Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton 1783272988, 9781783272983

Table of contents :
Frontcover
Contents
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgements
List of Contributors
Foreword
Andrew Ayton: A Brief Tribute
Andrew Ayton: A Recognition of his Work
Abbreviations
1 ‘Big and Beautiful’. Destriers in Edward I’s Armies
2 Cum Equis Discoopertis: The ‘Irish’ Hobelar in the English
Armies of the Fourteenth Century
3 Andrew Ayton, the Military Community and the Evolution of
the Gentry in Fourteenth-Century England
4 Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status,
c. 1270–c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I
5 Sir Henry de Beaumont and His Retainers: The Dynamics of a Lord’s
Military Retinues and Affinity in Early Fourteenth-Century England
6 Financing the Dynamics of Recruitment: King, Earls and
Government in Edwardian England, 1330–60
7 The Symbolic Meaning of Edward III’s Garter Badge
8 Sir Robert Knolles’ Expedition to France in 1370: New Perspectives
9 The Organisation and Financing of English Expeditions to the
Baltic during the Later Middle Ages
10 Naval Service and the Cinque Ports, 1322–1453
11 The Garrison Establishment in Lancastrian Normandy in 1436
according to Surviving Lists in Bibliothèque Nationale de
France manuscrit français 25773
Bibliography of the Writings of Andrew Ayton
Index
Tabula Gratulatoria

Citation preview

Contributors: Gary P. Baker, Adrian R. Bell, Peter Coss, Anne Curry, Robert W. Jones, Andy King, Craig L. Lambert, Tony K. Moore, J.J.N. Palmer, Philip Preston, Michael Prestwich, Matthew Raven, Clifford J. Rogers, Nigel Saul, David Simpkin.

Warfare in History GENERAL EDITORS: Matthew

Bennett, Anne Curry, Stephen Morillo

MILITARY COMMUNITIES IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW AYTON

Baker, Lambert and Simpkin (Eds)

Cover image: One of Sir John Charlton’s Sons (c.1340) from St Mary’s Church, Shrewsbury. Photograph by Andy King. Copyright: Church Conservation Trust.

MILITARY COMMUNITIES

Gary P. Baker is a Research Associate at the University of East Anglia and a Researcher in History at the University of Groningen. Craig L. Lambert is Lecturer in Maritime History at the University of Southampton. David Simpkin teaches history at Birkenhead Sixth-Form College.

IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

From warhorses to the men-at-arms who rode them; armies that were raised to the lords who recruited, led, administered, and financed them; and ships to the mariners who crewed them; few aspects of the organisation and logistics of war in late medieval England have escaped the scholarly attention, or failed to benefit from the insights, of Dr Andrew Ayton. The concept of the military community, with its emphasis on warfare as a collective social enterprise, has always lain at the heart of his work; he has shown in particular how this age of warfare is characterised by related but intersecting military communities, marked not only by the social and political relationships within armies and navies, but by communities of mind, experience, and enterprise. The essays in this volume, ranging from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century, address various aspects of this idea. They offer investigations of soldiers' and mariners' equipment; their obligations, functions, status, and recruitment; and the range and duration of their service.

EDITED BY GARY P. BAKER , CRAIG L. LAMBERT AND DAVID SIMPKIN

warfare in history

Military Communities in Late Medieval England

warfare in history issn 1358-779x

Series editors Matthew Bennett, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK Anne Curry, University of Southampton, UK Stephen Morillo, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA This series aims to provide a wide-ranging and scholarly approach to military history, offering both individual studies of topics or wars, and volumes giving a selection of contemporary and later accounts of particular battles; its scope ranges from the early medieval to the early modern period. New proposals for the series are welcomed; they should be sent to the publisher at the address below. Boydell & Brewer Limited, PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk ip12 3df Previously published volumes in this series are listed at the back of this volume

Military Communities in Late Medieval England Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton

Edited by

Gary P. Baker, Craig L. Lambert and David Simpkin

the boydell press

© Contributors 2018 All rights reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner

First published 2018 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge ISBN 978-1-78327-298-3 The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620–2731, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate

This publication is printed on acid-free paper

Typeset by www.thewordservice.com

Andrew Ayton, at home in Shughborough. Photograph: Agnes Ayton

Contents List of Illustrations ix Acknowledgements xi List of Contributors xii Foreword xiii Nigel Saul Andrew Ayton: A Brief Tribute xvi Sir Philip Preston Andrew Ayton: A Recognition of his Work xvii Gary P. Baker, Craig L. Lambert and David Simpkin, with contributions from J. J. N. Palmer Abbreviations xxiv 1 ‘Big and Beautiful’. Destriers in Edward I’s Armies 1 Michael Prestwich 2 Cum Equis Discoopertis: The ‘Irish’ Hobelar in the English 15 Armies of the Fourteenth Century Robert W. Jones 3 Andrew Ayton, the Military Community and the Evolution of 31 the Gentry in Fourteenth-Century England Peter Coss 4 Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status, 51 c. 1270–c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I David Simpkin 5 Sir Henry de Beaumont and His Retainers: The Dynamics of a Lord’s 77 Military Retinues and Affinity in Early Fourteenth-Century England Andy King 6 Financing the Dynamics of Recruitment: King, Earls and 105 Government in Edwardian England, 1330–60 Matthew Raven 7 The Symbolic Meaning of Edward III’s Garter Badge 125 Clifford J. Rogers 8 Sir Robert Knolles’ Expedition to France in 1370: New Perspectives 147 Gary P. Baker

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9 The Organisation and Financing of English Expeditions to the Baltic during the Later Middle Ages Adrian R. Bell and Tony K. Moore 10 Naval Service and the Cinque Ports, 1322–1453 Craig L. Lambert 11 The Garrison Establishment in Lancastrian Normandy in 1436 according to Surviving Lists in Bibliothèque Nationale de France manuscrit français 25773 Anne Curry

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211 237

Bibliography of the Writings of Andrew Ayton 271 Index 275 Tabula Gratulatoria 293

Illustrations Plate:  Detail from the Luttrell Psalter. London, British Library, xxvii Additional MS 42130, f. 202v. © The British Library Board 4

Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status, c. 1270– c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I. David Simpkin Table 4.1: Comparison of banneret numbers for the Falkirk 55 campaign, 1298 Table 4.2: Service of bannerets within the retinues of other 58 men at Falkirk Table 4.3: Paid retinues on the Scottish March, December 63 1297–March 1298 Table 4.4: Occasions of retinue leadership by Falkirk 70 bannerets, 1298–1314

5

Sir Henry de Beaumont and His Retainers: The Dynamics of a Lord’s Military Retinues and Affinity in Early FourteenthCentury England. Andy King Table 5.1: Sir Henry de Beaumont’s retainers, 1297–1303 82 Table 5.2: Roger Halow’s service with Sir Henry de Beaumont, 83 1301–14 Table 5.3 Service by Northumbrians with Sir Henry de Beaumont 87 Table 5.4: Sir Philip Darcy’s retinue, 1315 89 Table 5.5: The Saltmarsh family’s military service with Sir 91 Henry de Beaumont, 1314–36 Table 5.6: Sir Thomas Gray’s military service with Sir Henry 92 de Beaumont, 1304–19 Table 5.7: Sir William Marmion’s military service with Sir 94 Henry de Beaumont, 1308–16 Table 5.8: Sir John de Eure’s service with Sir Henry de 96 Beaumont, 1308–14

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Sir Robert Knolles’ Expedition to France in 1370: New Perspectives. Gary P. Baker Table 8.1: E101/30/25 mm.1 and 2: Lists of captains, retinue 159 sizes, and monies received Table 8.2: E101/30/25 m. 3: ‘Bracketed’ retinue list 161

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list of illustrations

The Organisation and Financing of English Expeditions to the Baltic during the Later Middle Ages. Adrian R. Bell and Tony K. Moore Table 9.1: Licences for passage in 1367–69 187 Table 9.2: Military connections between English crusaders 190 Figure 9.1: Reconstruction of Payment Flows 202 Figure 9.2: Reconstruction of the financial transactions between 203 western crusaders and the Teutonic Order

10 Naval Service and the Cinque Ports, 1322–1453. Craig L. Lambert Table 10.1: Separate ships contributed by Essex ports to naval 218 operations, 1322–1453 Table 10.2: Separate ships contributed by Kent ports to naval 220 operations, 1322–1453 Table 10.3: Separate ships contributed by Sussex ports to naval 222 operations, 1322–1453 Table 10.4: Separate ships contributed to naval operations by all 223 the Cinque Ports, 1322–1453 Table 10.5: Shipping contributions of the Cinque Ports 224 compared with other ports, 1322–1453 Table 10.6: Shipping contributions of ports during three periods 226 of the Anglo-French war 11 The Garrison Establishment in Lancastrian Normandy in 1436 according to Surviving Lists in Bibliothèque Nationale de France manuscrit français 25773. Anne Curry Table 11.1. Total sizes of garrisons and retinues as indicated in 263 the lists Table 11.2: Distribution of troops in garrison by area (including 265 field troops and creus) Map 11.1: Map of Norman Garrisons 269 The editors, contributors and publishers are grateful to all the institutions and persons listed for permission to reproduce the materials in which they hold copyright. Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders; apologies are offered for any omission, and the publishers will be pleased to add any necessary acknowledgements in subsequent editions.

Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank Andrew Ayton for ultimately providing them with the opportunity and incentive to put this volume together in his honour; the editors would not have known one another or the various contributors to this volume were it not for him, to say nothing of the benefits we have gained from being Andrew’s supervisees. Anyone who knows Andrew will testify that it is not possible to match his standards of meticulousness, but we hope that he will detect some of his own influence on the better aspects of the editors’ own papers, such as they are. We would also like to thank the contributors to this volume; all were understandably eager to show their respect for Andrew in the traditional academic manner, having in some cases known Andrew for several decades and benefited from his generosity. We in turn wish to thank the contributors for their generosity and hard work on this project. Our thanks are also due to Caroline Palmer and the team at Boydell for their patience and understanding, as always, during the customary fits and starts of the editing process.When Andrew began his doctoral research in the 1980s he commented on the rich offerings available to historians willing to engage in serious study of the military personnel and communities of late medieval England; this volume stands as further testimony (if any were needed) that his clarion call has not been in vain. Summer, 2017.

Contributors Gary P. Baker is a Research Associate at the University of East Anglia, and a Researcher at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Adrian R. Bell is a Professor in the History of Finance, Associate Dean (International), and Head of the ICMA Centre at the University of Reading. Peter Coss is an Emeritus Professor of Medieval History at Cardiff University. Anne Curry is Professor of Medieval History and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Southampton. Robert W. Jones is an Academic Administrator at Advanced Studies in England and a Visiting Scholar at Franklin and Marshall College. Andy King is a Lecturer in History at the University of Southampton. Craig L. Lambert is a Lecturer in Maritime History at the University of Southampton. Tony K. Moore is a Lecturer in Finance at the ICMA Centre, University of Reading. Michael Prestwich is an Emeritus Professor of Medieval History at Durham University. Matthew Raven is a Ph.D. (‘The Earls of Edward III’) student at the University of Hull; he was initially supervised by Andrew Ayton. Clifford J. Rogers is a Professor of History at the United States Military Academy at West Point. David Simpkin is a Teacher of History at Birkenhead Sixth-Form College.

Foreword Nigel Saul

Andrew Ayton is one of the most distinctive voices in the field of late medieval military history. His speciality has been to apply the prosopographical method to the study of the English armies of the fourteenth century using research methodologies developed in the social sciences. Where past scholars have either constructed simple campaign narratives or analysed changing battle tactics, and where students of politics have examined the interaction of war and society, Andrew has looked instead at those underlying structures which he considers crucial to a medieval army’s effectiveness in the field. Drawing on his extensive database of combatants, compiled from such sources as pay rolls, horse inventories and letters of protection, he has brought a new sophistication to the study of retinue recruitment and composition, and to the interaction between campaign retinues and the society from which they were drawn. A key concept of his is that of the ‘military community’, a term he first coined (drawing inspiration from the work of Philip Morgan on late medieval Cheshire) in 1994 to describe that pool of manpower drawn largely from the ranks of the landed classes and coterminous with the political groupings from which the mounted warriors were recruited. The military communities, Andrew argues, were endowed with a quality of stability, born of the steady accumulation of memory and experience, which helped to counter the inherent instability of campaign retinues, companies that by their nature were ephemeral entities with a life of only a few months or more. For Andrew, an Edwardian army was not simply a military machine; it was a living organism, a social and institutional network, the effectiveness of which was largely dependent on ties between the great captains, the organisational hubs of the army, and the informal local networks into which they tapped. Lacking a permanent institutional structure of its own, the army was held together by the social authority and resources of its principal commanders and their relationships with the men in their retinues. In the field, the force’s effectiveness would depend largely on the individual commander’s authority and on the day-to-day relations

xiv foreword

between his immediate lieutenants. Where either the first was lacking or the latter weakened by rivalries and jealousies, the army’s operational capability would be jeopardised or even lost altogether. Where the commander’s authority was effective, however, and where there was cohesion between the lieutenants, there were major tactical benefits that could contribute mightily to the army’s success. These carefully formulated ideas, sketched here in outline, were all developed in a series of studies, beginning with Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (1994), which Andrew wrote at just one institution, the University of Hull. Andrew went up to Hull in the late 1970s to read History and, on graduating, embarked on his doctoral research on military service under Edward III under the supervision of John Palmer, a pioneer in the application of computer databases to historical research. On completing his doctorate, Andrew stayed on at Hull to work under John on the latter’s Domesday Book project, and then became successively a non-established teacher, Lecturer, and Senior Lecturer in the department. I first met Andrew in the early 1980s in the Round Room of the Public Record Office, as it was then called, and based as it was then in Chancery Lane. I was finishing off my own work on the medieval Gloucestershire gentry, and Andrew was making his way through the horse inventories, sources which I was also using myself. We began talking, and on many an occasion our conversations would continue later, either before or after the seminars at the Institute of Historical Research which we both then attended. Our interests and instincts chimed easily, and we have remained in touch ever since. Whenever I have needed chapter and verse on the military careers of any fourteenth-century English knights, Andrew has immediately come to my rescue with all the details stored on his database. Andrew’s generosity in sharing his knowledge and ideas with others is legendary. And so too is his willingness to collaborate, as his involvement in a variety of joint research projects indicates. He is co-editor and main author with Sir Philip Preston of what is now the standard book on the battle of Crécy, and he has been the leader of such externally funded research projects as that on shipping and mariners in fourteenth-century England. It is a tribute to his generosity of spirit that he has inspired such strong devotion among all those whom he has taught, both at undergraduate and postgraduate level. He has an outstanding record as a research supervisor, and the indebtedness of his postgraduate students both to his encouragement and his methodological thinking is evident in their own work. A commentator with a degree of historical awareness might say that his students’ attachments to each other and to their former supervisor are no less cohesive than those in any of the medieval campaign retinues that Andrew has studied. As a scholar, Andrew has never been other than a perfectionist. Although he has written at book-length, he is essentially a miniaturist, the master of the learned article, the sharply focused study. Every periodical piece that he

foreword xv

has published, and every chapter that he has contributed to an edited book, is beautifully written, every sentence carefully constructed and every word well chosen, the penetrating intellect always showing through. As Andrew’s footnotes show, he is also an exceptionally widely read scholar, not only in medieval studies but in the social sciences, and not only in English history but in European, and especially Hungarian, history. It is worth noting that he is the editor of an English translation of an excellent general history of Hungary, Pal Engel’s The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526 (2001). While Andrew has never been one to seek out the historical limelight or to crave an audience he has made some notable appearances on television, on both occasions at the battlefield at Crécy. In 2004, he appeared on Mike Loades’ ‘Weapons that Made Britain’ in the episode focusing on the longbow, where Mike famously charged him on horseback to time how long it would have taken the French men-at-arms to reach the English line, and the deadliness of English archers at range as the French advanced. More recently, in 2013, he enjoyed great success in the BBC Four series, ‘Chivalry and Betrayal: The Hundred Years’ War’, in which he talked to the presenter, Janina Ramirez, again on-site at Crécy. Because Andrew is very tall and Janina is somewhat less so, the interview had to be conducted with Andrew standing in a dry ditch and Janina next to him on a lane-side bank. On both occasions Andrew was characteristically fluent and enthusiastic, talking in a relaxed way about a subject that he both enjoys and is the master of. Andrew is someone who inspires great respect and affection among all those who have the pleasure to know him. This volume of essays is offered to him by his friends and his former students as a token of their admiration, gratitude and thanks.

Andrew Ayton: A Brief Tribute Sir Philip Preston

It is a privilege to be invited to participate in a tribute to Andrew because it is an opportunity to thank him for risking the Crécy Matterhorn with an amateur climber, or as he might prefer, tackling a bustling city with a guide (book) less companion. In the seven years of collaboration on Crécy 1346, years in which he delighted in the treacle of prosopography, and allowed internal deadlines to glide past with impunity, what was constant and indeed marks all his work was, and remains, the sincerity of his devotion to the trade of historian: a trade made noble through scrupulous research and meticulous presentation of evidence. Virtuous though such efforts are, their value is tested by how well they are expressed to his audience. In my opinion, Andrew’s writing is of the highest rank, thus combining the skill of the artist with that of the artisan. As we were writing Crécy 1346, Robert Hardy and Matthew Strickland were simultaneously writing their surely classic: Warbow. In a small bar in France, Hardy turned to me and said, “we’re two amateurs working with two of England’s finest historians.” At that, I ordered another two glasses and it is a very great pleasure to be able to record that conversation here.

Andrew Ayton: A Recognition of his Work Gary P. Baker, Craig L. Lambert and David Simpkin, with contributions from J. J. N. Palmer

Given the contribution Andrew Ayton has made to the study of late medieval military history we hope he is not surprised by the production of a Festschrift in his honour. All the editors of this volume were supervised by Andrew for their doctoral studies, and all no doubt thrashed out the general outlines to their theses in one of the infamous ‘Ayton’ meetings that regularly ran into the late evening. Andrew’s enthusiasm for his subject was infectious and it is to his credit that many of his former students have gone on to publish contributions on late medieval military and naval history. The papers featured in the present volume highlight the important international impact Andrew’s work has had on his students and academic colleagues. Andrew, a native of Dorset, is in his own words ‘a country dweller at heart’ but has spent much of his working life in the big city. He studied as an undergraduate at the University of Hull in the early 1980s, during which time he undertook several modules taught by Professor John Palmer. John’s module on the Hundred Years’ War in particular seems to have kindled Andrew’s interest in medieval military history and military communities; it certainly began a fruitful association between two like-minded scholars which was to span some three decades until John’s retirement in 2002. Andrew often visited John’s home to discuss their latest research and he will be pleased to know he is remembered with some affection by John’s children. After graduating, Andrew spent a brief spell in a ‘real’ job, before returning to Hull to study for his Ph.D. under John Palmer – ‘The Warhorse and Military Service under Edward III’ – and from 1985 to 1987 Andrew was employed, alongside Virginia Davis, on John’s Domesday Project. This was a role for which Andrew was particularly well equipped. He had taken John Palmer’s special subject on the Domesday Book as an undergraduate, which

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had provided him with the essential background plus the basic computing skills – in particular related to databases – needed for the research: rare qualifications in the mid-1980s. This period, of course, included the 900th anniversary of Domesday Book, which for Andrew and Virginia entailed a frenetic year, giving lectures and demonstrations around the UK while trying to keep to a research schedule and do some work on their own account. In addition to this they occasionally worked through the night in Hull’s Computer Centre, fixing IT and database issues (with which many in this volume are all too familiar!). These long nights, we are reliably informed by Professor Palmer, were usually sustained by a few bottles of wine. When the Domesday funding ran out, Andrew was employed to develop a course on History and Computing, a module which he and John subsequently taught together for more than a decade. Shortly after that collaboration began, in 1989, Andrew was appointed to a lectureship at the University of Hull, where he was to remain until his retirement in 2015. During the 1980s Andrew, John Palmer and Anne Curry were all developing research strategies based on the creation and exploitation of computer databases. Their overlapping interests were stimulated further by a conference held at Rewley House, which produced the volume Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War.1 While John Palmer developed an electronic version of the Domesday Book, and Anne Curry examined fifteenth-century armies, Andrew focused his attention on the military community of fourteenth-century England. We are fortunate that he did so because over the last thirty-plus years Andrew has gone on to produce research of the highest quality in the field of military service prosopography; indeed, he is one of the pioneers of research into medieval military service prosopography, a methodology which involves using mass collective biographies to facilitate research into warfare and soldiering. Andrew’s teaching reflected his principal research areas of computing, late medieval military communities, East-Central Europe and, more broadly, the Napoleonic wars, the last-mentioned theme being a research area that Andrew intends to explore in greater depth in future. His third-year special subject centred on an in-depth investigation of the wars of Edward III, and students of this course were lucky to have received research-led teaching of the highest calibre. During his last years of teaching, Andrew also taught a third-year module entitled: ‘From Bannockburn to Stalingrad: The Anatomy of Military Disaster’, which subsequently morphed into a study of several key battles from Poltava to Stalingrad. One of the editors of this volume was fortunate enough to be in the first cohort of students to take the module. Through the ‘Military Disasters’ module, Andrew showed that

A. Ayton, ‘English Armies in the Fourteenth Century’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 21–38.

1



andrew ayton: a recognition of his work

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while armies across the ages were products of their cultural time they also shared many common attributes. In the 1990s and 2000s what emerged at the University of Hull through Andrew’s research, his teaching and his doctoral supervision, is the ‘Hull School’. Broad in its areas of research, it was always underpinned by the detailed analyses of computer databases created from primary sources centred on quantitative and social-sciences research methodologies. The use of databases allowed a voluminous corpus of source material to be collated, processed, and analysed. For his work on military recruitment the creation of computer databases meant Andrew could analyse the processes and key changes in recruitment. On a macro scale, this meant whole armies could be reconstructed, as Andrew’s work on the English army on the Crécy campaign of 1346 testifies.2 However, it is perhaps in the micro analyses of military retinues that Andrew’s work was truly innovative. His article on ‘The Dynamics of Military Recruitment’ provided a theoretical framework that showed the minutiae of military recruitment, the changes it went through as the Anglo-French war progressed and how this impacted on the social networks that underpinned the process of recruitment.3 Andrew’s first book, Knights and Warhorses, which was initially published in 1994, emerged out of his doctoral research.4 A multi-faceted work, its principal importance lies in its analysis and use of the source materials on Edwardian military communities, and it remains, even nearly a quartercentury later, the go-to work for students, scholars, and those interested in the fourteenth-century military community of England. What the work reveals above all is Andrew’s intimate knowledge and understanding of the sources, which underpins so much of his (and his students’) work. The editors and contributors to this volume, along with many others, are indebted to Andrew for his help, advice, and generosity of spirit when dealing with queries about these materials, and on numerous other occasions. Although a historian by trade, Andrew was also keen to adopt social science methodologies and network theory as a way of investigating military communities, as shown most vividly in his most recent work on the processes of military recruitment in the fourteenth century. Many of his ideas on military communities and the processes of recruitment underpin several chapters in this volume, including those by Andy King and by Andrew’s former students Gary Baker, Matt Raven, and David Simpkin. Recently, Andrew 2

A. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, in A. Ayton and P. Preston, The Battle of Crécy

1346 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 159–251.

A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A.

3

Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59. 4 A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses. Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994).

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has focused some attention on the careers of soldiers who increasingly saw waging war as a key form of employment: the ‘proto-professional’ who was often found serving in garrisons.5 Anne Curry’s chapter in this volume adds more to this topic by looking at the organisation of Lancastrian garrisons in France. The methodology pioneered by Andrew for the fourteenth century was based on the principle that medieval armies ought not to be conceptualised in the same way as modern, barracks-style armies, but as products and extensions of the social fabric and structure of late medieval society. This simple idea has essentially revolutionised historians’ understanding of Edwardian armies and fundamentally altered the way they are written about. However, rather than diverting or distracting from the bloody reality of warfare, this approach has facilitated a deeper and richer understanding of the dynamics of late medieval military campaigns and battles, as seen, for example, in Andrew’s recent study of English casualties at the battle of Bannockburn and their medium-term impact on the dynamics of recruitment.6 Indeed, in more recent years, Andrew has extended aspects of this methodology and conceptual model to comparative studies of late medieval armies and conflicts, most notably in his contribution to a volume on medieval and modern transcultural wars. Drawing on his deep appreciation and knowledge of central and eastern European martial cultures, especially those of Hungary, this comparative study of military institutions in the years between the battles of Muhi (1241) and Mohács (1526) highlighted the potential of combining social, institutional, and cultural approaches to warfare within a single study.7 Andrew describes himself as more a historian of warfare than a medievalist, and this is perhaps indicative of the future direction of his research. Indeed, Andrew continues to work on a monograph about the role of battle in history; the research builds on his work on the battle of Crécy as well as on his expertise on Hungary. In addition to his work on the military community of fourteenthcentury England, Andrew maintained a keen interest in all aspects of martial culture. Although the primary focus of Knights and Warhorses was more on the knights – or perhaps that should be men-at-arms – than their mounts, Andrew’s research included detailed transcriptions of thousands of horses’ colours and valuations, evidence that helped to paint a fuller picture of 5

A. Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England’, JMH 43, no. 1

(2017), pp. 4–23.

A. Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat: Bannockburn and the Dynamics of Recruitment in England’, in Bannockburn, 1314–2014: Battle and Legacy, ed. M. Penman (Donington,

6

2016), pp. 36–56.

A. Ayton, ‘From Muhi to Mohács: Armies and Combatants in Later Medieval European Transcultural Wars’, in Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the Twenty-First

7

Century, ed. H.-H. Kortüm (Berlin, 2006), pp. 213–47.



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the quality and variety of the ‘equine community’ of Edwardian England. Two papers in this volume build on this aspect of Andrew’s research, with Michael Prestwich’s fascinating analysis of the ‘big and beautiful’ destriers of the reign of Edward I complemented by Robert W. Jones’ enquiry into the place of the Irish hobelar in English armies of the fourteenth century. Reverting to the men-at-arms themselves, on more than one occasion Andrew has brought new light to bear on the previously much-neglected Court of Chivalry records, especially the unpublished dispute concerning John, Lord Lovel, and Thomas, Lord Morley, establishing the value of the depositions not simply as fascinating pen-portraits of military service but as windows into the militarisation and martial culture of fourteenth-century England.8 Characteristically, Andrew has brought quantitative depth to a corpus of documents which hitherto had largely been used selectively and for purely illustrative purposes. Alongside Andrew’s analyses of heraldic dissemination and the relationship of this process to gentry-formation,9 this is an area of expertise that Andrew has shared with his friends and long-time academic correspondents Maurice Keen and Peter Coss. Indeed Andrew is currently working on a new paper on the Carlisle Roll of Arms of 1334 in addition to a forthcoming piece on a soldier from the Court of Chivalry records who has long attracted his attention, Sir Nicholas Sabraham.10 Clifford Rogers’s paper on the Order of the Garter in this present volume is a welcome addition to the literature on war and chivalry, whilst Peter Coss has reflected on, but also challenged, the idea that military service was the ‘prime mover’ in the structure and formation of the gentry. More recently Andrew has made a considerable contribution to the naval dimension of the Hundred Years’ War. This was stimulated in 2011 by an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) award to undertake research into the fourteenth-century English merchant fleet. Designed to develop a database of English merchant ships, this project was an extension of Andrew’s methodological approach to ‘doing history’. Using navy payrolls as its main source, the ESRC project also uncovered some interesting developments regarding the Plantagenet naval wars of the later fourteenth century. Drawing on these data Andrew’s recent work on naval operations has begun to shed new light on the scale and scope of England’s A. Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry’ in The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and

8

Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. A. Ayton and J. L. Price (London, 1995), pp. 81–104; see also Andrew’s further analyses of this corpus of records in, for example, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp. 45–56.

See, for example, A. Ayton, ‘Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J. S. Bothwell (York, 2001), pp. 107–32. 10 A. Ayton, ‘From Brittany to the Black Sea: Nicholas Sabraham and English Military Experience in the Fourteenth Century’, in Courts of Chivalry and Admiralty in Late Medi9

eval Europe, ed. A. Musson and N. Ramsay (Woodbridge, forthcoming, 2018).

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wars at sea in this period. What is emerging has the potential to change the established narrative. Rather than a period of decline for English arms, the Anglo-French war of c. 1369–c. 1390 was one principally fought at sea in which English commanders developed an aggressive naval strategy designed to seek out and bring enemy naval forces to battle. In his recent studies of fourteenth-century English maritime communities Andrew has applied his prosopographical approach to show that the personnel of English fleets were an important group of recruits and were an integral part of England’s war effort. His work on the coastal communities of Essex, for example, reveals that those inhabitants of the coastal zone were a flexible group of recruits who served in multifaceted combat roles.11 Andrew continues to explore the naval war of the fourteenth century and, with Craig Lambert, is working on a book-length study that will principally focus on the war at sea during the later fourteenth century. Andrew was also keen to examine the socio-economic lives of fourteenth-century shipmasters by linking the nominal data in naval records with those produced by the government’s tax assessors, a methodological development most notably revealed in his article ‘The English Mariner in the Fourteenth Century’.12 The chapter by Craig Lambert in this volume builds on Andrew’s recent work in the maritime sphere by re-evaluating the role of the Cinque Ports in the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-French wars of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Apart from his work as a leading academic in his chosen field Andrew has helped the next generation of academics and taken on several important research-related roles. He recently served as a member of the advisory board of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) project: ‘The Evolution of English Shipping Capacity and Shipboard Communities from the Early Fifteenth Century to Drake’s Circumnavigation, 1577’, at the University of Southampton (2014–17); an ESRC Peer-Review College member (2012 to present); a Trustee of the Battle of Crécy Trust; and a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Keele. These roles follow on from his earlier stint as a key advisor to the AHRC ‘Soldier in Later Medieval England Project’ at the universities of Reading and Southampton (2006–09). Andrew is always willing to share his knowledge, and many of the participants in this volume have benefited from his advice, sharing of data, and methodological approach to historical research. All three editors A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea: Essex Ports in England’s Wars, 1320–1400’, in The Fighting Essex Soldier: Recruitment, War and Society

11

in the Fourteenth Century, ed. J. Ward, N. Wiffen and C. Thornton (Hatfield, 2017), pp.  98–142; A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare: Strategy, Organisation and Manpower’, in The Hundred Years War: Problems in Focus Revisited, ed. A. Curry (London, forthcoming, 2018).

12

A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘The English Mariner in the Fourteenth Century’, in

Fourteenth Century England VII, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 153–76.



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of this volume in particular benefited enormously from his enthusiasm and knowledge of the topics we each chose as the focus of our doctoral studies. As noted above, the meetings in Andrew’s office became famous for the time he devoted to discussion. Hours could be spent analysing the next methodological step forward, but at the core of the discussions were Andrew’s intimate knowledge of the sources and historiography that would genuinely add to the betterment of his students’ work. The papers in this volume are presented in recognition of Andrew’s work and aim to convey our gratitude to a great scholar, mentor, and friend.

Abbreviations BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research BL British Library, London BNF Bibliothèque Nationale de France CChR Calendar of Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 6 vols (London, 1903–27) CCR Calendar of the Close Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward I to Henry VI (London, 1886– 1939) CCW Calendar of Chancery Warrants, 1244–1326 (London, 1927) CDS Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1881–8); Supplementary, ed. G. G. Simpson and J. B. Galbraith (Edinburgh, 1988) CFR Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward I to Henry VI (London, 1911–62) CIM Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous Preserved in the Public Record Office, 8 vols (London, 1916–2003) CIPM Calendar of Inquisitions Post-Mortem, Edward I to Edward III (London, 1906–54) Complete Peerage The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom, G. E. Cokayne, et al., 13 vols, new edn (London, 1910–59) CPR Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward I to Henry VI (London, 1891– 1916) DL Records of the Duchy of Lancaster, The National Archives, Kew DLV The Durham Liber Vitae: London, British Library, MS Cotton Domitian A.VII, ed. David Rollason and Lynda Rollason, 3 vols (London, 2007) EcHR Economic History Review EHR English Historical Review Fœdera Fœdera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis publica, ed. Thomas Rymer, 4 vols in 7 parts (Record Commission edn, 1816–69) JMH Journal of Medieval History

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Norwell The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell: 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, ed. M. Lyon, B. Lyon and H. S. Lucas (Brussels, 1983) ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online version) OED Oxford English Dictionary Parliamentary Writs Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, ed. F. Palgrave, 2 vols in 4 parts (London, 1827–34) PROME The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275–1504, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., 16 vols (London, 2005) Rotuli Normanniae Rotuli Normanniae in Turri Londinensi Asservati, Johanne et Henrico Quinto Angliae Regibus, vol. 1, 1200–1205, 1417, ed. T. D. Hardy (London, 1835) Rot. Scot. Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati, ed. D. MacPherson, J. Caley, W. Illingworth and T. H. Horne, 2 vols (Record Commission, 1814–19) SP State Papers, Foreign and Domestic, in The National Archive, Kew TNA The National Archives of England, Kew TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society

Detail from the Luttrell Psalter (c. 1320–40), showing Sir Geoffrey Luttrell mounted and ready for war, reflecting the chivalric preoccupations and heraldic trappings redolent of the wars of the period. London, British Library, Additional MS 42130, f.202v. © The British Library Board

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‘Big and Beautiful’ Destriers in Edward I’s Armies* Michael Prestwich

What was a destrier? The word probably refers to the tradition that a squire led a charger with his right hand, though it is also possible that it related to the horse leading with the right leg as it charged.1 This does little to provide an answer. Relatively few horses were classed as destriers, as Andrew Ayton wisely pointed out: ‘There is a danger in assuming that all late medieval warhorses were destriers … which is like assuming every saloon car to be a Rolls-Royce.’2 The lists of horses on the Falkirk campaign of 1298 include just thirty-eight destriers, out of a total of some 1,370.3 Destriers were elite mounts but, for the historian, they are not as easy to identify as RollsRoyces are. It is far from clear what differentiated them from other horses. Size is the most likely explanation, but the evidence for their stature and weight is not consistent. The traditional assumption was that destriers were very large. In 1900 J. E. Morris described them as ‘slow but powerful shire-horses’; more recently, R. H. C. Davis suggested, without citing any evidence, that they were seventeen or eighteen hands tall. That is equivalent to a modern Clydesdale. Andrew Ayton’s carefully qualified view was that ‘the most expensive horses *

My grateful thanks are due to Mrs Louisa Sutton, whose photographs of documents in The National Archives have been invaluable in the preparation of this paper. 1 Writing around 1400, Christine de Pizan described ‘plusieurs gros destriers moult beaulx en destre estoient menez’; quoted by P. Contamine, ‘Le cheval “noble” aux XIVe– XVe siècles’, Comptes rendus des séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 152 (2008), p. 1697, no. 11. C. Gillmor, ‘Practical Chivalry: the Training of Horses for Tournaments and Warfare’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, new ser. 13 (1992), pp. 7–29, explains the importance of the right lead. 2 A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 23. 3 Scotland in 1298: Documents relating to the Campaign of King Edward I in that year, ed. H. Gough (Paisley and London, 1898), pp. 161–237.

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were, indeed, of formidable stature’. As recently as 2008, it was argued in a general history of cavalry that ‘the destrier was twice as large as a riding horse’.4 Recent work, using both pictorial and archaeological evidence, has suggested that this is implausible. As a result, the popular vision of knights trundling about on heavy draught horses, some so tall that their riders had to be mounted by means of cranes, has been replaced by a scholarly view that they rode small, nimble but sturdy horses, resembling Welsh cobs.5 One argument is that pictorial evidence, such as the Bayeux Tapestry, the illustration of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell, mounted and armoured, or Ucello’s fresco in Florence depicting Sir John Hawkwood, implies a height of no more than fifteen hands for a warhorse. Equally, while archaeological evidence is limited, there is nothing to support the hypothesis of the tall destrier. Material, primarily from London, such as horseshoes and bits, suggests that ‘the great majority of medieval horses did not reach the sort of fifteen-hands height and proportionate bulk that is today expected of an ordinary riding horse’.6 Analysis has shown that royal horse armour from the sixteenth century would fit a strong mount of about fifteen hands, suggesting that ‘destriers were of moderate height and robust build’.7 One suggestion is that, rather than being distinguished by size, the destrier may have been distinguished from other horses ‘perhaps in nobility – certainly in greater strength and manoeuvrability in combat, as one might reasonably expect’.8 However, the evidence provided by paintings and illustrations is tricky. In his memorial fresco Sir John Hawkwood’s mount is shown ambling, with the feet on one side moving forward together. This was the gait of a riding horse, a palfrey, not a destrier. In Sir Geoffrey Luttrell’s case, the proportions are odd. Even with straight legs and long stirrups, the rider’s feet reach only about half-way down the horse (Hawkwood’s feet were shown as level with the bottom of the horse’s chest). If the picture is correct, Luttrell either had exceptionally short legs, or a very large horse. On the other hand, the height of Luttrell’s wife and daughter-in-law suggest that the horse was no more than fifteen hands. The evidence of the Bayeux Tapestry is not easy to interpret, but Bernard Bachrach has suggested that it shows ‘large and heavy’ warhorses whose ‘weight should be estimated conservatively to have

J. E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford, 1901), p.  82; R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment (London, 1989), p. 69; Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 23; R. Jarymowicz, Cavalry from Hoof to Track (Westport, Conn., 2008), p. 38. 5 M. Bennett, ‘The Medieval Warhorse Reconsidered’, in Medieval Knighthood V, ed. S. Church and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1995), pp. 21–6. 6 The Medieval Horse and its Equipment, ed. J. Clark (London, 1995), pp. 24–6, 29. 7 A. Hyland, The Warhorse (Stroud, 1998), p.  10. Hyland’s deep knowledge of, and familiarity with, horses gives her work particular value. 8 The Medieval Horse and its Equipment, p. 25. 4



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been in the 1,500lb range’.9 Given that in some cases the long stirrups on these horses reach almost to the ground, this verdict is a little surprising. Medieval artists, however, did not attempt to be accurate; their intention was rather to show their subjects in the best light. The artist of the early fourteenth-century German Codex Manesse consistently drew riders with horses which appear little larger than Shetland ponies.10 In equestrian seals the rider might be enlarged to make him appear all the more impressive. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the pictorial evidence does not support the view that destriers were exceptionally tall. There are, unfortunately, no archaeological finds that can be conclusively linked to destriers; the London material is likely to have been associated with ordinary riding or working horses. A find of thirteenth-century horse bones at Market Harborough was likewise of draught animals, not warhorses. These averaged about fourteen hands.11 Sixteenth-century horse armour helps to show the size of a warhorse in that period, but is not necessarily applicable to a couple of centuries earlier. The sixteenth century saw considerable concern about the quality of English horses; it was a period when the destrier’s day was waning.12 It is perhaps also relevant to note that height has not always been regarded as desirable in a cavalry horse. Napoleon’s famous mount, Marengo, stood just over fourteen hands.13 In the mid-nineteenth century Captain Louis Nolan (often held responsible for the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade) commented that ‘Our cavalry horses are feeble; they measure high, but they do so from length of limb, which is weakness, not power.’ He explained that ‘Instead of the long, low, deep-chested, short-backed, strong-loined horse of former days, you find nothing now but long-legged, straight-shouldered animals, prone to disease from the time they are foaled.’ He had particular praise for a Persian horse of fourteen hands three inches, which carried ‘a man of our regiment of gigantic proportions, and weighing, in marching order, twenty-two and a half stone’ on a march of eight hundred miles with no ill-effect. Another horse of little more than fourteen hands carried its B. Bachrach, ‘Caballus et Caballerius in Medieval Warfare’, in The Study of Chivalry: Resources and Approaches, ed. D. Howell, D. Chickering and T. H. Seiler (Kalamazoo, 1988), pp.  173–211 (viewed at http://deremilitari.org/2013/11/caballus-et-caballarius-inmedieval-warfare/, accessed 23/10/2017). 10 See, for example, Wolfram von Eschenbach, whose horse’s head barely reaches his shoulders: http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/cpg848/0294?sid=b82556b8314350a4527 ff37c57f00c96 (accessed, 23/02/2016). 11 I. L. Baxter, ‘Medieval and early post-medieval Horse Bones from Market Harborough, Leicestershire, England, UK’, Circaea. The Journal for the Association of Environmental Archaeology 11 (1996 for 1993), p. 74. 12 P. Edwards, The Horse Trade in Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge, 1988), p. 39. 13 See http://www.nam.ac.uk/online-collection/detail.php?acc=1963-09-89-1 (viewed 10 March, 2016). 9

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rider four hundred miles in five days; unlike its rider, it survived the ordeal, ‘and did not even throw out a wind-gall’.14 An early twentieth-century cavalry expert’s view was that a large horse was ‘an abomination to the man that has to ride him and a severe trial to his patience and endurance’.15 Although many of the arguments suggesting that destriers were of no great size seem persuasive, they do not fit comfortably with the evidence for Edward I’s efforts to improve the quality of English horses. At the time of the first Welsh war in 1277, a royal sergeant was sent to France to purchase valuable horses. Further horses were imported for the Crown by Italian merchants, and close royal associates such as the earl of Lincoln, Sir William de Valence and Sir William Beauchamp also acquired horses overseas.16 With the second Welsh war of 1282–83 the government made yet more efforts to increase the numbers of high-quality horses. A much quoted writ of 1282 lamented the lack of ‘great horses suitable for war’, and required all with £30 of land to procure such mounts.17 Two Italian merchants received safeconducts to bring eighty ‘great horses’ to England, and the king sent Sir John Vescy and Antony Bek to Spain to buy horses.18 It would be surprising if the ‘great horses’ in particular were mounts of no more than average size. The English policy of importing quality horses created alarm in France, and in 1282 Maurice de Craon wrote to Edward, informing him that ‘in no way is the king of France willing to give permission for any horse to leave his realm’.19 Later in the reign there were no concerted efforts to import horses, perhaps because the efforts at the time of the Welsh wars had resulted in a sufficient improvement. Other documentary material, notably stable accounts, provides further clues.20 Bernard Bachrach, rare among modern scholars in arguing that warhorses were large, discussed the problems involved in feeding them, suggesting that they required over 25lbs of fodder a day, half hay and half grain such as oats or barley.21 This is consistent with practice since at least the nineteenth century. The daily allowance for a cavalry horse in barracks in the 1830s was 12lbs of hay and 10lbs of oats; in the early twentieth century the American army regulation ration was 14lbs of hay, and 12lbs of oats. L. E. Nolan, Cavalry; its History and Tactics, 3rd edn (London, 1860), pp. 240–1. J. J. Boniface, The Cavalry Horse and his Pack (Kansas City, 1908), p. 97. 16 CPR, 1272–81, pp. 184, 186, 212. See also Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 24–5. 17 Parliamentary Writs, I, p. 226. 18 CPR, 1281–92, pp. 11, 14. 19 Lettres des rois, reines et autres personnages, ed. M. Champollion Figeac, i (Paris, 1839), p. 289. 20 Davis, The Medieval Warhorse, p. 87, provided a graph ‘showing the number of royal stud accounts’, from which he drew various conclusions. However, all the figures do is demonstrate the patchy survival of these accounts. 21 Bachrach, ‘Caballus et Caballerius in Medieval Warfare’, pp. 173–211. 14 15



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Such figures are in line with a more modern estimate, that a stallion in heavy service should consume 10lbs of hay and 12½lbs of grain a day.22 Cavalry horses at the start of the twentieth century normally varied in size from fifteen to sixteen hands. Russian Cossacks used smaller horses, of no more than fourteen-and-a-half hands, and the mounts of German heavy cavalry were up to seventeen hands.23 The stable accounts from Edward I’s reign show that the horses were stallfed, rather than being allowed to graze. The basic diet consisted of oats and hay, with fresh-cut grass sometimes provided in summer. The accounts do not reveal the quantities of hay, merely the price. For oats, in addition to the price, the quantities are given in bushels. The bushel was a measure of volume, and could vary in weight from less than 25lbs to as much as 50lbs of oats. Experiments in 1832 demonstrated that a bushel of oats weighed 40lbs.24 A royal household account for 1292–93 shows that thirty horses each received between two-fifths and half a bushel of oats daily, along with a small quantity of bran.25 At Woodstock in the following year, stallions were allocated half a bushel of oats each day.26 Colts naturally received much less, their diet consisting of hay, bran, chaff and a small quantity of oats.27 The evidence is not confined to royal stable accounts. When royal officials set rations for garrisons in Scotland in 1300, the allowance for warhorses was set at half a bushel a day.28 A record of the countess of Hereford’s household shows that most of her horses (about seventy in number) received half a bushel of oats daily, with some having more.29 If it is assumed that the bushel was light, at 25lbs, these figures are similar to those for cavalry horses from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for the horses would have had around twelve pounds of oats a day. Such levels were far greater than was the case for farm animals in the medieval period. John Langdon calculated that the highest level of consumption of oats was for carthorses in W. W. Albert and K. H. Kline, Feeding Suggestions for Horses (Urbana, Ill., 1987), p. 6.; T. J. Christian, Mounted Instruction for Field Artillery (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1921); The Farmer’s Register (Shellbanks, Va, 1835), ii, p. 45. 23 Boniface, The Cavalry Horse and his Pack, pp. 93–5. 24 Veterinary Department, War Office, Animal Management (London, 1908), p. 90; C. W. Pasley, Observations on the Expediency and Practicality of Simplifying and Improving Measures, Weights and Money (London, 1834), p.  68. C. Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World (Dublin, 1997), p. 243, suggests a weight of between 23 and 25lbs. For my calculations, I have made the conservative assumption that the bushel weighed 25lbs. 25 TNA, E 101/353/15. 26 TNA, E 101/97/22. 27 TNA, E 101/97/23. 28 M. Prestwich, ‘Victualling Estimates for English Garrisons in Scotland during the early Fourteenth Century’, EHR 82 (1967), pp. 536–43, at p. 542. 29 C. H. Hartshorne, ‘Illustrations of Domestic Manners from the Reign of Edward the First’, Journal of the British Archaeological Association 18 (1862), pp. 322, 324–5. 22

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the Home Counties, at 8.28 quarters a year, or less than 0.2 of a bushel per day. The figure for plough horses was lower still, at 2.59.30 No doubt these farm animals grazed far more than did those in royal studs. The allocation of fodder to the majority of horses in Edward I’s time therefore suggests that they may have been similar in size to the cavalry horses of the early twentieth century. Most of the stable accounts do not specify whether horses were destriers or not, but merely distinguish stallions from mares, and from foals. Where destriers are identified, it is clear that they had a more lavish diet than other horses. In 1283 the king’s destrier Cornhill received twenty-six bushels of oats over a thirty-five day period, over two-thirds of a bushel a day. In addition he had four bushels of bran over the same period, as well as hay. Other entries in the same account show that it was only the destriers that received bran, in addition to hay and oats.31 In 1293 three stallions, Bayard de la Tache, Feraunt de Bek and Bayard de Arderne, all destriers, at Woodstock, received two-thirds of a bushel of oats each a day. Hay and horsebread was also provided. A little later Bayard de la Tache’s allowance was three-quarters of a bushel.32 Early in 1303 William Beauxamys had charge of three royal destriers in London. They were allocated two bushels of oats a day, as well as 3d worth of hay. When Beauxamys took two destriers from Sherburn to Princes Risborough, over nine days in the same year, the horses were again allocated two-thirds of a bushel a day.33 The destriers were therefore normally receiving up to half as much more oats than other horses. Assuming that they were also given more hay, that means they were getting up to an additional 12lbs of fodder. On that basis, they would have been some 400–500lbs heavier than the majority of horses.34 Adding hay to the oats, a reasonable estimate is that destriers were given, in all, at least 30lbs of fodder daily, a similar amount to that consumed by the draught horses pulling trams in south London at the start of the twentieth century.35 The evidence therefore shows that the quantities of fodder allocated to destriers were remarkably high. There are obvious difficulties in any calculation. One is uncertainty about the weight of a quarter of oats. Another is that the quality of grain was different in the medieval period from that of recent times, though it is not necessarily the case that modern oats make better horse fodder. British army experience in India was that oats ‘extremely J. Langdon, ‘The Economics of Horses and Oxen in Medieval England’, Agricultural History Review 30 (1982), pp. 31–40, at p. 33. 31 TNA, E 101/97/3. 32 TNA, E 101/97/10; E 101/97/22. 33 TNA, E 101/98/22. 34 A horse requires roughly 2–2½lbs fodder for every hundredweight, see Albert and Kline, Feeding Suggestions for Horses, p. 1. 35 Boniface, The Cavalry Horse and his Pack, p. 402. 30



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poor in appearance; small; light and heavily bearded, with a large proportion of husk’ gave better feeding results than superior imported grain.36 Medieval horses will have been given whole oats rather than the rolled or crushed oats of the present day, which are easier to digest.37 Even so, the volume fed to the medieval destriers suggests that they were very substantial animals, weighing 1,600lbs or more. In comparison, present-day thoroughbreds weigh roughly 1,000lbs, while heavy draught horses can weigh twice as much.38 This is not to argue that the elite of Edward I’s cavalry were mounted on the equivalent of modern carthorses, but the evidence of their diet strongly suggests that their destriers were large, certainly not resembling Welsh cobs. Many attempts have been made to find modern breeds which resemble the medieval destrier; there has even been an attempt to recreate it with the Spanish-Norman horse, an Andalusian-Percheron cross. These stand between 15.3 and seventeen hands.39 The Royal Armouries used a Lithuanian heavy draught horse of just over fifteen hands as the basis for a model to display horse armour. At sixteen hands a horse of this breed weighs almost 2,000lbs, and could well have a rough resemblance to a thirteenth-century destrier.40 It is tempting to assume that the ideal destrier came close to the recommendation of the War Office in the early twentieth century, that the class of horse required for the army was ‘deep, short legged, short backed, good barrelled … with substance and quality’.41 However, the one contemporary piece of evidence giving the measurements of a particularly fine animal suggests that some destriers may well have been very tall. In 1342 the pope sent a French destrier to the Chinese emperor. It was six Chinese feet eight inches tall, and was eleven feet six inches in length. The Chinese foot, or chi, was close to the European foot, and this horse would have stood at about twenty hands.42 It would be perfectly possible to ride such a huge animal; the tallest of twenty-first-century British police horses is nineteen hands.43 Veterinary Department, Animal Management, pp. 91–2. The view in the American army was that whole oats were superior, as they were less likely to be bolted, see Boniface, The Cavalry Horse and his Pack, p. 401. 38 A shire horse should weigh between 1,800 and 2,200lbs: see http://www.shire-horse. org.uk/about-us/the-shire-horse/breed-standard-points-of-the-horse/ accessed 19/06/2017. 39 See http://www.spanish-norman.com/ (accessed 02/03/2016). 40 Hyland, The Warhorse, p. 10. See http://horses.petbreeds.com/l/71/Lithuanian-HeavyDraft (accessed 02/03/2016). 41 Veterinary Department, Animal Management, p. 20. 42 Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World, p. 158; H. Cordier, ‘Le Christianisme en Chine et en Asie Centrale sous les Mongols’, T’oung Pao 18 (1917), p.  105. The proportions of these measurements suggest that the length given was from head to tail, and that height was taken at the withers. 43 The largest horse recently in police service, Klydascope, stands at nineteen hands. See http://www.horsetrust.org.uk/home/residents/police-horses/big-klyde/ (accessed 22/02/2016). 36 37

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Breeding was undoubtedly important, but the royal stable accounts do not reveal the principles that were adopted. It may be that new methods were used, for not only did the king import horses from Spain, but he also acquired expertise from there in their breeding, with Garcia of Spain one of those in charge of the royal studs. Garcia had been initially employed by Edward’s queen, Eleanor of Castile, and it is very possible that her influence was important.44 The evidence of the stable accounts has been helpfully analysed by Charles Gladitz.45 They reveal the numbers of horses kept in the various studs, dividing them into stallions, mares, colts and foals. Thus at one point in the early 1290s there were three stallions and up to twenty-eight mares at Woodstock, while at Knowle there was one stallion, with ten mares and forty-nine colts, most of them two years old. The stallion, with nine colts, had been sent from Woodstock. Stallions were frequently moved from one stud to another. In 1303 William Beauxamys took two destriers from Sherborne to Princes Risborough, at the king’s orders, and three from London to Woodstock. While this suggests that there was careful choice of stallions for breeding, there is less evidence to show that an equivalent selection of mares took place, though it was noted in 1291 that one filly at Hampton-in-Arden was ‘the best in the whole stud’. The accounts do not single out those colts which would develop as destriers, and very many of the horses bred will have been intended for use as carthorses and packhorses for transporting the royal household, rather than as warhorses.46 It would not have been acceptable to ride a mare on campaign.47 Like all warhorses, those described as destriers were stallions, and would have had a tendency to bite and kick. Their diet, heavy in oats, is likely to have made them all the more lively. Even Edward I himself did not always find his stallions easy to manage. One almost threw him at Winchelsea in 1297, and another stood on him in the night before the battle of Falkirk.48 The purchase of three hackneys, one costing a mere 18s, in 1300 ‘to lead certain of the king’s destriers from York to Berwick on Tweed’ suggests that the destriers were being awkward.49 In the early twentieth century the British War Office’s guidance noted in passing that ‘stallions and rigs should not be employed as soldiers’ horses as there must always be a risk of their screaming S. Cockerill, Eleanor of Castile (Stroud, 2014), p. 236. Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World, pp. 165–70. 46 TNA, E 101/97/6, E 101/97/9; E 101/97/10; E 101/98/22. 47 See Contamine, ‘Le cheval “noble” aux XIVe–XVe siècles’, p. 1705, n. 53, for a quote from the romance Perceforest suggesting that it would be shameful for a knight to ride a mare. 48 M. Prestwich, Edward I (London, 1988), pp. 111, 480. 49 Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae, ed. J. Topham et al. (London, 1787), p. 71. See also ibid., p. 77, for the purchase of two hackneys ad dextrarios regis. 44 45



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or misbehaving at some critical moment’.50 This temperament will have made training all the more important, but there is no evidence to suggest that destriers were schooled in a different manner from other warhorses. The purchases of long ropes to catch horses, such as the five pence spent on one to capture a stallion, Morel de Ber, at Knowle, provides a limited insight into the difficulties involved in training.51 Horse valuation lists, the importance of which was so well demonstrated by Andrew Ayton in his pioneering work, were prepared so that compensation could be paid to those who lost horses in war.52 They provide brief descriptions of mounts that were valued, noting their colour and any distinguishing markings. Thus a white star on the forehead, or white feet, would be noted. A price was recorded so as to enable the Crown to pay compensation should a horse die on campaign. A problem with the lists for Edward I’s reign is that they are not as comprehensive as are those for later periods, because no compensation was promised to the many who served at their own, or their lord’s, expense. The lists therefore only detail the horses of men who were in receipt of royal pay. Even so, they provide invaluable evidence about the horses in Edward I’s armies.53 The incomplete valuation lists for the second Welsh war do not reveal the impact of the government’s efforts to import horses, for one did no more than distinguish horses and rounceys, while the others listed all mounts as horses. No destriers were mentioned, but this may well have been because the clerks chose not to identify them as such, rather than because none were present on the campaign. Some of the horses were certainly as valuable as some listed later as destriers: Sir Robert Tateshall’s horse was appraised at 70 marks, and Sir William Leyburn’s at 50 marks. There were several worth 40 marks.54 There is no doubt that there were destriers in service at this time, for a royal stable account notes that of fifty-three horses at Chester in April 1283, twenty were destriers.55 The king had his own destrier, Cornhill, while the queen also had one.56 On 12 May the account listed fifty-one horses, but this time twenty-two were described as destriers and coursers, with two Veterinary Department, Animal Management, p. 34. A rig is a horse with either one or both testicles undescended. 51 TNA, E 101/97/11. 52 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses. 53 Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World, pp.  224–37, provides details drawn from the lists between 1295 and 1302. In the lists he drew up, he sorted the horses by colour. 54 TNA, C 47/2/5; C 47/2/6; C 47/2/7; Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 67. 55 TNA, E 101/97/3. 56 This may have been ridden by the queen, or used to haul her carriage, as was the case with four destriers bought for Queen Isabella in 1311–12. Three were for the carriage, and one was to be ‘a palfrey for the person of the queen’: The Household Book of Queen Isabella of England, ed. F. D. Blackley and G. Hermansen, (Edmonton, 1971), pp. 150–3. 50

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hackneys, thirteen palfreys, and one sumpter. The rest were simply horses, with no rounceys mentioned. The use of the term ‘courser’ is interesting, for it did not appear in the valuation lists until 1336.57 The valuation list for the 1296 Scottish campaign included just four destriers, and for the Flanders campaign in the following year there were a dozen. For the Falkirk campaign of 1298, the number had risen to thirtyeight. Apart from destriers, a good many mounts were identified as rounceys, but the majority were simply termed horses (equi) in the list. In the 1300 list there were about thirty destriers.58 There is nothing to suggest that the clerks who drew up the lists had any difficulty in distinguishing destriers from other horses, for it is rare to find corrections made on this score; exceptionally, in 1300 Sir William Suthle’s mount, valued at 100 marks, was initially described as a horse (equus), but this was crossed out in favour of destrier (dextrarius).59 The terminology appears to have been less precise when it came to the differences between rounceys, hackneys and palfreys.60 The descriptions given in the horse lists provide no evidence about the criteria used to work out values. The details of colour were there solely for identification purposes. As that notable eighteenth-century expert, the duke of Newcastle, argued, ‘marks and colours be nothing at all to know the goodness of a horse’.61 The assessors no doubt considered the age and capabilities of the horses, but there were many other elements that could be brought into play in working out their value. The late-fourteenth-century Ménagier de Paris set out a good many criteria for judging horses, including four which the author considered to be also appropriate to young women: lovely hair, a fine chest, beautiful loins and large buttocks.62 The early twentieth-century British army handbook on animal management devoted eight detailed pages to an analysis of the points that should be considered in assessing horses.63 TNA, E 101/97/3; Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p.  66. The term was used in an account of tournament expenses from 1278: S. Lysons, ‘Copy of a Roll of Purchases made for the Tournament of Windsor Park, in the sixth year of King Edward the First, preserved in the Record Office at the Tower’, Archaeologia 17 (1814), pp.  297–310, at p. 307. Curiously, Davis, The Medieval Warhorse, p. 67, suggested that the courser ‘for some reason does not seem to have been used for fighting’. 58 TNA, E 101/5/23; E 101/6/28; E 101/6/37; E 101/8/23; Scotland in 1298, pp. 161–237. 59 TNA, E 101/8/23. 60 See Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 62–8 for a full discussion of the terminology used to describe horses of different types. 61 Quoted by N. Russell, Like engend’ring like. Heredity and animal breeding in early modern England (Cambridge, 1986), p. 84. For an explanation of the genetics of horse colours, see https://www.vgl.ucdavis.edu/services/coatcolor.php (accessed 05/03/2016). 62 Quoted by A. G. Miller, ‘“Tails” of Masculinity: Knights, Clerics, and the Mutilation of Horses in Medieval England’, Speculum 88 (2013), pp. 958–95, at p. 966. 63 Veterinary Department, Animal Management, pp. 21–9. 57



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Given the large number of horses valued, the process must have been rough and ready, with bargaining between the horse owners and the royal clerks. Andrew Ayton suggested, surely rightly, that appraisers ‘would base their judgements on the normal level of warhorse prices’.64 It is, however, difficult to know what the normal level was, for horse prices varied very considerably. The royal wardrobe account for 1300 lists the purchase of about fifty horses, mostly carthorses and sumpters. The prices paid varied from a remarkable £20 for one carthorse, down to £1 for a packhorse. A horse to carry the king’s armour cost £10.65 These were much higher levels than those that have been calculated from manorial accounts, which suggest that the mean price for a carthorse at this period was roughly £1.66 However, it is unlikely that there was any overall artificial enhancement of the values in the horse lists of Edward I’s reign, though some of the valuations given to horses owned by officials high in the royal household suggest that influence may have been brought to bear. In 1300 Sir Walter Beauchamp, steward of the household, saw his destrier initially appraised at 60 marks, but this was raised to 80.67 Ralph Manton, cofferer of the wardrobe, had a destrier valued at 80 marks in 1300, and one at 100 marks in the following year, both very high figures.68 The valuations lists show that destriers were, in broad terms, the most valuable horses, with the most expensive put at 120 marks.69 Yet the lists do not show a clear boundary in terms of value between destriers and other horses, and do not reveal the attributes that defined a mount as a destrier. On the Falkirk campaign, Sir Robert Scales had a black destrier valued for a mere 20 marks.70 In 1300 the cheapest destrier, owned by Sir John Lyndhurst, was assessed at a low figure of 25 marks, and Sir Robert Bavent had one valued at 30 marks. Yet Sir Walter Huntercombe’s mount, described simply as a bay horse, was considered to be worth 60 marks, while Sir Roger Mortimer’s sorrel horse was put at 50 marks.71 The most expensive mount Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 223. Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae, pp. 77–80. 66 D. L. Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages’, Cambridge Agrarian History 2, ed. H. E. Hallam (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 750, 794. 67 TNA, E 101/8/23. For later examples of adjustment of values, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 69. 68 TNA, E 101/8/23; CDS, ii. no. 1190. 69 Sir Hugh le Despenser had a 120 mark destrier in 1298: Scotland in 1298, p. 187. In 1303 Sir Robert de la Warde and Sir Robert Clifford both had 120 mark destriers: TNA, E 101/612/11. 70 Scotland in 1298, p. 170. 71 TNA, E 101/8/23. This valuation list for 1300 is not a complete record, for it does not include horses worth less than £5, yet the household account includes many entries for compensation for loss of horses valued at £2: Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae, pp. 170–1. 64 65

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in the lists described simply as a horse was one owned by Sir Adam Welles in 1303, assessed at 100 marks.72 High status was no more than loosely linked to possession of a destrier. The one earl to feature in the valuation lists, William Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, had a destrier valued at 100 marks in the Flanders expedition of 1297.73 Sir Aymer de Valence, Sir Hugh le Despenser, Sir Hugh Courtenay, Sir Roger Mortimer of Chirk, Sir John Botetourt and Sir Robert Clifford are among the high-ranking men with destriers on the 1298 expedition to Scotland. Yet there were some men of less standing with expensive destriers, such as Sir William Echingham, with one valued at 50 marks, or two of the knights in Sir John de la Mare’s retinue with 40-mark mounts.74 John Droxford, keeper of the wardrobe, took a destrier valued at 60 marks to Flanders in 1297, but simply had a horse, valued at 30 marks, on the 1298 Scottish campaign. He took the same horse to Scotland in 1300.75 The evidence, admittedly limited in this respect, suggests that there was a rapid turnover of destriers. For the Welsh campaign of 1282–83 Sir Walter Beauchamp had a bay horse, valued at 25 marks. He became steward of the royal household in 1289, and so it is not surprising that in the Scottish campaign of 1296 he had a far more valuable mount, a bay destrier with a white back foot, assessed at 80 marks. This was marked as being ‘returned to the king’s marshal’, implying that it was rendered useless. In the following year, in Flanders, he had a black destrier, valued at 80 marks.76 For the Falkirk campaign, he had what was probably the same horse, now valued at 70 marks. This was recorded as ‘returned to the caravan’, presumably when it was no longer fit for campaigning. It was replaced by a bay destrier, with a star on its head, valued at 80 marks.77 In 1300 he had yet another destrier, iron-grey in colour, initially marked on the list as worth 60 marks, though this was corrected to 80 marks. This too was sent to the caravan.78 In 1303 he had yet another destrier, black with white feet and a star on its face. This was his most expensive horse, valued at 100 marks.79 Sir Adam Welles TNA, E 101/612/11. TNA, E 101/6/37. It has always been assumed that Warwick remained in England, but his presence on the valuation list suggests that he may have joined the expedition late. See P. Coss, ‘Beauchamp, William (IV) de, ninth earl of Warwick (c. 1238–1298)’, ODNB, online edition (accessed 09/02/2016). Warwick cannot have been long in Flanders, for he had contracted to serve for three months in Scotland: Scotland in 1298, pp. 64–5. 74 Scotland in 1298, pp. 203, 213. 75 TNA, E 101/6/28; E 101/8/23; Scotland in 1298, p. 174. 76 TNA, C 47/2/7; E 101/5/23; E 101/6/37. 77 Scotland in 1298, p. 183. Ibid., p. 196, shows that if a horse recovered in the caravan, it would be restored to its owner. 78 TNA, E 101/8/23. 79 TNA, E 101/612/11. 72 73



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provides another example of rapidly changing ownership. He had a horse worth 35 marks in Scotland in 1296, but the following year in Flanders he had a far superior mount, a black destrier valued at 60 marks. In Scotland in 1298 his destrier was valued at 50 marks, and described as parti-coloured black with white feet. Two years later he had a bay, with star and two white feet, put at a more impressive 100 marks. In 1303 his mount was described as a horse, but it was nevertheless valued highly, at 100 marks.80 Sir John Botetourt had a black destrier worth 60 marks in Flanders in 1297, and a dapple white one, valued similarly, in Scotland in the next year. It was lost at Falkirk, and in 1300 he had a grey, again valued at 60 marks. The implication of this rapid turnover for the cost of fighting is clear. The horse was by far the most expensive item required by mounted men, and if a destrier’s career in war was as short as it appears from this evidence, the financial implications were very considerable. Nor, of course, was the cost confined to a single horse. The Crown only compensated men if their main mount was lost on campaign, but knights and men-at-arms will have taken several horses with them.81 Even an earl might find it difficult to raise the funds needed to buy a good horse. In March 1296 Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk, borrowed 48 marks from John Droxford, keeper of the wardrobe, to pay for a horse he bought from another royal official, Matthew Columbers.82 There were obvious problems in taking a destrier on campaign in Edward I’s reign. The terrain in both Wales and Scotland was not suited to heavy horses. Battle was rare, and destriers were not built for pursuit across mountains and moors. There will have been great difficulty in providing fodder on the scale such pampered mounts were accustomed to. However, when battle did occur, the advantages of a heavy destrier were clear. The force behind a couched lance was not derived from the strength of the rider, but from the weight of his mount. The impetus of a destrier was much greater than that of a lesser horse. At the same time, that impetus could prove fatal should the destrier charge into a line of fixed pikes, and be impaled. Falkirk was the only large-scale battle in Edward I’s reign; the battles of Irfon Bridge and Maes Moydog in Wales were on a small scale. The evidence of casualties among the horses at Falkirk provides some support for Matthew Bennett’s criticism of what he described as ‘the myth of the overwhelming superiority of the mounted charge’.83 According to the chronicler Walter of Guisborough the English cavalry at Falkirk could not initially break through the defensive Scottish formations, the schiltroms. It was probably at this stage that some of the destriers were lost. After the infantry had done their work, TNA, E 101/6/37; Scotland in 1298, p. 172; TNA, E 101/8/23, E 101/612/11. In 1338 the norm was for an earl to have six horses for himself, a banneret five, a knight four, and a squire three. See Norwell, p. 386. 82 TNA, E 213/185. 83 Bennett, ‘The Medieval Warhorse Reconsidered’, p. 34. 80 81

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with arrows and stones, the horsemen destroyed what was left of the Scottish positions.84 While the numbers from the valuation lists may not be large enough for the statistics to be wholly reliable, they are suggestive. Six of the thirty-eight destriers in the valuation list were killed, or about 15 per cent. This was roughly double the overall percentage of losses; in all, 110 horses were slain, out of a total of about 1,350. The records reveal that Sir John Botetourt lost a destrier at Falkirk, as did two of the three knights listed in his retinue, as well as his brother Guy. Those of the retinue described as valetti lost no horses. It looks as if Botetourt and his knights led a charge, with fatal results for their mounts.85 Similarly, Sir Robert FitzPayn, with a retinue of nineteen, lost his destrier, and two of his knights their horses. Only two of his valetti did so.86 Sir Henry Beaumont lost his destrier in the battle, while his knight’s horse was killed. None of those of lesser rank in his retinue lost horses.87 It seems evident that those mounted on destriers were in the forefront of the charges, when they were confronted by the solid Scottish formations, bristling with firmly anchored pikes. Falkirk was not a disaster for the majority of the destriers, but the losses among them were a foretaste of what would happen at Courtrai in 1302, Bannockburn in 1314 and the many other battles of the first half of the fourteenth century in which infantry triumphed over mounted troops. The traditional image of the medieval knight mounted on a lumbering destrier resembling a modern draught horse, standing seventeen or eighteen hands tall, has understandably been derided. Most warhorses were probably no more than fifteen hands. However, destriers were distinct from the great majority of warhorses, and the evidence of their diet strongly suggests that it was size that distinguished them. Regrettably, the English documentary material, extensive as it is, does not provide specific measurements to prove the size of these elite warhorses. However, one indenture listed the horses in the royal stud at Knowle in 1291, where there were four stallions. One was old and feeble, but the other three were described as ‘dextrarii magni et pulchri’.88 The appearance and overall conformation of the destriers in Edward I’s armies can never be more than a matter of conjecture, but they were surely ‘big and beautiful’.

The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, ed. H. Rothwell, Camden Society 3rd ser., 89 (1957), p. 328. 85 Scotland in 1298, pp.  166–7. For a slightly different breakdown of the figures, see Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World, pp. 160, 237. 86 Scotland in 1298, p. 171. 87 Ibid., p. 172. 88 TNA, E 101/97/6; Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World, p. 168. 84

2

Cum Equis Discoopertis: The ‘Irish’ Hobelar in the English Armies of the Fourteenth Century Robert W. Jones

The hobelar is very much the poor relation in the study of the English armies of the fourteenth century, eclipsed by both the man-at-arms and the archer. Our understanding of his origins and role has been wholly based on only two major studies of this troop type: J. E. Morris’ ‘Mounted Infantry Warfare’ in 1914 and J. Lydon’s ‘The Hobelar: An Irish Contribution to Medieval Warfare’ in 1954.1 The lack of interest might be considered surprising, given that Morris saw him as the precursor to the mounted longbowman, while Lydon called him ‘the most effective fighting man of the age’, referring to the hobelar as ‘an entirely different type of mounted soldier’.2 Yet other historians have been happy to accept the conclusions of Morris and Lydon, considering the hobelar only in passing.3 Perhaps the reason that so little work has been done on him is that he is always considered in comparison to the man-at-arms – the elite warrior, in his shining harness, doyen of chivalry and a core element of the medieval political and social elite – and the longbowman – the almost super-heroic, J. E. Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry in Medieval Warfare’, TRHS 3rd ser., 8 (1914), pp. 77–102; J. Lydon, ‘The Hobelar: An Irish Contribution to Medieval Warfare’, Irish Sword 2 (1954), pp. 12–16. 2 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 101; Lydon, ‘The Hobelar’, p. 13. 3 See, for example, D. Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Sourcebook, I (London, 1996), pp. 165, 173, 180, 204, and 265–6; M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages (New Haven and London, 1996), passim; R. Frame, ‘The Defence of the English Lordships, 1250–1450’, in A Military History of Ireland, ed. T. Bartlett and K. Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 76–98, at p. 80: ‘the hobelar or mounted lancer, who rode to war but fought on foot’. P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. M. Jones (London, 1985), p. 71, calls the hobelars ‘English’ and states that they were used in campaigns against the Welsh. He also discusses other forms of light cavalry, such as the Turcopoles in the Holy Land, mounted Saracen archers in southern Italy and the Catalan alforrats. 1

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Hundred Years’ War-winning, nationalistic symbol of medieval English, and Welsh, martial prowess. By contrast, there is little if any mention of the hobelar in the battle narratives of the middle ages; they have no great role to play in the successes of the English over the French. They do not form a political and social class within medieval society and there is no way, therefore, to discuss their impact outside of the military sphere.4 It is also almost certain that their Irish origins have counted against them too. Medieval Ireland has been considered militarily backwards by most historians of warfare, who seem to have inherited something of the dismissive tone of their English sources. Another reason for the lack of serious work may be because the hobelar’s presence in English armies was relatively short-lived. They first appear on Edward I’s Scottish campaign of 1296, after which their numbers increase rapidly. Some 490 served in the contingent from Ireland for the 1304 campaign, and one thousand were requested (but did not arrive) for that of 1332. By the 1350s his numbers had dwindled again, and they all but vanish by the time of Crécy, superseded by the mounted longbowman who, combining the hobelar’s mobility with the archer’s firepower, became an essential part of English armies for the next two hundred years.5 The origins of the hobelar, say Morris and Lydon, lie in Ireland. Their evidence seems conclusive. The term is first seen in documents relating to the contingent brought by John de Wogan, Justiciar of Ireland, for the 1296 campaign, and over the next decade Edward’s forces included an increasing number of hobelars in the Irish contingents. The derivation of the term ‘hobelar’ stems from the hobby or hobin, the small horse that these troops habitually rode, this name in turn coming from the Gaelic word obann meaning ‘swift’.6 According to Morris and Lydon, the hobelar was unlike any cavalry present in England at the time, being mounted on a small pony, without the caparison of the ‘heavy’ cavalryman and equipped with only a mail shirt, a helmet, a sword, and a spear. He was therefore unsuited for ‘shock action’, the ‘only duty of cavalry’.7 However, he was an excellent scout and raider, perfect for the style of warfare common in Ireland and most effective in the Scottish campaigns of the fourteenth century. This assertion may be challenged, however. The etymology of the name ‘hobelar’ does, at first, seem to be correct. Although both French and Latin word lists include a number of variaThe social origins of the hobelar are considered as an aside in Gary Baker’s ‘Investigating the Socio-Economic Origins of English Archers in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century’, Journal of Medieval Military History 12 (2014), pp. 173–216. 5 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p.  78; Lydon, ‘The Hobelar’, p.  13; Baker, ‘Origins of English Archers’, p. 183. 6 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, pp. 80–1; Lydon, ‘The Hobelar’, p. 13. 7 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 78; Lydon, ‘The Hobelar’, p. 13. 4



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tions – hobeleor, hobler and the like in French and hobelarius, hobelerius, hobiliarius and so forth in Latin – the examples given all stem from the fourteenth century and later, and the variations in spelling suggest that this is a neologism based on a word foreign to both. Furthermore, the majority are from documents connected with the deeds or government of Edward III, which is of course just what one might expect.8 However, there are cognate words in French which might be suggestive of a Continental derivation. There is the bird of prey called a hobby, small and swift. In French this is rendered as hobet, houbet, but also hobereau, hobeler or hober which, according to Le Grand Robert, derives from the medieval Flemish hobeleu, meaning to budge or move oneself (se bouger in modern French, but hober or ober in that of the fourteenth century according to the Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue Française).9 Such etymological arguments are far from clear, and the Franco-Flemish evidence cannot wholly refute Morris’ assertion of a Gaelic origin for the term hobelar, but it does make it much less certain.

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Whilst some scholars have suggested a tradition of mounted combat in Ireland, from which Morris and Lydon claim the hobelar evolved, there is very little evidence for this. Such a view seems to have arisen in part because of Gerald of Wales’ Topographia Hiberniae. In one chapter he describes ‘the nature, customs and character of the people’ of Ireland, including how they treat their babies, their style of clothing, how they ride, and how they fight in battle. These last two paragraphs read: When they are riding, they do not use saddles or leggings or spurs. They drive on, and guide their horses by means of a stick with a crook at its upper end, which they hold in their hand. They use reins to serve the purpose both of a bridle and bit. These do not keep the horses, accustomed to feeding on grass, from their food. Moreover, they go naked and unarmed into battle. They regard weapons as a burden, and they think it brave and honourable to fight unarmed. They use,

For the French occurrences of the word, see Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue Française 5, ed. F. Godefroy (Paris, 1885), p.  480, and for the Latin, see R. E. Latham, Revised Medieval Latin Word‐list (London, 1965), p. 227. 9 For the bird, see P. Robert, Le Grand Robert de la langue Française, ed. A. Rey, V (Paris, 1996), p.  211; Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue Française, p.  481. For the verb hober, see Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue Française, p.  480. In the latter part of the sixteenth century hobereau also referred to a country gentleman ‘de petite noblesse’, a squire in the modern English sense of the word, which might be of interest given the conclusions below. 8

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robert w. jones however, three types of weapon – short spears, two darts (in this they imitate the Basclenses), and big axes …10

It seems that many historians have linked these together, to create a javelin‐ armed horseman riding bareback.11 In truth, the greater part of the evidence for the use of horses in battle by the native Irish comes from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Katharine Simms, writing on Gaelic warfare, describes cavalry as an important part of cattle raids, but the earliest of her examples is from shortly after 1240, nearly a century beyond the first Cambro‐Norman incursions; we should consider how far we might be seeing the impact of the Anglo‐Norman military culture upon the Irish, a factor recognised in other areas of West European expansion during the period.12 Evidence prior to and at the time of the Conquest of 1170 does not appear to support the argument for widespread use of light cavalry by the Gaelic Irish. Neither Gerald of Wales’ Expugnatio Hibernica nor the Norman‐French chanson The Song of Dermot and the Earl make any mention of mounted Irish troops during the early phase of the Conquest that they both cover.13 In part, this may be ascribed to the fact that the fighting at this point took the form of assaults upon coastal towns or ambushes launched from heavily wooded country, neither actions conducive to the use of cavalry. It is also the case that these were not solely, or even primarily, Gaelic settlements, but consisted of the Ostmen, Scandinavian settlers whose own military tradition was very much infantry-based. However, Irish sources are no more forthcoming than the Expugnatio or The Song. The Cogadh Gaedhel re Gallaibh, the twelfth‐century narrative of Brian Boruma’s war against the Norse, makes no mention of cavalry in combat, even though it concludes with the pitched battle of Clontarf, and whilst

‘Item sellis equitando non utuntur, non ocreis, non calcaribus. Virga tantum, quam manu gestant, in superiori parte camerata, tam equos excitant quam ad cursus invitant. Frenis quidem utuntur, tam chami quam freni vice fungentibus. Quibus et equi, semper herbis assueti, ad pabula nequaquam impediuntur. Praeterea, nudi et inermes ad bella procedunt. Habent enim arma pro onere; inermes vero dimicare pro audacia reputant et honere. Tribus tantum utuntur armorum generibus; lanceis non longis, et jaculis binis, in quibus et Basclensium morem sunt imitati; securibus quoque amplis…’; Giraldi Cambrensis, ‘Topographia Hibernica’, Opera, ed. J. Dimock, 5 (London, 1867), pp. 150–1; Gerald of Wales, The History and Topography of Ireland, trans. J. O’Meara (London, 1982), p. 101. 11 See, for example, Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Sourcebook 1, pp. 77 and 128; A. Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse (Stroud, 1994), p. 103. 12 K. Simms, ‘Warfare in the Medieval Gaelic Lordships’, Irish Sword 12 (1975), pp.  98–108. For the cross‐fertilisation of military cultures, see R. Bartlett, ‘Technique Militaire et Pouvoir Politique, 900‐1300’, Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 41 (1980), pp. 1135–59 and R. Bartlett, The Making of Europe (London, 1993), pp. 60–84. 13 Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibernica, trans. A. B. Scott and F. X. Martin (Dublin, 1978); The Song of Dermot and the Earl, ed. and trans. G. H. Orpen (Oxford, 1892). 10



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the annals do refer to cavalry engagements around the time of the Anglo‐ Norman conquest, such entries are rare and lack detail, a typical one reading: A hosting by Conchobar Ua Briain, and by the men of Mumha into Laighlen, and they took their hostages, and they proceeded from thence into Midhe, and plundered the island of Loch Semdidhe. Their cavalry and the cavalry of Connacht met there, and the cavalry of Connacht were defeated.14

The sparsity of evidence in the annals is reinforced in John V. Kelleher’s article on the battle of Móin Mhór in 1151. In spite of this being a major engagement between two powerful kings, there is no evidence that either force fought predominantly from horseback.15 Whilst there is only a little evidence for the use of horses as battlefield weapons, this is not to say that the Irish made no use of them whatsoever. There is evidence that the Irish nobility were very interested in equestrianism and that, far from being limited to ‘hobbies’, as Lydon indicates, a twelfth‐century Book of Rights listing items given by an over‐king to his vassals includes a wide variety of horses, such as ‘horses for racing’, ‘steeds of the road’, and ‘horses used to hosting’.16 The book also mentions horses imported from Scotland and France, and it is known that Welsh horses were imported for breeding.17

* * *

In Chrétien de Troye’s romance Erec and Enide, The Haughty Knight of the Heath rides into the melée on an Irish horse, which bears him ‘violently forward’, and Chrétien refers to it as a ‘charger’.18 This suggests that, to Cogadh Gaedhel re Gallaibh: The War of the Gaedhil with the Gaill, ed. and trans. J. Henthorn Todd (London, 1867); Annals of Loch Cé, ed. and trans. W. M. Hennessy, 1 (London, 1871) for the year 1130. There are similar entries in this annal for the years 1128, 1130, 1236, and 1256, and in the Annals of Ulster, 2, ed. and trans. B. McCarthy (Dublin, 1893) for the years 1099, 1128, 1131 and 1247. 15 J. V. Kelleher, ‘The Battle of Móin Mhór 1151’, Celtica 20 (1988), pp. 11–27. 16 See M. T. Flanagan, ‘Irish and Anglo-Norman Warfare in Twelfth‐Century Ireland’, in A Military History of Ireland, ed. T. Bartlett and K. Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), p. 64. The items listed in this document make the book seem very like an Anglo-Saxon heriot: see N. P. Brooks, ‘Arms and Status in Late Saxon England’, in Ethelred the Unready, ed. D. Hill (Oxford, 1978), pp.  81–103. Finbar McCormick has suggested that the riding horse was an animal reserved for those of kingly status in early medieval Ireland (‘The Horse in Early Ireland’, Anthropozoologica 42, no. 1 (2007), pp. 85–104). 17 N. A. James, ‘Horses in Medieval Welsh Court Poetry’ and S. Davies, ‘Horses in the Mabinogion’, in The Horse in Celtic Culture, ed. S. Davies and N. A. Jones (Cardiff, 1997), pp. 90, 136. 18 ‘De l’autre part, encontre lui/ point li Orguelleus de la Lande,/ et sist sor un cheval d’Irlande/ qui le porte de grant ravine./ sor l’escu, devant la pointrine,/ le fiert Erec de tel vertue/ que del destrier l’a abatu’. Chrétien de Troyes, ‘Erec et Enide’, in Les romans 14

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the late twelfth‐century mind (Erec and Enide was written around 1169), Irish horses need not have been small and unsuitable for ‘heavy cavalry’. Indeed the evidence would appear to indicate that the Irish were using horses of a number of different conformations for a number of different purposes. Horses were expensive, high‐status items, and an interest in horseflesh is typical of medieval aristocracies. The Carolingians, Anglo‐Saxons and Normans all had highly sophisticated royal stud farms, and it would be surprising if the Irish nobility did not take a similar interest and pride in these status symbols.19 What we appear to have in Ireland is not a Gaelic light-cavalry culture, with the majority of warriors riding into battle, as suggested by Nicolle,20 but a nobility similar to that in Anglo‐Saxon England or Wales, where Gerald of Wales tells us, ‘Their leaders ride into battle on swift mettlesome horses which are bred locally. Most of the common people prefer to fight on foot, in view of the marshy uneven terrain. The horsemen will often dismount as circumstance and occasion demand, ready to flee or attack.’21 This is not where we find the light horse of either Morris or Nicolle. So, if we are no longer certain of the Gaelic derivation of his name, or of the Gaelic origin of his style of combat, is it possible to suggest that the hobelar is in fact an import and that he came across the Irish Sea, perhaps with the Cambro‐Norman settlers in the twelfth century? In the Expugnatio Hibernica Gerald of Wales gives his formula for the conquest of the Irish.22 In this chapter he outlines the shortcomings of the French knight in the type of warfare present in Ireland: There is a great difference between warfare in France on the one hand and in Ireland and Wales on the other. In France men choose the open plains for their battles, but in Ireland and Wales rough, wooded country; there heavy armour is a mark of distinction, here it is only a burden; there victory is won by standing firm, here by mobility; there knights are taken prisoner, here they are beheaded; there they are ransomed, here they are butchered.

de Chrétien de Troyes, ed. Mario Roques, 1 (Paris, 1953), p. 65; Chrétien de Troyes, ‘Erec and Enide’, in Arthurian Romances, trans. C. W. Carroll and W. W. Kibler (London, 1991), p. 64. 19 For royal studs, see R. H. C. Davis, ‘The Warhorses of the Normans’, Anglo-Norman Studies 10 (1987), pp. 67–81 and The Medieval Warhorse (London, 1989), pp. 38–42, 74, 81, and 137; Hyland, Medieval Warhorse, pp. 62–3 and 83–5. 20 Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Sourcebook, 1, pp. 77 and 128. 21 ‘Equis autem cursoribus et generosis, quos patria gignit, nobiliores ad bella feruntur. Pars autem populi major, propter terras palustres pariter et inaequales, ad praelia pedestres incedunt. Equites autem, pro locorum et temporum opportunitate, seu fugiendo seu fugando facile pedites fiunt’; Giraldi Cambrensis, ‘Descriptio Kambriae’, Opera, 6 (London, 1868), p.  181; Gerald of Wales, The Journey through Wales/The Description of Wales, trans. L. Thorpe (London, 1978), p. 234. 22 Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio, pp. 244–9.



