged conspirator that is relevant.6
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Co-conspirators rule of evidence – in the leading case of Ahern the High Court said: … when two or more persons are bound together in the pursuit of an unlawful object, anything said, done or written by one in furtherance of the common purpose is admissible in evidence against the others. The combination implies an authority in each to act or speak on behalf of the others: Tripodi at 7. Thus anything said or done by one conspirator in pursuit of the common object may be treated as having been said or done on behalf of another conspirator. That being so, once participation in the conspiracy is established, such evidence may prove the nature and extent of the participation. The principle lying behind the rule is one of agency ….7 In a conspiracy case, the acts and statements of co-conspirators need not be in furtherance of the conspiracy to be admissible; it is sufficient that they are relevant to whether there was a conspiracy and to what the nature of it was.8 For such evidence to be admissible, there must be “reasonable evidence”, apart from the acts or words that the accused was a participant, a question for the trial judge.9 The case of Masters shows how a trial judge is to approach this question of admissibility.10 Often the admissibility is so obvious that no formal ruling is necessary. Otherwise, the judge must be satisfied of a prima facie case against a particular accused based upon evidence independent of acts or statements of co-conspirators. The decision is analogous to a ruling on a case to answer. If there is a prima facie case, then the judge must further consider whether the “co-conspirator” rule should be rejected against an accused because of unfairness.11 In the event that the trial judge rules against the admissibility of the evidence tendered against a particular accused, the jury should be informed of the effect of this ruling.12 It has been judicially recognised that the co-conspirator rule can operate oppressively.13 It has been judicially stressed that a trial judge needs to give careful directions about evidence of the acts and declarations of co-conspirators including its hearsay nature and the need for the jury to scrutinise it with care.14 Consistent and inconsistent verdicts – even where more than one person is on trial, one party can be convicted and another acquitted where differences in the evidence against each does not make the verdicts inconsistent.15 Where in a joint trial the evidence is of equal weight against two alleged co-conspirators, it has been said that the trial judge should direct that both should either be acquitted or convicted.16 It is
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otherwise where there are separate trials,17 and so an accused facing a trial for conspiracy is not entitled to a stay of proceedings because an alleged co-conspirator was earlier acquitted.18 1 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; (1988) 34 A Crim R 175; [1988] HCA 39 at 93 (CLR); 177 (A Crim R) (the Court). See also R v Orton [1922] VLR 469 at 474 per Cussen J; R v Gunn (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 336; 47 WN (NSW) 157 at 343 (SR (NSW)); 159 (WN (NSW)) per Street CJ; Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 833 (AC); 627 (Cr App R) per Lord Salmon. 2 Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 2 WLR 532; (1973) 57 Cr App R 600 at 833 (AC); 627 (Cr App R) per Lord Salmon; R v Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470; [1980] 3 WLR 89; [1980] 2 All ER 401; (1980) 71 Cr App R 148 at 481 (AC); 92–93 (WLR); 403 (All ER); 152 (Cr App R) per Lord Diplock. 3 R v G [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 (CCA) at 44; Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 at [140], [144] per Kirby J (dissenting in the result) and at [217] per Callinan J. Overt acts may be relevant on sentence: Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29. 4 R v Nessel (1980) 5 A Crim R 374 at 378 per D M Campbell J (Qld CCA). 5 R v Saffron [No 1] (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; 36 A Crim R 262 at 435 (NSWLR); 299 (A Crim R) per Hope JA (CA). 6 R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 (NSW CCA). 7 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; (1988) 34 A Crim R 175; [1988] HCA 39 at 94–95 (CLR); 178 (A Crim R), the Court, referring to Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1; 35 ALJR 72; [1961] HCA 22 at 7 (CLR). 8 R v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 (CCA). 9 Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87; (1988) 34 A Crim R 175; [1988] HCA 39 at 100, 103 (CLR); 182, 185 (A Crim R) (the Court). 10 R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; 59 A Crim R 445 (CCA). 11 R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; 59 A Crim R 445 at 465–466 (NSWLR); 459 (A Crim R) (the Court); R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 (CCA); R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 (CCA). 12 R v Dellapatrona (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 at 153–154. 13 R v Griffıths [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 3 WLR 405; (1965) 49 Cr App R 279; R v Jackson (1987) 11 NSWLR 318; (1987) 30 A Crim R 230 at 322 (NSWLR) per Roden J. 14 R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 (CCA). 15 The R v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668; 56 ALJR 688; [1982] HCA 32 at 677 (CLR) where the Court said “the apparent phenomenon is readily explained in terms of the obligation of the jury to consider separately the guilt of the two accused on the basis only of the evidence admissible against each.” See also R v Hunt [1968] 2 QB 433; [1968] 3 WLR 231; (1968) 52 Cr App R 580 (CA) at 438 (QB); 583 (Cr App R). 16 Marsh v Vauhan 78 ER 937; (1598) Cro Eliz 701; Dharmasena v The King [1951] AC 1 (PC); R v Longman (1980) 72 Cr App R 121. The authorities are considered in R v Catalano (1992) 61 A Crim R 323 (NT SC Kearney J). 17 R v Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 118; [1972] 1 All ER 65; (1972) 56 Cr App R 31; Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1975] AC 717; [1974] 3 WLR 155; (1974) 59 Cr App R 250. 18 R v Catalano (1992) 61 A Crim R 323 (NT SC Kearney J).
[CLP.800]
Conspiracy to defraud and other conspiracies
Categories of conspiracy – although there is only one offence of conspiracy, for convenience it is categorised into separate heads.1 Conspiracy to commit a criminal offence is a primary one. Before Withers, there was uncertainty as to what objectives, apart from well recognised ones, could form the subject of a charge of conspiracy. Withers held that the courts could no longer create new categories of conspiracy and that the law only recognised certain accepted heads of conspiracy, such as conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.2, Of these two, only conspiracy to defraud remains a recognised common law offence in New South Wales. As noted at [CLP.700], s 341 abolished the common law offence of conspiring to pervert the course of justice, but s 342 preserves conspiring to commit an offence against Pt 5 of the Crimes Act 1900, which includes s 319, the offence of perverting the course of justice. Conspiracy to defraud – dishonesty is an essential element of the offence.3 The elements of conspiracy to defraud were stated by McHugh J in Peters as follows:
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[CLP.800]
Although most cases of conspiracy to defraud involve an agreement to use dishonest means which has the effect of inflicting economic loss on a third party, the infliction of such loss is not an essential element of the offence. It is sufficient that the conspirators intended to obtain some advantage for themselves by putting another person’s property at risk or depriving another person of a lawful opportunity to obtain or protect property. It is also well established that a conspiracy to defraud may be established if the defendants agree to deceive a person into acting or refraining from acting contrary to his or her public duty.4 (footnotes omitted)
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The three categories of fraud identified in Peters are the intentional creation of a situation in which the accused: (1) deprives another person of money or property, or (2) puts the money or property of that other person at risk, or (3) prejudicially affects that person in relation to some lawful right, interest, opportunity or advantage, knowing that he has no right to deprive that person of that money or property or to prejudice his or her rights.5 1 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [51] per McHugh J referring to Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers [1975] AC 842; [1974] 3 WLR 751; (1974) 60 Cr App R 85. 2 Director of Public Prosecutions v Withers [1975] AC 842; [1974] 3 WLR 751; (1974) 60 Cr App R 85. 3 R v Ward (1996) 88 A Crim R 159 (NSW CCA). 4 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [73]. Other leading authorities include Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 WLR 741; [1974] 3 All ER 1032; (1974) 60 Cr App R 124; R v Horsington [1983] 2 NSWLR 72; (1083) 14 A Crim R 118 (CCA); R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 65 (SASR); 33 (A Crim R); Wai Yu-Tsang v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 269; [1991] 3 WLR 1006; [1991] 4 All ER 664; Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43. 5 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [30] by Toohey and Gaudron JJ and at [73] per McHugh J.
[CLP.820]
Penalty and sentencing
As a common law misdemeanour, the penalty for conspiracy is at large, see [CLO.120]. In the High Court case of Hoar it was said: In exceptional cases the element of concert may justify a more severe penalty for conspiracy than for the substantive offence which the conspirators commit … but where a court, imposing a penalty for conspiracy, takes into account the overt acts of the conspiracy, it would be wrong to impose a further penalty in respect of those acts.1 A sentencing judge is entitled to have regard to the part a conspirator played in the execution of a conspiracy.2 1 R v Hoar (1981) 148 CLR 32; 56 ALJR 43; [1981] HCA 67 at 38 (CLR) per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Aickin and Brennan JJ. 2 Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1; (1995) 78 A Crim R 538; [1995] HCA 29.
[CLP.840]
Corporations
Section 59(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that a provision of an Act relating to an offence applies to bodies corporate as well as to individuals. See also s 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987, [6.26460]. [CLP.860]
Duress
See further commentary at [1.1700].
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[CLP.920] Incitement
Historically, incitement was an indictable common law misdemeanour.1 As to common law misdemeanours, see [CLO.40]. The offence of incitement has existed for centuries. In the case of Bacon (1663) 1 Lev 146; 83 ER 341, Bacon was indicted for intending to murder the Master of the Rolls and for offering another 100 pounds to do it. His argument that his intent only was not indictable was rejected. He was fined and imprisoned. R v Higgins (1801) 2 East 5; 102 ER 269 is a far more detailed decision. There, the defendant was charged that he did “falsely, wickedly, and unlawfully solicit or incite” another to steal goods of his employer. It was argued for the defendant that there was no precedent for an indictment “for a bare solicitation to commit an offence without an act done in pursuance of it”. Referring to various authorities, all four judges in Higgins rejected this argument. Le Blanc J said at 23 (East); 276 (ER): It is contended that the offence charged … is no misdemeanor, because it amounts only to a bare wish or desire of the mind to do an illegal act. If that were so, I agree that it would not be indictable. But this is a charge of an act done; namely, an actual solicitation of a servant to rob his master, and not merely a wish or desire that he should do so. A solicitation or inciting of another, by whatever means it is attempted, is an act done; and that such an act done with a criminal intent is punishable by indictment has been clearly established by the several cases referred to.
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Incitement is the appropriate charge where the offence incited is not in fact carried out. If it is carried out, the inciter becomes an accessory to the offence itself. Like conspiracy and attempt, incitement is an inchoate crime, that is to say, a “just begun” or “partially completed” crime.2 In Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; (1956) 41 Cr App R 11, Lord Tucker pointed out that inchoate crimes of conspiracy, attempt and incitement developed with the principal object of frustrating the commission of a contemplated crime by arresting and punishing the offenders before they committed the crime.3 Unlike conspiracy, incitement requires no agreement. Unlike attempt, no step needs to be taken towards the commission of the offence itself. 1 Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (21st ed, Vol IV, Butterworth & Co, 1950) Editor-in-Chief LC Warmington. 2 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 3 Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; (1956) 41 Cr App R 11 at 626; 44-45.
[CLP.900]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .......... in the State of New South Wales did unlawfully incite CD (or if the incitement was to people at large, “others”) to commit an offence, namely (specify offence). The identification of the person to whom the incitement is made is not always essential: R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [49]. Various decisions hold that an incitement may be made to people at large, see for example R v Jones [2008] QB 460; [2007] EWCA Crim 1118; [2007] 3 WLR 907; [2007] 4 All ER 112. [CLP.920]
Jurisdiction, penalty and cross references
Although an indictable misdemeanour historically, now the offence of incitement is included in Tables 1 and 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (cll 28B and 15). The effect is that if the offence incited is included in either Table 1 or Table 2 so that it can be prosecuted summarily, incitement to commit that offence can similarly be prosecuted summarily. If the offence incited is included in Table 1, then incitement to commit that offence is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the person charged elects otherwise. If the offence incited is included in Table 2, then incitement to commit that offence is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects otherwise. Otherwise, incitement is prosecuted on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. If prosecuted on indictment, an incitement, like other common law misdemeanours,
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[CLP.920]
can result in a fine or imprisonment with no fixed limit; see Punishment for common law misdemeanours at [CLO.120]. A sentence for incitement should not exceed the sentence for the completed offence itself.1 For related inchoate offences: conspiracy, see commentary at [1.265]–[CLP.820] and attempt, s 344A of the Crimes Act 1900, see commentary at [CA.344A.40]–[CA.344A.140]. Statutory incitement offences include: Section 26 – solicit etc to murder; Section 61N – inciting an act of indecency; Section 61O – inciting an aggravated act of indecency; Section 80G – incitement to commit sexual offence; Section 249F – inciting or soliciting etc a corrupt commission or reward etc. There is also s 351A of the Crimes Act 1900 – recruiting persons to engage in criminal activity. The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 contains various offences of inciting hatred towards various groups: ss 20D, 38S, 49ZT, 49ZXB. 1 R v Pearce [1953] 1 QB 30; [1952] 2 All ER 718; (1952) 36 Cr App R 149; R v Scaife [1959] Crim LR 295.
[CLP.940]
Elements of incitement
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) incited another (or others) to commit an offence, (2) intending that the offence so incited be committed. These elements are now reflected in s 11.4 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) dealing with incitement.
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[CLP.960]
Element (1) Incitement to commit an offence
Meaning of incitement – there are many meanings of incite – common synonyms are urge or encourage. It has been said that the term does not necessarily mean to originate or to initiate.1 “Incite” has been held to mean “to rouse; to stimulate; to urge or spur on; to stir up; to animate”.2 Common forms of behaviour covered by incite are said to be “command”, “request”, “propose”, “advise”, “encourage” or “authorise”3, or by exerting pressure or making threats.4 “Incitement” is synonymous with “soliciting”5, and see s 26 solicit to murder. Actus rea of incitement – the actus reus of the crime is incitement to commit an offence6; the “deliberate encouragement or active inducement of the commission of a criminal offence”.7 Once the incitement or urging is proved, the offence is complete.8 The incitement may be implied as well as express – the advertising of a device that could detect police radar traps was held to constitute an incitement even though the advertisement warned that the use of the device was an offence.9 To constitute the offence of incitement, there must be a communication that reaches some person whom the accused wishes to incite, but it is not necessary the latter should act upon the communication or that the mind of that person should in fact be persuaded to commit the crime or be influenced in any way at all.10 Where the communication is sent with a view to incite, but does not reach the intended recipient, the sender is guilty of attempting to incite.11 The offence of inciting to commit a crime may be committed by addressing it not to an individual, but to the public in general by publishing the incitement in a newspaper12, or by radio broadcast13, or by writing graffiti on train and station toilets.14 R v Jones [2008] QB 460; [2007] EWCA Crim 1118; [2007] 3 WLR 907; [2007] 4 All ER 112 was a case where the accused incited children under 13 to engage in sexual activity by writing graffiti on train and station toilets seeking girls aged 8 to 13 for sex for payment and requesting contact via his mobile telephone number. Concerning prohibited drugs, it was held in R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [51], [52] and [54] that a person A may incite another, B to supply a prohibited drug to A himself. Hodgson JA (with whom Hidden J and Smart JA agreed) at [51] drew a distinction between the usual situation where an addict requests drugs from his usual supplier and the situation where the request is made
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to a person not understood by the addict to be ready, willing and able to be able to supply the drug. Hodgson JA said that in the former situation, the element of incitement is absent, whereas in the latter situation “the extra element of incitement might occur, so as to bring it about that the other person is induced to become ready, willing and able to make the supply”.15 In Eade at [59], Smart AJ said that whether in a particular case what was said amounts to an incitement depends upon the context in which the words were used and the circumstances. Impossibility – if the act incited is not a crime then there will be no incitement. A father who incited his fifteen year old daughter to have sexual intercourse with him was held not guilty of incitement because on account of her age, she would not have committed a crime by having intercourse with him.16 However, in cases of attempt and conspiracy, there can be liability for attempting to commit or conspiring to commit an offence that is impossible to commit, see [CLP.760] and [CA.344A.100]. Section 11.4(3) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) expressly provides for liability for inciting the impossible.
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Trans-jurisdictional incitements – the related issue of trans-jurisdictional conspiracies was considered by the High Court in Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65 and see commentary at [CLP.700]. 1 R v Crichton [1915] SALR 1 at 3 per Way CJ; Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976] Crim LR 131. 2 Young v Cassells (1914) 33 NZLR 852 at 854 per Stout CJ, cited in R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [59] per Smart AJ. 3 R v Massie [1999] 1 VR 542; 103 A Crim R 551; [1998] VSCA 82 per Brooking JA (Winneke P and Batt JA agreeing) at 554 (VR); 564 (A Crim R), cited in R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [59] per Smart AJ. 4 Applin v Race Relations Board [1973] QB 815; [1973] 2 WLR 895; [1973] 2 All ER 1190. 5 R v Haines (2001) 80 SASR 363; 125 A Crim R 126; [2001] SASC 347 at [32]. 6 R v Zhan Yu Zhong (2003) 139 A Crim R 220; [2003] VSCA 56 (Vic CA) at [18] per Buchanan JA (Winneke P and Phillips JA agreeing). Other authorities include R v Higgins (1801) 2 East 5; 102 ER 269; R v Quail (1866) 4 F & F 1076; 176 ER 914; R v Gregory (1867) 10 Cox CC 459. 7 R v Hamilton [2005] 2 SCR 432; (2005) SCC 47 at [29] (Supreme Court of Canada). 8 R v Higgins (1801) 2 East 5; 102 ER 269; Walsh v Sainsbury (1925) 36 CLR 464; [1925] HCA 28 at 476 (CLR) per Isaacs J. 9 Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976] Crim LR 131. See also R v Ford (1853) 1 Legge 777 where it was held that to call another a liar and a coward with no other object than to cause a breach of the peace was an incitement. 10 R v Krause (1902) 66 JP 121; 18 TLR 238; R v Assistant Recorder of Kingston-Upon-Hull; Ex parte Morgan [1969] 2 QB 58; [1969] 1 All ER 416; 53 Cr App R at 62 (QB) per Lord Parker CJ; R v Dimozantos (1991) 56 A Crim R 345 (Vic CCA); R v Zhan Yu Zhong (2003) 139 A Crim R 220; [2003] VSCA 56 (Vic CA) at [18]; R v C [2005] EWCA Crim 2827; [2006] 1 Cr App R 20 at [28]. 11 R v Banks (1873) 12 Cox CC 393; R v Ransford (1874) 13 Cox CC 9; R v Chelmsford Justices; Ex parte Amos [1973] Crim LR 437 (CA); R v Jones [2008] QB 460; [2007] EWCA Crim 1118; [2007] 3 WLR 907; [2007] 4 All ER 112. 12 R v Most (1881) 7 QBD 244. 13 Clyne v Bowman (1987) 11 NSWLR 341; 33 A Crim R 280 (Yeldham J). 14 R v Jones [2008] QB 460; [2007] EWCA Crim 1118; [2007] 3 WLR 907; [2007] 4 All ER 112. 15 Compare R v Crichton [1915] SALR 1. 16 R v Whitehouse [1977] QB 868; [1977] 3 All ER 737; (1977) 65 Cr App R 33. Also R v C [2005] EWCA Crim 2827; [2006] 1 Cr App R 20.
[CLP.980]
Element (2) Intending that the offence be committed
Mens rea of incitement – the High Court has considered the mental element required in relation to the other inchoate offences of attempt and conspiracy. In each instance, intention is required and not mere recklessness.1 So too in the case of secondary participation in the commission of an actual offence by way of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring.2 Reported cases on incitement in Australia and England
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appear to assume that intention is the requisite state of mind for incitement and have not specifically considered the question of whether the lesser mental element of recklessness suffices. However, in 2005 the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 6:3 majority held, contrary to previous Canadian decisions, that recklessness was a sufficient state of mind in cases of incitement.3 1 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163; Ansari v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 299; 202 A Crim R 505; [2010] HCA 18 at [33]; R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; (2010) 202 A Crim R 523; [2010] HCA 17 at [67]. 2 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163. 3 R v Hamilton [2005] 2 SCR 432; (2005) SCC 47 at [29].
[CLP.1000]
Joint criminal enterprise
See commentary at [CA.19A.200]. [CLP.1020]
Mental illness (insanity) and criminal liability
Note
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The related topic of automatism, see [CLP.200] and following. Defence of mental illness outlined: 1. An accused’s sanity is presumed by law. To rebut this the accused has the onus of proving mental illness on the balance of probabilities. 2. The defence of mental illness (formerly insanity) is based upon lack of culpability, lack of moral blame arising through an intellectual failure of understanding, but not through an emotional inability to control actions. 3. Section 38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 provides for the special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness if the accused was mentally ill at the time the offence was committed. 4. Mental illness is not relevantly legislatively defined. A person will be mentally ill within s 38 if his or her condition falls within one or other limb of the rules in McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718 as they are now interpreted. 5. An additional aspect of mental illness is insane automatism (involuntary actions as a result of mental illness) which is classified as falling within the first limb of the McNaghten Rules and does not independently negate the element of intent which the prosecution must prove. 6. The question of mental illness can go to the jury if the evidence properly raises it and even against the accused’s wishes. 7. In practice the defence of mental illness must be supported by medical evidence. 8. Dixon J gave a classic mental illness direction in R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1. 9. By s 39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, the consequences of raising the defence of mental illness are now not necessarily as draconian as they once were. 10. The defence of mental illness can apply to both indictable and summary offences.
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[CLP.1040] Origin and basis of the defence of mental illness Cross references: Irresistible impulse ..................................................................................................... [CLP.1200] Relevant legislation – Part 4 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 [5.11750] ...................................................................................................................................... s 23A of the Crimes Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind s 23A ............................................ Act 1900 Unfitness to be tried ................................................................................................... [5.10690] The defence of mental illness, earlier called “insanity”, has a centuries long common law history, some of which is related by O’Brien J in R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 (CCA). As pointed out in R v S, originally felonies were essentially crimes of strict liability with little, if any, attention paid to the offender’s intention or mental state – over time this changed and it came to be recognised that the insane, like children, are sometimes not morally blameworthy and in such cases should not be held criminally liable for their actions.1 “[M]ens rea began as a matter of morality … [which] in this early sense, has lived on in the law in the defence of infancy or insanity.”2 Two forms of insanity became recognised: first, a total inability to reason (likened then to an animal) and later, second an inability to distinguish the doing of good from evil (likened to a child).3 In broad terms, these two categories remain to this day.
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Central to criminal responsibility is individual capacity for rational choice of action. The essence of the defence of mental illness is lack of moral blame. “For criminal liability to be incurred (cases of strict liability4 and culpable negligence always apart) civilised penal systems have, in modern times, insisted that the accused should be shown to possess a blameworthy state of mind.”5 Dixon CJ spoke of “no culpability”.6 Also, the deterrent threat of punishment is useless against people uninfluenced by that threat because they cannot understand what they are doing.7 Mental illness is not a defence of broad ambit – its availability depends upon whether an individual’s mental processes at the relevant time fall within one or other of the two limbs of the “McNaghten Rules” propounded in McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718 as these are now interpreted. “The test is a rigid one: it relates solely to a person’s intellectual ability to appreciate: (a) the physical act that he is doing, and (b) whether it is wrong. If he has such intellectual ability, his power to control his physical acts by exercise of his will is irrelevant.”8 A judge commented that the criminal law attempts to identify those who should be held accountable to society for their actions and is concerned with the concept of blameworthiness according to the actual level of awareness possessed by the particular accused – it uses juries who draw the dividing line aided by recognised psychiatric evidence.9 Dixon J described the law’s attempt to classify those who should be found not guilty on the ground of mental illness as “a somewhat difficult task”.10 1 2 3 4
R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 20–29. R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 25. R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 26–29. There are defences to offences of strict liability. Automatism is one, see for example Edwards v Macrae (1991) 14 MVR 193 (NSW CA), a case of driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol. There is little authority on whether the defence of mental illness not based on automatism applies to such an offence. One authority is R v Weeks (1993) 66 A Crim R 466, a decision of a District Court judge who held that the defence of mental illness applied to a case of dangerous driving causing death where automatism was not involved. There are English authorities to the contrary, see [CLP.1140] footnotes. For the reasons there indicated, it is suggested that they were incorrectly decided and that there is no reason in principle why, in a proper case, the general defence of mental illness should not apply to a strict liability offence. 5 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 96–97 (CLR); 370–371 (A Crim R) per Stephen J. See also at 79–80 (CLR); 358–359 (A Crim R) per Barwick CJ. There are many judicial statements of this general kind, including R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 187 per Stephen J; Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921; Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279; [1937] HCA 83 at 287 (CLR) per Latham CJ; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1; R v Majewski
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6 7 8 9 10
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[1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 at 478 (AC) per Lord Simon; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 272 (SASR); 394 (A Crim R) per King CJ; Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; [1963] 1 All ER 223 at 173 (AC); Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 272 (AC). Sir Owen Dixon“A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 260. R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 183 (CLR) per Dixon J. R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 WLR 440; (1960) 44 Cr App R 246 at 402–403 (QB) per Lord Parker CJ. R v Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437; (1987) 31 A Crim R 453 at 464 (A Crim R) per Thomas J (Qld CA). R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 187 (CLR) per Dixon J.
[CLP.1060]
The special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness and the McNaghten Rules
Special verdict – Section 38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 provides for a special verdict as follows:
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38. If, in an indictment or information, an act or omission is charged against a person as an offence and it is given in evidence on the trial of the person for the offence that the person was mentally ill, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his or her action at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it appears to the jury before which the person is tried that the person did the act or made the omission charged, but was mentally ill at the time when the person did or made the same, the jury must return a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness. McNaghten Rules – “mental illness” is not defined in the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990. At common law, insanity was not a legal term and had no legal definition.1 A person is “mentally ill so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his or her action” within the meaning of s 38 if his or her condition falls within the rules set out in McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718 (the “McNaghten Rules”)2 which stated (emphasis added): 1. “[E]very man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the jury.” 2. “[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.” The meaning of these various expressions will be considered in the numbered paragraphs following. Act or omission charged – Concerning “act or omission charged” in s 38, there is a dearth of authority on the meaning of these words.3 While in most cases the precise identification of the relevant act will not give rise to any difficulty,4 that is not always so, particularly in cases of murder by shooting.5 In relation to “act” and murder, see [CA.19A.120] – [CA.19A.160]. In the context of the phrase “act or omission” in a section of a State Criminal Code, three High Court justices said that “act” means a “bodily action which, either alone or in conjunction with some quality of the action, or consequence caused by it, or an accompanying state of mind, entails criminal responsibility”.6 As to omissions, it has been observed that criminal liability for mere omissions in Anglo-Australian law is exceptional unless it has been expressly imposed by statute.7 Availability and effect of special verdict under s 38 – Until recent years, the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness was indefinite psychiatric detention, a prospect so unattractive that “nothing but the danger of a capital conviction appears to be a sufficient inducement to fall back on the defence of insanity”.8 This has been altered by s 39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 by which the court may order that the person be detained in a place and manner as the court thinks fit until released by due process of law or may make such other order (including release from custody, unconditionally or subject to conditions) as is appropriate. The defence of mental illness can apply both to
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indictable and summary offences – s 38 speaks of an act or omission charged against a person as an offence in an indictment or information.9 As to offences of strict liability, see [CLP.1040] footnotes. 1 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 at 404 (QB) per Devlin J. Similarly, “sane” does not ordinarily have a precise or fixed connotation: R v Anderson (Hilton Bombing Case) (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 at 451 per Gleeson CJ (NSW CCA). 2 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 38 per O’Brien J. 3 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 42 per O’Brien J. 4 R v Williamson (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 428; (1996) 92 A Crim R 24 at 29 (A Crim R) per Doyle CJ (SA CCA). 5 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 is a good example of the difficulty that may arise in identifying the relevant act. 6 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 38 (CLR); 248 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ considering s 23 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) and referring to Kitto J and Menzies J in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64, 71–72 and Gibbs J and Stephen J in Kaporonovski v The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 at 231, 241. See also Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47; 42 ALJR 295; [1968] HCA 66. 7 R v Iannelli (2003) 56 NSWLR 247; (2003) 139 A Crim R 1; [2003] NSWCCA 1 at [20] per Handley JA (NSW CCA). 8 Sir Owen Dixon“A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 257. 9 Edwards v Macrae (1991) 14 MVR 193 (NSW CA) for example, was a case of driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol where a defence of automatism was raised.
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[CLP.1080]
Meaning of “defect of reason caused by disease of the mind”
Classic direction – In R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1, Dixon J as the trial judge in a murder trial, directed a jury on the defence of mental illness, partly quoted below. Dixon J’s explanation of component parts of the McNaghten Rules, has been approved by the High Court.1 This direction, described as the “classic direction”2 and as a “model direction”,3 is used in New South Wales (modified as appropriate).4 Defect of reason – This requirement refers to an accused’s inability to understand or reason, not to a lack of self-control or an emotional state. It means that “the functions of the understanding are through some cause, whether understandable or not, thrown into derangement or disorder”.5 A defect of reason is the primary thing to be looked for6 and it is this requirement that excludes from the defence emotional and volitional disorders such as irresistible impulse. Judicial definition of the degree of defect of reason required is limited. Dixon J spoke in Porter at 189–190 (CLR) of an inability to “reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure” – see [CLP.1100] subheading “Did not know what he was doing was wrong”. If caused by mental illness, a defect of reason includes no reason at all.7 To satisfy McNaghten, the defect of reason need only be present at the time of the relevant act.8 It is not every defect of reason from disease of the mind that avoids criminal responsibility for an act – it must be such a disorder of the capacity to reason in moderate degree as prevents the person from knowing either the physical nature or its moral quality according to the McNaghten Rules.9 Disease of the mind – is not a medical concept but a legal one and is wider than the phrase itself suggests. It is an abnormality of mind and not restricted to “what doctors might call a disease”.10 Whether it is possible to point to any physical cause of the derangement of the functioning of the mind or not is irrelevant.11“Mind” here means the “mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding” and not some physical disorder of the brain.12 In Porter, Dixon J instead of speaking of “disease of the mind”, spoke in the wider terms of “mental disorder” and of “disease, disorder or disturbance”: … [the accused’s] state of mind must have been one of disease, disorder or disturbance. Mere excitability of a normal man, passion, even stupidity, obtuseness, lack of self-control and impulsiveness, are quite different things from what I have attempted to describe as a state of disease or disorder or mental disturbance arising from some infirmity temporary or of long standing. If that existed it must
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then have been of such a character as to prevent him from knowing the physical nature of the act he was doing or of knowing that what he was doing was wrong. … I have used the expression “disease, disorder or disturbance of the mind”. That does not mean … that there must be some physical deterioration of the cells of the brain, some actual change in the material, physical constitution of the mind, as disease ordinarily means when you are dealing with other organs of the body where you can see and feel and appreciate structural changes in fibre, tissue and the like. You are dealing with a very different thing with the understanding. It does mean that the functions of the understanding are through some cause, whether understandable or not, thrown into derangement or disorder.13 While the courts have been wary of formulating a definition of “disease of the mind”,14 as earlier mentioned, Dixon J’s direction is widely applied in Australia (appropriately adapted). Dixon CJ disapproved of previous rigidity of interpretation of the McNaghten Rules, observing that they are not to be construed as “a legislative declaration”15 and were not a judicial decision, but rather, “extra-judicial” advice.16 The Chief Justice pointed out that before McNaghten, the authorities did not employ any rigid formula of insanity.17 Dixon CJ suggested that Tindal CJ in McNaghten probably chose the words “disease of the mind” for their widest possible meaning but so as to exclude “drunkenness, conditions of intense passion and other transient states attributable either to the fault or to the nature of man”, adding that he took “disease of the mind” to “include, as well as all forms of physical or material change or deterioration, every recognisable disorder or derangement of the understanding whether or not its nature … is capable of explanation or determination”.18 There is very old authority for a broad interpretation of “disease of the mind”. In R v Foy [1960] Qd R 225, Philp J at 241–243 referring to Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, Ch IV, pointed out that before McNaghten, at common law insanity was equated to dementia, which had a meaning much wider than disease in a medical sense. At 242, Philp J said that according to Hale, it was immaterial whether the dementia was “complete or partial, permanent or temporary or intermittent and whether it was ‘natural’ or caused by physical disease, concussion, labour or any other cause”. Observing that this was the established law before McNaghten, Philp J asked if in that case “disease of the mind” was intended to mean something different from the law as stated by Hale, where the authority came from to change the law?19 A more recent statement approved in the High Court is … [t]he essential notion appears to be that in order to constitute insanity in the eyes of the law, the malfunction of the mental faculties called “defect of reason” in the M’Naghten Rules, must result from an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, be it of long or short duration and be it permanent or temporary, which can be properly termed mental illness, as distinct from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli. … the notion of “disease of the mind” should be explained to the jury in some such terms.20 “Mental illness” is synonymous with the older expression “disease of the mind” employed in McNaghten.21 Particular mental states and medical conditions are discussed in [CLP.1120] below. 1 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 228 (CLR) per Evatt J; Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 367 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ; Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5 at 301 (CLR). 2 Hawkins v The Queen [No 2] (1993) 68 A Crim R 1 at 9 per Cox J and at 70 per Zeeman J (in a dissenting judgment); R v Milloy [1993] 1 Qd R 298; (1991) 54 A Crim R 340 at 345 (A Crim R) per de Jersey J (Qld CCA). 3 R v Curren (1987) 27 A Crim R 49 (SA CCA). 4 See for example R v Matheis (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 321; 75 WN (NSW) 328 at 322 (SR (NSW)) where Owen J (Street CJ and Herron J agreeing) remarked that while omitting to give a direction in terms of Porter is not necessarily a misdirection where insanity is raised, it is wise for a trial judge to pay heed to Dixon J’s directions. 5 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 189 (CLR) per Dixon J. 6 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 at 408 (QB) per Devlin J.
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7 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1009 per Gresson P (CA); R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 171 (AC) per Lord Diplock for the House of Lords. 8 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249. 9 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 42 per O’Brien J. 10 R v Joyce [1970] SASR 184 at 194 (SA Full Sup Ct). 11 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 at 406–407 (QB) per Devlin J. 12 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 187 (CLR) per Dixon J. Also R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 at 407 (QB) per Devlin J, approved by Lord Diplock in R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 172 (AC) and quoted in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 50 (CLR); 258 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 13 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 188 (CLR) per Dixon J. It has been commented that the words “disorder” and “disturbance” in the direction of Dixon J “must take their colour from the word ‘disease’ and refer to disorder and disturbance of the mental faculties which can be characterised as mental illness”: R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274–275 (SASR); 395–396 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 14 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 15 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 368 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ. Neither were they “words of the law to be weighed like diamonds”: Sir Owen Dixon “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 260. 16 Sir Owen Dixon “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 257. 17 Sir Owen Dixon “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 260. 18 Sir Owen Dixon “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghten and Maclean” (1957) 31 ALJ 255 at 260. These words were judicially adopted by Owen J in R v Connolly (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 184 at 185. 19 R v Foy [1960] Qd R 225 at 242–243 per Philp J quoted in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 49 (CLR); 257 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 20 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274–275 (SASR); 396 (A Crim R) per King CJ. This passage was approved in the High Court in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 53 (CLR); 260 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. See also R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249 at 407 (QB) per Devlin J. 21 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274–275 (SASR); 395–396 (A Crim R) per King CJ.
[CLP.1100]
Meaning of “knowing the nature and quality of the act or that it is wrong”
“Nature and quality of the act” – these words forming the first limb of McNaghten are synonymous, dealing only with the physical quality of the act and are not intended to distinguish between its physical and moral aspects.1 They refer to a state of mind where a person is prevented by mental disorder from knowing the physical nature of what he or she is doing.2 An example is homicide by a delusional person to whom that is no different from destroying an inanimate object.3 In Sodeman,4 a trial for the murder of a young girl by strangulation, Dixon J, remarking that many people find the phrase as “anything but illuminating”, explained its meaning in the context of that case as “the capacity to comprehend the significance of the act of killing and of the acts by means of which it was done”. Cases falling within this first limb of McNaghten are few. “Did not know what he was doing was wrong” – more common is the claim of insanity under the second limb of McNaghten in a failure to understand that the act done was wrong. “Wrong” here does not mean contrary to law, but rather, “wrong according to the ordinary standards adopted by reasonable men”.5 In older terminology, it was a failure to know the difference between “good and evil”.6 To “know” in this context means “to appreciate” or “understand” the moral quality (or physical nature) of the both the act7 and its consequences.8 The question is not knowledge of right and wrong in the abstract, but knowledge of the wrongness of the particular act at the particular time.9 An accused’s failure of understanding in this respect does not have to be absolute. In Sodeman, Dixon J commented that this second limb of McNaghten is “stated with a false appearance of simplicity” and commented that “[i]n general it may be correctly said that, if the disease or mental derangement so governs the faculties that it is impossible for the party accused to reason with some moderate degree of calmness in relation to the moral quality of what he is doing, he is prevented from knowing that what he does is wrong” (emphasis added).10 These words apply to both limbs
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of McNaghten.11 In Porter, Dixon J spoke of an inability to “reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure”.12 While it has been remarked that factually a direction in these terms is not always appropriate,13 these phrases of Dixon J’s are often used to direct juries.14
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Porter was the case of a man charged with the murder of his child by poisoning. Dixon J gave this direction … [i]f you think that at the time he administered poison to that child he had such a mental disorder or disturbance or derangement that he was incapable of reasoning about the right or wrongness, according to ordinary standards, of the thing which he was doing, not that he reasoned wrongly, or that being a responsible person he had queer or unsound ideas, but that he was quite incapable of taking into account the considerations which go to make right or wrong, then you should find him guilty upon the ground that he was insane ….15 1 R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21 at 27 per Lord Reading; R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 188 (CLR) per Dixon J; Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 215 (CLR) per Dixon J. 2 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 188 (CLR) per Dixon J. 3 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 189 (CLR) per Dixon J. 4 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 215 (CLR) per Dixon J. 5 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 190 (CLR) per Dixon J; Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 375 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ. Knowledge that an act is wrong in law however, may be evidence from which it might be inferred that the accused had the capacity to know the act was wrong in itself: R v Tobin [1978] 1 NZLR 423 at 427 per Richmond P. 6 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 375 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ. 7 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 42 per O’Brien J. 8 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 189 (CLR) per Dixon J; Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5 at 300 (CLR). 9 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 189 (CLR) per Dixon J. 10 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 215 (CLR) per Dixon J and approved in Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 375 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ. 11 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 375 (CLR) per Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ. 12 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 190 (CLR) per Dixon J. 13 Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5 at 301 (CLR) where it was said that this direction may be called for in cases of crimes committed in a state of frenzy, uncontrolled emotion or suspended reason, the product of mental disease or disorder. The direction however may not be appropriate for crimes committed after some deliberation: R v Jenkins (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 20; [1964] NSWR 721; 81 WN (Pt 2) 44; R v Fleeton (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 72; [1964–5] NSWR 63; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 269 at 74 (NSWR). See also R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 43 per O’Brien J. 14 See for example R v Matusevich (1976) VR 470 at 476; R v Phomaranuphong [2001] NSWSC 1157 per McClellan J. See also R v Matheis (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 321; 75 WN (NSW) 328. 15 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 190 (CLR) per Dixon J.
[CLP.1120]
What mental states come within a “disease of the mind”?
Whether a particular mental state amounts to a “disease of the mind” is always a question of law for the trial judge.1 It is not for medical witnesses to speak of what disease of the mind is legally.2 Whether particular evidence proves insanity is a question of fact for the jury.3 Almost invariably, medical evidence is given and is necessary to support a defence of insanity.4 Without supporting medical evidence, most claims of insanity are unlikely to be sufficient to be left to the jury.5 The trial judge must decide if there is sufficient evidence for insanity to go to the jury.6 If the evidence is sufficient to raise insanity, it is the duty of the trial judge to leave the issue to the jury, and irrespective of whether it is raised by the accused or not, or even is disclaimed by the accused,7 see [CLP.1140] subheading “Raising mental illness”. As earlier mentioned, to prove insanity there must be shown a disorder of intellectual reasoning from mental illness rather than simply the existence of an emotional disorder. As Dixon J pointed out in Porter,
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many of those before the criminal courts are abnormal with peculiar temperaments and dispositions, but who nonetheless understand what they are doing and the wrongness of their actions.8 An act done from irresistible impulse will not support a defence of insanity unless it stems from a mental disease and one of the limbs of McNaghten is satisfied,9 although it may go towards a defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind.10 For further commentary, see [CLP.1200] “Irresistible impulse”. A psychopath with gross lack of self-control and diminution of emotional feeling, who could nevertheless understand intellectually that his act was wrong, was not regarded as legally insane.11 In any particular case, whether the accused suffered from a defect of reasoning from a disease of the mind depends upon the particular evidence given. With that caveat, the major mental diseases or psychoses such as schizophrenia have been accepted as diseases of the mind,12 as have also physical diseases when they affect the soundness of the mental faculties, such as psychomotor epilepsy,13 arteriosclerosis,14 and hyperglycaemia.15 But a temporary disorder or disturbance of an otherwise healthy mind caused by external factors is not properly to be regarded as disease of the mind within the McNaghten Rules.16 As to a disorder of the mind caused by external factors, and also recurrent conditions, see [CLP.280] “Determining whether automatism is caused by mental illness”. It has been held that a person predisposed to epileptic attack that is triggered by alcohol or provocative words still has a disease of the mind within McNaghten.17 In relation to self-induced intoxication by alcohol or drugs, see Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 and in particular, ss 428G and 428H.
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Although the McNaghten Rules are “universally accepted” as defining insanity for criminal law purposes,18 their application has been a matter of difficulty.19 One reason is because mental illness is better understood now than in 1843, and the law has “had to contain itself within the terms of a formula no longer suited to medical knowledge”.20 In some cases, difficult questions can arise in deciding whether a particular state of mind falls on one or other side of the line.21 A person is not criminally responsible for an act performed automatically, in the sense of being not done in the voluntary exercise of that person’s will to act. An involuntary act may give rise to the defence of (sane) automatism, but if it stems from a disease of the mind, it gives rise to the defence of insanity, not the defence of automatism – see “Automatism and involuntary acts”, [CLP.200] and following. In the context of mental illness and automatism, it has been said that a temporary mental disorder or disturbance must not be prone to recur if it is to avoid classification as a disease of the mind.22 1 R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffitt J; R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 519 per Ritchie J, quoted in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 51 (CLR); 258 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. See also R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1013 per Gresson P (CA). 2 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 186 (CLR) per Dixon J; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 49 (CLR); 257 (A Crim R). 3 R v True (1922) 16 Cr App R 164; Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 203 (CLR) per Latham CJ. 4 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 2 WLR 76; [1958] 1 All ER 193; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 413 (AC) per Lord Denning; R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1630 per Moffitt J. 5 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 83 (CLR); 283 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 6 R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffitt J. 7 R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffitt J. 8 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 183 (CLR) per Dixon J. 9 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 204 (CLR) per Latham CJ; Brown v The Queen (1959) 33 ALJR 89. 10 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 WLR 440; (1960) 44 Cr App R 246. 11 Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5. 12 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 412 (AC) per Lord Denning; Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 34 ALJR 18; [1960] AC 432; [1960] 2 WLR 588; [1960] 1 All ER 734 at 449 (AC) (PC).
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13 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 412 (AC) per Lord Denning. See also R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; [1983] 3 WLR 123; [1983] 2 All ER 673 at 173 (AC); R v Meddings [1966] VR 306. 14 R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 WLR 724; [1956] 3 All ER 249. 15 R v Quick [1973] QB 910; [1973] 3 WLR 26; (1973) 57 Cr App R 722; R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287; [1989] 2 All ER 9; (1989) 89 Cr App R 10. 16 R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 274 (SASR); 396 (A Crim R) per King CJ approved in the High Court in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 53 (CLR); 260 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 17 R v Meddings [1966] VR 306 at 310 per Sholl J. 18 R v Meddings [1966] VR 306 at 307 per Sholl J. 19 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1008 per Gresson P (CA). 20 R v Carter [1959] VR 105 at 110 per Sholl J. 21 R v Meddings [1966] VR 306 at 309 per Sholl J. 22 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 54 (CLR); 260 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ.
[CLP.1140]
Presumption of sanity – raising and proving mental illness
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Presumption of sanity and onus of proving mental illness – The prosecution is entitled to rely on the presumption that an accused is of sound mind.1 “[E]very person is presumed to be of sufficient soundness of mind to be criminally responsible for his actions until the contrary is made to appear at his trial.”2 The reference to a “presumption” is simply a method of indicating where the onus of proof lies if an issue as to mental capacity arises.3 This presumption represents a principal exception to the general rule that the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains throughout upon the prosecution.4 An accused person who seeks to establish mental illness to avoid criminal responsibility bears the legal onus of proving that condition on the balance of probabilities.5 Relationship of intent and mental illness – The prosecution must always prove intent. It is for an accused to prove the defence of mental illness. This is related to, but is not necessarily identical to, the question of intent, see [CLP.1040]. Lack of voluntariness (automatism) is generally considered an aspect of intent, see [CLP.300] (the alternative view is that it is part of the actus reus).6 An accused’s failure to understand the nature and quality of his (or her) act (McNaghten first limb) is an aspect of intent, see [CLP.1100]. However, failure to understand that an act is wrong (McNaghten second limb) is not part of any intent the prosecution must prove.7 Raising mental illness – In R v Joyce, it was held that the Crown cannot give evidence of the accused’s insanity when the question of his or her state of mind is not raised by the defence, but if, as a result of the defence putting forward evidence of the state of the accused’s mind, either by calling witnesses or by cross-examination of prosecution witnesses (even though it may not be for the purpose of establishing the defence of insanity but for some other purpose), there is evidence on which a jury could properly find insanity, it is the duty of the trial judge to leave the question of insanity to the jury.8 Other authorities are to this same effect.9 Accordingly, if the defence calls evidence to raise automatism that points to insanity, the latter must be left to the jury.10 Similarly, the fact that the evidence may show insanity does not relieve the judge of leaving sane automatism to the jury if this is open.11 Where the evidence is capable of showing either insanity or automatism, both should be left to the jury.12 Whether the contention of mental illness be advanced by the accused, by the Crown or put by the judge of his or her own motion to the jury, the standard of proof in each case is proof on the balance of probabilities.13 Medical evidence – In practical terms, medical evidence is required to support a claim by an accused of mental illness.14 “In order to displace the presumption of mental capacity, the defence must give sufficient evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the act was involuntary … [t]he evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mental incapacity”.15 Juries are not bound to accept medical evidence, but at the same time they are
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not entitled to disregard it capriciously.16 A jury should not reject unanimous medical evidence unless there is other evidence that can displace or throw doubt on it.17 Cases where medical evidence may be doubted have been considered.18 Appeal against special verdict – The Court of Criminal Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the verdict not guilty on the ground of mental illness.19
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1 McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200; 8 ER 718 at 210 (Cl & F); 722 (ER); Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481 (AC); 95 (Cr App R) per Viscount Sankey LC; R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 183 (CLR) per Dixon J; Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 413 (AC) per Lord Denning; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 61 (CLR); 266 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ. 2 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 183 (CLR) per Dixon J. 3 R v Anderson (Hilton Bombing Case) (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 at 451 per Gleeson CJ (NSW CCA). 4 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481 (AC); 95 (Cr App R). 5 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 at 183 (CLR) per Dixon J; Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 475 (AC); 89 (Cr App R) per Viscount Sankey LC; Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 199 (CLR) per Latham CJ; R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1014 per Gresson P; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 42 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ. 6 See for example consideration by Barwick CJ in Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 and R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17. 7 There are two English authorities that suggest that the defence of mental illness is merely a situation where mens rea is lacking: R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court; Ex parte K [1997] QB 23; [1996] 3 WLR 68; [1996] 3 All ER 719, applied in Director of Public Prosecutions v Harper [1997] 1 WLR 1406. No authority is cited for this proposition other than Archbold which quotes no authority for it either. The latter decision was criticised by Tony Ward in his article “Magistrates, Insanity and the Criminal Law” [1997] Crim LR 796 at 802 who pointed out that knowledge of the wrongness of an act is not part of the mens rea of any offence. The English proposition is only correct if mens rea is understood in its original moral sense, as O’Brien J in R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 61 said it is to be understood. 8 R v Joyce [1970] SASR 184 (Full Court). 9 Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316; [1946] HCA 55 (where this rule seems to have been assumed); R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999 at 1013 per Gresson P; R v Bastian [1958] 1 WLR 413; (1958) 42 Cr App R 75; R v Starecki [1960] VR 141; R v Price [1963] 2 QB 1; [1962] 3 WLR 1308; [1962] 3 All ER 957 at 7 (QB); R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffitt J; R v Meddings [1966] VR 306; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750; (1982) 6 A Crim R 35 (NSW CCA); R v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511; (1984) 10 A Crim R 312 (NSW CCA); Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; (1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28 at 508 (CLR); 291–292 (A Crim R). See also R v Jeffrey [1967] VR 467. Section 23A(7) of the Crimes Act 1900 permits evidence to be “offered” by the Crown tending to prove mental illness in a case in which substantial impairment by abnormality of mind is advanced. 10 R v Joyce [1970] SASR 184; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 11 Bedelph v The Queen [1980] Tas R 23; (1980) 1 A Crim R 445 at 27–28 (Tas R), 447 (A Crim R), per Green CJ; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 12 R v Cottle [1958] 1 NZLR 999; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 273 (SASR); 395 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 13 R v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511; (1984) 10 A Crim R 312 per Street CJ and Slattery J (NSW CCA). 14 R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 552; R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 at 311. 15 Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 413 (AC) per Lord Denning. 16 R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 at 370 per Roden J (NSW CCA).
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17 R v Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474; [1958] 2 All ER 87; (1958) 42 Cr App R 145 at 152 (Cr App R); Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 per Connor and Franki JJ; R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 (NSW CCA); R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 at 161 (NSW CCA). 18 They include R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 WLR 440; (1960) 44 Cr App R 246 at 403 (QB); R v Jenkins (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 20; [1964] NSWR 721; 81 WN (Pt 2) 44; R v Fleeton (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 72; [1964–5] NSWR 63; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 269 at 75 (NSWR); Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788; [1977] 3 WLR 902; [1978] 1 All ER 542 at 793 (AC); R v Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428; 68 A Crim R 536; R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240. 19 R v Foy (1922) 39 WN (NSW) 20; R v Greig (1996) 89 A Crim R 254 (NSW CCA).
[CLP.1160] Aspects of jury directions on mental illness Jury directions in cases involving mental illness are inherently complex because of the shifting onuses of proof and different standards of proof. The complexity can be increased where alternatives such as sane and insane automatism are being put to the jury – as to this, see [CLP.340]. The following is therefore not intended as a comprehensive guide to all directions that may be required in particular instances. The relationship of mental illness to intent works in the following way: The prosecution which has the onus of proving intent, has however, the presumption of the accused’s sanity. Once there is evidence of mental illness, the jury is instructed that they must first consider whether the prosecution has proved the elements of the offence, presuming the accused to be sane, by reference to the whole of the evidence other than evidence of mental illness. If satisfied on this evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the jury should then determine whether on the whole of the evidence on the balance of probabilities, the accused was mentally ill at the time so as not to be responsible in law for his or her act (according to McNaghten). It is an error to direct the jury that they should take into account evidence of mental illness on the question of whether the prosecution has proved its case because to do so would impose proof of sanity on the prosecution as an element of intent and avoid the legal onus on the accused to prove insanity.1 If the jury is satisfied of guilt on this basis but also satisfied of the defence of mental illness, the verdict is not guilty by reason of mental illness. If the jury is not satisfied of mental illness, the verdict is guilty. As to the latter, where the accused attempts but fails to prove mental illness on the balance of probabilities, that same evidence is not then relevant to the issue of intent including voluntariness.2 The alternative limbs of McNaghten require explanation to a jury3 and ordinarily there is an “especially great” necessity of explaining how the evidence in the particular case bears upon the abstract definitions of mental illness.4 The concepts of defect of reason and disease of the mind also require explanation. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that there is no obligation on a judge to direct a jury in the terms used by Dixon J in Porter (see [CLP.1080]; [CLP.1100]) but nevertheless, trial judges were urged to pay close heed to the form of summing up in Porter’s case.5 These directions are of course, not suited to every case, see [CLP.1100]. Where there is evidence of actions on the part of an accused from which the jury might infer that he or she was not insane, it is prudent to warn the jury of the danger of testing the defence of insanity by the kind of reasoning which a sane person would employ.6 By s 37 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, an explanation must be given to the jury of the findings which may be made on the trial and the legal and practical consequences of those findings. The explanation must include a reference to the existence, composition and relevant functions of the Mental Health Review Tribunal and that the tribunal may make a recommendation for the release of a person detained under s 39 only if satisfied that the safety of the person or the public will not be seriously endangered thereby. This should include an explanation “that the only way in which the accused will certainly receive treatment for his (or her) mental condition is if they give the special verdict”.7 1 R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 60–67 (see for convenience headnotes 7(e)–(f); 8(a)–(b)); R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 at 275 (SASR); 396–397 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 2 R v Tsigos [1964–5] NSWR 1607 at 1629 per Moffit J; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 82 (CLR); 282 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500;
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(1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28. Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed, (1990 Lawbook Co) pp 449–450 says that while this is the conventional view, there is some support for the proposition that evidence of mental illness is admissible where relevant to deny the mental element of a crime. Hawkins itself may contain overtones of this. But, particularly in the light of R v S, this alternative view is not the law in New South Wales. See for example R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1 (Dixon J). Willgoss v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 295; 33 ALJR 510; [1960] HCA 5 at 302 (CLR). R v Matheis (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 321; 75 WN (NSW) 328. R v Matusevich [1976] VR 470 at 476. See also Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659; 34 ALJR 307; [1960] HCA 77; R v Weise [1969] VR 953 at 961 per Barry J. R v Hilder (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 at 80–81per Hunt CJ at CL.
[CLP.1180]
Intoxication – liquor or drugs
Part 11A which applies to all offences committed on or after 16 August 1996, effects substantial changes to the common law regarding intoxication as it relates to criminal liability. In relation to offences committed before that date, the common law applies. For commentary in relation to both the common law and statutory positions concerning intoxication, now see s 428A. When an intention to cause a particular result is an element of the crime charged, evidence of the accused’s intoxication through alcohol or drugs may be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining whether that intent in fact existed. The test is always whether there was absence of the required intent in the accused – it is not his or her capacity to form such intent. The onus is on the Crown to prove that the accused had the requisite intent.1 Similarly, evidence of intoxication may bear upon the question whether the accused’s act was “willed” or voluntary.2
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Where insanity has been caused by intoxication, the supervening insanity, even though it be temporary, is just as much a defence as insanity produced by other causes.3 The same principle applies to delirium tremens caused by drinking.4 A state of automatism brought about by intoxication may preclude the guilty intent necessary to constitute a crime.5 Personality disorders with poor control after taking liquor have been considered.6 In a case of murder, intoxication may reduce the crime to manslaughter by its relevance to the specific intent required for murder;7 it appears it may exculpate altogether by its relevance to voluntariness.8 Intoxication may negative the specific intent required in larceny;9 breaking, entering and stealing;10 attempted robbery whilst armed;11 attempted rape;12 rape;13 but compare incest.14 On the other hand, intoxication may be evidence tending to establish a specific intent, eg where the actions of the accused are completely “out of character” because of his intoxication. A medical witness may not be asked whether an intoxicated accused could possess or lack a particular intent – that is a question which a layman can answer as well as a psychiatrist.15 Intoxication may be relevant on a charge of manslaughter as to the issue whether the actions of the accused causing the death were voluntary.16 The question of when directions relating to the effect of intoxication should be given has been considered.17 It is a matter for the trial judge to evaluate whether there is evidence of intoxication fit to be considered by the jury.18 The relationship of intoxication to arson has recently been considered by the House of Lords.19 Drunkenness in relation to the mitigation of sentence has been considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal.20 1 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; 18 ALR 257 disapproving Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard [1920] AC 479; (1920) 14 Cr App R 159. See also R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152; [1969] 3 WLR 819; [1969] 3 All ER 410; R v Gordon [1963] 63 SR (NSW) 631; 80 WN (NSW) 957; R v Haywood [1971] VR 755; R v Dodd (1974) 7 SASR 151; Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441; [1964] 2 WLR 38; [1964] 1 All ER 111; Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2; R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17.
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2 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 in which the High Court departed from R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142. See also R v Murray [1980] 2 NSWLR 526; 2 A Crim R 418. 3 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465; R v Connolly (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 184; R v Shields [1967] VR 706. 4 R v Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563. 5 R v Keogh [1964] VR 400. 6 R v Shields [1967] VR 706 distinguishing R v Meddings [1966] VR 306. See also R v Jeffrey [1967] VR 467. 7 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465; R v Burke (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 336; 35 WN (NSW) 92. See also R v Crump [1966] Qd R 340; R v Nicholson [1956] St R Qd 520; R v Herlihy [1956] St R Qd 18; R v Crozier [1965] Qd R 133; R v Thiele [1928] SASR 361. Compare Attorney-General of Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; [1961] 3 WLR 619; [1961] 3 All ER 299; R v Peterkin (1982) 6 A Crim R 351. 8 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17; R v Martin (1984) 16 A Crim R 87; [1984] HCA 23. 9 R v Glen (1899) 9 QLJ 140 applying R v Farnborough [1895] 2 QB 484. 10 R v Mathieson [1906] 25 NZLR 879. 11 Dearnley v The King [1947] St R Qd 51. 12 R v Ryan (1853) Legge Supreme Court Cases 797. Compare Parker v The King (1915) 17 WALR 96. 13 R v Hornbuckle [1945] VLR 281. Compare Holman v The Queen [1970] WAR 2; R v Murray; R v Egan (1985) 15 A Crim R 20. See also R v Curtis (1991) 55 A Crim R 209. 14 R v O’Regan [1961] Qd R 78. 15 R v Carn (1982) 5 A Crim R 466; R v Haidley [1984] VR 229; (1983) 10 A Crim R 1. 16 R v Martin (1984) 16 A Crim R 87; [1984] HCA 23. 17 R v Galambos (1980) 2 A Crim R 388; R v Murray. See also Bedi v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 269; (1993) 68 A Crim R 539. 18 R v Shaw [1981] 2 NSWLR 648; 4 A Crim R 228. See also R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201; R v Summers (1986) 22 A Crim R 47. 19 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; [1981] 2 WLR 509; [1981] 1 All ER 961. See also R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64; [1984] 3 All ER 848; (1985) 80 Cr App R 157. 20 R v Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A Crim R 381.
[CLP.1200]
Irresistible impulse
Irresistible impulse occurs where the act is willed although the mind is unable to control it; it is not to be confused with involuntariness.1“The law is concerned with an irresistible impulse as ordinarily understood only when it is a manifestation of the insanity of an insane man.”2 Irresistible impulse, arising otherwise than from mental disease eg from anger or passion, is not a defence.3 Irresistible impulse per se affords no defence – where the defence of insanity is raised in criminal proceedings, the law will not recognise irresistible impulse as a symptom from which the jury may, without evidence, infer insanity within the McNaghten Rules; where, however, evidence had been given that irresistible impulse was a symptom of the particular disease of mind from which an accused was said to be suffering, and as to its effect on his ability to know the nature and quality of his act or that his act was wrong, it would be the duty of the judge to deal with the matter in the same way as any other relevant evicence given at the trial.4 Acting on irresistible impulse is not of itself a defence unless it results from mental disease which brings about or is associated with an incapacity to know the nature and quality of the act or to know that it is wrong so that it amounts to insanity.5 There is no presumption of law that uncontrollable impulse is a symptom of legal insanity, nor is it the duty of a trial judge to instruct the jury that uncontrollable impulse may afford a strong ground for the inference that the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know what he or she was doing was wrong.6 Irresistible impulse has been considered in a number of articles.7 1 R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84.
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2 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 653 (CLR) per Windeyer J. It has been noted however, that the distinction between automatism and irresistible impulse and insanity has not been found easy to draw: R v Wogandt (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 at 35 (Qld CCA). See also R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388 (SA CCA). 3 Hitchens v The Queen [1962] Tas SR 35. 4 Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 34 ALJR 18; [1960] AC 432; [1960] 2 WLR 588; [1960] 1 All ER 734 (PC). See also Clift v Clift [1964–5] NSWR 1896; (1964) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 298 (Sup Ct, Jacobs J). 5 Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 203–204 (CLR) per Latham CJ; R v Holmes [1960] WAR 122 at 124 per Jackson SPJ; R v Burr [1969] NZLR 736 at 748; R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 at 90 per Bray CJ. 6 Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 34 ALJR 18; [1960] AC 432; [1960] 2 WLR 588; [1960] 1 All ER 734 (PC). 7 P Fairall, “Irresistible Impulse, Automatism and Mental Disease” (1981) 5 Crim LJ 136 at 155; “Irresistible Impulse”: 10 ALJ 130; 176; “Irresistible Impulse and the M’Naghten Rules (discussion of Attorney-General (SA) v Brown)” 34 ALJ 277.
[CLP.1220]
Marital coercion
The presumption existed at common law, in the case of certain crimes, that where a crime was committed by a wife in the presence of her husband, the wife had acted under the coercion of the husband. This presumption has been abolished by statute: see Crimes Act 1900, s 407A. It is still a good defence to prove that an offence committed by the wife was committed under the coercion of her husband.1 It is not required that the offence be committed in the presence of the husband: it is sufficient that the husband is in a situation close enough to influence the wife into doing what he wants done.2 This principle does not extend to a de facto wife.3
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A husband and wife cannot alone be found guilty of conspiracy for they are considered, in law, as one person and are presumed to have one will.4 Marriage does not absolve the parties from criminal offences committed before marriage.5 If a married woman incites her husband to the commission of a felony, she is an accessory before the fact.6 If she jointly with her husband assists a felon, she may be an accessory after the fact.7 She is not answerable for her husband’s breach of duty, however fatal, though she is privy to his misconduct, if no duty is cast upon her and she is merely passive.8 If a married woman, indicted jointly with her husband, is described as his wife, she need not prove her marriage.9 If she is described as a single woman, she must prove her marriage by satisfactory evidence.10 The defence of marital coercion is available in summary proceedings.11 The concepts of marital coercion and duress are cognate.12 1 R v Grondkowski [1946] KB 369; [1946] 1 All ER 559; (1946) 31 Cr App R 116; R v Malinowski [1946] 1 KB 369; R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125. 2 Goddard v Osborne (1978) 18 SASR 481; (1978) 21 ALR 189 referring to R v Connolly (1829) 2 Lew CC 229; R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229; R v Baines (1900) 69 LJQB 681; R v Whelan [1937] SASR 237. 3 Brennan v Bass (1984) 35 SASR 311. 4 1 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, c 27, s 8; Mawji v The Queen [1957] AC 126; [1957] 2 WLR 277; [1957] 1 All ER 385; Kowbel v R [1954] 4 DLR 337. 5 Robinson’s Case 168 ER 1; (1746) 1 Leach 37. 6 2 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, c 29, s 34; R v Manning (1849) 2 Car & Kir 887. 7 R v Holley [1963] 1 WLR 199; 1 All ER 106; (1962) 47 Cr App R 13. 8 R v Squire (1799) 1 Russell on Crime, 12th ed, 407n. 9 R v Knight (1823) 1 Carrington & Payne 116. 10 R v Jones (1664) Kelyng’s Crown Cases 37; R v Woodward (1838) 8 Carrington & Payne 561; R v McGinness (1870) 11 Cox CC 391; Morris v Miller (1767) 4 Bur 2057.
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11 Goddard v Osborne (1978) 18 SASR 481; (1978) 21 ALR 189. See also Ewart v Fox [1954] VLR 699; O’Sullivan v Fisher [1954] SASR 33. 12 Ibid.
[CLP.1240]
Mens rea, strict liability and intent
Contents of commentary: Mens rea – the requirement of a guilty mind ........................................................... Presumption that mens rea must be proved .............................................................. The various forms of mens rea .................................................................................. Coincidence with the actus reus and partial mens rea .............................................. Mens rea – abnormal and particular mental states .................................................... Mens rea and strict and absolute liability offences ................................................... Mens rea – “defence” of honest and reasonable mistake of fact ............................. Intention ...................................................................................................................... [CLP.1260]
[CLP.1260] [CLP.1280] [CLP.1300] [CLP.1320] [CLP.1340] [CLP.1360] [CLP.1380] [CLP.1400]
Mens rea – the requirement of a guilty mind
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For a common law crime to be complete, the criminal act had to be accompanied by a guilty mind.1 “The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a proposition as to a state of mind.”2 The element of “mens rea”,3 the state of mind stigmatised as wrongful by the criminal law when compounded with the relevant prohibited conduct, constitutes a particular offence.4 “For criminal liability to be incurred (cases of strict liability and culpable negligence always apart) civilized penal systems have, in modern times, insisted that the accused should be shown to possess a blameworthy state of mind.”5 For offences of a truly criminal character the requirement of mens rea is presumed. This avoids “the public scandal of convicting on a serious charge persons who are in no way blameworthy”.6 In terms of criminal liability, whether an accused’s guilty state of mind was the result of pre-meditation or was formed an instant before acting is of no relevance. 1 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 252 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. There are many authorities. In R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70, Jordan CJ said at 109 (SR (NSW))that “... [t]he general rule as to mens rea is clear and plain. It is a well-established rule of the common law that an act is not criminal unless it is the product of a guilty mind”. The expression sometimes used is a “wrongful state of mind”″, see for example R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 at 477–478 (AC) per Lord Simon. 2 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 187 per Stephen J. 3 In Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476; [1974] 2 WLR 1; [1973] 3 All ER 1109 at 491 (AC), Lord Hailsham LC observed that properly translated, the Latin aphorism: “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” means “an act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also guilty.” The origin of the expression “mens rea” to describe a criminal state of mind appears unclear, see Stephen J in R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 186. 4 R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 at 478 (AC) per Lord Simon. 5 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 96 (CLR); at 370 (A Crim R) per Stephen J. 6 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; [1969] 2 WLR 470; [1969] 1 All ER 347 at 150 (AC) per Lord Reid.
[CLP.1280]
Presumption that mens rea must be proved
This statement of Jordan CJ in R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70 at 109 (SR (NSW)) has been approved in the High Court: … assuming [the accused’s] mind to be sufficiently normal for him to be capable of criminal responsibility, … it is also necessary at common law for the prosecution to prove that [the accused] knew that he was doing the criminal act which is charged against him, that is, that he knew that all the
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facts constituting the ingredients necessary to make the act criminal were involved in what he was doing. If this be established, it is no defence that he did not know that the act which he was consciously doing was forbidden by law. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. But it is a good defence if he displaces the evidence relied upon as establishing his knowledge of the presence of some essential factual ingredient of the crime charged.1 An accused acting under an honest mistake of fact will not have a guilty mind. Where mens rea is an element of the offence, the mistake of fact needs only to be honestly held, but not necessarily reasonable.2 This is in contrast to offences of strict liability, where the belief must be both honest and reasonable, see [CLP.1380]. However, in practice, if evidence of an accused’s asserted honest mistaken belief of fact emerges in a trial, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of it will bear upon the question of whether the accused actually held the belief.3 The presumption of mens rea applies to statutory offences also. In the much quoted Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921, Wright J said: There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals, and both must be considered ….4
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The presumption of mens rea as an element of statutory offences was considered by the High Court in the leading case of He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203. In his famous judgment, there Brennan J said (in the context of the importation and possession of heroin contrary to the terms of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth)) at 565 (CLR); 233 (A Crim R): When a statute creates and defines an offence only by reference to its external elements, a mental element is usually implied in the definition. A person who engages in prohibited conduct is not criminally responsible for it unless the mental element is present. The mental element is mens rea or guilty mind.5 Brennan J said that these external elements are conduct, circumstances and results.6 Brennan J said that the general principles applying to the interpretation of the provision in He Kaw Teh were: (1) There is a presumption that in every statutory offence, it is implied as an element of the offence that the person who commits the actus reus does the physical act defined in the offence voluntarily and with the intention of doing an act of the defined kind. (2) There is a further presumption in relation to the external elements of a statutory offence that are circumstances attendant on the doing of the physical act involved. It is implied as an element of the offence that, at the time when the person who commits the actus reus does the physical act involved, he either — (a) knows the circumstances which make the doing of that act an offence; or (b) does not believe honestly and on reasonable grounds that the circumstances which are attendant on the doing of that act are such as to make the doing of that act innocent. (3) The state of mind to be implied under (2) is the state of mind which is more consonant with the fulfilment of the purpose of the statute …. (4) The prosecution bears the onus of proving the elements referred to in (1) and (2) beyond reasonable doubt except in the case of insanity and except where statute otherwise provides.7 1 Approved in Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 by Windeyer J at 108–109 (CLR); He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 530–531 (CLR); 206–208 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ (Mason J agreeing) and at 572 (CLR); 238–239 (A Crim R) per Brennan J; Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493; (2004) 78 ALJR 957; [2004] HCA 30 at [10] per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J and at [41] per McHugh J. 2 In He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 253 (A Crim R) Dawson J
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made this observation:
3 4
5 6 7
… at common law, because intent is an ingredient of a crime, it must be proved by the prosecution and a mistaken belief in facts which are inconsistent with the required intent does not have to be based upon reasonable grounds. Either the accused has a guilty mind or he does not, and if an honest belief, whether reasonable or not, points to the absence of the required intent, then the prosecution fails to prove its case: see Morgan [1976] AC 182. Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL) at 214 (AC) per Lord Hailsham. This principle has been acknowledged in many cases including Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 at 540 per Dixon J; Brend v Wood (1946) 62 TLR 462 at 463 per Lord Goddard CJ; Ex parte Falstein; re Maher (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 133 at 152 per Street J; Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; [1963] 1 All ER 223 (PC) at 173 (AC); Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 (HL)at 272 per Lord Reid; Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342; (1980) 54 ALJR 202; [1980] HCA 5 at 346 (CLR) per Barwick CJ and at 348 (CLR) per Mason J; Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1; [1984] 3 WLR 437; [1984] 2 All ER 503 (PC) at 12–14 (AC); at 441–443 (WLR); at 507–508 (All ER); He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 528–529; 565–567 (CLR); at 206, 234 (A Crim R). He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 565 (CLR); at 233 (A Crim R). Referring to what Dixon CJ, in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 59, called the external elements necessary to form the crime. He Kaw Teh at 582 (CLR); 246 (A Crim R) per Brennan J.
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[CLP.1300]
The various forms of mens rea
A generic and imprecise expression – There is no single mental element common to all offences,1 and mens rea may take various forms. The expression “mens rea” has attracted judicial criticism because of its imprecision.2 Mens rea “means a number of quite different things in relation to different crimes”;3 it is “confusing to call so many dissimilar states of mind by one name”.4 Notwithstanding these criticisms, mens rea remains a useful generic shorthand expression to describe the mental element in crimes. The term “fault element” is sometimes used instead. “Mens rea” is used legislatively in Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 concerning intoxication. Intention, recklessness and knowledge – In practice, for most offences, the particular state of mind required to establish mens rea does not pose uncertainty. In addition to actual intention, recklessness is accepted as a form of mens rea.5 Intention or recklessness are the most usual forms of mens rea for most common law crimes.6 For a number of statutory offences, recklessness is now the specified mental element, see commentary on recklessness at [CA.4A.20]. Sometimes the mental element is knowledge, as in cases of sexual intercourse without consent or possession of prohibited drugs. There are cases that deal with “wilful blindness” (for example, receiving stolen property); but this is not a form of mens rea itself, it is simply an aspect of the subjective proof of knowledge.7 Wilful blindness may sometimes be treated as equivalent to knowledge,8 or to constitute recklessness.9 Malice was an earlier composite form of mens rea; a problematic concept, removed as a fault element in 2007, see [CA.4A.20] and commentary on the meaning of “maliciously” at [CA.5.40]. In Kural v The Queen, the High Court observed that it is impossible to make a statement that is universally valid for all purposes about the essential elements of a guilty mind; it may involve intention, foresight, knowledge or awareness with respect to some act, circumstance or consequence.10 Illustration: fault elements (mens rea) for Commonwealth offences – The various common mental states that can attract criminal liability have been distilled into the fault elements for Commonwealth offences under s 5.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which provides that in addition to any specific fault element specified, the fault elements of any Commonwealth offence may be intention, knowledge, recklessness and negligence (where there is a “great falling short of the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise” and the conduct merits criminal punishment).11
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Negligence – Reflecting the concept of a guilty mind, most forms of mens rea concern the accused’s subjective state of mind. An exception is negligence which concerns the accused’s conduct assessed against an objective standard of reasonableness.12 Here, the question is not what the accused actually foresaw, which is irrelevant,13 but what he ought to have foreseen, that is, what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have foreseen. Recklessness by contrast, requires at least some subjective foresight on the part of the accused; negligence does not. Simple lack of care such as would attract civil liability is not enough to establish criminal negligence.14 Criminal negligence has been described as recklessness involving grave moral guilt and as being of such a degree as to warrant the sanction of the criminal law.15 But this description is not apposite to all offences requiring proof of negligence; the degree of negligence required can vary according to the nature of the offence.16 For manslaughter by negligence, the level of negligence must be very high; so gross as to amount to “wickedness”, see commentary on manslaughter by criminal negligence at [CA.24.200] and following. Less serious offences such as negligent driving require a lesser level of negligence.17
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Statutory fault elements – These are numerous and varied and include the following expressions, either alone or in combination with other expressions: allow(s), cause(s), dishonestly, fraudulently, knowingly, permit(s), possess, suffers or permits, wilfully. As to the meanings of these expressions, see commentary at [CLP.80]. In determining the mens rea of a statutory offence, particular regard must be had to the definition of the offence.18 1 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 531 (CLR); at 207 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ. 2 Pejorative descriptions include “ambiguous and imprecise”: He Kaw Teh at 530 (CLR); 207 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ and “beset by problems of terminology” at 568 (CLR); 236 (A Crim R) per Brennan J; the “most question-begging of all Latin phrases”: Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 688 (AC) per Lord Simon. 3 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL) at 213 (AC); 150 (Cr App R) per Lord Hailsham referring Stephen J in R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 185. 4 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 185 per Stephen J. 5 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 97 (CLR); 371 (A Crim R) per Stephen J; Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 506 (CLR) per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ. See also Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; [1969] 2 WLR 470; [1969] 1 All ER 347 at 162 (AC) per Lord Diplock. 6 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL) at 209 (AC) per Lord Hailsham. 7 Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR 1; 35 A Crim R 382 (HC); R v Schipanski (1987) 17 NSWLR 618 (CCA); R v Dykyj (1993) 29 NSWLR 672; (1993) 66 A Crim R 567 (CCA); R v McConnell (1993) 69 A Crim R 39 (CCA). 8 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 531 (CLR); 208 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ, referred to in Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; (1987) 29 A Crim R 12; [1987] HCA 16 at 511 (CLR); 18 (A Crim R) by Toohey and Gaudron JJ (dissenting). 9 R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696 (CCA); R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293 (CCA) (cases of sexual intercourse without consent). 10 Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; (1987) 29 A Crim R 12; [1987] HCA 16 at 504 (CLR); 13 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. 11 This provision is based upon the judgment of Brennan J in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203. 12 Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257; R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 at [40]; Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430 (FC) at 445; R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658 (CCA) at 675. 13 R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 at [59]–[62] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
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14 Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34 at 576 (AC) per Lord Atkin; Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 509 per McTiernan and Menzies JJ; McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22 at 49–50 (CLR); R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658; R v Warner (1991) 25 NSWLR 382; (1991) 58 A Crim R 54. 15 Callaghan v The Queen (1952) 87 CLR 115; [1952] HCA 55 at 121 (CLR); Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 509 per McTiernan and Menzies JJ. An often quoted description is “such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment”: R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8. This statement was approved Lord Atkin in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34 at 583 (AC), who pointed out however, that these words are not and were probably not intended to be a precise definition of the crime there in question. It was quoted with approval in R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 at 91 (NSWLR) per Hunt CL at CL. In R v EMJ (2001) 27 SR (WA) 265 at 273, French J observed, “Although reference to such a high degree of negligence lacks precision, it is clear that this is an evaluative process that must of necessity amount to a judgment based on all the circumstances attending the individual case.” 16 Clout v Hutchinson (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 32; 67 WN (NSW) 203 (FC); R v White (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 188; (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 195; Callaghan v The Queen (1952) 87 CLR 115; [1952] HCA 55; McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22; Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430 (FC) at 445; R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658 (CCA) at 675; NSW Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 59 A Crim R 6 (CCA) at 11. 17 Clout v Hutchinson (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 32; 67 WN (NSW) 203 (FC); R v White (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 188; (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 195. Compare R v D [1984] 3 NSWLR 29; 14 A Crim R 198. 18 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL).
[CLP.1320] Coincidence with the actus reus and partial mens rea Partial mens rea – Some offences require proof of mens rea for only part of the complete elements involved, sometimes called partial mens rea. Assaulting a police officer in the execution of his or her duty is an example. An intention to assault must be proved, but not the aggravating circumstance of knowledge that the victim was or might be a police officer.1 Another example is assault occasioning actual bodily harm where the prosecution is not required to prove an intention to cause actual bodily harm.2 A contrary example is a charge of cultivation of prohibited plants in excess of commercial quantity where it has been held that the Crown must prove intention both to cultivate prohibited plants and a number of plants in excess of the commercial quantity.3 Mens rea must coincide with the actus reus – For an accused to be guilty of an offence, the mens rea must exist at the same time as the actus reus.4 For practical reasons, there is some flexibility to the requirement of the two states existing at the same time.5 1 R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26 (by 3:2 majority) and see [2.7967]. 2 Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350; (1988) 30 A Crim R 471; [1988] HCA 3; R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 (NSW CCA) and [CA.59.100]. 3 R v W (1993) 32 NSWLR 348; (1993) 70 A Crim R 517 (NSW CCA). 4 Meyers v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 1488; (1997) 147 ALR 440; [1997] HCA 43 at 442 (ALR). See also Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Miller (James) [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978; R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441 at 112 (VR); Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 392 (CLR) per Mason CJ, at 401 (CLR) per Brennan J, at 414 (CLR) per Deane and Dawson J. 5 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228; 1 All ER 373 (PC); R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59; [1965] 2 WLR 1220; (1965) 49 Cr App R 206; Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439; R v Miller (James) [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669; R v Le Brun [1992] 1 QB 61; [1991] 3 WLR 653; [1991] 4 All ER 673.
[CLP.1340]
Mens rea – abnormal and particular mental states
Various types of mental states may mean that there is no guilty mind so as to attract criminal liability. In R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70 at 109 (SR (NSW)), Jordan CJ observed:
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A person is never regarded as criminally liable for an act which, although physically the act of his body, was done while his mind was in so abnormal a state that it cannot be regarded as his act at all, for example he was sleep-walking, or so young, or so insane, as to be incapable of knowing that he was acting or the nature or quality of his act. The following topics may bear upon mens rea: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
children and infants, ................................................................................ claim of right (for some offences), ......................................................... duress, ....................................................................................................... insanity or mental illness, ........................................................................ intoxication (where a specific intent must be proved), ..........................
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j) In murder (k) (l)
[CLP.560] [CA.117.200] [CLP.860] [CLP.1020] [CLP.1180]; [2.40920] [CLP.1200] [CLP.1280] [CLP.1380] [CLP.1420] [2.40372]
irresistible impulse (where caused by mental illness), ........................... mistake of fact (where mens rea is an element), .................................... mistake of fact – Proudman v Dayman, ................................................. necessity, ................................................................................................... self-defence. ............................................................................................. cases, the following may reduce murder to manslaughter: provocation, .............................................................................................. [2.1910] substantial impairment by abnormality of mind. .................................... [2.1950].
[CLP.1360]
Mens rea and strict and absolute liability offences
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Three categories of offences – In Wampfler, the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that the High Court decision of He Kaw Teh shows that concerning mens rea, statutory offences fall into three categories: (1) offences where mens rea is an element; (2) offences of strict liability where mens rea is presumed in the absence of evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact; (3) offences of absolute liability where mens rea plays no part.1 Meaning of strict liability – An offence of strict liability is one which does not require the prosecution to prove mens rea in order to make out a case, but allows the accused to raise honest and reasonable mistake of fact by way of exculpation2 (as to this “defence”, see [CLP.1380]). In a case of strict liability, where an issue arises on the evidence as to whether the defendant was honestly and reasonably mistaken as to the existence of those facts which (if true) would have made his act innocent, the prosecution will succeed only where it establishes that such was not the defendant’s state of mind.3 Meaning of absolute liability – Where a statutory offence is one of absolute liability, the prosecution does not need to establish that the defendant knew that his act was wrongful, and it will succeed even where the defendant had no such knowledge.4 A statutory offence imposing absolute liability is one which, in addition to excluding the requirement of mens rea, also excludes a defence of honest and reasonable mistake.5 Determining whether an offence is one of strict or of absolute liability – Offences of a serious nature are usually not construed as offences of strict liability.6 It has been judicially remarked that it is unusual to find an offence of strict liability arising under the provisions of the Crimes Act 1900,7 although there are some such as dangerous driving causing death etc under s 52A.8 Offences of strict and of absolute liability tend to be found in offences of a regulatory kind such as motor traffic offences, safety offences and public health and pollution offences. In Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 at 540, Dixon J said: If the purpose of the statute is to add a new crime to the general criminal law, it is natural to suppose that it is to be read subject to the general principles according to which that law is administered. But
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other considerations arise where in matters of police, of health, of safety or the like the legislature adopts penal measures in order to cast on the individual the responsibility of so conducting his affairs that the general welfare will not be prejudiced. Although these indications do not all point in the same direction,9 in determining whether an offence is one of absolute liability, regard should be had to: (a) the words of the statute itself; (b) the subject matter with which the statute deals; and (c) whether strict liability or an absolute liability will assist in overcoming the mischief at which the statute is aimed.10 It has been observed that where the legislature chooses to remain silent as to its intention, it must do so in the knowledge that the courts will ordinarily apply the presumption that the defendant’s state of mind is relevant.11 There are various judicial statements expressing the purpose of imposing strict liability. In Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong, it was commented that: … the creation of strict liability will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the prohibited act.12
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In Lim Chin Aik, it was said: It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the performance of the regulations. That means there must be something he can do, directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control, which will promote the observance of the regulations. Unless this is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature imposed strict liability merely in order to find a luckless victim.13 A practical reason for enacting offences of strict liability in offences of a regulatory kind is that proving mens rea in each such cases is inconvenient and often impossible.14 This avoidance of inconvenience to the prosecution sometimes results in injustice to defendants.15 Strict liability examples – Examples of strict liability offences are dangerous driving causing death,16 driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol,17 driving without a licence,18 driving an overweight vehicle,19 driver failing to allow a medical practitioner to take a blood sample after an accident,20 breaching a domestic violence order,21 supplying or selling a restricted substance under the Poisons Act 1966,22 selling adulterated food23 and polluting waterways.24 Second degree principals, accessories and vicarious liability – In respect of a principal in the second degree to a strict liability offence, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused knew of all facts which made the conduct of the principal offender a criminal offence.25 Offences of strict liability may operate to make an individual or corporate employer vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee.26 In Mousell Bros Ltd v London & North Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836 at 845, Atkin J said that the authorities establish that: … while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed.27 In this quoted passage, nothing turns upon any distinction between “absolute” liability and “strict” liability.28 Absolute liability offences – Concerning offences of absolute liability, Dawson J in He Kaw Teh stated that:
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It is generally accepted that statutes which create offences for the purpose of regulating social or industrial conditions or to protect the revenue, particularly if the penalty is monetary and not too large may more easily be regarded as imposing absolute liability. … [I]f a prohibition is directed at a grave social evil, the absolute nature of the offence may more readily be seen, particularly if proof of intent would be difficult and would represent a real impediment to the successful prosecution of offenders.29
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Examples of offences held to be of absolute liability are failing to submit to a breath analysis,30 exceeding the speed limit,31 selling alcohol to the under aged32 and publishing misleading advertisements offering employment.33 1 R v Wampfler (1987) 11 NSWLR 541; 34 A Crim R 218 at 546 (NSWLR); 222 (A Crim R) per Street CJ (Hunt and McInerney JJ agreeing). 2 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 590 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 3 Holloway v Gilport Pty Ltd (1995) 79 A Crim R 76 at 79 per Hunt CJ at CL. That the legal burden is cast upon the prosecution once there is evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact has been accepted since Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72. 4 Holloway v Gilport Pty Ltd at 79 per Hunt CJ at CL. 5 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 at 581 (CLR); 314 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ applying He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 590 (CLR); 252 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 6 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203. 7 CTM v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 371; [2007] NSWCCA 131 per Howie J at [69]. 8 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14. 9 Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352; (1992) 59 A Crim R 408 at 410 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL referring to observations of Gibbs CJ in He Kaw Teh at 530 (CLR); 206–207 (A Crim R). 10 Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352; (1992) 59 A Crim R 408 at 410 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL referring to He Kaw Teh at 529–530, 567–568, 594–595 (CLR); 206–207, 234–236, 254–256 (A Crim R); State Rail Authority (NSW) v Hunter Water Board (1992) 28 NSWLR 721; (1992) 65 A Crim R 101 (CCA); R v Walker (1994) 35 NSWLR 384; (1994) 77 A Crim R 236 at 239–240 (A Crim R) per McInerney J (Hunt CJ at CL and Bruce J agreeing). 11 Binskin v Watson (1990) 48 A Crim R 33 (NSW CA) at 43 per Priestly JA (Meagher JA agreeing). 12 Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1; [1984] 3 WLR 437; [1984] 2 All ER 503 (PC) at 14 (AC); 508 (All ER) per Lord Scarman. 13 Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; [1963] 1 All ER 223 (PC) at 174 (AC) per Lord Evershed. See also He Kaw Teh at 567 (CLR); 235 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 14 R v Woodrow 153 ER 907; (1846) 15 M & W 404 at 913 (ER); 417 (M & W) per Parke B; Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207; Parker v Alder [1899] 1 QB 20. 15 R v Woodrow 153 ER 907; (1846) 15 M & W 404 at 913 (ER); 417 (M & W) per Parke B. 16 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14. 17 Re Attorney-General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (No 3 of 2002) (2004) 61 NSWLR 305; 147 A Crim R 546 at [101]. 18 Richardson v Pullen (1998) 28 MVR 488 (Tas SC Evans J). 19 Binskin v Watson (1990) 48 A Crim R 33 (NSW CA). 20 Brown v Bergan (1991) 53 A Crim R 417 (NSW SC Newman J). 21 Police (SA) v Beukes (2011) 205 A Crim R 406; [2011] SASC 9 (Vanstone J). 22 R v McGrath [1971] 2 NSWLR 181 (NSW CCA). 23 Hawthorn v Morcam Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 120; (1992) 65 A Crim R 227 (NSW CCA). 24 Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 25 NSWLR 715; (1992) 58 A Crim R 428 at 719 (NSWLR); 430 (A Crim R) per Gleeson CJ; Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 29 NSWLR 497; (1992) 66 A Crim R 134 (NSW CCA).
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25 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 173 (CLR); 487 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ, at 178 (CLR); 494 (A Crim R) per Mason J, at 183–184 (CLR); 500–501 (A Crim R) per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ (principals in the second degree); R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA) at 37–38 per Hunt J (accessories). 26 Parker v Alder [1899] 1 QB 20; Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 25 NSWLR 715; (1992) 58 A Crim R 428; Department of Land & Water Conservation v Greentree (2003) 140 A Crim R 25; [2003] NSWCCA 31. 27 Applied by the High Court in R v A/ asian Films Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 195; [1921] HCA 11 at 214 (CLR). 28 Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 25 NSWLR 715; (1992) 58 A Crim R 428 at 720 (NSWLR); 433 (A Crim R) per Gleeson CJ. 29 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 594–595 (CLR); 255 (A Crim R). 30 R v Walker (1994) 35 NSWLR 384; (1994) 77 A Crim R 236. 31 Kearon v Grant [1991] 1 VR 321. 32 Hickling v Laneyrie (1991) 21 NSWLR 730. 33 Holloway v Gilport Pty Ltd (1995) 79 A Crim R 76.
[CLP.1380]
Mens rea – “defence” of honest and reasonable mistake of fact
An honest and reasonable mistake of fact is often referred to as a Proudman v Dayman “defence”, a description not strictly accurate, but acknowledged as “convenient shorthand” by the High Court.1 The “defence” was described by Dixon J in Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 at 539: As a general rule an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if they existed, would make the defendant’s act innocent affords an excuse for doing what would otherwise be an offence.2
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The rule in Australia was stated in the High Court joint judgment in CTM v The Queen as follows: [8] Where it is a ground of exculpation, the law in Australia requires that the honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief be in a state of affairs such that, if the belief were correct, the conduct of the accused would be innocent. In that context, the word “innocent” means not guilty of a criminal offence. In the case of an offence, or a series of offences, defined by statute, it means that, if the belief were true, the conduct of the accused would be “outside the operation of the enactment” [Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 at 541]. As explained in He Kaw Teh v The Queen, the evidentiary onus of raising the ground of exculpation is on the accused, but, once that occurs, the ultimate legal onus of displacing the ground lies on the prosecution. The concept of evidentiary onus itself needs to be understood in the light of the subject matter to which it applies; here, honest and reasonable belief, a concept that has a subjective element of a kind that ordinarily is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, and an objective element that must be capable of being measured against the evidence by the tribunal of fact.3 [footnotes included] Mistakes of fact can take many forms and a state of mind that qualifies under Proudman v Dayman may be a matter of difficulty.4 There must be an actual belief honestly and reasonably held in a certain fact or state of affairs; absence of knowledge and inadvertence are not enough.5 As ignorance of the law is no excuse,6 the mistake must be one of fact and not of law.7 A mistaken opinion, a result of a judgment based upon facts, is not a mistake of fact.8 Concerning the distinction between mistakes of fact and law, a mistake as to a compound event consisting of law and fact is considered to be a mistake of fact.9 It has been held that exercising due diligence does not constitute an extension of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake.10 1 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 at [6] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ. Kirby J pointed out at [61] that “… it is more accurate to characterise it as a circumstance or consideration that may deprive the facts of an ingredient essential to the offence”. 2 Others authorities include Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100; [1934] HCA 64; Cameron v Holt (1980) 142 CLR 342; (1980) 54 ALJR 202; [1980] HCA 5; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203.
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3 CTM v The Queen at [8] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ. See also Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279; [1937] HCA 83; Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 530 (CLR); Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 at 581–582 (CLR); 314 (A Crim R). The English position may be different where it has been held that the accused’s belief must only be honest, not necessarily reasonable, see Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL); B (a child) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428; [2000] 2 WLR 452; [2000] 1 All ER 833. This was commented upon by the High Court in Jiminez at 582 (CLR); 314–315 (A Crim R) and by Hayne J in CTM v The Queen at [176]–[178]. 4 CTM v The Queen at [7] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ. 5 Bergin v Stack (1953) 88 CLR 248; [1953] HCA 53 at 261–262 (CLR) per Fullagar J; Gherashe v Boase [1959] VR 1; Von Lieven v Stewart (1990) 21 NSWLR 52; State Rail Authority (NSW) v Hunter Water Board (1992) 28 NSWLR 721; (1992) 65 A Crim R 101. 6 R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70 at 109 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ. One reason for this rule is that otherwise, there is no knowing to what extent the excuse of ignorance might be used; it would be urged in almost every case: Bilbie v Lumley 102 ER 448; (1802) 2 East 469 at 472 per Lord Ellenborough. 7 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 114 (CLR) per Windeyer J; Strathfield Municipal Council v Elvy (1992) 25 NSWLR 745; (1992) 58 A Crim R 352; Griffın v Marsh (1994) 34 NSWLR 104; (1994) 28 ATR 355; Ostrowski v Palmer (2004) 218 CLR 493; (2004) 78 ALJR 957; [2004] HCA 30 (erroneous advice as to where the accused could fish is not a mistake of fact); CTM v The Queen at [7]; Police v Pace (2008) 186 A Crim R 113; [2008] SASC 182 (incorrect departmental advice about the content of regulations cannot provide the foundation for a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact). In Australian Fisheries Management Authority v Su (2009) 176 FCR 95; (2009) 195 A Crim R 352; [2009] FCAFC 56, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that a foreign fisherman who honestly and reasonably believed that a red line marked on a GPS navigation unit represented the border of the Australian Fishing Zone had made a mistake of fact and not law. 8 R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37. 9 Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279; [1937] HCA 83 at 306 (CLR) per Dixon J. 10 Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 29 NSWLR 497; (1992) 66 A Crim R 134 (NSW CCA).
[CLP.1400]
Intention
Meaning of intention – “Intention” is used in two different senses; firstly as a description of various forms of mens rea,1 and secondly and more narrowly, as connoting an element of acting to achieve a proscribed purpose.2 “Intent, in one form, connotes a decision to bring about a situation so far as it is possible to do so - to bring about an act of a particular kind or a particular result.”3 A result may be intended in this sense even though the likelihood of that result is somewhat remote.4 Although intention often involves acting to achieve a desired result,5 desire is not a necessary component of intention.6 In some instances, acting with foresight of probable although undesired consequences may be regarded as intending those consequences to occur.7 In the case of an inevitable undesired consequence, an accused may be viewed as intending the “inseparable consequence” of his act.8 Foresight will not be equated to intention in relation to attempts, see [CA.344A.60] or to offences requiring proof of specific intent.9 As to foresight in the context of intent to murder, see [CA.19A.520]. Crimes of general intent and specific intent and intoxication – There is a legal distinction between crimes of general or basic intent and crimes of specific intent. The former have been described as “those crimes whose definition expresses (or, more often, implies) a mens rea which does not go beyond the actus reus”, for example common assault.10 In He Kaw Teh, Brennan J gave this description: General or basic intent relates to the doing of the act involved in an offence; special or specific intent relates to the results caused by the act done. In statutory offences, general or basic intent is an intent to do an act of the character prescribed by the statute creating the offence; special or specific intent is an intent to cause the results to which the intent is expressed to relate.11 Although the High Court has held that this distinction, which originated in England, is not part of the common law in Australia,12 it is a distinction of increasing use in New South Wales. Where intoxication is involved, the distinction between offences of basic intent and specific intent has been introduced by Pt 11A
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of the Crimes Act 1900, see [2.40900].13 Section 428B contains a definition of an offence of specific intent and gives a list of offences as “examples” of such offences, see [2.40920]. By s 428C(1), intoxication may be taken into account in determining whether an accused had the intention to cause the specific result necessary, see [2.40960]. This has been held to include murder.14 Otherwise for the purposes of determining mens rea, intoxication, if self-induced, cannot be taken into account, see s 428D at [2.40980]. Transferred intention (malice) – If an accused has the mens rea for an offence and does the act constituting the actus reus, producing the expected result but against an unexpected victim, he will be guilty nevertheless. “It is … settled law that if, for example, X shoots with intent to kill Y, but misses and hits and kills Z instead, X is guilty of the murder of Z. This is the doctrine of transferred malice.”15 Proof of intent – The Crown must prove the subjective intention of an accused.16 A criminal intention is not to be presumed objectively from an accused’s acts. The High Court said in Smyth: In this Court disapproval has been expressed on more than one occasion of the use, where a specific intent must be found, of the supposed presumption, conclusive or otherwise, that a man intends the natural, or natural and probable, consequences of his acts: (authorities cited).17
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The reason was stated in Stokes: The danger of the presumption that every person intends the natural consequences of his acts is that it produces an illegitimate transfer of the burden of proof upon the issue of intention from the Crown to an accused denying the allegation: Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 358 at 365.18 But the Crown may invite the jury to draw an inference or a conclusion from the accused’s own acts that they were done with the subjective intention which the Crown has to establish.19 In Kural, a High Court majority said: How does one prove the existence of the requisite intention? Sometimes there is direct evidence in the form of an admission by the accused that he intended his conduct to involve the forbidden act. More often, the existence of the requisite intention is a matter of inference from what the accused has actually done. The intention may be inferred from the doings of the proscribed act and the circumstances in which it was done.20 Section 66A of the Evidence Act 1995 provides that “the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a representation made by a person that was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s … intention, knowledge or state of mind.” See [6.6700]. Motive is different from intention21 and does not need to be proved by the prosecution,22 but if in fact proven, motive is a matter from which a jury may infer intention.23 Evidence of opinion or belief is not sufficient to prove subjective intent. In a Victorian case, an accused had been convicted of assault with intent to rape, with the complainant saying in evidence, “I believed he was going to rape me or worse”. On appeal, it was said, “… the intention of the accused, his mens rea, cannot ordinarily be established by opinion evidence and must be established by objective facts from which such an inference can be drawn upon the appropriate standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”24 Intent does not usually require explanation to a jury – It has been judicially commented that although “intent” is a legal term of art, its use in the main coincides with general usage.25 However, “intent” does not readily lend itself to precise legal definition. In Moloney, the House of Lords cautioned: The golden rule should be that, when directing a jury on the mental element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent, unless the judge is convinced that, on the facts and having regard to the way the case has been presented to the jury in evidence and argument, some further explanation or elaboration is strictly necessary to avoid misunderstanding.26 1 See for example He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 568–569 (CLR); 236 (A Crim R) per Brennan J.
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2 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 95 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. See also Leonard v Morris (1975) 10 SASR 528 (FC) per Bray CJ at 531–32; R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 at 418 (Qd R); 46 (A Crim R) per Connolly J. 3 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 569 (CLR); 236 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 4 Leonard v Morris (1975) 10 SASR 528 per Bray CJ at 531–32. An example was given in the divorce case of Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644; [1963] 3 WLR 176; 2 All ER 966 (HL) at 664 (AC); 186 (WLR); 972 (All ER) where Lord Reid spoke of a golfer trying to reach the green when it was likely he would end up in a bunker, pointing out that that the golfer’s intention was clear even though the odds of actually reaching the green were poor. 5 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64 per Kitto J. 6 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC; R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 at 418 (Qd R); 46 (A Crim R) per Connolly J. 7 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19, the Court at 469 (CLR). See also R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 at 540; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 690 (AC) per Lord Simon; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 569–570 (CLR); 236 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 8 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC. 9 R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333 (CCA) at 346 per Hunt CJ at CL applying R v Hoskin (1974) 9 SASR 531 at 540–541; R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741; [1976] 3 All ER 46; (1976) 63 Cr App R 59 at 747–748 (WLR); 52–53 (All ER); 64 (Cr App R); R v Safwan (1986) 8 NSWLR 97; 23 A Crim R 385; R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65; Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 at 164 (A Crim R) per Kirby J. 10 Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 (HL) at 216 (AC); 152 (Cr App R) per Lord Simon. 11 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 569–570 (CLR); 237 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 12 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 81–85 (CLR); 359–362 (A Crim R) per Barwick CJ, 91–92 (CLR); 367–368 (A Crim R) per Gibbs J, 111 (CLR); 381 (A Crim R) per Mason J. 13 The same distinction appears in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch, cl 8.2(1). 14 R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243 (NSW CCA). 15 R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441 (Vic CCA) at 116 (VR); 462 (A Crim R). Other authorities are R v Saunders & Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473; 75 ER 706; Agnes Gore’s Case 77 ER 853; (1611) 9 Co Rep 81; R v Supple (1870) 1 VR (L) 151. The doctrine of transferred malice was considered in R v King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; 139 A Crim R 132; [2003] NSWCCA 399 (NSW CCA). 16 See for example, Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at 551 (CLR) per Kirby J. It has been judicially acknowledged that there is a degree of practical artificiality in this, see Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120 per Barwick CJ. 17 Smyth v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 163; [1957] HCA 24 per the Court at 166 (CLR). 18 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA) at 30 per Hunt J. 19 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 30 per Hunt J citing Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2 at 596–597 (CLR); R v Kalajzich (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 at 459. 20 Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; (1987) 29 A Crim R 12; [1987] HCA 16 at 504 (CLR); 13 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. 21 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 73 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC. 22 It is sometimes impossible to determine the reason for an accused’s criminal act, see the United States case of Pointer v United States (1894) 151 US 396 at 413 referred to by Kirby J in De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [53]. At [57], Kirby J gives suggested jury directions on the subject of motive. 23 De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33 at [28] per Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ. See also R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18. 24 R v Cahill [1998] 4 VR 1 (CA) at 3 per Ormiston JA. 25 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 690 (AC) per Lord Simon.
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26 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025 at 926 (AC) per Lord Bridge (with whom the other Law Lords agreed), applied in R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 (Qld CA).
[CLP.1420]
Necessity
See further commentary at [CLP.2100]ff. [CLP.1440]
Presumption of innocence
“The accused is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty, and he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt that is raised in the case.”1 In general, the more serious the allegation, the more clearly must the accused’s guilt be proved.2 There is no obligation on a trial judge to use an expression such as “presumption of innocence” where the jury is given a clear direction on the onus of proof.3 It is misleading to speak of a presumption of innocence which is applicable to a witness.4 It has been said that the presumption of innocence must be a basic consideration in the decision on every application heard before evidence is given.5 Where by statute or common law some matter is presumed against an accused person “unless the contrary is proved”, the burden of proof required to be discharged by the accused is on the balance of probabilities.6
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For alleged offenders between ten and 14 years, the presumption of doli incapax applies. To rebut this presumption of innocence, it must be proved that such a person knew that his or her act was wrong according to the ordinary principles of reasonable people. 1 R v Phillips (1868) 8 SCR (NSW) 54 per Hargrave J; R v Hawkins 103 ER 755; (1808) 10 East 211; R v Burdett 106 ER 873; (1820) 4 B & Ald 95. See also Viscount Sankey LC, in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72; Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; 28 Cr App R 65. 2 R v Hobson (1823) 1 Lewin’s CC 261 per Holroyd J. See also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34; R v Hagan [1966] Qd R 219 per Gibbs J at 227. 3 R v Palmer (1992) 64 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA). 4 Howe v The Queen (1980) 55 ALJR 5; 32 ALR 478. 5 G v The Queen (1984) 35 SASR 349; (1984) 12 A Crim R 189 (SA Sup Crt FC). 6 R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; (1943) 29 Cr App R 76; Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 233 (CLR).
[CLP.1460]
Presumption of regularity
It is a maxim of the criminal law that omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium – all acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly until the contrary is proved. It will be presumed, even in a case of murder, that a man who has acted in a public capacity or situation was duly appointed and has properly discharged his official duties.1 The presumption is of some force when applied to public or official acts.2 This presumption has been considered by the High Court in relation to the issue of warrants authorising use of listening devices and the related question of jurisdiction of inferior courts and superior courts in this context.3 In Dillon v The Queen [1982] AC 484; [1982] 2 WLR 538; [1982] 1 All ER 1017, the Privy Council held that the Courts will not presume the existence of facts which are central to an offence, particularly those which touch upon the liberty of the subject. Other decisions both in England and Australia have rejected reliance upon the presumption of regularity in criminal proceedings.4 In Cassell v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 189; 110 A Crim R 317; [2000] HCA 8 at [67], Kirby J (there a dissentient) noted that there are decisions such as R v Templeton [1956] VLR 709 at 713 where it has been suggested that the presumption can apply and that on the one occasion that the question was presented for decision in the High Court in Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475, the majority, whilst noting Dillon and the differences of view which had arisen, reserved the question. In Day, Brennan J (dissenting) rejected the presumption of
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regularity. Kirby J in Cassell said that, like Brennan J, he would incline to the view that the presumption of regularity is unavailable in criminal proceedings to cure gaps in the evidence relevant to proof of the essential elements of an offence. 1 R v Gordon 168 ER 359; (1789) 1 Leach 515; R v Rees (1834) 6 Carrington & Payne 606; R v Jones 170 ER 1105; (1809) 2 Camp 131; R v Verelst (1813) 3 Campbell 432; R v Borrett (1833) 6 Car & P 124; R v Murphy (1837) 8 Car & P 297; 173 ER 502; R v Newton (1844) 1 Carrington & Kirwan 469; R v Townsend (1841) Carrington & Marshman 178; R v Manwaring (1856) Dearsly & Bell 132; R v Cresswell (1876) 1 QBD 446; R v Stewart (1876) 13 Cox CC 296; R v Roberts (1878) 14 Cox CC 101; R v Garvey (1887) 16 Cox CC 252. Cf R v Essex (1857) Dearsly & Bell 369. It would seem that the maxim creates on appeal, or application for certiorari, a presumption that the court of trial was properly constituted, R v Whelan [1921] 1 IR 310. 2 Re Crippen [1911] P 108; Knowles v The King [1930] AC 366. 3 Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; 97 A Crim R 195. See also R v Murdoch (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 (NSW CCA). 4 Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659; Lucerne v Collins [1967] 1 NSWR 407; (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 247; Selby v Pennings (1989) 19 WAR 520; Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424; 24 A Crim R 36. These cases were referred to by Kirby J in Cassell v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 189; 110 A Crim R 317; [2000] HCA 8 at [67] in a dissenting judgment, but not on this point.
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[CLP.1480]
Presumption of knowledge of law
At common law, the general rule is that ignorance of the law is no excuse,1 from which it follows that the prosecutor does not ordinarily have to prove that the accused knew that the act or omission alleged constituted an offence.2 The rule ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law does not afford excuse) is usually spoken of as arising from a presumption that every person knows the law. However, the real position is simply that ignorance of the law cannot be set up as a defence,3 even by a foreigner,4 although it may be a ground for mitigation of sentence.5 There is no presumption that everyone knows the law, even though ignorance of the law does not excuse.6 The subject of ignorance of the law in the context of one of the criminal codes has been considered by the High Court.7 Where a person is charged with an offence created by a regulation whose efficacy depends upon publication, it may be a defence to show that the regulation has not been brought to the notice of the public or the person or persons likely to be affected by it.8 A continuous act or proceeding, nor originally unlawful, commenced before the passing of a prohibiting statute, cannot be treated as unlawful by the passing of the statute unless reasonable time is given.9 Ignorance of the law may negative or help to negative certain types of specific intent, such as the intent to deceive.10 There is an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse in the case of larceny whereby one who takes possession of property which he or she really believes to be his or her own does not take it fraudulently, even though the claim is based on a mistake of law.11 Where a particular intent or state of mind is of the essence of an offence, a mistaken but bona fide belief by an accused that he had a right to do a particular act may be a complete defence as showing that he had no criminal intent.12 If, in a particular context, legislation requires that an accused should know an act is unlawful, that element of the offence itself cannot be eliminated by saying that ignorance of the law is no excuse.13 A reasonable but mistaken belief can only furnish an excuse where the mistake is one of fact; otherwise the general principle applies that ignorance of the law is no excuse.14 A person’s ignorance of the law of contempt cannot excuse him or her from its obligations.15 Criminal conspirators cannot excuse themselves by saying that, owing to their ignorance of the law, they did not realise that such an act was a crime.16 Aiders and abettors must know the essential matters constituting an offence, but it is not a defence for them to show that they did not know that such matters constituted an offence.17 1 R v Turnbull (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 108; 61 WN (NSW) 70 at 109 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ; Von Lieven v Stewart (1990) 21 NSWLR 52 at 66–67 per Handley JA.
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2 R v Taib [1999] 2 Qd R 649; (1998) 105 A Crim R 10 (Qld CA). 3 R v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386; [1923] HCA 59; R v Kennedy [1923] SASR 183; R v Mayor of Tewkesbury (1868) LR 3 QB 629; Olsen v Grain Sorghum Marketing Board [1962] Qd R 580; Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473; [1937] 2 All ER 646; R v Findlater [1939] 1 KB 594; (1940) 27 Cr App R 24. See also Bowmaker Ltd v Tabor [1941] 2 KB 1. 4 R v Esop (1836) 7 Car & P 456; 173 ER 203; Re Barronet and Allain (1852) 1 Ellis & Blackburn 1; R v Taib [1999] 2 Qd R 649; (1998) 105 A Crim R 10 (Qld CA). 5 R v Crawshaw (1860) 8 Cox CC 375. 6 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230 per Hunt J citing Martindale v Falkner (1846) 2 CB 706; 135 ER 1124 at 719 (CB), 1129 (ER) and Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473; [1937] 2 All ER 646 at 479 (AC). The same point was made in McKechnie v Jones (1976) 13 SASR 184 (FC). 7 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54. 8 R v Sheer Metalcraft Ltd [1954] 1 QB 586; [1954] 2 WLR 777; [1954] 1 All ER 542; Johnson v Sargant & Sons [1918] 1 KB 101. 9 Burns v Nowell (1880) 5 QBD 444. Cf R v Bailey [1800] Russell & Ryan 1. 10 Brend v Wood (1946) 175 LT 306. 11 R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137; Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 at 569 (CLR) per Brennan J and at 600 (CLR) per Toohey J. 12 R v Hall (1828) 3 Car & P 409; 172 ER 477; R v Twose (1879) 14 Cox CC 327; R v Rutter (1908) 25 TLR 73; Watkins v Major (1875) LR 10 CP 662. 13 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 97 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. R v Taib [1999] 2 Qd R 649; (1998) 105 A Crim R 10 (Qld CA) considers ignorance of the law and mens rea. 14 Von Lieven v Stewart (1990) 21 NSWLR 52 at 66–67 per Handley JA. 15 Attorney-General (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650; (1990) 50 A Crim R 342. 16 R v Churchill [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 2 WLR 682; [1967] 1 All ER 497 at 237 (AC). 17 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544; [1950] 1 All ER 300 at 546 (KB) per Lord Goddard CJ, applied by the High Court in Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163.
[CLP.1500]
Presumption that natural consequences intended
In Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 365 (CLR),1 the High Court said in a joint judgment that the introduction of a statement that a man is presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of his act is seldom helpful and always dangerous. A statement to the contrary in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161 was expressly disapproved in Parker v The Queen.2 In England, the decision in Smith has been reversed by legislation.3 It seems therefore that no such presumption exists in New South Wales and that a person’s intention, when in issue, is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence and the nature of his act is but one of the factors to be considered. As it is the accused’s intention at a particular time that is relevant, facts personal to the accused which may distinguish him from the ordinary man and which could have a bearing upon the operation of the accused’s mind, are relevant and evidence relating thereto is admissible.4 See also commentary on intent at [CA.39.80] under the topic “Murder”. 1 For an extension of this statement see Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 per Windeyer J. See also Smyth v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 163; [1957] HCA 24 and Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14. Compare Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161 and see now Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91. 2 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14. 3 Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8. 4 Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR 171; (1981) 5 A Crim R 234. See also Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; (1994) 72 A Crim R 288; [1994] HCA 28.
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Presumption of continuance
The so-called “presumption of continuance” is really no more than the drawing of an available inference. Of the cases concerning the presumption of continuance, it has been said, … [i]n my opinion, these are really no more than a recognition that there are situations in which, by a process of reasoning and inference, a fact may be found to exist at a particular time, without direct proof of its existence then, because of its proved existence at another point of time either earlier or later. But this is of no assistance, unless the facts proved are such that it is legitimate to infer from them the existence of the facts of which direct proof is not available.1 The speed of a train or vehicle is presumed to remain the same for some time,2 and evidence of the manner of driving just before the place the subject of the charge may be given.3 In NSW, the presumption has been held not to apply to a matter as volatile as changing blood alcohol levels.4 The presumption has been considered in relation to continuation of life.5
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1 Donoghue v St Luke’s Hospital Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 647 at 657 per Walsh JA. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander (1993) 33 NSWLR 482; (1993) 69 A Crim R 396, Hunt CJ at CL said at 408 in the context of the question of whether the presumption of continuance exists, … [w]hat does exist is an inference, based upon the common experience of mankind in relation to various matters, that certain facts which exist at one time will still be in existence at some subsequent time (…). It all depends upon the nature of the particular fact and the distance between the two times as to whether such an inference should be drawn. 2 R v Dalloz (1909) 1 Cr App R 258; for other factual applications see R v Street (1888) 3 QLJ 88; R v Sharp (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 150; Attorney-General v Bradlaugh (1884) 14 QBD 667. 3 R v Lewis [1913] VLR 227; Hallett v Warren (1929) 93 JP 225. 4 R v Olejarnik (1994) 33 NSWLR 567; 72 A Crim R 542. The authorities in relation to the presumption and blood alcohol levels were reviewed by Charles JA in Wright v Morton (1997) 95 A Crim R 125 (Vic CA). 5 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395; [1937] HCA 80 at 404 per Dixon J.
[CLP.1540]
Presumption of sanity
At common law, there is a presumption of law that every person is of sound mind.1 The reference to a “presumption” is simply a method of indicating where the onus of proof lies if an issue as to mental capacity arises.2 The defence of insanity is an exception to the general rule that the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains throughout upon the prosecution.3 1 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 266 (A Crim R) per Deane and Dawson JJ. 2 R v Anderson (Hilton Bombing Case) (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 at 451 per Gleeson CJ. 3 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481 (AC).
[CLP.1560]
Presumption of death
As to presumption of death in bigamy cases, see Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961, s 94. [CLP.1580]
Wife acting under husband’s coercion
See [CLP.1220] Marital coercion.
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Trial procedure – outline of a criminal trial and its antecedents
Contents of commentary: Arrest, charge and committal ..................................................................................... The finding of a bill of indictment ............................................................................ Case management provisions and listing for trial ..................................................... Trial by jury and judge alone trial ............................................................................. Pre-trial applications ................................................................................................... Arraignment of the accused before a jury panel ....................................................... Jury empanelment ....................................................................................................... Judge’s introductory remarks ..................................................................................... Crown and defence opening addresses ...................................................................... Presentation of the prosecution case .......................................................................... Closing of the Crown case ......................................................................................... Defence case ............................................................................................................... Closing addresses ....................................................................................................... Trial judge’s summing up ........................................................................................... Retirement and deliberation of the jury .....................................................................
[CLP.1600] [CLP.1640] [CLP.1660] [CLP.1680] [CLP.1700] [CLP.1720] [CLP.1740] [CLP.1760] [CLP.1780] [CLP.1800] [CLP.1820] [CLP.1840] [CLP.1860] [CLP.1880] [CLP.1900] Return of the jury and the taking of the verdict ....................................................... [CLP.1920]
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Editor’s Note: The following outline is intended to illustrate how a criminal trial for an indictable offence is conducted, including an account of the antecedent steps from arrest or charge. Aspects of criminal trials may be many and various. The outline encompasses the principal features of a trial and relevant rules and procedure; it is not intended as a complete guide to each and every situation or question that may arise, or every applicable legal rule or principle. The outline assumes a legally represented accused. [CLP.1620]
Arrest, charge and committal
Trials for indictable (serious) criminal offences are preceded by the laying of a charge called a court attendance notice, sometimes after an arrest, sometimes not. In the event the person charged pleads not guilty to the charge, the prosecution must serve on that person a brief of evidence comprising witness statements and any documentary evidence. Unless the charge is to be disposed of in a summary hearing, there is then (unless waived by the accused) a committal hearing before a magistrate to determine whether there is evidence capable of satisfying a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt on that charge or some other indictable charge. If the evidence is sufficient, the accused is committed for trial to either the District Court or the Supreme Court. Occasionally, instead of these procedures, a person may be placed upon his or her trial for an indictable offence directly by the laying of an ex offıcio indictment by the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney General. References: Meaning of indictable offence: s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA) and [CPA.8.20] commentary at ............................................................................................................ Prosecution on indictment: s 5 CPA and commentary at ......................................... [CPA.8.20] Arrest provisions: ss 99–103 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 Brief of evidence: ss 183–187 CPA Court attendance notice: s 47 CPA 94
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Committal for trial: Ch 3 Pt 2 CPA Committal for another offence: s 65 CPA and commentaryat .................................. [CPA.65.20] Evidence capable of satisfying a jury of guilt: s 62 CPA and commentary at ........ [CPA.62.40] Ex officio indictment: commentary ............................................................................ [CPA.66.40] Summary hearings of indictable charges: ss 5, 6 and 1 Tables 1 and 2 CPA Waiver of committal: s 68 CPA The finding of a bill of indictment
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Indictable offences are to be prosecuted on an indictment: s 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA). Following committal for trial, the papers are sent to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions: ss 111–113 CPA. The Director of Public Prosecutions decides whether a bill of indictment is or is not to be found against the person so committed: s 7(2) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986. In practice, bills of indictment are “found” (prepared) by a Crown Prosecutor or trial advocate, see commentary at [CPA.113.20]. There are relevant DPP “Prosecution Policy and Guidelines” for use in determining when it is appropriate to proceed with a prosecution, see [DPP.540]–[12.5330]. The charge in the indictment found need not be the same as the committal charge, see [CPA.113.20]. An indictment may be instituted in either the official or personal name of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions: s 9 CPA. Before an indictment is found, an accused person may make a written application to the Director of Public Prosecutions that “no bill [of indictment]” be found, see [CPA.113.20]. After an indictment is found, an accused person may make a written application to the Director of Public Prosecutions for a direction that there be no further proceedings on the indictment (nolle prosequi), see commentary at [CPA.113.40]. The functions of an indictment were said in R v Janceski (2006) 64 NSWLR 10; [2005] NSWCCA 281 at [52] to include: (i) Informing the court of the precise identity of the offence with which it is required to deal. (ii) Providing the accused with the substance of the charge which he or she is called upon to meet, including identification of the essential factual ingredients. (iii) Enabling the court to ensure that only relevant evidence is admitted and to properly instruct the jury on the relevant law. (iv) Determining the availability of a plea of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. (v) To invest the trial court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the prosecution. (citations not included) [CLP.1660] Case management provisions and listing for trial In both the Supreme Court and the District Court, there is a Criminal Listing Director who arranges for the listing of criminal trials: ss 122, 123 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA). Pending trials are listed before a judge for mention to see whether the accused wishes to plead “not guilty” and proceed to trial. Sometimes on such a listing hearing an accused is “arraigned”, that is to say, the charge or charges are read to him or her from the indictment and he or she is asked to enter a plea of either not guilty or guilty to the charge, see commentary on arraignment at [CPA.154.20]. Where there is an indication of a plea of not guilty on arraignment or informally, the trial is listed for hearing. The listing judge seeks from each legal representative an estimate of the probable length of the trial. Various related orders may also be made such as for bail, or the issue of a warrant to bring a person refused bail to court on the day of the trial, or for any necessary interpreter. There are provisions for pre-trial disclosure and case management at trial mentions: ss 134–136, 139–146, 146A, 147–149 and 149A–149F CPA. The prosecution is obliged to give a notice of the prosecution case and has a duty to disclose to the defence all relevant material and must furnish to the defence, inter alia, a copy of the indictment, a statement of facts, a copy of witness statements and a copy of each document proposed to be tendered: ss 141, 142 CPA. There is provision for a defence response including notification of the nature of the person’s defence, including particular defences to be relied on, points of law that the accused intends to raise and the furnishing of a copy of any expert’s report whom the
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accused intends to call: s 143 CPA. In practice, the defence often does not provide this information. Often, an accused’s “defence” is simply “I am not guilty”. The court has a discretion to excuse failure to comply with these provisions: s 146 CPA; and a discretion not to apply case management measures: s 134(2) CPA. In many instances, there is little or no case management. There are specific obligations on the defence to give notice of alibi (s 150 CPA and commentary at [4.4350]–[CPA.150.240]) and notice of intention to adduce evidence of substantial mental impairment: s 151 CPA. [CLP.1680]
Trial by jury and judge alone trial
Unless the accused elects for trial by judge alone, criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court or the District Court are to be tried by a jury: s 131 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA). For a State trial (but not a Commonwealth trial), there are provisions for a trial by judge alone upon election for this: ss 132, 132A, 133 CPA. Either the prosecution or the defence can apply (not less than 28 days before the trial date) for trial by judge alone; if both parties agree, the court must make an order for judge alone trial: s 132 CPA. The order must not be made if the accused does not agree: s 132(3) CPA. If the prosecutor does not agree, the order may be made nevertheless where it is in the interests of justice to do so: s 132(4) CPA. In exercising its discretion in s 132(4) CPA, the court may refuse to make an order if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards, including (but not limited to) an issue of reasonableness, negligence, indecency, obscenity or dangerousness: s 132(5) CPA. In a joint trial, an application must not be made unless all accused persons apply to be tried by a judge alone: s 132(2) CPA. In some cases, an accused may think his chances are improved by an application for a judge alone trial, for example, where the facts themselves are particularly repugnant and/or distressing, or where there is some issue such as a claim of mental illness more likely to be accepted by a judge than by a jury.
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[CLP.1700]
Pre-trial applications
The court has jurisdiction when the indictment is presented and the accused is arraigned; any orders that may be made for the purposes of the trial in the absence of a jury may be made before the jury is empanelled: s 130 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA). It is common for various applications to be made to the trial judge, generally by the defence but sometimes by the prosecution, before the trial proper begins before a jury. Often, these applications are made before the scheduled trial date. Sometimes they are made on the first day of the listed trial itself. Such applications can include an application for one or more of the following orders: • adjournment of the trial: ss 19, 40 CPA and commentary at [CPA.19.40]. Such application is often made before the scheduled trial date. If there is any evidence that the accused may be unfit to stand trial, the judge may order the trial adjourned for the purpose of conducting an inquiry to determine whether the accused is unfit to be tried for the alleged offence in accordance with Pt 2 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990, see commentary at [MHFPA.10.20]; • amendment of the indictment: s 21(1) CPA, commentary at [CPA.21.20]; • separation of the trial from a co-accused: s 21(2) CPA, commentary at [CPA.21.40]–[CPA.21.80]; • severance of counts from an indictment: s 21(2) CPA, commentary at [CPA.21.180]–[CPA.21.400]; • change of trial venue: s 30 CPA, commentary at [CPA.30.20]; • demurrer or motion to quash the indictment: ss 17, 18 CPA, commentary at [CPA.17.20]. These applications are now rare; • stay of proceedings, either temporary or permanent: commentary at [CPA.19.140]; • plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit: s 156 CPA, commentary at [4.5100]–[CPA.156.240]; • exclusion or limitation of evidence for various reasons. Often, the ground is that the evidence is in some way unfairly prejudicial to the accused or is irrelevant. Provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (EA) include ss 85, 97, 98, 114, 115, 126B, 126H, 135, 136, 137 and 138;
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• voir dire determination of a fact or facts relevant to whether evidence should be admitted or used against the accused or whether a witness is competent or compellable: s 189EA. • Basha inquiry to permit, in the absence of a jury, the examination and cross-examination of a witness either not called at committal, or to see whether a witness can say more on a subject of significance than the police have been able to obtain from that witness: see R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 at 339 per Hunt J; R v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172; 72 A Crim R 160 at 180–181 (NSWLR); 191–191 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 at 351 (Hunt CJ at CL). In addition, the judge may make orders, where appropriate, for the closing of the court and the non-publication of evidence or the name of a complainant or other person.
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[CLP.1720]
Arraignment of the accused before a jury panel
Once any pre-trial applications have been ventilated before the trial judge, a panel of potential jurors is called into the public gallery of the court. At the discretion of the trial judge, the accused either enters the dock or remains on the floor of the court: s 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA) and commentary at [CPA.34.20]. If not in the dock, the accused should be seated near his counsel or solicitor and not anywhere in the public gallery where jury panel take seats. In almost all circumstances, an accused person in custody should never be brought into court from custody, in front of an already assembled jury panel, thereby drawing attention to the refusal of bail. In front of the jury panel, the judge calls upon the Crown Prosecutor. The Crown Prosecutor says “I call for trial AB and I present an indictment against him”. The accused is asked to stand by the judge or the clerk of arraigns (the judge’s associate). The clerk of arraigns reads out each charge to the accused and in relation to each charge says “How say you, are you guilty or not guilty?” The arraignment consists of these three parts, that is to say, the calling of the accused to the bar by name, the reading of the indictment and asking the accused whether he is guilty or not: R v Nicolaidis (1994) 33 NSWLR 364; 72 A Crim R 394 at 367 (NSWLR); 396 (A Crim R) per Gleeson CJ. The indictment may include multiple charges and more than one accused. In any trial, there can only be one operative indictment: Swansson v The Queen (2007) 69 NSWLR 406; 168 A Crim R 263; [2007] NSWCCA 67. If the accused pleads not guilty to any charge, the accused stands for trial: s 154 CPA. It is the arraignment before a jury panel that “marks the commencement of a trial by jury”: Nicolaidis at 367 (NSWLR); 397 (A Crim R). For detailed commentary on the arraignment, see [CPA.154.20]. Following arraignment, counsel for the accused announces his or her appearance. A jury is then empanelled. By this time, an accused person may have been arraigned as many as three times, once when the matter was listed for trial, once for a pre-trial application and again on the day of the trial itself before the jury is empanelled. It is well established that there may be more than one arraignment: Nicolaidis 367 (NSWLR); 397 (A Crim R). [CLP.1740] Jury empanelment Subject to the discharge of individual jurors during the trial, the jury is to consist of 12 members: s 19(1) of the Jury Act 1977 (JA). There is provision for the selection of up to 3 additional jurors in a case where this is appropriate to ensure that there will be sufficient jurors remaining when the jury comes to consider its verdict: s 19(2) JA. In the event it becomes necessary to discharge a juror or jurors during a trial or if a juror dies, there is provision for as few as 10 jurors to continue as a properly constituted jury (or even as few as 8 in particular circumstances): s 22 JA. For commentary on the discharge of jurors, see [JA.22.20] and [JA.22.40]. Part 5 of the Jury Act 1977 makes provision for the summoning of jurors. When all pre-trial issues have been dealt with, a jury panel of potential jurors summoned is brought into court. Following the arraignment of the accused in the presence of the jury panel, it is customary for the trial judge to raise certain matters with the members of the jury panel designed to ensure that any juror who should not or cannot properly serve as a juror is excused from selection. The judge should inquire of the jury panel whether any member of it knows the accused or the complainant. The trial judge must invite the prosecutor to make a brief statement about the nature of the charge and to read out the names of the
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witnesses who may be called in the prosecution case (s 38(7) JA) to ensure that none of the members of the panel personally know any potential witness, or at least, any potential witness whose evidence is likely to be contentious. The judge must point out to the jury panel the obligation of a juror to judge the case impartially and invite any panel member who feels incapable of doing this to apply to be excused: s 38(7) of the Evidence Act 1995. The judge should refer the panel to the estimates of counsel as to the probable length of the trial to ensure that any member selected will be available for the whole duration of the trial. It is suggested that it is advisable to ask if any panel member cannot readily understand ordinary spoken English or cannot hear adequately or has any physical or medical condition making it difficult to sit and listen for extended periods. When the judge has considered applications of panel members who seek to be excused, the jury empanelment begins. Counsel for the accused should seek the judge’s leave to assist the accused in the selection of the jury. Apart from the right of challenge to the whole jury array under s 41 of the Jury Act 1977 which is rarely exercised, an accused person has the right of peremptory challenge to at least 3 potential jurors called: s 42(1) JA. There is provision for challenge for cause in Pt 6. Part 7 stipulates the manner in which a jury is to be selected. After the jury is sworn, the judge dismisses those members of the jury panel either excused or not selected.
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[CLP.1760]
Judge’s introductory remarks
The trial judge makes some introductory remarks to inform the jury of various fundamental and important matters including the function of the jury, the role of the judge, the onus and standard of proof, (if relevant) dealing with multiple and/or alternative charges or multiple accused, fact finding, legal argument in the jury’s absence, the choosing of a foreman or forewoman and that person’s role, the prohibition on jurors making their own inquiries, the prohibition on discussing the case with outsiders, the importance of ignoring any pre-trial media publicity and the bringing of irregularities to the judge’s attention. In addition, if the judge knows what the issue or issues in the trial are, some mention of them may be made. The judge also usually refers to practical matters such as the estimated length of the trial, the court hours and daily breaks in the trial, the taking of notes, the introduction of the legal representatives, the role of the court officers, and the sending of a note to the judge through the foreman or forewoman of any question the jury has. [CLP.1780]
Crown and defence opening addresses
As there are no pleadings as such in a criminal case, the Crown opening address is of great importance and serves a number of functions. The opening informs the judge, the jury and the accused of the nature of the Crown case and how it is anticipated it will be proved. The Crown opening should not only outline the facts proposed to be established by evidence, but also to indicate the nature of the Crown case in conceptual terms: Tran v The Queen (2000) 105 FCR 182; 118 A Crim R 218; [2000] FCA 1888 at [128]. The Crown Prosecutor may refer to the elements of the charge or charges and to relevant matters of law but must make it clear that anything said about the applicable law is subject to the trial judge’s final directions as to the relevant law. The Crown Prosecutor may be asked by the defence not to open on a matter to which objection is to be taken. If the jury is to be asked to consider an available alternative verdict, this should be referred to in the Crown opening address. As to alternative verdicts, see [CPA.162.20]–[CPA.162.100]. The Crown opening address should not be made in inappropriately emotive terms. Opening addresses are to inform and not to present argument. For commentary on the opening address by a Crown Prosecutor, see [CPA.159.20]. An accused person or his counsel may address the jury immediately after the prosecution opening and such opening should generally be limited to the matters raised in the prosecution opening, including what is and is not in dispute and also matters to be raised by the accused: s 159 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA) and commentary at [CPA.159.20]. A defence opening address is not an opportunity to argue the defence case. Limitations to a defence opening were noted in R v MM (2004) 145 A Crim R 148; [2004]
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NSWCCA 81 at [139]. These include not embarking on a dissertation on the onus or standard of proof or trespassing on the trial judge’s functions including the giving of directions and warnings. The defence also has the right to open the defence case if evidence is to be called, before that evidence is to be called and whether or not there was a defence opening address immediately after the Crown opening address: s 159(3) CPA. Notwithstanding, it is not uncommon for there to be no defence opening address at any stage of the trial. It is suggested that it is good practice for the trial judge to inquire of defence counsel in the absence of the jury whether there is to be a defence opening address immediately after the Crown opening address. For commentary on defence opening addresses, see [CPA.159.20]. [CLP.1800]
Presentation of the prosecution case
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Following the opening address or addresses, the prosecutor begins to call witnesses who have relevant and admissible evidence to give. Witnesses must take either an oath or an affirmation: ss 21–24 of the Evidence Act 1995 (EA). A person who does not have the capacity to understand the obligation to give truthful evidence may give unsworn evidence about a fact: s 13EA. Some classes of witness, for example, a complainant in a sexual assault trial, may give evidence by CCTV. In such a case, the judge must give the jury certain directions about evidence given in this way. The order in which prosecution witnesses are called is up to the prosecutor. The Evidence Act 1995 includes various provisions about the giving of evidence, including cross-examination: ss 26–46. In a joint trial and, in the absence of defence agreement to the contrary, prosecution witnesses are cross-examined by the defence representatives in the order of the names of the accused on the indictment. Various jury directions and warnings by the trial judge may be appropriate as prosecution witnesses give their evidence. If an arresting police officer speaks of telling an accused of his right to silence, the trial judge must tell the jury that an accused has a continuing right to silence and that the jury can draw no adverse inference against an accused who chooses to exercise this right: Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34 at 99 (CLR); 323 (A Crim R), s 89 EA. If disputed identification evidence is given, the judge must warn of the care that must be taken with identification evidence. Unless a prosecutor considers that a particular witness is being deliberately untruthful, all relevant witnesses must be called in the prosecution case, even if unfavourable to the Crown: Seneviratne v The King [1936] 3 All ER 36 (PC) per Lord Roche at 49; Richardson v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 116; 48 ALJR 181; [1974] HCA 19 at 121 (CLR); R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; 15 A Crim R 88; [1984] HCA 38 at 575 (CLR); 97–98 (A Crim R). If a prosecutor thinks that an eyewitness is being deliberately untruthful, it is a common practice for the prosecutor to call that witness and ask his or her name and occupation and nothing further, thereby making that witness available for cross-examination by the defence. If a Crown witness appears to be “unfavourable”, or to be not making a genuine attempt to give evidence or has made a prior inconsistent statement, the Crown may seek leave to cross-examine that witness (although not usually at large): s 38 EA. The prosecution must disclose all relevant material favourable or unfavourable to the prosecution: R v McIlkenny [1992] 2 All ER 417; (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 at 312 (Cr App R) per Lloyd LJ; R v Brown (Winston) [1994] 1 WLR 1599; [1995] 1 Cr App R 191 at 1006 (WLR) per Steyn LJ; Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125; 157 A Crim R 121; [2005] HCA 68 at [81]–[83] per Kirby J. Prosecutors must prosecute fairly and must not unduly press for a conviction: R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 705 per Newton J and Norris AJ; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; 9 A Crim R 107; [1983] HCA 42 per Deane J at 663–664 (CLR); 110–111 (A Crim R); DPP Prosecution Guidelines, see [DPP.60] and [DPP.80]. This does not mean that the prosecution case may not be firmly argued, see commentary at [CPA.160.20]. [CLP.1820]
Closing of the Crown case
When all prosecution witnesses have been called and admissible documents tendered, the prosecutor indicates this by saying, “If your Honour pleases, that is the Crown case”. If defence counsel considers that the evidence in relation to any charge is not capable of proving an element of that charge, an application for a verdict by direction can be made (in the absence of the jury). If the judge agrees, the judge should
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direct the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty on that charge. A direction should be made only if “there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty”: Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; 50 A Crim R 157; [1990] HCA 51 at 214–215 (CLR); R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177; 202 A Crim R 522; [2010] HCA 17 at [29]. A trial judge cannot direct a verdict merely because he or she has formed the view that a guilty verdict would be unsafe or unsatisfactory: R v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74; 44 A Crim R 404. Concerning a verdict by direction in a case based upon circumstantial evidence, see R v XHR [2012] NSWCCA 247.
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In the event that the Crown case contains evidence capable of proving all of the elements the Crown must prove, but nevertheless the case appears very weak in a particular respect, defence counsel may seek a Prasad direction: R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; 2 A Crim R 45 (SA CCA). If the judge considers it appropriate, the judge may inform the jury that it may find the accused not guilty without proceeding further, that is, without hearing any defence case, or closing addresses or the judge’s summing up. The giving of this direction is entirely within the discretion of the trial judge: R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 at [153]. If given, the direction should be short and simple, making only brief reference to the weakness that persuaded the judge to give the direction: R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118 at 218 (SASR); 145 (A Crim R) per Cox J; Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206 at [61]. The judge commonly suggests to the jury that they spend only a limited time in considering whether to act on this direction to bring in a verdict of not guilty. In practice, rather than bringing in a verdict of not guilty, juries more often ask to hear more evidence, that is, the defence evidence. Once the Crown case is closed, unless the prosecution is taken completely by surprise by something raised in the defence case that could not have been reasonably anticipated, the prosecution cannot “split its case” and call any evidence in reply: R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; 16 A Crim R 147; [1985] HCA 35 at 684–686 (CLR); 157–158 (A Crim R) and also Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365; [1952] HCA 18 at 389 (CLR) and Niven v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 513; 42 ALJR 306; [1968] HCA 67 (a case of prior inconsistent statement by the accused). A case of alibi can be different depending upon the circumstances and the Crown can sometimes lead evidence in reply to rebut the alibi, even if it has had notice of it: s 150(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (CPA), R v Heuston (1996) 90 A Crim R 213 (CCA NSW) and commentary at [CPA.150.60]. [CLP.1840]
Defence case
An accused may himself give evidence and/or call other witnesses or may remain silent and call no evidence at all. An accused no longer has the former right to make an unsworn statement: s 31 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. If the accused gives no evidence, the trial judge must direct the jury that no adverse inference may be drawn from that fact: s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995 (EA). An accused who gives evidence should do so before calling any other witness, although this rule is not absolute: R v RPS (unreported, CCA NSW 13 August 1997) at 23 per Hunt CJ at CL; RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 113 A Crim R 341; [2000] HCA 3 at [8]–[9]. A prosecutor may not cross-examine an accused on matters relevant only to credit without leave of the court: s 104 EA. The application of the civil law rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 and its application to a criminal trial has been the subject of many decisions, too numerous to review in this outline. Many are referred to in Khamis v The Queen (2010) 203 A Crim R 121; [2010] NSWCCA 179 where it was said at [53] that, as a general rule, the rule in Browne v Dunn should be applied in a criminal trial sparingly and where no other option is available. In summing up, it is customary for the trial judge to direct the jury that in considering the evidence of the accused, this evidence is to be assessed in the same way the evidence of other witnesses in the trial is to be assessed. [CLP.1860]
Closing addresses
After the conclusion of the evidence, the prosecutor makes a closing address to the jury (except perhaps if the accused is unrepresented, in which event the prosecutor often makes no address at all). The defence closing address or addresses follow: s 160 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. In the case of more than
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one accused and in the absence of agreement of defence counsel to the contrary, the order of defence closing addresses should correspond to the order of the accused’s names on the indictment, see authorities at [CPA.160.20]. Only rarely is it appropriate for the trial judge to interrupt a Crown or defence closing address: R v Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872; [2000] 2 Cr App R 361 (CA) at 888 (All ER) per Rose LJ. For detailed commentary on the Crown and defence closing addresses, see [CPA.160.20]. [CLP.1880]
Trial judge’s summing up
There are many judicial statements on what is required of a judge’s summing up. The following are some (but by no means all) of the authoritative statements on various aspects of the duty of a trial judge: RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; 113 A Crim R 341; [2000] HCA 3 at [41] per Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ: The fundamental task of a trial judge is, of course, to ensure a fair trial of the accused. That will require the judge to instruct the jury about so much of the law as they need to know in order to dispose of the issues in the case. No doubt that will require instructions about the elements of the offence, the burden and standard of proof and the respective functions of judge and jury. Subject to any applicable statutory provisions it will require the judge to identify the issues in the case and to relate the law to those issues. It will require the judge to put fairly before the jury the case which the accused makes. In some cases it will require the judge to warn the jury about how they should not reason or about particular care that must be shown before accepting certain kinds of evidence.
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R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; 47 A Crim R 211 (CCA), the Court at 105 (NSWLR); 225 (A Crim R): A summing up should, in every case, not only include directions as to the ingredients of the offence which the Crown has to establish and an explanation of how the relevant law may be applied to the facts of the particular case, but it should also include a collected resumé of the evidence which relates to each of those ingredients and a brief outline of the arguments which have been put in relation to that evidence: [… authorities cited including Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; [1952] HCA 3 at 466 (CLR)]. This is a rule which appears increasingly to be ignored by trial judges. It is not a compliance with that rule simply to read the relevant part of the section to the jury and then to read out the evidence which has been given chronologically, starting with the first witness and going through the evidence in chief, the cross-examination and then re-examination of each witness before turning to the next witness and so on. The idea of a summing up is to present for the jury the issues of fact which they have to determine. Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; 60 A Crim R 169; [1992] HCA 13 at 560 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R), the Court (except Brennan J): In a criminal trial, the distinction between directions on matters of law and directions on matters of fact or argument is fundamental. A trial judge is bound to direct the jury as to any principle of law or rule of practice applicable to the case, and a misdirection or non-direction on such a matter will usually mean that the trial has miscarried. But matters of fact and the arguments in relation to them are in a different category. A trial judge is not bound to discuss all the evidence or to analyse all the conflicts in the evidence (R v Ali (1981) 6 A Crim R 161 at 164), and, by itself, the failure of a trial judge to do so does not mean that there has been any miscarriage of justice. Also at 561 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R): … the requirement of fairness means that ordinarily the respective cases for the prosecution and the accused must be accurately and fairly put to the jury. But that requirement does not oblige the judge to put to the jury every argument put forward by counsel for the accused: (R v Lowery [No 3] [1972] VR 939 at 948). Summary of evidence – the judge is not obliged to summarise all the evidence given in the trial if this is unnecessary in all the circumstances: s 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. In R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510; [1981] 2 WLR 524; [1981] 1 All ER 974, Lord Hailsham at 519 (AC) observed that:
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The purpose of a direction to a jury is not best achieved by a disquisition on jurisprudence or philosophy or a universally applicable circular tour round the area of law affected by the case. … A direction to a jury should be custom built to make the jury understand their task in relation to a particular case. In R v Chai (2002) 128 A Crim R 101; [2002] HCA 12 at [18], the High Court in a joint judgement said: Firstly, it is not the function of a trial judge to expound to the jury principles of law going beyond those which the jurors need to understand to resolve the issues that arise for decision in the case. Secondly, the law should be explained to the jury in a manner which relates it to the facts of the particular case and the issues to be decided [Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; [1952] HCA 3]. The judge’s task was not to compose an essay on the topic of accessorial liability for manslaughter. It was to explain to the jurors so much of the law as they needed to know in order to decide the issues that arose from the charges, the evidence, the case for the prosecution and the defence case. See also Huynh v The Queen (2013) 228 A Crim R 306; [2013] HCA 6 at [31]. Role of the judge – in Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192, Johnson J (with Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing) said at [140]: … the judge’s role in a criminal trial is to hold the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part in their disputations; the judge does not exercise an inquisitorial role in which he seeks himself to remedy the deficiencies in the case on either side, nor is it part of the function of the trial judge to don the mantle of prosecution or defence counsel: Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; 9 A Crim R 107; [1983] HCA 42 at 682 (CLR). The fundamental task of a trial judge is to ensure a fair trial: R v Meher [2004] NSWCCA 355 at [76]. Trial judges should normally refrain from advancing an argument in support of the Crown case that was not put by the Crown.
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Necessary warnings – in Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314; 35 A Crim R 387; [1988] HCA 47, Brennan J observed at 324–325 (CLR); 394–395 (A Crim R): Trial judges give warnings to juries in many situations to guard against perceptible risks of justice miscarrying. The warnings may relate to the jury’s contact with the public, the need to disregard information obtained outside the courtroom, the dismissal of prejudice or a variety of other matters occurring in the course of a trial. A warning may be needed to ensure that the jury attributes the appropriate significance and weight to the evidence. That is a central aspect of the jury’s function. In the majority of cases the assessment of the evidence can be left to the jury’s experience unaided by judicial warnings but there are some occasions when a warning is needed. A warning is needed when there is a factor legitimately capable of affecting the assessment of evidence of which the judge has special knowledge, experience or awareness and there is a perceptible risk that, unless a warning about that factor is given, the jury will attribute to an important piece of evidence a significance or weight which they might not attribute to it if the warning were given. It is not possible to define a priori the circumstances in which a warning is necessary: the circumstances which show whether a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice exists in relation to the assessment of evidence include the charge, the evidence and the conduct and atmosphere of the trial. Although no rule of law postulates a priori the cases in which a warning is needed, a failure to give a warning when one is needed leaves the proper significance and weight of the evidence in doubt. The Evidence Act 1995 contains various provisions concerning warnings: s 165 – unreliable evidence, s 165A – children’s evidence and s 165B – delay in prosecution. Warnings can be required on a variety of topics including an accused’s right to silence, the dangers of identification evidence, the evidence of accomplices and informers, and the giving of evidence via CCTV by “vulnerable person” witnesses. The foregoing list is far from exhaustive. Joint trials – in R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; 59 A Crim R 445 at 455 (CLR); 448 (A Crim R), the Court of Criminal Appeal stipulated:
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Where more than one accused are being tried together, it is the clear duty of the judge – except in unusual cases – to separate for the jury’s consideration the evidence properly relevant and material in the case of each, and to present the case made against each of the accused separately… [authority cited]. That is not to suggest that, where a substantial body of the evidence is common to more than one accused, and where the trial judge has in relation to the first accused complied with his or her obligation to collect the evidence as it relates to each of the ingredients of the offence charged and to give a brief outline of the arguments which have been put in relation to that evidence (R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; 47 A Crim R 211 (CCA), the Court at 105 (NSWLR); 224–225 (A Crim R)), it is necessary for the judge to repeat that in the same detail when dealing with each of the other accused to which the same material relates. But, unless the evidence is wholly identical against each accused – which is an unusual case – it is necessary, in order to ensure that the jury is assisted, to deal with each accused separately by presenting the case against each separately. It is not a sufficient compliance with that obligation merely to direct the jury that they must consider the evidence separately against each of the accused: [authority cited]. Duty to leave a defence disavowed by defence counsel – a trial judge is obliged to put an arguable defence to the jury even against the wishes of that accused’s counsel. In Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107; 45 ALJR 333; [1971] HCA 20 at 117–118 (CLR), Barwick CJ stated: Whatever course counsel may see fit to take, no doubt bona fide but for tactical reasons in what he considers the best interest of his client, the trial judge must be astute to secure for the accused a fair trial according to law. This involves, in my opinion, an adequate direction both as to the law and the possible use of the relevant facts upon any matter upon which the jury could in the circumstances of the case upon the material before them find or base a verdict in whole or in part.
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Duty to put defence case clearly – in R v Meher [2004] NSWCCA 355 at [76], Wood CJ at CL said that the task of a judge: … requires the judge to explain why it is that the accused asserts that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt … So far as the accused is concerned, it is the case which the defence makes that the jury must be given to understand, including any matter that is properly open upon which they might find for the accused: Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107; 45 ALJR 333; [1971] HCA 20. Alternative verdicts – the High Court considered the question of what instruction should be given to a jury in the manner of consideration of alternative verdicts in Stanton v The Queen (2003) 77 ALJR 1151; [2003] HCA 29. For commentary on Stanton and jury directions on alternative verdicts, see [CPA.162.80]. [CLP.1900]
Retirement and deliberation of the jury
At the conclusion of the summing up, the judge asks counsel whether there is any amendment or addition sought to any matter of law or fact referred to in the summing up. If counsel seeks any further direction concerning a matter of law, this should be sought in the absence of the jury. The judge asks the jury to retire to consider its verdict or verdicts. After the jury so retires, the judge sends the exhibits into the jury room. The usual practice is for the judge to ask counsel to check the exhibits before they are sent to the jury room to ensure that nothing which has not been admitted as an exhibit is sent in. If there is any question from the jury, the judge reassembles the court to consider the question and brings the jury into court to deal with whatever the question is. Any jury question should be answered by the judge with an opportunity for the jury to consider the answer before any verdict is taken: R v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 at [71]; R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [72]; R v Hickey [2002] NSWCCA 474; 137 A Crim R 62 at [47]. A copy of all or part of the transcript of evidence may be supplied to the jury at their request and if the judge considers that it is practicable to do so: s 55C of the Jury Act 1977 (JA). In the event of a request for transcript, it is common for the judge to inquire of the jury what part or parts of the transcript they wish to be given.
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A jury may separate overnight after retiring to consider their verdict, (s 54 JA) and almost invariably does so. Before separating, the judge should tell or remind the jurors that they should not discuss the case with anyone else and not even with the other jurors until they are all reassembled in the jury room the following day. If, during the course of deliberations, the jury indicates that it is unable to agree, the judge may consider it appropriate to give the jury a direction in accordance with the High Court decision in Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; 69 A Crim R 248; [1993] HCA 71. This direction is reproduced at [JA.19.80]. [CLP.1920]
Return of the jury and the taking of the verdict
When the judge receives a message that the jury has reached its verdict, the court is reassembled. When the jury returns, the clerk of arraigns (the judge’s associate) asks the foreman or forewoman to stand and asks that person “Has the jury reached its verdict?” On receiving an affirmative answer, the associate then reads out each count in the indictment and in relation to each asks “How say you, is the accused guilty or not guilty?” When the verdicts have been given, the associate says “Members of the jury, you say the accused is guilty (or not guilty), so says your foreman, so say you all?” This is intended to be a check to ensure that the announced verdict is in fact a unanimous verdict. For commentary on the delivery of the verdict, see [JA.19.80]. In a State trial, s 55F of the Jury Act 1977 (JA) provides for the returning of a majority verdict where: (i) there are at least 11 jurors, and (ii) if there has been no verdict reached after a period the court considers reasonable having regards to the nature and complexity of the trial and being not less than 8 hours of deliberation, and (iii) provided the court is satisfied after examination on oath of a least one juror that is it unlikely that the jury will reach a unanimous verdict after further deliberation.
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In the case of a jury of 12, a majority verdict of 11 may be taken and in the case of 11 jurors, a majority of 10. For commentary, see [JA.55F.20]. A verdict in a Commonwealth trial must be unanimous: s 55F(4). Immediately following the delivery of the verdict, the jury is discharged: s 55E JA. Once discharged, a juror may remain in court as a member of the public: s 55E(2) JA. It is customary for the judge to thank the jury and sometimes, after a long trial, exempt them from jury service for a specified period: s 39 JA. In the event that the accused is found not guilty of the charge or charges, the judge, after inquiring of the prosecutor whether there is any reason not to do so, discharges the former accused. In the event of a verdict of guilty, the judge may then convict the accused. What is more commonly done is to remand the offender for sentence. The formal order for conviction is often not made until immediately before the judge actually imposes the sentence by saying “you are convicted, I sentence you to …”. The verdict of either not guilty or guilty should be endorsed on the back sheet of the indictment.
“Defences” – exculpations from criminal liability [CLP.2100]
Criminal defences
Statutory exceptions apart, in every crime there must be guilty conduct accompanied by such mental element as the circumstances of the case requires.1 Within this framework of liability there are various recognised grounds of exculpation,2 commonly referred to and mostly inaccurately, as criminal “defences”.3 For convenience, the generic term defence will be used here. The word “defences” suggests something that must be proved by an accused person but in fact, many criminal defences involve no more than an accused raising or pointing to some evidence that casts a reasonable doubt on some essential element to be proved by the prosecution. Some such defences concern a lack of understanding or capacity. Others involve lack of voluntariness or a perceived compulsion to act. Some involve mistake. Others related to murder are partial defences, reducing but not completely avoiding, liability. Then there are
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statutory defences (not listed) that cast a legal onus on the accused person. Recognised defences, “non-defences”, special pleas and related matters and situations are discussed at [CLP.2120]ff. 1 Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, 21st ed Volume IV at 14, Warmington LC Editor-in-Chief, Butterworth & Co 1950. 2 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 at [8]. 3 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA NSW) at 2 per Hunt J.
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[CLP.2120] Defences of lack of understanding and capacity • Mental illness, commentary at [CLP.1020]ff. The prosecution is entitled to the presumption that every person is presumed to be sane unless the contrary is proven, see [CLP.1140]. An accused who seeks to prove mental illness bears a legal onus to prove this on the balance of probabilities, see [CLP.1140]. Irresistible impulse is not a defence unless it arises from mental illness, see [CLP.1200]. • Infancy, commentary at [CLP.560]. There is a rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of 10 and 14 years is mentally incapable of a crime. [CLP.2140] Defences involving lack of intent • Absence of criminal intent, commentary at [CLP.1260]–[CLP.1380]. • Lack of co-existence of mens rea and actus reus, commentary at [CLP.1320]. • Intoxication, Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900, commentary at [CA.428I.20]ff. Voluntary intoxication is not a defence as such but a distinction is made between offences that require a specific intent to be proved and those that do not. Concerning the former, by s 428C, intoxication may be taken into account in determining whether the accused had the specific intent necessary. • Mistake of fact (where mens rea is an element of the offence), commentary at [CLP.1280]. • Honest and reasonable mistake of fact (where mens rea is not an element), commentary at [CLP.1380]. • Accident, commentary at [CLP.120]. • Consent in cases of assault, sexual assault and larceny, commentary at [CA.61.160], [CA.61HA.40]–[CA.61HA.80] and [CA.117.340]. • Claim of right in cases in which stealing is an element, commentary at [CA.117.200]. • Abandonment as a defence to larceny, commentary at [CA.117.260]. [CLP.2160] Defences involving questions of voluntariness or compulsion to act • Automatism (sane and insane), commentary at [CLP.160] and [CLP.200]. • Self-defence, ss 418–423 of the Crimes Act 1900, commentary at [CA.423.40]ff. If self-defence is raised, s 419 expressly stipulates that the prosecution must prove that the accused did not act in self-defence. • Duress, commentary at [CLP.860]. • Marital coercion, commentary at [CLP.1220]. • Necessity, commentary at [CLP.1420]. [CLP.2180] Partial defences to murder • Provocation, commentary at [CA.23.20]ff. • Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind, s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900. • Infanticide, s 22A of the Crimes Act 1900, commentary at [CA.22A.40]. [CLP.2200] Special pleas and related matters • Pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, commentary at [4.5100]ff. • Plea of pardon, commentary at [CPA.154.320].
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• Demurrer to indictment, commentary at [CPA.17.20]. • Grounds for a stay of proceedings, commentary at [CPA.19.160]ff. [CLP.2220]
Situations that do not give rise to a legal defence
• Impossibility is not a usually a defence where criminal intent existed, see law of attempt at [CA.344A.40]ff and particularly [CA.344A.100]. • Ignorance of the law, see [CLP.40]. • Entrapment is not a defence but may be a ground for a stay of proceedings, see commentary at [CPA.19.160]. [CLP.2240]
Prosecution must usually disprove defence
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Concerning almost every issue in a criminal trial, the prosecution bears the legal burden of proving that issue, including proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused does not come within any ground of exoneration raised in the evidence.1 The only exceptions to this rule are mental illness (the prosecution being able to rely on the presumption of sanity, see [CLP.1500]) and statutory defences expressly casting a legal onus of proof on an accused. Section 29 of the Drugs Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 provides an example where a person, who possesses more than the traffickable quantity of a prohibited drug, is deemed to posses it for supply unless he or she proves otherwise. Another example is the statutory (partial) defence to murder of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind under s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900. In any case, where an accused bears a legal burden of proof, this need only be proven on the balance of probabilities: s 141(2) of the Evidence Act 1995. The prosecution is generally permitted to lead evidence to rebut all possible defences,2 but this does not extend to crediting the accused with a “fancy defence” in order to rebut it with “some damning piece of prejudice”.3 1 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 at 481–482 (AC). See also R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448; 32 ALJR 212; [1958] HCA 38 at 459 (CLR) per Dixon CJ; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26 at 665 (CLR) per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ. The issue must be raised in the evidence – the prosecution does not have to meet every “defence” which could possibly arise in relation to the offence charged: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Jeffrey (1992) 58 A Crim R 310 per Hunt CJ at CL at 314. 2 R v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68; 88 A Crim R 399 (CA Vic) at 406 (A Crim R) per Southwell AJA. 3 Thompson v The King [1918] AC 221 at 232 per Lord Sumner.
[CLP.2260]
Evidentiary onus, threshold required
For a trial judge to direct the jury on a relevant defence, the accused ordinarily has an evidentiary onus to point to some evidence raising the defence as a reasonable possibility. In CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25, the High Court observed: As explained in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 15 A Crim R 203; 59 ALJR 620 at 534–535 (CLR); 210 (A Crim R), the evidentiary onus of raising the ground of exculpation is on the accused, but, once that occurs, the ultimate legal onus of displacing the ground lies on the prosecution. The judgment of Hunt J in R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA NSW) contains a detailed statement of this principle. Various authorities have considered what is meant by an evidentiary onus and by comparison to a legal onus.1 The threshold of an evidentiary onus is not high. In R v Crisologo (1997) 99 A Crim R 178, the Court of Criminal Appeal said that “the substantially lesser evidentiary onus that an accused person bears … is no more than to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury about the Crown case”. A relevant factor is where a particular fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused.2 The necessary evidential threshold was considered in R v Clark (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 (CCA NSW). Of Clark, the Court of Appeal in Victoria in R v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 at [44] said that it establishes that although an accused need do no more than point to evidence or other material that may raise a reasonable doubt, it is not appropriate to invite a jury to engage in “fanciful supposition”.3 In
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Mencarious v The Queen (2008) 189 A Crim R 219; [2008] NSWCCA 237, McClellan CJ at CL (James and Fullarton JJ said at [65] that “a trial judge is not bound to direct the jury in relation to an hypothesis unless it is reasonable having regard to the evidence (citations omitted)”. Boyle provides an example of what is not permitted. Boyle was charged with the murder of his wife many years earlier. She had been shot in the head. The accused claimed that he awoke beside her to find her dead, panicked and placed her body in a 44 gallon drum where it remained for years. The Crown case was circumstantial. Concerning the issue of voluntariness to be proved by the prosecution, the court said at [50]: … it would be quite wrong, in our view, for a jury to be invited, in the absence of any evidence, to conclude that the acts done by an accused may not have been voluntary because of the possibility that he might have been acting in some kind of automatic state. It would be inappropriate, for example, to “float” the possibility that the accused might have had an epileptic seizure, or blacked out for some other reason, at the time of the commission of the offence when there is absolutely nothing in the evidence to support any such conclusion. Youssef ((1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA NSW)] is significant, in that regard, because it makes clear that it is no part of a jury’s role to engage in baseless speculation.4
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In R v Wardrope (1987) 29 A Crim R 198, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal said that an issue should only be left to the jury if it is capable of being given effect to by a process which can fairly be described as reasoning. The court added (at p 211) that determining in a given case whether there is evidence which could be acted upon by reasonable jurors “is necessarily a highly subjective exercise”. As these cases make clear, whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a defence is a question for the trial judge.5 In Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; [1978] HCA 9, Gibbs J at 118 (CLR), speaking in the context of self-defence, commented that if a judge is in any doubt as to whether there is sufficient material to raise that issue, the issue should be left to the jury. In Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319; 156 A Crim R 487; [2005] HCA 65 at [29] and [30], McHugh J made these observations: A jury is entitled to refuse to accept the cases of the parties and “work out for themselves a view of the case which did not exactly represent what either party said.” ... With great respect to the majority judges in the Court of Appeal (R v Stevens [2004] QCA 99), much of their reasoning was based on the express or implied premise that the evidence had to establish a possible inference of accident before that issue could be left to the jury. Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; 50 ALJR 108; [1975] HCA 42 at 105 (CLR) denies that proposition. Juries cannot take into account fantastic or far-fetched possibilities. But they “themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances”. And, as Windeyer J pointed out in Thomas v The Queen, ((1960) 102 CLR 584; 33 ALJR 413; [1960] HCA 2 at 606 (CLR)) it is not the task of juries “to analyse their own mental processes”. Nor is a reasonable doubt “confined to a ‘rational doubt’, or a ‘doubt founded on reason’ in the analytical sense”. Jurors may have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused although they cannot articulate a reason for it other than they are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved its case.6 Nothing should be said to the jury of the accused having any evidentiary onus so as to avoid confusing the jury with the prosecution’s legal onus.7 1 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Jeffrey (1992) 58 A Crim R 310 per Hunt CJ at CL at 313; King v The Queen (2003) 215 CLR 150; 77 ALJR 1477; [2003] HCA 42 at [18] per Gleeson CJ. 2 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 A Crim R 251; [1993] HCA 65 at 233 (CLR); 262–263 (A Crim R) per Brennan and Toohey JJ. 3 Other authorities to the same effect include Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 WLR 965; (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 at 416 (AC) per Lord Morris; R v Tikos (No 1) [1963] VR 285 (CCA) at 289 per Sholl J; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA NSW).The phrase “fanciful supposition” comes from a judgment of O’Connor J in Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66 at 662 (CLR). 4 Quoted with approval in Woodbridge v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 503; [2010] NSWCCA 185 at [70].
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5 R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 at 337 per Badgery-Parker J (Hunt CJ at CL and Allen J agreeing): Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1; [2007] NSWCCA 70. 6 Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26 at 665 (CLR) per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ. 7 McEwen v The Queen (1998) 99 A Crim R 421 (CCA NSW) at 424–425 per Hunt CJ at CL.
[CLP.2280]
Trial judge’s duty to direct on available defences not sought by the defence
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Sometimes evidence in a trial may suggest a defence that, for a tactical reason, defence counsel does not want to go the jury. A common example is where defence counsel in a murder trial wants to avoid giving the jury a choice of manslaughter and wants the trial conducted as “murder or nothing”, see [CA.19A.600]. If there is evidence of an available defence, the trial judge is obliged to direct the jury on the issue, even if the issue is not raised by the defence and, at least in some instances, even against the wishes of defence counsel.1 In Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; 102 A Crim R 299; [1998] HCA 21, McHugh and Hayne JJ said at [53]: … criminal proceedings are not wholly adversarial in nature. One important exception to the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings is that a trial judge has a duty to direct the jury on any matter that could result in the acquittal of the accused even though the accused deliberately refuses to argue the point. Again, there must be some evidence capable of raising the defence so as to enliven this duty. Flanagan v The Queen (2013) 236 A Crim R 255; [2013] NSWCCA 320 furnishes a good example. Ms Flanagan was charged with wounding the complainant with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm. The Crown case was that the appellant deliberately stabbed the complainant to his chest with a knife. Her case was that her only physical involvement with the complainant was to try to break up a fight between her brother and the complainant. She gave evidence that she was not armed with a knife and did not stab or strike the complainant. The trial judge did not direct the jury on self-defence and was not asked to. On appeal however, it was contended for the appellant that nevertheless, the trial judge should have directed the jury on self defence. Refusing the appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal at [91] said that a case of self-defence involves an acceptance that the accused inflicted a wound or engaged in an assault or that the jury might reason to that conclusion and that this was contrary to the appellant’s case. The court applied the principle that an appeal does not exist to allow an accused to run one set of issues at a trial and a different set of issues on appeal.2 In R v Payne [1970] Qd R 260, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal observed at 264: … a judge is bound to direct the jury as to a defence which is supported by the evidence but is not advanced by the accused; … But this does not mean that a judge must search his mind for fanciful interpretations of the evidence in order to put them to the jury as possible defences, particularly if he is not asked to do so by counsel for the accused. 1 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107; 45 ALJR 333; [1971] HCA 20 at 117–118 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. Other significant authorities are Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272; (1943) 28 Cr App R 65; Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; [1952] HCA 3; Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635; [1957] 3 WLR 656; (1958) 42 Cr App R 1; Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71; Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186; 42 ALJR 184; [1968] HCA 51; R v Bozikis [1981] VR 587; 5 A Crim R 58; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76. 2 Applying Darwiche v The Queen (2011) 209 A Crim R 424; [2011] NSWCCA 62 at [170] and Nudd v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 301; [2006] HCA 9 at [9].
Duress [CLP.2500]
Duress outline
Duress is a common law defence in New South Wales entitling an accused to a complete acquittal.1 It involves a crime committed only because the accused has lost his free choice to refrain from doing it
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because he feared that the consequences of the threat were greater than those flowing from committing the crime,2 in short a choice of harms.3 “In duress the words or actions of one person break the will of another”.4 It has been called a particular form of necessity.5 Said to have been known since the 14th century,6 the history of duress appears in a number of cases.7 In New South Wales, duress is treated as an aspect of voluntariness.8 Occasionally, it has been regarded as negativing mens rea.9 Another view, increasingly common elsewhere, is that duress stands outside these concepts and operates simply as a legal excuse.10
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Common law duress has been described as being in a vague and unsatisfactory state, with calls over many years for legislative definition.11 Consistency of principle and application is not a hallmark of many reported decisions. Duress is now defined in s 10.2 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. There is also a statutory definition in Victoria, see [CLP.2640]. Two leading New South Wales authorities are the Court of Criminal Appeal decisions in R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 (principally the judgment of Moffit P) and R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 (the judgment of Hunt J with whom Gleeson CJ and Mahoney JA agreed). The High Court has considered duress (coercion) under the Queensland Criminal Code in Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53. Significant restatements on aspects of common law duress by the House of Lords are contained in R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771,12 and R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709. Once duress is raised evidentially, the onus to prove that there was no reasonable possibility that the accused acted under duress then falls upon the prosecution – for this reason, strictly speaking, to call duress a “defence” is a misnomer, see [CLP.2100]. The accused must point to cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by evidence called on his behalf, or a combination of the two, as makes duress a live issue fit and proper to be left to the jury.13 Because the prosecution bears the legal onus of proving that the accused did not act under duress, the defence can be open to abuse, a subject of expressed judicial concern more in England than in New South Wales. In R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [20], Lord Bingham (for the majority) observed that “the defence of duress is peculiarly difficult for the prosecution to investigate and disprove beyond reasonable doubt”, adding that this is the more so when little detail of the alleged compulsion is given by the defence until the trial is underway. Lord Bingham commented at [21], “I find it unsurprising that the law in this and other jurisdictions should have developed so as to confine the defence of duress within narrowly defined limits”. If circumstances fall short of duress as a defence, they may nevertheless be relevant in mitigation of penalty, see [CLP.2680]. There are the related topics of necessity including duress of circumstances, see [1.460] and marital coercion [CLP.2640]. 1 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 541 (NSWLR); 434 (A Crim R); R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [19]. 2 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 544–545 (NSWLR); 434 (A Crim R). 3 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 435 (AC). 4 R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1982] 1 All ER 801; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235 at 240 (Cr App R) per Lord Lane CJ. 5 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 429 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC. 6 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 at 681 (AC) per Lord Wilberforce. 7 R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99; 23 A Crim R 86 (FC). 8 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR); 438 (A Crim R); R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [35]. In Victoria, see MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305; 200 A Crim R 433; [2010] VSCA 97 at [23]. Cf R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99; 23 A Crim R 86 (FC) at 105 (SASR); 88 (A Crim R) per Cox J.
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9 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 at 679–680 (AC); 17–18 (Cr App R). See also Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; 78 A Crim R 307; [1995] HCA 66 at 45 (CLR); 326 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 10 Attorney-General v Whelan [1934] IR 518 at 526 per Murnaghan J; R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 at 128; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 at 670 (AC) per Lord Morris, at 680 (AC) per Lord Wilberforce, at 710–711 (AC) per Lord Edmund-Davies; R v Harding [1976] VR 129 at 141; R v Hibbert (1995) 99 CCC (3d) 193 at [21], [38] and [47] per Lamer CJC; R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [18]. 11 R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC) at 529 per Winneke CJ and Pape J; R v Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 (CA); R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 (CA); Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [28]. 12 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771. 13 R v Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841; [1963] 2 All ER 688; (1963) 47 Cr App R 166. It may be that evidence comes in the form of things said by the accused in a record of interview with police.
[CLP.2520] Requirements of duress An often cited basis of duress is the following from the dissenting judgment of Smith J in R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC) who said at 543: … I consider that the following affirmative proposition may be stated. Where the accused has been required to do the act charged against him (i) under a threat that death or grievous bodily harm will be inflicted unlawfully upon a human being if the accused fails to do the act and (ii) the circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness would have been likely to yield to the threat in the way the accused did and (iii) the threat was present and continuing, imminent and impending (as previously described) and (iv) the accused reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out and (v) he was induced thereby to commit the crime charged and (vi) that crime was not murder, nor any other crime so heinous as to be excepted from the doctrine and (vii) the accused did not, by fault on his part when free from the duress, expose himself to its application and (viii) he had no means, with safety to himself, of preventing the execution of the threat, then the accused, in such circumstances at least, has a defence of duress. This passage has been approved in a number of judgments and, in substance, is accepted as correct statement of the common law of duress.1 In one case however, it was questioned whether these propositions are completely correct,2 and in another it was said that while the propositions may be correct in law, they may cause confusion if stated badly to a jury, particularly concerning the incidence of the burden of proof.3 A similar version of these requirements was given by Lord Bingham in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [20] as follows (citations omitted): (1) Duress does not afford a defence to charges of murder, attempted murder and, perhaps, some forms of treason. (2) To found a plea of duress the threat relied on must be to cause death or serious injury. (3) The threat must be directed against the defendant or his immediate family or someone close to him. (4) The relevant tests pertaining to duress have been largely stated objectively, with reference to the reasonableness of the defendant’s perceptions and conduct and not, as is usual in many other areas of the criminal law, with primary reference to his subjective perceptions. (5) The defence of duress is available only where the criminal conduct which it is sought to excuse has been directly caused by the threats which are relied upon.
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(6) The defendant may excuse his criminal conduct on grounds of duress only if, placed as he was, there was no evasive action he could reasonably have been expected to take. (7) The defendant may not rely on duress to which he has voluntarily laid himself open. 1 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 141 per Moffit P; R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 (FC) at 537; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353; (1979) 1 A Crim R 124 (FC) at 536 (VR); Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [28]. Smith J’s judgment was also referred to with apparent approval in R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 540 (NSWLR); 433 (A Crim R). 2 R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99; 23 A Crim R 86 (FC). 3 R v Emery (1978) 18 A Crim R 49 (CCA Vic).
[CLP.2540]
Present and continuing threat of death or serious bodily harm
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Nature of the threat required – in Attorney-General v Whelan [1934] IR 518 at 526, it was said that the threat had to be “of immediate death or serious personal violence so great as to overbear the ordinary power of human resistance”.1 In terms of injury, most authorities have consistently required that the threatened injury be really serious injury.2 There is some limited authority for the proposition that threat of imprisonment may possibly suffice.3 It has been doubted that a threat to property would ever be sufficient.4 The question of whether the threat of aboriginal traditional punishment can suffice as duress arose in a South Australian case but the question was not there decided.5 The subject of the threat – duress can also be a defence where the threat is directed not to the accused but to members of the accused’s family.6 Additionally in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [21], Lord Bingham (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) said that the “threat must be directed against the defendant or his immediate family or someone close to him…” (emphasis added), adding that it appears to be consistent with the rationale of duress that if the threat is not made to the defendant or his family, then it must be directed to “a person for whose safety the defendant would reasonably regard himself as responsible”.7 Examples of these others have included a de facto partner,8 boyfriend,9 and passenger in the accused’s car.10 The object of the threat – the judgment in R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 (FC) at 356–357 appears to say that duress is only available where the offence committed was nominated by the threatener. In R v Cole [1994] Crim LR 582, the English Court of Appeal held that where an accused had been threatened by moneylenders to whom he was in debt, the accused could not rely on duress in robbing two building societies because the moneylenders had not stipulated that he commit robbery to meet their demands. As the commentary to Cole says, if these cases stand for the proposition that duress will only apply to specifically nominated crimes, such a limitation seems contrary to principle. R v Ali (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 692; [1995] Crim LR 303 seems to indicate that there is no such restriction. Present and continuing threat – in R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 at 206 (QB) Lord Widgery said: It is essential to the defence of duress that the threat shall be effective at the moment when the crime is committed. The threat must be a “present” threat in the sense that it is effective to neutralise the will of the accused at that time.11 The court in Hudson added at 207 (QB) that the existence at a particular moment of threats sufficient to destroy the will of a person threatened ought to provide that person with a defence of duress “even though the threatened injury may not follow instantly, but after an interval”. By contrast in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [27], Lord Bingham (the other Law Lords agreeing) said that in his opinion duress requires that the execution of the threat must be reasonably believed to be “imminent and immediate”. Lord Bingham at [27] commented that Hudson has been described academically as “an indulgent decision” and has weakened the requirement of the immediacy of the threat.12 Notwithstanding, Hudson has been earlier and later approved in various cases in New South Wales.13
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In Nguyen v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; [2008] NSWCCA 22, a case involving the growing of a large commercial quantity of cannabis, the appellant worked on the particular rural property previously growing lawful crops. He asserted that initially he did not know the new type of crop to be planted and that, when he became aware it was cannabis, he wished to leave. He said he remained only because of death threats made to him and to his son (who was elsewhere) if he left. The trial judge refused to put duress to the jury. On appeal it was held, applying Hudson, that it is sufficient if the threat is continuing, imminent and impending. The evidence was capable of supporting the conclusion that the threat was of death or serious injury to him and his son in the event that he did not do what the threatener required. Regarding the threat “continuing”, in R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [37], it was said that for a threat to be effective it must be continuing threat to the time of the crime and such threat will not be continuing and effective if the accused has a reasonable opportunity to render the threat ineffective, see [CLP.2600].
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Evidence of receiving the threat – evidence by an accused of threats received is regularly received in duress cases. Such evidence is not hearsay in these circumstances and is admissible not to establish the truth of the out of court threat, but simply the fact that the threat was made.14 1 Quoted by Moffit P in R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 136. 2 R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC); R v Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 WLR 1238; [1988] 3 All ER 1025 at 298 (QB); R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR); 438 (A Crim R); R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [35]; R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 at [21]. Authorities suggesting lesser violence may suffice include R v Steane [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813; (1948) 32 Cr App R 61 (CCA) at 1005 (KB) per Lord Goddard and R v Harding [1976] VR 129 (FC) at 169 per Murphy J. 3 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 133 per Moffit P; R v Steane [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813; (1948) 32 Cr App R 61 (CCA) at 1005 (KB) per Lord Goddard; R v Harding [1976] VR 129 (FC) at 169 per Murphy J. 4 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 139 per Moffitt P; R v Brown [1968] SASR 467 (FC) at 498; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 at 687 (AC) per Lord Simon. 5 R v Warren (1996) 88 A Crim R 78 (CCA SA). 6 R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC) at 542–543; R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 (FC) at 537–538; R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 140–141, 158–159; R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR); 438 (A Crim R); R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [36]. 7 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206 at [49] (CA) contains a similar statement. 8 R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC). 9 R v Wright [2000] Crim LR 510. 10 R v Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 WLR 1238; [1988] 3 All ER 1025 (CA). 11 R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 (CA) Lord Parker CJ delivering the judgment prepared by Widgery LJ. 12 The High Court too noted the academic criticism of R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 in Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [35], but said nothing of R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709. 13 R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 (CCA); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 (CCA); Nguyen v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; [2008] NSWCCA 22. 14 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 at 965; R v N (1999) 106 A Crim R 493; [1999] NSWCCA 187.
[CLP.2560]
Subjective inducement to commit a crime
Causal connexion – the subjective requirement of the defence of duress is that the mind of the accused must in fact be overborne by the threat.1 There must be a direct causal link between the threat and the accused’s decision to break the law.2 There is no duress if the accused would have committed the crime anyway, threat or no threat.3 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536; R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [36].
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Subjective test – in R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1982] 1 All ER 801; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235 at 241 (Cr App R), Lord Lane CJ said the subjective test should have been put as follows: Was the defendant, or may he have been, impelled to act as he did because, as a result of what he reasonably believed [the threatener] had said or done, he had good cause to fear that if he did not so act [the threatener] would kill him or (if this is to be added) cause him serious physical injury? In R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR), Hunt J said that the prosecution must establish that there is no reasonable possibility that the accused did the act alleged by reason of the threat made. Battered woman syndrome – it was held in the South Australian case of R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362 that expert evidence of the “battered woman syndrome” should have been admitted in a trial of two women whose wills had been overborne by a man who had a continuing relationship with both of them. On appeal, it was held that the evidence was relevant and admissible on at least the question of whether the wills of the women were in fact overborne. This is on the basis that the violent/dependant relationships the women had with the man were likely to be outside the experience of jurors. The view expressed in Runjanjic was queried in a judgment by Levine J in R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117. Nevertheless, evidence of the battered woman syndrome has been admitted on both the subjective and objective tests.4 1 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 135 per Moffit P; R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR); 438 (A Crim R); R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [36]. 2 R v Brown [1968] SASR 467 (FC) at 498; R v Cole [1994] Crim LR 582. 3 4 R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 at [44].
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[CLP.2580]
Objective test of reasonableness
Objective test – the objective test in duress was referred to by Lord Lane CJ in R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1982] 1 All ER 801; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235 at 241 (Cr App R) in these terms: The law, requires a defendant to have the self-control reasonably to be expected of the ordinary citizen in his situation. Lord Lane in Graham at 240–241 (Cr App R) quoted the following from a Law Commission report on defences of general application: … there should be an objective element in the requirements of the defence so that in the final event it will be for the jury to determine whether the threat was one which the defendant in question could not reasonably have been expected to resist. This will allow the jury to take into account the nature of the offence committed, its relationship to the threats which the defendant believed to exist, the threats themselves and the circumstances in which they were made, and the personal characteristics of the defendant. The last consideration is, we feel, a most important one. Threats directed against the weak, immature or disabled person, may well be much more compelling than the same threats directed against a normal healthy person. In R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122, it was said that the defence of duress will be available provided that the average person of ordinary firmness of mind, of a like age and sex, in like circumstances, would have done the acts.1 The person of ordinary or reasonable firmness of mind is “not a hero necessarily, not a coward, just an average person”.2 Concerning the onus of proof of the objective test, Hunt J said in R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 542 (NSWLR); 435 (A Crim R): The relevant direction in relation to the objective test should therefore be that the Crown must establish that there is no reasonable possiblity that a person of ordinary firmness of mind would have yielded to the threat in the way the accused did. Personal characteristics of the accused – this subject was considered in detail in R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372; [1996] 4 All ER 837; [1996] 2 Cr App R 157. Bowen was convicted of a number of counts of
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obtaining goods by deception. He obtained electrical goods from shops by applying for credit, paying a deposit, taking the goods and never paying the balance. He claimed that he had been told by two men to obtain these goods and that they threatened that he and his family would be petrol bombed if he did not obtain them. He said they also threatened that if he went to the police, his family would be attacked. A psychologist called on his behalf claimed that he had an IQ of only 68, a reading age of a child less than 7 years and was abnormally suggestible. On appeal, Stuart-Smith LJ said the Court could not see how low IQ, short of mental impairment or mental defectiveness, can be said to be a characteristic that makes those who have it less courageous and less able to withstand threats and pressure. Stuart-Smith LJ, after referring to a number of English authorities, concluded that the principles to be derived from these authorities include the following: (1) for the purpose of considering the objective test, the mere fact that an individual accused is more pliable, vulnerable, timid or susceptible to threats than a normal person are not characteristics with which it is legitimate to invest the reasonable/ordinary person; (2) an accused may be in a particular category of people who the jury may think less able to resist pressure than people not within the category. Obvious examples are young age, possibly sex (although many women would consider themselves as having as much moral courage as men), pregnancy (adding fear of harm to an unborn child), serious physical disability inhibiting self protection and a recognised mental illness or condition leading to learned helplessness; (3) in most cases it is only probably the age and sex of that accused that is relevant, and perhaps, physical health or disability; (4) psychiatric evidence may be admissible to show that an accused suffers from a mental illness or recognised psychiatric condition to assist the jury in deciding objectively whether a person such condition may have been impelled to act as the accused did, provided that people generally suffering from such condition may be more susceptible to pressure and threats. Otherwise psychiatric evidence is not admissible simply to show that in the doctor’s opinion the accused is especially timid, suggestible or vulnerable to pressure and threats, or to bolster the credibility of the accused; (5) where counsel for the defence wishes to submit that the accused has some characteristic falling within (2), this must be made plain to the trial judge. The question may arise in relation to the admissibility of evidence as per (3), in which case the judge will have to make a ruling. Where there is no relevant medical evidence, counsel must raise the question with the judge before closing addresses so that the judge can rule whether the alleged characteristic is capable of being relevant. If so, it must be left to the jury. [Note: some of the above numbers do not correspond to the originals.] Concerning (1), Stuart-Smith LJ referred to cases where it was held that as the standard of the objective test is a person of reasonable firmness, evidence of an accused’s personal characteristics such as inherent weakness, vulnerability and susceptibility to threats are inconsistent with that standard and therefore irrelevant for a jury’s consideration.3 It should be noted however, that in New South Wales evidence of the “battered woman syndrome” has been regarded as admissible on the objective test as well as the subjective test.4 The person of ordinary firmness is a sober person and it has been held that the fact that an accused’s will has been eroded by voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs is irrelevant.5 In a case where the accused was a drug addict, it was pointed out that drug addiction is a self-induced condition, not a characteristic.6 Nature of the threat etc – Hunt J said in R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 545 (NSWLR); 439 (A Crim R): … in deciding whether the threat alleged to have been made was of such a nature that the person of ordinary firmness and will would have yielded to it, they should have regard not only to the nature of the threat and its proportion to the crime committed but also to any circumstances known to the accused concerning the person making the threat which may reasonably have affected the ordinary person’s reaction to it ….
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The test is would have yielded, not could have yielded.7 The act done must be a “reasonable and proportionate” response to the threat the accused believed he faced.8 1 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 143 per Moffit P and repeated in R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [36]. 2 R v Horne [1994] Crim LR 584 (CA) at 585. 3 The cases referred to were the decisions of the Court of Appeal in R v Horne [1994] Crim LR 584 and R v Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App R 82. 4 R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 at [44] applying R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53 A Crim R 362. 5 R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1982] 1 All ER 801; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235 (CA); R v Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576; R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372; [1996] 4 All ER 837; [1996] 2 Cr App R 157 at 379 (WLR) (CA). 6 R v Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576 (CA). 7 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 539–543 (NSWLR); 433–436 (A Crim R). 8 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570.
[CLP.2600]
Absence of means of prevention
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Safe means of averting the threat – an ingredient of the defence is the absence of a safe means of prevention of the execution of the threat.1 In R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 (CCA) at 300, Lee J stated: The law requires that a man threatened with death or physical violence if he does not do an act which is criminal, will not meekly and unreasonably yield to the threat when opportunity is reasonably open for him to render it ineffective, and his failure to take advantage of such opportunity precludes him from relying upon the defence of duress. Many cases emphasise this requirement.2 Some speak of “a reasonable opportunity for the will to reassert itself”.3 Whether such an opportunity existed and was reasonably open is a jury question.4 The test is objective and the answer will depend upon whether an average person of ordinary firmness of mind, of a like age and sex, in like circumstances, involving like risks in respect of the alternatives open, would have availed himself of the opportunity in question.5 The jury has to consider the risk the accused ran in ignoring the threat, or in taking some course of action to avoid it.6 Involving the police – concerning going to the police, the High Court quoted the following from the decision of King CJ in R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288: The ordinary way in which a citizen renders ineffective criminal intimidation is to report the intimidators and to seek the protection of the police. That must be assumed, under ordinary circumstances, to be an effective means of neutralising intimidation. If it were not so, society would be at the mercy of criminals who could force pawns to do their criminal work by means of intimidation.7 Where an opportunity was open to an accused to go to the police, it is relevant for the jury to consider what risks there were to him if he did so.8 Evidentiary threshold – the High Court in Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 considered a case of a man convicted in Queensland of the unlawful trafficking of a dangerous drug who raised the statutory defence of coercion under the Queensland Criminal Code. Taiapa claimed that he collected drugs at the direction of two criminals when he failed to pay them all of a drug debt he owed them. He said the men threatened to shoot him or his de facto wife if he refused. Asked in cross-examination at his trial why he did not go to the police, he said that he did not believe that this was “100 per cent safe”. The trial judge withdrew coercion from the jury on the basis that at the time of the offence, the threat was not sufficiently immediate. Taiapa was convicted. Dismissing his appeal, the High Court said: [39] … It was necessary for the applicant to identify some basis in the evidence raising as a reasonable possibility the existence of reasonable grounds for his belief, that he had no alternative other than to collect and transport a quantity of prohibited drugs in order to avoid
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the carrying out of the threats made …. This necessarily requires consideration of the basis for the applicant’s belief that reporting the matter to the police would not have prevented the carrying out of the threats. [40] … an unparticularised concern that police protection may not be a guarantee of safety cannot without more supply reasonable grounds for a belief that there is no option other than to break the law in order to escape the execution of a threat. 1 Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [33] citing R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 at 543. 2 R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 (CA); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 133; R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 538 (NSWLR); 431 (A Crim R); R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 at 40 (SASR); 294 (A Crim R); Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [28]. 3 R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 at 206 (QB); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 135 per Moffit P. 4 R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 (CA); R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 (CCA); R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 133–134. 5 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 142 per Moffit P. 6 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 142 per Moffit P. 7 R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 at 40 (SASR); 294 (A Crim R) quoted in Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53 at [32]. 8 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 142 per Moffit P.
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[CLP.2620]
Absence of fault by accused
Absence of fault – in R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC), Smith J said at 543 that one requirement of the defence of duress is that the accused did not, by fault on his part when free from the duress, expose himself to its application. The cases in this area generally involve an accused who has voluntarily involved himself with criminals. In a dissenting speech in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 at 687 (AC), Lord Simon said of duress at 687 (AC): Would it not enable a gang leader of notorious violence to confer on his organisation by terrorism immunity from the criminal law? Every member of his gang might well be able to say with truth, “It was as much as my life was worth to disobey”.1 Is the test subjective or objective? – there are two lines of authority, the former propounding a subjective test of fault and the latter an objective test. The former line includes the decisions in R v Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20 and R v Baker [1999] 2 Cr App R 335.2 Fitzpatrick concerned a man who became involved with the IRA and “thereby voluntarily exposed himself to illegal compulsion”.3 In Baker, it was held that an accused would only be denied the defence of duress where he voluntarily put himself in a position where he was aware of the risk of being subjected to pressure by threats of violence to commit offences of the type alleged. The Court of Appeal said this was a jury question.4 In R v Ali (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 692; [1995] Crim LR 303, the Court of Appeal appears to have approved a direction that if the defendant had no reason to anticipate threats of violence then he could rely on duress. The latter line of authority includes R v Calderwood [1983] NI 361 and R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709 where a stricter objective requirement is stipulated. In Hasan, Lord Bingham (with whom Lords Steyn, Rodger and Brown agreed) held at [37]–[39] that Baker misstated the law and that “the defence of duress is excluded when as a result of the accused’s voluntary association with others engaged in criminal activity he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence”. 1 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6. Lynch was overruled in R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771. Lord
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Simon’s dissenting view in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 is much closer to the approach taken in R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709, see in particular [22]. 2 Other authorities in this category are R v Sharp [1987] QB 853; [1987] 3 WLR 1; [1987] 3 All ER 103; R v Shepherd (1987) 86 Cr App R 47; [1987] Crim. LR 686. 3 R v Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20 at 33 per Lowry LCJ. 4 R v Shepherd (1987) 86 Cr App R 47; [1987] Crim. LR 686 at 51 (Cr App R) also said that it was a jury question whether the accused had taken the risk of being subjected to threats of violence.
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[CLP.2640] Crimes other than murder Murder and treason – historically, the defence of duress did not apply to murder and treason, or at least very serious types of treason.1 Whether duress is now excluded from treason may be a matter of some doubt.2 The basis of the defence of duress is that a person subject to duress faces a choice of evils.3 Murder is excluded from duress because it is said that this consideration does not apply – murder involves the deliberate taking of another’s innocent life.4 In R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771, Lord Hailsham LC explained: In such a case a reasonable man might reflect that one innocent human life is at least as valuable as his own or that of his loved one. In such a case a man cannot claim that he is choosing the lesser of two evils. Instead he is embracing the cognate but morally disreputable principle that the end justifies the means.5 Writers have criticised this viewpoint as “unconvincing”6 and as “over-simple” and “too facile”.7 Degrees of participation in murder – the House of Lords, by majority in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6, held that duress was open to a principal in the second degree to murder, there an aider and abettor.8 Lynch drove a car containing a number of members of the IRA on an expedition in which the members shot and killed a police officer. Lynch was not an IRA member and he acted unwillingly on the orders of the group’s leader, being convinced that if he disobeyed, he would himself be shot. In New South Wales, Lynch was followed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v McConnell [1977] 1 NSWLR 714 where it was held that duress, while available to a principal in the second degree to murder, is not available to a principal in the first degree, that is, a party who took a part in the actual killing. There are decisions in Victoria and South Australia to the same effect.9 In the earlier R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281, the Court of Criminal Appeal did not question that an accessory after the fact to murder was entitled to rely on duress; a man who had disposed of a body after being threatened that he too would be murdered if he did not do it. The issue in Williamson was whether the threat was sufficiently immediate. In Abbott v The Queen [1977] AC 755; [1976] 3 WLR 462; [1976] 3 All ER 140, the Privy Council considered the question of whether duress was available to a man who had actually participated in a murder. By majority, it was held that the defence of duress is not available to a principal in the first degree who takes part in the actual killing. The House of Lords in R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771, a case involving three men who were together present at two killings, reconsidered Lynch and overruled it.10 Howe held that duress was not available to the person who had actually killed the victim and was also not available to those who had participated in the murder as principals in the second degree. It is to be noted that in Victoria, the common law defence of duress has been abolished and that under the substituted statutory defence, duress is a defence to murder if there is a threat of death or really serious injury.11 Attempted murder – concerning attempted murder, in Howe, Lord Griffiths expressed the obiter view that, as with murder, duress should not apply to attempted murder either. The reason is “because it is to be remembered that the prosecution have to prove an even more evil intent to convict of attempted murder than in actual murder. Attempted murder requires proof of an intent to kill, whereas in murder it is sufficient to prove an intent to cause really serious injury”.12 This dictum was applied by a majority of the
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House of Lords in R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284; [1992] 1 All ER 832 where it was held that when duress is not available to a murderer, there is no justification in logic, morality or law in affording the defence to a charge of attempted murder.13 Lord Jauncey, referring to the view of Lord Griffiths in Howe, added that it is pure chance that attempted murder is not murder and that the fact that the attempt failed to kill should not make any difference.14
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Cases other than murder – apart from murder and treason, the defence of duress applies to all other crimes and has been held to be available in cases of manslaughter15, theft16, buggery17, prejury18, contempt of court19, cultivation of a prohibited drug20, conspiracy21 and escaping from custody22 Duress has been held to be available in contempt proceedings.23 1 Authorities include R v Dudley (1884) 14 QBD 273; Attorney-General v Whelan [1934] IR 518 at 526; R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (FC) at 543; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6 (HL); Abbott v The Queen [1977] AC 755; [1976] 3 WLR 462; [1976] 3 All ER 140; R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 at 36–37 (SASR); 291 (A Crim R). 2 See B Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed (1990) Law Book Co, p 543. 3 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 433 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC. 4 EH East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1803) London, Butterworths, Vol 1 p 225. 5 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 433 (AC). 6 B Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed (1990) Law Book Co, p 545. See also Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 13th ed by Ormerod, (2011) Oxford University Press at pp 360–361. 7 Criminal Law 4th ed by C Howard, (1982) Law Book Company pp 404–405. 8 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; (1975) 61 Cr App R 6. 9 R v Brown [1968] SASR 467; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353; (1979) 1 A Crim R 124; R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 (FC); R v Japaljarri (2002) 134 A Crim R 261; [2002] VSCA 154; R v Smith (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1; 80 A Crim R 491 (CCA SA). 10 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771. 11 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322O – Duress and s 322Q – Abolition of duress at common law. 12 R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 445 (AC). 13 R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284; [1992] 1 All ER 832. 14 R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284; [1992] 1 All ER 832 at 426 (AC). 15 R v Evans (No 1) [1976] VR 517. 16 R v Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841; [1963] 2 All ER 688; (1963) 47 Cr App R 166. 17 R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125. 18 R v Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; [1971] 2 All ER 244 (CA). 19 R v K (1983) 78 Cr App R 82; [1983] Crim. LR 736. 20 Nguyen v The Queen (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; [2008] NSWCCA 22. 21 R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122. 22 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536. 23 R v K (1983) 78 Cr App R 82; [1983] Crim. LR 736 (CA); R v Garde-Wilson (2005) 158 A Crim R 20; [2005] VSC 441 per Harper J.
[CLP.2660]
Sufficiency of evidence, onus of proof and jury directions
Accused’s evidentiary onus – for a trial judge to direct the jury on the defence of duress, the accused bears an evidentiary onus to point to some evidence or material raising the defence as a reasonable possibility, see “Defences” – Exculpations From Criminal Liability [1.1300] and in particular [CLP.2260]. The trial judge determines questions of sufficiency of evidence – whether duress should be left to the jury in a given case is a question for the trial judge.1 It has been said that duress is properly to be regarded as a plea in confession and avoidance.2 It is suggested that it will be difficult for an accused to rely upon duress without admitting participation in the relevant criminal act. There are various cases (not murder related) providing examples of where it was held that the issue of duress should not have gone to the jury3
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If there is a defence of duress to go to the jury, the accused does not have to prove he was acting under duress; the prosecution bears the legal onus of proving that the accused was not so acting. The prosecution must prove that the accused acted voluntarily and, to do so, it must eliminate any reasonable possibility that the accused acted under duress.4
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In R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 538 (NSWLR); 438 (A Crim R) Hunt J, treating duress as an aspect of voluntariness, set out a form of jury directions suitable where duress is raised. Paraphrased, these include: (1) the prosecution must establish that the accused’s acts constituting the offence were done voluntarily. It is argued for the accused that you should not conclude that he acted voluntarily because he acted under duress; (2) the accused does not have to establish that he acted under duress. The prosecution must prove he acted voluntarily and so must eliminate any reasonable possibility that he acted under duress; (3) the prosecution must establish either: (a) that there is no reasonable possibility that the accused acted by reason of a threat of death or serious bodily harm, or (b) if the prosecution cannot eliminate (a) then it must establish in relation to any such threat that there is no reasonable possibility that such was its gravity that a person of ordinary firmness of mind and will, and of the same sex and maturity as the accused, would have yielded to that threat in the way in which the accused did; (4) if the prosecution has not established either 3(a) or (b), (or if you have not concluded from the whole of the evidence that the alleged acts of the accused were done by voluntarily), then you must find him not guilty; (5) the prosecution has to establish one or the other of 3(a) or (b) but not both. If it establishes either 3(a) or (b), (and if you conclude from the whole of the evidence that the alleged acts of the accused were done voluntarily), then you should go on to consider the other ingredients of the offence. The directions should be tailored to the particular facts and an explanation given as to how the directions may be applied to the facts. Direction re caution – it has been held not inappropriate for a trial judge to urge a jury to look at the evidence of alleged duress with care and careful scrutiny.5 1 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 544 (NSWLR); 437 (A Crim R); R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; 60 A Crim R 305 (CCA NSW) at 337 (A Crim R); Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1; [2007] NSWCCA 70. 2 R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288 (FC) at 54 (SASR); 306 (A Crim R) per Zelling J. 3 Examples include R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401; R v Huynh (2008) 180 A Crim R 517; [2008] NSWCCA 16; Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53; Martin v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 579; 202 A Crim R 97; [2010] VSCA 153 and Myers v The Queen [2011] VSCA 271. 4 R v Bone [1968] 1 WLR 983; [1968] 2 All ER 644; (1968) 52 Cr App R 546; R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 133; R v Pimental (1999) 110 A Crim R 30; [1999] NSWCCA 401 at [35]. 5 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 537 (NSWLR); 431 (A Crim R) (where Hunt J pointed out that the Crown is entitled to a fair trial as well as the accused); R v Franco (2006) 168 A Crim R 322; [2006] VSCA 302.
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Duress and sentencing
In Tiknius v The Queen (2011) 221 A Crim R 365; [2011] NSWCCA 215, it was held that when an offender commits a crime while acting under duress which falls short of a complete defence to the charge, that duress is capable of being a mitigating factor on penalty. The onus lies upon the offender to establish the facts which are said to operate to mitigate the penalty. Matters of motivation such as duress can be said to objectively affect the seriousness of an offence.1 A subjective apprehension of danger, not sufficient to
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constitute duress by itself, may be taken into account in mitigation of penalty where a contemnor is guilty of contempt.2 The question of whether the non-performance of promised cooperation for a sentence discount because of threats has been considered.3 1 R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; [2004] NSWCCA 131. 2 Wood v Galea (1997) 92 A Crim R 287 at 291; Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Tran (2006) 166 A Crim R 393; [2006] NSWSC 118 3 at [16]. 3 R v Chaaban (2006) 166 A Crim R 406; [2006] NSWCCA 352.
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Necessity [CLP.2800] Necessity outline In some limited circumstances, the law allows a defence where a person threatened with serious harm has the choice of either suffering the harm or committing an offence to avoid it. Sometimes, the description is the choosing of a lesser evil. This is the common law defence of necessity, a defence carefully limited and not often successfully invoked.1 In R v Perka (1984) 14 CCC (3d) 385 at 398, Dickson J said that the idea behind the defence of necessity was that a liberal and humane criminal law cannot hold people to the strict obedience of laws in emergency situations where normal human instincts, whether of self-preservation or altruism, overwhelmingly impel disobedience.2 Section 10.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides for the similar defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency. Necessity constitutes a complete defence resulting in acquittal. Necessity is related to both the defence of duress and self-defence. Many aspects of the defence of duress will apply similarly to necessity – for detailed commentary on duress, see [1.1700]ff. Necessity differs from duress in that, with duress, the person is threatened with serious harm if he or she does not commit an offence; whereas with necessity, there is a threat from either someone else or something else which the person threatened seeks to avoid by taking action which constitutes an offence. Necessity differs from self-defence in that usually with self-defence, but not with necessity, the person threatened attacks the person making the threat. The law of necessity develops on a case by case basis.3 1 See the discussion in Bayley v Police (2007) 99 SASR 413; 178 A Crim R 202; [2007] SASC 411 and articles by Stanley Yeo in (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal 17 and (1997) 21 Criminal Law Journal 69. 2 Quoted by Gleeson CJ in R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 546. 3 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 per Rose LJ; Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480; [2000] 4 All ER 961 per Brooke LJ.
[CLP.2820]
Requirements of necessity
Requirements of the defence – the leading case of R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 involved an attempted escape from gaol by a prisoner who claimed he feared being killed by other inmates. The Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court said the defence of necessity involves these three elements: (1) the criminal act or acts must have been done only in order to avoid certain consequences which would have inflicted irreparable evil upon the accused or upon others whom he was bound to protect; (2) the accused must honestly believe on reasonable grounds that he was placed in a situation of imminent peril; (3) the acts done to avoid the imminent peril must not be out of proportion to the peril to be avoided. Put in another way, the test is: would a reasonable man in the position of the accused have considered that he had any alternative to doing what he did to avoid the peril? In R v Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App R 137, it was held that an accused will have a defence of necessity if: (1) the commission of the crime was necessary, or reasonably believed to have been necessary, for the purpose of avoiding or preventing death or serious injury to himself or herself, or another;
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(2) that necessity was the sine qua non of the commission of the crime; and (3) the commission of the crime, viewed objectively, was reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the evil to be avoided or prevented.
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Factual considerations – the Loughnan requirements, as stated by Young CJ and King J, were adopted in a modified form by Gleeson CJ (with whom Clarke JA and Ireland J agreed) in R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542. Speaking of the “requirements”, the Chief Justice said at 546: … it is now more appropriate to treat those “requirements”, not as technical legal conditions for the existence of necessity, but as factual considerations relevant, and often critically relevant, to the issues of an accused person’s belief as to the position in which he or she is placed, and as to the reasonableness and proportionality of the response. The expressed need to restrict the defence of necessity – R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 has been applied in many decisions.1 The courts have emphasised the need to place limits on the defence of necessity to avoid it being abused. In R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542, Gleeson CJ observed at 546–547: As with self-defence, considerations of reasonableness and proportionality are essential control mechanisms. … The corollary of the notion that the defence of necessity exists to meet cases where the circumstances overwhelmingly impel disobedience to the law is that the law cannot leave people free to choose for themselves which laws they will obey, or to construct and apply their own set of values inconsistent with those implicit in the law. Nor can the law encourage juries to exercise a power to dispense with compliance with the law where they consider disobedience to be reasonable, on the ground that the conduct of an accused person serves some value higher than that implicit in the law which is disobeyed. This is why, historically, it has been regarded as important to seek to limit the scope of the defence by referring to requirements such as urgency and immediacy. … The relevant concept is of necessity, not expediency, or strong preference. If the prisoner, or the jury, were free to consider and reject possible alternatives on the basis of value judgments different from those made by the law itself, then the rationale of the defence, and the condition of its acceptability as part of a coherent legal system, would be undermined. … The need to restrict the defence of necessity has been stated in other jurisdictions. One such restriction in England, as in New South Wales, is the limitation to cases where the threat is of death or serious bodily harm to the accused or to some other person.2 Without restriction, the defence would “very easily become simply a mask for anarchy”.3 In Canada, it has been said that necessity must be strictly controlled and scrupulously limited and may only be invoked as an excuse to criminal conduct and not as a justification for it.4 Notwithstanding the relaxation of approach to the “requirements” as contained in R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542, this does not appear to have resulted in an increase in the numbers of cases where accused are found not guilty on the ground of necessity. For convenience, the description “requirements” will be retained in the commentary. Cases where necessity has been allowed as a defence – the law allows a defence of necessity in relation to all offences except murder and treason.5 Cases where the defence of necessity has been allowed have included a father, taking a gravely ill son to hospital, exceeding the speed limit6, driving whilst disqualified to prevent a suicide7, reckless driving by a man who feared an attack from two men approaching his car8, a distressed ship’s crew and passengers jettisoning cargo to save their lives9, procuring an unlawful abortion to preserve the life of the mother10, surgical separation of conjoined twins soon to die without surgery, with one to die even with surgery11, informal detention and treatment of a mentally ill man who had become a danger to himself12. In England, the application of necessity in some instances, particularly driving cases, came to be called “duress of circumstances”.13 Cases where necessity has not been allowed on the facts – escape from gaol14, trespass15, dangerous driving where the manner of driving was disproportionate to the threat perceived16, five appeals seeking to invoke necessity in relation to offences involving, possession, cultivation, production and importation of cannabis said to be for the relief of pain for various medical ailments17, sending letters containing threats against
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[CLP.2820]
property, life and limb unless the recipients undertook to engage in anti-nuclear activities18, obtaining false drivers licences and passports to conceal identity from former criminal associates19, stealing to assuage hunger.20
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Necessity is never a defence to murder.21 It has been held in England that necessity is not a defence to an offence of absolute liability.22 1 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1; [2007] NSWCCA 70; Mattar v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 98; B v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 103 at [301] per Simpson J. 2 R v Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 WLR 1238; [1988] 3 All ER 1025 at 298 (QB) per Woolf LJ. 3 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 WLR 467; [1971] 2 All ER 175 at 746 (Ch) per Edmund Davies LJ. See also R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467; [2005] 2 WLR 709. 4 R v Perka (1984) 14 CCC (3d) 385 at [38] and [49] per Dickson J (with whom Ritchie, Chouinard and Lamer JJ agreed). The issue of necessity was revisited by the Supreme Court of Canada in Latimer v The Queen [2001] 1 SCR 3 where it was unanimously held that necessity was not a defence to a charge of murder in relation to the “mercy killing” of the appellant’s severely disabled daughter. There is no suggestion in Latimer of any relaxation of the approach taken in Perka. As to the distinction between a defence by way of excuse for criminal conduct and a defence by way of justification of such conduct, see the article by Stanley Yeo in (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal 17. 5 R v Dudley (1884) 14 QBD 273; R v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607; R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771. 6 R v White (1987) 9 NSWLR 427; 31 A Crim R 194 per Shadbolt DCJ. 7 R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652; (1989) 88 Cr App R 343 (CA). 8 R v Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 WLR 1238; [1988] 3 All ER 1025. 9 Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1341. 10 R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; [1938] 3 All ER 615. 11 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480; [2000] 4 All ER 961. 12 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107; [1998] 3 All ER 289. 13 R v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607. 14 R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443; R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542. 15 Limbo v Little (1989) 45 A Crim R 61 (NT CA). 16 Bayley v Police (2007) 99 SASR 413; 178 A Crim R 202; [2007] SASC 411. 17 R v Quayle [2005] 1 WLR 3642; [2006] 1 All ER 988; [2005] 2 Cr App R 34 (CA). 18 R v Dixon-Jenkins (1985) 14 A Crim R 372 (Vic CCA). 19 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1; [2007] NSWCCA 70. 20 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 WLR 467; [1971] 2 All ER 175. It might have been otherwise if the appellant’s hunger had reached the point where serious illness or death may have ensued. 21 R v Dudley (1884) 14 QBD 273; R v Japaljarri (2002) 134 A Crim R 261; [2002] VSCA 154 (Vic CCA); R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771 at 433 (AC). However, see the remarks of Young CJ and King J in R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 at 449 suggesting that there may be exceptions to this rule. 22 Buckoke v Greater London Council [1971] Ch 655; [1971] 2 WLR 760; [1971] 2 All ER 254 at 668 (Ch) per Lord Denning MR; Cichon v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1994] Crim LR 918.
[CLP.2840]
Requirement (1) Avoidance of irreparable harm
Threatened death or serious injury – in R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, Young CJ and King J observed that the limits of this requirement were ill-defined but clearly included a threat of death. In R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 547, Gleeson CJ said that “if the appellant acted as he did, honestly believing, on reasonable grounds, that escape from prison was necessary in order to avoid threatened death or serious injury, then his conduct would be excused” (emphasis added). In a cautiously worded judgment, the Court of Appeals of California held that the defence of necessity could apply to two women who escaped from
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gaol to avoid threatened forcible participation in lesbian sexual acts or violence after their repeated complaints to the gaol authorities had gone unheeded.1 The harm threatened may be to another whom the accused is entitled to protect, see commentary on duress at [CLP.2540]. 1 People v Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823.
[CLP.2860]
Requirement (2) Honest belief of imminent peril
Honest and reasonable belief – an accused’s response to a threat is assessed on an objective basis. As stated, R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 requires that the accused must honestly believe on reasonable grounds that he was placed in a situation of imminent peril. In the context of duress, the related question of the nature of the test to be applied when determining a defence based on “reasonable belief” was considered in Oblach v The Queen (2005) 65 NSWLR 75; 158 A Crim R 586; [2005] NSWCCA 440. Imminent peril – concerning the “imminence” of a peril, it was observed in R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 at 448 that “if there is an interval of time between the threat and its expected execution it will be very rarely if ever that a defence of necessity will succeed”. In R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 546, Gleeson CJ said that requirements such as urgency and immediacy are regarded as important to limit the scope of the defence. However, it has been judicially observed in England that there are sound reasons for holding that the existence of an emergency in the normal sense of the word is not an essential prerequisite for the application of the doctrine of necessity – the principle is one of necessity, not emergency.1 1 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 WLR 480; [2000] 4 All ER 961 per Brooke LJ.
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[CLP.2880]
Requirement (3) Proportionality – reasonable man test
In R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, Young CJ and King J said the question to be asked is whether “a reasonable man in the position of the accused would have considered that he had any alternative to doing what he did to avoid the peril”. It must be shown that the accused had no reasonable alternative to committing the offence.1 It will be noted that the phrase is “would have considered” and not “could have considered”; the distinction is important.2 The law expects an accused to have an ordinary firmness of mind of an average person – some allowance is made for personal characteristics such as age, gender and physical health, see Duress commentary at [CLP.2580]. The offence committed must be a “reasonable and proportionate” response to the threat the accused believed he faced.3 1 See R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 547. 2 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 539–543 (NSWLR); 433–436 (A Crim R). 3 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570.
[CLP.2900]
Legal and evidentiary onus of proof and jury directions
If there is evidence capable of establishing necessity as a reasonable possibility, the prosecution then bears the onus of disproving necessity1, and see commentary at [CLP.2240]. The accused bears an evidential burden to point to evidence or other material to properly raise the issue of necessity: Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; 214 A Crim R 486; [2009] HCA 53, the Court at [5] and see Defences – Evidentiary onus, threshold required at [1.1480] and authorities there cited. Any evidence adduced or pointed to in support a defence such as necessity must be taken at its most favourable to the accused: R v Khazaal (2012) 246 CLR 601; 217 A Crim R 96; [2012] HCA 26 at [74] per French CJ. The question of whether the evidential burden has been discharged is a question of law for the trial judge: Khazaal at [13] and see commentary at [CLP.2260]. As to jury directions, see Duress commentary at [CLP.2660]. 1 See R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 547.
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[CLP.2900]
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Part 1 – Preliminary and interpretation 1 Name of Act............................................................................................................................... 169 2 Repeals and savings [Repealed]............................................................................................... 169 3 Application of certain provisions of Act......................................................................................169 3A Territorial application of the criminal law of the State [Repealed]............................................. 169 3B Misuse of public property by public officials outside the State [Repealed]............................... 170 4 Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 170 4A Recklessness............................................................................................................................. 178 4B Dishonesty................................................................................................................................. 182 5 Maliciously [Repealed]............................................................................................................... 183 6 Month [Repealed].......................................................................................................................187 7 “Possession” when criminal....................................................................................................... 187 8 “Public place” etc....................................................................................................................... 194 9 What offences felonies [Repealed]............................................................................................ 195 10 What offences misdemeanours [Repealed]...............................................................................197 Part 1A – Geographical jurisdiction 10A Application and effect of Part.....................................................................................................199 10B Interpretation.............................................................................................................................. 199 10C Extension of offences if there is a geographical nexus.............................................................199 10D Provisions relating to double criminality.................................................................................... 200 10E Procedural and other provisions................................................................................................ 200 10F Special provisions with respect to geographical jurisdiction..................................................... 201 Part 2 – Offences against the Sovereign 11 Provisions of 36 Geo III, c 7, and 57 Geo III, c 6, repealed except as to offences against the person of the Sovereign............................................................................................................ 202 12 Compassing etc deposition of the Sovereign—overawing Parliament etc................................202 16 Nothing herein to affect 25 Ed III, c 2....................................................................................... 203 16A Procedure in cases of treason [Repealed]................................................................................ 204 Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 1 – Homicide 17 Petit treason [Repealed]............................................................................................................ 205 17A Date of death............................................................................................................................. 205 18 Murder and manslaughter defined.............................................................................................205 19 Murder—punishment [Repealed]............................................................................................... 207 19A Punishment for murder.............................................................................................................. 207 19B Mandatory life sentences for murder of police officers............................................................. 236 20 Child murder—when child deemed born alive...........................................................................237 21 Child murder by mother—verdict of contributing to death etc...................................................237 22 Trial for child murder—verdict of concealment of birth............................................................. 238 22A Infanticide................................................................................................................................... 238 23 Trial for murder—partial defence of extreme provocation......................................................... 239 23A Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind.........................................................................253 24 Manslaughter—punishment....................................................................................................... 256 25 Trial where the death or cause of death occurs out of New South Wales [Repealed].............267 25A Assault causing death................................................................................................................267
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25B
Assault causing death when intoxicated—mandatory minimum sentence............................... 272
Division 2 – Conspiracy to murder 26 Conspiring to commit murder.....................................................................................................272 Division 3 – Attempts to murder 27 Acts done to the person with intent to murder.......................................................................... 274 28 Acts done to property with intent to murder.............................................................................. 278 29 Certain other attempts to murder...............................................................................................280 30 Attempts to murder by other means.......................................................................................... 282 Division 4 – Documents containing threats 31 Documents containing threats................................................................................................... 284
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Division 5 – Suicide 31A Suicide and attempt to commit suicide......................................................................................286 31B Survivor of suicide pact............................................................................................................. 286 31C Aiding etc suicide....................................................................................................................... 286 Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm 32 Impeding endeavours to escape shipwreck.............................................................................. 287 33 Wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent.......................................................................... 289 33A Discharging firearm etc with intent............................................................................................ 293 33B Use or possession of weapon to resist arrest etc..................................................................... 295 34 Feloniously wounding—verdict of minor offence [Repealed].................................................... 298 35 Reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding............................................................................. 299 35A Causing dog to inflict grievous bodily harm or actual bodily harm........................................... 302 36 Causing a grievous bodily disease [Repealed]......................................................................... 305 37 Choking, suffocation and strangulation......................................................................................305 38 Using intoxicating substance to commit an indictable offence..................................................309 38A Spiking drink or food.................................................................................................................. 311 39 Using poison etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm............................................. 314 40 On trial for poisoning—verdict of minor offence [Repealed]..................................................... 318 41 Using poison etc to injure or to cause distress or pain.............................................................318 41A Poisoning etc of water supply....................................................................................................319 42 Injuries to child at time of birth.................................................................................................. 321 43 Abandoning or exposing a child under 7 years.........................................................................322 43A Failure of persons with parental responsibility to care for child................................................ 324 44 Failure of persons to provide necessities of life........................................................................ 326 45 Prohibition of female genital mutilation......................................................................................330 45A Removing person from State for female genital mutilation....................................................... 336 46 Causing bodily injury by gunpowder etc....................................................................................337 47 Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc................................................................ 339 48 Causing explosives to be placed in or near building, conveyance or public place.................. 342 49 Setting trap etc...........................................................................................................................344 49A Throwing rocks and other objects at vehicles and vessels.......................................................345 51A Predatory driving........................................................................................................................ 346 51B Police pursuits............................................................................................................................349 52 Endangering passengers on railway [Repealed]....................................................................... 349 52A Dangerous driving: substantive matters.................................................................................... 349 52AA Dangerous driving: procedural matters......................................................................................363 52AB Offence of failing to stop and assist after vehicle impact causing death or grievous bodily harm........................................................................................................................................... 366 52B Dangerous navigation: substantive matters...............................................................................371 52BA Dangerous navigation: procedural matters................................................................................373 53 Injuries by furious driving etc..................................................................................................... 374
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54
Causing grievous bodily harm................................................................................................... 376
Division 7 – Possessing or making explosive etc with intent to injure the person 55 Possessing or making explosives or other things with intent to injure..................................... 379
Division 8A 60AA 60 60A 60B 60C
– Assaults and other actions against police and other law enforcement officers Meaning of “law enforcement officer”........................................................................................ 391 Assault and other actions against police officers...................................................................... 392 Assault and other actions against law enforcement officers (other than police officers).......... 400 Actions against third parties connected with law enforcement officers.....................................401 Obtaining of personal information about law enforcement officers........................................... 401
Division 8B – Assaults etc at schools 60D Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 402 60E Assaults etc at schools.............................................................................................................. 402 Division 9 – Common assaults 61 Common assault prosecuted by indictment...............................................................................403
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Division 9A – Defence of lawful correction 61AA Defence of lawful correction...................................................................................................... 414 Division 10 – Offences in the nature of rape, offences relating to other acts of sexual assault etc 61H Definition of “sexual intercourse” and other terms.................................................................... 455 61HA Consent in relation to sexual assault offences..........................................................................458 61I Sexual assault............................................................................................................................469 61J Aggravated sexual assault.........................................................................................................472 61JA Aggravated sexual assault in company..................................................................................... 476 61K Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse.......................................................................... 478 61L Indecent assault......................................................................................................................... 480 61M Aggravated indecent assault..................................................................................................... 486 61N Act of indecency........................................................................................................................ 488 61O Aggravated act of indecency..................................................................................................... 491 61P Attempt to commit offence under sections 61I–61O................................................................. 494 61Q Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................495 61R Consent [Repealed]................................................................................................................... 496 61S Offenders who are minors......................................................................................................... 496 61T Offender married to victim......................................................................................................... 496 61U Circumstances of certain sexual offences to be considered in passing sentence................... 497 62 Carnal knowledge—proof [Repealed]........................................................................................ 497 63 Common law offences of rape and attempted rape abolished................................................. 497 65 Attempt, etc to commit rape. [Repealed]................................................................................... 497 65A Sexual intercourse procured by intimidation, coercion and other non-violent threats [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 497 66 Procuring etc carnal knowledge by fraud [Repealed]................................................................497 66A Sexual intercourse—child under 10...........................................................................................497 66B Attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with child under 10............. 501 66C Sexual intercourse—child between 10 and 16.......................................................................... 502
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Division 8 – Assaults 56 Obstructing member of the clergy in discharge of his or her duties......................................... 381 57 Assault on persons preserving wreck........................................................................................382 58 Assault with intent to commit a serious indictable offence on certain officers..........................383 59 Assault occasioning actual bodily harm.....................................................................................388 59A Assault during public disorder....................................................................................................390
Crimes Act 1900
66D 66E 66EA 66EB 66F 73 77 77A 78 78A 78B 78C 78D 78F 79 80 80A 80AA
Attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with child between 10 and 16............................................................................................................................................... 506 Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................508 Persistent sexual abuse of a child.............................................................................................509 Procuring or grooming child under 16 for unlawful sexual activity............................................510 Sexual offences—cognitive impairment.....................................................................................512 Sexual intercourse with child between 16 and 18 under special care......................................514 Consent no defence in certain cases........................................................................................ 515 Proceedings in camera in certain cases [Repealed]................................................................. 516 Limitation [Repealed]................................................................................................................. 516 Incest..........................................................................................................................................516 Incest attempts...........................................................................................................................519 Defences.................................................................................................................................... 519 Removal from guardianship etc [Repealed].............................................................................. 519 Sanction of Attorney-General.....................................................................................................519 Bestiality..................................................................................................................................... 520 Attempt to commit bestiality.......................................................................................................521 Sexual assault by forced self-manipulation............................................................................... 521 Referral to child protection agency............................................................................................ 522
Division 10A 80B 80C 80D 80E 80F
– Sexual servitude Meaning of “sexual servitude”....................................................................................................522 Meaning of “circumstances of aggravation”...............................................................................523 Causing sexual servitude...........................................................................................................523 Conduct of business involving sexual servitude........................................................................523 Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................523
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Division 10B – Incitement to commit sexual offence 80G Incitement to commit sexual offence......................................................................................... 524 Division 11 – Misconduct with regard to corpses 81C Misconduct with regard to corpses............................................................................................ 524 Division 12 – Attempts to procure abortion 82 Administering drugs etc to herself by woman with child........................................................... 527 83 Administering drugs etc to woman with intent...........................................................................528 84 Procuring drugs etc....................................................................................................................530 Division 13 – Concealing birth of a child 85 Concealment of birth..................................................................................................................532 Division 14 – Kidnapping 86 Kidnapping................................................................................................................................. 533 87 Child abduction.......................................................................................................................... 539 Division 14A – Procuring for prostitution 91A Procuring etc.............................................................................................................................. 539 91B Procuring person by drugs etc...................................................................................................540 Division 15 – Child prostitution 91C Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 541 91D Promoting or engaging in acts of child prostitution................................................................... 541 91E Obtaining benefit from child prostitution.................................................................................... 542 91F Premises not to be used for child prostitution........................................................................... 542 Division 15A 91FA 91FB 91G
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– Child abuse material Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 543 Child abuse material—meaning.................................................................................................543 Children not to be used for production of child abuse material................................................ 544
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
91H 91HA
Production, dissemination or possession of child abuse material.............................................545 Defences.................................................................................................................................... 545
Division 15B 91I 91J 91K 91L 91M
– Voyeurism and related offences Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 546 Voyeurism.................................................................................................................................. 546 Filming a person engaged in private act................................................................................... 547 Filming a person’s private parts.................................................................................................548 Installing device to facilitate observation or filming................................................................... 549
Division 16 – Bigamy 92 Bigamy....................................................................................................................................... 549 93 Participator in bigamy................................................................................................................ 549 Part 3A – Offences relating to public order Division 1 – Riot and affray 93A Definition.................................................................................................................................... 551 93B Riot............................................................................................................................................. 551 93C Affray.......................................................................................................................................... 555 93D Mental element under sections 93B and 93C........................................................................... 559 93E Offences of riot, rout, affray abolished [Repealed].................................................................... 559
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Division 2 – Explosives and firearms offences 93F Interpretation.............................................................................................................................. 559 93FA Possession, supply or making of explosives............................................................................. 560 93FB Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms.............................................................. 560 93G Causing danger with firearm or spear gun................................................................................ 561 93GA Firing at dwelling-houses or buildings....................................................................................... 563 93H Trespassing with or dangerous use of firearm or spear gun.................................................... 563 93I Possession of unregistered firearm in public place...................................................................564 Division 3 – Contamination of goods 93J Definitions of “contaminate” and “goods”...................................................................................564 93K Contaminating goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss............................... 565 93L Threatening to contaminate goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss.......... 565 93M Making false statements concerning contamination of goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss..............................................................................................................565 93N Aggravated circumstances—unwarranted demand................................................................... 566 93O Aggravated circumstances—death or grievous bodily harm..................................................... 566 93P Special provisions relating to geographical application of this Division.................................... 566 Division 4 – Bomb and other hoaxes 93Q Conveying false information that a person or property is in danger......................................... 567 93R Leaving or sending an article with intent to cause alarm..........................................................567 Division 5 – Criminal groups 93S Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 568 93T Participation in criminal groups..................................................................................................568 93TA Receiving material benefit derived from criminal activities of criminal groups..........................569 93U Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................570 Division 6 – Unlawful gambling 93V Offence of conducting unlawful gambling operation..................................................................570 Division 7 – Consorting 93W Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 571 93X Consorting.................................................................................................................................. 571 93Y Defence...................................................................................................................................... 575
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Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 1 – General 94AA Property previously stolen..........................................................................................................577 Division 2 – Robbery 94 Robbery or stealing from the person......................................................................................... 577 95 Same in circumstances of aggravation......................................................................................586 96 Same (robbery) with wounding.................................................................................................. 590 97 Robbery etc or stopping a mail, being armed or in company................................................... 592 98 Robbery with arms etc and wounding....................................................................................... 598 Division 3 – Demanding property with intent to steal 99 Demanding property with intent to steal.................................................................................... 602
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Division 4 – Sacrilege and housebreaking 105A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 604 106 Breaking and entering place of Divine worship and committing serious indictable offence [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 605 107 The like with intent to commit a serious indictable offence [Repealed].................................... 606 108 Burglary [Repealed]................................................................................................................... 607 109 Breaking out of dwelling-house after committing, or entering with intent to commit, indictable offence........................................................................................................................................607 110 Breaking, entering and assaulting with intent to murder etc..................................................... 609 111 Entering dwelling-house............................................................................................................. 611 112 Breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence............................ 613 113 Breaking etc into any house etc with intent to commit serious indictable offence................... 619 114 Being armed with intent to commit indictable offence...............................................................621 115 Being convicted offender armed with intent to commit indictable offence................................ 623 115A Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................624 Division 5 – Larceny 116 All larcenies to be of same nature.............................................................................................624 117 Punishment for larceny.............................................................................................................. 625 118 Intent to return property no defence.......................................................................................... 646 119 Verdict where several takings proved........................................................................................647 120 Trial for larceny—verdict of embezzlement etc......................................................................... 647 121 Verdict of “larceny or receiving”................................................................................................. 648 122 Verdict where persons indicted for joint larceny or receiving....................................................649 123 Verdict of minor indictable offence.............................................................................................650 124 Fraudulent appropriation............................................................................................................ 650 125 Larceny by bailee.......................................................................................................................651 126 Stealing cattle or killing with intent to steal............................................................................... 653 127 Stealing or killing cattle—uncertainty as to sex or age not to entitle to acquittal..................... 655 128 Trial for stealing cattle—verdict of stealing skins...................................................................... 655 129 Trial for killing cattle—verdict of stealing................................................................................... 656 130 Trial for stealing cattle—verdict of misdemeanour.................................................................... 656 131 Unlawfully using etc another person’s cattle............................................................................. 657 132 Stealing dogs............................................................................................................................. 659 133 Taking money to restore dogs................................................................................................... 660 134 Stealing, destroying etc valuable security................................................................................. 661 135 Stealing, destroying etc wills or codicils.................................................................................... 662 136 Proviso to sections 134 and 135............................................................................................... 663 137 Civil remedies not affected by conviction.................................................................................. 664 138 Stealing, destroying etc records etc of any court or public office............................................. 664 139 Stealing etc metal, glass, wood etc fixed to house or land.......................................................665
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140 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 154A 154AA 154B 154C 154D
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Division 5A 154E 154F 154G 154H 154I 154J
Stealing etc trees etc in pleasure-grounds etc.......................................................................... 666 Stealing property in a dwelling-house........................................................................................667 The same with menaces............................................................................................................668 Stealing goods in process of manufacture................................................................................ 668 Selling etc materials to be manufactured.................................................................................. 669 Stealing from ship in port or on wharfs etc............................................................................... 669 Stealing from ship in distress or wrecked..................................................................................670 Tenants etc stealing articles let to hire...................................................................................... 670 Taking a conveyance without consent of owner........................................................................671 Car stealing etc [Repealed]....................................................................................................... 672 Stealing aircraft and unlawfully taking or exercising control of aircraft..................................... 672 Taking motor vehicle or vessel with assault or with occupant on board...................................673 Stealing firearms........................................................................................................................ 673 – Offences relating to theft of motor vehicles and vessels Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 675 Stealing motor vehicle or vessel................................................................................................675 Facilitating organised car or boat rebirthing activities............................................................... 676 Making, using and interfering with unique identifiers................................................................ 677 Possession of motor vehicle or vessel where unique identifier has been interfered with........ 677 Possession of vehicle identification plate not attached to motor vehicle.................................. 678
Division 6 – Embezzlement or larceny 155 Definition of clerk or servant...................................................................................................... 678 156 Larceny by clerks or servants....................................................................................................680 157 Embezzlement by clerks or servants.........................................................................................681 158 Destruction, falsification of accounts etc by clerk or servant [Repealed]..................................683 159 Larceny by persons in Public Service....................................................................................... 685 160 Embezzlement etc by persons in the Public Service................................................................ 686 161 Proof of general deficiency in accounts.....................................................................................687 162 Larceny etc by joint owners....................................................................................................... 688 163 Trial for embezzlement—verdict of larceny............................................................................... 689 Subdivision 7 – Frauds by factors and other agents [Repealed] 164 Terms “agents”, “intrusted” and “misappropriate” [Repealed]....................................................690 165 Agent misappropriating money etc intrusted to him or her [Repealed].....................................690 166 The like as to goods etc intrusted to him or her [Repealed].....................................................691 167 Not to affect trustees or mortgagees nor to restrain agents from receiving money on valuable securities etc [Repealed]............................................................................................. 692 168 Fraudulent sale of property by agent [Repealed]...................................................................... 692 169 The same by person under power of attorney [Repealed]........................................................693 170 Agent obtaining advances on property of his or her principal [Repealed]................................ 693 171 What to be deemed intrusting with goods etc [Repealed]........................................................ 694 172 Trustees fraudulently disposing of property [Repealed]............................................................ 695 173 Directors etc fraudulently appropriating etc property [Repealed].............................................. 696 174 Directors etc omitting certain entries [Repealed].......................................................................698 175 Director etc wilfully destroying etc books of company etc [Repealed]......................................699 176 Director or officer publishing fraudulent statements [Repealed]............................................... 699 176A Directors etc cheating or defrauding [Repealed]....................................................................... 701 177 Proviso to sections 165 to 176 inclusive [Repealed].................................................................703 178 No relief from compulsory disclosures [Repealed].................................................................... 703 Subdivision 8 – Fraudulent misappropriation [Repealed] 178A Fraudulent misappropriation of moneys collected or received [Repealed]............................... 704
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Subdivision 9 – Valueless cheques [Repealed] 178B Valueless cheques [Repealed]...................................................................................................708 Subdivision 10 – Obtaining money etc by deception [Repealed] 178BA Obtaining money etc by deception [Repealed]..........................................................................709 Subdivision 11 – Obtaining money etc by false or misleading statements [Repealed] 178BB Obtaining money etc by false or misleading statements [Repealed]........................................ 715 Subdivision 12 – Obtaining credit by fraud [Repealed] 178C Obtaining credit by fraud [Repealed]......................................................................................... 719 Subdivision 13 – False pretences [Repealed] 179 False pretences etc [Repealed]................................................................................................. 722 180 Causing payment etc by false pretence etc [Repealed]............................................................730 181 False pretence of title [Repealed]..............................................................................................731 182 Accused may be convicted on a charge of false pretences etc though property obtained partly by a false promise [Repealed]......................................................................................... 731 183 Trial for false pretences etc—verdict of larceny [Repealed]..................................................... 732 184 Fraudulent personation [Repealed]............................................................................................732 184A Personating owner of stock or property [Repealed].................................................................. 733 185 Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments [Repealed]................................................. 733 Subdivision 14 – Fraudulent arrangements [Repealed] 185A Inducing persons to enter into certain arrangements by misleading etc statements etc [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 734
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Subdivision 15 – Corrupt rewards [Repealed] 186 Taking reward for helping to recover stolen property [Repealed]............................................. 736 Division 16 – Receivers 187 Term “stealing” in sections 188 and 189................................................................................... 737 188 Receiving stolen property where stealing a serious indictable offence.................................... 738 189 Receiving etc where principal guilty of minor indictable offence...............................................744 189A Receiving etc goods stolen out of New South Wales............................................................... 745 189B Prosecution under section 188 or 189 where property stolen in course of transmission.........745 190 Receiving etc cattle unlawfully killed, or carcass etc................................................................ 746 191 Uncertainty as to sex or age not to entitle to acquittal..............................................................747 192 Receiving material or tools intrusted for manufacture...............................................................747 192A Verdict where several persons are indicted for jointly receiving............................................... 748 Part 4AA – Fraud Division 1 – Preliminary 192B Deception................................................................................................................................... 749 192C Obtaining property belonging to another................................................................................... 749 192D Obtaining financial advantage or causing financial disadvantage.............................................750 Division 2 – Fraud and related offences 192E Fraud.......................................................................................................................................... 750 192F Intention to defraud by destroying or concealing accounting records.......................................757 192G Intention to defraud by false or misleading statement.............................................................. 760 192H Intention to deceive members or creditors by false or misleading statement of officer of organisation................................................................................................................................764 Part 4AB – Identity offences 192I Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 765 192J Dealing with identification information....................................................................................... 765 192K Possession of identification information.....................................................................................765 192L Possession of equipment etc to make identification documents or things............................... 765 192M Miscellaneous provisions........................................................................................................... 766
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Part 4AC – Money laundering 193A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 767 193B Money laundering...................................................................................................................... 767 193C Dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime................................................... 768 193D Dealing with property that subsequently becomes an instrument of crime.............................. 769 193E Alternative verdicts.....................................................................................................................769 193F Proof of other offences not required..........................................................................................770 193FA Combining several contraventions in a single charge...............................................................770 193G Transitional provision................................................................................................................. 770
Division 1 – Preliminary 193H Corrupting betting outcome of event......................................................................................... 771 193I Betting........................................................................................................................................ 771 193J Events and event contingencies................................................................................................ 771 193K Obtaining financial advantage or causing financial disadvantage.............................................771 193L Proof of intention to obtain financial advantage or cause financial disadvantage.................... 772 193M Encourage.................................................................................................................................. 772 Division 2 – Offences 193N Engage in conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event.......................................................772 193O Facilitate conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event.........................................................772 193P Concealing conduct or agreement about conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event...... 773 193Q Use of corrupt conduct information or inside information for betting purposes........................ 773 Part 4AD – Criminal destruction and damage
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Division 1 – Interpretation 194 Interpretation.............................................................................................................................. 775 Division 2 – Crimes against property generally 195 Destroying or damaging property.............................................................................................. 776 196 Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person............................................... 783 197 Dishonestly destroying or damaging property........................................................................... 786 198 Destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life.........................................790 199 Threatening to destroy or damage property.............................................................................. 792 200 Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property.......... 795 Division 3 – Crimes relating to particular kinds of property 201 Interfering with a mine............................................................................................................... 799 202 Causing damage etc to sea, river, canal and other works........................................................800 203 False statement that a person or property is in danger [Repealed]......................................... 800 Division 4 – Sabotage 203A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 800 203B Sabotage.................................................................................................................................... 801 203C Threaten sabotage..................................................................................................................... 801 Division 5 – Bushfires 203D Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 802 203E Offence.......................................................................................................................................802 Part 4AE – Offences relating to transport services Division 1 – Offences relating to aircraft, vessels etc 204 Destruction of, or damage to, an aircraft or vessel with intent or reckless indifference........... 803 205 Prejudicing the safe operation of an aircraft or vessel..............................................................803 206 Assault etc on member of crew of aircraft or vessel.................................................................803 207 Placing etc dangerous articles on board an aircraft or vessel.................................................. 804
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208 209 210
Threatening to destroy etc an aircraft, vessel or vehicle.......................................................... 804 False information as to plan etc to prejudice the safety of an aircraft or vessel or persons on board an aircraft or vessel......................................................................................................... 806 Destroying, damaging etc an aid to navigation......................................................................... 806
Division 2 – Offences relating to railways etc 211 Criminal acts relating to railways............................................................................................... 806 212 Endangering passengers etc on railway....................................................................................807 213 Obstructing a railway................................................................................................................. 807 214 Obstructing a railway—verdict of misdemeanour...................................................................... 808 Part 4A – Corruptly receiving commissions and other corrupt practices 249A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 809 249B Corrupt commissions or rewards............................................................................................... 809 249C Misleading documents or statements used or made by agents................................................811 249D Corrupt inducements for advice................................................................................................. 811 249E Corrupt benefits for trustees and others....................................................................................812 249F Aiding, abetting etc.................................................................................................................... 812 249G Repayment of value of gift etc...................................................................................................813 249H Disqualification for office............................................................................................................ 813 249I Dismissal of trivial case............................................................................................................. 813 249J Custom not a defence............................................................................................................... 813
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Part 4B – Blackmail 249K Blackmail offence....................................................................................................................... 814 249L Unwarranted demands—meaning............................................................................................. 814 249M Menaces—meaning................................................................................................................... 814 249N Obtaining gain or causing loss—meaning................................................................................. 815 249O Public duty—meaning................................................................................................................ 815 Part 5 – Forgery Division 1 – Preliminary 250 False document—meaning........................................................................................................ 816 251 Inducing acceptance of false document.................................................................................... 820 252 Interpretative provisions relating to obtaining property, financial advantage and financial disadvantage.............................................................................................................................. 820 Division 2 – Forgery 253 Forgery—making false document.............................................................................................. 820 Division 3 – Offences related to forgery 254 Using false document................................................................................................................ 821 255 Possession of false document................................................................................................... 821 256 Making or possession of equipment etc for making false documents...................................... 822 Part 5A – False and misleading information 307A False or misleading applications................................................................................................824 307B False or misleading information.................................................................................................824 307C False or misleading documents................................................................................................. 825 Part 6 – Computer offences 308 General definitions..................................................................................................................... 826 308A Meaning of access to data, modification of data and impairment of electronic communication 826 ................................................................................................................................................... 308B Meaning of unauthorised access, modification or impairment.................................................. 827 308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit serious indictable offence........................................................................................................................................827 308D Unauthorised modification of data with intent to cause impairment..........................................827 308E Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication.............................................................828
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Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence........................................ 828 Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit serious computer offence......... 828 Unauthorised access to or modification of restricted data held in computer (summary offence)...................................................................................................................................... 829 Unauthorised impairment of data held in computer disk, credit card or other device (summary offence)..................................................................................................................... 829
Part 6A – Offences relating to escape from lawful custody 310A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 831 310B Rescuing inmate from lawful custody........................................................................................ 831 310C Aiding escape............................................................................................................................ 831 310D Escaping.................................................................................................................................... 832 310E Tunnels to facilitate escape....................................................................................................... 837 310F Permitting escape...................................................................................................................... 837 310G Harbouring escapee...................................................................................................................838 310H Application of Part......................................................................................................................838 Part 6B – Terrorism 310I Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 839 310J Membership of terrorist organisation......................................................................................... 839 310K Multiplicity of offences................................................................................................................839 310L Repeal of Part............................................................................................................................ 839 Part 7 – Public justice offences
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Division 1 – Definitions 311 Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 840 312 Meaning of “pervert the course of justice”.................................................................................841 313 Knowledge that offence is a serious indictable offence is unnecessary................................... 841 Division 2 – Interference with the administration of justice 314 False accusations etc................................................................................................................ 841 315 Hindering investigation etc.........................................................................................................841 315A Threatening or intimidating victims or witnesses.......................................................................842 316 Concealing serious indictable offence....................................................................................... 842 317 Tampering etc with evidence..................................................................................................... 847 318 Making or using false official instrument to pervert the course of justice................................. 849 319 General offence of perverting the course of justice.................................................................. 850 Division 3 – Interference with judicial officers, witnesses, jurors etc 320 Extended meaning of “giving evidence”.................................................................................... 856 321 Corruption of witnesses and jurors............................................................................................ 856 322 Threatening or intimidating judges, witnesses, jurors etc......................................................... 856 323 Influencing witnesses and jurors................................................................................................857 324 Increased penalty if serious indictable offence involved........................................................... 858 325 Preventing, obstructing or dissuading witness or juror from attending etc............................... 858 326 Reprisals against judges, witnesses, jurors etc.........................................................................859 Division 4 – Perjury, false statements etc 327 Offence of perjury...................................................................................................................... 859 328 Perjury with intent to procure conviction or acquittal.................................................................863 329 Conviction for false swearing on indictment for perjury............................................................ 864 330 False statement on oath not amounting to perjury....................................................................864 331 Contradictory statements on oath..............................................................................................864 332 Certain technical defects provided for....................................................................................... 864 333 Subornation of perjury............................................................................................................... 865 334 General provisions applicable to perjury and false statement offences....................................865
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308F 308G 308H
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335 336 337 338 339
False statements in evidence on commission...........................................................................865 False entry on public register.................................................................................................... 866 False instruments issued by public officers............................................................................... 866 Restrictions on prosecutions for perjury.................................................................................... 866 Application of Division to perjury under other Acts....................................................................867
Division 5 – Miscellaneous 340 Extent of abolition of offences................................................................................................... 867 341 Certain common law offences abolished...................................................................................867 342 Certain conspiracy offences not affected.................................................................................. 868 343 Certain common law offences not abolished.............................................................................868 343A Saving of other punishments..................................................................................................... 868 Part 8 – Unlawful gambling [Repealed] Part 8A – Attempts 344A Attempts..................................................................................................................................... 869 Part 9 – Abettors and accessories 345 Principals in the second degree—how tried and punished....................................................... 877 346 Accessories before the fact—how tried and punished.............................................................. 885 347 Accessories after the fact—how tried and punished................................................................. 888 347A Wife may be accessory after fact to husband’s felony..............................................................890 348 Punishment of accessories after the fact to certain treason-related offences.......................... 890 349 Punishment of accessories after the fact to murder etc............................................................890 350 Punishment of accessories after the fact to other serious indictable offences......................... 891 351 Trial and punishment of abettors of minor indictable offences..................................................891 351A Recruiting persons to engage in criminal activity...................................................................... 894 351B Aiders and abettors punishable as principals............................................................................894 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Part 10 – Arrest of offenders [Repealed] Part 10A – Detention after arrest for purposes of investigation [Repealed] Part 10B – Harbouring escapees [Repealed] Division 5 – Offence relating to escaped prisoners [Repealed] 358C Harbouring escapee from another State or Territory [Repealed].............................................. 896 Part 11 – Criminal responsibility—defences Division 2 – Lawful authority or excuse 417 Proof of lawful authority or excuse............................................................................................ 897 417A Proof of exceptions.................................................................................................................... 898 Division 3 – Self-defence 418 Self-defence—when available....................................................................................................898 419 Self-defence—onus of proof...................................................................................................... 899 420 Self-defence—not available if death inflicted to protect property or trespass to property........ 899 421 Self-defence—excessive force that inflicts death...................................................................... 899 422 Self-defence—response to lawful conduct................................................................................ 900 423 Offences to which Division applies............................................................................................ 900 423A Joint trial in case of perjury etc [Repealed]............................................................................... 910 424 Witnesses in mitigation [Repealed]............................................................................................910 424A Admission by suspects [Repealed]............................................................................................910 425 Conviction for misdemeanour where facts amount to felony [Repealed]..................................910 426 After trial for felony, where alternative verdict possible no further prosecution [Repealed]...... 911 427 On trial for any serious indictable offence or minor indictable offence – verdict of attempt [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 911 428 Practice as to entering the dock [Repealed]............................................................................. 912
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Part 11A – Intoxication 428A Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 913 428B Offences of specific intent to which Part applies.......................................................................913 428C Intoxication in relation to offences of specific intent..................................................................916 428D Intoxication in relation to other offences....................................................................................916 428E Intoxication in relation to murder, manslaughter and assault causing death............................ 916 428F Intoxication in relation to the reasonable person test................................................................917 428G Intoxication and the actus reus of an offence........................................................................... 917 428H Abolition of common law relating to self-induced intoxication...................................................917 428I Application of Part......................................................................................................................917
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Part 11B – Defence of mental illness [Repealed] Part 12 – Sentences 431 Convicted persons not to be liable to death penalty................................................................. 925 431A Life sentences............................................................................................................................ 925 431B Mandatory life sentences for certain offences [Repealed]........................................................ 926 432 Misdemeanours [Repealed]....................................................................................................... 926 436 Sentences to irons [Repealed]...................................................................................................927 438 Restitution of property stolen in certain cases [Repealed]........................................................927 439 Guilty plea to be taken into account [Repealed]....................................................................... 928 440 Statutory offences [Repealed]....................................................................................................928 441 Judgment after sentence deferred [Repealed].......................................................................... 929 441A Time from which sentences shall take effect [Repealed].......................................................... 929 442 Provision for passing sentences of less duration than those fixed [Repealed]........................ 930 442A Circumstances ................................................................................................................................................... of certain sexual offences to be considered in passing sentence [Repealed] 930 442B Reduction of sentences for assistance to authorities [Repealed]............................................. 930 443 Additional sentences on second or third convictions [Repealed]..............................................930 444 Cumulative or concurrent sentences [Repealed].......................................................................931 445 Proof of previous conviction [Repealed].................................................................................... 932 447A Punishment on escape [Repealed]............................................................................................932 447B Outstanding charge may be taken into account in passing sentence [Repealed]....................933 Part 13 – Proceedings after sentence [Repealed] 457 Direction for compensation to be enforceable by execution etc [Repealed].............................934 458 Sentences by Courts-martial under Imperial Acts [Repealed]...................................................934 464 Remissions where more than one sentence [Repealed]...........................................................935 465 Forfeiture in felonies abolished [Repealed]............................................................................... 935 468 Effect of reversing judgment in such cases [Repealed]............................................................ 935 Part 13A – Review of convictions and sentences [Repealed] Part 13B – Offences punishable by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction 475A Offences punishable summarily.................................................................................................937 475B Election for summary trial.......................................................................................................... 938 Part 14 – Former provisions relating to offences punishable by Justices and procedure before Justices generally [Repealed] Part 14A – Miscellaneous offences Division 1 – Larceny and similar summary offences 502 Possession of skin etc of stolen cattle...................................................................................... 940 503 Stealing dogs............................................................................................................................. 941 504 Possessing stolen dog or skin................................................................................................... 942 505 Stealing animals etc ordinarily kept in confinement.................................................................. 942 506 Stealing animals etc ordinarily kept in confinement—second offence...................................... 943 507 Possession of stolen animals etc.............................................................................................. 943
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508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 521A 522 523 524 525 526 527 527A 527B 527C 528
Possession of stolen animals etc—second offence.................................................................. 943 Restoration of such stolen animals etc......................................................................................943 Setting engine for deer etc........................................................................................................ 943 Killing pigeons [Repealed]......................................................................................................... 944 Taking fish in waters on private property...................................................................................945 Stealing shrubs etc.................................................................................................................... 946 The like—second offence [Repealed]........................................................................................946 Stealing etc live or dead fence etc............................................................................................ 946 The like—second offence [Repealed]........................................................................................947 Unlawful possession of trees, fences etc.................................................................................. 947 Stealing dead wood................................................................................................................... 947 The like—second offence [Repealed]........................................................................................948 Stealing plants etc in gardens................................................................................................... 948 Stealing plants etc not growing in gardens............................................................................... 948 Stealing of rock, stone etc......................................................................................................... 949 Possession of shipwrecked goods.............................................................................................949 Offering shipwrecked goods for sale......................................................................................... 949 Seizure of such goods............................................................................................................... 950 Stealing or damaging books and other things in public library and other places..................... 950 Term “Public Library”..................................................................................................................950 Fraudulently appropriating or retaining property [Repealed]..................................................... 951 Obtaining money etc by wilfully false representation [Repealed]..............................................951 Framing a false invoice [Repealed]........................................................................................... 952 Persons unlawfully in possession of property........................................................................... 953 Advertising reward for return of stolen property [Repealed]..................................................... 959
Division 2 – Other offences 529 Criminal defamation................................................................................................................... 959 530 Serious animal cruelty............................................................................................................... 963 531 Killing or seriously injuring animals used for law enforcement................................................. 964 545A Bogus advertisements [Repealed]............................................................................................. 964 545AB Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm [Repealed]........ 965 545B Intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise................................................................. 965 545C Knowingly joining or continuing in etc an unlawful assembly................................................... 968 545D Unlawful making or possession of explosives [Repealed]........................................................ 970 546 Abetting or procuring................................................................................................................. 973 546A Consorting with convicted persons [Repealed]......................................................................... 974 546B Convicted persons found with intent to commit offence............................................................975 546C Resisting etc police.................................................................................................................... 976 546D Impersonation of police officers................................................................................................. 979 547 Apprehended violence or injury—recognizance to keep the peace etc [Repealed]................. 980 547AA Apprehended domestic violence orders [Repealed]..................................................................980 547A False statement respecting births, deaths or marriages [Repealed].........................................980 547B Public mischief........................................................................................................................... 981 547C Peeping or prying.......................................................................................................................982 547D Person apprehended carrying razor etc.................................................................................... 983 Division 3 – General 548 Alternative methods of proceeding before Justices [Repealed]................................................ 983 548A Power to commit [Repealed]......................................................................................................984 549 Offenders may be summoned under existing Acts [Repealed]................................................. 984 550 Where not necessary to allege particular ownership [Repealed]..............................................984 551 General averment of intent to defraud or injure [Repealed]......................................................984
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Jurisdiction of Magistrates in respect of offences arising under Division 2 of Part 4 [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 984 Sentence may be for less term or fine of less amount than that fixed [Repealed].................. 984 Hard or light labour [Repealed]..................................................................................................985 Application of forfeitures and penalties [Repealed]................................................................... 985 Summary conviction a bar to further proceedings.....................................................................985
Part 15 – Conditional release of offenders [Repealed] 556A Power to permit release of offenders [Repealed]......................................................................987 556B Proceedings on breach of condition of recognizance [Repealed].............................................987 557 Interpretation [Repealed]........................................................................................................... 987 558 Deferring sentence [Repealed].................................................................................................. 987
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Part 15A – Apprehended violence [Repealed] Part 16 – Miscellaneous enactments 565 Power of Courts to bring prisoners before them [Repealed].....................................................988 565A Bail Act 1978 to prevail [Repealed]........................................................................................... 988 566 Witnesses neglecting to attend trial captured under warrant may be admitted to bail [Repealed].................................................................................................................................. 988 567 Supreme Court Rules may prescribe forms of indictments etc [Repealed].............................. 988 573 Provision for wife where husband convicted of aggravated assault [Repealed].......................989 574 Prosecutions for blasphemy.......................................................................................................989 574A Information etc for obscene or blasphemous libel [Repealed].................................................. 989 574B Prevention of suicide................................................................................................................. 989 575 Misappropriation of corn etc by servants [Repealed]................................................................ 990 576 Indecent exposure of the person [Repealed]............................................................................ 990 577 Change of venue [Repealed]..................................................................................................... 990 577A Disclosure of address or telephone number of witness [Repealed]..........................................990 578 Publication of evidence may be forbidden in certain cases [Repealed]................................... 990 578A Prohibition of publication identifying victims of certain sexual offences....................................991 578B Possession of child pornography [Repealed]............................................................................ 992 578C Publishing indecent articles....................................................................................................... 992 578D Police may enter and search premises for indecent articles [Repealed]..................................994 578E Offences relating to advertising or displaying products associated with sexual behaviour...... 994 579 Evidence of proceedings dealt with by way of recognizance after 15 years............................ 994 580 Certain charges not to be brought at common law................................................................... 996 580A Abolition of offence of being a common nightwalker.................................................................996 580B Abolition of offences of eavesdropping and being a common scold.........................................996 580C Abolition of common law offences relating to brothels..............................................................996 580D Abolition of rule that husband and wife cannot be guilty of conspiracy....................................996 580E Abolition of distinction between felony and misdemeanour...................................................... 997 580F Abolition of penal servitude........................................................................................................997 580G Abolition of imprisonment with light or hard labour................................................................... 997 580H Abolition of common law offences and rules.............................................................................997 581 Savings and transitional provisions........................................................................................... 997 582 Regulations................................................................................................................................ 998
FIRST SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] SCHEDULE 2 – APPLICATION OF ACT SCHEDULE 3 – ABOLISHED COMMON LAW OFFENCES AND RULES 1 2 3
Arson........................................................................................................................................ 1001 Forgery..................................................................................................................................... 1001 Riot, rout and affray................................................................................................................. 1001
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4 5 6 7
Coercion of wife by husband................................................................................................... 1001 Maintenance (including champerty)......................................................................................... 1001 Common barrator..................................................................................................................... 1001 Person who fails to disclose crime committed by the person’s husband or wife or de facto partner...................................................................................................................................... 1002
FOURTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] FIFTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] SIXTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] SEVENTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] EIGHTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] NINTH SCHEDULE – [REPEALED] SCHEDULE 10 1
Offences punishable by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction................................ 1003
SCHEDULE 11 – SAVINGS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS Part 1A – Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 1A 1B 1C
Application of section 30 of Interpretation Act 1987................................................................1004 Construction of certain references...........................................................................................1004 Statement for purposes of section 30A of Interpretation Act 1987......................................... 1004
Part 1 – Crimes (Amendment) Act 1989 1 2
References in legislation..........................................................................................................1005 Omitted provisions................................................................................................................... 1005
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Part 2 – Criminal Legislation (Amendment) Act 1992 3 4 5 6 7
Sexual intercourse................................................................................................................... 1005 Consent to sexual intercourse................................................................................................. 1005 Application of amendment to section 409............................................................................... 1005 Operation of amendments relating to taking of vehicles without consent and other indictable offences....................................................................................................................................1006 Reduction of sentences for assistance to authorities..............................................................1006
Part 3 – Crimes (Registration of Interstate Restraint Orders) Amendment Act 1993 8
Interstate restraint orders.........................................................................................................1006
Part 4 – Crimes Legislation (Review of Convictions) Amendment Act 1993 9 10 11 12 12A
Definition.................................................................................................................................. 1006 Matters arising under section 475........................................................................................... 1006 Matters arising under section 26 of Criminal Appeal Act 1912............................................... 1007 Application of Part 13A to past convictions............................................................................. 1007 Application of further amendments made by Crimes Amendment (Review of Convictions and Sentences) Act 1996........................................................................................................ 1007
Part 5 – Crimes Legislation (Unsworn Evidence) Amendment Act 1994 13
Application of abolition of accused person’s right to give unsworn evidence or to make unsworn statement...................................................................................................................1007
Part 6 – Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1994 14
Section 476 (indictable offences punishable summarily with consent of accused)................ 1007
Part 7 – Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 1995 15 16 17 18 19
140
Forensic samples..................................................................................................................... 1008 Apprehended violence orders—s 562G...................................................................................1008 Summons for appearance or arrest of defendant—s 562K.................................................... 1008 Registration of interstate restraint orders—s 562U................................................................. 1008 Abolition of offences of eavesdropping and being a common scold—s 580B........................1008
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of provisions
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Definitions................................................................................................................................ 1008 Order must be made on conviction for certain offences......................................................... 1008 Order must be made on charge for certain offences.............................................................. 1008 Consent orders........................................................................................................................ 1009 Specification of restricted premises or place in order............................................................. 1009 Application for variation or revocation of order........................................................................1009 Time limit for making of complaint for order by District Court.................................................1009 Proceedings for an order by District Court.............................................................................. 1009 Telephone interim orders......................................................................................................... 1009 Measures to protect children in AVO proceedings.................................................................. 1010
Part 9 – Crimes Amendment (Children’s Evidence) Act 1996 [Repealed] Part 9A – Traffic Legislation Amendment Act 1997 29A
Regulations of a savings nature.............................................................................................. 1010
Part 10 – Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 1997 30 31 32 33
Offenders who are minors....................................................................................................... 1010 Increase in time limit for prosecutions for offences relating to unlawful access to data in computer..................................................................................................................................1010 Ordersundersection353A(4)..................................................................................................101 Pleaofautrefoisconvictorautrefoisacquit.............................................................................101
Part 11 – Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 1997 34
Operation of amendments in relation to use or employment of a child for pornographic purposes...................................................................................................................................101
Part 12 – Crimes Amendment (Detention after Arrest) Act 1997 35
ApplicationofAct......................................................................................................................101
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Part 13 – Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997 36 37
Replacementofdefenceofdiminishedresponsibility—applicationofnewdefence...............101 Application of requirement to give notice of defence.............................................................. 1012
Part 14 – Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 1998 38 39 40
Power of registrar to extend interim apprehended violence orders........................................ 1012 Abolition of common law rule that husband and wife cannot be found guilty of conspiracy...1012 Other amendments.................................................................................................................. 1012
Part 15 – Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Amendment (Camera Devices) Act 1999 41
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1012
Part 16 – Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence) Act 1999 42 43 44 45 46
Definitions................................................................................................................................ 1013 Existing orders......................................................................................................................... 1013 Existing complaints and applications....................................................................................... 1013 References to interstate restraint orders................................................................................. 1014 Regulations.............................................................................................................................. 1014
Part 17 – Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2000 47
Application of amendments relating to geographical jurisdiction............................................ 1014
Part 18 – Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2002 48
Regulations.............................................................................................................................. 1014
Part 19 – Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2003 49 50 51 52 53 54
Defence under section 77(2)................................................................................................... 1015 Defence under section 91D(2).................................................................................................1015 Trial for rape—verdict of carnal knowledge............................................................................. 1015 Trial for carnal knowledge—girl in fact over 10....................................................................... 1015 Trial for carnal knowledge—verdict of assault with intent....................................................... 1015 Rape or attempt—verdict of incest or attempt.........................................................................1015
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Part 8 – Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence Orders) Act 1996
Crimes Act 1900
55
Limitations................................................................................................................................ 1016
Part 20 – Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2004 56 57
Dangerous driving and dangerous navigation......................................................................... 1016 Sexual assault by forced self-manipulation............................................................................. 1016
Part 21 – Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 2004 58
Classification of films, publications or computer games..........................................................1016
Part 22 – Crimes Legislation Amendment (Gangs) Act 2006 59
Limitation period for consorting................................................................................................1017
Part 23 – Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence) Act 2006 60 61 62 63 64
Definitions................................................................................................................................ 1017 Regulations.............................................................................................................................. 1017 Existing apprehended violence orders.....................................................................................1017 Pending applications................................................................................................................ 1018 References to repealed offences.............................................................................................1018
Part 24 – Crimes Amendment Act 2007 65
Repeal of definition of “Maliciously”.........................................................................................1018
Part 25 – Crimes Amendment (Consent—Sexual Assault Offences) Act 2007 66 67
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1018 Review of amendments........................................................................................................... 1018
Part 26 – Crimes Amendment (Cognitive Impairment—Sexual Offences) Act 2008 68
Amendments............................................................................................................................ 1019
Part 27 – Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2008 69
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1019
Part 28 – Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2009 70
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1019
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Part 29 – Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Act 2012 71
Report by Ombudsman on consorting offence........................................................................1019
Part 30 – Crimes Amendment (Reckless Infliction of Harm) Act 2012 72
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1020
Part 31 – Crimes Amendment (Cheating at Gambling) Act 2012 73
Review of amendments........................................................................................................... 1020
Part 32 – Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2012 74
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1020
Part 33 – Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 75
Review of operation of amendments made by amending Act.................................................1021
Part 34 – Crimes Legislation Amendment (Child Sex Offences) Act 2015 76
142
Application of amendments..................................................................................................... 1021
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Table of Amending Legislation Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Crimes (Girls’ Protection) Act 1910 (am by Crimes (Girls’ Protection) Amendment Act 1911) Crimes (Girls’ Protection) Amendment Act 1911 Crimes Appeal Act 1912 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1918 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1924 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1926 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1929 Crimes (Further Amendment) Act 1929 Crimes (Intimidation and Molestation) Act 1929 Crimes (Fraudulent Misappropriation) Act 1929 Police Regulation (Amendment) Act 1935 Motor Traffıc (Amendment) Act 1937 Statute Law Revision Act 1937 Child Welfare Act 1939
2 of 1910
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 25 Jul 1910 25 Jul 1910
21 of 1911
21 Dec 1911
21 Dec 1911
16 of 1912 35 of 1918 10 of 1924 4 of 1926 2 of 1929 26 of 1929 31 of 1929
16 Apr 1912 3 Dec 1918 1 Oct 1924 17 Mar 1926 12 Mar 1929 29 Oct 1929 26 Nov 1929
16 Apr 1912 3 Dec 1918 1 Oct 1924 17 Mar 1926 12 Mar 1929 29 Oct 1929 26 Nov 1929
39 of 1929
11 Dec 1929
11 Dec 1929
13 of 1935
13 Mar 1935
13 Mar 1935
29 of 1937 35 of 1937 17 of 1939
22 Dec 1937 23 Dec 1937 23 Oct 1939
22 Dec 1937 23 Dec 1937 1 Dec 1939 (Gaz 185, 24 Nov 1939, p 5541)
Justices (Amendment) Act 1940 Government Railways (Amendment) Act 1944 Firearms Act 1946 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1950
6 of 1940 36 of 1944
6 May 1940 8 Dec 1944
43 of 1946 36 of 1950
19 Sep 1946 16 Nov 1950
Crimes (Amendment) Act 1951 Motor Traffıc (Amendment) Act 1951 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1954 Justices (Amendment) Act 1954 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1955
31 of 1951 59 of 1951 3 of 1954 32 of 1954 16 of 1955
6 Nov 1951 28 Dec 1951 14 Apr 1954 23 Nov 1954 14 Apr 1955
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1 Mar 1951 (Gaz 40, 9 Mar 1951, p 680)
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Supreme Court Procedure Act 1957 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1961 Maintenance Act 1964
13 of 1957 70 of 1961 74 of 1964
Date of gazettal/ assent/registration 8 Apr 1957 15 Dec 1961 21 Dec 1964
Decimal Currency Act 1965 Poisons Act 1966
33 of 1965 31 of 1966
20 Dec 1965 13 Apr 1966
Parole of Prisoners Act 1966
41 of 1966
11 Oct 1966
Crimes (Amendment) Act 1966 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 Police Offences, Vagrancy and Crimes (Amendment) Act 1967 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1967 Vagrancy, Disorderly Houses and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1968 Pistol Licence (Amendment) Act 1970
48 of 1966 14 of 1967
9 Dec 1966 23 Mar 1967
19 of 1967
23 Mar 1967
77 of 1967 32 of 1968
14 Dec 1967 22 Oct 1968
50 of 1970
14 Oct 1970
Supreme Court Act 1970 (am by 52 of 1970 Supreme Court (Amendment) Act 1972)
14 Oct 1970
Summary Offences Act 1970 Justices (Further Amendment) Act 1971
96 of 1970 70 of 1971
9 Dec 1970 21 Dec 1971
Reprints Act 1972 District Court Act 1973
48 of 1972 9 of 1973
9 Oct 1972 10 Apr 1973
144
Date of commencement 1 Jul 1957 1 Jul 1966 (Gaz 60, 17 Jun 1966, p 2388) 14 Feb 1966 1 Nov 1967 (Gaz 107, 6 Oct 1967, p 3597) 31 Jan 1967 (Gaz 10, 3 Feb 1967, p 301 and Gaz 16, 17 Feb 1967, p 515) 1 Jan 1968
1 May 1971 (Gaz 47, 30 Apr 1971, p 1363) 1 Jul 1972 (Gaz 59, 2 Jun 1972, p 2018) 6 Mar 1972 (Gaz 21, 25 Feb 1972, p 624) 1 Jul 1973 (Gaz 75, 8 Jun 1973, p 2158)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Firearms and Dangerous Weapons Act 1973
38 of 1973
Defamation Act 1974
18 of 1974
Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974
50 of 1974
Notice of Action and Other Privileges Abolition Act 1977
19 of 1977
Crimes (Banking Transactions) 25 of 1978 Amendment Act 1978 Crimes (Bail) Amendment Act 1978 166 of 1978 (am by Crimes (Amendment) Act 1979)
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 8 May 1973 1 Aug 1975 (Gaz 100, 25 Jul 1975, p 2901) 10 Apr 1974 1 Jul 1974 (Gaz 79, 28 Jun 1974, p 2381) 6 May 1974 2 Aug 1974 (Gaz 92, 2 Aug 1974, p 2957) 24 Mar 1977 19 Aug 1977 (Gaz 92, 19 Aug 1977, p 3541) 16 Mar 1978 29 Dec 1978
Crimes (Summary Offences) Amendment Act 1979
72 of 1979
11 May 1979
Crimes (Amendment) Act 1979
95 of 1979
17 May 1979
101 of 1979 Crimes (Compensation) Amendment Act 1979 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1984) Crimes (Amendment) Act 1980 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1984)
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53 of 1980
17 May 1979
28 Apr 1980
Sch 1: 17 Mar 1980 (Gaz 45, 14 Mar 1980, p 1143) Schs 1–5: 1 Aug 1979 (Gaz 96, 20 Jul 1979, p 3512) Schs 1 and 2: 12 Nov 1979 (Gaz 148, 2 Nov 1979, p 5451) Sch 1: 28 May 1979 (Gaz 71, 25 May 1979, p 2471) Schs 1 and 2: 19 May 1980 (Gaz 73, 16 May 1980, p 2423)
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981
42 of 1981
Crimes (Securities Industry) Amendment Act 1981
65 of 1981
Miscellaneous Acts (Companies) Amendment Act 1981
123 of 1981
Crimes (Homicide) Amendment Act 1982
24 of 1982
Crimes (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 1982
116 of 1982
Crimes (Road Safety) Amendment Act 1982 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1983
124 of 1982
Crimes (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 1983
116 of 1983
10 of 1983
Crimes (Further Amendment) Act 1983 131 of 1983
Crimes (Procedure) Amendment Act 1983
146
170 of 1983
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 15 May 1981 Sch 1: 14 Jul 1981 (Gaz 91, 26 Jun 1981, p 3392) 28 May 1981 Sch 1: 1 Jul 1981 (Gaz 89, 25 Jun 1981, p 3344) 30 Dec 1981 Sch 8: 1 Jul 1982 (Gaz 90, 30 Jun 1982, p 2959) 23 Apr 1982 14 May 1982 (Gaz 61, 7 May 1982, p 1987) 7 Dec 1982 Schs 1–3: 18 Apr 1983 (Gaz 60, 15 Apr 1983, p 1701) 8 Dec 1982 Sch 1: 17 Dec 1982 18 Apr 1983 Schs 1–5: 16 May 1983 (Gaz 71, 13 May 1983, p 2101) 14 Dec 1983 Sch 1: 16 Dec 1983 (Gaz 172, 16 Dec 1983, p 5656) 21 Dec 1983 Sch 1: 23 Dec 1983 (Gaz 176, 23 Dec 1983, p 5943) 31 Dec 1983 Sch 1: 18 Jun 1984 (Gaz 90, 8 Jun 1984, p 2950)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983
180 of 1983
Crimes (Endangered Fauna) Amendment Act 1983 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1984
184 of 1983
Crimes (Registration of Instruments) Amendment Act 1984
22 of 1984
Crimes (Compensation) Amendment Act 1984
70 of 1984
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1984 Crimes (Amendment) Act 1985 Crimes (Powers of Arrest) Amendment Act 1985 Miscellaneous Acts (Search Warrants) Amendment Act 1985
153 of 1984
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Dec 1983 Sch 1(1)(a), (2) and (5): 13 Aug 1984 (Gaz 121, 3 Aug 1984, p 3991); Sch 1(1)(b), (c), (3) and (4): 22 Aug 1986 (Gaz 134, 22 Aug 1986, p 4056) 31 Dec 1983 Sch 1: 31 Dec 1983 31 May 1984 Sch 1: 8 Jun 1984 (Gaz 90, 8 Jun 1994, p 2950) 6 Jun 1984 Sch 1: 1 Mar 1985 (Gaz 178, 21 Dec 1984, p 6298) 27 Jun 1984 Sch 1: 30 Jul 1984 (Gaz 116, 27 Jul 1984, p 3828) 10 Dec 1984
9 of 1985 27 of 1985
29 Mar 1985 22 Apr 1985
38 of 1985
26 Apr 1985
7 of 1984
Crimes (Death Penalty Abolition) 58 of 1985 Amendment Act 1985 Crimes (Child Assault) Amendment Act 149 of 1985 1985
Crimes (Summary Procedure) Amendment Act 1985
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208 of 1985
Sch 1: 28 Feb 1986 (Gaz 29, 14 Feb 1986, p 654)
15 May 1985 28 Nov 1985
10 Dec 1985
Schs 1 and 2: 23 Mar 1986 (Gaz 44, 14 Mar 1986, p 1160) S 3: 10 Dec 1985
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1985 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1986 Crimes (Release on Licence Board) Amendment Act 1986 Crimes (Remissions) Amendment Act 1986
231 of 1985
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 18 Dec 1985
16 of 1986
1 May 1986
36 of 1986
6 May 1986
44 of 1986
9 May 1986
Crimes (Mental Illness) Amendment Act 1986
93 of 1986
29 May 1986
National Parks and Wildlife (Marine Mammals Protection) Amendment Act 1986 Crimes (Photographic Evidence) Amendment Act 1986
133 of 1986
4 Dec 1986
162 of 1986
17 Dec 1986
Crimes (Remissions) Further Amendment Act 1986
189 of 1986
18 Dec 1986
212 of 1986 Miscellaneous Acts (Public Prosecutions) Amendment Act 1986 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1987) Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 218 of 1986 Act (No 2) 1986 Interpretation Act 1987 15 of 1987
23 Dec 1986
Crimes (Radar Detected Offences) Amendment Act 1987
15 May 1987
148
32 of 1987
S 3: 25 May 1986 (Gaz 85, 23 May 1986, p 2289) Sch 1: 22 Aug 1986 (Gaz 134, 22 Aug 1986, p 4056) S 4: 2 Feb 1987 (Gaz 20, 30 Jan 1987, p 428) S 3: 1 Nov 1987 (Gaz 167, 30 Oct 1987, p 6031) Sch 1: 1 Jul 1987 (Gaz 109, 26 Jun 1987, p 3179) Sch 1: 13 Jul 1987 (Gaz 117, 10 Jul 1987, p 3860)
23 Dec 1986 13 Apr 1987
Sch 2: 1 Sep 1987 (Gaz 136, 28 Aug 1987, p 4809) S 3: 1 Sep 1987 (Gaz 136, 28 Aug 1987, p 4808)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Crimes (Road Safety) Amendment Act 1987
287 of 1987
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 21 May 1987 Sch 1(1): 1 Dec 1987 (Gaz 179, 20 Nov 1987, p 6457); Sch 1(2): 1 Jul 1987 (Gaz 109, 26 Jun 1987, p 3179) 28 May 1987 Sch 32: 1 Sep 1987 (Gaz 136, 28 Aug 1987, p 4809) 29 May 1987 Sch 3: 18 Jan 1988 (Gaz 2, 8 Jan 1988, p 10) 16 Jun 1987 Sch 1: 5 Jul 1987 (Gaz 115, 3 Jul 1987, p 3757) 4 Dec 1987 21 Feb 1988 (Gaz 33, 19 Feb 1988, p 930) 16 Dec 1987 Sch 1: 15 Feb 1988 (Gaz 28, 12 Feb 1988, p 832) 16 Dec 1987 Sch 1(1), (2) and (4): 18 Jan 1988 (Gaz 8, 15 Jan 1988, p 172); Sch 1(3): 16 Dec 1987 16 Dec 1987 13 Jan 1988
289 of 1987
16 Dec 1987
13 Jan 1988
294 of 1987
16 Dec 1987
1 Feb 1988 (Gaz 18, 29 Jan 1988, p 457)
45 of 1987
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 48 of 1987 Act (No 1) 1987
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Miscellaneous Acts (Community Welfare) Repeal and Amendment Act 1987 Crimes (Secret Commissions) Amendment Act 1987
58 of 1987
116 of 1987
Crimes (Personal and Family Violence) 184 of 1987 Amendment Act 1987 238 of 1987 Miscellaneous Acts (Victims Compensation) Repeal and Amendment Act 1987 273 of 1987 Miscellaneous Acts (Children’s Court and Criminal Proceedings) Amendment Act 1987
Crimes (Criminal Destruction and Damage) Amendment Act 1987 Crimes (Procedure) Amendment Act 1987 Crimes (Railway Safety) Amendment Act 1987
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 20 of 1988 Act 1988 Evidence (Evidence on Commission) 64 of 1988 Amendment Act 1988
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Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988
81 of 1988
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 28 Jun 1988 Sch 2: 28 Jun 1988 21 Nov 1988
6 Dec 1988
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 92 of 1988 Act (No 2) 1988 Transport Legislation (Repeal and 114 of 1988 Amendment) Act 1988
19 Dec 1988
Crimes (Child Prostitution) Amendment 115 of 1988 Act 1988
21 Dec 1988
21 Dec 1988
Crimes (Firearms) Amendment Act 1989 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1990) Criminal Procedure (Sentencing) Amendment Act 1989
27 of 1989
21 Apr 1989
40 of 1989
11 May 1989
Crimes (Apprehended Violence) Amendment Act 1989
62 of 1989
23 May 1989
Crimes (Computers and Forgery) Amendment Act 1989
71 of 1989
29 May 1989
Sentencing Act 1989
87 of 1989
2 Jun 1989
Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1989
100 of 1989
15 Aug 1989
150
1 Nov 1989 (Gaz 105, 27 Oct 1989, p 8841) 19 Feb 1989 (Gaz 23, 17 Feb 1989, p 1058) Sch 26: 19 Dec 1988 Sch 4: 16 Jan 1989 (Gaz 3, 16 Jan 1989, p 277) 12 Feb 1989 (Gaz 21, 10 Feb 1989, p 912) 1 Jul 1990 (Gaz 68, 25 May 1990, p 4065) 13 Aug 1989 (Gaz 87, 4 Aug 1989, p 4978) Sch 1: 18 Feb 1990 (Gaz 24, 16 Feb 1990, p 1261) 16 Jul 1989 (Gaz 82, 7 Jul 1989, p 4045) 25 Sep 1989 (Gaz 89, 18 Aug 1989, p 5662) 17 Sep 1989 (Gaz 93, 8 Sep 1989, p 6584)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Crimes (Amendment) Act 1989 (am by 198 of 1989 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1990) Crimes (Life Sentences) Amendment 218 of 1989 Act 1989 Prisons (Serious Offenders Review Board) Amendment Act 1989
219 of 1989
Crimes Legislation (Amendment) Act 1990
5 of 1990
Miscellaneous Acts (Mental Health) Repeal and Amendment Act 1990
11 of 1990
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 46 of 1990 Act 1990 Crimes (Child Victim Evidence) 49 of 1990 Amendment Act 1990
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 21 Dec 1989 17 Mar 1991 (Gaz 37, 1 Mar 1991, p 1692) 21 Dec 1989 Sch 1: 12 Jan 1990 (Gaz 7, 12 Jan 1990, p 171) 21 Dec 1989 S 5: 12 Jan 1990 (Gaz 7, 12 Jan 1990, p 169) 22 May 1990 1 Feb 1992 (Gaz 12, 24 Jan 1992, p 391) 1 Jun 1990 3 Sep 1990 (Gaz 82, 29 Jun 1990, p 5400) 22 Jun 1990 Sch 2: 22 Jun 1990 28 Jun 1990
Crimes (Public Justice) Amendment Act 1990
51 of 1990
18 Sep 1990
Traffıc (Photographic Evidence) Amendment Act 1990
53 of 1990
21 Sep 1990
Criminal Procedure Legislation (Amendment) Act 1990
74 of 1990
4 Dec 1990
Traffıc (Amendment) Act 1990
96 of 1990
7 Dec 1990
Crimes (Injuries) Amendment Act 1990 101 of 1990
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13 Dec 1990
12 Nov 1990 (Gaz 133, 26 Oct 1990, p 9423) 25 Nov 1990 (Gaz 141, 9 Nov 1990, p 9816) 1 Jan 1991 (Gaz 174, 21 Dec 1990, p 11207) 17 Mar 1991 (Gaz 37, 1 Mar 1991, p 1693) 1 Jan 1991 (Gaz 174, 21 Dec 1990, p 11208) 17 Mar 1991 (Gaz 37, 1 Mar 1991, p 1692)
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
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Crimes (Police Evidence) Amendment 102 of 1990 Act 1990 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 108 of 1990 Act (No 2) 1990
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 13 Dec 1990 1 Jan 1991 13 Dec 1990
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 17 of 1991 Act 1991
3 May 1991
Criminal Procedure (Police Custody of 44 of 1991 Property) Amendment Act 1991
27 Nov 1991
Electricity and Other Legislation (Amendment) Act 1991
63 of 1991
17 Dec 1991
Marine (Boating Safety—Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1991
80 of 1991
17 Dec 1991
Search Warrants (Amendment) Act 1991
92 of 1991
17 Dec 1991
Criminal Legislation (Amendment) Act 1992
2 of 1992
17 Mar 1992
Firearms Legislation (Amendment) Act 1992
13 of 1992
4 Apr 1992
Crimes (Identity of Offenders) Amendment Act 1992
19 of 1992
14 May 1992
Statute Law (Miscelllaneous Provisions) Act 1992
34 of 1992
18 May 1992
152
Sch 1(1) and (3): 17 Mar 1991 (Gaz 37, 1 Mar 1991, pp 1692 and 1695); Sch 1(2): 12 Nov 1990 Sch 1: 27 May 1991 (Gaz 79, 17 May 1991, p 3724) 13 Dec 1991 (Gaz 174, 13 Dec 1991, p 10304) Sch 2: 1 Mar 1992 (Gaz 26, 21 Feb 1992, p 1037) 20 Dec 1991 (Gaz 180, 20 Dec 1991, p 10555) 20 Sep 1992 (Gaz 116, 18 Sep 1992, p 6837) 3 May 1992 (Gaz 55, 1 May 1992, p 2985) 1 May 1992 (Gaz 55, 1 May 1992, p 2986) 12 Jul 1992 (Gaz 87, 10 Jul 1992, p 4747) Sch 1: 18 May 1992
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Crimes (Dogs) Amendment Act 1993
23 of 1993
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 Statute Law (Penalties) Act 1993 Crimes (Common Nightwalkers) Amendment Act 1993 Crimes Legislation (Review of Convictions) Amendment Act 1993
46 of 1993
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 27 Nov 1992 29 Jan 1993 (Gaz 7, 22 Jan 1993, p 155) 8 Dec 1992 8 Dec 1992 14 Apr 1993 1 Aug 1993 (Gaz 84, 30 Jul 1993, p 4257) 8 Jun 1993 1 Sep 1993 (Gaz 94, 27 Aug 1993, p 4861) 15 Jun 1993 Sch 1: 15 Jun 1993
47 of 1993 52 of 1993
15 Jun 1993 24 Sep 1993
15 Jun 1993 24 Sep 1993
64 of 1993
9 Nov 1993
Coroners (Amendment) Act 1993
79 of 1993
24 Nov 1993
Crimes (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 1993
101 of 1993
2 Dec 1993
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 108 of 1993 Act (No 2) 1993 Crimes Legislation (Dangerous 17 of 1994 Articles) Amendment Act 1994 Crimes Legislation (Unsworn 26 of 1994 Evidence) Amendment Act 1994
2 Dec 1993
14 Nov 1993 (Gaz 124, 12 Nov 1993, p 6715) S 5: 1 Feb 1994 (Gaz 24, 21 Jan 1994, p 225) 19 Dec 1993 (Gaz 138, 17 Dec 1993, p 7275) Sch 1: 2 Dec 1993
16 May 1994
16 May 1994
30 May 1994
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 32 of 1994 Act 1994
2 Jun 1994
10 Jun 1994 (Gaz 78, 10 Jun 1994, p 2756) Sch 1(1): 2 Jun 1994; Sch 1(2): 13 Jan 1988
Crimes (Application of Criminal Law) Amendment Act 1992
83 of 1992
Statute Law (Penalties) Act 1992 112 of 1992 Crimes (Registration of Interstate 6 of 1993 Restraint Orders) Amendment Act 1993
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Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
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This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Crimes (Female Genital Mutilation) Amendment Act 1994
58 of 1994
Crimes (Dangerous Driving Offences) Amendment Act 1994
78 of 1994
Crimes (Threats and Stalking) Amendment Act 1994
83 of 1994
Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1994
84 of 1994
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 95 of 1994 Act (No 2) 1994 Statute Law Revision (Local 11 of 1995 Government) Act 1995
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 16 of 1995 Act 1995 22 of 1995 Criminal Procedure Amendment (Indictable Offences) Act 1995 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1999) Criminal Legislation (Amendment) Act 23 of 1995 1995 Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995
27 of 1995
Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 1995
49 of 1995
154
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 5 Oct 1994 1 May 1995 (Gaz 50, 28 Apr 1995, p 2121) 12 Dec 1994 23 Dec 1994 (Gaz 174, 23 Dec 1994, p 7565) 12 Dec 1994 23 Dec 1994 (Gaz 174, 23 Dec 1994, p 7564) 12 Dec 1994 23 Dec 1994 (Gaz 174, 23 Dec 1994, p 7564) 12 Dec 1994 Sch 2: 12 Dec 1994 9 Jun 1995 Sch 1.28: 23 Jun 1995 (Gaz 77, 23 Jun 1995, p 3279) 15 Jun 1995 Sch 2.7: 15 Jun 1995 19 Jun 1995 Sch 2.3[3], [7] and [8]: 1 Sep 1995 (Gaz 105, 1 Sep 1995, p 5044) 19 Jun 1995 Sch 1.2: 1 Jul 1995 (Gaz 79, 30 Jun 1995, p 3433) 19 Jun 1995 1 Sep 1995 (Gaz 102, 25 Aug 1995, p 4355) 2 Nov 1995 Sch 1: 31 Dec 1995 (Gaz 156, 22 Dec 1995, p 8683)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 1996
6 of 1996
Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act 1996
22 of 1996
Crimes Amendment (Review of Convictions and Sentences) Act 1996 Crimes Amendment (Children’s Evidence) Act 1996
65 of 1996
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 22 Nov 1995 8 Dec 1995 (Gaz 149, 8 Dec 1995, p 8401) 12 Dec 1995 1 Jan 1996 (Gaz 156, 22 Dec 1995, p 8682) 12 Dec 1995 1 Jan 1996 (Gaz 156, 22 Dec 1995, p 8682) 21 Dec 1995 Sch 2.4: 21 Dec 1995 21 May 1996 30 Jun 1996 (Gaz 77, 28 Aug 1996, p 3282) 5 Jun 1996 16 Aug 1996 (Gaz 95, 16 Aug 1996, p 4609) 19 Jun 1996 1 Oct 1986 (Gaz 110, 27 Sep 1996, p 6525) 27 Sep 1996 27 Sep 1996
68 of 1996
27 Sep 1996
Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence Orders) Act 1996
93 of 1996
26 Nov 1996
Fines Act 1996
99 of 1996
26 Nov 1996
Crimes Amendment (Court Finger-printing Scheme) Act 1996
112 of 1996
2 Dec 1996
Disorderly Houses Amendment Act 1995
53 of 1995
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995
62 of 1995
Classification (Publications, Films and 63 of 1995 Computer Games) Enforcement Act 1995 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 99 of 1995 Act (No 2) 1995 Crimes Amendment (Mandatory Life 5 of 1996 Sentences) Act 1996
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Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS
28 Mar 1997 (Gaz 31, 27 Mar 1997, p 1663) 1 Mar 1997 (Gaz 20, 21 Feb 1997, p 797) Sch 2: 27 Jan 1998 (Gaz 1, 2 Jan 1998, p 4) 6 Jan 1997 (Gaz 150, 20 Dec 1996, p 8524)
155
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Mining Legislation Amendment Act 1996
137 of 1996
Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence Orders) Act 1997
14 of 1997
Crimes Amendment (Detention after Arrest) Act 1997
48 of 1997
75 of 1997 Traffıc and Crimes Amendment (Menacing and Predatory Driving) Act 1997 Crimes Amendment (Assault of Police 80 of 1997 Offıcers) Act 1997 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 85 of 1997 1997
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 16 Dec 1996 Sch 2.3: 14 Mar 1997 (Gaz 26, 14 Mar 1997, p 1470) 29 May 1997 18 Aug 1997 (Gaz 91, 15 Aug 1997, p 6287) 2 Jul 1997 Sch 1: 9 Feb 1998 (Gaz 22, 6 Feb 1998, p 521) 10 Jul 1997 10 Oct 1997 (Gaz 107, 3 Oct 1997, p 8348) 10 Jul 1997 10 Jul 1997 30 Sep 1997
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Procedure) Act 1997 Crimes Amendment (Contamination of Goods) Act 1997
86 of 1997
30 Sep 1997
89 of 1997
4 Nov 1997
Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997
106 of 1997
1 Dec 1997
Traffıc Legislation Amendment Act 1997
115 of 1997
9 Dec 1997
Crimes Legislation Further Amendment 135 of 1997 Act 1997
17 Dec 1997
Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 1997
17 Dec 1997
156
142 of 1997
30 Mar 1998 (Gaz 62, 27 Mar 1998, p 1823) 4 Jan 1998 (Gaz 1, 2 Jan 1998, p 3) 21 Dec 1997 (Gaz 137, 5 Dec 1997, p 9768) 3 Apr 1998 (Gaz 64, 3 Apr 1998, p 2290) 29 Jun 1998 (Gaz 97, 26 Jun 1998, p 4431) 16 Jan 1998 (Gaz 7, 16 Jan 1998, p 280) 25 Jan 1998 (Gaz 7, 16 Jan 1998, p 279)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Evidence (Children) Act 1997
143 of 1997
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 147 of 1997 Act (No 2) 1997 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police 38 of 1998 and Public Safety) Act 1998
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Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 1998
53 of 1998
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 54 of 1998 Act 1998 Nurses Amendment (Nurse 102 of 1998 Practitioners) Act 1998 Unlawful Gambling Act 1998
113 of 1998
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 120 of 1998 (No 2) Act 1998 Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 127 of 1998
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Child Sexual Offences) Act 1998
131 of 1998
Justices Legislation Amendment (Appeals) Act 1998
137 of 1998
Crimes Legislation Further Amendment 149 of 1998 Act 1998
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Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 17 Dec 1997 Sch 1: 1 Aug 1999 (Gaz 86, 30 Jul 1999, p 5224) 17 Dec 1997 Sch 2.8: 17 Dec 1997; Sch 3.11: 17 Mar 1998 18 Jun 1998 1 Jul 1998 (Gaz 97, 26 Jun 1998, p 4422) 29 Jun 1998 31 Jul 1998 (Gaz 115, 31 Jul 1998, p 5746) 30 Jun 1998 Sch 2.6: 30 Jun 1998 2 Nov 1998 29 Oct 1999 (Gaz 124, 29 Oct 1999, 10238) 9 Nov 1998 1 Mar 1999 (Gaz 25, 26 Feb 1999, p 979) 26 Nov 1998 Sch 2: 26 Nov 1998 26 Nov 1998 8 Feb 1999 (Gaz 15, 5 Feb 1999, p 392) 30 Nov 1998 15 Jan 1999 (Gaz 4, 8 Jan 1999, p 13) 8 Dec 1998 Sch 2.7: 1 Mar 1999 (Gaz 25, 26 Feb 1999, p 973) 8 Dec 1998 8 Feb 1999 (Gaz 15, 5 Feb 1999, p 391)
157
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Children and Young Persons Legislation (Repeal and Amendment) Act 1998
158 of 1998
Road Transport Legislation Amendment 19 of 1999 Act 1999
Crimes Amendment (Offensive Weapons) Act 1999
21 of 1999
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Statute Law (Miscellaneous) Provisions 31 of 1999 Act 1999 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 40 of 1999 1999 Road Transport (Safety and Traffıc Management) Amendment (Camera Devices) Act 1999
82 of 1999
Statute Law (Miscellaneous) Act (No 2) 85 of 1999 1999 Crimes Amendment (Apprehended 88 of 1999 Violence) Act 1999 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000)
94 of 1999
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2000
43 of 2000
158
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 14 Dec 1998 Sch 2.11[2] and [3]: 18 Dec 2000 (Gaz 159, 8 Dec 2000, p 12781) 1 Jul 1999 Sch 2.6: 1 Dec 1999 (Gaz 133, 26 Nov 1999, p 10863) 5 Jul 1999 Sch: 1 Sep 1999 (Gaz 88, 6 Aug 1999, p 5475) 7 Jul 1999 Schs 4.20 and 5.27: 7 Jul 1999 8 Jul 1999 Sch 2: 1 Sep 1999 (Gaz 98, 27 Aug 1999, p 6685) 3 Dec 1999 Sch 2: 24 Dec 1999 (Gaz 144, 24 Dec 1999, p 12191) 3 Dec 1999 Sch 2.9: 3 Dec 1999 6 Dec 1999 Sch 1: 26 Apr 2000 (Gaz 3, 14 Jan 2000, p 161) 8 Dec 1999 Pt 1 of Sch 3: 3 Apr 2000 (Gaz 42, 31 Mar 2000, p 2487); Pts 2 and 3 of Sch 3: 1 Jan 2000 (Gaz 144, 24 Dec 1999, p 12184) 27 Jun 2000 Sch 1: 31 Jul 2000 (Gaz 93, 21 Jul 2000, p 6457)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 53 of 2000 Act 2000 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 59 of 2000
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 93 of 2000 Act (No 2) 2000 Crimes Amendment (Computer 20 of 2001 Offences) Act 2001 Corporations (Consequential 34 of 2001 Amendments) Act 2001 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 56 of 2001 Act 2001 Crimes Amendment (Aggravated Sexual 62 of 2001 Assault in Company) Act 2001 Crimes Amendment (Gang and Vehicle Related Offences) Act 2001
84 of 2001
89 of 2001 Crimes Amendment (Child Protection—Physical Mistreatment) Act 2001 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2002) Crimes Amendment (Sexual Servitude) 99 of 2001 Act 2001
Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Act 2001
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116 of 2001
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 29 Jun 2000 Sch 3.3: 29 Jun 2000 5 Jul 2000 Sch 1.1: 1 Jan 2001 (Gaz 168, 22 Dec 2000, p 13459) 8 Dec 2000 Sch 2.10: 8 Dec 2000 19 Jun 2001 Sch 1: 3 Aug 2001 (Gaz 120, 3 Aug 2001, p 5778) 28 Jun 2001 Sch 2.9: 15 Jul 2001 17 Jul 2001 Sch 2.15: 17 Jul 2001 21 Sep 2001 Sch 1: 1 Oct 2001 (Gaz 146, 28 Sep 2001, p 8182) 21 Nov 2001 Sch 1: 14 Dec 2001 (Gaz 190, 14 Dec 2001, p 9829) 5 Dec 2001 Sch 1: 5 Dec 2002
11 Dec 2001
18 Dec 2001
Sch 1: 22 Mar 2002 (Gaz 59, 15 Mar 2002, p 1605) Sch 1: 22 Feb 2002 (Gaz 42, 15 Feb 2002, p 825)
159
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2001
117 of 2001
Justices Legislation Repeal and Amendment Act 2001
121 of 2001
Crimes Amendment (Bushfires) Act 2002
24 of 2002
Licensing and Registration (Uniform Procedures) Act 2002
28 of 2002
Crimes Amendment (Police and Other Law Enforcement Offıcers) Act 2002
45 of 2002
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Penalty Notice Offences) Act 2002
46 of 2002
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 53 of 2002 Act 2002 90 of 2002 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 Courts Legislation Miscellaneous 99 of 2002 Amendments Act 2002 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002
160
103 of 2002
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 18 Dec 2001 Sch 3: 21 Dec 2001 (Gaz 196, 21 Dec 2001, p 10437) 19 Dec 2001 Sch 2.72: 7 Jul 2003 (Gaz 104, 27 Jun 2003, p 5978) 21 Jun 2002 Sch 1: 19 Jul 2002 (Gaz 119, 19 Jul 2002, p 5429) 21 Jun 2002 Sch 4.27: 10 Jan 2003 (Gaz 255, 13 Dec 2002, p 10559) 4 Jul 2002 Sch 1: 15 Jul 2002 (Gaz 116, 12 Jul 2002, p 5221) 4 Jul 2002 Sch 2: 1 Sep 2002 (Gaz 135, 30 Aug 2002, p 6537) 4 Jul 2002 Sch 2.10: 4 Jul 2002 22 Nov 2002 Sch 2: 1 Feb 2003 (Gaz 263, 20 Dec 2002, p 10741) 29 Nov 2002 Sch 1.1: 7 Jul 2003 (Gaz 104, 27 Jun 2003, p 5971) 29 Nov 2002 Sch 4.16: 1 Dec 2005 (Gaz 45, 15 Apr 2005, p 1356)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Property Identification) Act 2003
5 of 2003
Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2003
9 of 2003
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2003 Nurses Amendment Act 2003
27 of 2003
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment Sch 4[1] and [6]– 17 Dec 2002 [8]: 13 Jan 2003 (Gaz 13, 10 Jan 2003, p 97) Sch 4[4] (to extent it inserts s 356FA(1) and (2)(a)): 1 May 2003 (Gaz 49, 21 Feb 2003, p 2196) 18 Dec 2002 Sch 1: 10 Feb 2003 (Gaz 39, 7 Feb 2003, p 757) 28 May 2003 Sch 1: 15 Dec 2003 (Gaz 196, 12 Dec 2003, p 11173) 5 Jun 2003 Sch 1: 13 Jun 2003 (Gaz 97, 13 Jun 2003, p 5624) 8 Jul 2003 Sch 3: 8 Jul 2003
45 of 2003
30 Sep 2003
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 82 of 2003 Act (No 2) 2003 Crimes Legislation Further Amendment 85 of 2003 Act 2003
27 Nov 2003
Firearms and Crimes Legislation Amendment (Public Safety) Act 2003
92 of 2003
10 Dec 2003
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2004
11 of 2004
24 Mar 2004
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2002
130 of 2002
Crimes Amendment (School Protection) 135 of 2002 Act 2002
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Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS
5 Dec 2003
Sch 2.1: 1 Aug 2004 (Gaz 126, 30 Jul 2004, p 6114) Sch 2.6: 27 Nov 2003 Sch 1: 14 Feb 2004 (Gaz 12, 16 Jan 2004, p 163) Sch 1: 15 Dec 2003 (Gaz 196, 12 Dec 2003, p 11174) Sch 4: 24 Mar 2004
161
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2004
48 of 2004
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Amendment (Uniform Classification) Act 2004 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2004 Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 2004
55 of 2004
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 24 Mar 2004 Sch 2.1: 3 May 2004 (Gaz 77, 30 Apr 2004, p 2215) 6 Jul 2004 Sch 1: 22 Oct 2004 (Gaz 166, 22 Oct 2004, p 8111) 6 Jul 2004 Sch 1: 12 Nov 2004 (Gaz 179, 12 Nov 2004, p 8431) 6 Jul 2004 Sch 2.7: 6 Jul 2004
82 of 2004
3 Nov 2004
Sch 2.2: 26 May 2005
91 of 2004
10 Dec 2004
95 of 2004
15 Dec 2004
Marine Safety Amendment (Random Breath Testing) Act 2005
4 of 2005
10 Mar 2005
Road Transport (General) Act 2005
11 of 2005
14 Apr 2005
Crimes Amendment (Grievous Bodily Harm) Act 2005
14 of 2005
12 May 2005
Sch 2.12: 10 Dec 2004 Sch 1 (except Sch 1[11]): 1 Jan 2005 (Gaz 200, 17 Dec 2004, p 9303); Sch 1[11]: 15 Dec 2004 Sch 2.1: 13 May 2005 (Gaz 54, 13 May 2005, p 1661) Sch 3.5: 30 Sep 2005 (Gaz 120, 30 Sep 2005, p 7674) Sch 1: 12 May 2005
Road Transport (Safety and Traffıc Management) Amendment (Alcohol) Act 2004
17 of 2004
Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Act 41 of 2004 2004
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Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
162
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Criminal Procedure Further Amendment (Evidence) Act 2005
25 of 2005
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Act 2005 (am by APEC Meeting (Police Powers) Act 2007) Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Amendment Act 2005
54 of 2005
Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) (Brendan’s Law) Act 2005
74 of 2005
Defamation Act 2005
77 of 2005
Crimes Amendment (Animal Cruelty) Act 2005
94 of 2005
Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Public Safety) Act 2005 Crimes Amendment (Organised Car and Boat Theft) Act 2006
119 of 2005
73 of 2005
26 of 2006
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 58 of 2006 Act 2006 Crimes Legislation Amendment 61 of 2006 (Gangs) Act 2006
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Amendment (DNA Review Panel) Act 2006
© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS
70 of 2006
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 May 2005 Sch 2.2: 12 Aug 2005 (Gaz 102, 12 Aug 2005, p 4309) 27 Jun 2005 Sch 4: 13 Sep 2005 (Gaz 113, 9 Sep 2005, p 7271) 21 Oct 2005 Sch 3: 28 Oct 2005 (Gaz 132, 28 Oct 2005, p 8934) 26 Oct 2005 Sch 1: 13 Feb 2006 (Gaz 16, 3 Feb 2006, p 531) 26 Oct 2005 Sch 5.1: 1 Jan 2006 24 Nov 2005 Sch 1: 16 Dec 2005 (Gaz 158, 16 Dec 2005, p 11189) 15 Dec 2005 Sch 2: 15 Dec 2005 26 May 2006 Sch 1: 1 Sep 2006 (Gaz 111, 1 Sep 2006, p 7059) 20 Jun 2006 Sch 2.9: 20 Jun 2006 28 Sep 2006 Sch 1: 15 Dec 2006 (Gaz 186, 15 Dec 2006, p 11523) 19 Oct 2006 Sch 2.1: 23 Feb 2007 (Gaz 33, 23 Feb 2007, p 945)
163
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
14 of 2007
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 27 Oct 2006 Schs 1 and 2: 12 Mar 2007 (Gaz 41, 9 Mar 2007, p 1711) 27 Oct 2006 Sch 2.1: 15 Dec 2006 (Gaz 183, 15 Dec 2006, p 10750) 2 Nov 2006 Sch 2: 1 Jan 2007 (Gaz 189, 22 Dec 2006, p 11543) 22 Nov 2006 Sch 3.7: 1 Feb 2007 (Gaz 22, 1 Feb 2007, p 575) 4 Dec 2006 Sch 2.1: 1 Jul 2007 (Gaz 83, 29 Jun 2007, 3965) 4 Dec 2006 Sch 3.6: 4 Dec 2006 12 Dec 2006 Sch 4.1: 12 Dec 2006 15 Jun 2007 Sch 2.2: 12 Oct 2007 (Gaz 146, 12 Oct 2007, p 7729) 4 Jul 2007 Sch 3.1: 4 Jul 2007
38 of 2007
27 Sep 2007
73 of 2006 Crimes Amendment (Apprehended Violence) Act 2006 (am by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2006) Road Transport Legislation Amendment 79 of 2006 (Drug Testing) Act 2006
Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Act 2006
88 of 2006
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Police Amendment (Miscellaneous) Act 94 of 2006 2006 Aboriginal Land Rights Amendment Act 2006
111 of 2006
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 120 of 2006 Act (No 2) 2006 Police Powers Legislation Amendment 128 of 2006 Act 2006 Criminal Procedure Amendment 6 of 2007 (Vulnerable Persons) Act 2007 APEC Meeting (Police Powers) Act 2007 Crimes Amendment Act 2007
164
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Sch 1[7] and Sch 2: 27 Sep 2007; Sch 1[1]–[6] and [8]–[26]: 15 Feb 2008 (Gaz 16, 15 Feb 2008, p 705)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2007
57 of 2007
Crimes Amendment (Consent—Sexual Assault Offences) Act 2007
66 of 2007
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
74 of 2007 Crimes Amendment (Sexual Procurement or Grooming of Children) Act 2007 Crimes (Domestic and Personal 80 of 2007 Violence) Act 2007
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 82 of 2007 Act (No 2) 2007 Miscellaneous Acts (Local Court) 94 of 2007 Amendment Act 2007 Law Enforcement and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 Road Transport Legislation (Breath Testing and Analysis) Act 2007
97 of 2007
Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Act 2008
1 of 2008
Crimes Amendment (Rock Throwing) Act 2008
18 of 2008
Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008
53 of 2008
© 2017 THOMSON REUTERS
99 of 2007
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 15 Nov 2007 Sch 3[1] and [3]–[6]: 15 Nov 2007; Sch 3[2]: 7 Dec 2007 (Gaz 180, 7 Dec 2007, p 9253) 23 Nov 2007 Sch 1: 1 Jan 2008 (Gaz 185, 21 Dec 2007, p 9807) 7 Dec 2007 Sch 1: 18 Jan 2008 (Gaz 9, 18 Jan 2008, p 75) 7 Dec 2007 Sch 2.7: 10 Mar 2008 (Gaz 30, 7 Mar 2008, p 1429) 7 Dec 2007 Sch 2.1: 7 Dec 2007 13 Dec 2007 Sch 2: 6 Jul 2009 (Proc 314 of 2009, 3 Jul 2009) 13 Dec 2007 Sch 1.2: 14 Dec 2007 13 Dec 2007 Sch 3.5: 25 Jan 2008 (Gaz 10, 25 Jan 2008, p 149) 19 Mar 2008 Sch 1: 28 Mar 2008 (Gaz 37, 28 Mar 2008, p 2468) 20 May 2008 Sch 1: 23 May 2008 (Gaz 56, 23 May 2008, p 3952) 1 Jul 2008 Sch 6: 1 Jul 2008
165
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Act 2009
99 of 2009
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2009 Crimes Amendment (Police Pursuits) Act 2010 Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography and Abuse Material) Act 2010 Relationships Register Act 2010
106 of 2009
Health Practitioner Regulation Amendment Act 2010 Weapons and Firearms Legislation Amendment Act 2010
34 of 2010
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 28 Oct 2008 Sch 1[1]–[7]: 1 Dec 2008 (Gaz 150, 21 Nov 2008, p 11250) 8 Dec 2008 Sch 1[1]–[33]: 1 Jan 2009 (Gaz 158, 19 Dec 2008, p 12303) 8 Dec 2008 Sch 5[1] and [2]: 8 Dec 2008 19 May 2009 Sch 1.3: 19 May 2009 26 Jun 2009 Sch 2.16: 1 Jul 2009 (Proc 305 of 2009, 1 Jul 2009) 14 Dec 2009 Schs 1 and 2: 22 Feb 2010 (Proc 41 of 2010, 19 Feb 2010) 14 Dec 2009 Sch 2.7: 8 Jan 2010 18 Mar 2010 Sch 1: 18 Mar 2010 28 Apr 2010 Sch 1: 17 Sep 2010 (Proc 517 of 2010, 10 Sep 2010) 19 May 2010 Sch 3.27: 19 May 2010 15 Jun 2010 Sch 2.7: 1 Jul 2010
40 of 2010
15 Jun 2010
Crimes (Sentencing Legislation) Amendment (Intensive Correction Orders) Act 2010
48 of 2010
28 Jun 2010
Crimes Amendment (Cognitive Impairment—Sexual Offences) Act 2008
74 of 2008
Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2008
105 of 2008
Courts and Crimes Legislation Further 107 of 2008 Amendment Act 2008 Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 27 of 2009 2009 NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 49 of 2009
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Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
166
2 of 2010 9 of 2010
19 of 2010
Sch 3.8: 9 Jul 2010 (Proc 351 of 2010, 9 Jul 2010) Sch 5.4: 1 Oct 2010 (Proc 532 of 2010, 17 Sep 2010)
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Table of Amending Legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Crimes Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2010 Firearms Legislation Amendment Act 2010 Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Offıcers) Act 2011 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Act 2012
64 of 2010
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 10 Sep 2010 S 3: 10 Sep 2010
92 of 2010
4 Nov 2010
Sch 3: 4 Feb 2011
135 of 2010
7 Dec 2010
Sch 9: 7 Dec 2010
20 of 2011
23 Jun 2011
S 3: 23 Jun 2011
27 of 2011
27 Jun 2011
Sch 3.5: 8 Jul 2011
3 of 2012
14 Mar 2012
Crimes Amendment (Reckless Infliction of Harm) Act 2012 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2012 Crimes Amendment (Cheating at Gambling) Act 2012 Crime Commission Act 2012
41 of 2012
21 Jun 2012
Sch 1: 9 Apr 2012 (Proc 143 of 2012, 5 Apr 2012) Sch 1: 21 Jun 2012
42 of 2012
21 Jun 2012
Sch 1.5: 6 Jul 2012
64 of 2012
13 Sep 2012
Sch 1: 13 Sep 2012
66 of 2012
24 Sep 2012
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2012 Road Transport Legislation (Repeal and Amendment) Act 2013
67 of 2012
24 Sep 2012
Sch 5.1: 5 Oct 2012 Sch 1: 24 Sep 2012
19 of 2013
3 Apr 2013
Police Legislation Amendment (Special 56 of 2013 Constables) Act 2013
23 Aug 2013
Crimes Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2013 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2013
64 of 2013
12 Sep 2013
90 of 2013
20 Nov 2013
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Sch 4.8: 1 Jul 2013 (Proc 329 of 2013, 28 Jun 2013) Sch 3.1: 1 Dec 2014 (Proc 750 of 2014, 28 Nov 2014) S 3: 12 Sep 2013 Sch 1.2: 20 Nov 2013
167
CA
Principal legislation
Crimes Act 1900
Principal legislation
Number
Crimes Act 1900
40 of 1900
Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
This legislation has been amended as follows: Amending legislation Number
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Oct 1900 31 Oct 1900
Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014
2 of 2014
Date of gazettal/ Date of commenceassent/registration ment 31 Jan 2014 Sch 1: 31 Jan 2014
13 of 2014
20 May 2014
Crimes Amendment (Female Genital Mutilation) Act 2014 Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Act 2014 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2014 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Child Sex Offences) Act 2015 No 13 Crimes Amendment (Off-road Fatal Accidents) Act 2015 Inclosed Lands, Crimes and Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Interference) Act 2016 Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Act 2016 Terrorism (Police Powers) Amendment (Investigative Detention) Act 2016 Justice Portfolio Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 2016
15 of 2014
20 May 2014
23 of 2014
5 Jun 2014
59 of 2014
23 Oct 2014
13 of 2015
29 Jun 2015
61 of 2015
24 Nov 2015
7 of 2016
22 Mar 2016
16 of 2016
11 May 2016
17 of 2016
16 May 2016
54 of 2016
25 Oct 2016
55 of 2016
25 Oct 2016
168
Sch 1: 13 Jun 2014 (Proc 354 of 2014, 13 Jun 2014) Sch 1: 20 May 2014 Sch 1: 5 Jun 2014 Sch 1.1: 23 Oct 2014 Sch 1: 29 Jun 2015 Sch 1: 24 Nov 2015 Sch 2: 1 Jun 2016 (Proc 277 of 2016, 1 Jun 2016) Sch 2: 8 Sep 2016 (Proc 577 of 2016, 8 Sep 2016) Sch 2: 16 May 2016 Sch 1.4: 25 Oct 2016 Sch 3.5: 6 Jan 2017
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 1 – Preliminary and interpretation [CA.3A.20]
s 3A
PART 1 – PRELIMINARY AND INTERPRETATION [Pt 1 heading subst Act 2 of 1929, s 21]
1
Name of Act
[S 1 am Act 54 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 2.6[1]; subst Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 2.8; am Act 89 of 1997; Act 137 of 1996; Act 65 of 1996; Act 6 of 1996; Act 63 of 1995; Act 49 of 1995; Act 84 of 1994; Act 83 of 1994; Act 64 of 1993; Act 83 of 1992; Act 2 of 1992; Act 101 of 1990; Act 51 of 1990; Act 49 of 1990; Act 11 of 1990; Act 5 of 1990; Act 100 of 1989; Act 71 of 1989; Act 62 of 1989; Act 40 of 1989; Act 27 of 1989; Act 115 of 1988; Act 81 of 1988; Act 287 of 1987; Act 238 of 1987; Act 184 of 1987; Act 116 of 1987; Act 133 of 1986; Act 38 of 1985; Act 22 of 1984; Act 7 of 1984; Act 184 of 1983; Act 180 of 1983; Act 116 of 1982; Act 42 of 1981; Act 53 of 1980; Act 95 of 1979; Act 72 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974; Act 38 of 1973; Act 77 of 1967; Act 16 of 1955; Act 31 of 1951; Act 43 of 1946; Act 35 of 1937; Act 31 of 1929; subst Act 2 of 1929, s 2; am Act 10 of 1924]
2
Repeals and savings [Repealed]
[S 2 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[1]; am Act 2 of 1929, s 21]
3
Application of certain provisions of Act
The Parts and sections mentioned in Schedule 2, so far as their provisions can be applied, shall be in force with respect to all offences, whether at Common Law or by Statute, whensoever committed and in whatsoever Court tried. [S 3 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[2]; am Act 2 of 1929, s 21]
SECTION 3 COMMENTARY Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[CA.3.20]
Second Schedule
Some of the sections and Parts mentioned in the Second Schedule have been affected by subsequent legislation. Section 352 (one of the sections mentioned in the Second Schedule) applies to offences under the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 notwithstanding the provisions of s 6 of that Act.1 Section 394 does not apply to the trial of summary offences.2 Section 3 has been analysed.3 1 Maybury v Plowman (1913) 16 CLR 468. 2 R v Vanecek (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 72. 3 R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 103; 42 FLR 53; on appeal, R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 464.
3A
Territorial application of the criminal law of the State [Repealed]
[S 3A rep Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; insrt Act 83 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 3A COMMENTARY [CA.3A.20]
“Territorial nexus”
Section 3A provided that an offence against the law of New South Wales was committed if all the elements necessary to constitute the offence and a “territorial nexus” between the State and at least one element of the offence existed. Such a “territorial nexus” existed if the element was (or included) an event occurring in the State or the element occurred outside the State but while the person alleged to have committed the offence is in the State. The existence of the “necessary territorial nexus” between the State and an element
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This Act is the Crimes Act 1900.
Crimes Act 1900 s 3B
[CA.3A.20]
of an offence was presumed and was conclusive unless the person charged with the offence disputed the existence of the territorial nexus and the court or jury was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the nexus did not exist. (See also Pt 1A – Geographical Jurisdiction.) 3B
Misuse of public property by public officials outside the State [Repealed]
[S 3B rep Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; insrt Act 6 of 1996, s 3 and Sch 1]
4
Definitions (1) In this Act, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires: Aircraft includes any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air. Armed, in relation to a weapon, or instrument, or an offensive weapon, or instrument, that is a dangerous weapon, includes bearing or having the immediate physical possession of the weapon, or instrument. Authorised officer has the same meaning as it has in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[Def insrt Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.72[1]]
Banker includes every director or manager of any banking company, whether incorporated or not, or of any branch thereof, and every person carrying on the business of a banker. Cattle includes any horse, mare, gelding, colt, foal, filly, ass, mule, bull, cow, ox, steer, heifer, calf, ram, ewe, sheep, lamb, pig, goat, deer, alpaca, llama, vicuna, camel, or dromedary, and every hybrid or cross thereof. Counsel [Repealed] Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Def rep Act 120 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 3.6[1]]
Court and Judge respectively shall be equally taken to mean the Court in which or the Judge before whom the trial or proceeding is had in respect of which either word is used. Dangerous weapon means: (a) a firearm, or an imitation firearm, within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996, or (b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998, or (c) a spear gun. [Def am Act 40 of 2010, Sch 3.8[1]; Act 127 of 1998, s 53 and Sch 3.2[1]; Act 54 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 2.6[2]]
Document of title to goods includes every bill of lading, India warrant, dock warrant, warehousekeeper’s certificate, warrant, or order for the delivery or transfer of any goods or valuable thing, and every bought and sold note or document used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or purporting to authorise by indorsement or delivery, the possessor of such document to transfer or receive any goods thereby represented or therein mentioned or referred to. Document of title to land includes every deed, certificate of title, map, paper, or parchment, written or printed, or partly written and partly printed, being or containing evidence of the title, or part of the title, to any real estate or to any interest in or out of real estate. Domestic violence offence [Repealed] [Def rep Act 73 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 2[1]; subst Act 88 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Dwelling-house includes: (a) any building or other structure intended for occupation as a dwelling and capable of being so occupied, although it has never been so occupied,
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Part 1 – Preliminary and interpretation s4 (b)
a boat or vehicle in or on which any person resides, and
(c)
any building or other structure within the same curtilage as a dwelling-house, and occupied therewith or whose use is ancillary to the occupation of the dwelling-house.
Grievous bodily harm includes: (a) the destruction (other than in the course of a medical procedure) of the foetus of a pregnant woman, whether or not the woman suffers any other harm, and (b) any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person, and (c) any grievous bodily disease (in which case a reference to the infliction of grievous bodily harm includes a reference to causing a person to contract a grievous bodily disease). [Def am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; subst Act 14 of 2005, s 3 and Sch 1]
Indictment includes any information presented or filed as provided by law for the prosecution of offences. Intoxicating substance includes alcohol or a narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding. [Def insrt Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Intoxication has the same meaning it has in Part 11A. [Def insrt Act 2 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]
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Judge—see Court. Justice [Repealed] [Def rep Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.72[2]]
Loaded arms means any gun, pistol, or other arms, loaded in the barrel or chamber or magazine with gunpowder or other explosive substance, and with ball, shot, slug, or other destructive material, although the attempt to discharge may fail from want of proper priming, or from any other cause; and every gun, pistol, or other arms, unlawfully presented at any person, shall be deemed to be loaded unless the contrary is shown. Member of the crew in relation to an aircraft means a person having functions or duties on board the aircraft. Minor indictable offence means an indictable offence that is not a serious indictable offence. [Def insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[20]]
Money includes all coined money, whether current within New South Wales or not, and all bank notes or instruments ordinarily so called, if current as such, and payable to the bearer. Night means the period of time commencing at nine of the clock in the evening of each day and concluding at six of the clock in the morning of the next succeeding day. Offensive weapon [Repealed] [Def rep Act 21 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Offensive weapon or instrument means: (a) a dangerous weapon, or (b) any thing that is made or adapted for offensive purposes, or
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Governor means, except in respect of the exercise of the pardoning power, the Governor with the advice of the Executive Council.
Crimes Act 1900 s4 (c)
any thing that, in the circumstances, is used, intended for use or threatened to be used for offensive purposes, whether or not it is ordinarily used for offensive purposes or is capable of causing harm.
[Def subst Act 21 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Officer, in relation to a body corporate or public company, includes a person who has been appointed, or acts, as an auditor of the body corporate or public company. Person, Master, and Employer severally include any society, company, or corporation. Personal violence offence [Repealed] [Def rep Act 73 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 2[1]; am Act 62 of 2001; Act 88 of 1999]
Place of Divine worship includes any building or structure ordinarily used for Divine worship. Prescribed sexual offence [Repealed] [Def rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[8]]
Prescribed sexual offence proceedings [Repealed] [Def rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[8]]
Property includes every description of real and personal property; money, valuable securities, debts, and legacies; and all deeds and instruments relating to, or evidencing the title or right to any property, or giving a right to recover or receive any money or goods; and includes not only property originally in the possession or under the control of any person, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and everything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.
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Property belonging to a vessel includes every portion of its cargo, and property belonging to any of the officers, crew, or passengers thereof. Public disorder means a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations. [Def insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Railway includes a tramway, and also includes all stations, buildings, structures and equipment belonging to or associated with a railway or tramway. Serious indictable offence means an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. [Def insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[20]]
Trustee means a trustee on some express trust howsoever created, and includes the heir or personal representative of such trustee, and every other person upon whom the duty of such trust shall have devolved, and also any official manager, assignee, liquidator, or other like officer, acting under any Act relating to joint stock companies or to bankruptcy or insolvency and also an executor or administrator. Valuable security includes every order or other security whatsoever entitling or evidencing the title of any person to any share or interest in any public stock or fund, whether of any part of the British dominions or of any Foreign State, or in any fund of any body corporate, company, or society, whether within or without the British dominions, or to any deposit in any bank; and every debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, cheque, warrant, order, or security whatsoever for money, or for payment of money, whether current in any part of the British dominions or in any Foreign State, and every document of title to land or goods, as herein defined. Note: The Interpretation Act 1987 contains definitions and other provisions that affect the interpretation and application of this Act.
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Part 1 – Preliminary and interpretation s4 Vessel [Repealed] [Def rep Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Weapon [Repealed] [Def rep Act 21 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
Weapon, or instrument [Repealed] [Subs (1) am Act 131 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(2); Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(1); Act 62 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(2); Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 5(2); Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(2); Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2); Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 3(1); Act 48 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 4(1); Act 116 of 1983, s 4 and Sch 1(1); Act 116 of 1982, s 4 and Sch 1(1); Act 95 of 1979, s 5 and Sch 1(2); Act 50 of 1974, s 4; Act 77 of 1967, s 2; Act 16 of 1955, s 6; Act 31 of 1951, s 2; Act 10 of 1924, s 4]
(2) A dwelling-house does not cease to be a dwelling-house by reason only of being temporarily unoccupied. [Subs (2) insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 4]
(3) [Repealed] [Subs (3) rep Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[2]; insrt Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
(4) In this Act, except in so far as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires, a reference to an offence mentioned in a specified provision of this Act that has been amended or repealed is, or includes, a reference to an offence mentioned in the provision as in force before the amendment or repeal. [Subs (4) insrt Act 7 of 1984, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
(5) [Repealed] Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (5) rep Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.72[3]; insrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 5(2)]
(6) [Repealed] [Subs (6) rep Act 73 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 2[2]; subst Act 88 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 62 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
(7) A reference in any offence under this Act to causing any poison, intoxicating substance or other destructive or noxious thing to be administered to or taken by any person includes a reference to causing any person to inhale, take or be exposed to the poison, intoxicating substance or thing by its release into the person’s environment. [Subs (7) am Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; insrt Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
(8) Notes included in this Act do not form part of this Act. [Subs (8) insrt Act 73 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 2[3]] [S 4 am Act 2 of 2014; Act 40 of 2010; Act 1 of 2008; Act 38 of 2007; Act 120 of 2006; Act 73 of 2006; Act 61 of 2006; Act 26 of 2006; Act 14 of 2005; Act 48 of 2004; Act 121 of 2001; Act 62 of 2001; Act 53 of 2000; Act 94 of 1999; Act 88 of 1999; Act 21 of 1999; Act 131 of 1998; Act 127 of 1998; Act 54 of 1998; Act 84 of 1994; Act 198 of 1989; Act 62 of 1989; Act 81 of 1988; Act 287 of 1987; Act 184 of 1987; Act 48 of 1987; Act 7 of 1984; Act 116 of 1983; Act 116 of 1982; Act 42 of 1981; Act 95 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974; Act 77 of 1967; Act 16 of 1955; Act 31 of 1951; Act 10 of 1924]
SECTION 4 COMMENTARY Cross reference .................................................................................................................................... [CA.4.20] “Aircraft” ................................................................................................................................................ [CA.4.40] “Counsel” .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.4.60] “Document of title to goods” ................................................................................................................. [CA.4.80]
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[Def rep Act 21 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
Crimes Act 1900 s4
[CA.4.20]
“Document of title to land” .................................................................................................................. [CA.4.100] “Dwelling-house” ................................................................................................................................. [CA.4.120] “Governor” .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.4.140] “Grievous bodily harm” ....................................................................................................................... [CA.4.160] “Loaded arms” .................................................................................................................................... [CA.4.180] “Offensive weapon, etc” ...................................................................................................................... [CA.4.200] “Place of Divine worship” ................................................................................................................... [CA.4.220] “Trustee” ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.4.240] “Valuable security” .............................................................................................................................. [CA.4.260]
[CA.4.20]
Cross reference
Section 35 of the Interpretation Act 1987 is set out at [6.26700]. [CA.4.40]
“Aircraft”
This definition was inserted by Act 77 of 1967. No accepted definition of “aircraft” exists at common law. There have been various statutory definitions in English and United States law.1 The English Air Navigation Order 19662 includes the following in the classification of aircraft: free balloon, captive balloon, airship, glider, kite, aeroplane (landplane), aeroplane (seaplane), aeroplane (amphibian), gyroplane and helicopter. 1 For various attempts at definition, see Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law (3rd ed, 1966), pp 15, 16. 2 Statutory Instrument No 1184 of 1986.
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[CA.4.60]
“Counsel”
Two attorneys may jointly defend an accused person just as two barristers might do so.1 1 R v Matthews (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 45; 3 WN (NSW) 89.
[CA.4.80]
“Document of title to goods”
As to evidence of shipping documents in larceny from wharves, trains, etc, see s 277 (formerly s 102 Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.11480]). [CA.4.100]
“Document of title to land”
A deed of settlement deposited with the Registrar-General upon an application to bring land under the Real Property Act 1900 was held to be a document of title to land.1 1 R v White (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 379; 21 WN 104.
[CA.4.120]
“Dwelling-house”
This definition was inserted by Act 50 of 1974. The “curtilage” is the ground immediately around the house such as passes upon the grant of a messuage without being expressly mentioned.1 Whereas the definition of “dwelling-house” is clearly wide enough to include individual residential flats or units, it does not extend to an entire structure which contains a number of individual flats, etc.2 1 Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed, 1966), p 225 (a “messuage” is a house, including gardens, courtyard, orchard and outbuildings). 2 R v Tahau [1975] 1 NSWLR 479. See also Grant v Langston [1900] AC 388; Hollyhomes v Hind [1944] 1 KB 571.
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s4 “Governor”
Section 14 of the Interpretation Act 1987 provides that in any Act or instrument, a reference to the Governor is a reference to the Governor with the advice of the Executive Council, and includes a reference to any person for the time being lawfully administering the Government. [CA.4.160]
“Grievous bodily harm”
The House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161 held that the words “grievous bodily harm” should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Viscount Kilmuir LC said (at 334 (AC); 171 (All ER)) that “bodily harm” needs no explanation and “grievous” means no more and no less than “really serious”.1 It is not necessary that the harm should be either permanent or dangerous, but the old definition as “harm that seriously interferes with health or comfort” is a misdirection.2 In R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201 at 337 (SASR), 203 (A Crim R), King CJ disapproved the use of the term “serious bodily harm” as being synonymous with “grievous bodily harm”. The Chief Justice said: If the meaning of “grievous” is to be explained, the expression “really serious” rather than merely “serious” should be used.3
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In R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65 at 68, King CJ said: … generally speaking it is unnecessary and even undesirable to offer an explanation [of grievous bodily harm]. If explanation is thought to be necessary, it should be confined to the expression “really serious bodily harm”.4 A statement in Howard, Criminal Law (4th ed, p 49) that, “The modern rule is that ‘grievous bodily harm’ has no fixed legal meaning but should be left to the jury in each case for them to interpret according to the ordinary current meaning of the words” has been judicially approved.5 It has been held that the words mean the direct causing of some grievous injury to the body with or without a weapon; they do not apply to infection by poison or venereal disease.6 The following have been either held to be, or accepted as being capable of constituting grievous bodily harm: a fractured jaw;7 a fractured ankle, fractured ribs and an injury to the lungs;8 a broken collar bone;9 a deep wound near the eye and cuts or contusions to the chest;10 a laceration both externally and internally to a young girl’s vagina;11 any bullet wound in any part of the body, even a finger.12 In considering the older authorities, it should be remembered that since R v Miller [1951] VLR 346 and Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161, a stricter interpretation of grievous bodily harm has been applied as compared to earlier authorities.13 The following have been said not to constitute grievous bodily harm: a black eye, a sprain or considerable bruising;14 a severing of a substantial portion of an ear lobe (in Queensland).15 As to this latter injury, the New South Wales’ partial definition of “grievous bodily harm”, which includes “any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person”, may include such an injury. Cases of asphyxiation by suffocation or strangulation or attempts at those acts have been considered.16 1 Following R v Miller [1951] VLR 346 (where a number of older authorities have been considered). See also R v Weeding [1959] VR 298; R v Metharam [1961] 3 All ER 200; (1961) 45 Cr App R 304; R v Cunningham [1981] 3 WLR 223; 73 Cr App R 253; R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65; R v Hunter (1989) 51 SASR 158; 44 A Crim R 93.
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This phrase appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900: ss 18, 23, 27, 31, 33, 33A, 35, 35A, 39, 42, 46, 49, 52A, 52B, 54, 96, 98, 110 and 208. It also appears in s 42 of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffıc Management) Act 1999.
Crimes Act 1900 s4
[CA.4.160]
2 R v Miller [1951] VLR 346 (FC) disapproving R v Ashman (1858) 1 F & F 88. See also R v Weeding [1959] VR 298; R v Metharam [1961] 3 All ER 200; (1961) 45 Cr App R 304; R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65; R v Hunter (1989) 51 SASR 158; 44 A Crim R 93. 3 Perks was quoted in the High Court majority judgment in Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR). See also R v Griffıths (1999) 103 A Crim R 291 (SACCA). 4 Cf R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741; [1976] 3 All ER 46; (1976) 63 Cr App R 59 where it was said that the adjective “grievous” is outmoded and therefore the words “really serious” have been properly and sensibly used to describe the nature of the bodily harm that must be intended. 5 R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201 per White J (O’Loughlin J agreeing) at 345 (SASR), 210 (A Crim R). 6 R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23. 7 R v Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995); R v Abbott (1995) 81 A Crim R 55. 8 R v Crawley (1982) 5 A Crim R 451. 9 R v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271. 10 R v Phillips and Timmons (1830) 1 Craw & D 164. 11 R v Cox (1818) Russ & Ry 362; 168 ER 846. 12 R v Bolter (1875) Cox CC 440. 13 R v Miller [1951] VLR 346 at 356. 14 R v Tranby (1991) 52 A Crim R 228 (CCA Qld). 15 R v Ross [1922] VLR 329; R v Weeding [1959] VR 298; R v Rhodes (1984) 14 A Crim R 124; R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201. 16 R v Ross [1922] VLR 329; R v Weeding [1959] VR 298; R v Rhodes (1984) 14 A Crim R 124; R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201.
[CA.4.180]
“Loaded arms”
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A tin box containing gunpowder and detonators, intended to ignite the gunpowder, when anybody opened the box, is not loaded arms.1 1 R v Mountford (1835) 7 Car & Payne 242; 173 ER 107.
[CA.4.200]
“Offensive weapon, etc”
Section 4 does not define an offensive weapon or instrument, nor does it define weapon or instrument except to include a dangerous weapon. The purpose of the definition in s 4 is simply to extend the ordinary meaning to imitations or replicas. The following statements may be considered useful: “Although it is difficult to say what should or should not be called an offensive weapon, it would be going a great deal too far to say that nothing but guns, pistols, daggers and instruments of war should be so considered … bludgeons, properly so called, clubs, and anything that is not in common use for any other purpose but a weapon, are clearly offensive weapons”.1 “There are nisi prius cases reported which encourage me to read the words ‘offensive weapons’ as applying to instruments which like swords and bludgeons may fairly be said to be constructed or to be used for one purpose only – attacking – and to instruments which are adapted to inflicting injuries in combat or attack, but have other uses, only if they are carried on the occasion in question with the intention of using them for purposes of attack, be that the sole purpose or one among others”.2 If a weapon is not an offensive weapon per se the onus is on the prosecution to prove that it is.3 Specific articles have been considered, eg a leather belt with brass studs,4 knuckle-duster,5 short metal bar,6 flick knife.7 1 R v Hutchinson (1784) 1 Leach 339 at 343; 168 ER 273 at 274–275. 2 Threlfall v Panzera [1958] VR 547 at 550 per Gavan Duffy J. See also R v Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466.
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s4
[CA.4.220]
“Place of Divine worship”
A church tower only accessible from the body of the church1 or a vestry opening into the church2 are parts of the church. 1 R v Wheeler (1829) 3 Car & Payne 585; 172 ER 556. 2 R v Evans & Smith (1842) Car & M 298; 174 ER 515.
[CA.4.240]
“Trustee”
In the English Larceny Act 1916, s 46, the definition of “trustee” is limited to a trustee on some express trust created by some deed, will or instrument in writing. As to persons held to be within the definition, see the cases.1 1 R v Fletcher (1862) Le & Ca 180; 169 ER 1353; R v Gibbs (1855) 169 ER 798; Dears 445; 6 Cox CC 455; R v Townshend (1884) 15 Cox CC 466; R v Davies [1913] 1 KB 573.
[CA.4.260]
“Valuable security”
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The definition of “property” in s 4 includes valuable securities. The following have been held to be valuable securities: a transfer of shares in a company,1 scrip certificates of shares in the funds of a foreign company,2 post-office orders (being warrants and orders for payment of money),3 an agreement by A to pay B money if B does not bring an action,4 a cheque in irregular form,5 a forged letter which could be an authority for payment of money if correctly signed,6 a document which will be a complete bill of sale when signed by the drawer,7 a request for a bank draft,8 a promissory note which is not valuable until delivered to a certain person,9 a pawnbroker’s ticket,10 a deed marked as cancelled under the Real Property Act 1900,11 insurance stamps (English),12 and a clearing house automated payment system order.13 It is not necessary to show that anything is due on a cheque for it to be a valuable security.14 Cheques made out to the accused and wrongly received by him after his resignation from his employer were not valuable securities until they came into his possession and therefore he did not “take” them as such.15 An unstamped order for payment of money which could not be paid without a penalty is not a valuable security.16 1 2 3 4 5
R v Smith (1898) 62 JP 231. Cf R v Lanauze (1847) 2 Cox CC 362. R v Smith (1855) Dears 561; 169 ER 845. R v Gilchrist (1841) Car & M 224; 174 ER 482. R v John (1875) 13 Cox CC 100. R v Smith (1878) 1 SCR NS (NSW) 71; R v Murphy (1890) 7 WN (NSW) 21. Cf Orbit Mining and Trading Co v Westminster Bank [1963] 1 QB 794. 6 R v Rose (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 31; 3 WN 77. 7 R v Bowerman [1891] 1 QB 112. 8 R v Anderson (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 153.
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3 R v Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466; R v Allamby [1974] 1 WLR 1494; [1974] 3 All ER 126; 59 Cr App R 189; Haggarty v Palmer (1974) 5 ALR 53; Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490; R v Dayle [1974] 1 WLR 181; [1973] 3 All ER 1151; Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1986] 1 WLR 796; [1986] 2 All ER 570; (1986) 83 Cr App R 145. 4 Considine v Kirkpatrick [1971] SASR 73. 5 Miller v Hrvojevic [1972] VR 305. 6 Evans v Hughes [1972] 1 WLR 1452; [1972] 3 All ER 412; 56 Cr App R 813. 7 Gibson v Wales [1983] 1 WLR 393; [1983] 1 All ER 869; (1983) 76 Cr App R 60; R v Simpson [1983] 1 WLR 1494; [1983] 3 All ER 789; (1984) 78 Cr App R 115.
Crimes Act 1900 s 4A
[CA.4.260]
9 R v Gordon (1889) 23 QBD 354; R v Graham (1913) 8 Cr App R 149. See also R v Ransom (1812) Russ & Ry 232; 168 ER 776. 10 R v Morrison (1859) Bell 158; 169 ER 1210. 11 R v White (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 379; 21 WN 104. As to a memorandum of transfer under the Real Property Act 1900, see R v Lower [1948] SASR 227. 12 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Chiuk-Wah (Pat) [1971] AC 835; 55 Cr App R 342. 13 R v King [1992] QB 20; (1991) 93 Cr App R 259. 14 R v Warren (1861) 22nd March 1861. Argus (Newspr) (Vic). 15 R v Wauchope (1957) 2 FLR 191. See also Ex parte Muszkat; Re Casas (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 87. 16 R v Yates (1827) 1 Mood 170; 168 ER 1229.
4A
Recklessness
For the purposes of this Act, if an element of an offence is recklessness, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. [S 4A insrt Act 57 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3[1]]
SECTION 4A COMMENTARY History and application ....................................................................................................................... [CA.4A.20] Meaning of recklessness ................................................................................................................... [CA.4A.40]
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[CA.4A.20]
History and application
Until it was omitted by the Crimes Amendment Act 2007,1 the fault element of various offences under the Crimes Act 1900 was “maliciously” under the former s 5. The expression “maliciously” attracted significant judicial criticism2 and was not easy to explain to juries.3 The discarding of maliciously was said to remove an “archaic” fault element from the Crimes Act and to replace it “with the more modern fault elements of ‘recklessly’ and ‘intentionally’ where appropriate”.4 In relation to s 35, reckless infliction of grievous bodily harm or wounding, this change was with effect from 27 September 2007. For other offences previously having maliciously as the fault element, the change was from 15 February 2008. Soon after the omission of maliciously, s 4A was introduced by the Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2007,5 providing that recklessness may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. This was explained by the Attorney General in the Second Reading speech, “A minor amendment is being made for abundant clarity, to put beyond doubt that recklessness … may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. This is in line with the Commonwealth criminal code.”6 As to the purpose of this extended meaning, see [CA.4A.40]. “Recklessly” or cognate expression is now the or a fault element instead of “maliciously” in offences under ss 31(1), 32, 35, 35A, 39(1), 42, 46, 60(3), 60(3A), 60A(3), 60E(3), 61J(1), 61K, 66C, 80A, 95, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 138, 154C, 195, 201, 202, 210. Recklessly or cognate expression is also a fault element in offences under ss 43A, 80D, 80E, 93GA, 93T, 193B, 193D, 203E, 204, 307A, 308D, 308E, 529. 1 The expression “malicious” and the definition of “maliciously” were omitted from the Crimes Act altogether by the Crimes Amendment Act 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2]. 2 Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493; [1955] HCA 59 per Fullagar J at 510 (CLR); Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 per Dixon CJ at 59; Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 213; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 per Hunt J at 472 (NSWLR); 309–310 (A Crim R) with Finlay and Allen JJ agreeing. 3 R v Safwan (1986) 8 NSWLR 97; 23 A Crim R 385 per Street CJ at 101–102 (NSWLR); 388–389 (A Crim R); R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 per Hunt J at 472 (NSWLR); 309–310 (A Crim R); R v Livingstone [2004] NSWCCA 122.
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4 Second Reading Speech Crimes (Amendment) Bill 2007 (NSW), (Hansard, Legislative Council, 26 September 2007). 5 Act 57 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3[1]. 6 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 November 2007). The similar provision in the Commonwealth Code is s 5.4(4), see [CA.4A.40].
Meaning of recklessness
There is no definition of recklessness in the Crimes Act 1900. “‘Recklessness’ is a concept about risk. It relates to the degree of foresight of a particular result associated with a certain course of action and deciding to engage in that conduct despite the potential consequences.”1 A judicially approved definition of recklessness in a case of malicious infliction of actual bodily harm in Coleman was “a realisation of the possibility that some such injury might result but nevertheless proceeding to act.”2 Absent from these definitions (because it rarely arises in practice) is the necessary requirement that the risk be unjustified.
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Recklessness is defined in the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995: 5.4 Recklessness (1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if: (a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk. (2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if: (a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk. (3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact. (4) If recklessness is a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element. It has been judicially remarked that “Every crime involving mens rea … requires either intention or recklessness …”.3 The term “intention” in criminal law does not readily lend itself to precise definition.4 Although intention often involves acting to achieve a desired result,5 desire is not a necessary component of intention (or of recklessness either).6 However, intention connotes an element of purpose.7 Less commonly, intent can mean acting in the knowledge of a prohibited circumstance.8 By contrast, the essence of recklessness is acting with the awareness of unjustified risk rather than acting with purpose.9 The purpose of the extended meaning of recklessness in s 4A appears to be to ensure that an accused charged with an offence committed recklessly, will not escape liability if a jury considers his or her true state of mind involved not mere recklessness, but rather actual intention. Recklessness is an easier state of mind to prove than intention. “Intention cannot exist without foresight, but foresight can exist without intention.”10 A person who throws rocks from a bridge at cars passing underneath may act indifferent to the risk of injury to anyone travelling below (I couldn’t care less) or may simply act for the thrill of it, hoping no one is actually injured. Each is a reckless state of mind. It was this exact conduct that led to the enactment of the Crimes Amendment Act 200711 which removed “maliciously” as a fault element for various offences under the Crimes Act 1900 and substituted “recklessly”. The penalties for malicious or reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding under s 35 were increased. The fault element (mens rea) of recklessness is foresight of risk of a prohibited result or circumstance – the physical element (actus reus) is an action which objectively involves unreasonable risk of that prohibited result or circumstance.12
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[CA.4A.40]
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The risk must be unjustified, a risk without social utility. Therefore, a surgeon who performs a necessary but hazardous operation is not liable if it fails.13 The idea of criminal liability for an act not actually intended is to encompass gross deviations from accepted standards of conduct. “The value of the concept of recklessness is that it furnishes an acceptable basis of responsibility for conduct which is socially advantageous to regard as criminal but which cannot without distortion be accommodated within the concept of intention.”14 The question of whether a risk was unjustified would ordinarily be a question for prosecuting authorities and will rarely arise at trial. “I think it wise to bear in mind the possibility that words such as reckless or recklessly, which can be used in a number of different contexts, may not necessarily be expected to bear the same meaning in all statutory provisions in which they are found”.15
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For many offences involving recklessness as mens rea, proof of recklessness requires proof that an accused subjectively foresaw the prohibited result or circumstance as a possibility and yet proceeded to act. The requirement of subjective foresight has been legislatively modified in cases involving self-induced intoxication and the issue of consent in sexual assault cases. Also, in cases of reckless driving, all that must be proved is that an accused’s driving was objectively reckless.16 In murder cases, foresight of death or grievous bodily harm must be as a probability, not merely a possibility, see commentary at [CA.5.140]. For most indictable offences and subject to the special exceptions just mentioned, recklessness requires proof of the accused’s subjective foresight of the relevant risk.17 In England, originally the same requirement of subjective recklessness existed.18 But the 1982 House of Lords’ decision of Caldwell changed the position to one where objective recklessness could suffice as well.19 However, England in the 2003 House of Lords’ decision of G has now judicially reverted to the same longstanding requirement in New South Wales, ie that in general, subjective recklessness only will suffice.20 The requirement for proof of subjective foresight is consistent with the idea of recklessness as mens rea, a guilty mind and makes allowance for accused people such as children and those with mental disabilities who may not foresee otherwise obvious risks.21 For others, in the case of an obvious risk, it has been judicially remarked that the requirement of proof of the accused’s subjective awareness of the risk is not unduly burdensome on the prosecution: In a contested case based on intention, the defendant rarely admits intending the injurious result in question, but the tribunal of fact will readily infer such an intention, in a proper case, from all the circumstances and probabilities and evidence of what the defendant did and said at the time. Similarly with recklessness: it is not to be supposed that the tribunal of fact will accept a defendant’s assertion that he never thought of a certain risk when all the circumstances and probabilities and evidence of what he did and said at the time show that he did or must have done.22 The High Court has spoken of “the law’s scepticism in accepting later assertions as to the existence or absence of a mental state which are at odds with practical experience of life.”23 An accused who says he “closed his mind” to a particular risk, implicitly acknowledges initial recognition of that very risk; but an accused’s statement “it never crossed my mind”, if accepted as a reasonable possibility, negates recklessness.24 Criminal recklessness differs from civil negligence in that negligence is determined on an objective standard25 and is incompatible with the criminal requirement of mens rea, a guilty mind. Self-induced intoxication forms a special case. The former requirement for proof of subjective foresight in cases of self-induced intoxication was judicially altered in England in Majewski.26 But before the enactment of Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 applying to offences alleged from 16 August 1996, the New South Wales position remained that intoxication was relevant to the question of the states of mind of both specific intent and recklessness.27 Part 11A adopted the English view. The matter is now governed by s 428D which provides that in cases of self-induced intoxication, in determining whether a person had the mens rea for an offence other than for an offence of specific intent, evidence of the person’s intoxication cannot be taken into account. Despite the logical difficulty which can be involved in applying this provision to proof of subjective foresight, it is an exceptional rule, founded in public policy.28
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In sexual assault cases, the issue of an accused knowing a complainant did not consent can involve subjective recklessness, but also what is, in effect, objective or inadvertent recklessness. An accused will be liable on the basis of inadvertent recklessness where he has not turned his mind to the risk that the complainant was not consenting when this risk would have been obvious to someone with the accused’s mental capacity, see 61HA(3)(c).29
In at least two cases in New South Wales, Coleman in 1990 and Blackwell in 2011, it has been argued that what should be generally required for criminal recklessness (and not just for murder) is the foresight of the probability of the prohibited result or circumstance, rather than simply the possibility. In each case, this submission was expressly rejected.32 The criminal law does not seek to define the degree of requisite subjective awareness of risk attracting criminal liability beyond possibility and probability. But it has been observed that the slighter the risk, the less likely it will be that the accused will either have been, or be thought by a jury to have been, aware of it.33
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Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 is a decision of some importance. There it was held that in a case of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm under s 35 of the Crimes Act, the possibility that the accused must foresee is not, as was previously the case when the fault element was “maliciously”, simply the possibility of some physical harm,34 but instead the possibility of actual grievous bodily harm.35 1 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General — Model Criminal Code Discussions Paper Chapter 5 p 53 — June 1998. 2 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 471 (NSWLR); 309 (A Crim R) per Hunt J (Finlay and Allen JJ agreeing). 3 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465 at 34 (SR (NSW)) per Street CJ; Roper CJ in Eq. and Herron J. “Judicial examination of the distinction between various forms of mens rea has not been extensive.” — He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 569 (CLR); 236 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 4 In R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025 (HL) at 926 (AC) Lord Bridge, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, said that ordinarily, “when directing a jury on the mental element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent …”. See also Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 at 165-166 (A Crim R) per Kirby J. 5 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64 per Kitto J. 6 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Lord Hailsham; R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN 465 at 33-34 (SR (NSW)) (CCA). 7 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 95 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. 8 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 572-589 (CLR); 238-251 (A Crim R). 9 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Lord Hailsham. 10 Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th ed (1966), by J W C Turner, Cambridge University Press at [24]. 11 Second Reading Speech Crimes (Amendment) Bill 2007 (NSW), (Hansard, Legislative Council, 26 September 2007). 12 Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 358 per Lord Edmund-Davies (in a dissenting judgment later approved in R v G [2003] UKHL 50). 13 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 470 (CLR); 23 (A Crim R). 14 Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed by Brent Fisse at 496. 15 R v Reid [1992] 1 WLR 793 (HL) at 807 per Lord Goff. 16 R v Hain [1966] 2 NSWR 142; (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 7 at 145 (NSWLR); 10 (WN (Pt 1) (NSW)); R v Goodwin (unreported NSWCCA 10 December 1991 pp 5-6).
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Murder cases apart, what an accused must be proven to have foreseen is the possibility of the prohibited result or circumstance, rather than the probability of it.30 In cases of murder, it must be shown that the accused foresaw death or grievous bodily harm as a probability,31 and see [CA.5.140].
Crimes Act 1900
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s 4B
[CA.4A.40]
17 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN 465 (CCA); R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155; Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64 per Kitto J; Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 119 per Barwick CJ. 18 The authorities including R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155 are reviewed in the House of Lords’ decision in R v G [2003] UKHL 50. 19 According to the widely criticised majority decision of the House of Lords in Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, a case of arson by an accused with self-induced intoxication. 20 R v G [2003] UKHL 50 where Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 was expressly and unanimously overruled. 21 R v G [2003] UKHL 50 at [32], [33] per Lord Bingham, with whom Lords Browne-Wilkinson; Steyn; Hutton and Roger agreed. 22 R v G [2003] UKHL 50 at [39] per Lord Bingham. A similar observation was made by Geoffrey Lane LJ in R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695 at 703. 23 Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 at [8] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 24 Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 358 per Lord Edmund-Davies (in a dissenting judgment later approved in R v G [2003] UKHL 50; Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 at [3]. 25 Caldwell at 358 per Lord Edmund-Davies; Banditt at [2]. 26 R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 (HL). 27 R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306. Regarding murder by reckless indifference, the authorities are set out at [37] of R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243. 28 See R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243 at [68]-[95] per Wood CJ at CL; R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695 at 704. 29 Even before the enactment of s 61HA in 2007, for the purposes of the law of consent to sexual intercourse, recklessness concerning consent could be both advertent and non-advertent: R v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334; R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 (CA); R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293; R v Mitton (2002) 132 A Crim R 123; [2002] NSWCCA 124. 30 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155; R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 at 426 (QB); R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 475 (NSWLR); 312 (A Crim R) per Hunt J; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 40; R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97 at [97] per McColl JA. As observed by Hunt J in R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 476 (NSWLR); 313 (A Crim R), the possibility (and not the probability) test was always accepted for the common law crime of rape (authorities cited). See also Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 at [33]. 31 La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; [1976] HCA 52; R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19. 32 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306; Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 at [76]–[78]. 33 Howard’s Criminal Law 5th ed by Brent Fisse at 490. 34 R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 at 426 (QB) per Diplock LJ; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 475 (NSWLR); 312 (A Crim R) per Hunt J; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 40. 35 Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 at [82] per Beazley JA (with James J agreeing).
4B
Dishonesty (1) In this Act: dishonest means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.
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(2) In a prosecution for an offence, dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact. [S 4B insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[1]]
SECTION 4B COMMENTARY [CA.4B.20]
Meaning of “dishonesty”
For detailed commentary on this definition and the meaning of “dishonesty”, see [CA.197.100]. Maliciously [Repealed]
CA
5
[S 5 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
SECTION 5 COMMENTARY
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Editor’s note .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.5.20] History ................................................................................................................................................... [CA.5.40] Cross reference .................................................................................................................................... [CA.5.60] Judicial comment on “maliciously” ........................................................................................................ [CA.5.80] Meaning of “maliciously” ..................................................................................................................... [CA.5.100] (1) (Actual) Intention ........................................................................................................................... [CA.5.120] (2) Recklessness ................................................................................................................................ [CA.5.140] Foresight of consequences ................................................................................................................ [CA.5.160] Other aspects of “maliciously” ............................................................................................................ [CA.5.180] Jury directions .................................................................................................................................... [CA.5.200]
[CA.5.20] Editor’s note The following commentary relates to s 5 of the Crimes Act 1900 before it was repealed by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2] . [CA.5.40]
History
Historical Commentary Previously s 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883. [CA.5.60]
Cross reference
Historical Commentary “Maliciously” appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900: ss 31(1), 32, 33, 33A, 35, 35A, 36, 39, 41, 41A, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 61J(2)(a), 61K(a), 95(2)(b), 105A(1), 138, 194(3), 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202(a), (b), 210(a), 211(1)(a), (b), 211(2)(a), (b). Also Justices (Short Description of Miscellaneous Offences) Act s 195(a); Police Offences Act 1901 ss 135(2), 136(2) and Prisons Act 1952 (now the Correctional Centres Act 1952) ss 45A(4), 46(1). See also mens rea at [CLP.1240] and “recklessness” at [CA.5.140]. [CA.5.80]
Judicial comment on “maliciously”
Historical Commentary “Few words have caused more trouble both at common law and in the interpretation of statutes where it occurs”.1 The definition in s 5 has attracted other judicial criticism.2 1 per Dixon CJ in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 59.
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2 Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493; [1955] HCA 59 per Fullagar J at 510 (CLR); Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 213; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 472 (NSWLR), 309 (A Crim R). But compare R v Smith [1982] 1 NSWLR 1 and also R v Harvey (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 39; 3 WN (NSW) 83 where Innes J at p 44 (LR (NSW)) described the definition in an earlier act as “very correct”. See also R v Kurtic (1996) 85 A Crim R 57.
[CA.5.100]
Meaning of “maliciously”
Historical Commentary The principle is that in any statutory definition of “crime”, “malice” must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general, but as requiring either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ie, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to nor does it indeed require any ill will towards the person injured.1 “The term malice, as interpreted by the Courts, has two different meanings; one being actual malice or malice in fact, and the other implied or constructive malice, which is ‘malice in law’.”2 1 Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law, 16th ed (1952), approved in R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155 and R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402. See also R v Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119. 2 Stephen & Oliver – Criminal Law Manual 1883 p 7 and see Shearer v Shields [1914] AC 808 at 813.
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[CA.5.120]
(1) (Actual) Intention
Historical Commentary An “intention” to my mind connotes a state of affairs which the party “intending” does more than merely contemplate: it connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in him lies, to bring about, and which, in point of possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about,1 by his own act of volition.2 [T]he word contains in its connotation elements of purpose. It is not merely that the mind goes with the act but that the mind intends by the act to achieve something.3 The question is what was the accused’s actual intention. “[I]t is the intention of the particular accused which is in issue, not that of some hypothetical average or reasonable man.”4 The High Court has disapproved “the supposed presumption … that a man intends the natural, or natural and probable, consequences of his acts”.5 But in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is usual to direct the jury that a person’s acts may themselves provide the most convincing evidence of his intention.6 The accused is entitled to give evidence of his state of mind at the relevant time.7 1 The degree of probability required to constitute intention is discussed in R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; [1986] 2 WLR 357; [1986] 1 All ER 646 at 473 (AC) and see also R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 where the High Court in a joint judgment said at 469 (CLR) “Indeed, on one view, a person who does an act knowing its probable consequences may be regarded as having intended those consequences to occur.” 2 Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237; [1950] 1 All ER 720 per Asquith LJ at 253 (KB) quoted by Lord Hailsham in Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC). This definition was applied in NSW in ICAL Ltd v County Natwest Securities Aust Ltd (1988) 13 ACLR 129. See also R v Mohan [1976] QB 1. 3 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 at 95 (CLR) per Barwick CJ. 4 R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263. 5 Smyth v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 163; [1957] HCA 24 at 166 (CLR). Also Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 365 (CLR); Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; [1960] HCA 2 at 596–597 (CLR); Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 632 (CLR). 6 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25.
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7 R v Fitzpatrick (1926) 19 Cr App R 91.
[CA.5.140]
(2) Recklessness
Murder – “A person who, without lawful justification or excuse, does an act knowing that it is probable that death or grievous bodily harm will result, is guilty of murder if death in fact results. It is not enough that he does the act knowing that it is possible but not likely that death or grievous bodily harm might result.”: R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 469–470 (CLR).4 It should be noted that this is the position at common law. In NSW, because of the wording of s 18“… with reckless indifference to human life …”, indifference as to whether grievous bodily harm will probably be caused, as distinct from the probability of death, will not suffice for murder: see R v Solomon [1980] 1 NSWLR 321; (1979) 1 A Crim R 247. As indicated in [CA.5.100], the definition of “malice” adds nothing to the concept of murder.5 Other Offences – “… in statutory offences other than murder, the degree of recklessness required to establish that an act was done maliciously was a realisation on the part of the accused that the particular kind of harm in fact done (that is, some physical harm – but not necessarily the degree of harm in fact so done) might be inflicted (that is, may possibly be inflicted) yet he went ahead and acted.”: R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 475 (NSWLR), 312 (A Crim R) and quoted in R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 40.6 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
There must, however, be an act which is intended to inflict some substantial injury.7 1 Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th ed (1966) par 24. 2 Vallance v The Queen (1961) CLR 56 where the accused fired an air gun towards a girl intending to frighten her but in fact wounding her. Also R v Stones [1955] SR 25; 72 WN 465; R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155; R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42. 3 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 475 (NSWLR), 313 (A Crim R) where relevant case law is extensively reviewed. See also R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25. 4 See also R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 and the article “Murder, Recklessness and Grievous Bodily Harm” by Professor D Lanham (1978) 2 Criminal Law Journal 255. 5 Howard, Australian Criminal Law (5th ed 1990), pp 44–45. 6 See also R v Galasso (1981) 4 A Crim R 454, but compare to that case the judgment of Roden J in R v Storey (1985) 19 A Crim R 275. 7 R v Harvey (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 39; 3 WN (NSW) 83 where the accused, not realising water in a bucket was scalding, threw the water over a boy he thought cheeky and injured him.
[CA.5.160]
Foresight of consequences
Historical Commentary In our opinion the word “maliciously” in a statutory crime postulates foresight of consequence.1 [I]t is, we think, clear that malice in law generally means intention or recklessness. Generally speaking, malice aforethought means only intention, but the combined effect of s 5 and s 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 in New South Wales is to set up exceptional cases of constructive murder where it includes states of mind other than an intention to kill. It seems probable that the attempt to define “maliciously” and “murder” by statute was to overcome difficulties in proof of the accused’s mental state and to add to intent such note which must be taken to be the natural and probable consequences of the unlawful act
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Historical Commentary “Intention cannot exist without foresight, but foresight can exist without intention.”1 To prove the mental element for an offence including malice, it is not necessary to show that the result of the act was desired. It is sufficient if the result is foreseen.2“The degree of reckless indifference required for the crime of murder, amounting to an act done ‘of malice’ (or malice aforethought) is altogether of a different order to that required for lesser crimes”3
Crimes Act 1900 s5
[CA.5.160]
done, or, as it has been phrased “it is a device for relieving the prosecution from the duty of proving the wicked intent appropriate for the crime”.2 The important thing is not the desire of consequence, ie, motive or intent, but merely foresight of consequence which is the common factor to intention and recklessness. Every crime involving mens rea requires one or other factor, so that if it does not positively require intention, it requires either intention or recklessness; and particularly is this so in crimes involving malice.3 One who acts negligently, that is, without considering the risk of the occurrence of a given type of harm in consequence of his or her act does not act “maliciously”.4 1 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 at 400. 2 [1954] Criminal Law Review 666. 3 R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465 at 34 (SR (NSW)), 471 (WN). See also R v Whitehead [1960] VR 12; R v Smyth [1963] VR 737; R v Lovett [1975] VR 488. 4 R v Mogg (1830) 4 Car & P 363; 172 ER 741; R v Harvey (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 39; 3 WN (NSW) 83; R v Lubienski (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 55; 9 WN (NSW) 159.
[CA.5.180]
Other aspects of “maliciously”
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Historical Commentary It has been said that s 5 is a correct definition of “malice” as known in common law.1 In an earlier case, the effect of s 5 was put somewhat differently to that set out above. There, it is stated that the effect of the definition seems to be that an act is done maliciously if it is done (1) with express malice, ie, with an actual intention to do an injury of the same kind as that which in fact was done; or (2) with indifference to human life or suffering, or with intent to injure, where there is no lawful cause or excuse for doing the act; or (3) recklessly or wantonly.2 The injurious act may have been directed against a person other than the one actually injured (“transferred malice”).3 An intention to assault does not of itself supply the intention to maliciously injure property.4 1 R v Sadler (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 380; 17 WN 144. See also Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; Elliott v C [1983] 1 WLR 939; [1983] 2 All ER 1005; R v Egan (1985) 15 A Crim R 20; Director of Public Prosecutions v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067; 1 All ER 331. 2 R v Harvey (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 39; 3 WN (NSW) 83. Cf Stephens, History of Criminal Law, vol 2 p 118. 3 R v Saunders & Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473; 75 ER 706; R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359. 4 Kippist v Parnell (1988) 36 A Crim R 18.
[CA.5.200]
Jury directions
Historical Commentary “There are no doubt cases in which the ‘eloquence’ of the intention of the perpetrator of an act, is such that the requirement of malice (or mens rea) is so obviously satisfied that a formal direction as to it may serve no purpose beyond imposing an unnecessary burden upon the jury.”1 It will often be sufficient to direct that an act is done maliciously if done intentionally and without lawful excuse. Even the aspect of “without lawful excuse” need not be put to the jury unless the evidence raises that issue.2 If the injury is indirect, the element of foresight arises and requires an appropriate direction.3 As stated above, where recklessness is relied upon to prove malice, except in cases of murder, an act is done recklessly if the accused realised the possibility of injury or damage.4 The terms “intention” and “recklessness” require little elaboration.5 With a charge such as s 33 which includes both a specific element of intent and the ingredient of “maliciously”, judicial views in NSW have differed as to how much of the s 5 definition should be given.6 Despite an earlier decision that there is no error in quoting the whole of the definition in s 5,7 and the subsequent suggestion that a paraphrase of s 5 may suffice,8 neither approach was taken in R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333. There it was held that where a trial judge told a jury that if an accused had
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intended to inflict grievous bodily harm, he had acted maliciously. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that any further reference to the definition of “maliciously” was not only unecessary but unwise as it may confuse the jury on the separate issue of specific intent.
1 2 3 4 5
6
7 8
6
R v Storey (1985) 19 A Crim R 275 per Roden J at 300. R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 472 (NSWLR), 309 (A Crim R). R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41 at 120 (WLR). R v Galasso (1981) 4 A Crim R 454; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25. R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025 at 926 (AC) followed in R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 (“intent”); R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41 at 119 (WLR) (“recklessness”). Compare R v Smith [1982] 1 NSWLR 1 to R v Safwan (1986) 8 NSWLR 97; 23 A Crim R 385 per Street CJ at 101 (NSWLR), 389 (A Crim R) (Cf judgments of Lee and McInerney JJ) and to R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333. Compare also these approaches to that taken in other jurisdictions – see R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 where it was held that it may be unecessary to refer to maliciously at all and R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65 where King CJ said that the introduction of the concept of recklessness into the definition of “malice” in such an offence is apt to mislead a jury. R v Smith [1982] 1 NSWLR 1. R v Safwan (1986) 8 NSWLR 97; 23 A Crim R 385 per Street CJ at 101 (NSWLR), 389 (A Crim R) (Cf judgments of Lee and McInerney JJ).
Month [Repealed]
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[S 6 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[3]; am Act 121 of 2001]
SECTION 6 COMMENTARY [CA.6.20]
“Month”
Sentence of one month’s imprisonment imposed on 31 October will expire on 30 November. The imprisonment ends at 12 o’clock at night on the day immediately preceding the day in the following month corresponding to the day on which the imprisonment began. If there are not enough days in the second month to satisfy this rule, the prisoner will be liberated on the last day of the second month.1 1 Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233.
7
“Possession” when criminal
Where by this or any other Act the unlawful receiving of any property, or its possession without lawful cause or excuse, is expressed to be an offence, every person shall be deemed to have such property in his or her possession within the meaning of such Act who: (a) has any such property in his or her custody, or (b) knowingly has any such property in the custody of another person, or (c) knowingly has any such property in a house, building, lodging, apartment, field, or other place, whether belonging to or occupied by himself or herself or not, and whether such property is there had or placed for his or her own use, or the use of another. [S 7 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[21]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [2]]
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This subject is discussed in more detail under this sub-heading in s 33.
Crimes Act 1900 s7
[CA.7.20]
SECTION 7 COMMENTARY Application of section 7, contents of commentary and cross-references ............................................ [CA.7.20] Concept of criminal possession – summary ........................................................................................ [CA.7.40] Criminal offences involving possession ................................................................................................ [CA.7.60] Meaning of criminal possession ........................................................................................................... [CA.7.80] Joint possession ................................................................................................................................. [CA.7.100] Possession and intent ........................................................................................................................ [CA.7.120] Jury directions on possession ............................................................................................................ [CA.7.140]
[CA.7.20]
Application of section 7, contents of commentary and cross-references
Section 7 applies as far as practicable to all offences and all courts: s 3. It has been held not relevant to offences under the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985: R v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64. [CA.7.40]
Concept of criminal possession – summary
In summary, at common law criminal possession, a question of fact, can be stated as: 1. Knowingly having either physical possession or control of an object to the exclusion of any other person (other than another person having joint possession of it). 2. There must be an intention to possess the object (including some knowledge of its true nature). Mere access to or knowledge of the presence of an object without a present intention to possess it is not criminal possession. Section 7 appears to add little to the common law meaning.
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[CA.7.60]
Criminal offences involving possession
Possession of certain chattels with a particular intent was no offence at common law.1 But, by various statutory provisions, it is. Examples include possessing an offensive weapon to commit an indictable offence or to resist arrest,2 possessing explosives with intent to injure or to commit a serious indictable offence,3 possessing housebreaking implements or implements to enter or drive a conveyance,4 possessing data with intent to commit a serious computer offence,5 possessing goods reasonably suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained,6 possessing child pornography,7 unlawfully possessing a driver’s licence,8 possessing firearms without authorisation,9 and possessing liquor by minors.10 In addition, there is possession of various prohibited drugs contrary to the Drugs Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 which sometimes involves statutory concepts peculiar to drugs – for specialised commentary on drug possession, see [DMTA.7.40] and following. Possession can also be an element of various offences; larceny11 and receiving stolen property are examples.12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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R v Heath (1810) Russ & Ry 184; 168 ER 750; R v Dugdale (1853) 1 El & Bl 435; 118 ER 499. Crimes Act 1900 s 33B. Crimes Act 1900 s 55. Crimes Act 1900 s 114(1). Crimes Act 1900 s 308F(1). Crimes Act 1900 s 527C(1). Crimes Act 1900 s 578B(2). Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1998 s 23(1). Firearms Act 1996 s 7A(1). Summary Offences Act 1988 s 11(1). Crimes Act 1900 s 117, see [CA.117.160]. Crimes Act 1900 s 188(1), see [CA.188.100].
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 1 – Preliminary and interpretation [CA.7.80] [CA.7.80]
s7 Meaning of criminal possession
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The High Court decision of Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265; [1919] HCA 32 considered the expression “actual possession” in a Victorian statute. It was held that those words mean “the complete present personal physical control of the property to the exclusion of others not acting in concert with the accused”.5 Although the expression “actual possession” is little used in the Crimes Act 1900, Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 or other NSW criminal statutes,6 nevertheless Moors v Burke is a seminal authority on the meaning of “possession”. Giving judgment for the court, Isaacs J approved this observation: The word “possession” is used in relation to movable things in three different senses. First, it is used to signify mere physical possession … which is rather a state of facts than a legal notion. The law does not define modes or events in which it may commence or cease. It may perhaps be generally described by stating that when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, (1) so far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual control of it at pleasure, and (2) so far as regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land occupied by him, or in some receptacle belonging to him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the thing.7 … No phrase is more usual for describing the ordinary test of possession than the question – “had he the separate undivided and exclusive control of the thing?”8 … Possession is proved by various acts varying with the nature of the subject matter. But exclusiveness is essential. That, of course, does not mean that several persons may not in concert have and exercise that exclusive possession as against the rest of the world.9 The concept of possession is also encapsulated in a series of quotations in the judgment of Gibbs CJ in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 537 (CLR); 212 (A Crim R). Section 7 has not been interpreted in any reported decision.10 The scope of the deeming provisions in s 7 broadly reflect at least the extended meaning of possession as stated in Moors v Burke and later authorities. The situation where one does not have the physical possession of a thing, but rather can assume or resume control of it at will is sometimes called “de facto possession” or “constructive possession”. Of this, the High Court said “de facto possession is a conception which is itself much more extensive than that of physical custody. It is wide enough to include any case where the person alleged to be in possession has hidden the thing effectively so that he can take it into his physical custody when he wishes and where others are unlikely to discover it except by accident.”11 The idea of possession as including control involves the notion of exclusivity of possession (apart from joint possession with any other or others acting in concert). Exclusivity of possession can arise from the legal right to exclude others or simply by means of physical exclusion, including concealment. In determining the extent of the exclusivity of control necessary to constitute possession, it has been held that the prosecution does not have to prove impossibility of, or difficulty of, access to the object by third persons – it is ultimately a question of fact.12 Possession in the criminal law sense is concerned with possession as a state of facts rather than as a legal concept.13 Possession is a question of fact to be inferred from all the circumstances.14 In the High Court, Dawson J observed that “[p]ossession may be an intricate concept for some purposes, but the intricacies
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“Possession” comes from the Latin “possessio” meaning the de facto relationship between the holder of a thing and the thing itself.1 A legal dictionary definition of “possession” is “1. The fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over property. 2. The right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others …”.2 An accepted working definition of “possession” is “[i]n the ordinary use of the word ‘possession’, one has in one’s possession whatever is, to one’s own knowledge, physically in one’s custody or under one’s physical control.”3 Possession does not necessarily involve ownership. Possession has been said to be a larger term than control because possession itself involves control.4
Crimes Act 1900 s7
[CA.7.80]
belong to the civil rather than the criminal law … [where] the concept is a basic one involving the intentional exercise of physical custody or control over something. Knowledge is the basis of the necessary intent.”15 Even so, it has been noted elsewhere that possession “can have various meanings and is sometimes an ambiguous word”.16 It is “always giving rise to trouble”.17 In terms of its definition, “the common law has never formulated a comprehensive definition of the concept of possession” and terms such as “actual possession” and “constructive possession” have tended themselves to be ambiguous.18
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In each case, the meaning of possession depends on the proper interpretation of the context in which it is used.19“One must … attempt from the apparent intention of the Act itself to reach a construction of the word ‘possession’ which is not so narrow as to stultify the practical efficacy of the Act or so broad that it creates absurdity or injustice.”20 So for example, while one might have the possession of explosives with criminal intent in any of the situations encompassed in the three subsections of s 7, one would not possess an offensive weapon with intent to resist arrest by placing it elsewhere “for the use of another”: s 7(c). As earlier stated, the definition in s 7 has been held not relevant to offences under the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985.21 While most criminal liability stems from acts or omissions, having possession of something is not easily regarded as an act or omission but rather, a state of affairs.22 Possession represents not an act but the passive consequences of a prior act, namely, the act of acquisition of possession.23 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 2 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 3 Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks (PC) [1974] AC 862; [1974] 2 WLR 899; [1974] 2 All ER 840 at 866 (AC) per Lord Diplock, applied in R v Boyesen [1982] AC 768; [1982] 2 WLR 882; [1982] 2 All ER 161 at 773–774 (AC) per Lord Scarman and in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 600 (CLR); 259 (A Crim R) by Dawson J (“a working definition”); and at 537 (CLR); 212 (A Crim R) by Gibbs J (Mason J agreeing). 4 Hedberg v Woodhall (1913) 15 CLR 531; [1913] HCA 2 at 535 (CLR) per Griffiths CJ. 5 Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265; [1919] HCA 32 at 274 (CLR). 6 “Actual possession” is used in the Crimes Act 1900 only in s 157 concerning embezzlement by clerks or servants; in the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 only in s 16(b) concerning having possession of a forged or fraudulently altered prescription. The expression is also used s 30(1)(b) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffıc Management) Act 1999 and in ss 16(3)(b) and (c) and 18A(1) of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966. 7 Moors v Burke at 270 (CLR) per Isaacs J quoting Pollock and Wright on Possession in the Common Law (1888) at pp 118–119. This definition was described by Dawson J in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 15 A Crim R 203 at 600; 259 as “somewhat verbose”. 8 Moors v Burke at 270 (CLR) per Isaacs J quoting Pollock and Wright on Possession in the Common Law (1888) at pp 118–119. 9 Moors v Burke at 271 (CLR) per Isaacs J. 10 Section 7 was referred to in R v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64 (NSW CCA). 11 Williams v Douglas (1949) 78 CLR 521; [1949] HCA 40 at 526–527 (CLR) per Latham CJ, Dixon and McTiernan JJ. 12 Baldock v Douglas (1953) 56 WALR 82 at 89 per Virtue J (WA SC). 13 Moors v Burke at 270 (CLR); Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks (PC) at 867 (AC) (PC). 14 R v Solway [1984] 2 Qd R 75; 11 A Crim R 449; Cumming v The Queen (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 (WA CCA). 15 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at per Dawson J at 599 (CLR); 258 (A Crim R). 16 Marshall v Benson (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 151 at 156 per Wallace P (a case of an unlicensed pistol found in a policeman’s residence). In R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293 at 296, possession was said by Doyle CJ to be “a notoriously elusive legal concept” and “difficult to explain”. 17 Marshall v Benson (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 151 at 156 per Wallace P quoting Lord Parker CJ in Towers & Co Ltd v Gray [1961] 2 QB 351 at 361. 18 Marshall v Benson (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 151 at 160 per Mason JA (Holmes JA agreeing); Yeates v Hoare [1981] VR 1034 at 1037 per Kaye J.
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19 Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 304 (AC); 425–426 (Cr App R) per Lord Pearce; Marshall v Benson (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 151 at 156; R v Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298 at 311; See v Milner (1980) 2 A Crim R 210 at 211 (Fed Ct FC); Yeates v Hoare [1981] VR 1034 at 1037 per Kaye J. 20 Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 304 (AC); 424–425 (Cr App R) per Lord Pearce. 21 R v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64 (NSW CCA). 22 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 564 (CLR); 233 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. 23 R v Grant [1975] 2 NZLR 165 at 169 per Mahon J; Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 575 per Gibbs J.
Joint possession
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As earlier noted, the High Court’s decision in Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265; [1919] HCA 32 acknowledged the concept of joint possession. A moveable object may be in the joint possession of two or more people. A simple example is a television in the joint possession of a husband and wife but items of jewellery in their home being in the possession of only the wife.1 Simply because a husband and wife (or any other pair or group) occupy the same home or vehicle does not of itself mean each is in possession of everything in it.2 While physical control or custody may be shared, it must be control or custody to the exclusion of other persons or persons other than those with whom it is shared.3 In the absence of evidence of a common purpose between two people, mere knowledge by one of them of the possession of an object by the other is not sufficient to prove joint possession between them.4 Further, it is not enough for possession that a number of people simply have access to a thing to the exclusion of others.5 It is not a defence for an accused that some other person was a joint possessor of an object.6 1 2 3 4 5
A similar example was given in R v Ngo (2002) 135 A Crim R 550 at [66]. See for example, R v Harrison [1961] Crim LR 256; R v Myall (1986) 43 SASR 258 (FC). R v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64 at 66–67 (NSW CCA); R v Amanatidis (2001) 125 A Crim R 89 at [9]. See for example, R v Pierpoint (1993) 71 A Crim R 187 (NSW CCA). R v Filippetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335 (NSW CCA); R v Sobolewski (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 April 1998); R v Amanatidis (2001) 125 A Crim R 89 at [9]. 6 R v Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 (WA CCA); R v Amanatidis (2001) 125 A Crim R 89 at [53] (NSW CCA).
[CA.7.120]
Possession and intent
The leading authority on the subject of intent in relation to possession is the High Court’s decision in the drug importation case of He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 which held that where a statute makes it an offence to possess goods, in the absence of a sufficient contrary indication, knowledge by an accused that the goods are in his or her custody is a necessary ingredient of the offence because the word “possession” itself necessarily imports a mental element. The judgment of Brennan J is especially noteworthy. “Possession at common law involves knowingly having physical control or custody of the item in question. It is not necessary to have manual custody of the item in order to have possession of it, but where such custody is not present, there must be an intention to exercise domain or power over it.”1 Physical possession or custody itself is often proof of the mental element. “[I]n many cases custody of an object may supply sufficient evidence of possession, including the necessary mental element, … because the inference of knowledge may often be properly drawn from surrounding circumstances.”2 However, where possession is not alleged to be physical, mere knowledge of the presence of a proscribed object without an intention to possess it is insufficient. In a Queensland drug case, the accused admitted to police he knew of cannabis in the bathroom cupboard of his home which he said someone had left there during a party weeks before. He said he had intended to dump the cannabis but that it had “slipped his mind”. It was found that the accused had laid no claim to the cannabis or done anything to move or hide it.
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[CA.7.120]
It was held that he was not in possession of it because before a person can be said to be in possession of an object, he must not only know of its existence, but must lay some claim to it, or exercise some control over it.3 If a person is unaware of being in physical possession of an object such as where something is put into the person’s pocket without his or her knowledge, there cannot be a charge of unlawful possession of it.4 But on becoming aware of the object, if the person deliberately retains it, that will amount to possession of it.5 Momentary physical possession in the course of the act of concealment of an object has been held to be possession in law.6 The question can arise of whether the possessor of a house or box or package is necessarily in possession of everything found in it.7 Intent here involves an intention to possess the object inside including some knowledge of its proscribed nature. In the case of a concealed prohibited drug, the requisite intent may rest on something less than actual knowledge, such as an awareness of the likelihood of its presence.8 As to this, see [DMTA.7.40] subheading “Mental element of possession”. In such cases there can be “innocent possessors”, that is, those who have possession or control in fact but who do not intend to possess.9 It has been held in three English cases that an intention to possess an object does not necessarily include a consciousness at the relevant time that the object is in one’s possession. Two cases involved men who had forgotten they each put an offensive weapon in their cars and the third, a man who had forgotten he put a small quantity of cannabis resin in his wallet while in another country.10 In this last case, the Court of Appeal said that possession does not depend upon the possessor’s powers of memory.11
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In England and Victoria, it has been held that, concerning a charge of possessing an article for use in the course of a burglary, the article possessed had to be intended for use in the course of a future burglary and that possession of the article after commission of the burglary was not an offence.12 1 R v Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185; (1999) 108 A Crim R 223 (Vic CA) at [47] per Chernov JA (Charles JA and Hedigan AJA agreeing). 2 Williams v The Queen (1978) 140 CLR 591; 53 ALJR 101; [1978] HCA 49 at 610 (CLR) per Aickin J, approved by Gibbs CJ in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 537 (CLR); 212 (A Crim R). 3 R v Solway [1984] 2 Qd R 75; 11 A Crim R 449, a case that turned on its own particular facts, see for example, R v Barnier [2001] NSWCCA 459. 4 Irving v Nishimura (1907) 5 CLR 233 at 237. 5 Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 289 (AC); 403 (Cr App R) per Lord Morris. 6 R v Thomas (1981) 6 A Crim R 66; R v Todd [1976] Qd R 21; (1977) 6 A Crim R 105 (both Queensland drug cases). 7 See Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 280 (AC); 390–391 (Cr App R) per Lord Reid (dissenting). 8 Bahri Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; 29 A Crim R 12; Saad v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 20; 61 ALJR 243; [1987] HCA 14; Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR 1; 35 A Crim R 382. 9 Examples are given by Bray CJ in R v Boyce (1976) 15 SASR 40 at 46. 10 R v Buswell [1972] 1 WLR 64; 1 All ER 75 (CA); R v McCalla (1988) 87 Cr App R 372; R v Martindale [1986] 1 WLR 1042; 3 All ER 25; (1987) 84 Cr App R 31 (CA). See also Police v Kennedy (1998) 71 SASR 175; sub nom R v Kennedy (1998) 100 A Crim R 377 (SA SC, Bleby J). 11 R v Martindale [1986] 1 WLR 1042; 3 All ER 25; (1987) 84 Cr App R 31 (CA) at 1044 (WLR); 26 (All ER) per Lord Lane CJ. 12 R v Ellames (1974) 60 Cr App R 7 (CA); R v Marijancevic (1991) 54 A Crim R 431 (Vic CCA).
[CA.7.140] Jury directions on possession A useful summary of quotations concerning the concept of possession can be found in the judgment of Gibbs CJ in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 537 (CLR); 212 (A Crim R). One concise and approved direction is “[t]he concept of possession does not require that
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The following direction given in a drug possession case where a narcotic was found in a flat which the accused occupied with others, was described on appeal as “clear and succinct and [complying] with the law”: The law says this, that possession does not necessarily mean ownership. Possession involves these two concepts: first, that whatever the Crown is alleging is possessed must knowingly be in the accused’s physical custody or be at some place under his physical control and the second component of this word possession is that the accused must have the intention and ability to exercise control and ownership over the particular property in question, to the exclusion of all other people if he wants to.2 Where the facts suggest possession in an accused who choses to give no alternative explanation, a jury is entitled to draw the inference of possession.3 In a “container contents” case, even if it is not in issue, a direction should be given (even briefly) that it must be proved that the accused knew or believed that the container contained the prohibited item.4
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In a case against three men concerning the alleged joint and several possession of offensive weapons found in the possession of only one, the following direction has been said to be appropriate and necessary: [C]onsider the nature of each article and the case of each man individually and separately and have regard to the circumstances as a whole and the time of day. Are you sure that each man intended to use the article he carried to injure someone? Alternatively, are you satisfied that he was a party to a common purpose, with one or more of the others, of using one or more of the articles for inflicting injury upon someone? And, when you consider this alternative, you must first be sure that he knew that one or both of the others had the article which each of them was shown to be carrying.5 In a drug possession case where a couple were jointly charged and one died before trial, the prosecution did not have to prove and the trial judge did not have to direct on exclusive possession in the accused.6 Where the Crown ran a trial on the basis of sole possession but the defence in its case raised the possibility of joint possession, the trial judge did not err in directing on joint possession.7 The appropriate direction concerning possession by receivers has been considered.8 To establish a charge of receiving stolen goods, the prosecution must prove guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. Merely to retain possession of stolen property, which was originally innocently received, when knowledge is obtained that it has in fact been stolen, is not receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen.9 Jury directions in a case of housebreaking implements have been considered.10 1 R v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 at 301 (NSW CCA). 2 R v Trotter [1999] NSWCCA 90 at [10]–[11] per Wood CJ at CL. See also a direction suggested in R v Dib (1991) 52 A Crim R 64 at 66 (NSW CCA). 3 R v Popa (1991) 53 A Crim R 102 at 103, 108; R v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172; 72 A Crim R 160 at 176–177 (A Crim R); R v Greatorex (1994) 74 A Crim R 496 at 498. 4 Bruce v The Queen (1987) 61 ALJR 603 (HC); R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 (NSW CCA); R v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 (NSW CCA). 5 R v Edmonds [1963] 2 QB 142; (1963) 47 Cr App R 114 at 149–150 (QB), 118–120 (Cr App R) (CCA). Concerning directions in relation to three men allegedly in joint possession of heroin in a car, see R v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 at 300 (NSW CCA). 6 R v Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 (WA CCA). 7 R v Tang (2000) 113 A Crim R 393 (NSW CCA). 8 R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 (NSW CCA); R v Cross (1995) 84 A Crim R 242 (NSW CCA). 9 R v Balogh (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 108 (CCA). 10 R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340; (1962) 46 Cr App R 106 (CCA).
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the article be in the hand or the pocket of the possessor but it does require that the possessor knowingly has the article in his physical possession or under his control either individually or jointly with others”.1
Crimes Act 1900 s8
8
[CA.8.20]
“Public place” etc
Where, by this or any other Act, or by any rule, regulation, ordinance or by-law, duly made under or by virtue of the provisions of any Act, any offence, conduct, or language, in a public place, or open and public place, or place of public resort, is made punishable, or a person guilty thereof is made liable to apprehension, the place shall be deemed public for the purposes of the enactment or taken to be otherwise within the meaning if the same, although a vessel or vehicle only, or a room, or field, or place, ordinarily private, was at the time used for a public purpose, or as a place of common resort, or was open to the public on the payment of money or otherwise. [S 8 am Act 10 of 1924, s 4]
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SECTION 8 COMMENTARY [CA.8.20] Public place Section 8 does not define “public place” but states in what cases a place ordinarily private may be deemed public. The section applies to all offences and in whatever court tried: s 3. The section converts a place, etc, which is ordinarily private if at the time of the offence, (1) it was used for a public purpose; (2) it was used as a place of common resort; (3) it was open to the public on the payment of money or otherwise. A public place is one where the public in fact go whether they have a right to go there or not.1 The word “public” relates not to title but to lack of seclusion; not to places where all people may go as of right, but to places where people commonly do go and are likely to be found.2 The following have been held to be public places: a public billiard room,3 unenclosed land adjoining a public house,4 a railway platform,5 a hall for distribution of government relief,6 a private field to which the public were admitted free to watch races,7 a racecourse on Crown land where the public could come and go without hindrance or charges,8 an hotel,9 a shop open to the public,10 a railway goods shed at a time when open to the public,11 a railway carriage travelling on its journey,12 a passenger boat on which the public have a right to travel,13 a partially enclosed entrance to a sanitary convenience for the use of one sex only,14 a place out of sight of public footpath but to which people were in the habit of going without interference,15 the roof of a house in view from other houses,16 a police court passage which is open at certain times to the public,17 a public omnibus,18 sandpit on private land open to the public,19 a room where wharflabourers assemble to be engaged for work,20 a local council board room,21 a bar in a public house,22 brickyard premises,23 a commercial aircraft in flight,24 a motor car standing in a street,25 a dance hall,26 the access passage to a home units building,27 a caravan park.28 The following have been held not to be public places: the reading room of a mechanic’s institute,29 the coffee room of a public house,30 a railway carriage not being used for the conveyance of passengers,31 the Church of England grounds, Kogarah,32 unalienated Crown land,33 a women’s lavatory provided for female staff and tenants but occasionally used by other women,34 a local council office,35 a racecourse area reserved for members,36 a room in a public house,37 a reserve for aborigines,38 a doctor’s waiting rooms,39 a foyer of a hospital.40 1 R v Wellard (1884) 14 QBD 63; R v Collinson (1931) 23 Cr App R 49; Ex parte Brian (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 125; 19 WN 123; Ward v Marsh [1959] VR 26; [1958] ALR 724; Gudgeon v Lewis (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 452; Nicholson v Morgan [1920] SALR 142; R v Button [1966] AC 591. 2 Gudgeon v Lewis (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 452 at 453. 3 Police v Richards 8 MCR (NZ) 99; Fowler v Pitcher [1918] VLR 424. 4 White v Cubitt [1930] 1 KB 443. 5 Woods v Lindsay [1910] SC (J) 88.
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s9
6 Moss v McIntyre [1934] ALR 149. See also Brady v Lenthall [1930] SASR 314. 7 R v Collinson (1931) 23 Cr App R 49. See also Sawtell v Regan (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 362; Sanderson v Allchurch [1922] SASR 7. 8 Ex parte Whelan (1872) 11 SCR (NSW) 88. 9 Ex parte Hallett (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 234. 10 Ex parte Halliday (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 88; Ward v Marsh [1959] VR 26; [1958] ALR 724. 11 Clarriss v Lamb; Ex parte Lamb [1910] QWN 28. 12 Langrish v Archer (1882) 10 QBD 44. 13 Police v Nicholson 19 MCR 44. 14 Moloney v Whitwell [1924] VLR 454 following R v Harris (1871) LR 1 CCR 282. 15 R v Wellard (1884) 14 QBD 63. 16 R v Thallman 169 ER 1416; (1863) Le & Ca 326; 9 Cox CC 388. 17 Ex parte Vardy (1875) Addison’s Digest (1907) 349. 18 R v Holmes (1853) 3 Car & K 360; 175 ER 589; also a tram. 19 Roberts v O’Sullivan [1950] SASR 245. 20 McKinna v Connelly [1918] VLR 641. 21 Taylor v Phelan (1869) 6 W, W & a’B (L) 242. 22 R v Carr (1883) 9 VLR (L) 188; R v Clark (1963) 47 Cr App R 203. As to after hours, see Frischkorn v Rush [1957] QWN 7. 23 O’Sullivan v Arriola [1951] SASR 108. 24 R v Hildebrandt [1964] Qd R 43. 25 Walker v Crawshaw [1924] NZLR 93; Mansfield v Kelly [1972] VR 744. 26 R v Morris (1963) 47 Cr App R 202. 27 Appeal of Camp [1975] 1 NSWLR 452. 28 DPP v Vivier [1991] 4 All ER 18. 29 Moore v Wilson (1911) 28 WN (NSW) 119. 30 Steele v Lewis (1883) 1 QLJ 137. Cf R v Theodoulou [1963] Crim LR 573. 31 Ex parte Freestone (1856) 1 H & N 93; 156 ER 1131. 32 Ex parte Clarke (1895) 15 A Digest (1st ed) 996. 33 Ex parte Dick (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 388. 34 O’Sullivan v Brady [1954] SASR 140. 35 Carroll v Woods [1922] SASR 458. 36 R v Barnard (1884) 18 SALR 54. 37 Morgan v Smallman (1874) 5 AJR 165. 38 Myers v Simpson (1965) 6 FLR 440; [1965] ALR 1148. 39 McAneny v Kearney; Ex parte Kearney [1966] Qd R 306. 40 McIvor v Garlick [1972] VR 129.
9
What offences felonies [Repealed]
[S 9 rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[22]; am Act 58 of 1985; Act 16 of 1955]
SECTION 9 COMMENTARY What offences felonies [Repealed] ....................................................................................................... [CA.9.20] Abolition of s 9 ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.9.40] Felony – historical ................................................................................................................................ [CA.9.60]
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[CA.8.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s9 [CA.9.20]
[CA.9.20] What offences felonies [Repealed]
Whenever, by this Act, a person is made liable to the punishment of penal servitude, the offence for which such punishment may be awarded is hereby declared to be and shall be dealt with as a felony, and wherever in this Act the term “felony” is used, the same shall be taken to mean an offence punishable by penal servitude. [CA.9.40]
Abolition of s 9
Section 580E(1)(inserted by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999) abolished all distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours and repealed s 9. Instead, s 580E(4) substituted for felony, the “serious indictable offence” which, by s 4(1), means an indictable offence punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of five years or more. Serious indictable offence is contrasted to the “minor indictable offence” which, by s 4(1), means an indictable offence which is not a serious indictable offence. Indictable offences are to be contrasted to summary offences. As to the meaning of indictable offences and summary offences. [CA.9.60]
Felony – historical
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“The punishment for felony was always death till the reign of George IV. For misdemeanour, the punishment was always imprisonment or a fine, or both imprisonment and a fine.”1 In R v McHardie and Danielson, it was said that for all practical purposes, the distinction between felony and misdemeanour from a procedural point of view had ceased to exist.2 The division of offences into felonies and misdemeanours was purely arbitrary; depending to a large extent upon the punishment imposed for the particular offence.3 In New South Wales, there was no distinction in prison discipline between penal servitude and imprisonment. For a general discussion on felonies and misdemeanours, see Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed, 1966) pp 123–129. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 provides that the expression “felony” means an indictable offence that is punishable by penal servitude. Section 580F abolished the punishment of penal servitude from 1 January 2000 and by that section, references to “penal servitude” are to be taken as references to “imprisonment”. In other Australian jurisdictions, the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours has been replaced by other classifications.4 The distinction between felonies and misdemeanours has also been abolished in New Zealand,5 and in England.6 In the absence of specific statutory provision, it was not competent for a jury to find a person charged with a misdemeanour guilty of a felony and vice versa.7 Section 425 (also repealed from 1 January 2000 by Act 94 of 1999) made provision for the conviction of a person of a misdemeanour only where a misdemeanour was charged but the facts in evidence amounted to a felony. 1 R v Morris [1951] 1 KB 394; 34 Cr App R 210 at 395–396 (KB) per Lord Goddard. Also S v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 266; 45 A Crim R 221; [1989] HCA 66 at 284 (CLR); 234 (A Crim R) per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 2 R v McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; 10 A Crim R 51 (CCA). The distinction was considered in detail by Lee J in R v Palmer (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 March 1969). 3 Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837. 4 Crimes Act s 322B (Vic); Criminal Law Consolidation Act s 5D (SA); 322B. In the code states the term “felony”, if referred to at all, is taken to refer to a crime under the code, eg Qld Criminal Code s 4(a). 5 See 49 Law Quarterly Review 483. 6 Criminal Law Act 1967, s 1(1). On all matters in which a distinction has previously been made, the law now applicable is as for misdemeanours (s 1(2)). 7 R v Taylor (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 81; R v Mustafa (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 154.
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10
s 10
What offences misdemeanours [Repealed]
[S 10 rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[22]; am Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 10 COMMENTARY
[CA.10.20] What offences misdemeanours [Repealed] Whenever, by this Act, no greater punishment can be awarded than imprisonment, with or without hard labour, or the imposition of a fine, in addition to or without imprisonment, the offence shall be and be dealt with as a misdemeanour only.
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[CA.10.40] Misdemeanour – historical Section 580E introduced into the Crimes Act from 1 January 2000 abolished all distinctions between felony and misdemeanour and substituted “minor indictable offence” for misdemeanour. The word “misdemeanour” in its ordinary sense, meant all those crimes and offences for which the law did not provide a particular name and which were punishable, according to the degree of the offence, by fine or imprisonment; the word was not limited to offences which were punishable only on indictment.1 Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 defines “misdemeanour” as meaning an indictable offence that is not punishable by penal servitude. The punishment of penal servitude was abolished from 1 January 2000 by s 580F. If a statute prohibited or commanded an act of commission or omission of public importance, disobedience to the statute was a common law misdemeanour punishable by indictment, unless such method of procedure manifestly appeared to be excluded by the statute.2 Where an Act creates an offence and prescribes no remedy for it, the offence is indictable at common law.3 It is a recognised rule of law that the imposition of a statutory penalty does not displace the common law remedy.4 To breach regulations made under the authority of a statute is to breach the statute itself.5 Where a statute renders acts punishable for the first time, and contains no general prohibition, such acts cannot be prosecuted by indictment unless that mode of trial is prescribed but can only be prosecuted in the manner which the statute directs.6 Offences punishable at common law are dealt with at [CLO.20]. There is no limit to the term of imprisonment which may be imposed for a common law misdemeanour but where the offence charged is an attempt to commit a statutory offence, the practice is not to inflict a punishment greater than that imposed by the statute for the complete offence.7 A fine may be imposed – there is no general limit to such fine except the provisions of Magna Carta 1215 and the Bill of Rights 1688 against excessive and unreasonable fines.8 A sentence of imprisonment in excess of two years may be imposed.9 In the absence of specific statutory provision, it was not competent for a jury to find a person charged with a misdemeanour guilty of felony.10 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pickup v Dental Board of the United Kingdom [1928] 2 KB 459. R v Hall [1891] 1 QB 747; R v Watt [1912] VLR 225. R v Hall [1891] 1 QB 747 at 767. Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429 at 436. Hart v Hudson Bros Ltd [1928] 2 KB 629 at 635; Wicks v DPP [1947] AC 362. R v Kakelo [1923] 2 KB 793; (1923) 17 Cr App R 149; and see Wilkinson v Banking Corporation [1948] 1 KB 721; R v Barnett [1951] 2 KB 425; (1951) 35 Cr App R 37. Cf R v Mills [1986] VR 179; (1985) 17 A Crim R 214.
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What offences misdemeanours [Repealed] ....................................................................................... [CA.10.20] Misdemeanour – historical ................................................................................................................. [CA.10.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 10
[CA.10.40]
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7 R v Hokin (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 280; 39 WN (NSW) 76. 8 R v Morris [1951] 1 KB 394; 34 Cr App R 210. 9 R v Morris [1951] 1 KB 394; 34 Cr App R 210; R v Higgins [1952] 1 KB 7; [1951] 2 All ER 758; (1951) 35 Cr App R 130; R v Bryan (1951) 35 Cr App R 121 (10 years for conspiracy). 10 R v Taylor (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 81; R v Mustafa (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 154.
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Part 1A – Geographical jurisdiction s 10C
PART 1A – GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION [Pt 1A insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
10A
Application and effect of Part
(1) This Part applies to all offences.
(3) If the law that creates an offence makes provision with respect to any geographical consideration concerning the offence, that provision prevails over any inconsistent provision of this Part. (4) This Part is in addition to and does not derogate from any other basis on which the courts of the State may exercise criminal jurisdiction. [S 10A insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
10B
Interpretation
(1) For the purposes of this Part, the necessary geographical nexus is the geographical nexus required by section 10C. (2) For the purposes of this Part, the place in which an offence is committed is the place in which the physical elements of the offence occur.
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(3) For the purposes of this Part, the place in which an offence has an effect includes: (a) any place whose peace, order or good government is threatened by the offence, and (b) any place in which the offence would have an effect (or would cause such a threat) if the criminal activity concerned were carried out. (4) A reference in this Part to the State includes a reference to the coastal waters of the State in which the criminal law of the State applies (including in any part of the adjacent area of the State in which the substantive criminal law of the State applies by force of the law of the State or of the Commonwealth in accordance with the Crimes at Sea Act 1998). [S 10B insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
10C
Extension of offences if there is a geographical nexus
(1) If: (a) all elements necessary to constitute an offence against a law of the State exist (disregarding geographical considerations), and (b) a geographical nexus exists between the State and the offence, the person alleged to have committed the offence is guilty of an offence against that law. (2) A geographical nexus exists between the State and an offence if: (a) the offence is committed wholly or partly in the State (whether or not the offence has any effect in the State), or (b) the offence is committed wholly outside the State, but the offence has an effect in the State. [S 10C insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
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(2) This Part extends, beyond the territorial limits of the State, the application of a law of the State that creates an offence if there is the nexus required by this Part between the State and the offence.
Crimes Act 1900 s 10D 10D
[CA.10E.20] Provisions relating to double criminality
(1) This Part applies to an offence that is committed partly in the State and partly in another place outside the State, irrespective of whether it is also an offence in that other place. (2) This Part applies to an offence that is committed wholly in a place outside the State only if: (a) it is also an offence in that place, or (b) it is not also an offence in that place, but the trier of fact is satisfied that the offence constitutes such a threat to the peace, order or good government of the State that the offence warrants criminal punishment in the State. [S 10D insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
10E
Procedural and other provisions
(1) The existence of the necessary geographical nexus for an offence is to be presumed and the presumption is conclusive unless rebutted under subsection (2). (2) If a person charged with an offence disputes the existence of the necessary geographical nexus, the court is to proceed with the trial of the offence in the usual way. If, at the conclusion of the trial, the trier of fact is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the necessary geographical nexus does not exist, it must (subject to subsection (3)) make or return a finding to that effect and the charge is to be dismissed.
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(3) If the trier of fact would, disregarding any geographical considerations, find the person not guilty of the offence, it must make or return a finding of not guilty. The trier of fact must make or return a finding of not guilty on the grounds of mental illness in any such case if they were the only grounds on which the trier of fact would have found the person not guilty of the offence. (4) This section also applies to any alternative verdict available by law to the trier of fact in respect of another offence with which the person was not charged. A finding of guilt may be made or returned in any such case, unless the trier of fact is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the necessary geographical nexus for that other offence does not exist. (5) The issue of whether the necessary geographical nexus exists must, if raised before the trial, be reserved for consideration at the trial. (6) A power or authority exercisable on reasonable suspicion or belief that an offence has been committed may be exercised in the State if the person in whom the power or authority is vested suspects on reasonable grounds or believes that the elements necessary to constitute the offence exist (whether or not the person suspects or believes or has any ground to suspect or believe that the necessary geographical nexus with the State exists). [S 10E insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
SECTION 10E COMMENTARY [CA.10E.20]
General application
This Part replaces s 3A of the Act. The operation of s 3A has been discussed in a number of cases with respect to the common law offence of conspiracy,1 and see [CLP.700] Trans-jurisdictional conspiracies. 1 See R v Isaac (1996) 87 A Crim R 513 and Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; 74 ALJR 282; 109 A Crim R 207; [1999] HCA 65.
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10F
Special provisions with respect to geographical jurisdiction
(2) The necessary geographical nexus exists between the State and any of the following offences if the offence is committed by a public official (within the meaning of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988) and involves public money of the State or property held by the public official for or on behalf of the State: (a) larceny or any offence that includes larceny, (b) fraud or any other offence under Part 4AA. (3) The necessary geographical nexus exists between the State and an offence against section 45 or 45A if the person against whom the offence is committed is a person ordinarily resident in the State. [Subs (3) insrt Act 15 of 2014, Sch 1[1]]
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[S 10F am Act 15 of 2014; insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[2]]
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(1) This section applies for the purposes of, but without limiting, this Part.
Crimes Act 1900 s 11
[CA.11.20]
PART 2 – OFFENCES AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN 11 Provisions of 36 Geo III, c 7, and 57 Geo III, c 6, repealed except as to offences against the person of the Sovereign The provisions of the Act of the Parliament of Great Britain, thirty-sixth George the Third chapter seven, made perpetual by the Act of the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland fifty-seventh George the Third chapter six, and all the provisions of the last mentioned Act in relation thereto, save such of the same respectively as relate to the compassing, imagining, inventing, devising, or intending death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maim, or wounding, imprisonment, or restraint of the person of the heirs and successors of His said Majesty King George the Third, and the expressing, uttering, or declaring of such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, or any of them, shall be and the same are hereby repealed. [S 11 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[23]]
SECTION 11 COMMENTARY [CA.11.20]
Imperial Acts
Section 1 of the English Treason Act 1795 (36 Geo III c 7) provides in part:
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If any person or persons whatsoever shall, within the realm or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maim or wounding, imprisonment or restraint of the person of His Majesty, His heirs and successors, being legally convicted thereof, upon the oaths of two lawful and credible witnesses, upon trial or otherwise convicted or attained by due course of law, then every such person and persons, so as aforesaid offending, shall be deemed, declared and adjudged to be a traitor and traitors, and shall suffer pain of death as in cases of high treason. Section 1 of the Treason Act 1817 (57 Geo III c 6) recited s 1 of the 1795 Act and provided that the provisions should be made perpetual. Section 4I provided that the three years limitation of prosecution established by the Treason Act 1795 should apply save in cases of compassing or imagining the death of any successor, or misprision of such treason, etc. Section 6 applied the punishment of the Treason Act 1814, namely death by hanging. The death penalty has been abolished for all offences: see s 431. Section 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 declares the following provisions of the Treasons Acts of 1795 and 1817 to have been in force in New South Wales on 25 July 1828 (by virtue of the Imperial Act 9 Geo IV c 83), to have remained in force in New South Wales from that day, and to continue in force: such provisions as relate to the compassing, imagining, inventing, devising or intending death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maim or wounding, imprisonment or restraint of the person of the Sovereign and the expressing, uttering, or declaring of such compassings, imaginings, inventions, devices, intentions or any of them. The offence of treason is now set forth in s 24 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 12
Compassing etc deposition of the Sovereign—overawing Parliament etc
Whosoever, within New South Wales or without, compasses, imagines, invents, devises, or intends to deprive or depose Our Most Gracious Lady the Queen, her heirs or successors, from the style, honour, or Royal name of the Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom, or of any other of Her Majesty’s dominions and countries, or to levy war against Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, within any part of the United Kingdom, or any other of Her Majesty’s dominions, in order, by force or constraint, to compel her or them to change her or their measures or counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon, or in order to intimidate or overawe, both Houses or either House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or the Parliament of New South Wales, or to move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the
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s 16
United Kingdom, or any other of Her Majesty’s dominions, or countries under the obeisance of Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, and expresses, utters, or declares such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, or any of them, by publishing any printing or writing, or by open and advised speaking, or by any overt act or deed, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 12 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(1)]
SECTION 12 COMMENTARY Related sections
Section 24 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) includes in the offence of treason the levying of war against the Commonwealth. Section 25 defines treachery and further sections in the same part deal with sabotage and sedition. Editor’s note: Sections 13–15 are repealed by Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[9] and have not been reproduced.
16
Nothing herein to affect 25 Ed III, c 2
Nothing contained in this Part shall lessen the force of, or in any matter affect, anything enacted by the Statute passed in the twenty-fifth year of King Edward the Third “A declaration which offences shall be adjudged Treason”.
SECTION 16 COMMENTARY Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[CA.16.20]
Imperial Act
The Treason Act 1351 (25 Ed III, St 5, c 2) provided in part: Whereas diverse opinions have been before this time in what case treason shall be said, and in what not, the King, at the request of the lords and of the commons, hath made a declaration in the manner as hereinafter followeth; that is to say, when a man doth compass or imagine the death of Our Lord the King, or of Our Lady his Queen, or of their eldest son and heir; or if a man do violate the King’s companion, or the King’s eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the King’s eldest son and heir; or if a man do levy war against Our Lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open deed by the people of their condition … and it is to be understood, that in the cases above rehearsed, that ought to be judged treason which extends to Our Lord the King, and his royal majesty. This provision is said to be declaratory of the common law.1 Section 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 declares the Treason Act 1351 to have been in force in New South Wales on 25 July 1828 (by virtue of the Imperial Act 9 Geo IV c 83) to have remained in force in New South Wales since that day and to continue in force insofar as it declares what offences shall be adjudged treason as amended by the statutes 9 Geo IV c 31; 11 Geo IV and 1 Will IV c 66 adopted by 4 Wm IV, No 4, and 2 and 3 Will IV c 34 adopted by 9 Vic, No 1. Compare s 24 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Watson & WatsonFederal Offences[CA.52A.60]. 1 See generally Archbold (44th ed, 1992), 25.2; R v Casement [1917] 1 KB 98 at 124.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 16A
16A
Procedure in cases of treason [Repealed]
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[S 16A rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[9]; insrt Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
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s 18
PART 3 – OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON DIVISION 1 – HOMICIDE [Div 1 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[3]]
17
Petit treason [Repealed]
[S 17 rep Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
Date of death
(1) The rule of law that it is conclusively presumed that an injury was not the cause of death of a person if the person died after the expiration of the period of a year and a day after the date on which the person received the injury is abrogated. (2) This section does not apply in respect of an injury received before the commencement of this section. [S 17A insrt Act 101 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
18
Murder and manslaughter defined (1) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. (b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter.
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(a)
[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[4]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(2); Act 58 of 1985, s 2 and Sch 1(2); Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
(2) (a) (b)
No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section. No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only.
[Subs (2) am Act 116 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]] [S 18 am Act 116 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 218 of 1989; Act 58 of 1985; Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 18 COMMENTARY [CA.18.20]
Classification of homicides
Homicide is the killing of one human being1 by another.2 A homicide may be justifiable, excusable, accidental or culpable. If the execution of a criminal is carried out by an officer upon whom that duty is not cast, or if it is carried out in a different manner from that which is authorised by the form of the sentence, it is murder;3 if carried out in strict conformity with the legal sentence, it is justifiable. Killing by an officer resisted in the execution of her or his duty is justifiable if there was a reasonable necessity for the use of such force by the officer, and the amount of force used was not unreasonable or excessive, otherwise the killing is manslaughter. An officer who kills a person who makes no resistance is guilty of murder.4 The same rule applies to killing by persons assisting officers or lawfully arresting or
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acting to prevent a breach of the peace.5 Officers attempting to put an end to a riot, and other persons assisting them are justified if any persons taking part in the riot who refuse to disperse or who resist apprehension are killed or hurt.6 If a person whom an officer or a private person is legally attempting to arrest upon a charge of treason or felony, flees and he or she cannot be otherwise arrested, he or she may be killed and the homicide is justifiable.7 If the attempted arrest relates to a misdemeanour, breach of the peace, or civil process, killing by the officer is murder if done intentionally or with a weapon likely to kill, otherwise it is manslaughter.8 Section 580E(1) abolished all distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours. Instead, s 580E(4) substituted for felony, the “serious indictable offence” which, by s 4(1), means an indictable offence punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more. Where a forcible and violent felony is attempted upon the person of another, the person assaulted or any other person present is entitled to repel force by force, and, if necessary, to kill the aggressor; but there must be a reasonable necessity for the killing or at least an honest and reasonable belief that there is such a necessity.9 The use of deadly force is justifiable only if it is used to protect the person using it or some other person from serious violence, or from a reasonable apprehension of it.10 It is not lawful, by the use of deadly force, to take the life of a person who is committing a larceny or other felony without violence or threats,11 or a simple assault12 or only a misdemeanour.13 A woman is justified in killing a man who is attempting to rape or commit sodomy upon her.14 The owner, lodger or occupant of a dwelling house, or any other person within the house, is justified in using such force as he or she honestly believes is reasonably necessary to prevent arson, burglary or other violent felony; if in so doing he or she kills the intruder, he or she does not commit any crime.15
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Excusable homicide occurs where the killing is by misadventure or misfortune and is without culpable negligence.16 Self-defence may justify homicide. For commentary on self-defence, see [CA.423.40] – [CA.423.140]. For the defence of accident, see [CLP.120]. Where the defence of resistance to violent felony or self-defence is raised, it is important that the issues should be left to the jury as matters of justification, not of defence.17 Culpable homicide is punishable as (1) murder: s 19A; (2) manslaughter: s 24; (3) culpable driving: (s 52A); (4) culpable navigation (s 52B). Justifiable, accidental or excusable homicide is not punishable.18 1 The question of what is a “human being” is examined in Howard, Australian Criminal Law (4th ed, 1982), pp 23 et seq. 2 As to suicide pacts, see R v Croft [1944] KB 295; [1944] 2 All ER 483; (1944) 29 Cr App R 169 and ss 31A–31C[CA.31A.20]. 3 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 501. 4 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), pp 490, 494, 496; Goffe’s Case 86 ER 146; (1672) 1 Vent 216; R v Longden 168 ER 774; (1812) Russ & Ry 228. 5 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 484. 6 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, p 495; R v McNaughton, Donnelly and Hayes (1881) 14 Cox CC 576. 7 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 489; HM Advocate v Sheppard [1941] SC (J) 67. 8 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 481. 9 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 484; R v Bull 173 ER 723; (1839) 9 Car & P 22; R v Symondson (1896) 60 JP 645; R v Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540. 10 R v Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 173; 173 ER 448; R v Weston (1879) 14 Cox CC 346 at 351; R v Symondson (1896) 60 JP 645; R v Biggin [1920] 1 KB 213; (1920) 14 Cr App R 87. 11 R v Scully 171 ER 1213; (1824) 1 Car & P 319; R v McKay [1957] VR 560. 12 R v Bull 173 ER 723; (1839) 9 Car & P 22. 13 R v Dadson 169 ER 407; (1850) 2 Den 35. 14 1 Hawkin’s Pleas of the Crown (2nd ed, 1973) c 10, s 21.
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15 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 487; R v Meade 168 ER 1006; (1823) 1 Lewin 184; R v Symondson (1896) 60 JP 645. See also R v Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 173; 173 ER 448; R v Odgers 174 ER 355; (1843) 2 Mood & R 479 at 483 (Mood & R), 356–357 (ER); Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272; (1943) 28 Cr App R 65 at 6, 7 (AC), 71–72 (Cr App R); R v Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547; [1957] 2 WLR 524; (1957) 41 Cr App R 100. 16 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1800), p 492. See also R v Knock (1877) 14 Cox CC 1; R v Deana (1909) 2 Cr App R 75; R v Wild (1837) 2 Lew 214; R v Hussey (1925) 18 Cr App R 160; (1925) 89 JP 28. 17 See heading “Onus of proof in self-defence and jury directions” at [CA.423.140]. 18 Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 588; [1946] 2 All ER 124; (1946) 31 Cr App R 123.
Murder—punishment [Repealed]
[S 19 rep Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3); am Act 58 of 1987; Act 81 of 1982; Act 24 of 1982; Act 16 of 1955]
19A
Punishment for murder
(1) A person who commits the crime of murder is liable to imprisonment for life. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life for the crime of murder is to serve that sentence for the term of the person’s natural life. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 21(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life). [Subs (3) am Act 56 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 2.15; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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(4) This section applies to murder committed before or after the commencement of this section. (5) However, this section does not apply where committal proceedings (or proceedings by way of ex officio indictment) for the murder were instituted against the convicted person before the commencement of this section. In such a case, section 19 as in force before that commencement continues to apply. (6) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy. [S 19A am Act 56 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(4)]
SECTION 19A COMMENTARY Indictment for murder ....................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.20] Cross references .............................................................................................................................. [CA.19A.40] History .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.19A.60] Elements of murder .......................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.80] Element (1) Death of the deceased, being a human being .......................................................... [CA.19A.100]
Unlawful act Unlawful act .................................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.120] Act must be voluntary .................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.140] Identification of act causing death ................................................................................................. [CA.19A.160] Omissions ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.180] By the accused – liability of accomplices ...................................................................................... [CA.19A.200] Where party responsible cannot be established ............................................................................ [CA.19A.220]
Causation of death Causation of death ......................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.240] Causation not usually an issue ...................................................................................................... [CA.19A.260] Causation a question of fact for the jury ........................................................................................ [CA.19A.280] Substantial or significant contribution to death .............................................................................. [CA.19A.300] Indirect causation ........................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.320]
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Delayed causation .......................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.340] Pre-existing condition in victim ....................................................................................................... [CA.19A.360] Conduct accelerating death ........................................................................................................... [CA.19A.380] Death by unexpected means ......................................................................................................... [CA.19A.400] Indeterminate causation ................................................................................................................. [CA.19A.420] The “but for” test ............................................................................................................................ [CA.19A.440] Breaking the causal chain – novus actus interveniens ................................................................. [CA.19A.460] Foreseeability and causation ......................................................................................................... [CA.19A.480] Element (3)(a) Accused’s act or omission with reckless indifference to human life ..................... [CA.19A.500] Element (3)(b) Accused’s act or omission with intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm ..... [CA.19A.520] Element (3)(c) Act or omission in pursuance of crime punishable by penal servitude for life or 25 years (felony-murder) ............................................................................................................... [CA.19A.540] Malice and murder ......................................................................................................................... [CA.19A.560] Year and a day rule ........................................................................................................................ [CA.19A.580] Alternative verdict of manslaughter ................................................................................................ [CA.19A.600] Defences and partial defences ...................................................................................................... [CA.19A.620] Murder and self defence ................................................................................................................ [CA.19A.640] Alternative verdicts to murder ........................................................................................................ [CA.19A.660]
[CA.19A.20]
Indictment for murder
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That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did murder CD. Date of death and naming of the deceased – if death does not occur on the same day as the act causing it, the date of the offence is specified as the date of the death as the offence is not complete until death occurs.1 The name of the deceased must be stated in the indictment if it is known or can be ascertained with reasonable diligence; if not, the deceased may be described as “a person unknown”.2 Where the prosecution cannot say whether the accused was the principal or an accessory – a single count alleging murder may be charged where the prosecution cannot say whether the accused was the principal, an accessory or was acting in a common purpose.3 Section 18 defines only one offence, but murder can be committed in four different ways and a case of murder may be put one of more of the alternative ways.4 One situation which may necessitate this is where two accused go to trial, each with a “cut throat” defence.5 See further at [CA.19A.200] sub heading “Where it cannot be proved etc”. Inclusion of other charges – there is no reason in principle why more than one count for murder may not be included in the one indictment,6 but this may give rise to consideration of an application for severance. It is not the practice in New South Wales that where murder is charged, no other type of charge will be included in the indictment.7 Manslaughter – generally, charges for murder and manslaughter are not laid in the alternative – they are both forms of homicide and, on a charge of murder, it is open to the jury to bring in a verdict of manslaughter.8 If there is evidence to support an alternative verdict of manslaughter, the trial judge must leave manslaughter to the jury and irrespective of the wishes of the parties in the trial.9 See “Alternative verdict of manslaughter” at [CA.19A.600]. 1 2 3 4
R v O’Loughlin; Ex parte Ralphs (1971) 1 SASR 219 per Wells J at 272. R v Hicks 174 ER 296; (1840) 2 Mood & R 302; R v Campbell 174 ER 722; (1843) 1 Car & K 82. R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377. R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [229] and [274] per Carruthers AJ (Heydon JA and Smart AJ agreeing) citing Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67; R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 at 301 (NSWLR). 5 R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [273] per Carruthers AJ. 6 R v Hass [1972] 1 NSWLR 589; R v McCarthy (1984) 14 A Crim R 155 at 159 (NSWCCA). 7 R v McGarritty (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 June 1994) at p 12, applied in R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [330]. The position in England is the same, see Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254; 2 WLR 1145; 2 All ER 401; (1964) 48 Cr App R 183.
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8 Packett v The King (1937) 58 CLR 190; [1937] HCA 53 per Latham CJ at 195 (CLR) and per Dixon J at 213 (CLR); Beavan v The Queen (1954) 92 CLR 660; [1954] HCA 41 at 662 (CLR); Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 at 450–451 (CLR) per Barwick CJ and at 453–454 (CLR) per Kitto J; R v Downs (1985) 3 NSWLR 312; 18 A Crim R 75. 9 The authorities including the High Court decisions in Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15; Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 are distilled in R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385. See also Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 per Beazley JA at [49]–[63].
Cross references CA
[CA.19A.40]
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Related offences Manslaughter – s 18, 24 Child murder – ss 20–22 Infanticide – s 22A Conspiracy to murder – s 26 Soliciting to murder – s 26 Attempts to murder – ss 27–30 Aiding suicide – s 31C Dangerous driving or navigation causing death – s 52A, 52B Misconduct with regard to corpses – s 81C Accessory after the fact to murder – s 349 Unlawful disposal of a corpse
Paragraph [CA.24.20]–[CA.24.260] [CA.22.20]–[CA.22.40] [CA.22A.20]–[CA.22A.40] [CA.26.20] [CA.26.40] [CA.30.20]–[CA.30.80] [CA.52A.20]–[CA.52A.260] [CA.81C.20]ff [2.33180] [CLO.440]
Defences, partial defences and mental states Accident Voluntariness Automatism Duress Insanity and mental illness Mens rea and intent Self defence Provocation – s 23 Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind – s 23A Intoxication – Pt 11A
[CLP.120] [CLP.160] [CLP.200] [CLP.860] [CLP.1020] [CLP.1240]–[CLP.1400] [2.40383]ff [2.1890]–[2.1935] [2.1950]–[CA.23A.60] [2.40900]ff
Sentences Death penalty abolished – s 431 Life sentences – s 431A
[2.41300] [2.41320]
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[CA.19A.0] History
History of culpable homicide.1 A statutory definition of murder in New South Wales was introduced in ss 9 and 14 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883. These provisions were re-enacted with variations as s 18(1) and (2) respectively. Because s 18 deals also with manslaughter, it is to be viewed as a section dealing not simply with murder but with the law of homicide.2 1 See Dixon J, “The Development of the Law of Homicide” (1935) 9 ALJ Supp 64, who commented that “For eight centuries the course of its very gradual evolution has been from an almost exclusive concern with the external act which occasioned death to a primary concern with the mind of the man who did the act.” Also Dixon CJ in Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 625–627 (CLR); Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334; 44 ALJR 221; [1970] HCA 17. 2 R v Downs (1985) 3 NSWLR 312; 18 A Crim R 75 at 318 (NSWLR); 81 (A Crim R) per Lee J and see Windeyer J in Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 at 462 (CLR).
[CA.19A.80]
Elements of murder
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By s 18(1), for murder the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the death of the deceased, being a human being; (2) caused by an unlawful act or omission of the accused; (3) such act or omission being done: (a) with reckless indifference to human life; or (b) with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm; or (c) in an attempt to commit, or during, or immediately after the commission by the accused, or by some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by penal servitude for life or for 25 years. Apart from element (3) above, there is a fourth basis of liability for murder, that is, where the actual act causing death is performed by someone else, on the basis of common purpose murder, see [CA.19A.200]. Jury directions – appropriate directions in various categories of murder are considered in, inter alia, two accused, each blaming the other: R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 (intentional murder, common purpose, felony murder); reckless indifference: R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127; R v Katarzynski [2005] NSWCCA 72; R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243; felony murder: R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361; R v Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98; R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462. [CA.19A.100]
Element (1) Death of the deceased, being a human being
Meaning of and proof of death – s 33 of the Human Tissue Act 1983 provides that for the purposes of the law of New South Wales, a person has died when there has occurred: (a) irreversible cessation of all function of the person’s brain; or (b) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the person’s body. Establishing death does not necessarily require finding a body; death may be proved by compelling circumstantial evidence1 such as to leave no rational or reasonable hypothesis other than murder.2 Authorities are referred to at [CA.19A.160] under the sub-heading “Where precise act causing death cannot be identified”. Murder may more likely be inferred if the accused, being uniquely in a position to explain a victim’s disappearance, offers no explanation.3 As to trial where death or cause of death occurred outside New South Wales, see Pt 1A. Deceased a human being – for murder, the one killed must be a person who is in being, that is, fully born in a living state.4 On an indictment for the murder of a newborn child, the fact that the child was born alive must be strictly proved.5 Section 20 provides that such a child shall be held to have been born alive if it has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world, whether it has had an independent circulation or not.
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A leading authority on the born alive rule is R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278; (2005) 154 A Crim R 55; [2005] NSWCCA 178 where Spigelman CJ (with whom Grove and Bell JJ agreed) stated the following propositions (judgment paragraph numbers given): 1. The rule consists of two distinct components. First, that the foetus must have completely left its mother’s body (although the umbilical cord did not have to be cut). Secondly, the child must be alive at or after birth, in that sense, had occurred. ([27])
3. As an issue of fact, live birth can be proven by many different overt acts including crying, breathing, heartbeat, etc. Breathing need not necessarily be unassisted. ([46]) 4. The born alive rule has never encompassed a requirement of viability in the sense of the physiological ability of a newly born child to survive as a functioning being. ([54])
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There are authorities for the proposition that where an unborn child receives injuries, is born alive but dies of those antenatal injuries, the perpetrator may suffer criminal liability for homicide.6 However, the House of Lords specifically refused to answer the question of whether the crimes of murder or manslaughter can be committed where unlawful injury is deliberately inflicted to a child in utero, where the child is subsequently born alive, enjoys an existence independent of the mother, thereafter dies and the injuries inflicted while in utero either caused or made a substantial contribution to the death.7 It is neither murder nor manslaughter to kill an unborn child while still in the mother’s womb.8 As to infanticide, see s 22A. As to abortion, see ss 82–84. 1 R v Hindmarsh 168 ER 387; (1792) 2 Leach 569; R v Ryan [1906] St R Qd 15; Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66; R v Robertson (1914) 9 Cr App R 189; Ex parte Brady, Re Oram (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 109; R v Horry [1952] 71 NZLR 111; R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 2 WLR 273; (1955) 39 Cr App R 1; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; 58 ALJR 133; [1984] HCA 7; R v Burton (1986) 24 A Crim R 169 (CCA NSW); Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 ALJR 23; 68 A Crim R 251. Articles: JP Bourke“The Problem of the Missing Corpse” (1952) 25 ALJ 589 and Dr N Morris“Corpus Delicti and Circumstantial Evidence” (1952) 68 LQR 391. 2 R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 2 WLR 273; (1955) 39 Cr App R 1; R v Murphy (1867) 4 WW & a’B (L) 63; R v Varley [1973] 2 NSWLR 427 aff’d Varley v The Queen (1976) 51 ALJR 243. 3 R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57; (1991) 52 A Crim R 303; Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 ALJR 23; 68 A Crim R 251; Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65; Burrell v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 193. Compare Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; (2001) 119 A Crim R 8; [2001] HCA 25. 4 R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338 at 339 per Barry J, applied in R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278; (2005) 154 A Crim R 55; [2005] NSWCCA 178 at [28] (CCA). 5 R v Townsend (1874) 8 SALR 72. See also R v Doulton (1832) 5 Car & P 329; R v Sellis 173 ER 370; (1837) 7 Car & P 850; R v Crutchley 173 ER 355; (1837) 7 Car & P 814. 6 R v F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245; 89 A Crim R 250 (CCA) where various common law authorities were referred to including R v Senior 168 ER 1298; R v West 175 ER 329; (1848) 2 Car & K 784. 7 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245; [1997] 3 WLR 421; [1997] 3 All ER 936. See also R v King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; 139 A Crim R 132; [2003] NSWCCA 399. 8 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 433; Ormerod D, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 16.5.
[CA.19A.120]
Unlawful act
Not every homicide is legally culpable – see “Classification of homicides” at [CA.18.20]. By s 18(2), an act or omission for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, eg self defence or bona fide medical or surgical treatment, does not constitute murder within s 18. The Crown must prove that the act or omission was unlawful and was not accidental.1 For commentary on accident, see [CLP.120].
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2. Authority is clearly in favour of a conclusion that the common law “born alive” rule is satisfied by any indicia of independent life. There is no single test of what constitutes “life”. ([56])
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.120]
Any act which is a substantial cause of death makes the actor liable for the death if the other elements of murder can be proved.2 Physical contact between accused and victim is not necessary – see “Indirect causation” at [CA.19A.320]. 1 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72; R v Mullen (1938) 59 CLR 124; [1938] HCA 12; R v Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451; 49 WN (NSW) 157; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; (1987) 25 A Crim R 163; [1987] HCA 26; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1. 2 A common law exception was perjury by one who gave false evidence at the victim’s trial for a capital offence thereby assisting in the victim’s conviction and contributing to his or her death by execution: R v Macdaniel (1755) Foster 121.
[CA.19A.140]
Act must be voluntary
For detailed commentary on the issue of voluntariness, see Actus reus – voluntariness at [CLP.160].
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Voluntariness – not usually an issue – in Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205, Barwick CJ at 213 referred to the fundamental principal that the “act” of the accused must be a “willed” ie, a voluntary act which has caused the death charged. What constitutes a “voluntary act” was also discussed by Windeyer J (at 244–246) and has been discussed elsewhere.1 Barwick CJ observed at 213 that in the ordinary run of cases, the voluntary quality of the deed physically related to the accused is not in question. The presumption that everyone sui juris has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for crimes committed operates2 and mostly the contest will concentrate upon the question of the intent with which the accused acted. Two High Court cases Ugle (2002) and Murray (2002) dealt with deaths by stabbing and shooting respectively where the evidence raised voluntariness and where the trial judge’s omission in each case to direct the jury on the issue of voluntariness was held to have been an error.3 Voluntariness and the choice of act causing death – in cases of deaths by shooting, there are two views on how the relevant “act” should be viewed for the purpose of determining whether it was voluntary or not. Windeyer J said in Ryan (1967) that while the principle that “an act is only punishable as a crime when it is the voluntary act of the accused is a statement satisfying in its simplicity”, the answer to the question of “what is a voluntary act” is far from simple, partly because of imprecise distinctions about ideas concerning the working of the human mind.4 Windeyer J noted that causing a death by shooting can involve the separate acts of loading the firearm, cocking it, presenting it and pulling the trigger, the last such act being the lethal conduct.5 Is the relevant act, all of these necessary actions, or simply the last one? Ryan concerned an accused who entered a service station at night intending to rob the attendant. He pointed at the attendant a sawn off loaded rifle which was cocked and without the safety catch on. While the accused was attempting to tie the attendant up, the latter made a sudden movement. The accused’s finger pressed the trigger without, he claimed, intention on his part, ie, involuntarily. The attendant died instantly. The accused asserted that the death was an “accident”. The jury convicted him of murder. Barwick CJ said in Ryan (at 218) that it was too imprecise to aggregate all the relevant events antecedent to the discharge of the rifle as the act of the accused causing death. If the jury concluded that the rifle discharge was involuntary, they could choose as the act causing death (a) its presentation in the circumstances, or (b) its subsequent discharge. In the case of (a), the jury “… could have concluded that the act causing death was the presentation of the cocked, loaded gun with a safety catch unapplied and that its involuntary discharge was a likelihood which ought to have been in the contemplation of the [accused] when presenting the gun …”. The other justices in Ryan took a narrower view. Windeyer J said (at 245–246) that the accused’s act was not to be called involuntary just because his mind worked quickly and impulsively. If the accused “being conscious of the situation in which he had put himself, pressed the trigger as a result, however spontaneous, of the man whom he was threatening making some sudden movement, it could not be said that his action was involuntary so as to make the homicide guiltless.” Taylor and Owen JJ (at 231) thought that it was “… impossible to isolate the act of pressing the trigger
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In a dissenting judgment on the question of whether it was necessary for the trial judge to have given a direction on voluntariness, Gummow and Hayne JJ said: In deciding what is the relevant act, it is important to avoid an overly refined analysis. The more narrowly defined is that “act”, the more likely it is that there will be thought to be some question about whether the accused willed that act. Or, to put the same point another way, the more precise the identification of a particular physical movement as the “death-causing act”, the more likely it is that it will be harder to discern a conscious decision by the actor to make that precise and particular physical movement.7 and added: … once it is recognised that the relevant act in this case is the act of discharging the loaded shotgun, it can be seen that whether or not particular elements of that composite set of movements (load, cock, present, fire) were the subject of conscious consideration by the appellant, there is no basis for concluding that the set of movements, taken as a whole, was not willed.8 Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ all said that there should have been a direction given on voluntariness, but at least Gaudron J at [16] and Kirby J at [89] expressed views about what the relevant “act” was that appear to endorse the views expressed by Windeyer J in Ryan.9 This kind of factual situation has arisen in other cases.10 Prosecution bears onus of proving voluntariness – that it is unnecessary for a trial judge to raise the issue of voluntariness with the jury if the evidence clearly suggests no lack of voluntariness.11 Where voluntariness is an issue, the prosecution must prove that the accused’s act was voluntary.12 The presumption that an act by an apparently conscious person is willed or voluntary accords with common experience. The High Court said in Falconer (1990) that although the prosecution bears the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the act, an accused bears an evidential onus of rebutting the presumption on the balance of probabilities – an unwilled act may not be considered unless that evidential onus is discharged.13 Voluntariness is a jury question – the question of whether a reflex or automatic motor action is an involuntary or unwilled act is a question for the jury.14 Appropriate jury directions on the question of voluntariness were discussed in R v Katarzynski [2005] NSWCCA 72. 1 See Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72 per Lord Sankey at 482 (AC); R v Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] 3 WLR 326; [1957] 2 All ER 741 at 672 (QB); R v Haywood [1971] VR 755; R v Tait [1973] VR 151; R v Dodd (1974) 7 SASR 151; DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 689 (AC) per Lord Simon. 2 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386. See also R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244; R v McLeod (1991) 56 A Crim R 320 (CCA NSW). 3 Ugle v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 171; 76 ALJR 886; [2002] HCA 25; Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 131 A Crim R 215; [2002] HCA 26. 4 Ryan v The Queen at 244. 5 Ryan v The Queen at 245. 6 Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193; 131 A Crim R 215; [2002] HCA 26. 7 Murray v The Queen at [49].
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from the other circumstances and argue that it, alone, caused the wounding and death.” Menzies J (at 233) said, “I do not accept … that the act causing [the victim’s] death ought … to have been regarded as the mere pressing of the trigger to discharge the rifle.” A similar case was the High Court case of Murray (2002) where the deceased was shot while sitting in a chair by a shotgun blast from a shotgun held by the appellant. The appellant said he only intended to frighten the deceased and he presented a loaded and cocked shotgun to him when he was struck by something thrown by the deceased and the gun discharged. The appellant’s finger may have been on or near the trigger, but he denied that he deliberately pulled the trigger.6
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8 Murray v The Queen at [53]. 9 An article by ID Elliott “Responsibility for Involuntary Acts: Ryan v The Queen” (1968) 41 ALJR 497 suggests that the analysis of Windeyer J is to be preferred. 10 R v Supple (1870) 1 VR (L) 151; R v Jarmain [1946] KB 74; [1945] 2 All ER 613; (1946) 31 Cr App R 39; R v Cronau (1980) 3 A Crim R 461; R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1; R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127; R v Hind (1995) 80 A Crim R 105. 11 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; R v McLeod (1991) 56 A Crim R 320; R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 at 304 (NSWLR); 373 (A Crim R); R v Whitfield [2002] NSWCCA 501 at [80]. 12 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; (1936) 25 Cr App R 72; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244. 13 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244. 14 Murray v The Queen at [16] per Gaudron J; at [41] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; at [89] per Kirby J and at [148] per Callinan J .
[CA.19A.160]
Identification of act causing death
For the related topic of substantial or significant contribution to death, see [CA.19A.300]. Utility of identifying act causing death – Stephen J observed in White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342; 52 ALJR 724; [1978] HCA 38 at 359 (CLR) (a case not involving homicide) that, “[w]hile it is generally true that ‘the intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime’1 it is always necessary, if there is said to be any lack of temporal coincidence between the act and intent, accurately to identify the relevant act.”2 Identification of the act which causes death can be important: (a) in terms of the intent under s 18(1)(a) which accompanied that act, and (b) sometimes, in terms of the voluntariness or involuntariness of the act.
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In Royall (1991) Brennan J said that in determining whether any of the mental elements of murder has been proved in a given case, it is necessary to identify the conduct of the accused which causes the death.3 Where precise act causing death cannot be identified – to establish murder, it is not always possible or necessary to establish a precise act causing death – various authorities are collected in R v PL (2009) 199 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 256. Sometimes, generally in cases based on circumstantial evidence, a particular act causing death cannot be identified.4 Examples are where a body is so decomposed that the cause of death cannot be determined5 or where no body is found.6 Similarly in Butcher (1986), the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal said, “[a] single cause of death is not always able to be isolated. As a matter of law there need not be a sole cause of death …”.7 It is immaterial that the prosecution cannot prove which of several acts on the part of the accused caused death if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that one or other of them did.8 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 was a case where the Crown could not positively identify the act of the accused which caused death.9 The accused was convicted of the murder of a woman who fell to her death from the bathroom window of a sixth floor flat. Shortly before her fall, she had been in the shower. Earlier, there had been a violent argument between the accused and the deceased. The deceased’s blood was found in the bathroom and throughout the flat. There were gouge marks in the bathroom wall and a chipped ashtray. The Crown case was that the accused murdered the deceased in one of three ways viz: (1) he pushed her out the window, (2) he attacked her in the bathroom and she fell in avoiding the attack, or (3) having a well-founded and reasonable apprehension of life-threatening violence, she jumped from the window. The trial judge told the jury it was for them to decide whether the accused caused the deceased’s death in any one of the three ways suggested. On the question of the identification of the act causing death, Brennan J said at 404–405:
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Brennan J added (at 405) that neither was it essential to identify which of the mental states prescribed by s 18(1)(a) accompanied the act or acts involved provided the jury was satisfied that they were accompanied by one of those states. Multiple acts causing death – it does not matter that there is more than one cause of death – it is a misapplication of principle to attempt to search for a principal cause of death.10 This is because it is sufficient if the accused makes a substantial or significant contribution to the deceased’s death, see authorities at [CA.19A.300]. If an accused kills another by one or other of two or more different acts each of which, if it caused death, would be a sufficient act to establish criminal liability, to found a conviction, it is not necessary to prove which act caused the death.11 This is so where an accused committed a series of acts, such as a long course of beating, where the fatal blow cannot be identified.12 In a case of death by blood loss from multiple stabbing, it was held that where there was no evidence of which wound was fatal, the jury were entitled to conclude that the totality of the stab wounds caused the fatal blood loss.13 There is also the situation where the prosecution case is that the accused either did the act causing death or was an accessory14 – see [CA.19A.200].
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Choice of act causing death is for the jury – just as the question whether an alleged act caused death is not a question for the trial judge but rather for the jury,15 the choice of the act causing death is not for the trial judge, but is a matter for the jury under proper direction.16 Appropriate jury directions on the question of the act causing death were discussed in R v Katarzynski [2005] NSWCCA 72. 1 Quoting Fowler v Padget 101 ER 1103; (1798) 7 Term Rep 509 at 1106 (ER); 514 (Term Rep) per Lord Kenyon CJ. 2 See also Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669. 3 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 401 (CLR); 69 (A Crim R). 4 In R v PL (2009) 199 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 256. 5 R v Robertson (1914) 9 Cr App R 189; Keir v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 149; Kaliyanda v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 300. 6 R v Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 QB 388; [1955] 2 WLR 273; (1955) 39 Cr App R 1; R v Horry [1952] 71 NZLR 111; Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 ALJR 23; 68 A Crim R 251; Burrell v The Queen (2007) 190 A Crim R 148; [2007] NSWCCA 65; Burrell v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 193. 7 R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1 at 14 (A Crim R) where the victim of a robbery died after he rushed onto a knife presented towards his stomach by the accused. 8 Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1980) [1981] 1 WLR 705; [1981] 2 All ER 617; (1981) 73 Cr App R 40; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669; McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26. 9 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669. See also McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26. 10 R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 applying R v McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393; R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1. 11 Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1980) [1981] 1 WLR 705; [1981] 2 All ER 617; (1981) 73 Cr App R 40 (CA). See also Mohan v The Queen [1967] 2 AC 187; [1967] 2 WLR 676; [1967] 2 All ER 58; Hoessinger v The Queen (1992) 62 A Crim R 146 (CCA NT). 12 R v Ryder [1995] 2 NZLR 271; R v PL (2009) 199 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 256 at [48].
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In most cases of alleged murder, a precise identification of the act which causes death is attempted in order to furnish a foundation for the inference of the mental state with which that act was done. But where the accused has engaged in a course of violent conduct after which the victim does something that directly causes his or her death, it is not essential in point of law to identify which act or series of acts in the course of that conduct caused the victim to take the final fatal step provided the jury be satisfied on the whole of the evidence that some or all of those acts caused the death and was accompanied by one of the mental states prescribed by s 18(1)(a).
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.160]
13 R v Carranceja (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 (CCA Vic). 14 R v Swindall 175 ER 95; (1846) 2 Car & K 230; R v Thatcher [1987] 1 SCR 652; (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275; R v White (1989) 41 A Crim R 237 (CCA NSW); R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377. See also Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1168; [2012] HCA 37. 15 R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 at 527 (Full Court); R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 (CA). 16 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 218. Also Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393; R v Wilkinson (1985) 20 A Crim R 230. Cf Brennan v The King (1936) 55 CLR 253; [1936] HCA 24 at 266 (CLR) per Dixon and Evatt JJ.
[CA.19A.180]
Omissions
While s 18(1)(a) imposes liability for murder in cases of certain acts or omissions, it is not often that a charge of murder is brought based upon an omission. Where death is caused by omission, the charge proffered is usually manslaughter rather than murder.1
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However, omission to perform a legal duty has founded liability for murder. In Taber (2002), a charge of murder was left to the jury where the accused jointly robbed a woman in her home, binding and gagging her before they left. Shortly after leaving her house, one accused dialled 000 and informed the operator of the location of the bound victim. However, the operator discounted the call as a hoax and the woman died of dehydration. The trial judge said he would direct the jury that a person who deliberately puts another in danger comes under a legal duty to take steps to remove that danger and that any failure to do so may constitute an omission causing death. The judge ruled that there could be a verdict of guilty of murder if the jury was satisfied that the accused acted at any relevant time with reckless indifference to the victim’s life.2 Elsewhere, it was said that if an accused is responsible for his/her victim being rendered unconscious and placed in a dangerous situation as a consequence, a duty to take positive action to render assistance would arise and the accused may be guilty of murder by omission if the other elements of murder are proved.3 In an earlier case, a father and step-mother of a little girl were convicted of the child’s murder by neglect. The Crown case was that the child died as a result of ill treatment, failure to provide proper food and clothing and failure to obtain available medical assistance.4 Whether conduct constitutes an act or an omission may depend simply upon how the conduct is characterised.5 1 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334. Also R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450; R v Stone [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 WLR 169; (1977) 64 Cr App R 186. 2 R v Taber (2002) 56 NSWLR 443; (2002) 136 A Crim R 478; [2002] NSWSC 1239 (Barr J). 3 R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542; 69 A Crim R 115. 4 R v Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; [1904] QWN 50. See also R v Gibbins (1919) 13 Cr App R 134. Cf Kelly v The King (1923) 32 CLR 509; [1923] HCA 46 and R v Clarke [1959] VR 645. 5 See the explanation by Windeyer J in R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 477.
[CA.19A.200]
By the accused – liability of accomplices
For general commentary on abettors and accessories, common purpose etc, see [CA.345.20]–[2.33410]. Two bases of accessorial liability – a person who is not himself physically responsible for murder may nevertheless be legally liable for the murder, either as an aider and abettor or because he is a participant in a joint criminal enterprise.1 The liability of those in the former category is derivative; those in the latter primary, see sub-heading “Differing liabilities”. Aiders and abettors etc – in Likiardopoulos (2012), the High Court referred to the “basic common law distinctions between categories of participation, namely, those of principals, accessories before the fact, accessories at the fact, and accessories after the fact.”2 The following passage from the judgment of
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Callinan J in Osland (1998) was quoted with approval: The distinguishing feature of accessories at the fact was their presence at the commission of the crime. Accessories at the fact were described as “aiding and abetting” the commission of the crime. Accessories before the fact were referred to as having “counselled or procured” the crime. Different penalties were typically imposed for the various classifications of participation.3 The liability which attaches to the traditional classifications of accessory before the fact and principal in the second degree may be enough to establish the guilt of a secondary party: in the case of an accessory before the fact where that party counsels or procures the commission of the crime and in the case of a principal in the second degree where that party, being present at the scene, aids or abets its commission.4 In Giorgianni (1985) it was said by three justices of the High Court: Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence requires the intentional assistance or encouragement of the doing of those things which go to make up the offence.5 (emphasis added) The principles of aiding and abetting were considered in a Victorian case of R v Lam (2005).6 An accomplice who is a principal in the second degree to murder is liable to the same punishment as the principal in the first degree: see s 345 and [CA.345.20]–[CA.345.180]. As to accessories before the fact: see s 346 and [CA.346.20]–[CA.346.80]. As to the liability of accessories after the fact: see s 347 and [2.CA.347.20]–[CA.347.100]. By s 349(1), an accessory after the fact to murder is liable to 25 years penal servitude.
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Joint criminal enterprise – common purpose – in McAuliffe (1995), the High Court said: The doctrine of common purpose applies where a venture is undertaken by more than one person acting in concert in pursuit of a common criminal design. Such a venture may be described as a joint criminal enterprise. Those terms – common purpose, common design, concert, joint criminal enterprise – are used more or less interchangeably to invoke the doctrine which provides a means, often an additional means, of establishing the complicity of a secondary party in the commission of a crime.7 The concept of joint criminal enterprise was described in R v Tangye (1997) 92 A Crim R 545 at 556–557 by Hunt CJ at CL: A joint criminal enterprise exists where two or more persons reach an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between them that they will commit a crime. The understanding or arrangement need not be express, and its existence may be inferred from all the circumstances. It need not have been reached at any time before the crime is committed. The notion of joint criminal enterprise has been developed, inter alia, in various High Court decisions, notably Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3; McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26; Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15; Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64; R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; (2007) 168 A Crim R 95; [2007] HCA 11. Liability for murder as a member of a joint criminal enterprise can include liability for a death in the course of a robbery under the felony murder rule.8 There can be liability for murder as a member of a joint criminal enterprise where the agreement to murder is subject to a contingency which may or may not occur.9 Common purpose and extended common purpose – in Gillard (2003) Hayne J, with whom Gummow J agreed, summarised what have become known as the doctrines of common purpose and extended common purpose: [110] In its simplest application, the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise means that, if a person reaches an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement with another or others that they will commit a crime, and one or other of the parties to the arrangement does, or they do between them, in
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In the common purpose case of McAuliffe (1995) the High Court said:
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[CA.19A.200]
accordance with the continuing understanding or arrangement, all those things which are necessary to constitute the crime, all are equally guilty of the crime regardless of the part played by each in its commission. [111] The doctrine has further application. It is not confined in its operation to the specific crime which the parties to the agreement intended should be committed. “[E]ach of the parties to the arrangement or understanding is guilty of any other crime falling within the scope of the common purpose which is committed in carrying out that purpose”. The scope of the common purpose is to be determined subjectively: by what was contemplated by the parties sharing that purpose. And “[w]hatever is comprehended by the understanding or arrangement, expressly or tacitly, is necessarily within the contemplation of the parties to the understanding or arrangement”.10 (footnotes omitted)
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The two categories of common purpose murder were described by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Sharah (1992): It is well established that there are two classes of common purpose murder. The first class is where the Crown proves that the accused was present and that the deceased was killed in accordance with an understanding or arrangement to which the accused was a party and that that understanding or arrangement included the intent charged, that is, either to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. The second class of case is where the accused lends himself to a criminal enterprise knowing that a potentially lethal weapon was being carried by one of his companions and in the event that it is in fact used by one of his partners with an intent sufficient for murder, then the accused too will be guilty of that offence of murder if the Crown establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused contemplated that in the carrying out of the common unlawful purpose, one of his partners might use a lethal weapon with the intention of at least causing serious bodily harm.11 Aiding and abetting compared to common purpose – there is a conceptual distinction between the liability of an aider and abettor and that of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. In Clayton v The Queen (2006) 168 A Crim R 174; [2006] HCA 58, where the High Court declined to reconsider its decisions in McAuliffe and Gillard, it was said in a joint judgment: The history of the distinction between joint enterprise liability and secondary liability as an aider, abettor, counsellor or procurer of an offence has recently been traced by Professor Simester. (Simester, “The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 578 at 596–598.) As that author demonstrates, liability as an aider and abettor is grounded in the secondary party’s contribution to another’s crime. By contrast, in joint enterprise cases, the wrong lies in the mutual embarkation on a crime, and the participants are liable for what they foresee as the possible results of that venture. In some cases, the accused may be guilty both as an aider and abettor, and as participant in a joint criminal enterprise. That factual intersection of the two different sets of principles does not deny their separate utility.12 (footnote included) Rationale of common purpose liability – Kirby J observed in Gillard (2003): … Those who participate in activities highly dangerous to life and limb share equal responsibility for the consequences of the acts that ensue. This is because, as the law’s experience shows, particularly when dangerous weapons are involved in a crime scene, whatever the actual and earlier intentions of the secondary offender, the possibility exists that the primary offender will use the weapons, occasioning death or grievous bodily harm to others. The law then tells the secondary offender not to participate because doing so risks equal inculpation in such serious crimes as ensue.13 Where it cannot be proved whether the accused was the principal, an accessory or was acting in a common purpose – a person who is present aiding and abetting a murder can be guilty of that offence as a principle in the second degree even without proof by the Crown of any pre-arranged plan or proof of which offender struck the fatal blow.14 A person will be guilty of the offence charged as a principal where the evidence does not enable the court to decide whether he is the principal or an accessory before the fact. 15 This
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Differing liabilities – in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75, the question arose of whether in the case of a mother and son acting in concert to kill their husband/father, the mother (who did not strike the fatal blow), could be guilty of murder, when the son (who did strike that blow) was ultimately acquitted. McHugh J considered the contrasting situations of derivative liability and primary liability; stating that in the case of the party who is present at the commission of a crime by pre-concert with the primary perpetrator, such a person is a principal in the first degree and has primary and not derivative liability. McHugh J contrasted such a person with those not present (accessories before the fact or principals in the third degree) or those present but merely encouraging but not participating physically or whose acts were not substantial causes of death (principals in the second degree) and whose liability is derivative of the liability of the actual perpetrator – those in these categories can only be convicted of the crime of which the perpetrator was found guilty. But for a person acting in concert with the actual perpetrator, it is the acts and not the crime itself that are attributed to the former.18 “The principle that those who act in concert and are present at the scene are responsible for the acts of the actual perpetrator operates to make a person guilty of the principal crime, even thought the actual perpetrator is acquitted completely.”19 McHugh J observed that the perpetrator may have a defence or partial defence such as lack of mens rea, self-defence, provocation, duress or insanity.20 Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) was a case where a man was beaten to death by six participants including the accused. The Crown accepted guilty pleas from the other five to lesser charges than murder. At the accused’s trial where he was convicted of murder, the Crown put the case against him on the alternative basis that he was a party to a joint criminal enterprise to inflict really serious injury on the deceased and also that he had directed and encouraged the others to murder the deceased. On appeal, it was contended that under Osland, it was an error by the trial judge to leave the accessorial case of murder to the jury when the other participants had not been convicted of murder. All members of the Court rejected this proposition on the basis that the evidence at the accused’s trial was capable of proving that each of the others whom the accused directed and encouraged were liable as principals for the deceased’s murder.21 1 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75; McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 at 113–114 (CLR). 2 Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1168; [2012] HCA 37 per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [22]. 3 Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1168; [2012] HCA 37 per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [22] quoting Callinan J in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75 at [206]. 4 McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 at 113–114 (CLR); 232–233 (A Crim R) (the Court). 5 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 505 (CLR); 186 (A Crim R) per Wilson, Dawson and Deane JJ. 6 R v Lam (2005) 159 A Crim R 448; [2005] VSC 294 per Redlich J. See also the judgments of McHugh J and Callinan J in Osland v The Queen. 7 McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 at 113–114 (CLR); 232–233 (A Crim R) (the Court). 8 R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [199]ff. 9 May v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 111 per Bathurst CJ. 10 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64. 11 R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 at 301 (NSWLR); 370 (A Crim R) per Carruthers J (Gleeson CJ and Smart J agreeing), quoted in R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [225].
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principle applies also where the evidence does not allow the court to say whether the offender acted pursuant to a common enterprise or in an accessorial capacity.16 Where the Crown cannot say whether the accused was the principal or a secondary party, the case may be put in the alternative – in this instance, a single charge of murder suffices.17
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.200]
12 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 168 A Crim R 174; [2006] HCA 58 at [20] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ. 13 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [62]. 14 R v Clarke [1959] VR 645; Mohan v The Queen [1967] 2 AC 187; [1967] 2 WLR 676; [1967] 2 All ER 58; R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131; R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396; 64 A Crim R 451. See also Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; [1985] HCA 65; R v Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3. 15 Mohan v The Queen [1967] 2 AC 187; [1967] 2 WLR 676; [1967] 2 All ER 58; R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441 at 123 (VR); R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396; 64 A Crim R 451 at 398–399 (NSWLR); 455 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL. 16 R v Hore [2005] NSWCCA 3 at [84]. 17 R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1; R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377. 18 Osland v The Queen at 341–342 (CLR) per McHugh J with whom Kirby and Callinan JJ agreed. 19 Osland v The Queen at 345 (CLR). 20 Osland v The Queen at 344 (CLR). See also Matusevich v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 633; 51 ALJR 657; [1977] HCA 30 (principal found not guilty from insanity). 21 Likiardopoulos v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1168; [2012] HCA 37 per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [24], [27] and [30] (French CJ agreeing), per Heydon J at [44].
[CA.19A.220]
Where party responsible cannot be established
Apart from cases of those acting in a common purpose, an evidentiary question can arise where two or more can be shown to have had opportunity to have caused or been criminally involved in the victim’s death but where the prosecution is unable to show what, if any, precise part each played.1
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This situation can arise in the case of a child’s death. Where it is clear that a child has died as a result of injuries inflicted by one or other of its parents but there is no evidence of which was responsible, in the absence of evidence of a joint enterprise between them, both should be acquitted.2 It was held in the case of a gaol murder that if the trial judge determined that there was sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable possibility that a party other than the accused was the perpetrator, the jury should have directed that the accused must be acquitted unless that possibility was excluded beyond reasonable doubt.3 1 Williams G, “Which Of You Did It?” (1989) 52 Mod LR 179; Griew E, “It Must Have Been One Of Them” [1989] Crim LR 129. 2 R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497; [1955] 3 WLR 369; (1955) 39 Cr App R 141 (CCA); R v Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5; R v Russell (1987) 85 Cr App R 388. 3 R v Robinson [2003] NSWCCA 188 at [198]. See also the non-murder case of R v Filippetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335.
[CA.19A.240]
Causation of death
The prosecution bears the onus of proving legal causation of death. There is a distinction between factual causation and legal causation, see [CLP.420]. For a summary of the general principles of causation, see [CLP.380]. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]–[CLP.540]. [CA.19A.260]
Causation not usually an issue
In most criminal cases, the issue of legal causation is not controversial.1 It has been said that unless causation has arisen as an issue during trial, it is unnecessary for a trial judge to direct the jury as to the question of causation.2 Where causation does arise as a real issue, a number of different questions can arise as discussed below. Where causation is an issue, the prosecution must identify the relevant act(s) or omission(s) relied upon, see [CLP.400]. 1 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 441 (CLR) per McHugh J.
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s 19A
2 R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 288 (Cr App R).
1 R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 at 527; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 at 290–291 (Cr App R); Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 441 (CLR) per McHugh J; Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81. 2 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 218–220; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 386 (CLR) per Mason CJ. 3 R v Lam (No 22) (2005) 15 VR 574; 164 A Crim R 445; [2005] VSC 296.
[CA.19A.300] Substantial or significant contribution to death For the related topic of identification of the act causing death, see [CA.19A.160].
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Where causation is in issue, the question will be: did the accused cause the deceased’s death? In Butcher (1986), the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal said that a single cause of death is not always able to be isolated and that, as a matter of law, there need not be a sole cause of death.1 In deciding questions of causation, the law selects one or more causes out of a total sum of conditions according to the purpose in hand.2 In Royall (1991), Brennan J observed that the basic proposition relating to causation in homicide is that an accused’s conduct, whether by act or omission, must contribute significantly to the death of the victim3 but it need not be the sole, direct or immediate cause of the death.4 Deane and Dawson JJ (at 411) spoke of “a substantial or significant” cause of death. McHugh J identified a number of tests of causation including the “operating and substantial cause” test.5 McHugh J remarked that the adjective “operating” adds nothing (at 449) and that “substantial” means “not more than not de minimus” (at 442, 449). In the context of causation, many authorities employ the term “substantial”.6 An example of substantial causation is contained in the Western Australian case of Krakouer (2006), (facts, see [CLP.440]) which reviews a number of authorities on the question, including Royall.7 In Moffatt (2000), a case in which the deceased had a pre-existing medical condition and there were a number of possible causes of death, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal observed in relation to causation: What is clear is that the act of the appellant must have more than a coincidental or insignificant effect – rather it must provide a substantial contribution towards the death of the deceased.8 1 R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1 at 14 (A Crim R) where the victim of a robbery died after he rushed onto a knife presented towards his stomach by the accused. 2 Simpson v Sinclair [1917] AC 127 at 135; National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; 35 ALJR 4; [1961] HCA 15 at 591 (CLR). 3 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 398 (CLR); quoting R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393 per Robert Goff LJ at 288 (Cr App R). Also R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844; [1991] 3 All ER 670; (1991) 93 Cr App R 251. 4 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193; R v Lewis [1975] 1 NZLR 222; R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523; R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41; R v McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31; R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393; R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1. 5 The other tests being
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[CA.19A.280] Causation a question of fact for the jury The issue of legal causation is a question of fact1 and it is for the jury to determine whether the connection between the conduct of the accused and the death of the deceased was sufficient to attribute causal responsibility to the accused.2 The Victorian case of Lam (2005) provides an illustration of a situation where the accused’s actions were factually connected to deaths by drowning of people trying to escape the accused, but which actions were held too temporally and physically remote to operate as a substantial cause of their deaths.3
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.300]
(2) the natural consequence test; (3) the reasonable foresight of consequences test; and (4) the novus actus interveniens test (sometimes used in conjunction with and sometimes independently of one of the other tests) : Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 441–451 (CLR) per McHugh J, and see commentary at [CLP.500]. 6 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 All ER 193; R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141; R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133; (1971) 55 Cr App R 262; R v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469 at 480; R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523; R v Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; [1981] 2 All ER 422; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173. See also Odgers SJ and Yeo SMH, “Semantics and the Threshold test for Imputable Causation”, (2000) 24 Crim RL 73. 7 Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81. 8 R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 per Wood CJ at CL at [71].
[CA.19A.320]
Indirect causation
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In homicide, direct physical contact between accused and victim resulting in death is common but not essential.1 There have been cases of murder where a person causes death by inducing fright, shock or mental suffering.2 In cases where direct physical contact is absent, an issue of causation is more likely to arise and “commonsense” does not provide a reliable legal answer. In Royall (1991), McHugh J observed that there are two cases (detailed below) where the invocation of commonsense principles of causation often provides little assistance to the jury.3 The first case is where an accused’s act would not have brought about the event or occurrence without the intervention or a subsequent act of the victim or a third party. This category includes the “escape cases” where the victim dies or is injured during the course of trying to escape from threatened violence by the accused.4 Lord Coleridge stated in R v Halliday (1889) 61 LT 701 at 702, “[i]f a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.”5 An example of third party intervention is Pagett (1983) where a girl who was being used as a shield by the accused in a shoot out with police, was shot dead by the police who could not see her.6 The second case is where, notwithstanding the accused’s act or omission, the event or occurrence could have been prevented if the victim or a third person had taken action to avoid the consequences of the act or omission. This situation is considered under “Novus actus interveniens – breaking the causal chain” at [CLP.540]. 1 For example R v Huggins (1730) 17 St Tr 309 at 376 where a gaoler was held liable for the death of a prisoner imprisoned in unwholesome air. See also R v Pinhorn (1844) 1 Cox 70; R v Waters (1848) 1 Den 356; 169 ER 278; R v Phillpot 169 ER 686; (1853) Dears 179. 2 R v Pitts 174 ER 509; (1842) Car & M 284; R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692; R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150; R v Williams [1992] 1 WLR 380; [1992] 2 All ER 183; (1992) 95 Cr App R 1. Cf R v Towers (1874) 12 Cox CC 530; R v Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684; [1989] 2 All ER 865; (1989) 89 Cr App R 211. 3 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 per McHugh J at 441 (CLR). 4 R v Evans (1812) unreported (see Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (12th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1964, London) p 414); R v Pitts 174 ER 509; (1842) Car & M 284; R v Grimes (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 209; 10 WN (NSW) 211; R v Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 96; R v Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197; R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95; R v Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453; DPP v Daley [1980] AC 237; (1979) 69 Cr App R 39; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669. 5 Applied by Deane and Dawson JJ in Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 405 (CLR). 6 R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 393.
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[CA.19A.380] [CA.19A.340]
s 19A
Delayed causation
Holland was a case where the victim of an assault had suffered a severe cut to a finger. Although advised by a surgeon to have the finger amputated as its condition was life-threatening, the victim refused. The victim died a fortnight later. The surgeon gave evidence that had the finger been amputated, the victim’s life would most probably have been preserved. The accused’s argument that the death was too remote from the wound he inflicted was unsuccessful. [CA.19A.360]
Pre-existing condition in victim
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“It has long been the policy of the law that those who use violence on other people must take their victims as they find them.”1 The presence in the deceased, of a constitutional defect unknown to his assailant, which makes the victim more susceptible to death than would be a person in normal health, does not enable the assailant to claim that the death is an accident.2 “A killing is not the less a crime because the victim was frail and easily killed.”3 This principle has been applied in relation to physical weaknesses in victims4 including cases of acceleration of death (see “Conduct accelerating death” at [CA.19A.380]) and also to a victim’s beliefs which cause the victim to refuse life-saving medical treatment.5 1 R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 at 1415 (WLR) (CA); R v Smithers (1977) 75 DLR (3d) 321; R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 at [65]. 2 Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21; R v Van Den Bemd (1994) 179 CLR 137; 70 A Crim R 494; R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174. 3 Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21 at 79 (CLR) per Windeyer J. 4 R v Johnson 168 ER 999; (1827) 1 Lewin 164; R v Martin 172 ER 907; (1832) 5 Car & P 128; R v Cheeseman 173 ER 202; (1836) 7 Car & P 455; R v Murton 176 ER 221; (1862) 3 F & F 492; R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692; R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454; (1909) 1 Cr App R 13; R v Edmunds (1909) 25 TLR 658; R v Martyr [1962] Qd R 398; Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21; R v Van Den Bemd (1994) 179 CLR 137; 70 A Crim R 494; R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174; Compare R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150; R v Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684; [1989] 2 All ER 865; (1989) 89 Cr App R 211. 5 R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446; (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 (CA). See also R v Holland (1841) 174 ER 313; (1841) 2 Mood & R 351.
[CA.19A.380]
Conduct accelerating death
An act or omission which causes an acceleration of death which would occur in any event can result in liability for murder. The principle was explained in R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 at 527–528: Death is, of course, inevitable. Homicide is really the acceleration of the event. Accordingly if the victim received from one assailant an injury which would or might ultimately result in death, but before the event occurred he received from another assailant a further injury which accelerated his death, the second assailant would be regarded as having caused death for the purposes of the law of homicide, whereas the first assailant would only be guilty of an attempt to commit homicide …1 Similarly, the fact that a victim was suffering from a medical condition which would have soon caused his death is no answer to a charge of causing death sooner by some unlawful act.2 A United States Court directed that an accused was guilty of murder if he incited a condemned man to commit suicide on the eve of his execution.3 The acceleration of death must be by an amount that is “more than de minimus”.4
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Death sometimes results from a delayed complication of the original injury. In R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523, the victim of a stabbing to his bowel died almost one year later after an apparently successful operation from a complication of delayed onset. The Victorian Full Court approved a direction given to a jury by Maule J in R v Holland (1841) 174 ER 313; (1841) 2 Mood & R 351 as follows, “the real question is whether in the end the wound inflicted by the prisoner was the cause of death?”
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.380]
Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81 at [33] reviews a number of authorities dealing with acceleration of death, including some United States cases. 1 R v Evans [No 2] [1976] VR 523 at 527–528. 2 R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174; Krakouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; [2006] WASCA 81. See also 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 428; R v Martin 172 ER 907; (1832) 5 Car & P 128; R v Webb 174 ER 140; (1834) 1 Mood & R 405; R v Murton 176 ER 221; (1862) 3 F & F 492; R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454; (1909) 1 Cr App R 13; R v Adams [1957] Crim LR 365. Cf Mamote-Kulang v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 62; 37 ALJR 516; [1964] HCA 21. 3 Commonwealth v Bowen (1816) 13 Mass 365. 4 R v Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim R 201; [2000] NSWCCA 174 per Wood CJ at CL at [71] citing various authorities.
[CA.19A.400]
Death by unexpected means
In Demirian (1989) it was said that, “[i]f a person creates a situation intended to kill and it does kill it is no answer to a charge of murder that it caused death at a time or in a way that was to some extent unexpected.”1
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In Demirian, a conspirator in a plot to plant a bomb near a building died when the device exploded unexpectedly when being handled by the deceased conspirator. His co-conspirator was charged with murder. A sixteenth century example: a prostitute who bore a child abandoned it alive in an orchard covered with leaves. A kite attacked the child with its claws causing its death. The woman was convicted of murder.2 Further examples are the “disposal of body cases” such as where attackers, intending to kill their victim, assaulted him and, believing they had killed him, rolled him over a cliff where in fact he died from exposure from lying at the bottom of the cliff rather than the assault;3 where the accused believing he had already killed the victim and intending to do so, threw her into a river whereby she drowned.4 A different case involved a man convicted of murder who struck his victim severely to the head causing the victim to collapse unconscious on a beach. Death was caused not by the blows struck but by drowning in the incoming tide.5 1 R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1988) 33 A Crim R 441 per McGarvie and O’Bryan JJ at 113 (VR) quoted in Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 by Mason CJ at 392 (CLR) and also by Brennan J at 400 (CLR), Dawson and Deane JJ at 411 (CLR) and McHugh J at 452 (CLR). 2 The Harlot’s case (1560) Crompton’s Justice 24; Hale PC 53. Also Agnes Gore’s Case 77 ER 853; (1611) 9 Co Rep 81; R v Michael 173 ER 867; (1840) 9 Car & P 356. 3 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228; 1 All ER 373 where Lord Reid speaking for the Judicial Committee said at 230 (WLR), “It … [is] … impossible to divide up what was really one transaction … There is no doubt that the accused set out to do all these acts in order to achieve their plan and as parts of the plan; and it is much too refined a ground of judgment to say that, because they were under a misapprehension at one stage and though that their guilty purpose had been achieved before in fact it was achieved, therefore they are to escape the penalties of the law.” 4 R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59; [1965] 2 WLR 1220; (1965) 49 Cr App R 206. 5 R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141.
[CA.19A.420]
Indeterminate causation
The exact mode of killing becomes immaterial in proving murder if there is sufficient evidence to satisfy a jury that there was a killing by the accused or an accomplice in circumstances which make it murder.1 Various authorities are collected in R v PL (2009) 199 A Crim R 199; [2009] NSWCCA 256 and see commentary at [CA.19A.160] under the sub-heading “Where precise act causing death cannot be
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1 R v Burdett 106 ER 873; (1820) 4 B & Ald 95; R v Murphy (1867) 4 WW & a’B (L) 63; R v Makin (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 1; 9 WN (NSW) 129; R v Nash (1911) 6 Cr App R 225; Attorney-General v Edwards [1935] IR 500; People v Kirwan [1943] IR 279; R v Horry [1952] 71 NZLR 111; Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217; 68 ALJR 23; 68 A Crim R 251; R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406; (1996) 85 A Crim R 187 (Vic CCA). See also Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1980) [1981] 1 WLR 705; [1981] 2 All ER 617; (1981) 73 Cr App R 40. 2 Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; (2002) 132 A Crim R 453; [2002] HCA 33; R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; (2004) 147 A Crim R 585; [2004] VSCA 164 at [23]–[25]. See also Mutual Life Insurance Co Of New York v Moss (1906) 4 CLR 311; [1906] HCA 70.
[CA.19A.440]
The “but for” test
For detailed commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]–[CLP.540] and in particular “Factual causation and legal causation” at [CLP.420].
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An indicator (but not a definitive test) of causal connection is to ask whether, but for the accused’s conduct, the consequence to the victim would have occurred. If the answer is “no”, often a causal connection is established.1 Conversely, if the answer is “yes”, there is likely to be no causal connection. While the common law has refused to apply the “but for” test as the sole test of causation, nevertheless it has been described as a useful tool in determining whether a causal link existed.2 Other authorities have considered the “but for” test.3 1 McHugh J pointed out that causation-in-fact is not causation-in-law: Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 440 (CLR), referring to Colvin, “Causation in Criminal Law” (1989) 1 Bond Law Review 253 at 254–258. See [CLP.420] for commentary. 2 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 440 (CLR) per McHugh J (and see 449); Arulthilakan v The Queen (2003) 78 ALJR 257; [2003] HCA 74 at [57] per Kirby J. 3 R v Dolloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273; R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 477 per Windeyer J; R v Dyos [1979] Crim LR 660. See also R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215; (1992) 62 A Crim R 465.
[CA.19A.460]
Breaking the causal chain – novus actus interveniens
Where, although an act of the accused constitutes a necessary condition for (a causa sine qua non) the death of a victim, nevertheless the intervention of a third person, event or occurrence may be regarded as the sole cause of the victim’s death, thereby relieving the accused of criminal responsibility; a novus actus interveniens. For detailed commentary on novus actus interveniens, see [CLP.540]. [CA.19A.480]
Foreseeability and causation
Foresight of consequences is relevant to intent – see [CLP.1400] and [CA.19A.520]. It may also be relevant to the question of legal causation, see detailed commentary “Reasonable foresight of consequences test – act or omission of victim or third party” at [CLP.520]. [CA.19A.500]
Element (3)(a) Accused’s act or omission with reckless indifference to human life
Liability for murder by reckless indifference – even without an actual intention to kill, a person who does an act without lawful excuse knowing that it is probable (as distinct from possible) that death will result is guilty or murder if death does in fact result.1 Murder in the context of reckless indifference by omission has been considered.2 Meaning of recklessness – “‘Recklessness’ is a concept about risk. It relates to the degree of foresight of a particular result associated with a certain course of action and deciding to engage in that conduct despite the potential consequences.”3 Put another way, “[r]ecklessness involves that the person charged adverted to
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identified”. Motive may be taken into account as evidence that the accused was responsible for the death.2 As mentioned at [CA.19A.100], the fact that the accused caused the death may be proved circumstantially.
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.500]
the risk involved in his conduct, but nevertheless persisted in it, indifferent to the possible injurious consequences, and the state of the accused’s mind is therefore relevant where reckless conduct is alleged.”4 Recklessness compared to intention – recklessness does not require an intention or wish to cause death;5 if actual intent can be shown, the prosecution has no need to rely on recklessness and in such cases, a direction on recklessness may be both unnecessary and inappropriate.6 Howard’s Criminal Law observes that there are two distinctions between recklessness and intention, depending on which kind of intention one is talking about: (a) the usual kind of intention to kill includes a purpose by the accused to bring about the victim’s death. In reckless killing the accused does not purposely seek to cause the victim’s death but is either indifferent to it or hopes the victim will not be harmed; (b) the other state of mind treated by the law as equivalent to intention to kill is foresight of certainty of death, even if death is not desired. The distinction here from reckless killing is only a matter of degree. If the probability that the accused’s actions will cause death is so high as to be a certainty, the accused’s state of mind will be equated to intent to kill. If death is not certain, but rather, probable this will be treated as recklessness.
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Howard says that the distinction between reckless killing and negligent killing lies in the foresight of death. While foresight of the probability of death is essential for recklessness, negligence excludes actual foresight as negligence is the failure to foresee what one should have foreseen.7 “Probability” of death – what does a “probability” of death mean? It has been pointed out that the main difficulty with the use of the word “probable” to describe the degree of risk is that it means different things to different people.8 The term “probable” has been treated as synonymous with “likely”.9 It has been held that in many and perhaps most cases, any attempt at directing a jury in terms of equating “probable” as requiring some precise degree of probability such as “more likely than not” is undesirable and that “probable” and “likely” convey the notion of a substantial – “a real and not remote” – chance regardless of whether it is less or more than fifty per cent.10 A Victorian case of R v Faure [1999] 2 VR 537; [1999] VSCA 166 involved a couple allegedly playing Russian roulette with a six shot revolver. Each had two shots with the cylinder being pulled each time before the trigger was pulled. Each took turns in pulling the trigger. The accused’s girlfriend was killed on the fourth shot he claimed. It was held (at 551) that the jury should have been directed that “probable” meant a substantial or real and not remote chance, whether or not it was more that fifty percent. In Darkan v The Queen (2006) 227 CLR 373; (2006) 163 A Crim R 80; [2006] HCA 34, the High Court considered the expression “a probable consequence” under the Criminal Code . Various meanings of the term “probable” were considered. At [25], Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ said that “whatever precise meaning the word ‘probable’ bears in a particular context, it is usually used to establish a contrast to what is ‘possible’.” Subjective foresight of actual death – as with intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm, the prosecution must prove the subjective intent of the accused, not what, objectively, a person in the accused’s position might have been expected to have foreseen.11 Section 18 is different from the common law in that it requires foresight of the probability of death; foresight of the probability of grievous bodily harm is not enough.12 In some circumstances, deliberate abstention of inquiry as to the magnitude of the risk involved might be evidence of actual knowledge or foresight.13 There are judicial warnings of the dangers of charging murder by reckless indifference because of the danger that a jury might reason that the accused had, in fact, contemplated that death would be the probable consequence of his action merely because they thought that a reasonable person in his position would have foreseen that consequence as probable.14 Recklessness and malice – s 18(2)(a) excludes from the operation of s 18 acts or omissions which were not malicious. It has been said that if the prosecution establishes one of the three states of mind specified in s 18(1), there is no room for the operation of the concept of malice under s 5.(now repealed)15 In any event, a mind reckless as to death is relevantly a malicious mind.16 In this context, the social utility of what the person causing death was doing before death occurred may be relevant.17
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Jury directions on recklessness – when directions on recklessness are necessary, clear directions need to be given.18 In R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243, Wood CJ at CL said (Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing): [33] In order for an accused to be convicted of murder by reckless indifference to human life, the Crown needs to show that he or she knew that the probable result of his or her act (or omission), in this case the act of firing the gun, was to cause the death of another, and knowing of that likelihood (which has to be a substantial or real chance as distinct from a mere possibility) he or she went ahead and did the act regardless: R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10 (a code case). To prove murder by reckless indifference to human life, an accused need not be shown to have specifically intended or wanted death to result, only that he or she comprehended that there was a real or substantial likelihood of it occurring, and went ahead regardless. As such, it is strictly not a crime of specific intent (see the decisions on the equivalent offence in Code States such as Masnec v The Queen [1962] Tas SR 254 and Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56). The Crown must still however show that the accused intended to do the physical act (or omission) involved, and that such act (or omission) was voluntary. [34] Of importance is the circumstance that an awareness or foresight of the consequence of the act (or omission), on the part of the accused personally, is essential for proof of the offence. It is not sufficient that an ordinary or reasonable person would have foreseen the probability of the occurrence being the death of another: Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107. There is, accordingly, an additional element affecting the subjective mental state of the accused, which is to be established in the case of murder by reckless indifference, and which goes beyond the basic intent to do (or omit) the act which brings about death. The mens rea for this form of offence, as was pointed out in R v Crabbe, is the knowledge of the offender that death is the probable consequence of his or her act (or omission), to which I would add the decision to go ahead regardless of that consequence.
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R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127 and R v Katarzynski [2005] NSWCCA 72 provide other examples of directions on reckless indifference. Intoxication – intoxication is relevant when the mental element to be proved by the Crown in murder is reckless indifference to human life.19 In R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243, it was held that the legislature should be taken as having intended that murder, in all its forms, and reckless indifference to human life should come within the operation of s 428C. Sentencing – as to sentencing, there is no prima facie presumption that murder resulting from reckless indifference is less culpable than murder involving one of the other categories of murder in s 18.20 1 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 469–470 (CLR). Also R v Jakac [1961] VR 367; R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141; R v Sergi [1974] VR 1; Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91; La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; [1976] HCA 52 per Gibbs and Jacobs JJ; Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v White (1989) 17 NSWLR 195; (1989) 43 A Crim R 283; R v Windsor [1982] VR 89; (1980) 4 A Crim R 197; R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669; R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542; 69 A Crim R 115. 2 R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542; 69 A Crim R 115. 3 Model Criminal Code Discussions Paper Ch 5 p 53 – Model Criminal Code Offıcers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General June 1998 4 R v Ashman [1957] VR 364 at 366. 5 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 470 (CLR). Also R v Peterkin (1982) 6 A Crim R 351 (CCA NSW) at 365 per Enderby J. 6 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 118 per Barwick CJ. An example was given at p 135 by Menzies J in Pemble of a person intentionally dropping a large block of stone from a high building onto a crowded street below. Also R v Allwood (1975) 18 A Crim R 120 (CCA Vic); La Fontaine v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 62; [1976] HCA 52 at 77 (CLR); Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v Cooke (1985) 39 SASR 225; 16 A Crim R 304; R v Marshall (1987) 49 SASR 133; 26 A Crim R 259; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 414 (CLR) per Deane and Dawson JJ.
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[CA.19A.500]
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.500]
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7 B Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law (5th ed, 1990), p 58. The Queensland case of R v T [1997] 1 Qd R 623; (1996) 91 A Crim R 152 contains a detailed examination of recklessness and foresight of consequences and the leading authorities. 8 D Lanham, “Murder, Recklessness and Grievous Bodily Harm” [1978] Crim LJ 255 at 260. 9 R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 at 153; R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 469–470 (CLR); Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 14, 19, 43 (CLR). 10 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 19–21 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. See also R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131 at 216 (NSWLR); 152 (A Crim R). 11 See in particular Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120 per Barwick CJ. 12 R v Solomon [1980] 1 NSWLR 321; (1979) 1 A Crim R 247; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 395 (CLR) per Mason CJ. 13 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 471 (CLR); Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163. 14 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120 per Barwick CJ; R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; (2007) 171 A Crim R 315; [2007] VSCA 95 at [50]–[59]. 15 Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 454–455 (CLR) per McHugh J. 16 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 119 per Barwick CJ. 17 An example sometimes used is the heart transplant surgeon: Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Hailsham LC; B Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law (5th ed, 1990), p 63. 18 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120 per Barwick CJ; R v Allwood (1975) 18 A Crim R 120 (CCA Vic); R v Peterkin (1982) 6 A Crim R 351 (CCA NSW); R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 470 (CLR); R v Nuri [1990] VR 641; (1989) 49 A Crim R 253. 19 R v Peterkin (1982) 6 A Crim R 351 (CCA NSW); R v Fuller (1982) 6 A Crim R 424 (CCA NSW); R v Martin (1984) 16 A Crim R 87; [1984] HCA 23; R v Cooke (1985) 39 SASR 225; 16 A Crim R 304. See also Pt 11A (Intoxication). 20 R v Aiton (1993) 68 A Crim R 578 at 597–598 (CCA Vic); R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127.
[CA.19A.520]
Element (3)(b) Accused’s act or omission with intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm Liability – by s 18(1)(a), an accused is guilty of murder if he or she intends to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm and the act or omission causes death without lawful cause or excuse. As to the meaning of “grievous bodily harm”, see [CA.4.160]. Some authorities where death has been caused consider intent to cause grievous bodily harm in particular.1 For detailed commentary on intent, see [CLP.1240] and particularly [CLP.1400]. Proof of subjective intent – the intent that must be proved is the accused’s intent and not of some reasonable person in the accused’s position at the relevant time; intent is subjective, not objective.2 It is wrong to direct a jury that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts.3 Admissions apart, intent is something which must be proved by inference.4 In inferring intent from what an accused said or did, a jury may take into account their experience of life and consider what intent would normally be inferred from such words or actions (but they must realise that it is the intent of the particular accused which is in issue).5 Where there is no direct evidence available from which to draw an inference as to the accused’s subjective intent, the principle focus of attention will ordinarily be the facts surrounding the alleged offence.6 “In some cases the evidence that the [accused’s] acts provide may be so strong as to compel an inference of what his intent was, no matter what he may say about it afterwards.”7 The nature and extent of injuries inflicted by an accused may be indicative of intent.8 Evidence of motive is admissible as to intent.9 To decide whether intent is established, a jury should have regard to the whole of the evidence.10 Intention does not necessarily include desire – intention generally implies a decision to bring about a particular consequence and suggests purposive behaviour.11 But a person may intend an outcome even though he or she does not desire it.12 It has been held that a person intends the consequence of his
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In Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7, Kirby J observed at 165–166 (A Crim R): It is important to draw a distinction between the intention of the accused and his or her motives, desires, wishes or hopes in doing the act alleged to constitute the crime charged (Hyam v DPP at 73; 100–101). Attempts have been made to define the meaning of “intent” or its derivatives (See, eg, Steane [1947] KB 997 at 1004–1005; (1947) 32 Cr App R 61 at 65–66; Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413 at 418–419). However the better view is that the word, being one of ordinary acceptation, should not be defined but should be left to the trier of fact without elaboration as to its meaning. (Moloney at 926; 106) The only exception is a case where some element in the evidence suggests the need for elucidation, so as to draw the distinction between intention on the one hand, and the accused’s motives, desires, wishes, hopes, reasons on the other. (footnotes included)
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Knowledge or foresight of consequences is not necessarily intent – knowledge or foresight of consequences of itself does not necessarily demonstrate an intent to bring about those consequences and the separate mental states of intent and knowledge of likely consequences has been emphasised.14 In Pemble (1971), Barwick CJ said (in the context of reckless indifference to life): Although what the jury think a reasonable man might have foreseen is a legitimate step in reasoning towards a conclusion as to the accused’s actual state of mind, a firm emphasis on the latter as the fact to be found by the jury is necessary to ensure that they do not make the mistake of treating what they think a reasonable man’s reaction would be in the circumstances as decisive of the accused’s state of mind. They need also to be reminded that the accused’s circumstances are relevant to the decision as to his state of mind; for example his age and background, educational and social, his current emotional state and his state of sobriety.15 Similarly, the House of Lords has “made it absolutely clear that foresight of consequences is no more than evidence of the existence of the intent; it must be considered and its weight assessed, together with all the evidence in the case. Foresight does not necessarily imply the existence of intention …”.16But while foresight of death is not automatically equated to intention, it may be considered as some evidence of intention and, a result foreseen as morally or practically certain, is likely to be regarded as intended.17 In Crabbe (1985), the High Court said that, “on one view, a person who does an act knowing its probable consequences may be regarded as have intended those consequences to occur.”18 Coincidence of mens rea and actus reus – Generally, to establish murder, the relevant mental elements prescribed by s 18(1)(a) must accompany the act which causes death, see [CLP.1320]. An exception has been recognised in the case of an accused who incorrectly believes that he or she has done an act which has killed a victim (with that intent) and disposes of the “body” in a way which in fact causes the victim’s death.19 Whether this exception will be confined to this type of case remains to be seen.20 Accused need not intend a specific victim – s 18(1)(a) speaks of an accused acting with intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon “some person”. Provided the accused had an intention to kill somebody, it is immaterial that he or she had no particular victim in view, eg shooting at random into a crowd;21 similarly, if the wrong person is killed.22 Intoxication and intent – evidence of intoxication from alcohol and/or drugs is relevant to the question of intent in murder.23 Part 11A (ss 428A–428I) deals specifically with intoxication see commentary [CA.428I.20]–[CA.428I.60]. In Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; 18 ALR 257, Gibbs J considered the directions that should be given to a jury concerning intoxication and an offence of specific intent – see [CA.428I.40].24 1 R v Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] 3 WLR 326; [1957] 2 All ER 741; R v Rhodes (1984) 14 A Crim R 124 (CCA Vic); R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201 (CCA SA).
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voluntary act (a) when he desires it to happen, whether or not he foresees that it will probably happen, or (b) when he foresees that it will probably happen whether he desires it or not.13
Crimes Act 1900
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s 19A
[CA.19A.520]
2 R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263 (FC). In Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14, the High Court said that the objective test confirmed in England in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 All ER 161 should not be used as authority in Australia. 3 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358; [1952] HCA 56 at 365 (CLR); Smyth v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 163; [1957] HCA 24 at 166 (CLR); Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; [1960] HCA 2 at 596–597 (CLR); Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14. 4 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; (1990) 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 580 (CLR) per Dawson J (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ concurring). 5 R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263 (FC). 6 Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 at 648 (ALJR), 166 (A Crim R) per Kirby J. 7 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 648–649 (CLR) per Windeyer J. 8 R v Shaw [1981] 2 NSWLR 648; 4 A Crim R 228 at 651 (NSWLR); Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 648–649 (CLR) per Windeyer J. 9 R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227; [1927] HCA 47 at 232 (CLR) per Isaacs ACJ; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44 at 242–243 (CLR) per Dixon CJ; Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334; 44 ALJR 221; [1970] HCA 17. 10 R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42 at 418–419 (Qd R); 47 (A Crim R). 11 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91 at 74 (AC) per Lord Hailsham LC. 12 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 per Windeyer J; R v Stones (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 25; 72 WN (NSW) 465; R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; (1957) 41 Cr App R 155; R v Willmot (No 2) [1985] 2 Qd R 413; 18 A Crim R 42. 13 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; (1974) 59 Cr App R 91; R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255. See also B Fisse, Howard’s Criminal Law (5th ed, 1990), p 43 et seq. 14 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 43 (CLR) per Brennan J. See also R v Hoskin (1974) 9 SASR 531 at 536–538; R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741; [1976] 3 All ER 46; (1976) 63 Cr App R 59 at 64 (Cr App R). See also [CA.5.140]; [CA.5.160]. 15 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120. See also Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 82 per Windeyer J; Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 at 642 (ALJR); 157 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ and Dawson J. 16 R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; [1986] 2 WLR 357; [1986] 1 All ER 646 at 472 (AC) per Lord Scarman referring to R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025. See also R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; [1986] 3 All ER 1; (1986) 83 Cr App R 267; Frankland v The Queen [1987] AC 576; [1987] 2 WLR 1251; (1988) 86 Cr App R 116. Limited reference to Hancock and Moloney was made by Gibbs CJ and by Brennan J in Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29. 17 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; [1986] 3 All ER 1; (1986) 83 Cr App R 267. 18 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19 at 469 (CLR), the Court. 19 The leading authority is Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228; 1 All ER 373. See also R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978. The question was also considered in Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 but no unified view emerged. 20 21 22 23 24
See Editorial in (1999) 23 Crim LJ 5. R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54. R v Supple (1870) 1 VR (L) 151; R v Bacash [1981] VR 923. R v Martin (1984) 16 A Crim R 87; [1984] HCA 23. See also R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1. See also Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 at 641 (ALJR); 155 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ and Dawson J.
[CA.19A.540]
Element (3)(c) Act or omission in pursuance of crime punishable by penal servitude for life or 25 years (felony-murder)
“Felony murder” rule – the term “felony-murder” is long established and is still used even though s 580E abolished all distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours (as inserted by Act 94 of 1999) and substituted instead “serious indictable offence” and the “minor indictable offence”, see [2.49850].
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Intent to be proved – the requisite intent is an intent to commit a felony punishable by penal servitude for life or 25 years4 and it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove an intent to kill or to cause injury – the act causing death need only be done voluntarily.5 The commission of the felony itself satisfies any requirement of malice under s 18(2).6 A causal link between the felony relied upon and the death is not required. For example in R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67, a man died after being punched in the course of a robbery with wounding, which was the foundation offence for a charge of felony murder. The cause of the victim’s death was not the wounding, but rather, being punched. It was held per Street CJ at p 69:
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There is no relevant requirement of a causal link between the felony relied upon as constituting the homicide one of felony murder and the death other than stated in s 18(1)(a) itself, that is to say the act of the accused causing death was done during or immediately after the committing of a life sentence crime.7 Accomplice’s liability for physical acts of perpetrator - s 18(1)(a) deals expressly with accomplices, imposing liability for death caused in relation to the commission of crimes carrying the relevant penalties, by the accused, “or some accomplice with him or her”. This is an aspect of common purpose liability. In R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462, two men were charged with murder in the course of an aggravated robbery in company. During the robbery, one of the men struck a heavy blow to a bystander in a cafe leading to the bystander’s death. It was contended on appeal that a proper construction of s 18(1)(a) meant that murder can only be established where it was the act or omission of the accused himself that caused the death. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected this proposition. At [199]–[200], Wood CJ at CL said that it is a principle of long standing that a person may be found guilty of murder although he or she did not commit the act or acts which physically caused the death of the victim, provided that the or she was acting in concert with the perpetrator, and that, the wording of s 18 does not alter the operation of the common law rules of complicity. For an accomplice to be liable for felony murder, the accomplice must have contemplated (as a possibility amounting to a substantial risk) the act of wounding, causing grievous bodily harm or other act in fact occurring so as to take the original criminal enterprise to one of an offence carrying either life imprisonment or 25 years imprisonment.8 Appropriate jury directions were considered in R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 and R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476.9 “During or immediately after” – the relevant portion of s 18(1)(a) contains the words “during or immediately after”. Whether something is or is not done immediately is a question of fact.10 In a case of a death arising in the course of a robbery with wounding, “the word ‘immediately’ does not require to be given a meaning which would restrict the application of the section to an event occurring within seconds or minutes of the termination of those particular actions which constituted in law a robbery of the victim. The whole of the circumstances involved in the robbery must be looked at and a decision made against the entire context of the evidence in regard thereto.”11 The temporal requirement in s 18 of the act causing death to have been done “in” an attempt to commit a felony has been considered in a robbery case where the fatal stabbing occurred after the property was taken.12 “In an attempt to commit” – as to attempts, see commentary at [2.32600] and following. Strict proof of felony foundation offence required – the prosecution must strictly prove the commission of the felony relied upon.13 It has been said that where the prosecution charges felony-murder, it cannot succeed in establishing that offence by proof merely of a previous conviction for felony plus evidence that the act causing death was done during the commission of the felony; the prosecution must prove afresh the commission by the accused of that felony of which a jury had already found him guilty.14
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History of felony murder – sometimes called “constructive murder” because it involves a constructed intent, the history of the felony-murder rule, both at common law and its modification and operation in New South Wales by s 18, has been considered in a number of cases.1 Although often the subject of criticism,2 the doctrine of felony-murder survives in a number of jurisdictions in various forms narrower than the common law.3
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.540]
Alternatives and defence of substantial impairment – where the Crown limits its case to felony-murder, the trial judge is not obliged to put the alternative bases for murder,15 although this is often done in fact.16
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It has been said that on a charge of murder based only on the felony-murder rule under s 18, manslaughter is not available as an alternative verdict for an accomplice, for a verdict of not guilty of murder on that basis entitles such an accomplice to an outright acquittal,17 but there is also authority to the contrary, and expressly contradicting this proposition.18 The defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind under s 23A is applicable where the prosecution charges felony murder under s 18.19 1 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 240–242 per Windeyer J; R v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 (CCA NSW). 2 For example, D Lanham, “Felony-murder – Ancient and Modern” (1983) 7 Crim LJ 90; J Willis, “Felony Murder at Common Law in Australia” (1977) 1 Crim LJ 231; Model Criminal Code Discussions Paper Ch 5 p 53 – Model Criminal Code Offıcers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General June 1998. 3 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 3A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 12A – see also Criminal Codes of s 302(2); WA s 279(2); Tas s 157(1)(c). 4 There are a number of such offences. They include s 33 – wounding with intent to do bodily harm or resist arrest; s 36 – causing a grievous bodily disease; ss 37, 38 – attempting to choke etc or using stupefying drug to enable the commission of an indictable offence; ss 46, 47 – causing bodily injury by or using with intent explosive or acid etc; s 61JA – aggravated sexual assault in company; s 66A, s 66B – sexual intercourse with a child under 10 or attempt; s 66EA – persistent sexual abuse of a child; s 93O – contaminating goods with intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm; s 96 – robbery with wounding; s 97(2) – robbery with dangerous weapon; s 98 – wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm in conjunction with robbery in company, armed robbery or assault with intent to rob; ss 106(3), 112(3) – breaking and entering a place of divine worship or dwelling-house and committing felony in circumstances of special aggravation; s 109(3) – entering dwelling etc with intent etc and breaking out in circumstances of special aggravation; s 198 – maliciously destroying etc property with intent to endanger life; s 204 – destruction etc to aircraft or vessel with intent; s 208 – threatening to destroy aircraft, vessel or vehicle with wounding, discharge of firearm or causing explosion; s 211 – criminal acts relating to railways with intent etc. See also ss 12, 27–30, 431 and 431A. Section 4 of the Piracy Punishment Act 1902 provides penal servitude for life for various acts done in relation to the crime of piracy. 5 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 (CCA NSW); R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361; R v Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98. 6 Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493; [1955] HCA 59; Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 213 per Barwick CJ. 7 See also R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361; R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [315] per Carruthers AJ (Heydon JA and Smart AJ agreeing). 8 R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361; R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [315] per Carruthers AJ (Heydon JA and Smart AJ agreeing); R v Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98 and see High Court authorities at [CA.19A.200]. 9 See also R v Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98 at [8] per Hidden J and at [35] per Newman AJ; R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462. 10 Wightman v The Land Board of Canterbury District and Quirk (1912) 31 NZLR 799 at 806 per Denniston J. See also Jolliffe v Dean (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 157; 71 WN (NSW) 90 at 159 (SR (NSW)) per Street CJ. 11 R v Hitchins [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; (1983) 9 A Crim R 238 at 324 (NSWLR) per Lee J (Street CJ and Enderby J agreeing). 12 R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 at 529 (CCA NSW). 13 R v Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46 at 54 (CCA NSW); R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 at 529 (CCA NSW). 14 See for example R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 (CCA NSW). 15 R v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 (CCA NSW). 16 For example R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361; R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476; R v Thurston [2004] NSWCCA 98; R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462. 17 R v Hitchins [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; (1983) 9 A Crim R 238. 18 R v Spathis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [238]–[240] per Carruthers AJ. 19 R v Thompson (1988) 36 A Crim R 223 (CCA NSW).
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Malice and murder
“Maliciously” is previously defined in s 5 (now repealed) and for general commentary on the former s 5 and malice, see [CA.5.40]–[CA.5.200]. “The purpose of s 18(1)(a) was to overcome the problems arising from the common law concept of malice aforethought which included actual and implied malice and gave rise to many difficulties in the law”: R v Downs (1985) 3 NSWLR 312; 18 A Crim R 75 at 316 (NSWLR); 79 (A Crim R) per Lee J. See also R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 where Hunt J examined the authorities on malice in the context of murder.
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[CA.19A.580] Year and a day rule The common law rule that death had to occur within a year and a day of the injury caused by the accused was abolished by s 17A as inserted by Act 101 of 1990. [CA.19A.600] Alternative verdict of manslaughter Jury verdicts in murder cases – it has been judicially acknowledged that juries in murder trials do not always bring in verdicts strictly in accordance with an objectively obvious view of the evidence and/or the trial judge’s directions. In the High Court case of MacKenzie (1996), three justices said, “the appellate court may conclude that the jury took a ‘merciful’ view of the facts upon one count: a function which has always been open to, and often exercised by, juries.”1 In MacKenzie, an earlier remark that “[s]ometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might be described as their innate sense of fairness and justice in place of the strict principles of law” was referred to with approval as “practical and sensible”.2 In the High Court case of Gilbert (2000) Gleeson CJ and Gummow J said, “[t]he system of criminal justice, … , requires the assumption, that, as a general rule, juries understand, and follow, the directions they are given by trial judges. It does not involve the assumption that their decision-making is unaffected by matters of possible prejudice.” (emphasis added)3 In Gilbert, Callinan J spoke of “the reality that a jury room might not be a place of undeviating intellectual and logical rigour”.4 Common purpose cases – a number of High Court decisions examine liability under the doctrine of common purpose or extended common purpose.5 The principles were summarised by Hayne J in Gillard (2003).6 Because there may be a difference in the intentions of the two parties, a person who intentionally assists in homicide may be guilty only of manslaughter, even though the principal offender is guilty of murder.7 Concerning an accused charged jointly with murder under the doctrine of common purpose, Kirby J in Gillard remarked that, “[b]ecause manslaughter is an offence that permits a differentiation of culpability for homicide, it has a potential, in circumstances where it applies, to allow a jury to ameliorate the operation of the doctrine of common purpose.”8 Choice of “murder or nothing” – counsel, especially defence counsel, often prefer to conduct a murder trial on the basis of “murder or nothing”.9 Of this, Fullagar J in Mraz (1955) commented that: In many murder trials the question whether the possibility of a verdict of manslaughter should be raised presents a serious problem to counsel for the accused. Probably in most cases it is regarded as disadvantageous to the accused to suggest the possibility of a verdict of manslaughter. A jury which would hesitate to convict of murder may be only too glad to take a middle course which is offered to them.10 Jury’s right to verdict of manslaughter – a jury determined to enter a verdict of manslaughter in a murder trial has the right do so. In Gammage (1969), Barwick CJ said: Out of the circumstance that, though not charged, manslaughter if made out may be found on an indictment of murder, there naturally arises the obligation to tell the jury if they ask, or if the accused
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By s 18(2), no act or omission which was not malicious shall be within s 18. As stated above, where the prosecution relies upon intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm or reckless indifference to human life, there is no room for the operation of the concept of malice – see [CA.19A.500]. Where the prosecution advances felony murder under s 18, the commission of the felony itself satisfies any requirement of malice under s 18(2) – see [CA.19A.540].
Crimes Act 1900 s 19A
[CA.19A.600]
requires it, that this alternative verdict is open to them if that is their view of the facts. Failure to so advise them will give rise to a justifiable complaint on the part of the prisoner. But, part of that advice should, in my opinion, be a clear statement of the occasion on which the jury might properly return a verdict of manslaughter.11 Barwick CJ added: They have no right, in my opinion, to return a verdict of manslaughter where they are satisfied of murder. But, as I have said, persistence by them in returning another verdict must ultimately result in the acceptance of that verdict. In that sense, but in no other sense, it is both within their power and, if you will, their privilege to return a wrong verdict.12 Kirby J in Gillard said, “[a]s a general rule, ‘under the … common law, it remains within the power of the jury to find a verdict of manslaughter, even although it means disregarding the direction [of the judge on legal liability for homicide]’.”13 In informing the jury of their right to bring in a verdict of manslaughter, the trial judge should not use the expression “merciful verdict of manslaughter”.14 Judge’s duty in directing on manslaughter – if manslaughter is a possible verdict open on the evidence, the trial judge must put this to the jury and even against the wishes of defence counsel. In Pemble (1976), Barwick CJ said: Whatever course counsel may see fit to take, no doubt bona fide but for tactical reasons in what he considers the best interest of his client the trial judge must be astute to secure for the accused a fair trial according to law. This involves … an adequate direction both as to the law and the possible use of the relevant facts upon any matter upon which the jury could in the circumstances of the case upon the material before them find or base a verdict in whole or in part.15
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Similarly, in Varley Barwick CJ said: [I]f there were a basis in the evidence on which the jury, not being satisfied of all the elements of murder, could find manslaughter, he [the judge] was bound to direct the jury accordingly. His duty in that regard cannot be controlled by the tactics or manoeuvring of the accused or of those representing him.16 Where the accused omits or declines to rely on evidence which would support a verdict of manslaughter, it is nevertheless the duty of the trial judge to draw the attention of the jury to the relevant evidence and direct them accordingly.17 It has been said that the Crown is entitled to suggest a verdict of manslaughter to the jury.18 Summary of High Court principles – the authorities on this subject were distilled in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Kanaan (2005).19 There it was said that from the various High Court decisions the following propositions follow: (1) Manslaughter cannot be left for the determination of the jury as an alternative verdict in a murder trial unless there is evidence to support such a verdict (or unless the case on manslaughter is “viable”). (2) However, if in a murder trial the jury nevertheless returns a verdict of manslaughter where there is no evidence to support it, the judge may request them to reconsider the matter but, if they persist in that verdict, the judge must accept it. (3) If there is evidence to support an alternative verdict of manslaughter, the judge must leave that issue to the jury – notwithstanding that it has not been raised by any party, and even if a party objects (or all parties object) to the issue being left to the jury. (4) If there is evidence to support an alternative verdict of manslaughter, and if the judge has not left that issue (for whatever reason), there has been an error of law.20 1 MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70 at 367–368 (CLR); 482–483 (A Crim R) per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ.
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s 19A
2 MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70 at 367 (CLR); 482–483 (A Crim R) per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ quoting R v Kirkman (1987) 44 SASR 591 at 593 per King CJ. 3 Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15 at [13]. 4 Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15 at [13]. 5 Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3 (common purpose); McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 (extended common purpose); Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414; (2000) 109 A Crim R 580; [2000] HCA 15; Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64. 6 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [109]–[112]. 7 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [25] per Gleeson CJ and Callinan J. 8 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [96]. 9 An expression to mean that the accused would either be convicted of murder or acquitted outright, for example Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [1]; Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319; (2005) 156 A Crim R 487; [2005] HCA 65; R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385. 10 Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493; [1955] HCA 59 at 513 (CLR). 11 Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 at 450 (CLR). 12 Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 at 451 (CLR). 13 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; (2003) 139 A Crim R 100; [2003] HCA 64 at [96] per Kirby J citing Packett v The King (1937) 58 CLR 190; [1937] HCA 53 at 213 (CLR) per Dixon J; and also Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570; [1913] HCA 70 at 578–579 (CLR); Beavan v The Queen (1954) 92 CLR 660; [1954] HCA 41 at 662 (CLR). 14 Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68 at 451 (CLR) per Barwick CJ who described the expression as ambiguous; R v Petroff (1980) 2 A Crim R 101 (NSWCCA); R v Schneidas (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 713; (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 at 716 (NSWLR); 105 (A Crim R); R v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 at 382 (A Crim R) (NSW CCA). 15 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 117. 16 Varley v The Queen (1976) 51 ALJR 243 at 245 citing Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272; (1943) 28 Cr App R 65; Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444; 44 ALJR 36; [1969] HCA 68; Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107. 17 R v Trimarchi (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 451; 49 WN (NSW) 157; R v Scriva (No 2) [1951] VLR 298; R v Mullins (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 234; [1961] NSWR 303 at 239–240 (SR (NSW)); Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 at 681 (CLR) (PC); R v Schneidas (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 713; (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 at 716 (NSWLR); 105 (A Crim R). Cf Kelly v The King (1923) 32 CLR 509; [1923] HCA 46. 18 R v Osborne [1970] 1 NSWR 622; 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 625 at 628 (WN) per Maguire J. 19 R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385. 20 R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385 at [75] per Hunt AJA; Buddin and Hoeben JJ. See also Ross v The King (1922) 30 CLR 246; [1922] HCA 4; R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; (2001) 123 A Crim R 30; [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [39] per Wood CJ at CL; Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 per Beazley JA at [49]–[63].
[CA.19A.620]
Defences and partial defences
What are commonly termed the “defences” to a charge of murder are (1) those matters or circumstances which would entitle the accused to an outright acquittal; (2) those which would entitle him to a verdict of “not guilty on the ground of mental illness”; and (3) those which would entitle him to a verdict of “not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter”. An outright acquittal is appropriate if: (a) the jury is not satisfied that the death was caused by an act of the accused; (b) the jury is not satisfied that the act of the accused causing death was unlawful; and may be appropriate if:
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[CA.19A.620]
Crimes Act 1900 s 19B
[CA.19A.620]
(c) the jury is not satisfied that the act causing death was accompanied by the requisite intent (or alternative third element); although in this last mentioned case, a manslaughter verdict may also be appropriate (see [CA.19A.600]). Matters which may lead to an outright acquittal include: (i) accident, see [CLP.120]; (ii) automatism, see [CLP.200]; (iii) self defence, see [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]; (iv) absence of “mens rea”, see [1.440]–[CLP.1400]. As to the special verdict of “not guilty on the ground of mental illness”, see [CLP.1020]. As to the verdict of “not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter”, see [CA.19A.600]. As to other possible verdicts on a trial for murder, see [CA.19A.660]. [CA.19A.640]
Murder and self defence
For codified sections on self-defence, now see ss 418–423 For commentary on self-defence, now see [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. [CA.19A.660]
Alternative verdicts to murder
Upon an indictment for murder, the jury may acquit, find the accused not guilty on the grounds of mental illness, or convict her or him of murder, manslaughter or, in the appropriate case, dangerous driving occasioning death, see s 52A. The accused may also be found guilty of an attempt to commit murder, or of an assault with intent to commit murder: see s 162. An act done with intent to murder is an attempt to murder.1
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Upon the trial of a person for murder of a child, the jury may convict of concealment of birth: see s 22. Where a woman being delivered of a child is charged with its murder, the jury may acquit her but return a special finding under s 21. In certain cases, the jury may convict of infanticide: see s 22A. It has been said in England that the jury may be directed that they should not find a verdict of not guilty, ie, that their verdict should be murder or manslaughter.2 If the jury find the accused not guilty of murder, they may be asked whether they find the accused guilty of manslaughter.3 Whether in a particular case the trial judge should have left to the jury an alternative verdict of accessory after the fact4 has been considered. A recommendation of mercy upon the ground that the act was unpremeditated, and that in the past the accused had received continuous and great provocation does not necessarily reduce the offence to manslaughter.5 1 R v White [1910] 2 KB 124; (1910) 4 Cr App R 257 at 133 (KB). 2 R v Larkin [1943] 1 KB 174; 1 All ER 217; 29 Cr App R 18. See however Jackson v The Queen (1976) 134 CLR 42; 50 ALJR 544; [1976] HCA 16; Yager v The Queen (1977) 139 CLR 28; 51 ALJR 367. 3 R v Baxter (1914) 9 Cr App R 60. 4 Apted v The Queen [1981] Tas R 140; (1981) 5 A Crim R 141. 5 R v Fairbrother (1909) 1 Cr App R 233.
19B
Mandatory life sentences for murder of police officers
(1) A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life for the murder of a police officer if the murder was committed: (a) while the police officer was executing his or her duty, or (b) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by that or any other police officer in the execution of his or her duty, and if the person convicted of the murder:
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(c) knew or ought reasonably to have known that the person killed was a police officer, and (d) intended to kill the police officer or was engaged in criminal activity that risked serious harm to police officers.
(3) This section does not apply to a person convicted of murder: (a) if the person was under the age of 18 years at the time the murder was committed, or (b) if the person had a significant cognitive impairment at that time (not being a temporary self-induced impairment). (4) If this section requires a person to be sentenced to imprisonment for life, nothing in section 21 (or any other provision) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 or in any other Act or law authorises a court to impose a lesser or alternative sentence. (5) Nothing in this section affects the obligation of a court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person convicted of murder in accordance with section 61 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. (6) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy. (7) This section applies to offences committed after the commencement of this section. [S 19B insrt Act 20 of 2011, s 3]
20
Child murder—when child deemed born alive
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On the trial of a person for the murder of a child, such child shall be held to have been born alive if it has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world whether it has had an independent circulation or not.
SECTION 20 COMMENTARY [CA.20.20]
Effect of section 20
See [2.1440]. The effect of s 20 is that, in cases of child murder, it is not necessary to prove that the child had an independent circulation. The application of s 20 limited to trials for murder. 21
Child murder by mother—verdict of contributing to death etc
Whosoever, being a woman delivered of a child is indicted for its murder, shall, if the jury acquit her of the murder, and specially find that she has in any manner wilfully contributed to the death of such child, whether during delivery, or at or after its birth, or has wilfully caused any violence, the mark of which has been found on its body, be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 21 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 21 COMMENTARY [CA.21.20]
Application of section
This section only applies where the mother is indicted for murder. See s 42, as to grievous bodily harm to a child during or after delivery. As to the word “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100].
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(2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life under this section is to serve the sentence for the term of the person’s natural life.
Crimes Act 1900 s 22
22
[CA.22.20]
Trial for child murder—verdict of concealment of birth
Where, on the trial of a person for the murder or manslaughter of a child, the jury are not satisfied that the person is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence within section 85, they may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence under the said section, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 22 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]; Act 2 of 1929, s 4]
SECTION 22 COMMENTARY Alernative verdicts .............................................................................................................................. [CA.22.20] Penalty ................................................................................................................................................ [CA.22.40]
[CA.22.20]
Alernative verdicts
For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. [CA.22.40]
Penalty
Section 85 provides a penalty of imprisonment for two years for concealment of birth: see [CA.85.20]. Section 22 is available either on a trial for murder or manslaughter.
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22A
Infanticide
(1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this section the offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of such child. (2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she by any wilful act or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury may, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for the provisions of this section they might have returned a verdict of murder, return in lieu thereof a verdict of infanticide, and the woman may be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the said child. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the murder of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter or a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity, or a verdict of concealment of birth. [S 22A insrt Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 22A COMMENTARY Indictment for infanticide .................................................................................................................. [CA.22A.20] Infanticide – generally ...................................................................................................................... [CA.22A.40]
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Indictment for infanticide
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid caused the death of her child being a child under the age of twelve months, by a wilful act, that is to say by (stabbing it with a knife), but at the time of the act she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child (or from the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child) and by reason thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed.
For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. [CA.22A.40]
Infanticide – generally
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There are only two reported cases in Australia on infanticide.1 There have been reported cases in Papua New Guinea.2 Infanticide exists as a concession to maternal disturbance of mind following birth and reduces what would ordinarily be murder to a lesser offence. If the killing of a child is from another cause, it will not be infanticide.3 The view has been expressed that women should not be prosecuted for murder when the facts point to infanticide.4 However, tactically the prosecution is likely to charge murder to perhaps later accept a plea of guilty to infanticide. A baby is fully and completely born when it is completely delivered from the body of its mother and it has a separate and independent existence in the sense that it does not derive its power of living from its mother. It is not material that the child may still be attached to its mother by the umbilical cord; that does not prevent it from having a separate existence. But it is required, before the child can be the victim of murder or of manslaughter or of infanticide, that the child should have an existence separate from and independent of its mother, and that occurs when the child is fully extruded from the mother’s body and is living by virtue of the functioning of its own organs.5 1 R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338; R v Taylor [1969] Tas SR 1. 2 R v Yigwai [1963] PNGLR 40 (P & NG Sup Ct, Mann CJ); R v Asamakan [1964] PNGLR 193 (Sup Ct, Mann CJ); Imiyo Wamela v The State [1982] PNGLR 269. 3 R v Yigwai [1963] PNGLR 40 (P & NG Sup Ct, Mann CJ). 4 R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338 per Barry J. 5 R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338.
23
Trial for murder—partial defence of extreme provocation
(1) If, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act causing death was in response to extreme provocation and, but for this section and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury is to acquit the accused of murder and find the accused guilty of manslaughter. (2) An act is done in response to extreme provocation if and only if: (a) the act of the accused that causes death was in response to conduct of the deceased towards or affecting the accused, and (b) the conduct of the deceased was a serious indictable offence, and (c) the conduct of the deceased caused the accused to lose self-control, and (d) the conduct of the deceased could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased. (3) Conduct of the deceased does not constitute extreme provocation if: (a) the conduct was only a non-violent sexual advance to the accused, or (b) the accused incited the conduct in order to provide an excuse to use violence against the deceased.
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This offence is available as an alternative verdict upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child (s 22A(2)), and it will seldom be charged as a substantive offence, although it may be, (s 22A(1)).
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.20]
(4) Conduct of the deceased may constitute extreme provocation even if the conduct did not occur immediately before the act causing death. (5) For the purpose of determining whether an act causing death was in response to extreme provocation, evidence of self-induced intoxication of the accused (within the meaning of Part 11A) cannot be taken into account. (6) For the purpose of determining whether an act causing death was in response to extreme provocation, provocation is not negatived merely because the act causing death was done with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. (7) If, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was in response to extreme provocation, the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act causing death was not in response to extreme provocation. (8) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder. (9) The substitution of this section by the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 does not apply to the trial of a person for murder that was allegedly committed before the commencement of that Act. (10) In this section: act includes an omission to act. [S 23 subst Act 13 of 2014, Sch 1; Act 24 of 1982, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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SECTION 23 COMMENTARY Provocation outline ............................................................................................................................. [CA.23.20] Extreme provocation ........................................................................................................................... [CA.23.40] Four requirements of extreme provocation and onus of proof .......................................................... [CA.23.60] Requirement (a) Act causing death a response to conduct of the deceased ................................... [CA.23.80] Requirement (b) Deceased’s conduct was a serious indictable offence ......................................... [CA.23.100] Requirement (c) Deceased’s conduct caused the accused to lose self-control (subjective test) ... [CA.23.120] Requirement (d) Deceased’s conduct could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control etc (objective test) ....................................................................................................................... [CA.23.140] Interrelationship of the subjective and objective requirements and jury directions ......................... [CA.23.160] Conduct may constitute extreme provocation even if it did not occur immediately before the act causing death .............................................................................................................................. [CA.23.180] Accused inciting conduct to provide an excuse to use violence is not extreme provocation – s 23(3)(b) ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.23.200] Self-induced intoxication of the accused s 23(5) ............................................................................. [CA.23.220]
[CA.23.20]
Provocation outline
Provocation applies only to trials for murder1 and, if accepted by a jury, reduces murder to manslaughter. Unlike self-defence, provocation is not a complete defence. Central to provocation was a sudden and temporary loss of self-control (this need no longer be sudden).2 The allowance of provocation has been explained as a concession to human frailty.3 The law recognises provocation as a circumstance in which an accused person is “less to blame morally than for what he does deliberately and in cold blood”.4 In 1803, Sir Edward East wrote of provocation under the heading “Of Homicide from Transport of Passion, or Heat of Blood”.5 Provocation is an old common law concept that has “attracted a wealth of learned and instructive judicial and academic discussion”.6 Historically, the law has struggled with not only the limits of provocation, but also with the basis of it. The common law evolved as a mass of single instance decisions not as a unified body of law. The Privy Council in Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220; [1962] 3 WLR 1461; [1963] 1 All ER 73 at 231 (AC) said:
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Provocation in law consists mainly of three elements – the act of provocation, the loss of self-control and the retaliation proportionate to the provocation. As will be seen at [CA.23.140], the proportionate aspect has now become absorbed in the objective, ordinary person requirement.
Homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is reduced to manslaughter if the accused causes death whilst acting under provocation. The provocation must be such that it is capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and to act in the way in which the accused did. The provocation must actually cause the accused to lose self-control and the accused must act whilst deprived of self-control before he has had the opportunity to regain his composure.7 In another High Court case, Dawson J said, “[p]rovocation is not a justification or excuse for homicide as is, for example, self-defence. It is sometimes described as a partial defence, but in truth it is an anomaly which finds its explanation in history”.8
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In Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16, the High Court at [15] observed: … Although it is common to describe the doctrine as a “partial defence”, the true position is that the unlawful intentional killing of another under provocation is not murder. The malice that is implicit in the intention to kill or to do grievous bodily harm is denied in the case of a killing done under provocation.9 The former s 23 (which applied to murders alleged to have been committed before 13 June 2014) was interpreted by the courts as operating in a way largely consistent with the common law.10 There has been a uniformity of approach to the law of provocation whether under common law, statute or code provisions in the criminal code states.11 The history of the development of the defence of provocation was considered extensively by the High Court in Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 and R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61, in England in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146; [2000] 3 WLR 654; [2000] 4 All ER 289 and in New South Wales by O’Brien CJ of Cr D in R v Croft [1981] 1 NSWLR 126; 3 A Crim R 307. Legal provocation ordinarily involves a deceased’s actions. Historically, the courts were cautious about mere words as provocation, see [CA.23.80]. The defence of provocation has been criticised as operating unjustly, as for example, where used as the “homosexual advance defence”12 and in other instances, (see [CA.23.40]). The view that provocation can be applied far too leniently has led to the restriction of provocation to cases of extreme provocation. 1 It has been held that provocation does not apply to attempted murder: R v Farrar [1992] 1 VR 207; 53 A Crim R 387 per Hampel J; McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69. 2 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 (PC) and now s 23(4). 3 R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 at 7 per Gleeson CJ. 4 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 615 per Windeyer J. 5 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1803), p 232, London, Butterworth. 6 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 320 (CLR), 189 (A Crim R). 7 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at [25] per Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ. 8 McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69 at 97 (CLR), 292 (A Crim R) per Dawson J who pointed out that it avoided the otherwise mandatory death sentence. 9 Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 at [15] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ. 10 Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50 at 340 (CLR), 309 (A Crim R); Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 660 (CLR). See also R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 320 (CLR); 190 (A Crim R); Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66 (CLR); 336 (A Crim R).
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In Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67, the High Court encapsulated provocation:
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.20]
11 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 320 (CLR), 190 (A Crim R); Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66 and 71 (CLR); 336-337 and 341 (A Crim R); Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 at [35]. 12 Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50, see particularly the judgment of Kirby J.
[CA.23.40]
Extreme provocation
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Raising the bar on provocation – in 2012, the New South Wales Legislative Council set up a Select Committee on the Partial defence of Provocation. This followed community concern at the finding of not guilty of murder of a Mr Singh who killed his wife by cutting her throat. Singh claimed that his wife provoked him by telling him she never loved him, loved someone else and threatened him with deportation. The jury accepted the partial defence of provocation and convicted Singh of manslaughter. The recommended alteration of the law of provocation under s 23 was contained in the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2014. The Second Reading Speech of this Bill contained the following: The select committee noted significant problems with the partial defence. In particular, the select committee was concerned by the use of the defence where a victim left or attempted to leave a domestic relationship or otherwise changed the nature of the relationship. The select committee considered the partial defence should generally not be available for provocation of this sort, which merely involves the victim exercising his or her right to personal autonomy. However the select committee was unable to reach a consensus on abolishing the partial defence. After careful consideration of the opposing arguments, the select committee unanimously recommended retaining but significantly restricting the partial defence. The select committee felt that the partial defence remained necessary, particularly for female victims of long-term domestic violence where the complete defence of self-defence might be difficult to establish. However, the select committee was concerned to “raise the bar” on the level of provocation required and also to ensure that it could not be used in cases where the provocation claimed was a non-violent sexual advance, infidelity or leaving a relationship.1 Partial codification – while the new s 23 does not attempt to define “extreme provocation”, s 23(2) sets out four requirements for it. In addition, s 23(3) specifically provides that a non-violent sexual advance to the accused is not extreme provocation and nor is a situation in which the accused incited the conduct in order to provide an excuse to use violence against the deceased. These four requirements and the two specific exclusions which represent in combination a partial codification of extreme provocation are considered below. 1 Reverend the Honourable Fred Nile, Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 5 March 2014, p 27034).
[CA.23.60]
Four requirements of extreme provocation and onus of proof
Four requirements – by s 23(2), an act or omission is done in response to extreme provocation, if and only if: (a) the act of the accused that causes death was in response to conduct of the deceased towards or affecting the accused, and the conduct of the deceased: (b) was a serious indictable offence, and (c) caused the accused to lose self-control, and (d) could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased. Extreme provocation only arises if murder is otherwise proved – all the elements of murder must be established before the defence of provocation is considered – for the elements of murder, see [CA.19A.100]. The relevant intent is an intention to kill or to do grievous bodily harm before provocation arises.1 The High Court and the Victorian Court of Appeal have put recklessness (see [CA.19A.500]) “to
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one side”.2 None of the leading cases suggest that provocation can be relevant to murder under the “felony-murder” rule, see [CA.19A.540] – it is suggested that the two concepts are wholly incompatible. In Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 at 643 (CLR), Barwick CJ said that a trial judge should instruct the jury that they have no need to consider operative provocation until they are satisfied by the Crown of murder. Legal and evidentiary onus of proof – if there is any evidence of each of (a), (b), (c) and (d), by s 23(7), the onus then falls on the prosecution to negative extreme provocation by proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s act causing death was not in response to extreme provocation. This requirement conforms to the general principle that concerning almost every issue in a criminal trial, the prosecution bears the legal onus of proving that issue, including proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused does not come within any ground of exoneration raised in the evidence, see [CLP.2240]. In R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42, Wood J (with Gleeson CJ and Grove J agreeing) observed at 47 that if the prosecution negatives any of the requirements of provocation, then the offence remains one of murder. Notwithstanding the prosecution’s legal onus of proof, for a trial judge to direct the jury on provocation, the accused has an evidentiary onus to point to some evidence raising extreme provocation as a reasonable possibility, see [CLP.2260]. Duties of the trial judge – whether there is evidence fit for consideration by the jury on a question of extreme provocation is a question of law for the trial judge.3 But if there is some reasonable evidence of it, the issue must be left for the jury.4 In the joint judgment, the High Court in Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 said the test of provocation is: “whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused which is suggested by material in the evidence, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was unprovoked in the relevant sense.”