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When two armies meet in battle out on the plains, that heavy armour, consisting of several layers of linen or steel, gives soldiers excellent protection and is most becoming. But equally, when the fighting takes place only within a restricted space, or over wooded or boggy ground, where there is scope for foot soldiers rather than horsemen, light armour is far superior. For light arms are quite sufficient for use against enemies who are not armoured. Any battle against these is either won or lost immediately, generally in the very first encounter. In that situation it is inevitable that an enemy who is mobile and in retreat over confined or difficult terrain can only be routed by an equally mobile force pressing hard on them, and only lightly armed. For owing to the weight of that armour with its many layers, and saddles which are high and curved back, men have difficulty in dismounting, even more difficulty in mounting, and find advancing on foot, when the need arises, most difficult of all.23

This is almost exactly the same problem that Morris and Lydon argue the English armies were facing on campaign in Scotland during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Gerald also offers a solution to the problem. He advocates the use of ‘that breed of men which has been brought up in the Welsh borders and trained in the warfare that goes on in those parts’, because ‘when the changing conditions of war demand it, they are skilled horsemen at one moment, at another quick-moving infantry’.24 These men, of course, were the Geraldine clan and their adherents, men of south Wales who had been major players in the initial invasion of Ireland and were Gerald’s kinsmen. It is possible to argue that Gerald is in fact over‐emphasising the role of his relatives; it is certain that in other sections of his narrative they get more than their fair share of the limelight. However, it is also true that at the time he was writing, there were light‐armed, mobile troops serving in the Welsh March. In his book Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches, Suppe describes a type of soldier called a ‘muntator’, who is found in the records of the ‘Gallica tamen milicia multum ab Hibernica, sicut et a Kambrica distare dinoscitur. Ibi namque plana petuntur, hic aspera; ibi campestria, hic silvestria; ibi arma honori, hic oneri; ibistabilitate vincitur, hic agilitate; ibi capiunutur milites, hic decapitantur; ibi redimuntur, hic perimuntur. Sicut igitur ubi militares acies de plano conveniunt, gravis illa et multiplex armatura, atm linea scilicet quam ferrea, milites egregie munit et ornat, sic ubi solum in arto confligitur, seu loco silvestri seu palustri, ubi pedites potius quam equites locum habent, longe levis armatura prestancior. Contra inermes namque viros, quibus semper in primo fere impetu vel parta est statim vel perdita victoria, expediciora satis arma sufficiunt, ubi fugitivam et agilem per arta vel aspera gentem sola necesse est gravi quadam et armata mediocriter agilitate confundi. Cum illa nimirum armatura multiplici, sellisque recurvis et altis difficile descenditur, difficilius ascenditur, difficillime, cum opus est, pedibus itur.’ Ibid., pp. 246–7. 24 ‘In omni igitur expedicione sive Hibernica sive Kambrica, gens in Kambrie marchia nutrita, gens hostilibus parcium illarum conflictibus exercitata, competentissima […] cum alea martis exegerit, nunc quis habilis, nuunc pedibus agilis inventa […].’ Ibid., pp. 246–7. 23

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counties of Shropshire and Staffordshire in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.25 There are remarkable similarities between this ‘horseman armed with a hauberk, an iron helmet, and a lance’ and the fourteenth‐century hobelar. Suppe suggested that the muntator ‘constituted a mobile force of lightly armed cavalry … ideal for pursuit of small bands of Welsh raiders on foot … Patrols of muntators would be eminently suited for locating parties of Welsh on foot and forcing them into battle’.26 This is much the same role as that performed by Robert le Brut, ‘an Irish hobelur [sic.], retained to spy the passings and haunts of the enemy by night and day’ in July 1299, and of Gerald’s ideal soldier for Ireland.27 In fact their regular employment in the garrisons of the Scottish border towns suggests very similar use to that recognised for the muntator by Suppe, taking into account the more intense level of conflict on the Scots border at the time. Morris records that in August 1311 in the castles of Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Stirling, Perth, Dundee and Bothwell there were some seventy-three hobelars, approximately half the number of archers and one-seventh the number of heavy cavalry, which were presumably men‐at‐ arms and sergeants in Morris’ understanding of the terms.28 It would also go some way to explaining the persistence of hobelars in commissions of array and some English coastal garrisons into the fifteenth century.29 Here, then, we have perhaps the strongest evidence for an Anglo‐Norman origin for the hobelar. Shropshire and Staffordshire are two counties from which large numbers of the first Cambro‐Norman settlers in Ireland originated.30 It is not inconceivable that these marcher nobles, recognising the success of the muntator against the Welsh, introduced them to Ireland to deal with the similar situation there. Then, around a hundred years later, being asked to serve in wars against an elusive Scottish foe, the lords in Ireland brought the muntator back across the Irish Sea, but under a name with a Gaelic origin: ‘hobelar’. Even if a direct link with the muntator cannot be proven, a Welsh link is suggested by the etymology of the old French verb hober, as discussed above. Its Flemish origins might suggest a link with the Flemish settlers in the Geraldine stronghold of Pembrokeshire. If not actually a Shropshire muntator, he might well have been a similar Pembroke hobelier – not a man who was mounted, but one who shifted himself. So, if the hobelar can be linked to the muntator, what were the origins of the latter? Unlike in Gaelic Ireland, historians have not suggested that the F. Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 63–85. Ibid., p. 85. 27 CDS, ii, no. 1084, quoted in Lydon, ‘The Hobelar’, p. 14. 28 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 82. 29 A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013), p. 180. 30 B. Smith, Conquest and Colonisation in Medieval Ireland (Cambridge, 1999), p. 38. 25

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native Welsh fought from horseback, and there is therefore no suggestion that the muntator is Celtic in origin. Although Nicolle suggests a possible link with pre‐Conquest ‘riding men’, there would seem to be little evidence for a Saxon origin either.31 Gerald of Wales’ horsemen are not Welsh, but rather Cambro‐Normans, who have become accustomed to a different kind of terrain. Suppe has recognised similarities between the muntator and the so‐called second‐class cavalry, or equites classis secundae, which existed under a number of terms such as, in Latin, loricatus, scutiferus, servientes equitans, eques levis armaturae, and in French, serjans, damoiseau, and ecuyer.32 However, both Contamine and Smail agree that this second‐class cavalry differed from the knights only in terms of their social rank and the expense and quality of their equipment.33 Similarly, Morris says that the English heavy cavalry, ‘whether the superior knights or the inferior scutiferi,’ fought in the same way, that is with the couched lance and at the charge.34 This is not what we have seen to be the primary role of either the muntator or the hobelar, and it would seem to suggest that they cannot be tactically related to the non‐knightly cavalry of Western Europe. Yet in all other respects they do appear to be very similar. There is even a technical, tenurial link, for the service of two muntators was the equivalent to that of one knight, as was that of two sergeants.35 The equipment of the muntator is not all that different from the equipment of the knightly cavalry of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries – a mail shirt, a helmet, a shield, and a lance – and these knightly cavalry were capable of performing a charge at lance‐point. The different sizes of horse might be a factor in distinguishing between the two, but I suspect that the small size of the muntator and hobelar’s mounts has been overplayed. Warhorses of the twelfth century were around fourteen or fifteen hands high, and ponies need not necessarily be smaller than this; the distinction is one of conformation (that is to say, bone structure, musculature, gait and the like) rather than height.36 By the thirteenth century the disparity in equipment between the secondclass cavalry and milites had grown significantly, the latter now armoured cap á pied in mail, sporting arm and leg protections of cuir bouilli or iron plates, and wearing full head helms rather than iron caps.37 However the equipment of the classis secundae cavalry remains very similar to that of the muntator. Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Sourcebook, 1, p. 114. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp.  69–70; R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge, 1989), p. 111. Suppe makes the same link (Military Institutions, pp. 75–8). 33 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 70; Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 111. 34 Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 78. 35 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 65. 36 See Hyland, Medieval Warhorse, pp. 1–2. 37 For a visual depiction of the thirteenth‐century knight, see the vivid depictions 31

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The same cannot be said of the hobelar. In the fourteenth century the difference between the hobelar and the man‐at‐arms is significant. The latter wore large amounts of plate armour. A sergeant might not be so well equipped, but by the time the hobelar arrived on the scene, even he would be wearing some form of plate defence. The difference between the hobelar and the fourteenth‐century ‘second class’ cavalry is also indicated by the fact that, under Edward I, the hobelar was paid 6d per day, half that of a sergeant (1 shilling), and a quarter of that of the knight (2 shillings).38 This may suggest a disparity in the equipment of the hobelar and the sergeant, but one should not ignore the fact that pay scales were also set according to social rank, so in part the difference will have been one of ‘breeding’ – the hobelar coming from a lower social class then either the sergeant or the knight. This question of the ‘breeding’ of the hobelar goes some way to help in understanding why Morris failed to see the link between the hobelar and the ‘second‐class’ cavalry. He may have been blinded by the terminology, seeing different terms as denoting a new type of soldier, and assuming that the hobelar, as light cavalry, had to be of a different order from the knightly and near-knightly heavy cavalry, including the serjans and squire. This impression would have been reinforced by the fact that the hobelar came out of Ireland – traditionally seen as having an alien military culture – and bore a name of apparently Gaelic origin. Lydon’s work, published in a journal on Irish military history and entitled ‘an Irish contribution to medieval warfare’, was almost bound to follow this idea of the hobelar as new and indigenous to Ireland. Subsequent historians also failed to question Morris’ conclusions because of this problem of translating medieval military terminology, as Stephen Morillo has discussed in his article ‘Milites, Knights and Samurai: Military terminology, comparative history, and the problem of translation’.39 Military terms, or ‘soldier‐words’ as Morillo calls them, have different emphases and connotations depending on the vector of meaning being used, be it functional, organisational or social. Thus, the same word can mean diverse things in documents of different purposes or periods.40 of battle in the Morgan Crusader Bible (formerly known as the Maciejowski Bible), published as Old Testament Miniatures: A Medieval Picturebook (New York, 1969). 38 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 84. 39 S. Morillo, ‘Milites, Knights and Samurai: Military Terminology, Comparative History, and the Problem of Translation’, in The Normans and their Adversaries at War, ed. R. Abels and B. Bachrach (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 167–84. 40 ‘The terminology used for those heavy cavalry who were not knights changed in the course of time; under Edward I, there were still sergeants in the royal household, but most non-knightly cavalrymen were termed squires (scutiferi) or valets (valetti), terms which might be synonymous. Later, all might simply be called men-at-arms (armigeri).’ M. Prestwich, ‘Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War’, TRHS 6th ser. 5 (1995), pp. 201–20, at p. 202.



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The misinterpretation of medieval terms that are still in use today, or the use of modern ‘soldier‐words’ and categorisations in the process of translation, can cause even greater problems. The latter is inevitable, since medieval military history is a product of the military culture of nineteenth‐ century Western Europe. The modern study of military history was born in the staff colleges of the European powers in the mid-nineteenth century, with the aim of teaching cadet officers the fundamental and eternal laws of war. In order to do this, battles and campaigns throughout history were selected to be compared and contrasted with each other. The only way in which conclusions could be drawn from these examples was if a common frame of reference was imposed. Because the lessons learned had to be applied on the contemporary battlefield, the most sensible framework to use was that of the modern way of warfare; it was familiar and therefore easily comprehended. But the military culture of nineteenth‐century Europe was not the same as that of medieval Europe. Morris recognised this, warning of the dangers of using modern definitions of ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ cavalry when dealing with medieval horsemen. One cannot avoid using modern phrases, but one need not think of the Lifeguards or Blues and Royals when talking of ‘heavy’ cavalry, or of hussars when talking of ‘light’ cavalry of the middle ages; medieval ‘mounted infantry’ were not like seventeenth‐century dragoons, nor were they companies of line battalions put on horseback for special purposes.41 Yet the military culture of the nineteenth century is still superimposed on that of the middle ages. In nineteenth‐century military culture, troops were organised by types, with each – heavy cavalry, light cavalry, dragoons, line infantry, light infantry, grenadiers, foot artillery, horse artillery et cetera ad nauseum – having a strictly defined role within the prosecution of war, and each soldier receiving specific equipment and training designed solely to fulfil that role. It would be very rare for one type of soldier to be found performing the tasks of another (say, for example heavy cavalry fighting on foot as infantry), and uncommon for troops to move from one branch of service to another, even as officers. Medieval military culture did not have these strict definitions. Although various Assizes of Arms and similar documents outline what a particular individual should have in terms of military equipment, there is no evidence to suggest that this placed any limit upon the functions he could be asked to perform or the weapons and armour he might own. The Assize of Arms was not a sumptuary law seeking to restrict the equipment that an individual should have, but a means of ensuring a minimum level of readiness. Thus, when Morris understands the hobelar as a new troop type, and sees that ‘the only duty of cavalry was to charge, not to scout’, 41

Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 78.

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he is interpreting the evidence according to the nineteenth‐century military culture still so familiar in the armed forces of the twentieth century.42 More recent writers have fallen into the same trap. In her article ‘Armour and Military Dress in Thirteenth‐ and Early Fourteenth‐Century England’, Frédérique Lachaud cites an entry in the Royal Wardrobe accounts for July 1297 of one ‘Geoffrey de Creal, a mounted sergeant of the king’, who received ‘an aketon, a gambeson, a pair of horse trappers, a pair of cuisses, a haubergeon, a bascinet, a chapel de fer, a gorger, a pair of gloves of plate, a crossbow, a saddle and a targe’ for his services in France.43 She goes on to say that de Creal, ‘clearly fought as heavy cavalry’, presumably because of the evidence of the heavy armour – cuisses, bascinet, gorger, et cetera – and horse trappers.44 If this is the case, what are we to make of the inclusion of the crossbow and targe? This is not, after all, the equipment one expects to be carried by a heavy cavalryman, but that of a foot soldier. Perhaps de Creal was being equipped for a range of challenges he might face in the course of his military duties, which could include not only service on horseback as heavy cavalry but also on foot as a crossbowman. The writer of what is still considered to be one of the foremost works on the warfare of the Crusades, R. C. Smail, wrote: the term levis armatura meant only that they were not so well equipped as the wealthier milites; it did not mean that they were normally used as light, and the knights as heavy, cavalry, with all the tactical implications which such a contrast would imply to a modern reader. Occasionally the fact that they were lightly equipped was put to some special military purpose; they were sent as ‘speculatores’ on reconnaissance, or they were employed as skirmishers. Usually, however, they are not associated in the texts with specialized functions, and they appear to have gone into action with the knights.45

Here again the link is made between the eques classis secundae and the milites. Whilst Smail, like Morris, warns against using modern definitions of heavy and light cavalry, he then goes on to assign ‘special military purposes’ to the levis armatura that are wholly congruent with the ‘modern’ roles of light cavalry. In fact, acting as scouts or skirmishers may not have been considered a specialised task by medieval warriors. Those of the knightly class, and even some of the highest aristocracy, were quite prepared to perform just such functions. After landing at Pevensey at the start of the Hastings campaign, ‘William was quick to investigate the region and its inhabitIbid. F. Lachaud, ‘Armour and Military Dress in Thirteenth‐ and Early Fourteenth‐ Century England’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), p. 352. 44 Ibid., pp. 344–66, at p. 353. 45 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 111. 42 43



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ants with a company of no more than twenty‐five knights’.46 During the siege of Alençon, in the war against Geoffrey Martel, no less a man than William FitzOsbern, the steward of Normandy, was sent ahead of the army on reconnaissance.47 That the knight was prepared to act as speculator reinforces the point that the nineteenth‐century concept of troops being particularly equipped for one role is anachronistic when applied to the middle ages. Just because a warrior had the equipment expected of a knight, it does not mean that he wore or used it all. In June 1189, William Marshal and four companions were sent by King Henry II to reconnoitre the advance of King Philip II of France and Count Richard of Le Mans. They did so, avoiding skirmishes with the enemy forces (according to the author of the Histoire) because of their greater mobility resulting from not wearing their hauberks. The following morning, when Henry himself went out to scout the enemy positions, he refused to take William because the latter was already fully armoured.48 In a similar fashion, the knight was not obliged to use a single type of horse whilst on campaign. The destrier, or ‘Great Horse’, was in fact a rare appearance on the battlefield.49 Andrew Ayton has shown that, according to the restauro equorum rolls, the number of such horses taken on campaign was actually very small, the vast majority of mounts being classified as coursers or rounceys.50 These types were good riding horses, bred for use as everyday riding animals or for the hunt. By contrast the ‘Great Horse’ was specifically bred and trained for the lance-armed charge. Ayton notes that these high-value beasts do not generally appear in the records for campaigns in Ireland or Scotland, but are most obvious in those for campaigns on the Continent, where knights obviously believed that the opportunity for mounted combat in pitched battle were greatest.51 There are occasional

‘Guillelmus uero cum uiginti quinque, non amplis militum comitatu promptus ipse loca et incolas explorauit.’ William of Poitiers, Gesta Guillelmi Ducis, ed. and trans. R. H. C. Davis and M. Chibnall (Oxford, 1998), pp.  114–15. Ever the sycophantic biographer, William of Poitiers notes that the Duke’s actions were unusual both in his own time and classically, when even Pompey Magnus and Julius Caesar would send ‘exploratores’ to scout rather than exposing themselves to personal danger, separated from the whole army. However, this should not be taken to mean that the writer is referring to specialist troops. 47 Ibid., pp. 26–7. 48 The History of William Marshal, ed. A. J. Holden, trans. S. Gregory (London, 2002), i, pp. 426–7 and 432–5. 49 For fuller discussion of the nature and role of the destrier, see the paper in this volume by Michael Prestwich. 50 A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 63–4. 51 Ibid. It is tempting, given the development of an English tactical doctrine that saw men-at-arms fight on foot, to suggest that the destrier was not in fact being taken across for battle, but instead for the opportunities to participate in tournaments and deeds of arms. 46

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references to men-at-arms having horses valued under the designation of ‘hobby’, but these are very rare.52 If we can become confused by the tactical and equipment vectors of medieval soldier-words, then the social vector is even more fraught with problems. Earlier I suggested that the hobelar was paid less than the knight or the sergeant because he was drawn from a lower social class. However, as the fourteenth century progressed this was less likely to be the case. The rise of the non-knightly gentry and of the yeoman landholder, and their involvement in the military community, rapidly blurred the old boundaries between the military and social elite. Gary Baker has argued that there is no clear indication that the mounted archers were simply ‘former hobelars armed with bows’, nor that the hobelar and mounted archer came from the same socio-economic circles.53 Some hobelars, it is true, appear in later records described as archers, but equally many hobelars appear later as men-at-arms. He highlights that the hobelars who were still retained in the last half of the fourteenth century might well be ‘more socially akin’ to the archer, by dint of their economic resources. Being only able to command a wage of 8d brought them closer to the archer, being paid 6d, than to the man-at-arms and his wage of 12d.54 It would also be a matter of the individual’s ability to keep up with the latest developments in harness although, as we have seen, the equipment did not necessarily determine the status of the owner. There is one example concerning hobelars that hints at the very complex interplay of tactical role, social status and level of equipment that went into the definition of a soldier’s status in the middle ages. Amongst the petitions from the commander of the English garrison of Berwick to the administration of Edward II we find this: Information from [the keeper of Berwick] to the King that John le Hireis [Iirois] came to Berwick on Sunday in mid-Lent and left his men in Northumberland and sought leave to go to the parts of Carlisle to harass the enemy as the eastern borders were distant, and he was given leave and returned to his men and went, and they halted the enemy and much grieved them. Then John returned on the Monday after the octave of Easter and staged a muster before the chamberlain and [the keeper] of twenty-eight men suitably mounted and armed with aketon, hauberk and bacinet (where sufficient men less well provided in garrison receive 12d a day), and twenty-six hobelars normally equipped. It seemed to John that his men were not receiving appropriate pay, but the petitioners had been ordered to treat all as hobelars except John himself, who was allowed 12d a day. May the King recompense John as one who has deserved a reward, having grieved the enemy to the utmost of his power. God give you good news of your heir.55 52 53 54 55

Ibid. Baker, ‘Origins of English Archers’, pp. 182–5. Ibid., p. 185. From Northern Petitions Illustrative of life in Berwick, Cumbria and Durham in the



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Here we have a contingent (ironically, given the line of argument of this paper, led by John ‘the Irishman’) comprising both men-at-arms and hobilars , the former (for it has to be the men-at-arms who are referred to) being ‘suitably mounted and armed with aketon, hauberk and bacinet’ – ‘covenablement mountez et armes Daketoun Hauberioun et bacinetz’ – at least as well-equipped as other men-at-arms already within the garrison’s establishment, whilst the hobilars are normally equipped. Despite this, and the petitioners’ identifying of them as men-at-arms, their orders regarding pay (and presumably John’s commission for raising troops) only allowed for hobelars, apparently to the chagrin of the chamberlain and keeper of Berwick. Here the determination of the soldier-word used to describe these men was not based upon the functional vector (men-at-arms and hobelars had both been out to harass the enemy around Carlisle, and the men-atarms were covenablement mountez et armez to use the terminology of the time), nor social (the keeper and chamberlain are happy to refer to them as men-at-arms) but administrative.56 In short, they were being defined according to the requirements of the Exchequer’s purse-strings. Morris’ and Lydon’s assertions about the hobelar can be challenged therefore on a number of grounds: he need not have been part of a native Irish military culture; his name need not stem from a Gaelic word; his role is not unique or new in the fourteenth century, having been performed not only by the muntator on the Welsh March in the eleventh and twelfth but also, when circumstances demanded it, by those ‘heavy cavalrymen’, the knights and men‐at‐arms. Their final claim – that the hobelar had a lasting effect on the English conduct of war in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – must also be examined more closely. Baker has argued convincingly that hobelars did not automatically become mounted archers when the former fell out of favour.57 Men who at one time had been hobelars were equally likely to appear later as men-atarms as they were as mounted archers and, equally, mounted archers might once have been men-at-arms or indeed go on to serve as men-at-arms at a later date. Again, our nineteenth-century understanding of ‘soldier-words’ precludes us from seeing the flexibility and the separation of the social and functional vectors of military service.

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Fourteenth Century, ed. C. M. Fraser, Surtees Society, 194 (1981), pp.  62–3; the translated text is reproduced at http://www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/SOURCES/petitions.htm, accessed 21/17/2016. The petition is referred to in Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 92. 56 On the use of ‘man-at-arms’ as a unit of accountancy in military muster rolls, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 92. 57 Baker, ‘Origins of English Archers’.

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But what of a functional shift? Morris and Lydon both see the hobelar as being an ancestor of the mounted longbowman, born out of the epiphany that putting a lightly equipped man on a horse made him more manoeuvrable and effective. We have argued that this was no epiphany, and that such men had served in English armies from earliest times. Similarly, far from being an innovation in the fourteenth century, mounted archers (that is to say men armed with a bow who rode to battle, as opposed to horse archers, men who shot bows from horseback) are advocated as a vital part of Marcher warfare by Gerald of Wales in the twelfth century, and recorded in some numbers in his chronicle of the conquest of Ireland.58 They also appear regularly, if not in great numbers, throughout the forces raised in the thirteenth century.59 The novelty of the mounted longbowman, as with that of the hobelar, lies not in the combination of archers or lightly‐armed men with horses, but in the increasing numbers of the same in the field forces of royal campaigns. The innovation is not technological, but tactical, and the result of social and bureaucratic changes during the latter part of the fourteenth century – a point widely recognised for the longbowman per se, but not, it appears, when he was mounted. For the hobelar this has not been recognised at all. This chapter has sought to re‐evaluate Morris’ conclusions about the hobelar. It has argued that far from being a Gaelic Irish warrior arriving in mainland Britain and fighting in a new way, his origins may lie in the Welsh Marches or Pembrokeshire where, under the guise of the muntator or similar, he was just another form of the equites classis secundae, that group of non‐knightly cavalry that included the sergeants. This warrior was then reimported into the British mainland under the new name of ‘hobelar’. Having adapted to the different circumstances of warfare in Ireland, however, his equipment was lighter than that of the fourteenth‐century sergeants and therefore considered differently with regard to matters such as pay. It suggests that the reason Morris believed him to be something new was because he was working within a framework of nineteenth‐century military culture and values that served to distort his view of the medieval situation. This framework endures today, primarily because the ‘soldier‐words’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries form a convenient shorthand for describing troop types. Unfortunately the rigid definition of troop types that forms part of nineteenth‐century military culture does not allow for the flexibility of role and equipment that were found in medieval armies, nor for the shifting of those definitions to suit the social and administrative needs of the time, and thus can lead to a misrepresentation of medieval warfare. Far from being a sideshow of medieval military history, the hobelar should now perhaps take centre‐stage, as a microcosm of the major pitfalls in this field of study. Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio, passim. The mounted archers are given the distinctive Latin term of ‘arcarii’, whilst those on foot are ‘sagitarii pedestris’. 59 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 134–5. 58

3

Andrew Ayton, the Military Community and the Evolution of the Gentry in Fourteenth-Century England

Peter Coss

It seems to me that one of the great ironies of military history – the study of the most terrible of human endeavours – is its capacity to attract peaceloving gentlemen like Andrew Ayton and the late Maurice Keen. Like Maurice, Andrew has been in the vanguard of modern studies, a disciplined and clear-sighted campaigner, mindful of the collective interest and of the contributions of others, including those who went before – ‘companionship-in-arms’ is an appropriate analogy. In his early works Andrew called for the systematic exploitation of the voluminous but ‘unexplored’ records of military service and its prosopographical study.1 That the situation is now so radically changed is due in large measure to his approach and his endeavour. Like all successful captains he has been able to inspire others to further the enterprise, and to adapt to circumstances by following up on both his own and their subsequent successes. A further characteristic of his work is that he avoids seeing military service as a discrete area of life but looks rather at the interaction between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ dimensions. As he shows, there is a two-way traffic. On the one hand prevailing norms, in terms of social interaction, belief and behaviour, had profound implications for military recruitment, as he deftly demonstrates. Moreover, since society was not static but evolving, recruitment was, from the outset, dynamic even before the impact of military changes and developments. On the other hand, the high level of military involvement achieved by the English kings in their wars cannot have failed A. Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry’, in The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. A. Ayton and J. L. Price (London and New York, 1998), pp. 81–104, at p. 82.

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to have equally profound effects upon aristocratic society in general. While he has not dealt with this question systematically, he has thrown out challenges to historians of the gentry along the way. In his essay on the aristocracy at the outset of the Hundred Years’ War, Ayton effectively proffered his glove to those historians of the gentry who place their emphasis upon the role of landowners in county administration: ‘Given the range of military commitments facing the traditional warrior class in England at the start of the Hundred Years’ War, commitments involving the defence of the realm as well as the king’s expeditions to France, should we not conclude that war was the prime “public” activity of the gentry at this time?’2 Furthermore, ‘there were, at that time, more men of gentle blood taking up arms than were engaged in shire administration and related activities’.3 More recently, the work of David Simpkin in particular has allowed him to extend this argument back to the reigns of Edward I and Edward II.4 Using his characteristic terminology, he points to the high participation by lesser landowners as knights and sergeants in their wars, ‘the extent and depth of militarization’ forging a military community within the gentry and laying the foundations for the extraordinary manifestation of martial culture in the French wars of Edward III. He takes the 140 knights who fought in retinues at Falkirk in 1298 as a sample. Three-quarters of these men served in the king’s armies on at least three occasions, and over half of them at least five times. These ‘spells of service’ were significant ‘as vibrant landmarks in a martial tradition that had been grafted onto the lifestyle of the secular landowning community’. They also stood out by comparison with other forms of public service that the gentry might be called upon to perform. It would be wrong to imagine that ‘shire administration’ necessarily bulked larger in their lives, he argues, and this is hardly surprising given that the king required of the gentry far more warriors than administrators.5 The implications are clear. Historians need to pay less attention to the civilian and correspondingly more attention to the military side in their understanding of the evolution of the gentry. It is not enough, it seems, to regard the military and the civilian as two sides of the same coin. Their relative importance is also an issue. Here, I wish to take up the challenge and examine more directly the role of military service and the military commuA. Ayton, ‘Edward III and the English Aristocracy at the Beginning of the Hundred Years’ War’, in Armies and Warfare in Medieval France and Britain, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), pp. 173–206, at p. 200. 3 Ibid. 4 D. Simpkin, The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn (Woodbridge, 2008). 5 See especially, A. Ayton, ‘Armies and Military Communities in Fourteenth-Century England’, in Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen, ed. P. Coss and C. Tyerman (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 215–39, at pp. 222–3. 2



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nity in the evolution of the gentry. I will do so primarily by revisiting my own work on and around the subject but with particular reference to the studies of Ayton and Keen. What role was played by aristocratic militarism in the evolution of the gentry? Before embarking on this it is necessary to prepare the ground by outlining my understanding of the evolution of the gentry.6 I have examined the process by which the gentry was formed between the latter half of the thirteenth century and the middle decades of the fourteenth.7 In this period we see the development of a partnership in government between the state and the lesser nobility on the one hand, and on the other, the crystallization of the social gradation which became a feature of the gentry from then on. The gentry possessed an elite culture and a substantial landed base which gave a strong territorial dimension to the exercise of power. Territoriality, I argue, is vital to an understanding of the evolution of the gentry. It has four components: collective identity, status gradation, local public office and authority over the populace. A sea change occurred during the last two decades of the reign of Edward I, with an explosion of commissions, due very largely to the needs of the royal government, an expansion in which a large percentage of county knights was called upon to participate. By the 1320s, at least 75–80 per cent of county knights were involved. It was in the 1320s, too, that the Commons emerged as a political force, stimulating a stronger collective identity and involving increasing interaction between parliament and the counties. Nonand sub-knights participated increasingly in the several activities which had once been the exclusive prerogatives of the knights. The emergence of social gradation allowed the gentry to maintain a sense of social superiority while accommodating a degree of upward mobility into their ranks from lawyers, administrators and other aspirants.8 All of this was predicated upon the existence of an elite culture and this is where I have envisaged military values entering the fray. There can be no doubt that the ideology surrounding knighthood and military service to the king became immensely powerful in the period of the Scottish wars. Its effects in terms of disseminating a collective culture were undoubtedly more persuasive than anything that could be offered in the civilian sphere. The framework for the modern study of the fourteenth-century gentry was set by Nigel Saul, Knights and Esquires: The Gloucestershire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1981). See also M. J. Bennett, Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancashire Society in the Age of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (Cambridge, 1983), Nigel Saul, Scenes from Provincial Life: Knightly Families in Sussex, 1280–1400 (Oxford, 1986), and P. Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Cheshire 1277–1403 (Manchester, 1987). 7 The basic interpretation is contained in my essay, ‘The Formation of the English Gentry’, Past and Present 147 (1995), pp. 38–64 and the ideas developed in P. Coss, The Origins of the English Gentry (Cambridge, 2003). 8 On this point, see also P. Coss, The Foundations of Gentry Life: The Multons of Frampton and their World (Oxford, 2010), chs 1 and 10. 6

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Chivalric knighthood and its principle of exclusivity were already present in English society by the middle of the thirteenth century. However, as Ayton has stressed, repeated service in aristocratic retinues as campaign succeeded campaign extended its range and deepened its impact. For the great lords and bannerets, in particular, fighting was their raison d’être. As is well known the visual effect of heraldry and martial monuments was stunning, and affected virtually all areas of life. One thinks not only of the many depictions of active knights on sepulchral monuments of the various kinds but in particular of those showing bannerets with their warhorses or destriers and attendants and, at Westminster, the tombs of Edmund Crouchback, earl of Lancaster, and Sir Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke with their mounted and fully equipped knights.9 Heraldry, moreover – it needs to be emphasised – was not a static system but a living presence, denoting both old and new associations, often determined by retinue service. Heraldic schemes on tombs and in glass express the cohesive effects of this culture in glorious profusion. These allowed expression of ‘groupings’ that might be territorial, tenurial, kinship or retinue- and affinity-based. The bachelor knight could recognise himself, and be recognised by others, as a unit within a greater whole; in short, as a member of the military community. As we have said, the explosion of royal commissions drew in around 80 per cent of county knights. There were some, however, who even as late as the 1320s remained aloof from commissions, or if they did not they confined these to the keeping of castles and commissions of array. We can detect, therefore, the persistence of a purely militaristic and retinue-centred culture which eschewed civilian matters. Even though these were a minority among county knights their presence is indicative. It was their values that lay at the heart of aristocratic ideology. As Ayton has made clear, the members of a military community do not have to be of equal status for the concept to be viable. Far from it. However, one can expect the military culture to have been particularly pronounced among the bannerets, and within the general body of bachelor knights it was probably more dominant among the longstanding and key figures in retinues than perhaps among the more intermittent members.10 Collective identity was not everything, and there were dimensions to aristocratic culture that emphasised the individual family and its lineage.11 Here too, however, the prominence of the military content of aristocratic culture is plain for all to see. For what follows I am drawing specifically on my essay, ‘Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion in Edwardian England’, in Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), and on the studies reported there. 10 For fuller discussion of the the military and social role of bannerets in this period, see the article by David Simpkin in this volume. 11 The full panoply of meanings associated with knighthood is perhaps best seen 9



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Nevertheless, when this has been said, I am doubtful whether a simple dichotomy between military and civilian public duties is the best way to approach the issue, and I think that some refashioning of the argument might be useful. As we have seen from Ayton’s work, the dynamics of military recruitment tapped into pre-existing social networks. Of crucial importance was the retinue, itself an important component of the vertical lines of association that had long characterised aristocratic life. The retinue had in fact multiple purposes, not all of them bellicose. It linked the household with the running of estates and it provided vital escort duties. A lord went to courts, to parliaments, to tournaments and to sundry ceremonies and occasions in the company of members of his retinue. In days gone by it was dominated by the tenurial relationship. By the time of the Welsh and Scottish wars this had attenuated somewhat and the factors governing membership were now more varied, including the proximity of estates and regional interests. As is well known, the indentures by which lords made agreements for service with key members of their retinues were for peace as well as war. Particularly important in military recruitment, as Ayton has emphasised, were sub-retinues and the single units of recruitment comprising knights and men-at-arms. These, too, had a pre-history, one that long antedated the Scottish wars. As I have shown recently, one can see them operating in the counties during the Barons’ War of 1264–65.12 The military service that we have been exploring is one dimension, if arguably the ultimate expression, of a well-articulated aristocratic world, dominated by physical service, by vertical association and by a powerful militaristic ideology. If we are to divide aristocratic life into two dimensions – which I think we can so long as we do not see them as necessarily in contention – I would suggest that one dimension comprised the retinue and aristocratic association around service more widely, rather than military action per se. What, then, of the other side of the coin, which we might term ‘civilian’ or ‘domestic’ public service? The terminology needs to be refashioned on this side too – away from the idea of county administration. There was, in reality, very little administration in the shires at this time, and what there was was largely confined to the sheriff and his staff. Part of the misunderstanding here stems from historians who have spoken of the role of administrative knights. This is a confusing misnomer.13 The Angevin system called upon knights for specific judicial tasks, for membership of the juries of the grand assize, for example, to report on judgements made by the county court, and to assess if a defendant’s excuse for non-attendance was genuine through the image of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell in the Luttrell Psalter. See ‘Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion’, pp. 41–3, and the works cited there. 12 P. Coss, ‘Retinues, Agents and Garrisons during the Barons’ Wars’, in Baronial Reform and Revolution in England, 1258–67, ed. A. Jobson (Woodbridge, 2016), pp. 183–98. 13 Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, p. 64.

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or not. What was required by the system was the additional status and prestige afforded by knights as opposed to free men, not ‘administration’ as such. Two further developments during the thirteenth century are particularly significant. One is the central government calling upon members of the landowning community (or communities) whom it trusted to perform certain intermittent tasks – the assessment and collection of occasional taxation, for example, and the staffing of judicial commissions dealing with the assizes and the delivering of gaols. As we have seen, there was an explosion of commissions from the 1290s, prompted by judicial developments and by the needs arising from the king’s wars. The willing participation in these commissions by county knights was governed not only by the Crown’s needs but also by the landowners’ desire to reinforce their own status and authority over the populace. Hence the emergence in particular of the commissions of the peace and the central significance of justices of the peace. The end product was a sort of partnership in government between Crown and gentry. The second development was parliamentary representation. The calling of representatives for advice and consultation, at first hesitant and then given a revolutionary twist during the period of so-called reform and rebellion, became a normal feature of royal governance in the time of Edward I and Edward II. The result was in effect the formation of constituencies, of regular interaction between centre and provinces and the creation of a forum where the interests of the community could be articulated. Membership was, once again, determined by status: initially, that is until the 1320s, the counties were represented exclusively by knights. None of this can be classed as ‘administration’; if we are to find one term to set against retinue it is perhaps ‘public office’, using office to encapsulate various duties and activities. If we are to see retinue (involving military service) and public office (reflecting domestic concerns) as the two main dimensions to aristocratic life, it is important not to push the dichotomy too far and to recognise what they have in common. The plain fact is that whether we are dealing with civil or military issues, whether we are dealing with the private or the public arena, with retinues, courts and commissions, the central component was the expression of elevated status. Status was what the Crown called upon and status was what the knights brought to all situations; it was what they felt, what they valued and what they shared. The oxygen of status was display.14 This is why the expression of militarism, of exclusive membership of the warrior caste, was of such overwhelming importance. The social effect is encapsulated by the military sepulchre, located in parish and in more prestigious churches. Status united the twin worlds of retinue and office. Display took many forms. See the remarks in Coss, Foundations of Gentry Life, pp.  6–7. A series of essays is devoted to the issue in Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display, ed. Coss and Keen.

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A specific issue where the respective roles of ‘retinue’ and ‘office’ are brought into sharp relief is that of social gradation.15 A military, or retinuebased, explanation of the ‘rise’ of the esquire, implicit in Ayton’s work, is explicitly articulated by Maurice Keen in his last major work, Origins of the English Gentleman.16 In this he separated two closely connected questions: how did the second grade of gentry, the esquires, come into being and ‘why was it that those (originally, some of those) who belonged in this grade came to be recognised as armigerous?’17 By concentrating upon the second question he offers us an explanation of the first, that is to say he identifies the mechanism by which gradation was achieved. The key ingredient was military service. As he says, in the fourteenth century esquires came to function alongside knights as part of a warrior elite. The testimonies in the Court of Chivalry were later to show that they, too, were steeped in ‘the lore of chivalry and heraldry’. It is hardly surprising that many of them should have ‘assumed arms’ or that knights do not seem to have questioned their right to them, even if they had no ancestral claim. A key word in Keen’s explanation is ‘acculturation’, here signifying the adoption of the martial identity hitherto championed exclusively by the knights. The possession of a coat of arms came to be the key indicator of gentle status. The few examples we have of the actual conferring of a coat of arms in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries underscore this. Keen makes one further, and extremely important, comment that links us back to the counties: acculturation worked not only in vertical terms but in horizontal terms too: ‘If an esquire Brown went to war and used a coat which he painted in the chamber of his manor and perhaps displayed in his parish church, one could hardly expect his neighbours the Smiths and Wessons who had not followed the war but were equally well established to refrain from doing likewise’.18

Keen concludes that ‘in tracing the heraldic rise of the esquires, the martial side of the story needs to be kept very sharply in focus alongside “territoriality”’.19 There is another powerful argument to add. The word ultimately chosen to describe the second tier of the gentry was one with martial connotations and many of the texts in which we see it and its Latin equivalents (armiger and I discuss this issue with particular reference to the esquires in ‘Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation in England’, TRHS 6th ser., 5 (1995), pp. 155–78. This essay is republished as ch. 9 of The Origins of the English Gentry. Page references are to the latter. 16 M. Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman: Heraldry, Chivalry and Gentility in Medieval England, c.1300-c.1500 (Stroud, 2002). See also Keen, ‘Heraldry and Hierarchy: Esquires and Gentlemen’, in Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe, ed. J. Denton (Manchester, 1999), pp. 94–108. 17 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, p. 72. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 81.

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scutifer) relate to military service.20 One should add, though, that esquire also had household and service connotations, taking us back again to the retinue as the key institution.21 Powerful though these arguments are, they cannot be the whole explanation for the development of the second tier of the gentry. As Keen himself acknowledges, at the beginning of the fourteenth century there was no designation of a grade below the knights.22 There were, however, others who considered themselves gentle or who were on the margins of gentility.23 Thus far we have looked at the direct effects of the kings’ wars. There were also indirect effects. These followed from an increasing shortage of available knights, due in part to military engagements and in part to an explosion of commissions, itself fuelled in large measure by the Crown’s needs.24 Taxation was required more often and commissioners of array had to be sent out to ensure a steady supply of footsoldiers. Consequently, from the 1320s onwards the near monopoly by knights broke down and the elite of commissioned landowners widened. We find non- or sub-knightly landowners serving together with lawyers and lawyer/administrators and men of urban origins. The membership of judicial commissions also widened as did the social quality of members of parliament. From the 1320s onwards counties returned men described as valetti. The use of this term is significant because it had been in use for some time to describe men who were considered to be of gentle stock but who were either permanently or temporarily sub-knightly. It had long been used, for example, to describe men who were being distrained to take up knighthood. With the use of valettus in the parliamentary context the concept of ‘knight of the shire’ was born. Henceforth a county representative was not necessarily expected to be an actual knight. Valettus had been employed widely, in both military and civilian contexts. It was one of the terms used when referring to non-knights serving as menat-arms but it was also used in household contexts, usually meaning gentils hommes. And it was used in indentures of retainer with reference to the men-at-arms whom indentured knights contracted to bring with them. In 1318, to take just one example, Sir Hugh le Despenser the younger retained Hugh de Neville of Essex who was to furnish two additional knights plus seven vadletz. Different terms could be used for the same phenomenon. A subsequent clause in the same indenture refers to the men as esquiers. It was, of course, the latter term which was to triumph subsequently, undoubtedly reflecting its military connotations. Ibid., p. 74. Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, p. 219. 22 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, p. 72. 23 Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, pp. 3–4. 24 For what follows, see Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, ch. 7, ‘The Explosion of Commissions’. 20 21



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A full explanation of the development of social gradation, then, requires us to look at both the direct and indirect effects of the wars, principally the service of the non-knightly men-at-arms themselves. There were also preconditions. It is clear enough that in the thirteenth century men already spoke in terms of gentility in ways that suggested its incidence was wider than the chivalric knights, though they and their ladies were certainly the gentle par excellence. And knightly landowners lived cheek by jowl with others who did not bear that distinction. When it came to putting pressure on men to serve in its wars, the Crown saw the distinction between them not so much in terms of status but in terms of the overall value of their property, even if this could only be approximate. Heraldry constituted the means by which a broader elite could be defined. Landowning, retinue and office jointly provided the impulse that led to a view of the world seen collectively and territorially. There was, however, no inevitability about these developments. There was always the possibility, arguably strong in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, that England might develop a caste nobility centred upon militaristic knighthood. Key figures were the bannerets. They were prominent in the king’s military household and significant, too, in the retinues of the great lords. In the so-called Parliamentary Roll of Arms, a national list of knights dating from early in the reign of Edward II and arranged largely on a county basis, bannerets are listed separately.25 They come together, too, in the Occasional Rolls, commemorating the participants of battles, sieges and tournaments. The Falkirk Roll, for example, gives the blazon of the 111 bannerets who fought there with the king on 22 July 1298. Bannerets were responsible for some of the most spectacular sepulchral monuments. Above them were, of course, the earls and other great lords who figure collectively, for example, in some of the great heraldic schemes in stained glass. There was, therefore, what we might call a higher military community above the bachelor knights. Nevertheless, all the knights were bound together by a formidable ideology. That a caste nobility did not emerge from this is due to a variety of countervailing factors, perhaps the most crucial being the existence of the wider military community which Ayton has evoked so effectively and which drew on pre-existing social networks whose share in the ideology could not ultimately be denied. The role of sub-knightly men-atarms and the rise of the esquires played a major part in ensuring that the future of the English ruling class would revolve rather around the separation between higher nobility and gentry, the knights constituting the highest rank, and the esquires the second rank, within the latter.26 At the same time, however, the direct relationship between gentry and the Crown was blunted, After the king, thirteen earls and the bishop of Durham, they are listed as nos. 16–109. 26 Coss, ‘Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion’, pp. 66–8. 25

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or at least mediated, by a strengthening of magnate power. The growth of military communities, the increasing significance of the retinue and the powerful sense of aristocratic identity forged by war all played a part in binding local society increasingly around the great lords who behaved more and more as agents of the Crown in the provinces. The scene was set for the growth of the affinity and of the three-cornered polity of Crown, magnate and gentry which characterised the full realisation of bastard feudalism.27

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For the remainder of the essay I want to turn my attention to the second half of the fourteenth century and to the emergence of the third grade of gentry: the gentlemen. What part did military service play in this? The emergence of the esquires as a social rank was hesitant and less clear-cut than is sometimes imagined, and it failed to defuse all tensions. As many historians have noted, the sumptuary legislation of 1363 that announced their arrival referred more precisely to ‘esquires and all types of gentle men below the estate of knight’ (esquiers & toutes maneres de gentils gentz desouth lestat de chivaler), implying that the elevation of the term esquire did not cover all situations nor encompass all of those with claims to gentility. This might be taken to suggest the existence of a residual category, which historians have not been slow to connect with the Statute of Additions of 1413, announcing as it did the arrival of a third tier below knights and esquires. As this solidified, the three-tiered gentry of knights, esquires and gentlemen, and their female counterparts, came to fruition. How did this come about? Did the military community play a part in this, too, and if so how? As Andrew Ayton has emphasised, fundamental changes took place in military recruitment and military service from the middle decades of the fourteenth century and these must surely have had social repercussions.28 A crucial development was that of the mixed retinue, whereby mounted archers were recruited alongside men-at-arms. After a time of hybrid armies, for which commissioners of array continued to recruit, we enter into This is too great an issue to be developed very far here. For recent discussions, see C. Carpenter, ‘Bastard Feudalism in England in the Fourteenth Century’, in Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald, ed. S. Boardman and J. Goodare (Edinburgh, 2014), the same author’s Bastard Feudalism in Fourteenth-Century Warwickshire, Dugdale Society Occasional Paper No. 52 (2016), and P. Coss, ‘Bastard Feudalism and the Framing of Thirteenth-Century England’, in Italy and Medieval Europe: A Festschrift for Chris Wickham, ed. R. Balzaretti, J. Barrow and P. Skinner (Oxford, 2018). The subject is discussed extensively in Christine Carpenter’s Ford Lectures (forthcoming). 28 For his most recent discussion of the subject, see A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59. 27



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a period when mixed retinues predominated and the responsibility for finding archers together with men-at-arms passed to the captains. At first they tapped into their own tenantry and into existing social networks in a manner similar to the means of recruitment of men-at-arms. The rise of enlarged or super retinues meant, however, that the traditional methods were superseded, or at least supplemented, as a new breed of captain of sub-noble, or occasionally downright obscure, origins came to the fore. Increasing recourse was had to men like Jankyn Nowell, an adventurer who contracted with Sir Hugh de Hastings in 1380 to serve with four men-at-arms and five archers.29 We witness growing numbers of careerist soldiers and the rise of less stable retinues. Notwithstanding the demographic fall resulting from plague, the pool of available manpower seems to have expanded, not least it seems in response to the widening of martial opportunities during the second half of the century from France, Iberia and Italy, into the Mediterranean more broadly, into Prussia and even into Transylvania. In this context Ayton cites the Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Gray, who wrote of the ambitious, restless and unknown youths who came from all over England to serve in the king’s armies.30 The appeal of the military life to men living on the margins of gentility, younger sons and others of insecure income, is self-explanatory. Successful soldiers could equally derive from families with no claim to gentility. One example is Sir Hugh Browe who, giving evidence to the Court of Chivalry, said that he had served in garrisons and in companies in France but not in the great campaigns. As Ayton writes, ‘That the aforementioned veteran Sir Hugh Browe had been required by both parties in the Scrope v. Grosvenor dispute to give evidence … offers some indication of how a yeoman’s son could, as a result of prolonged and distinguished service with the sword, earn social acceptance from the gentle born and admittance to their ranks’.31 The mounted archers constitute a particular issue. As Ayton points out, from the 1350s they were numerically predominant within the military community. But who were they? He found, in fact, that they were ‘a heterogeneous body of men’ but that ‘many were of yeomen stock, aptly described by Maurice Keen as “minor landowners, not gentry, but a cut above the ordinary peasant husbandman”’.32 Thus, in terms of their status, they may be

A. Goodman, ‘The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings’, EHR 95 (1980), pp. 116–17. 30 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p. 38, citing Sir Thomas Gray, Scalacronica, 1272–1363, ed. A. King, Surtees Society 209 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 156–7. 31 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p.  55, citing Bennett, Community, Class and Careerism, pp. 175, 182. See also the references given on p. 53. 32 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), pp.  15–16, citing M. Keen, The Outlaws of Medieval England (rev. edn., London, 1987), p. xvii. See also Morgan, War and Society, p. 41. 29

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contrasted with the infantry who had been recruited by the commissioners of array, men more likely to have been of servile origins.33 As a result, the combatants of the mixed retinues of mounted archers and men-at-arms had a ‘narrower social base’ than the earlier armies and the gap between the chivalrous and non-chivalrous had been reduced.34 Under Edward III, the ‘basic’ mounted archer was more frequently required. Consequently, ‘a typical royal army would probably include many archers and men-at-arms of roughly the same status’.35 While some sprang, as it were, from ‘parish gentry’, others were ‘yeomen, artisans and husbandmen who, while starting out as archers, aspired to be men-at-arms’. Among these, he surmises, were spectacularly successful soldiers, like Sir Robert Knolles who was from lowly beginnings in Cheshire.36 What were the effects of this widening of the military community upon the world of gentility back in the counties? And how does it relate to the emergence of the gentleman? In his Origins of the English Gentleman, Maurice Keen emphasised what he called the virtual decoupling of heraldic arms from military service. Although this is largely a fifteenth-century phenomenon he traces the process back to the later fourteenth century, to the beginnings of a progressive demilitarization of ‘English genteel society’. Let us briefly follow his arguments here.37 First, the years from 1390 to the accession of the bellicose Henry V saw little overseas action by the English. Young aristocrats of this generation were much less likely to have seen martial service than their predecessors. Moreover, not only would they have heard less talk of arms and war from ‘old knights and esquires’, but what they did hear would have tended to reflect a certain war-weariness, conditioned by high taxation and lack of success. In some quarters, moreover, there was scepticism over the values that had once underpinned English triumphs.38 It was possible for witnesses before the Court of Chivalry during the first decade of the fifteenth century to assert that they were armigerous and of old ancestry but had not seen service. Even when war was renewed under Henry V it changed in pattern and in tempo. Gone were the days of the chevauchées, the sharp campaigns of short duration, and intermittent truces. Henry’s war See also M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (London, 1996), p. 143. 34 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p.  16. This finding has been confirmed by the results of the great AHRC project on the soldiers serving the English Crown between 1369 and 1453: A. R. Bell, A, Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013), p. 162. Archers, moreover, were often the kinsmen of men-at-arms. 35 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 16 n. 33. 36 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp. 40–1; Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 69. 37 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, pp. 88–100. 38 See also N. Saul, ‘A Farewell to Arms? Criticism of Warfare in Late FourteenthCentury England’, Fourteenth Century England II, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 131–46. 33



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was one of conquest and continuous warfare. The old military community was being superseded by men who were away for much longer periods and who looked for rewards in France in terms of property and offices. The military element in genteel society was becoming more professional and its roots in English society had loosened.

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We have, in short, an era of ‘demilitarisation’ to set against the ‘militarisation’ of a century earlier, much emphasised by Ayton. Keen proceeds to set the evidence for it alongside the rise of the gentleman or ‘mere gentleman’. Although the Statute of Additions of 1413 was not applied rigorously at first, with men being variously and inconsistently described, ‘gentleman’ soon came into wide use to indicate a level less elevated than esquire but firmly above the yeoman who had no such claim to gentility.39 It was only to be expected that such men would aspire to be armigerous, even though many of them lacked ancestral justification. The heralds, who took an increasing part in the granting of arms in the fifteenth century, clearly saw their aspiration as entirely appropriate. The Statute of Additions is of great significance and undoubtedly led to greater precision in the use of social terminology. However, it was not a deus ex machina. On the contrary it was clearly reflecting social developments and was expressing a need. To understand this we clearly have to go back a generation or two. It is impossible to resist the temptation to equate it with the sumptuary legislation of 1363 which, as we have seen, spoke of esquires and all manner of gentle men below the level of esquire. Keen points, too, to the broad spectrum encompassed by esquires in the poll tax preamble of 1379. There were, as he says, many more esquires than knights and there was a need to distinguish between the greater and lesser among them, as indeed the poll tax did in differentiating between those with sufficient income to be a knight, those with a lesser income and those who were landless and in service. The last category reveals that we are still very much in the realm of the retinue and the military community. The beginnings of ‘demilitarisation’ may have had other consequences too. The spectacular fall in the numbers of knights in English society during the early decades of the fifteenth century, which has not yet been fully explained, may have begun as early as the 1390s.40 A fall in the number of knights serving in royal armies must have served to increase the status of the substantial esquires who took their place, further elevating their status and probably adding pressure to restrict the use of the term. Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, p.  102; see also C. Carpenter, Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 1401–1499 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 66–82. 40 For the most recent discussion of this phenomenon, see Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, ch. 2, ‘The Knights’. 39

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Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that ‘demilitarisation’ coupled with tensions within the corpus of esquires can wholly explain the appearance of the gentleman or that the explanation is to be found entirely in the military sphere. As Keen himself points out, there is one very important distinction between the words esquire and gentleman. Whereas the former has military connotations, the latter does not, although it does have a service, especially household, dimension. Some of the evidence used to good effect by Keen to show the close connection between military service and heraldry, and between military service, heraldry and gentility in the fourteenth century can be used to open up a rather different line of inquiry. Was military service in aristocratic retinues of the second half of the fourteenth century sufficient in itself to claim gentility? Given that, as we shall see, the answer is no, the question becomes why not? After all, it appears to have been generally sufficient as far as the ‘rise’ of the esquires had been concerned. The obvious starting point is the famous writ of 2 June 1417 in which Henry V instructs some of his sheriffs to have it proclaimed that men should not assume ‘cotearmures’ in the way that they have on recent expeditions abroad unless they have an ancestral right to them or they have been granted by someone of sufficient authority. All those claiming such arms, unless they had fought at Agincourt, were to come on an appointed day to show their right, under pain of exclusion from the current expedition, loss of their wages, and having those ‘cotearmures’ defaced. As Keen points out, the concern is very obviously not aimed at established men but at those whose right to arms was questionable. The remarkable thing is that the king was prepared to dispense with men’s services if they did not comply. The very same year saw an ordinance from the duke of Clarence, the king’s brother, regulating the duties of heralds. They were required to have a knowledge of all those ‘of noble and gentle estate’ living in their provinces. The first steps were being taken on a road that would lead to heraldic visitations. In 1419 a writ sent by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, to justices of the peace seeking reinforcements was aimed at knights and esquires ‘who bear arms of ancestry’. How do we explain these developments? Keen links them to military discipline and to issues of social control. He points in this context to the Statute of Liveries of 1390 which prohibited the retaining by lords of men below the level of esquire, except for household servants. The statute followed complaints in parliament and reflected a concern for law and order. However, it would be unwise to look at Henry V’s action from an entirely top-down perspective. Arguably, it reflects more widelyheld concerns. Two other pieces of evidence could be re-interpreted in this context. One is the evidence that one John Edom, who had been a servant in the household of the earl of Pembroke, had been granted an escutcheon of arms by him on the expedition to Poitou in 1372, even though he lacked a gentle ancestry. This is cited by Keen in the context of the military esquires, given that John’s explanation for his heraldic status



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was that he had been to the wars.41 One could argue, however, that he could not have assumed a coat of arms without intervention from his lord, precisely because he was not deemed to be socially qualified. More startling is the famous case of John Kingston, who was made an esquire and granted arms by Richard II in 1389 so that he could joust with a French knight.42 The letters patent tells that the king first received him as a ‘gentle man’ before elevating him. The implication is that his existing status disqualified him from entering the lists; remedying this was, it seems, the whole point of the exercise. Let us look at the evidence of the Court of Chivalry from this perspective. Here we enter the particular expertise of both Maurice Keen and Andrew Ayton. The Court of Chivalry has been aptly described by Maurice Keen as ‘a court of knighthood and honour’, not the least among its duties being the adjudication of disputes where two parties claimed the right to bear particular arms. The proceedings of three cases from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries have come down to us: the voluminous Scrope versus Grosvenor of 1386, Lovell versus Morley of the same year, and Grey versus Hastings from 1409.43 The means of proceeding are in themselves significant and revealing. Commissioners were sent out into the localities to record testimony. They were to concentrate upon what they heard from generosi, that is to say from ‘gentle men’, who would be wellinformed in such matters, not least because they bore arms themselves. It was evidence from these men that was wanted, not from those of lesser estate. Not surprisingly, the testimonies tend to include an indication of the status of the speaker, in addition to his age and the length of time he had been in arms. It was clearly in the interests of the parties to ensure that as many of the men speaking for them were of high status, that is to say knights, seasoned esquires and significant churchmen. The evidence adduced was largely of two kinds. One is autobiographical, noting when and where the parties had been seen displaying the relevant arms. The other was visual: the evidence of sepulchral monuments, stained glass, seals and other items on which heraldry was displayed. This testified to ‘common’ or ‘public fame’, fame that is among the genteel community. In short, social esteem was essential to the entire process from the start. As we have seen, martial prowess was an impressive ingredient in this; however, it was not allembracing. The witnesses for Grey in 1409 include a small group who had Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, p. 70. Ibid., p. 78. 43 Ibid., chs. 2–4. For Scrope versus Grosvenor, see Morgan, War and Society, pp. 128–30; for Grey versus Hastings, see Keen, ‘English military experience and the court of chivalry: the case of Grey v. Hastings’, in Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne, XIVe-XVe siècle, ed. S. Boardman and J. Goodare (Lille, 1992), pp. 123–42; and for Lovell versus Morley, see Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service’, pp. 81–104. 41

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not been militarily active. All of them said they were gentle men of ancestry and they all had coat armour. Some of them described themselves as apprentices at law. Robert Baa said explicitly that he ‘had never been involved in viages’ [voyages, that is to say, campaigns]. Another group actually said that they were gentle men of ancestry but that they did not, in fact, have arms. John Lee, who described himself as an esquire, admitted that he had never been to war and added that he lived off his lands. The evidence from 1409, moreover, does not stand alone. The hitherto neglected Lovell versus Morley case was brought to scholarly attention by Andrew Ayton in 1998. It reveals ‘the world of relatively obscure genteel combatants’.44 The great majority of the witnesses on both sides were non-knights. Most described themselves as esquires, but not all. Eleven men say either that they were gentle men (gentils hommes) or that they were of gentle blood (gentil sanc). Among them were ‘venerable old veterans’, men like Henry de Hoo, who had fought at Halidon Hill as far back as 1333. Such men were not, on the whole, the preferred deponents in armorial disputes. If we put this material together with that of the non-esquires who spoke for Grey in 1409, a more complex picture begins to emerge of the world at the lower end of gentility in the period between the sumptuary legislation of 1363 and the Statute of Additions of 1413, and the role of the military community in that evolution. If some were successfully claiming gentility on the basis, or partial basis, of military activity, it was not the sole criterion. Not only that, but claims on the basis of military service alone seem to have been meeting resistance. We have already seen that gentle society could be wary of new entrants coming back from the wars. If Sir Thomas Gray felt like this it is surely likely that there was resistance to the ambitions of ‘lesser esquires’ and the like long before Henry V entered the fray. We have noted some of the mechanisms by which barriers could be lifted. Military reputation was only one qualifying factor. As is very well known, there were other routes into social acceptance: the law, non-military service with great lords, for instance, and successful commercial activity. Success in these tended to be followed by investment in property. It is clear that in order to push through social barriers considerable ground work was necessary. What was needed was an acceptable income, some local standing measured by judicial capacity and minor local office, social contacts and, at a certain point, employment by the Crown. In other words, a measure of gentility was a prerequisite, if not entirely a sine qua non. There is evidence, moreover, to suggest that local society did not necessarily accept, or wholly accept, parvenus in the first generation.45 The issue of upward mobility, or at least social recognition, through military service needs to be set, then, in a wider context. There is over-

44 45

Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service’, p. 85. Coss, Foundations of Gentry Life, pp. 267–70.



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whelming evidence to suggest that this was an age of particular sensitivity in terms of social aspiration and social pretension, of conservative resistance, of tension and status confusion. We find these issues manifested in the literature of the age. Geoffrey Chaucer, for example, was very sensitive to them. In depicting aristocratic society his approach was a strikingly conservative one. He gives us an idealistic portrait of the military role of the knight, defender of society and of the faith, and an esquire who is his son and a trainee knight, a strikingly traditional way of understanding society. The key figure in understanding Chaucer’s stance, however, is his non-martial, office-holding Franklin, who oozes social pretension from every pore.46 He portrays himself as an aristocrat, living a life characterised by easy consumption and largesse. Beginning as a freeholder (implicit in the name) the Franklin rose through law and administration to become a respected member of county society, as shown by the major offices he came to hold. Having deployed the knight and esquire in the conservative mode of traditional estates satire, Chaucer was left with a comparatively lowly term to describe this type of man.47 By separating the roles of knight and trainee knight on the one hand from the landowning and office-holding Franklin/Esquire on the other, Chaucer puts the two dimensions of gentry life we have been discussing in contention. We need to put them back together, as two sides of a dynamic whole. There was in reality no single cursus honorum that led to social acceptance. The ‘Smiths and Wessons’, neighbours of the Browns, had long contained men of new blood, often lawyers and administrators. Military service had always been advantageous but it had rarely been an autonomous route to status. However, the fact that retinues became less rooted in traditional social networks must have complicated matters, and the fact that men-at-arms and mounted archers fought together seems less likely to have overcome differences back home than had been the case with knights and men-at-arms earlier in the century, especially given the changed conditions of the post-plague world. Social aspiration was a perennial feature of this society, but a countervailing spirit of social exclusion was another. Another medium through which we can approach the issue of social assertion is through sepulchral monuments.48 Military effigies had, of course, a long history, and were to continue to evoke high status. In some cases, these proclaimed a man’s rise to social esteem. One has only to think of the military captains of the 1360s, men like the ‘soldier of fortune’ Sir The latest treatment is my contribution, ‘The Franklin’, in Historians on Chaucer: The ‘General Prologue’ to the Canterbury Tales, ed. S. H. Rigby (Oxford, 2014), pp. 227–46. 47 See also N. Saul, ‘The Social Status of Chaucer’s Franklin: A Reconsideration’, Medium Aevum 52 (1983), pp. 10–26. 48 See N. Saul’s English Church Monuments in the Middle Ages: History and Representation (Oxford, 2009). 46

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Hugh Calveley (d. 1394) whose monument at Bunbury, Cheshire, has been described as ‘among the finest to a knight of its age’.49 Although military effigies predominated among the fourteenth-century gentry, monuments to civilians were also very much present. Some of these were of men whom Nigel Saul calls ‘esquire-administrators who had risen to distinction through magnate or legal service’.50 But there were lesser figures, too, who were commemorated in various media, men who were no more than substantial freeholders. The spectrum of families proclaiming their status in this way was becoming increasingly wide. It may well be significant in this context that some were becoming more precise in the identity they were asserting: as a great wool merchant, for example, as a sergeant-at-law, or as the esquire of this or that important magnate.51 This seems to be a discernible phenomenon of the first decade of the fifteenth century. In short, it looks as though gentle society itself effectively set limits upon the social recognition achievable through military service per se or through membership of a broadening military community. For those with some prior claim to gentility, inherited or acquired, successful participation in war was a boost to their credibility, allowing them to enter the ranks of the armigerous. It was also possible for the relatively low-born to rise, sometimes spectacularly as in the case of some military captains. There was certainly movement between ranks, specifically from archer to man-at-arms. Robert Fishlake, for example, who gave evidence for Sir Edward Hastings in the Court of Chivalry around 1409, had earlier served on at least half a dozen occasions as an archer and he was by no means unique.52 The increasing use of the words valettus and ‘yeoman’ to describe an archer (both with service connotations) has been seen, with justice, as evidence of a rise in status. The Statute of Additions, however, put yeoman on the wrong side of the gentle divide, albeit in the highest category. Military service as a lever for upward mobility had its limitations. It has to be recognised that the army was not the only route to advancement and was perhaps relatively rarely the first or only step. The situation in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was tense and confused, and there is clearly a lot more prosopographical work to be done before we achieve greater clarity. Looking across the fourteenth century as a whole, however, we can appreciate the vital role played by military activity in the evolution of the gentry. The military community did much to determine the structure of the gentry and its relations with For Calveley and his monument, see Saul, English Church Monuments, pp. 321–2. Ibid., p. 242. 51 Ibid., pp. 233–4, 250; Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, p. 136; Coss, ‘Knights, Esquires’, p. 237. 52 For Robert Fishlake and a discussion of the phenomenon, see Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, pp. 162–70. Fishlake settled down at Elsing, perhaps in the service of the Hastings family. Archers were often linked, it seems, to aristocratic households. 49 50



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the higher nobility. But military service cannot be elevated to the level of prime mover. The formation of the gentry resulted from the interplay of various forces and impulses, among which social aspiration, royal needs, retinue-based service and the holding of domestic office all played their part.

4

Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status, c. 1270-c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I

David Simpkin

The emergence of the knight banneret as a distinctive rank within the English and French socio-military hierarchies can be traced to around the year 1180 when, for both status and practical considerations, the need was felt to delineate clearly between those knights who had the wealth and wherewithal to lead a troop of knights into battle and those, on the other hand, who did not.1 Two hundred and fifty years later, however, the term banneret was rapidly declining in usage and significance, both in its social and military contexts (as so often, these two dimensions and stimuli of hierarchical change, the social and the military, are difficult to disentangle, for good reason). Socially, by the early years of the reign of Henry VI the former distinction between those summoned to parliament as barons and those summoned as knights banneret had disappeared, so that ‘by around 1425, they were all just “peers”’.2 Militarily, meanwhile, the rank of knight banneret was becoming nothing more than a remnant of a bygone age, a largely residual and redundant marker of status which even those who possessed the honour seem scarcely to have acknowledged or to have demanded acknowledgement of. Although Sir John Fastolf was promoted to the rank of banneret before the battle of Verneuil in 1424, he was seldom recorded as such in subsequent musters; indeed, during the final, Henrician stage of the Hundred Years’ War, only four individuals were recorded on the muster rolls as bannerets.3 What accounts for this demise? D. Crouch, The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900–1300 (Harlow, 2005), p. 247. 2 C. Given-Wilson, The English Nobility in the Late Middle Ages (London, 1987), p. 62. 3 A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013), p. 72. 1

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As all historians and good students of history know, there is never simply one explanation: multi-causality is a necessary and unavoidable reflection of the complexity of human relations, a complexity which only increases as the time-period under the historical microscope expands. As E. H. Carr once wrote, ‘The historian deals in a multiplicity of causes’ (though he did go on to point out the historian’s need and urge to create a ‘hierarchy of causes’ leading to ‘the ultimate cause, the cause of all causes’, something which we can return to in the conclusion).4 Between 1180 and 1430 – a vast span of time akin to that between the dispute over the Stamp Act in the British colonies of North America and today – so much changed in the social, military, political, economic and cultural dynamics of English society that seeking a single answer to the reason for the eventual waning of the rank of banneret would seem forlorn. Nevertheless, the decision of Andrew Ayton to put aside the microscope and take up the telescope in a recent conceptual study of military recruitment in late medieval England does, possibly, offer some clues as to what might lie behind this development; for, if we recall that the rank of banneret was first and foremost a military rank that demanded of its recipient not only military service but also military leadership,5 it would make sense that changes in the nature and patterns of military recruitment might have affected the role, and therefore the status, of the knight banneret. Ayton’s apt cosmological analogy of major army captains acting like stars at the centre of solar systems, exerting immense gravitational pull on their ‘planetary lieutenants, but not necessarily their satellites’, conjures up a profoundly fluid yet essentially stable state of affairs within the military communities of Edwardian England that must surely replace the out-dated and far more static analogy of a captain’s core retainers surrounded by less stable elements.6 And it is precisely within this celestial model that the role of the knight banneret at his peak of influence within the military community arguably makes most sense, with the bannerets often during the mid-fourteenth century performing the role of the ‘planetary lieutenants’ and even, in some cases, the ‘star’ at the heart of the system, though more often than not under Edward III this position was occupied by the king or by one of his dukes or earls. The example used by Ayton to illustrate his model, the retinue of the earl of Warwick on the Crécy campaign of 1346, perfectly illustrates this point, with the earl drawing on three bannerets, Sir Thomas Ughtred, Sir Aimery St Amand and

E. H. Carr, What is History?, 2nd edn (London, 1990), pp. 89–90. M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (London, 1996), p. 14. 6 A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59, at p. 20. 4 5



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Sir Robert Scales, as his sub-recruiters for the expedition.7 Ayton’s work has, therefore, characteristically opened the door to multiple layers of research. Initially this chapter was conceived as an attempt to explain the gradual demise and eventual virtual disappearance of the rank of knight banneret within English armies across the years 1272 to 1453, using the conceptual ‘solar’ model as a starting point. Such an approach would have been facilitated by my own work on the armies of Edward I and Edward II,8 Andrew Ayton’s work on the armies of Edward III and the findings of the ‘Soldier in Later Medieval England’ project, covering the years 1369 to 1453.9 However, on further reflection it became apparent that the implications of the new, emerging conceptual schema of late medieval military communities are so vast that it would be advisable first to undertake a more manageable and provisional survey of the evidence for the reign of Edward I, which is not only served by a great quantity of valuable prosopographical data but was also, arguably, the point at which the status of knight banneret reached its zenith within the English military hierarchy (some of the more substantive reasons for this assertion will be explained within the chapter). Indeed, the years 1277 to 1314, between the first Welsh war of Edward I and the battle of Bannockburn, fall at an approximate mid-point between the emergence of the rank of knight banneret and its eventual demise. Therefore the aims of this paper are several-fold: to assess the recruitment roles of the knights banneret within the armies of Edward I in light of the new ‘solar’ or ‘planetary’ model, including vis-à-vis the earls’ retinues; to make some preliminary observations of how these recruitment roles and pools reacted to what Ayton refers to as endogenous change within the system,10 that is, changes such as deaths, retirements and inheritances that could lead to changes in the ‘team’ of bannerets available for service on military campaigns; and to determine the regularity of the bannerets’ service as military recruiters. The detailed tracking of these recruitment pools and the changing roles of the bannerets within them across a much longer period, from the accession of Edward I through to the English loss of Gascony in 1453, is something that would require a full thesis or monograph to do it justice, but it is likely that such an investigation would do much to explain the decline of the knight banneret. That said, although such a comprehensive study has not been possible in this instance, this chapter will point out and reflect on some of the most obvious points of contrast and change between the recruitment roles of the bannerets in the wars of the first two Edwards, on the one hand, Ibid., pp. 11–17. See also, A. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, in A. Ayton and P. Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 159–251, at pp. 204–15. 8 D. Simpkin, The English Aristocracy at War, from the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn (Woodbridge, 2008). 9 See www.medievalsoldier.org. 10 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp. 28–30. 7

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and their recruitment roles during the later stages of the Hundred Years’ War, up to around the death of Henry V, on the other.

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The importance of knights banneret as not only military recruiters but also as military leaders during the late thirteenth century can immediately be ascertained from chronicle and armorial records. Chroniclers are notoriously imprecise when discussing matters of a military nature, but the monk William Rishanger of St Albans (fl. 1250–1312) was one annalist who at least took the trouble to distinguish between the different types of knight in English armies. Describing the capture of the baronial rebels at Northampton in April 1264, he differentiated between the fifteen bannerets (milites vexilliferos) and the fifty knights of lesser rank (milites minoris gradus) who were detained, whilst he also used the word vexilliferos to refer to two English knights captured in Gascony in 1296, namely Sir Jean de Bretagne and Sir Alan la Zouche.11 A wonderful illustration of the association between banners, military leadership and consequently military might was the crossing of the English army to Flanders in 1297, when Edward I is reported to have attempted to compensate for the low aristocratic turn-out by getting his foot-soldiers to raise pennons, thereby giving the impression to the enemy that the host was stronger than it was.12 The single military action for which the chroniclers shed most light on the dispositions and actions of knights banneret is, however, the battle of Falkirk of 22 July 1298. Walter of Guisborough (fl. temp. Edward I), a canon of Yorkshire who was well informed of events during the wars in Scotland, refers to how at the battle, the bishop of Durham, commander of the second division, led thirty-six vexillariis electis as they swept around to the rear of the Scottish schiltroms under Sir William Wallace.13 In his account of the same battle Bartholomew Cotton, a Benedictine monk (d. 1321/22), broke down each of the main divisions, or ‘battles’ of the English army into units of banners (vexilla),14 and these can be compared with the number of bannerets

Willelmi Rishanger, quondam Monachi S. Albani, et quorundam Anonymorum, Chronica et Annales, Regnantibus Henrico Tertio et Edwardo Primo, ed. H. T. Riley, Rolls Ser., 28 no. 2 (London, 1865), pp. 21, 134 12 The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, 1212–1301, ed. A. Gransden (London, 1964), p. 143. 13 The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, ed. H. Rothwell, Camden Society 3rd ser., 89 (1957), p. 327. 14 Bartholomaei de Cotton, Historia Anglicana (AD 449–1298), ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Ser., 16 (London, 1859), pp. 343–4. 11



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recorded in each of the four divisions on the heraldic Falkirk Roll of Arms.15 Table 4.1 makes the comparison. Table 4.1: Comparison of banneret numbers for the Falkirk campaign, 1298 Falkirk Roll

Cotton

1 division, earl of Lincoln

20 banners

23 banners

2nd division, bishop of Durham

27 banners

23 banners

3rd division, King Edward

46 banners

40 banners

4th division, earl Warenne

18 banners

25 banners

Total

111 banners

111 banners

st

Juxtaposition of the two sources highlights the essential accuracy of Bartholomew Cotton’s account, though intriguingly it shows that Cotton relied on some source different from the armorial for his materials. In terms of the Falkirk Roll, the knights banneret, or les grans seignurs a baniers as they are described at the beginning of the armorial, include a few men of comital status among their number serving within the divisions led by the chevetyns de la batayle, including the earl of Hereford (and his son) and the earl Marshal in the earl of Lincoln’s division; the earls of Dunbar (and his son) and Angus under Antony Bek, the bishop of Durham; the earls of Lancaster and Warwick in the king’s household division, along with Lancaster’s brother, Henry, and Sir Jean de Bretagne, the future earl of Richmond; and the earls of Gloucester, Oxford and Arundel, along with the future earl of Pembroke Aymer de Valence, with the earl Warenne. Among the bannerets can also be found several lords from overseas, namely Sir Jean de Bar, Sir Amanieu d’Albret, Sir Pons de Castillon, Sir Pierre Amanieu the captal of Buch, Sir Piers de Bordeaux and Sir Otton de Cazeneuve, as well as four Scots, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Alexander Lindsay, Sir Alexander Balliol of Cavers and Sir Richard Siward, all but two of these named under the king’s command. Deducting the fourteen men of comital status and the ten household bannerets of non-English origin from the 111 men named within the ‘battles’ at Falkirk leaves eighty-seven bannerets. The implication is that each of these men must have led a substantial retinue, for if the mounted, armoured element at the battle of Falkirk was indeed around three thousand men strong, as has been estimated on more than one occasion,16 the average size of the retinues serving under the bannerets, including those with the earls, should have been around twenty-seven men Aspilogia III: Rolls of Arms, Edward I (1272–1307), ed. G. J. Brault, 2 vols (Woodbridge, 1997), i, pp. 404–18. 16 M. Prestwich, Edward I (London, 1988), p. 479; supported in Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp. 17–18, 79.