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The question is the same when a trial judge is considering whether or not to leave provocation to the jury …, but as a matter of practicality a trial judge is likely to lean towards leaving provocation if he or she can.5 The High Court reiterated this in Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 at [26]. In Lindsay at [27] the High Court, referring to R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61, reiterated that Stingel emphasised the “limited scope” of the threshold question of law and the need to exercise judicial caution before declining to leave provocation. In Lindsay at [39], the Court referred to the “limited scope of the threshold question” and the recognition of “the need for restraint lest the court usurp the function of the jury”. A caution was expressed in R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 at 51 where Wood J for the Court of Criminal Appeal said: As this Court pointed out in Marshall (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, Gleeson CJ, Priestley and Sharpe JJ, No 060351 of 1989, 17 July 1990), before a defence dependent on a jury’s assessment of the facts is left, it is necessary to see whether there can be constructed a realistic hypothesis concerning the facts proved in evidence, and the available inferences which would give rise to the possibility of the defence being a serious issue for consideration. Speculation as to a possible hypothesis or version of the facts is not enough. Where there is reasonable evidence of it, a judge should leave extreme provocation to the jury even though the accused does not seek to rely upon it and irrespective of another defence put on behalf of the accused.6 The judge should refer the jury to the relevant evidence supporting extreme provocation, and particularly where it has not been raised by defence counsel.7 A composite concept – Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 states that provocation is a composite concept and illustrates the degree of care a trial judge must take in directing a jury on provocation including the care that must be taken using standard bench book directions. At [67] the Court said: In every case in which provocation is raised it is necessary for the trial judge to explain the concept and the ways in which the prosecution may eliminate it. Model directions, when appropriately adapted to
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[CA.23.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.60]
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the case, may assist trial judges in this task, but model directions must not be used in a way that distracts attention from the central task of the judge in instructing the jury. That task is to identify the real issues in the case and to relate the directions of law to those issues: Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; [1952] HCA 3 at 466 (CLR). Cases on whether provocation should be left to the jury – under the former s 23, there are many reported cases concerning whether on the facts of the particular case, provocation should have been left to the jury.8 1 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66 (CLR); 337 (A Crim R). 2 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66 (CLR); 337 (A Crim R); R v Thorpe (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 719; [1999] VSCA 172 at [16]. 3 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 at 681 (CLR) (PC); R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 at 47; R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 at 154; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75 at [170]; Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 at [24]. 4 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 at 681–682 (CLR) (PC); R v R (1981) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127 per King CJ; R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61; Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67; Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16. 5 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 67–68 (CLR); 338 (A Crim R). See also Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220; [1962] 3 WLR 1461; [1963] 1 All ER 73; Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14; R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 318 (CLR); 188 (A Crim R); Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 per the High Court at [26]. 6 Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635; [1957] 3 WLR 656; (1958) 42 Cr App R 1 at 642 (AC) per Lord Tucker; Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220; [1962] 3 WLR 1461; [1963] 1 All ER 73 at 231 (AC); Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 at 681–682 (CLR) (PC); Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186, 42 ALJR 184; [1968] HCA 51 at 213 (CLR); Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107; 45 ALJR 333; [1971] HCA 20 at 117–118, 132–133; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 at 161–162, 169 (CLR); R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 334 (CLR); 200 (A Crim R); Heron v The Queen (2003) 140 A Crim R 317; [2003] HCA 17 at [28], [29]; Lindsay v The Queen (2015) 89 ALJR 518; [2015] HCA 16 at [27]. 7 R v Stewart (1995) 4 All ER 999; [1996] 1 Cr App R 229 (Note); R v Acott [1996] 4 All ER 443; [1996] 2 Cr App R 290. 8 See R v Scriva (No 2) [1951] VLR 298; R v Sabri Isa [1952] St R Qd 269; Mehemet Ali v The Queen (1957) 59 WALR 28; Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71 at 681–682 (CLR) (PC); R v Stone (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 361; [1965] NSWR 898; R v Stellino (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 36; [1966] 2 NSWR 654; Edwards v The Queen [1973] AC 648; [1973] 1 All ER 152; (1973) 57 Cr App R 157; R v Minehan [1973] 1 NSWLR 659; R v Romano (1984) 36 SASR 283; 14 A Crim R 168; R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266; 20 A Crim R 388; R v Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332; 22 A Crim R 252; R v Wardrope (1987) 29 A Crim R 198; R v Shea (1988) 33 A Crim R 394; R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42; R v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137; R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889; (1993) 96 Cr App R 133; R v Bowhay (2000) 111 A Crim R 271; [2000] NSWCCA 54; R v Parsons (2000) 1 VR 161; [2000] VSCA 15.
[CA.23.80] Requirement (a) Act causing death a response to conduct of the deceased Response to conduct – while the accused’s act or omission causing death is required to be a response to conduct of the deceased, there is no longer a requirement for the act or omission carried out under a loss of self-control and causing death to be done suddenly, see [CA.23.180]. Section 23(4) allows for extreme provocation even if the conduct did not occur immediately before the act causing death. Conduct of the deceased – under the previous s 23, it was held that the relevant conduct might be by someone associated with the deceased. In R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 at 155, Badgery-Parker J held that “the provocative conduct which may sustain a defence of provocation need not necessarily be conduct of the deceased personally if it is conduct in the presence of the deceased by a person so closely associated with the deceased that it is reasonable for the jury to attribute the conduct of that person to the deceased”. This ruling has been affirmed.1
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Act done with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm – s 23(6) provides that provocation is not negatived merely because the act causing death was done with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. As mentioned at [CA.23.60], these are the relevant mental states. 1 R v Hall [2001] NSWCCA 202 per Sully J for the Court at [48]. 2 R v R (1981) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127 at 325 (SASR); 131 (A Crim R) per King CJ; R v Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332; 22 A Crim R 252 (CCA); R v Davis (1998) 100 A Crim R 573 (CCA) (considering a long line of authorities to this same effect). It should be noted that on a special leave application to the High Court in Davis v The Queen (1998) 73 ALJR 139, McHugh and Hayne JJ, although refusing special leave, said that they thought there was a “strong case” for saying that Quartly was wrongly decided on the requirement of presence point. 3 See Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665; 38 ALJR 71; R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1. 4 R v R (1981) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127 per King CJ (with whom Jacobs J agreed) at 326 (SASR); 131 (A Crim R). 5 R v Terry [1964] VR 248 where Pape J reviewed a number of older authorities standing for this proposition.
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[CA.23.100]
Requirement (b) Deceased’s conduct was a serious indictable offence
Limitation of a serious indictable offence – this requirement is an important limitation on the previous defence of provocation. By s 4 of the Crimes Act 1900, “serious indictable offence” means an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. An “indictable offence” is an offence that may be prosecuted on indictment, even if it may be prosecuted otherwise, see [CPA.8.20]. The Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2014 noted that: The requirement that the behaviour of the deceased must amount to a serious indictable offence would also ensure that law-abiding members of the community do not inadvertently provoke another person to an extent that they form an intention to kill or seriously injure them. What this threshold also provides is that merely leaving a relationship or infidelity will never provide a foundation for the partial defence because every member of the community has the right to exercise his or her personal autonomy. … [V]ictims of domestic violence would be able to rely upon the partial defence in appropriate cases. Domestic violence, particularly long-term abuse, generally includes conduct involving serious indictable offences such as the range of assaults in the Crimes Act 1900.1 This restriction alone is sufficient to exclude at least most of the instances of the use of provocation as the “homosexual advance defence”. For good measure, the legislature has put this beyond doubt with the inclusion of s 23(3)(a) which says so in terms. Concerning “the range of assaults”, it should be noted that assault simpliciter under s 61 is not a serious indictable offence; more serious assaults are. Actions and words – while physical acts have always qualified as provocation2, at common law, words unaccompanied by a blow were not a “sufficient provocation”.3 In Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 588; [1946] 2 All ER 124; (1946) 31 Cr App R 123, Viscount Simon rejected the proposition that a sudden confession of adultery could constitute provocation. Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14 was an important case on words, involving a husband taunted by his wife, with a confession of multiple adulteries and a thrown telephone by her. Barwick CJ at 605 (CLR) accepted the proposition in Holmes but said that circumstances alter cases. Gibbs J too confirmed Holmes, but at 616 (CLR) said the law was not so clear as to whether words used as a means of conveying
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Conduct of the deceased towards or affecting the accused – this phrase also appeared in the former s 23(2)(a). A series of decisions held that conduct of the deceased being words, conduct or gestures had to occur in the hearing or presence of the accused and not reach the accused by way of some hearsay account of that conduct – but this requirement may not be absolute.2 The requirement of presence has not always been interpreted strictly.3 Also, it can be sufficient if the deceased’s conduct is not directed towards the accused, but rather, affects the accused. Concerning this same phrase in the earlier s 23, it has been held sufficient if the conduct in the form of acts or words otherwise constituting provocation are done or said by the deceased to or in the presence of the killer.4 It was held that an attack by the deceased on a relative of the accused, in the accused’s presence, can amount to provocation.5
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.100]
information might constitute provocation. Section 23(1) was earlier altered to include provocation arising from the use of grossly insulting language or gestures on the part of the deceased and this was held to place this conduct in the same position as killing upon provocation arising from a blow.4 Before the new law of extreme provocation under s 23, it had come to be accepted, that words, particularly those of “an appropriately violent character” could qualify as provocation.5 The former concession to grossly insulting language or gestures by the deceased has now been removed from s 23. Of the former provision, in R v Lees [1999] NSWCCA 301 at [37] Wood CJ at CL observed that, “[o]ther kinds of words may qualify as provocative conduct, such as words of threatened violence, blackmail, extortion and so on. They are equally capable of provoking strong feelings, and they may or may not be accompanied by physical acts”. For extreme provocation in some instances, this kind of consideration may still apply. Apart from blackmail offences, intimidation with intent to cause fear under s 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 is a serious indictable offence. 1 Reverend the Honourable Fred Nile, Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 5 March 2014, p 27034). 2 R v Lees [1999] NSWCCA 301 at [17] per Wood CJ at CL. 3 Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 615 per Taylor and Owen JJ. 4 R v Withers (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 382; 42 WN (NSW) 113 at 392–393 (SR (NSW)) per Street CJ. 5 R v Allwood (1975) 18 A Crim R 120; R v Dutton (1979) 21 SASR 356; R v Romano (1984) 36 SASR 283; 14 A Crim R 168; R v Lees [1999] NSWCCA 301 at [30].
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[CA.23.120]
Requirement (c) Deceased’s conduct caused the accused to lose self-control (subjective test)
Causal connection – a causal connection between loss of self-control and the fatal act has always been required. In Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50 at 339 (CLR); 308 (A Crim R) Brennan CJ said that the loss of self-control must be “induced by” the deceased’s conduct and it must cause the fatal act or omission. Section 23(2)(c) makes this requirement explicit. Loss of control is necessary – in Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14 at 651–652 (CLR), Windeyer J quoted from Blackstone who said in his Commentaries IV at p 190 that the difference between manslaughter and murder “principally consists in this, that manslaughter arises from the sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart”. Killings stemming not from loss of control but from desires to exact revenge or punishment of from considerations of expediency are excluded from provocation. Temporal limitations were placed upon provocation to distinguish loss of control from less excusable states of mind. Common law provocation was described as: … some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind.1 In addition to loss of self-control, the accused “must act whilst deprived of self-control before he has had the opportunity to regain his composure”.2 In R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that for provocation, more is required than anger, or loss of temper, or building resentment. There must be a loss of self-control which includes a state in which the blood is boiling or a state of fear or terror, in either case, to the point where reason has been temporarily suspended. In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75, one issues was whether provocation was available as a defence if the killing was carried out pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise. Gaudron and Gummow JJ held it could not and said at [34]: A person cannot act pursuant to an understanding or arrangement with another that, together, they will kill a third person and, at the same time, act under provocation. That is because provocation only arises where there is some act of the deceased which results in the loss of self-control to the point of
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committing the act which caused death. In that situation, the accused cannot also be taken to have acted so as to give effect to some prior understanding or arrangement with respect to the victim’s death. In Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 at 635 (CLR), Barwick CJ observed that older authorities consider that “loss of self-control” does not describe an absolute state and that acceptance that there are degrees of loss of self-control was consistent with the later adoption of the view that whether the accused had relevantly lost self-control depended on whether the ordinary man would, in like circumstances, have lost self-control to the required extent.
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States of mind – An important decision is R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 which involved a married woman who killed her husband who had physically abused her for years. Gleeson CJ (with whom Finlay and Abadee JJ agreed): (1) noted at 8, that Mason J in Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 pointed out that while anger is the characteristic emotion associated with provocation, that loss of control may also be caused by fear, panic or mental instability; (2) observed at 9, that the contrast between the formation of an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm arising out of emotions of hatred, resentment, fear or revenge on the one hand, and the formation of such intention as a result of loss of self-control in response to provocative conduct is not based on rigid and scientifically demonstrable distinctions; (3) remarked at 14 that emotions such as hatred, resentment, fear, or the desire for revenge, which commonly follow ill-treatment, and sometimes provide a motive for killing, do not of themselves involve a loss of self-control although on some occasions, and in some circumstances, they may lead to it. Further, the distinction which the law regards as critical in this area has never been amenable to rigorous analysis, and it is usually expressed in language which is metaphorical and in terms of concepts that are imprecise. The breaking down, and ultimate removal, of the requirements of immediacy of the deceased’s provocative conduct and suddenness of the accused’s response, in aid of extending the scope of the concession made by the law to human frailty, has made the distinction even less precise; (4) commented at 13 that the law of provocation is still only a limited concession to a certain type of human frailty and is not intended to allow a jury to reduce what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter upon a view that a deceased person received his or her just deserts. The law is not intended to encourage resort to self-help through violence. The High Court quoted R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 with approval in Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 at [54]. Evidence of loss of control – loss of self-control can be proved expressly by testimony of the accused as to his or her state of mind or by inference from his or her actions and appearance at the time of the killing.3 The evidence may come from the surrounding circumstances.4 The failure of the accused to testify to a loss of self-control is not fatal to a defence of provocation.5 The reason is that to do so weakens or destroys a claim of self-defence and the law does not place an accused in this dilemma.6 In cases where a loss of self-control is alleged to have occurred after a period of abuse, psychiatric evidence may assist the jury to develop their understanding beyond that which is commonplace.7 Accused’s personal attributes and circumstances – consideration of whether the conduct of the deceased caused the accused to lose self-control is a subjective test. The objective ordinary person test provided in s 23(2)(d) does not mean that an accused’s personal attributes and circumstances are not taken into account. A leading case is R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 where at 324 (CLR); 193 (A Crim R) the High Court stated: … the objective test was [not] intended to be applied in a vacuum or without regard to such of the accused’s personal characteristics, attributes or history as serve to identify the implications and to affect the gravity of the particular wrongful act or insult.
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Delay in accused’s response – see commentary at [CA.23.180].
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.120]
The High Court added at 325 (CLR) 194 (A Crim R): The central question posed by the objective test … obviously cannot be answered without the identification of the content and relevant implications of the wrongful act or insult and an objective assessment of its gravity in the circumstances of the particular case. Conduct which may in some circumstances be quite unprovocative may be intensely so in other circumstances. Particular acts or words which may, if viewed in isolation, be insignificant may be extremely provocative when viewed cumulatively.
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In Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67, the High Court said at 66 (CLR); 337 (A Crim R): … the gravity of the conduct said to constitute the provocation must be assessed by reference to relevant characteristics of the accused. Conduct which might not be insulting or hurtful to one person might be extremely so to another because of that person’s age, sex, race, ethnicity, physical features, personal attributes, personal relationships or past history. The provocation must be put into context and it is only by having regard to the attributes or characteristics of the accused that this can be done. But having assessed the gravity of the provocation in this way, it is then necessary to ask the question whether provocation of that degree of gravity could cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and act in a manner which would encompass the accused’s actions.8 1 Direction by Devlin J to the jury in R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 cited with approval by the English Court of Appeal in R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889; (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 and quoted by Gleeson CJ in R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 at 8. 2 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66 (CLR), 337 (A Crim R). 3 R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 at 48 and authorities quoted there. 4 R v Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752; (1992) 95 Cr App R 326; R v Cambridge [1994] 1 WLR 971; [1994] 2 All ER 760; (1994) 99 Cr App R 142. 5 R v Hopper [1915] 2 KB 431; (1916) 11 Cr App R 136; Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220; [1962] 3 WLR 1461; [1963] 1 All ER 73 at 232 (AC) (PC); Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 per Mason J at 169 (CLR); 106 (A Crim R); R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 at 48; R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 at 14. 6 Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76 per Mason J at 169 (CLR); 106 (A Crim R). 7 R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 at 14. 8 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.
[CA.23.140]
Requirement (d) Deceased’s conduct could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control etc (objective test)
Ordinary person requirement is a compromise – the objective requirement that the conduct of the deceased could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control is part of a legal compromise in allowing provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. Gibbs J (with whom Mason J agreed) explained in Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 at 656 (CLR): Murder can only be reduced to manslaughter on the ground of provocation if the provocation in fact had the effect of depriving the accused of the power of self-control. It might at first sight be thought incongruous to inquire whether the actions of a man who had lost the power of self-control were out of all reasonable proportion to the incident which had deprived him of that power. However, the law as to provocation obviously embodies a compromise between a concession to human weakness on the one hand and the necessity on the other hand for society to maintain objective standards of behaviour for the protection of human life.1 Ordinary person requirement – the ordinary person was originally “the reasonable man”, a concept introduced into the law of provocation well after provocation itself was firmly established.2 The reasonable
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The test involving the hypothetical ordinary person is an objective test which lays down the minimum standard of self-control required by the law. Since it is an objective test, the characteristics of the ordinary person are merely those of a person with ordinary powers of self-control. They are not the characteristics of the accused, although when it is appropriate to do so because of the accused’s immaturity, the ordinary person may be taken to be of the accused’s age.5 The High Court endorsed the explanation of Viscount Simon LC in Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272; (1943) 28 Cr App R 65 at 9 (AC) that the “reasonable man” test serves to ensure that “an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual” could not rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did.6 In R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61, the High Court in a joint seven member judgment said: The requirement that the wrongful act or insult be of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is clearly intended to involve an objective threshold test. It is only if that test is satisfied that it becomes necessary to consider whether the accused was, in fact, subjectively deprived of his or her self-control.
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Concerning the rationale underlying the ordinary person test, the Court in Stingel quoted from the judgment of Wilson J in the Canadian case of R v Hill [1986] 1 SCR 313; 25 CCC (3d) 322 who said: “The objective standard, therefore, may be said to exist in order to ensure that in the evaluation of the provocation defence there is no fluctuating standard of self-control against which accused are measured. The governing principles are those of equality and individual responsibility, so that all persons are held to the same standard notwithstanding their distinctive personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the standard.”7 (emphasis added) The Court in Stingel summed up the effect of the threshold objective test of ordinary person (including age where appropriate), that is, a hypothetical or imaginary person with powers of self-control within ordinary limits as a consideration that “will almost inevitably involve projecting the hypothetical ordinary person … into the position of the accused at the time of the killing”.8 Loss of control to the extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm – the High Court decision in Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50 highlights the care that must be taken in distinguishing the intent of the ordinary person under s 23(2)(d) from the accused’s actual actions. Green and the deceased, an older man, had been friends for some years. Each had been drinking. The deceased uninvited, got into bed with Green, and indecently touched him. Although Green said “I’m not like this”, the deceased touched him again. Green then stabbed the deceased ten times while he rolled from the bed onto the floor and then when he was on the floor. Green said he thought back to when his father sexually assaulted his sisters and “belted” his mother. Brennan CJ said at 339 (CLR), 309 (A Crim R): Dependent on the circumstances of the trial, the jury may need a direction to draw their attention to the difference between “would” and “could” and will ordinarily need a direction to distinguish between what the ordinary person could have been induced to intend and what the ordinary person could have been induced to do. In the present case, for example, the jury might have been more ready to allow the possibility that an ordinary person could have been induced to intend to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased than to allow the possibility that an ordinary person could have been induced to batter and stab the deceased to the extent that the appellant battered and stabbed him.
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man later became the “ordinary man”, as the former may have suggested a man acting reasonably.3 Some older authorities spoke of the question of whether the retaliation is proportionate to the provocation. The majority of the High Court in Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 67 (CLR) observed that it is now well established that this question of proportionality has been absorbed into the application of the ordinary person test.4 In Masciantonio, the majority said:
Crimes Act 1900 s 23
[CA.23.140]
McHugh J pointed out at 375 (CLR), 336-337 (A Crim R) that given the extensive and brutal nature of the deceased’s injuries, to instruct the jury to consider whether ordinary person in the position of the accused could have so far lost self-control that he could have done exactly what the accused did made Green’s prospects of successfully arguing provocation “hopeless”. The final question is therefore not whether the ordinary person could have done what a particular accused did, but whether the ordinary person could have lost control to the extent of forming an intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm.9
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Could have caused a loss of self-control – the word “could” as used in s 23(2)(b) connotes a possibility rather than a probability. Thus, it has been held to be a misdirection to direct a jury that the provocative conduct “would cause” a loss of self control. In Heron v The Queen (2003) 140 A Crim R 317; [2003] HCA 17, the High Court dealt with an application for special leave to appeal following a conviction for murder. Special leave was refused. However, four of the five members of the court accepted that directions given to the jury using the words either “must” or “would” in place of “could” amounted to misdirections. 1 See also in particular the judgment of Kirby J (dissenting in the result) in Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50. The appropriateness of this compromise is not unanimous, see for example, the dissenting judgment of McHugh J in Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67. 2 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336 at 338 per Keating J, referred to in Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 at [58]. 3 Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 at 635 (CLR) per Barwick CJ; Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14 at 606 (CLR) per Barwick CJ and at 613 (CLR) per Gibbs J. 4 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 at [60]. 5 Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 66–67 (CLR) 337 (A Crim R). 6 Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619; 51 ALJR 57; [1976] HCA 44 at 638 (CLR) per Barwick CJ; Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233; 203 A Crim R 321; [2010] HCA 35 at [58]. 7 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 326 (CLR), 193 (A Crim R) referring to R v Hill [1986] 1 SCR 313; 25 CCC (3d) 322 at 343 (SCR), 345 (CCC). 8 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 198 (CLR), 337 (A Crim R). 9 See also the majority in Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 at 69 (CLR); 339 (A Crim R); R v Thorpe (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 719; [1999] VSCA 172 at [16].
[CA.23.160]
Interrelationship of the subjective and objective requirements and jury directions
These topics were the subject of the judgment of the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Thorpe (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 719; [1999] VSCA 172. This decision is important reading for anyone concerned with a jury summing up on provocation. It was held that the trial judge misdirected the jury on provocation in failing to make it clear that the assessment of the gravity of the provocative words or conduct by reference to the characteristics of the accused (an aboriginal man) was relevant not just to the subjective test but also to the objective test. In the joint judgment, the Court: (1) at [14], observed that the objective test as it has been developed in R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61, Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58; 80 A Crim R 331; [1995] HCA 67 and Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334; 97 A Crim R 307; [1997] HCA 50 “is not an easy or everyday concept”; (2) at [16], stated that the objective test is whether the provocative words or conduct, measured in gravity by reference to the personal situation of the accused, could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to the extent that the accused did; (3) at [13], pointed out that the objective test does not take into account the characteristics of the accused (except age, where relevant) as regards self-control (emphasis in judgment);
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(4) at [16], remarked that it is “notoriously difficult to explain to a jury that provocation is not an affirmative defence but something that the Crown must negate, and then relate that proposition to the facts, without inadvertently suggesting that an onus, however limited, lies on the accused”. The Court made suggestions as to how this difficulty may be avoided.
[CA.23.180]
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Section 23(7) provides that if, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was in response to extreme provocation, the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act causing death was not in response to extreme provocation. This reflects the “ultimate question” for the jury as stated by the High Court in R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312; 50 A Crim R 186; [1990] HCA 61 at 333 (CLR), 199 (A Crim R). Conduct may constitute extreme provocation even if it did not occur immediately before the act causing death
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Delay following provocation – s 23(4) specifically provides that there may be extreme provocation even if the conduct did not occur immediately before the act causing death. An example is the Victorian case of R v Shea (1988) 33 A Crim R 394 where the accused was beaten in a hotel. He went home and told his wife before getting a boning knife, returning to the hotel and stabbing his assailant in the chest. It was held that the delay did not preclude the jury being directed on provocation. The result was otherwise in the English “battered wife” case of R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889; (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 where delay was considered. The wife had thrown petrol into her husband’s bedroom and set it alight. At 139 (Cr App R), the Court of Appeal said: … it is open to the judge, when deciding whether there is any evidence of provocation to be left to the jury and open to the jury when considering such evidence, to take account of the interval between the provocative conduct and the reaction of the defendant to it. Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct made its impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained self-control. The passage of time following the provocation may also show that the subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self-control … . The Court added at 139 (Cr App R) that while as a matter of law a delayed response does not negative provocation, “the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation”. “Battered wives” and “last straw” cases – a leading decision is that in R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 which involved a woman married to a heavy drinker who had physically abused her for years. During one night while the husband was asleep, and after a noisy argument, it appeared that the wife cut his throat and chopped his head with a meat cleaver. The wife said she killed him after he first tried to kill her. The woman raised provocation at her trial. On appeal, Gleeson CJ (with whom Finlay and Abadee JJ agreed) considered whether the law required either a specific triggering event or a sudden response. The Chief Justice: (1) noted at 11 that battered women tend not to react with instant violence to taunts or violence as men tend to do, instead often suffering a “slow-burn” of fear, despair and anger which eventually erupts into the killing of their batterer; (2) stated at 10 and 13 that a killing need not follow immediately upon the provocative act or conduct of the deceased and that there may be a significant interval of time between such act or conduct and the accused’s sudden and temporary loss of self-control. However, as a matter of fact, the longer the interval, the more difficult it will usually be to attribute the actions of the accused to loss of self-control; (3) held at 13 that the conduct of the deceased which induced the loss of self-control need not have occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death. Nor need the act or omission causing death be done or omitted suddenly; (4) held at 13–14 that in changing times a loss of self-control can develop even after a lengthy period of abuse and without the necessity for a specific triggering incident. The presence of such an incident will
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assist a case of provocation but its absence is not fatal. This is an area in which psychiatric evidence may assist juries to develop their understanding beyond the commonplace and the familiar. In “last straw” cases, the parties have often been in a relationship for some time – in the course of a violent relationship, a last straw incident not particularly remarkable in itself may nevertheless be sufficient to constitute provocation. The court will consider the cumulative effect of separate incidents.1 As R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 makes clear, if there has been a lengthy period of abuse as with a battered woman, even a specific triggering incident may not be necessary. In Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14, Windeyer J at 662 (CLR) said: It is not, I think, required either by the statute or at common law that the first beginning of emotion must not be earlier than just before the fatal act; nor do I think it is necessary that the provocative conduct should be a single isolated act. It may be an episode in a series of incidents, an episode which, because of what had gone before, proved to be beyond endurance and led to an onset of ungovernable passion. There are other examples of cases in this category.2 1 Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14 at 616 (CLR) per Gibbs J; R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1174; [1996] 2 All ER 1023; [1996] 2 Cr App R 108 at 1181 (WLR); 1030 (All ER); 116 (Cr App R); R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All ER 889; (1993) 96 Cr App R 133. 2 Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; 51 ALJR 403; [1977] HCA 14; R v Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397 (NSW CCA); R v R (1981) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127; Roche v The Queen [1988] WAR 278; 29 A Crim R 168; R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1174; [1996] 2 All ER 1023; [1996] 2 Cr App R 108; R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636; 95 A Crim R 479; R v Kumar (2002) 5 VR 193; 133 A Crim R 245; [2002] VSCA 139.
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[CA.23.200]
Accused inciting conduct to provide an excuse to use violence is not extreme provocation – s 23(3)(b)
In Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610; 37 ALJR 3; [1963] HCA 14, Windeyer J at 658 (CLR) observed that of the various requirements of provocation: The first [is], that such provocation was not intentionally caused by the accused, is merely a repetition of the old common law rule that a contrived provocation will not suffice. Richard Mason’s Case (1748) Fost 132; 168 ER 66 is an early example. There the judges said: “the blows were plainly a provocation sought on his part, that he might execute the wicked purpose of his heart, with some colour of excuse”. Two situations of self-induced provocation were identified by Charles JA in R v Yasso (2004) 10 VR 466, 148 A Crim R 369; [2004] VSCA 127 at [40], [41]: (1) in cases where the accused deliberately incites the provocation, acting with premeditation or actual foresight and the accused cannot be said to act as a result of a loss of self-control; (2) a situation where the accused, by his conduct, risked an attack which might constitute provocation or where the conduct of the deceased was a predictable consequence of the accused’s prior conduct. Charles JA cited as an example of (1) R v Newman [1948] VLR 61 at 66 where Barry J instructed a jury that “[i]t is not permitted that a man should seek out his enemy and await some provocation in order to use that as a pretext for slaying him”. Charles JA cited as a leading example of (2) R v Allwood (1975) 18 A Crim R 120 where the accused and the deceased lived together as man and wife for four years and had a young daughter. The deceased left the appellant for another man, taking the child. She rejected the accused’s attempts at reconciliation. He took a rifle to her new house and renewed his offer of marriage and asked about her new sexual relationship. They quarrelled – the accused fired four shots killing the deceased. On appeal, it was held he was not entitled to provocation on the basis of her admissions of sexual relations with her new partner as he must have been aware of them, sought out the deceased and was set upon a confrontation. There have been a number of decisions on self-induced provocation that reflect the rule in s 23(3)(b).1 A distinction has been drawn between threatening conduct of the accused provoking a predictable a reaction
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from the victim, in which case provocation will not be available and threatening conduct by the accused that unexpectedly produces an extreme reaction, in which case provocation may be available.2 1 Edwards v The Queen [1973] AC 648; [1973] 1 All ER 152; (1973) 57 Cr App R 157 at 658 (AC); 158 (All ER); 168 (Cr App R) (PC); R v Thorpe (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 719; [1999] VSCA 172. 2 Edwards v The Queen [1973] AC 648; [1973] 1 All ER 152; (1973) 57 Cr App R 157 at 658 (AC); 158 (All ER); 168 (Cr App R) (PC).
Self-induced intoxication of the accused s 23(5)
In assessing the accused’s reaction, self-induced intoxication has never been relevant.1 The ordinary person is assumed not to be affected by alcohol or drugs.2 However, an intoxicated man can lose self-control just as much as a sober man. It will be a question of fact for the jury as to whether the accused lost self-control by reason of the provocative act or by reason of his or her intoxication.3 1 R v McCarthy [1954] 2 QB 105; [1954] 2 WLR 1044; [1954] 2 All ER 262; R v Webb (1977) 16 SASR 309 at 314; R v Croft [1981] 1 NSWLR 126; 3 A Crim R 307 (CCA); R v O’Neill [1982] VR 150; 4 A Crim R 404. 2 R v Cooke (1985) 39 SASR 225; 16 A Crim R 304. 3 R v Cooke (1985) 39 SASR 225; 16 A Crim R 304 per King CJ at 235 (SASR); 314 (A Crim R); R v Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335; 20 A Crim R 201 at 207 (A Crim R). See also R v Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332; 22 A Crim R 252 at 337 (NSWLR); 257 (A Crim R); R v Croft [1981] 1 NSWLR 126; 3 A Crim R 307 at 149 (NSWLR); 329–330 (A Crim R).
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23A
Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind
(1) A person who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not to be convicted of murder if: (a) at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, the person’s capacity to understand events, or to judge whether the person’s actions were right or wrong, or to control himself or herself, was substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition, and (b) the impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter. [Subs (1) am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [5]]
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), evidence of an opinion that an impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter is not admissible. [Subs (2) am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5]]
(3) If a person was intoxicated at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, and the intoxication was self-induced intoxication (within the meaning of section 428A), the effects of that self-induced intoxication are to be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section. (4) The onus is on the person accused to prove that he or she is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section. (5) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or accessory, to be convicted of murder is to be convicted of manslaughter instead. [Subs (5) am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5]]
(6) The fact that a person is not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death by virtue of this section does not affect the question of whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death. (7) If, on the trial of a person for murder, the person contends:
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[CA.23A.20]
(a)
that the person is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that the person was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, or (b) that the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section, evidence may be offered by the prosecution tending to prove the other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered. (8) In this section: underlying condition means a pre-existing mental or physiological condition, other than a condition of a transitory kind. [S 23A am Act 147 of 1997; subst Act 106 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 23A COMMENTARY Generally .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.23A.20] Diminished responsibility .................................................................................................................. [CA.23A.40] Diminished responsibility .................................................................................................................. [CA.23A.60]
[CA.23A.20]
Generally
The amended s 23A commenced on 3 April 1998 but the section only operates in relation to cases of murder committed after the commencement of the legislation. The repealed s 23A remains in force in cases of murder committed prior to commencement.1 The amendment to s 23A replaces the partial defence of “diminished repsonsibility” with a new partial defence of “substantial impairment by abnormality of mind”.
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1 See Schedule 11 Crimes Act 1900, Part 13.
[CA.23A.40]
Diminished responsibility
REPEALED 23A. (1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death charged the person was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts or omissions, he shall not be convicted of murder. (2) It shall be upon the person accused to prove that he is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder. (3) A person who but for subsection (1) would be liable, whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter. (4) The fact that a person is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death charged shall not affect the question whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death. (5) Where, on the trial of a person for a murder, the person contends – (a) that he is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that he was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death charged; or (b) that he is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder, evidence may be offered by the Crown tending to prove the other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered.
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Diminished responsibility
Editor’s note This commentary relates to the previous s 23A, “Diminished responsibility”. Section 23A is in similar terms to s 2 of the English Homicide Act 1957 and s 6 of the English Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964.1 Reference might also be made to s 304A of the Queensland Criminal Code Act 1899.2
A practice had developed in England of merely reading the statutory provision to the jury. This practice has been criticised in England,4 and Queensland.5
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The burden of proving diminished responsibility is on the accused (s 23A(2)) on the balance of probabilities.6 The accused must show (a) that her or his state of mind when he or she carried out the relevant acts or omissions was abnormal, (b) that the abnormality arose from a condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind, an inherent cause, or was induced by disease or injury, and (c) that the abnormality substantially impaired her or his mental responsibility for the acts or omissions.7 The abnormality of mind must be a permanent condition and it is irrelevant whether it is due to inherited or environmental causes.8 The phrase “abnormality of mind” covers the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise willpower to control physical acts in accordance with rational judgment; “mental responsibility” points to a consideration of the extent to which the accused’s mind is answerable for her or his physical acts, and must include a consideration of the extent of her or his ability to exercise willpower to control her or his physical acts; whether the accused at the time of the killing was suffering from any “abnormality of mind” in the abovementioned sense is a question for the jury; while medical evidence is important on this question the jury are entitled to take into consideration all the evidence, including the acts and statements of the accused and her or his demeanour, they are not bound to accept the medical evidence if there is other material before them which in their judgment conflicts with and outweighs it; it seems however that the question whether the “abnormality of mind” arose from the condition of arrested or retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes, or was induced by disease or injury is a matter to be determined on expert evidence.9 It is not necessary to show mental abnormality since birth.10 It is doubtful that the transient effect of alcohol, even if it does produce a toxic effect on the brain, is an “injury” within the meaning of s 23A(1).11 The issue of substantial impairment is a question for the jury.12 Where psychiatric evidence called by the Crown in reply was wrongly admitted the verdict was reduced from murder to manslaughter.13 Where prejudicial evidence to suggest the accused’s motive was admitted, a new trial was ordered.14 If the available medical evidence shows plainly that a plea of diminished responsibility can properly be accepted, a plea to manslaughter is proper.15 It is unreasonable for a jury to reject psychiatric evidence consistent with the other evidence.16 However the extent to which expert opinion can be relied on depends on whether the factual assumptions upon which the evidence is based are otherwise made out by the evidence in the trial.17 As to sentencing, see Veen v The Queen.18 It has been held in Queensland that there may be circumstances where a judge may direct a jury to return a verdict of not guilty of murder: however where the defence evidence relating to diminished responsibility is challenged, the Crown may insist that the jury’s verdict be taken.19 The meaning of disease, when questions of attributing criminal responsibility are concerned, exclude effects which are more or less transitory, or are due to a temporary malfunction or are self-induced such as consumption of alcohol or drugs. The word “injury” carries with it the ordinary English usage of physical
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The defence of diminished responsibility is applicable in all cases where murder is charged, irrespective of the head of murder relied upon.3
Crimes Act 1900 s 24
[CA.23A.60]
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injury. The effect of anabolic steroids in altering the function of the brain cells does not qualify as a relevant “abnormality of mind” in accordance with the section.20 1 See Archbold (43rd ed, 1988), [20.36] – [20.40]. 2 See Howard, Criminal Law (4th ed, 1982), pp 94–98. See also R v Files [1983] 2 Qd R 153; R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312. 3 R v Thompson (1988) 36 A Crim R 223. 4 R v Terry [1961] 2 QB 314; (1961) 45 Cr App R 180; Rose v The Queen [1961] AC 496; (1961) 45 Cr App R 102; R v Gomez (1964) 48 Cr App R 310; R v Spriggs [1958] 1 QB 270; (1958) 42 Cr App R 69. 5 R v Rolph [1962] Qd R 262. 6 R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1; (1957) 41 Cr App R 182. See also R v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99; 52 Cr App R 251. 7 R v Purdy [1982] 2 NSWLR 964; 7 A Crim R 251. See also R v Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238; R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149; R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240. 8 R v McGarvie (1986) 5 NSWLR 270; 22 A Crim R 286. 9 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 WLR 440; (1960) 44 Cr App R 246. See also R v Jennion [1962] 1 WLR 317; [1962] 1 All ER 689; 46 Cr App R 212; R v Ahmed Din [1962] 1 WLR 680; [1962] 2 All ER 123; 46 Cr App R 269; Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788; [1977] 3 WLR 902; [1978] 1 All ER 542; R v Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437; (1987) 31 A Crim R 453; R v Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428; 68 A Crim R 536; R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191; R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240. 10 R v Gomez (1964) 48 Cr App R 310. 11 R v Di Duca (1959) 43 Cr App R 167. See also R v Gittens [1984] 1 QB 698; (1984) 79 Cr App R 272; R v Jones (1986) 22 A Crim R 42; R v Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350; [1989] 1 All ER 267; R v Nielson [1990] 2 Qd R 578; (1990) 47 A Crim R 269; R v Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470; (1992) 95 Cr App R 278; R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191. 12 R v Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175; (1965) 50 Cr App R 61; R v Wallace [1978] 7 A Crim R 317. See also R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149; R v Chayna (1993) 66 A Crim R 178. 13 R v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171. See also R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312. 14 Stockton v The Queen (1981) 3 A Crim R 384. 15 R v Cox [1968] 1 WLR 308; 1 All ER 386. 16 R v Chester [1982] Qd R 252; 5 A Crim R 296. 17 R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240. 18 Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458; 53 ALJR 305; [1979] HCA 7. See further Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; 33 A Crim R 230; Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611; 36 A Crim R 382; R v Chivers [1993] 1 Qd R 432; (1991) 54 A Crim R 272; R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67; R v Carr (1996) 1 VR 585. 19 Morgan v Attorney-General (Qld) (1987) 24 A Crim R 342. 20 R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 678–679 (NSWLR), 23–24 (A Crim R)) per Powell JA (with whom Studdert and Levine JJ agreed).
24
Manslaughter—punishment
Whosoever commits the crime of manslaughter shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years: Provided that, in any case, if the Judge is of the opinion that, having regard to all the circumstances, a nominal punishment would be sufficient, the Judge may discharge the jury from giving any verdict, and such discharge shall operate as an acquittal. [S 24 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[7]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5); Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 24 COMMENTARY General ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.24.20]
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Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.24.40]
Elements of the offence Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.24.60] Generally ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.24.80] Element (1) An act causing death .................................................................................................... [CA.24.100] Element (2) Unlawful act .................................................................................................................. [CA.24.120] Element (2) A dangerous act – appreciable risk of serious injury ................................................... [CA.24.140] Jury directions .................................................................................................................................. [CA.24.160] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.24.180] Generally .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.24.200] Element (1) Duty of care .................................................................................................................. [CA.24.220] Element (2) Gross negligence .......................................................................................................... [CA.24.240] Element (3) Death was occasioned or accelerated ......................................................................... [CA.24.260] Sentence ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.24.280]
[CA.24.20]
General
Manslaughter is defined in s 18(2) as punishable homicide, not amounting to murder. See s 18. The law recognises two distinct categories of the offence of manslaughter, namely, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.
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Voluntary manslaughter – Voluntary manslaughter occurs when all the elements of the offence of murder are established however, the offence is reduced to manslaughter by reason of either (a) provocation or (b) diminished responsibility. See Alternative verdict of manslaughter at [CA.19A.600], s 23ff Provocation and s 23Aff Diminished responsibility. Involuntary manslaughter – The common law recognises two categories of involuntary manslaughter: (i) killing by unlawful and dangerous act and (ii) killing by criminal negligence.1 A further category of killing by a blow not intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm (also called battery manslaughter) has effectively been excluded by the High Court’s decision in Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 and subsumed within the category of death by unlawful and dangerous act.2 In any one case, the facts may be capable of establishing both categories of manslaughter.3 Proviso – Appropriate time for application for discharge – It has been said that the appropriate time to deal with an application to act under the proviso is after counsels’ closing addresses to the jury. In considering the application, (a) it is necessary for the judge to form his own view of the facts and (b) the judge should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts which might support a verdict of guilty.4 Verdict – In cases where there are alternative bases for liability for manslaughter, there is no requirement for a jury to be agreed on one basis for liability for manslaughter. It is sufficient that the jury is simply unanimous as to the verdict of manslaughter.5 There is a power for a trial judge to ask a jury for the basis of its finding of manslaughter. However, the judge should only do so in exceptional circumstances.6 1 Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR). 2 In Wilson v The Queen at 334 (CLR), Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh said of the battery manslaughter category: Cases of death resulting from a serious assault, which would have fallen within battery manslaughter, will be covered by manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. Cases of death resulting unexpectedly from a comparatively minor assault, which also would have fallen within battery manslaughter, will be covered by the law as to assault. A conviction for manslaughter in such a situation does not reflect the principle that there should be a close correlation between moral culpability and legal responsibility, and is therefore inappropriate.
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Elements of the offence
Crimes Act 1900 s 24
[CA.24.20]
3 Wilson v The Queen at 333 (CLR); R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 at 94–95 (NSWLR), 227 (A Crim R). 4 R v Brown (1984) 13 A Crim R 454 (ACT Sup Ct) per Kelly J. 5 R v Cramp (1999) 110 A Crim R 198; [1999] NSWCCA 324 at [63]–[66]; R v Dally (2000) 115 A Crim R 582; [2000] NSWCCA 162 at [68]. 6 R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374; 90 A Crim R 587. See also R v Cawthorne [1996] 2 Cr App R (s) 445.
[CA.24.40]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did feloniously slay CD. As to the form of indictment against an accessory, see s 378. It has been recommended that, as with murder, other charges should not be added to an indictment alleging manslaughter.1 However, this is a rule which is not applied inflexibly.2 A corporation as a defendant – Manslaughter can be committed by a corporation but usually only in circumstances where the acts of the employees can be attributed to the corporation. In R v HM Coroner for East Kent; Ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr App R 10, Lord Justice Bingham said: Whether the defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the ingredient of manslaughter must be established by proving the necessary mens rea and actus reus of manslaughter against the corporation by evidence properly to be relied upon against it. A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such.
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A company may be liable for criminal negligence in extreme cases of failure to provide a safe system or to supervise its implementation.3 1 R v Stringer [1933] 1 KB 704; (1933) 24 Cr App R 30; R v Carr (1934) 24 Cr App R 199; R v Large [1939] 1 All ER 753; (1940) 27 Cr App R 65. In R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493; [1983] 3 WLR 349; [1983] 2 All ER 1058, the House of Lords recommended that the practice in England is not to allow the joinder of a count of manslaughter with one alleging death caused by reckless driving. This practice is not followed in Scotland where it is permissible to charge in the alternative: Dunn v HM Advocate [1960] JC 55; [1960] Crim LR 182. 2 In R v Gorman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 May 1997), the Crown charged the accused with murder and manslaughter in relation to the same victim. Following conviction, the prisoner challenged the manner of his charging. The Court of Criminal Appeal approved the manner of charging and noted that, in this case, the two charges were not alternatives. 3 R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (2005) 152 A Crim R 384. This case contains an analysis of authorities with regard to a corporation as a defendant in criminal proceedings alleging manslaughter.
[CA.24.60]
Elements of the offence
The common law recognises that the following elements must be established to prove manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act: (1) the death of a person was caused by an act of the accused; (2) the act was both: (a) unlawful, and (b) dangerous; and carrying with it (from the standpoint of a reasonable man), an appreciable risk of serious injury.1 1 See Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 334–335 (CLR). In R v Jones (1995) 38 NSWLR 652; 78 A Crim R 504, Hunt CJ at CL gave an example of a jury direction in relation to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act which outlined the elements of the offence. The direction is reproduced in full in Jury Directions at [CA.24.160].
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Generally
In R v Larkin [1943] 1 KB 174; 1 All ER 217; 29 Cr App R 18, Humphreys J (at 219) (KB) described the nature of the offence in the following terms: Where the act which a person is engaged in performing is unlawful, then, if at the same time it is a dangerous act, that is, an act which is likely to injure another person, and quite inadvertently the doer of the act causes the death of that other person by that act, then he is guilty of manslaughter.2 1 Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257. See decision of majority at 327 (CLR). The reference to R v Holzer [1968] VR 481Holzer is a reference to a formulation of the offence taken from a decision of Smith J in R v Holzer [1968] VR 481 referred to in detail by the majority at 325 (CLR) of Wilson. 2 This statement was applied with approval by Barwick CJ in Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 124.
[CA.24.100]
Element (1) An act causing death
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The unlawful and dangerous act must be the cause of the death in a real sense. In Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669, Deane and Dawson JJ said at 411 (CLR): Of course, there may be no single cause of the death of the deceased, but if the accused’s conduct is a substantial or significant cause of death that will be sufficient, given the requisite intent, to sustain a conviction for murder.1 Causation is a jury question. In relation to directing a jury as to causation, Burt CJ, with whom Jones and Smith JJ agreed, said in Campbell v The Queen [1981] WAR 286; (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 (at 161 (A Crim R)): It would seem to me to be enough if juries were told that the question of cause [causation] for them to decide is not a philosophical or a scientific question, but a question to be determined by them applying their common sense to the facts as they find them, they appreciating that the purpose of the enquiry is to attribute legal responsibility in a criminal matter.2 For further commentary on Causation, see [CA.19A.240]–[2.1526]. 1 See Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 per Brennan J at 398 (CLR); Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 423 (CLR). See also: R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994) at 8–9. 2 This statement was specifically approved in Royall v The Queen by Mason CJ at 387 (CLR), by Deane and Dawson JJ at 411 (CLR), by Toohey and Gaurdon JJ at 423 (CLR).
[CA.24.120]
Element (2) Unlawful act
The unlawful act must be “in breach of the criminal law”.1 An “act which amounts to no more than a tort is insufficient.”2 “Criminal negligence in the performance of an act which is otherwise lawful is not an ‘unlawful act’. Where an act of that kind is involved, the case is one of manslaughter by criminal negligence, not manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act.”3 However, it is not every act which may be termed “criminal” which will constitute an unlawful act. In R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222, it was submitted that an act which constitutes a breach of the Motor Traffıc Regulations 1934 is excluded as supporting a charge of manslaughter within the category of unlawful and dangerous act.
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The leading authority in Australia is Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257. In this case, the accused punched the victim causing him to fall, his head hitting the ground. The decision involves a detailed examination of the history of the offence of manslaughter based on unlawful and dangerous act and concludes that “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act (in the R v Holzer [1968] VR 481Holzer sense) is a relevant and appropriate category of manslaughter.”1
Crimes Act 1900 s 24
[CA.24.120]
Hunt CJ at CL concluded (at 97 (NSWLR)) that: (1) An act which constitutes a breach of some statutory or regulatory prohibition does not, for that reason alone, constitute an unlawful act sufficient to found a charge of manslaughter within the category of an unlawful and dangerous act. (2) Such an act may, however, constitute such an unlawful act if it is unlawful in itself – that is, unlawful otherwise than by reason of the fact that it amounts to such a breach. Pullman’s case involved driving a motor vehicle and generally, where death results from such an act, manslaughter by criminal negligence could be relied upon. An example of an act which may be unlawful as well as being a breach of the Motor Traffıc Regulations 1934 is driving under the influence of alcohol.4 There was no mention of the restriction referred to in Pullman’s case in Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257. However, in that case, there was no issue that the act, a punch to the head or hitting the deceased’s head on the concrete, constituted an unlawful act.5
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The nature of acts which have been accepted as unlawful, in addition to the assault accepted in Wilson’s case,6 include the injection of heroin into another,7 brandishing a firearm in an attempt to assault the victim or discharging a firearm in public place,8 driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol,9 or deliberately using a vehicle as a form of weapon.10 In a case where an unlawful injury is inflicted on a pregnant woman, and when the child is subsequently born and survives independently but dies as a result of the injury, a conviction for manslaughter could be sustained.11 The mens rea that must be established by the Crown is the intent to commit the breach of the criminal law alleged as the unlawful act.12 It is not necessary that the accused knew that the act was unlawful (or dangerous)13 but it is necessary that the accused “intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous.”14 (Also see An objective test at [CA.24.140].) It is not necessary that the act committed was directed to the person actually killed.15 Where the accused acted in self-defence, or with justification, the “unlawful act” has not been established.16 1 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 122. See also R v Holzer [1968] VR 481 at 482; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 per Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ at 335 (CLR). 2 R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 at 92 (NSWLR). 3 Wilson v The Queen per Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ at 335 (CLR). 4 R v Pullman at 96 (NSWLR). 5 Wilson v The Queen at 327 (CLR). 6 See also: R v O’Neill (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 August 1992). 7 R v McLean (1981) 5 A Crim R 36. In R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41, the injection of heroin to another was considered an unlawful act, even if there was no specific legislative provision outlawing such action, because the drug had illegally been taken into possession by the accused. It should be noted that in NSW, it is an offence to administer a prohibited drug to another person: s 13 of the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985; cf R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; (1982) 74 Cr App R 348 at 429 (WLR) – where the act of supplying the dangerous drug, not being directed against the deceased, was held to be insufficient to constitute the actus reus of the offence. In R v Mitchell [1983] QB 741; [1983] 2 WLR 938; [1983] 2 All ER 427 at 943 (WLR), Dalby’s case was distinguished. See also R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 and R v Kendall (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 February 1991) for cases of criminal negligence in failing to provide assistance to a person who has overdosed on drugs. 8 Pemble v The Queen at 123 per Barwick CJ and at 127 per McTiernan J. See also Pullman at 95 (NSWLR). However, the shooting of an escaping thief intending only to frighten him was held not to be an unlawful act, see R v Turner [1962] VR 30. 9 Pullman at 96 (NSWLR). 10 Pullman at 95, 97 (NSWLR) (see also reference in Pullman to R v Farrar (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 May 1991)). For further examples of acts which may constitute or those that do not constitute unlawful acts, see Laws of Australia, Criminal Law Ch 7 “Manslaughter” by Brent Fisse and Paul Fairall [134].
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11 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 WLR 412; 2 All ER 10; 1 Cr App R 351. Applied with approval in R v F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245; 89 A Crim R 250. 12 R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981; [1967] 3 WLR 888; (1967) 51 Cr App R 417, a case of accidental shooting; R v Holzer [1968] VR 481R v Holzer at 482; Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury [1977] AC 500; [1976] 2 WLR 918; (1976) 62 Cr App R 291. 13 Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury. See also R v Jones; R v McLeod (1991) 56 A Crim R 320 at 327; R v Whittaker (1993) 68 A Crim R 476. 14 Per Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury at 507 (AC), 296 (Cr App R). 15 In R v Larkin [1943] 1 KB 174; 1 All ER 217; 29 Cr App R 18, the deceased moved between the accused and his intended victim and was fatally struck with a razor; R v Mitchell at 943 (WLR); cf: R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; (1982) 74 Cr App R 348. 16 Wilson v The Queen at 327 (CLR); R v Jones at 662 (NSWLR), 513–515 (A Crim R). In R v Turner, the accused, a member of the public, claimed that he was justified in firing a shot to frighten a car thief so that he might apprehend him. The shot fatally wounded the thief. On appeal, the conviction for manslaughter was overturned, the accused’s action being held to be justified, in the circumstances.
[CA.24.140]
Element (2) A dangerous act – appreciable risk of serious injury
In Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257, the question was stated in the following terms (at 327 (CLR)) “(…) was the act of the appellant in punching the deceased dangerous?” This question was further refined to concentrate upon the degree of risk. The majority in Wilson answered the question by modifying a test taken from R v Holzer [1968] VR 481.1 At 333 (CLR), it was held that:
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It is better to speak of an unlawful and dangerous act carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury. A direction in those terms gives adequate recognition to the seriousness of manslaughter and to respect for human life, whilst preserving a clear distinction from murder. The level of dangerousness is to be viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable person. In Wilson v The Queen at 335 (CLR), the majority said: In the end the jury had to determine whether the appellant’s act in punching the deceased was, from the standpoint of a reasonable person, an act carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury to the deceased. They were not so directed; they were told to consider whether it was a dangerous act. The distinction is not merely semantic. An act may be dangerous without carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury and, unless the two elements are brought to the minds of the jury, there is a real danger that they may wrongly convict of manslaughter. In R v Jones (1995) 38 NSWLR 652; 78 A Crim R 504, Hunt CJ at CL said at 663 (NSWLR); 508–509 (A Crim R): Once it has established that the act was a deliberate one (and then only if that is in dispute), the Crown does not have to establish any particular intention on the part of the accused. It is an objective test; the Crown does not have to establish that the accused knew that the act was unlawful or dangerous.2 In R v O’Neill (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 August 1992), Gleeson CJ (with whom Mahoney JA and Badgery-Parker J agreed), said at p 3: However, the law as established by the decision of Wilson (…) is that in a case such as the present it should be explained to the jury in appropriate words that the test of what is a dangerous act is objective, not subjective, and that an act is dangerous if it is one that carries with it an appreciable risk of serious injury. 1 The statement from R v Holzer [1968] VR 481 is quoted in Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 325 (CLR). 2 See also R v Whittaker (1993) 68 A Crim R 476.
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[CA.24.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 24 [CA.24.160]
[CA.24.140] Jury directions
In R v Jones (1995) 38 NSWLR 652; 78 A Crim R 504, Hunt CJ at CL (at 663 (NSWLR); 514 (A Crim R)) provided an example of a written direction that might be provided to a jury in a case of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act: The Crown must establish: (1) that it was the act of the accused in stabbing the deceased which caused his death; and (2) that that act was an unlawful and dangerous one; and (3) that that act was not done in self-defence. An act is unlawful if it involves a deliberate application of force to another person without that person’s consent. An act is dangerous if it is such that a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have realised that, by that act, the deceased was being exposed to an appreciable (or significant) risk of serious injury. An act is not done in self-defence when the Crown has established either (a) that the accused did not believe that it was necessary in self-defence to stab the deceased; or (b) that there were no reasonable grounds for forming any such belief. Note The belief of the accused, so far as self-defence is relevant to manslaughter, does not include any intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm.
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In this case, his Honour stressed the necessity to deal separately with the directions for murder and manslaughter.1 When the issue of self-defence is raised on the facts it is necessary for the trial judge to give a direction to the jury even when counsel for the accused specifically disclaims reliance on the defence.2 Failure to give such a direction can result in a new trial being ordered.3 For further commentary on these issues and jury directions on self-defence, see [CA.423.140]. 1 R v Jones (1995) 38 NSWLR 652; 78 A Crim R 504 at 663 (NSWLR), 514 (A Crim R). 2 Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107. See also R v Galambos (1980) 2 A Crim R 388; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25; R v Lawson [1986] VR 515; (1985) 18 A Crim R 360; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; 23 A Crim R 98; [1986] HCA 76. 3 R v Goff (2000) 112 A Crim R 485; [2000] NSWCCA 194.
[CA.24.180]
Elements of the offence
That the accused: (1) was under a duty to care for the deceased; (2) was grossly negligent (or perhaps reckless) and he/she failed thereby to perform that duty; (3) as a result of the failure to perform the duty, whether through act or omission, death was occasioned or accelerated.1,2 1 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 at 240 (NSWLR), 347 (A Crim R). See also R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79 at 297 (WLR), in which the House of Lords reconfirmed the tests for criminal negligence established in R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 10–11 and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34. In Laws of Australia, Criminal Law, Ch 7, “Manslaughter” by Brent Fisse and Paul Fairall, the authors define criminal negligence but express caution as to the concept as it has not been consistently or precisely defined by the courts – see [149] at 182. 2 In R v Adomako, Lord Mackay formulated the elements of the offence in the following manner (at 295), “On this basis in my opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who died. If such a breach of duty is established the next
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question is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore a crime. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred.”
[CA.24.200]
Generally
In Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430, the Court (Young CJ, McInerney and Crockett JJ) said at 445: In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment. In Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR), the majority accepted that the test of dangerousness in criminal negligence was that stated in Nydam v The Queen. Whilst this statement is obiter (Wilson related to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act), it is an unqualified acceptance of this test and implies acceptance of the Nydam v The Queen formulation of manslaughter by criminal negligence.
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The majority of the High Court also referred with approval to Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34. In R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79, the House of Lords approved the “gross negligence test set out by the Court of Appeal in the present case following Rex v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576.”1 In R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8, Hewart LCJ said at 13: To support an indictment for manslaughter the prosecution must prove the matters necessary to establish civil liability (except pecuniary loss), and in addition, must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of punishment. The decision in R v Bateman was approved in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions at 583 (AC), where Lord Atkin said: But the substance of the judgment is most valuable, and in my opinion is correct. In practice it has generally been adopted by judges in all cases of manslaughter by negligence, whether in driving vehicles or otherwise. In New South Wales, the case of R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334, has been repeatedly applied particularly in cases alleging criminal negligence by omission.2 1 Per Lord Mackay, R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79 at 297 (WLR). 2 See for example: R v Kendall (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 February 1991); R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994); R v Gorman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 May 1997). This case was also applied in R v Lawford (1993) 61 SASR 542; 69 A Crim R 115.
[CA.24.220]
Element (1) Duty of care
In R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994), Finlay J said at 10: It is trite law that negligence does not entail liability unless the law exacts a “duty” in the circumstances to observe care. “Duty” may therefore be defined as “an obligation recognised by law, to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of danger to others”.
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There are a number of important statements of principle, in relation to manslaughter by criminal negligence, in both English and Australian authorities.
Crimes Act 1900 s 24
[CA.24.220]
R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 held that it is necessary to establish the ingredients that would make the accused liable in civil law for negligence that is “that A owed a duty to B to take care, that that duty was not discharged, and that the default caused the death of B.”1 In R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334, a case in which it was alleged that the accused had assumed responsibility for the care of another who subsequently died from a drug overdose, Yeldham J examined a large number of English and some American authorities and applied Jones v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 307 where it was said: There are at least four situations where the failure to act may constitute the breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in certain status relation to another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.2 Allowing that the categories of persons who may be found to have a duty of care are almost endless, the following categories have been more frequently prosecuted: Duty of parents and guardians for children and other relatives – In R v Taktak, it was observed that “… cases which involve neglect of young children concern a duty as to which, one would have thought, there could be little doubt.”3 The relation between the deceased child and the accused does not have to be a direct family relationship.4 In addition to children, other relatives under the care of the accused may also be owed a duty of care.5
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Duty of care owed by professionals – In R v Bateman, a case involving negligence by a doctor, Lord Hewart CJ said at 12: If a person holds himself out as possessing special skill and knowledge and he is consulted, as possessing such special skill and knowledge, by or on behalf of a patient, he owes a duty to the patient to use due caution in undertaking the treatment. If he accepts the responsibility and undertakes the treatment and the patient submits to his direction and treatment accordingly, he owes a duty to the patient to use diligence, care, knowledge, skill and caution in administering the treatment. No contractual relation is necessary, nor is it necessary that the service be rendered for reward.6 Duty owed by users of motor vehicles – In Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34, Lord Atkin said at 583 (AC): The principle to be observed is that cases of manslaughter in driving motor cars are but instances of a general rule applicable to all charges of homicide by negligence.7 In R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222, a case dealing with unlawful and dangerous act, there is discussion of the offence of criminal negligence in the context of a motor vehicle collision and it is noted that the invariable practice is for the Crown to rely on criminal negligence when charging manslaughter.8 Duty of care owed to strangers – In R v Taktak, the question was whether an accused owed a duty of care to a helpless stranger who had apparently overdosed on drugs. Yeldham J, after analysing the relevant authorities in detail, held that the answer depended upon whether the appellant had voluntarily assumed the care of a helpless person.9 It was held that the actions of the accused in taking the deceased from a relatively public place excluded her from the chance of help by others. This was sufficient for the accused to have assumed a duty to care for the deceased.10 Whether a duty of care exists is a matter of law – In R v Cameron, Finlay J said (at 10): It was for his Honour to say whether circumstances, if found by the jury, gave rise to a duty of care. If a duty of care is required, then it is a question of law for the Judge whether that duty exists. It is not a question of fact in the ordinary course for the jury (R v Russell [1933] VLR 59; and Taktak at 358). It is for the jury to decide as a matter of fact whether there is evidence from which the duty of care can be found.
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1 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 10. 2 As quoted in R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 at 243–244 (NSWLR). 3 R v Taktak at 240 (NSWLR). Examples of cases involving children include: R v Shepherd (1862) Le & Ca 147; 169 ER 1340 (failure to procure aid of a midwife for a daughter); R v Conde (1867) 10 Cox CC 547; R v Downes (1875) 1 QBD 25 (father neglecting to care for his child); R v Egan (1897) 23 VLR 159 (a mother, while drunk, accidentally smothered her daughter. Her conviction was overturned on appeal); R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75 (a case of alleged manslaughter by starvation of an infant by her grandmother); R v Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; [1904] QWN 50 (mother and stepfather failing to provide medical assistance to a child); R v Gibbins (1919) 13 Cr App R 134 (a case of child murder); R v Russell [1933] VLR 59 (prisoner standing by whilst his wife and young children drown); R v Senior [1899] 1 QB 283 (failing to provide medical aid for child because of religious objections, this case was not followed in R v Lowe [1973] QB 702; [1973] 2 WLR 481; [1973] 1 All ER 805); R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358 (a mother overdosing her six-year-old daughter); R v Gorman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 May 1997) (a stepfather failing to obtain medical assistance for his badly burnt stepdaughter). 4 R v Clarke [1959] VR 645 (a case alleging that the accused, acting in concert, were in the position of loco parentis to a child that was not their own); R v Duffy (1880) 6 VLR (L) 430, a stepfather was in loco parentis for his wife’s child. His wife was also convicted. 5 R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450, the prisoner neglected to provide sufficiently for her aunt with whom she lived, hastening her death; in R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18, a judge left open the question of whether a de facto husband had duty to care for his wife. The jury acquitted the husband. In R v Stone [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 WLR 169; (1977) 64 Cr App R 186, the prisoner, who was partially deaf and almost blind, of low intelligence, assumed the care of and subsequently neglected to care for his sister who lived with him. His wife was also convicted. 6 For other cases involving professionals, see R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79 (a case of an anaesthetist causing death during an operation); Akerele v The King [1943] AC 255; [1943] 1 All ER 367 (case of a doctor negligently mixing a drug. Doctor acquitted on appeal); R v Gunter (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 282; 38 WN (NSW) 97 (a man carrying on a kind of medical practice). 7 In R v Taktak at 239 (NSWLR), it was held that the case of Andrews, despite relating to neglect in driving a motor vehicle, is one of general application. Other examples of cases involving neglect in the use of a motor vehicle are: R v Woods (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 638; 74 WN (NSW) 420; R v Newell (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 274; 44 WN (NSW) 91; R v Burnside [1962] VR 96. 8 In this regard, Hunt J in R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 (at 93–94 (NSWLR)) relied upon the decision of Brown v Robinson (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 297; 76 WN (NSW) 758. See also commentary on s 52A. 9 R v Taktak at 246 (NSWLR), applying R v Stone [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 WLR 169; (1977) 64 Cr App R 186; R v Nicholls and Jones v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 307. 10 See also: R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41, where the accused injected heroin into a friend who consented to the injection; R v Kendall (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 February 1991) where three men had injected drugs intravenously and one of them subsequently died; R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994) where the deceased came into contact with an overhead power line which had been brought down by the accused the day before. 11 R v Taktak at 246 (NSWLR). 12 R v Cameron at 10.
[CA.24.240]
Element (2) Gross negligence
The test is an objective one.1 The matter is to be judged from the standard of care that the reasonable man would have exercised.2 It is for the judge to direct the jury what standard to apply and for the jury to say whether that standard has been reached. The jury should not exact the highest, or a very high, standard, nor should they be content with a very low standard. The law requires a fair and reasonable standard of care and competence.3
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In Taktak, this depended upon whether there was evidence that the accused had voluntarily assumed the care of a helpless person,11 whereas in Cameron, this depended upon the jury finding “whether anybody could foresee that his act in bringing down and leaving exposed a live electric wire could cause injury to another, then he owed that other a duty of care”.12
Crimes Act 1900 s 24
[CA.24.240]
The standard is required to be judged from the standpoint of a person in the position of the accused. Therefore, factors relevant to that standard should be imputed to the reasonable man. In R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358, where a mother overdosed her daughter despite having advice from doctors as to the correct dose, the jury would have regard to “the facts that the doctors had given the prescriptions and the advice as to dosage (…)”.4 In R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994), where the accused brought down power lines, the jury would have regard to “the appellant’s age, to his lack of knowledge about electricity, and to the matters such as lack of education, and lack of sophistication, when they came to consider whether they found his conduct so grossly serious that it was deserving of punishment.”5
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The case of R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 involved an alleged negligent omission, in which it was suggested that it is necessary for the accused to have some insight as to the damage that may be caused by his inaction. Yeldham J said (at 248 (NSWLR)), “Nor is there any evidence that he was aware that death, if likely, might have been prevented by the administration of Narcan or any other preparation.” In Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430, however, a case alleging a positive act, the court said (at 444), “The requisite mens rea in the latter crime (criminal negligence) does not involve a consciousness on the part of the accused of the likelihood of his act’s causing death or serious bodily harm to the victim or persons placed in similar relationship as the victim was to the accused.”6 In Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430, the court said (at 445) that the departure had to be “such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment.”7“Mere negligence or mere inadvertence is not enough” for a conviction for criminal negligence.8 In R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79, Lord Mackay said (at 296 WLR) that “(T)he essence of the matter which is supremely a jury question is whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a criminal act or omission.” In R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222, Hunt CJ at CL said (at 91 (NSWLR)), applying Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34, that for the offence of manslaughter based on criminal negligence, the Crown had “to establish such a high degree of negligence or disregard for the life and safety of others as to be regarded as a crime against the community generally and as conduct deserving punishment.” In a case in which the appellant claimed to have mistaken the deceased for a deer, the Court of Appeal held that the defence of honest and reasonable mistake is subsumed in the trial judge’s direction to the jury on gross negligence and consequently, there was no need for the jury to be specifically directed with respect to this “defence”.9 In R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110; 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App R 41, an issue arose as to whether consent by the victim, who had voluntarily been injected with heroin by the accused, was a defence to the charge. It was held not to be a defence but was a factor relevant to whether or not the act was one of gross negligence. 1 Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201; R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358. 2 Nydam v The Queen the court (Young CJ, McInerney and Crockett JJ) at 445; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR). 3 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8, per Hewart LCJ at 12. 4 R v Taylor per Lush J at 360. 5 R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994) per Finlay J, approving the summing up in this case, at pp 11–12. 6 See also R v Taylor per Lush J at 360, applying this passage from Nydam. Whether there is a relevant distinction to be made between cases of omission and those alleging a positive act as to whether it is necessary to have insight or consciousness as to the damage that may result from an omission or a positive act does not appear to have been finally resolved although as noted above Nydam was applied with approval by the High Court in Wilson v The Queen. It is noted that in R v Cameron, a case of negligent omission, a purely objective test was applied.
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7 This test was specifically approved in Wilson v The Queen at 333 (CLR) and applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Cameron at p 11. 8 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 at 247 (NSWLR) per Yeldham J. 9 R v Osip (2000) 2 VR 595; 116 A Crim R 578; [2000] VSCA 237. In R v Lavender [2004] NSWCCA 120, extensive consideration was given to whether the defence of honest and reasonable mistake should be left to the jury. The court concluded that Osip was correct and that the defence was not available.
Element (3) Death was occasioned or accelerated
The issue of causation is the same as that for manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act – see [CA.24.100]. In R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994), a case involving an allegation of criminal negligence, this issue of causation was specifically addressed. At 9, the court applied Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 in finding that the trial judge’s directions were sufficient. [CA.24.280]
Sentence
The circumstances which can give rise to the offence of manslaughter are so various, and the range of culpability so wide, that it is very difficult to identify any pattern of sentencing.1 On the other hand, while it is always necessary to have regard to the particular factual context in order to understand the human tragedy involved in any particular case, it is also not possible to overlook the circumstance that the offence involves the felonious taking of a human life and, as such, calls for a grave measure of criminal justice, that is, one commensurate to the objective and subjective circumstances of the case.2 See also [2.1920]ff on sentence in cases of a finding of manslaughter based on provocation.
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1 R v Blacklidge (unreported, CCA (NSW), 12 December 1995); R v Maguire (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 August 1995); R v George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38; [2004] NSWCCA 247. 2 R v Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397; R v George.
25
Trial where the death or cause of death occurs out of New South Wales [Repealed]
[S 25 rep Act 83 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 25 COMMENTARY [CA.25.20]
Section 25
Section 25 related to a trial where the death or cause of death occurred out of New South Wales. See now Pt 1A. 25A
Assault causing death
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if: (a) the person assaults another person by intentionally hitting the other person with any part of the person’s body or with an object held by the person, and (b) the assault is not authorised or excused by law, and (c) the assault causes the death of the other person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years. (2) A person who is of or above the age of 18 years is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) when the person is intoxicated. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. (3) For the purposes of this section, an assault causes the death of a person whether the person is
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[CA.24.260]
Crimes Act 1900 s 25A
[CA.25A.20]
killed as a result of the injuries received directly from the assault or from hitting the ground or an object as a consequence of the assault. (4) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2), it is not necessary to prove that the death was reasonably foreseeable. (5) It is a defence in proceedings for an offence under subsection (2): (a) if the intoxication of the accused was not self-induced (within the meaning of Part 11A), or (b) if the accused had a significant cognitive impairment at the time the offence was alleged to have been committed (not being a temporary self-induced impairment). (6) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (2): (a) evidence may be given of the presence and concentration of any alcohol, drug or other substance in the accused’s breath, blood or urine at the time of the alleged offence as determined by an analysis carried out in accordance with Division 4 of Part 10 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002, and (b) the accused is conclusively presumed to be intoxicated by alcohol if the prosecution proves in accordance with an analysis carried out in accordance with that Division that there was present in the accused’s breath or blood a concentration of 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood.
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(7) If on the trial of a person for murder or manslaughter the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence under subsection (1) or (2), the jury may acquit the person of murder or manslaughter and find the person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (8) If on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (2) the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence under subsection (1), the jury may acquit the person of the offence under subsection (2) and find the person guilty of an offence under subsection (1). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (9) Section 18 does not apply to an offence under subsection (1) or (2). (10) In this section, cognitive impairment includes an intellectual disability, a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder), a neurological disorder, dementia, a mental illness or a brain injury. [S 25A insrt Act 2 of 2014, Sch 1[2]]
SECTION 25A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.25A.20] Jurisdiction, cross-references and related offences ........................................................................ [CA.25A.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.25A.60] Elements (1) and (2) Intentional assault by hitting .......................................................................... [CA.25A.80] Element (3) Without authorisation or lawful excuse ...................................................................... [CA.25A.100] Element (4) Causing death ............................................................................................................ [CA.25A.120] Aggravated offence s 25A(2) – Elements (1A) and (1B) Accused being 18 or above and intoxicated ................................................................................................................................. [CA.25A.140] Defences to a charge under s 25A ................................................................................................ [CA.25A.160] Alternative verdicts ......................................................................................................................... [CA.25A.180]
[CA.25A.20]
Indictment
Section 25A(1): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD by hitting him/her without authorisation or lawful excuse, causing the death of CD.
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[CA.25A.60]
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Section 25A(2): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, being aged 18 years or above and being intoxicated, did assault CD by hitting him/her without authorisation or lawful excuse, causing the death of CD. [CA.25A.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related offences
Section 25B(1) provides that a person convicted of an offence under s 25A(2) is to be sentenced to a non-parole period of not less than 8 years. The related offence of manslaughter, although carrying the same 25 year maximum as s 25A(2), has no corresponding minimum non-parole period. The introduction of s 25A by the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (Act 2 of 2014) which commenced on 31 January 2014 also included various legislative additions and amendments to facilitate the operation of s 25A. These included: Section 428E – where evidence of intoxication results in a person being acquitted of murder. If the intoxication was self-induced, this cannot be taken into account in determining whether the person had the requisite mens rea for an offence under s 25A; Section 428E(2) – an offence under s 25A is not an offence of specific intent for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication). Division 4 of Pt 10 of the Law Reform (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002, ss 138D–H provides that a person arrested for an alleged offence under s 25A or for an assault which could lead to the perpetrator being charged under s 25A in the event of the victim’s death, may be required by a police officer to undergo testing or provide samples to determine whether that person was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs.
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Various substances such as anabolic and androgenic steroidal agents have been added to Sch 1 of the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 thus making them prohibited drugs under the definition in s 3 of that Act. Section 21A(5AA) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides that self-induced intoxication is not to be taken as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Section 76 is amended to provide that home detention is not available for an offence under s 25A. Related offences: • Section 19 – murder; • Section 24 – manslaughter; • Section 61 – assault. [CA.25A.60]
Elements of the offences
Section 25A(1): The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally assaulted the victim; (2) by hitting him/her; (3) without authorisation or lawful excuse; (4) causing the victim’s death. Section 25A(2) Aggravated offence: The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) being aged 18 years or above; and (1B) being intoxicated; (1) intentionally assaulted the victim; (2) by hitting him/her; (3) without authorisation or lawful excuse; (4) causing the victim’s death.
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There is no summary jurisdiction for this offence. A charge under s 25A is strictly indictable.
Crimes Act 1900 s 25A [CA.25A.80]
[CA.25A.0] Elements (1) and (2) Intentional assault by hitting
Assault by hitting – assault in the context of s 25A is expressly limited to a particular form of battery, that is, by hitting – involving the application of force rather than a mere touching. Definitions of “hit” include, “[s]trike (a person or thing) with a blow or missile; deliver (a blow or stroke); strike (a person etc. a blow etc.). Knock (a part of the body) on or against something”.1 and “to deal a blow or stroke; bring forcibly into collision”.2 To strike another with a missile will not suffice under s 25A because of the limitation that an object used to strike must be held. How “hitting” will be judicially interpreted remains to be seen but regard may be had to the purpose of s 25A in construing its meaning.3 The provision was introduced in an attempt to deal with deaths caused by “one punch” assaults, often by an intoxicated perpetrator. In the Second Reading Speech to the Legislative Assembly, the Premier stated: The Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Bill 2014 introduces a new offence for one-punch assaults where a person unlawfully assaults another who dies as a result of the assault, with a 20-year maximum sentence being introduced. Perpetrators of one-punch killings have previously been prosecuted in New South Wales for manslaughter. This means that when the case goes to court the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offender should have foreseen that, by doing what he or she did, the victim would be placed at risk of serious injury.4 For detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.180].
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Mens rea – the intent required under s 25A is merely an intention to hit another. As s 25A(4) expressly states, the prosecution is not required to prove that the accused reasonably foresaw that death might result. Under s 25A, unlike the law of common assault (see [CA.61.140]), an actual intent to hit must be proved and not merely recklessness. By comparison to a charge of manslaughter, under s 25A, the prosecution does not have to prove an objectively appreciable risk of serious injury. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 2 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary 2nd ed 1988 The Macquarie Library. 3 Section 34(2)(f) of the Interpretation Act 1987. 4 Second Reading Speech by the Premier Mr B O’Farrell (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 January 2014, p 26621).
[CA.25A.100]
Element (3) Without authorisation or lawful excuse
Hitting another may be done with authorisation or lawful excuse. A police officer may use reasonable force to effect an arrest. A boxing match involves the consent of the participants to being hit. An element of proof of assault is absence of consent, see [CA.61.160]. Hitting another in self-defence involves a lawful excuse, see [2.40383]ff. Section 417 provides that wherever doing a particular act without authority is expressed to be an offence, the proof of such authority or excuse shall lie on the accused – see commentary at [CA.417.20]. However, s 419 provides that where self-defence is raised, the prosecution has the onus of proving that the accused did not act in self-defence. [CA.25A.120]
Element (4) Causing death
Section 25A(3) provides that “for the purposes of this section, an assault causes the death of a person whether the person is killed as a result of the injuries received directly from the assault or from hitting the ground or an object as a consequence of the assault”. This subsection suggests a definition of causation for the purposes of s 25A. If so, some indirect deaths following an assault by hitting, such as death occurring during an escape by the victim to avoid further violence (see [CA.19A.320]) may not be regarded as being caused by the assault by hitting. For commentary on causation of death, see [CA.19A.240]–[CA.19A.460]. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]–[CLP.540]. As to the meaning of “death”, see [CA.19A.100].
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 1 – Homicide
s 25A
Aggravated offence s 25A(2) – Elements (1A) and (1B) Accused being 18 or above and intoxicated Meaning of intoxication – s 25A(2) provides for a more serious offence if the perpetrator is aged 18 years or above and commits the offence when intoxicated. There is no definition in the Crimes Act 1900 of what being “intoxicated” means. Section 428A simply provides that “intoxication means intoxication because of the influence of alcohol, a drug or any other substance”. As Barwick CJ observed in R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; (1980) 4 A Crim R 348; [1980] HCA 17 at 71 (CLR): The state of drunkenness or intoxication can vary very greatly in degree. A person may be intoxicated in the sense that his personality is changed, his will is warped, his disposition altered, or his self-control weakened … .
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Judicial definitions of intoxication are few. However, in R v Ormsby [1945] NZLR 109, Fair J directed a jury that: A man is in a “state of intoxication” … when as a result of his consumption of intoxicating liquor, his physical and mental faculties, or his judgment, are appreciably and materially impaired in the conduct of the ordinary affairs or acts of daily life. Black’s Law Dictionary defines intoxication as “A diminished ability to act with full mental and physical capabilities because of alcohol or drug consumption”.1 For the purposes of “intoxication” under s 25A(2), this definition probably understates the degree of diminution of ability necessary. Proof of intoxication – s 25A(6)(a) provides that evidence may be given of the presence and concentration of any alcohol, drug or other substance in the accused’s breath, blood or urine at the relevant time as determined by an analysis carried out in accordance with Div 4 of Pt 10 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. Section 25A(6)(b) provides that the accused is conclusively presumed to be intoxicated by alcohol if the prosecution proves, in accordance with an analysis carried out in accordance with Div 4 of Pt 10 , that there was present in the accused’s breath or blood a concentration of 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. Where there is actual evidence of a person’s blood alcohol level or drug concentration, evidence by a pharmacologist is often called to express an expert view on the extent of likely affectation at that alcohol or drug level. Where there is no evidence of the actual alcohol or drug concentration, evidence of intoxication may be proved by the observations of eyewitnesses. The South Australian case of Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85; 116 A Crim R 492; [2000] SASC 405 refers to evidence of an intoxicated man with descriptions commonly given by police officers, including “staggering around on the road”, “extremely unsteady on his feet”, “eyes glazed and bloodshot”, “speech being slurred with a strong smell of liquor about him”. The Victorian case of R v Le Broc (2000) 2 VR 43; 114 A Crim R 546; [2000] VSCA 125 (where an appellant complained that his trial judge failed to direct the jury on intoxication) illustrates the necessity for actual evidence to demonstrate intoxication to the requisite degree rather than mere descriptions. There, the Court of Appeal said at [30], “The mere invocation of expressions such as ‘drunk’, ‘out of it’, or ‘pissed’ without more – that is, without some substantial evidentiary basis – is insufficient to require a direction on intoxication”. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA).
[CA.25A.160] Defences to a charge under s 25A By s 25A(5), two defences are expressly stated to apply to a charge under s 25A(2), that is (a) that the intoxication was not self-induced within the meaning of Pt 11A, or (b) that the accused had, at the relevant time, a (non-temporary, self-induced) significant cognitive impairment. “Cognitive impairment” is defined in s 25A(10). Provided that there is some proper factual basis established, other possible defences may include: (1) an absence of voluntariness in that the act of hitting was not a voluntary act (see generally [1.146]); (2) mental illness (see generally [CLP.1020]);
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[CA.25A.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 25B
[CA.25A.160]
(3) necessity (see generally [CLP.1420]); (4) duress (see generally [CLP.860]); (4) self-defence (see generally 0s 418 ). [CA.25A.180]
Alternative verdicts
Before s 25A, the normal charge for a “one punch” assault causing death was manslaughter. Section 25A(7) provides that a verdict under ss 25A(1) or (2) is an alternative to a verdict to murder or manslaughter. Section 25A(8) provides that on a trial of a person for an offence under s 25A(2), a verdict under s 25A(1) is an alternative verdict. For commentary on alternative verdicts generally, see [CPA.162.20]–[CPA.162.80]. 25B
Assault causing death when intoxicated—mandatory minimum sentence
(1) A court is required to impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less than 8 years on a person guilty of an offence under section 25A(2). Any non-parole period for the sentence is also required to be not less than 8 years. (2) If this section requires a person to be sentenced to a minimum period of imprisonment, nothing in section 21 (or any other provision) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 or in any other Act or law authorises a court to impose a lesser or no sentence (or to impose a lesser non-parole period). (3) Nothing in this section (apart from subsection (2)) affects the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 or any other Act or law relating to the sentencing of offenders. (4) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy. [S 25B insrt Act 2 of 2014, Sch 1[2]]
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DIVISION 2 – CONSPIRACY TO MURDER [Div 2 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[4]]
26
Conspiring to commit murder Whosoever: conspires and agrees to murder any person, whether a subject of Her Majesty or not, and whether within the Queen’s dominions or not, or solicits, encourages, persuades, or endeavours to persuade, or proposes to, any person to commit any such murder,
shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 26 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(6)]
SECTION 26 COMMENTARY Conspiracy to murder ......................................................................................................................... [CA.26.20] Soliciting to murder ............................................................................................................................. [CA.26.40]
[CA.26.20]
Conspiracy to murder
For detailed commentary on conspiracy, see [1.265]–[CLP.820]. For detailed commentary on murder, see [2.1340]–[CA.19A.580]. Elements of conspiracy to murder – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) agreed with another or others; (2) to murder a third party.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 2 – Conspiracy to murder
s 26
Indictment: That AB between (about) .......... and (about) .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did conspire with CD to murder EF.
Sentencing – For offences under s 26 committed after 1 February 2003, a standard non-parole period of 10 years is specified, see s 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518]. R v Kalajzich (1997) 94 A Crim R 41 (NSWSC, Hunt CJ at CL) was concerned with a conspiracy for the contract killing of a conspirator’s wife. R v Lo [2003] NSWCCA 313 concerned a conspiracy to murder a witness in pending criminal proceedings.
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[CA.26.40] Soliciting to murder The elements of this crime are: (1) a communication between the accused and another; (2) with the object of persuading that other to murder. The form of the indictment is: That AB on .......... did solicit [encourage, persuade, endeavour to persuade, propose to] CD to murder EF. The intent to be proved is the intent to persuade the person solicited to murder a third party; not that the accused intended that the third party be murdered.1 Section 26 is in similar terms to the corresponding English provision.2 To incite or solicit another to commit or attempt to commit a crime is also an offence at common law, see [CLO.660]. “Solicits” has a wide meaning. Hence, where a person requests another to commit murder, the charge frequently proffered is “solicit to murder” even though the section expressly includes other words of similar import. A number of cases consider the meaning of “solicit” in this context.3 In a South Australian case, an accused asked another, “Will you kill him for me?”. The trial judge told the jury that “soliciting” means no more than to “urge”. It was argued on appeal that the words used were not a solicitation but a mere inquiry only. On appeal, it was said that, if anything, “urge” was too favourable a direction to the accused because it “might seem to possess an element of vehemence, which … is not a necessary ingredient of the word ‘solicit’”.4 The court said, “[i]mportuning, entreating or imploring may … be ‘soliciting’, but so may something less dramatic and less vehement. … [A] request or a proposal to A that he should murder B, would be a soliciting …, if seriously made”.5 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has applied this passage: The word “solicits” is a common English word, and it means, in its simplified form, “to ask”. In various English dictionaries this simple meaning is given, but other similar words are also used to explain other meanings it possesses, such as “to call for”, “to make a request”, “to petition”, “to entreat”, “to persuade”, “to prefer a request”.6 Solicit also means to “attempt to try to obtain”.7 For the law of soliciting to murder in New South Wales, it has been held that: (a) the offence is complete when the solicitation occurs even though it is immediately rejected by the person solicited; (b) it does not matter if the person solicited agrees to commit the offence but really has no intention of committing the offence or later changes his mind; (c) there is no defence of withdrawal prior to the murder being committed.8 Thus, while there must be some communication to the person solicited, it is not necessary to show that his or her mind was affected by it.9 The Court of Criminal Appeal has quoted with apparent approval the following direction: “[the accused] must be intending to ask or persuading the person involved to carry out the murder …. It matters not that the person is not persuaded and indeed could never be persuaded.”10
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Separate trials – the question of separate trials for accused jointly charged with conspiracy to murder was considered in R v Domican (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 (NSWSC, Hunt J). For detailed commentary on separate trials, see [CPA.21.60]–[CPA.21.400].
Crimes Act 1900 s 27
[CA.26.40]
There may be incitement to murder at a future time, eg, a child not yet born.11 One case held that the publication of an article in a newspaper may be an encouragement or persuasion to murder, although not addressed to any particular person and not nominating any particular person as the suggested victim.12 If the communication is not proved to have reached the person to be persuaded there may be no solicitation, however, there may be a conviction for attempting to commit the crime.13 The section expressly includes “endeavours to persuade”. It is for the jury to say what the words concerned mean, having regard to the language used, the occasion when they are used, the person to whom they are addressed and the circumstances surrounding their use.14
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The appropriate sentencing range for soliciting to murder has been considered.15 1 See R v Ay (unreported, NSW CCA, 30 October 1998). 2 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK) s 4. 3 R v Most (1881) 7 QBD 244; R v Forgione [1969] SASR 248; R v Azzopardi (unreported, NSW CCA, 1 October 1998); R v Ay. In other contexts, see Sweeney v Astle [1923] NZLR 1198 at 1202; Coleman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 371; 114 A Crim R 298; [2000] NSWSC 275; R v Laws (2000) 50 NSWLR 96; 116 A Crim R 63; [2000] NSWSC 880. 4 R v Forgione at 251 (SC, FC). 5 R v Forgione at 251. See also R v Ay where the following definition from Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, 1990) (USA) “though the word implies a serious request, it requires no particular degree of importunity, entreaty, imploration or supplication” was quoted by Smart J. 6 Sweeney v Astle (not a case of soliciting to murder) at 1202 per Stout CJ approved in R v Azzopardi and quoted in R v Ay. 7 R v Most at 258 per Huddlestone B; R v Forgione at 252. 8 R v Ay. 9 See also R v Krause (1902) 66 JP 121; 18 TLR 238; R v Diamond (1920) 84 JP 211. 10 R v Ay. 11 R v Shephard [1919] 2 KB 125; (1920) 14 Cr App R 26; R v Ay. See also R v Bentley [1923] 1 KB 403; R v Tait [1990] 1 QB 290; [1989] 3 WLR 891; [1990] 3 All ER 682. 12 R v Most. 13 R v Krause; R v Ransford (1874) 13 Cox CC 9 (a case involving a charge, amongst others, of “feloniously, wickedly, diabolically, and against the order of nature” committing an unnatural offence); R v McCarthy, Holland and O’Dwyer [1903] 2 Irish Reports 146. 14 R v Diamond; R v Ay. 15 R v Lewis (1998) 100 A Crim R 361 (NSW CCA).
DIVISION 3 – ATTEMPTS TO MURDER [Div 3 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3[5]]
27
Acts done to the person with intent to murder Whosoever: administers to, or causes to be taken by, any person any poison, or other destructive thing, or by any means wounds, or causes grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent in any such case to commit murder,
shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 27 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(7); Act 16 of 1955, s 5]
SECTION 27 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.27.20]
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[CA.27.60]
s 27
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ........................................................................ [CA.27.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.27.60] Element (1) Administration etc of poison etc or wounding or causing grievous bodily harm ............ [CA.27.80] Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”) ................................................................................. [CA.27.100] Attempted murder – “defences” ....................................................................................................... [CA.27.120]
[CA.27.20]
Indictment
Administration etc of poison etc:
An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the poison; the identification of the actual poison is a matter of evidence, see Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. Wounding or causing grievous bodily harm: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did wound (or cause grievous bodily harm to) CD with intent to murder CD. [CA.27.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. A standard non-parole period of 10 years is specified for an offence under s 27 committed after 1 February 2003.1 Where the complainant is a child under the age of 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.2 An offence under s 27 is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4.
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It has been held that attempted murder is always available as an alternative verdict to murder, provided that the attempt arises out of the same matrix of facts as are alleged to constitute the murder.3 Related provisions: • Sections 18 and 19A – murder. • Section 28 – acts done to property with intent to murder. • Section 29 – other attempts to murder. • Section 30 – attempts to murder by other means. • Section 33 – wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent. • Section 33A – discharging firearm etc with intent. • Section 35 – reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding. • Section 39 – using poison etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. • Section 344A – attempts. 1 Section 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518]. 2 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520]. 3 R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA), a case where the victim was in fact already dead when the accused tried to kill him.
[CA.27.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused (without lawful excuse): (1) administered to (or caused to be taken by) the complainant a poison (or other destructive thing); or (1) wounded (or caused grievous bodily harm to) the complainant; (2) with intent to kill.
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That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did administer to (or cause to be taken by) CD poison (or other destructive thing) with intent to murder CD.
Crimes Act 1900 s 27
[CA.27.0]
[CA.27.80]
Element (1) Administration etc of poison etc or wounding or causing grievous bodily harm Administer etc poison etc – for commentary on the administration of poison or other destructive thing, see [CA.39.80]. “Poison” is not defined in the Crimes Act. A poison is that which, when administered, is injurious to health or life.1 Substances harmless in themselves may become poisons by the time or manner of their administration.2 The expression “destructive thing” is not defined in the Crimes Act. The meaning of “destructive” includes “tending to destroy” and “deadly to”.3 As to the meaning of the expressions “administer to” and “cause to be taken by”, see commentary at [CA.39.80].
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Wounding – there is no definition of “wounding” in the Crimes Act 1900. To constitute a wounding, there must be an injury by which the skin is broken.4 If the skin is broken, and there was bleeding, that is a wound.5 The whole skin must be broken and a mere breaking of the cuticle or upper skin is not sufficient.6 The breaking of internal skin, eg within the mouth, is sufficient.7 However, a split lip from a punch is a wounding but “only in the most technical sense”.8 Proving a mere flow of blood is not sufficient9; but it may be otherwise where it can be shown where the blood came from.10 The consequences of a wounding can vary widely.11 The use of an instrument is not necessary.12 The wounding may be indirectly caused.13 The common law authorities are reviewed in detail in the Tasmanian case of Devine v The Queen [1982] Tas R 155; 8 A Crim R 45 (CCA). A proscribed “wounding” is an unlawful wounding, the meaning of which was considered by the High Court in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56. Grievous bodily harm – As to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. Although not often relevant to a charge under s 27, there is a partial definition of grievous bodily harm in s 4. Actus reus of attempted murder – in addition to an intention to kill, the prosecution must prove that the accused did some act or acts towards carrying out that intention that went beyond mere preparation and that cannot be regarded as having any purpose other than killing the intended victim.14 This is often expressed by saying that the act was not too remote from the objective. For commentary on proximity and what acts are sufficient to constitute an attempt, see [CA.344A.60]. Depending upon the circumstances, an actual administration of poison or the act of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm may itself well show that what was done was more than just mere preparation. 1 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309 per Lord Coleridge CJ. 2 R v Haydon (1845) 1 Cox CC 184. See also R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49. 3 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 4 Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 Car & P 684; 172 ER 1419 per Lord Lyndhurst CB (quoted with approval by Windeyer J in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 77); R v Beckett (1836) 1 Mood & R 526; 174 ER 181; R v Berwick [1979] Tas R 101; Devine v The Queen [1982] Tas R 155; (1982) 8 A Crim R 45 (CCA). 5 Moriarty v Brooks per Lord Lyndhurst CB. 6 R v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271; R v McLoughlin (1838) 8 Car & P 635; 173 ER 651; JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 WLR 537; [1983] 3 All ER 230 at 232 (All ER) (QBD); Devine v The Queen (CCA). 7 R v Shadbolt (1835) 5 Car & P 504; 172 ER 1073 (split to inner lip); R v Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 173; 173 ER 448; JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower at 232 (All ER) (QBD). 8 R v Shepherd [2003] NSWCCA 351 at [32] per Kirby J. 9 R v Jones (1849) 3 Cox CC 441; JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 WLR 537; [1983] 3 All ER 230 (QBD). 10 R v Waltham (1849) 3 Cox CC 442 (rupture to lining membrane of urethra). 11 R v Hatch [2006] NSWCCA 330 at [16]. 12 R v Duffıll (1843) 1 Cox CC 49. See also R v Chisari [2006] NSWCCA 19 at [31]. 13 R v Sheard (1837) 7 Car & P 846; 173 ER 368. See also R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452 (Vic Sup Ct FC). 14 McMillan v Reeves (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 126 at 127; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 at 381–382 (NSWLR); 59 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing).
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Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”)
Intent to commit murder – intent is central to a crime of attempt. “[I]n the law of attempt the emphasis lies on the criminal intent of the actor, rather than on the patent criminality of the act which he performed.”1 Although murder itself may be committed with a mental state less than an intent to kill (see [CA.19A.500]–[CA.19A.540]), the intent required by s 27 is an actual intent to kill, and not some lesser intent such as intention to cause grievous bodily harm.2 It should be noted that the expression “intent to commit murder” in s 27 is not to be read literally. A judge observed that “murder” is a term of art, whereas “intent” is a word which denotes a matter of fact – an actual state of a person’s mind – an intent to commit murder can literally exist only in the mind of a person who knows enough criminal law to understand that which he intends to do will be murder.3 If the issue of intent to kill is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, this must be established as a rational inference, and an inference capable of bearing no other reasonable explanation.4 For general commentary on intent, see [CLP.1400].
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Intoxication – intoxication from alcohol and/or drugs in sufficient degree may be relevant to the question of whether an accused in fact formed the specific intention to kill.5 Part 11A (ss 428A–428I) deals specifically with intoxication – see [CA.428I.20]–[CA.428I.60] commentary at [CA.428I.20]–[CA.428I.60]. In Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; 18 ALR 257, Gibbs J considered the directions that should be given to a jury concerning intoxication and an offence of specific intent – see [CA.428I.40].6 Factual impossibility or use of insuffıcient means – cases have arisen where the crime sought to be committed was factually impossible by the means used or where insufficient means were used to achieve the desired criminal result. An example of the former was the Victorian case of R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 where a woman was convicted of the attempted murder of her own brother by driving over him in her car, believing him to be alive, when in fact he was already dead. An example of the latter was R v Collingridge (1976) 16 SASR 117 in South Australia where the accused man introduced the bared end of a live electrical wire into the water in a bath whilst his wife was kneeling in it. The wire did not come into contact with his wife’s body. She felt a tingling sensation, screamed and the man pulled the wire out; his wife unharmed. The scientific evidence was to the effect that the wire’s current was not capable of killing the wife or even causing her serious harm so long as she did not touch the wire itself. The man was convicted of attempted murder. With acknowledgement of a House of Lords decision of Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476; [1974] 2 WLR 1; [1973] 3 All ER 1109 which had held that an attempt to do something factually impossible was not an offence, it was held on appeal that the attempt failed not because of factual impossibility but because of insufficient means had been used and that the man had been properly convicted. A series of cases both in New South Wales and in other Australian jurisdictions have refused to follow Smith.7 The decision has not been followed in England either.8 Factual impossibility has been held to be irrelevant.9 The position is that even though for some factual reason, an attempt to murder will fail, this will not preclude criminal liability. For detailed commentary on factual impossibility in the law of criminal attempt, see [CA.344A.100]. 1 Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929; (1986) 23 A Crim R 254 at 932 (VR); 258 (A Crim R) per Murphy J. 2 R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 at 147–148; R v Spartels [1953] VLR 194 at 195; R v Grimwood [1962] 2 QB 621; [1962] 3 WLR 747; (1962) 46 Cr App R 393; Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 421–422; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56; Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 at [37] per McClellan CJ at CL. 3 R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 103; 42 FLR 53 at 105 (A Crim R) per Blackburn CJ; quoted by Brennan CJ in McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69 at 87–88 (CLR); 290 (A Crim R). 4 Knight v The Queen at 502–503 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA). 5 Cutter v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 638; 94 A Crim R 152; [1997] HCA 7 (High Court). 6 See also Cutter v The Queen at 641–642 (ALJR); 155 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ and Dawson J.
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[CA.27.100]
s 27
Crimes Act 1900 s 28
[CA.27.100]
7 Britten v Alpogut; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49; R v Barbouttis (1995) 37 NSWLR 256; 82 A Crim R 432 (per Gleeson CJ dissenting in the result and Dunford J); Onuorah v The Queen (2009) 76 NSWLR 1; 197 A Crim R 430; [2009] NSWCCA 238 (where the analysis of Gleeson CJ in Barbouttis was followed). 8 R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1; [1986] 2 WLR 988; (1986) 83 Cr App R 178. 9 Britten v Alpogut at 938 (VR); 264 (A Crim R) per Murphy J (Fullagar and Gobbo JJ agreeing); R v Mai at 382 (NSWLR); 59 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing).
[CA.27.120]
Attempted murder – “defences”
Self-defence can apply to a charge of attempted murder, see ss 418–423 and commentary at [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. Duress is not a defence to murder.1 In England by a House of Lords majority in R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 2 WLR 284; [1992] 1 All ER 832, it has been judicially observed that the question of whether duress is a defence to attempted murder in Australia has not been resolved.2 The trial judge in an attempted murder case in Victoria allowed the question of duress to go to the jury and examined the authorities in a judgment on the question.3
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Provocation can reduce culpable homicide to manslaughter. In McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69, a case of attempted murder under the Tasmanian Criminal Code, the High Court said that provocation will not operate so as to excuse an attempted murder altogether and has no application to attempted murder.4 1 R v Dudley (1884) 14 QBD 273; DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653; [1975] 2 WLR 641; [1975] 1 All ER 913; R v McConnell [1977] 1 NSWLR 714; R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; (1987) 85 Cr App R 32 (HL); R v Wilson [2007] 2 Cr App R 411. 2 R v Japaljarri (2002) 134 A Crim R 261; [2002] VSCA 154 at [53] (Vic CA). 3 R v Goldman (2004) 147 A Crim R 472; [2004] VSC 291 (Redlich J). 4 McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69. See also R v Wells (1981) 28 SASR 63; 3 A Crim R 453 (SA SC Jacobs J); Roche v The Queen [1988] WAR 278; 29 A Crim R 168 (WA CCA). There is a review of earlier conflicting authorities in the article by Fairall P, “Provocation, Attempted Murder and Wounding with Intent to Murder” (1983) 7 Crim LJ 44.
28
Acts done to property with intent to murder Whosoever: sets fire to any vessel, or any chattel therein, or any part of her tackle apparel or furniture, or casts away or destroys any vessel, or by the explosion of gunpowder, or other explosive substance, destroys, or damages any building, or places, or throws, any matter or thing upon or across a railway, or removes, or displaces any sleeper, or other thing belonging to a railway, with intent in any such case to commit murder,
shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 28 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(8); Act 16 of 1955, s 5]
SECTION 28 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.28.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ........................................................................ [CA.28.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.28.60] Element (1) Setting fire to a vessel etc; destroying a building with explosive etc ............................ [CA.28.80] Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”) ................................................................................. [CA.28.100]
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Attempted murder – “defences” ....................................................................................................... [CA.28.120]
[CA.28.20]
Indictment
Example – use of explosives to destroy or damage a building with intent to murder:
An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the type of explosive; the identification of the actual explosive is a matter of evidence, see Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. An indictment will not be defective because the intended victims could not be identified by name – designation of persons by description is permissible, see s 16(1)(f) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.490].
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[CA.28.40] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references See [CA.27.40] concerning the related s 27. [CA.28.60] Elements of the offence The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) set fire to a vessel (or to a chattel within a vessel) (or to part of the tackle, apparel or furniture of a vessel); or (1) cast away a vessel (or destroyed a vessel); or (1) by the explosion of gunpowder (or other explosive substance) destroyed (or damaged) a building; or (1) placed (or threw) any matter or thing upon or across a railway; or (1) removed (or displaced) a sleeper (or other thing belonging to a railway); (2) with intent to kill (without lawful excuse). [CA.28.80]
Element (1) Setting fire to a vessel etc; destroying a building with explosive etc
Terms: “Vessel” was defined in s 4 of the Crimes Act until the omission of that definition by Act 26 of 2006. No definition was substituted in the Crimes Act in its place. Vessel is relevantly defined as “a ship or boat, now usu. one of larger size; a craft”.1 “Cast away” – the definition of cast includes “to throw forth”.2 “Railway” is defined in s 4 as including a tramway, and also includes all stations, buildings, structures and equipment belonging to or associated with a railway or tramway. Actus reus of attempted murder – in addition to an intention to kill, the prosecution must prove that the accused did some act or acts towards carrying out that intention that went beyond mere preparation and that cannot be regarded as having any purpose other than killing the intended victim.3 For commentary on proximity and what acts are sufficient to constitute an attempt, see [CA.344A.60]. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 2 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 3 McMillan v Reeves (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 126 at 127; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 at 381–382 (NSWLR); 59 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing).
[CA.28.100] Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”) Intent to commit murder – intent is central to a crime of attempt, see [CA.27.100]. The phrase “intent to commit murder” is not to be read literally; it means intent to kill (without lawful excuse), see [CA.27.100].
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CA
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did by the explosion of an explosive substance destroy (or damage) a building, namely (or at) .................................................. (name or address of building) with intent to murder CD (or persons within the said building).
Crimes Act 1900 s 29
[CA.28.100]
Although murder itself may be committed with a mental state less than an intent to kill (see [CA.19A.500]–[CA.19A.540]), the intent required by s 28 is an actual intent to kill, and not some lesser intent such as intention to cause grievous bodily harm.1 If the issue of intent to kill is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, there must be no other reasonable explanation for the accused’s actions.2 For general commentary on intent to commit murder, see [CA.27.100] and on intent, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication – intoxication from alcohol and/or drugs in sufficient degree may be relevant to the question of whether an accused in fact formed the specific intention to kill, see [CA.27.100]. Factual impossibility or use of insuffıcient means – even though for some factual reason, an attempt to murder will fail, this will not preclude criminal liability. For detailed commentary on factual impossibility in the law of criminal attempt, see [CA.27.100] and [CA.344A.100]. 1 R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 at 147–148; R v Spartels [1953] VLR 194 at 195; R v Grimwood [1962] 2 QB 621; [1962] 3 WLR 747; (1962) 46 Cr App R 393; Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 421–422; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56; Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 at [37] per McClellan CJ at CL. 2 Knight v The Queen at 502–503 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA).
[CA.28.120]
Attempted murder – “defences”
Self-defence can apply to a charge of attempted murder, see ss 418–423 and commentary at [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. Duress and Provocation, see [CA.27.120].
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29
Certain other attempts to murder Whosoever: attempts to administer to, or cause to be taken by, any person any poison, or other destructive thing, or shoots at, or in any manner attempts to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or attempts to drown, suffocate, or strangle any person, with intent in any such case to commit murder,
shall, whether any bodily injury is effected or not, be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 29 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(9)]
SECTION 29 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.29.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ........................................................................ [CA.29.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.29.60] Element (1) Attempt to administer poison, shoot at, drown etc ......................................................... [CA.29.80] Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”) ................................................................................. [CA.29.100] Attempted murder – “defences” ....................................................................................................... [CA.29.120]
[CA.29.20]
Indictment
Attempted administration etc of poison etc: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did attempt to administer to (or cause to be taken by) CD poison (or other destructive thing) with intent to murder CD. An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the poison; the identification of the actual poison is a matter of evidence, see Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78.
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[CA.29.80]
s 29
Shooting at etc: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did shoot (or did attempt to discharge a loaded arm) at CD with intent to murder CD. Attempting to drown, suffocate or strangle: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did attempt to drown (or to suffocate or to strangle) CD with intent to murder CD. Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
See [CA.27.40] concerning the related s 27. Another provision is s 37 – attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle with intent to enable the commission of an indictable offence. [CA.29.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused (without lawful excuse): (1) attempted to administer to (or cause to be taken by) the complainant a poison (or other destructive thing); or (1) shot (or attempted to discharge a loaded arm) at the complainant; or (1) attempted to drown (or suffocate or strangle) the complainant; (2) with intent to kill.
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[CA.29.80]
Element (1) Attempt to administer poison, shoot at, drown etc
Attempted administration etc poison etc – for commentary on the administration of poison or other destructive thing, see [CA.39.80]. “Poison” is not defined in the Crimes Act. A poison is that which, when administered, is injurious to health or life.1 Substances harmless in themselves may become poisons by the time or manner of their administration.2 The expression “destructive thing” is not defined in the Crimes Act. The meaning of “destructive” includes “tending to destroy” and “deadly to”.3 As to the meaning of the expressions “administer to” and “cause to be taken by”, see commentary at [CA.39.80]. As to attempted electrocution, see R v Collingridge (1976) 16 SASR 117 discussed at [CA.27.100]. Shoots at etc – the expression “shoots at” means shoots intending to hit, and not simply towards.4 “Loaded arms” is defined in s 4. The definition commences “means any gun, pistol or other arms, loaded in the barrel or chamber or magazine …”. A loaded revolver loaded in some of its chambers is a loaded arm even though when the accused pulled the trigger the hammer fell upon an unloaded chamber.5 Merely drawing a revolver from a pocket is not an attempt to discharge it.6 Where two persons are indicted for shooting with intent to murder, if there is evidence of a common purpose between them, they may both be found guilty although it is uncertain which of them fired the shot.7 Drowning, suffocation or strangling – to suffocate is to “[k]ill by stopping the supply of air through the lungs; to impede breathing … stifle, choke.”8 To strangle is to “[k]ill by external compression of the throat or windpipe, esp. by means of a rope or the hands passed tightly around the neck”.9 An attempt to strangle means that a step has been taken which is directly connected with the act of choking or throttling, and the doing of which can reasonably be regarded as having no other purpose than the completion of the act of strangulation.10 Actus reus of attempted murder – in addition to an intention to kill, the prosecution must prove that the accused did some act or acts towards carrying out that intention that went beyond mere preparation and that cannot be regarded as having any purpose other than killing the intended victim.11 For commentary on proximity and what acts are sufficient to constitute an attempt, see [CA.344A.60]. 1 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309 per Lord Coleridge CJ. 2 R v Haydon (1845) 1 Cox CC 184. See also R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49.
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CA
[CA.29.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 30
[CA.29.80]
3 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 4 R v Evans (1973) 5 SASR 183; R v Marshall (1987) 49 SASR 133; 26 A Crim R 259; R v Abdallah (2005) 157 A Crim R 219; [2005] NSWCCA 365 at [56]. 5 R v Jackson (1890) 17 Cox CC 104. 6 R v Grogan (1889) 15 VLR 340. 7 R v Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr App R 198. 8 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 9 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 10 R v Haley (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 550. 11 McMillan v Reeves (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 126 at 127; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 at 381–382 (NSWLR); 59 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing).
[CA.29.100]
Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”)
Intent to commit murder – intent is central to a crime of attempt, see [CA.27.100]. The phrase “intent to commit murder” is not to be read literally, it means intent to kill (without lawful excuse), see [CA.27.100]. Although murder itself may be committed with a mental state less than an intent to kill (see [CA.19A.500]–[CA.19A.540]), the intent required by s 29 is an actual intent to kill, and not some lesser intent such as intention to cause grievous bodily harm.1 If the issue of intent to kill is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, there must be no other reasonable explanation for the accused’s actions.2 For general commentary on intent to commit murder, see [CA.27.100] and on intent, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication – intoxication from alcohol and/or drugs in sufficient degree may be relevant to the question of whether an accused in fact formed the specific intention to kill, see [CA.27.100].
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Factual impossibility or use of insuffıcient means – even though for some factual reason, an attempt to murder will fail, this will not preclude criminal liability. For detailed commentary on factual impossibility in the law of criminal attempt, see [CA.27.100] and [CA.344A.100]. 1 R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 at 147–148; R v Spartels [1953] VLR 194 at 195; R v Grimwood [1962] 2 QB 621; [1962] 3 WLR 747; (1962) 46 Cr App R 393; Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 421–422; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56; Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 at [37] per McClellan CJ at CL. 2 Knight v The Queen at 502–503 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA).
[CA.29.120]
Attempted murder – “defences”
Self-defence can apply to a charge of attempted murder, see ss 418–423 and commentary at [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. Duress and Provocation, see [CA.27.120]. 30
Attempts to murder by other means
Whosoever, by any means other than those specified in sections 27 to 29 both inclusive, attempts to commit murder shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 30 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(10); Act 51 of 1931, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 30 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.30.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ........................................................................ [CA.30.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.30.60] Attempted murder by any other means .............................................................................................. [CA.30.80]
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[CA.30.80]
s 30
Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”) ................................................................................. [CA.30.100] Attempted murder – “defences” ....................................................................................................... [CA.30.120]
[CA.30.20]
Indictment
The adequacy of a differently worded charge under s 30 was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 (where a man attempted to set fire to his wife). The suggested form above follows the wording of s 30. Section 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that the description of any offence in the words of the Act creating the offence, or in similar words, “is sufficient in law”, [4.310]. [CA.30.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
See [CA.27.40] concerning the related s 27. In particular, a charge of attempted murder cannot be dealt with summarily, and, on conviction, a standard non-parole period of 10 years is specified. [CA.30.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused (without lawful excuse): (1) did a (specified) act or omission being an attempt to kill the complainant; (2) with intent to kill.
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[CA.30.80]
Attempted murder by any other means
“Any means” – the any other means specified in this section only include methods of attempting to commit murder which are not similar to those specified in ss 27–29.1 An act done with intent to murder is an attempt to murder – when an accused is convicted of an attempt to murder, he or she is necessarily convicted of an offence under either ss 27, 28, 29 or 30.2 Actus reus of attempted murder – in addition to an intention to kill, the prosecution must prove that the accused did some act or acts towards carrying out that intention that went beyond mere preparation and that cannot be regarded as having any purpose other than killing the intended victim.3 The issue is one of proximity or remoteness.4 In McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 695, Brennan CJ observed that, provided the act is not too remote: The act or omission must be part of a series of events which is defined by reference to the intention possessed by the alleged offender at the time when the act was done or the omission was made. If that intention had been fulfilled the series of events would have constituted “the actual commission of the crime”. The actual intent of an alleged offender both constitutes the mental element and defines the series of which the alleged offender’s act or omission forms a part. For commentary on proximity and what acts are sufficient to constitute an attempt, see [CA.344A.60]. For commentary on actus reus generally, see [CLP.140]. 1 R v Brown (1883) 10 QBD 381. 2 R v White [1910] 2 KB 124; (1910) 4 Cr App R 257; Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151. 3 McMillan v Reeves (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 126 at 127; R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 at 381–382 (NSWLR); 59 (A Crim R) per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing). 4 Park v The Queen at [42]. 5 McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69 at 84–85 (CLR); 282 (A Crim R) (referring to a provision of the Tasmanian Criminal Code which reflects the common law).
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CA
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did by .................................................. (specify act or omission not falling within ss 27–29) to (or at) CD attempting to murder CD.
Crimes Act 1900 s 31
[CA.30.0]
[CA.30.100]
Element (2) Intent to kill (“to commit murder”)
Intent to commit murder – intent is central to a crime of attempt, see [CA.27.100]. Unlike ss 27–29 where each speak of “with intent … to commit murder”, s 30 proscribes “attempts to commit murder”. It has been judicially observed that the phrase “intent to commit murder” is not to be read literally because murder is a term of art and that the words mean an intent to kill, see [CA.27.100]. Similarly, it has been held that the intent required by s 30 is an actual intent to kill, and not some lesser intent such as intention to cause grievous bodily harm.1 If the issue of intent to kill is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, there must be no other reasonable explanation for the accused’s actions.2 For general commentary on intent to commit murder, see [CA.27.100] and on intent, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication – intoxication from alcohol and/or drugs in sufficient degree may be relevant to the question of whether an accused in fact formed the specific intention to kill, see [CA.27.100]. Factual impossibility or use of insuffıcient means – even though for some factual reason, an attempt to murder will fail, this will not preclude criminal liability. For detailed commentary on factual impossibility in the law of criminal attempt, see [CA.27.100] and [CA.344A.100]. 1 Park v The Queen (2010) 202 A Crim R 133; [2010] NSWCCA 151 at [37] per McClellan CJ at CL. The line of authority on the requirement of intent to kill includes R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 at 147–148; R v Spartels [1953] VLR 194 at 195; R v Grimwood [1962] 2 QB 621; [1962] 3 WLR 747; (1962) 46 Cr App R 393; Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 421–422; Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495; 63 A Crim R 166; [1992] HCA 56 and McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69 at 87 (CLR); 284 (A Crim R). 2 Knight v The Queen at 502–503 (CLR); 172 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 (CA).
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[CA.30.120]
Attempted murder – “defences”
Self-defence can apply to a charge of attempted murder, see ss 418–423 and commentary at [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. Duress and Provocation, see [CA.27.120].
DIVISION 4 – DOCUMENTS CONTAINING THREATS [Div 4 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[6]]
31
Documents containing threats
(1) A person who intentionally or recklessly, and knowing its contents, sends or delivers, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, any document threatening to kill or inflict bodily harm on any person is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) It is immaterial for the purposes of an offence under this section whether or not a document sent or delivered is actually received, and whether or not the threat contained in a document sent, delivered or received is actually communicated to the person concerned or to the recipient or intended recipient of the document (as relevant in the circumstances). [S 31 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 83 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(2) and (3)]
SECTION 31 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.31.20] Elements of the offence and jurisdiction ............................................................................................ [CA.31.40] Element (1) Intentionally or recklessly ............................................................................................... [CA.31.60]
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 4 – Documents containing threats
[CA.31.100]
s 31
Element (2) Sending or delivering etc a document ............................................................................ [CA.31.80] Element (3) Threat to kill or inflict bodily harm ................................................................................ [CA.31.100]
[CA.31.20]
Indictment
That AB on … at … in the said State did intentionally (or recklessly) send to (or deliver to, or cause to be received by) CD a document knowing it to contain a threat to kill (or inflict bodily harm on) CD (or EF). Elements of the offence and jurisdiction
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally or recklessly; (2) sent a document (or delivered a document) to another person (or caused a document to be received by another person); (3) knowing that document contained a threat to kill or inflict bodily harm on that other person (or a third person). For offences alleged after 1 September 1995, a charge under s 31 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810].
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[CA.31.60] Element (1) Intentionally or recklessly As to “intentionally”, see [CLP.1240]. As to “recklessly”, see [2.470]. Recklessness may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge, see [2.470]. In relation to offences alleged before 15 February 2008, the fault element under s 31 was “maliciously”, see [CA.4A.20]. As to the meaning of the now omitted “maliciously”, see [CA.5.100]. [CA.31.80] Element (2) Sending or delivering etc a document Leaving a document with an accomplice where its contents were likely to be read by the person threatened in it was held to be a sending.1 A threatening letter sent to A but intended by the accused also to reach B constituted a “sending” of the letter to B.2 As to “causes to be received”, see “causes” at [CLP.80]. By s 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987: “document” means any record of information, and includes: (a) anything on which there is writing, or (b) anything on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them, or (c) anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else, or (d) a map, plan, drawing or photograph. There is a corresponding definition in the Dictionary in Ch 5 Pt 1 of the Evidence Act 1995. The meaning of document has been judicially considered.3 1 R v Jones (1851) 2 Car & K 398; 175 ER 164. 2 R v Grimwade (1844) 1 Car & K 592; 174 ER 952. 3 Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Australian Airlines Ltd (1991) 28 FCR 360; 52 A Crim R 464 (FCA Gray J).
[CA.31.100] Element (3) Threat to kill or inflict bodily harm An ambiguous document may be explained by proof of extraneous facts.1 The complainant may be asked as to what appeared to be the meaning of the document to him or to her.2 It is for the jury to say whether an ambiguous document constitutes a threat to kill or inflict harm3 and is to be inferred from all the circumstances of the case.4
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CA
[CA.31.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 31A
[CA.31.100]
The meaning of “threat to kill” has been considered.5 The relationship between threatening to kill and self-defence has been considered in England.6 1 2 3 4 5 6
R R R R R R
v v v v v v
Menage (1862) 3 F & F 310; 176 ER 140. Tucker (1826) 1 Moody 134; 168 ER 1214; R v Hendy (1850) 4 Cox CC 243. Tyler (1835) 1 Moody Cr C 428; 168 ER 1330; R v Carruthers (1844) 1 Cox CC 138. Braynell (1850) 4 Cox CC 402; R v Menage (1862) 3 F & F 310; 176 ER 140. Leece (1995) 78 A Crim R 531 (Higgins J ACT SC). Cousins [1982] 1 QB 526; [1982] 2 WLR 621; (1982) 74 Cr App R 363.
DIVISION 5 – SUICIDE [Div 5 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[7]]
31A
Suicide and attempt to commit suicide
The rule of law that it is a crime for a person to commit, or to attempt to commit, suicide is abrogated. [S 31A insrt Act 180 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 31A COMMENTARY [CA.31A.20]
Suicide
At common law, an attempt to commit suicide was a misdemeanour.1 1 R v Doody (1854) 6 Cox CC 463.
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31B
Survivor of suicide pact
(1) The survivor of a suicide pact shall not be guilty of murder or manslaughter but may be guilty of an offence under section 31C. (2) In this section, suicide pact means a common agreement between 2 or more persons having for its object the death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his or her own life, but nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as being done by the person in pursuance of the pact unless it is done while the person has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the pact. (3) The onus of proving the existence of a suicide pact shall lie with the accused person on the balance of probabilities. [S 31B insrt Act 180 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
31C
Aiding etc suicide
(1) A person who aids or abets the suicide or attempted suicide of another person shall be liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) Where: (a) a person incites or counsels another person to commit suicide, and (b) that other person commits, or attempts to commit, suicide as a consequence of that incitement or counsel, the firstmentioned person shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 31C insrt Act 180 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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[CA.31C.60]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 32
SECTION 31C COMMENTARY Booklet setting out suicide methods not unlawful ........................................................................... [CA.31C.20] Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.31C.40] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.31C.60]
[CA.31C.20]
Booklet setting out suicide methods not unlawful
Where a society published a booklet setting out various suicide methods, the court refused to make a declaration that the distribution of the booklet was unlawful.1
[CA.31C.40]
CA
1 Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795; [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 All ER 277.
Indictments
(1) That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid aided (abetted) the suicide (attempted suicide) of CD. (2) That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid incited (counselled) CD to commit suicide and the said CD committed (attempted to commit) suicide as a consequence of such incitement (counsel). [CA.31C.60]
Elements of the offence
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The elements of an offence under s 31C(1) are that the accused: (a) aided or abetted, (b) the suicide or attempted suicide, (c) of another person. The elements of an offence under s 31C(2) are that the accused: (a) incited or counselled another person, (b) to commit suicide, and (c) as a consequence of that incitement or counsel, (d) that person committed, or attempted to commit suicide. Generally as to aiding, abetting, inciting and counselling, see commentary to s 345 at [CA.345.40]. Section 574B, provides that it shall be lawful for a person to use such force as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the suicide of another person. As to attempt, see [CA.344A.20]–[CA.344A.140].
DIVISION 6 – ACTS CAUSING DANGER TO LIFE OR BODILY HARM [Div 6 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[8]]
32
Impeding endeavours to escape shipwreck Whosoever: intentionally or recklessly prevents or impedes any person on board of, or having quitted, any ship or vessel in distress, or wrecked, stranded, or cast on shore, in his or her endeavour to save his or her life, or intentionally or recklessly prevents or impedes any person in his or her endeavour to save the life of such first-mentioned person,
shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 32 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(11)]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 32
[CA.32.20]
SECTION 32 COMMENTARY Editor’s note ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.32.20] Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.32.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.32.60] “Vessel” ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.32.80] “Stranded” ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.32.100]
[CA.32.20] Editor’s note The term “maliciously” was replaced with “intentionally or recklessly” by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3], which commenced on 15 February 2008. The commentary below relates to s 32 before this amendment was made. [CA.32.40]
Indictment
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... a certain vessel was cast on shore (or was in distress) at .................................................. in the State aforesaid; and that on the .......... day of .......... in the year aforesaid AB maliciously did impede one JN who was on board of (or who had quitted) such vessel in his endeavour to save his life (or did impede one CD in his endeavour to save the life of JN who was on board of, etc).
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[CA.32.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that a ship or vessel was in distress, wrecked, stranded or cast on shore; (2) that the victim was endeavouring to save his life, or that another person was endeavouring to save the victim’s life; (3) that the accused prevented or impeded such endeavours; and (4) that the action of the accused was malicious. [CA.32.80]
“Vessel”
The Act defines “vessel” as meaning any ship or vessel used in or intended for navigation,1 not being an undecked boat: see s 4. The New South Wales Navigation Act 1901 defines a “ship” as meaning every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars: s 3. The Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912 defines a “ship” as meaning a vessel not ordinarily propelled by oars only: s 67.2 1 See also Southport Corporation v Morriss [1893] 1 QB 359 at 361; The Lighter (No 3) (1902) 18 TLR 322. 2 See also The Champion [1934] P 1 at 7–10.
[CA.32.100]
“Stranded”
As to the meaning of “stranded”, see the cases.1 A “ship in distress” is one which requires immediate assistance, for example, when on fire at sea.2 1 Carruthers v Sydebothom (1815) 4 M & S 77; 105 ER 764 at 86, 87 (M & S), 767–768 (ER); Hearne v Edmunds (1819) 1 Brod & B 388; 129 ER 772 at 389 (Brod & B), 772 (ER); Rayner v Godmond (1821) 5 B & Ald 225; 106 ER 1175 at 227, 228 (B & Ald), 1175–1176 (ER); Harman v Vaux (1813) 3 Camp 429; 170 ER 1434 at 431 (Camp), 1435 (ER); McDougle v Royal Exchange Assurance Co (1816) 4 M & S 503; 105 ER 920 at 504, 505 (M & S), 921 (ER); Bishop v Pentland (1827) 7 B & C 219; 108 ER 705 at 224 (B & C), 707 (ER); Wells v Hopwood (1832) 3 B & A 20; 110 ER 8 at 23, 24 (B & A), 9–10 (ER); Corcoran v Gurney (1853) 1 El & Bl 456; 118 ER 507 at 462 (El & Bl), 509 (ER). 2 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1973.
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s 33
Editor’s note: Sections 32A–32C are repealed by Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(3) and have not been reproduced.
33
Wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent
CA
(1) Intent to cause grievous bodily harm A person who: (a) wounds any person, or (b) causes grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to that or any other person is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. (2) Intent to resist arrest A person who: (a) wounds any person, or (b) causes grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to resist or prevent his or her (or another person’s) lawful arrest or detention is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. (3) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against section 35, the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against section 35. The person is liable to punishment accordingly.
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[S 33 subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[4]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 218 of 1989]
SECTION 33 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.33.20] Cross reference .................................................................................................................................. [CA.33.40] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.33.60] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.33.80] Element (1) Wounding or causing grievous bodily harm ................................................................. [CA.33.100] Element (2) Intent to do grievous bodily harm ................................................................................. [CA.33.120] Elements of the offence under s 33(2) ............................................................................................. [CA.33.140] Wounding etc with intent to resist arrest etc .................................................................................... [CA.33.160] Alternative verdicts ........................................................................................................................... [CA.33.180] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.33.200]
[CA.33.20] Indictment Section 33(1) That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State did wound (or cause grievous bodily harm to) CD with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to him/her (or to EF). Section 33(2) That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State did wound (or cause grievous bodily harm to) CD with intent to prevent (or resist) his/her own lawful arrest (or detention) (or to prevent or resist the lawful arrest or detention of EF). [CA.33.40] Cross reference There is a standard non-parole period of 7 years, see [CA.33.200].
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Crimes Act 1900 s 33
[CA.33.40]
Section 33(3) provides the alternative verdict of reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding under s 35. By s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, ([4.11520]), if this offence is committed upon a child under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 33 is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. The plea of self-defence is available to a person charged with wounding etc with intent. As to self-defence, in relation to preventing or resisting arrest, see [CA.33.160]. For codified sections on self-defence, see ss 418–423. For commentary on self-defence, see [CA.423.40] – [CA.423.140]. The defence of provocation has no application to offences under s 33.1 Offences under s 33 are offences of “specific intent” and included in the Table of such offences under s 428B. An accused’s intoxication may be relevant as to whether he or she had the specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm or to resist or prevent arrest for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication). Where there is evidence of intoxication of a sufficient nature for it to have possibly affected the accused’s intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, the trial judge is obliged to give a direction on the relationship between intoxication and the formation of a specific intention.2 1 R v Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 103; 42 FLR 53. See also R v Wells (1981) 28 SASR 63; 3 A Crim R 453; McGhee v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 82; 69 ALJR 650; 79 A Crim R 281; [1995] HCA 69. 2 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA).
[CA.33.60]
Jurisdiction
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily.
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[CA.33.80]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) wounded or caused grievous bodily harm another person; (2) with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to that person (or any other person). Wounding etc with intent to resist arrest etc under s 33(2) – for elements and commentary, see [CA.33.140], [CA.33.160]. [CA.33.100]
Element (1) Wounding or causing grievous bodily harm
As to the meaning of wounding, see [CA.27.80]. As to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. There is a partial definition in s 4 which incorporates as grievous bodily harm the destruction of a foetus of a pregnant woman, any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person and any grievous bodily disease. For offences alleged before 15 February 2008, the fault element under s 33 was “maliciously”, see [CA.4A.20]. Section 33(1), both before the omission of “maliciously” and after, creates two distinct offences – a wounding does not necessarily amount to grievous bodily harm and grievous bodily harm does not necessarily include a wounding.1 1 McCullough v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 439; [2009] NSWCCA 94 at [35]. See also Bourke v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 38; [2010] NSWCCA 22 at [49].
[CA.33.120]
Element (2) Intent to do grievous bodily harm
The prosecution must prove an actual subjective intent to cause grievous bodily harm and not simply reckless indifference or foresight of that consequence without actual intent.1 In considering what will amount to evidence of an intent to do grievous bodily harm, regard must be had to any weapon used and the conditions under which it was used.2 However, the actual use of a weapon is not an essential element of an offence against s 33; the offence may be committed without using any weapon at all.3 But the mere
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s 33
striking of a blow with a fist, even if grievous bodily harm is in fact caused, is not of itself sufficient evidence to show an intent to do grievous bodily harm.4
It is not essential that the causing of grievous bodily harm be the primary intent; if this is a subsidiary intent, it is sufficient.7 For example, where an accused was charged with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, it was held not to matter that his primary intention was to avoid apprehension.8 In a case of a joint assault upon a police officer, it was held not to matter that one accused may have acted with the intent of preventing his lawful arrest and the other with the intent of actually causing grievous bodily harm.9 Jury directions as to liability on an accessorial basis have been considered.10
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As s 33(1) itself now makes clear, the intent need not be to do grievous bodily harm to the person actually injured.11 1 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25; R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333 at 344 per Hunt CJ at CL (Smart and Levine JJ agreeing). See also R v Cox (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 664; 175 ER 897; Re Knight’s Appeal (1968) 12 FLR 81; R v Hoskin (1974) 9 SASR 531; R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741; [1976] 3 All ER 46; (1976) 63 Cr App R 59; R v Blevins (1988) 48 SASR 65. 2 R v Cox (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 664; 175 ER 897 (scythe); R v Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 173; 173 ER 448 (hammer); R v McLoughlin (1838) 8 Car & P 635; 173 ER 651 (bottle). 3 R v Chisari [2006] NSWCCA 19 at [31] per Simpson J (Beazley JA and Rothman J agreeing). See also R v Heaton (1899) 5 ALR (CN) 61 (Vic Sup Ct FC). 4 R v Wheeler (1844) 1 Cox CC 106 (one blow breaking a jaw in two places). Compare R v Williams [1908] QWN 33 (kicking and striking). 5 R v McKnoulty (1995) 77 A Crim R 333 at 344 per Hunt CJ at CL (Smart and Levine JJ agreeing), referring to Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; [1960] HCA 2 at 596–597 (CLR); R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 30. 6 R v Pearson (2002) 137 A Crim R 419; [2002] NSWCCA 429 at [39] per Bell J applying R v Barreto (unreported NSWCCA 29 September 1993). 7 R v Gillow (1825) 1 Moody 85; 175 ER 614 (shooting to avoid apprehension). See also R v Cox (1818) Russ & Ry 362; 168 ER 846 (cutting of genitals to commit rape upon a young girl); R v Bowen (1841) Car & M 149;174 ER 448 (to facilitate a robbery); R v Hansford [1974] VR 251. 8 R v Gillow (1825) 1 Moody 85; 175 ER 614. 9 R v Warren (1985) 15 A Crim R 317 (WA CCA). 10 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189. 11 R v Lynch (1846) 1 Cox CC 361; R v Fretwell (1864) Leigh & Cave 443; 169 ER 1465 (firing into a group); R v Stopford (1870) 11 Cox CC 643; R v Monger [1973] Crim LR 301. Compare Hunt v The Queen (1825) 1 Moody 93; 168 ER 1198.
[CA.33.140]
Elements of the offence under s 33(2)
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) wounded or caused grievous bodily harm another person; (2) with intent to prevent or resist his or her own or another person’s lawful arrest. [CA.33.160]
Wounding etc with intent to resist arrest etc
The question is not whether the accused believed that the arrest resisted was lawful, but whether such arrest was in fact objectively lawful.1 The requirement to prove lawful arrest under s 33(2) “is not satisfied merely by showing, as a subjective test, that the intention of an accused person was to resist or prevent
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CA
The usual direction in relation to such a specific intent is that a person’s acts may themselves provide the most convincing evidence of his intention – an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm may be inferred from the nature of the act which is done.5 Where a specific result is the obvious and inevitable consequence of the doing of an act and the act is done deliberately, it is open to the jury to draw an inference as to the existence of the intent.6
Crimes Act 1900 s 33
[CA.33.160]
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what he believed, even mistakenly, to be a lawful arrest. The Crown must show by an objective approach, that the arrest which the accused was, by wounding, seeking to resist or prevent would have been the exercise of a legal right”.2 As to the powers of arrest, see [LEPRA.99.60] – [LEPRA.99.140]. At common law, police officers have power to arrest and detain a person whom they have reasonable grounds for suspecting has committed an offence.3 The meaning of arrest has been considered.4 There are three principle components to a lawful arrest: (1) an act justifying arrest, (2) informing the person that he or she is under arrest, and (3) (unless unnecessary or impracticable) informing the person arrested of the reason for the arrest.5 The meaning of resisting arrest has been considered.6 A person illegally arrested may resist that assault with a corresponding amount of force, but may not use a deadly weapon nor inflict grievous bodily injury.7 Mistaken self-defence may be raised, as in a case where the accused mistook arresting officers for robbers.8 An intention to wound is not an element of an offence under s 33(2).9 In a Western Australian case of this kind, it was said that the judge should tell the jury that what has to be proved is: (a) a wounding of the person concerned, (b) that the wounding was a result of a willed act and without justification, that is, it was not by way of accident or self-defence, and (c) that the wounding was committed as a result of an act taken with intent to resist or prevent the lawful arrest of any person.10 A person can be convicted of attempt under this section.11 As to attempt, see [2.32600] – [CA.344A.140]. 1 R v Heavey (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom R v Hoare [1965] NSWR 1167 per Walsh J at 256 (Herron CJ agreeing). See also R v Howarth (1828) 1 Moody 207; 168 ER 1243; R v Bentley (1850) 4 Cox CC 406 (where it was remarked that to consider the question of whether the accused himself believed he was being lawfully arrested or not “would lead to infinite niceties of discrimination”). 2 R v Heavey (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom R v Hoare [1965] NSWR 1167 per Herron CJ at 249. 3 Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 80 A Crim R 542; [1995] HCA 8 per Gaudron J at 129–130 (CLR); 550 (A Crim R). See also Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429. As to arrest without warrant, see Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148. 4 Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 WLR 1252; [1969] 2 All ER 271; R v Lavery [No 2] (1978) 19 SASR 515 at 516–517 per King CJ; R v O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397 at 401 per Hunt J; Van Der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656; 35 A Crim R 232; [1988] HCA 56 at 670 (ALJR); 255 (A Crim R) per Deane J; Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 41 A Crim R 389 (CA) at 393 per Kirby P (Samuels and Priestly JJA agreeing); R v C (1997) 93 A Crim R 81 at 96 per Hunt CJ at CL. 5 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; [1947] 1 All ER 567; Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 WLR 1252; [1969] 2 All ER 271 at 219 (QB) per Parker LCJ; Hull v Nuske (1974) 8 SASR 587 at 594-595 per Walters J; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 (SA Sup Ct FC); Wornes v Rankmore [1976] Qd R 85 (FC) at 94 per Campbell J; Hortin v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313; 68 A Crim R 381 (Mullighan J); State of New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303; Johnstone v New South Wales (2010) 202 A Crim R 422; [2010] NSWCA 70. 6 R v Osborne [1987] 1 Qd R 96 (Q Ct of Cr App). 7 R v Ryan (1890) 11 LR (NSW) 171; 6 WN (NSW) 162. 8 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1967] 2 WLR 129; [1966] 3 All ER 931. 9 Kendal v The Queen [1984] WAR 150 (WA CCA). 10 Kendal v The Queen [1984] WAR 150 (WA CCA). 11 R v Miller [1972] VR 771 at 776-777.
[CA.33.180] Alternative verdicts By s 33(3), where the intent charged is not proved but there is a wounding or grievous bodily harm caused, the accused may be convicted under s 35. As to when the jury should be told of this alternative verdict, see
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1 R v Naylor (1910) 5 Cr App Rep 19 at 22; R v Adams [1932] VLR 222. 2 R v Jenkins (1877) Knox 295; R v Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114 approved in R v Taylor (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 81; R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452 approved in R v Caple (1984) 14 A Crim R 106; R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466 and in England in R v Jenkins [1983] 1 All ER 1000; (1983) 76 Cr App R 313 and R v Wilson [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 WLR 686; [1983] 3 All ER 448. See also R v Lillis [1972] 2 QB 236; [1972] 2 WLR 1409; [1972] 2 All ER 1209.
[CA.33.200]
Sentencing
A standard non-parole period of 7 years is specified for offences under s 33, see s 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518]. The maximum penalty of 25 years is indicative of the seriousness of this category of offence.1 However, in the case of a single superficial stab wound, it was said that a lengthy sentence was not warranted.2 A “glassing” case under s 33 has been considered.3 Offences in or close to the worst category have been considered.4
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1 R v Watt (unreported NSWCCA 2 April 1997); R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17 at [11]; R v Zhang [2004] NSWCCA 358 at [28]. 2 R v Williams (2004) 148 A Crim R 325; [2004] NSWCCA 246 at [45]–[54]. 3 Herron v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 215 at [54]. 4 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25; R v Kirkland [2005] NSWCCA 130 and the related case of R v Bobak [2005] NSWCCA 320; R v Mitchell (2007) 177 A Crim R 94; [2007] NSWCCA 296.
33A
Discharging firearm etc with intent
(1) Intent to cause grievous bodily harm A person who: (a) discharges any firearm or other loaded arms, or (b) attempts to discharge any firearm or other loaded arms, with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to any person is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. (2) Intent to resist arrest etc A person who: (a) discharges any firearm or other loaded arms, or (b) attempts to discharge any firearm or other loaded arms, with intent to resist or prevent his or her (or another person’s) lawful arrest or detention is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. [S 33A subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[5]; am Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 33A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.33A.20] Jurisdiction and cross reference ...................................................................................................... [CA.33A.40]
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Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93. There are cases in which the judge may decline to tell the jury that they can bring in the alternative verdict.1 On an indictment under this section, there cannot be a conviction for either common assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm unless there is an alternative count actually charging those offences.2
Crimes Act 1900 s 33A
[CA.33A.20]
Elements of the offences under s 33A ............................................................................................ [CA.33A.60] Element (1) Discharge or attempted discharge of a firearm etc ..................................................... [CA.33A.80] Element (2) Intent to cause grievous bodily harm or resist etc arrest .......................................... [CA.33A.100]
[CA.33A.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did discharge (or attempt to discharge) a firearm namely a ......................... (or loaded arms namely a ......................... ) with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to CD (or with intent to resist/prevent his/her/EF’s) lawful arrest/detention. [CA.33A.40]
Jurisdiction and cross reference
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. By s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.11520], if this offence is committed upon a child under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 33A is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. [CA.33A.60]
Elements of the offences under s 33A
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally discharged (or attempted to discharge) a firearm (or other loaded arms); (2) with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to another (or with intent to resist or prevent his/her lawful arrest or detention, or the lawful arrest or detention of a third person).
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[CA.33A.80]
Element (1) Discharge or attempted discharge of a firearm etc
As to the meaning of “attempted”, see [CA.344A.60]. There is no definition of “firearm” in the Crimes Act 1900, but the term is defined in s 4 of the Firearms Act 1996 as “‘firearm’ means a gun, or other weapon, that is (or at any time was) capable of propelling a projectile by means of an explosive, and includes a blank fire firearm, or an air gun, but does not include anything declared by the regulations not to be a firearm”, see [9.2230]. “Loaded arms” is defined in s 4 of the Crimes Act 1900. [CA.33A.100]
Element (2) Intent to cause grievous bodily harm or resist etc arrest
Offences under s 33A are offences of “specific intent” for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication) and are included in the table of such offences under s 428B. Where there is evidence of intoxication of a sufficient nature for it to have possibly affected the accused’s intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, the trial judge is obliged to give a direction on the relationship between intoxication and the formation of a specific intention.1 As to intent to cause grievous bodily harm, see [CA.33.120]. As to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. There is a partial definition in s 4 which incorporates as “grievous bodily harm” the destruction of a foetus of a pregnant woman, any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person and any grievous bodily disease. As to arrest in this context and intent to resist or prevent arrest, see [CA.33.160]. Authorities specific to s 33A are few.2 The decision in R v Imad Salameh (1986) 26 A Crim R 353 (NSW CCA) concerned the former fault element under s 33A of “maliciously” which applied to offences alleged before 15 February 2008, see [CA.4A.20]. However, the section is in broadly similar terms to the offences under s 33 of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent and many of the authorities applying to s 33 also have application to s 33A, see [CA.33.100] – [CA.33.160]. The case of R v Heavey (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom R v Hoare [1965] NSWR 1167 where two accused were convicted of malicious wounding of a policeman with intent to prevent lawful apprehension under s 33, is apposite also to s 33A(2). There it was held that the question is not whether the accused believed that the arrest resisted was lawful, but rather, whether such arrest was in fact objectively
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lawful,3 see [CA.33.160]. A police constable spoke to three men in a vehicle and saw in it tools including bolt cutters and a hacksaw. There was also a torch and some gloves. One man took an unloaded shotgun from the rear of the vehicle. The men said they had been out shooting. The constable was suspicious and told the men he wanted them to come to a police station so that he could make further enquiries. During the trip to the police station, two of the men loaded the shotgun. During a stop en route, one of the men pushed the shotgun close to the constable’s face and threatened to shoot him. When the constable attempted to remove his own pistol from its holder, he was assaulted and robbed of his pistol. When he tried to run away, one of the men fired both barrels of the shotgun, wounding the constable in his hand. On appeal, it was argued that at the time of the wounding, there had been no actual arrest or overt act or statement by the constable to show that he was about to make a lawful arrest. Walsh J (with whom Herron CJ agreed) at p 256 said that it was “quite unreal” to suggest that because the constable, menaced by a shotgun, did not say he intended to arrest the men, or by his acts indicate his immediate intention to arrest them, the charge could not be sustained. Walsh J added that it must have been quite plain to the offenders that the constable would have arrested them as soon as he was able to.
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In a Queensland case where the accused was charged with unlawfully attempting to strike a person with a projectile, namely a bullet with intent to resist lawful arrest, the trial judge had instructed the jury that it was not necessary for the Crown to prove an intent to strike a person with a bullet, merely an intent to resist arrest. On appeal, it was held that a person cannot attempt to do something unless he contemplates a particular result and intends to bring that about; it was not sufficient for conviction that the accused would have merely foreseen that there was a danger of striking one of the police officers with a bullet.4 As to other like authorities concerning the intent required in cases of attempt, see [CA.344A.60]. 1 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA). 2 One reported case is Cioban v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 265; [2003] NSWCCA 304 which is concerned principally with evidence and sentencing issues. 3 R v Heavey (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom R v Hoare [1965] NSWR 1167 per Walsh J at p 256 (Herron CJ agreeing). 4 R v Leavitt [1985] 1 Qd R 343; (1984) 12 A Crim R 184 (Qld CCA).
33B
Use or possession of weapon to resist arrest etc
(1) Any person who: (a) uses, attempts to use, threatens to use or possesses an offensive weapon or instrument, or (b) threatens injury to any person or property, with intent to commit an indictable offence or with intent to prevent or hinder the lawful apprehension or detention either of himself or herself or any other person or to prevent or hinder a police officer from investigating any act or circumstance which reasonably calls for investigation by the officer is liable to imprisonment for 12 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 3.7[1]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[2]; Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
(2) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in the company of another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 15 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 33B am Act 94 of 2006; Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 27 of 1989; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
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[CA.33A.100]
Crimes Act 1900 s 33B
[CA.33B.20]
SECTION 33B COMMENTARY Indictments/charges ......................................................................................................................... [CA.33B.20] Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.33B.40] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.33B.60] Elements (1)(i) Using etc an offensive weapon or instrument ........................................................ [CA.33B.80] Element (1)(ii) Threatening injury to any person or property ........................................................ [CA.33B.100] Element (2) With intent to commit an indictable offence or prevent etc apprehension or investigation .............................................................................................................................. [CA.33B.120] Element (3) In company ................................................................................................................. [CA.33B.140]
[CA.33B.20]
Indictments/charges
That AB on ................ at ................ in the said State did use [attempt to use][threaten to use][possess] an offensive weapon [offensive instrument] namely, ................ (describe offensive weapon or instrument)(or did threaten injury to CD [threaten injury to property – describe property]) with intent ................ to (specify indictable offence intended)(or to prevent or hinder the lawful apprehension or detention of himself/herself [or EF])(or to prevent or hinder a member of the police force from investigating an act or circumstance which reasonably called for investigation by such member). If it is alleged that the offence was committed in company, the words “while being in company with GH” should be added.
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[CA.33B.40]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 33B(1) is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. An offence under s 33B(2) is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is therefore strictly indictable. [CA.33B.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1)(i) (a) used, or (b) attempted to use, or (c) threatened to use, or (d) possessed an offensive weapon or instrument; or (1)(ii) threatened injury to a person (or to property); (2) with intent to (a) commit an indictable offence, or (b) to prevent or hinder the lawful apprehension or detention either of himself or herself or any other person), or (c) to prevent or hinder a police officer from investigating any act or circumstance which reasonably calls for investigation by the officer; (3) (if applicable) in the company of another person or persons.
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s 33B
Elements (1)(i) Using etc an offensive weapon or instrument
In turn, “dangerous weapon” is defined in s 4 as meaning: (a) a firearm, or an imitation firearm, within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996, or (b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998, or (c) a spear gun. For commentary on what is meant by an “offensive instrument” and by an “offensive instrument”, see commentary to s 97 at [CA.97.120]. The meaning of “offensive instrument” was considered in R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575 where it was held that a motor vehicle driven at a police officer during an attempted arrest was capable of being an “offensive instrument”. Gleeson CJ said: The noun “instrument”, in this context, means a thing with or through which something is being done, or effected. The adjective “offensive” means something that is adopted or used for the purpose of attack. The question whether an object or article is an offensive instrument raises for consideration the nature of the object, the uses of which it is capable, and the intention of the person who is using it on the occasion in question. An object which in its nature and in its ordinary use is not offensive may become an offensive instrument by reason of the use to which a person puts it, and the intent which accompanies such use.1
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In this case, it was also said that offences against s 33B, where an accused uses an offensive weapon or instrument to avoid lawful apprehension, are to be regarded extremely seriously. It is incumbent upon the court, in dealing with such offences to show an appropriate measure of support for police officers. Using or attempting or threatening to use – “use” connotes purpose; the definition of “use” includes “to employ for some purpose”.2 In terms of using a weapon to avoid lawful apprehension, it has been held that the offence is complete once the use of a weapon with intent to avoid lawful apprehension has been established.3 The prosecution must prove a general intent in an accused to use an offensive weapon or instrument for one of the proscribed purposes specified in s 33B(1)(b) and self-induced intoxication is not relevant on the question of the formation of this general intent.4 The prosecution must also prove a specific intent to which self-induced intoxication is relevant, see [CA.33B.120]. There is no definition of “attempt” in the Crimes Act 1900 but to attempt to use an offensive weapon or instrument here means that an accused performs some sufficiently overt act or acts towards using a weapon etc to carry out of one of the specific intents under s 33B, see [CA.344A.60] for commentary on “attempt”. As to threatening, “[i]t is the very essence of a threat that it be made for the purpose of intimidating, or overcoming, the will of the person to whom it is addressed”5 and “… pressure, or perhaps extreme pressure, on the person to whom it is addressed to take a particular course”.6 A threat may be implied as well as express.7 Possession – for detailed commentary on the meaning of possession, see [CA.7.80]. 1 R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575 at 577. See also Considine v Kirkpatrick [1971] SASR 73 where it was held that a belt became an offensive weapon when its owner wrapped one end around his wrist and began swinging the buckle. 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed (1997) The Macquarie Library. R v Cheney [1999] NSWCCA 312. Harkins v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 263 and Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D. Wood v Bowron (1866) LR 2 QB 28 per Lush J. Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 per Lord Halsbury LC. Director of Public Prosecutions v Curby [2000] NSWSC 745.
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Offensive weapon or instrument – these words are defined in s 4 as meaning (a) a dangerous weapon, or (b) any thing that is made or adapted for offensive purposes, or (c) any thing that, in the circumstances, is used, intended for use or threatened to be used for offensive purposes, whether or not it is ordinarily used for offensive purposes or is capable of causing harm.
Crimes Act 1900 s 34
[CA.33B.80]
[CA.33B.100]
Element (1)(ii) Threatening injury to any person or property
Injury – “injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In this context, a dictionary definition is “physical damage to a person’s body”.1 “Injury” in this context clearly includes damage. It will be noted that the threat to cause injury may be in relation to anyone not just the receiver of the threat. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). In R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 24 (A Crim R) per Powell JA (Studdert and Levine JJ agreeing), it was said that this is the ordinary English meaning of “injury”.
[CA.33B.120]
Element (2) With intent to commit an indictable offence or prevent etc apprehension or investigation
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Intent under s 33B – in Harkins v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 263, it was held that there are two intents to be proved by the prosecution under a charge of using a vehicle as an offensive instrument with intent to prevent lawful apprehension. The first intent was the general intent of using a vehicle as an offensive instrument and the second intent, a specific intent, being use of the vehicle to prevent lawful apprehension. The Court held that the accused’s self-induced intoxication was not relevant in determining whether the accused had the general intent but was relevant in determining whether he had the specific intent because of the terms of ss 428B and 428C. Indictable offence – s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 defines “indictable offence” as an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 defines “indictable offence” as meaning an offence for which proceedings may be taken on indictment, whether or not proceedings for the offence may also be taken otherwise than on indictment. Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 stipulates which offences must be dealt with summarily, that is, those expressly required to be dealt with summarily, those described as summary offences and those for which the maximum penalty provided is not more than two years imprisonment. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that all offences (except offences that are required to be dealt with summarily) shall be punishable by information (to be called an indictment). [CA.33B.140]
Element (3) In company
A leading authority on the meaning of “in company” is R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159. For commentary on this case, see [CA.61J.140]. For other authorities on “in company”, see [CA.97.140]. 34
Feloniously wounding—verdict of minor offence [Repealed]
[S 34 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[6]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 34 COMMENTARY Editor’s note
The following commentary relates to s 34 of the Crimes Act 1900 before it was repealed by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[6]. [CA.34.20]
Operation of s 34
For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. Where an accused was charged under s 33 with shooting at with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, it was held not to be open to a jury under s 34 to bring in a verdict of malicious wounding as wounding was not an element of the offence mentioned in the indictment.1 Where a jury is directed in relation to s 33, a full exposition of the ingredients under s 35 is not required.2
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s 35
By s 3 and Sch 2, s 34, where applicable, applies to all offences and courts. However, because of the specific provisions of s 34 which relates only to ss 33 and 35, such applicability is limited accordingly. 1 R v Aldridge (1993) 67 A Crim R 371. See also R v Miller (1879) 14 Cox CC 356. 2 R v Sullivan (1981) 6 A Crim R 259. See also R v Bacash [1981] VR 923.
35
Reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding
CA
(1) Reckless grievous bodily harm—in company A person who, in the company of another person or persons: (a) causes grievous bodily harm to any person, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(2) Reckless grievous bodily harm A person who: (a) causes grievous bodily harm to any person, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.
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[Subs (2) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(3) Reckless wounding—in company A person who, in the company of another person or persons: (a) wounds any person, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (3) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(4) Reckless wounding A person who: (a) wounds any person, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (4) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(5) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against any subsection of this section the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against any other subsection of this section (that carries a lesser maximum penalty), the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against that other subsection. The person is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 35 am Act 41 of 2012; subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[7]; am Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 10 of 1983, s 5 and Sch 1(1); am Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 35 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.35.20]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 35
[CA.35.20]
Jurisdiction, history and cross reference ............................................................................................ [CA.35.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.35.60] Element (1) Causing grievous bodily harm or wounding ................................................................... [CA.35.80] Element (2) Recklessness as to causing actual bodily harm .......................................................... [CA.35.100] Element (3) In company ................................................................................................................... [CA.35.120] Alternative verdicts ........................................................................................................................... [CA.35.140]
[CA.35.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at ............ the said State (while in the company of CD or a person unknown) did recklessly wound (or inflict grievous bodily harm upon) EF. [CA.35.40]
Jurisdiction, history and cross reference
A charge under s 5 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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Section 35 was amended by the Crimes Amendment (Reckless Infliction of Harm) Act 2012 following the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 which held that in the case of grievous bodily harm with its fault element of recklessness instead of the earlier fault element of malice, the degree of harm that an accused must have foreseen as a possibility must not have been just some physical harm but, rather, grievous bodily harm itself. This created a serious difficulty of proof for the prosecution in some cases. The effect of Blackwell has been reversed by s 35(2)(b) which provide that an accused must [only] be reckless as to causing actual bodily harm, as distinct from grievous bodily harm or wounding.1 Some of the history of s 35 is set out in the judgment of Button J in Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116. Standard non-parole periods are specified for offences under s 35, see s 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. These periods are: s 35(1) – 5 years; s 35(2) – 4 years; s 35(3) – 4 years; s 35(4) – 3 years. Section 33 deals with intentional wounding or the causing of grievous bodily harm. By s 33(3), a verdict under s 35 is an alternative to intentional wounding or causing grievous bodily harm. By s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, if this offence is committed upon a child under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 35 is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. 1 See Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116 per Button J at [60] and [67] (Hoeben JA agreeing, Campbell J not deciding) and Greg Smith Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Reckless Infliction of Harm) Bill 2012 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 30 May 2012, p 12327).
[CA.35.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) caused grievous bodily harm to or wounded the complainant; (2) recklessly as to causing the complainant actual bodily harm; (3) (if applicable) while in the company of another (or others). [CA.35.80]
Element (1) Causing grievous bodily harm or wounding
As to causation, see [CLP.380]. Generally, there is no real issue about causation. As to proof of intent, see [CLP.1240]. If the facts make it appropriate, the jury should be directed that it must be proven that the accused’s act was a willed or voluntary act.1 As to voluntariness, see [CLP.300].
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s 35
Grievous bodily harm means really serious bodily harm. For detailed commentary as to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. There is a partial definition in s 4 which incorporates as grievous bodily harm the destruction of a foetus of a pregnant woman, any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person and any grievous bodily disease. A wounding involves the complete breaking of the skin. For detailed commentary as to the meaning of wounding, see [CA.27.80]. 1 R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 at 217–218 (CCA NSW).
Element (2) Recklessness as to causing actual bodily harm
Recklessly – for detailed commentary on the meaning of “recklessly”, see s 4A and [CA.4A.20], [CA.4A.40]. In brief, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted with subjective foresight of the possibility that actual bodily harm would be caused to someone but nevertheless proceeded to act. Before s 35 was amended by the Crimes Amendment (Reckless Infliction of Harm) Act 2012, it was held in Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 (a case of grievous bodily harm) that what had to be foreseen by the accused was not simply the possibility of actual bodily harm, but of grievous bodily harm. The 2012 amendment to s 35 restores the position to an earlier version of s 35 where the fault element was “maliciously”. In that instance, it was sufficient if the prosecution proved that the accused foresaw that some physical harm may result from his or her action but not necessarily harm as serious as actual wounding or grievous bodily harm.1 Recklessly also can be established if it is proved that the accused acted intentionally or with knowledge, see s 4A and commentary at [CA.4A.20], [CA.4A.40].
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A person may be guilty of unlawfully wounding if he or she uses a weapon designed to wound even though there is no actual desire to wound.2 It is immaterial whether the person actually struck is the person whom the accused intended to strike.3 The elements of accessorial liability of an accomplice under s 35 when the fault element was malice has been considered.4 Actual bodily harm – in the context of bodily harm, “harm” has been defined as “physical pain, illness or impairment of the body”.5 Bodily harm “includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with … health or comfort … . Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must … be more than merely transient and trifling”.6 In some contexts, “bodily harm” has been held to include psychiatric injury.7 Intoxication – an offence under s 35 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a s 35 charge, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.8 1 R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; [1967] 3 WLR 1192; (1967) 51 Cr App R 402 at 426 (QB) per Diplock LJ; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 475 (NSWLR); 312 (A Crim R) per Hunt J; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 40; R v Savage [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 3 WLR 914; [1991] 4 All ER 698 at 752 (HL); R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170 at 178 per Hunt CJ at CL 2 R v Cox (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 664; 175 ER 897; R v Ward (1872) LR 1 CCR 356, two cases which discuss a shooter firing in another’s general direction but actually striking that person. 3 R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359; Standish v The Queen (1991) 60 A Crim R 364; [1991] TASSC 83. 4 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 35–42 per Hunt J (Wood and McInerney JJ agreeing). 5 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 6 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 (CCA) per Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal at 509 (KB); 13 (Cr App R). Donovan was approved in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 (HL) and applied by the Court of Appeal in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 and in Markou v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 48; [2012] NSWCCA 64 at [17]. 7 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689; [1994] 2 All ER 552; (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 at 695 (WLR); 558 (All ER); 151–152 (Cr App R). 8 Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D.
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[CA.35.100]
Crimes Act 1900 s 35A
[CA.35.10]
[CA.35.120]
Element (3) In company
In R v Ita (2003) 139 A Crim R 340; [2003] NSWCCA 174, a case of sexual assault in company, it was said that in order to be “in company”, each person must share a common purpose, each person must be physically present and the victim’s perspective is relevant although not determinative. However, physical presence is an elastic concept and the real test is the coercive effect of the group. There must be such proximity as would enable the inference that the coercive effect of the group operated to embolden the offender or to intimidate the victim.1 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal approved this statement: A person commits a robbery, or an assault with intent, in company where that person participates in the robbery or assault together with another or others in the sense that the victim is confronted by the combined force or strength of two or more persons or that the forces of two or more persons are deployed against the victim. It is not necessary that more than one participant actually strike or rob the victim; it is sufficient that the accused and one or more other participants be physically present for the common purpose of robbing, or assaulting with intent, and of physically participating if required.2 The meaning of “in company” has been considered in other cases.3
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1 R v Ita (2003) 139 A Crim R 340; [2003] NSWCCA 174. In Western Australia v Dick (2006) 161 A Crim R 271; [2006] WASC 8, Johnson J said that emboldening the offender meant being prepared to assist and participate if necessary. 2 R v Brougham (1986) 43 SASR 187 at 191 per King CJ, approved in R v Crozier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 March 1996); R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 (the judgment of Kirby J reviews a number of the authorities); R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462. 3 R v Joyce [1968] NZLR 1070; R v Cooper (1978) 17 SASR 472; R v Galey [1985] 1 NZLR 230; R v Howard [1987] 1 NZLR 347; R v Leoni [1999] NSWCCA 14; Gore v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 330; 208 A Crim R 353; Markou v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 48; [2012] NSWCCA 64 at [24]–[35].
[CA.35.140]
Alternative verdicts
Section 35(5) provides for an alternative verdict under any other subsection of s 35 if the jury is not satisfied that the accused committed the s 35 offence actually charged. On an indictment under this section, it may be that there cannot be a conviction for either common assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm unless there is an alternative count actually charging those offences in the indictment.1 The availability of alternative verdicts is not always clear.2 Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides for alternative verdicts of attempt and assault with intent to commit the offence charged if the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the latter. There may be conceptual difficulties with these statutory alternatives in a case where the fault element under s 35 is recklessness. For commentary on alternative verdicts, see [CPA.162.20]–[CPA.162.100]. 1 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; 8 A Crim R 466 and in England in R v Wilson [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 WLR 686; [1983] 3 All ER 448 and R v Jenkins [1983] 1 All ER 1000; (1983) 76 Cr App R 313. See also R v Lillis [1972] 2 QB 236; [1972] 2 WLR 1409; [1972] 2 All ER 1209. 2 R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; 157 A Crim R 238; [2005] NSWCCA 385 at [86] per Hunt AJA.
35A
Causing dog to inflict grievous bodily harm or actual bodily harm
(1) Cause dog to inflict grievous bodily harm A person who: (a) has control of a dog, and (b) does any act that causes the dog to inflict grievous bodily harm on another person, and
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s 35A
(c) is reckless as to the injury that may be caused to a person by the act, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[8]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
CA
(2) Cause dog to inflict actual bodily harm A person who: (a) has control of a dog, and (b) does any act that causes the dog to inflict actual bodily harm on another person, and (c) is reckless as to the injury that may be caused to a person by the act, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (2) subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[8]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) Alternative finding If, on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1), it appears that grievous bodily harm was not inflicted on the other person but that actual bodily harm was inflicted, the person may be found not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under subsection (2) and be liable to punishment accordingly. (4) Doing an act includes omitting to do the act In this section, a reference to the doing of an act includes a reference to omitting to do the act. [S 35A am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 23 of 1993, s 3 and Sch 1(1)]
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SECTION 35A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.35A.20] Jurisdiction and cross references .................................................................................................... [CA.35A.40] Elements of the offences under s 35A ............................................................................................ [CA.35A.60] Element (1) Having control of a dog ................................................................................................ [CA.35A.80] Element (2) Intentional act or omission ......................................................................................... [CA.35A.100] Element (3) Causing the dog to inflict grievous bodily harm etc ................................................... [CA.35A.120] Element (4) Reckless as to the injury that might be caused ......................................................... [CA.35A.140]
[CA.35A.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales having control of a dog, namely a ......................... (breed or, of unknown breed) did an act, namely (for example) by encouraging the dog to attack or confront etc CD (or by an omission, namely by failing to exercise restraint over the said dog) caused the said dog to inflict grievous bodily harm (or actual bodily harm) on CD, and that at the time of the said act (or omission) AB was reckless as to the injury that may be caused to CD (or to another person) by the said act (or omission). [CA.35A.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
For offences alleged after 1 September 1995, a charge under s 35A(1) is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. A charge under s 35A(2) is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.13810]. The Companion Animals Act 1998 makes provision for the identification and registration of, inter alia, dogs and for the duties of and responsibilities on their owners, see [CMAA.Pt1.20]. Provisions of that Act include:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 35A Section Section Section Section
[CA.35A.40] 12A – Preventing a dog from escaping, see [9.701]; 13 – Responsibilities while a dog is in a public place, see [9.705]; 16 – Offences where a dog attacks a person or animal, see [9.720]; and 17 – Dog must not be encouraged to attack, see [9.725].
[CA.35A.60]
Elements of the offences under s 35A
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) having control of a dog; (2) intentionally did an act or omitted to do an act; (3) which act or omission caused the dog to inflict grievous bodily harm (or actual bodily harm) on another; and (4) was reckless as to the injury that might be caused by that act or omission. [CA.35A.80]
Element (1) Having control of a dog
“Control” is defined in part as “Exercise power or influence over; dominate, regulate. Restrain from action, hold in check …”.1 As examples, control can include keeping a dog on premises and keeping a dog on a leash. Another example is control by command. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press.
[CA.35A.100]
Element (2) Intentional act or omission
As to intent, see [CLP.1240]. An intentional act in this context might include deliberately releasing a dog by opening a gate etc, or by letting a dog off a leash. A relevant omission could include failing to call a dog off when it menaced or began to attack someone.
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[CA.35A.120]
Element (3) Causing the dog to inflict grievous bodily harm etc
As to the meaning of causes, see [CLP.80]. In any given case, causation will be a question of fact for the jury, see [CA.19A.280]. The meaning of “inflict” has been judicially considered, but in the context of a person inflicting grievous bodily harm, not a dog. In that context, a judicially accepted statement from R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452 is “although the word ‘inflicts’ … does not have as wide a meaning as the word ‘causes’’ … the word ‘inflicts’ does have a wider meaning than it would have if it were construed so that inflicting grievous bodily harm always involved assaulting the victim.”1 The Court there said: In our opinion, grievous bodily harm may be inflicted … either where the accused has directly and violently “inflicted” it by assaulting the victim, or where the accused has “inflicted” it by doing something, intentionally, which, though it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, does directly result in force being applied violently to the body of the victim, so that he suffers grievous bodily harm.2 As to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. There is a partial definition in s 4 which incorporates as “grievous bodily harm” the destruction of a foetus of a pregnant woman, any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person and any grievous bodily disease. As to the meaning of actual bodily harm, see [CA.59.100]. By s 35A(3), if on a charge under s 35A(1) the prosecution proves elements (1), (2) and (4), but only the infliction of actual bodily harm, rather than grievous bodily harm, there may be an alternative verdict under s 35A(2). 1 R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452 at 461 (Vic Sup Ct FC) which was expressly approved by the House of Lords in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Wilson [1984] 1 AC 242; [1983] 1 WLR 356; [1983] 1 All ER 993 and applied in R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466; R v Caple (1984) 14 A Crim R 106 (Vic CCA); R v Aldridge (1993) 67 A Crim R 371 (NSW CCA). 2 R v Salisbury at p 461.
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[CA.37.20] [CA.35A.140]
s 37
Element (4) Reckless as to the injury that might be caused
“Recklessness” involves foresight of possible consequences. As to the meaning of recklessness, see [CA.4A.40]. By s 4A, the fault element of recklessness may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. 36
Causing a grievous bodily disease [Repealed]
[S 36 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; am Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 101 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 2; rep Act 10 of 1924, s 5]
Choking, suffocation and strangulation
CA
37
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) intentionally chokes, suffocates or strangles another person so as to render the other person unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance, and (b) is reckless as to rendering the other person unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) chokes, suffocates or strangles another person so as to render the other person unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance, and (b) does so with the intention of enabling himself or herself to commit, or assisting any other person to commit, another indictable offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 25 years. (3) In this section:
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another indictable offence means an indictable offence other than an offence against this section. [S 37 subst Act 23 of 2014, Sch 1[1]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[2]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(13)]
SECTION 37 COMMENTARY Indictments ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.37.20] Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences ............................................................................. [CA.37.40] History and purpose of s 37 ............................................................................................................... [CA.37.60] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.37.80] Element (1) Intentionally chokes, suffocates or strangles ............................................................... [CA.37.100] Element (2) Rendering another unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance ...................... [CA.37.120] Alternative Elements (3) Recklessness as to rendering unconscious etc, or intention to commit another indictable offence ........................................................................................................... [CA.37.140]
[CA.37.20]
Indictments
Section 37(1): That AB on .......... at ................... in the State of New South Wales did intentionally choke, suffocate or strangle CD as to render CD unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance and was reckless in doing do. Section 37(2): That AB on .......... at ................... in the State of New South Wales did choke, suffocate or strangle CD as to render CD unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance and did so with the intention of enabling himself (or herself) to commit, another indictable offence, namely (specify) (or assisting another person to commit another indictable offence).
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Crimes Act 1900 s 37
[CA.37.20]
These forms of indictment can be amended as the circumstances require. For example, if the complainant was not rendered unconscious or insensible but simply fearful and thus incapable of resistance, then only incapacity of resistance need be alleged. [CA.37.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences
Summary jurisdiction – A charge under s 37(2) is strictly indictable. A charge under s 37(1) is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – an offence under s 37 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent (unless excused under s 279(4)). Related offences: Section 344A – attempts. Section 19A – murder. It should be noted that as s 37(2) carries a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment, if the victim of a strangulation etc under s 37(2) dies as a result, the offender will be liable to conviction for murder under the felony-murder rule, see [CA.19A.540].
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[CA.37.60]
History and purpose of s 37
The former s 37 was a narrower provision, proscribing attempts to choke, suffocate or strangle another so as to render that person unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance with the intent to enable the offender or a third person to commit an indictable offence. As to the origin of s 37, see [CA.37.100]. Commencing on 5 June 2014, the new s 37(1) creates an additional offence of choking, suffocation or strangulation. In the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014, the Attorney-General said: The bill amends the Crimes Act 1900 to introduce an additional strangulation offence in New South Wales and to simplify and modernise the existing offence of strangulation in the Crimes Act. Strangulation is a potentially fatal act, which causes significant physical and psychological trauma to victims. It is prevalent in domestic violence incidents. The use of strangulation in this context is a recognised indicator of the risk of further harm to victims of domestic violence, including homicide. The Director of Public Prosecutions raised concerns with the Government as to the adequacy of the current provision concerning strangulation in s 37 of the Crimes Act. He identified numerous cases of strangulation. Some of these were acts of intimidation while others were serious assaults resulting in unconsciousness. Time and again these cases were dealt with only as common assaults. This bill responds to those concerns.1 Injuries – strangulation etc can cause a variety of serious injuries both physical and psychological. Some are detailed in an article “Strangulation, Domestic Violence and the Legal Response” published in the Sydney Law Review.2 Delayed death may result from lack of oxygen to the brain.3 1 Brad Hazzard, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014, p 28314). 2 Douglas H and Fitzgerald R, “Strangulation, Domestic Violence and the Legal Response” (2014) 36 (2) Sydney Law Review 231 at p 232ff. 3 “Strangulation, Domestic Violence and the Legal Response” at p 233.
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[CA.37.100] [CA.37.80]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 37
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant [delete alternatives if only one act is relied on]; (2) intentionally choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant [delete alternatives if only one act is relied on]; (3) was reckless as to rendering the complainant unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance [delete alternatives if only one state is relied on]. Section 37(2): The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant [delete alternatives if only one act is relied on]; (2) so as to render the complainant unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance [delete alternatives if only one state is relied on], and (3) did so with the intention of enabling himself (or herself) to commit (or to assisting other person to commit), another indictable offence.
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[CA.37.100]
Element (1) Intentionally chokes, suffocates or strangles
Definitions – the wording of the former s 37, carried into the new s 37, was derived from the terms of s 21 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK) (24 & 25 Vict, c 100). The terms “chokes, suffocates or strangles” are not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. These words are largely synonymous. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives these definitions: Choke: “1 Stop the breath of; suffocate, temporarily or finally, by squeezing the throat, blocking it up … 2 Smother ….” Suffocate: “1 Kill … by stopping the supply of air through the lungs or other respiratory organs. 2 Destroy as if by the exclusion of air … 3 Impede breathing in (a person); stifle, choke.” Strangle: “1 Kill by external compression of the throat or windpipe, esp. by means of a rope or the hands passed tightly around the neck. Constrict painfully (the neck or throat). 2 Kill by stopping the breath; smother; suffocate, choke.”1 The corresponding definitions in the Macquarie Concise Dictionary are: Choke: “1, to stop the breath of, by squeezing or obstructing the windpipe; strangle; stifle; suffocate.” Suffocate: “1, to kill by preventing the access of air to the blood through the lungs. 2, to impede the respiration of.” Strangle: “1, to kill by compression of the windpipe, as by a cord around the neck. 2, to kill by stopping the breath in any manner; choke; stifle; suffocate.”2 It has been held that an attempt to choke need not be an attempt to take life.3 The ordinary primary meaning of “strangle” is actual killing by external compression of the windpipe. The terms of the former s 37 spoke of an attempt to strangle etc. However, the context of “strangle” in s 37 “so as to render the other person unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance” clearly indicates that such an action does not need to result in death to constitute strangling within the meaning of the new section. This is clear also from the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014 by the Attorney-General who said: … many people who survive strangulation have minimal visible external injuries, despite the seriousness of the offence. An insidious aspect of strangulation incidents is the significant fear and psychological damage that can be inflicted on a victim without any physical injuries being apparent. Regardless of an actual loss of consciousness, assaults of this nature, which involve the exercise of
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CA
Section 37(1):
Crimes Act 1900 s 37
[CA.37.100]
extreme psychological control, can be terrifying to the victim. The trauma suffered by a victim of strangulation can be invisible, yet both devastating and long term.4 Intention to strangle etc – s 37(1) specifically requires proof of intentional choking, strangulation etc. Intention as to the outcome of the choking, strangulation does not have to be proved. As s 37(1)(b) expressly provides, concerning the outcomes of unconsciousness, incapacity of resistance etc, recklessness as to these outcomes is all that must be shown. Although intention to choke etc, is not stated explicitly in s 37(2), actual intention is implicit in that subsection because of the requirements of ss 37(2) and (3). For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication and intent – an offence under s 37(1) is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 37(1), self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.5 1 2 3 4
Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary 2nd ed 1988 The Macquarie Library. R v Bishop (1888) 4 WN (NSW) 107. Brad Hazzard, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014, p 28314). 5 Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D.
[CA.37.120]
Element (2) Rendering another unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance
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Asphyxia – the actions of choking, suffocating or strangling can result in asphyxia. Asphyxia has been described as: Anything which interferes with the intake and absorption of oxygen (respiration) produces asphyxia. If the lungs do not receive a sufficient supply of fresh air, important organs, especially the brain, are deprived of oxygen. The result is loss of consciousness, and, if the condition continues heart action will fail causing death.1 Definitions – the state of unconsciousness requires no definition. To be rendered insensible is to be (relevantly) “1, incapable of feeling or perceiving; deprived of sensation; unconscious, as a person after a violent blow”.2 Whether a complainant was “incapable of resistance” by reason of choking etc will be a question of fact. Parliament intended that this phrase is to include incapability by reason of fear. In the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014, the Attorney-General said: The phrase “incapable of resistance” is part of the current strangulation provision. It is retained in the new provisions, and emphasises that actual unconsciousness is not a requisite element of the offence. This addresses the domestic violence scenario when a victim is placed in a state of such fear by the offender’s actions that he or she is incapable of resisting the offender. It avoids the evidentiary difficulty of proving a lack of consciousness when the only prosecution witness may be the person who was unconscious.3 In addition, it is not difficult to imagine a complainant being incapable of resistance through dizziness or weakness from being significantly deprived of oxygen. Equally, a complainant may be both dizzy from lack of oxygen and fearful and therefore incapable. 1 Cooke AM (ed), The Royal Society of Medicine Family Medical Guide (Longman, London, 1980), p 580. 2 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary 2nd ed 1988 The Macquarie Library 3 Brad Hazzard, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014, p 28314).
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[CA.37.140]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 38
Alternative Elements (3) Recklessness as to rendering unconscious etc, or intention to commit another indictable offence
Recklessness under s 37(1)(b) – once the prosecution can prove an intentional choking etc in fact resulting in unconsciousness, incapacity to resist etc, all that is required to be proved to satisfy element (3) is that the accused foresaw the possibility of one of these states resulting and acted anyway, see general commentary on recklessness at [CA.4A.40]. In the absence of an admission, the accused’s foresight of the possibility of unconsciousness, incapacity to resist etc will ordinarily be proved as a matter of necessary inference by the degree of choking, strangulation etc. By s 4A, if the prosecution can prove that the accused actually intended or knew that the complainant would be rendered unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance, that will establish the element of recklessness. Intention to commit another indictable offence s 37(2)(b) – for the prosecution to prove an offence under s 37(2), there must be proof of not only an intention to choke, suffocate or strangle, but also doing so with the further intention of committing another indictable offence as well or to assist another to commit another indictable offence. Choking or strangling is not infrequently done to facilitate sexual assault – there are a number of cases under the earlier version of s 37 of attempted strangulation with intent to commit some form of sexual assault.1
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Meaning of “indictable offence” – s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 defines “indictable offence” as an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 defines “indictable offence” as meaning an offence for which proceedings may be taken on indictment, whether or not proceedings for the offence may also be taken otherwise than on indictment. Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 stipulates which offences must be dealt with summarily, that is, those expressly required to be dealt with summarily, those described as summary offences and those for which the maximum penalty provided is not more than two years imprisonment. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that all offences (except offences that are required to be dealt with summarily) shall be punishable by information (to be called an indictment). Intoxication and intention to commit another indictable offence – under s 428B, an offence under s 37(2) is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intention to commit another indictable offence or to assist another in doing so, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. 1 R v HQ [2003] NSWCCA 336; McKechnie v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 13; R v MW [2007] NSWCCA 291; R v Cutrale [2011] NSWCCA 214; R v O’Connor [2014] NSWCCA 53.
38
Using intoxicating substance to commit an indictable offence
A person who: (a) administers an intoxicating substance to another person, or (b) causes another person to take an intoxicating substance, with intent to enable himself or herself, or to assist a third person, to commit an indictable offence is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. [S 38 subst Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 218 of 1989]
SECTION 38 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.38.20] Jurisdiction, purpose of the section and cross references ................................................................. [CA.38.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.38.60] Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take an intoxicating substance ..................... [CA.38.80]
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CA
[CA.37.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 38
[CA.38.20]
Element (2) Mens rea – with intent to commit an indictable offence .............................................. [CA.38.100] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.38.120]
[CA.38.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did administer to CD (or cause CD to take) an intoxicating substance [namely …], intending to enable himself or herself (or to assist a third person) to commit an indictable offence [namely ......................... ]. [CA.38.40]
Jurisdiction, purpose of the section and cross references
Charges under s 38 are not included within either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and are therefore strictly indictable.1 One purpose of this kind of provision is to proscribe the administration of a substance having a tendency to deprive the victim of his or her powers of resistance against an intended indictable offence.2 The indictable offence is often sexual assault. It can sometimes be difficult to prove criminal acts committed after the administration of an intoxicating substance as the victim may be in a stunned, substance-induced state making it difficult for them to remember the incident in any detail – s 38 therefore allows administration etc of an intoxicating substance to be charged as a specific offence, rather than the prosecution having to prove that the administrator intended afterwards to commit an indictable offence.3
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In its present form, s 38 was introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Act 2008. The purpose of amending the previous s 38, which made it an offence to administer etc “any chloroform, laudanum or other stupefying or overpowering drug or thing” to enable the commission of an indictable offence, was to “modernise” the offence, recognising that alcohol is the most commonly used drink spiking agent, in addition to drugs such as Rohypnol.4 Other offences involving administering or causing an intoxicating substance to be taken under the Crimes Act 1900 are: • Section 38A – spiking drink or food; • Section 39 – using an intoxicating substance etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm; • Section 41 – using an intoxicating substance etc to injure or to cause distress or pain. 1 See s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 at [4.10960] and Sch 1 at [4.13810]. 2 R v Arnold; Ex Parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 134 A Crim R 151; [2002] QCA 357 at [40] per Mackenzie J (McPherson JA and Atkinson J agreeing). 3 The Hon. John Ajaka – Legislative Council debate on the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Bill, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 6 March 2008, p 6001). 4 Second Reading Speech by the Attorney General in introducing the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Bill and Legislative Council debate, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 6 March 2008, p 6001 and following).
[CA.38.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) administered to the complainant (or caused the complainant to take) an intoxicating substance; (2) intending to enable himself or herself (or to assist a third person) to commit an indictable offence. [CA.38.80]
Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take an intoxicating substance
The meaning of “administers” in this kind of context was considered by the House of Lords in R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19, see commentary at [CA.39.80].1 It has a wider meaning than the spiking of drink or food under s 38A. The meaning of the term “causes another person to take” in a similar context was considered in Kennedy and also in R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334, see commentary at [CA.39.80].2
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[CA.38.120]
s 38A
Section 4(7) of the Crimes Act 1900 extends the meaning of “causing another person to take” by providing, “[a] reference in any offence under this Act to causing any … intoxicating substance … to be administered to or taken by any person includes a reference to causing any person to inhale, take or be exposed to the … intoxicating substance … by its release into the person’s environment”. “Intoxicating substance” is defined in s 4(1) as including “alcohol or a narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding”.
[CA.38.100]
CA
1 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [10], [12] considering s 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK). 2 R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334 per Howie J at [17], [18], [25].
Element (2) Mens rea – with intent to commit an indictable offence
As to intent, see commentary at [CLP.1240]. An offence under s 38 is an offence of “specific intent” for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication) and is included in the Table of such offences under s 428B. Where there is evidence of intoxication of a sufficient nature for it to have possibly affected the accused’s intention, the trial judge is obliged to give a direction on the relationship between intoxication and the formation of a specific intention.1 Indictable offence – by s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, an “indictable offence” means an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment, see [4.50] and commentary at [CPA.8.20]. An offence may be dealt with on indictment if it is an offence permitted to be dealt with summarily or on indictment, see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 5(2), at [4.170]. All offences listed in Tables 1 and 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 by s 259(2) are indictable offences, see [4.10940] and [4.13810].
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1 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA).
[CA.38.120]
Sentencing
An offence under s 38 is regarded as a very serious crime,1 and is “a particularly insidious form of criminal act”.2 It should attract a salutary penalty itself, apart from and in addition to, any penalty imposed for the indictable offence intended to be committed while the victim was involuntarily intoxicated.3 The offence is aggravated if the intoxicating substance is potentially injurious of itself.4 Sentencing a juvenile for this offence has been considered.5 1 R v Reyes [2005] NSWCCA 218 at [81] per Grove J; Samadi v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 251; [2008] NSWCCA 330 at [160] (NSWCCA) per Beazley JA. 2 Samadi v The Queen at [158] (NSWCCA) per Beazley JA. 3 R v Dawson [2000] NSWCCA 399 at [54]; R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191at [34] (NSWCCA); R v Lawson [2005] NSWCCA 346 at [31]; Samadi v The Queen at [160] (NSWCCA). 4 R v TA at [34] (NSWCCA). 5 C (1991) 55 A Crim R 478 (NSW CCA).
38A
Spiking drink or food
(1) In this section: harm includes an impairment of the senses or understanding of a person that the person might reasonably be expected to object to in the circumstances. impair includes further impair. (2) A person: (a) who causes another person to be given or to consume drink or food:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 38A
[CA.38A.20] (i)
containing an intoxicating substance that the other person is not aware it contains, or (ii) containing more of an intoxicating substance than the other person would reasonably expect it to contain, and (b) who intends a person to be harmed by the consumption of the drink or food, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years or 100 penalty units, or both. (3) For the purposes of this section, giving a person drink or food includes preparing the drink or food for the person or making it available for consumption by the person. (4) A person does not commit an offence against this section if the person has reasonable cause to believe that each person who was likely to consume the drink or food would not have objected to consuming the drink or food if the person had been aware of the presence and quantity of the intoxicating substance in the drink or food. (5) A person who uses an intoxicating substance in the course of any medical, dental or other health professional practice does not commit an offence against this section. (6) An offence against this section is a summary offence. [S 38A insrt Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
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SECTION 38A COMMENTARY Form of charge ................................................................................................................................. [CA.38A.20] Jurisdiction, purpose of the section and cross references .............................................................. [CA.38A.40] Elements of the offence under s 38A .............................................................................................. [CA.38A.60] Element (1) Causing a person to be given or to consume drink or food ........................................ [CA.38A.80] Element (2) Containing an intoxicating substance etc .................................................................. [CA.38A.100] Element (3) Intention to cause harm ............................................................................................. [CA.38A.120]
[CA.38A.20]
Form of charge
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did cause CD to be given (or to consume) a drink namely [ ......................... ] (or food namely [ ......................... ]) which drink (or food) contained an intoxicating substance namely[ ......................... ] that CD was not aware it contained (or which contained more of the intoxicating substance namely [ ......................... ] than CD would have reasonably expected it to contain) intending CD to be harmed thereby. A charge will not be defective simply because it does not specify the substance concerned; the identification of the actual substance is a matter of evidence: Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. [CA.38A.40]
Jurisdiction, purpose of the section and cross references
As s 38A(6) makes explicit, this offence is to be prosecuted summarily only. Section 38A and the related s 38 were introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Act 2008. In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill, the Attorney-General stated that it was a response to “growing community concerns about the practice of drink spiking” and cited an estimate by the Australian Institute of Criminology of up to 4,000 cases of drink spiking in Australia each year.1 Other offences involving administering or causing an intoxicating substance to be taken under the Crimes Act 1900 are: • Section 38 – using an intoxicating substance to commit an indictable offence; • Section 39 – using an intoxicating substance etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm;
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s 38A
• Section 41 – using an intoxicating substance etc to injure or to cause distress or pain. 1 Second Reading Speech by the Attorney General in introducing the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Bill and Legislative Council debate, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 6 March 2008, p 6001).
[CA.38A.60]
Elements of the offence under s 38A
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (2) which contained an intoxicating substance that the complainant was not aware it contained (or which contained more of the intoxicating substance than the complainant would reasonably have expected it to contain); (3) intending the complainant to be harmed thereby.
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[CA.38A.80]
Element (1) Causing a person to be given or to consume drink or food
The meaning of the allied phrase “causing to take” was considered by the House of Lords in Kennedy (2007)1, see commentary at [CA.39.80]. Although s 38A(3) stipulates that for the purpose of s 38A“giving a person drink or food includes preparing the drink or food for the person or making it available for consumption by the person”, it is notable that s 38A(2)(a) itself does not use the direct term “giving”, but rather, “causes to be given” (or “to consume”). It may be that the straightforward (albeit criminal) act of giving someone a spiked drink by handing it to them, is intended to be encompassed in the phrase “causes to be given” if the recipient does not actually drink it; or “causes to consume” if the recipient in fact drinks it. The expression “causes to be given”, with the partial meaning expressed in s 38A(3), appears to be intended to encompass all forms of activity which may be involved in ensuring that another is given a spiked drink intending that person harm, including ordering such a drink, or preparing it, or giving it to the recipient, or arranging for a third party to give it. 1 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [10], [12] considering s 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK).
[CA.38A.100]
Element (2) Containing an intoxicating substance etc
“Intoxicating substance” is defined in s 4(1) as including “alcohol or a narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding”. This element is satisfied if the intoxicating substance is present in the drink or food when the recipient was either unaware of its inclusion at all or, when more of the intoxicating substance was present than the recipient would reasonably expect, unless the defence in s 38A(4) is made out, ie if the accused had reasonable cause to believe that the intended recipient would not have objected to consuming the drink or food if aware of the presence or quantity of the intoxicating substance in it. If this defence is raised, the accused must prove it on the balance of probabilities.1 1 Evidence Act 1995 s 141(2), see [6.17380].
[CA.38A.120]
Element (3) Intention to cause harm
As to intent, see commentary at [CLP.1240]. An offence under s 38A is not an offence of “specific intent” for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication) as it is not included in the Table of such offences under s 428B. Therefore, any self-induced intoxication of an accused charged under s 38A cannot be taken into account on the question of intent, see s 428D. Because of the terms of s 38A(1) and the extended meaning of “harm” stipulated, “harm” will not be limited to physical harm. In the context of bodily harm, “harm” has been defined as “physical pain, illness
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(1) caused the complainant to be given (or to consume) drink (or food);
Crimes Act 1900 s 39
[CA.38A.120]
or impairment of the body”.1 The wording of s 38A(1) suggests that the impairment of the senses or understanding that a complainant “might reasonably be expected to object to in the circumstances” is to be determined as a question of fact objectively. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA).
39
Using poison etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person administers to another person, or causes another person to take, any poison, intoxicating substance or other destructive or noxious thing, and (b) the poison, intoxicating substance or other thing endangers the life of, or inflicts grievous bodily harm on, the other person, and (c) the person intends to injure, or is reckless about injuring, the other person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
(2) If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against section 41 or 41A, the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against section 41 or 41A. The person is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 39 am Act 1 of 2008; subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[10]; am Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 39 COMMENTARY Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.39.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.39.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.39.60] Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take poison etc ............................................. [CA.39.80] Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure or recklessness ................................................................. [CA.39.100] Element (3) Endangering life or infliction of grievous bodily harm .................................................. [CA.39.120]
[CA.39.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did administer to CD (or cause CD to take) poison [namely ......................... ] (or an intoxicating substance, or a destructive or noxious thing [namely ......................... ]) intending thereby to injure CD (or being reckless about injuring CD); and which poison (intoxicating substance, destructive or noxious thing) endangered CD’s life (or inflicted grievous bodily harm upon CD). An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the poison; the identification of the actual poison is a matter of evidence: Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. Clause 13(1) of Sch 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (see [4.15990]) provides that “It is sufficient to allege that the accused person did an act with intent to … injure without alleging an intent to … injure any particular person.” [CA.39.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 39 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. Other offences involving administering or causing poison etc to be taken under the Crimes Act 1900 are:
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• Section 27 – administering or causing to be taken poison or other destructive thing with intent to commit murder; • Section 29 – attempting to administer or cause to be taken poison or other destructive thing with intent to commit murder; • Section 38 – using an intoxicating substance to commit an indictable offence; • Section 38A – spiking drink or food; • Section 41 – administering or causing to be taken any poison, intoxicating substance or other destructive or noxious thing with intent to injure, or cause distress or pain; • Section 41A – introducing poison or other destructive or noxious thing into a water supply with intent to injure. By s 39(2), verdicts under ss 41 or 41A are provided as alternative verdicts. [CA.39.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) administered to the complainant (or caused the complainant to take) poison (or an intoxicating substance, or a destructive or noxious thing); (2) intending thereby to injure the complainant (or being reckless about injuring the complainant); and (3) which poison (intoxicating substance, destructive or noxious thing) endangered the complaint’s life (or inflicted grievous bodily harm upon the complainant).
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[CA.39.80]
Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take poison etc
According to a decision of the House of Lords in R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 in construing a English section broadly similar, but by no means identical, two distinct offences are created by s 39: (a) offence (1) is committed where A administers the poison etc directly to V, as by injecting V with the poison etc, holding a glass containing the poison to V’s lips, or (as in R v Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189; [1988] Crim LR 531) spraying the poison in V’s face; (b) offence (2) is committed where the poison etc is not administered to V but taken by him, provided A causes the poison to be taken by V and V does not make a voluntary and informed decision to take it. If A puts poison in food which V is about to eat and V, ignorant of the presence of the poison, eats it, A commits offence (2).1 In Kennedy, (a heroin injection case, resulting in death), the meaning of the expressions “administer to” and “cause to be taken by” were considered. The appellant prepared a syringe of heroin ready for injection and gave it to the deceased who voluntarily injected himself with it, fatally. The House of Lords considered two cases of fatal heroin injection where, in each, the accused was actively involved in a voluntary injection by the deceased.2 On the question of whether the appellant administered the heroin, the House of Lords held that he did not, saying at [19]: “the deceased had a choice whether to inject himself of not. He chose to do so knowing what he was doing. It was his act.” At [24], this was added, “It is possible to imagine scenarios in which two people could properly be regarded as acting together to administer an injection. But nothing of the kind was the case here.” On the question of whether the appellant caused the heroin to be taken by the deceased, it was held that he was not guilty of this either because an accused “is not to be treated as causing V to act in a certain way if V makes a voluntary and informed decision to act in that way rather than another.”3 The House of Lords, referring to an article by Professor Glanville Williams, observed that “an informed voluntary choice was ordinarily regarded as a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation”.4 This same concept was applied in R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334 where a woman, who was a passenger on a cruise ship, died after taking a drug given to her by another passenger.
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[CA.39.80]
Crimes Act 1900 s 39
[CA.39.80]
There, it was said that the offence under s 39 “is not made out simply because the accused may have offered the drug, with encouragement or influence to [the deceased]. It was her act in taking the drug and the accused did not cause her to take it.”5 It was held that the meaning of the words “cause another person to take” in s 39(1) “require that the accused be in a position of authority or power over the person who takes the drug.”6
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Section 4(7) of the Crimes Act 1900 extends the meaning of “causing another person to take” by providing, “A reference in any offence under this Act to causing any poison, intoxicating substance or other destructive or noxious thing to be administered to or taken by any person includes a reference to causing any person to inhale, take or be exposed to the poison, intoxicating substance or thing by its release into the person’s environment.”. “Poison” is not defined in the Crimes Act. A poison is that which, when administered, is injurious to health or life.7 Substances harmless in themselves may become poisons by the time or manner of their administration.8 A minute quantity of morphine in an admixture did not make a seller of the mixture guilty of selling “poison” without being a chemist.9 “Intoxicating substance” is defined in s 4(1) as including “alcohol or a narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding”. The expression “destructive or noxious thing” is not defined in the Crimes Act. The meaning of “destructive” includes “tending to destroy” and “deadly to”,10 and “noxious” includes the meanings “harmful to health; injurious”.11 A substance useful in small quantities, may be noxious when administered in large quantity.12 Whether a substance is “noxious” may depend upon proof that the quantity administered is such as to make it noxious.13 Account must be taken of the substance itself, the effect of the dosage administered and the person to whom it was administered.14 1 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [10], [12] considering s 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK). 2 R v Rogers [2003] 1 WLR 1374; [2003] 2 Cr App R 10 where the accused was found guilty of administration for holding a tourniquet to the deceased’s arm to raise a vein for the deceased to insert the syringe, and R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 5; [2002] Crim LR 490 where the accused was convicted of manslaughter for his part in preparing the syringe and handing it to the deceased on the basis that the jury was entitled to find that the accused and the deceased were jointly engaged in administering the heroin. The House of Lords in Kennedy at [20] said that Rogers was wrongly decided. 3 Kennedy at [14]. 4 Kennedy at [17] quoting from the article by Professor Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus? (1989) 48(3) CLJ 391 at 398. 5 R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334 per Howie J at [25]. 6 Wilhelm at [17], [18]. 7 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309 per Lord Coleridge CJ. 8 R v Haydon (1845) 1 Cox CC 184. See also R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49. 9 Pharmaceutical Society v Delve [1984] 1 QB 71. 10 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 11 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). A “noxious thing” is the more archaic expression for an “injurious substance”: R v Lagan (2001) 127 A Crim R 262; [2001] ACTSC 131 per Higgins J at [71]. 12 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309 per Lord Coleridge CJ. 13 R v Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547 at 549 per Cockburn CJ; R v Barton (1931) 25 QJPR 81 (Q Sup Ct, RJ Douglas J). 14 R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49.
[CA.39.100]
Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure or recklessness
Intent to injure – As to intent, see commentary at [CLP.1240]. “Injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In this context, a dictionary definition is “physical damage to a person’s body”.1 Injury includes
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s 39
“causing harm to the body”.2 Bodily harm “includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with … health or comfort … . Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must … be more than merely transient and trifling.”3 Whether there was an intention to injure may depend on whether the purpose for which the noxious substance was administered was benevolent or malevolent.4
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Recklessness – If recklessness rather than the specific intent to cause injury is alleged, this will require proof that an accused subjectively foresaw injury as a possibility and yet proceeded to act. As to the state of mind of recklessness, see detailed commentary at [CA.4A.20]. If recklessness is alleged rather than actual intent, s 4A nevertheless provides that “if an element of an offence is recklessness, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge”. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). In R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 24 (A Crim R) per Powell JA (Studdert and Levine JJ agreeing), it was said that this is the ordinary English meaning of “injury”. See also Deeble v Nott (1941) 65 CLR 104; 58 WN (NSW) 116; [1941] HCA 11 where Starke J said at 109 (CLR) that “bodily injuries” in a civil Act meant “any physical injuries”. 2 R v Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 at 389 (HL) per Lord Griffiths (with whom the other Law Lords agreed). 3 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 (CCA) per Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal at 509 (KB); 13 (Cr App R). Donovan was approved in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 (HL) and applied by the Court of Appeal in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185. 4 R v Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 at 390 (HL) per Lord Griffiths. Here, it was held that a homosexual man who gave two boys slimming tablets with the intention of causing them insomnia saying they were “speed”, which caused the boys vomiting and diarrhoea, was properly convicted of intending to “injure” them within the terms of an English section similar to the terms of s 41 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 5 R v Tamcelik; Ex parte Ozcan [1998] 1 Qd R 330 (Qld SC). In Hevey v Leonard [1976] VR 624 at 632, it was said that pain itself does not constitute injury; it is only evidentiary. 6 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689; [1994] 2 All ER 552; (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 at 695 (WLR); 558 (All ER); 151–152 (Cr App R).
[CA.39.120]
Element (3) Endangering life or infliction of grievous bodily harm
Infliction of grievous bodily harm – the mental element under s 39(1)(c) is either actual intent to injure or, at least, the contemplation of the possibility of the infliction of injury. Whether any given injury constitutes grievous bodily harm is a question of fact. As to the meaning of “grievous bodily harm”, see [CA.4.160]. Endangering life – whether the victim’s life was endangered is also a question of fact.1 It is unlikely that some remote risk of death could satisfy the requirement of “endangers the life of”. In manslaughter cases by unlawful or dangerous act, the dangerous act must produce an “appreciable risk” of serious injury.2 In relation to a different provision in Victoria (set out in footnote 1 below), it has been held that “danger of death” means an “appreciable risk” of death.3 1 In the Victorian case of R v Nuri [1990] VR 641; (1989) 49 A Crim R 253 at 644 (VR); 256 (A Crim R), in the context of s 22 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which provides that “a person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death is guilty of an indictable offence”, it was held that the test of whether intentional conduct in fact endangered life was to be assessed objectively, ie whether a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have realised that he or she had placed another in danger of death. This is analogous to the objective test applicable in cases of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act (as to which, see commentary at [CA.24.140]). 2 R v Holzer [1968] VR 481 applied in Wilson v The Queen(1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257. See also commentary at [CA.24.140]. 3 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484; (1998) 100 A Crim R 397 at 404 (A Crim R) (VSC Mandie J).
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Pain by itself is not “injury”5; so an intention to cause only pain would not suffice to prove intent under s 39. Although in some contexts “bodily harm” may include psychiatric injury,6 in the context of the degree of harm required by s 39(1)(b), “injury” is unlikely to be given this wider meaning.
Crimes Act 1900 s 40
40
[CA.]
On trial for poisoning—verdict of minor offence [Repealed]
[S 40 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[10]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
41
Using poison etc to injure or to cause distress or pain
A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person administers to another person, or causes another person to take, any poison, intoxicating substance or other destructive or noxious thing, and (b) the person intends to injure, or to cause distress or pain to, the other person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [S 41 am Act 1 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[6]; subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[10]; am Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 41 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.41.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.41.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.41.60] Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take poison etc ............................................. [CA.41.80] Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure or to cause distress or pain .............................................. [CA.41.100]
[CA.41.20]
Indictment
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That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did administer to CD (or cause CD to take) poison [namely ......................... ] (or an intoxicating substance, or a destructive thing, or a noxious thing [namely ......................... ]) intending thereby to injure CD (or to cause distress or pain to CD). An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the poison; the identification of the actual poison is a matter of evidence: Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. Clause 13(1) of Sch 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (see [4.15990]) provides that “It is sufficient to allege that the accused person did an act with intent to … injure without alleging an intent to … injure any particular person.” [CA.41.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 41 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. Other offences involving administering or causing poison etc to be taken under the Crimes Act 1900 are: • Section 27 – administering or causing to be taken poison or other destructive thing with intent to commit murder; • Section 29 – attempting to administer or cause to be taken poison or other destructive thing with intent to commit murder; • Section 38 – using an intoxicating substance to commit an indictable offence; • Section 38A – spiking drink or food; • Section 39 – using an intoxicating substance etc to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm; • Section 41A – introducing poison or other destructive or noxious thing into a water supply with intent to injure. [CA.41.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused:
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s 41A
(1) administered to the complainant (or caused the complainant to take) poison (or an intoxicating substance, or a destructive thing, or a noxious thing); (2) intending thereby to injure the complainant (or to cause distress or pain to the complainant). [CA.41.80]
Element (1) Actus reus – administering or causing to take poison etc
Section 4(7) of the Crimes Act 1900 extends the meaning of “causing another person to take” by providing, “A reference in any offence under this Act to causing any … intoxicating substance … to be administered to or taken by any person includes a reference to causing any person to inhale, take or be exposed to the … intoxicating substance … by its release into the person’s environment”. “Poison” is not defined in the Crimes Act. A poison is that which, when administered, is injurious to health or life, see commentary at [CA.39.80]. “Intoxicating substance” is defined in s 4(1) as including “alcohol or a narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding”.This partial definition and “intoxicating substance” as a proscribed substance under s 41, was added by the Crimes Amendment (Drink and Food Spiking) Act 2008. “Destructive thing” and “noxious thing” are not defined in the Crimes Act. As to the meaning of these expressions, see commentary at [CA.39.80].
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1 R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19 at [10], [12] considering s 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK). 2 R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334 per Howie J at [17], [18], [25].
[CA.41.100]
Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure or to cause distress or pain
Intent to injure – As to intent, see commentary at [CLP.1240]. “Injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. As to the meaning of “injury”, see commentary at [CA.39.100]. An offence under s 41 is an offence of “specific intent” and included in the Table of such offences under s 428B. An accused’s intoxication may be relevant as to whether he or she had the specific intent to injure or to cause distress or pain for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication). Depending upon the evidence of the degree of the accused’s intoxication, the trial judge may be obliged to give a direction on the relationship between intoxication and the formation of the specific intention to injure or to cause distress or pain.1 1 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA)
41A
Poisoning etc of water supply
A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person introduces any poison or other destructive or noxious thing into a supply of water, and (b) the person intends to injure any person or persons. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [S 41A subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[10]; am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 53 of 1980, s 5 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 41A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.41A.20]
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The meaning of the term “administers” in this general kind of context was considered by the House of Lords in R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269; [2007] 3 WLR 612; [2007] 4 All ER 1083; [2008] 1 Cr App R 19, see commentary at [CA.39.80].1 The meaning of the term “causes another person to take” in an allied context was considered in Kennedy and also R v Wilhelm (2010) 200 A Crim R 413; [2010] NSWSC 334, see commentary at [CA.39.80].2
Crimes Act 1900 s 41A
[CA.41A.20]
Jurisdiction and cross references .................................................................................................... [CA.41A.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.41A.60] Element (1) Actus reus – introducing poison etc into a water supply ............................................. [CA.41A.80] Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure ......................................................................................... [CA.41A.100]
[CA.41A.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did introduce into a water supply [namely ......................... ]a poison [namely ......................... ] (or destructive thing or noxious thing [namely ......................... ]) intending thereby to injure CD (or a person unknown, or others). An indictment will not be defective simply because it does not specify the poison; the identification of the actual poison is a matter of evidence: Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628; [1954] HCA 78. Clause 13(1) of Sch 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (see [4.15990]) provides that “It is sufficient to allege that the accused person did an act with intent to … injure without alleging an intent to … injure any particular person.” [CA.41A.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 41A is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. As to other offences involving use of poison etc under the Crimes Act 1900, see list at [CA.41.40].
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[CA.41A.60] Elements of the offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) introduced into a water supply a poison (or a destructive or noxious thing); (2) intending thereby to injure a person (or persons). [CA.41A.80]
Element (1) Actus reus – introducing poison etc into a water supply
“Introduces” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. Relevantly, one meaning of “introduce” is “add or incorporate”.1 “Poison” is not defined in the Crimes Act. A poison is that which, when administered, is injurious to health or life,2 and see commentary at [CA.39.80]. The expression “destructive or noxious thing” is not defined in the Crimes Act either. As to the meaning of the terms “destructive” and “noxious”, see commentary at [CA.39.80]. “Supply of water” is not defined in the Crimes Act, but the meaning is obvious and will include any reservoir, dam or watercourse from which people obtain water. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 2 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309.
[CA.41A.100]
Element (2) Mens rea – intent to injure
Intent to injure – As to intent, see commentary at [CLP.1240]. “Injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. As to the meaning of “Injury”, see commentary at [CA.39.100]. An offence under s 41A is an offence of “specific intent” and included in the Table of such offences under s 428B. An accused’s intoxication may be relevant as to whether he or she had the specific intent to injure for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication). Depending upon the evidence of the degree of the accused’s intoxication, the trial judge may be obliged to give a direction on the relationship between intoxication and the formation of the specific intention to injure.1 1 R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 (NSW CCA)
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[CA.42.40]
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 42
Injuries to child at time of birth
Whosoever, during or after the delivery of a child, intentionally or recklessly inflicts on such child, whether then wholly born or not, any grievous bodily harm, shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [S 42 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
CA
SECTION 42 COMMENTARY Indictment and jurisdiction .................................................................................................................. [CA.42.20] Elements of the offence under s 42 ................................................................................................... [CA.42.40]
[CA.42.20]
Indictment and jurisdiction
That AB .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales during (or after) the delivery of a child to CD intentionally (or recklessly) did inflict upon the said child grievous bodily harm. This offence cannot be dealt with summarily, see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 at [4.10960] and [4.13810]. [CA.42.40]
Elements of the offence under s 42
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The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) during (or after) the delivery of a child; (2) the accused inflicted grievous bodily harm on that child; (3) intentionally or recklessly. Reported cases on this offence are few. It has been held that the child must be so far developed that in the ordinary course of events, it would have had a fair chance of being born alive.1 “Grievous bodily harm” means really serious bodily harm, see commentary at [CA.4.160]. As to the meaning of “intentionally”, see commentary at [1 416]. As to the meaning of “recklessly”, see commentary at [CA.4A.20]. By s 4A, if recklessness is charged as the fault element, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. Before 15 February 2008, the fault element under s 42 was “maliciously”. An accused was charged under an earlier version of s 422 with maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm upon a child during the delivery of the child, when he was practising as a doctor, although though not a legally qualified medical practitioner. The accused was called to attend a woman during her confinement. While attempting to deliver her child, he dislocated the child’s hip causing bruising and the child died. He tried for an hour to bring the child forth without success. The evidence showed that no one with appropriate knowledge would have acted as the accused did. Although found guilty at trial, his conviction was quashed on appeal, the court holding that although the accused may have displayed ignorance, he could not be said to have acted maliciously – he did not act recklessly or with indifference to human life.3 With a charge under s 42, by s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent, see [4.11520]. 1 R v Berriman (1854) 6 Cox CC 388. See also R v Hewitt and Smith (1866) 4 F & F 1101; 176 ER 923. 2 Section 58 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW). 3 R v Lubienski (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 55; 9 WN (NSW) 159 (NSW Sup Ct FC) per Windeyer J.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 43
43
[CA.43.20]
Abandoning or exposing a child under 7 years
A person who, without reasonable excuse, intentionally abandons or exposes a child under 7 years of age is guilty of an offence if it causes a danger of death or of serious injury to the child. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [S 43 subst Act 41 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; am Act 85 of 2003; Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 43 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.43.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.43.40] Elements of the offence under s 43 ................................................................................................... [CA.43.60] Element (1) Without reasonable excuse ............................................................................................ [CA.43.80] Element (2) Intentional abandonment or exposure .......................................................................... [CA.43.100] Element (3) Child under 7 years ...................................................................................................... [CA.43.120] Element (4) Causing danger of death or serious injury ................................................................... [CA.43.140]
[CA.43.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did, without reasonable excuse, intentionally abandon (and/or expose) a child under 7 years of age, namely CD, causing a danger of death or of serious injury to the child..
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[CA.43.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
For offences alleged after 1 September 1995, a charge under s 43 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. By s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent, see [4.11520]. [CA.43.60]
Elements of the offence under s 43
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) without reasonable excuse; (2) intentionally abandoned (and/or exposed) a child; (3) being under 7 years of age; (4) causing a danger of death or of serious injury to that child. [CA.43.80]
Element (1) Without reasonable excuse
In the Second Reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Bill 2004 which amended s 43, it was stated, “A defence of ‘without reasonable excuse’ replaces the use of the term ‘unlawfully’ [as the fault element] in the current section. It will be the role of judicial officers to determine whether an individual can establish this defence.”1 The drafting of s 43 clearly makes the absence of reasonable excuse an element of the offence, so as to cast the legal burden of proving this on the prosecution. But as with many other “defences”, this does not mean that in every case the prosecution must bring evidence to prove that the accused acted without reasonable excuse – an accused wishing to raise reasonable excuse will first bear an evidentiary onus to point to or produce some evidence from which it could be inferred that there was a reasonable excuse for the accused’s act or omission; in which event, the prosecution must prove that in fact there was no reasonable possibility of a reasonable excuse.2
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The phrase “without reasonable excuse” was considered in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 (a case concerning possession of a prohibited article in a public place). There, it was observed that a reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person.3 Noting that the term “reasonable excuse” has been used in many statutes and is the subject of many reported decisions, the High Court said that “what is a reasonable excuse depends not only on the circumstances of the individual case but also on the purpose of the provision to which the defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ is an exception.”4 “[T]he reality is that when legislatures enact defences such as ‘reasonable excuse’ they effectively give, and intend to give, to the courts the power to determine the content of such defences.”5 In other contexts, it has been said that the words “reasonable excuse” should be given a wide construction.6 For commentary on “reasonable excuse”, see [CLP.80] and [CA.316.200]. 1 The Hon. Carmel Tebbutt, Minister for Community Services etc Second Reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Bill 2004, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 5 May 2004, p 8331) 2 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA) at 2–3 per Hunt J (authorities collected). See also He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 572 (CLR); 239 (A Crim R) per Brennan J, at 592 (CLR); 253 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 3 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 470 (CLR); at 336 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 4 Taikato v The Queen at 464 (CLR); 331 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 5 Taikato v The Queen at 466 (CLR); 332 (A Crim R) per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 6 R v Tawill [1974] VR 84; (1973) 22 FLR 284 (FC) at 88 (VR), 289–290 (FLR); Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417.
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[CA.43.100]
Element (2) Intentional abandonment or exposure
As to the meaning of “intentionally”, see commentary at [1 416]. “Abandonment” has been held to mean leaving a child to its fate.1 In this contex, to “abandon” means to “desert; leave behind; leave without help.”2 Relevantly, to “expose” means to “place in an unsheltered position; leave without protection – compel to be out of doors; esp (Hist.) leave an infant to perish for want of shelter.”3 There may be exposure without abandonment.4 Conversely, it is not difficult to imagine an abandonment without exposure. In the Second Reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Bill 2004, it was stated that “the … section could be used to mount a prosecution against anyone – it need not be a parent – who abandons a child in a car in the blazing summer sun, thereby causing a danger of serious injury to the child.”5 Perhaps an equally apposite term in this example is “exposes”. While some cases may be clearly either an abandonment or an exposure, others may fall within both expressions. For this reason, it is suggested that an indictment charging “did … abandon or expose” is not necessarily duplicitous. 1 2 3 4
R v Boulden (1957) 41 Cr App R 105. Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. R v Williams (1910) 4 Cr App R 89 where the father made his children walk 30 miles in bad weather.
5 The Hon. Carmel Tebbutt, Minister for Community Services etc Second Reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Bill 2004, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 5 May 2004, p 8331).
[CA.43.120]
Element (3) Child under 7 years
Section 43 was amended by the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Act 2004 to increase the age of an abandoned or exposed child from 2 years to 7 years. The age of a child may be proved by various means.1 The child’s birth certificate may be tendered by virtue of s 49(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995. In this event, there must be some evidence identifying the child concerned with the child named in the birth certificate.2 Alternatively, the mother of the child or some other person present at
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the child’s birth may give evidence of this fact.3 In some obvious cases, evidence may be given of appearance from which an inference of age can be drawn.4 1 As to the methods of proof of birth and age, see JusticeHeydon JD, Cross on Evidence 7th ed (LexisNexis Butterworths 2004) at [41040] – [41065]. 2 R v Rogers (1914) 10 Cr App R 276 at 278 per Reading LCJ. 3 See for example, R v Weaver (1873) LR 2 CCR 85; 12 Cox CC 527 (grandmother present at birth). 4 Sweeney v Denness (1954) 56 WALR 52 at 56 per Dwyer CJ.
[CA.43.140]
Element (4) Causing danger of death or serious injury
The meaning of the expression “danger of death” was considered in a Victorian case concerning a section providing that “A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death is guilty of an indictable offence.”1 It was held that danger of death in this context means an “appreciable risk” of death.2 There is no definition of “serious injury” in the Crimes Act 1900. While it has been held in Victoria that the term “injury” is equivalent to “actual bodily harm” and that “serious injury” equates to “grievous bodily harm”,3 the term “grievous bodily harm” is said to mean really serious bodily harm (see [CA.4.160]), so that serious injury may mean an injury of consequence but falling short of grievous bodily harm. 1 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 22. 2 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484; (1998) 100 A Crim R 397 (Vic SC) per Mandie J 3 R v Spartels [1953] VLR 194 (VSC) at 198 per Sholl J.
43A
Failure of persons with parental responsibility to care for child
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(1) In this section: child means a child under 16 years of age. parental responsibility means the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority in respect of a child that, by law, parents have in relation to their children. (2) A person: (a) who has parental responsibility for a child, and (b) who, without reasonable excuse, intentionally or recklessly fails to provide the child with the necessities of life, is guilty of an offence if the failure causes a danger of death or of serious injury to the child. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [S 43A insrt Act 41 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
SECTION 43A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.43A.20] Jurisdiction and cross references .................................................................................................... [CA.43A.40] Elements of the offence under s 43A .............................................................................................. [CA.43A.60] Element (1) Parental responsibility for a child ................................................................................. [CA.43A.80] Element (2) Without reasonable excuse ........................................................................................ [CA.43A.100] Element (3) Failing to provide the necessities of life ..................................................................... [CA.43A.120] Element (4) Causing a danger of death or of serious injury ......................................................... [CA.43A.140]
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Indictment
That AB on …….. at …….. in the State of New South Wales having parental responsibility for CD a child did without reasonable excuse intentionally or recklessly fail to provide CD with the necessities of life and thereby caused a danger of death or of serious injury to CD. Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 43A is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Section 44 makes it an offence for a person under a legal duty to provide another with the necessities of life to fail to do so without reasonable excuse. [CA.43A.60]
Elements of the offence under s 43A
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had parental responsibility for a child; and (2) without reasonable excuse; (3) intentionally or recklessly failed to provide the child with the necessities of life; and (4) thereby caused a danger of death or of serious injury to the child.
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[CA.43A.80]
Element (1) Parental responsibility for a child
“Parental responsibility” is defined in s 43A(1). This expression makes it clear that liability under s 43A is not limited to those who are a child’s natural parents but will extend to those who have assumed parental responsibilities as well, such as step-parents, a partner of a natural parent, grandparents1 and others in loco parentis2 either permanently or temporarily. Whether a person has assumed parental responsibility for a child is a question of fact.3 Cases have emphasised that a heavy responsibility rests upon parents to care for a child who is utterly defenceless.4 1 2 3 4
R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75. R v Clarke [1959] VR 645. Liverpool Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Jones [1914] 3 KB 813. R v Wilkinson [1999] NSWCCA 248 at [26]; Sam v The Queen (2011) 206 A Crim R 67; [2011] NSWCCA 36 at [151].
[CA.43A.100]
Element (2) Without reasonable excuse
In Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; [1996] HCA 28 (a case not concerning failure to care for a child but possession of a prohibited article in a public place), it was observed that a reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person.1 For the meaning of “without reasonable excuse”, see commentary at [CA.43.80]. This is an element of the offence to be proved by the prosecution. Nevertheless, an accused wishing to raise “reasonable excuse” will first bear an evidentiary onus to point to or produce some evidence from which it could be inferred that there was a reasonable excuse for the accused’s omission or act; in which event the prosecution must prove that in fact there was no reasonable possibility of a reasonable excuse.2 1 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; [1996] HCA 28 at 470 (CLR); 336 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 2 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–3 per Hunt J (CCA) (authorities collected).
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[CA.43A.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 44
[CA.43A.10]
[CA.43A.120]
Element (3) Failing to provide the necessities of life
Mens rea – an offence under s 43A is an offence of omission; a failure to act so as to make proper provision. As to the meaning of intentionally, see commentary at [CLP.1340]. As to the meaning of “recklessly”, see commentary at [CA.4A.20]. By s 4A, if recklessness is charged as the fault element, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. For the prosecution to prove recklessness in this context, it must be proven that the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of a danger of death or of serious injury from failing to provide necessities of life, see [CA.4A.40]. Necessities of life – necessities of life are those things as tend to preserve life.1 Examples of necessities of life given in ACT legislation are food, shelter, clothing and medical care.2 Cases of failure to provide medical care have been considered.3 In some circumstances, necessities may also include exercise and adequate heating.4
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Couples – a husband is not excused by his wife’s neglect if he knew of it and nevertheless permitted her to continue it.5 In this context, the principles of accessorial liability may apply in a given case.6 1 R v Brooks (1902) 5 Can Crim Cas 372 at 378 (SC of British Columbia). 2 Children and Young People Act 2008 (ACT), s 343. In the Second Reading speech for the Crimes Amendment (Child Neglect) Bill 2004 which introduced s 43A, The Hon. Carmel Tebbutt, Minister for Community Services etc said “The necessities of life include, but are not limited to, such things as providing a child with adequate food, clothing, medical treatment, accommodation, or care”. (Hansard, Legislative Council, 5 May 2004, p 8331). 3 Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 KB 216; R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; (1980) 72 Cr App R 82; R v Nielsen (2001) 121 A Crim R 239; [2001] QCA 85. 4 R v Ridley (1811) 2 Camp 650; 170 ER 1282; R v Marriott (1838) 8 Car & P 425; 173 ER 559; R v Waters (1848) 1 Den 356; 169 ER 278; R v Huggins (1866) 2 Str 882; 93 ER 915; R v Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; [1904] QWN 50. 5 R v Bubb (1850) 4 Cox CC 455. See also R v Gibbins (1919) 13 Cr App R 134. 6 See for example Mohan v The Queen [1967] 2 AC 187; [1967] 2 WLR 676; [1967] 2 All ER 58; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25.
[CA.43A.140]
Element (4) Causing a danger of death or of serious injury
As to causation, see [CLP.380]. Unlike many other charges, in cases under s 43A, causation is frequently likely to be a real issue. As to the meaning of danger of death or of serious injury, see commentary regarding s 43 at [CA.43.140]. 44
Failure of persons to provide necessities of life
(1) A person: (a) who is under a legal duty to provide another person with the necessities of life, and (b) who, without reasonable excuse, intentionally or recklessly fails to provide that person with the necessities of life, is guilty of an offence if the failure causes a danger of death or causes serious injury, or the likelihood of serious injury, to that person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person cannot be found guilty of both an offence against section 43A and an offence against this section in respect of the same act or omission. [S 44 subst Act 135 of 2010, Sch 9; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[11]; Act 41 of 2004; Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 44 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................... [CA.44.20]
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Jurisdiction and cross reference ........................................................................................................ [CA.44.40] Elements of the offence under s 44 ................................................................................................... [CA.44.60] Element (1) Duty to provide the necessities of life ............................................................................ [CA.44.80] Element (2) Failure to provide necessities without reasonable excuse ........................................... [CA.44.100] Element (3) Causing danger of death or serious injury etc ............................................................. [CA.44.120] Jury directions on failing to provide necessities of life ..................................................................... [CA.44.140]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .......... in the State of New South Wales, having a legal duty to provide CD with the necessities of life, did without reasonable excuse intentionally or recklessly fail to provide CD the necessities of life and thereby caused a danger of death to CD (or caused serious injury to CD, or the likelihood of serious injury to CD). [CA.44.40]
Jurisdiction and cross reference
Summary jurisdiction – a charge under s 44 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Section 43A makes it an offence for a person who has parental responsibility for a child to intentionally or recklessly fail to provide that child with the necessities of life without reasonable excuse, if the failure causes a danger of death or serious injury to the child.
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[CA.44.60]
Elements of the offence under s 44
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had a legal duty to provide another person with the necessities of life, and (2) without reasonable excuse, intentionally or recklessly failed to provide that person with the necessities of life, and (3) that such failure caused a danger of death to that person (or caused serious injury to that person, or the likelihood of serious injury). [CA.44.80]
Element (1) Duty to provide the necessities of life
Necessities of life – necessities of life are those things as tend to preserve life, including food, shelter, clothing and medical care. In some circumstances, necessities may also include exercise and adequate heating. For commentary and authorities, see [CA.43A.120]. Duty to provide necessities of life – s 44 does not appear to be the subject of any reported case – the authorities referred to below are taken from cases of death where the necessities of life were not provided. In criminal law, the duty of a person to provide for another is limited. In Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56, it was said that the “common law has resisted imposing a universal obligation on one person to take care for another. Accordingly, a person is generally not criminally liable for a failure to prevent harm occurring to another”.1 Any relevant duty must be recognised by the common law or statute – not every moral duty amounts to a legal duty.2 This example has been given: One man, for instance, may see another starving, and may be able, without the least inconvenience to himself, to bring food to the sufferer, and thus save the latter’s life; but the omission to do this is not indictable, unless there be a special responsibility to this effect imposed upon the defendant.3 See also commentary on manslaughter by criminal negligence at [CA.24.220]. Four situations have been identified as creating a duty to provide the necessities of life. In 1962 in Jones v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 307, it was said in this context:
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[CA.44.80]
There are at least four situations where the failure to act may constitute the breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a certain status relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid.4
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A “status relationship to another” will include that of parent or person in loco parentis, to a young child.5 A duty to provide necessities extends to gaolers and those who keep others confined in mental institutions.6 An employer may have a such a duty towards an employee, but only in exceptional circumstances.7 An earlier version of s 44 expressly stipulated legal liability to provide for, inter alia, any “apprentice, or servant or any insane person”. As mentioned, voluntary assumption of responsibility for another helpless from physical or mental incapacity and to the exclusion of others, can attract a legal duty to provide necessities.8 The English case of R v Stone [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 WLR 169; (1977) 64 Cr App R 186 is an example. Stone lived with his mistress Dobinson. Stone’s sister Fanny came to live with them. Fanny suffered from anorexia. Initially, she was able to look after herself but later, and gradually, her condition deteriorated and she became bedridden. Although she needed medical help, Stone and Dobinson did not obtain medical help, with the result that Fanny died in squalor covered in filth and bedsores. Each was convicted of manslaughter and their appeals were dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that because they had taken Fanny into their home, they assumed a duty of care for her and had been grossly negligent in the performance of that duty. The fact that Fanny was Stone’s sister was merely incidental. There are other broadly similar cases.9 Many were reviewed by Yeldham J in R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334, a death case. An essential element of such cases is exclusive and absolute control by the accused of a helpless person and isolation from help by any responsible third party.10 Various authorities have considered what constitutes a state of helplessness.11 Except where the law imposes a charge to look after another, whether one person has charge of another is a question of fact.12 Where a neglected person in need of necessities is able to withdraw from the situation of control or arrange for the provision of his or her own necessities, no duty will arise.13 1 Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56 at [95] per McClellan CJ at CL and Howie AJ (Schmidt J agreeing). 2 Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56 at [96] citing R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450 at 453 per Coleridge CJ who remarked, “It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation”. See also R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 at 236–244 (NSWLR); 343–345 (A Crim R) per Yeldham J (NSW CCA). 3 Wharton F, A Treatise on Criminal Law (11th ed, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1912) Vol I at [455], edited by Kerr JM. 4 Jones v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 307 (United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit) quoted by Yeldham J in R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334 at 243–244 (NSWLR); 351 (A Crim R). See also Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56 at [98]. 5 R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75; R v Clarke [1959] VR 645. See also commentary at [CA.43A.80]. 6 R v Treeve (1796) 2 East PC 821; R v Edwards (1838) 8 Car & P 611; 173 ER 640 at 612 (Car & P); 641 (ER); R v Waters (1848) 1 Den 356; 169 ER 278; R v Porter (1864) 9 Cox CC 449; R v Huggins (1866) 2 Str 883; 93 ER 915; R v Pelham (1846) 8 QB 959; 115 ER 1135. 7 Self’s Case (1776) 1 East PC 226; R v Ridley (1811) 2 Camp 650; 170 ER 1282; R v Smith (1838) 8 Car & P 153; 173 ER 438; R v S and Wife (1851) 5 Cox CC 279; R v Smith (1865) Le & Ca 607; 169 ER 1533. 8 R v Hall (1999) 108 A Crim R 209; [1999] NSWSC 738 at [13] per Bell J; Burns v The Queen (2011) 205 A Crim R 240; [2011] NSWCCA 56 at [96]; R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 34 A Crim R 334. 9 Cases include R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75; R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450. 10 See, for example, R v Marriott (1838) 8 Car & P 425; 173 ER 559; R v Edwards (1838) 8 Car & P 611; 173 ER 640; R v Porter (1864) 9 Cox CC 449; R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450; R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18. 11 R v Smith (1865) Le & Ca 607; 169 ER 1533; R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450; R v Chattaway (1924) 17 Cr App R 7; R v Bonnyman (1943) 28 Cr App R 131. 12 R v Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151; [1904] QWN 50.
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[CA.44.100] Element (2) Failure to provide necessities without reasonable excuse Failure to provide necessities – any alleged failure by an accused to supply the necessities of life will be judged as an objective fact according to what a reasonable person would have considered necessary in the circumstances and not what the accused subjectively thought.1 The reasonable person however, must be assumed to have the personal characteristics of the accused.2 In R v Senior [1899] 1 QB 283 (a case of child neglect) at 291, the court said that “neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind”. Senior was considered by the House of Lords in R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; (1981) 72 Cr App R 82 concerning a charge of “wilfully” neglecting to provide adequate medical attention for a child. The majority equated “wilfully” with common law recklessness and held that the jury had to be satisfied that (a) that the child in fact needed medical aid and (b) either the accused was aware that the child’s health might be at risk if medical aid was not provided, or that the accused’s unawareness of that fact was due to his not caring whether the child’s health was at risk or not. The actus reus was the failure to supply what was objectively necessary.3 Mens rea – as to the meaning of intentionally, see commentary at [CLP.1400]. If necessities are deliberately withheld, clearly this will constitute an intentional failure. Proof of recklessness requires proof that an accused subjectively foresaw the danger of death or serious injury etc as a possibility and yet failed to act. As to the meaning of “recklessly”, see commentary at [CA.4A.20]. As to the state of mind of recklessness and the proof of it, see commentary at [CA.4A.20]. By s 4A, if recklessness is charged as the fault element alone, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge. Without reasonable excuse – in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 (a case concerning not neglect, but possession of a prohibited article in a public place), it was observed that a reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person.4 For the meaning of “without reasonable excuse” see commentary at [CA.43.80]. This is an element of the offence to be proved by the prosecution. Nevertheless, an accused wishing to raise “reasonable excuse” will first bear an evidentiary onus to point to or produce some evidence from which it could be inferred that there was a reasonable excuse for the accused’s omission or act; in which event the prosecution must prove that in fact there was no reasonable possibility of a reasonable excuse;5 see [CA.43.80]. Intoxication – an offence under s 44 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 44, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.6 1 R v Senior [1899] 1 QB 283; Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury [1977] AC 500; [1976] 2 WLR 918; (1976) 62 Cr App R 291 at 992 (WLR) per Lord Salmon; Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358 (Vic CA); R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288; [1994] 3 All ER 79; R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 at [40]. 2 Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37. 3 R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; (1981) 72 Cr App R 82 at 400 (AC) per Lord Diplock. 4 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 470 (CLR); 336 (A Crim R) per Dawson J. 5 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–3 per Hunt J (CCA) (authorities collected). 6 Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D.
[CA.44.120] Element (3) Causing danger of death or serious injury etc Whether a particular failure caused the danger of death etc is a question of fact.1 Danger of death – in Victoria, it has been held that this ““element is proved by establishing that, viewed objectively, the conduct carried ‘‘an appreciable risk of death’”.2 See also commentary at [CA.43.140].
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13 R v Ridley (1811) 2 Camp 650; 170 ER 1282; R v Waters (1848) 1 Den 356; 169 ER 278; R v S and Wife (1851) 5 Cox CC 279; R v Shepherd (1862) 9 Cox CC 123; R v Smith (1865) Le & Ca 607; 169 ER 1533.
Crimes Act 1900 s 45
[CA.44.120]
Serious injury – “injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In this context, a dictionary definition is “physical damage to a person’s body”.3 Injury includes “causing harm to the body”.4 There is no definition of “serious injury” in the Crimes Act 1900 either. It may be that an injury of real consequence but falling short of grievous bodily harm (ie really serious bodily harm) may constitute a serious injury – see commentary at [CA.43.140]. 1 R v Falkingham (1865-72) LR 1 CCR 222; R v White (1865-72) LR 1 CCR 311. 2 Aggelidis v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] VSCA 6 at [10] applying R v Abdul-Rasool (2008) 18 VR 586; 180 A Crim R 556; [2008] VSCA 13 at [19] and R v Marijancevic (2009) 22 VR 576; 195 A Crim R 426; [2009] VSCA 135 at [17]. 3 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). In R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 24 (A Crim R) per Powell JA (Studdert and Levine JJ agreeing), it was said that this is the ordinary English meaning of “injury”. See also Deeble v Nott (1941) 65 CLR 104; 58 WN (NSW) 116; [1941] HCA 11 where Starke J said at 109 (CLR) that “bodily injuries” in a civil Act meant “any physical injuries”. 4 R v Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 at 389 (Cr App R) (HL) per Lord Griffiths (with whom the other Law Lords agreed).
[CA.44.140]
Jury directions on failing to provide necessities of life
The Victorian case of R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18 contains detailed jury directions including directions on the question of fact of whether the accused owed a duty of care.
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45
Prohibition of female genital mutilation
(1) A person who: (a) excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person, or (b) aids, abets, counsels or procures a person to perform any of those acts on another person, is liable to imprisonment for 21 years. [Subs (1) am Act 15 of 2014, Sch 1[2]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 15 of 2014, Sch 1[3]]
(3) It is not an offence against this section to perform a surgical operation if that operation: (a) is necessary for the health of the person on whom it is performed and is performed by a medical practitioner, or (b) is performed on a person in labour or who has just given birth, and for medical purposes connected with that labour or birth, by a medical practitioner or authorised professional, or (c) is a sexual reassignment procedure and is performed by a medical practitioner. (4) In determining whether an operation is necessary for the health of a person only matters relevant to the medical welfare of the person are to be taken into account. (5) It is not a defence to a charge under this section that the person mutilated by or because of the acts alleged to have been committed consented to the acts. (6) This section applies only to acts occurring after the commencement of the section. (7) In this section: authorised professional means: (a) a registered midwife, or (b) a midwifery student, or
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s 45
in relation to an operation performed in a place outside Australia—a person authorised to practise midwifery by a body established under the law of that place having functions similar to the functions of the Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia, or a medical student.
[Def subst Act 34 of 2010, Sch 2.7[1]; am Act 45 of 2003, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1] and [2]]
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medical practitioner, in relation to an operation performed in a place outside Australia, includes a person authorised to practise medicine by a body established under the law of that place having functions similar to the Medical Board of Australia. [Def subst Act 34 of 2010, Sch 2.7[1]]
medical student means: (a) a person registered as a student in the medical profession under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, or (b) in relation to an operation performed in a place outside Australia—a person undergoing a course of training with a view to being authorised to be a medical practitioner in that place. [Def subst Act 34 of 2010, Sch 2.7[1]]
midwifery student means: (a) a person registered as a student in the nursing and midwifery profession under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, or (b) in relation to an operation performed in a place outside Australia—a person undergoing a course of training with a view to being authorised to be a midwife practitioner in that place. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Def insrt Act 34 of 2010, Sch 2.7[1]]
sexual reassignment procedure means a surgical procedure to alter the genital appearance of a person to the appearance (as nearly as practicable) of the opposite sex to the sex of the person. [S 45 am Act 15 of 2014; Act 34 of 2010; Act 45 of 2003; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 58 of 1994, s 3; rep Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 45 COMMENTARY Forms of indictment ............................................................................................................................ [CA.45.20] Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences ............................................................................. [CA.45.40] History and purpose of s 37 ............................................................................................................... [CA.45.60] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.45.80] Element (1) Carrying out female genital mutilation .......................................................................... [CA.45.100] Element (2) Aiding etc female genital mutilation .............................................................................. [CA.45.120] Defence under s 45(3) ..................................................................................................................... [CA.45.140]
[CA.45.20]
Forms of indictment
Section 45(1)(a): That AB (or a person unknown) on .......... at .......... in the year .......... in the State of New South Wales did excise or otherwise mutilate (or infibulate or otherwise mutilate) the whole or part of the clitoris (and/or labia minora and/or labia majora) of CD. Section 45(1)(b) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring:
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[CA.45.20]
That AB on .......... at .......... in the State of New South Wales did excise or otherwise mutilate (or infibulate or otherwise mutilate) the whole or part of the clitoris (and/or labia minora and/or labia majora) of CD (“the female genital mutilation”). And the Director of Public Prosecutions further charges That EF before the said AB did commit the said female genital mutilation, did aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of the female genital mutilation by the said AB in the manner aforesaid. There is not necessarily any impermissible duplicity in charging “aid, abet, counsel or procure”, see [CA.45.120]. [CA.45.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences
An offence under s 45 is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and a charge under s 45 is therefore strictly indictable. Related offences: Section 45A – removing a person from NSW for female genital mutilation; Section 35 – reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding; Section 59 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm; Section 61I – sexual assault; Section 61J – aggravated sexual assault; Section 66A – sexual intercourse – child between 10 and 16; Section 344A – attempt. Similar offences in other jurisdictions:
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ACT: Crimes Act 1900, ss 73–75; NT: Criminal Code Act ss 186A–186D; Qld: Criminal Code Act 1899 s 323A; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 33–33B; Tas: Criminal Code Act 1924 s 178A; Vic: Crimes Act 1958 ss 32–34 (s 15 definition); WA: The Criminal Code Act s 306; UK: The Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 ss 1–4. [CA.45.60]
History and purpose of s 37
What is female genital mutilation? – sometimes called female genital cutting or female circumcision, it is the removal of some or all of the external female genitalia. The World Health Organisation classifies female genital mutilation into four types: Type I: Partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy). Type II: Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision). Type III: Narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris (infibulation). Type IV: All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization.1 To “apposition” is, relevantly, “the act of adding to or together; a placing together; juxtaposition”.2 History and purpose – s 45 was introduced in 1994 by the Crimes (Female Genital Mutilation) Amendment Act 1994 (Act 58 of 1994). In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill, it was said:
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This bill will make the practice of female genital mutilation a criminal offence in this State. Female genital mutilation, or FGM, is the term used to describe a number of practices involving the mutilation of female genitals for traditional or ritual reasons. The practice involves the excision or removal of parts or all of the external female genitalia. The procedure is usually performed on girls of tender age. It has been estimated that FGM occurs in more than forty countries, and tradition is the major factor which contributes to its continuation. While the practice is often linked to certain religious communities, this view is in fact mistaken. The origins of the practice pre-date most major religions. This bill will make the practice of female genital mutilation a criminal offence in this State. Female genital mutilation, or FGM, is the term used to describe a number of practices involving the mutilation of female genitals for traditional or ritual reasons. The practice involves the excision or removal of parts or all of the external female genitalia. The procedure is usually performed on girls of tender age. It has been estimated that FGM occurs in more than forty countries, and tradition is the major factor which contributes to its continuation. While the practice is often linked to certain religious communities, this view is in fact mistaken. The origins of the practice pre-date most major religions.3 Substantial increase in maximum penalty – originally the maximum penalty for an offence under s 45 was imprisonment for 7 years. The maximum penalty is now 21 years. This increase was introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Female Genital Mutilation) Act 2014 (Act 15 of 2014) which commenced on 20 May 2014. In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill, the Attorney-General said: The bill amends the Crimes Act to increase the maximum penalty for performing female genital mutilation from seven years to 21 years imprisonment and to create a new offence of removing a person from New South Wales with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on that person. In December 2011 the Commonwealth Government announced the review of Australia’s legislative framework criminalising female genital mutilation. In March 2013 the review of Australia’s female genital mutilation legal framework made a number of recommendations aimed at ensuring consistent offences and penalties. In April 2013 the Standing Committee on Law and Justice agreed to the recommendations. Female genital mutilation involves the partial or total removal of the female genitalia. It is an abhorrent practice. There are no health benefits and a number of short- and long-term complications can arise from the practice. The immediate harm to the girl or woman can include severe pain, haemorrhage, tetanus and sepsis. Long-term health problems are associated with the practice. The World Health Organization estimates that more than 125 million girls and women alive today have been the victim of female genital mutilation. New South Wales was the first Australian jurisdiction to introduce the offence of performing female genital mutilation in 1995. The Commonwealth review found that the New South Wales provisions differed from the provisions later settled on in the model criminal code and other jurisdictions in two respects. First, the maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment is significantly less than the maximum penalty in the code and other jurisdictions. Second, New South Wales is the only jurisdiction that does not have a specific removal offence.4 1 Eliminating Female genital mutilation – An interagency statement – World Health Organisation 2008 p 4. 2 The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed 1997 The Macquarie Library. 3 RJ Webster on behalf of the Attorney-General, Second Reading Speech Crimes (Female Genital Mutilation) Amendment Bill 1994 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 4 May 1994). 4 Greg Smith, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech Crimes Amendment (Female Genital Mutilation) Bill 2014 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 5 March 2014).
[CA.45.80]
Elements of the offences
Section 45(1)(a): The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt a single element, that is, that the accused: • excised or otherwise mutilated (or infibulated or otherwise mutilated) the whole or part of the clitoris (and/or labia minora and/or labia majora) of the complainant. Section 45(1)(b) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring: The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
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[CA.45.80]
Crimes Act 1900 s 45
[CA.45.80]
doubt that: • another person excised or otherwise mutilated (or infibulated or otherwise mutilated) the whole or part of the clitoris (and/or labia minora and/or labia majora) of the complainant (“the female genital mutilation”); and that • before that other person committed the female genital mutilation, the accused aided or abetted that other person to perform the female genital mutilation on the complainant. [CA.45.100]
Element (1) Carrying out female genital mutilation
Definitions – to excise simply means to cut out or cut off. The meaning of infibulation is given at [CA.45.60]. To mutilate is to, inter alia, “cut off … maim, mangle. Make … imperfect by removing or severely damaging a part”.1 The offence is committed if there is excision, infibulation or mutilation of the whole or any part of the clitoris, labia majora or labia minora of the victim. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press.
[CA.45.120]
Element (2) Aiding etc female genital mutilation
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A principal is essential – s 45(1) recognises that FGM is usually performed by a third party on the victim at the instigation of a parent or guardian of the victim. Normally, the third party is a “traditional practitioner” (usually an older woman) or health personnel, a doctor, nurse, trained midwife or other trained health worker.1 Section 45(1)(a) creates the offence of FGM and s 45(1)(b) proscribes the aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring its commission. The maximum penalty is the same for each. A person cannot be convicted as an accessory to the offence unless another has committed the offence itself.2 Meanings of terms – the phrase “aids, abets, counsels or procures” is the traditional language to denote an accessory, originating in s 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (UK). It is used in ss 249F, 351, 351B and 546 of the Crimes Act 1900; in ss 19 and 20 of the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 and also s 11.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). For general commentary on aiding, abetting etc. see [CA.351.60]. Although the four words have been held to convey one general concept, they do have different meanings: • Aid – “the ordinary meaning of aid is to give help support or assistance to”.3 • Abet – to abet is “to incite instigate or encourage”.4 • Counsel – to “counsel” means to advise or solicit before the commission of the offence.5 • Procure – to “procure” means to produce by endeavour. One procures a thing by setting out to see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening.6 “Procuring” is a word in common usage meaning “to cause or bring about”.7 Aids, abets, counsels or procures is one concept – in Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163, Mason J adopted this observation to describe the generic concept these four words convey: All the [four] words … are, I think, instances of one general idea, that the person charged as a principal in the second degree is in some way linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and is by his words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more likely, such commission.8 Mason J added: While it may be that in the circumstances of a particular case one term will be more closely descriptive of the conduct of a secondary party than another, it is important that this not be allowed to obscure the substantial overlap of the terms at common law and the general concept which they embody.9 Accessory supplants principals in the first and second degree – the earlier terminology of principle in the first degree, ie a person who was present at the scene aiding or abetting and principle in the second degree, ie a person who had counselled or procured the crime but not present at its commission, has been supplanted by the language of the accessory, that is, one who aids, abets, counsels or procures the offence.10 For example, in Giorgianni, Mason J remarked:
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Distinction between presence and absence? – Historically, an aider and abettor was a person present when a crime was committed, whereas a counsellor and procurer was absent from the scene itself.12 This may no longer be an essential distinction. There is authority for the proposition that there is now no distinction to be drawn between accessories present at and those absent from the scene of a crime if each such accessory had the required knowledge of the criminal purpose and took steps to assist in and/or to promote its commission.13 Similarly, the author of Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law says, “Although historically the term [aid] was commonly used to describe someone present assisting the principal at the time of the offence, there is now no such restriction. Aiding can be satisfied by any act of assistance before or at the time of the offence”.14 No duplicity – in many cases of FGM, the prosecution may not have evidence of exactly what the parent or guardian of the victim did to bring about the commission of the offence or whether or not that person was actually present when the offence was committed. A number of authorities have held that there is no duplicity in charging an accused with “aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring”.15 It has been held that an accused so charged will be liable if the jury is satisfied that he or she did any one of those things leading to the commission of the actual offence.16 Mens rea neccessary – the High Court in Giorgianni considered the mental state required for the criminal liability of an accessory.17 Intentional assistance or encouragement is required.18 To establish that one person is an accessory to the commission of an offence by another person by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring him, the prosecution must establish:
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(1) the commission of the offence by the principal offender, and (2) that the accused knew all the essential facts or circumstances which must be established by the prosecution to show that the offence was committed by the principal offender (whether or not the accused knew that they amounted to an offence), and (3) that, with that knowledge and based upon it, the accessory intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal offender to commit the offence.19 1 Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical overview and exploration of the dynamics of Change – UNICEF New York 2013 p 42. 2 Walsh v Sainsbury (1925) 36 CLR 464; [1925] HCA 28; Cain v Doyle (1946) 72 CLR 409; [1946] HCA 38 per Latham CJ and Williams J; R v Whitehouse [1977] QB 868; [1977] 2 WLR 925; [1977] 3 All ER 737; R v Bodin [1979] Crim LR 176; R v Carter; Ex parte Attorney-General [1990] 2 Qd R 371; 47 A Crim R 55 (Qld CCA); R v Nolan (2012) 83 NSWLR 534; 224 A Crim R 1; [2012] NSWCCA 126. This requirement is expressly required by s 11.2(2)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 . 3 R v Giorgi (1982) 31 SASR 299; 7 A Crim R 305 (CCA). 4 R v Giorgi. See also R v Russell [1933] VLR 59 (CCA) per Cussen ACJ at 67. 5 R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808; [1985] 2 All ER 226; (1985) 81 Cr App R 131 at 813 (QB); 269 (All ER); 121 (Cr App R). 6 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773; [1975] 2 All ER 684; (1975) 61 Cr App R 118 at 779 (QB); 686 (All ER); 121 (Cr App R) per Lord Widgery CJ (CA). 7 R v Beck [1985] 1 WLR 22; [1985] 1 All ER 571; (1985) 80 Cr App R 355 per Watkins LJ, followed in R v Aston [1998] Crim LR 498. 8 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 per Mason J at 493 (CLR), 177–178 (A Crim R) adopting the observation of Cussen ACJ in R v Russell at 67. 9 Giorgianni v The Queen at 493 (CLR), 177–178 (A Crim R). 10 See for example Johns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3 at 117 (CLR) per Stephen J; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [1998] HCA 75 per Callinan J at [68]. 11 Giorgianni v The Queen per Mason J at 493, 177–178.
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In substance, … there appears to be no distinction between a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact beyond the question of presence.11
Crimes Act 1900 s 45A
[CA.45.120]
12 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814; [1951] 1 All ER 412 at 818-819 (KB); Thambiah v The Queen [1966] AC 37; [1966] 2 WLR 81; [1965] 3 All ER 661 (PC); Giorgianni v The Queen per Gibbs CJ at 480 (CLR), 168 (A Crim R) and per Mason J at 493 (CLR); 177 (A Crim R). 13 Re Pong Su (No 21) (2005) 202 FLR 1; [2005] VSC 96 per Kellam J at [59]. 14 D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 13th ed 2011 Oxford University Press at p 192 citing R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534. 15 Re Pong Su (No 21) per Kellam J at [17]; Re Smith (1858) 3 H & N 227 at 237–238; Ferguson v Weaving at 819 (KB) per Lord Goddard CJ; Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795; [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 All ER 277 at 809 (QB) per Woolf J; Mosman Municipal Council v Waratah Village Partners Pty Ltd (2002) 118 LGERA 460; [2002] NSWLEC 19 per Lloyd J. 16 McDermott v The Queen (1987) 45 SASR 335 at 337 per King CJ. 17 Giorgianni v The Queen 18 Giorgianni v The Queen per Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 505 (CLR); 186 (A Crim R) and per Gibbs CJ at 482 (CLR); 173 (A Crim R). 19 This summary (amended above) of Giorgianni was given by Hunt CJ in Holloway v Gilport Pty Ltd (1995) 79 A Crim R 76 at 89. See also R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 at 37–38.
[CA.45.140]
Defence under s 45(3)
Section 45(3) provides the defence of medical necessity, whether during labour etc or generally or in a sexual reassignment procedure performed by a medical practitioner. By s 45(5), the consent of a female mutilated is no defence.
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45A
Removing person from State for female genital mutilation
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if the person takes another person from the State, or arranges for another person to be taken from the State, with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the other person. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 21 years. (2) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) and in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the accused took another person, or arranged for another person to be taken, from the State with the intention of female genital mutilation being performed on the other person if it is proved that: (a) the accused took the person, or arranged for the person to be taken, from the State, and (b) female genital mutilation was performed on the person while outside the State. (3) It is not a defence to a charge under this section that the person taken from the State consented to being so taken. (4) In this section: female genital mutilation means an act referred to in section 45(1)(a), the performance of which would be an offence against that section if performed in the State. [S 45A insrt Act 15 of 2014, Sch 1[4]]
SECTION 45A COMMENTARY Indictment and jurisdiction and cross-reference .............................................................................. [CA.45A.20] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.45A.40]
[CA.45A.20]
Indictment and jurisdiction and cross-reference
That AB did take CD from New South Wales to .......... (specify place) (or to a place unknown) (or did arrange for CD to be taken from New South Wales to .......... etc) with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on CD.
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An offence under s 45A is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and a charge under s 45A is therefore strictly indictable. For the meaning of female [CA.45.20]–[CA.45.140].
mutilation
and
general
commentary,
see
s
45
and
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) took the complainant from New South Wales (or arranged for the complainant to be taken from New South Wales); (2) with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the complainant. The essence of the offence is the taking of the complainant from New South Wales with the intention that female genital mutilation be performed on the complainant. It will be noted that intention may be proved from the facts of removal from New South Wales or the arranging thereof and the fact that female genital mutilation was performed on the complainant while she was out of the State. Consent is not a defence. 46
Causing bodily injury by gunpowder etc
Whosoever intentionally or recklessly by the explosion of gunpowder or other substance, or the use of any corrosive fluid, or destructive matter, burns maims disfigures disables, or does grievous bodily harm to, any person, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 46 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(15)]
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SECTION 46 COMMENTARY Forms of indictment ............................................................................................................................ [CA.46.20] Jurisdiction, cross-references and related offences ........................................................................... [CA.46.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.46.60] Element (1) Intentionally or recklessly ............................................................................................... [CA.46.80] Element (2) Burns maims etc or does grievous bodily harm to ...................................................... [CA.46.100] Element (3) Explosion of a substance or use of a corrosive fluid ................................................... [CA.46.120]
[CA.46.20]
Forms of indictment
That AB on .......... at ......................... in the State of New South Wales intentionally or recklessly did grievous bodily harm to (or burned, maimed, disfigured or disabled) CD by the explosion of a substance, namely .......... (or a substance unknown) (or by the use of a corrosive fluid, or destructive matter etc). The presence of “or” between “intentionally” and “recklessly” does not show an intention to create two offences.1 There was a single offence before the Crimes Amendment Act 2007 replaced “maliciously” as the fault element under s 46. See also note under [CA.195.20]. 1 See Ex parte Polley; Re McLennan (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 391; 64 WN (NSW) 125 at 392 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ.
[CA.46.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related offences
An offence under s 46 is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and a charge under s 46 is therefore strictly indictable. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if a charge under s 46 alleges an offence committed against a spouse (including a de-facto partner) or a child living in the accused’s household, or otherwise a child of the spouse and the accused, the spouse is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent, unless excused by the court: s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and ss 3, 4, 5 and 11 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007.
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[CA.45A.40]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 46
[CA.46.40]
Related offences: • Section 28 – Acts done to property with intent to murder; • Section 47 – Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc; • Section 48 – Causing explosives to be placed in or near building, conveyance or public place; • Section 55 – Possession or making explosives or other things with intent to injure; • Section 93FA – Possession, supply or making of explosives; • Section 196 – Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person; • Section 200 – Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property. Origin of s 46 – with modification, the words of s 46 have been taken from s 28 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK).
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[CA.46.60] Elements of the offence The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally or recklessly; (2) did grievous bodily harm to (or burnt, maimed, disfigured or disabled) the complainant; (3) by the explosion of a substance (or by use of a corrosive fluid etc). [CA.46.80] Element (1) Intentionally or recklessly Mens rea – the former fault element of “maliciously” was omitted from s 46 from 15 February 2008 – see Crimes Amendment Act 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]. The fault element under s 46 is intention or recklessness (and see note to [CA.46.20]). For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400] and on recklessness, see [CA.4A.20]–[CA.4A.40]. Recklessness can be easier to prove than actual intention. For recklessness, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted with subjective foresight of the possibility that grievous bodily harm may be done to the victim or that the victim might be burned, maimed, disfigured or disabled but nevertheless proceeded to act, see [CA.4A.40]. It can be established that an accused acted recklessly if it is proved that he or she in fact acted intentionally or with knowledge, see s 4A and commentary at [CA.4A.20], [CA.4A.40]. Concerning the fault element of maliciously under the similar s 28 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK), it has been said the mens rea of maliciously refers to both the consequence as well as the explosion.1 Intoxication – an offence under s 46 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 46, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account: Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D. 1 Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2009 Oxford University Press at B12.195.
[CA.46.100] Element (2) Burns maims etc or does grievous bodily harm to “Maim” has an historical, technical meaning. “A maim at common law is such a bodily hurt as renders a man less able in fighting to defend himself or annoy his adversary, but if the injury is such as disfigures him only, without diminishing his corporal abilities, it does not fall within the crime of mayhem”.1 Where a blow was aimed at a victim’s head, there was held to be no proof of an intention to maim; it would have been otherwise if the blow had been directed at the man’s arm to prevent his being able to use it.2 “Disfigure” is defined as “to mar the figure, appearance, or beauty of; deform, deface.”3 “Disable” – under s 46, disable does not only mean permanent disablement; used in its ordinary meaning, “disable” covers both temporary and permanent disablement.4 Grievous bodily harm – this means really serious bodily injury, see commentary at [CA.4.160]. 1 East’s Pleas of the Crown (1803), p 393. 2 R v Sullivan (1841) Car & M 209; 174 ER 475.
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3 The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed 1997 The Macquarie Library. 4 R v James (1979) 70 Cr App R 215, not applying R v Boyce (1824) 1 Mood CC 29; 168 ER 1172. James involved the throwing of bleach in the faces of police officers.
[CA.46.120]
Element (3) Explosion of a substance or use of a corrosive fluid
As to the meaning of explosion and explosive substance, see [CA.47.100]. Boiling water has been held to be “destructive matter”.1
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1 R v Crawford (1845) 2 Car & K 129; 175 ER 54.
Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc Whosoever: causes any gunpowder or other explosive substance to explode, or sends, or delivers to, or causes to be taken, or received by, any person, any explosive substance, or other dangerous or noxious thing, or puts or lays at any place, or casts or throws at, or upon, or otherwise applies to, any person, any corrosive fluid or any destructive or explosive substance,
with intent in any such case to burn maim disfigure disable, or do grievous bodily harm to, any person, shall, whether bodily injury is effected or not, be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 47 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(16)]
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SECTION 47 COMMENTARY Forms of indictment and purpose of section ...................................................................................... [CA.47.20] Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences ............................................................................. [CA.47.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................... [CA.47.60] Element (1A) Causing an explosive substance to explode ............................................................... [CA.47.80] Element (1B) Sending etc an explosive substance or dangerous thing etc .................................... [CA.47.100] Element (1C) Throwing etc a corrosive fluid etc .............................................................................. [CA.47.120] Element (2) Intent to do grievous bodily harm, burn, disfigure etc .................................................. [CA.47.140] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.47.160]
[CA.47.20]
Forms of indictment and purpose of section
That AB on .......... at ......................... in the State of New South Wales did cause an explosive substance (or gunpowder) to explode; or did send to (or deliver to, or cause to be taken by, or received by) CD an explosive substance (or other dangerous thing or noxious thing), or did put or lay at a place, namely .......... (describe) (or throw at or cast upon or otherwise apply to CD) a corrosive fluid (or a destructive or explosive substance); with intent to do grievous bodily harm to (and/or burn and/or maim and/or disfigure and/or disable) CD (or to a person or persons unknown). In the purview of s 47 are, amongst others, those who plant bombs or send noxious substances by mail or throw acid to disfigure. It has been commented that “a comparatively wide range of circumstances, some of them overlapping, are encompassed by the provision”.1 Central to s 47 is acting with intent to cause grievous bodily harm or burning etc. If grievous bodily harm is not only intended but, in fact actually caused, a charge of causing grievous bodily harm with intent under s 33 may be proffered. 1 R v Dinh (2010) 199 A Crim R 573; [2010] NSWCCA 74 at [47] per Johnson J.
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s 47 [CA.47.40]
Crimes Act 1900
[CA.47.0]
Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences
An offence under s 47 is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and a charge under s 47 is therefore strictly indictable. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if a charge under s 47 alleges an offence committed against a spouse (including a de-facto partner) or a child living in the accused’s household, or otherwise a child of the spouse and the accused, the spouse is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent, unless excused by the court: s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and ss 3, 4, 5 and 11 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. Related offences: • Section 28 – Acts done to property with intent to murder; • Section 30 – Attempts to murder; • Section 33 – Causing grievous bodily harm with intent; • Section 46 – Causing bodily injury by gunpowder etc; • Section 48 – Causing explosives to be placed in or near building, conveyance or public place; • Section 55 – Possession or making explosives or other things with intent to injure; • Section 93FA – Possession, supply or making of explosives; • Section 93FB – Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms; • Section 196 – Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person; • Section 200 – Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 344A – Attempts.
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[CA.47.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) did cause an explosive substance (or gunpowder) to explode, or (1B) did send to (or deliver to, or cause to be taken by, or received by) the complainant an explosive substance (or other dangerous thing or noxious thing), or (1C) did put or lay at a place (or throw at or cast upon or otherwise apply to the complainant) a corrosive fluid (or a destructive or explosive substance); and (2) with intent to do grievous bodily harm to and/or burn and/or maim and/or disfigure and/or disable the complainant. [CA.47.80]
Element (1A) Causing an explosive substance to explode
Explosive substance – it has been held that “explosive substance” in its ordinary and natural meaning is a kind of material that is able to explode, although (in the context of simply possessing it) it need not be capable of exploding without anything being done to it.1 “Explosion” means “the act of exploding; a violent expansion or bursting with noise …”.2 The English Court of Appeal approved this definition: “[E]xplosion” may … be defined as the sudden or extremely rapid conversion of a solid or liquid body of small bulk into gas or vapour, occupying many times the volume of the original substance, and, in addition, highly expanded by the heat generated during the transformation. This sudden or very rapid expansion of volume is attained by an exhibition of force, more or less violent according to the constitution of the original substance and the circumstance of explosion. Any substance capable of undergoing such a change upon the application of heat, or other disturbing cause, is called “explosive”.3 An explosive substance has been held to include a petrol bomb,4 the petrol combining with air to create an explosive substance together with a wick – a blast effect is not a requirement for an explosion.5 It has been noted that whether in an individual case a petrol bomb is an explosive substance should be left as a
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 47
Mens rea – although the only specific intent referred to in s 47 is the intent to cause grievous bodily harm etc, it is implicit that there must be a corresponding intent to cause an explosion to produce one of the harms specified in the section. For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intentionally causing an explosion will ordinarily involve some deliberate act such as detonation or ignition. However, it may be that a person who plans to injure others by the explosion of an explosive substance may still cause an explosion contrary to s 47 if the explosive substance explodes prematurely. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]. Actus reus – the necessary actus reus is the taking of some action to cause an explosive substance to explode. For general commentary on actus reus, see [CLP.140]. 1 Wheeley v Western Australia (2007) 173 A Crim R 436; [2007] WASCA 168 at [48] per McLure JA (Buss JA agreeing). See also R v Prentice [1973] Qd R 346 (CA). 2 The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed 1997 The Macquarie Library. 3 R v Bouch [1983] QB 246; [1982] 3 WLR 673; [1982] 3 All ER 918 quoting this definition from the 9th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1879). 4 R v Bouch; Commonwealth Smelting Ltd v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Ltd [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121 (CA); R v Howard [1993] Crim LR 213. 5 R v Bouch at 251. 6 R v Howard, commentary note at 214. 7 R v Stewart (1959) 44 Cr App R 29. 8 R v McCarthy [1964] 1 WLR 196; [1964] 1 All ER 95; (1964) 48 Cr App R 111.
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[CA.47.100]
Element (1B) Sending etc an explosive substance or dangerous thing etc
On a charge of throwing explosive substance into vessel with intent to do damage under the former s 238 of the Crimes Act 1900, it was held that to support an indictment under that section, it was not enough to establish merely that gunpowder or other explosive was thrown into a vessel, but it must also be shown that the substance was in a condition to explode when thrown, although no actual explosion resulted.1 Similarly, an English case held that the substance must be capable of exploding, so that throwing a bottle of gunpowder and an unlit fuse was not an offence, as it merely involved throwing a bottle.2 “Noxious” means “harmful or injurious to health or physical well-being”.3 Concerning a “noxious thing”, s 4(7) provides that a reference to causing a noxious thing to be taken by a person “includes a reference to causing any person to inhale, take or be exposed to the … [noxious] thing by its release into the person’s environment”. 1 R v Carr (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 59 (CCA). 2 R v Shephard (1868) LT 19 at 20. 3 The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed 1997 The Macquarie Library. See also R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307.
[CA.47.120]
Element (1C) Throwing etc a corrosive fluid etc
The placing of a car bomb falls within this element (and element (1A) if it explodes). Such a case was R v Demirian [1989] VR 97; (1989) 33 A Crim R 441 (FC). A large explosive device placed in the rear of a car exploded in the car park below the building, causing very substantial damage to that building and to other buildings. One person was injured. The accused there was however charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property, and murder. R v Dinh (2010) 199 A Crim R 573; [2010] NSWCCA 74 is an example of the application of corrosive fluid. The female victim was in a relationship with the accused’s father. The accused’s mother was jealous of the father’s relationship with the victim. The accused and an accomplice, wearing balaclavas,
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question of fact for the jury; the judge however, being entitled to add that evidence of a petrol bomb allows only one conclusion.6 Other examples are plaster gelatine and detonators,7 and a stick of gelignite, a length of fuse and a detonator.8
Crimes Act 1900 s 48
[CA.47.120]
approached the victim outside a restaurant she had attended. The accused held a knife and a bottle of acid. The victim was overpowered by the two men and, while on the ground and being held down, had her arm sprayed with acid by the accused, suffering burns as a result. [CA.47.140]
Element (2) Intent to do grievous bodily harm, burn, disfigure etc
Terms – as to the meanings of maim, disfigure, disable and grievous bodily harm, see [CA.46.100]. Mens rea – expressly, the mens rea to be proved is actual intent to cause one of the listed harms. For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intent to cause one of the various specified harms is central to a charge under s 47, criminal liability being attracted where an explosion is caused, noxious substance sent etc, “whether bodily injury is effected or not”. In the case of a planted bomb for example, where an intended victim was uninjured, or only lightly injured, a charge under s 47 could be proffered because of the explosion coupled with the specific intent involved. In such a case, where a particular victim survived but sustained grievous bodily harm, a charge might be proffered under s 47 as an alternative to a charge of attempted murder. Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence under s 47 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore in determining whether an accused had an intention to cause any of the harms set out in the section, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply.
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[CA.47.160]
Sentencing
In R v Dinh (2010) 199 A Crim R 573; [2010] NSWCCA 74 at [46], Johnson J observed: When an offence, such as that under s 47, is defined to include any of several categories of conduct, the seriousness of the conduct in a particular case depends not on the statute defining the offence, but on the facts of the case. In the case of a s 47 offence, a sentencing Judge has to consider where the facts of the particular case lie in a spectrum at one end of which lies the worst type of offence perpetrated by any act which constitutes a s 47 offence as defined …. Johnson J noted at [53] that there are relatively few sentencing decisions on s 47. 48
Causing explosives to be placed in or near building, conveyance or public place
(1) A person who causes an explosive to be placed in or near: (a) a building, or (b) a vehicle, vessel, train or other conveyance, or (c) a public place, with the intention of causing bodily harm to any person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. (2) A person commits an offence under this section whether or not: (a) any explosion occurs, or (b) any bodily harm is caused. [S 48 subst Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; am Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 48 COMMENTARY Forms of indictment ............................................................................................................................ [CA.48.20] Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences ............................................................................. [CA.48.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.48.60] Element (1) Causing explosive to be placed near a building etc ...................................................... [CA.48.80]
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s 48
Element (2) Intention to cause bodily harm ..................................................................................... [CA.48.100]
[CA.48.20]
Forms of indictment
That AB on .......... at ......................... in the State of New South Wales did cause an explosive to be placed in or near a building (or in or near a vehicle, vessel, train, aircraft etc) (or in or near a public place) with the intention of causing bodily harm to CD (or to any person in or near the said building) (or vehicle, public place etc).
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Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences
An offence under s 48 is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and a charge under s 48 is therefore strictly indictable. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if a charge under s 48 alleges an offence committed against a spouse (including a de-facto partner) or a child living in the accused’s household, or otherwise a child of the spouse and the accused, the spouse is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent, unless excused by the court: s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and ss 3, 4, 5 and 11 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. Related offences: • Section 28 – Acts done to property with intent to murder; • Section 30 – Attempts to murder; • Section 33 – Causing grievous bodily harm with intent; • Section 46 – Causing bodily injury by gunpowder etc; • Section 47 – Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc; • Section 55 – Possession or making explosives or other things with intent to injure; • Section 93FA – Possession, supply or making of explosives; • Section 93FB – Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms; • Section 196 – Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person; • Section 200 – Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 344A – Attempts. [CA.48.60] Elements of the offence The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) caused an explosive to be placed in or near a building (or a vehicle, vessel, train, aircraft etc) (or a public place); (2) with the intention of causing bodily harm to any person. [CA.48.80]
Element (1) Causing explosive to be placed near a building etc
Terms – as to “explosive”, see [CA.47.80]. “Vehicle” is defined (in part) in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as, “[a] means of conveyance, usu. with wheels, for transporting people, goods, etc.; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge etc. Any means of carriage or transport …”1 As to a “public place”, see commentary at [CA.8.20]. By s 8, “[a] place shall be deemed public … although a vessel or vehicle only, or a room, or field, or place, ordinarily private, was at the time used for a public purpose, or as a place of common resort, or was open to the public on the payment of money or otherwise.” Causing explosives to be placed – a person may “cause” a proscribed situation by doing the relevant act to bring it about himself, or by exerting some control or influence on another to bring the proscribed situation about, see commentary on the meaning of “causes” at [CLP.80]. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press.
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[CA.48.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 49 [CA.48.100]
[CA.48.0] Element (2) Intention to cause bodily harm
Bodily harm – concerning bodily harm, “harm” has been defined as “physical pain, illness or impairment of the body”.1 Bodily harm “includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with … health or comfort …. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must … be more than merely transient and trifling.”2 Intention to cause bodily harm – expressly, the mens rea to be proved is actual intent to cause bodily harm. For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intent to cause bodily harms is central to a charge under s 48, and expressly by s 48(2), criminal liability is attracted whether or not an explosion occurs or any bodily harm is caused. Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence under s 48 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore in determining whether an accused had an intention to cause any of the harms set out in the section, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 2 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 (CCA) per Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal at 509 (KB); 13 (Cr App R). Donovan was approved in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 (HL) and applied by the Court of Appeal in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185.
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49
Setting trap etc
(1) Any person who: (a) places or sets, or causes to be placed or set, any trap, device or thing (whether its nature be electronic, electric, mechanical, chemical or otherwise) capable of destroying human life or inflicting grievous bodily harm on any person, or (b) knowingly permits any such trap, device or thing to continue to be placed or set, with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall extend to any gin or trap, placed with the intention of destroying vermin, or to any trap, device or thing placed in a dwelling-house for the protection thereof. [S 49 subst Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 49 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.49.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.49.30] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.49.40] Causing death by traps ...................................................................................................................... [CA.49.60] Terms defined ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.49.80] “Specific intent” ................................................................................................................................. [CA.49.100]
[CA.49.20]
Indictment
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did place (set) (caused to be placed [set]) a trap to wit .......... capable of destroying human life or inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. The above indictment can be adapted for an offence under s 49(1)(b).
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s 49A
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 49 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are that the accused: (1) placed or set, or caused to be placed or set, any trap, device or thing or knowingly permitted such trap to be placed or set; (2) such trap etc being capable of destroying human life or inflicting grievous bodily harm; (3) with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. [CA.49.60]
Causing death by traps
Causing death by traps set in contravention of s 49 may amount to manslaughter.1 As to the proviso, see R v Bavastock.2 1 R v Heaton (1896) 60 JP 508. See also R v Munks [1964] 1 QB 304; [1963] 3 WLR 952; (1964) 48 Cr App R 56. 2 R v Bavastock [1954] Crim LR 625. Cf Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (11th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1958), vol 1, p 699.
[CA.49.80]
Terms defined
“Causes”, see [CLP.80]. “Knowingly permitting”, see [CLP.80]. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
“Grievous bodily harm”, see [CA.4.160]. “Specific intent”, see [CLP.1240]. [CA.49.100]
“Specific intent”
As to “specific intent”, see [CLP.1240]. 49A
Throwing rocks and other objects at vehicles and vessels
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person intentionally throws an object at, or drops an object on or towards, a vehicle or vessel that is on any road, railway or navigable waters, and (b) there is a person in the vehicle or vessel, and (c) the conduct risks the safety of any person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) This section extends to a vehicle or vessel that is stationary at the time that the object is thrown or dropped. (3) In the prosecution of an offence under this section, it is not necessary to prove: (a) that the accused was aware that his or her conduct risked the safety of any person, or (b) that the object made contact with the vehicle or vessel. (4) In this section: road means a road or road related area within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Road Transport Act 2013. [Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[1]]
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[CA.49.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 49A throw includes propel. vehicle includes: (a) (b) (c) (d)
a a a a
motor vehicle, and train or tram, and bicycle, and vehicle drawn by an animal or an animal ridden by a person.
[S 49A am Act 19 of 2013; insrt Act 18 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1]
Editor’s note: Sections 50 and 51 are repealed by Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(4) and have not been reproduced.
51A
Predatory driving
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(1) The driver of a vehicle who, while in pursuit of or travelling near another vehicle: (a) engages in a course of conduct that causes or threatens an impact involving the other vehicle, and (b) intends by that course of conduct to cause a person in the other vehicle actual bodily harm, is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) This section does not take away the liability of any person to be prosecuted for or found guilty of an offence under this Act or of any other offence, or affect the punishment that may be imposed for any such offence. However, a person who: (a) has been convicted or acquitted of an offence under this section cannot be prosecuted for any other offence under this Act on the same, or substantially the same, facts, or (b) has been convicted or acquitted of any other offence under this Act cannot be prosecuted for an offence under this section on the same, or substantially the same, facts. (3) In this section: impact involving a vehicle includes: (a) an impact with any other vehicle or with a person or object, or (b) the vehicle overturning or leaving a road. vehicle has the same meaning it has in section 52A. [S 51A insrt Act 75 of 1997, s 4 and Sch 2]
SECTION 51A COMMENTARY Indictment/charge, jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................... [CA.51A.20] Elements of offences under s 51A ................................................................................................... [CA.51A.40] Element (1) Driver of a vehicle ........................................................................................................ [CA.51A.60] Element (2) In pursuit of or travelling near another vehicle ............................................................ [CA.51A.80] Element (3) Engage in a course of conduct that caused or threatened an impact ...................... [CA.51A.100] Element (4) Intention to cause actual bodily harm ........................................................................ [CA.51A.120] Possible defences to a charge under s 51A .................................................................................. [CA.51A.140] Sentencing considerations and additional penalties ...................................................................... [CA.51A.160]
[CA.51A.20]
Indictment/charge, jurisdiction and cross references
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales was the driver of a vehicle, namely .......... and while in pursuit of another vehicle, namely .......... , (or while travelling near
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s 51A
another vehicle, namely .......... ) did engage in a course of conduct that caused an impact (or threatened an impact) involving that other vehicle, intending by that course of conduct to cause a person in the other vehicle (or if appropriate, the person in the other vehicle, namely CD) actual bodily harm. A charge under s 51A is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. Related offences: Menacing driving under s 118 of the Road Transport Act 2013. Negligent, furious or reckless driving under s 117 of the Road Transport Act 2013. CA
Dangerous driving causing death or grievous bodily harm under s 52A of the Crimes Act 1900. Injuries by furious driving etc under s 53 of the Crimes Act 1900. [CA.51A.40]
Elements of offences under s 51A
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: 1. was the driver of a vehicle; and 2. while in pursuit of another vehicle (or while travelling near another vehicle); 3. did engage in a course of conduct that caused an impact (or threatened an impact) involving the other vehicle; 4. intending by that course of conduct to cause a person in the other vehicle actual bodily harm. [CA.51A.60]
Element (1) Driver of a vehicle
Driver – as to the meaning of “driver”, see [CA.52A.120]. If there is evidence that the accused’s driving may not have been voluntary, the prosecution will have to prove voluntariness, see [RTA.117.80].
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Vehicle – as s 51A(3) states, “vehicle” here has the same meaning as in the definition under s 52A(9). [CA.51A.80]
Element (2) In pursuit of or travelling near another vehicle
These temporal considerations will be questions of fact. To travel near another vehicle needs no explanation. “Pursuit” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines pursuit (in part) as the “action of pursuing, with intent to overtake and catch or harm; an instance of this; a chase.”1 As a practical matter, for the prosecution, and depending on the actual circumstances, it will often be easier to allege “travelling near” rather than “pursuit” as unlike the former which simply involves proof of proximity, the latter involves showing an intention to pursue over a period of time. 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002.
[CA.51A.100]
Element (3) Engage in a course of conduct that caused or threatened an impact
Engaging in a course of conduct – engaging in a course of conduct is different from the doing of a single act. However, persisting in an action can be otherwise. In Victorian cases of stalking, judges have considered the meaning of “engaging in a course of conduct”. In Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297, McDonald J said at 306, “in order for conduct which is engaged in to be a ‘course of conduct’, the relevant conduct must be conduct which is protracted or conduct which is engaged in on more than one separate occasion”. By comparison, an incident of predatory driving may not be protracted. In Berlyn v Brouskos (2002) 134 A Crim R 111; [2002] VSC 377 at [24], Nettle J followed Gunes and said “there must be a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity of purpose”. Predatory driving is an offence of a different character from stalking. It may be that under s 51A, the course of conduct may occur over a very short period, see the observations of Nettle J in Berlyn at [14]–[23]. In the Second Reading Speech of the Traffıc and Crimes Amendment (Menacing and Predatory Driving) Bill 1997 which introduced s 51A, the Minister for Roads said:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 51A
[CA.51A.100]
In some circumstances [predatory driving] could be seen as akin to stalking with a motor vehicle. I emphasise that impact is not necessary. A driver’s vehicle does not need to be hit for that person to have a very real feeling that he could suffer a crippling injury or death. An example of predatory driving may be a situation in which a driver, perhaps in the course of a pursuit, in order to prevent another driver from completing a merging manoeuvre, swerves at the other driver’s vehicle, perhaps running it off the road. This is dangerous and life-threatening behaviour.1 1 Hon. Carl Scully, Minister for Roads etc, Second Reading Speech of the Traffıc and Crimes Amendment (Menacing and Predatory Driving) Bill 1997 (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 19 June 1997 pp 10719–10720).
[CA.51A.120]
Element (4) Intention to cause actual bodily harm
Actual bodily harm – there is no definition of “bodily harm” in the Crimes Act 1900. The commonly accepted definition comes from R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 where Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal, at 509 (KB) said: … “bodily harm” has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.1 See also commentary at [CA.59.100].
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Intention to cause actual bodily harm – the intent to be proved with a charge under s 51A is the accused’s actual subjective intent to engage in a course of driving intending thereby to cause someone in another vehicle actual bodily harm. For commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. In many cases, actual intent will be proved by inference from the manner of driving itself where the intent of causing or threatening an impact likely to cause actual bodily harm is so obvious that no other reasonable inference is available.2 1 Applied in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44; Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 at [133], [134] (NSWCA) per McColl JA (Mason P and Ipp JA agreeing); McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305. 2 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375 per Dixon J; Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; [1911] HCA 66 at 619 (CLR) per Griffith CJ; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; 37 ALJR 191; [1963] HCA 44; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; (1990) 51 A Crim R 181; [1990] HCA 56 at 578 (CLR); 183 (A Crim R) per Deane J.
[CA.51A.140]
Possible defences to a charge under s 51A
As to possible defences to a charge under s 51A, see [RTA.117.200], some of which may be applicable. [CA.51A.160]
Sentencing considerations and additional penalties
Road rage – in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Coleman (2001) 120 A Crim R 415; [2001] VSCA 59, Tadgell JA remarked at [14]: Let it therefore be widely known and clearly understood that there is no room in our society for road rage. Nor is there room for a person who, when he climbs aboard a motor car, insulates himself from the world behind a screen of metal and glass and behaves as he likes with arrogance and selfishness. The unceasing proliferation of motor vehicles in our society and on our roads demands that those using them take a correspondingly increasing degree of care in doing so. The respondent, instead of taking care, not only scorned the notion that he should do so but used his own motor car in effect as a weapon. Cancellation of licence under the Road Transport Act 2013 (RTA) – an offence under s 51A is a “major offence” within s 4 of the RTA. By s 205(2)(d) of that Act, a driver convicted of a s 51A offence as a major offence is automatically disqualified from holding a driver licence for 3 years with a minimum period of 12 months. If the driver has been convicted of a major offence within the previous 5 years, by s 205(3)(d), the automatic period of disqualification is 5 years, with a minimum period of 2 years.
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Habitual traffıc offender declaration – by s 217 of the RTA, a person is declared to be an habitual traffic offender if the person is convicted of a relevant offence within the meaning of s 216 of the Act and has been convicted of two other relevant offences committed on different occasions within the previous 5 years. A “relevant offence” includes a “major offence” within s 4 of the RTA, which includes an offence under s 51A of the Crimes Act 1900. Police pursuits
(1) The driver of a vehicle: (a) who knows, ought reasonably to know or has reasonable grounds to suspect that police officers are in pursuit of the vehicle and that the driver is required to stop the vehicle, and (b) who does not stop the vehicle, and (c) who then drives the vehicle recklessly or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to others, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: (a) in the case of a first offence—imprisonment for 3 years, or (b) in the case of an offence on a second or subsequent occasion—imprisonment for 5 years. (2) In this section, vehicle has the same meaning as it has in section 52A. [S 51B insrt Act 2 of 2010, Sch 1]
52
Endangering passengers on railway [Repealed]
[S 52 rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(4)]
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52A
Dangerous driving: substantive matters
(1) Dangerous driving occasioning death A person is guilty of the offence of dangerous driving occasioning death if the vehicle driven by the person is involved in an impact occasioning the death of another person and the driver was, at the time of the impact, driving the vehicle: (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug, or (b) at a speed dangerous to another person or persons, or (c) in a manner dangerous to another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) Aggravated dangerous driving occasioning death A person is guilty of the offence of aggravated dangerous driving occasioning death if the person commits the offence of dangerous driving occasioning death in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (3) Dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm A person is guilty of the offence of dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm if the vehicle driven by the person is involved in an impact occasioning grievous bodily harm to another person and the driver was, at the time of the impact, driving the vehicle: (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug, or (b) at a speed dangerous to another person or persons, or (c) in a manner dangerous to another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
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51B
Crimes Act 1900 s 52A (4) Aggravated dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm A person is guilty of the offence of aggravated dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm if the person commits the offence of dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 11 years. (5) When vehicle is involved in impact—generally For the purposes of this section, the circumstances in which a vehicle is involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, a person include if the death or harm is occasioned through any of the following: (a) the vehicle overturning or leaving a road while the person is being conveyed in or on that vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise), (b) an impact between any object and the vehicle while the person is being conveyed in or on that vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise), (c) an impact between the person and the vehicle, (d) the impact of the vehicle with another vehicle or an object in, on or near which the person is at the time of the impact, (e) an impact with anything on, or attached to, the vehicle, (f) an impact with anything that is in motion through falling from the vehicle, (g) the person falling from the vehicle, or being thrown or ejected from the vehicle, while being conveyed in or on the vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise), (h) an impact between any object (including the ground) and the person, as a consequence of the person (or any part of the person) being or protruding outside the vehicle, while the person is being conveyed in or on the vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise).
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[Subs (5) am Act 11 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 4[1]; Act 16 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 2.7[1]]
(6) When vehicle is involved in causing other impacts For the purposes of this section, a vehicle is also involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, a person if: (a) the death or harm is occasioned through the vehicle causing an impact between other vehicles or between another vehicle and any object or person or causing another vehicle to overturn or leave a road, and (b) the prosecution proves that the vehicle caused the impact. (7) Circumstances of aggravation In this section, circumstances of aggravation means any circumstances at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm in which: (a) the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in the accused’s breath or blood, or (b) the accused was driving the vehicle concerned on a road at a speed that exceeded, by more than 45 kilometres per hour, the speed limit (if any) applicable to that length of road, or (c) the accused was driving the vehicle to escape pursuit by a police officer, or (d) the accused’s ability to drive was very substantially impaired by the fact that the accused was under the influence of a drug (other than intoxicating liquor) or a combination of drugs (whether or not intoxicating liquor was part of that combination). [Subs (7) am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[1]; Act 135 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
(8) Defences It is a defence to any charge under this section if the death or grievous bodily harm occasioned by the impact was not in any way attributable (as relevant): (a) to the fact that the person charged was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug or a combination of drugs, or
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(b) to the speed at which the vehicle was driven, or (c) to the manner in which the vehicle was driven. [Subs (8) am Act 135 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
(9) Definitions In this section: drug has the same meaning as it has in the Road Transport Act 2013. object includes an animal, building, structure, earthwork, embankment, gutter, stormwater channel, drain, bridge, culvert, median strip, post or tree. prescribed concentration of alcohol means a concentration of 0.15 grammes or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. [Def am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[2]]
road means: (a)
a road or road related area within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Road Transport Act 2013 (other than a road or road related area that is the subject of a declaration made under section 18(1)(b) of that Act relating to all of the provisions of that Act), or (b) any other place. [Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[3]; Act 11 of 2005, s 247 and Sch 3.5[1]; Act 19 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.6[2]; insrt Act 115 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 4.4[1]]
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vehicle means: (a)
any motor car, motor carriage, motor cycle or other vehicle propelled wholly or partly by volatile spirit, steam, gas, oil, electricity, or by any other means other than human or animal power, or (b) a horse-drawn vehicle, whether or not it is adapted for road use, but does not mean a vehicle used on a railway or tramway. [S 52A am Act 19 of 2013; Act 99 of 2007; Act 11 of 2005; Act 11 of 2004; Act 19 of 1999; Act 135 of 1997; Act 115 of 1997; Act 16 of 1995; subst Act 78 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1; am Act 46 of 1990; Act 81 of 1988; Act 10 of 1983; Act 53 of 1980; Act 50 of 1974; Act 31 of 1966; Act 16 of 1955; insrt Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 52A COMMENTARY Generally .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.52A.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.52A.40] Cross reference ................................................................................................................................ [CA.52A.60] Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.52A.80] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.52A.100] Element (1) Driver, driving and vehicle .......................................................................................... [CA.52A.120] Element (2) Impact ......................................................................................................................... [CA.52A.140] Element (3) The impact occasioned grievous bodily harm or death to the person ...................... [CA.52A.160] Element (4)(a) Driving under influence of alcohol or drug ............................................................ [CA.52A.180] Element (4)(b) & (c) Driving at a speed or in a manner dangerous to another person ................ [CA.52A.200] Element (5) Circumstances of aggravation .................................................................................... [CA.52A.220] Sentencing ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.52A.240] Defence that death or injury not attributable ................................................................................. [CA.52A.260]
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[Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[2]; subst Act 19 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.6[1]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 52A [CA.52A.20]
[CA.52A.20] Generally
The present s 52A commenced 23 December 1994 and replaced the offence generally known as culpable driving. Section 52A was originally introduced because of the reluctance of courts to convict motorists of manslaughter in the factual circumstances envisaged by the section.1 When the Bill introducing the new s 52A was introduced in 1994, the Attorney General told Parliament in his Second Reading Speech at p 4794 that: The effect of the reforms proposed by this bill is to overcome the perceived problems with the existing legislation. This bill will provide a stronger deterrent against these type of offences. In particular, the Government is sending a message to the community and to the courts that dangerous driving which kills or maims will be severely punished wherever it occurs.2 Essentially, two offences are created by this section together with aggravated forms of the offences. The offences are dangerous driving: (i) occasioning death and (ii) occasioning grievous bodily harm. The offences are ones of strict liability and the prosecution is not required to prove a guilty intent.3 A defence of reasonable and honest mistake is available to the accused and when raised, must be negatived by the Crown. In Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163, Mason J said at 490 (CLR): … the language of the section does not exclude the operation of a defence of mistake of fact on reasonable grounds and therefore the defendant will not be liable in a case in which the dangerous manner of driving is due to a mechanical defect if he neither knew nor ought to have known of the existence of that defect. There is an evidentiary onus on the accused to raise the issue of honest and reasonable belief.4 In order to discharge this onus, the accused need only point to or produce material from which it could be inferred that there is at least a reasonable possibility that he or she had an honest and reasonable belief.5 The Crown bears the onus of eliminating any reasonable possibility that he or she did have that belief.6 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Section 351, aiding and abetting the offence, applies to s 52A.7 A child in utero who is injured in a manner described in s 52A and who is subsequently born, lives independently and then dies as a result of those injuries is a person within the meaning of s 52A.8 1 A-G (NSW) v Bindoff (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 489; 70 WN (NSW) 309 at 310 (WN (NSW)). Generally as to sentencing, see R v Slattery (1996) 90 A Crim R 519. 2 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 27 October 1994, pp 4792–4794). 3 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 479, 490, 499 (CLR); R v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31 at 637–638 (CLR). 4 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 at 582 (CLR). 5 R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–3. 6 See and compare: R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; 56 A Crim R 424 at 541–542 (NSWLR). See also R v Helmling (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 November 1993) where these propositions are discussed with regard to s 52A by Hunt CJ at CL. 7 See generally: Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163 at 477 (CLR). 8 R v F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245; 89 A Crim R 250.
[CA.52A.40]
Indictment
Dangerous driving occasioning death or grievous bodily harm – s 52A(1)–(3): That AB on .......... in the said State did drive a motor car, registered no ABC-123 (or describe vehicle – see s 52A(9) where “vehicle” is defined) when the vehicle was involved in an impact*1, whereby [the death of CD was occasioned][grievous bodily harm was occasioned to CD], and at the time of the said impact AB was [under the influence of alcohol][under the influence of a drug, namely;][driving the said vehicle at a speed dangerous to the another person or persons][driving the said vehicle in a manner dangerous to another person or persons]**2
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In this indictment, select the alternatives in the round brackets ( ) and delete the inappropriate alternatives in the square brackets [ ].
1 *(it is not necessary to describe the nature of the impact. Impact include those defined in ss 52A(5) and (6), ie that the vehicle came into contact with another vehicle) 2 In circumstances of aggravation – ss 52A(2) and 52A(7): As above but add after **, “in circumstances of aggravation, namely (describe the circumstance alleged – see s 52A(7) eg, that at the time of impact occasioning the death of CD, the prescribed concentration of alcohol was in AB’s blood).” 3 See R v Lee (1994) 76 A Crim R 271. 4 A-G (NSW) v Bindoff (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 489; 70 WN (NSW) 309. See also McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22.
[CA.52A.60]
Cross reference
For culpable navigation, see s 52B and following. [CA.52A.80]
Jurisdiction
Except where death is occasioned, charges under s 52A are Sch 1 Table 1 offences under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[CA.52A.100]
Elements of the offence
That: (1) the accused was the driver of a “vehicle” (as defined in s 52A(9)); (2) the vehicle was involved in an impact, that is; (i) being one of the following alternatives (see s 52A(5)): (a) that the vehicle overturned or left a road whilst the victim is being conveyed in or on that vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise); (b) that an impact between any object and the vehicle while the victim is being conveyed in or on that vehicle (whether as a passenger or otherwise); (c) being an impact between the victim and the vehicle; (d) an impact of the vehicle with another vehicle or an object in, on or near which the victim is at the time of the impact; (e) an impact with anything on, or attached to, the vehicle; (f) an impact with anything that is in motion through falling from the vehicle; (The inclusion of the word “include” in the section indicates that other types of impacts which are not specifically listed might also amount to an “impact”) or, (ii) if the death or grievous bodily harm is occasioned through the vehicle causing an impact between other vehicles or between another vehicle and any object or person and the prosecution proves that the vehicle caused the impact; (see s 52A(6)). (3) the impact occasioned the death of or grievous bodily harm to the victim; and (4) at the time of driving the vehicle: (a) the accused was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug; or
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The averment of “in circumstances of aggravation” should be included in the indictment where relevant.3 More than one circumstance of aggravation may exist in the one case. It is suggested that it is preferable to particularise each circumstance of aggravation in the indictment. It is necessary to set forth in the indictment the facts alleged to constitute the offence.4
Crimes Act 1900 s 52A
[CA.52A.100] (b) the accused was driving it at a speed dangerous to another person or persons; or (c) the accused was driving it in a manner dangerous to another person or persons.
For the aggravated offence, the following additional element applies: (5) the vehicle was being driven at the time in circumstances of aggravation, namely that: (a) the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in the accused’s blood; or (b) the accused was driving the vehicle on a road at a speed that exceeded, by more than 45 kilometres per hour, the speed limit (if any) applicable to that length of road; or (c) the accused was driving the vehicle to escape pursuit by a police officer. [CA.52A.120]
Element (1) Driver, driving and vehicle
Driver and driving – Under s 52A, it must be shown that the vehicle was being driven. In Tink v Francis [1983] 2 VR 17, there is extensive consideration of the authorities in relation to the meaning of “drive” in the context of driving a motor vehicle. Young CJ concluded at 19: The ordinary meaning to be attached to the word “drives” when applied to a motor car should, I think embrace the notion of some control of the propulsive force which, if operating, will cause the car to move. The propulsive force is not, however, to be confined to sources within the motor vehicle itself, but includes at least the force of gravity and, if momentum can with sufficient accuracy be described as a force, its momentum. I see no reason why it should not also include other forces externally applied.1
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The manner of driving encompasses “all matters connected with the management and control of a car by a driver when it is being driven.”2 Driving is a voluntary act and therefore if the driver falls asleep, for the period that he is asleep he is not “driving”. It was said in Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 by the majority at 578 (CLR) that: … where the question is whether a driver who falls asleep at the wheel is guilty of driving in a manner dangerous to the public, the relevant period of driving is that which immediately precedes his falling asleep.3 A driver who regularly suffered epileptic seizures was found guilty of driving dangerously because the driver, immediately before the onset of a seizure, was subjecting other road users to a real, substantial and significant risk of injury or death when such a seizure occurred. This was a risk which was over and above that ordinarily associated with driving a motor vehicle.4 However, it is not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury in relation to the question as to whether the accused’s driving was voluntary unless there is some issue as to the accused being asleep or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In R v Dunne (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 Mar 1993), Meagher JA (with whom Gleeson CJ and Abadee J agreed) said at p 4: The question of whether the accused’s acts were voluntary or conscious is of the greatest importance where there is some question of the accused having fallen asleep or being influenced by alcohol. In the present case there was no such question. Where there is no such question the accused’s acts are presumed to be voluntary and conscious. (emphasis added) In R v Affleck (1992) 65 A Crim R 96, Smart J addressed an unusual situation where three people each appeared to be partially in control of a motor vehicle, which ultimately overturned, killing one of them. The question was who was the “driver” of the vehicle. Smart J said at 98: The determining matter is the control over propulsion, that is, over the mode of moving and stopping the vehicle. Without the person using the clutch, and applying force to the accelerator, the vehicle usually cannot go forward or backwards and by use of the brake he controls whether the vehicle moves. Notwithstanding that Mr Taylor operated the gears and the deceased was steering I think that Mr Affleck’s control over the clutch, the accelerator and the brakes and his use of them were sufficient to make him the driver.
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In Ricketts v Laws (1988) 14 NSWLR 311 at 314, Kirby P said: A vehicle may have two drivers, as for example where an instructor actually has his or her hand on the wheel or was controlling the direction of the car from a dual mechanism.5
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Vehicle – “Vehicle” is defined widely in s 52A(9). The previous s 52A referred to “motor vehicle”. In his second reading speech, the Attorney General explained the need for this change in the following way at 4794: The term “motor vehicle” wherever it appears, will now be replaced by “vehicle”. This will mean that the offence may be committed by a driver of any mechanical or horse-drawn vehicle. The artificial distinction between driving a motor vehicle dangerously where death or grievous bodily harm is occasioned and driving some other vehicle dangerously where death or grievous bodily harm is occasioned, is thus removed.7 1 See also McInerney J at 42 and Southwell J at 58. As to other cases dealing with what is required to prove driving by the accused, see also: R v Kitson (1955) 39 Cr App R 66; Saycell v Bool [1948] 2 All ER 83; [1948] WN 232; Wallace v Major [1946] KB 473; [1946] 2 All ER 87; Doyle v Harvey [1923] VLR 271. 2 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572; 59 A Crim R 308; [1992] HCA 14 at 579 (CLR); R v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31. 3 See also R v P (1993) 69 A Crim R 159 at 162. 4 Gillett v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 419; [2006] NSWCCA 370. 5 Ricketts v Laws was a civil case. It was quoted with approval in R v Affleck (1992) 65 A Crim R 96 at 98. Other authorities which suggest there may be more than one person driving: Langman v Valentine [1952] 2 All ER 803 at 806, Bassell v McGuiness (1981) 29 SASR 508 at 522. 6 Hampson v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 782 at 797; See also Wallace v Major [1946] KB 473; [1946] 2 All ER 87 at 476 (KB); Bassell v McGuiness (1981) 29 SASR 508 where a different conclusion was reached; and Hughes v McFarlane [1983] 2 VR 17 where the tow rope broke, it was found that the person steering the vehicle may become the “driver”. 7 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 27 October 1994, pp 4792–4794).
[CA.52A.140]
Element (2) Impact
(i)(a) Overturning or leaving the road – Section 52A(5)(a) refers to “overturning” however, in the context, does not require that the overturning occurred on the road: see “road” defined in s 52A(9) and see also R v B (unreported CCA (NSW), 21 August 1990); R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548; (1991) 53 A Crim R 263. Under the former s 52A, “leaving the highway” was said to mean the actual act of leaving the highway and possibly travelling thereafter; but did not mean commencing to leave the highway, being about to leave the highway, or starting on a course which ultimately ends in leaving the highway.1 (i)(b) Impact between object and vehicle – “vehicle” and “object” are defined in s 52A(9). “Object” is defined as including an animal, building, structure, earthwork, embankment, gutter, stormwater channel, drain, bridge, culvert, median strip, post or tree. (i)(c) Impact between the vehicle and the victim – “vehicle” is defined in s 52A(9). (i)(d) Impact, in or near which the victim is at the time – When the Crown relies upon this subsection, the observations by O’Brien CJ of Cr D in R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658 may be noted. At p 690, his Honour stated: It is to be noted that this passage speaks of the killing indirectly by impact of the offender’s vehicle and that if the offender’s vehicle runs into another vehicle the death must be the consequence of the person killed being in the other vehicle or being near it. The passage does not suggest, nor could it, that the actual impact with the other vehicle should cause the injury which kills the deceased in or near the other
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In Hampson v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 782, Foster J considered many authorities in relation to whether a person in a towed vehicle is a “driver” and concluded that the person is not because the person does not have control of the means of propulsion.6
Crimes Act 1900 s 52A
[CA.52A.140]
vehicle. In the example given of an impact of the offender’s vehicle with a post, that actual impact did not cause the death. It was the actual impact of the broken post with the deceased who was near the post at the time of the impact of the vehicle with it which killed him, but nevertheless the death was the consequence of the impact of the vehicle with the post, that is to say, “occasioned through” the impact. If the impact be with another vehicle it seems to me that the two questions for consideration are whether the death was “occasioned through” the impact of the offender’s vehicle with the other vehicle and whether the deceased was “in” or was “near” the other vehicle “at the time of the impact”.2 (i)(e)–(f) Impact with anything on, or attached to the vehicle and impact with anything falling from the vehicle – “vehicle” is defined in s 52A(9). (ii) Causing another vehicle to collide with an object or other vehicle – Section 52A(6) introduces two new concepts. Firstly, that the accused’s vehicle need not be directly involved in the impact and secondly, the section introduces the concept of the vehicle of the accused causing the impact without it being directly involved. In the second reading speech at 4793, the Attorney General said: The bill therefore removes the requirement that the driver’s car be involved in the impact. Thus a person may still be liable even though his or her vehicle is not involved in the impact. The onus will be on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused driver’s vehicle did cause the other vehicles or a vehicle and an object or person, to impact, and death or grievous bodily harm to another person was occasioned.3
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Causing the impact – In earlier cases involving dangerous driving when the issue was whether death was caused by the driving, it has been said that the driving must be a substantial contributing cause of the death.4 It has also been said that it is sufficient to direct the jury that “the question of cause for them to decide is not a philosophical or a scientific question, but a question to be determined by them applying their common sense to the facts as they find them, they appreciating that the purpose of the enquiry is to attribute legal responsibility in a criminal matter.”5 The High Court has considered the question of the direction in relation to causing death in cases of murder and manslaughter and approved a direction in the following terms: To be a cause of death, for the purposes of these offences, the act for which the accused is responsible must be a substantial or significant cause of bringing about death but need not be the sole cause but it must be a substantial or significant cause viewed in a commonsense and practical way.6 When evidence suggests that an act intervened which may have broken the chain of causation, for example in cases of where there is a suggestion of over-reaction on the part of the other drivers from fear or apprehension arising from the objective evidence of the accused’s vehicle movements it may be necessary to direct the jury that the “victim’s fear or apprehension must be well-founded or well-grounded or reasonable in all the circumstances” and that “the act of escape or self-preservation must be the natural consequence” of the behaviour of the accused’s vehicle.7 In cases where it is considered necessary to direct the jury on causation in cases of fright, escape or self preservation, it is ordinarily undesirable to focus attention upon foreseeability.8 For a general discussion as to the issues involved in causation, see Colvin, “Causation in Criminal Law”, (1989) 1 Bond Law Review 253.9 1 R v Kinghorne (1982) 8 A Crim R 41. 2 See also Harlor v The Queen (1956) 95 CLR 170 in particular at 172, 173. 3 4 5 6 7
Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 27 October 1994, pp 4792–4794). R v Cornish (1988) 48 SASR 520; (1988) 33 A Crim R 91; R v Mayne (1975) 11 SASR 583 at 598. Campbell v The Queen [1981] WAR 286; (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 per Burt CJ at 161 (A Crim R). McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 at 118–119 (CLR). Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 per Deane and Dawson JJ at 412–413 (CLR), see also Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 425 (CLR).
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8 McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; 69 ALJR 621; 79 A Crim R 229; 130 ALR 26 at 119 (CLR); Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 at 412–413, 425 (CLR). 9 See also Howard’s Criminal Law, 5th ed, (1990) pp 30–43; Yeo, “An Australian Perspective of Fright Cases”, (1993) 57 Journal of Criminal Law 390. The concept of causation in civil cases has been recently considered in the High Court in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; [1991] HCA 12.
Element (3) The impact occasioned grievous bodily harm or death to the person
By s 4, “grievous bodily harm includes any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person” and see commentary under that definition. In R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658, O’Brien CJ of Cr D made observations regarding the meaning of “occasioned”. In R v F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245; 89 A Crim R 250, the Court of Criminal Appeal was considering a question posed by the Crown in the following terms: Is a child in utero who is injured through impact with a motor vehicle or through impact with any object of a motor vehicle in or on which that child in utero was being conveyed, is subsequently born, lives independently and then dies as a result of the injuries sustained, a person for the purposes of s 52A of the Crimes Act. Grove J (with whom McInerney and Hulme JJ agreed) answered the question in the affirmative. The victim was a “person” to which the section applied provided the victim was born alive.1 The fact that the accused makes an admission of the injuries of the victim does not disentitle the Crown from leading evidence of those injuries.2
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1 The court referred to Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 WLR 412; 2 All ER 10; 1 Cr App R 351. 2 R v Heinrich (1992) 61 A Crim R 212 at 217, 220–221.
[CA.52A.180]
Element (4)(a) Driving under influence of alcohol or drug
As to what is required to prove driving, see Driver and driving at [CA.52A.120]. Under s 52AA(1) – (3), if the accused has a prescribed concentration of the alcohol of 0.15 or more, provided such sample is taken within two hours of the impact, he or she is presumed to be driving under the influence of alcohol. Whether the accused was driving under the influence of liquor or a drug is a question of fact,1 but whereas the accused could have been guilty of an offence under s 5 of the Traffıc Act 1909 irrespective of whether the accused was in fact capable of properly driving a motor vehicle, it would appear that under ss 52A(1)(a) and 52A(3)(a)2, it is necessary that there be some causal link between the accused’s condition and the death or injury charged. The causal link can be inferred in the Crown case but the accused is entitled to prove of the balance of probabilities that the causal link does not exist. See Defence that death or injury not attributable in [CA.52A.260]. Opinions on the extent of intoxication may be given in evidence by lay witnesses, including police officers, with the evidence of a qualified medical practitioner to support it.3 Under the Evidence Act 1995, the common law in relation to evidence of opinion has been modified; see s 76 Evidence Act 1995 at [6.7940]. Expert evidence converting the analysis contained in the certificate into a number of alcoholic drinks may be given.4 Evidence of co-ordination tests carried out on the accused whilst he or she was in custody have been admitted in evidence.5 As to taking a blood sample in similar circumstances, see Bottroff v Holland [1965] SASR 397. As to admissions made whilst in hospital, see R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9. See also Ridley v Hanney [1962] WAR 157. Note, these cases all pre-date the Evidence Act 1995. In each case, the various discretions applicable to the admission of evidence need to be considered.
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[CA.52A.180]
Where a person is charged with driving under the influence of a drug, it is not necessary for the Crown to establish mens rea nor is it a defence for such person to show that he or she was not aware, or negligently unaware, of the fact that he or she was under the influence of a drug.6 1 Molloy v McDonald (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 159. 2 See s 52A(8); R v F (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 543; 74 WN (NSW) 211. 3 R v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 approving R v German (1947) 89 CCC 90. See also R v McKimmie [1957] VR 93; R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737; 51 A Crim R 281. Compare R v Kelly [1958] VR 412. 4 R v Somers [1963] 1 WLR 1306; [1963] 3 All ER 808; (1964) 48 Cr App R 11. 5 Benney v Dowling [1959] VR 237. 6 August v Fingleton [1964] SASR 22.
[CA.52A.200]
Element (4)(b) & (c) Driving at a speed or in a manner dangerous to another person
The concept of driving at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public establishes an objective standard which is impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other drivers on the highway.1 As such, the concept is not a species of negligent driving of a kind that is simply less serious than the negligent driving sufficient to make out an offence of manslaughter.2 Consequently, the offence focuses attention on the driving by the driver. The question that must be asked is whether the “manner of driving, the condition of the vehicle, or the condition of the driver as a matter of objective fact made the driving a danger to the public”.3
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In the decision of R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548; (1991) 53 A Crim R 263, where, in a joint escapade involving the driver and a number of passengers, the only danger involved was to the participants themselves, the Court recognised that it was not appropriate to categorise the “passengers” as members of the public.4 Section 52A has now been amended to change the focus from “the public” to “another person”.5 In McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22, Barwick CJ addressed the matters necessary to establish “driving at a speed, or in a manner dangerous” and the manner in which those matters can be directed to the jury. He said (at 49 (CLR)): Naturally the first matter in the case of a charge that the vehicle has been driven in a manner which is dangerous to the public is to determine and present to the jury what precisely is the manner of driving which the Crown alleges the accused has pursued and which it claims is dangerous to the public. If that manner of driving is not by its very description potentially dangerous to the public, it would be necessary to isolate for the jury the features of it which the Crown charges to be so dangerous. Of course, if the evidence could properly suggest to the jurymen some other feature of the applicant’s driving as itself dangerous to the public, the jury should be told that they are competent to treat that feature of the driving rather than the feature or features of the driving chosen as dangerous by the Crown, as in breach of the section. Equally, if the evidence could bear such an interpretation, they could be told that if they find the applicant to have been driving in the precise manner charged by the Crown as dangerous but think it dangerous to the public for some reason other than that assigned by the Crown, they are at liberty to find that element of the offence established upon the footing of their own view as to the reason why the manner of driving was dangerous to the public. But in any case, the jury would need to be told what the expression “dangerous to the public” as used in the section involves. The section speaks of a speed or manner which is dangerous to the public. This imports a quality in the speed or manner of driving which either intrinsically in all circumstances, or because of the particular circumstances surrounding the driving, is in a real sense potentially dangerous to a human being or human beings who as a member or as members of the public may be upon or in the vicinity of the roadway on which the driving is taking place. It may be, of course, that potential danger to property on or in the vicinity to that roadway would suffice to make the speed or manner of driving dangerous to the
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public, but the need for death or injury to a person to result from impact with a vehicle so driven may make that question unlikely to arise, though the possibility of it doing so must be acknowledged. This quality of being dangerous to the public in the speed or manner of driving does not depend upon resultant damage, though to complete the offence under the section, impact causing damage must occur during that driving. Whilst the immediate result of the driving may afford evidence from which the quality of the driving may be inferred, it is not that result which gives it that quality. A person may drive at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public without causing actual injury: it is the potentiality in fact of danger to the public in the manner of driving, whether realised by the accused or not, which makes it dangerous to the public within the meaning of the section. This concept is in sharp contrast to the concept of negligence. The concept with which the section deals requires some serious breach of the proper conduct of a vehicle upon the highway, so serious as to be in reality and not speculatively, potentially dangerous to others. This does not involve a mere breach of duty however grave, to a particular person, having significance only if damage is caused thereby. These distinctions make it imperative that the jury be specifically directed as to the criteria to be applied and the distinctions to be observed in determining whether any particular speed or manner of driving can have the quality, intrinsic or occasional, of being dangerous to the public with the meaning of the section; and that the particular features of the driving charged as in breach of the section be isolated for the jury and related to these criteria. The expression “driving at a speed, or in a manner, which is dangerous to the public” describes the actual behaviour of the driver and, in general, does not require any given state of mind as an essential element of the offence; but the section does not exclude a defence of mistake of fact on reasonable grounds or involuntariness or other exceptional excuse to which a state of mind may be material. “Manner” of driving includes all matters connected with the management and control of a car by the driver by which it is being driven. It includes starting and stopping, signalling or failing to signal, and sounding a warning or failure to sound a warning, as well as other matters affecting the speed at which, and the course in which, the car is driven. Casual behaviour on the roads and momentary lapses of attention, if they result in danger to the public, are not outside the expression merely because they are casual or momentary. But sudden, even though mistaken, action in a critical situation may not, in all the circumstances of a case, constitute driving to the danger of the public.6 Whether danger exists depends upon all the circumstances of the case, for example, the character and condition of the roadway, the amount and nature of the traffic that might be expected, the speed of the motor vehicle, the observance of traffic signals, and the condition of the driver’s car.7 In R v Goodman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 December 1991), the court (Hunt CJ at CL, Allen and Badgery-Parker JJ) explained the objective test in relation to the manner of driving in the following terms: The test as to whether the manner of the appellant’s driving was dangerous to the public is an objective one. The Crown did not have to prove that the appellant intended the management and control of his vehicle to be dangerous to the public, or even that he realised that his conduct his was or would be dangerous to the public. His conduct had to be judged according to an objective standard fixed in relation to all users of the public roads generally. The jury had to determine whether the conduct of the appellant amounted a serious breach of what they considered to be the proper management and control of a vehicle upon a public road, so serious as to be in reality a potential danger to other persons on or in the vicinity of that roadway.8 In R v Hain [1966] 2 NSWR 142; (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 7, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal discussed a number of the authorities and deduced the following series of propositions which would still have substantial application under s 52A. The court stated (at pp 10–11 (WN)): 1 Provided that there is evidence to support a conviction in terms of the relevant section and the jury have been properly instructed as to the applicable law, it is for the jury to decide as a fact whether the manner of driving was dangerous to the public or not. 2 The test to be applied in determining whether the management and control of the vehicle constituted driving in a manner dangerous to the public is an objective standard fixed in
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[CA.52A.200]
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3 4
5
6
7
8
relation to other users of the highway whether potentiality in fact of danger to the public is realised by the driver of the motor vehicle or not. “Manner of driving” includes all matters connected with the management and control of the vehicle when it is being driven. An act or omission done or omitted to be done with reference to the management or control of the vehicle which is merely casual or transitory may, in an appropriate case, constitute “manner of driving”. Hence inattention on the part of the driver of motor vehicle which leads to some act or omission on his part in his management or control of the vehicle is of itself no defence to a charge that the vehicle was driven in a manner which was dangerous to the public. The quality of being dangerous to the public does not depend upon death or grievous bodily harm being occasioned to some person, though such a result must be proved to have occurred during that driving to complete the offence under the relevant section. It is not enough that an impact takes place between the vehicle driven by the accused and another vehicle at some point of time after the vehicle has been driven in a manner which is dangerous to the public – the impact must occur whilst the vehicle is being driven in a manner dangerous to the public; but the interval of time between the driving which is in breach of the section and the impact may in all the factual circumstances of the case be so short that the offending driving can be regarded as proceeding to the moment of impact. The quality of driving may be deduced from the resultant facts provided in evidence and accepted by the jury.
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It has been said by the Court of Criminal Appeal that conduct which would support a conviction of driving at a speed dangerous, may also, without more, support a conviction of driving in a manner dangerous.9 Accordingly, where speed is the only relevant fact relied upon, an accused may be charged with driving at a speed dangerous or driving in a manner dangerous to another person.10 Evidence of an accused’s driving 35–40 minutes prior to the collision has been admitted.11 Evidence of the accused’s blood alcohol level has been held to be relevant to the quality of her or his driving.12 However, evidence of alcohol ought not to be admitted “unless it goes far enough to show that the quantity of alcohol taken is such that it may have some effect on the way in which the person drives”.13 Momentary inattention may amount to driving in a manner dangerous. In R v P (1993) 69 A Crim R 159, Gleeson CJ was considering a question posed by the Crown to the effect – can momentary inattention amount to driving in a manner dangerous, following the decision in the High Court of Jiminez v The Queen. In answering the question “yes”, his Honour said that “the decisions in Coventry, McBride and Jiminez can all stand together”.14 In an appropriate case, for example in a case where the Crown relies upon momentary inattention as the element of dangerousness, the jury should usually be instructed as to the distinction between conduct which amounts to mere negligence and the seriousness of the conduct necessary to constitute driving in a manner dangerous to the public.15 In R v Goodman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 December 1991), the Court of Criminal Appeal made the following observations in relation a driver who attempted an overtaking manoeuvre at p 8: Common sense dictates that the obligation upon a driver wishing to attempt an overtaking manoeuvre is to assure himself, before doing so and by taking such steps as are objectively reasonable in the circumstances, that he will be able to complete that manoeuvre with safety. That obligation is a continuing one, so that if conditions change during the course of the manoeuvre, he must abandon it if he is no longer reasonably assured of completing it with safety. 1 King v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 833; [2012] HCA 24 at [31]. See also McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22 at 49–50 (CLR).
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2 King v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 833; [2012] HCA 24 at [34]. The earlier NSW decision of R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658, in as much as it stated that dangerous driving was a species of a less serious kind of negligence, has been rejected by the High Court in the case of King v The Queen. 3 Gillett v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 419; [2006] NSWCCA 370 at [27] approved by the plurality in King v The Queen at [34]. 4 R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548; (1991) 53 A Crim R 263. 5 R v S was specifically referred to as the reason for the change by the Attorney General in his Second Reading Speech at p 4794: Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 27 October 1994, pp 4792–4794). 6 R v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31 at 638–639 (CLR); see also R v P (1993) 69 A Crim R 159 at 161–162; R v Parker (1957) 41 Cr App R 134; Kaighin v The Queen (1990) 1 WAR 390. 7 R v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31; Callaghan v The Queen (1952) 87 CLR 115; [1952] HCA 55; Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508. 8 At pp 5–6. See also R v Coventry (1938) 59 CLR 633; [1938] HCA 31; R v McBride [1962] 2 QB 167; [1961] 3 WLR 549; (1961) 45 Cr App R 262; R v Evans [1963] 1 QB 412; [1962] 3 WLR 1457; [1962] 3 All ER 1086; R v Webb [1986] 2 Qd R 446; (1986) 3 MVR 302; Owens (1987) 30 A Crim R 59; R v Leaf-Milham (1987) 47 SASR 499; (1987) 30 A Crim R 68. 9 For a recent re-statement of this proposition, see: R v Goodman (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 December 1991) at p 6. 10 R v De Keyzer (1987) 9 NSWLR 709; 89 FLR 105 at 712 (NSWLR). 11 R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9. Compare R v Horvath [1972] VR 533. See also Martin v The Queen (1981) 4 A Crim R 302. 12 R v Guthrie (1981) 52 FLR 171; 40 ACTR 27. See also as an example R v Hindmarsh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 31 July 1991). 13 Per Lord Widgery CJ in R v Thorpe [1972] 1 WLR 342; [1972] 1 All ER 929; (1972) 56 Cr App R 293 quoted with approval by Yeldham J in Owens (1987) 30 A Crim R 59 at 65. See also R v McBride [1962] 2 QB 167; [1961] 3 WLR 549; (1961) 45 Cr App R 262. 14 R v P (1993) 69 A Crim R 159 at 162. 15 R v Hopton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 October 1998) per Spigelman CJ at p 8. As to the nature of the direction, see McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44; 40 ALJR 57; [1966] HCA 22 per Barwick CJ quoted earlier in [CA.52A.200]. See also R v Saunders (2002) 133 A Crim R 104; [2002] NSWCCA 362.
[CA.52A.220]
Element (5) Circumstances of aggravation
“Prescribed concentration of alcohol” is defined in s 52A(9) as meaning a “concentration of 0.15 g or more of alcohol in 100 ml of blood”. [CA.52A.240]
Sentencing
In R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209; (1998) 101 A Crim R 259; 29 MVR 523, Spigelman CJ (with whom Wood CJ at CL, Sully, James and Adams JJ agreed) provided a guideline judgment with respect to sentencing for an offence under s 52A. In R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252; (2002) 134 A Crim R 53; [2002] NSWCCA 343, the court reformulated the Jurisic guideline. It further noted that the numerical guideline has been significant in ensuring the adequacy and consistency of sentences. In defining the typical case the court said: A frequently recurring case of an offence under s 52A has the following characteristics: (i) Young offender. (ii) Of good character with no or limited prior convictions. (iii) Death or permanent injury to a single person. (iv) The victim is a stranger. (v) No or limited injury to the driver or the driver’s intimates. (vi) Genuine remorse. (vii) Plea of guilty of limited utilitarian value.
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[CA.52A.240]
Crimes Act 1900 s 52A
[CA.52A.240]
A custodial sentence will usually be appropriate unless the offender has a low level of moral culpability, as in the case of momentary inattention or misjudgment. (i) Extent and nature of the injuries inflicted. (ii) Number of people put at risk. (iii) Degree of speed. (iv) Degree of intoxication or of substance abuse. (v) Erratic or aggressive driving. (vi) Competitive driving or showing off. (vii) Length of the journey during which others were exposed to risk. (viii) Ignoring of warnings. (ix) Escaping police pursuit. (x) Degree of sleep deprivation. (xi) Failing to stop. Items (iii) to (xi) relate to the moral culpability of an offender.
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For offences against ss 52A(1) and 52A(3) for the typical case: Where the offender’s moral culpability is high, a full time custodial head sentence of less than three years (in the case of death) and two years (in the case of grievous bodily harm) would not generally be appropriate. For the aggravated version of each offence under s 52A an appropriate increment is required. Other factors, such as the number of victims, will also require an appropriate increment. The guideline focuses attention on the objective circumstances of the offence. The subjective circumstances of the offender will also require consideration. In R v Errington (2005) 157 A Crim R 553; [2005] NSWCCA 348 at [27], Mason P commented that: There is a wide spectrum of behaviour indicative of differing levels of moral culpability, indeed differing degrees of abandonment [of responsibility]. It is not required that cases be assigned to one or other of two pigeon holes marked respectively “momentary inattention or misjudgment” and “abandoned responsibility”. In R v Khatter [2000] NSWCCA 32, Simpson J (dissenting but with whom Sully J and Carruthers AJ agreed on this point) held (at [31]): Offences under s 52A are not divided into those of momentary inattention and those of abandonment of responsibility. Those are the two extremes. There are shades and gradations of moral culpability in different instances of the offence and it is proper for the courts to recognise a continuum, rather than a dichotomy, when assessing moral culpability. In R v Garlick (1994) 73 A Crim R 433, Carruthers J referred to the disparity of sentences between manslaughter and culpable driving and intimated that the maximum penalties for culpable driving were too low.1 Since that decision, s 52A has been substantially amended by increasing the maximum sentences. In R v Savka (1996) 88 A Crim R 393, Sully J (with whom Hunt CJ at CL and Studdert J agreed), in dealing with a sentence under the present legislation, said: I would myself have thought that in the field in which we are dealing in this unhappy case, general deterrence is a matter prime importance. It is, in my opinion, of the very essence of what needs to be done on this occasion, to ensure that there is sent out into the relevant portions of the community a clear and unmistakable message that the Courts recognise that Parliament did not amend s 52A just for the sake of doing it; but that Parliament intended that the new regime of penalties should be taken seriously by all concerned.2 In decisions prior to the amendment of s 52A, it was said that it will only be in an exceptional case that s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (formerly s 556A of the Crimes Act 1900) could be applied.3 Section 556A has now been repealed. In sentencing for culpable/dangerous driving, it is legitimate to have regard to the consequences of the driving.4
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1 R v Garlick (1994) 73 A Crim R 433 at 440. See also R v Hill (1998) 29 MVR 323; R v McKinney (1999) 29 MVR 355; [1999] NSWCCA 51. 2 This statement is consistent with a long line of authorities in which deterrence is emphasised as the an important feature: See for example: R v McIntyre (1988) 38 A Crim R 135; R v Speer (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 December 1990); R v Heinrich (1992) 61 A Crim R 212. See also to the same effect: R v Slattery (1996) 90 A Crim R 519; R v Musumeci (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 October 1997); R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209; (1998) 101 A Crim R 259; 29 MVR 523. 3 R v Swift (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 April 1991); R v Heinrich (1992) 61 A Crim R 212; R v Manwarring (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 April 1994); R v Harvey (unreported, CCA (NSW), 3 October 1985). 4 R v Norris (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 October 1989); R v Murin (unreported, CCA (NSW), 16 August 1985); R v Willis (unreported, CCA (NSW), 14 September 1988); R v Heinrich. 5 SBF v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 219; [2009] NSWCCA 231 at 244 (A Crim R).
[CA.52A.260]
Defence that death or injury not attributable
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Section 52A(8) provides that it shall be a defence to any charge under the section that the death or injury was not in any way attributable (as relevant) to the fact that the accused was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug, or was driving at a speed or in a manner dangerous. In R v F (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 543; 74 WN (NSW) 211, it was held that the onus is on the Crown to prove that the death or injury was occasioned through impact, and that the accused was driving under the influence, or at a speed or in a manner dangerous; but there is no onus on the Crown to prove a causal connection between the death or injury occasioned by the impact and the accused’s condition or her or his manner of driving. The onus rests on the accused on the balance of probabilities to prove there was no causal connection. To bring s 52A(8) into operation, it is sufficient for the accused to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the death or injury occasioned by the impact was not in any way attributable to the accused’s condition or manner of driving, that is, that there was an absence of causal connection between the death or injury on the one hand and the accused’s condition or manner of driving on the other hand.1 As to double jeopardy see s 52AA(6) and commentary at [CA.52AA.40]. 1 R v Windle (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 110; 75 WN (NSW) 63.
52AA
Dangerous driving: procedural matters
(1) Presumption as to intoxication For the purposes of section 52A, the accused is conclusively presumed to be under the influence of liquor if the prosecution proves that the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in the accused’s breath or blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm. [Subs (1) am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[3]]
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The offence of aggravated dangerous driving is a less serious offence than that of manslaughter for the purposes of applying the test in R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; 5 A Crim R 329; [1981] HCA 31. However, there is no bright line test to be applied when sentencing for aggravated dangerous driving so as in order to avoid breaching the rule in De Simoni. It is proper for the sentencing judge to make strong findings of fact with respect to the objective seriousness of the offence if those remarks are warranted on the evidence although care must always be taken to ensure that the rule in De Simoni is not breached.5
Crimes Act 1900 s 52AA (2) Evidence of intoxication—alcohol For the purposes of section 52A, evidence may be given of the concentration of alcohol present in the accused’s blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm as determined by a blood analysis carried out in accordance with Part 4 of Schedule 3 to the Road Transport Act 2013. [Subs (2) am Act 61 of 2015, Sch 1[1]; subst Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[4]; am Act 79 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1]–[2]; Act 11 of 2005, s 247 and Sch 3.5[2]; subst Act 19 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.6[3]; am Act 115 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 4.4[2]; Act 16 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 2.7[2]]
(3) Time of intoxication A concentration of alcohol determined by the means referred to in subsection (2) is taken to be the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm: (a) if the blood sample that was analysed was taken within 2 hours after the impact, and (b) unless the accused proves that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at the time of the impact was less than the prescribed concentration of alcohol. (3A) Evidence of intoxication—drugs For the purposes of section 52A, evidence may be given of the concentration of a drug (other than alcohol) present in the accused’s blood or urine at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm as determined by a blood or urine analysis carried out in accordance with Part 4 of Schedule 3 to the Road Transport Act 2013.
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[Subs (3A) am Act 61 of 2015, Sch 1[1]; subst Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[5]; insrt Act 79 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 2.1[3]]
(3B) Time of intoxication A concentration of a drug (other than alcohol) determined by the means referred to in subsection (3A) is taken to be the concentration of the drug in the accused’s blood or urine at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm: (a) if the blood or urine sample that was analysed was taken within 4 hours after the impact, and (b) unless the accused proves that there was no such drug in the accused’s blood or urine at the time of the impact. [Subs (3B) insrt Act 79 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 2.1[3]]
(4) Alternative verdicts If on the trial of a person who is indicted for murder or manslaughter or for an offence under section 53 or 54 the jury is satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence under section 52A, it may find the accused guilty of the offence under section 52A, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (5) Question of aggravation If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 52A(2) or (4) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 52A(1) or (3), it may find that the accused is guilty of the offence under section 52A(1) or (3), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (6) Double jeopardy This section does not take away the liability of any person to be prosecuted for or found guilty of murder, manslaughter or any other offence or affect the punishment that may be imposed for any such offence. However, a person who: (a) has been convicted or acquitted of an offence under section 52A cannot be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter or for any other offence under this Act on the same, or substantially the same, facts, or (b) has been convicted or acquitted of murder or manslaughter or of any other offence under this Act cannot be prosecuted for an offence under section 52A on the same, or substantially the same, facts.
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[CA.52AA.40]
s 52AA
(7) Definitions In this section: prescribed concentration of alcohol means a concentration of 0.15 grammes or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. [Def am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[4]]
road [Repealed] [S 52AA am Act 61 of 2015; Act 19 of 2013; Act 99 of 2007; Act 79 of 2006; Act 11 of 2005; Act 19 of 1999; Act 115 of 1997; Act 16 of 1995; insrt Act 78 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1]
SECTION 52AA COMMENTARY Alternative lesser verdict of dangerous driving ............................................................................. [CA.52AA.20] Double jeopardy ............................................................................................................................. [CA.52AA.40]
[CA.52AA.20]
Alternative lesser verdict of dangerous driving
For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. [CA.52AA.40]
Double jeopardy
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The effect of s 52AA(6) is twofold: (1) it retains the liability of a person to be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter in circumstances where the driving is an element of the factual situation. (2) it precludes further prosecution on the same or substantially the same facts. The words “has been convicted” used in s 52AA(6) means a final conviction. The jeopardy referred to should be understood as preventing double punishment rather than the entry of a judgment. Consequently, the entry of a “conviction” for dangerous driving, in an indictment that included a charge of murder, after a plea of guilty to that charge, did not prevent the order of conviction from being vacated when it was realised that a final conviction for the offence would prevent the prosecution of the accused for murder.1 In King v Stair (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 248, it was held that a person who had been acquitted of culpable driving could not be prosecuted for negligent driving, the words “any other offence” in the former s 52A(4) being held to include any offence, whether indictable or not, and whether created by the Crimes Act 1900 or any other Act. Subsequently, s 52A(4) was amended by adding the words “under the Act”2 to overcome Stair’s case. In Johnson v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, NSWSC, 26 June 1996), Hidden J upheld a plea of autrefois acquit when the Crown sought to proceed on a charge of negligent driving after the accused had been acquitted on the charge of culpable driving.3 In Director of Public Prosecutions v Vella [1999] NSWSC 49, Hulme J upheld the contention of the DPP that a magistrate’s decision to dismiss a charge of negligent driving, following an acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving, based on a claim of double jeopardy was erroneous. Hulme J held, relying upon Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; 72 ALJR 1416; 103 A Crim R 372; 156 ALR 684, that … the concept of driving negligently means driving in a manner which is negligent and a convenient definition of “negligent” is “careless, unheedful, inattentive” – expressions which direct attention to the attitude of the driver. The concept is quite different from driving in a manner which is dangerous – a concept which looks to the effect, actual or potential, on others, albeit a manner of driving may involve both concepts. Thus each offence involves proof of a fact which the other did not. A prosecution under s 8(1) of the Traffıc Act 1909 (now repealed), for failing to stop after an accident was not a prosecution for an offence “on the same or substantially the same facts”.4
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[Def rep Act 61 of 2015, Sch 1[2]; insrt Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[6]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 52AB
[CA.52AA.40]
As to issue estoppel, see Brown v Robinson (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 297; 76 WN (NSW) 758. It has been held that the former s 52A(4) does not preclude joinder in the one indictment relating to the one accident of counts of culpable driving alleging (a) driving in a manner dangerous and (b) driving under the influence of liquor.5 The words “under this Act” were added after “offence” originally by Act 81 of 1988. 1 2 3 4 5
R v Holton [2004] NSWCCA 214. Act 16 of 1955. It does not appear that in reaching the decision, consideration was given to s 52A(4) under the former s 52A. R v Haycock (1954) 71 WN (NSW) 221. R v Thompson [1976] 2 NSWLR 453 at 455 per Street CJ.
52AB Offence of failing to stop and assist after vehicle impact causing death or grievous bodily harm
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(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) a vehicle being driven by the person is involved in an impact occasioning the death of another person, and (b) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the vehicle has been involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, another person, and (c) the person fails to stop and give any assistance that may be necessary and that it is in his or her power to give. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) a vehicle being driven by the person is involved in an impact occasioning grievous bodily harm to another person, and (b) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the vehicle has been involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, another person, and (c) the person fails to stop and give any assistance that may be necessary and that it is in his or her power to give. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 7 years. (3) The provisions of section 52A (5) and (6) (which prescribe circumstances in which a vehicle is taken to be involved in an impact) apply for the purposes of this section in the same way as they apply for the purposes of section 52A. (4) In this section, vehicle has the same meaning as it has in section 52A. [S 52AB insrt Act 74 of 2005, s 3 and Sch 1]
SECTION 52AB COMMENTARY Form of charge, jurisdiction and cross-references ........................................................................ [CA.52AB.20] History and purpose of s 146 ........................................................................................................ [CA.52AB.40] Elements of offences under s 52AB .............................................................................................. [CA.52AB.60] Element (1) Drive a vehicle ........................................................................................................... [CA.52AB.80] Element (2) Involved in an impact ............................................................................................... [CA.52AB.100] Element (3) Occasioning death or grievous bodily harm to another .......................................... [CA.52AB.120] Element (4) Knowledge of impact and death or grievous bodily harm ....................................... [CA.52AB.140] Element (5) Failure to stop and give necessary assistance ....................................................... [CA.52AB.160] Possible defences to a charge under s 52AB ............................................................................. [CA.52AB.180] Sentencing considerations and additional penalties ................................................................... [CA.52AB.200]
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[CA.52AB.60] [CA.52AB.20]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 52AB
Form of charge, jurisdiction and cross-references
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did a vehicle, namely .......... which vehicle was involved in an impact and which impact occasioned the death of CD (or grievous bodily harm to CD) and the said AB knew or ought reasonably to have known that the vehicle was involved in such impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm to CD and the said AB failed to stop and give any assistance that may have been necessary and that it was in AB’s power to give.
Section 146 of the Road Transport Act 2013 makes it an offence to stop and assist after a vehicle impact causing injury. Regulation 287 of the Road Rules 2008 specifies the duties of a driver to stop and give particulars after a crash. Section 205 of the Road Transport Act 2013 provides for disqualification of licence for offences, including under s 52AB.
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[CA.52AB.40]
History and purpose of s 146
With the cognate s 52AB of the Crimes Act 1900, the predecessor of s 146, that is, s 70 of the Road Transport (Safety and Management) Act 1999 was enacted by the Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) Act 2005. The following extracts from the Second Reading speech for the Bill show the purposes of these provisions. Ms Diane Beamer on behalf of the Attorney General said: … Under this bill, a new offence of failing to stop, with much heavier penalties, is introduced into the Crimes Act in recognition of society’s abhorrence of those who injure their fellow citizens and then abandon them to die. When a driver leaves the scene of an accident, leaving in his or her wake a dead or badly injured person without attempting to render assistance, the fundamental code of civilised society is breached … . … … The focus of the new offences is to ensure assistance for victims of serious vehicle impacts. Assistance may save a life, minimise injury, improve the prospect of recovery, alleviate suffering, and preserve the dignity of the injured or deceased. Failure to stop and assist in serious accidents should invite significant punishment. The requirement is to stop and give any assistance necessary that is in the driver’s power to give. That is not to say that people must stop to perform first aid when they are not qualified to do so, or rescue someone from a burning car in dangerous circumstances. Obviously commonsense judgment will be required. What is required is for the person to stop and take steps to assist directly or obtain expert help by contacting police or emergency services to ensure that professional expert assistance is obtained at the earliest opportunity. The action of drivers fleeing may thwart police in their ability to identify the drivers and collect necessary evidence. … (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 21 September 2005, p 18124). [CA.52AB.60] Elements of offences under s 52AB The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1. the accused did drive a vehicle; 2. which vehicle was involved in an impact; and 3. which occasioned the death of another person (or grievous bodily harm to another person); and 4. the accused knew or ought reasonably to have known that the vehicle was involved in an impact that occasioned the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, another person; and 5. failed to stop and give any assistance that may have been necessary and that it was in the accused’s power to give.
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A charge under s 52AB is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence (cl 16A) under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment.
Crimes Act 1900 s 52AB [CA.52AB.80]
[CA.52AB.0] Element (1) Drive a vehicle
“Drive” is defined in s 4 of the Road Transport Act 2013 but is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In Tink v Francis [1983] 2 VR 17, there is extensive consideration of the authorities in relation to the meaning of “drive”. Young CJ concluded at p 19: The ordinary meaning to be attached to the word “drives” when applied to a motor car should, I think embrace the notion of some control of the propulsive force which, if operating, will cause the car to move. The propulsive force is not, however, to be confined to sources within the motor vehicle itself, but includes at least the force of gravity and, if momentum can with sufficient accuracy be described as a force, its momentum. I see no reason why it should not also include other forces externally applied. It has been held that more than one person may drive a vehicle.1 The ability to steer is not itself definitive of driving. A driver, affected by alcohol, was weaving and swerving across a roadway before her vehicle mounted the nature strip and collided with a pole, killing her passenger in the front passenger seat. The passenger had grabbed the steering wheel just before the car left the roadway in what the judge described as a act of self-preservation. It was held that the ability to steer a vehicle is not an essential aspect of being a driver and the driver maintained management and control of the vehicle in terms of controlling its propulsion (both accelerating and braking) up to the point of impact: Williams v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 286 per RA Hulme J and Basten JA.
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In Hampson v Martin [1981] 2 NSWLR 782, Foster J considered many authorities in relation to whether a person in a towed vehicle is a “driver” and concluded that the person is not a driver because the person does not have control of the means of propulsion. It will be noted that the section is not restricted to drivers of motor vehicles, but simply vehicles. By s 52AB(4) “vehicle” has the same meaning as it has in s 52A which provides that “vehicle” means: (a) any motor car, motor carriage, motor cycle or other vehicle propelled wholly or partly by volatile spirit, steam, gas, oil, electricity, or by any other means other than human or animal power, or (b) a horse-drawn vehicle, whether or not it is adapted for road use, but does not mean a vehicle used on a railway or tramway. 1 Ricketts v Laws (1988) 14 NSWLR 311 at 314 per Kirby J (instructor and learner); R v Affleck (1992) 65 A Crim R 96 per Smart J (defendant controlling the vehicles pedals but not the steering wheel or gears). See also Langman v Valentine [1952] 2 All ER 803 at 805, 806 and Bassell v McGuiness (1981) 29 SASR 508 at 522 per Matheson J.
[CA.52AB.100]
Element (2) Involved in an impact
The concept of impact is broadened by s 52AB(3) which incorporates the terms of s 52A(5) and (6), specifying various situations that will constitute an “impact”. The impact need not be with another vehicle. [CA.52AB.120]
Element (3) Occasioning death or grievous bodily harm to another
If the impact causing death or injury is not a direct impact with the person killed or injured or the vehicle in which that person was travelling, a factual question of causation will or may arise. In this event, the prosecution will have to prove causation. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380].Whether an impact occasions death or grievous bodily harm to another is a question of fact. As to when death occurs, see [CA.19A.100]. Grievous bodily harm means really serious injury – for detailed commentary, see [CA.4.160]. [CA.52AB.140]
Element (4) Knowledge of impact and death or grievous bodily harm
The mental state required to be proved is either that the accused actually knew of an impact causing death or grievous bodily harm or that he or she ought to have known this. The former of these alternative mental states is the driver’s actual subjective knowledge. The latter however has an objective component. In the Second Reading Speech of the Bill containing s 146, it was said, “The extension of the mental element to
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[CA.52AB.160]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 6 – Acts causing danger to life or bodily harm
s 52AB
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances where a driver would be completely unaware of an impact, such as the circumstances set out in s 52A(5)(f), that is, an impact caused by the motion of an object falling from a vehicle. Also, an apparently minor impact may cause an unexpected and unlikely death or injury constituting grievous bodily harm. It is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove only that the accused knew or ought to have known that there was an accident by itself.4 The severity of the impact may be an important matter in determining whether the driver ought to have known of the impact and death or grievous bodily harm. 1 Second Reading Speech for the Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) Bill 2005, Ms Diane Beamer on behalf of the Attorney-General, (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 21 September 2005, p 18124). 2 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 29 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. 3 Simpson v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 228; 103 A Crim R 19; [1998] HCA 46 at [11]–[14] per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 4 Ex parte Bedser; Re Kotze (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 53.
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[CA.52AB.160]
Element (5) Failure to stop and give necessary assistance
Section 52AB creates the obligation on a driver to stop and to give any necessary assistance that it is within the driver’s power to give. Limits on this were acknowledged in the Second Reading Speech for the Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) Bill 2005 under which s 52AB of the Crimes Act 1900 was enacted, see [CA.52AB.20]. In a Victorian case, it was noted that a driver may stop at the scene of an accident, but fail to render assistance.1 It should be noted that under ss 52AB(1)(c) and (2)(c), the obligation on a driver responsible for an impact is not limited to giving assistance to the victim – the victim may be dead. Notification of the police and/or other authorities may be the only assistance a driver can give. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal has said that a driver’s responsibility for failing to stop after the accident was not mitigated because, in practical terms, there was little he could have done for the deceased and that the driver did not know that for certain. The Court said “[s]uch assistance may save life, minimise injury, improve the prospect of recovery and relevantly in this instance, preserve the dignity of the deceased.”2 It has been judicially remarked that a primary matter to which the charge of failure to stop is directed is to ensure the identification of the driver and to facilitate the prompt investigation of the circumstances of the accident (including testing for blood alcohol content).3 1 Pollard v The Queen [2010] VSCA 156 at [29]. 2 WW v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 165 at [85]. 3 Fitzgerald v Police (2000) 113 A Crim R 413; [2000] SASC 168 at [16]; R v Fairley (2004) 40 MVR 403; [2004] VSCA 15 per Eames JA at [16]. See also the Second Reading Speech of the Bill enacting s 52AB at [CA.52AB.40].
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incorporate an objective element of ‘ought reasonably to have known’ is warranted in the special circumstances of this offence.”1 The test may not be wholly objective. The expression “knew or ought to have known” is one sometimes used in Criminal Codes in other state jurisdictions. The meaning of “ought to have known” has been considered by the High Court in the very different context of culpable homicide under the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas). In that context, it was held that the relevant question was not what some hypothetical reasonable person in the position of the accused would have appreciated, but rather, what the particular accused with his or her actual knowledge and capacity ought to have known in the circumstances.2 This may sometimes be proved by inference.3
Crimes Act 1900 s 52AB
[CA.52AB.10]
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[CA.52AB.180] Possible defences to a charge under s 52AB Apart from being unaware that there had been an impact at all, possible defences to a charge under s 52AB may include (a) honest and reasonable mistake of fact, (b) necessity and (c) duress. For commentary on these defences in a driving context, see [RTA.117.200] and generally, [1.414] (honest and reasonable mistake of fact), [CLP.1420] (necessity) and [CLP.860] (duress). [CA.52AB.200] Sentencing considerations and additional penalties Maximum penalties – the penalties under s 52AB have been made the same as those under s 52A. The reason was given in the Second Reading Speech for the Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) Bill 2005 as follows: The maximum penalties applying in these cases are severe. The maximum penalties are equivalent to those for offences of dangerous driving occasioning death and dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm in section 52A of the Crimes Act. As a result no incidental advantage will accrue to a driver who flees and knows or ought reasonably to have known that death or grievous bodily harm was occasioned by the impact.1 Sentencing considerations – an attempt to avoid detection is often a factor in failing to stop.2 It has been judicially observed that failure to stop and assist is indicative of a failure or refusal by the driver to accept responsibility for his or her conduct.3 It has been judicially observed that drivers who, in breach of their duty, depart the scene of an accident in circumstances where it is likely to be inferred that they did so to avoid the consequences of unlawful conduct, cannot expect that the courts will give weight to exculpatory explanations for why they have done so which are proffered after the event.4 A claim by a driver of failing to stop because of panic does not necessarily provide an element of mitigation, but the driver is entitled to have that assertion assessed by the sentencing judge.5 Victim’s injuries – concerning the taking into account of the victim’s injuries, it has been held that the only injuries that can be taken into account in sentencing an offender for failing to stop after an accident are those injuries that can be directly attributed to the failure to stop.6 Disqualification of licence – an offence under s 52AB is a “major offence” within s 4 of the Road Transport Act 2013. By s 205(2)(d) of that Act, a driver convicted of a 52AB offence is automatically disqualified from holding a driver licence for 3 years with a minimum period of 12 months. If the driver has been convicted of a major offence within the previous 5 years, by s 205(3)(d), the automatic period of disqualification is 5 years, with a minimum period of 2 years. Habitual traffıc offender declaration – by s 217 of the Road Transport Act 2013, a person is declared to be an habitual traffic offender if the person is convicted of a relevant offence within the meaning of s 216 and has been convicted of two other relevant offences committed on different occasions within the previous 5 years. A “relevant offence” includes a “major offence” within s 4 of the Road Transport Act 2013, which includes an offence under s 52AB of the Crimes Act 1900. Section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 – s 203 of the Road Transport Act 2013 provides that s 10 does not apply if the person charged has had s 10 applied to an “applicable offence” during the previous 5 years. Section 203(2) specifies various driving offences as “applicable offences”, which includes an earlier conviction under s 52AB. 1 Second Reading Speech for the Crimes Amendment (Road Accidents) Bill 2005, Ms Diane Beamer on behalf of the Attorney-General, (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 21 September 2005, p 18124). 2 R v Fairley (2004) 40 MVR 403; [2004] VSCA 15 per Chernov JA at [3]. 3 R v Woodland [2007] NSWCCA 29 at [39]; R v Shumack (2008) 191 A Crim R 513; [2008] NSWCCA 311 at [2]–[4]. 4 Wassef v The Queen [2011] VSCA 30 at [31]. 5 R v Ryan (2003) 141 A Crim R 403; [2003] NSWCCA 202 at [30]. 6 R v Harding (2008) 50 MVR 413; [2008] VSCA 124.
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52B
s 52B
Dangerous navigation: substantive matters
A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 27 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3[1]]
(2) Aggravated dangerous navigation occasioning death A person is guilty of the offence of aggravated dangerous navigation occasioning death if the person commits the offence of dangerous navigation occasioning death in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (3) Dangerous navigation causing grievous bodily harm
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A person is guilty of the offence of dangerous navigation causing grievous bodily harm if the vessel navigated by the person is involved in an impact occasioning grievous bodily harm to another person and the person navigating the vessel was, at the time of the impact, navigating the vessel: (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug, or (b) at a speed dangerous to another person or persons, or (c) in a manner dangerous to another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (3) am Act 27 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3[1]]
(4) Aggravated dangerous navigation occasioning grievous bodily harm A person is guilty of the offence of aggravated dangerous navigation occasioning grievous bodily harm if the person commits the offence of dangerous navigation occasioning grievous bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 11 years. (5) When vessel is involved in impact—generally For the purposes of this section, the circumstances in which a vessel is involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, a person include if the death or harm is occasioned through any of the following: (a) the vessel overturning or running aground while the person is being conveyed in or on the vessel (whether as a passenger or otherwise), (b) an impact between any object and the vessel while the person is being conveyed in or on that vessel (whether as a passenger or otherwise), (c) an impact between the person and the vessel, (d) the impact of the vessel with another vessel or an object in, on or near which the person is at the time of the impact, (e) an impact with anything on, or attached to, the vessel, (f) an impact with anything that was in motion through falling from the vessel, (g) the person falling from the vessel, or being thrown or ejected from the vessel, while being conveyed in or on the vessel (whether as a passenger or otherwise),
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(1) Dangerous navigation occasioning death A person is guilty of the offence of dangerous navigation occasioning death if the vessel navigated by the person is involved in an impact occasioning the death of another person and the person navigating the vessel was, at the time of the impact, navigating the vessel: (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug, or (b) at a speed dangerous to another person or persons, or (c) in a manner dangerous to another person or persons.
Crimes Act 1900 s 52B (h)
an impact between any object (including the water and the ground) and the person, as a consequence of the person (or any part of the person) being or protruding outside the vessel, while the person is being conveyed in or on the vessel (whether as a passenger or otherwise).
[Subs (5) am Act 11 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 4[2]]
(6) When vessel is involved in causing other impacts For the purposes of this section, a vessel is also involved in an impact occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, a person if the death or harm is occasioned through the vessel causing an impact between other vessels or between another vessel and any object or person or causing another vessel to overturn or run aground. (7) Circumstances of aggravation In this section, circumstances of aggravation means any circumstances at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm in which: (a) the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in the accused’s breath or blood, or (b) the accused was navigating the vessel at a speed that exceeds the speed limit (if any) applicable to the person navigating the vessel, or to the navigable waters, on which the vessel was navigated at the time of the impact, or (c) the accused was navigating the vessel in an attempt to escape pursuit by a police officer, or (d) the accused’s ability to navigate was very substantially impaired by the fact that the accused was under the influence of a drug (other than intoxicating liquor) or a combination of drugs (whether or not intoxicating liquor was part of that combination).
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[Subs (7) am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[5]; Act 135 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
(8) Defences It is a defence to any charge under this section if the death or grievous bodily harm occasioned by the impact was not in any way attributable (as relevant): (a) to the fact that the person charged was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug or a combination of drugs, or (b) to the speed at which the vessel was navigated, or (c) to the manner in which the vessel was navigated. [Subs (8) am Act 135 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
(9) Definitions In this section: drug has the same meaning as it has in the Road Transport Act 2013. [Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[7]; subst Act 19 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2.6[4]]
object includes a pier, wharf, jetty, pontoon, buoy, breakwater, bridge, support, mooring post or platform, navigation aid, retaining wall, marina, boatshed, slipway or swimming enclosure. prescribed concentration of alcohol means a concentration of 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. [Def am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[6]]
vessel means a vessel within the meaning of the Marine Safety Act 1998. [Def am Act 4 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2.1[1]] [S 52B am Act 19 of 2013; Act 99 of 2007; Act 4 of 2005; Act 11 of 2004; Act 27 of 2003; Act 19 of 1999; Act 135 of 1997; subst Act 6 of 1996, s 3 and Sch 1; am Act 46 of 1990; Act 81 of 1988; insrt Act 10 of 1983, s 5 and Sch 5(2)]
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s 52BA
Dangerous navigation: procedural matters
(1) Presumption as to intoxication For the purposes of section 52B, the accused is conclusively presumed to be under the influence of liquor if the prosecution proves that the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in the accused’s breath or blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm. (2) Evidence of intoxication For the purposes of section 52B, evidence may be given of the concentration of alcohol present in the accused’s blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm as determined by a blood analysis carried out in accordance with Schedule 1 to the Marine Safety Act 1998. [Subs (2) am Act 4 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2.1[2]]
(3) Time of intoxication A concentration of alcohol determined by the means referred to in subsection (2) is taken to be the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at the time of the impact occasioning death or grievous bodily harm: (a) if the blood sample that was analysed was taken within 2 hours after the impact, and (b) unless the accused proves that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at that time was less than the prescribed concentration of alcohol.
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(4) Alternative verdicts If on the trial of a person who is indicted for murder or manslaughter or for an offence under section 54 the jury is satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence under section 52B, it may find the accused guilty of the offence under section 52B, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (5) Question of aggravation If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 52B(2) or (4) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 52B(1) or (3), it may find that the accused is guilty of the offence under section 52B(1) or (3), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (6) Double jeopardy This section does not take away the liability of any person to be prosecuted for or found guilty of murder, manslaughter or any other offence or affect the punishment that may be imposed for any such offence. However, a person who: (a) has been convicted or acquitted of an offence under section 52B cannot be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter or for any other offence under this Act on the same, or substantially the same, facts, or (b) has been convicted or acquitted of murder or manslaughter or of any other offence under this Act cannot be prosecuted for an offence under section 52B on the same, or substantially the same, facts. (7) Definition In this section: prescribed concentration of alcohol means a concentration of 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. [Def am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[8]] [S 52BA am Act 99 of 2007; Act 4 of 2005; insrt Act 6 of 1996, s 3 and Sch 1]
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[Subs (1) am Act 99 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3.5[7]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 53
[CA.52BA.20]
SECTION 52BA COMMENTARY General .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.52BA.20] “Vessel” .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.52BA.40]
[CA.52BA.20]
General
Section 52B closely follows the wording and structure of s 52A substituting “vessel” for “motor vehicle”. Therefore, the annotations in [CA.52A.200] are apposite. [CA.52BA.40]
“Vessel”
Section 2 of the Maritime Services Act 1935 defines “vessel” as meaning any ship, lighter, barge, boat, raft, craft and any floating object or apparatus used wholly or in part for the conveyance of persons or things by water, of whatsoever description and howsoever navigated, and includes amphibious vehicles, seaplanes, hydroplanes, hydrofoils, hovercraft, sunken or stranded vessels and the wreck or remains of any vessel. The test for establishing of navigating a vessel in a manner dangerous to the public is objective: overloading could constitute navigation in a manner dangerous.1 The relationship between s 52B and s 96 of the Navigation Act 1901 has been considered.2 1 R v Warner (1991) 25 NSWLR 382; (1991) 58 A Crim R 54. 2 R v Warner (1991) 25 NSWLR 382; (1991) 58 A Crim R 54.
53
Injuries by furious driving etc
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Whosoever, being at the time on horseback, or in charge of any carriage or other vehicle, by wanton or furious riding, or driving, or racing, or other misconduct, or by wilful neglect, does or causes to be done to any person any bodily harm, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years.
SECTION 53 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge, jurisdiction, historical note and cross references ................................................ [CA.53.20] Elements of offences under s 53 ....................................................................................................... [CA.53.40] Element (1) Being in charge of a vehicle ........................................................................................... [CA.53.60] Element (2) By wanton or furious driving etc. .................................................................................... [CA.53.80] Element (3) Causing any bodily harm to another ............................................................................ [CA.53.100]
[CA.53.20]
Indictment/charge, jurisdiction, historical note and cross references
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales being in charge of a vehicle, namely .......... by wanton (or furious) driving (or racing, or other misconduct, or by wilful neglect) did (or caused to be done) bodily harm to CD. A charge under s 53 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. Historical note: this offence was taken from s 35 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (UK) (24 & 25 Vict. c.100). Its antiquated terms have not been altered. Furious driving is sometimes charged under s 53 where bodily harm falling short of grievous bodily harm is caused, or where no bodily harm is caused, under s 117 of the Road Transport Act 2013. Related offences: Menacing driving under s 118 of the Road Transport Act 2013. Negligent, furious or reckless driving under s 117 of the Road Transport Act 2013. Dangerous driving causing death or grievous bodily harm under s 52A of the Crimes Act 1900.
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s 53
Predatory driving under s 51A of the Crimes Act 1900. [CA.53.40]
Elements of offences under s 53
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: 1. being in charge of a vehicle; 2. by wanton (or furious) driving (or racing, or other misconduct, or by wilful neglect); 3. did (or caused to be done) bodily harm to another. Element (1) Being in charge of a vehicle
Being in charge of a vehicle will, in almost all cases, mean the driver or rider of the vehicle concerned. As to this, see commentary at [RTA.117.80]. There may be exceptions, such as a driving instructor. There is a definition of “vehicle” in s 52A(9), but this is not expressed to apply to s 53. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines vehicle (in part) as: “A means of conveyance, usu. with wheels, for transporting people, goods, etc.; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge etc. Any means of carriage or transport…”.1 A bicycle has been held to fall within this section.2 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002. 2 Taylor v Goodwin (1879) 4 QBD 228; R v Parker (1895) 59 JP 793.
[CA.53.80]
Element (2) By wanton or furious driving etc.
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Although furious driving is an offence sometimes charged, there are no reported New South Wales cases concerning the interpretation of s 53 and the few English cases concerning the English equivalent provision did not involve interpretation of it. Furious driving – “furious” is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (in part) as: “full of fury, very angry, raging; resulting from or showing fury; violent, frantic.”1 An older English authority described furious driving as driving which does or can endanger the life or health of any person who may be on the road,2 but this does not really encapsulate the element of anger etc involved, or distinguish furious driving from other kinds of proscribed driving such as negligent driving. Wanton driving – “wanton” conduct means conduct which has an unrestrained disregard of the consequences of the accused’s actions so far as the lives or safety of other persons are concerned.3 Similarly, “wanton” means “unreasonably or maliciously risking harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences” and “wantonness” means “Conduct indicating that the actor is aware of the risks but indifferent to the results. Wantonness usually suggests a greater degree of culpability than recklessness, and it often connotes malice in criminal-law contexts.”4 It has been said that wantonness differs from recklessness in that “… ‘Wanton’ has much the same meaning but includes not only an indifference to consequences but an unrestrained disregard of them (R v Canadian Liquid Air Ltd., an unreported case from British Columbia).”5 Racing, or other misconduct – “race” is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (in part) as: “a contest of speed between … vehicles etc.”6 Other misconduct might involve illegitimate driving activities such as speed trials or burnouts. Wilful neglect – to act wilfully is to act intentionally.7 To “wilfully neglect to do a thing” is to intentionally or purposefully omit to do it.8 See also general commentary on the meaning of “wilfully” at [CLP.80]. It is suggested that, in this context, to “drive with wilful neglect” means to drive with intentional disregard of a driver’s obligation to drive safely. Mental element – conduct alleged to involve driving in a manner deserving of punishment is ordinarily evaluated according to an objective standard, that is, whether in a given instance the driving under consideration differs from acceptable driving by the proscribed degree. Thus, both dangerous driving and negligent driving are assessed according to an objective standard, see [CA.52A.200] and [RTA.117.120] respectively. The prosecution is not required to prove that the driver intended to drive in either of these
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[CA.53.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 54
[CA.53.80]
ways. Older English authorities dealing with cases of wanton driving state that it is not necessary to explain to a jury what this expression means as its meaning is so well known (and presumably, much less explain whether the test of it is subjective or objective).9 While this may have been so a century or so ago, it is certainly not so now. It is suggested that, like dangerous and negligent driving, the tests of furious or wanton driving will be objective. Whether a driver is racing etc will simply be a question of fact. However, wilful neglect may involve a partly subjective test to satisfy the requirement of “wilful”. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002. Chatterton v Parker (1914) 111 LT 380. R v Bolton (unreported, District Court, NSW, Cooper J, 14 May 1981). Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (4th ed, 1974 Sweet & Maxwell London) at 2971. Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002. Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84; [1968] HCA 14 per Barwick CJ at 95 (CLR), Windeyer J at 107 (CLR), McTiernan J at 98 (CLR) and Taylor J (with whom Owen J agreed) at 101 (CLR). 8 R v Downes (1875) 1 QBD 25 per Mellor J. 9 R v Crowden (1911) 6 Cr App R 190; R v Burdon (1927) 20 Cr App R 80.
[CA.53.100]
Element (3) Causing any bodily harm to another
Any bodily harm – here “any bodily harm” is likely to be given the same meaning as “actual bodily harm”, the commonly accepted definition of which was stated by Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 at 509 (KB): … “bodily harm” has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.1 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
See also commentary at [CA.59.100]. Does or causes to be done – this expression may simply draw the distinction between bodily harm directly done and indirectly done. In the latter case, there may be a factual question of causation. For detailed commentary on the question of causation, see [CLP.380]. Harm to another – there is nothing in s 53 to indicate that the requisite harm must be done to someone outside the vehicle the accused is in charge of.2 1 Applied in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44; Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 at [133], [134] (NSWCA) per McColl JA (Mason P and Ipp JA agreeing); McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305. 2 Section 52A proscribes dangerous driving causing the death of or grievous bodily harm to “another person”; such person may be a passenger in the vehicle being driven by the accused. In an earlier version of s 52A, this conduct was proscribed in relation to “a member of the public”. In R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548; (1991) 53 A Crim R 263, it was held that with rare exceptions, a passenger in a vehicle is a member of the public. A fortiori, “another” is to be read without restriction.
54
Causing grievous bodily harm
Whosoever by any unlawful or negligent act, or omission, causes grievous bodily harm to any person, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years.
SECTION 54 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................... [CA.54.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.54.40]
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Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.54.60] Element (1) Causing grievous bodily harm ........................................................................................ [CA.54.80] Element (2) By any unlawful or negligent act or omission .............................................................. [CA.54.100]
[CA.54.20]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did by an unlawful act (or omission) (or by a negligent act or omission) namely, .......... cause grievous bodily harm to CD. Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 54 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence and, under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. Related provisions are: • Section 24 – involuntary manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act and by criminal negligence • Section 33 – intentionally causing grievous bodily harm; • Section 35 – recklessly causing grievous bodily harm. Alternative verdict – In a driving case where the accused is charged under s 54, s 52AA(4) provides for an alternative verdict under s 52A.
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[CA.54.60] Elements of the offence The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) caused grievous bodily harm to the complainant; (2) by an unlawful act (or omission), or by a negligent act (or omission). [CA.54.80] Element (1) Causing grievous bodily harm Grievous bodily harm means really serious bodily harm, see commentary at [CA.4.160]. Whether or not the accused’s act or omission was the cause of grievous bodily harm in any given case will be a question of fact. It has been held that the grievous bodily harm need not be the direct result of the unlawful or negligent act or omission.1 An accused may be convicted of causing grievous bodily harm if such harm is caused by an attempt to escape by the victim under a reasonable apprehension of personal injury from a threatened assault by the accused.2 For commentary on causation, see [CLP.380]ff. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the act was specifically directed to the actual victim sustaining grievous bodily harm, see [CA.24.120]. 1 R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54 where a conviction for unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm upon two theatre goers was upheld when they were injured in a crush when the theatre lights were put out after an iron bar was place across a doorway. See also R v Nicholson [1916] VLR 130 where the accused removed a gas meter and failed to plug the severed pipe and the householder was injured by an explosion when she lit a lamp. Also R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452 (FC). 2 R v Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197; R v Halliday (1889) 61 LT 701; Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 65 ALJR 451; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669.
[CA.54.100]
Element (2) By any unlawful or negligent act or omission
Two Court of Criminal Appeal decisions, R v D [1984] 3 NSWLR 29; 14 A Crim R 198 and R v Pullman (1991) 25 NSWLR 89; 58 A Crim R 222 state that liability under s 54 for unlawful or negligent acts or omissions causing grievous bodily harm incorporates some principles relevant to the two categories of involuntary manslaughter, that is, killing by an unlawful and dangerous act and killing by criminal negligence. Negligent act or omission – the degree of negligence must be very high to attract liability under s 54. In R v D (a case involving a collision on a waterway between a half cabin cruiser and a dinghy), Yeldham J
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[CA.54.100]
(with Street CJ and Mahoney JA agreeing) said at 34 (NSWLR); 208 (A Crim R): … in relation to s 54 …, I consider that the legislature, in providing that in certain circumstances a negligent act may give rise to criminal liability, intended that the criminal standard of negligence appropriate to the common law crime of manslaughter as a result of a negligent act or omission should be applied. Notwithstanding the relatively small penalty provided, I do not think it is consistent with logic, nor is it necessary or desirable, to seek to import into the section some intermediate standard of negligence ranking between the civil standard on the one hand and that relating to manslaughter on the other.1 Concerning manslaughter by criminal negligence – the Victorian case of Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430, a decision approved by the High Court2, stated at 445 that In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment.
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In Pullman, Hunt CJ at CL said (at 91 (NSWLR); 224 (A Crim R)), (applying Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; (1938) 26 Cr App R 34), that for the offence of manslaughter based on criminal negligence, the prosecution had “to establish such a high degree of negligence or disregard for the life and safety of others as to be regarded as a crime against the community generally and as conduct deserving punishment.”3 The high degree of negligence meriting “criminal punishment” has been variously described as, inter alia, “culpable”, “criminal”, “gross” and “wicked”.4 Objective test of negligence – the test is not a subjective one from the perception of the accused, but is objective.5 The matter is to be judged from the standard of care that the reasonable man would have exercised.6 However, the standard is required to be judged from the standpoint of a person in the position of the accused. Therefore, factors relevant to that standard should be imputed to the reasonable man, see the cases of R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358 and R v Cameron (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 September 1994), referred to at [CA.24.240]. In R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37, Kirby J remarked Subjective intention does not enjoy a monopoly on moral culpability. … The claim of a person who causes harm that he or she did not mean to do it or did not stop to think as excusing them of wrongdoing is commonly treated as unpersuasive, especially where death or serious injury ensue.7 Unlawful act or omission – Pullman involved a car driven onto the wrong side of the road by the accused causing a collision resulting in death and serious injury to other road users. As the accused’s car did not collide directly with any other vehicle, a charge of dangerous driving causing death or grievous bodily harm was not available. Hunt CJ (Campbell and Newman JJ agreeing) said at 97 (NSWLR); 230 (A Crim R) In D [1984] 3 NSWLR 29 at 33–34; (1984) 14 A Crim R 198 at 202, this Court held that the negligent act (or omission) to which s 54 refers must be the same as that required for the category of manslaughter based upon criminal negligence. By analogy, therefore, the unlawful act required to support the other limb of s 54 must be the same as that required for the category of manslaughter based upon an unlawful and dangerous act – although there is, of course, no requirement under s 54 that the Crown establish that the act is also dangerous. The unlawful act must constitute a breach of the criminal law and an act amounting to no more than a tort is insufficient, see authorities at [CA.24.120]. In Pullman, Hunt CJ said at 97 (NSWLR); 229 (A Crim R) that an act constituting a breach of some statutory or regulatory prohibition does not, for that reason alone, constitute an unlawful act in this context; but that such an act, if unlawful in itself, that is, unlawful otherwise than by such a breach, may constitute an unlawful act. An example given in Pullman was driving
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s 55
under the influence of alcohol, an act illegal in itself, apart from constituting a breach of the traffic regulations. Examples of other unlawful acts are given at [CA.24.120].
1 Citing R v Leskinen (1978) 36 FLR 414 per Blackburn J. 2 In Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR); 76 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ and in R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [60] (Callinan and Heydon JJ agreeing) and per Kirby J at [70] and [136]. 3 A statement to the same effect was made in R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 11–12 per Hewart LCJ, quoted with approval in Clout v Hutchinson (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 32; 67 WN (NSW) 203 and adopted in R v Jones (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 November 1963)). 4 R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 per Kirby J at [127]. The judgment of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Shields [1981] VR 717; 2 A Crim R 237 reviews many authorities dealing with the meaning of negligence in a criminal law context. 5 Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201; R v Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358. 6 Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430, the Court at 445; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313; 66 ALJR 517; 61 A Crim R 63; 107 ALR 257 at 333 (CLR); 74–75 (A Crim R). 7 R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67; (2005) 155 A Crim R 458; [2005] HCA 37 per Kirby J at [127].
DIVISION 7 – POSSESSING OR MAKING EXPLOSIVE ETC WITH INTENT TO INJURE THE PERSON Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Div 7 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[9]]
55
Possessing or making explosives or other things with intent to injure
Whosoever knowingly has in his or her possession, or makes, or manufactures, any gunpowder, explosive substance, or dangerous or noxious thing, or any machine, engine, instrument, or thing: (a) with intent by means thereof to injure, or otherwise commit a serious indictable offence against the person of any one, or (b) for the purpose of enabling another person to injure, or otherwise commit a serious indictable offence against the person of any one, shall be liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [S 55 am Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[27] and [70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]]
SECTION 55 COMMENTARY Forms of indictment ............................................................................................................................ [CA.55.20] Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences ............................................................................. [CA.55.40] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.55.60] Element (1) Knowingly had possession or made etc an explosive substance etc ............................ [CA.55.80] Element (2) Intent to injure or commit serious indictable offence ................................................... [CA.55.100]
[CA.55.20]
Forms of indictment
That AB on .......... at ......................... in the State of New South Wales knowingly had in his or her possession (or did make or manufacture) an explosive substance (or gunpowder, or a dangerous or noxious thing, or a machine, engine, instrument, or thing) with intent by means thereof to injure CD (or others) (or
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In the related case of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, the intent that must be proved by the prosecution is an intent to commit the breach of the criminal law alleged as the unlawful act, see authorities referred to at [CA.24.120].
Crimes Act 1900 s 55
[CA.55.20]
to commit a serious indictable offence against the person of CD (or of anyone)), or for the purpose of enabling another person to injure CD (or others) (or to commit a serious indictable offence against the person of CD (or of anyone)). [CA.55.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-reference and related offences
A charge under s 55 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267. Related offences: • Section 46 – Causing bodily injury by gunpowder etc; • Section 47 – Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc; • Section 48 – Causing explosives to be placed in or near building, conveyance or public place; • Section 93FA – Possession, supply or making of explosives; • Section 93FB – Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms; • Section 196 – Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person; • Section 200 – Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 44A – Attempt. Section 55 had its origin in and is in almost identical terms to s 64 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK).
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[CA.55.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) knowingly had in his or her possession or made or manufactured an explosive substance (or gunpowder, or a dangerous or noxious thing, or a machine, engine, instrument, or thing); (2) with intent by means thereof to injure the complainant (or others) (or to commit a serious indictable offence against the person of the complainant (or of anyone), or (2) for the purpose of enabling another person to injure the complainant (or others) (or to commit a serious indictable offence against the person of the complainant (or of anyone). [CA.55.80]
Element (1) Knowingly had possession or made etc an explosive substance etc
Knowingly had possession – s 7 extends the ordinary meaning of “possession” beyond having property on one’s person. For general commentary on criminal possession, see [CA.7.20]–[CA.7.140]. As to knowingly, the High Court dealt with the requirement of knowledge in Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR 1; 35 A Crim R 382; an extract from the judgment is quoted at [CLP.80] under “Knowingly”. An indictment that omits the averment of knowingly is defective.1 Makes or manufactures – these terms are largely synonymous. “Make” is defined in part as “[p]roduce by a combination of parts or ingredients, by giving a certain form to matter …”. “Manufacture” is defined as: 1 Bring (material) into a form suitable for use. 2 Make or fabricate from material; produce by physical labour or machinery ….2 Explosive substance – as to the meaning of explosive substance, see [CA.47.80]. Noxious thing – as to the meaning of noxious thing, see [CA.47.100]. 1 R v Stewart (1959) 44 Cr App R 29. 2 Definitions from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press.
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[CA.56.30] [CA.55.100]
s 56
Element (2) Intent to injure or commit serious indictable offence
Intent – the mens rea to be proven is the possession or making of an explosive substance or dangerous thing etc with the actual intent by means thereof to injure others or to enable another to injure others or to commit or enable the commission of a serious indictable offence against the person of another. For general commentary on intent, see [CLP.1400].
Serious indictable offence – as to the meaning of indictable offence, see [CA.37.140]. By s 4, a serious indictable offence means an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. As mentioned, the serious indictable offence must be such offence against the person of another.
DIVISION 8 – ASSAULTS [Div 8 heading subst Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[10]]
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56
Obstructing member of the clergy in discharge of his or her duties Whosoever: by threats or force prevents, or endeavours to prevent, any member of the clergy, or other person duly authorised in that behalf, from officiating in a place of divine worship, or from the performance of his or her duty in the lawful burial of the dead in a burial-place, or strikes, or offers any violence to, any member of the clergy, or minister engaged in, or to the knowledge of the offender about to engage in, any of the duties aforesaid, or going to perform the same,
shall be liable to imprisonment for two years. [S 56 am Act 54 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 2.6[3]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [8]]
SECTION 56 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.56.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.56.30] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.56.40] “Place of Divine worship” ................................................................................................................... [CA.56.60] General ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.56.80]
[CA.56.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did by threats prevent JN a member of the clergy then duly authorised in that behalf from offıciating in a place of divine worship, to wit, .......... the .......... Church at .......... aforesaid (or did by force prevent etc from performing his or her duty in the lawful burial of the dead in the burial-place of .......... at .......... aforesaid). [CA.56.30]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 56 is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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Intoxication – under s 428B an offence under s 55 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore in determining whether an accused had an intention to injure or to commit a serious indictable offence against the person of another or to enable someone else to do either of these things, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply.
Crimes Act 1900 s 57
[CA.56.0]
[CA.56.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the person obstructed is a member of the clergy duly authorised to officiate in the place of divine worship or in the burial-place state; and (2) the accused obstructed the member of the clergy in the performance of the duty stated. The section defines such obstruction in terms of threats, force, endeavouring to prevent, striking or offering violence. [CA.56.60]
“Place of Divine worship”
A “place of Divine worship” includes any building or structure ordinarily used for divine worship: s 4. As to the meaning of “building”, see [CA.112.80]. [CA.56.80]
General
As to a person’s right to enter a place of divine worship, see Long v Rawlins (1874) 4 QSCR 86. Disturbance of religious worship is now a summary offence.1 1 Imperial Acts Application Act 1969, s 39. For a case of “indecent behaviour” in that the accused disrupted a church service, see Abrahams v Cavey [1968] 1 QB 479; [1967] 3 WLR 1229; [1967] 3 All ER 179.
57
Assault on persons preserving wreck
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Whosoever wounds, strikes, or assaults, any person while in the execution of his or her duty concerning the preservation of a vessel in distress, or any vessel or effects, stranded, or cast on shore, or lying under water, with intent to obstruct him or her, or thereby in fact obstructing him or her in the execution of such duty, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [S 57 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [4]]
SECTION 57 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.57.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.57.30] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.57.40] “Vessel” ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.57.60] “Stranding”, “ship in distress” ............................................................................................................. [CA.57.80] “Wounding” ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.57.100] “Assault” ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.57.120] “Obstruction” ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.57.140]
[CA.57.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did assault JN while engaged in the execution of his or her duty concerning the preservation of certain effects, to wit (specify them) which had been cast on shore from a vessel called .......... with intent thereby to obstruct the said JN (or whereby the said JN was obstructed in the execution of his or her said duty). [CA.57.30]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 57 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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[CA.57.140] [CA.57.40]
s 58
Elements of the offence
[CA.57.60]
CA
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the vessel named in the indictment was in distress, stranded, cast on shore or lying under water as stated; (2) that the person named was engaged in the execution of her or his duty endeavouring to preserve such vessel or the effects therefrom; (3) that the accused wounded, struck or assaulted that person, (4) with intent to obstruct her or him or did in fact obstruct her or him in the execution of such duty. “Vessel”
Section 4 defines “vessel”. [CA.57.80]
“Stranding”, “ship in distress”
As to “stranding”, “ship in distress” etc, see s 4. [CA.57.100]
“Wounding”
As to “wounding”, see [CA.27.80]. [CA.57.120]
“Assault”
As to “assault”, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.320]. [CA.57.140]
“Obstruction”
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As to “obstruction”, see [CA.58.160]. 58
Assault with intent to commit a serious indictable offence on certain officers Whosoever: assaults any person with intent to commit a serious indictable offence, or assaults, resists, or wilfully obstructs any officer while in the execution of his or her duty, such officer being a constable, or other peace officer, custom-house officer, prison officer, sheriff’s officer, or bailiff, or any person acting in aid of such officer, or assaults any person, with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person for any offence,
shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 58 am Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.72[5]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[28]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]; Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 4(1); Act 77 of 1967, s 5]
SECTION 58 COMMENTARY Indictments ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.58.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.58.30] Assault with intent to commit serious indictable offence ................................................................... [CA.58.40] Assault ................................................................................................................................................ [CA.58.60] Self-defence ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.58.80] Elements .................................................................................................................................................... of the offence of assaulting, resisting or obstructing an officer in the execution of duty [CA.58.100] Assault .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.58.120] “Resist” ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.58.140] “Wilful obstruction” ............................................................................................................................ [CA.58.160] Knowledge and intent ....................................................................................................................... [CA.58.180]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 58
[CA.58.20]
Acting in the execution of duty ......................................................................................................... Elements of the offence of assault to prevent arrest ....................................................................... Assault .............................................................................................................................................. General ............................................................................................................................................. Power of arrest ................................................................................................................................. Verdict ...............................................................................................................................................
[CA.58.20]
[CA.58.200] [CA.58.220] [CA.58.240] [CA.58.260] [CA.58.280] [CA.58.300]
Indictments
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did assault JN with intent to commit a serious indictable offence, namely, to steal the goods of the said JN. That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did assault JN then being a constable (custom-house offıcer, prison offıcer, etc) in the execution of his duty. As to resisting police, see also s 546C which creates a summary offence. An indictment that alleged that the accused “assaulted, resisted or wilfully obstructed” was held to be bad for duplicity.1 That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did assault JN with intent in so doing to prevent the lawful apprehension of CD for an offence, that is to say, for (state the offence generally). 1 R v Galvin (No 1) [1961] VR 733.
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[CA.58.30]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 58 is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.58.40]
Assault with intent to commit serious indictable offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) an assault by the accused on the person named, (2) with intent to commit the serious indictable offence specified. Assaults with intent to commit sexual offences are specifically dealt with by the Act in various other sections: see ss 61K, 66D, 74, 78L and 78O post. [CA.58.60]
Assault
For detailed commentary as to assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.320]. [CA.58.80]
Self-defence
As to self-defence, for codified sections, see ss 418–423. For commentary on self-defence including defence of property, see [CA.423.40]–[CA.423.140]. [CA.58.100]
Elements of the offence of assaulting, resisting or obstructing an officer in the execution of duty
The elements of this crime are: (1) assaulting, resisting or wilfully obstructing (2) a justice, constable or other peace officer, custom-house officer, prison officer or bailiff, or any person aiding such officer
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[CA.58.180]
s 58
(3) while such officer is in the execution of her or his duty. [CA.58.120]
Assault
As to assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.320].
If the officer is exceeding her or his authority, resistance is not an offence within the meaning of this section.2 However, a person is guilty of assault if he or she uses more force than is necessary for the purpose of justifiable resistance.3 1 R v Galvin [No 2] [1961] VR 740 at 749. Cf R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26. 2 R v Cumpton (1880) 5 QBD 341; Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213; Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218; R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 WLR 946; (1963) 48 Cr App R 42; Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1967] 2 WLR 129; [1966] 3 All ER 931; Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59; (1981) 72 Cr App R 193. 3 R v Mabel (1840) 173 ER 918; 9 Car & P 474.
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[CA.58.160]
“Wilful obstruction”
Wilful obstruction means obstruction without lawful excuse.1 It would seem that the words “wilful obstruction” do not necessarily imply assault and that they extend to acts done to interfere with officers who, in the execution of their duty, are seeking to obtain evidence as to offences.2 Causing a crowd to gather together and refusing to leave when requested by a police officer is obstruction.3 In relation to the offence of wilfully preventing free passage in public place contrary to s 7 of the Offences in Public Places Act 1979 (NSW), it was held that to constitute that offence, the act complained of must not only have been done deliberately, but with the knowledge and intention that it would have the effect of preventing the free passage of some other person, without any lawful excuse for so doing.4 For commentary on the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. 1 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17; [1966] 2 All ER 649. See also Robson v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939; (1967) 51 Cr App R 307. 2 Hinchliffe v Sheldon [1955] 1 WLR 1207; 3 All ER 406; Bastable v Little [1907] 1 KB 59; Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218; Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480; [1972] 2 WLR 163; [1972] 1 All ER 275; Kavanagh v Hiscock [1974] QB 600; [1974] 2 WLR 421; [1974] 2 All ER 177; Willmott v Atack [1977] QB 498; [1976] 3 WLR 753; 3 All ER 794; (1976) 63 Cr App R 207; Wershof v Commissioner of Police [1978] 3 All ER 540; (1978) 68 Cr App R 82; Green v Moore [1982] QB 1044; [1982] 2 WLR 671; [1982] 1 All ER 428; Moore v Green [1983] 1 All ER 663; Lewis v Cox [1985] QB 509; [1984] 3 WLR 875; [1984] 3 All ER 672; Innes v Weate [1984] Tas R 14; 12 A Crim R 45. 3 Pankhurst v Jarvis (1910) 101 LT 946. See also Despard v Wilcox (1910) 102 LT 103; R v Hufflett (1919) 84 JP 24. 4 Fitzgerald v Montoya (1989) 16 NSWLR 164; 40 A Crim R 105 (NSW Sup Ct CA).
[CA.58.180]
Knowledge and intent
Upon an indictment for assaulting an officer in the execution of her or his duty, it is not necessary to prove that the person committing the assault knew that the person assaulted was an officer.1 As to knowledge and intent, it has been said: (1) that knowledge on the part of the accused that the person assaulted, resisted or obstructed is a member of the police force, or that he or she is acting in the execution of her or his duty, is not a part of the definition of the offence and need not be proved by the prosecution in the first instance as part of its essential case; (2) but that it must be proved that the person was in fact a member of the police force and was in fact acting “in the due execution of (her or his) duty”;
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CA
[CA.58.140] “Resist” The word “resist” carries with it the idea of opposing by force some course of action which the person resisted is attempting to pursue.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 58
[CA.58.180] (3) that if the prosecution proves that the person concerned was a member of the police force acting in the due execution of his duty, and that the accused assaulted, resisted or obstructed him, the accused may nevertheless exculpate himself, if he establishes on the balance of probabilities that he acted reasonably in a bona fide belief based on reasonable grounds, that the member of the police force was in fact unlawfully assaulting or otherwise interfering with him or another person, and that, had the facts been as the accused supposed them to be, his own actions would have been lawful and innocent.2
It is sufficient for the Crown to prove intent in relation to the assault only: it is not necessary to show intent in relation to the other elements of the offence, namely, that the person assaulted was a policeman, and that he was acting in the execution of his duty.3 1 R v Forbes and Webb (1865) 10 Cox CC 362. 2 R v Galvin (No 1) [1961] VR 733. 3 R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26.
[CA.58.200]
Acting in the execution of duty
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A police officer who enters private premises without a warrant for the purpose of making inquiries, in the belief that an offence has been committed, becomes a trespasser after the owner of the premises has told her or him to leave them, and is not therefore thereafter acting in the execution of her or his duty.1 But a police officer who finds a person committing an offence or has reasonable cause to suspect a person of having committed an offence, may lawfully follow that person on to private premises for the purpose of apprehending her or him.2 If an officer arrests a person illegally, he is not acting in the execution of her or his duty,3 nor is he or she so acting, strictly speaking, when, as he or she lawfully may, he assists a householder to eject an intruder.4 Where an officer is acting under a warrant, unless the warrant is a nullity, it confers upon the officer an authority, resistance to which would constitute an offence under this section.5 A constable, whether in uniform or not, or at a time outside her or his ordinary working hours or not, has a continuing duty to assist in preventing disturbances in public places, or breaches of the peace. If he or she makes an arrest for this purpose, he or she is acting in the execution of her or his duty.6 The House of Lords has held that where a person acts in a manner that arrest by any person is justified, and an off-duty constable performs such arrest, the constable is acting in the execution of her or his duty and the accused’s belief that his arrestor was not a policeman does not provide a defence.7 It is an offence at common law to refuse to assist a police officer in the execution of her or his duty where the officer sees persons breaking the law, the assistance is necessary and it is refused without lawful excuse or physical impossibility. Whether the assistance, if given, would have proved sufficient or useful is not the question.8 As to assaulting police to release a third person from custody, see R v Fennell.9 In Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336; sub nom Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT) (1993) 71 A Crim R 115 and R v K (1993) 118 ALR 596, the Full Federal Court discussed the meaning of “in the execution of his duty” as dealt with in the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), and noted that the provision “should not be construed in any narrow or restricted sense, but should be given a broad operation to protect the performance of all police duties, and not just some”. The same meaning should be applied to the interpretation of s 58.10 1 Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213. See also Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 13 A Crim R 250; [1984] HCA 80. 2 Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101. See also McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 53 FLR 55; Panos v Hayes (1987) 44 SASR 148.
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3 R v Whitehouse (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 118; R v Smith (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 419. See also Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229. As to affray, see R v Purdy [1975] QB 288; (1974) 60 Cr App R 30. 4 R v Roxburgh (1871) 12 Cox CC 8. 5 Corbett v The King (1932) 47 CLR 317; 33 SR (NSW) 14; [1932] HCA 36. Cf Horsfield v Brown [1932] 1 KB 355. See also R v Purdy [1975] QB 288; (1974) 60 Cr App R 30. 6 Horne v Coleman (1929) 46 WN (NSW) 30. See also Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218; Johnson v Phillips [1976] 1 WLR 65; [1975] 3 All ER 682. 7 Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955; (1982) 74 Cr App R 150. Compare R v Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411; (1984) 78 Cr App R 276. 8 R v Brown 174 ER 522; (1841) Car & M 314; R v Sherlock (1866) LR 1 CCR 20; R v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284; 64 WN (NSW) 71. See generally Glamorgan County Council v Glasbrook Bros [1925] AC 270. 9 R v Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428; [1970] 3 WLR 513; [1970] 3 All ER 215. See also Hills v Ellis [1983] QB 680; [1983] 2 WLR 234; [1983] 1 All ER 667. 10 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Gribble (2004) 151 A Crim R 256; [2004] NSWSC 926 at [26] per Barr J.
[CA.58.220]
Elements of the offence of assault to prevent arrest
The elements of this crime are: (1) assault by the accused of any person; (2) with the intention of resisting or preventing the lawful arrest or detention of any person for any offence. [CA.58.240]
Assault
As to assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.320]. [CA.58.260]
General
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As to resisting and generally as to this offence, see [CA.58.140]. [CA.58.280]
Power of arrest
As to the power of arrest, see Pt 8 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002, at [LEPRA.99.60]ff. The Crown must show that the arrest which the accused was seeking to resist or prevent was in exercise of a legal right; that is, not whether the accused believed that the arrest which he or she was resisting was lawful, but whether such arrest was in fact lawful.1 See also [CA.58.140]. Arrest cannot be justified merely for the purpose of asking questions.2 1 R v Heavey (1965) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 248; sub nom R v Hoare [1965] NSWR 1167. See also Appeal of Ravnjak (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 166. 2 Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN 41; Ex parte Evers; Re Leary (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 146; Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 28 A Crim R 1; [1986] HCA 88.
[CA.58.300]
Verdict
It is open to the jury to return a verdict of common assault if it is of the opinion that the accused used more force than was necessary to avoid an unlawful apprehension.1 1 R v Wilson [1955] 1 WLR 493; 1 All ER 744; (1955) 39 Cr App R 12; R v Galvin (No 1) [1961] VR 733.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 8 – Assaults
[CA.58.300]
Crimes Act 1900 s 59
59
[CA.59.20]
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm
(1) Whosoever assaults any person, and thereby occasions actual bodily harm, shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in the company of another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[4]] [S 59 am Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 59 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................... [CA.59.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.59.40] Elements of assault occasioning actual bodily harm ......................................................................... [CA.59.60] Element (1) Assault ............................................................................................................................ [CA.59.80] Element (2) Occasioning of actual bodily harm ............................................................................... [CA.59.100] Element (3) (where applicable) Offender in company ..................................................................... [CA.59.120] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.59.140]
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[CA.59.20]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD thereby occasioning to him/her actual bodily harm (where applicable: while in the company of EF, or EF and GH, or in the company of a person or persons unknown). [CA.59.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under s 59 is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence and, under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent: s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520]. An offence under s 59 is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Related provisions are: • Section 35 – reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding. • Section 54 – causing grievous bodily harm; • Section 61 – common assault. [CA.59.60]
Elements of assault occasioning actual bodily harm
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted the complainant; (2) occasioning to him or her actual bodily harm; (3) (where s 59(2) applies) while in the company of another or others.
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[CA.59.100] [CA.59.80]
s 59
Element (1) Assault
Mens rea – the intent to be proved in the case of an actual striking is simply an intention to strike the victim – proof of an intent to injure is not required, see [CA.59.100]. As to the intent to be proved where there is no actual striking, see [CA.61.140]. 1 R v Beech (1912) 107 LT 461; 7 Cr App R 197; R v Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 109; R v Grimes (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 209; 10 WN (NSW) 211; R v Royall (1989) 41 A Crim R 447.
[CA.59.100]
Element (2) Occasioning of actual bodily harm
To establish the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the prosecution need not prove a specific intent to cause actual bodily harm: the elements of the offence consist simply of an assault and actual bodily injury.1
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There is no definition of “bodily harm” in the Crimes Act 1900. The commonly accepted definition comes from R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 where Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal, at 509 (KB) said: … “bodily harm” has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.2 Bruises and scratches have been said to be capable of amounting to actual bodily harm.3 In New South Wales, it has been said that if a victim has been injured psychologically in a very serious way, going beyond merely transient emotions, feelings and states of mind, this would be likely to amount to “actual bodily harm”.4 In this context, the English Court of Appeal has stated that a person’s body includes all parts of the body including organs, nervous system and brain, so that “bodily injury” may include “injury to any of those parts of [the] body responsible for [the] mental and other faculties”; with the result that “bodily harm” is capable of including psychiatric injury, but not mere emotions such as fear, distress or panic, nor “states of mind that are not themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical condition”.5 In England, neuroses being anxiety and depressive disorders as recognisable psychiatric illness caused by numerous menacing silent telephone calls were held to be actual bodily harm.6 In Western Australia, it was held that an HIV infection passed through sexual contact, if it caused infection to, and destruction of immune cells, would constitute “bodily injury”.7 In another Western Australian case, it was held that pain by itself without identifiable bodily injury is not “bodily harm”.8 There is a distinction between grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm. The distinction, though one of principle, involves assessment of degree.9 1 R v Percali (1986) 42 SASR 46 at 46–47; Coulter v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 350; (1988) 30 A Crim R 471; [1988] HCA 3 at 354, 364 (CLR) and 473, 480 (A Crim R); R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 (NSW CCA); R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170 at 177 per Hunt CJ at CL. 2 Applied in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44; Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 at [133], [134] (NSWCA) per McColl JA (Mason P and Ipp JA agreeing). See also R v Overall at 177 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Lardner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, No 60499 of 1997, 10 September 1998) at 4; McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305 at [44]. 3 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466 at 67 (NSWLR); 467 (A Crim R) (CCA NSW The Court).
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An assault can consist of the application of force of some kind to another, or the threat of it, without consent and without lawful excuse. For detailed commentary on assault, see [2.8030]ff. Lawful excuse may include the assaulter acting in his or her own lawful self-defence, see s 418 and commentary at [2.40383]ff. An accused may be convicted if a person, who has a reasonable apprehension of an assault by the accused, jumps out of a window and is injured.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 59A
[CA.59.100]
4 Li v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 442 at [45] per James J (Grove and Simpson JJ agreeing), applying R v Lardner. 5 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689; [1994] 2 All ER 552; (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 at 695 (WLR); 558 (All ER); 151–152 (Cr App R). See also R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282; (1954) 38 Cr App R 1. 6 R v Ireland [1998] AC 147; [1997] 4 All ER 225; [1998] 1 Cr App R 177 (HL). 7 Houghton v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 399; 144 A Crim R 343; [2004] WASCA 20. 8 Scatchard v The Queen (1987) 27 A Crim R 136 (WA CCA). 9 R v Overall at 173 per Mahoney JA; at 178 per Hunt CJ at CL.
[CA.59.120]
Element (3) (where applicable) Offender in company
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The mere presence of another person at the scene of the commission of an offence without more is not sufficient to make that person criminally liable as being “in company” with the actual offender: R v Crozier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 March 1996). The meaning of “in company” in the context of s 61J(2)(c) was considered in R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 where Kirby J (with whom Heydon JA, Greg James J agreed) said at [120]: A number of propositions can be stated: • First, the statutory definition (s 61J(2)(c)) requires that the offender be “in the company of another person or persons”. • Secondly, the accused and such person, or persons, must share a common purpose (either to rob, or as here, sexually assault). • Thirdly, the cases appear to assume that each participant is physically present. • Fourthly, participation in the common purpose without being physically present (for example, as a look-out or as an accessory before the fact) is not enough. • Fifthly, the perspective of the victim (being confronted by the combined force or strength or two or more persons) is relevant, although not determinative. If two or more persons are present, and share the same purpose, they will be “in company” even if the victim was unaware of the other person. In Button at [123], Kirby J stated that physical presence is “an elastic concept”. This same point was made in R v Ita (2003) 139 A Crim R 340; [2003] NSWCCA 174 where it was said that the real test is the coercive effect of the group. There must be such proximity as would enable the inference that the coercive effect of the group operated to embolden the offender or to intimidate the victim. Various authorities consider the expression “in company” in the context of robbery in company, see [CA.97.140]. [CA.59.140]
Sentencing
Sentencing where more serious injuries were caused which may have constituted a more serious offence under s 35 was considered in R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170. 59A
Assault during public disorder
(1) A person who assaults any person during a large-scale public disorder, although not occasioning actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who assaults any person during a large-scale public disorder, and by the assault occasions actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) [Repealed] [Subs (3) rep Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
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s 60AA
(4) [Repealed] [Subs (4) rep Act 97 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1.2] [S 59A am Act 97 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; insrt Act 119 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2[1]]
DIVISION 8A – ASSAULTS AND OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS [Div 8A heading insrt Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
Meaning of “law enforcement officer” CA
60AA
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In this Division: law enforcement officer means: (a) a police officer, or (b) the Commissioner for the Independent Commission Against Corruption or an Assistant Commissioner for that Commission, or (c) an officer of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, within the meaning of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988, who performs investigation functions, or (d) the Commissioner for the Police Integrity Commission or an Assistant Commissioner for that Commission, or (e) an officer of the Police Integrity Commission, within the meaning of the Police Integrity Commission Act 1996, who performs investigation or confiscation functions, or (f) the Commissioner for the New South Wales Crime Commission or an Assistant Commissioner for that Commission, or (g) a member of staff of the New South Wales Crime Commission, within the meaning of the Crime Commission Act 2012, who performs investigation or confiscation functions, or (h) the Commissioner of Corrective Services, or (i) governors of correctional centres, correctional officers and probation and parole officers, within the meaning of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999, or (j) an officer of the Department of Juvenile Justice who works with children who have, or are alleged to have, committed offences and who is employed at or works from a community centre or children’s detention centre, or (k) an officer of the Department of Juvenile Justice who is involved in the conduct of youth justice conferences, or (l) a Crown Prosecutor or an Acting Crown Prosecutor, or (m) an Australian legal practitioner who is employed as a member of staff of the Director of Public Prosecutions, or (n) a sheriff’s officer, or (o) a recognised law enforcement officer within the meaning of the Police Act 1990, or (p) a special constable within the meaning of section 82L of the Police Act 1990. [S 60AA am Act 56 of 2013, Sch 3.1; Act 66 of 2012, Sch 5.1; Act 120 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 3.6[2]; Act 130 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 4[1]; insrt Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 60 60
Assault and other actions against police officers
(1) A person who assaults, throws a missile at, stalks, harasses or intimidates a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, although no actual bodily harm is occasioned to the officer, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (1) am Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(1A) A person who, during a public disorder, assaults, throws a missile at, stalks, harasses or intimidates a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, although no actual bodily harm is occasioned to the officer, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
(2) A person who assaults a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and by the assault occasions actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2A) A person who, during a public disorder, assaults a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and by the assault occasions actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 9 years. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
(3) A person who by any means: (a) wounds or causes grievous bodily harm to a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that officer or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for 12 years.
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[Subs (3) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[2]; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[13]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3A) A person who by any means during a public disorder: (a) wounds or causes grievous bodily harm to a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that officer or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (3A) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[2]; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[13]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[6]]
(4) For the purposes of this section, an action is taken to be carried out in relation to a police officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, even though the police officer is not on duty at the time, if it is carried out: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by that police officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or (b) because the officer is a police officer. [Subs (4) subst Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[3]] [S 60 am Act 41 of 2012; Act 38 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; Act 45 of 2002; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 80 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 6 of 1996, s 3 and Sch 1; amAct 31 of 1951]
SECTION 60 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges ............................................................................................................................ [CA.60.20] Jurisdiction and cross references ....................................................................................................... [CA.60.40] Elements of assault etc of police officers in the execution of duty .................................................... [CA.60.60] Element (1) Assaults, throws a missile at, stalks, harasses or intimidates (ss 60(1), (1A), (2) (2A)) and wounding or causing grievous bodily harm (ss 60(3), (3A)) ................................................. [CA.60.80] Element (2) A police officer .............................................................................................................. [CA.60.100]
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Element (3) While in the execution of the officer’s duty .................................................................. [CA.60.120] Element (4) During a public disorder (ss 60(1A), (2A), (3A)) .......................................................... [CA.60.140] Element (5) Occasioning actual bodily harm (ss 60(2), (2A)) .......................................................... [CA.60.160] Element (5A) Recklessness as to causing actual bodily harm (ss 60(3), (3A)) .............................. [CA.60.180] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.60.200]
Indictments/charges
Cases other than those involving wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State (if applicable, during a public disorder) did assault, throw a missile at, stalk, harass or intimidate (delete whichever alternatives are inapplicable) CD a police offıcer while in the execution of CD’s duty (where applicable, in a case of assault, occasioning to CD actual bodily harm). Cases involving deliberate or reckless wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State (if applicable, during a public disorder) did wound/inflict grievous bodily harm on (delete whichever is inapplicable) CD a police offıcer while in the execution of CD’s duty, and was reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that offıcer or any other person.
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A charge of “having assaulted resisted or wilfully obstructed a member of the police force in the due execution of his duty” was held bad for duplicity.1 Stalking, harassment and intimidation frequently involves repetitious conduct, see [CA.60.80], below. Such conduct over time can quite properly be charged in a single charge without contravening the rule against duplicity.2 Where a man was convicted of both harassment and intimidation of a police officer arising out of the same incident, he was held entitled to a plea in bar in relation to the charge of harassment because the charge of intimidating the officer necessarily subsumed the charge of harassing him: Vella v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 156 A Crim R 113; [2005] NSWSC 897 per Hall J. 1 R v Galvin [No 2] [1961] VR 740 (Vic Sup Ct, FC). This decision was overruled by majority in R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26; [1962] HCA 23, but not on this point. 2 Daly v Medwell (1986) 40 SASR 281; 17 A Crim R 68 (White J and Full Court on appeal – SASR); (White J – A Crim R); Walsh v Tattersall (1996) 188 CLR 77; 88 A Crim R 496; [1996] HCA 26 at 107 (CLR); 519 (A Crim R) per Kirby J.
[CA.60.40]
Jurisdiction and cross references
A charge under either s 60(1) or s 60(1A) is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment, [4.10960] and [4.13810]. A charge under either s 60(2) or s 60(2A) is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If either offence is prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Charges under either s 60(3) or s 60(3A) are not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and therefore must be charged on indictment. There are standard non-parole periods prescribed of 3 and 5 years for offences against ss 60(2) and 60(3) respectively, see Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 54A and the related Table. The Crimes Act 1900 contains a number of offences concerning various officers in the execution of their duty: • Section 58 Assaulting any officer while in the execution of duty or any person aiding such an officer. • Section 60A Assaulting etc a law enforcement officer in the execution of duty. • Section 546C Resisting or hindering a member of the police force in the execution of duty or incitement to assault a member of the police force in the execution of duty.
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[CA.60.40]
Other related offences under the Crimes Act 1900 include: • Section 33 Wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm or prevent arrest. • Section 33A Discharging a firearm with intent to do grievous bodily harm or prevent arrest etc. • Section 33B Using etc a weapon to prevent arrest etc. • Section 35 Reckless grievous bodily harm or wounding. • Section 59 Assault occasioning actual bodily harm. • Section 60B Assaults etc against third parties connected with law enforcement officers. • Section 60C Obtaining of personal information about law enforcement officers with intent. • Section 61 Common assault. There is also the offence of stalking or intimidation with intent under s 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. [CA.60.60]
Elements of assault etc of police officers in the execution of duty
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Charges under ss 60(1) and 60(1A) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted or threw a missile at or stalked or harassed or intimidated; (2) a police officer; (3) while in the execution of his or her duty; (4) (where applicable) during a public disorder. Charges under ss 60(2) and 60(2A) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted; (2) a police officer; (3) while in the execution of his or her duty; (4) (where applicable) during a public disorder; (5) occasioning actual bodily harm to the officer. If the charge involves an allegation of assault and other elements are not proved, depending upon the circumstances, there may be an alternative verdict of simple assault: R v Galvin [No 1] [1961] VR 733 (Vic Sup Ct, FC) and see commentary on alternative verdicts at [CPA.162.40]. Charges under ss 60(3) and 60(3A) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) wounded or caused grievous bodily harm to; (2) a police officer; (3) while in the execution of his or her duty; (4) (where applicable) during a public disorder; (5A) and was reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that officer or any other person. [CA.60.80]
Element (1) Assaults, throws a missile at, stalks, harasses or intimidates (ss 60(1), (1A), (2) (2A)) and wounding or causing grievous bodily harm (ss 60(3), (3A))
Purpose of s 60 – in Vella v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 156 A Crim R 113; [2005] NSWSC 897 Hall J said at [41], “The legislative intention behind s 60(1) … can be taken to be protection of police officers from unlawful and other specified conduct which is capable of, and does, interfere with the execution of an officer’s duty.” Assaults – assault includes battery. “An assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force, on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person”.1 Assault and battery are generically treated and charged simply as assault, see [CA.61.100]. In R v Manton (2002) 132 A Crim R 249; [2002] NSWCCA 316, Mason P (with whom Hulme and Simpson JJ agreed) said that in s 60(1), “assault” obviously includes battery as well as the
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commission of an act which intentionally or recklessly causes the officer to apprehend immediate and “unlawful violence”. As to the elements of assault, see [CA.61.80]. For detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.20] – [CA.61.320]. Where immediate violence is threatened, the charge may be assault but could, in some cases, be “did intimidate”, or even “did stalk” depending upon which term is most apposite in the circumstances.
Throws a missile at – missile is not defined for the purpose of s 60. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines missile as a “weapon or other object suitable for throwing at a target or discharging from a machine. A destructive projectile that is self-propelling and directed by remote control or automatically”.3 Solid objects such as bullets, rocks and bottles have been described as missiles.4 In a South Australian case, it was held that the throwing of petrol from or within a container constitutes throwing a missile.5
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Stalks – stalking is not defined for the purpose of s 60. There is a partial definition of stalking in s 8 of the Crimes (Personal and Domestic Violence) Act 2007, by which the term includes “the following of a person about or the watching or frequenting of the vicinity of, or an approach to, a person’s place of residence, business or work or any place that a person frequents for the purposes of any social or leisure activity”. “Stalking” has also been defined as “1. The act of or an instance of following another by stealth. 2. The offense (sic) of following or loitering near another, often surreptitiously, with the purpose of annoying or harassing that person or committing a further crime such as assault or battery”.6 Harasses – harass is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. To “harass” means to trouble or to vex.7 “Harassment” has been defined as “words, conduct, or action (usually repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no useful purpose”.8 “It is the giving of trouble or stress to another which is the central import of the term [harass]”.9 Also, the dictionary meaning of “harass”, being “to trouble by repeated attacks, incursions, etc, as in war … harry; raid; to disturb persistently; torment, as with troubles, cares, etc” has been accepted as an appropriate guide to the meaning of the word in s 60.10 While “harass” “often signifies conduct which is persistent, repetitive or continuous”11, in some circumstances, a single action can amount to harassment. In the Western Australian case of Johnson v Collier (1997) 142 FLR 409, the question was considered of whether the sending of a single threatening letter by a man to his estranged wife against a background of bitter personal disputation could constitute the Commonwealth offence of harassing by post. Anderson J held that the fact that only one letter was sent does not preclude a finding of harassment and that it all depends on the circumstances – although harassment often involves repetitive conduct, if there is a course of conduct by one person calculated to distress another, a single letter written as part of this conduct intended to contribute to the whole distress can amount to harassment.12 Intimidates – the meaning of “intimidates” in s 60 was considered in Meller v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517; [2000] NSWSC 75. There, Simpson J noted at 519 (NSWLR) that dictionaries define “intimidate” to mean “to render timid, to inspire with fear, to overawe, to cow, or to force to or deter from some action by threats or violence or by inducing fear” and that, according to definition and to the ordinary notion of the term, “the act that constitutes the intimidation has an effect on another person”. “The concept is twofold: intimidation necessarily consists both of a particular form of conduct and the effect the conduct has on another person. There is no intimidation until another person has been intimidated”.13 Simpson J at 520 (NSWLR) held that in order to prove intimidation under s 60, “it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the police officer was put in fear or apprehension, was forced into or deterred from some action by being put in fear, or was overawed or cowed”. Elsewhere, it has been observed that “[o]rdinarily intimidation would involve some threatening words or conduct tending to coerce the other person”.14
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A person subject to unlawful arrest is entitled to use reasonable force to resist or escape. If for this reason a police officer is struck or threatened during the course of an unlawful arrest, the element of being in the execution of the officer’s duty will not be made out and the charge will fail.2 Also, the act will not have been unlawful so as to constitute an assault etc in the first place.
Crimes Act 1900 s 60
[CA.60.80]
It has been held that the offence of intimidation of a police officer under s 60 is established by proof of no more than that the acts or words of the accused caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension and the prosecution does not have to prove that such fear overbore the officer to such an extent that he or she was influenced to act or deterred from some action in the course of his or her duty.15 It was held in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Best [2016] NSWSC 261 that s 60 does not require that the intimidatory conduct be in the presence of the officer to whom it was directed. In that case, a man who had been acquitted of murder, asked police officer A if he could speak to police officer B. The man told A that B had been harassing him, adding that “Just tell him that if he doesn’t back off I’m going to go and get a gun and kill him.” A told B of this threat and B gave evidence that he felt intimidated by it. It was held that whether the conduct is done in the presence of the officer concerned or communicated to that officer by some other means is not determinative of the issue of whether there was a deliberate act of intimidation. Wounding or causing grievous bodily harm – there is no definition of either of these terms in the Crimes Act 1900. To constitute a wounding, there must be an injury by which the whole skin is broken. If the whole skin is broken, and there was bleeding, that is a wound. For commentary on the meaning of “wounding”, see [CA.27.80]. Grievous bodily harm means really serious bodily harm. For commentary on the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. By s 4, “grievous bodily harm” includes any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person.
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Intoxication and mens rea – the mental element for offences under s 60 is intention, except for assaults and possibly intimidation, where recklessness may suffice, see [CA.61.140]. For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Offences under s 60 are not offences of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 60, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account: Crimes Act 1900, ss 428B and 428D. 1 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 per Goff LJ at 1177 (WLR); 378 (All ER) and see commentary at [CA.61.100]. 2 Bentley v Brudzinski (1982) 75 Cr App R 217. 3 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 4 Smith v Leurs [1944] SASR 213; Dickey v Police [1964] NZLR 503; Police v Jackson [1980] 1 NZLR 78; Seamark v Prouse [1980] 1 WLR 698; [1980] 3 All ER 26; (1980) 70 Cr App R 236; Rous v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-289. 5 Field v Gent (1996) 67 SASR 122; 87 A Crim R 225. 6 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 7 O’Sullivan v Lunnon (1986) 163 CLR 545, 22 A Crim R 120; [1986] HCA 57 at 550 (CLR);124 (A Crim R) per Gibbs CJ; Vella v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 156 A Crim R 113; [2005] NSWSC 897 at [27] per Hall J. 8 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (5th ed, 2002) defines “harass” as meaning trouble by repeated attacks. In the Queensland case of O’Sullivan v Lunnon (1985) 21 A Crim R 347, it was said that “harass” means, colloquially, to vex or needle someone. 9 Carnes v Visser [2000] TASSC 136 at [2] per Slicer J. 10 Vella v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 156 A Crim R 113; [2005] NSWSC 897 at [28]. 11 Johnson v Collier (1997) 142 FLR 409 per Anderson J. 12 See also Daly v Medwell (1986) 40 SASR 281; 17 A Crim R 68 (White J and Full Court on appeal – SASR); (White J – A Crim R) as to harassment by phone calls and single instances. 13 Meller v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517; [2000] NSWSC 75 at 519 (NSWLR) per Simpson J, quoted with approval in R v Manton (2002) 132 A Crim R 249; [2002] NSWCCA 316 at [6] per Mason P (NSW CCA). 14 R v Mathews [1993] 2 Qd R 316; 64 A Crim R 305 at 318 (Qd R); 307 (A Crim R) per McPherson JA (Qld CA). 15 R v Manton (2002) 132 A Crim R 249; [2002] NSWCCA 316 (NSW CCA).
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Element (2) A police officer
Although “police officer” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900, by s 21(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987, “police officer” is defined as meaning “a member of NSW Police who is a police officer within the meaning of the Police Act 1990”. As to Federal police officers, s 64(1) of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) creates the offence of assaulting a Federal police officer in the execution of his or her duty. Element (3) While in the execution of the officer’s duty
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Mental element – the High Court held in R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26; [1962] HCA 23, by a three to two majority, that the prosecution must prove that the accused’s act was done while the police officer was in fact acting in the execution of his or her duty but not that the accused necessarily knew that the officer was so acting. Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ observed that provisions of the present kind have existed for in the order of a century (and been re-enacted) and have been long interpreted as creating an offence of assaulting police officers while in the execution of their duty, rather than knowing them to be in the execution of their duty.1 Both Dixon CJ and Kitto J dissented, taking the view that the intent of the accused must go to all elements of the offence.2 Although the majority’s view in Reynhoudt and some of the reasoning underlying it has been questioned,3 it remains the law unless and until reversed by the High Court.4 In Semaan v Poidevin (2013) 228 A Crim R 363; [2013] NSWSC 226, Rothman J at [54] said while the minority judgment of Dixon CJ in Reynhoudt is extremely persuasive, particularly in light of the reasoning in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203, nevertheless, he was bound by the majority judgment in Reynhoudt. Meaning of “in the execution of duty” – the ambit of a police officer’s powers and duties has always been expressed in very general terms.5 It is part of the obligation and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the police, but they are at least those, and they would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring an offender to justice.6 In Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336; sub nom Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT) (1993) 71 A Crim R 115 at 120 (A Crim R) (Fed Ct, FC) the Federal Court concluded that: … a police officer acts in the execution of his duty from the moment he embarks upon a lawful task connected with his functions as a police officer, and continues to act in the execution of that duty for as long as he is engaged in pursuing the task and until it is completed, provided that he does not in the course of the task do anything outside the ambit of his duty so as to cease to be acting therein. Concerning the expression “duty as an officer” in a different context, a High Court justice remarked, “[t]he word ‘duty’ there is not, I think, used in a sense that is confined to a legal obligation, but really would be better represented by the word ‘function’”.7 As to the phrase “member of the police force acting in the performance of his duty” it has been remarked in the High Court that the phrase has two aspects, the first being concerned with characterisation, the second “with function”.8 An earlier case held that a man who deliberately pushed past a constable standing on duty at a public dance hall and knocking his cap off was guilty of assaulting the constable in the execution of his duty.9 In Canada, the view has been expressed that for a charge of obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty, it is not necessary to show that the officer was engaged in the performance of a specific duty at the time.10 A Tasmanian judge remarked that the existence and nature of the duty often depends upon a reasonable assessment by the police officer of any given situation, which may be held to be right or wrong.11 Police trespassing without authorisation may act outside the execution of their duty.12 A police officer who arrests a person illegally is not acting in the execution of his or her duty.13 A police officer who uses
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unlawful physical force on a person acts outside his or her duty.14 In a case involving a protester arrested after ignoring a police instruction, it was held that the police had no duty to prevent an act which was no more than a civil wrong.15
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Extended meaning of “in the execution of duty” – hostile actions carried out against a police officer while not on duty are, by s 60(4), to be regarded as carried out while in the execution of the officer’s duty, if carried out as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by the officer in the execution of duty, or simply because the officer is a police officer. 1 R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26; [1962] HCA 23 per Taylor J at 395 (CLR), Menzies J at 399 (CLR), Owen J at 407 (CLR). 2 R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; 36 ALJR 26; [1962] HCA 23 per Dixon CJ at 386 (CLR), Kitto J at 389 (CLR) (who thought that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove knowledge, but simply advertence to the possibility of the complainant being a police officer). 3 Brennan J referred to the competing views in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 at 576–577 (CLR); 242–243 (A Crim R). As to the effect of re-enactment, see Flaherty v Girgis (1987) 162 CLR 574; 61 ALJR 255; [1987] HCA 17 at 594 (CLR) and Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310; 71 ALJR 32; [1996] HCA 31 at 329, 351 (CLR). 4 Other authorities to the same effect as Reynhoudt are Leonard v Morris (1975) 10 SASR 528 (SA Sup Ct, FC); Morse v Ashton (1978) 18 SASR 221 (SA Sup Ct, Jacobs J). 5 R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 WLR 946; (1963) 48 Cr App R 42 at 170 (QB); Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17; [1966] 2 All ER 649; Thomson v C (1989) 95 FLR 116 at 117 per Angel J; Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336; sub nom Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 1993 (ACT) (1993) 71 A Crim R 115. 6 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17; [1966] 2 All ER 649 at 419 (QB); 651 (All ER) per Lord Parker CJ. See also Johnson v Phillips [1976] 1 WLR 65; [1975] 3 All ER 682. 7 Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co Ltd v Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 1; [1952] HCA 32 at 6 (CLR) per Dixon CJ. 8 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 72 A Crim R 32; [1994] HCA 15 at 458 (CLR); 52 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 9 R v Elias (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 285 (CCA). 10 R v Westie (1971) 2 CCC (2d) 315 per McFarlane JA citing supporting authorities. 11 Innes v Weate [1984] Tas R 14; 12 A Crim R 45 at 51 (A Crim R) per Cosgrove J (Tas Sup Ct). See also R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 WLR 946; (1963) 48 Cr App R 42 at 170–171 (QB). 12 Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213; R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 WLR 946; (1963) 48 Cr App R 42; Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446; [1980] 3 WLR 283; [1980] 2 All ER 753 at 458–459 (AC) per Lord Edmund-Davies (HL); Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 13 A Crim R 250; [1984] HCA 80 at 10 (CLR); 254 (A Crim R) per Brennan J (in a judgment dissenting in the result); Letts v King [1988] WAR 76 (WA Sup Ct, FC); Beer v McCann; Ex parte McCann [1993] 1 Qd R 25; 57 A Crim R 101 (Qld CCA); Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 72 A Crim R 32; [1994] HCA 15 at 458–459 (CLR); 53 (A Crim R) per Toohey J. 13 R v Whitehouse (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 118; R v Smith (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 419; Hortin v Rowbottom (1993) 61 SASR 313; 68 A Crim R 381 at 324 (SASR); 391 (A Crim R) per Mullighan J (SA Sup Ct). See also Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229. 14 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177–1179 (WLR); 378–380 (All ER); 235–237 (Cr App R) per Goff LJ (authorities collected). 15 Innes v Weate [1984] Tas R 14; 12 A Crim R 45 per Cosgrove J.
[CA.60.140]
Element (4) During a public disorder (ss 60(1A), (2A), (3A))
Public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations”. For the offence of riot, see s 93B and commentary at [CA.93B.20]ff. For the offence of affray, see s 93C and commentary at [CA.93C.20]ff.
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Element (5) Occasioning actual bodily harm (ss 60(2), (2A))
Occasioning – the term “occasion” has been legally defined as “to give occasion to, to produce, to cause incidentally or indirectly: bring about or be the means of bringing about or producing”: Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, 1990) (USA).
“Bodily harm” has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.2 For commentary on the meaning of “actual bodily harm”, see [CA.59.100]. To establish the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the prosecution need not prove a specific intent to cause actual bodily harm: R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 (NSW CCA). 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). 2 Applied in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44; Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM (2004) 60 NSWLR 310; 148 A Crim R 301; [2004] NSWCA 185 at [133], [134] (NSWCA) per McColl JA (Mason P and Ipp JA agreeing). See also R v Overall (1993) 71 A Crim R 170 at 177 per Hunt CJ at CL; R v Lardner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, No 60499 of 1997, 10 September 1998) at 4; McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305 at [44].
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[CA.60.180]
Element (5A) Recklessness as to causing actual bodily harm (ss 60(3), (3A))
Recklessness under ss 60(3), (3A) – there is no definition of “recklessness” in the Crimes Act 1900. A judicially approved definition of recklessness in a case of the former offence of malicious infliction of actual bodily harm was “a realisation of the possibility that some such injury might result but nevertheless proceeding to act”.1 For detailed commentary on recklessness including foresight of consequences, see [CA.4A.40]. Sections 60(3)(b) and (3A)(b) make it plain that the prosecution does not have to prove either that the accused intended or even foresaw that his or her action would or might cause an injury as serious as wounding or grievous bodily harm; foresight of the causing of actual bodily harm is all that is necessary. But if the prosecution proves that the accused had an actual intent to cause actual bodily harm, much less wounding or grievous bodily harm, s 4A provides that “if an element of an offence is recklessness, that element may also be established by proof of intention or knowledge”. Further, it is clear from the inclusion of “or any other person” that it is sufficient if the prosecution proves that the accused foresaw the possibility of causing actual bodily harm to someone but not necessarily to the police officer in fact sustaining the wound or grievous bodily harm. 1 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 at 471; 309 per Hunt J (Finlay and Allen JJ agreeing).
[CA.60.200]
Sentencing
In Re Attorney-General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 [No 2 of 2002] (2002) 137 A Crim R 196; [2002] NSWCCA 515, Spigelman CJ (with the other four members of the bench agreeing) said: [22] Offences involving assault of police officers in the execution of their duty are serious offences requiring a significant element of deterrence in the sentences to be imposed. The community is dependent to a substantial extent upon the courage of police officers for protection of lives, personal security and property. The Courts must support the police in the proper execution of their duties and must be seen to be supporting the police, and their authority in maintaining law and order, by the imposition of appropriate sentences in cases where assaults are committed against police.
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Bodily harm – there is no definition of “bodily harm” in the Crimes Act 1900. In the context of bodily harm, “harm” has been defined as “physical pain, illness or impairment of the body”.1 The commonly accepted definition comes from R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 where Swift J for the Court of Criminal Appeal, at 509 (KB) said:
Crimes Act 1900 s 60A
[CA.60.200]
… [26] … significant risks are run by police officers throughout the State in the normal execution of their duties. The authority of the police, in the performance of their duties, must be supported by the courts. In cases involving assaults against police there is a need to give full weight to the objective of general deterrence and, accordingly, sentences at the high end of the scale, pertinent in the light of all the circumstances, are generally appropriate in such cases. [27] These principles apply irrespective of whether the offender is to be sentenced in the Local or District Courts. The jurisdictional maximum of two years imprisonment in the Local Court should not affect the actual level of sentence imposed. Magistrates must not regard the jurisdictional limit as some form of maximum sentence reserved for a worst case. (See R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; 115 A Crim R 497; [2000] NSWCCA 317.) A similar view has been expressed in other cases.1 In one case (involving an offence of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm upon an off duty police officer), it was said “[t]here is no reason to distinguish between police who have been formally rostered on duty and those who, although off duty, seek to exercise policing powers in order to arrest an offender or to maintain public order”.2 For sentencing, it is a circumstance of aggravation under s 21A(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 that “the victim was a police officer … and the offence arose because of the victim’s occupation”. Further, offences under ss 60(2) and 60(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 are included in the Table in Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for which a standard non-parole period is provided.
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1 R v Crump (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 February 1975); R v Myers (unreported, CCA (NSW), No 60467 of 1989, 13 February 1990); R v Cheng (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 September 1994); R v Nasif (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 March 1995); R v Edigarov (2001) 125 A Crim R 551; [2001] NSWCCA 436; R v Sloane (2001) 126 A Crim R 188; [2001] NSWCCA 421. 2 R v Sloane (2001) 126 A Crim R 188; [2001] NSWCCA 421 at [34] per Wood CJ at CL (Studdert and Bell JJ agreeing).
60A Assault and other actions against law enforcement officers (other than police officers) (1) A person who assaults, throws a missile at, stalks, harasses or intimidates a law enforcement officer (other than a police officer) while in the execution of the officer’s duty, although no actual bodily harm is occasioned to the officer, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (1) am Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
(2) A person who assaults a law enforcement officer (other than a police officer) while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and by the assault occasions actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) A person who by any means: (a) wounds or causes grievous bodily harm to a law enforcement officer (other than a police officer) while in the execution of the officer’s duty, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that officer or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for 12 years. [Subs (3) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[3]; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[13]]
(4) For the purposes of this section, an action is taken to be carried out in relation to a law enforcement officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, even though the officer is not on duty at the time, if it is carried out: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by that officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or
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because the officer is a law enforcement officer.
[S 60A am Act 41 of 2012; Act 38 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; insrt Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
SECTION 60A COMMENTARY [CA.60A.20]
Related reading
For detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.320]. Actions against third parties connected with law enforcement officers
CA
60B
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(1) A person who assaults, stalks, harasses or intimidates any person with whom a law enforcement officer has a domestic relationship, with the intention of causing the law enforcement officer to fear physical or mental harm: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by the law enforcement officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or (b) because the law enforcement officer is a law enforcement officer, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who obtains personal information about a person with whom a law enforcement officer has a domestic relationship, with the intention of using or permitting the use of the information to cause the officer to fear physical or mental harm: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by the law enforcement officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or (b) because the law enforcement officer is a law enforcement officer, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (2) am Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]
(3) For the purposes of this section, causing a law enforcement officer to fear physical or mental harm includes causing the officer to fear physical or mental harm to another person with whom he or she has a domestic relationship. (4) For the purposes of this section, a person intends to cause fear of physical or mental harm if he or she knows that the conduct is likely to cause fear in the other person. (5) For the purposes of this section, the prosecution is not required to prove that the person alleged to have been assaulted, stalked, harassed or intimidated, or the law enforcement officer, actually feared physical or mental harm. (6) In this section, domestic relationship has the same meaning as in the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. [Subs (6) subst Act 80 of 2007, s 103 and Sch 2.7[1]; Act 73 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 2[4]] [S 60B am Act 80 of 2007; Act 73 of 2006; Act 61 of 2006; insrt Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
60C
Obtaining of personal information about law enforcement officers
A person who obtains personal information about a law enforcement officer, with the intention of using or permitting the use of the information for the purpose of assaulting, stalking, harassing, intimidating, or otherwise harming, the officer: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by the law enforcement officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or (b) because the officer is a law enforcement officer, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 60C am Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; insrt Act 45 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
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DIVISION 8B – ASSAULTS ETC AT SCHOOLS [Div 8B insrt Act 135 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
60D
Definitions
(1) In this Division: member of staff of a school includes a person who performs voluntary work for the school. school means: (a) (b)
an infants school, primary school or secondary school (however described), and a child care facility for children under school age.
school premises includes parks and other community premises that are used by a school (but only while they are being used for the purposes of the school). school student includes a child attending a child care facility. (2) For the purposes of this Division, a school student or member of staff of a school is taken to be attending a school: (a) while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the purposes of school work or duty (even if not engaged in school work or duty at the time), or (b) while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the purposes of before school or after school child care, or (c) while entering or leaving school premises in connection with school work or duty or before school or after school care. [S 60D insrt Act 135 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
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60E
Assaults etc at schools
(1) A person who assaults, stalks, harasses or intimidates any school student or member of staff of a school while the student or member of staff is attending a school, although no actual bodily harm is occasioned, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who assaults a school student or member of staff of a school while the student or member of staff is attending a school and by the assault occasions actual bodily harm, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) A person who by any means: (a) wounds or causes grievous bodily harm to a school student or member of staff of a school while the student or member of staff is attending a school, and (b) is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that student or member of staff or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for 12 years. [Subs (3) subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[4]; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[13]]
(4) A person who enters school premises with intent to commit an offence under another provision of this section is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (5) Nothing in subsection (1) applies to any reasonable disciplinary action taken by a member of staff of a school against a school student. [S 60E am Act 41 of 2012; Act 38 of 2007; insrt Act 135 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
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DIVISION 9 – COMMON ASSAULTS [Div 9 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[11]]
61
Common assault prosecuted by indictment
Whosoever assaults any person, although not occasioning actual bodily harm, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years.
SECTION 61 COMMENTARY
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Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.61.20] Cross references ................................................................................................................................ [CA.61.40] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.61.60] Elements of assault (including battery) .............................................................................................. [CA.61.80] Assault and battery ........................................................................................................................... [CA.61.100] Element 1 – striking etc or threat of immediate violence ................................................................. [CA.61.120] Element 2 – Intentionally or recklessly ............................................................................................. [CA.61.140] Element 3 – without consent ............................................................................................................ [CA.61.160] Element 4 – without lawful excuse ................................................................................................... [CA.61.180] Particular acts/activities which can constitute assault ...................................................................... [CA.61.200] Fights ................................................................................................................................................ [CA.61.220] Sport and other physical contests .................................................................................................... [CA.61.240] Surgical and medical procedures ..................................................................................................... [CA.61.260] Bodily decoration .............................................................................................................................. [CA.61.280] Sado-masochistic activities .............................................................................................................. [CA.61.300] Chastisement .................................................................................................................................... [CA.61.320]
[CA.61.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State did assault CD [if battery followed add] and did beat and otherwise ill-treat him/her. Where there is a battery, an alternative form of averment may be That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State did assault CD by beating him/her.1 While it has been observed in South Australia that it is unusual now for an indictment or summons to allege a battery even where the victim has been struck – by common usage batteries are averred generically as assaults,2 the averment as above of “did assault and did beat and otherwise ill-treat” is the traditional form and has been held still appropriate in New South Wales.3 Where an information included “did beat or otherwise ill-treat” it was held that the prosecution was not bound to prove a battery as well as an assault.4 In this context “beat” means to commit battery. 1 Suggested by Mann LJ in Director of Public Prosecutions v Taylor [1992] 1 All ER 299 at 305. 2 MacPherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 at 195 per Bray CJ. 3 R v Dhillon (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 April 1989) (where it was said that to aver a battery where there was a battery was prudent as it made it known with certainty what was alleged); Sako v Anthony (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Badgery-Parker J, 8 March 1991). 4 Sako v Anthony (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Badgery-Parker J, 8 March 1991).
[CA.61.40]
Cross references
The Crimes Act 1900 contains a number of specific assault offences which include:
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[S 61 am Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61 Section 33 35 58 58 58 58 59 60 60A 94–98 206 546C 562AB
[CA.61.40] Offence Wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm Reckless wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm Assault with intent to commit a serious indictable offence Assaulting any officer while in the execution of duty Assaulting any person aiding an officer in the execution of duty Assault with intent to resist or prevent lawful apprehension Assault occasioning actual bodily harm Assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty Assaulting a law enforcement officer in the execution of duty Assault with intent to rob (and with various aggravating circumstances) Assaulting crew of aircraft or vessel Incitement to assault a police officer in the execution of duty Stalking and intimidation
There are many kinds of sexual and indecent assaults – see Index to Sexual Assault and Like Offences at [CA.Pt3.Div10.20]. [CA.61.60]
Jurisdiction
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Common assault under s 61 is a common law offence.1 Although an indictable offence,2 common assault (including battery) is usually prosecuted summarily. Common assault is listed in Table 2 of Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 260(2) of that Act, common assault is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects otherwise. By s 268(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the maximum penalty for common assault if dealt with summarily is 12 months imprisonment and/or a fine of 20 penalty units. 1 R v Mitchell (unreported, NSW CCA, 2 July 1971) (2 Petty Sess Rev 705). 2 R v Fisher (2002) 54 NSWLR 467 (CCA).
[CA.61.80]
Elements of assault (including battery)
The prosecution must prove that the accused: (1) Struck, touched or applied force to another (battery), or, threatened another with immediate violence (assault) (2) Intentionally or recklessly (3) Without consent (4) Without lawful excuse While ordinarily voluntariness is presumed, if the evidence raises the reasonable possibility that the accused’s act was involuntary, the Crown must prove that the act was voluntary.1 1 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 per Viscount Kilmuir LC at 407 and Lord Denning at 413; Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 216–217 per Barwick CJ; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; 50 A Crim R 244 at 40–41 (CLR), 250–251 (A Crim R); R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA) per Hunt J at 4. See also commentary “Automatism and involuntary acts” at [CLP.200].
[CA.61.100]
Assault and battery
Subject to certain exceptions, a person has a right to his or her own “bodily integrity”; to interfere with that integrity by touching, absent lawful excuse or consent, constitutes an assault.1“[T]he law cannot draw the
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line between different degrees of violence and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it.”2 The various exceptions are considered below at [CA.61.180]“Element 4 – Without lawful excuse”. Battery is a crime that is also actionable in tort as a trespass to the person. Some of the authorities are civil trespass cases.
“Assault” and “battery” describe allied but distinct concepts. “The law draws a distinction, in terms more easily understood by philologists than by ordinary citizens, between an assault and a battery. An assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force, on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person.”6 A composite definition of “assault” (including “battery”) in the Queensland Criminal Code appears to be an attempt to reproduce the common law.7
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In the commentary following “assault” is sometimes used generically. 1 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 233 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 (NSWCA) at 200 (NSWLR); 349 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 2 Blackstone Commentaries (17th ed, 1830) Vol 3, p 120, quoted in Marion’s case at 233. 3 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444, per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing); R v Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654 (CA). 4 MacPherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 at 195 per Bray CJ. 5 R v Mansfield Justices; Ex parte Sharkey [1985] QB 613; [1984] 3 WLR 1328; [1985] 1 All ER 193 at 627 (QB) per Lord Lane CJ; Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444, per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing); R v Kerr [1988] 1 NZLR 270 at 273 (CA); R v Taylor [1992] 1 All ER 299 at 302–303 per Mann LJ (Hidden J agreeing). Cf R v Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654 (CA). 6 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 per Goff LJ at 1177 (WLR); 378 (All ER), applied in Wilson v Pringle [1987] 1 QB 237 (CA). See also Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 139 per Owen J; R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 (NSW CCA) at 317 per Lee J; R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 47 (AC) per Lord Goff; R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97. 7 The definition of “assault” in s 245 of the Queensland Criminal Code is: A person who strikes, touches, or moves, or otherwise applies force of any kind to, the person of another, either directly or indirectly, without his consent, or with his consent if the consent is obtained by fraud, or who by any bodily act or gesture attempts or threatens to apply force of any kind to the person of another without his consent, under such circumstances that the person making the attempt or threat has actually or apparently a present ability to effect his purpose, is said to assault that other person, and the act is called an assault. The term “applies force” includes the case of applying heat, light, electrical force, gas, odour, or any other substance or thing whatever if applied in such a degree as to cause injury or personal discomfort. Howard in Australian Criminal Law (5th ed, 1990), p 138 suggests that this is an attempt to reproduce the common law.
[CA.61.120]
Element 1 – striking etc or threat of immediate violence
Most prosecutions for common assault involve battery, that is, actual application of force. In most cases prosecuted there is an assault followed by battery.1 Assault without battery will now be considered, and then battery itself. In its literal sense assault has been defined as “an act which … causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence”.2 With threatening words or gestures, the gist of the offence is
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“Assault” has become synonymous with the term “battery”.3 Bray CJ observed that “it is very common nowadays to allege assault only and to prove a battery as well and for the accused to be punished for the battery on conviction for assault. But this is because in the current speech even of lawyers the word ‘assault’ is habitually used as if it included ‘battery’”.4 Nevertheless, assault and battery are separate common law offences.5
Crimes Act 1900
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s 61
[CA.61.120]
fear.3 An assault can consist of a threatened battery.4 For example, to point a gun at another is an assault5 or to ride after someone and threaten to beat him6 or to advance towards someone with a clenched fist.7 There will be no assault, at least generally, if the intended victim is unaware of the threat, or does not in fact feel threatened.8 A qualified threat may negate what would otherwise be an assault.9 The immediacy of the threat necessary can depend upon the circumstances. A threat of personal violence at some future time is not sufficient,10 although in some such circumstances a fear can be a continuing fear.11 Unlawful imprisonment, itself a common law misdemeanour – see [CLO.520], can also constitute assault if all the elements of assault accompany the unlawful imprisonment.12 It appears to be now established that words alone are capable of constituting assault. Some earlier authorities doubted the proposition.13 While not authoritatively decided in Australia, the House of Lords has held that words alone may constitute assault.14 Threats over the telephone or even silent telephone calls may constitute assault.15 Battery is “any act by which a person intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to [another]”.16 Of battery it has been said “[t]he fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate. It has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery”.17 The effect of this principle is that “everybody is protected not only against physical injury but against any form of physical molestation”.18 Touching of a person’s clothing amounts to battery as well.19 It has been held that an omission to act cannot amount to battery.20 To push another in anger is battery.21 The touching does not have to be direct,22 and so spitting on another can constitute battery.23 A man who punched a woman in the face who was holding a child, causing her to drop the child who was injured, was held guilty of a battery of the child.24 The act causing the touching does not have that effect immediately. Hence striking another by a trap deliberately set can be a battery.25 However, the erection of an obstruction causing injury has never been regarded as a battery if someone comes and strikes the obstruction.26 It has been held that to cause another to ingest a noxious substance is not a battery27 and nor is the communication of a sexually transmitted disease.28 There can be a battery without an assault, as for example where someone lays hands upon a sleeping person who has therefore been unaware of the preceding application of force.29 Obviously, not all touchings amount to battery. The law accepts inevitable touchings from the exigencies of daily life. “[N]obody can complain of the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is within reason slapped …”.30 A teacher who had the habit of patting children on the buttocks to encourage them to move in the desired direction was held not guilty of assault.31 Where one person invites another to touch him or her (as in a case of indecency) and the invitee does so, an assault is not committed by the invitor.32 1 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 41–42 (AC) per Lord Ackner; R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 at 220 per Badgery-Parker J (CCA). 2 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444, per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing); R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 47 (AC) per Lord Goff. 3 Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451 at 454 per Taylor J; Rosza v Samuels [1969] SASR 205 at 207 per Hogarth J; Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SC SA), White J at 17. 4 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed, Stevens, p 172. 5 Pointing a loaded gun is an assault: Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 122, per Barwick CJ. See also R v Kwaku Mensah [1946] AC 83 at 91. Even pointing an unloaded gun is an assault, unless the victim can see that it is not loaded: R v St George (1840) 9 C & P 483; 173 ER 921 at 490 (C & P) per Parke B. 6 Mortin v Shoppee (1828) 3 C & P 373; 172 ER 462. 7 Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349; 172 ER 735. 8 R v St George (1840) 9 C & P 483; 173 ER 921 at 490 (C & P) per Parke B (presenting a loaded gun is not an assault if done secretly); State v Barry 45 Mont 598 (1912) (pointing a rifle at the victim’s back); Pemble v The
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18 19 20 21 22
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26 27 28 29
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s 61
Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 123, per Barwick CJ; Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309 at 315 per Smith and Kennedy CJ; Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 at 12. In Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315, McGarvie J held that a charge of assault was properly dismissed where the assailant thrust a knife through a hole in a partition separating him from the victim, who said that he was not frightened as he felt safe in a locked cubicle. The circumstances of Brady v Schatzel [1911] St R Qd 206, may constitute an exception to the general rule where a conviction for assault was confirmed on appeal where the victim said that he was not scared by an assailant pointing a gun at him with and threatening words, because the victim did not think the assailant would fire. Turberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684 where a man put his hand on his sword saying “if it were not assize time I would not take such language”. Compare the facts in Rosza v Samuels [1969] SASR 205. See also Genner v Sparkes (1704) 1 Salk 79; 91 ER 74; Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850; 138 ER 1437. R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 (NSW CCA). Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SC SA), White J at 14. MacPherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 (SA SC, FC). In Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SC, SA), White J held that a man who picked up a woman in his car and refused to let her out saying with reference to sexual assault, “I am going to take you to my mate’s house. He will really fix you up”, was guilty of assault. See also R v Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95 and generally, Morgan v Colman (1981) 27 SASR 334; 4 A Crim R 324 at 337–338 (SASR), 327–328 (A Crim R) per Wells J. In Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451 Taylor J, while seeming to take the view that a threat consisting of mere words is insufficient for assault, held that threats over the telephone depending upon the circumstances can constitute assault. In R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 (NSW CCA), Lee J at 318 said that it was not necessary to consider the “problem” of whether “mere words” can constitute assault. R v Ireland [1998] AC 147; [1997] 4 All ER 225; [1998] 1 Cr App R 177; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147. See also R v Wilson [1955] 1 WLR 493; 1 All ER 744; (1955) 39 Cr App R 12 (“get out knives”); Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11. Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451; R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 (NSW CCA); R v Ireland [1998] AC 147; [1997] 4 All ER 225; [1998] 1 Cr App R 177 (silent telephone calls). Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 1 WLR 1324 (CA) at 1329 per Leggatt LJ defining “assault”, but in the sense of a battery. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER) per Goff LJ. See also Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 25 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER) per Goff LJ. R v Day (1845) 1 Cox CC 207; R v Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App R 331 at 334. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444 per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing). Cole v Turner (1705) 6 Mod 149; 87 ER 907. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444 per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing). For example, to strike a horse on which a woman is riding to throw her off is a battery: Dodwell v Burford (1669) 1 Mod 149; 86 ER 703. R v Cotesworth (1704) 6 Mod 172; 87 ER 928; R v Smith (1866) 4 F & F 1066, 176 ER 910; Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305; 56 ALJR 848; [1982] HCA 55; Director of Public Prosecutions v JWH (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Hulme J, 17 October 1997); Doolan v Edgington (1999) 110 A Crim R 19 (NT SC, Martin CJ) (spitting at a policeman). Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 890 (QBD). R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 45 Stephen J (example of person falling into set trap); Director of Public Prosecutions v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067; 1 All ER 331. Note: setting a trap with intent to cause grievous bodily harm is an offence under s 49. Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Black W; 96 ER 526 at 894–895 (Black W). R v Walkden (1845) 1 Cox CC 282; R v Hanson (1849) 2 Car & K 912; 175 ER 383. Note: ss 38–41 create specific offences in relation to administering poison etc. R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23. Note: s 36 makes it an offence to cause a grievous bodily disease. Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 38 (CLR) per Brennan J.
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[CA.61.120]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61
[CA.61.120]
30 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER) per Goff LJ. 31 R v Ferguson (1974) 75 A Crim R 31 (Qld CA). 32 Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834; (1951) 35 Cr App R 138; DPP v Rogers [1953] 1 WLR 1017; [1953] 2 All ER 644; (1953) 37 Cr App R 137.
[CA.61.140]
Element 2 – Intentionally or recklessly
For assault in its strict sense, the intent to be proved is an intent to cause another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence.1“I take assault as an example of a crime of basic intent where the consequence is very closely connected with the act. The actus reus of assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence. The mens rea corresponds exactly.”2 The intent to be proved is the intent to cause fear, not the intent to in fact carry out the threat.3 Accordingly, where a toy gun or an unloaded gun is pointed, an assault is committed if the victim thinks the threat is real.4 In a case of battery, the intent to be proved is simply an intention to strike the victim – proof of an intent to injure is not required.5 While some older authorities have said that touching with a hostile intent is necessary for battery,6 the High Court has said that hostility has never been a common law requirement.7 To kiss another person without consent has been held a battery.8 It has been said however, that hostility must be shown in a case of assault by words or conduct.9 As an alternative to specific intent, the prosecution may prove recklessness, that is to say that the accused foresaw or knew that he or she might hit somebody and acted not caring whether that happened or not.10 For recklessness, it must be established that the accused adverted to the risk and chose to ignore it.11
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While accidental or unintended touching is not battery, a person using unnecessary violence to push through a crowd would have the necessary intent.12 As assault is not an offence of specific intention, self-induced intoxication is irrelevant to the question of intent – see s 428D. 1 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 445 per James J (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing). 2 DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 at 216 (AC) per Lord Simon of Glaisdale; R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80; 131 A Crim R 523; [2002] NSWCCA 243 per Wood CJ at CL. 3 Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121 (QBD). 4 R v St George (1840) 9 C & P 483; 173 ER 921; Brady v Schatzel [1911] St R Qd 206; R v Everingham (1949) 66 WN (NSW) 122. 5 Wilson v Pringle [1987] 1 QB 237 at 249 per Croom Johnson LJ; Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 at 743 (NSWLR), 391 (A Crim R) per Clarke JA (CCA). 6 See R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472 per Barwick CJ. 7 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 25 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. See also Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 WLR 1528; 3 All ER 468; (1981) 74 Cr App R 1 at 1534 (WLR), 471 (All ER), 8 (Cr App R) per Lord Lane CJ; R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 41–42 (AC) per Lord Ackner; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 (NSW CCA) at 201 (NSWLR); 350 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 8 R v Dungey (1864) 4 F & F 99; 176 ER 487 at 102 (F & F). 9 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 25 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 (NSW CCA) at 201 (NSWLR); 350 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 10 R v Venna [1976] QB 421 at 426–429 per James LJ (CA); R v Revell (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 December 1976); DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 at 216 (AC) per Lord Simon of Glaisdale; R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 WLR 623; [1976] 2 All ER 142 at 474–475 (AC) per Lord Elwyn-Jones LC; R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 at 220 per Badgery-Parker J.
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11 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56; R v Spratt (1990) 91 Cr App 362 (Eng CA); R v Savage [1992] 1 AC 699 (HL). 12 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 30–31 (AC) per Lord Griffiths.
[CA.61.160]
Element 3 – without consent
Absence of consent is generally regarded as an element of assault, in addition to absence of lawful excuse.3 In England doubt has been expressed as to whether absence of consent is an element of assault rather than consent, where available, merely being a defence.4 Whichever is the correct position, in cases of common assault, the prosecution must prove absence of consent.5 Often evidence is elicited from the complainant that he or she did not consent to the assault. However, in the circumstances of some assaults, absence of consent may be inferred.6 If the facts raise any real issue concerning consent, the trial judge must tell the jury that the prosecution must prove that the accused either knew that the complainant did not consent, or was reckless as to consent.7
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Consent given to being touched can be procured in various fraudulent ways. Deceit as to the identity of the person doing the act,8 or as to the essential nature and character of the act itself may vitiate consent.9 Failing to inform a sexual partner of suffering from a sexually transmissible disease has been held not to vitiate consent.10 Depending upon the circumstances, consent given may be irrelevant in more serious cases of assault where actual bodily harm is caused. “[T]he infliction of bodily harm without good reason is unlawful and … the consent of the victim is irrelevant.”11 What the law accepts as “good reason” in this context so as to negate assault tends to depend upon public policy considerations reflecting social attitudes, which can themselves change. Classes of assaults causing actual bodily harm to which consent may be an answer in law include sporting and other physical contests, surgical procedures and decoration of the body by tattooing or piercing. These categories and others are considered below under the subheading “Particular acts/activities which may constitute assault” at [CA.61.200], below. 1 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74 (CCA). 2 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 233 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 3 In Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 the English Court of Appeal described absence of consent as “an essential element” of an assault, referring to the definition of “assault” (including “battery”) of James J in Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444 as “the actual intended use of unlawful force to another person without his consent” (emphasis added). In Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 WLR 1528; 3 All ER 468; (1981) 74 Cr App R 1 at 1534 (WLR), 471 (All ER), 8 (Cr App R) Lord Lane CJ described an assault as “any intentional touching of another person without the consent of that person and without lawful excuse” (emphasis added). See also Lergesner v Carroll [1991] 1 Qd R 202; 49 A Crim R 51 (CCA). 4 The argument was advanced in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 (HL) that the definition of “assault” does not include absence of consent (at 226). Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle at 246–247 observed that there are conflicting dicta on the matter and said that it was not necessary to decide the question. His Lordship expressed the obiter view however, that consent was a defence and that its lack was not an element of assault. 5 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333; R v Kuckailis [2001] NSWCCA 333 per Howie J at [17]. See also R v Ferguson (1974) 75 A Crim R 31 at 36 per McPherson JA (Qld CA). 6 R v Ferguson (1974) 75 A Crim R 31 at 36 per McPherson JA (Qld CA). 7 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333; R v Kuckailis [2001] NSWCCA 333 per Howie J at [17].
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If there is consent to what would otherwise be an assault, there is no assault.1“Consent ordinarily has the effect of transforming what would otherwise be unlawful into accepted, and therefore acceptable, contact. Consensual contact does not, ordinarily, amount to assault.”2
Crimes Act 1900 s 61
[CA.61.160]
8 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74; R v Pryor (2001) 124 A Crim R 22; [2001] QCA 341 (Qld CA). See also Woolley v Fitzgerald [1969] Tas SR 65 (Tas Sup Ct, Chambers J); R v Richardson [1998] 3 WLR 1292. 9 R v Case (1850) 1 Den 580; 169 ER 381; R v Flattery (1876-77) LR 2 QBD 410 and R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340; (1924) 17 Cr App R 56 (victims consenting to sexual intercourse believing it to be a surgical operation). If however, the complainant knows that a proposed act is sexual intercourse, this knowledge is not affected by a mistake as to the purpose for which this is proposed, see Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74; R v Mobilio [1991] 1 VR 339; (1990) 50 A Crim R 170 (Vic CCA). 10 R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23. Communication of sexually transmitted disease is now an offence under s 36. 11 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 at 243 (AC) per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle (also Lord Templeman at 237 (AC) and Lord Lowry at 250 (AC)). Many other authorities contain similar statements of principle, including R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534; R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 at 507 (KB); Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 (CA).
[CA.61.180]
Element 4 – without lawful excuse
For there to be an assault the law requires an intentional application of force to the person of another which is unlawful. For it to be an unlawful act of the accused there must be no lawful justification for it.1 There are many lawful justifications for intentional applications of force. Apart from consent, there is accepted social and everyday touching include touching another to engage his or her attention (using no more force than is reasonably necessary)2 or seizing a hand to shake it or slapping someone’s back in friendship.3 Other lawful justifications are:
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(a) reasonable punishment of a child – see subheading “Chastisement” under [CA.61.200], below; (b) lawful arrest4 and execution of legal process.5 It is an answer to a charge of assault that the accused was lawfully arresting the complainant either on criminal or civil process, and used no more force than was necessary.6 Serving process by thrusting a document into the folds of a person’s coat is not necessarily an assault.7 As to arrest, see [2.33510]ff; (c) self-defence8 – and see [CA.423.40] – [CA.423.140]; (d) defence of property – see [CA.423.80]; (e) accident – and see commentary at [CLP.120]. 1 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74 at 75 per Finlay J (CCA) approved in Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 189 (NSWLR); 337 (A Crim R) per Kirby ACJ. 2 Wiffın v Kincard (1807) 2 Bos & PNR 471; 127 ER 713; Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 WLR 562; 1 All ER 987; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER). 3 Turberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER). 4 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER). But subject to the exercise of this power, the court said that a police officer possesses no greater rights than an ordinary citizen where assault and battery is concerned (at 378 (All ER)). 5 Harrison v Hodgson (1830) 10 B C 445. 6 Rose v Kempthorne (1910) 22 Cox CC 356. See also Southam v Smout [1964] 1 QB 308; Vaughan v McKenzie [1969] 1 QB 557. 7 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229 at 1177 (WLR), 378 (All ER). 8 Stanley v Powell [1891] QB 86 (cases collected); Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426.
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[CA.61.240] [CA.61.200]
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Particular acts/activities which can constitute assault
Apart from chastisement, the concept of consent, and public policy considerations relating to consent, is often central to the following: Fights
An ordinary fight between two angry participants is capable of constituting an assault – but where there is a contest without hostility and not calculated to produce real bodily injury there is no assault.1 It is difficult to formulate the precise distinction between these two situations – the question must be determined by reference to the intention of the parties and the mode and conditions of the encounter.2 It is not in the public interest that people should cause or try to cause each other actual bodily harm for no good reason – it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused and this means most fights will be unlawful regardless of consent.3 1 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 at 338 per McInerney J. 2 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 at 343 per McInerney J. 3 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 (CA).
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[CA.61.240]
Sport and other physical contests
Consent to the infliction of violence as ordinarily and reasonably contemplated as incidental to a sporting contest will ordinarily preclude the infliction of physical violence during the course of the game from constituting an assault.1 Players of intrinsically violent games are regarded as consenting to force of a kind and degree which could reasonably be expected to occur in the game.2 In body contact sports the law accepts that play will not always be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules and players are regarded as submitting to some applications of force outside the rules, but not all of them.3 In such cases it may be a question of degree depending upon the circumstances.4 Whether consent depends upon whether the act was done during play in accordance with the rues of the game or not is an unresolved question.5 Also unresolved is the appropriateness of the test in relation to consent as to whether what occurred was “outside the reasonable expectation of the reasonable player”.6 What does seem clear is that a participant in a sport does not consent to being injured during the course of the game by any act which is not done in the legitimate pursuit of the objects of the game.7 An off-the-ball punch to the jaw in a rugby match will not be excused by the concept of consent.8 1 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 at 339 per McInerney J quoting R v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83. 2 R v Carr (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 October 1990) (head high tackle on player without the ball); R v Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995) (elbow to the face in a rugby league match). 3 McAvaney v Quigley (1992) 58 A Crim R 457; Re Lenfield (1993) 114 FLR 195; R v Abbott (1995) 81 A Crim R 55. 4 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 at 549 per Stephen J; Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 per McInerney J at 338–341. 5 R v Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995) compare reservations of Hunt CJ at CL at 2 to the views of Levine J at 6. 6 See R v Carr (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 October 1990) and R v Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995) per Levine J at 6. 7 R v Stanley (unreported, NSW CCA, 7 April 1995) per Hunt CJ at CL at p 2 (also Levine J at p 6). See also R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 at 265–266 (AC) per Lord Mustill. 8 R v Billinghurst [1978] Crim LR 553. See also R v Gingell [1980] Crim LR 661.
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[CA.61.220]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61 [CA.61.260]
[CA.61.20] Surgical and medical procedures
Even though actual bodily harm may be caused, reasonable surgical or medical interference will not constitute assault1 provided that informed consent is obtained from the patient.2 It has been said that bodily invasions in the course of proper medical treatment stand completely outside the criminal law and that the importance of consent in this context is not that it furnishes a defence in itself, but that it is usually essential to the propriety of medical treatment.3 Special circumstances apart, absence of consent results in the loss of the doctor’s immunity,4 and to administer medical treatment to a conscious and sane adult without consent is both a criminal battery and a trespass.5 A sane adult has the right unreasonably to refuse medical treatment.6 In emergencies or cases of necessity where a patient cannot give consent because of unconsciousness or disorientation, the law permits a doctor to proceed without consent.7
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Ritual circumcision of males is lawful.8 Female genital mutilation (subject to certain exceptions) however, is a criminal offence.9 1 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 at 719 (QB) (CA); R v Richardson [1998] 3 WLR 1292 (CA). 2 Bravery v Bravery [1954] 1 WLR 1169; 3 All ER 59 (CA) per Evershed MR and Hodson LJ at 1174–1175 (WLR); In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316. 3 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 393 per Lord Mustill (HL). 4 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 393 per Lord Mustill (HL). 5 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 6 S v McC [1972] AC 24 at 43 per Lord Reid; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 at 882 per Lord Scarman. 7 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 393 per Lord Mustill (HL). 8 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 at 231 (AC) per Lord Templeman. 9 Section 45 Crimes Act 1900 introduced by the Crimes (Female Genital Mutilation) Amendment Act 1994.
[CA.61.280]
Bodily decoration
Even though they may cause actual bodily harm, the law accepts activities directed to bodily decoration such as tattooing and bodily piercing.1 Branding with consent has also been accepted as non-criminal in a case where a husband branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife at her request. It was held that this was not an offence even though actual bodily harm was deliberately caused.2 In an English case it was held that the apparent consent of boys aged 12 and 13 to tattoos which became inflamed was no consent at all as they were unable to appreciate the nature of the act.3 1 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 at 231 (AC) per Lord Templeman. 2 R v Wilson [1996] 1 WLR 125 (CA). 3 Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 168 (QBD).
[CA.61.300]
Sado-masochistic activities
The question of consent arose in the case of a man who caused bodily harm to a girl whom he caned (he claimed consensually) for sexual gratification. The English Court of Criminal Appeal said that as a general rule is it unlawful to beat another person with such violence that infliction of bodily harm is a probable consequence and that in such a case consent is immaterial.1 In another case, the House of Lords considered whether consent afforded a defence to sado-masochistic activities which resulting in the wounding of some of the participants.2 Lord Templeman observed that the question of whether the defence of consent should
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be extended to the consequences of sado-machochistic encounters can only be decided by consideration of policy and public interest.3 By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords held that where injury was caused in this way, consent is immaterial. 1 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1. 2 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44. 3 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 at 234 (AC) per Lord Templeman.
Chastisement
Lawful chastisement is a recognised exception to liability for assault.1 There is a statutory defence of lawful correction – see s 61AA. A parent or a person in loco parentis may correct a child in a reasonable manner.2 The correction must be reasonable, moderate, administered with a proper instrument, and have a proper relation to the age, physique and mentality of the child.3 The law as to correction has reference only to a child old enough to be capable of understanding correction.4 It must not be used for the gratification of passion or rage.5 A father cannot point a loaded pistol at a son to frighten him.6 To chastise a female naked was held to be unreasonable correction.7
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A similar right exists in a schoolteacher as a delegation of the parental right.8 It may extend to acts done on the way to and from school as well as acts done on school premises.9 To convict a schoolteacher it must be shown that the punishment was unreasonable or excessive.10 A husband is not entitled to chastise or imprison his wife.11 1 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; 3 WLR 125; 2 All ER 1057 (CA), per the court at 719 (QB); R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 per Lord Jauncey at 245 (AC); Lord Mustill at 266–267 (AC). 2 Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465. 3 R v Terry [1955] VLR 114; R v Mackie [1973] Crim LR 54. 4 R v Griffın (1869) 11 Cox CC 402. 5 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44 per Lord Mustill at 266–267 (AC). 6 R v Hamilton (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 9. 7 R v Miles (1842) 6 The Jur 243. 8 In Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16 Kitto J at 29 suggested that a schoolteacher’s power of reasonable chastisement exists, at least in a system of compulsory education, not by virtue of a delegation by the parent, but because of the nature of the relationship of schoolteacher and pupil and the inherent necessity of maintaining order at the school. See also Hansen v Cole (1890) 9 NZLR 272. Mansell v Griffın [1908] 1 KB 947 (punishment by an assistant teacher). Corporal punishment is not permitted in New South Wales government schools – the Ministerial guidelines for government school fair discipline codes must not permit corporal punishment, see s 35(2A) of the Education Act 1990. 9 Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465; R v Newport Justices; Ex parte Wright [1929] 2 KB 416. 10 Byrne v Hebden [1913] QSR 233; White v Weller [1959] Qd R 192. 11 R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671; R v Caldwell [1976] WAR 204; R v Watson (1986) 22 A Crim R 308 at 312 per McPherson J (CCA Qld).
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
DIVISION 9A – DEFENCE OF LAWFUL CORRECTION [Div 9A heading insrt Act 89 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; (am Act 53 of 2002)]
61AA
Defence of lawful correction
(1) In criminal proceedings brought against a person arising out of the application of physical force to a child, it is a defence that the force was applied for the purpose of the punishment of the child, but only if: (a) the physical force was applied by the parent of the child or by a person acting for a parent of the child, and (b) the application of that physical force was reasonable having regard to the age, health, maturity or other characteristics of the child, the nature of the alleged misbehaviour or other circumstances. (2) The application of physical force, unless that force could reasonably be considered trivial or negligible in all the circumstances, is not reasonable if the force is applied: (a) to any part of the head or neck of the child, or (b) to any other part of the body of the child in such a way as to be likely to cause harm to the child that lasts for more than a short period. (3) Subsection (2) does not limit the circumstances in which the application of physical force is not reasonable.
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(4) This section does not derogate from or affect any defence at common law (other than to modify the defence of lawful correction). (5) Nothing in this section alters the common law concerning the management, control or restraint of a child by means of physical contact or force for purposes other than punishment. (6) In this section: child means a person under 18 years of age. de facto spouse [Repealed] [Def rep Act 19 of 2010, Sch 3.27[1]]
parent of a child means a person having all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority in respect of the child which, by law, parents have in relation to their children. person acting for a parent of a child means a person: (a) who: (i) is a step-parent of the child, a de facto partner of a parent of the child, a relative (by blood or marriage) of a parent of the child or a person to whom the parent has entrusted the care and management of the child, and (ii) is authorised by a parent of the child to use physical force to punish the child, or (b) who, in the case of a child who is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (within the meaning of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998), is recognised by the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander community to which the child belongs as being an appropriate person to exercise special responsibilities in relation to the child. Note: “De facto partner” is defined in section 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987. [Def am Act 19 of 2010, Sch 3.27[2] and [3]]
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 61AA
(7) This section does not apply to proceedings arising out of an application of physical force to a child if the application of that force occurred before the commencement of this section. (8) The Attorney General is to review this section to determine whether its provisions continue to be appropriate for securing the policy objectives of the section. The review is to be undertaken as soon as possible after the period of 3 years from the commencement of this section. A report on the outcome of the review is to be tabled in each House of Parliament within 6 months after the end of the period of 3 years.
CA
[S 61AA am Act 19 of 2010; insrt Act 89 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1] (am Act 53 of 2002)]
SECTION 61AA COMMENTARY [CA.61AA.20]
Related reading
For commentary on chastisement in the context of assault, see [CA.61.320].
DIVISION 10 – OFFENCES IN THE NATURE OF RAPE, OFFENCES RELATING TO OTHER ACTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT ETC [Div 10 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[12]]
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DIVISION 10 COMMENTARY Sexual assault trials – Part 3 Division 10: lists, tables, definitions, major topics etc ............ [CA.Pt3.Div10.20] Index of sexual assault and like offences ............................................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.40] Table of sexual assault offences existing and repealed (including maximum penalties) ....... [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS – PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE AND DIRECTIONS LIST ........... [CA.Pt3.Div10.80] Definitions ............................................................................................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.100] Warning and standard procedure direction to be given to jury ............................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.120] Pre-trial .................................................................................................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.140] During trial – evidence and procedure ................................................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.160] Trial directions ....................................................................................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.180] After trial .............................................................................................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.200]
Issues in sexual assault trials Introduction ........................................................................................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.300] Recent complaint evidence – rationale and admissibility ..................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.320] Requirements for admissibility of complaint evidence at common law ................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.340] [1] First reasonable opportunity rule ..................................................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.360] [2] The complainant had to give evidence ............................................................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.380] [3] The person to whom the complaint was made had to give evidence ............................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.400] [4] The complaint usually had to refer to a sexual incident ................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.420] [5] Whether the complaint had to take the form of complaint .............................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.440] [6] The complaint was not to be elicited by leading questions ............................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.460] Function of judge and jury concerning complaint evidence ................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.480] Criticism and legislative amendment of the common law assumption ................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.500] Complaint after the Evidence Act 1995 ................................................................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.520] Re-establishing credit under s 108(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 ......................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.540] Delayed complaint or failure to complain - Kilby direction ................................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.560] Statutory warning re Kilby direction - leading to Crofts direction ......................................... [CA.Pt3.Div10.580] Crofts direction criticism and the enactment of s 294(2)(c) ................................................. [CA.Pt3.Div10.600] Long delay in complaint - forensic disadvantage to accused — Longman Warning ........... [CA.Pt3.Div10.620] Legislative amendments to Longman and Crofts directions ................................................ [CA.Pt3.Div10.640] Delayed complaint directions – comparison of s 165B rules to common Law rules ........... [CA.Pt3.Div10.660]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA [CA.Pt3.Div10.20]
[CA.Pt3.Div10.20] Sexual assault trials – Part 3 Division 10: lists, tables, definitions, major topics etc
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General note: Sexual assault offences were formerly contained in ss 61A–61G. These sections were repealed by Act No 198 of 1989 operative from 17 March 1991 and were replaced by ss 61H–61U. [CA.Pt3.Div10.40] Index of sexual assault and like offences Accused, under 18 – sanction of Attorney-General required for offences against males (s 78T – repealed) Act of gross indecency, male (s 78Q – repealed) Act of indecency (s 61E – repealed; s 61N) aggravated (s 61O) procure on male (s 81A – repealed) with or towards girl under 16 (s 76A – repealed) Actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse (s 61C – repealed; s 61K) Aggravated act of indecency (s 61O) Aggravated indecent assault (s 61M) Aggravated sexual assault (s 61J) in company (s 61JA) Alternative verdicts, ss 61B – 61E (repealed) (s 61G – repealed) Alternative verdicts, ss 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61M and 61O (s 61Q) Alternative verdicts, s 66A–66D (s 66E) Alternative verdicts, ss 80D and 80E (s 80F) Assault, with an act of indecency (s 61E – repealed; s 61L) with intent to have carnal knowledge of girl under 10 (s 68 – repealed) with intent to have carnal knowledge of girl 10–16 (s 72 – repealed) with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male under 10 (s 78I – repealed) with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male 10–18 (s 78L – repealed) with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male 10–18 by father, step-father or teacher (s 78O – repealed) with intent to have sexual intercourse (s 61K) with intent to have sexual intercourse with child under 10 (s 66B) with intent to have sexual intercourse with child 10–16 (s 66D) Attempt, bestiality (s 80) carnal knowledge of girl under 10 (s 68 – repealed) carnal knowledge of girl 10–16 (s 72 – repealed) carnal knowledge of girl 16–17 by father, step-father, teacher (s 74 – repealed) commit offence under ss 61B – 61E (repealed) (s 61F – repealed) homosexual intercourse with male under 10 (s 78I – repealed) homosexual intercourse with male 10–18 (s 78L – repealed) homosexual intercourse with male 10–18 by father, step-father, teacher (s 78O – repealed) incest (s 78B) penalty (s 61P) procure act of indecency with male (s 81A – repealed) rape (s 65 – repealed) sexual intercourse with child under 10 (s 66B) sexual intercourse with child 10–16 (s 66D)
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s 61AA
sexual intercourse with child 16–18 under special care (s 73) Attorney-General, sanction of for s 78A and s 78B (s 78F) Attorney-General, sanction of for offences against males if accussed under 18 (s 78T – repealed) Bestiality (s 79) Bestiality, attempt (s 80) Camera, proceedings in (s 77A – repealed) Carnal knowledge, alternative to rape (s 64 – repealed) deemed complete on proof of penetration (s 62 – repealed) of girl under 10 (s 67 – repealed) of girl under 10, attempt (s 68 – repealed) of girl 10–16 (s 71 – repealed) of girl 10–16, attempt (s 72 – repealed) of girl 16–17 by father, step-father, teacher (s 73 – repealed) of idiot or imbecile (s 72A – repealed) procured by fraud (s 66 – repealed) Causing sexual servitude (s 80D) Child under 10, sexual intercourse with (s 66A) Child 10–16, sexual intercourse with (s 66C) Child 16–18 under special care, sexual intercourse with (s 73) Coercion, sexual intercourse procured by (s 65A) Conduct of business involving sexual servitude (s 80E) Consent, meaning in s 61I and s 61J (s 61R) Consent no defence in certain cases (s 77) Consent no defence, acts against male (s 78R – repealed) Cunnilingus, see definition of “sexual intercourse” (s 61H) Defences to incest and attempt incest (s 78C) Definition of “homosexual intercourse” (s 78G – repealed) Definition of “sexual intercourse” (s 61H) Drug, inducing carnal connection by use of (s 66 – repealed) Father, carnal knowledge of girl 16–17 by (s 73 – repealed) homosexual intercourse by (s 78N – repealed) attempted homosexual intercourse (s 78O – repealed) Female, indecent assault of (s 76 – repealed) Forced self-manipulation, sexual assault by (s 80A) Fraud, procuring carnal knowledge by (s 66 – repealed) Girl, under 10 carnal knowledge of (s 67 – repealed) under 10 attempt carnal knowledge of (s 68 – repealed) under 16, act of indecency with or towards (s 76A – repealed) 10–16 carnal knowledge of (s 71 – repealed) 10–16 attempt carnal knowledge of (s 72 – repealed) 16–17 carnal knowledge of, by father, step-father or teacher (s 73 – repealed) 16–17 attempt carnal knowledge of, by father, step-father or teacher (s 74 – repealed) Grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse (s 61B – repealed) Gross indecency, act of with or towards male (s 78Q – repealed) Guardianship, removal from on conviction (s 78D – repealed) Husband, personating to procure carnal knowledge (s 66 – repealed)
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Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.40] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.40]
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Homosexual intercourse, definition of (s 78G – repealed) with idiot or imbecile (s 78M – repealed) with male under 10 (s 78H – repealed) with male under 10, attempt or assault with intent (s 78I – repealed) with male 10–18 (s 78K – repealed) with male 10–18, attempt or assault with intent (s 78L – repealed) with male 10–18 by father, step-father, teacher (s 78N – repealed) with male 10–18 by father, step-father, teacher, attempt or assault with intent (s 78O – repealed) Idiot or imbecile, carnal knowledge of (s 72A – repealed) homosexual intercourse with (s 78M – repealed) Impersonation (see Personation) In company, aggravated sexual assault (s 61JA) Incest (s 78A) Incest, attempt (s 78B) Incest, defences (s 78C) Indecent assault (s 61E – repealed; s 61L) aggravated (s 61M) of female (s 76 – repealed) on male (s 81 – repealed) Indecency, act of (s 61E – repealed; s 61N) Intellectual disability, sexual intercourse (s 66F) Intimidation, sexual intercourse procured by (s 65A) Male, act of gross indecency with or towards (s 78Q – repealed) under 10, homosexual intercourse (s 78H – repealed) under 10, attempt homosexual intercourse (s 78I – repealed) 10–18, homosexual intercourse (s 78K – repealed) 10–18, attempt homosexual intercourse (s 78L – repealed) indecent assault on (s 81 – repealed) Married, offender, no bar to conviction (s 61T) Minors, offenders (s 61S) Non-violent threat, sexual intercourse procured by (s 65A) Offender married to victim (s 61T) Offenders who are minors (s 61S) Persistent sexual abuse of child (s 66EA) Personation, procuring carnal knowledge (s 66 – repealed) Proceedings in camera (s 77A – repealed) Procure act of indecency with male (s 81A – repealed) Rape, carnal knowledge alternative (s 64 – repealed) Rape, common law offence abolished (s 63 – repealed) Sanction of Attorney-General for offences under ss 78A and 78B (s 78F) Sanction of Attorney-General for offences against males if accused under 18 (s 78T – repealed) Sentencing, offences arising out of substantially same set of circumstances (s 61U) Sexual abuse of child, persistent (s 66EA) Sexual assault, aggravated (s 61J) Sexual assault, aggravated, in company (s 61JA)
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s 61AA
Sexual assault category 1 – inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse (s 61B – repealed) Sexual assault category 2 – inflicting actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse (s 61C – repealed) Sexual assault category 3 – sexual intercourse without consent (s 61D – repealed) Sexual assault category 4 – indecent assault and act of indecency (s 61E – repealed) Sexual assault by forced self-manipulation (s 80A) Sexual intercourse, definition (s 61A – repealed; s 61H) procured by intimidation or non-violent threat (s 65A) with child under 10 (s 66A) with child under 10, attempt (s 66B) with child 10–16 (s 66C) with child 10–16, attempt (s 66D) with child 16–18 under special care (s 73) with person who has an intellectual disability (s 66F) without consent (s 61D – repealed; s 61I) without consent in circumstances of aggravation (s 61J) Sexual servitude, causing (s 80D) conduct of business involving (s 80E) Soliciting or inciting an offence under ss 79, 81 – repealed or 81A – repealed (s 81B – repealed) Special care, definition (s 73) sexual intercourse with child 16–18 under (s 73) Step-father, carnal knowledge of girl 16–17 by (s 73 – repealed) homosexual intercourse by (s 78N – repealed) attempt homosexual intercourse by (s 78O – repealed) Teacher, carnal knowledge of girl 16–17 by (s 73 – repealed) homosexual intercourse by (s 78N – repealed) attempt homosexual intercourse by (s 78O – repealed) Trial for homosexual offence – male in fact 10–18 (s 78J – repealed) [CA.Pt3.Div10.60]
Table of sexual assault offences existing and repealed (including maximum penalties)
Note Repealed sections are in italics; current sections are in bold. Section 61B Repealed
Description Sexual assault category 1. Inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse
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Created 14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981
Amended
Repealed Penalty 20 years 17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
Notes –“Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H (originally s 61A) – Alt verdict, see s 61G
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Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA Section 61C Repealed
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61D Repealed
[CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Description Sexual assault category 2. Maliciously inflict actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse Sexual assault category 3. Sexual intercourse without consent
Created 14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981
Amended
Repealed Penalty 12 years 17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981
1. Offence under authority added. 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985 2. Offence, being in company added. 21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987 1. Offence under authority added. 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985 2. Offence, being in company added. 21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987
7 years; 10 years 17.3.91 if person under Act No 198 of 16 Amendment 1 – 1989 12 years Amendment 2 – 12 years
61E Repealed
14.7.81 Act Sexual assault No 42 of category 4. Indecent assault; 1981 act of indecency to person under 16
61F Repealed
Attempt to commit an offence under ss 61B, 61C, 61D or 61E
420
14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981
Indecent assault 17.3.91 4 years; 6 years Act No 198 of if person under 16. Act of 1989 indecency 2 years. Amendment ss 1 and 2 added various different penalties
Notes –“Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H (originally s 61A) – Alt verdict, see s 61G –“Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H (originally s 61A) – Alt verdict, see s 61G
Alt verdict, see s 61G. Consent no defence – s 77
Penalties as 17.3.91 prescribed by Act No 198 of principal sections 1989
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Section 61I Current
Description Sexual assault
Created 17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
61J Current
Aggravated sexual assault
17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
20 years
61JA Current
Aggravated sexual assault in company
1.10.01 Act No 62 of 2001
Life
61K Current
Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse
17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
20 years
61L Current
Indecent assault 17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
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Amended
Repealed
Penalty 14 years
5 years
s 61AA Notes “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. Attempt – see s 61P. Alt verdict – see s 61Q. Consent – see s 61R “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. Attempt – see s 61P. Alt verdict – see s 61Q. Consent – see s 61R. “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. Attempt – see s 61P. Alt verdict – see s 61Q. Consent – see s 61R. “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. Attempt – see s 61P Attempt – see s 61P. Consent no defence – s 77
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CA
Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900
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s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.60]
Section 61M Current
Description Created Aggravated 17.3.91 Act indecent assault No 198 of 1989
61N Current
Act of indecency
17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
61O Current
Aggravated act of indecency
17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
63 Repealed as an offence
Rape
before 1981
65 Repealed
Attempt rape. Assault female with intent to commit Sexual intercourse procured by intimidation or non-violent threat Procuring carnal knowledge by fraud
before 1981
65A Current
66 Repealed
422
Amended
Amended: Currently s 63 abolishes common law offence of rape
Repealed
Notes Attempt – see s 61P. Alt verdict – see s 61Q. Consent no defence – s 77 Attempt – 2 years if see s 61P. person under 16; 18 months if Consent no defence – person 16 and s 77 above Attempt – 5 years if see s 61P. person under Alt verdict – 16; 3 years if see s 61Q. person 16 and Consent no above; 7 years if person under defence – s 77 10 Life (25 years) Alt verdict – 14.7.81 see s 64; Act No 42 s 78E of 1981
14 years 14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981 6 years
21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987
before 1981
Penalty 7 years; 10 years if person under 10
13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
Alt verdict – see s 78E
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H
14 years
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Section 66A Current
Description Sexual intercourse – child under 10
66B Current
23.3.86 Act Attempt or No 149 of assault with 1985 intent to have sexual intercourse with a child under 10
66C Current
Sexual intercourse – child 10–16
66D Current
23.3.86 Act Attempt or No 149 of assault with 1985 intent to have sexual intercourse with a child 10–16
66EA Current
Persistent sexual abuse of child
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Created 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
8.1.99 Act No 131 of 1998
Amended Repealed 1.2.2003 Act No 90 of 2002 Term of imprisonment amended from 20 to 25 years 1.2.2003 Act No 90 of 2002 Term of imprisonment amended from 20 to 25 years 13.6.2003 Act No 9 of 2003 Penalties categorised by age and aggravation
Penalty 25 years
25 years
16 years if person 10–14 (20 years for aggravated offence); 10 years if person 14–16 (12 years for aggravated offence) See s 66C above
25 years
s 61AA Notes “Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H. Alt verdict – see s 66E. Consent no defence – s 77 “Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H. Consent no defence – s 77
“Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H. Alt verdict – see s 66E. Consent no defence – s 77 “Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H. Consent no defence – s 77 Consent no defence – s 77. Sanction by DPP required
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Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900
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s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.60]
Section 66F Current
Description Sexual intercourse – intellectual disability
Created 21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987
67 Repealed
Carnal knowledge of girl under 10
before 1981
68 Repealed
before 1981 Attempt or assault with intent to carnally know girl under 10
14 years 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
71 Repealed
Carnal knowledge of girl 10–16
before 1981
10 years 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
424
Amended
Repealed
Penalty 66F(2) 10 years (when person under authority) 66F(3) 8 years
Life (25 years) 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
Notes “Sexual intercourse” defined in s 61H. “Intellectual disability” defined in s 66F(1). Consent no defence – s 77. Sanction of AG or DPP required “Carnal knowledge” defined in s 62. Alt verdict – see ss 69 and 70. Consent no defence – see s 77 “Carnal knowledge” defined in s 62. Consent no defence – see s 77 “Carnal knowledge” defined in s 62. Consent no defence, statutory defence – see s 77. Limitation period see s 78
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Section 72 Repealed
Description Created before 1981 Attempt or assault with intent to carnally know girl 10–16
72A Repealed
before 1981 Carnal knowledge of idiot or imbecile
73 Current
Sexual intercourse with child 16–18 under special care Carnal knowledge of girl 16–17 by father, step-father or teacher Attempt to carnally know girl 16–17 by father, step-father or teacher Indecent assault of female
73 Repealed
74 Repealed
76 Repealed
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13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
before 1981
before 1981
before 1981
Amended
Repealed Penalty 5 years 23.3.86 Act No 149 of 1985
5 years 21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987
s 61AA Notes “Carnal knowledge” defined in s 62. Consent no defence, statutory defence – see s 77. Limitation period see s 78 “Carnal knowledge” defined in s 62. Consent no defence – see s 77 “Special care” – see s 73(3)
8 years if person 16 and under 17; 4 years if person 17 and under 18 8 years “Carnal 13.6.03 knowledge” Act No 9 defined in of 2003 s 62. Consent no defence – see s 77 8 years “Carnal 13.6.03 knowledge” Act No 9 defined in of 2003 s 62. Consent no defence – see s 77 6 years Consent no 14.7.81 defence if Act No 42 girl under 16 of 1981 – see s 77. Limitation period – see s 78
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Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900
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s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.60]
Section 76A Repealed
Description Created Act of indecency before 1981 with or towards girl under 16
78A Current
Incest
78B Current
Attempt incest
78H Repealed
Homosexual intercourse with male under 10
426
Amended
Repealed Penalty 2 years 14.7.81 Act No 42 of 1981
before 1981 13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003. “sexual intercourse” replaced “carnal knowledge” before 1981 13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003 “person” replaced “male”
8 years
8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
2 years
25 years 1.2.2003 Act No 90 of 2002
Notes Consent no defence and statutory defences – see s 77 Defences and consent no defence – see s 78C. Sanction of AG or DPP required – see s 78F.
Defences and consent no defence – see s 78C. Sanction of AG or DPP required – see s 78F. “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Alt verdict – s 78J. Consent no defence – s 78R
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Section 78I Repealed
Description Attempt or assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male under 10
Created 8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
78K Repealed
Homosexual intercourse with male 10–18
8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
10 years
78L Repealed
Attempt or assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male 10–18
8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
5 years
78M Repealed
8.6.84 Act Homosexual intercourse with No 7 of idiot or imbecile 1984
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Amended
Repealed Penalty 14 years 1.2.2003 Act No 90 of 2002
5 years 21.2.88 Act No 184 of 1987
s 61AA Notes “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence– s 78R “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R
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CA
Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
Crimes Act 1900
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s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.60]
Section 78N Repealed
Description Homosexual intercourse by father, step-father or teacher with male 10–18
Created 8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
78O Repealed
Attempt or assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse by father, step-father or teacher with male 10–18
78Q Repealed
79 Current
428
Amended
Repealed 13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
Penalty 14 years
8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
7 years
Act of gross indecency
8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984
13.6.03 Act No 9 of 2003
2 years
Buggery, bestiality
before 1981 8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984. To apply only to bestiality
Notes “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R. Alt charge under ss 78K or 78L – s 78P “Homosexual intercourse” defined in s 78G. Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R. Alt charge under ss 78K or 78L – s 78P Sanction of AG or DPP required – s 78T. Consent no defence – s 78R
14 years
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 3 – Offences against the person [CA.Pt3.Div10.60] Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc Description Attempted buggery, bestiality
Created Amended Repealed before 1981 8.6.84 Act No 7 of 1984. To apply only to bestiality 17.3.91 Act No 198 of 1989
Penalty 5 years
80A Current
Sexual assault by forced self-manipulation Causing sexual servitude
22.3.02 Act No 99 of 2001
15 years (19 years for aggravated offence)
80E Current
22.3.02 Act Conduct of No 99 of business involving sexual 2001 servitude
15 years (19 years for aggravated offence)
81 Repealed
Indecent assault on male
81A Repealed
before 1981 Procure or attempt to procure act of indecency with male before 1981 Soliciting or inciting an offence under ss 79, 81 or 81A
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80D Current
81B Repealed
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before 1981
Notes
14 years; 20 years if person under 10
CA
Section 80 Current
s 61AA
“Sexual servitude” – see s 80B. “Circumstances of aggravation” – see s 80C. Alt verdict – see s 80F “Sexual servitude” – see s 80B. “Circumstances of aggravation” – see s 80C. Alt verdict – see s 80F
8.6.84 Act 5 years No 7 of 1984 8.6.84 Act 2 years No 7 of 1984
8.6.84 Act 12 months No 7 of 1984
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]
[CA.Pt3.Div10.0] SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS – PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE AND DIRECTIONS LIST
Many legislative provisions to be found in a variety of different statutes concerning procedure and evidence apply to trials concerning a “prescribed sexual offence”, or concerning a “personal assault offence” which includes a prescribed sexual offence. Additionally, trials of prescribed sexual offences tend to attract many jury directions, often inapposite elsewhere. Many such provisions and directions (sometimes applying only to trials of prescribed sexual offences) are listed below. [CA.Pt3.Div10.100]
Definitions
“Prescribed sexual offence” – under s 3 of the Crimes Act 1900“prescribed sexual offence” means: (a) an offence under section 61B, 61C, 61D, 61E, 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61K, 61L, 61M, 61N, 61O, 63, 65, 65A, 66, 66A, 66B, 66C, 66D, 66EA, 66EB, 66F, 67, 68, 71, 72, 72A, 73, 74, 76, 76A, 78A, 78B, 78H, 78I, 78K, 78L, 78M, 78N, 78O, 78Q, 79, 80, 80A, 80D, 80E, 81, 81A, 81B, 86, 87, 89, 90, 90A, 91, 91A, 91B, 91D, 91E, 91F or 91G of the Crimes Act 1900, or (b) an offence that, at the time it was committed, was a prescribed sexual offence for the purposes of this Act or the Crimes Act 1900, or (c) an offence that includes the commission of, or an intention to commit, an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), or (d) an offence of attempting, or of conspiracy or incitement, to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
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In proceedings (including committal proceedings) concerning a “prescribed sexual offence”, the evidentiary and procedural provisions contained in Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 1 (ss 290–294C) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 apply – see s 290. “Prescribed sexual offences” are included in the definition of “personal assault offences” (as falling within Pt 3 of the Crimes Act 1900) for the purpose of Ch 6 Pt 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, which deals with the giving of evidence by “vulnerable persons” including children under 16 years – see s 306M(1). [CA.Pt3.Div10.120]
Warning and standard procedure direction to be given to jury
With the use of particular evidentiary and procedural provisions (referred to below), the trial judge must: (a) inform the jury that the particular procedure [specified] is standard procedure (referred to below as “standard procedure direction”); and/or (b) warn the jury not to draw any inference adverse to the accused or to give the evidence any greater or lesser weight because of the use of the procedure (referred to below as “weight and no adverse inference warning”). [CA.Pt3.Div10.140]
Pre-trial
In prescribed sexual offence cases, pre-trial orders are usually binding on trial judge: s 130A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. An alibi notice by an accused must be given at least 21 days before trial: s 150 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. With crimes involving sexual violence, the victim should be consulted before any decision is made to modify the charge, accept a guilty plea to a less serious charge or to discontinue proceedings. Also, the victim is to be kept informed of trial process and protected from contact with accused etc: Pt 2 s 6 (s 6.5) of the Victims Rights Act 1996. • an image of a person is sensitive evidence if it is obscene or indecent, or if providing a copy of the image to another without the subject’s consent would interfere with that person’s privacy, or was taken after the subject’s death. Included in sensitive evidence is a photograph of an alleged
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 61AA
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.160] During trial – evidence and procedure • a complainant’s evidence (including evidence given by CCTV etc) in a prescribed sexual offence case normally must be taken in camera unless the court otherwise directs: s 291; • the court may direct that any other part or the entire proceedings be held in camera: s 291A; • trials of alleged incest offences (s 78A or s 78B) are to be held entirely in camera: s 291B; • the court may permit the media to remain in court when a complainant is giving CCTV evidence, even when the proceedings are in camera (except in incest trials): s 291C(1). • where evidence is given in camera from inside or outside the courtroom, the court may make such arrangements as it considers reasonably practicable for media representatives to view or hear evidence given in camera from elsewhere (eg by CCTV) or to view or hear a record of the evidence: s 291C(2); • where evidence is given in camera by a complainant from outside the courtroom by means of CCTV or other technology allowing external communication, a media representative may remain in the courtroom (unless the court otherwise directs) while the evidence is given (other than in the case of alleged incest offences under s 78A or s 78B): s 291C(1). • a non-publication order prohibits publication of material that identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of a complainant in a prescribed sexual offence case: s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900; • the court may forbid publication of the whole or any part of the evidence: s 292 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986; • a non publication order prohibits publication and broadcasting of the name of any child witness, any child accused, any sibling of an accused or witness, and the name of any person mentioned in criminal proceedings in relation to something done by a person as a child: s 11 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987. Regardless of age, a complainant is entitled to have a support person(s) chosen present near the complainant during the giving of the complaintant’s evidence concerning a prescribed sexual offence, even if the complainant gives evidence via CCTV and/or gives evidence in camera: s 294C(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. • a “vulnerable person” means a child or a cognitively impaired person: s 306M(1); • a “cognitively impaired person” includes a person who has an intellectual disability, a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder), a neurological disorder, dementia, a severe mental illness or a brain injury: s 306M(2); • Part 6 applies to evidence given by a cognitively impaired person only if the court is satisfied that the facts may thereby be better ascertained: s 306P. • a complainant who is a vulnerable person is entitled to (but may choose not to) give evidence from outside the court via CCTV: s 306ZB; • where evidence is not given via CCTV by a complainant who is a vulnerable person, the court must make alternative arrangements for the giving of that evidence to restrict (especially) visual contact with the accused or others. This may involve the use of screens and/or planned seating arrangements to restrict vision: s 306ZH;
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sexual assault victim showing that person’s genitalia or otherwise that person in a state of undress, or a video held or seized by the prosecution showing a person committing a sexual offence: s 281B. • the prosecution is not required and cannot be required by subpoena or otherwise to give an accused a copy of anything the prosecution reasonably considers sensitive evidence: s 281C. • procedures for giving an accused or representative access to sensitive evidence are provided: s 281D.
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]
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• with the use of any of these arrangements, the judge must give a “standard procedure direction” and “weight and no adverse inference warning” (see [CA.Pt3.Div10.120]): s 306ZI; • the court may order various people to be with a vulnerable person giving evidence via CCTV other than a support person, ie a court officer, an interpreter, or a person for assisting the vulnerable person in giving evidence associated with an impairment or disability or for providing other support: s 306ZD(2); • a vulnerable person giving evidence by CCTV may not give identification evidence by this means: s 306ZE; • if the courtroom is not equipped so as to allow a vulnerable person to give evidence by CCTV, the proceedings may be adjourned elsewhere where such facility exists: s 306ZF. • if a vulnerable person does not give evidence by CCTV because the facility is not available, or the vulnerable person chooses not to give evidence by CCTV, or because the court orders that the vulnerable person may not give evidence by CCTV, the court must (unless the vulnerable person chooses otherwise) make arrangements for the giving of the vulnerable person’s evidence to restrict contact between the vulnerable person “and any other person or persons” by the use of screens, planned seating arrangements or adjournment of the proceedings to other premises: s 306ZH; • in this event the judge must give a “standard procedure direction” and “weight and no adverse inference warning” (see [CA.Pt3.Div10.120]): s 306ZI(4). • unless the court satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice to do so (s 306Y), a vulnerable person may give evidence in chief wholly or partly by the playing of a pre-recorded interview: s 306U; • the vulnerable person must not be in the court or visible or audible to the court by CCTV while the pre-recorded interview is played in court: s 306U(1); • evidence of a previous representation by a vulnerable person other than by the playing of a pre-recorded interview is not to be called unless the wishes of the vulnerable person have been taken into account: s 306T; • a “weight and no adverse inference warning” (see [CA.Pt3.Div10.120]) is to be given if a pre-recorded interview is played: s 306X; • the court may order that the jury be given all or part of a transcript of pre-recorded interview with a vulnerable person: s 306Z (as to this see R v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628 in which it was said, inter alia, that the recording should not become an exhibit or go to the jury room and that the transcript should be recovered from the jury after the complainant’s evidence has been completed). • if a re-trial is ordered of a person convicted of a prescribed sexual offence, the prosecutor may tender therein a record of the complainant’s original evidence provided notice is given – the trial judge has no discretion not to admit it: s 306B; • the record of the original evidence must be the best available record and must be properly authenticated: s 306E; • if the complainant’s original evidence is re-tendered, the complainant is not compellable to give any further evidence: s 306C; • the complainant may choose to give further oral evidence with leave: s 306D. • where in the trial of a person charged with a prescribed sexual offence the jury could not reach a verdict or the trial is discontinued for any other reason, and if a new trial is listed, the prosecutor may tender therein a record of the complainant’s original evidence provided notice is given: s 306I; • the record of the original evidence must be the best available record and must be properly authenticated: ss 306E and 306L;
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A person who has difficulty communicating is entitled to use a communication aid or person(s) to assist if the person ordinarily uses an aid or person(s): s 275B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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A witness who cannot hear adequately or speak adequately may be questioned in any appropriate way: s 31 of the Evidence Act 1995. If requested, or of its own motion, the court can direct that a person give evidence by audio link or audio visual link from any place within or outside NSW, including a place outside Australia, if it determines it is more convenient to do so and is not unfair to any party: s 5B of the Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998. • A person incapable of understanding the obligation to give truthful evidence is not competent to give sworn evidence (s 13(1)), but may give unsworn evidence if the person understands the difference between the truth and a lie, the court tells the person it is important to tell the truth and the person indicates he or she will not tell lies: s 13(2). • an accused is not compellable to give evidence for the prosecution and an associated accused is not compellable to give evidence for or against an accused unless the associated accused is being tried separately: s 17. • a spouse, de facto spouse, parent or child of an accused may object to being required to give evidence for the prosecution or to give evidence of a communication between themselves and the accused, if that person takes objection and the court finds that there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused to the person or to the relationship between the person and the accused, and the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of the evidence being given: s 18. See also s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 at [15] below re child assault offence. • comment upon failure of accused or accused’s spouse, de facto spouse, parent or child giving evidence – the prosecutor may not comment on any such failure – unless such comment is made by another party, the judge may make such comment, but not as to suggest that the accused etc failed to give evidence because of a belief that the accused was guilty: s 20. In relation to, inter alia, a prescribed sexual offence allegedly committed on a child under 18 years, the spouse of the accused is compellable to give evidence without his or her consent for the prosecution or the defence unless, on application by the spouse, the court has excused the spouse from giving evidence. The court may excuse the spouse from giving evidence for the prosecution if satisfied: (a) that the application is made freely and independently of threat or other improper influence; (b) the evidence of the spouse is relatively unimportant or can be established by other evidence; and (c) that the offence charged is of a minor nature : s 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. • an unrepresented accused cannot personally cross-examine the complainant – the court may appoint a person to cross-examine instead: s 294A. • in the event that such a person is appointed, the judge must give a “standard procedure direction” and “weight and no adverse inference warning”: s 294A(7) (see [CA.Pt3.Div10.120]).
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• the court may decline to admit the original evidence if the court is of the opinion that the accused would be thereby unfairly disadvantaged: s 306I(5); • the record of the original evidence may be altered or edited by agreement of the parties or to remove inadmissible statements by the court’s direction: s 306I(6) and (7); • if the complainant’s original evidence is re-tendered, the complainant is not compellable to give any further evidence unless the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the complainant to give further evidence: s 306J; • the complainant may choose to give further oral evidence with leave, only to be given if the court is satisfied that it is necessary: s 306K.
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
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An accused may, if advised to do so by his or her lawyer, admit matters of fact or give any consent that a party to a civil proceeding may make or give: s 184 of the Evidence Act 1995. Unless the court otherwise directs, it is not necessary for a person who has made a scientific examination of an article or person to give evidence of the result of their examination, and a certificate of such person stating that the examination was made, the nature of the qualifications of the examiner and the facts and conclusions arrived at is admissible as evidence of the matters stated in the certificate: s 282 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Evidence relating to a complainant’s sexual experience is generally inadmissible – certain exceptions are provided for: s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Division 2 of Ch 6 Pt 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (ss 295–306) generally prohibits the calling for production of or adducing evidence of counselling communications by, to or about a complainant in relation to a sexual assault offence. There is a prohibition on evidentiary use in a trial of any application etc used in support of an application for statutory compensation or payment of approved counselling, or any transcript of evidence before the Victims Compensation Tribunal – such documents may not be subpoenaed: s 84 of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996. A question must be disallowed that is: (a) misleading or confusing; (b) unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive; (c) put to a witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate; (d) has no basis other than a sexist, racial, cultural or ethnic stereotype : s 275A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (now repealed). See also s 41 of the Evidence Act 1995.
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If requested and if the court considers it practical and appropriate to do so, the jury may be given a transcript or portion of it of the evidence given at trial: s 55C of the Jury Act 1997. [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]
Trial directions
A number of common trial directions given in sexual assault trials are enumerated by Wood CJ at CL in R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 at 250–251 (NSWLR). See [2.9360.10]. See [2.8830] – [CA.Pt3.Div10.660] • if a question is asked that tends to suggest an absence of or delay in complaint, the judge must warn the jury that absence or delay of complaint does not necessarily indicate that the allegation of sexual assault is false and that there may be good reasons for a delayed or absent complaint: s 294(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. • Crofts restricted – the judge must not warn the jury that delay in complaining is relevant to the complainant’s credibility unless there is sufficient evidence to justify such a warning: s 294(2)(c). This is a statutory modification of the former common law gloss on the statutory warnings under s 294(2)(a) and (b) as per Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 and applies to sexual assault proceedings commenced after 1 January 2007. Crofts said that where a judge gives warnings under ss 294(2)(a) and (b), the jury should also be informed (but not in stereotypical terms) that the absence of a complaint or a delay in the making of it may be taken into account in evaluating the evidence of the complainant, and in determining whether to believe him or her. • Longman restricted – if there has been a significant delay in complaint and the accused has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage thereby, if requested, the judge may inform the jury of the nature of the disadvantage and of the need to take that disadvantage into account when considering the evidence: s 165B(2) of the Evidence Act 1995. This is the statutory modification
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of the former common law warning as per Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60 and applies to sexual assault proceedings commenced after 1 January 2009. Prior to that date and after 1 January 2007 a similar but not identical provision appeared in s 294(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. In such cases, it should be noted that before a Longman type warning can be given, three pre-conditions must be satisfied: (a) there must be delay. Delay includes delay between the alleged offence and its being reported: s 165B(2) and (5) of the Evidence Act 1995; (b) the judge must be satisfied that the accused has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage (partially defined in s 165B(7)) which is a disadvantage not constituted by mere delay itself: s 165B(6)(b), and (c) a party requests the direction: s 165B(2).
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In Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 Brennan J referred to the categories in which a “dangerous to convict” direction on uncorroborated evidence was required to be given at common law, which included sexual assault victims and children. Judges are sometimes asked by counsel for an accused to give a direction that includes the phrase “dangerous to convict” – the former Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60 warning included this phrase. It has been judicially observed that phrases such as “dangerous to convict” and “unsafe to convict” carry the danger that they will be regarded by the jury as, in substance, an instruction by the judge to acquit – R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 per Wood CJ at CL at [34] and Sully J at [118]; DRE v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 400; [2006] NSWCCA 280 per Spigelman CJ at [27]. In Robinson v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [19] Spigelman CJ said of the direction “dangerous to convict”, “[i]t is a formulation that is best avoided, save in exceptional circumstances”. The Evidence Act 1995 now provides in s 165B(4) that: It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in informing the jury of the nature of the significant forensic disadvantage suffered and the need to take that disadvantage into account, but the judge must not in any way suggest to the jury that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant solely because of the delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of the delay. A judge may not warn a jury or suggest to a jury that complainants in sexual assault cases are unreliable witnesses “as a class” and it is prohibited to warn a jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant: s 294AA of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. This is the statutory restriction of the former common law warning as per R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 at 19 (NSWLR) per Lee J, and applies to sexual assault proceedings commenced after 1 January 2007. If requested by a party, the trial judge must warn the jury of evidence, the reliability of which may be affected by age, ill-health (whether physical or mental), injury or the like. Here, the judge is to warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable and of the matters that may cause it to be so and of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence or the weight to be given to it: s 165 of the Evidence Act 1995. The question “why would the complainant lie” should not be posed as it tends to reverse the onus of proof in the implicit suggestion that the accused should explain why the complainant would make a false or mistaken allegation: R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520; 98 A Crim R 1. The authorities on this question are collected in the judgment of Latham J in Doe v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 203. In Jovanovic Sperling J at p 542 suggested the following direction: “[i]t would be wrong to conclude that X is telling the truth because there is no apparent reason, in your view, for X to lie. People lie for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes it is apparent. Sometimes it is not. Sometimes the reason is discovered. Sometimes it is not. You cannot be satisfied that X is telling the truth merely because there is no apparent reason for X to have made up these allegations. There might be a reason for X to be untruthful that nobody knows about”. Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106 – when evidence is tendered by the Crown of sexual incidents not the subject of any charge, the jury should be instructed as to the relevance of the evidence and how it may
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be used. As to the appropriate directions, see Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 85 at [80]-[82] and [117]-[120]. When context evidence is admitted, it does not require a direction that it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, unless it is lead as tendency evidence to show the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant: Name withheld [2008] NSWCCA 272. As to this subject generally see also HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; 82 ALJR 723; 183 A Crim R 159; [2008] HCA 16.
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Where there are multiple counts the judge should direct the jury that they must consider each count separately and to consider it only by reference to the evidence that applies to it: KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; (2001) 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11 per McHugh J at [36]. This direction guards against the risk that the jury might decide some counts and simply extrapolate their decision to other counts – it militates against an accused found guilty on one count being treated as a person with a propensity to commit crimes: R v Trainor [2003] VSCA 200 per Buchanan JA at [29]. It may be desirable that the preceding direction be supplemented in a “word against word” case: R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 per Spigelman CJ at [186]. As a general rule “[s]ome reference ought to be made to the effect upon the assessment of the credibility of a complainant if the jury finds itself unable to accept the complainant’s evidence with respect to any count”, but the absence of such a direction is not necessarily fatal – the words of the direction will depend on the circumstances: Markuleski per Spigelman CJ at [186]-[188]. “It will often be appropriate to direct jurors that where they entertain a reasonable doubt concerning the truthfulness or reliability of a complainant’s evidence in relation to one or more counts, that must be taken into account in assessing the truthfulness or reliability of the complainant’s evidence generally”: per Spigelman CJ at [188]. In other states the giving of this kind of direction has been criticised on the basis that the practical effect of it may be “likely to promote propensity reasoning and produce confusion rather than assist a jury to properly evaluate the evidence” – “[t]he jury may well reason that if they are permitted to diminish the complainant’s credibility on this basis, why then cannot they also enhance it by similar reasoning?”: see R v Trainor [2003] VSCA 200 (Vic Sup Ct CA) per Buchanan JA at [32] and Charles JA at [5]. This view was taken too in Western Australia where it was said that, in addition, the direction may work an injustice to the complainant: R v Lefroy (2004) 150 A Crim R 82 (WA Sup Ct CA) at [32]. In this context, remarks made in the High Court as to why a jury may not find a charge proven despite generally accepting a complainant are worth noting. “In addition to want of supporting evidence, other factors that might cause a jury to draw back from reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt in relation to some aspects of a complainant’s evidence might be that the complainant has shown some uncertainty as to matters of detail, or has been shown to have a faulty recollection of some matters, or has been shown otherwise to be more reliable about some parts of his or her evidence than about others”: MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; 135 A Crim R 361 per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [34]. The potential problems with a Markuleski direction as mentioned above, were acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in Queensland where a direction along the lines of the following was suggested: Your general assessment of [the complainant] as a witness will be relevant to all counts, but you will have to consider her evidence in respect of each count when considering that count. Now, it may occur in respect of one of the counts, that for some reason you are not sufficiently confident of her evidence to convict in respect of that count … a situation may arise where, in relation to a particular count, you get to the point where, although you’re inclined to think she’s probably right, you have some reasonable doubt about an element or elements of the offence, that particular offence. Now, if that occurs, of course, you find the accused not guilty in relation to that count. That does not necessarily mean you cannot convict of any other count. You have to consider the reason why you have some reasonable doubt about that part of her evidence and consider whether it affects the way you assess the rest of her evidence, that is whether your doubt about that aspect of her evidence causes you also to have a reasonable doubt about the part of her evidence relevant to any other count R v LR (2005) 156 A Crim R 354 (Qld Sup Ct CA) per Keane JA at 369 ([67]) (McPherson JA and Douglas J agreeing).
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A jury may be warned not to compromise its verdicts by “settlement”, ie where some jurors want to enter verdicts of not guilty and some want to enter verdicts of guilty, agreeing to resolve such an impasse by bringing in verdicts of guilty on some charges and not guilty on others.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.200] After trial A court must make an apprehended violence order for the protection of a person against whom a “domestic violence offence” has been committed, unless such order is not required: s 39 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. A “domestic violence offence” is defined in s 11 as a personal violence offence committed against a person with whom the accused has or has had a domestic relationship. By s 4 a “personal violence offence” includes many sexual offences included under the definition of “prescribed sexual offence” within s 3 of the Crimes Act 1900.
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On conviction of a sexual assault offence under Pt 3 Div 10 of the Crimes Act 1900, if the victim is under the offender’s authority, the court may refer the matter to an appropriate child protection agency: s 80AA of the Crimes Act 1900. For a person convicted of certain offences against a child, including sexual intercourse and an act of indecency punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or more, the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 provides for registration of such offender and for consequential obligations such as change of residence and reporting. Under s 4, as soon as practicable after a “registrable person” is sentenced, the sentencing court is to give that person notice of their reporting obligations and of the consequences of failure to comply with those obligations – the court is also to give written notice to the Commissioner of Police and to the supervising authority for the person.
Issues in sexual assault trials [CA.Pt3.Div10.300] Introduction “Failure to complain for a long time may have a negative impact on the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Speedy complaint may enhance it.”1 A judge should not suggest however that this is a legal presumption, it is a proposition of common sense2 and a jury question of fact in the particular case – see [2.9065]. Sexual assault trials often exhibit features not usually found in other kinds of trials. They are often simply the complainant’s word against the accused’s word, with little else. Prompt complaint, or its absence, may therefore be important evidentially. While victims of other types of assaults generally report them quickly, victims of sexual assault, especially children, but also adults, do not. There is often good reason for a delayed complaint. For an accused, long delay in complaint can cause forensic disadvantage requiring directions by a trial judge to make this plain. Although the concept of prompt complaint is simple enough, the rules governing its admissibility are sometimes complex, a complexity not reduced by the Evidence Act 1995. Also, this has been an area where judicial views on how complainants should and do act and what directions must be given to protect the accused against forensic difficulties caused by a delayed complaint, have often met pointed criticism from other judges, academics and experts. Various judicially formulated rules have been overridden or modified legislatively. The legislative amendments and High Court decisions that prompted them are: Kilby v The Queen3 – delay in complaint – legislative response in 1981 was s 405B of the Crimes Act 1900, replaced by s 107 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, which is now ss 294(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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In KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; (2001) 118 A Crim R 262; [2001] HCA 11, McHugh J noted [37]: “The more directions and warnings juries are given the more likely it is that they will forget or misinterpret some directions or warnings.” If the court considers it appropriate, any direction of law may be given to the jury in writing: s 55B of the Jury Act 1977.
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Longman v The Queen4 – warning of forensic disadvantages to accused by long delay in complaint – legislative response was ss 294(3)–(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 for hearings commenced on or after 1 January 2007 and then replaced by an amended s 165B of the Evidence Act 1995 for proceedings the hearing of which began on or after 1 January 2009. Crofts v The Queen5 – (to re-balance ss 294(1) and (2) equivalent as per Kilby) – legislative response was s 294(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 19866 for proceedings commenced on or after 1 January 2007.7 Graham v The Queen8 – delay in complaint – meaning of “fresh in the memory” – legislative response was s 66(2A) of the Evidence Act 19959 for proceedings the hearing of which began on or after 1 January 2009.10 For the above reasons, this area of sexual assault and particularly delayed complaint and its various aspects, has been productive of many appeals to both courts of criminal appeal across Australia and to the High Court. While no provision of the Evidence Act 1995 deals specifically with admissibility of complaint, the Act has made real changes to the admissibility of complaint evidence. Non-specific Evidence Act provisions bearing on this topic are ss 55, 66, 102, 108(3), 165, 136, 137 and 192. Part 4.5 of the Evidence Act now contains specific provisions concerning warnings in relation to children’s evidence and forensic disadvantages from delay in complaint.
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In many aspects of complaint evidence, common law principles still apply or have some relevance and therefore common law cases and principles are included in the commentary following. 1 R v Fuller [2001] NSWCCA 390 at [28] per Heydon JA. 2 R v Matthews [1999] 1 VR 534; (1998) 102 A Crim R 269 (CA). See also R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118 at 198; 125 per King CJ (SA CCA). 3 (1973) 129 CLR 460 4 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60 5 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 6 Introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Act 2006 which commenced on 1 January 2007. 7 “Proceedings commenced” means when the accused is arrested and charged: R v TJ (2009) 76 NSWLR 167; 197 A Crim R 508 at [22] per McLellan CJ at CL; at [76] per Hidden J. 8 (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438. 9 Introduced by the Evidence Amendment Act 2007 which commenced on 1 January 2009. 10 “proceedings the hearing of which began” means when the accused is arraigned: R v GG [2010] NSWCCA 230 at [48] per Beazley JA (Buddin J and Barr AJ agreeing).
[CA.Pt3.Div10.320]
Recent complaint evidence – rationale and admissibility
The origin of, and reason for the admission of evidence of recent complaint in sexual assault cases (more accurately described as “prompt complaint”1 is the subject of many authorities, including the judgment of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v The Queen2 The complaint admissibility rules applied to complainants of either sex, even though most were female.3 Why complaint evidence was admitted: At common law, evidence of the fact that a complaint had been made at the earliest opportunity was admissible, not as hearsay evidence of the truth of the fact complained of4, but as evidence going to strengthen the complainant’s credit as a witness.5 Prompt complaint demonstrated consistency between the complainant’s out-of-court statement and her evidence at trial.6 As such, complaint went to the question of whether the complainant should be believed.7 Also, it gave support to the credibility of the complainant whose evidence was otherwise vulnerable to attack as a belated fabrication.8 Conversely, failure to make prompt complaint could reduce credibility.9“Did the woman make a complaint at once? If so, that is consistent with her story. Did she not do so? That is inconsistent”.10
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Jury directions: Jury directions concerning prompt complaint had to be framed with precision to avoid a jury impression that a complaint had greater evidentiary status than it had by law.15 Juries had to be told that complaint is not corroboration.16 In a Victorian case where the evidence was finely balanced it was held to be a misdirection for the judge to have told the jury that the complaint was evidence that showed consistency on the complainant’s part because the most it could do was support the credit of the complainant by showing a consistency in the way she reacted at the time and her evidence in court.17 However, this latter strict approach was not always taken – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.420], [CA.Pt3.Div10.440] and [CA.Pt3.Div10.500]. Use of complaint evidence: Prompt complaint evidence could support a complainant’s evidence of lack of consent,18 but was not limited only to cases where consent was in issue – it is relevant to credit generally.19 Complaint could support the complainant’s whole account, including the identification of the perpetrator.20 Where an inadmissible complaint was admitted by the defence for the (unsuccessful) tactical purpose of raising prior inconsistent statement, a conviction on the basis of its inadmissibility was not overturned on appeal.21
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Multiple complaints: Evidence of more than one complaint could be given, provided each could be regarded as having been made at the first reasonable opportunity.22 The fact that the complaint might have been made to one person before it was made to another did not preclude admissibility of the latter.23 Two or more witnesses could give evidence of the complainant’s complaint even when in giving evidence, the complainant omitted referring to complaining to more than one witness.24 Evidentiary importance of complaint: Judges expressed differing views on the importance of complaint evidence in Jones v The Queen25. Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said that, “recent complaint, or its absence, is a factor ordinarily of limited assistance”.26 By contrast, in R v BD Hunt CJ at CL remarked that in his experience in sexual assault trials, complaint was very often the most powerful factor supporting the complaint’s credit and, that if such evidence was not given, juries almost inevitably asked why it had not.27. Much depended upon the facts of the particular case. Additionally, if no evidence of complaint was adduced, the jury was likely to assume that the victim had not complained – evidence of complaint was admitted to avoid adverse inference being drawn.28 Complaint evidence therefore had the dual function of negativing any effect the complainant’s silence might otherwise have on her credibility and of positively supporting her credit.29 Whether complaint supports credit is a jury question: A jury is not obliged to regard prompt complaint as supporting the complainant’s credit and the trial judge should make this clear – just as the jury might think delay in complaining completely irrelevant, so they might think the making of a particular complaint did not make the complainant’s account more credible.30 It is a jury question of fact not a presumption of law.31 It has been judicially remarked that, “any attempt to formulate a rule which will cover all cases is bound to fail”.32 It is the duty of a trial judge to give clear directions as to the function of evidence of complaint and the use to which it may be put.33 1 As pointed out by Ormiston JA in R v Munday (2003) 7 VR 423; 143 A Crim R 318 at 427; 322 [11] footnote 2, the word “recent” reverses the relevant concept, ie it is the sexual attack which should be “recent”, not the complaint. 2 Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297. See also R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167; Kilby v The Queen at 464-472 per Barwick CJ (McTiernan; Stephen and Mason JJ agreeing); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC); Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 at 446–448; 246–248 per Toohey; Gaudron; Gummow and Kirby JJ. Complaint was said by Holmes J, in Commonwealth v Cleary (1898) 172 Mass 175 to be a “perverted
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Evidence of prompt complaint was not evidence of any fact other than the fact of the making of the complaint itself.11and was an exception to the general rule against the admission of previous consistent statements (ordinarily inadmissible unless part of the res gestae, or, to meet a suggestion of recent invention).12 Such evidence was not corroboration as it was not independent of the complainant.13 It was, and still is, standard for judges to warn juries that the fact that an assertion is repeated does not make it any less untrue if it was untrue to begin with.14
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survival of the ancient requirement that the [victim] should make hue and cry as a preliminary to bringing her appeal”, quoted in R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 560 and by Hayne JA in R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645; (1997) 94 A Crim R 525 at 655–656 (VR); 536 (A Crim R) (CA). M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 514–515 (CLR); 232 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Papakosmas v The Queen at [18] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. Kilby v The Queen at 474 per Barwick CJ; R v Skuse (unreported CCA NSW 24 Oct 1996). The fact that although evidence of recent complaint, although hearsay in nature, was not admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule was explained by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v The Queen at [21]–[22] as follows, “Whether or not evidence of a statement made out of court is hearsay depends upon the use that is sought to be made of the evidence. Under the rules of evidence developed by the common law, it was the potential use of evidence of a statement made out of court as evidence of the truth of what was asserted in the statement that made it hearsay. The common law did not create an exception to the rule against hearsay by permitting evidence of complaint to be used for a hearsay purpose. Rather it permitted such evidence to be used for another purpose”. See also Kilby v The Queen at 474 per Menzies J. R v Lillyman at 170 per Hawkins J; R v Osborne at 558-561; Sparks v The Queen(1964) AC 964 at 979; Kilby v The Queen at 466 per Barwick CJ; R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC); Ugle v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 171; 76 ALJR 886; [2002] HCA 25 at 649 (CLR); 447–448 (A Crim R); R v Moore (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 at 579 per Hunt CJ at CL. R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167; R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645; (1997) 94 A Crim R 525 at 651; 531 per Winneke JA (Ashley AJA agreeing); Papakosmas v The Queen at [13], [15] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. Kilby v The Queen; R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764. Britton v Commissioner for Road Transport (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 249 at 251 (FC) per Jordan CJ; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 513–514 (CLR); 231–232 (A Crim R); R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 (Qld CA) at 58 per Fitzgerald P. R v Lillyman at 171; R v Osborne at 559-560; Kilby v The Queen at 469 per Barwick CJ; R v Fuller [2001] NSWCCA 390 at [28] per Heydon JA. R v Osborne at 558-559. Kilby v The Queen at 469 per Barwick CJ; Crofts v The Queen at 434; 235–236; R v Elsworthy (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 at 456–457. Britton v Commissioner for Road Transport at 251 per Jordan CJ; Kilby v The Queen at 466, 472, 474; Papakosmas v The Queen at [12] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. Evidence of previous consistent statements were ordinarily inadmissible unless part of the res gestae, or, to meet a suggestion of recent invention. R v Christie (1914) AC 545; Eade v The King (1924) 34 CLR 154; Kilby v The Queen at 466 per Barwick CJ; Crofts v The Queen at 434; 235–236; R v Stoupas at 651; 531 per Winneke JA. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 514 (CLR); 232 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Papakosmas v The Queen at [31] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. Jones v The Queen (1997) 143 ALR 52; 71 ALJR 538. R v Doyle (unreported CCA NSW 13 April 1993) at p6 per Hunt CJ at CL (the direction that complaint is not corroboration should be given in every case where it is not otherwise clear); R v Moore (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 (NSW CCA); R v Elsworthy (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 (CCA) at 460 per Sperling J. R v Stoupas at 651; 531 per Winneke JA (Ashley AJA agreeing). R v Lillyman; Kilby v The Queen at 466 per Barwick CJ; Papakosmas v The Queen at [13]–[16] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. R v Osborne; R v Robertson Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 262; (1990) 45 A Crim R 408 (CCA); R v JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) per Hunt J; Papakosmas v The Queen at [16] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. R v Lillyman; Kilby v The Queen at 474 per Menzies J. Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 (HC). R v Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280; Breen v The Queen (1976) 180 CLR 233 at 234; R v Freeman; R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477; 11 A Crim R 325 (CCA); R v King at 61 (Qld CA). R v Smith (unreported CCA NSW 20 December 1990). Breen v The Queen (1976) 180 CLR 233.
25 (1997) 191 CLR 439; 98 A Crim R 107.
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26 Jones v The Queen at 453; 119. 27 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139. 28 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 513–514 (CLR); 232 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. See also R v Osborne; Kilby v The Queen; Ugle v The Queen. 29 R v King per Pincus JA and Thomas J at 61. 30 R v Matthews [1999] 1 VR 534; (1998) 102 A Crim R 269 (CA) at 274 per Callaway JA. 31 Kilby v The Queen at 469 per Barwick CJ; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 514 (CLR); 232 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J. 32 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC) at 5 33 R v Elsworthy.
[1] First reasonable opportunity rule
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At first, the common law assumed that a genuine victim of sexual assault would invariably complain immediately. Originally, to be admissible as “recent complaint” (or “proximate complaint”)1, the complaint had to be made “at the earliest opportunity”.2 Other formulations were, “as speedily after the acts complained of as could reasonably be expected”3 and, “at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself”.4 However, more recently, it has been remarked that phrases like this should not be read as a statute5 and the temporal requirement of earliest opportunity was not always stringently applied. The reasons for this are examined under the heading “Criticism and legislative amendment of the common law rule” at [CA.Pt3.Div10.500] below. 1 As it was twice described by Barwick CJ in Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 466 and 469. 2 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561; Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 460; 473 per Barwick CJ; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 at [51] per Kirby J; Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [16] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J. 3 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 at 171 per Hawkins J. 4 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561. 5 R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 at 61 (Qld CA) per Pincus JA and Thomas J (Fitzgerald P substantially agreeing).
[CA.Pt3.Div10.380]
[2] The complainant had to give evidence
As the purpose of evidence of prompt complaint was to support the credit of the complainant, unless the complainant herself gave evidence, the evidence was inadmissible.1 The position remains the same under the terms of the Evidence Act 1995.2 1 R v Sparks [1964] AC 964 at 979; Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 474 per Menzies J; Ugle v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 171; 76 ALJR 886; [2002] HCA 25 at 649 (CLR); 447–448 (A Crim R); R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645; (1997) 94 A Crim R 525 (Vic CA) at 651; 531 per Winneke JA. 2 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 at [5] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.400]
[3] The person to whom the complaint was made had to give evidence
Decisions outside Australia have held that unless the receiver of the complaint gives corresponding evidence of it, the complainant’s evidence of complaint is inadmissible.1 This limitation has not been accepted in Australia.2 The point was analysed in the 1997 Victorian case of R v J (No 2), the court saying, “… it cannot be correct that the complainant should be prevented from giving that evidence because, for example, the person to whom the complaint was made has died, cannot be found, has forgotten what was said, is a hostile witness, did not hear the complaint when made, or now denies that the victim made the alleged complaint. The fact that the victim’s evidence as to complaint is unsupported will, in the absence of
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an acceptable explanation, clearly go to the weight of the evidence of complaint; but in our view the evidence of either the complainant or the recipient is admissible …”3 1 R v Kincaid [1991] 2 NZLR 1; R v White [1999] 1 AC 210. The contrary view has been taken in Canada: R v Ball (1957) 117 CCC 666 (CA British Columbia), approved in Kribs v The Queen [1960] SCR 400. 2 R v Duell [1964] Qd R 451, applied in R v Blade (unreported CCA NSW 1 May 1991) where Gleeson CJ noted that it was accepted in the appeal that the complaint evidence of a complainant girl was admissible notwithstanding the absence of her mother to whom she complained); R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602;R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; (2000) 109 A Crim R 419; [2000] VSCA 18 (Vic CA). See also R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 at 60 (Qld CA). 3 R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 at 620 (CA), applied in R v GAE (2000) 1 VR 198; (2000) 109 A Crim R 419; [2000] VSCA 18 (Vic CA) where Chernov JA noted at [96] that in J (No 2) the High Court refused an application for special leave on this point, saying that the appeal would not succeed.