15

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strong. Even allowing for the size of the larger retinues led by the earls, one would expect each banneret to have had between fifteen to twenty men in their service. However, a glance through the various sources for the English army at Falkirk gives a far more fragmented impression for the part of the mounted, armoured element in receipt of crown pay, for there one finds no fewer than 151 retinue leaders, leading retinues which on average contained no more than 6.4 men-at-arms.17 Many of the individuals so-named as retinue leaders were not, however, of banneret status, and indeed some were not even of knightly status. Furthermore, as always with medieval armies, sources relating to military pay and recruitment (which essentially the horse inventories were) do not necessarily reveal how an army was organised in the field. It has been shown that the paid contingents of banneret-led retinues during the reign of Edward I contained on average around thirteen menat-arms, usually including two or three knights bachelor (the lower grade of knight) among their number.18 Even this size of banneret retinue would, however, appear insufficient for the size of mounted force raised at Falkirk; and so, when combined with the fragmented impression provided by the horse inventories, one is left with the likelihood that something more was probably taking place than meets the eye: that some of the smaller retinue leaders and their retinues were actually being drawn into the orbit of the bannerets for the duration of the campaigns. This has been noted previously for the armies of Edward I on an impressionistic level;19 but in light of the new dynamics of recruitment model, it is worth revisiting the Falkirk army and the role of the bannerets within it, specifically in relation to the retinues of the earls and of lesser men. In the absence of indentures for military service during the early Edwardian period – contracts and sub-contracts were only used with greater frequency from the 1330s and 1340s – the formal and informal connections binding together the different layers of the mounted, armoured element of these armies can only be detected through prosopographical analysis of the military–administrative sources. For the Falkirk army of 1298 the recruitment of men-at-arms can be viewed from several perspectives, with the letters of protection, attorney and respites of debt complementing the paid element preserved in the horse inventories;20 but unfortunately, the evidence for the retinues of the knights banneret is hugely uneven. In the seventeen retinues of English knights banneret serving under the earl of Lincoln (not including the earls), the names of only eighty-seven men-atSimpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 60. Ibid., p. 62. 19 Ibid., p. 64. 20 The letters of protection, attorney and respites of debt can be found at TNA, C 67/13. The horse inventories have been printed in Scotland in 1298: Documents relating to the Campaign of Edward I in that Year, ed. H. Gough (Paisley, 1888), pp. 160–237. 17 18



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arms can be recovered, whilst for the division serving under the bishop of Durham the evidence is even pithier: just forty-seven names of men-atarms are recorded from the retinues of twenty-four bannerets. The paucity of evidence for the second ‘battle’ under the bishop of Durham can largely be explained by the presence of large numbers of northern bannerets, who tended not to apply for letters of protection due to the proximity of their lands to the Scottish border.21 One of the bannerets serving in the bishop’s ‘battle’, Sir Walter Huntercombe of Wooler, Northumberland, later claimed to have served at the battle of Falkirk with thirty men-at-arms,22 yet the name of not one of these men-at-arms is listed on the Scottish roll for 1298. The best-recorded division of the army is, not surprisingly, that with the king, with the survival of a household horse inventory largely accounting for this. The best-documented retinues in this part of the army do suggest that the bannerets were leading retinues of sufficient size to produce three thousand or more men-at-arms: forty-eight men are named with Sir Hugh le Despenser; thirty-five with Sir Robert Clifford; thirty-four men with the household steward Sir Walter Beauchamp; twenty-one with Sir Roger Mortimer of Chirk; and the same number with Sir Robert FitzPayn.23 These are similar to the size of the retinue claimed by Sir Walter Huntercombe and suggest that the recruitment effort among the English gentry in 1298 probably outstripped that in any other year,24 though the smaller retinue sizes recorded in the wardrobe books for other campaigns of the period do not always tell the full story, recording as they do only the paid part of the bannerets’ retinues. All told, 458 names are recoverable from the retinues of bannerets serving in the king’s household division, whilst from the fourth and final division, that with the earl Warenne, a further sixty-six names can be added. All told, therefore, we know the names of 658 men-at-arms who were directly recruited by the eighty-seven home-grown bannerets listed on the Falkirk Roll; and an additional fifty-two men-atarms were recruited by the other, non-English bannerets, making a total of 710. From the retinues of the twelve men of comital status named on the armorial, plus the retinue of the bishop of Durham, we know the names of 334 individual men-at-arms, whilst from the various other, fragmented For a later period, see Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 233. PROME, 2, p. 475. 23 Despenser (Scotland in 1298, pp. 187–8; TNA, C 67/13, mm. 1, 6d); Clifford (Scotland in 1298, pp.  196–8; C  67/13, mm. 2, 3, 4, 7); Beauchamp (Scotland in 1298, pp.  183–4; C  67/13, mm. 7, 7d, 8); Mortimer (Scotland in 1298, pp.  224–5; C  67/13, mm. 1, 5d); FitzPayn (Scotland in 1298, pp. 171–2; C 67/13, mm. 6d, 8d). 24 See also Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p.  87, for the recruitment of knights bachelor in 1298 who appear to have escaped the net on previous campaigns; and D. Simpkin, ‘Total War in the Middle Ages? The Contribution of English Landed Society to the Wars of Edward I and Edward II’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 61–94, at pp. 76–9, for an attempt at statistical analysis of the recruitment data. 21

22

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retinues (the majority belonging to knights bachelor and sergeants within the royal household) there are 456 names. Therefore, of the total number of 1,500 named retinue-based personnel at Falkirk, not including those who are simply recorded as in the service of the king, a total of 710, or 47 per cent, appear to have been directly recruited by the knights banneret. Whilst the patchy nature of the sources means that this cannot be taken as a precise indicator of the proportionate contribution of each rank to the army’s recruitment, it does give an approximate insight into the crucial role of the bannerets in raising an army. What Andrew Ayton has found in the armies of Edward III, however, is that the bannerets were part of a chain of recruitment, often working as part of recruitment teams rather than completely on their own. As we have seen, the earl of Warwick’s retinue on the Crécy campaign of 1346 comprised three bannerets, with Sir Thomas Ughtred, Sir Aimery St Amand and Sir Robert Scales responsible for the recruitment of twenty, twenty and fifteen men-at-arms respectively. Most of the knights bachelor also brought along one or two esquires, equating in size to many of the retinues led by knights bachelor on the household horse inventory for the Falkirk campaign. The Warwick retinue for the Crécy campaign is illuminated by a range of documents, the most important of which being the files of warrants for protections and attorneys which provide a hierarchical structure for the retinue.25 The Scottish roll for the Falkirk campaign does not provide this level of detail but, from the letters of protection, attorney and respites of debt, the presence of bannerets within the larger comital retinues can sometimes be detected, as indeed can the occasional service of bannerets within the retinues of other bannerets. Table 4.2 summarises these service connections. Table 4.2: Service of bannerets within the retinues of other men at Falkirk ‘Battle’ commander

Earl of Lincoln

Bishop of Durham

25

Major retinue leader

Sub-leader (bannerets)

Earl of Lincoln

Sir William Vavassour

Earl of Norfolk

Sir Robert FitzRoger [Sir John Clavering] Sir John Lovel Sir Alan la Zouche

Bishop of Durham

Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir

Andrew Astley Alexander Balliol John Cantilupe Peter Corbet Philip Darcy John Gray

Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p. 12.



military recruitment and social status ‘Battle’ commander King Edward I

Major retinue leader

Sub-leader (bannerets)

Earl of Lancaster

Sir Henry of Lancaster

Sir Hugh le Despenser

Sir John ap Adam Sir William Ferrers

Sir Thomas Furnivall

Sir Henry Pinkeney

Earl of Gloucester

Sir William Morley Sir Robert de la Warde

Aymer de Valence

Sir Maurice Berkeley Sir Thomas Berkeley

Earl Warenne

59

It has been possible to identify nineteen bannerets – around a fifth of the bannerets named on the Falkirk Roll of Arms – on the Falkirk campaign who were actually leading their retinues into larger companies and whose menat-arms did not, therefore, necessarily have a direct relationship with the man in overall charge of the retinue. To use Ayton’s analogy, the bannerets were, from this perspective, the ‘planetary lieutenants’ within the recruitment system, drawing into the orbit of the main company commanders the smaller ‘satellites’ which would otherwise have been beyond their gravitational reach. This is most apparent in the case of the company led by the bishop of Durham who, by dint of his clerical office, is unlikely to have been able to tap into the lower reaches of the military recruitment networks available to the earls and bannerets within the army. In this light the fact that six northern bannerets had letters of protection with the bishop for the campaign was not simply a bureaucratic abstraction, for these lieutenants represented a stable team of recruiters in the bishop’s service. Sir Andrew Astley, Sir John Cantilupe, Sir Philip Darcy and Sir John Gray of Rotherfield had accompanied the bishop to Scotland in 1296,26 whilst Sir Alexander Balliol and Sir Peter Corbet had joined Darcy and Gray in the bishop’s service in Flanders the following year.27 These bannerets came into the bishop’s service through various means. Sir Philip Darcy’s Lincolnshire lands, for example, were close to the estates of John Bek of Eresby – the Beks being a Lincolnshire family – and Darcy served the bishop as constable of Durham castle.28 How many men-at-arms these bannerets took into the bishop’s service is not clear: the letters of protection reveal just one man with Balliol in 1297, one with Corbet in 1297 and two with Cantilupe in 1298,29 but we can be pretty sure that this was just the tip of the iceberg. Although, therefore, the bishop was apparently verbally attacked by Sir Ralph Basset TNA, C 67/11, mm. 3, 4, 5, 6. TNA, C 67/12, mm. 7, 8d. 28 C. M. Fraser, A History of Antony Bek, Bishop of Durham 1283–1311 (Oxford, 1957), p. 105. 29 TNA, C 67/12, mm. 3, 3d; C 67/13, m. 1. 26 27

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of Drayton at the battle of Falkirk for interfering in military affairs,30 this is not a view likely to have been shared by many of Basset’s fellow bannerets, who had served under the bishop on previous campaigns. The bishop was a friend of the king and a veteran of military campaigns, including Edward’s crusade, and therefore not a man to be messed with. The new earl of Gloucester, Ralph Monthermer, surely had something similar in mind when he enlisted the services of the bannerets Sir William Morley and Sir Robert de la Warde for the Falkirk campaign. Monthermer was not an earl by hereditary right but by virtue of his marriage to the king’s daughter, Joan of Acre, countess of Gloucester. Monthermer had only recently begun to recruit retinues for military service. Following his surreptitious marriage to Joan early in 1297, Monthermer was scheduled to follow the king to Flanders in an attempt to appease his disgruntled father-in-law, both William Rishanger and Nicholas Trivet recording that the king required Monthermer to recruit fifty knights.31 In the end the king allowed Monthermer to remain in England because he was needed in the north, instead requiring the countess to contribute a hundred armed men under some other captain.32 The Wallace rising prevented Monthermer from crossing to Flanders, and at the end of the year he was recruited for service on the Scottish March with a retinue of a hundred barded horses, under the overall command of the earl Warenne.33 For the Falkirk campaign of the following year we know the names of fifty-one individuals who planned to set out under his banner,34 suggesting a company in excess of a hundred men. To raise a large retinue so quickly Monthermer was able to rely on a few of those who had served the previous earl of Gloucester, Gilbert Clare, who had died in 1295. Richard Cornherth, William Ros and Thomas Pulesdon, for example, had set out for Wales with the old earl in 1295 before joining Monthermer in Scotland three years later,35 whilst the connection of Hugh St John to Earl Gilbert went back even further, to the Welsh war of 1282–83.36 However, Monthermer also set out to acquire what Ayton describes as ‘off-the-peg’ retinues,37 enlisting the service of the bannerets Sir William Morley and Sir Robert de la Warde (Monthermer tried to obtain the services of a third banneret, Sir Thomas Furnivall, though in this instance The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, p. 327; Fraser, Antony Bek, pp. 75–6. Rishanger, Chronica et Annales, p. 173; Nicholai Triveti, de Ordine Frat. Praedicatorum, Annales (AD MCXXXVI-MCCCVII), ed. T. Hog, English Historical Society (London, 1845), p. 358. 32 Parliamentary Writs, I, p. 296. 33 TNA, E 159/71, m. 106d. 34 TNA, C 67/13, mm. 1–9. 35 TNA, C 67/10, m. 3. 36 TNA, C 67/8, m. 4d. 37 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p. 22. 30 31



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he does not appear to have been successful, as on the Falkirk Roll Furnivall is listed in the king’s division, not the division under the earl Warenne, in which Monthermer served).38 However, as Ayton notes, the relatively small retinue sizes of the early fourteenth century meant that, more often than not, the bannerets leading these composite retinues would have been known to the earls in advance, therefore retaining the sense of an essentially stable recruitment pool.39 This is difficult to prove in Monthermer’s case because of his meteoric ascent in status, but Sir William Morley had served with him on the Scottish March during the winter of 1297–98 and was returning to the retinue in the summer.40 Although Sir Aymer de Valence (later earl of Pembroke, following his mother’s death in 1307) could to some extent make use of his father William’s (d. 1296) connections within the military community,41 his decision to draw up indentures for life service with the Berkeley family of bannerets in 1297 ahead of the expedition to Flanders can also be seen in the light of urgent, pressing recruitment needs.42 This was the first time that Valence had led a military retinue and he was fortunate in being able to acquire the service of the Berkeleys. They had previously been linked to the earl of Norfolk, but he did not travel to the continent in the summer of 1297, refusing to serve. Valence’s retinue was also boosted by the presence of the Berkeleys in the Falkirk army.

* * *

In all likelihood some of the more established earls on the Falkirk campaign were not dependent on the service of bannerets as sub-recruiters, as most retinues of the 1290s and 1300s tended to be smaller than those of later in the fourteenth century. Therefore, many earls were probably able to recruit the required numbers from their own estates and associates, leaving many bannerets to lead their retinues independently. As Andrew Spencer has observed, under Edward I ‘a wealthy earl might bring forty to fifty lances to the muster, while the retinues of lesser comital lights might be only twenty strong’.43 Earls’ retaining of bannerets by indenture did become more

TNA, C 67/13, m. 1; Rolls of Arms, Edward I, i, p. 412. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p. 21. 40 Rot. Scot., i, p. 48; TNA, C 67/13, mm. 2, 9. 41 The knights Sir John de la Rither, Sir Nicholas Carru and Sir John Columbers had served with Sir William in Wales during 1294–95 before joining Aymer’s retinue in 1298: TNA, C 67/10, m. 6; Scotland in 1298, p. 216. 42 ‘Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War 1278–1476’, ed. M. Jones and S. K. Walker, Camden Miscellany XXXII, Camden Society 5th ser., 3 (1994), pp. 1–190, no. 4. 43 A. Spencer, ‘The Comital Military Retinue in the Reign of Edward I’, Historical Research 83 (2010), pp. 46–59, at p. 50. 38 39

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common during the reign of Edward II, but this often seems to have been as much for political reasons as for strictly military ones.44 In this sense, the system of recruitment often only yields up its secrets during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II on those occasions, as with Ralph Monthermer and the bishop of Durham, when there was significant endogenous change within the military community or when the status of the primary recruiter ill-suited him to gather a large retinue simply from his own immediate resources: in other words, in exceptional circumstances. On the whole, the pressures on the English military community were not such at this point as to stretch the earls’ resources to breaking-point: except during 1294–98, there was usually only one specific focus of campaigning, sporadically in Wales during the 1270s and 1280s, more regularly in Scotland from the late 1290s.45 Consequently many bannerets remained as recruiters of retinues in their own right, rather than in the service of others. This might be a point of some significance. As the fourteenth century wore on the knights banneret and the status and role of the banneret may gradually have lost their weight within the military community due to the fact that bannerets increasingly served as sub-recruiters rather than as primary recruiters. However, at present it seems more likely that the shift to full-time professional soldiering in Normandy and the pays de conquête from 1417 had the greatest impact on the bannerets’ role.46 Regardless, the growth in size of retinues from the late thirteenth through to the late fourteenth centuries was significant and probably led to some subtle reappraisals of the bannerets’ military function. As Peter Coss has stated, the rank of banneret ‘always had a tendency to reflect prior wealth’;47 as such, the bannerets’ pre-eminent position within the English military community was a result of the traditional connection between wealth, status and service. Under Edward I these traditional, social foundations of military service and leadership were still very much in place, but they began to crumble from the 1350s. See, for example, Thomas, earl of Lancaster’s retaining of Sir William Latimer, banneret, in May 1319: J. R. Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster 1307–1322: A Study in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1970), p.  41. This might have been made specifically with the forthcoming campaign to Scotland in mind, but is more likely to have been conceived as part of the earl’s broader trial of strength with the king, following on from additional indentures drawn up by the earl during 1317. 45 The campaigning in France, Scotland and Wales between 1294 and 1298 does, however, appear to have led to a short-term stretching of the military retinues of the earls and bannerets, with lords being required on occasion to contribute soldiers to more than one theatre of war simultaneously. For examples, see Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 70. 46 For a discussion of the service and roles of knights banneret within English armies of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, see Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, pp. 56–85, especially p. 72. 47 P. Coss, The Origins of the English Gentry (Cambridge, 2003), p. 241. 44



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Comparison of the earls’ retinue sizes in the reign of Edward I with those later in the fourteenth century helps to show why knights banneret increasingly moved from leadership to sub-leadership of retinues. Detailed knowledge of the size of earls’ retinues during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II is not easy to come by due to the fact that they were not usually in receipt of crown pay. However, one exception was the aforementioned three-month service on the Scottish March during the winter of 1297–98, to deal with Wallace’s rising, when five earls and one banneret were paid for mounted retinues, recorded in Table 4.3. Table 4.3: Paid retinues on the Scottish March, December 1297-March 129848 Retinue leader

Retinue size

John, earl Warenne, captain of the expedition

100 barded horses

Roger le Bigod, earl of Norfolk

130 barded horses

Ralph Monthermer, earl of Gloucester

100 barded horses

Humphrey Bohun, earl of Hereford

90 barded horses

William Beauchamp, earl of Warwick

30 barded horses

Sir Henry Percy

50 barded horses

Viewed in isolation these retinue sizes reveal little, but when compared with retinues gathered in the mid- and late-fourteenth century the differences are often stark. This can be seen through analysis of the retinues of the only two comital families recorded in Table 4.3 that remained military active throughout the greater part of the fourteenth century, namely the Beauchamps and the Bohuns. Shortly before his death, William Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, led thirty barded horses (taken here to mean men-at-arms) to Scotland in December 1297. By contrast, his grandson Thomas, earl of Warwick, led a retinue of 348 men (including 149 mounted archers) on the Crécy campaign of 1346,49 whilst his like-named son, Thomas, led a retinue of 400 men (200 men-at-arms and 200 archers) on the duke of Lancaster’s ‘Great March’ across France during 1373–74,50 and possibly 440 men (140 men-at-arms and 300 archers) on the campaign led by Richard II to Scotland in 1385, though the number given in the pay records differ from those in the ‘Order of Battle’.51 Therefore, the Beauchamp retinue increased ten-fold from the reign of Edward I to the reign of Edward III (five-fold if only the men-at-arms are counted) and perhaps a little further still by the TNA, E 159/71, m. 106d. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, p. 245. 50 TNA, E 403/450, m. 4. 51 See the ‘Order of Battle’ printed in S. Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt (London, 1964), p. 437; the issue roll records payment for a retinue of 280 men (TNA, E 403/508, m. 12). 48 49

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reign of Richard II. A similar process can be traced in the Bohun retinue. Whilst Earl Humphrey led a retinue of ninety barded horses to Scotland in December 1297, his second son, William, earl of Northampton, served on the Crécy campaign with 302 men (161 men-at-arms and 141 mounted archers),52 whilst William’s nephew, Humphrey, earl of Hereford, indented for service with 700 men (300 men-at-arms and 400 mounted archers) on the naval expedition of 1372.53 On the Falkirk campaign of 1298 it would appear that neither the earl of Warwick, Guy, nor the earl of Hereford recruited a single banneret for service in their retinues, and the truth of the matter is that they probably did not need to. However, as we have seen, in 1346 the earl of Warwick recruited three bannerets, whilst the earl of Northampton recruited two bannerets.54 In 1372 the earl of Hereford enlisted two bannerets, Sir Philip le Despenser and Sir Roger Scales, to help recruit his retinue of 700 soldiers,55 but interestingly the earl of Warwick did not have any bannerets in his 400-strong retinue in France during 1373–74.56 Perhaps this is indicative of the emergence of professional military contractors lower down the social hierarchy, though the inclusion in Warwick’s retinue of twenty-seven knights bachelor must also have helped. Either way, whether their role was being usurped by lesser knights or by professional soldiers of sub-gentle origin, the ability of the earls to recruit such large retinues without the help of bannerets must have had an impact on the bannerets’ recruitment role, exacerbating the already-noted tendency for bannerets to serve as sub-recruiters rather than as principal retinue leaders. These shifts in the bannerets’ recruitment roles possibly raised questions about their relevance and status. Returning to the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, then, it would appear that the bannerets retained greater autonomy within the armies than they did later in the fourteenth century. This in turn might explain why the status of the knight banneret remained so high during this earlier period, as most emphatically illustrated on the Parliamentary Rolls of Arms of c. 1312, where the 169 ‘Banerez de Engletere’ are given pride of place at the head of the armorial.57 Moreover, whilst the nascent role of the knights banneret as sub-recruiters can be seen in the English army at Falkirk, this does not appear to have had a detrimental effect on the essential stability of the recruitment networks at play, something which Andrew Ayton has already observed for the reign of Edward III. Take, for example, the relationship between Ralph Monthermer, earl of Gloucester, and the banneret Sir Robert 52 53 54 55 56 57

Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, p. 245. TNA, E 403/446, m. 31. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, p. 245. TNA, E 101/32/20, m. 1. TNA, E 101/32/39. Parliamentary Writs, I, pp. 410–20.



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de la Warde. At first glance there is no evidence that Warde was leading a sub-retinue on behalf of Monthermer on the Falkirk campaign; the letters of protection on the Scottish roll do not reveal the intricacies of the retinue’s make-up, whilst Warde’s retinue from previous campaigns are not well documented: only four individuals can be identified from the retinue he led to Gascony in 1294, when Warde had led a retinue within the comitiva of Edmund, earl of Lancaster.58 However, by considering the composition of Warde’s retinues after the Falkirk campaign, it is evident that a number of men-at-arms in Monthermer’s retinue in the summer of 1298 were, in fact, part of Warde’s sub-retinue, comprising a unit of men-at-arms who served together regularly during the Scottish wars. Following their service with Monthermer in 1298,59 John le Taillour and John Langford could be found in Warde’s retinue in 1300 and 1303; Richard Pontefract went on to serve with Warde in 1303; Robert Staunton served with Warde in 1300, 1303 and 1306; and Peter Gresley was with Warde in 1303 and 1306.60 Furthermore, Sir Robert de la Warde also served in Monthermer’s retinue in Scotland in 1300 and 1301,61 when he is likely again to have led a sub-retinue. Monthermer was therefore able to make use of his bannerets to raise a large retinue in 1298 with apparent efficiency. Sir Aymer de Valence’s predicament and approach was very similar to that of Monthermer, with the need to raise a large, new military retinue from scratch being partly met by re-activating the military retinue of his father, Sir William, but predominantly by enlisting the service of experienced bannerets. The earl of Norfolk’s decision not to serve in Gascony in 1297 provided Valence with a perfect opportunity to enlist the Berkeleys in his retinue, and he grabbed it with both hands. Formerly Sir Thomas Berkeley and his son Sir Maurice had been associated with the earl of Norfolk. A list of Norfolk’s retinue headed (translated from the Latin) ‘Bannerets and knights of the earl Marshal with clerks and esquires of the same’ and dated 1295 lists three bannerets with the earl, namely Sir Hugh le Despenser, Sir Thomas Berkeley and Sir Maurice Berkeley.62 This clearly was his retinue for service in Wales, as can be seen from comparison with the letters of protection for the Welsh war of 1294–95.63 Norfolk’s retinue list from 1295 offers an unusual and intriguing insight into the recruitment hierarchy of a comital retinue from the reign of Edward I similar to that of the earl of Rôles Gascons 1242–1307, ed. F. Michel, C. Bémont, and Y. Renouard, 5 vols (Paris, 1885–1962), iii, pp. 119, 126, 136. 59 TNA, C 67/13, mm. 1–9. 60 For Warde’s retinues, see: TNA, C 67/14, m. 10 (1300); E 101/612/11, mm. 2, 8 and C 67/15, m. 12 (1303–4); and E 101/612/19, m. 1 and C 67/16, mm. 7–11 (1306). 61 TNA, C 67/14, mm. 5, 10. 62 TNA, C 47/2/10, m. 8. 63 TNA, C 67/10, mm. 5–7. 58

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Warwick for the Crécy campaign. Sir Hugh le Despenser was to be accompanied by two additional bannerets (cum duobus vexillis) and ten knights; Sir Thomas Berkeley was to be accompanied by one banneret (presumably his son, Maurice) and five knights, whilst Sir Maurice was simply to be accompanied by a companion (cum socio suo), namely Sir Robert Berkeley. As we have seen, the earl of Norfolk also had at least four bannerets in his retinue on the Falkirk campaign; and given that such reliance on bannerets as sub-recruiters seems to have been quite unusual in this period among the earls, it is worth reflecting on why Norfolk resorted to these measures. Possibly as marshal of the army he felt it important to have a particularly prestigious retinue;64 perhaps he was an innovator by nature, as he was also one of the first earls to be a party to a surviving life indenture; later, probably he sought to build up a strong retinue for political reasons.65 Whatever the answer, Norfolk’s refusal to serve in Gascony in 1297 led Valence to draw up a life indenture with Sir Thomas Berkeley on 2 July 1297, with Thomas required to serve with Maurice and five knights, exactly the same number as he had served with under the earl of Norfolk. In total, during times of war, Sir Thomas was to receive payment for twenty-four barded horses in Valence’s company, these being divided between two bannerets, five knights and six esquires.66 This is another example of a newly emerging retinue leader acquiring ‘off-the-peg’ retinues to bolster his armed strength. All told, of Valence’s retinue on the horse inventory for the Falkirk campaign of 1298,67 no fewer than twelve men-at-arms can be shown to have had links to the Berkeley retinue in either previous or subsequent years. Therefore around a quarter of the Valence retinue on the Falkirk campaign was provided by the Berkeleys and their armed followers, thereby ensuring (as in the case of Monthermer and Warde) that the new military retinue already had strong service bonds at its core. In all likelihood many of the men with Valence in Scotland in 1298 had served under the Berkeleys in Wales during 1294–95, but only in two cases can this be proven due to the patchy documentation for the Welsh war. Both Sir Robert Berkeley and the valettus John Roges had served with Sir Thomas Berkeley under the earl of Norfolk in Wales before joining Valence’s retinue three years later.68 On the Flanders expedition of 1297–98, eleven of the men-at-arms who appeared on the horse inventory with Valence actually acquired letters of protection Marc Morris is certainly right to argue, in light of the dating of the document, that the earl’s household list of 1294–95 essentially marked an expansion of the household for military purposes, representing his retinue ‘on a war footing’: M. Morris, The Bigod Earls of Norfolk in the Thirteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 153. 65 This accounts for the expansion of the earl’s household later, in 1297: ibid., pp. 176–9. 66 ‘Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War’, no. 4. 67 Scotland in 1298, pp. 216–18. 68 TNA, C 67/10, m. 4. 64



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for the campaign through Sir Thomas Berkeley; and of these, five also had their horses appraised in Valence’s retinue in Scotland in 1298.69 The valetti Elias le Mareschal and William Acton had served with Sir Thomas Berkeley junior in Scotland in 1296 before joining the retinue of Valence at Falkirk.70 Casting our eyes beyond the Falkirk campaign, a couple of men-at-arms from the Valence retinue at Falkirk subsequently served with the Berkeleys, suggesting that they had actually been recruited by the Berkeleys in 1298: Richard Pauncefoot, valettus, served in Scotland with Sir Maurice Berkeley in 1301;71 and William Gamage, valettus, followed Sir Thomas Berkeley to Scotland in 1307.72 Indeed, as J. R. S. Phillips has shown, Valence was adept at absorbing the retinues of bannerets into his retinue during military campaigns, later enlisting the retinues of Sir William Latimer, Sir Robert Clifford and a couple of others on the Scottish campaign of 1307, for example.73 This, together with the evidence from the Monthermer retinue, adds to Ayton’s point about the mounted, armoured elements of early Edwardian armies being characterised by what he terms ‘dynamic stability’,74 a situation in stark contrast to the far more unstable recruitment situation later in the fourteenth century, especially in the decades after 1348. What in the past often appeared to be retinues of regularly shifting composition, by comparison with the Ricardian and Henrician stages of the Hundred Years’ War now appear to have been remarkably stable military retinues.75 This was the case despite the natural shifts due to deaths, non-service and the emergence of new leaders within the military community. Crucially for the status of the knight banneret, it was they at this point, rather than sub-gentle contractors, who provided for any shortfalls in recruitment. With regard to the smaller, fragmentary retinues located within the sources for the Falkirk campaign, the majority of these were simply small The eleven men apparently in Berkeley’s sub-retinue under Valence in Flanders were: Robert Bradeston; William Durant; John Gacelyn; Sir Thomas Gurney; John Lokinton; John Roges; Richard Sone; Nicholas Stowe; Robert le Taillour; Walter Tril; and Sir William Wauton: TNA, C 67/12, mm. 2, 3, 8d; E  101/6/28, m. 1. Of these, Gacelyn, Gurney, Roges, Taillour and Wauton had their horses appraised in Valence’s retinue for the Falkirk campaign. 70 TNA, E 101/5/23, m. 1. 71 TNA, E 101/9/23, m. 3. 72 CDS, v, p.  445. Gamage was one of the wealthier Gloucestershire men among the valetti in the Berkeley retinue; N. Saul, Knights and Esquires: The Gloucestershire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1981), pp. 69–71. 73 J. R. S. Phillips, Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke: Baronial Politics in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1972), p. 254. 74 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, p. 16. 75 For further analysis of retinue composition under Edward I and Edward II, see: Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp.  119–41; Spencer, ‘Comital Military Retinue’, pp. 46–59. 69

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companies of knights and esquires linked to the royal household; therefore, organisationally these would presumably have served at the battle under the direct command of the king, as a reserve. However, at least some bannerets were able to attract into their service knights and esquires with the capacity to recruit small companies of men-at-arms of their own. These, then, were the bannerets’ own sub-recruiters, though given that banneret retinues during the reign of Edward I were not especially large, most bannerets, like most earls, appear to have been able to recruit their retinues entirely from their own estates and associates. Altogether there are thirteen instances where leaders of small retinues of one to four men-at-arms can be shown to have joined the larger companies of bannerets. Sir Brian FitzAlan of Bedale was joined by Robert Lathum with a sub-retinue of four men-at-arms and John Sothill with one man-at-arms;76 Sir William Latimer acquired two menat-arms from John Heselarton, one from Thomas Latimer, and one from Gerard Salveyn;77 the household steward Sir Walter Beauchamp obtained four men-at-arms from John Kingston and three from Gilbert Talbot;78 whilst the keeper of the wardrobe Sir John Droxford was accompanied by a retinue of three men-at-arms with Hugh St Philibert and one man-atarms with Roger le Savage.79 Sir Robert Tateshall, Sir Robert FitzRoger, Sir Hugh Bardolf and Sir Pons Castillon also acquired small sub-units within their larger retinues.80 As noted previously, ‘viewed from this perspective, the bannerets appear not only as leaders of large troops under their own command; they were also focal points around which other, smaller units would assemble’.81 Looking forward to the late fourteenth century, these small sub-units were still omnipresent within the fabric of English armies, and bannerets often still played a significant role in their recruitment. One difference, however, which probably contributed to the gradual demise of the distinct role and status of the knight banneret was that by the 1370s and 1380s knights bachelor were competing with the bannerets to recruit the largest retinues, making the status differentiation less significant. On the Scottish campaign of 1385, of the thirteen retinues comprising more than fifty soldiers, five (38 per cent) were led by ordinary knights,82 and

TNA, C 67/13, mm. 5, 6d, 8d. TNA, C 67/13, mm. 5, 6d, 8d, 9. 78 TNA, C 67/13, mm. 5, 8; Scotland in 1298, p. 185. 79 TNA, C 67/13, mm. 6, 6d; Scotland in 1298, p. 174. 80 Robert Darcy led one man into the retinue of Sir Robert Tateshall junior (TNA, C 67/13, mm. 5d, 8d); Hugh Gobion led one man into the retinue of Sir Robert FitzRoger (C  67/13, mm. 6d, 8); William Mortimer led one man into the retinue of Sir Hugh Bardolf (Scotland in 1298, pp. 222–3); and Raymond St Quentin led two men into the retinue of Sir Pons de Castillon (Scotland in 1298, pp. 204–5). 81 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 64. 82 Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 85. 76

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therefore these small sub-units were just as likely to accumulate around knights bachelor as they were around bannerets.

* * *

There is good reason, then, to see the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries as the heyday of the knight banneret, both militarily and, as a consequence, socially, for on the one hand they continued to retain a degree of independence in the recruitment and leadership of retinues on military campaigns, whilst on the other hand the professional military contractor of sub-gentle origin had not yet emerged and was not yet needed, therefore ensuring that even as sub-recruiters, the role of the banneret remained paramount. Impressionistically, ascent to the rank of knight banneret certainly seems to have carried a concomitant obligation to lead retinues to war if one had not previously done so and, indeed, to lead larger retinues than in the past had one already acquired previous recruitment experience. Few ‘new men’ entered the ranks of the knight banneret in this period, but Sir John Charlton, who did so in the early years of the reign of Edward II, led a retinue on the Bannockburn campaign of 1314 and subsequently at the siege of Berwick in 1319, when he received pay for a retinue of two knights and eighteen sergeants.83 Sir John Botetourt led a retinue of one knight and seven valetti to Flanders in 1297 when he still possessed the rank of knight bachelor; but, having been promoted to knight banneret on 23 August, he led a larger retinue to Scotland in the following year, of three knights and thirteen valetti.84 It is easy to observe that knights banneret were expected to lead retinues of men-at-arms to war; however, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the expectations incumbent on the bannerets it is necessary to gauge the regularity with which they did so and the fluctuating size, over time, of their retinues. The prosopographical data for such an analysis are patchy in the years before the Falkirk campaign, with the campaigns to Wales being sporadic and those on the continent during 1294–98 either poorly attended for political reasons (Flanders) or patchily documented (Gascony). However, between 1298 and 1314 there is a very good run of nominal data for the Edwardian soldiery, especially those of knightly status and higher. Taking the eighty-seven ‘home-grown’ bannerets recorded on the heraldic Falkirk Rolls of Arms, Table 4.4 summarises the number of campaigns on which they led retinues, from Falkirk to Bannockburn inclusive. To provide some context, during these years there were major campaigns to Scotland in 1298, 1300, 1301, 1303–4, 1310–11 and 1314, smaller-scale expeditions in 1306 and 1307, as well as additional periods of service on the Scottish March during relative lulls in fighting.

83 84

TNA, C 71/6, mm. 1, 4; E 101/378/4, fol. 27r. Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 62.

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david simpkin Table 4.4: Occasions of retinue leadership by Falkirk bannerets, 1298–131485

Occasions of retinue leadership

Number of bannerets

% of total

Total number of leadership occasions

1

8

9%

8

2

7

8%

14

3

16

19%

48

4

15

17%

60

5

10

12%

50

6

11

13%

66

7

12

14%

84

8

2

2%

16

9

1

1%

9

10

1

1%

10

11

0

0

0

12

2

2%

24

13

1

1%

13

Total Mean average

86

402 (4.7 occasions each)

One striking feature arising from this analysis is that a large proportion of bannerets from the Falkirk campaign died within a relatively short space of time of that expedition. Of the eighty-seven bannerets included in this survey, twenty (23 per cent) died before the end of the reign of Edward I (d. 1307), whilst an additional eighteen (20 per cent) died after 1307 but before the battle of Bannockburn. Therefore, in total, there was a high rate of turnover among the pool of bannerets in the years between the battles of Falkirk and Bannockburn, with 43 per cent of the English knights banneret who led retinues at Falkirk unavailable to Edward II for the campaign to Scotland against Robert I in 1314. That said, often the sons or brothers of the Falkirk bannerets took over their leadership roles; and, where this can clearly be demonstrated, such continuity of leadership within the banneret In cases where a banneret died and was replaced by a son or brother, the service of the family has been included in the table as it represents continuity of service and leadership among the knights banneret. The total number in the table comes to eighty-six rather than eighty-seven bannerets because Sir Robert Tateshall and Sir Robert Tateshall junior led retinues as bannerets at Falkirk. However, the father died shortly after the campaign and the son died in 1303. It would make little sense, therefore, for present purposes to count the leadership records of father and son separately.

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family has been factored into Table 4.4. For example, Sir Henry, Lord Grey of Codnor, led retinues to Scotland in 1298, 1300, 1301, 1303–4 and 1306, on the last occasion being paid for a retinue of five knights and fourteen sergeants for service in eastern Scotland under Sir Aymer de Valence.86 In the following year, however, perhaps due to illness (Henry died in 1308), his son, Sir Richard Grey of Codnor, seems to have taken over leadership of the retinue, and Sir Richard also served on the Bannockburn campaign of 1314.87 Therefore in Table 4.4 the banneret family of Grey of Codnor is recorded as having led retinues to war on seven rather than five occasions during the stated years. As for the mortalities, chroniclers were generally keen to record deaths of prominent figures on military campaigns and there is little evidence to suggest that the high rate of banneret-level deaths during 1298 to 1314 was caused directly by military service, the actual battle of Bannockburn (when a significant number of bannerets and other knights were killed) being exceptional in this respect.88 Nevertheless, it might be the case that the regular strains of campaigning and possible injuries suffered, or diseases picked up whilst serving in royal armies, did contribute to the high death-rate among these men. More broadly, and despite these endogenous changes and disruptions to the military community, Table 4.4 adds to the impression that the knights banneret of the reign of Edward I were absolutely crucial to the recruitment effort within the realm, to an extent which began to wane in the later fourteenth century and disappeared almost completely by the death of Henry V. A simple comparison of the Falkirk army of 1298 with the army of Richard II in Scotland in 1385 shows that whereas around a hundred bannerets led retinues in the former army, only thirteen bannerets (as against fifty-nine knights bachelor) were paid for leading retinues in the latter.89 Furthermore, in the reign of Edward I the military contribution of the bannerets to the war effort was very much a collective enterprise, for although not every Falkirk banneret led retinues to war as often as Sir Ralph FitzWilliam (ten occasions during 1298–1314),90 Sir Edmund Hastings (twelve TNA, C 67/13, m. 6d (1298); C 67/14, m. 10 (1300); C 67/14, m. 4d (1301); C 67/15, mm. 8, 14; E 101/12/18, fol. 8r (1303–4); E 101/13/16, fol. 5v (1306). 87 TNA, E 101/14/15, m. 9 (1307); C 71/6, m. 3 (1314). 88 Of the eighty-one members of the political and military elite who can be shown to have fought at Bannockburn, including family members, fourteen are known to have been killed and a further sixteen taken as prisoners of war (37 per cent of the total); A. Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat: Bannockburn and the Dynamics of Recruitment in England’, in Bannockburn, 1314–2014: Battle and Legacy, ed. M. Penman (Donington, 2016), pp. 36–56, at p. 42. 89 Rolls of Arms, Edward I, i, pp.  404–18; Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 85. 90 Three men named in his retinue in 1298 (TNA, C  67/13, m. 6); paid for going from Yorkshire to Berwick with six sergeants in the autumn of 1299 (BL, Additional 86

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occasions),91 Sir John Segrave (twelve occasions)92 or Sir Robert Clifford (thirteen occasions),93 there were far more regular recruiters than reluctant MS 37654, fol. 12r); twelve men named in his retinue in 1300 (C  67/14, mm. 10–12); two men named in his retinue in 1301 (C 67/14, mm. 3, 4); twelve men named in his retinue in 1303–4 (E  101/612/9, m. 1; CCW, p.  192); twelve men named in his retinue in 1306 (C 67/16, mm. 5, 7, 12); thirty-two men named in his retinue on the Scottish March during the winter of 1309–10 (CDS, v, p. 449); twenty-three men named in his retinue during 1310–11 (C 71/4, mm. 9, 11); two men named in his retinue as Warden of the March around Cumbria in 1313 (C  71/6, m. 10); and seventeen men named in his retinue for the Bannockburn campaign (C 71/6, mm. 1, 3, 5, 9). 91 Named on the Falkirk Rolls of Arms in 1298 (Rolls of Arms, Edward I, i, p. 409); three men named in his retinue near Berwick in the winter of 1299–1300 (E 101/8/26, m. 3); named in the Song of Caerlaverock in 1300 (Rolls of Arms, Edward I, p.  441); paid for a retinue of two knights and eight sergeants in the army of the Prince of Wales in 1301 (BL, Additional MS 7966a, fol. 84v); eleven men named in his retinue in Scotland in 1302 (E 101/10/5, m. 8; E 101/10/12, m. 4); three men named in his retinue at Berwick in 1303 (E 101/612/9, m. 2); paid for a retinue of two knights and seven sergeants at Perth in 1306 (E101/13/16, fol. 12v); two men named in his retinue on the Scottish March in 1308 (Rot. Scot., i, p. 58); four men named in his retinue on the Scottish March in 1309 (CDS, v, p.  449); twenty-one men named in his retinue at Dundee in 1311 (CDS, iii, p.  430); twenty-four men named in his retinue at Berwick in 1312 (CDS, iii, p. 415–16); one man named in his retinue on the Scottish March during the winter of 1313–14 (C 71/6, m. 10). 92 Twelve men named in his retinue in 1298 (C 67/13, mm. 1–2); one man named in his retinue on the Scottish March during the winter of 1299–1300 (C 67/14, m. 15); six men in his retinue in 1300 (C 67/14, mm. 11–12); fourteen men in his retinue in 1301 (C 67/14, mm. 1–8); forty men named in his retinue for the area around Berwick in 1302 (C 67/15, m. 15; E 101/10/5, m. 8; E 101/10/12, m. 3); two men named in his retinue on the Scottish March in the winter of 1302–3 (C 67/15, m. 15); twenty-eight men named in his retinue for the keeping of Berwick during 1303–4 (C 67/15, passim; E 101/612/9, mm. 1–2); three men named in his retinue in 1306 (C 67/16, mm. 4, 11, 12); two men named in his retinue in 1307 (C 67/16, mm. 2, 2d); keeper of Scotland with sixty men-at-arms during 1309 (Parliamentary Writs, II, ii, p. 380); twenty-two men named in his retinue during 1310–11 (C 71/3, mm. 2–4; C 71/4, passim; CCW, pp. 226–8); five men named in his retinue in 1314 (C 71/6, mm. 3–4). 93 Thirty-eight men named in his retinue in 1298 (Scotland in 1298, pp.  196–8; TNA, C 67/13, mm. 1–8); he led a retinue of sixty barded horses on the Scottish March during the winter of 1298–9 (E 101/7/19, m. 2); two men named in his retinue on the Scottish March during the winter of 1299–1300 (C 67/14, mm. 14–15); paid for a retinue of four knights and eighteen sergeants in 1300 (Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae, ed. J. Topham et al. (London, 1787), p.  197); one man named in his retinue in 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4); one man named in his retinue on the Scottish March in the winter of 1302–3 (C 67/15, m. 15); twenty-eight men named in his retinue during 1303–4 (C 67/15, passim; E 101/612/11, m. 2); paid for a retinue of seven knights and thirty-three sergeants near Carlisle during 1306 (E 101/369/11, fol. 89v); eight men named in his retinue in 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); led a retinue of a hundred men-at-arms and three hundred foot as Warden of the Scottish March during the winter of 1309–10 (Parliamentary Writs, II, ii, p.  393); thirty-seven men named in his retinue during 1310–11 (C  71/4, passim; CCW, p.  326; Rot. Scot., i, p.  89); thirty-six men named in his retinue during the winter of 1311–12 (E  101/14/15, m. 3); thirteen men named in his retinue for the Bannockburn campaign of 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1).



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ones, especially given the mortalities noted above and the usual issues with the sources. On average, the Falkirk bannerets led retinues to war on a minimum of 4.7 occasions during the years 1298–1314. Indeed thirty of the bannerets, or 35 per cent, can be shown to have led retinues on six or more occasions; and it must be remembered that these are not simply occasions of military service, but of demonstrable retinue-level command. Moreover, whilst these figures do include the Falkirk campaign, they do not include retinue leadership on expeditions before 1298, a point of significance given that a significant proportion of the Falkirk bannerets were reaching the end of their careers in arms, and indeed their lives. A fairly typical career of retinue leadership for the bannerets who managed to survive into the reign of Edward II was that of Sir Robert Mohaut (d. 1329). The names of fifteen men-at-arms from his retinue are known for the Falkirk campaign,94 but then his leadership of a retinue in Scotland in 1300 is known only because of his appearance in the heraldic Song of Caerlaverock;95 this makes it likely that the nine men-at-arms proffered in his name at the ‘feudal’ muster were led by Mohaut in person during the siege.96 On the expedition of 1301 he received pay for a retinue of three knights and thirteen sergeants in the army of the Prince of Wales;97 for the campaign of 1303–4, sixteen men took out letters of protection or attorney for service in his retinue, or indeed had their horse appraised in Mohaut’s service;98 four men had letters of protection or attorney for the last outing to Scotland under Edward I, in 1307;99 and Mohaut was apparently joined by at least thirteen men-at-arms on the Scottish expedition of Edward II in 1310.100 All told, Mohaut can be shown to have led retinues to war on six occasions between the battles of Falkirk and Bannockburn, though he had also led a retinue to Flanders on the politically contentious expedition of 1297.101 Within Mohaut’s Falkirk retinue were eight men-at-arms who served under his banner on three or more occasions, adding further to the sense of stability.102 Another feature of banneret-level recruitment which contributed towards stability in the armies of Edward I was the fact that more often than not, fluctuations in the retinue sizes of individual bannerets tended to be mild, far more so than later in the fourteenth century. This situation was doubtless Scotland in 1298, p. 209. Rolls of Arms, Edward I, i, p. 434. 96 Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland and the Transactions between the Crowns of Scotland and England, ed. F. Palgrave (London, 1837), i, p. 231. 97 BL, Additional MS 7966a, fol. 84v. 98 TNA, C 67/15, mm. 8, 12; E 101/612/8, m. 1. 99 CDS, v, pp. 445–6. 100 TNA, C 71/4, m. 12. 101 TNA, C 67/12, mm. 2, 7, 7d. 102 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 125. 94 95

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facilitated by the fact that generally, the size of the retinues could be determined by the natural recruitment reach of the bannerets, with Crown-set targets being far less common than from the reign of Edward III onwards. Usually under Edward I and Edward II, bannerets were simply required to bring to muster as many men and horses as possible. The only specific recruitment targets that were regularly set, those for the ‘feudal’ muster, had little impact on this stability, not only because the required numbers were small, but also because the ‘feudal’ contingents were usually recruited in the same way as other parts of the banneret retinue, namely the menat-arms serving gratuitously or for crown wages.103 On the rare occasion that specific targets for recruitment at crown wages were set, the retinues were of modest size: summonses to bannerets to muster at Newcastle and Carlisle in November 1311 show that men of banneret status were expected to bring retinues of between ten and thirty men-at-arms,104 as had been customary under Edward I. These targets of modest size facilitated retinuelevel stability as bannerets could make recruitment plans in advance of the campaigns. Thus for the retinue of Sir Henry Tyes, banneret, we know the names of nine men in his paid retinue for the Caerlaverock campaign of 1300 and the same number with letters of protection for the Bannockburn campaign in 1314.105 Moreover, Tyes received crown wages in 1301 for a retinue of two knights and seven sergeants,106 suggesting a retinue of fairly constant and modest dimensions, though the retinue in 1314 was probably a little larger. In the late fourteenth century the role of the individual knight banneret was in some respects more important than a century earlier, because when they did indent for retinues, these were often spectacularly large compared to those of the reign of Edward I. Indeed this remained the case into the fifteenth century: in 1415 the banneret Sir John Tiptoft had 480 men-at-arms for service in his retinue in Aquitaine.107 However, such status terms as ‘banneret’ tend to be attached to definable strata of society with distinct characteristics, not to individuals, and so as the collective recruitment contribution of the bannerets became less significant, or at least as the regularly active team of such recruiters dwindled, the relevance Ibid., ch. 5. Parliamentary Writs, II, ii, p.  416. Sir John Clavering and Sir Robert Felton were required to muster with thirty-men-at-arms ad vadia; Sir John Crumwell and Sir Ralph FitzWilliam with twenty men-at-arms; and Sir Richard FitzMarmaduke, Sir Ralph Neville, Sir Walter Falconberg, Sir Nicholas Meynill, Sir Henry Percy, Sir Thomas Furnivall and Sir Robert Hastang with ten men-at-arms. Sir Robert Clifford was exceptional in being required to bring sixty men-at-arms, whilst several others, including Sir William Latimer and Sir John St John, were simply instructed to bring all their men-atarms to muster. 105 TNA, E 101/8/23, mm. 4–5 (1300); C 71/6, mm. 1, 6 (1314). 106 BL, Additional MS 7966a, fol. 83r. 107 Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 86. 103

104



military recruitment and social status

75

of the term itself must have been brought into question. In addition, as the availability of crown wages for military service increased from the 1330s, so the bannerets’ almost unique ability (with the exception of the earls and some of the non-banneret barons) to tap into wide-ranging recruitment networks based on landholding ties and locality became less significant; and as the average military retinue grew exponentially in size, so perhaps most bannerets became squeezed between, on the one hand, the earls and the most martial bannerets who were still capable of meeting these new requirements and, on the other, the ambitious non-gentle military contractors, or professionals, emerging from below. What is likely to have happened is that over succeeding generations both the Crown’s desire to create bannerets and the gentry’s desire to attain the rank dried up as the title became a meaningless shell of what it had formerly represented, namely the epitome of the status–service–recruitment nexus. This makes the awarding of the rank of banneret to Sir John Fastolf and a few other leading military figures in the early fifteenth century not only exceptional but curious, given that unlike the status of knight, that of banneret lacked a significant civilian dimension.

* * *

In conclusion, this paper has sought to meet two main objectives: firstly, to reconsider the nature of military recruitment in the armies of Edward I in the light of the ‘dynamics of recruitment’ schema recently explained and expounded by Andrew Ayton, with a specific focus on the role of the knights banneret; and secondly, to use this investigation as a way of making some provisional observations about the gradual decline of the rank of knight banneret by the fifteenth century. A thread connecting these two objectives has been the idea that the military-administrative sources hold the key to both investigations, with the special status of the knight banneret as a military recruiter and leader making it all the more likely that the reasons for his ultimate demise can be traced, first and foremost, to changes in the organisation and waging of war. As the records for military service become more available and the English armies of the late medieval period more fully understood (developments largely pioneered and driven, at least for the fourteenth century, by Andrew Ayton), it is likely that the causal significance of military service, recruitment and organisation for developments in the social, cultural, political and economic history of late medieval England will become increasingly obvious. Returning to E. H. Carr’s statement on historical causation mentioned at the outset of this paper, at present conclusive explanations for the bannerets’ demise must await further study. For now it must be sufficient to state that, whilst there was doubtless a multitude of causes for the eventual waning of the rank of knight banneret by the mid-fifteenth century, the ‘cause of all causes’ surely lies within a military context.

5

Sir Henry de Beaumont and his Retainers: The Dynamics of a Lord’s Military Retinues and Affinity in Early * Fourteenth-Century England

Andy King

The Durham Liber Vitae is a manuscript listing the names of those admitted to the confraternity of the Cathedral Priory of Durham, and its predecessors at Lindisfarne and Chester le Street. The first entries are from the ninth century, and few date from after 1300. Among those few is a group of eighteen names, in a fourteenth-century hand, headed by that of Sir Henry de Beaumont.1 Comparison with other evidence suggests the names are those of part of his military retinue, probably dating to 1314;2 if so, it is likely that the names commemorate a pilgrimage made by Beaumont and some of his retainers to the cathedral, and its relics of St Cuthbert, on their * I have to thank Andrew Ayton and David Simpkin for their great generosity in

providing much of the data on which this paper is based (it should perhaps be pointed out that Andrew remained blissfully unaware of its ultimate destination!). A version was presented at the ‘Lords and Lordship in the British Isles (1300–1600)’ Conference, University of St Andrews, 2015; I am very grateful to the audience for their comments. I also have to thank David Simpkin for commenting on a draft, and Claire Etty for helping to beat the final version into submission. 1 Those named are Sir Henry de Beaumont, Sir Robert Neville, Sir John Marmion, Sir John de Eure, Sir Thomas Gray, Sir Peter Saltmarsh, Sir William Marmion, Sir Robert Breton, Sir Odinel Heron, Sir Norman Darcy, Sir Richard Byron, Sir Walter de Lisle, Sir William de Buckminster, Sir John de Fenwick, Sir Edmund Chaplain (or Sir Edmund, the chaplain), Sir Walter de Trickingham, Sir Walter de Gloucester, Sir John Mereworth; DLV, i, 207 (entry 72r7 279). Brief biographies of these eighteen men are provided in the ‘Commentary’, in DLV, iii, 443–589, sub nomine. 2 See Appendix, below.

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way to serve under arms in Scotland. Any spiritual benison they might have gained from the exercise does not, however, appear to have translated into worldly advantage, for at least four of those named were subsequently captured at the catastrophic English defeat at Bannockburn.3 Sir Henry de Beaumont had an eventful and often contentious career. A foreign adventurer, who made good through a career of continuous military service, in the face of repeated political controversy, he provides an interesting case-study for the investigation of military retinues. A great deal of work has been done on the recruitment and composition of such retinues and their stability, or lack thereof (notably, of course, by Andrew Ayton).4 However, while the dynamics of a military retinue were, at least in part, the dynamics of lordship, it is has rarely been possible to trace the personal relationships which underpin them. In Sir Henry de Beaumont’s case, however, we are unusually well informed, because one of his retainers was the Northumbrian Sir Thomas Gray. And Gray’s like-named son was the author of a chronicle, the Scalacronica, composed in the late 1350s, which includes some fascinating details of the elder Gray’s relationship with Beaumont, presumably derived from Gray’s own testimony.5 Born circa 1280, Beaumont was a Frenchman, the younger son of Louis de Brienne, Vicomte de Beaumont-au-Maine, and a relative of both Edward I’s queen, Eleanor of Castile, and Edward II’s queen, Isabella of France. Beaumont’s sister, Isabella, married the English baron John de Vescy, one of Edward I’s close associates; and Beaumont himself became a knight of Edward’s household in 1297.6 He became close to the Prince of Wales, and was granted a baronial estate in Lincolnshire in 1307, soon after the latter Thomas Gray, John de Eure, Robert Neville and John Mereworth; Nicolai Triveti Annalium continuatio, ed. A. Hall (Oxford, 1722), p. 15. 4 See, for instance, A. Ayton, ‘Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J. S. Bothwell (York, 2001), pp. 107–32; A. Ayton, ‘Armies and Military Communities in Fourteenth-Century England’, in Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen, ed. P. Coss and C. Tyerman (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 215–39; A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp.  9–59; A. Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat: Bannockburn and the Dynamics of Recruitment in England’, in Bannockburn, 1314–2014: Battle and Legacy, ed. M. Penman (Donington, 2016), pp.  36–56. The work of many other historians could be cited, but particularly relevant for the present study is D. Simpkin, The English Aristocracy at War from the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn (Woodbridge, 2008). 5 Sir Thomas Gray: Scalacronica (1272–1363), ed. A. King, Surtees Society 209 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. l–li. 6 Beaumont’s career is outlined in J. R. Maddicott, ‘Beaumont, Sir Henry de (c. 1280–1340)’, ODNB; Complete Peerage, 2, pp.  59–60; S. Cameron and A. Ross, ‘The Treaty of Edinburgh and the Disinherited (1328–1332)’, History 84 (1999), pp. 237–56, at pp. 251–2. 3



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came to the throne as Edward II.7 In 1308, he was appointed as one of the keepers of Scotland south of the Forth, and in 1310, he was granted custody of Roxburghshire and its castle for life;8 he would serve frequently on the Scottish Marches for the rest of the reign. In 1309, he received a personal summons to parliament, promoting him to the ranks of the nascent parliamentary peerage.9 At a time when the Gascon Piers Gaveston was the focus of opposition to the king, Beaumont, as another highly-promoted Frenchborn royal favourite, was a natural target of Edward’s opponents. Accordingly, the Ordinances of October 1311 specifically provided that Beaumont be removed from Edward’s counsel – though to little practical effect.10 Beaumont’s unpopularity extended even to the royal household; in 1317, he and his brother Louis, bishop-elect of Durham, were kidnapped and briefly held prisoner by the Northumbrian household knight, Sir Gilbert de Middleton.11 In circa 1310, Beaumont had married Alice, niece and heiress of the Scotsman John Comyn, earl of Buchan. As well as bringing him lands in Leicestershire,12 this gave him a claim to Comyn’s Scottish earldom of Buchan, and the office of constable of Scotland, and thus a direct vested interest in English control over Scotland.13 This led him to fall out with Edward II over the long-term Anglo-Scottish truce sealed in 1323.14 He was evidently back in favour by September 1325, when he was appointed joint guardian of Edward’s son, when the latter went to France to do homage for Gascony.15 However, the following February, he was imprisoned and his lands confiscated because he refused to swear an oath to do the will of

The grant comprised the larger part of the barony of Folkingham, including the manors of Folkingham and Edenham and Barton-on-Humber, with the reversion of Heckington; CChR, 1300–26, pp. 107, 153; CIPM, viii, no. 173 (pp. 188–9); I. J. Sanders, Feudal Military Service in England: A Study of the Constitutional and Military Powers of the Baronies in Medieval England (Oxford, 1956), p. 46. 8 Rot. Scot., i, p. 56; CPR, 1307–13, p. 214 (and see ibid., pp. 209, 215). 9 Complete Peerage, 2, p. 60. 10 See clauses xxii, xxiii; The Statutes of the Realm (1101–1713), ed. A. Luders, et al. (11 vols, Record Commission, 1810–28), i, p. 163; S. Phillips, Edward II (London and New Haven, 2010), pp. 178–9, 215–16. 11 A. King, ‘Bandits, Robbers and Schavaldours: War and Disorder in Northumberland in the Reign of Edward II’, in Thirteenth Century England IX, ed. M. Prestwich, et al. (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 115–30, at pp. 125–8; M. Prestwich, ‘Gilbert de Middleton and the Attack on the Cardinals, 1317’, in Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages. Essays Presented to Karl Leyser, ed. T. Reuter (London, 1992), pp. 179–94. 12 CPR, 1307–13, p. 267, CCR, 1307–13, pp. 409, 497–8, 514; CIPM, viii, no. 271. 13 CCR, 1307–13, p. 340. 14 See below, n. 141. 15 Fœdera, II, ii, p.  606; CPR, 1324–7, p.  174 (the commission was subsequently cancelled). 7

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Sir Hugh le Despenser the younger.16 After Edward’s deposition, Beaumont proceeded to fall out with Queen Isabella and Sir Roger Mortimer, again over the issue of peace with Scotland and his claim to the earldom; his lands were confiscated again, and he went into exile in France, returning only after Edward III’s coup in 1330.17 Still in pursuit of the earldom of Buchan, Beaumont took a leading role in the 1332 expedition of the Disinherited, which resulted in the crowning of Edward Balliol as King of Scots, followed by renewed Anglo-Scottish war, as Edward III supported Balliol’s attempts to make his kingship a reality. Balliol granted Beaumont his earldom, and he served as Balliol’s justiciar and as constable. For his pains, Beaumont was captured when his castle of Dundarg was besieged in December 1334, though he had been ransomed and released by the following summer.18 By the time of Beaumont’s death in 1340, his son John had already embarked on a military career, serving with his father in Scotland on his last campaign in 1336.19 As a knight of Edward III’s household, he led retinues to Flanders in 1338–39 and 1340, and to Scotland in 1341, which demonstrate a degree of continuity with those of his father;20 indeed Henry may himself originally have intended to lead the retinue to Flanders in 1338–39.21 However, John was killed at a tournament in Easter 1342, leaving a twoyear-old son as his heir – effectively ending the Beaumont family’s military endeavours for a generation.22

* * *

Unfortunately, there are considerable gaps in the evidence for reconstructing Beaumont’s retinues. In particular, the expedition of the Disinherited of

Le Livere de Reis de Britanie e le Livere de Reis de Engletere, ed. J. Glover, Rolls Ser. (1865), pp.  354–5; Croniques de London, depuis l’an 44 Hen. III jusqu’à l’an 17 Edw. III, ed. J. G. Aungier, Camden Society, 1st ser., 28 (1844), p.  49; G. A. Holmes, ‘The Judgement on the Younger Despenser, 1326’, EHR 70 (1955), pp. 261–7, at p. 266; CCR, 1323–7, p. 593; CFR, 1319–27, pp. 374, 417–18. 17 CFR, 1327–37, p. 116; R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327–35 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 61–6. 18 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 185–6. 19 TNA, E 101/19/36, m. 2. 20 Norwell, pp.  301, 302, 331; TNA, C 76/15, m. 22; E  36/204, ff. 99, 100d.; CDS, v, nos. 3736, 3737, 3743, 3746. 21 CCR, 1337–9, p. 322. A royal writ of March 1338 indicates that he was engaged to go ‘beyond the sea in the king’s company’. In the event, John appears to have gone in his father’s stead. 22 ‘Adæ Murimuth continuatio chronicarum’, Chronica A. Murimuth et R. de Avesbury, ed. E. M. Thompson, Rolls Ser., 93 (1889), p. 124. John de Beaumont’s son, Henry, did not come of age until 1360, just as the Treaty of Brétigny came into effect; and he died just before the renewed outbreak of the French wars in 1369. Complete Peerage, 2, p. 61. 16



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1332 was a private enterprise, and so has left no trace in crown records. Consequently, there is virtually no information for Beaumont’s retinue at the battle of Dupplin Moor – the greatest triumph of his career, which formed the basis of his subsequent martial reputation.23 Similarly, his service for Balliol as King of Scots is largely unrecorded. Even where evidence does exist, it is more often than not incomplete. In 1309–10, Beaumont was paid for service in Scotland from All Saints to Easter, with sixty men; however we know the names only of the twenty-five who took out letters of protection.24 And it should be borne in mind that those who took out letters of protection did not always trouble themselves to turn out.25 Similarly, for five of the sixteen putative pilgrims listed with Beaumont in the Durham Liber Vitae (Richard Byron, John de Fenwick, John Marmion, Robert Neville and John Mereworth),26 there is no other evidence of their connection with him. The limitations of the evidence are made clear by a return made by the sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1324, naming the knights and men-at-arms in his county. The sheriff returned the names of sixteen armigeri, who were said to be ‘with Sir Thomas de Wake, some with Sir William de Kyme and some with Sir Henry de Beaumont’.27 Of these sixteen, three (Robert de Legbourne, Roger Breton and Ralph Paris) share the surnames of men who are known to have served with Beaumont on other occasions.28 However, this incidental reference is the only evidence for their own service with him. This incompleteness of the evidence can render attempts at interpretation somewhat problematic. For instance, in a petition to the pope of 1331, Simon de Audray describes himself as a ‘vadlet monsieur Henry de Beaumound’ (appearing alongside John Kynwas, who describes himself as Beaumont’s clerk).29 At this period, the term ‘valet’ could have connotations of

John Capgrave’s brief account of his career, written circa 1446, is concerned almost solely with this expedition; Johannis Capgrave Liber de illustribus Henricis, ed. F. C. Hingeston, Rolls Ser. (1858), pp.  167–9. The Scottish chronicler Andrew Wyntoun, writing in the 1420s, named Beaumont foremost amongst Balliol’s supporters at Dupplin, describing him as ‘wise and right worthy’; The Original Chronicle of Andrew of Wyntoun, ed. F. J. Amours, 6 vols (Scottish Text Society, 1903–14), v, pp. 398, 399. 24 CDS, iii, no. 192; CDS, v, nos. 566, 2737 (all the protections were issued on the same day, 24 October 1309). 25 For the limitations of letters of protection as a source, see A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 157–64. 26 Though it is possible that this is same Sir John Mereworth who served with John de Beaumont in 1338 and 1340; below, p. 100. Note that the figure of sixteen men excludes Edmund [the] Chaplain (see Appendix). 27 Parliamentary Writs, II, ii, p. 645. 28 Henry de Legbourne (see below, p.  85); Sir Robert Breton and Richard Breton (below, pp. 86, 98); and William Paris (see below, p. 84). 29 TNA, SC 8/242/12083. 23

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either military or civilian service, or indeed both;30 but there is no record that Audray ever served Beaumont under arms. This could suggest a separation between Beaumont’s wider affinity and his purely military retinue, with men such as Audray serving him only in a civilian and not in a martial capacity. Or it may simply be that Audray did not bother to take out letters of protection when serving him under arms, and that such service is therefore unrecorded. Such difficulties notwithstanding, sufficient evidence does survive for some conclusions to be drawn. For the first few years of his career, while serving as a landless knight of the royal household, Beaumont retained only a small company – usually just five or six men-at-arms. Very full records survive for his retinues for the period 1297 to 1303, in the form of a series of horse valuation inventories (see Table 5.1).31 These reveal that the personnel of his retinue remained stable at first, with very little turnover between 1297 and 1300. Then, for no very obvious reason, this stability ceased. The retinues Beaumont led to Scotland in 1301 and 1303 had little continuity with those previous, or indeed, with each other; only three of the six men who served with him in 1300 did so again in 1301; and only two who served in 1301 served again in 1303. Table 5.1: Sir Henry de Beaumont’s retainers, 1297–1303 1297*

1298

1300

1301

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Simon Mildenhale

x

x

x

Philip Burstall

x

Retainers

1296

Sir John Claron William Pointz

†

‡

x

John Chandel William le Marshal

1303

x x

x

x

x

x

Roger Halow

x

x

Thomas Boteler

x

Stephen Bournay

x

Roger le Coffer

x

Arnold Commond

x

See Anglo-Norman Dictionary, under vadlet [http://www.anglo-norman.net; accessed: 01/02/2017]; P. Coss, The Origins of the English Gentry (Cambridge, 2003), pp.  196–7, 225–8. 31 1296: E 101/5/23, m. 3; 1297: E 101/6/37, m. 7; 1298: Scotland in 1298: Documents relating to the Campaign of King Edward the First in that Year, ed. H. Gough (Paisley, 1888), p. 172; 1300: E 101/8/23, m. 2; E 101/9/24, m. 1; 1303: E 101/612/11, m. 1. For horse valuation inventories, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 84–96. 30



sir henry de beaumont and his retainers Retainers

1296

1297*

Arnold Doun

1298

1300

83

1301

1303

x

Sir Gerard Fresnay

x

John Estlington

x

Thomas Monkston

x

William Nulle

x

Campaign in Flanders Claron was knighted between serving in 1297 and 1298 ‡ Pointz also served with two other unnamed men-at-arms in 1299; Liber quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae. Anno regni regis Edwardi primi vicesimo octavo, ed. J. Topham, et al. (London, 1787), p. 209. *

†

The grant of a substantial landed estate to Beaumont in 1307, however, led to a transformation of the composition of his retinues. He was now able to recruit much larger numbers, such as the forty men-at-arms he was assigned to raise in 1308; the sixty men he led in 1309–10; the eighty men-at-arms he contracted to raise in 1316; and the ninety-two men-at-arms he served with in 1335.32 His son John would lead retinues of twenty-four men-at-arms to Flanders in 1338, and fifty-eight men-at-arms and twenty hobelars to Scotland in 1341.33 Of Henry’s retainers from the period 1297 to 1303, only Roger Halow is recorded as serving with him after 1307 (see Table 5.2). This apparent lack of continuity may, though, be just a trick of the evidence, as for the period of Edward II’s reign we are dependent mainly on letters of protection, which provide a far less complete picture. Indeed, not a single one of those who are known to have served with Beaumont in 1296 to 1303 bothered to take out letters of protection during that period; and some of them may have continued to serve after this without leaving any trace in the records. Table 5.2: Roger Halow’s service with Sir Henry de Beaumont, 1301–14 8 July 1301

Horse inventory

E 101/9/24, m. 1

18 May 1303

Horse inventory

E 101/612/11, m. 1

14 Nov. 1308

Protection

Rot. Scot., i, p. 59

24 Oct. 1309

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2737

19 Apr. 1314

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2966

CDS, iii, nos. 47, 192; CDS, v, no. 566; TNA, E 101/68/2, no. 39; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, p. 249. 33 Norwell, p. 331; TNA, E 36/204, fols 99, 100d. 32

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The recruitment – or not – of tenants into their lord’s retinues has recently been a matter of some debate amongst historians, tied up with the oncemore fashionable concept of ‘bastard feudalism’.34 In the early fourteenth century, some magnates, such as Thomas, earl of Lancaster, drew a mere handful of their retainers from their estates; others, such as Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke, Thomas of Brotherton, earl of Norfolk, and Guy Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, recruited their tenants to a somewhat greater, though still limited, extent.35 Beaumont, however, relied heavily on his new estates to recruit military manpower, perhaps because he lacked the status and connections of these higher-ranking noblemen. Nevertheless, it is notable that he was able to do so straightway, despite the fact that he had no previous links with these areas. Lincolnshire, in particular, proved a fertile recruiting ground, and a number of his tenants in the county would serve him under arms. Sir William Marmion, one of his main retainers, held the manor of Keisby of him, and John Marmion, William’s cousin and (probably) another retainer, held Winteringham of Beaumont.36 John Driby, who served with Beaumont in 1316, came from the family which held the manor of Baston of him;37 Sir Walter de Gloucester, who served with him in 1315, 1317 and 1319, held property of him at Heydour;38 Adam de Kydale who served with him in 1309, held land of him at South Ferriby;39 and William Paris, who served with him in 1319, held land at Winceby of him.40 At least two of Beaumont’s military retainers came from his Lincolnshire manor of Barton: Peter Barde and Thomas Burgoyne, who both served with him in 1314;41 and John Jolliffe, who served with him in 1310, was from his manor of

C. Burt, ‘A “Bastard Feudal” Affinity in the Making? The Followings of William and Guy Beauchamp, Earls of Warwick, 1268–1315’, Midland History 34 (2009), pp. 156–80; and see A. Spencer, ‘The Comital Military Retinue in the Reign of Edward I’, Historical Research 83 (2010), pp. 46–59, at pp. 53–4; Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp. 134–5. 35 J. R. Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster 1307–22: A Study in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1970), p.  58; J. R. S. Phillips, Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, 1307–24: Baronial Politics in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1972), p.  256; Burt, ‘A “Bastard Feudal” Affinity in the Making?’, p.  176; A. Marshall, ‘An Early Fourteenth-Century Affinity: The Earl of Norfolk and his Followers’, Fourteenth Century England V, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 3–12, at pp. 7–8. 36 CIPM, viii, no. 271, pp.  193, 195; and see below, p.  94. With all the references to Beaumont’s inquisition post mortem, it is of course possible that the men recorded as his tenants in 1340 were not the like-named retainers from Edward II’s reign. 37 CDS, v, no. 3087; CIPM, vi, no. 397 (inquisition of 1322); CIPM, vii, no. 590 (1334). Another branch of the family held the Lincolnshire manor of Driby of Beaumont: CIPM, viii, no. 271, p. 194. 38 CDS, v, nos. 3048, 3112, 3243; CIPM, v, no. 350 (1311). 39 CDS, v, no. 2737; CIPM, viii, no. 271, p. 195. 40 CDS, v, no. 3243; CIPM, viii, no. 271, p. 194. 41 CDS, v, no. 2966. 34



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Heckington.42 Perhaps most striking is that at Beaumont’s death, his manor of Dembleby was held by three tenants by knight service,43 all of whom had served with him under arms: Henry de Legbourne, who had served with him in 1309;44 Walter de Trickingham, who appears in the Durham Liber Vitae with Beaumont, and served with him in 1315 and 1319, and (assuming this is the same man) with Sir John de Beaumont in 1341;45 and John Gubaud, who served with Henry in 1322.46 Beaumont also recruited some of his Leicestershire tenants, such as Richard de Croupes, a Gloucestershire man who held an £8 rent of him in Leicestershire at Long Whatton, and who served with him in 1309.47 However, he seems to have drawn far less heavily on his less extensive Leicestershire estates, perhaps because the county was dominated by the lordship of Thomas, earl of Lancaster.48 Clearly, then, in many cases men served with Beaumont under arms because they were his tenants; conversely, in some cases, they may have become his tenants because they served him under arms, being granted lands in reward for their service.49 However, where he did make such grants, he seems to have limited them to life terms. Robert Saltmarsh was granted Beaumont’s Leicestershire manor of Arnesby for life, for the nominal service of a rose each year, as well as lands in Yorkshire, probably before 1329.50 As Robert was to live until 1357, this amounted to a considerable reward, though for long service; he was still serving Beaumont under arms in 1336 (by which time, he had been knighted). This was a form of reward used by a number of magnates in the early fourteenth century to secure the long-term services of a retainer;51 and it may well be that Robert’s military service to Beaumont was much more extensive than the surviving evidence suggests.52 Beaumont may have made a similar arrangement with Roger Newmarch. At CDS, v, no. 2793. CIPM, viii, no. 271, p. 194. 44 CDS, v, no. 2737. 45 CDS, v, nos. 3048, 3243, 3743. 46 CDS, v, no. 2737; CPR, 1321–4, p. 185. 47 CIPM, viii, no. 26 (Croupes’ inquisition post mortem of 1337); CDS, v, no. 2737. 48 I owe this point to Prof. Michael Brown; and see Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, pp. 9–10. Beaumont held a twelfth part of the honour of Leicester, by the inheritance of his wife, Alice, with the custody of the twelfth inherited by her sister Margaret; Lancaster had inherited half of the honour. Sanders, Feudal Military Service in England, pp. 61–2; CPR, 1307–13, pp. 267, 514; CPR, 1317–21, p. 585. Lancaster did hold lands in Lincolnshire as well, but Lincolnshire was a much bigger county, and the Lancastrian estate at Bolingbroke was a long way from Beaumont’s various Lincolnshire lands. 49 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp. 134–5. 50 CIPM, x, no. 375. A writ of 1329 makes reference to unspecified lands in Yorkshire and Leicestershire which Beaumont had granted to Robert; CCR, 1327–30, p. 440. 51 Spencer, ‘Comital Military Retinue’, pp. 51–2. 52 See Table 5.5. 42 43

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his death in 1346, Newmarch’s sole recorded estate was the manor of Thorpe in Barnby, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, ‘held for his life of the grant of Henry de Bello Monte’.53 No record survives of Roger’s service to Beaumont, but Sir Thomas Newmarch had served with him in 1319, and it is reasonable to suppose that, like Robert Saltmarsh, Roger was granted the manor in return for military service, which is not now recorded.54 Beaumont did not, however, make such grants from the Lincolnshire lands which seemed to have formed the core of his estates. Where a tenurial relationship with his Lincolnshire retainers can be demonstrated, it is probable that it pre-existed the military relationship; the Marmion family, at least, were longstanding tenants of his manor of Winteringham, and William Marmion was a tenant at Keisby in 1305, before Beaumont was granted the lordship of the manor.55 Beaumont was also able to recruit in Lincolnshire beyond his own estates. Sir Robert Breton, who served with Beaumont in 1314, 1315, 1316 and 1319, and who is named in the Durham Liber Vitae, came from Elsham, not far from Barton;56 and Stephen le Chandler and John Paternoster, who served with him in 1317, both hailed from Lincoln.57 Another fruitful area of recruitment was the North-East, undoubtedly on account of his assiduous service in Scotland and in the defence of the Anglo-Scottish Marches. The Beaumont family had links with northern England from before Henry’s arrival in England, for his sister, Isabella, had married John de Vescy, lord of Alnwick, Northumberland, and Malton, Yorkshire. Although Vescy died in 1289, Isabella remained high in Edward I’s favour, and she was granted custody of Bamburgh castle in 1304.58 In 1311, Edward II granted Henry the custody of the Yorkshire estates of Godfrey de Melsa, during the minority of the seven-month-old heir.59 These were connections which would have facilitated Beaumont’s recruitment of Northumbrians and Yorkshiremen. Amongst the Yorkshiremen were the Salvayns, the Saltmarshes and the Newmarches.60 The Northumbrians (see Table 5.3) included one of his principal retainers, Sir Thomas Gray; two members of the prominent Heron family, Sir Roger and Sir Odinel; Sir Robert de Clifford (or possibly his like-named son), of Ellingham; Sir John de Eure, who also held land in Yorkshire and the bishopric of Durham, and Stephen de Eure (presumably a relative); William de Heton; John Galoun; and John de Eslington (who CIPM, x, no. 25. CDS, v, no. 3243; TNA, C 81/1720, no. 63. 55 CIPM, iii, no. 474 (an inquisition of 1298); CChR, p. 49. 56 CDS, v, nos. 2966, 3051, 3087, 3243, C 81/1720, no. 63; DLV, i, 207. 57 CDS, v, no. 3105. 58 M. Prestwich, ‘Isabella de Vescy and the Custody of Bamburgh Castle’, BIHR 44 (1971), pp. 148–52. 59 CPR, 1307–13, p. 335 (for Melsa’s lands, see CIPM, no. 266). 60 For the Salvayns, see below, n. 130; for the Saltmarshes, see Table 5.5. 53

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had replaced Isabella de Vescy as keeper of Bamburgh in 1312).61 Also listed in the Liber Vitae with Beaumont was Sir John de Fenwick. And it may well be that the evidence particularly under-represents the service of Northumbrians, because they were less likely to go to the trouble of taking out letters of protection for service on their own doorstep.62 Table 5.3: Service by Northumbrians with Sir Henry de Beaumont *

Sir Thomas Gray

See Table 5.6, below

Sir Roger Heron Sir Odinel Heron Sir John de Eure

*

*

1306, 1308

CDS, v, nos. 492 (p. 210); Rot. Scot., i, p. 59

1314

CDS, v, no. 2966

See Table 5.8, below

Stephen de Eure

1311

CDS, v, no. 2886

Sir Robert de Clifford

1309

CDS, v, no. 2737

William de Heton

1309

CDS, v, no. 2737

Roger FitzRalph

1308

Rot. Scot., i, p. 59

Richard FitzRalph

1319

CDS, v, no. 3243

1311

CDS, v, no. 2886

1314?