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.420]
[4] The complaint usually had to refer to a sexual incident
There is little by way of judicial definition of complaint1, but ordinarily, “It is trite that, in order to constitute evidence of recent complaint, the complaint must relate to the sexual character of the offence alleged and it must disclose relevant sexual conduct by the accused which supports the credibility of the complainant.”2 There have been exceptions to this. In a Queensland case where a sleeping woman was sexually assaulted, her complaint of simply being “attacked” was admitted.3 A state of unconsciousness in a complainant might prevent a precise complaint of what actually happened.4 In a Victorian case where a Tamil woman was threatened with a knife before being sexually assaulted, her complaint of being threatened with a knife was admitted as complaint, even though she did not specifically mention the sexual assault, evidently for reasons of cultural shame. On appeal it was held that even the complaint of the knife threat alone buttressed the complaint’s account in the circumstances and was admissible as complaint evidence.5 Complaints by children can sometimes constitute another exception (as the nature or seriousness of the assault may not be understood).6 In an English case where a clergyman was charged with indecent conduct towards a boy, evidence was held to admissible that the boy, having been asked by his mother what was the matter, said that he would tell her another time, but added, “Mr Newsholme is a bad man. Do not let me go to that church any more.”7 While a complaint must generally disclose conduct of a sexual nature, it can be of a general kind and need not relate with specificity to the material later led in evidence.8 While there need not be an exact coincidence between the terms of the complaint and the evidence given, complaint that goes beyond the evidence itself and is prejudicial or fills in important gaps in the complainant’s evidence should be rejected.9 1 R v Mainwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82; 12 A Crim R 253 (CCA) per Begg J at 85; 256. 2 R v Brdarovski [2006] VSCA 231; (2006) 166 A Crim R 366 at [51]. See also R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409; R v Braye-Jones [1966] Qd R 295 at 297; R v Colquhoun (unreported, CCA NSW 28 Oct 1992). In the facts of R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; (1983) 9 A Crim R 185 at 198; 197, it was said to be unnecessary to consider whether this requirement is absolute. 3 R v Giffın [1971] Qd R 12. 4 This kind of situation was discussed in R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; (1983) 9 A Crim R 185 at 198; 197. 5 R v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 at 395-396 (Vic CCA). 6 See for example, comments by Derrington J in R v Robertson Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 262; (1990) 45 A Crim R 408 (CCA) at 271 (Qd R); 416 (A Crim R). 7 Chesney v Newsholme (1908) P.301 (cited in R v McNamara [1917] NZLR 382 at 388). 8 R v Colquhoun (unreported, CCA NSW 28 Oct 1992) per Carruthers J, Campbell and Levine JJ agreeing. 9 R v JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) per Hunt J.
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[5] Whether the complaint had to take the form of complaint
A Victorian case held that a mere narrative of events is not to be regarded as a complaint.1 However, this authority has been not followed in Queensland where it was held that there is no distinction between a complaint in terms of an accusation or one in terms of a factual narrative.2 There it was observed that it does not matter that the form of words chosen or the tone of voice used might be better described as narrative rather than the making of an accusation or the ventilation of a grievance – it is what is said at the time that is important to show consistency between that and what is said in court from the witness-box.3 Additionally, in the case of a child, there may be a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of the matter or misplaced shame.4 It is not necessary that the statement be uttered in a manner indicating anger, despair or any other emotion.5 1 De B v De B [1950] VLR 242. Referring to this case, in R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; (1983) 9 A Crim R 185 at 198; 197 the Full Court said “it is essential that a grievance or an accusation be expressed … but how explicit this must be is not clear …” 2 R v Robertson Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 262; (1990) 45 A Crim R 408 (CCA). 3 R v Robertson per Carter J at 276; 422. 4 R v Robertson per Derrington J at 271; 416. See also R v Mainwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82; 12 A Crim R 253 (CCA) per Begg J at 85; 256. 5 R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 (CCA) per Macrossan J at 321.
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.460]
[6] The complaint was not to be elicited by leading questions
An admissible complaint should be a spontaneous account in the sense of an unassisted and unvarnished statement of what happened, but the fact that this is elicited by questions does mean it is not spontaneous.1 Open questions such as“what is the matter?” or “why are you crying?” will not make a resulting complaint inadmissible.2 A more marginal case was of a boyfriend repeatedly asking, “did he touch you?”3 But the courts guard against the admission of evidence that has been put into the mouth of the complainant by questions of a leading or suggestive nature.4 Complaint is inadmissible if elicited by questions of a “leading and inducing or intimidating character”.5 A complaint elicited after questions that suggest a particular story that might not otherwise have been told, deprives such complaint of its ability to strengthen the credit of the complainant.6 1 R v Northcott [1917] 1 KB 347 at 350 (CCA) followed in R v Stewart (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 33 (CCA); R v JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) per Hunt J; R v Nikolovski (unreported CCA NSW 5 Dec 1990). 2 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 556 per Ridley J; R v Heaton (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 33; R v Nikolovski (unreported CCA NSW 5 Dec 1990). 3 R v Wannan (2006) 161 A Crim R 465 (SA SC) where it was held by majority that the affirmative response to this question was admissible as complaint. 4 R v Northcott [1917] 1 KB 347 at 350 (CCA). 5 R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 556 per Ridley J; R v Nikolovski (unreported CCA NSW 5 Dec 1990). 6 R v JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) per Hunt J.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.480]
Function of judge and jury concerning complaint evidence
Cross on Evidence states that “It is for the judge to determine whether the statement is capable of being a complaint and meets the conditions for admissibility; it is for the jury to determine whether it is in fact a complaint.”1 Whether complaint is to be admitted is to be determined by the judge according to whether the complaint is capable of being regarded by the jury as being a spontaneous account of the incident or as giving support to the complainant’s account.2 The judge will rule on admissibility as with a confession, and may do so on a voir dire.3 If there is an issue as to whether what was said amounts to a complaint, the jury should be instructed as to the distinction between a complaint in law and a statement by the victim which
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falls short of constituting complaint – also appropriate directions should be given to the jury in relation to the victim’s credibility upon the jury finding complaint or the absence of complaint.4 1 Cross on Evidence by Justice J D Heydon 7th ed Butterworths at [17285]. See also R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561; R v Duell [1964] Qd R 451 at 456; R v Mainwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82; 12 A Crim R 253 (CCA); R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 at 321 per McCrossan J; R v Abela [2007] VSCA 22; 170 A Crim R 244 at [50]-[52]. 2 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC) at 5; R v JAH (unreported, NSWSC, 12 October 1990) per Hunt J; R v Robertson Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 262; (1990) 45 A Crim R 408 (CCA) per Derrington J at 272 (Qd R); 417 (A Crim R); R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312. 3 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC). 4 R v Mainwaring[1983] 2 NSWLR 82; 12 A Crim R 253 (CCA) per Miles J at 261.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.500]
Criticism and legislative amendment of the common law assumption
Questioning of the common law rule: The common law assumption that a genuine victim will complain at the first opportunity came to be questioned.1 That assumption was “no longer regarded as a universal truism of human nature. Whether or not complaint is made may depend upon a number of circumstances.”2 The requirement that the complaint be made at the earliest reasonable opportunity began to be interpreted with some flexibility.3
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Reasons for delay in complaint: It was artificial to consider the timing of the complaint in isolation from other factors, particularly, the personal circumstances of the complainant.4 Sexual assaults are qualitatively different from other assaults. Victims of sexual assault may be inhibited from making immediate complaint by feelings of shame, confusion and, sometimes, loyalty to the perpetrator. While immediate complaint might be expected by an adult victim of sexual assault by a stranger,5 that is not necessarily so where the victim knows the perpetrator. Factors to be considered include any physical injury, emotional injury or shock, ongoing distress and agitation,6 the complainant’s age, personality and temperament, the nature of and the circumstances after the offence, and the people with whom the complainant came into contact.7 Other factors were the nature and proximity of the relationship, the emotional maturity of the complainant, whether any physical or other threat was made, and the availability of a sympathetic person to whom a complaint might be made.8 Complaints by children: The courts take a flexible approach where the complainant is a young child.9 The assumption of immediate complaint by a genuine victim applies much less to children. In deciding on the admissibility of a child’s complaint, the age of and circumstances facing the child must be considered.10 A child victim who has trusted the offender may be reluctant to complain from fear of not being believed or of punishment or, even of rejection by the offender.11 Also a child may not understand the wrongness of sexual assault.12 Section 294(1), (2): Factors of the above kinds were the philosophy underlying the introduction of s 405B of the Crimes Act 1900 in 1981 (now ss 294(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986) which provides that if, on the trial of a person for a prescribed sexual offence, evidence is given or a question is asked of a witness that tends to suggest an absence of or delay in complaint by the complainant, the judge must warn the jury that absence of complaint or delay in complaining does not necessarily indicate that the allegation that the offence was committed is false; and must inform the jury that there may be good reasons why a victim of a sexual assault may hesitate in making, or may refrain from making complaint.13 For commentary on this provision, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.580]. Relaxation of the Kilby rule: Broader tests of admissibility than the “first opportunity” were suggested. While generally complaint should be proximate to the event complained of, undue concentration upon the time factor may lead to too narrow and artificial a result.14 There is no set rule as to when delay is too long to enable a complaint to be deemed “recent”.15“Undue emphasis on the need for speedy complaint fails to recognise the real basis upon which the evidence of complaint is admitted. It is admitted because the trial judge rules that it is evidence capable of being regarded by the jury as supporting the credibility of the complainant.”16
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1 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 515 (CLR); 233 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 at [5] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ and at [48] per Kirby J. 2 R v Williams (1999) 102 A Crim R 260 at [19-20] per Wood CJ at CL. 3 R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 (NSW CCA) at 169 per Hunt CJ at CL. 4 R v Lazos (1992) 78 A Crim R 388 (Vic Sup Ct FC) at 395. 5 See for example comments by Yeldham J in R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 at 20; 323. 6 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC) at 8. 7 R v Freeman [1980] VR 1 (FC) at 8. 8 R v Williams [1980] VR 1 at [19] per Wood CJ at CL. As to threats, see R v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 (FC) per Bray CJ at 461-462, Hogarth J at 468-469. 9 R v Gilmont (unreported CCA NSW 13 April 1992). 10 R v Gilmont (unreported CCA NSW 13 April 1992); R v TJK (unreported CCA NSW 6 Oct 1992). 11 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 515 (CLR); 233 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 1 at [5] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ and at [49] per Kirby J. 12 R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 3 at 169 per Hunt CJ at CL. 13 R v Williams (1999) 102 A Crim R 260 2 at [20] per Wood CJ at CL. 14 R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 at 61 (Qld CA) per Pincus JA and Thomas J (Fitzgerald P substantially agreeing) quoting R v Warner [1996] 1 Qd R 573; (1995) 78 A Crim R 383 (CA). 15 R v GG [2004] VSCA 238; 151 A Crim R 92 at 101 [46] per Eames JA, with Warren CJ and Batt JA agreeing). 16 R v Luke (unreported CCA NSW 22 Oct 1996) per Badgery-Parker J at 13. See also R v Warner [1996] 1 Qd R 573; (1995) 78 A Crim R 383 15. 17 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479-480 per Dixon CJ (Kitto J agreeing) quoted by Fitzgerald P in R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 (1995) supra 15 at 58 (Qld CA). 18 R v Freeman (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 6 at 5 (FC).
[CA.Pt3.Div10.520]
Complaint after the Evidence Act 1995
The basis of the admissibility of complaint evidence at common law as supporting the complainant’s evidence no longer applied under the Evidence Act 1995 as by s 102“credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible”, and none of the exceptions to s 102 applied.1 Admissibility of complaint under the Evidence Act 1995: The admissibility of complaint evidence under the terms of the Evidence Act 1995 was explained by Hunt CJ at CL in R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 1312 as follows: (1) complaint evidence in a sexual assault case is capable of rationally affecting the assessment of the fact in issue, ie sexual intercourse without consent, and is therefore relevant evidence under s 55 (at p138); (2) because s 102 provides that evidence relevant only to a witness’s credibility is not admissible (apart from the exceptions in s 108), the common law basis of admissibility as supportive of the complainant’s credit, no longer applies (at p137); (3) however, s 66 provides an exception to the exclusion of hearsay under s 59 and permits evidence of such out of court statements as “first hand” hearsay in certain circumstances, and thus, according to s 60, directly as evidence of the truth of what was said, subject to the power of the trial judge either to exclude it under ss 135, 137, or to limit its use under s 136 (at p137);
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An alternative formulation was whether there was an earlier statement to the same effect as the complainant’s evidence which rationally tends to support the credibility of the witness, having regard to the time and circumstances in which the statement was made.17 The ultimate question must always be “does the complaint, in the circumstances in which it was uttered, tend to buttress the complainant’s credit as a witness?”18
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(4) because the evidence is hearsay, it can attract the obligation upon the trial judge imposed by s 165 to warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable, to explain why that is so and to warn of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it (at pp139-140); (5) an alternative basis of admissibility is under s 108(3) which provides that the credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or is the result of suggestion, and the court gives leave (at pp140-141). Graham and “fresh in the memory”: A pre-condition to the giving of first hand hearsay evidence under s 66(2) is that the occurrence of the asserted fact was “fresh in the memory” of the complainant at the time the complaint was made. The meaning of “fresh in the memory” was considered by the High Court in Graham v The Queen (1998)3 where evidence of a complaint to a friend six years after the time of sexual assaults was admitted by the trial judge. Holding the evidence inadmissible, the Court said that “fresh”, in its context in s 66, means “recent” or “immediate” and that although “fresh” has a connotation that describes the quality of the memory, the core of the meaning intended is the temporal relationship between the sexual assault and the time of the making of the complaint which will very likely be measured in hours or days, not in years.4
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Even before the addition of s 66(2A) it has since been held that a strict or literal interpretation should not be given to the time frames referred to in Graham and that questions of fact and degree may arise.5 Statutory modification of Grahams 66(2A): The decision in Graham no longer governs the meaning of “fresh in the memory”6 because criticism of Graham7 prompted an amendment to s 66 in 2006 (see [CA.Pt3.Div10.300]) with the addition of s 66(2A) which provides: In determining whether the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of a person, the court may take into account all matters that it considers are relevant to the question, including: (a) the nature of the event concerned, and (b) the age and health of the person, and (c) the period of time between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation. The question now is no longer simply a temporal one. This appears to bring the position under the Evidence Act 1995 closer to the more recent cases at common law, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.500]. Even before the enactment of s 66(2A), a number of decisions gave a broader meaning to “fresh in the memory” than the formula in Graham, taken literally, seemed to allow. In one case a period of 66 days was held to be “fresh in the memory”.8 Whether a complaint as an “asserted fact” within s 66(2) is “fresh in the memory” is a question of fact.9 1 R v H (1997) 92 A Crim R 168 (NSW CCA) at 170-171 per Hunt CJ at CL (Studdert and Simpson JJ agreeing). 2 R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 per Hunt CJ at CL (Bruce J agreeing). This decision was approved by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [29]. 3 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438. 4 Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 at [4] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 5 R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 at [52]. 6 R v XY [2010] NSWCCA 181 at [99] per Whealy J (Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing). 7 An academic Dr Anne Cossins said of the Graham interpretation “the High Court failed to recognise the documented differences between traumatic and non-traumatic memories and how the retention rates and qualities of such memories differ.” The reference to the article from which this comment comes appears in R v XY [2010] NSWCCA 181 at [48] and [68]. 8 R v Skipworth [2006] NSWCCA 37 at [18]. In R v Gordon-King [2008] NSWCCA 335 a 47 day old complaint was admitted, but in R v Langbein (2008) 181 A Crim R 378 at [85] it was held that a lapse of 85 days was too long to be “fresh in the memory” and similarly, a lapse of just over three months: R v Name withheld [2009] NSWCCA 93 at [20].
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9 R v Name withheld [2009] NSWCCA 93 at [23].
[CA.Pt3.Div10.540]
Re-establishing credit under s 108(3) of the Evidence Act 1995
Note
If a prosecutor wants complaint evidence admitted that is not “fresh” within the meaning of s 66, or in a case of doubt, the prosecutor should ensure that an application for leave under s 108(3) is made.2 If leave is granted, evidence of a prior consistent statement can be led in the complainant’s evidence in chief.3 There are differences between the admission of evidence of an earlier complaint under s 108(3) and an admission under s 66 - the “freshness” required by the s 66 is not a requirement of s 108(3) and the purpose is different. Under s 108(3) the purpose is not to show consistency of conduct by the complainant, but to restore credit, impugned by an inconsistent statement or by an allegation of fabrication etc.4 To keep this distinction clear evidence of a prior consistent statement admitted under s 108(3) should not be referred to as “complaint”.5
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In exercising the discretion under s 108(3) it is important to bear in mind (1) that s 108(3) creates an exception to the general rule under s 102 that evidence relevant only to a witnesses’ credibility is not admissible and (2) that it is important to identify how the evidence re-establishes credibility.6 A consistent out-of-court statement made as part of a series of events leading up to the trial may not be admissible because it adds nothing to the complainant’s evidence at trial.7 The timing of a complaint may be more important than the circumstances in which it was made8, but this is not a universal rule - it will often be the case that a suggested fabrication tied to a time, event or circumstance can be rebutted by an earlier consistent statement.9 In Graham v The Queen10 it was said that the appellant’s denial of the charges and the course of cross-examination may well have amounted to a suggestion that the complainant’s evidence had been “fabricated” within the meaning of the s 108(3).11 While a denial by an accused of the alleged events without more does not necessarily suggest fabrication or suggestion expressly or implicitly12, nevertheless, “The terms of s 108(3) are clear. There is no warrant for reading into the provision a requirement that fabrication be explicitly raised or strongly inferred before the credibility rule is waived”.13 An assessment by the judge of the degree of ferocity of the attack on the complainant and even its efficacy may be relevant to the question of granting leave.14 In deciding whether to grant leave, the judge should consider, inter alia, the various matters set out in s 192(2)15 and, if admitted, whether the use of the prior consistent statement should be limited under s 136.16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438. R v Dwyer [1999] NSWCCA 47at [28] per Dunford J (Meagher JA and Grove J agreeing). R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 142 per Hunt CJ at CL. R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [57] per Howie J (Meagher JA and Simpson J agreeing). R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [61]. Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 at [8] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. R v Ali [2000] NSWCCA 177 at [46] per Sperling J (Priestly JA and Foster AJA agreeing). As was asked rhetorically in the joint judgment in Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 at [9] “How does the making of a complaint six years after the events bear on [the question of credibility]?” 8 R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 4 at [56]. 9 R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 at [21], [23] per Simpson J (Adams and Johnson JJ agreeing). R v DJT [1999] NSWCCA 22 is an example where evidence of a complaint to the police made many years after the alleged
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For trials commencing after 1 January 2009, this provision may be of less importance as a basis for the admissibility of complaint where there was some delay because of the legislative overriding of the High Court decision in Graham v The Queen (1998)1 by the enactment of s 66(2A) of the Evidence Act 1995 – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.520].
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.540]
assaults was held admissible under s 108(3) to rebut a suggestion that the accusations had been made to obtain victim’s compensation to pay a debt, the debt having been incurred after the complaint was made. 10 11 12 13
(1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438. Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438 1 at [7] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. R v Whitmore (1999) 109 A Crim R 51 at [39] per Greg James J (Newman and Sperling JJ agreeing). R v Pavitt (2007) 169 A Crim R 452 at [105] per McColl JA and Latham J (a case where the accused’s counsel had signalled an attack upon the complainant based in part on alleged mental illness). 14 R v HJS [2000] NSWCCA 205 at [155] per Simpson J (Spigelman CJ and Ireland J agreeing). 15 Stanoevski v The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115; 118 A Crim R 247. 16 See for example R v HJS [2000] NSWCCA 205 13 at [156] per Simpson J.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.560]
Delayed complaint or failure to complain - Kilby direction
“Delay in making complaint about sexual assault has posed difficult issues for the administration of justice.”1 Kilby direction: By contrast to prompt complaint, delay in complaining or failure to complain at all could weaken credit and cast doubt upon the reliability of the complainant’s evidence. The leading Australian authority was the High Court decision of Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 where Barwick CJ at 469 quoted this passage, “It is a strong, but not a conclusive, presumption against a woman that she made no complaint in a reasonable time after the fact.”2 The Chief Justice said:
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It would no doubt be proper for a trial judge to instruct a jury that in evaluating the evidence of a woman who claims to have been the victim of a rape and in determining whether to believe her, they could take into account that she had made no complaint at the earliest reasonable opportunity. Indeed, in my opinion, such a direction would not only be proper but, depending of course on the particular circumstances of the case, ought as a general rule to be given.3 Kilby has been endorsed by the High Court many times4 and (sometimes despite criticism – see [2.9080]) frequently applied in New South Wales.5 Failure of a complainant to complain at the earliest possible opportunity is not evidence of consent6, and nor is it evidence disproving the facts alleged.7 Where a complaint on the day of the alleged offence was excluded and there was no evidence of when the complainant first complained, it was held inappropriate to give a direction concerning delay in complaint.8 1 R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 367 per Spigelman CJ. 2 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 469 per Barwick CJ (McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ agreeing) quoting R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 at 170-171, in turn quoting F V Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown. 3 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 465 per Barwick CJ. 4 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232; Graham v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 606; 102 A Crim R 438. 5 Including R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 (where a direction held to comply with Kilby appears); R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276; 17 A Crim R 297; R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109. 6 Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 2 at 472 per Barwick CJ. 7 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 4 at 434 (CLR) per Dawson J. 8 R v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.580]
Statutory warning re Kilby direction - leading to Crofts direction
Uniform assumptions in common law cases like Kilby about victims of sexual assault should behave led to the introduction of s 405B into the Crimes Act 1900 in 1981 which provided for a jury warning that absent or delayed complaint may be for good reason and does not necessarily indicate falsity.1 This later became s 107 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, and is now s 294(2)(a) and (b) of that Act. Section 294 provides:
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(1) This section applies if, on the trial of a person for a prescribed sexual offence, evidence is given or a question is asked of a witness that tends to suggest: (a) an absence of complaint in respect of the commission of the alleged offence by the person on whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, or (b) delay by that person in making any such complaint. (2) In circumstances to which this section applies, the Judge: (a) must warn the jury that absence of complaint or delay in complaining does not necessarily indicate that the allegation that the offence was committed is false, and (b) must inform the jury that there may be good reasons why a victim of a sexual assault may hesitate in making, or may refrain from making, a complaint about the assault, and (c) must not warn the jury that delay in complaining is relevant to the victim’s credibility unless there is sufficient evidence to justify such a warning. Sub-section 294(2)(c) was not part of s 405B. It was not introduced until 2006 and is considered at [CA.Pt3.Div10.600]. The statutory warning under ss 294(2)(a) and (b) and its earlier equivalents were considered in a series of cases.
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In Davies (1985), the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the statutory warning did not codify the law of complaint and that, as a general rule, in addition to giving the statutory warning required by s 405B, judges should as a general rule continue to direct juries that absence of or delay in complaint may be taken into account in evaluating a complainant’s evidence.2 Then in Murray (1987) it was said that the law does not lay down any defined direction concerning late complaint and it is a matter for the trial judge in every case to determine whether anything more than the statutory warning is required (the words of the warning itself raising the question of the weight to be given to the complaint).3 The High Court in Crofts (1996) considered a Victorian provision equivalent to s 405B. Crofts was a case where a child did not complain of the appellant’s sexual assaults upon her for six years because she thought that without some tangible proof of them, she would not be believed. Even though this was a child’s complaint with evidence of the reason for her delay in complaining, the High Court there said that the Kilby direction continued to be appropriate as a balance to the statutory warning under the equivalent to ss 294(2)(a) and (b). In the joint judgment the rider was added that the Kilby direction should not be in terms that undermine the statutory warning by suggesting a stereotyped view that complainants in sexual assault cases are unreliable or that delay in complaint is invariably a sign of false complaint.4 Crofts resulted in the enactment of s 294(2)(c) – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.600]. 1 By the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981. 2 R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276; 17 A Crim R 297 at 278 (NSWLR); 305–306 (A Crim R) per Hunt J (Slattery CJ at CL and Carruthers JJ agreeing). Davies was approved by the High Court in Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 at 449; 248. 3 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 at 16-18; 319-321 per Lee J. 4 Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 2 at 451 (CLR); 250-251 (A Crim R) per Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.600]
Crofts direction criticism and the enactment of s 294(2)(c)
The Crofts direction attracted considerable judicial and academic criticism throughout Australia on the basis that it showed a lack of understanding of why many adult complainants1 and, particularly child complainants2, can be reluctant to complain and perpetuates an erroneous stereotypical view of how sexual victims should act.3 Criticism notwithstanding, it was accepted in New South Wales that the Crofts direction had to be given as a general rule ie that the statutory direction which tells the jury that there may be reasons for delay in complaint, should be balanced by them being informed that they were entitled to take delay into account in assessing the complainant’s credibility.4
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.600]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA
[CA.Pt3.Div10.600]
There is judicial comment on the irony of the statutory warning enacted to balance the Kilby direction, then being regarded in Crofts as requiring a Kilby warning added to balance the statutory direction itself.5 The legislative response to Crofts was to add to the statutory warning in s 294(2) by adding s 294(2)(c) which provides that the judge must not warn the jury that delay in complaining is relevant to the victim’s credibility unless there is sufficient evidence to justify such a warning.6 This provision applies to proceedings commenced on or after 1 January 2007. A couple of points need to be noted about s 294(2)(c). Absence of complaint altogether is not mentioned. However, in trial situations there will have been eventual complaint to the police. Given the wording of the sub-section, it appears that delay itself does not constitute “sufficient evidence to justify such a warning”. There is no express indication of what evidence is sufficient, but it is suggested that, at least, evidence tending to suggest fabrication would justify a Crofts warning.
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1 R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 367 per Spigelman CJ. 2 R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 at [244] per Wood CJ at CL; R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 at [122], [123] per Howie J. Members of the High Court too had expressed such reservations: M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 515 (CLR); 233 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Suresh v The Queen (1998) 102 A Crim R 18 at [5] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ and at [49] per Kirby J. 3 Article Delay and the credibility of complainants in sexual assault proceedings by Hugh Donnelly from the Judicial Commission of NSW, Judicial Officers’ Bulletin April 2007 Volume 19 No 3 pp20-21. 4 R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276; 17 A Crim R 297 (approved by the High Court in Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 at 451; 250-251); R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; 125 A Crim R 186 2 at [175] per Spigelman CJ, at [243] per Wood CJ at CL, at [332] per Simpson J; R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 at [32] per Wood CJ at CL; R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 2 at [42] per Dunford J and at [125] per Howie J. 5 R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 2 at [126] per Howie J. 6 Introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Act 2006.
[CA.Pt3.Div10.620]
Long delay in complaint - forensic disadvantage to accused — Longman Warning An important aspect of delay in complaint is long delay in complaint to the police, or at least, in bringing the allegations to an accused’s notice,1 and the forensic disadvantages this may place an accused in. In Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60,2 the High Court considered a case of the alleged indecent touching of a girl twice, once when she was 6 and again when she was 10 over 20 years before she complained to the police. In each case the complainant alleged this occurred as she slept and it awakened her. There was no corroboration. The High Court said that the jury should have been warned of a factor perhaps not apparent to them ie the accused’s loss of the means of testing the allegations, otherwise open but for long delay. Had the allegations been made promptly, the accused could have explored their detail and perhaps produce evidence to rebut them or confirm his denial – however, after over 20 years that opportunity was gone and the and the accused’s recollection could not be adequately tested.3 The jury should have been told that, as the evidence of the complainant could not be adequately tested after the passage of more than twenty years, it would be dangerous to convict on that evidence alone unless the jury, scrutinizing the evidence with great care, considering the circumstances relevant to its evaluation and paying heed to the warning, were satisfied or its truth and accuracy.4 McHugh J in Longman observed, The fallibility of human recollection and the effect of imagination, emotion, prejudice and suggestion on the capacity to “remember” is well documented. The longer the period between an “event” and its recall, the greater the margin for error.5 In terms of long delay making the exploration of detail difficult, Spigelman CJ in Johnston observed, “[sexual assault] cases … are characterised by a direct conflict of word against word, between a 450
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Remarks too of D Kirby J in R v JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 (2006) are pertinent, “Once an accused is apprised of the case he has to meet, he can cast his mind back to the time of the alleged offence. Only then can he begin to assemble the forensic weapons that may demonstrate that the complainant’s account is untrustworthy or unreliable. Obviously, the longer the interval, the greater the prejudice. Was he there? Did he have the opportunity to commit the offence? Who else was there? Having regard to the circumstances, as he remembers them, what aspects of the complainant’s account are wrong or unreliable? How can he demonstrate that inaccuracy”?7 In a joint judgment in Crampton applying Longman, the members of the High Court observed that where there is long delay, an accused’s defence will often simply be outright denial, without the timely opportunity to test the complainant’s evidence, locate other witnesses and to try to recollect precisely what the accused was doing on the occasion in question. The denial to an accused of the forensic weapons that reasonable contemporaneity may provide constitutes a significant disadvantage on which the judge must give firm directions.8 These must take the form of a warning, not simply a comment.9
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Courts in Australia have been reluctant to grant permanent stays of very old sexual assault charges in part because of the obligation to give the Longman direction.10 In some other countries, the dangers to a fair trial from long delay are resolved by statutes of limitation.11 In a majority decision, the High Court in Doggett (2001) held that even corroboration of an 18 year old complaint does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation to give a Longman direction.12 Kirby J stated, “The giving of a Longman warning is not rendered unnecessary simply because the prosecution’s case is strong, or because there are admissions by the accused or some other evidence confirming a complainant’s accusations.”13 The dissenting judgments of Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Doggett repay reading, especially because the later introduced s 165B(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 appears to be a legislative recognition of their Honours’ views – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.640]. The Longman line of High Court cases produced judicial division, even in the High Court itself, as to when the warning should be given and the necessary content of it. A detailed analysis of the three decisions was given in the 2002 case of BWT by Sully J.14 Since Longman was decided, the principle for which it stands has had “a long and troubled history”15 and has resulted in many appeals. “Although many may have made the attempt, no definitive statement of the minimum requirements of a Longman direction has yet emerged.”16 Some aspects of the Longman line of cases are clear enough. There are two features of the Longman warning that should be emphasised: (1) the jury is to be told why it is “dangerous to convict” ie, the delay means that the evidence of the complainant cannot be “adequately tested” and (2) the jury is to be told how they should go about their task because of the identified danger ie, to “scrutinize the evidence with great care”.17 In BWT practical guidelines are set out for trial judges in giving the Longman direction (before the statutory amendments from 1 January 2007 – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.640]).18 Various criticisms of the Longman direction have been made. One is that it has created an “irrebuttable presumption” that the delay has prevented the accused from adequately testing and meeting the complainant’s evidence, that the jury must be warned of, irrespective of whether or not the accused was in fact prejudiced in that way, thereby creating an assumption that the accused was in fact innocent.19 Another criticism is that the words “dangerous to convict” (and also “unsafe to convict”) may be incorrectly understood by a jury to be in effect a direction to acquit.20 1 See R v JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [65] per D Kirby J. 2 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; (1989) 43 A Crim R 463; [1989] HCA 60.
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complainant and an accused. It is often the case that there will be no independent verification of the basic allegations of whether a sexual act occurred at all, and if it is conceded that it did occur, whether it was a consensual act. In order to resolve a direct conflict of oral testimony, the contextual details of the alleged conduct will often prove to be of determinative significance. However, it is precisely such contextual details which may be lost by reason of delay.”6
Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19
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20
[CA.Pt3.Div10.620]
Longman at 91; 471 per Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ. Longman at 91; 471 per Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ. Longman at 107; 483. R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 370 per Spigelman CJ (Sully and Ireland JJ agreeing). R v JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [64] per D Kirby J. Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; (2000) 117 A Crim R 222; [2000] HCA 60 at [45] per Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ. The delay in this case was almost 20 years. This view was repeated by Gaudron and Callinan JJ in Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416 at [51] In Crampton McHugh J at [131] remarked that after this kind of delay, it is extremely difficult testing a complainant’s evidence as to detail, against responses like “I can’t remember”. Crampton at [126] per McHugh J. Crampton at [129] per McHugh J; Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416 8 at [140] per Kirby J. Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416 8 at [140] per Kirby J. Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416 8 per Gaudron and Callinan JJ, Kirby J (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J contra). Doggett at [138]. R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 at [65]-[92] per Sully J (Wood CJ at CL and Dowd J agreeing). R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 at [47] per Simpson J. R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 at [59] per Simpson J. R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 371 per Spigelman CJ. R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 14 at [65]-[92] per Sully J (Wood CJ at CL and Dowd J agreeing). The judgment of Sully J was endorsed by Kirby J in Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [55]. See also R v TJ (2009) 76 NSWLR 167; 197 A Crim R 508 at [51]. R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 14 at [13]-[18] per Wood CJ at CL (Sully J and Dowd J agreeing). R v Robinson (2006) 162 A Crim R 88 at [19] per Spigelman CJ who remarked “It is a formulation that is best avoided, save in exceptional circumstances.” See also R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 15 at [27] per Spigelman CJ; R v Sepulveda (2006) 167 A Crim R 108 at [181].
[CA.Pt3.Div10.640]
Legislative amendments to Longman and Crofts directions
The criticisms of Longman and Crofts were such that the legislature intervened. With reference to Longman (and also Murray1) it was said: “These directions have been roundly criticized by members of the judiciary, legal practitioners and academics as being, variously, too confusing, inconsistent, having no rational basis, reinstating false stereotypes about women, and giving rise to a high number of appeals of a very technical nature.”2 For sexual assault proceedings commenced on or after 1 January 2007 different rules apply, at first, by reason of the addition to s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 of subs (3)–(5).3 These sub-sections were then repealed and replaced by an amended version of s 165B of the Evidence Act 19954 which effectively replicates s 294(3)–294(5) and applies to trials commenced after 1 January 2009 – see [CA.Pt3.Div10.300]. Section 165B headed “Delay in prosecution” provides: (1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding in which there is a jury. (2) If the court, on application by a party, is satisfied that the defendant has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay, the court must inform the jury of the nature of that disadvantage and the need to take that disadvantage into account when considering the evidence. (3) The judge need not comply with subsection (2) if there are good reasons for not doing so. (4) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in informing the jury of the nature of the significant forensic disadvantage suffered and the need to take that disadvantage into
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account, but the judge must not in any way suggest to the jury that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant solely because of the delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of the delay. (5) The judge must not warn or inform the jury about any forensic disadvantage the defendant may have suffered because of delay except in accordance with this section, but this section does not affect any other power of the judge to give any warning to, or to inform, the jury. (6) For the purposes of this section: (a) delay includes delay between the alleged offence and its being reported, and (b) significant forensic disadvantage is not to be regarded as being established by the mere existence of a delay. (7) For the purposes of this section, the factors that may be regarded as establishing a “significant forensic disadvantage” include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) the fact that any potential witnesses have died or are not able to be located, (b) the fact that any potential evidence has been lost or is otherwise unavailable.
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Of s 294(3)–294(5), the earlier provisions that s 165B replaced, it was said that this constituted the “legislative overriding” of the former mandatory Longman direction.5 Section 165B goes further and legislatively resolves many of the areas of judicial uncertainty engendered by the Longman line of authorities. Many of the kinds of concerns raised in pre-present s 165B cases remain relevant in considering whether any, and if so what, warning or direction is necessary having regard to the terms of s 165B. Apart from the common law prejudice from delay principles referred to in [CA.Pt3.Div10.660], other cases established the following: (1) there was no precise period of delay after which it could be said that a Longman warning was required.6 (2) where specific forensic disadvantage for the accused is identified, this should be highlighted in the summing up.7 (3) however, it is not necessary for the judge to identify every conceivable disadvantage that could have been suffered.8 (4) if an accused has made no enquiries as to the existence of some type of evidence, it is difficult to maintain that the opportunity to test that evidence has been lost.9 (5) in some cases where it is not possible to identify any forensic disadvantage, no warning may be required because there could be no explanation to the jury of why it could be dangerous to convict.10 (6) in giving a Longman direction, the judge should not refer to any disadvantage to the Crown from delay.11 1 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315. 2 Second Reading Speech on behalf of the Attorney-General (Legislative Assembly Hansard 18 October 2006) Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Bill 2006. 3 Introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and Other Offences) Act 2006. 4 Introduced by the Evidence Amendment Act 2007. 5 R v GG [2010] NSWCCA 230 at [48] per Beazley JA (Buddin J and Barr AJ agreeing). 6 Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416 at [127] per Kirby J “the longer the delay, the clearer is the obligation to give the warning”. In Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192 it was held that there was no error in not giving a Longman direction after a 2 year delay. 7 R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362. 8 R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 at [29] per Spigelman CJ who said it is sufficient to focus on specific examples of disadvantage, even hypothetical ones and to indicate that there may be other disadvantages. 9 R v AW [2009] NSWCCA 1 at [37] per Latham J.
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10 Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192 6 at [182]. 11 R v Erohin [2006] NSWCCA 102 at [86] per James J.
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[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]
Delayed complaint directions – comparison of s 165B rules to common Law rules
The modified rules concerning Longman directions are set out below, with reference to some of the earlier common law principles: (1) the dual nature of the Longman direction is preserved by s 165B(2) but the conditions precedent to making such direction are that (i) a party must apply for the direction and (ii) the court must be satisfied that the accused has suffered a “significant forensic disadvantage” because of the consequences of the delay. By s 165B(6)(b) delay without more is not “significant forensic disadvantage” and by s 165B(4) the judge must not suggest that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict solely because of delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences of delay.1 Section 165B(7) provides that “significant forensic disadvantage” may include the death or absence of potential witnesses and/or potential evidence being lost or unavailable. (2) if there are good reasons for not giving a Longman direction, the trial judge need not comply with s 165B(2). An example of “good reasons” is the minority position taken in Doggett where despite an 18 year delay, there was corroboration. The common law position was as per the majority in Doggett who held that the warning had to be given, corroboration notwithstanding.2 Another good reason might be delay by the accused absconding.3 (3) section 165B(4) preserves the common law position that no particular form of words must be used.4 The form of words used will depend upon the circumstances of the case.5 (4) by s 165B(5) a judge may only “warn or inform” a jury about forensic disadvantage from delay in accordance with the terms of s 165B. The weight of common law authority was that a Longman type direction had to be cast as a “warning” and not just a comment or even a caution.6 (5) the proviso to s 165B(5) is that the section does not affect any other power of the judge to warn or inform the jury about forensic disadvantage from delay. A trial judge has a duty to give such directions to a jury as are necessary to ensure a fair trial and avoid any miscarriage of justice.7 Although a warning about the forensic disadvantage of delay under s 165B(2) requires an “application by a party”, common law cases concerning the absence of a Longman warning where there is substantial delay say that this may lead to a miscarriage of justice regardless of the attitude of the parties at trial.8 1 At common law in cases of substantial delay, prejudice was presumed: R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 at [13]-[14] per Wood CJ at CL (acknowledging the principle, while questioning it). 2 Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343, 119 A Crim R 416, the dissenting judgments of Gleeson CJ and McHugh J. 3 R v JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [65] per Kirby J (Spigelman CJ and Howie J agreeing). 4 R v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 at [8] per Meagher JA; R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 at [25] per Spigelman CJ. 5 M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; (1994) 76 A Crim R 213; [1994] HCA 63 at 514–515 (CLR); 232–233 (A Crim R) per Gaudron J; Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314; 35 A Crim R 387 at 330; 391-392; R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 375 per Spigelman CJ; R v AW [2009] NSWCCA 1 at [38] per Latham J. 6 R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241; 129 A Crim R 153 1 at [95] per Sully J; R v JJB (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 3 at [42] per D Kirby J; R v DRE (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 4 at [18] per Spigelman CJ. Compare however, R v TJ (2009) 76 NSWLR 167; 197 A Crim R 508 at [126] per McCallum J and at [76] per Hidden J. 7 See for example Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; 88 A Crim R 232 at 451; 250; R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 5 at 375 per Spigelman CJ; Tully v The Queen (2006) 230 CLR 234; 167 A Crim R 192 at [180] (CLR) per Crennan J. 8 R v Roberts (2001) 53 NSWLR 138; 124 A Crim R 60 at [52]; R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [35], [40].
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Editor’s note: Sections 61A-61G have been repealed by Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1 and have not been reproduced.
Definition of “sexual intercourse” and other terms
(1) For the purposes of this Division, sexual intercourse means: (a) sexual connection occasioned by the penetration to any extent of the genitalia (including a surgically constructed vagina) of a female person or the anus of any person by: (i) any part of the body of another person, or (ii) any object manipulated by another person, except where the penetration is carried out for proper medical purposes, or (b) sexual connection occasioned by the introduction of any part of the penis of a person into the mouth of another person, or (c) cunnilingus, or (d) the continuation of sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
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[Subs (1) am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; Act 22 of 1996, s 5 and Sch 3[1]; Act 2 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
(1A) For the purposes of this Division, a person has a cognitive impairment if the person has: (a) an intellectual disability, or (b) a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder), or (c) a neurological disorder, or (d) dementia, or (e) a severe mental illness, or (f) a brain injury, that results in the person requiring supervision or social habilitation in connection with daily life activities. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
(2) For the purposes of this Division, a person is under the authority of another person if the person is in the care, or under the supervision or authority, of the other person. [Subs (2) am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person who incites another person to an act of indecency, as referred to in section 61N or 61O, is taken to commit an offence on the other person. [Subs (3) subst Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[1]] [S 61H am Act 74 of 2008; Act 9 of 2003; Act 22 of 1996; Act 23 of 1995; Act 2 of 1992; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61H COMMENTARY [CA.61H.20]
Meanings of some terms in s 61H
The following terms are considered below: • “penetration to any extent of the genitalia” of a female • “surgically constructed vagina” • “proper medical purposes” • “continuation of sexual intercourse” • “cunnilingus” • “cognitive impairment”
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The use of this phrase makes it clear that penetration of the parts of the female genitalia external to the vagina constitutes sexual penetration.1 Penetration of the lips is sufficient.2 The previous definition was penetration of the vagina3 which the High Court held was necessarily to be understood in its strict anatomical sense.4 The words “penetration to any extent of the genitalia” of a female makes this part of the definition of sexual intercourse accord with the former common law definition of carnal knowledge which, when coupled with the absence of consent, constituted common law rape, see [CA.61I.60]. The sex determination of a transsexual person was considered in R v Harris (1988) 17 NSWLR 158; 35 A Crim R 146 (CCA). The dissenting judgment of Carruthers J reviews a number of overseas authorities on the subject, and (at 155–157 (A Crim R)), quotes from an expert medical witness on the characteristics of a surgically constructed vagina. Another sexual assault case involving a surgically constructed vagina was R v Cogley [1989] VR 799; 41 A Crim R 198 (CCA).
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In R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 (CCA NSW) at 209, Priestly JA (with Allen and Badgery Parker JJ agreeing) said that this exception is clearly directed to the purpose with which the penetration is carried out and that, if that purpose is a proper medical one, then the exception applies. Where the question arises, the Crown must prove as an ingredient of the charge that the penetrator’s subjective purpose was not a proper medical one. Proof will sometimes consist of inferences to be drawn from the external actions of the penetrator. Frequently, it will only be from those external actions (including whatever was said) that the subjective purpose will be able to be inferred, one way or the other. In the New Zealand case of R v Kaitamaki [1980] 1 NZLR 59 (CA) at 61, Richmond P and Richardson J said that sexual intercourse is a continuing act and a continuing act may become criminal during its progress as a result of a change in the state of mind of the complainant. On appeal, this same view was taken: Kaitamaki v The Queen [1985] AC 147; [1984] 3 WLR 137; [1984] 2 All ER 435 (PC). This position appears to have been accepted too in the South Australian case of R v Murphy (1988) 52 SASR 186; (1988) 37 A Crim R 405 at 420 (A Crim R) by Cox J (with whom Perry J agreed). A case (on an allegation later discovered to have been falsely made by the complainant) of withdrawal of consent during sexual intercourse was Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447; (1987) 27 A Crim R 465; [1987] HCA 46. In R v Randall (1991) 55 SASR 447; (1991) 53 A Crim R 380 at 449–452 (SASR); 381–384 (A Crim R), Cox J (with whom King CJ agreed) said of cunnilingus: “In my opinion, it denotes the licking or sucking of the vagina or vulva, including the labia majora, with the tongue or mouth. No distinction is to be drawn between the outer and inner aspects of the labia”. In DPP, Reference No 1 of 1992 v M (1993) 9 WAR 281; (1993) 65 A Crim R 197, Malcolm CJ and Walsh J said at 287 (WAR); 203 (A Crim R): According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed), Vol IV, at p 129 cunnilingus is the licking of the vulva or clitoris. The term is derived from the Latin cunnus (vulva) and lingua (tongue). The Latin verb linguere means “to lick”. According to Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, Vol 1, at p C-152, cunnilingus is: The practice of licking, kissing, sucking, or otherwise fondling the vulva (the sex organs of the female) with the mouth, usually by a male but also by a female homosexual. … In our opinion, cunnilingus, as defined in the dictionaries, does not involve penetration of the vagina. It is an act of stimulation. In this respect we agree with and adopt what was said by Cox J in Randall (1991) 55 SASR 447 at 449–452; 53 A Crim R 380 at 381–384. An aspect of this meaning, perhaps not immediately clear, is the meaning of “social habilitation”. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary5 defines “habilitate” as meaning Make capable, qualify. The same definition of “in the care, or under the supervision or authority” was earlier contained in s 61A introduced with amendments in 1985.6 The 1985 amendments followed recommendations of the Report of
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the New South Wales Child Sexual Assault Task Force of March 1985 which stated at pg 112: Providing for relationships of trust between child and offender proved a difficult task. The Task Force accepts that there are a number of obvious relationships which doubtless qualify, such as parents, step-parents, foster-parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts and siblings. These are essentially familial. There are however, a large number of relationships which are not strictly speaking familial, but which may also be relationships in which the adult exerts influence and authority over the child, eg babysitters, neighbours, teachers, de facto spouses, boarders, etc. … Whether or not any other relationship between the child and the offender should also be characterised as a relationship of trust could be an issue for the determination of the jury, by reference to a list of factors. Factors such as the duration of the contact between the child and the offender, the circumstances of the contact, its frequency and any responsibility, statutory or otherwise, which the offender may have for the care of the child, are capable of legislative description. While there may be an argument for simplifying jury directions, the Task Force believes that these factors are capable of being understood and applied by juries.
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In R v DH [1997] NSWSC 259, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the now repealed s 66C(2) which made it an offence to have sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16 years who was “(whether generally or at the time of the sexual intercourse only) under the authority” of the offender. It was said in R v DH that it might be inferred from the terms of s 66C(2) that it was concerned with “a breach of a relationship of trust between the offender and the child with whom the offender has sexual intercourse”. The s 61H(2) definition of “in the care, or under the supervision or authority” is almost identical to a Victorian provision s 48(1) forbidding sexual penetration of a 16 or 17 year old child “under his or her care, supervision or authority”.7 In the Victorian case of R v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141; (2000) 116 A Crim R 249; [2000] VSCA 159 in the context of this provision, it was said: [58] … Juries may be told that the obvious purpose underlying the section is to protect sixteen and seventeen-year-olds from being taken advantage of by persons who are in a position to influence them. They may be told that the section is concerned to protect young people, and often, protect them from themselves …8 In Howes, it was further remarked It is clear from s 48(1) that the child must be in the relationship mentioned (under care, supervision or authority) at the time of the sexual act. Whether this was so is a question of fact for the jury. The relationship may be an ad hoc one, which has come into existence only on the day of the offence and which is to endure only for a few hours, as in R. v Rigby.9 The parties to the relationship will often fall into a readily definable category, but this is not essential. The relationship may well be a standing one, but again this is not essential. Examples of what I would call a standing relationship are that of schoolteacher and pupil regularly taught by that teacher, general practitioner or psychiatrist and patient receiving regular treatment; priest and person regularly receiving spiritual guidance; employer and permanent employee.10 Section 58(6) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) gives a non-exhaustive list of people who meet the criteria of having a child under their “care, supervision or authority”.11 It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove a causal connection between the fact of the accused being in a position of authority in relation to the complainant and the occurrence of sexual intercourse.12 1 Explanatory note in the Crimes Legislation (Amendment) Act 1992. 2 R v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647. 3 The previous 61A(1) in part defined “sexual intercourse” as meaning “sexual connection occasioned by the penetration of the vagina of any person”. 4 Holland v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 176; 67 ALJR 946; [1993] HCA 43 (HC). 5 Shorter Oxford Dictionary 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press
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6 Introduced by the Crimes (Child Assault) Amendment Act 1985, Act 149 of 1985. 7 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(1). 8 R v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141; (2000) 116 A Crim R 249; [2000] VSCA 159 at [58] per Brooking JA (Winneke P and Chernov JA agreeing). At [57], Brooking JA said: I see no reason why a jury should not be given, for their possible assistance, the definition of “authority” to be found in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: 4. Power to influence the conduct and actions of others; personal or practical influence. 9 R v Rigby (unreported, CCA (Vic), No 180 of 1993, 21 October 1993). 10 Howes at [63] per Brooking JA. 11 The list under s 58(6) is (a) teacher, (b) foster parent, (c) legal guardian, (d) minister of religion with pastoral responsibility for the child, (e) employer, (f) youth worker, (g) sports coach, (h) counsellor, (i) health professional, (j) a member of the police force acting in the course of his or her duty in respect of the child, (k) if the person is employed in, or providing services in, a remand centre, youth residential centre, youth justice centre or prison and is acting in the course of his or her duty in respect of the child. 12 R v DH at 12; Howes at [60].
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61HA
Consent in relation to sexual assault offences
(1) Offences to which section applies This section applies for the purposes of the offences, or attempts to commit the offences, under sections 61I, 61J and 61JA. [Subs (1) am Act 59 of 2014, Sch 1.1[1]]
(2) Meaning of consent A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees to the sexual intercourse. (3) Knowledge about consent A person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse if: (a) the person knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse, or (b) the person is reckless as to whether the other person consents to the sexual intercourse, or (c) the person has no reasonable grounds for believing that the other person consents to the sexual intercourse. For the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of fact must have regard to all the circumstances of the case: (d) including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents to the sexual intercourse, but (e) not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. (4) Negation of consent A person does not consent to sexual intercourse: (a) if the person does not have the capacity to consent to the sexual intercourse, including because of age or cognitive incapacity, or
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if the person does not have the opportunity to consent to the sexual intercourse because the person is unconscious or asleep, or (c) if the person consents to the sexual intercourse because of threats of force or terror (whether the threats are against, or the terror is instilled in, that person or any other person), or (d) if the person consents to the sexual intercourse because the person is unlawfully detained. (5) A person who consents to sexual intercourse with another person: (a) under a mistaken belief as to the identity of the other person, or (b) under a mistaken belief that the other person is married to the person, or (c) under a mistaken belief that the sexual intercourse is for health or hygienic purposes (or under any other mistaken belief about the nature of the act induced by fraudulent means), does not consent to the sexual intercourse. For the purposes of subsection (3), the other person knows that the person does not consent to sexual intercourse if the other person knows the person consents to sexual intercourse under such a mistaken belief. [Subs (5) am Act 59 of 2014, Sch 1.1[2]]
(6) The grounds on which it may be established that a person does not consent to sexual intercourse include: (a) if the person has sexual intercourse while substantially intoxicated by alcohol or any drug, or (b) if the person has sexual intercourse because of intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat, that does not involve a threat of force, or (c) if the person has sexual intercourse because of the abuse of a position of authority or trust. (7) A person who does not offer actual physical resistance to sexual intercourse is not, by reason only of that fact, to be regarded as consenting to the sexual intercourse.
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(8) This section does not limit the grounds on which it may be established that a person does not consent to sexual intercourse. [S 61HA am Act 59 of 2014; insrt Act 66 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
SECTION 61HA COMMENTARY Consent concerning sexual assaults under ss 61I, 61J and 61JA ............................................... [CA.61HA.20] Element (2) – Consent – What amounts to consent? ................................................................... [CA.61HA.40] Negation of consent, statutory provisions ..................................................................................... [CA.61HA.60] Authorities on negation of consent ................................................................................................ [CA.61HA.80] Element (3) – Mens rea – Knowing the complainant did not consent ........................................ [CA.61HA.100]
[CA.61HA.20]
Consent concerning sexual assaults under ss 61I, 61J and 61JA
Note: References to repealed section numbers are in italics. Elements of sexual assault Elements the prosecution must prove for offences under ss 61I, 61J and 61JA each include that the accused: 1. had sexual intercourse with the complainant; 2. without the consent of the complainant; and 3. knowing the complainant did not consent. Element (1) – Sexual intercourse – see s 61H and commentary at [CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. Section s 61HA applies to alleged offences committed after 1 January 2008. Previously, and from 1989, s 61R (now repealed) contained some but fewer of the concepts included in s 61HA.
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[CA.61HA.0] Element (2) – Consent – What amounts to consent?
For the first time in New South Wales, there is (by s 61HA(2)) a statutory definition of the meaning of consent: the consenting person “freely and voluntarily” agreeing to sexual intercourse.1 At common law, before January 2008, the concept of “free and voluntary” consent, although having wide judicial support2, did not have unanimous judicial support3; because consent given reluctantly or after a great deal of persuasion does not readily fit into the phrase “free and voluntary consent”.4 The conventional pre-January 2008 offence jury direction concerning consent stipulated that it involved a conscious and voluntary agreement on the part of the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused and that consent obtained after persuasion still constitutes consent, provided that ultimately it is given freely and voluntarily.5 In essence, the post-January 2008 direction is the same as the pre-January 2008 direction. Consent is the subjective state of mind of the complainant6 at the time of sexual intercourse.7 There must be consent before penetration.8 The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent. The jury must determine the complainant’s state of mind as a fact – as they cannot see into the complainant’s mind, it is necessary to examine all of the relevant facts including the complainant’s words and conduct.9 It has been said that an analogy is proof of intention.10 The issue is whether the complainant consented to the physical act of penetration11 with knowledge of its sexual character.12 Actual consent to sexual intercourse demands a perception of what is about to take place, and a perception as to the identity of the accused and the character of the act as sexual,13 but not necessarily that the act is “wrong” criminally or morally.14
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Consent covers a wide range of states of mind in the context of intercourse, ranging from actual desire on the one hand to reluctant acquiescence on the other.15 Submission is different from and does not necessarily equal consent – although every consent involves submission, it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.16 The dividing line between the states of mind of consent and submission (a jury question) is not always easy to draw.17 Consent may be evidenced by words and/or conduct.18 Consent “can be given verbally, by a look or by a willingness expressed by actions or acquiescence”.19 In the absence of threats etc, physical inaction may convey consent.20 Although it has been judicially remarked that whether consent requires not only a state of mind, but also the communication of it, “could be the subject of debate”21, the definition of consent including the term “agrees”, suggests the requirement of some communication. The term “consent” itself includes the aspect of communication as part of its definition.22 Conversely, a complainant who fails by word or action to manifest dissent is not in law thereby necessarily taken to have consented to sexual intercourse.23“[T]he element in rape is the absence of consent, and not the existence of dissent …”.24 A complainant does not have to struggle or scream.25 By s 61HA(7), a person who does not offer actual physical resistance is not by reason only of that fact to be regarded as consenting to sexual intercourse. A complainant may freeze and say nothing, but that does not equal consent.26 An English decision states positively that there is no requirement that the absence of consent has to be demonstrated or that it has to be communicated to an accused for the actus reus of sexual intercourse without consent to exist.27 It has been observed that consent is a subjective phenomenon and that to require a physical resistance by the complainant, as a matter of law, would be to confuse non-consent with the evidence of it.28 Evidentially however, depending upon the circumstances, a failure to communicate non-consent may have the consequence of the jury not accepting a complainant’s evidence of non-consent, or may furnish some basis for a reasonable belief on the part of the accused that there was consent.29 Consent previously given may be withdrawn, or a previous refusal of consent may be reversed – if this is the result of persuasion, the consent must be free and voluntary and not mere submission to improper persuasion by means of force or threats.30 Ordinarily, a complainant will say in evidence that she/he did not consent, but this is not essential, for example in the case of a significantly cognitively impaired complainant.31 Where evidence of non-consent
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is given, it is not objectionable to ask this in the form of a direct question.32 It has been said however, that where the complainant claims no recollection of the event because of unconsciousness or extreme intoxication, it is not a proper question to ask the complainant whether she/he in fact consented.33
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1 This definition conforms to that in the Model Criminal Code Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Report: 5.2.3. 2 Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal Pursuant to Section 350(1a) Criminal Law Consolidation Act (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214; R v Clark (unreported, NSW (CCA), No 60439 of 1997, 17 April 1998) per Simpson J; R v Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 per Studdert J. 3 R v Clark (unreported, NSW (CCA), No 60439 of 1997, 17 April 1998) per Simpson J; R v Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 per Hunt AJA and Hulme J. 4 R v Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 per Hunt AJA and Hulme J. The difference of opinion in this case lead to the enacting of s 61HA(2). 5 See Judicial Commission of New South Wales Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book at [5-1550]. 6 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 at 332 (QB); R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 155 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA. See also R v Lambert [1919] VLR 205 at 213 per Cussen J. 7 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 155 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA; R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 per Studdert J at [12]. 8 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 at 332 (QB). 9 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 at 332 (QB); R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J (dissenting in the result) at [25]. 10 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [25]. 11 R v Schell [1964] Tas SR 184; R v Hatchard [1999] SASC 111. 12 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74 at 260–261 (CLR); R v Morgan [1970] VR 337; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; 66 A Crim R 419 at 531 (NSWLR), 438 (A Crim R). 13 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74, the court at 261 (CLR). 14 R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; 66 A Crim R 419 at 531 (NSWLR), 438 (A Crim R) 15 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 at 331 (QB). 16 R v Day 173 ER 1026; (1841) 9 Car & P 722 at 724 (Car & P), 1027 (ER) per Coleridge J; R v Wollaston (1872) 12 Cox CC 180 at 182 per Kelly CB. In R v Clark (unreported, NSW (CCA), No 60439 of 1997, 17 April 1998) Simpson J, in her Honour’s then dissenting, but now accepted judgment, said the trial judge should not convey idea that consent freely and voluntarily given is the same thing as reluctant submission. The contrary decision in Holman v The Queen [1970] WAR 2 at 6 is no longer good law, even at common law – see for example Ibbs v The Queen [1988] WAR 91. 17 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405at 371–374 (SASR), 267–269 (A Crim R) per Gray J (Sulan J concurring). 18 R v Wilkes [1965] VR 475 at 477 per Winneke CJ (FC); R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [21]. 19 Verdon v The Queen (1987) 30 A Crim R 388 (WA SC) (actions may suffice); R v Chant (unreported, NSW (CCA), 12 June 1998) at 8 per Wood CJ at CL. 20 R v Maes [1975] VR 541 at 548 (Vic Sup Ct, FC); R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 (Vic CA). 21 R v Maes [1975] VR 541 at 548 (Vic Sup Ct, FC). 22 The Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed) defines consent as a noun as “asssent; acquiescence; permission; compliance”. 23 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 155 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA; R v Chant (unreported, NSW (CCA), 12 June 1998) at 8 per Wood CJ at CL.
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In most cases, a jury will require little, if any, instruction to understand the concept of consent34 and in most cases it is unnecessary for the trial judge to give a detailed analysis of the question of whether the complainant consented.35 But some cases, especially those were there is a legal “negation” of consent, will require more detailed instruction.
Crimes Act 1900 s 61HA
[CA.61HA.40]
24 R v Dee (1884) 15 Cox CC 579 (Ireland Court for Crown Cases Reserved) at 592 per Palles CB. May CJ said at 587 “Does [consent] mean an intelligent, positive concurrence of the will of the woman, or is the negative absence of dissent sufficient?” 25 R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 per Studdert J at [12]. 26 R v Porteus [2003] NSWCCA 18 at [37]. 27 R v Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447 (CA). 28 Dr G D Woods QC (later his Honour Judge Woods) in his 1981 report Sexual Assault Law Reform in NSW: A Commentary on the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 and Cognate Act (1981), p 18. 29 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 155 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA; R v Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447 (CA). 30 R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 per Studdert J at [12]. 31 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 155 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA. 32 R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 156 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA. 33 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [26], [27] who said a question to the effect: “did you want to have sexual intercourse on that occasion?” is permissible. 34 R v Maes [1975] VR 541 at 547 (Vic Sup Ct, FC). 35 Pearmine v The Queen [1988] WAR 315; (1987) 37 A Crim R 424 at 427 (A Crim R) per Kennedy J (WA CCA); R v Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641; (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 646 (Qd R), 156 (A Crim R) per Davies and McPherson JJA.
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[CA.61HA.60]
Negation of consent, statutory provisions
Section 61HA(4) and (5) stipulate a number of circumstances where (in most) there may have been some expression of consent by the complainant, that “consent” is “negated”. For alleged offences before 1 January 2008, the now repealed s 61D contained fewer corresponding circumstances (indicated below in italics), by which “consent” was “vitiated”. Some of these circumstances reflect the earlier common law; some clarify or extend the common law. As to the common law authorities, see [2.9040] next. The circumstances of negation of consent are: (a) the complainant did not have capacity to consent, including because of age or cognitive incapacity (s 61HA(4)(a)); (b) the complainant did not have opportunity to consent because of unconsciousness or sleep (s 61HA(4)(b)); (c) the complainant expressed consent because of threats of force (to the complainant or any other person) or terror (instilled in the complainant or any other person) (s 61HA(4)(c); s 61D(2)(c)); (d) the complainant expressed consent because of unlawful detention (s 61HA(4)(d)); (e) the complainant consented under a mistaken belief as to the identity of the accused (s 61HA(5)(a); s 61D(2)(a)(i)); (f) the complainant consented under a mistaken belief that the accused was married to her/him (s 61HA(5)(b); s 61D(2)(a)(ii)); (g) the complainant consented under a mistaken belief that the sexual intercourse was for medical or hygienic purposes or under any other mistaken belief about the nature of the act induced by fraudulent means (s 61HA(5)(c); s 61D(2)(a1)). In addition, consent may be negated if the complainant has sexual intercourse: (h) while substantially intoxicated by alcohol or any drug (s 61HA(6)(a)); (i) because of intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat, not involving a threat of force (s 61HA(6)(b)); (j) because of abuse of a position of authority or trust (s 61HA(6)(c)).
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[CA.61HA.80] Authorities on negation of consent The statutory categories which do or may negate consent under s 61HA(4)–(6) fall into three main categories viz: (a) incapacity or no opportunity to consent; (b) threats or improper pressure; (c) fraud or mistake. Many of these categories are recognised in common law authorities. Their rationale is that, consent being a subjective matter in the mind of the complainant, in such cases there was never any real consent at all. Cases concerning each of the three categories are now considered. Child or cognitively impaired person – A child1 or person with a cognitive impairment2 who merely submitted to sexual intercourse without exercising a real and free choice in the matter, or without understanding the sexual nature of the act, did not consent at common law. Section 66F concerns offences relating to sexual intercourse with the cognitively impaired. In a Tasmanian case, it was held that in the case of alleged sexual intercourse of a five-year-old girl by her step-father, the Crown could prove the absence of consent by the girl in any one of three ways: (i) that she did not comprehend the physical act of penetration proposed; (ii) that she had no understanding that the act of penetration was of a sexual character; (iii) that she was not able to appreciate that she could refuse to comply with her step-father’s wishes.3 A woman of very low intellect but with strong sexual passions was held to have been capable of consenting to sexual intercourse.4 Sleep or unconsciousness – A complainant who was unconscious or asleep did not consent, because the question of consent was never in an unconscious or sleeping complainant’s mind.5 It is a question of fact for the jury to determine if the complainant was asleep. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was asleep at the time that intercourse took place then consent could not be obtained.6Literally, it is not a question of consent being negated – there was never consent in the first place. However, it is possible that consent may encompass supervening unconsciousness.7 Intoxication of complainant – A complainant intoxicated to the point of having no comprehension of another’s desire to have sexual intercourse, being incapable of exercising judgment on the question of whether to consent or not, did not consent at common law.8 Nor did a complainant who did not wish to have sexual intercourse but was so intoxicated she was unable to express her dissent by words or actions.9 It is necessary to distinguish between cases where the intoxication is so gross that the complainant is unable to consent and those cases where the complainant is not so severely intoxicated and consents to sexual intercourse either because her/his inhibitions are reduced, or for any other reason.10 Consent as a result of reduced inhibitions from intoxication, is still valid consent. Where a trial judge gave a direction on the disinhibiting effects of alcohol and cannabis, it was held also necessary to give a direction identifying the point at which disinhibition gives way to lack of real consent.11 The line between the two is not always easy to draw.12 A complainant’s level or degree of understanding or intoxication, or state of sleep or unconsciousness will be a question for the jury. Was the complainant capable of exercising judgment on the question of consent?13 In each of these kinds of cases, the ultimate question of fact for the jury will be: did the complainant consent?14 Jury directions on the issues in intoxication cases have been suggested.15 At common law, submission to sexual intercourse extracted by force or threats of violence was not regarded as consent.16 Threats from others: an example is a prisoner having sexual intercourse with the complainant, another inmate, telling the latter that other prisoners were sexually interested in him and that he would protect the complainant from them in exchange for sexual intercourse. It was held that the jury should have been directed that if the accused knew that the complainant submitted to sexual intercourse as a result of threats from other prisoners, the complainant was to be regarded as not consenting.17
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61HA
[CA.61HA.80]
There are a number of examples of intimidation or threats not involving the threat of force that negate the expression of consent. In Queensland, an accused told his 18-year-old sister-in-law that if she did not engage in sexual intercourse with him she would be unable to go home to her parents and would continue to be subject to sexual abuse by him.18 In Tasmania, “threats of any kind” was held to include public humiliation: a threat that if a woman did not submit to sexual intercourse, videotape of her having intercourse would be published.19 Another case that might fall either within the category of intimidatory or coercive conduct and/or unlawful detention was an English case where two girls were offered a lift home by the accused and another man. Instead they were driven to the home of the other man where the complainant was dragged by the accused into a bedroom, told he was going to have intercourse with her and told to take her trousers off. She did so because she was frightened and submitted to intercourse. The accused was held properly convicted.20 Abuse of authority or a position of trust (s 61HA(6)(c)): the meaning of phrases like this has been considered.21 Common examples of this kind are submission to sexual intercourse by a parent or parental figure22 or a schoolteacher.23
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In these kinds of cases, the question is not whether the complainant’s fear etc is objectively reasonable, but rather whether the complainant subjectively held the fear. It has been remarked that the question is not whether a woman of average fortitude, maturity, or determination would have ignored or resisted a similar threat if made to her, but whether the consent of the particular complainant was induced by the threat made to her by the accused; here the past relationship of the complainant and accused may be relevant.24 It has been held that terror felt by a complainant may be based upon a complainant’s subjective belief as to the accused’s propensity for violence.25 By s 61HA(6)(b), consent may be negated because of “intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat”, not involving a threat of force. There is a dearth of common law cases of convictions for sexual assault in the absence of violence actually used, threatened or feared.26 In a case where a woman of Vietnamese origin had stolen some goods from a supermarket, she submitted to sexual activity with the accused who posed as a security officer and threatened to report her to the supermarket security unless she complied, the now repealed ss 61R(1)(c) and 65A of the Crimes Act 1900 were considered. The former section provided that a person who submits to sexual intercourse as a result of threats or terror was not to be regarded as consenting. The latter section made it an offence for a person to have sexual intercourse with another as a result of a non-violent threat where the complainant “could not in the circumstances be reasonably expected to resist the threat”. The definition of “non-violent threat” was in much the same terms as the present s 61HA(6)(b). It was held for the purposes of s 61R(1)(c) that “threats” meant threats of violence, the court adding that the prosecution should have charged the accused under s 65A.27 In the Second Reading Speech for the Bill enacting s 65A, an example of submission without real consent was given of an immigrant woman, speaking almost no English with dependent children, who works from home as an outworker, sewing piece-work as her only income. The man delivering work to her says that he will stop bringing work unless she submits to sexual intercourse with him; a threat she could not be reasonably expected to resist.28 Section 61HA contains no equivalent of the phrase in the former s 65A being circumstances where the complainant “could not in the circumstances be reasonably expected to resist the threat”, but it may well be that this concept will be incorporated into the interpretation of the new s 61HA(6)(b). Mistaken belief as to identity – many cases of this kind concern women who have sexual intercourse with a man believing him to be her husband or boyfriend.29 Often, the man enters the bed of the woman in darkness. In these situations, it has been held that a complainant in this situation was only consenting to intercourse with her husband etc, rather than to the man concerned.30 Mistake as to identity is not limited to impersonation of husbands, but may apply to any situation in which the complainant is falsely persuaded by the man that his identity is other than his real identity.31 The High Court observed that “[t]he identity of the man and the character of the physical act that is done or proposed seem now clearly to be regarded as forming part of the nature and character of the act to which the woman’s consent is directed”.32
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In the UK the Court of Appeal stated, “[i]n our judgment, the ratio of [the leading case of] R v Dee is [that it is] the absence of consent and not the existence of fraud which makes it rape”, and that R v Clarence“exposes the fallacy of the submission that there can be rape by fraud or false pretences”.37 Although at common law it was not sexual intercourse without consent for a man to have sexual intercourse with a woman who to his knowledge falsely believed she was lawfully married to him38, s 61HA(5)(b) (previously s 61D(2)(a)(ii)) alters this.
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Mistaken belief about the nature of sexual intercourse induced by fraudulent means – there are a number of cases where females have been induced to submit to sexual intercourse by false representations about the purpose of sexual penetration.39 This was not regarded as consent at common law because the nature and character of the act done was not that to which consent was given.40 Section 61HA(5)(c) (previously s 61D(2)(a1)) confirms the common law position. 1 R v Day 173 ER 1026; (1841) 9 Car & P 722 at 1027 (ER), 724 (Car & P) per Coleridge J; R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 33 per Wills J; R v Howard [1966] 1 WLR 13; [1965] 3 All ER 684; (1966) 50 Cr App R 56. 2 Proof of cognitive impairment is not sufficient alone: R v Lynch (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 420; 47 WN (NSW) 147 (CCA) per Ferguson J at 421 (SR (NSW)). What has to be proved is an incapacity to understand that the act of penetration was of a sexual nature, as distinct from an act of a totally different character, R v Morgan [1970] VR 337 (FC) at 341; R v Schell [1964] Tas SR 184. In R v Eastwood (1998) 114 A Crim R 448; [1998] VSCA 42, (Vic CA) Phillips CJ at 456 (A Crim R) said that the understanding need not be a complete or sophisticated understanding and that sufficient “rudimentary knowledge” of what the act comprises and its character is enough for consent. 3 R v Roden (1981) 4 A Crim R 166 Crawford J. 4 R v Lynch (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 420; 47 WN (NSW) 147. See also R v Beattie (1981) 26 SASR 481. 5 R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311; R v Young (1878) 14 Cox CC 114. 6 Dean v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 341; [2006] NSWCCA 341 at [32]. 7 Saibu v The Queen (1993) 10 WAR 279 at 292 per Franklyn J. 8 R v Camplin 169 ER 163; (1845) 1 Den 89; R v Lang (1976) 62 Cr App R 50; R v Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300; R v Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447; R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [17]. 9 R v Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447. 10 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [17]. 11 R v Chant (unreported, NSW (CCA), 12 June 1998) per Wood CJ at CL. 12 The Victorian case of R v Van Jager (1992) 59 A Crim R 124 provides a good example. 13 R v Lang (1976) 62 Cr App R 50 at 51 (UK CA). 14 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [17]; R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444; 139 A Crim R 30; [2003] NSWCCA 191. 15 R v Blayney (2003) 87 SASR 354; (2003) 140 A Crim R 249; [2003] SASC 405 per Debelle J at [23] and [33]. 16 R v Day 173 ER 1026; (1841) 9 Car & P 722; R v Hallett 173 ER 1036; (1841) 9 Car & P 748; R v Stanton 174 ER 872; (1844) 1 Car & K 415; R v Woodhurst (1870) 12 Cox CC 443; R v Burles [1947] VLR 392; R v Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223 at 338 (SR (NSW)); R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 per Studdert J at [12].
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To be distinguished are false representations by (usually) a man as to his characteristics or intentions. It has been judicially remarked that to say that consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true as a general proposition, either in fact or in law, and that otherwise, “many seductions would be rapes”.33 A “gaol-bird” inducing consent to sexual intercourse with him by pretending to be a man of virtue is not guilty of sexual assault.34 Nor was a man who had sexual intercourse with a prostitute without having any intention of paying her, despite promising to do so.35 The High Court commented that, “in considering whether an apparent consent is unreal it is the mistake or misapprehension that makes it so. It is not the fraud producing the mistake which is material so much as the mistake itself … the stress has been on the fraud. But that stress tends to distract the attention from the essential enquiry, namely, whether the consent is no consent because it is not directed to the nature and character of the act”.36
Crimes Act 1900 s 61HA 17 18 19 20 21
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22 23 24 25 26 27
[CA.61HA.80]
R v Clark (unreported, NSW (CCA), No 60439 of 1997, 17 April 1998) per Simpson J at 11 (Studdert J agreeing). R v Shaw [1995] 2 Qd R 97 (CA). R v G (unreported, Tas CCA, 25 June 1993) per Green CJ. R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 WLR 585; (1981) 73 Cr App R 344 at 331 (QB). R v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141; (2000) 116 A Crim R 249; [2000] VSCA 159 (Vic CA); R v Miller (2001) 127 A Crim R 344; [2001] NSWCCA 209 (concerning step-father). Other such figures might include employer, counsellor, physician, minister, priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach. See for example, Ward E, “Rape of Girl-Children by Male Family Members” (1982) 215 ANZJ Crim 15. R v Nichol 168 ER 720; (1807) Russ & Ry 130 (teacher’s husband); R v McGavaran (1852) 6 Cox CC 64. R v Shaw [1995] 2 Qd R 97 (CA) per McPherson JA at 115. R v Preston (unreported, NSW CCA, 9 April 1997) at 17. R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328 per Studdert J at [12]. R v Aiken (2005) 63 NSWLR 719; (2005) 157 A Crim R 515; [2005] NSWCCA 328.
28 Second Reading Speech by Mr Unsworth for the Bill that became Act No 184 of 1987. 29 For example R v Dee (1884) 15 Cox CC 579; R v Gallienne [1964] NSWR 919; (1963) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 94 (CCA); R v Pryor (2001) 124 A Crim R 22; [2001] QCA 341 (Qld CA). 30 R v Dee (1884) 15 Cox CC 579 at 594 per Palles CB; R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 44 per Stephen J. 31 Elbekkay v The Queen [1995] Crim LR 163 (UK CA); R v Pryor (2001) 124 A Crim R 22; [2001] QCA 341. 32 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74, the court at 260–261 (CLR). 33 R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 27 per Wills J and at 43 per Stephen J. 34 R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 29–30 per Wills J. 35 R v Linekar [1995] 2 Cr App R 49 (CA). 36 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74, the court at 260–261 (CLR). 37 R v Linekar [1995] 2 Cr App R 49 (CA) at 257, 258. References to R v Dee and R v Clarence are given above. 38 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74. 39 Cases include R v Flattery (1876-77) LR 2 QBD 410 (pretended surgical procedure); R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340; (1924) 17 Cr App R 56 at 347 (KB) (singing teacher pretending to clear airway); R v Mobilio [1991] 1 VR 339; (1990) 50 A Crim R 170 (FC) (unnecessary vaginal penetration with medical equipment purportedly done for diagnostic purposes – this was held not to negate consent because the mistake went to the purpose and not to the nature of the act. Section 61HA(5)(c) alters this). 40 R v Flattery (1876-77) LR 2 QBD 410; R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23 at 44 per Stephen J; R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340; (1924) 17 Cr App R 56 at 347 (KB). Many authorities are reviewed in Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74.
[CA.61HA.100]
Element (3) – Mens rea – Knowing the complainant did not consent
A jury, once satisfied that the complainant was not consenting to sexual intercourse, must then consider whether the prosecution can prove that the accused knew that the complainant was not consenting. By s 61HA(3) from 1 January 2008, an accused who has sexual intercourse with a complainant has knowledge that the complainant does not consent if the accused: (a) knows the complainant does not consent; or (b) is reckless as to whether the complainant does not consent; or (c) has no reasonable grounds for believing the complainant consents.1 In determining (a), (b) or (c), s 61HA(3)(d) provides that the trier of fact must have regard to all the circumstances, including any steps taken by the accused to ascertain whether the complainant consented. Before 1 January 2008, s 61R(1) simply provided that an accused who is reckless as to whether there is consent is to be taken to know that a complainant does not consent. The state of the accused’s mind as to the presence or absence of consent is a subjective inquiry and not an objective one.2 An accused may honestly but mistakenly believe a complainant was consenting. Mistake as to consent is considered below.
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There was not and still is not any statutory definition of “recklessness”.3 Its meaning is to be construed according to the common law.4 Although described as “an old and well understood English word”,5 in the context of sexual intercourse without consent, it is not a term of certain legal meaning.6 This is a subjective question of what the accused knew, not what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have known.
Recklessness in New South Wales may be proven by what are sometimes called “advertent recklessness” or by “non-advertent recklessness”.9
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Advertent recklessness – it is clear that a person can be taken to know that the other person is not consenting to sexual intercourse by virtue of a kind of recklessness in which the first person has actually adverted to whether the other person is consenting to sexual intercourse … it is sufficient to constitute this kind of recklessness that the first person realises that the second person might not be consenting and, notwithstanding that realisation, decides to proceed to have sexual intercourse with her and has such sexual intercourse, without there being some additional, independent requirement that he is determined to have sexual intercourse with her, whether or not she is consenting.10 A state of mind of complete indifference to the question of and requirement of consent (“couldn’t care less”) is recklessness.11 To be guilty of advertent recklessness, the possibility that the complainant is not consenting, of which the accused is aware, must be more than a bare possibility.12 It is a subjective rather than an objective test.13 A view in the mind of the accused that the complainant probably consents, but may not consent, will constitute recklessness as to consent.14 In the case of O’Meagher, an appeal was upheld because the trial judge told the jury that “if you are satisfied that the complainant did not consent and that it must have been apparent that at least there was a risk that she was not consenting, then you would be entitled to accept that the accused was reckless as to whether or not there was consent”. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that that statement could have created in the jury’s mind the notion that the test was objective not subjective.15 Inadvertent recklessness – where the accused has not considered the question of consent and a risk that the complainant was not consenting to sexual intercourse would have been obvious to someone with the accused’s mental capacity, if they had turned their mind to it, the accused is to be taken to have satisfied the requisite mens rea referred to by the word “reckless” in s 61HA(3)(c).16 It has been remarked that ordinarily recklessness becomes a relevant issue only where there is a possibility of ambiguity in the signals of consent or non-consent emanating from the complainant or arising from the circumstances.17 In an English case, it was said that “the accused may negative any intention on his part to have intercourse with the woman regardless of her consent if he holds an honest belief on reasonable grounds in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make his intercourse with the woman an innocent one”.18 At common law, following the decision of the House of Lords in DPP (UK) v Morgan,19 the belief no longer needed to be reasonable, only honestly held.20 The reasonableness of the belief was said to be only important as evidence tending to show whether such a belief was in fact honestly held by the accused.21 It has been observed that where there was no reasonable basis for such a belief, it is unlikely that a jury would accept that it was in fact actually held.22 By s 61HA(3)(c) from 1 January 2008, an accused is deemed to know the complainant does not consent if the accused has no reasonable grounds for believing the complainant consents. By s 61HA(3)(d) and (e) for the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of fact must have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any steps taken by the accused to ascertain whether the complainant consents to the sexual intercourse, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the accused. In the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment (Consent – Sexual Assualt Offences) Bill 2007,
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At common law, an accused was guilty of rape if he was “aware that the woman was not consenting or else realised she might not be and determined to have intercourse with her whether she was consenting or not”.7 Various formulations of the concept of recklessness were given by members of the House of Lords in the leading case of DPP (UK) v Morgan.8
Crimes Act 1900 s 61HA
[CA.61HA.100]
the Attorney-General said of these provisions: The accused’s assertion that he or she had a belief that the other person had consented is difficult to refute, no matter how unreasonable in the circumstances. The law does not adequately protect victims of sexual assault when the offender has genuine but distorted views about appropriate sexual conduct. The subjective test is outdated. It reflects archaic views about sexual activity.23 The terms of a direction in which the test under s 61HA(3)(c) would be formulated is not yet clear. In many cases, the opposing factual versions given by the complainant and the accused do not create a context in which the question of a reckless state of mind becomes relevant.24 Where an accused denies that sexual intercourse took place a direction on recklessness is generally not required,25 nor if the accused maintains that to his knowledge, the complainant consented at all times.26 A direction on recklessness should not be given as a matter of course as any unncessary direction has the potential to distract or confuse the jury.27
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After 1 January 2008, s 61HA(3)(e) specifically makes self-induced intoxication irrelevant to the question of whether the accused knew the complainant was not consenting. Before this date, self-induced intoxication in the accused was irrelevant also.28 Offences under ss 61I, 61J and 61JA are not offences of specific intent and therefore s 428D applies. 1 The High Court described the predecessor to s 61HA(3), s 61R(1) as a “deeming provision”: Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [31]. 2 R v McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926; (1979) 1 A Crim R 242; R v Newham (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 November 1993). 3 In Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 at [111], Callinan J suggested that this is deliberate; the legislature “eschewing all of the various judicial elaborations or explanations attempted [of reckless] over the years”. 4 R v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334 at 337. 5 Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 per Callinan J at [108]. 6 Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80 per Callinan J at [99]. 7 R v Daly [1968] VR 257 at 258–259 (Vic Sup Ct, FC) (approved in DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 at 203 (AC), 141–142 (Cr App R) per Cross LJ); R v Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223 the court at 337 (SR (NSW)); R v Zorad [1979] 2 NSWLR 764 at 772–773; R v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334 at 337 per Yeldham J. 8 DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 at 209, 213–214, 215 (AC); 146, 149–150, 151 (Cr App R). 9 R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [78], [79] (NSW CCA) 10 R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [79] (NSW CCA), approved in the High Court in Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80. 11 R v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118; 3 All ER 316; (1983) 77 Cr App R 225, considered by Kirby P in R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293 at 666–667 (NSWLR). 12 R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [92]. 13 R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293; R v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334. 14 R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [92]. 15 R v O’Meagher (1997) 101 A Crim R 196 at 201 (NSW CCA). 16 R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293 at 672 (NSWLR) per Kirby P, citing R v Henning (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 May 1990); R v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334 and R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696. Applied in R v Mitton (2002) 132 A Crim R 123; [2002] NSWCCA 124 at [28]; R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [78]. 17 R v Henning (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 May 1990) at 32. 18 DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136 at 229 (AC) referring to Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 WLR 1303; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373 at 276 per Lord Reid. See also Chard v Wallis (1988) 12 NSWLR 453; 36 A Crim R 147. 19 DPP (UK) v Morgan [1976] AC 182; (1975) 61 Cr App R 136
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20 Before DPP (UK) v Morgan, the law required an honest belief on reaonsable grounds that there was consent: R v Sperotto (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 334; 92 WN (NSW) 223, the court at 338 (SR (NSW)). In the light of Morgan, it was held that Sperotto in this respect no longer represented the law and that a mistake by the accused concerning consent simply had to be honestly held, whether on reasonable grounds or not: R v McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926; (1979) 1 A Crim R 242 per Street CJ at 930 (NSWLR), 245–246 (A Crim R); R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; (1983) 9 A Crim R 185 (FC), the court at 193 (A Crim R); R v Banditt (2004) 151 A Crim R 215; [2004] NSWCCA 208 at [93]; South v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 117 at [30]. 21 R v McEwan [1979] 2 NSWLR 926; (1979) 1 A Crim R 242 at 929 (NSWLR) per Street CJ. 22 DPP (NT) v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43; (2004) 78 ALJR 1565; [2004] HCA 47 at [106] per Kirby J. 23 Second Reading speech of the Crimes Amendment (Consent – Sexual Assualt Offences) Bill 2007, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 November 2007, p 3584). 24 See for example R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696; R v Tolmie (1995) 37 NSWLR 660; 84 A Crim R 293 25 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 at 15 (NSWLR), 318 (A Crim R) per Lee J. 26 R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696 at 700 per Carruthers J. 27 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 at 15 (NSWLR), 318 (A Crim R) per Lee J; R v Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 at [3], [4] and [42]. 28 R v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 at [127]; DJB v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 209 at [68].
61I
Sexual assault
Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 61I am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 61I COMMENTARY Indictment .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.61I.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ....................................................................... [CA.61I.40] History and general ........................................................................................................................... [CA.61I.60] Elements of the offence under s 61I ................................................................................................. [CA.61I.80] Element (1) Sexual intercourse ....................................................................................................... [CA.61I.100] Element (2) Without consent ........................................................................................................... [CA.61I.120] Element (3) Knowing there was no consent ................................................................................... [CA.61I.140] Sentencing ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.61I.160]
[CA.61I.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did have sexual intercourse with CD without her consent and knowing that she did not consent. [CA.61I.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. A standard non-parole period of 7 years is specified for an offence committed after 1 February 2003.1 If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.2 An offence under s 61I is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. A table of the many legislative provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials appears at [CA.Pt3.Div10.80], with the provisions summarised at [CA.Pt3.Div10.100]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. For common trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180].
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[CA.61I.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61I
[CA.61I.40]
Prompt or delayed complaint is often relevant, see principles [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. Evidence concerning sexual experience of a complainant’s is generally inadmissible, with certain exceptions, see s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 . Alternative verdicts – Section 61Q provides for alternative verdicts to s 61I in three cases where the jury is not satisfied on the question of consent. By s 61Q(2), if the complainant is aged between 14 and 16, there may be a verdict under s 66C(3) or s 66C(4). By s 61Q(4), if the complainant is a close family member (as stipulated in s 78A(2)), there may be an alternative verdict of incest under s 78A or attempted incest under s 78B. By s 61Q(5), if the complainant is cognitively impaired, there may be an alternative verdict under s 66F. Section 61P provides for an alternative verdict of attempt, as does s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. 1 Section 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. 2 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61I.60]
History and general
The Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 abolished the common law crime of rape and replaced it with a series of graduated sexual assault offences.1 Further major changes were made by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1989 which provided “three basic offences, three aggravated offences of each and one additional offence of assault with intent to have sexual intercourse”.2
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The offence of sexual assault is much wider than rape. Rape was defined as “carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent: carnal knowledge is a physical fact of penetration”.3 “Carnal knowledge” meant any degree of penile penetration of the labia4 (and regardless of whether there was emission of seminal fluid).5 Accordingly, rape involved only vaginal (in the popular meaning) penetration by a male. There appears to have been no common law offence of anal rape.6 “Sexual intercourse” in s 61H is defined much more broadly than either carnal knowledge, or the popular meaning of sexual intercourse as connoting simply penile penetration of the vagina. It extends to penetration by any body part or object of the female genitalia or anus of a person, to the introduction of any part of a penis into another’s mouth, to cunnilingus and to the continuation of any of these things. Accordingly the offender and complainant may be a person of either sex. Some common law cases held that (unless they were living apart by court order) a lawfully wedded man could not be guilty of the rape of his wife (other than as an accomplice).7 This rule was abrogated by s 61T(a). An English common law rule held that a boy under 14 years was conclusively presumed incapable of rape.8 This rule too was abrogated, by s 61S(1). 1 Section 63(1) abolished the common law offences of rape and attempted rape. Section 63(2) makes provision with respect to rape and other former sexual offences as per Sch 11, Pts 1, 1A and 19. 2 Second Reading Speech by the Attorney-General J R A Dowd (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 28 November 1989 at 13,569). 3 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; [1957] HCA 74 at 260–261 (CLR). 4 R v Lines 174 ER 861; (1844) 1 Car & K 393 per Parke B “whether, at any time, any part of the virile member of the prisoner was within the labia of the pudendum of the prosecutrix”. See also R v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647; Holland v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 176; 67 ALJR 946; [1993] HCA 43 at 180 (A Crim R) (HC); Christophers v The Queen (2000) 23 WAR 106; (2000) 116 A Crim R 280; [2000] WASCA 308 (CCA) at [61]. 5 R v John Cox 172 ER 985; (1832) 5 Car & P 297; R v Henry Allen 173 ER 727; (1839) 9 Car & P 31. 6 R v Gaston (1981) 73 Cr App R 164 (CA). 7 R v Clarke [1949] 2 All ER 448; (1949) 33 Cr App R 216; R v Cogan [1976] QB 217; [1975] 3 WLR 316; [1975] 2 All ER 1059. These decisions were questioned in R v McMinn [1982] VR 53; (1981) 57 FLR 206. The proposition that by marriage a wife gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse by her husband was considered
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by the High Court in R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379; 66 ALJR 36; [1991] HCA 48 where it was said that if this ever was the common law, it is no longer so. The same decision was made in R v R [1992] 1 AC 599; [1991] 3 WLR 767; [1991] 4 All ER 481 (HL). 8 R v Waite [1892] 2 QB 600.
[CA.61I.80]
Elements of the offence under s 61I
[CA.61I.100]
CA
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) without the consent of the complainant, and; (3) knowing that the complainant did not consent. Element (1) Sexual intercourse
The actus reus of this offence is having sexual intercourse without consent. Sexual intercourse is broadly defined by s 61H(1). It is rare that there is an issue about whether an act of sexual intercourse was intentional, but where this issue does arise, the trial judge must make it clear to the jury that the accused acted voluntarily and intentionally rather than, for example as was claimed in one case, by accident.1 If the basis of the charge is penetration of the vagina or anus, the prosecution needs only to prove penetration to any extent, s 61H(1)(a). So the fact that the hymen was not ruptured is not conclusive.2 Where actual penetration is not proven but only an attempt, there can be a conviction for attempt, s 61P.
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Section 61H includes no requirement of proof of ejaculation – as mentioned at [CA.61I.60] – the common law of rape required no such proof either. Proof of the use of force is not required. The only force required is the minimum effort as is required to perform the least act of intercourse.3 It is not necessary to prove a purpose of sexual gratification.4 1 R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563; 159 A Crim R 327; [2005] VSCA 288. This decision of the Court of Appeal Victoria was reversed by the High Court, but not on this point, AJS v The Queen (2007) 235 CLR 505; (2007) 171 A Crim R 436; 81 ALJR 1208; [2007] HCA 27. 2 R v Hughes 173 ER 1038; (1841) 9 Car & P 752. In Holland v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 176; 67 ALJR 946; [1993] HCA 43 at 180 (A Crim R), the High Court noted that at common law it was not necessary to prove rupture of the hymen to prove rape (see the footnotes). 3 Papadimitropoulos at 255 (CLR). 4 R v Dunn (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 April 1992) where a woman who was bathing an infant girl put her finger into the infant’s anus through irritation after the infant defecated. Penetration of a woman’s vagina to remove drugs, falls within the definition of “sexual intercourse” in s 5 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA); R v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575 (CCA). See also R v Mobilio [1991] 1 VR 339; (1990) 50 A Crim R 170 (FC) at 343 (VR).
[CA.61I.120]
Element (2) Without consent
For detailed commentary on the issue of consent, see [CA.61HA.20]–[CA.61HA.100]. The question of consent or its lack, is often the principal issue in a trial of an offence alleged under s 61I. The meaning of consent is set out in s 61HA(2), that is, free and voluntary agreement to sexual intercourse. The provisions of s 61HA apply to offences alleged to have been committed after 1 January 2008. Previously and from 1989, the question of consent was dealt with in the less extensive and now repealed s 61R. If the complainant was a child under 16 years at the relevant time and the prosecution charges an accused with an offence under s 61I, the jury must still be satisfied both that the child did not consent and that the accused knew this: McGrath v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 527; [2010] NSWCCA 48 at [11].1 1 Section 77, which provides that the consent of a child under 16 years is no defence to certain charges, does not apply to s 61I.
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[CA.61I.120]
[CA.61I.140]
Element (3) Knowing there was no consent
For detailed commentary on the issue knowledge of the absence of consent, see [CA.61HA.100]. The mens rea of an offence under s 61I is having non-consensual sexual intercourse knowing that there was no consent. The prosecution must prove not only that the complainant did not consent, but also that the accused knew that there was no consent. Knowledge of lack of consent may be shown by proof of recklessness as an alternative to actual knowledge of that fact, see s 61HA(3) and commentary at [CA.61HA.100]. As an offence under s 61I is not an offence of specific intent, self-induced intoxication is irrelevant to the question of whether an accused knew that the complainant was not consenting, see s 428D. [CA.61I.160]
Sentencing
For considerations relevant to sentencing this offence, see [CA.66A.120]. 61J
Aggravated sexual assault
(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and in circumstances of aggravation and who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse is liable to imprisonment for 20 years.
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[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby, or (b) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, or (c) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or (d) the alleged victim is under the age of 16 years, or (e) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (f) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (g) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment, or (h) the alleged offender breaks and enters into any dwelling-house or other building with the intention of committing the offence or any other serious indictable offence, or (i) the alleged offender deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty for a period before or after the commission of the offence. [Subs (2) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
(3) In this section, building has the same meaning as it does in Division 4 of Part 4. [Subs (3) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[1]; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 61J am Act 99 of 2009; Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61J COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.61J.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ...................................................................... [CA.61J.40]
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Elements of the offence under s 61J ............................................................................................... [CA.61J.60] Element (1) Sexual intercourse ........................................................................................................ [CA.61J.80] Element (2) Without consent .......................................................................................................... [CA.61J.100] Element (3) Knowing there was no consent .................................................................................. [CA.61J.120] Element (4) In circumstances of aggravation ................................................................................. [CA.61J.140] Sentencing ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.61J.160]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did have sexual intercourse with CD without her consent and knowing that she did not consent in circumstances of aggravation,1 namely that [particulars of circumstance of aggravation].. 1 While s 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 stipulates that the description of any offence in the words of an Act is sufficient in law, it is suggested that it is desirable to particularise the circumstance of aggravation alleged in the indictment. If there is more than one circumstance of aggravation, this may be taken into account on sentence: R v Li (unreported, CCA (NSW), No 60610 of 1996, 9 July 1997).
[CA.61J.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. A standard non-parole period of 10 years is specified for an offence committed after 1 February 2003.1
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If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.2 An offence under s 61J is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Alternative verdicts – By s 61Q(1), a verdict under s 61 is an alternative to s 61J. Other alternative verdicts (detailed below at [CA.61K.40]) are available in the case of some particular circumstances of aggravation alleged but not proven. Where an accused is charged under s 61J with sexual intercourse without consent with a close family member (as stipulated in s 78A(2)) but the issue of consent is not proven, by s 61Q(4), there may be an alternative verdict of incest under s 78A or attempted incest under s 78B. Section 61P provides for an alternative verdict of attempt, as does s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. Related provisions and cross-references: • Section 61I – sexual intercourse without consent. • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Common sexual assault trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]. • Generally inadmissibility of evidence concerning a complainant’s sexual experience, see s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. • Prompt or delayed complaint by the complainant, see [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. 1 Section 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. 2 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61J.60]
Elements of the offence under s 61J
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) without the consent of the complainant; (3) knowing that the complainant did not consent;
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[CA.61J.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61J
[CA.61J.60]
(4) in circumstances of aggravation. [CA.61J.80]
Element (1) Sexual intercourse
For commentary on element (1), see [CA.61I.100]. [CA.61J.100]
Element (2) Without consent
For commentary on the absence of consent, see [CA.61HA.20]–[CA.61HA.100] and also [CA.61I.120]. If the complainant was a child under 16 years at the relevant time and the prosecution charges an accused with an offence under s 61J(1), the jury must still be satisfied both that the child did not consent and that the accused knew this: McGrath v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 527; [2010] NSWCCA 48 at [11].1 1 Section 77, which provides that the consent of a child under 16 years is no defence to certain charges, does not apply to s 61J(1).
[CA.61J.120]
Element (3) Knowing there was no consent
For commentary on the accused’s knowledge of the absence of consent, see [CA.61HA.100] and [CA.61I.140]. [CA.61J.140]
Element (4) In circumstances of aggravation
The various circumstances of aggravation are considered below:
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“Immediately before or after” – the phrase “immediately after” was considered in the context of a fatal shooting after a robbery. In R v Attard (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 April 1993), the trial judge elaborated little on the meaning of “immediately after” and said that there was no hard and fast rule as to its meaning and that what was involved was a question of fact and degree for the jury to determine. On appeal, it was held that these directions were perfectly adequate. “Intentionally”, see [CLP.80]. “Recklessly”, see [CA.4A.40]. “Actual bodily harm”, see [CA.59.100]. A similar provision was considered in R v Tout (1987) 11 NSWLR 251; (1987) 32 A Crim R 358 (NSW CCA), a case where an accused had forcible sexual intercourse with two women after threatening to shoot them with a gun he claimed to have had in the boot of his car nearby, but did not actually produce. The women complied with this threat believing the accused in fact had a gun. On appeal, it was argued that to constitute a threat within the meaning of the provision, the gun actually had to be produced. It was held however, that the presence or production of a weapon was not necessary to constitute the threat, and that simply stating that the accused had a gun and would shoot the victims with it unless they complied with his sexual demands was a threat within the meaning of the provision. In R v RJS (1993) 31 NSWLR 649; 69 A Crim R 163, the accused was charged with sexual intercourse without consent, aggravated by threatening to inflict actual bodily harm by means of an offensive weapon being a small pocket knife. The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on the basis that there was no evidence that the accused had taken the knife to the scene of the crime with the intention of using it offensively, rather than using it as such at the time. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge was in error and that it was not necessary for the Crown to prove that the accused brought the object to the scene of the crime intending to use it in an offensive manner. The Court observed that an object, which in its nature and in its ordinary use is not offensive, may become an offensive instrument by reason of the use to which a person puts it, and the intent which accompanies such use. “Offensive weapon or instrument” is now defined in s 4 in terms that reflect this idea. See also the authorities referred to at [CA.4.200], [CA.33B.120] and [CA.97.120].
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The meaning of “in company” in the context of s 61J(2)(c) was considered in R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 where Kirby J (with whom Heydon JA, Greg James J agreed) said at [120]: A number of propositions can be stated: • First, the statutory definition (s 61J(2)(c)) requires that the offender be “in the company of another person or persons”. • Secondly, the accused and such person, or persons, must share a common purpose (either to rob, or as here, sexually assault). • Thirdly, the cases appear to assume that each participant is physically present. • Fourthly, participation in the common purpose without being physically present (for example, as a look-out or as an accessory before the fact) is not enough. • Fifthly, the perspective of the victim (being confronted by the combined force or strength or two or more persons) is relevant, although not determinative. If two or more persons are present, and share the same purpose, they will be “in company” even if the victim was unaware of the other person. In this same context in R v Crozier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 March 1996), it was held that in the case of a man who occupied the front seat of a vehicle without more while a second man had forcible intercourse with a woman in the rear seat, the mere presence of another person is not sufficient to constitute being “in company”.
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In Button at [123], Kirby J stated that physical presence is “an elastic concept”. This same point was made in R v Ita (2003) 139 A Crim R 340; [2003] NSWCCA 174 where it was said that the real test is the coercive effect of the group. There must be such proximity as would enable the inference that the coercive effect of the group operated to embolden the offender or to intimidate the victim. As Kirby J pointed out in Button at [103], most of the cases that consider “in company” are concerned with robbery in company, rather than sexual assault. A number of these robbery cases were considered in Button, and see also [CA.97.140]. As to proof of age, see [CA.43.120]. “Under the authority” is defined in s 61H(2),. For commentary on this phrase, see [CA.61H.20]. By s 61Q(3) where the jury is not satisfied of this circumstance of aggravation, verdicts under either s 66A (Sexual intercourse—child under 10) or s 66C (Sexual intercourse—child between 10 and 16) are available alternative verdicts. This phrase is not defined, but its meaning is obvious. “Cognitive impairment” is defined in s 61H(1A). By s 61Q(4) where the jury is not satisfied that the issue of consent is not proven beyond reasonable doubt, a verdict under s 66F is available as an alternative verdict. “Breaks”, see [CA.109.140]. “Enters”, see [CA.109.60]. “Dwelling-house” is defined in s 4. ″Other building″ means a building other than a dwelling-house. Section 61J(3) provides that “building” has the same meaning as it does in Div 4 of Pt 4. Division 4 contains ss 112 (Breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence) and 113 (Breaking etc into any house etc with intent to commit serious indictable offence). Before their amendment by the Crimes Amendment Act 2007 (Act 38 of 2007), these sections specifically listed a variety of buildings each not being a “dwelling-house”, to distinguish them from a dwelling-house. Each section now speaks simply of “dwelling-house or other building”. This circumstance of aggravation appears to be directed not only at an offender who unlawfully enters with the specific intent of sexual assault, but also at one who opportunistically sexually assaults an occupant of a dwelling or other building after breaking and entering for some other serious criminal purpose.
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[CA.61J.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61JA
[CA.61J.140]
The act of depriving another of liberty without lawful excuse constitutes the common law offence of false imprisonment. For commentary on false imprisonment, see [CLO.520]–[CLO.620]. Also relevant are cases in relation to detaining in the context of kidnapping, see [CA.86.100]. A number of the authorities are considered in the South Australian case of R v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392; 40 A Crim R 213 (CCA) (where both rape and false imprisonment were charged) in the judgment of von Doussa J. There, von Doussa J at 405 (SASR); 225–226 (A Crim R) observed that it is well established that the confinement of the victim may occur by the victim’s submission to a threat to apply physical force to his or her person immediately upon going or attempting to go beyond the area in which the offender intends to confine him or her. In Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 at 53–54, Atkin LJ stated: It appears to me that a person could be imprisoned without his knowing it. I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious and while he is a lunatic … So a man might in fact, to my mind, be imprisoned by having the key of a door turned against him so that he is imprisoned in a room in fact although he does not know that the key has been turned. [CA.61J.160]
Sentencing
The seriousness of an offence of this type is undoubted. However, a sentencing judge should be cautious in describing an offence as falling within the worst category especially when the Crown does not make that submission.1 Analysis of the statistics relevant to the length of sentence for this offence have been considered.2 1 Glover v The Queen (2009) 193 A Crim R 292; [2009] NSWCCA 48 at [24]–[25]. 2 Glover v The Queen at [27]–[29].
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61JA
Aggravated sexual assault in company
(1) A person: (a) who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse, and (b) who is in the company of another person or persons, and (c) who: (i) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby, or (ii) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, or (iii) deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty for a period before or after the commission of the offence, is liable to imprisonment for life. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
(2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence under this section is to serve that sentence for the term of the person’s natural life. (3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 21 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life). (4) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy. [S 61JA am Act 38 of 2007; insrt Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
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Indictment ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.61JA.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references .................................................................... [CA.61JA.40] Elements of the offence under s 61JA ........................................................................................... [CA.61JA.60] Element (1) Sexual intercourse ...................................................................................................... [CA.61JA.80] Element (2) Without consent ........................................................................................................ [CA.61JA.100] Element (3) Knowing there was no consent ................................................................................ [CA.61JA.120] Element (4) In company ............................................................................................................... [CA.61JA.140] Element (5) Infliction of injury etc or deprivation of liberty .......................................................... [CA.61JA.160]
[CA.61JA.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did have sexual intercourse with CD without her consent and knowing that she did not consent and while in the company of another (or others) namely EF (or EF and GH, or a man or men unknown) and that (s 61JA(1)(c)(i)) at the time of (or immediately before or after) that sexual intercourse, AB intentionally (or recklessly) inflicted actual bodily harm on CD (or on IJ who was then present – or on IJ who was then nearby); or (s 61JA(1)(c)(ii)) at the time of (or immediately before or after) that sexual intercourse, AB threatened to inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on IJ who was then present – or on IJ who was then nearby)by means of an offensive weapon or instrument; or (s 61JA(1)(c)(iii)) AB deprived CD of her liberty for a period before (or after) that sexual intercourse. [CA.61JA.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
A standard non-parole period of 15 years is specified for an offence committed after 1 February 2003.1 If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.2 An offence under s 61J is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Alternative verdicts – By s 61Q(1A), if the jury is not satisfied of element (4), that is, the accused being in company, verdicts under either ss 61I or 61J are alternatives. By s 61Q(3) where the complainant is under 16 and the jury is not satisfied on the question of consent, there may be a verdict under either ss 66A or 66C. By s 61Q(5) where the complainant is cognitively impaired and the jury is not satisfied on the question of consent, there may be a verdict under s 66F. Section 61P provides for an alternative verdict of attempt, as does s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. For related provisions and cross-references, see [CA.61I.40]. 1 Section 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999,. 2 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 .
[CA.61JA.60]
Elements of the offence under s 61JA
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) without the consent of the complainant; (3) knowing that the complainant did not consent; and (4) who was in the company of another or others; and
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SECTION 61JA COMMENTARY
Crimes Act 1900 s 61K
[CA.61JA.60]
(5) who either: (a) at the time of (or immediately before or after) the commission of the offence, intentionally (or recklessly) inflicts actual bodily harm on the complainant (or on another who was present – or nearby); or (b) at the time of (or immediately before or after) the commission of the offence, threatened to inflict actual bodily harm on the complainant (or on another who was present – or nearby) by means of an offensive weapon (or instrument); or (c) deprived the complainant of her (or his) liberty for a period before (or after) the commission of the offence. [CA.61JA.80]
Element (1) Sexual intercourse
For commentary on element (1), see [CA.61I.100]. [CA.61JA.100]
Element (2) Without consent
For commentary on the absence of consent, see [CA.61HA.20]–[CA.61HA.100] and also [CA.61I.120]. If the complainant was a child under 16 years at the relevant time and the prosecution charges an accused with an offence under s 61JA(1), the jury must still be satisfied both that the child did not consent and that the accused knew this: McGrath v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 527; [2010] NSWCCA 48 at [11].1 1 Section 77, which provides that the consent of a child under 16 years is no defence to certain charges, does not apply to s 61J(1).
[CA.61JA.120]
Element (3) Knowing there was no consent
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For commentary on the accused’s knowledge of the absence of consent, see [CA.61HA.100] and [CA.61I.140]. [CA.61JA.140]
Element (4) In company
For commentary on the meaning of the accused being in company, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(c). [CA.61JA.160]
Element (5) Infliction of injury etc or deprivation of liberty
“Immediately before or after”, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(a). “Intentionally”, see [CLP.80]. “Recklessly”, see [CA.4A.40]. “Actual bodily harm”, see [CA.59.100]. “Offensive weapon or instrument” is defined in s 4. See also the authorities referred to at [CA.4.200], [CA.33B.120] and [CA.97.120]. “Deprivation of liberty”, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(i). 61K
Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse
Any person who, with intent to have sexual intercourse with another person: (a) intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the other person or a third person who is present or nearby, or (b) threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the other person or a third person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [S 61K am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 61K COMMENTARY
[CA.61K.20]
Indictment
Section 61K(a): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did intentionally (or recklessly) inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on EF who was then present – or on EF who was then nearby) with intent to have sexual intercourse with CD. Section 61K(b): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did threaten to inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on EF who was then present – or on EF who was then nearby) by means of an offensive weapon (or an offensive instrument) with intent to have sexual intercourse with CD. [CA.61K.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. An attempt to commit an offence under s 61K carries the same penalty as the completed offence, see s 61P
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If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.1 An offence under s 61J is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Other cross-references: • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Generally, inadmissibility of evidence concerning a complainant’s sexual experience, s 293 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 1 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61K.60]
Elements of the offences under s 61K
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally (or recklessly) inflicted actual bodily harm upon the complainant (or upon a third party present or nearby); (2) with intent to have sexual intercourse with the complainant. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) threatened to inflict actual bodily harm upon the complainant (or upon a third party present or nearby) by means of an offensive weapon (or an offensive instrument); (2) with intent to have sexual intercourse with the complainant. [CA.61K.80]
Element (1) s 61K(a) Intentional or reckless infliction of harm
“Intentionally”, see [CLP.80]. “Recklessly”, see [CA.4A.40]. “Actual bodily harm”, see [CA.59.100].
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Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.61K.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.61K.40] Elements of the offences under s 61K ............................................................................................ [CA.61K.60] Element (1) s 61K(a) Intentional or reckless infliction of harm ....................................................... [CA.61K.80] Element (1) s 61K(b) Threat of infliction of actual bodily harm ..................................................... [CA.61K.100] Element (2) With intent to have sexual intercourse ....................................................................... [CA.61K.120]
Crimes Act 1900 s 61L
[CA.61K.80]
[CA.61K.100]
Element (1) s 61K(b) Threat of infliction of actual bodily harm
In any given case, a question of whether a third party was “nearby” is a question of fact for the jury. “Offensive weapon or instrument” is now defined in s 4 in terms that reflect this idea. See also the authorities referred to at [CA.4.200], [CA.33B.120] and [CA.97.120]. Two authorities consider threats to inflict actual bodily harm upon the complainant by means of an offensive weapon (or an offensive instrument): R v Tout (1987) 11 NSWLR 251; (1987) 32 A Crim R 358 (NSW CCA) and R v RJS (1993) 31 NSWLR 649; 69 A Crim R 163. For commentary on these cases, see [CA.61J.140]. [CA.61K.120]
Element (2) With intent to have sexual intercourse
“Sexual intercourse”, see s 61H . “Intent”, see [CLP.80]. 61L
Indecent assault
Any person who assaults another person and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 61L insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 61L COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................. [CA.61L.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ...................................................................... [CA.61L.40] Elements of the offence under s 61L ............................................................................................... [CA.61L.60] Element (1) Assault .......................................................................................................................... [CA.61L.80] Element (2) Act of indecency ......................................................................................................... [CA.61L.100]
[CA.61L.20]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD and at the time of (or immediately before or immediately after) such assault, committed an act of indecency on CD (or in the presence of CD). [CA.61L.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
A charge under s 61L is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.1 An offence under s 61J is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Related provisions: • Section 61M – aggravated indecent assault,. • Section 61N – act of indecency. • Section 61O – aggravated act of indecency,. 1 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520].
[CA.61L.60] Elements of the offence under s 61L The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted the complainant; and
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(2) at the time thereof (or immediately before or immediately after) committed an act of indecency on the complainant (or in the presence of the complainant).
In practical terms, and depending upon the circumstances, proof of elements (1) or (2) above, may involve specific proof of one or more of the following: (1) Assault – this may be: (a) a physical assault, where the touching is also the act of indecency; or (b) an act causing the victim to apprehend a physical assault, combined with an act of indecency. (2) The assault must be intentional, or (at least theoretically) reckless. (3) Unless the victim is under the age of 16 years, the prosecution must prove that the victim did not consent, and that the accused either knew the victim did not consent, or was reckless as to the question of consent. Where the victim was under 16, there is no question of consent. (4) The act done must have been without lawful excuse. (5) To be capable of being considered indecent, determined objectively, according to ordinary community standards, the accused’s act must have a sexual connotation. (6) If the sexual connotation is obvious then no actual proof of a motive of sexual gratification is necessary. But if not obvious, the prosecution must prove that the accused had a motive of sexual gratification.
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[CA.61L.80]
Element (1) Assault
Assault (1) by battery, or, (2) by the threat of it – generically, the component elements of an assault are that the accused: (a) touched, struck or applied force to another (battery), or, threatened to do so; (b) intentionally or recklessly; (c) without consent; (d) without lawful excuse. For detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.20]–[CA.61.180]. An indecent assault is an assault that is itself indecent or is accompanied by circumstances of indecency.1 It usually consists of a battery,2 constituted by “any intentional touching of another person without the consent of that person and without lawful excuse.”3 No hostility, or hostile intent need by shown.4 Less often, the assault consists not of physical contact but “merely of conduct which causes the victim to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence.”5 Although for a non-physical assault, some “hostility” must be shown (so as to cause apprehension in the victim), the threat of some indecent touching is enough to satisfy this requirement.6 The assault and the act of indecency are often the same act – an indecent assault is an assault aggravated by the act of indecency.7 To establish a charge of indecent assault, it is not necessary that there should be an assault of some kind, and an independent act of indecency – the assault and the act of indecency may be one and the same act,8 as is frequently the case.9 Act of indecency without an assault – if there is an act of indecency but no assault, then there will be no offence of indecent assault, as for example where an accused commits no act in the nature of an assault himself, but induces a compliant child to commit an act of indecency on the accused himself.10 In this kind of event, there may be a charge of an act of indecency under s 61N. Intentionally or recklessly – the prosecution must prove an intentional assault. Concerning recklessness, it is difficult to imagine how someone could commit an indecent assault recklessly, given that, as set out in
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In R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62 at [21], Barr J observed that “The offence created by s 61L Crimes Act is commonly called indecent assault, but that name disguises the true nature of the offence, which is constituted by two elements, namely an assault and a contemporaneous act of indecency.”
Crimes Act 1900 s 61L
[CA.61L.80]
[CA.61L.100] below, it must be also proven that the person at least intended that his action was capable of being considered objectively sexually indecent.11 However, recklessness can be important as to the question of the victim’s consent. Indecent assault is not an offence of specific intent for the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication), and evidence of an accused’s intoxication is irrelevant to the question of intent, see s 428D.12 Without consent – As with sexual intercourse without consent, in a case of indecent assault upon a complainant 16 years of age or more, the prosecution must prove not only that the complainant did not consent to the assault,13 but also that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting or was reckless as to consent.14 Either advertent recklessness or inadvertent recklessness ([consent] “didn’t enter my mind”) will suffice for proof of knowledge of lack of consent,15 and see [CA.61HA.100]. Jury directions on recklessness should only be given if recklessness is a real issue.16
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By s 77, where the complainant is a child under 16, the child’s consent is no defence.17 In such a case, it is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove an “assault” in the ordinary legal meaning of the term – that is to say, an act done without the consent or against the will of the person “assaulted”. All that must be proved is an act done to the complainant which would have amounted to an “assault” within its ordinary meaning if it had been done without consent or against the complainant’s will.18 1 Beal v Kelley [1951] 2 All ER 763; 35 Cr App R 128 per Lord Goddard CJ. See also R v Johnson [1968] SASR 132. 2 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 41 (AC) per Lord Ackner. 3 Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 WLR 1528; 3 All ER 468; (1981) 74 Cr App R 1 at 1534 (WLR) per Lord Lane CJ, applied in R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 41 (AC) per Lord Ackner and in Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 192 (NSWLR); 340 (A Crim R) per Sheller JA, at 200 (NSWLR); 348 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 4 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 25 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 201 (NSWLR); 350 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 5 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 41 (AC) per Lord Ackner. An example of an assault without the victim being touched is R v Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr App R 4 where the accused exposed himself to the complainant and moved towards her, inviting her to have a “connection” with him, but without touching her. This was held to amount to an assault. 6 Historically, it must be shown that the accused’s conduct was “angry, revengeful, rude, insolent or hostile”: Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29 at 25 (CLR) per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ quoting W Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1st ed, 1716), ch LXII, s2, p134; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 201 (NSWLR); 350 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. Conduct done for sexual gratification will be “insolent”: Boughey at 39 (CLR) per Brennan J. 7 R v Schloss (1897) QCR 337; (1897) 8 QLJ 21 (Qld SC FC) per Griffith CJ. In R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62 at [25], Barr J remarked that “All that that offence requires is an assault which has a particular quality, namely that of being an indecent act.” 8 R v Sorlie (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 532; 42 WN (NSW) 152; approved in Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 186–187 (NSWLR); 335 (A Crim R) per Kirby A-CJ, at 191–192 (NSWLR); 340 (A Crim R) per Sheller JA and at 202 (NSWLR); 350 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 9 Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 202 (NSWLR); 351 (A Crim R) per Cole JA. 10 Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834; (1951) 35 Cr App R 138; R v Burrows [1952] 1 All ER 58; (1951) 35 Cr App R 180; DPP v Rogers [1953] 1 WLR 1017; [1953] 2 All ER 644; (1953) 37 Cr App R 137; Riseley v The Queen [1970] Tas SR 41 (CCA). 11 See the observations of Lord Griffiths in R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 (HL) at 34 and 35 (AC). 12 Attorney-General v Curran [2004] NSWCCA 234 at [15]. 13 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74 at 75; 80; R v Burt (2003) 140 A Crim R 555; [2003] NSWCCA 248 at [76], [80] per Wood CJ at CL; NWL v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 67 at [93].
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[CA.61L.100]
Element (2) Act of indecency
Meaning of act of indecency – the indecency s 61L is concerned with is sexual indecency1 and to be indecent, an assault must have a sexual connotation.2 What constitutes sexual indecency is to be determined objectively by the jury3 according to the jury’s view of prevailing community standards of decency.
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In the unreported judgment of R v Manson, Gleeson CJ said “An indecent act is one which right-minded persons would consider to be contrary to community standards of decency.”4 It has been judicially observed that community standards are those of the time in question, which may change over the years.5 Clear sexual connotation – evidence of motive not required – Where the motive or purpose of sexual gratification is obvious, this alone is sufficient to give the necessary sexual connotation so as to make the act capable of being held indecent without actual proof of this motive.6 If an assault has a clear sexual connotation, it can be an indecent assault, even though the accused’s motive is something other than sexual gratification. For example, in R v Court, Lord Griffiths said: … in the context of indecent assault, the necessary intent is to commit an assault which the jury as right-thinking people consider to be sexually indecent. The motive for such an act will usually be to obtain sexual gratification, but it need not necessarily be so. A man might strip a woman in public with the motive of obtaining sexual gratification or, alternatively, with the motive of revenge to humiliate her; but whichever his motive he would undoubtedly be guilty of indecent assault because his intentional stripping of her clothing is an indecent affront to her sexual modesty. Motive generally throws light on intention and is therefore admissible to prove intention.7 Of this same example, Lord Ackner said: Those very facts, devoid of any explanation, would give rise to the irresistible inference that the defendant intended to assault his victim in a manner which right-minded persons would clearly think was indecent. Whether he did so for his own personal sexual gratification or because, being a misogynist or for some other reason, he wished to embarrass or humiliate his victim, seems to me to be irrelevant.8 (emphasis supplied) Another case was R v Manson where the appellants were charged with acts of indecency from the taking of photographs of a naked 11year old girl. They said that their purpose was to protest against the abuse of females and argued that for this reason and because it was artistic, their conduct could not amount to an act of indecency. Gleeson CJ said: … I am of the view that the jury might have accepted the sincerity of the appellants and the explanation they gave of their purposes in taking these photographs, whilst at the same time convicting them of the offences in question. The fact that conduct is engaged in for political or artistic purposes does not throw around such conduct a kind of cordon sanitaire, producing the result that it cannot be illegal. It is entirely possible that a person might for political or artistic purposes, take a photograph of an act that a jury regards as an act of indecency. …
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14 R v Bonora (1994) 35 NSWLR 74 at 75; 80; Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 at 202–203 (NSWLR); 351 (A Crim R) per Cole JA; R v Burt (2003) 140 A Crim R 555; [2003] NSWCCA 248 at [76], [80] per Wood CJ at CL. 15 Fitzgerald v Kennard (1995) 38 NSWLR 184; 84 A Crim R 333 per Sheller JA at 195 (NSWLR); 343–344 (A Crim R) and per Cole JA at 202–206 (NSWLR); 351–354 (A Crim R). 16 R v Mueller (2005) 62 NSWLR 476; [2005] NSWCCA 47 at [3]–[4] and [42]. 17 R v Valence (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 138; (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 137 (CCA). 18 R v Valence (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 138; (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 137 (CCA); R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; 66 A Crim R 419.
Crimes Act 1900 s 61L
[CA.61L.100]
If, as in the present case, the act in question has an unequivocally sexual connotation the Crown does not have to prove that the act was done for the purposes of providing sexual gratification. On the other hand, the purpose for which an act is done may well be regarded by right-minded people as relevant to the question whether it is decent or indecent, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The fact that an act was done for artistic or political purposes may lead a jury to conclude that it was not indecent. On the other hand, it would certainly not require such a conclusion.″9 Equivocal sexual connotation and evidence of motive – there is the occasional case where a sexual connotation is not clear, in which case the prosecution must prove the accused’s motive of sexual gratification.10 An obvious example is a genital examination of an unconscious woman by a man who is a stranger. If carried out by a doctor for a proper medical purpose, no one would consider this indecent. But if done simply out of prurient interest, clearly it would be considered indecent.11 In R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221, the House of Lords considered the case of a man who spanked a girl on her bottom and, when asked why, said “I don’t know – buttock fetish”. Objectively viewed, the accused’s act was capable of both a sexually innocent interpretation and a sexually indecent interpretation. The issue was whether the evidence of motive was admissible. It was held that this evidence of motive threw light on the accused’s intent and was properly before the jury to assist them in deciding whether the act was objectively indecent.12 The contrary position was considered in R v Manson where it was said that evidence of a non-sexual motive is admissible to assist a jury in determining whether naked photographs of an 11 year old girl were in fact objectively indecent.
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Act incapable of being indecent despite indecent intent – if the circumstances of the assault are incapable of being regarded objectively as indecent, then even an undisclosed indecent intention of the accused cannot make the assault an indecent one.13 An example was R v George where the accused removed a shoe from a girl’s foot on a number of occasions and admitted he did so because it gave him a kind of perverted sexual satisfaction. It was held that none of these actions could possibly amount to an indecent assault.14 “Immediately before or after” – as already noted, the assault and the act of indecency are often the same act. But if there are two distinct acts involved, they need not occur within seconds or minutes of each other, and the whole of the circumstances must be considered.15 The phrase “immediately after” was considered in R v Attard in the context of a fatal shooting after a robbery.16 The trial judge elaborated little on the meaning of “immediately after” and said that there was no hard and fast rule as to its meaning and that what was involved was a question of fact and degree for the jury to determine. On appeal, it was held that these directions were perfectly adequate. “In the presence of” – in R v Francis (1989) 88 Cr App R 127, it was held that a man who masturbated in the presence of two thirteen year old boys in the change room at a swimming pool, knowing they were watching and derived sexual satisfaction from that fact could be said to be committing an act of gross indecency towards the boys. In R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21 (NSW CCA), it was held that similar considerations apply when a couple (even a married couple) engage in sexual intercourse not only in the presence of a young person, but when they also invited and encouraged the young person to watch them. If a victim is subjected to a battery indecent assault, the perpetrator will be criminally liable for it even if the victim is unaware of it.17 The position may be the same where the assault is a separate act to the act of indecency, but the victim is aware only of the former, not the latter. It has been held in the South Australian case of R v AWL that a man who took a photograph of himself naked with his erect penis placed on a pillow close to the head of a sleeping girl under 16 who was asleep with her head resting on the pillow, committed the offence of gross indecency in the presence of a girl under 16, even though she had no knowledge of his action.18 The offence was detected when the photograph was found in the man’s possession. He did not touch the girl in any way. The court said that the offence provision was intended to protect children in a wide variety of circumstances and that it is not necessary to prove either that a child comprehended the act, or saw it or was aware of it.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 61L
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1 In Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; 41 ALJR 402; [1968] HCA 6, Windeyer J at 390 (CLR) pointed out that the word indecent “sometimes denotes lewd forms of misbehaviour, but not always”. 2 R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296 (NSW CCA) Lee CJ at CL at 301. See also R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993) and R v Stevens (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994). 3 R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993); R v McIntosh (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994). 4 R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993) per Gleeson CJ at 2–3 (Clarke JA and Sully J agreeing). Other authorities to this same effect are Purves v Inglis (1915) 34 NZLR 1051 at 1053; R v Valence (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 138; (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 137 (CCA); Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; 41 ALJR 402; [1968] HCA 6 per Windeyer J at 399 (CLR); R v Harkin at 299–301 (A Crim R). In R v Stringer (2000) 116 A Crim R 198; [2000] NSWCCA 293 Adams J, referring to Manson, noted at [56]: The test of indecency has been variously stated as whether the behaviour was unbecoming or offensive to common propriety (Harkin [citation given]) or an affront to modesty (Crowe v Graham [citation given]) or would offend the ordinary modesty of the average person (Moloney v Mercer [1971] 2 NSWLR 207). 5 Eades v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2010) 77 NSWLR 173; (2010) 203 A Crim R 136; [2010] NSWCA 241 at [40] per Campbell JA. 6 R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296 (NSW CCA) Lee CJ at CL at 301 (Wood and Matthews JJ agreeing). 7 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 35 (AC). 8 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 42–43 (AC). 9 R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993) per Gleeson CJ at 2 (Clarke JA and Sully J agreeing). 10 R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296 (NSW CCA) Lee CJ at CL at 301. See also R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993) and R v Stevens (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994). 11 This example was given by Lord Griffiths in R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 35 (AC). 12 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 per Lord Keith at 33 (AC), per Lord Fraser at 33 (AC), per Lord Griffiths at 35 (AC), per Lord Ackner at 43 (AC). 13 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 per Lord Ackner at 42 (AC). 14 R v George [1956] Crim LR 52, quoted by Lord Ackner in R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 at 42 (AC). 15 R v Hitchins [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; (1983) 9 A Crim R 238 at 324 (NSWLR) (a robbery/felony murder case). 16 R v Attard (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 April 1993). 17 R v Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 WLR 1071; [1988] 2 All ER 221 (HL) at 42 (AC) per Lord Ackner (with whom Lords Keith, Fraser and Griffiths agreed). 18 R v AWL [2003] SASC 416 at [11]–[12] per Debelle J (Prior and Bleby JJ agreeing). 19 R v Johnson [1968] SASR 132 (SA SC, Bray CJ) where the charge was brought under s 70 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
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In an earlier South Australian case, R v Johnson, an attendant at a reformatory for delinquent boys, who was not authorized to administer corporal punishment, punished two boys for misconduct by caning them on the buttocks. At the same time, he behaved in an indecent manner but that behaviour was unseen by, and unknown to, the boys he was caning. The attendant was charged with indecent assault upon a male person.19 The court held that although there was evidence to go to the jury that he had been guilty of common assault, as the indecent behaviour was not offered towards the boys there was no evidence to go to the jury on the charge of indecent assault. But s 61L does not require the “offering” of an act of indecency, simply that it was committed on or in the presence of the victim. It is suggested that had the attendant been charged in New South Wales under s 61L, he would clearly have been guilty.
Crimes Act 1900 s 61M
61M
[CA.61M.20]
Aggravated indecent assault
(1) Any person who assaults another person in circumstances of aggravation, and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (2) Any person who assaults another person, and, at the time of, or immediately before or after, the assault, commits an act of indecency on or in the presence of the other person, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years, if the other person is under the age of 16 years. [Subs (2) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
(3) In (a) (b) (c)
this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or [Repealed] the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (d) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (e) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment.
[Subs (3) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[4]; Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 61M am Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 61M COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................ [CA.61M.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ..................................................................... [CA.61M.40] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.61M.60] Element (1) Assault upon the complainant ..................................................................................... [CA.61M.80] Element (2) In circumstances of aggravation or complainant under 16 ....................................... [CA.61M.100] Element (3) Commission of an act of indecency .......................................................................... [CA.61M.120]
[CA.61M.20]
Indictment/charge
Section 61M(1): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD in circumstances of aggravation, namely that (see alternatives below) and at the time of (or immediately before or after) that assault, AB committed an act of indecency on (or in the presence of) CD. Alternative circumstances of aggravation: Section 61M(3)(a): AB was then in the company of another person or persons (namely EF etc or a person or persons unknown); Section 61M(3)(c): CD then was generally (or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of AB; Section 61M(3)(d): CD had a serious physical disability; Section 61M(3)(e): CD had a cognitive impairment. Section 61M(2): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD she/he then being under the age of 16 years and at the time of (or immediately before or after) that assault, AB committed an act of indecency on (or in the presence of) CD.
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[CA.61M.120] [CA.61M.40]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 61M
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
A charge under s 61M is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment,. If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.1 An offence under s 61M is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4.
CA
Related provisions, alternative verdicts and attempt: • Section 61I – sexual assault. • Section 61K – assault with intent to have sexual intercourse. • Section 61L – indecent assault. • Section 61N – act of indecency. • Section 61O – aggravated act of indecency. By s 61Q(1), alternative verdicts under ss 61I, 61L or 61N are available on a charge under s 61M. An attempt to commit an offence under s 61M carries the same penalty as the completed offence, see s 61P. 1 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61M.60]
Elements of the offence
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The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted the complainant; (2) in circumstances of aggravation, namely that (alternatives in s 61M(3)); or (2) the complainant then being under the age of 16 years; and (3) at the time of (or immediately before or after) that assault, committed an act of indecency on (or in the presence of) the complainant. [CA.61M.80]
Element (1) Assault upon the complainant
For detailed commentary on assault in the context of sexual offences, see [CA.61L.60]. [CA.61M.100]
Element (2) In circumstances of aggravation or complainant under 16
“In the company of another” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140]. “Under the authority” is defined in s 61H(2). For commentary on this phrase, see [CA.61H.20]. “Victim with serious physical disability” – this phrase is not defined, but its meaning is obvious. “Cognitive impairment” is defined in s 61H(1A). “Under the age of 16 years” – as to proof of age, see [CA.43.120]. [CA.61M.120]
Element (3) Commission of an act of indecency
For detailed commentary on the meaning of an act of indecency, see [CA.61L.80]. “Immediately before or after”, see [CA.61J.140]. “In the presence of”, for authorities on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61L.80].
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61N
61N
[CA.61N.20]
Act of indecency
(1) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person under the age of 16 years, or incites a person under that age to an act of indecency with or towards that or another person, is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. (2) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person of the age of 16 years or above, or incites a person of the age of 16 years or above to an act of indecency with or towards that or another person, is liable to imprisonment for 18 months. [Subs (2) insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[2]] [S 61N am Act 23 of 1995; Act 2 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1(3); insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61N COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................. [CA.61N.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.61N.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.61N.60] Element (1) Act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant or incitement .............................. [CA.61N.80] Element (2) Complainant below or above age 16 ......................................................................... [CA.61N.100] Element (3) Incitement with (or towards) the accused or another ................................................ [CA.61N.120]
[CA.61N.20]
Indictment/charge
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Act of indecency: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did commit an act of indecency with (or towards) CD, the said CD being under the age of 16 years (or being aged 16 years or above). Incitement to an act of indecency: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did incite CD to an act of indecency with (or towards) the said AB (or with EF), (or towards EF), the said CD being under the age of 16 years (or being aged 16 years or above). The words “with or towards” in s 61N were considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Orsos (1997) 95 A Crim R 457 where it was held that to commit an act of indecency “with” a person involves two participants whereas logically and grammatically, one person may commit an act of indecency “towards” another. Section 61N therefore establishes different offences and to charge them in a single count would render the count bad for duplicity. There are other decisions to the same effect, see [CA.61N.80]. [CA.61N.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
A charge under s 61N is a Sch 1 Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.1 An offence under s 61N is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Related provisions: • Section 61L – indecent assault. • Section 61M – aggravated indecent assault. • Section 61O – aggravated act of indecency.
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s 61N
An attempt to commit an offence under s 61N carries the same penalty as the completed offence, see s 61P. 1 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61N.60]
Elements of the offences
Act of indecency:
CA
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) committed an act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant; (2) the complainant being under the age of 16 years; or (2) the complainant being aged 16 years or above. Incitement to an act of indecency: The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) incited the complainant to an act of indecency; (2) the complainant being under the age of 16 years; or (2) the complainant being aged 16 years or above; (3) with (or towards) the accused (or with a third party), (or towards a third party). [CA.61N.80]
Element (1) Act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant or incitement
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Act of indecency – The test of indecency has been variously stated as whether the behaviour was unbecoming or offensive to common propriety (R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296) or an affront to modesty (Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; 41 ALJR 402; [1968] HCA 6) or would offend the ordinary modesty of the average person (Moloney v Mercer [1971] 2 NSWLR 207).1 In Manson, Gleeson CJ said: An indecent act is one which right-minded persons would consider to be contrary to community standards of decency. In Purves v Inglis (1915) 34 NZLR 1051 at 1053] … the following was said: “The word indecent has no definite legal meaning and it must be taken therefore in its modern and popular affectation. In the Standard Dictionary indecent is defined to be anything that is unbecoming or offensive to common propriety.”2 An act of indecency must have a sexual connotation, see commentary at [CA.61L.80]. Where a clear sexual connotation exists, evidence of a motive of sexual gratification is not required; but it is otherwise where any sexual connotation is equivocal, see [CA.61L.80]. If an act is incapable of being objectively regarded as indecent, it will not be indecent, even if prompted by an undisclosed indecent intention, see [CA.61L.80]. Concerning an earlier similar section to s 61N, it was held by a High Court majority that despite the literal meaning of the words “act of indecency”, these words in this context do not include an actual indecent assault or carnal knowledge.3 “With or towards” – as noted at [CA.61N.20], the decisions in R v Orsos and other cases make it clear that an act of indecency with a person is a different offence from an act of indecency towards a person.4 When the offence is charged as being one of committing an act of indecency “with” a person, it will be necessary that there be proved some form of participatory conduct by the complainant with the accused (whether voluntary or not).5 An act of indecency “towards” another is committed by a person who acts indecently towards a non-participant.6 A man who masturbated in the presence of children knowing they were watching committed an act of indecency “towards” the children.7 A married couple who engage in consensual sexual intercourse obviously do not commit an act of indecency, however if they engage in that conduct in the presence of a child and invite the child to watch then they commit an act of indecency “towards” the child.8 With the
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Crimes Act 1900 s 61N
[CA.61N.80]
related offence of indecent assault, there are cases that hold that a perpetrator will be criminally liable for such an assault even if the victim is unaware of it, see [CA.61L.80]. “Towards” and proximity – R v Barrass held that the offence of committing an act of indecency “towards” a person does not require that the relevant act of indecency be committed in the immediate physical presence of the victim.9 There is nothing in the legislation that requires immediate presence, although most offences will be committed when the complainant and the accused are in close proximity. In Barrass, an offender’s intended exposure and manipulation of his penis in the view of the complainants whilst they were in separate motor vehicles sufficiently made out the element of being “towards” those complainants. Non-proximate acts of indecency or incitements thereto by electronic means such as the telephone have been judicially considered. R v Chonka involved a man posing as a doctor who phoned various girls and, inter alia, told them to perform various indecent acts upon themselves or others. Some of the girls did so. The majority, Fitzgerald JA and Ireland AJ, said that it was unnecessary to decide whether the accused’s suggestion to an 18 year old girl that she engage in auto-erotic behaviour during a telephone call could constitute an indecent act “towards” him.10 Smart AJ however, said I would not doubt that an act of indecency could be directed towards a person over the telephone or by other means not involving the act of indecency being carried out in the personal presence of the other person. This would apply even more strongly in the case of incitement to an act of indecency.
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Smart AJ said that telephone and electronic methods of communication must be taken into account.11 This view was taken one step further by James J in DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352, a case where an 18 year old man asked his 13 year old girlfriend to send a nude photograph of herself to him by mobile phone – and she did so. James J said that he saw no reason why an act of indecency incited by the defendant could not have been “towards” the defendant, even though the act of indecency incited would not be performed by the 13 year old girl in either the physical or even in the audible presence of the defendant.12 Incitement to an act of indecency – In the Victorian case of R v Massie, Brooking JA said: The word “incite” is an ordinary English word. Common forms of behaviour covered by the word are: “command”, “request”, “propose”, “advise”, “encourage” or “authorise”. One can thus incite a crime by words or by acts which have any of these tendencies.13 In Young v Cassells, Stout CJ said the “word ‘incite’ means to rouse; to stimulate; to urge or spur on; to stir up; to animate.”14 Concerning the mens rea of incitement in this context, it was pointed out in R v Chonka at [50] that the prosecution had to prove that the accused actually intended that his words of incitement would in fact bring about an act of indecency: The suggestion might be intentionally (i.e. deliberately) made without any intention that it be acted upon; for example, a suggestion intentionally made might be ironic or vulgar abuse. Before the appellant could be convicted, the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he intended the complainants to engage in the sexual activity which he suggested with the persons whom he identified (or was recklessly indifferent to whether or not they did so). Concerning the actus reus of incitement, in R v Eade, Smart AJ said: It was pointed out in Assistant Recorder of Kingston [1969] 2 QB 58 at 62; (1968) 53 Cr App R 96 at 98 that with the offence of incitement it is merely the incitement which constitutes the offence and that it matters not that no steps have been taken towards the commission of the substantive offence nor whether the incitement had any effect at all.15 Similarly in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Eades, James J commented that “in an offence of incitement the relevant act is the act which the other person was incited by the defendant to perform and not any act which may have actually been performed by the other person.”16
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s 61O
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1 See R v Stringer (2000) 116 A Crim R 198; [2000] NSWCCA 293 (NSWSC Adams J). 2 R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA, 17 February 1993). 3 Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1; 65 ALJR 402; 54 A Crim R 183; 100 ALR 193 at 27 (CLR); 201 (A Crim R) per McHugh (with whom Toohey J agreed) and Gaudron J at 16 (CLR); 194 (A Crim R) who agreed with this construction. 4 R v Orsos (1997) 95 A Crim R 457 (NSW CCA). See also R v Preece [1977] QB 370; [1976] 2 WLR 749; [1976] 2 All ER 690 at 375–376 (QB); R v Page (unreported, CCA (NSW), 25 November 1991); Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; (2000) 117 A Crim R 222; [2000] HCA 60 at [59]–[63]; R v Chonka [2000] NSWCCA 466; DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352 (James J). 5 Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161; (2000) 117 A Crim R 222; [2000] HCA 60 at [59]–[63]. See also R v Orsos (1997) 95 A Crim R 457 and R v Preece [1977] QB 370; [1976] 2 WLR 749; [1976] 2 All ER 690. 6 R v Chonka [2000] NSWCCA 466 at [46] per Fitzgerald JA (Ireland AJ agreeing); R v Page (unreported, CCA (NSW), 25 November 1991). 7 R v Francis (1989) 88 Cr App R 127 applied in R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21 at [65]. See also R v Barrass [2005] NSWCCA 131. 8 R v Gillard (1999) 105 A Crim R 479; [1999] NSWCCA 21 9 R v Barrass [2005] NSWCCA 131 10 R v Chonka [2000] NSWCCA 466 at [47]. 11 Chonka at [63]. In R v Barrass [2005] NSWCCA 131 at [29], Hidden J, who delivered the principal judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, said he agreed with the observation of Smart AJ “to the extent that it conveys that immediate presence is not required.” 12 DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352 at [53]. 13 R v Massie [1999] 1 VR 542; (1998) 103 A Crim R 551; [1998] VSCA 82 at 554 (VR); 564 (A Crim R) per Brooking JA (Winneke P and Batt JA agreeing). 14 Young v Cassells (1914) 33 NZLR 852 per Stout CJ. 15 R v Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390; [2002] NSWCCA 257 at [60]. See also R v Chonka [2000] NSWCCA 466 at [75] per Smart AJ and R v Zhan Yu Zhong (2003) 139 A Crim R 220; [2003] VSCA 56 at [18] per Buchanan J (Winneke P and Phillips JA agreeing). 16 DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352 at [6] per James J. 17 R v McIntosh (unreported, NSW CCA, 26 September 1994); DPP (NSW) v Eades [2009] NSWSC 1352 at [28] per James J.
[CA.61N.100]
Element (2) Complainant below or above age 16
As to proof of age, see [CA.43.120]. [CA.61N.120]
Element (3) Incitement with (or towards) the accused or another
“With or towards” is considered at [CA.61N.80]. The provision makes clear that the accused will be criminally liable if the victim is incited to an act of indecency not only with or towards the accused, but also with or towards a third party. 61O
Aggravated act of indecency
(1) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person under the age of 16 years, or incites a person under that age to an act of indecency with or towards that or another person, in either case in circumstances of aggravation, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (1A) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person of the age of 16 years or
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In determining whether an act which another person is incited by the accused to perform is an act of indecency, the court may take into account the surrounding circumstances, including the intent or purpose of the accused.17
Crimes Act 1900 s 61O
[CA.61O.20]
above, or incites a person of the age of 16 years or above to an act of indecency with or towards that or another person, in either case in circumstances of aggravation, is liable to imprisonment for 3 years. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[3]]
(2) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person under the age of 10 years, or incites a person under that age to an act of indecency with or towards that or another person, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (2) am Act 40 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2[1]]
(2A) A person: (a) who commits an act of indecency with or towards a person under the age of 16 years, or incites a person under the age of 16 years to an act of indecency with or towards that person or another person, and (b) who knows that the act of indecency is being filmed for the purposes of the production of child abuse material, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (2A) am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[1]; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
(3) For the purposes subsections (1) and (1A), circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or (b) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (c) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (d) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (3) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[6]; Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2A): (a) child abuse material has the meaning given by Division 15A, and (b) an act of indecency is being filmed if one or more images (whether still or moving) of the act of indecency are being recorded or transmitted for the purpose of enabling those images to be observed by any person (whether during the filming or later). [Subs (4) am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[1]; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[7]] [S 61O am Act 9 of 2010; Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; Act 40 of 1999; Act 23 of 1995; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61O COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................ [CA.61O.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ..................................................................... [CA.61O.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.61O.60] Element (1) Act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant or incitement .............................. [CA.61O.80] Element (2) Age of complainant .................................................................................................... [CA.61O.100] Element (3) Circumstances of aggravation and filming ................................................................ [CA.61O.120]
[CA.61O.20]
Indictment/charge
Act of indecency in circumstances of aggravation: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did commit an act of indecency with (or towards) CD, (s 61O(1)) the said CD then being under the age of 16 years and in circumstances of aggravation, namely
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that .......... (specify as per s 61O(3)), or (s 61O(1A)) the said CD then being of the age of 16 years or above and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify as per s 61O(3)), or (s 61O(2)) the said CD then being under the age of 10 years, or (s 61O(2A)) the said CD then being under the age of 16 years and the said AB knowing that the act of indecency was being filmed for the purposes of the production of child abuse material. That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did incite CD to an act of indecency with (or towards) the said AB (or with or towards a third party EF), (s 61O(1)) the said CD then being under the age of 16 years and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify as per s 61O(3)), or (s 61O(1A)) the said CD then being of the age of 16 years or above and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify as per s 61O(3)), or (s 61O(2)) the said CD then being under the age of 10 years, or (s 61O(2A)) the said CD then being under the age of 16 years and the said AB knowing that the act of indecency was being filmed for the purposes of the production of child abuse material. The words “with or towards” were considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Orsos (1997) 95 A Crim R 457 and in other authorities, see [CA.61N.20]. “With” and “towards” have the effect of prescribing different offences which must be separately charged.
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[CA.61O.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
Charges under s 61O(1) or s 61O(1A) are Sch 1 Table 2 offences under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have them dealt with on indictment. Charges under s 61O(2) or s 61O(2A) are Sch 1 Table 1 offences under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elects to have them dealt with on indictment. If dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see ss 267(2) and 268(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. If the complainant was under 18 years, the spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.1 An offence under s 61O is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Related provisions: • Section 61L – indecent assault. • Section 61M – aggravated indecent assault. • Section 61N – aggravated act of indecency. An attempt to commit an offence under s 61O carries the same penalty as the completed offence, see s 61P. 1 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.61O.60]
Elements of the offences
Act of indecency (with various circumstances of aggravation): The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) committed an act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant; (2) the complainant being under the age of 10 years (s 61O(2)); or (2) the complainant being under the age of 16 years (s 61O(1) or s 61O(2A)); or (2) the complainant being of the age of 16 years or above (s 61O(1A)); (3) (for charge under either (s 61O(1) or s 61O(1A)) in circumstances of aggravation, namely that
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Incitement to an act of indecency in circumstances of aggravation:
Crimes Act 1900 s 61P
[CA.61O.60]
.......... (specify); or (3) (for charge under s 61O(2A)) and knowing that the act of indecency was being filmed for the purposes of the production of child abuse material. Incitement to an act of indecency (with various circumstances of aggravation): The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) incited the complainant to an act of indecency with (or towards) the accused (or with or towards a third party); (2) the complainant being under the age of 10 years (s 61O(2)); or (2) the complainant being under the age of 16 years (s 61O(1) or s 61O(2A)); or (2) the complainant being of the age of 16 years or above (s 61O(1A)); (3) (for charge under either (s 61O(1) or s 61O(1A)) in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify); or (3) (for charge under s 61O(2A)) and knowing that the act of indecency was being filmed for the purposes of the production of child abuse material. [CA.61O.80]
Element (1) Act of indecency with (or towards) the complainant or incitement
For detailed commentary on the terms “act of indecency”, “with or towards” and “incitement” to an act of indecency, see [CA.61N.80]. [CA.61O.100]
Element (2) Age of complainant
As to proof of age, see [CA.43.120]. [CA.61O.120]
Element (3) Circumstances of aggravation and filming
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For commentary on the meaning of the various terms used in s 61O(3): “In company”, see [CA.61J.140]. “Under the authority”, see [CA.61H.20]. “Cognitive impairment” is defined in s 61H(1A), see [CA.61H.20]. “Serious physical disability” is not defined, but the meaning is obvious. “Child abuse material” as used in s 61O(2A)(b) is defined in s 91FB. “Filmed” is defined is defined in s 61O(4)(b). 61P
Attempt to commit offence under sections 61I–61O
Any person who attempts to commit an offence under section 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61K, 61L, 61M, 61N or 61O is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. [S 61P am Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61P COMMENTARY [CA.61P.20]
General
Generally as to attempts, see s 344A. It has been held in England that a prima facie case of attempted rape is sufficiently raised if there is evidence from which intent to rape could be inferred and acts were proved which a jury could properly
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regard as more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence; not incumbent on prosecution to prove that defendant physically attempted to penetrate the complainant’s vagina.1 1 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 1 WLR 274; 2 All ER 190; (1993) 96 Cr App R 298.
Alternative verdicts
(1) Question of aggravation If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61J, 61M or 61O the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 61I, 61L or 61N, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (1A) Question of aggravation in company If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61JA the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 61I or 61J, it may find the person not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
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(2) Question of consent regarding alleged victim under 16 If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61I the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66C(3) or 66C(4), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (2) am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
(3) Question of consent or authority regarding alleged victim under 16 If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61J or 61JA the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66A or 66C, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (3) am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
(4) Question of consent regarding incest If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61I or 61J the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 78A or 78B, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (5) Question of consent regarding cognitive impairment If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61I, 61J or 61JA, the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66F, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (5) insrt Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
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61Q
Crimes Act 1900 s 61Q
[CA.61Q.20]
(6) Question of whether offence committed for purposes of production of child abuse material If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 61O(2A) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 61O(2) or 61N, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (6) am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[2]; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[8]] [S 61Q am Act 9 of 2010; Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; Act 9 of 2003; Act 62 of 2001; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61Q COMMENTARY [CA.61Q.20]
Alternative verdicts in cases of sexual assault
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. 61R
Consent [Repealed]
[S 61R rep Act 66 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; am Act 9 of 2003; Act 62 of 2001; Act 2 of 1992; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
61S
Offenders who are minors
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(1) For the purposes of any offence, a person is not, by reason only of age, to be presumed incapable of having sexual intercourse with another person or of having an intent to have sexual intercourse with another person. (2) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of any law relating to the age at which a child can be convicted of an offence. [S 61S am Act 85 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1.2[1]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
61T
Offender married to victim
The fact that a person is married to a person: (a) upon whom an offence under section 61I, 61J, 61JA or 61K is alleged to have been committed is no bar to the firstmentioned person being convicted of the offence, or (b) upon whom an offence under any of those sections is alleged to have been attempted is no bar to the firstmentioned person being convicted of the attempt. [S 61T am Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[7]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 61T COMMENTARY [CA.61T.20]
General
The validity of a similar provision in South Australia has been upheld by the High Court.1 1 R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379; 66 ALJR 36; [1991] HCA 48.
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Circumstances of certain sexual offences to be considered in passing sentence
Where a person is convicted of: (a) both an offence under section 61I and an offence under section 61K, or (b) both an offence under section 61J and an offence under section 61K, or (c) both an offence under section 61JA and an offence under section 61K, whether at the same time or at different times, the Judge passing sentence on the person in respect of the two convictions or the later of the two convictions is required, if it appears that the two offences arose substantially out of the one set of circumstances, to take that fact into account in passing sentence. [S 61U am Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[8]; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
62
Carnal knowledge—proof [Repealed]
[S 62 rep Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[5]; am Act 7 of 1984; Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
63
Common law offences of rape and attempted rape abolished (1) The common law offences of rape and attempted rape are abolished.
(2) Parts 1A, 1 and 19 of Schedule 11 make provision with respect to rape and other former sexual offences. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[4]; Act 27 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3[2]; insrt Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[6]] [S 63 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 27 of 2003; Act 9 of 2003; subst Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(5); am Act 16 of 1955]
65
Attempt, etc to commit rape. [Repealed]
[S 65 rep Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(7)]
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65A Sexual intercourse procured by intimidation, coercion and other non-violent threats [Repealed] [S 65A rep Act 66 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 2(6)]
66
Procuring etc carnal knowledge by fraud [Repealed]
[S 66 rep Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[8]; am Act 94 of 1999]
66A
Sexual intercourse—child under 10
(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with a child who is under the age of 10 years is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for life. (2) A person sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence under this section is to serve that sentence for the term of the person’s natural life. (3) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 21 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (which authorises the passing of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life). (4) Nothing in this section affects the prerogative of mercy. [S 66A subst Act 13 of 2015, Sch 1[1]; am Act 27 of 2009; subst Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; am Act 90 of 2002; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(5)]
SECTION 66A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.66A.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.66A.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.66A.60] Elements of s 66A(1) ....................................................................................................................... [CA.66A.80]
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61U
s 66A
Crimes Act 1900 s 66A
[CA.66A.20]
Element (3) of s 66A(2) – circumstances of aggravation .............................................................. [CA.66A.100] Sentencing considerations ............................................................................................................. [CA.66A.120]
[CA.66A.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did have sexual intercourse, the said CD then being under the age of 10 years (and if appropriate: and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify circumstance as per s 66A(3)). [CA.66A.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily.1 A standard non-parole period of 15 years is specified for an offence under either s 66A(1) or (2) committed after 1 February 2003.2
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The spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.3 An offence under s 66A is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Alternative verdicts: By s 61Q(3), a verdict under s 66A is an alternative to a charge under ss 61J or 61JA. Section 66E(1) provides for various alternative verdicts to a charge under s 66A(1) and s 66E(2) provides for various alternative verdicts to a charge under s 66A(2). For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. Related provisions and cross-references: • Section 61O – aggravated act of indecency. • Section 66B – attempting, or assaulting with intent to have sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66C – sexual intercourse, child between 10 and 16 and s 66D – attempt. • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Common sexual assault trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]. • Prompt or delayed complaint by the complainant, see [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. 1 Offences under s 66A are not included as a Sch 1 Table 1 or Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. 2 Section 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518] 3 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520].
[CA.66A.60] Elements of the offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) the complainant being under the age of 10 years; (3) (under s 66A(2)) in circumstances of aggravation (as specified in one of the paragraphs in s 66A(3)). [CA.66A.80] Elements of s 66A(1) “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. For commentary on sexual intercourse, including intent in this context, see [CA.61I.100]. As to intention generally, see [CLP.1400]. Any purported consent of the child is no defence by s 77. Proof of age – the age of a child may be proved by various means.1 A statement by a child himself as to his own age is not admissible, because it must necessarily be founded upon hearsay.2 In sexual assault cases,
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evidence of the complainant’s date of birth is often given by the mother. Alternatively, evidence may be given by some other person who knows when the child was born.3 The child’s birth certificate may be tendered by virtue of s 49(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW); in this event, there should be evidence identifying the child with the person named in the certificate.4 In obvious cases, evidence may be given of appearance from which an inference of age can be drawn.5
1 As to the methods of proof of birth and age, see Justice Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence 7th ed (LexisNexis Butterworths 2004) at [41040]–[41065]. 2 R v Young [1923] SASR 35 (SA Sup Ct FC). 3 R v Young [1923] SASR 35 (SA Sup Ct FC). Examples include R v Weaver (1873) LR 2 CCR 85; 12 Cox CC 527 (grandmother present at birth); R v Hosgood (1884) 18 SALR 123 (sister); R v Hinckley (1886) 2 QLJ 182 (sister); R v Cox [1898] 1 QB 179 (teacher); R v Wilson (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 7; 31 WN (NSW) 12 (father). See also R v Tomes [1917] VLR 78 (employer). 4 R v Bellis (1911) 6 Cr App R 283; R v Rogers (1914) 10 Cr App R 276; R v Young [1923] SASR 35. 5 Sweeney v Denness (1954) 56 WALR 52 at 56 per Dwyer CJ. 6 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315.
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[CA.66A.100]
Element (3) of s 66A(2) – circumstances of aggravation
As to meaning of the following terms under s 66A(2): (a) “immediately before or after”, this is a question of fact, see [CA.61J.140]. (a) “actual bodily harm” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.59.100]. (a) “intentionally or recklessly”, as to intentionally, see [CLP.1400]; as to recklessly, see [CA.4A.40]. (a) “nearby” – whether a third person is “nearby” is a question of fact. Nearby is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 5th ed, 2002 as “Close at hand, neighbouring; not far off.” (b) “offensive weapon or instrument” is defined in s 4. See also the authorities referred to at [CA.4.200], [CA.33B.120] and [CA.97.120]. (c) “in the company of another” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(c). (d) “under the authority” is defined in s 61H(2). For commentary on this phrase, see [CA.61H.20] re s 61H(2). (e) “serious physical disability” – this phrase is not defined, but its meaning is obvious. (f) “cognitive impairment” is defined in s 61H(1A). (g) “took advantage” – the meaning of this expression was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in CTM v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 371; [2007] NSWCCA 131 where it was said at [56], in the context of an alleged sexual assault of a girl between the ages of 14 and 16 years contrary to s 66C(4) where the circumstance of aggravation was said to have been the accused taking advantage of the complainant’s intoxication by alcohol, that the jury should at least have been told that the accused must have known that the complainant was under the influence of alcohol and that the Crown had to prove that the accused knew that her intoxication affected her attitude to sexual intercourse, making it more likely that she would consent to it. In the context of s 66A(3)(g), it may be that the jury should be told that the accused knew that the child’s intoxication made it less likely that the child would resist, call out, complain or perhaps even remember.1 (g) “under the influence of alcohol or a drug” – for a person to be under the influence of alcohol or a drug, whether a child under 10 or otherwise, that person must have been affected in some way
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Evidentiary considerations – where the prosecution case relies solely on the evidence of the complainant, the jury should be instructed that the complainant’s evidence “must be scrutinised with great care” before a verdict of guilty is brought in.6 There is also s 165(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 which concerns a warning where evidence may be unreliable by reason of age, see [6.18720].
Crimes Act 1900 s 66A
[CA.66A.100]
by the alcohol or drug. Such affectation is a question of degree. The context of this phrase in s 66A(3)(g), including the words “in order to commit the offence”, suggests that the prosecution must prove that the child was intoxicated to a sufficient degree for the accused to make the calculation that because of that intoxication, he or she could have sexual intercourse with the child when, absent that intoxication, that could not be done, or at least, could not be done without significant risk of detection, or perhaps proof. (h) “deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(i). (i) “breaks and enters into any dwelling-house or other building” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(h). (i) “serious indictable offence” is defined in s 4 as being an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. “Indictable offence” is defined in s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 as an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment and commentary at [CPA.8.20]. 1 The Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision was overturned by the High Court in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25, but not on this point.
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[CA.66A.120]
Sentencing considerations
Relevant sentencing considerations include the following: (a) general deterrence should be a primary factor in sentencing for child sexual offences: R v Burchell (1987) 34 A Crim R 148 at 150–151 per Hunt J. (b) the age of the victim is an important consideration in determining the objective seriousness of an offence and whether it falls within the mid range: MLP v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 93; [2006] NSWCCA 271 at [22] per Kirby J. The younger the victim, the more serious the criminality: R v T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29; R v KNL (2005) 154 A Crim R 268; [2005] NSWCCA 260 at [42]. (c) in determining the objective seriousness of an offence, the nature and extent of penetration is a relevant consideration: RJA v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 178; [2008] NSWCCA 137; Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447; (1987) 27 A Crim R 465; [1987] HCA 46; R v Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15 at [66]. (d) other considerations are how the offences took place, over what period of time, with what degree of force or coercion, and the use of threats or pressure before or after the offence to ensure the victim’s compliance: R v AJP (2004) 150 A Crim R 575; [2004] NSWCCA 434 at [25] per Simpson J. (e) good character is of lesser weight in sentencing for sexual offences against children because it is often this factor that provides the offender with the opportunity to commit the offences. It is also of lesser weight where the offences occur over a lengthy period and involve a breach of trust: R v Woods (2009) 195 A Crim R 173; [2009] NSWCCA 55. Not all sexual offenders against children are adults and/or of full mental capacity. Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; 212 A Crim R 254; [2011] HCA 39 involved an appellant with a mental disability who was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10. The High Court said that in this case, retribution and denunciation did not require significant emphasis when determining the sentence and there was no requirement for general deterrence. The appropriate sentence for an offender who was himself less than 13 years old was considered in AEL v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 355; [2007] NSWCCA 97. Assistance to authorities may bring a discount in sentence and, in the case of an offender who admitted to a number of sexual offences against children when there was no other evidence against him on these charges, was held on appeal to be entitled to a combined sentencing discount of 40 per cent: R v Woods (2009) 195 A Crim R 173; [2009] NSWCCA 55.
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66B
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 66B
Attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with child under 10
Any person who attempts to have sexual intercourse with another person who is under the age of 10 years, or assaults any such person with intent to have sexual intercourse, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years.
SECTION 66B COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.66B.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.66B.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.66B.60] Element (1) Attempt or assault ........................................................................................................ [CA.66B.80] Element (2) Intent to have sexual intercourse ............................................................................... [CA.66B.100] Element (3) Under the age of 10 years ......................................................................................... [CA.66B.120] Sentencing for attempt ................................................................................................................... [CA.66B.140]
[CA.66B.20]
Indictment
Attempt to have sexual intercourse: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did attempt to have sexual intercourse with CD, the said CD then being under the age of 10 years. Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse:
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That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did assault CD with intent to have sexual intercourse with her/him, the said CD then being under the age of 10 years. [CA.66B.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily.1 No standard non-parole period is provided for an offence under s 66B.2 The spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.3 An offence under s 66B is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Related provisions: • Section 61O – aggravated act of indecency. • Section 66A – sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66C – sexual intercourse, child between 10 and 16 and s 66D – attempt. • Section 66D – attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16. • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Common sexual assault trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]. • Prompt or delayed complaint by the complainant, see [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. 1 Offences under s 66B are not included as a Sch 1 Table 1 or Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. 2 See s 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518] 3 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520].
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[S 66B am Act 90 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 2[2]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(5)]
Crimes Act 1900 s 66C
[CA.66B.40]
[CA.66B.60]
Elements of the offences
Attempt to have sexual intercourse: The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) attempted; (2) to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) the complainant being under the age of 10 years. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse: (1) assaulted the complainant; (2) with the intent to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) the complainant being under the age of 10 years. [CA.66B.80]
Element (1) Attempt or assault
For detailed commentary on what constitutes an attempt, see s 344A. For detailed commentary on assault in the context of sexual offences, see [CA.61L.60]. [CA.66B.100]
Element (2) Intent to have sexual intercourse
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. For commentary on sexual intercourse, including intent in this context, see [CA.61I.100]. As to intention generally, see [CLP.1400]. Any purported consent of the child is no defence by s 77. [CA.66B.120]
Element (3) Under the age of 10 years
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For commentary on proof of age, see [CA.66A.80]. [CA.66B.140]
Sentencing for attempt
In R v Taouk (1992) 65 A Crim R 387 (CCA NSW) (a non-sexual assault case), it was said “There is clearly an interrelationship between the seriousness of the intended consequences and the real prospects of having achieved them, and that relationship has to be weighed in each case in the light of all of the circumstances.” This statement was applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal in a case involving attempted sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years: R v McQueeney [2005] NSWCCA 168 at [25]. As to general sentencing principles concerning sexual offences against children, see [CA.66A.120]. 66C
Sexual intercourse—child between 10 and 16
(1) Child between 10 and 14 Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who is of or above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years is liable to imprisonment for 16 years. (2) Child between 10 and 14—aggravated offence Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who is of or above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years in circumstances of aggravation is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. (3) Child between 14 and 16 Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who is of or above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.
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(5) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby, or (b) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, or (c) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or (d) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (e) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (f) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment, or (g) the alleged offender took advantage of the alleged victim being under the influence of alcohol or a drug in order to commit the offence, or (h) the alleged offender deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty for a period before or after the commission of the offence, or (i) the alleged offender breaks and enters into any dwelling-house or other building with the intention of committing the offence or any other serious indictable offence. [Subs (5) am Act 27 of 2009, Sch 1.3[1]; Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[11]; Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
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[S 66C am Act 27 of 2009; Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; Act 38 of 2007; subst Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2[5]]
SECTION 66C COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.66C.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.66C.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.66C.60] Element (1) Sexual intercourse ....................................................................................................... [CA.66C.80] Element (2) Age of the complainant .............................................................................................. [CA.66C.100] Element (3) Circumstances of aggravation ss 66C(2) and (4) ...................................................... [CA.66C.120] Sentencing considerations ............................................................................................................. [CA.66C.140]
[CA.66C.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did have sexual intercourse with CD, the said CD then being of the age of 10 years (or alternatively, above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years), (or alternatively, of the age of 14 years), (or alternatively, above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years), (and if appropriate: and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify circumstance as per s 66C(5)). [CA.66C.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
These offences cannot be dealt with summarily, apart from an offence under s 66C(3) which may be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elects to have it dealt with on indictment.1
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(4) Child between 14 and 16—aggravated offence Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who is of or above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years in circumstances of aggravation is liable to imprisonment for 12 years.
Crimes Act 1900 s 66C
[CA.66C.40]
No standard non-parole period is provided for an offence under s 66C.2 The spouse of an accused can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.3 An offence under s 66C is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4. Alternative verdicts: Section 66E provides various alternative verdicts within the scope of charges brought under various subsections of ss 66A and 66C. By s 61Q(2), a verdict under either s 66C(3) or s 66C(4) is an alternative to a charge under s 61I. By s 61Q(3), a verdict under s 66C is an alternative to a charge under ss 61J or 61JA. For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100].
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Related provisions and cross-references: • Section 61I – sexual assault. • Section 61J – aggravated sexual assault. • Section 61JA – aggravated sexual assault in company. • Section 66A – sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66B – attempting, or assaulting with intent to have sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66D – attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16. • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Common sexual assault trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]. • Prompt or delayed complaint by the complainant, see [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. 1 Offences under s 66C (other than under s 66C(3)) are not included as a Sch 1 Table 1 or Table 2 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. An offence under s 66C(3) is included in Sch 1 Table 1 cl 1. 2 Section 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518]. 3 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520].
[CA.66C.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) had sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) the complainant being of the age of 10 years; or above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years; or of the age of 14 years; or above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years; (3) (under s 66C(2) or (4)) in circumstances of aggravation (as specified in one of the paragraphs in s 66C(5)). [CA.66C.80]
Element (1) Sexual intercourse
“Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. For commentary on sexual intercourse, including intent in this context, see [CA.61I.100]. As to intention generally, see [CLP.1400]. Consent – while in fact sometimes there is genuine consent by a child involved, legally by s 77, any consent or purported consent of the child is no defence. Lack of consent is not an element of a charge under s 66C. If in fact the child did not consent and the accused knew this, there will have been an offence under s 61I.
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s 66C
Element (2) Age of the complainant
Accused’s honest and reasonable mistake as to the complainant’s age – in CTM v The Queen (2008), the High Court considered whether a man charged under s 66C(3) with having sexual intercourse with a girl aged 15 could raise the common law ground of exculpation of honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the girl’s age. The majority held that an honest and reasonable belief that the other party to the sexual activity is above the age of 16 years is an answer to a charge of a contravention of s 66C(3).2 Although the burden of proving that an accused did not have such a belief will ultimately be on the prosecution, the evidential burden of establishing such a belief is in the first place upon the accused. This evidential burden will not be satisfied by a mere out of court assertion by the accused as to a belief that the complainant was aged 16 or more.3 In the joint judgment in CTM, it was pointed out that the greater the gap between the child’s true age and the age of 16 years, the less likely it may be, in practice, that such a belief was reasonable.4 There is no corresponding exculpatory belief by an accused that the complainant was of some lesser age than 16 years.5 Hayne J observed that if an issue is raised by an accused concerning an honest and reasonable belief that the other party is above the age of 16 years, this does not raise any issue of consent for the proof by the prosecution or for consideration by the jury.6
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Evidentiary considerations – where the prosecution case relies solely on the evidence of the complainant, the jury should be instructed that the complainant’s evidence “must be scrutinised with great care” before a verdict of guilty is brought in.7 There is also s 165(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 which concerns a warning where evidence may be unreliable by reason of age, see [6.18720]. 1 As to the methods of proof of birth and age, see Justice Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence 7th ed (LexisNexis Butterworths 2004) at [41040]–[41065]. 2 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 at [35] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ, at [66] per Kirby J, at [173] per Hayne; contra at [237] per Heydon J. 3 CTM at [39] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ, and at [179], [194] per Hayne J. 4 CTM at [27] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ. 5 CTM at [27] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Keifel JJ, and at [174] per Hayne J. 6 CTM at [175] per Hayne J. 7 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315.
[CA.66C.120]
Element (3) Circumstances of aggravation ss 66C(2) and (4)
As to meaning of the following terms under s 66C(5): (a) “immediately before or after”, this is a question of fact, see [CA.61J.140]. (a) “actual bodily harm” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.59.100]. (a) “intentionally or recklessly”, as to intentionally, see [CLP.1400]; as to recklessly, see [CA.4A.40]. (a) “nearby” – whether a third person is “nearby” is a question of fact. Nearby is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 5th ed, 2002 as “Close at hand, neighbouring; not far off.” (b) “offensive weapon or instrument” is defined in s 4. See also the authorities referred to at [CA.4.200], [CA.33B.120] and [CA.97.120]. (c) “in the company of another” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(c). (d) “under the authority” is defined in s 61H(2). For commentary on this phrase, see [CA.61H.20] re s 61H(2). (e) “serious physical disability” – this phrase is not defined, but its meaning is obvious. (f) “cognitive impairment” is defined in s 61H(1A).
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Proof of age – the age of a child may be proved by various means.1 For commentary on this topic, see [CA.66A.80].
Crimes Act 1900 s 66D
[CA.66C.120]
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(g) “took advantage” – the meaning of this expression was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in CTM v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 371; [2007] NSWCCA 131 where it was said at [56], in the context of an alleged sexual assault of a girl between the ages of 14 and 16 years contrary to s 66C(4) where the circumstance of aggravation was said to have been the accused taking advantage of the complainant’s intoxication by alcohol, that the jury should at least have been told that the accused must have known that the complainant was under the influence of alcohol and that the Crown had to prove that the accused knew that her intoxication affected her attitude to sexual intercourse, making it more likely that she would consent to it. In a case concerning a younger child, it may be that the jury should be told that the accused knew that the child’s intoxication made it less likely that the child would resist, call out, complain or perhaps even remember.1 (g) “under the influence of alcohol or a drug” – for a person to be under the influence of alcohol or a drug, that person must have been affected in some way by the alcohol or drug. Such affectation is a question of degree. The context of this phrase in s 66A(3)(g), including the words “in order to commit the offence”, suggests that the prosecution must prove that the child was intoxicated to a sufficient degree for the accused to make the calculation that because of that intoxication, he or she could have sexual intercourse with the child when, absent that intoxication, that could not be done, or at least, could not be done without significant risk of detection, or perhaps proof. (h) “deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(i). (i) “breaks and enters into any dwelling-house or other building” – for commentary on the meaning of this phrase, see [CA.61J.140] re s 61J(2)(h). (i) “serious indictable offence” is defined in s 4 as being an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. “Indictable offence” is defined in s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 as an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment and commentary at [CPA.8.20]. 1 The Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision was overturned by the High Court in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25, but not on this point.
[CA.66C.140]
Sentencing considerations
As to general sentencing principles concerning sexual offences against children, see [CA.66A.120]. 66D Attempting, or assaulting with intent, to have sexual intercourse with child between 10 and 16 Any person who attempts to commit an offence under section 66C upon another person who is of or above the age of 10 years, and under the age of 16 years, or assaults any such person with intent to commit such an offence, shall be liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. [S 66D insrt Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(5)]
SECTION 66D COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.66D.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references ...................................................................... [CA.66D.40] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.66D.60] Element (1) Attempted sexual intercourse or assault with intent .................................................... [CA.66D.80] Element (2) Age of the complainant .............................................................................................. [CA.66D.100] Element (3) (where applicable) Circumstances of aggravation ss 66C(2) and (4) ....................... [CA.66D.120]
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s 66D
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did attempt to have sexual intercourse with CD (or alternatively, did assault CD with intent to have sexual intercourse with CD), the said CD then being of the age of 10 years (or alternatively, then being above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years), (or alternatively, then being of the age of 14 years), (and if appropriate: and in circumstances of aggravation, namely that .......... (specify circumstance as per s 66C(5)). [CA.66D.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross references
If the complainant was aged 14 or above at the time of the alleged offence and either the prosecutor or the accused consents, a charge may be dealt with summarily. Otherwise, these offences must be prosecuted on indictment.1 No standard non-parole period is provided for offences under s 66C or attempts under s 66D.2 The spouse of an accused person can be compelled to give evidence without the accused’s consent.3 An offence under s 66C is a “personal violence offence” for the purposes of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, see s 4.
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Alternative verdict: Section 66E(5) provides for a verdict under s 66D as an alternative to a charge under s 66C. Section 66E(1) provides for a verdict under s 66D as an alternative to a charge under s 66A(1) or (2). For commentary concerning statutory and common law alternative verdicts and when the issue of a possible alternative verdict should be raised, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. Related provisions and cross-references: • Section 66A – sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66B – attempting, or assaulting with intent to have sexual intercourse with a child under 10. • Section 66C – sexual intercourse with a child between 10 and 16. • Table of provisions concerning procedure and evidence in sexual assault trials, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.80]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.160]. • Common sexual assault trial directions, see [CA.Pt3.Div10.180]. • Prompt or delayed complaint by the complainant, see [2.8830]–[CA.Pt3.Div10.660]. 1 See s 260 and Sch 1 Table 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.10960] and [4.13810]. 2 Section 54A and the Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, see [14.7512], [14.7518]. 3 Section 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see [4.11520].
[CA.66D.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) attempted to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; or (1) assaulted the complainant with intent to have sexual intercourse with her or him; (2) the complainant then being of the age of 10 years; or above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years; or of the age of 14 years; or above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years;
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(or alternatively, then being above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years),
Crimes Act 1900 s 66E
[CA.66D.60]
(3) (and, if applicable, under s 66C(2) or (4)) in circumstances of aggravation (as specified in one of the paragraphs in s 66C(5)). [CA.66D.80]
Element (1) Attempted sexual intercourse or assault with intent
For detailed commentary on what constitutes an attempt, see s 344A. For detailed commentary on assault in the context of sexual offences, see [CA.61L.60]. “Sexual intercourse” is defined in s 61H. For commentary on sexual intercourse, including intent in this context, see [CA.61I.100]. As to intention generally, see [CLP.1400]. Consent – lack of consent is not an element of a charge under s 66C or s 66D. While in fact there is sometimes genuine consent by a child involved, by s 77 legally any consent or purported consent of the child is no defence. [CA.66D.100]
Element (2) Age of the complainant
Proof of age – the age of a child may be proved by various means.1 For commentary on this topic, see [CA.66A.80]. Accused’s honest and reasonable mistake as to the complainant’s age – in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25, the High Court held that a man charged under s 66C(3) with having sexual intercourse with a girl aged 15 could raise the common law ground of exculpation of honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the girl’s age, see commentary at [CA.66C.100].
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Evidentiary considerations – where the prosecution case relies solely on the evidence of the complainant, the jury should be instructed that the complainant’s evidence “must be scrutinised with great care” before a verdict of guilty is brought in.2 There is also s 165(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 which concerns a warning where evidence may be unreliable by reason of age, see [6.18720]. 1 CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440; (2008) 185 A Crim R 188; [2008] HCA 25 2 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315.
[CA.66D.120]
Element (3) (where applicable) Circumstances of aggravation ss 66C(2) and (4)
As to meaning of the various terms under s 66C(5) as circumstances of aggravation, see [CA.66C.120]. 66E
Alternative verdicts
(1) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 66A the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66B, 66C(1), (2), (3) or (4) or 66D, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 66B, 66C(1), (2), (3) or (4) or 66D. The accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (1) am Act 13 of 2015, Sch 1[2]]
(2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 13 of 2015, Sch 1[3]]
(3) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 66C(2) or (4) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66C(1) or (3), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 66C(1) or (3). The accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (4) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 66C(1) or (2) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66C(3) or (4), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence
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under section 66C(3) or (4). The accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (5) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 66C the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 66D, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 66D. The accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 66E am Act 13 of 2015; subst Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; am Act 9 of 2003; Act 198 of 1989; insrt Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(5)]
[CA.66E.20]
CA
SECTION 66E COMMENTARY Alternative verdicts in cases of sexual assault
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. 66EA
Persistent sexual abuse of a child
(1) A person who, on 3 or more separate occasions occurring on separate days during any period, engages in conduct in relation to a particular child that constitutes a sexual offence is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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(2) It is immaterial whether or not the conduct is of the same nature, or constitutes the same offence, on each occasion. (3) It is immaterial that the conduct on any of those occasions occurred outside New South Wales, so long as the conduct on at least one of those occasions occurred in New South Wales. (4) In proceedings for an offence against this section, it is not necessary to specify or to prove the dates or exact circumstances of the alleged occasions on which the conduct constituting the offence occurred. (5) A charge of an offence against this section: (a) must specify with reasonable particularity the period during which the offence against this section occurred, and (b) must describe the nature of the separate offences alleged to have been committed by the accused during that period. (6) In order for the accused to be convicted of an offence against this section: (a) the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence establishes at least 3 separate occasions, occurring on separate days during the period concerned, on which the accused engaged in conduct constituting a sexual offence in relation to a particular child of a nature described in the charge, and (b) the jury must be so satisfied about the material facts of the 3 such occasions, although the jury need not be so satisfied about the dates or the order of those occasions, and (c) if more than 3 such occasions are relied on as evidence of the commission of an offence against this section, all the members of the jury must be so satisfied about the same 3 occasions, and (d) the jury must be satisfied that the 3 such occasions relied on as evidence of the commission of an offence against this section occurred after the commencement of this section.
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[CA.66EA.20]
(7) In proceedings for an offence against this section, the judge must inform the jury of the requirements of subsection (6). (8) A person who has been convicted or acquitted of an offence against this section may not be convicted of a sexual offence in relation to the same child that is alleged to have been committed in the period during which the accused was alleged to have committed an offence against this section. This subsection does not prevent an alternative verdict under subsection (10). (9) A person who has been convicted or acquitted of a sexual offence may not be convicted of an offence against this section in relation to the same child if any of the occasions relied on as evidence of the commission of the offence against this section includes the occasion of that sexual offence. (10) If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has, in respect of any of the occasions relied on as evidence of the commission of the offence against this section, committed a sexual offence, the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of that sexual offence. The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (11) Proceedings for an offence against this section may only be instituted by or with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions. (12) In this section:
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child means a person under the age of 18 years. sexual offence means any of the following: (a) an offence under section 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61K, 61L, 61M, 61N, 61O, 66A, 66B, 66C, 66D, 66F, 73, 74, 78H, 78I, 78K, 78L, 78N, 78O, 78Q or 80A, (b) an offence of attempting to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a), (c) an offence under the law of a place outside New South Wales that would, if it had been committed in New South Wales, be an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). [Subs (12) am Act 62 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[9]] [S 66EA am Act 62 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 131 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
SECTION 66EA COMMENTARY [CA.66EA.20]
Alternative verdict under s 66EA(10)
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. 66EB
Procuring or grooming child under 16 for unlawful sexual activity
(1) Definitions In this section: adult person means a person who is of or over the age of 18 years. child means a person who is under the age of 16 years. conduct includes: (a) communicating in person or by telephone, the internet or other means, or (b) providing any computer image, video or publication.
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s 66EB
unlawful sexual activity means an act that constitutes an offence under this Division or Division 10A, 15 or 15A (or, in the case of an act occurring outside this State, that would constitute such an offence if it occurred in this State). (2) Procuring children An adult person who intentionally procures a child for unlawful sexual activity with that or any other person is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: (a) in the case of a child who is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 15 years, or (b) in any other case—imprisonment for 12 years. (2A) Meeting child following grooming An adult person: (a) who intentionally meets a child, or travels with the intention of meeting a child, whom the adult person has groomed for sexual purposes, and (b) who does so with the intention of procuring the child for unlawful sexual activity with that adult person or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: (a) in the case of a child who is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 15 years, or (b) in any other case—imprisonment for 12 years.
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[Subs (2A) insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[14]]
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), a child has been groomed for sexual purposes by an adult person if, on one or more previous occasions, the adult person has engaged in conduct that exposed the child to indecent material. [Subs (2B) insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[14]]
(3) Grooming children An adult person: (a) who engages in any conduct that exposes a child to indecent material or provides a child with an intoxicating substance, and (b) who does so with the intention of making it easier to procure the child for unlawful sexual activity with that or any other person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: (a) in the case of a child who is under the age of 14 years—imprisonment for 12 years, or (b) in any other case—imprisonment for 10 years. (4) Unlawful sexual activity need not be particularised In any proceedings for an offence against this section, it is necessary to prove that the child was or was to be procured for unlawful sexual activity, but it is not necessary to specify or to prove any particular unlawful sexual activity. (5) Fictitious children A reference in this section to a child includes a reference to a person who pretends to be a child if the accused believed that the person was a child. In that case, a reference in this section: (a) to unlawful sexual activity includes a reference to anything that would be unlawful sexual activity if the person were a child, and (b) to the age of the child is a reference to the age that the accused believed the person to be.
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CA
[Def am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[13]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 66EB (6) Charge for aggravated offence The higher maximum penalty under subsection (2), (2A) or (3) in the case of a child under the age of 14 years does not apply unless the age of the child is set out in the charge for the offence. [Subs (6) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[15]]
(7) Defence It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against this section if the accused reasonably believed that the other person was not a child. (8) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against subsection (2) or (2A) the jury is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against subsection (3), the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against subsection (3). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (8) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[16]] [S 66EB am Act 105 of 2008; insrt Act 74 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
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66F
Sexual offences—cognitive impairment
(1) Meaning of “person responsible for care” For the purposes of this section, a person is responsible for the care of a person who has a cognitive impairment if the person provides care to that person: (a) at a facility at which persons with a cognitive impairment are detained, reside or attend, or (b) at the home of that person in the course of a program under which any such facility or other government or community organisation provides care to persons with a cognitive impairment. The care of a person with a cognitive impairment includes voluntary care, health professional care, education, home care and supervision. (2) Sexual intercourse: person responsible for care A person: (a) who has sexual intercourse with a person who has a cognitive impairment, and (b) who is responsible for the care of that person (whether generally or at the time of the sexual intercourse), is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (3) Sexual intercourse: taking advantage of impairment A person who has sexual intercourse with a person who has a cognitive impairment, with the intention of taking advantage of that person’s cognitive impairment, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 8 years. (4) Attempts A person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (2) or (3) is guilty of an offence and liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. (5) Consent not a defence for sexual intercourse The consent of a person who has a cognitive impairment is not a defence to a charge for an offence under subsection (2)–(4). (6) Consent not a defence for indecent assault or act of indecency The consent of a person who has a cognitive impairment is not a defence to a charge for an offence under section 61L, 61M(1), 61N(2) or 61O(1A) (or under section 61P in connection with such an offence) if: (a) the accused was responsible for the care of that person (whether generally or at the time of the conduct constituting the offence), or (b) the accused engaged in the conduct constituting the offence with the intention of taking advantage of that person’s cognitive impairment.
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[CA.66F.100]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 66F
CA
(7) Defences It is a defence to a charge for an offence under subsection (2)–(4) or an offence referred to in subsection (6) in which the prosecution relies on the operation of that subsection: (a) if, at the time of the conduct constituting the offence: (i) the accused did not know the person to whom the charge relates had a cognitive impairment, or (ii) the accused was married to the person to whom the charge relates or was the de facto partner of that person, or (b) if the act constituting the offence was carried out for any proper medical or hygienic purpose. [Subs (7) am Act 67 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(8) Approval of Attorney General for prosecution A prosecution for any of the following offences may not be commenced without the approval of the Attorney General: (a) an offence under subsection (2)–(4), (b) an offence referred to in subsection (6) in which the prosecution relies on the operation of that subsection. [S 66F am Act 67 of 2012; subst Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[4]; am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 2(7)]
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SECTION 66F COMMENTARY Approval of prosecution .................................................................................................................... [CA.66F.20] “Sexual intercourse” .......................................................................................................................... [CA.66F.40] Knowledge ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.66F.60] Consent ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.66F.80] Attempts .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.66F.100]
[CA.66F.20]
Approval of prosecution
The Director of Public Prosecutions may approve a prosecution under s 66F (Gazette 147, 23 September 1988). [CA.66F.40]
“Sexual intercourse”
As to the meaning of “sexual intercourse”, see s 61H. [CA.66F.60]
Knowledge
It has been said that the knowledge of the accused may be established by admissions, by proof of long standing acquaintance, or by the fact that the victim’s appearance made it obvious that he or she was intellectually disabled: the victim’s appearance is a proper matter for the jury to observe and consider.1 1 See R v Colgan (1958) 59 SR (NSW) 96; 76 WN (NSW) 41; R v Hudson [1966] 1 QB 448; [1965] 2 WLR 604; (1965) 49 Cr App R 69; R v Schell [1964] Tas SR 184.
[CA.66F.80]
Consent
The victim’s consent is no defence: see s 77. [CA.66F.100]
Attempts
For commentary as to attempts, see [CA.344A.20]–[CA.344A.140].
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Crimes Act 1900 s 73 Editor’s note: Sections 67–72A are repealed by Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(6), (7), (10) and (11) and have not been reproduced.
73
Sexual intercourse with child between 16 and 18 under special care
(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who: (a) is under his or her special care, and (b) is of or above the age of 16 years and under the age of 17 years, is liable to imprisonment for 8 years. (2) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person who: (a) is under his or her special care, and (b) is of or above the age of 17 years and under the age of 18 years, is liable to imprisonment for 4 years. (3) For the purposes of this section, a person (the victim) is under the special care of another person (the offender) if, and only if: (a) the offender is the step-parent, guardian or foster parent of the victim or the de facto partner of a parent, guardian or foster parent of the victim, or (b) the offender is a school teacher and the victim is a pupil of the offender, or (c) the offender has an established personal relationship with the victim in connection with the provision of religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the victim, or (d) the offender is a custodial officer of an institution of which the victim is an inmate, or (e) the offender is a health professional and the victim is a patient of the health professional. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (3) am Act 67 of 2012, Sch 1[2]]
(4) Any person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. (5) A person does not commit an offence under this section if the person and the other person to whom the charge relates were, at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, married to each other. [S 73 am Act 67 of 2012; subst Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 48 of 1987; Act 149 of 1985; subst Act 10 of 1924, s 5; am Act 2 of 1910]
SECTION 73 COMMENTARY Proceedings ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.73.20] Proof of age ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.73.40] Complaint ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.73.60] Consent .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.73.80] Conviction and sentencing ............................................................................................................... [CA.73.100]
[CA.73.20]
Proceedings
The offence may be tried in camera: s 291 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.11980]. [CA.73.40]
Proof of age
As to proof of age, see [CA.66A.80]. [CA.73.60]
Complaint
As to complaint, see [2.8830]ff.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
[CA.77.20] [CA.73.80]
s 77
Consent
Consent is no defence: s 77. [CA.73.100]
Conviction and sentencing
Upon the conviction of a father or step-father, he may be divested of authority over the female with whom the offence is committed: s 78D.
CA
The appropriate sentence for an offence committed by a step-father has been considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal.1 1 R v Clare [1984] 2 NSWLR 522; (1984) 14 A Crim R 322. See also R v Hermann (1988) 37 A Crim R 440.
Editor’s note: The following provisions are repealed and have not been reproduced: • Sections 74 and 75 by Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[12]. • Sections 76 and 76A by Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(8).
77
Consent no defence in certain cases
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(1) The consent of the child or other person to whom the charge relates shall be no defence to a charge under section 61E(1A), (2) or (2A), 61M(2), 61N(1), 61O(1), (2) or (2A), 66A, 66B, 66C, 66D, 66EA, 66EB, 67, 68, 71, 72, 72A, 73, 74 or 76A or, if the child to whom the charge relates was under the age of 16 years at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, to a charge under section 61E(1), 61L, 61M(1) or 76. [Subs (1) am Act 13 of 2015, Sch 1[4]; Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[17]; Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[5]; Act 74 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[13]; Act 131 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[4]; Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5); Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 2(9)]
(2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[14]; am Act 40 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2[2]; Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[5]; Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5)] [S 77 am Act 13 of 2015; Act 105 of 2008; Act 74 of 2008; Act 74 of 2007; Act 9 of 2003; Act 40 of 1999; Act 131 of 1998; Act 23 of 1995; Act 198 of 1989; Act 184 of 1987; subst Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 2(15); am Act 42 of 1981; Act 50 of 1974; subst Act 10 of 1924, s 5; am Act 2 of 1910]
SECTION 77 COMMENTARY Consent by child 14 or over ............................................................................................................... [CA.77.20] Consent .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.77.40] Accused’s opinion of girl’s age ........................................................................................................... [CA.77.60]
[CA.77.20]
Consent by child 14 or over
The present s 77 sets forth instances where the consent of the child may be raised as a defence. The section applies to all offences and courts: Sch 2, s 3. Where the case is tried before a judge and jury, it is for the jury to determine the facts, for example, whether the accused had reasonable cause to believe the prosecutrix was under 16 or over.1 The burden of proof is on the accused person on the balance of probabilities.2 For commentary as to “reasonable excuse”, see [CLP.80]. 1 Sparre v The King (1942) 66 CLR 149; [1942] HCA 19.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 77A
[CA.77.20]
2 R v Banks [1916] 2 KB 621; (1916) 12 Cr App R 74; R v Harrison [1938] 3 All ER 134; (1938) 26 Cr App R 166. See also R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; (1943) 29 Cr App R 76.
[CA.77.40]
Consent
For detailed commentary, see [CA.61H.20]–[CA.61HA.100]. [CA.77.60]
Accused’s opinion of girl’s age
The accused does not have to form the opinion that the girl is a particular age.1 1 R v Logan [1962] QWN 3.
77A
Proceedings in camera in certain cases [Repealed]
[S 77A rep Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[10]; am Act 142 of 1997; Act 115 of 1988; subst Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 3(2); am Act 149 of 1985; subst Act 42 of 1981, s 3 and Sch 1(10); insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
78
Limitation [Repealed]
[S 78 rep Act 2 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1(5); am Act 149 of 1985; Act 42 of 1981; subst Act 10 of 1924, s 5; am Act 21 of 1911]
78A
Incest
(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with a close family member who is of or above the age of 16 years is liable to imprisonment for 8 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, a close family member is a parent, son, daughter, sibling (including a half-brother or half-sister), grandparent or grandchild, being such a family member from birth. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 78A subst Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[15]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 149 of 1985; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 6]
SECTION 78A COMMENTARY Authority to prosecute ...................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.20] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.40] Proceedings ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.60] Consent ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.78A.80] General ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.100] Complaint ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.120] Age of offender ............................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.140] Sentencing ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.160] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.78A.180] General ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.200] Proof of age ................................................................................................................................... [CA.78A.220]
[CA.78A.20]
Authority to prosecute
The sanction of the Attorney-General must be obtained before a prosecution for incest can be commenced: s 78F. The consent must be obtained before the information is laid or the accused is charged.1 It is for the judge to decide whether the document evidencing consent is a sufficient compliance.2 An indictment alleging offences “on divers days” between two dates was criticised.3 1 McDonnell v Smith (1918) 24 CLR 409; [1918] HCA 26; cf R v Evans [1964] VR 717. 2 R v Harkins [1958] VR 543. See also R v Cullen [1951] VLR 335. 3 R v Thompson [1914] 2 KB 99; (1913) 9 Cr App R 252.
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[CA.78A.100] [CA.78A.40]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 78A
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) sexual intercourse between son and mother, brother and sister, father and daughter, or grand-father and grand-daughter; (2) whether the relationship is of the half or full blood and whether or not it is traced through lawful wedlock. Proceedings CA
[CA.78A.60]
Proceedings on this offence must be held in camera: s 78F. This includes an appeal.1 1 R v Priestley (1922) 16 Cr App R 143.
[CA.78A.80]
Consent
Consent is not a defence, but ignorance of the relationship is: s 78C. [CA.78A.100]
General
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Section 78A does not apply to step-parents and step-children.1 Section 35(1) of the New South Wales Adoption of Children Act 1965 equates the relationship arising from an adoption order to that of parent and child arising out of lawful wedlock. Section 35(4) provides that, notwithstanding s 35(1), for the purposes of any law of New South Wales relating to a sexual offence where the relationship between persons is relevant, an adoption order, or the discharge of an adoption order, does not cause the cessation of the relationship, and the relationship shall be deemed to exist in addition to any relationship that exists by virtue of the application of s 35(1).2 Where a man and woman are charged in separate counts of an indictment and are tried separately, the conviction of the man may be good though the woman is acquitted.3 The relationship of the parties may be proved by oral evidence or by certificates of marriage and birth,4 coupled with identification. It has been said that where proof of marriage is an essential ingredient in a criminal charge, such marriage must be strictly proved, and it is not sufficiently proved by admissions by the accused as to the marriage or by evidence of cohabitation or common repute.5 An accused may lead evidence in defence of his allegation that he did not know the prosecutrix was his daughter, even if such evidence tends to bastardise a child.6 If the prosecutrix consented to intercourse, she is an accomplice and therefore her evidence must be corroborated,7 but not if she merely submitted without a true consent.8 Evidence by the prosecutrix of other incestuous acts is admissible, but if such evidence is not corroborated, the jury should be warned against it.9 It has been held in England that it is a misdirection to tell the jury that they must first decide whether they believe the prosecutrix; they should be instructed not to make up their minds until they find that she is corroborated.10 Evidence that the parties lived together is admissible to rebut the defence of innocent association.11 Whether evidence of a similar act on a date remote to the date of the offence charged should be admitted is a matter for the discretion of the presiding judge.12 Where there is an issue as to the nature of the act done by the accused with or to another person, evidence is admissible of a series of similar acts between them, because human nature has a propensity to repetition and a series of acts are likely to bear the same characteristics.13 Generally as to corroboration in incest cases, see R v McKeon.14 Where the children had admitted to other persons that the evidence they gave against their father was false, it was held that the evidence of such other persons should have been admitted.15
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Crimes Act 1900 s 78A
[CA.78A.100]
In the appropriate case, the summing up should distinguish between the offence of incest and that of attempted incest.16 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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15 16
R v Geddeson (1906) 25 NZLR 323. Cf s 73 ante, and in Victoria, R v Frith [1914] VLR 658. See also R v Stanley (1903) 23 NZLR 1100. R v Gordon (1927) 19 Cr App R 20. See R v Rickards [1922] SASR 269. R v Umanski [1961] VR 242 where a “marriage” in Germany in 1950 was involved. The court reviewed the previous authorities – Morris v Miller (1767) 4 Bur 2057; Birt v Barlow 99 ER 113; (1779) 1 Doug KB 171 at 174 (Doug KB); R v Newton 174 ER 363; (1843) 2 Mood & R 503; R v Simmonite (1843) 1 Cox CC 30; R v Flaherty 175 ER 328; (1847) 2 Car & Kir 782; R v Rogerson (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 234; R v Savage (1876) 13 Cox CC 178; R v Lindsay (1902) 18 TLR 761; R v McLeod (1890) 11 LR (NSW) L 218; (1890) 7 WN (NSW) 36; R v Lindsay (1916) 30 DLR 417. Cf R v Jones (1934) 24 Cr App R 55; R v Hemmings [1939] 1 All ER 417; (1940) 27 Cr App R 46. R v Carmichael [1940] 1 KB 630; [1940] 2 All ER 165; (1940) 27 Cr App R 183. As to brother and sister, see R v Webber [1921] St R Qd 8. R v Stone (1911) 6 Cr App R 89. R v Dimes (1912) 7 Cr App R 43. R v Bloodworth (1914) 9 Cr App R 80. Cf R v Hartley [1941] 1 KB 5; (1943) 28 Cr App R 15. R v Draper (1930) 21 Cr App R 147. R v Ball [1911] AC 47; (1911) 6 Cr App R 31. See also R v Bloodworth (1914) 9 Cr App R 80. R v Hewitt (1925) 134 LT 157; (1927) 19 Cr App R 64. R v Sims [1946] 1 KB 531; (1946) 31 Cr App R 158. R v McKeon [1961] NSWR 249; (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 798. See also B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599; (1992) 63 A Crim R 225; [1992] HCA 68; R v B (1993) 66 A Crim R 192. R v Phillips (1938) 26 Cr App R 17. R v Kilbride (1932) 23 Cr App R 12.
[CA.78A.120] Complaint As to complaint, see [2.8830]ff. [CA.78A.140] Age of offender It appears that a boy under the age of 14 cannot be convicted of this offence1: see s 61S. 1 R v Waite [1892] 2 QB 600.
[CA.78A.160] Sentencing The question of sentencing has been given detailed consideration by the Court of Criminal Appeal.1 1 R v H (1980) 3 A Crim R 53. See also R v C [1982] Qd R 405; (1982) 6 A Crim R 128; R v Boyd [1984] WAR 236; (1984) 12 A Crim R 20; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1989) [1989] 1 WLR 1117; [1989] 3 All ER 571; (1990) 90 Cr App R 141; R v G (1989) 98 FLR 32; R v T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29.
[CA.78A.180] Elements of the offence The elements of this crime are: (1) sexual intercourse between mother and son, sister and brother, daughter and father, grand-daughter and grand-father (whether or not the relationship is of the half or the full blood and whether or not it is traced through lawful wedlock); and that (2) the accused be over the age of 16 at the time of the offence. [CA.78A.200] General Generally as to incest, see [2.11800]–[CA.78A.220].
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[CA.78D.20] [CA.78A.220]
s 78F
Proof of age
As to proof of age, see [CA.78A.220]. 78B
Incest attempts
Any person who attempts to commit an offence under section 78A is liable to imprisonment for two years.
CA
[S 78B am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[16]; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 6]
SECTION 78B COMMENTARY [CA.78B.20]
Attempted incest
See generally, [2.11800]–[2.12080]. For detailed commentary as to the law of attempts, see [CA.344A.20]–[CA.344A.140]. 78C
Defences
(1) It shall be a sufficient defence to a charge under section 78A or section 78B that the person charged did not know that the person with whom the offence is alleged to have been committed was related to him or her, as alleged. [Subs (1) am Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
(2) It shall be no defence to a charge under section 78A or section 78B that the person with whom the offence is alleged to have been committed consented thereto. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (2) am Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch] [S 78C am Act 31 of 1951; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 6]
78D
Removal from guardianship etc [Repealed]
[S 78D rep Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[17]; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 6]
SECTION 78D COMMENTARY [CA.78D.20]
Repeal of related sections
Section 72A has been repealed by Act 184 of 1987. 78F
Sanction of Attorney-General
(1) No prosecution for an offence under sections 78A or 78B shall be commenced without the sanction of the Attorney-General. (2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[4]] [S 78F am Act 43 of 2000; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 6]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 79
[CA.78F.20]
SECTION 78F COMMENTARY [CA.78F.20]
General
The Director of Public Prosecutions may sanction prosecutions (Gazette 117, 10 July 1987). The hearing of proceedings in camera includes an appeal.1 1 R v Priestley (1922) 16 Cr App R 143.
Editor’s note: The following provisions are repealed and have not been reproduced: • Section 78G by Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[18]. • Sections 78H and 78I by Act 90 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 2[3]. • Sections 78J–78L by Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[18]. • Section 78M by Act 184 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(10). • Sections 78N–78R by Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[18]. • Section 78S by Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3(3).
79
Bestiality
Any person who commits an act of bestiality with any animal shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [S 79 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 7 of 1984, s 3 and Sch 1(5) and (6); Act 10 of 1924, s 5]
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SECTION 79 COMMENTARY Indictment – bestiality ......................................................................................................................... [CA.79.20] Bestiality ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.79.40]
[CA.79.20]
Indictment – bestiality
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did commit with a (cow) an act of bestiality. Charges in respect of different persons should not be included in the one indictment.1 1 R v Bailey [1924] 2 KB 300; (1925) 18 Cr App R 42. Cf R v Sims [1946] 1 KB 531; (1946) 31 Cr App R 158.
[CA.79.40]
Bestiality
Bestiality consists of any form of sexual intercourse with an animal or bird.1 Penetration per anum is not essential.2 A woman may commit bestiality.3 Notwithstanding the retention of a heavy penalty in s 79, it would appear that custodial sentences are inapplicable except possibly when there are unusual aggravating circumstances. As the English Court of Criminal Appeal has said, it is the accused who needs help, not the dog.4 1 2 3 4
520
R R R R
v v v v
Brown (1890) LR 24 QBD 357; R v Reynolds (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 129. Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125. Packer [1932] VLR 225. Compare R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125. Higson (1984) 6 Cr App R 20; [1984] Crim LR 299.
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
[CA.80.20]
80
Part 3 – Offences against the person Div 10 - Offences in the nature of rape, sexual assault etc
s 80A
Attempt to commit bestiality
Any person who attempts to commit an act of bestiality with any animal shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. [S 80 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 7 of 1984, s 3 and Sch 1(7); Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
[CA.80.20]
CA
SECTION 80 COMMENTARY Attempted bestiality
As to attempted bestiality, see R v Edwards.1 As to attempt, see [CA.344A.20]–[CA.344A.140]. 1 R v Edwards [1956] QWN 16.
80A
Sexual assault by forced self-manipulation
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(1) In this section: circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby, or (b) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, or (c) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or (d) the alleged victim is under the age of 16 years, or (e) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (f) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (g) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment. [Def am Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 11 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 4[3]]
self-manipulation means the penetration of the vagina (including a surgically constructed vagina) or anus of any person by an object manipulated by the person, except where the penetration is carried out for proper medical or other proper purposes. [Def am Act 22 of 1996, s 5 and Sch 3(2)]
threat means: (a) (b)
a threat of physical force, or intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat, which does not involve a threat of physical force.
(2) Any person who compels another person to engage in self-manipulation, by means of a threat that the other person could not reasonably be expected to resist, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) subst Act 11 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 4[4]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2A) Any person who compels another person to engage in self manipulation: (a) by means of a threat that the other person could not reasonably be expected to resist, and
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Crimes Act 1900 s 80A
[CA.80A.20]
(b) in circumstances of aggravation, is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 11 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 4[4]]
(3) A person does not commit an offence under this section unless the person knows that the other person engages in the self-manipulation as a result of the threat. [S 80A am Act 74 of 2008; Act 38 of 2007; Act 11 of 2004; Act 94 of 1999; Act 22 of 1996; insrt Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(6)]
SECTION 80A COMMENTARY Elements of offence ......................................................................................................................... [CA.80A.20] Publication of evidence .................................................................................................................... [CA.80A.40]
[CA.80A.20]
Elements of offence
The elements of an offence under s 80A are set out in s 80A(2). [CA.80A.40]
Publication of evidence
As to publication of evidence, see s 292 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.12000]. 80AA
Referral to child protection agency
On conviction of a person for an offence under this Division, the court may refer the matter to an appropriate child protection agency if the person against whom or with whom the offence was committed is under the authority of the offender. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 80AA insrt Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[19]]
DIVISION 10A – SEXUAL SERVITUDE [Div 10A insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
80B
Meaning of “sexual servitude”
(1) For the purposes of this Division, sexual servitude is the condition of a person who provides sexual services and who, because of the use of force or threats: (a) is not free to cease providing sexual services, or (b) is not free to leave the place or area where the person provides sexual services. (2) In this section: sexual service means the commercial use or display of the body of the person providing the service for the sexual arousal or sexual gratification of others. threat means: (a) a threat of force, or (b) a threat to cause a person’s deportation, or (c) a threat of any other detrimental action unless there are reasonable grounds for the threat of that action in connection with the provision of sexual services by a person. [S 80B insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
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[CA.80F.20] 80C
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 10A – Sexual servitude
s 80F
Meaning of “circumstances of aggravation”
In this Division, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances involving either or both of the following: (a) the alleged victim is under the age of 18 years, (b) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment (within the meaning of Division 10). [S 80C am Act 74 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[6]; insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
80D
Causing sexual servitude CA
(1) A person: (a) who causes another person to enter into or remain in sexual servitude, and (b) who intends to cause, or is reckless as to causing, that sexual servitude, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence against this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (2) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[18]] [S 80D am Act 105 of 2008; insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
80E
Conduct of business involving sexual servitude
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(1) A person: (a) who conducts any business that involves the sexual servitude of other persons, and (b) who knows about, or is reckless as to, that sexual servitude, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years. (2) A person commits an offence against this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 19 years. (3) For the purposes of this section, conducting a business includes: (a) taking any part in the management of the business, or (b) exercising control or direction over the business, or (c) providing finance for the business. [S 80E insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
80F
Alternative verdicts
If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 80D(2) or 80E(2) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 80D(1) or 80E(1), respectively, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 80F insrt Act 99 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1]
SECTION 80F COMMENTARY [CA.80F.20] Alternative verdicts in cases of sexual servitude Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100].
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Crimes Act 1900 s 80G
[CA.&.20]
DIVISION 10B – INCITEMENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL OFFENCE [Div 10B heading insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[19]]
80G
Incitement to commit sexual offence
(1) A person who incites the commission of an offence under Division 10, 10A or 15A is guilty of an offence and is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. (2) For the person to be guilty, the person must intend that the offence incited be committed. (3) A person may be found guilty even if committing the offence incited is impossible. (4) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to the offence incited also apply to an offence under this section. (5) It is not an offence to incite the commission of the following offences: (a) an offence against section 61N or 61O that is constituted by inciting another person to an act of indecency, (b) an offence against section 61P, 66B, 66D, 66EB, 66F(4), 73(4), 78B or 80. [S 80G insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[19]]
Editor’s note: Sections 81–81B are repealed by Act 7 of 1984, s 3 and Sch 1(8) and have not been reproduced.
DIVISION 11 – MISCONDUCT WITH REGARD TO CORPSES Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Div 11 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[13]]
81C
Misconduct with regard to corpses
Any person who: (a) indecently interferes with any dead human body, or (b) improperly interferes with, or offers any indignity to, any dead human body or human remains (whether buried or not), shall be liable to imprisonment for two years. [S 81C insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 5]
SECTION 81C COMMENTARY Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.81C.20] Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.81C.40] Misconduct with regard to corpses – history and purpose .............................................................. [CA.81C.60] Elements of the offences ................................................................................................................. [CA.81C.80]
[CA.81C.20]
Indictments
(a) That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did indecently interfere with a dead human body. (b) That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid did improperly interfere with (offer indignity to) a dead human body (human remains).
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[CA.81C.80] [CA.81C.40]
Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 11 – Misconduct with regard to corpses
s 81C
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 81C is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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Misconduct with regard to corpses – history and purpose
Section 81C was introduced into the Crimes Act 1900 by the Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974. The Second Reading speech of the Bill simply mentions the offence without discussion of it.1 Indecency in treatment of a dead human body was an offence at common law “as an insult to public decency”.2 However, relatively little has been written on this subject.3 There are some reported cases. According to Russell on Crime, It is an indictable misdemeanour to expose a naked corpse in a place where many persons were certain to pass and repass, and where the exposure is calculated to disgust and shock the passers-by and to outrage public decency.4 Further, to sell the dead body of an executed convict for the purpose of dissection, where dissection was not part of the sentence, was also an indictable common law misdemeanour.5 The old practice of “grave robbing” is mentioned in an article “Who Owns Your Body?” by Atherton.6 As at 1788, grave robbing was held not to be a common law offence but the court said that from that time, it should be such an offence.7 In several cases, it has been held that it is an offence to remove a corpse from a grave without authority, even for pious reasons.8 Concerning dissections now, by s 6 of the Anatomy Act 1977, a person in charge of the conduct of anatomical examinations at any university, college, school etc may be issued with a licence to conduct anatomical examinations at a specified place. Part 2 of the Anatomy Act 1977 regulates the transfer of bodies and human tissue and the disposal thereof by the holder of such a licence. Otherwise, removal of any part of a dead body may contravene s 81C. In Re Gray (deceased) [2001] 2 Qd R 35; 117 A Crim R 22; [2000] QSC 390, Chesterman J considered an application by the widow of a recently deceased man to remove semen from her dead husband as she wished to become pregnant using the semen by artificial insemination. This involved the surgical removal of part of a section of testicle. Chesterman J noted at [18]: … The prohibition on interfering with a body sanctioned by the possibility of criminal prosecution indicates that to remove part of the body for whatever reason or motive is unlawful. … At [17], his Honour said that a Queensland equivalent to s 81C meant that “it would seem at least arguable that removing part of the testicles of a dead man would come within the ambit of [the section]”. 1 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 26 March 1974, p 1828). 2 Wharton F, A Treatise on Criminal Law (11th ed, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1912) Vol II at [1702], edited by Kerr JM. 3 See McBain G, “Modernising the Law on the Unlawful Treatment of Dead Bodies” Journal of Politics and Law Vol 7 No 3 (2014) Canadian Centre of Science and Education. 4 Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (12th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1964, London) at p 1414 citing R v Clark (1883) 15 Cox CC 171. 5 Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (12th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1964, London) at p 1414 citing R v Cundick (1882) Dowl & Ry NP 13; 171 ER 900. 6 Atherton R, “Who Owns Your Body?” (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 178. 7 R v Lynn (1788) 2 Term Rep 733; 100 ER 394. 8 R v Lynn (1788) 2 Term Rep 733; 100 ER 394; R v Sharpe (1857) Dears & B 160; 169 ER 939; R v Kenyon (1901) 36 LJ News 571.
[CA.81C.80] Elements of the offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (a) indecently interfered with a dead human body; or
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CA
[CA.81C.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 81C
[CA.81C.80]
(b) improperly interfered with (or offered an indignity to) a dead human body or remains (whether buried or not). Death – s 33 of the Human Tissue Act 1983 provides that for the purposes of the law of New South Wales, a person has died when there has occurred: (a) irreversible cessation of all function of the person’s brain; or (b) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the person’s body. Indecent interference – the question of what is indecent was considered by Gleeson CJ in R v Manson (unreported, NSW CCA 17 February 1993) who said: An indecent act is one which right-minded persons would consider to be contrary to community standards of decency. In Purves v Inglis (1915) 34 NZLR 1051 at 1053] … the following was said: “The word indecent has no definite legal meaning and it must be taken therefore in its modern and popular affectation. In the Standard Dictionary indecent is defined to be anything that is unbecoming or offensive to common propriety”. For other authorities on the test of what is indecent, see commentary at [CA.61N.80]. Various cases involve an accused committing sexual acts upon the bodies of the dead.1
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Improper interference – many cases where an accused is charged with improper interference with a dead human body involve the dismemberment of the body, sometimes to try to conceal the killing.2 Indecent or improper interference with a dead human body by the killer may constitute a factor of aggravation on sentence for an unlawful killing.3 Offering an indignity to a dead human body or remains – a provision in the same terms was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Moyer [1994] 2 SCR 899. There, the accused and a young “skinhead” took neo-Nazi photographs in a Jewish cemetery. The accused choreographed the photo shoot which included pictures of the skinhead simulating urination on identifiable gravestones and supplied the props. At issue was whether “offering indignities” requires physical contact with human remains. The accused had contended that he offered indignities only to the monuments atop the graves. Delivering the Court’s judgment, Lamer CJ dismissed this argument and concluded that physical interference with a dead body or human remains is not required for the offence to be committed. The Chief Justice said that the words “interferes with or offers any indignity” reveal that physical interference is a sufficient but not a necessary element of the offence. Further, the use of “indignity” indicates that contact with the body is not necessary. In addition, the words “whether buried or not” also reveal that physical contact is not an essential and that Parliament clearly contemplated the offering of indignities when the body or human remains were buried, that is, the “offering of indignities to human remains separated from an accused by six feet of dirt”. 1 Including Director of Public Prosecutions v Ahwan (2005) 17 NTLR 1; 196 FLR 267; [2005] NTCCA 21; R v Vosikata (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 391. 2 Including Ali v The Queen (2005) 79 ALJR 541; [2005] HCA 8; R v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81; 151 A Crim R 547; [2005] QCA 4; R v Chant [2009] NSWSC 290 per Howie J; R v Best [2012] NSWSC 924 per Rothman J. 3 Many authorities are referred to in Director of Public Prosecutions v England [1999] 2 VR 258; 106 A Crim R 99; [1999] VSCA 95. See also R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315 per James J.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 12 – Attempts to procure abortion
[CA.82.60]
s 82
DIVISION 12 – ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE ABORTION [Div 12 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[14]]
82
Administering drugs etc to herself by woman with child Whosoever, being a woman with child, unlawfully administers to herself any drug or noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means, CA
with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 82 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 82 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.82.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.82.30] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.82.40] Where substance is in fact harmless ................................................................................................. [CA.82.60] Intent ................................................................................................................................................... [CA.82.80]
[CA.82.20]
Indictment
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That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, being then with child, unlawfully did administer to herself a large quantity, to wit, two ounces of a drug called savin (or did use to herself a certain instrument) with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage. [CA.82.30]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 82 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.82.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was pregnant; and (2) that she administered to herself a drug or other noxious thing; or that she used an instrument upon herself; (3) with the intention of terminating such pregnancy; (4) unlawfully. [CA.82.60]
Where substance is in fact harmless
If a woman takes a substance which is in fact harmless, believing it to be a noxious thing and with intent to procure a miscarriage, she is guilty of the common law misdemeanour of an attempt to procure miscarriage.1 In order to constitute the statutory offence, the substance taken must be proved to be noxious,2 but it need not be an aborifacient.3 The quantity of an otherwise noxious drug may be too small
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Crimes Act 1900 s 83
[CA.82.60]
to constitute an element of the offence,4 but a large dose of a substance otherwise harmless may thereby become noxious.5 The fact that the substance administered produced a miscarriage is evidence that it was a noxious thing.6 1 2 3 4 5
R v Brown (1899) 63 JP 790. R v Isaacs (1862) Le & C 220; R v Osborn (1919) 84 JP 63. R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49. R v Perry (1847) 2 Cox CC 223. R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307. See also R v Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547; R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774; [1981] 2 All ER 833; (1981) 73 Cr App R 49. 6 R v Hollis (1873) 12 Cox CC 463.
[CA.82.80]
Intent
To prove the intent with which the thing was taken or the instrument was used, evidence as to other acts may be admissible,1 but only where the defence alleges accident or legitimate use.2 As to the meaning of “unlawfully”, see [CLP.80]. 1 R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389. See also R v Palm (1910) 4 Cr App R 253; R v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137. 2 R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389. See also R v Palm (1910) 4 Cr App R 253; R v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137
83
Administering drugs etc to woman with intent
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Whosoever: unlawfully administers to, or causes to be taken by, any woman, whether with child or not, any drug or noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means, with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 83 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 83 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.83.20] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.83.30] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.83.40] Terms defined ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.83.60] General ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.83.80] Operations by medical practitioners ................................................................................................. [CA.83.100] Evidence ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.83.120]
[CA.83.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid unlawfully (did administer to or cause to be taken by JN a large quantity, to wit, two ounces of a drug called savin) (did use upon JN a certain instrument), with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of the said JN. [CA.83.30]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 83 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 12 – Attempts to procure abortion
[CA.83.100] [CA.83.40]
s 83
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused administered a drug or noxious thing to the woman named, or used an instrument upon her; (2) unlawfully; (3) with the intention of procuring her miscarriage.
[CA.83.60]
CA
Pregnancy of the woman concerned is not a necessary ingredient to the charge. Terms defined
“Causes”, see [CLP.80]. “Unlawfully”, see [CLP.80]. [CA.83.80]
General
See generally, [CA.82.40]. As to the meaning of “unlawfully”, see [CLP.80]. As to administration of drugs and noxious things, see [CA.39.80].1 Where an act was done by the accused with the intention of procuring a miscarriage he was held to be guilty of the offence even though the method used could not procure a miscarriage.2 1 See also R v Wilson (1856) Dears & B 127; R v Farrow (1857) Dears & B 164. 2 R v Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189 (manual manipulation).
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[CA.83.100]
Operations by medical practitioners
An operation performed in good faith by a qualified medical practitioner to preserve the mother’s life is not an offence.1 The onus of showing lack of good faith is on the Crown.2“On the basis of all the foregoing,”3 I accordingly decide that the relevant law in relation to unlawfulness is as follows: For the use of an instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage to be lawful the accused must have honestly believed on reasonable grounds that the act done by him was (a) necessary to preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health (not being merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth) which the continuance of the pregnancy would entail; and (b) in the circumstances not out of proportion to the danger to be averted. Accordingly, to establish that the use of an instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage was unlawful, the Crown must establish either (a) that the accused did not honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the act done by him was necessary to preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health (not being merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth) which the continuance of the pregnancy would entail; or (b) that the accused did not honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the act done by him was in the circumstances proportionate to the need to preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health (not being merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth) which the continuance of the pregnancy would entail.4 Where the operation to terminate a pregnancy is skilfully performed with the patient’s consent by a duly qualified medical practitioner, the accused must have had, in order for the operation to be lawful, an honest belief on reasonable grounds that the operation was necessary to preserve the patient from serious danger to life, or physical or mental health. The onus is on the Crown to negative this belief. Where persons are charged with conspiracy in relation to abortion, it suffices if the Crown, having proved all other relevant matters, establishes that each accused had agreed to be a party to the termination of pregnancies without regard to whether such termination was lawful or not, knowing that such terminations, if not all, would be
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Crimes Act 1900 s 84
[CA.83.100]
unlawful, and at the same time leaving it to another to decide whether an unlawful termination would be carried out in any particular case.5 The extension of the English legislation to nurses acting under a doctor’s directions has been considered.6 1 R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687. Cf R v Trim [1943] VLR 109. 2 R v Newton [1958] Crim LR 469. 3 Menhennitt J had considered R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; R v Carlos [1946] VLR 15; R v Trim [1943] VLR 109; R v Ross [1955] St R Qd 48; R v Anderson [1951] 70 NZLR 439; R v Newton [1958] Crim LR 469; R v McKay [1957] VR 560; R v Tikos (No 1) [1963] VR 285; R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 and various legal texts. 4 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667 at 672 per Menhennitt J. 5 R v Wald (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25. See also R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376. 6 Royal College of Nursing v Dept Health and Social Security [1982] AC 800.
[CA.83.120]
Evidence
Where the accused alleged that he or she possessed instruments and drugs in the proper exercise of her or his profession as a medical practitioner evidence of her or his acts in respect of another woman was held admissible.1 Where evidence is given of other illegal acts by the accused, and the witnesses as to those acts are accomplices to those acts, but not to the act charged, the warning as to the evidence of accomplices should be given, that is, that there should be corroboration.2
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It is permissible to prove that the accused carried on the business of an abortionist.3 Where a medical practitioner or midwife frequently procures miscarriages, it is unlikely that her or his actions with a particular woman are lawful.4 Where the evidence fails to connect the accused’s intention to take part in an illegal operation with the actual performance of the operation, there may be a case of conspiracy to procure a miscarriage.5 If death is caused by an illegal operation the offence may be murder,6 or manslaughter.7 1 R v Starkie [1922] 2 KB 275; (1922) 16 Cr App R 61. See also R v Ross [1955] St R Qd 48; R v Dale (1889) 16 Cox CC 703; R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389; R v Anderson (1973) 5 SASR 256. 2 R v Farid (1945) 30 Cr App R 168; Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378; [1954] 1 All ER 507; (1954) 38 Cr App R 11; R v Price [1969] 1 QB 541; (1968) 52 Cr App R 295; R v Lovegrove [1920] 3 KB 643; (1920) 15 Cr App R 50. 3 R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389; R v Twiss [1918] 2 KB 853; (1919) 13 Cr App R 177. See also O’Brien v The Queen [1963] WAR 70. 4 Cf R v Sims [1946] 1 KB 531; (1946) 31 Cr App R 158; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367. 5 R v Bennett (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 329. 6 R v Perry [1909] 2 KB 697; (1909) 2 Cr App R 267. 7 R v Farid (1945) 30 Cr App R 168.
84
Procuring drugs etc
Whosoever unlawfully supplies or procures any drug or noxious thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether with child or not, shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. [S 84 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 84 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................... [CA.84.10] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.84.15] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.84.20] General ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.84.40]
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[CA.84.100]
s 84
If article a drug ................................................................................................................................... [CA.84.60] Intention .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.84.80] Procure ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.84.100]
[CA.84.10]
Indictment/charge
[CA.84.15]
Jurisdiction
A charge under s 84 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.84.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused unlawfully procured or supplied the drug, noxious thing, or instrument named; (2) knowing that the same was intended to be unlawfully used; (3) with the intention of procuring the miscarriage of the woman named. [CA.84.40]
General
See generally [CA.82.40].
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[CA.84.60]
If article a drug
If the article supplied is a drug, it is immaterial whether it is capable of producing a miscarriage.1 1 R v Duffy (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 28; R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49.
[CA.84.80]
Intention
The offence is made out even if the intention to procure a miscarriage exists only in the mind of the accused1 and even although the woman to whom it is supplied is not pregnant.2 As to the meaning of “unlawfully”, see [CLP.80]. 1 R v Hillman (1863) Le & Ca 343; R v Neil [1909] QSR 225. See also R v Hyland (1898) 24 VLR 101; R v Scully (1903) 23 NZLR 380. 2 R v Titley (1880) 14 Cox CC 502.
[CA.84.100]
Procure
“Procure” means to obtain possession of something from another person.1 1 R v Mills [1963] 1 QB 522; (1963) 47 Cr App R 49.
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That AB on ............... at ............... in the State of New South Wales did unlawfully supply a drug (namely – specify drug) to CD (or procured a drug or noxious thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever), then knowing that the said drug (or noxious thing, etc) was intended to be unlawfully used with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman.
Crimes Act 1900 s 85
[CA.85.10]
DIVISION 13 – CONCEALING BIRTH OF A CHILD [Div 13 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3[15]]
85
Concealment of birth
(1) Whosoever by any disposition of the dead body of a child, whether the child died before or after or during its birth, wilfully conceals or attempts to conceal the birth of the child, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years. (2) It shall be a sufficient defence to any charge under this section if the accused person shall satisfy the court or jury that the dead body in respect of which the disposition took place had issued from the body of its mother before the expiration of the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. [S 85 subst Act 10 of 1924, s 7]
SECTION 85 COMMENTARY Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................... [CA.85.10] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.85.15] Concealment of birth .......................................................................................................................... [CA.85.20]
[CA.85.10]
Indictment/charge
That AB on ............... at ............... in the State of New South Wales did give birth to a child and did (or CD did) after the death of that child wilfully conceal (or attempt to conceal) the birth of the child by ............... (describe means employed).
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[CA.85.15]
Jurisdiction
Where the accused is the mother of the child and is not charged with any other person, a charge under s 85 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. [CA.85.20]
Concealment of birth
The elements of this crime are: (1) that a woman named was delivered of a child after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy; and (2) that after the birth and the death of such child; (3) the accused wilfully concealed or endeavoured to conceal its birth; (4) by disposing of its body by the means indicated in the indictment. The section contemplates a foetus so far developed that when born it would have had a chance to live.1 The body must be identified as the body of the child whose birth is alleged,2 but a confession by the mother that she had burnt the dead body of her child was held to be sufficient to support the charge.3 Where the only evidence was that the child had been born, it had been taken away by other persons, and the accused did not know where it was put, held insufficient to justify a conviction.4 To take the dead body of a child and leave it exposed in a public place is not an offence under the section but may be indictable as a public nuisance.5 The concealment must have been done after the birth of the child,6 and after its death,7 but the moment of death need not be proved.8 There must be a concealment of the fact of birth carried out by a disposition of the body involving some act or concealment.9 Evidence that the mother had the body in her possession though about to dispose of it,10 or that she allowed others to take the body away unless it was at her request and with her knowledge,11 or a mere denial of the child’s birth12 is not sufficient to establish the offence.
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s 86
There is concealment where the child is placed where it is not likely to be found,13 and a temporary place of concealment is sufficient.14 A person does not commit the offence of attempting to conceal the birth if the child is concealed while it is still alive,15 but if she returns to the place after the child’s death and does something further there the offence may be committed.16 Concealment from a particular person is not an offence; the concealment must be from the world at large.17 Whether there is evidence of concealment is a matter for the judge; whether the body was in fact disposed of with the intent to conceal it is a matter for the jury.18 On a trial for murder or manslaughter of a child the jury may convict under s 85: see s 22. CA
As to attempt, see [CA.344A.20] – [CA.344A.140].
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As to the meaning of “lawfully”, see [CLP.80]. 1 R v Berriman (1854) 6 Cox CC 388; R v Hewitt and Smith (1866) 4 F & F 1101; 176 ER 923. Cf R v Colmer (1864) 9 Cox CC 506. 2 R v Williams (1871) 11 Cox CC 684. 3 R v Kersey (1909) 1 Cr App R 260. See also R v Davidson (1934) 25 Cr App R 21. 4 R v Bate (1871) 11 Cox CC 686. 5 R v Clark (1883) 15 Cox CC 171. 6 R v Derham (1843) 1 Cox CC 56. The child may be born dead. See also R v Donohue [1914] VLR 195. 7 R v Turner (1839) 8 Car & P 755; R v Cameron (1856) 7 A Digest (2nd ed) 449. 8 R v Coxhead (1845) 1 Car & Kir 623. 9 R v Rosenberg (1906) 70 JP 264. (Body on mother’s bed concealed in her petticoat – acquittal directed). Cf R v Perry (1855) Dears 471 (accused put body under pillow under her head – conviction upheld); R v Narden (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 160 (similar facts). 10 R v Snell (1837) 2 Mood and R 44. 11 R v Bate (1871) 11 Cox CC 686. 12 R v Smith (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 162. 13 R v Brown (1870) LR 1 CCR 244. 14 R v Perry (1855) Dears 471. 15 R v May (1867) 10 Cox CC 448. 16 R v Hughes (1850) 4 Cox CC 447. 17 R v Morris (1848) 2 Cox CC 489; R v Higley (1830) 4 Car & P 366. 18 R v Clarke (1866) 4 F & F 1040.
DIVISION 14 – KIDNAPPING [Former Div 13A renum Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[1]; insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[5]] [Div 14 heading subst Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[1] and [3]; insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[16]]
86
Kidnapping
(1) Basic offence A person who takes or detains a person, without the person’s consent: (a) with the intention of holding the person to ransom, or (a1) with the intention of committing a serious indictable offence, or (b) with the intention of obtaining any other advantage, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) am Act 67 of 2012, Sch 1[3]]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 86 (a)
the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in the company of another person or persons, or (b) the person commits an offence under subsection (1) and at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, actual bodily harm is occasioned to the alleged victim. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. (3) Specially aggravated offence A person subsection (a) (b)
is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under (1): in the company of another person or persons, and at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, actual bodily harm is occasioned to the alleged victim.
A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. (4) Alternative verdicts If on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (2) or (3) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of a lesser offence under this section, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the lesser offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (5) A person who takes or detains a child is to be treated as acting without the consent of the child. (6) A person who takes or detains a child does not commit an offence under this section if: (a) the person is the parent of the child or is acting with the consent of a parent of the child, and (b) the person is not acting in contravention of any order of a court relating to the child. (7) In this section: Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
child means a child under the age of 16 years. detaining a person includes causing the person to remain where he or she is. parent of a child means a person who has, in relation to the child, all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority that, by law, parents have in relation to their children. taking a person includes causing the person to accompany a person and causing the person to be taken. [S 86 am Act 67 of 2012; former s 85A renum Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[2]; insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
SECTION 86 COMMENTARY Cross reference .................................................................................................................................. [CA.86.20] Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.86.40] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.86.60] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.86.80] Element (1) Taking away or detaining .............................................................................................. [CA.86.100] Element (2) Without the person’s consent ....................................................................................... [CA.86.120] Element (3(a)) With intent to hold for ransom .................................................................................. [CA.86.140] Element (3(b)) With intent to hold for any advantage ...................................................................... [CA.86.160] Aggravated offences under ss 86(2) and (3) ................................................................................... [CA.86.180] Jury Directions .................................................................................................................................. [CA.86.200] Sentencing ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.86.220] Common law offence of kidnapping and generally .......................................................................... [CA.86.240]
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[CA.86.100] [CA.86.20]
s 86
Cross reference
For the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication), an offence under s 86 is an offence of “specific intent”: see s 428B. [CA.86.40]
Indictment
[Select the appropriate words in the brackets.] Add the following words where appropriate: … in circumstances of aggravation namely (that AB was then in company with another person (or persons) namely EF/that at that time, immediately before or immediately after such (taking/detaining) in the said circumstances, actual bodily harm was occasioned to CD). [Select the appropriate words in the brackets.] Add the following words where appropriate: … in circumstances of special aggravation namely that AB was then in company with another person [or persons] namely EF and that at that time, immediately before or immediately after such (taking/detaining) in the said circumstances, actual bodily harm was occasioned to CD. [Select the appropriate words in the brackets.] [CA.86.60]
Jurisdiction
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This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. [CA.86.80] Elements of the offence (1) that the accused took away the person named, or detained her or him; (2) without the person’s consent; (3) with the intention: (a) to hold her or him to ransom; or (b) to obtain any other advantage.1 (1) that the accused was then in company with another person (or persons); or (2) that at that time, immediately before or immediately after the commission of the said offence, actual bodily harm was occasioned to the victim named. (1) that the accused was then in company with another person (or persons); and (2) that at that time, immediately before or immediately after the commission of the said offence, actual bodily harm was occasioned to the victim named. 1 R v Boland [1974] VR 849; compare R v Reid [1973] 1 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 1350; (1972) 56 Cr App R 703 at 303 (QB).
[CA.86.100]
Element (1) Taking away or detaining
The offence under s 86 of “taking and detaining” the victim provides only one offence which can be committed in separate ways.1 In R v Campbell [1981] Qd R 516, the accused forced the complainant from his front yard to his car at gunpoint and then drove him through a number of streets before he was released. The court held: The taking, enticing away or detaining of a person is serious because it infringes upon that person’s liberty. In the light of this it becomes clear that it is the quality of infringement, rather than its duration that is significant. The “taking” does not have to involve a significant time or distance. It is sufficient if
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CA
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did (take and detain/take/detain) CD without that person’s consent (with the intention of holding CD to ransom/with the intention of obtaining an advantage).
Crimes Act 1900 s 86
[CA.86.100]
the victim’s liberty has been interfered with. Similarly the detention need not be for any specific length of time, provided it involves an interference with the victim’s liberty.2 The common law does not prohibit a husband from being convicted for taking and carrying away his wife.3 In R v C (1981) 3 A Crim R 146, during the course of a trial involving the alleged kidnapping and rape of a wife by her estranged husband, O’Brien CJ of Crim Div held that “a husband can be convicted of the commission against his wife of an offence under s 90A (the predecessor to s 86), whether or not they are in fact separated and whether or not there is any form of court order effectively separating them”.4 The common law does not allow as a lawful excuse a father’s claim to the paramountcy of his position in the family as a basis for abducting his unmarried child.5There is no claim of right defence available for an offence of kidnapping.6 Attempting to abduct a person from a religious sect on moral and spiritual grounds does not constitute a lawful excuse in common law.7 As to the elements of the common law offence, see commentary at [CA.86.240].
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1 Davis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 392 at [67]. 2 Per Demack J at 521; see also R v Milat (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 18 July 1996) in which Hunt CJ at CL directed a jury with regard to detention: “To detain a person means to prevent that person from leaving should he wish to do so. It is sufficient that the person was detained for only a very short time”; R v Wellard [1978] 1 WLR 921; [1978] 3 All ER 161; (1978) 67 Cr App R 364 (CA) at 367 (Cr App R). 3 R v Reid [1973] 1 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 1350; (1972) 56 Cr App R 703 at 303 (QB). 4 R v C (1981) 3 A Crim R 146 at 148. 5 R v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186; [1984] 2 All ER 449; see also criticism of the House of Lords decision in R v D by Williams G, “Can Babies be Kidnapped?” [1989] Crim LR 473. 6 Williams v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 26 at [43]. 7 R v Henman [1987] Crim LR 333.
[CA.86.120]
Element (2) Without the person’s consent
Generally where the issue of consent arises, it is necessary for the Crown to establish two things. First, that the complainant did not consent to the action and secondly, that the accused knew that the complainant was not consenting. An issue of recklessness might arise in an appropriate case. For further commentary on consent, see [CA.61H.20]–[CA.61HA.100]. [CA.86.140]
Element (3(a)) With intent to hold for ransom
Ransom – In s 86, the word “ransom” has a more limited meaning than the expression “for any other advantage”.1“Ransom” may apply to a demand for things other than money.2 Intention – It is necessary that the intention to obtain the advantage sought must exist at the time of any taking away. However, as detaining is a continuing process, the intention to obtain an advantage need only exist during the period of the detention.3 The intention of the accused to hold the victim or to obtain an advantage can exist irrespective of whether the victim is willing or consents to remain with the accused.4 1 R v Collett (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 June 1979); R v Robson [1978] 1 NSWLR 73. 2 See discussion of the meaning of the word “ransom” in R v Campbell [1981] Qd R 516 at 521. 3 R v Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467 at 469–470 per Hunt CJ at CL at 8; R v Collett (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 June 1979) per Roden J at p 10. See also R v Reid [1973] 1 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 1350; (1972) 56 Cr App R 703. 4 R v DMC (2002) 137 A Crim R 246; [2002] NSWCCA 513 at [44].
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[CA.86.200] [CA.86.160]
s 86
Element (3(b)) With intent to hold for any advantage
Advantage – “Advantage” has a wide meaning and is wider in meaning than “ransom”. It can encompass a situation where the intention was to hold for the purpose of enticing another person to a particular place.1 A psychological satisfaction, such as kidnapping a victim to talk to him or her, is capable of amounting to an advantage under the section.2 A demand that the victim drive the accused on an eight-hour journey also amounted to an advantage.3
1 R v Robson [1978] 1 NSWLR 73 at 75–76 (per Maxwell J, whilst giving a ruling during the course of a trial). This ruling was approved on appeal: R v Collett (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 June 1979). 2 R v Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467 per Hunt CJ at CL. See also R v Rose [2003] NSWCCA 411; R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [50]. 3 R v Toohey (1973–76) 3 Petty Sessions Review 1337.
[CA.86.180]
Aggravated offences under ss 86(2) and (3)
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An aggravated offence under s 86(2) can be committed when the offender is “in company” or actual bodily harm is occasioned to the victim. The meaning of being “in company” has been considered in a number of cases and involves the victim being confronted by the combined force of two or more persons who share a common purpose.1 The infliction of “actual bodily harm” involves injury that is not permanent, but must be more than merely transient or trifling. Bruising and scratches to the victim are typical of the sorts of injuries which can constitute actual bodily harm.2 A specially aggravated offence in s 86(3) is one where both of the aggravating factors referred to in s 86(2) occurred in the same offence. 1 R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 at [120]; R v Leoni [1999] NSWCCA 14 at [16]; R v Villar [2004] NSWCCA 302 at [68]; R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [61]. 2 R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [62]; McIntyre v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 549; [2009] NSWCCA 305 at [44].
[CA.86.200]
Jury Directions
Section 86(4) provides for alternative verdicts where circumstances of aggravation are not proved under ss 86(2) or 86(3). For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. During the course of a trial for a number of murders and an offence under s 90A (previous section relating to kidnapping) Hunt CJ at CL, relevantly, gave the following written directions to the jury.1 These directions are equally applicable to an offence under s 86. Detain – To detain a person means to prevent that person from leaving should he wish to do so. It is sufficient that the person was detained for only a very short time. Intention – The intention to hold that person for advantage must exist at some time during the period the person is held. The intention need not exist for the whole of that period. Advantage – The advantage to the person detaining the other person need not be one which is actually achieved. It is sufficient if that person has the intention of achieving some advantage to himself by detaining that other person. The advantage sought to be achieved need not be financial. It is sufficient if it is of the nature of a psychological gratification. It may be an error to sum up to the jury on both the alternatives provided in the section, namely taking the person and detaining the person depending how the Crown frames its indictment.2 However, the Crown may allege, in the one indictment, both taking and detaining.3 1 R v Milat (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 18 July 1996). 2 R v DMC (2002) 137 A Crim R 246; [2002] NSWCCA 513 at [44].
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As to intention: See element 3(a) above at [CA.86.140].
Crimes Act 1900 s 86
[CA.86.200]
3 Davis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 392 at [67].
[CA.86.220]
Sentencing
The gravamen of the offence for the purpose of sentencing is the unlawful detaining of a person.1 In R v Collett (unreported, CCA (NSW), 7 June 1979), Roden J listed a number of factors which may be relevant in sentencing for an offence under s 90A (previous section relating to kidnapping): • the length of time of any detention; • the extent to which fear and terror may be occasioned in the detainee, how he was treated and what may have been required of him by his captors; • the purpose of the detention, ie for money, political advantage etc; • the extent to which persons are subjected to ordeal and anguish through fear for the well-being of the person being detained. This list was not said to be exhaustive however, Roden J considered that it was important “to state the type of consideration which might be expected to be of relevance generally in cases of offences under this section”.2 In sentencing for an offence of kidnapping, the deterrent aspect of punishment is of the greatest importance.3 Imposition of the maximum penalty has been considered (with respect to a previous section enacting the offence of kidnapping).4 In R v Kay [2000] NSWSC 716, the court has appended a schedule of sentences imposed for offences which have included offences of kidnapping.
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It has been noted with respect to sentencing for offences under s 86 that they are sufficiently homogenous that a reference to the Judicial Commission statistics alone will not be of much assistance to a sentencing court.5 1 R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [54]. 2 R v Collett at pp 18–19. In R v Cowan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 February 1990), Finlay J (with whom Hunt and Allen JJ agreed) applied (with approval) the factors identified by Roden J in R v Collett. See also R v Newell [2004] NSWCCA 183 at [32], R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [55]. 3 R v Toohey (1973–76) 3 Petty Sessions Review 1337. 4 R v Hawkins (1993) 67 A Crim R 64. 5 R v Newell [2004] NSWCCA 183 at [43], R v Speechley [2012] NSWCCA 130 at [53].
[CA.86.240]
Common law offence of kidnapping and generally
Both s 86 and s 90A included a number of matters which had not previously been accepted as kidnapping at common law.1 In R v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186; [1984] 2 All ER 449, the House of Lords considered the nature and history of the common law offence of kidnapping. In addition to a number of principles applicable to the offence, the following elements were identified: (1) the taking or carrying away of one person by another; (2) by force or by fraud; (3) without the consent of the person so taken or carried away; and (4) without lawful excuse.2 As to the common law misdemeanour of false imprisonment, see Common Law Offences, at [CLO.20].3 For detailed analysis of the common law offence of kidnapping, see R v Nguyen [1998] 4 VR 394; (1997) 99 A Crim R 151. A kidnapping for ransom usually follows the pattern of seizure, secret confinement and a ransom demand. The American courts have been reluctant to extend the scope of the offence beyond this.4 1 R v Toohey (1973–76) 3 Petty Sessions Review 1337.
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Part 3 – Offences against the person Division 14A – Procuring for prostitution
s 91A
2 R v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186; [1984] 2 All ER 449 at 800 (AC). See also R v Hale [1974] 1 QB 819; [1974] 3 WLR 249; 1 All ER 1107; (1973) 59 Cr App R 1; R v Wellard [1978] 1 WLR 921; [1978] 3 All ER 161; (1978) 67 Cr App R 364 (CA). 3 See also R v Reid [1973] 1 QB 299; [1972] 2 All ER 1350; (1972) 56 Cr App R 703; R v Hale [1974] 1 QB 819; [1974] 3 WLR 249; 1 All ER 1107; (1973) 59 Cr App R 1. 4 53 Columbia Law Review 549. R v Campbell [1981] Qd R 516.
Child abduction
(1) A person who takes or detains a child with the intention of removing or keeping the child from the lawful control of any person having parental responsibility for the child, without the consent of that person, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person who takes or detains a child with the intention of stealing from the child is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (3) In this section: child means a child under the age of 12 years. detaining a child includes causing the child to remain where he or she is. taking a child includes causing the child to accompany a person and causing the child to be taken. (4) In this section, a reference to a person who has parental responsibility for a child is a reference to: (a) a person who has, in relation to a child, all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority that, by law, parents have in relation to their children, or (b) a person authorised to be the carer of the child under an Act relating to the care and protection of children.
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[S 87 subst Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[3]; am Act 94 of 1999]
Editor’s note: The following provisions are repealed and have not been reproduced: • Sections 88–90 and 91 by Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[3]. • Section 90A by Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[6].
DIVISION 14A – PROCURING FOR PROSTITUTION [Div 14A heading insrt Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[4]]
91A
Procuring etc
Whosoever procures, entices or leads away any person (not being a prostitute), whether with that person’s consent or not for purposes of prostitution, either within or without New South Wales, shall, notwithstanding that some one or more of the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed outside New South Wales, be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [S 91A am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 72 of 1979, s 4 and Sch 2(1); Act 50 of 1974, s 5; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 8]
SECTION 91A COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.91A.20] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.91A.40]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 91B
[CA.91A.20]
[CA.91A.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did procure (or entice or lead away) CD for the purposes of prostitution. [CA.91A.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are that the accused: (1) procured, enticed or led away; (2) another person (not being a prostitute); (3) for purposes of prostitution. Since Act No 72 of 1979 came into operation on 1 August 1979,1 the offence relates to male and female prostitution only where the person procured etc, is not a prostitute. To establish “procuring” it is necessary to prove that there is a sufficient causal relationship between the accused’s actions and the availability of the other person for prostitution. That relationship exists when it is at the instigation or upon the proposal of the accused that the other person undertakes the assignment. The accused must have been active in achieving the result whether by persuasion, by holding out special inducements, or by invitation.2 “Procure” is a word in common usage and has no special meaning: the use by the judge of the word recruit in his summing up was unobjectionable.3 A person for whom another person is procured may be convicted of conspiring with the procurer.4
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Prostitution is the offering by a person of her or his body commonly for acts of indecency for sexual gratification in return for payment.5 Prostitution in itself has never been made a criminal offence.6 1 Gazette No 96 of 20 July 1979. 2 R v Castiglione (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 393; [1963] NSWR 1; 80 WN (NSW) 537. See also R v Quinn (1918) 44 DLR 707; R v Cook [1954] 1 WLR 125; 1 All ER 60; R v Christian (1913) 23 Cox CC 541. 3 R v Broadfoot [1976] 3 All ER 753; (1976) 64 Cr App R 71. 4 R v Mackenzie (1911) 6 Cr App R 64. 5 R v Webb [1964] 1 QB 357; (1963) 47 Cr App R 265; R v DeMunck [1918] 1 KB 635; Lentin v Reynolds [1966] VR 182. 6 Barrington v Rochford [1926] VLR 492.
91B
Procuring person by drugs etc
Whosoever by means of any fraud, violence, threat, or abuse of authority, or by the use of any drug or intoxicating liquor, procures, entices, or leads away any person for purposes of prostitution, either within or without New South Wales, shall, notwithstanding that some one or more of the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed outside New South Wales, be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 91B am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 50 of 1974, s 5; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 8]
SECTION 91B COMMENTARY [CA.91B.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are that the accused: (1) by means of fraud, violence, threat, or abuse of authority, or by the use of intoxicating liquor; (2) procured, enticed or led away another person; (3) for the purposes of prostitution. Generally see [CA.91A.40].
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[CA.91C.20]
s 91D
The essence of the offence is the use of fraud, or the administration of a drug, etc, and probably only one offence is committed even if there have been several acts of sexual gratification.
DIVISION 15 – CHILD PROSTITUTION [Div 15 heading am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[20]; insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[17]]
91C
Definitions act of child prostitution means any sexual service, whether or not involving an indecent act: (a) that is provided by a child for the payment of money or the provision of any other material thing (whether or not it is in fact paid or provided to the child or to any other person), and (b) that can reasonably be considered to be aimed at the sexual arousal or sexual gratification of a person or persons other than the child, and includes (but is not limited to) sexual activity between persons of different sexes or the same sex, comprising sexual intercourse (as defined in section 61H) for payment or masturbation committed by one person on another for payment, engaged in by a child. child means a person who is under the age of 18 years. material [Repealed]
[S 91C am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[21]; Act 95 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[1] and [2]; Act 198 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(7); reinsrt Act 115 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(3); rep Act 32 of 1968, s 4; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 8]
SECTION 91C COMMENTARY Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[CA.91C.20]
Related section
See s 61H. 91D
Promoting or engaging in acts of child prostitution
(1) Any person who: (a) by any means, causes or induces a child to participate in an act of child prostitution, or (b) participates as a client with a child in an act of child prostitution, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years or, if the child is under the age of 14 years, to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) [Repealed] [Subs (2) rep Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[20]]
(3) The consent of a child is not a defence to a charge relating to an offence under this section. [Subs (3) am Act 9 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[21]] [S 91D am Act 9 of 2003; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 115 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(3); rep Act 72 of 1979, s 4 and Sch 2(2); am Act 50 of 1974; subst Act 31 of 1951, s 2; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 8]
SECTION 91D COMMENTARY Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.91D.20] Reasonable cause ........................................................................................................................... [CA.91D.40]
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CA
For the purposes of this Division:
Crimes Act 1900 s 91E
[CA.91D.20]
[CA.91D.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this offence are clearly set forth in s 91D(1). [CA.91D.40]
Reasonable cause
As to the meaning of “reasonable cause”, see [CLP.80]. 91E
Obtaining benefit from child prostitution
(1) Any person who receives money or any other material benefit knowing that it is derived directly or indirectly from an act of child prostitution is liable to imprisonment for 10 years or, if the act of child prostitution involves a child under the age of 14 years, to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) am Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[22]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section if the person satisfies the court that the money or other material benefit concerned: (a) was received by the person for the lawful provision of goods or services, or (b) was paid or provided in accordance with a judgment or an order of a court or a legislative requirement, whether or not under New South Wales law. (3) The higher maximum penalty under this section in the case of an offence involving a child under the age of 14 years does not apply unless the age of the child is set out in the charge for the offence. [Subs (3) insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[23]] [S 91E am Act 105 of 2008; Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 115 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 91E COMMENTARY Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.91E.20] Publication of evidence .................................................................................................................... [CA.91E.40]
[CA.91E.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this offence are clearly set forth in s 91E(1). [CA.91E.40]
Publication of evidence
Publication of evidence may be forbidden, s 292 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 91F
Premises not to be used for child prostitution
(1) Any person who is capable of exercising lawful control over premises at which a child participates in an act of child prostitution is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) For the purposes of this section, each person: (a) who is an owner, lessee, licensee or occupier of premises, (b) who is concerned in the management of premises or in controlling the entry of persons to, or their movement within, premises, is to be considered as capable of exercising lawful control over the premises, whether or not any other person is capable of exercising lawful control over the premises. (3) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section relating to an act of child prostitution if the person satisfies the court: (a) that the person did not know about the act, or
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(b)
that the person did not know that a child was participating in the act or, for any other reason, did not know that the act was an act of child prostitution, or (c) that the person used all due diligence to prevent the child from participating in the act.
[S 91F am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 115 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 91F COMMENTARY
[CA.91F.20]
CA
Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.91F.20] Publication of evidence ..................................................................................................................... [CA.91F.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of an offence under s 91F are clearly set forth. [CA.91F.40]
Publication of evidence
Publication of evidence may be forbidden: s 292 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
DIVISION 15A – CHILD ABUSE MATERIAL [Div 15A heading subst Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[24]]
91FA
Definitions
For the purposes of this Division: child means a person who is under the age of 16 years. child abuse material—see section 91FB. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Def insrt Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[4]]
data includes: (a) information in any form, or (b) any program (or part of a program). [Def insrt Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[4]]
material includes any film, printed matter, data or any other thing of any kind (including any computer image or other depiction). [Def am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[5]] [S 91FA am Act 9 of 2010; insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[24]]
91FB
Child abuse material—meaning
(1) In this Division: child abuse material means material that depicts or describes, in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive: (a) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child as a victim of torture, cruelty or physical abuse, or (b) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child engaged in or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons), or (c) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child in the presence of another person who is engaged or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity, or (d) the private parts of a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 91FB (2) The matters to be taken into account in deciding whether reasonable persons would regard particular material as being, in all the circumstances, offensive, include: (a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults, and (b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the material, and (c) the journalistic merit (if any) of the material, being the merit of the material as a record or report of a matter of public interest, and (d) the general character of the material (including whether it is of a medical, legal or scientific character). (3) Material that depicts a person or the private parts of a person includes material that depicts a representation of a person or the private parts of a person (including material that has been altered or manipulated to make a person appear to be a child or to otherwise create a depiction referred to in subsection (1)). (4) The private parts of a person are: (a) a person’s genital area or anal area, or (b) the breasts of a female person. [S 91FB insrt Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[6]]
91G
Children not to be used for production of child abuse material
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(1) Any person who: (a) uses a child who is under the age of 14 years for the production of child abuse material, or (b) causes or procures a child of that age to be so used, or (c) having the care of a child of that age, consents to the child being so used or allows the child to be so used, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[7]]
(2) Any person who: (a) uses a child who is of or above the age of 14 years for the production of child abuse material, or (b) causes or procures a child of that age to be so used, or (c) having the care of a child of that age, consents to the child being so used or allows the child to be so used, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (2) am Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[7]]
(3) [Repealed] [Subs (3) rep Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[8]]
(4) For the purposes of this section, a person may have the care of a child without necessarily being entitled by law to have the custody of the child. (5) Where on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under subsection (2), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 91G am Act 9 of 2010; subst Act 95 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 142 of 1997; insrt Act 115 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 91G COMMENTARY Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.91G.20] Publication of evidence .................................................................................................................... [CA.91G.40]
[CA.91G.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of an offence under s 91G are clearly set forth. As to the meaning of “allows”, see [CLP.80]. Publication of evidence CA
[CA.91G.40]
The publication of evidence may be forbidden: s 292 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 91H
Production, dissemination or possession of child abuse material
(1) In this section: disseminate child abuse material, includes: (a) send, supply, exhibit, transmit or communicate it to another person, or (b) make it available for access by another person, or (c) enter into any agreement or arrangement to do so.
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possess child abuse material includes, in relation to material in the form of data, being in possession or control of data (within the meaning of section 308F(2)). produce child abuse material includes: (a) film, photograph, print or otherwise make child abuse material, or (b) alter or manipulate any image for the purpose of making child abuse material, or (c) enter into any agreement or arrangement to do so. (2) A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. [S 91H subst Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[9]; am Act 105 of 2008; insrt Act 95 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
91HA
Defences
(1) Innocent production, dissemination or possession It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. (2) It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H not involving the production or dissemination of child abuse material that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (3) Public benefit It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the conduct engaged in by the defendant: (a) was of public benefit, and (b) did not extend beyond what was of public benefit. (4) Conduct is of public benefit if, and only if, the conduct is necessary for or of assistance in: (a) enforcing or administering a law of the State, or of another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth, or (b) monitoring compliance with, or investigating a contravention of, a law of the State, or of another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth, or
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Crimes Act 1900 s 91HA (c)
the administration of justice.
(5) The question of whether a person’s conduct is of public benefit is a question of fact and the person’s motives for engaging in the conduct are irrelevant. (6) Law enforcement officers It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that: (a) the defendant was, at the time of the offence, a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his or her duties, and (b) the conduct of the defendant was reasonable in the circumstances for the purpose of performing that duty. (7) Classified material It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the material concerned was classified (whether before or after the commission of the alleged offence) under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 of the Commonwealth, other than as refused classification (RC). (8) Approved research It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91G or 91H that the conduct engaged in by the defendant: (a) was necessary for or of assistance in conducting scientific, medical or educational research that has been approved by the Attorney General in writing for the purposes of this section, and (b) did not contravene any conditions of that approval. [S 91HA insrt Act 9 of 2010, Sch 1[9]]
DIVISION 15B – VOYEURISM AND RELATED OFFENCES Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Div 15B heading insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
91I
Definitions
(1) In this Division: building includes a vehicle, vessel, tent or temporary structure. private parts means a person’s genital area or anal area, whether bare or covered by underwear. (2) For the purposes of this Division, a person is engaged in a private act if: (a) the person is in a state of undress, using the toilet, showering or bathing, engaged in a sexual act of a kind not ordinarily done in public, or engaged in any other like activity, and (b) the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would reasonably expect to be afforded privacy. (3) For the purposes of this Division, a person films another person, or another person’s private parts, if the person causes one or more images (whether still or moving) of the other person or the other person’s private parts to be recorded or transmitted for the purpose of enabling the person or a third person to observe those images (whether during the filming or later). [S 91I insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
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s 91K
Voyeurism
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is a summary offence. (3) Aggravated offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining sexual arousal or sexual gratification, observes a person who is engaged in a private act: (a) without the consent of the person being observed to being observed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being observed does not consent to being observed for that purpose, and (c) in circumstances of aggravation, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years.
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(4) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) the person whom the offender observed was a child under the age of 16 years, or (b) the offender constructed or adapted the fabric of any building for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence. (5) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against subsection (3) the trier of fact is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against subsection (1), the trier of fact may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against subsection (1). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (6) Attempts A person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) or (3) is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. [S 91J insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
91K
Filming a person engaged in private act
(1) General offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining, or enabling another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification, films another person who is engaged in a private act: (a) without the consent of the person being filmed to being filmed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being filmed does not consent to being filmed for that purpose, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. (2) An offence against subsection (1) is a summary offence. (3) Aggravated offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining, or enabling another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification, films another person who is engaged in a private act: (a) without the consent of the person being filmed to being filmed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being filmed does not consent to being filmed for that purpose, and
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CA
(1) General offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining sexual arousal or sexual gratification, observes a person who is engaged in a private act: (a) without the consent of the person being observed to being observed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being observed does not consent to being observed for that purpose, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both.
Crimes Act 1900 s 91K (c) in circumstances of aggravation, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years. (4) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) the person whom the offender filmed was a child under the age of 16 years, or (b) the offender constructed or adapted the fabric of any building for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence. (5) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against subsection (3) the trier of fact is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against subsection (1), the trier of fact may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against subsection (1). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (6) Attempts A person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) or (3) is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence. [S 91K insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
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91L
Filming a person’s private parts
(1) General offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining, or enabling another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification, films another person’s private parts, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would reasonably expect the person’s private parts could not be filmed: (a) without the consent of the person being filmed to being filmed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being filmed does not consent to being filmed for that purpose, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. (2) An offence against subsection (1) is a summary offence. (3) Aggravated offence A person who, for the purpose of obtaining, or enabling another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification, films another person’s private parts, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would expect that his or her private parts could not be filmed: (a) without the consent of the person being filmed to being filmed for that purpose, and (b) knowing that the person being filmed does not consent to being filmed for that purpose, and (c) in circumstances of aggravation, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years. (4) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances in which: (a) the person whom the offender filmed was a child under the age of 16 years, or (b) the offender constructed or adapted the fabric of any building for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence. (5) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against subsection (3) the trier of fact is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against subsection (1), the trier of fact may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against subsection (1). The person is liable to punishment accordingly. (6) Attempts A person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) or (3) is liable to the penalty provided for the commission of the offence.
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[CA.92.20]
s 92
(7) Double jeopardy A person cannot be convicted of both an offence against this section and an offence against section 91K in respect of conduct occurring on the same occasion. [S 91L insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
Installing device to facilitate observation or filming
(1) Offence A person who, with the intention of enabling that person or any other person to commit an offence against section 91J, 91K or 91L, installs any device, or constructs or adapts the fabric of any building, for the purpose of facilitating the observation or filming of another person, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. (2) An offence against this section is a summary offence. (3) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person charged with an offence against section 91J, 91K or 91L the trier of fact is not satisfied that the offence is proven but is satisfied that the person has committed an offence against this section, the trier of fact may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of an offence against this section. The person is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 91M insrt Act 105 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 1[31]]
DIVISION 16 – BIGAMY [Div 16 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[18]]
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92
Bigamy
Whosoever, being married, marries another person during the life of the former husband or wife, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years: Provided that no person shall be convicted under this section whose husband or wife has at the time of such second marriage been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, or, if domiciled in New South Wales at the time of the first marriage, has been continually absent from New South Wales for the space of five years then last past, and was, on reasonable grounds, believed by the accused at the time of the second marriage not to be living, of which facts the proof shall lie on the accused. Editorial note: See Marriage Act 1961 (Commonwealth), section 94. [S 92 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 92 COMMENTARY [CA.92.20]
Related legislation
Bigamy is now an offence under the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 94. The relevant section of the Act came into operation on 1 September 1963, and the offence of bigamy committed after that date is punishable under the Commonwealth Act and not otherwise.