DLV, i, 207

1315

CDS, v, no. 3048

John Galoun Sir John de Fenwick John de Eslington *

*

Named in DLV

None of these men had a tenurial relationship with Beaumont. There is, however, an interesting variation on the usual landed relationship between lord and retainer in the case of the FitzRalphs. Roger FitzRalph, who served with Beaumont in 1308, was dead by August 1314; his estate had been reduced to the properties of Ditchburn, Cartington and Ryal, held in chief, and Charlton, held of Sir Henry Percy, for he had sold off his other properties in 1310 and 1313.63 His heir was his brother, Richard, who served with Beaumont in 1319. The following year, however, Beaumont purchased the entire remaining FitzRalph estate.64 It is tempting to speculate that Richard may have been captured, and so forced to sell up to pay his ransom. Whatever the circumstances of the sale, it provided Beaumont with a landed CDS, v, no. 3048; CFR 1307–19, p. 133. A. King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, c. 1296-c. 1408’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 2001), p. 192. 63 CIPM, v, 508; Feet of Fines, Northumberland, 1273–1346, Newcastle upon Tyne Record Series 11 (1932), nos. 154, 171. 64 Feet of Fines, Northumberland, nos. 196, 197. 61

62

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interest in Northumberland; and his son, John, was able to recruit in the county, for John Heron served with him in Flanders in 1340.65 Beaumont also appears to have recruited some Scots into his service after gaining the earldom of Buchan in 1333; and though he had lost control of it by the following year, he still held the manor of Sprouston, near Roxburgh in 1335–36.66 Of the thirty-six men-at-arms he led to Scotland in 1336, three appear to be Scottish: Oliver Macfeloun, Robert Melrose (whose surname suggests a Roxburghshire origin) and William McCulloch (from a Galloway family who adhered to Balliol and the English).67 Beaumont’s military recruitment thus seems to have focused principally on those parts of the country where he held lands or had personal connections. But given that he started his career as a knight of Edward I’s household, and remained close to Edward II for most of his reign, it is striking how little he recruited from within the royal household (unlike, for instance, Piers Gaveston, and the Despensers).68 Only three of Edward II’s household knights seem to have served with him: Sir John de Eure, recorded as a household knight in 1312–13; Sir John de Fenwick, a household knight in 1314–15; and Sir Gerard Salvayn, a household knight during 1311–15.69 Of these, Eure and Fenwick were attached to the household largely in a military capacity, while Salvayn was falling from royal favour at the time when he served with Beaumont.70 And all three may anyway have been recruited as northerners, rather than as household knights. Beaumont was also able to boast a member of the parliamentary peerage among his retainers: Sir Philip Darcy, a fellow Lincolnshire landholder, and one of his tenants.71 He had previously recruited John Darcy (either Philip’s brother or cousin) in 1310.72 For the ill-fated Scottish expedition of 1314, Beaumont recruited Philip himself, along with his son and heir, Norman; and Norman is named in the Durham Liber Vitae (though his father is not).73 The advantage of recruiting such an eminent figure – apart from the TNA, C 76/15, m. 22. CDS, iii, p. 321. 67 TNA, E 101/19/36, m. 2. For the McCullochs, see I. A. MacInnes, Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332–1357 (Woodbridge, 2016), pp. 153–4. 68 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, p. 143; N. Saul, ‘The Despensers and the Downfall of Edward II’, EHR 99 (1984), pp. 11–12. 69 A. Tebbit, ‘The Household Knights of Edward II’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Bristol, 2006), pp. 238–42. 70 A. King, ‘Thomas of Lancaster’s First Quarrel with Edward II’, in Fourteenth Century England III, ed. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 40–3. 71 Darcy held a fourth part of half a knight’s fee of Beaumont at Osberneby, Lincolnshire; CIPM, viii, no. 271 (p.  194). Darcy’s career is outlined in Complete Peerage, 4, pp. 51–2. 72 CDS, v, no. 2737; Complete Peerage, 4, p. 52n. 73 CDS, v, no. 2966; DLV, i, 207. 65

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prestige – was that he was able to bring his own retainers with him. John Chartney, John Illey, and Edmund Lymbury are recorded as serving with Beaumont only in the company of Sir Philip Darcy. These were clearly Darcy’s men, as they appear together in the retinue which Darcy himself recruited for service in Scotland in 1315 (see Table 5.4).74 And this provides us with a glimpse of the structure of sub-retaining which now underlay Beaumont’s retinues. Table 5.4: Sir Philip Darcy’s retinue, 1315 Retainers Sir Philip Darcy Sir Norman Darcy Hugh Darcy

*

Service with Beaumont

Reference

1314, 1317, 1319

CDS, v, nos. 2966, 3105, 3243

1314, 1319

CDS, v, nos. 2966, 3243

–

John Chartney

1314

Hugh Bardeore

–

William le Wylde

–

John de la Launde

–

Edmund Illey

–

John Illey John Lymbury Edmund Lymbury John Caynes *

CDS, v, no. 2966

1314

CDS, v, no. 2966

1314, 1319

CDS, v, nos. 2966, 3243

1314

CDS, v, no. 2966

–

Named in DLV

Sir William Marmion was another of Beaumont’s sub-contractors; Robert de Burstall took out letters of protection for service with Marmion on 26 August 1310, the same day that Marmion himself took out similar letters for service with Beaumont.75 And Sir Thomas Gray and Roger Heron both brought companies (of four and two men-at-arms respectively) to serve with Beaumont in 1306.76 But the composition of military retinues was also shaped by personal relationships and the wider political contexts in which they developed. Sir Philip Darcy was also associated with Beaumont in a non-military capacity; he appeared alongside him and Sir William Marmion as a witness to royal

CDS, v, no. 3047. CDS, v, 2774. A Philip de Burstall had served with Beaumont in Flanders in 1297 (Table 5.1). 76 CDS, v, no. 492 (p. 210). 74

75

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charters at York in 1312;77 and in April 1318, he was at Somerton castle in Lincolnshire (of which Beaumont had the custody), witnessing a deed of Louis de Beaumont, bishop of Durham.78 Also witnessing the deed were Henry’s sometime military retainers Sir Robert Breton and Sir John Lymbury (the latter would also accompany Henry to France on a diplomatic mission in 1325).79 However, the Darcys’ relationship with Beaumont subsequently broke down. Philip and Norman both served with him again on the expedition to recapture Berwick in 1319. The expedition failed amid great acrimony, as Thomas, earl of Lancaster, quarrelled with the king over the direction of the campaign.80 Beaumont was, at this stage, a staunch supporter of Edward; the Darcys, however, were to join Lancaster’s rebellion in 1321–2, fighting against the king at the battle of Boroughbridge.81 They do not appear to have served with Beaumont again. The longest-standing of Beaumont’s retainers, in both a military and civil capacity, was the Yorkshire knight Sir Peter Saltmarsh (for his military service, see Table 5.5). When Beaumont was kidnapped by Gilbert de Middleton in 1317, Saltmarsh was held at Mitford castle as a hostage for him.82 In 1321 and 1322, he was a witness alongside Henry to grants made by Bishop Louis de Beaumont.83 He accompanied Henry to France in 1325, in the train of Edward, earl of Chester (the future Edward III); and again when Henry was appointed as an envoy in 1331.84 Rather later, in 1335, he was in Henry’s service in Scotland when he was sent to petition the archbishop of Canterbury, on Henry’s behalf.85 Saltmarsh was also recorded as present at Bedford in 1329, when Beaumont brought a retinue in support of Henry, earl of Lancaster’s abortive rising against Sir Roger Mortimer’s regime.86 And at least three of Saltmarsh’s relatives also served with Beaumont under arms at various times (Table 5.5). J. S. Hamilton, The Royal Charter Witness Lists of Edward II (1307–1326) from the Charter Rolls in the Public Record Office, List and Index Society 288 (2001), pp.  50, 52 (both charters were sealed on the same day, 28 May). 78 Durham University Library, Durham Cathedral Archive, Reg. II, fol. 102r. (an inspeximus of 1329). 79 Fœdera, II, i, p.  606. For Lymbury’s service, see Table 5.4; for Breton, see above, p. 86. 80 Phillips, Edward II, pp. 342–51. 81 Complete Peerage, 4, p. 52. 82 CCR, 1313–18, pp. 518, 532; CPR, 1317–21, p. 174. 83 Durham University Library, Durham Cathedral Archive, Reg. II, fols 74r, 80r.–v. 84 Fœdera, II, ii, p. 606; CPR, 1330–4, pp. 223, 227. 85 CDS, iii, no. 1187. 86 CIM 1307–49, no. 1111. It should be noted that those named at Bedford as ‘against the king with armed power’ are listed without reference to particular retinues, so it is possible that Saltmarsh may have been serving with another of the rebel magnates, rather than with Beaumont. 77



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Table 5.5: The Saltmarsh family’s military service with Sir Henry de Beaumont, 1314–36 Peter Saltmarsh

1314

Protection

CDS, v, nos. 2966, 2968

––

1314?

Durham Liber Vitae

DLV, i, 207

––

1315

Protection

CDS, v, no. 3048

––

1316

Protection

CDS, v, no. 3087

––

1317

Protection

CDS, v, no. 3105

––

1319

Protection

CDS, v, no. 3243

1329 (Bedford)

Inquisition

CIM 1307–49, no. 1111

Robert Saltmarsh

1314

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2966, 2968

––

1336

Horse valuation

E 101/19/36, m. 2

Thomas Saltmarsh

1314

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2968

Edward Saltmarsh

1336

Horse valuation

E 101/19/36, m. 2

–– ?

Beaumont also had a long-lasting – if occasionally strained – relationship with the Northumbrian Sir Thomas Gray (see Table 5.6).87 Gray is first recorded in Beaumont’s service at the siege of Stirling castle in the summer of 1304. The Scalacronica has a dramatic account of how Gray rescued Beaumont, described as his ‘master’ (meister),88 who was caught by a hook thrown from a Scottish engine. In the process, Gray was shot in the head by a bolt from a springald, which – rather surprisingly – he survived.89 Not unreasonably, this appears to have earned him Beaumont’s trust, and he now began to serve him in a non-military capacity; in 1305, he was appointed, alongside Beaumont, as an attorney for Isabella de Vescy in an inquiry concerning her rights in the Scottish barony of Crail.90

For Gray’s career, see A. King, ‘Scaling the Ladder: The Rise and Rise of the Grays of Heaton, c. 1296-c. 1415’, in North-East England in the Later Middle Ages, ed. C. D. Liddy and R. H. Britnell (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 57–73. 88 The term mestre was used in a military context to refer to captains and leaders, see Anglo-Norman Dictionary [http://www.anglo-norman.net; accessed: 01/02/2017]. 89 Scalacronica, ed. King, p. 47. 90 CDS, ii, no. 1670. 87

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April-July 1304

Chronicle

Scalacronica, ed. King, p. 47

10 May 1306

Accounts

CDS, v, no. 492 (p. 210)

1306–7

Horse compensation

E 101/13/16, f. 19r.

10 Oct. 1311

Letters of Protection

CDS, v, no. 2921

1314?

Durham Liber Vitae

DLV, i, 207

23 June 1314

Chronicle

Scalacronica, ed. King, pp. 73–5

20 July 1319

Letters of Protection

CDS, v, no. 3243

Sir Thomas Gray’s service with Louis de Beaumont, 1319–27 1319, Constable of Norham

Commission

See below, n. 97

Further military service followed with the renewed outbreak of Anglo-Scottish war, in the royal expeditions of 1306, 1311 and 1314, and Gray’s name appears in the Durham Liber Vitae. The Scalacronica includes an account of a skirmish, the day before Bannockburn. Beaumont was leading a force towards Stirling, when a Scottish force advanced out of a wood in front of them: Sir Henry de Beaumont said to his men, ‘Let us pull back a little, let them come, give them the field’. Thomas Gray, knight, said to him, ‘Sir, I doubt that we should give them so much ground now, for they’ll have the lot all too easily’. ‘Right’, said Henry, ‘if you’re afraid, then flee’; ‘Sir’, said Thomas, ‘I shall not flee for fear today’, and spurring his horse with William Deyncourt, knight, they charged into the midst of the enemy. William was killed, Thomas was captured, his horse killed by spears, and he himself was taken with [the Scots] on foot, as they went on to defeat the forces of the two lords outright.91

The picture presented by the Scalacronica was presumably related by Gray himself to his son, some years after the event; the story may well have improved with retelling, and it obviously presents a partial account. In particular, the elder Gray may have been seeking to justify a reckless charge which got his companion killed and himself captured; and the battlefield dispute was a common topos in chronicle accounts, to explain defeats.92 Nevertheless, as presented, the account may perhaps provide some insight Scalacronica, ed. King, p. 75. For instance, the Vita Edwardi Secundi records that just before Bannockburn, the earl of Gloucester advised the king not to give battle that day, only for his advice to be angrily rejected; Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. W. R. Childs (Oxford, 2005), p. 91.

91

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sir henry de beaumont and his retainers

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into Beaumont’s character: he responded to Gray’s questioning of his tactical judgement by losing his temper, and impugning Gray’s courage, thus provoking Gray to defend his honour by a foolhardy headlong charge into the Scottish ranks. Gray was released from captivity within a few months.93 However, in the circumstances, he may have been somewhat wary of resuming his relationship with Beaumont. Indeed, when Gray was next recorded serving under arms, in March 1316, it was independently, with his own company of men – although Beaumont had been sent to defend Northumberland the previous October.94 By 1319, however, if relations had indeed broken down, they had evidently been repaired, for Gray took out letters of protection to serve with Beaumont on the Berwick expedition. Gray may have decided that Beaumont was simply too important for the defence of the Marches to allow personal grievances to interfere (similarly, it was as a distraction from the Scottish war that the 1321–22 rebellion against Edward II was portrayed in the Scalacronica – presumably reflecting the elder Gray’s views).95 In addition, Beaumont’s brother Louis had been appointed bishop of Durham in 1317; and Gray held most of his lands from the bishopric.96 Equally, Louis’ appointment of Gray as constable of the bishops’ castle of Norham, on the bank of the Tweed, may have helped to win him back to his old lord.97 From the Beaumonts’ viewpoint, in the aftermath of Gilbert de Middleton’s rising, they needed the service of reliable supporters amongst the leading Northumberland gentry; and Gray, who was not implicated in the affair (unlike Sir John de Eure, another of Henry’s erstwhile retainers), was an obvious choice. Gray stood as one of the mainpernors for Henry when he was threatened with imprisonment in 1323, after quarrelling with the king over the ratification of the Anglo-Scottish truce.98 But thereafter, his association with Henry seems to have lapsed, as the latter fell from Edward II’s favour, and ceased to be employed in the defence of the Marches. Gray turned instead to the lordship of the prominent northern baron Sir Henry Percy; nor did he resume his relationship with Beaumont on the latter’s return to lead the expedition of the Disinherited in 1332. However, Gray’s son, the like-named author of the Scalacronica, may well have served in this campaign. The Scalacronica contains a detailed and very vivid account of the expedition, Gray must have been released by April 1315, when he was appointed to a commission of oyer and terminer in Northumberland; CPR, 1313–17, p. 250. 94 ‘Mandate to make letters of protection … for Thomas de Grey and his following (meignee)’; CCW, p. 438; CDS, iii, no. 453; Rot. Scot., i, pp. 150, 151. For the impact of Bannockburn on retinues and recruitment generally, see Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat’. 95 Scalacronica, ed. King, p. 87. 96 King, ‘Scaling the Ladder’, p. 66. 97 J. Raine, The History and Antiquities of North Durham (London, 1852), p. 45. 98 Fœdera, II, i, p. 520 (calendared in CCR, 1318–23, p. 717). 93

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giving Beaumont a central role. It is clearly based on an eyewitness account; given his father’s former connections with Beaumont, it may well be that the eyewitness was the younger Gray himself. At any rate, he evidently admired him as a leader; describing an inspiring speech made by Beaumont at a crucial point just before the battle of Dupplin Moor, he describes him as that ‘worthy man’ (prodhom) – an epithet he uses only very sparingly.99

* * *

The Scalacronica also provides a revealing glance at the social networks that could grow out of a military retinue, in the well-known tale concerning another of Beaumont’s retainers, Sir William Marmion. Marmion held lands in Lincolnshire and Leicestershire, the two counties in which Beaumont’s own landed interests were centred; he served with Beaumont on at least six occasions between 1308 and 1316 (see Table 5.7); and he appears as a witness to royal charters alongside Beaumont in 1312.100 William is named in the Durham Liber Vitae, along with John Marmion (his brother or his cousin). John may also have been in Beaumont’s following in May 1313, when both received letters of protection for going overseas in the king’s service, accompanying Edward II on his visit to France, for the knighting of Phillip IV’s sons.101 Table 5.7: Sir William Marmion’s military service with Sir Henry de Beaumont, 1308–16 Nov. 1308

Protection

Rot., Scot., i, p. 59

Jan. 1309

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2709

Oct. 1309

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2737

Aug. 1310

Protection

CDS, v, no. 2774

Apr. 1314

Attorney, Protection

CDS, v, nos. 1711, 2966

1314?

Durham Liber Vitae

DLV, i, 207

12 Oct. 1316

Protection

CDS, v, no. 3087 John Marmion

1314?

Durham Liber Vitae

DLV, i, 207

‘prodhom’, Scalacronica, ed. King, pp. 108, 109. For Gray’s use of eyewitness accounts, see ibid., pp. xxxv, l–lii. 100 See n. 77, above. 101 CPR 1307–13, p. 580. For the visit, see Phillips, Edward II, pp. 208–13. William had a brother and a cousin called John; it could be either who appears in the Liber Vitae, and/or who went to France. 99



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The Scalacronica relates how, at some point after the fall of Berwick in 1318: at a great feast of lords and ladies in the county of Lincoln, a faithful ladyin-waiting brought a war helm, with a crest of a gilded wing, to William Marmion, knight, with a letter from his lady, commanding that he go to the most perilous place in Great Britain, and that he make the helm famous. It was decided there by the knights that he should go to Norham, as the most perilous, adventurous place in the country.102

Norham castle was the caput of a liberty held by the bishop of Durham, and that bishop was Louis de Beaumont. Furthermore, the constable of the castle, by Louis’s appointment, was Sir Thomas Gray. And Marmion and Gray had served together under Henry on the Scottish expedition of 1314; both are listed in the Durham Liber Vitae.103 Although Marmion did not undertake his chivalrous adventure as a retainer of Beaumont, his escapade in ‘the most perilous, adventurous place in the country’ was enacted within a social and military network framed by Beaumont’s affinity. But the episode may point to differing attitudes within that affinity. Marmion, a Lincolnshire lord for whom military service was an episodic activity, taking place a long way from home, is depicted by Gray’s son (who presumably had the story from his father) as holding a view of warfare shaped by the conventions of chivalric romance: service under arms offered the chance to perform feats of arms worthy to win the love of a lady. However, Gray was a lord of the Scottish Marches, for whom warfare was a day-to-day reality taking place in his own country, and military service was a career; and he had a rather more hard-nosed approach to war and chivalry.104 This can be seen from the events that transpired four days after Marmion’s arrival at Norham, when a body of mounted Scottish men-at-arms appeared before the castle. Seeing Marmion ‘coming on foot, all gleaming with gold and silver, so equipped that it was a marvel, with the helm on his head’ and ‘knowing well the reason for his arrival at Norham’, Gray got him to mount a warhorse, and sent him out alone, with the exhortation that: it’s more fitting that chivalric deeds should be done on horseback than on foot, whenever this can suitably be done. Mount your horse. See, there are your enemies, put spurs to your horse and do battle in their midst; I’ll renounce God if I don’t rescue your body, dead or alive, or die trying!’

Gray himself, however, waited until Marmion had charged single-handedly into the Scots (thus breaking up their formation), before coming out of the castle with his men to attack on foot – a tactic he had learned from Scalacronica, ed. King, p. 81. CDS, v, nos 1711, 2966; DLV, i, 207. 104 A. King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold: The Order of Chivalry in Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica’, Fourteenth Century England I, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2000). 102 103

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the Scots through bitter experience at Bannockburn.105 Given Gray’s alleged dispute with Beaumont over tactics at Bannockburn, this may suggest a fault line within the retinue between Marchers and the men of ‘the South’, over attitudes to war.106 Table 5.8: Sir John de Eure’s service with Sir Henry de Beaumont, 1308–14 1308

Letters of Protection

Rot. Scot., i, pp. 58, 59

1311

Letters of Protection

CDS, v, no. 2886, 2907

1314

Letters of Protection

CDS, v, no. 2966

1314?

Durham Liber Vitae

DLV, i, 207

There may also have been friction between Beaumont and his Northumbrian retainers over the defence of the Marches following Bannockburn, perhaps exemplified in the vicissitudes of Beaumont’s relationship with the prominent Marcher knight Sir John de Eure (see Table 5.8). By the time of Eure’s first recorded service with Beaumont, he had already served in parliament as knight of the shire for Northumberland. In 1310, he was appointed sheriff of Yorkshire, and after his term in office, he served with Beaumont again in June 1311 – just a few months before Beaumont was singled out for personal condemnation by the king’s opponents in the Ordinances. In December 1313, presumably at Beaumont’s request, Eure was appointed to two commissions of oyer and terminer, to investigate illegal deer hunting in parks belonging to Isabella de Vescy.107 He served under arms with Beaumont again in 1314 on the campaign that ended at Bannockburn (probably the occasion when his name was entered into the Durham Liber Vitae). Eure was captured at the battle, and though released by the following April, there is no record that he ever served with Beaumont again.108 This was not, however, the end of their dealings. Eure is recorded as a knight of the royal household in 1312–13, a position he may have owed, at least in part, to Beaumont’s patronage; certainly, Beaumont had acted as Eure’s patron in November 1311, when he procured a royal licence for him to alienate lands in mortmain to estabKing, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold’, pp. 24–5. For Gray’s perspective of the North-South divide, see A. King, ‘Englishmen, Scots and Marchers: National and Local Identities in Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica’, Northern History 36 (2000), pp. 217–31. 107 CPR, 1313–17, p. 132. 108 Nicolai Triveti Continuatio, ed. Hall, p. 15. Eure was presumably back in England by 1 April 1315, when he was appointed to a commission of oyer and terminer in Northumberland; CPR, 1313–17, p.  316. On the impact of Bannockburn on English military retinues more generally, see Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat’. 105

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lish a chantry.109 Yet in April 1317, Eure sealed an agreement with another household knight, Sir Robert de Sapy, to prevent – or at least delay – the consecration of Beaumont’s brother Louis as bishop of Durham.110 Eure was also heavily implicated in the kidnapping of Henry and Louis by another disaffected household knight, the Northumbrian Sir Gilbert de Middleton, in September. The brothers were imprisoned in Mitford castle in Northumberland – of which Eure was constable.111 His alienation from Beaumont and the king was confirmed when he became a life-retainer of Thomas, earl of Lancaster, and he was beheaded as a rebel after the battle of Boroughbridge.112 Intriguingly, the Scalacronica records that Middleton was in part motivated by anger at the arrest of Sir Adam de Swinburne, another Northumbrian knight of the royal household, ‘for speaking too plainly about the state of the Marches’.113 As sheriff of Northumberland, Swinburne had been ordered to assist Beaumont in the defence of the Marches, in October 1315;114 it may be that Beaumont was one of the targets of Swinburne’s complaints, and that Eure agreed with his criticisms. He may also have agreed with Sir Thomas Gray’s criticism of Beaumont’s tactics at Bannockburn. Certainly, Eure’s implication in the plot to kidnap his former lord suggests a strong personal animus against him. Eure was not the only one of Beaumont’s retainers who subsequently adhered to Lancaster; Sir Odinel Heron and Sir Gerard Salvayn were also retained by him, and Heron, too, fought for him at Boroughbridge. In both cases, however, their service with Beaumont seems to have been only short-term, and for Salvayn at least, attachment to Lancaster was certainly not born of disaffection with Beaumont.115

* * *

Before falling out with him, Eure had benefited from Beaumont’s closeness to the king. As one of Edward II’s favourites, Beaumont was well placed to offer good lordship to his retainers; and he exercised this good lordship particularly in the period 1310 to 1312. In March 1310, he secured a CPR, 1307–13, p. 400; Tebbit, ‘The Household Knights of Edward II’, p. 239. Durham University Library, Durham Cathedral Archive, Miscellaneous Charter 4238. 111 TNA, E 101/68/2, no. 36; CPR, 1317–21, p. 88; King, ‘Bandits, Robbers and Schavaldours’, pp. 126–7. 112 A. King, ‘Lordship, Castles and Locality: Thomas of Lancaster, Dunstanburgh Castle and the Lancastrian Affinity in Northumberland, 1296–1322’, Archaeologia Aeliana, 5th ser., 29 (2001), pp. 223–43, at pp. 224, 226. 113 Scalacronica, ed. King, pp. 79–81. 114 Rot. Scot., i, p. 150; Registrum palatinum Dunelmense, ed. T. Duffy Hardy, Rolls Ser., 4 vols (London, 1873–8), ii, 1100–1 (calendared in CDS, v, no. 608). 115 King, ‘Lordship, Castles and Locality’, pp.  224, 227; King, ‘Thomas of Lancaster’s First Quarrel’, at pp. 40–4. 109 110

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writ of exemption from service on assizes and juries for Adam de Kydale, who had served with him the previous October.116 In April 1310, he secured a pardon for Robert Saltmarsh for the killing of William de Holme (the first indication of Beaumont’s connection to that family).117 The following September, he obtained a pardon for Richard Breton for the death of John de Tillesbury; it was perhaps in return for this that Breton took out letters of protection to serve with him in August 1311.118 That January, Beaumont had secured the marriage of the widow of Giles de Braose for Robert Breton (presumably a relation of Richard’s), who is recorded as serving with him later in the decade.119 Similarly, in May 1312, Beaumont obtained a grant of free warren for his long-term retainer Sir William Marmion;120 in July, he obtained a similar grant for Henry de Legbourne, who had served with him in 1309;121 and in December, he obtained the marriage of Agnes, widow of the tenant-in-chief Roger de Scotre, for another of his military retainers, Sir Walter de Lisle.122 These grants were made in an atmosphere of acute political tension, leading up to the killing of Piers Gaveston in June 1312. Thus, what in normal circumstances would have been a routine exercise of good lordship would now have appeared as just the kind of influence-peddling which had led the Ordainers to demand Beaumont’s removal from the king’s presence. By calling on Beaumont’s good lordship at this time, Eure, the Bretons, Kydale, Saltmarsh, Marmion, Legbourne and Lisle were, in effect, aligning themselves with the court party against the reformers. Indeed, it may be that Beaumont was dispensing his patronage in a deliberate effort to secure their loyalty to the king at a time when civil war was a distinct possibility. As Eure’s case shows, however, such patronage did not necessarily secure lasting gratitude. Having benefited from Beaumont’s patronage in 1310, Kydale subsequently became embroiled in a dispute with him in 1314, over purveyance in his home town of Barton, Lincolnshire (which was held by Beaumont). Beaumont obtained a commission of oyer and terminer, alleging that Kydale had led a gang in an assault on him and his servants in the town, and had ‘wounded and imprisoned his said men and servants, and placed fire against the house, so that, they having from fear of the fire and assault, issued from that house, lost a great part of the purveyances

CDS, v, no. 2737, CPR, 1307–13, p. 212. CPR, 1307–13, p. 224. 118 CPR, 1307–1313, p.  279; CDS, v, no. 2909. Richard Breton served with Beaumont again in 1314; CDS, v, no. 2966. 119 CPR, 1307–13, p. 319. Robert served in 1314, alongside Richard Breton; CDS, v, no. 2966. 120 CChR, 1300–26, p. 192. 121 CChR, 1300–26, p. 192; CDS, v, no. 2737. 122 CPR, 1307–13, p. 517. 116 117



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and of other goods of his’.123 Purveyance was a perennially controversial issue, and one which had become linked with the abuses associated with the court faction; the Ordinances included provisions limiting it. Inevitably, therefore, Kydale’s dispute with his former patron would have taken on political overtones.

* * *

Work on early fourteenth-century English military retinues has tended to highlight elements of stability and continuity; indeed, Sir Henry de Beaumont’s retinue has been cited as an example of this.124 And, disputes with individual retainers notwithstanding, Beaumont’s military retinues after 1307 do demonstrate a degree of continuity. As many as eight of his military retainers may have served him under arms over the course of a decade or more – albeit rather sporadically, so far as the surviving evidence indicates. These are Roger Halow, Sir Thomas Gray and Sir Peter Saltmarsh;125 John Haconthorpe, recorded as serving with him in 1309, 1315 and 1322;126 Walter Lisle, who served in 1308 and 1319, and probably in 1314; and William Buckminster, in 1309, 1319 and probably 1314.127 Finally, Robert Saltmarsh and Robert Ros appear to have served Beaumont over the span of two decades: they are recorded as serving with him in 1314 and 1336, and 1315 and 1336 respectively.128 Of course, the two who served in 1336 may not have been the same men who served in the 1310s; but if they were like-named sons, cousins or nephews, this would still represent a degree of long-term familial connection. Others served both Beaumont and his son and heir, Sir John; and service by groups of relations was also fairly common – as with many retinues.129 Aside from the Saltmarshes, four of the Salvayns served with Henry in 1311 and 1315.130 Robert and Richard Roucliffe both served with Henry in Scotland in 1336, and with John in Flanders in 1338 and 1340 (by which time, Robert had been knighted).131 Sir Edmund Barde and John CPR, 1313–17, pp.  230, 239 (see also ibid., p.  237). It is worth noting that when serving in Beaumont’s military retinue, Kydale would himself have been reliant on purveyance for sustenance. 124 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp. 119–41; Ayton, ‘In the Wake of Defeat’, see also Ayton’s work cited above, n. 4; and Spencer, ‘Comital Military Retinue’. 125 See Tables 5.2, 5.6 and 5.5 respectively. 126 CDS, v, nos. 2737, 3048; CPR, 1321–4, p. 185. 127 Rot. Scot., i, p. 59; CDS, v, nos. 2737, 3243; DLV, i, 207. 128 CDS, v, nos. 2966, 2968, 3051; TNA, E 101/19/36, m. 2 (and see Table 5.5). 129 Simpkin, English Aristocracy at War, pp. 133–4; Spencer, ‘Comital Military Retinue’, p. 50. 130 John and Nicholas Salvayn in 1311, and the brothers George and Gerard Salvayn in 1315 (CDS, v, nos. 2910, 3051). 131 TNA, E 101/19/36, m. 2; Norwell, p.  316; Treaty Rolls Preserved in the Public Record 123

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Barde served with Henry in 1336, and John Barde served with John de Beaumont in 1338; they were presumably related to Peter Barde, of Barton, who had served with Henry in 1314.132 John Paris, who served with Sir John de Beaumont in Scotland in 1341, was probably related to William Paris, who had served with Henry in 1319.133 The Sir John Mereworth who served with John in Flanders in 1338 and 1340 may be the same Sir John Mereworth, from Kent, listed with Henry in the Durham Liber Vitae, probably in 1314 (though it is perhaps more likely that he was the latter’s son).134 Similarly, Sir Walter de Trickingham, named alongside Mereworth in the Liber Vitae, and who served with Henry in 1315 and 1319, may well be the same Sir Walter de Trickingham who served with John in 1341, along with his own son, John de Trickingham. Many of these longer-term retainers were from the Lincolnshire estates of the Beaumonts, including William Paris, Peter Barde, and Walter de Trickingham.135 But stability and continuity – or indeed, the lack thereof – are very much in the eye of the historian; and the evidence can also be read to suggest a comparative lack of continuity in Beaumont’s military retinues. Of the 147 individuals who can be identified as serving with him in the twenty-nine years from the acquisition of his first lands in 1307, until his last military service in 1336, just twenty-one (14 per cent) are recorded as serving with him more than once, and only twelve (8 per cent) can be shown to have served three or more times – though it must, once again, be emphasised that owing to the patchy nature of the evidence, this undoubtedly under-represents the continuity of Beaumont’s retinues. The retinues of many long-serving captains saw a high degree of turnover. However, many such captains can be shown to have maintained a comparatively stable core of long-term retainers – or, at least, a core of retainers with a comparatively slow turnover – providing their retinues with an element of long-term coherence.136 Beaumont, on the other hand, does not seem to have maintained such a core. While some served, if only intermittently, over the course of a decade or more, few appear to have served over a period as long as five years. Indeed, the evidence reveals perhaps only one, or at most two, who fit the pattern of service for a long-term retainer and familiaris; and these were Sir Peter Saltmarsh and, to a lesser extent, Sir Thomas Gray. This may in part be explained by the vicissitudes of Office, II, 1337–1339, ed. J. Ferguson (London, 1972) no. 357; C  76/15, m. 22. Richard served with John again in Scotland in 1341; CDS, v, no. 3746. 132 E 101/19/36, m. 2; Norwell, p. 316; CDS, v, no. 2966. 133 CDS, v, nos. 3243, 3746. 134 Norwell, p. 316; TNA, C 76/15. Mereworth is listed as a knight of Kent in 1324, and held lands there of the Clare inheritance; Parliamentary Writs, II, ii, p.  644; CIPM, v, no. 538 (p. 343). 135 Above, pp. 84–5. 136 Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp. 15–17; and above, n. 124.



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Beaumont’s career, his rapid rise to prominence as a foreign royal favourite, and his lack of roots in English landed society. His periods in prison, exile and Scottish captivity would have hindered the maintenance of any affinity. His followers could not have known that on each occasion he would be able to recover his position fairly quickly, and so they may have sought out new lords. Thus, when Beaumont fell out of favour in 1323, Gray’s nineteenyear-long association with him lapsed, and he sought the patronage of Sir Henry Percy instead. When Beaumont served on the Scottish expedition of the newly-crowned Edward III in 1327, it was only a few months since he had been released from prison. On this occasion, he served in the company of Henry, earl of Lancaster, possibly because he had not had the chance to re-establish himself sufficiently to raise a retinue of his own.137 Beaumont’s subsequent association with the Disinherited expedition may also have served to weaken links with his English retainers. Like many of the Disinherited lords, he had to raise capital to pay for the expedition by leasing lands and, in July 1332, he leased much of his estate in Lincolnshire and Leicestershire to the Perucci of Florence for four years.138 As he spent much of the next few years in Scotland and the Marches, gaining, defending and then trying to regain his earldom of Buchan, he may have lost touch with much of his affinity in England. Nevertheless, Saltmarsh seems to have served with him in this period; and it is notable that of the thirty-five menat-arms who served with him in 1336 (including his son John), no less than nine had either served with him before 1332, or appear to have been related to men who had served with him before then. On the other hand, this is a notably smaller retinue than those he had been able to raise previously.139 The stability of Beaumont’s retinues may also have been disrupted by political tensions. The Darcys’ alignment with Thomas, earl of Lancaster, in 1321–22, at a time when Beaumont remained loyal to the king, seems to have put an end to their service for him. Differences over military tactics may also have played a part, as with Sir Thomas Gray and Sir John de Eure. But another disruptive factor may simply have been Sir Henry de Beaumont’s own personality. Written in circa 1446, John Capgrave’s Liber de illustribus Henricis numbers Beaumont among his illustrious Henrys. Capgrave’s account of his career starts, however, by stating that Beaumont ‘was regarded as a hot-headed man, quickly moved to anger’.140 And indeed, Beaumont seems to have been possessed of a sharp and ungovernable temper. Thus, CDS, v, no. 3265. CPR, 1330–4, p.  283, 312; CIPM, vii, no. 622; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 77–8. 139 TNA, E 101/19/36, m. 2. This is a horse inventory roll, so it presumably records Beaumont’s entire retinue. For the size of previous retinues, see above, p. 83. 140 ‘Henricus iste … vir fervidus fuisse fertur, et cito commotus’, Liber de illustribus Henricis, ed. Hingeston, pp. xliii, 167. 137

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at a council meeting in 1323, he fell out with Edward II: ‘with an excessive motion and irreverent mind, [he] answered the king frequently that he would not counsel him in this behalf ’. Ordered out by the king, ‘Henry in leaving the council said as he had said before, and that it would please him more to be absent from the council than to be present’.141 This temper sometimes affected his relations with his retainers. He fell out with Sir Thomas Gray on the battlefield, on the eve of Bannockburn; he fell out with his former retainer Adam Kydale over purveyance; and he seems to have seriously fallen out with Sir John de Eure, who was so disaffected that he joined a conspiracy to kidnap him.

* * *

There are no surviving records of Beaumont’s financial or estate management, nor any indentures with his retainers, so it is difficult to draw overall conclusions about his wider affinity. Nevertheless, limited as the evidence is, it appears that – unlike magnates such as Thomas, earl of Lancaster, and Guy Beauchamp, earl of Warwick142 – Beaumont does not seem to have used his affinity to create a regional hegemony. Rather, his seems to have been an affinity organized primarily for war. If this were the case, he may never have made any indentures for life service in peace and war, preferring to recruit retainers on an ad hoc basis. His recorded patronage was directed almost entirely towards those who served him under arms; his closest known associates were knights such as Sir Thomas Gray and Sir Peter Saltmarsh whose service was primarily martial. Unlike the retinues of courtiers such as Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke, Beaumont’s retaining had a significant regional focus:143 he recruited men in the North-East on the strength of his constant service in the Scottish Marches; he recruited men in Lincolnshire on the strength of his lordship in the county. Edward II’s patronage of Beaumont was heavily criticized. Yet Beaumont used the estates granted him by the king to recruit men to serve in the king’s wars; and even when he used the resources of his estates in pursuit of his own (or his wife’s) claims, this was still in accordance with the overall aims of his king. And surely, this was the fulfilment of the medieval ideal of territorial lordship.

CCR 1318–23, p. 717 (the Latin original is printed in Fœdera, II, i, p. 520). Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, pp. 49–52; Burt, ‘A “Bastard Feudal” Affinity in the Making?, pp. 176–8. 143 Phillips, Aymer de Valence, pp. 258–9. 141

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Appendix: The Durham Liber Vitae entry The entry headed with Sir Henry de Beaumont’s name can be dated paleographically to between c. 1340 and c.1360.144 However, the occasion it records must date to before October 1317, when Sir John de Eure was involved in the kidnapping of Henry and Louis de Beaumont.145 It is hardly likely that Beaumont would have tolerated Eure’s company after this date (or indeed, that Eure would be entered in the Liber Vitae after he had helped to kidnap the bishop elect, especially as the kidnappers were excommunicated). Leaving aside Edmund Capell’, whose name (i.e., Edmund [the] Chaplain) suggests he may well have been a clerk,146 of the sixteen others named beneath Beaumont, all are apparently knights (the names are prefixed: dom’), and twelve are recorded as serving under arms with him on at least one other occasion. This suggests that the list represents one of Beaumont’s military retinues. The best match for the surviving evidence appears to be the royal expedition of 1314, which ended at Bannockburn. Six of those named took out letters of protection for service with Beaumont on 19 April 1314 (Sir Robert Breton, Sir Norman Darcy, Sir John de Eure, Sir Odinel Heron, Sir William Marmion and Sir Peter Saltmarsh); and Sir Thomas Gray is recorded in Beaumont’s company at the battle in the Scalacronica.147 In addition, John Mereworth and Robert Neville, both named in the Durham Liber Vitae, were both present at the battle, for both were captured.148 Neville does, however, present certain problems of identification:149 a Robert Neville took out letters of protection on 19 April 1314 with John de Mowbray; and another Robert Neville took out letters of protection on 6 May, in the company of Hugh de Audley – though this could be the same man, changing to a different captain. It may be that Neville then transferred to Beaumont’s company (without bothering to take out yet another letter of protection). The same may perhaps be true of John Mereworth, who took out letters of protection to serve with the earl of Hereford, on 13 April, and took out further letters of protection, which did not specify any captain, on 12 May.150 Certainly, Sir William Marmion transferred to Beaumont’s

DLV, i, 279. Lynda Rollason suggests that the entry was copied into the Liber Vitae from an earlier list. 145 See above, p. 97. 146 He was perhaps the same Edmund, parson of Wrawby Church (Lincolnshire), who took out letters of protection for service with Beaumont in Scotland in January 1317; CDS, v, no. 3105; DLV, iii, 100. 147 CDS, v, no. 2966; Scalacronica, ed. King, pp. 73–5. 148 See above, n. 3. 149 He was probably the eldest son of Ralph Neville of Raby; DLV, iii, 539. 150 CDS, v, nos. 2964, 2973. Of course, these may be two different men with the same name. 144

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retinue from Hereford’s; having taken out letters of protection to serve with Hereford on 29 March, he then took out additional letters to serve with Beaumont on 19 April.151 By the same token, it should be noted that Robert Achard (who is not listed in the Liber Vitae), who took out letters of protection to serve with Beaumont on 19 April, then took out letters of attorney, on 27 April, but for service with Ralph de Monthemer.152 Finally, it should also be noted that those named in the Liber Vitae do not represent all of Beaumont’s retinue in 1314 (if this is indeed the occasion), but apparently only the knights.

151 152

CDS, v, nos. 2961, 2966, 2971. CDS, v, nos. 1716, 2966. Again, these may be two different men with the same name.

6

Financing the Dynamics of Recruitment: King, Earls and Government in * Edwardian England, 1330–60

Matthew Raven

It is, it seems, no longer necessary to justify the place of administrative history in an Eltonian bark.1 The records of medieval institutions, and the processes they reveal, have become the preoccupation of a ‘new’ administrative history, placing institutions and the ideas running through them in a wider context.2 Part of this revival has been manifested in the exhaustive researches of those historians interested in military service prosopography – pioneered, of course, by Andrew Ayton. This work has revealed how armies functioned internally and within the wider social networks from which this manpower was drawn. The transformation to paid service generated a complex sea of relationships between different groups – the retinue captains providing the hubs around which clusters of men of varying continuity formed and reformed within and across the contingents of an army – which Ayton has called the ‘dynamics of recruitment’.3 In a world of paid service the success * I would like to thank Gwilym Dodd, Mark Ormrod, Colin Veach, Gary Baker and

the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback on earlier versions of this chapter. G. R. Elton, ‘The Problems and Significance of Administrative History in the Tudor Period’, reprinted in his Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, i (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 249–59. 2 J. Sabapathy, Officers and Accountability in Medieval England, 1170–1300 (Oxford, 2014), pp. 14–19. See also C. Carpenter, ‘War, Government and Governance in England in the Later Middle Ages’, The Fifteenth Century VII, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 1–23. 3 A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59. 1

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of these dynamics depended on the availability of money to stimulate and maintain the recruitment process. After a period of experimentation, from the mid-1340s to the 1370s, these funds came in the form of ‘a balanced scheme…pay, regard and restauro equorum’ (the ‘pay package’).4 To assist the costs of captains, additional lump sum payments – regard – paid before the commencement of campaign (usually at a quarterly rate of 100 marks per thirty men-at-arms) developed alongside wages, becoming common from the mid-1340s. From this time onwards, the availability of regard and an increase in the size of prests (sums offered in advance of wages before a campaign) meant more cash was theoretically available for captains to use in the recruitment process.5 However, like the payment of wages after a campaign, the availability of regard and prests was of course determined by the availability of cash. The government departments of the Exchequer and the Wardrobe could issue payments in cash, but in wartime the government’s financial obligations almost always outstripped the ready cash available. One consequence of this cash-flow problem was that payments to important, senior noblemen – such as the Black Prince and John of Gaunt – undertaking important military and diplomatic business, often took priority over payments to lesser captains,6 but sufficient ready cash to pay even these most senior captains was frequently unavailable. To meet this challenge, the Crown turned to the process of assignment. This was where the revenues from a particular source of the Crown’s anticipated income – such as customs revenues – were assigned away from the Exchequer to an individual until the debt was paid. Unfortunately, since the Exchequer lacked an accurate method of anticipating revenue and ensuring sources did not become over-assigned, the captain or his attorneys could find that the source upon which the assignment had been made did not actually provide the

A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), p.  111 and ch. 4. Restauro Equorum comprised remuneration for assessed horses lost on campaign. 5 A. Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England’, JMH 43 (2017), pp.  4–23, at pp.  12–13. There is some doubt whether regard payments were kept by captains or distributed among their sub-contractors (cf. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p.  110 n. 142 and N. Gribit, Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345–1346 (Woodbridge, 2016), pp.  84–5). The point here is that regard provided money before a campaign that could be used to stimulate recruitment. Note that before the Reims campaign (1359–60) the payment of prests had not settled into the later practice of advancing wages for the first quarter of service as stipulated by indenture: Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 141–2. 6 D. Green, ‘The Household and Military Retinue of Edward the Black Prince’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Nottingham, 1998), p.  121; S. Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361–1399 (Oxford, 1990), p. 59. 4



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necessary sums.7 There was, in short, the potential for a monumental and damaging cash-flow problem.8 As the most important cogs in the recruitment machine the nobility were faced directly by the problems of providing wages to their men. It seems highly probable that an earl met the initial cost of wages owed to his retinue by the Crown and that the swift payment of sums due was accordingly important to the continuing viability of recruitment. The lamentable lack of comital household accounts renders this assertion unproveable, but the evidence of military subcontracts and of large outstanding sums due for wages incurred on campaign, added to the more general fact that in wartime the Crown was almost always committed to paying out far greater sums than it actually had in cash, make this a fair assumption.9 Certainly, earls in this period were credited with ‘loans’, probably reimbursing wages advanced to their men.10 The massive costs of fielding a comital retinue could not be borne by an earl indefinitely, so relatively swift payment of sums due to them was crucial if the dynamics of recruitment were to function, and an army to remain in the field. This is, of course, what the ‘pay package’ was for: without adequate supplies of cash these dynamics, upon which Edward III’s armies now depended, would fail. This was obvious to the king’s government. From 1333 to 1338, for example, the Exchequer relocated to York so that Crown revenues could be paid to the army more swiftly during the campaigns against the Scots.11 However, this was an unwieldy exercise ill-suited to continental campaigning and was not repeated under Edward III. Furthermore, the financial structures of later medieval England posed problems for prompt payment of prests, and A. Steel, The Receipt of the Exchequer, 1377–1485 (Cambridge, 1954), pp. xxix–xxxiv; G. L. Harriss, ‘Preference at the Medieval Exchequer’, BIHR 30 (1957), pp. 17–40. 8 For an investigation into how similar cash-flow problems were overcome for crusading ventures to Eastern Europe, see the paper in this volume by Adrian R. Bell and Tony K. Moore. 9 J. W. Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369–1380’, in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 1–28, at pp. 26–7; M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), pp. 159–67, 218–29; A. Goodman, ‘The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings, 1380’, EHR 95 (1980), pp.  114–20, esp. pp.  119–20; S. Walker, ‘Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: The Subcontracts of Sir John Strother, 1374’, BIHR 58 (1985), pp.  100–6; Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 58–66; M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (London, 1966), pp. 87–8. Gribit, Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition, pp.  93–8 shows that sums of money for wages were sporadically sent over to the captains in Gascony in 1345–46 and provides an excellent discussion of the problem. His research shows that an effective supply of money to the leaders of a long campaign was integral in keeping an army together. 10 E.g. to the earl of Northampton for £216 13s 4d in 1338: TNA, E 401/349 15 April. 11 T. F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England, iii (Manchester, 1928), pp. 65–6. 7

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to the swift settling of a captain’s account.12 Tout and his followers examined the structure and workings of the institutions of war finance within the historiographical framework of the early twentieth century. For these historians, the royal administration was the battleground between the king and a baronage striving to control him, so they investigated the relationship between the ‘state departments’ susceptible to baronial influence and those controlled more directly by the king.13 Such notions are no longer convincing: the assumptions framing these pioneering studies have since been abandoned and relations between the king and his magnates are now viewed against a norm of fundamental cooperation.14 The more recent historiography of magnate power relations under Edward III has shifted from institutions into the localities and towards studies of patronage and chivalric culture.15 This chapter looks at institutional processes once again, but moves beyond the discarded framework of a fractious relationship between king and nobility within the government departments and into the world of the dynamics of recruitment, informed by this normative relationship between the king and his earls. In contemporary political thought, the king needed to work with his government and the earls to defend his realm and secure his rights. But how was this actually achieved? To find out, we need to look at the institutions and structures of war finance to see how the king acted within them to make them work. The aim is to show how the dynamics of recruitment functioned in a financial system in which cash flow was often a major problem, especially in times of war. We then need to ask what this reveals about the relationship between Edward III and his earls. It is important to provide answers to these questions, since the ‘new’ institutional history needs to be synthesised into the history of Edwardian power relations.

Noted in A. E. Prince, ‘The Payment of Army Wages in Edward III’s Reign’, Speculum 19 (1944), pp. 137–60, at pp. 148–9; M. Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty (Oxford, 1962), pp.  168–9; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp.  97–8; A. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, in A. Ayton and P. Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 159–251, at p.  193; G. Baker, ‘Investigating the Socio-Economic Origins of English Archers in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century’, Journal of Medieval Military History 12 (2014), pp. 173–216, at pp. 211–12; Gribit, Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition, ch. 4. 13 E.g. Tout, Chapters, iv, pp. 69–185; J. H. Johnson, ‘The King’s Wardrobe and Household’, in J. F. Willard and W. A. Morris, The English Government at Work, i (Cambridge, M. A., 1940), pp. 206–49; Prince, ‘Payment’, pp. 137–60. 14 See G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975), chs 8, 9; M. C. Buck, ‘The Reform of the Exchequer, 1316–1326’, EHR 98 (1983), pp. 241–260; Carpenter, ‘War, Government and Governance’, pp. 3, 8–15. 15 E.g. W. M. Ormrod, Edward III (London, 2011), pp. 134–8, 363–67, 534–7, 595–600. 12



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I In the absence of adequate cash reserves, much of the money the Crown needed to provide for the captains of Edward III’s armies was sourced by pledges of assignment. The nature of these assignments posed fundamental risks to the workings of Edward III’s paid armies. The huge sums needed to finance the Hundred Years’ War placed a great strain on the kingdom’s financial resources, especially in the years 1338–41. These saw Edward III’s ill-fated attempts to buy the military support of various continental powers in addition to raising his own troops, with the costs of war approaching the staggering sum of £500,000 by 1341.16 The ever-present difficulties of providing enough cash for Edward’s armies to function were increased by the Crown’s policy of offering double pay in these years and by a general decline of the volume of coin in circulation through the mid-fourteenth century.17 The potential for a tally to become ‘bad’ – for the hoped-for revenue to be unobtainable – was always a problem, and especially so between 1338 and 1345. These factors meant that the financial system was placed under even more pressure than usual until William Edington instituted a reform of the Crown’s finances from the mid-1340s.18 This section will focus on the campaigns of the mid-fourteenth century to illustrate the structural problems confronting swift payment, highlight how these problems enforced a hierarchy of preference towards the earls as the king’s most important captains and natural companions, and analyse the varying levels of success achieved in supplying earls with payments of sums due. Then, the various methods used to procure these payments can be examined to ascertain how the king tried to provide the earls with money and to ask what these efforts reveal about the relationship between the king, the layers of central and local government, and the earls. For example, before the earl of Warwick accompanied the king to France in 1345, he received advances on his wages of £555 19s 12d assigned by the treasurer on four collectors of the fifteenth and the clerical tenth, and a wardrobe bill for £720 assigned on the receivers of wool in Norfolk.19 Warwick’s experience was not unique. At least eighty-seven such assign-

Tout, Chapters, iv, pp. 104–9; W. M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in England, 1327–1377 (London, 1990), p. 11. 17 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 84–5; M. Prestwich, ‘The Crown and the Currency: The Circulation of Money in Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England’, The Numismatic Chronicle 142 (1982), pp. 51–65; M. Allen, Mints and Money in Medieval England (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 325–31, 345, tables 10.3 and 10.12 and Appendix 3, table C.2. The shortage was exacerbated from 1338 to 1340 as the king spent massive sums on buying the support of continental princes, a policy which was abandoned after 1340. 18 Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 295–7, 371–7. 19 TNA, E 159/121, m. 346; E 36/204, fol. 13r. 16

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ments were issued for earls going on campaign in 1345 to the value of c. £25,000, mostly on the issues of the biennial fifteenth and tenth granted in the parliament of June 1344.20 Each assignment was a risk, but these risks should not be overemphasised and the assignments were generally successful. However, the issue of each assignment represented the start of an administrative process subject to the dangers inherent in the anticipatory system of medieval finance, and it was those risks that posed a threat to the continued functioning of the recruitment process. Accordingly, we find that one assignment for £20 on the sheriff of Cumbria, issued to the earl of Northampton on 7 March 1345, was unsuccessful.21 The inability of the sheriff, Hugh Moriceby, to pay is all the more telling because of Northampton’s connection with him: Hugh had served in the earl’s company in the Low Countries from 1337 to 1339, losing a horse in the process.22 Although the issuing of prests became increasingly prevalent after 1341, these were always offset against the sums outstanding after a campaign had finished and a captain’s account made, which needed to be paid if magnates’ treasuries were to be replenished. These payments could be very slow indeed. Occasionally, these debts could span reigns: in January 1338 the king acted on behalf of Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, and ordered the Exchequer to account with him for sums due to his comital predecessors, William and Guy, for wages, expenses and horses lost in the campaigns of Edward I.23 Nothing came of this until 1340, since the Exchequer was unable to ascertain the details of William and Guy’s service from its archive.24 Despite this, members of the parliament being held ‘in whom the king has complete confidence’ testified verbally for Warwick. It emerged that Warwick’s ancestors were owed £3,570 6s 10d and subsequently he received a number of assignments and allowances, all conveniently centred around his strongholds of Worcestershire and Warwickshire.25 The need for verbal testimony by parliamentary representatives as proof was extremely unusual. Yet the nature of the financial system meant substantial delays in full settlement of account were often experienced, especially during times of particular fiscal pressure, or by those on the margins of the king’s favour. Hugh Courtenay, earl of Devon (d. 1377), falls into the latter category. He fulfilled his duties of service when not incapacitated by illness, although without the advantage of a wealthy earldom and without Taken from the memoranda rolls, wardrobe books and the receipt and issue rolls. TNA, E 401/380 7 March; E 401/383 14 October (re-assignment as a fictitious loan). 22 TNA, C 81/1734, no. 40; CPR 1334–1338, p. 530; Treaty Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, II, 1337–1339, ed. J. Ferguson (London, 1972), nos. 291, 733; C 81/1750, no. 12; E 101/311/31, fol. 3. 23 CCR, 1337–1339, p. 233; TNA, E 159/114, m. 77. 24 TNA, C 47/35/18/49; CCR, 1339–1341, pp. 348–9; E 159/116, m. 64d. 25 TNA, E 372/184, m. 39; E 159/117, m. 89, allowed in E 372/185, m. 1d. 20 21



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distinction.26 Courtenay rarely witnessed royal charters and had a merely functional relationship with his king. He was one of the poorest earls and this probably prompted him into an extremely unwise attempt at reducing the relief fine owed to the king after the death of his father, from the £100 due from an earl, to a knightly rate of £15 (for his three knights’ fees in his barony of Oakhampton).27 This attempt came in January 1341, the apex of the acutest financial crisis of the reign. From 1293 to the early 1330s the Courtenays had petitioned to be recognised as earls and for their portion of the inheritance of Isabella de Forz, heiress to the earldom of Devon, famously appropriated by Edward I.28 Their de facto power in the county was finally recognised by Edward III in 1335 when he bestowed on the family the title of earls of Devon. In a financial crisis, Courtenay’s financially motivated attempt to turn this long-looked-for recognition upon itself and to act as a baron when it suited him, by paying only baronial rather than comital relief, went down badly with Edward III. For Courtenay’s foolishness his lands were distrained and he was forced to pay the entire £100.29 His political ineptitude certainly did not encourage the king to go to any special effort to see that the wages owed to him after his efforts in Brittany in 1342 were promptly satisfied. A debenture for £316 1s 10d was drawn up for Courtenay on the clerical tenth of April 1345 but this sum was not met until December 1375.30 If Courtenay’s troubles can be explained by a blend of relative unimportance and political cold-shouldering, most earls under Edward III experienced no such concerns. Practically, the king needed them to fulfil their central role in the dynamics of recruitment. The military obligations on the king and the importance of his earls in fulfilling these obligations combined with their social place at the king’s side to ensure active assistance in reimbursing costs for most earls: delays in payment were probably more attributable to the pressures of taxation and over-assignment than to politics. Many of the earls’ worst experiences in this regard came through the years 1338–45. For example, the payments of wages due after the siege of Dunbar in Scotland, over the winter of 1337, were complicated not only by the confused administrative arrangements noted by A. E. Prince but by the insecurity

R. J. Burls, ‘Society, Economy and Lordship in Devon in the Age of the First Two Courtenay Earls, c. 1297–1377’ (Unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2002), pp. 123–30, 163–4. 27 TNA, E 159/119, m. 234; BL, Additional MS 49,359 fol. 87 ff. 28 TNA, SC 8/325/E712; SC 8/240/11972; SC 8/82/4087; SC 8/41/2017; SC 8/3/101; K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford, 1973), pp. 258–9; A. M. Spencer, Nobility and Kingship in Medieval England: The Earls and Edward I, 1272–1307 (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 17–19. 29 TNA, E 159/119, m. 234; BL, Additional MS 49,359 fol. 87 ff. 30 TNA, E 36/204, fol. 123r; E 404/490/548. 26

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of the subsequent assignments.31 The earl of Arundel was owed 500 marks; after repeated orders to settle his account this was paid in instalments from 1342–54.32 The earl of Gloucester promptly received a substantial wardrobe debenture in his favour but the annotated payments were cancelled. Despite a repeated order for payment in July 1338, by 1341 he had been forced to surrender this debenture after two unsuccessful assignments in return for letters patent assigning the remaining £526 8s 4d due.33 His dues for horses lost were not fully met until 1351.34 Within the shifting pressures of the tax burden, and with the level of over-assignment conditioning the possibility of payment, receipt of sums due was, it seems, dependant on an individual’s relationship with the king, and how important the latter perceived him to be. After account had been made at the end of a campaign, most earls experienced shorter delays outside the period 1338–45. Kenneth Fowler found that Henry of Grosmont experienced significantly swifter payment rates before and after 1338–45 due to a combination of the alleviation of fiscal pressure and his personal importance.35 By using last known payment dates of sums due to earls for particular campaigns, an indication of payment rates – and potentially the importance of the individual in the eyes of the king – can be seen. These figures should not be regarded as definitive, since statistical analysis of such payments is beset by problems: a small and fluctuating sample size; gaps in the evidence; long-running debts being amalgamated together and accordingly hard to disaggregate; and the dangers of circumstance, such as the deaths of earls (for example Salisbury in 1344, Pembroke in 1348 and Lancaster in 1361) complicating the payment process. Nevertheless, there is enough material for a valuable impressionistic comparison.36 The average wait for the last known payment of debts due for the early Scottish campaigns (1334, 1335, 1336–37) is just one year and three months. From 1337 to 1341 (including Warwick’s campaign in Scotland in 1337, the Dunbar campaign from 1337 to 1338, and the Low Countries campaigns from 1338 to 1340), the average rises sharply to eight years. For the campaigns in Scotland and Brittany in 1342, the average, although still large, drops to five years eight months. For Prince, ‘Payment’, pp. 142–6. TNA, E 159/116, m. 15; E 159/118, m. 85d; E 404/5/32 4 June 24 Edward III, supplemented by E 403/330, m. 36; E 403/336, mm. 9, 17. 33 TNA, E 404/489/54; E 404/4/25 23 February 13 Edward III; CCR, 1341–1343, p. 45; CPR, 1340–1343, p. 264. 34 TNA, E 101/20/25, m. 21; E 101/20/33. 35 K. Fowler, ‘Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310–1361’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1961), pp. 861–76 and table VI. See also Gribit, Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition, pp. 108–9 for the 1345–46 campaign. 36 In compiling these averages, I have used the liberate rolls, the receipt and issue rolls, the wardrobe books, the memoranda rolls, the warrants for issue and wardrobe debentures, exchequer accounts various (E 101), the enrolled customs accounts and the pipe rolls. 31

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the expeditions to Aquitaine and to Crécy-Calais from 1345–47, the average again drops, to three and a half years; and for the campaigns of the early 1350s (the Winchelsea naval battle and Stafford’s expedition to Gascony in 1352) to one and a quarter years. For the campaigns of 1355–56, the average rises to two years ten months, and for the Reims campaign of 1359–60, to three years five months. The conclusions of Fowler and Nicholas Gribit regarding Henry of Grosmont hold true for the other earls. Debts due for the Scottish campaigns of the mid-1330s were met very quickly, while those due for the campaigns of the late-1330s to mid-1340s took a very long time to satisfy. From the mid-1340s, the recovering state of the royal finances enabled swifter payment and accordingly the costs accruing to the earls who participated in the campaigns of the 1350s were dealt with substantially faster. This suggests that payments received over three and a half years (or less) formed a workable timescale of payment for the earls and, furthermore, that Edward III and his government provided this before 1338 and after the mid-1340s. Of course, the nature of the credit system meant troublesome delays in payment were not limited to the period from 1338 to c. 1345, especially for those deemed less important or on the margins of royal favour. For instance, William Montague, second earl of Salisbury (d. 1397) had a long wait for his accounts to be settled after his service at Poitiers in 1355–56 and in northern France in 1359–60. His Poitiers bills had not been satisfied by the mid-1360s, and those for 1359–60 were outstanding until 1366.37 His relations with his king were difficult and it may have been this lack of favour that resulted in the delay.38 This can be contrasted with some of the more favoured earls in the same period. The substantial debts due to the earl of Warwick after the Reims campaign were satisfied by 1363, as were those due to the earl of Stafford.39 Similarly, the earls of Suffolk and Northampton, although they had to wait slightly longer, received full satisfaction in 1364.40 The problems inherent in assignment and exacerbated by the fiscal burdens of continental warfare examined above posed a threat not just to the earls’ coffers but also to the ability of the Edwardian armies to function, so the relatively prompt payment of advances and of sums due after campaign was crucial to the set of dynamics at work in the formation of these armies. Within the changing financial environment, harshest in the early years of continental warfare, Edward III and his government managed this problem fairly well before 1338 and after the mid-1340s by enforcing a hierarchy of preferential treatment for the benefit of the most active earls. TNA, E 404/494/254; E 404/491/90. G. A. Holmes, The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1957) pp. 15–16; Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 366–7. 39 TNA, E 404/491/239, 309. 40 Suffolk: TNA, E 404/491/231, supplemented by E  403/403, mm. 23, 24, 37; E 101/393/11, fols 10r, 11v, 15r. Northampton: E 404/491/352. 37

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Now that the importance of royal favour has been highlighted and the success of the king and government in overcoming these problems quantified, we can turn to the methods by which Edward III and his ministers tackled these problems and ensured that enough funds were available for the war state to operate to its full capacity. II The earls were inherently important to the recruitment process and as great figures within the polity. That said, the crucial role of the earls under their king throughout these years was not in itself sufficient to nullify all the complications and dangers associated with campaign finance. G. L. Harriss showed how normal creditors – captains and other creditors of lesser status than the titled elite – struggled to rise above the crowd and draw the goodwill and active assistance of the king.41 The struggles of such lesser men to attract royal attention, and thus obtain royal warrants to the Exchequer ordering payment, presented few problems for the earls; they were both a necessary priority of policy in a world of paid armies raised by the dynamics of recruitment and the king’s closest social companions.42 However, finding a suitable source of revenue – ‘good and sufficient assignment’, in the language of the time – was a far greater obstacle for the king’s government. Obtaining a royal order for payment was much less of a problem than actually getting paid. It is in the struggles for full and swift payment that the methods employed to the advantage of the earls can most clearly be seen. Uncovering the ways in which Edward III worked through the governmental system to try to provide the earls with payments reveals the dynamics of the relationship between the king, his central and local officials, and the earls, and highlights the interdependence of royal and comital power, as local networks and structures were forcibly attuned to the needs of war finance. The simplest and commonest method was to assign an earl to a source in an area in which he held a strong landed interest. This would immediately lessen the logistical demands placed on the earl’s officials in the collection of the revenue, while local connections would increase the chances of co-operation from the relevant crown officials.43 Earls possessed huge landed estates, giving them substantial areas of influence that formed a natural and convenient centre for the assignments made to them at the discretion of the treasurer, where such discretion was possible. Again, the massed assignments

41 42 43

Harriss, ‘Preference’, esp. pp. 18–23. Although note the experiences of the earls of Devon and Salisbury. Harriss, ‘Preference’, pp. 24–5.



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before the campaigns of 1345 make an exemplary case study due to the detailed records. The scale of the sums involved prevents a wholly neat division of assignments according to comital landholding, but the importance of such considerations remains obvious. Prominent among the assignments on tax collectors in Essex were the earls of Oxford and Northampton, great Essex landholders; on those of the east and north Midlands, the earls of Derby and Arundel. The same considerations applied to Worcestershire and Warwickshire for the earl of Warwick; Devon for the Courtenay earl; collectors of the Welsh portions of the clerical tenth for the earl of Pembroke, a great Marcher lord; Surrey and Sussex for the earl of Arundel; Suffolk for the earl of Suffolk; and Kent for the earl of Huntingdon.44 The use of tenurial geography was not, of course, restricted to the preparations made for this campaign and was common throughout the period. After the campaign in Scotland in 1335–36, Richard, earl of Arundel, received a tally for his wages on Henry Hambury, Chamberlain of North Wales.45 This source was doubly favourable: as lord of Chirk and Oswestry, Arundel held large estates in the northern March and furthermore he was Justice of North Wales, in which capacity he delivered the appurtenances of office to Hambury’s replacement in 1338 and tested the appearance of the Chamberlain at the Upper Exchequer.46 In 1341 and 1345, Arundel would experience similarly shrewd assignments on his behalf: firstly on the issues of the tenth collected by the bishop of Chichester, a close neighbour to the Arundel heartlands of southern Sussex, and then on the marriage fine of the son of Thomas West, one of Arundel’s adherents, along with a tally on Arundel himself as keeper of Portchester castle.47 The connections between the magnates contracting huge debts in the king’s wars, and the customs officials, sheriffs, and tax collectors upon whom those sums were assigned, have yet to be fully explored but it can be shown that the earls of Northampton and Derby had certain men appointed as customs officials in 1341.48 Tellingly, with these officials in office the earls subsequently received the sums due to them, including arrears built up over the crisis years of 1339 and 1340.49 All these connections, geographical and personal, well illustrate the use that could be made by the king’s administrators of the landscape of local power and the use of comital lordship in getting the earls the money they needed to function as recruiters and commanders. TNA, E 159/121 mm. 342–49; E 159/122, mm. 271–8. TNA, E 403/288, m. 15. 46 CPR, 1334–1338, pp. 45, 406, 415; CFR, 1337–1347, p. 98; TNA, E 372/185, m. 45. 47 CCR, 1341–1343, p.  181; TNA, E 401/383 17 November. Thomas West in Arundel’s service: C 76/20, mm. 16, 18; C  76/22, m. 11; C  76/23, mm. 12, 24; CCR, 1346–1349, pp. 243–4. 48 CFR, 1327–1337, pp. 227, 264. 49 TNA, E 356/8, mm. 32, 32d. 44 45

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At times of great necessity, such routine measures no longer sufficed. The years 1338–45 saw the greatest concentration of such financial pressures in the period under study. They provide a window onto the development of the direct and forceful mechanisms by which the strained system of assignment was shaped by the king and his government in the interests of the earls’ needs for the dynamics of recruitment to function. During such periods of pressure, the king applied his personal authority on behalf of the earls, and such direct intervention is often conveyed through the notes of warranty on royal letters. Letters warranted by the privy seal or the secret seal represented the direct will of the king, and such letters were usually issued at the supplication of the beneficiary.50 Financial administration in this period must be viewed in light of the Walton Ordinances, issued on 12 July 1338.51 The Ordinances prioritised war business above everything else; a warrant under the privy seal – which was with the king in Flanders – was required to authorise expenditure.52 It is unsurprising to find that the earls frequently received such writs in the following years. For example, just days after the Ordinances were issued, Edward, by writ of the secret seal, ordered the treasurer and chamberlains of the Exchequer to remedy ‘with all speed’ the arrears of various sums owed by bills of the privy seal to the earl of Suffolk, which had not yet been satisfied.53 Despite the suffocating effect the Ordinances had on the home administration, which played a substantial part in the crisis of 1339–41,54 their terms were strictly adhered to, following the grant of the ill-fated ninth on wheat, fleeces and lambs in 1340. As part of the huge credit operations in preparation for renewed campaigning, Edward had a number of prominent earls assigned large sums on the first and second year of the ninth of produce by order of the privy seal, dated 22 June.55 Their inclusion in the schedule of assignments on the ninth shows that their king realised the payments to these earls were a priority if his campaigns were to continue. The king enforced his wishes through the authority of his personal seals in favour of his most important earls. The struggles of the king to ensure that his most important commanders got paid can most clearly be seen when an initial order for payment proved unsuccessful. The orders of 22 June 1340 provide a case in point, as the imposition of the ninth met wide-scale resistance, with only some £15,000 raised by the end of the year. The king was in dire straits, since the sums A. L. Brown, ‘The Authorisation of Letters under the Great Seal’, BIHR 37 (1964), pp. 125–56, at pp. 132–6, 148. 51 Tout, Chapters, iii, pp. 143–50. 52 Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 199–200, 219–20. 53 TNA, E 404/4/24 29 July 12 Edward III. 54 See Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, chs 11–13; Ormrod, Edward III, ch. 8. 55 CPR, 1340–1343, pp. 1–4; CCR, 1339–1341, p. 424. 50



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promised to mercantile and military creditors far exceeded the revenue dribbling over to him in Brabant. Such circumstances gave rise to an illuminating series of records showing the desperation and anger of the king at the failure to satisfy his nobles with the money they needed. The earl of Northampton had received assignments on the receivers of the tax in Northampton and Nottingham and provides a representative example. In September, by which time it was readily apparent that the issues of the ninth would prove painfully inadequate,56 these receivers were ordered by privy seal writ to pay the earl, notwithstanding previous instruction to the contrary.57 On 12 October, the Exchequer was ordered to have new tallies on the county receivers struck, while the following day the treasurer sent letters to the prior of Thurgarton, receiver of the tax for Nottinghamshire.58 The prior was told that he had done nothing with regard to the earl’s assignment ‘to the contempt of us and to the damage of the earl’ and he was promptly threatened by sub pena with a £100 penalty if non-payment continued. It seems this was to no avail. The following March saw William Edington, receiver-general of the ninth for the southern shires, instructed to produce the Northamptonshire sum, as: the earl has besought the king to order … the arrears … to be paid … and the king has considered the costs sustained by the earl in his service and the great sums of money by which he is bound to divers creditors for this cause and wishes to help him so that he may be able to pay those debts speedily.59

In June, some of this assignment was moved onto the clerical tenth, supposedly a more secure source.60 Only by the end of 1342 do acquittances for payment appear, for £972 of the £2,572 14s 2¾d levied on the northern receiver John Ellerker; and two orders sent to the Exchequer in the mid1350s for enquiry into these accounts and the sums paid to the earl appear unfulfilled.61 Meanwhile, the administration had been forced to re-assign a number of important sums due to earls on the ninth thanks to a combination of poor yields and the revocation of assignments made by the council.62 In such circumstances, the king’s government sent a stream of writs into the

Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, p. 280. CCR, 1339–1341, p. 532. 58 CCR, 1339–1341, p. 556; TNA, E 404/493/122. 59 CCR, 1341–1343, p. 49. 60 CCR, 1341–1343, p. 177; TNA, E 159/117, m. 122d. 61 TNA, E 159/119, m. 78d; C 62/119, m. 1; E 372/187, m. 48d; E 159/129, Brevia Directa Baronibus, Michaelmas term, Rot. 1; E  159/131, Brevia Directa Baronibus, Easter term, Rot. 4. 62 CPR, 1340–1343, pp.  260, 264; TNA, C  76/16, m. 7; CCR, 1339–1341, pp.  575–6; CCR, 1341–1343, pp.  24, 36, 62, 98, 165, 173. Cf. E 159/119, m. 91; E  372/187, m. 48d. For the revocations, Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, pp. 276–85. 56 57

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localities to try and impress the importance of the earl’s payments upon the harried collectors and officials responsible for paying them. Local officials of all kinds had to respond to the needs of the earls as they worked and fought in the service of the king. If the huge assignments made on the ninth proved ultimately impossible to collect, such problems and the efforts to resolve them were hardly confined to this extraordinary tax on agricultural produce, as the wording of warrants to the Exchequer throughout the period illustrates. The urgency of payments to particular earls was emphasised by the clause stipulating they should be paid ‘without delay’, sometimes with the justification of wages being in arrears.63 More exceptional orders expounded on the earls’ needs at greater length: in 1340 the chancellor and the treasurer were both ordered at the earl of Arundel’s request to satisfy him ‘with all haste by good assignment or by another method to be agreed in consideration of his exploits in our great business’.64 Arundel was thus able to negotiate and agree a favourable assignment with the treasurer. A later writ for the earl of Northampton orders that he receive £1,000 ‘for certain causes’ by cash, or by assignment on the customs, not to be moved without the express command of the king.65 Such cases show how advantageous treatment was received by those earls whose claims were backed by the active, personal support of their king. Sometimes it is possible to see the positive effect of such warrants. Arundel was owed over £1,000 by wardrobe bills after the Dunbar campaign of 1337–38.66 The Exchequer was first ordered to satisfy these bills in July 1338; after repeated orders to do so the treasurer issued bills to several tax collectors in September and the earl had been satisfied by November 1339.67 The most striking display of the king’s ruthless determination to forward his earls the money they needed to keep the recruitment process going can be seen in a series of orders regarding delayed assignments sent to collectors of the fifteenth and tenth granted to fund the campaigns of 1345. Those responsible for supplying the earl of Northampton were to pay the earl immediately or the king would punish them for the earl being obliged to withdraw from his passage due to their non-payment.68 Such threats can hardly be considered veiled and they continued after the earl had landed in Brittany, since his forces needed the issues of the tax to be forwarded E.g. to Warwick, Oxford and Gloucester in 1337. Warwick: TNA, E 404/3/20 15 July 11 Edward III; E  404/3/21 22 November 11 Edward III, resulting in E  403/297, m. 1. Oxford: E 404/3/20 30 July 11 Edward III. Gloucester: C 62/114, m. 1. 64 TNA, C 81/1330, no. 56. 65 TNA, E 404/5/31 23 December 18 Edward III. 66 TNA, E 404/501/86. 67 TNA, E 404/4/25 10 November 12 Edward III; CCR, 1337–1339, p. 448; E 404/501/84, 85; E 101/20/25, m. 2. 68 CCR, 1343–1346, p. 533. 63



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to them ‘so that the earl have no reason to withdraw from that service for lack of payment’.69 This rhetoric used the widely held recognition of the importance of maintaining a cash flow to the armies of Edward III to mount a case of undeniable necessity in favour of the earls and thus to force the king’s officials to prioritise their payment. The language of urgency subsumed the priority of payments directly into service to king and realm to try and secure the preference Edward III wanted his earls to receive. At the siege of Calais in 1347, the king’s fears seem to have been realised. Despite orders to the collectors in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and Middlesex that Northampton be paid without delay so as to prevent his withdrawal, the earl’s company haemorrhaged manpower, to the fury of the king.70 The crucial link between provision of cash and retinue retention could hardly be clearer. It is equally clear that the king was fully aware of this link and that, by his direct intervention and the use of the language of necessity, he cajoled and bullied his administrators in the government offices and in the localities to try to secure his earls preferential assignments and to try to have these drafts met once they had been issued. There was, however, a great asset of the English economy that could be used as a vital supplement to the system of assignment on cash revenues. The early years of the Hundred Years’ War saw a number of ambitious schemes for the manipulation of the wool trade, by which wool would be exported to the Continent to provide a saleable commodity with which the war could be financed.71 The use of wool exports to fund his campaigns in the Low Countries gave Edward the opportunity to allow concessions to earls exporting their own wool through the customs, which could then be sold and the profit used to maintain their retinues. This method bypassed assignment on over-stretched domestic revenues and allowed money to be raised on the Continent where it could easily be used for retinue retention. Particularly important commanders were exempted from paying customs altogether, as the earls of Derby and Northampton were for eighty and 342 sacks of wool respectively in 1338, while in 1343 the earl of Arundel received discharge of £280 which should have been due for taking wool through the customs of London in 1340.72 All these orders were warranted by the privy

CCR, 1343–1346, p.  622; TNA, E  159/122, m. 42. The collectors in Suffolk and Norfolk were ordered to appear in the Exchequer because they had not paid the earl: E 159/122, m. 41d. 70 CCR, 1346–1349, pp. 185, 318; R. Partington, ‘The Nature of Noble Service to Edward III’, in Political Society in Later Medieval England: A Festschrift for Christine Carpenter, ed. B. Thompson and J. Watts (Woodbridge, 2015), pp. 74–92, at pp. 83–4. 71 For the taxes on and importance of wool, Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 194–8, 225–8, 257, 287; E. B. Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), chs 6 and 7. 72 Derby: CFR, 1337–1347, p. 107. Northampton: CCR, 1337–1339, p. 135; TNA, E 356/8, m. 26. Arundel: E 159/119, m. 118; E 356/8, m. 6d; E 372/187, m. 32d. 69

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seal. If the custom could not be completely bypassed then there were other ways of easing the burden on the king’s most important commanders: the earl of Suffolk exported two hundred sacks in 1338 and paid the subsidy on only half of them, as did the earl of Derby; in 1341 Suffolk exported wool at half the rate due and the earl of Huntingdon was allowed to export old wool ‘notwithstanding any order forbidding wool to be taken out the realm’.73 In the context of the government’s financial difficulties over the previous years the potential of wool in enabling the dynamics of recruitment was fully realised in the early 1340s. A detailed plan for a major expedition (subsequently aborted) in 1341 reveals the intention to raise a huge wool levy to finance the first forty days of campaigning.74 In 1342, however, a wide-scale attempt was made to use wool as an advance payment for a major expedition. Three large contingents were to be sent to Brittany: the first was commanded by the earl of Northampton as King’s Lieutenant and included the earl of Devon and Ralph Stafford; the king was to lead an army including the earls of Warwick, Derby, Suffolk and Salisbury; the earls of Gloucester and Pembroke were to lead a third wave.75 In the summer of 1342 the collectors of the wool subsidy were ordered to forward large quantities of wool to all of these commanders as substantial advance payments on their wages.76 The value of these prests met a large proportion – often approaching 50 per cent – of the sums due to most earls at the settling of their accounts.77 Customs accounts and subsequent accounts for wages show that many of these orders

Suffolk, 1338: CFR, 1337–1347, pp. 107–8; TNA, E 404/493/22; E 356/8, mm. 17, 19. Derby: CPR, 1338–1340, p.  158; E  356/8, m. 31. Suffolk, 1341: CPR, 1340–1343, p.  171; CCR, 1341–1343, p. 67; E 401/363 14 May. Huntingdon: CCR, 1341–1343, p. 200. Ordinance forbidding export: The Statutes of the Realm (1101–1713), ed. A. Luders et al. (11 vols, Record Commission, 1810–28), i, 15 Edw. III, Stat. 3, cap. 5. 74 M. Prestwich, ‘English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341’, BIHR 56 (1983), pp. 102–13. 75 See J. Sumption, Trial by Battle: The Hundred Years War, I (London, 1990), ch. 11 and Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, app. 2. Further to the discussion in Ayton, note that the earl of Oxford is omitted from the Breton section of Edington’s payroll because he did not go to Brittany, although he was originally supposed to and advance payments of wool were ordered for him. He served in Scotland from September to November. This would explain why he appears to pay the value of his wool advance for Brittany (£336) back into the Receipt in 1345 (TNA, E 36/204, fol. 13r; E 401/382 20 April). 76 CCR, 1341–1343, pp.  413, 564–73. The exception is the earl of Devon, who was not assigned upon a collector because he was assigned the bulk of his wages upon himself as receiver of wool for Devon in April 1343: CCR, 1343–1346, p. 46; TNA, E 36/204, fol. 12r; E 401/380 18 November. 77 The value of the advance payment can be calculated from the sources in the above note and compared to the sums due in the payroll (TNA, E  36/204) and with the ensuing wardrobe debentures (in E 404/490). The enrolled customs account in E 356/8 records the shipment of these advances. 73



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were carried out.78 As such, the Breton expeditions of 1342 witnessed the onset of substantial prests during the Hundred Years’ War. This marked a change from the financing of the Low Countries campaigns and was probably prompted by the difficulties experienced in finding enough cash to keep troops in the field alongside the costs of Edward’s Grand Alliance strategy through 1338–40. Furthermore, and significantly, the sums advanced to stimulate the earls’ recruitment networks in 1342 took advantage of the kingdom’s greatest export commodity in an opportunistic and successful attempt to limit the dangers inherent in the process of assignment upon cash revenues. A startling discovery in 1352 further illustrates the opportunistic methods by which Edward III and his government could try to provide swift cash payments to the earls that needed them. Robert Gyene, mayor of Bristol, was found to have concealed £20,000 lost by the Despensers under Edward II and was subsequently imprisoned.79 The king swiftly capitalised on this unexpected windfall and sealed a remarkable indenture with Ralph, earl of Stafford, on 18 July 1353.80 Stafford was to receive the £20,000 (excepting £507 10s), and whatever debts were owed to Gyene. Stafford was granted an oyer and terminer commission to prosecute this with further royal support as necessary and with suit in the king’s name. Gyene was to be imprisoned without mainprise until the full sum had been levied. A commission including Richard Stafford, the earl’s brother and attorney, and royal judges was duly issued and Richard Stafford indented with the sheriffs of Gloucestershire and Somerset in 1354 to provide payment.81 This scheme was probably intended to finance a new expedition to Gascony, following up the successes of Stafford’s campaign there in the latter half of 1352.82 Although the indenture specifies that the £20,000 was given in part payment of costs incurred in this previous expedition, almost all of those costs had been paid in advance by prest or were subsequently received at the Exchequer, not from Gyene’s hidden stash.83 This, and the sheer size of the Gyene hoard, suggests that Edward III, in consultation with the earl, tried to take advantage of the completely unlooked for discovery of the Despenser money to give Stafford a huge fund of cash to use in the preparations for a new campaign.84 This plan See above. TNA, E 368/126, Recorda, Michaelmas term, Rots. 13–15, 13d–15d. 80 CCR, 1349–1354, p. 618. 81 CPR, 1350–1354, p. 522; TNA, E 101/559/18; E 101/333/23. 82 For this campaign, J. Sumption, Trial by Fire: The Hundred Years War, II (London, 1999), pp. 91–101. 83 TNA, E 101/26/25; E 372/197, m. 41d; E 403/368, mm. 9, 22; E 403/375, mm. 28, 30; E 403/377, mm. 10, 25; E 403/378, m. 28. 84 Ormrod, Edward III, p. 374 likewise assumes a new expedition was planned. In the event, this expedition never took place and we do not know how much of the Despenser cash went to Stafford. A privy seal writ of 15 November 1354 ordered the Exchequer to make account with the earl and to assign or pay what may be leftover, but there is 78

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is similar to the well-known use of King John II’s ransom instalments to help fund the Reims campaign of 1359–60.85 On both occasions, the availability of large reserves of cash drawn from extraordinary sources outside of the normal crown revenues provided an ad hoc way to meet the challenges of providing a cash flow to stimulate the dynamics of recruitment. Conclusion Such opportunism is instructive. Edward III and his government generally tried to have the earls paid by any means available, subject to the limitations of a pre-modern financial system placed under extraordinary pressures by the Hundred Years’ War. The problem for king and earls was that the huge sums needed to make the dynamics of recruitment work placed a great strain on a system of credit and taxation already stretched by the diplomatic and organisational burdens of war, which rose in the reign of Edward III to hitherto unseen heights. These pressures were at their most acute from 1338 to 1345, which saw taxation levels in real terms unmatched until the later seventeenth century.86 Lengthy delays in payment were frequent in these years and some desperate measures to secure payment were employed. If the problem was essentially singular – a perennial shortage of cash and the resulting danger of over-assignment, which in turn threatened the workings of Edward III’s paid armies – then a number of methods were used to circumvent it. The government made use of the landed influence of the earls by assigning them, when possible, on areas pertaining to that influence. If needed, the king’s will was expressed in favour of his earls through writs under the privy or secret seals. And if a further exercise of forceful management was required, the language of urgency was used in orders to the Exchequer and to local officials to secure prompt payment. By using this politicised language, the king and the treasurer bombarded a range of local collectors and officials with orders to pay and penalties or threats if they did not. In the aftermath of the late 1330s, payments in wool were planned in 1341 and then carried out in 1342 as a method of bypassing the process of assignments on cash revenues. This was the first instance of massed and systematic prests being used since the start of large-scale continental warfare in 1338 and it signified a shift as the Crown attempted, in the future, to provide a greater portion of the cash needed for the recruitment process no marginal note of execution indicating this was carried out: TNA, E  159/131, Brevia Directa Baronibus, Michaelmas term, Rot. 21. 85 Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, pp.  346–8; Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 372–7, 397–8. 86 P. K. O’Brien and P. A. Hunt, ‘England, 1485–1815’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815, ed. R. Bonney (Oxford, 1999), p. 58.



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up front. Extraordinary cash sums such as the Gyene hoard were taken advantage of when possible. It is important to understand these methods of extraction, because they show how the king and his government enforced a hierarchy of preference favouring his earls within the processes of the institutions responsible for supplying the cash necessary for the prosecution of the Hundred Years’ War. It was by using the mechanisms discussed above that Edward III tried to enable the dynamics of recruitment to function; and in this, he was relatively successful before 1338 and after the mid-1340s. The efforts of the king outlined above are revealing about the nature of the relationship between Edward III and his earls. The desire to get the necessary money to his earls is obvious. When the fragmentary scraps of evidence are drawn together we can see the king and his government striving hard to provide the earls with payments. Of wider significance is that these processes reveal the procedure of payment for the costs of campaigning as a key area of co-operation between the king and the earls. The efforts of the king and his government in traversing the structural difficulties of medieval finance so as to make the ‘pay package’ work reveal the administrative methods by which his principal commanders were given enough cash to enable them to exploit their recruitment networks and help the king fulfil his obligation of defence. This illuminates an important aspect of the relationship between king and earls – royal authority, governmental practice and local networks – in the process. The active support of Edward III was often crucial in enabling the earls to function as key recruiters in his largely paid armies, without whom the dynamics of recruitment on which his war effort depended would falter. As king, prevalent traditions of political thinking placed a set of obligations on Edward III which revolved around just internal rule secured by successful defence against external threats. These ideas were, for instance, symbolised on the Great Seal, which projected the imagery of the king sitting in judgement on the obverse and riding into battle on the reverse. A powerful nobility with plentiful resources was required for the fulfilment of these obligations.87 The earls of fourteenth-century England were an aristocracy of service; Edward III knew it and in the matter of payments due for military service he tried to make sure the earls were able to operate at the level required and expected of them. The study of the Edwardian aristocracy needs to include the study of such institutional processes in a wider political and ideological context to take account of networks of obligation and favour in the processes of central government, as well as in the localities.

Spencer, Nobility and Kingship, pp. 262–5. I will discuss this topic in relation to the reign of Edward III further in my doctoral thesis.

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The Symbolic Meaning of Edward III’s * Garter Badge Clifford J. Rogers

One of Andrew Ayton’s many contributions to his field is the way he helped both his own and the next generation of historians appreciate that, as Nigel Saul puts it in his foreword to this volume, an Edwardian army ‘was held together by the social authority and resources of its principal commander’, and that ‘in the field, the force’s effectiveness would depend largely on the individual commander’s authority and on the day-to-day relations between his immediate lieutenants’. As Richard Barber has emphasised, Edward III consciously used his immense social and chivalric authority to foster powerful bonds of affection and mutual understanding with and among his principal military captains, and one of the most important means he employed to that end was the creation of a new chivalric order in 1348.1 Britain’s ‘Most Noble Order of the Garter’ is the oldest, most famous, and most prestigious of all the monarchical orders of knighthood. The buckled blue band with its gold motto of honi soit qui mal y pense (‘shamed be he who thinks ill of it’) has become part of the royal arms of the United Kingdom, and can be seen in countless places in Britain and the Commonwealth as a result. Knights and Ladies of the Order are entitled to display their own heraldic arms encircled by the Garter, and for this reason also, many garter-emblems can be found in churches, colleges, hospitals and other public structures throughout Britain and across the world. * I am grateful to Richard Barber, D’Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, Richard Kaeuper

and above all Francis Ingledew (who provided thorough comments on an earlier draft) for assistance with this paper. The generosity of Professors Boulton and Ingledew is particularly appreciated because this essay runs counter to their own work. 1 R. Barber, ‘The Military Role of the Order of the Garter,’ Journal of Medieval Military History 7 (2009), pp. 1–11, and idem, Edward III and the Triumph of England: The Battle of Crécy and the Company of the Garter (London, 2013).

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When they first encounter the garter symbol and motto, students and tourists often react with some puzzlement. To twenty-first-century sensibilities, a garter seems a strange choice for a chivalric emblem, while the motto naturally provokes the question ‘who thinks ill of what?’ Efforts to satisfy the curiosity aroused by the heraldry of the Order have not been lacking. According to an oft-told story, of which there are several variations, King Edward retrieved a garter that slipped from a lady’s leg at a ball, and pronounced the motto as a gentlemanly effort to shield her from embarrassment. The earliest version of this tale, however, was first published in the 1460s, and has no foundation whatsoever in any source even close to contemporary with the Order’s establishment.2 Nonetheless, by the early sixteenth century this story was the ‘common report’ [fama vulgi] of the Order’s origins even in England, and historians writing in that century, though usually not fully endorsing the popular tradition, were generally willing to accept it as at least possibly true. Following Polydore Vergil (1512), they usually took the line that, if the story was true, the seemingly ‘unworthy’ or ‘meane’ beginnings of the Order should not be disdained, for ‘something that rises from a petty or sordid origin increases all the more in dignity’. In the next century, however, scholars like Peter Heyline and Elias Ashmole took the story of the ball ‘to be a vain and idle Romance, derogatory both to the Founder, and the order’, ‘remote from truth, and of little credit’. Since then, this has been the dominant view among historians.3 The essence of this story appears in Tirant lo Blanc, c. 1460, and was probably circulating in England by the late 1430s, when the author, Joanot Martorell, visited England; there is even a suggestion in his work that he heard it directly from Henry VI. J. Martorell and M. Joan de Galba, Tirant lo Blanc, trans. D. H. Rosenthal (London, 1984), pp. x, 121–3. Some version of the story may already have been going around in England in the late fourteenth century. W. M. Ormrod, ‘For Arthur and St George: Edward III, Windsor Castle, and the Order of the Garter’, in St George’s Chapel, Windsor, in the Fourteenth Century, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 13–34, at pp. 30–1; cf. C. S. Jaeger, Ennobling Love. In Search of a Lost Sensibility (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 140–2. It was picked up by sixteenth-century authors like Polydore Vergil and Camden, the last-mentioned of whom made the lady in question the countess of Salisbury. D. J. D. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown. The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe, 1325–1520 (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 155–7; H. E. L. Collins, The Order of the Garter, 1348–1461: Chivalry and Politics in Late Medieval England (Oxford, 2000), pp. 270–1; E. Ashmole, The Institution, Laws and Ceremonies of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, 2nd edn (London, 1692), pp. 179–80. For the most recent discussions of this subject, see L. Carruthers, ‘Honi soit qui may y pense: The Countess of Salisbury and the “Slipt Garter,”’ in Surface et profondeur. Mélanges offerts à Guy Bourquin à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, ed. Colette Stévanovitch and René Tixier (Nancy, 2003), pp. 221–34; F. Ingledew, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight and the Order of the Garter (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); and S. Trigg, ‘The Vulgar History of the Order of the Garter’, in Reading the Medieval in Early Modern England, ed. D. Matthews and G. McMullen (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 91–105. 3 Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, pp. 95–100.

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Literary scholars, however, have recently tended to suggest that the ‘vulgar tradition’ may be right after all – at least in embodying ‘symbolic truths’, and perhaps even ‘historical truth’.4 Historians, Stephanie Trigg suggests, have been too ready to displace the ‘feminised story’ with ‘the voice of masculine common sense and reason’. They have thereby lost sight of the importance of the ‘slipt garter’ narrative and its elaborations, which represent ‘a fuller, even a truer response to the king’s enigmatic pronouncement’ of the motto, bringing us ‘closer to its original intent’.5 In this view, Edward coined a deliberately ambiguous motto, and picked the garter as an insigne precisely because it was either tinged with shame, or at least ‘insignificant’ and ‘odd’. Either way, the choice was an affirmation of his own social power.6 Stephen Jaeger, along these lines, argues that the foundation of the Order was a parable of the nearly magical royal ability to define the parameters of honour and shame, even to the extreme of transforming something sordid into an object of the highest veneration, using an act of ‘cross-dressing’ to turn a symbol of illicit desire into a badge of noble and chivalric aspiration.7 There can be no doubt that, as Trigg says, ‘the Order of the Garter is one of the pre-eminent sites for distributing and regulating the symbolic and mythic capital … of the British monarchy’, or that the power to allocate both honour and shame was one of the most important tools of royal government for so long as royal government persisted in Europe.8 If the ‘slipt-garter’ tale is more than a myth, it suggests that Edward III aimed to establish himself (by virtue of his royal status) not as a paragon of a martial-chivalric code greater than himself, one reflecting natural law and divine ordination, but rather as a supreme arbiter of chivalry and courtliness, even of mores and morality.9 This, in turn, suggests that chivalry and

Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 95. Trigg herself doubts whether the story has any historical truth, but cf. Carruthers, ‘Slipt Garter’, pp. 233–4; S. Crane, The Performance of Self: Ritual, Clothing and Identity during the Hundred Years War (Philadelphia, 2002), pp. 138–9; Jaeger, Ennobling Love, pp. 141–2. 5 Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, pp. 99–100. 6 Paraphrasing Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 104; cf. Carruthers, ‘Slipt Garter’, pp. 233–4. 7 Jaeger, Ennobling Love, p. 140; Crane, Performance, pp. 137–9; Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 95. 8 Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 91. 9 See Jaeger, Ennobling Love, pp. 140–1. Jaeger suggests the Garter story shows Edward III as a ‘maste[r] over nature, behaving as gods (the Socratic, not the Homeric ones) behave, with a degree of control beyond the lot of mortals … By putting a woman’s garter on his leg, the king abases himself  … But the same gesture exalts him: it is a sublime act of gallantry  … The private and the intimate lose their power to embarrass, because the king’s act rescues them and transports them  … into the realm of invulnerability reserved for the king, where the gross, the bawdy and the illicit are illusions and even seemingly taboo acts turn sublime’. 4

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courtliness are artificial and malleable cultural products, rather than reflections of deep-seated and widely-shared social values. Hence, as Trigg rightly says, ‘the stakes in interpreting this foundational moment have always been very high’.10 Although the literary scholars are right to point out that the changes in how the stories of the Order’s foundation have been viewed by successive writers offer valuable insight into the mentalité of those writers’ own times,11 the historians of the Order have almost certainly been correct in asserting that the legend of the ball is a simple fiction, which cannot cast any light on Edward III’s own intentions, on two grounds. First, there is the fact that there is no recounting of that tale – or any similar story – that is even close to contemporary with the putative event, which from a historian’s perspective is sufficient to disallow it in the absence of exceptionally compelling later sources. Second, it seems clear that this tale was a late invention, produced as a way to explain what by the fifteenth century had become a mystery (the motto) linked to a perplexing oddity – the choice of an item of women’s underclothing with ‘sordid’ connotations as an emblem for the world’s most honourable brotherhood of knights – because that seeming oddity reflects a fifteenth-century, rather than a fourteenth-century, understanding of what garters were.12 By the late fifteenth century, garters had become strictly gendered articles of female apparel, worn under ladies’ skirts. But in the mid-fourteenth century they were still fashionable items of male attire, worn externally, where they could be admired.13 Bibbeworth’s glossary – variously said to have been composed anywhere from 1240 to around 1325 – defined garters as items ‘worn by squires and boys’.14 The Luttrell Psalter, c. 1330, includes a depiction of a man with belt-like garters similar in proportion to those

Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 91. Jaeger, Ennobling Love, p. 142. 12 Already by the late fourteenth century, garters may have begun to seem somewhat ‘sordid’ (as Polydore Vergil later said), since in 1389 they were used in Toulouse as an emblem for prostitutes. F. Godefroy, Dictionnaire de la langue Française et de tous ses dialects du IXe au XVe siècle, 10 vols (Paris, 1881–1902), s.v. jartier. But Charles VI was still wearing (or believed to have been wearing) one visibly in 1393: see n. 21, below. 13 Gendered: Martorell wrote of the Order’s device as being ‘buckled garters, the kind many noblewomen use to hold up their stockings’. Tirant lo Blanc, p.  123. Fashionable: P. J. Begent and H. Chesshyre, The Most Noble Order of the Garter. 650 Years (London, 1999), pp. 16, 358; this makes an important modification to Boulton, Knights, pp. 157–9. 14 Walter de Bibbesworth, Le Tretiz, ed. W. Rothwell (London, 1990), p.  6. Boulton, Knights, p. 157, gives the late date. A date around 1240 is commonly preferred, but not solidly established, and it may be that this reference to garters points to a later composition than usually thought. 10 11



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of the Order, with the ends left hanging long.15 Edward III wore garters decorated with pearls and gold in 1334, and other garters purchased for men or boys appear in English royal accounts for 1307, 1322, 1332, around 1339, and 1341.16 Edward’s cousin Henry, duke of Lancaster, recorded in 1354 how the wearing of garters, and his pride in how well they suited him, had led him in his youth to the sin of vanity.17 In the 1363 sumptuary laws, yeomen and craftsmen were forbidden to wear gold or silver garters, indicating that garters were still thought of as fashionable for elite men in England.18 A latefourteenth-century lead badge depicts an archer wearing a jewelled garter.19 A French manuscript of the same period portrays a male courtier wearing a broad golden garter with the end looped up and around in the same way as in the Order’s badge.20 As late as 1393, the masked and costumed King Charles VI of France was identified and therefore saved from being burned to death during the tragic bal des ardents because two women of the court recognized a silver garter he was wearing.21 Moreover, insofar as the evidence allows us to say, garters like those of the Order’s insigne – that is broad, decorated with precious metal, and with a hanging end – were exclusively male. Manuscript illuminations show that in the fourteenth century women did at least sometimes wear garters, but the only images of women wearing garters that I have been able to find show simple ties, proportioned more like shoelaces than belts, usually without hanging ends, and never with a single dangling tail.22 If mid-fourteenthBarber, Triumph of England, pl. 13. Cf. Ingledew, Sir Gawain, p. 114. Barber, Triumph of England, p. 269. 17 Henry of Grosmont, Le Livre de seynts medecines, ed. E. J. Arnould (Oxford, 1940), p.  72: “Et par surquiderie est orgoil tant entrée en moi par …les garters qe bien me seoient a mon avys – qe gaires ne vaut; et si jeo en oïse poynt parler, ma fole joie en estoit greignure de tant …” 18 Rotuli Parliamentorum: ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento, 8 vols (London, 1767–1832), 2, p. 264. 19 Museum of London, collection number 82.8/14: http://collections.museumoflondon. org.uk/online/object/28997.html, accessed 15/06/2017. 20 For a lithographed version from C. Louandre, Les arts somptuaires: histoire du costume et de l’ameublement et des arts et industries qui s’y rattachent (Paris, 1858), see the New York Public Library digital collections at https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47e0dce6-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99, accessed 15/06/2017. 21 Geste des ducs de Bourgogne, and Livre des trahisons, in Chroniques relatives à l’histoire de la Belqique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne. Textes français, ed. J. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1873), p. 275, and note also p. 435. 22 Lilienfeld Stiftsbiliothek Cod. 244v (http://illumanu.tumblr.com/post/28702548877/14thcentury-1349–1351-austria-lilienfeld), accessed 15/06/2017, which is from 1349–51, does seem to show loose ends hanging from the garter. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS Fr. 25525 fo. 111v and Pierpont Morgan Library MS G.  24 fols 10, 42, 113v show garter strips but no loose ends. See also the fifteenth-century illuminations in Bodleian Library MS Douce 195, fol. 66v and Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Latin 1173 fol. 52 (second and 15

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century women, like men, also wore more elaborate and therefore expensive garters, then (as Richard Barber notes), ‘one would expect to find record of them in the detailed accounts for Queen Philippa’s often extravagant apparel’, but that is not the case.23 Francis Ingledew suggests that Edward picked the garter badge because the king meant for it to call to mind the erotic and the female, so that he could use the image and the motto to reject complaints about the sexual immorality of himself or his court.24 But if that had been his intent, then (based on the evidence in the previous two paragraphs) he would presumably have used a simple, narrow, tied ribbon, which would have been feminine or at least gender-neutral, not a distinctively masculine belt-like garter.25 Thus I cannot agree with Ingledew that ‘there is at least as good reason … for the [Order’s] garter to have been female as male’, nor can I see any justification for his assertion that (in the fourteenth century as opposed the fifteenth or the twenty-first century) ‘if the garter’s visual aspect pointed in itself no more to a female garter than to a male one, the word garter alone would potentially suffice to continue to refer suggestively to a woman’.26 Once this is appreciated, the question to be asked about the symbol changes: from ‘why would Edward III select an item of ladies’ underclothing as a symbol for his new chivalric order’ to ‘why would the king pick for the order’s insigne a band of material used by well-dressed men to hold up their stockings’? If there is no reason to view the garter as a female, sexually suggestive, device,27 then the ‘shame’ or ‘scorn’ [honi] of the motto becomes decoupled from any implication of sexual transgression,28 and third rows), and Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BNF] manuscrit français 239 fol. 204v, which show what look to be simple narrow ribbon garters without hanging ends. Also from the fifteenth century, Bibliothèque de l’École des Beaux-Arts, MS. 0482, fol. 60v and Pierpont Morgan Library MS M.381 fol. 54, show what appear to be rolled-over stocking tops and no visible sign of garters. 23 Barber, Triumph of England, p. 370 – referring to women’s garters in general, but the point applies a fortiori to garters that were not mere ties of cloth (even silk). 24 Ingledew, Sir Gawain, pp. 20–1, 115–19 et passim, with the idea most clearly expressed ‘in Edward’s voice’ on p. 119. 25 The ones with scalloped edges like the three late-fourteenth-century examples found in London are gender-indeterminate, but more likely male. E. Crowfoot, F. Pritchard and K. Staniland, Textiles and Clothing c. 1150–1450, new edn (London, 2001), pp. 143–4, and cf. p. 104. 26 Ingledew, Sir Gawain, pp. 113–14. 27 Ingledew, Sir Gawain, p. 20. 28 Jaeger argues that the reader who wrote the Garter motto at the end of the manuscript of Gawain and the Green Knight did so ‘to ward off the shame symbolized by a woman’s undergarment’, linking the Garter to the lady’s girdel in the poem. ‘It is unlikely’, he continues, ‘he would have done that if the order’s traditions only connected the motto with Edward III’s wars in France. The garter had to be understandable as a sign of disgrace, like the green girdle.’ Ennobling Love, p.  141; see also p.  273. But since Jaeger



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needs another line of explanation – which fortunately is ready to hand in the traditional explanation of the phrase. The question of why Edward would pick an emblem that, even if not ‘sordid’ or ‘odd’, does nonetheless still seem ‘insignificant’, remains.29 But for that question, it is much easier to discern a probable answer, one that moreover fits well with the most probable and generally accepted understanding of the meaning of its accompanying motto. If we also consider the choice of insigne in its context as the selection of a symbol for the second secular monarchical order of chivalry, a creation undoubtedly influenced by the foundation of the first such order some eighteen years earlier by Edward III’s ally Alfonso XI of Castile, the sense of the symbolism becomes even clearer and more certain. The Order of the Band The earliest secular monarchical knightly order was the Order of the Band [Orden de la Banda or Orden de la Vanda], founded by King Alfonso XI of Castile and León in 1330.30 The badge of the Order, worn as an insigne by each of its members, was a strip (banda) of cloth from around two to four inches wide, crossing diagonally from the left shoulder to the opposite hip. The leading scholar of the monarchical orders, D’Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, has made clear some of the logic that lay behind the adoption accepts that the postscript was written at some indeterminate time after the creation of the manuscript (which he dates at c. 1400), it only reflects the fact that by then fashion had changed, and garters had become thought of as women’s underclothing and thus gendered, sexualized and shame-linked. Ingledew argues that the poem itself dates back to the middle fourteenth century, but in any case Gawain’s principal failing in Sir Gawain is not his compromises with chastity, but his failures of courage and loyalty, so there is no need to invoke shame of a sexual nature to explain the linkage between the garter motto and the poem, especially since (as Ingledew valuably points out) some in England ‘thought ill’ of Edward’s willingness to compromise his rights in order to gain the peace of Brétigny in 1360. Ingledew, Sir Gawain, pp. 6–18; pp. 118–19, pp. 129–32. 29 Cf. Trigg, ‘Vulgar History’, p. 103: ‘the most problematic scenario of all seems to be that Edward could indeed have established a great Order out of such a small item. Not all the earnest arguments of [Polydore] Vergil and others can write away the oddness of this feature of the Order.’ Trigg’s answer is that the essential inconsequentiality of the insigne is actually ‘the point’, and that ‘we are indeed honi, shamed, or condemned out of our own mouths, as soon as we start to rationalise the king’s choice of emblem and motto’. I am arguing, to the contrary, that a rational explanation for the king’s choices can indeed be offered, and that the Garter should not be understood as ‘an item of female clothing with erotic connotations’ (Ingledew, Gawain, p. 6, and see also pp. 20–1, 113–15) and so need not be seen as ‘odd’. 30 Károly I of Hungary formed a knightly Fraternal Order of St George even earlier, in 1326, but this was not strictly a monarchical order like the Banda, the Garter, or the Star. For a concise treatment of this and other knightly confraternities preceding the Garter, see Barber, Triumph of England, pp. 343–65.

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of this badge. The band served as a visible identifier of those who had earned the distinction of membership in the Order. Being made a Knight of the Band was something to be proud of, something to show off, and the wearing of the insigne was a convenient, physical way to publicise the honour. A diagonal band sewn onto a surcoat, as a physical object of adornment, was sufficiently normal not to seem odd or awkward, but nonetheless sufficiently unusual that, in the particular form adopted for the Order, it was quite distinctive, even striking. In Boulton’s opinion, that is really all there is to the banda itself: it ‘seems to have had no particular symbolic significance’, he believes.31 This, however, seems unlikely. Medieval kings – particularly medieval kings fond of chivalric pageantry, as Alfonso XI very much was – had strong eyes for visual symbolism, which of course absolutely suffused much of medieval art, heraldry and ceremony. Moreover, one need not dig very deeply to uncover the allusions King Alfonso likely intended: the members of the Order were to be a united band of knights loyal to each other and the monarch who was the head of their group as well as their sovereign ruler. The visual pun works in fourteenth-century Castilian even better than it does in English. Banda could mean a ribbon or band of material, or a diagonal stripe in heraldic arms (what in English is now termed a bend), and it could also mean ‘a group of armed men’ (though in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries this was more usually spelled bando).32 In the early seventeenth century, the Spanish lexicographer Sebastián de Covarrubias apparently thought of the Order’s device as related to the meaning ‘a union, a bunch of men who act in a united fashion’, since he noted the Order’s formation in his Tresoro de la lengua castellana under the entry for ‘VANDA de gentes’, with that definiBoulton, Knights, ch. 3; quotation p. 71; note also pp. 90–1. Sebastian Corominas [or Coromines], Diccionario crítico etimológico de la lengua castellana (Berne, 1954), s.vv. bando and banda (II). Corominas gives the first documented use of banda in the sense of ‘group of armed men’ as 1540, but the discussion in the body of the entry makes it clear that he believes the Castilian use of the word with this meaning antedates the equivalent French usage of ‘bande’, which he says came into use in the fourteenth century. Moreover, he notes the related meaning of a group of animals or birds as documented around 1300, and presumes that a third meaning (a ship-load), which is documented from the fifteenth century, somehow came from the first meaning, which must therefore be earlier. In the fleet of the Crown of Aragon in the late thirteenth century, rowers and crossbowmen on galleys were divided into two watches or sides called bandas. L. V. Mott, Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean. The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers (Gainesville, 2003), p.  178. A banda could also be a girdle (ceñidor), which is interesting considering the connections between the Order of the Garter and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, discussed most fully by Ingledew, Sir Gawain. Lastly, vanda could also – according to a sixteenth-century Castillian-Latin dictionary – mean a belt, specifically a knight’s sword-belt, the cingulum militare, which was a (or even the) principal symbol of knightly status. Dictionarium Aelij Antonii Nebrissensis grammatici (Madrid, 1683), s.v. Balteum.

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tion.33 In any case, banda also resonated with the phrase ir en bando, which meant ‘to lend assistance to’, and the verb bandear, which meant either ‘to aid’ or ‘to band together in a separate group’.34 Thus, a knight of the Order was someone who could be summoned to go en bando (to the assistance of ) or por bandear (to aid) his king, in company with his bando/vanda (group of united men) of fellow-members, with whom he had decided to bandear (to band together as a distinct group), each wearing and identified by the distinctive banda (strip of cloth, and heraldic bend) insigne.35 During the early years of the Hundred Years’ War, there were frequent diplomatic interchanges between the courts of England and Castile, for King Edward III of England – whose father had been proudly half-Castilian36 – eagerly hoped to gain Castile’s support for his war with France, or at the very least wanted to ensure that Spanish naval resources did not go to the assistance of Philip VI of France. Diplomacy was especially intense in the years just prior to King Edward’s first adoption of the Garter badge and motto, in preparation for a marriage between the king’s daughter, Joan, and the future Pedro II of Castile.37 In 1343, two of King Edward’s closest friends and advisers, Henry of Lancaster, earl of Derby, and William Montague, earl of Salisbury and marshal of England, travelled to Spain to conduct negotiations and to participate in Alfonso’s siege of Algeciras. There the members of the Order of the Band were presumably present in force, many of them serving as the king’s personal military company, as the statutes of the Order required.38 Considering all these contacts, King Edward, as a devotee of Sebastián de Covarruvias [or Covarrubias], Tresoro de la lengua castellana o española, 2 vols (Madrid, 1673–74), s.v. Vanda: ‘ayuntiamento, y caterva de hombres que van adunados’. 34 Corominas, Diccionario, s.vv. bando, bandear; Julioi Cejador y Frauca, Vocabulario medieval Castellano (Hildesheim, 1996), s.v. bandear (‘hacer bando aparte’). 35 As a particularly apposite example (for reasons that will become clear below) of the former usage, when Henry of Lancaster and William Montagu, earl of Salisbury, were at the siege of Algeciras a few years before the founding of the Order of the Garter, they and their men became involved in a hot skirmish with the defenders, and ‘los castellanos / llegaron por bandear los Ingleses’. Poema de Alfonso Onceno (Madrid, 1863), ll. 2281–2. 36 Edward II had ‘great regard … for his Castilian heritage’ and a ‘predilection for things Castilian’. C. L. Chamberlin, ‘A Castilian in King Edward’s Court: The Career of Giles Despagne, 1313–27’, in England and Iberia in the Middle Ages, 12th-15th Century, ed. M. Bullón-Fernández (New York, 2007), pp. 89–117, at pp. 89–90. In the last year of his reign, Edward was planning to wed his heir (the future Edward III) to a sister of Alfonso XI (who founded the Order of the Band a few years later). Ibid., p. 106. 37 Fœdera, III, pp.  1, 9, 12, 13, 19–22; 25–7, 48–9, 58, 63, 73–5, etc.; L. Mirot, and E. Déprez, ‘Les ambassades anglaises pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans’, Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes, LXI (1900), nos. CI, CII, CX, CXI, CXIII, CXVII, CXXII, CXXIV, CXXVI. 38 Boulton, Knights, pp.  72, 74, 84–5; G. Daumet, ‘L’ordre castillan de l’Écharpe’, in Bulletin Hispanique, 25 (1923), pp.  5–32. All members of the Banda had to be vassals either of the king or of one of the king’s sons, and all those who were his personal vassals had to serve in his personal military company. 33

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chivalric display, would certainly have been interested in, and well-informed about, the Order of the Band.39 Thus, there is little room to doubt that when he founded the second European monarchical order of knighthood a few years later, he did so with full cognisance of the general precedents set by the first one.40 The Order of the Garter Although the foundation of the Order of the Garter was not proclaimed until 1348, Edward had been planning to found a knightly fraternity at least since 1344, when the project was envisioned as a revival of Arthur’s Round Table.41 After a grand three-day tournament held at Windsor (later the seat of the Order of the Garter), Lancaster and Salisbury – recently returned from their embassy to Spain – led a grand procession to a pre-arranged location, where King Edward took an oath to found a new, permanent Round Table on Arthurian lines. The first two magnates to swear ‘to observe, sustain, and promote this project’ were, again, Lancaster and Salisbury.42 For reasons that cannot now be determined, but may have something to do with Salisbury’s death eight days after the ceremony just described, possibly due to a wound incurred during the associated tournament, the Round Table project was put on hold for two years.43 But Edward was too enamoured of chivalric display, and too aware of its value in motivating his soldiers, to forswear its pageantry as he made preparations for For the participation of a substantial and distinguished English contingent at Algeciras, and for evidence that Edward was well informed about the Castilian court, see P. E. Russell, The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford, 1955), pp. 7–9; K. Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant (New York, 1969), pp. 45–6. 40 As also concluded by R. Barber, Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine (New York, 1978), pp. 87–9, and Boulton, Knights, p. 109, who writes in reference to the 1344 Round Table precursor of the Garter that ‘it would be difficult to believe that his decision [to “refound” the Round Table] was not inspired by what he had just heard from his ambassadors about the Castilian order’. 41 Boulton, Knights, pp. 96–117. 42 Ibid., pp.  104–5. Edward’s choice to give Salisbury this prominent role in the proceedings, and Salisbury’s willingness to do so, should give pause to those inclined to give some credence to stories of a break between Edward and William, whether over the former’s alleged rape of the latter’s wife or some lesser form of sexual betrayal, which might in turn be connected to the honi of the motto. Cf. Ingledew’s convincing argument that Jean le Bel took the rape story very seriously and his much less persuasive suggestion that we should also take it seriously. Sir Gawain, pp. 46–52, 66–9, 73–5. 43 Ingledew, Sir Gawain, p.  68, points out that the usual assumption that Salisbury’s death was the result of a tournament wound is not well supported by the Latin of the main source, Adam Murimuth. 39



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the great expedition to France that culminated in the battle of Crécy in 1346. Although the evidence is not conclusive, and a date as late as 1348 is possible, Juliet Vale has argued strongly that it was for that 1346 campaign that Edward first adopted the garter badge and its famous ‘Honi soit qui mal y pense’ motto, which he had emblazoned on a ship’s streamer, a taffeta bed, two jupons, and a cloak, hood, tunic and super-tunic.44 Although only the king himself employed the device in that campaign, it is likely that from the first he envisioned its use as the future insigne for a fraternal band of knights who had won distinction in supporting his military efforts to uphold his rights in France (which was the purpose of the campaign), just as it soon afterwards became.45 Neither the statutes of the Order of the Garter nor any contemporary writer, however, explained the meaning of the honi soit qui mal y pense motto, or made it clear what the pronoun y (‘of it’) referred to.46 Nor did they identify the reason for the adoption of the garter as a badge, either for the campaign or for the Order. Perhaps the symbolism was meant to be restricted ‘insider’s knowledge’: one of the secrets of the Order that the members swore not to reveal. On the other hand, it is possible that the reason that contemporaries failed to record the meanings of the Garter badge and motto is that these were still considered sufficiently obvious not to require explication. It seems to me more likely that, as public symbols, J. Vale, Edward III and Chivalry. Chivalric Society and its Context, 1270–1350 (Woodbridge, 1982), pp. 77–81. Cf. Barber, Triumph of England, pp. 272–4. 45 Boulton, Knights, p. 113. Vale’s alternate hypothesis, that Edward III used the symbol as a purely personal badge for the campaign, then was prompted by the victory at Crécy ‘to make the device he had adopted for the campaign the basis for an order of chivalry’ as ‘a pious act of thanksgiving; a fitting reward for those who had served him outstandingly in battle; but also as a means of enshrining in perpetuity the symbol of his vindicated claim’ is certainly also possible. However, it seems to me that the use of a garter in a specifically round, belt-like form, and with a tail long enough past the buckle to be slipped in a knot (the significance of both of which will be discussed below) do suggest an intent from the beginning to use the symbol in connection with a knightly band of companions. Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, p. 82. 46 The French y in the motto definitely means ‘of it’, but interestingly even in the fourteenth century that point seems not always to have been understood. The author of Wynnere and Wastoure (probably composed between 1351 and 1370) translated the motto as ‘Hethyng haue the hathell [th]at any harme thynkes’, i.e. ‘Scorn have the gentleman that thinks any harm’, apparently a general admonition to altruism and noble-mindedness. Wynnere and Wastoure, in Parlement of the Thre Ages, ed. I. Gollancz (London, 1897), p. 91. Similarly, whoever appended the motto to the manuscript of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight omitted the pronoun and made it ‘Hony Soyt qui mal pence’. Even royal financial accounts sometimes skip the y. Nonetheless, these writers are clearly changing the meaning from what Edward III (who was raised by a French mother and spoke French perfectly well) originally chose and what the Garter knights themselves used. Cf. Ingledew, Gawain, p.  115; Barber, Triumph of England, p.  272; Boulton, Knights, p. 154. 44

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they were intended to convey a message, not to perplex or mystify.47 But in any case, at least some aspects of the symbolic meaning of the device were far from being obscure. The use of cloth of blu (a particular, unusual shade of blue) combined with gold letters – the specific colours of the French royal arms – was a clear hint.48 So too was the choice of the motto’s language. All of King Edward’s other known mottos were in English.49 The Garter, it seems, was given French colours and a French motto because its y pronoun referred to Edward’s pursuit of his claim to the French throne, which he saw as, by ‘divine ordination’, his ‘most clear right’.50 Thus, honi soit qui mal y pense meant essentially ‘shamed be he who thinks ill of the king’s efforts to secure his rights in France’ or ‘…who thinks ill of the Ashmole, Institution, p.  183, considered that ‘all things relating to the Order, were so designed and appointed That every one might plainly perceive, how much these things tended to the maintaining of Amity and Concord’. Cf. Anne Middleton’s suggestion that the insigne is ‘by design unintelligible to anyone who does not already know the anecdote of its establishment’. A. Middleton, ‘William Langland’s “Kynde Name”: Authorial Signature and Social Identity in Late Fourteenth-Century England’, in Literary Practice and Social Change in Britain, 1380–1530, ed. Lee Patterson (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 15–82, at p. 30. 48 As Newton has shown, ‘blu’ (as opposed to azure or ynde) was a term specifically used in wardrobe accounts for Garter items and very little else; the main exceptions, significantly, being a pair of formal robes for the captive Jean II, and, although only sometimes, the post-1340 English royal arms (incorporating the French royal arms). S. M. Newton, Fashion in the Age of the Black Prince: A Study of the Years 1340–65 (Woodbridge, 1980), pp.  41–5; for gold letters (and gold ribbons), ibid., p.  45. This is one reason why Jaeger is wrong to say that the connection between the garter and Edward’s political ambitions in France ‘is at least as questionable as the story of the [lady’s] lost garter’. Ennobling Love, p. 141. 49 Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, pp. 76, 81. Although Dieu et mon droit is traditionally associated with Edward III’s adoption of the French royal arms in 1340, there is no contemporary evidence for this, and no mention of the motto in Edward III’s household accounts. W. M. Ormrod, personal communication. 50 In his proclamation to the French justifying his assumption of the title of King of France in 1340, he noted that God had given him the most clear right to the French throne [dispositione divina … ad nos jure serenissimo devolutum]; that Philip held France ‘against God and right’ [contra Deum et justitiam; in the French version, contre Dieu et droiture]; and that the Flemings had recognised his title ‘having regard to God and our right’ [en regard de Dieu et de nostre droit]. Robert of Avesbury, De Gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi Tertii, ed. E. M. Thompson (London, 1889), p.  309; Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Oeuvres de Froissart, 18, Pièces justificatives (Reprint edn, Osnabrück, 1967), p.  108. For Edward’s other variations on the phrase ‘dieu et mon droit,’ see: Avesbury, Gestis, p.  304; J. Delpit, Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre, 1 (Paris, 1847), p. 67; TNA, SC1/37/135, printed Fœdera, II, ii, p. 1131; Oeuvres de Froissart, 18, p. 302; C. J. Rogers, ‘The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–6), according to MS78 of Corpus Christi College, Oxford’, Journal of Medieval Military History 7 (2009), pp. 168–75, at p. 172 (and cf. p. 170). When Henry VI made the phrase a royal motto, it seems that he was harkening back to the language of Edward III. 47



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justice of his cause’. This was clearly understood by Elias Ashmole, the first real historian of the Order: Whereas King Edward the Third had set on foot a Title to the Kingdom of France, and in right thereof assumed its Arms; he from the Colour of them, caused the Garter of the Order to be made Blue, and the circumscription Gold. And it may, without any straining, be inferr’d from the Motto … that he retorted shame and defiance upon him, that should dare to think ill of so just an enterprise, as he had undertaken for the recovery of his lawful right to that Crown; and that the magnanimity of those Knights, whom he had chosen into this Order was such, as would inable them to maintain that Quarrel, against all who durst think ill of it.51

The Garter motto, then, proclaims defiance to those who oppose Edward’s war in France, and support for the king’s pursuit of his inherited rights there – as represented by his quartering the French royal arms with the English ones, an action of which some had indeed thought ill, and not just in France, where the deed aroused ‘a great deal of scandal and indignation’.52 Even the well-disposed Rochester chronicler wrote that Edward ‘could not salvage his reputation, when by the instigation of the Flemings he had assumed the arms of the king of France, and styled himself king of France in letters sent everywhere, and [yet] had not obtained the kingdom’.53 Pope Benedict XII, for similar reasons, thought Edward’s action was astonishing and that it must have been due to bad and perverse counsel.54 This answers Jaeger’s attempt to break the link between the garter motto and Edward’s claims in France by arguing that ‘the motto makes no sense if it does not deflect the shame of a potentially disgraceful act’, while ‘the English invasion of France had to be seen and represented as a heroic undertaking’.55 Moreover, even some of those who were persuaded by Edward’s strong public-relations effort to accept his argument that he had a right to the French throne did not think well of his expensive and perhaps (given the disparity of strength between France and England) rash or even hopeless pursuit of that right. The Parliament of 1344, the last before the Crécy campaign, did agree to support another major campaign in pursuit of ‘a Ashmole, Institution, p. 184; also see Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, pp. 76–82; and accepted by Collins, Order of the Garter, pp. 11–12, and by Begent and Chesshyre, Most Noble Order, p. 17. 52 Jean de Venette in Chronique Latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 à 1300, avec les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 à 1368, ed. H. Géraud, 2 vols (Paris, 1843), 2, p.  184: non modicum scandalum et indignationem. We should bear in mind that since Edward fully intended to become the sovereign ruler of at least a large portion of France (or preferably all of it), French opinion did matter to him. 53 Historia Roffensis (British Library, London: Cottonian MS, Faustina B V), fol. 88. 54 Eugène Déprez, Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans. La papauté, la France et l’Angleterre (1328–1342) (Paris, 1902), pp. 290–1, 295. 55 Jaeger, Ennobling Love, p. 142. 51

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suitable peace’, but not without taking the opportunity to complain of ‘the great burdens which the lords and commons of England have borne and sustained because of the war’ and how ‘they have been put in great difficulties by the many Aids [taxes] and burdens’ already imposed by the war effort. In essence, the Members of Parliament made it clear that the English population’s support for Edward’s foreign ambitions was almost exhausted (unhappiness with war taxation was even stronger in 1348).56 This point, in combination with the one made in the last paragraph, addresses Ingledew’s argument that the y of the motto is unlikely to be connected to Edward’s claim to the French throne, since ‘support for the claim in England appears literally unanimous’, and since the somewhat defensive defiance of the motto would have been out of place at the time of its adoption by Edward III, when, in Ingledew’s view, the success of the English war effort had ‘still-gathering momentum’.57 Therefore, the adoption of the badge and the motto is not out of place for the Crécy expedition of 1346, which was expressly intended to bring an end to the war by winning a peace that reflected Edward’s hereditary rights in France.58 That in turn meant either winning the French throne itself, or at least acquiring full sovereignty over Aquitaine in return for his releasing his claim to the crown – a compromise he was willing to make for the sake of peace.59

Rotuli Parliamentorum, translated in C. J. Rogers, ed., The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, 1999), pp.  104–5; Barber, Triumph of England, p. 276. 57 Ingledew, Sir Gawain, pp. 116–17. 58 On the Crécy campaign, see C. J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2000); A. Ayton and P. Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005); and M. Livingston and K. DeVries, The Battle of Crécy: A Casebook (Liverpool, 2015). ‘Reflected his rights’ does not necessarily mean gained him the throne: see the following note. 59 Mark Ormrod points out that even though Edward was willing to give up his claim to the French crown in exchange for sovereignty over Aquitaine (and, it should be added, an end to French interference in Scotland), that does not imply any lack of sincerity in his emphasis on the justice of his right to the throne. Ormrod, ‘For Arthur and St. George’, pp.  25–7. As I have emphasised elsewhere, Edward’s diplomatic stance was always that as a lover of peace he was willing to settle for less than his full rights. C. J. Rogers, ‘The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354–1360 Reconsidered’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J. S. Bothwell (York, 2001), pp.  193–213. Expanding on Ormrod’s point, it should be remembered that even in the Anglo-French treaties of 1358–60, which envisioned Edward’s giving up the title of King of France, there was no provision for him to revert to his pre-1340 arms. Edward would likely never have agreed to do so, for that would have cast into question the justice of his war in a way that giving up the crown, in the interests of peace, would not have. 56



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The Badge But what about the garter badge itself? It was from the earliest depictions always portrayed in a particular way, with a buckle and extra length looped over into a knot.60 Ashmole and George Beltz quite rightly recognised the significance of the knot: in the words of the letters of induction issued by the near-contemporary Company of the Holy Spirit of the Right Desire, which also used a knot (of a simple cord) as its symbol, the knot represented ‘the ties which were to bind the companions together in a “moral unity”’.61 This image was powerful and easily understood, so that in addition to the Garter and the Knot, two other early chivalric orders, Amadeus of Savoy’s 1364 Order of the Collar and the fourteenth-century German Society of the Buckle, also used knots in their badges.62 Yet Edward, though using this imagery before these other orders, chose to make it a secondary rather than primary visual element, subordinated to the garter per se. Richard Barber, more recently, argued that the badge represented the belt of knighthood, and he is very likely right that King Edward meant for the cingulum militare to be seen in his new order’s symbol.63 Yet, as Boulton has pointed out, these explanations, while ‘probably correct as far as [they] go’ ‘have not made any suggestion as to why the knot [or belt] should have taken the unusual form of a garter’.64 Boulton sensibly notes that the garter, as a physical object, shared the characteristics that had made the surcoat-band a suitable insigne for the Order of the Band: it was on the one hand familiar and unobjectionable, and on the other hand sufficiently distinctive when worn in the traditional way to serve as a badge of membership in a society of some sort … Edward could conceivably have chosen an armband, a collar, or a belt rather than a garter, but the first two were not traditional elements of male attire, and the last – which would

Boulton, Knights, pp. 154, 156, including a leaden Garter badge of 1350–76. This is surely intentional; the excess length needed to loop the tail around is substantial, and the garter could easily have been shown with the buckle merely completing the circle. 61 The quotation above is Boulton’s description of the symbolism explicitly associated with the knot emblem of the Company of the Holy Spirit of the Right Desire, founded in Naples in 1352–53. Knights, p.  225. This meaning of the Garter’s imagery was also understood by Ashmole and Beltz. Ashmole, Institution, p. 183: ‘the Symbol of Unity and Society’… ‘By this Symbol he design’d to bind the Knights or Fellows of it, severally unto one another, and all of them jointly to Himself, as Soveraign of the Order’. G. F. Beltz, Memorials of the Order of the Garter from its Foundation to the Present Time etc. (London, 1841), xlvii. 62 Boulton, Knights, pp. 259–62, 241, 247, 478–9. 63 Barber, Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine, p. 87. 64 Boulton, Knights, p. 157. 60

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have been most appropriate for symbolic reasons – was still a normal part of civil dress and thus would not have been distinctive.65

Now all this, like the earlier points about the knot and the knightly belt, offers valuable insight, but it is still not complete. Boulton’s conclusion that ‘the garter as such was little more than a clever variant on the band [of the Order of the Band], and had no symbolic meaning of its own’66 is unacceptable, and indeed runs against Boulton’s own statement that ‘Edward must have had some very particular reason for adopting a garter’.67 After all, King Edward was a connoisseur of, in Juliet Vale’s words, the ‘symbolic cultural capital’ and ‘powerful symbolic resonance of chivalric icons’, – and therefore not the sort of person who would pick an emblem for such a major project without careful attention to its symbolic significance.68 Moreover, despite Boulton’s assertion that the garter insigne ‘had no obvious (or easily conceivable) association either with fighting or with his claim to the French throne’,69 there nonetheless is a very straightforward, albeit less than obvious, symbolic association between the badge and the band of knightly supporters willing to fight to uphold Edward’s right to the French crown. As already noted, Edward III doubtless had in mind the Order of the Band when he made plans for his own monarchical order of knights. If the above conclusions concerning the punning symbolism of the banda are correct, Edward would surely have been informed of it – and even if no one explained it to him, he would probably have understood the essence of it, for in French (his maternal tongue) and in its Anglo-Norman dialect, bande (or bende, as the same word was also spelled), around this time, did share two of the meanings that the word also retains in modern English: it meant both a small group of men – more particularly, a troop of soldiers who fought under a single banner – and also a circle of mateBoulton, Knights, pp.  158–9. However, Boulton was incorrect in thinking the male garter was obsolescent in 1348; in fact visible garters continued in use for decades beyond that date. Nonetheless, it is true that a visible garter was not as commonplace and indeed nearly universal as a belt. 66 It should be remembered that Boulton, as noted above, did not include in his analysis of the band’s symbolism the idea of a visual pun evoking banda [group of men], bandear, or ir en bando. 67 Boulton, Knights, pp.  157–9; cf. also C. Mills, History of Chivalry (Philadelphia, 1844), p. 134. This also leaves open the question of why the symbol had to be a traditional item of male attire; that was not true, for example, of the knot or star badges of the next two orders founded. 68 J. Vale, ‘Image and Identity in the Prehistory of the Order of the Garter’, in St George’s Chapel, Windsor, in the Fourteenth Century, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 35–50, and more broadly her Edward III and Chivalry. 69 Boulton, Knights, p. 158. 65



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rial, such as a sash or a garter.70 Moreover, tenir bende de someone meant to be a supporter or partisan of that person. Thus, when the chronicler Jean le Bel, writing around 1360, referred to Edward III as a ‘noble king’ and denied that adjective to Philip VI of France, he worried that his readers might question his historical objectivity: that he might be thought ‘ten[ir] bende et partie’ of Edward III.71 Although some of the founder-knights who first received the Garter from Edward III were Frenchmen most, of course, were not, and by the mid-fourteenth century English noblemen seem generally to have been more comfortable speaking English than Anglo-Norman.72 But for his English subjects, too, the garter, as a ‘band’, could convey a significant punning symbolism – in their native tongue, as well as in the French that most of them (those who counted, anyway) understood perfectly well. A strong hint towards this meaning appears in the work of William of Worcester – loyal servant of a prominent fifteenth-century K. G., and himself something of an authority on chivalric matters, whose own copy of the statutes of the Order is now the oldest extant manuscript.73 A passage in his Boke of Noblesse (1475), the importance of which seems to have been overlooked by later historians of the Order, provides the oldest English explanation of the meaning of the garter insigne. According to Worcester, a member of the Order wore the garter around the calf ‘in token of worship that he being in bataile what fortune fille shuld not voide the feeld, but abide the fortune that God lust sende’.74 For him, 70 Anglo-Norman Dictionary, s.vv. bende, bande; Le Grande Robert de la langue française, 10th edn (Paris, 2001), s.v. bande (a troop of men fighting under a single banner, attested by 1360); and, for Anglo-Norman use before 1325, Rupert Taylor, The Political Prophecy in England (New York, 1911), p. 161 (text); T. M. Smallwood, ‘The Prophecy of the Six Kings’, Speculum 60 (1985), pp. 571–92, at p. 577. 71 Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. J. Viard and E. Déprez, 2 vols (Paris, 1904–5), 2, p. 65. 72 This is a debatable point, but consider that (as already noted above) all of Edward’s known personal mottoes were in English, and that in 1362 English became the normal language of legal proceedings and of the opening address to parliamentary assemblies. W. M. Ormrod, Edward III (New Haven, 2011), p.  455. Edward’s contemporary Henry of Grosmont, duke of Lancaster (born c. 1310), though he wrote his Livre de seyntz medicines (1354) in French, excused himself for possible errors by saying ‘I am English and not much accustomed to [speaking] French’ [n’ai pas moelt hauntee le franceis]. Le Livre de Seyntz Medicines, ed. E. J. Arnould (Oxford, 1940), p. 239. Thomas Usk (d. 1388) wrote that ‘the understandying of Englysshmen wol not stretche to the privy termes in Frenche, what-so-ever we bosten of straunge langage’, and assumed that it was English ‘words …we lerneden of our dames tonge’. Thomas Usk, Testament of Love, ed. G. W. Shawver, based on the edition of John F. Leyerle (Toronto, 1992), p. 45. 73 L. Jefferson, ‘MS Arundel 48 and the Earliest Statutes of the Order of the Garter’, EHR 109 (1994), pp. 365–85. 74 William of Worcester, The Boke of Noblesse. Addressed to King Edward the Fourth

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in other words, the garter represented a sort of reminder of obligation, binding its wearer to the field of battle and preventing him from fleeing. At first this seems rather far-fetched: why use a garter, of all things, as a ‘token’ of an obligation not to flee? But if we dig a little deeper, there is a logic there, and it is likely that Worcester was correctly recording at least part of the truth behind the original symbolism of the order. In Middle English a single word, usually with the spelling bond, though sometimes band, bande or bende, encompassed the meanings of what have now split into two words: band and bond.75 As already suggested above, one half of the essential meaning of a garter is a ‘band’ of material; in Middle English, there is a pun between that meaning of ‘band’ and the other, which includes the senses of ‘an obligation’ (including specifically ‘a feudal obligation, as of a lord to his tenant or of a tenant to his lord’) and ‘a force that unites’, and also the sense of ‘fetters’, including legirons.76 But if Worcester was right about the idea that the garter band symbolised a bond or obligation, it can hardly have been the particular constraint he thought it represented, an obligation never to flee from battle. The earliest copies of the Garter statutes do not include any such provision, in marked contrast to the near-contemporary Order of the Star, making it very unlikely that this was the original intent of the symbolism.77 On on His Invasion of France in 1475, ed. J. Gough Nichols (Edinburgh, 1860; reprint New York: Burt Franklin, 1972), p. 46. The significance of this passage as an explanation of the garter’s symbolic meaning has not, so far as I am aware, been previously noted by modern historians or literary scholars. Ashmole (Institution, p.  183) knew of this explanation of the symbolism of the garter at third hand, but did not know that it derived from an earlier authority than É. Forcadel (misleadingly referred to by Ashmole as Stephanus Frocatulus rather than Forcatulus). Étienne Forcadel, De Gallorum imperio et philosophia, libri septem (Paris, 1580), fol. 505v. Worcester’s idea of the Garter’s symbolism may derive from something he heard during an inquiry into the conduct of his master, Sir John Fastolf, at the Battle of Patay in 1429. After the English vanguard had been defeated, Fastolf led the remaining forces off the field, leading Talbot to accuse him of cowardice, and reportedly causing Bedford to suspend temporarily his membership in the Order. Worcester played a leading role in preparing Fastolf ’s successful defense against the charges. See H. Collins, ‘Sir John Fastolf, John Lord Talbot and the Dispute over Patay: Ambition and Chivalry in the Fifteenth Century’, in War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain, ed. D. Dunn (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 114–40. 75 The pun is fairly clearly used intentionally in Gawain where the ‘lace’ or girdle given to Gawain by the lady is also referred to as a bond (‘bende’), a ‘token’ which he is obligated to wear as long as he lives. Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight, ed. R. Morris (London, 1869), ll. 2505–9; cf. l. 192. 76 See the Middle English Dictionary, s.v. bond, defs. 1a, 3, 6; OED, s.v. bond (sb. 1), defs. 7, 8; s.v. bend (sb. 1, sb. 2). 77 Henry VIII’s 1522 revision of the statutes does add a provision forbidding the members to fly from the battlefield, not found in the earliest text or the Henry V



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the other hand, it is very likely that the garter as a ‘band’ was indeed intended to evoke the idea of the obligations or ‘bonds’ that would bind the members to one another and to their sovereign; as Charles Mills long ago observed in his History of Chivalry, ‘it was quite in the spirit of those days for a band to be regarded as an excellent symbol of the friendly union which ought to exist between the knights companions’.78 The trail we have been following thus far originated in the first part of the definitional meaning of a garter, as a band of material. But of course, not all bands of material are garters; the other half of the essential meaning of the word is that a garter is intended to support or ‘uphold’ stockings.79 In fourteenth-century English, uphold did already have both the literal meaning of (to quote the Oxford English Dictionary) ‘to keep from falling down or sinking’ and also the figurative meaning of ‘to lend strength to’: ‘to support, sustain, maintain by aid or assistance’.80 The same goes for the Anglo-Norman sustenir, which could mean literally ‘to hold up’ or, more broadly, could mean to sustain, help, support, or uphold, including specifically ‘to uphold as legal’.81 Hence, buckling on a garter could symbolize accepting an obligation or covenant to uphold. Putting these two garter-specific meanings with the various elements of allusional symbolism already noted above, we have: ‘a tight-knit [knot, bond] band [bande] of knights [belt] who have taken on an obligation [bond] to support or uphold [garter]’.82 (If the roundness of the garterversion. Before then it was included in the Garter statutes as (unreliably) reported in Tirant lo Blanc (c. 1460, but probably based on knowledge obtained during the author’s visit to England in 1438–39), and in Waurin’s chronicle, with reference to 1469. Jefferson, ‘MS Arundel’, p. 364 n. 2; Martorell, Tirant lo Blanc, p. 124; Jean de Waurin, Recueil des Chroniques, 5 (London, 1891), pp. 577–8; cf. Hugues de Lannoy (d. 1456), Enseignements Paternels, in Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy, voyageur, diplomate et moraliste, edited by C. Potvin and J.-C. Houzeau (Louvain, 1878), pp. 457–8, where Louis de Robesart is said to have refused to flee from a doomed situation ‘pour garder l’onneur de saditte ordre [of the Garter] et aussy la sienne’. 78 Mills, History of Chivalry, p.  134. Note also Ashmole’s observation (seemingly without conscious awareness of the linkage to the Middle English pun involved with the symbol) that the Order was founded to ‘oblige and tie those whom [Edward III] thought fit to make his Associates, in a firm Bond of Friendship and Honour’ (Emphases added). Institution, p. 183. 79 The first definition of ‘garter’ in the Oxford English Dictionary reads: ‘A band worn round the leg, either above or below the knee, to keep the stocking from falling down’. 80 OED, s.v.; both meanings attested before 1344. 81 Anglo-Norman Dictionary, s.v.; both meanings attested before 1344. 82 It may be worth mentioning here, on a different matter, that it is widely agreed that the earls of Huntingdon and Arundel, despite their importance as military commanders in Edward’s wars, were not made founding K.G.s because of their insufficient support for Edward III during the crisis of 1340. Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, pp. 89–91; Collins, Order of the Garter, p. 40.

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symbol was intended also to evoke the Round Tables of King Arthur and of Windsor castle, which is also quite likely given the clear linkages between the Order and the Round Table project of 1344, that would simply reinforce the first three elements of that description.)83 To get all of this does require a bilingual ‘reading’ of the image, but that would not be unheard of; in the Prophecy of John of Bridlington, for example, ‘Windsor’ is rendered ‘Ventis aurum’, from the English ‘winds’ and the French ‘or’.84 Adding to this the import of the Garter motto, we can read the device as representing ‘a tight-knit band of knights bound to upholding Edward’s right to the French royal title and arms, in defiance of those who think ill of it’.85 Conclusion It is true that we cannot be sure that Edward III intended the badge of his new chivalric order to convey all this, but there can be little doubt that the core meanings of ‘band’, ‘bond’, and ‘supporter’ were consciously in his mind when he devised it. To test the probability of a proposed explanation for an observed phenomenon, scientists and statisticians often examine a ‘null hypothesis’. The ‘null hypothesis’ is essentially that ‘the proposed explanation is wrong; there is no cause-effect relationship between the two variables under consideration, and the observed results are instead the result of random chance’. For example, a coin is flipped twenty times in a row and comes up ‘heads’ every time. To test the hypothesis that it is a weighted or two-headed trick coin rather than a standard one, a statistician can calculate the likelihood of the observed outcome assuming that the ‘null hypothesis’ is true: that the coin is a fair one. Since the probability of the observed result with a fair coin is .000095 per cent, the likelihood that the coin is not a fair one is 99.999905 per cent. Similarly, to assess the probability that Edward’s choice of the garter as a symbol was consciously linked to the concepts of ‘band’, ‘bonds/ties’, and ‘support’, we may consider the likelihood of the 83

Le Bel, Chroniques, 2, p. 35; Jean Froissart, Oeuvres, ed. J. M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols (Brussels, 1867–77), 4, pp. 203–6; note also S. Brindle and S. Priestly, ‘Edward III’s Building Campaigns at Windsor and the Employment of Masons, 1346–77’, in St George’s Chapel, Windsor, in the Fourteenth Century, ed. N. Saul (Woodbridge, 2005), pp.  203–24 at pp. 203–6 and J. Munby, ‘Carpentry Works for Edward III at Windsor Castle’, ibid., pp. 225–238 at pp.  227–8. and On the continuing linkage between the Garter and the Round Table in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century minds, see Collins, Order of the Garter, pp. 269–70.

Taylor, Political Prophecy, p. 55. It should be noted that this fits nicely with the inclusion of Edward himself as a member of the Order; he could not very well be a ‘supporter’ of the monarch (i.e. himself ), but he very much felt himself duty-bound to ‘uphold’ his inherited rights.

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‘null hypothesis’ that a symbol chosen randomly, or deliberately selected because of its insignificance and inappropriateness, would just happen to suit so aptly a new chivalric order comprising a band of Edward III’s supporters, bound (in Mark Ormrod’s words) by ‘unity and camaraderie’ in ‘a common bond of service’ to the monarch.86 Although quantification is impossible, that null hypothesis is surely beyond the boundaries of reasonable probability, just as would be the proposition that the choice of blu and gold for the colours of the emblem was coincidental rather than a conscious allusion to the arms of France.87 Similarly, although there is no direct evidence that Edward was influenced in his choice of the Garter insigne by the Castilian banda, the null hypothesis is that by random chance two Western European monarchs both decided, within two decades, to form the first two monarchical orders of chivalry, and each just happened to pick a type of band as a symbol of his order, then gave such importance to the symbol that the order took its popular name from it. The improbability of those two null hypotheses is directly proportional to the probability that the thesis of this essay is correct: that Edward III, adapting and improving on a visual pun already used by Alfonso XI, selected the garter insigne because a garter is in its very essence a band that supports, just as the Order of the Garter formed a band of knights bound to support him as he pursued his rights in France.

Ormrod, Reign of Edward III, p. 101. See also Ashmole, quoted n. 58 above. Though that latter hypothesis has been advanced, with the idea the garter’s blue is merely symbolic of loyalty in general. S. Crane, ‘Knights in Disguise: Identity and Incognito in Fourteenth-century Chivalry’, in The Stranger in Medieval Society, ed. F. R. P. Akehurst and S. Cain Van D’Elden (Minneapolis, 1997), p.  79, n. 45; cf. Boulton, Knights, p. 161; Newton, Fashion, pp. 42–3.

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Sir Robert Knolles’ Expedition to France * in 1370: New Perspectives Gary P. Baker

Sir Robert Knolles’ chevauchée through northern France between August and December 1370 is arguably the most fascinating English expedition of the fourteenth century.1 Outwardly it displayed all the hallmarks of a structurally uniform English army typical of the period: fully-mounted mixed retinues of roughly equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers, with their pay and other terms of service likely to have been stipulated by contracts of indenture.2 Yet in other respects the army was entirely unconventional. The pay, terms of service under which the men were to serve, and the senior command structure were novel. It was also the last campaign in the fourteenth century for which charters of pardon for military service were issued in significant numbers and, unconventionally, they were issued prior to the campaign – for service to be rendered – rather than after it. It was * This article derives from my Ph.D. thesis supervised by Andrew Ayton: G. P. Baker,

‘The English Way of War, 1360–99’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 2012), pp. 149–78. 1 Several chroniclers mention the campaign. The main accounts are: The Anonimalle chronicle, 1333–1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), pp.  63–5; Cabaret d’Orville, J. La Chronique de Bon Duc Loys de Bourbon, ed. A. M. Chazaud (Paris, 1876), pp.  24–9; Chronique Normande du XIVe Siècle ed. A. and E. Molinier (Paris, 1882), pp.  195–9, 349–52; Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois: 1327–1393, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1862), pp. 207–8; J. Cuvelier, Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin, vol. 2, ed. E. Charrière (Paris, 1839), pp.  121–3, lines 17,751–18,506; Thomas Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, vol. 1, A. D. 1272–1381 (London, 1863), pp.  309–11; Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Tome Deuxième; Chronique des Règnes de Jean II et de Charles V, ed. R. Delachenal (Paris, 1916), pp. 143–9. Chronographia Regum Francorum, vol. 2 (1328–1380), ed. H. Moranville (Paris, 1893), pp. 342–4; Chroniques de Jean Froissart, vol. 8 (1370–77), ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1888), pp. 1–5. 2 No indentures for the campaign have survived, but the army was almost certainly recruited in this way.

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also the only English force of the entire period which came apart at the seams in the field, fragmenting into four divisions due to bickering between its commanders and their subordinates, with disastrous consequences. The newly appointed French Constable, Bertrand du Guesclin, confronted and defeated two of the four divisions in pitched battle, temporarily reversing the French King Charles V’s Fabian strategy and dealing a huge military, and perhaps psychological, blow to the English. To fully comprehend why the failure of this army was so important for future English martial organisation, and contributed to an overhaul of English war strategy, it is necessary to examine the army’s organisational and structural framework, its command hierarchy, and the bonds between its personnel, to see how these differed, if at all, from other armies of the period, and what bearing, if any, these factors had on why it imploded so spectacularly. Preparations for War Since the renewal of Anglo-French hostilities in 1369, the English had largely been on the back foot. Charles V’s forces had begun recapturing lands in south-western France that had been ceded to Edward III by the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. Two English armies sent to France in 1369 had alleviated some of the pressure but achieved little else.3 At a Great Council in London in February 1370, it was decided to launch another expedition to France in the summer of four thousand men, part of a joint enterprise with Charles II of Évreux, king of Navarre.4 Though Charles was sovereign of the small kingdom of Navarre that straddled the western passes across the Pyrenees, he was also a French Prince of the Blood who, through his parents, had See, K. Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, 1: The Great Companies (Oxford, 2001), pp.  283–9; J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War III: Divided Houses (London, 2009), pp. 18–60; J. W. Sherborne, ‘John of Gaunt, Edward III’s Retinue and the Campaign of 1369’, in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 77–97. 4 The author of the Anonimalle chronicle, p. 62, describes the meeting as a ‘parlement’ but as no formal summons was issued it does not merit the description. It also states that there were to be ‘deux m[ille] gentz darmes et vi m[ille] darchiers’. This is likely a copy error given the numbers specified in Knolles’ later indenture: TNA E  101/68/4 no. 90. Early plans in 1370 for Edward III to launch an invasion via the Low Countries were abandoned after negotiations begun with the King of Navarre: W. M. Ormrod, Edward III (New Haven, 2012), p. 507. Some ships mustered for this purpose were likely diverted to transport the armies which would take the place of the royal expedition: Issue Roll of Thomas de Brantingham, Bishop of Exeter, Lord High Treasurer of England in the 44th Year of King Edward III. A. D. 1370, trans. F. Devon (London, 1835), pp. 458, 494 (hereafter Brantingham); TNA, E 101/30/34; E 101/30/29, mm. 1–4, 7; E 101/30/37; TNA, E 364/3, m. 6d; Fœdera, III, ii (London, 1825), pp. 889–90. 3



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inherited claims to substantial lands in northern France, particularly in Normandy. However, through both the machinations of the French Crown, and his own political scheming in the 1350s when he had played the English and French off against each other to further his own ends, Charles had lost all his French possessions barring the Cotentin Peninsula in the northern tip of Normandy and the city of Évreux.5 The English army was to land at La Hogue on the Cotentin (as Edward III had done in 1346), rendezvous with Charles’ forces and English routiers in the region, and invade France. At the same time two much smaller forces – three hundred men recruited by agents of the Black Prince and the earl of Pembroke, and five hundred led by Sir Walter Hewitt – were to sail to Gascony to bolster the defences in Aquitaine.6 Both Charles II and Edward III sought to benefit from an alliance. For Charles, it offered the dual prospects of regaining his former territories from the French crown, and ending the depredations of the English-held garrison at Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in the heart of the Cotentin. The garrison’s commanders, John Cocking and Roger Hilton, from December 1369, had raided throughout the peninsula extracting protection money from its inhabitants. ‘The effect was to divert substantially the whole taxable capacity of Charles’ … [northern] domains into the pockets of the English’.7 For Edward III an alliance created another safe point of entry into northern France alongside Calais, and, by invading the far richer, and politically more sensitive regions of northern France (due to their proximity to the centre of French government) the campaign would serve to draw Valois resources away from English-held territory in the south-west.8 Edward, no doubt, also hoped this new campaign would help to seize the war’s initiative and momentum back from the French, which the two expeditions the previous year had largely failed to achieve. But there was also a far more important financial motive for the English king. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1337 the English government had been perennially short of cash to fund the war; ever its Achilles heel. The decade of relative peace from 1360 to 1369, and the ransoms and indemnity payments from France resulting from the Treaty of Brétigny, had somewhat obscured this fact. Edward III had even built up a budget surplus from ransoms paid by French prisoners during the early 1360s. But this had all been spent on the opening year of the conflict after 1369, as well as on other costs associated with the war and one-off expenses during the 1360s, J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War II: Trial By Fire (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 103–11, 124–32; Sumption, Divided, pp. 64–6. 6 Sumption, Divided, p.  69. Hewitt’s men would be transported to France by a fleet of thirty-five ships costing £357 12s 2d: TNA, E 101/30/29, mm. 4–5. 7 Sumption, Divided, p. 66. 8 Fowler, Mercenaries, p. 292. 5

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like setting up the Black Prince’s administration in Aquitaine. The Crown’s prerogative to collect customs duties on English overseas trade, and the income from its demesne lands, brought in some revenue, but both were far from sufficient. The only conceivable way of funding the war in the shortterm was to ask parliament to grant a subsidy, but the timing could hardly have been worse. The country was just recovering from a major outbreak of plague which had struck early in 1369, and torrential rains had seen a poor harvest and a rise in food prices.9 Under the circumstances Edward was reluctant to ask parliament for funds, and after a near-decade of peace the country had become unaccustomed to funding a war effort; the last such grant was in 1357.10 Whilst the king could have led an army in person, with the royal presence coercing a reluctant parliament into granting a subsidy, such campaigns were hugely expensive, as were those led by one of his adult sons. Moreover – though he again planned to lead his forces in 1372 – at nearly sixty years old in 1370, Edward III was well past his prime. This reality, and the fiscal circumstances, helps explain why the expedition of 1370 was something of a novel financial experiment. Knolles sealed his indenture with the Crown on 20 June 1370, agreeing to lead a force of two thousand men-at-arms and two thousand archers for two years.11 He was to recruit the army in any part of England except Northumberland and Westmorland (areas of manpower reserved for defence against the Scots), and the cost of shipping the army to France was to be met by the government. This was all relatively customary, but the way Knolles and his men were to be paid was remarkable. Rather than receiving a daily wage, Knolles was to receive a flat fee of 1,000 marks (£666 13s 4d).12 More importantly, the king agreed to pay the men’s wages at double the customary rates (and double regard for the men-at-arms), but only for the first quarter year (thirteen weeks) of the campaign or, if it were longer, from the point they left their homes until their arrival in France. Thereafter they were to live off the land and from booty taken during the expedition. ‘No precedent for contractual service without pay before 1369 is known’ and the experiment was only tried again once more, and that on a limited basis, in 1375.13 Knolles’ appointment as commander was unprecedented: the first time that command of a major expedition had been given to a man below the rank of an earl. At about fifty years old and with a profitable career as a Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, p. 309. W. M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III (Stroud, 2000), pp. 194; 189–94 for detailed financial tables. 11 TNA, E 101/68/4, no. 90. 12 Anonimalle, p. 63, says 2,000 marks, and lands in England worth £747 annually. 13 J. W. Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369– 1380’, in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 1–28, at p. 7. 9

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routier captain on the continent in the 1350s and 1360s, he certainly did not lack military experience.14 But in a society where rank and status were central to authority, and positions of high command limited to the aristocracy, Edward III’s decision to appoint a member of the gentry (a parvenu at that) as commander of such a large force undoubtedly shocked contemporaries. This fact was not lost upon Knolles or the king. A week prior to sealing his indenture, on 13 June, Knolles had agreed, with the acquiescence of the king, to share the command of the army with three other men: Thomas, Lord Grandison; Sir Alan Buxhull (or Buxhill); and Sir John Bourchier. The four men agreed to share the profits of the expedition based upon the size of their retinues, keep the army together in the field, and make all decisions collectively: prophetic if futile clauses, given how events were to unfold.15 Accordingly, on 1 July, all four men were appointed as king’s lieutenants in France.16 Knolles’ co-commanders were closely associated with the person of the king or the royal household. Buxhull, son of Lord Buxhull of Sussex, had been one of Edward III’s chamber knights from at least 1358, Constable of the Tower since 1366, and was the current under-chamberlain of the royal household. Though he had fought in France before, he appears to have been an infrequent campaigner who served exclusively on large expeditions – what Philippe de Mézières would later describe as a ‘war of the host’ soldier rather than a ‘war on the frontier’ soldier like Knolles and other routiers, who spent the majority of their time in the saddle, undertaking day-to-day military activities like raiding and skirmishing.17 Bourchier, in his early forties and slightly younger than Buxhull, was a far more experienced soldier. His careerin-arms – per the testimony he gave before the Court of Chivalry during the Scrope–Grosvenor dispute – probably began at the siege of Calais during 1346–47, and from then until his death in May 1400 he spent a large amount of his time fighting as far afield as Castile, France, the Low Countries, and even on ‘crusade’ in Lithuania. He had most recently fought at Nájera in 1367. Of the co-commanders of the 1370 expedition, Bourchier may have been one with whom Knolles had had previous dealings: both fought during the Breton civil war and were present at the peace negotiations in November

M. Jones, ‘Knolles, Sir Robert (d. 1407)’, ODNB, online edn. (2009). BL, Cotton MS Caligula D. III fol. 115; Fœdera, III, ii, p. 897. 16 Fœdera, III, ii, pp. 894–5. 17 Philippe de Mézières, Le Songe du Vieil Pélerin, 2, ed. G. W. Coopland (Cambridge, 1969), p.  403. Buxhull’s service in France in 1355 and 1369 are his only known campaigns prior to 1370. It is possible, given that he was in his mid-to-late forties in 1370, that he had campaigned earlier in the war but this remains uncertain. On his career, see C. Paine, ‘Buxhull, Sir Alan (1323?–1381)’, ODNB, online edn. (2008). G. F. Beltz, Memorials of the Order of the Garter from its Foundation to the Present Time etc. (London, 1841), pp. 188–92. 14 15

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1363.18 Lord Grandison of Kent was the youngest, and least experienced, of the four commanders, aged thirty-one in 1370. His first known martial venture had been under John of Gaunt the previous year, the same year he was appointed a Knight of the Garter.19 This was an honour that would subsequently be bestowed on both Buxhull and Bourchier, again highlighting the proximity of all these men to the king.20 It is the household connections that explain the real reason behind the joint appointments to command. Knolles was one of the most experienced routiers in England in 1370, undoubtedly capable of leading men, and with the skillset of an experienced freebooter that was required for a campaign of this nature. What he did not possess, however, in an age when birth and lineage were more important than ability, was the social gravitas necessary for senior command in the eyes of his contemporaries. Buxhull, Bourchier, and Grandison all provided the veneer of social respectability, but even they were not of the standing which one would expect for an expedition of this size. Many leading members of the nobility still would not serve under the command of a man like Knolles whom they deemed a social inferior, as reflected by the status of many of the captains who led retinues on the expedition (see below). Whether Knolles had a say in their appointment is unclear, and we can only speculate as to their motives for accepting command. Few men went to war because of the expectation that wages would significantly enrich them, and a campaign of two years’ duration where wages were only guaranteed for thirteen weeks – even at double rates – represented a financial gamble. Bourchier, given the frequency of his previous and subsequent martial exploits, seems to have been of a bellicose temperament and probably relished another opportunity to fight. Grandison, though a member of the peerage, having adopted his title on the death of his uncle in 1369, had only one campaign under his belt. It is likely that he wanted to prove himself in the eyes of his peers, and his youth and inexperience meant that he had the most to gain of any of the army’s leaders. Buxhull’s service is hardest to explain; his position within the household meant he had the most to lose were the campaign to prove unsuccessful. He was certainly an ambitious man, for he would later become one of ‘the most conspicuous manipulators of royal patronage’ around Edward III in the king’s final years.21 He may have seen the campaign as an opportunity to enhance his reputation in royal eyes, but the fact he was granted a £100 ‘gift’ on 17 July, ‘for his M. Jones, ‘The Fortunes of War: The Military Career of John, Second Lord Bourchier (d. 1400)’, Essex Archaeology and History 26 (1995), pp. 145–61; Beltz, Memorials, pp. 343–5. 19 Complete Peerage, 4, p. 75. Beltz, Memorials, pp. clii, 176–8, suggests that his elevation may have owed to ‘some proof of valour’ on the campaign. 20 Buxhull KG (1372); Bourchier KG (1392). Beltz, Memorials, pp. clii, cliv. 21 Ormrod, Edward III, p. 535. 18



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reward, going in the King’s service in the retinue of Robert Knolles’, could equally suggest he was a less than enthusiastic participant.22 Preparations for the expedition had begun a month before Knolles had sealed his indenture. On 15 May, messengers were dispatched throughout the realm to proclaim that all those who wished to join the army should equip themselves and hasten to Southampton, and over the next few days household officials were sent to requisition ships from the mouth of the Thames as far north as Berwick-upon-Tweed. On 31 May, John Salman, merchant, received £66 13s 4d to hire ships in Holland and Zealand, and Walter de Henley, king’s sergeant-at-arms, was sent to Southampton and thence onto Devon and Cornwall to requisition more ships.23 A month later, on 17 June, another of the king’s sergeants-at-arms was sent to raise ships from the Thames to the Medway, and similar orders were issued over the next few days, including a first payment for mariners’ wages. Much of this money for requisitions and wages was, however, returned, as the departure of the army was delayed, and the embarkation point changed, on 26 June, from Southampton to Winchelsea and Rye.24 There were two reasons for this delay and change of destination. The first was that events in France quickly overtook English preparations. At the time of the council in February, Aquitaine was thought to be in a state of reasonable defence, hence why only eight hundred men were initially earmarked for the duchy. But news soon began filtering across the Channel that shattered the government’s illusions of the situation. Two of the duchy’s staunchest military leaders – Sir John Chandos, seneschal of Poitou, and Sir James Audley – both founding knights of the Order of the Garter, long-time companions-in-arms of both Edward III and the Black Prince, and two of the most celebrated knights of their age, had died in late 1369. The Black Prince, who had never recovered from the mystery illness he had contracted whilst on campaign in Iberia in 1367, was now so ill that he was being carried on a litter and was in no fit state to offer effective military leadership. His younger brother Edmund of Langley, earl of Cambridge, and John Hastings, earl of Pembroke, upon whom the responsibility fell, were no soldiers.25 By the end of the year the English had effectively lost control of Périgord and Quercy. Moreover, in July 1370, a fleet of twenty-four French ships burned down the village of Gosport near Plymouth. This attack, and Brantingham, p. 203. Alternatively, this money might account for Buxhull’s ‘missing’ retinue on the campaign documentation, discussed below. 23 Brantingham, pp.  175, 210. TNA, E 101/30/8, m. 1, for Henley’s expenses related to this expedition and others (1369–74). 24 These orders were repeated on 9 July: Brantingham, pp. 180–1, 191–2. 25 Froissart described Cambridge as ‘indolent, guileless and peaceable’: A. Tuck, ‘Edmund, first duke of York (1341–1402)’, ODNB, online edn. (2008); R. I. Jack, ‘Hastings, John, thirteenth earl of Pembroke (1347–1375)’, ODNB, online edn. (2008). 22

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further ‘pinprick raids on undefended settlements’ which continued on-andoff until November, were hardly serious; the French were unable to thwart the assembly of English shipping in the Channel throughout the year, nor could they prevent the voyages to and from England of the King of Navarre; the English still maintained an overwhelming advantage at sea.26 Nevertheless, preventing these French vessels from interfering with English shipping certainly kept busy the two English fleets which the government kept in the Channel between January and October.27 The government’s response to the deteriorating situation in Aquitaine – a decision on 18 April to send John of Gaunt to France with an additional eight hundred men, doubling the force earmarked to go under Hewitt at the council in February – appears to be a somewhat token gesture, but little else could be done in such a short space of time.28 The situation across the Channel was developing rapidly and the government could not afford, in both time and money, to spend months arranging to send a large army. No muster roll survives for Gaunt’s force, and no study has yet analysed the names of those taking out letters of protection and attorney who intended to join him, but the speed with which the force was assembled and then left England in July (along with the lack of muster documentation) would suggest that most men accompanying the duke were his own indentured retainers, who could be assembled quickly.29 It seems almost certain that these overlapping campaign preparations delayed the departure of Knolles’ army, but far more important was the second, and main, cause for the delay: the ever-slippery Charles of Navarre. Charles, aware of Edward III’s plans shortly after the council in February, was simultaneously negotiating with both the English and French governments, in the latter case to have his territorial claims in northern France recognised. By May, despite several attempts to receive a concrete answer about the viability of his military planning and Charles’ acquiescence of the scheme, Edward III decided to invite the recalcitrant Navarrese king to England to ‘seal their alliance more quickly and with less contention in person than by intermediaries’.30 After further delays by Charles to gain assurances that Edward would also discuss the status of the garrison of Saint-Sauveur, he arrived in England on 21 July, transported by twenty-two of Edward III’s royal vessels, and one Flemish vessel, all flying standards bearing the arms of England and the flag of St George, manned by hundreds of men-at-arms, archers, and mariners, as befitted a royal visit, at great expense to the English Sumption, Divided, p. 126. TNA, E 101/396/13, n. 6; Brantingham, p. 451; E 364/4, m. 4d; E 101/30/21; 29; 36. 28 Brantingham, p.  99; Sumption, Divided, p.  884 n. 13. The fleet taking Gaunt comprised seventy-six ships at a cost of £1440 17s 7d: TNA, E 101/30/29, mm. 5–7. 29 TNA, C 61/83, mm. 2–4, 9; C 76/53, m. 21. 30 Sumption, Divided, p. 72 for quote. 26 27



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king.31 The meeting between the two monarchs took place at Clarendon Palace, Wiltshire, on 1 August. No formal record of the meeting survives – perhaps none was ever created to ensure secrecy – but the outcome of their negotiations must have angered and frustrated Edward III. Charles was willing to consider an English alliance, but not ready to do so publicly, nor would he allow an English army to land in the Cotentin uncontested; doing so would sever all ties he had to Charles V, removing any chance of negotiating a diplomatic resolution to his territorial dispute with the French king. Thus, nothing of any real benefit was gained from the negotiations. Indeed Edward, having dealt with the underhand king of Navarre in the past, had already pre-empted the fruitless negotiations, as orders had been sent in June, before Charles even arrived in England, to change the embarkation point of the army from Southampton to Rye and Winchelsea, indicating his decision to send the army to Calais and not Normandy.32 By mid-July preparations were in the final stages.33 On 17 July 5000 marks (£3,333 6s 8d) were sent by boat from Westminster to the Tower of London for the payment of Knolles and his men, and the following day William, Lord Latimer, steward of the king’s household, John, Lord Neville, Sir Henry Lescrope, Sir Ralph de Ferrers, and several royal officials were despatched from the capital to Winchelsea and Rye to superintend the muster and review of Knolles and his men and oversee other, final preparations.34 On 19 July, John de Thorp, one of the king’s clerks, received money to pay the wages of the army, the ships and mariners of the transport fleet, and the armed vessels which would protect it on its journey to and from France.35 The fragmented and piecemeal process of requisition of ships and payment of seamen’s wages makes it difficult to calculate the exact size of Knolles’ transport fleet. The issue roll for the year shows that whilst John de Thorp was the fleet’s principal paymaster, no less than thirteen men (including Thorp) performed a similar function, each man responsible for paying ships requisitioned in various ports and stretches of the coast, encompassing the entirety of the south and east coasts of England.36 Only three particulars TNA, E 101/30/13, mm. 1r-3v; E  101/29/39, mm. 2–5. For repairs and upgrades to these ships: E 101/30/15, mm. 2–4; victuals/stores: E 101/30/17. 32 Sumption, Divided, pp. 71–4. 33 For preparations and expenses of the campaign: Brantingham, pp. 126, 135–7, 149–50, 160, 164, 168, 175, 191, 193, 196, 198–9, 204–7, 211, 220. 34 Neville, one of the king’s admirals, received £48 for his service: TNA, E  101/30/22. Lescrope’s expenses: E 101/31/1. 35 Thorp cumulatively received £10,000: Brantingham, pp.  150, 206. Hugh Fastolf, leading a flotilla of twenty-six ships, was part of this armed escort, TNA, E 101/30/28. 36 These were all royal officials barring the merchant John de Salman. Jurisdictions: Salman (foreign vessels from Holland and Zeeland); Walter de Henley (Hampshire, Devon, and Cornwall); John Legg (Cinque Ports); Thomas Durant and Adam Hertyngdon (from the Thames to Romney); William Beaufey (Newcastle, Hull, Grimsby), 31

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of accounts for these individuals relating to this campaign have survived – those of John Legg; Bernard de St John and John Cok; and Robert Woubourne – cumulatively accounting for eighty-four ships.37 A few more vessels can be added to this from advances of wages provided to a handful of shipmasters recorded on the issue roll, but we are a long way from anything like a full payroll.38 From work undertaken into other English transport fleets from 1338 to 1359 it can be estimated that Knolles’ fleet comprised about 250 ships.39 The fact that the Crown was able to assemble somewhere in the region of 450 to 500 ships for various naval operations in the year (accounting for cross-over between the various fleets), virtually all of which came from the English merchant marine – an undertaking which would have taxed the maritime resources of any medieval polity – strongly counters the notion that the English merchant fleet had collapsed by 1370.40 Indeed new research is revealing that it was numerically robust.41 The costs of military operations in 1370 – both on land and sea, as well as the maintenance of garrisons – were astronomical. Sir Walter Hewitt’s men and those recruited by the Black Prince’s agents – all destined for service in Aquitaine at the council in February – and the shipping costs for these forces amounted to at least £10,656 2s 10d, over and above which the earl of Pembroke received £2500 for his expenses and as a reward for remaining in France with sixty men-at-arms and eighty archers. The initial wage cost of the forces under the duke of Lancaster came to £8,387 12s, not including the cost of the transport fleet at £1536 19s 11d. In all, his expedition probRobert de Woubourne (from Lyme Regis to Seaford); Bernard de St John and John Cok (Guernsey); Thomas Wetwang and Richard de Imworth (Boston, King’s Lynn, Great Yarmouth, Ipswich); Walter Frost (Hull, Newcastle); John de Thorp (main paymaster): Brantingham, pp. 149, 168, 243–50, 259–71, 277. 37 John Legg: TNA, E  101/30/24; Bernard de St John and John Cok: E  101/30/27; Robert Woubourne: E  101/30/30. A roll of the expenses of Walter de Henley survives which includes £10 for arresting ships in Southampton (i.e. Hampshire), Devon, and Cornwall, but contains no ship numbers: E 101/30/8 m.1. 38 Brantingham, pp.  250, 261, 263–4, though some of these ships were likely bringing victuals to port and were probably not involved in transportation, ibid., pp.  245–7, 249–50. 39 C. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 114–55. 40 Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, p. 21, on the cross-over. 41 For belief in the collapse; Sumption, Divided, pp.  131–4. For an overview of the counter-argument, see C. Lambert, ‘Henry V and the Crossing to France: Reconstructing Naval Operations for the Agincourt Campaign, 1415’, JMH 43 (2017), pp. 27–31. See also A. Ayton, G. P. Baker, and C. Lambert, Ships and Seamen: England’s Merchant Fleet and Maritime Communities from the Late Middle Ages to the Age of Drake, 1300–1580 (forthcoming); A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare: Strategy, Organisation and Manpower’, in The Hundred Years War: Problems in Focus Revisited, ed. A. Curry (forthcoming).