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CA
91M
Crimes Act 1900 s 93
93
[CA.93.20]
Participator in bigamy
Whosoever, whether married or unmarried, marries the husband or wife of any person not continually so absent, as in the proviso to section 92 mentioned, knowing him or her to be married, and the former wife or husband to be alive, shall be liable to imprisonment for five years. Editorial note: See Marriage Act 1961 (Commonwealth), section 94. [S 93 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 93 COMMENTARY [CA.93.20]
General
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See s 92 and [CA.92.20].
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Part 3A – Offences relating to public order Division 1 – Riot and affray
s 93B
PART 3A – OFFENCES RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER [Pt 3A reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
DIVISION 1 – RIOT AND AFFRAY [Div 1 heading insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[5]]
93A
Definition violence means any violent conduct, so that: (a) except for the purposes of section 93C, it includes violent conduct towards property as well as violent conduct towards persons, and (b) it is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or damage but includes any other violent conduct (for example, throwing at or towards a person a missile of a kind capable of causing injury which does not hit or falls short).
[S 93A am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]; reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; am Act 50 of 1970; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
93B
Riot
(1) Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot and liable to imprisonment for 15 years. [Subs (1) am Act 119 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2[2]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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(2) It is immaterial whether or not the 12 or more persons use or threaten unlawful violence simultaneously. (3) The common purpose may be inferred from conduct. (4) No person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. (5) Riot may be committed in private as well as in public places. [S 93B am Act 119 of 2005; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
SECTION 93B COMMENTARY Indictment for riot ............................................................................................................................. [CA.93B.20] Jurisdiction in cases of riot and cross-references ........................................................................... [CA.93B.40] Elements of riot ................................................................................................................................ [CA.93B.60] An outline of riot at common law ..................................................................................................... [CA.93B.80] S 93B element 1 – Twelve or more present together using or threatening violence for a common purpose ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.93B.100] S 93B element 2 – Conduct of participants (taken together) causing fear for personal safety .... [CA.93B.120] S 93B element 3 – The accused used unlawful violence for the common purpose ..................... [CA.93B.140] Sentencing for riot .......................................................................................................................... [CA.93B.160]
[CA.93B.20] Indictment for riot That AB [CD and EF] on the day of [date] at [place] in the State of New South Wales being one of 12 or more persons present together in a riotous assembly, using [and threatening] unlawful violence for a common purpose namely, [particulars], did use unlawful violence for the said common purpose by [eg assaulting members of the public] and the said conduct of all such said persons (taken together) was such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety.
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CA
In this Division:
Crimes Act 1900 s 93B
[CA.93B.20]
It is important to allege that the accused was one of 12 or more persons present at the time.1 An indictment against one alleged rioter may simply allege rioting “with persons unknown”.2 An indictment charging various participants in one riot, but not present together at the same time in separate counts has been considered.3 1 R v Mahroof (1989) 88 Cr App R 317 (CA). This was the analogous case of a charge of violent disorder which requires three or more present together. 2 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 213 (NSWLR) per McHugh J. 3 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 213 (NSWLR) per McHugh J, referred to at [CA.93B.100].
[CA.93B.40]
Jurisdiction in cases of riot and cross-references
Riot is listed in Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 260(1) of that Act, riot is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elect otherwise. By s 267(2)–(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, if dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty for riot is two years imprisonment and/or a fine of 100 penalty units. Cross references: Offence of affray s 93C ........................................................................................................................... Offence of violent disorder s 11A Summary Offences Act 1988............................................................ Common law offence of incitement.......................................................................................[CLO.660] Presumption against bail for riot – s 8D Bail Act 1978......................................................................... [CA.93B.60]
Elements of riot
The prosecution must prove that:
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(1) the accused was one of 12 or more people – (a) who were present together at a place (public or private), and (b) who used or threatened unlawful violence for a common purpose, and (2) that the conduct of these people (taken together) was such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety,1 and (3) that the accused in fact used unlawful violence for the common purpose.2 1 R v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 at 252 per Hunt CJ at CL (NSW CCA). This case does not mention element 3. However, as both the section and the authority in footnote 2 below shows, this element is essential. 2 In R v Tyler (1993) 96 Cr App R 332 (CA) this element was omitted from the indictment. This omission was held to mean that the indictment was defective (but capable of being amended at trial).
[CA.93B.80]
An outline of riot at common law
Riot was an offence against public order. “A riot, like an affray, involves both violence and public alarm. They involve public alarm because they are currently or potentially dangerous.”1 Like affray, riot was an old common law misdemeanour. Riot was defined in 1716 by Hawkins in his work, Pleas of the Crown.2 The Riot Act 1714 (UK) provided a statutory offence of riot in different terms.3 Under s 2 of that Act, those rioters who remained at the scene for one hour after the proclamation was read (the “reading of the Riot Act”) were guilty of a felony. Later, the elements of the offence of riot at common law were said to have been: (1) three or more persons; (2) acting with a common purpose; (3) which has been executed or incepted; (4) and with the intent to help one another by force if necessary against any person who may oppose them in the execution of their common purpose; and (5) applying the use of force or violence, not merely used in demolishing, but displayed in such a manner as to alarm at least one person of reasonable firmness and courage.4 Although
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[CA.93B.100]
s 93B
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Riot as a common law offence was abolished in the UK by the Public Order Act 1986 and s 1 of that Act substituted a statutory offence of riot. In New South Wales s 93B was enacted in the same terms as s 1 of the UK Act (apart from penalty) by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988. Riot as a common law offence was abolished in New South Wales also – see s 93E. 1 R v McCormack [1981] VR 104; (1980) 2 A Crim R 405 at 108 (VR); 409 (A Crim R) (Vic CCA). 2 W Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (1st ed, 1716), Bk 1 at 155 “… first a Riot seems to be a tumultuous Disturbance of the Peace, by three Persons, or more, assembling together of their own Authority, with an Intent mutually to assist one another, against any who shall oppose them, in the Execution of some Enterprize of a private Nature, and afterwards actually executing the same in a violent and turbulent Manner, to the Terror of the People, whether the Act intended were of itself lawful or unlawful.” 3 Riot Act 1714 (UK) (1 Geo 1, stat 2, c 5) s 1. 4 Field v Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 KB 853. 5 Offences Against Public Order Working Paper No 82 (1982 UK), pp 27–28 – see Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 209 (NSWLR) per McHugh J (CA). 6 R v Wong Chey (1911) 6 Cr App R 59 at 60 (CCA); Ford v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1921] 2 KB 344 at 349 per Bailhache J; Athens Maritime Enterprises Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) (The Andreas Lemos) [1983] QB 647; [1983] 2 WLR 425 at 661–662 (QB) per Staughton J. 7 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 209 (NSWLR) per McHugh J (CA). See also Second Reading Speech Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1988 (NSW) (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 19 October 1988, p 2600). 8 R v McCormack [1981] VR 104; (1980) 2 A Crim R 405 (Vic CCA). 9 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103. 10 R v Maher (2005) 154 A Crim R 457.
[CA.93B.100]
S 93B element 1 – Twelve or more present together using or threatening violence for a common purpose
The Court of Appeal decision Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 dealing with the former common law offence of riot made it clear that in the case of a number of accused charged with riot in the one count, it was necessary for all those jointly accused to have been present at the same time. This is because of the common law requirement that each accused must have had the intent to assist the other.1 It was therefore not sufficient for a joint charge that, in an incident extending over a period of time, participants arrived and departed at different times.2 This consideration is reflected in s 93B in the requirements of 12 or more being present together and using or threatening unlawful violence for a common purpose. Section 93B(2) however, provides that it is immaterial whether or not the 12 or more persons use or threaten unlawful violence simultaneously. Where various participants in a riot were present at different times “in many cases the Crown will be able to overcome the necessity for separate trials by charging each accused with separate counts in the one indictment”.3 By s 93B(5) the place at which the 12 or more persons are present together may be a public place or a private place. “Violence” is defined in s 93A and may include violent conduct towards property as well as towards persons, and is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or damage, but includes other violent conduct such as the throwing at someone of a missile capable of causing injury. Although violent intent must be proved in the accused (s 93D(1)), it is also immaterial whether all of the 12 or more participants intended to use violence or were aware that their conduct may have been violent – see
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these elements were never considered authoritatively on appeal,5 they have been applied many times.6 Nevertheless, and despite the antiquity of riot as a common law offence, the precise elements of riot were never settled.7 Although an offence not often charged, riot has been used in various situations, including a group of about 200 threatening a police station,8 a varying group who threatened a police compound at a motorcycle racing track throughout most of a day9 and a prison riot.10
Crimes Act 1900 s 93B
[CA.93B.100]
s 93D(3). The violence used or threatened must be unlawful. “Unlawful” means without lawful excuse: see [CLP.80]. Self-defence is a lawful excuse which has been held to apply to affray and, by analogy, must apply to riot as well.4 It has been held in England in an analogous case of violent disorder, that if the prosecution cannot prove that the requisite minimum number of participants were unlawfully fighting, each accused should be acquitted even though the prosecution could prove that each accused was unlawfully fighting.5 As to threats of violence, see Affray at [CA.93C.100]. An alternative verdict of assault may be available.6 By s 93B(3) the common purpose may be inferred from conduct. Historically, it did not matter whether the original purpose of the participants assembling together was lawful or unlawful.7 If a person seeing others engaged in a riot, joins them and assists them, that person is as much a rioter as if he or she had first assembled with the others for that purpose.8
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1 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 212 (NSWLR) per McHugh J. 2 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 203 (NSWLR) per Kirby P. 3 Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 213 (NSWLR) per McHugh J referring to R v Assim [1966] 2 QB 249; [1966] 3 WLR 55; (1966) 50 Cr App R 224; R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30; Chief Constable of Norfolk v Clayton [1983] 2 AC 473. Kirby P observed (at 202 (NSWLR)) that one vice in doing this “is that it may rope in to a lengthy trial an individual rioter who had only a peripheral connection with the assembly”. 4 R v Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638; 34 A Crim R 277; R v Sharp [1957] 1 QB 552; 2 WLR 472; R v Rothwell and Barton [1993] Crim LR 626. 5 R v Fleming [1989] Crim LR 658 (CA). 6 R v Wong Chey (1911) 6 Cr App R 59 (CCA); R v O’Brien (1911) 6 Cr App R 108 (CCA). 7 R v Graham & Burns (1888) 16 Cox CC 420 at 427 per Charles J; R v Caird (1970) 54 Cr App R 499 at 504–505 per Sachs LJ. 8 Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (12th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1964, London) at p 248..
[CA.93B.120]
S 93B element 2 – Conduct of participants (taken together) causing fear for personal safety
Section 93B(4) provides that no person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. The question is whether the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness would fear for his or her safety.1 The prosecution may, however, prove that people actually present in fact feared for their personal safety – see the corresponding paragraph under Affray at [CA.93C.140]. 1 See commentary following report of R v Thind [1999] Crim LR 842.
[CA.93B.140]
S 93B element 3 – The accused used unlawful violence for the common purpose
In addition to being present with 11 or more others who use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose, to be guilty of riot, an accused must be shown to have in fact used violence (and not merely threatened it) for the common purpose. Still less does an individual’s mere presence in a group of rioters of itself make that individual guilty of riot.1 It is necessary for the jury to examine the case against each accused and the particular role of that accused in relation to acts of violence – the judge should give the jury a summary of the evidence against each accused.2 In terms of the intent to be proved, s 93D(1) provides that a person is guilty of riot only if the person intends to use violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent. By s 93D(3) this does not affect the determination for the purposes of riot of the number of persons who use or threaten violence. 1 R v Atkinson (1869) 11 Cox CC 330; R v Cook [1995] 2 Qd R 77; (1994) 74 A Crim R 1 (Qld CA). 2 Boxer v The Queen (1995) 14 WAR 505; 81 A Crim R 299 at 300 (A Crim R) (WA CCA). See also Anderson v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 10 NSWLR 198; 27 A Crim R 103 at 212 (NSWLR) per McHugh J.
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[CA.93C.60] [CA.93B.160]
s 93C
Sentencing for riot
Sentencing for riot was considered in R v McCormack [1981] VR 104; (1980) 2 A Crim R 405 and R v Maher (2005) 154 A Crim R 457. 93C
Affray
CA
(1) A person who uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and whose conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety is guilty of affray and liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 119 of 2005, s 4 and Sch 2[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) If 2 or more persons use or threaten the unlawful violence, it is the conduct of them taken together that must be considered for the purposes of subsection (1). (3) For the purposes of this section, a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone. (4) No person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. (5) Affray may be committed in private as well as in public places. [S 93C am Act 119 of 2005; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
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SECTION 93C COMMENTARY Indictment for affray ......................................................................................................................... [CA.93C.20] Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.93C.40] Elements of affray ............................................................................................................................ [CA.93C.60] Nature and history of affray ............................................................................................................. [CA.93C.80] Element 1 – Use or threat of unlawful violence towards another ................................................. [CA.93C.100] Element 2 – Intention or awareness .............................................................................................. [CA.93C.120] Element 3 – Causing a person of reasonable firmness present to fear for their personal safety ... [CA.93C.140] Jury directions ................................................................................................................................ [CA.93C.160] Sentencing considerations ............................................................................................................. [CA.93C.180]
[CA.93C.20]
Indictment for affray
That AB [and CD] on .......... at .......... in the said State did use/threaten (delete whichever is inapplicable) unlawful violence towards DE (or persons unknown) and that such conduct of the said AB [and CD] was such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety. [CA.93C.40]
Jurisdiction
Affray is listed in Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 260(1) of that Act, affray is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elect otherwise. By s 267(2)–(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, if dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty for affray is two years imprisonment and/or a fine of 100 penalty units. [CA.93C.60]
Elements of affray
The prosecution must prove that the accused: 1. used or threatened unlawful violence towards another; 2. either intentionally, or being aware that his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence; 3. as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present to fear for his or her personal safety.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 93C
[CA.93C.60]
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Although s 93C(1) speaks of “a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear etc” by s 93C(4), the prosecution does not have to prove that a person of reasonable firmness was actually at, or was likely to have been present at, the scene. “Unlawful” means without lawful excuse: see [CLP.80]. Self-defence is a lawful excuse which applies to affray: R v Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638; 34 A Crim R 277; R v Sharp [1957] 1 QB 552; 2 WLR 472. [CA.93C.80] Nature and history of affray Affray was a very old common law misdemeanour. Its history has been judicially considered.1 The term “affray” is derived from the French “effrayer” meaning terror,2 which was an essential element of the offence. The essence of common law affray, in its principal form, was “that two or more fight together to the terror of the Queen’s subjects”.3 Another form of affray was to brandish terrifying weapons: see [CA.93C.100] below. Affray is designed for the protection of the bystander and envisages at least three people: 1. the person using or threatening unlawful violence; 2. a person towards whom the violence or threat is directed; and 3. a person of reasonable firmness who need not actually be, or be likely to be present at the scene.4 Affray was conceived by the common law as one of a number of offences designed to uphold public order and to protect the public against lawlessness and disorder.5 Despite its antiquity, affray fell into desuetude until the latter half of the twentieth century.6 Before then reported cases on affray were rare.7 Since then, affray has been considered in a number of English cases. Although affray is not infrequently charged in Australia, judicial consideration here of the offence is scant. Where it is appropriate, there are real procedural advantages in charging affray. A typical affray involves a gang attacking or threatening others. The conduct is continuous. Even though there are in fact a series of assaults, assault can be difficult to charge. Those threatened can be hard to identify – for their own safety they tend to leave or remain at a distance. It can be hard to get evidence of particular assaults. Witnesses’ accounts of what actually happened tend to be confused.8 Charging affray simplifies prosecution. No individual blow or threat need be proven. No particular victim need be identified. Where a melee continues for some time, affray can be charged as continuous conduct. A case where an affray fell into separate sequences was held to give rise to special considerations.9 It has been noted that all persons participating in an affray are in law principals but the actual role of some may in fact be the encouragement or assistance of others.10 Common purpose is not an element of the offence of affray.11 In England affray was made a statutory offence by s 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 (UK). The terms of s 93C are very close to those in the English Act. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
R v Button [1966] AC 591 (HL); R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 (HL). R v Button [1966] AC 591 at 601 per Marshall J (CCA). R v Button [1966] AC 591 at 625 per Lord Gardiner LC for the House of Lords. Commentary to R v Davison [1992] Crim LR 31 at 32–33 approved in R v Sanchez [1996] Crim LR 572 (CA). R v Button [1966] AC 591 at 609 per Marshall J (CCA). R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 984 per Lord Hailsham LC. R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 988 per Lord Reid. R v Okutgen (1982) 8 A Crim R 262 at 263 per Starke J (Vic CA). R v Christopher Smith [1997] 1 Cr App R 14 (CA). R v Annakin (1988) 17 NSWLR 202 (note); 37 A Crim R 131 at 149 (A Crim R) (NSW CCA). Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 64 NSWLR 645; 155 A Crim R 573 per Johnson J at [50].
[CA.93C.100] Element 1 – Use or threat of unlawful violence towards another “Violence” is defined in s 93A as any violent conduct – for the purpose of affray it does not include violent conduct towards property, but is not restricted to conduct intended to cause injury or damage. Of common law affray it was said in England “affray is typically charged in cases of pitched street battles between rival gangs, spontaneous fights in public houses, clubs and at seaside resorts, and revenge attacks
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[CA.93C.100]
Part 3A – Offences relating to public order Division 1 – Riot and affray
s 93C
Although usually an offence committed by joint unlawful fighting and with several people accused,6 affray can be committed by only one person acting unlawfully. Section 93C(2) implicitly recognises this. With a fight involving only one aggressor, that person will not be acquitted of affray simply because the victim acts in lawful self-defence.7“… [O]ne of the combatants may be lawfully acting in self-defence. The fight may be just as real a fight and just as terrifying as if both combatants were wrongdoers. Onlookers will fear that if the unlawful assailant wins he will attack them.”8 To constitute affray the violence or threats must be unlawful. Self-defence is a defence to a charge of affray.9“[A] person who merely defends himself against the attack of another and does not himself attack is not guilty of affray.”10 It was held in an English case that it was not a defence to commencing an affray that the police were trying to effect an unlawful arrest.11 It has been said that at common law a person cannot consent to an affray.12 Apart from actual violence, overt threats of violence can sometimes cause fear in others. The brandishing of weapons to the terror of others has long been a form of affray.13 But the mere possession of a weapon is not necessarily enough and whether there is an affray may depend on the type of weapon.14
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Section 93C(3) provides that for affray, a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone.15 However, setting a dog on police officers with the words “go on, go on” so that the dog in effect, became a weapon, was held sufficient.16 1 Law Commission working paper Offences Against Public Order (Law Com No 82 (1982)) referred to in I v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 285 (HL) per Lord Hutton at [8]. 2 R v Christopher Smith [1997] 1 Cr App R 14 at 17 per Lord Bingham CJ. 3 R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 987 per Lord Hailsham LC. 4 R v Scarrow (1968) 52 Cr App R 591; R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 989 per Lord Reid; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 (CA). 5 R v Scarrow (1968) 52 Cr App R 591. 6 R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 990 per Lord Morris. 7 R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 approving R v Scarrow (1968) 52 Cr App R 591; R v Summers (1972) 56 Cr App R 604. 8 R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 989 per Lord Reid. 9 R v Sharp [1957] 1 QB 552; 2 WLR 472; R v Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638; 34 A Crim R 277 (NSW CCA). 10 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 at 503 per Lord Lane CJ. 11 R v Purdy [1975] QB 288; (1974) 60 Cr App R 30 (CA). 12 R v Raabe [1985] 1 Qd R 115; 14 A Crim R 381 (CCA) at 118 (Qd R); 383 (A Crim R) per Connolly J. 13 The Statute of Northampton 1328 (aimed at stopping the lord of the manor riding with men riding armed into the market place) forbade the carrying or brandishing in public of unusual or terrifying weapons: R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 984 per Lord Hailsham LC, noting that R v Meade (1903) 19 TLR 540 was a prosecution under this Act. 14 I v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 285 per Lord Hutton for the House of Lords at [10] and [16] (the carrying of petrol bombs by a group can, in some circumstances, constitute a threat of violence without them being waved or brandished). As to petrol bombs, see also M v West London Youth Court; Ex parte M (unreported, 7 July 1999) referred to in the commentary to R v Thind [1999] Crim LR 842 at 843. 15 The UK equivalent section was considered in R v Robinson [1993] Crim LR 581 (CA). 16 R v Dixon [1993] Crim LR 579 (CA).
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on individuals”.1 In another case “[affray] typically involves a group of people who may well be shouting, struggling, threatening, waving weapons, throwing objects, exchanging and threatening blows …”.2 The use of violence may be one-sided3 and the offence may be committed although the persons attacked did not resist or retaliate.4 In an English case three men went into a hotel and were “fighting everyone, young and old, punching, kicking and no one retaliated”. They were held guilty of affray.5 Section 93C(2) provides that if violence is used or threatened by two or more people, it is the conduct of them taken together that must be considered.
Crimes Act 1900 s 93C [CA.93C.120]
[CA.93C.10] Element 2 – Intention or awareness
The mental element for affray is set out in s 93D(2) which provides that a person is guilty of affray only if the person intends to use or threaten violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence. The mental state of the defendant can be inferred from their actions.1 1 Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 64 NSWLR 645; 155 A Crim R 573 per Johnson J at [61].
[CA.93C.140]
Element 3 – Causing a person of reasonable firmness present to fear for their personal safety
The essence of affray is that the aggression of person 1 directed against person 2 causes (or would cause) person 3 to fear for his or her own safety.1 It is the effect of the aggression on a third party which distinguishes affray from assault. “[I]n each case the wrongful act is the same yet the mischief of the act falls on the victim in the offence of assault but on the bystander in the offence of affray.”2 The question is not whether the immediate victim feared for his or her safety, but whether the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness, who need not actually be present, would fear for his or her safety.3 Failure to make this requirement of the creation of fear in a bystander clear to a jury will constitute a misdirection.4
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Section 93C(4) now provides expressly that no person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. In a case before the corresponding English provision was enacted, it was explained, “[t]here will in most cases be evidence available from actual uninvolved bystanders as to the nature and degree of the violence being exhibited, but the absence of such evidence does not mean that the prosecution must fail. It would be strange if it were otherwise, because uninvolved members of the public are likely, if they are wise, to make themselves scarce at the first signs of trouble. It would scarcely be just if this fact allowed the defendants to escape conviction.”5 Consistently, s 93C(5) provides that affray may be committed in private as well as in public places. Additionally, it has been held that in a situation where there was no outsider likely to have been aware of fighting in a car park after hours, an innocent intended victim of the fighting or violence could be a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene.6 While it is open to the prosecution to prove that any people present in fact feared for their personal safety, “if people are present it is not necessary to prove by their evidence that they were terrified. It is enough if the circumstances are such that ordinary people like them would have been terrified.”7 1 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 at 505 per Lord Lane CJ for the Court of Appeal. 2 R v Button [1966] AC 591 at 625 per Lord Gardiner LC for the House of Lords. 3 See commentary following report of R v Thind [1999] Crim LR 842. 4 R v Sanchez [1996] Crim LR 572; R v Thind [1999] Crim LR 842. 5 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 at 505 per Lord Lane CJ for the Court of Appeal. 6 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501. 7 R v Taylor [1973] AC 964 at 989 per Lord Reid.
[CA.93C.160]
Jury directions
The English Court of Appeal generally approved the following common law direction: “Affray” is an old English word, not one we use very often today, but what it means is this that a number of people, two will do, start fighting in a public road or place in such a way that people who may be present may well get frightened. The old English word used to be “terrified”. So what the prosecution has to prove … is, first of all, that that accused person took part in a fight in a public place … Second, that the fighting that went on was such as might well frighten any ordinary person passing
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[CA.93C.180]
s 93F
by. The prosecution has not got to prove that anyone was frightened; the prosecution has not got to prove that someone was passing by; but the prosecution must prove that the character of the fighting which was going on was such that it might well frighten.1 Note
1 Direction to a jury by Paull J in R v Mapstone [1964] 1 WLR 439; [1963] 3 All ER 930 quoted in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1983) [1985] 1 All ER 501 at 503 per Lord Lane CJ for the Court of Appeal.
[CA.93C.180]
Sentencing considerations
The level of violence used and the scale of the affray are factors relevant to sentence.1 A distinction can be drawn between premeditated affrays, including pitched street battles of rival groups, and affrays which break out spontaneously in response to an unforeseen event.2 1 R v McCormack [1981] VR 104; (1980) 2 A Crim R 405 at 108 (VR); 409 (A Crim R) (CCA). 2 R v Huynh [2000] NSWCCA 18 at [29].
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93D
Mental element under sections 93B and 93C
(1) A person is guilty of riot only if the person intends to use violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent. (2) A person is guilty of affray only if the person intends to use or threaten violence or is aware that his or her conduct may be violent or threaten violence. (3) Subsection (1) does not affect the determination for the purposes of riot of the number of persons who use or threaten violence. [S 93D reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
93E
Offences of riot, rout, affray abolished [Repealed]
[S 93E rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[6]; reinsrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
DIVISION 2 – EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS OFFENCES [Former Pt 3B renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[7]; insrt Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)] [Former Pt 3B heading subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[7]; am Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
93F
Interpretation
(1) In this Division: firearm, imitation firearm, pistol and prohibited firearm have the same meanings as in the Firearms Act 1996. [Def am Act 40 of 2010, Sch 3.8[2]]
unregistered firearm means a firearm that is not registered under the Firearms Act 1996, but does not include any such firearm that is not required to be registered under that Act. [Def am Act 92 of 2010, Sch 3]
(2) For the purposes of this Division, a person who is in a vehicle or vessel in a public place is taken to be in that place. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]
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The concluding words “might well frighten” are not strong enough. Section 93C(1) requires that the conduct would not might cause a person to fear for their safety. Also by s 93C(5), affray is not limited to public places. With these alterations and making the word conform to s 93C, the words above may be suitable as a basis for a jury direction.
Crimes Act 1900 s 93F
[CA.93F.20]
(3) In subsection (2), vehicle includes a caravan or anything else constructed to be drawn by a vehicle or animal. [S 93F am Act 92 of 2010; Act 40 of 2010; Act 38 of 2007; subst Act 92 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; am Act 54 of 1998; Act 13 of 1992; reinsrt Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
SECTION 93F COMMENTARY [CA.93F.20]
General
Section 4 of the Firearms Act 1996 contains definitions of “firearm” and “prohibited firearm”. 93FA
Possession, supply or making of explosives
(1) A person who possesses an explosive in a public place is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who possesses, supplies or makes an explosive, under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person did not possess, supply or make the explosive for a lawful purpose, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years or 50 penalty units, or both. [Subs (2) subst Act 57 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3[2]]
(3) [Repealed]
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[Subs (3) rep Act 42 of 2012, Sch 1.5]
(4) A person is not guilty of an offence against subsection (1) or (2) for possessing or making an explosive if the person satisfies the court that he or she had a reasonable excuse for doing so or did so for a lawful purpose. [S 93FA am Act 42 of 2012; Act 57 of 2007; insrt Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
93FB
Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms
(1) A person who, in a public place, possesses: (a) anything (not being a firearm within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996) capable of discharging by any means: (i) any irritant matter in liquid, powder, gas or chemical form or any dense smoke, or (ii) any substance capable of causing bodily harm, or (b) a fuse capable of use with an explosive or a detonator, or (c) a detonator, or (d) a distress signal, or distress flare, that operates by emitting a bright light, is liable, on conviction before the Local Court, to imprisonment for 2 years, or a fine of 50 penalty units, or both. [Subs (1) am Act 59 of 2014, Sch 1.1[3]; Act 94 of 2007, s 4 and Sch 2; Act 121 of 2001, s 4 and Sch 2.72[45]]
(2) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section for possessing anything referred to in subsection (1) if the person satisfies the court that he or she had a reasonable excuse for possessing it or possessed it for a lawful purpose. (3) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section for possessing anything referred to in subsection (1)(a) if the person satisfies the court that he or she possessed it for the purpose of self-defence and that it was reasonable in the circumstances to possess it for that purpose. (4) In considering a defence under subsection (3), the court must have regard to its reasonableness in all the circumstances of the case, including:
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[CA.93FB.40]
s 93G
(a) the immediacy of the perceived threat to the person charged, and (b) the circumstances, such as the time and location, in which the thing was possessed, and (c) the type of thing possessed, and (d) the age, characteristics and experiences of the person charged. [S 93FB am Act 59 of 2014; Act 94 of 2007; former s 545E renum Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; am Act 121 of 2001; Act 54 of 1998; Act 17 of 1994; insrt Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(8)]
[CA.93FB.20]
“Reasonable Excuse”
The carrying of a pressurised canister of formaldehyde to defend oneself if the person happened to be attacked was not a lawful purpose or reasonable excuse as the Act showed in 1992: Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386. As to the meaning of “reasonable excuse”, see [CLP.80]. [CA.93FB.40]
General
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The decision of the High Court in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 may be summarised as follows. Section 545E(1) [now s 93FB] treats an article or thing capable of discharging a harmful substance or irritant matter as a dangerous weapon: it proceeds on the basis that where a person brings into a public place an item capable of discharging an irritant or a substance capable of causing bodily harm, it is probable that the item was so brought with the intention of causing harm and, even if that intention is not present, the availability of such an item in a public place enables it to be used to cause harm. Unless excused under s 545(2), possession of the item in a public place sufficiently constitutes an offence. In construing s 545E(2), “lawful purpose” is ordinarily to be read as a purpose that is authorised by law. The meaning of “lawful” depends on its context. In this instance, the purpose, context and subject matter of the subsection indicated that the legislature had used “lawful purpose” to mean a purpose positively authorised by law. What is reasonable excuse depends not only on the circumstances of the individual case but also on the purpose of the provision of which the defence “reasonable excuse” is an exception. The courts are thus obliged, in relation to s 545E, to make value judgments (amounting virtually to political judgments) as to what circumstances giving rise to a well-founded fear of attack entitled a person to be armed with a prohibited article or thing. The courts thus being left to make judgments probably better left to politicians in Parliament, it is impossible to conclude that “self-defence” could never be a “reasonable excuse” for the purposes of the section. 93G
Causing danger with firearm or spear gun
(1) Any person who: (a) possesses a loaded firearm or loaded spear gun: (i) in a public place, or (ii) in any other place so as to endanger the life of any other person, or (b) fires a firearm or spear gun in or near a public place, or
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SECTION 93FB COMMENTARY “Reasonable Excuse” ..................................................................................................................... [CA.93FB.20] General .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.93FB.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 93G
[CA.93G.20]
(c)
carries or fires a firearm or spear gun in a manner likely to injure, or endanger the safety of, himself or herself or any other person or any property, or with disregard for the safety of himself or herself or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) For the purposes of this section: (a) a firearm is to be regarded as being loaded if there is ammunition: (i) in its chamber or barrel, or (ii) in any magazine or other device which is in such a position that the ammunition can be fitted into its chamber or barrel by operation of some other part of the firearm, and (b) a spear gun is to be regarded as being loaded if a spear, or an instrument or thing similar to a spear, is fitted to it. (3) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section for possessing or doing anything referred to in subsection (1) if the person satisfies the court that he or she had a reasonable excuse for possessing it or doing it or possessed it or did it for a lawful purpose. [S 93G reinsrt Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
SECTION 93G COMMENTARY Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................... [CA.93G.20] Terms defined .................................................................................................................................. [CA.93G.40]
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[CA.93G.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of the offence that the accused: 93(1)(a) 1. possessed a loaded firearm (spear gun); 2. (i) in a public place; or (ii) in any other place so as to endanger the life of any other person.1 93(1)(b) 1. fired a firearm (spear gun) in or near a public place. 93(1)(c) 1. carried a firearm (spear gun); 2. (i) in a manner likely to injure, or endanger the safety of himself (herself) or any other person or any property; or (ii) with disregard for the safety of himself (herself) or any other person. 1 It is not necessary and not an element of the offence that the possession of the firearm referred to in s 93(1)(a) is with the intention to endanger life: R v Piltz (2004) 59 NSWLR 538; [2004] NSWCCA 34.
[CA.93G.40]
Terms defined
“Possession”, see s 7. “Public place”, see s 8. Possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle (or at least an enclosed motor vehicle) on a public road does not constitute possession of that firearm in a public place: Hardman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2003) 57 NSWLR 390; (2003) 138 A Crim R 560; [2003] NSWCA 130. “Reasonable excuse”, see [CLP.80].
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Part 3A – Offences relating to public order Division 2 – Explosives and firearms offences
93GA
s 93H
Firing at dwelling-houses or buildings
(1) A person who fires a firearm at a dwelling-house or other building with reckless disregard for the safety of any person is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (1A) A person who, during a public disorder, fires a firearm at a dwelling-house or other building with reckless disregard for the safety of any person is liable to imprisonment for 16 years. (1B) A person who, in the course of an organised criminal activity, fires a firearm at a dwelling-house or other building with reckless disregard for the safety of any person is liable to imprisonment for 16 years. [Subs (1B) insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
(2) In the prosecution of an offence under this section, it is not necessary to prove that a person was actually placed in danger by the firing of the firearm. (3) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under this section, the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence but is satisfied on the evidence that the person is guilty of an offence under section 93G or 93H, it may find the person not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 93G or 93H, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (4) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1A) or (1B), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence but is satisfied on the evidence that the person is guilty of an offence under subsection (1), it may find the person not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under subsection (1), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly.
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[Subs (4) insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[2]] [S 93GA am Act 3 of 2012; Act 61 of 2006; insrt Act 92 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93H
Trespassing with or dangerous use of firearm or spear gun
(1) A person who, possessing a firearm, imitation firearm, spear gun or imitation spear gun, enters any building or land (other than a road), unless the person: (a) is the owner or occupier of the building or land or has the permission of the owner or occupier, or (b) does so with a reasonable excuse, or (c) does so for a lawful purpose, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who fires a firearm or spear gun in or into any building or on or on to any land, unless the person: (a) is the owner or occupier of the building or land or has the permission of the owner or occupier, or (b) does so with a reasonable excuse, or (c) does so for a lawful purpose, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (2) am Act 50 of 1970, s 4]
(3) The onus of proving the matters referred to in subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) and subsection (2)(a), (b) and (c) lies with the defendant. [S 93H subst Act 13 of 1992, s 7 and Sch 5(2); reinsrt Act 27 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3); rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; am Act 50 of 1970; insrt Act 43 of 1946, s 4]
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[Subs (1A) insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[10]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 93I
[CA.93H.20]
SECTION 93H COMMENTARY [CA.93H.20]
Terms defined
“Firearm”, see [9.2230]. “Possession”, see s 7. “Reasonable excuse”, see [CLP.80]. “Lawful excuse”, see s 417. 93I
Possession of unregistered firearm in public place
(1) A person who: (a) possesses an unregistered firearm in a public place, and (b) is not authorised under the Firearms Act 1996 to possess the firearm, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), an offence under subsection (1) is committed in circumstances of aggravation if the offence involves the possession: (a) of more than one unregistered firearm, or (b) of an unregistered firearm that is a pistol, or (c) of an unregistered firearm that is a prohibited firearm.
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[S 93I reinsrt Act 92 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; rep Act 38 of 1973, s 84 and Sch 2; insrt Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 93I COMMENTARY [CA.93I.20]
Terms defined
“Possession”, see s 7. “Public place”, see s 8. Possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle (or at least an enclosed motor vehicle) on a public road has been held not to constitute possession of that firearm in a public place: Hardman v Director of Public Prosecutions (2003) 57 NSWLR 390; (2003) 138 A Crim R 560; [2003] NSWCA 130. This decision may not apply to possessing an unregistered firearm in a public place.
DIVISION 3 – CONTAMINATION OF GOODS [Former Pt 3C renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [Former Pt 3C heading subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[8]]
93J
Definitions of “contaminate” and “goods”
(1) In this Division: contaminate goods includes: (a) interfere with the goods, or (b) making it appear that the goods have been contaminated or interfered with. goods includes any substance or article: (a) whether or not for human consumption, and
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s 93M
whether natural or manufactured, and whether or not incorporated or mixed with other goods.
[Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]
(2) In this Division, a reference to economic loss caused through public awareness of the contamination of goods includes a reference to economic loss caused through: (a) members of the public not purchasing or using those goods or similar goods, or (b) steps taken to avoid public alarm or anxiety about those goods or similar goods. [S 93J am Act 38 of 2007; former s 93IA renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93K
Contaminating goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss
A person who contaminates goods with the intention of: (a) causing public alarm or anxiety, or (b) causing economic loss through public awareness of the contamination, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Former s 93IB renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; am Act 54 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 2.6[5]; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93L Threatening to contaminate goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss
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(1) A person who makes a threat that goods will be contaminated with the intention of: (a) causing public alarm or anxiety, or (b) causing economic loss through public awareness of the contamination, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, a threat may be made by any act, and may be explicit or implicit and conditional or unconditional. [Former s 93IC renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93M Making false statements concerning contamination of goods with intent to cause public alarm or economic loss (1) A person who makes a statement that the person believes to be false: (a) with the intention of inducing the person to whom the statement is made or others to believe that goods have been contaminated, and (b) with the intention of thereby: (i) causing public alarm or anxiety, or (ii) causing economic loss through public awareness of the contamination, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, making a statement includes conveying information by any means. [Former s 93ID renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
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[Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 93N 93N
Aggravated circumstances—unwarranted demand
(1) A person is guilty of an offence against this section if the person commits an offence under section 93K, 93L or 93M in connection with an unwarranted demand by the person. An unwarranted demand is a demand that the person believes he or she does not have any reasonable grounds for making. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[15]]
(2) A person convicted of an offence against this section is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) If on the trial of a person for an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 93K, 93L or 93M, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (3) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[15]] [S 93N am Act 38 of 2007; former s 93IE renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93O
Aggravated circumstances—death or grievous bodily harm
(1) A person is guilty of an offence against this section if the person commits an offence against section 93K or 93L and: (a) the contamination of the goods causes the death of any person or grievous bodily harm to any person, or (b) the person intends by that contamination to cause such death or harm. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[16]]
(2) A person convicted of an offence against this section is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) If on the trial of a person for an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 93K or 93L, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (3) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[16]] [S 93O am Act 38 of 2007; former s 93IF renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
93P
Special provisions relating to geographical application of this Division
(1) A person commits an offence against a provision of this Division if: (a) the person does an act outside the State that constitutes the offence, and (b) (apart from this section) the act would have constituted the offence had it been done within this State, and (c) the offence involves intending to cause public alarm or anxiety, or economic loss, within the State. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]
(2) A person who commits an offence by the operation of this section may be dealt with, and is liable to the same punishment, as if the person had committed the offence within the State. (3) If an offence against a provision of this Division involves intending to cause public alarm or anxiety, or economic loss, within the State, a geographical nexus between the State and any other element of the offence is not required. [Subs (3) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]; Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
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s 93R
(4) The other provisions of this Act, the provisions of other Acts and the common law, in so far as these are applicable, apply to an offence to which this section applies as if it had been committed within the State (for example, section 344A and the rules of law relating to attempts to commit offences apply to such an offence). (5) This section is in addition to and does not derogate from any other basis on which the courts of the State may exercise criminal jurisdiction.
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[S 93P am Act 38 of 2007; former s 93IG renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[9]; am Act 43 of 2000; insrt Act 89 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 1[2]]
DIVISION 4 – BOMB AND OTHER HOAXES [Former Pt 3D renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[10]; insrt Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[5]] [Former Pt 3D heading subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[10]]
93Q
Conveying false information that a person or property is in danger
(1) A person who conveys information: (a) that the person knows to be false or misleading, and (b) that is likely to make the person to whom the information is conveyed fear for the safety of a person or of property, or both, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) This section extends to conveying information by any means including making a statement, sending a document, or transmitting an electronic or other message.
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(3) In this section, a reference to the safety of a person includes the safety of the person who conveys the information and the person to whom it is conveyed. [Former s 93IH renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[11]; insrt Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[5]]
93R
Leaving or sending an article with intent to cause alarm
(1) A person: (a) who leaves in any place, or sends by any means, a substance or article, and (b) who intends to induce a false belief that the substance or article is likely to be a danger to the safety of a person or of property, or both, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, a false belief that a substance or article is likely to be a danger includes a false belief that the substance or article is likely to explode, ignite, or contain, consist of or discharge a dangerous matter. [Former s 93II renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[11]; insrt Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[5]]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 93S
DIVISION 5 – CRIMINAL GROUPS [Former Pt 3E renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[12]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[11]] [Former Pt 3E heading subst Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[3]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[12]]
93S
Definitions
(1) In this Division: criminal group means a group of 3 or more people who have as their objective or one of their objectives: (a) obtaining material benefits from conduct that constitutes a serious indictable offence, or (b) obtaining material benefits from conduct engaged in outside New South Wales (including outside Australia) that, if it occurred in New South Wales, would constitute a serious indictable offence, or (c) committing serious violence offences, or (d) engaging in conduct outside New South Wales (including outside Australia) that, if it occurred in New South Wales, would constitute a serious violence offence.
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law enforcement officer has the same meaning as it has in Division 8A of Part 3. serious violence offence means an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 10 years or more, where the conduct constituting the offence involves: (a) loss of a person’s life or serious risk of loss of a person’s life, or (b) serious injury to a person or serious risk of serious injury to a person, or (c) serious damage to property in circumstances endangering the safety of any person, or (d) perverting the course of justice (within the meaning of Part 7) in relation to any conduct that, if proved, would constitute a serious violence offence as referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]]
(2) A group of people is capable of being a criminal group for the purposes of this Division whether or not: (a) any of them are subordinates or employees of others, or (b) only some of the people involved in the group are involved in planning, organising or carrying out any particular activity, or (c) its membership changes from time to time. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[14]] [S 93S am Act 38 of 2007; former s 93IJ renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[13]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[11]]
93T
Participation in criminal groups
(1) A person who participates in a criminal group is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is a criminal group, and (b) knows, or ought reasonably to know, that his or her participation in that group contributes to the occurrence of any criminal activity. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (1) subst Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[4]]
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s 93TA
(1A) A person who participates in a criminal group by directing any of the activities of the group is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) knows that it is a criminal group, and (b) knows, or is reckless as to whether, that participation contributes to the occurrence of any criminal activity. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person who assaults another person, intending by that action to participate in any criminal activity of a criminal group, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (3) A person who destroys or damages property belonging to another person, or threatens to destroy or damage property belonging to another person, intending by that action to participate in any criminal activity of a criminal group, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (4) A person who assaults a law enforcement officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, intending by that action to participate in any criminal activity of a criminal group, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. (4A) A person who participates in a criminal group whose activities are organised and on-going by directing any of the activities of the group is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) knows that it is a criminal group, and (b) knows, or is reckless as to whether, that participation contributes to the occurrence of any criminal activity. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (4A) insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[5]]
(5) For the purposes of this section, an action is taken to be carried out in relation to a law enforcement officer while in the execution of the officer’s duty, even though the law enforcement officer is not on duty at the time, if it is carried out: (a) as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by that law enforcement officer in the execution of the officer’s duty, or (b) because the officer is a law enforcement officer. [S 93T am Act 3 of 2012; former s 93IK renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[13]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[11]]
93TA
Receiving material benefit derived from criminal activities of criminal groups
(1) A person who receives from a criminal group a material benefit that is derived from the criminal activities of the criminal group is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) knows that it is a criminal group, and (b) knows, or is reckless as to whether, the benefit is derived from criminal activities of the criminal group. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) In this section, a material benefit derived from the criminal activities of a criminal group is a material benefit derived or realised, or substantially derived or realised, directly or indirectly, from the criminal activities of a group. [S 93TA insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[6]]
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[Subs (1A) insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[4]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 93U 93U
Alternative verdicts
(1) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 93T(1A), (2), (3), (4) or (4A), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 93T(1), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 93T(1), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (2) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 93T(1), (1A) or (4A), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 93TA, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under section 93TA, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (2) insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[8]] [S 93U am Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[7]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[17]; former s 93IL renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[13]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[11]]
DIVISION 6 – UNLAWFUL GAMBLING [Div 6 heading insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[18]]
93V
Offence of conducting unlawful gambling operation
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(1) A person who conducts an unlawful gambling operation is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 1,000 penalty units or imprisonment for 7 years (or both). (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an unlawful gambling operation means an operation involving at least 2 of the following elements (one of which must be paragraph (d)): (a) the keeping of at least 2 premises (whether or not either or both are gambling premises) that are used for the purposes of any form of gambling that is prohibited by or under the Unlawful Gambling Act 1998, (b) substantial planning and organisation in relation to matters connected with any such form of prohibited gambling (as evidenced by matters such as the number of persons, and the amount of money and gambling turnover, involved in the operation), (c) the use of sophisticated methods and technology (for example, telephone diverters, telecommunication devices, surveillance cameras and encrypted software programs) in connection with any such form of prohibited gambling or in avoiding detection of that gambling, (d) a substantial loss of potential revenue to the State that would be derived from lawful forms of gambling. (3) In any proceedings for an offence under this section, evidence that persons have been in regular attendance at premises suspected of being used for the purposes of any form of gambling that is prohibited by or under the Unlawful Gambling Act 1998 is relevant to the matters referred to in subsection (2)(a) or (b). (4) In this section: conduct includes organise or manage. gambling premises has the same meaning as in the Unlawful Gambling Act 1998. [Former s 344 renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[19]; reinsrt Act 113 of 1998, s 59 and Sch 2.4; rep Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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[CA.93X.20]
s 93X
DIVISION 7 – CONSORTING [Div 7 insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[9]]
93W
Definitions
In this Division: consort means consort in person or by any other means, including by electronic or other form of communication.
CA
convicted offender means a person who has been convicted of an indictable offence (disregarding any offence under section 93X). [S 93W insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[9]]
93X
Consorting
(1) A person who: (a) habitually consorts with convicted offenders, and (b) consorts with those convicted offenders after having been given an official warning in relation to each of those convicted offenders, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years, or a fine of 150 penalty units, or both.
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(2) A person does not habitually consort with convicted offenders unless: (a) the person consorts with at least 2 convicted offenders (whether on the same or separate occasions), and (b) the person consorts with each convicted offender on at least 2 occasions. (3) An official warning is a warning given by a police officer (orally or in writing) that: (a) a convicted offender is a convicted offender, and (b) consorting with a convicted offender is an offence. [S 93X insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[9]]
SECTION 93X COMMENTARY History and purpose of section ........................................................................................................ [CA.93X.20] Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................. [CA.93X.40] Elements of the offence and jurisdiction .......................................................................................... [CA.93X.60] Element (1) Habitual consorting with two or more convicted offenders .......................................... [CA.93X.80] Element (2) Consorting after having been given an official warning ............................................. [CA.93X.100] Criticism of the offence of habitual consorting ............................................................................... [CA.93X.120]
[CA.93X.20]
History and purpose of section
An offence of habitually consorting with reputed criminals was first introduced into the Vagrancy Act 1902 by an amendment in 1929 in the era of the East Sydney “razor gangs”.1 In this era, New Zealand and various Australian states had similar legislation making it an offence to “habitually consort with reputed thieves”. A history of the offence of consorting is contained in two papers, one in 2013 by Andrew McLeod, On the Origins of Consorting Laws, and the other, in 2003 by Associate Professor Alex Steel, Consorting in New South Wales: Substantive Offence or Police Power?2 In 1979, an offence of habitually consorting with persons who have been convicted of indictable offences was introduced into the Crimes Act 1900 as s 546A (now repealed). Carrying a maximum penalty of only six months imprisonment, s 546A was said to be “too hard to prove” and was rarely prosecuted.3
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Crimes Act 1900 s 93X
[CA.93X.20]
Section 93X was enacted to “modernise” the offence of consorting, to “deter people from associating with a criminal milieu”4 and to “replace and clarify” the offence.5 The validity of s 93X was upheld by a 5:2 majority in the High Court in Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 241 A Crim R 381; [2014] HCA 35. Of the rationale for s 93X, Hayne J said at [78]: … The premise for the prohibition is that stopping association with the designated class will prevent those who are forbidden to consort from using the occasion of their association to consider or explore the possibility of one or more of them (or others) engaging in some criminal act and will thereby prevent crime. Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said at [111]: It may be inferred, from the terms of s 93X, that the provision is targeted, albeit indirectly, to the prevention of crime. Convicted offenders who are not able to associate amongst themselves and with others on a regular basis may find it more difficult to organise criminal activities and enlist others to participate in such activities. It has been said in South Australia: “[t]he legislative intent is, as I think, precautionary and preventative, rather than to administer punishment for dishonest planning, criminal transactions, or machinations whilst the group are together”.6 In Tasmania: “[h]owever contrary to legal principle it may be, it is an effective weapon for breaking up associations of criminals …”.7 The offence of consorting has long been criticised as an unwarranted incursion into civil liberties and as, in reality, a police power dressed up as a substantive offence. Some criticisms are noted at [CA.93X.120] below.
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1 Introduced by the Vagrancy (Amendment) Act 1929 (Act 30 of 1929). 2 A McLeod, “On the Origins of Consorting Laws” (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 103; A Steel, “Consorting in New South Wales: Substantive Offence or Police Power?” (2003) University of New South Wales Law Journal 567. 3 The Honourable John Ajaka (Parliamentary Secretary), Legislative Council debate following the Second Reading of the Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 March 2012 p 9091). 4 The Honourable David Clarke, Second Reading Speech on behalf of the Minister for Police, Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 March 2012 p 9091). 5 Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012, Explanatory note – Overview of Bill (e). 6 Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 at 202 per Mayo J. 7 Bryan v White [1962] Tas SR 113 at 116 per Gibson J.
[CA.93X.40]
Indictment/charge
That AB between (about) .......... and (about) .......... at .......... in the State of New South Wales did habitually consort with two or more convicted offenders, namely CD, EF and GH and did consort with those said convicted offenders after having been given an offıcial warning in relation to each of those said convicted offenders. [CA.93X.60]
Elements of the offence and jurisdiction
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) habitually consorted with two or more convicted offenders, and (2) consorted with those convicted offenders after having been given an official warning in relation to each of those convicted offenders. Proclaimed to commence on 9 April 2012, the offence of consorting under s 93X is an indictable offence. As such, there is no time limit under s 179 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 for the commencement of proceedings. As a Sch 1 Table 2 offence, under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, it is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment.
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[CA.93X.80] [CA.93X.80]
s 93X
Element (1) Habitual consorting with two or more convicted offenders
Various cases discuss what habitual consorting means, including three High Court decisions. In MacDonald v The King (1935) 52 CLR 739; [1935] HCA 18 at 743 (CLR), in the context of the offence of “habitually consorting with reputed criminals”, Rich J said, “[t]he offence connotes frequenting the company of reputed criminals and is a question of degree. It is inadvisable and, perhaps, impossible, to attempt an exhaustive definition of the offence”. The meaning of “consorts” was considered in Johanson v Dixon (1979) 143 CLR 376; 53 ALJR 494; [1979] HCA 23 where Mason J said: In its context “consorts” means “associates” or “keeps company” and it denotes some seeking or acceptance of the association on the part of the defendant (Brown v Bryan [1963] Tas SR 1 at 2). … It is not for the Crown to prove that the defendant has consorted for an unlawful or criminal purpose. The words creating the offence make no mention of purpose … Nor does the word “consorts” necessarily imply that the association is one which has or needs to have a particular purpose.2
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In Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 241 A Crim R 381; [2014] HCA 35 at [64], Hayne J said that the meaning given by Mason J should be adopted. Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [101] also quoted Mason J and said: The fundamental ingredient of association of this kind is companionship, or seeking out the company of the other person. It follows that not every meeting with a convicted offender would qualify as habitually consorting. Keane J in Tajjour at [215] said that “[i]t has long been understood that ‘consorting’ involves the seeking out or acceptance of a relationship of personal intimacy”. Another description of “consorts” is a personal relationship, or at least some degree of familiarity, “that results in a tendency towards companionship”.3 To an extent, “consort” itself implies acting habitually4, but the expression “habitually consorts” is a joint one. “In ascertaining the purpose of … [the provision] it must be kept in mind that both words ‘habitually consorting’ jointly give the statutory concept. The adverb limits the scope”.5 “Habitually” is “used often as an antithesis to ‘occasionally’”.6 “A man habitually consorts with reputed thieves when it is his habit to be a companion of reputed thieves”.7 Whether or not consorting is habitual is a question of degree.8 Individual instances cannot be “segregated into separate compartments” and the whole of the evidence must be considered.9 Relevant factors include the number and frequency of meetings or communications, the circumstances, the length of time and the degree of intimacy involved.10 What is important is the cumulative weight of all the instances.11 The whole of the facts must be looked at together to determine whether or not there was an habitual consorting. “One incident alone would be insufficient, and so perhaps would two or three incidents ….”12 As Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 241 A Crim R 381; [2014] HCA 35, the earlier Johanson v Dixon and other cases make clear, the prosecution does not have to prove a criminal purpose in the various meetings; purpose is irrelevant.13 As a practical consideration, “it would in most cases be impossible to disprove or counter an assertion by a person against whom proceedings were taken under this section that the object of his consorting on any particular occasion was not unlawful”.14 Meetings taking place in a public place or in places open to the public do not take such meetings outside the provision.15 Consorting is not concerned with “a chance encounter”.16 The mens rea is intentional habitual consorting.17 “Convicted offenders” - habitual consorting no longer relies on the old concept of “reputed thieves”, but under s 93W, rather on the firmer concept of a person convicted of an “indictable offence”. By s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, an indictable offence is an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment, see [4.50] and also [4.170], [CPA.8.20] and s 260. As to proof of convictions, see s 178 of the Evidence Act 1995.
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“Habitually consorts” - the “definition” of “consort” in s 93W widens the concept of consort from face to face meetings to include “electronic or other forms of communication”. The “amendments will ensure that networks established via Facebook, Twitter and SMS will not be immune from these provisions”.1 Nevertheless, there is no statutory definition of what “consort” means.
Crimes Act 1900 s 93X
[CA.93X.80]
Requirement of at least 2 convicted offenders on at least 2 occasions with each – the former of these two requirements under s 93X(2) reflects the established idea (expressed in a Tasmanian case) that “the true intent and object of … [the provision] is to punish habitual companionship with reputed thieves … as a class and the offence is not constituted by habitual companionship with only one member of the class”.18 Concerning the minimum number of occasions that must be proved, a judge commented, “[n]o rule can be laid down as to what measure of frequency is requisite. It is a question of degree depending on all the circumstances …”.19 As earlier observed, the occasions must be sufficient to show a habit of consorting. It is suggested that circumstances would need to be exceptional to show a habit from only two meetings or other communication. According to Associate Professor Steel in his paper20, “[the] cumulative approach to proving habit appears to lie behind a longstanding practice by New South Wales police of making six ‘bookings’ before laying a charge. [footnote] This practice appears to result from police cautiousness.” Professor Steel’s footnote says, “Apparently this is based on dicta of Bavin J in Ex parte Corbett re Kelly (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 51 that ‘[e]vidence that an accused was seen in the company of reputed criminals on seven occasions within six months … is sufficient to support a charge of habitually consorting’: in Cheryl-Ann Brunskill, “Consorting” (2003) 11 Policing Issues and Practice Journal 1, 2.’ As a general rule of thumb, this approach, while perhaps overly cautious, may be a reasonable one. As pointed out at [CA.93X.60], there is no time limit under s 93X.
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1 The Honourable David Clarke, Second Reading Speech on behalf of the Minister for Police, Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 March 2012 p 9091). 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Barwick CJ and Stephen J agreed with Mason J, as did Aickin J in a detailed judgment. Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 at 201 per Mayo J. O’Connor v Hammond (1902) 21 NZLR 573 at 577 per Stout CJ. Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 at 202 per Mayo J. O’Connor v Hammond (1902) 21 NZLR 573 at 576 per Stout CJ. Brealy v Buckley [1934] ALR 371 at 372 per Gavan Duffy J. MacDonald v The King (1935) 52 CLR 739; [1935] HCA 18 at 743 (CLR) per Rich J; Barber v Harvey (1942) 60 WN (NSW) 32 at 33 per Maxwell J; Benson v Rogers [1966] Tas SR 97 at 98 per Burbury CJ. Barber v Harvey (1942) 60 WN (NSW) 32 at 33 per Maxwell J. Clarke v Nelson, Ex parte Nelson [1936] QWN 17 at 19 per Macrossan SPJ; Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 at 201 per Mayo J. Reardon v O’Sullivan [1950] SASR 77 at 79 per Ligertwood J. See also Brealy v Buckley [1934] ALR 371; Auld v Purdy (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 218; Barber v Harvey (1942) 60 WN (NSW) 32. Auld v Purdy (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 218 at 220 per Street J. See also Barber v Harvey (1942) 60 WN (NSW) 32 at 33 per Maxwell J. Johanson v Dixon (1979) 143 CLR 376; 53 ALJR 494; [1979] HCA 23; Dias v O’Sullivan [1949] SASR 195 at 202 per Mayo J; Bryan v White [1962] Tas SR 113 at 116 per Gibson J; Young v Bryan [1962] Tas SR 323 at 333 per Burbury CJ. Bryan v White [1962] Tas SR 113 at 116 per Gibson J. Beer v Toms; Ex parte Beer [1952] St R Qd 116 at 127 per Townley J. Bryan v Brown [1963] Tas SR 1 at 2 (Full Court). See Gabriel v Lenthall [1930] SASR 318 at 325 per Richards J. Porter v Bryan [1963] Tas SR 41 at 43 per Burbury CJ. Reardon v O’Sullivan [1950] SASR 77 at 79 per Ligertwood J. A Steel, “Consorting in New South Wales: Substantive Offence or Police Power?” (2003) University of New South Wales Law Journal 567.
[CA.93X.100]
Element (2) Consorting after having been given an official warning
The requirement of an official warning about consorting with convicted offenders addresses two issues. As the definition of “official warning” in s 93X(3) contains both the requirement of warning a person orally or in writing that a convicted offender is a convicted offender and that consorting with a convicted offender is
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Part 3A – Offences relating to public order Division 7 – Consorting
[CA.93Y.20]
s 93Y
an offence, firstly, this provides proof that the person warned knows, from at least that time, that the consortee is a convicted offender and that consorting with him is an offence. Secondly, the latter requirement serves to promote the stated aim of deterring people from associating with a criminal milieu. It will be noted that s 93X(1)(b) requires an official warning in relation to each of the convicted offenders involved. Criticism of the offence of habitual consorting
Criminalising habitual consorting has long attracted significant criticism. It was acknowledged in the 2012 Parliamentary debate that consorting laws have been misused in the past.1 Consorting can be directed at otherwise innocent people. “Apart from the statute the conduct to be punished may be quite innocent. A person may find, by reason of the family into which he was born and the environment in which he must live, that it is virtually impossible to avoid mixing with people who must be classed as reputed thieves. He is to be punished not for any harm which he has done to others, but merely for the company which he has been keeping, however difficult and even disloyal it might be to avoid it. The wisdom and even the justice of such a law may be, and often has been, questioned”.2 Some groups, such as indigenous people, have disproportionate numbers of convictions and may be prevented from interacting with their extended kin.3 The range of indictable offences is very wide and conviction of an indictable offence does not necessarily indicate membership of a criminal milieu.4 Aiding a suicide (s 31C) and unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to and from a computer (s 308E) are examples.
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Criticisms notwithstanding, as mentioned in [CA.93X.20], against a long history of enactments of this kind, the High Court has upheld the validity of s 93X. 1 The Honourable John Ajaka (Parliamentary Secretary), Legislative Council debate following the Second Reading of the Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012 (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 March 2012 p 9091). 2 Jan v Fingleton (1983) 32 SASR 379; 9 A Crim R 293 at 380 (SASR) per King CJ. 3 David Shoebridge MLC, Legislative Council debates, Hansard, 7 March 2012, p 9091. 4 See A Steel, “Consorting in New South Wales: Substantive Offence or Police Power?” (2003) University of New South Wales Law Journal 567.
93Y
Defence
The following forms of consorting are to be disregarded for the purposes of section 93X if the defendant satisfies the court that the consorting was reasonable in the circumstances: (a) consorting with family members, (b) consorting that occurs in the course of lawful employment or the lawful operation of a business, (c) consorting that occurs in the course of training or education, (d) consorting that occurs in the course of the provision of a health service, (e) consorting that occurs in the course of the provision of legal advice, (f) consorting that occurs in lawful custody or in the course of complying with a court order. [S 93Y insrt Act 3 of 2012, Sch 1[9]]
SECTION 93Y COMMENTARY [CA.93Y.20]
Defence to a charge of habitual consorting
This defence appears to require a person charged with habitually consorting to prove (1) that the consorting fell within one of the categories in s 93Y(a)–93Y(f), and (2) was reasonable in the circumstances. It appears to be left to the courts to determine (2).
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[CA.93X.120]
Crimes Act 1900 s 93Y
[CA.93Y.20]
Concerning s 93Y(a), the case of family members, it was said in the Second Reading Speech of the Bill that introduced s 93Y, Consorting with extended family may … be reasonable in circumstances where the defendant is heavily reliant on, or lives in a community based on, extended kinship. It may not however be reasonable in other situations. The onus will be on the defendant to bear and one for the court to determine on a case by case basis.1 1 The Hon. David Clarke on behalf of the Minister for Police, Second Reading of the Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Bill 2012, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 7 March 2012, p 9091)
An earlier habitual consorting provision in Tasmania provided a defence of “good and sufficient reasons” for consorting. Consistently with other authorities, it was held that this does not include showing that the purpose of consorting was not for an unlawful purpose, see [CA.93X.60]; but that, although these words are inexact, “they must include a notion of fairness”.1
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1 Bryan v White [1962] Tas SR 113 at 118 per Gibson J.
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Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 2 – Robbery
[CA.94AA.20]
s 94
PART 4 – STEALING AND SIMILAR OFFENCES [Pt 4 heading subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[2]]
DIVISION 1 – GENERAL [Former subdiv 1 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 1 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[19]]
Property previously stolen
Where on the trial of a person for any offence which includes the stealing of any property it appears that the property was, at the time when it was taken by the accused, already out of the possession of the owner by reason of its having been previously stolen, the accused may be convicted of the offence charged notwithstanding that it is not proved that the taking by him or her amounted to an interference with the right to possession of, or a trespass against, the owner. [Former s 93J renum Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[20]; am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[4]; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 94AA COMMENTARY [CA.94AA.20]
General
The section removes the common law effect that a person who obtains stolen property cannot be guilty of larceny.1
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1 R v King (1817) Russ & Ry 332; 168 ER 830; R v Davies [1970] VR 27.
DIVISION 2 – ROBBERY [Former subdiv 2 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 2 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[20]]
94
Robbery or stealing from the person
Whosoever: robs or assaults with intent to rob any person, or steals any chattel, money, or valuable security from the person of another, shall, except where a greater punishment is provided by this Act, be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [S 94 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 48 of 1966, s 2]
SECTION 94 COMMENTARY Indictments ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.94.20] Jurisdiction, related offences and cross references ........................................................................... [CA.94.40] Robbery .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.94.60] Elements of robbery ........................................................................................................................... [CA.94.80] Robbery element (1) Unlawful taking and carrying away ................................................................ [CA.94.100] Robbery element (2) From another’s person, presence or immediate care etc .............................. [CA.94.120] Robbery elements (3) Against the victim’s will and (4) By force or by putting in fear .................... [CA.94.140] Robbery element (5) Taking with intention to permanently deprive ................................................. [CA.94.160] Sentencing for robbery ..................................................................................................................... [CA.94.180] Elements of the offence of assault with intent to rob ....................................................................... [CA.94.200]
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94AA
Crimes Act 1900 s 94
[CA.94.20]
Assault with intent to rob element (1) Assault .................................................................................. [CA.94.220] Assault with intent to rob element (2) Intent to rob .......................................................................... [CA.94.240] Elements of the offence of stealing from the person ....................................................................... [CA.94.260] The nature of stealing from the person ............................................................................................ [CA.94.280] Stealing from the person element (1) Unlawful taking and carrying away ...................................... [CA.94.300] Stealing from the person element (2) From another’s person ......................................................... [CA.94.320] Stealing from the person element (3) Intent to permanently deprive .............................................. [CA.94.340] Sentencing for stealing from the person .......................................................................................... [CA.94.360] Alternative verdicts ........................................................................................................................... [CA.94.380]
[CA.94.20]
Indictments
Robbery: That AB on the .......... day of .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did rob CD of certain moneys, namely $ .......... [or chattels etc – describe] the property of CD. Assault with intent to rob: That AB on the .......... day of .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did assault CD with intent to rob him/her [or with intent to rob EF]. Stealing from the person:
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That AB on the .......... day of .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did steal certain moneys, namely $ .......... [or chattels etc – describe] the property of CD, from the person of CD. Notes – An allegation of “assault and rob” is not duplicitous but “assault and” is surplusage and should not be included: R v Smith (1990) 47 A Crim R 43. Where an employee is robbed of goods etc belonging to his or her employer, it does not matter if the indictment alleges that the goods etc were the property of the employee, rather than of the employer, as, at the relevant time, they will have been in the employee’s possession. In the case of a charge of stealing from the person, a count for receiving may be added: see Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.94.40]
Jurisdiction, related offences and cross references
Charges of robbery and assault with intent to rob cannot be dealt with summarily. In the case of a charge of stealing from the person, for an offence alleged to have been committed after 1 September 1995, the charge is to be dealt with summarily unless: • where the value of the property does not exceed $5,000, the prosecutor elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment, and • where the value of the property does exceed $5,000, either the prosecutor or the accused person elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment, See ss 259 and 260 and Sch 1 Tables 1 Pt 2 and 2 Pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related offences: s 95: s 96: s 97: s 98:
Aggravated robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person – 20 years Aggravated robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person - with wounding or grievous bodily harm – 25 years Armed robbery and robbery in company – 20 years – if armed with dangerous weapon – 25 years Robbery or assault with intent to rob while armed or in company and with wounding or grievous bodily harm – 25 years
Cross-references:
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Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 2 – Robbery
[CA.94.100]
s 94
• Section 61 – common assault. • Section 117 – larceny. • Section 344A – attempts. [CA.94.60]
Robbery
“Robbery” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. An offence at common law, the ingredients of robbery were stated in R v Donnelly (1779) 1 Leach 193; 168 ER 199: The definition of robbery, … is “a felonious and violent taking of any money or goods from the person of another, putting him in fear”; from which it is evident, that to constitute the crime of robbery, three ingredients are necessary: First, a felonious intent, or animus furandi: Secondly, some degree of violence, or putting in fear: and Thirdly, a taking from the person of another.3
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This statement from Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 is often quoted: The essence of the offence is that violence is done or threatened to the person of the custodian who stands between the robber and the property in order to prevent or overcome his resistance and oblige him to part with the property and submit to the thief stealing it. Thus the offence against the person and the theft are combined. … the offence can only exist where the victim has sufficient care or personal possession of the goods to allow the court to say that constructively the goods were taken “in his presence” … It is a question of degree for the jury to decide whether the victim of the violence was sufficiently the custodian of the property stolen, whether he had sufficient possession and care of it, to constitute the stealing as being in his presence.4 Smith v Desmond contains a detailed analysis of the historical development of the offence of robbery. R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1 also considered the nature of the offence at length. 1 Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 per Lord Pearce at 993 (AC). 2 R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1 at 47 (VR). 3 Quoted by Lord Morris in Smith v Desmond at 982 (AC). Other definitions are to be found in R v Hickman (1784) 1 Leach 278; 168 ER 241 (quoted at [CA.94.140]) and R v Harding (1930) 21 Cr App R 166. 4 Smith v Desmond per Lord Pearce at 997–999. This passage has been quoted with approval by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Bellamy (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 February 1993); R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 at 222 and R v Jacobs (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [163].
[CA.94.80]
Elements of robbery
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) unlawfully took and carried away of property of some value; (2) from the person of another, or in his or her presence, or from under his or her immediate and personal care and protection; (3) against his or her will; (4) either by force or putting him or her in fear; and (5) with the intention of permanently depriving him or her of that property. [CA.94.100]
Robbery element (1) Unlawful taking and carrying away
Intention to steal – the accused must be shown to have had a larcenous intent (animus furandi) existing at the time of the use of the force or the putting of the victim in fear.1 Claim of right – a bona fide claim of right to the money or property taken constitutes a good defence. Claim of right is considered in detail at [CA.117.200], including its application to robbery.
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Robbery is an aggravated form of theft and is a combination offence consisting of stealing and an assault,1 “… at common law, robbery was always considered to be a crime of violence whether carried out by actual force or merely putting a person in fear.”2
Crimes Act 1900 s 94
[CA.94.100]
Taking and carrying away – the prosecution must show that the property was taken by or delivered into the absolute possession of the accused for at least some period, however short.2 While there must not only be a taking, but a carrying away as well, any movement of the property from its original position, however slight, is a sufficient carrying away.3 As per element (5), such movement must be accompanied by an intention to permanently deprive. The act of appropriation of property can be a continuous one and it is for the jury to decide when it is complete.4 An old authority held that provided there is initially an intention to permanently deprive, robbery is committed even if the robber immediately returns the property to its owner.5 It has been held that the doctrine of recent possession is applicable to a charge of robbery.6
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Property of some value – any property may be the subject of robbery. Provided it is of some value to the victim, its actual value is immaterial.7 “Valuable security” is defined in s 4. 1 Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976; R v Pollock [1967] 2 QB 195; [1966] 2 WLR 1145; [1966] 2 All ER 97; R v Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166; [1967] 2 WLR 665; [1967] 1 All ER 483; R v Emery (1975) 11 SASR 169; R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391. 2 R v Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320; 168 ER 263 where an accused pulled an earring from a woman’s ear tearing the ear. The accused did not retain the earring as it became entangled in the victim’s hair. This was held to be robbery as the earring was in the accused’s possession for a moment, separate from the woman’s person and was taken by violence. See also R v Farrell (1787) 1 Leach 322 and R v Simpson (1854) Dears 421; 169 ER 788. 3 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230. See also R v Coslet (1782) 1 Leach 236; 168 ER 220; R v Thompson (1825) 1 Mood CC 78; 168 ER 1192; Wallis v Lane [1964] VR 293. The principle is illustrated by the following two cases. In R v Cherry (1781) 1 Leach 236n; 2 East PC 556, a man got into a waggon containing a bale of linen lying horizontally. He raised the bale perpendicularly and cut it to remove the contents but was discovered before being able to do so. The judges held that as the property had not been removed from the place where it first lay, there was not a sufficient carrying away. Compare the similar case of R v Coslet where goods in a waggon were moved within the waggon by the accused. This was held to be a sufficient taking and carrying away. 4 R v Hale (1979) 68 Cr App R 415 (CA) where an accused who had forced his way into a house, picked up a jewellery box before tying up the occupant. On appeal following conviction for robbery, the argument that the jewellery box had already been stolen when the tying up occurred was rejected. 5 R v Peat (1781) 1 Leach 228; 168 ER 216. 6 R v Fallon (1963) 47 Cr App R 160; R v Connolly (No 2) [1991] 2 Qd R 661. Compare R v Smith (1986) 7 NSWLR 444; 23 A Crim R 266 at 283 (A Crim R) (NSW CCA). 7 R v Bingley (1833) 5 Car & P 602; 172 ER 1118 (a note of a debt written on a slip of paper); R v O’Leary (1865) 2 WW & a’B (L) 13 (Vic Sup Ct FC) (the taking of a calico pocket torn from the victim’s clothing).
[CA.94.120]
Robbery element (2) From another’s person, presence or immediate care etc
It is not necessary for the person having custody of the property to be physically present at the time of the theft if, at the time of the assault, the property was under his care and protection.1 In Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 Lord Morris said at 985: If someone had a number of chattels in his immediate care and protection and was then overpowered and was taken some distance away and was then left bound, gagged and blindfolded it would still be robbery even though at the actual moment when the chattels were taken away he could neither hear anything nor see anything, and even though the actual removal of the chattels only took place some time later than the initial application of the force.2 Lord Pearce said at 998: The only relevance of the victim’s awareness is this. Is he aware of the theft or intended theft and is he compelled by force or fear to submit to it? Or has he been prevented by violence or threat from becoming aware of the theft and has that enabled the thieves to steal? If the answer to either of these questions is yes, the offence against the person and the theft are combined and the offence of robbery is constituted.
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Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 2 – Robbery
[CA.94.140]
s 94
It is a question of degree for the jury to decide whether the victim of the violence was sufficiently the custodian of the property stolen, whether he had sufficient possession and care of it, to constitute the stealing as being in his presence.3
1 Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976. See also Clements v The State (1890) 11 SE 505 (USA) referred to in Smith v Desmond (cash taken from house of man forcibly confined to nearby shed); R v Grocock (1888) 14 VLR 51 (stationmaster assaulted at door of his office by accused who then took money from inside the office); R v McNamara [1965] VR 372 (victim assaulted in lounge room connected by an open door to the adjoining room from where property was taken). Compare R v Langlands [1932] VLR 450. 2 Smith v Desmond. See also R v Selway (1859) 8 Cox CC 235 and R v McNamara. Compare R v Langlands and R v Hall [1964] 1 QB 273; [1963] 3 WLR 482; [1963] 2 All ER 1075. 3 Smith v Desmond per Lord Pearce at 999, and see Lord Morris at 985–986. 4 R v Phipoe (1795) 2 Leach 673; 168 ER 438 where the victim, at knife point, was forced to write a promissory note on paper supplied by the accused. This was held not to be a robbery as the note was not of value to the victim and was not in his peaceable possession. 5 R v Harding (1930) 21 Cr App R 166 (employee’s property in employer’s coat). See also Smith v Desmond (cash stolen out of hours from a night watchman and a maintenance engineer at a bakery).
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[CA.94.140]
Robbery elements (3) Against the victim’s will and (4) By force or by putting in fear
Against the victim’s will – the prosecution must show that the property was taken against the will of the victim by actual force used or by putting the victim in fear. “The true definition of ‘robbery’ is the stealing or taking from the person, or in the presence of another, of property of any amount, with such a degree of force or terror, as to induce the party unwillingly to part with his property” (emphasis added).1 If the victim states that he did not part with his property from any apprehension of force to his person, it is not robbery.2 Force – the force may be applied to the person of the victim, or directed towards or threatened against a third party.3 A sudden taking or snatching of property from a person unawares and without touching or stopping the victim is not robbery.4 It is only force used intentionally against the victim in the taking of property which suffices for robbery. Thus, an accused who cut a woman’s hand while trying to sever a string which secured her basket so that he could steal it, was held not guilty of robbery.5 “[T]he force used must be … of such a nature as to shew that it was intended to overpower the party robbed, and prevent his resisting, and not merely to get possession of the property stolen.”6 If violence is used, the force applied need not be great. Any force will suffice7 and the dividing line between stealing from the person and robbery can be fine. Jostling a person so as to make him lose balance has been held to be sufficient force for robbery.8 It has been judicially observed that force is an ordinary word, understood by juries, and that whether in a given case force was used is a question for the jury.9 The level of force used in a simple robbery under s 94 may vary greatly. In R v Agius (2000) 77 SASR 469; 115 A Crim R 387; [2000] SASC 259, Olsson J for the SA Court of Criminal Appeal at [52] observed that “robbery with violence spans situations which amount to little more than bag snatching, at one extreme, to circumstances involving great brutality and which are inherently more serious than some types of what is, technically, armed robbery at the other.” Force and stealing must coincide – there must be an intention to steal at the time the force is used or before. If the accused forms an intention to steal only after force is used, there is no robbery.10 The force (or the putting in fear) must be before or at the time of the taking. Force used after a theft is complete will not amount to robbery.11
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It was long ago held that the property taken must have been the victim’s property and have been “in his peaceable possession”.4 However, it is not necessary that the person from whom the property is taken be the actual owner of the property or even in possession of it as a bailee. It can be sufficient if the property is in the victim’s presence or under his or her protection.5 As s 94AA makes clear, even stolen property may be the subject of robbery.
Crimes Act 1900 s 94
[CA.94.140]
Putting in fear – a threat of violence will support a charge of robbery just as well as actual force.12 “A man with … a pistol in his hand, demands and obtains the money of another without touching his person”.13
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As to nature of the fear necessary, East E, Pleas of the Crown (1806), Vol 2 said at p 713: I may venture to state, that on the one hand the fear is not confined to an apprehension of bodily injury, and on the other hand it must be of such a nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with his property against his will, and to put him as it were under a temporary suspension of the power of exercising it through the influence of the terror impressed, in which case the fear supplies as well in sound reason as in legal construction, the place of force. It is unnecessary that there be actual danger provided there is a reasonable fear of danger in the victim (eg a threat using a replica pistol).14 There need not always be an actual demand. The threat may be implied,15 for example, if money is paid by the victim from terror, a express demand by the accused may not be necessary.16 Can a threat to property constitute a suffıcient threat for robbery? There is some old authority in England for the proposition that a threat of damage to the victim’s property can be putting in fear for the purpose of the offence of robbery17 and the proposition appears in older texts and is referred to in a relatively modern case.18 However, each of these cases involved threats to property by a mob and hence, there may have been in each a perception of physical danger by the victim. There does not appear to be any reported case of a robbery by an accused alone making a threat of injury to the victim’s property. There is no Australian case for the proposition that a threat to property can suffice for robbery. Can a threat to impugn the victim’s character suffıce for robbery? While there are old authorities to the effect that a threat to the victim’s character (such as an accusation of sodomy) can be sufficient to ground a charge of robbery,19 there is no modern example of such a case. 1 R v Hickman (1784) 1 Leach 278; 168 ER 241. 2 R v Reane (1794) 2 Leach 616; 168 ER 410. 3 In R v Donnelly (1779) 1 Leach 193; 168 ER 199 at 196 (Leach), Hotham B said that it is robbery for an accused to threaten another’s child so as to induce that person to hand over property. See also R v Cheshire (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 129. Archbold (1995) Vol 2, [21]–[91] states, “The force may be directed at a person who is not the victim of the theft if such force is used in order to effect the theft.” The example is given of an accused who threatens a wife with violence so that her husband who is present will hand over his wallet. 4 R v Baker (1783) 1 Leach 290; 168 ER 247; R v Walls (1845) 2 Car & K 214; 175 ER 89; Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 1; 113 A Crim R 196; [2000] NSWCA 125 per Powell JA at [7]. 5 R v Edwards (1843) 1 Cox CC 32. 6 R v Gnosil (1824) 1 Car & P 304; 171 ER 1206. 7 R v Harrison (1931) 22 Cr App R 82. 8 R v Dawson (1977) 64 Cr App R 170. 9 R v Dawson. 10 R v Emery (1975) 11 SASR 169 where Bray CJ said at 173, “It is undoubted law that robbery is a crime in which violence and dishonesty must coincide; see Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960…”. 11 R v Gnosil; R v Emery; R v Hanias (1976) 14 SASR 137; R v Butcher [1986] VR 43; (1985) 16 A Crim R 1; R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517. See also the facts of R v Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134. 12 R v King (2004) 59 NSWLR 515; 144 A Crim R 405; [2004] NSWCCA 20 at [52] per Grove J and at [126] per Davidson AJ. 13 R v Donnelly at 196 (Leach). 14 R v Donnelly. 15 R v Blackham (1787) 2 East PC 711. 16 R v Blackham where a woman, without any demand being made, gave money to the accused who was trying to rape her to induce him to stop. 17 R v Simons (1773) 2 East PC 731; R v Spencer (1783) 2 East PC 712; R v Astley (1792) 2 East PC 729; R v Winkworth (1830) 4 Car & P 444; 172 ER 775.
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18 For example, The Crimes Act 1900, Hamilton H & Addison G, (1902), Law Book Co, p 107 and later editions and see R v Butcher at 54 (VR). Compare Gillies P, Criminal Law 3rd ed, Law Book Co, p 498 . 19 For example, R v Donnelly; R v Hickman and R v Knewland (1796) 2 Leach 721; 168 ER 461. These cases and other such cases were considered in R v Pollock [1967] 2 QB 195; [1966] 2 WLR 1145; [1966] 2 All ER 97.
Robbery element (5) Taking with intention to permanently deprive
“The element of stealing that is essential in this crime is stealing within the ordinary common law concept, that is to say the taking and carrying away of the property of another with the intention of permanently depriving that other of his property.”1 Thus, the taking of a vehicle from its owner as a get-away car with the intention of abandoning it was held not to support a conviction for robbery.2 “The deemed larceny under s 154A [of the taking and driving of a vehicle] does not include this intention to permanently deprive the victim of his property. It is not plainly within the ordinary common law concept of larceny …”.3 A trial judge’s failure to direct on this issue can cause a conviction for robbery to be set aside.4 1 2 3 4
R R R R
v v v v
Salameh (1986) 26 A Crim R 353 per Street CJ at 358 (NSW CCA). Salameh. Salameh per Street CJ at 358. Tucker (1984) 36 SASR 135; 13 A Crim R 447 (a case of stealing from the person).
[CA.94.180]
Sentencing for robbery
In R v Murray (unreported, CCA (NSW), 11 September 1986), Lee J for the court said that robbery, whether with or without arms, is be regarded in virtually all circumstances as an offence of the utmost gravity which must carry a custodial sentence. This statement was applied in R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 23 at 26.
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[CA.94.200]
Elements of the offence of assault with intent to rob
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) assaulted the complainant; (2) with the intention of robbing the complainant (or some other person).1 The elements of robbery are set out at [CA.94.80] above. Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 makes assault with intent to rob an alternative verdict where the principle charge is that of robbery. 1 Archbold (1995) Vol 2, [21]–[91] where it is said, “The force may be directed at a person who is not the victim of the theft if such force is used in order to effect the theft.” The example is given of an accused who threatens a wife with violence so that her husband who is present will hand over his wallet.
[CA.94.220]
Assault with intent to rob element (1) Assault
Assault – for detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.80]ff. An assault often involves, but does not necessarily involve, a battery. In Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439, it was said, An assault is any act which intentionally – or possibly recklessly – causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence. Although “assault” is an independent crime and is to be treated as such, for practical purposes today “assault” is generally synonymous with the term “battery” and is a term used to mean the actual intended use of unlawful force to another person without consent.1 In R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472, Barwick CJ said of assault in the common law sense, Such an assault necessarily involves the apprehension of injury or the instillation of fear or fright. It does not necessarily involve physical contact with the person assaulted: nor is such physical contact, if it occurs, an element of the assault. Central to assault in the present context is the creation of fear. In Dougan v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 135; [2006] NSWCCA 34 it was stated,
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[CA.94.160]
Crimes Act 1900 s 94
[CA.94.220]
An element of assault with intent to rob is intentionally causing another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence with the intent thereby of depriving a person of his or her property, ie the intention must be to compel the victim by fear to submit to the theft.2 1 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 per James J at 444 (Lord Parker CJ and Bridge J agreeing) and quoted by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314. Of this quotation it is said in Archbold (1995) Vol 2, [21]–[93] that it is difficult to see how a reckless assault could suffice for robbery because if the assault was not intended, it could not be said to have been committed with the intention to commit robbery. 2 Dougan v The Queen (2006) 160 A Crim R 135; [2006] NSWCCA 34 per Hoeben J at [26].
[CA.94.240]
Assault with intent to rob element (2) Intent to rob
Intent to rob – as to robbery, see commentary at [CA.94.60]ff. The prosecution must prove an intentional assault coupled with an intention to rob.1 Absent an admission, the intention to rob must be spelt out from the circumstances, that is, the time and place of the assault, the expressions and gestures of the accused, etc. An actual demand for money, etc, need not necessarily be proved.2 The trial judge must give directions on the constituent elements of robbery, see [CA.94.80]. Where a trial judge failed to direct the jury on the intent required to permanently deprive the victim of his property, a conviction for assault to rob was set aside on appeal.3 For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication – by s 428B, assault with intent to rob is an offence of specific intent. As such, the effect of alcohol is relevant to the question of whether an accused in fact had the intention to rob.4
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Claim of right – a claim of right may be a defence to a charge of assault with intent to rob.5 Claim of right is considered in detail at [CA.117.200]. In a case in 1844, a claim of right was allowed in answer to a charge of assault with intent to rob; the right claimed being a right to recover money owed to a friend of the accused by the father of a person from whom it was demanded.6 A claim of right is not a defence to assault itself.7 1 2 3 4 5 6
R v Barnett (1848) 2 Car & K 594; 175 ER 248. R v Trusty (1783) 1 East PC 418. R v Tucker (1984) 36 SASR 135; 13 A Crim R 447 (SA CCA). R v Makisi (2004) 151 A Crim R 245; [2004] NSWCCA 333. See for example R v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208. R v Boden (1844) 1 Car & K 395; 174 ER 863 per Parke B quoted by Gaudron J in Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 at 608 (CLR); 120 (A Crim R). See also R v Hemmings (1864) 4 F & F 50; 176 ER 462; R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102. 7 R v Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166; [1967] 2 WLR 665; [1967] 1 All ER 483.
[CA.94.260]
Elements of the offence of stealing from the person
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) unlawfully took and carried away of property of some value; (2) from the person of another; (3) with the intention of permanently depriving that person of such property. [CA.94.280]
The nature of stealing from the person
While force or putting in fear is not an actual element of stealing from the person,1 its potential is germane to the offence. The nature of the offence of stealing from the person was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134, a case involving violence and injury caused by the accused after he had snatched valuable jewellery from a salesman in a jewellery shop who had been showing the items to the accused. Smart AJ, who delivered the judgment, said at [25] that the offences of robbery, assault with intent to rob and steal from the person “are
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seen as part of an overall [legislative] scheme dealing with the graver thefts where there is violence or putting in fear or the potential for violence exist.” Dunford J, who agreed with Smart AJ, added at [29] that “stealing from the person should be regarded as a variant of robbery, rather than as a variant of larceny”. 1 R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 at 522; R v Hooper [2004] NSWCCA 10 at [27] per James J; Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (2000) 49 NSWLR 1; 113 A Crim R 196; [2000] NSWCA 125 per Powell JA at [6]; R v Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134.
Stealing from the person element (1) Unlawful taking and carrying away
Common cases of stealing from the person are a bag snatch or a pick pocketing. It is immaterial whether the stealing is effected by force or by stealth. It must be proved that the property stolen was completely detached from the person of the victim.1 However, once detached, little carrying away is required; it has been held that removal by “a hair’s breadth will do”.2 Note that a disturbance of property without a complete taking away may suffice for either an alternative verdict of attempted stealing from the person or of simple larceny,3 see Alternative verdicts [CA.94.380]. A claim of right may be a defence to a charge of stealing from the person, see commentary at [CA.117.200]. 1 R v Thompson (1825) 1 Mood CC 78; 168 ER 1192 (where a thief’s incomplete removal of a pocketbook from a victim’s pocket was held to be an insufficient asportation for stealing from the person); R v Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320; 168 ER 263; R v Simpson (1854) Dears 421; 169 ER 788; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12. 2 R v Simpson per Alderson B at 424 (Dears). See also R v Lapier. 3 R v Taylor. See also R v Walsh (1824) 1 Mood CC 14; 168 ER 1166; R v Coslet (1782) 1 Leach 236; 168 ER 220; Wallis v Lane [1964] VR 293.
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[CA.94.320]
Stealing from the person element (2) From another’s person
Older cases such as those referred to in element (1), concern stealing from the victim’s actual person. But two Australian authorities show that the ambit of “the person” in this context is more akin to the wider notion of “the person” in the case of robbery. In the South Australian case of R v Stewart [1929] SASR 500, the Court of Criminal Appeal there considered many of the old authorities and held that two accused who took banknotes from a bank officer who had the notes not on his person, but on a shelf under the counter in front of him, were properly convicted of stealing from the person. Stewart was followed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134 where it was said: … the crime of stealing from the person involves a personal confrontation and the potential for personal conflict and force or fear, particularly if the victim endeavours to stop the theft. In such circumstances it matters not whether the property stolen is on the person of the victim or in his immediate presence. It is unnecessary in this case to elaborate on what satisfies the requirement of the person’s immediate presence. It certainly embraces a case such as this where the victim is standing beside the property guarding it.1 If the property is with the victim in his or her room, rather than on his or her person, an offence may be committed under s 148. 1 R v Delk (1999) 46 NSWLR 340; 106 A Crim R 240; [1999] NSWCCA 134 per Smart AJ at [15] (Dunford and Greg James JJ agreeing). The High Court refused an application for special leave to appeal this decision.
[CA.94.340]
Stealing from the person element (3) Intent to permanently deprive
The taking by the accused must be with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of the property taken, see commentary at [CA.94.160] and under Larceny at [CA.117.320]. [CA.94.360]
Sentencing for stealing from the person
In the bag snatching case of R v Ranse (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 August 1994) Gleeson CJ said,
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[CA.94.300]
Crimes Act 1900 s 95
[CA.94.360]
One of the primary purposes of the system of criminal justice is to keep the peace. In this connection the idea of peace embraces the freedom of ordinary citizens to walk the streets and to go about their daily affairs without fear of physical violence. It also embraces respect for the property of others. Offences of the kind committed by the present respondent are not trivial instances of disrespect for private property. They are serious breaches of the peace. They are direct attacks upon the security of person and property which the law exists to protect.1 It has been held that, absent special circumstances, a bag snatching offence will attract a full time custodial sentence where violence is involved.2 This is particularly so where the victim is an older person.3 The fact that stealing from the person may be dealt with in the Local Court may justify some mitigation,4 but the significance of this can vary from case to case.5 If the matter is too serious to be dealt with in the Local Court, this factor will have little effect.6 1 This passage from Ranse has been quoted with approval in a number of cases, see R v Chmait [1999] NSWCCA 217 at [8]; R v Wilson (2001) 125 A Crim R 450; [2001] NSWCCA 399 at [35]; R v Maloukis [2002] NSWCCA 155 at [15] and R v Marinos [2003] NSWCCA 136 at [17]. 2 R v Taylor [2000] NSWCCA 442 at [48] per Wood CJ at CL. 3 R v Maloukis at [19]. 4 R v Trindall [2005] NSWCCA 446 at [37]. 5 R v Palmer [2005] NSWCCA 349 at [15]; R v Yassien [2006] NSWCCA 15 at [29]–[30]. 6 R v El Masri [2005] NSWCCA 167 at [29].
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[CA.94.380]
Alternative verdicts
On a charge of robbery or stealing from the person there may be a conviction for larceny under s 117.1 There may be a conviction for an attempt or an assault with intent to rob: s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The issue of an alternative verdict should be opened by the Crown and in any case it must be raised before the opening addresses.2 For commentary on alternative verdicts and the raising of them, see [4.5532]ff. 1 R v Holmes (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 6; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12; Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 at 970 (AC); R v Shendley [1970] Crim LR 49; R v Heaton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990); Mifsud v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 313. 2 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230.
95
Same in circumstances of aggravation
(1) Whosoever robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person, or steals any chattel, money, or valuable security, from the person of another, in circumstances of aggravation, shall be liable to imprisonment for twenty years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(3); Act 48 of 1966, s 2]
(2) In this section, circumstances of aggravation means circumstances that (immediately before, or at the time of, or immediately after the robbery, assault or larceny) involve any one or more of the following: (a) the alleged offender uses corporal violence on any person, (b) the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on any person, (c) the alleged offender deprives any person of his or her liberty. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(3)] [S 95 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966]
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SECTION 95 COMMENTARY Indictments ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.95.20] Jurisdiction, related offences and cross references ........................................................................... [CA.95.40] Elements of the aggravated offences ................................................................................................. [CA.95.60] Element (2) Circumstances of aggravation ........................................................................................ [CA.95.80] Alternative verdicts ........................................................................................................................... [CA.95.100] Sentencing under s 95 ..................................................................................................................... [CA.95.120]
Indictments
Aggravated robbery: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did rob CD of certain moneys, namely $ .......... [or chattels etc – describe] the property of CD in circumstances of aggravation, namely that immediately before (or at the time of or immediately after) the said robbery, the said AB (a) did use corporal violence on CD (or on EF), or (b) did intentionally (or recklessly) inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on EF), or (c) did deprive CD (or EF) of his (or her) liberty. Aggravated assault with intent to rob: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did assault CD with intent to rob him/her [or with intent to rob EF] in circumstances of aggravation, namely that immediately before (or at the time of or immediately after) the said assault, the said AB (a) did use corporal violence on CD (or on EF), or (b) did intentionally (or recklessly) inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on EF), or (c) did deprive CD (or EF) of his (or her) liberty. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Aggravated stealing from the person: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did steal certain moneys, namely $ .......... [or chattels etc – describe] the property of CD, from the person of CD in circumstances of aggravation, namely that immediately before (or at the time of or immediately after) the said stealing, the said AB (a) did use corporal violence on CD (or on EF), or (b) did intentionally (or recklessly) inflict actual bodily harm on CD (or on EF), or (c) did deprive CD (or EF) of his (or her) liberty. Note It is no longer appropriate to allege “assault and rob” in a charge of robbery, see [CA.94.20]. Where an employee is robbed of goods etc belonging to his or her employer, the indictment may allege that the goods etc were the property of the employee, rather than of the employer, as, at the relevant time, they will have been in the employee’s possession. Where the circumstance of aggravation alleged is the infliction of actual bodily harm as per s 95(2)(b), if the mens rea alleged is recklessness, the provisions of s 4A may be apposite, that is, that if an element of an offence is recklessness, that element may be established by proof of [actual] intention or knowledge, see s 4A. [CA.95.40]
Jurisdiction, related offences and cross references
The aggravated charges under s 95 cannot be dealt with summarily as none are listed in Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see ss 259 and 260. Related offences:
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[CA.95.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 95
[CA.95.40]
s 94: s 96:
Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person – 14 years Aggravated robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person – wounding or grievous bodily harm – 25 years Armed robbery and robbery in company – 20 years – if armed with dangerous weapon – 25 years Robbery or assault with intent to rob while armed or in company and with wounding or grievous bodily harm – 25 years
s 97: s 98:
Cross-references: • Section 61 – assault. • Section 117 – larceny. • Section 344A – attempts. [CA.95.60] Elements of the aggravated offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the constituent elements of robbery ([CA.94.80]), or assault with intent to rob ([CA.94.200]), or stealing from the person ([CA.94.260]); (2) and that either immediately before, at the time of or immediately after the robbery, assault or larceny, the accused: (a) used corporal violence on the complainant or on some other person; or (b) intentionally or recklessly inflicted actual bodily harm on the complainant or on some other person; or (c) deprived the complainant or some other person of his or her liberty.
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[CA.95.80]
Element (2) Circumstances of aggravation
“Immediately before” – “immediately after” – in R v Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238, Lee J said, “the word ‘immediately’ does not require to be given a meaning which would restrict the application of the section to an event occurring within seconds or minutes of the termination of those particular actions which constituted in law a robbery of the victim. The whole of the circumstances involved in the robbery must be looked at and a decision made against the entire context of the evidence in regard thereto.”1 Lee J said that whether an action which followed a robbery was “immediately after” the robbery was a question of fact for the jury to determine.2 “It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word ‘immediately’ in all cases. The words ‘forthwith’ and ‘immediately’ have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression ‘within a reasonable time’ and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay.”3 Jury direction on “immediately after” – R v Attard (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 April 1993) was a case of felony murder involving a fatal shooting during an armed robbery. The trial judge told the jury there was no hard and fast rule about the meaning of “immediately” but it meant the same as “forthwith”. Gleeson CJ said at p 7: It is not difficult to imaging borderline cases where the relationship in fact and time between the felony and the killing is such that a decision as to whether the latter occurred “immediately after” the former could involve a difficult judgment on a matter of degree. Even in such cases, it may be doubted whether there is much to be gained by instructing a jury in terms which substitute for the language of the statute some other verbal formula whose meaning is no more clear. There may be danger in doing so. (a) Use of corporal violence – Any degree of violence is sufficient.4 The relevant phrase before the section was amended in 1994 was “… strikes, or uses any other corporal violence to any person …”. A push may not be a “striking” but it is “corporal violence”.5 An accused who hit a victim with the handlebars of a child’s scooter causing bruising and a cut was held to have used corporal violence.6 Where an accused was charged as an accessory to robbery with corporal
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s 95
(b) Intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm – for general commentary on intentional acts, see [CLP.1400]. For commentary on recklessness, see [CA.4A.40]. Where recklessness is charged, proof of actual intention will also prove recklessness, see s 4A. The words “actual bodily harm” should be given their ordinary and natural meaning of actual bodily injury.8 “Bodily harm” includes “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort … Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling ….”9 An assault which causes an hysterical and nervous condition is an assault occasioning actual bodily harm.10
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(c) Deprivation of liberty – the act of depriving another of liberty without lawful excuse constitutes the common law offence of false imprisonment. For commentary on false imprisonment, see [CLO.520]–[CLO.620]. Also relevant are cases in relation to detaining in the context of kidnapping, see [CA.86.100]. A number of the authorities are considered in the South Australian case of R v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392; 40 A Crim R 213 (CCA) (a case of rape and false imprisonment) in the judgment of von Doussa J. The deprivation of liberty can be a confining of the victim in a house,11 or in a vehicle,12 in a public street13 or anywhere else. The restraint need only be momentary.14 A battery may not necessarily be an imprisonment itself.15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
R v Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238 at 247 (A Crim R) (Street CJ and Enderby J agreed). R v Elliott at 248 (A Crim R). R v Berkshire Justices (1878) 4 QBD 469 at 471 per Cockburn CJ. See also R v Elliott. R v Harrison (1931) 22 Cr App R 82. R v Clarke (1993) 71 A Crim R 58. See also R v Goolagong (unreported, CCA (NSW), 28 September 1994). R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62 at [22]. R v Hart (2002) 131 A Crim R 609; [2002] NSWCCA 313. R v Metharam [1961] 3 All ER 200; (1961) 45 Cr App R 304. R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; (1936) 25 Cr App R 1 at 509 (KB). See also R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44. R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282; (1954) 38 Cr App R 1. See also R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689; [1994] 2 All ER 552; (1994) 99 Cr App R 147. Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CBNS 180; 140 ER 1052. Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26 (by driving too fast for the victim to alight). Ludlow v Burgess (1982) 75 Cr App R 227; [1971] Crim LR 238. Simpson v Hill (1795) 1 Esp 431; 170 ER 409 per Eyre CJ; Sandon v Jervis (1859) El Bl & El 942; 120 ER 760. Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 671; Macpherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184.
[CA.95.100]
Alternative verdicts
If the circumstances of aggravation are not proved, the accused may be convicted of robbery or assault with intent to rob under s 94.1 On a charge of robbery or stealing from the person in circumstances of aggravation, there may be a conviction for larceny under s 117.2 Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides for alternative verdicts of attempt and assault with intent to commit the offence charged. The issue of an alternative verdict should be opened by the Crown and in any case, it must be raised before the closing addresses.3 As to whether the question of an alternative verdict should be raised by the trial judge, see the authorities referred to at [CPA.162.60]. 1 R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278. See also R v Stewart (1886) 12 VLR 567; R v Coughlan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990); R v Fitzpatrick (1988) 50 SASR 10.
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violence under s 95, it was held that a necessary element of that charge concerning the accused’s guilt as an accessory is that the prosecution establish that there was an agreement implicit or explicit between the actual assailant and the accused or that the accused had adverted to the possibility of violence and nevertheless decided to continue in the enterprise.7
Crimes Act 1900 s 96
[CA.95.100]
2 R v Holmes (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 6; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12; Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 at 970 (AC); R v Shendley [1970] Crim LR 49; R v Heaton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990). 3 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230.
[CA.95.120]
Sentencing under s 95
Henry guideline – the well known guideline judgment of R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 concerns armed robbery under s 97. Accordingly, the Henry guideline must be approached with caution when sentencing for an offence under s 95.1 It is an error for a sentencing judge to equate an offence under s 95 with the more serious offence of armed robbery.2 Nevertheless, Henry is a “relevant reference point” under s 95.3 Use of corporal violence – with this aggravating factor, the nature and extent of the violence will be relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence.4 Double counting – in a case of robbery aggravated by deprivation of liberty, it was held to be impermissible double counting to take into account the actual use or threatened use of violence as well.5 1 2 3 4 5
96
R R R R R
v v v v v
Tortell [2007] NSWCCA 313 at [14]. Black [2001] NSWCCA 41 at [12]; R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [366]. Black at [12]; Azzi v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 169 at [37]. Atonio (2005) 154 A Crim R 183; [2005] NSWCCA 200 at [29]. Mauai [2005] NSWCCA 207 at [13]–[16].
Same (robbery) with wounding
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Whosoever commits any offence under section 95, and thereby wounds or inflicts grievous bodily harm on any person, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 96 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(4); Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(18); Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 96 COMMENTARY Indictments, jurisdiction and cross references ................................................................................... [CA.96.20] History ................................................................................................................................................. [CA.96.40] Elements of the aggravated offences ................................................................................................. [CA.96.60] Element (3) Wounding – infliction of grievous bodily harm ............................................................... [CA.96.80] Sentencing under s 96 ..................................................................................................................... [CA.96.100]
[CA.96.20]
Indictments, jurisdiction and cross references
The forms of indictment under s 95 are set out at [CA.95.20]. For an alleged offence under s 96, there should be added to the relevant s 95 indictment the words “and did thereby wound (or inflict grievous bodily harm on) the said CD (or on the said EF or on GH)”. As to the person wounded or sustaining grievous bodily harm, it will be noted that s 96 provides for such harm to any person. In Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 224 Barwick CJ said, [i]seems to me that under s. 96 whilst the striking or the use of violence must be voluntary, there need be no intention to wound and particularly no intention to wound the person who is in fact wounded. It seems to me that an accused may be guilty of the offence under s. 96, when he has robbed A, struck B and wounded C by the blow which he aimed at B, having towards C no intent even of the most general kind. The aggravated charges under s 96 cannot be dealt with summarily as none are listed in Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, see ss 259 and 260.
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[CA.96.80]
s 96
For related sections and cross references, see under s 95 at [CA.95.40]. [CA.96.40]
History
Section 96 was amended by adding “or inflicts grievous bodily harm on” by Act 84 of 1994 commencing on 23 December 1994. Elements of the aggravated offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the constituent elements of robbery ([CA.94.80]), or assault with intent to rob ([CA.94.200]), or stealing from the person ([CA.94.260]); (2) and that either immediately before, at the time of or immediately after the robbery, assault or larceny, the accused: (a) used corporal violence on the complainant or on some other person; or (b) intentionally or recklessly inflicted actual bodily harm on the complainant or on some other person; or (c) deprived the complainant or some other person of his or her liberty (see [CA.95.80]); and (3) that the accused thereby wounded the complainant or some other person (or inflicted grievous bodily harm on the complainant or on some other person). [CA.96.80]
Element (3) Wounding – infliction of grievous bodily harm
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Wounding – as to the meaning of wounding, see [CA.27.80]. In essence, there is a “wound” if the continuity of the skin is broken;1 but it is the whole skin and not merely the cuticle or upper skin which must be divided.2 Proving a mere flow of blood is not sufficient.3 Grievous bodily harm – this expression means really serious bodily harm. It is not necessary that the harm be either permanent or dangerous. For commentary on the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see [CA.4.160]. There is a partial definition of grievous bodily harm in s 4 which incorporates the destruction of a foetus of a pregnant woman, any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person and any grievous bodily disease. Grievous bodily harm may cover cases where there is no actual wounding – for example, a broken collar bone.4 Conversely, there can be a technical wounding, ie a breaking of the skin which does not amount to grievous bodily harm. Intention – s 96 does not require an intention to wound or inflict grievous bodily harm. In R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67, Street CJ said: Sections 95 and 96 are cast in terms which do not of themselves suggest that there must be an intent to wound in order to constitute an offence under s 96. The relevant intent is that encompassed within s 95. Section 96 appears to me to be cast in such terms as to involve an objective evaluation of whether or not in the committing of an offence under s 95 there was occasioned a wound to a person. It is the character of the injury upon which s 96 fastens and it does not in my view affect or extend the intent which is requisite to be established in order to constitute an offence under s 95.5 In Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 224, Barwick CJ said that the act of the accused simply needed to be a voluntary act and that no intention to wound need be proven, nor even a realization by the accused that his or her act would cause a wounding. As mentioned at [CA.96.20], Barwick CJ in Ryan said at 224 that an accused may be guilty of the offence under s 96 when he has robbed A, struck B and wounded C by a blow aimed at B.6 1 R v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271. 2 R v Beckett (1836) 1 Mood & R 526; 174 ER 181; R v McLoughlin (1838) 8 Car & P 635; 173 ER 651. 3 R v Jones (1849) 3 Cox CC 441; JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 WLR 537; [1983] 3 All ER 230.
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[CA.96.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 97
[CA.96.80]
4 R v Wood. 5 R v Munro at 71 (Nagle CJ at CL and Slattery J agreed). See also Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205; R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361. 6 See also R v Wells (1880) QCR 112; 5 QSCR 181.
[CA.96.100]
Sentencing under s 96
Henry guideline – the well known guideline judgment of R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 concerns armed robbery under s 97. Nevertheless, a sentencing judge is entitled to take the Henry guideline into account in assessing the seriousness of an offence under s 96.1 Causation of permanent harm – the infliction of grievous bodily harm resulting in permanent disability makes an already serious offence, the more serious.2 1 R v Thomas [2007] NSWCCA 269 at [22], [91]. See also R v Black [2001] NSWCCA 41 at [12]; Azzi v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 169 at [37]. 2 MS2 v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 93; [2005] NSWCCA 397 at [13] per Adams J (a case of permanent brain damage).
97
Robbery etc or stopping a mail, being armed or in company
(1) Whosoever, being armed with an offensive weapon, or instrument, or being in company with another person, robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person, or stops any mail, or vehicle, railway train, or person conveying a mail, with intent to rob, or search the same, shall be liable to imprisonment for twenty years.
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[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 48 of 1966, s 2]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) when armed with a dangerous weapon. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(5)]
(3) Alternative verdict If on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (2) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under subsection (1), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (3) insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(5)] [S 97 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966]
SECTION 97 COMMENTARY History ................................................................................................................................................. [CA.97.20] Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.97.40] Cross reference .................................................................................................................................. [CA.97.60] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.97.80] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.97.100] Element (1)(a) Dangerous weapon – offensive weapon or instrument ........................................... [CA.97.120] Element 1(b) In company ................................................................................................................. [CA.97.140] Element (2)(a) Did rob ...................................................................................................................... [CA.97.160] Element (2)(b) Assault with intent to rob .......................................................................................... [CA.97.180] Element 2(c) Stopping mail etc with intent to rob ............................................................................ [CA.97.200]
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Verdict ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.97.220] Sentence ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.97.240]
[CA.97.20]
History
Subsections (2) and (3) were inserted by Act No 84 of 1994 and commenced on 23 December 1994. Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State being then armed with an offensive weapon or instrument [offensive weapon] [offensive instrument] [dangerous weapon] namely a .......... (or being then in company with another person namely .......... ) did rob CD (or did assault CD with intent to rob him/her [or EF]) (or did stop a mail [vehicle carrying a mail] [railway train carrying a mail] [person carrying a mail] with intent to rob the same [search the same]). Note Select alternative offences in round brackets ( ); delete alternatives in square brackets [ ] if inapplicable. The indictment should not allege “assault and” before “rob”. A count for receiving may be added: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.97.60]
Cross reference
Related offences: s 94: s 95:
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s 96: s 98
Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person 14 years Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person with corporal violence, malicious infliction of actual bodily harm or deprivation of liberty 20 years Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person with wounding or grievous bodily harm 25 years Robbery; assault with intent to rob, whilst armed with an offensive weapon or instrument or in company, with wounding or grievous bodily harm 25 years.
Defence of claim of right: see [CA.117.200]. [CA.97.80]
Jurisdiction
These offences cannot be dealt with summarily. [CA.97.100] Elements of the offence (1) the accused being: (a) armed with an offensive weapon or instrument or with a dangerous weapon; or (b) in company with another person (2) did: (a) rob a person (see s 94 ); or (b) assault a person with intent to rob (see s 94,); or (c) stop a mail or vehicle, railway train or a person conveying a mail with intent to (i) rob the same; or (ii) search the same. [CA.97.120]
Element (1)(a) Dangerous weapon – offensive weapon or instrument
“Armed” is partially defined by s 4: “‘Armed’ in relation to a weapon, or instrument, or an offensive weapon or instrument, that is a dangerous weapon, includes bearing or having the immediate physical possession of the weapon, or instrument.”
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[CA.97.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 97
[CA.97.120]
In Miller v Hrvojevic [1972] VR 305 Lush J said: To be armed with a weapon means something more than to be in possession of it; the weapon must also be available for immediate use as a weapon. No doubt questions of fact and degree are involved. A man is armed with a pistol if he is wearing it in a holster, although perhaps not if it is in the boot of his car. It is not necessary for it to be in his hand for him to be armed with it.1 There is no need for the violence or threat of violence involved in an armed robbery to involve the use of the weapon or instrument with which the person is armed.2 If the offence is committed by two or more persons, only one of whom is armed, each or all may be convicted of armed robbery.3 “Dangerous weapon” is defined in s 4 to mean: (a) a firearm (within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996); or (b) a prohibited weapon or prohibited article (within the meaning of the Prohibited Weapons Act 1989); or (c) a spear gun. “Offensive weapon” and “Offensive weapon, or instrument” are partially defined by s 4“include a dangerous weapon and also an imitation or replica of an offensive weapon or of an offensive weapon, or an instrument, as the case may require.”
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Whether a person is “armed with an offensive weapon or instrument” may depend upon the type of weapon or instrument involved and depending upon the type, the intention of the carrier or user.4 The authorities draw a distinction between “(a) an article which per se is an offensive weapon, that is to say, an article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person; and (b) an article which, though it is not made or adapted for such use, is carried with the intent to so use it.”5 Some articles by their very nature are offensive weapons per se. “… although it is difficult to say what should or should not be called an offensive weapon, it would be going a great deal too far to say, that nothing but guns, pistols, daggers and instruments of war should be so considered; but that bludgeons, properly so called, clubs, and anything that is not in common use for any other purpose but a weapon, are clearly offensive weapons …”6 Other articles are offensive weapons only because the carrier of such an article has the intention to use it for an offensive purpose. In Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 McGarvie J said, “A person armed with an article of a kind normally used only to inflict or threaten injury is armed with an offensive weapon whatever his intention. An article of a kind which is not normally used only to inflict or threaten injury is an offensive weapon only if the person found armed with it had then any intention to use it for an offensive, that is an aggressive purpose.”7 In R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10 Kelly J said, “… a person may be said to be armed with an instrument if he is in possession of that instrument which is immediately available to him intending that it may be used for offence.”8 Thus in another context, an accused who used a knife to attempt to remove a glass pane from a door in the course of an attempted break, enter and steal, was held not guilty of the aggravating feature of being armed with an offensive weapon because his intent was not to use the knife as a weapon, but only as a breaking instrument.9 If a weapon is not an offensive weapon or instrument per se the onus is on the prosecution to prove that it is.10“It is noteworthy that the courts seem to have been reluctant to class an object as an offensive weapon in the absence of cogent evidence that, although adapted to inflict injuries in combat or attack, it was being carried for that purpose.”11 Many cases have made a distinction between the original intention of a person who takes up an instrument whose normal use is other than that of a weapon and a subsequent change of intention, at which time the instrument is used as a weapon of offence. In Considine v Kirkpatrick [1971] SASR 73 a youth wearing a studded leather belt, about to engage in a fight with another youth, removed the belt from his waist and wrapped it around his wrist, swinging the buckle. He was convicted of carrying an offensive weapon
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There are other decisions to the effect that, in relation to an instrument capable of being used as an offensive weapon, intention can change.13 In Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490 Lord Widgery CJ said: I accept that it is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that the relevant intent was formed from the moment when the defendant set out on his expedition. An innocent carrying of, say, a hammer can be converted into an unlawful carrying when the defendant forms the guilty intent, provided in my view, that the intent is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen.14 It has been held that each case depends upon its own facts15 and that the question of whether an accused had at the relevant time and place the intention necessary to bring the article in his possession within the definition of an “offensive weapon” is a question of fact for the jury.16
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An article is used for an offensive or aggressive purpose not only if it is used to inflict injury, but also if it is used to threaten injury.17 A person carrying a weapon or instrument not offensive per se for self defence is not “armed with an offensive weapon”.18 The meaning of “offensive instrument” was considered in R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575 in the context of using an offensive instrument with intent to prevent apprehension contrary to s 33B. There it was held that a motor vehicle driven at a police officer during an attempted arrest was capable of being an “offensive instrument”. Gleeson CJ said: The noun “instrument” in this context, means a thing with or through which something is being done or effected. The adjective “offensive” means something that is adopted or used for the purpose of attack. The question whether an object or article is an offensive instrument raises for consideration the nature of the object, the uses of which it is capable, and the intention of the person who is using it on the occasion in question. An object which in its nature and in its ordinary use is not offensive may become an offensive instrument by reason of the use to which a person puts it and the intent which accompanies such use.19 It has been held that a replica pistol is not an “offensive weapon”20 but is an “offensive instrument” as “instrument” has a much wider meaning than “weapon”.21 1 Miller v Hrvojevic [1972] VR 305 at 306. See also Rowe v Conti; Threlfall v Panzera [1958] VR 547; Haggarty v Palmer (1974) 5 ALR 53; Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315; R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10. 2 R v Foster (1995) 78 A Crim R 517 at 523. 3 R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361. 4 Considine v Kirkpatrick [1971] SASR 73; Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490; Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315; R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575; R v Haigh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 4 August 1995). 5 R v Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466 (CCA) where a knuckle duster and a revolver were given as examples of the former class and a sandbag and a razor as examples of the latter. 6 R v Cosans (1785) noted in the report of R v Hutchinson (1784) 1 Leach 339 at 343. 7 Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315 at 320. See also Rowe v Conti; Threlfall v Panzera [1958] VR 547; R v Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466; Miller v Hrvojevic [1972] VR 305; R v Dayle [1974] 1 WLR 181; [1973] 3 All ER 1151. 8 R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10 at 15. 9 R v Haigh (unreported, CCA (NSW), 4 August 1995). 10 R v Petrie [1961] 1 WLR 358; [1961] 1 All ER 466; Evans v Hughes [1972] 1 WLR 1452; [1972] 3 All ER 412; 56 Cr App R 813; R v Dayle [1974] 1 WLR 181; [1973] 3 All ER 1151; Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490.
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without lawful excuse. Bray CJ (dissenting) reviewed a number of authorities, including many old authorities, and concluded that “carrying” referred to the time when the belt was first taken up as an article of clothing and that a subsequent change of intention was irrelevant.12 The majority however (Chamberlain and Zelling JJ), held that once the accused wrapped the belt around his wrist and started swinging it, he began to “carry an offensive weapon” however innocent his intentions may have been when he left home because he had formed a new intention.
Crimes Act 1900 s 97
[CA.97.120]
11 R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10 per Kelly J at 12. 12 This view has been taken in other cases, for example R v Johnson (1822) Rus & Ry 492; R v Fry & Webb (1837) 2 Mood & R 42; 174 E.R. 208; R v Turner (1849) 3 Cox CC 304. See also R v Sutton (1877) 13 Cox CC 648; R v Grice (1837) 7 Car & P 803; R v Williams (1878) 14 Cox CC 59; R v Jura [1954] 1 QB 506; Police v Smith [1974] NZLR 32. 13 Woodward v Koessler [1958] 1 WLR 1255; 3 All ER 557; Allamby v Medford [1974] 1 WLR 1494; 3 All ER 126; Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490. 14 Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724; [1975] 2 All ER 490 at 729 (WLR), 495 (All ER). 15 R v Dayle [1974] 1 WLR 181; [1973] 3 All ER 1151; R v RJS (1993) 31 NSWLR 649; 69 A Crim R 163 at 165–167 (A Crim R). 16 Allamby v Medford [1974] 1 WLR 1494; 3 All ER 126. 17 Pelvey v Brebner [1963] SASR 36 at 39–40. 18 Evans v Hughes [1972] 1 WLR 1452; [1972] 3 All ER 412; 56 Cr App R 813; Chadbourne v Ansell [1975] WAR 104; Wilson v Kuhl [1979] VR 315. 19 R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575 at 577; R v RJS (1993) 31 NSWLR 649; 69 A Crim R 163 at 165–167 (A Crim R). 20 R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10. See also R v Carroll [1975] 2 NZLR 474 and Van Den Berg v The Queen [1984] WAR 162; 12 A Crim R 113 where an accused who carried a sawn off barrel of a rifle and presented to make it appear to be a rifle, was held not to be “armed with an offensive weapon” as the barrel was not carried with the intention of inflicting bodily harm and was not useable for that purpose. 21 R v Farrar (1983) 78 FLR 10 (note: Kelly J said that in this case, nothing turned upon the extended definition of “offensive weapon or instrument” in s 4 as including imitations or replicas).
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[CA.97.140]
Element 1(b) In company
In R v Brougham (1986) 43 SASR 187 it was said: A person commits a robbery, or an assault with intent, in company where that person participates in the robbery or assault together with another or others in the sense that the victim is confronted by the combined force or strength of two or more persons or that the forces of two or more persons are deployed against the victim. It is not necessary that more than one participant actually strike or rob the victim; it is sufficient that the accused and one or more other participants be physically present for the common purpose of robbing, or assaulting with intent, and of physically participating if required.1 In R v Galey [1985] 1 NZLR 230 it was said that it is not enough that the participation by one party also present was giving assistance by merely giving encouragement or by keeping a lookout or by driving a get-away car.2 The New Zealand Court of Appeal (at 234) observed that there seems to be no good reason why the penalty for a robbery offence should be much greater simply because the offender has an accomplice present who merely keeps watch for or encourages him. But if another although giving only encouragement, is immediately present at the robbery, that may suffice for robbery in company.3 After a thorough examination of the authorities on the issue of what amounts to an offence committed “in company” when used in the context of a sexual assault, Kirby J, with whom Heydon JA and G James J agreed, said: First, the statutory definition ( s 61J(2)(c)) requires that the offender be “in the company of another person or persons”. Secondly, the accused and such person, or persons, must share a common purpose (either to rob, or as here, sexually assault). Thirdly, the cases appear to assume that each participant is physically present. Fourthly, participation in the common purpose without being physically present (for example, as a look-out or as an accessory before the fact) is not enough. Fifthly, the perspective of the victim (being confronted by the combined force or strength or two or more persons) is relevant, although not determinative. If two or more persons are present, and share the same purpose, they will be “in company”, even if the victim was unaware of the other person.4 1 R v Brougham (1986) 43 SASR 187 per King CJ at 191 (Mohr and von Doussa JJ agreeing). See also R v Langlands [1932] VLR 450 and Kelly v The Queen (1989) 23 FCR 463; 90 ALR 481.
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2 R v Galey [1985] 1 NZLR 230. See also R v Joyce [1968] NZLR 1070; R v Cooper (1978) 17 SASR 472. 3 R v Howard [1987] 1 NZLR 347. Cf R v Cooper (1978) 17 SASR 472 per Walters J at 477. 4 R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159 at [120]. See also R v Leoni [1999] NSWCCA 14.
[CA.97.160]
Element (2)(a) Did rob
For commentary on robbery, see [CA.94.60]. [CA.97.180]
Element (2)(b) Assault with intent to rob
[CA.97.200]
CA
For commentary on assault with intent to rob, see [CA.94.200]. Element 2(c) Stopping mail etc with intent to rob
By virtue of s 4, “railway” includes “tramway”. [CA.97.220]
Verdict
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Apart from the alternative verdict provided in s 97(3), if the circumstances of aggravation ie being armed or in company are not proved, the accused may be convicted of robbery or assault with intent to rob under s 94.1 For detailed commentary on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532]–[CPA.162.100]. On a charge of robbery or stealing from the person in circumstances of aggravation there may be a conviction for larceny under s 117.2 There cannot be a conviction for common assault3 as, in the absence of express statutory provision, a person charged with a felony could not be convicted of a misdemeanour.4 Section 580E(1) (inserted by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999 No 94, to commence from 1 January 2000) abolished all distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours. There may be a conviction for an attempt or assault with intent to rob: s 427. The issue of an alternative verdict should be opened by the Crown and in any case it must be raised before the closing addresses.5“It is, we believe, unwise for a trial judge to introduce these matters on his own initiative …”.6 As to the question of the raising of a possible alternative verdict during the trial itself, see [CPA.162.60], Raising an alternative verdict after the prosecution case commences. 1 R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278. See also R v Stewart (1886) 12 VLR 567; R v Coughlan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 August 1977); R v Fitzpatrick (1988) 50 SASR 10. 2 R v Langlands [1932] VLR 450. See also R v Holmes (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 6; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12; Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 at 970 (AC); R v Shendley [1970] Crim LR 49; R v Heaton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990). 3 R v Woodhall (1872) 12 Cox CC 240; R v Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114. 4 R v Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114; R v Mustafa (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 154; R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452; Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1; 65 ALJR 402; 54 A Crim R 183; 100 ALR 193 per Dawson J at 13 (CLR) and see s 425. 5 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230. 6 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466 at 71 (NSWLR); 470 (A Crim R) (Slattery, Maxwell and Hunt JJ).
[CA.97.240]
Sentence
The offence of robbery, whether armed or unarmed, should be regarded in virtually all circumstances as an offence of utmost gravity: carrying a loaded gun escalates the seriousness of a robbery offence: the elements of both specific and general deterrence should be given emphasis in sentencing for armed robbery offences.1 Armed robbery except in the most exceptional circumstances, must carry a full-time custodial sentence.2
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Crimes Act 1900 s 98
[CA.97.240]
In R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 at [161]–[167] the Court of Criminal Appeal promulgated a guideline sentence for the offence of armed robbery. The following characteristics associated with the offence that commonly came to the attention of the court included: (i) Young offender with no or little criminal history (ii) Weapon like a knife, capable of killing or inflicting serious injury (iii) Limited degree of planning (iv) Limited, if any, actual violence but a real threat thereof (v) Victim in a vulnerable position such as a shopkeeper or taxi driver (vi) Small amount taken (vii) Plea of guilty, the significance of which is limited by a strong Crown case. Taking those factors into account the range of sentence for the offence should be four to five years. Aggravating and mitigating factors will justify a sentence below or above the range. The narrow range is a starting point. In addition to other aggravating factors the following features are particular to the offence of armed robbery: (1) Nature of the weapon; (2) Vulnerability of the victim; (3) Position on a scale of impulsiveness/planning; (4) Intensity of threat, or actual use of force; (5) Number of offenders; (6) Amount taken; (7) Effect on the victim.3 The guideline judgment also noted that non-custodial sentences should be limited to exceptional cases only.4 The fact that the accused is, at the time of the offence, affected by a drug of addiction or motivated by a need to obtain a drug is not a mitigating factor on sentence. The fact that accused is motivated by such a need may however be taken into account.5 The Henry guidelines apply equally to sentences imposed on children although an allowance on sentence might be made by reason of the special circumstance of their age.6
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In cases of serious premeditated robbery in company and armed robbery the Court of Criminal Appeal has noted that the sentencing court will be expected to take a stern approach to sentencing consistent with the grave social concern that such offences cause the community.7 The Court of Criminal Appeal has held that the considerations outlined in Henry apply with equal force to the offence of robbery in company.8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
98
R R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v v
Readman (1990) 47 A Crim R 181. See also R v Roberts (1994) 73 A Crim R 306. Roberts. See also R v Ellis (1993) 68 A Crim R 449. Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 at [170]. Henry at [209]; R v Raniga (2009) 193 A Crim R 184; [2009] NSWCCA 35 at [10]. Henry at [202], [273]–[274]. SDM (2001) 51 NSWLR 530; 127 A Crim R 318; [2001] NSWCCA 158 at [14]–[15]. Bavadra (2000) 115 A Crim R 152; [2000] NSWCCA 292 at [38]–[39]. Stanley [2003] NSWCCA 233; R v Lesi [2005] NSWCCA 63.
Robbery with arms etc and wounding
Whosoever, being armed with an offensive weapon, or instrument, or being in company with another person, robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person, and immediately before, or at the time of, or immediately after, such robbery, or assault, wounds, or inflicts grievous bodily harm upon, such person, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 98 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(6); Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(19)]
SECTION 98 COMMENTARY History ................................................................................................................................................. [CA.98.20] Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.98.40]
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[CA.98.100]
s 98
Cross reference .................................................................................................................................. [CA.98.60] Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.98.80] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.98.100] Element (1) Armed or in company ................................................................................................... [CA.98.120] Element (2) Robs or assaults with intent to rob ............................................................................... [CA.98.140] Element (3) Immediately before – immediately after ....................................................................... [CA.98.160] Element (4) Wounding – grievous bodily harm ................................................................................ [CA.98.180] Jury directions – robbery in company with wounding ...................................................................... [CA.98.200] Verdict ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.98.220]
History
This section was amended by Act 84 of 1994 by deleting “so armed” from “or being in company with another person so armed, robs, or assaults etc” and commenced on 23 December 1994. [CA.98.40]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State being then armed with an offensive weapon or instrument namely a .......... [offensive weapon] [offensive instrument] (or being then in company with another person namely .......... ) did rob CD (or did assault CD with intent to rob him/her [or EF]) and immediately before, or at the time of, or immediately after the robbery [assault] did wound (or inflict grievous bodily harm upon) CD. Note Select alternative offences in round brackets ( ); delete alternatives in square brackets [ ] if inapplicable. The indictment should not allege “assault and” before “rob”. A count for receiving may be added: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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[CA.98.60]
Cross reference
Related offences: s 94: s 95: s 96: s 97:
Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person 14 years Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person with corporal violence, malicious infliction of actual bodily harm or deprivation of liberty 20 years Robbery; assault with intent to rob; steal from the person with wounding or grievous bodily harm 25 years Robbery whilst armed with an offensive weapon or instrument or in company 20 years (with dangerous weapon 25 years)
Defence of claim of right: see [CA.117.200]. [CA.98.80]
Jurisdiction
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. [CA.98.100] Elements of the offence (1) that the accused: (a) whilst armed with an offensive weapon or instrument; or (b) being in the company of another person; (2) did (a) rob a person; or (b) assault a person with intent to rob; (3) and
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[CA.98.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 98
[CA.98.100] (a) immediately before; or (b) at the time of; or (c) immediately after; such robbery or assault; (4) did (a) wound such person; or (b) inflict grievous bodily harm upon such person.
[CA.98.120]
Element (1) Armed or in company
As to being armed with an offensive weapon or instrument, see [CA.97.120]. As to being in the company of another person, see [CA.97.140]. [CA.98.140]
Element (2) Robs or assaults with intent to rob
As to robbery, see [CA.94.80]. As to assault with intent to rob, see [CA.94.200]. [CA.98.160]
Element (3) Immediately before – immediately after
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“Immediately” – In R v Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238, Lee J said, “the word ‘immediately’ does not require to be given a meaning which would restrict the application of the section to an event occurring within seconds or minutes of the termination of those particular actions which constituted in law a robbery of the victim. The whole of the circumstances involved in the robbery must be looked at and a decision made against the entire context of the evidence in regard thereto.”1 His Honour said that whether an action which followed a robbery was “immediately after” the robbery was a question of fact for the jury to determine.2 Jury direction – R v Attard (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 April 1993) was a case of felony murder involving a fatal shooting during an armed robbery. The trial judge told the jury there was no hard and fast rule about the meaning of “immediately” but it meant the same as “forthwith”.3 Gleeson CJ said at 7: It is not difficult to imagine borderline cases where the relationship in fact and time between the felony and the killing is such that a decision as to whether the latter occurred “immediately after” the former could involve a difficult judgment on a matter of degree. Even in such cases, it may be doubted whether there is much to be gained by instructing a jury in terms which substitute for the language of the statute some other verbal formula whose meaning is no more clear. There may be danger in doing so. 1 At 247 (Street CJ and Enderby J agreed). 2 R v Elliott [1983] 3 NSWLR 318; 9 A Crim R 238 at 248 (A Crim R). 3 Following R v Berkshire Justices (1878) 4 QBD 469 where Cockburn CJ said at 471 “It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word ‘immediately’ in all cases. The words ‘forthwith’ and ‘immediately’ have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression ‘within a reasonable time’ and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay.”
[CA.98.180]
Element (4) Wounding – grievous bodily harm
Wounding – As to wounding, see [CA.27.80]. In essence, there is a “wound” if the continuity of the skin is broken;1 but it is the whole skin and not merely the cuticle or upper skin which must be divided.2 Proving a mere flow of blood is not sufficient.3 A wound which causes instantaneous death remains a “wound”. In a case of fatal shooting, “… there may be a wounding followed by death, though the death be instant upon the entry of the bullet into the body. The fraction of time elapsing between the breaking of the skin and death, though immeasurable, is significant.”4
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[CA.98.220]
s 98
Grievous bodily harm – By s 4“grievous bodily harm includes any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person” and see commentary under that definition at [CA.4.160].
Intention – There need be no intention to wound, merely a voluntary act by the accused. In Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 242–243 Windeyer J said, The felony created by s 98 is … constituted by a combination of two offences: They are armed robbery (or armed assault with intent to rob) and wounding (or inflicting grievous bodily harm). To convict an accused of this compound felony both offences must be proved, and in my view an element of mens rea is required in each. The statute speaks of an armed robber or assailant who wounds his victim. It postulates an act of the accused which actually wounds. This does not I think mean that an intent to wound is an element in the offence, but it does I think mean that the act which caused the wounding must be the act of the accused voluntarily done.6 Relationship to robbery etc – Section 98 contemplates that the act of wounding is to have a relationship both in fact and time to the robbery. Unlike s 96, s 98 requires the wounding to be of the victim of the robbery and not merely to any person.7
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1 R v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271. 2 R v Beckett (1836) 1 Mood & R 526; 174 ER 181; R v McLoughlin (1838) 8 Car & P 635; 173 ER 651. 3 R v Jones (1849) 3 Cox CC 441; JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 WLR 537; [1983] 3 All ER 230. 4 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 225. 5 R v Wood (1830) 1 Mood CC 278; 168 ER 1271*. 6 See also R v Munro (1981) 4 A Crim R 67; R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361. 7 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ at 224.
[CA.98.200]
Jury directions – robbery in company with wounding
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; 63 A Crim R 361 considered the appropriate jury directions in a case where the accused (A) was in company with another (B) who caused the actual wounding of V. At 367 Carruthers J (Gleeson CJ and Smart J agreeing) said that it was incumbent upon the Crown to prove: (a) that there was a common purpose between A and B in company to rob V whilst B was, to the knowledge of A, armed with an offensive weapon; (b) that during the course of the armed robbery B wounded V; (c) that A contemplated that in the carrying out of the common unlawful purpose of armed robbery such wounding might occur. [CA.98.220]
Verdict
If the wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm is not proved, the accused may be convicted under s 97.1 If no circumstances of aggravation are proved, the accused may be convicted of robbery or assault with intent to rob under s 94.2 On a charge of robbery or stealing from the person in circumstances of aggravation there may be a conviction for larceny under s 117,.3 There cannot be a conviction for common assault4 as, in the absence of express statutory provision, a person charged with a felony could not be convicted of a misdemeanour.5 Section 580E(1) (inserted by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sentencing) Act 1999 No 94 to commence from 1 January 2000) abolished all distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours. However, assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s 59 was before 1 January 2000 a felony and is now a “serious indictable offence”. There may be a conviction for an attempt or an assault with intent to rob:
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Grievous bodily harm may cover cases where there is no actual wounding – for example, a broken collar bone.5 Conversely, there can be a technical wounding ie a breaking of the skin which does not amount to grievous bodily harm.
Crimes Act 1900 s 99
[CA.98.220]
s 427 (now repealed). The issue of an alternative verdict should be opened by the Crown and in any case it must be raised before the closing addresses.6“It is, we believe, unwise for a trial judge to introduce these matters on his own initiative …”.7 1 R v Coughlan (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 August 1977). 2 R v Browne (1987) 30 A Crim R 278. See also R v Stewart (1886) 12 VLR 567; R v Fitzpatrick (1988) 50 SASR 10. 3 R v Holmes (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 6; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12; Smith v Desmond [1965] AC 960; [1965] 2 WLR 894; [1965] 1 All ER 976 at 970 (CA); R v Shendley [1970] Crim LR 49; R v Heaton (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 June 1990). 4 R v Woodhall (1872) 12 Cox CC 240; R v Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114. 5 R v Tierney (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 114; R v Mustafa (1973) 3 DCR (NSW) 154; R v Salisbury [1976] VR 452; Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1; 65 ALJR 402; 54 A Crim R 183; 100 ALR 193 per Dawson J at 13 (CLR) and see s 425. 6 R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230. 7 R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; (1983) 8 A Crim R 466 at 71 (NSWLR); 470 (A Crim R) (Slattery, Maxwell and Hunt JJ).
DIVISION 3 – DEMANDING PROPERTY WITH INTENT TO STEAL [Former subdiv 3 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 3 heading subst Act 38 of 2007, Sch 1[14]; insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[21]]
99
Demanding property with intent to steal
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(1) Whosoever, with menaces, or by force, demands any property from any person, with intent to steal the same, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in the company of another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
(3) It is immaterial whether any such menace is of violence or injury by the offender or by any other person. [Subs (3) insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[15]] [S 99 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 99 COMMENTARY Indictment ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.99.20] Elements of the offence ...................................................................................................................... [CA.99.40] Menaces ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.99.60]
[CA.99.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, with menaces (or by force) did demand of JN the (money) of him the said JN, with intent to steal the said (money) from the said JN. There is no such offence as attempting to demand money with menaces.1 1 R v Moran [1952] 1 All ER 803; (1952) 36 Cr App R 10. See also R v Hopkins [1924] VLR 484.
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[CA.99.60] [CA.99.40]
Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 3 – Demanding property with intent to steal
s 99
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) a demand by the accused from the person named of specified property; (2) where such demand is accompanied by menaces or force; (3) with the intention by the accused to steal such property. Menaces
It is immaterial whether the menaces are of violence, or injury, or by way of accusation: s 105 (now repealed).
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It is not necessary to prove an express demand in words – menaces may be by words or gestures. If the accused’s words or gestures were plainly indicative of what he required, they may be tantamount to a demand.1 The offence may be committed although the language used may only be a request and not an explicit demand, as a request imposing conditions may be evidence of a demand.2 Every threat or menace is not necessarily of a character to excite fear or alarm. There might be cases where the threat was of such a character that it was apparent that even in the most liberal construction it would not be calculated to influence anybody, and in such a case a judge would be justified in taking the case away from the jury. There might be cases where the threat, though not necessarily of such a character as to excite either fear or alarm, was of such a character that reasonable men might naturally hold the view that it would be calculated to do so. In such a case it would be the duty of a judge to leave the question whether the conduct of the accused – if believed – brought him within the section to the jury, with a proper direction as to the law. So also there might be cases where the threat was manifestly of such a character that there could be no doubt, but that it would naturally and reasonably operate on the mind not only of the victim of it, but of any reasonable person, and in such a case it could not be said that a summing up was insufficient or unfair to the accused, if the judge directed the jury, as a matter of law, that if they believed the story put before them by the Crown as to the conduct of the accused, it would constitute a menace within the section.3 A threat not calculated to deprive any person of reasonably sound mind of the free and voluntary action of her or his mind is not a “menace”.4 A “menace” can include a threat made to the victim’s property.5 The word “menaces” includes not merely threats of injury to persons or property, but menaces which could involve injury to a third person and threats to accuse of misconduct not amounting to a crime.6 The menaces may be made by letters or articles in a newspaper.7 The section expressly requires an intent to steal property. Must there also be an intention to threaten as well? It has been said that the authorities do not provide a clear answer to this question.8 An obiter view however, has been expressed as follows: [T]he conduct constituting the “menace” cannot be viewed in some detached way from the clear requirement that there exists as well the intent to steal. It is clear, of course, that the menace may have no effect on the victim and hence the reference to the mind of an ordinary man being influenced by the words or conduct of an accused to accede unwillingly to a demand …. [In terms of a jury direction] It may be as simple as stating that the “menaces” are offered with the intention of overbearing the will of the victim to retain the property to the point that the victim is prepared to part with it and that the menaces are offered with that intention in order to bring to fruition the separate and fundamental intention to steal, that is, to take and carry away and permanently deprive the victim of the property without any claim of right in the perpetrator. No case was cited that authoritatively states that existence of what I have described as “in effect”, the two intentions; the whole structure of the offence in s 99 however, arguably points to both being required.9 The demand must be made with intent to steal, “that is to say, it must be made in such circumstances that, if successful, it would amount to stealing”.10
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[CA.99.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 105A
[CA.99.60]
The test is whether if the money had been taken it could properly be said to have been stolen, that is “obtained fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith”. A person has a “claim of right” if he or she is honestly asserting what he or she believes to be an honest claim even though it may be unfounded in law and in fact.11 For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
R v Jackson (1783) 1 Leach 267; 168 ER 236 followed in R v Collister (1955) 39 Cr App R 100. R v Studer (1915) 11 Cr App R 307. See also R v Taylor (1859) 1 F & F 511. R v Rasmussen (1928) 45 WN (NSW) 87 at 88. R v Boyle [1914] 3 KB 339; (1914) 10 Cr App R 180. See also R v Clear [1968] 1 QB 670; (1967) 52 Cr App R 58; R v Garwood [1987] 1 WLR 319; 1 All ER 1032; (1987) 85 Cr App R 85. DPP v Kuo (1999) 49 NSWLR 226 at [12]; R v Rae (1998) 104 A Crim R 348. R v Tomlinson [1895] 1 QB 706; R v Boyle [1914] 3 KB 339; (1914) 10 Cr App R 180. See also R v Denyer [1926] 2 KB 258; (1926) 19 Cr App R 93; Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; (1937) 26 Cr App R 51. R v Wyatt (1921) 16 Cr App R 57; R v Rae (1998) 104 A Crim R 348. R v Boyle [1914] 3 KB 339; (1914) 10 Cr App R 180; R v Rasmussen (1928) 45 WN (NSW) 87. R v Chang (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 October 1998). R v Cheng (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 November 1998) per Levine J at pp 14–15, (Ireland and Barr JJ agreeing). R v Messervy (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 221 at 223 applying R v Walton & Ogden (1863) 9 Cox CC 268. See also R v Robertson (1864) 10 Cox CC 9; R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137. R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137. See also R v Gilson; R v Cohen (1944) 29 Cr App R 174.
Editor’s note: Sections 100–105 are repealed by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[16] and have not been reproduced.
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DIVISION 4 – SACRILEGE AND HOUSEBREAKING [Former subdiv 4 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 4 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[22]]
105A
Definitions
(1) In sections 106–115A: building includes any place of Divine worship. [Def insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[17]]
circumstances of aggravation means circumstances involving any one or more of the following: (a) the alleged offender is armed with an offensive weapon, or instrument, (b) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, (c) the alleged offender uses corporal violence on any person, (d) the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on any person, (e) the alleged offender deprives any person of his or her liberty, (f) the alleged offender knows that there is a person, or that there are persons, in the place where the offence is alleged to be committed. [Def am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
circumstances of special aggravation means circumstances involving any or all of the following: (a) the alleged offender intentionally wounds or intentionally inflicts grievous bodily harm on any person, (b) the alleged offender inflicts grievous bodily harm on any person and is reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person,
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[CA.105A.20] (c)
s 106
the alleged offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.
[Def subst Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[5]; am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
(2) The matters referred to in: (a) paragraph (c), (d) or (e) of the definition of circumstances of aggravation, or (b) paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition of circumstances of special aggravation, can occur immediately before, or at the time of, or immediately after any of the elements of the offence concerned occurred. (2A) For the purposes of paragraph (f) of the definition of circumstances of aggravation, if there was a person, or there were persons, in the place in relation to which an offence is alleged to have been committed at the time it was committed, the defendant is presumed to have known that fact unless the defendant satisfies the court that he or she had reasonable grounds for believing that there was no one in the place. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[7]]
(3) The definitions in subsection (1) are not mutually exclusive. [S 105A am Act 41 of 2012; Act 38 of 2007; Act 23 of 1995; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(7)]
SECTION 105A COMMENTARY [CA.105A.20]
Generally
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In s 105A(1)(f) the words “in the place where the offence is alleged to be committed” can include the immediate surrounds of the dwelling house that is allegedly broken and entered.1 The introductory words “circumstances involving” one or more of the aggravating features outlined in the section, should be read as meaning that if any of those circumstances “involve” one or more of the aggravating features at any point then the aggravating feature is made out.2“It follows that, so far as being armed with an offensive weapon is concerned [s 112(2)], it is enough if, in the course of committing the offence an offender is so armed for the circumstance of aggravation to occur but, if he or she is merely armed before the break or after the offence is completed, then no circumstance of aggravation has occurred.”3 1 R v Rice (2004) 150 A Crim R 37; [2004] NSWCCA 384 at [4] and [61]. 2 R v Elms (2004) 61 NSWLR 703; [2004] NSWCCA 467 at [63]. 3 R v Elms (2004) 61 NSWLR 703; [2004] NSWCCA 467 at [64].
106 Breaking and entering place of Divine worship and committing serious indictable offence [Repealed] [S 106 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[18]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 50 of 1974; Act 48 of 1966]
SECTION 106 COMMENTARY Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.106.20] Place of divine worship .................................................................................................................... [CA.106.40] Armed or in company ....................................................................................................................... [CA.106.60]
Editor’s note
The following commentary relates to s 106 of the Crimes Act 1900 before it was repealed by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[18]. © 2017 THOMSON REUTERS
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[Subs (2) am Act 41 of 2012, Sch 1[6]; Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[6]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 107
[CA.106.20]
[CA.106.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are either: (1) breaking and entering a place of divine worship and committing a serious indictable felony therein; or (2) being in a place of divine worship, committing a felony and then breaking out. In the more serious offence, it must be shown that the accused was armed or in company. [CA.106.40]
Place of divine worship
As to what is a place of divine worship, see s 4. [CA.106.60]
Armed or in company
As to being armed or in company, see [CA.97.140]. 107
The like with intent to commit a serious indictable offence [Repealed]
[S 107 rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[18]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966]
SECTION 107 COMMENTARY General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.107.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.107.40] Serious offence ................................................................................................................................. [CA.107.60] General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.107.80] Unlawful intent ................................................................................................................................ [CA.107.100]
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Editor’s note
The following commentary relates to s 107 of the Crimes Act 1900 before it was repealed by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[18]. [CA.107.20]
General
It is not necessary to allege that the place of divine worship is the property of any person: see Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 16 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990]. [CA.107.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused broke and entered a place of divine worship; (2) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. [CA.107.60]
Serious offence
For the more serious offence, it must be shown that the accused was armed or in company. [CA.107.80]
General
Generally, see [CLP.60]. [CA.107.100]
Unlawful intent
An unlawful intent may be inferred from all the circumstances of the case, for example, where the accused is found on premises he has broken into and fails to give a satisfactory explanation for his presence.1 1 R v Wood (1911) 7 Cr App R 56.
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s 109
Burglary [Repealed]
[S 108 rep Act 50 of 1974, s 6; am Act 48 of 1966]
(1) Whosoever: enters the dwelling-house of another, with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein, or, being in such dwelling-house commits any serious indictable offence therein, and in either case breaks out of the said dwelling-house shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[30], [31] and [70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(10)]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(10)]
(3) Specially aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (2) in circumstances of special aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 25 years.
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[Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(10)] [S 109 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 50 of 1974, s 6; Act 48 of 1966, s 2]
SECTION 109 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges .......................................................................................................................... [CA.109.20] Jurisdiction, history and cross references ........................................................................................ [CA.109.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.109.60] Element (1) Entering or being in the dwelling-house of another ..................................................... [CA.109.80] Element (2) Intent to commit or commission of a serious indictable offence ................................ [CA.109.100] Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation ............................................ [CA.109.120] Element (4) Breaking out of the dwelling-house of another .......................................................... [CA.109.140]
[CA.109.20]
Indictments/charges
Entry with intent: That AB on .......... at .......... the said State did enter the dwelling-house of CD with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein, namely, larceny (or other serious indictable offence – nominate), (if applicable, in circumstances of (special) aggravation, namely – nominate circumstances as per s 105A) and did afterwards break out of the said dwelling-house. Breaking out after serious indictable offence: That AB on .......... at .......... the said State being in the dwelling-house of CD and did commit a serious indictable offence therein, namely, larceny (of specify items stolen the property of CD) (or other serious indictable offence – nominate) (if applicable, in circumstances of (special) aggravation, namely – nominate circumstances as per s 105A) and afterwards did break out of the said dwelling-house.
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109 Breaking out of dwelling-house after committing, or entering with intent to commit, indictable offence
Crimes Act 1900 s 109
[CA.109.20]
Note: under the related s 112, it has been held that the serious indictable offence and the circumstance(s) of aggravation may be one and the same act: R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62.
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[CA.109.40] Jurisdiction, history and cross references With an offence alleged under s 109(1), where the serious indictable offence intended is stealing or destroying or damaging property or the serious indictable offence alleged is stealing or destroying or damaging property the value of which does not exceed $60,000, that offence comes within cl 6 of Sch 1 Table 1 under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Otherwise an offence alleged under s 109(1), or an aggravated or specially aggravated offence under s 109(2) or (3), must be prosecuted on indictment. There is no standard non-parole period for any offence under s 109. Section 109 was amended by s 6 of the Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974. Previously, a person who committed either offence under s 109 was thereby “deemed guilty of burglary”. The same Act abolished the offence of burglary under the former s 108. One result of the former amendment was that the offence of breaking out under s 109 came to closely resemble the cognate offence of breaking out under s 112(1)(b). Section 109 is confined to offences in “the dwelling-house of another”, whereas the “breaking out” offence under s 112(1)(b) may be committed in “any dwelling-house or other building”. Offences related to s 109 are: • Section 110 – breaking and entering a dwelling or appurtenant building and assaulting with intent to murder or inflicting grievous bodily harm. • Section 111 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 112 – breaking and entering any dwelling-house or other building and committing a serious indictable offence, or breaking out after committing such an offence. • Section 113 – breaking and entering a dwelling or other building with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 114 – possessing housebreaking or car breaking implements; being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc. [CA.109.60] Elements of the offences Entry with intent – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) entered the dwelling-house of another; (2) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein; and (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A); (4) thereafter broke out of the dwelling-house. Breaking out after serious indictable offence – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) being in a dwelling-house of another; (2) committed a serious indictable offence therein; and (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A); (4) thereafter broke out of the dwelling-house. [CA.109.80] Element (1) Entering or being in the dwelling-house of another As to the meaning of “enters” and “dwelling-house”, see [CA.112.80]. It should be noted that the dwelling-house must be of “another”.
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s 110
Element (2) Intent to commit or commission of a serious indictable offence
Intent and intoxication – where entry with intent to commit a serious indictable offence is charged, the prosecution must prove this specific intent.1 Section 428B(1) under Pt 11A Intoxication provides that an “offence of specific intent is an offence of which an intention to cause a specific result is an element”. Although an offence of entry with intent is not listed as an example of offence of specific intent under s 428B(2), the similar offences under ss 110, 111 and 113 are listed as examples of such an offence. It is suggested therefore that in determining whether an accused had an intention to commit a serious indictable offence, by s 428C, self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. 1 R v Pearson (1910) 4 Cr App R 40.
[CA.109.120]
Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation
The various “circumstances of aggravation” or “circumstances of special aggravation” are defined in s 105A(1). [CA.109.140]
Element (4) Breaking out of the dwelling-house of another
As to the meaning of “breaking” and “breaking out”, see [CA.112.80]. There must be some evidence that the accused left the house by an actual or constructive breaking out.1 The offence is committed even though the accused was lawfully in the house as a lodger or guest.2
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1 R v Payne (1887) 13 VLR 359. See also Halley v The Crown (1938) 40 WALR 105. 2 R v Wheeldon (1839) 8 Car & P 747; 173 ER 700.
110
Breaking, entering and assaulting with intent to murder etc
Whosoever breaks and enters any dwelling-house, or any building appurtenant thereto, and while therein or on premises occupied therewith assaults with intent to murder any person, or inflicts grievous bodily harm upon any person, shall be liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 110 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(20); Act 16 of 1955, s 5]
SECTION 110 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges .......................................................................................................................... [CA.110.20] Jurisdiction, history and cross references ........................................................................................ [CA.110.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.110.60] Element (1) Breaking and entering of a dwelling-house or appurtenant building ............................ [CA.110.80] Element (2) While therein assaulted with intent to murder or inflicted grievous bodily harm ....... [CA.110.100]
[CA.110.20]
Indictments/charges
That AB on ................ at ................ the said State did break and enter a dwelling-house being [address] (or the home of CD) (or a building [describe] appurtenant to [address] (or the home of CD)) and while therein (or on premises occupied therewith) (either) did assault with intent to murder CD, (or) did inflict grievous bodily harm on CD.
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As to the meaning of “serious indictable offence”, see [CA.112.100]. As to “claim of right” in this context, see [CA.112.100].
Crimes Act 1900 s 110 [CA.110.40]
[CA.110.0] Jurisdiction, history and cross references
An offence alleged under s 110 is not listed in either Table 1 or 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and therefore can only be prosecuted on indictment. There is no standard non-parole period for either of these offences. Section 110 offences fall within a series of offences known as housebreaking under Pt 4 Div 4 of the Crimes Act 1900. Related housebreaking offences are: • Section 109 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence or breaking out of a dwelling after committing a serious indictable offence. • Section 111 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 112 – breaking and entering a dwelling and committing a serious indictable offence etc. • Section 113 – breaking and entering a dwelling or other building with intent to commit a serious indictable offence; being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc. • Section 114 –being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc. Other offences involving either an intent to murder or causing grievous bodily harm are: • Sections 27–30 – attempts to murder. • Section 33 – causing grievous bodily harm with intent. • Section 33A – discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. • Section 35 – reckless causing of grievous bodily harm. • Section 54 – causing grievous bodily harm.
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[CA.110.60]
Elements of the offences
Entry with intent – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) broke and entered a dwelling-house or other building appurtenant thereto; and; (2) while therein (or on premises occupied therewith) either: (a) assaulted the victim with intent to murder him or her; or; (b) inflicted grievous bodily harm on the victim. [CA.110.80]
Element (1) Breaking and entering of a dwelling-house or appurtenant building
As to the meaning of breaking and of entering, see commentary at [CA.112.80]. As to the meaning of dwelling house, see commentary at [CA.112.80]. An appurtenant building is a building “appertaining or belonging; relating”1 to the dwelling-house. 1 The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed (1997) The Macquarie Library.
[CA.110.100]
Element (2) While therein assaulted with intent to murder or inflicted grievous bodily harm
For detailed commentary on assault, see [CA.61.100]–[CA.61.320]. As to intent to murder, see commentary at [CA.19A.520]. As to the meaning of grievous bodily harm, see commentary at [CA.4.160]. Where the infliction of grievous bodily harm is charged, the prosecution does not have to prove an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (or any other specific intent), but simply that the accused’s act was voluntary: R v Bowden (1981) 7 A Crim R 378 (NSW CCA).1 It should be noted that s 110 requires that the relevant assault or infliction of grievous bodily harm must take place while in the dwelling-house or appurtenant building. Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence of breaking and entering and assaulting with intent to murder under s 110 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intent to murder, self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s
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s 111
428C(2) apply. As noted Bowden makes it clear that no specific intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is required. It is suggested therefore that under s 110 where inflicting grievous bodily harm is charged, in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under that part of s 110, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account: ss 428B and 428D. 1 See also Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; 103 A Crim R 372; [1998] HCA 57 at [16].
Entering dwelling-house
(1) Whosoever enters any dwelling-house, with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[28] and [70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(11)]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(11)]
(3) Specially aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (2) in circumstances of special aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (3) insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(11)]
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[S 111 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966, s 2]
SECTION 111 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges .......................................................................................................................... [CA.111.20] Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references ..................................................................................... [CA.111.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.111.60] Element (1) Entering a dwelling-house ............................................................................................. [CA.111.80] Element (2) With intent to commit a serious indictable offence ..................................................... [CA.111.100] Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation ............................................ [CA.111.120] Alternative charge/verdict ................................................................................................................ [CA.111.140]
[CA.111.20]
Indictments/charges
That AB on ................ at ................ the said State did enter the dwelling-house of CD (or being [address]) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein, namely [specify offence] (and if applicable, in circumstances of aggravation (or special aggravation), namely [nominate circumstances as per s 105A]). [CA.111.40]
Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references
With an offence alleged under s 111(1), where the serious indictable offence intended is stealing or destroying or damaging property, that offence comes within cl 7 of Sch 1 Table 1 under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Otherwise, an offence alleged under s 111(1), or an aggravated or specially aggravated offence under ss 111(2) or (3), must be prosecuted on indictment. There is no standard non-parole period for any offence under s 111. For a comparison of ss 111 – 113, see [CA.113.40].
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111
Crimes Act 1900 s 111
[CA.111.40]
Section 111 offences fall within a series of offences known as housebreaking under Pt 4 Div 4 of the Crimes Act 1900. Related housebreaking offences are: • Section 109 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence or breaking out of a dwelling after committing a serious indictable offence. • Section 110 – breaking and entering a dwelling or appurtenant building and assaulting with intent to murder or inflicting grievous bodily harm. • Section 112 – breaking and entering a dwelling and committing a serious indictable offence etc. • Section 113 – breaking and entering a dwelling or other building with intent to commit a serious indictable offence; being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc. • Section 114 – being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc. [CA.111.60] Elements of the offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) entered a dwelling-house; (2) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein; (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A).
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[CA.111.80] Element (1) Entering a dwelling-house As to the meaning of entering and the meaning of dwelling-house, see commentary at [CA.112.80]. [CA.111.100] Element (2) With intent to commit a serious indictable offence As to the meaning of serious indictable offence, see commentary at [CA.112.100]. Intoxication and intent – s 111 makes it clear that the prosecution must prove a specific intent in the accused to commit a serious indictable offence within the dwelling-house entered. Sometimes, this may be proved by inference from the circumstances in which the accused is found in the dwelling. Under s 428B, an offence under s 111 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intent to commit a serious indictable offence, self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. Claim of right – if the serious indictable offence is one of either larceny or perhaps another offence of which larceny is an element such as stealing from the person, a bona fide claim of right to the property will mean that no offence under s 111 has been committed because of lack of criminal intent. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. Nevertheless, in such a case, the entrant to a dwelling may be guilty of an offence of unlawful entry on inclosed lands under s 4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901. [CA.111.120] Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation The various “circumstances of aggravation” and “circumstances of special aggravation” are set out in s 105A. In R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62, it was held that a single act of attacking a victim with some scooter handlebars and injuring him can be relied on by the prosecution to constitute both the serious indictable offence, namely an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and the circumstance of aggravation, namely the use by the appellant of corporal violence. There is no prohibition on those two elements being made out by the one act.1 1 Applied in R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197.
[CA.111.140] Alternative charge/verdict If an aggravated or specially aggravated offence is charged under s 111(2) or (3), but the circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation are not proved, then under s 115A there may be a finding of guilt of an offence under s 111(1) or (2) as the case may be.
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[CA.112.20]
112
s 112
Breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence
[Subs (1) subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[19]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[29] and [70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(12); Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(12)]
(3) Specially aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (2) in circumstances of special aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(12)] [S 112 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966, s 2; Act 10 of 1924]
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SECTION 112 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges .......................................................................................................................... [CA.112.20] Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references .................................................................................... [CA.112.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.112.60] Elements (1) Breaking and entering a dwelling-house or other building or (2A) Breaking out ....... [CA.112.80] Element (2) Commission of a serious indictable offence ............................................................... [CA.112.100] Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation ............................................ [CA.112.120] Alternative charge/verdict ............................................................................................................... [CA.112.140] Sentencing ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.112.160]
[CA.112.20]
Indictments/charges
Section 112(1)(a): That AB on .......... at .......... the said State did break and enter the dwelling-house (or other building – describe) of CD and commit a serious indictable offence therein, namely, larceny (of specify items stolen the property of CD) (or other serious indictable offence – nominate), (if applicable, in circumstances of (special) aggravation, namely – nominate circumstances as per s 105A). Section 112(1)(b): That AB on .......... at .......... the said State being in the dwelling-house (or other building – describe) of CD and committing a serious indictable offence therein, namely, larceny (of specify items stolen the property of CD)(or other serious indictable offence – nominate) (if applicable, in circumstances of (special) aggravation, namely – nominate circumstances as per s 105A) and afterwards did break out of the said dwelling-house (or other building). Note The serious indictable offence and the circumstance(s) of aggravation may be one and the same act, see [CA.112.120].
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(1) A person who: (a) breaks and enters any dwelling-house or other building and commits any serious indictable offence therein, or (b) being in any dwelling-house or other building commits any serious indictable offence therein and breaks out of the dwelling-house or other building, is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for 14 years.
Crimes Act 1900 s 112 [CA.112.40]
[CA.112.0] Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references
With an offence alleged under s 112(1), where the serious indictable offence intended is stealing or destroying or damaging property and the value of the property does not exceed $60,000, that offence comes within cl 8 of Sch 1 Table 1 under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elects to have them dealt with on indictment. If dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment, see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Otherwise, an alleged offence under s 112(1), or an aggravated or specially aggravated offence under s 112(2) or (3), must be prosecuted on indictment. A standard non-parole period of 5 years is specified for an offence under s 112(2) and of 7 years for an offence under s 112(3) in the case of offences committed after 1 February 2003.1 Section 112 offences fall within a series of offences known as housebreaking. Related offences are: • Section 109 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence or breaking out of a dwelling after committing a serious indictable offence. • Section 110 – breaking and entering a dwelling or appurtenant building and assaulting with intent to murder or inflicting grievous bodily harm. • Section 111 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 113 – breaking and entering a dwelling or other building with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 114 – possessing housebreaking or car breaking implements; being armed with intent to commit a serious indictable offence etc.
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A former cognate offence was burglary under s 108, abolished in 1974. Burglary differed from break and enter type offences in that burglary could only be committed at night and in relation to dwelling-houses. With burglary, unlike s 112, it had to be proved that the accused broke and entered with intent to commit a felony. 1 Section 54A and Table of Standard non-parole periods under Pt 4 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
[CA.112.60]
Elements of the offences
Section 112(1)(a) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) broke and entered a dwelling-house or other building; and (2) committed a serious indictable offence therein; (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A).1 Section 112(1)(b) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) being in a dwelling-house or other building; (2) committed a serious indictable offence therein; and (2A) broke out of the dwelling-house or other building; (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A). 1 Elements (1) and (2) were confirmed in Firbank v The Queen (2011) 223 A Crim R 301; [2011] NSWCCA 171 at [35] and R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197 at [8] per Simpson J.
[CA.112.80]
Elements (1) Breaking and entering a dwelling-house or other building or (2A) Breaking out
Actual breaking – there is no definition of breaking in the Crimes Act 1900. Breaking is a common law construct derived originally from 18th and 19th century burglary cases. The Larceny Act 1861 (Imp)
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introduced a fourteen year maximum for breaking, entering and committing a felony in substitution for earlier capital punishment available for burglary and housebreaking.1 The concepts of both breaking and entering were characterised by fine technical distinctions which have attracted more recent judicial criticism.2 Nonetheless, these distinctions remain the law in New South Wales.3 While breaking sometimes involves the use of force causing damage, neither damage nor force are essential. Breaking may be actual or constructive. An actual breaking occurs where to effect entry of any part of his body to premises, the accused physically breaks a door or window, picks a lock, uses a key, lifts a latch, or unloosens any fastening to a door or window (even if partially open).4 Turning on their own facts, many cases have been held to constitute breakings through doors and windows.5 It is a breaking to push open a closed but unsecured door, or to open a closed but unfastened window.6 If an accused enters premises without breaking, the opening of a closed internal door for the purpose of further ingress will constitute a breaking.7 The breaking open of the inner door of a shop by an employee is a breaking of the shop.8 The lifting of a cellar flap usually kept down by its own weight is a breaking.9 An entry down a chimney was held to be a breaking, as a chimney is closed as the nature of things will allow.10 But entry through an aperture in a wall, roof or cellar for the admission of light or air, this is not a breaking.11 It was not breaking of a dwelling to open further a door or window that was already partly open.12 Some of the foregoing propositions were considered in Galea v The Queen (1989) 1 WAR 450; 46 A Crim R 158 and Stanford v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 474; 179 A Crim R 541; [2007] NSWCCA 370. Constructive breaking – the common law recognised various forms of constructive breaking, including breakings by intimidation or by the use of a trick.13 In R v Boyle [1954] 2 QB 292; [1954] 3 WLR 364; (1954) 38 Cr App R 111, the accused obtained admission to a house from which he stole a handbag by falsely telling the occupier that he was a BBC employee sent to examine a radio. It was held that if the occupier would not have admitted the accused if the occupier knew the true position, this amounted to a breaking. There may be a constructive breaking by a conspiracy. In R v Chandler [1913] 1 KB 125; (1912) 8 Cr App R 82, the accused gained entry to a shop by conspiring with an employee to supply him with the key. In fact, the employee had informed the shop owner of the accused’s intention before the constructive breaking occurred. Entering – there was always a requirement for an entry as well as a breaking,14 although the entry did not have to be at the same time as the breaking.15 Following a breaking, “if any part of the body be within the house, hand or foot; this at common law is sufficient, and has always been so ruled.”16 In one case, it was held that there was sufficient entry where the accused’s finger was placed inside a window in the course of breaking the window.17 If only an instrument enters the premises, a distinction has been made according to whether it has been used simply to enable the accused to enter, or whether the entry of the instrument is only for the purpose of carrying out the serious indictable offence. In the former case, there is no entry by the person controlling the instrument. In the latter case, where the instrument is used to enable the removal of an object inside, or in the case of a firearm, to shoot at an occupant, there is an entry by the person who controls the instrument.18 Breaking out – it has been said that the same rules apply to breaking out as to breaking in.19 A lodger who entered premises lawfully, committed an offence by breaking out after committing a felony inside.20 It was held an offence to open a door, window or skylight in an attempt to escape, even though the burglar only managed to get his head through the opening.21 Unlocking and opening a hall door and running away is a sufficient breaking out of a house.22 Where the prosecution alleges a breaking out, there must be some evidence that the accused left the premises by an actual or constructive breaking.23 Intent in breaking and entering – in contradistinction to ss 109, 111 and 113, s 112 contains no requirement that the breaking and entering of premises be with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein. It was remarked in R v Kelly [1964] 1 QB 173; [1963] 3 WLR 835; (1964) 48 Cr App R 1 that if a man breaks into a house, to sleep for example, and when inside takes a liking to something and decides to steal it, that constitutes a breaking and entering and the commission of a felony. Dwelling-house – s 4 contains the following partial definition of “dwelling-house” as including:
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[CA.112.80]
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[CA.112.80]
(a) any building or other structure intended for occupation as a dwelling and capable of being so occupied, although it has never been so occupied, (b) a boat or vehicle in or on which any person resides, and (c) any building or other structure within the same curtilage as a dwelling-house, and occupied therewith or whose use is ancillary to the occupation of the dwelling-house.
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The meaning of “dwelling-house” was considered in R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197. When premises such as a shop or warehouse, although not originally constructed as a dwelling, come to be lived in, they can be regarded as a dwelling house.24 A tent may be a dwelling-house if it is lived in.25 Other building – a dictionary definition of “building” is “a substantial structure with a roof and walls”.26 In one case, a building was defined as “a structure of considerable size and intended to be permanent or at least to endure for a considerable time”.27 A caravan kiosk with electricity connected and used for selling goods was held to be a building.28 A collection of stalls within a market building may be regarded as a single building and the common area thereof within that building.29 By s 105A(1), “building” includes “any place of Divine worship”. 1 R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435 at [3]. 2 For example, R v Boyle [1954] 2 QB 292; [1954] 3 WLR 364; (1954) 38 Cr App R 111; R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197. 3 R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197. 4 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 552 (1736); 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 487 (1806); Turner JWC, Russell on Crime (12th ed, Stevens & Sons, 1964, London) pp 815–816.; R v Walker (1978) 19 SASR 532; R v Walkington [1979] 1 WLR 1169; [1979] 2 ER 716; (1979) 68 Cr App R 427; Galea v The Queen (1989) 1 WAR 450; 46 A Crim R 158; Stanford v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 474; 179 A Crim R 541; [2007] NSWCCA 370. 5 R v Owen (1827) 1 Lew CC 35 (lifting the latch of either the outer or inner door); Pugh v Griffıth (1838) 7 Ad & El 827; 112 ER 681 (lifting the latch of a door); R v Smith (1820) Russ & Ry 417; 168 ER 874 (removing glass from door); R v Bird (1839) 9 Car & P 44; 173 ER 732 (pushing in an already cut pane of glass); R v Perkes (1824) 1 Car & P 300; 171 ER 1204 and R v Tucker (1844) 1 Cox CC 73 (pane of glass broken); R v Haines (1821) Russ & Ry 451; 168 ER 892 (pulling down a window sash without a fastening and kept in place only by a pulley weight); R v Hyams (1836) 7 Car & P 441; 173 ER 196 (raising a shut sash window); R v Hall (1818) Russ & Ry 355; 168 ER 842 (pushing against a window held with wedges); R v Robinson (1831) 1 Mood CC 327; 168 ER 1290 (further breaking a window pane already broken); R v Lackey [1954] Crim LR 57 (undoing catch of open window to further open it). 6 R v Walker (1978) 19 SASR 532 (FC) at 533; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Trudgett (2013) 238 A Crim R 1; [2013] NSWSC 1607 at [15] per Barr AJ. See also R v Haines (1821) Russ & Ry 451; 168 ER 892; R v Hyams (1836) 7 Car & P 441; 173 ER 196; Galea v The Queen (1989) 1 WAR 450; 46 A Crim R 158. 7 R v King (1978) 19 SASR 118 at 123; R v Johnson (1786) 2 East PC 488. 8 R v Wenmouth (1860) 8 Cox CC 348. 9 R v Russell (1833) 1 Mood CC 377; 168 ER 1310. 10 R v Smith (1827) 1 Mood CC 178; 168 ER 1232; R v Brice (1821) Russ & Ry 450; 168 ER 892. 11 R v Lewis (1827) 2 Car & P 628; 172 ER 285; R v Spriggs (1834) 1 Mood & R 357; 174 ER 122. 12 R v Smith (1827) 1 Mood CC 178; 168 ER 1232; Halley v The Crown (1938) 40 WALR 105; R v Walker (1978) 19 SASR 532; Galea v The Queen (1989) 1 WAR 450; 46 A Crim R 158; R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20; Stanford v The Queen (2007) 70 NSWLR 474; 179 A Crim R 541; [2007] NSWCCA 370. 13 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 485–486. 14 R v Hughes (1785) 1 Leach 406; 168 ER 305. 15 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 491; R v Smith (1820) Russ & Ry 417; 168 ER 874. 16 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 490. 17 R v Davis (1823) Russ & Ry 499; 168 ER 917. See also R v Gibbons (1752) Fos 107; R v Rust (1828) 1 Mood CC 183; 168 ER 1234; R v O’Brien (1850) 4 Cox CC 400. 18 R v Hughes (1785) 1 Leach 406; 168 ER 305; R v Roberts (1828) Car CL 293; R v O’Brien (1850) 4 Cox CC 400. 19 Halsbury’s Laws of England 2nd ed Vol 9 at p 543 citing R v Wheeldon (1839) 8 Car & P 747; 173 ER 700.
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R v Wheeldon (1839) 8 Car & P 747; 173 ER 700. R v M’Kearney (1829) Jebb Cr & Pr Cas 99. Also R v Compton (1835) 7 Car & P 139; 173 ER 62. R v Lawrence (1830) 4 Car & P 231; 172 ER 683. R v Payne (1887) 13 VLR 359. R v Gibbons (1821) Russ & Ry 442; 168 ER 888. R v Storn (1865) 5 SCR (NSW) 26. The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed (1997) The Macquarie Library. Stevens v Gourley (1859) 7 CB (NS) 99; 141 ER 752 at 112 (CB (NS)); 757 (ER) per Byles J. Forster v Shire of Mornington [1949] VLR 150. R v Wilson [1969] SASR 218.
[CA.112.100]
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20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
s 112
Element (2) Commission of a serious indictable offence
Indictable offence, meaning of – s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 defines “indictable offence” as an offence (including a common law offence) that may be prosecuted on indictment. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 defines “indictable offence” as meaning an offence for which proceedings may be taken on indictment, whether or not proceedings for the offence may also be taken otherwise than on indictment. Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 stipulates which offences must be dealt with summarily, that is, those expressly required to be dealt with summarily, those described as summary offences and those for which the maximum penalty provided is not more than two years imprisonment. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that all offences (except offences that are required to be dealt with summarily) shall be punishable by information (to be called an indictment).
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Serious indictable offence – s 4 of the Crimes Act 1900 defines “serious indictable offence” as meaning “an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or a term of 5 years or more”. Commission of a serious indictable offence – the serious indictable offence most often charged under s 112 is larceny; the charge of break, enter and steal. Others include break and enter and commit an assault with an act of indecency,1 break and enter and have sexual intercourse without consent,2 break and enter and wound with intent,3 and break and enter and commit armed robbery.4 In view of the great diversity of circumstances in which this offence is committed, it is not possible to identify a “typical” s 112 case.5 Claim of right – if the serious indictable offence is one of either larceny or with an element of larceny such as robbery, a bona fide claim of right to the property will mean that no offence under s 112 has been committed. See also the comments of Brennan and Deane JJ in Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426; [1983] HCA 18 at 366 (CLR). For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. Intoxication – an offence under s 112 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the necessary mens rea, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.6 1 2 3 4 5 6
For example R v Lang [2008] NSWCCA 41. For example, Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262; 157 A Crim R 420; [2005] HCA 80. For example, Sheen v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 259. For example, R v Matthews [2008] NSWCCA 54. R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435 at [43]. Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D.
[CA.112.120]
Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation
The various “circumstances of aggravation” and “circumstances of special aggravation” are set out in s 105A. In R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62, it was held that a single act of attacking a victim with some scooter handlebars and injuring him can be relied on by the prosecution to constitute both the serious indictable offence, namely an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and the
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circumstance of aggravation, namely the use by the appellant of corporal violence. There is no prohibition on those two elements being made out by the one act.1 1 Applied in R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197.
[CA.112.140]
Alternative charge/verdict
As an indictment under the equivalent of s 112 does not allege an intent concerning the break and enter itself, there cannot be a conviction for an offence under the equivalent of s 113, which does require such an intent.1 However, an alternative count under Crimes Act 1900s 113 may be added to the indictment. Unless receiving under s 121 has been charged in the indictment, the special verdict of larceny or receiving under s 121 is not available as an alternative verdict where an offence under s 112 is charged.2 If an aggravated or specially aggravated offence is charged under s 112(2) or (3), but the circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation are not proved then, under s 115A, there may be a finding of guilt of an offence under s 112(1), or s 112(2) as the case may be. 1 R v Kelly [1964] 1 QB 173; [1963] 3 WLR 835; (1964) 48 Cr App R 1. 2 Geitz v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 289; 238 A Crim R 156.
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[CA.112.160]
Sentencing
In R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that it was not appropriate to express a sentencing guideline for s 112 offences in quantitative terms, but rather at [48], determined that a court should regard the seriousness of offence contrary to s 112(1) as enhanced and reflect that enhanced seriousness in the quantum of sentence if any or more of the following factors are present: (i) The offence is committed whilst the offender is at conditional liberty on bail or on parole. (ii) The offence is the result of professional planning, organization and execution. (iii) The offender has a prior record particularly for like offences. (iv) The offence is committed at premises of the elderly, the sick or the disabled. (v) The offence is accompanied by vandalism and by any other significant damage to property. (vi) The multiplicity of offence (reflected either in the charges or matters taken into account on a Form 1 pursuant to s 21 of the CP Act). In sentencing on multiple counts regard must be had to the criminality involved in each: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; 72 ALJR 1416; 103 A Crim R 372; 156 ALR 684. (vii) The offence is committed in a series of repeat incursions into the same premises. (viii) The value of the stolen property to the victim, whether that value is measured in terms of money or in terms of sentimental value. (ix) The offence was committed at a time when, absent specific knowledge on the part of the offender (a defined circumstance of aggravation – Crimes Act 1900 s 105A(1)(f)), it was likely that the premises would be occupied, particularly at night. (x) That actual trauma was suffered by the victim (other than as a result of corporal violence, infliction of actual bodily harm or deprivation of liberty – defined circumstances of aggravation: Crimes Act 1900 s 105A(1)(c), (d) and (e)). (xi) That force was used or threatened (other than by means of an offensive weapon, or instrument – a defined circumstance of aggravation Crimes Act 1900 s 105A(1)(a)). At [49] the Court added that, “[i]t will of course be requisite for a sentencing court to give appropriate weight to matters in mitigation as manifest in the particular case. These will include evidence of genuine regret and remorse and any rehabilitative steps taken by the offender. Whilst addiction to drugs and alcohol is a relevant circumstance for the Court to consider it is not of itself a mitigating factor.” See R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149; [1999] NSWCCA 111 at [193]–[203] and [217]–[259]).1
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[CA.113.40]
s 113
The prevalence of this offence is a factor to be taken into account in sentencing for it.2 The seriousness of the “serious indictable offence” is an appropriate matter to consider on sentence.3 1 In the Matter of the Attorney General’s Application (No 1) under s 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act; R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435. 2 R v Shaw (2001) 121 A Crim R 25; [2001] NSWCCA 44 at [26]. 3 R v Huynh [2005] NSWCCA 220.
Breaking etc into any house etc with intent to commit serious indictable offence
(1) A person who breaks and enters any dwelling-house or other building with intent to commit any serious indictable offence therein is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) subst Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[20]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[28] and [70]; Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(13); Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
(2) Aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(13)]
(3) Specially aggravated offence A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (2) in circumstances of special aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 20 years. [Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(13)]
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[S 113 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; Act 84 of 1994; Act 48 of 1966, s 2; Act 10 of 1924]
SECTION 113 COMMENTARY Indictments/charges .......................................................................................................................... [CA.113.20] Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references .................................................................................... [CA.113.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.113.60] Element (1) Breaking and entering a dwelling-house or other building ........................................... [CA.113.80] Element (2) With intent to commit a serious indictable offence ..................................................... [CA.113.100] Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation ............................................ [CA.113.120] Alternative charge/verdict ............................................................................................................... [CA.113.140]
[CA.113.20]
Indictments/charges
That AB on ................ at ................ the said State did break and enter the dwelling-house (or other building [describe]) of CD (or being [address]) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein, namely [specify offence] (and if applicable, in circumstances of aggravation (or special aggravation), namely [nominate circumstances as per s 105A]). [CA.113.40]
Jurisdiction, penalties and cross references
Under s 113(1) where the serious indictable offence alleged to have been intended is stealing or destroying or damaging property, such offence comes within cl 7 of Sch 1 Table 1 under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. As such it is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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113
Crimes Act 1900 s 113
[CA.113.40]
Otherwise, an offence alleged under s 113(1), or an aggravated or specially aggravated offence under s 113(2) or (3), must be prosecuted on indictment. There is no standard non-parole period for any offence under s 113.
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Section 113 offences fall within a series of offences known as housebreaking under Pt 4 Div 4 of the Crimes Act 1900. Related housebreaking offences are: • Section 109 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence or breaking out of a dwelling after committing a serious indictable offence. • Section 110 – breaking and entering a dwelling or appurtenant building and assaulting with intent to murder or inflicting grievous bodily harm. • Section 111 – entering a dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. • Section 112 – breaking and entering a dwelling and committing a serious indictable offence etc. • Section 114 – possessing housebreaking or car breaking implements. Sections 113 and 111 compared – a series of legislative amendments over many years has meant that ss 113 and 111 now look similar. The former offence of burglary under s 108 was repealed by the Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974. A component of burglary under the former s 108 involved either breaking and entering a dwelling-house with intent to commit a felony (a serious indictable offence) at night, or, entering a dwelling-house and committing a felony (a serious indictable offence) or with intent to do so and then breaking out at night. Until its amendment by the Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1994 (Act 84 of 1994), s 111 required an entry into a dwelling-house with intent to commit a felony (a serious indictable offence) “in the night”. Act 84 of 1994 omitted the words “in the night”.1 Further, offences under s 111 were and are limited to “any dwelling-house”. Offences under s 113 applied to the breaking and entering of not only “any dwelling-house”, but also other buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling-house and various other specified buildings. The scope of the other specified buildings within s 113 was broadened by the Crimes Amendment Act 2007 which provided that its terms would now apply simply to “any dwelling-house or other building”. By these amendments, the terms of ss 113 and 111 have become similar. But some differences remain: firstly, unlike s 113, s applies only to dwelling-houses and not to other buildings and secondly, all that must be proved under s 111 is the entering of a dwelling-house, whereas under s 113 the prosecution must prove a breaking as well as an entry. 1 The concept of breaking and entering or entering in the night was reinstated to a degree by the inclusion in s 105A of s 105A(f). This introduced a further circumstance of aggravation of housebreaking offences that “the alleged offender knows that there is a person or that there are persons, in the place where the offence is alleged to be committed”: Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 1995.
[CA.113.60]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) broke and entered a dwelling-house or other building; (2) with intent to commit a serious indictable offence therein; (3) (where applicable) in circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation (as specified in s 105A). [CA.113.80]
Element (1) Breaking and entering a dwelling-house or other building
As to the meaning of breaking and entering and of dwelling-house and other building, see commentary at [CA.112.80]. [CA.113.100]
Element (2) With intent to commit a serious indictable offence
As to the meaning of serious indictable offence, see commentary at [CA.112.100]. Intoxication and intent – s 113 makes clear that the prosecution must prove an accused’s specific intent to commit a serious indictable offence within the dwelling-house or other building entered. Sometimes, this
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s 114
Claim of right – if the serious indictable offence is one of either larceny or perhaps another offence of which larceny is an element such as stealing from the person, a bona fide claim of right to the property will mean that no offence under s 113 has been committed because of lack of intent to steal. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. Nevertheless, in such a case, the entrant to a dwelling may be guilty of an offence of unlawful entry on inclosed lands under s 4(1) of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901. [CA.113.120]
Element (3) In circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation
The various “circumstances of aggravation” and “circumstances of special aggravation” are set out in s 105A. In R v O’Donoghue (2005) 151 A Crim R 597; [2005] NSWCCA 62, it was held that a single act of attacking a victim with some scooter handlebars and injuring him can be relied on by the prosecution to constitute both the serious indictable offence, namely an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and the circumstance of aggravation, namely the use by the appellant of corporal violence. There is no prohibition on those two elements being made out by the one act.1 1 Applied in R v Bennett (2014) 245 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 197.
[CA.113.140]
Alternative charge/verdict
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If an aggravated or specially aggravated offence is charged under ss 113(2) or (3), but the circumstances of aggravation or special aggravation are not proved, then under s 115A there may be a finding of guilt of an offence under s 113(1), or s 113(2) as the case may be. 114
Being armed with intent to commit indictable offence
(1) Any person who: (a) is armed with any weapon, or instrument, with intent to commit an indictable offence, (b) has in his or her possession, without lawful excuse, any implement of housebreaking or safebreaking, or any implement capable of being used to enter or drive or enter and drive a conveyance, (c) has his or her face blackened or otherwise disguised, or has in his or her possession the means of blacking or otherwise disguising his or her face, with intent to commit an indictable offence, (d) enters or remains in or upon any part of a building or any land occupied or used in connection therewith with intent to commit an indictable offence in or upon the building, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [Subs (1) am Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[23]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[32], [33] and [70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3; Act 72 of 1979, s 4 and Sch 3]
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) conveyance means any cab, carriage, motor car, caravan, trailer, motor lorry, omnibus, motor or other bicycle, or any ship, or vessel, used in or intended for navigation, and drive shall be construed accordingly. [Subs (2) am Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[2]] [S 114 am Act 26 of 2006; Act 53 of 2000; Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 72 of 1979; subst Act 50 of 1974, s 6; am Act 48 of 1966, s 2; Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
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may be proved by inference from the circumstances in which the accused is found in the dwelling. Section 428B lists an offence under s 113 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intent to commit a serious indictable offence, self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply.
Crimes Act 1900 s 114
[CA.114.20]
SECTION 114 COMMENTARY The elements of being armed with intent ......................................................................................... [CA.114.20] “Indictable offence” ........................................................................................................................... [CA.114.40] Intent ................................................................................................................................................. [CA.114.60] Actual possession ............................................................................................................................. [CA.114.80] Implement of house breaking ......................................................................................................... [CA.114.100] Examination of character of entry not paramount .......................................................................... [CA.114.120] Lawful excuse ................................................................................................................................. [CA.114.140] Alternative convictions on acquittal ................................................................................................ [CA.114.160]
[CA.114.20]
The elements of being armed with intent
The elements of an offence under s 114 are clearly set forth in the various paragraphs of the section. [CA.114.40]
“Indictable offence”
As to the meaning of “indictable offence” see s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.50]. [CA.114.60]
Intent
The intent of the accused may be inferred from the nature of the weapon or instrument with which he or she is armed, the place where he or she is found, her or his statements and other circumstances.1 It is necessary where relevant under s 114(1)(a) to prove that the accused intended to enter a particular building2 and to commit a particular type of offence.
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1 R v Wood (1911) 7 Cr App R 56. Compare R v Williams (1916) 12 Cr App R 6; R v Pearson (1910) 4 Cr App R 40. 2 R v Jarrald & Ost 169 ER 1404; (1863) Le & Ca 301.
[CA.114.80]
Actual possession
It had previously been held that possession of housebreaking or safebreaking implements must be actual and not constructive.1 However, s 114 then contained the words “whosoever is found at night”: this element is now eliminated. 1 R v Yates (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 477; 80 WN (NSW) 744; R v Lumsden [1951] 2 KB 513; [1951] 1 All ER 1101; (1951) 35 Cr App R 57; R v Harris (1924) 18 Cr App R 157. See also R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340; (1962) 46 Cr App R 106.
[CA.114.100]
Implement of house breaking
Every instrument which from its nature is capable of being used for housebreaking, although ordinarily used for lawful purposes (for example, a house key, a pair of pliers) is a housebreaking implement if the circumstances at the time when the accused was found in possession of it indicate that it was her or his intention to use it as such.1 Evidence may be given that marks found on doors could have been made by an instrument in the possession of the accused.2 Where several persons are found engaged in the common purpose of housebreaking, but only one is found with housebreaking implements, all may be convicted of being in possession of them.3 1 R v Oldham 175 ER 540; (1852) 3 Car & K 249; R v Stewart (1932) 97 JP Jo 137 (electric torch); R v Percival, Smith & Graham (1905) 69 JP 320. 2 R v Hatch (1933) 24 Cr App R 100. 3 R v Thompson (1869) 21 LT 397. Compare R v Geoghegan (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 81; R v Lester (1955) 39 Cr App R 157; R v Pierpoint (1993) 71 A Crim R 187.
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[CA.115.20] [CA.114.120]
s 115
Examination of character of entry not paramount
An offence under s 114(1)(d) does not require examination of the character of entry beyond its accompaniment by the relevant intent.1 1 R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554.
Lawful excuse
Proof of lawful excuse lies on the accused: s 417. Where the other elements of an offence are proved, the burden shifts to the accused to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there was lawful excuse.1 Evidence of other actions by the accused may be given to rebut the defence of lawful excuse.2 1 R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; 1 All ER 340; (1962) 46 Cr App R 106. See also R v Pierpoint (1993) 71 A Crim R 187. Compare R v Ward [1915] 3 KB 696; (1915) 11 Cr App R 245. 2 R v Hodges (1957) 41 Cr App R 218.
[CA.114.160]
Alternative convictions on acquittal
Acquittal of a charge of armed assault with intent to rob does not preclude conviction on a charge of entering a building with intent to commit a robbery.1 1 R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554.
115
Being convicted offender armed with intent to commit indictable offence
Whosoever, having been convicted of any indictable offence, afterwards commits any offence mentioned in section 114, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 115 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[34] and [70]; Act 48 of 1966, s 2; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 115 COMMENTARY [CA.115.20]
General
The accused cannot be arraigned under s 115 until he or she has been convicted of the offence charged under s 114. Section 115 refers to conviction for a serious indictable offence, not to the commission of that serious indictable offence.1 1 R v Tillott (1991) 53 A Crim R 46.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 115A
115A
[CA.115A.20]
Alternative verdicts
(1) Aggravated offence reduced to basic offence If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 106(2), 107(2), 109(2), 111(2), 112(2) or 113(2) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 106(1), 107(1), 109(1), 111(1), 112(1) or 113(1) as appropriate, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (2) Specially aggravated offence reduced to aggravated offence If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 106(3), 107(3), 109(3), 111(3), 112(3) or 113(3) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 106(2), 107(2), 109(2), 111(2), 112(2) or 113(2) as appropriate, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (3) Specially aggravated offence reduced to basic offence If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 106(3), 107(3), 109(3), 111(3), 112(3) or 113(3) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 106(1), 107(1), 109(1), 111(1), 112(1) or 113(1) as appropriate, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. This subsection does not apply to an offence if the jury proceeds under subsection (2) in relation to it. [S 115A insrt Act 84 of 1994, s 3 and Sch 1(14)]
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SECTION 115A COMMENTARY [CA.115A.20]
Alternative verdicts
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict is raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100].
DIVISION 5 – LARCENY [Former subdiv 5 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 5 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[24]]
116
All larcenies to be of same nature
Every larceny, whatever the value of the property stolen, shall be deemed to be of the same nature, and shall be subject to the same incidents in all respects, as grand larceny was before the passing of the Act seventh and eighth George the Fourth, chapter twenty-nine.
SECTION 116 COMMENTARY [CA.116.20]
General
As far as practicable, s 116 applies to all offences and all courts: Sch 2.
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s 117
Prior to 1827 the English law distinguished between “petty” larceny involving property of twelve pence or less and “grand” larceny.1 1 Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed, 1966) para [296].
117
Punishment for larceny
Whosoever commits larceny, or any indictable offence by this Act made punishable like larceny, shall, except in the cases hereinafter otherwise provided for, be liable to imprisonment for five years. CA
[S 117 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[35] and [70]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
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SECTION 117 COMMENTARY Indictment .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.117.20] Cross reference ................................................................................................................................ [CA.117.40] Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.117.60] Definition of “larceny” ........................................................................................................................ [CA.117.80] Elements ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.117.100] (1) Wrongful taking and carrying away ........................................................................................... [CA.117.120] Physical movement of the property ................................................................................................ [CA.117.140] Trespass to the property taken ....................................................................................................... [CA.117.160] Fraudulent intent ............................................................................................................................. [CA.117.180] Claim of right ................................................................................................................................... [CA.117.200] Fraudulent taking ............................................................................................................................ [CA.117.220] (2) The personal goods of another ................................................................................................. [CA.117.240] Property the subject of larceny ....................................................................................................... [CA.117.260] The owner of the property .............................................................................................................. [CA.117.280] Husband and wife ........................................................................................................................... [CA.117.300] (3) Intent to permanently deprive ................................................................................................... [CA.117.320] (4) Without the owner’s consent ..................................................................................................... [CA.117.340] Larceny by a trick ........................................................................................................................... [CA.117.360] Larceny by intimidation ................................................................................................................... [CA.117.380] Larceny as result of mistake ........................................................................................................... [CA.117.400] Larceny by finding ........................................................................................................................... [CA.117.420] Doctrine of recent possession ........................................................................................................ [CA.117.440] Jury directions and verdict .............................................................................................................. [CA.117.460]
[CA.117.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State did steal (describe property) the property of CD. Time of taking – An indictment which alleges that property was taken between two dates is not defective and has the effect of alleging that the various articles were taken at the same time.1 Where it has been alleged that property has been stolen at one time but it appears that it has in fact been taken at different times, the Crown is not required to elect upon which taking it will proceed unless the trial judge so orders: s 119. Description of property – The articles stolen should be described in detail in the indictment.2 However identification of the precise property is not necessary in every case. Where it is alleged that an accused has stolen part of a larger item of property from which it cannot be distinguished, it is unnecessary for the Crown to identify the precise property as distinct from describing its nature and quantity or the number of items.3 The Crown does not have to prove that all the property specified in the indictment was stolen and it is enough if it is proved that any of the property was stolen.4
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General deficiency – Where it is alleged that an accused has stolen property over a period of time and the Crown cannot identify each theft or amount taken, larceny can be charged of the general deficiency of such moneys as can be established by reference to the victim’s books or by some other means. Ownership – Except in the very limited circumstances provided for in s 382, an indictment which does not allege ownership, possession or control in some person is defective;5 but naming such person is not essential if it is not known from whom the property was taken and, in that event, the indictment may allege stealing “from a person unknown”.6 Where it is known that property has been stolen from one of a number of persons, but it is not clear from which one, the indictment may contain different allegations of ownership in alternative counts.7 Alternatively, it has been suggested that, in this event, it may be permissible to allege ownership in a “person unknown”.8 It is improper to allege goods stolen to be the property of a person unknown if the owner is in fact known.9 If the indictment alleges that the property was that of a named person, the Crown must bring some evidence that that person was the owner of the property; if the property is alleged to be the property of persons unknown, the evidence must show that the Crown is unable to ascertain who the owner was.10 Where property owned by one person is taken from the possession or control of another, the indictment should normally allege stealing from the owner rather than the person having possession or control of it.11 By s 383 (now repealed), where property is owned by more than one person eg partners or trustees, it shall be sufficient to name one owner and add “another” or “others”. Where the owner has died, property vests in the Public Trustee until such time as probate or administration has been granted.12 An unregistered partnership may prosecute for theft of its property.13 Where an accused is charged with stealing from a company, incorporation must be proved, either by production of the certificate of incorporation or in some other way.14
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An amendment to the indictment will normally be allowed when it appears that the ownership etc resided in someone other than the person named in the indictment15 and see s 365 (now repealed). Joinder of several offences – As to the joinder of counts for separate offences, see s 370. If one larceny is committed by A and another larceny is committed by A and B, those two larcenies are not committed by the “same person” within the meaning of s 370 (now repealed).16 Receiving – A count for receiving may be added: s 384 (now repealed). Such a count should be added where the evidence is as consistent with receiving as with larceny.17 Where there are separate counts for larceny there may be corresponding counts for receiving. 1 R v Rye (1909) 2 Cr App R 155. 2 R v Young (1923) 17 Cr App R 131; R v Douglas (1926) 19 Cr App R 119. 3 R v Tideswell [1905] 2 KB 273 which involved the theft of two tons of ash from a bulk of 2 tons and Russell v Smith [1958] 1 QB 27 concerning eight sacks of pigmeal. 4 Edens v Cleary [1975] 1 NSWLR 278. See also R v Sharp (1847) 2 Cox CC 181; R v Clarke [1934] QSR 23; Hird v Grams [1943] QSR 49; Ex parte Patmoy; Re Jack (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 351; 61 WN (NSW) 228; R v Lindsay [1963] Qd R 386; Machent v Quinn [1970] 2 All ER 255. 5 R v Moranda (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 152; R v McCoy [1938] QSR 249; Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142 per Lord Goddard CJ at 151; R v Gregory [1972] 1 WLR 991; [1972] 2 All ER 861; (1972) 56 Cr App R 441. 6 R v Flood (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) (L) 299; Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50. 7 R v Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151. 8 R v Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151 per Davidson J at 469 (SR (NSW)) and Owen J at 470 (SR (NSW)). 9 2 East PC 561, quoted by Griffith CJ in Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50 at 132 (CLR). See also R v Isaacs (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 369; 1 WN (NSW) 31; R v Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151 at 470 (SR (NSW)). 10 Anglim and Cooke v Thomas [1974] VR 363 per Harris J at 374; Ellis v Lawson (1987) 33 A Crim R 69 (NSW Sup Ct, Campbell J). See also R v Isaacs (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 369; 1 WN (NSW) 31.
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11 R v Remnant (1807) Russ & Ry 136; R v Bourne (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 176; R v Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151 at 469 (SR (NSW)). 12 Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898, s 61. 13 Jeffrey v Bamford [1921] 2 KB 351. 14 R v Bower (1888) 5 WN (NSW) 28; R v Cawley (1896) 7 QLJR 45; R v Dwer [1962] Qd R 84. 15 R v Isaac (1884) 5 NSWLR 369 at 372, 374–375; Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50 at 135, 140 (CLR); R v Thompson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 466; 64 WN (NSW) 151 at 469–470 (SR (NSW)); R v Justelius [1973] 1 NSWLR 471 at 479. 16 See R v Edwards [1913] 1 KB 287; (1912) 8 Cr App R 128; R v Harris (1910) 5 Cr App R 285; R v Thompson [1914] 2 KB 99; (1913) 9 Cr App R 252. 17 R v Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68; R v Cash [1985] 1 QB 801; [1985] 2 WLR 735; 2 All ER 128; (1985) 80 Cr App R 314.
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[CA.117.40] s s s s s s s
118 119 120 121 122 123 124
s s s s s s s s s s
125 148 152 153 154A 156 159 162 173 183
s 384
Cross reference intention to eventually return property not a defence verdict where property taken at different times trial for larceny – verdict of embezzlement, false pretences etc larceny or receiving – special verdict special verdict where two or more jointly indicted for larceny and receiving verdict of misdemeanour later fraudulent appropriation or fraudulent retention of property for reward where property not originally taken with fraudulent intent (s 527 summary offence) larceny by a bailee stealing in a dwelling house (with menaces s 149) stealing from ship in port etc or from wharves etc stealing from ship in distress or wrecked taking a conveyance without consent of owner deemed to be larceny stealing by clerks or servants stealing by public servants stealing by joint owners fraudulent taking by company director verdict of larceny can be found where accused charged with obtaining property by false pretence etc. count for receiving may be added to an indictment for stealing.
There are also the following sections dealing with larceny of particular property: s s s s s s s
126 – 131 132,133 134 135 138 139 140
cattle dogs (s 503 valuable securities wills etc court or public office records glass, wood or metal fixtures trees, plants etc
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[CA.117.40]
Crimes Act 1900 s 117 s s s s s s s s s s s s
150 154 154AA 154B(1) 505 513 515 518 520 521 521A 525
[CA.117.60]
[CA.117.40] goods in the process of manufacture chattels or fixtures by tenants etc motor cars aircraft animals or birds not the subject of larceny at common law (summary) plants live or dead fences dead wood plants in gardens etc plants growing in enclosed lands other than gardens etc rock, soil etc books etc in public libraries etc (summary). Jurisdiction
Larceny of property of $5,000 or less in value is listed in Table 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 260(2) of that Act, larceny of property not exceeding $5,000 in value is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecuting authority elects otherwise. Larceny of property of more than $5,000 in value is listed in Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. By s 260(1) of that Act, larceny of property exceeding $5,000 in value is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecuting authority or the person charged with the offence elects otherwise.
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If no election is made the offence is to be dealt with summarily: see s 261. By s 268(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the maximum penalty for larceny (other than under s 154A) is imprisonment for 12 months and/or a fine of 50 penalty units (but if the value of the property does not exceed $2,000, the maximum fine is 20 penalty units): see [CPA.267.20]. [CA.117.80]
Definition of “larceny”
There is no definition of “larceny” in the Crimes Act 1900. The offence is defined at common law. East’s Pleas of the Crown (1803) defined larceny as: the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person of the mere personal goods of another, from any place, with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker’s) own use, and make them his own property, without the consent of the owner.1 In Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326. Barwick CJ (with whom McTiernan J agreed) said at 328, At “common law, larceny is the taking and carrying away the personal goods of another from any place with the felonious intent to convert them to the taker’s own use, and to make them permanently his own property without the consent of the true owner.”2 In Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110 at 123 Wilson and Dawson JJ quoted s 1(1) of the Larceny Act 1916 (UK) (proviso omitted) as being the common law definition of “larceny”. This definition is quoted in full below.3 Distinction between larceny and related offences – Various authorities discuss the distinction between larceny and similar or related offences: larceny and false pretences,4 larceny and fraudulent misappropriation,5 larceny by a trick and false pretences.6 See also footnote 14 under [CA.117.360]. 1 East Pleas of the Crown (1803) Vol 2, 553. 2 See also R v Wilson (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 258; Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546; R v Justelius [1973] 1 NSWLR 471 per Lee J at 476.
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3 The complete definition of “stealing” in the Larceny Act 1916 (UK) which according to the Lord Chancellor who introduced the Bill “faithfully consolidated the existing law”, (see Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law, (19th ed, 1966) para 222) was: For the purposes of this Act (1) a person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof: Provided that a person may be guilty of stealing any such thing notwithstanding that he has lawful possession thereof, if, being a bailee or part owner thereof, he fraudulently converts the same to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner: (2) (i) the expression “takes” includes obtaining the possession (a) by any trick; (b) by intimidation; (c) under a mistake on the part of the owner with knowledge on the part of the taker that possession has been so obtained; (d) by finding, where at the time of the finding the finder believes that the owner can be discovered by taking reasonable steps; (ii) the expression “carried away” includes the removal of anything from the place which it occupies, but in the case of thing attached, only if it has been completely detached; (iii) the expression “owner” includes any part owner, or person having possession or control of, or a special property in, anything capable of being stolen. 4 R v Mark (1902) 28 VLR 610; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80; R v Borinelli [1962] SASR 214; R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98. 5 R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. 6 Lambell v Moore [1929] VLR 149.
[CA.117.100] Elements That the accused: (1) wrongfully took and carried away; (2) the personal goods of another; (3) with the intent of permanently depriving the owner of such property; (4) without his or her consent. [CA.117.120] (1) Wrongful taking and carrying away There must be: (a) physical movement of the property; (b) in circumstances which constitute a trespass to that property; and (c) a fraudulent intent at the time of the taking. [CA.117.140] Physical movement of the property To constitute larceny there must be a taking and also an asportation or carrying away. Little actual movement is required provided that the property is moved from the spot where it was originally placed with an intention to steal. A bare removal by the accused from the place where he or she found the goods even though he or she does not make off with them, is a sufficient asportation.1 The movement of goods from one part of a truck to another part of the truck to conceal them so as later to remove them has been held sufficient2 as has secreting goods within a supermarket before reaching the check-out area.3 Moving a victim’s pocket book only an inch above the top of his pocket was sufficient asportation4 as was the transfer of a letter by a postman from his bag to his pocket.5 But where an accused set a package on end, in the place where it lay in a waggon to cut it open to get at the contents, this was held insufficient to constitute an asportation as the package had not been wholly moved from its original position.6
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Crimes Act 1900 s 117
[CA.117.140]
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An assumption of a right of ownership of property without any movement of it is not sufficient. Where a council employee showed a council refrigerator to a woman, purporting to sell it to her and receiving a cheque for it, he escaped conviction for attempted larceny as, although he had agreed to deliver the refrigerator, he had not taken any step to do so.7 There must also be some positive act on the part of the accused, the passive retention of property not originally taken will not suffice. An accused who kept three sheep that strayed onto his land was held not guilty of larceny.8 Where there is no asportation the accused may be guilty of attempted larceny: see s 427 (now repealed). There may be a conviction for attempted stealing even though he could not have completed the offence, for example, where he puts his hand in an empty pocket.9 In an indictment for attempting to steal the goods of a named person, it is not necessary to specify the particular goods.10 1 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 508. See also R v Simson (1664) Kelyng 31; R v Coslet (1782) 1 Leach 236; 168 ER 220; R v Walsh (1824) 1 Mood CC 14; 168 ER 1166; R v Thompson (1825) 1 Mood CC 78; 168 ER 1192; R v Amier 172 ER 1269; (1834) 6 Car & P 344; R v Gruncell (1840) 9 Car & P 365; R v Poynton (1862) Leigh & Cave 247; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12; Wallis v Lane [1964] VR 293; R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372; 47 A Crim R 230 at 374–375 (NSWLR); 232 (A Crim R) per Hunt J (Enderby and Sharpe JJ agreeing). 2 Wallis v Lane [1964] VR 293. 3 Humes v Townsend (1989) 4 WAR 196. 4 R v Thompson (1825) 1 Mood CC 78; 168 ER 1192. See also R v Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320; 168 ER 263; R v Coslet (1782) 1 Leach 236; 168 ER 220; R v Taylor [1911] 1 KB 674; (1911) 6 Cr App R 12. 5 R v Poynton (1862) Leigh & Cave 247. 6 R v Cherry (1781) 1 Leach 236n; 2 East PC 556; R v Wilkinson (1598) 1 Hale’s PC 508; R v Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320; 168 ER 263. 7 R v Bloxham (1943) 29 Cr App R 37. 8 R v Thomas (1953) 37 Cr App R 169. 9 R v Ring, Atkins & Jackson (1892) 17 Cox CC 491. 10 R v Johnson & Anderson (1864) Leigh & Cave 489.
[CA.117.160] Trespass to the property taken Larceny has been said to be an “offence against possession” in which the taking must amount to a trespass against the property taken1 and there is no larceny if the circumstances would not sustain a civil action for trespass.2 In R v Davies [1970] VR 27 it was said:3 For a case of larceny there must always be a taking of property from another who has it in his actual possession and a taking in circumstances which amount to an act of trespass. A mere change of possession is not sufficient. The voluntary passing of possession will not found a larceny, no matter what the taker may do thereafter or what intention he may form thereafter. There must be a taking of possession against the will of the person from whom possession is taken … The taking must also amount to an act of trespass against the person from whom possession is taken; it is not sufficient that it is without the consent of some other person who is the true owner or that it involves the conversion of his property. Larceny is an offence against possession not ownership. There is a constructive taking where the accused obtains possession: (1) by a trick, see [CA.117.360]. (2) by intimidation of the owner, see [CA.117.380]. (3) as the result of a mistake on the part of the owner, see [CA.117.400]. (4) by finding in circumstances where the accused believes that the owner can be discovered by taking reasonable steps: see [CA.117.420]. If the accused originally obtains possession of goods lawfully, a subsequent decision to misappropriate them does not create a larceny as there is no initial trespass. Thus an accused who, with neighbours, removed goods from a burning house to save them but subsequently converted them was not guilty of larceny.4
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Where an owner of his own free will parts not only with the possession but also the property in the goods taken, the person taking the goods cannot be guilty of larceny, no matter how fraudulent the means by which the delivery of the goods was procured.8 No taking by an accused of property which has become vested in her or him can become larceny, irrespective of what her or his original intent was.9 For example, an accused having said he or she would buy a horse for eight pounds, the vendor delivered it to her or him. The accused mounted the horse saying he or she would return with the money. The vendor assented and the accused rode off but did not return. It was held that there was no larceny as the vendor had parted with the property in the horse as well as possession of it. The vendor’s remedy was said to be an action to recover the price of the horse.10 The last mentioned principle applies to an accused who obtains property in goods from an employee provided that the employee has authority to part with the property in them.11 Where a bank cashier gave an accused money in exchange for a forged bank order, the accused was guilty of obtaining the money by false pretences and not by larceny. It was said “… if the owner intended the property to pass, though he would not so have intended if he had known the real facts, that is sufficient to prevent the offence of obtaining another’s property from amounting to larceny”.12 But it has been held that if the employee’s authority does not extend to parting with the property in goods, the accused’s taking may be larceny.13 In a trial for larceny the accused may be found guilty of false pretences, etc: s 120. At common law a bailee could not be guilty of larceny because having had property lawfully in her or his possession, there was no wrongful taking and carrying away.14 But in cases of employees, a distinction has been drawn between possession and physical custody. Although the employee may have the physical custody of the goods, the legal possession remains in the employer so that conversion by the employee of the goods to her or his own use can constitute a taking. “A servant and a bailee at common law are in a different position; for a bailee has the possession of the goods entrusted to him, a servant only the custody.”15 If an employee gives away her or his employer’s goods this is larceny by the employee.16 Larceny by a clerk or servant is a specific offence: s 156. 1 2 3 4 5
R v Davies [1970] VR 27; R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389; Hayes v Fries (1988) 49 SASR 184; 32 A Crim R 394. Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110 at 123 per Wilson and Dawson JJ. R v Davies [1970] VR 27 at 29 (Vic Sup Ct, FC). R v Leigh (1800) 2 East PC 694. R v Riley (1853) Dearsly 149 followed in R v O’Brien (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 136; 38 WN (NSW) 10. See also Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377; R v Matthews [1950] 1 All ER 137; (1950) 34 Cr App R 55; Korp v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board [1964] VR 563; R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389. As to larceny by a bailee see s 125. 6 R v Riley (1853) Dearsly 149. 7 Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377. 8 R v Prince (1868) LR 1 CCR 150; R v Russett [1892] 2 QB 312; R v Fisher (1910) 5 Cr App R 102; 103 LT 320; Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463; Lacis v Cashmarts [1969] 2 QB 400; R v Roffel [1985] VR 511; (1984) 14 A Crim R 134. Compare R v Clarkson (1986) 24 A Crim R 54. See also R v Morris [1984] 1 AC 320; R v Gomez [1993] 1 All ER 1.
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However, if the original possession is obtained wrongfully (ie by a trespass), even though not feloniously, and the accused later misappropriates the goods, this can constitute larceny.5 This is known as a “continuing trespass”, a concept which evolved to meet the legal requirement of coincidence in time between the existence of a fraudulent intent at the time of a taking and in circumstances constituting a trespass.6 For example, where an accused who was inebriated, took a bicycle, not to keep it but simply to ride it around for a few hours, there was then no larceny; merely a civil trespass. But when on seeing the bicycle the following morning, he decided to keep it, he then became guilty of larceny as, although he had no felonious intent at the time of the taking, the taking was a trespass which continued.7 Section 154A now dispenses with the need to prove an intention to permanently deprive in the case the taking of “conveyances”.
Crimes Act 1900 s 117
[CA.117.160]
9 R v Coleman (1783) 1 Leach 303; R v Harvey (1787) 1 Leach 467; R v Nicholson, Jones & Chappel (1794) 2 Leach 610; R v Thomas (1841) 9 Car & P 741. 10 R v Harvey (1787) 1 Leach 467. In such a case the accused may now be guilty of obtaining property by deception under s 178BA. 11 R v Prince (1868) LR 1 CCR 150; R v Jackson (1826) 1 Moody 119; R v Parkes (1794) 2 Leach 614. 12 R v Prince (1868) LR 1 CCR 150 at 155 per Blackburn J. 13 Ellis v Lawson (1987) 33 A Crim R 69. See also R v Longstreeth (1826) 1 Moody 137; R v Sutton [1966] 1 WLR 236; 1 All ER 571. 14 Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 at 555 per Griffith CJ. 15 R v Cooke (1871) LR 1 CCR 295 at 300 per Bovill CJ. 16 R v White (1840) 9 Car & P 344. See also R v Tideswell [1905] 2 KB 273.
[CA.117.180]
Fraudulent intent
There can be three relevant mental states in relation to larceny. The taking and carrying away must be wrongful in that the property taken: (i) must be taken without a claim of right made in good faith; (ii) must be taken fraudulently. In addition, there is element (3), namely, that the property must be taken with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of it. As to this aspect, see [CA.117.320]. [CA.117.200]
Claim of right
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To constitute larceny the taking must be without a claim of right. The following commentary examines claim of right in relation to larceny and, for convenience, in relation to other offences, a number of which have larceny as an element. In some cases involving an offence involving or related to property an accused may rely upon a claim of right as a defence to what would otherwise be criminal conduct. The common law claim of right has been stated as follows: “a person is not criminally responsible, as for an offence relating to property, for an act done or omitted to be done by him with respect to any property in the exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud.”1 Where applicable, honest belief in a claim of right is a complete defence and, if accepted as a reasonable possibility by the jury, entitles the accused to an acquittal.2 It has been observed that the historical willingness of the courts to find that the facts of a case did not disclose felony stemmed mainly from the “savage penalty” imposed for larceny of more than one shilling, and was also connected with the realisation that unlawful misappropriations occur in an extraordinary variety of circumstances.3 The law concerning claim of right cannot be regarded as definitively settled. In Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54, the High Court considered the question of claim of right in relation to an Aboriginal elder who had killed a wild “plain turkey” and kept its chick contrary to Queensland fauna conservation legislation. The members of the court were divided in the result, the majority Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ concluding that the defendant did not have a claim of right. The five justices expressed various views concerning aspects of the law of claim of right. Those views, some only individually expressed, include the following: (a) claim of right is relevant to the commission of an offence because it goes to absence of mens rea to an essential element of the offence;4 (b) it is not necessary that the right claimed be recognised by law;5 (c) a moral claim will not suffice; the belief (rightly or wrongly held) must be as to a legal right;6 (d) claim of right is not based upon mere ignorance of the criminal law, which is no defence at all;7 (e) it is not ignorance of the criminal law which founds a claim of right, but ignorance of the civil law;8
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(f) a claim of right relates to property,9 or at least “has its origin and at least its primary application in cases relating to property”,10 and is also available when the offence “relates to the damaging or destroying of property, and contains a mental element which would be negated by the existence of an honest claim of right”;11 (g) the defence may be available even though the infringement of the proprietary rights of another is not an element of the offence;12 (h) claim of right can operate at two levels. First, where the prosecution must prove an intent as an element, an inconsistent belief, honestly held will afford a defence. Second, there is the wider principle that “the existence of any state of mind, however limited, which is an element of a crime, may be negated by an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make the impugned act innocent”.13 In R v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208, the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales considered claim of right in relation to a woman charged as an accessory before the fact to aggravated assault with intent to rob. Wood CJ at CL at [24] (with whom Heydon JA and Sully J concurred) set out the following principles concerning claim of right (the authorities quoted in the judgment are footnoted): (a) the claim of right must be one that involves a belief as to the right to property or money in the hands of another;14 (b) the claim must be genuinely, ie, honestly held, it not being to the point whether it was well founded in fact or law or not;15 (c) while the belief does not have to be reasonable,16 a colourable pretence is insufficient;17 (d) the belief must be one of a legal entitlement to the property and not simply a moral entitlement;18 (see also point (c) in preceding paragraph) (e) the existence of such a claim, when genuinely held, may constitute an answer to a crime in which the means used to take the property involved an assault, or the use of arms; the relevant issue being whether the accused had a genuine belief in the legal right to the property rather than a belief in a legal right to employ the means in question to recover it;19 (and see (k) below) (f) the claim of right is not confined to the specific property or banknotes which were once held by the claimant, but can also extend to cases where what is taken is their equivalent in value, of which Langham and Lopatta20 provide examples; although that may be qualified when, for example, the property is taken ostensibly under a claim of right to hold them by way of safekeeping, or as security for a loan, yet the actual intention was to sell them;21 (g) the claim of right must, however, extend to the entirety of the property or money taken. Such a claim does not provide any answer where the property or money taken intentionally goes beyond that to which the bona fide claim attaches;22 (h) in the case of an offender charged as an accessory, what is relevant is the existence of a bona fide claim in the principal offender or offenders, since there can be no accessorial liability unless there has in fact been a foundational offence,23 and unless the person charged as an accessory, knowing of the essential facts which made what was done a crime, intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured those acts;24 (see also (m) below) (i) it is for the Crown to negative a claim of right where it is sufficiently raised on the evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury.25 (see also (p) below) Heydon JA thought that it is “astonishing” that claim of right can be a defence to robbery (at 311 (Qd R)). Sully J thought it “absurd” and said that the law needs “prompt and specific legislative correction” (at 321 (Qd R)). In other cases further features of claim of right have been said to be: (j) there is a distinction between a claim of right and the defence of honest and reasonable mistake.26 (k) a person may have a claim of right even though they employ dishonest means to gain possession of property the subject of the claim.27
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(l) claim of right concerning a debt can apply only to a belief that the debt is presently due and payable.28 (m) a claim of right is available to an accused who was asserting the right for another person.29 (n) while the belief giving rise to the claim of right need not itself be reasonable, reasonableness is a factor which is part of the objective circumstances which may be considered in determining the issue of genuine belief.30 (o) a trial judge is obliged to give a direction as to claim of right where the issue had been sufficiently raised even though counsel had overlooked it or had deliberately refrained from seeking it out of concern that it may disadvantage a case of outright denial of involvement in the offence alleged.31 A judge remarked that “[o]f course the apparent ‘legality’ of the reason expressed by the believer may be so dubious that it may lead any reasonably-minded juror to reject the belief as unbelievable or totally unreal. That is a question of fact for the jury. But the claim of right should still be left to the jury.”32 (p) before any legal onus falls upon the prosecution to eliminate the reasonable possibility that an accused acted in accordance with a claim of right, an evidentiary onus must be satisfied by the accused by pointing to or producing material from which such a reasonable possibility could be inferred.33 The jury must be directed that the question is whether the accused honestly thought he or she had a right to act as he or she did, not what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have thought.34 Good character is relevant to the assessment of an accused’s credibility as to whether he or she in fact held a belief of claim of right.35
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Cases in which claim of right has been held to apply include: 1. Larceny and robbery: “In cases of robbery and larceny, the existence of an honest claim of right to take property in the manner and circumstances in which it is taken precludes a finding that the property is taken animo furandi …”: Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R) per Brennan J. Cases include R v Hall (1828) 3 Car & P 409; 172 ER 477 and R v Hemmings (1864) 4 F & F 50; 176 ER 462 (each cases of robbery); R v Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166; [1967] 2 WLR 665; [1967] 1 All ER 483 and R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 (aggravated robbery/armed robbery); R v Boden (1844) 1 Car & K 395; 174 ER 863 (assault with intent to rob); R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137 (demanding money with menaces); R v Wade (1869) 11 Cox CC 549; R v Dillon (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 159; R v Nundah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 482 (larceny – in Wade the accused took property to enforce a debt he claimed was due – see also R v George (1890) 11 LR (NSW)(L) 373; R v Bowman [No 2] (1987) 87 FLR 472; 49 NTR 48 – compare facts in R v Brow [1981] VR 783; Lenard v The Queen (1992) 57 SASR 164; (sub nom R v Lenard (1992) 58 A Crim R 123); R v Dickson (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 298 (receiving). 2. Burglary: breaking entering and stealing: Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426; [1983] HCA 18. 3. Unlawful use of a motor vehicle: where an accused knew that the owner of a vehicle had not consented to his using it, but believed that the owner would not have any objection to his using it and would have given his consent if asked, the question of claim of right should be left to the jury: R v Pollard [1962] QWN 13 (FC). 4. Obtaining of money or property by false pretences (including forged instruments): R v Hopley (1915) 11 Cr App R 248; R v Williams (No 3) [1962] Crim LR 111; R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1; R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633; 2 A Crim R 431; R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28. See also Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24. 5. Trespass to property: Ex parte Desmond (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 387; R v Gilson (1944) 29 Cr App R 174 at 180; R v Pollard [1962] QWN 13; Police v Cunard [1975] 1 NZLR 511; Margarula v Rose (1999) 149 FLR 444; [1999] NTSC 22.
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1 Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426; [1983] HCA 18 at 365–366 per Brennan and Deane JJ quoting Dixon J in Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279; [1937] HCA 83 at 306 (CLR). The definition quoted comes from s 22 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which their Honours said stated the common law “with complete accuracy”. 2 R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 91 (SASR); 55 (A Crim R) per White J citing R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447; R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391; R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1; R v Brow [1981] VR 783 and R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633; 2 A Crim R 431. 3 R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 at 64 (SASR); 405–406 (A Crim R) per Johnson J. 4 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 per Brennan J at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R); Dawson J 592–593 (CLR); 108 (A Crim R). Also R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102 at 105 per King CJ and cases there cited. 5 Walden v Hensler per Brennan J at 568 (CLR); 90 (A Crim R); Toohey J at 602 (CLR); 114 (A Crim R) (quoting R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137; Gibbs J in Mitchell v Norman; Ex parte Norman [1965] Qd R 587 at 594–595 and Johnston J in R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391); Gaudron at 607 (CLR); 119 (A Crim R) who said “[t]he question is not whether the right is recognised by the law but whether it is claimed by reason of the supposed operation of law”. Compare Deane J at 580–581 (CLR); 99 (A Crim R). 6 Walden v Hensler per Toohey J at 602 (CLR); 115 (A Crim R); Gaudron J at 608–609 (CLR); 120 (A Crim R). 7 Walden v Hensler per Dawson J at 594 (CLR); 109 (A Crim R); Toohey J at 600 (CLR); 115 (A Crim R). 8 Walden v Hensler per Dawson J at 592–593 (CLR); 108 (A Crim R). This view was endorsed in Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 at [41] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 9 Walden v Hensler per Brennan J at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R); Toohey J at 599 (CLR); 113 (A Crim R). 10 Walden v Hensler per Dawson J at 591 (CLR); 108 (A Crim R). 11 Walden v Hensler per Brennan J at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R). 12 Walden v Hensler per Brennan J at 572 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R). 13 Walden v Hensler per Dawson J at 591–592 (CLR); 107–108 (A Crim R). 14 R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391. 15 R v Nundah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 482; R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137; R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447 at 107 (SASR); 452–453 (A Crim R); Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54; and R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 at 52–53 (SASR); 394–396 (A Crim R). (As to reasonableness of the belief and the foundation of it in law, in Nundah at 489 it was observed that “a man may be a stupid, unreasonable, or wrong-headed man, without being a dishonest one”. In Lopatta at 107 (SASR); 453 (A Crim R) White J stated that “an accused person charged with a crime of dishonesty may be heard to say that he honestly believed in a claim of right even if there is no foundation in fact or law for that wrong-headed belief” and cited the many authorities for this proposition. See also Director of Public Prosecutions Reference (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 8 NTLR 148; 105 A Crim R 489; [1999] NTSC 23 (Martin CJ) involving Aboriginal law. 16 R v Nundah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 482 at 485–490; R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 at 49 (SASR); 392 (A Crim R); and R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28. 17 R v Dillon (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 159 and R v Wade (1869) 11 Cox CC 549. 18 R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137; Harris v Harrison [1963] Crim LR 497. 19 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 615–616 (NSWLR); 423–424 (A Crim R); R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1; R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391 at 58 (SASR); 400 (A Crim R); R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 33–34 (A Crim R); 66 (SASR); Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426; [1983] HCA 18; R v Williams [1988] 1 Qd R 289; 21 A Crim R 460; and see also R v Boden (1844) 1 Car & K 395; 174 ER 863. 20 R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391; R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447.
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6. Damage to or destruction of property: Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R) per Brennan J referring to R v Day (1844) 8 JP 186 and Taylor v Newman (1863) 8 LT 424. Also R v Twose (1879) 14 Cox CC 327 (arson). Section 194(3) provides that in relation to criminal destruction and damage to property under Pt 2 of Div 4 of the Crimes Act 1900“an act done by a person under a reasonable belief that the person had a right to do the act shall be taken not to have been done maliciously”.
Crimes Act 1900
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s 117
[CA.117.200]
21 Lenard v The Queen (1992) 57 SASR 164; (sub nom R v Lenard (1992) 58 A Crim R 123). 22 Astor v Hayes (1988) 38 A Crim R 219 at 222. 23 R v Gregory (1867) LR 1 CCR 77 at 79; R v See Lun (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 363; 49 WN (NSW) 116; R v Richards [1974] QB 776; (1974) 58 Cr App R 60 and R v Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; (1987) 85 Cr App R 32. 24 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; 16 A Crim R 163; R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25 and R v Buckett (1995) 79 A Crim R 302; 126 FLR 435. 25 R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447 at 108 (SASR); 453–454 (A Crim R); Astor v Hayes (1988) 38 A Crim R 219; Lenard v The Queen (1992) 57 SASR 164; (sub nom R v Lenard (1992) 58 A Crim R 123); R v Williams [1988] 1 Qd R 289; 21 A Crim R 460 at 302–303 (Qd R); 475 (A Crim R). 26 R v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; (1996) 86 A Crim R 412 (Vic CA). Honest and reasonable mistake is discussed in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203. 27 R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447; R v Langham (1984) 36 SASR 48; 12 A Crim R 391; R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28; Noble v Police (1994) 70 A Crim R 560 (SASC, Matheson J). In R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1 it was acknowledged that there may be a deceptive obtaining of property which is not dishonest. Of this it was said in R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 615–616 (NSWLR); 423 (A Crim R) that “[o]f course in many cases the deception will be powerful evidence of dishonesty. However, when a claim of legal right … is raised, the issue is whether there was a belief in a legal right to obtain the property, not whether there was a belief in a legal right to practice the deception.” 28 R v Pollard [1962] QWN 13 (FC); R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 65–66 (SASR); 33 (A Crim R) per King CJ. 29 R v Williams (1836) 7 Car & P 354; 173 ER 132; R v Boden (1844) 1 Car & K 395; 174 ER 863 (cited by Gaudron J in Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 at 607 (CLR); 119 (A Crim R)); R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102 (SA CCA). 30 R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447 at 121 (SASR); 466 (A Crim R) per Legoe J; Margarula v Rose (1999) 149 FLR 444; [1999] NTSC 22 at [78] per Riley J. A claim can be so fanciful that the claimant’s bona fides cannot be accepted – in this regard a claimant’s education and experience can be important – see R v Lauchlan (1999) 103 A Crim R 594 (SASC, Wicks J). See also Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 at [42] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 31 R v Fuge (2001) 123 A Crim R 310; [2001] NSWCCA 208 at 315 (A Crim R) applying Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 and R v Stokes (1990) 51 A Crim R 25. 32 R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; 10 A Crim R 447 at 121 (SASR); 466 (A Crim R) per Legoe J (SA CCA). 33 R v Hunt (1996) 88 A Crim R 307 (NSW CCA) at 307 per Hunt CJ at CL (Simpson J agreeing) referring to R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 2–4 and R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 298. In Lenard v The Queen (1992) 57 SASR 164; (sub nom R v Lenard (1992) 58 A Crim R 123) (SA CCA) at 177; 136 White J remarked in this context (King CJ agreeing): “[i]t is not necessary for a trial judge to invent possible defences or unrealistic defences for an accused person.” 34 R v Cooper (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 426; 31 WN (NSW) 164 (CCA). 35 R v Nilon (1981) 5 A Crim R 385 (Qld CCA).
[CA.117.220]
Fraudulent taking
The older definitions of “larceny” speak of a “fraudulent” or a “wrongful or fraudulent” taking. In most cases a taking without consent of another’s property, without a claim of right and with an intention to permanently deprive will leave little room for the suggestion that the taking was not fraudulent ie that it was not morally wrongful. But there can be cases where there is a taking in these circumstances without the existence of a fraudulent intent. A friend or flatmate might “borrow” money without permission, intending to spend the money actually taken but to replace it with an equivalent sum. All of the elements of larceny are satisfied except that, in the mind of the borrower, there is no wrongful or fraudulent intent. Section 118 now provides that a person charged with larceny who appropriated property but intended eventually to restore it, or in the case of money, to return an equivalent amount, shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to be acquitted. This provision apart, there have been cases in which the question of intent in such circumstances has been considered and in which a strict and narrow view of the old
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requirement of fraudulent intent taken.1 These decisions have been the subject of later judicial criticism. “We find it impossible to accept that a conviction for stealing, whether it be called larceny or theft, can reveal no moral obloquy.”2 If the taking is fraudulent, it is not necessary to show that it was for the purpose of monetary gain.3
CA
1 R v Williams [1953] 1 QB 660; R v Cockburn [1968] 1 WLR 281; [1968] 1 All ER 466. 2 R v Feely [1973] 1 QB 530 per Lawton LJ delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal at 541. This decision was applied in R v Weatherstone (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 August 1987). 3 R v Cabbage (1815) Russ & Ry 292; R v Wynn (1849) 2 Car & K 859; R v Jones (1846) 175 ER 98; 2 Car & K 236; cf R v Dickinson (1820) Russ & Ry 420.
[CA.117.260]
Property the subject of larceny
The subject of larceny must be of some value, yet it need not be of the value of any known coin.1 A piece of paper may be of value.2 It is sufficient if the thing is only of value to the owner.3
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As there must be a carrying away, larceny can only be committed of things which are moveable. A mere incorporeal right to a thing, such as a chose in action, is not the subject of larceny, but the stealing of a valuable security is a statutory offence: s 134. While at common law water in natural reservoirs could not be the subject of larceny, water supplied by a water company to a consumer, and standing in her or his pipes, may be the subject of larceny at common law,4 as may gas fraudulently taken from the gas company’s pipes.5 As it is not moveable, land cannot be the subject of larceny. By s 134, however, the stealing of a valuable security including title deeds to land is a punishable offence. At common law things attached to and forming part of land, such as houses and fixtures, ores in mines, and trees and growing crops while still annexed to land could not be stolen.6 Offences relating to such things are now subject to statute: s 139 stealing etc glass, wood or metal fixtures; s 140 trees, plants etc; s 144 metal, coal or mineral of commercial value; s 154 chattels or fixtures by tenants etc; s 513 plants; s 515 live or dead fences; s 518 dead wood; s 520 plants in gardens etc; s 521 plants growing in enclosed lands other than gardens etc; s 521A rock, soil etc. Where a building is not affixed to land it may be the subject of larceny.7 If the owner or some other person severs things from the land, and the accused then comes and takes them, this may be larceny.8 Where the accused both severs things from the land and at the same time or at a later time takes them away this is not larceny unless the accused forms the intent to steal after severance but before asportation.9 Animals ferae naturae (of a wild disposition) while alive and not reclaimed are not the subject of larceny at common law but if they become the property of any person by capture, they may be stolen.10 When an animal is killed by a wrongdoer on someone else’s land, the animal killed remains the property of the owner of that land.11 A return to another’s land by the wrongdoer for the purpose of taking such killed animals may amount to larceny if the killing of the animals and the later removal of them from the land is not regarded as one continuous act.12 The mere killing of a wild animal by a hunter does not make the animal her or his property.13 Fish taken at sea are in the possession of the owner of the boat in which they are taken.14 The degree of control necessary to establish ownership will vary with the habits of the animal. As to stealing animals ordinarily kept in confinement, see s 505. As to cattle and dogs, see heading “Other statutory provisions” this below. At common law wild bees were no person’s property, but bees which have settled and have been hived are capable of being stolen.15 The common law regarded oysters as ferae naturae,16 but oysters growing on Crown land are by virtue of s 84 of the Fisheries and Oysters Farms Act 1935, the property of the Crown and may therefore be the subject of larceny.17 Section 97(2) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 provides that any protected
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fauna, other than prescribed fauna, shall, until captured or killed in accordance with the Act, be deemed the property of the Crown. Section 97(3) provides that prescribed fauna shall, when liberated in New South Wales, be deemed to be the property of the Crown. “Fauna” means any mammal, bird or reptile and “protected fauna” means fauna of a species not named in Sch 11 (s 5). Things of which the ownership has been abandoned are not capable of being stolen,18 and if there is any ground for supposing that the accused may have believed that the goods found by him had been abandoned the jury must be directed that if they find such belief as a fact the accused should be acquitted.19 A golf club which excludes the general public from its land has a special property in golf balls lying on its course which have been lost and abandoned by their original owners; this property is sufficient to support an indictment for larceny against a trespasser who picked up the balls with the intention of stealing them.20 Refuse in a householder’s garbage can is the property of the householder until taken away; thereafter it is the property of the garbage collecting authority and an employee of that authority can be guilty of larceny if he or she fraudulently takes the rubbish.21 Treasure trove, that is hidden treasure whose owner is unknown, is not the subject of larceny,22 but it is a common law misdemeanour to conceal its finding.23 As to wrecks and shipwrecked goods, see ss 153, 522. The dead body of a human being is not capable of being stolen,24 unless it possesses some attribute to justify its preservation on scientific or other grounds in which case it may become the subject of property.25 To take a dead body from a burial ground without authority is a common law misdemeanour.26 Removal of a corpse from a grave even for pious and laudable reasons is a common law misdemeanour.27
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Money can be the subject of larceny like any other moveable property. The criminal law has treated money as property ie pieces of paper or metal discs, albeit with a designated value, rather than as a medium of exchange.28 This idea is reflected in cases which deal with money removed from a till etc but with an intention to return an identical amount.29 Opium was held to be the subject of larceny even though the person in possession thereof did not possess a certificate under s 15 of the Police Offences (Amendment) Act 1908 (now repealed).30 A drug, possession of which is forbidden by law, is nevertheless property capable of being stolen.31 Special provisions apply to “conveyances” including cars with merely driving them etc sufficing for larceny without the need for proof of an intention to permanently deprive (s 154A) and a higher penalty (s 154AA – 10 years). The Act makes special provision in respect to the stealing of particular property: ss 126 – 131 cattle, ss 132,133 dogs (s 503 summary), s 134 valuable securities, s 135 wills etc, s 138 court or public office records, s 150 goods in the process of manufacture, s 154B(1) aircraft (penalty 10 years), s 505 animals or birds not the subject of larceny at common law (summary), s 525 books etc in public libraries etc (summary). The stealing of electricity is an offence under s 30 Electricity Act 1945 (formerly s 154C of the Crimes Act 1900). 1 R v Morris (1840) 9 Car & P 349; R v Bingley (1833) 5 Car & P 602; 172 ER 1118. 2 R v Perry (1845) 1 Car & K 725; R v Wauchope (1957) 2 FLR 191 (cheque); R v Daley (1879) 2 SCR (NS) (NSW) 151. 3 R v Clarke (1810) 2 Leach 1036. 4 Ferens v O’Brien (1883) 11 QBD 21. 5 R v White (1853) Dearsly 203; R v Firth (1869) LR 1 CCR 172; R v Russell (1878) 1 SCR NS (NSW) 73. 6 1 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, c 33, s 34. 7 Billing v Pill [1954] 1 QB 70. 8 Lee v Risdon (1816) 7 Taunton 188; R v Foley (1889) 26 LR Ir 299. 9 R v Townley (1871) LR 1 CCR 315. Cf R v Edwards (1877) 13 Cox CC 384. 10 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 511. 11 Blades v Higgs (1865) 11 HLC 621; Rigg v Earl Lonsdale (1857) 1 Hurl & Norm 923.
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31
R v Townley (1871) LR 1 CCR 315. R v Roe (1870) 11 Cox CC 554. R v Mallison (1902) 20 Cox CC 204. R v Gadd [1911] QWN 31. Ex parte Emerson (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 101. Branch v Davison (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 284. Section 84 was repealed by Act No 28 of 1994. 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown 606. R v White (1912) 7 Cr App R 266. Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142; R v Woodman [1974] QB 754. Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App R 5. 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown 510. See also R v Hancock [1990] 2 WLR 640. R v Thomas (1863) Leigh & Cave 313; Attorney-General v British Museum Trustees [1903] 2 Ch 598. R v Haynes (1614) 12 Coke’s Reports 113. Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406; [1908] HCA 45. R v Gilles (1818) Russ & Ry 366; R v Lynn (1788) 2 Term Rep 733; 1 Leach 497; R v Cundick (1822) 1 Dowling & Ryan NP 13. R v Sharpe (1857) Dearsly & Bell 160. R v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190 per Smith J at 198. See also Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 at 561; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80 at 315 (SR (NSW)); Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326 at 330; R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389 at 397. For example R v Feely [1973] 1 QB 530. R v Waterhouse (1911) 28 WN (NSW) 61. See also Anic v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 223. R v Anic (1993) 68 A Crim R 313.
[CA.117.280]
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s 117
The owner of the property
See subheading “Ownership” under [CA.117.20]. Although it is necessary to prove that the owner’s goods have been taken, this may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though the Crown witnesses cannot swear to the loss of the articles said to have been stolen or identify the property found on the accused.1 No general rule can be laid down as to when proof of similarity amounts to proof of identity.2 The essence of larceny is the taking of property without the consent of the owner. The “owner” is not limited to the person who is the legal owner of the property stolen but may include any person having possession or control of or a special property in the goods.3 As to wrecks and shipwrecked goods, see ss 153, 522. The ownership must exist at the time of the taking: it is not sufficient that it should arise merely by the act of taking.4 The ownership need not be sole ownership. The property may belong to a partnership or to joint owners: see s 162. “Larceny is of a particular thing. There are two meanings of ‘property’, one beneficial ownership and the other the technical one lying at the root of the law as to larceny.”5 An owner may be convicted of stealing her or his own goods by depriving her or his bailee of her or his special property in such goods. Where the bailee has a right to possession as against the accused, such as where the owner has left the goods with a bailee as a security, larceny occurs when the owner takes them without the bailee’s consent.6 An innkeeper’s lien on goods deposited with her or him is sufficient to support an indictment for larceny, though subject to that lien, the property was in the accused.7 A vendor’s lien is sufficient title to support an indictment for larceny against the purchaser.8 Where goods are in the custody of a caretaker, the property of the goods is in the caretaker.9 As to larceny as a bailee, see s 125. Abandoned goods are the property of the person who first appropriates them.10 Things in which no person has any determinate property such as air are not the subject of larceny. Although there can be no larceny of things which have no owner, there may be larceny of things of which the owner is unknown.11 1 R v Burton (1854) Dearsly 282; R v Mockford (1868) 11 Cox CC 16; R v Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64. 2 Schiffmann v The King (1910) 11 CLR 255; R v Casey (1926) 26 SR (NSW) 189; 43 WN (NSW) 51.
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[CA.117.280]
Crimes Act 1900 s 117 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
[CA.117.280]
R v Harding (1930) 21 Cr App R 166. R v Townley (1871) LR 1 CCR 315; R v Petch (1878) 14 Cox CC 116. Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 at 552. R v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347; R v Newman (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 344; Rose v Matt [1951] 1 KB 810. R v Hough (1894) 10 WN (NSW) 205. R v Cameron (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 56. R v Bourne (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 176. R v Edwards (1877) 13 Cox CC 384; R v White (1912) 7 Cr App R 266. Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50; R v Joiner (1910) 4 Cr App R 64; R v King (1908) 25 WN (NSW) 168. See also R v Gregory [1972] 1 WLR 991; [1972] 2 All ER 861; (1972) 56 Cr App R 441.
[CA.117.300]
Husband and wife
At common law a wife could not be guilty of stealing her husband’s goods on the basis that possession by the wife was possession by the husband.1 This was altered by s 16A of the Married Persons (Property and Torts) Act 1901. 1 R v Creamer [1919] 1 KB 564.
[CA.117.320]
(3) Intent to permanently deprive
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The taking by the accused must be with the intention permanently of depriving the owner of the property taken.1 The intent to steal must exist when the taking occurs.2 If goods are taken from a person against her or his will, the intent to steal may be inferred.3 But if the facts justify it, the alternative view must be put to the jury.4 There must be an intention on the part of the accused to assume ownership in the goods taken, to deprive their owner permanently of them, to deprive him of the property in them.5 A temporary taking without such intention is not larceny. In R v Johnson (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) 201 Stephen CJ said at 207, “[H]e who unlawfully takes a chattel for the temporary use of it merely, and who does not assume any ownership therein, is not guilty of larceny. But if he pawns the chattel, for example, he assumes the ownership, and thereby manifests an intention to vest the property in himself …”. The required intention of deprival and appropriation is an intention to assume the exercise of dominion or general property over the goods as distinct from an intention to exercise the rights of a bailee or servant, etc.6 Taking goods from a shop without payment with the intention of later returning them to claim a refund can constitute an intention to permanently deprive.7 To constitute larceny there must be an intention by the accused at the time of taking to deprive the owner permanently of the goods taken. Thus where the goods are taken by mistake or accident and there is at the time an intention to return them and no subsequent intention to deprive the owner permanently of his property in the goods, there is no larceny.8 As mentioned above, if when the stolen property is received, the receipt is entirely innocent (that is, non-tortious as well as non-felonious) the fact that the accused changes his mind and later misappropriates the property does not convert the receipt of the property into larceny or receiving stolen property.9 However, where the goods were originally received tortiously or as the result of a trespass, a subsequent intent to steal will convert the transaction into larceny.10 In all cases of larceny the questions of whether: (i) the accused took the goods knowingly or by mistake; (ii) he took them bona fide under a claim of right, or otherwise; and (iii) he took them with an intent to return them to the owner, or fraudulently with an intent to deprive the owner of them altogether and to appropriate or convert them to his own use; are questions entirely for the consideration of the jury to be determined by them upon the particular facts of the case.11
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1 R v Thurborn (1849) 1 Denison 387; 2 Car & K 831; R v Mortimer (1908) 1 Cr App R 20. Compare R v Easom [1971] 2 QB 315. Also see s 118. 2 R v Hudson [1943] 1 KB 458; Moynes v Cooper [1956] 1 QB 439. Cf Russell v Smith [1958] 1 QB 27. 3 R v Stephens (1910) 4 Cr App R 52. 4 R v Jones (1925) 19 Cr App R 39; R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137. 5 Foster v The Queen (1967) 118 CLR 117 at 121. 6 Lowe v Hooker (1987) 35 A Crim R 90 at 94. 7 R v Poole (1857) Dearsly & Bell 345; R v Hall (1849) 2 Car & K 947; R v Bailey (1872) LR 1 CCR 347. 8 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 509. See also R v Phillips & Strong (1801) 2 East PC 662; R v Crump (1825) 1 Car & P 658; R v Webb (1835) 1 Moody 431; R v Holloway (1849) Car & K 942; R v Poole (1857) Dearsly & Bell 345; R v Hall (1849) 2 Car & K 947; R v Manning & Smith (1852) 6 Cox CC 86; R v Richards (1844) 1 Car & K 532; R v Dickinson (1820) Russ & Ry 420. R v Bailey (1872) LR 1 CCR 347; Hewson v Gamble (1892) 8 TLR 301; Lowe v Hooker (1987) 35 A Crim R 90. Compare Minigall v McCammon [1970] SASR 82. 9 R v Matthews [1950] 1 All ER 137; (1950) 34 Cr App R 55. See also R v Revuelta [1959] Cr LR 777; R v Steele (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 167. 10 R v Riley (1853) Dearsly 149 approved in Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377; R v Kindon (1957) 41 Cr App R 208; R v O’Brien (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 136; 38 WN (NSW) 10; R v Buttle (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 154; Minigall v McCammon [1970] SASR 82; R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389. 11 R v Farnborough [1895] 2 QB 484 followed in R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264; (1938) 26 Cr App R 137.
[CA.117.340] (4) Without the owner’s consent The taking must be without the consent of the owner of the property.1 This does not mean contrary to or against the owner’s will but without it.2 It is not larceny if the accused in good faith reasonably believed that the owner did consent, nor is it larceny if the owner did in fact consent although the accused believed that he did not. In some cases, absence of consent of the owner may be established circumstantially and without the evidence of the owner.3 If an owner lays a trap for a thief, as by leaving her or his door unfastened, he or she does not thereby consent to the thief taking her or his property.4 1 R v McGrath (1869) LR 1 CCR 205; Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. 2 R v Middleton (1873) LR 2 CCR 38; R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389. 3 R v Burton (1854) Dearsly 282; R v Caplin (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 514; 50 WN (NSW) 189. 4 R v Chandler [1913] 1 KB 125; (1912) 8 Cr App R 82. Cf R v Turvey [1946] 2 All ER 60; Martin v Puttick [1968] 2 QB 82.
[CA.117.360] Larceny by a trick A taking amounts to larceny where: (1) possession is obtained from the owner by a trick; (2) the accused when he obtains such possession intends to steal the goods; and (3) the owner does not intend to part with her or his entire property in the goods but only with the temporary possession of them.1 The following are some examples of larceny by a trick: pretending to purchase without intending to pay,2 hiring goods with the intention of not returning them,3 giving counterfeit coins or worthless cheques in
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Section 124, enables the jury to bring in a verdict of fraudulent appropriation where the accused forms a fraudulent intent after obtaining the property, or when he or she fraudulently retains the property hoping for reward. An intention by the accused eventually to restore the goods or to return an equivalent amount to money stolen is not of itself a defence: s 118. As to “joy-riding” offences, see s 154A.
Crimes Act 1900 s 117
[CA.117.360]
payment,4 impersonation,5 taking goods for a pretended purpose,6 or for sale to a third person,7 obtaining money by a confidence trick,8 obtaining deposit to abide a wager,9 pretending to sell goods without intention to deliver them,10 using a banking machine where no bank credit is held.11 As to the distinction between larceny, false pretences and fraudulent misappropriation see R v Ward and other authorities footnoted below.12
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If money or goods are obtained by a trick but the owner, being deceived by such trick, intends to part with her or his property in the money or goods the offence is false pretences and not larceny.13 Larceny by a trick may be committed where, by a fraudulent agreement, money is handed to the accused by way of security or pledge.14 Using metal discs instead of coins to operate a vending machine may amount to larceny by a trick.15 The various factual situations in some of the cases of larceny by a trick are detailed in Archbold.16 1 R v Robins (1854) Dearsly 418; R v Fisher (1910) 5 Cr App R 102; 103 LT 320; Dennant v Skinner [1948] 2 KB 164. 2 R v Sharpless & Greatrix (1772) 1 Leach 92; R v Campbell (1827) 1 Moody 179; R v Gilbert (1828) 1 Moody 185; R v Pratt (1830) 1 Moody 250; R v Savage (1831) 5 Car & P 143; R v Box (1839) 9 Car & P 126; R v Sheppard (1839) 9 Car & P 121; R v Cohen (1851) 2 Denison 249; R v Stephens (1910) 4 Cr App R 52. 3 R v Pear (1779) 1 Leach 212; R v Semple (1786) 1 Leach 420; R v Brooks (1838) 8 Car & P 295; R v Cole (1847) 2 Cox CC 340; R v Janson (1849) 4 Cox CC 82. 4 R v Stewart (1845) 1 Cox CC 174; R v Small (1837) 8 Car & P 46; R v Brereton (1914) 10 Cr App R 201. 5 R v Longstreeth (1826) 1 Moody 137; R v Kay (1857) Dearsly & Bell 231; R v Gillings (1858) 1 Fos & Fin 36. 6 R v Aickles (1784) 1 Leach 294; R v Williams (1834) 6 Car & P 390; R v Rodway (1841) 9 Car & P 784. 7 R v Waller (1865) 10 Cox CC 360; Oppenheimer v Attenborough [1908] 1 KB 221; Oppenheimer v Frazer & Wyatt [1907] 2 KB 50; R v Scranton (1920) 15 Cr App R 104; Folkes v King [1923] 1 KB 282; Heap v Motorists’ Advisory Agency Ltd [1923] 1 KB 577; Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487; London Jewellers Ltd v Attenborough [1934] 2 KB 206; Pearson v Rose and Young Ltd [1951] 1 KB 275; Du Jardin v Beadman Brothers Ltd [1952] 2 QB 712. 8 R v Wilkins (1789) 1 Leach 520; R v Johnson & Wright (1851) 2 Denison 310; R v Brown (1856) Dearsly 616. 9 R v Robson (1820) Russ & Ry 413; R v Buckmaster (1887) 20 QBD 182; R v Hilliard (1913) 109 LT 750. 10 R v Russett [1892] 2 QB 312. 11 Kennison v Daire (1985) 38 SASR 404; upheld HC 64 ALR 17. See also R v Evenett (1987) 24 A Crim R 330. 12 (1938) 55 WN 80. See also Oppenheimer v Frazer & Wyatt [1907] 2 KB 50; Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463; R v Caslin [1961] 1 WLR 59; [1961] 1 All ER 246; (1960) 45 Cr App R 47; R v Borinelli [1962] SASR 214; Clemesha v The Queen [1978] WAR 193; R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98. 13 R v Solomons (1890) 27 Cox CC 93; R v Wilson & Martin (1837) 8 Car & P 111; White v Garden (1851) 10 CB 919; R v Wilks (1914) 10 Cr App R 16. See also Lambell v Moore [1929] VLR 149. Compare R v Justelius [1973] 1 NSWLR 471. 14 R v Wort [1927] VLR 560. 15 R v Hands (1887) 16 Cox CC 188. 16 1966, 36th ed, pars 1483–1498. This material does not appear in the later editions, because of the English Theft Act 1968.
[CA.117.380] Larceny by intimidation Where the accused with the intention of stealing obtains possession of goods by intimidating the owner this is larceny. A threat of temporary imprisonment was held to be sufficient intimidation.1 In larceny by intimidation, the owner’s consent does not save the accused, as the courts have always regarded a consent given under the compulsion of threats of harm as not a real consent – to be effective the owner’s consent must be full and free.2 1 R v Lovell (1881) 8 QBD 185. See also R v McGrath (1869) LR 1 CCR 205 where a lady attending an auction was forced to purchase cloth for which she had not bid.
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2 Marshall v Szommer (1989) 44 A Crim R 198 (Crawford J, Tas SC).
[CA.117.400]
Larceny as result of mistake
Whether an accused who on receiving the property is not aware of the mistake but later on finding out decides to appropriate the property, is guilty of larceny appears to depend on the circumstances.2 It has been said that when the accused discovered the nature of the property he or she had acquired and then had decided to appropriate it, this was larceny.3 1 R v Middleton (1873) LR 2 CCR 38; R v Cheatham (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 20; R v Flowers (1886) 16 QBD 643; R v Hehir (1895) 18 Cox CC 267; R v Gilks [1972] 1 WLR 1341; 2 All ER 280. 2 R v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190. See also R v Potisk (1973) 6 SASR 389; Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110; Marshall v Szommer [1990] Tas R 210. 3 R v Hudson [1943] 1 KB 458. Compare R v Thomas (1953) 37 Cr App R 169; R v Williams [1953] 1 QB 660. Hudson’s case was followed in Russell v Smith [1958] 1 QB 27 but compare Moynes v Cooper [1956] 1 QB 439.
[CA.117.420]
Larceny by finding
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If a person finds goods that have been actually lost, or are reasonably supposed by that person to have been lost, and appropriates them, with intent to take the entire dominion over them, really believing, when taken, that the owner cannot be found, it is not larceny; but if taken with the like intent, though lost, or reasonably supposed to be lost, but reasonably believing that the owner can be found it is larceny.1 The mens rea which the Crown must prove is a belief by the accused that the owner of the goods can be found. This belief can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the finding and the taking of the goods, including not only what the accused has done in relation to the goods but also what he or she has not done that might reasonably be regarded as consistent with the actions of an honest man finding goods.2 Where the accused afterwards forms the intention to appropriate the goods whether the owner is found or not, or where he or she afterwards acquires the belief that the owner could be found, he or she is not guilty of larceny by finding as he or she must have both the intention and the belief at the time of finding.3 Where some property has been abandoned and it has not passed into the lawful possession of some other person, it is not capable of being stolen.4 The law as to finding lost articles does not apply to straying animals.5 1 R v Thurborn (1849) 1 Denison 387; 2 Car & K 831. See also R v Kerr (1837) 8 Car & P 176; Merry v Green (1841) 7 Meeson & Welsby 623; R v Rowe (1859) Bell CC 93; Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142; Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; (1951) 35 Cr App R 94; Feist v Bonython [1944] SASR 176; Minigall v McCammon [1970] SASR 82; Donoghue v Coombe (1987) 45 SASR 330; Hayes v Fries (1988) 49 SASR 184; 32 A Crim R 394. 2 R v MacDonald [1983] 1 NSWLR 729. 3 R v Matthews (1873) 12 Cox CC 489; R v Preston (1851) 2 Denison 353; R v Shea (1856) 7 Cox CC 147; R v Christopher (1858) Bell CC 27; R v Moore (1861) Leigh & Cave 1; R v Yorke (1848) 2 Car & K 841 (goods kept in hope of obtaining a reward); R v Peters (1843) 1 Car & K 245; R v Gardner (1862) Leigh & Cave 243; R v Glyde (1868) LR 1 CCR 139; R v Knight (1871) 12 Cox CC 102; R v Dixon (1855) 7 Cox CC 35. See also Russell v Smith [1958] 1 QB 27; Thompson v Nixon [1966] 1 QB 103; (1965) 49 Cr App R 324. 4 Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142; R v Woodman [1974] QB 754. 5 R v Bailey (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 23; R v Venables (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 612; 25 WN 190.
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Where the accused appropriates goods obtained under a mistake on the part of the owner, with knowledge that he or she has obtained possession in these circumstances, larceny may be committed, even if the accused took no steps to cause the mistake.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 117
[CA.117.40]
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[CA.117.440] Doctrine of recent possession It has been said that “recent possession” is not a special rule or a legal doctrine, but rather an example of circumstantial evidence.1 If a person is found in possession of recently stolen property and either fails to give any explanation as to how he or she came by it, or gives an explanation which the jury does not consider may reasonably be true, then it is open to the jury to conclude from the mere fact of possession that that person either stole the property or received it knowing it to have been stolen.2 The element of recency may have a different meaning depending on the nature of the goods found in the possession of the accused: in most cases it will be a matter for the jury to decide whether the theft has been sufficiently recent to justify the application of the doctrine.3 Where articles recently stolen are found on premises or in a vehicle occupied by the accused it must also be shown that they were there with her or his knowledge and sanction before it can be presumed that they were in her or his possession.4 It is the fact of possession which is the necessary ingredient in the doctrine of recent possession.5 For detailed commentary on possession, see [CA.7.20] – [CA.7.140]. There is no presumption either of law or of fact inherent in the doctrine of recent possession.6“…the wiser course is to avoid the use of the word ‘presumption’ altogether in this connection.”7 In R v Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727 at 731–732, Street CJ said: It is wrong to direct a jury, or to convey to it the impression, that it must or should convict in the absence of any explanation at all or in the absence of any explanation which may reasonably be true. There is no rule or presumption to this effect and no such impression should be conveyed to a jury. The doctrine rises no higher than entitling a jury, if it so chooses, to rely upon these ingredients alone as a basis for a verdict of guilty. Equally, unless there is no other evidence in the Crown case, it is wrong to direct a jury that it must acquit in the event of the accused person giving an explanation which may reasonably be true. The furnishing of an explanation which may reasonably be true goes no further on the accused’s behalf than to prevent the jury from basing a verdict of guilty merely upon the fact of his possession of recently stolen property. The jury should be told that if it concludes that the explanation may reasonably be true then it is not open to the jury to convict the accused merely upon the basis of his possession of recently stolen property. It will be necessary for the jury, in those circumstances, to consider whatever other evidence is before it and available to establish guilt. If, of course, there is no other available evidence, it will be appropriate to direct the jury that it must acquit if it takes the view that the explanation may reasonably be true.8 There is authority to the effect that, where an accused person changes his ground after first being confronted with the finding of recently stolen property in his possession, it is his initial attitude which is important.9 In Bruce v The Queen (1987) 61 ALJR 603, the High Court said: Where an accused person is in possession of property which is recently stolen, the jury is entitled to infer as a matter of fact, in the absence of any reasonable explanation, guilty knowledge on the part of the accused. Such an inference will be drawn from the unexplained fact of possession of such property and not from any admission of guilt arising from the failure to proffer an explanation. It is the possession of recently stolen property in the absence of explanation or explanatory circumstances, which enables the inference to be drawn. Thus the absence of any reasonable explanation must not itself be explicable in a manner consistent with innocence. The accused must have had an opportunity to give an explanation in circumstances where, if he is innocent, an explanation might reasonably be expected. Those circumstances do not encompass the situation where an accused, having been duly cautioned, declines to answer questions by the police in the exercise of his right to do so. On the other hand, the fact that the caution was given or that the right to silence was asserted or exercised does not itself provide an explanation of the possession of recently stolen goods or necessarily negate the existence of circumstances of unexplained possession of such goods where such circumstances otherwise exist.10
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[CA.117.460]
s 117
1 R v Waganeen (1989) 38 A Crim R 187. 2 R v Langmead (1864) 9 Cox CC; R v Saunders (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 200; Trainer v The King (1906) 4 CLR 126; [1906] HCA 50; R v Petrie (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 20; 63 WN (NSW) 258; R v Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727. 3 R v McCaffery [1911] VLR 92; R v Brain (1919) 13 Cr App R 197; R v Smale (unreported, CCA (NSW), 15 August 1986). 4 R v Lovell (1933) 39 ALR 268; R v Cottrell [1983] 1 VR 143; R v Mayall (1986) 43 SASR 258; R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395. 5 R v Williams [1954] VLR 134. 6 R v Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727 per Street CJ at 730. 7 R v Petrie (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 20; 63 WN (NSW) 258 at 21 (SR (NSW)), 259 (WN (NSW)). 8 R v Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727 at 731–732 per Street CJ. See also R v Ately (1985) 9 NSWLR 226; R v Holden (1917) 34 WN (NSW) 78; R v McKenna (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 330; R v Jorgic [1963] NSWR 66; 80 WN (NSW) 761; R v Petrie (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 20; 63 WN (NSW) 258; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; McCarthy v The Queen (1984) 13 A Crim R 13; R v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23. 9 R v Bellamy [1981] 2 NSWLR 727 per Street CJ at 731 following R v Caplin (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 514; 50 WN (NSW) 189. 10 Bruce v The Queen (1987) 61 ALJR 603. See also R v Beljavev [1984] VR 657. 11 R v Smith (1986) 7 NSWLR 444; 23 A Crim R 266.