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ably cost the Crown the best part of £35,000 to £40,000 by the time he arrived back in England in October 1371, expense not budgeted for early in 1370. The costs of the various delegations to the King of Navarre at Cherbourg, the fleet which transported him to-and-from England, the ships that protected that fleet, and the retinues of the men appointed to accompany him on his royal visit amounted to at least £648 1s 1d. Other naval expenses were also heavy: £4771 5s 4d was issued for the wages and regard of men aboard forty-four ships (thirty-five of which were royal vessels) patrolling the Channel between 23 January and 30 September, and this is likely to be a minimum figure. Robert de Ashton and Nicholas Tamworth received £775 6s 8d for the wages of their fleets in February. Guy Brian, one of the king’s admirals, received £5474 17s 6d to keep the seas in February and late September. Even the North Sea required attention: Walter Frost of Hull received £333 7s 10d, for the wages of himself, soldiers, and seamen, aboard eight ships ‘as well to resist divers French and Danish enemies as to intercept the messenger of the King of France, being in Scotland’. These initial expenses alone amounted to some £45,000 to £50,000, not taking into account Knolles’ army, the ordinary expenses of the Crown like the wages of the king’s officials, gifts, annuities, and the repayment of loans. In particular, the maintenance of garrisons and the wages for the men stationed within them were a considerable expense. The biggest of these was Calais where £5,321 5s 8d was spent, including £66 13s 4d ‘for making a certain bastion at Graylyngwatre’. Other fortresses, though not as expensive to maintain, nevertheless drained the Crown’s resources, like the £637 spent on the wages of fifty men in Castle Cornet and the tower of Beauregard, Guernsey, and the £1148 10s 8d spent garrisoning Southampton, Portsmouth, and the Isle of Wight. In all these fortresses cost the crown at least £8,500. Adding the costs of Knolles’ force – about £35,000 for the army and a further £5,000 approximately for the transport fleet – means that a minimum, conservative estimate of military expenditure for 1370 amounts to perhaps about £90,000 to £100,000.42 The expenses of the king’s household and the ordinary overheads of government amounted to about £55,000, and the Crown’s average Knolles’ army: TNA, E 403/441, m. 5 (£34,864 12s). Shipping: Brantingham, pp. 149, 168, 243–50, 259–71, 277. Gaunt: Brantingham, pp.  99, 140, 157, 165, 274, 368, 376, 407–8; E 364/5, m. 5d. Hewitt and the Black Prince: Brantingham: pp. 119–20, 130, 134, 139, 141–2, 273, 411, 445–6, 452, 459, 482. The earl of Pembroke: Brantingham: p. 406. King of Navarre’s delegation: Brantingham: pp.  183, 187, 253, 277. Naval expenses of English admirals: Brantingham, pp. 258, 272, 396, 451–2, TNA E 101/30/18; E 101/30/21; E  364/4, m. 3r. Royal ships: Brantingham, pp.  2, 230, 265–6, 276; TNA E  101/29/39, mm. 2–5. At least nine of these ships were also involved in transporting the King of Navarre to and from England. The issue roll lists payments for various shipping totalling a further c. £1,360. Garrisons: Brantingham (Southampton, Portsmouth, Isle of Wight), pp.  229–32, 255–6, 367, 376; (Cornet/Beauregard), 138; (Calais), 84–6, 117, 184, 233–4, 438–9; (other fortresses), 5, 188–9, 243, 281–2, 295, 344, 372, 399.

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annual income was about £80,000–£100,000; thus, there was a budget deficit of some £50,000, seriously challenging the liquidity of the government.43 A series of three clerical tenths granted to the king in January 1370 to be paid over three years and estimated at £18,000 per annum trickled in at more like £15,000.44 In the absence of a parliamentary subsidy the government was forced to borrow ‘magnus summas pecuniae’ from its leading subjects, including Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, who lent the king £20,000; this was just under half of the £45,800 the Crown borrowed in the year.45 These huge costs, and the efforts taken to meet them, highlight why Knolles’ army was envisaged as a financial experiment and why other military planning for the year was on a relatively limited scale; the government was living from hand-to-mouth. Knolles’ army Reconstructing a medieval army is a challenging task, with the requisite documentation, if it survives at all, often scattered throughout several record series and fraught with interpretative problems. Knolles’ force is no exception. There is no complete, surviving vadia guerre account (the main type of document which can provide an army’s rudimentary structure), and even if one were extant Andrew Ayton has warned about taking the figures these documents provide at face value.46 Identifying the rank-and-file of the army is also problematic as there are no surviving muster rolls for any of the army’s retinues. However, whilst the absence of certain classes of document is unfortunate, that which does survive for this army is in many ways more intriguing. Average customs revenues between 1365 and 1370 were c. £65,000; 1370 was a bad year and revenues were only c. £49,000: Ormrod, Reign of Edward III, p. 192, table 4; W. M. Ormrod, ‘Gross Revenues from the Customs and Subsidies on Overseas Trade, 1276–1485’: http://www.esfdb.org/table.aspx?resourceid=11612, accessed 14/06/2017. Demesne and prerogative: W. M. Ormrod, ‘The Western European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp.  123–60, at p.  147, fig. 23. Calais staple: G. Holmes, The Good Parliament (Oxford, 1975), pp.  79–83, 110–11. Overheads: G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975), p. 487. 44 TNA, E 179/67/11; E 359/17, rot. 1; E 359/75, rots. 9–9d. CCR, 1369–74, p. 111; CFR, 1369–74, p. 73; Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III, p. 190. 45 Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, 1, p.  309; Brantingham, pp.  111, 118, 126, 134, 138, 153, 166, 173, 186, 204, 207, 217–19, 223–4, 251–2, 256. Arundel had financed military campaigns in return for political capital since the 1330s. Sumption, Divided, pp. 70–1. Total borrowing: ‘English Exchequer New Loans, 1350–77’: http://www.esfdb.org/Table. aspx?resourceid=11399, accessed 20/06/2017. 46 A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 148–55. 43



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The document from which a rudimentary army structure can be gleaned is what James Sherborne called ‘an incomplete retinue list’.47 The document in question, TNA, E 101/30/25, is in fact more complicated. It comprises three membranes stitched together at the top in the Exchequer style. On each of the first two membranes – both of which are undated – there is a list of captains’ names with the numerical size of their contingents, and monies they received (possibly prests) under the heading (in translation) ‘Names of the men-at-arms and archers present in the company of Sir Robert Knolles’.48 Both lists are near identical, but there are subtle differences between the two. Table 8.1: E101/30/25 mm.1 and 2: Lists of captains, retinue sizes, and monies received.49

Captain Name Robert Knolles Thomas Grandison John Minsterworth

Rank Knight Baron Knight

Matthew Redemane Edmund Dummer

Esquire Knight

William Bussy

Knight

Gilbert Giffard

Knight

Thomas Baunfeld

Knight

John Aysterby

Knight

William Lucy*

Knight

William Riburgh David Merton John de Louthre

Esquire Esquire Esquire

Men-at-Arms 300 100 200 (10 knights) 150 20 (6 knights) 10 (1 knight) 30

Archers 300 100 300

Money received £666 13s 4d £600 £2,000

150 20

£1500 £240

10

£178 18s 8d

30

20 (1 knight) 10 (1 knight) 2 (m1) 0 (m2) 25 10 4

20

£100 (m1); £250 (m.2) £220

10

£178 18s 8d

2 (m1) 0 (m2) 50 10 4

£333 6s 8d £67 18s 8d

Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues’, p. 7. A. E. Prince, ‘The Payment of Army Wages in Edward III’s Reign’, Speculum 19 (1944), pp. 137–60, at p. 158, mistakenly described it as ‘a statement of his [Knolles’] receipts and expenses’. 48 Nomina hominum ad arma et saggitariorum profecturorum in comitiva domini Roberti Knolles, militis. 49 The order the captains appear is retained. Where a man’s title only is given in the document his full name has been provided here. Some payments were listed in two or more instalments; the cumulative figure is provided. 47

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Captain Name John Gourneye Richard atte See Nicholas de Skelton Peter Ughtred John Avenele Thomas Ughtred Robert Plumpton Richard Fyton John Malet Thomas Coun

Rank Knight Esquire Esquire Esquire Knight Knight Knight Knight Knight Knight

Thomas Tryvet† Richard Sondes Piers Strange William la Zouche John de Lisle

Knight Esquire Esquire Baron Knight

Walter FitzWalter Thomas Morieux Thomas Symond

Baron Knight Knight

John Wauton‡

Esquire

Totals

Men-at-Arms 3 4 4 6 15 30 30 30 30 60 (m1) 80 (m2) 0 10 10 140 40 (m1) 60 (m2) 40 20 20

Archers 3 4 4 6 15 30 30 30 30 60 (m1) 80 (m2) 0 10 10 140 40 (m1) 60 (m2) 40 20 20

0 (m1) 1 (m2)

0

1,373 / 1,412

1,498 / 1,536

Money received £67 18s 8d £67 18s 8d £66 13s 4d

£400 (m1) £509 (m2)

£333 6s 8d £300 £200 £200 (m1) £240 (m2) £7,721 13s 4d £8,020 13s 4d

Only appears in TNA, E 101/30/25, m. 1. His name is partially struck through suggesting he did not serve. † No men-at-arms or archers listed on either list. ‡ Only appears in membrane 2. *

The most obvious omission from these lists is the retinues of Buxhull and Bourchier. We know from the third membrane of E 101/30/25 (discussed below) that Bourchier commanded four hundred men, and both he and Buxhull had letters of protection and attorney issued for men who intended to serve in their retinues.50 Indeed, several facets of these two lists – the absence of two commanders; the growing size of some of the retinues and wage costs between the two lists; the fact that cumulatively the retinues constitute far less than the four thousand men stipulated in Knolles’ indenture; that some retinues are listed as unpaid; and the ambiguity of the status of Lucy, Tryvet, FitzWalter, La Zouche, and Wauton – indicate that these (including membrane three) 50

TNA, C 76/53, mm. 6, 8–12, 15, 17–18 (Bourchier had ten men, Buxhull twenty-one).



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were working documents drawn up as the army assembled during the summer of 1370; part of a series which is now lost. The exact date of their compilation must be at some point before 28 June, because it was on the latter date that Bourchier and Sir Walter atte Lee – both captains in receipt of wages on membrane three – were paid, and neither man appears on membranes one or two. Membrane three of E 101/30/25 is a list of wages paid to the army’s captains and the size of their retinues, by date, suggesting payment upon arrival, between 14 May and 28 June 1370. Though, again, the exact date of the document’s compilation is not stated (if indeed it was not compiled over several weeks) it clearly post-dates the lists on membranes one and two because several of the retinues, and the payments for them, have increased in size. Table 8.2: E101/30/25 m. 3: ‘Bracketed’ retinue list51

County Cumb. Illegible Illegible Lincs. Illegible

Names of Bracketed Captain Name Associates 14 May 1370 John de Louthre Richard atte See; Nicholas de Skelton Richard atte See John de Louthre; Nicholas de Skelton Nicholas de Richard atte See; Skelton John de Louthre Sir William Bussy Sir John de Aysterby; Galfrid de Elkington Sir John de Sir William Bussy; Aysterby Galfrid de Elkington

Illegible Sir Thomas de Baunfield Yorks. Peter Ughtred Som.

Sir Edmund Dummer

15 May 1370 Sir Walter de la Lee; William Riburgh Sir Walter de la Lee; Matthew de Redmane Sir Robert de Knolles; Sir John Minsterworth; Matthew de Redmane

Men-atArms: Archers

Money received

4:4 4:4

£67 18s 8d

4:4

£67 18s 8d

10:10

£178 18s 8d

10:10

£178 18s 8d

40:40

£688 8s 8d

6:6

£66 13s 4d

20:20

£240

Original order retained. Those men who do not appear, and those retinue sizes which are different, from TNA, E 101/30/25, mm. 1 and 2, are italicised.

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County Captain Name Salop. Matthew Redmane

Heref.

Sir John Minsterworth

Kent

Lord Thomas de Grandison

Glouc.

Kent

Hamp.

Derb.‡ Norf.

Names of Bracketed Associates Sir John Minsterworth; Sir Edmund Dummer; William Riburgh; Robert Strikeland 29 June 1370 Sir Edmund Dummer; Sir Fulk de Pembrugge; Matthew de Redmane; Ralph Seymore; William Riburgh; Sir Thomas Faucomberge

17 May 1370 Sir Gilbert Giffard of the county of Glouc.; Sir Thomas Caun of the county of Kent; Sir John Bourchier of the county of Essex Sir Gilbert Giffard Sir Thomas Grandison of Kent; Thomas Coun of Kent Sir Thomas Coun Sir Robert Knolles; Sir Thomas Grandison of Kent; Sir Gilbert Giffard of Glouc.; John Baddeby of the county of Oxfordshire Sir Thomas John de Lisle† Grandison of Kent; Sir Gilbert Giffard of Glouc.; Sir John de Tychebourne of the county of Southampton [i.e. Hamps.] William Riburgh Robert de Knolles Sir Thomas Morieux junior

24 May 1370 Sir Alan de Buxhull; Sir Thomas Symond

Men-atArms: Archers 150:150

Money received £1500

200:300

£3066 13s 4d

200:200*

£3596 17s 4d

30:30

£300

120:180

£2365 14s

60:60

£1137 6s 8d

25:50

£333 6s 8d

20:20

£200



sir robert knolles’ expedition to france in 1370

County Captain Name Camb. Thomas Symond

Essex Essex Essex

28 June 1370 Sir John Bourchier Walter FitzWalter; Sir Thomas Grandison; Sir John de Lisle Lord Walter Thomas Grandison; FitzWalter John Bourchier; Walter atte Lee Sir Walter atte Lee Alan de Buxhull; Walter FitzWalter

Kent & John Avenele and Essex Robert Dykeswell Totals

Names of Bracketed Associates Sir Alan de Buxhull; Sir Thomas Moreaux

29 June 1370 Sir Robert Knolles men-at-arms archers total

163

Men-atArms: Archers 20:20

Money received £240

200:200

£3396 13s 4d

40:40

£724 16s 8d

10:10

£169 16s 8d

20:20

£339 13s 4d

1193 1378 2571

£18,859 14s 8d

Riburgh, Bourchier, FitzWalter, Lee, Avenele, Baunfield, and Dykeswell, are noted as being at Winchelsea and Rye the Saturday following the Feast of St Peter (29 June). † Noted as being at Southampton the Wednesday following the Feast of St Peter ‡ Either Derbyshire or Berkshire *

Whilst this third membrane does not constitute a full payroll – the retinues of Knolles and Buxhull are missing along with nine other men – if we add the personnel numbers from all three membranes together, taking the maximum total noted for each captain when there are discrepancies between the lists, E 101/30/25 represents an army strength of 3,759 men (1,787 men-at-arms and 1,972 mounted archers).52 In other words, if those The nine captains who appear on membranes one and two and not on membrane three – Merton, Gourneye, Thomas Ughtred, Plumpton, Fyton, Malet, Sondes, Strange, and La Zouche – are an interesting group. La Zouche was part of the delegation that escorted the King of Navarre to and from England with a retinue of twelve men-atarms and sixteen archers (TNA, E 101/30/40 for his expenses and the names of his men; Brantingham, pp. 202, 252–5). This appointment was clearly made after he had decided to join Knolles’ army, otherwise he would not appear on the initial list of the army’s retinues. Whether he joined the army is unclear. The other men are problematic. None are in receipt of wages and no protections or attorneys for the campaign list men from their retinues; they were either incorporated into one of the other retinues, or else they did not serve. It should also be noted that three retinue captains – Sir John Boulwas, Sir John Clanvowe, and Sir William Neville – who swore oaths of obedience to Knolles on 10 July (Fœdera, III, ii, p. 897) do not appear on TNA, E 101/30/25. However, as both

52

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serving unpaid for a charter of pardon are included (discussed below), along with the missing retinue of Buxhull, then Knolles had managed to recruit the four thousand men he had agreed in his indenture. The greatest strength of the third-membrane list, however, is the glimpse it provides of the relationships between the army’s captains. Gaining an insight into these relationships is crucial, for it was the breakdown of these bonds which were a major factor in the disintegration of the army. Whilst no document can provide every facet of such relationships, the information presented on this third membrane – information which has been entirely ignored by scholars – provides some tantalising clues. Next to each captain’s name in the left-hand margin of the document (as can be seen from Table 8.2), a county is listed – which from other sources we can see constitutes the captain’s county of origin and/or landholdings – and to the right of each captain are the names of other men bracketed together.53 These ‘bracketed’ men were acting as surety that the captain would serve with the agreed number of men in his company, and for the payments received.54 As far as can be ascertained, there is no other instance in the second half of the fourteenth century which is directly comparable to this. There are surviving instances when retinue captains required that men with whom they subcontracted (to provide a portion of their retinue personnel) also find individuals who would stand as surety that the subcontractor would honour the agreement.55 H. G. Richardson also noted that in 1374 the earl of Suffolk, after entering into agreements with two subcontractors, also provided sums of money to a third party, returnable if the subcontractors defaulted on their agreements, and some of the pardon recipients for the War of St Sardos in 1324–25 were required to have mainpernors to guarantee their service.56 Whilst it is possible that the decision in 1370 to require all captains to provide sureties was more common practice in the period than the records suggest, if this were the case it would surely have generated a greater imprint in the surviving records. In other words, the requirement that the majority, if not all, the captains in Knolles’ army provide pledges for the size of their companies may well have been unprecedented.57 If this was the case Neville and Clanvowe likely served (they received protections and attorneys: C 76/53, mm. 17, 21, 23) it is probable Boulwas did too. 53 Their origins have been extensively investigated: Baker, ‘Way of War’, pp. 336–48. 54 The word used is the abbreviated ‘pleg’, thus either plegium or plegagium. 55 S. Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361–99 (Oxford, 1990), p. 54. 56 H. G. Richardson, ‘Year Books and Plea Rolls as Sources of Historical Information’, TRHS 5 (1922), pp. 27–70, at 43–4; TNA, E 13/95, m. 3d. St Sardos: C 61/37. There are examples throughout the roll including for one Gilbert de Dullington on m. 12. The instance of pardons and their mainpernors are discussed in the introduction to the said roll by Malcolm Vale, see The Gascon Roll Project (www.gasconrolls.org) http://www. gasconrolls.org/en/edition/calendars/C61_37/document.html, accessed 14/06/2017. 57 I would like to express my gratitude to Andrew Ayton for his advice on this point.



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then the reasoning must be because of the way the campaign was being financed, and the calibre of men this seems to have attracted (see below); the Crown required extra safeguards that the men would serve and conduct themselves properly. In a way, this precaution is unsurprising, given that the commanders of the army had also had to agree to share the spoils of the campaign and make all decisions jointly. It is unfortunate, therefore, that none of the indentures between Crown and captains for the campaign have survived that might shed more light on the matter. Most of the ‘bracketed’ individuals were other captains in the army. This might suggest that standing surety for one another was merely an administrative exercise, with captains doing so for each other as and when they happened to arrive at the embarkation point. Whilst in some instances this may have been the case, two factors mitigate against this being the norm, and suggest a much deeper connection between the captain and the men who stood surety for him. First, the way in which captains stand as surety for one another in ‘clusters’ by date, can often be shown to be more than co-incidental. For example, on 14 May, John de Louthre, Richard atte See, and Nicholas de Skelton, all stood as surety for each other’s retinues, and though only Louthre’s origin – Cumberland – can be gleaned from the document, detailed prosopographical research reveals that both See and Skelton were also northern captains from Cumberland and Yorkshire.58 On the same day two Lincolnshire knights, William Bussy and John Aysterby, stood as surety for one another along with a third man, Geoffrey (Galfrid) de Elkington, from the same county.59 It is important to remember, of course, that geographical proximity does not necessarily engender familiarity or friendship; men from the same region could just as easily loathe each other as be brothers-inarms. But the very fact that men from the same localities had arrived at the embarkation point, possibly having travelled together, and stood as surety for one another’s retinues, does suggest their association was more than one of administrative convenience. Indeed, if we look beyond those men listed as pledgers who were among the army’s captains we can find even stronger bonds. For instance, Sir Fulk de Pembrugge (Pembridge) and Sir Thomas Faucomberge (Fauconberg) both had letters of protection and/or attorney Richard atte See: TNA, C  76/52, m. 3; C  76/67, m. 7. Skelton: CPR, 1399–1401, p. 374. Skelton may even have been a disabled combatant; a man of the same name was assaulted in his home in 1357 and had his foot cut off by his assailants, CPR, 1354–58, p. 610. 59 Bussy: CIPM, xii, p. 291. He also held lands in Nottinghamshire; CIPM, xiv, p. 211; R. Gorski, The Fourteenth-Century Sheriff: English Local Administration in the Late Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2003), p.  184; J. S. Roskell, Parliament and Politics in Late Medieval England (London, 1981), p. 47. Aysterby: CIPM, xii, p. 368; T. Guard, Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2013), p. 79. Elkington: CIPM, xii, p. 352. 58

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issued for service in the retinue of Sir John Minsterworth. Both men also acted as pledgers for Minsterworth, and all three men came from, or at least had lands in, the Welsh Marches. The relationship between Minsterworth and Fauconberg is made more intriguing still as shortly after the campaign both men defected to the French. Since men’s affiliation to the leaders of local society did not stretch as far as treason, the fact that both these men took this huge step must be more than co-incidence.60 As far as the links go between the captains in the army generally we can only speculate. Knolles may have known some of them personally from his days as a freebooter, like Sir Thomas Coun who had enjoyed a successful career raiding the Norman countryside.61 Equally he may have had no previous association at all with some of them. Whilst some captains will have known each other, even considered themselves friends or have been linked by marriage, there will certainly have been men who rode to war who did not know each other; no different to any other army of the period. They were certainly a mixed group. Men like twenty-five-year-old Lord FitzWalter and the Yorkshire knights Sir Thomas Ughtred (the son of the celebrated Thomas first Lord Ughtred) and Sir Robert Plumpton were the sort of captains one would expect to find leading retinues in a more traditionally funded army; but the clear majority of captains on this venture seem to have been either young, and/or militarily inexperienced men.62 Most are difficult to identify, hinting at their relative obscurity, or else they were younger sons or from cadet branches of notable gentry families. The seventeen-year-old Sir Walter atte Lee certainly fits the latter mould. His father, John, had been steward of the royal household before his imprisonment in 1368 for abusing his powers. This does not seem to have affected his son’s position, for in February 1368 Walter travelled to Milan, either to seek his fortune as a soldier or for diplomatic business concerning the duke of Clarence. He was back in England the following year for he accompaTNA, C 76/53, mm. 11, 16, 18. Minsterworth: CIM, iii, no. 885. Pembridge was from Shropshire for which he sat as MP: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ volume/1386–1421/member/pembridge-sir-fulk-1409, accessed 20/06/2017. Fauconberg held lands in several counties although his main holdings centred in Yorkshire. His defection to the French may have been due to bouts of mental illness which perhaps made him susceptible to being easily led. Unlike Minsterworth, who was executed for his crimes, Fauconberg was imprisoned at Gloucester Castle. He later gained his freedom and participated in the Percy rebellions against Henry IV, from which he again escaped with his life: P. McNiven, ‘Fauconberg, Sir Thomas (1345–1407)’, ODNB, online edn. (2004). 61 Chronique Normande du XIVe Siècle, ed. A. and E. Molinier (Paris, 1882), pp. 121–2. 62 FitzWalter: C. Starr, ‘Fitzwalter family (per. c. 1200–c. 1500)’, ODNB, online edn. (2004); http://www.medievalsoldier.org/profiles/may2008.html; Ughtred: A. Ayton, ‘Ughtred, Thomas, first Lord Ughtred (1291/2–1365)’, ODNB, online edn (2008); Complete Peerage, 8, pp. 2–3; Plumpton: K. Dockray, ‘Plumpton family (per. c. 1165–c. 1550)’, ODNB, online edn. (2004). 60



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nied John of Gaunt’s army to France, but the 1370 campaign was probably the first in which he led a retinue of his own.63 Similarly, two northern esquires, Peter Ughtred, presumably a relation of Sir Thomas Ughtred, and Matthew Redmane, were both in their late teens or early twenties, doubtlessly hoping to make a name for themselves in France.64 Even the marcher knight Sir John Minsterworth was a man of only regional significance, and yet he commanded a retinue of a size usually associated with members of the higher nobility; only Knolles commanded more men on the campaign.65 The Crown was clearly concerned about the prevalence of these young, often inexperienced men. In one surviving example of what may have been a series of such agreements dated 5 July, Minsterworth, Redmane and Coun all put their seals to a document outlining their obligations.66 The reason for the prevalence of such a group of largely inexperienced captains is almost certainly the army’s pay structure. It is fairly certain that few combatants in the Hundred Years’ War served purely because of the prospect of crown pay (due to the often haphazard and late payment), but receiving wages was at least some consolation for those unable to secure any plunder on campaign. The fact that the men on this expedition were only receiving double wages for the first quarter (or effectively wages for six months at the normal rate) of a campaign which was envisaged to last two years, coupled with the perceived lack of Knolles’ social standing as commander, meant that the expedition attracted a certain type of captain: men willing to risk the gamble of limited remuneration. The circumstances and motivations of each man were obviously different, but in general they were young men seizing the opportunity of a speculative campaign that might win them renown, often commanding retinues for the first time as far as we can ascertain, or those down on their luck who hoped the campaign would re-invigorate their fortunes. Did this inexperience permeate down into the rank-and-file of the army? Unfortunately, the absence of muster rolls for the army’s retinues means we can only speculate from the names of those in receipt of letters of protection and attorney (documents which only denote an intention to serve), those serving for a charter of pardon, and those mentioned in the narrative sources. Cumulatively this amounts to about 750 individuals; just fewer than 20 per cent of the army.67 http://www.historyofparliament.org/volume/1386–1421/member/lee-sir-walter-1350–1395, accessed 14/06/2017; Ormrod, Edward III, pp. 492–7 64 Sumption, Divided, pp. 69–70. 65 A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King, D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013), pp. 85–7, 130–4. 66 TNA, E 101/30/31. 67 Ambiguities in surname evidence, and the presence of non-combatants in receipt of these legal safeguards, like the five men in the service of Knolles’ wife Constance (TNA, 63

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Some of the better known, more socially elevated, men included in this number certainly did not lack military experience. For example, Sir Fulk de Pembridge (probably related to Sir Richard de Pembridge, chamber knight of Edward III, who helped supervise the embarkation of Knolles’ army) had fought in the Holy Land in the mid-1360s, reflected in his crest of a Saracen’s head with long plaits of hair, whilst the Herefordshire knight and poet, Sir John Clanvowe, had fought in Brittany in the 1360s (where he may have encountered Knolles), and had also been at Lussac when Sir John Chandos had been fatally wounded.68 Indeed Clanvowe and one of his tenants, the Yorkshire knight Sir William Neville, who accompanied him on the campaign, may well have formed, or strengthened, a lifelong friendship and brotherhood-in-arms, heightened by their capture on the campaign. Both would later become knights of the royal household and take part in crusading ventures in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. When they both died in October 1391 in Tunis, probably of plague, they were buried together.69 As Michael Prestwich pointed out: ‘The comradeship born of campaigning together was a link that has left only a weak trace in the records, but it must have been a powerful bond in the field’.70 Members of the upper echelons of the gentry such as these men may well have provided unofficial discipline among the rank-and-file, or acted as sub-captains within some of the retinues. It is even possible tentatively to identify potential comradeship groups from the very limited geographical information provided in the protections and attorneys,71 like the three men from Thomas Coun’s retinue in receipt of protections from ‘Harborough’.72 Despite the inexperience of some of the army’s captains, and our knowledge of how events were to transpire, it is surprising to find that of all the contemporary narrative accounts which mention the campaign only the C 76/53, mm. 6–7) always make providing exact figures difficult. On Constance and her role in her husband’s military affairs: Sumption, Divided, p. 758; Fœdera, III, i, p. 480. 68 Pembridge: TNA, C 76/53, m. 18; http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ volume/1386–1421/member/ pembridge-sir-fulk-1409, accessed 14/06/2017; Clanvowe: C  76/53, mm. 17, 23; N. Saul, ‘Clanvow, Sir John (c.1341–1391)’, ODNB, online edn. (2004). 69 CIPM, xiii, pp.  98, 140; vol. xvi, p.  267; vol. xvii, p.  447; TNA, C  76/53, mm. 17, 21, 23; A. T. Luttrell, ‘Chaucer’s Knight and the Mediterranean’, in Library of Mediterranean History, 1 (1994), pp. 127–60, at pp. 144–5; C. Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King’s Affinity: Service, Politics, and Finance in England, 1360–1413 (New Haven, 1986), pp. 282–3; J. A. F. Thomson, ‘Neville, Sir William (c.1341–1391)’, ODNB, online edn (2004). 70 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (London, 1996), p. 45. 71 Of the c. 750 individuals there is geographic information for 290 men; 7.25 per cent of the army as a whole. 72 TNA, C 76/53, m. 16. This was either Harborough, Warwickshire, or Market Harborough, Leicestershire. For a look at the wider army, see Baker, ‘Way of War’, pp. 169–76.



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Anonimalle chronicler comments on the character of the army, describing it as an ill-disciplined and inexperienced rabble consisting of ‘diverses gentz de religione eschapez et apostates et ensement plusours larounes et robbers de diverses gaioles’.73 What evidence is there to back up this assessment? As with many other armies launched by the English up to this stage in the Hundred Years’ War, Knolles’ army had a number of men serving, unpaid, in return for a charter of pardon to expiate some past misdeed. At least for forces prior to 1360 this could contribute an additional 5–10 per cent onto an army’s paid contingents.74 It is extremely surprising, therefore, given the Anonimalle author’s testimony, that only around fifty men were in receipt of pardons for this campaign, as evinced by their enrolments on the Patent Rolls.75 Whilst it is possible that extra pardons for this campaign may have been recorded on a no longer extant ‘pardon roll’, the numbers are hardly likely to have been significant enough to merit the Anonimalle author’s assessment.76 Indeed, as Galbraith has pointed out, the Anonimalle chronicler is a lone contemporary voice blaming Knolles for the subsequent break-up of the army.77 This animosity towards Knolles seems to stem solely from a dispute between Knolles and St Mary’s Abbey, where the chronicle was compiled, over the possession of the manor of Whitgift.78 The assertion that Knolles commanded an army full of apostates and criminals can thus be seen as a less-than-subtle attempt to blacken his name. In the absence of any muster rolls we can only speculate as to how the army was recruited, but the likelihood is that captains turned first to men of their own familia (family members and close personal associates) to form the core of their retinues, with those captains who required more men, like Minsterworth, relying on subcontractors to meet their obligations, and a smattering of pardon recipients to make up any numerical shortfall. In other words, barring its senior command arrangements and the calibre of some of its captains, Knolles’ army was structurally no different from any other English army of the period, even if its captains were required to ensure pledges for their service. This latter requirement by the Crown did not necessarily mean the army was destined to split apart, but the warning signs, and the Crown’s apprehension, were certainly evident before the army left England. But to understand fully why it was that Knolles’ army fractured Anonimalle, p. 63. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 146. 75 CPR, 1367–1370, pp.  411–13, 415, 417, 430–3, 435–7, 441–4, 446–7, 449–53, 455, 458; CPR, 1370–1374, pp. 20, 22, 27, 266. 76 There is an example of such a roll for the Breton expedition of 1342 (TNA, C 67/28A). However, the practice of enrolling pardons on the patent rolls does not seem to have changed. 77 Anonimalle, p. xxxvii. 78 CFR, 1369–77, p. 394. 73 74

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during the campaign, it is necessary to look at its actions in the field and the repercussions of its failure. The Campaign and its Aftermath The movements of the army and the events of the campaign have been covered extensively elsewhere and only the most pertinent details are included here.79 After landing at Calais in the first week of August the English army left the fortress on about the 9th, taking a circular route eastward around Paris, plundering and burning as they went, their numbers swelled by English routier captains and their companies already present in France. On 22 September, Knolles’ forces were encamped near Corbeil, to the south-east of the French capital. At this point it was decided to offer the French battle. On 24 September Knolles’ army arrayed themselves in battleorder, with the Seine to their east and the road southwards to Orléans to their west, near Villejuif, goading the French forces behind Paris’ high walls to fight them. Though a small number of French men-at-arms did accept the challenge and skirmished with the English forces, in general Charles V’s orders that his troops remain behind the city’s walls were obeyed.80 In anger, or at least as a parting show of disdain, Knolles’ army burned several suburban villages on the outskirts of the city before withdrawing the following day. The episode is certainly worthy of comment. If, as seems likely, the purpose of the campaign was to draw French resources away from Englishheld territories in south-western France, was it also part of the plan to offer the French battle? A decisive victory against the French king on the outskirts of Paris would certainly have placed huge pressure on the French to come to a diplomatic accord, perhaps even a final and irrevocable recognition of the territory ceded to England in 1360. Edward III had sought battle on more than one occasion in the early phase of the war, so it was clearly a strategy with previous pedigree.81 Moreover, to that point the campaign had been a roaring success. Knolles is personally reputed to have accumulated 100,000 francs.82 Perhaps, like a gambler well up on his original stake, he hoped for more by risking all his winnings on the vagaries of battle, confident The best modern narrative accounts are Sumption, Divided, pp.  84–94; Fowler, Mercenaries, pp. 289–97; R. Delachenel, Histoire de Charles V, 4 (Paris, 1928), pp. 301–48. 80 They ‘demandoit bataille’ according to the Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois, p. 207. 81 On English battle-seeking in the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War, see C. J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp. English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2000), p. 8. 82 Chroniques de Jean Froissart, 7, 1367–1370, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1878), p. 235. 79



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of success given England’s previous victories. On the other hand, it is just as easy to argue that his actions were, as Fowler put it, ‘a show [of ] pure bravado’.83 Whatever the truth of the matter, following their departure from the outskirts of Paris, the army headed south, splitting into two columns to maximise their range of plundering and spent the rest of October in the Vendômois and Touraine. They were effectively killing time, awaiting the outcome of further negotiations between the English diplomats and the King of Navarre. The ever-intransigent Charles had returned to France in late August, but even at this stage he had still to declare for one side or the other, simultaneously negotiating with both the proxies of Edward III and Charles V. It was probably this period of relative inactivity which saw underlying resentments within the army come to the fore. Whilst Knolles had enriched himself, there was a feeling among many of his subordinates that they had not received their fair share.84 They were probably running low on cash to pay their men by late October, if they had not expended it already, and could not afford to remain idle, needing to keep moving to extract further protection money and plunder from the French countryside. Sir John Minsterworth emerged as the leader of the dissenters, angry that Knolles was not heeding his counsel and accusing his commander of being an old robber or brigand (‘vispilionem veterem’), who was keeping most of the profits for himself.85 The ire of Minsterworth and the other captains is understandable. Knolles’ inactivity may have meant that their unpaid men began to desert, but his strategy was also sound. The army’s position in Vendômois and Touraine meant they were ‘well placed to co-ordinate operations with the English forces in Poitou [where Gaunt’s men were stationed] and Saint-Sauveur or march into lower Normandy once a deal was done with Charles of Navarre’.86 In the end, short-term financial concerns over-rode strategic ones. The catalyst for the army’s breakup was the departure of Buxhull in midNovember when Knolles sent him northwards with a detachment of one Fowler, Mercenaries, p. 290. As the author of the Anonimalle chronicle, p. 64, remarked: ‘En quel tenps le dire sire Robert prist toutez les raunsones de diverses countres devers lut et pur ceo graunt envye et graunt rancoure de coer sourdist perentre les seignours et communes et le dit sire Robert de Knolles’. ‘In this period, the said Sir Robert took all the ransoms of diverse countries for himself; because of this great envy and great rancour of heart developed between the lords and commons and the said Sir Robert Knolles’. Translated in: C. J. Rogers, ed., The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, 1999), p. 190. See also Delachenal, Charles V, v. 4, pp. 334–45. 85 Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, 1, p.  310; The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, ed. J. Taylor, W. R. Childs, L. Watkiss, 1 (Oxford, 2003), pp. 106–7, 986–7. 86 Sumption, Divided, p. 87. 83

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hundred men to take command at Saint-Sauveur.87 Buxhull’s position within the royal household and position vis-à-vis the person of Edward III had evidently made him a stabilising presence; with his absence the festering tensions between Knolles and his subordinates boiled over. Knolles planned to move westwards towards his lordship of Derval in Brittany where he could secure his gains and winter the army in safety before recommencing the campaign the following spring. Many of his captains had other ideas. Rather than following Knolles into Brittany from whence they would be unable to sustain themselves they opted to remain where they were, doubtlessly planning to venture forth on their own, confident in their ability to beat anything the French could muster. Knolles, probably exasperated and frustrated by constant challenges to his authority, and rightly concerned by reports of massing French strength, decided to strike out on his own. At the beginning of December he marched westwards with what was probably the greater part of the army, pausing only briefly to garrison several fortified places the army had captured to date, including the abbey of Vaas. Those who remained split up into three separate groups, presumably to make it easier to forage and maximise their profits: the first was jointly commanded by Grandison and Sir Hugh Calveley (an old associate of Knolles and a routier captain already present in France who had joined the army in November); the second was led by FitzWalter; and the third by Minsterworth. The decision, according to the Anonimalle chronicler, was ‘to the great harm of England, and great comfort of their enemies’.88 Whilst the remaining captains’ decision to split up made practical sense, it was to be their undoing. Since Knolles’ army had landed in France in early August the French had not been idle. As well as ordering the population to retreat where possible into the fortified settlements that littered the French countryside, Charles V had taken decisive steps to bolster his forces. Bertrand du Guesclin was recalled from Aquitaine and on 2 October, barely a week after Knolles’ army had left Paris, Charles V elevated the Breton knight to the position of Constable of France.89 ‘The appointment of a man of his relatively modest background was, to say the least, somewhat unusual, but justified by his long experience of military affairs’;90 and events were to prove that the king had made a wise choice. His appointment was accompanied by an intenCalculated from TNA, E 101/30/38 (forty-nine men-at-arms, twenry-eight mounted archers, and twenty-three armed/armoured archers – sagittarii armati – starting their tenure at the fortress on 1 December; see also Buxhull’s orders: Fœdera, III, ii, p.  903. We cannot be certain whether these one hundred men constituted Buxhull’s ‘missing’ retinue. See also another retinue list of the garrison from Buxhull’s captaincy dated from February 1371 (E 101/31/18). 88 Anonimalle, p. 64; Rogers, Sources, p. 190. 89 Delachenal, Charles V, 4, pp. 321–3. 90 Fowler, Mercenaries, p. 293. 87



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sive recruitment programme in Lower Normandy, and French forces were brought in from various other locations to bolster the new Constable’s forces assembling at Caen: Marshal Mouton de Blainville brought his retinue in early November; Olivier de Clisson brought troops from Brittany; even the aged Marshal Arnoul d’Audrehem came out of retirement to join the army. This amounted to about 4,000 men whilst another force of approximately 1,200 men was amassing at Châtellault under Marshal Sancarre.91 After leaving Caen on 1 December, Du Guesclin’s army reached Le Mans two days later where he received reports that one of the English contingents – Grandison and Calveley’s, estimated at between 600 and 1,200 men – were encamped about 19 miles further south, between Pontvallain and Mayet. After a forced night march they surprised Grandison and Calveley’s contingent early on the morning of 4 December at Pontvallain and overwhelmed them.92 As well as those slain, the French took several prominent prisoners at Pontvallain including captains, leading members of their retinues, and several English routier captains who had joined the army as it conducted its chevauchée. Those taken included Grandison, Sir Gilbert Giffard, Sir Philip Courtenay, Sir Hugh le Despenser, Sir William Neville, Matthew Redmane, Sir John Clanvowe, Sir Edmund Dummer, Richard and David Green, Geoffrey Worsley, Thomas Follifoot, David Holgrave ‘et grant quantité d’autres’.93 Calveley managed to escape and made his way to Poitou.94 FitzWalter’s contingent, encamped a few miles south of Grandison’s and who must soon have learned of the outcome of the battle from those who had fled the field, retreated towards the fortified abbey of Vaas, but had insufficient time to man the defences before Marshal Sancarre arrived. FitzWalter was captured and later ransomed, but most of his men were killed.95 The position of Minsterworth’s corps is unknown but it was clearly far enough away for it to be able to avoid the Constable’s forces. Like Knolles, who had arrived at his castle of Derval in mid-December, Minsterworth and his men arrived in Brittany. The Marcher knight and his men, along with many from Knolles’ company (but not Knolles himself ) Sumption, Divided, pp. 86–7. The Chronique Normande, pp. 196–7 states that they were in the process of heading westwards towards Knolles’ forces in Brittany, having belatedly realised the potential of the French threat. See also: Quatre Premiers Valois, pp. 207–8; Chroniques de Jean Froissart, 8, pp.  2–3. Sir John de Lisle may have been among the English casualties: TNA, E 101/30/26. 93 Chronique Normande, p. 197. The names are compiled from several sources: Anonimalle, p. 64; Chronographia regum Francorum, p. 343; Cuvelier, Chronique, 2, p. 177 lines 18, 484–5. 94 Sumption, Divided, p. 91. 95 FitzWalter had to mortgage his lands to pay his ransom: CPR, 1374–77, p. 191. Jean Cabaret d’Orville mistakenly believed FitzWalter was the Marshal of England: Chronique du Bon Duc Loys de Bourbon, pp. 25–6. 91

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and about 1,100 reinforcements from England led by Sir Thomas Fog and Robert Neville, for which there was now no purpose, then made their way towards the port of Saint-Mathieu.96 Upon reaching the harbour, pursued by Olivier de Clisson’s troops, they found only two English ships willing to take them. Minsterworth and the wealthier men managed to buy passage back to England, but many men were left stranded and were massacred.97 The failure of the campaign ended any chance of an Anglo-Navarrese alliance. A draft treaty had been finalised on 2 December, but was abandoned after the English defeats became known. Charles of Navarre, now shorn of English support for the foreseeable future, and no doubt in bad faith, did homage to the King of France in March 1371.98 The participants of the army who were captured found themselves significantly out of pocket to gain their liberty; indeed Bourchier, Redmane and Worsley were among those named in a petition to the Good Parliament of 1376 requesting financial aid as they had been ‘put to such great and outrageous ransoms’.99 Others, like FitzWalter, were still seemingly languishing in French gaols several years later, and Grandison died in 1375 shortly after his release, perhaps due to the insanitary conditions of his confinement.100 Failure also brought serious censure for the survivors. Minsterworth, the first major player to return to England and as guilty as any man for the army’s break-up, unsurprisingly laid the blame at Knolles’ feet.101 After an enquiry, the king’s council concluded in July 1372 that Knolles and the other commanders, principally Buxhull, were responsible for failing to maintain discipline and abandoning the expedition without the king’s permission.102 Consequently, the king confiscated the lands given to Knolles to provide him with his fee for the campaign; and both he and presumably Buxhull, who was still commanding the castle of St Sauveur, spent two-and-a-half TNA, SC 8/119/5939; C 76/53, m. 26; Fowler, Mercenaries, p. 297. Sumption, Divided, p. 91. 98 Sumption, Divided, pp. 93–4. 99 R. Ambühl, Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture In the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2013), pp.  207–8; idem, ‘Reversal of Fortunes in the 1370s: The Experience of English and Gascon Prisoners of War’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 191–208, at p. 193. For a poignant letter Bourchier wrote from captivity to his wife Maud, see K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford, 1980), pp.  28, 45, 241. Michael Jones has suggested this refers to a second period of captivity: Jones, ‘Fortunes of War’, p. 152. 100 FitzWalter: T. Moore, ‘Walter, Fifth Lord FitzWalter of Little Dunmow (Essex)’: http://medievalsoldier.org/profiles/may2008.html#_edn16, accessed 20/06/2017. This included mortgaging some lands in Lincolnshire to Matthew Redmane and a subsequent dispute between the two. Grandison: Complete Peerage, 4, p. 75. 101 Chroniques de Jean Froissart, 8, p. 24; Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, p. 311. 102 I have been unable to locate any formal record of this enquiry. 96

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years in the political wilderness.103 But by 1 November 1374, at the request of the Black Prince and John of Gaunt, who doubtlessly knew Knolles from their time fighting in France, the king pardoned Knolles for the failure of the campaign ‘for … he should not be held as responsible as his men for their unruliness, disobedience and arrogance’.104 Some of Knolles’ goods and chattels were returned, though he never regained his fee and was forced to surrender the profits he was thought to have made from the campaign.105 Knolles’ exoneration came just over twelve months after orders had been issued, in October 1373, to arrest Minsterworth, presumably for slandering Knolles,106 the latter’s friends at court certainly aiding the ‘old brigand’; but the Marcher knight evaded capture and fled to France to take up his new, albeit brief career, in the service of Charles V.107 The Place of the Campaign in the Hundred Years’ War According to Jonathan Sumption, one of the immediate consequences of the failure of Knolles’ campaign was that ‘it ended the myth of English invincibility on the battlefield, which had for years been one of their most valuable military and diplomatic assets’.108 This may well be true, but one should not over-emphasise this point. Du Guesclin had temporarily reversed Charles V’s Fabian strategy of avoiding battle. But when the English next returned to France in force with John of Gaunt’s chevauchée in 1373, indeed for the rest of the fourteenth century, the French reverted to type: they shadowed and harassed English armies but refused to engage them. English commanders still traversed the French countryside with near impunity. As John Palmer aptly put it, the French strategy ‘avoided the possibility of defeat, but at the cost of the chance of victory’.109 Du Guesclin’s achievements in 1370 certainly warrant praise, but he failed to engage the main part of Knolles’ army, instead surprising and overwhelming small contingents with his much greater numbers. The campaign was far more impor-

Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, 1, pp. 310–11. St Albans Chronicle, 1, pp. 16–17. 105 CPR, 1374–77, pp.  20–21; Fœdera, III, pp.  963–4. Knolles’ ‘fine’ was 10,000 marks: St Albans Chronicle, 1, pp. 16–17. 106 Thomas Walsingham labelled the marcher knight as a traitor and a false accuser: Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, p. 311. 107 CPR, 1370–74, p. 394, 420–1; CFR, 1368–1377, p. 232. He was later apprehended and sent to the Tower where he was hung, drawn, and quartered in March or April 1377: Sumption, Divided, p. 277; St Albans Chronicle, pp. 106–9. 108 Sumption, Divided, p. 91. 109 J. J. N. Palmer, England, France, and Christendom, 1377–99 (London, 1972), p. 6. 103

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tant because of the long-term effects it had on the organisation of English armies, and the over-arching war strategy. The quadripartite senior command structure of the army led by a man whose relatively modest social origins meant that he lacked the authority necessary to command such a force, the way the campaign was financed, and the calibre of retinue captains these experiments attracted, all combined to cause the campaign’s failure and ensure the experiment was never tried again. Had the organisational gamble paid off it would be interesting to speculate as to whether Edward III and his successors would have revived it in the future. As it was, the biggest casualty in terms of army organisation was the use of pardons for military service.110 The use of pardons for military service had reached an apogee for the Crécy–Calais expedition (1346–47) where several thousand were issued, and though they would never again reach such a high-water mark, numbers remained high until the Reims campaign of 1359–60, when seven hundred or so were issued. Thereafter, however, numbers declined dramatically. In the near decade of Anglo-French peace following the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), fewer than two hundred were enrolled on the patent rolls. Admittedly in these years there were only a few relatively small-scale expeditions to Ireland but, significantly, for the first major campaign after the resumption of the war – Gaunt’s Balingham expedition in 1369 – no pardons appear on the patent rolls. It may well be the case that the Crown started recording them elsewhere and thus their ‘decline’ reflects a change in administrative practice. Yet if this was the case it is a change that has eluded the attention of several notable scholars.111 Thus, the fifty or so pardons issued for Knolles’ expedition made this the last campaign in the fourteenth century in which they were granted in any real number; only about 150 were enrolled on the patent rolls for the rest of the century. Though they would briefly re-emerge in Henry V’s reign, they would never again return to their pre-1360 levels. Whilst the campaign of 1370, particularly the failure of the expedition, can certainly be attributed with a degree of significance in the disappearance of pardons, this should not be overplayed; there does not seem to have been any complaint against their use in the parliaments of 1371 or 1372 for example. The campaign’s role should be viewed as cementing in the minds of contemporaries what many probably already believed, that pardons were an unreliable recruitment tool. Aside from the questionable morality of allowing men to gain absolution from their crimes by performing a brief stint of military service, there were two bigger reasons for the Crown’s reluctance to issue military pardons. The first was the potential for fraud;

For what follows on pardons, see Baker, ‘Way of War’, pp. 30–5, 164–6. In correspondence that I have had with Adrian R. Bell, David Simpkin, Helen Lacey and Andrew Ayton, there has been no indication that this was the case.

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men failing to perform their agreed service.112 Whilst perhaps hinting at the difficulty in recruiting men for the campaign, the fact that nearly all the pardons for the 1370 expedition were issued prior to its departure for service to be rendered – a near unique occurrence in the second half of the fourteenth century – was probably an attempt to reduce incidents of fraud, with the charter only being activated on completion of the service. The second reason for the Crown’s reluctance was that pardons had become increasingly unnecessary. The changes in English military organisation and society more generally during the early-to-mid fourteenth century are too complex to go into here but, broadly, armies became smaller and the preserve of, if not ‘professional’ soldiers, then certainly ‘military careerists’.113 The unruly criminal elements of society were thus no longer required to bolster army numbers; the Crown could find enough men willing to fight in the king’s wars. The campaign of 1370 marked, therefore, the final death-throes for a system which had outlived its use. But it was in its contribution towards altering the Crown’s over-arching war strategy that the real significance of the failure of Knolles’ campaign can be found. Recent research into the phase of the Hundred Years’ War from 1369 to 1389 has highlighted the fact that the war was fought predominantly at sea.114 From 1371 to 1389 only three major field armies (comprising more than one thousand men) were sent to France; in the same period no fewer than eleven English fleets were put to sea of over one thousand men (not including mariners).115 Whilst it is true that there were a handful of smaller English armies operating in this period, like the roughly nine hundred men sent to Brittany in 1372, and that two large armies were sent to Portugal and Flanders in 1381 and 1383 respectively, there was also a multitude of smaller flotillas put to sea during the period not accounted for above. In other words, the balance of the ledger remains firmly in favour of the period being categorised as a predominantly naval war, with land armies playing Morality: H. J. Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III, 1338–62 (Manchester, 1966), pp. 173–5. Fraud: The Statutes of the Realm (1101–1713), ed. A. Luders, et al. (11 vols, Record Commission, 1810–28), i, pp. 257, 264; S. Phillips, ‘The Parliament of February 1334’ PROME (CD-ROM, Leicester, 2005), petition 3; M. Ormrod, ‘Parliaments of Feb. and Oct. 1339, 1351, and 1353’ in PROME, 1351: item 26 no. xvi; 1353: item 41. 113 A. Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England’, JMH 43 (2017), pp. 4–23. 114 For much of what follows, see C. Lambert in this current volume and A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea: Essex Ports in England’s Wars, 1320–1400’, in The Fighting Essex Soldier: Recruitment, War and Society in the Fourteenth Century, ed. C. Thornton, J. Ward and N. Wiffen (Hatfield, 2017), pp. 98–142. I would like to express my gratitude to Craig Lambert for helping formulate these ideas. See also, J. W. Sherborne, ‘The English Navy: Shipping and Manpower, 1369–89’, Past and Present 27 (1967), pp. 163–75. 115 Bell et al., Soldier in Later Medieval England, pp. 271–2. 112

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a supporting role. The English strategy was essentially to acquire a ring of fortresses around the French coast which would act as ‘barbicans of the realm’. These barbicans acted not only to defend England by keeping the war on the French side of the Channel, but also served as entry points for English armies raiding into France, fortresses which could easily be supplied from the sea.116 Though there is debate as to England’s over-arching war aims, it seems likely that the goal was to have English territorial claims in France, particularly to sovereignty over Aquitaine, recognised by the French Crown. To do this required placing substantial military pressure on the French by land, and particularly in this period, by sea. The reason for this switch to a naval strategy was financial. Putting fleets to sea was expensive, but nowhere near as expensive as assembling armies of several thousand men which also required ships to be requisitioned to transport them to the Continent. These requisitioned vessels also needed converting to allow them to be able to transport horses overseas, and specialised craft would be necessary to transport the horses to the shore, all adding to an expedition’s costs. Records for the preparations of Knolles’ army, for example, reveal that as well as providing transports for the men the Crown spent £70 10s 8d to buy ‘planks, nails, iron, and other things … for the shipping of 8,464 horses’; a further 40s to hire ‘11 schoutes … to take the horses from the land to the ships’; and £6 8s 4d to make bridges out of the timber, and the expenses of carpenters to make them.117 By contrast, sending flotillas of thirty to forty ships to sea, which could be manned by far fewer men than was required for a land army, and required no expensive conversions for horses, had major tactical benefits. They could attack French shipping and raid French ports and be gone before local resistance could be organised. They could also be used defensively, to protect the English coasts from French counter-raids; it was these tit-for-tat naval raids that were to characterise the war far more than armies conducting chevauchées. Moreover, armed men (which were the combatants that the Crown started to use at sea) were paid less than a man-at-arms (8d per day as opposed to 1s per day), so there was a wider saving on wages. In other words, significant damage could be done to the French economy, at least as much as a field army could achieve, but much more cost effectively. Whilst it is probably going too far to suggest that it was the failure of Knolles’ expedition that brought about this strategic switch, it certainly contributed to the change. If the first two-thirds of the fourteenth century was a period of organisational and structural experimentation for English armies that saw the emergence of the structurally uniform army, then the second half of the century should be viewed as an attempt to finance these G. Martin, ‘Richard II: Parliament of 1378, Text and Translation’, PROME. Brantingham, p.  269. For horse allowances for combatants: Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 57–9.

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changes.118 Experiments in taxation like the parish subsidy of 1371 (arguably a direct result of the failure of Knolles’ campaign, in which parliament proposed to raise a sum of £100,000 via a levy on the clergy and laity) and the infamous poll taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1380; attempted innovations in martial finance, as seen on the Scottish campaign of 1385; and domestic disputes between Crown and parliament in the reigns of both Edward III and Richard II, all ultimately stemmed from attempts to either increase the Crown’s revenues or control royal spending.119 Remembering the circumstances of the Knolles expedition – a Crown that had spent any cash reserves it had amassed in the previous year – allows it to be seen in its proper context. It was, in effect, the first in a long series of financial experiments after the resumption of the war in 1369, designed to wage war as cost-effectively as possible against an enemy who possessed greater resources in money and manpower. Had the gamble paid off the financial model adopted in 1370 might have been utilised again. As it was, the Crown was forced to re-think its strategy and it turned towards a more cost-effective naval war. Though Knolles’ campaign was not the last major chevauchée into the French heartland in the fourteenth century, the three that followed in 1373, 1375 and 1381 were last-gasp attempts to try to put pressure on the French Crown by traditional means, and they came at a time when the still expensive, but far more cost-effective, naval strategy was in full swing. If the failure of the 1370 expedition was not the immediate catalyst for this strategic change then it certainly made a significant contribution.

Indeed, this process of financial experimentation to raise an army as cost effectively as possible has a pedigree stretching back until at least the reign of Edward II. For the example of the 1340s military assessment: CPR, 1343–1345, pp.  427–8; A. Ayton, ‘The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346’, in England and Normandy in the Middle Ages, ed. D. Bates and A. Curry (London, 1994), pp. 253–68, at pp. 254–8; Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance, pp. 392–4. 119 A vast literature exists on these topics. See, for example, W. M. Ormrod, ‘An Experiment in Taxation; The English Parish Subsidy of 1371’, Speculum 63 (1988), pp. 58–82; J. J. N. Palmer, ‘The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385)’, EHR 83 (1968), pp. 771–5. 118

9

The Organisation and Financing of English Expeditions to the Baltic during * the Later Middle Ages

Adrian R. Bell and Tony K. Moore

Andrew Ayton’s research has illuminated our understanding of royal military service by the fourteenth-century aristocracy and how the king drew on existing socio-economic networks to assemble his armies. But what did the Edwardian military community do when there were no royal armies to join? And how were private military activities organised and funded? During the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, numerous English magnates and knights, along with their followers, travelled to Prussia to join the Teutonic knights in their campaigns against the pagan (at least until 1386) Lithuanians.1 The historiography has concentrated on whether these Baltic expeditions can properly be termed crusades or whether they are better viewed as exercises in chivalric vanity.2 The Baltic excursions of the Western European aristocracy have been described as ‘chivalrous package tours’, a ‘safari’ * This article is an output from the ESRC-funded research project ‘Credit Finance in

the Middle Ages: Loans to the English Crown, 1272–1340’ (RES-062–23–0733). It also draws upon source materials created during the AHRC-funded project ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England’. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Fifteenth Century Conference and the Leeds International Medieval Conference, and we are grateful to the audiences for their interest and comments. 1 For general discussions, see: T. Guard, Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade. The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2013); E. Christiansen, The Northern Crusades (London, 1997); W. Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels 2 vols (Sigmaringen, 1989–95); C. Tyerman, England and the Crusades, 1095–1588 (Chicago, 1997). 2 A. Ehlers, ‘The Crusade of the Teutonic Knights against Lithuania Reconsidered’, in Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier 1150–1500, ed. A. V. Murray (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 21–44.

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and even ‘a parade of bored nobles seeking parties and pageantry … and finding excitement in the forests of Lithuania chasing human game’.3 This essay will not wade into the debate over the relative importance of religious or touristic motivations but will instead focus on how such expeditions were funded and assembled, including the existing and future military links between fellow crusaders. As we shall see, the evidence concerning English participation in the Baltic crusades is patchy. What there is, including deponent testimony from the Court of Chivalry, suggests that involvement in military campaigns beyond the scope of national warfare was not uncommon and that these expeditionary parties drew upon existing networks.4 Andrew Ayton has recently stressed the importance of the ‘dynamics of recruitment’, which ‘moulded military service as a social and cultural phenomenon: they explain the incidence of military service – who served, when, where and with whom – and thus the accumulation of actual experience that fuelled fortunes and mentalities, individual and collective’.5 The investigation of military networks is currently undergoing a transformation as historians begin to use the computational power of relational databases to analyse huge amounts of nominal data.6 Most historians have concentrated on service in royal armies, for which the surviving evidence is most plentiful, but many of the soldiers who fought for the English kings also took part in expeditions to the Baltic. Moreover, the process by which crusading parties were assembled was similar to that by which a royal army was raised. Such military parties were frequently based around an important magnate and seem to have drawn on social or familial, even quasi-feudal, links. To illustrate the contemporary resonance of this idea, the most recent study on this topic has drawn an interesting parallel with Chaucer’s Knight and how, in the prologue to the Canterbury Tales, his portrayal is followed by that

C. Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London, 2007), p.  707; Christiansen, Northern Crusades, p. 151; and W. Urban, Prussian Crusade (Lanham, 1980), p. 377. 4 For example, see The Scrope and Grosvenor Controversy, ed. N. H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1832); A. R. Bell, ‘The Soldier, ‘hadde he riden, no man ferre’’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 209–18. 5 A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, pp 8–59, at p.  25; further developed in A. Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-century England’, JMH 43 (2017), pp. 4–23. 6 Current projects are tackling ‘big data’ to enlighten recruitment patterns in this period. See, for instance, S. Gibbs and A. R. Bell, ‘Fighting Merchants’, in Medieval Merchants and Money: Essays in Honour of James L. Bolton, ed. M. Allen and M. Davies (London, 2016), pp. 93–112. 3



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of his son, the Squire and then his Yeoman, an archer.7 This chapter will test whether the case study of English participation in the Baltic crusades reveals the same underlying ‘dynamics of recruitment’ as were found in royal armies. The funding of such expeditions also posed a number of serious logistical challenges, most notably how to transfer funds from Western Europe to the Baltic. The transport of specie across long distances was both risky and often restricted by governments, while potential creditors might have been discouraged from lending to crusaders by the difficulties in suing recalcitrant debtors (often politically influential figures) in far-away countries. As we will show, these practical obstacles were overcome by ‘piggy-backing’ on sophisticated pan-European networks of trade and credit. In particular, this essay will focus on three documents surviving in the Duchy of Lancaster archives to show how the young Humphrey de Bohun (shortly to formally succeed his uncle to the earldoms of Hereford and Essex, and his father to that of Northampton) and four of his travelling companions arranged to repay their Prussian debts in 1363. This informational nexus allows us to analyse the links between these men.8 Finally, it will examine how such transfers of funds by crusaders, like Bohun and company, from England and France to Prussia played an important role in balancing trade between Western Europe and the Baltic. Assembling an Expedition The earliest recorded involvement of Englishmen in the Baltic reisen can be dated to 1328–29, when Peter von Dusburg or his continuator wrote that ‘multi nobiles regni Anglie’ joined the Teutonic knights on campaign.9 The first named individual ‘crusader’ was Thomas de Ufford, who, according to the chronicler and herald of the Teutonic knights, Wigand von Marburg, joined the summer reisen of 1331 with one hundred lances. There was only limited English involvement in the 1330s and early 1340s, but this was followed by clusters of intense crusading activity succeeded by periods of apparent inaction. For example, several parties of Englishmen set out for Prussia in the late 1340s and early 1350s, most famously Henry, duke of Lancaster for the winter reisen of 1351–52, before a lull in the mid- and late1350s. English crusading parties set off for the Baltic every year between 1360 A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013), p. 1. 8 TNA, DL 25/1638, /1639, /1989. For discussion of these bonds, see R. C. Fowler, ‘Seals in the Public Record Office’, Archaeologia 74 (1924), pp.  103–16, at p.  115; The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333–1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), pp. 51 and 170. 9 Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, i, pp. 115–35. 7

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and 1369, again followed by a gap of more than a decade. English participation revived in 1383 and was frequent until 1394, including two impressive parties led by Henry, earl of Derby (later King Henry IV) in 1390–91 and 1392–93. There was a handful of English crusaders in the first decade of the fifteenth century and some may have fought at Tannenberg in 1410, when the Teutonic knights suffered a crushing defeat. After Tannenberg, western participation in the Baltic crusades seems to have come to an end. This pattern of participation was obviously closely related to the progress of the Hundred Years’ War between England and France. First, during wartime, the English kings were unwilling to diminish their own fighting force by allowing soldiers to divert to Prussia. Second, during periods of AngloFrench peace, would-be soldiers had to find alternative outlets for their martial energies and found them in the Baltic.10 Timothy Guard argues that there were even higher aims for those involved as they saw it as ‘the avenue to military prestige, public honour and spiritual gain’.11 The seminal work by Werner Paravicini has compiled the most comprehensive lists of western crusaders to Prussia. He found some 212 identifiable English crusaders between 1328 and 1410, as well as other occasions when the presence of Englishmen was recorded but no names were given.12 This is a considerable achievement, but there are a few problems with some of Paravicini’s identifications; for example, he seems to have confused Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, who does not seem to have visited Prussia, with his son Henry ‘Hotspur’, who certainly took part in the reisen.13 More recently, Timothy Guard has refreshed this list through careful study of chancery licences and papal safe conducts (alongside other sources) and has added a further twenty-seven names to the Paravicini list.14 It is also possible to outline a few extra crusaders from unpublished archival sources. The ‘Soldier in Later Medieval England’ project compiled a list of nearly 25,000 protections granted to, and attorneys appointed by, individuals leaving England on campaign, but only eight are specifically described as Prussia-bound. However, five of these were supposed to travel with Thomas, duke of Gloucester, on his planned crusade/trade mission in 1391, which was aborted after problems at sea; the remaining three were

Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 266 and 268. Guard, Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade, p. 119. 12 Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, i, table 9, pp. 123–7. We are grateful to Timothy Guard for his insights regarding this list of participants. 13 Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, i, table 9, pp.  123–7; S. Walker, ‘Percy, Sir Henry (1364–1403)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2004); Jan. 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ article/21931, accessed 12 June 2012]. 14 Guard, Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade, Appendix: Register of English crusaders c. 1307–1399. 10 11



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ambassadors to Prussia rather than crusaders.15 It should be noted that such grants often do not specify the intended destination, merely stating that the recipient was going ‘overseas’. Unfortunately, this brevity, although doubtless welcome to the hard-pressed royal clerks, probably conceals further participants in the Baltic expeditions. In addition, the issue rolls record royal payments to three crusaders in 1390–92, although one of these was to the duke of Gloucester for his abandoned expedition.16 Further, Richard II granted money to three household knights, Sir William de Neville, Sir John Clanvowe and Sir John Pauley, described as travelling to Prussia with the licence of the king in May 1390. It is not clear whether Clanvowe and Neville made it to the Baltic, but both died in Constantinople in October 1391 and they may have travelled there after the end of the winter reisen of 1390–91.17 Finally, there are more unusual sources; a memorial brass in Felbrigg church records that Roger de Felbrigg died in Prussia in 1380, and we know that Sir Simon Felbrigg went to Prussia in 1390/91.18 These sources also contain hints that the English crusading parties were assembled in a similar way to royal armies of the late fourteenth century. The English kings raised their armies using a system of indentured retinues. The Crown would issue a contract ‘indenture’, to a commander, specifying: the numbers and composition of the army; the length and place of service; the rates of pay; and detailing how the spoils of war would be divided.19 The commander would then be responsible for raising the troops. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, including formal

For this and other references to military service, see www.medievalsoldier.org (accessed 12 June 2017). The five appointments of attorney included Gloucester himself on 6 September 1391 (TNA, C 76/76, m. 15); Richard Breton on 20 September 1391, and Sir Michael de la Pole, Robert Turk, and Thomas de Morlee, all on 23 September 1391 (C  76/76, m. 14). The three protections were for Thomas Graa and Walter Sibill on 16 June 1388 (C 76/72, m. 2) and William Kirketon, travelling with Master Nicholas Stoket on 15 July 1388 (C  76/73, m. 15) and further described as ‘son of Matilda, who was the wife of John Kirketon, lately mercer and citizen of London’. For Graa, Sibill and Stoket as ambassadors, see Fœdera, vii, p. 588. 16 Gloucester received £333 6s 8d in connection with his departure to Prussia on 5 March 1392 (TNA, E  403/536, m. 22); £20 to Herr Mistelburgh van Burges (knight of Bohemia) and £23 6s 8d to John Beaufort, esquire, on 12 December 1391 (TNA, E 403/536, m. 11). 17 TNA, E  403/531, m. 7. Pauley also appointed an attorney on 7 March 1390 as he was going overseas (C 76/74, m. 8). S. Düll, A. Luttrell and M. Keen, ‘“Faithful unto death”: The Tomb Slab of Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe, Constantinople 1391’, Antiquaries Journal 71 (1991), pp. 174–90. 18 Notes taken during personal visit to Felbrigg Church, Norfolk, in summer 2009; Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, i, table 9, p. 127. 19 For a review of the English military recruitment system, see A. R. Bell, War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 49–52. 15

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and informal sub-contracting with third parties.20 In addition, commanders would draw upon their own networks both social and military (which were closely intertwined). For instance, in preparing to lead a naval expedition in 1387, Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel was able to recruit 2,500 soldiers in just three months.21 His own retinue was large and included men with close ties to him, such as Thomas Mowbray, earl of Nottingham (his son-in-law), Thomas Holland (his nephew, and future duke of Surrey) and Owain Glyn Dŵr (a neighbour from the Shropshire–Wales border). The remainder of the force was provided by twenty-six further retinues, varying in size from thirty to 382 men.22 For example, Sir Thomas de Ponynges (a tenant who married Arundel’s widow on the death of the earl) led a retinue of seventy soldiers. In addition, within each retinue further sub-networks are discernible from notations added to the muster roll.23 From her work on the later Agincourt campaign of 1415, Anne Curry has made similar observations about networks for recruitment: ‘Some troops may already have been bound to the captain, perhaps by private indenture for peace and war, or by employment in the household or on the estate. Others may have been tenants, or neighbours, family or friends. Existing links were thus central to recruitment.’24 It can also now be demonstrated that an individual’s recruitment reach could be expanded to a national and even international scale. For instance, gaining military experience itself would expand a soldier’s recruitment network away from their local and social networks, allowing them to gather larger retinues including other more experienced soldiers – who in turn would recruit further soldiers.25 These ‘dynamics of recruitment’ can be observed in the gathering of expeditions to the Baltic. In 1367–68, for example, a number of magnates, knights and esquires secured licences de passagio. Each of these licences specified the number of followers, the number of horses and any money that the recipient was permitted to take overseas, as shown in Table 9.1 below. Eleven licences specifically described the recipients as going to Prussia and three more (Beaumont, FitzWalter and Lucy) are known from other sources to have gone to the Baltic. It is likely that some of the other licencees whose destination is not given were also heading to Prussia. In total there are nineteen named particiA. Goodman, ‘The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings, 1380’, EHR 95 (1980), pp. 114–20; S. Walker, ‘Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: the Subcontracts of Sir John Strother, 1374’, BIHR 58 (1985), pp. 100–6. 21 Bell, War and the Soldier, pp. 52–8. 22 Ibid., p. 56, Table 3. 23 Ibid., pp. 154–5. 24 A. Curry, ‘Personal Links and the Nature of the English War Retinue: A Case Study of John Mowbray, Earl Marshal, and the Campaign of 1415’, in Liens, reseaux et solidarities, ed. E. Anceau, V. Gazeau and F. J. Ruggiu (Paris, 2006), pp. 153–67, at p. 155. 25 Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 49. 20



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pants and 134 followers. The parties varied in size, from the one yeoman in the service of William Dalleson, esquire, to the twenty-nine esquires and yeomen accompanying three members of the Beauchamp family – resonating again with the portrait of Chaucer’s knight, squire and yeoman. A crusading expedition was therefore formed of multiple parties, in the same way that a royal army was composed of a number of retinues. The two were not identical, of course; most notably crusading expeditions did not have a formal centralised command structure and they were not funded by the royal purse. Table 9.1: Licences for passage in 1367–69 Date 8/11/1367 8/11/1367 8/11/1367 12/11/1367

13/11/1367 16/11/1367 20/11/1367 20/11/1367 21/11/1367

28/11/1367 26/1/1368 2/2/1368 27/3/1368 27/3/1368

Recipient Sir Richard Maulever Thomas Boynton, esquire Thomas de Southworth, esquire Sir Thomas de Beauchamp of Warwick, Sir William de Beauchamp his brother and Sir Roger de Beauchamp ‘le fils’ William Dalleson, esquire Sir John de Multon and Richard de Welby Anthony, Lord Lucy Ivo FitzWarin Hugh le Despenser

Money £40 in cash £20 in cash £20 in cash

Esquires Yeomen – 5 – 2 – 2

1,000 marks

9

20

30 marks £40 in cash

– –

1 4

15 1 3

– 5 4

5 –

– 6

17

–

23

–

£500 in cash £100 in cash £20 in cash and two letters sealed by his brother, the Lord Despenser for receiving a certain sum overseas William de Furnivall £200 in cash Robert Urswyk, esquire of the a letter of Earl of Cambridge exchange for 100 marks Sir Edward Courtenay and a letter of two brothers exchange for £130 Henry, Lord Beaumont a letter of exchange for £1000 Walter FitzWalter a letter of exchange for 600 marks