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[CA.117.460]
Jury directions and verdict
Where there is a count for larceny and receiving the jury may find a special verdict under s 121; but if the jury convict on one of these counts they should be discharged from giving a verdict on the other.1 The summing up should distinguish between larceny and receiving, and if there is more than one accused, between their respective shares of the offences charged.2 As to the verdict where two or more persons are jointly indicted for larceny and receiving, see s 122. Where there are alternative counts for larceny and receiving, once it appears that the case is larceny or nothing, only the count of larceny should be left to the jury.3 If the jury acquit of larceny but convict of receiving, and the evidence justifies a conviction for larceny but not for receiving, the verdict and conviction will be set aside.4 Where two persons are charged with larceny and receiving and the jury find a general verdict of guilty, the court may substitute a conviction for larceny.5 As to alternative verdicts of larceny, embezzlement, false pretences, or fraudulent misappropriation, see s 120, s 183. As to larceny by a bailee, see s 125. As to verdict of misdemeanour, see s 123. As to fraudulent appropriation, or fraudulent retention of property to secure a reward, see s 124. 1 2 3 4 5
R R R R R
v v v v v
Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68; R v Roma [1956] Crim LR 46. Ebbage (1930) 22 Cr App R 50. Christ (1951) 35 Cr App R 76 at 78–79 per Devlin J. Evans (1916) 12 Cr App R 8; R v Melvin [1953] 1 QB 481. Turner (1917) 34 WN (NSW) 106.
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The doctrine of recent possession cannot be called in aid in a murder or robbery charge, where the item allegedly stolen was or may have been used in the commission of the murder or robbery.11
Crimes Act 1900 s 118
118
[CA.118.20]
Intent to return property no defence
Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. [S 118 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[10]]
SECTION 118 COMMENTARY [CA.118.20]
General
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This section does not dispense with the need for the prosecution to prove the third element of larceny, (see [CA.117.320]) ie an intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property in the goods. The scope and purpose of this section was considered by the High Court in Foster v The Queen (1967) 118 CLR 117. There, the accused was alleged to have had in his possession without lawful excuse a pistol he had taken. The accused said that he had not intended to steal the pistol but had merely borrowed it from the house of the owner of the pistol where he was staying. He said he had intended to replace the pistol later that same day. The trial judge endorsed a submission by the Crown that because of the terms of s 118, it was not necessary to establish an intention by the accused to permanently deprive the owner of the pistol at the time of the taking. The High Court said that this direction was erroneous. Barwick CJ said that it was necessary for the Crown to prove that the taking of the pistol was not innocent and involved an intention by the accused to assume ownership in it, to deprive the owner permanently of it, to deprive him of the property in it. The Chief Justice said at 121: Section 118 … does not deny the necessity for an intention in one of these forms to accompany the taking. It deals with the case of an accused who has appropriated the property and not of an accused who has only assumed possession of it. It merely ensures that the consequence of forming or having that intention is not defeated by an intention eventually to restore the property to the true owner. Thus, if the intention is to deprive the true owner of possession for a limited time, larceny is not made out. But if the intention of the taker is to exercise ownership of the goods, to deal with them as his own, an intention later to restore the property in the goods will not prevent the original taking being larcenous. Of course, in truth the thief cannot alter the ownership of the goods: but he can have an intention to do so. There are cases in which the suggestion has been advanced in argument that a larcenous taking was deprived of that character because of an intention in the taker to eventually restore the goods to the owner.1 In Foster, Barwick CJ at 121 said that the real function of s 118 was to ensure that suggestions of that kind do not form part of the law of larceny in NSW. Where a jury found a verdict of “guilty, but with the intention of returning the money” it was held that this was a verdict of guilty of larceny as the accused, a bank teller, had assumed the ownership over money he had taken from the bank, and his intention eventually to return an equivalent amount could not purge the offence.2 An intention to replace goods or money stolen may amount to strong mitigation.3 1 R v Wright (1828) Carrington’s Supplement 278 (173 ER 953n); R v Phetheon (1840) 9 Carrington & Payne 552 and R v Trebilcock (1858) Dearsly & Bell 453. 2 R v Johnson (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) 201. 3 R v Cockburn [1968] 1 WLR 281; [1968] 1 All ER 466.
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[CA.120.40]
119
s 120
Verdict where several takings proved
Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the property alleged in any count to have been stolen at one time, was taken at different times, the prosecutor shall not be required to elect upon which taking the prosecutor will proceed, unless the Judge so orders: Provided always that evidence shall not in any such case be given of any taking which occurred more than six months in point of time from any other of such takings. CA
[S 119 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[11]; Act 2 of 1929, s 5]
SECTION 119 COMMENTARY Application of section ........................................................................................................................ [CA.119.20] Indictment .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.119.40]
[CA.119.20]
Application of section
This section applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2. [CA.119.40]
Indictment
An indictment alleging that various articles were stolen between 21 October 1908 and 9 February 1909 had the effect of alleging that the various articles stolen were taken at the one time.1
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1 R v Rye (1909) 2 Cr App R 155. See also R v Firth (1869) LR 1 CCR 172. As to “milking” petrol see McDonald v Mather (1976) 13 SASR 438.
120
Trial for larceny—verdict of embezzlement etc
Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the person took the property in such manner as to amount in law to the offence of embezzlement or fraudulent misappropriation, or the fraudulent application, or disposition, of property as a clerk, or servant, or person employed in the Public Service, or of obtaining property by any false pretence or by any wilfully false promise, or partly by a false pretence and partly by a wilfully false promise, the jury may acquit the person of the larceny charged, and find the person guilty of such other offence, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 120 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6; Act 2 of 1929, s 6]
SECTION 120 COMMENTARY Application of section 120 ................................................................................................................ [CA.120.20] Embezzlement .................................................................................................................................. [CA.120.40] Fraudulent misappropriation ............................................................................................................. [CA.120.60] False pretences ................................................................................................................................ [CA.120.80] “Wilfully” .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.120.100] Alternative verdict ........................................................................................................................... [CA.120.120] Judge’s direction ............................................................................................................................. [CA.120.140]
[CA.120.20]
Application of section 120
Section 120 applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2. [CA.120.40]
Embezzlement
As to embezzlement, see s 157.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 121
[CA.120.0]
[CA.120.60]
Fraudulent misappropriation
As to fraudulent misappropriation, see s 178A. [CA.120.80]
False pretences
As to false pretences, see s 179. [CA.120.100]
“Wilfully”
As to the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. [CA.120.120]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. On an indictment for stealing a cheque, there may be an alternative verdict of fraudulent misappropriation under s 178A.1 1 R v Wall (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 41.
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[CA.120.140]
Judge’s direction
There cannot be a conviction for false pretences if it is a case of larceny or nothing, and the court cannot substitute a verdict of larceny where there is a conviction for false pretences under this section, because under s 120, an acquittal for larceny is a condition precedent.1 If the judge decides to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty of larceny, and to consider the case as one of obtaining property by false pretences, it may be proper to give defence counsel a further opportunity to address the jury on this issue and to have the false pretences specified in writing.2 Where the facts indicated false pretences but not larceny the Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a verdict of false pretences.3 Where on a trial for larceny the Crown presses a charge of obtaining goods by false pretences, all the elements which constitute the latter offence should be made out, and the jury should be clearly instructed as to the issues involved in the latter charge and the relevant evidence tendered in connection therewith.4 An accused charged with attempted larceny cannot be convicted on an attempt to obtain the property by false pretences.5 1 2 3 4 5
R R R R R
121
v v v v v
Wall (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 41. Russell (1944) 29 Cr App R 165. Caslin [1961] 1 WLR 59; [1961] 1 All ER 246; (1960) 45 Cr App R 47. Cooke (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 188. Gallagher (1929) 21 Cr App R 172.
Verdict of “larceny or receiving”
Where, on the trial of a person charged with larceny, or any offence which includes larceny, and, also, with having unlawfully received the property charged to have been stolen, knowing it to have been stolen, the jury find specially that the person either stole, or unlawfully received, such property, and that they are unable to say which of those offences was committed by the person, such person shall not by reason thereof be entitled to acquittal, but shall be liable to be sentenced for the larceny, or for the unlawful receiving, whichever of the two offences is subject to the lesser punishment. [S 121 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[21]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]]
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[CA.121.40]
s 122
SECTION 121 COMMENTARY Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.121.20] Judge’s direction ............................................................................................................................... [CA.121.40]
[CA.121.20]
Application of section
[CA.121.40]
Judge’s direction
The proper way to apply s 121 is for the judge to advise the jury that such a verdict is available and inform the jury of the manner in which the verdict is to be taken.1 This may be done by asking the jury: As to the first count of stealing, do you find the accused guilty or not guilty? As to the second count of receiving, do you find the accused guilty or not guilty? If these two questions are answered “not guilty” the jury may then be asked: Do you return a special verdict that the accused is guilty either of stealing or receiving but you are unable to say which? The verdict of “not guilty” on each of the two specific charges does not amount to a complete determination of the charges contained in the indictment: it provides a basis upon which the special verdict is open to be returned by the jury if it so decides.2
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In R v Saleam (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 (CCA NSW) Lee J said at 115, It is clear from Cassidy [1919] 19 SR (NSW) 48 that where the jury has open to it a special verdict under s 121 the judge should see to it in his directions that the jury understand that that requires a verdict of not guilty on each of the counts for stealing and receiving. It should be noted that by a majority the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Clarke (1995) 78 A Crim R 226 held that s 121 applies only where it is the same property alleged to have been either stolen or received. Where out of a greater quantity of property alleged to have been stolen it was alleged that only one particular item was received, the court said that if the Crown had wished to rely upon s 121 in relation to that one particular item, it should have charged the accused with having stolen it in a separate count, and with the receiving charge relating to it in the alternative to that count. Further, in R v Nguyen (unreported, CCA (NSW), 20 February 1997) the Court of Criminal Appeal (by majority) held that before the special verdict under s 121 may be given, the jury must unanimously agree (i) that the accused either stole the property or received it, and (ii) that they are unable to say which of those offences were committed by him. It is not available as a compromise verdict where some but not all jurors are satisfied that the accused committed one of those offences. 1 R v Cassidy [1919] SR (NSW) 48; 36 WN 13. See also Gilson v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 353; 53 A Crim R 344; R v Walters (1992) 62 A Crim R 16; R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395; R v Clarke (1995) 78 A Crim R 226. 2 R v Ferguson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 8 May 1986).
122
Verdict where persons indicted for joint larceny or receiving
On the trial of any two, or more, persons charged with larceny, and also with having unlawfully received property, the jury may find all, or any, of such persons guilty, either of stealing, or unlawfully
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CA
This section applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2.
Crimes Act 1900 s 122
[CA.122.20]
receiving, the property, or part or parts thereof, or may find one, or more, of the said persons guilty of stealing, and the other, or others, of them guilty of unlawfully receiving the property, or part or parts thereof. [S 122 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[21]]
SECTION 122 COMMENTARY [CA.122.20]
Application of section
This section applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. 123
Verdict of minor indictable offence
Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the property in question was taken, appropriated, or retained, under circumstances amounting to a minor indictable offence, the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged and find the person guilty of the minor indictable offence, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 123 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[36] and [37]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]]
SECTION 123 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.123.20] Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.123.40] Minor indictable offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.123.60]
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[CA.123.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.123.40]
Application of section
This section applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. [CA.123.60]
Minor indictable offence
As to what is a minor indictable offence, see [CA.9.60]. 124
Fraudulent appropriation
Where, upon the trial of a person for larceny, it appears: (a) that the person had fraudulently appropriated to his or her own use or that of another, the property in respect of which the person is indicted, although the person had not originally taken the property with any fraudulent intent, or (b) that the person had fraudulently retained the property in order to secure a reward for its restoration, the jury may return a verdict accordingly, and thereupon the person shall be liable to imprisonment for two years, or to a fine of 20 penalty units, or both. [S 124 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [5]; Act 112 of 1992, s 3 and Sch 1; Act 50 of 1974, s 6; subst Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
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[CA.125.40]
s 125
SECTION 124 COMMENTARY Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.124.20] Summary offence .............................................................................................................................. [CA.124.40]
[CA.124.20]
Application of section
Section 124 applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2. [CA.124.40]
Summary offence
Where fraud is an ingredient of a criminal offence it must be established by the existence of a dishonest intention at the time the act was committed: the intention is synchronous with the act.1 1 R v Cooper (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 426; 31 WN (NSW) 164.
125
Larceny by bailee
Whosoever, being a bailee of any property, fraudulently takes, or converts, the same, or any part thereof, or any property into or for which it has been converted, or exchanged, to his or her own use, or the use of any person other than the owner thereof, although he or she does not break bulk, or otherwise determine the bailment, shall be deemed to be guilty of larceny and liable to be indicted for that offence. The accused shall be taken to be a bailee within the meaning of this section, although he or she may not have contracted to restore, or deliver, the specific property received by him or her, or may only have contracted to restore, or deliver, the property specifically. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 125 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1], [4] and [9]; Act 48 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 4(4); Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 125 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.125.20] Larceny by a bailee .......................................................................................................................... [CA.125.40] Bailment ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.125.60] Fraudulent conversion by the bailee .............................................................................................. [CA.125.100]
[CA.125.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. being the bailee of certain property to wit .......... owned by CD, fraudulently took (converted) (exchanged) the property (to his own use) (to the use of a person other than CD). [CA.125.40]
Larceny by a bailee
The elements of this crime, which is larceny, are: (1) that the accused received property from the owner under an agreement (express or implied); (2) under circumstances which constituted the accused a bailee of such property; and (3) the accused took such property (or part thereof) or converted such property to his own use or exchanged such property; (4) that such taking, conversion or exchange was fraudulent. As to what constitutes a taking, see [CA.117.160]. As to what property may be the subject of larceny, see [CA.117.240]. As to who is the “owner of property”, see [CA.117.240].
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For the summary offence of fraudulent appropriation, see s 527.
Crimes Act 1900 s 125
[CA.125.40]
As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. As to frauds by factors and other agents, see ss 164 to 178. [CA.125.60]
Bailment
“Bailment implies three things: first the delivery of some specific article by one person to another; second, that the thing delivered should remain the general property of the bailor; and third, that it or some specific thing into which it is converted under the terms of the bailment is to be returned to the bailor or delivered to some person for him.”1 There must be a delivery by the bailor.2 A person cannot become a bailee by fraud.3 Where there is a bailment of goods, the bailee obtains not only the physical custody but also the legal possession of the goods. If the terms of the bailment contemplate that the thing delivered is to be dealt with in a certain way, for example, sold, it is a question of evidence whether the proceeds of the sale are to become the property of the bailor.4 The first paragraph of s 125 alters the common law in two respects. First it is not necessary to prove a breaking of the bulk: second, it is provided that, whether the conversion of the article bailed was authorised by the bailor or not, the bailee is equally guilty of larceny if he or she takes the substituted property.5 The words “shall be taken to be a bailee” in the second paragraph of s 125 relate only to the ownership of the substituted property, and mean that the accused shall be taken to be a bailee of that property, although he or she may not have contracted to restore or deliver the original property received by her or him.6
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A bailee of money cannot as a rule be convicted of larceny.7 The question whether a stakeholder of money is a mere bailee of the specific money delivered, or whether he or she acquires property in it subject to account, depends on the facts. In view of the difficulty involved in proving a bailment where there has been a fraudulent misappropriation of money or a valuable security, the more appropriate charge is under s 178A, which applies to bailees.8 When property is bailed a person may be charged with stealing her or his own property, ownership of which may be described in the indictment as that of the bailee.9 An infant can be a bailee.10 Even before the married women’s property legislation it was held that a married woman could be a bailee.11 A servant who has the custody of her or his master’s goods is not a bailee of them. In such a case the legal possession remains in the master, and if the servant misappropriates the goods he or she takes them from the possession of her or his master and commits larceny at common law.12 If the intention is that the property in the goods should pass to the person to whom they are delivered, as in the case of a sale of goods on credit, where the goods are not paid for the relationship between the parties remains that of creditor and debtor, and not that of bailor and bailee. Where the defence is that there was a sale on credit, the direction to the jury must carefully distinguish between civil and criminal liability.13 A finder of goods who elects to assume possession is not a bailee as a bailee refers only to a person who has received into her or his possession goods from another person or express or implied terms as to their possession.14 A hirer of goods under a hire purchase agreement may be convicted of larceny as a bailee if he or she fraudulently converts the goods to her or his own use or the use of any person other than the owner.15 As to the various kinds of bailments see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 2, para [1501]. 1 2 3 4 5 6
652
Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 at 556–557. See also R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. Ashby v Tolhurst [1937] 2 KB 242. R v Critchell (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 209; R v Parker (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 217. Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546. Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546; R v Wall (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 41. Slattery v The King (1905) 2 CLR 546 at 560.
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[CA.125.100]
s 126
[CA.125.100]
CA
7 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 at 119; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80; R v Wall (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 41. See also R v Hassall (1861) Le & Ca 56. 8 R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. See also R v Hastings [1958] Crim LR 128. 9 R v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347. 10 R v Newman (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 344; R v McDonald (1885) 15 QBD 323. 11 R v Robson (1861) Le & Ca 93. 12 R v Cooke (1871) LR 1 CCR 295. 13 R v Ward (1928) 20 Cr App R 167. 14 Thompson v Nixon [1966] 1 QB 103; (1965) 49 Cr App R 324. 15 R v Deller (1952) 36 Cr App R 184.
Fraudulent conversion by the bailee
It is not necessary to show that the accused had a fraudulent intent to convert the property at the time he or she received it: it is sufficient to show a felonius intent at some time subsequent to receipt.1 Evidence of conversion sufficient to prove the civil action of trover will not necessarily be sufficient to justify a conviction under s 125: what must be shown is an act done by the accused inconsistent with the purposes of the bailment, analogous to larceny, and there must be a definite time when the act of conversion can be said to have taken place.2 Prima facie the conversion of a bailed chattel by the sale of it is fraudulent.3 A dishonest refusal to return the chattel on demand would also be evidence of a conversion.4 Pawning a chattel may or may not be evidence of conversion: if the bailee honestly intended to redeem the chattel when he or she pawned it and he or she had a sufficient prospect of doing so, her or his conduct might not be inconsistent with her or his duty as a bailee but a mere hope of redeeming the goods at some future time would not be sufficient.5 The fact that a bailee is entitled to her or his commission does not of itself prevent a conviction under this section.6 Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
As to the distinction between larceny by a trick and larceny by a bailee see R v Ward.7 1 R v Millard (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 8; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. 2 R v Jackson (1864) 9 Cox CC 505. See also R v Wakeman (1912) 8 Cr App R 18; R v Weeks (1866) 10 Cox CC 224; R v Cosser (1876) 13 Cox CC 187; R v Oxenham (1876) 13 Cox CC 349; R v Price (1913) 9 Cr App R 15. 3 R v Price (1913) 9 Cr App R 15. 4 R v Wakeman (1912) 8 Cr App R 18. 5 R v Medland (1851) 5 Cox CC 292; R v Wynn (1887) 16 Cox CC 231. 6 R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. 7 (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80.
126
Stealing cattle or killing with intent to steal
Whosoever: steals any cattle, or wilfully kills any cattle with intent to steal the carcass, or skin, or other part, of the cattle so killed, shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [S 126 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 126 COMMENTARY The elements of stealing cattle or killing cattle with intent to steal ................................................. [CA.126.20] Taking ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.126.40]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 126
[CA.126.20]
Asportation ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.126.60] Ownership ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.126.80] Intent to steal .................................................................................................................................. [CA.126.100] Acting without owner’s consent ...................................................................................................... [CA.126.120] Recent possession ......................................................................................................................... [CA.126.140] Cattle .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.126.160] “Wilfully” .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.126.180] Taking ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.126.200] Evidence of ownership ................................................................................................................... [CA.126.220] Animal’s sex or age uncertain ........................................................................................................ [CA.126.240] Alternative verdicts ......................................................................................................................... [CA.126.260]
[CA.126.20]
The elements of stealing cattle or killing cattle with intent to steal
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the cattle were the property of the person named or of a person unknown; and (2) that the accused stole them. [CA.126.40]
Taking
As to what constitutes a taking for the purposes of larceny, see [CA.117.160]. [CA.126.60]
Asportation
As to asportation or carrying away, see [CA.117.160]. [CA.126.80]
Ownership
As to what constitutes ownership, see [CA.117.240].
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[CA.126.100]
Intent to steal
As to intent to steal, see [CA.117.320]. [CA.126.120]
Acting without owner’s consent
As to acting without the owner’s consent, see [CA.117.340]. [CA.126.140]
Recent possession
As to recent possession, see [CA.117.440]. [CA.126.160]
Cattle
“Cattle” includes any horse, mare, gelding, colt, foal, filly, ass, mule, bull, cow, ox, steer, heifer, calf, ram, ewe, sheep, lamb, pig, goat, deer, alpaca, llama, vicuna, camel, dromedary, and every hybrid or cross thereof: s 4. [CA.126.180]
“Wilfully”
As to the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. [CA.126.200]
Taking
Tampering with brands of sheep, with intent to appropriate them, is evidence of taking. This may constitute a larceny, although the sheep were originally mustered by the accused with other sheep of her or his own, and although at the time of such mustering the accused had no intention of stealing them, it being held that the original mustering was not a taking.1 If the original taking of lost animals is not a trespass (for example, where they are delivered to the accused with a view to finding the owner) the subsequent killing of the animals is not larceny.2 But where
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possession of the animal is obtained wrongfully, though not feloniously, a subsequent attempt by the accused to fraudulently dispose of the animal may be larceny.3 Where animals join the accused’s flock without his knowledge, or in circumstances where no wrongful taking or possession is disclosed, and the accused later kills them for his own use then knowing they are not his, this is larceny.4 R v Venables (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 612; 25 WN 190. R v King (1908) 25 WN (NSW) 168. R v O’Brien (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 136; 38 WN (NSW) 10; R v Buttle (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 154. R v Buttle (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 154 following R v Finlayson (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 301; R v Bailey (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 23; R v Venables (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 612; 25 WN 190.
[CA.126.220]
CA
1 2 3 4
Evidence of ownership
Brands and earmarks are evidence of ownership of animals.1 Section 16 of the Registration of Stock Brands Act 1921, provides that an official brand directory shall be prima facie evidence that the person mentioned in such directory is the proprietor of the brand mentioned therein. Upon charges of larceny and receiving, evidence that other sheep stolen at other times and from other persons was found in the possession of the accused was held to be inadmissible.2 1 R v Hall (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 74. 2 R v Emmett [1905] VLR 718.
[CA.126.240]
Animal’s sex or age uncertain
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal merely because the animal’s sex or age is uncertain: s 127.
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[CA.126.260]
Alternative verdicts
Where the jury is not satisfied that the accused stole the animal they may find him guilty of stealing the carcass, skin or part of the animal or of killing the animal with intent to steal the carcass, etc: s 128 post. Alternatively if the accused is charged with intent to steal the carcass etc the jury may find him guilty of cattle stealing: s 129. The jury may find the accused guilty of illegally using the animal: s 130. 127
Stealing or killing cattle—uncertainty as to sex or age not to entitle to acquittal
Where, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 126 it appears that the person stole, or killed, an animal of the species described in the indictment, but it is uncertain on the evidence what was its sex, or age, such person shall not be entitled to acquittal by reason only of such uncertainty. [S 127 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5]; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
128
Trial for stealing cattle—verdict of stealing skins
Where, on the trial of a person for stealing cattle, the jury are not satisfied that the person is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that the person is guilty of stealing the carcass, or skin, or part, of such cattle, or of killing the said cattle within section 126, they may acquit the person of the offence charged, and find the person guilty of such last-mentioned stealing, or killing, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 128 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]]
SECTION 128 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.128.20] Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.128.40]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 129
[CA.128.20]
[CA.128.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.128.40]
Application of section
This section applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. 129
Trial for killing cattle—verdict of stealing
Where, on the trial of a person for the offence of killing cattle within the meaning of section 126, the jury are not satisfied that the person is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that the person is guilty of stealing such cattle, they may acquit the person of the offence charged, and find the person guilty of such stealing, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 129 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]]
SECTION 129 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.129.20] Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.129.40]
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[CA.129.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.129.40]
Application of section
This section applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2. 130
Trial for stealing cattle—verdict of misdemeanour
Where, on the trial of a person for stealing cattle, the jury are not satisfied that the person is guilty thereof, but are satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence within section 131, they may acquit the person of the offence charged, and find the person guilty of an offence under the said last mentioned section, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 130 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 130 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.130.20] Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.130.40]
[CA.130.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100].
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[CA.131.60] [CA.130.40]
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Application of section
This section applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. Unlawfully using etc another person’s cattle
Whosoever: takes and works, or otherwise uses, or takes for the purpose of working, or using, any cattle the property of another person without the consent of the owner, or person in lawful possession thereof, or takes any such cattle for the purpose of secreting the same, or obtaining a reward for the restoration or pretended finding thereof, or for any other fraudulent purpose, or fraudulently brands, or ear-marks, or defaces, or alters, the brands or ear-marks of any cattle the property of another person, shall be liable to imprisonment for three years.
SECTION 131 COMMENTARY Indictment – unlawfully using cattle .................................................................................................. [CA.131.20] Indictment – secreting cattle ............................................................................................................ [CA.131.40] Indictment – branding cattle ............................................................................................................. [CA.131.60] The elements of unlawfully using cattle ........................................................................................... [CA.131.80] Terms defined ................................................................................................................................. [CA.131.100] Acting without owner’s consent ...................................................................................................... [CA.131.120]
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The elements secreting cattle ........................................................................................................ [CA.131.140] General ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.131.160] Retaining property for reward ......................................................................................................... [CA.131.180] The elements of fraudulently branding etc ..................................................................................... [CA.131.200] General ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.131.220] Verdict ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.131.240] Alteration ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.131.260]
[CA.131.20]
Indictment – unlawfully using cattle
That AB on the .......... day .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, unlawfully did take and work (or use) or did take for The purpose of working (or of using), a certain horse the property of JN without the consent of JN (or without the consent of CD a person then in lawful possession of the said horse). [CA.131.40]
Indictment – secreting cattle
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did take for the purpose of secreting the same (or obtaining a reward for the restoration, or pretended finding thereof) one horse the property of JN. [CA.131.60]
Indictment – branding cattle
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid fraudulently did brand one heifer, the property of JN. It is not necessary to state in the indictment what the fraudulent purpose was: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80].
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CA
131
Crimes Act 1900 s 131 [CA.131.80]
[CA.131.0] The elements of unlawfully using cattle
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused without the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession; (2) took the cattle named; and (3) used them, or purported to use them. [CA.131.100]
Terms defined
“Cattle” – As to the meaning of cattle, see [CA.126.160]. “Ownership” – As to ownership, see [CA.117.240]. “Unlawfully”, see [CLP.80]. [CA.131.120]
Acting without owner’s consent
As to acting without the owner’s consent, see [CA.117.340]. Where the consent of the person in possession of two horses was obtained by fraud, it was held that the offence was made out.1 If the accused uses the animal for a purpose other than that consented to the offence is made out.2 Where there is a bona fide dispute as to ownership between the accused and another, the accused cannot be convicted of illegal user.3 A seizure under claim of right cannot be made the subject of illegal user.4 For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. To constitute an offence under the section the user must begin in trespass to the animal.5 If there is employment by the accused for profit, convenience, or pleasure, the accused’s intent is immaterial.6
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Milking a cow may constitute an unlawful user even where there is no asportation of the cow.7 The mere driving of cattle is not an offence, per se.8 Mere transportation of animals after stealing them does not constitute unlawful user.9 If the accused without consent uses or works any cattle which stray on to his land he may be guilty of this offence.10 There can be no illegal user of sheep unless they are rams,11 however, shearing of sheep may be an illegal user.12 Using cattle as coachers, that is, to assist in driving other cattle, may be an unlawful user.13 Removal of the accused’s hobbles from a horse was held to be evidence of user of such horse.14 Putting a stallion at night in with the accused’s mares was held to be an unlawful user.15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
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Ex parte Walton (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 141. R v West (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 329; Wimble v Foulsham [1908] VLR 98; R v Frew (1867) 7 SCR (NSW) 111. Ex parte McDonald (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 252. Cf Clarkson v Aspinall [1950] QSR 79. Ex parte Wark (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 125. Cunningham v McFarlane (1881) 1 QLJ 49. Emmerson v Clarke (1872) 3 QSCR 76; Re Haughton (1877) 5 QSCR 53. Mollenhauer v Lindenmayer [1964] QWN 22. Cf Ex parte Bowman (1866) 6 SCR (NSW) 15. Clifford v White [1910] QSR 364; New Zealand & Australian Land Co Ltd v Salisbury [1920] QSR 63; Ex parte Sparks (1879) 2 SCR NS (NSW) 218; Hocken v Beahr [1955] QSR 406; Halberstater v McHugh [1942] QSR 148. Roberts v Thomson [1963] QWN 36; New Zealand & Australian Land Co Ltd v Salisbury [1920] QSR 63. McLeod v Hanrahan (1886) 12 VLR 587. R v Collett (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 291. Emmerson v Clarke (1872) 3 QSCR 76. R v Lilliecrap (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 125; Clifford v White [1910] QSR 364; Ex parte Sparks (1879) 2 SCR NS (NSW) 218; R v Frew (1867) 7 SCR (NSW) 111; New Zealand & Australian Land Co Ltd v Salisbury [1920] QSR 63; Campbell v Rankin [1943] QWN 19.
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[CA.131.260]
s 132
14 R v McKenzie (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 219. 15 R v Taylor (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 43.
[CA.131.140]
The elements secreting cattle
[CA.131.160]
CA
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused without the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession; (2) took the cattle named; and (3) for the purpose of secreting them, obtaining a reward for their restoration or pretended finding, or for any other fraudulent purpose. General
See generally [CA.131.80]. [CA.131.180]
Retaining property for reward
As to retaining property for the purposes of a reward, see s 124, [CA.124.40]. [CA.131.200]
The elements of fraudulently branding etc
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused branded, earmarked, or defaced or altered the brand or earmark; (2) of another person’s cattle; (3) fraudulently. [CA.131.220]
General
See generally [CA.131.80].
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[CA.131.240]
Verdict
A verdict of “not guilty of cattle stealing but guilty of fraudulently branding cattle” was held to be a proper verdict.1 1 Menges v The King (1919) 26 CLR 369.
[CA.131.260]
Alteration
Adding to an existing earmark may not constitute an alteration.1 1 R v Burns (1928) 45 WN (NSW) 163. See also s 199 of the Rural Lands Protection Act 1989.
132
Stealing dogs
Whosoever, having been summarily convicted under this or any former Act, of any such offence as is hereinafter in this section mentioned, afterwards, steals any dog, or has unlawfully in his or her possession any stolen dog, or the skin of any stolen dog, knowing such dog to have been stolen, shall be liable to imprisonment for one year. [S 132 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]]
SECTION 132 COMMENTARY Indictment – stealing dog ................................................................................................................. [CA.132.20]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 133
[CA.132.20]
Indictment – possessing stolen dog ................................................................................................. [CA.132.40] The elements of dog stealing ........................................................................................................... [CA.132.60] Summary offences ............................................................................................................................ [CA.132.80]
[CA.132.20]
Indictment – stealing dog
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did steal one dog the property of JN. And the Attorney-General further charges that before the committing of the said offence, to wit on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, the said AB was summarily convicted of stealing a dog. [CA.132.40]
Indictment – possessing stolen dog
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid, unlawfully had in his or her possession a stolen dog, the property of JN, knowing the said dog to have been stolen. And the Attorney-General further charges that before the committing of the said offence, to wit, on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, the said AB was summarily convicted of stealing a dog. [CA.132.60]
The elements of dog stealing
The elements of these crimes are: (1) that the accused had been summarily convicted of dog stealing, or knowingly having a stolen dog in her or his possession; and afterwards (2) stole a dog, or knowingly had a stolen dog or its skin in her or his possession.
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[CA.132.80]
Summary offences
The summary offences referred to by s 132 are stealing dogs (s 503) and possessing a stolen dog or its skin (s 504). 133
Taking money to restore dogs
Whosoever corruptly takes any money or reward, directly or indirectly, under pretence, or upon account, of aiding any person to recover any dog which has been stolen, or which is in the possession of any person other than its owner, shall be liable to imprisonment for one year.
SECTION 133 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.133.20] The elements of taking money to restore dogs ............................................................................... [CA.133.40] Rewards ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.133.60] Taking money ................................................................................................................................... [CA.133.80]
[CA.133.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, corruptly did take a sum of money, to wit, ten dollars, under pretence and upon account of aiding JN to recover a dog which had been stolen. [CA.133.40]
The elements of taking money to restore dogs
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused received money;
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(2) under pretence that he would restore the dog to its owner, or would aid in its recovery by the owner. [CA.133.60]
Rewards
As to offering rewards for stolen property see s 528. Taking money
Taking money under s 133 means taking a reward in the form of money for the use of the accused or for some person other than the giver; the mere taking of physical custody of money as a messenger is not sufficient.1 The word “corruptly” refers to an act done by a person knowing that he or she is doing what is wrong and is doing it with an evil object.2 There must be evidence of corruption other than the mere act of taking the money.3 Where the accused took money under pretence of helping a person to recover stolen goods he or she was guilty of an offence under a similar English section even though he or she had no acquaintance with the thief nor pretended that he or she had, he or she had no power to apprehend the thief, the goods were not restored and the accused had no power to restore them.4 An accused was held guilty where he knew the thieves, accepted money from the owner to purchase the goods from them, but took no steps to bring them to justice.5 1 2 3 4 5
R R R R R
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134
v v v v v
Worthington [1921] VLR 660. Worthington. Worthington. Ledbitter (1825) 1 Mood CC 76. Pascoe (1849) 2 Car & Kir 927.
Stealing, destroying etc valuable security
Whosoever steals, embezzles, or for any fraudulent purpose destroys, cancels, obliterates, or conceals, the whole or any part of any valuable security, shall be liable, as if he or she had stolen a chattel, to be punished as for larceny. [S 134 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[9]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 134 COMMENTARY Indictment – stealing valuable security ............................................................................................ [CA.134.20] Indictment – destroying etc document of title to land ...................................................................... [CA.134.40] Stealing or destroying valuable security ........................................................................................... [CA.134.60] Embezzlement .................................................................................................................................. [CA.134.80] Disclosing an act ............................................................................................................................ [CA.134.100] Valuable security ............................................................................................................................. [CA.134.120] Jury should be drawn to the specific charge ................................................................................. [CA.134.140] Remedies ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.134.160]
[CA.134.20]
Indictment – stealing valuable security
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal a certain valuable security, the property of JN. It is not necessary to specify the valuable security in any further detail: s 386. A count for receiving may be added: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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[CA.133.80]
Crimes Act 1900 s 135
[CA.134.0]
[CA.134.40]
Indictment – destroying etc document of title to land
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid for a fraudulent purpose did destroy (cancel) (obliterate) (conceal) a certain document of title to land, containing evidence of the title of JN to land called Whiteacre, in which land the said JN then had and still hath an interest. It is not necessary to specify the contents of the document in any greater detail: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 or the nature of the fraudulent purpose: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.134.60]
Stealing or destroying valuable security
As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. [CA.134.80]
Embezzlement
As to what constitutes embezzlement, see s 157. [CA.134.100]
Disclosing an act
As to a person disclosing an act under compulsory process, see s 136. [CA.134.120]
Valuable security
A deed deposited with the Registrar-General upon application to bring land under the Real Property Act 1900 may be a valuable security.1 1 R v White (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 379; 21 WN 104.
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[CA.134.140]
Jury should be drawn to the specific charge
Where the accused is charged with stealing a cheque the attention of the jury should be drawn to the specific charge: it is not necessarily supported by evidence that the accused misappropriated the proceeds of the cheque.1 1 R v Hampton (1915) 11 Cr App R 117 followed in Ex parte Muszkat; Re Casas (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 87.
[CA.134.160]
Remedies
Civil remedies are not affected: s 137. 135
Stealing, destroying etc wills or codicils
Whosoever steals, or, for any fraudulent purpose destroys, cancels, obliterates, or conceals, the whole or any part of any will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument, either during the life of the testator, or after the testator’s death, or whether the same relates to real, or personal estate, or to both, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [S 135 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[12]]
SECTION 135 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.135.20] Stealing or destroying will ................................................................................................................ [CA.135.40]
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Indictment
That AB on the .......... day .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal a certain will, to wit, the will of JN. The alternative charge of destroying etc a will may be adapted from [2.20880]. The fraudulent purpose need not be stated: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Ownership need not be stated: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 16 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.135.40]
CA
Where the charge is stealing, a count for receiving may be added: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Stealing or destroying will
As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. As to protection of person disclosing act under compulsory process see s 136. “Will” in its natural meaning is confined to a disposition of real property taking effect upon death. “testament” is a similar disposition of personal property. “Codicil” is a supplement by which a will is added to or altered. 136
Proviso to sections 134 and 135
No person shall be convicted under section 134 or section 135 in respect of any act done by the person, if, before being charged with the offence, the person first disclosed such act on oath, under compulsory process, in a proceeding instituted in good faith by a party aggrieved, or under compulsory examination in some matter in bankruptcy, or insolvency, or under compulsory examination in some matter in the liquidation of a corporation. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 136 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 136 COMMENTARY Genreal ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.136.20] Disclosure ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.136.40]
[CA.136.20]
Genreal
Compare s 177. [CA.136.40]
Disclosure
As to the meaning of “first disclosure” see R v Gunnell.1 An accused is not protected by a disclosure made in the same proceedings.2 The section refers to acts disclosed under compulsory process or under compulsory examination. An act disclosed by a person without objection during cross-examination in a civil action is not disclosed “in consequence of any compulsory process”.3 A statement of affairs prepared by a debtor in the course of his bankruptcy was held not to be a statement made by him in any compulsory examination;4 similarly for a bankrupt’s preliminary examination not on oath.5 A disclosure in an affidavit made with the object of being released from prison after being committed for contempt was held to be a disclosure in consequence of a compulsory process.6 1 R v Gunnell (1886) 16 Cox CC 154. 2 R v Oliver (1909) 3 Cr App R 246.
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R R R R
137
[CA.136.40] v v v v
Noel [1914] 3 KB 848; (1914) 10 Cr App R 255. See also R v Tuttle (1929) 45 TLR 357; 21 Cr App R 85. Pike [1902] 1 KB 552. Tuttle (1929) 45 TLR 357; 21 Cr App R 85. Maywhort [1955] 1 WLR 848; [1955] 2 All ER 752; (1955) 39 Cr App R 107.
Civil remedies not affected by conviction
(1) Nothing in section 134 or in section 135, nor any proceeding, conviction, or judgment thereupon, shall affect any remedy at law, or in equity, which any party aggrieved would have had if this Act had not been passed. (2) No evidence of the conviction of any person under either of the said sections shall be admissible in any action, or suit, against the person. [Subs (2) am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[6]] [S 137 am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
138
Stealing, destroying etc records etc of any court or public office
Whosoever steals, or for any fraudulent purpose, takes from its place of deposit, for the time being, or from any person having the lawful custody thereof, or unlawfully and intentionally or recklessly cancels, obliterates, injures, or destroys, the whole or any part, of any record, document, or writing, of, or belonging to, any Court, or relating to any matter or cause, civil or criminal, pending, or terminated, in any Court, or relating to the business of any office or employment under Her Majesty, and being in any public office, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [S 138 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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Editor’s note
The term “maliciously” was replaced with “intentionally or recklessly” by Act No 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3], which commenced on 15 February 2008. The commentary below relates to s 138 before this amendment was made.
SECTION 138 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... Stealing court records ...................................................................................................................... Terms defined ................................................................................................................................... Warrant taken from bailiff .................................................................................................................
[CA.138.20]
[CA.138.20] [CA.138.40] [CA.138.60] [CA.138.80]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, for a fraudulent purpose, did take a certain record, to wit .......... of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, from JN then having the lawful custody of the same. It is not necessary to state the nature of the fraudulent purpose: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, nor is it necessary to allege that the record is the property of any person: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 16 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.138.40]
Stealing court records
As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. [CA.138.60]
Terms defined
“Fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. “Unlawfully”, see [CLP.80].
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[CA.139.60]
s 139
“Maliciously”, see [CA.5.40]–[CA.5.200]. [CA.138.80]
Warrant taken from bailiff
A warrant taken from a bailiff for the purposes of depriving him of the power to execute process was held to be taking for a fraudulent purpose.1 1 R v Bailey (1872) LR 1 CCR 347.
Stealing etc metal, glass, wood etc fixed to house or land
Whosoever steals, or rips, cuts, severs, or breaks with intent to steal, any glass, or woodwork, belonging to any building, or any metal, or any utensil, or fixture, whether made of metal or other material, or of both respectively, fixed in, or to, any building, or anything made of metal, fixed in any land being private property, or used as a fence to any dwelling-house, garden, or area, or being in any square, or street, or in, or on, any place dedicated to public use or ornament, or in any burial-ground, shall be liable to be punished as for larceny. [S 139 am Act 53 of 1980, s 5 and Sch 2(3); Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 139 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.139.20] Theft by tenants ................................................................................................................................ [CA.139.40] Stealing of fixtures ............................................................................................................................ [CA.139.60]
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[CA.139.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal (or rip, cut, sever, and break, with intent to steal the same) ten kilograms weight of lead, the property of the said JN, then fixed to the dwelling-house of the said JN. Upon an indictment for stealing a count for receiving may be added: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.139.40]
Theft by tenants
As to theft by tenants and occupiers, see s 154. [CA.139.60]
Stealing of fixtures
As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. If a person secures possession of a house, under an agreement for a lease with a fraudulent intention of stealing the fixtures, he is by stealing the fixtures, guilty of larceny of the fixtures. Evidence is admissible as to damage done to other houses to show the intention with which the accused took possession.1 A cart shed was held to be a building.2 Metal fixed on a post let into the ground is “metal fixed on land”.3 Where the accused stole the property after it had been severed from the building, he was held not to be guilty of the present offence.4 Upon an indictment under the present section an accused cannot be convicted of simple larceny.5 Where the accused were found attempting to steal pipes under floorboards it was held that they could not be convicted under this section in relation to the floorboards.6 1 R v Richards [1911] 1 KB 260; (1910) 6 Cr App R 21. 2 R v Worrall (1836) 7 Car & P 516; R v Rice (1859) Bell CC 87. See also R v Brummit (1861) Le & Ca 9; R v Finch (1834) 1 Mood 418.
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CA
139
Crimes Act 1900 s 140 3 4 5 6
[CA.139.60]
R v Jones (1858) Dears & Bell 555. See also R v Cooper, Shea & Stocks (1908) 24 TLR 687; 1 Cr App R 88. R v Gooch & Devonshire (1838) 8 Car & P 293 followed in R v Molloy [1921] 2 KB 364; (1921) 15 Cr App R 170. R v Molloy [1921] 2 KB 364; (1921) 15 Cr App R 170. R v Harlow [1967] 2 QB 193; (1967) 51 Cr App R 184.
140
Stealing etc trees etc in pleasure-grounds etc
Whosoever: steals, or destroys or damages with intent to steal, the whole, or any part, of any tree, sapling, shrub, or plant, or any underwood, growing in any park, pleasure-ground, garden, orchard, or avenue, or in any ground belonging to any dwelling-house, where the value of the article stolen, or the amount of injury done, exceeds two dollars, or steals, or destroys or damages with intent to steal, the whole, or any part, of any tree, sapling, shrub, or plant, or any underwood respectively growing elsewhere than in any situation beforementioned, where the value of the article stolen, or the amount of injury done, exceeds ten dollars, shall be liable to be punished as for larceny. [S 140 am Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 140 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.140.20] Stealing trees etc .............................................................................................................................. [CA.140.40]
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[CA.140.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal (or damage with intent to steal) one oak tree of the value of five dollars, the property of JN, then growing in a certain pleasure-ground of the said JN situate at ......................... aforesaid. Upon an indictment for stealing, a count may be added for receiving: s 384. [CA.140.40]
Stealing trees etc
As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. If several trees are stolen or cut down at the same time, their value may be aggregated for the purpose of the present offence.1 Only the actual damage to the trees and not any consequential injury may be taken into account.2 Unless there is evidence sufficient to justify an inference beyond all reasonable doubt that the value of the article stolen or the amount of the injury done exceeds two dollars, an offence under s 140 cannot be established, nor in the absence of evidence sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion that the value exceeds two dollars, can a reasonable suspicion be entertained that the goods have been stolen under the conditions provided for by s 140.3 1 R v Shepherd (1868) LR 1 CCR 118. 2 R v Whiteman (1854) Dears 353; 169 ER 757. 3 R v Young (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 46; 64 WN (NSW) 193.
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[CA.148.80]
s 148
Editor’s note: The following provisions are repealed and have not been reproduced: • Sections 141–143 by Act 31 of 1951, s 2. • Sections 144–147 by Act 137 of 1996, s 4 and Sch 2.3[2].
148
Stealing property in a dwelling-house
Whosoever steals in a dwelling-house any property shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. CA
[S 148 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 9 of 1985, s 2 and Sch 1(1)]
SECTION 148 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.148.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.148.40] Stealing ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.148.60] Dwelling-house ................................................................................................................................. [CA.148.80]
[CA.148.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid, in the dwelling-house of JN did steal certain property, to wit, ......................... . Upon this indictment, there may be a conviction for larceny.1 A count may be added for receiving: s 384.
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1 R v Compton (1828) 3 Car & P 418; 172 ER 482; R v Bullock (1825) 1 Mood 324; R v Brookes (1842) Car & M 543; 174 ER 626.
[CA.148.40] Elements of the offence The elements of this crime: (1) that the accused stole; (2) property; (3) in a dwelling-house and carried it out of such dwelling-house. [CA.148.60] Stealing As to what constitutes stealing, see [CA.117.100]. [CA.148.80] Dwelling-house As to what is a dwelling-house, see s 4. For this offence, the dwelling-house must be such a house that burglary could be committed in it.1 A person may be convicted of this offence even though he himself is the owner of the dwelling-house.2 The goods must be under the protection of the house, that is, deposited there for safe custody: it is not sufficient that they are under the eye or personal care of someone who happens to be there.3 The question of whether the goods are under the protection of the house or in the personal care of the owner is one for the judge and not for the jury.4 If on going to bed, a person put his clothes and money by his bed, this property is under the protection of the dwelling-house and not of the person.5 As to stealing from the person, see s 94. 1 2 East PC 499, at 644. 2 R v Bowden (1843) 2 Mood CC 285; 169 ER 113.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 149
[CA.148.80]
3 R v Owen (1792) 2 East PC 645; R v Castledine (1792) 2 East PC 645; R v Watson (1794) 2 Leach 640; 168 ER 422; R v Campbell (1792) 2 Leach 564; 168 ER 385; R v Taylor (1820) Russ & Ry 418; 168 ER 875; R v Carroll (1825) 1 Mood CC 89; 168 ER 1197. 4 R v Thomas (1827) Car CL 295. 5 R v Hamilton (1837) 8 Car & P 49; 173 ER 394; R v Thomas (1827) Car CL 295.
149
The same with menaces
Whosoever steals any property in a dwelling-house, and uses thereafter any menace or threat to any person therein, shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [S 149 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 149 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.149.20] Stealing in a dwelling-house with menace ....................................................................................... [CA.149.40]
[CA.149.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid in the dwelling-house of JN did steal certain property, to wit, .......... and did thereafter use certain menaces and threats to CD, the said CD then being in the said dwelling-house. A count may be added for receiving: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.149.40]
Stealing in a dwelling-house with menace
As to stealing in a dwelling-house, see [CA.148.40]. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
As to what comprises menaces, see [CA.99.60]. If somebody was in the house at the time and subjected to a menace or threat, it appears that the value of the property stolen is immaterial.1 If there is a common purpose to inspire terror a person who remains outside the house may also be convicted.2 1 R v Jackson (1783) 1 Leach 267; 168 ER 236. 2 R v Murphy (1853) 6 Cox CC 341. See also R v Etherington (1795) 2 Leach 671; 168 ER 437.
150
Stealing goods in process of manufacture
Whosoever steals, to the value of one dollar, any goods, article, or material, while anywhere placed, or exposed, during the process or progress of manufacture, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. [S 150 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 150 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.150.20] Stealing goods in process of manufacture ....................................................................................... [CA.150.40]
[CA.150.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, in a certain mill of JN situate at ......................... aforesaid, did steal twenty metres of woollen cloth, of the value of more than one dollar, of the goods and chattels of the said JN, the said goods and chattels being then placed and exposed in the said mill during the process and progress of manufacture.
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[CA.152.40]
s 152
A count may be added for receiving: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.150.40]
Stealing goods in process of manufacture
As to stealing, see [CA.117.100]. Goods remain in “the process or progress” of manufacture, even though the texture is completed, if they are not yet brought into a condition for sale.1 1 R v Woodhead (1836) 1 Mood & R 549; 174 ER 189.
Selling etc materials to be manufactured
CA
151
Whosoever, being, for the purpose of manufacture, or any special purpose connected with manufacture, employed to make, prepare, or work up, any goods, article, or material, or being for any such purpose entrusted with any such goods, article, or material, or with any tools, or apparatus, sells, pawns, purloins, secretes, embezzles, exchanges, or otherwise fraudulently disposes of the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to imprisonment for four years.
SECTION 151 COMMENTARY [CA.151.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid, then being, for the purpose of manufacture, employed to make, prepare and work up certain goods, that is to say, twenty kilograms weight of woollen yarn, the property of JN did sell (or purloin, exchange and fraudulently dispose of) the same.
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As to receiving goods for manufacture, see s 192. 152
Stealing from ship in port or on wharfs etc
Whosoever: steals any property in any vessel, barge, or boat, while in any haven, or port, or upon any navigable river, or canal, or in any creek, or basin, belonging to, or communicating with, any such haven, port, river, or canal, or steals any property from any dock, wharf, or quay, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [S 152 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 152 COMMENTARY Indictment – stealing from ship in port ............................................................................................. [CA.152.20] Indictment – stealing from wharf ...................................................................................................... [CA.152.40] Stealing from ship in port or from wharf ........................................................................................... [CA.152.60]
[CA.152.20]
Indictment – stealing from ship in port
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal fifty kilograms weight of tea, the property of JN in a certain vessel in a port called ......................... then being. [CA.152.40]
Indictment – stealing from wharf
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did steal fifty kilograms weight of tea, the property of JN, from a wharf called the
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Crimes Act 1900 s 153
[CA.152.40]
......................... wharf situate at ......................... aforesaid. [CA.152.60]
Stealing from ship in port or from wharf
As to stealing, see [CA.117.100]. As to the meaning of vessel, see s 4. In the case of stealing in a ship, it is only necessary to prove that the accused asported the goods within the ship, but in the case of stealing from a wharf, full asportation must be proved. The master or owner of a ship cannot be guilty of this offence in her or his own ship.1 1 R v Madox (1805) Russ & Ry 92; 168 ER 700.
153
Stealing from ship in distress or wrecked
Whosoever steals, or plunders, any part of any vessel in distress, or wrecked, stranded, or cast on shore, or any property of any kind to the value of two dollars belonging to such vessel, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 153 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 153 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.153.20] Summary offences ............................................................................................................................ [CA.153.40] Stealing from wreck, etc ................................................................................................................... [CA.153.60]
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[CA.153.20]
Indictment
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, a certain vessel, the property of some person to the Attorney-General aforesaid unknown, was wrecked, stranded and cast on shore; and that AB afterwards, on the day and year aforesaid, did steal and plunder twenty oak planks, being parts of the said vessel, and fifty kilograms weight of tea, of the value of … dollars, being property belonging to the said vessel so wrecked, stranded and cast on shore, the property of some person to the Attorney-General aforesaid unknown. [CA.153.40]
Summary offences
As to summary offences relating to shipwrecked goods, see ss 522–524. [CA.153.60]
Stealing from wreck, etc
As to stealing, see [CA.117.100]. As to wrecks etc, see s 32. “Property belonging to a vessel” is defined in s 4. 154
Tenants etc stealing articles let to hire
Whosoever, being the tenant, or occupier, of any house, building, or lodging, steals any chattel, or fixture let to be used therewith, whether the contract was entered into by the accused, or by any person on his or her behalf, shall be liable to be punished as for larceny. [S 154 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
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[CA.154A.20]
s 154A
SECTION 154 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.154.20] Stealing by tenants ........................................................................................................................... [CA.154.40]
[CA.154.20]
Indictment
The indictment as for larceny is sufficient: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 10 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. For indictment, see [CA.117.20]. [CA.154.40]
Stealing by tenants CA
As to stealing, see [CA.117.100]. As to theft of fixtures, see s 139. At common law, a tenant in lawful possession of property was not guilty of larceny if he or she appropriated either a fixture or a chattel belonging to the landlord and let to be used with the premises,1 unless he or she had procured his tenancy with fraudulent intent to steal.2 As to “material particular” see s 178BB and [CA.178BB.200]. 1 R v Meeres (1685) 1 Show KB 51; 89 ER 441. 2 R v Munday (1799) 2 Leach 850; 168 ER 524, followed in R v Richards [1911] 1 KB 260; (1910) 6 Cr App R 21.
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154A
Taking a conveyance without consent of owner
(1) Any person who: (a) without having the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of a conveyance, takes and drives it, or takes it for the purpose of driving it, or secreting it, or obtaining a reward for its restoration or pretended restoration, or for any other fraudulent purpose, or (b) knowing that any conveyance has been taken without such consent, drives it or allows himself or herself to be carried in or on it, shall be deemed to be guilty of larceny and liable to be indicted for that offence. [Subs (1) am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[2]]
(2) For the purposes of this section conveyance means any cart, wagon, cab, carriage, motor car, caravan, trailer, motor lorry, tractor, earth moving equipment, omnibus, motor or other bicycle, tank or other military vehicle, or any ship, or vessel, used or intended for navigation, and drive shall be construed accordingly. [Subs (2) am Act 107 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 5[1]; Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 53 of 1980, s 5 and Sch 1(3)] [S 154A am Act 107 of 2008; Act 26 of 2006; Act 147 of 1997; Act 53 of 1980; subst Act 50 of 1974, s 6; am Act 77 of 1967; Act 16 of 1955; Act 31 of 1951; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
SECTION 154A COMMENTARY Indictment ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.154A.20] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.154A.40]
[CA.154A.20]
Indictment
The indictment may be framed as for larceny, see s 387 (now repealed).
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Crimes Act 1900 s 154AA
[CA.154A.0]
[CA.154A.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this offence are that the accused: (1) without the consent of the owner or person having lawful possession; (2) of a conveyance (see s 154A(2)); (3) took and drove such conveyance, or took it for the purpose of driving, secreting, obtaining a reward for restoration, or for any other fraudulent purpose. The second arm of the offence is where a person knowing that a conveyance has been taken without consent, drives it or allows himself to be a passenger therein or thereon. As to the meaning of “allows”, see [CLP.80]. The present section is in substantially different form to its predecessor. The concept of movement is built into the word “takes” and some movement of the vehicle is essential to establish the offence.1 As to charges for this offence in two different states, see Ireland v Samuels.2 Where the accused hired a vehicle falsely alleging he was a licensed driver, it was held that the owner’s consent was not vitiated by such deception.3 Section 154A may apply to a vehicle owned by the Commonwealth.4 1 2 3 4
R v Bogacki [1973] QB 832; [1973] 2 WLR 937; [1973] 2 All ER 864. Ireland v Samuels (1974) 7 SASR 19. Whittaker v Campbell [1984] 1 QB 318; [1983] 3 WLR 676; (1983) 77 Cr App R 267. Clixby v Weston (1988) 15 NSWLR 35; 38 A Crim R 60.
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154AA
Car stealing etc [Repealed]
[S 154AA rep Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[4]; am Act 11 of 2005; Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 19 of 1999; Act 115 of 1997; insrt Act 81 of 1988, s 3 and Sch 3(2)]
154B
Stealing aircraft and unlawfully taking or exercising control of aircraft
(1) Whosoever steals any aircraft shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) Whosoever without lawful excuse takes or exercises control, whether direct or through another person, of an aircraft shall be deemed to be guilty of larceny and be liable to imprisonment for seven years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) Whosoever without lawful excuse takes or exercises control, whether direct or through another person, of an aircraft while another person, not being an accomplice of the first-mentioned person, is on board the aircraft shall be deemed to be guilty of larceny and be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years. [Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(4) Whosoever without lawful excuse, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any trick or false pretence, takes or exercises control, whether direct or through another person, of an aircraft while another person, not being an accomplice of the first-mentioned person, is on board the aircraft shall be deemed to be guilty of larceny and be liable to imprisonment for twenty years. [Subs (4) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]] [S 154B am Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 77 of 1967, s 2; rep Act 16 of 1955, s 6; am Act 31 of 1951; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
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s 154D
SECTION 154B COMMENTARY [CA.154B.20]
Stealing aircraft
As to stealing generally, see [CA.117.100]. As to various other offences relating to aircraft, see ss 204–210. As to the meaning of “aircraft”, see s 4. Proof of lawful excuse lies on the accused: s 417. Taking motor vehicle or vessel with assault or with occupant on board
CA
154C
(1) A person who: (a) assaults another person with intent to take a motor vehicle or vessel and, without having the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of it, takes and drives it, or takes it for the purpose of driving it, or (b) without having the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of a motor vehicle or vessel, takes and drives it, or takes it for the purpose of driving it, when a person is in or on it, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[5]]
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(2) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) in circumstances of aggravation. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (3) In this section: circumstances of aggravation means circumstances involving any one or more of the following: (a) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, (b) the alleged offender is armed with an offensive weapon or instrument, (c) the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on any person. [Def am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]]
drive includes operate. [Def insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[6]]
motor vehicle means a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Road Transport Act 2013. [Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[8]; Act 11 of 2005, s 247 and Sch 3.5[4]]
vessel means a vessel within the meaning of the Marine Safety Act 1998. [Def insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[6]] [S 154C am Act 19 of 2013; Act 38 of 2007; Act 26 of 2006; Act 11 of 2005; reinsrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[10]; rep Act 63 of 1991, s 4 and Sch 2; am Act 50 of 1974; insrtAct 26 of 1929, s 2]
154D
Stealing firearms
(1) A person who steals a firearm is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. (2) In this section:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 154D firearm has the same meaning as in the Firearms Act 1996, and includes an imitation firearm within the meaning of that Act. [Def subst Act 40 of 2010, Sch 3.8[3]]
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[S 154D am Act 40 of 2010; insrt Act 92 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 4 – Stealing and similar offences Division 5A – Offences relating to theft of motor vehicles and vessels
s 154F
DIVISION 5A – OFFENCES RELATING TO THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND VESSELS [Former subdiv 5A renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]; insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
154E
Definitions
(1) In this Division: motor vehicle means: (a) a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Road Transport Act 2013 (whether or not the vehicle contains the motor intended to form part of it), or (b) a motor intended to form part of, or capable of forming part of, any such motor vehicle, or (c) any part of any such motor vehicle containing, or consisting of, an identification plate for a vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989 of the Commonwealth.
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[Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[9]]
unique identifier means any numbers, letters, symbols or other identification information: (a) marked on or attached to a motor vehicle or vessel, or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel, or (b) marked on a thing that is designed to be attached to a motor vehicle or vessel, or a part of the motor vehicle or vessel, or (c) stored in electronic form in a part of a motor vehicle or vessel, for the primary purpose of: (d) enabling a particular motor vehicle, vessel or part to be distinguished from all other motor vehicles, vessels or parts (including by enabling a part to be identified as a part of a particular motor vehicle or vessel), or (e) identifying different motor vehicle or vessel production batches (including by enabling a part to be identified as a part of a motor vehicle or vessel of a particular production batch). vessel means a vessel within the meaning of the Marine Safety Act 1998. [Subs (1) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[5]]
(2) For the purposes of this Division, a part of a motor vehicle or vessel includes a thing (such as a key) manufactured in connection with the motor vehicle or vessel that enables the operation of the motor vehicle or vessel or prevents the unauthorised operation of the motor vehicle or vessel. [Subs (2) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[5]] [S 154E am Act 19 of 2013; Act 99 of 2009; insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
154F
Stealing motor vehicle or vessel
A person who steals a motor vehicle or vessel is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. [S 154F insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
SECTION 154F COMMENTARY Stealing ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.154F.20] Motor vehicle .................................................................................................................................. [CA.154F.40]
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CA
interfere with a thing includes alter, deface, remove, obliterate, conceal or add anything to the thing.
Crimes Act 1900 s 154G
[CA.154F.20]
[CA.154F.20]
Stealing
Generally as to stealing, see [CA.117.100]. As to an indictment for stealing, see [CA.117.20]. [CA.154F.40]
Motor vehicle
“Motor vehicle” is defined by s 4 of the Road Transport Act 2013 as meaning a vehicle that is built to be propelled by a motor that forms part of the vehicle. 154G
Facilitating organised car or boat rebirthing activities
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(1) A person who facilitates a car or boat rebirthing activity that is carried out on an organised basis knowing that: (a) it is a car or boat rebirthing activity, and (b) it is carried out on an organised basis, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 14 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, a car or boat rebirthing activity is an activity involving one or more of the following: (a) the stealing of a motor vehicle or vessel or the receiving of a stolen motor vehicle or stolen vessel, (b) the interference with a motor vehicle or vessel, or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel, or a unique identifier, for the purpose of concealing the fact that a motor vehicle or vessel, or any part of a motor vehicle or vessel, is stolen, (c) the affixing of stolen parts to a motor vehicle or vessel, (d) the interference with a unique identifier, being a unique identifier that wholly or partly identifies a motor vehicle or vessel for registration under a law of any jurisdiction, for the purpose of disguising or misrepresenting the identity of a motor vehicle or vessel, (e) the registration, in this or any other jurisdiction, of a stolen motor vehicle or stolen vessel, or of a motor vehicle or vessel that has had stolen parts affixed to it, (f) the supply of, or offering to supply, a stolen motor vehicle or stolen vessel. (3) A person facilitates a car or boat rebirthing activity if the person: (a) takes, or participates in, any step, or causes any step to be taken, that is part of the activity, or (b) provides or arranges finance for any step that is part of the activity, or (c) provides the premises in which any step that is part of the activity is taken, or allows any step that is part of the activity to be taken in premises of which the person is the owner, lessee or occupier or of which the person has the care, control or management. (4) A car or boat rebirthing activity is carried out on an organised basis if: (a) it is planned, organised, structured or otherwise carried out in such a manner as to indicate that the activity is carried out on more than one occasion and involves more than one participant, and (b) it is carried out for profit or gain. (5) In proceedings for an offence against this section, for the purpose of proving that an activity was carried out on an organised basis, or that the accused knew it was carried out on an organised basis, it is not necessary to prove: (a) that the accused knew any of the participants in the activity or that any of the participants knew each other, or
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(b)
that the activity was planned, organised, structured or otherwise carried out under the direction of any particular person or persons or in any hierarchical manner, or (c) that the same participants were involved on each occasion on which the activity was carried out.
[S 154G insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
Making, using and interfering with unique identifiers
(1) A person who: (a) dishonestly interferes with, or copies, a unique identifier, or (b) possesses a motor vehicle or vessel, or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel, with the intention of dishonestly interfering with, or copying, a unique identifier, or (c) dishonestly makes a unique identifier, or a purported unique identifier, or (d) knowingly induces another person to accept any information attached to a motor vehicle, vessel or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel as a genuine unique identifier for the motor vehicle, vessel or part, when the information is not in fact a genuine unique identifier for that motor vehicle, vessel or part, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 7 years.
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(2) For the purposes of this section, information is attached to a motor vehicle, vessel or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel if it is: (a) marked on or attached to the motor vehicle, vessel or part, or (b) marked on a thing attached to the motor vehicle, vessel or part, or (c) stored in electronic form in a part of the motor vehicle or vessel. (3) In proceedings for an offence against this section, if it is necessary to allege a person knowingly induced another person to accept information attached to a motor vehicle, vessel or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel as a genuine unique identifier for the motor vehicle, vessel or part, it is not necessary to allege that the accused knowingly induced a particular person to accept the information as a genuine unique identifier. (4) In this section, a reference to inducing a person to accept information attached to a motor vehicle, vessel or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel as a genuine unique identifier includes a reference to causing a computer to respond to the information attached to the motor vehicle, vessel or part as if it were a genuine unique identifier. (5) In this section: information includes numbers, letters or symbols. [S 154H insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
154I Possession of motor vehicle or vessel where unique identifier has been interfered with (1) A person who dishonestly has possession of a motor vehicle or vessel, or a part of a motor vehicle or vessel, a unique identifier of which has been interfered with, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, a person dishonestly has possession of a thing if: (a) the person obtained or received the thing dishonestly, or (b) the person intends to register, supply or use the thing dishonestly. [S 154I insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
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154H
Crimes Act 1900 s 154I 154J
[CA.155.20] Possession of vehicle identification plate not attached to motor vehicle
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if the person, without reasonable excuse, knowingly has possession of a vehicle identification plate not attached to the motor vehicle to which it relates. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 5 years. (2) The onus of proof of reasonable excuse in proceedings for an offence against this section lies on the accused. (3) In this section: motor vehicle means a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Road Transport Act 2013 (whether or not the vehicle contains the motor intended to form part of it). [Def am Act 19 of 2013, Sch 4.8[10]]
vehicle identification number means a vehicle identification number allocated to a vehicle in accordance with the national standards under the Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989 of the Commonwealth. vehicle identification plate means a plate, label or other thing that has a vehicle identification number on it, is designed to be attached to a motor vehicle and which: (a) enables the motor vehicle to be identified for the purposes of registration under a law of any jurisdiction, or (b) includes information relating to the manufacture of the motor vehicle or compliance with the national standards under the Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989 of the Commonwealth.
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[S 154J am Act 19 of 2013; insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[7]]
DIVISION 6 – EMBEZZLEMENT OR LARCENY [Former subdiv 6 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former subdiv 6 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[25]]
155
Definition of clerk or servant
Every person employed for any purpose, as, or in the capacity of, a clerk, or servant, or as a collector of moneys, although temporarily only, or employed also by other persons, or employed to pay as well as receive moneys, or although the person had no authority from his or her employer to receive money, or other property, on his or her account, shall be deemed a clerk, or servant. [S 155 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [5]; Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 155 COMMENTARY “Person, master and employer” ........................................................................................................ [CA.155.20] Clerk or servant ................................................................................................................................ [CA.155.40]
[CA.155.20]
“Person, master and employer”
“Person, master and employer” severally include any society, company or corporation: s 4. [CA.155.40]
Clerk or servant
A clerk or servant is a person under the control and bound to obey the orders of her or his master: he or she may be a clerk or servant without being bound to devote her or his whole time to this service, but if he or she is bound to devote her or his whole time to it, this is strong evidence of her or his being under control.1
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s 155
A person who is employed to obtain orders and receive money, but who is at liberty to do this when and where he or she so decides, is not a clerk or servant.2 In the following cases the accused were held to be clerks or servants or acting as such: director of company employed to collect the company’s moneys,4 an apprentice,5 accountant and treasurer to overseers,6 captain of barge authorised to sell coal,7 commercial traveller paid by commission and allowed to obtain orders for others,8 solicitor employed at a salary to collect rents and manage property,9 a collier allowed to sell coal but not obliged to do so,10 a person only occasionally employed,11 a person employed also by others,12 son assisting father who was employed by prosecutor,13 person paid partly by a share of profits,14 member of friendly society employed to receive weekly payments where the property of the society was vested in trustees,15 a broker exclusively employed at a salary to distrain,16 driver of a taxicab,17 collector for hospital paid by salary and commission,18 property salesman on promise of further work.19 The following persons have been held not to be clerks or servants: debtor employed by trustee under deed of assignment,20 a person authorised or employed to receive rents gratuitously,21 cattle drover permitted to sell,22 a person employed to collect an offertory,23 a person having an isolated authority to receive money,24 treasurer of a friendly society,25 a bailee,26 a drover of cattle.27
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If an agreement of service is in writing and is in existence, the writing must be put in evidence.28 1 R v Negus (1873) LR 2 CCR 34. 2 R v Negus (1873) LR 2 CCR 34; R v Bowers (1866) LR 1 CCR 41; R v Mayle (1868) 11 Cox CC 150; R v Marshall (1870) 11 Cox CC 490; R v Hall (1875) 13 Cox CC 49; R v Walker (1858) 8 Cox CC 1; R v May (1861) Le & Ca 13; R v Wilford (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 465. 3 R v Chater (1861) 9 Cox CC 1. 4 R v Stuart [1894] 1 QB 310. 5 R v Mellish (1805) Russ & Ry 80. 6 R v Squire (1818) Russ & Ry 349. 7 R v Hartley (1807) Russ & Ry 139. 8 R v Tite (1861) Le & Ca 29; R v Bailey (1871) 12 Cox CC 56. 9 R v Gibson (1861) 8 Cox CC 436. See also R v Booth (1897) 3 ALR (CN) 19. 10 R v Thomas (1853) 6 Cox CC 403. 11 R v Spencer (1815) Russ & Ry 299; R v Winnall (1851) 5 Cox CC 326; R v Hughes (1832) 1 Mood 370. 12 R v Batty (1842) 2 Mood 257; R v Turner (1870) 11 Cox CC 551; R v Carr (1811) Russ & Ry 198. Cf R v Goodbody (1838) 8 Car & P 665. 13 R v Foulkes (1875) LR 2 CCR 150. 14 R v Wortley (1851) 5 Cox CC 382; R v MacDonald (1861) Le & Ca 85. 15 R v Proud (1861) Le & Ca 97; R v Hall (1836) 1 Mood 474; R v Miller (1842) 2 Mood 249. See also R v Cantlon (1868) 5 WW & a’B 24; R v Houston (1895) 6 QLJ 145. 16 R v Marsh (1862) 3 F & F 523; R v Bren (1863) Le & Ca 346; R v Tyree (1869) LR 1 CCR 177; R v Flanagan (1867) 10 Cox CC 561. 17 R v Solomons [1909] 2 KB 980; (1909) 2 Cr App R 288. 18 R v Herbert (1873) 4 AJR 89. 19 R v Moran (1876) 7 QLJ (NC) 101. 20 R v Barnes (1858) 8 Cox CC 129. 21 R v Hoare (1859) 1 F & F 647. 22 R v Goodbody (1838) 8 Car & P 665. 23 R v Burton (1829) 1 Mood 237. 24 R v Freeman (1833) 5 Car & P 534; R v Nettleton (1830) 1 Mood 259. See also R v Hughes (1832) 1 Mood 370. See also R v Hughes (1832) 1 Mood 370. 25 R v Tyree (1869) LR 1 CCR 177. 26 R v Gibbs (1855) 169 ER 798; Dears 445; 6 Cox CC 455.
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Whether or not the accused was acting as a clerk or servant is a question of fact for the jury.3
Crimes Act 1900 s 156
[CA.155.40]
27 R v Liffıdge (1853) Legge 793. 28 Re Clapton (1848) 3 Cox CC 126.
156
Larceny by clerks or servants
Whosoever, being a clerk, or servant, steals any property belonging to, or in the possession, or power of, his or her master, or employer, or any property into or for which it has been converted, or exchanged, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 156 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]]
SECTION 156 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.156.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.156.60] Clerk or servant ................................................................................................................................ [CA.156.80] Stealing ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.156.100] Various instances of larceny ........................................................................................................... [CA.156.120]
[CA.156.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, being then a clerk to JN, did steal certain money, to wit, the sum of twenty dollars, the property of the said JN his said master. If it is doubtful whether the money or goods stolen be the property of the master add another count, thus commencing as in the last form. And that the said AB whilst he was such (clerk) to the said JN, to wit, on the day and year afore, did steal certain other money, to wit, the sum of twenty dollars, then being in the possession and power of the said JN his said master. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
As to adding a count of receiving, see Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. It is not necessary to specify the kind of money or security: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Where the charge is in respect of larceny of money and there is proof of general deficiency, see s 161. As to embezzlement, see s 157. As to fraudulent misappropriation, see s 178A. There may be a conviction for larceny.1 1 R v Jennings (1858) 7 Cox CC 397.
[CA.156.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was a clerk or servant; (2) that the property charged was owned by her or his master, or was in the power or possession of her or his master; and (3) the accused stole such property. [CA.156.80]
Clerk or servant
As to who is a clerk or servant, see [CA.155.40]. [CA.156.100]
Stealing
As to what is stealing, see [CA.117.100].
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[CA.157.20] [CA.156.120]
s 157
Various instances of larceny
Where the accused contracted to sell jewellery on commission, received jewellery and failed to account for most of such jewellery or pay for it, it was held that as there was no evidence that he had sold any of the jewellery he could not be convicted of stealing the proceeds of such sales.3 Where the master intrusted his servant with a one pound note to pay for a twelve shilling advertisement and the servant gave him the eight shillings change but appropriated the cost, he was acquitted on the basis that the twelve shillings balance was never in the possession of the master and unless it was in his possession there was no larceny by a servant.4 Where the accused was the bare custodian of government cheques he could not be convicted of larceny as a servant because he never had any distinct possession of such cheques.5 On the other hand where a servant who had authority to draw cheques, drew a cheque and absconded with the proceeds he was guilty of this offence.6 On a charge of larceny of a cheque, it is a misdirection not to distinguish between conversion of the cheque and misappropriation of the proceeds.7 A servant who paid off his own creditors with his master’s cheques was not guilty of larceny but had no defence to a charge of fraudulent conversion.8
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R v Hornby (1844) 1 Car & Kir 305. See also R v Tideswell [1905] 2 KB 273. R v White (1840) 9 Car & P 344. R v Mowatt (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 146. R v Israel (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 138. R v Goodison (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 53. R v Oliver (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 6. R v Hampton (1915) 11 Cr App R 117. R v Davenport [1954] 1 WLR 569; [1954] 1 All ER 602; (1954) 38 Cr App R 37. See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182; (1984) 79 Cr App R 288; R v Holt (1983) 12 A Crim R 1.
157
Embezzlement by clerks or servants
Whosoever, being a clerk, or servant, fraudulently embezzles, either the whole or any part of, any property delivered to, or received, or taken into possession by him or her, for, or in the name, or on the account of, his or her master, or employer, shall be deemed to have stolen the same, although such property was not received into the possession of such master, or employer, otherwise than by the actual possession of such clerk, or servant, and shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 157 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [4]]
SECTION 157 COMMENTARY Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.157.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.157.40] Clerk or servant ................................................................................................................................ [CA.157.60]
[CA.157.20]
Indictments
First count That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, being then a (clerk) to JN, did by virtue of such his employment, and while he was so employed as aforesaid, receive and take into his possession certain money, to wit, the sum of twenty dollars, for, and in the name, and on the account of the said JN his master as aforesaid, and did then fraudulently embezzle the said money. Second count And the Attorney-General further charges that the said AB afterwards, to wit, on the ..........
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A person who receives goods by means of a pretended sale in collusion with a servant may be jointly indicted for larceny with the servant.1 A gift by a servant of a master’s property to another is larceny.2
Crimes Act 1900 s 157
[CA.157.20]
day of .......... in the year and at the place aforesaid, being then a (clerk) to the said JN, did by virtue of such his employment, and whilst he was so employed receive and take into his possession certain other money, to wit, the sum of ten dollars, for, and in the name, and on the account of the said JN his master, as aforesaid, and did then fraudulently embezzle the said last mentioned money. A further similar count may be added provided that no more than six months has elapsed between the first and last offence: s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [CPA.23.20]. As to proof of general deficiency where the charge is in respect of money, see s 161. As to falsification of books of accounts, see s 158. As to frauds by factors or agents, see ss 164 – 178. As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. As to fraudulent misappropriation, see s 178A. Where money is embezzled by a person under s 18 and is thereafter used for payment of a bet or wager the person embezzled may recover such money from the person to whom it was so paid: ss 16, 17 of the Unlawful Gambling Act 1998. A person indicted under this section may be convicted for larceny: s 164. [CA.157.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was the clerk or servant of the person named in the indictment; and (2) that he received the property specified (or it was delivered to him or taken into his possession) for, or in the name of, or on account of his master or employer; and
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(3) he fraudulently embezzled such property. [CA.157.60]
Clerk or servant
As to who is a clerk or servant, see [CA.155.40]. As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. A clerk or servant who steals any chattel, money or valuable security belonging to or in the possession or power of her or his master or employer, is guilty of larceny as a clerk or servant;1 if such clerk or servant fraudulently intercepts money or goods before they come into her or his master’s legal possession and converts them to her or his own use he or she commits the offence of embezzlement. To constitute embezzlement the property must have been received by the accused for, or in the name or on account of her or his master or employer.2 If the receipt of the property by the accused is wholly wrongful, for example, where he or she earnt money in her or his own name by a wrongful and dishonest use of the master’s property, the offence is not embezzlement.3 If the property has already been in the employer’s possession, or having been in the possession of any other clerk or servant on behalf of the employer, is given by that clerk or servant to the accused to be paid or delivered to some other person on behalf of the employer, and the accused misappropriates it, the offence is not embezzlement.4 The offence may be larceny. If property which has never been in the employer’s possession is in the possession of another clerk or servant of the employer, and is delivered by her or him to the accused to deliver to the employer, the accused commits embezzlement if he or she misappropriates the property.5 The crime of embezzlement is complete when the accused fraudulently misappropriates the property, and he or she is not entitled to an acquittal merely because he or she has made true and correct entries in her or his master’s accounts.6 If, however, the money received for the employer is accounted for and not denied, the fact of not paying it over without some evidence of fraudulent intent is not sufficient proof of the offence.7
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If the accused does not deny the receipt or appropriation of the property which he or she is accused of embezzling, but acknowledges that he or she received it, and alleges a claim of right, unless it is clear that such claim is merely a pretence, he or she ought not to be convicted of embezzlement.8 For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. The embezzlement is committed in the place where the accused has refused to account,9 or in the place where he or she ought to have accounted and failed to do so,10 or where he or she accounted falsely,11 or where he or she received and misappropriated the property in question.12
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It is not a criminal offence to embezzle the moneys of an unlawful and criminal society.14 But the property of an irregularly constituted non-criminal society,15 or a society whose object is the restraint of trade,16 may be embezzled. 1 See s 156. 2 R v Beaumont (1854) Dears 270; R v Harris (1854) Dears 344; R v Thorpe (1858) Dears & Bell 562; R v Gale (1876) 2 QBD 141; R v Davenport [1954] 1 WLR 569; [1954] 1 All ER 602; (1954) 38 Cr App R 37; R v Sydenham (1863) 2 W & W (L) 16; R v Draper (1870) 1 VR (L) 39; R v Goodison (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 53; Ex parte Jones (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 57. 3 R v Cullum (1873) LR 2 CCR 28; R v Read (1878) 3 QBD 131. See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491; (1986) 83 Cr App R 70. 4 R v Hayward (1844) 1 Car & Kir 518; R v Reed (1854) 6 Cox CC 284; R v Murray (1830) 1 Mood 276; R v Hawkins (1850) 4 Cox CC 224; R v Wright (1858) Dears & Bell 431. 5 R v Masters (1848) 1 Den 332. 6 R v Guelder (1860) 8 Cox CC 372; R v Lister (1856) 7 Cox CC 203; R v White (1839) 8 Car & P 742; R v Jackson (1844) 1 Car & Kir 384; R v Davison & Gordon (1855) 7 Cox CC 158. Cf R v Jones (1837) 7 Car & P 834; R v Creed (1843) 1 Car & Kir 63; R v Winnall (1851) 5 Cox CC 326. 7 R v Hodgson (1828) 3 Car & P 422; R v Ramsay (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 43. 8 R v Norman (1842) Car & Marshman 501. 9 R v Murdock (1851) 5 Cox CC 360; R v Taylor (1803) 2 Leach 974. 10 R v Davison & Gordon (1855) 7 Cox CC 158; R v Rogers (1877) 3 QBD 28. 11 R v Murdock (1851) 5 Cox CC 360; R v Rogers (1877) 3 QBD 28. Cf R v Treadgold (1878) 14 Cox CC 220. 12 R v Hobson (1803) Russ & Ry 56; R v Rogers (1877) 3 QBD 28. 13 R v Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 343; R v Proud (1861) Le & Ca 97; R v Stephens (1888) 16 Cox CC 387. 14 R v Hunt (1838) 8 Car & P 642. 15 R v Tankard [1894] 1 QB 548. 16 R v Stainer (1870) LR 1 CCR 230.
158
Destruction, falsification of accounts etc by clerk or servant [Repealed]
[S 158 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[6]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997]
SECTION 158 COMMENTARY Indictment – clerk destroying book ................................................................................................... [CA.158.20] Indictment – clerk making false entry ............................................................................................... [CA.158.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.158.60] Clerk or servant ................................................................................................................................ [CA.158.80] Falsifies ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.158.100] Valuable security ............................................................................................................................. [CA.158.120] Falsifying accounts – generally ...................................................................................................... [CA.158.140]
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To rebut a defence that errors in the employee’s account were accidental, evidence may be given of similar errors by the accused in his own favour.13
Crimes Act 1900 s 158 [CA.158.20]
[CA.158.20] Indictment – clerk destroying book
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, being then a clerk to JN, did with intent to defraud .......... destroy, to wit, by burning the same (alter or mutilate or falsify) a certain .......... book, to wit, a cash-book, which said book then belonged to the said JN his employer. [CA.158.40]
Indictment – clerk making false entry
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, being then clerk to JN did with intent to defraud make a certain false entry in a certain book, to wit, a cash-book, which said book then belonged to the said JN, his employer, by falsely entering in such book under the date of the 1st day of June 1968, the sum of five hundred dollars as having been paid on that date to one CD whereas in fact the said sum of five hundred dollars was not paid on the said day to the said CD, as the said AB well knew at the time when he made the said false entry. It is not necessary to allege an intent to defraud any particular person: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.158.60] Elements of the offence The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was the clerk or servant of the person named; and (2) that the accused destroyed, altered, mutilated or falsified a book or account etc, or made a false entry therein or omitted or altered an entry therein; (3) such book belonging to his employer; (4) with intent to defraud.
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[CA.158.80] Clerk or servant As to who is a clerk or servant, see [CA.155.40]. [CA.158.100] Falsifies “Falsifies” in s 158 should be given its general meaning of making false in any way: it does not require actual alteration of the document in question.1 1 R v Webber (1988) 15 NSWLR 49; 38 A Crim R 210.
[CA.158.120] Valuable security A valuable security is defined in s 4. [CA.158.140] Falsifying accounts – generally To fraudulently cause an innocent person to make a false entry or to fraudulently concur in such an entry being made constitutes the offence.1 A person who delivers an accurate account stating there is a “balance in hand”, does not commit this offence even though he or she may not have in his or her possession such balance.2 The document or account falsified must belong to or be in the possession of the employer or be received by the accused for or on account of the employer.3 Falsification of mechanical means of recording (for example, tampering with a taximeter) is within the section.4 To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.5 There may be an intent to defraud even though the defrauder does not intend to benefit himself. The essence of the meaning of the words “to defraud” is detriment to the person defrauded, not advantage to
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s 159
the defrauder. The detriment may consist not merely of the deprivation of something substantial but also of the opportunity to exercise, or to the exercise of a right in relation to property. A person may be defrauded no less by being hindered or delayed in seeking to recover his property than by being deprived directly of his property.6
1 2 3 4 5
R v Butt (1884) 51 LT 607; R v Oliphant [1905] 2 KB 67. R v Williams (1899) 79 LT 739. R v Palin [1906] 1 KB 7. R v Solomons [1909] 2 KB 980; (1909) 2 Cr App R 288. Re London & Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 738 per Buckley J approved in R v Wines [1954] 1 WLR 64; [1953] 2 All ER 1497; (1953) 37 Cr App R 197. See also R v Potter [1958] 1 WLR 638; 2 All ER 51; (1958) 42 Cr App R 168. 6 R v Abberton [1931] VLR 237 per Lowe J. 7 R v Mackey [1919] VLR 39.
159
Larceny by persons in Public Service
Whosoever, being employed in the Public Service, steals any property, or any part thereof, intrusted to him or her, or taken into his or her possession, or being in his or her custody, or under his or her control, by virtue or colour of such employment, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years. [S 159 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [4]]
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SECTION 159 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.159.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.159.40] Stealing ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.159.60] Accused’s office ................................................................................................................................ [CA.159.80] Possession ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.159.100]
[CA.159.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, being then employed in the Public Service, to wit, as ......................... having then in his custody and under his control, by virtue and colour of such his employment, certain money, the property of Her Majesty, did steal certain money, to wit, the sum of twenty dollars, the property of Her Majesty, being parcel of the money so in his custody and under his control as aforesaid. It is not necessary to specify the money in detail: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Property may be laid in the Queen where larceny by a public servant is alleged: see Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 12 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. A count may be added for receiving: Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. As to proof of general deficiency, see s 161. [CA.159.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was an officer in the public service; (2) that government moneys were intrusted to him; (3) by virtue or under colour of his employment as a public servant; and
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CA
“Any material particular” includes any material entry which it was the duty of the accused to insert in the records.7
Crimes Act 1900 s 160
[CA.159.40]
(4) that he stole such moneys. [CA.159.60]
Stealing
As to stealing generally, see [CA.117.100]. [CA.159.80]
Accused’s office
It is not necessary to show the accused’s appointment to the office, it is sufficient to show that he acted in it.1 1 R v Borrett (1833) 6 Car & P 124.
[CA.159.100]
Possession
A public servant does not come into possession of government property “by virtue of his employment” unless he had the authority to receive it.1 1 R v O’Donoghue (1917) 23 CLR 9.
160
Embezzlement etc by persons in the Public Service
Whosoever, being employed in the Public Service, fraudulently embezzles any property, or any part thereof, so intrusted to him or her, or taken into his or her possession, or being in his or her custody, or under his or her control, or fraudulently secretes, removes, or in any manner fraudulently applies, or disposes of, the same, or any part thereof, shall be deemed to have stolen the same, and shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years.
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[S 160 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1] and [4]]
SECTION 160 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.160.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.160.60] General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.160.80] Fraudulently embezzled ................................................................................................................. [CA.160.100]
[CA.160.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, being then employed in the Public Service, to wit, as ......................... , and certain money, the property of Her Majesty then being intrusted to him by virtue and colour of his said employment, did embezzle certain money, to wit, twenty dollars, the property of Her Majesty, being parcel of the money so intrusted to him, and did then fraudulently appropriate and dispose of the same. It is not necessary to specify the money in detail: s 386 (now repealed). Property may be laid in the name of the Queen where embezzlement by a public servant is alleged: see Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 12 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. As to proof of general deficiency, see s 161. As to alternative verdicts, see s 163. [CA.160.60] Elements of the offence The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was a public servant; (2) that he or she received the property specified (or it was delivered to him or her or taken into his or her possession) for, or in the name of or on account of the Government;
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[CA.161.40]
s 161
(3) by virtue or under colour of his or her employment as a public servant; and (4) he or she fraudulently embezzled such property. [CA.160.80]
General
See generally [CA.159.40]. [CA.160.100]
Fraudulently embezzled
As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. CA
As to embezzlement, see [CA.157.40]. 161
Proof of general deficiency in accounts
On the prosecution of a person for larceny, or embezzlement as a clerk, or servant, or as a person employed in the Public Service, where the charge is in respect of money, it shall not be necessary to prove the larceny, or embezzlement, by the accused of any specific sum of money, if there is proof of a general deficiency on the examination of the books of account, or entries kept, or made by him or her, or otherwise, and the jury are satisfied that he or she stole, or fraudulently embezzled the deficient money, or any part thereof. [S 161 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[4] and [9]]
SECTION 161 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.161.20] Evidence ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.161.40]
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[CA.161.20]
Indictment
An indictment for larceny or embezzlement charges a specific sum. The effect of s 161 is that where the charge is in respect of money, if books of account are kept by the accused and these books show a general deficiency, the books can be used as evidence of the larceny or embezzlement of the sum specified in the indictment. In the ordinary case where it is possible to trace the individual items and to prove a conversion of individual property or money, it is undesirable to include them all in a count alleging a general deficiency.1 Where it is the duty of the accused to account at fixed times for her or his aggregate receipts to date and he or she embezzles the money, he or she may be indicted in one count for embezzling the gross sum whether or not it is possible to trace and prove the individual sums making up the aggregate amount.2 1 R v Tomlin [1954] 2 QB 274; (1954) 38 Cr App R 82. See also R v Robertson (1936) 25 Cr App R 208; R v Lawson [1952] 1 All ER 804; (1952) 36 Cr App R 30; R v Goodall (1975) 11 SASR 94; Caratti v The Queen [1984] WAR 313; (1983) 10 A Crim R 328; [1984] WAR 313; R v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254; R v Mews [1989] WAR 38 (1988) 35 A Crim R 213; R v McMullen (1990) 54 SASR 55. 2 R v Balls (1871) 24 LT 760. See also R v Williams (1834) 6 Car & P 390.
[CA.161.40]
Evidence
Section 161 does not apply where the evidence of the general deficiency is disclosed by the examination of books and entries kept and made by the accused in conjunction with others.1 Entries not in the accused’s handwriting, but made with her or his knowledge may operate as an admission against her or him.2 On a charge of embezzling specific sums, evidence of a general deficiency in the accounts is admissible.3 1 R v Reah (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 116; 33 WN 45. See also R v Panagiotou (1982) 6 A Crim R 174. 2 R v Royle (1895) 6 QLJ 146.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 162
[CA.16.40]
3 R v Houston (1895) 6 QLJ 145; R v Tomlin [1954] 2 QB 274; (1954) 38 Cr App R 82.
162
Larceny etc by joint owners
Whosoever, being a member of any copartnership, or being one of two, or more, joint owners, steals, or embezzles, any property of, or belonging to, such copartnership, or joint owners, may be convicted of, and punished for, the offence as if he or she was not a member of the copartnership, or one of such joint owners. Copartnership shall, for the purposes of this section, include all corporations and societies whatsoever. [S 162 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[9]]
SECTION 162 COMMENTARY Partners ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.162.20] Larceny or embezzlement by joint owners ....................................................................................... [CA.162.40]
[CA.162.20]
Partners
As to description of partners etc see Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 15 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990]. As to the allegation of ownership in partners, see Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 15 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.162.40]
Larceny or embezzlement by joint owners
As to stealing generally, see [CA.117.100].
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As to embezzlement, see [CA.157.40]. At common law a co-owner could not steal property from her or his other co-owners,1 but if he or she took them from a person who was a bailee for all the co-owners, he or she could be convicted of larceny,2 even though the bailee was herself or himself one of the co-owners.3 Persons may be co-owners in an association which does not constitute a legal entity because of non-compliance with statutory requirements.4 Under the English provision,5 in which the phrase “beneficial owners of any property” appears, it has been held that a society which is not formed for the acquisition of gain is not a co-partnership within the meaning of the section.6 It is no defence to show that the money was won by the accused and others in an illegal transaction.7 The history of s 162 is traced by Menzies J in Croton v The Queen.8 Where the accused and another have a joint banking account and the accused withdraws money therefrom without the authority of the other person and uses such money for her or his own purposes he or she is not guilty of larceny under this section. The receipt of the paper money or coins by the applicant from the bank could not have been larcenous for several reasons. In the first place, the transference of possession of that paper money or coin was voluntary on the part of the bank: it was not a taking of that paper money or coins out of the possession of the bank against the will of the bank. Secondly, if it matters, that paper money or coins was not taken out of the possession of the joint owner of the bank credit, Mrs Webster; for she never did have possession of that paper money or coins: nor did the bank at any time hold possession of that money as in any sense her agent. Further, the property in that paper money or coins was in the bank immediately before it was handed over to the [accused], and not in Mrs Webster, or Mrs Webster and the [accused] jointly. And, lastly, as I see the evidence of the suggested arrangement between the [accused] and
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[CA.163.40]
s 163
Mrs Webster, the property in and the possession of the money or coins, in my opinion, passed to the applicant solely even if on receipt of them he came under an obligation to account for all or some part of the “money” they represented.9 Hale PC 513. R v Bramley (1822) Russ & Ry 478. R v Webster (1861) Le & Ca 77. R v Tankard [1894] 1 QB 548. Larceny Act 1916, s 40(4). R v Robson (1885) 16 QBD 137. Cf R v Neat (1899) 19 Cox CC 424. R v Page (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 272; 11 WN 28. (1967) 117 CLR 326 at 335–341. Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326 at 331 per Barwick CJ.
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CA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Trial for embezzlement—verdict of larceny
Where, on the trial of any person for embezzlement, or the fraudulent application, or disposition, of property as a clerk, or servant, or person employed in the Public Service, it appears that the person obtained the property in such manner as to amount in law to larceny, the jury may acquit the person of the offence charged, and find the person guilty of larceny, or of larceny as such clerk, servant, or person, as the case may be, and the person shall be liable to punishment accordingly. [S 163 am Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5] and [6]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
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SECTION 163 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.163.20] Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.163.40]
[CA.163.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [CPA.162.20] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.163.40]
Application of section
The section applies to all offences and to all courts: s 3, Sch 2. For an application of the equivalent English section, see R v O’Driscoll.1 1 R v O’Driscoll [1968] 1 QB 83.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 164
[CA.164.20]
SUBDIVISION 7 – FRAUDS BY FACTORS AND OTHER AGENTS [REPEALED] [Subdiv 7 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]] [Subdiv 7 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[26]]
164
Terms “agents”, “intrusted” and “misappropriate” [Repealed]
[S 164 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 164 COMMENTARY [CA.164.20]
Further definition
As to deemed to be intrusted with goods, see s 171. 165
Agent misappropriating money etc intrusted to him or her [Repealed]
[S 165 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 165 COMMENTARY General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.165.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.165.40] Trustees and mortgagees ................................................................................................................. [CA.165.60] Compulsory disclosure ..................................................................................................................... [CA.165.80] Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
Fraudulent misappropriation ........................................................................................................... [CA.165.100] Related legislation .......................................................................................................................... [CA.165.120] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................. [CA.165.140] “Intrusted” and “agent” .................................................................................................................... [CA.165.160] Direction in writing .......................................................................................................................... [CA.165.180]
[CA.165.20]
General
A charge under s 165 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction in certain circumstances: see s 475A. [CA.165.40]
Indictment
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, JN did intrust AB as an agent with a certain large sum of money, to wit, the sum of five hundred dollars with a direction in writing to the said AB to pay (or deliver) the said sum of money to a certain person specified in the said direction; and that the said AB afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, in violation of good faith and contrary to the terms of the said direction, did misappropriate the said sum of money so to him intrusted as aforesaid. [CA.165.60]
Trustees and mortgagees
As to trustees and mortgagees, see s 167. [CA.165.80]
Compulsory disclosure
As to compulsory disclosure, see ss 177 and 178.
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[CA.166.40] [CA.165.100]
s 166
Fraudulent misappropriation
Where there is evidence of fraudulent misappropriation of any money or valuable security, a charge lies under s 178A.1 1 R v Heavener (1932) 33 SR (NSW) 101; 50 WN (NSW) 22.
[CA.165.120]
Related legislation
[CA.165.140]
CA
Section 88 of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 1941 makes fraudulent conversion fraudulent omission to account and fraudulently rendering of accounts by licensees under the Act a misdemeanour. Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the person named in the indictment intrusted money to the accused; (2) as her or his agent; (3) with a direction in writing to apply the money as directed therein; and (4) the accused misappropriated the money. [CA.165.160]
“Intrusted” and “agent”
As to the meaning of “intrusted” and “agent”, see s 164. [CA.165.180]
Direction in writing
To support a conviction under this section there must be a direction in writing.1
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1 R v McDonald (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 25.
166
The like as to goods etc intrusted to him or her [Repealed]
[S 166 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997]
SECTION 166 COMMENTARY Charge under section 166 ................................................................................................................ [CA.166.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.166.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.166.60] Alternative offence ............................................................................................................................ [CA.166.80] Generally ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.166.100] Valuable security ............................................................................................................................. [CA.166.120] “Safe custody” of money ................................................................................................................ [CA.166.140]
[CA.166.20]
Charge under section 166
A charge under s 166 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction in certain circumstances: see s 475A. [CA.166.40]
Indictment
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. In the State aforesaid, JN did intrust to AB as an agent, to wit, as a banker, for safe custody, a certain valuable security (or chattel) without any authority to him the said AB to sell, negotiate, transfer or pledge the same; and that the said AB on the day and year aforesaid in violation of good faith and contrary to the purpose for which such valuable security (or chattel) was intrusted to him, did misappropriate the said valuable security (or chattel) and the proceeds of the same.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 167
[CA.166.40]
As to the fraudulent misappropriation of money or a valuable security, see s 178A. [CA.166.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the person named in the indictment intrusted to the accused; (2) a chattel or valuable security; (3) for safe custody or for any other special purpose; and (4) without authority to sell, negotiate, transfer or pledge such property; and (5) the accused misappropriated it or the proceeds thereof. [CA.166.80]
Alternative offence
An alternative offence in the section is the misuse by an agent of a power of attorney. [CA.166.100]
Generally
See generally [CA.165.140]. [CA.166.120]
Valuable security
“Valuable security” is defined in s 4. [CA.166.140]
“Safe custody” of money
Where a client intrusted money to a solicitor to invest on mortgage he or she was not intrusted with such money “for safe custody”.1
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1 R v Newman (1882) 8 QBD 706. See also R v Cooper (1874) LR 2 CCP 123; R v Yule [1964] 1 QB 5; (1963) 47 Cr App R 229.
167 Not to affect trustees or mortgagees nor to restrain agents from receiving money on valuable securities etc [Repealed] [S 167 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
168
Fraudulent sale of property by agent [Repealed]
[S 168 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999]
SECTION 168 COMMENTARY Charge under section 168 ................................................................................................................ [CA.168.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.168.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.168.60] “Agent” and “intrusted” ..................................................................................................................... [CA.168.80] Matter for the jury ........................................................................................................................... [CA.168.100]
[CA.168.20]
Charge under section 168
A charge under s 168 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: see s 475A. [CA.168.40]
Indictment
An appropriate indictment may be adapted from [CA.166.40]. [CA.168.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was an agent;
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[CA.169.80]
s 170
(2) intrusted with property for safe custody; and (3) that the accused fraudulently sold, negotiated, transferred or pledged such property. [CA.168.80]
“Agent” and “intrusted”
As to the meaning of “agent” and “intrusted”, see s 164. [CA.168.100]
Matter for the jury
Whether there has been an intrusting or a loan is a matter for the jury.1 CA
1 R v Smith [1924] 2 KB 194; (1924) 18 Cr App R 76.
169
The same by person under power of attorney [Repealed]
[S 169 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
SECTION 169 COMMENTARY Charge under section 169 ................................................................................................................ [CA.169.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.169.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.169.60] Terms defined ................................................................................................................................... [CA.169.80]
[CA.169.20]
Charge under section 169
A charge under s 169 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: see s 475A.
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[CA.169.40]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, then being intrusted with a power of attorney for the sale and transfer of certain property, belonging to JN, fraudulently did sell, transfer, and misappropriate the said property. [CA.169.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are that: (1) the accused was intrusted with a power of attorney; (2) for the sale or transfer of property; and (3) fraudulently sold, transferred or misappropriated such property. [CA.169.80]
Terms defined
As to the meaning of “intrusted” and “misappropriate”, see s 164. Section 169 is not limited to agents. As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. 170
Agent obtaining advances on property of his or her principal [Repealed]
[S 170 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[4]]
SECTION 170 COMMENTARY Charge under section 170 ................................................................................................................ [CA.170.20] Indictment – agent unlawfully pledging goods ................................................................................. [CA.170.40] Indictment – agent obtaining advance on goods ............................................................................. [CA.170.60] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.170.80] “Agent” and “intrusted” ................................................................................................................... [CA.170.100]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 171
[CA.170.20]
“Deemed intrusting” ........................................................................................................................ [CA.170.120] Compulsory disclosure ................................................................................................................... [CA.170.140]
[CA.170.20]
Charge under section 170
A charge under s 170 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction in certain circumstances: s 475A. [CA.170.40]
Indictment – agent unlawfully pledging goods
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid JN did intrust to AB as his agent, for the purpose of sale, ten bales of wool, and that the said AB on the day and year aforesaid, otherwise than for the use of the said JN, and in violation of good faith, did pledge and deliver the said ten bales of wool to CD, as security for a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of two hundred dollars, then borrowed and received from the said CD by him the said AB. [CA.170.60]
Indictment – agent obtaining advance on goods
That on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, JN did intrust to AB, as his agent, for the purpose of sale, ten bales of wool, and that the said AB, on the day and year aforesaid, did, in violation of good faith and not for the use of his principal, obtain an advance of money, to wit, two hundred dollars, from CD upon an undertaking by him the said AB to transfer, consign, pledge and deliver the said wool to the said CD.
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[CA.170.80]
Elements of the offence
The elements of these crimes are: (1) that the accused was the agent of the person named in the indictment; (2) intrusted with that person’s goods; (3) for the purpose of sale or otherwise disposing thereof; and (4) the accused otherwise than for the use of his principal and in violation of good faith; (5) either: (a) dealt with the goods as security for his own borrowings; or (b) obtained moneys for himself on an undertaking to deal with the goods as security therefor; or (c) assisted in such dealings. [CA.170.100]
“Agent” and “intrusted”
As to the meaning of “agent” and “intrusted”, see s 164. [CA.170.120]
“Deemed intrusting”
As to what is deemed intrusting with goods for the purpose of s 170, see s 171. [CA.170.140]
Compulsory disclosure
As to disclosure under compulsory process, see ss 177 and 178. 171
What to be deemed intrusting with goods etc [Repealed]
[S 171 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
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s 172
Trustees fraudulently disposing of property [Repealed]
[S 172 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 52 of 1970]
Charge under section s 172 ............................................................................................................. [CA.172.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.172.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.172.60] Trustee .............................................................................................................................................. [CA.172.80] Executor may be trustee ................................................................................................................ [CA.172.100] Sentencing ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.172.120]
[CA.172.20]
Charge under section s 172
A charge under s 172 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. Under Pt 75, r 3 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970, applications under s 172 are assigned to the Criminal Division of the Court. The Director of Public Prosecutions may sanction a prosecution under s 172 (Gazette No 117 of 10 July 1987). [CA.172.40]
Indictment
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That before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the .......... day of .......... in the year ......................... AB was the trustee of certain property, to wit, ......................... shares in the ......................... company (Limited) wholly (or partially) for the benefit of JN or for a certain (public) purpose that is to say (stating the purpose); and that he the said AB on the day and year aforesaid, at .......... in the .......... State aforesaid, did (convert and appropriate) the said property to his own use, in violation of good faith, and with intent to defraud. There may be a general averment of an intent to defraud: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990]. It is sufficient for the indictment to allege that the accused was a trustee without alleging an express trust.1 Where the prosecution is instituted on the fiat of the Attorney-General it is sufficient to lodge the fiat with the clerk of arraigns, and it need not be proved at the trial.2 1 R v Piper (1900) 65 JP 10. 2 R v Dexter, Laidler & Coates (1899) 19 Cox CC 360; R v Metz (1915) 84 LJKB 1462; (1915) 11 Cr App R 164. See also R v Taylor (1870) 1 VR (L) 84.
[CA.172.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was holding certain property as a trustee; and (2) that he converted this property to his own use, or otherwise disposed of or destroyed it; (3) with intent to defraud. [CA.172.80]
Trustee
“Trustee” is defined in s 4. It was held that a writing in the following words “Received from A twenty-five pounds being to pay B on account of mortgage” did not constitute the accused a trustee: under this section a trust must be created by a person other than the trustee.1 1 R v Ahrenfeldt (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 242.
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CA
SECTION 172 COMMENTARY
Crimes Act 1900 s 173
[CA.172.0]
[CA.172.100]
Executor may be trustee
An executor may be a trustee under this section.1 1 R v Taylor (1870) 1 VR (L) 84.
[CA.172.120]
Sentencing
Sentencing has been considered.1 1 R v Bell [1982] Qd R 216; (1981) 5 Crim R 347.
173
Directors etc fraudulently appropriating etc property [Repealed]
[S 173 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 95 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 173 COMMENTARY Procedural provision ......................................................................................................................... [CA.173.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.173.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.173.60] Indictment against manager ............................................................................................................. [CA.173.80] “Public company” ............................................................................................................................ [CA.173.100] Fraudulent taking or applying ......................................................................................................... [CA.173.120]
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Evidence ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.173.140] “Fraudulently” .................................................................................................................................. [CA.173.160] “Officer” ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.173.180] Directors ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.173.200]
[CA.173.20]
Procedural provision
An offence under s 173 may be heard by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.173.40]
Indictment
That before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, AB was a director (or offıcer or member) of a certain public company called the ......................... Company, and that he the said AB, being such (director) as aforesaid, on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid, did fraudulently take and apply to his own use and benefit certain money, to wit, two hundred dollars, the property of the said Company. The Companies Code creates several indictable offences for directors and officers of companies but see now the CommonwealthCorporations Act 1989. [CA.173.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was a director, officer, member of a body corporate or a public company; and (2) that he or she converted to her or his own use etc the company’s property or destroyed such property; (3) fraudulently.
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s 173
Indictment against manager
If the indictment is against a manager it has been held that it is sufficient to prove that the accused managed the business of the company, and that it is unnecessary to prove his appointment as manager.1 Quaere whether the same principle applies to directors.2 An auditor is an officer of a company for the purposes of this section.3
[CA.173.100]
CA
1 R v Lawson [1905] 1 KB 541; Gibson v Barton (1875) LR 10 QB 329. 2 R v Atkins (1900) 64 JP 361. 3 R v Shacter [1960] 2 QB 252; (1959) 44 Cr App R 42.
“Public company”
Under the Companies Code a “public company” is defined as meaning a company other than a proprietary company: s 5.1 Section 9 of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 1989 contains a similar definition. 1 See also R v Cammilleri [1979] 1 NSWLR 184.
[CA.173.120]
Fraudulent taking or applying
Mere irregularity in the conduct of business is not of itself fraudulent appropriation.1 1 Nelson v The Queen [1902] AC 250. See also R v Armstrong [1972] 1 NSWLR 559.
[CA.173.140]
Evidence
As to evidence, see R v Goodall.1
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1 (1975) 11 SASR 94.
[CA.173.160]
“Fraudulently”
“Fraudulently” means “dishonestly” and the test is wholly subjective.1 1 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210. See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) (1985) 41 SASR 147; 19 A Crim R 436; R v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254; R v Lawson (1996) 86 A Crim R 111.
[CA.173.180]
“Officer”
For the purposes of an offence of fraudulent misappropriation under s 173 by an “officer or member of any body corporate or public company”, “officer” is a person who holds an office by virtue of which he or she participates in the management or administration of the affairs of the company. The definition of “officer” in s 5 of the Companies Code is not to be read into the Crimes Act 1900.1 1 R v Scott (1990) 20 NSWLR 72; 49 A Crim R 96.
[CA.173.200]
Directors
It has been held in England that directors who by reason of their shareholdings and directorship are in total control of the company are legally capable of stealing the property of such company.1 Likewise in New South Wales the Court of Criminal Appeal has said: In the context of provisions like s 173 there is clear authority that being in dominant control of a company provides no defence to a director proven to have fraudulently “applied” company cheques for his or her own purposes.2
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Crimes Act 1900 s 174
[CA.173.200]
The self-interested consent of a shareholder/director given in furtherance of a crime committed against the company cannot be said to represent the consent of the company.3 1 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] 1 QB 624; (1984) 78 Cr App R 131. See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1987) (1987) 48 SASR 1; 30 A Crim R 343. 2 R v MacLeod (2001) 52 NSWLR 389; 125 A Crim R 60 per Mason P at [24]; distinguishing and disapproving R v Roffel [1985] VR 511; (1984) 14 A Crim R 134 in the context of this legislation. 3 Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 at [31].
174
Directors etc omitting certain entries [Repealed]
[S 174 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 95 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 174 COMMENTARY Procedural provision ......................................................................................................................... [CA.174.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.174.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.174.60] General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.174.80]
[CA.174.20]
Procedural provision
An offence under s 174 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A.
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[CA.174.40]
Indictment
That before and at the time of committing the offence hereinafter mentioned AB was director (or offıcer) of a certain public company called the ......................... Company, and that he [or she] the said AB being such (director) as aforesaid, on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid did receive and possess himself [or herself] of certain moneys to wit, twenty dollars, the property of the said Company, otherwise than in payment of a just debt, and thereupon did omit to make or direct to be made a true and suffıcient entry thereof in the books and accounts of the said Company, with intent to defraud. A general averment of intent to defraud is sufficient: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990]. [CA.174.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was a director or officer of a company; and (2) as such he or she received or became possessed of the company’s property; and (3) he or she omitted to make a true and sufficient entry thereof in the company’s books; (4) with intent to defraud. [CA.174.80]
General
See generally [CA.173.60]. See also [CA.158.60].
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s 176
Director etc wilfully destroying etc books of company etc [Repealed]
[S 175 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 95 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974]
Procedural provision ......................................................................................................................... Indictment – director destroying company’s books .......................................................................... Indictment – director making false entry .......................................................................................... Destroying books or making false entries ........................................................................................
[CA.175.20]
[CA.175.20] [CA.175.40] [CA.175.60] [CA.175.80]
Procedural provision
An offence under s 175 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.175.40]
Indictment – director destroying company’s books
That before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, AB was a director (or offıcer or member) of a certain public company called ......................... Company, and that he the said AB being such (director) as aforesaid, did destroy and mutilate (or alter or falsify) a certain book, to wit, a ledger, belonging to the said Company with intent to defraud. A general averment of intent to defraud is sufficient: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990].
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[CA.175.60]
Indictment – director making false entry
That before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, AB was a director (or offıcer or member) of a certain public company called the .......... Company, and that he, the said AB being such (director), as aforesaid, on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, with intent to defraud, did make a false entry in a certain book, to wit, a cash-book of the said Company, by falsely entering in such book under the date of the 1st day of June 1969, the sum of four hundred dollars, as having been paid on that day to CD. Whereas in fact the said sum of four hundred dollars was not paid on the said day to the said CD, as the said AB well knew at the time when he made the said false entry. As to pleading intent to defraud, see Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [4.15990]. [CA.175.80]
Destroying books or making false entries
See generally [CA.174.60]. See also R v Cammilleri.1 As to “material particular” see s 178BB, [CA.178BB.200]. 1 [1979] 1 NSWLR 184.
176
Director or officer publishing fraudulent statements [Repealed]
[S 176 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 95 of 1979; Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 176 COMMENTARY Procedural provision ......................................................................................................................... [CA.176.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.176.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.176.60]
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SECTION 175 COMMENTARY
Crimes Act 1900 s 176
[CA.176.20]
“Director” and “public company” ....................................................................................................... [CA.176.80] “Material particular” ......................................................................................................................... [CA.176.100] Prospectus ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.176.120]
[CA.176.20]
Procedural provision
An offence under s 176 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.176.40]
Indictment
That before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, AB was a director (or offıcer of a certain public company, called the ......................... Company, and that he the said AB being such (director) as aforesaid, on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, did circulate and publish a certain written statement and account which said written statement and account was false in certain material particulars, that is to say, in this, that it was therein falsely stated that (state the particulars); he the said AB then well knowing the said written statement and account to be false in the several particulars aforesaid, with intent thereby to deceive and defraud JN then being a shareholder of the said Company (or induce JN to become a shareholder in the said Company or induce JN to advance certain property to the said company). [CA.176.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused was a director or officer of the company named; and (2) whilst such he made, circulated or published (or concurred in such action); (3) a written statement relating to the affairs of the company; Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
(4) which was false in a material particular; (5) with intent to deceive (and defraud) the person named; (6) he or she well knowing of the falsity of the statement. [CA.176.80]
“Director” and “public company”
As to who is a “director” etc, and what is a “public company”, see [CA.173.200] and [CA.173.100]. [CA.176.100]
“Material particular”
As to “material particular” see s 178BB, [CA.178BB.200]. [CA.176.120]
Prospectus
A prospectus is a written statement.1 Although no one statement in the prospectus is untrue, the prospectus may be false in a material particular if it puts before intending investors figures which apparently disclose the existing position of the company, but in fact conceal it.2 The fact that the statement was made outside the State is immaterial if it was circulated or published within the State.3 The accused’s knowledge that the statement was false may be shown expressly (that is, by his acts or declarations) or impliedly (from his position in the company and his opportunities of knowledge). It must be shown that the accused not only knew but understood the falsity of the statement.4 If statements are proved to be false to the knowledge of the accused an intention to defraud may be readily presumed.5 It is not necessary to prove that any person was actually prejudiced by the fraudulent statement: where the charge is against a director for knowingly publishing a false prospectus inviting subscriptions to a debenture issue, it is not necessary to establish intent to defraud also.6
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s 176A
1 R v Gurney (1869) 11 Cox CC 414. 2 R v Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83; R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176; R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195. 3 R v Hooley (1922) 16 Cr App R 171. 4 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176. 5 R v Birt (1899) 63 JP 328. 6 R v Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83. 7 Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732. See also R v Bassey (1931) 22 Cr App R 160; R v Bennett (Berkeley Bernard) (1914) 9 Cr App R 146; R v Wines [1954] 1 WLR 64; [1953] 2 All ER 1497; (1953) 37 Cr App R 197; Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 2 WLR 351; [1957] 1 All ER 411; R v Potter [1958] 1 WLR 638; 2 All ER 51; (1958) 42 Cr App R 168; Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124; R v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425 at 447.
176A
Directors etc cheating or defrauding [Repealed]
[S 176A rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; insrt Act 95 of 1979, s 5 and Sch 1(3)]
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SECTION 176A COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.176A.20] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.176A.40] “Officer” ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.176A.60] Generally ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.176A.80] Sentence ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.176A.100]
[CA.176A.20]
Jurisdiction
An offence under s 176A may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction, s 475A. [CA.176A.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of an offence under s 176A are that the accused: (1) being a director [officer], [member], of a body corporate [public company]; (2) (a) cheats or defrauds; or (b) does any act with intent to cheat or defraud; or (c) omits to do an act with intent to cheat or defraud; (3) (a) the body corporate [company]; or (b) any person in his or her dealings with the body corporate [company]. [CA.176A.60]
“Officer”
“Officer” includes auditor: s 4. [CA.176A.80]
Generally
To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. Put in another way to “deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action”.1 However deceit is not a necessary element of an offence alleging “defrauding”. The statement to the contrary in Balcombe v De Simoni can no longer be regarded as authoritative. “Nevertheless, to prove defrauding the prosecution must establish that the accused used ‘dishonest means’ to achieve his or her
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“To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.”7
Crimes Act 1900 s 176A
[CA.176A.80]
object.”2 In Peters v The Queen at [30] Toohey and Gaudron JJ said: Ordinarily, however, fraud involves the intentional creation of a situation in which one person deprives another of money or property or puts the money or property of that other person at risk or prejudicially affects that person in relation to “some lawful right, interest, opportunity or advantage” knowing that he or she has no right to deprive that person of that money or property or to prejudice his or her interests. Thus, to take a simple example, a “sting” involving an agreement by two or more persons to use dishonest means to obtain property which they believe they are legally entitled to take is not a conspiracy to defraud.3 In a prosecution under s 176A it is sufficient if the Crown establishes the possibility of loss, “that is that the victim has been prejudiced in some aspect of his proprietary rights or the enforcement of those rights”.4
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To prove that the accused “defrauded” a “person in his or her dealings” with the body corporate or company the prosecution must prove that the accused used dishonest means to prejudice the rights of such a person in his or her dealings with the body corporate or company.5 The first limb of the section deals with cheating and defrauding the body corporate or company. The second limb applies to “any person”, and not to a “director of a company”. “In other words the question raised by the second limb is whether the director defrauded, or did or omitted to do an act with an intent to defraud, a person in that person’s actual dealings with the company.” The expression “any person in his or her dealings” defines the circumstances in which the acts alleged to have occurred will constitute an offence.6 1 Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43 at [76] quoting from Balcombe v De Simoni (1972) 126 CLR 576 at 598. See also Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732, Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124 at 127 (AC). 2 Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43 at [78]. 3 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250. See also R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 62 (SASR), 30–31, per King CJ; Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (1996) Vol 2, paras 17–89, 17–94. 4 R v Negline (unreported, CCA (NSW), 5 December 1990), p 7. 5 Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43 at [81]. See also Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [84], R v Sinclair [1968] 1 WLR 1246; [1968] 3 All ER 241; (1968) 52 Cr App R 618, R v Grantham [1984] 2 WLR 815. 6 Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603; 113 A Crim R 448; 173 ALR 529; [2000] HCA 43 at [70].
[CA.176A.100]
Sentence
Authority makes it clear that the amount of money involved in premeditated deception is an important, and the period of time over which offences are committed a relevant, factor in determining the extent of criminality.1 The cases in this area also stress the importance of general deterrence. Organisations, be they business or government, cannot operate effectively without placing a good deal of trust in their employees. Opportunities for the abuse of that trust are legion and breaches are often difficult to detect. Commonly, offenders are able to continue their depredations for long periods. Often matters only come to light when the total amounts involved become too large to be overlooked. It seems to me an inevitable inference that there must be many cases where offending is never discovered – a factor also arguing for sentences which are substantial deterrents.2 The appropriate length of sentence for the commission of this offence has been considered in a number of cases.3 1 See R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430 and R v Mears (1991) 53 A Crim R 141, referred to by Wood CJ at CL and Sperling J in R v Woodman [2001] NSWCCA 310. 2 Per Hulme J in R v Mungomery (2004) 151 A Crim R 376 at [41].
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s 178
3 R v Giam (No 2) (1999) 109 A Crim R 348; R v Finnie [2002] NSWCCA 533; R v Jackson [2001] NSWCCA 355; R v Pantano (1990) 49 A Crim R 328; R v Mato (1999) 109 A Crim R 121; R v Carr (2002) 135 A Crim R 171; R v Mungomery (2004) 151 A Crim R 376.
177
Proviso to sections 165 to 176 inclusive [Repealed]
[S 177 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 50 of 1974; Act 31 of 1951]
Related commentary ........................................................................................................................ [CA.177.20] General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.177.40]
[CA.177.20]
Related commentary
See notes to s 136, [CA.136.40]. [CA.177.40]
General
The purpose of s 177 is to protect a person from criminal charges where he or she has disclosed, under compulsory process or examination, acts or omissions which constitute an offence under ss 165 to 176; “compulsory process” in s 177 refers to some act of the court or the parties before the court which requires the relevant party to give evidence on oath in proceedings such as giving evidence under a subpoena.1
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Where the Crown sought to tender the deposition of the accused’s public examination under the Queensland Companies Act 1961, it was held that although the onus is on the accused on the balance of probabilities to prove protection under the Queensland section, similar to s 177, the jury should be directed that on the evidence adduced by the Crown it would be dangerous for them to convict the accused because the material before them was such that it would justify them in finding that he had discharged such onus.2 1 Fachler v Hyde [1986] 6 NSWLR 487; (1986) 23 A Crim R 429. 2 R v Lyon (1963) 57 QJPR 133. See also R v Gidlow [1983] 2 Qd R 557.
178
No relief from compulsory disclosures [Repealed]
[S 178 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[7]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 52 of 1970; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 178 COMMENTARY [CA.178.20]
Section 178 has been judicially considered
This section has been judicially considered.1 1 Re Saltergate Insurance Co Ltd and the Companies Act (1980) 4 ACLR 733.
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SECTION 177 COMMENTARY
Crimes Act 1900 s 178A
[CA.178A.20]
SUBDIVISION 8 – FRAUDULENT MISAPPROPRIATION [REPEALED] [Subdiv 8 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[8]] [Subdiv 8 headinginsrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[27]]
178A
Fraudulent misappropriation of moneys collected or received [Repealed]
[S 178A rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[8]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 30 of 1929; insrt Act 2 of 1929, s 7]
SECTION 178A COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.178A.20] Indictment – fraudulent misappropriation ....................................................................................... [CA.178A.40] Indictment – fraudulently omitting to account for moneys received .............................................. [CA.178A.60] The elements of fraudulent misappropriation ................................................................................ [CA.178A.80] The elements of fraudulent failure ............................................................................................... [CA.178A.100] Coverage of section ..................................................................................................................... [CA.178A.120] That the accused received certain money ................................................................................... [CA.178A.140] Failure to account ........................................................................................................................ [CA.178A.160] Terms under which the money was received .............................................................................. [CA.178A.180] Distinction between larceny false pretences and fraudulent misappropriation ........................... [CA.178A.200] “Money” and “valuable security” ................................................................................................... [CA.178A.220] Sentence ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.178A.240]
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[CA.178A.20]
Jurisdiction
In some circumstances an offence under s 178A may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.178A.40]
Indictment – fraudulent misappropriation
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at ......................... in the State aforesaid, having collected (or received) certain money to wit, the sum of .......... upon terms requiring him the said AB to pay the same to CD, fraudulently did misappropriate to his own use the said money in violation of the terms on which he the said AB so collected (or received) the said money. [CA.178A.60]
Indictment – fraudulently omitting to account for moneys received
That AB between the .......... day of .......... and the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .......... in the State aforesaid, having collected (or received) certain money to wit the sum of .......... upon terms requiring him the said AB to account to CD for the balance of the said money after an authorised deduction had been made thereout fraudulently did omit to account to the said CD for the balance of the said money so collected (or received) by him the said AB in violation of terms on which the said AB so collected (or received) the said money. The date may be immaterial.1 The section is frequently applied in cases where a deposit, paid to an agent under contract of a sale of a property has been fraudulently misappropriated by the agent. The form of indictment above set forth uses the words “upon terms requiring him the said AB to pay to CD the said sum of”. These words are quite appropriate in ordinary cases, but it is assumed that under an indictment so framed it would be necessary for the Crown to prove (in the case supposed), that AB the agent, held the deposit on terms requiring her or him to repay the deposit to CD. Where the contract has gone off, this may be due to default on the part of the vendor or the purchaser. The contract of sale may
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s 178A
In such cases in order to prevent the defendant from succeeding upon what is generally a mere technical defence, it seems permissible to allege in the indictment that the money was received by the agent under a contract between A and B upon terms requiring the agent to pay the deposit to the person entitled thereto under the terms of the contract. It seems reasonable to assume that this would be held to include the person ultimately entitled in the events that have happened, who would not necessarily be the person who was originally entitled when the contract was signed.2 For instance, the person who signed the contract has fraudulently misappropriated the deposit, it cannot be fairly alleged that the agent is prejudiced by the omission in the indictment of the name of the person whom he or she has defrauded, and the substitution of the alternative form above suggested. Averment of the particular fraudulent intent is not necessary: s 70 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, [5.1610]. As to the meaning of “fraudulently”, see [CLP.80]. 1 R v Boseley [1937] 4 All ER 100; (1937) 26 Cr App R 99. 2 R v Grubb [1915] 2 KB 683; (1915) 11 Cr App R 153. See also Mumford v The Queen (1989) 95 FLR 358.
[CA.178A.80]
The elements of fraudulent misappropriation
The elements of this crime are: Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
(1) that the accused collected or received the money or valuable security charged in the indictment; (2) upon terms that he or she should deliver, account for, or pay to some person named the whole or some part of such money or valuable security, or the proceeds thereof after any authorised deductions or payments had been made; and (3) the accused fraudulently misappropriated the money or failed to account for it in violation of the terms upon which he collected or received it. [CA.178A.100]
The elements of fraudulent failure
The elements of this offence are that: (1) the accused received money; (2) the receipt of the money was upon terms which required the accused to account for the money; (3) the accused failed to account in accordance with those terms; and (4) the failure to account was fraudulent.1 1 Andrews v The Queen (1968) 126 CLR 198; 43 ALJR 57; [1968] HCA 84. See also R v Francipane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 December 1998) per Sperling J at 18.
[CA.178A.120]
Coverage of section
Section 178A does not require that before an agent can be held criminally responsible for the appropriation of money, it must be shown that he violated some written direction: the section is intended to be a general provision covering all forms of fraudulent misappropriation.1 1 R v Heavener (1932) 33 SR (NSW) 101; 50 WN (NSW) 22.
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also contain special provisions as to what is to be done with the deposit. It may be a question of difficulty to determine whether the agent was the agent for the vendor or the purchaser or a mere stakeholder. Assuming that there is no doubt that the agent has acted fraudulently in retaining the deposit, it is often difficult to determine whether the person who is legally entitled to demand payment of the deposit is the vendor or the purchaser, though the facts may show that the agent has refused to repay the deposit to either of them. The defence commonly set up in such cases is that the agent believed he or she had a claim for his commission, or, if the purchaser claims the deposit, that the agent was retaining it in the interest of the vendor.
Crimes Act 1900 s 178A [CA.178A.140]
[CA.178A.10] That the accused received certain money
To make out an offence under s 178A that (a) the accused had on a certain date received certain money upon terms requiring her or him to account to another person, and that he or she had fraudulently omitted to account to that other person in violation of the terms upon which he or she received the money, it is necessary to establish (i) that the accused received money particularized upon terms requiring her or him to account to the other person, and (ii) that at the time when he or she was bound to account according to those terms he or she fraudulently omitted to do. Because of the precise terms involved in the statutory offence created by s 178A, great care is called for on the part of the trial judge to ensure that the ingredients of the offence are lucidly explained to the jury.1 1 Andrews v The Queen (1968) 126 CLR 198; 43 ALJR 57; [1968] HCA 84. See also R v McQueeny (1989) 39 A Crim R 56.
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[CA.178A.160]
Failure to account
In R v Frier1 Gleeson CJ (with whom Hunt CJ at CL and Hidden J agreed) said: A proper understanding of an allegation that a person in a fiduciary position has failed to account usually requires an understanding of the nature of that person’s duty to account. In this context the concept of failure is a concept related to non-fulfilment of a duty or an obligation. In the case of R v Maharaj (1995) 85 A Crim R 374 at 383 it was said: Where a principal passes money to an agent for the purpose of a particular transaction and the basis is that the money is being provided either to be held by the agent pending a particular event or to be used by him in a particular way, then the payment will ordinarily be subject to a trust and the agent will be obliged to account to the principal for the money. An agent in such a position may, when obliged to do so, account for the money either by repaying it or by demonstrating that it is being used in one of the specified identified ways. An agent will not have accounted for the money by demonstrating that it was used in a different way from one of the specified ways. “In s 178A, the word ‘account’ encompasses a broad range of conduct which may include repayment or demonstration of use in accordance with the instructions. The question is whether or not the terms of the receipt required accounting of any particular character and, if so, whether accounting has occurred in accordance with those terms.”2 The phrase “omit to account” in s 178A means a failure to pay over to the person entitled thereto in accordance with the terms on which the money was received.3 1 R v Frier (unreported, CCA (NSW), 26 February 1997). 2 R v Francipane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 December 1998) per Spigelman CJ at p 8. 3 R v Francipane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 23 December 1998) per Sperling J at pp 19–22.
[CA.178A.180]
Terms under which the money was received
The terms under which the money was received by the accused may be imposed by the person paying the money, by the person for whom the money was received, or that may be implied by the circumstances of the particular transaction.1 A person intrusted with money for a specific purpose is not entitled to spend it or use it,2 and he commits an offence if he fraudulently converts it to his own use.3 The mixture of the funds of another with one’s own funds may be in many cases natural and proper, in other cases convenient but irregular, and in the third, both irregular and criminal. The distinction between these cases required to be treated with the greatest judicial care, so as, while preserving the fullest civil responsibility, to prevent the third or criminal category from being extended to mistaken, though convenient acts. The essence of the offence is intent to defraud; that is to say the wilful appropriation of the property of another.4
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[CA.178A.240]
s 178A
Where the evidence shows that a company director was not only in a position of control but in fact personally controlled the receipt and disposition of cheques paid to the company upon terms requiring the company to account for the whole or part of the proceeds, the question whether the director’s receipt and disposition of those moneys is to be regarded only as a receipt and disposition of the company, or whether the director has received the cheques personally, apart altogether from the company, is a question of fact.5
1 R v Kirk (1901) 20 NZLR 463. 2 R v Hall (1915) 11 Cr App R 221; R v Smith [1924] 2 KB 194; (1924) 18 Cr App R 76. See also R v Noel [1914] 3 KB 848; (1914) 10 Cr App R 255; Stephens v The Queen (1978) 139 CLR 315; R v Nicholson (1984) 12 A Crim R 231; Mumford v The Queen (1989) 95 FLR 358; R v Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316. 3 R v Bottomley (1922) 16 Cr App R 184. 4 Lanier v The King [1914] AC 221. 5 R v J (1987) 9 NSWLR 615; 30 A Crim R 173. See also R v Moran (1991) 52 A Crim R 440; R v Maharaj (1995) 85 A Crim R 374. 6 R v Evans [1964] VR 717.
[CA.178A.200]
Distinction between larceny false pretences and fraudulent misappropriation
The distinction between the various forms of larceny (s 117, ante), the statutory offence of obtaining property by false pretences (s 179, post) and the statutory offence of fraudulent misappropriation was discussed in R v Ward.1 1 (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80.
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[CA.178A.220]
“Money” and “valuable security”
As to the meaning of “money” and “valuable security”, see s 4. The word “money” is to be given its ordinary meaning.1 As to fraudulent conversion by agents, see s 88 of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 1941. 1 R v Hunt (1996) 88 A Crim R 307.
[CA.178A.240]
Sentence
In all but exceptional cases offences of misappropriation must be regarded as serious and warrant the imposition of a custodial sentence. Salient issues to be considered on sentence include the total sum of money involved, the length of time over which the fraud was committed, the nature of the conduct involved and the nature of the relationship between the accused and the victim, particularly if the fraud was undertaken by a professional such as a solicitor.1 1 R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 183. When the sentence relates to defalcations by a solicitor, see R v Smith (2000) 114 A Crim R 8 and the cases referred to therein.
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The offence may apparently be committed even though the directions as to how the money is to be disposed of are only conditional.6
Crimes Act 1900 s 178B
[CA.178B.20]
SUBDIVISION 9 – VALUELESS CHEQUES [REPEALED] [Subdiv 9 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[9]] [Subdiv 9 headinginsrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[28]]
178B
Valueless cheques [Repealed]
[S 178B rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[9]; am Act 147 of 1997; insrt Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 178B COMMENTARY Cross reference .............................................................................................................................. [CA.178B.20] Elements of the crime .................................................................................................................... [CA.178B.40] Money ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.178B.60] Valuable security ............................................................................................................................ [CA.178B.80] Passing a cheque ........................................................................................................................ [CA.178B.100] Defences ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.178B.120] Evidence ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.178B.140]
[CA.178B.20]
Cross reference
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Where the property charged does not exceed $15 000, this offence may be tried summarily: s 476. Where the property does not exceed $5 000 the offence is a summary one: s 500. [CA.178B.40] Elements of the crime (1) that the accused obtained goods, money or a valuable security; (2) by passing a cheque; (3) which was not met on presentation. [CA.178B.60]
Money
The meaning of money is defined in s 4. [CA.178B.80]
Valuable security
The meaning of valuable security is defined in s 4. [CA.178B.100]
Passing a cheque
Where A asked B for a loan of seventy-five dollars and B agreed to give him the seventy-five dollars on condition that A gave him a post-dated cheque for eighty-five dollars it was held that this was not “passing a cheque” within the meaning of the section as it is essential that the thing “passed” be accepted as something which it is not, “passing” meaning “to put into circulation”.1 The section may be used where the charge of false pretences cannot be established by reason of the fact that at the time the accused passed the cheque, he had funds available in the bank, although there were insufficient funds at the time the cheque was presented at the bank for payment. 1 Brauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 at 192.
[CA.178B.120]
Defences
If the accused proves that: (1) he or she had reasonable grounds for believing that the cheque would be paid in full on presentation; and
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s 178BA
(2) he or she had no intent of defraud; that is a full defence to the charge. The onus of proving this defence is on the accused: it is not necessary for her or him to prove it beyond reasonable doubt, it is sufficient if he or she proves it on the balance of probability.1 Reference is also made to a claim of right. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. 1 Bauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 at 187; see also R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; (1943) 29 Cr App R 76; Sodeman v The King (1936) 55 CLR 192; [1936] HCA 75 at 200, 216 (CLR).
Evidence
The state of a bank account or the fact that the accused had no account with a particular bank may be proved orally or by affidavit by a bank officer who has examined the books of the bank: s 415 (now repealed).
SUBDIVISION 10 – OBTAINING MONEY ETC BY DECEPTION [REPEALED] [Subdiv 10 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[10]] [Subdiv 10 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[29]]
178BA
Obtaining money etc by deception [Repealed]
[S 178BA rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[10]; am Act 43 of 2000; Act 147 of 1997; Act 71 of 1989; insrt Act 95 of 1979, s 5 and Sch 1(4)]
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SECTION 178BA COMMENTARY Indictment .................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BA.20] Cross reference ........................................................................................................................... [CA.178BA.40] Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BA.60] Elements of the offence ............................................................................................................. [CA.178BA.100] By deception .............................................................................................................................. [CA.178BA.120] Dishonesty ................................................................................................................................. [CA.178BA.140] “Money”, “valuable thing” or “financial advantage” .................................................................... [CA.178BA.160] Sentencing ................................................................................................................................. [CA.178BA.180]
[CA.178BA.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .......... in the said State, by deception namely, (describe deception alleged) dishonestly obtained for himself/herself [CD] (identify other person or company etc,1) money [valuable thing] [financial advantage], namely the sum of X dollars (or describe the valuable thing or a financial advantage alleged). 1 Interpretation Act 1987, s 21(1); “person” includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.
[CA.178BA.40]
Cross reference
“Dishonestly” appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1914: Sections 185A, 197, 309(1), 438(3) (now repealed) and 502. [CA.178BA.60] Jurisdiction (i) The offence may in certain specified circumstances be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: see s 475A. (ii) Offences committed before 1 September, 1995,
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[CA.178B.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 178BA
[CA.178BA.60]
– The offence may be dealt with summarily: see s 476(6)(d) – the offence shall be dealt with summarily if the property involved is less than $5 000: see s 496(1)(c). Note: Reduced penalties apply. (iii) Offences committed after 1 September, 1995 the offence shall be dealt with summarily unless; – if the value of the property does not exceed $5 000, the prosecutor elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: see Sch 1, Table 2, Pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986; – if the value of the property exceeds $5 000, either the prosecutor or the accused person elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: Sch 1, Table 2, Pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.178BA.100]
Elements of the offence
That the accused: (1) by a deception, (2) dishonestly obtained for herself or himself or another person, (3) money, a valuable thing, or financial advantage.1 1 R v Licardy (Unreported CCA (NSW) 26.5.95).
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[CA.178BA.120]
By deception
Deception is defined in s 178BA(2). Deception is the intentional inducing in another of a state of mind which the accused knows does not accord with fact.1 It has been said that deliberate deception is one of the two most obvious forms of dishonesty.2 A deception may be by words or by conduct.3 Therefore someone obtaining a meal in a restaurant having no means to pay for it is guilty of obtaining the meal by deception.4 The representation as to payment is a continuing one until payment is made or some new arrangement is entered into.5 The term “reckless” has been considered in relation to an offence of obtaining by deception.6 For further commentary on “reckless” see [CA.19A.440].7 The presentation of a credit card on which the limit had been reached has been held to be a false representation.8 Representations made by the presentation of a cheque have been considered.9 Obtaining a transfer of funds by electronic means has also been considered.10 The Crown is precluded from alleging that the assertion made in pleadings in civil proceedings is a deception for the purpose of this section: Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574.11 Whilst Jamieson v The Queen says that a pleading served in litigation should not be treated as containing a representation of fact, that may not be so in relation to other demands made for the purposes of litigation: Downey v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 371. Where, in the one count, the Crown charges a number of matters as together constituting the deception the jury may need to be directed in the following manner: … where a number of matters are specified in the charge as together constituting one ingredient in the offence, any one of them is capable of doing so, then it is enough to establish the ingredient that any one of them is proved; but … any such matter must be proved to the satisfaction of the whole of jury. The jury should be directed accordingly, and it should be made clear to them as well that they should all be satisfied that the statement upon which they are agreed was an inducement as alleged.12 It is no defence to a claim of deceptively obtaining a loan that the recipient intended to repay the loan.13 The deception must be the effective cause of obtaining the money etc. “… it is an essential ingredient of the offence created by that section that the cause of the payment of the money (or handing over of the valuable thing or the giving of the financial advantage) was the deception used by the accused.”: R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145 at 147.14 The deception must operate on the mind of the person to whom it is directed.15 The deception employed must precede the obtaining. Therefore in a case where a deception was made as to how petrol was to be paid for after it had been obtained the offence was not made out.16 The onus of proving the money etc, was
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1 Corporate Affairs Commission v Papoulias (1989) 20 NSWLR 503 at 506B; Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124; Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909; for the meaning of “deceive” see: Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732; Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370. 2 R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 at 1060. 3 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370. See also R v Greenstein [1976] 1 WLR 1353; [1975] 1 All ER 1; R v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248; [1976] 1 All ER 659. 4 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370 per Lord Morris at 385. 5 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370 at 382–383, 386–387. 6 In Mattingly v Tuckwood (1989) 43 A Crim R 111; (1989) 88 ATCR 1, Miles J held that the term “reckless”, when used in the context of false representation and applying the judgment of the High Court in R v Crabbe [1985] 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19, means indifference as to whether a representation is true or false knowing that, more probably than not, it is false. In R v Smith (1982) 7 A Crim R 437 at 446–447 the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal considered the word “reckless” in regard to a similar legislation; see also R v Staines (1974) 60 Cr App R 160; Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909; and the discussion of the authorities in Pollard v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1992) 28 NSWLR 659; 63 A Crim R 383 per Abadee J. 7 See also discussion of “recklessness” in commentary on “maliciously” in s 5. 8 R v Lambie [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294. 9 R v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151; R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145; R v Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513; R v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248; [1976] 1 All ER 659; Fisher v Bennett (1987) 85 FLR 469. 10 R v Crick (18 Aug 1993) The Times; R v Thompson [1984] 1 WLR 962, but see R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR) re: “credits in bank accounts”; see also S Martin, “Obtaining Bank Credits and Debits by Deception” (1992) 16 Crim LR 77. 11 Jamieson v The Queen overruled R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256; 51 A Crim R 89. 12 R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 at 119. In R v Phillips (1988) 86 Cr App R 18 Woolf LJ quoted with approval a passage from a judgment of Hodgson J in R v More to the following effect: “It seems to us however that it will only be necessary for us to give a direction on the lines set out in Brown … in the comparatively rare case where it emerges at some stage in the course of the trial, or as a result of a question asked by the jury, that there is a risk of disagreement between the members of the jury as to whether a particular ingredient of the offence has been proved.” 13 R v McCall (1970) 55 Cr App R 175 at 180; R v Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618; Halstead v Patel [1972] 1 WLR 661. 14 Per Maxwell, Hunt, McInerney JJ. See also R v Clarkson [1987] VR 962; 25 A Crim R 277; R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; R v Stanhope (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10.9.87). 15 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495; R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359; R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; R v Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513. 16 R v Collis-Smith [1971] Crim LR 716 (CA). 17 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495 at 497 (Cr App R); R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359 at 1771B (WLR); R v Lambie [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294 at 95 (WLR). 18 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495 at 497–498 (Cr App R). 19 R v Miller (1992) 95 Cr App R 744 (CA). 20 R v Clucas [1949] 2 KB 226.
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obtained by reason of the deception employed falls upon the prosecution.17 It is ordinarily necessary that the cause of the obtaining be established by direct evidence, although it can be proved by inference.18 It is irrelevant whether the person deceived has the ability to discover the truth of the facts behind the deception. The deception can cause the obtaining even, if at the time the property was obtained, the party deceived suspected that he was being deceived.19 Proof that the person deceived would not have parted with her or his money, but for the deception employed, does not necessarily establish that the deception was the effective cause of the obtaining.20 The deception does not have to be practised on the person suffering the resultant loss.21
Crimes Act 1900 s 178BA
[CA.178BA.120]
21 R v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151 at 7 (WLR), R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145 at 147, R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236.
[CA.178BA.140]
Dishonesty
In relation to dishonesty in England juries are instructed in accordance with decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053.1 The decision in Ghosh has been followed in a number of jurisdictions in Australia.2 However the test has not received universal approval – see Griew, “Dishonesty: Objections to Feely and Ghosh” [1985] Crim LR 341.3 In Victoria, a series of cases questioned the use of the Ghosh direction where a claim of right was involved.4 In NSW the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416, in the context of considering the appellant’s claim of right, considered the meaning of the words “dishonestly obtains” in s 178BA. The Court5 said: The application of those decisions (Ghosh and Feely) in Australian jurisdictions has been a matter of controversy. (at 613) There are undoubtedly many cases, perhaps even a majority of cases, in which the standards of reasonable and decent people provide an adequate guide in determining whether a person has dishonestly obtained property. However, especially in cases where what is involved is something in the nature of claim of right, a test which is simply in terms of the standards of ordinary people will leave a jury with inadequate instruction. (at 614–615)6 Of course in many cases the deception will be powerful evidence of dishonesty. However, when a claim of legal right of the kind now in question is raised, the issue is whether there was a belief in a legal right to obtain the property, not whether there was a belief in a legal right to practise the deception. (at 616–617)7
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It is to be noted that the court emphasised that the views there expressed were in relation to the particular context being dealt with. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. In Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR) the High Court considered the application of the Ghosh test to a charge of conspiracy to defraud under ss 86 and 86A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In the context of that case the majority of the Court (Toohey and Gaudron JJ with whom Kirby J agreed) was critical of the Ghosh test.8 The majority noted that the word “dishonestly” when appearing in legislation can be used in its ordinary meaning or it may be used in a special sense. If it is used in its special sense, for example as it is used in the Victorian legislation under consideration in R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1, then it is necessary for the trial judge to explain precisely the meaning provided under the legislation.9 As with R v Salvo it would appear that the word “dishonestly” is used in a special sense in s 178BA and must be read together with the word “obtained”. Where there is claim of right in relation to the property obtained the special meaning is that provided in R v Love noted above. Where however the question is whether the means used to obtain the property are dishonest, the majority in Peters held that, providing those means are capable of being so characterised, the question is one for the jury to determine and that the jury should be instructed that “the question whether they are to be characterised as dishonest is to be determined by application of the standards of ordinary, decent people”.10 In R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210 it was held that the term “fraudulently” used in s 173, was interchangeable with the word “dishonestly” (see at 604C) and that it is sufficient if the trial judge instructs the jury that the accused acted dishonestly without defining the word further. In deciding the issue the jury should apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. (see at 607G)11 Persons jointly charged with obtaining property can both make a defence of claim of right, if bona fide.12 “Obtained” is not defined in s 178BA or elsewhere in the Crimes Act 1914. In the English Theft Act 1968“obtaining” is defined in section 15(2) in the following terms: For the purposes of this section a person is to be treated as obtaining property if he obtains ownership, possession or control of it, and “obtain” includes obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain or retain.
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A valuable thing or financial advantage etc must be capable of being “obtained”.13 In R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 it was observed by Gleeson CJ at 477 that the “… question of when, and by what means, it may be said to have been obtained, may well be affected by the nature of the thing obtained.” It was held that a memorandum of transfer was obtained when it came into the possession of the accused.14 Also see “Obtaining property” in s 179.
1 The test in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 at 1064 is to the following effect: In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether, according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people, what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails.
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If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. 2 R v Harvey [1993] 2 Qd R 389; R v Allard [1988] 2 Qd R 269; R v Cornelius (1988) 34 A Crim R 49 (WA); R v Laurie (1986) 23 A Crim R 219; [1987] 2 Qd R 762. In R v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; (1996) 86 A Crim R 412 Callaway JA said at 470 (VR) that: “[t]he touchstone is not what an ordinary reasonable person would regard as dishonest but rather the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people.” 3 See also Campbell, “The test of Dishonesty in R v Ghosh” (1984) 43 Cambridge Law Journal 349; Halpin, “The test for Dishonesty” [1996] Crim LR 283. 4 R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1; R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633; 2 A Crim R 431; R v Brow [1981] VR 783. These cases were considered and applied in South Australia in R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28. 5 Per Gleeson CJ, Newman and Loveday JJ. 6 See for an example of an ordinary case R v Sperling (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 August 1992) in which the court considered a submission that the trial judge should have instructed the jury in accordance with Ghosh. The jury had been instructed that whilst dishonesty could be determined by applying the current standards of ordinary decent people as the jury perceived them to be, they were not instructed that the accused must realise what he was doing was dishonest according to those standards. Without referring to the decision of R v Ghosh, the court held that the instructions given allowed the jury to approach their task with a “clear understanding of the relevant principles of law involved.” 7 See also R v Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335. 8 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed), p 7. 9 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at 503–504 (CLR), 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed), p 13. The majority also noted at 504 (CLR) that in a case in which it is necessary for a jury to decide whether an act is dishonest, the proper course is for the trial judge to identify the knowledge, belief or intent which is said to render that act dishonest and to instruct the jury to decide whether the accused had that knowledge, belief or intent and, if so, to determine whether, on that account, the act is dishonest. 10 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed). The test to be applied for determining dishonesty in Peters has been criticised, see “The Appropriate test for Dishonesty” (2000) 24 Crim LJ 46. 11 Compare R v McFarlane (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 April 1993) re: s 197. 12 R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102. 13 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR). 14 R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 477. Kron was applied in R v Reid (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 October 1996) which was subject to an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the High Court. 15 R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 476–477.
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In R v Kron, it was held that, wherever the deception took place, in order to establish jurisdiction it was necessary for the Crown to prove that the money, (valuable thing, or financial advantage) was obtained in NSW.15
Crimes Act 1900 s 178BA [CA.178BA.160]
[CA.178BA.140] “Money”, “valuable thing” or “financial advantage”
Money is defined in s 4 of the Act and “includes all coined money, whether current within New South Wales or not, and all bank notes or instruments ordinarily so called, if current, as such, and payable to the bearer”. In R v Hunt (1996) 88 A Crim R 307 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the meaning of the word “money” in the context of considering s 178A of the Crimes Act 1914. In that case the Crown framed a charge on the basis that the accused had received money. In fact the accused had initially received a cheque. The Court observed (at 317) that “the word money is capable of many meanings. The context in which it is used usually determines its meaning.” The Court found that despite the fact that the accused had received a cheque and subsequently money as proceeds of the cheque that the framing of the charge in terms of money, made the charge more understandable for the jury and the court and was permissible. The meaning of “valuable thing” was considered in R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416. It was held that the word “thing” could have a wide meaning but it was necessary that it be capable of being obtained and therefore the meaning did not extend to encompass control of property.1 In Victoria the concept of “financial advantage” has been considered and it was held that it is a simple one consisting of two common words of clear meaning. The words should be given their plain meaning and no narrow construction should be given to them: R v Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 at 81.2 In Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045 it was held that the proffering of a valueless cheque can amount to a financial advantage because the proferrer “derives a financial advantage by evading an antecedent debt, for however short a period. In one sense it can be said that he obtains ‘credit’ or time to pay.”3
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1 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 616–617 (NSWLR). 2 See also: Lanham, “Obtaining a Financial Advantage by Deception in Victoria” (1977) 1 Crim LJ 188. 3 Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045 per Gray J at 1049.
[CA.178BA.180]
Sentencing
In R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994), a case involving offences under s 178BB, Simpson J made the following observations on sentencing “white collar crime”: … white collar crime itself is so various in its manifestations and nature that it is scarcely susceptible of precise definition or of defined sentencing principles. I do not read the cases cited as laying down any proposition of the inevitability of a full-time prison sentence in any case which could be brought within the description of “white collar crime.”1 In the same case Hunt CJ at CL said: I do not accept that it is appropriate to lay down any rule that, in all cases of serious white collar crime, a sentence other than a full-time custodial one by itself demonstrates error requiring a Crown appeal to be upheld. There is a wide range in the nature of white collar crimes and necessarily a wide range in the nature of the appropriate sentences to be imposed.2 In cases of premeditated deception the amount of money obtained is an important factor in determining the degree of criminality involved.3 1 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994) at 4. 2 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994) at 6. 3 R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430 at 435.
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[CA.178BB.80]
s 178BB
SUBDIVISION 11 – OBTAINING MONEY ETC BY FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS [REPEALED] [Subdiv 11 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[11]] [Subdiv 11 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[30]]
178BB
Obtaining money etc by false or misleading statements [Repealed]
CA
[S 178BB rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[11]; am Act 43 of 2000; Act 147 of 1997; insrt Act 95 of 1979, s 5 and Sch 1(4)]
SECTION 178BB COMMENTARY Indictment .................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BB.20] Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BB.60] Elements of the offence ............................................................................................................... [CA.178BB.80] (1) With intent to obtain for himself or another person ............................................................. [CA.178BB.120] (2) Money, valuable thing or financial advantage ...................................................................... [CA.178BB.140] (3) Made, published or concurred in making or publishing ....................................................... [CA.178BB.160] (4) Any statement (oral or written) ............................................................................................. [CA.178BB.180] (5)(i) Which is known to be false in a material particular .......................................................... [CA.178BB.200] (ii) Reckless disregard to falsity ................................................................................................. [CA.178BB.220] Generally .................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BB.240] Sentence .................................................................................................................................... [CA.178BB.280]
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[CA.178BB.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .......... in the said State, with intent to obtain for himself/herself [CD] (identify other person or a company etc) money [valuable thing] [financial advantage], namely the sum of $XX (or describe the valuable thing or financial advantage alleged) did make [publish] [concur in making] [concur in publishing] a statement (describe the statement made or published etc) which he knew to be false or misleading in a material particular, namely (describe nature of falsity) [which is false or misleading in a material particular namely, (describe the falsity alleged) and was made with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or is false or misleading in a material particular]. [CA.178BB.60] Jurisdiction (i) The offence may in certain specified circumstances be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: see s 475A. (ii) Offences committed before 1 September, 1995. – the offence may be dealt with summarily: see s 476(6)(d). – the offence shall be dealt with summarily if the property involved is less than $5 000: see s 496(1)(c). Note: Reduced penalties apply. (iii) Offences committed after 1 September, 1995 the offence shall be dealt with summarily unless: – if the value of the property does not exceed $5 000, the prosecutor elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: see Sch 1, Table 2, Pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. – if the value of the property exceeds $5 000, either the prosecutor or the accused person elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: Sch 1, Table 1, Pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.178BB.80] Elements of the offence That the accused: (1) with intent to obtain for herself or himself or another person, (2) any money, valuable thing or financial advantage,
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Crimes Act 1900 s 178BB
[CA.178BB.80]
(3) made, published or concurred in making or publishing, (4) an oral or written statement, (5) (i) which he or she knew to be false or misleading in a material particular; or (ii) which is false or misleading in a material particular and was made with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false or misleading in a material particular. [CA.178BB.120]
(1) With intent to obtain for himself or another person
In this section there is no requirement of a fraudulent or dishonest intention and therefore the only intention necessary is an intent to obtain money, a valuable thing or a financial advantage.1 Directions to the jury by the trial judge in relation to s 178BB should never suggest that dishonesty is not involved (as distinct from required) in the offence, for that may divert the jury from proper consideration of the seriousness of the actions of the accused.2 With regard to obtaining in s 178BA it has been held that the valuable thing (or financial advantage etc) must be capable of being “obtained”.3 As to obtaining money etc by deception, see s 178BA. As to obtaining property by false pretences, see s 179. “Person” includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.4 1 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) per Hunt CJ at CL (with whom Mahoney ACJ and Barr J agreed) at 22. 2 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) per Hunt CJ at CL at 23–24. 3 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR). 4 Interpretation Act 1987, section 21(1).
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[CA.178BB.140]
(2) Money, valuable thing or financial advantage
Money is defined in s 4 of the Act and “includes all coined money, whether current within New South Wales or not, and all bank notes or instruments ordinarily so called, if current, as such, and payable to the bearer”. In R v Hunt (1996) 88 A Crim R 307 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the meaning of the word “money” in the context of considering s 178A of the Crimes Act 1900. In that case the Crown framed a charge on the basis that the accused had received money. In fact the accused had initially received a cheque. The Court observed (at 317) that “the word money is capable of many meanings. The context in which it is used usually determines its meaning.” The Court found that despite the fact that the accused had received a cheque and subsequently money as proceeds of the cheque that the framing of the charge in terms of money, made the charge more understandable for the jury and the court and was permissible. The meaning of “valuable thing” was considered in R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416. It was held that the word “thing” could have a wide meaning but it was necessary that it be capable of being obtained and therefore the meaning did not extend to encompass control of property.1 In Victoria the concept of “financial advantage” has been considered and it was held that it is a simple one consisting of two common words of clear meaning. The words should be given their plain meaning and no narrow construction should be given to them: R v Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 at 81. 1 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 616–617 (NSWLR).
[CA.178BB.160]
(3) Made, published or concurred in making or publishing
The element of recklessness in s 178BB is confined to the making of a false or misleading statement as opposed to publishing or concurring in making or publishing a statement: R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 at 611. “Publish” is not defined in the Act. With regard to s 178BB“publish” has been said to mean to convey, by some means, the offending statement to the mind of another.1 The words “concurs in publishing” have been considered.2
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[CA.178BB.200]
s 178BB
The concept of “concurrence” is not co-extensive with the concept of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring (Crimes Act 1900, s 351) however s 351 still has scope to operate under s 178BB.3
[CA.178BB.180]
CA
1 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 363, referred to in R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605 at 609. 2 R v Connell (unreported, Seaman J, Supreme Court, (WA) 14 September 1992), whilst dealing with a provision similar to s 178BB, it was said that “to ‘concur’ for the purpose of the separate charges involves no more than the doing of an act which, together with the acts of other people who may behaving quite lawfully, brings about the publication of the accounts …”, applied in R v Lee (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) per Studdert J at 22. 3 R v Lee (unreported, CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) per Studdert J (with whom Priestley JA and Levine J agreed) at pp 22–23.
(4) Any statement (oral or written)
“Statement” is not defined in s 178BB or in the Crimes Act 1900. A statement may include pictorial or diagrammatic material.1 It has been held that on the proper construction of the section “statement” means a single statement. The effect of this decision is that each statement alleged to be false or misleading must be charged separately. A charge that alleges more than one statement will be duplicitous. It has been further held that there is some scope for the Crown to allege that a “statement” can be inferred from the existence a number of utterances and a course of conduct.2 1 Given v Pryor [1979] 39 FLR 437 at 440. 2 R v Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 per Spigelman CJ at [17]–[19].
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[CA.178BB.200]
(5)(i) Which is known to be false in a material particular
“It is now well established that the falsity of a statement may arise, not only because a fact therein alleged is falsely alleged, but because the statement, by omitting material facts, creates a false impression.”R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 204.1“The omission has to make that which is stated affirmatively untrue, untrue in the sense that it creates and intentionally an impression in the public, a belief in the public, which is wrong.”2“In order to ascertain the question whether this document is false in a material particular or in all material particulars, one may ask oneself this question: If the facts had been revealed or even clearly indicated, would any man of sense have put his money into the scheme?”3 See [CA.179.200]. “False pretence of fact” under s 179. It must only be shown that the accused knew that the statement was false but where an omission is alleged it must be shown that the accused appreciated that the omission created an impression that was not true, thereby making the statement false.4“The best and often the only way of proving that a statement was known to be false by the person who made it is to prove that he or she had the means of such knowledge. A jury is then entitled to draw what may be, in some circumstances, the irresistible inference that he or she had knowledge in fact.”5 See also [CA.179.260] with regard to knowledge of the falsity of a statement under s 179. The word “material” should be interpreted as requiring “no more and no less than that the false particular must be of moment or of significance, not merely trivial or inconsequential.”: R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199.6 A particular will be material if it was relevant to the purpose for which it was being made. It will be relevant to that purpose if it may be taken into account by the person to whom the statement is made in making any decision upon the matter in respect of which the statement was made. It is unnecessary that the statement be taken into account. What is involved is an objective assessment.7 Material falsity needs to be judged by a reading of the document as a whole.8 A statement, the truth of which goes directly or indirectly to influence whether or not an action is performed is a material statement.9 “The fact that the Crown was alleging that the statement was false in a number of particulars did not mean that several offences were being alleged. There was but one offence alleged, namely, the concurrence in the publishing of a statement knowing it to be false in a material particular, and the falsity of the statement
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Crimes Act 1900 s 178BB
[CA.178BB.200]
could be in one respect or in many respects”. In s 178BB however the reference to the definite article in the references to “material particularity” is such as to identify the fact that a single statement is being referred to on the section’s proper construction. Therefore, generally, it will not be appropriate to accumulate “false statements” in one indictment although will be categories of cases in which a single statement can be considered as one utterance or representation.10 Where, in the one count, the Crown charges a number of matters as together constituting the false or misleading statement the jury may need to be directed in the following manner: … where a number of matters are specified in the charge as together constituting one ingredient in the offence, and any one of them is capable of doing so, then it is enough to establish the ingredient that any one of them is proved; but … any such matter must be proved to the satisfaction of the whole of jury. The jury should be directed accordingly, and it should be made clear to them as well that they should be satisfied that the statement upon which they are agreed was an inducement as alleged.11
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The Crown should particularise in the charge the “material particular” which is allegedly false or misleading etc.12 1 A case in relation to s 176 of the Crimes Act 1900; see also R v Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83; R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176; R v Mackinnon [1959] 1 QB 150; Montgomery v Stewart (1967) 116 CLR 220 at 226–227. 2 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 at 183 (Cr App R). 3 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 at 187 (Cr App R). 4 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 at 183 (Cr App R). 5 R v Wicks (1936) 25 Cr App R 168 at 174 per du Parcq J. 6 R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 at 202 quoting from Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FCR 348 at 352. 7 R v Gervaise (unreported, CCA (NSW), 13 November 1997) at p 11. 8 R v Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83 at 447 (KB). See also Arnison v Smith (1989) 41 Ch D 348 per Halsbury LC at 369. 9 R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473; 27 A Crim R 271; R v Clogher [1999] NSWCCA 397 at [17]. 10 R v Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 at [17]–[19]. 11 R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 at 119. 12 John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508; (1987) 27 A Crim R 228; [1987] HCA 42 at 521 (CLR), see also 544 (CLR).
[CA.178BB.220]
(ii) Reckless disregard to falsity
In Pollard v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1992) 28 NSWLR 659; 63 A Crim R 383, Abadee J accepted a submission that the word “reckless”, used in the context of s 178BB, meant, “… a statement made not caring whether it was true or false, a statement made without an honest belief as to its truth …”.1 As noted above the element of recklessness in s 178BB is confined solely to the “making” of a false or misleading statement.2 1 (1992) 28 NSWLR 659; 63 A Crim R 383 at 674–675 (NSWLR). 2 R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605.
[CA.178BB.240] Generally Reference is made to a claim of right. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. Where the alleged false and misleading statements were contained in relation to a statement of claim in a civil suit the indictment was quashed on demurrer.1 For a summary offence in somewhat similar terms see s 527A.2 1 R v Jurca [1986] 6 NSWLR 491; 23 A Crim R 439. See also Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574 and Downey v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 371; cf R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256; 51 A Crim R 89.
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[CA.178C.40]
s 178C
2 See also Kassis v Katsantonis [1984] 3 NSWLR 330.
[CA.178BB.280]
Sentence
In the same case Hunt CJ at CL said: I do not accept that it is appropriate to lay down any rule that, in all cases of serious white collar crime, a sentence other than a full-time custodial one by itself demonstrates error requiring a Crown appeal to be upheld. There is a wide range in the nature of while collar crimes and necessarily a wide range in the nature of the appropriate sentences to be imposed.2 1 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994) at p 4. 2 R v Brown at p 6.
SUBDIVISION 12 – OBTAINING CREDIT BY FRAUD [REPEALED] [Subdiv 12 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[12]] [Subdiv 12 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[31]]
178C
Obtaining credit by fraud [Repealed]
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[S 178C rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[12]; insrt Act 70 of 1961, s 2]
SECTION 178C COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.178C.20] Indictment – obtaining credit by false pretence ............................................................................. [CA.178C.40] Indictment – obtaining credit by fraud ........................................................................................... [CA.178C.60] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.178C.80] Where no debt is incurred ........................................................................................................... [CA.178C.100] Any other fraud ............................................................................................................................ [CA.178C.120] Obtaining of credit ........................................................................................................................ [CA.178C.140] Intent ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.178C.160] Evidence of similar acts ............................................................................................................... [CA.178C.180]
[CA.178C.20]
Jurisdiction
Under certain circumstances the offence may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.178C.40]
Indictment – obtaining credit by false pretence
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid in incurring a debt or liability to JN obtained credit to the amount of fifty dollars from the said JN by falsely pretending that (state the false pretence).
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In R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 August 1994), a case involving offences under s 178BB, Simpson J made the following observations on sentencing “white collar crime”: … white collar crime itself is so various in its manifestations and nature that it is scarcely susceptible of precise definition or of defined sentencing principles. I do not read the cases cited as laying down any proposition of the inevitability of a full-time prison sentence in any case which could be brought within the description of “white collar crime”.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 178C
[CA.178C.40]
It has been said that an indictment which omits the false pretence is bad.1 The accused should be given particulars of the alleged false pretence.2 1 R v Thomas (1931) 23 Cr App R 21. 2 R v Perry (1945) 31 Cr App R 16.
[CA.178C.60]
Indictment – obtaining credit by fraud
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, in incurring a debt or liability to JN, obtained credit to the amount of fifty dollars by means of fraud, namely (state particulars of the fraud). As an example of obtaining credit by fraud, see R v McDonald.1 It has been said that a count in an indictment charging the accused with obtaining credit “by false pretences or by means of fraud” was to be regarded as charging only one offence and was not therefore bad for duplicity.2 This decision has been criticised and separate counts are to be preferred.3 1 R v McDonald [1933] VLR 214. 2 R v Perry (1945) 31 Cr App R 16. 3 R v Holmes [1958] Crim LR 394. See also R v Torr [1966] 1 WLR 52; [1966] 1 All ER 178; (1965) 50 Cr App R 73.
[CA.178C.80]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused incurred a debt or liability; and (2) in the course of such transaction obtained credit; Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
(3) by a false pretence (or by a wilfully false promise etc) with intent to defraud or by fraud. [CA.178C.100]
Where no debt is incurred
Where no debt is incurred, the accused cannot be convicted of this offence.1 1 R v Mitchell [1955] 1 WLR 1125; [1955] 3 All ER 263; (1955) 39 Cr App R 49. See also R v Garlick (1958) 42 Cr App R 141. Cf R v Leon [1945] KB 136; (1944) 30 Cr App R 128. See also R v Thornton [1964] 2 QB 176; (1962) 47 Cr App R 1.
[CA.178C.120]
Any other fraud
It has been said that because of the words of the section “by any other fraud” the word “other” shows that the false pretences must be fraudulent, that is, there must be an intent to defraud.1 It is a clear misdirection to tell the jury that an intent to defraud need not be proved.2 As to bankrupts, see R v Rowlands.3 1 R v Muirhead (1908) 1 Cr App R 189. 2 R v Brownlow (1910) 4 Cr App R 131. 3 R v Rowlands (1882) 8 QBD 530.
[CA.178C.140]
Obtaining of credit
“Obtaining of credit” connotes the obtaining of credit in respect of payment or repayment of money and has no wider meaning.1 Where a person purchases goods and sends the money to the vendor, but the vendor does not hand over the goods he has not “obtained credit”; but if the purchaser hands over the purchase-money on arrangement that the goods shall not be delivered till some time in the future, the vendor does “obtain credit”.2 The section should not be used when there is no real evidence of fraud, merely of procrastination.3 It must be shown that the accused obtained credit for himself.4
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[CA.178C.180]
s 178C
Obtaining a loan may be obtaining credit within the section.5 Credit may be obtained even though security for the debt is given.6 Obtaining goods in exchange for valueless cheques is not within the section.7 A person who without means orders a meal in a restaurant (although he makes no verbal representation at the time of his ability to pay for the meal) may be convicted under this section.8 Where the accused obtained possession of goods under a contract for purchase on credit which ab initio he had no intention of performing, he was guilty of an offence under this section.9 To constitute the offence of obtaining credit there must be fraud by a misstatement of existing fact as distinguished from a mere promise or statement about the future.11 Buying goods without any intention of paying for them may be evidence of “fraud other than false pretences”.12
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1 Raven v Fisher [1964] AC 210; (1963) 47 Cr App R 174, overruling R v Ingram [1956] 2 QB 424; (1956) 40 Cr App R 115. See also Osborn v Barton (1950) 66 TLR 115; R v Coyne (1905) 69 JP 151; R v Pryce (1949) 34 Cr App R 21; R v Laker (1949) 34 Cr App R 36; R v Juby (1886) 16 Cox CC 160. 2 R v Dawson [1960] 1 WLR 163; [1960] 1 All ER 558; (1960) 44 Cr App R 87. 3 R v Dawson [1960] 1 WLR 163; [1960] 1 All ER 558; (1960) 44 Cr App R 87. 4 R v Hamer [1954] Crim LR 209; R v Bryant (1899) 63 JP 376; R v Steel (1910) 5 Cr App R 289. 5 R v Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618. See also R v Pryce (1949) 34 Cr App R 21; R v Laker (1949) 34 Cr App R 36; R v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151. 6 R v Fryer (1912) 7 Cr App R 183. 7 R v Cosnett (1901) 20 Cox CC 6. 8 R v Jones [1898] 1 QB 119. 9 R v McDonald [1933] VLR 214. 10 R v Street [1960] VR 669. 11 R v Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618. 12 R v Thompson (1910) 5 Cr App R 9.
[CA.178C.160]
Intent
The criminal intent involved in the offence is the intent to cheat another out of a position of economic safety into a position of risk involved in giving credit: it is not an intent to defraud another of some material thing.1 As to the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. Reference is made to a claim of right. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. 1 R v Kelly [1934] VLR 29.
[CA.178C.180]
Evidence of similar acts
Evidence of similar acts committed by the accused at a period immediately preceding the commission of that charged in the indictment is admissible for the prosecution in order to prove intent or negative mistake.1 Such evidence should be confined, however, to similar transactions.2 1 R v Wyatt [1904] 1 KB 188. 2 R v Baird (1915) 11 Cr App R 186. See also R v Hurren (1962) 46 Cr App R 323.
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CA
The words “obtain credit” mean a deferment of a liability to pay.10
Crimes Act 1900 s 179
[CA.179.20]
SUBDIVISION 13 – FALSE PRETENCES [REPEALED] [Subdiv 13 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]] [Subdiv 13 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[32]]
179
False pretences etc [Repealed]
[S 179 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 179 COMMENTARY
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Indictments – Obtaining property by false pretences ....................................................................... [CA.179.20] Indictment – Obtaining property partly by false pretence and partly by wilfully false promise ....... [CA.179.40] Indictment – Obtaining property by wilfully false promise ................................................................ [CA.179.60] Form of indictment ............................................................................................................................ [CA.179.80] Cross reference .............................................................................................................................. [CA.179.100] Jurisdiction ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.179.120] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................. [CA.179.160] False pretence of fact ..................................................................................................................... [CA.179.200] 1. (ii) False promises and (iii) partly by false pretences and false promises ................................ [CA.179.220] Cases involving cheques ................................................................................................................ [CA.179.240] 2. Knowledge by accused that pretence was false ........................................................................ [CA.179.260] 3. Obtaining property ...................................................................................................................... [CA.179.280] 4. Intent to defraud ......................................................................................................................... [CA.179.300] Locus of the offence ....................................................................................................................... [CA.179.320]
[CA.179.20]
Indictments – Obtaining property by false pretences
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did falsely pretend to CD that a certain written paper (or paper partly written and partly printed) then produced by the said AB, purporting to be a cheque drawn by the said AB (or drawn by one EF) upon the (Commonwealth Trading Bank, Sydney) for payment to the bearer of the sum of one hundred dollars, was a genuine and available order for the payment of the sum of one hundred dollars, and was then of that value, and that he/she the said AB then had money in the hands of the said bank (for paying the said cheque) by means of which false pretences the said AB did then obtain from the said CD (a refrigerator or money in the sum of one hundred dollars) the property of the said CD with intent to defraud. That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did falsely pretend to CD that he/she the said AB was the servant of EF and that he/she the said AB had been sent by the said EF to obtain from the said CD (certain timber) and was then authorised by the said EF to receive the same from the said CD by means of which false pretence the said AB did then obtain from the said JN the said (timber) the property of the said CD with intent to defraud. [CA.179.40]
Indictment – Obtaining property partly by false pretence and partly by wilfully false promise
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did falsely pretend to CD that he/she the said AB then was an offıcer in the navy, and held an appointment in the public service, and the said AB did then make to the said CD the following wilfully false promise, that is to say, that if the said CD would supply her/him with a suit of clothes he/she the said CD would within the next three months pay him for the same, by means partly of which false pretences and partly by means of which false promise the said AB did on the day and year aforesaid obtain from the said CD a suit of clothes, the property of the said CD with intent to defraud.
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Indictment – Obtaining property by wilfully false promise
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, did make to CD the following wilfully false promise, that is to say, that he/she, the said AB, upon receiving from the said CD the sum of two hundred dollars, would forthwith obtain and deliver to the said CD one hundred cartons of cigarettes, by means of which wilfully false promise the said AB did then obtain from the said CD money to the amount of two hundred dollars, the property of the said CD with intent to defraud. Form of indictment
It is essential that the false pretence be set out in the indictment with sufficient certainty.1 An indictment is good which states that the false pretence was made to all the Queen’s subjects, for example, by an advertisement in a newspaper.2 Where the words “with intent to defraud” were omitted from the indictment the Crown was permitted to amend.3 Two or more pretences may be laid in the one count of false pretences: it is enough to sustain a conviction if any one of the pretences is proved and relied thereon as an inducing cause in itself.4
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The property may be laid in the person entitled to possession as in larceny: thus an accused may be charged with obtaining his own property by false pretences from his bailee.5 It is not necessary on a charge of obtaining money by false pretences either to allege or prove whose the property was: it is sufficient to show that it does not belong to the accused.6 A charge of false pretences may be sustained even though the attempt to defraud contained an element of impossibility.7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v
Thomas (1931) 23 Cr App R 21. Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766. Fraser (1923) 17 Cr App R 182. See also R v Baxter [1927] SASR 321. Infirri (1981) 5 A Crim R 132. Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347. Halliday (1868) 5 Wyatt, Webb & a’Beckett (L) 33. Gulyas (1985) 2 NSWLR 260; 15 A Crim R 472.
[CA.179.100]
Cross reference
As to causing payment by a false pretence, see s 180. As to falsely pretending title, see s 181. As to fraudulent personation, see s 184. As to fraudulently inducing persons to execute instruments, see s 185. As to fraudulent arrangements, see s 185A. Various statutes create both indictable and summary offences for fraudulent acts and statements. On a trial for false pretences there may be a conviction for larceny: s 183. A conspiracy to cheat and defraud is an indictable offence at common law. Cheating at games or cards is deemed to be obtaining money by false pretences: s 18 of the Unlawful Gambling Act 1998. [CA.179.120] Jurisdiction (i) The offence may in certain specified circumstances be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: see s 475A. (ii) Offences committed before 1 September 1995 – the offence may be dealt with summarily: see s 476(6)(d). – the offence shall be dealt with summarily if the property involved is less than $5 000: see s 496(1)(c). Note: Reduced penalties apply. (iii) Offences committed after 1 September 1995 the offence shall be dealt with summarily unless: – if the value of the property does not exceed $5 000 the prosecutor elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: see s 20 and Table 2 to Sch 1, Criminal Procedure Act 1986; – if the value of the property exceeds $5 000, either the prosecutor or the accused person elects for the case to be dealt with on indictment: s 20 and Table 1 to Sch 1, Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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[CA.179.80]
Crimes Act 1900 s 179
[CA.179.120]
[CA.179.160] Elements of the offence (1) that the accused made: (i) a false pretence of fact, or (ii) a wilfully false promise, or (iii) a partly false pretence and a partly false promise to some other person; (2) which he or she knew to be false; (3) whereby means of such pretence (wilfully false promise etc) he or she obtained property; (4) with an intent to defraud.1
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1 R v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48. It is not necessary to allege an intent to defraud any particular person: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
[CA.179.200] False pretence of fact To constitute a false pretence within the meaning and intent of s 179 of the Crimes Act 1900–1946, the false statement must be one of a material existing fact. A mere promise to do some act in the future is not sufficient. This statement of the law was made in New South Wales in the case of R v Lutze,1 and adhered to in later decisions.2 Since this decision s 179 was amended. The case for the prosecution is that when the appellant entered into each of the contracts in this case, he thereby impliedly represented that he intended to carry it out whereas in fact he had no such intention. It is of course undisputed that to constitute a false pretence the false statement must be of an existing fact. The prosecution contend that a statement of present intention, although it relates to the future, is a statement of existing fact. That was the view expressed by Bowen LJ in his celebrated dictum in Edgington v Fitzmaurice: “There must be a misstatement of an existing fact: but the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s mind is, therefore, a mistatement of fact”. Edgington v Fitzmaurice3 was an action for deceit. Whatever the position may be in civil cases, we are satisfied that a long course of authorities in criminal cases has laid it down that a statement of intention about future conduct, whether or not it be a statement of existing fact, is not such a statement as will amount to a false pretence in criminal law.4 A lie about an existing fact told for a fraudulent purpose is a false pretence.5 Language in the form of hope or expectation may be used in such a way as to form a representation as to an existing fact.6 Merely extravagant advertisements may not amount to false pretences,7 but misstatements as to quality and weight of goods may.8 The false pretence need not be made to the person from whom the property was obtained, provided it is shown that the pretence operated on such person’s mind.9 False pretences were established in the following cases (the list is not exhaustive): false statement by a carrier that he had delivered goods to a consignee and lost the receipt,10 that a document was a lease for a number of years,11 that the accused was a single man and able to contract a valid marriage with the prosecutrix,12 that the accused was a medical practitioner,13 that the accused was a captain in the Guards,14 that mortgaged property was unencumbered,15 that a one pound note was a five pound note,16 that a counterfeit note was genuine,17 that a worthless cheque was a valuable security,18 that a forged document was genuine,19 that the accused was authorised to order goods on another’s behalf20 that the accused was carrying on a genuine business activity or that such business activity was extensive,21 that a particular amount of money was owed to the accused (or someone else) by the prosecutor (or someone else)22 that the accused had done work which he had not done,23 that the accused had a good title to sell a car which was in fact still subject to a hire purchase agreement24 posing as a dealer25 that the accused held share in an
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existing company26 that the accused was a prostitute and had a room available.27 A mere expression of opinion, or statement on a point of law does not of itself constitute a false pretence: there must be a representation as to an existing fact.28 If a misrepresentation of an existing fact is accompanied by a promise, the promise does not prevent the misrepresentation from being a false pretence.29
1 (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 86. 2 Greene v The King (1949) 79 CLR 353 per Rich J at p 359. Reference was made also to R v Thorland (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 412; 1 WN 78 and R v Patmoy (1994) 62 WN (NSW) 1. See now R v Justelius [1973] 1 NSWLR 471. 3 4 5 6 7 8
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28
(1885) 29 Ch D 459 at 483. R v Dent [1955] 2 QB 590 at 595 per Devlin J. R v Woolley (1980) 3 Carrington & Kirwan 98. Aarons Reefs Ltd v Twiss [1896] AC 273; R v Kylsant (Lord) [1932] 1 KB 442; [1931] All ER 179; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83; R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176; R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195. R v Bryan [1857] Dearsly & Bell 265; R v Williamson (1869) 21 LT 444; R v Levine and Wood (1867) 10 Cox CC 374; R v Lewis (1869) 11 Cox CC 404. R v Ardley [1871] LR 1 CCR 301; R v Foster (1877) 2 QBD 301; R v Kenrick (1843) 5 QB 49; R v Sherwood [1857] Dearsly & Bell 251; R v Lee [1864] Leigh & Cave 418; R v Dundas (1853) 6 Cox CC 380; R v Suter and Coulson (1867) 17 LT 177; R v Ball [1842] Carrington & Marshman 249; R v Stevens (1844) 3 LTOS 22; R v Abbott (1847) 1 Denison 273; R v Dark (1847) 1 Denison 276; R v Garlick (1847) 1 Denison 276; R v Roebuck [1856] Dearsly & Bell 24; R v Sanders [1919] 1 KB 550; R v Patmoy (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 127. R v Brown (1847) 2 Cox CC 348; R v Butcher [1858] Bell CC 6. See also R v Douglass (1808) 7 Carrington & Payne 785, n; 212 (servant); R v Moseley [1861] Leigh & Cave 92 (agent); R v Rouse, Billingsley and Bayes (1849) 4 Cox CC 7 (secretary and treasurer of society); R v Garner (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 137 (child). R v Airey (1801) 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 30. R v Gruby and Viner (1845) 5 LTOS 538. R v Copeland [1842] Carrington & Marshman 516. Cf R v Sawyer [1936] VLR 1. R v Bloomfield [1842] Carrington & Marshman 537. R v Hamilton (1845) 1 Cox CC 244. R v Meakin (1869) 20 LT 544; R v Sampson (1885) 52 LT 772; R v Britcher (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 121. R v Jessop (1858) Dearsly & Bell 442. R v Coulson & Rusting (1850) 1 Denison 592. R v Dowey (1868) 37 LJMC 52; R v Hazelton (1874) LR 2 CCR 134; R v Jarman (1878) 14 Cox CC 111; R v Smith (1853) 6 Cox 314; R v Walne (1870) 11 Cox CC 647. R v Prince (1868) LR 1 CCR 150. R v Franklin (1864) 4 Foster & Finlason 94. R v Crab (1868) 11 Cox CC 85; R v Cooper [1877] 2 QBD 510; R v King [1897] 1 QB 214; R v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 77; R v Sugar [1914] 3 KB 1112; R v Randell (1887) 16 Cox CC 335; R v Mosley [1924] 2 KB 187. R v Woolley (1850) 1 Denison 559; R v Leonard (1848) 1 Denison 304; R v Barnes (1850) 2 Denison 59; R v Witchell (1798) 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 830; R v Taylor (1883) 15 Cox CC 268; R v Oates (1855) Dearsly CC 459; R v Thorland (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 412; 1 WN 78. R v Rigby (1858) 7 Cox CC 507; R v Hunter; R v Carter (1867) 10 Cox CC 642. R v Deller (1952) 36 Cr App R 184. See also R v Paynter (1908) 25 TLR 191; R v Alexandra (1937) 26 Cr App R 116. R v Mack (1909) 2 Cr App R 114. R v Pearce [1904] QSR 243. R v Caslin [1961] 1 WLR 59; [1961] 1 All ER 246; (1960) 45 Cr App R 47. R v Brien (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 154. See also R v Lotze (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 86; R v Murphy (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 191; Cf R v Britcher (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 121.
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The false pretence may be by conduct with or without the use of any spoken word30 but there must be deceit spoken, written or acted.31
Crimes Act 1900 s 179
[CA.179.200]
29 R v Fry (1858) Dearsly & Bell 449; R v West (1858) Dearsly & Bell 575; R v Bates & Pugh (1848) 3 Cox CC 201; R v Jennison (1862) Leigh & Cave 157. 30 “A man may look a lie, nod a lie, smile a lie”. See R v Barnard (1837) 7 Carr & P 784; R v Story (1805) Russell & Ryan 81; R v Jackson (1813) 3 Campbell 370; R v Freeth (1807) Russell & Ryan 127; R v Goss (1860) Bell 208; R v Hazelton (1874) LR 2 CCR 134; R v Bull (1877) 13 Cox CC 608; R v Jarman (1878) 14 Cox CC 111; R v Hunter (1867) 10 Cox CC 642; R v Powell (1884) 15 Cox CC 568. 31 R v Jones [1898] 1 QB 119.
[CA.179.220]
1. (ii) False promises and (iii) partly by false pretences and false promises
The alternative forms of the offence created by s 179 are that the accused obtained property with intent to defraud, by a wilfully false promise, or partly by a false pretence and partly by a wilfully false promise.
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In the section, the word “wilfully”has the meaning of “consciously and intentionally”1 and the word “false” has the meaning of “lying, deceitful, dishonest”.2 A promise which is meant to and does create the impression that the promisor intends that the promise shall be performed by him is deceitful if in fact he has not that intention at the time of the promise. He may lack that intention because he has decided not to perform it, or because he does not believe, at the time when he makes the promise, that he will be able to perform it. In either case the promise is wilfully false. The mere fact that the promise was not performed does not justify the inference that the promisor did not have the intention that it should be performed; that conclusion is one of fact, and whether or not it should be drawn must depend on the evidence in each case. If the promise was made in reckless disregard of the likelihood of the promisor’s being able to keep it, that circumstance may justify a conclusion that he did not have the intention to do so, but again that is an inference of fact, and whether it should be drawn must be determined in the light of the evidence in each case.3 For further commentary as to the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80]. As a matter of proof of a false promise, I do not think that a case could fail merely because, for example, the word “promise” was not used by the defrauder. Any words used, whether by way of assurance, representation, promise, warrant or undertaking or otherwise, would be sufficient provided the jury are satisfied that the intention in uttering the words was to defraud and there was no intention on the part of the accused either to bring about or to cause to be brought about the future state of affairs, or which were known by him to be unlikely to occur, provided always that what was said by the accused did act as an inducement causing the victim to part with his property. A “promise” may be inferred from the undertaking or representation that something will come about; a typical example is a proposal of marriage, couched in the term “will you be mine?” Whilst it may include a contractual promise, I do not think that the word was used by the legislature in any technical sense as sometimes appears in the law of contract where sometimes fine analysis of words is necessary to determine whether statements are promissory (so as to give rise to liability on a contractual basis) or merely representational.4 Apparently the promise made by the accused does not have to relate to, or be based upon, some lawful or legally enforceable consideration.5“Where two persons conspire together to accomplish an unlawful purpose, and one, by false pretences, obtains money from the other, and parts with it in furtherance of the unlawful purpose, a prosecution will be against him, on the complaint of the other party, for obtaining money under false pretences, notwithstanding the guilt of the party complaining.”6 1 Cf R v Senior [1899] 1 QB 283 at 290; R v Ryan (1914) 10 Cr App R 4; R v Petch (1909) 2 Cr App R 71 at 72; R v Hatton [1925] 2 KB 322; R v Walker (1934) 24 Cr App R 117 at 122. 2 Cf English & Scottish Co-operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Societies Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440 at 452 per Slesser L J. 3 R v Harrison [1957] VR 117 at 120, 121 per Barry J. 4 R v Freeman [1981] 2 NSWLR 686; 4 A Crim R 55 at 695 (NSWLR), 65 (A Crim R), per Begg J. 5 R v B (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 497; 70 WN 294.
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6 Re Cummins (1891) 25 Amer Rep 291 quoted with approval by Herron J in R v B (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 497; 70 WN 294 at 301 (WN).
[CA.179.240]
Cases involving cheques
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The fraudulent giving of a post-dated cheque, the accused having no sufficient funds when the cheque was drawn, and having no reason to expect any on the day of the date of the cheque is a false pretence.2 Although the mere giving of a past-dated valueless cheque, without more, may amount only to the making of a false promise, any circumstances which show that the accused so spoke or acted as to lead the person cashing the cheque to believe it was a good and valid order for payment at the time of delivery, will be evidence of the making of a false representation of an existing fact and thus a false pretence.3 All these cases show, in our opinion, that where a cheque, whether dated as on the day of issue or post-dated, is given, the person issuing the cheque does by implication make a representation (unless of course there is evidence otherwise) that he believes it to be a good cheque, that is to say one that will be honoured on presentation in due course, and that he has presently a reasonable expectation of having sufficient funds available at the time of presentation to meet the cheque. It can, we think, make no difference in principle that in one case the time of presentation for payment may be very short perhaps an hour or so, while in the other case the period of post-dating might result in the cheque not being presented for perhaps a month or longer. In either case all that he must do is to see that funds are available when the cheque is presented, although where a cheque is dated on the day of issue it may be reasonable, if the circumstances warrant such a view, to conclude that he is also representing that, at the moment of delivery, sufficient funds to meet the cheque are lying to his credit in the bank. Much of the difficulty in connection with post-dated cheques has, we think, arisen because of the habit of laying the false pretence as it was laid here, that is, that a certain cheque was a good and valid order for the payment of the amount of the cheque. The authorities we have cited make it clear that a pretence so laid is in form sufficient to sustain a conviction for false pretences where it is established that the prisoner never had any reasonable expectation of being able to meet the cheque and that the giving of the cheque was a fraudulent device intended to deprive another of his property. But we think it would be desirable that those who draw these indictments should, in addition to using the old formula, lay the pretence with more particularity and set out what it is that is alleged to be the representation or pretence of an existing fact upon which reliance is placed. A formula such as “that he then presently had a genuine expectation on reasonable grounds that the cheque would be met on the due date”, or “a genuine expectation on reasonable grounds that on the day of he would have sufficient funds or credit available to meet the cheque” would in most cases suffice, but of course, every case must depend on its own circumstances. Much of the diffiuclty arises from the use of the words that “a certain paper and writing was a good and valid order”. Normally, it might be thought that to be a good and valid order when given it must be such that it would be paid, whereas, of course, the post-dating precludes this from being done, even if money were available in the account.4 1 R v Hughes (1858) 1 Foster & Finlason 355; R v Hazelton (1874) LR 2 CCR 134; R v Giles (1865) Leigh & Cave 502. 2 R v Miller (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 185. 3 R v Hattam (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 410; 30 WN (NSW) 118. 4 R v Kuff [1962] VR 578 at 588–589. In its joint judgment the Victorian Full Court discussed R v Bathurst (1870) 1 AJR 40; R v Parker (1837) 2 Moody 1; R v Apfel (1872) 3 VR (L) 172; R v Hughes (1858) 1 Foster & Finlason 355; R v Barnard (1837) 7 Carr & P 784; R v Miller (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 185; R v Muston (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 357; R v Hattam (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 410; 30 WN (NSW) 118; Smith v Elder [1955] NZLR 12; R v Walne (1870) 11 Cox CC 647; R v Miller [1955] NZLR 1038; R v Maytum-White (1957) 42 Cr App R 165. See also R v Gilmartin [1983] 1 All ER 829; R v Free (1983) 9 A Crim R 362; R v Stacey (1985) 20 A Crim R 45.
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A statement that a cheque will be paid on presentation is a statement as to an existing fact and amounts to a representation that the cheque is a good and valid order for the payment of the sum stated thereon.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 179 [CA.179.260]
[CA.179.240] 2. Knowledge by accused that pretence was false
It must be shown that the pretence was in fact untrue and was false to the knowledge of the accused.1 The burden of proving knowledge lies on the Crown.2“The best and often the only way of proving that a statement was known to be false by the person who made it is to prove that he had the means of such knowledge. A jury is then entitled to draw what may be, in some circumstances, the irresistable inference that he had knowledge in fact.”3 The pretence must be knowingly false at the time it is made.4 In civil matters an untrue statement, as to the truth or falsity of which the man who makes it has no belief, is fraudulent,5 but in criminal matters mere recklessness in making a statement is not sufficient proof; there must be evidence form which the accused’s knowledge of its falsity may be inferred.6 Where there was a duty or obligation on the accused to speak and he or she remained silent with the intention of inducing another party to act upon the belief that his silence indicated he had nothing relevant to say, this may be fraud.7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48. R v Wicks (1936) 25 Cr App R 168 at 174 per du Parcq J. R v Wicks (1936) 25 Cr App R 168. R v Dutt (1912) 8 Cr App R 51. Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187 at 203; Derry v Peak (1889) 14 App Cas 377 at 374. R v Summerskill (1918) 13 Cr App R 170. Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925 at 950. See R v Hopley (1915) 11 Cr App R 248.
[CA.179.280]
3. Obtaining property
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As to definition of “property”, see s 4. It is not necessary that the property should be delivered to the accused; it is sufficient that the property passes from the person defrauded: see s 180. The indictment must allege and the evidence must establish that the accused either for himself or for some other named person unlawfully obtained property by means of the alleged false pretences. Section 179 is not directed to the technical concept of property but rather to the physical custody; “obtaining property” means translation of physical custody.1 To obtain a gift of money by a false pretence or to obtain a loan of money or a valuable security may come within the section.2 If the mind of the person defrauded was influenced by the false pretence, it does not matter that he or she was influenced by other circumstances as well,3 or that he or she had the means of finding out whether the pretence was true or not.4 It is sufficient if part only of the false pretence is proved, so long as that which is proved operated upon the mind of the person defrauded.5 The pretence alleged and proved must not be too remote form the obtaining.6 The pretence may be made on several different occasions in different conversations7 or the pretence may be a continuing one.8 The false pretence must be made before the property is obtained.9 If at the time when the chattel was obtained the owner knew that the pretence was false, the accused cannot be convicted of this offence10 but he may be convicted of an attempt.11 The fact that the person defrauded believed the false pretence may be proved by asking her or him in the witness box what opinion he or she formed as to the accused’s statements or conduct which constituted the pretence.12 The property obtained must be something which is capable of being stolen.13 It is not necessary that the property should be in existence at the time that the pretence is made, provided that the subsequent obtaining of the chattel is directly linked with the false pretence.14 There must be an intention on the part of the person defrauded to part with the ownership of the property and not merely the possession thereof.15 It is not however necessary to prove that the property in the goods passed to the accused,16 as the passing of the property from the possession of the person defrauded is
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[CA.179.300]
s 179
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1 R v Petronius-Kuff [1983] 3 NSWLR 178; (1978) 8 A Crim R 18. See also R v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347. 2 R v Jones (1850) 1 Denison 551; R v Burgon (1856) Dearsly & Bell 11. 3 R v Lince (1873) 12 Cox CC 451. See also R v Hewgill (1854) Dearsly CC 315; R v Lambassi [1927] VLR 349; R v Cameron (1991) 57 A Crim R 406. 4 R v Jessop (1858) Dearsly & Bell 442; R v Woolley (1850) 1 Denison 559; R v Wickham (1839) 10 Adolphus & Ellis 34. 5 R v Lince (1873) 12 Cox CC 451. See also R v Ady (1835) 7 Car & P 140; R v Perrott (1814) 2 Maule & Selwyn 379; R v Hill (1811) Russ & Ry 190; R v Gibson (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 282; 47 WN (NSW) 119; R v Kuff [1962] VR 578. 6 R v Gardner (1856) Dearsly & Bell 40; R v Bryan (1861) 2 Fos & Fin 567. See also R v Martin (1867) LR 1 CCR 56; 36 LJMC 20; R v Burton (1886) 16 Cox CC 62; R v King [1987] 2 WLR 746. 7 R v Welman (1853) Dearsly 188. 8 R v Greathead (1878) 14 Cox CC 108; R v Moreton (1913) 109 LT 417. 9 R v Brooks (1859) 1 Fos & Fin 502; R v Steels (1867) 11 Cox CC 5. 10 R v Mills (1857) Dearsly & Bell 205; R v Korff (1852) Legge 716. Cf R v Ady (1835) 7 Car & P 140. 11 R v Roebuck (1856) Dearsly & Bell 24; R v Hensler (1870) 11 Cox CC 570. 12 R v King [1897] 1 QB 214. 13 R v Robinson (1859) Bell CC 34. 14 R v Martin (1867) LR 1 CCR 56; 36 LJMC 20. 15 R v Wilks (1914) 10 Cr App R 16. As to the distinction between larceny by a trick and false pretences see R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. 16 R v Sanders [1919] 1 KB 550. Cf R v Smalley [1963] Qd R 508; R v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347. 17 R v O’Sullivan [1925] VLR 514. 18 Folkes v King [1923] 1 KB 282; Lambell v Moore [1929] VLR 149. See also R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80.
[CA.179.300]
4. Intent to defraud
The indictment must allege and the evidence must show, that the act of making a false pretence and obtaining property thereby was done with intent to defraud.1 Proof of the falsity of the pretence and that the accused knew it was false is prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud, but it is not sufficient if the facts show that there was no such intent.2 Similarly the intention to defraud may be inferred from the facts of the case.3 Thus where property is obtained by false pretences there is prima facie an intent to defraud.4 There may be intent to defraud even though the accused did not intend ultimately to cheat the owner out of his property.5 It is not necessary that the accused should have intended to use the property for purposes different from those for which the victim of his deceit understood he would use it before he can be held to have an intent to defraud. The words “with intent to defraud” make it necessary to establish that the accused made the false pretence with the intention of inducing another person to part with property.6 The resort to deceit and falsehood to obtain money for purposes for which an accused knows approval will not be given, and the taking and using of such money in that fashion, is equivalent to taking it with intent to defraud.7 Unless the court is satisfied that the accused had an intent to defraud the offence is not made out.8 Therefore the jury should be directed as to the necessity of finding and intent to defraud.9 To prove intent evidence may be given that the accused in a series of connected acts obtained or attempted to obtain other property from the same or other persons by means of similar false pretences.10 Reference is made to a claim of right. For detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200].
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sufficient.17 If the owner of goods intends not to pass the property in them but to confer on the person to whom he or she gives possession the power to pass the property, it may be a case of obtaining property by false pretences.18
Crimes Act 1900 s 180
[CA.179.300]
It is not necessary to allege an intent to defraud any particular person: Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 1 R v Bennett (Berkeley Bernard) (1914) 9 Cr App R 146; R v O’Sullivan [1925] VLR 514. 2 R v Williams (1836) 7 Car & P 354; 173 ER 132. See also R v Stone (1858) 1 Fos & Fin 311; R v Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618. 3 R v Ferguson (1913) 9 Cr App R 113; R v Hopley (1915) 11 Cr App R 248. See also R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82; Tan v The Queen [1979] WAR 149. 4 R v Hammerson (1914) 10 Cr App R 121. 5 R v Hamilton (1845) 1 Cox CC 244; R v Naylor (1865) LR 1 CCR 4. 6 Balcombe v De Simoni (1972) 126 CLR 576. See also R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210; R v Aylen (1987) 49 SASR 254. 7 R v Pellow (1856) 73 WN (NSW) 478. 8 R v Gray (1891) 17 Cox CC 299; R v Hunt (1918) 13 Cr App R 155; R v Pickup (1931) 22 Cr App R 186 distinguished in R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82. See also R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102. 9 R v Ferguson (1913) 9 Cr App R 113; R v Secombe (1917) 12 Cr App R 275; R v Summerskill (1918) 13 Cr App R 170; R v Baker (1923) 17 Cr App R 190; R v Renton (1925) 19 Cr App R 33; R v Kay (1925) 19 Cr App R 42; R v Smith (1931) 22 Cr App R 180; R v Pickup (1931) 22 Cr App R 186; R v Moss (1931) 23 Cr App R 132; R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82; R v Williams [1953] 1 QB 660. See also R v Gibson (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 282; 47 WN (NSW) 119. 10 R v Roebuck (1856) Dearsly & Bell 24; R v Francis (1874) LR 2 CCR 128; R v Cooper (1875) 1 QBD 19; R v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 77; R v Boothby (1933) 24 Cr App R 112; R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758; R v Wyatt [1904] 1 KB 188; R v Simmonds (1909) 2 Cr App R 303; R v Fisher [1910] 1 KB 149; R v Charlesworth (1910) 4 Cr App R 167; R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746; R v Starkie [1922] 2 KB 275; (1922) 16 Cr App R 61; R v Deighton [1954] Crim LR 208.
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[CA.179.320]
Locus of the offence
If the false pretence is made within the jurisdiction and property is posted here for delivery in a foreign country, the accused can be convicted here.1 If the property is obtained here, the accused can be convicted here, although the false pretence is made outside the jurisdiction.2 Where the accused posted a letter in Victoria containing a false pretence to a person in Tasmania, it was held that he could be properly convicted in Victoria.3 In R v Kron, a case dealing with s 178BA, it was held that, wherever the deception took place, in order to establish jurisdiction it was necessary for the Crown to prove that the money, (valuable thing, or financial advantage) was obtained in NSW.4 1 R v Stoddart (1909) 2 Cr App R 217; R v Baxter [1972] QB 1. 2 R v Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230; R v Holmes (1883) 12 QBD 23; Secretary of State for Trade v Markus [1975] 1 All ER 958; Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909. See now s 3A. 3 R v Waugh [1909] VLR 379. Cf R v Collins (1986) 42 SASR 47. On appeal 44 SASR 214. 4 R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 476–477.
180
Causing payment etc by false pretence etc [Repealed]
[S 180 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 180 COMMENTARY [CA.180.20]
Causing payment to another by a false pretence, etc
See generally [CA.179.20] to [CA.179.320]. Section 180 does not create a new substantive offence but is a definition or evidentiary section. Its purpose is to overcome some of the very difficulties which have been discussed in the cases as to what
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[CA.181.40]
s 182
1 R v Crowley (1963) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 238 at 242 per Herron CJ. In the course of his judgment Herron CJ referred to R v Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230; R v Waugh [1909] VLR 379; R v Kilham (1870) LR 1 CCR 261; R v Ball [1951] 2 KB 109; (1951) 35 Cr App R 24; R v Lurie [1951] WN 493; 2 All ER 704; (1951) 35 Cr App R 113; R v Scheer [1923] 2 DLR 402; R v Cox [1923] NZLR 596; R v McReynolds [1935] NZLR 944; R v Miller [1955] NZLR 1038; R v Arnold (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 347; R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80. See also R v Petronius-Kuff [1983] 3 NSWLR 178; (1978) 8 A Crim R 18; R v Lawson (1996) 86 A Crim R 111.
181
False pretence of title [Repealed]
[S 181 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 147 of 1997]
SECTION 181 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.181.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.181.40]
[CA.181.20]
Indictment
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That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did falsely represent to JN that he or she the said AB had a good title to and lawful right to sell certain sheep, to wit, one hundred sheep, by means of which false representation the said AB then did obtain from the said JN the sum of two hundred dollars of the moneys of the said JN with intent to defraud. [CA.181.40]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that the accused falsely and knowingly represented; (2) that he or she had a title or right to certain property, or the right to convey or dispose of such property; (3) thereby obtaining other property; (4) with intent to defraud. It had previously been held that no allegation of title by a seller, however false, could be a false pretence being a matter of law or opinion and not a representation as to an existing fact.1 1 R v Lotze (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 86. See also R v Timperon (No 2) (1976) 15 SASR 1.
182 Accused may be convicted on a charge of false pretences etc though property obtained partly by a false promise [Repealed] [S 182 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 31 of 1951]
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constitutes an obtaining. If the accused is shown to have carried out the transactions mentioned there he is deemed to have obtained the property. The section speaks of causing or procuring property to be delivered to himself or to someone else for his benefit. In such cases the notion of a transfer of property in the goods is extinguished even if, as I have pointed out, it was ever implicit in s 179 at all.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 183
[CA.182.20]
SECTION 182 COMMENTARY [CA.182.20]
General
Where an accused falsely stating that he/she owed money to another, borrowed money and promised to pay it back immediately not intending that he/she should repay the loan, he/she was convicted of obtaining money by false pretences.1 1 R v Thorland [1884] 5 LR (NSW) 412; 1 WN 78.
183
Trial for false pretences etc—verdict of larceny [Repealed]
[S 183 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 147 of 1997; Act 50 of 1974; Act 31 of 1951; Act 2 of 1929]
SECTION 183 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.183.20] General ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.183.40]
[CA.183.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.183.40]
General
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It has been said that there cannot be a conviction for larceny on a trial for false pretences where larceny was committed by a bailee.1 Section 183 applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. 1 R v Ward (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 308; 55 WN 80.
184
Fraudulent personation [Repealed]
[S 184 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 50 of 1974]
SECTION 184 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.184.20] Elements of impersonation or pretending to be someone else ....................................................... [CA.184.40]
[CA.184.20]
Indictment
False personation: That AB on at in the State of New South Wales did falsely personate CD, then being the owner of (or entitled to)[specify property] with intent fraudulently to obtain for himself the said [property]. Falsely pretending to be another person: That AB on at in the State of New South Wales did falsely pretend to be CD, and using such pretence did [state action and property sought to be obtained by it] with intent fraudulently to obtain for himself the said [property]. Where the value of the property exceeds $5,000, the charge is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecution or the accused elect for trial on indictment – see Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure
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[CA.184A.20]
s 184A
Act 1986, [4.13870] and s 260(1). Where the value of the property does not exceed $5,000, the charge is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecution elects for trial on indictment – see Table 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and s 260(2). [CA.184.40]
Elements of impersonation or pretending to be someone else
Section 184 provides for two separate offences. First, it makes it an offence to impersonate another actual person (whether living or dead) with fraudulent intent. Second, it makes it an offence to pretend to be some other (fictitious) person, with fraudulent intent.1 At common law, personation was an indictable misdemeanour if amounting to a common law cheat ie adversely affecting the public interest.2 The section preserves the common law offence. False impersonation has been legally defined as “the crime of falsely representing oneself as another person, usu. a law-enforcement officer, for the purpose of deceiving someone”.3 Many English cases of false personation were brought under statute.4 The name or character assumed could be of a person alive or dead.5 In New South Wales there are various statutory offences of impersonating people of a particular class, for example a juror6 or a correctional officer.7 Section 184 extends criminal liability to include falsely pretending to be some other person, a person who may never have existed at all.8
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“Falsely” – the term “false” is relevantly defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed) as “deceptive, misleading. 1 Of a statement etc: deliberately asserting what is known to be untrue...”, and relevantly in the Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed) as “1 not true or correct; erroneous. 2 uttering or declaring what is untrue. 3 deceitful; treacherous; faithless. 4 deceptive; used to deceive or mislead. 5 not genuine”. “Fraudulently” has a meaning interchangeable with “dishonestly” and refers to the accused’s state of mind.9 1 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1. 2 Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice 2001 ed at 22-61. An example was personating a juror: R v Clark (1918) 82 JP 295; 26 Cox CC 138. 3 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) (US West Group) p 757. 4 A number of such offences are listed in Halsbury’s Laws of England (2nd ed) at paras 970-976 (pp 577-580). 5 R v Martin (1817) Russ & Ry 324; 168 ER 826; R v Cramp (1817) Russ & Ry 324; 168 ER 827; R v Pringle (1840) 9 C & P 408; 173 ER 889. 6 Jury Act 1977, s 67 – see [5.4810]. 7 Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999, s 265 – see [14.10530]. 8 Clarkson v The Queen (2007) 171 A Crim R 1 at [43]-[50]. 9 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210 at 604; 215 (CCA).
184A
Personating owner of stock or property [Repealed]
[S 184A rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
SECTION 184A COMMENTARY [CA.184A.20]
General
Section 184A is somewhat similar to the former s 257.
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The prosecution must prove that the accused: (1) falsely; (2) impersonated another person (or pretended to be some other person); (3) with intent fraudulently to obtain property.
Crimes Act 1900 s 185
185
[CA.185.20]
Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments [Repealed]
[S 185 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[13]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 185 COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.185.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.185.40] Valuable security ............................................................................................................................... [CA.185.60] False pretences ................................................................................................................................ [CA.185.80] Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments ........................................................................ [CA.185.100]
[CA.185.20]
Jurisdiction
In certain circumstances this offence may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.185.40]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did falsely pretend to JN (state the false pretences) by means of which said false pretences the said AB did then induce the said JN to accept a certain bill of exchange, with intent thereby to defraud (or injure). [CA.185.60]
Valuable security
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As to the meaning of valuable security, see s 4. [CA.185.80]
False pretences
As to false pretences, see [CA.179.20] – [CA.179.320]. [CA.185.100]
Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments
Where the accused said “I will pay you one hundred dollars if you sign this paper”, this was held to be a false pretence of an existing fact and not an expression of future intention.1 Where it is intended to use the document as a valuable security, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal merely because there is a defect in the document which might have made it invalid if he had attempted to make use of it.2 The section is directed to the situation where action concerning the document imposes liability on the person defrauded, or someone other than the accused, to pay money or to perform an obligation to the advantage of the accused or some other person whom he desires to benefit.3 1 R v Gordon (1889) 23 QBD 354. 2 R v Graham (1913) 8 Cr App R 149. 3 R v Thornton [1964] 2 QB 176; (1962) 47 Cr App R 1.
SUBDIVISION 14 – FRAUDULENT ARRANGEMENTS [REPEALED] [Subdiv 14 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[14]] [Subdiv 14 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[33]]
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[CA.185A.80]
s 185A
185A Inducing persons to enter into certain arrangements by misleading etc statements etc [Repealed] [S 185A rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[14]; am Act 34 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 123 of 1981; Act 53 of 1980; insrt Act 77 of 1967, s 6]
Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.20] Indictment ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.40] Form of indictment ......................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.60] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.185A.80] Property ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.185A.100] Conspiracy ................................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.120] Marketable securities ................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.140] Prescribed interest ....................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.160] Participation interest ..................................................................................................................... [CA.185A.180] Related legislation ........................................................................................................................ [CA.185A.200]
[CA.185A.20]
Jurisdiction
In certain circumstances this offence may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A.
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[CA.185A.40]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did make the following statement to wit (state details of statement, promise or forecast) to JN which said statement was false (misleading or deceptive) whereby the said JN was induced (or whereby the said AB attempted to induce the said JN) to take part in arrangements with respect to property, to wit (state details of the arrangements, their purpose or effect). [CA.185A.60]
Form of indictment
The indictment must contain an assertion that the purpose or effect of the arrangements made was to enable persons taking part to receive profits or income “alleged to be likely to arise”: it is an element of the offence that the accused made allegations that profits or income would arise, or be likely to arise, the notion underlying s 185A being that that state of affairs did not obtain or was not likely to eventuate.1 1 R v Vibert [1985] 1 NSWLR 518.
[CA.185A.80]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) (a) that the accused made a statement promise or forecast which he or she knew to be false, misleading, or deceptive; or (b) that he or she dishonestly concealed material facts; or (c) that he or she recklessly made a false, misleading or deceptive statement; (2) by which he or she induced or attempted to induce another person; (3) to take part or offer to take part in arrangements; (4) with respect to property other than marketable securities; (5) the purpose or effect (or pretended purpose or effect) of which was to: (a) enable persons taking part in the aforesaid arrangements with respect to property; (b) to participate in or receive profits or income;
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SECTION 185A COMMENTARY
Crimes Act 1900 s 186
[CA.185A.80] (c) alleged to arise or likely to arise; (d) from dealings in the aforesaid property.
[CA.185A.100]
Property
As to the meaning of property, see s 4. [CA.185A.120]
Conspiracy
As to conspiracy, see notes to Sch 3, Pt 4, cl 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.185A.140]
Marketable securities
Section 9 of the CommonwealthCorporations Act 1989 defines “marketable securities” as meaning debentures, stocks, shares or bonds of any Government, of any local government authority or of any corporation, association or society, and includes any right or option in respect of shares in any corporation or any prescribed interest. [CA.185A.160]
Prescribed interest
Section 9 defines “prescribed interest” as meaning: (a) a participation interest; or (b) a right, whether enforceable or not, whether actual, prospective or contingent and whether or not evidenced by a formal document, to participate in a time-sharing scheme; but does not include a right or interest, or a right or interest included in a class or kind of rights or interests, declared by the regulations to be an exempt right or interest, or a class or kind of exempt rights or interests, for the purposes of Chapter 7. [CA.185A.180]
Participation interest
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Section 9 also contains a detailed definition of “participation interest”. [CA.185A.200]
Related legislation
Chapter 7 of the Corporation Act 1989 relates to securities. Where the vital part of the transaction involved was a deed which resulted in each purchaser agreeing to acquire an interest in a land development project, the interest being described by reference to a proportionate tenancy in common in one of the blocks comprised in the overall area, held that the arrangement offered was a “marketable security” and therefore excepted from s 185A.1 1 R v Sterling [1981] 2 NSLWR 920.
SUBDIVISION 15 – CORRUPT REWARDS [REPEALED] [Subdiv 15 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[15]] [Subdiv 15 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[34]]
186
Taking reward for helping to recover stolen property [Repealed]
[S 186 rep Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[15]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997; Act 35 of 1937]
SECTION 186 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.186.20] Taking money to restore dogs .......................................................................................................... [CA.186.40] Advertising a reward ......................................................................................................................... [CA.186.60]
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[CA.186.100]
s 186
Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.186.80] “Taking” and “corruptly” .................................................................................................................. [CA.186.100]
[CA.186.20]
Indictment
[CA.186.40]
CA
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, corruptly did take or did offer to take or did agree to take a certain sum of money to wit, ten dollars, under pretence and upon account of helping JN to recover certain property, to wit ......................... the property of the said JN before then stolen; he/she the said AB not having used all diligence to cause the person by whom the said property was so stolen as aforesaid to be brought to trial for the same. Taking money to restore dogs
As to taking money to restore dogs, see s 133. [CA.186.60]
Advertising a reward
As to advertising a reward for return of property stolen or lost, see s 528. [CA.186.80]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime are: (1) that property had been stolen or otherwise obtained in a manner punishable by the Crimes Act 1900; and (2) that the accused corruptly; (3) took or offered to take or agreed to take a reward or money; (4) under pretence of helping to recover the property.
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[CA.186.100]
“Taking” and “corruptly”
“Taking” money under this section means taking a reward in the form of money for the use of the taker or for some person or persons other than the giver. The mere taking of the physical custody of money as a messenger or mandatory of the person giving such custody is not sufficient to constitute a taking within the section. The word “corruptly” in the section refers to an act done by a person knowing that he is doing what is wrong and doing it with an evil object. If the object or one of the objects of the accused is to afford facilities to offenders for the disposal of stolen property whilst screening them from prosecution, and so enabling them to obtain the profit from the crime in safety, or if her or his object or one of her or his objects is to share in such profits, he or she has acted corruptly within the section.1 The allegation of corruption must be supported by evidence over and above the mere act of taking.2 A reward is received corruptly if it is received under a false pretence and with no intention to discover the thief.3 Where the accused knew the thieves and received money from the victim of the robbery to buy the goods back for him or her with no intention of bringing the thieves to justice, the offence was established.4 1 R v Worthington [1921] VLR 660. This case reviews the history of a similar section and examines the older authorities: R v Drinkwater (1740) 1 Leach 15; R v Ledbitter (1825) 1 Mood CC 76; R v Hart (1843) 2 LTOS 248; R v King (1844) 1 Cox CC 36; R v Hicks (1845) 4 LTOS 453; R v Pascoe (1849) 2 Car & Kir 927; R v O’Donnell (1857) 7 Cox CC 337. 2 Ibid. 3 R v Ledbitter (1825) 1 Mood CC 76. 4 R v Pascoe (1849) 2 Car & Kir 927.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 187
[CA.187.20]
DIVISION 16 – RECEIVERS [Former Div 1 Subdiv 16 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[4]] [Former Div 1 Subdiv 16 heading insrt Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[35]]
187
Term “stealing” in sections 188 and 189
For the purposes of sections 188 and 189: Stealing includes the taking, extorting, obtaining, embezzling, or otherwise disposing of the property in question. [S 187 am Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 187 COMMENTARY [CA.187.20]
“Obtaining”
The word “obtaining” in this section refers to an actual and physical obtaining, such as occurs in the obtaining by false pretences, or by any other kind of fraud. If therefore a person lawfully receives property as a servant he cannot be convicted of receiving if he afterwards fraudulently sells the property well below its fair price; the original possession by the accused being lawful, his subsequent change of intention with regard to the disposition of the property is not evidence to support a charge of receiving.1 1 R v Missell (1926) 19 Cr App R 109. See also R v Matthews [1950] 1 All ER 137; (1950) 34 Cr App R 55.
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188
Receiving stolen property where stealing a serious indictable offence
(1) Whosoever receives, or disposes of, or attempts to dispose of, any property, the stealing whereof amounts to a serious indictable offence, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be guilty of a serious indictable offence, and may be indicted, either as an accessory after the fact, or for a substantive offence, and in the latter case whether the principal offender has been previously tried or not, or is amenable to justice or not, and in either case is liable: (a) if the property is a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle part, or a vessel or a vessel part, to imprisonment for 12 years, or (b) in the case of any other property, to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[8]; Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[11]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[39]–[41] and [70]]
(2) In this section: motor vehicle has the same meaning as it has in Division 5A. [Def am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[5]; Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[9]]
vessel means a vessel within the meaning of the Marine Safety Act 1998. [Def insrt Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[10]] [Subs (2) am Act 26 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[9]; insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[12]] [S 188 am Act 99 of 2009; Act 26 of 2006; Act 84 of 2001; Act 94 of 1999; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 188 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.188.20] Form of the indictment ..................................................................................................................... [CA.188.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.188.60]
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[CA.188.80]
s 188
Terms defined ................................................................................................................................... [CA.188.80] Proof of theft ................................................................................................................................... [CA.188.100] Stealing must be a serious indictable offence ............................................................................... [CA.188.120] Receiving property .......................................................................................................................... [CA.188.160] Guilty knowledge ............................................................................................................................ [CA.188.180] Recent possession ......................................................................................................................... [CA.188.200] Husband and wife ........................................................................................................................... [CA.188.220] Statutory evidence of guilty knowledge .......................................................................................... [CA.188.240]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did receive and have (three pairs of shoes and one waistcoat) the property of JN, before then stolen, he/she the said AB at the time when he/she received the said (three pairs of shoes and one waistcoat) knowing the same to have been stolen. [CA.188.40]
Form of the indictment
When an accused is indicted for larceny or receiving in the alternative the jury may return a special verdict of guilty of larceny or receiving, see s 121. A count for receiving may be added to a count for larceny, s 384 (now repealed). When the evidence is as consistent with larceny as with receiving, the indictment should contain counts for both offences.1
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Section 385 (now repealed), provided that any number of receivers at different times of the property or part thereof may be charged in the one indictment. But this did not justify the inclusion in one count of three separate receivings by three different persons at three different times.2 Where an accused is charged with larceny and receiving, the evidence being consistent with both, the jury should be directed that it is for them to decide whether the accused was the thief or whether he or she received the property from the thief and should be reminded that a person cannot receive property from herself or himself.3 If the jury convict him on one of these alternative counts, they should be discharged from giving a verdict on the other.4 1 R v Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68. See also R v Cash [1985] 1 QB 801; [1985] 2 WLR 735; 2 All ER 128; (1985) 80 Cr App R 314. 2 R v Pearl (1942) 28 Cr App R 183. See also R v Michalski (1955) 39 Cr App R 22. 3 R v Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68. See also Gilson v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 353; 53 A Crim R 344; R v Nguyen (1992) 60 A Crim R 196; R v McCarthy (1993) 71 A Crim R 395. 4 R v Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678; 1 All ER 1006; (1954) 38 Cr App R 68; R v Lockett [1914] 2 KB 720; (1913) 9 Cr App R 268.
[CA.188.60]
Elements of the offence
The elements of this crime constituted by s 188 are: (1) that the property referred to in the indictment had been stolen; (2) that such stealing was a serious indictable offence; (3) that the accused received, disposed of, or attempted to dispose of such property; and (4) at the time he knew it was stolen property. [CA.188.80]
Terms defined
“Stealing” – as to the extended meaning of “stealing” for the purposes of s 188, see s 187. “Attempts”, see [CA.344A.20] – [CA.344A.140].
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[CA.188.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 188
[CA.188.80]
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[CA.188.100] Proof of theft There must be proof that the goods were stolen or obtained in circumstances which amount to serious indictable offence. However, the circumstances in which the accused received the property may establish such stealing. Other evidence of the theft is not necessarily required.1 The fact that the accused told lies as to when the property came into her or his possession is not necessarily evidence that the goods were stolen.2 Where the accused received the property from a child under eight years of age who had taken it from the owner, it was held that this was not receiving although it could amount to larceny as a bailee or larceny by finding.3 The stealing must be proved by evidence which is admissible against the accused: it cannot be proved by calling evidence of admissions made by the thief, nor by proving the conviction of the thief.4 The fact that a co-accused pleads guilty is not evidence.5 The normal method is to call substantive evidence of the theft; for example, evidence by the owner that the goods disappeared without his authority. It is not necessary to prove who stole the property.6 The thief is an admissible witness but being an accomplice her or his evidence should be corroborated.7 The mere fact that the property is found at the accused’s house has been held not to be corroboration as the thief might have put it there.8 The receiving may be from the thief or from another guilty receiver,9 if before the receiver gets the property the owner’s possession intervenes, the offence is not made out.10 If the receiver is convicted and subsequently the thief is tried and acquitted, the receiver is not entitled to have her or his conviction set aside.11 The fact that the accused was willing to sell the property at well below its commercial value is some evidence that it is stolen property.12 There must be proof that the goods were stolen in New South Wales,13 but see s 189A. 1 R v Sbarra (1918) 13 Cr App R 118; R v Creamer [1919] 1 KB 564; R v Fuschillo [1940] 2 All ER 489; Mabbott v The Queen [1990] WAR 323 (1989) 40 A Crim R 243. 2 Cohen v March [1951] 2 TLR 402. See also R v Young [1953] 1 All ER 21; (1952) 36 Cr App R 200. 3 Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; (1951) 35 Cr App R 94. 4 R v Turner (1832) 1 Mood 347; R v Cox (1858) 1 F & F 90. See also R v Gibbons [1971] VR 79. 5 R v Fallows (1948) 65 TLR 93. 6 R v Davis (1833) 6 Car & P 177. See also R v Farrell, Dingle and Woodward (1831) Legge 5. 7 R v Haslam (1786) 1 Leach 418; R v Robinson (1864) 4 F & F 43. 8 R v Pratt (1865) 4 F & F 315. 9 R v Reardon & Bloor [1866] LR 1 CCR 31. 10 R v Hancock and Baker (1878) 14 Cox CC 119. 11 R v Hughes (1860) Bell 242. 12 Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206. 13 R v Macalister (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 157; 35 WN 60.
[CA.188.120]
Stealing must be a serious indictable offence
The following offences are serious indictable offences for the purposes of s 188: Robbery or stealing from the person, see s 94. Robbery with violence, see s 95. Robbery with wounding, see s 96. Robbery whilst armed or in company, see s 97. Robbery whilst armed and wounding, see s 98. Larceny see ss 117 – 125. Stealing cattle, see ss 126 – 129. Stealing a valuable security, see s 134.
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s 188
[CA.188.160]
CA
Stealing a will, see s 135. Stealing public records, see s 138. Stealing fixtures, see s 139. Stealing trees, etc, see s 140. Stealing in a dwelling-house, see s 148. Stealing in a dwelling-house with menaces, see s 149. Stealing goods in process of manufacture, see s 150. Stealing from ships or wharves, see s 152. Stealing from wrecks, see s 153. Stealing by tenants or lodgers, see s 154. Taking conveyance, see s 154A. Stealing aircraft, see s 154B. Larceny by a clerk or servant, see s 156. Embezzlement by a clerk or servant, see s 157. Larceny by public servant, see s 159. Embezzlement by public servant, see s 160. Director fraudulently taking property, see s 173. False pretences, see ss 179 – 183. Certain forms of sacrilege (ss 106, 107) and breaking and entering, etc (ss 109 – 115). Receiving property
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Proof of some form of possession by the accused must be shown.1 If the property is found in her or his house it is a question of fact for the jury whether it was found in her or his possession, that is, whether it was there with her or his knowledge and sanction.2 Something more must be shown than the mere fact that the goods were on her or his premises: it must be shown that the goods came there at her or his instigation, or that when he or she became aware of their presence, he or she exercised some control over them.3 Mere physical handling of the goods does not necessarily amount to possession – there may be a picking up of the goods without taking them into possession.4 There must be a clear direction as to what constitutes possession especially where the issue is whether the accused is a joint possessor with the principal whom he or she is assisting, or merely a person assisting illegally.5 Where the exclusive possession remains in the thief, a conviction for receiving cannot be sustained even though the accused had the guilty intent and knowledge.6 It is not necessary to prove the manual possession of the goods by the accused: it is sufficient that they were under her or his absolute control7 or that he or she is in joint possession with the thief.8 Goods which are in the hands of an innocent agent or bailee of the accused may be in the constructive possession of the accused.9 A person who is guilty of stealing goods as a principal or accessory cannot be convicted of receiving them.10 It is immaterial whether the accused received the property for her or his own property, merely to assist the thief, or for purposes of concealment.11 But where an accused receives goods which he or she knows are stolen with the intention of at once handing them over to the police, he or she is not guilty of unlawful receiving nor does a subsequent change of intention render her or him guilty.12 A receiver from another guilty receiver may be guilty of this offence.13 But if the accused steals from the thief, he or she is not guilty of receiving as he or she has committed a fresh larceny of the goods.14 At the time of the receiving the goods must still be stolen property: if after the stealing but before the receiving they have returned to the possession of the owner or her or his agent the accused cannot be convicted of receiving.15
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Crimes Act 1900 s 188
[CA.188.160]
If between the stealing and the receiving the form but not the identity of the goods has changed, the receiver may be convicted.16 However, if only the proceeds of the stolen goods are received by the accused he or she is not guilty of receiving.17
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For detailed commentary on possession, see [CA.7.20] – [CA.7.140]. 1 R v Watson [1916] 2 KB 385; (1916) 12 Cr App R 62. 2 R v Savage (1906) 70 JP 36. See also R v Lewis (1910) 4 Cr App R 96. 3 R v Ca [1961] 1 WLR 1083; 2 All ER 856; (1961) 45 Cr App R 374. See also R v Batty (1912) 7 Cr App R 286; R v Foreman (1913) 9 Cr App R 216. 4 Hobson v Impett (1957) 41 Cr App R 138; R v Frost (1964) 48 Cr App R 284. 5 R v Healey [1965] 1 WLR 1059; [1965] 1 All ER 365; (1964) 49 Cr App R 77; R v Fien [1962] NSWR 134. 6 R v Wiley (1850) 2 Den 37; R v Ashworth (1911) 6 Cr App R 112; R v Crane (1912) 7 Cr App R 113; R v Cook (1912) 8 Cr App R 91; R v Berger (1915) 11 Cr App R 72; R v Seiga (1960) 45 Cr App R 26. 7 R v Smith 169 ER 818; (1855) Dears 494; R v Hobson (1854) Dears 400; R v Gleed (1916) 12 Cr App R 32. 8 R v Smith 169 ER 818; (1855) Dears 494; R v P (1909) 3 Cr App R 259. 9 R v Cryer (1857) Dears & Bell 324; R v Rogers (1868) LR 1 CCR 136; R v Cottrell [1983] 1 VR 143. 10 R v Owen (1825) 1 Mood 96; R v Perkins (1852) 2 Den 459; R v Coggins (1873) 12 Cox CC 517. Cf Carter Patersons and Pickfords v Wessel [1947] KB 849; R v Saliba [1973] Qd R 142. See also R v Cash [1985] 1 QB 801; [1985] 2 WLR 735; 2 All ER 128; (1985) 80 Cr App R 314; R v Davis [1989] 1 Qd R 171. 11 R v Davis (1833) 6 Car & P 177; R v Richardson (1834) 6 Car & P 335. 12 R v Matthews [1950] 1 All ER 137; (1950) 34 Cr App R 55. 13 R v Reardon & Bloor (1866) LR 1 CCR 31. 14 R v Brett (1845) 1 Cox CC 261; R v Wade (1844) 1 Car & Kir 739. 15 R v Dolan (1855) 6 Cox CC 449; R v Schmidt (1866) LR 1 CCR 15; R v Hancock and Baker (1878) 14 Cox CC 119; R v Villensky [1892] 2 QB 597. Cf R v King [1938] 2 All ER 662; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1974) [1974] 1 QB 744; (1974) 59 Cr App R 203. See also R v Alexander [1981] VR 277. 16 R v Cowell & Green (1796) 2 East PC, 617 (sheep stolen, mutton received); R v Fogg (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 33. 17 R v Walkley (1829) 4 Car & P 132; R v Richards [1934] QWN 19.
[CA.188.180]
Guilty knowledge
It must be alleged and shown that at the time the accused received or disposed of the goods he knew they were stolen or obtained in circumstances amounting to a serious indictable offence or minor indictable offence. The innocent receipt of property and the subsequent dishonest appropriation of it, after knowledge that it is stolen, do not constitute the crime of receiving unless something has taken place after the guilty knowledge which can be regarded either as a fresh act of receiving or a completing of the original receiving if the latter was in fact incomplete at the time.1 A suspicion by the accused that the property was obtained in breach of a rationing order is not necessarily equivalent to a suspicion that the goods were stolen.2 In considering the coincidence of time between receipt and guilty knowledge, it may be that the time of receipt is not a moment of time but a period occupied by a transaction.3 Belief without actual knowledge is sufficient. The knowledge need not be such as would be acquired if the accused had actually seen the property stolen: it is sufficient if the jury think that the circumstances accompanying the transaction were such as to make the accused believe that the property was stolen.4 It is the actual knowledge or wilfulness of the accused which constitutes this element of the offence, not the test that might be applied to the hypothetical reasonable man.5 It is not necessary to prove that the accused knew by whom or from whom the goods were stolen,6 or where they were stolen.7 A finding by the jury that the accused believed he or she had some claim to the property negatives unlawful intent and guilty knowledge.8
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s 188
It is proper in a case of receiving stolen property to instruct the jury that it may have regard to what an ordinary reasonable person in the accused’s position would have believed in the circumstances and to consider whether the accused wilfully closed his or her eyes to facts that would have led a reasonable person to believe that the particular property was stolen.9
1 R v Johnson (1911) 6 Cr App R 218; Balogh v The Queen (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 108; Murphy v Porter (1984) 12 A Crim R 38. 2 R v Snelling (1942) 28 Cr App R 117. 3 R v Curlija [1967] SASR 1. See also R v Merriman [1907] VLR 1. 4 R v White (1859) 1 F & F 665. See also R v Quillerat [1962] Tas SR 370; R v Grainge [1974] 1 WLR 619; [1974] 1 All ER 928; R v Raad [1983] 3 NSWLR 344; R v Schipanski (1987) 17 NSWLR 618; R v Armstrong (1990) 48 A Crim R 382. 5 R v Parker [1974] 1 NSWLR 14. Compare R v Smith [1973] 2 WLR 942; [1973] 2 All ER 896; (1973) 57 Cr App R 666. See also R v Fallon (1981) 28 SASR 394; 4 A Crim R 411. Anderson v Lynch (1982) 17 NTR 21. 6 R v Farrell, Dingle and Woodward (1831) Legge 5; R v Parker (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 217. 7 R v Angus (1895) 16 ALT 205. 8 R v Dickson (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 298. 9 R v Dykyj (1993) 29 NSWLR 672; (1993) 66 A Crim R 567. See also R v McConnell (1993) 69 A Crim R 39.
[CA.188.200]
Recent possession
The doctrine of recent possession applies to receiving as it does to larceny. For notes on this doctrine, see [CA.117.440].
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[CA.188.220]
Husband and wife
A husband may be convicted of receiving property stolen by his wife.1 The presumption of coercion having been abolished (see s 407A) it would seem that a wife can be convicted of receiving property stolen by her husband,2 unless it is shown that she committed the offence in the presence of and under the coercion of her husband. Where the husband and wife are jointly indicted for receiving the wife may be convicted if there is evidence of a receiving by her separate and apart from her husband.3 If stolen goods are received by a wife without her husband’s knowledge, and he upon becoming aware of it, passively assents to what she has done but takes no active part in the matter, he is not guilty of receiving,4 but if he ratifies her actions, even though he does not touch the property he may be guilty.5 1 R v M’Athey (1862) Le & Ca 250. 2 Cf R v Brooks (1853) Dears 184. See also R v Kanwar [1982] 1 WLR 845; [1982] 2 All ER 528; (1982) 75 Cr App R 87. 3 R v Baines (1900) 69 LJQB 681. 4 R v Dring 169 ER 1027; (1857) Dears & B 329. See also R v Pritchard (1913) 9 Cr App R 210. 5 R v Woodward 169 ER 1329; (1862) Le & Ca 122.
[CA.188.240]
Statutory evidence of guilty knowledge
Convictions before a magistrate may be proved.1 Evidence allowable under s 420 should not be given where the case is substantially one of larceny with a count for receiving added.2 Adding a count for larceny will not make the evidence admissible.3 The terminal date for the operation of both paragraphs (a) and (b) of s 420 is the date of the offence charged, or, if more than one offence is charged, the date of the earlier offence.4 The object of s 420 is to enlarge the class of evidence which may be received and it does not cut down the common law rules as to the admissibility of evidence of similar acts.5 Evidence that the accused on another
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As to statutory evidence of guilty knowledge, see [CA.188.240].
Crimes Act 1900 s 189
[CA.188.240]
occasion received stolen property with guilty knowledge may be admissible as throwing real light on the question whether her or his receipt of property on the occasion charged was innocent; the mere fact that in respect of the other occasion he or she was acquitted does not exclude the evidence although it cannot be used to impeach her or his character on credit.6 Evidence admissible under s 420 is not limited to the fact that other stolen property was found but includes evidence as to the circumstances in which it was found and statements made by the accused at the time in explanation of her or his possession. The evidence that the property was stolen need not be given before the evidence that the property was found in the accused’s possession but it may be given after.7 The fact that the property is the subject of another indictment against the accused does not make evidence concerning it inadmissible.8 To prove guilty knowledge evidence may be given that the accused had received from the thief other property stolen by her or him.9 The court has an overriding discretion to disallow the admission of such evidence.10 It is not necessary to prove that the other stolen goods were found in the possession of the accused at the time of her or his arrest: it is sufficient to prove that they were in her or his possession shortly after they were stolen, although they were disposed of before her or his arrest.11
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The jury should be directed that they are not trying a charge in respect of other stolen property found in the possession of the accused.12 1 R v Jones (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 234. 2 R v Ballard (1916) 12 Cr App R 1; R v Davies [1953] 1 QB 489; (1953) 37 Cr App R 16; R v Jones (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 234. 3 R v Bromhead (1906) 71 JP 103; R v Girod and Girod (1906) 70 JP 514. 4 R v Cresswell (1987) 8 NSWLR 56; 26 A Crim R 414. 5 R v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198; 61 WN 128. 6 R v Miles (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 198; 61 WN 128; R v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 followed; Maxwell v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 309; (1934) 24 Cr App R 152 distinguished. 7 R v Smith [1918] 2 KB 415; (1918) 13 Cr App R 157. Compare R v Wood [1987] 1 WLR 779 (1987) 85 Cr App R 287. 8 R v Jones and Hayes (1877) 14 Cox CC 3. 9 R v Dunn & Smith (1826) 1 Mood 146; R v Davis (1833) 6 Car & P 177; R v Nicholls and Clark (1858) 1 F & F 51. 10 R v List [1966] 1 WLR 9; [1965] 3 All ER 710; (1965) 50 Cr App R 81. See also R v Herron [1967] 1 QB 107; (1966) 50 Cr App R 132. 11 R v Rowland [1910] 1 KB 458; (1909) 3 Cr App R 277. 12 R v Horsenail (1919) 14 Cr App R 57. See also R v Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416.
189
Receiving etc where principal guilty of minor indictable offence
Whosoever receives, or disposes of, or attempts to dispose of, any property, the stealing whereof is a minor indictable offence, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be guilty of a minor indictable offence, and whether the person guilty of the principal offence has been previously tried or not, or is amenable to justice or not, shall be liable to imprisonment for three years. [S 189 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[42]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 189 COMMENTARY [CA.189.20]
General
For indictment, see [CA.188.20].
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[CA.189A.20]
Generally, see notes to s [CA.344A.20] – [CA.344A.140].
188,
[CA.188.40]
–
[CA.188.240].
s 189A As
to
attempts,
see
There may be an unlawful receiving under this section in circumstances where the accused with guilty knowledge received the goods from a person who had conspired to defraud the owner of the goods.1 In England receiving property knowing it to have been obtained on credit under false pretences or by means of other fraud is not an offence known to law.2 The obtaining must be actual and physical as occurs in an obtaining by false pretences.3 1 R v Kutas (1923) 17 Cr App R 179; R v Klein (1932) 23 Cr App R 185. 2 R v Schweller (1924) 18 Cr App R 52. 3 R v Missell (1926) 19 Cr App R 109.
189A
Receiving etc goods stolen out of New South Wales
(1) Whosoever, without lawful excuse, receives or disposes of, or attempts to dispose of, or has in his or her possession, any property stolen outside the State of New South Wales, knowing the same to have been stolen, and whether or not he or she took part in the stealing of the property, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years.
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[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[1]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
(2) For the purposes of this section property shall be deemed to have been stolen if it has been taken, extorted, obtained, embezzled, converted, or disposed of under such circumstances that if the act had been committed in the State of New South Wales the person committing it would have been guilty of an indictable offence according to the law for the time being of the State of New South Wales. (3) No person shall be liable to conviction under this section if the taking, extorting, obtaining, embezzling, converting, or disposing is not a criminal offence in the country in which the act is committed. [S 189A am Act 94 of 1999; Act 147 of 1997; Act 50 of 1974, s 6; insrt Act 10 of 1924, s 9]
SECTION 189A COMMENTARY [CA.189A.20]
Receiving property stolen outside State
As to receiving generally, see s 187. As to proof of lawful excuse, see s 417. As to attempts, see [CA.344A.20] – [CA.344A.140]. As to possession, see [CA.7.20] – [CA.7.140]. Where the accused stole property out of the jurisdiction and was found within the jurisdiction with the stolen property in his possession he was convicted under the comparable English section.1 It must be shown that the property was stolen outside the State.2 1 R v Graham (1901) 65 JP 248. 2 R v Steele (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 167.
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Those offences which are serious indictable offences for the purposes of s 188 are catalogued in [CA.188.120] [CA.188.140]. Generally all other offences which constitute a “stealing” as defined in s 187 are minor indictable offences, for example, fraudulent appropriation, s 124.
Crimes Act 1900 s 189B
[CA.189B.20]
189B Prosecution under section 188 or 189 where property stolen in course of transmission (1) Where in the trial of a person for the offence under section 188 or 189 of receiving, or disposing of, or attempting to dispose of, any property knowing it to have been stolen, it is proved that the property was stolen in the course of transmission between New South Wales and any other jurisdiction or between any other jurisdiction and New South Wales: (a) the person shall be liable to be convicted of the offence without proof that the stealing took place in New South Wales, and (b) for the purpose of determining whether or not the stealing amounts to a serious indictable offence or a minor indictable offence, the stealing shall be deemed to have taken place in New South Wales. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[43]]
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) other jurisdiction means a State (other than New South Wales) or Territory of the Commonwealth. [S 189B am Act 94 of 1999; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 189B COMMENTARY [CA.189B.20]
General
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It would appear that amendments to s 189A and s 189B were inserted to overcome any doubts that may have been created by decisions such as Foster v The Queen (1967) 118 CLR 117; R v Sawyer (1970) 16 FLR 354 and R v Brennan (1970) 16 FLR 358. 190
Receiving etc cattle unlawfully killed, or carcass etc
Whosoever: receives any animal, unlawfully killed, with intent to steal the carcass, or skin, or other part thereof, knowing the same to have been so killed, or receives, or disposes of, or attempts to dispose of, any part of an animal so killed, or of an animal unlawfully stolen, knowing it to have been so killed or so stolen, shall be guilty of a serious indictable offence, and may be indicted and punished as if the animal had been stolen, and the accused had unlawfully received the same. [S 190 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[21] and [28]; Act 50 of 1974, s 6]
SECTION 190 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.190.20] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.190.40] Generally .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.190.60] Animal ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.190.80]
[CA.190.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, unlawfully did receive and have one ox (or sheep), the property of CD before then unlawfully stolen; he or she the said AB at the same time when he or she so received the said ox (or sheep) then knowing it to have been so unlawfully stolen.
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[CA.192.20] [CA.190.40]
s 192
Elements of the offence
[CA.190.60]
CA
The alternative elements of this crime are: A (1) that the animal specified in the indictment had been feloniously killed; and (2) the accused received such animal; (3) knowing it had been feloniously killed; (4) with intent to steal the carcass, skin or part of the animal. B (1) that the animal specified had been feloniously killed or stolen; and (2) the accused received, disposed of, or attempted to dispose of such animal; (3) knowing it to have been so killed or stolen. Generally
As to receiving generally, see s 187. As to attempts, see [CA.344A.20] – [CA.344A.140]. [CA.190.80]
Animal
The word “animal” is not defined although the side note to the section refers to “cattle”. This word is defined in s 4. Not all animals may be the subject of larceny, see [CA.117.240]. 191
Uncertainty as to sex or age not to entitle to acquittal
Where, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 190, it appears that the animal was of the species mentioned in the indictment, but it is uncertain on the evidence what was its sex or age, such person shall not be entitled to acquittal by reason only of such uncertainty.
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[S 191 am Act 31 of 1951, s 10 and Sch]
SECTION 191 COMMENTARY [CA.191.20]
Application of section
As far as practicable s 191 applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. 192
Receiving material or tools intrusted for manufacture
Whosoever receives any goods, article, or material or any tools, or apparatus for manufacturing, or working up, the same, knowing the same to have been purloined, embezzled, or secreted, within the meaning of section 151, or that the person offering the same is fraudulently disposing thereof, shall be liable to imprisonment for four years.
SECTION 192 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.192.20] Receiving goods or material intrusted for manufacture ................................................................... [CA.192.40]
[CA.192.20]
Indictment
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did receive and have certain goods, that is to say, ten kilograms weight of woollen yarn, the property of JN, the said goods before then having been purloined and secreted by one CD, the said CD having been, for the purpose of manufacture,, employed to make, prepare and work up the same; he or she, the said AB at the time when he or she so received the said ten kilograms weight of woollen yarn, the property of JN, well knowing the same to have been so purloined and secreted, as aforesaid.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 192A
[CA.192.20]
[CA.192.40]
Receiving goods or material intrusted for manufacture
As to receiving generally, see [2.26840]. As to selling materials to be manufactured, see s 151. 192A
Verdict where several persons are indicted for jointly receiving
Where, on the trial of two or more persons for jointly receiving property, it appears that one, or more, separately received such property, or any part thereof, the jury may convict such one or more of the said persons as is, or are, proved to have so received the same.
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[Former s 193 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[16]]
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[CA.Pt4AA.20]
s 192C
PART 4AA – FRAUD [Pt 4AA insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
PART 4AA COMMENTARY Generally
The Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Act 2009 commenced on 22 February 2010 and dramatically reduces the number of fraud and forgery offences under the Crimes Act 1900. The fraud, forgery and identity offences are to be prosecuted summarily unless an election is made to proceed on indictment. Note that the commentary from former Fraud and fraud related offences has been maintained in the service: see ss 174, 175, 176A, 178A, 178BA, 178BB, 178A, 178C, 179 and 184.
DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 192B
Deception
(1) In this Part, deception means any deception, by words or other conduct, as to fact or as to law, including: (a) a deception as to the intentions of the person using the deception or any other person, or (b) conduct by a person that causes a computer, a machine or any electronic device to make a response that the person is not authorised to cause it to make. (2) A person does not commit an offence under this Part by a deception unless the deception was intentional or reckless. [S 192B insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
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192C
Obtaining property belonging to another
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a person obtains property if: (a) the person obtains ownership, possession or control of the property for himself or herself or for another person, or (b) the person enables ownership, possession or control of the property to be retained by himself or herself or by another person, or (c) the person induces a third person to do something that results in the person or another person obtaining or retaining ownership, possession or control of the property. (2) A person does not commit an offence under this Part by obtaining or intending to obtain property belonging to another unless the person intends to permanently deprive the other of the property. (3) For the purposes of this Part, property belongs to a person if: (a) the person has possession or control of the property, or (b) the person has a proprietary right or interest in the property (not being an equitable interest arising only from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest or from a constructive trust). If property is subject to a trust, the persons to whom it belongs include any person having a right to enforce the trust. (4) A person obtaining property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself has, nevertheless, the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if the person’s intention is to treat the thing as his or her own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights. A borrowing or lending of the property may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. (5) Without limiting the generality of subsection (4), if: (a) a person has possession or control (lawfully or not) of property belonging to another, and
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[CA.Pt4AA.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 192C (b)
the person parts with the property under a condition as to its return that the person may not be able to perform, and (c) the parting is done for the purposes of his or her own and without the other’s authority, the parting amounts to treating the property as his or her own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights. [S 192C insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
192D
Obtaining financial advantage or causing financial disadvantage
(1) In this Part, obtain a financial advantage includes: (a) obtain a financial advantage for oneself or for another person, and (b) induce a third person to do something that results in oneself or another person obtaining a financial advantage, and (c) keep a financial advantage that one has, whether the financial advantage is permanent or temporary. (2) In this Part, cause a financial disadvantage means: (a) cause a financial disadvantage to another person, or (b) induce a third person to do something that results in another person suffering a financial disadvantage, whether the financial disadvantage is permanent or temporary. [S 192D insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
DIVISION 2 – FRAUD AND RELATED OFFENCES
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192E
Fraud
(1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (a) obtains property belonging to another, or (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. (3) A person may be convicted of the offence of fraud involving all or any part of a general deficiency in money or other property even though the deficiency is made up of any number of particular sums of money or items of other property that were obtained over a period of time. (4) A conviction for the offence of fraud is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, and a conviction for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of fraud. [S 192E insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
SECTION 192E COMMENTARY Indictment ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.20] Cross References .......................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.40] Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.60] Generally and penalty .................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.80] Elements of the offence ............................................................................................................... [CA.192E.100] Element (1) By Deception ............................................................................................................ [CA.192E.120] Element (2) Dishonestly Obtains ................................................................................................. [CA.192E.140]
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s 192E
Causation ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.160] Obtained ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.180] Financial advantage ..................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.200] Establishing jurisdiction ................................................................................................................ [CA.192E.220] General deficiency – s 192E(3) ................................................................................................... [CA.192E.240] Alternative verdict – s 192E(4) ..................................................................................................... [CA.192E.260] Sentencing ................................................................................................................................... [CA.192E.280]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, by deception namely, (describe deception alleged) dishonestly obtained property [identify the property] belonging to [CD] [identify other person or company etc,1] (obtained a financial advantage, namely [identify the advantage])or (caused a financial disadvantage namely [describe the financial disadvantage alleged]). 1 Interpretation Act 1987, s 21(1) – “Person” includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.
[CA.192E.40]
Cross References
“Dishonestly” also appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900: ss 178BA (repealed), 185A (repealed), 192F, 192G, 192H, 197 and 502. Note – “Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B. [CA.192E.60]
Jurisdiction
Offences under Pt 4AA are Table 1 offences that are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the person charged elects otherwise: see Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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[CA.192E.80]
Generally and penalty
Section 192E is designed to be the principal fraud offence contained in Pt 4AA of the Act. When enacted, it replaced a large number of other fraud offences (ss 176A, 178A, 178BA, 178C, 179, 184). The penalty attached to the offence has been increased across the spectrum of offences to 10 years imprisonment. The definition of “dishonesty” adopted in the legislation (see s 4B of the Act), was said in the Second Reading speech to be the same as that adopted in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1 (See further commentary “Element 2 Dishonestly Obtains” at [CA.192E.140]). 1 Second Reading Speech, Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Bill 2009, NSW Legislative Council, Debates, 12 November 2009, p 19507.
[CA.192E.100]
Elements of the offence
That the accused: 1. By deception, 2. (a) dishonestly obtains property belonging to another person; or (b) (i) dishonestly obtains any financial advantage, or (ii) dishonestly causes any financial disadvantage. [CA.192E.120]
Element (1) By Deception
Deception in Pt 4AA is defined in s 192B. Section 192B(2) requires that the deception be either intentional or reckless.1 Deception is the intentional inducing in another of a state of mind which the accused knows does not accord with fact.2 It has been said that deliberate deception is one of the two most obvious forms of dishonesty.3 A deception may be by words or by conduct.4 Therefore, someone obtaining a meal in a restaurant having no means to pay for it is guilty of obtaining the meal by deception.5 The representation as
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to payment is a continuing one until payment is made or some new arrangement is entered into.6 The term “reckless” has been considered in relation to an offence of obtaining by deception.7 The presentation of a credit card on which the limit had been reached has been held to be a false representation.8 Representations made by the presentation of a cheque have been considered.9 Obtaining a transfer of funds by electronic means has also been considered.10 The Crown is precluded from alleging that the assertion made in pleadings in civil proceedings is a deception for the purpose of this section: Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574; 67 A Crim R 150; [1993] HCA 48.11 While Jamieson v The Queen says that a pleading served in litigation should not be treated as containing a representation of fact, that may not be so in relation to other demands made for the purposes of litigation: Downey v The Queen (1994) 68 ALJR 371. Where, in the one count, the Crown charges a number of matters as together constituting the deception the jury may need to be directed that: … where a number of matters are specified in the charge as together constituting one ingredient in the offence, any one of them is capable of doing so, then it is enough to establish the ingredient that any one of them is proved; but … any such matter must be proved to the satisfaction of the whole of jury. The jury should be directed accordingly, and it should be made clear to them as well that they should all be satisfied that the statement upon which they are agreed was an inducement as alleged.12
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It is no defence to a claim of deceptively obtaining a loan that the recipient intended to repay the loan.13 1 For commentary on recklessness, see s 4A. 2 Corporate Affairs Commission v Papoulias (1989) 20 NSWLR 503 at 506; Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; [1960] 2 WLR 669; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124; Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 3 WLR 143; [1977] 2 All ER 909; for the meaning of “deceive”, see Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732; Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 WLR 359; [1973] 3 All ER 131. 3 R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689 at 1060 (QB). 4 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 WLR 359; [1973] 3 All ER 131. See also R v Greenstein [1975] 1 WLR 1353; [1976] 1 All ER 1; (1975) 61 Cr App R 296; R v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248; [1976] 1 All ER 659. 5 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 WLR 359; [1973] 3 All ER 131 per Lord Morris at 385 (AC). 6 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 WLR 359; [1973] 3 All ER 131 at 382–383, 386–387 (AC). 7 In Mattingley v Tuckwood (1989) 43 A Crim R 111; 88 ACTR 1, Miles J held that the term “reckless”, when used in the context of false representation and applying the judgment of the High Court in R v Crabbe [1985] 156 CLR 464; 16 A Crim R 19; [1985] HCA 22, means indifference as to whether a representation is true or false knowing that, more probably than not, it is false. In R v Smith (1982) 7 A Crim R 437 at 446–447, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal considered the word “reckless” in regard to a similar legislation; see also R v Staines (1974) 60 Cr App R 160; Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 3 WLR 143; [1977] 2 All ER 909 and the discussion of the authorities in Pollard v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1992) 28 NSWLR 659; 63 A Crim R 383 per Abadee J. 8 R v Lambie [1982] AC 449; [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294. 9 R v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151; R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145; R v Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513; (1982) 74 Cr App R 94; R v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248; [1976] 1 All ER 659; Fisher v Bennett (1987) 85 FLR 469. 10 R v Crick (18 Aug 1993) The Times; R v Thompson [1984] 1 WLR 962; [1984] 3 All ER 565; (1984) 79 Cr App R 191, but see also R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR) re: “credits in bank accounts”; see also S Martin, “Obtaining Bank Credits and Debits by Deception” (1992) 16 Crim LR 77. 11 Jamieson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 574; 67 A Crim R 150; [1993] HCA 48 overruled R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256; 51 A Crim R 89. 12 R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 at 119. In R v Phillips (1988) 86 Cr App R 18, Woolf LJ quoted with approval a passage from a judgment of Hodgson J in R v Moore [1986] Crim LR 552 to the following effect: “It seems to us
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however that it will only be necessary for us to give a direction on the lines set out in Brown … in the comparatively rare case where it emerges at some stage in the course of the trial, or as a result of a question asked by the jury, that there is a risk of disagreement between the members of the jury as to whether a particular ingredient of the offence has been proved.” Note other suggested directions in Fraud cases are provided by the Judicial Commission of NSW in their bench book. See http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/fraud.html. 13 R v McCall (1970) 55 Cr App R 175 at 180; R v Carpenter (1911) 22 Cox CC 618; Halstead v Patel [1972] 1 WLR 661; [1972] 2 All ER 147; (1972) 56 Cr App R 334.
Element (2) Dishonestly Obtains
“Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B in the following terms: (1) In this Act: dishonest means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. (2) In a prosecution for an offence, dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact.
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This test for dishonesty is said to be consistent with the decision Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; [1998] HCA 71. In England, juries are instructed in accordance with decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689.2 The decision in Ghosh has been followed in a number of jurisdictions in Australia.3 In Peters at [9], the effect of the decision is Ghosh was summarised as follows: The test adopted in Ghosh, namely, whether the acts in question were dishonest according to current standards of ordinary decent people and if so, whether the accused must have realised that they were dishonest by those standards … . That test is plainly reflected in the statutory definition of the “dishonesty” now provided in s 4B. However, the test has not received universal approval – see Griew, “Dishonesty: Objections to Feely and Ghosh” [1985] Crim LR 341.4 In Victoria, a series of cases questioned the use of the Ghosh direction where a claim of right was involved.5 The NSW the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416, in the context of addressing the appellant’s submission on the existence of a claim of right, considered the meaning of the words “dishonestly obtains” as used in the former s 178BA. There the Court said: The application of those decisions (Ghosh and Feely) in Australian jurisdictions has been a matter of controversy. (at p 613) There are undoubtedly many cases, perhaps even a majority of cases, in which the standards of reasonable and decent people provide an adequate guide in determining whether a person has dishonestly obtained property. However, especially in cases where what is involved is something in the nature of claim of right, a test which is simply in terms of the standards of ordinary people will leave a jury with inadequate instruction. (at p 614–615)6 And later the court said: Of course in many cases the deception will be powerful evidence of dishonesty. However, when a claim of legal right of the kind now in question is raised, the issue is whether there was a belief in a legal right to obtain the property, not whether there was a belief in a legal right to practise the deception. (at p 616–617)7 It is to be noted that the court emphasised that the views there expressed were in relation to the particular context being dealt with. For additional detailed commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. In Peters at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR), the High Court considered the application of the Ghosh test to a charge of conspiracy to defraud under ss 86 and 86A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In the context of that case, the majority of the Court (Toohey and Gaudron JJ with whom Kirby J agreed) was critical of the general application of the Ghosh test.8 The majority noted that the word “dishonestly” when appearing in legislation can be used in its ordinary meaning or it may be used in a special sense. If it is used in its
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special sense, for example as it is used in the Victorian legislation under consideration in R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1, then it is necessary for the trial judge to explain precisely the meaning provided under the legislation.9 Where there is claim of right in relation to the property obtained, a question arises as to whether the special meaning provided in R v Love is to be used to direct the jury as to the meaning of “dishonesty” or whether the statutory meaning in s 4B is to be used. Where, however, the question is whether the means used to obtain the property are dishonest, the majority in Peters held that, providing those means are capable of being so characterised, the question is one for the jury to determine and that the jury should be instructed that “the question whether they are to be characterised as dishonest is to be determined by application of the standards of ordinary, decent people”.10 In R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; 3 A Crim R 210, it was held that the term “fraudulently” used in the former s 173, was interchangeable with the word “dishonestly” (see at 604 (NSWLR)) and that it is sufficient if the trial judge instructs the jury that the accused acted dishonestly without defining the word further. In deciding the issue, the jury should apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. (see at 607 (NSWLR)) [34]11 Persons jointly charged with obtaining property can both make a defence of claim of right, if bona fide.12 1 Second Reading Speech, Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Bill 2009, NSW Legislative Council, Debates, 12 November 2009, p 19507 2 The test in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689 at 1064 (QB) is to the following effect:
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In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether, according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people, what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails.
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If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. R v Harvey [1993] 2 Qd R 389; R v Allard [1988] 2 Qd R 269; 29 A Crim R 418; Cornelius v The Queen (1988) 34 A Crim R 49 (WA); R v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762; 23 A Crim R 219. In R v Lawrence [1997] 1 VR 459; 86 A Crim R 412, Callaway JA said at 470 (VR) that: “[t]he touchstone is not what an ordinary reasonable person would regard as dishonest but rather the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people.” See also Campbell, “The test of Dishonesty in R v Ghosh” (1984) 43 Cambridge Law Journal 349; Halpin, “The test for Dishonesty” [1996] Crim LR 283. R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1; R v Bonollo [1981] VR 633; 2 A Crim R 431; R v Brow [1981] VR 783. These cases were considered and applied in South Australia in R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28. See, for an example of what might described as an ordinary case, R v Sperling (unreported, NSWCCA, 13 August 1992) where the court considered a submission that the trial judge should have instructed the jury in accordance with Ghosh. The jury had been instructed that whilst dishonesty could be determined by applying the current standards of ordinary decent people as the jury perceived them to be, they were not instructed that the accused must realise what he was doing was dishonest according to those standards. Without referring to the decision of R v Ghosh, the court held that the instructions given allowed the jury to approach their task with a “clear understanding of the relevant principles of law involved.” See also R v Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335. Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; [1998] HCA 7 at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed). Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; [1998] HCA 7 at 503–504 (CLR), 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed). The majority also noted at 504 (CLR) that in a case in which it is necessary for a jury to decide whether an act is dishonest, the proper course is for the trial judge to identify the knowledge, belief or intent which is said to render that act dishonest and to instruct the jury to decide whether the accused had that knowledge, belief or intent and, if so, to determine whether, on that account, the act is dishonest.