12

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Several of the crusading parties of 1367–68 were clearly based around family units. One of the larger parties was led by Sir Edward Courtenay with two of his seven brothers, and another by Sir Thomas de Beauchamp, son of the then earl of Warwick (who had himself visited Prussia in 1365) with his brother Sir William (later lord of Abergavenny) and Sir Roger de Beauchamp ‘le fils’.26 There were also other, less immediately obvious connections between these groups. The Prussian chronicler Wigand mentions an English party including ‘Nortz Vewater’ and the lord ‘Bemunt’, who can be identified with Walter FitzWalter and Henry, Lord Beaumont, who both received licence to cross overseas in 1368, albeit to an undisclosed location.27 Both FitzWalter and Beaumont’s sons campaigned together in Prussia during 1390–91.28 It is also interesting to note that the other participants in the expedition of 1367–68 included Anthony, Lord Lucy of Allerdale and Cockermouth, who died in Prussia and has recently been identified as the St Bees man. Lucy was related to both FitzWalter and to Beaumont (Henry was the nephew of Agnes de Beaumont, Anthony’s step-mother). Also present was Sir John de Multon of Frampton, a cadet branch of the Multons of Egremont, who had married into the Lucys of Allerdale. In addition, John, while a minor, had been in the wardship of Anthony’s father Thomas, Lord Lucy, and thus they may have been brought up in the same household. Both Lucy and Multon died overseas, probably in Prussia.29 CPR, 1367–1370, pp. 24, 56–8, 64–5, 72, 127–8; Roger ‘le fils’ is possibly to be identified with Roger son of Sir Roger de Beauchamp of Bletsoe (Complete Peerage, 2, pp.  44–5). In 1363, Earl Thomas had granted to Sir Roger de Beauchamp, whom the earl described as his cousin, an annual fee of £40 drawn on the manors of Stratford Tony and Newton Tony (Wilts.), although it is unclear whether this Roger was the father or the son (CCR, 1361–1364, p. 510). 27 CPR, 1367–1370, pp. 130, 131, 132. It is possible that FitzWalter was part of the entourage of Lionel of Antwerp, Edward III’s second surviving son, who was travelling to Italy to marry Violante Visconti. We know, however, from a story recounted by Jean Froissart (if accurate), that FitzWalter must have been involved in at least one expedition to the Baltic before 1380. In that year, FitzWalter (as marshal of the host) was leading the English army through the forest of Marchenoir and past the castle of Vievy-le-Rayé (cant. Ouzouer-le-Marché, dep. Loir-et-Cher), whose lord had assembled a large force of knights and esquires. On seeing this, Fitzwalter departed from the route not, according to Froissart, to assault the castle but rather ‘to speak with the knight manning the barrier, whom he knew well, having been with him in Prussia’ (Chroniques de Jean Froissart, ed. S. Luce et al., 15 vols (Paris, 1869–1975), ix, 278). The translation and identification of Vievy-le-Rayé are our own. For fuller discussion, see T. K. Moore, ‘Walter, Fifth Lord Fitzwalter of Little Dunmow (Essex)’, Soldier Profile (http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/ soldier/database/May2008.php accessed 12 June 2017). 28 The Westminster Chronicle, 1381–1394, ed. L. C. Hector and B. F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982), pp. 474–6. 29 C. J. Knüsel et al., ‘The Identity of the St Bees Lady, Cumbria: An Osteobiographical Approach’, Medieval Archaeology 54 (2010), pp. 271–311, at pp. 300–1. 26



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These military and social connections can be explored further through the case study of Humphrey de Bohun, heir to the earldoms of Hereford, Essex and Northampton, and his participation in the winter reisen of 1362– 63. In January 1363, at Thorn on the Vistula, Bohun (who had already assumed his comital titles even though Edward III only formally invested him after his return in May 1363) and four fellow English crusaders (Sir Miles de Stapleton of Bedale, Sir John de Burley, Sir Walter Devereaux of Bodenham and Sir Richard de Waldegrave) issued two bonds to three Prussian merchants for a total of 2,600 écus.30 This came at the end of what seems to have been an extended European ‘Grand Tour’ by Bohun, undertaken before he came of age and succeeded to his extensive estates as son and heir of William de Bohun, earl of Northampton (d. 1360), and nephew and heir of Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford and Essex (d. 1361). In January 1362, his father-in-law Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, and four others were admitted as guardians of the young Humphrey de Bohun, ‘who is going beyond the seas on pilgrimage, during his nonage’.31 Bohun may have already left England before this, however, since one of his pledges at Thorn, Waldegrave, testified in the Scrope–Grosvenor case that: Beyond the great sea he saw Sir William Scrope [of Bolton] so armed, with a label, in the company of the earl of Hereford at Satalia in Turkey, at a treaty which was concluded between the King of Cyprus and ‘le Takka,’ Lord of Satalia, when the King of Cyprus became Lord of Satalia.32

Another of the Bohun party in Prussia, Stapleton, may also have been at Satalia.33 The capture of Satalia is often dated to 1364, but these events can more likely be linked to Peter of Cyprus’ campaigns in August and September 1361.34 It is not clear whether Bohun and company returned to England after their Mediterranean exploits, but they were certainly in Prussia for the winter reisen of 1362–63. Bohun had returned to England by February 1363, when he witnessed the formal confirmation of the Anglo-Castilian treaty agreed in 1362, and he was admitted to his dual inheritance in May.35 TNA, DL 25/1638 and /1639. CPR, 1361–1364, p. 173. 32 Scrope and Grosvenor Controversy, ii, p. 377. Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 269. 33 J. S. Roskell, ‘Sir Richard Waldegrave of Bures St Mary, Speaker in the Parliament of 1381–2’, Proceedings of the Suffolk Institute of Archaeology, 27 (1958), pp.  154–75, at p. 158; J. S. Roskell, L. Clark and C. Rawcliffe, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1386–1421, 4 vols (Stroud, 1992), iv, p. 736. 34 The date of the visit to Satalia is variously given as 1361 or 1364 and Anthony Luttrell even argues that it should be dated 1367; A. Luttrell, ‘English Levantine Crusaders, 1363–1367’, Renaissance Studies 2 (1988), pp. 143–53, at p. 150. 35 CPR, 1361–1364, p. 299; CCR, 1360–1364, pp. 452, 459, 482, 487–8, 496. It is interesting that Bohun witnessed the bond in Thorn and the Anglo-Castilian treaty as the earl of Hereford even before the king formally took his homage in May. 30 31

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A closer examination of these men may shed light on how the subretinues led by English crusaders were assembled.36 The military connections between these five men are shown in Table 9.2 below.37 Table 9.2: Military connections between English crusaders Campaign

Bohun

Stapleton

Satalia, 1361

x

x

Prussia, 1362–63

x

x

Auray, 1364

Burley

Devereaux

x

x

x

x

Waldegrave x x

x (killed)

Italy, 1365

x

France, 1369

x

Naval, 1371

x

Naval, 1372

x

x x x x

x

Stapleton was a founding member of the Knights of the Garter, and Bohun himself and Burley were later to join the order. In fact, after Stapleton’s death in 1364, probably as a result of injuries suffered at the battle of Auray, it was Bohun that succeeded to his stall.38 Certainly Waldegrave was closely linked to the Bohun family, being mentioned in the will of Elizabeth, countess of Northampton (d. 1356) and serving with William de Bohun, earl of Northampton, in the royal campaign of 1359. After accompanying Humphrey de Bohun to Prussia during 1362–63, he also visited Italy with him in 1366 and served under him in the French campaign of 1369, as well as during the naval campaigns of 1371 and 1372. Bohun also rewarded Waldegrave with a life grant of the manor of Brunden (Suffolk).39 Devereaux received a protection intending to serve in France with Bohun in 1369.40 Although Burley did Andrew Ayton comments that Bohun was an ‘employer of military careerists’ but was not a military careerist himself; Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-century England’, p. 10. 37 It should be noted that this summary shows when the party served together, and that this is not a full picture of each individual members’ military service. Burley served at St Sauveur in 1371 (TNA, E 101/31/18, m. 3), Calais in 1373 (E 403/451, m. 4; C 76/56, m. 8), France in 1379 (C 76/63, m. 3), and Calais in 1382 (C 76/66, m. 10). Devereaux served in France in 1380 (C 76/65, mm. 26, 28). Both Burley and Waldegrave served in Richard II’s expedition to Scotland in 1385 (E 403/508, mm. 13, 21). 38 H. E. L. Collins, The Order of the Garter, 1348–1461: Chivalry and Politics in Late Medieval England (Oxford, 2000), pp. 289–90. 39 Roskell et al., The House of Commons 1386–1421, iv, p. 736; CPR 1364–67, pp. 303–4; C 76/52, mm. 18, 22; E 101/31/15, m. 1; /32/20, m. 1. For a recent discussion of Waldegrave’s political and military experience, see A. Curry, ‘Speakers at War in the Late 14th and 15th Centuries’, Parliamentary History 29 (2010), pp. 8–21. 40 TNA, C 76/52, mm. 21, 22. 36



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take part in the campaign of 1369 and the naval campaign of 1372, he is not recorded as serving with Bohun.41 However, some time before October 1363, and probably after his return to England in February, Bohun granted the manor of Harefield (Gloucs.) to Burley for life.42 The table is also instructive on the horizontal links between the companions. All but Stapleton (deceased) went on to serve in the first campaign of the reopening of the Anglo-French war in 1369 and three of the five soldiers served again in 1372. Thus our case study is another instructive example of the ‘dynamics of recruitment’ in action. Whatever caused this party to come together was a strong force and the established links ensured that they continued to benefit and draw upon these networks in both the military community (both within royal service and without) as well as local landed society. As we have seen, this insight is not new but highlights how such groups acted both in and out of military service. The opening up of the military-administrative records allows such networks to be more clearly defined. Indeed it is not necessary to focus on the noble leader to explain such service. Rather, the wealth of data also demonstrates that at a micro level horizontal links to colleagues were as important as vertical links to an important figure. It is, therefore, no longer enough to explain the military community at this time in terms of great affinities, as it has become clear that this is only a contributing part of how expeditions were formed and how soldiers ended up serving together.43 Funding the Expeditions The remainder of this discussion will now turn to the particular problems of financing the expeditions of English crusaders to Prussia. Like exotic holidays today, participation in the reisen was expensive. Indeed, it would hardly have counted as ‘conspicuous consumption’ if it was not. It is possible to gather some rough indications of the potential cost of a trip to the Baltic. In September 1351, William de Kerdeston entered into a recognisance for £600 sterling to John Rothemberg and Nicholas Steveynbergh, merchants of Prussia, although Kerdeston may only have borrowed

TNA, E 403/439, m. 26, war payment on 16 February 1370 of £26 14s 1d, most likely for arrears of wages for service the previous year; E 403/446, m. 29, war payment on 9 August 1372 of £6 13s 4d for the wages of one knight (himself ) and two men-at-arms. 42 CPR, 1361–1364, p. 403. Burley was still holding the manor in 1368 (CPR, 1367–1370, p. 196). 43 For another look at the importance of horizontal links in the military community, see A. R. Bell, ‘English Members of Philippe de Mézières’ Order of the Passion’, in Philippe de Mézières and his Age: Piety and Politics in the Fourteenth Century, ed. R. Blumenfeld-Kosinski and K. Petrov (Leiden, 2011), pp. 321–46. 41

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£275.44 It is probable that this debt resulted from crusading costs incurred by Kerdeston, although the recognisance does not state this explicitly. In 1363, as we shall see, the Bohun party recognised debts of 2,600 écus (c. £562 sterling) to merchants from Thorn and this probably only represents part of the total cost of their expedition. During the winter of 1367 and spring of 1368, the king issued licences de passagio to fourteen separate parties specifically described as going to Prussia, giving them permission to export a minimum of £3,224 sterling in both cash and via letters of exchange, as summarised in Table 9.1 above. In addition, there were at least a further three parties (Lucy, FitzWalter and Beaumont) whose destination was not specified but who seem to have gone to Prussia, and who had licence to export a further £1,533 6s 8d sterling.45 The most expensive English expeditions were probably those of Henry, earl of Derby in the early 1390s. Derby’s first trip to Prussia during 1390–91 cost £4,383 8s 3½d sterling and his second, in 1392–93, £4,915 5s ¾d sterling. Note that not all of the expenses incurred by Derby during his second excursion were incurred in Prussia, since there was no reisen that year, and Derby diverted to visit Venice and the Holy Land.46 Finally, at London in July 1392, John, Lord Montague repaid 1,000 nobles (£333 6s 8d) to a Prussian merchant, Lefardus Blumendale, which Montague had borrowed from Blumendale and Wynand Ostinchusen in Danzig.47 Giles Constable and Simon Lloyd have studied how participants in the crusades to the Holy Land in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries raised the necessary money, but there has been little work on how the English crusaders to the Baltic in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries raised the necessary funds.48 As Christopher Tyerman points out, one major difference between the earlier crusades to the Holy Land and the expeditions to Prussia was that ‘no subsidies from taxation, redemptions,

CCR, 1349–1354, p. 387. CPR, 1367–1370, pp. 131, 132. FitzWalter was also allowed to take two basins, six cups, two covers, twelve dishes, twelve bowls and twelve silver spoons, while Beaumont had permission to take ‘vessels of gold and silver necessary for his household’. Obviously they wanted to have their plate and eat off it too. 46 Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land Made by Henry, Earl of Derby, in the Years 1390–1 and 1392–3, ed. L. Toulmin Smith, Camden Society, new ser., 52 (1894). 47 Calendar of the Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London, 1381–1412, ed. A. H. Thomas (London, 1932), p. 183. This will also be discussed in more detail below. 48 G. Constable, ‘The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century’, in Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer, ed. B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer and R. C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982); S. D. Lloyd, ‘Crusader Knights and the Land Market in the Thirteenth Century’, Thirteenth Century England II, ed. P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1988), pp. 119–36; S. D. Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade, 1216–1307 (Oxford, 1988), esp. pp. 175–97. 44 45



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or other obventions were available’.49 This is most obvious in the case of the papacy, which had been a major source of crusading funds. In the thirteenth century, the popes frequently provided English crusaders with substantial financial support, drawing on monies raised from redemptions of vows, gifts and legacies to the Holy Land as well direct clerical taxes. Richard, earl of Cornwall received an unknown but undoubtedly large sum in 1238, while three other royal relations who participated in the seventh crusade, Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester, the king’s Lusignan half-brother William de Valence and Sir William Longespée, were promised 4,000 marks, 2,200 marks and 2,000 marks respectively.50 Ultimately much of this was extracted from the English Church, with triennial tenths being imposed in 1254, 1274 and 1291, although little of this actually found its way to the Holy Land.51 The papacy had never devoted the same degree of financial support to the Baltic crusades, even in the thirteenth century.52 The other major source of financing for previous crusades had been the Crown; both Richard I and the future Edward I spent huge sums on their crusading ventures. Richard assembled a huge force and a fleet, which may have numbered as many as seventeen thousand men. This included as many as four thousand knights in the royal household, for whom he paid wages, provided equipment and horses. The infantry were also paid wages by the king. Although the other English participants, the magnates and knights who had signed up as crucesignati, did not receive wages from the king, they were still subsidised to a significant degree; Richard provided the ships to transport them to the East, as well as food for all.53 Henry III gave financial support to his brother Richard, earl of Cornwall’s crusade in 1238–40.54 In 1270, the Lord Edward (the future Edward I) contracted with eighteen crusaders to accompany him on crusade with a total of 225 knights. The contractors received 100 marks per knight promised, and entered into subcontracts to raise these forces in a precursor of the indenture system.55 The Baltic crusades did not receive the same level of royal support. None of the fourteenth-century English kings went to Prussia themselves (although Henry, earl of Derby did journey to Prussia twice before his usurpation of the throne in 1399) or provided large-scale funding for expeditions, although Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 270. W. E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 432–9. 51 Ibid., pp. 255–89, 311–65. 52 I. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254 (Leiden, 2007). 53 Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 65–73, 80–3. 54 R. C. Stacey, Politics, Policy and Finance under Henry III, 1216–1245 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 125–8. 55 Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade, pp. 118–23, 137–8. 49 50

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there are occasional instances of royal support for individual crusaders. As we have noted, in May 1390, Richard II granted 100 marks each to the household knights Sir William de Neville and Sir John Clanvowe and £20 to Sir John Pauley in aid of their voyage to Prussia.56 Moreover, although both Edward III and Richard II did confirm the annual fee of 40 marks originally granted to the Teutonic Order by Henry III, this does not compare to the grants made to the Hospitallers and Templars by earlier kings.57 If the kings of England were not directly involved in supporting expeditions to the Baltic, the leaders of crusading parties may have subsidised their followers. In 1399, when Thomas Despenser, earl of Gloucester, granted the esquire William Hamme an annual retaining fee of 10 marks, their agreement specified that Hamme was bound to accompany Despenser to Prussia, Rhodes or elsewhere, although in that case Hamme was to receive wages.58 The surviving accounts of the two expeditions led by Henry, earl of Derby to Prussia provide more information. Ultimately, John of Gaunt, Derby’s father, paid for nearly 80 per cent of his son’s first Prussian voyage and 90 per cent of his second. Within Derby’s party, his household knights received wages or access to loans. Knights of Derby’s household received 2s per diem during the reyse, esquires 1s and valets (or archers) 6d.59 This parallels the daily payments available for royal armies, which followed a standard pattern during this period where in addition to the payments mentioned, bannerets received 4s per day, earls 6s 8d and dukes 13s 4d (one mark) per day.60 It is also interesting to compare what we have discussed about forming retinues and overseas expeditions to how John Mowbray, earl Marshal, brought together his own retinue for Agincourt. From careful study of the earl’s vadia guerre, Anne Curry has been able to identify a number of soldiers who were linked to Mowbray in peace. For instance, it can be seen that he was supported by, and further soldiers were also recruited by, the earl’s steward, the master of the earl’s horses, his minstrel, an individual who organised the earl’s shipping, another providing provisions and others who were in receipt of annuities. Mowbray also brought his yeomen of the chamber, clerks, his baker and armourer.61 To return to the Prussian campaign, in total, Derby spent £544 8s 8½d on wages for his household during his first expedition. Magnates could also provide access to credit. Sir John de Lowdham received TNA, E 403/531, m. 7. CPR, 1389–1392, p.  74. For twelfth- and thirteenth-century liberality, see Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade, pp. 239–43. 58 Bell, ‘English Members’; ‘Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War, 1278– 1476’, ed. M. Jones and S. Walker, Camden Miscellany XXXII, Camden Society, Fifth Series, iii (1994), p. 124. 59 Expeditions to Prussia, pp. lxxxvi–lxxxvii, ibid., pp. xliiii–xlvi, 128–32, 142, 142–3. 60 Bell et al, Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 8. 61 Curry, ‘Personal Links and the Nature of the English War Retinue’, pp. 164–5. 56 57



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a prest of £50 sterling from Derby but apparently no wages. It is, however, possible that this was in fact an advance on Lowdham’s wages, but was not treated as such after his death on campaign. Richard de Abberbury junior (later knighted), who was not a member of Derby’s household, borrowed £200 sterling from Gaunt.62 It is possible that Bohun’s travelling companions in 1363 may have received some financial support or other rewards in return for their custodial service. Moreover, as we have seen, Burley and Waldegrave were both granted lands by Bohun after their return.63 Would-be crusaders lacking wealthy patrons, on the other hand, might have to resort to borrowing. Two of the crusaders of 1367–68, Anthony, Lord Lucy and Sir John de Multon, recognised debts of £600 sterling and £20 sterling respectively to the king’s mistress Alice Perrers at the same time as they received licence to set out for Prussia. The two recognisances were entered into the close rolls on 21 November 1367, while Lucy received his licence de passagio for £500 on 20 November and, on 16 November, Multon and Richard de Welby had a joint licence for £40.64 It is possible that this was a continuation of Lucy’s previous dealings with Perrers; in 1365, he had granted her a life-interest in his manor of Radstone (Northants.) for 1,000 marks.65 It would be, however, quite a coincidence for both Lucy and his fellow crusader Multon to borrow money from Perrers at the same time as each other, and at the same time as receiving their licences to take similar sums out of the country. The discrepancy between the £500 that Lucy was licensed to take out of the country with him and the debt of £600 that he recognised to Perrers may reflect disguised interest.66 Such recognisances included a provision that should the debtor default, then the sheriff would automatically levy the sums owed from their lands and chattels. Crusaders also took precautions to ensure that their debts would be honoured. Before leaving for Prussia sometime before 1349, Sir William de Hastings granted his manor of Benham Valence (Berks.) to Theobald Mounteneye and Robert de Eleford in order that, should he die before his return, they would sell the manor to pay Hastings’ debts (possibly including the costs of his Baltic adventure).67 Alternatively, English crusaders could borrow money in Prussia, to be repaid in Bruges or back in England, as in the cases of Kerdeston, Montagu and Bohun discussed below. S. Walker, ‘Sir Richard Abberbury (c.1330–1399) and his Kinsmen: the Rise and Fall of a Gentry Family’, Nottingham Medieval Studies 34 (1990), pp. 113–40, at p. 133. 63 See: Expeditions to Prussia, pp. lxxxvi-lxxxvii. Ibid., pp. xliiii–xlvi, 128–32, 142, 142–3; 64 CCR, 1364–1368, p. 396. 65 J. S. Bothwell, ‘The Management of Position: Alice Perrers, Edward III, and the Creation of a Landed Estate, 1362–1377’, JMH 24 (1998), pp. 31–51, at p. 40. 66 A. R. Bell, C. Brooks and T. K. Moore, ‘Interest in Medieval Accounts: Examples from England, 1272–1340’, History 94 (2009), pp. 411–33, at p. 422–5. 67 CIM, 1392–1399, p. 229. 62

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A more extreme example is that of Sir Richard Abberbury junior, whom we have already encountered borrowing £200 from John of Gaunt to fund his crusade to Prussia in 1390 – he later seems to have liquidated all his assets to Thomas Chaucer in 1408 to fund his continuous pilgrimage overseas.68 Transferring Funds The various ways by which the English aristocracy, famously capital-rich but cash-poor, could raise ready money are not the primary focus of this paper. Instead, it will concentrate on the mechanics of how such funds were transferred between England and Prussia, which presented a number of practical obstacles. This may seem surprising, since the growth of international payment and banking systems is supposed to lie at the heart of the ‘commercial revolution’ of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.69 The bill of exchange enabled long-distance transfers of funds without transporting specie, while book transfers between different branches of merchant societies or money-changers minimised the need to use coin for transactions. Such techniques were developed by the great Italian merchant societies, whose activities were concentrated on the Mediterranean, France, the Low Countries and Spain. This classic Italianate banking system, however, never spread to England (although Italian merchants were active there) or east of the Rhine. Instead, the English and the German merchants used financial methods that have been seen as primitive and unworthy of study.70 Recent work by Paravicini, Murray and Jenks has modified this negative picture somewhat, arguing that the financial instruments (most notably a variety of obligatory writings and promissory notes) used by the English and Germans were not backward but in fact well suited to local conditions.71 We will return to this question shortly, but the key point to note is that western crusaders to

A. R. Bell, ‘English Members’, p. 338, n. 65. P. R. Spufford, Money and its Use in Medieval Europe (Cambridge, 1989), esp. pp. 240–63. 70 R. de Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediæval Bruges, Italian MerchantBankers, Lombards and Money-Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 347, 353. 71 J. M. Murray, Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 1280–1390 (Cambridge, 2005), p.  230; S. Jenks, ‘Small is Beautiful: Why Small Hanseatic Firms Survived in the Late Middle Ages’, in The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. J. Wubs-Mrozewicz and S. Jenks (Leiden, 2012), pp.  195−9. For other examples of the early use of commercial paper by English merchants, see A. R. Bell, C. Brooks and T. K. Moore, ‘The Non-use of Money in the Middle Ages’, in Money and its Use in Medieval Europe Three Decades On: Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Spufford, ed. M. Allen and N. Mayhew, Royal Numismatic Society Special Publication 52 (London, 2017), pp. 138–45. 68 69



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the Baltic could not simply use bills of exchange to move money between England and Prussia. The most basic method of transferring funds from England to Prussia was simply for the travellers physically to take sufficient money, in the form of coin or plate, with them. It seems that both of Derby’s expeditions were substantially paid for in this way, although during his second visit he did receive £400 from the master of the Teutonic Order in Prussia.72 The transport of precious metals, however, presented numerous logistical problems. One pound sterling was one pound by weight of nearly pure silver and, moreover, for much of the period the highest denomination silver coin in circulation was the penny. One thousand pounds in cash would thus consist of 240,000 silver pennies and weigh nearly half a ton. The introduction of gold coins by the northern European monarchies in the fourteenth century, first the French écu and later the English noble, may have reduced some of the difficulties inherent in transporting large sums of money in coin, since the greater unit value of gold compared to silver meant that it was possible to transport greater sums with fewer coins, but transport of coin remained bulky and inconvenient, not to mention risky. In 1328, Pope John XXII, seeking to avoid the commissions charged by Italian merchant societies for paper transfers, sent 60,000 florins in coin to the papal army in Lombardy. Despite the presence of 150 armed guards, the convoy was ambushed and half of the money lost.73 The English expeditions to the Baltic were, however, essentially miniature armies and may have believed that they could look after themselves. Perhaps more restrictive were the bullionist policies followed by medieval states. These equated the wealth of a country with its stocks of precious metals, and thus sought to encourage the import of silver and gold and to restrict their export.74 England, thanks to its precocious centralised administration and its island status, was particularly well-placed to regulate the movements of precious metals.75 As we have seen, in 1367–68, numerous crusaders had to acquire royal licences de passagio to take money (either in the form of cash or letters of exchange) out of the country, usually to Calais. It is not clear, however, how these sums were subsequently transferred to Prussia. More fundamentally, the long-distance transport of specie goes against the grain of financial history, which has favoured the development of alternatives to cash and the ever more intensive utilisation of money. In Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land, p. 149 Spufford, Money and its Use, p. 255 n. 3. 74 For an overview of medieval ‘bullionism’, see D. Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge. 2002), pp. 125–31. 75 J. H. Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272–1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice’, in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven, 1979), esp. pp. 174–87. 72 73

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essence, why tie up large sums for long periods by transporting coin across Europe when that money could instead be profitably put to use in trade? A more realistic alternative for English crusaders was therefore to borrow money in Prussia and arrange to repay their Prussian creditors on their return to Western Europe. However, this raised serious concerns about enforcing such contracts. Modern economists refer to this as the ‘Fundamental Problem of Exchange’.76 In brief, party A wants to enter into an exchange with party B. This could be a trading relationship, with principal A entrusting his goods to agent B for sale at a foreign market, or a credit transaction, with creditor A lending money to debtor B. Both parties will benefit from engaging in the exchange. However, party B can refuse to fulfil his obligations to party A and thus retain all of the benefit for himself. Knowing this, party A will refuse to enter into an exchange transaction with party B in the first place, leaving them both worse off. In essence, exchange will not take place unless both parties can be sure ex ante that their counterparties will meet their obligations. One solution is for sanctions to be imposed on the defaulting parties, such that the cost of defaulting is greater than the benefits from doing so. Such sanctions could be enforced by public order institutions, such as courts, although the efficacy of medieval court systems has been questioned, particularly for international transactions.77 Alternatively, economists have focused on the potential for private order enforcement institutions, often using game theory. The argument is that in repeated games, unlike the one-off game described above, reputation matters. For example, a debtor who defaults on his loans or an agent who defrauds his principal may find that no-one will lend him money or engage his services in the future. It has been argued that a community responsibility system, perhaps co-ordinated through merchant guilds, could enforce such private order sanctions and thus encourage exchange.78 There is currently a lively debate about the respective significance of private and public order institutions.79 There were a number of particular difficulties in solving the ‘Fundamental Problem of Exchange’ in the case of the English expeditions to the A. Greif, ‘The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis’, Review of European Economic History 4 (2000), pp. 251–84. 77 For a positive view of the strength of public order institutions, see J. Edwards and S. Ogilvie, ‘What Lessons for Economic Development Can We Draw from the Champagne Fairs?’, in Explorations in Economic History 49 (2012), pp. 131–48. 78 A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge, 2006), esp. pp. 55–123. This interpretation has recently been challenged in S. Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000–1800 (Cambridge, 2011), esp. pp. 271–85. 79 See the recent debate in the EcHR (J. Edwards and S. Ogilvie, ‘Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised’, EcHR 65 (2012), pp.  421–44; A. Greif, ‘The Magribi Traders: a Reappraisal? EcHR 65 (2012), pp. 445–69. 76



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Baltic. The first point is that public order institutions between England and the Baltic were very weak. It would have been costly for the Teutonic Order to litigate before the English law courts. Moreover, they may have found it difficult to secure and enforce court judgements against locally important figures. Furthermore, there was less scope for private order institutions. Reputation and honour were certainly important to the medieval aristocracy, albeit in a slightly different form than mercantile reputation. For example, Earl Humphrey de Bohun and his crusading partners promised on ‘[their] good faith and on [their] knightly honour’ to come to Bruges on the set term. If they defaulted, Stapleton, Burley, Devereaux and Waldegrave all promised to submit to be hostages for the debt, not to leave Bruges and not to take up military arms.80 There are very similar clauses in contemporary deeds by other Baltic crusaders: Renaud de Vivonne, James Douglas, and the famous Marshal Boucicaut.81 However, such chivalric codes may not have been as binding when they crossed social boundaries. Moreover, many of the noble participants in the Baltic expeditions would not have planned to return to Prussia, ruling out the possibility of repeated games. Finally, it would also have been counter-productive for the Teutonic Order to impose a collective punishment on all English crusaders, since they wished to encourage more would-be crusaders to come to Prussia. A different approach must be considered. We will now examine two examples, introduced above, to investigate other ways in which the ‘Fundamental Problem of Exchange’ was, if not solved, at least mitigated. The first is the money borrowed from two Prussian merchants, John Rothemberg and Nicholas Steveynbergh, by Sir William de Kerdeston in 1351.82 Kerdeston recognised before Chancery that he owed the merchants £600 sterling and granted that if he did not pay on time, then this sum could be raised from his lands and chattels in Norfolk. In theory, the use of recognisances should avoid lengthy judicial proceedings, since Kerdeston had already acknowledged his liability for the debt and provided for the automatic recovery of the principal in case of default.83 Moreover, the recognisance has TNA, DL 25/1638 and /1639. C. Higounet, ‘De La Rochelle à Torun: Aventure de Barons en Prusse et Relations Économiques (1363–1364)’, Le Moyen Âge 69 (1963); Historical Manuscripts Commission. Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part vi. The Manuscripts of the Duke of Hamilton (London, 1887), pp. 210–11; ‘Campagne de Boucicault en Prusse’, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 38 (1877), pp. 491–2. One of Boucicaut’s co-parties was Jean, Lord of Sempy, with whom Boucicaut had issued the challenge of Saint-Inglevert in 1390, thus highlighting more networks, this time within the French military community. 82 CCR, 1349–1354, p. 387. 83 For recognizances, see M. M. Postan, ‘Private Financial Instruments in Medieval England’, in his Medieval Trade and Finance (Cambridge, 1973), pp.  34–40; R. H. Bowers, ‘From Rolls to Riches: King’s Clerks and Moneylending in Thirteenth-Century England’, Speculum 58 (1983), pp.  62–8; C. McNall, ‘The Business of Statutory Debt 80 81

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some of the characteristics of a penal bond.84 Although the face value of the debt acknowledged was £600, in fact the bond was defeasible on payment of £275 sterling at London in equal portions at Michaelmas and Christmas 1351. It is likely, therefore, that the true value of Kerdeston’s debt was only £275 (including interest), but if he did not repay this at the set terms, then he would have been liable for the larger sum of £600, serving as a powerful incentive for Kerdeston to fulfil his obligations. In the event, the recognisance was cancelled, suggesting that Kerdeston satisfied his creditors. In the second example, John, Lord Montagu of Wark borrowed 1,000 nobles from Wynand Ostinchusen and Leofardus Blumendale at Danzig, probably to cover his costs incurred during the winter reisen of 1391–92.85 At Danzig, Montagu found sureties in the form of two English magnates (John, Lord Beaumont and William, Lord Botreaux), an English merchant, and three (also possibly English) citizens of Danzig.86 This meant that, should Montagu default, his creditors could recover their money from the sureties resident in Danzig rather than having to litigate in England. The sureties would then have to recoup this money from the principal debtors back in England, but would be better placed to do this than the principal creditors. As with Kerdeston, Montagu repaid on time and, on 12 July 1392, Leofardus acknowledged receipt of the 1,000 nobles from Montagu before the warden and aldermen of London. For greater security, this acquittance was also sealed by three other German merchants resident in London. The formal process in a highly visible venue would serve both as legal evidence of repayment and disseminate information about the repayment to the mercantile community. Moreover, Leofardus and the three German merchants also issued a bond for 1,000 nobles to Montagu. This meant that if Ostinchusen or another interested party tried to sue Montagu, perhaps claiming that Blumendale had not paid over the debt to them, then Montagu could recover the money from Blumendale or his sureties. Since these three merchants were resident in London, it would have been easier to prosecute them than to try and secure satisfaction before a Prussian court. Finally, Werner Paravicini has reconstructed a sophisticated network of Registries, 1283–1307’, in Credit and Debt in Medieval England c.1180–c.1350, ed. P. R. Schofield and N. J. Mayhew (Oxford, 2002), pp. 68–88. 84 Indeed, Joseph Biancalana argues that the later penal bond developed from recognizances of debt with penalty clauses; J. Biancalana, ‘The Development of the Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance’, Journal of Legal History 26 (2005), pp. 106–11. 85 Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls, 1381–1412, p.  183; Paravicini lists Montagu as being in Prussia during the winter of 1391–2, but Beaumont and Botreaux, two of Montagu’s sureties in Danzig, as being on the summer reisen of 1391 (Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, i, table 9, pp. 126–7). 86 John Bever, citizen of Danzig, one of Montagu’s sureties, maybe identical with the John Bebys who was appointed as governor of all the English merchants trading in the Baltic in 1391; T. H. Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, 1157–1611 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 67.



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finance linking the Baltic crusaders, Hanseatic merchants and the Teutonic Order via Bruges.87 According to this, the original advances to the crusaders were made by the Teutonic Order itself (or rather the debts acknowledged by the crusaders reflected the costs that they had incurred as guests of the Order). The Order itself, as discussed above, lacked the connections to collect these debts themselves in England. Instead they turned to Prussian merchants drawn from the great aldermanic families of Elbing, Thorn, Danzig, Königsberg and Marienberg, who ‘acted as guarantors and brokers of loans whose principal came from the coffers of the Teutonic Order itself ’.88 These merchants had the ability not just to collect on these debts in England or Bruges, but also to repatriate the principal (and, hopefully, profits) back to Prussia via their trading activities. Of course, repayment in England would be useless to the Prussian merchants if there was no way for them to repatriate this money to Prussia. Direct trade between England and Prussia provided one such route. The Prussian merchant could invest the money collected from his crusading debtor in English wool or, from the second half of the fourteenth century, cloth for export.89 These goods could either be exported directly to Prussia or sent to Bruges, where they would join wider trading networks linking the Mediterranean and the Baltic. Alternatively, the Prussian merchant could be repaid in Bruges and use this to fund the purchase of Flemish cloth for export back to Prussia. This can be illustrated in detail from our Bohun case study. We re-join our party at the end of the reisen. Before returning to England, however, Bohun and his fellows had to deal with the small matter of settling their bill. Three documents, two bonds and a receipt survive in the archives of the Duchy of Lancaster and provide the basic outlines of the financial transactions between the Bohun party and the Prussian merchants.90 The minimal reconstruction of payment flows is shown in figure 9.1 below. The two bonds were issued at Thorn in early January, one to Heinrich Schönhals and Matthäus Wyse for the sum of 1,600 écus and the other to Gerhard von Alen for 1,000 écus, both repayable at Bruges within two weeks after Easter (16 April). In the case of Bohun and company’s debt to Wyse and Schönhals, we know that this was initially repaid by Thomas Albon, as stated in the receipt made by Schönhals. Albon was a wealthy London woolmonger, connected to leading citizens like Nicholas Brembre and to foreign merchants.91 This payment was made on the eve of Easter Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, esp. pp. 79–82 and 96–108; Murray, Bruges, pp. 245–8; Jenks, ‘Small is Beautiful’, pp. 195–7. 88 Murray, Bruges, pp. 246–7. 89 Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, pp. 76–83; T. H. Lloyd, The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 141–3, 216–17; Murray, Bruges, pp. 236–45. 90 TNA, DL 25/1638, /1639, /1989. 91 In 1368, John Raymond of Anstey recognised a debt of £39 6s 3d to Brembre and Albon 87

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(two weeks before the due date) at Bruges in the hostel of Matheus van der Beurse, as intended in the original bond. Van der Beurse was a prominent hosteller and broker, who seems to have specialised in catering to the German merchant community in Bruges.92 Indeed, it is commonly believed that the use of the term ‘bourse’ for a financial centre was derived from the sign outside the van de Beurse family complex in Bruges, which displayed

(TNA, C 241/149/66) and, in 1370–1, Brembre and Albon jointly provided £300 towards a loan made by the Londoners to the king (Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London G, 1352–1374, ed. R. Sharpe (London, 1905), p. 275). In 1354–55 Albon was accused, with Fulk of Horwood, of colluding with foreign merchants to export wool contrary to the royal prohibition (CPR, 1370–1374, p. 320). In 1375 he was named as an attorney by Italian merchants to collect debts owed to them (Calendar of the Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London, 1364–1381, ed. A. H. Thomas (London, 1929), p. 204). 92 For the connections between the van der Beurse family and the Hanse merchants, see Murray, Bruges, pp. 116, 163, 227, 324.



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the punning family arms of three purses.93 Van der Beurse also applied his seal to the receipt for greater security. Although we have no further information about how Albon was satisfied, the fact that this receipt and the bond itself ended up cancelled in the archives of the Bohuns’ successors implies that he had been repaid in turn. The bond to von Alen was recovered by Bohun with the endorsement that payment had been made to Reynold Papen at the hostel of Arnold Polthus, again as specified in the original agreement.94 There are no other associated documents, so it is unknown whether this latter repayment was made by the debtors directly or via an intermediary. There may well have been more to the story than the bald facts set out above and we may deduce further steps, building on Paravicini’s general reconstruction of the financial transactions between western crusaders and the Teutonic Order. These are shown in figure 9.2 below. Figure 9.2. Reconstruction of the financial transactions between western crusaders and the Teutonic Order

First, the German merchants named as the creditors in the bonds may have been acting as guarantors for the Teutonic Order itself; in which case the debts acknowledged to von Alen, Schönhals and Wyse actually represent the cost of Bohun’s stay with the Teutonic knights, or even an ‘entrance fee’ for his participation in the reisen.95 Second, the three German merchants For the folk etymology of ‘bourse’, see ibid., pp. 178–9. For Polthus as a Bruges hosteller, see Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, ii, p. 290. 95 The possibility that there may have been some kind of fixed fee or customary rate charged by the Order gains some support from the fact that another crusading lord, Reynold Vivonne of Pouillé, also issued a bond at Thorn only a few days after Bohun and for exactly the same sum (see below, 204–5). 93

94

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would have issued bonds promising to repay the Order later in the year, after they had been repaid by Bohun and company. Meanwhile, and thirdly, Thomas Albon was busy exporting wool from England to Calais for sale to Flemish merchants. Fourth, when the bonds fell due at Easter, Albon used the credits from the sale of his wool to redeem at least one of the Bohun bonds from Schönhals. Unfortunately, it is not known how this was arranged. It is possible that Bohun and company had a prior agreement with Albon that he would extend them credit in Bruges and that they would repay him in England. Alternatively, a broker may have matched Schönhals with Albon.96 Fifth, Albon presented the bond to Bohun and company in England for payment.97 Sixth, returning to Bruges, the payment by Albon to Schönhals was confirmed by the hosteller van der Beurse. It might then have been credited to Beurse’s account with one of the Bruges money-changers, giving Schönhals access to the local balance transfer system.98 This could then have been used to purchase Flemish cloth for re-export back to Prussia, or to settle any debts for cloth previously purchased on credit. Seventh, the profits from the resale of this cloth in Prussia could have been used to repay the Teutonic Order, thus completing the circuit. There are two further examples of crusade financing from the same campaigning year of 1362–63 that reinforce the process set out above. The first case study is that of Jean de Blois, whose accounts show that he raised funds totalling £1,893 11s groot during his Baltic expedition, of which £571 14s 4d groot was transported to Prussia in cash and the remaining £1,321 6s 8d groot was borrowed in Prussia.99 The second, concerning a group of Poitevin nobles, bears remarkable similarities to Bohun’s transactions, both in terms of the language of the bonds and the role of leading merchants as intermediaries.100 At Thorn on Sunday 15 January 1363, Renaud de Vivonne,

The exchange rate of 32 5/12d groot per écu at which Albon redeemed the bond was not specified in the original document. It is possible that the exchange rate was the result of a negotiation between the two parties and could vary depending on the parties’ perceptions of their relative credit. Paravicini has found roughly contemporaneous examples where the exchange rate is cited at between 32½d groot and 33½d groot per écu, representing a spread of between 0.25 per cent and 3.2 per cent above the rate paid by Albon (Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, ii, pp. 295–6). As a result, Albon may have saved up to 7 livres groot. 97 Bohun was in receipt of a royal fee of £103 14¾d assigned on the farm of the city of London, to make up the balance of lands worth £500 that Edward III had promised to his father William. Although the pipe rolls simply state that this sum was paid to Bohun, it is possible that he assigned Albon to collect it on his behalf (CPR 1361–1364, p.  482; E 372/20, item London m. 1d; /209, item London m. 2; /210, item London mm. 1–2). 98 De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit. 99 Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, ii, p. 168. 100 Higounet, ‘De La Rochelle à Torun’, pp. 529–40. As noted above, this figure of 2,600 écus is identical to that owed by Bohun, despite the different sizes of their parties. 96



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lord of Pouillé, Gui sire d’Argenton-le-Châtel and the latter’s brother Geoffroi, issued a bond for 2,600 écus to Gerard de Lare, merchant of Thorn and procurator of Herman de Dulmen of the same, to be paid in the house of Matthew van der Beurse in Bruges on 1 June. Later, on Saturday 13 May, Renaud, Gui and Geoffroi issued a further bond for 1,100 écus payable to Herman before 9 August 1363, again at the Beurse hostel in Bruges. However, they seem to have paid only 900 écus and, on 8 March 1364, they again bound themselves to pay the outstanding 2,800 écus to Herman or his attorney at Bruges in the Beurse hostel, in two equal portions due on 7 April and 12 May 1364. Again, Renaud failed to meet the agreed terms, paying only 1,200 écus on one occasion and a further 260 écus on another. Subsequently, on 26 August 1364, John Chandrier, a leading burgess of La Rochelle, the chief trading port of Poitou, entered into an obligation on behalf of Gui lord d’Argenton, one of Renaud’s pledges, to pay 1,600 écus to Gerard, in the name of the said Herman, for the remainder of the debt and ‘for the recovery and remedy of the damages, expenses and interest had and due by reason of the late payment of the said debt’. This was to be paid in the Beurse hostel at Bruges before Christmas. This payment was duly made by Chandrier’s factors, as Gerard recognised on 22 December 1364. Presumably Chandrier, like Albon, then sought to recover the money that he had paid from Gui. The above chain of events can be summarised as follows. First, there was a flow of credit from east to west, in the form of the loans advanced to Bohun and company and Vivonne and company in Prussia, which were settled at Bruges by Albon and (in part) Chandrier respectively, who were presumably reimbursed in England and Poitou by the principals. This credit flow was balanced out by a flow of goods of equivalent value from west to east (wool from England or wine from Poitou to Flanders, cloth from Flanders to Prussia). Although it is unlikely that any actual coins were transported across Northern Europe, the net effect was the transfer of 6,560 écus in value to Prussia, thus completing the circuit. This demonstrates two key points. First, it provides another example of the concern with the enforceability of long-distance credit arrangements, since, in the case of default, creditors could recover their money from local merchants. It also shows that public judicial institutions were used by merchants and that credit arrangements were structured to facilitate the operations of the courts. These arrangements were also designed to increase the potential for private order enforcement mechanisms. In the above case, the Teutonic Order itself would have found it very difficult to collect debts in England and to repatriate that money back to Prussia. Both the public and private order institutions between the Teutonic Order in Prussia and noble debtors in England were very weak. The ‘Fundamental Problem of Exchange’ could be circumvented, however, by breaking down the credit transfer into a number of shorter steps. So there was a chain of relationships, between the Teutonic

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Order and the Prussian merchants, the Prussian merchants and English or Flemish merchants, and the English/Flemish merchants and the English nobles. Each of these links was stronger since they could more easily make use of local public order institutions. Moreover, there was also more opportunity for effective private order institutions, given more frequent and significant interactions between each party. For example, the English noble debtor may not have been too concerned about defaulting on an obligation to the Teutonic Order or even to Prussian merchants, but he would have frequently interacted with English merchants, thus increasing the reputational cost of default. Second, and equally importantly, it reveals the intimate and necessary connection between trade and credit. As James Murray puts it, ‘money and credit flow along with trade … for only where merchants travelled could there be the kinds of financial infrastructure that could enable journeying knights … to tap or transmit money over great distances’.101 Bruges played a key role in these transactions as ‘the pivot of the financial relationship between the Northern world and the Atlantic countries at this date’.102 The European Balance of Payments System This brings us to a further question, namely the role that these arrangements to fund the expeditions by western crusaders to the Baltic played within the wider context of international financial and trading networks. This can best be approached using the concept of the balance of payments, which is essentially an accounting record of all the monetary transactions between a country and the rest of the world.103 A country’s balance of payments is usually divided into the current account and the capital or financial account. The current account (sometimes loosely referred to as the balance of trade) comprises both trade (‘visible’) and services (‘invisible’). In the cases described above, the export of cloth from Flanders to Prussia would be categorised as ‘visible’ trade, while the transfer of funds to repay English debts incurred in Prussia could best be classed under the ‘invisible’ or service category. Thus ‘tourist’ income from western crusaders would therefore have made a positive contribution to the Prussian current account. As an accounting identity, a country’s balance of payments must balance exactly. This means that any surplus or deficit on the current account must be balanced by an equivalent change in the capital account, that is to say, Murray, Bruges, p. 248. Higounet, ‘De La Rochelle à Torun’, p. 530. 103 For an approachable introduction, see P. R. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 8th edn (London, 2009), pp. 301–9. For the development of the concept, see M. P. Taylor, The Balance of Payments: New Perspectives on Open Economy Macroeconomics (Aldershot, 1989), pp. 1–18. 101

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the purchase of assets abroad or sale to foreigners of domestic assets. Today, a country with a current account surplus but which did not wish to repatriate this money (since that might drive up exchange rates, with implications for the competitiveness of domestic industry) could instead buy up financial assets in the deficit country, most often in the form of government debt. In the middle ages, however, there were only a limited number of assets that foreigners might want or were permitted to acquire, and so imbalances in the current account were generally resolved via transfers of precious metals, which is to say that a deficit in the current account would lead to an outflow of specie (silver or gold) from the country and a surplus in the current account would bring an influx of specie into the country.104 In theory, this process should be effectively self-regulating, since a country with a persistent current account deficit would eventually run out of reserves of silver or gold and thus be unable to fund further imports. This concept of the balance of payments can be used to examine the macro-economic effects of English (and other western) participation in the reisen. Prussia seems to have had a deficit on its current account (visible trade) with Flanders; in other words, they imported more goods from Flanders, mostly in the form of finished cloth, than they exported to Flanders. Based on their analysis of the exchange rate between Flanders and Prussia between 1385 and 1450, Oliver Volckart and Nicholas Wolf found that the Prussian mark was consistently undervalued against the Flemish pond groot, which they attributed to this unfavourable balance of trade. In addition, they found evidence for exports of specie from Prussia to Flanders but no indication of any flows of precious metals in the opposite direction. This persistent deficit in the Prussians’ visible trade with Flanders must have been funded in some way. Volckart and Wolf have suggested that the surplus that Prussia enjoyed in its trade with Poland and Hungary brought silver into Prussia, which could then be transferred to Flanders.105 An alternative to the export of specie was a three-cornered trade involving Prussia, England and Flanders, with Bruges as the central entrepôt. Hanseatic merchants exported goods (wax, timber, furs, salted fish) to England. The proceeds from the sale of these goods were used to buy English goods, mostly wool in the early fourteenth century and later, from the second half of the fourteenth century, cloth.106 Much of this English wool and cloth would have been exported to Flanders, and this revenue could have been used to buy Flemish cloth for re-export back to Prussia. As Murray puts it, ‘the creation of credit based on wool delivered to Bruges’ was a ‘natural Spufford, Money and its Use, pp. 254, 342–4. O. Volckart and N. Wolf, ‘Estimating Financial Integration in the Middle Ages: What Can We Learn from a TAR Model?’, Journal of Economic History 66 (2006), pp. 122–39, at p. 132 and n. 29. 106 Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, pp. 96–101. 104 105

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… extension to Hanse business activities’ involving the ‘exchange of wool for finished Flemish cloth as return draught’.107 In short, the Prussians had a trade deficit with Flanders but a surplus with England, while the Flemings had a deficit with England and a surplus with Prussia; in effect, these international trade balances could be netted out. Another possibility is that Prussian ‘invisible’ earnings, in the form of the tourist income from western participants in the reisen, could have offset some of the deficit in terms of ‘visible’ trade. In the Bohun example discussed above, for instance, the monies received by Schönhals and Wyse, and von Alen in Bruges were probably used, at least in part, either to purchase cloth for re-export to Prussia or to settle a previous account for cloth bought on credit. This cycle has been reconstructed in detail by Paravicini, and is summarised thus by Jenks: In effect, the merchants were using the crusaders to transfer their idle surplusses [in Prussia] back to Bruges, with the added fillip that they had the use of the crusaders’ money in the interim. That, in turn, allowed the merchants to purchase cloth on long-term credit in Flanders, repaying their suppliers from the funds credited to them by the crusaders through the good offices of hostellers and money changers in Bruges … this cycle amounted to a very long-term – and correspondingly risky – letter of exchange.108

The key question is how significant such crusading expenditure may have been in relation to the wider Prussian balance of payments. Unfortunately, given the surviving source material, it is not possible to reconstruct Prussia’s balance of payments in any detail. Such an exercise is impossible even for much better-documented countries such as England.109 However, it is possible to glean some indications of the scale of visible trade from scattered references. At Thorn in 1362–63, for example, the total value of custumable goods was nearly 70,000 Prussian marks. During 1368–69, the Prussian cities combined imported goods worth around 13,000 Prussian marks from overseas via Lübeck and exported goods worth about 20,000 Prussian marks. Between 1390 and 1405 the great steward of Königsberg exported goods worth about 22,000 Prussian marks to Flanders.110 These rough figures can be compared to the sums known to have been expended in Prussia by western crusaders. In 1357–58, Gaston de Foix borrowed the equivalent of roughly 12,000 Prussian marks (24,000 écus) in Murray, Bruges, pp. 244–5. Jenks, ‘Small is Beautiful’, pp. 5–6. 109 T. H. Lloyd, ‘Overseas Trade and the English Money Supply in the Fourteenth Century’, in Credit and Debt in Medieval England c.1180–c.1350, ed. N. J. Mayhew, Edwardian Monetary Affairs, British Archaeological Society Reports 36 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 96–124. 110 W. Paravicini, ‘Eddelleute, Hansen, Brüggerbürger: die Finanzierung der Westeuropäischen Preussenreisen im 14. jahrhundert’, Hansische Geschichtsblätter 104 (1986), p. 18. 107

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Elbing, Bruges and elsewhere. In the particularly well-documented year of 1362–63, examined in detail above, Jean de Blois, Bohun, Vivonne and their companies issued bonds for a total of around 9,000 Prussian marks to their creditors in Prussia. In 1380, the Teutonic Order advanced around 13,500 Prussian marks (27,000 florins) to a group of French knights and sergeants. In 1387, the duke of Austria borrowed 6,500 Prussian marks from Heinrich Gôte (representing the Order) and the city of Lübeck. Finally, during his three expeditions to the Baltic in 1388–89, 1395–96 and 1399–1400, the duke of Julich-Guelders borrowed nearly 22,000 Prussian marks from the Order. Even this cursory examination suggests that ‘tourist’ income from western crusaders could have played a very significant role within Prussia’s overall balance of payments.111

* * *

As set out above, the case study of Earl Humphrey de Bohun and his companions provides a good starting point for an analysis of the financial and military dynamics of an English crusading party to Prussia. First, the English military records demonstrate strong bonds between these travelling companions, outside of the formal financial relationship explicitly expressed in the bond signed and sealed at Thorn. They demonstrate a complex set of sub-retinues over an eleven-year period from Satalia in 1361 to the projected naval campaign of 1372, taking in seven different theatres of engagement. It can be demonstrated that these five companions were not thrown together by chance, but had chosen to campaign together. Thus we can propose that military relations were sometimes a precursor and accompaniment to continuing close social ties. Second, participants in such expeditions made use of sophisticated financial instruments to transfer funds from Western Europe to the Baltic. Long distance credit relationships were subdivided into a series of shorter but stronger steps, like links within a chain, designed to maximise the effectiveness of both private and public order institutions. Moreover, such arrangements were not just used to avoid the inconveniences of transporting large amounts of specie and to help mitigate the ‘Fundamental Problem of Exchange’, but were integrated into wider patterns of trade. In fact, the ‘tourist’ income received from Baltic crusaders may have been sufficient to offset a substantial part of any Prussian deficit with Western Europe in terms of ‘visible’ trade. Thus the macro-economic role of English and other Western European crusaders to Prussia may have been as important as their purely military activities.

111

Paravicini, Die Preussenreisen, ii, table 88, pp. 212–19.

10

Naval Service and the Cinque Ports, * 1322–1453 Craig L. Lambert

The history of the Cinque Ports, a confederacy of towns linked together by mutual interests under charters of privileges, is a long one. The genesis of the Ports is much debated. What we do know is that by the twelfth century the original five head ports of Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich were joined by Winchelsea and Rye, both of which were given ‘ancient status.’ Expansion was rapid and by the fourteenth century approximately thirty towns across Sussex, Kent and Essex were affiliated with the Ports.1 Some contemporaries saw them as the most important ports in England and their status as a county, with each head port forming a borough, ensured the Ports played an important role in political matters.2 The Crown did not grant the Ports’ charters unconditionally and when the king launched a military or naval campaign he could ask the Cinque Ports to provide fifty-seven ships, each manned by twenty-one men, for fifteen days free of charge. Obviously, the origin and evolution of this ‘ship-service’ has * I would like to thank Andrew Ayton for his collaboration over several years on

maritime topics that have helped stimulate the ideas presented here. I would also like to thank him for sharing transcripts of some documents that feature in this present chapter. The author gratefully acknowledges the support for two projects from which this piece is derived: the Arts and Humanities Research Council, ‘The Evolution of English Shipping Capacity and Shipboard Communities from the early Fifteenth Century to Drake’s Circumnavigation (1577)’, based at the University of Southampton and headed by Craig Lambert (AH/L004062/1); and the Economic and Social Research Council, ‘Shipping, Mariners and Port Communities in Fourteenth- Century England’, based at the University of Hull and headed by Andrew Ayton (RES-000–22–4127). 1 The history of the confederation is examined in detail by K. M. E. Murray, The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (Manchester, 1935). 2

The Estate Book of Henry de Bray, c.1298–1340, ed. D. Willis (London, 1916), p.  5; J. R. Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, 924–1327 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 204, 257, 361.

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attracted the attention of scholars.3 More generally, however, naval historians are interested in the overall contribution the Cinque Ports made to Plantagenet and Lancastrian naval operations. In examining the Ports’ role in naval operations over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, historians have not been kind. We are told that while they played a crucial role in Edward I’s wars, by the time of Edward III’s reign they ceased to be of importance. Such historiographical arguments can be traced back to the nineteenth century. In 1813 John Lyon asserted that by the 1370s the Ports were unable to contribute large numbers of ships to naval operations.4 A more measured analysis was offered in 1847 by Nicholas Harris Nicolas.5 Nicolas drew on a wealth of manuscript sources to argue that the Ports played an important part in the naval wars of the Plantagenet kings. Despite the work of Nicolas, the studies that followed continued the naval-decline narrative. In 1892 Montague Burrows traced the start of the decline to the reign of Edward II.6 In 1900 Ford Maddox Hueffer supported Burrows’ assertion.7 In 1907 and 1926 Michael Oppenheim argued that during Edward III’s reign the Ports’ involvement in naval operations declined markedly.8 In 1929 and 1932 F. W. Brooks agreed with the established narrative.9 In 1990 Jonathan Sumption summed up the state of the Cinque Ports in the fourteenth century thus: ‘they were no longer the great maritime power they had once been. Romney could support only one ship in 1341 and Hythe none at all’.10 In 1997 Nicholas Rodger wrote that ‘their period of greatest importance was the thirteenth century’.11 In 2011 Graham Cushway suggested that ‘by the time of Edward III’s reign, the Cinque Ports’ moment had passed’.12 In 2013 Susan Rose stated that ‘towards the end of the fourteenth century and in the fifteenth century the Cinque Ports contingent 3 4

N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports’, EHR 111 (1996), pp. 636–51. J. Lyon, The History of the Town and Port of Dover and of Dover Castle with a Short

Account of the Cinque Ports (Dover, 1813), p. 231. N. H. Nicolas, History of the Royal Navy: From the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution, 2 vols (London, 1847) who discusses the Cinque Ports throughout his work. 6 M. Burrows, Cinque Ports (London 3rd edn, 1892), ch. 6. 7 F. M. Hueffer, The Cinque Ports: A Historical and Descriptive Record (London, 1900), p. 15. 8 M. Oppenheim, ‘Maritime History,’ in The Victoria History of the County of Sussex, ed. W. Page, 2 (London, 1907), pp.  125–65; M. Oppenheim, ‘Maritime History’, in The Victoria History of the County of Kent, ed. W. Page (London, 1926), pp. 251, 265. In History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy from 1400–1660 (London, 1897), p. 2, Oppenheim blamed the existence of the Ports for delaying the development of the royal navy. 9 F. W. Brooks, ‘The Cinque Ports’, The Mariner’s Mirror 15 (1929), pp. 142–91. 10 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London, 1990), p. 176. 11 N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (London, 1997), p. 126. 12 G. Cushway, Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377 (Woodbridge, 2011), p. 87. 5



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in any royal fleet declined markedly’.13 The naval-decline theory is supported by studies that have a focus on a particular member of the confederacy.14 Not all local studies of the Ports are so pessimistic, however, and in 2010 Helen Clarke argued that Sandwich remained important from 1360 until the middle of the fifteenth century.15 As noted above, the reasons why the Ports were granted their charters of privileges also forms an important strand in the historiography. Here historians are trying to grapple with a key problem: if during the Hundred Years’ War the Ports gradually became superfluous to naval and military operations, why did the Crown continue to reissue their charters? For Burrows and Oppenheim confirmation of their charters was inextricably linked to their ship service.16 Murray challenged this by pointing out that the origin of the Ports’ privileges owed more to local conditions and other issues, particularly their interest in the herring fisheries.17 In 1996 Nicholas Rodger entered this debate.18 For Rodger, the Ports’ charters were not granted because of their ship-service, which by Edward III’s reign had more or less ceased, but were granted on the basis of the Ports’ proximate location to Normandy.19 That each king reissued their charters of privilege was based entirely on the need to keep the Ports as firm supporters of crown policy. In 2012 Susan Rose acknowledged the important role geography had played in the origins of the Cinque Ports’ charters: ‘it was necessary for the security of the realm for the Crown to have confidence in the loyalty of those who lived in the coast of Kent’.20 The geo-political thesis is certainly a powerful one and is most eloquently argued by Rodger and Rose. They are probably correct to argue that it was 13 S. Rose, England’s Medieval Navy, 1066–1509: Ships, Men and Warfare (Barnsley, 2013), pp.  55–6. See also S. Rose, ‘Maritime Logistics and Edward I’s Military Campaigns: What can be Learnt from the Surviving Documents’, The Mariner’s Mirror 99 (2013), pp. 388–97. 14 See, for example, W. D. Cooper, The History of Winchelsea: One of the Ancient Towns Added to the Cinque Ports (London, 1850), pp. 97–105; D. and B. Martin, with contributions by J. Eddison, D. Rudling and D. Sylvester, New Winchelsea Sussex: A Medieval Port Town (King’s Lynn, 2004), pp. 13–15. 15 H. Clarke, S. Pearson, M. Mate and K. Parfitt, Sandwich, ‘The Completest Medieval Town in England’: A Study of the Town and Port from its Origins to 1600 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 119, 146. 16 Burrows, Cinque Ports, ch. 3; Oppenheim, History of the Administration, p. 2; Cushway, Edward III and the War at Sea, p. 87 follows a similar argument. 17 Murray, Constitutional History, pp. 9–12.

Rodger, ‘The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports’. The geo-political idea was not entirely novel by 1996. See, for example, Oppenheim, ‘Maritime History of Kent’, p. 243; Brooks, ‘Cinque Ports’, p. 151; Hueffer, The Cinque

18 19

Ports, p. 2.

S. Rose, ‘The Value of the Cinque Ports to the Crown 1200–1500’, in Roles of the Sea in Medieval England, ed. R. Gorski (Woodbridge, 2012), p. 53. See also Rose, England’s

20

Medieval Navy, pp. 56–7.

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the proximity of the Ports to France that ensured their charters were continually granted. They are also right to say that, for the most part, during the Hundred Years’ War the naval service of the Ports was no different to that provided by any other port. That Edward III and his successors rarely called on the Ports’ traditional ship-service is not surprising. Edward III’s reign produced significant changes in the forms of military service, in particular the move away from feudal levies to fully paid armies.21 That Edward III did not issue demands for the Ports to perform their ship service therefore fits more broadly with the developments that were occurring within the system of military recruitment. However, that Edward III rarely called on the Ports’ ship-service does not mean they were unimportant, nor does it mean their naval service was not in some ways unique. Indeed, as Cinque Port ships participated in naval operations so frequently it can be argued that they did provide an unusual service.22 Looking below at the numbers of ships the Ports contributed to naval operations over the period from 1320 to 1453, it is easy to see why the decline narrative developed. Over 1369–95 and then after 1417 there was indeed a fall in the numbers of ships that some members of the Cinque Ports provided for naval operations. The traditional interpretation is that this reducing role in naval campaigns was caused by the silting of the Ports’ harbours and loss of trade, both leading to economic decline.23 It is true that some of the members of the confederacy commercially declined over this period. Yet others, such as Rye, entered a period of prosperity.24 It will be demonstrated here that the reasons the Ports supplied fewer ships after 1369 are far more nuanced than has previously been argued. That the decline narrative has become the established argument fits more broadly with the current historiography of the Hundred Years’ War, which argues that once the war re-started in 1369 English military fortunes reversed. It is true that Edward III gradually lost the lands he had claimed through the Treaty of Brétigny, but many political and economic factors played their part in this story. In terms of this chapter it is important to note that maritime historians of the Hundred Years’ War follow the established narrative by arguing that over the last quarter of the fourteenth century English naval operaThese changes are complex and have been dealt with by Andrew Ayton in several places: A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III

21

(Woodbridge, 1999), ch. 1; A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59.

C. Lambert, ‘The Contribution of the Cinque Ports to the Wars of Edward II and Edward III: New Methodologies and Estimates’, in Roles of the Sea in Medieval England,

22

ed. R. Gorski (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 59–78. 23 The Navy of the Lancastrian Kings: Accounts and Inventories of William Soper, Keeper of the King’s Ships, 1422–1427, ed. S. Rose (London, 1982), pp. 28–9; Rose, England’s Medieval Navy, p. 57. 24 Martin et al., Winchelsea, p. 21.



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tions became less effective.25 Andrew Ayton and others have started to question this theory.26 An alternative narrative is that after 1370 English naval commanders pursued an aggressive war at sea. In some cases naval forces were deployed to support English-held ‘barbicans’ on the French coast, but armatas (small fleets composed of heavily armed sailing ships, barges and balingers) were also assembled to seek out the enemy and bring them to battle.27 Thus, a case study of the naval service of the Cinque Ports comes at an opportune moment, presenting us with the chance to explore the wider naval-decline theory through an examination of a group of ports that were at the forefront of the naval war. To reconstruct the involvement of the Cinque Ports in the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-French wars (c. 1322–c. 1453) requires a systematic survey of the navy payrolls, which record the requisition and payment of ships and men for naval duties. After 1327 the Ports rarely performed their shipservice, meaning their vessels are recorded in the navy payrolls. Using a methodological approach we can use these sources to quantify the numbers of separate ships that each port contributed to naval operations across this period.28 Most navy payrolls reveal, for each ship, its name and port of origin, the master’s name and crew numbers. Using the three identifiers of port, ship name and master’s name it is possible to identify separate ships. Within a ten-year time-frame records of ships that are identical according to these three ‘identifiers’ are deemed to be referring to the same vessel. As an example, in the period 1370–80 Thomas Bolle of Sandwich served seven times in naval operations. On two occasions he commanded the Peter while for the other five he was in charge of the James. So although Bolle undertook seven voyages he did so in only two separate ships.29 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War III: Divided Houses (London, 2009), pp.  132, 183, 378. Cushway, Edward III and the War at Sea, ch. 20; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, ch. 8. 25

A. Ayton and C. Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea: Essex Ports in England’s Wars, 1320–1400’, in The Fighting Essex Soldier: Recruitment, War and Society

26

in the Fourteenth Century, ed. J. Ward, N. Wiffen and C. Thornton (Hertfordshire, 2017), pp.  98–142; idem, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare: Strategy, Organisation and Manpower’, in The Hundred Years War: Problems in Focus Revisited, ed. A. Curry (London, forthcoming, 2018); A. Ayton, ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England’, JMH 43 (2017), pp. 4–23; C. Lambert, ‘Henry V and the Crossing to France: Reconstructing Naval Operations for the Agincourt Campaign, 1415’, JMH 43 (2017), pp. 24–39. Many years ago James Sherborne drew attention to the important part naval operations played in wartime strategy in the latter part of the fourteenth century, see J. W. Sherborne, ‘The English Navy: Shipping and Manpower, 1369–89’, in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London and Rio Grande, 1994), pp. 1–28.

See especially, Ayton and Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare’. This methodology is explored in more detail in Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops’. 29 BL, Additional MS 37494, fol. 20v; TNA, E 101/30/24, m. 1; E 101/31/32, m. 1; E 101/33/31, m. 6; E 101/36/14, m. 5; E 101/37/25, m. 3; E 101/180/2, f. 3v; E 101/182/6, fol. 32r. 27

28

216

craig l. lambert

The Cinque Ports and Naval Service The naval service of the Cinque Ports can be characterised in three ways. Firstly, they undertook defensive and offensive operations, which included coastal raiding. In 1325 the Ports assembled a fleet of twenty-three ships manned by 1,080 mariners to guard the coast during the War of St Sardos.30 In 1340 at least one ship from Sandwich and one from Winchelsea were involved in the fight at Sluys, and in 1347 twelve Cinque Ports ships participated in the sea blockade during the siege of Calais.31 From April to July 1372 the Ports put two fleets to sea. The first flotilla served to combat ‘la malice des enemys’, while the second fleet put to sea for ‘la sauve garde de la costre’.32 In April 1436 the Ports were ordered to go to sea against the king’s enemies.33 A typical coastal raid was that undertaken in July 1339 when some ships from the Cinque Ports attacked Boulogne, destroyed forty-three ships of various types, set fire to the town and issued some summary justice by hanging several men.34 The Crown was apt at exploiting the zeal of the Portsmen. In 1435 the Winchelsea shipowner/master William Morforte begged the Crown to forgive him for his crimes against ships of Picardy ports – towns at the time of his actions allied to England as part of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance – as he ‘is nowe opon the see at his owen grete coste, with one hundred persons arrayed, for to withstonde and depresse the kyngs enemys and his rebellis of this worthy reame’.35 When Morforte appealed in October 1435, Burgundy had abandoned the English cause and Henry VI was happy to offer him pardon as long as he paid a fine for escaping custody in Dover castle. Seven years later Morforte’s rehabilitation was complete and he was named as the owner of two barges, one being the Mary and ‘that other pratte (fine) barge called Trinite,’ that were to serve as part of an elaborate scheme to keep the sea.36 Secondly, they provided transport and supply ships for English expeditionary forces. In 1342, of the approximately 450 ships that transported the king’s army to Brittany, eighty-eight were supplied by the Cinque Ports.37 In 30 31 32

TNA, E 101/17/10. TNA, E 101/389/8, m. 16; Clarke et al., Sandwich, pp. 62–3, 81; E 101/21/36, mm. 4–5. TNA, E 101/31/32.

33

The White and Black Books of the Cinque Ports, 1432–1955, ed. F. Hull (London, 1966), p. 8. Nicolas, History of the Royal Navy, ii, pp. 41–2; Adam Murimuth, Continuatio Chronicarum, ed. E. M. Thompson, Rolls Ser., 93 (London, 1889), pp. 103–4. There is some confusion as to whether this occurred in 1339 or in January 1340 (Murimuth has the feast of St Hillary as the date of the raid, so 13 January 1340, whereas Nicolas has July 1339. The 1339 date is likely more accurate as the raid recorded by Murimuth is probably that led by Robert Morley). 35 PROME, 11, p. 180. 36 Ibid, pp. 373–4. In 1443 Morforte served in command of the 120-ton Mary when he shipped forces from Southampton to Normandy, TNA, E 101/53/39. 34

37

TNA, E 36/204, pp. 221–40.



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

217

1356, of the 110 ships that transported the duke of Lancaster to Normandy, twenty-five were provided by Folkestone, Hythe, Rye, Sandwich, Seaford, Small Hythe and Winchelsea.38 In 1384 the Ports’ contributed nine ships and over two-thirds of the manpower for a fleet of eleven vessels that supported English military operations in Scotland.39 Finally, the Ports provided the Crown with a base for launching military expeditions. In 1359 Edward III shipped from Sandwich the best-equipped force to leave England in the later middle ages.40 In 1423 a fleet of fifty-six ships transported Thomas Beaufort to France from Sandwich.41 A year later fiftyseven ships sailed to Calais from Sandwich under Robert, Lord Willoughby.42 It is also likely that some contingents assembled for Henry VI’s ‘coronation expedition’ left from Sandwich.43 In 1439 and 1442 two fleets sailed from Winchelsea.44 The use of the Ports as assembly- and crossing-points continued into the reign of Henry VIII. In April 1513 victuals and ordnance were shipped from Sandwich in support of Henry’s invasion of France.45 The Shipping Contributions of the Cinque Ports to Naval Operations, 1322–145346 Members of the Cinque Port confederacy were located primarily within the borders of two counties, Kent and Sussex, with only Brightlingsea, a limb of Sandwich, falling within Essex. As Table 10.1 shows, Brightlingsea was an interesting case, contributing fifteen ships, or just under a tenth (8 per cent) of Essex’s ships. The port’s involvement in naval operations is also curious because from 1352 until 1423 it ceased to provide ships.47 A shipsurvey of 1572 shows the port had eleven ships ranging from thirty to fifty

38 39

TNA, E 403/379, mm. 36–7; E 101/612/44; E 101/612/48. TNA, E 101/40/7. The fleet was manned by 197 homes darmes, 287 archers and 338

mariners. 137 homes darmes, 227 archers and 228 mariners were aboard Cinque Ports ships.

TNA, E 101/27/22; E 101/27/23; E 101/27/24; E 101/27/25. TNA, E 101/51/7. 42 TNA, E 101/51/10. 43 TNA, E 403/695, m. 20. 44 TNA, E 403/746, mm. 16–18; E 101/53/39. 45 TNA, SP 1/229, fol. 195. 46 Throughout the foregoing analysis the Cinque Ports ships that transported Edward III’s army to France in 1346 are not included. This is because the list of shipping involved in the 1346 fleet offers no nominal data and so we can never know how many ships involved in the 1346 fleet sailed in other naval operations. On the 1346 fleet, see C. L. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century 40 41

(Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 136–41. 47

TNA, E 101/51/7, m. 1.

218

craig l. lambert

tons, suggesting Brightlingsea shipowners continued to invest in shipping.48 One reason for its lack of involvement in naval operations between 1353 and 1422 could be the effects of plague in 1348.49 Table 10.1: Separate ships contributed by Essex ports to naval operations, 1322–1453

Number of Ships

Number of mariners

Tonnage (number of ships with recorded tonnage)

2

6

53 (2)

Benfleet

1

40

140 (1)

Bradfield

2

31

100 (1)

Brightlingsea*

15

169

221 (5)

Burnham-on-Crouch

12

76

183 (7)

Coggeshall

1

34

—

Colchester

63

1058

2479 (39)

Fobbing

6

125

354 (4)

Fordham

2

23

70 (2)

Goldhanger

1

—

30

Hadleigh

1

20

—

Harwich

45

1089

1993(22)

Ports

Alresford

Maldon

15

186

421 (9)

Manningtree

6

61

165 (4)

Mersea

2

23

40 (2)

St Osyth

2

50

140 (1)

Salcott

6

89

—

2

27

90 (2)

184

3107

6479 (average: 64)

Walton-on-the-Naze Total

Sources: BL, MS 7967, fol. 99r; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 77r-v; BL, Additional MS 37494 fols 19r-v; TNA, E 36/204, pp. 229, 232, 233; E 101/16/40; E 101/17/3; E 101/18/3; E 101/18/31; E 101/19/16; E 101/20/1; E 101/21/7; E 101/21/10; E 101/21/12; E 101/24/9b; E 101/25/9; E 101/25/24; E 101/26/18; E  101/26/38; E  101/27/22; E  101/27/24; E  101/27/25; E  101/27/37; E  101/28/23; E  101/28/24; E 101/29/1; E 101/29/35; E 101/32/1; E 101/33/27; E 101/33/31; E 101/34/25; E 101/36/14; E 101/36/20; E  101/37/7; E  101/37/13; E  101/37/14; E  101/37/15; E  101/37/17; E  101/37/18; E  101/37/25; E 101/38/18; E 101/38/30; E 101/39/2; E 101/40/8; E 101/40/9; E 101/40/19; E 101/40/20; E 101/40/36; E 101/40/40; E 101/41/26; E 101/42/21; E 101/42/22; E 101/51/7; E101/51/10; E 101/53/24; E 101/53/39;

48 49

TNA, SP 15/22, fols 7v–8r. C. Dove, The Liberty of Brightlingsea (Brightlingsea, 1974) deals with the impact the Black

Death had on this port.



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

219

E  101/612/40; E  101/612/41; E  101/612/44; E  101/612/48; E  403/379, m. 36; E  403/735, mm. 20, 24–26; E  403/750, mm. 12–16; E  403/780, m. 5; Norwell, pp. 378, 382, 383; C 47/2/11; CCR, 1343–46, pp.128–32, 359; CCR, 1369–74, p. 227; CCR, 1377–81, p. 263; CPR, 1361–64, p. 515; CFR, 1337–47, pp. 4, 151; Rotuli Normanniae, p. 328

In Kent the Cinque Ports were woven more deeply into the county’s military, social, and economic fabric.50 Members of the Cinque Ports supplied over four-fifths of the 455 ships and associated manpower provided by the county of Kent. The men of the Kentish Cinque Ports also played a prominent role in local and national government. Sandwich in particular provided several families whose members became heavily involved in both the administration and prosecution of naval affairs. In the 1340s Peter Barde of Sandwich was Admiral of the Southern fleet.51 Another Sandwich family, the Condys, were also extremely successful and by the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries cadet branches had established themselves as Members of Parliament in Sandwich and Hythe.52 The most prominent member of the family was John Condy, who participated in some of most momentous naval expeditions during the reigns of Edward II and Edward III.53 Condy’s socio-economic standing placed him above the middling sort within the local community; he held the office of town mayor, as had his father before him.54 In 1341 he was granted the bailiwick of Sandwich by hereditary right and in that same year he was appointed to a commission that investigated shipments of smuggled wool.55 He also contributed to the religious life of the town and in 1345 he founded a chantry in St Mary’s Church. By the 1350s he was also receiving £30 annually from the farm of Canterbury.56 The Loveryks also rose to prominence in naval affairs. Thomas Loveryk first appears in the records in 1335 commanding the Marie of Sandwich in Edward III’s expedition to Scotland, and two years later John Loveryk transported victuals to the king’s forces in Scotland as commander of the Barge Esmon. In 1337 William Loveryk commanded the Godbyete as part of the fleet assembled to take Edward III to Flanders and within a year of 1337 Small Hythe/Tenterden is an associate of Rye and Winchelsea, but its shipping is included in the Kentish contributions. 51 Clarke et al., Sandwich, p.  62. Barde was one of the richest men in Sandwich, see A. Hanley and C. C. Chalklin, ‘Kent Lay Subsidy of 1334/5’, Kent Archaeological Society 50

(1961), p. 62. The House of Commons 1386–1421, ii, pp. 715–16. John Condy was MP for Hythe in 1388, Peter Condy sat as MP for Sandwich in 1388 and Lawrence Condy represented Sandwich from 1419–21. For the Condy family, see Clarke et al., Sandwich, pp. 62–3, 81.

52

TNA, E 101/78/4a, m. 2; E 101/17/24, m. 4d; E 101/21/36, m. 4; E 36/204, pp. 222, 239. In 1326 he participated in the fleet that put to sea to prevent the landing of Roger Mortimer; in 1340 he fought at the battle of Sluys and in 1347 he served at the siege of Calais. 54 Hanley and Chalklin, ‘Kent Lay Subsidy’, p. 76; CPR, 1343–45, p. 91. 53

55 56

CPR, 1340–43, p. 213. CPR, 1354–58, p. 326.

220

craig l. lambert

both John and William were retained by Edward III as royal shipmasters; clearly they had impressed.57 Table 10.2: Separate ships contributed by Kent ports to naval operations, 1322–1453

Number of ships

Number of mariners

Tonnage

Aylesford

2

6

48 (2)

Canterbury

4

5

24 (1)

Chalk

4

-

48 (1)

Cliffe

4

28

-

Ports

Deal*

1

-

24

Dover*

65

1246

1710 (22)

Eythorne

1

-

-

Faversham*

11

183

132 (2)

Folkestone*

9

108

476 (9)

Gillingham*†

4

84

90 (2)

Gravesend

3

35

140 (3)

Hoo St Werburgh

10

50

98 (5)

Hythe*

39

593

1014 (20)

Lydd*

1

42

-

Maidstone

3

33

-

Margate*

21

171

366 (13)

Medway

2

9

-

New Hythe

14

92

282 (9)

Northfleet

4

57

110 (2)

Queenborough

1

20

-

Reading Street

8

86

366 (7)

Rochester

1

10

30 (1)

Romney*

30

743

834 (16)

Sandwich*

173

3724

4373 (72)

Sarre

1

6

12 (1)

Small Hythe*

28

456

884 (14)

Strood

10

138

160 (2)

Wouldham

1

9

20

455

7934

11241 Average: 55

Total

TNA, E 101/17/10, m. 2; BL, Cotton Nero MS C. VIII, fol. 265r; CCR, 1337–39, p. 197; E 101/19/39, m. 3; Norwell, pp. 363–4; E 101/20/39, nos, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44.

57



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

221

†

Gillingham’s contributions may have included ships (or rather men) from Grange, which was a limb of Hastings. See R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, ed. E. Goldsmid, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1885), p. 84 who writes (based on information from M. William Lambert) that Grange was expcted to provide ‘two men and armour with the ships of Hastings’.