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[CA.192E.180]
s 192E
10 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; [1998] HCA 7 at 503–504 (CLR); 521 (ALJR) per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (with whom Kirby J agreed). The test to be applied for determining dishonesty in Peters has been criticised, see “The Appropriate test for Dishonesty” (2000) 24 Crim LJ 46. 11 Compare R v McFarlane (unreported, NSWCCA, 21 April 1993) regarding s 197. 12 R v Sanders (1991) 57 SASR 102.
Causation
The deception must be the effective cause of obtaining the money etc, as, “… it is an essential ingredient of the offence created by that section that the cause of the payment of the money (or handing over of the valuable thing or the giving of the financial advantage) was the deception used by the accused”: R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145 at 147.1
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The deception must operate on the mind of the person to whom it is directed.2 The deception employed must precede the obtaining. Therefore, in a case where a deception was made as to how petrol was to be paid for after it had been obtained, the offence was not made out.3 The onus of proving the money etc, was obtained by reason of the deception employed falls upon the prosecution.4 It is ordinarily necessary that the cause of the obtaining be established by direct evidence, although it can be proved by inference.5 It is irrelevant whether the person deceived has the ability to discover the truth of the facts behind the deception. The deception can cause the obtaining even if, at the time the property was obtained, the party deceived suspected that he was being deceived.6 Proof that the person deceived would not have parted with her or his money but for the deception employed does not necessarily establish that the deception was the effective cause of the obtaining.7 The deception does not have to be practised on the person suffering the resultant loss.8 1 Per Maxwell, Hunt, McInerney JJ. See also R v Clarkson [1987] VR 962; 25 A Crim R 277; R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; (1974) 58 Cr App R 412; R v Stanhope (unreported, NSWCCA, 10 September 1987); Flack v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 167 at [36]–[38]; Miller v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 34 at [58]. 2 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495; R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359; (1972) 56 Cr App R 131; R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; (1974) 58 Cr App R 412; R v Davies [1982] 1 All ER 513; (1982) 74 Cr App R 94. 3 R v Collis-Smith [1971] Crim LR 716 (CA). 4 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495 at 497 (Cr App R); R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764; [1971] 3 All ER 1359; (1972) 56 Cr App R 131 at 1771B (WLR); R v Lambie [1982] AC 449; [1981] 3 WLR 88; (1981) 73 Cr App R 294 at 95 (WLR). 5 R v Laverty [1970] 3 All ER 432; (1970) 54 Cr App R 495 at 497–498 (Cr App R). 6 R v Miller (1992) 95 Cr App R 744 (CA). 7 R v Clucas [1949] 2 KB 226; [1949] 2 All ER 40. 8 R v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2; [1973] 3 All ER 715; (1974) 58 Cr App R 151 at 7 (WLR); R v Ho (1989) 39 A Crim R 145 at 147; R v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370; [1974] 1 All ER 1236; (1974) 58 Cr App R 412.
[CA.192E.180]
Obtained
“Obtaining property belonging to another” is now extensively defined in s 192C. The terms “obtaining a financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage” are now extensively defined in s 192D. Further note s 192E(2) to the effect that a “person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property.” The property or financial advantage must be something that is capable of being “obtained”.1 (R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR). Presumably then the financial disadvantage alleged must be something that is capable of being lost. 1 Interpretation Act 1987, s 21(1) – “Person” includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.
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[CA.192E.0] Financial advantage
What amounts to a financial advantage is not defined in the Act. In Victoria, the concept of “financial advantage” has been considered and it was held that it is a simple one consisting of two common words of clear meaning. The words should be given their plain meaning and no narrow construction should be given to them: R v Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 at 81.1 In Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045, it was held that the proffering of a valueless cheque can amount to a financial advantage because the proferrer “derives a financial advantage by evading an antecedent debt, for however short a period. In one sense it can be said that he obtains ‘credit’ or time to pay.”2 To obtain a loan on ordinary commercial terms is a financial advantage.3 When it is alleged that a financial advantage was obtained, it is not relevant that a disadvantage was suffered by the owner of the property or the lender.4 In R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474, it was observed by Gleeson CJ at 477 that the “… question of when, and by what means, [the financial advantage] may be said to have been obtained, may well be affected by the nature of the thing obtained.” It was held that a memorandum of transfer was obtained when it came into the possession of the accused.5
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Also see commentary “Obtaining property” in the repealed s 179 at [CA.179.280] but be aware that the definition of obtaining property in s 192D now governs the meaning of that term. Many of the older cases referred to in s 179 are no long good law. 1 2 3 4 5
As approved in Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [41]. See also: Lanham, “Obtaining a Financial Advantage by Deception in Victoria” (1977) 1 Crim LJ 188. Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [20], [46]. Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [42]. R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 477. Kron was applied in R v Reid (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 October 1996) which was subject to an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the High Court.
[CA.192E.220]
Establishing jurisdiction
In R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474, it was held that wherever the deception took place, in order to establish jurisdiction, it was necessary for the Crown to prove that the money, (valuable thing, or financial advantage) was obtained in NSW.1 1 R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 476–477.
[CA.192E.240]
General deficiency – s 192E(3)
For commentary on a general deficiency, see s 161 and [CA.161.20]–[CA.161.40]. Please note that s 161 itself has no application with respect to fraud offences except in a case where the alternative verdict discussed at [CA.192E.260] is relied on by the Crown. [CA.192E.260]
Alternative verdict – s 192E(4)
A charge of fraud under s 192E is a statutory alternative charge to an offence of larceny or any offence that includes larceny and a charge of larceny is equally a statutory alternative for an offence under this section. In the usual case where the Crown relies on a statutory alternative charge, it must open its case on the basis that such an alternative is an available verdict.1 1 See R v Cameron [1983] 2 NSWLR 66; 8 A Crim R 466 at 71 (NSWLR). See also discussion of alternative verdicts in Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 at [47]–[65]).
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s 192F
Sentencing
In the same case, Hunt CJ at CL said: I do not accept that it is appropriate to lay down any rule that, in all cases of serious white collar crime, a sentence other than a full-time custodial one by itself demonstrates error requiring a Crown appeal to be upheld. There is a wide range in the nature of white collar crimes and necessarily a wide range in the nature of the appropriate sentences to be imposed.2 However, in Stevens v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 2603, Spigelman CJ said: Past sentencing practices with respect to the offence of obtaining a benefit by deception, contrary to s 178BA of the Crimes Act 1900, must be treated with some care in this regard. There are a number of features of identity crimes which involve aggravated effects on victims and the community generally when compared with other forms of obtaining benefit by deception. These will be recognised, not least by increased maximum penalties, when the Crimes Amendment (Fraud and Forgery) Bill 2009 comes into force. That Bill is designed to harmonise New South Wales law with the national model scheme as proposed by Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys General (MCLOC).
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The penalties that apply for the offence under s 192E are double those that previously applied under s 178BA. In cases of premeditated deception, the amount of money obtained is an important factor in determining the degree of criminality involved.4 Sentencing for fraud cases has been the subject of a detailed paper by the Judicial Commission of NSW.5 1 2 3 4 5
R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994) at p 4. R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994) at p 6. Stevens v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 260 at [2] R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430 at 435. Research Monograph 37 – September 2012, Judicial Commission of NSW, copy available online at http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/research-monographs-1/research-monograph-37/Monograph37.pdf.
192F
Intention to defraud by destroying or concealing accounting records
(1) A person who dishonestly destroys or conceals any accounting record with the intention of: (a) obtaining property belonging to another, or (b) obtaining a financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. (2) In this section, destroy includes obliterate. [S 192F insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
SECTION 192F COMMENTARY Indictment ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.192F.20]
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In R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994), a case involving offences under s 178BB, Simpson J made the following observations on sentencing “white collar crime”: … white collar crime itself is so various in its manifestations and nature that it is scarcely susceptible of precise definition or of defined sentencing principles. I do not read the cases cited as laying down any proposition of the inevitability of a full-time prison sentence in any case which could be brought within the description of “white collar crime”.1
Crimes Act 1900 s 192F
[CA.192F.20]
Cross References ........................................................................................................................... [CA.192F.40] Jurisdiction ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.192F.60] Generally and penalty ..................................................................................................................... [CA.192F.80] Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................ [CA.192F.100] Element (1) Dishonestly ............................................................................................................... [CA.192F.120] Element (2) Destroyed, concealed, accounting record ................................................................ [CA.192F.140] Element (3) Obtaining property belonging to another .................................................................. [CA.192F.160] Element (3) Obtaining financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage ........................ [CA.192F.180]
[CA.192F.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, dishonestly destroyed (concealed) an accounting record [identify record] with the intention of (obtaining property belonging to [CD]) (obtaining a financial advantage namely, [describe financial advantage]) (causing a financial disadvantage namely [describe the financial disadvantage]). [CA.192F.40]
Cross References
“Dishonestly” also appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900: ss 178BA (repealed), 185A (repealed), 192E, 192G, 192H, 197 and 502. Note – “Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B. [CA.192F.60]
Jurisdiction
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Offences under Pt 4AA are Table 1 offences that are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the person charged elects otherwise: see Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Note that this offence has not been included in Sch 10 of the Crimes Act 1900 and thus is not one that can be heard in the Supreme Court exercising its summary jurisdiction – see s 475A. [CA.192F.80]
Generally and penalty
Section 192F is designed to replace two former ss 174 and 175. Those previous provisions were principally directed to actions of officers and directors of companies. The commentaries with respect to those offences are maintained in the service for the moment: see [CA.173.20]–[CA.175.80]. The offence has wider application now than with respect to officers and directors of companies, although they would also appear to be covered by this provision. The penalty attaching to the offence has been reduced from 10 years to 5 years imprisonment. The definition of “dishonesty” adopted in the legislation (see s 4B), was said in the Second Reading speech to be the same as that adopted in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1 (See further commentary “Element 1 Dishonestly” at [CA.192F.120]). 1 Second Reading Speech, Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Bill 2009, NSW Legislative Council, Debates, 12 November 2009, p 19507.
[CA.192F.100]
Elements of the offence
That the accused: 1. Dishonestly 2. Destroyed (concealed) an accounting record; 3. With the intention of (a) obtaining property belong to another [CD]; (b) obtaining a financial advantage; (c) causing a financial disadvantage.
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s 192F
Element (1) Dishonestly
“Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B in the following terms: (1) In this Act: dishonest means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. (2) In a prosecution for an offence, dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact.
[CA.192F.140]
Element (2) Destroyed, concealed, accounting record
“Destroy” includes “to obliterate” an accounting record (see s 192F(2)). There is no other definition of “destroy” used in the Act. The Oxford Dictionary defines “destroy” in part as “ruin completely, injure or spoil utterly, cancel, eliminate, cause to disappear”.1 In the context of whether a tree was “destroyed”, it was held: We think it is right as a matter of language not necessarily to treat destruction as a synonym for “obliteration”; a glass vase is destroyed when it falls to the ground and shatters, even though the fragments which once comprised it still remain. On the other hand “destruction” must have at least elements of finality and totality about it and must go further than merely a material change in the life-span or stability of the tree.2 For further commentary on “destroy” see [CA.195.100].
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“Conceal” is not defined in the Act. The word “conceal” is defined in the Oxford Dictionary in part as, to keep from the knowledge or observation of others, refrain from disclosing or divulging, keep close and secret.3 In a different context, it was held by the NSW Court of Appeal that “concealment” was a conscious or deliberate keeping back of facts.4 “Accounting record” appears to be a term capable of a wide meaning. In the Australian Legal Dictionary, the term is defined as being, “generally, records of a person carrying on a business, which record and explain relevant transactions engaged in by the person in carrying on the business.”5 1 2 3 4
Oxford Dictionary 2nd ed 1989 Clarendon Press. Barnet LBC v Eastern Electricity Board [1973] 1 WLR 430; [1973] 2 All ER 319 at 322, 323 (All ER). Oxford Dictionary 2nd ed 1989 Clarendon Press. Clark v Esanda Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 1 at 4-5. The point in question related to concealment of material facts in a hire purchase agreement. 5 Australian Legal Dictionary 1997 Butterworths.
[CA.192F.160]
Element (3) Obtaining property belonging to another
“Obtaining property belonging to another” is extensively defined in s 192C. “Property” is also defined in s 4. [CA.192F.180]
Element (3) Obtaining financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage
These terms are partly defined in s 192D. The property or financial advantage must be something that is capable of being “obtained”.1 Presumably then the financial disadvantage alleged must be something that is capable of being lost. Financial advantage – What amounts to a financial advantage is not defined in the Act. In Victoria, the concept of “financial advantage” has been considered and it was held that it is a simple one consisting of two common words of clear meaning. The words should be given their plain meaning and no narrow construction should be given to them: R v Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 at 81.2
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For further commentary on dishonesty, see [CA.192E.140].
Crimes Act 1900 s 192G
[CA.192F.180]
In Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045, it was held that the proffering of a valueless cheque can amount to a financial advantage because the proferrer “derives a financial advantage by evading an antecedent debt, for however short a period. In one sense it can be said that he obtains ‘credit’ or time to pay.”3 In R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474, it was observed by Gleeson CJ at 477 that the “… question of when, and by what means, [the financial advantage] may be said to have been obtained, may well be affected by the nature of the thing obtained.” It was held that a memorandum of transfer was obtained when it came into the possession of the accused.4 Given the terms of the section, it would appear that the intention to obtain property, obtain a financial advantage or cause a financial disadvantage alleged must be held at the time that the accused dishonestly destroys or conceals the accounting records. In this section, there is no requirement for a dishonest intention and therefore the only intention required to be proved is an intent to obtain property, the financial advantage or cause the financial disadvantage alleged.5 The section focuses on the means of obtaining property or a financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage. Those means, which must involve destruction or concealing of accounting records, must be dishonest.6 1 2 3 4
R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR) See also: Lanham, “Obtaining a Financial Advantage by Deception in Victoria” (1977) 1 Crim LJ 188. Matthews v Fountain [1982] VR 1045 per Gray J at 1049. R v Kron (1995) 78 A Crim R 474 at 477. Kron was applied in R v Reid (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 October 1996) which was subject to an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the High Court. 5 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) at p 22. 6 Suggested jury directions are provided by the Judicial Commission of NSW in the Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book.
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192G
Intention to defraud by false or misleading statement
A person who dishonestly makes or publishes, or concurs in making or publishing, any statement (whether or not in writing) that is false or misleading in a material particular with the intention of: (a) obtaining property belonging to another, or (b) obtaining a financial advantage or causing a financial disadvantage, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years. [S 192G insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
SECTION 192G COMMENTARY Indictment ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.192G.20] Cross References .......................................................................................................................... [CA.192G.40] Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................................... [CA.192G.60] Generally and penalty .................................................................................................................... [CA.192G.80] Elements of the offence ............................................................................................................... [CA.192G.100] Element (1) Dishonestly made (or published) (or concurs in making) (or concurs in publishing) a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular ................................................ [CA.192G.120] Element (2) Intending to obtain the property of CD (or intending to obtain a financial advantage) (or intending to cause a financial disadvantage) ................................................................... [CA.192G.140] Sentence ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.192G.160]
[CA.192G.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State, dishonestly made (or published) (or concurs in making)(or concurs in publishing) a statement [identify the statement alleged] that is false or misleading in a material particular, namely [state the particular that is said to be misleading] intending to
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s 192G
(obtain property namely, [identify the property] belonging to CD or a company) (obtain a financial advantage [identify the nature of the financial advantage sought]) (cause a financial disadvantage namely, [identify the financial disadvantage]. [CA.192G.40]
Cross References
“Dishonestly” also appears in the following sections of the Crimes Act 1900: ss 178BA (repealed), 185A (repealed), 192E, 192F, 192H, 197 and 502. Note – “Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B. Jurisdiction
Offences under Pt 4AA are Table 1 offences that are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the person charged elects otherwise: see Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Note that this offence has not been included in Sch 10 of the Crimes Act 1900 and thus is not one that can be heard in the Supreme Court exercising its summary jurisdiction – see s 475A. Compare with s 178BB and [CA.178BB.40] [CA.178BB.60]. [CA.192G.80]
Generally and penalty
Section 192G is designed to replace the former s 178BB. The commentary with respect to that section is maintained in the service for the moment: see [CA.178BB.20]–[CA.178BB.280]. The maximum penalty attaching to the offence has been maintained at 5 years imprisonment. The definition of “dishonesty” adopted in the legislation (see s 4B), was said in the Second Reading speech to be the same as that adopted in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1 (See further commentary “Element 1 Dishonestly” at [CA.192G.120]).
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1 Stevens v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 260 at [2]; Second Reading Speech, Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Bill 2009, NSW Legislative Council, Debates, 12 November 2009, p 19507.
[CA.192G.100]
Elements of the offence
That the accused: 1. Dishonestly made (or published) (or concurs in making) (or concurs in publishing) a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular; 2. intending to obtain the property of CD (or intending to obtain a financial advantage) (or intending to cause a financial disadvantage) [CA.192G.120]
Element (1) Dishonestly made (or published) (or concurs in making) (or concurs in publishing) a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular
“Dishonesty” is now defined in s 4B in the following terms: (1) In this Act: dishonest means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. (2) In a prosecution for an offence, dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact. When the term “dishonestly” is used in the context of this section, it focuses on the making or publishing or the concurring in making or publishing of a particular statement. It will be a matter for the Crown to identify the dishonesty relied on but it might amount to any aspect of the making or publishing of the statement which is false or misleading in a material particular. For further commentary on dishonesty, see [CA.192E.140]. Made, published or concurred in making or publishing – “Publish” is not defined in the Act. With regard to the former s 178BB, the term “publish” has been said to mean, to convey, by some means, the offending statement to the mind of another.1 The words “concurs in publishing” have been considered.2
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[CA.192G.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 192G
[CA.192G.120]
The concept of “concurrence” is not co-extensive with the concept of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring (see Crimes Act 1900, s 351). However, it has been said in relation to the former s 178BB that s 351 still had scope to operate.3 Any statement (oral or written) – “Statement” is not defined in Pt 4AA or elsewhere in the Crimes Act 1900. A statement may include pictorial or diagrammatic material.4 It has been held that on the proper construction of the former s 178BB, (where the term “any statement” was used in the same context as this provision) “any statement” means a single statement. The effect of this decision is that each statement alleged to be false or misleading must be charged separately. A charge that alleges more than one such statement will be duplicitous.5 It has been further held that there is some scope for the Crown to allege that a “statement” can be inferred from the existence a number of utterances and a course of conduct.6
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That is false or misleading in a material particular – “It is now well established that the falsity of a statement may arise, not only because a fact therein alleged is falsely alleged, but because the statement, by omitting material facts, creates a false impression.” R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at 204.7 “The omission has to make that which is stated affirmatively untrue, untrue in the sense that it creates and intentionally an impression in the public, a belief in the public, which is wrong.”8 “In order to ascertain the question whether this document is false in a material particular or in all material particulars, one may ask oneself this question: If the facts had been revealed or even clearly indicated, would any man of sense have put his money into the scheme?”9 In order to decide whether a statement is false in a material particular, the jury is entitled to assess the whole of the document in its proper context. In Aaron’s Reefs v Twiss [1896] AC 273, Lord Halsbury LC said at 281: … I think one is entitled to look at the whole document and see what it means taken together … It is said that there is no specific allegation of fact which is proved to be false. Again I protest, as I have said, against that being the true test. I should say, taking the whole thing together, was there false representation? I do not care by what means it is conveyed - by what trick or device or ambiguous language: all those are expedients by which fraudulent people seem to think that they can escape from the real substance of the transaction. If by a number of statements you intentionally give a false impression and induce a person to act upon it, it is not the less false although if one takes each statement by itself there may be a difficulty in showing that any specific statement is untrue… The whole of this transaction seems to me to have been fraudulent to the last degree.10 “Material particular” – The word “material” should be interpreted as requiring “no more and no less than that the false particular must be of moment or of significance, not merely trivial or inconsequential”: R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199.11 A particular will be material if it was relevant to the purpose for which it was being made. It will be relevant to that purpose if it may be taken into account by the person to whom the statement is made in making any decision upon the matter in respect of which the statement was made. It is unnecessary that the statement be actually taken into account. What is involved is an objective assessment.12 Material falsity needs to be judged by a reading of the document as a whole.13 A statement, the truth of which goes directly or indirectly to influence whether or not an action is performed, is a material statement.14 “The fact that the Crown was alleging that the statement was false in a number of particulars did not mean that several offences were being alleged. There was but one offence alleged, namely, the concurrence in the publishing of a statement knowing it to be false in a material particular, and the falsity of the statement could be in one respect or in many respects”.15 In the former s 178BB however, the reference to the definite article in the references to “material particularity” is such as to identify the fact that a single statement is being referred to on the section’s proper construction. Therefore, generally, it will not be appropriate to accumulate “false statements” in one indictment although will be categories of cases in which a single statement can be considered as one utterance or representation.16 Where, in the one count, the Crown charges a number of matters as together constituting the false or misleading statement, the jury may need to
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s 192G
be directed in the following manner: … where a number of matters are specified in the charge as together constituting one ingredient in the offence, and any one of them is capable of doing so, then it is enough to establish the ingredient that any one of them is proved; but … any such matter must be proved to the satisfaction of the whole of jury. The jury should be directed accordingly, and it should be made clear to them as well that they should be satisfied that the statement upon which they are agreed was an inducement as alleged.17
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1 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 363, referred to in R v Rinaldi (1993) 30 NSWLR 605; 68 A Crim R 284 at 609 (NSWLR); 288 (A Crim R). 2 In R v Connell (unreported, Seaman J, Supreme Court, (WA) 14 September 1992), whilst dealing with a provision similar to the former s 178BB, it was said that “to ‘concur’ for the purpose of the separate charges involves no more than the doing of an act which, together with the acts of other people who may behaving quite lawfully, brings about the publication of the accounts …”. This was applied in R v Lee (unreported CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) per Studdert J at p 22. 3 R v Lee (unreported CCA (NSW), 19 June 1997) per Studdert J at 22–23. 4 Given v Pryor (1979) 39 FLR 437 at 440. 5 R v Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 at [17]–[18]. Compare with Montgomery v Stewart (1967) 116 CLR 220; 40 ALJR 534; [1967] HCA 11. 6 R v Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 at [19]. 7 A case in relation to s 176 of the Crimes Act 1900; see also R v Lord Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83; R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176; R v Mackinnon [1959] 1 QB 150; [1958] 3 WLR 688; [1958] 3 All ER 657; Montgomery v Stewart (1967) 116 CLR 220; 40 ALJR 534; [1967] HCA 11 at 226–227 (CLR). 8 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 at 183 (Cr App R). 9 R v Bishirgian [1936] 1 All ER 586; (1936) 25 Cr App R 176 at 187 (Cr App R). 10 As applied in R v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 at [125]. 11 R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 at 202 quoting from Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FCR 348 at 352; Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [45]; R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996), per Hunt CJ at CL at p 12. 12 R v Gervaise (unreported, NSWCCA, 13 November 1997) at p 11. 13 R v Lord Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442; (1931) 23 Cr App R 83 at 447 (KB). See also Arnison v Smith (1889) 41 Ch D 348 per Halsbury LC at 369. 14 R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473; 27 A Crim R 271; R v Clogher [1999] NSWCCA 397 at [17]. 15 R v M [1980] 2 NSWLR 195 at [24]. 16 R v Giam (1999) 104 A Crim R 416; [1999] NSWCCA 53 at [17]–[19]. 17 R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115 at 119. 18 John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508; 27 A Crim R 228; [1987] HCA 42 at 521 (CLR), see also 544 (CLR).
[CA.192G.140]
Element (2) Intending to obtain the property of CD (or intending to obtain a financial advantage) (or intending to cause a financial disadvantage)
In this section, there is no requirement of a fraudulent or dishonest intention and therefore the only intention necessary is an intent to obtain money, a valuable thing or a financial advantage.1 It has been said in relation to the earlier provision of s 178BB that directions to the jury by the trial judge should never suggest that dishonesty is not involved (as distinct from required) in the offence. Such a direction may divert the jury from proper consideration of the seriousness of the actions of the accused.2 Obtaining property – With regard to “obtaining”, it has been held in relation to the earlier s 178BA that the valuable thing (or financial advantage etc) must be capable of being “obtained”.3 For further commentary
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The Crown should particularise in the charge the “material particular” which is allegedly false or misleading etc.18
Crimes Act 1900 s 192H
[CA.192G.140]
on obtaining property, see commentary at [CA.192E.180]. Also see commentary on obtaining property by false pretences, under the former s 179 at [CA.179.280]. “Person” includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic.4 Financial advantage – In Victoria, the concept of “financial advantage” has been considered and it was held that it is a simple one consisting of two common words of clear meaning. The words should be given their plain meaning and no narrow construction should be given to them: R v Walsh (1990) 52 A Crim R 80 at 81.5 For further commentary on financial advantage, see [CA.192E.200]. 1 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) per Hunt CJ at CL (with whom Mahoney ACJ and Barr J agreed) at p 22; applied in Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [44]. 2 R v Stolpe (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 October 1996) per Hunt CJ at CL at p 23–24. 3 R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 at 617 (NSWLR). 4 Interpretation Act 1987, s 21(1). 5 See also Elias v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 222 A Crim R 286; [2012] NSWCA 302 at [41]–[42].
[CA.192G.160]
Sentence
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In R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994), a case involving offences under s 178BB, Simpson J made the following observations on sentencing “white collar crime”: … white collar crime itself is so various in its manifestations and nature that it is scarcely susceptible of precise definition or of defined sentencing principles. I do not read the cases cited as laying down any proposition of the inevitability of a full-time prison sentence in any case which could be brought within the description of ″white collar crime.1 In the same case, Hunt CJ at CL said: I do not accept that it is appropriate to lay down any rule that, in all cases of serious white collar crime, a sentence other than a full-time custodial one by itself demonstrates error requiring a Crown appeal to be upheld. There is a wide range in the nature of white collar crimes and necessarily a wide range in the nature of the appropriate sentences to be imposed.2 1 R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994) at p 4. 2 R v Brown (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 August 1994) at p 6.
192H Intention to deceive members or creditors by false or misleading statement of officer of organisation (1) An officer of an organisation who, with the intention of deceiving members or creditors of the organisation about its affairs, dishonestly makes or publishes, or concurs in making or publishing, a statement (whether or not in writing) that to his or her knowledge is or may be false or misleading in a material particular is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 7 years. (2) In this section: creditor of an organisation includes a person who has entered into a security for the benefit of the organisation. officer of an organisation includes any member of the organisation who is concerned in its management and any person purporting to act as an officer of the organisation. organisation means any body corporate or unincorporated association. [S 192H insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
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PART 4AB – IDENTITY OFFENCES [Pt 4AB insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
192I
Definitions
In this Part: identification information means information relating to a person (whether living or dead, real or fictitious, or an individual or body corporate) that is capable of being used (whether alone or in conjunction with other information) to identify or purportedly identify the person, and includes the following: (a) a name or address, (b) a date or place of birth, marital status, relative’s identity or similar information, (c) a driver licence or driver licence number, (d) a passport or passport number, (e) biometric data, (f) a voice print, (g) a credit or debit card, its number or data stored or encrypted on it, (h) a financial account number, user name or password, (i) a digital signature, (j) a series of numbers or letters (or both) intended for use as a means of personal identification, (k) an ABN. [S 192I insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]] Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
192J
Dealing with identification information
A person who deals in identification information with the intention of committing, or of facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [S 192J insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
192K
Possession of identification information
A person who possesses identification information with the intention of committing, or of facilitating the commission of, an indictable offence is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 7 years. [S 192K insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
192L
Possession of equipment etc to make identification documents or things
A person who: (a) possesses any equipment, material or other thing that is capable of being used to make a document or other thing containing identification information, and (b) intends that the document or other thing made will be used to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, an indictable offence, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years. [S 192L insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
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deal in identification information includes make, supply or use any such information.
Crimes Act 1900 s 192M 192M
Miscellaneous provisions
(1) This Part does not apply to dealing in a person’s own identification information. (2) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this Part. (3) This Part applies to a person who intends to commit an indictable offence even if committing the offence concerned is impossible or the offence concerned is to be committed at a later time. (4) Section 309A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 enables a victim of an offence against this Part to obtain a certificate from a court that such an offence has been committed to assist with problems the offence has caused in relation to the victim’s personal or business affairs.
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[S 192M insrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[3]]
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PART 4AC – MONEY LAUNDERING [Former Pt 4, Div 1A renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[17]; insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
193A
Definitions
deal with includes: (a) receive, possess, conceal or dispose of, or (b) bring or cause to be brought into New South Wales, including transfer or cause to be transferred by electronic communication, or (c) engage directly or indirectly in a transaction, including receiving or making a gift. instrument of crime means property that is used in the commission of, or to facilitate the commission of, a serious offence. proceeds of crime means any property that is substantially derived or realised, directly or indirectly, by any person from the commission of a serious offence. serious offence means: (a) an offence (including a common law offence) against the laws of New South Wales, being an offence that may be prosecuted on indictment, or (b) the offence of supplying any restricted substance prescribed for the purposes of section 16 of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 that arises under section 18A(1) of that Act, or (c) an offence committed outside New South Wales (including outside Australia) that would be an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) if it had been committed in New South Wales. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 193A am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]; insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
193B
Money laundering
(1) A person who deals with proceeds of crime: (a) knowing that it is proceeds of crime, and (b) intending to conceal that it is proceeds of crime, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 20 years. (2) A person who deals with proceeds of crime knowing that it is proceeds of crime is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 15 years. (3) A person who deals with proceeds of crime being reckless as to whether it is proceeds of crime is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (4) It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence under this section if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant dealt with the proceeds of crime to assist the enforcement of a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory. [S 193B insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
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In this Part:
Crimes Act 1900 s 193C 193C
Dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person deals with property, and (b) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is proceeds of crime, and (c) at the time of the dealing, the value of the property is $100,000 or more. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years.
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(2) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person deals with property, and (b) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is proceeds of crime, and (c) at the time of the dealing, the value of the property is less than $100,000. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years. (3) Without limiting subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b), there are reasonable grounds to suspect that property is proceeds of crime in each of the following circumstances: (a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)—the dealing involves a number of transactions that are structured or arranged to avoid the reporting requirements of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 of the Commonwealth that would otherwise apply to the transactions, (b) the dealing involves a number of transactions that are structured or arranged to avoid the reporting requirements of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 of the Commonwealth that would otherwise apply to the transactions, (c) the dealing involves using one or more accounts held with authorised deposit-taking institutions in false names, (d) the dealing amounts to an offence against section 139, 140 or 141 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 of the Commonwealth, (e) the value of the property involved in the dealing is, in the opinion of the trier of fact, grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s income and expenditure over a reasonable period within which the dealing occurs, (f) the dealing involves a significant cash transaction (within the meaning of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988(Cth) of the Commonwealth) and the defendant: (i) has contravened the defendant’s obligations under that Act relating to reporting the transaction, or (ii) has given false or misleading information in purported compliance with those obligations, (g) the dealing involves a threshold transaction (within the meaning of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 of the Commonwealth) and the defendant: (i) has contravened the defendant’s obligations under that Act relating to reporting the transaction, or (ii) has given false or misleading information in purported compliance with those obligations, (h) the defendant: (i) has stated that the dealing was engaged in on behalf of or at the request of another person, and (ii) has not provided information enabling the other person to be identified and located. (4) It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence under this section if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property was substantially derived or
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Dealing with property that subsequently becomes an instrument of crime
(1) If: (a) a person deals with property intending that the property will become an instrument of crime, and (b) the property subsequently becomes an instrument of crime, the person is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 15 years. (2) If: (a) a person deals with property being reckless as to whether the property will become an instrument of crime, and (b) the property subsequently becomes an instrument of crime, the person is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (3) Proceedings for an offence under this section must not be commenced without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. (4) It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence under this section if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant dealt with the proceeds of crime to assist the enforcement of a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory. (5) In this section: Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
property means money or other valuables. [S 193D insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
193E
Alternative verdicts
(1) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 193B(1), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 193B(2) or (3), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the other offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (2) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 193B(2), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 193B(3), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the other offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (2A) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 193B, the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 193C(1) or (2), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the other offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [Subs (2A) insrt Act 16 of 2016, Sch 2[2]]
(3) If on the trial of a person for an offence under section 193D(1), the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 193D(2), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the other offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 193E am Act 16 of 2016; insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 193F 193F
Proof of other offences not required
(1) To avoid doubt, it is not necessary, in order to prove for the purposes of an offence under this Part that property is proceeds of crime, to establish that: (a) a particular offence was committed in relation to the property, or (b) a particular person committed an offence in relation to the property. [Subs (1) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]]
(2) To avoid doubt, it is not necessary, in order to prove for the purposes of an offence under this Part that property will be an instrument of crime, to establish: (a) an intention or risk that a particular offence will be committed in relation to the property, or (b) an intention or risk that a particular person will commit an offence in relation to the property. [Subs (2) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]] [S 193F am Act 99 of 2009; insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
193FA
Combining several contraventions in a single charge
(1) A single charge of an offence against a provision of this Part may be about 2 or more instances of the defendant engaging in conduct (at the same time or different times) that constitutes an offence against a provision of this Part. (2) If a single charge is about 2 or more such instances and the value of the property dealt with is an element of the offence in question, that value is taken to be the sum of the values of the property dealt with in each of those instances. [S 193FA insrt Act 16 of 2016, Sch 2[3]]
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193G
Transitional provision
This Part (as amended by the Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Act 2016) applies to or in respect of acts or omissions in relation to proceeds of crime arising from serious offences committed before or after the commencement of the amendments made to this Part by that Act. [S 193G am Act 16 of 2016, Sch 2[4]; Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]; insrt Act 73 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 3]
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s 193K
PART 4ACA – CHEATING AT GAMBLING [Pt 4ACA insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY Corrupting betting outcome of event
(1) For the purposes of this Part, conduct corrupts a betting outcome of an event if the conduct: (a) affects or, if engaged in, would be likely to affect the outcome of any type of betting on the event, and (b) is contrary to the standards of integrity that a reasonable person would expect of persons in a position to affect the outcome of any type of betting on the event. (2) For the purposes of this Part, an agreement about conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event is an agreement between 2 or more persons under which one or more of those persons agree to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event. (3) In this Part: agreement includes an arrangement. conduct means an act or an omission to perform an act. engage in conduct means: (a) do an act, or (b) omit to perform an act. [S 193H insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
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193I
Betting
(1) In this Part, bet includes the following: (a) place, accept or withdraw a bet, (b) cause a bet to be placed, accepted or withdrawn. (2) A reference in this Part to betting on an event includes a reference to betting on any event contingency. [S 193I insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
193J
Events and event contingencies
(1) In this Part, an event means any event (whether it takes place in this State or elsewhere) on which it is lawful to bet under a law of this State, another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth. (2) In this Part, an event contingency means any contingency in any way connected with an event, being a contingency on which it is lawful to bet under a law of this State, another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth. [S 193J insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
193K
Obtaining financial advantage or causing financial disadvantage
(1) In this Part, obtain a financial advantage includes: (a) obtain a financial advantage for oneself or for another person, and (b) induce a third person to do something that results in oneself or another person obtaining a financial advantage, and (c) keep a financial advantage that one has, whether the financial advantage is permanent or temporary. (2) In this Part, cause a financial disadvantage means:
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Crimes Act 1900 s 193K (a) cause a financial disadvantage to another person, or (b) induce a third person to do something that results in another person suffering a financial disadvantage, whether the financial disadvantage is permanent or temporary. [S 193K insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
193L
Proof of intention to obtain financial advantage or cause financial disadvantage
(1) If an offence under this Part requires a person (the accused) to intend to obtain a financial advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with betting on an event, that element of the offence is established if, and only if, it is proved that: (a) the accused meant to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with betting on the event, or (b) the accused was aware that another person meant to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with betting on the event, as a result of the conduct the subject of the charge. (2) It is not necessary to prove that any financial advantage was actually obtained or any financial disadvantage was actually caused. (3) In (a) (b) (c)
this section, the conduct the subject of the charge means: in the case of an offence against section 193N—the conduct that the accused engaged in, or in the case of an offence against section 193O—the conduct that the accused facilitated, or in the case of an offence against section 193P—the conduct, or the conduct the subject of the agreement, that the accused encouraged another person to conceal.
[S 193L insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
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193M
Encourage
In this Part, encourage another person to engage in conduct includes command, request, propose, advise, incite, induce, persuade, authorise, urge, threaten or place pressure on the person to engage in conduct. [S 193M insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
DIVISION 2 – OFFENCES 193N
Engage in conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event
A person who engages in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event: (a) knowing or being reckless as to whether the conduct corrupts a betting outcome of the event, and (b) with the intention of obtaining a financial advantage, or causing a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [S 193N insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
193O
Facilitate conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event
(1) A person who facilitates conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event: (a) knowing or being reckless as to whether the conduct facilitated corrupts a betting outcome of the event, and (b) with the intention of obtaining a financial advantage, or causing a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event, is guilty of an offence.
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Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person facilitates conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event if the person: (a) offers to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event, or (b) encourages another person to engage in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event, or (c) enters into an agreement about conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an event. 193P Concealing conduct or agreement about conduct that corrupts betting outcome of event (1) A person who encourages another person to conceal from any appropriate authority conduct, or an agreement about conduct, that corrupts a betting outcome of an event: (a) knowing or being reckless as to whether the conduct corrupts a betting outcome of the event, and (b) with the intention of obtaining a financial advantage, or causing a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) In this section, an appropriate authority includes: (a) a police officer, or (b) a body that has the official function of controlling, regulating or supervising an event, or any betting on an event. [S 193P insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
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193Q
Use of corrupt conduct information or inside information for betting purposes
(1) A person who possesses information in connection with an event that is corrupt conduct information, and who knows or is reckless as to whether the information is corrupt conduct information, is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) bets on the event, or (b) encourages another person to bet on the event in a particular way, or (c) communicates the information to another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would or would be likely to bet on the event. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person who possesses information in connection with an event that is inside information, and who knows or is reckless as to whether the information is inside information, is guilty of an offence if the person: (a) bets on the event, or (b) encourages another person to bet on the event in a particular way, or (c) communicates the information to another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would or would be likely to bet on the event. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years. (3) Information in connection with an event is corrupt conduct information if the information is about conduct, or proposed conduct, that corrupts a betting outcome of the event. (4) Information in connection with an event is inside information if the information: (a) is not generally available, and (b) if it were generally available, would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly bet on the event in deciding whether or not to bet on the event or making any other betting decision.
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[S 193O insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 193Q (5) Information is generally available if: (a) it consists of matter that is readily observable by the public, or (b) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of the public, or (c) it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from information referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). (6) In proceedings for an offence against subsection (1)(b) or (c) or (2)(b) or (c) it is not necessary to prove that the person encouraged to bet, or to whom information was communicated, actually bet on the event concerned. (7) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1), the trier of fact is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied that the accused is guilty of an offence under subsection (2), it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an offence under subsection (2), and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. (8) A reference in this section to communicating information includes a reference to causing information to be communicated.
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[S 193Q insrt Act 64 of 2012, Sch 1[1]]
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PART 4AD – CRIMINAL DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE [Former Pt 4 Div 2 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[19]; former Pt 4 Ch 2 renum Act 31 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 5.27[4]; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
DIVISION 1 – INTERPRETATION [Former Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 1 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[20]; former Pt 4 Ch 2 Div 1 renum Act 31 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 5.27[1]]
Interpretation
(1) In this Part, a reference to property does not include a reference to property that is not of a tangible nature. [Subs (1) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]]
(2) In this Part, a reference to property includes a reference to wild creatures that have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity and also includes any other wild creatures or their carcasses but only if they: (a) have been reduced into possession that has not been lost or abandoned, or (b) are in the course of being reduced into possession. [Subs (2) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]]
(3) For the purposes of this Part, an act done by a person under a reasonable belief that the person had a right to do the act does not constitute an element of any offence under this Part.
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[Subs (3) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[21]]
(4) For the purposes of this Part, damaging property includes removing, obliterating, defacing or altering the unique identifier of the property. The unique identifier is any numbers, letters or symbols that are marked on or attached to the property as a permanent record so as to enable the property to be distinguished from similar property. [Subs (4) am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[18]; insrt Act 5 of 2003, s 3(1) and Sch 1] [S 194 am Act 99 of 2009; Act 38 of 2007; Act 5 of 2003; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 194 COMMENTARY [CA.194.20]
Claim of right – s 194(3)
For commentary on claim of right, see [CA.117.200]. A claim of right is relevant to the commission of an offence because it goes to the absence of mens rea to an essential element of the offence.1 Ordinarily, the rule is that if a defendant can point to evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the holding of a claim of right, it is then up to the prosecution to prove that the defendant was not acting with such a claim in mind, see the authorities quoted at [CA.117.200]. Before 2007, when the fault element under ss 195, 196 and 198 was “maliciously”, the then s 194(3) provided “[f]or the purposes of this Chapter, an act done by a person under a reasonable belief that the person had a right to do the act shall be taken not to have been done maliciously.” To state as s 194(3) now does that such a belief “does not constitute an element of any offence under this Part” would seem to reverse the previous position so as to cast on a defendant not only an evidentiary onus to point to some evidence raising a claim of right, but also a legal onus to demonstrate a valid claim of right on the balance of probabilities as well. 1 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; 61 ALJR; 29 A Crim R 85; [1987] HCA 54 per Brennan J at 571 (CLR); 92 (A Crim R) and Dawson J at 592–593 (CLR); 108 (A Crim R).
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Crimes Act 1900 s 195
[CA.195.20]
DIVISION 2 – CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY GENERALLY [Former Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 2 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[20]; former Pt 4 Ch 2 Div 2 renum Act 31 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 5.27[2]]
195
Destroying or damaging property
(1) A person who intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages property belonging to another or to that person and another is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 5 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(1A) A person who, in the company of another person or persons, intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages property belonging to another or to that person and another is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 6 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 11 years. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 107 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 5[2]]
(2) A person who, during a public disorder, intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages property belonging to another or to that person and another is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 7 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 12 years. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[12]] [S 195 am Act 107 of 2008; Act 38 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 195 COMMENTARY Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.195.20] Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references ...................................................................... [CA.195.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.195.60] Element (1) Intentional or reckless action ........................................................................................ [CA.195.80] Element (2) Destruction of or damage to property ........................................................................ [CA.195.100] Element (3) Property belonging to another .................................................................................... [CA.195.120] Element (1A) In company or during a public disorder – s 195(1A) or (2) ..................................... [CA.195.140] Possible defences to a charge under s 195 .................................................................................. [CA.195.160]
[CA.195.20]
Indictments
Section 195(1): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did intentionally or recklessly destroy or damage property namely .................................................. belonging to GH (or, to the said AB and GH, or, to another)(and where applicable, by fire or by explosives). Section 195(1A) or (2): That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales while in the company of CD (or, CD and EF, or another or others)(or, during a public disorder) did intentionally or recklessly destroy or damage property namely .................................................. belonging to GH (or, to the said AB and GH, or, to another)(and where applicable, by fire or by explosives).
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1 Ex parte Polley; Re McLennan (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 391; 64 WN (NSW) 125 at 392 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ. 2 See Re Hassett (1994) 76 A Crim R 19 (Vic CCA). 3 The Hon John Hatzistergos Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, Second Reading Speech of the Crimes Amendment Bill 2007, (Hansard, Legislative Council, 26 September 2007, p 2318). 4 Hedberg v Woodhall (1913) 15 CLR 531; [1913] HCA 2 at 535 (CLR) per Griffith CJ; R v Courtie [1984] AC 463; [1984] 2 WLR 330; 78 Cr App R 292 at 471 (AC); 298–299 (Cr App R 292) per Lord Diplock; Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264; 19 A Crim R 65 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 275–276 (CLR) and 70–71 (A Crim R).
[CA.195.40]
Jurisdiction, related provisions and cross-references
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Summary jurisdiction – a charge under s 195 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if the property destroyed or damaged is owned or part owned by the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner, by s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that person, unless excused, is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 195 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related provisions concerning damage to property: • Section 196 – destroying or damaging property with intent to injure; • Section 197 – dishonestly destroying or damaging property; • Section 199 – threatening to destroy or damage property; • Section 200 – possession of explosives etc with intent to destroy or damage property; • Sections 308D, 308E, 308I – impairment etc of computer data etc. [CA.195.60]
Elements of the offences
Section 195(1) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) intentionally or recklessly; (2) destroyed or damaged property; (3) belonging to another (or belonging to the accused and another); (4) (where applicable) by fire (or by explosives). Section 195(1A) or (2) – the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) while in the company of another (or others) (or, during a public disorder); (1) intentionally or recklessly; (2) destroyed or damaged property; (3) belonging to another (or belonging to the accused and another); (4) (where applicable) by fire (or by explosives).
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“Intentionally or recklessly” one offence or two? It is suggested that despite the phrase “Intentionally or recklessly” in s 195, it was not the intention of Parliament to create two separate offences, namely one of intentionally damaging property and another of recklessly damaging property. The presence of “or” does not of itself show that it is intended to create two offences.1 Before the Crimes Amendment Act 2007 which replaced “maliciously” as the fault element under s 195, there was only one offence.2 There is nothing in the Second Reading Speech for the introductory Bill that suggests an intention to create multiple offences where the fault element was simply “maliciously”.3 Further, under each of s 195(1), (1A) and (2), the same penalty is prescribed.4
Crimes Act 1900 s 195
[CA.195.60]
For commentary on element (1A), see [CA.195.140]. [CA.195.80]
Element (1) Intentional or reckless action
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Mens rea – the fault element or mens rea under s 195 is intention or recklessness (see also [CA.195.20]). For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400] and on recklessness, see s 4A–[CA.4A.40]. Recklessness can be easier to prove than actual intention. It can be established that an accused acted recklessly if it is proved that he or she in fact acted intentionally or with knowledge, see s 4A and commentary at [CA.4A.20] and [CA.4A.40]. The former fault element of “maliciously” was omitted under s 195 from 15 February 2008 – see Crimes Amendment Act 2007 s 3 and Sch 1[2]. Recklessness – where recklessness is alleged, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted with subjective foresight of the possibility that property would be destroyed or damaged to some degree in the way that in fact occurred, but nevertheless proceeded to act. That the accused does not have to be proved to have foreseen the extent of the actual damage was confirmed in CB v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWSC 618. The plaintiff, a youth (CB) almost 15 years old at the relevant time, was charged and convicted under s 195(1)(b) of intentionally or recklessly destroying a house by fire. The plaintiff and another youth climbed through the bathroom window of an unoccupied residence being renovated by its absent owners. On the third floor, they smoked cigarettes lit with a lighter belonging to the other youth. When that youth went downstairs, the plaintiff used the lighter to singe frayed material on a couch. The foam couch quickly caught fire. The other youth returned to help the plaintiff try extinguish the fire. This effort failed and when the room filled with smoke they left the house, which then burned down. In a police interview, the plaintiff said that he did not intend to set the couch “completely on fire” and that it was his intention “just to singe it”. He further said that once they left the house he thought the couch was going to burn out, and possibly the fly screen on the window above the couch. He said that he did not think the whole house would catch alight and that he did not ring the fire brigade because he did not want to get into trouble. The plaintiff contended that to prove recklessness the prosecution had to show that he foresaw the possibility that applying the lighter to the sofa fibres might lead to the house burning down. Adamson J rejected this and held (at [29]–[30]) that to prove foresight of damage to or the destruction of property under s 195, in accordance with R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306 (CCA NSW which dealt with the previous fault element of “maliciously”), the prosecution had only to prove “a realisation on the part of the accused that the particular kind of harm in fact done (that is, some physical harm – but not necessarily the degree of harm in fact so done) might be inflicted (that is, may possibly be inflicted) yet he went ahead and acted.”1 Mistaken belief as to ownership – the mens rea includes an intent etc to destroy the property of another. In R v Smith [1974] QB 354; [1974] 2 WLR 20; [1974] 1 All ER 632, it was held that a person who destroys or damages property believing it to be his or her own lacks the intent necessary to commit the offence.2 Actus reus – omissions – in almost all cases under s 195, the prosecution will rely upon some act of the accused directed towards destroying or damaging property.3 However, an English case held that, in some circumstances, a person can be held guilty of criminal damage on the basis of an omission to act. In R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 9784, the accused fell asleep while smoking in the room of a house he occupied as a squatter. He awoke to find that the mattress on which he was sleeping was smouldering. Instead of putting out the fire, the accused simply moved to another room of the house and went back to sleep. Although the accused had no intention of destroying or damaging the house at the time he committed the acts which caused the fire, the House of Lords held that in these circumstances the accused had come under a duty to take steps to prevent the fire. Those circumstances were: that the accused had done an act which had set in train events which created a risk to property belonging to another; that he had become aware of the train of events; and that he had, or ought to have, become aware of the risk that this train of events presented. Accordingly, his failure to take steps to put out the fire amounted to criminal damage. Lord Diplock said “… I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal
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liability conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one’s state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence.”5
1 See also Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 81 NSWLR 119; 208 A Crim R 392; [2011] NSWCCA 93 referred to by Adamson J in CB v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NSWSC 618. 2 R v Smith [1974] QB 354; [1974] 2 WLR 20; [1974] 1 All ER 632 at 360 (QB). 3 An account of the history of statutory offences directed at property rather than individuals is given in the judgment of Jacobs P in R v Phillips [1973] 1 NSWLR 275. 4 R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978. It should be noted that at the time Miller was decided, the law in the UK was under the decision in Metropolitan Commissioner of Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, that objective recklessness could suffice for recklessness. This has never been the case in New South Wales and is no longer the case in the UK, see [CA.4A.40]. 5 Miller at 175–176 (AC). This decision was cited by Barr J in R v Taber (2002) 56 NSWLR 443; (2002) 136 A Crim R 478; [2002] NSWSC 1239 at 450 (NSWLR); 484 (A Crim R) where he said that if an accused commits a series of acts as part of one transaction, mens rea should not be required at all stages; only at one stage. 6 Crimes Act 1900, ss 428B and 428D.
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[CA.195.100]
Element (2) Destruction of or damage to property
Imprecise definition – apart from a partial definition of damaging a “unique identifier” of property (such as a serial number) contained in s 194(4), there is no definition of “damages” in the Crimes Act 1900. Neither is there a definition of “destroys”. In Samuels v Stubbs (1972) 4 SASR 200, Walters J observed at 203: The word “damage” in law has more than one meaning, and care has to be exercised in examining the context in which the word appears … . It seems to me that it is difficult to lay down any very general and, at the same time, precise and absolute rule as to what constitutes “damage”. Some of the authorities on the meaning of “damages” bear out this difficulty of precise definition. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines “destroy” (in part) as “Ruin completely, make utterly useless, spoil” and defines “damage” (in part) as “Harm done to a thing … esp physical injury impairing value or usefulness”.1 The courts have tended to give “damages” a wide interpretation. Although decisions have not always been consistent, various categories of damage appear to be judicially accepted, see sub-heading Hammond conclusion – alternative paths to establishing criminal damage. What constitutes criminal damage is a question of fact – as will be seen, there are cases at the margin capable of being decided one way or the other. “What constitutes criminal damage is a matter of fact and degree and it is for the [jury or magistrates], applying their common sense, to decide whether what occurred was damage or not”.2 Cases of physical damage – this is the most straightforward category. Some early English cases, including cases preceding the Malicious Damage Act 1861 (UK), concerned deliberate damage to industrial machines by nineteenth century Luddites.3 The physical damage did not need to be great. One marginal example was a conviction for walking across knee deep grass, causing damage to it, calculated at six pence.4 By contrast, in Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48 where a defendant was charged with damaging a scaffolding clip and bar erected as part of a barrier of scaffolding across a common way (but not, it is to be noted, the scaffolding itself), it was held on appeal that even if it could be shown that the defendant had scratched these components, the scratching of them is an incident of their normal use and that it would be unlikely that if the magistrates had considered this damage, that it could be held to constitute criminal damage. This may be an example of the de minimus principle. Impairment of function without permanent physical damage by removal or displacement of parts etc – a number of authorities have held that impairment of the usefulness of property can be an alternative way to
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Intoxication – an offence under s 195 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 195, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.6
Crimes Act 1900 s 195
[CA.195.100]
demonstrate criminal damage. R v Fisher (1865) LR 1 CCR 7 involved a disaffected employee who dismantled and wrongly re-assembled a boiler, including plugging up a pipe so as to render it temporarily useless and liable to burst if used. Although there was no actual physical damage, the employee’s conviction was upheld on appeal, with Pollock CB commenting that “great injury may be done to a machine by the displacement of its parts”. Other such cases of impairment of function with physical damage included the removal (without physical damage) of a vital part of a machine5 and the displacement of a vital part of a machine.6 It has been held that removed parts undamaged in themselves will not support a conviction for damage to the parts; if the parts are undamaged, the defendant should be charged with damage to the whole machine.7 In R v Whiteley (1991) 93 Cr App R 25 (CA), a computer hacker was alleged to have altered data on a computer system which caused the computer to fail.8 Lord Lane CJ reviewed the authorities in relation to “damage”. His Lordship quoted with approval from the decision of Auld J in Morphitis v Salmon who said:
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The authorities show that the term “damage” for the purpose of this provision, should be widely interpreted so as to include not only permanent or temporary physical harm, but also permanent or temporary impairment of value or usefulness. Addition of something without permanent damage – if removing something from a device to make it inoperable can be criminal damage, can adding something to have this same effect also be criminal damage? In two cases involving the wheel clamping of vehicles, it was suggested (with little or no analysis) that this did not constitute criminal damage to the vehicles apparently as, although they rendered the vehicles temporarily inoperable, the clamps were simply attached to the vehicles involving no intrusion into the vehicles themselves.9 As noted in commentary following the second of these decisions, if a device can be damaged by removing something, logic suggests that it can be damaged by adding something.10 Adding water to milk which then had to be thrown away was held to constitute damage (although this decision may have been influenced by the term “spoil” in the relevant section along with “damage”).11 In a Victorian case, there was held to be criminal damage where the defendant scattered over the complainant’s wheat field seeds of noxious weeds which germinated.12 A contrary conclusion was reached by Simpson J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 244 where the defendants were environmental activists associated with “Greenpeace”. With others, they scaled a mesh fence and entered a coal loader near Newcastle. They activated a safety isolation switch on a conveyor belt, rendering the conveyor inoperable and then chained themselves to the underside of the conveyor belt, using heavy metal chain and steel clamps. In consequence, the conveyor was out of operation for almost 2 hours, at a cost of approximately $27,000. Simpson J held at [38] that a functional interference with the conveyor without actual physical interference to it was not sufficient to establish criminal damage and said at [44] that for a conviction under s 195, it was necessary that the prosecution establish, even to a limited degree, some physical interference or alteration to the property. The 2013 case of Hammond – the ruling in Fraser was questioned by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Hammond v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 93 where Slattery J extensively reviewed the authorities. At [69], Slattery J (with Hoeben CJ at CL and Bellew J agreeing) said: But were it necessary to decide the question I would respectfully differ from the approach that Simpson J took in Fraser, and conclude that the course of authority in both England and Australia now supports the conclusion that interference with functionality of the property in question alone, even without physical harm to or “derangement” of the property is sufficient to establish “damage” within Crimes Act s 195. In my opinion this conclusion is justified on the various judicial formulae of what constitutes “damage” developed in the course of authority. Hammond concerned a man who spat on a stainless steel seat in a police dock, involving only possible functional interference. It was therefore necessary to decide whether interference purely with function can constitute criminal damage. Slattery J reviewed, inter alia, the following cases:
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Samuels v Stubbs where a policeman’s hat was crushed by the defendant while the policeman was attempting to make an arrest during an anti-war demonstration. The defendant kicked the cap, then jumped on it with both feet crushing it. It remained in a “semi-crushed” condition before being unlawfully removed from the scene by a third party. Walters J said at 203–204: It is my view … the word “damages” … is sufficiently wide in its meaning to embrace injury, mischief or harm done to property, and that in order to constitute “damage”, it is unnecessary to establish such definite or actual damage as renders the property useless, or prevents it from serving its normal function — in this case, prevents the cap from being worn. In my opinion, it is sufficient proof of damage if the evidence proves a temporary functional derangement of the particular article of property
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In A (a juvenile) v The Queen [1978] Crim LR 689, the defendant spat on a police sergeant’s raincoat. The sergeant was unaware of the incident occurring but attempted to remove it later with a paper tissue. The defendant was arrested and charged and as a result, no further attempts were made to clean the raincoat. At the hearing, when the uncleaned raincoat was produced, a faint mark could be seen on it. The defendant’s appeal against conviction was allowed. The Crown Court said: Spitting at a garment could be an act capable of causing damage. However, one must consider the specific garment which has been allegedly damaged. If someone spat upon a wedding satin dress, for example, any attempt to remove the spittle may in itself leave a mark or stain. The court will find no difficulty in saying that an article had been rendered “imperfect” if, after a reasonable attempt at cleaning it, a stain remained. An article may also have been rendered “inoperative” if, as a result of what happened it has been taken to dry-cleaners. However, in the present case, no attempt has been made, even with soap and water, to clean the raincoat, which was a service raincoat designed to withstand elements. R v Henderson (unreported, Court of Appeal UK (Crim Div), 29 November 1984) involved the dumping of soil, rubble and mud onto a development site. This was held to be criminal damage because a significant amount of money had to be spent to remove this material and to restore the land to its pre-existing condition. R v Hayne (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 September 1998) concerned the pouring of petrol throughout a house. The Court held that whether this could be described as a Samuels v Stubbs “temporary functional derangement” or a Morphitis v Salmon “temporary impairment of value or usefulness”, the act of pouring petrol was malicious damage under the terms of s 195 as it then was. R v Fiak (2005) EWC Crim 2381 dealt with an appeal by a man who was arrested for being drunk in charge of a car and for assaulting a police officer. After being placed in a police cell overnight, he put a blanket down the toilet, repeatedly flushing it, flooding his cell. His argument that clean water on a waterproof floor could not constitute damage was unsuccessful. The court held that as damage includes temporary impairment of value or usefulness, the blanket could not be used until it had been dried and the cell was out of action until the water was cleared. Graffıti cases – various cases have involved graffiti, sometimes applied for political or ideological purposes.13 One such case was R v Zischke [1983] 1 Qd R 240 where the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal of a man convicted of 11 counts of wilful and unlawful damage to property caused by spraying with an aerosol spray of “slogans and exhortations of a political and socio-political nature” on the surface of buildings, footpaths and walls in a mall in Townsville. The property had been restored at trouble and not inconsiderable cost to the owner. Dismissing the appeals, the Court said 246: [I]f property is disfigured but in such a manner that it can be restored, although only with expense or difficulty, then there has been damage. … Probably the formula that most nearly embraces all the attempts at definition is that a thing is damaged if it is rendered imperfect or inoperative. … It was not in our view essential to the success of the prosecution to establish that an expenditure of money was
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King v Lees (1948) 65 TLR 21 where the defendant urinated on the mat of a taxi cab. A divisional court held that this was criminal damage, even though the injury could be put right “quickly and easily leaving no after-effect”;
Crimes Act 1900 s 195
[CA.195.100]
required to remedy the state of affairs produced by the paint, although proof of such expenditure may afford helpful evidence of the fact and the extent of the imperfection created. Hammond conclusion – alternative paths to establishing criminal damage – based upon an extensive review of the authorities, it was concluded in Hammond at [69] that alternative paths to a finding of criminal damage include physical harm, functional interference, “temporary functional derangement” and “impairment of value or usefulness”. The Court in Hammond at [76] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the presence of the spittle caused an interference with the function of the seat in the dock. Destroys adds little to damages – as noted earlier, the dictionary definition of “destroys” is to make something utterly useless. This will usually be more difficult to prove than simply proving that property was damaged. As damage is an integral part of actual destruction, it is suggested that “destroys” here adds little of practical utility to “damages”. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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9 10 11 12 13
Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735. See R v Zischke [1983] 1 Qd R 240 at 244. Gayford v Chouler [1898] 1 QB 316, a decision described as “considerably more difficult to justify” in Hammond v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 93 at [43]. R v Tacey (1821) Russ & Ry 452; 168 ER 893; Getty v Antrim County Council [1950] NI 114. R v Foster (1852) 6 Cox CC 25. Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48. In Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, it was held that a card containing a computer program is damaged by erasure of the program. Lloyd v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1992] 1 All ER 982 at 990g–h (DC); Drake v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1994] Crim LR 855. Commentary following the report of Drake v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) at 856. Roper v Knott [1898] 1 QB 868. R v Maund (1866) 1 WW & a’B (L) 96 (FC). Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [1986] Crim LR 330; Roe v Kingerlee; R v Burgess (2005) 152 A Crim R 100; [2005] NSWCCA 52.
[CA.195.120]
Element (3) Property belonging to another
“Property” is partially defined in s 194(2) as including wild creatures in some circumstances. “Property” is also defined in s 4 of the Act and in s 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987. Caution needs to be taken in applying these definitions as s 194(1) excludes intangible property. Belonging to another – by the terms of s 195(1), (1A) and (2) themselves, the relevant property may belong partly to the accused. In Walton v Salmon 10 Petty Sessions Review 4530 (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, 24 April 1992), Loveday J considered whether it was necessary for the prosecution to establish the identity of the actual owner of the property allegedly damaged. His Honour said (at 4532): In my view the allegation that the vehicle was the property of [DE] was an immaterial allegation in the present case. It was sufficient if the prosecution proved that the vehicle was the property of a person other than the respondent. [CA.195.140]
Element (1A) In company or during a public disorder – s 195(1A) or (2)
In company – the concept of being in company with another or others is a feature of robbery in company (s 97), some sexual offences including sexual assault in company (s 61J), aggravated sexual assault in company (s 61JA), indecent assault in company (s 61M) and act of indecency towards a person under 16 in company (s 61O) and other offences including kidnapping in company (s 86). An offence under s 195(1A) differs from such offences in that criminal damage is directed to property rather than to a person. Authorities such as R v Button (2002) 54 NSWLR 455; (2002) 129 A Crim R 242; [2002] NSWCCA 159
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During a public disorder – public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations”. For the offence of riot, s 93B and commentary, see [CA.93B.20]. For the offence of affray, s 93C and commentary, see [CA.93C.20].
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[CA.195.160]
Possible defences to a charge under s 195
Provided that there is some proper factual basis, possible defences may include: (1) a lack of mens rea in that the defendant either did not intend any damage or foresee the possibility of any damage, or, believed that the property was wholly his or her to damage or destroy (see generally [CLP.1380], [CLP.1400] and [CA.4A.40]); (2) accident (see generally [CLP.120]); (3) an absence of voluntariness in that the act causing the damage was not a voluntary act (see generally [CLP.160]); (4) a claim of right (see generally [CA.117.200]). The defendant will have the onus of demonstrating that he or she acted on this basis on the balance of probabilities, see s 194(3) and commentary and [CA.117.200]; (5) mental illness (see generally [CLP.1020]); (6) necessity (see generally [CLP.1420]); (7) duress (see generally [CLP.860]); (8) self-defence (see generally s 418). 196
Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person
(1) A person who destroys or damages property, intending by the destruction or damage to cause bodily injury to another, is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 7 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; renum Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[13]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person who, during a public disorder, destroys or damages property, intending by the destruction or damage to cause bodily injury to another, is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 9 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 16 years. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[13]] [S 196 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 16 of 1955; Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 196 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.196.20]
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which considered the requirement of being in company in the context of an aggravated sexual assault need to be read in the context of an offence directed to property. The propositions stated in Button applied in the present context would appear to require a shared common purpose to destroy or damage property and that each participant be physically present at the time of the destruction or damage. For commentary on being “in company” see [CA.61J.140] under the sub-heading Section 61J(2)(c) – Offender in company and [CA.97.140].
Crimes Act 1900 s 196
[CA.196.20]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions ...................................................................... [CA.196.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.196.60] Element (1A) During a public disorder ............................................................................................. [CA.196.80] Element (1) Did destroy or damage property ................................................................................. [CA.196.100] Element (2) Intention to cause bodily injury ................................................................................... [CA.196.120] Element (2A) By means of fire or explosives ................................................................................. [CA.196.140] Possible defences to a charge under s 196 .................................................................................. [CA.196.160]
[CA.196.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales (if applicable, during a public disorder) did destroy or damage property namely ......................... (if applicable, by means of fire or explosives) intending thereby to cause bodily injury to CD (or, to another). [CA.196.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions
Summary jurisdiction – a charge under s 196 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.
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Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if the property destroyed or damaged is owned or part owned by the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner, by s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that person, unless excused, is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 196 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related provisions concerning damage to property: • Section 195 – destroying or damaging property; • Section 197 – dishonestly destroying or damaging property; • Section 198 – destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life; • Section 199 – threatening to destroy or damage property; • Section 200 – possession of explosives etc with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 344A – attempts. Related provisions concerning intention to injure: • Section 28 – destroying or damaging any building by explosives or setting fire to a vessel with intent to murder; • Section 30 – attempted murder by any other means; • Section 46 – causing grievous bodily harm etc by gunpowder or other substance; • Section 47 – causing grievous bodily harm etc by causing explosion; • Section 48 – causing explosive to be place in or near a building, vehicle or public place intending to cause bodily harm; • Section 49A – throwing objects at vehicles or vessels. [CA.196.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) (if applicable) during a public disorder; (1) did destroy or damage property; (2) intending thereby to cause bodily injury to another; (2A) (if applicable) by means of fire or explosives.
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s 196
Element (1A) During a public disorder
Public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations”. For the offence of riot, s 93B and commentary, see [CA.93B.20]. For the offence of affray, s 93C and commentary, see [CA.93C.20]. Element (1) Did destroy or damage property
Actus reus – this offence has both an element of damage to property and an element of intended injury to the person. In relation to causing bodily injury, the mens rea required is an actual intent to achieve that result. The actus reus of the offence is the deliberate destruction of or damage to property. Examples of acts falling within s 196 are setting fire to a house in the knowledge that others were inside or cutting the brake cable of another’s car. In some cases, the actual damage caused may be different from that in fact contemplated by the accused. In such cases, the intention of the accused to cause bodily injury to another may be more difficult to prove. Destroy or damage property – for commentary on destruction of or damage to property, see [CA.195.100] relating to s 195. Given that the intent to be proven under s 196 is damage to cause bodily injury, the damage necessary to be proved in this instance will need to be of a more severe kind than can sometimes suffice under s 195.
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Property – as to “property”, see [CA.195.120] relating to s 195. It will be noted that unlike s 195, which requires proof of destruction of or damage to property of another, proof of ownership or possession of property of another is not a requirement under s 196. It is therefore suggested that the detonation of a device like a car bomb in or near a place where other people might be expected to be would fall within the terms of s 196 because of the destruction of or damage to the car. [CA.196.120]
Element (2) Intention to cause bodily injury
Intention to cause bodily injury – intention can describe various forms of mens rea or can connote acting to achieve a proscribed purpose, see [CLP.1400]. Under this element, intention has the latter meaning, a decision to cause, if possible, bodily injury. In some circumstances, foresight of injury may be regarded as actual intent of injury, see authorities cited at [CLP.1400]. The type of damage in fact caused and its extent may clearly indicate an intention to injure. As to proof of intent, authorities on this topic are cited at [CLP.1400]. It is important to note that s 196 requires intention to cause bodily injury to another by the destruction of or damage to property and not simply as a result of an act which also destroys or damages property. This critical distinction is illustrated by two English decisions in the similar context of s 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (UK) which makes it an offence to destroy or damage any property intending thereby to endanger the life of another. In R v Steer [1988] AC 111; [1987] 3 WLR 205; [1987] 2 All ER 833, the accused was convicted under s 1(2) after he fired shots at the windows of a house occupied by the victim against whom the accused held a grudge. The House of Lords quashed his conviction holding that the charge was misconceived because the danger to life was caused by the bullets and not by any damage to the windows they were fired through. In R v Webster [1995] 2 All ER 168; [1995] 1 Cr App R 495, the accused pushed a heavy stone onto a passing passenger train from a bridge above. Only a corner of the stone penetrated the train’s roof but passengers were showered with roof material including fibre glass. The accused’s conviction under s 1(2) was quashed because the trial judge failed to direct the jury that the accused was guilty only if he foresaw danger to life from the damage to the carriage and not merely from the stone itself. Causation – causation of injury will rarely be a practical issue. Where it is a practical issue, it is likely to be more difficult for the prosecution to prove an intent to injure. For general commentary on causation, see [CLP.380].
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[CA.196.100]
Crimes Act 1900 s 197
[CA.196.120]
Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence under s 196 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intention to cause bodily injury, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. Bodily injury – “Injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In this context, a dictionary definition is “physical damage to a person’s body”.1 Injury includes “causing harm to the body”.2 Pain by itself is not “injury”.3 See also commentary on actual bodily harm at [CA.59.100]. 1 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). In R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 24 (A Crim R) per Powell JA (Studdert and Levine JJ agreeing), it was said that this is the ordinary English meaning of “injury”. See also Deeble v Nott (1941) 65 CLR 104; 58 WN (NSW) 116; [1941] HCA 11 where Starke J said at 109 (CLR) that “bodily injuries” in a civil Act meant “any physical injuries”. 2 R v Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 at 389 (Cr App R) (HL) per Lord Griffiths (with whom the other Law Lords agreed). 3 R v Tamcelik; Ex parte Ozcan [1998] 1 Qd R 330 (Qld SC). In Hevey v Leonard [1976] VR 624 at 632, it was said that pain itself does not constitute injury; it is only evidentiary.
[CA.196.140]
Element (2A) By means of fire or explosives
“Explosives” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. A dictionary definition of “explosive” is simply “A substance that can be made to explode”.1 An explosion often involves or results in fire – the presence of “or” between these two nouns does not mean that the prosecution has to elect between charging the means employed as either fire or explosives.2 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 2 See Ex parte Polley; Re McLennan (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 391; 64 WN (NSW) 125 at 392 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ.
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[CA.196.160]
Possible defences to a charge under s 196
Reference is made to the corresponding heading concerning s 195 at [CA.195.160]. It should be noted that some of the possible defences to a charge under s 195 will not apply to a charge under s 196, such as a mistaken belief that the property destroyed or damaged was that of the accused himself/herself. 197
Dishonestly destroying or damaging property
(1) A person who dishonestly, with a view to making a gain for that person or another, destroys or damages property is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 7 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (1) renum Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[14]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person who, during a public disorder, dishonestly, with a view to making a gain for that person or another, destroys or damages property is liable: (a) to imprisonment for 9 years, or (b) if the destruction or damage is caused by means of fire or explosives, to imprisonment for 16 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[14]] [S 197 am Act 61 of 2006; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
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SECTION 197 COMMENTARY
[CA.197.20]
Indictment/charge
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales (if applicable, during a public disorder) dishonestly, with a view to making a gain for himself (or, for CD) did destroy or damage property namely ......................... (if applicable, by means of fire or explosives). [CA.197.40]
Jurisdiction and related provisions
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Summary jurisdiction – a charge under s 197 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related provisions concerning damage to property: • Section 195 – destroying or damaging property; • Section 196 – destroying or damaging property with intent to injure; • Section 198 – destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life; • Section 199 – threatening to destroy or damage property; • Section 200 – possession of explosives etc with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 344A – attempts. [CA.197.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) (if applicable) during a public disorder; (1) dishonestly, with a view to making a gain for himself (or another); (2) did destroy or damage property; (2A) (if applicable) by means of fire or explosives. [CA.197.80]
Element (1A) During a public disorder
Public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations”. For the offence of riot, s 93B and commentary, see [CA.93B.20]. For the offence of affray, s 93C and commentary, see [CA.93C.20]. [CA.197.100]
Element (1) Dishonestly, with a view to making a gain
Dishonestly – a comprehensive definition of “dishonestly” is “a task which has eluded legislatures, law reform bodies, official committees and judges”.1 The concept of dishonesty “has to be flexible enough to cover a myriad of situations and to reflect community standards which may vary from time to time”.2 Various authorities have held that dishonesty does not have to be defined for juries.3 In R v Feely [1973] QB 530; [1973] 2 WLR 201; [1973] 1 All ER 341 at 537–538 (QB), Lawton LJ observed: We do not agree that judges should define what “dishonestly” means. This word is in common use … . Jurors, when deciding whether an appropriation was dishonest can be reasonably expected to, and
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Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................. [CA.197.20] Jurisdiction and related provisions ................................................................................................... [CA.197.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.197.60] Element (1A) During a public disorder ............................................................................................. [CA.197.80] Element (1) Dishonestly, with a view to making a gain ................................................................. [CA.197.100] Element (2) Did destroy or damage property ................................................................................. [CA.197.120] Element (2A) By means of fire or explosives ................................................................................. [CA.197.140]
Crimes Act 1900 s 197
[CA.197.100]
should, apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. In the case of statutory fraud offences, it has been held that the words “fraudulently” and “dishonestly” have interchangeable meanings.4 In only a few cases is dishonesty a genuine issue.5 But in some cases, as for example, where an accused claims to have acted under a claim of right, the question can arise of whether dishonesty is to be judged wholly subjectively from what the accused considered was justified. In such marginal cases, the essence of the difficulty is whether conduct should be regarded as dishonest where, although subjectively the accused believes that he was justified depriving another of property, objectively, ordinary people would consider it dishonest. Sometimes, it is the nature of an accused’s claim of right that is questionable objectively. Sometimes, it is the nature of the means used to obtain property that is objectively questionable. In marginal cases, this issue resulted in a divergence of views in England on the one hand and in Australian common law jurisdictions on the other. The English decisions were R v Feely and R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689. In Feely, it was held that (1) it is for the jury to determine whether the defendant acted dishonestly and not for the judge and (2) that “dishonestly” can only relate to the defendant’s own state of mind.6 But the Court in Feely at 537–538 (QB) added that when deciding whether an appropriation was dishonest, jurors can be expected to, and should, apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. In this respect, Feely was criticised for undermining the subjective test of whether the act was dishonest in the mind of the defendant. In Ghosh, it was remarked that to employ a test of dishonesty from only a defendant’s point of view would bring about the result that Robin Hood would be no robber. The Court of Appeal held that:
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In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. In common law jurisdictions in Australia, a more subjective approach was taken. The majority in R v Salvo [1980] VR 401; 5 A Crim R 1 declined to follow Feely. Fullagar J at 432 (VR) said that dishonesty means obtaining property “without any belief that the [accused] has any right to deprive the other of it.” Murphy J took a similar view, saying at 430–431 (VR) that the “standards of ordinary decent people” test would lead to different outcomes from case to case and would weaken public confidence in both the courts and juries. Decisions in New South Wales took the approach in Salvo in preference to Feely/Ghosh.7 One such case was R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416 where the accused engaged in a subterfuge involving, inter alia, forging a signature to gain ownership of land to which he believed himself entitled. The Court of Criminal Appeal observed that there are cases such as Love itself where people set out to obtain something to which they believe they are legally entitled but employ means of deception to obtain it. The Court said “Unfortunately, the ordinary standards of reasonable people can be an unreliable guide as to what constitutes ‘dishonesty’ in such a case. Many right-thinking people would find themselves perplexed if called upon to evaluate the honesty of such conduct.”8 The Court said that to express the test of dishonesty in terms of standards of ordinary people especially in cases involving something in the nature of a claim of right will leave the jury with inadequate instruction.9 The appropriate test of dishonesty was considered by the High Court in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250, a case involving conspiracy to defraud. There, it was held by a majority that if the question is whether an act was dishonest according to ordinary notions, it is sufficient that the jury be instructed that that is to be decided by the standards of ordinary, decent people.10 However, unlike Ghosh, the High Court majority said that the prosecution does not have to prove, in addition, that the accused knew that his act was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary decent people.11 This latter position is altered by the enactment of s 4B of the Crimes Act 1900 which has the effect of restoring the position to the English position pre-Peters.
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The various competing views on the test for dishonesty were considered in 1995 by the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee which preferred the English approach and concluded that: The great virtue of the Feely/Ghosh test is that it provides a framework in which [difficult questions in borderline cases] can be asked and answered so that justice can be done in the individual case.12 As a result, the Feely/Ghosh test was enacted as s 130.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) in May 2001. The same approach has been taken in New South Wales. The Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity and Forgery Offences) Act 2009 introduced into the Crimes Act 1900 s 4B which provides: dishonest means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. (2) In a prosecution for an offence, dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact. In the light of the High Court decision in Peters v The Queen, it was said in Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 that a trial judge must: (a) identify the knowledge, belief or intent which is said to render the relevant conduct dishonest; and (b) instruct the jury to decide whether the accused had that knowledge, belief or intent and, if so, to determine whether, on that account, the act was dishonest; and (c) direct the jury that, in determining whether the conduct of the accused was dishonest, the standard is that of ordinary, decent people.13 It is suggested that in the light of s 4B, to the Macleod requirement, the following should be added:
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(d) and direct the jury that, the accused’s act was known by him or her to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. With a view to making a gain – the meaning of “gain” in this kind of context was considered in the Victorian case of Director of Public Prosecutions’ Reference No 1 of 1988 [1989] VR 857; (1989) 40 A Crim R 461. Section 197(3) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides that a person who dishonestly, with a view to gain for himself or another, destroys or damages any property shall be guilty of an indictable offence. The facts were typical of an offence under s 197 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The accused was charged with having a workmate destroy his Holden car for “insurance reasons”. Following the car’s destruction, the accused made a claim on his insurance company for payment under the terms of his policy of the market value of the car. The trial judge directed a verdict of not guilty on two bases, that is, that there is nothing unlawful about destroying one’s own property and that there could be no “gain” because the accused was to receive only the market value of the car. The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal did not agree, holding that the section is not limited to the property of others and that in this context “gain” is to be given a wide meaning. The Court held that it was a “gain” for the accused to be paid the market value of his car. Another typical case was R v Pearson (2000) 114 A Crim R 80; [2000] NSWCCA 149 where the accused was convicted of deliberately burning his smash repair business in order to benefit from the business’s insurance policy. Intoxication – an offence under s 197 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 197 self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account.14 1 Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; 72 ALJR 517; 96 A Crim R 250 at [123] per Kirby J. See also R v Kastratovic (1985) 42 SASR 59; 19 A Crim R 28 at 62 (SASR) per King CJ. 2 The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee Chapter 3 – Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences, Final Report (1995) at p 15. 3 R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597; (1980) 3 A Crim R 210; R v Love (1989) 17 NSWLR 608; 44 A Crim R 416; Peters v The Queen at [18] per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 4 R v Glenister at 604 (NSWLR); 315 (A Crim R).
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(1) In this Act:
Crimes Act 1900 s 198
[CA.197.100]
5 The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee Chapter 3 – Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences, Final Report (1995) at pp 19, 25. 6 See R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053; [1982] 3 WLR 110; [1982] 2 All ER 689 at 1063 (QB) per Lord Lane CJ. 7 R v Ghosh at 1064 (QB) per Lord Lane CJ. 8 See for example R v Love; R v Condon (1995) 83 A Crim R 335 at 346 (CCA NSW). 9 R v Love, the Court at 614. 10 R v Love, the Court at 614. 11 Peters v The Queen at [15]–[17] per Toohey and Gaudron JJ, with Kirby J agreeing at [145]. 12 The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee Chapter 3 – Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences, Final Report (1995) at p 15. 13 Macleod v The Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230; 140 A Crim R 343; [2003] HCA 24 at [100] per McHugh J. 14 Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D.
[CA.197.120]
Element (2) Did destroy or damage property
Destroy or damage property – for commentary on destruction of or damage to property, see [CA.195.100] relating to s 195. Given that the intent to be proven under s 197 is with a view to making gain, the damage necessary to be proved in this instance will need to be of a more severe kind than can sometimes suffice under s 195.
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Property – as to “property”, see [CA.195.120] relating to s 195. It will be noted that unlike s 195, which requires proof of destruction of or damage to property of another, proof of ownership or possession of property of another is not a requirement under s 197. Circumstantial evidence – many cases under s 197 of destruction of property so as to claim insurance are proved circumstantially. One such case was Hanna v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 195 where McClellan CJ at CL observed at [27]: Where the Crown presents a circumstantial case all of the circumstances must be considered. The case must not be considered piecemeal: The Queen v Hillier [2007] 228 CLR 618 at 637–638 [46]–[48] and see the discussion in Burrell v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [162]ff. [CA.197.140]
Element (2A) By means of fire or explosives
“Explosives” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. A dictionary definition of “explosive” is simply “A substance that can be made to explode”.1 An explosion often involves or results in fire – the presence of “or” between these two nouns does not mean that the prosecution has to elect between charging the means employed as either fire or explosives.2 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press. 2 See Ex parte Polley; Re McLennan (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 391; 64 WN (NSW) 125 at 392 (SR (NSW)) per Jordan CJ.
198
Destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life
A person who destroys or damages property, intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another, is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 198 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(21); subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 198 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.198.20] Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions ...................................................................... [CA.198.40] Elements of the offence .................................................................................................................... [CA.198.60]
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Element (1) Did destroy or damage property ................................................................................... [CA.198.80] Element (2) Intending thereby to endanger the life of another ...................................................... [CA.198.100]
[CA.198.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales did destroy or damage property namely ......................... intending thereby to endanger the life of CD (or, of another). [CA.198.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions
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Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if an offence under s 198 is directed at the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner, by s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that person, unless excused, is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 198 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related provisions concerning damage to property with intent to harm: • Section 196 – destroying or damaging property with intent to injure; • Section 28 – destroying or damaging any building by explosives or setting fire to a vessel with intent to murder; • Section 30 – attempted murder by any other means; • Section 46 – causing grievous bodily harm etc by gunpowder or other substance; • Section 47 – causing grievous bodily harm etc by causing explosion; • Section 48 – causing explosive to be place in or near a building, vehicle or public place intending to cause bodily harm; • Section 49A – throwing objects at vehicles or vessels; • Section 344A – attempts. Similar provisions to s 198 in other jurisdictions: • Section 197(2) Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); • Section 1(2) Criminal Damage Act 1971 (UK). [CA.198.60]
Elements of the offence
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1) did destroy or damage property; (2) intending thereby to endanger the life of another. [CA.198.80]
Element (1) Did destroy or damage property
Actus reus – this offence has both an element of damage to property and an element of intention to endanger the life of another. Concerning intent to endanger life, the mens rea required is an actual intent to achieve that result. The actus reus of the offence is the deliberate destruction of or damage to property. Destroy or damage property – for commentary on destruction of or damage to property, see [CA.195.100] relating to s 195. Given that the intent to be proven under s 198 is an intention to endanger life, the damage necessary to be proved in this instance will need to be of a more severe kind than can sometimes suffice under s 195. Property – as to “property”, see [CA.195.120] relating to s 195. It will be noted that unlike s 195, which requires proof of destruction of or damage to property of another, proof of ownership or possession of property of another is not a requirement under s 198.1 It is therefore suggested that the detonation of a
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There is no summary jurisdiction for this offence. A charge under s 198 is strictly indictable. Although imprisonment for 25 years is prescribed, there is no standard non-parole period for this offence.
Crimes Act 1900 s 199
[CA.198.80]
device like a car bomb in or near a place where other people might be expected to be would fall within the terms of s 198 because of the destruction of or damage to the car. 1 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 1988 (1989) 40 A Crim R 461; [1989] VR 857.
[CA.198.100]
Element (2) Intending thereby to endanger the life of another
Intention to endanger another’s life – intention can describe various forms of mens rea or can connote acting to achieve a proscribed purpose, see [CLP.1400]. Under this element, intention has the latter meaning, that is, an intention to endanger life. In some circumstances, foresight of endangerment of life may be regarded as actual intent of endangerment of life, see authorities cited at [CLP.1400]. The type of damage in fact caused and its extent may clearly indicate an intention to endanger life. As to proof of intent, authorities on this topic are cited at [CLP.1400]. What is required to be proved for an intention to endanger life is “proof of intent to behave in such a way as would in fact, to the defendant’s knowledge, endanger life.”1 To endanger someone’s life is to put his life in peril. It need not be proved that any loss of life occurred, but there must, I think, be a real risk to someone’s life, a potential danger to life, that is intended by the defendant … The prisoner’s realisation that his action might well involve a risk of physical danger to (a victim) falls significantly short of an intention either to endanger her life or to cause her grievous bodily harm.2 It is important to note that s 198 requires intention to endanger the life of another by the destruction of or damage to property and not simply as a result of an act which also destroys or damages property, see authorities cited at [CA.196.120].
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Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence under s 198 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intention to cause bodily injury, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. 1 R v Brown [1995] Crim LR 328 at 329. 2 R v Teremoana (1990) 54 SASR 30; (1990) 49 A Crim R 207 at 216–217 (A Crim R).
199
Threatening to destroy or damage property
(1) A person who, without lawful excuse, makes a threat to another, with the intention of causing that other to fear that the threat would be carried out: (a) to destroy or damage property belonging to that other or to a third person, or (b) to destroy or damage the first-mentioned person’s own property in a way which that person knows will or is likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury to, that other or a third person, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (1) renum Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[15]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person who, during a public disorder and without lawful excuse, makes a threat to another, with the intention of causing that other to fear that the threat would be carried out: (a) to destroy or damage property belonging to that other or to a third person, or (b) to destroy or damage the first-mentioned person’s own property in a way which that person knows will or is likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury to, that other or a third person, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (2) insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[15]] [S 199 am Act 61 of 2006; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
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SECTION 199 COMMENTARY
[CA.199.20]
CA
Indictment/charge ............................................................................................................................. [CA.199.20] Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions ...................................................................... [CA.199.40] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.199.60] Element (1A) During a public disorder ............................................................................................. [CA.199.80] Element (1)(a) Threat to destroy or damage property belonging to another ................................. [CA.199.100] Element (1)(b) Destruction etc likely to endanger life or to cause injury ....................................... [CA.199.120] Element (2) Intention of causing fear of carrying out threat .......................................................... [CA.199.140] Element (3) Without lawful excuse ................................................................................................. [CA.199.160]
Indictment/charge
Threatening to destroy or damage property: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales (if applicable, during a public disorder) without lawful excuse made a threat to CD to destroy or damage property belonging to CD (or to EF) with the intention of causing CD to fear that the threat would be carried out. Threatening to destroy etc the accused’s own property to endanger life etc: That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales (if applicable, during a public disorder) without lawful excuse made a threat to CD to destroy or damage AB’s own property in a way which AB knew would or was likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury to CD (or to EF) with the intention of causing CD to fear that the threat would be carried out.
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[CA.199.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions
Summary jurisdiction – a charge under s 199 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. If prosecuted summarily, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment – see s 267 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if an offence under s 199 is directed at the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner, by s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that person, unless excused, is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 199 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related provisions concerning damage to property: • Section 195 – destroying or damaging property; • Section 196 – destroying or damaging property with intent to injure; • Section 197 – dishonestly destroying or damaging property; • Section 198 – destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life; • Section 200 – possession of explosives etc with intent to destroy or damage property; • Section 344A – attempts. Related provisions concerning threats of damage or injury: • Section 31 – documents containing threats • Section 203B – threaten sabotage; • Section 208 – threatening to destroy etc an aircraft etc. Similar provisions to s 199 in other jurisdictions: • Section 198 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); • Section 2(1) Criminal Damage Act 1971 (UK).
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[CA.199.0]
[CA.199.60] Elements of the offences The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) (if applicable) during a public disorder; (1) made a threat to another, either (a) to destroy or damage property belonging to that other (or to a third person); or (b) to destroy or damage the accused’s own property in a way which the accused knew would or was likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury to that other (or to a third person); (2) with the intention of causing that other to fear that the threat would be carried out; (3) without lawful excuse. As to (3), it should be noted that by s 417, the accused must prove any claimed lawful excuse, see [CA.199.160].
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[CA.199.80] Element (1A) During a public disorder Public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations.” For the offence of riot, s 93B and commentary, see [CA.93B.20]. For the offence of affray, s 93C and commentary, see [CA.93C.20]. [CA.199.100] Element (1)(a) Threat to destroy or damage property belonging to another Property – as to the meaning of “property”, see commentary at [CA.195.120]. Threat to destroy or damage – the actus reus of this offence is the making of a threat either to destroy or damage another’s property or to destroy or damage the accused’s own property in a way which the accused knows would or would be likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury, if in fact carried out. It is the threat that is essential rather than an actual intention to carry out the threat. It does not matter if the accused did not intend to carry out the threat.1 A threat under s 199 may be implied rather than express. For example, in R v Cakmak [2002] 2 Cr App R 10; [2002] Crim LR 58 (CA), the accused was charged under the equivalent of s 199(1)(a). She threatened to set fire to herself while on the London Eye as a protest. On appeal, it was held that despite the fact that her actual threat was to set fire to herself, the jury was entitled to find an implied damage to property. Destroy or damage property – for commentary on destruction of or damage to property, see [CA.195.100] relating to s 195. Under ss 199(1)(b) and 199(2)(b), given that the threat to be proven is damage which the person making the threat knows will or is likely to endanger life or cause bodily injury, the threat of damage will need to be of a more severe kind than can sometimes suffice under s 195. Belonging to another – under ss 199(1)(a) and 2(a), the property must either belong to the person to whom the threat is made or belong to a third party. The words of s 199 are to be contrasted to those of s 195 which speaks of property in joint ownership, that is, “belonging to another or to that person [the accused] and another”. 1 R v Dixon-Jenkins (1985) 14 A Crim R 372 (Vic CCA); R v Alexander (2007) 174 A Crim R 297; [2007] VSCA 178 at [30].
[CA.199.120] Element (1)(b) Destruction etc likely to endanger life or to cause injury Likely to endanger life – as to the meaning of endangering life, see [CA.198.100]. As to a threat that would be taken as “likely” to endanger life, the High Court considered the meaning of “likely” in the context of homicide and the definition of an act “commonly known to be likely to cause death or bodily harm” in the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas).1 There the Court said that the term was to be given its ordinary meaning, that is, “to convey the notion of a substantial – a ‘real and not remote’ – change regardless of whether it is less or more than fifty per cent”.2
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Cause injury – “injury” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. In this context, a dictionary definition is “physical damage to a person’s body”.3 Injury includes “causing harm to the body”.4 Pain by itself is not “injury”.5
1 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; (1986) 20 A Crim R 156; [1986] HCA 29. 2 Boughey per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at 22 (CLR), 163 (A Crim R). 3 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) (USA). In R v De Souza (1997) 41 NSWLR 656; (1997) 95 A Crim R 1 at 24 (A Crim R) per Powell JA (Studdert and Levine JJ agreeing), it was said that this is the ordinary English meaning of “injury”. See also Deeble v Nott (1941) 65 CLR 104; 58 WN (NSW) 116; [1941] HCA 11 where Starke J said at 109 (CLR) that “bodily injuries” in a civil Act meant “any physical injuries”. 4 R v Hill (1986) 83 Cr App R 386; [1986] Crim LR 815 at 389 (Cr App R) (HL) per Lord Griffiths (with whom the other Law Lords agreed). 5 R v Tamcelik; Ex parte Ozcan [1998] 1 Qd R 330 (Qld SC). In Hevey v Leonard [1976] VR 624 at 632, it was said that pain itself does not constitute injury; it is only evidentiary.
[CA.199.140]
Element (2) Intention of causing fear of carrying out threat
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Intention to cause fear – the mens rea of this offence is the making of a threat with the intention that the person threatened would fear that the threat would be carried out.1 It has been held that the test of whether the person threatened would have feared that the threat would be carried out is to be judged objectively, that is to say, whether an ordinary reasonable person would have such a fear in the circumstances.2 In determining an accused’s intention, it is appropriate to consider the nature of the relationship of the parties and any motive to make a threat.3 For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Intoxication – under s 428B, an offence under s 199 is listed as an offence of specific intent and therefore, in determining whether an accused had an intention to cause bodily injury, by s 428C self-induced intoxication is to be taken into account unless either of the exceptions in s 428C(2) apply. 1 R v Dixon-Jenkins (1985) 14 A Crim R 372 (Vic CCA); R v Cakmak [2002] 2 Cr App R 10; [2002] Crim LR 58 (CA). 2 See R v Cakmak. 3 Barbaro v Quilty [1999] ACTSC 119 at [71]; R v Alexander (2007) 174 A Crim R 297; [2007] VSCA 178 at [28].
[CA.199.160]
Element (3) Without lawful excuse
Section 417 relevantly provides that wherever doing a particular act without lawful excuse is made to be an offence, the proof of such excuse shall be on the accused. This creates a legal and not simply an evidentiary onus of proof upon an accused who seeks to excuse the making of a threat within the meaning of s 199.1 For commentary on s 417 and lawful excuse, see [CA.417.20]. An example of a lawful excuse is a man threatening to shoot another’s dog should he find the dog attacking his sheep.2 1 As to the question of an accused’s onus of proof generally, see R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA). 2 Given in Ormerod D, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th Ed, Oxford University Press, 2011) at [29.5.1].
200 Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage property (1) A person who has possession, custody or control of an article with the intention that it should be used to destroy or damage property belonging to: (a) some other person, or
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Composite expression – given the nature of the offences created by ss 199(1)(b) and (2)(b) and the context, it is suggested that the words “will or is likely to endanger the life of, or to cause bodily injury” create a conjunctive expression rather than disjunctive alternatives.
Crimes Act 1900 s 200
[CA.200.20]
(b) the first-mentioned person or the user, or both of them, and some other person, is liable (if the article is an explosive) to imprisonment for 7 years or (if the article is not an explosive) to imprisonment for 3 years. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; renum Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[16]; am Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[6]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person who, during a public disorder, has possession, custody or control of an article with the intention that it should be used to destroy or damage property belonging to: (a) some other person, or (b) the first-mentioned person or the user, or both of them, and some other person, is liable (if the article is an explosive) to imprisonment for 9 years or (if the article is not an explosive) to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; insrt Act 61 of 2006, s 3 and Sch 1[16]] [S 200 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 61 of 2006; Act 48 of 2004; Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 200 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.200.20] Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions ...................................................................... [CA.200.40] History and purpose of s 200 ........................................................................................................... [CA.200.60] Elements of the offences .................................................................................................................. [CA.200.80] Element (1A) During a public disorder ........................................................................................... [CA.200.100] Element (1) Possession, custody or control of an article (including explosive) ............................ [CA.200.120] Element (2) Intention that the article should be used to destroy or damage property .................. [CA.200.140]
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[CA.200.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales (if applicable, during a public disorder) had possession, custody or control of an article, namely …… (specify article) with the intention that it should be used to destroy or damage property belonging to CD (or to another) (or to AB and/or EF etc).. Given that “possession” has been construed to encompass custody or control (see [CA.7.80]), it is suggested that the words “possession, custody or control” create a conjunctive expression rather than disjunctive alternatives. [CA.200.40]
Jurisdiction, cross-references and related provisions
A charge under s 200 is a Sch 1 Table 1 offence under s 260 the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or person charged elects to have it dealt with on indictment, see [4.10960] and [4.13810]. Spouse etc may be compelled to give evidence – if an offence under s 200 is directed at the accused’s spouse or de-facto partner, by s 279(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that person, unless excused, is compellable to give evidence either for the prosecution or the defence, without the accused’s consent. An offence under s 200 is a “personal violence offence” within s 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and therefore a “domestic violence offence” within the meaning of ss 3 and 11 of that Act and thus, within the meaning of s 279(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Related Crimes Act 1900 provisions concerning possession of explosives etc with intent: • Section 93FA – Possession, supply or making of explosives; • Section 93FB – Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms; • Section 195 – Destroying or damaging property; • Section 196 – Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure;
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[CA.200.80]
Part 4AD – Criminal destruction and damage Division 2 – Crimes against property generally
s 200
• Section 197 – Dishonestly destroying or damaging property; • Section 198 – Destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life; • Section 199 – Threatening to destroy or damage property. Graffıti Control Act 2008: • Section 4 – Marking premises or property; • Section 5 – Possession of graffiti implement; • Section 8B – Possession of spray paint cans by persons under 18.
[CA.200.60]
CA
Similar, but by no means identical, provisions to s 200(1) in other jurisdictions: Section 191(a)(i) Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); Section 3(a) Criminal Damage Act 1971 (UK). History and purpose of s 200
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Section 200 (now s 200(1)) was introduced by the Crimes (Criminal Destruction and Damage) Amendment Act 1987 (Act 287 of 1987). In the Second Reading of the Crimes (Criminal Destruction and Damage) Bill, it was remarked that the seriousness of the offences under Pt 4AD Div 2 of the Crimes Act 1900, of which s 200 is a part, “no longer depends upon the type of property damaged but on the means used to damage the property, the intent of the accused and whether the life of any person was endangered”.1 It was said that s 200 “would help to combat graffiti because it will criminalize the possession of spray-paint cans and other items intended to be used to deface property and would also criminalize the possession of implements intended to be used to damage public telephones and equipment intended to be used to unlawfully burn property”.2 The Attorney-General said that s 200 “will assist in preventing offences by allowing apprehension of offenders before an attempt has occurred where there is an intent to use the article for an illegal purpose”.3 Concerning graffiti, as noted in [CA.200.40], there are now offences provided for under the Graffıti Control Act 2008. Section 200(2) was introduced by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Gangs) Act 2006 (Act 61 of 2006), largely in response to the Cronulla riots of December 2005. It was directed towards “impromptu groups of violent individuals or mobs”.4 Section 200(2) increased the penalties for an offence under s 200 if committed during a public disorder. Section 200 has been the subject of almost no reported decisions.5 1 The Hon. J R Hallam, Minister for Agriculture etc, Second Reading Speech (Criminal Destruction and Damage) Bill (Hansard, Legislative Council, 24 November 1987, p 17124). The reference to endangerment of life was a reference to s 198. 2 Second Reading Speech, Hansard, Legislative Council, 24 November 1987, p 17127. 3 Second Reading Speech, Hansard, Legislative Council, 24 November 1987, p 17127. 4 The Hon. Eric Roozendaal, Minister for Roads, Second Reading Speech Crimes Legislation Amendment (Gangs) Bill (Hansard, Legislative Council, 19 September 2006, p 1734). 5 One case was R v Galasso (1981) 4 A Crim R 454 which considered the former fault element of “maliciously”.
[CA.200.80]
Elements of the offences
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused: (1A) (if applicable) during a public disorder; (1) had possession, custody or control of an article (if applicable, being an explosive); (2) with the intention that it should be used to destroy or damage property belonging to either: (a) some other person, or (b) the accused or the intended user of the article, or (c) the accused and the intended user of the article, or (d) the accused, the intended user of the article and some other person.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 200 [CA.200.100]
[CA.200.0] Element (1A) During a public disorder
Public disorder is defined in s 4 as meaning “a riot or other civil disturbance that gives rise to a serious risk to public safety, whether at a single location or resulting from a series of incidents in the same or different locations”. For the offence of riot, s 93B and commentary, see [CA.93B.20]. For the offence of affray, s 93C and commentary, see [CA.93C.20]. The use of “during” clearly requires the prosecution to prove an accused’s involvement in the public disorder. [CA.200.120]
Element (1) Possession, custody or control of an article (including explosive)
Possession – s 7 contains a definition of criminal possession. The concept of possession can encompass either custody or control. See commentary at [CA.7.80]. For commentary on possession, see [CA.7.40]–[CA.7.140]. Explosive – “explosive” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900. A dictionary definition of “explosive” is simply a “substance that can be made to explode”.1 1 Shorter Oxford Dictionary On Historical Principles 5th ed 2002 Oxford University Press.
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[CA.200.140]
Element (2) Intention that the article should be used to destroy or damage property
Intention – the intention to be proved is possession etc with intention that the article be used to destroy or damage property. For general commentary on intention, see [CLP.1400]. Unlike the similar provisions in the United Kingdom and Victoria, s 200 does not proscribe possession etc with the intention etc without lawful excuse. By s 194(3), an act done by a person under a reasonable belief of a right to do the act does not constitute an element of an offence under s 200. This provision seems to place both an evidentiary onus and a legal onus on a person who seeks to defend a charge under s 200 to show that in possessing the particular article concerned, that he or she acted under some claim of right. As to claim of right in this context, see [CA.194.20]. As to other possible defences, see [CA.195.160]. Intoxication – an offence under s 200 is not an offence of specific intent and in determining whether an accused had the mens rea for a charge under s 200, self-induced intoxication is not to be taken into account: Crimes Act 1900 ss 428B and 428D. Destroy or damage property – “Property” is partially defined in s 194(2) as including wild creatures in some circumstances. “Property” is also defined in s 4 of the Act and in s 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987. Caution needs to be taken in applying these definitions as s 194(1) excludes intangible property. As to the meaning of the expression “destroy or damage” property, see [CA.195.100]. Belonging to another etc – the wording of s 200 indicates that the property may belong wholly or partly to the accused himself or herself. In the case of an intended destruction of, or damage to, property belonging to another, there is authority establishing that the prosecution does not need to identify that other person, see [CA.195.120].
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[CA.201.20]
Part 4AD – Criminal destruction and damage Division 3 – Crimes relating to particular kinds of property
s 201
DIVISION 3 – CRIMES RELATING TO PARTICULAR KINDS OF PROPERTY [Former Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 3 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[20]; former Pt 4 Ch 2 Div 3 renum Act 31 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 5.27[3]]
Interfering with a mine
(1) A person who intentionally or recklessly: (a) causes water to run into a mine or any subterranean channel connected to it, (b) destroys, damages or obstructs any shaft, passage, pit, airway, waterway or drain of, or associated with, a mine, (c) destroys, damages or renders useless any equipment, structure, building, road or bridge belonging to, or associated with, a mine, or (d) hinders the working of equipment belonging to, or associated with, a mine, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (1) am Act 7 of 2016, Sch 2[1] and [2]]
(2) In this section, mine includes: (a) a place at which gas or other petroleum is extracted from the ground, and (b) a place at which exploration for minerals, or for gas or other petroleum, is undertaken by mechanical means that disturb the ground, and (c) a place at which works are being carried out to enable the extraction of minerals, or of gas or other petroleum, from the ground, and (d) a former mine at which works are being carried out to decommission the mine or make it safe. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (2) insrt Act 7 of 2016, Sch 2[3]] [S 201 am Act 7 of 2016; Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
Editor’s note
The term “maliciously” was replaced with “intentionally or recklessly” by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3], which commenced on 15 February 2008. The commentary below relates to s 201 before this amendment was made.
SECTION 201 COMMENTARY [CA.201.20]
“Maliciously”
As to “maliciously”, see s 5. It has been held that a person does not act maliciously if he or she closes the airway of a mine in the exercise of a supposed right to do so.1 It has been queried whether a slate quarry is a mine.2 1 R v Matthews and Twigg (1876) 14 Cox CC 5. See also R v James 173 ER 429; (1837) 8 Car & P. 131. 2 Australian Slate Quarries Ltd v Commissioner for Taxation (Cth) (1923) 33 CLR 416.
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201
Crimes Act 1900 s 202
202
[CA.202.20]
Causing damage etc to sea, river, canal and other works
A person who: (a) intentionally or recklessly destroys, damages, removes or interferes with piles or other materials that form part of, or have been fixed or placed in position in order to secure: (i) a sea wall or other structure designed to prevent erosion by the sea, (ii) the bank or bed of, or a dam, weir or lock located on, a river or canal, (iii) a drain, aqueduct, marsh or reservoir, or (iv) a dock, quay, wharf, jetty or other harbour installation, (b) intentionally or recklessly opens a floodgate or sluice that is located at or on a dam, weir, reservoir or watercourse, or (c) with the intention of obstructing or hindering the navigation of vessels or boats on a navigable river or canal: (i) interferes with or obstructs the flow of the river or canal, (ii) damages or interferes with the bank or bed of the river or canal, or (d) destroys, damages or interferes with any structure or equipment constructed or installed in connection with the use of the river or canal for the purposes of navigation, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 202 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
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Editor’s note
The term “maliciously” was replaced with “intentionally or recklessly” by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3], which commenced on 15 February 2008. Section 5 of the Crimes Act 1900 was repealed by the same Act
SECTION 202 COMMENTARY [CA.202.20]
Maliciously
Generally as to “maliciously”, see s 5. 203
False statement that a person or property is in danger [Repealed]
[S 203 rep Act 117 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 3[6]; subst Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
DIVISION 4 – SABOTAGE [Former Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 4 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[20]; insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]
203A
Definitions
In this Division: economic loss includes the disruption of government functions or the disruption of the use of public facilities. public facility means any of the following (whether publicly or privately owned): (a) a government facility, including premises used by government employees in connection with official duties, (b) a public infrastructure facility, including a facility providing water, sewerage, energy or other services to the public,
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[CA.203C.20]
s 203C
(c)
a public transport facility, including a conveyance used to transport people or goods, (d) a public place, including any premises, land or water open to the public, (e) a public computer system, including a computer system used for the operation of a public facility, for the provision of banking services or for other services to the public. [S 203A am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[5]; Act 48 of 2004, s 3 and Sch 1[7]; insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]
203B
Sabotage CA
A person: (a) whose conduct causes damage to a public facility, and (b) who intended to cause that damage, and (c) who intended by that conduct to cause: (i) extensive destruction of property, or (ii) major economic loss, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. [S 203B insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]
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203C
Threaten sabotage
(1) A person who: (a) makes to another person a threat to damage a public facility, and (b) intends that person to fear that the threat will be carried out and will cause: (i) extensive destruction of property, or (ii) major economic loss, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. (2) In the prosecution of an offence under this section it is not necessary to prove that the person threatened actually feared that the threat would be carried out. (3) For the purposes of this section: (a) a threat may be made by any conduct, and may be explicit or implicit and conditional or unconditional, and (b) a threat to a person includes a threat to a group of persons, and (c) fear that a threat will be carried out includes apprehension that it will be carried out. [S 203C insrt Act 43 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 1[8]]
SECTION 203C COMMENTARY [CA.203C.20]
Sentencing
There is a standard non-parole period of five years for the commission of this offence.1 Sentencing has been considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal.2 1 See s 54D. 2 R v Mills (2005) 154 A Crim R 40.
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Crimes Act 1900 s 203D
DIVISION 5 – BUSHFIRES [Former Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 5 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[20]; insrt Act 24 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
203D
Definitions
In this Division: causing a fire includes: (a) lighting a fire, or (b) maintaining a fire, or (c) failing to contain a fire, except where the fire was lit by another person or the fire is beyond the control of the person who lit the fire. firefighter means a member of a fire brigade under the Rural Fires Act 1997 or the Fire Brigades Act 1989 or of any other official firefighting unit (including a unit from outside the State). spread of a fire means spread of a fire beyond the capacity of the person who causes the fire to extinguish it. [S 203D am Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[5]; insrt Act 24 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
203E
Offence
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(1) A person: (a) who intentionally causes a fire, and (b) who is reckless as to the spread of the fire to vegetation on any public land or on land belonging to another, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, recklessness may also be established by proof of intention. (3) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence against this section if: (a) the person is a firefighter or acting under the direction of a firefighter, and (b) the person caused the fire in the course of bushfire fighting or hazard reduction operations. (4) If on the trial of a person for an offence against this section the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence against section 100(1) of the Rural Fires Act 1997, it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 203E insrt Act 24 of 2002, s 3 and Sch 1]
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[CA.205.20]
Part 4AE – Offences relating to transport services Division 1 – Offences relating to aircraft, vessels, etc
s 206
PART 4AE – OFFENCES RELATING TO TRANSPORT SERVICES [Former Pt 4AA renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[21]; insrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6)]
DIVISION 1 – OFFENCES RELATING TO AIRCRAFT, VESSELS, ETC 204 Destruction of, or damage to, an aircraft or vessel with intent or reckless indifference CA
Any person who: (a) with intent to cause the death of a person, or (b) with reckless indifference for the safety of the life of a person, destroys or damages an aircraft or vessel is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [S 204 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(22); reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
SECTION 204 COMMENTARY [CA.204.20]
Definitions
As to the definition of “aircraft” and “vessel”, see s 4. Generally as to “reckless indifference”, see [CA.19A.500]. 205
Prejudicing the safe operation of an aircraft or vessel
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A person who, whether on board the aircraft or vessel or not, does anything with the intention of prejudicing the safety of an aircraft or vessel is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 205 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 205 COMMENTARY [CA.205.20]
Definitions
As to the definitions of “aircraft” and “vessel”, see s 4. 206
Assault etc on member of crew of aircraft or vessel
A person who, while on board an aircraft or vessel, assaults or threatens with violence a member of the crew of the aircraft or vessel: (a) so as to interfere with the functions or duties performed by the crew member in connection with the safe operation of the aircraft or vessel, or (b) so as to diminish the ability of the crew member to perform those functions or duties, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 206 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 207
[CA.206.20]
SECTION 206 COMMENTARY [CA.206.20]
Definitions
As to definitions of “aircraft”, “vessel” and “member of the crew”, see s 4. Generally as to “assault”, see [CA.61.20] – [CA.61.320]. 207
Placing etc dangerous articles on board an aircraft or vessel
(1) In this section: dangerous article means: (a) a firearm, ammunition for a firearm, a weapon or an explosive, or (b) a substance or thing that, because of its nature or condition, could endanger the safety of an aircraft or vessel or persons on board an aircraft or vessel. (2) A person who: (a) places or carries on board an aircraft or vessel an article knowing that it is a dangerous article, (b) knowing that an article is a dangerous article, delivers the article to a person for the purpose of having the article placed or carried on board an aircraft or vessel, or (c) has possession of an article while on board an aircraft or vessel knowing that the article is a dangerous article, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
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[Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) Subsection (2): (a) does not apply to or in relation to anything done with an article in relation to an aircraft or vessel with the consent of the owner or operator of the aircraft or vessel where that consent is given with a knowledge of the nature or condition of the article, and (b) does not apply to or in relation to the carrying or placing of a firearm or ammunition for a firearm on board an aircraft or vessel with permission given in accordance with regulations in force under the Air Navigation Act 1920 of the Commonwealth. (4) A reference in this section to a firearm includes a reference to an imitation firearm within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996. [Subs (4) insrt Act 40 of 2010, Sch 3.8[4]] [S 207 am Act 40 of 2010; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 207 COMMENTARY [CA.207.20]
Definitions
As to the definitions of “aircraft” and “vessel”, see s 4. As to possession, see [CA.7.20] – [CA.7.140]. 208
Threatening to destroy etc an aircraft, vessel or vehicle
(1) In this section: threat includes: (a) an expression of intention, or
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s 208
the making of a statement from which an expression of intention could reasonably be inferred.
transport vehicle means: (a) a mechanically or electrically driven vehicle that is used or designed to be used for the purpose of conveying passengers or goods, or passengers and goods, or for the purpose of drawing a vehicle or vehicles of the kind referred to in paragraph (b), or (b) a vehicle not so driven that is directly or indirectly connected to and drawn by, or designed to be connected to and drawn by, a vehicle of the kind first referred to in paragraph (a), but does not include an aircraft or vessel. (2) A person who makes a demand of another person with a threat: (a) to destroy or damage, or endanger the safety of, an aircraft, vessel or transport vehicle, or (b) to kill, or inflict bodily injury on, persons who are in or on an aircraft, vessel or transport vehicle, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) A person who makes a demand of another person together with a threat to do any of the things mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b) and, while that threat still has effect: (a) discharges a firearm, (b) causes an explosion, or (c) inflicts grievous bodily harm on, or wounds, a person, is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(23)]
(4) A person who makes a threat: (a) to destroy or damage, or endanger the safety of, an aircraft, vessel or transport vehicle, or (b) to kill, or inflict bodily injury on, persons who are in or on an aircraft, vessel or transport vehicle, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 208 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 218 of 1989; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 208 COMMENTARY [CA.208.20]
Generally
As to definitions of “aircraft” and “vessel”, see s 4. Sentencing for this offence has been considered.1 1 R v Smith (unreported, CCA (NSW), 18 September 1990); R v Humphries (unreported, CCA (NSW), 2 December 1997).
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[CA.208.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 209
[CA.209.20]
209 False information as to plan etc to prejudice the safety of an aircraft or vessel or persons on board an aircraft or vessel A person who makes a statement or conveys information, knowing it to be false, to the effect, or from which it could reasonably be inferred, that there has been, is or is to be a plan, proposal, attempt, conspiracy or threat to: (a) take, or exercise control of, an aircraft or vessel by force, (b) destroy or damage, or endanger the safety of, an aircraft or vessel, or (c) kill, or inflict bodily injury on, persons in or on an aircraft or vessel, is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. [S 209 reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 209 COMMENTARY [CA.209.20]
Definitions
As to the definitions of “aircraft” and “vessel” see s 4.
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210
Destroying, damaging etc an aid to navigation
A person who: (a) intentionally or recklessly destroys, damages, removes, conceals or interferes with a mark, device or equipment used or designed to be used to assist the navigation of aircraft or vessels, or (b) does any act with the intention of causing any such destruction, damage, concealment or interference, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 210 am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[3]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 210 COMMENTARY [CA.210.20]
Definitions
As to the definitions of “aircraft” and “vessel”, see s 4.
DIVISION 2 – OFFENCES RELATING TO RAILWAYS ETC 211
Criminal acts relating to railways
(1) A person who: (a) does any act on or in connection with the operation of a railway, or (b) omits to do any act on or in connection with a railway that it is the person’s duty to do, with the intention of causing the death of, inflicting bodily injury on or endangering the safety of any person who is on the railway, or who is in or on any locomotive or other rolling stock on the railway, is liable to imprisonment for 25 years. [Subs (1) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; Act 218 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(24)]
(2) A person who:
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[CA.212.20]
Part 4AE – Offences relating to transport services Division 2 – Offences relating to railways etc
s 213
(a) does any act on or in connection with the operation of a railway, or (b) omits to do any act on or in connection with the operation of a railway that it is the person’s duty to do, with the intention of causing any locomotive or other rolling stock on the railway to be derailed, destroyed or damaged, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12]; Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
Editor’s note The term “maliciously” was removed by Act No 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[12], which commenced on 15 February 2008. The commentary below relates to s 211 before this amendment was made.
SECTION 211 COMMENTARY “Railway” ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.211.20] “Maliciously” ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.211.40] Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.211.60]
[CA.211.20]
“Railway”
As to the definition of “railway”, see s 4. [CA.211.40]
“Maliciously”
As to “maliciously”, see s 5.
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[CA.211.60]
Alternative verdict
An alternative verdict under ss 212 or 213 may be found: see s 214. 212
Endangering passengers etc on railway
A person who, by an unlawful act or a negligent omission, endangers the safety of any person who is on, or who is being conveyed on, a railway is liable to imprisonment for 3 years. [S 212 reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
SECTION 212 COMMENTARY [CA.212.20]
“Railway”
As to the definition of “railway”, see s 4. 213
Obstructing a railway
A person who: (a) intentionally and without lawful excuse, does an act, or omits to do an act, which causes the passage or operation of a locomotive or other rolling stock on a railway to be obstructed, or (b) assists a person to do or omit to do such an act, with the knowledge that the person’s intention to do or omit to do that act is without lawful excuse, is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. [S 213 reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 50 of 1974]
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[S 211 am Act 38 of 2007; Act 94 of 1999; Act 218 of 1989; reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
Crimes Act 1900 s 214
[CA.213.20]
SECTION 213 COMMENTARY [CA.213.20]
“Obstruction”
Obstruction was held to be committed where the accused left an object on a railway line which was likely to cause an obstruction, even though his objective was not to cause an obstruction but merely to put others to the trouble of removing the object.1 “Obstruction” is not confined to physical obstruction.2 1 R v Holroyd (1824) 2 Mood & R 339; 174 ER 308. See also R v Bradford (1860) 8 Cox CC 309. 2 R v Hardy (1871) LR 1 CCR 278; R v Hadfield (1870) LR 3 CCR 253.
214
Obstructing a railway—verdict of misdemeanour
(1) If, on the trial of a person for an offence under section 211, the jury is not satisfied that the person is guilty of the offence, but is satisfied that the person is guilty of an offence under section 212 or 213, it may acquit the person of the offence charged and instead find the person guilty of an offence under section 212 or 213. (2) If, in accordance with subsection (1), a jury finds a person guilty of an offence under section 212 or 213, the person is liable to be punished as provided by that section. [S 214 reinsrt Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(6); rep Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5); am Act 50 of 1974; Act 31 of 1951] [Editor’s Note: Sections 215–249 were repealed by Act 287 of 1987, s 2 and Sch 1(5)]
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SECTION 214 COMMENTARY Alternative verdict ............................................................................................................................. [CA.214.20] Sections 194–249: repeal and substitution ...................................................................................... [CA.214.40]
[CA.214.20]
Alternative verdict
Where a lesser charge is not included in the indictment or the possibility of an alternative verdict raised in the prosecution’s opening address, care must be taken in determining whether an alternative verdict should be introduced to avoid prejudice to the accused. For detailed commentary on this topic and on alternative verdicts generally, including jury directions, see [4.5532] – [CPA.162.100]. [CA.214.40]
Sections 194–249: repeal and substitution
Sections 194 – 249 of the Crimes Act 1900 were repealed by the Crimes (Criminal Destruction and Damage) Amendment Act 1987 (No 287). These sections were partly replaced by the current ss 194 – 203 of the Crimes Act 1900. For crimes against property generally, including malicious damage, see ss 195 – 198.
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 4A – Corruptly receiving commissions and other corrupt practices [CA.249A.20]
s 249B
PART 4A – CORRUPTLY RECEIVING COMMISSIONS AND OTHER CORRUPT PRACTICES [Pt 4A insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
249A
Definitions
agent includes: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f)
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(g)
any person employed by, or acting for or on behalf of, any other person (who in this case is referred to in this Part as the person’s principal) in any capacity, any person purporting to be, or intending to become, an agent of any other person (who in this case is referred to in this Part as the person’s principal), and any person serving under the Crown (which in this case is referred to in this Part as the person’s principal), and a police officer (and in this case a reference in this Part to the agent’s principal is a reference to the Crown), and a councillor within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1993 (and in this case a reference in this Part to the agent’s principal is a reference to the local council of which the person is a councillor), and a councillor within the meaning of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (and in this case a reference in this Part to the agent’s principal is a reference to the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council), and a Board member of a Local Aboriginal Land Council within the meaning of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (and in this case a reference in this Part to the agent’s principal is a reference to the Local Aboriginal Land Council).
[Def am Act 111 of 2006, s 4 and Sch 2.1; Act 40 of 1999, s 4 and Sch 2[3]]
benefit includes money and any contingent benefit. [S 249A am Act 111 of 2006; Act 40 of 1999; Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[8]; insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 249A COMMENTARY [CA.249A.20]
“Agent”
Under earlier legislation it was held that “agent” includes a member of a local council.1 1 Leary v Cohan (1940) 14 LGR 142.
249B
Corrupt commissions or rewards
(1) If any agent corruptly receives or solicits (or corruptly agrees to receive or solicit) from another person for the agent or for anyone else any benefit: (a) as an inducement or reward for or otherwise on account of: (i) doing or not doing something, or having done or not having done something, or (ii) showing or not showing, or having shown or not having shown, favour or disfavour to any person, in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, or
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CA
In this Part:
Crimes Act 1900 s 249B
[CA.249B.20]
(b)
the receipt or any expectation of which would in any way tend to influence the agent to show, or not to show, favour or disfavour to any person in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, the agent is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (2) If any person corruptly gives or offers to give to any agent, or to any other person with the consent or at the request of any agent, any benefit: (a) as an inducement or reward for or otherwise on account of the agent’s: (i) doing or not doing something, or having done or not having done something, or (ii) showing or not showing, or having shown or not having shown, favour or disfavour to any person, in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, or (b) the receipt or any expectation of which would in any way tend to influence the agent to show, or not to show, favour or disfavour to any person in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, the firstmentioned person is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), where a benefit is received or solicited by anyone with the consent or at the request of an agent, the agent shall be deemed to have received or solicited the benefit. [S 249B insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 249B COMMENTARY Elements of the offence ................................................................................................................. [CA.249B.20] “Corruptly” ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.249B.40] Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
An act in relation to a principal’s affairs ......................................................................................... [CA.249B.60] “Consideration” ............................................................................................................................... [CA.249B.80]
[CA.249B.20]
Elements of the offence
The elements of offences under s 249B are clearly set out in the section. [CA.249B.40]
“Corruptly”
“Corruptly” does not mean merely the doing of a prohibited act, but the doing of such an act with wrongful intention.1 The fact that a secret commission has been given raises the presumption that it was given corruptly.2 Where a local government inspector informed a person that he was in breach of a by-law but if he paid him some money he would overlook the offence and if others reported the breach, he would “fix it up”, it was held that an offence had been committed under former legislation in similar terms to s 249B.3 Where an alderman failed to disclose at a council meeting a fact unfavourable to the application before it (having solicited a bribe concerning the application), did not vote thereon and was deemed to have voted against the application, he was nevertheless deemed to have breached earlier provisions similar to ss 249B and 249F.4 1 R v Stevenson [1907] VLR 475. See also Clark v Johnson [1967] SASR 279; R v Gallagher (1987) 29 A Crim R 33; R v Jamieson [1988] VR 879; (1987) 34 A Crim R 308. 2 R v Scott [1907] VLR 471. See also Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163; Ex parte Gobbert (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 113. 3 R v Keane (1929) 47 WN (NSW) 10. 4 R v Cobcroft (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 608.
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Part 4A – Corruptly receiving commissions and other corrupt practices s 249D [CA.249B.60]
An act in relation to a principal’s affairs
What is an act in relation to a principal’s affairs has been considered.1 1 Hole v Gibb (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 130.
[CA.249B.80]
“Consideration”
The meaning of “consideration” in contrast to a gift has been judicially considered.1
CA
1 R v Braithwaite [1983] 1 WLR 385; [1983] 2 All ER 87; (1983) 77 Cr App R 34.
249C
Misleading documents or statements used or made by agents
(1) Any agent who uses, or gives to the agent’s principal, a document which contains anything that is false or misleading in any material respect, with intent to defraud the agent’s principal, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (2) Any agent who makes a statement to the agent’s principal which is false or misleading in any material respect, with intent to defraud the principal, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 249C insrt Act 116 of of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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249D
Corrupt inducements for advice
(1) If a person corruptly gives a benefit to another person for giving advice to a third person, being advice which the person giving the benefit intends will influence the third person: (a) to enter into a contract with the person who gives the benefit, or (b) to appoint the person who gives the benefit to any office, and, at the time the benefit is given, the person who gives the benefit intends the giving of the benefit not be made known to the person advised, the person who gives the benefit is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (2) If a person corruptly receives a benefit for giving advice to another person, being advice which is likely to influence the other person: (a) to enter into a contract with the person who gave the benefit, or (b) to appoint the person who gave the benefit to any office, and, at the time the benefit is received, the person who receives the benefit intends the giving of the benefit not be made known to the person to be advised, the person who receives the benefit is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), where a benefit is given or received by anyone with the consent or at the request of another person, the other person shall be deemed to have given or received the benefit. (4) If any person corruptly offers or solicits a benefit for the giving of advice by one person to another: (a) intending that the advice will influence the person advised: (i) to enter into a contract with anyone, or (ii) to appoint anyone to any office, and (b) intending that the giving or receipt of the benefit not be made known to the person advised, the firstmentioned person is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (5) In this section: (a) a reference to the giving of advice includes a reference to the providing of information orally or in writing,
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Crimes Act 1900 s 249D (b)
a reference to entering into a contract includes a reference to offering to enter into a contract, and (c) a reference to the appointment of a person includes a reference to: (i) joining in the appointment of the person, and (ii) voting for or assisting in the election or appointment of the person.
[S 249D insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
249E
Corrupt benefits for trustees and others
(1) In (a) (b) (c)
this section, a reference to a person entrusted with property is a reference to: a trustee of the property, an executor or administrator appointed for the purpose of dealing with the property, a person who, because of a power of attorney or a power of appointment, has authority over the property, and (d) a person managing or administering the property (or appointed or employed to manage or administer the property) under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009.
[Subs (1) am Act 49 of 2009, Sch 2.16]
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(2) Any person who offers or gives a benefit to a person entrusted with property, and any person entrusted with property who receives or solicits a benefit for anyone, without the consent: (a) of each person beneficially entitled to the property, or (b) of the Supreme Court, as an inducement or reward for the appointment of any person to be a person entrusted with the property, are each liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (3) In this section, a reference to the appointment of a person includes a reference to: (a) joining in the appointment of the person, and (b) assisting in the appointment of the person. (4) Proceedings for an offence under this section shall not be commenced without the consent of the Attorney General. (5) A consent to commence any such proceedings purporting to have been signed by the Attorney General is evidence of that consent without proof of the signature of the Attorney General. [S 249E am Act 49 of 2009; insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
249F
Aiding, abetting etc
(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels, procures, solicits or incites the commission of an offence under this Part is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. (2) A person who, in New South Wales, aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence in any place outside New South Wales, being an offence punishable under the provisions of a law in force in that place which corresponds to a provision of this Part, is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 249F insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 249F COMMENTARY [CA.249F.20]
Previous legislation
A similar provision in previous legislation has received judicial consideration.1 1 R v Cobcroft (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 608.
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Part 4A – Corruptly receiving commissions and other corrupt practices s 249J
249G
Repayment of value of gift etc
(1) If a person is convicted of an offence under this Part, the court may (as well as imposing a penalty for the offence) order the person to pay to such other person as the court directs the whole or part of the amount or the value, assessed by the court, of any benefit received or given by the person. (2) Any money payable to a person under this section may be recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to the person. 249H
CA
[S 294G insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
Disqualification for office
If a person is convicted of an offence under this Part, the person is disqualified from holding civic office for the purposes of the Local Government Act 1993, for the period of 7 years from the conviction or such lesser period as the court may order. [S 249H am Act 11 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.28[1]; insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
249I
Dismissal of trivial case
If, in any proceedings for an offence under this Part, it appears to the court that the offence is of a trivial or merely technical nature, the court may in its discretion dismiss the case. [S 249I insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
249J
Custom not a defence
In any proceedings for an offence under this Part, it is not a defence that the receiving, soliciting, giving or offering of any benefit is customary in any trade, business, profession or calling.
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[S 249J insrt Act 116 of 1987, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 249K
PART 4B – BLACKMAIL [Pt 4B insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
249K
Blackmail offence
(1) A person who makes any unwarranted demand with menaces: (a) with the intention of obtaining a gain or of causing a loss, or (b) with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person is guilty of an offence against this subsection if the person commits an offence against subsection (1) by an accusation, or a threatened accusation, that a person has committed a serious indictable offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 14 years. [S 249K insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
249L
Unwarranted demands—meaning
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. (2) The demand need not be a demand for money or other property. [S 249L insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
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249M
Menaces—meaning
(1) For the purposes of this Part, menaces includes: (a) an express or implied threat of any action detrimental or unpleasant to another person, and (b) a general threat of detrimental or unpleasant action that is implied because the person making the unwarranted demand holds a public office. (2) A threat against an individual does not constitute a menace unless: (a) the threat would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response to the threat, or (b) the threat would cause the particular individual to act unwillingly in response to the threat and the person who makes the threat is aware of the vulnerability of the particular individual to the threat. (3) A threat against a Government or body corporate does not constitute a menace unless: (a) the threat would ordinarily cause an unwilling response, or (b) the threat would cause an unwilling response because of a particular vulnerability of which the person making the threat is aware. (4) It is immaterial whether the menaces relate to action to be taken by the person making the demand. [S 249M insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
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Obtaining gain or causing loss—meaning
For the purposes of this Part: (a) a gain means gain in money or other property, whether temporary or permanent, and includes keeping what one has, and obtaining a gain means obtaining a gain for oneself or for another, and (b) a loss means loss in money or other property, whether temporary or permanent, and includes not getting what one might get, and causing a loss means causing a loss to another. [S 249N insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
Public duty—meaning
CA
249O
For the purposes of this Part, a public duty means a power, authority, duty or function: (a) that is conferred on a person as the holder of a public office, or (b) that a person holds himself or herself out as having as the holder of a public office.
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[S 249O insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[22]]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 250
[CA.250.20]
PART 5 – FORGERY [Pt 5 subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]] [Pt 5 heading subst Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1[4]]
DIVISION 1 – PRELIMINARY 250
False document—meaning
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(1) For the purposes of this Part, a document is false if, and only if, the document (or any part of the document) purports: (a) to have been made in the form in which it is made by a person who did not in fact make it in that form, or (b) to have been made in the form in which it is made on the authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its making in that form, or (c) to have been made in the terms in which it is made by a person who did not in fact make it in those terms, or (d) to have been made in the terms in which it is made on the authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its making in those terms, or (e) to have been altered in any respect by a person who did not in fact alter it in that respect, or (f) to have been altered in any respect on the authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its alteration in that respect, or (g) to have been made or altered on a date on which, or at a place at which, or otherwise in circumstances in which, it was not in fact made or altered, or (h) to have been made or altered by, or on the authority of, a person who did not in fact exist. (2) For the purposes of this Part, a person is to be treated as making a false document if the person alters a document so as to make it false within the meaning of this section (whether or not it is false in some other respect apart from that alteration). (3) For the purpose of the application of this section, a document that purports to be a true copy of another document is to be treated as if it were the original document. [S 250 subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]]
SECTION 250 COMMENTARY Application of section ....................................................................................................................... [CA.250.20] Forgery at common law .................................................................................................................... [CA.250.40] Intent ................................................................................................................................................. [CA.250.60] Uttering ............................................................................................................................................. [CA.250.80] Forgery defined by statute ............................................................................................................. [CA.250.100] Uttering defined by statute ............................................................................................................. [CA.250.120]
[CA.250.20]
Application of section
As far as practicable s 250 applies to all offences and all courts: s 3, Sch 2. [CA.250.40]
Forgery at common law
Forgery at common law is the fraudulent making of a written instrument which purports to be what it is not.1 Forgery at common law has been abolished: see s 307 (now repealed). Every fraudulent alteration of a true instrument is a forgery of the whole instrument.2 Thus a forgery of a signature to a document may amount to the forgery of the entire document.3
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[CA.250.40]
Part 5 – Forgery Division 1 – Preliminary
s 250
It is forgery at common law to falsely fill out a court summons,9 to put a seal on a document which is invalid without a seal so as to defraud the person executing it,10 to alter the entries made by donors on a list of subscriptions,11 to forge a certificate of ordination,12 to forge a railway pass,13 to forge an order of discharge from prison,14 to forge an acquittance,15 or a receipt,16 or a power of attorney,17 or a bill of lading,18 a bill of exchange,19 a promissory note,20 letters of credence to collect money,21 a consent to act as a next friend in a suit.22 It is not forgery at common law to make an entry in a book of accounts containing a false statement,23 or to fill in voting papers with the names and marks of voters who are marksmen with their consent.24 The false instrument must carry on the face of it the semblance of a valid instrument: it must not obviously be an illegal document.25 Thus forgery can be committed on an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document,26 but not on a document which is void on its face.27 It is no answer to a charge of forgery that the false instrument would, if genuine, be invalid by reason of some objection not appearing on the face of it.28
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It is not necessary that the resemblance to a genuine document should be exact: it is sufficient if the false document is so like a genuine one as to be calculated to deceive persons with ordinary powers of observation, although persons with special experience would not be deceived.29 1 Ex parte Windsor (1865) 10 Cox CC 118; R v Ritson (1869) LR 1 CCR 200. See also R v Parkes and Brown (1797) 2 Leach 775; R v Jones and Palmer (1785) 1 Leach 366; R v Epps (1864) 4 F & F 81; R v Roberts (1886) 12 VLR 135; R v Dodge [1972] 1 QB 416; (1971) 55 Cr App R 440; Brott v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 426; 58 A Crim R 97. 2 R v Teague (1802) 2 East PC 979. 3 R v Autey (1857) Dears & Bell 294. 4 R v Closs 169 ER 1082; (1858) Dears & B 460. 5 R v Smith (1858) Dears & Bell 566. 6 R v Birkett (1805) Russ & Ry 86; R v Griffıths (1858) Dears & Bell 548; R v Hart (1837) 1 Mood 486; Flower v Shaw (1848) 2 Car & Kir 703. 7 R v Parkes and Brown (1797) 2 Leach 775; R v Rogers (1838) 8 Car & P 629; R v Blenkinsop (1848) 2 Car & Kir 531; R v Epps (1864) 4 F & F 81. 8 R v Bateman (1845) 1 Cox CC 186; R v Wilson (1848) 2 Car & Kir 527; 1 Den 284. 9 R v Collier (1831) 5 Car & P 160. 10 R v Collins (1844) 1 Cox CC 57. 11 R v Hamilton [1901] 1 QB 740. 12 R v Etheridge (1901) 19 Cox CC 676. See also Slader v Smalbrooke (1664) 1 Lev 138. 13 R v Boult (1848) 2 Car & Kir 604. 14 R v Harris (1833) 1 Mood 393. See also R v Fawcett (1793) 2 East PC 862. 15 R v Ferrers (1666) 1 Sid 278; 82 ER 1104. 16 R v Ward 93 ER 824; (1726) 2 Str 747. 17 R v Farr (1663) T Raym 81; 83 ER 44. 18 R v Stocker (1695) 5 Mod Rep 137. 19 R v Sheldon (1680) 2 Strange 748. 20 R v Hales (1728) 17 State Tr 161. 21 Savage’s Case (1647) Style 12; 82 ER 491. 22 R v Smythies (1849) 1 Den 498. 23 Ex parte Windsor (1865) 10 Cox CC 118. See also Re Arton (No 2) [1896] 1 QB 509.
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CA
Forgery must be of some document or writing so it is not forgery to put a false signature on a portrait,4 or to use false trade wrappers.5 The instrument or some part of it must be false in some material respect.6 The instrument may be false because the accused represents her or his signature thereon to be that of some other person existent or non-existent,7 or because the accused has filled in the document in a manner different to that authorised or after her or his authority had expired.8
Crimes Act 1900 s 250
[CA.250.40]
24 R v Hartshorn (1853) 6 Cox CC 395. See also Blake v Allen (1600) Moore 619; Combe’s case (1604) Moore 759; R v Elsworth (1780) 2 East PC 986; R v Kinder (1800) 2 East 855; R v Atkinson (1837) 7 Car & P 669; R v Treble (1810) 2 Taunt 328; R v Post (1806) Russ & Ry 101. 25 R v Deakins (1663) 1 Sid 142; R v Crooke (1731) 2 Stra 901; R v Goate (1700) 1 Lord Raym 737; R v Murphy (1753) 19 State Trials 693; R v Sterling (1773) 1 Leach 99; R v Coogan (1787) 1 Leach 449; R v Lyon (1813) Russ & Ry 255; R v Burke (1822) Russ & Ry 496; R v Pike (1838) 2 Mood 70; R v Taylor (1843) 1 Car & Kir 213; R v Butterwick (1839) 2 Mood & Robinson 196; R v Cooke (1838) 8 Car & P 582; R v Wicks (1809) Russ & Ry 149. 26 R v Hawkeswood (1783) 1 Leach 257; R v Reculist (1796) 2 Leach 703; R v Teague (1802) 2 East PC 979; R v Pike (1838) 2 Mood 70. 27 R v Wall (1800) 2 East PC 953; R v Moffatt (1787) 1 Leach 431; R v Jones (1779) 1 Doug 300; R v Reading (1794) 2 Leach 590; R v Pateman (1821) Russ & Ry 455; R v Bartlett (1841) 2 Mood & Robinson 362; R v Donnelly (1835) 1 Mood 438; R v Reed (1838) 2 Mood 62; R v Harper (1881) 7 QBD 78; R v Cartwright (1806) Russ & Ry 106. 28 R v Mackintosh (1800) 2 East PC 942; R v Pike (1838) 2 Mood 70. 29 R v Hoost (1802) 2 East PC 950; R v Elliot (1777) 1 Leach 175; R v Collicott (1812) Russ & Ry 213; 2 Leach 1048.
[CA.250.60]
Intent
To establish the crime of forgery it must be shown that the accused had in the case of public documents, an intent to deceive, and in other cases an intent to defraud.1 Reasonable belief in authority to do the act complained of is a good defence.2
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Proof that some person was actually injured by the forgery is not necessary.3 The fact that the accused intended to provide payment on a forged bill or did in fact pay before proceedings were instituted is not relevant to the question of guilt.4 1 R v Allday (1837) 8 Car & P 136; R v Toshack (1849) 1 Den 492; R v Sharman (1854) Dears 285; R v Sheppard (1810) Russ & Ry 169; R v Crowther (1832) 5 Car & P 316; R v James (1836) 7 Car & P 553; R v Cooke (1838) 8 Car & P 582; R v Todd and Trussler (1844) 2 LTOS 378; Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124; R v Moon [1967] 1 WLR 1536; 3 All ER 962; (1967) 52 Cr App R 12; R v Elton [1910] VLR 1. 2 R v Forbes (1835) 7 Car & P 224; R v Parish (1837) 8 Car & P 94; R v Beard (1837) 8 Car & P 143; R v Beardsall (1859) 1 F & F 529; R v Smith (1862) 3 F & F 504. 3 R v Ward 93 ER 824; (1726) 2 Str 747; R v Marcus (1846) 2 Car & Kir 356; R v Hoatson (1847) 2 Car & Kir 777; R v Nash (1852) 2 Den 493; R v Holden (1810) Russ & Ry 154; R v Martin (1836) 1 Mood 483; R v Moody (1862) Le & Ca 173; R v Boardman (1838) 2 Mood & Robinson 147. 4 R v Hill (1838) 2 Mood 30; R v Geach (1840) 9 Car & P 499.
[CA.250.80]
Uttering
It is an offence at common law to utter any forged instrument the forging of which is an offence at common law. It is immaterial whether the attempt to defraud by the uttering is successful.1 A false document is said to be uttered, when it is parted with, tendered or used in some way for a fraudulent purpose.2 A person who delivers a forged document to an accomplice in order that the accomplice may utter it does not herself or himself utter the document,3 but if he or she gives it to an innocent agent in order that the latter utter it, he or she is guilty himself of uttering.4 The offence of forgery is complete if a false instrument is made with intent to defraud; it is not necessary that the instrument should be uttered or published.5 1 R v Sharman (1854) Dears 285. 2 R v Ion (1852) 21 LJMC 166; R v Radford (1845) 1 Den 59; R v Welch (1851) 2 Den 78; R v Shukard (1811) Russ & Ry 200; R v Cooke (1838) 8 Car & P 582.
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[CA.250.120]
s 250
3 R v Heywood (1847) 2 Car & Kir 352; R v Palmer (1804) 1 Bosanquet & Puller (NR) 96. 4 R v Palmer (1804) 1 Bosanquet & Puller (NR) 96; R v Collicott (1812) Russ & Ry 213; 2 Leach 1048. 5 R v Elliot (1777) 1 Leach 175; R v Crocker (1805) Russ & Ry 97.
[CA.250.100]
Forgery defined by statute
Apart from the fact that the definition of “forgery” in s 250 is not expressly limited to documents (as it refers to other matters or things) there appears to be no substantial difference between forgery at common law1 and forgery under the Act.2 “Counterfeiting” appears to mean “imitating”.3 Altering in any particular would in effect be limited to material alterations as if the alteration was quite immaterial to the meaning or effect of the document it would be difficult to prove an intent to defraud. The signature to a document in a fictitious name, if done with intent to defraud, is just as much a forgery as if somebody else’s signature had been counterfeited.4 Where the falsity of a document arises from the use of a fictitious name or signature, or both, the document is a forgery only if, having regard to all the circumstances of the transaction, the identity of the maker of the document is a material factor.5
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The statutory definition requires an “intent to defraud”. “To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false; to defraud is to deprive by deceit, it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury; more tersely it may be put that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of conduct.”6 1 2 3 4
See [CA.250.40]. Cf English Forgery Act 1913, s 1. R v Hermann (1879) 4 QBD 284. R v Manning (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 129; R v Hiddilston (1889) 6 WN (NSW) 105. See also R v Wilton (1889) 6 WN (NSW) 6; R v Hassard [1970] 1 WLR 1109; 2 All ER 647. 5 R v Gambling [1975] 1 QB 207. 6 Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732–733 per Buckley J; R v Wines [1954] 1 WLR 64; [1953] 2 All ER 1497; (1953) 37 Cr App R 197.
[CA.250.120]
Uttering defined by statute
Section 250 defines uttering as the uttering, offering, disposing of or putting off of any forged instrument, document, signature matter or thing (1) knowing it to be forged and (2) with intent to defraud.1 The essence of “uttering” as defined in s 250 is the physical delivery of the forged document in question and it is the place where the forged document was physically delivered which is critical on the question of jurisdiction.2 1 See [CA.250.80]. Cf the English Forgery Act 1913, s 6. See also R v Finkelstein and Truscovitch (1886) 16 Cox CC 107; R v Giles 168 ER 1227; (1827) 1 Mood CC 166; R v Owen [1957] 1 QB 174; R v Harris [1966] 1 QB 184; (1965) 49 Cr App R 330. 2 R v Lyons [1984] 2 NSWLR 476; 10 A Crim R 253.
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Section 250 defines forgery as the counterfeiting or altering in any particular, by whatever means effected, with intent to defraud of (1) an instrument or document; or (2) some signature or other matter or thing; or (3) any attestation or signature of a witness, whether required by law or not, to any instrument, document or matter, the forging of which is punishable under the Act.
Crimes Act 1900 s 251
251
[CA.251.20]
Inducing acceptance of false document
(1) In this Part, a reference to inducing a person to accept a false document as genuine includes a reference to causing a machine to respond to the document as if it were a genuine document. (2) If it is necessary for the purposes of this Part to prove an intent to induce some person to accept a false document as genuine, it is not necessary to prove that the accused intended so to induce a particular person. [S 251 subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]]
SECTION 251 COMMENTARY [CA.251.20]
Effect and application of section 251
The effect of s 251 is that if a person utters a forged instrument in New South Wales knowing it is a forgery, it is immaterial where the instrument was forged. As far as practicable, s 251 applies to all offences and all courts: see Sch 2. 252 Interpretative provisions relating to obtaining property, financial advantage and financial disadvantage The following provisions of Part 4AA (Fraud) also apply to this Part: (a) section 192C (Obtaining property belonging to another), (b) section 192D (Obtaining financial advantage or causing financial disadvantage). Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
[S 252 reinsrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; rep Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5); am Act 31 of 1951]
DIVISION 2 – FORGERY [Former Pt 5 Ch 2 renum Act 31 of 1999, s 3 and Sch 5.27[4]]
253
Forgery—making false document
A person who makes a false document with the intention that the person or another will use it: (a) to induce some person to accept it as genuine, and (b) because of its being accepted as genuine: (i) to obtain any property belonging to another, or (ii) to obtain any financial advantage or cause any financial disadvantage, or (iii) to influence the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of the offence of forgery. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [S 253 subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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[CA.254.60]
s 255
DIVISION 3 – OFFENCES RELATED TO FORGERY 254
Using false document
CA
A person who uses a false document, knowing that it is false, with the intention of: (a) inducing some person to accept it as genuine, and (b) because of its being accepted as genuine: (i) obtaining any property belonging to another, or (ii) obtaining any financial advantage or causing any financial disadvantage, or (iii) influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [S 254 reinsrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; rep Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5); am Act 53 of 1980]
SECTION 254 COMMENTARY Indictment – forging seal of New South Wales ................................................................................ [CA.254.20] Indictment – uttering instrument having thereon a forged seal ....................................................... [CA.254.40] Indictment – forging instrument having the impression of a forged seal thereon ........................... [CA.254.60]
[CA.254.20]
Indictment – forging seal of New South Wales
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did forge the seal of New South Wales with intent to defraud.
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[CA.254.40]
Indictment – uttering instrument having thereon a forged seal
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did utter a certain instrument, a ......................... , having thereon and affıxed thereto the impression of a forged seal of New South Wales, with intent to defraud; the said AB at the time he/she so uttered the said instrument knowing the said impression to be that of a forged seal. [CA.254.60]
Indictment – forging instrument having the impression of a forged seal thereon
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did forge a certain instrument, a ......................... having thereon and affıxed thereto a forged impression of the seal of New South Wales, made and apparently intended to resemble the impression of the said seal of New South Wales, with intent to defraud. 255
Possession of false document
A person who has in his or her possession a false document, knowing that it is false, with the intention that the person or another will use it: (a) to induce some person to accept it as genuine, and (b) because of its being accepted as genuine: (i) to obtain any property belonging to another, or (ii) to obtain any financial advantage or cause any financial disadvantage, or (iii) to influence the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. [S 255 subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
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Crimes Act 1900 s 256
[CA.255.20]
SECTION 255 COMMENTARY Indictment – forgery of Acts, proclamations, etc .............................................................................. [CA.255.20] Indictment – tendering in evidence forged Acts, etc ........................................................................ [CA.255.40]
[CA.255.20]
Indictment – forgery of Acts, proclamations, etc
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid did print a copy of a certain Act of Parliament, Act No .......... which said copy falsely purported to have been printed by the Government Printer of the said State. [CA.255.40]
Indictment – tendering in evidence forged Acts, etc
That AB on the .......... day of .......... in the year .......... at .................................................. in the State aforesaid, did tender in evidence in a certain action wherein CD was the plaintiff and EF the defendant in the Supreme Court of the said State at .................................................. aforesaid, a copy of a certain Act of Parliament, to wit, Act No .......... , which copy falsely purported to have been printed by the Government Printer of the said State, he the said AB then well knowing that the said copy was not printed by the Government Printer aforesaid.
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256
Making or possession of equipment etc for making false documents
(1) A person who makes, or has in his or her possession, any equipment, material or other thing designed or adapted for the making of a false document: (a) knowing that it is so designed or adapted, and (b) with the intention that the person or another person will use the equipment, material or other thing to commit the offence of forgery, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, makes or has in his or her possession any equipment, material or other thing designed or adapted for the making of a false document, knowing that it is so designed or adapted, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years. (3) A person who possesses any equipment, material or other thing that is capable of being used to make a false document, with the intention that the person or another person will use the equipment, material or other thing to commit the offence of forgery, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years. (4) This section applies in respect of any equipment, material or other thing that is designed or adapted for the purpose of making a false document whether or not it is also designed or adapted for another purpose. (5) This section applies to a person who intends to commit an offence even if committing the offence concerned is impossible or the offence concerned is to be committed at a later time. (6) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section. [S 256 reinsrt Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]; rep Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5); am Act 95 of 1979]
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CA
Editor’s note: The following provisions are repealed and have not been reproduced: • Sections 257–259, 261–264, 272–277, 279–284, 286–288, 290 and 292–295 by Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(5) and (6). • Sections 260, 265–271, 278, 285, 289, 291 and 296–306 by Act 99 of 2009, Sch 1[4]. • Section 307 by Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[21].
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Crimes Act 1900 s 307A
PART 5A – FALSE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION [Former Pt 5 Div 3 renum Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[22]; insrt Act 28 of 2002, s 81 and Sch 4.27[1]]
307A
False or misleading applications
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(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person makes a statement (whether orally, in a document or in any other way), and (b) the person does so knowing that, or reckless as to whether, the statement: (i) is false or misleading, or (ii) omits any matter or thing without which the statement is misleading, and (c) the statement is made in connection with an application for an authority or benefit, and (d) any of the following subparagraphs apply: (i) the statement is made to a public authority, (ii) the statement is made to a person who is exercising or performing any power, authority, duty or function under, or in connection with, a law of the State, (iii) the statement is made in compliance or purported compliance with a law of the State. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years, or a fine of 200 penalty units, or both. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(b)(i) if the statement is not false or misleading in a material particular. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(b)(ii) if the statement did not omit any matter or thing without which the statement is misleading in a material particular. (4) The burden of establishing a matter referred to in subsection (2) or (3) lies on the accused person. (5) In this section: application includes any claim, request or other form of application and also includes, in the case of an application for an authority, any application for the issue, grant, amendment, transfer, renewal, restoration or replacement of the authority and any other application in connection with the authority. authority includes any licence, permit, consent, approval, registration or other form of authority. benefit includes any advantage and is not limited to property. [S 307A insrt Act 28 of 2002, s 81 and Sch 4.27[1]]
307B
False or misleading information
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person gives information to another person, and (b) the person does so knowing that the information: (i) is false or misleading, or (ii) omits any matter or thing without which the information is misleading, and (c) any of the following subparagraphs apply: (i) the information is given to a public authority, (ii) the information is given to a person who is exercising or performing any power, authority, duty or function under, or in connection with, a law of the State, (iii) the information is given in compliance or purported compliance with a law of the State. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years, or a fine of 200 penalty units, or both. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(b)(i) if the information is not false or misleading in a material particular.
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Part 5A – False and misleading information s 307C (3) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(b)(ii) if the information did not omit any matter or thing without which the information is misleading in a material particular. (4) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(c)(i) if, before the information was given by a person to the public authority, the public authority did not take reasonable steps to inform the person of the existence of the offence against subsection (1).
(6) The burden of establishing a matter referred to in subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5) lies on the accused person. (7) For the purposes of subsections (4) and (5), it is sufficient if the following form of words is used: “Giving false or misleading information is a serious offence.” [S 307B insrt Act 28 of 2002, s 81 and Sch 4.27[1]]
307C
False or misleading documents
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) the person produces a document to another person, and (b) the person does so knowing that the document is false or misleading, and (c) the document is produced in compliance or purported compliance with a law of the State. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years, or a fine of 200 penalty units, or both.
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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the document is not false or misleading in a material particular. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who produces a document if the document is accompanied by a written statement signed by the person or, in the case of a body corporate, by a competent officer of the body corporate: (a) stating that the document is, to the knowledge of the first-mentioned person, false or misleading in a material particular, and (b) setting out, or referring to, the material particular in which the document is, to the knowledge of the first-mentioned person, false or misleading. (4) The burden of establishing a matter referred to in subsection (2) or (3) lies on the accused person. [S 307C insrt Act 28 of 2002, s 81 and Sch 4.27[1]]
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(5) Subsection (1) does not apply as a result of subsection (1)(c)(ii) if, before the information was given by a person (the first person) to the person mentioned in that subparagraph (the second person), the second person did not take reasonable steps to inform the first person of the existence of the offence against subsection (1).
Crimes Act 1900 s 308
PART 6 – COMPUTER OFFENCES [Pt 6 subst Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; reinsrt Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(11); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1[2]; repAct 31 of 1951, s 5]
308
General definitions
In this Part: data includes: (a) (b)
information in any form, or any program (or part of a program).
data held in a computer includes: (a) data entered or copied into the computer, or (b) data held in any removable data storage device for the time being in the computer, or (c) data held in a data storage device on a computer network of which the computer forms part. data storage device means any thing (for example a disk or file server) containing or designed to contain data for use by a computer. electronic communication means a communication of information in any form by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy.
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serious computer offence means: (a) an offence against section 308C, 308D or 308E, or (b) conduct in another jurisdiction that is an offence in that jurisdiction and that would constitute an offence against section 308C, 308D or 308E if the conduct occurred in this jurisdiction. [S 308 subst Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]; reinsrt Act 71 of 1989, s 3 and Sch 1(11); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
308A Meaning of access to data, modification of data and impairment of electronic communication (1) In this Part, access to data held in a computer means: (a) the display of the data by the computer or any other output of the data from the computer, or (b) the copying or moving of the data to any other place in the computer or to a data storage device, or (c) in the case of a program—the execution of the program. (2) In this Part, modification of data held in a computer means: (a) the alteration or removal of the data, or (b) an addition to the data. (3) In this Part, impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer includes: (a) the prevention of any such communication, or (b) the impairment of any such communication on an electronic link or network used by the computer, but does not include a mere interception of any such communication. (4) A reference in this Part to any such access, modification or impairment is limited to access, modification or impairment caused (whether directly or indirectly) by the execution of a function of a computer. [S 308A insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
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Part 6 – Computer offences s 308D 308B
Meaning of unauthorised access, modification or impairment
(1) For the purposes of this Part, access to or modification of data, or impairment of electronic communication, by a person is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to cause that access, modification or impairment.
(3) For the purposes of an offence under this Part, a person causes any such unauthorised access, modification or impairment if the person’s conduct substantially contributes to the unauthorised access, modification or impairment. [S 308B insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
308C Unauthorised access, modification or impairment with intent to commit serious indictable offence (1) A person who causes any unauthorised computer function: (a) knowing it is unauthorised, and (b) with the intention of committing a serious indictable offence, or facilitating the commission of a serious indictable offence (whether by the person or by another person), is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: The maximum penalty applicable if the person had committed, or facilitated the commission of, the serious indictable offence in this jurisdiction.
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(2) For the purposes of this section, an unauthorised computer function is: (a) any unauthorised access to data held in any computer, or (b) any unauthorised modification of data held in any computer, or (c) any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from any computer. (3) For the purposes of this section, a serious indictable offence includes an offence in any other jurisdiction that would be a serious indictable offence if committed in this jurisdiction. (4) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section: (a) even if committing the serious indictable offence concerned is impossible, or (b) whether the serious indictable offence is to be committed at the time of the unauthorised conduct or at a later time. (5) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section. [S 308C insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
308D
Unauthorised modification of data with intent to cause impairment
(1) A person who: (a) causes any unauthorised modification of data held in a computer, and (b) knows that the modification is unauthorised, and (c) intends by the modification to impair access to, or to impair the reliability, security or operation of, any data held in a computer, or who is reckless as to any such impairment, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict to a charge for: (a) an offence against section 195 (Destroying or damaging property), or (b) an offence against section 308E (Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication). [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[23]] [S 308D am Act 38 of 2007; insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
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(2) Any such access, modification or impairment is not unauthorised merely because the person has an ulterior purpose for that action.
Crimes Act 1900 s 308( 308E
[CA.308F.20] Unauthorised impairment of electronic communication
(1) A person who: (a) causes any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer, and (b) knows that the impairment is unauthorised, and (c) intends to impair electronic communication to or from the computer, or who is reckless as to any such impairment, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A conviction for an offence against this section is an alternative verdict to a charge for: (a) an offence against section 195 (Destroying or damaging property), or (b) an offence against section 308D (Unauthorised modification of data with intent to cause impairment). [Subs (2) am Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 1[23]] [S 308E am Act 38 of 2007; insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
308F
Possession of data with intent to commit serious computer offence
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(1) A person who is in possession or control of data: (a) with the intention of committing a serious computer offence, or (b) with the intention of facilitating the commission of a serious computer offence (whether by the person or by another person), is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years. (2) For the purposes of this section, possession or control of data includes: (a) possession of a computer or data storage device holding or containing the data or of a document in which the data is recorded, and (b) control of data held in a computer that is in the possession of another person (whether the computer is in this jurisdiction or outside this jurisdiction). (3) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if committing the serious computer offence concerned is impossible. (4) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section. [S 308F insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
SECTION 308F COMMENTARY [CA.308F.20]
Definitions
As to possession, see [CA.7.20] – [CA.7.140]. 308G Producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit serious computer offence (1) A person who produces, supplies or obtains data: (a) with the intention of committing a serious computer offence, or (b) with the intention of facilitating the commission of a serious computer offence (whether by the person or by another person), is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.
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Part 6 – Computer offences s 308I (2) For the purposes of this section, produce, supply or obtain data includes: (a) produce, supply or obtain data held or contained in a computer or data storage device, or (b) produce, supply or obtain a document in which the data is recorded. (3) A person may be found guilty of an offence against this section even if committing the serious computer offence concerned is impossible. (4) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against this section. [Subs (4) insrt Act 27 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3[3]]
308H Unauthorised access to or modification of restricted data held in computer (summary offence) (1) A person: (a) who causes any unauthorised access to or modification of restricted data held in a computer, and (b) who knows that the access or modification is unauthorised, and (c) who intends to cause that access or modification, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years. (2) An offence against this section is a summary offence. (3) In this section: restricted data means data held in a computer, being data to which access is restricted by an access control system associated with a function of the computer.
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[Def am Act 27 of 2003, s 3 and Sch 3[4]]
(4) Proceedings for an offence against this section must be commenced not later than 12 months from when the offence was alleged to have been committed. [Subs (4) insrt Act 54 of 2016, Sch 1.4[1]] [S 308H am Act 54 of 2016; Act 27 of 2003; insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
308I Unauthorised impairment of data held in computer disk, credit card or other device (summary offence) (1) A person: (a) who causes any unauthorised impairment of the reliability, security or operation of any data held on a computer disk, credit card or other device used to store data by electronic means, and (b) who knows that the impairment is unauthorised, and (c) who intends to cause that impairment, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years. (2) An offence against this section is a summary offence. (3) For the purposes of this section, impairment of the reliability, security or operation of data is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to cause that impairment. [S 308I insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
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[S 308G am Act 27 of 2003; insrt Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1]]
Crimes Act 1900
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Editor’s note: Sections 309 and 310 are repealed by Act 20 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[1] and have not been reproduced.
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Part 6A – Offences relating to escape from lawful custody [CA.310C.20]
s 310C
PART 6A – OFFENCES RELATING TO ESCAPE FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY [Pt 6A reinsrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]; rep Act 63 of 1995, s 66 and Sch 2[3]; insrt Act 49 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
310A
Definitions
correctional centre means a correctional centre within the meaning of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999, and includes a correctional complex within the meaning of that Act. inmate has the same meaning as it has in the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999. [S 310A reinsrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]; rep Act 63 of 1995, s 66 and Sch 2[3]; insrt Act 49 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1(3)]
310B
Rescuing inmate from lawful custody
Any person who, by force, rescues or attempts to rescue an inmate from lawful custody is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 14 years. [S 310B insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
SECTION 310B COMMENTARY [CA.310B.20]
Terms defined
“Attempts”, see [2.32610] – [CA.344A.140].
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“Inmate”, see [CA.310D.60]. “Lawful custody”, see [CA.310D.60]. 310C
Aiding escape
Any person: (a) who aids an inmate in escaping or attempting to escape from lawful custody, or (b) who conveys anything or causes anything to be conveyed into a correctional centre or to an inmate with intent to facilitate the escape of an inmate, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 7 years. [S 310C insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
SECTION 310C COMMENTARY [CA.310C.20]
Terms defined
“Inmate”, see [CA.310D.60]. “Escaping”, see [CA.310D.60]. “Attempting”, see [2.32610] – [CA.344A.140]. “Lawful custody”, see [CA.310D.60]. “Correctional centre”, see [CA.310B.20] – [14.9010].
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In this Part:
Crimes Act 1900 s 310D
310D
[CA.310D.20]
Escaping
Any inmate: (a) who escapes or attempts to escape from lawful custody, or (b) who, having been temporarily released from lawful custody, fails to return to lawful custody at the end of the time for which the inmate has been released, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. [S 310D insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
SECTION 310D COMMENTARY Indictment and elements to be proved .......................................................................................... [CA.310D.20] Cross reference and jurisdiction .................................................................................................... [CA.310D.40] Escaping from lawful custody ........................................................................................................ [CA.310D.60] Sentencing for escape ................................................................................................................... [CA.310D.80]
[CA.310D.20]
Indictment and elements to be proved
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(a) That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State being an inmate of .................................................. [correctional centre] did escape (or attempt to escape) from the lawful custody of CD the Governor of the said .................................................. [correctional centre]. (b) That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State being an inmate of .................................................. [correctional centre] having been temporarily released from the lawful custody of CD the Governor of the said .................................................. [correctional centre] did fail to return to that lawful custody at the end of the time for which he/she the said AB had been released. In relation to (a) the Crown must prove that the accused: (1) being an inmate (2) in lawful custody (3) did escape (or attempt to escape) from that custody. [CA.310D.40]
Cross reference and jurisdiction
Related offences: Common law offences of escaping from lawful custody and assisting escape from lawful custody, see [CA.310D.60] and [2.32510] s 310B
–
s 310C
– –
s 310E s 310F s 310G
832
– – –
rescuing or attempting to rescue an inmate from lawful custody by force (a) aiding an inmate in escaping or attempting to escape from lawful custody (b) conveying anything with intent to facilitate an inmate’s escape constructing etc a tunnel for use in facilitating an inmate’s escape wilfully or negligently permitting an inmate to escape from custody harbouring or maintaining an escaped inmate
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 6A – Offences relating to escape from lawful custody [CA.310D.60] s 358C
s 310D –
harbouring, maintaining or employing an escaped prisoner from another State or Territory
Under s 20(1) and Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 escaping from lawful custody is a Table 1 offence and as such, is to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecution or person charged elects otherwise, see ss 260 and 16. If there is escape from imprisonment for a Commonwealth offence, the escape is to be charged under s 47 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1 1 R v Gregory [1983] 3 NSWLR 172; 10 A Crim R 137 (CCA); R v Nanka [1984] 1 NSWLR 722; 71 FLR 391 (CCA).
[CA.310D.60]
Escaping from lawful custody
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Escaping from lawful custody was a common law misdemeanour, see heading “Common law offence of escaping from lawful custody” below. The predecessor to s 310D was s 34 of the Correctional Centres Act 1952 (formerly the Prisons Act 1952). Section 310D proscribes the escaping from lawful custody by inmates. By s 310A“inmate” is stated to have the same meaning as it has in the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999. By s 3(1) of that Act“inmate” means a person to whom Pt 2 applies. Part 2 deals with “Imprisonment by way of full-time detention” and by s 4(3), “inmate” means a person to whom Pt 2 applies as set out in s 4(1). Principally, Pt 2 applies to “any person the subject of a warrant under section 62 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 by which a court has committed the person to a correctional centre to serve a sentence or the remainder of a sentence by way of full-time detention, other than a person who is on release on parole” – s 4(1)(a). Persons committed to a correctional centre otherwise are also included including those on remand awaiting trial or hearing – s 4(1)(b) – (e). Section 62(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides that as soon as practicable after sentencing an offender to imprisonment, a court must issue a warrant for the committal of the offender to a correctional centre. By s 62(3)(b) a warrant under the section is sufficient authority for the governor of the correctional centre to keep the offender in his or her custody for the term of the sentence. If following an order by which a court or other competent authority has committed the person to a correctional centre, a warrant for the committal of the offender to a correctional centre has not yet issued, s 4(1)(e) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 operates nevertheless to deem that person an “inmate”. Persons other than “inmates” in other forms of lawful custody who escape are liable to conviction for the common law offence of escaping from lawful custody, see below “Common law offence”. To constitute the crime of escape there must be a conscious and intentional act of withdrawal from an actual custody; it is a defence that the original withdrawal from custody was unintentional or unconscious.1 Where an order permitting the temporary absence of an inmate was invalid because it was not made by a person with proper authority, it was held that such an invalid order will not ground a charge of escaping from lawful custody.2 The offence of escaping is not necessarily concluded once the inmate has emerged from the confines of the correctional centre; where in the vicinity of the correctional centre he or she is endeavouring to elude pursuit, the offence is still being committed.3 For commentary in relation to attempts, see [2.32610] – [CA.344A.140].
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s 95(1) Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 – escaping while in periodic detention s 33(1) Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 – detainee escaping from lawful custody s 15 Children (Interstate Transfer of Offenders) Act 1988 – escape by young offender in transit through New South Wales
Crimes Act 1900 s 310D
[CA.310D.60]
In evidentiary terms there is an overlapping of “inmate” to a considerable degree as used in s 310D and being in “lawful custody”. Proof that an accused was an “inmate” within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 would also constitute some evidence of lawful custody, see “Proof of Lawful Custody” below. “Lawful custody” is not defined in the Crimes Act 1900 (other than for the purposes of s 353A, now repealed, which gave power to search, medically examine, take photograph, finger-prints etc of a person in lawful custody upon a charge of committing a crime). The lawfulness of the custody depends on the terms of the sentence, of any warrant of commitment, and on the relevant statutory provisions.4“A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment and is thereafter during that term (and in the absence of any circumstance which would justify his release) kept restrained within a prison must, as a matter of both common sense and of law be said to be ‘in lawful custody’.”5 Once sentenced, a prisoner is in custody and the lawfulness of that custody will not depend on where he or she is held.6 A prisoner on day release or some other kind of lawful temporary absence may be still in lawful custody7 as s 310D(b) recognises. Someone lawfully detained for questioning can be in lawful custody.8 A person arrested on a warrant is in lawful custody.9 An appellant’s right to remain at liberty ceased when he appeared on bail in the District Court on the hearing of his appeal. He was then in the custody of the court and when he absconded, he was guilty of the common law misdemeanour of escaping from lawful custody.10 However, where a mentally ill prisoner was removed to and detained in a mental hospital pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1958 (NSW), he was not a prisoner held in lawful custody because he was not serving a sentence imposed by a court in judicial proceedings, but was detained by administrative act, viz by order of the Minister.11 These concepts are largely replicated in the definition of “person in custody” in s 249 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 which,
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means a person who is in lawful custody: (a) before being brought before a court in connection with the alleged commission of an offence; or (b) during proceedings to determine whether the person has committed an offence or while such proceedings are pending; or (c) following a grant of bail but before the person has fulfilled the necessary requirements entitling the person to be released; or (d) during any period for which the person is on remand; or (e) while awaiting sentencing for an offence or during sentencing proceedings; or (f) during any period after the person is sentenced for an offence; or (g) during any period after a periodic detention order is made in relation to the person and before a periodic detention notice is served on the person; or (h) in accordance with a warrant of commitment or other warrant, or an order of a court or other competent authority, but does not include a person who is detained in accordance with the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979. The lawfulness of custody may itself change with changes in circumstances. “If a person has been lawfully arrested and the detention of that person ceased to be lawful, then if nothing more occurs the person can hardly be guilty of escaping from lawful custody merely by walking out of the police station. As soon as the person left the police station, he or she could be arrested again for the offence for which the person was originally arrested but there would be no justification for a charge of escaping from lawful custody. Something must happen to make it clear to the person that he or she is not free to leave.”12 Section 41 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 provides that an inmate in transit, transferred to or through the Australian Capital Territory, remains in the lawful custody of the governor of the correctional centre from which the inmate is transferred or absent.
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Of course it is the Crown which must prove that the accused was in lawful custody.13 This must be proved by appropriate evidence and the authorities suggest that it is unlikely that the Crown can rely upon the presumption of regularity towards proof of lawful custody.14 While it has been held in Victoria that where the inmate is removed from one correctional centre to another the Crown must show the chain of circumstances to indicate he was in lawful custody, in that case the committal warrant committed the inmate to the gaoler in charge of a particular gaol.15 The High Court however, has said that the proposition that the prosecution has to prove the lawfulness of the detention of an inmate from his first imprisonment until the time of his escape is too wide.16 Under a different statutory regime in Western Australia where the Director of the Department of Corrections had custody of all convicted persons, the High Court held that the Crown had proved lawful custody by proving a court calendar containing details of the prisoner’s conviction and sentence, even though the calendar did not name the gaol in which the sentence was to be served.17 In New South Wales a number of statutory provisions are relevant to proof of lawful custody. As mentioned under “Inmate” above, by s 62(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 a court must issue a warrant for the committal of the offender to a correctional centre as soon as practicable after sentencing an offender to imprisonment and, by s 62(3)(b), such warrant is sufficient authority for the governor of the correctional centre to keep the offender in his or her custody for the term of the sentence. By s 233(1) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 the governor of a correctional centre has the care, direction, control and management of the correctional centre for which the governor is responsible. By s 260, a certificate issued by the Commissioner for Corrective Services or a prescribed person which states that on a date, or during a period specified, a specified person was in the custody of the governor of a specified correctional centre is admissible in any legal proceedings and is evidence of the facts so stated.
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Statutory provision is made for transfers of inmates from one correctional centre to another, see Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 ss 23 and 252. Provision is also made for transfer to hospital or another specified place, see s 24 and for local leave orders and permits, see ss 25, 26. Escaping from lawful custody was a common law misdemeanour.18 The history and nature of the common law offence of escape has been reviewed.19 The common law offence of escaping from lawful custody is expressly preserved by s 343, as is the common law offence of assisting a person to escape from lawful custody. The law recognises that necessity may be pleaded to a charge of escaping,20 although it seems that there are virtually no reported cases where the defence of necessity has succeeded.21 If an inmate breaks out of correctional centre to save her or his life, as in the case of fire, he or she is not guilty of escape.22 Where necessity is raised, the issue in such a case is whether the accused honestly believed, on reasonable grounds, that escape from prison was necessary in order to avoid threatened death or serious injury – the relevant concept is of necessity, not expediency, or strong preference; the accused must have been afforded no reasonable opportunity for an alternative course of action which did not involve a breach of the law.23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
R v Scott [1967] VR 276. R v Way [1981] 2 NSWLR 653; 3 A Crim R 465 (CCA). R v Ryan [1966] VR 553. Powch v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 496. R v Day (1983) 9 A Crim R 445 at 462 per Olney J (CCA, WA). Powch v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 496. R v Dunks (1982) 8 A Crim R 267; R v Day (1983) 9 A Crim R 445 at 462 (CCA, WA). Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 80 A Crim R 542; [1995] HCA 8 (HC), (CCA, NSW). R v Bondareff (1999) 109 A Crim R 23; [1999] SASC 316 (CCA, SA). R v Peehi (1997) 41 NSWLR 476; 92 A Crim R 539 (CCA). R v Gaffney [1971] 1 NSWLR 511 (CCA). Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 80 A Crim R 542; [1995] HCA 8 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 126 (CLR).
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[CA.310D.60]
Crimes Act 1900 s 310D
[CA.310D.60]
13 R v Michaels (1993) 70 A Crim R 78 (CCA, NSW). 14 In R v Dillon [1982] AC 484 the Privy Council held that the Courts will not presume the existence of facts which are central to an offence, particularly those which touch upon the liberty of the subject. Other decisions both in England and Australia have rejected reliance upon the presumption of regularity in criminal proceedings: Scott v Baker [1969] 1 QB 659; Lucerne v Collins [1967] 1 NSWR 407; (1966) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 247; Selby v Pennings (1989) 19 WAR 520; Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424; 24 A Crim R 36. These cases were referred to by Kirby J in Cassell v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 189; 110 A Crim R 317; [2000] HCA 8 at [67] in a dissenting judgment, but not on this point. Kirby J noted that there are decisions such as R v Templeton [1956] VLR 709 at 713 where it has been suggested that the presumption can apply and that on the one occasion that the question was presented for decision in the High Court in Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475, the majority, whilst noting Dillon and the differences of view which had arisen, reserved the question. In Day Brennan J (dissenting) rejected the presumption of regularity. Kirby J in Cassell said that, like Brennan J, he would incline to the view that the presumption of regularity is unavailable in criminal proceedings to cure gaps in the evidence relevant to proof of the essential elements of an offence. 15 R v Templeton [1956] VLR 709. See also Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475; Powch v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 496. 16 Powch v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 496. 17 Day v The Queen (1984) 153 CLR 475. 18 2 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, c 17, s 5. See also R v Hinds (1957) 41 Cr App R 143; R v Scott [1967] VR 276 (FC) per Smith J at 283–284, Gillard J at 290; R v Farlow [1980] 2 NSWLR 166; R v Peehi (1997) 41 NSWLR 476; 92 A Crim R 539 (CCA) per Hidden J at 477 (NSWLR). 19 R v Scott [1967] VR 276. 20 R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 (NSW CCA); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443. 21 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 (FC) per Anderson J.
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22 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 611. 23 R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 (NSW CCA).
[CA.310D.80]
Sentencing for escape
Section 57 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides that a sentence for escaping by an inmate is to be served consecutively with another sentence of imprisonment yet to expire or another sentence of imprisonment imposed in the same proceedings. Section 254 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 provides that if a person is unlawfully absent from custody during the term of a sentence, the term of the sentence is extended by the period of the unlawful absence. The courts have emphasised the aspect of deterrence in relation to escaping. Courts have always taken a serious attitude towards escaping from prison and, particularly, from minimum security prisons – if prisoners take advantage of a low degree of security to escape they both abuse the system from which they have benefited and bring it into public disrepute.1 Escapes and attempted escapes require putting down firmly because the only alternative to effective deterrence from escaping is a hardening of the prison discipline to make escape more difficult. Escape from an open institution requires a significant element of deterrence to be reflected in sentence.2 It has been held that personal crises affecting inmates or their families provide no justification for escape.3 Some authorities, notably R v Thompson (unreported, CCA (NSW), 21 May 1986), per Street CJ) have held that the ordinary sentence for an “unremarkable escape” is approximately two years.4 It has been said that now that the statutory maximum penalty has increased from seven years to 10 years imprisonment for escaping from lawful custody, a penalty of two years imprisonment for an “unremarkable escape” must no longer be regarded as adequate.5 Nevertheless, in another case a judge of appeal said that he did not consider that Thompson can be regarded as laying down a minimum tariff for sentences for escape, adding that it is not unusual for sentences as low as 6 months to be imposed.6
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s 310F
1 R v Williams (1982) 7 A Crim R 46 (NSW CCA). 2 R v Payne [1976] 2 NSWLR 446 (NSW CCA). 3 See for example R v Stewart (unreported, CCA (NSW), 1 December 1992); R v Simonds (unreported, CCA (NSW), 6 May 1991). 4 However Thompson was under a sentencing regime before the Sentencing Act 1989 and the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Also R v Stuart (1990) 47 A Crim R 293 (NSW CCA). 5 R v Steff (1997) 96 A Crim R 1 (NSW CCA). 6 R v Robinson [2000] NSWCCA 182 per Foster AJA at [29], Priestley JA and Smart J agreeing. 7 R v Jenni Young (unreported, CCA (NSW), 27 October 1993). 8 R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; (2000) 115 A Crim R 497; [2000] NSWCCA 317.
310E
Tunnels to facilitate escape
(1) A person who constructs, or takes part in the construction of, a tunnel that could reasonably be thought likely to be intended for use in facilitating an inmate’s escape from lawful custody is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 10 years. (2) It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the tunnel was actually intended for use in facilitating an escape, but it is a defence for the accused person to establish that he or she did not intend it to be so used. (3) In this section: Copyright © 2017. Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited. All rights reserved.
tunnel includes any partially completed tunnel and any excavation. [S 310E insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
310F
Permitting escape
(1) Any person who, being an officer of a correctional centre or a police officer, has actual custody of an inmate for the time being is guilty of an offence if he or she wilfully permits the inmate to escape from custody. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 7 years. (2) Any person who, being an officer of a correctional centre or a police officer, has actual custody of an inmate for the time being is guilty of an indictable offence if he or she negligently permits the inmate to escape from custody. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 2 years. (3) Any person who is employed by the management company of a managed correctional centre (within the meaning of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999) as a custodian of inmates at, or travelling to or from, the correctional centre is, for the purposes of this section, an officer of a correctional centre. [S 310F insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
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Very lenient sentences imposed by Local Courts have been criticised7 and the sentencing restriction imposed on Local Courts by s 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 has been considered in the context of very lenient penalties imposed in that court for escaping offences.8
Crimes Act 1900 s 310G
[CA.310F.20]
SECTION 310E COMMENTARY [CA.310F.20]
Terms defined
“Correctional centre”, see [CA.310B.20] – [14.9010]. “Inmate”, see [CA.310D.60]. “Wilfully permits”, see [CLP.80]. “Escapes from custody”, see [CA.310D.60]. 310G
Harbouring escapee
(1) Any person who knowingly harbours, maintains or employs an escaped inmate is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: imprisonment for 3 years. (2) In this section: escaped inmate includes a prisoner who has escaped from lawful custody in another State or Territory. [Subs (2) insrt Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[22]] [S 310G am Act 38 of 2007; insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
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310H
Application of Part
This Part does not apply to or in respect of: (a) an inmate who is in lawful custody for the purpose of serving a sentence of imprisonment the subject of an intensive correction order or home detention order under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, or (b) a detention centre or a detainee within the meaning of the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987. [S 310H am Act 48 of 2010, Sch 5.4; Act 53 of 2000, s 3 and Sch 3.3[36]; insrt Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[1]]
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New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
Part 6B – Terrorism s 310L
PART 6B – TERRORISM [Pt 6B future exp Act 40 of 1900, s 310L, with effect from 13 Sep 2016; insrt Act 54 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 4] [Pt 6B note rep Act 53 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 6[1]; am Act 14 of 2007; insrt Act 54 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 4]
310I
Definitions
In this Part:
terrorist organisation and member of a terrorist organisation have the meaning they are given by section 102.1 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. [S 310I future exp Act 40 of 1900, s 310L, with effect from 13 Sep 2016; insrt Act 54 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 4]
310J
Membership of terrorist organisation
(1) A person commits an offence if: (a) the person intentionally is a member of a terrorist organisation, and (b) the organisation is a terrorist organisation, and (c) the person knows the organisation is a terrorist organisation. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the person proves that he or she took all reasonable steps to cease to be a member of the organisation as soon as practicable after the person knew that the organisation was a terrorist organisation. [S 310J future exp Act 40 of 1900, s 310L, with effect from 13 Sep 2016; insrt Act 54 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 4]
310K
Multiplicity of offences
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If: (a)
an act or omission is an offence against both this Part and the Commonwealth Criminal Code, and (b) the offender has been punished for that offence under the Commonwealth Criminal Code, the offender is not liable to be punished for the offence under this Part. [S 310K future exp Act 40 of 1900, s 310L, with effect from 13 Sep 2016; insrt Act 54 of 2005, s 5 and Sch 4]
310L
Repeal of Part
This Part is repealed on 13 September 2019. [S 310L am Act 17 of 2016, Sch 2; future exp Act 40 of 1900, s 310L, with effect from 13 Sep 2016; am Act 64 of 2013, s 3; Act 64 of 2010, s 3; insrt Act 53 of 2008, s 3 and Sch 6[2]]
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Commonwealth Criminal Code means the Criminal Code set out in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 of the Commonwealth.
Crimes Act 1900 s 311
[CA.311.20]
PART 7 – PUBLIC JUSTICE OFFENCES [Pt 7 subst Act 51 of 1990, Sch 1(2)]
DIVISION 1 – DEFINITIONS 311
Definitions
(1) In this Part: benefit means any benefit or advantage whether or not in money or money’s worth. judicial officer means a person who is, or who alone or with others constitutes, a judicial tribunal and includes a coroner. judicial proceeding means a proceeding in or before a judicial tribunal in which evidence may be taken on oath. judicial tribunal means a person (including a coroner and an arbitrator), court or body authorised by law, or by consent of parties, to conduct a hearing for the purpose of the determination of any matter or thing and includes a person, court or body authorised to conduct a committal proceeding. public justice official means a person who is a public officer employed in any capacity (other than as a judicial officer) for the investigation, detection or prosecution of offenders. serious offence [Repealed] [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[44]; Act 79 of 1993, s 5]
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(2) In this Part, a reference to the making of a statement on oath includes a reference to the verification of a statement on oath. [S 311 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 79 of 1993, s 5; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 311 COMMENTARY Judicial proceeding ........................................................................................................................... [CA.311.20] Public justice official .......................................................................................................................... [CA.311.40]
[CA.311.20]
Judicial proceeding
It has been held that an action improperly brought against a fictitious person of a fictitious claim may constitute a judicial proceeding.1 Where proceedings were instituted by a person having no right of action it was held that no subsequent action for perjury could be taken thereon,2 similarly where the charge founding the proceedings did not constitute an offence,3 and where the magistrate’s jurisdiction was ousted by a question of title to land.4 1 2 3 4
840
R R R R
v v v v
Castiglione (1912) 7 Cr App R 233. Charles (1866) 3 W W & a’B (L) 52. See also R v Dobos (1984) 58 ACTR 10; 13 A Crim R 306. Leoni (1892) 18 VLR 469. Armstrong (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 36.
New South Wales Criminal Law Handbook 2017
[CA.312.20] [CA.311.40]
Part 7 – Public justice offences Division 2 – Interference with the administration of justice
s 315
Public justice official
The Court of Criminal Appeal in considering a stated question as to whether or not a police officer was a “public justice official” for the purposes of s 326(1) found that on a proper construction of the provisions of Part 7 a police officer is a public justice official.1 1 R v Orcher (1999) 48 NSWLR 273; NSWCCA 356.
Meaning of “pervert the course of justice”
A reference in this Part to perverting the course of justice is a reference to obstructing, preventing, perverting or defeating the course of justice or the administration of the law. [S 312 reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 312 COMMENTARY [CA.312.20]
General
For detailed discussion of the meaning of “pervert the course of justice” see s 319 at [CA.319.20] – [CA.319.160]. 313
Knowledge that offence is a serious indictable offence is unnecessary
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If it is an element of an offence under this Part that an offence is a serious indictable offence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accused knew that the offence was a serious indictable offence. [S 313 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
DIVISION 2 – INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 314
False accusations etc
A person who makes an accusation intending a person to be the subject of an investigation of an offence, knowing that other person to be innocent of the offence, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 314 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
315
Hindering investigation etc
(1) A person who does anything intending in any way to hinder: (a) the investigation of a serious indictable offence committed by another person, or (b) the discovery of evidence concerning a serious indictable offence committed by another person, or (c) the apprehension of another person who has committed a serious indictable offence, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45] and [70]]
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is to be considered to have committed a serious indictable offence if a public officer engaged in the detection or investigation of offenders suspects on reasonable grounds that a person has committed the offence.
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312
Crimes Act 1900 s 315
[CA.315.20]
(3) It is not an offence against this section merely to refuse or fail to divulge information or produce evidence. [S 315 am Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 315 COMMENTARY [CA.315.20]
Generally
In order to make out the element of knowledge required to be proved for this offence, the accused must be shown to know of the unlawful act done which is said to constitute a serious indictable offence, the investigation of which he or she is hindering. The accused does not need to know the precise details of the act, such as the precise time and place of the occurence or the persons involved. Nor does he or she need to know of the precise offence which has been committed.1 1 R v El-Zeyat (2002) 54 NSWLR 319; [2002] NSWCCA 138.
315A
Threatening or intimidating victims or witnesses
(1) A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any other person intending to influence any person not to bring material information about an indictable offence to the attention of a police officer or other appropriate authority is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
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(2) In this section: material information means information that a person has that might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension of a person who has committed an indictable offence, or the prosecution or conviction of any such person. [S 315A insrt Act 84 of 2001, s 3 and Sch 1[13]]
316
Concealing serious indictable offence
(1) If a person has committed a serious indictable offence and another person who knows or believes that the offence has been committed and that he or she has information which might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension of the offender or the prosecution or conviction of the offender for it fails without reasonable excuse to bring that information to the attention of a member of the Police Force or other appropriate authority, that other person is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45]]
(2) A person who solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for himself or herself or any other person in consideration for doing anything that would be an offence under subsection (1) is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (3) It is not an offence against subsection (2) merely to solicit, accept or agree to accept the making good of loss or injury caused by an offence or the making of reasonable compensation for that loss or injury. (4) A prosecution for an offence against subsection (1) is not to be commenced against a person without the approval of the Attorney General if the knowledge or belief that an offence has been committed was formed or the information referred to in the subsection was obtained by the person in the course of practising or following a profession, calling or vocation prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection. [Subs (4) insrt Act 85 of 1997, Sch 1.2[3]]
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[CA.316.60]
Part 7 – Public justice offences Division 2 – Interference with the administration of justice
s 316
(5) The regulations may prescribe a profession, calling or vocation as referred to in subsection (4). [Subs (5) subst Act 54 of 1998, s 3 and Sch 2.6[6]; insrt Act 85 of 1997, Sch 1.2[3]] [S 316 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 54 of 1998; Act 85 of 1997; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 316 COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.316.40] Elements ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.316.60] History ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.316.80] Conceal serious offence – commission of a serious offence ......................................................... [CA.316.100] Element (1) Knowing or believing .................................................................................................. [CA.316.120] Element (2) Information of “material assistance” ........................................................................... [CA.316.140] Element (3) Failure to bring information to attention of authorities ............................................... [CA.316.160] Element (4) Solicited etc a “benefit” ............................................................................................... [CA.316.180] Defence of “reasonable excuse” .................................................................................................... [CA.316.200]
[CA.316.20]
Indictments
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Conceal serious offence – s 316(1) That CD (or a person unknown) having on .......... at .......... in the said State committed a serious offence, namely, ......................... (specify serious offence), AB knowing or believing that the said offence had been committed and having information namely, ......................... (specify information) which may have been of material assistance in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction (delete any if inapplicable) of the said CD (or unknown person) did fail without reasonable excuse to bring that information to the attention of a member of the Police Force or other appropriate authority. Solicit etc benefit to conceal serious offence – s 316(2), add: and that the said AB on .......... at .................................................. in the said State did solicit [accept or agree to accept] a benefit for himself/herself [or for EF] in consideration of so failing. [CA.316.40]
Jurisdiction
This offence may be dealt with summarily. For an offence committed before 1 September 1995, s 476(6)(da) applies. For offences committed after 1 September 1995, s 258(a) and Table 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 applies. [CA.316.60]
Elements
Conceal serious offence – s 316(1) That another having committed a serious offence, the accused: (1) knowing or believing that such offence was committed; and (2) having information which might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension, or the prosecution or conviction of that other; (3) failed to bring such information to the attention of a member of the Police Force or other appropriate authority. Solicit etc benefit to conceal serious offence – s 316(2) (4) and solicited, accepted or agreed to accept a benefit for himself/herself or for any other.
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Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.316.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 316 [CA.316.80]
[CA.316.0] History
The predecessor to the offence of concealing a serious offence was the old common law misdemeanour of misprision of felony.1 This was an ancient offence2 and the older cases have been collected.3 The offence of misprision of felony was criticised as “extremely vague” and until the early 1960s, it was thought in England that it may have fallen into desuetude.4 Such doubts were dispelled, first in Australia with the decision in R v Crimmins [1959] VR 270 (which said that the citizen has a duty to disclose to the appropriate authorities any felony of which he or she has knowledge) and second, in England with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 which applied Crimmins.5
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The elements of misprision of felony are discussed in R v Lovegrove (1983) 33 SASR 332; 9 A Crim R 226 where Cox J also outlined a number of principles concerning the offence. Shortly stated they were: • a person was not obliged to tell the police what they already knew;6 • the disclosure to the authorities had to be made within a reasonable time and having a reasonable opportunity for so doing;7 • it did not matter whether the concealment took an active or a passive form;8 • the Crown did not have to prove that the accused knew the identity of the felon; • the offence was not restricted to those who actually witnessed the commission of the felony,9 but knowledge rather than suspicion was required;10 • the knowledge which had to be proved was a state of mind constituting actual knowledge and not some hypothetical reasonable person.11 It was recognised that there were in law, a number of excuses which could be pleaded as a defence but these were not clearly defined by the common law. They included: • privilege against self incrimination12 • a genuine belief that disclosure would have endangered a third party13 • a lawyer acting under legal professional privilege.14 Other excuses were suggested.15 Family ties were said not to suffice as an excuse in the case of really serious crime.16 A married woman is immune from prosecution as an accessory after the fact or for the offence of misprision of a felony for an offence committed by her husband,17 however this immunity does not extend to a de facto wife.18 1 The term “misprision” seems to have meant a wrongful act or omission and to indicate a serious misdemeanour: see Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 at 541, 555 (AC). 2 The history of misprision of felony can be found in R v Lovegrove (1983) 33 SASR 332; 9 A Crim R 226. See also R v Crimmins [1959] VR 270; Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230; R v James (1983) 36 SASR 215; 11 A Crim R 272. 3 As noted in R v James (1983) 36 SASR 215; 11 A Crim R 272, the cases to 1962 appear in the argument of the Solicitor-General Sir Jocelyn Simon QC in Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 at 544 (AC) ff. 4 R v Wozniak (1989) 16 NSWLR 185; 40 A Crim R 290. 5 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 Lord Denning at 564 (AC). 6 See also R v Stone [1981] VR 737. 7 Applying Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230. 8 Applying R v Crimmins [1959] VR 270; Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230. 9 Applying Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230. 10 R v Wozniak (1989) 16 NSWLR 185; 40 A Crim R 290. 11 See also R v Wozniak (1989) 16 NSWLR 185; 40 A Crim R 290.
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12 R v Lovegrove (1983) 33 SASR 332; 9 A Crim R 226; R v James (1983) 36 SASR 215; 11 A Crim R 272; Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; (1991) 55 A Crim R 322; [1991] HCA 34. 13 R v Lovegrove (1983) 33 SASR 332; 9 A Crim R 226. 14 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230, Lord Denning at 564 (AC); R v Wozniak (1989) 16 NSWLR 185; 40 A Crim R 290. 15 By Lord Denning in Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 at 564 (AC): doctor and patient; clergyman and parishioner; an employer discovering his employee stealing; master of a college and a student. 16 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 WLR 371; 3 All ER 37; (1961) 45 Cr App R 230 per Lord Denning at 564 (AC) and Lord Goddard at 569 (AC). 17 R v CAL (unreported, CCA (NSW), 24 October 1996). 18 R v Brown (unreported, CCA (NSW), 9 December 1998).
[CA.316.100]
Conceal serious offence – commission of a serious offence
Section 316 has not yet received detailed judicial consideration. Members of the Court of Criminal Appeal made some observations about the provision in R v Crofts (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 March 1995). Meagher JA said: It is a section which has many potential difficulties, the chief of which is the meaning of the words “without reasonable excuse”, difficulties which are magnified when one endeavours to contemplate how those words would apply to the victim of the crime.
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Gleeson CJ said: The evaluation of the degree of culpability involved in a contravention of s 316 of the Crimes Act could, depending upon the circumstances of the individual case, be an extremely difficult exercise. For that matter, as Meagher JA has mentioned, depending upon the circumstances of an individual case, it may be extremely difficult to form a judgment as to whether a failure to provide information to the police was “without reasonable excuse”. Section 311(1) defines “serious offence” as “an offence punishable by imprisonment or imprisonment for 5 years or more or for life”. [CA.316.120]
Element (1) Knowing or believing
As mentioned above, in relation to the offence of misprision of felony, knowledge rather than suspicion was the state of mind required for commission of the offence. [CA.316.140]
Element (2) Information of “material assistance”
The term “material assistance” is not defined. This term is also used in s 150 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 in relation to notices of alibi: see [CPA.150.20]ff. [CA.316.160]
Element (3) Failure to bring information to attention of authorities
While the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused’s failure to bring the information to the attention of the authorities, this burden of proving the negative may be less rigorous than in proving a positive. In DPP v Brauer [1991] 2 Qd R 261; (1989) 45 A Crim R 109 at 268 (Qd R); 112–113 (A Crim R), Thomas J said: The starting point … depends upon which party has the evidential burden. The amount or quality of evidence required to discharge it may be lessened when it may reasonably be supposed that the adversary is in a better position to know and prove the essential facts: [authorities cited]. However as the learned authors of Cross on Evidence (3rd Aust ed, 1986), p 190, par 4.33, note 126, have observed,
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[CA.316.160]
Crimes Act 1900 s 316
[CA.316.160]
this does not mean that the peculiar means of knowledge of one party spares the other of the burden of adducing evidence on the issue, although very slight evidence will often suffice. This is particularly true when a party has the proof of a negative.1 1 Applied in Jeffrey v DPP (Cth) (1995) 79 A Crim R 514 at 518 (CCA NSW); Fowkes v DPP [1997] 2 VR 506; (1996) 88 A Crim R 166 at 172 (A Crim R) (CA Vic).
[CA.316.180]
Element (4) Solicited etc a “benefit”
Section 311(1) defines benefit in this context as meaning “any benefit or advantage whether or not in money or in money’s worth”. The meaning and breadth of the term “benefit” (in the context of the Commonwealth offence of false pretences) is discussed in the (dissenting) judgment of Einfeld J in Yates v Wilson (1989) 22 FCR 397; 40 A Crim R 113 at 403–405 (FCR), 119–121 (A Crim R). The term “any advantage” is also used in s 90A Kidnapping. [CA.316.200]
Defence of “reasonable excuse”
Judicial comment upon the potential difficulty in the interpretation of this term in this context has been made in R v Crofts (unreported, CCA (NSW), 10 March 1995): see [CA.316.100] above. A reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person. It is different from a lawful excuse.1
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The High Court in Taikato v The Queen2 said: [T]he reality is that when legislatures enact defences such as “reasonable excuse” they effectively give, and intend to give, to the courts the power to determine the content of such defences. Defences in this form are categories of indeterminate reference that have no content until a court makes its decision. They effectively require the courts to prescribe the relevant rule of conduct after the fact of its occurrence. While the meaning of the phrase always depends upon the context and purpose of the provision in which it appears as a defence and the circumstances of the individual case,3 it has been said that “reasonable excuse” should be given a wide construction.4 The Victorian Full Court said in R v Tawill [1974] VR 84; (1973) 22 FLR 284 at 88 (VR), 289–290 (FLR): The words “without reasonable excuse” are words of wide import. We see no reason why defences, answers, justifications or excuses recognised by the established principles governing criminal responsibility, such as absence of mens rea, mistake, insanity, infancy or duress, do not fall within the ordinary grammatical meaning of those words.5 A bona fide mistake of fact or law based on reasonable grounds can amount to a reasonable excuse.6 A witness before the NSW Crime Commission who refused to answer questions on the basis that he feared exposure to a civil penalty was held to have a “reasonable excuse” for failing to answer within the meaning of s 18 of the Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) and that that phrase is not confined to the risk of self-incrimination in criminal or civil proceedings. Further, the issue was whether the witness in fact had a reasonable excuse not whether he expressed a reasonable excuse. Nevertheless, it is appropriate for the decision-maker to put out of mind “imaginary and insubstantial fears or those which, in the practical world, are so remote as to be safely ignored or over-ruled as unreasonable.”7 “Reasonable excuse” has been considered in other contexts.8 Proof of “reasonable excuse” rests upon the accused relying upon it on the balance of probabilities.9 1 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 470 (CLR) per Dawson J.
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2 Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; 90 A Crim R 323; 70 ALJR 960; 139 ALR 386 at 466 (CLR) per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. See also Evans v Hughes [1972] 1 WLR 1452; [1972] 3 All ER 412; 56 Cr App R 813 at 1455 (WLR). 3 Taikato at 464, 478 (CLR). 4 Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417 at 437 (NSWLR) per Kirby P. 5 Duress was held to constitute a “reasonable excuse” in R v Daher [1981] 2 NSWLR 669; (1981) 5 A Crim R 137. Cf R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33; 21 A Crim R 288. 6 Featherstone v Fraser (1983) 6 Petty Sessions Review 2962 per Yeldham J. 7 Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417 at 437, 439 (NSWLR) per Kirby P. 8 Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139; 11 ALR 32; [1904] HCA 38 (refusal of witness to be sworn without reasonable excuse); R v Tawill [1974] VR 84; (1973) 22 FLR 284 at 88 (VR); Lichaa v The Queen (1980) 3 A Crim R 355; R v Daher [1981] 2 NSWLR 669; (1981) 5 A Crim R 137; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; 59 ALJR 620; 15 A Crim R 203 (possession of drugs); Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; 59 ALJR 254; [1985] HCA 6; Kelsey v Hill [1995] 1 Qd R 182; (1994) 74 A Crim R 59 (being found in place reasonably suspected of being used for prostitution); Connors v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 (reasonable excuse for offensive language); Fitzgerald v Montoya (1989) 16 NSWLR 164; 40 A Crim R 105 (wilfully preventing the free passage of a person in a public place); Williams v Osborne (1975) 61 Cr App R 1; R v Lennard [1973] 1 WLR 483; 2 All ER 831; (1973) 57 Cr App R 542 (motorist refusing to provide a specimen). 9 R v Chairman of Parole Board (NT); Ex parte Patterson (1986) 32 A Crim R 266; R v Edwards [1975] QB 27; [1974] 3 WLR 285; [1974] 2 All ER 1085.
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317
Tampering etc with evidence
A person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding: (a) suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding, or (b) fabricates false evidence (other than by perjury or suborning perjury), or (c) knowingly makes use of fabricated false evidence, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [S 317 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 317 COMMENTARY Indictments ....................................................................................................................................... [CA.317.20] Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.317.40] Elements ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.317.60] Element (1) With intent to mislead a judicial tribunal ....................................................................... [CA.317.80] Element (2) In any judicial proceeding ........................................................................................... [CA.317.100] Elements (3) and (4) Suppressed, concealed, destroyed, altered or falsified anything that is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding ......................................................... [CA.317.120]
[CA.317.20]
Indictments
That CD on (date) at (place) in the said State, with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal, namely (specify tribunal eg Local Court at Sydney) in judicial proceedings, namely (specify proceedings eg Police v EF). For an offence under s 317(a) continue: suppressed (concealed, destroyed, altered or falisified) (specify the thing suppressed etc, eg. a witness statement of GH) knowing that it was or may have been required as evidence in any judicial proceedings. For an offence under s 317(b) continue: fabricated false evidence, namely (specify the false evidence eg a witness statement of GH). Note
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[CA.317.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 317
[CA.317.20]
The evidence specified must not amount to perjury or suborning perjury. For commentary on perjury, see s 327. For an offence under s 317(c) continue: knowingly made use of fabricated false evidence (specify the false evidence eg a witness statement of GH). [CA.317.40]
Jurisdiction
For an offence committed before 1 September 1995, the offence is strictly indictable: see s 476(6)(da). If committed after 1 September 1995, the offences in this section are listed in Table 1 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The offences are to be dealt with summarily unless the prosecutor or the accused elect otherwise: s 258(a) and Table 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. If dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty for the offences is two years imprisonment and/or a fine of 100 penalty units: see [CPA.267.20]. [CA.317.60]
Elements
That the accused 1. with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal 2. in any judicial proceedings For the offence in s 317(a): 3. suppressed (concealed, destroyed, altered or falsified) anything 4. that is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding For the offence in s 317(b): 3. fabricates false evidence
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For the offence in s 317(c): 3. knowingly makes use of fabricated false evidence. [CA.317.80]
Element (1) With intent to mislead a judicial tribunal
“Judicial tribunal” is defined in s 311 to mean “a person (including a coroner and an arbitrator), court or body authorised by law, or by consent of parties, to conduct a hearing for the purpose of the determination of any matter or thing and includes a person, court or body authorised to conduct a committal proceeding”. As to an “intent to mislead”, some assistance may be gained by considering cases with respect to perverting the course of justice: see [CA.319.140] below. [CA.317.100]
Element (2) In any judicial proceeding
“Judicial proceeding” is defined in s 311 to mean “a proceeding in or before a judicial tribunal in which evidence may be taken on oath”. It does not appear that it be necessary that any particular judicial proceedings had commenced before it could be found that an accused carried out an act intending to mislead a judicial tribunal in a judicial proceeding. In R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 281 (CLR); 435 (A Crim R), Brennan and Toohey JJ said, with regard to conspiracy to pervert the course of justice: A conspiracy to pervert the course of justice may be entered into though no proceedings before a court or before any other competent judicial authority are then pending (see R v Sharpe [1938] 1 All ER 48 at 51) or are even contemplated by anyone other than the conspirators. A coven of criminals who agree to commit a crime and to mislead the subsequent investigation so that an innocent person will be prosecuted for the crime-to-be-committed are guilty not only of a conspiracy to commit the crime but also of a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by inducing the institution of a false prosecution. At the time of such a conspiracy, no prosecution for the yet-to-be-committed crime could be pending and no prosecution for that crime would be contemplated by anyone other than the conspirators, yet the conspiracy to pervert the course of justice would be complete.
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s 318
Similarly with respect to an offence under s 317, it would appear that contemplation of the judicial proceedings combined with an intent to mislead the tribunal, for example by destroying evidence, would be sufficient to make out these first two elements of the offence. In this regard, it has been held that Div 2 of Pt 7 of the Crimes Act 1900, in which s 317 appears, contains provisions which obviously apply to conduct that pre-empts the institution of proceedings.1 1 DPP v Aydogan (2006) 67 NSWLR 727; [2006] NSWSC 558 at [27].
Elements (3) and (4) Suppressed, concealed, destroyed, altered or falsified anything that is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding
The thing suppressed (or the other conduct that is undertaken) is not limited to items of physical evidence which are to be tendered in evidence. The section applies to any potential evidence whether or not it is tendered in evidence and even if it is not capable of being tendered as evidence.1 1 DPP v Aydogan (2006) 67 NSWLR 727; [2006] NSWSC 558 at [27].
318
Making or using false official instrument to pervert the course of justice
(1) In this section:
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official instrument means an instrument of a kind that is made or issued by a person in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a judicial tribunal. (2) A person who makes a false official instrument, or who makes a copy of an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, with the intention that: (a) he or she or another person will use it to induce another person to accept the instrument as genuine or to accept the copy as a copy of a genuine official instrument, and (b) that acceptance will pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(3) A person who uses an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, or who uses a copy of an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, with the intention: (a) of inducing another person to accept the instrument as genuine or to accept the copy as a copy of a genuine official instrument, and (b) of thereby perverting the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [Subs (3) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(4) Section 250 applies to the interpretation of this section. [Subs (4) subst Act 99 of 2009, Sch 2[23]] [S 318 am Act 99 of 2009; Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 318 COMMENTARY [CA.318.20]
Related Chapter
Chapter 2 of Pt 5 (ss 299–306) relates to false instruments.
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[CA.317.120]
Crimes Act 1900 s 319
319
[CA.319.20]
General offence of perverting the course of justice
A person who does any act, or makes any omission, intending in any way to pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 319 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 319 COMMENTARY Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.319.20] Cross reference ................................................................................................................................ [CA.319.40] Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.319.60] History ............................................................................................................................................... [CA.319.80] Elements ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.319.100] Element (1) Any act or omission .................................................................................................... [CA.319.120] Element (2) With intent to pervert the course of justice ................................................................ [CA.319.140] Sentencing ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.319.160]
[CA.319.20]
Indictment
That AB on .......... at .................................................. in the State of New South Wales, did (describe act or omission) intending thereby to pervert the course of justice. [CA.319.40]
Cross reference
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For the purposes of Pt 11A (Intoxication), an offence under s 319 is an offence of specific intent: see s 428B. [CA.319.60]
Jurisdiction
This offence cannot be dealt with summarily. [CA.319.80]
History
Section 319 applies to offences committed on or after 25 November 1990. While the offence now known as conspiracy to pervert the course of justice is amongst the oldest offence known to the English common law, 1933 saw the earliest reported suggestion that by itself, a wilfully false statement made to a police officer in relation to an actual, alleged or suspected crime might constitute the offence of perverting the course of justice.1 Once established, the offences of perverting the course of justice and attempting to pervert the course of justice2 were substantive offences at common law3 and were indictable common law misdemeanours.4 By s 341, the common law offences of perverting the course of justice, attempting to pervert the course of justice and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice were abolished. However, a charge of conspiracy to commit an offence under s 319 is still available: see s 342.5 For detailed commentary on conspiracy, see [1.265]–[CLP.820]. Specific offences such as hindering investigations (s 315) or tampering with evidence (s 317) cover much of the conduct to which the common law offences applied. 1 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 per McHugh J at 298 (CLR), 448 (A Crim R), referring to R v Manley [1933] 1 KB 529; (1934) 24 Cr App R 25. 2 Sometimes called defeating the due course of justice, interfering with or obstructing the administration or the course of justice and effecting a public mischief.
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3 R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857 at 425 (QB); R v Rowell [1978] 1 WLR 132; [1978] 1 All ER 665; (1977) 65 Cr App R 174 at 138 (WLR), 671 (All ER); R v Machin [1980] 1 WLR 763; [1980] 3 All ER 151; 71 Cr App R 166 at 767 (WLR), 170 (Cr App R); R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 279 (CLR), 433 (A Crim R). 4 R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360; R v Grimes [1968] 3 All ER 179; R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857. 5 Subramaniam v Attorney-General (NSW) (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Barr J, 2 July 1997).
[CA.319.100]
Elements
[CA.319.120]
CA
That the accused (1) did any act or made any omission; (2) with intent in any way to pervert the course of justice. Element (1) Any act or omission
The common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice comprised both objective and subjective elements. The gist of the offence was “the doing of some act which has a tendency and is intended to pervert the administration of public justice”.1 An act has a tendency to pervert the course of justice if it creates a possibility that the course of justice might be perverted.2 Section 319 appears to be broader than the common law offence as it does not require proof that the conduct had any tendency to pervert the course of justice.3 Any relevant act or omission done with the requisite intention will establish the offence regardless of whether it had any prospect in fact of perverting the course of justice.4 In addition, s 312 defines perverting the course of justice as including perverting etc “the course of justice or the administration of the law” – see “The Course of Justice” below.
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“Act or omission” has a wide meaning and includes a series of acts or omissions or conversations5 which can be looked at in aggregate provided they comprise a single course of conduct.6 1 R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360 at 369; R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50 at 609 (CLR). 2 R v Murray [1982] 1 WLR 475; [1982] 2 All ER 225; (1982) 75 Cr App R 58 at 479 (WLR); R v Graham (1985) 20 CCC 210; Foord v Whiddett (1985) 6 FCR 475; 16 A Crim R 464; 60 ALR 269; R v Foord (1986) 20 A Crim R 267; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 277, 280, 294 (CLR), 431, 434, 444 (A Crim R). 3 See Gillies, Criminal Law (3rd ed, 1993), pp 814–816. The broader wording of s 319 seems to be deliberate; it is unlike the equivalent sections in the other jurisdictions: s 43 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth); s 256 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA); s 140Criminal Code (Qld); s 105 Criminal Code (WA); s 117(d) Crimes Act 1961 (NZ). 4 R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; 63 ALR 53 at 51 (NSWLR) (considering s 43 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)). 5 R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50; Foord v Whiddett (1985) 6 FCR 475; 16 A Crim R 464; 60 ALR 269; R v Foord (1986) 20 A Crim R 267. 6 R v Hammersley (1958) 42 Cr App R 207; R v Rowell [1978] 1 WLR 132; [1978] 1 All ER 665; (1977) 65 Cr App R 174; R v Foord (1986) 20 A Crim R 267; Morex Meat Australia Pty Ltd v The Queen [1996] 1 Qd R 418; (1995) 78 A Crim R 269; Subramaniam v Attorney-General (NSW) (unreported, NSW Sup Ct, Barr J, 2 July 1997).
[CA.319.140]
Element (2) With intent to pervert the course of justice
Under s 319, the prosecution must establish an intention to pervert the course of justice. Where an act has an obvious or manifest tendency to pervert the course of justice, proof of an intent to do the act may be readily inferred; where the act does not have such an obvious tendency, an intention to pervert the course of justice must be shown.1 The Crown may establish an intention to “pervert the course of justice” even though the accused has never heard of that expression.2 An intention merely to mislead the police or to deflect or frustrate an investigation is not sufficient, or at least has not been sufficient at common law. The Crown has had to establish that the intention was to
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[CA.319.140]
deflect police from invoking the jurisdiction of a court or some other judicial authority. The intention required must have been directed to pending or possible curial proceedings.3 This may no longer be the case. The extended definition of “pervert the course of justice” in s s 312 includes “the administration of the law” which may have a wider scope. It is not a requirement that the accused had a dishonest or corrupt motive; but while motive is not an element of the offence, it may be very material to the ascertainment of the accused’s intention.4 A number of cases deal with interference or attempted interference with witnesses in, or parties to, curial proceedings. “In the great majority of cases of perverting the course of justice by interfering with a witness the actus reus will be accompanied by unlawful means such as threats, bribery or improper pressure.”5 Obviously, improper conduct such as threats, bribery or unlawful intimidation will mean an offence is committed.6 Any attempt to induce a potential witness to give false evidence or to make a false statement intending to deflect an investigation and prosecution of a possible offence constitutes an attempt to pervert the course of justice.7 “The … question is whether the offence of perverting the course of justice by interfering with a potential witness can be committed where there is no evidence of any bribe, threat, undue pressure or other unlawful means”.8 The answer is that it can in some cases. Some instances involve contempts of court.9 Intimidation in this context does not necessarily mean unlawful threats. For example, an accused who threatens to sue a witness for perjury or for defamation unless the witness alters his/her evidence may be guilty of the offence and regardless of whether the intended evidence was false or whether the accused believed it was false.10
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What is “improper” or “undue” pressure and when is it unlawful? Not every interference with or pressure placed upon a witness constitutes an offence. Reasoned argument to persuade a witness to tell the truth is not criminal.11 But if improper conduct (apart from bribery, threats or intimidation by otherwise unlawful means) are used to coerce the witness, the offence may be committed.12 It may sometimes be difficult to draw the line between permissible persuasion and perversion of the course of justice.13 Any conduct designed to intimidate an accused person to enter a particular plea or a witness to alter his/her evidence, or refrain from giving evidence (that is, to overbear their free choice) is improper conduct and will constitute an offence if accompanied by an intent to pervert the course of justice.14 Such conduct corrupts the processes of the court because witnesses should give their evidence freely, and “truth ascertained only by examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court”.15 A promise or offer of a benefit (other that of for example, payment of legitimate legal expenses) may indicate a design to interfere with a person’s free choice.16 Perverting the course of justice is defined in s 312 as “obstructing, preventing, perverting or defeating the course of justice or the administration of the law”. In R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25, Brennan and Toohey JJ said of the nature of the concept of perverting the course of justice (at 280 (CLR); 434 (A Crim)): The course of justice is perverted (or obstructed) by impairing (or preventing the exercise of) the capacity of a court or competent judicial authority to do justice. The means of perverting the course of justice are various and comprehend: … erosion of the integrity of the court or competent judicial authority, the hindering of access to it, deflecting applications that would be made to it, denying it knowledge of the relevant law or of the true circumstances of the case and impeding the free exercise of its jurisdiction and powers, including the powers of executing its decisions.17 The concept involves any adverse interference with the proper administration of justice.18 The offence includes lying to police to prevent detection, arrest and prosecution,19 bribery of police to hinder prosecution,20 fabrication or concealment of evidence,21 interfering with witnesses by intimidation or bribery,22 inducing witnesses to lie to the police or perjure themselves,23 making false representations to a court to obtain bail,24 improperly attempting to have an accused change her plea,25 attempting to influence a magistrate.26
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Of the nature of the concept of the course of justice, Brennan and Toohey JJ in R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 said (at 280 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R)): The course of justice consists in the due exercise by a court or competent judicial authority of its jurisdiction to enforce, adjust or declare the rights and liabilities of persons subject to the law in accordance with the law and the actual circumstances of the case.27
The course of justice refers to any proceedings before the civil or criminal courts and includes proceedings before any tribunal having authority to enforce, adjust, declare or determine the rights and obligations of the parties and having a duty to act judicially.28 The course of justice does not begin until the jurisdiction of a court or judicial authority is invoked.29 In criminal cases that means when a charge is laid, whether by summons or arrest and charge, and in civil cases, the institution of proceedings.30
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It is well established that conduct prior to the commencement of curial proceedings may constitute an offence if it is intended to deflect the police from prosecution of a criminal offence or instituting disciplinary proceedings before a judicial tribunal.31 The Crown must prove that intention.32 But the Crown does not need to prove that a particular or identifiable offence was in contemplation either by the accused or by investigating officers.33 As mentioned under “Intent” above, it has been held that police investigations per se are not part of the course of justice; neither the police nor other investigative agencies administer justice in the relevant sense34 and that it is not sufficient for the Crown to prove merely an intention to deceive the police.35 Authorities must now be considered in the light of the definition in s 312. In R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25, Mason CJ (at 276 (CLR); 431 (A Crim R)) said that: “it is important to note that the expression ‘the course of justice’ is synonymous with the expression ‘the administration of justice’. In no relevant sense do the police administer justice.” However, the definition in s 312 refers to the “course of justice or the administration of the law”. It is yet to be determined whether this change in expression operates so as to include police investigations or other operations involved in the general administration of the law not normally regarded as part of the course of justice. Conduct after proceedings have concluded may also constitute an offence,36 particularly now given the extended definition in s 312. 1 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 282 (CLR), 435 (A Crim R). 2 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 144 (CLR), 315–316 (A Crim R); Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557. 3 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25. 4 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 144, 159 (CLR), 315, 328 (A Crim R). 5 R v Toney [1993] 1 WLR 364; [1993] 2 All ER 409; (1993) 97 Cr App R 176 at 370 (WLR) per Lloyd LJ. 6 R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857; R v Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468; R v Toney [1993] 1 WLR 364; [1993] 2 All ER 409; (1993) 97 Cr App R 176; Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41. 7 R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857; R v Machin [1980] 1 WLR 763; [1980] 3 All ER 151; 71 Cr App R 166; R v Sinclair (1989) 44 A Crim R 449 at 451. 8 R v Toney [1993] 1 WLR 364; [1993] 2 All ER 409; (1993) 97 Cr App R 176 per Lloyd LJ at 368 (WLR). 9 Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557. Instances include: Attorney-General v Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696; [1962] 3 WLR 819; [1962] 3 All ER 326 – depriving a man of his position in a trade union because he had testified against the union; Chapman v Honig [1963] 2 QB 502; [1963] 3 WLR 19; [1963] 2 All ER 513 – issuing a notice to quit to a tenant because he had given evidence against his landlord. If this action were threatened before the evidence was given, with the intention to intimidate the witness
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Of justice, Brennan and Toohey JJ said (at 280 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R)): Justice, as the law understands it, consists in the enjoyment of rights and the suffering of liabilities by persons who are subject to the law to an extent and in a manner which accords with the law applicable to the actual circumstances of the case.
Crimes Act 1900 s 319
[CA.319.140]
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to alter or withdraw the evidence, it would constitute an attempt to pervert the course of justice, even though the accused was only exercising a legal right and even if he/she believed the intended evidence was false: R v Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468 at 391 (QB). However, in Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 314 (A Crim R) Brennan, Toohey and McHugh JJ said (at 142 (CLR); 314 (A Crim R)) that any conduct constituting a threat to do what might lawfully be done in order to seek a legitimate end will not have a tendency to pervert the course of justice. 10 Shaw v Shaw (1862) 6 LT 477; R v Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468. 11 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 143 (CLR), 315 (A Crim R). 12 R v Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468 at 392–393 (QB); R v Freeman (1985) 3 NSWLR 303; 17 A Crim R 272; Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 143, 148–149, 159 (CLR), 314–315, 319, 328 (A Crim R); Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557. 13 This is especially difficult where the accused offers to pay a party’s expenses if they change their plea or offers to pay a witness if he/she will alter his/her evidence. Criminality will depend on whether the offer was intended to advance the legitimate interests of the party or witness or whether it was motivated by an ulterior motive, such as to protect the accused’s interests or to save embarrassment for the accused or his associates. In many cases, the accused will have several purposes and the jury must determine the “real purpose” in all the circumstances: Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 144 (CLR), 315 (A Crim R); R v Toney [1993] 1 WLR 364; [1993] 2 All ER 409; (1993) 97 Cr App R 176; Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557. 14 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 143, 158–159 (CLR); Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557 (improper pressure by a police officer). There is a “close analogy” between endeavouring to induce an accused to enter a particular plea and attempting to induce witnesses to alter their evidence or refrain from giving it: Meissner per Dawson J at 158 (CLR). 15 R v Taffs [1991] 1 NZLR 69 at 73. 16 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 at 143 (CLR), 315 (A Crim R). 17 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 per Brennan and Toohey JJ at 280 (CLR); 434 (A Crim R); R v Todd [1957] SASR 305 at 328. 18 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41 per Deane J at 148 (CLR), 319 (A Crim R). 19 R v Field (1964) 48 Cr App R 335; R v Debelis (1984) 36 SASR 1. 20 R v Hammersley (1958) 42 Cr App R 207; R v Matthews [1972] VR 3. 21 O’Mealy v Newell 103 ER 382; (1807) 8 East 364; R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360; White v The King (1906) 4 CLR 152; [1906] HCA 53; R v Sharpe [1938] 1 All ER 48; (1938) 26 Cr App R 122; R v Edelsten (1989) 18 NSWLR 213; 45 A Crim R 289; R v Rafique [1993] QB 843; [1993] 3 WLR 617; [1993] 4 All ER 1; R v Allan [1995] 2 VR 468. 22 Bushel v Barrett 171 ER 1074; (1826) Ry & Mood 434; R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857 at 425 (QB); R v Kellett [1976] QB 372; [1975] 3 WLR 713; [1975] 3 All ER 468; Attorney-General (Vic) v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55; (1997) 93 A Crim R 557. 23 R v Sharpe [1938] 1 All ER 48; (1938) 26 Cr App R 122; R v Grimes [1968] 3 All ER 179; R v Andrews [1973] QB 422; 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 1 All ER 857 at 425 (QB). 24 R v Baba [1977] 2 NSWLR 502; Re B [1981] 2 NSWLR 372; R v Freeman (1985) 3 NSWLR 303; 17 A Crim R 272. 25 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41. 26 R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50. 27 Referring to R v Todd [1957] SASR 305 at 328. 28 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 276 (CLR), 431 (A Crim R) per Mason CJ; R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50 (committal proceedings) (not following Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; 15 ALR 241; [1909] HCA 36 and Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415; 46 ALJR 638; [1972] HCA 58); R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360
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32 33 34
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36
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(commercial dispute resolution before arbitrators); R v Edelsten (1989) 18 NSWLR 213; 45 A Crim R 289 (adjournment application); R v Freeman (1985) 3 NSWLR 303; 17 A Crim R 272 (bail application). R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 276, 283, 294, 303 (CLR), 431, 436, 444, 452 (A Crim R). James v Robinson (1963) 109 CLR 593; 37 ALJR 151; [1963] HCA 32 at 606–607 (CLR); R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25. Kalick v The Queen (1920) 55 DLR 104; R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360; R v Kane [1967] NZLR 60; R v Thomas [1979] QB 326; [1979] 2 WLR 144; [1979] 1 All ER 577; R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596; (1985) 16 A Crim R 203; [1985] HCA 50; R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 per Mason CJ at 277 (CLR), 432 (A Crim R), Brennan and Toohey JJ at 283 (CLR), 436 (A Crim R), Deane J at 294 (CLR), 444 (A Crim R), McHugh J at 304–305 (CLR), 452 (A Crim R); R v Allan [1995] 2 VR 468. Obvious examples are attempts to destroy evidence before police are involved: R v Rafique [1993] QB 843; [1993] 3 WLR 617; [1993] 4 All ER 1, or to tamper with material which might become evidence in possible future proceedings: R v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360; R v Murray [1982] 1 WLR 475; [1982] 2 All ER 225; (1982) 75 Cr App R 58; R v Sharpe [1938] 1 All ER 48; (1938) 26 Cr App R 122; R v Britton [1973] RTR 502. An agreement to bribe police to provide protection for illegal abortions the accused intended to carry out constituted a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice; R v G [1974] 1 NSWLR 31. Failing to administer a breath test after an accident may be an offence if not administered because the driver was a fellow police officer who the accused did not want to charge; R v Ward & Hollister [1995] Crim LR 398. R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25. R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 per Mason CJ at 278 (CLR), 432 (A Crim R), Brennan and Toohey JJ at 286 (CLR), 439 (A Crim R), Deane J at 294 (CLR), 445 (A Crim R). R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 276, 283, 293, 302 (CLR), 431, 436, 444, 451 (A Crim R). Traffic records at the Motor Registry do not form part of the administration of justice so that altering the records does not constitute an offence: R v Selvage [1982] QB 372; [1981] 3 WLR 811; [1982] 1 All ER 96. But it may be otherwise if their use in pending or possible criminal proceedings was contemplated. R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 per Brennan and Toohey JJ at 284 (CLR), 437 (A Crim R), Deane J at 294 (CLR), 444 (A Crim R), McHugh J at 307 (CLR), 454 (A Crim R). The distinction between intending to mislead the police and intending to adversely affect possible curial proceedings may be of little practical significance as most police investigations are directed toward possible criminal proceedings: per McHugh J at 310 (CLR). In R v Todd [1957] SASR 305, the accused drove his car into a river and abandoned it to create the impression that he had drowned. He lied to the police when first questioned. This conduct was not held to constitute an attempt to pervert the course of justice because police investigations are not part of the course of justice. Todd should now be looked at having regard to the extended definition of “perverting the course of justice” in s 312. White v The King (1906) 4 CLR 152; [1906] HCA 53 (sending petition to Chief Justice after conviction claiming innocence). Proceedings before the Parole Board are part of the course of justice: R v Machirus [1996] 3 NZLR 404. In R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268; 60 A Crim R 429; [1992] HCA 25 at 306 (CLR), 453 (A Crim R), McHugh J considered the extent to which the course of justice extends beyond particular proceedings and includes the general continuing process of the course of justice.
[CA.319.160]
Sentencing
The Court of Criminal Appeal has given detailed consideration to sentencing in a case where an attempt to pervert the course of justice was doomed to failure: R v Taouk (1992) 65 A Crim R 387.1 The fact that an offender is directly involved in the administration of justice, whether as a police officer or otherwise, is a relevant factor on sentence even if the attempted act was not committed as part of that occupation.2 1 See also Marinellis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 307. 2 R v Nguyen (2004) 149 A Crim R 343; [2004] NSWCCA 332.
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[CA.319.160]
Crimes Act 1900 s 320
[CA.321.20]
DIVISION 3 – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL OFFICERS, WITNESSES, JURORS ETC 320
Extended meaning of “giving evidence”
In this Division, a reference to the giving of evidence includes a reference to the production of anything to be used as evidence. [S 320 reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
321
Corruption of witnesses and jurors
(1) A person who confers or procures or offers to confer or procure or attempt to procure any benefit on or for any person: (a) intending to influence any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or (b) intending to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding or to not attend as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not, and intending to pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.
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[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A person who solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for himself or herself or any other person: (a) in consideration for any agreement or undertaking that any person will as a witness in any judicial proceeding give false evidence or withhold true evidence or not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or (b) on account of anything to be done or omitted to be done by him or her or another person as a juror in any judicial proceeding, or on account of his or her or another person’s not attending as a juror in any judicial proceeding, intending to pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]] [S 321 am Act 94 of 1999; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 321 COMMENTARY [CA.321.20]
Generally
A person to be called as a witness in judicial proceedings: see par [CA.322.40] hereunder. 322
Threatening or intimidating judges, witnesses, jurors etc
A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any person: (a) intending to influence a person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or
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Part 7 – Public justice offences Division 3 – Interference with judicial officers, witnesses, jurors etc
s 323
(b)
intending to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding or to not attend as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not, or (c) intending to influence any person in the person’s conduct as a judicial officer, or (d) intending to influence any person in the person’s conduct as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.
CA
[S 322 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 322 COMMENTARY Terms defined ................................................................................................................................... [CA.322.20] Generally .......................................................................................................................................... [CA.322.40] Sentence ........................................................................................................................................... [CA.322.60]
[CA.322.20]
Terms defined
A person to be called as a witness in judicial proceedings: see [CA.322.40] hereunder. For the meaning of “causes” see [CLP.80].
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[CA.322.40]
Generally
A person to be called as a witness in judicial proceedings: In R v Lansdell (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 March 1995) Gleeson CJ said (at p 7) in relation to that phrase: Where it is objectively likely that a person, because of her involvement in relevant events, will be a witness in future legal proceedings, and that likelihood is known to (and, a fortiori, intended by) someone who thereupon sets out to influence her evidence, or her conduct, in one of the ways described in the section, then the requirements of the provision are satisfied. It is not only witnesses who are called in the proceedings that fall within the provision.1 1 R v Lansdell (unreported, CCA (NSW), 30 March 1995) at p 6.
[CA.322.60]
Sentence
In R v Schaffer [2005] NSWCCA 193 the court noted that an offence of threatening a magistrate was an “offence that strikes at the very heart of the administration of justice which the courts must dispense in an orderly fashion. It is necessary that conduct of the kind displayed by the applicant should be appropriately denounced in that the authority of the courts is vindicated rather than undermined”. A full-time custodial penalty was therefore found to be appropriate.1 1 R v Schaffer [2005] NSWCCA 193 at [23]. See also R v Jaques [2002] NSWCCA 444.
323
Influencing witnesses and jurors
A person who does any act: (a) intending to procure, persuade, induce or otherwise cause any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce any thing in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or
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Crimes Act 1900 s 323
[CA.323.20] (b)
intending, other than by the production of evidence and argument in open court, to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years. [S 323 reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 323 COMMENTARY [CA.323.20]
Generally
The intention required to make out s 323(a) might be a dual intention. It might be an intention of hindering an investigation (an offence against s 315) and also an intention, if that person is to be called as a witness, to induce that person to give false evidence. “The giving of false information to police may be a first step on the way to giving false evidence. Further, it is a mistake to assume that the person to whom the suggestion is made is necessarily to be a witness called by the prosecution. The offence is also committed where the intention is to induce the person to give false evidence as a defence witness.”1 There is nothing within s 323(a) to indicate a legislative intent that it is only a witness, or an intended witness, for the prosecution, who is to come within the purview of the section.2 1 R v Waskin (2003) 141 A Crim R 1 at 5. 2 R v Reid [1999] NSWCCA 355 at [26].
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324
Increased penalty if serious indictable offence involved
A person who commits an offence against section 321, 322 or 323 (offences concerning interference with witnesses, jurors, judicial officers and public justice officials) intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 324 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45] and [70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
325
Preventing, obstructing or dissuading witness or juror from attending etc
(1) A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades a person called as a witness in any judicial proceeding from attending as a witness or from producing anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (1A) A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades another person who the person believes may be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding from attending the proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [Subs (1A) insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[9]]
(2) A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades a person summoned as a juror in any judicial proceeding from attending as a juror is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 325 am Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[9]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
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[CA.326.20] 326
s 327
Reprisals against judges, witnesses, jurors etc
(1) A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any person on account of anything lawfully done by a person: (a) as a witness or juror in any judicial proceeding, or (b) as a judicial officer, or (c) as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding, is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to another person because the person believes the other person will or may be or may have been called as a witness, or will or may serve or may have served as a juror, in any judicial proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (2) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]; insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[10]]
(3) For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether the accused acted wholly or partly for a reason specified in subsection (1) or (2). [Subs (3) insrt Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[10]] [S 326 am Act 94 of 1999; Act 23 of 1995, s 3 and Sch 1.2[10]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 133 of 1986, s 4; reinsrt Act 184 of 1983, s 3 and Sch 1; rep Act 31 of 1951, s 5]
SECTION 326 COMMENTARY [CA.326.20]
In conjunction with a judicial proceeding
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If a plea of guilty is procured by pressure and threats and not in the exercise of free choice the course of justice is perverted.1 The meaning of the phrase “in connection with” depends on the context in which it is used. In s 326 the degree of connection between the conduct of the public justice official and judicial proceedings should be of a similar quality to the relationship between a witness, a juror and a judicial officer in any such proceedings. The scope and purpose of the statute requires a close connection with the judicial proceedings. It requires some form of possible impingement on the conduct of a public justice official with respect to the proper conduct of the judicial proceedings. As such threats made to an arresting police officer do not have the potential to so affect the conduct of the judicial proceedings and are therefore not “in connection with” such proceedings.2 1 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; (1995) 80 A Crim R 308; [1995] HCA 41. 2 R v Orcher (1999) 48 NSWLR 273; NSWCCA 356.
DIVISION 4 – PERJURY, FALSE STATEMENTS ETC 327
Offence of perjury
(1) Any person who in or in connection with any judicial proceeding makes any false statement on oath concerning any matter which is material to the proceeding, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, is guilty of perjury and liable to imprisonment for 10 years. [Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
(2) A statement can be considered to have been made in connection with a judicial proceeding whether or not a judicial proceeding has commenced, or ever commences, in connection with it. (3) The determination of whether a statement is material to a judicial proceeding that has not
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[Subs (1) am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[70]]
Crimes Act 1900 s 327
[CA.327.20]
commenced is to be made on the basis of any judicial proceeding likely to arise in connection with the statement. (4) The question of whether any matter is material to a proceeding is a question of law. [S 327 am Act 94 of 1999; subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 327 COMMENTARY Acquittal ............................................................................................................................................ [CA.327.20] Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.327.40] Joint trials ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.327.80] “Judicial proceeding” ...................................................................................................................... [CA.327.100] “An oath” ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.327.120] Jurisdiction ...................................................................................................................................... [CA.327.140] Materiality of statement .................................................................................................................. [CA.327.160] Statement wilfully false ................................................................................................................... [CA.327.180] Corroboration and evidence ........................................................................................................... [CA.327.200] Other matters .................................................................................................................................. [CA.327.220]
[CA.327.20]
Acquittal
An acquittal under s 328 does not of itself render unsafe and unsatisfactory conviction under s 327.1 1 MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70.
[CA.327.40]
Indictment
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As to indictments for perjury, see Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 at [4.16370].1 1 See also R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473; 27 A Crim R 271.
[CA.327.80]
Joint trials
As to joint trials in cases of perjury, see s 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.327.100]
“Judicial proceeding”
As to “judicial proceeding”, see s 311. [CA.327.120]
“An oath”
“On oath” includes every affirmation or declaration which any class of persons are permitted by law to make in place of an oath: Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. As to declarations or affirmations in lieu of oaths, see s 13 of the Oaths Act 1900. As to the manner of taking an oath, see s 11A of the Oaths Act 1900. As to authority to administer an oath, see s 79 of the Interpretation Act 1987. Schedule 3 Pt 4 cl 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 provides that there is a presumption that there is authority to administer an oath or take a declaration or affirmation. A person who gives evidence apparently on oath cannot later take the objection that the oath which he or she took was not binding on her or his conscience.1 If a witness is sworn and gives evidence, it is not necessary to swear her or him again after an adjournment, and perjury may be assigned upon the evidence given by her or him after such adjournment.2 Where the only proof that the accused had been sworn was the deposition itself bearing the accused’s signature and the magistrate’s signature to the jurat, it was held on proof of these signatures that the deposition was sufficient evidence against the accused that he had been duly sworn.3
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[CA.327.160]
s 327
In every case of perjury there must be two factors – one, a tribunal or person competent to administer the oath; the second, a person competent to take the oath.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R R R R R R R
v v v v v v v
Deleph Sing (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 81. Hammond (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 42. Richards (1861) Wilkinson’s Magistrate, 7th ed p 274. Kilkenny (1890) 16 VLR 139 per Hodges J. See also R v Sossi [1986] WAR 163; (1985) 17 A Crim R 405. Clegg (1868) 19 LT 47. See also R v Kilkenny (1890) 16 VLR 139. Shaw (1911) 6 Cr App R 103. Singh (Pritam) [1958] 1 WLR 143; 1 All ER 199; (1957) 42 Cr App R 44.
[CA.327.140]
Jurisdiction
By virtue of s 475A of this Act an offence under s 327 may in certain circumstances be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction. [CA.327.160]
Materiality of statement
It has been said that the statement made by the accused must be an assertion of fact not opinion.1
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Any statement which goes directly or indirectly to prove an issue is material.2 A statement may be material though it relates to a mere circumstance if it induces the tribunal to believe the substantial portion of the accused’s evidence.3 Evidence given by which the court is induced to allow other material evidence may itself be material,4 even though the former evidence was not strictly admissible,5 or was withdrawn by counsel.6 False answers to questions in cross-examination directed to credit may be material.7 Evidence given by an accused person after conviction with a view to mitigation of sentence may be material,8 as may be evidence of name,9 address,10 or occupation.11 Evidence so collateral as to be almost irrelevant is not sufficient to found perjury.12 The determination of the question of what is material is a question of law.13 That means that it is a matter to be determined by the judge alone.14 1 R v Schlesinger (1847) 10 QB 670; R v Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Reports 619. See also R v Dent (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 544; 29 WN (NSW) 124. 2 R v Lewis (1914) 10 Tas LR 48; R v Davies (1974) 7 SASR 375; R v Dobos (1984) 58 ACTR 10; 13 A Crim R 306; R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473; 27 A Crim R 271. 3 R v Tyson (1867) LR 1 CCR 107; R v Griepe (1697) 1 Ld Raym 256; R v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod Rep 192; R v Millward [1985] QB 519; (1985) 80 Cr App R 280. 4 R v Phillpotts (1851) 5 Cox CC 363. 5 R v Yates (1841) Car & M 132; R v Dunston (1824) Ry & Mood 109. 6 R v Phillpotts (1851) 5 Cox CC 363; R v Gibbon (1862) Le & Ca 109. 7 R v Overton (1843) 4 QB 83; R v Lavey (1850) 3 Car & Kir 26; R v Baker [1895] 1 QB 797. 8 R v Hewitt (1913) 9 Cr App R 192; R v Wheeler [1917] 1 KB 283; (1916) 12 Cr App R 159. 9 R v Mullany (1865) Le & Ca 593. 10 R v Lewis (1914) 10 Tas LR 48. 11 R v Swift (1877) Knox 325. See also R v Cohen (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 348. 12 R v Holden (1872) 12 Cox CC 166. Compare R v Altass (1844) 1 Cox CC 17; R v Southwood (1858) 1 F & F 356. 13 See s 327(4). 14 R v Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 at [119].
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A person who is not a competent witness and who is sworn by mistake is not lawfully sworn5 nor is a person sworn at an informal meeting of justices who had no authority to administer the oath.6 Where the court administers an affirmation to a person who has not objected to being sworn according to his religion, that person has not been lawfully sworn.7
Crimes Act 1900 s 327
[CA.327.10]
[CA.327.180] Statement wilfully false It has been held that the statement which forms the subject of the perjury charge must be made deliberately, intentionally and not through inadvertence or mistake or because the accused was taken by surprise.1“An honest mistake, inadvertence, carelessness or a misunderstanding leading to a statement which is objectively untrue is not enough”.2 A statement is made wilfully if the person making it either knows it is false or does not believe it to be true,3 even if, in fact, it is true.4 A statement by an accused as to her or his belief may amount to perjury.5 For general commentary as to the meaning of “wilfully”, see [CLP.80].
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1 R v Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Reports 619; R v Stolady (1859) 1 F & F 518. Compare R v London (1871) 24 LT 232. See also R v Lowe [1917] VLR 155; MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70. 2 R v Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 per Kirby J at [133]. See also MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; 71 ALJR 91; 90 A Crim R 468; 141 ALR 70 at 373–374 (CLR), 487–488 (A Crim R). 3 R v Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Reports 619. Also, Gordon v Mangelsdorf (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 438 (NSW Sup Ct, Brereton J). 4 Ockley and Whitlesbye’s Case (1622) Palm 294; Allen v Westley (1629) Het 97. 5 R v Pedley (1784) 1 Leach 325; R v Schlesinger (1847) 10 QB 670. Compare R v Crespigny (1795) 1 Esp 280.
[CA.327.200] Corroboration and evidence “To establish a charge of perjury there must be two witnesses to disprove a material fact sworn to by the prisoner, or evidence must be given of a material circumstance corroborating the testimony of a single witness to the same effect.”1 The corroboration need not necessarily be the evidence of another witness, but it must amount to more than probability: it must be evidence showing that on the particular occasion concerning which he or she is alleged to have sworn falsely, something occurred which shows he or she did swear falsely, and the evidence of other witnesses as to what occurred on similar occasions will be irrelevant as corroborative evidence.2 Where on a trial for perjury the only evidence of the falsity of the matter sworn was that given by a constable, who deposed that the accused had made statements contradicting what she had previously sworn was false, and had signed a written statement containing that admission, it was held that there was sufficient evidence of perjury to go to the jury.3 A letter written by an accused contradicting his sworn evidence may be sufficient corroboration,4 as may a clear statement made by him directly contrary to his sworn testimony.5 However, sworn statements before a court of petty sessions different from the evidence given at the trial are not in themselves sufficient corroboration.6 It is not necessary to prove every necessary fact by two witnesses, but there must be something more than the evidence of one witness.7 If two contradictory statements on oath have been made by the accused, and the jury are of opinion that one of such statements was wilfully false, but they cannot say which, they may specially so find: s 331. Where the alleged false statement is made at a trial, the practice is to prove the deposition, or call the shorthand writer to give evidence as to what the witness said. It seems that a person present at the trial may give evidence of what the accused said.8 Statements made by the judge, magistrate or justice before whom the perjury is committed are not admissible on the trial for perjury.9 It is not necessary to produce the judge’s notes, which are not the best evidence of what took place at the trial, and are not admissible except to refresh the memory of the judge if called as a witness.10 The notes or minutes of the clerk of the court are in the same position, and are of no greater authority than those of a shorthand writer or other person who took a note of the evidence.11 Judges of superior courts should not be called12 but there appears to be no reason why judges or magistrates of inferior courts should not be called to prove their notes.13 1 R v Muldoon (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 116. See also R v Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976; [1990] 2 All ER 966; (1990) 91 Cr App R 279.
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2 R v Hall (1890) 16 VLR 503. See also R v Cameron (1877) 3 VLR (L) 85; R v Allsop (1899) 24 VLR 812; R v Linehan [1921] VLR 582; R v Muldoon (1870) 9 SCR (NSW) 116. See also R v Townley (1986) 24 A Crim R 76. 3 R v Sumner [1935] VLR 197. 4 R v Mayhew (1834) 6 Car & P 315; R v Threlfall (1914) 10 Cr App R 112. Compare R v Boulter (1852) 5 Cox CC 543. 5 R v Hook (1858) Dears & Bell 606; R v Knill (1822) 2 B & Ald 929n. See also R v Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976; [1990] 2 All ER 966; (1990) 91 Cr App R 279. 6 R v Wheatland (1838) 8 Car & P 238; R v Hughes (1844) 1 Car & Kir 519; R v Jackson (1823) 1 Lew 270. 7 R v Roberts (1848) 2 Car & Kir 607; R v Parker (1842) Car & M 639. 8 R v Sunda Khan (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 29. 9 R v Britton (1893) 17 Cox CC 627. 10 R v Child (1851) 5 Cox CC 197; R v Morgan (1852) 6 Cox CC 107. 11 R v Newall (1852) 6 Cox CC 21. 12 R v Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595. 13 R v Harvey (1858) 8 Cox CC 99.
[CA.327.220]
Other matters
An indictment for perjury alleged to have been committed upon the trial of a civil action is usually not tried until the civil action is determined.1 A stay of proceedings was granted where a charge of perjury was laid against witnesses in a pending equity suit.2
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No civil action lies with respect of evidence (although false and malicious) given by witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings: this principle extends to prevent the maintenance of an action for conspiracy by an unsuccessful litigant against witnesses whom he or she alleges to have conspired together to give false evidence.3 1 Goldsmith v Pinnock (1890) 4 QLJ 17; R v Smyth (1882) 8 VLR (L) 141. 2 Ex parte Cooper (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 143. 3 Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130. See also R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256; 51 A Crim R 89. Compare R v Jurca (1986) 6 NSWLR 491; 23 A Crim R 439.
328
Perjury with intent to procure conviction or acquittal
Any person who commits perjury intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 328 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45] and [70]; subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 328 COMMENTARY [CA.328.20]
General
An accused person giving evidence on his own behalf may be charged under this section.1 It is sufficient to show that the accused’s purpose in committing perjury is to procure a conviction for a particular crime and that he knew of such crime: it is not necessary to prove that he knew the maximum penalty for that crime.2 1 R v Dean (1896) 17 LR (NSW) 35; 12 WN (NSW) 80. 2 R v Dodd [1985] 2 Qd R 277.
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Part 7 – Public justice offences Division 4 – Perjury, false statements etc
[CA.328.20]
Crimes Act 1900 s 329
329
[CA.330.20]
Conviction for false swearing on indictment for perjury
If on the trial of a person for perjury the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of perjury but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury) it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 329 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); am Act 31 of 1951]
330
False statement on oath not amounting to perjury
A person who makes on oath any false statement knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, if it is not perjury, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 330 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 330 COMMENTARY Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ [CA.330.20] Joint trials ......................................................................................................................................... [CA.330.40] Related legislation ............................................................................................................................ [CA.330.60]
[CA.330.20]
Jurisdiction
Under certain circumstances, an offence under s 330 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. [CA.330.40]
Joint trials
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As to joint trials for false swearing, see s 164 (formerly s 123) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [CA.330.60]
Related legislation
Various sections of the Oaths Act 1900 relate to oaths, declarations, etc. 331
Contradictory statements on oath
If on the trial of a person for perjury or for an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury): (a) the trier of fact is satisfied that the accused has made 2 statements on oath and one is irreconcilably in conflict with the other, and (b) the trier of fact is satisfied that one of the statements was made by the accused knowing it was false or not believing it was true but the trier of fact cannot say which statement was so made, the trier of fact may make a special finding to that effect and find the accused guilty of perjury or of an offence under section 330, as appropriate, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly. [S 331 am Act 57 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 3[3]; subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
332
Certain technical defects provided for
If on the trial of a person for perjury or for an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury): (a) any affidavit, deposition, examination or declaration offered in evidence is wrongly entitled or otherwise informal or defective, or
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[CA.333.20]
s 335
(b) the jurat to any such instrument is informal or defective, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal because of the omission, defect or informality but the instrument (if otherwise admissible) may be given in evidence and used for all purposes of the trial. [S 332 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
333
Subornation of perjury
(2) A person who commits subornation of perjury intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years. [S 333 am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[45] and [70]; reinsrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); rep Act 149 of 1985, s 5 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 333 COMMENTARY [CA.333.20]
General
Acts by the accused inconsistent with his belief in the truth of his defence may be given in evidence against him: for example, that he had induced a witness to give false evidence.1 As to “otherwise causes”, see “causes” at [CLP.80]. 1 R v Watt (1905) 20 Cox CC 852.
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334
General provisions applicable to perjury and false statement offences
It is immaterial for the purposes of this Division: (a) whether a statement on oath is given orally or in writing, or (b) which forms and ceremonies are used in administering the oath (or otherwise binding the person giving the testimony to speak the truth) so long as the person assents to the forms and ceremonies actually used, or (c) whether (in the case of a statement made in a judicial proceeding) the judicial tribunal concerned is properly constituted or held in the proper place or not, so long as it actually acts as a judicial tribunal in the proceeding in which the statement is made, or (d) whether the person who makes the statement is a competent witness or not, or whether the statement is admissible in the proceeding or not, or (e) in the case of judicial proceedings in an arbitration, whether the law governing the arbitration agreement or the proceedings, or any other relevant law, is or is not the law of New South Wales. [S 334 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
335
False statements in evidence on commission
If a person, in giving any testimony (either orally or in writing) otherwise than on oath, when required to do so by an order under section 33 (Power of the Supreme Court to give effect to application for assistance) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, makes any statement that is false in a material particular, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 335 am Act 27 of 1995, s 4 and Sch 1; subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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(1) A person who procures, persuades, induces or otherwise causes a person to give false testimony the giving of which is perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury and liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
Crimes Act 1900 s 336
[CA.335.20]
SECTION 335 COMMENTARY [CA.335.20]
Jurisdiction
Under certain circumstances an offence under s 335 may be dealt with by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction: s 475A. 336
False entry on public register
(1) A person who for an improper purpose makes a statement for the making of an entry in any register kept by a public officer for a public purpose, knowing the statement to be false or misleading in a material particular, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) A person who for an improper purpose makes an entry in any register kept by a public officer for a public purpose, knowing the entry to be false or misleading in a material particular, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 336 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); am Act 50 of 1974, s 7]
337
False instruments issued by public officers
A public officer who, being authorised or required to issue an instrument whereby any person may be prejudicially affected, issues the instrument for an improper purpose knowing it to be false in a material particular is liable to imprisonment for 5 years. [S 337 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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338
Restrictions on prosecutions for perjury
(1) A person is not to be prosecuted for perjury except: (a) by the Director of Public Prosecutions, or (b) at the direction of the Attorney General, or (c) by any other person with leave of the judicial officer who constituted the judicial tribunal before which the perjury is alleged to have been committed. (2) If it is impossible or impracticable to apply for leave to prosecute in accordance with subsection (1)(c), the prosecution may be instituted with leave of the Supreme Court. (3) A person is not to be prosecuted for perjury (except by the Director of Public Prosecutions or at the direction of the Attorney General) unless notice of the proposed prosecution has been given to the Director of Public Prosecutions. [S 338 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); reinsrt Act 64 of 1988, s 4 and Sch 2(1); rep Act 31 of 1951, s 2]
SECTION 338 COMMENTARY [CA.338.20]
Application for leave
Upon an application to a judicial officer for leave, it is the duty of that officer to decide whether the applicant is acting bona fide and not whether there is a prima facie case.1 The nature of proceedings for leave to prosecute has received detailed judicial consideration.2 1 Goldsbrough & Co v MacMahon (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 119. 2 Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48; (1989) 45 A Crim R 1.
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[CA.340.20]
339
s 341
Application of Division to perjury under other Acts
Any false oath declared by any Act to be perjury or made punishable as perjury by any Act is to be considered to be perjury for the purposes of this Act. [S 339 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
340
Extent of abolition of offences
The offences at common law abolished by this Division are abolished for all purposes not relating to offences committed before the commencement of this Part (as substituted by the Crimes (Public Justice) Amendment Act 1990). [S 340 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); am Act 273 of 1987; Act 58 of 1987; Act 53 of 1980; Act 166 of 1978, s 5 and Sch 1; Act 31 of 1951, s 2; Act 10 of 1924, s 11]
SECTION 340 COMMENTARY [CA.340.20]
“This Part”
“This Part” commenced on 25 November 1990.
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341
Certain common law offences abolished
The following offences at common law are abolished: • the offence of perverting the course of justice, • the offence of attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice, • the offence of falsely accusing a person of a crime or of procuring a person to falsely accuse a person of a crime, • the offence of concealing evidence so that a person is falsely accused of a crime, • the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice by assisting a person to avoid arrest, • the offence of persuading a person to make a false statement to police to mislead them in their investigation, • the offence of procuring a person to make a false accusation, • the offence of misprision of felony, • the offence of compounding a felony, • the offence of dissuading, intimidating or preventing, or attempting to dissuade, intimidate or prevent, a person who is bound to give evidence in a criminal matter from doing so, • the offence of using threats or persuasion to witnesses to induce them not to appear or give evidence in courts of justice, • the offence of perjury, • the offence of embracery (attempting to corrupt, influence or instruct a jury or to induce a jury to favour one side more than the other), • personating a juror. [S 341 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2); am Act 53 of 1980; Act 31 of 1951; Act 2 of 1929; Act 10 of 1924]
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DIVISION 5 – MISCELLANEOUS
Crimes Act 1900 s 342 342
[CA.342.20] Certain conspiracy offences not affected
The abolition of the common law offence of conspiring to pervert the course of justice does not prevent a prosecution for an offence of conspiring to commit an offence against this Part. [S 342 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 342 COMMENTARY [CA.342.20]
Certain conspiracy offences not affected
For detailed commentary on conspiracy, see [1.265]–[CLP.820]. 343
Certain common law offences not abolished
To remove any doubt, it is declared that the following offences at common law are not abolished by this Division: (a) the offence of escaping from lawful custody, (b) the offence of assisting a person to escape from lawful custody, (c) the offence of refusing to assist a peace officer in the execution of his or her duty in preventing a breach of the peace. [S 343 subst Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
SECTION 343 COMMENTARY [CA.343.20]
Related commentary
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For commentary in relation to common law offence of escaping from lawful custody, see [CA.310D.60]. 343A
Saving of other punishments
Nothing in this Part prevents or affects any other punishment, or any forfeiture, provided under any Act. [S 343A insrt Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
PART 8 – UNLAWFUL GAMBLING [REPEALED] [Pt 8 heading rep Act 38 of 2007, s 3 and Sch 2[23]] [Pt 8 reinsrt Act 113 of 1998, s 59 and Sch 2.4; rep Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)] [Pt 8 reinsrt Act 113 of 1998, s 59 and Sch 2.4; rep Act 51 of 1990, s 3 and Sch 1(2)]
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s 344A
PART 8A – ATTEMPTS [Pt 8A insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 7]
344A
Attempts
(2) Where a person is convicted of an attempt to commit an offence and the offence concerned is a serious indictable offence the person shall be deemed to have been convicted of a serious indictable offence. [Subs (2) amAct 147 of 1997, s 3 and Sch 3.11[5]] [S 344A am Act 94 of 1999, s 5 and Sch 3[29]; Act 147 of 1997; insrt Act 50 of 1974, s 7]
SECTION 344A COMMENTARY Application of section ..................................................................................................................... [CA.344A.20] The nature and rationale of the offence of attempt ....................................................................... [CA.344A.40] Meaning of “attempt” ...................................................................................................................... [CA.344A.60] What does and does not constitute attempt? ................................................................................ [CA.344A.80] Commission of intended offence factually impossible ................................................................. [CA.344A.100] The role of the trial judge and the role of the jury concerning attempt ....................................... [CA.344A.120] Verdicts – attempts and completed offences ............................................................................... [CA.344A.140]
[CA.344A.20]
Application of section
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As far as practicable s 344A applies to all offences and all courts: Second Schedule. [CA.344A.40]
The nature and rationale of the offence of attempt
Attempt is an inchoate common law offence (like conspiracy and inciting another to commit an offence), that is to say, one which is incomplete. At common law all attempts to commit a crime, whether (what were formerly) felonies or misdemeanours, are indictable misdemeanours unless there is a statutory provision that the particular attempt is a crime.1 Both the Crimes Act 1900 and the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 contain provisions expressly proscribing attempts at particular conduct.2 Section 344A(1) gives statutory recognition to the common law offence of attempt and equates the penalty for attempt to that provided for the substantive offence. Section 344A(2) alters the common law position that attempts are common law misdemeanours by providing that if the substantive offence itself is a serious indictable offence, then an attempt to commit that offence is itself a serious indictable offence. This has consequences in relation to the doctrine of merger of a common law misdemeanour for attempt in the felony of the actual committed offence, see [CA.344A.140] below. As to the rationale of making attempts themselves criminal, it has been said that “[t]he main justification for the retention of inchoate offences is the need to permit the law to impose criminal sanctions in certain cases where a crime has been contemplated but not in fact committed”.3 This rationale is considered in greater detail below at [CA.344A.100]. Attempts to commit some offences may be tried summarily, see Pt 5 of Table 1 and Pt 7 of Table 2 of Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 1 R v Grassby (1991) 55 A Crim R 419 at 433 per Allen J quoting Archbold, Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (35th ed, 1962), par 4101. The offence of attempt at common law was abolished in England by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (UK). At common law an attempt to commit a misdemeanour was a misdemeanour, whether the offence is created by statute, or was an offence at common law: R v Roderick (1837) 7 Car & P 795;
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(1) Subject to this Act, any person who attempts to commit any offence for which a penalty is provided under this Act shall be liable to that penalty.
Crimes Act 1900 s 344A
[CA.344A.40]
173 ER 347 per Parke B; R v Scofield (1784) Cald Mag Cas 397; Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929; (1986) 23 A Crim R 254 at 932 (VR), 258 (A Crim R) per Murphy J. For commentary as to the common law offence of attempt, see [CLO.320]. 2 For example, under the Crimes Act 1900, attempts to murder (ss 27 – 30), see [CA.27.20]ff, [CA.28.40] – [CA.28.120], [CA.29.40]ff, [CA.30.40] – [CA.30.80]; attempts to discharge loaded arms with intention to do grievous bodily harm etc (s 33); attempts to commit sexual offences (ss 61P, 66B) and others; attempts to dispose of stolen property (s 188). There are many others. Proscribed attempts under the Drug Misuse and Traffıcking Act 1985 include attempts to administer a prohibited drug (ss 12, 13). The definition of “supply” under that Act in s 4 includes “attempting” to do any of the the things which constitute supply. 3 English Law Commission in its report on Criminal Law: Attempt and Impossibility in relation to Attempt Conspiracy and Incitement Report No 102 (1980), p 6.
[CA.344A.60]
Meaning of “attempt”
In Australian jurisdictions having Criminal Codes, as in England, there are statutory definitions of “attempt”.1 There is no statutory definition of “attempt” in New South Wales. A criminal attempt was described by Parke B in R v Eagleton (1854) Dears CC 515; 169 ER 826 at 538 (Dears CC), 835 (ER) as follows, [t]he mere intention to commit a misdemeanour is not criminal. Some act is required, and we do not think that all acts towards committing a misdemeanour are indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are.
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To constitute an attempt, an accused must have a criminal intent and perform some sufficiently overt act or acts towards the carrying out of that intent. Hunt CJ at CL in R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371; 60 A Crim R 49 at 59 (A Crim R) (Enderby and Allen JJ agreeing) said an attempt to commit a crime has been proved if the Crown establishes: (i) that the accused intended to do the acts with the relevant state of mind which together would comprise the intended crime; and (ii) that, with that intention, he did some act towards the commission of that crime which went beyond mere preparation and which cannot reasonably be regarded as having any purpose other than the commission of that crime.2 The accused must have the intention to commit the substantive offence; recklessness or som