Sources: BL, MS 7967, fols, 99r-v; BL, Cotton Nero MS C.VIII, fol. 265r; BL, Additional MS 37494, fols, 19v, 20r–v, 25v, 26r–v, 35v; TNA, E  36/204, pp. 222, 223, 225, 229, 230, 231, 239, 240; E 101/16/34; E 101/17/10; E 101/17/24; E 101/17/25; E 101/18/35 pp. 2–6; E 101/19/22; E 101/19/38; E 101/19/39; E 101/20/4; E 101/20/7; E 101/20/39; E  101/21/7; E  101/21/36; E  101/24/9b; E  101/25/9; E  101/26/37; E  101/27/22; E  101/27/36; E  101/27/37; E  101/28/24; E  101/29/36; E  101/29/39; E  101/30/24; E  101/31/29; E  101/31/32; E  101/32/22; E  101/33/27; E  101/33/31; E  101/34/7; E 101/34/9; E 101/36/14; E 101/36/20; E 101/37/8; E 101/37/14; E 101/37/16; E 101/37/19; E  101/37/20; E  101/37/23; E  101/37/24; E  101/37/25; E  101/38/18; E  101/38/30; E 101/39/2; E 101/39/3; E 101/40/7; E 101/40/8; E 101/40/21; E 101/40/36; E 101/41/26; E 101/41/27; E 101/42/21; E 101/42/22; E 101/44/20; E 101/48/10; E 101/50/1; E 101/51/7; E 101/51/10; E 101/53/24; E 101/53/25; E 101/53/39; E 101/54/4; E 101/389/8, m. 16; E 101/612/42; E 101/612/43; E 101/612/44; E 101/612/46; E 101/612/47; E 101/612/48; E 403/379 m. 37; E 430/735, mm. 19–23; E 403/746, m. 16–17; E 403/750, mm. 12–16; E 403/780 mm. 4–5; CCR, 1318–23, pp. 591, 640–1, 660; CCR, 1333–37, p. 648; CCR, 1337–39, pp. 204, 216, 284; CCR, 1341–43, pp. 504, 613; CCR, 1343–46, pp. 128–32; CCR, 1346–49, p. 223; CCR, 1360–64, pp. 17–18; CCR, 1377–81, p. 262; CPR, 1321–24, p. 109; CPR, 1345–48, p. 283; CPR, 1358–61, p. 357; Norwell, pp. 367–8, 376, 370; Rotuli Normanniae, pp. 326–8; Rot. Scot., i, p. 483.

The member Ports of Sussex were also prominent in naval operations. Table 10.3 shows the Ports in the county supplied close to three-quarters of all Sussex ships and four-fifths of the manpower. As was the case in Kent, the men of the Sussex Cinque Ports played a prominent role in both county and national affairs. In 1303 and 1306 Gervase Alard of Winchelsea was Admiral of the Cinque Ports and of the Southern Fleet.58 In the 1340s Henry Finch of Winchelsea was made responsible for maintaining one of the king’s ships.59 In 1369 and 1373 Richard Londenes, commander and owner of the Plente of Winchelsea, served as the town’s Member of Parliament.60 In the 1370s William Skele of Winchelsea served as an armed man aboard the Barge of Wyhnchils, and sailed to Gascony, Cherbourg and Calais as commander of three ships. By 1389 he was Mayor of Winchelsea.61

58 59

Cooper, Winchelsea, p. 60.

CCR, 1346–49, p. 95; Cooper, Winchelsea, p. 88. Cooper, Winchelsea, p. 244; BL, Additional MS 37494, fol. 41v; TNA, E 101/33/31, m. 6. 61 He commanded the Seintemariecog and the Jonette in naval operations and in January 1371 he sailed to Bordeaux for wine as commander of the Leonard: TNA, E 101/28/24, m. 1; 60

222

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Table 10.3: Separate ships contributed by Sussex ports to naval operations, 1322–1453 Port

Number of ships

Number of mariners

Tonnage

Arundel

1

100

340

Camber

1

-

-

Chichester

1

-

-

Eastbourne

2

31

-

Hastings*

20

462

307 (6)

Pende

3

-

54 (2)

Pevensey*

12

266

180 (5)

Poynings

1

-

30

Rye*

49

1452

1644 (21)

Seaford*

17

198

225 (4)

Selsey

1

13

24

Shoreham

74

1344

1386 (24)

West Wittering

5

52

54 (2)

Winchelsea*

153

4117

5106 (48)

Total

340

8035

9350 (Average: 83)

Sources: BL MS 7967, fol. 97v; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76v, 77v; BL, Additional MS 37494, fols 20v, 26r-v, 41r; TNA, E  36/204, pp. 226, 227, 229, 230; E  101/17/3; E  101/17/10; E 101/17/24; E 101/18/3; E 101/18/31; E 101/19/16; E 101/19/22; E 101/19/38; E 101/19/39; E 101/20/7; E 101/21/7; E 101/21/36; E 101/23/22; E 101/24/9b; E 101/25/9; E 101/26/37; E 101/27/37; E 101/28/24; E 101/29/1; E 101/29/39; E 101/30/17; E 101/30/24; E 101/31/9; E  101/31/29; E  101/31/32; E  101/33/27; E  101/33/31; E  101/36/14; E  101/36/20; E 101/37/25; E 101/38/18; E 101/38/30; E 101/39/2; E 101/39/3; E 101/40/7; E 101/40/19; E 101/40/36; E 101/40/7; E 101/40/40; E 101/42/5; E 101/44/20; E 101/50/1; E 101/51/10; E 101/53/24; E 101/53/23; E 101/53/39; E 101/54/4; E 101/389/8, m. 16; E 403/379, mm. 36–37; E 430/735, mm. 19–23; E 403/746, m. 18; E 403/750, m. 12–16; E 101/612/42; E 101/612/46; E 101/612/48; E 101/612/49; CCR, 1318–23, p. 660; CCR, 1333–37, pp. 651–2; CCR, 1339–41, p. 331; CCR, 1341–43, pp. 505, 536; CCR, 1343–46, pp. 128–32; CCR, 1360–64, pp. 18, 65; CCR, 1364–68, p. 231; CCR, 1374–77, p. 10; CFR, 1337–47, p. 41; Norwell, pp. 366–8; CPR, 1324–27, p. 279.

The above discussion has focused on the naval contributions of Cinque Port members within their counties. Table 10.4, on the other hand, examines them as a confederacy. Not all the limbs of the Cinque Ports are represented in the navy payrolls. None the less, as we shall see below in the discussion on manpower, it is likely that the limbs and other clusters of villages in close proximity to the head Ports contributed a proportion of the Ports’ naval manpower. E 101/29/1, m.3; E 101/29/39, m. 3; E 101/30/24, m. 2; E 101/31/32, m. 4; E 101/36/14, m. 5; E 101/180/2, fol. 13v. For his office-holding, see Cooper, Winchelsea, p. 237.



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

223

Table 10.4: Separate ships contributed to naval operations by all the Cinque Ports, 1322–1453 Port

Ships

Mariners

Tonnage

Tons per man

Brightlingsea

15

169

221

2.9

Deal

1

-

24

-

Dover

65

1246

1710

2.3

Faversham

11

183

132

1.7

Folkestone

9

108

476

3.6

Gillingham

4

84

90

4

Hastings

20

462

307

3.4

Hythe

39

593

1014

2

Lydd

1

42

-

-

Margate

21

171

366

2.7

Pevensey

12

266

180

3.5

Romney

30

743

834

2.7

Rye

49

1452

1644

3.3

Sandwich

173

3724

4373

3

Seaford

17

198

225

5.7

Small Hythe

28

456

884

2.7 3.5

Winchelsea

153

4117

5106

Total

648

14014

17586 (average size: 67 tons)

Note: Ton:man ratio is calculated by matching only those ships that have both tonnage and crew size.

The most significant point from Table 10.4 is that Dover, Sandwich, Winchelsea and Rye were the most important Ports in the confederacy, and that between 1322 and 1453 the Ports contributed 648 ships to the Plantagenet naval war. By comparison, kingdom-wide, between 1320 and 1453 approximately six to seven thousand separate ships sailed in naval operations. Of course, the Cinque Ports provided their ships as a confederacy, so it is unfair to compare their naval contributions with those of individual ports. Table 10.5 compares the shipping contributions of key Cinque Port members with other ports, selected on the basis of their importance to the Crown in naval matters. It also provides a representative sample of small, medium, and large ports.

224

craig l. lambert Table 10.5: Shipping contributions of the Cinque Ports compared with other ports, 1322–1453 Port

Ships

Mariners

Tonnage

Tons per man

Barton-upon-Humber

52

308

1116

3.5

Bawdsey

26

920

774

3.4

Boston

108

1794

6112

3.9

Bristol

168

4042

8233

3.1

Cley-next-the-Sea

26

212

963

2.6

Dartmouth

382

8576

19999

3.7

Fowey

194

3740

7219

3.5

Great Yarmouth

455

11494

19794

2.7

Hull

292

4927

14835

4.5

Ipswich

139

3668

5233

3

Lymington

38

900

1086

4.1

Newcastle

135

1862

4384

4.6

Poole

56

1200

1620

4.3

Dover

65

1246

1710

2.3

Southampton

187

4586

8450

3.4

Sandwich

173

3724

4373

3

Winchelsea

153

4117

5106

3.5

Rye

49

1452

1644

3.3

Sources: BL, Additional MS 7967, fols 95r-99v; BL, Additional MS 37494, fols 17r, 18r-19v, 20v, 23v-25r, 27v, 35v-37v, 41v; BL, Cotton Nero MS C.VIII, fols 226, 264r-66v; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76r-77v; TNA, E 36/204, pp. 221–40; E 101/16/6; E 101/16/16; E 101/16/34; E 101/16/40; E 101/17/3; E 101/17/24; E 101/18/3; E 101/18/28; E 101/18/31; E 101/18/36; E 101/19/2; E 101/19/3; E 101/19/6; E 101/19/16; E 101/19/32; E 101/19/39; E 101/19/39; E 101/20/1; E 101/20/4; E 101/20/16; E 101/20/34; E 101/21/4; E 101/21/7; E 101/21/12; E  101/21/13; E  101/21/36; E  101/22/25; E  101/22/27; E  101/23/22; E  101/24/9b; E  101/24/10; E  101/25/9; E  101/25/20; E  101/25/24; E  101/26/16; E  101/26/18; E  101/26/37; E  101/26/38; E  101/27/22; E  101/27/23; E  101/27/24; E  101/27/25; E 101/27/36; E 101/28/16; E 101/28/18; E 101/28/24; E 101/29/1; E 101/29/2; E 101/29/35; E  101/29/36; E  101/29/39; E  101/30/18; E  101/30/28; E  101/30/29; E  101/30/30; E  101/31/10; E  101/31/14; E  101/31/22; E  101/31/23; E  101/32/8; E  101/32/34; E  101/33/27; E  101/33/31; E  101/33/40; E  101/34/25; E  101/34/30; E  101/36/14; E 101/36/20; E 101/36/21; E 101/37/7; E 101/37/8; E 101/37/13; E 101/37/14; E 101/37/15; E  101/37/17; E  101/37/18; E  101/37/19; E  101/37/25; E  101/38/18; E  101/38/19; E 101/38/28; E 101/38/29; E 101/38/30; E 101/39/1; E 101/39/2; E 101/39/3; E 101/39/17; E 101/40/8; E 101/40/9; E 101/40/19; E 101/40/20; E 101/40/21; E 101/40/36; E 101/40/40; E 101/42/3; E 101/42/6; E 101/42/21; E 101/42/22; E 101/44/20; E 101/48/8; E 101/48/10; E  101/49/25; E  101/51/7; E  101/51/10; E  101/53/24; E  101/53/25; E  101/53/39; E 101/54/4; E 101/54/14; E 101/389/8, m. 16; E 101/612/40; E 101/612/41; E 101/612/44; E 101/612/46; E 101/612/47; E 101/612/49; E 101/676/32; E 122/7/12, which records a naval fleet under Nicholas Tamworth; E  372/179, m. 44; E  403/735, m. 22; E  403/746,



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mm. 16–18; E 403/750, mm. 12–16; E 403/780, mm. 4–5; Fœdera, II, ii, p. 912; Norwell, pp. 370–85; Rotuli Normanniae, pp. 325–8; Rot. Scot., i, p. 692; C 47/2/25; C 47/2/59; C 81/1749, no. 28; CCR, 1333–37, pp. 27, 33, 53, 204, 348, 581; CCR, 1337–39, pp. 46, 194, 457; CCR, 1339–41, p. 143; CCR, 1341–43, pp. 630, 689; CCR, 1343–46, pp. 84, 128–34; CCR, 1346–49, p. 323; CCR, 1354–60, p. 607; CCR, 1360–64, pp. 364, 416; CCR, 1364–68, pp. 11, 181, 333; CCR, 1369–74, p. 44; CCR, 1374–77, p. 387; CCR, 1377–81, p. 262; CFR, 1327–37, p. 507; CFR, 1337–47, pp. 282, 403; CFR, 1356–68, pp. 27, 311; CPR, 1321–24, pp. 90, 205, 207; CPR, 1324–27, p. 31; CPR, 1327–30, pp. 27, 104; CPR, 1334–38, pp. 310, 559; CPR, 1341–43, p. 698; CPR, 1343–45, pp. 12, 202, 258; CPR, 1348–50, p. 147; CPR, 1354–58, p. 348; CPR, 1358–61, p. 351; CIM, vol. II, pp. 337,365, 478; CIM, vol. III, 1348–77 pp. 5–7.

It is true that Newcastle, Hull, Great Yarmouth, Southampton, Fowey, Dartmouth and Bristol provided as many, sometimes more, ships than the three leading Cinque Ports of Sandwich, Dover, Rye and Winchelsea. But the likes of Bristol and Southampton were international trading hubs and were centres of regional prosperity.62 Dartmouth possessed a large fishing fleet whilst Newcastle benefited from the Scottish wars and had a large coastal fleet based on the shipment of coal.63 Nonetheless, in terms of shipping contributions to the naval war, Sandwich and Winchelsea did not lag too far behind, and only a few ports put better-manned ships to sea. The Cinque Ports and the Hundred Years’ War The foregoing discussion has taken the ‘long view’ by examining the contributions of the Cinque Ports to England’s simultaneous wars against Scotland and France (and English fleets sailing to Ireland), in addition to naval campaigns under Henry IV. The analysis thus far has shown that the Ports’ involvement in naval operations was protracted. The following section will seek to address the main argument of the decline theory: that, in terms of naval expeditions of the Hundred Years’ War during the last quarter of the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth century, the Ports ceased to be important. In most studies this decline narrative is based on an examination of the Cinque Ports in isolation. Such studies are evidently valuable, but without a comparative analysis with other ports in the kingdom, any C. D. Liddy, War, Politics and Finance in Late Medieval English Towns: Bristol, York and the Crown, 1350–1400 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp.  43–57; T. Beaumont James, ‘The Town of Southampton and its Foreign Trade, 1430–1540’, in English Inland Trade, 1430–1540, ed. M. Hicks (Oxford, 2015), pp. 11–24.

62

M. Kowaleski, ‘The Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries in Late Medieval England’, EcHR 53 (2000), pp. 429–54; The Customs Accounts of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1454–

63

1500, Surtees Society Publication, 202, ed. J. Wade (Gateshead, 1995), p. 1; G. V. Scammell, ‘War at Sea under the Early Tudors: Some Newcastle upon Tyne Evidence’, Archaeologia Aeliana 38 (1960 & 1961), pp.  73–96; J. R. Blake, ‘The Medieval Coal Trade of North East England: Some Fourteenth Century Evidence’, Northern History 2 (June, 1967), pp. 1–26.

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changes to the involvement of the Cinque Ports in naval operations cannot be seen in the correct context. Table 10.6 examines the contributions of the Cinque Ports and compares them with other port towns over three distinct phases of the Anglo-French War. The period 1338–68 saw some of the largest transport fleets put to sea, so it is not surprising to find all the ports contributing large numbers of ships. The middle phase of the Anglo-French war (1369–95) saw a change in the direction of English war strategy from one focused on land campaigns to one centred on the sea.64 Thus, we find fifteen ports in Table 10.6 provided the same or more ships in the second phase of the war as they had in the first. The third phase (1417–53) saw an intensive land-based war as the Lancastrians conquered lands in France and then attempted to hold them. Importantly, after 1417, expeditionary armies sent from England to France tended to number only a few thousand combatants, meaning naval logistical operations were not on the same scale as those of Edward III. Table 10.6: Shipping contributions of ports during three periods of the Anglo-French war Nos of Ships, 1338–68

Nos of Ships, 1369–95

Nos of Ships, 1417–53

Brightlingsea

12

0

2

Deal

0

0

1

Dover

27

21

5

Faversham

6

2

2

Folkestone

6

1

2

Gillingham

1

2

1

Hastings

7

5

0

Hythe

16

16

0

Ports

Lydd

0

1

0

Margate

14

5

2

Pevensey

3

4

1

Romney

11

11

1

Rye

15

19

1

Sandwich

60

22

38

Seaford

7

2

0

Small Hythe

9

14

1

Winchelsea

57

17

11

Lambert, ‘Henry V and the Crossing to France’; Ayton and Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare’; Sherborne, ‘The English Navy’.

64



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

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Ports

Nos of Ships, 1338–68

Nos of Ships, 1369–95

Nos of Ships, 1417–53

Barton-upon-Humber

14

33

2

Bawdsey

22

4

0

Boston

46

48

10

Bristol

46

73

3

Cley-next-the-Sea

9

8

9

Dartmouth

76

206

34

Fowey

56

91

22

Great Yarmouth

253

127

10

Hull

108

114

17

Ipswich

55

46

4

Lymington

20

15

0

Newcastle

42

55

10

Poole

17

7

12

Southampton

48

77

12

Note: although Henry V raised a large a fleet in 1415 the payroll recording the English contingent of ships is now lost.

Over the second phase of the Anglo-French war (1369–95) it is undeniable that the Cinque Ports’ involvement in naval operations declined, but with the exception of Winchelsea it is questionable whether this presaged the naval decline of the Ports over the fifteenth century. Indeed, it is worth setting these figures into context. Firstly, as Table 10.6 shows, in the second phase of the war the Crown started to exploit more fully the southwestern ports. There were good reasons for doing so. After 1369 many southwestern ports had benefited from crown patronage and were expanding their commercial fleets.65 Additionally, with the exception of Dartmouth, until 1369 many of these ports had received little attention from requisition officers. The focus of English activity in France over the first phase might have meant the east coast ports were exploited more fully, but from 1338 to 1368 there were many fleets raised to ship expeditionary armies to Brittany and south-western France that contained relatively few ships from southwestern ports.66 Secondly, while some Cinque Port members (Gillingham, M. Kowaleski, ‘Warfare, Shipping and Crown Patronage: the Impact of the Hundred Years War on the English Port Towns’, in Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of John H. A. Munro, ed. L. Armstrong, I Elbl and M. Elbl (Leiden, 2007); Kowaleski, ‘The Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries’. 66 For example, the transport fleet that shipped the forces of the Black Prince to Gascony in 1355 contained only a handful of ships from south-western ports; see TNA, E 101/26/37; E 101/26/38. 65

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Rye, Romney, Lydd, Hythe and Small Hythe) either maintained or increased their contributions over the first and second stages of the war, others such as Dover, Pevensey and Hastings saw little change in the numbers of ships they put to sea. Importantly, after 1369 Lymington, Poole, Great Yarmouth, Bawdsey and Ipswich also provided fewer ships. In the third stage of the war (1417–53) Sandwich was the only port that increased its contribution from the previous phase. The key point to emerge from Table 10.6 is the reduction, between 1369 and 1395, in the contributions from Winchelsea and Sandwich. Up until 1369 they had provided the majority of Cinque Ports ships and so any fall in their contributions has the effect of reducing the numbers of vessels the confederacy put to sea. After 1417, except for Sandwich, the change in the numbers of ships provided by all the ports in Table 10.6 is more marked. It is generally accepted that the reduction in the shipping contributions of the Cinque Ports after 1417 was an acceleration of the process started in 1369. Yet, after 1417 Bristol, Dartmouth and Southampton also supplied fewer ships. Interestingly, the naval-decline narrative is not associated with these places, which from the later fourteenth century and into the fifteenth century were becoming more central to the naval war and entering a period of commercial expansion.67 That after 1417 the Cinque Ports were not alone in supplying fewer ships to the naval war suggests other factors were involved. It could be argued that what these figures show is the collapse of the English merchant fleet.68 That the Hundred Years’ War might have been responsible for a fall in the numbers of merchant ships is a familiar story that can be traced back to Anthony Saul’s case study of Great Yarmouth.69 The question is how much faith should we place on the example of an isolated case study?70 Indeed, if we probe further into the sources, the argument that the Hundred Years’ War caused a significant fall in the number of merchantmen cannot be supported.71 One way to evaluate the impact the war had on a ports’ shipping reserves is to examine the numbers of ships that appear in both the customs accounts and naval payrolls. A significant 67 Liddy, War, Politics and Finance, pp.  43–57; Kowaleski, ‘Warfare, Shipping and Crown Patronage’; Beaumont James, ‘The Town of Southampton’, in English Inland Trade, 1430–1540 ed. M. Hicks (Oxford, 2015), pp. 11–24. 68 See, for example, Cushway, Edward III and the War at Sea, ch. 20; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, ch. 8. 69

A. Saul, ‘Great Yarmouth and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century’,

BIHR 52 (1979), pp. 105–15.

Great Yarmouth is a complex case study and ecological changes, which reduced the numbers of herring massing off the coast of England, the silting of harbours, internal disputes, inter-port conflict and foreign competition, also played their part in Yarmouth’s decline; see A. Saul, ‘Great Yarmouth in the Fourteenth Century’ (Unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1975). 71 Ayton and Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare’. 70



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

229

overlap would suggest that the Crown was indeed plumbing the depths of the merchant fleet. Unfortunately, owing to the tax status of the Cinque Ports, evidence from the customs accounts is far from satisfactory. However, we can use other ports as a guide. Using the three-identifier methodology, we see that from 1377 to 1379 twenty-four Bristol ships served in naval operations and fifteen appear in the customs accounts. Four of the vessels in the customs records also appear in the navy payrolls.72 In Hull over the same period seventy-one ships served in naval operations and three appear in the customs accounts, all of which served in naval fleets.73 What is remarkable is that the Crown was able to find eighty-eight ships from both ports that do not appear in the customs accounts, suggesting that the merchant fleet was far larger than previously thought.74 Other branches of maritime commerce, such as the Bordeaux wine trade, might have been more affected by the Crown’s requisitioning practices, but this was not always the case.75 The evidence presented here suggests that the Crown requisitioned most of its ships from the coastal fleet. As coastal trade was not systematically recorded until 1565 we have no way of estimating the size of the coastal fleet, but it is tentatively suggested here that in the late medieval period three-quarters of English vessels only sailed coastwise.76 Another important factor was that because coastal trade was not taxed by the Crown, requisitioning ships from the large pool of coastal vessels had little impact on Crown revenues. Rather than a sudden collapse in England’s commercial fleet, the change in the scale of naval operations after 1417 related to a series of strategic, political and financial issues that occurred in the last quarter of the fourteenth century and impacted on Lancastrian naval planning. Strategically, after 1417, transport fleets were reduced in size because English expeditionary armies were smaller than they had been in earlier campaigns.77 This meant the Crown needed to exploit fewer ports for ships. Politically, in the last TNA, E 101/34/30; E  101/36/14; E 101/36/20; E  101/37/25; E  101/38/19; E  101/38/30; E 101/42/21; E 101/42/22; TNA, E 122/16/3. 73 TNA, E 101/36/14; E  101/36/20; E  101/37/7; E  101/37/17; E  101/37/18; E  101/37/25; E 101/38/29; E 101/42/22; TNA, E 122/59/1. 74 There might have been more ships serving in naval operations, but one account (TNA, E 101/42/22) only provides the names of some of the shipmasters. If we only take account of ship names, thirty ships served only in a naval capacity. 75 Lambert, ‘Henry V and the Crossing to France.’ 76 For the late medieval coastal trade, see M. Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade 72

in Medieval Exeter (Cambridge, 2003), ch. 6. A detailed study of coastal and overseas trade in the sixteenth century will appear in due course. I am indebted to Gary Baker for showing me a draft of his article (G. P. Baker, ‘Domestic and Short-Range Maritime Trade and Trade Networks, c. 1565–1577: A Case study of King’s Lynn, Plymouth, and Southampton’, in The Routledge Research Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800: Oceans in Global History and Culture, ed. C. Jowitt, C. L. Lambert, and S. Mentz (London, forthcoming).

77

The exceptions being Henry V’s 1415 and 1417 fleets.

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decades of the fourteenth century the Crown had to react to the growing influence of shipowners in parliament at a time when the English war effort was centred on the sea and when English merchants, many of them involved in seaborne trade, were helping to finance the war.78 At the same time, and to reduce the burden on English shipowners, the Crown started to hire more foreign vessels for army transport fleets. In 1346, thirty-six foreign vessels helped to ship Edward III’s forces to St Vaast la Hougue; 5 per cent of the total fleet.79 In 1380, 147 foreign ships (83.6 per cent of the fleet) were hired for the earl of Buckingham’s fleet.80 This trend continued apace. In 1417, 129 (50 per cent) of the recorded ships that transported Henry V’s army to Normandy were foreign. The financial aspect related to the taxation of English exports. Over the last quarter of the fourteenth and into the fifteenth century, there was a marked decline in the export of raw wool, and a huge increase in the export of cloth.81 The problem for the Crown was that it was unable to tax cloth exports as extensively as wool.82 Thus, in addition to hiring foreign ships, the Crown also requisitioned fewer English vessels from larger ports to ensure that tax revenues from maritime trade kept flowing into the Exchequer. At the same time as relying more on the shipping resources of smaller ports, the Crown requisitioned more vessels from the pool of ships that worked in the coasting trade.83 The cumulative effects of the changes to military operations after 1417, and the Crown’s policy of dealing with political and financial problems, were to reduce the numbers of English ships requisitioned for logistical operations. Manning Cinque Port Ships The above analysis has focused much of its attention on the numbers of ships that the Ports contributed to the naval operations. But the Ports also provided well-manned ships. An order from the reign of Edward II shows Kowaleski, ‘Warfare, Shipping and Crown Patronage’; Liddy, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 43–57; Lambert, ‘Henry V and the Crossing to France’; Ayton and Lambert, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare’; Sherborne, ‘The English Navy’.

78

79 80 81

BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 133v. TNA, E 101/39/2. M. Rorke, ‘English and Scottish Overseas Trade, 1300–1600’, EcHR, new ser., 59

(2006), pp.  265–88, at pp. 269–7; E. M. Carus-Wilson, ‘Trends in the Export of English Woollens in the Fourteenth Century’, EcHR, new ser., 3 (1950), pp. 162–79, at p. 167. 82 W. M. Ormrod, ‘The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 83–101, at p. 94.

The exploitation of smaller ports from the 1370s is discussed by Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea.’

83



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231

a 240-ton vessel was expected to have sixty mariners on board, equating to four tons per man.84 Apart from Seaford, all members of the Cinque Ports put ships to sea with more than the required number of men. This suggests we are dealing with a cluster of towns that were wedded to the war effort. It is likely that for most logistical operations the Crown used the existing crew of the ship. However, ships assembled for offensive and defensive purposes might have their original crews supplemented through the impressment of men who lived in settlements located within several miles of the coast.85 In this coastal strip dwelled many fisher-farmers who had experience of working at sea.86 While residents of the dwellings located within the ‘maritime lands’ may have been exempted from military service so they could be used for coastal defence, the king could, and occasionally did, override such exemptions. In 1372 for example the Crown recruited men from Essex coastal settlements to serve at sea, including one group of men who fought at the battle of La Rochelle with the Earl of Pembroke. 87 We can examine the manning of Cinque Port ships more closely owing to the survival of an interesting navy payroll. In April 1372 the Warden of the Cinque Ports, Lord Latimer, was ordered to assemble ships and barges arrayed for war from within the liberty of Ports and put these to sea for one month.88 This was followed by an order on 28 May to array archers and armed men to place aboard the ships.89 The results of these orders was that over the spring and summer of 1372 the Cinque Ports put two fleets to sea, one sailing over April and May, the other over June and July.90 The payroll for these expeditions names the constables, armed men and mariners that served. In total, 921 names are provided by the source, but because some men served in both fleets the number of individuals is likely to be much smaller. In the first fleet there were 210 armed men and 226 mariners, meaning that at least 436 individuals served. The payroll also reveals the process of recruitment. Of the thirty-five mariners aboard the Cog John of Dover, six 84

CPR, 1321–24, p. 417.

M. Kowaleski, ‘Working at Sea: Maritime Recruitment and Remuneration in Medieval England’, Ricchezza del Mare, Ricchezza dal Mare, Secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti della Tren-

85

tasettesima Settimana di Studi, 11–15 April 2005 (Florence, 2006), pp.  907–35. The process of recruitment is dealt with more fully in Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea’. 86 H. Fox, The Evolution of the Fishing Village: Landscape and Society along the South Devon Coast, 1086–1550 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 107–38.

J. R. Alban, ‘English Coastal Defence: Some Fourteenth-Century Modifications within the System’, in Patronage, the Crown and the Provinces in Later Medieval England,

87

ed. R. Griffiths (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 57–78. For instances when the Crown recruited men from the maritime lands for military service, see Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops’. 88 CCR, 1369–74, pp. 369–70. 89 Ibid., p. 384. 90

TNA, E 101/31/32.

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were recruited from Folkestone, four from Kingston and seventeen from Romney. It is this recruitment-spread that prompted the use of constables to enforce discipline. Stephen Condy, for example, served as constable aboard the Katherine of Sandwich and, as a member of one of the most important families within the Cinque Ports liberties, Stephen would have provided an authoritative presence aboard this ship.91 The payroll also shows that the men of the Cinque Ports were flexible combatants. In the first voyage the Barge of Wyhnchils was crewed by thirtyone mariners and ten armed men (homes armez). For its second voyage, in June/July, it was manned by twenty-four mariners and twenty armed men. To double the complement of armed men in the second voyage, ten mariners from the first voyage served as armed men in the second.92 There were also armed men serving in both fleets that have traceable careers as shipmasters. William Skele, the future mayor of Winchelsea, served in both fleets aboard the Barge of Wyhnchils as an armed man.93 As noted above, Skele also commanded ships in naval operations. In the April/May fleet, John Yol served aboard the Mighel of Dover as an armed man, but from 1355 to 1377 he commanded three ships out of Hythe, Romney and Winchelsea.94 In the April/May fleet Thomas Horseman was recorded as the first armed man aboard the Barge of Rye, but a few months later he sailed the same vessel to Bordeaux.95 In April/May John Frenshe junior and senior both served as armed men on the Katherine of Sandwich, but by 1372 John Frenshe senior had worked for over fifteen years as a shipmaster.96 The military flexibility of the Ports’ men in 1372 helps explain how the Crown was able to meet the increasing demands for manpower at a time when its war strategy became centred on the sea.97 In 1372, therefore, several hundred men from the Ports were recruited for naval service. Can we go beyond the numbers and assess the impact the heavy recruitment in 1372 had on the populations of the Cinque Ports? Such an investigation must be speculative but is worth pursuing so we can understand better how involved the men of the Cinque Ports were in the naval war of the late fourteenth century. In normal circumstances we could Andrew Ayton examines naval and landed service over this period in more detail in ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England’. 92 First voyage is TNA, E 101/31/32, m. 2; second voyage is E 101/31/32, m. 5. 93 Ibid., mm. 3, 4. 94 TNA, E 101/31/32, m. 2; E 101/26/37, m. 2; E 101/612/43; E 101/30/24, m. 2; E 101/36/14, m. 5; E 101/173/4, fol. 87v. 95 TNA, E 101/31/32, m. 3. For his career as a shipmaster: E 101/179/10, fol. 32r; E 101/602/3, fol. 26r; E 101/29/39, m. 4; E 101/30/17, m. 3d; E 101/31/29, m. 4; E 101/39/3, m. 6; E 101/38/18, m. 3; BL, Additional MS 37494, fol. 26r. 96 TNA, E101/612/48; E 101/612/46. 97 These demands are detailed by Sherborne in ‘The English Navy’. See also Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops’; idem, ‘Navies and Maritime Warfare’. 91



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compare the crew size of each ship with the demographic data contained in the poll taxes for each vessel’s home port. For the Cinque Ports this method has difficulties, not least because the Ports were exempt from taxation and so do not appear fully in the tax returns. We can perhaps examine the town of Winchelsea in a little more depth. In 1292 Edward I’s government produced a list of 690 occupants for the new town.98 Obviously the pre-plague population of Winchelsea was higher than that, and it would probably be correct to multiply the figure by three or four.99 Such an exercise would suggest that before the Black Death, Winchelsea had a population in the region of two thousand, of which three hundred to four hundred were likely to be men of military-serving age.100 The Black Death probably reduced the militarily able population to some two hundred men. In the April/May fleet of 1372 the thirty-one mariners aboard the Barge of Wyhnchils were recruited from Winchelsea. If we assume the ten armed men were also Winchelsea residents it is possible that a quarter of the militarily able men of the town served on this ship. Such high recruitment demands were not new to the men of Winchelsea. In 1338, for example, seventeen Winchelsea ships manned by 670 constables, mariners and boys sailed to Flanders with the king, although it is likely that some of these men were recruited from settlements close to Winchelsea.101 Indeed, it is worth stressing that the demands placed on the Cinque Ports for naval manpower did not diminish. In 1413 Sandwich, Dover, Rye, Hastings, Romney, Hythe and Winchelsea put a small flotilla to sea that consisted of 431 armed men, archers, mariners, constables and boys; one ship in this fleet, the Godyer of Dover, had a total crew of ninetytwo men and boys.102 If the Crown was struggling to find sufficient naval manpower at this time, the Cinque Ports were bucking the trend, perhaps another indication of their value to the Crown as a source of both ships

Martin et al., Winchelsea, p.  95. Nonarum Inquisitiones in Curia Scaccarii  Temp. Regis Edwardi III. Printed by command of His Majesty King George III. in Pursuance of an Address of the House of commons of Great Britain, ed. G. Vanderzee (London, 1807), p.  403 records just over ninety people but this is less useful as a demographic indicator.

98

The 690 reflects owners of property. If we suggest that each owner was accompanied by a family of 3–4 other individuals, approximately two thousand people must have resided in Winchelsea in the pre-Plague period. 100 Coastal communities tended to have low sex ratios, with men accounting for a smaller proportion of the population: eighty to ninety men per one hundred women; see M. Kowaleski, ‘The Demography of Maritime Communities in Late Medieval England’ in Town and Countryside in the Age of the Black Death: Essays in Honour of John Hatcher, ed. M. Bailey and S. Rigby (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 87–118. 99

101

Norwell, pp. 366–7.

TNA, E 101/51/1 and m. 8 for the Dover ship. The armed men could be esquires. The abbreviation is ‘arm’ which could be a shortened version of armiger; however, by 1413 it

102

would be unusual for esquires to be serving in a fleet raised from the Cinque Ports.

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and men.103 It is also perhaps fitting that old Cinque Port families were still actively serving in the 1413 fleet. John Alard, for example, was aboard the Jesus of Winchelsea.104 For English naval activity the period 1369 to 1395 was crucially important. Over this time the Crown focused much of its martial activity on the sea and this placed increased pressure on coastal communities to provide the necessary manpower and ships.105 This case study shows that after 1369 the Crown continued to draw on the services of the Cinque Ports. The men of the Ports rose to this challenge. Not only did manning levels aboard Cinque Port ships equal or outstrip those vessels requisitioned from larger ports outside the confederacy but the Ports’ men proved to be multi-skilled combatants. Of course, this was not service done for gratis. Armed men were paid 8d per day, 2d more than shipmasters and 5d more than mariners. Thus, in 1372, by serving as a fighting force, the ‘ordinary’ mariners of the Ports could increase their daily wage almost threefold. It is likely that some collusion occurred here, and one of the reasons for men serving in both capacities across the two voyages was that such a practice allowed everyone to share in the wage bounty. Conclusion The data presented above make a strong case that the Ports’ involvement in naval operations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was protracted. Over the second and third stages of the Hundred Years’ War the Ports continued to form an important part of naval operations. Even when, after 1417, some members of the confederacy supplied fewer ships, so too did other ports. The reasons why the Cinque Ports and other towns contributed fewer ships to the naval operations after 1417 related to changes in the Crown’s strategic, fiscal and political policies. The argument that the Ports’ heyday was in Edward I’s reign can also be challenged. Edward I may have called on the naval services of the Cinque Ports, but over-reliance does not equate with importance. Edward I’s fleets were small by comparison to those of his successors, which meant his bureaucrats had little experience of

I. Friel, Henry V’s Navy: The Sea-Road to Agincourt and Conquest, 1413–1422 (Stroud, 2015), p. 35 (in part building on the work of Susan Rose) suggests that naval manpower might have been hard to find in the fifteenth century. But see Sherborne, ‘The English Navy’, and Ayton and Lambert, ‘Shipping the Troops’ who both show that large numbers of men could be found to man ships even after the Black Death.

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TNA, E  101/51/1, m. 2. On the first list of names the armed men are listed first followed by the archers, master, constable, mariners and boys. Alard appears in the first group of men listed as serving on the Jesus, so he likely served as an armed man (esquire). 105 Sherborne, ‘The English Navy’. 104



naval service and the cinque ports, 1322–1453

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assembling large fleets. The Ports’ close link with the Crown combined with their organisational structure meant that Edward I’s clerks were naturally drawn to them for ships; it made their job easier. Moreover, Edward I had a quasi-feudal outlook to his recruitment methods and it suited him that the service of the Ports was called upon. Indeed, for some of Edward I’s expeditions the Cinque Ports may have contributed the majority of the ships and, even when Edward III dramatically scaled up transport fleets, the Ports continued to play an important role.106 In 1342 the Cinque Ports supplied nearly a quarter of the ships that transported Edward III’s army to Brittany.107 In 1417, of the recorded English ports that contributed ships to transport Henry V’s army to France, only Cromer supplied more ships than Sandwich.108 This involvement in naval logistics and naval warfare continued to the end of the Hundred Years’ War. Of the thirty-two ships that transported Thomas Kyriel to Normandy in 1450, only London contributed a greater number than Sandwich.109 If we look beyond the Hundred Years’ War we still see the Ports playing an important role in logistical operations. In 1513, of the forty-two ships that transported part of Henry VIII’s forces to France, twenty-eight (66.6 per cent) were contributed by the Cinque Ports.110 Even when the decline of the Ports had started, in the late Tudor period, state-of-the-art vessels continued to be built at Rye, and in 1588 the Cinque Ports provided ‘thoroughly well manned’ ships to the English fleet that faced the Spanish Armada.111 Indeed, it has been argued that it was the end of the Hundred Years’ War that precipitated the decline of some of the Cinque Ports.112 Such a sustained level of involvement in the Anglo-Scottish and AngloFrench wars meant the residents of the Ports were highly militarised. Men who served as both marines and mariners also held civic offices within the Ports and represented their boroughs in parliament. The populations of other towns such as Newcastle might be militarised, but this ebbed and flowed Rose, ‘Maritime Logistics and Edward I’s Military Campaigns’. TNA, E 36/204, pp. 221–40. 108 Cromer provided eleven ships; Sandwich ten ships. The next largest contributors were London (five); and Dover, Dartmouth and York, which all provided four ships, 106 107

Rotuli Normanniae, pp. 325–8.

TNA, E 403/780, mm. 4–5. TNA, E  101/56/16. The ships were from Dover, Hythe, Folkestone, Winchelsea, Sandwich, Romney and Brightlingsea. 111 In 1572 the total tonnage of shipping in Sandwich was 729, whereas Newcastle had over 1,500 tons of shipping and Hull over 2,000 tons; TNA, SP 15/22, fols 1r–2r, 12v. For the 1580s, see J. S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, i (Aldershot, 1988), pp.  32–3 109 110

and II, pp. 138–9.

G. J. Mayhew, ‘Rye and the Defence of the Narrow Seas: A 16th-Century Town at War’, Sussex Archaeological Collections 122 (1984), pp. 107–26; Clarke et al., Sandwich, p. 146.

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Elizabeth’s war against Spain naturally drew on the shipping resources of the south-west ports.

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depending on Anglo-Scottish relations. Men from the Cinque Ports, on the other hand, served in both the Scottish and French wars. Some shipmasters from other port towns might also have held civic offices, but this was not on the same scale as the men from the Cinque Ports.113 The Portsmen’s cumulative experience of naval warfare and logistical operations ensured that the strategic advice of the Barons of the Ports was frequently sought by monarchs keen to pursue foreign and domestic wars. In short, it would be difficult to find other towns in late medieval England with more militarised populations. An argument has been made that after 1369 the military experience of knightly representatives in parliament gave the assembly a more militant outlook, which could impact on government policy.114 If this was indeed the case, we should also include in this discourse the representatives of coastal towns that were in the frontline of the naval war, and none stood out more than the men of the Cinque Ports.

Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, pp. 28, 159, 194–5. A. King, ‘What Werre Amounteth: The Military Experience of Knights of the Shire, 1369–1389’, History 95 (2010), pp. 418–36, at p. 431.

113 114

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The Garrison Establishment in Lancastrian Normandy in 1436 According to Surviving Lists in Bibliothèque Nationale de France manuscrit français 25773 Anne Curry

The greatest contrast between English strategy in France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and between Edward III and Henry V as military leaders, is in the military occupation of territory through a garrison system. Whilst Edward III and his commanders had not completely eschewed this method of subduing and controlling the French, there was no real precedent for the systematic conquest of Normandy by Henry V and for the establishment of a network of garrisons in order to hold on to what had been conquered.1 Even after the treaty of Troyes the ‘English kingdom of France’ relied much on the maintenance of fortified and manned centres, both for internal security and for expansion into areas which remained loyal to the Dauphin. As the latter’s fortunes improved, the English increasingly fell back on their original conquests and power base in Normandy, until they were finally expelled from the area in 1450. Thanks to the survival of financial records on both sides of the Channel, we can know much about the English military establishment in this fifteenthcentury phase of the war, especially in Normandy. Muster rolls within these For Andrew’s perceptive comments on the contrast see A. Ayton, ‘English Armies in the Fourteenth Century’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A.

1

Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp.  21–38, at pp.  36–7. I would like to express a personal gratitude to Andrew for his advice and support as a member of the Advisory Board for the AHRC-funded Soldier project, but most of all for the stimulating discussions in the late 1980s when we were both exploring the new research possibilities offered by computer databases.

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records, for instance, generated 128,526 nominal records for ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England’ project, a figure which represented around half of the total names collected.2 Although the archives of the chambre des comptes have suffered many vicissitudes over the years, enough survives to enable a reconstruction of the garrison establishment as well as of field campaigns, and to facilitate research into many aspects of military activity and interactions.3 The key word, however, is reconstruction. Whilst relevant materials survive for every year, there are gaps in the evidence.4 In the light of the inconsistency of data survival, therefore, it is very helpful that a number of documents provide a fuller picture, such as the surviving accounts of Pierre Surreau, receiver-general of Normandy, for the years 1423–25, 1425–26 and 1428–29.5 Unfortunately the account of the receiver-general of Normandy for 1448–49 survives only in part and is missing its garrison section.6 Five documents are known which provide a complete listing of all the garrisons at a particular point in time. The best known, since it has been in

By the time of the publication of the project monograph we had data from 2,283 rolls concerning the English garrisons in Normandy between 1417 and 1450; A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013),

2

p. xi, note 1. For discussion of their temporal distribution see pp.  12–13. Additional rolls discovered since 2013 have been added to the on-line database at www.medievalsoldier.org.

For me this began with my doctoral study, ‘Military Organization in Lancastrian Normandy, 1422–50’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, CNAA/Teesside Polytechnic, 1985, on-line at uk.bl.ethos 351985). Subsequent publications include an overview in A. Curry, ‘English Armies in the Fifteenth Century’ in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the

3

Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp.  39–68, as well as more focused studies such as A. Curry, ‘Les gens vivans sur le pays pendant l’occupation de Normandie, 1417–1450’, in La guerre, la violence et les gens au moyen age. 1. Guerre et violence (Paris, 1996), pp. 209–21; A. Curry, ‘The Organisation of Field Armies in Lancastrian Normandy’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), pp.  207–31; A. Curry, ‘Isolated or Integrated? The English Soldier in Lancastrian Normandy’, in Courts and Regions of Medieval Europe, ed. S. Rees Jones, R. Marks and A. J. Minnis (Woodbridge, 2000), pp.  191–210; A. Curry, ‘Foreign Soldiers in English Pay: Identity and Unity in the Armies of the English Crown, 1415–1450’, in Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent Ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption, ed. G. Pépin, F. Boutoulle and F. Lainé (Bordeaux, 2016), pp. 303–16. 4 M. Nortier, ‘Le sort des archives dispersés de la chambre des comptes’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 123 (1965), pp. 460–537. For discussion of the financial organisation see A. Curry, ‘L’administration financière de la Normandie anglaise: continuité ou changement’, in La France des principautés. Les chambres des comptes xive et xve siècles, ed. P. Contamine and O. Mattéoni (Paris, 1996), pp. 83–103, and A. Curry, ‘La chambre des comptes de Normandie sous l’occupation anglaise, 1417–50 (textes et documents)’, in Les Chambres des comptes en France aux xive et xve siècles, ed. P. Contamine and O. Mattéoni (Paris, 1998), pp. 91–125.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BNF], manuscrit français 4485, 4491, 4488. BL, Additional MS 11,509, discussed in A. Curry, ‘The Loss of Lancastrian Normandy in 1450. An Administrative Nightmare?’, in The English Experience in France, ed. D. Grum-

5 6

mitt (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 24–45.



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print since 1864, concerns the year 1433 to 1434.7 It is to be found in Lambeth Palace Library MS 506, a collection of documents originally made by William Worcester, antiquary and one-time secretary to Sir John Fastolf (d. 1459), and later presented by his son, William Worcester junior, to Richard III. The list, in Latin, notes fifty garrisons and retinues, and is headed Declaratio hominum armorum, lanceorum et sagittariorum existentium in castris, fortalitiis, munitionibus, civitatibus et villis in ducatus Normaniae et Patria conquaesta pro salva custodia et defensione eorumdem a festo Sancti Michaelis anno Christi m iiij c xxxiij usque dictum festum Michaelis anno Christi m iiijc xxxiiij ex ordinatione domini regentis regni Franciae Johannis ducis Bedfordiae et per concilium Regis apud castrum de Falloise facta.

A further list concerning 1444–45 is found in the same manuscript and is similarly in Latin.8 It lists forty-three places holding garrisons as well as a number of retinues. Its heading reads as follows: Declaratio gentium armorum, architenentium, tam equestrium quam pedestrium, existentium in vadiis, retentorum en les garnisons [sic] castris et fortalitiis ducatus Normannie pro salva custodia eorum et ad serviendum in campis cum necesse fuerit et fuit ordinatum sub tempore inclyti principis domini gubernantis regni Francie, Ricardi ducis de York, tempore et anno quo treuga velut pax tractata est et apunctuata fuit inter Henricum vj regem Anglie et Francie et Carolum vij Francorum regem.

Another list, this time in French, also derives from the papers collected by William Worcester in College of Arms Arundel XLVIII.9 This mentions fifty-five retinues, of which forty-three were garrisons, giving their current and previous size as well as the name of their captain. The document relates London, Lambeth Palace MS 506, fols 16v–20r, printed in J. Stevenson, Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England, Rolls Series, 2 vols in 3 parts (London, 1861–4), II, ii (1864), pp. 540–6. A seventeenth-century copy is in London, Society of Antiquaries, MS 41, of which fols 1 to 43 are transcripts of Lambeth Palace Library, MS 506, fols 2 to 50.

7

Lambeth Palace Library, MS 506, fols 28r–30r. A sixteenth-century copy of this list exists in the chartrier de Thorigny in a private collection in France and was published by F. Dubosc, ‘Manuscrit inédit tiré des archives de la maison de Matignon’, Journal des

8

Savants de Normandie, 1 (1844), pp. 45–51. The chartrier contains a copy of the 1433–34 list which Dubosc also included in his article. The Matignon were an ancient Norman family with their seat at Torigni-sur-Vire (arr. Saint-Lô, c. Condé-sur-Vire, dépt. La Manche), being counts of Thorigny in the sixteenth century: J. B. Wood, The Nobility of the ‘Election’ of Bayeux, 1463–1666: Continuity Through Change (Princeton, 1980), p.  91. Jacques Goyon de Matignon (d. 1751) married Louise Hippolyte Grimaldi, heiress of Monaco, and through her became prince of Monaco, adopting the name and arms of the Grimaldi family. His Parisian house, the Hôtel Matignon, is now the official residence of the French prime minister.

A. Curry, ‘John, Duke of Bedford’s Arrangements for the Defence of Normandy in October 1434: College of Arms MS, Arundel 48, fols 274r-276r’, Annales de Normandie

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62 (2012), pp. 235–51.

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to a reorganisation of the Norman garrisons in October 1434 by the duke of Bedford, as its heading reveals. Ce sont les endentures des garnisons de Normandie et pais de conquest advisees et faictes a Rouen ou mois doctobre mil iiijc xxxiiij par monsieur le Regent estant pour lors audit lieu.

It is important to note, however, that none of these three lists can be directly linked to the actual administration of Lancastrian Normandy. The list relating to October 1434 comes closest, being in a French hand of the period, but is most likely a copy made for William Worcester. The two lists in Latin were compiled by Worcester some time after the loss of English lands in France. This language choice, since all records produced by the administration of Lancastrian France were in French, raises immediate issues on their origins: they cannot be simply direct copies of lost originals. The collection of texts in which they are included, Lambeth Palace Library MS 506, was aimed, in its final form at least, at encouraging the Yorkist kings to reopen the war by presenting exempla of the successes and good governance of the past.10 The lists for 1436 By contrast, the two remaining unpublished lists, provided in full transcription at the end of this chapter, are in French and were the product of the administration of Lancastrian Normandy in 1436, being preserved in the archives of the chambre des comptes. Both are now to be found in Bibliothèque Nationale de France manuscrit français 25773, the volume of montres de guerre for 1436–37.11 This classification arises from efforts in the time of Napoléon III (hence the stamp ‘Bibliothèque Impériale’ which the documents bear) to 10

See the preface of the manuscript composed by Worcester’s son, printed in Stevenson,

Letters and Papers, II, ii pp 521–29. It is unclear why Stevenson chose to omit the 1444–45 list from his otherwise fairly complete transcript of Lambeth Palace MS 506. K. B. McFarlane suggested that this manuscript was intended as an accompanying set of pièces justificatives for William Worcester’s Boke of Noblesse: ‘William Worcester. A Preliminary Survey’ in Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. J. C. Davies (London, 1957), pp. 198–214, reprinted in K. B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century. Collected Essays, ed. G. L. Harris (London, 1981), p.  216. The dating of The Boke, and by implication the Lambeth MS, is problematic and in need of fuller discussion.

Partial abstracts of the lists were included in Appendix II: Part B of an MA thesis by A. E. Marshall, ‘The Role of English War Captains in England and Normandy 1436–1461’ (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Wales, 1975), but the first list was incorrectly dated by Marshall to 1435 and there are some transcription errors. Marshall was also incorrect in claiming that the lists were not substantially different from each other. Similarly, the interim conclusions on the 1436 distributions in A. Curry, ‘Les soldats anglais en garnison en Normandie 1417–1450’, Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires

11

de Normandie 74 (2015), p.152, are superseded by this current article.



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create archival neatness by binding together original documents of the same type and of the same period.12 Through this archival practice the montres were separated from other surviving chambre des comptes materials held within the Bibliothèque Impériale. Some of the other chambre materials were similarly grouped by type into the series quittances et pièces diverses. BNF manuscrit français 25773 contains 148 musters or contrerolles (a report produced by the controller of the garrison for each three-month period, between the quarterly musters) as well as documents which the archival reorganisers of the 1850s considered to resemble musters and therefore worthy of inclusion within the series montres de guerre. The two lists, manuscrit français 25773/1071 and manuscrit français 25773/1121, do indeed have a format similar to that of the musters in the same volume and are placed therein according to their dating. Thus manuscrit français 25773/1071 is placed earlier because the period it covers is 30 March 1436 (expressed following the then French practice of the new year starting at Easter as ‘le trentieme jour de mars avant paques cccc trente cinq’) to 1 July next. Manuscrit français 25773/1121 covers the period from 29 June 1436 to 1 October of the same year. The headings are, respectively, as follows: (1071) Cest la declaration des gens darmes et de trait ordonnez et necessaires pour la garde seurete et deffense des ville portes et murs de Rouen, des chastel et pont de Seine dillec, et des autres villes et chasteaulx et forteresses des pays et duchie de Normandie et de conqueste fait par feu de bon memoire le roy Henri dAngleterre derrainement trespasse dont Dieu ait lame selon ladvis sur ce fait par messeigneurs du grant conseil du roi notre seigneur pour certain temps commencant le trentieme jour de mars avant pasques mil cccc trente cinq ou environ et finissant au premier jour de juillet prochainement venue (1121) Cest la declaration des gens darmes et de trait ordonnez et necessaires pour la garde et deffense des ville portes et murs de Rouen, des chastel et pont de Seine dillec et des autres villes chasteaulx et forteresses des pays et duchie de Normandie et de conqueste fait par feu de bon memoire le roy Henri dAngleterre derrainement trespasse dont Dieu ait lame selon ladvis sur ce fait par messeigneurs du grant conseil du roi notre seigneur pour certain temps commencant le vingt neufieme jour de juing mil cccc trente six et finissant au premier jour doctobre ensuivant

There are only minor differences between the headings, marked in italics in the texts above. The lists are identical in style and layout. Both are on a single sheet of parchment. Each begins with the opening initial (‘C’ of The original documents were glued onto sheets of paper which were then bound together into folio volumes. The mid-nineteenth-century paper has often deteriorated. By the 1850s modern dating organisation was applied, so that the year was deemed to begin on 1 January rather than using the old-style French year which began at Easter, or the medieval accounting year in the chambre des comptes which began at Michaelmas

12

(29 September).

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‘C’est’) presented in a decorative form, with only minor variations between them. Uprisers on the letter ‘l’ in the top line are extended, as is common in French handwriting styles in this period. We see further flourishes of a decorative nature elsewhere in the documents. Both lists are signed at the bottom ‘Par la relacion du grant conseil J[ean] Rinel’. We shall return in due course to Rinel and to the circumstances under which the lists were drawn up. After the heading both lists begin ‘Et premierement’. The information is then provided in four columns. The left hand column gives the name of the place, the next column the number of ‘lances a cheval’ (mounted lances, the expression used for men-at-arms), the next the number of foot lances, expressed as a roman numeral followed by ‘apie’ (on foot). The right hand column contains the number of archers expressed in the format ‘et n archiers’. In addition to geographical locations where garrisons were installed (thirty-seven in BNF manuscrit français 25773/1071 and thirty-six in BNF manuscrit français 25773/1121) both lists include retinues of the leading commanders – John, Lord Talbot, Robert, Lord Willoughby and Thomas, Lord Scales – as well as details of the retinues of officials in Normandy – the master of ordnance, the treasurer, the receiver-general of Normandy and the controller of the receipt – although without giving the name of their holder.13 The first thirty garrisons, plus the entry for the bailli of Caen, are in the same order in each list, although there are differences in the glosses concerning the second-named place (Vernon) and the fifth (Dreux). After the thirtieth named place (Conches) the order of the entries is different between the two lists. In BNF manuscrit français 25773/1071 the entries for the commanders and the office holders are given before the entries for the garrisons at Rouen (town, bridge and castle, followed by the bailli). The Rouen entry is then followed by seven further places. In BNF manuscrit français 25773/1121, however, the Rouen entries follow the entry for Conches. Then come six of the seven further places – there is no entry in this list for Bacqueville which had featured in the earlier list – and the entries for the commanders and officials, although in a different ordering from the earlier list. Despite such variations both lists present the garrisons in a distinct geographical pattern. Commencing at Mantes to the west of Paris on the Seine, the garrisons moving westwards down the river to Pont-de-l’Arche follow, before a turn southwards to the Eure valley to Évreux and Dreux and thence westwards to Verneuil before turning northwards to Lisieux. Then follow the garrisons directly north of Lisieux, Honfleur and Touques, moving westwards to Caen and Bayeux. There is then a shift southwards, but still westwards, to Vire, St-Lô, and then into the Cotentin northwards. Returning The office holders in this period were William Gloucester (master of the ordnance), John Stanlowe (treasurer), Pierre Baille (receiver-general), and Thomas Hunt (controller of the receipt).Whilst the list for October 1434 contains the companies of the officials it does not include any companies under individual commanders.

13



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via Pont d’Ouve at the mouth of the River Vire, the order of entries moves southwards first to Falaise and then to a number of garrisons on the southern frontier, including Fresnay-le-Vicomte. The next entry is for Conches, an odd shift given that it lay close to Evreux. Although as we have seen the lists after Conches depart from each other, the order of places is none the less consistent in both. Once Rouen has been ‘visited’ the order moves west along the Seine to Caudebec then into the pays de Caux to Arques before moving to the eastern frontier of Neufchâtel, Gournay and Gisors, terminating on the Seine at Château-Gaillard. The logic would appear to be based on the bailliages, the principal administrative divisions, the circuit being the bailliages of Mantes, Évreux, Caen, Cotentin, Alençon, Rouen, Caux and Gisors (although by this point the latter had been joined with Rouen). Only the retinues of the baillis of Caen and Rouen are listed, the omissions of the others being no doubt because the office of bailli was held alongside a captaincy.14 An inexplicable anomaly is the placing of Conches. That the ordering of Rouen and the commanders and officials is different is less perplexing since Rouen was the hub for administration and governance. The lists and the response to the response to the crisis of 1435 The importance of these lists lies in what they reveal about the English response to the downturn in their fortunes from late 1435 onwards in the face of losses in the pays de Caux and Seine valley towards Paris. Such events provoked new challenges for the military as well as political position of the English, the latter already undermined by the death of the duke of Bedford at Rouen on 14 September 1435 and the defection of the duke of Burgundy a week later after the failure of negotiations at Arras. Certain key English installations are missing from the lists, not least Harfleur, the initial conquest of Henry V, and Dieppe and Eu, ports on the north-east coast of the pays de Caux. These places had been lost in the face of French assaults supported by peasant uprisings. Dieppe fell in late October, with Fécamp, Valmont, Lillebonne, Montivilliers and Tancarville surrendering in late November and early December. Harfleur probably fell on 26 December although the Berry Herald places its loss a month earlier.15 Eu fell sometime between 1 February A. Curry, ‘The baillis of Lancastrian Normandy. English Men Wearing French Hats’, in The Plantagenet Empire 1259–1453, ed. P. Crooks, D. Green, W. M. Ormrod, Harlaxton Medieval Studies, XXXVI (Donington, 2016), pp.  357–68, at p.  361. The assumption can certainly be justified for the bailliage of the Cotentin. Hugh Spencer’s muster of 8 July 1436 was as bailli and captain of Regnéville, the troops totalling forty which was the size given for Regnéville in both lists: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1119. 15 The English chronicler Benet gives 26 December for the fall of Harfleur: John Benet’s Chronicle for the Years 1400 to 1462, ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden Miscellany 14

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and 29 March 1436.16 We might have expected further locations in the pays de conquête to be included in the lists alongside Mantes, in other words the places along the Seine towards Paris which were commonly organised in military terms along with the Norman garrisons. But here too there had been losses. Meulan was taken by the French on 24 September 1435, St-Germain-en-Laye in December, and Pontoise on 20 February 1436 after its inhabitants had risen up against their English masters.17 In the early part of 1436 the French advanced along the Seine towards Rouen, first attacking Caudebec.18 The very heartlands of English rule were under serious threat. The world was very different from that of October 1434 when Bedford had introduced his reforms of the garrisons as detailed in the list in College of Arms, Arundel XLVIII. His reforms had triggered the issuing to garrison captains of indentures for two years rather than the customary twelve months. As a result, the English found themselves, in the winter of 1435–36, still largely bound to a distribution of troops which had been drawn up for very different military priorities. Bedford’s hope in October 1434 had been to lay a new siege to Mont-Saint-Michel and to continue operations in Maine: therefore he had placed mobile companies on the southern frontier of the duchy.19 Only four hundred English troops appear to have been based in the pays de Caux as a result of Bedford’s reforms: Dieppe, at sixteen soldiers, was one of the smallest garrisons of all. We can, however, detect responsiveness to the challenges over the autumn and winter of 1435–36. For instance, the garrisons of Gournay and Neufchâtel were strengthened by 210 and eighty men respectively, and were able to hold firm against the French at Gerberoy.20 The additional presence of specially appointed field XXIV, Camden Society, 4th ser., 9 (London, 1972), p.  184. But the earlier date is found in the French chronicler Gilles Le Bouvier, known as Berry Herald: C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy. The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983), p.  40. For a narrative of the period of crisis see J. Barker, Conquest. The English Kingdom of France (London, 2009), pp. 232–54.

Its captaincy had changed hands on 31 January when Sir John Cressy replaced Sir John Montgomery: BNF, manuscrit français 25772/938. 17 Even though the Pontoise garrison had been increased from 116 to 168 men on 15 February and Lord Willoughby’s personal retinue had also been used there as reinforcement: respectively, BNF, Clairambault 208/12 and BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2838. 16

18

Thomas Basin, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. C. Samaran (Paris, 1933), i, p. 217. Not surprisingly, this attack is noted by Basin since it concerned his home town.

For the operation of the companies in Maine in the summer of 1435: BNF, manuscrit français 26059/2529; BNF, pièces originales 2135 Ogard 9. A new siege of MontSaint-Michel had been laid in November 1434 but the French capture of St Denis in June 1435 forced redeployment of the siege commander, Thomas, Lord Scales and his troops to the Île-de France: BNF, manuscrit français 26060/2668; BNF, pieces originales 2659 Scales 5. 20 BNF, manuscrit français 26059/2565, 2536. In May 1435 the French based at Beauvais occupied Gerberoy, close to English-held Gournay. Coming to the rescue, the earl of Arundel was wounded and captured, dying as a prisoner in Beauvais on 12 June: Basin, i, p. 211. 19



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companies under Richard Curson and Sir Thomas Kyriell helped to limit further enemy penetration into the Norman Vexin.21 In contrast, however, the additional troops and artillery put into Harfleur, Eu and Arques were enough to save only the latter, which by early January 1436 contained over three hundred soldiers compared with the forty placed there as a result of Bedford’s reforms of October 1434.22 According to the chronicler Thomas Basin, the English responded to the French advance of early 1436 towards Rouen by putting more soldiers into garrisons (‘remplirent de soldats les places et chateaux du pays en leur possession…’).23 They had been particularly swift to reinforce Caudebec, which housed four hundred men by 4 January and which was placed under the command of the highly experienced and feared John, Lord Talbot.24 In addition to sorties to undermine French incursions and the actions of rebel peasants, Talbot also strengthened Rouen in January with ‘hastily recruited creus’, ‘creu’ being a term which literally means an increase and which was commonly used to denote additional troops.25 The size of Talbot’s garrison at Château-Gaillard was boosted from thirtyfive to sixty-five men, and one hundred additional troops were placed in Gisors under Sir Thomas Hoo.26 Such arrangements reflect a great deal of planning which served to save the Norman capital. Yet it should be remembered that following Bedford’s death there was no single source of authority in Lancastrian France. It was not until 9 December 1435, towards the end of the parliament at Westminster, which had opened on 10 October, that Richard, duke of York agreed to take up office as lieutenant and governor general of France, with the earls of BNF, manuscrit français 26059/2544, 25772/951, 26060/2799; Archives Nationales [AN], Mi 104, Collection Lenoir 75, fol. 7. 22 For reinforcements put into these places, see BNF, manuscrit français 25772/947, 1022; BNF, Clairambault 191/128; AN, Mi 104, Collection Lenoir 75, fol. 7; AN, K 64/1/25. 21

23

Basin, i, p. 219. A. J. Pollard, John Talbot and the War in France 1427–1453 (London, 1983), p. 22, n. 44: ‘Talbot’s garrison of over four hundred men in Caudebec under Eyton was mustered there on 4 January although his captaincy did not officially begin until 14 January (BL, Additional Charter 439). It contained several men associated with Talbot’s personal retinue (BNF, manuscrit français 25772/1050).’ See below, n. 49, for discussion of the indenture dated 7 January 1436. Sir John Robessart had held the captaincy of Caudebec until 21 December 1435: BNF, Clairambault 191/128. In late November 1435 there had already been a small increase of the size of the garrison with a creu of one man-at-arms and twenty archers assigned to Robessart for one month: BNF, Clairambault 191/128. 25 Pollard, John Talbot, p. 23. 26 Ibid., citing BNF, manuscrit français 25772/1051–57 and BL, Additional Charters 6875 and 94. Before Christmas 1435 English soldiers at Gisors had been executed for plotting to surrender the place: BNF, manuscrit français 26060/2654, noted in C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 1415–1450. The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983), p. 40. 24

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Salisbury, Suffolk and Mortain (Edmund Beaufort) also agreeing to provide military service.27 Indentures were not sealed until the first months of the New Year, however, and York’s formal commission was not finalised until 8 May.28 He did not arrive in the duchy with his army until 7 June 1436. In the interim, authority in France was conciliar, led by the chancellor Louis of Luxembourg, bishop of Thérouanne, who is known to have spent most of the winter of 1435–36 in Rouen rather than in Paris. There was considerable effort to liaise with England with the aim that reinforcements would be sent to strengthen the English position. A key player in this liaison was Jean Rinel, the king’s French secretary and the signatory of both of the lists in BNF manuscrit français 25773.29 Indeed, the lists are possibly in his hand. Rinel was a French royal official and skilled lawyer who had transferred seamlessly from Valois to Plantagenet service.30 In 1407 he was principal secretary of the Dauphin Louis and by 1411 secretary to Charles VI himself. His first acquaintance with Henry V came during negotiations in 1419, but he served the English king closely during the regency that followed the sealing of the treaty of Troyes in May 1420. Henry rewarded him with a gift of 200 livres parisis of rent for his ‘grans peines, travaulx, labours et despences’ in accompanying the king in ‘tous les sieges, armees et chevauchees’. Well might Rinel specifically recall in the heading of the lists of 1436, 27

A. Curry, ‘Introduction to the Parliament of October 1435’, in PROME, vol. XI

(Woodbridge, 2006), p. 161.

York indented on 23 February for service with one baron, one knight banneret, seven knights bachelor, 490 men-at-arms and 2,200 archers: TNA E  404/52/208; E  403/722, m. 15, second payment 24 May E 403/724, m. 6; Salisbury on 5 March for three knights banneret, seven knights bachelor, 249 men-at-arms and 1040 archers: E  404/52/211; E  403/722, m. 15, second payment 24 May E 403/724, m. 6; Suffolk on 28 March for two knights bachelor, 37 men-at-arms and 160 archers: E 404/52/226; E  403/722, m. 19, second payment 24 May E  403/724, m. 6; Mortain on 16 January with two barons, six knights, 391 men-at-arms and 1600 archers: E 404/52/196; E 403/722, m. 15, second payment 10 May E  403/724, m. 4, the intended location of this service being outside Normandy although the force was diverted to the rescue of Calais after the Burgundians laid siege in June. For York’s commission as royal lieutenant, see BNF, manuscrit français 5330 fol. 137, printed in P. Johnson, Duke Richard of York 1411–1460

28

(Oxford, 1988), pp. 226–7.

Another important player in liaison between England and France was William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, who, after the Franco-Burgundian rapprochement at Arras on 21 September 1435, had made his way to Calais where he was entreated by Cardinal Beaufort and other lords to hasten to Rouen to see to the defence of the duchy: TNA E  404/52/206, E 403/722, m. 10. He was present in Normandy until November 1435, crossing again to the duchy in May 1436. 30 For what follows see P. Contamine, ‘Maître Jean de Rinel (vers 1380–1449), notaire et secrétaire de Charles VI puis de Henry [VI] pour son royaume de France, l’une des “plumes” de l’union des deux couronnes’, in De part et l’autre de la Normandie médiévale. 29

Receuil d’études en homage à François Neveux, Cahier des Annales de Normandie 35, no. 1 (2009), pp. 115–34.



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therefore, the successes in conquest as well as the unfortunate early demise of the king ‘de bon memoire’. At a time of crisis, as well as of political uncertainties caused by the volte face of the Burgundians, what better than to refer to the glories of the past? Rinel became French secretary to Henry VI immediately after the latter’s accession to the French throne on 22 October 1422. His close involvement in Bedford’s regency is evidenced, as also his frequent visits to England. He was in the English delegation at Arras in the early autumn of 1435, being also responsible for the composition of a text countering the arguments put forward by the Burgundians to justify the defection of their duke from the oath he had taken to the treaty of Troyes.31 With Guillaume Erard and Pierre Cauchon, then bishop of Lisieux, whose niece Rinel had married and who was a member of the ‘grant conseil’ referred to in the lists, Rinel left Arras to travel overland via Flanders and Calais to Boulogne. From there the party set sail to Le Tréport and thence to Dieppe before moving on to Caudebec and up the Seine to Rouen. Rinel then continued alone up the Seine to Mantes before travelling by road to Paris, which he had reached by the end of October 1435.32 Rinel was in England again in December 1435, being responsible for framing and signing the response which Henry VI sent to the Normans on 23 December in response to their letter of 3 December. The Normans had urged, amongst other things, for a high-status lord to be sent along with a large army, for unnecessary fortifications to be demolished, and for captains to hold only one captaincy. The royal reply of 23 December promised an army of two thousand lances (i.e. men-at-arms) and nine thousand archers led by the duke of York and other leading peers ‘pour y demourer longuement’, adding that by 1 January a ‘belle compagnie’ would cross to offer immediate help with another following within a month.33 Rinel is known to have been in Portsmouth on 12 January 1436 from where he, along with Jean, seigneur de Saâne (who had been a royal councillor in France from at least 1434 and who was probably a member of the council which had endorsed the 1436 lists), Master Pierre Morice, and Louis Gallet, an echevin from Paris, sent a letter to the duke of Gloucester to which the duke replied on 16 January.34 On 25 January Rinel and his companions sent a BL, Harley MS 4763, fols 196v-199v, discussed in A. Bossuat, ‘La littérature de propaganda au xve siècle. Le mémoire de Jean de Rinel, sécretaire du roi d’Angleterre, contre le duc de Bourgogne (1435)’, Cahiers d’histoire 1 (1956), pp. 131–46. 32 AN, K 64/1/19, printed in J. G. Dickinson, The Congress of Arras 1435. A Study in 31

Medieval Diplomacy (Oxford, 1955), pp. 232–3, from the transcript in TNA, PRO 31/8/136.

For printed transcriptions of relevant letters to and from the king, the originals of which are in BL, Cotton MS Titus A III, see ‘Rôles normands et français et autres pieces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765 et 1766’, Mémoires de la Société

33

des Antiquaires de Normandie 23 (1858), nos 1385–87. Another royal letter of 28 January 1436 to Louis of Luxembourg as chancellor is printed in Stevenson, Letters and Papers, i, pp. 424–9.

34

‘Rôles normands’, nos. 1389–90.

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second letter to the duke expressing their great anxiety at the continuing delay in sending aid. The letter outlined the parlous situation on behalf of themselves and ‘vos bons et loyaulx subjez de vostre rompu et cassé royaume de France’.35 Specifically, they expressed concern over the delayed arrival of shipping at Portsmouth to transport to France troops under Sir Thomas Beaumont. Beaumont was leader of one of the groups of advance reinforcements which the English government had raised to fulfil the promise they had made in the letter of 23 December. He had indented on 12 December for one year’s service of three knights bachelor, including himself, 197 men-at-arms and six hundred archers.36 Two other companies had been raised: Richard Wasteneys esquire indented on 23 November for the service of forty men-at-arms and five hundred archers from 20 December for two years,37 and Sir Henry Norbury on 12 December for thirty men-at-arms and four hundred archers for two years.38 The troops under Wasteneys and Norbury crossed in midJanuary from Portsmouth to Honfleur.39 A shortage of shipping had made it impossible for both troops to cross together: Norbury was given priority and instructed to land in the pays de Caux but it seems that this proved impossible.40 Although Beaumont’s company followed the optimum ratio of this period of one man-at-arms to three archers, the other two companies had a ratio of 12.5 archers for every man-at-arms, testimony to the awareness of the need to send reinforcements as quickly and as cheaply as possible: archers were easier to raise and were paid half the daily rate of men-at-arms.41 A postscript adds ‘…si est besoing de haster messire Thomas de Beaumont et qui envoiroit aveques luy oultre son nombre ii mille combattans à pie sans delay, en attendant monseigneur le duc d’Iorch et ung des nosseigneurs les comtes pour tout conduire’ (‘Rôles normands’, no. 1391). See also BNF, manuscrit français 26068/4223 for a royal letter of 1 February 1436 reassuring that the troops would soon be despatched but speaking of ‘le vent et la fortune de mer qui ont este et sont tres contraires’. 36 TNA E 403/722, m. 13. 37 TNA E 403/722, m. 6. 38 TNA E 403/722, mm. 8, 14. 39 For both captains the second instalment of pay was issued on 12 December: TNA E 403/722, m. 14. Protections for Wasteneys’ troops began to be issued from 19 November and for Norbury’s from 1 December: Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public 35

Records 48 (London, 1887), pp.  306–8. On 12 December orders were issued to muster their retinues on Portsdown Hill on 28–30 December and for the Cinque Ports to provide shipping by 27 December although a further general order went out on 20 December giving 5 January as a target date for shipping to arrive in Portsmouth: CPR, 1429–36, pp. 525–6. On 10 January 1436 commission was given to the captain of Honfleur and others to array the men of both Wasteneys and Norbury, implying they were expected to arrive imminently: Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 48, p. 308. 40 TNA E 28/80, printed in Stevenson, Letters and Papers, i, p. 508–10, although misdated there to 1450.

The reference to ‘ii mille combattans à pie’ in Rinel’s letter of 25 January suggests that the archers were foot but this is not indicated in the relevant indentures and warrants. Of

41



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As Rinel’s letter shows, however, even by late January there was still not enough shipping for Beaumont’s crossing. There was even further delay, indicated by the fact that it was not until 10 March that Beaumont collected his second instalment of pay.42 By this time the French threat to Paris was grave, forcing Louis of Luxembourg to return to the capital where Robert, Lord Willoughby had been attempting to hold the fort.43 Beaumont arrived in Paris with his troops a few days after 4 April but in a sortie towards SaintDenis he was routed by the French and taken prisoner.44 The French gained entry to Paris on 13 April. The English, led by Louis of Luxembourg and Robert, Lord Willoughby, evacuated the capital on 17 April and made for Rouen, which now became the hub of English interests in northern France. Neither of the lists in BNF manuscrit français 25773 is dated, nor is a place of creation given. Louis of Luxembourg was largely based in Normandy before mid-March 1436, which suggests that the decision on the distribution of troops for the three-month period from 31 March 1436, as reflected in the earlier of the two lists, was more likely taken at Rouen than at Paris. As for the members of the grant conseil at this point, they probably included Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Lisieux, the abbot of Fécamp, Robert Jolivet, the abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel, always loyal to the English cause even though his abbey never fell into their hands, as well as a number of lay lords. A document of 24 January 1436, for instance, has all three ecclesiastics as well as Sir Andrew Ogard mentioned as present at the grand conseil at Rouen at which Pierre Baille, who had previously been treasurer of the duke of Bedford, was appointed receiver-general of the duchy.45 The presence of loyal French lords such as the Sire de St Pierre is noted on other occasions in 1435 and 1436.46 Other possible presences include Sir Raoul le Sage, whose seat was at Valognes in the Cotentin, and Jean, seigneur de Saâne who, as we saw, had been in England with Rinel. Not until after the arrival of York and the complete fifty letters of protection taken out by men in all three retinues of advance reinforcements, four men appear to have served previously in France – Robert Rydesdale, William Sherman, Laurence Ryland and Thomas Symond. For full references, see www.medievalsoldier.org. Interestingly, the last two served together not only in the retinue of Beaumont in 1436 but also at Evreux in 1431: BNF, manuscrit français 25769/591, 593. 42 TNA, E 403/722, m. 17. This was paid via Richard Hotoft so it is possible that Beaumont had himself already crossed to France. Protections for his troops are found between 1 December 1435 and May 1436: Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 48, pp. 307–12. 43 G. L. Thompson, Paris and its People under English Rule. The Anglo-Burgundian Regime

1420–1436 (Oxford, 1991), pp. 232–3. 44 Ibid, p. 235. 45

AN, Mi 104, Collection Dom Lenoir 75, fol. 7. Ogard was also described as conseiller

in a document of 18 July 1436: BNF, pièces originales 2135 Ogard 10.

For instance, BNF, manuscrit français 26060/2661, dated 29 October 1435 when an indenture for Lord Scales as captain of St-Lô was drawn up. Also present on this occasion were the earl of Suffolk and Sir John Popham.

46

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concentration on Rouen rather than on both Rouen and Paris do we regularly see the major English military commanders as members of the grand conseil, but it is hard to believe that there was not some input from them into the lists to inform decisions of where to place the troops for best defence. Whilst Willoughby was based in Paris until its fall, Talbot was customarily in Rouen, whilst acting as lieutenant general sur le fait de la guerre between the Seine, Somme, Oise and the sea.47 Scales was often to be found on the southern frontier with his most frequent base at Domfront, the captaincy of which he held from 1428 to 1448, but he was also seneschal of the duchy.48 That the royal council in France held responsibility for the distribution of troops in Normandy is confirmed by the wording of the indenture issued on 7 January 1436 for Talbot’s captaincy of Caudebec.49 From 1 February to 1 April Talbot was to hold four hundred men in the garrison, but thereafter he was to hold ‘tel nombre de gens que le conseil du roy ordonna et dont le dit monsieur de Talbot sera daccort’. At some point in the spring, therefore, a decision was reached by the council on the numbers for all the garrisons: this is what is presented in the list in BNF manuscrit français 25773/1071 which covers the period from the end of March to the beginning of July. There is no evidence that quarterly lists of this kind had routinely been drawn up during the English occupation.50 They therefore appear to be specific to this year and an innovation of the council in this period of conciliar rule between the death of Bedford and the arrival of York. Indeed, it is very likely that a similar list had been drawn up for the previous quarter, since we have reference to the existence of a ‘rôle des garnisons’ for the quarter from December 1435 to March 1436.51 Although to date no such list has been found, surviving musters and quittances for these months suggest that the large numbers of troops found in the list for March to July 1436 were AN, K 64/10/15 which notes thirty-two of his retinue being sent to the defence of Paris in February 1436. His whole personal retinue mustered at Les Andeleys on 23 March 1436: BL, Additional MS 29315/2. 48 At the time of the lists, Willoughby was also captain of Bayeux and Pont-de-l’Arche, Talbot of Caudebec, Château-Gaillard, Coutances, and Gisors, having also been captain of St-Germain-en-Laye, Scales of Cherbourg, Domfront, and St-Lô. These were not the only multiple captaincies; Sir John Fastolf held Alençon, Caen and Fresnay. The writers of the letter to Henry VI on 3 December 1435 were clearly aware of this and did not approve of the situation. See above note 33. 49 BL, Additional Charter 11,009. The terms gave Talbot the right to discharge himself from the post if he did not agree. This shows perhaps the weakness of the council in comparison to the powers of the duke of Bedford who from 1429 onwards had had included in indentures his right to change numbers: Curry, ‘Military Organization’, p. 244. 50 As noted earlier there is no proof that the lists in Lambeth Palace MS 506 were official records of the English administration. The order of places in the lists for 1433–34, 1444–45 and 1434 differs in each case and is never the same as those for 1436. 51 As implied by BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2995. 47



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already in place, at least in some locations, in the previous quarter.52 The council had certainly performed a holding operation over the last quarter of 1435, in liaison with the earl of Suffolk who had been in the duchy between September and November. In general they had maintained the status quo, keeping in office almost all of the captains appointed by Bedford in October 1434; in those places where he had been captain, his lieutenants simply took over command. But the Estates of Normandy held in Rouen, whose taxation grants paid for the defence of the duchy, had clearly expressed a view on the need for greater defence, triggering the letter sent to Henry VI on 3 December asking for aid. The distribution of troops March to July 1436 (BNF manuscrit français 25773/1071) No total number is given in either of the lists but by adding together the entries we find that the list for March to July records an establishment of 7,442. This is the highest figure ever found across the whole of the English tenure of Normandy, testimony not only to the level of the crisis but also to the efforts to provide for secure defence. It presents an immediate contrast with the troops in the list concerned with the duke of Bedford’s reforms in October 1434, which total 4,527, reflecting an overall increase of 60.8 per cent (Table 11.1). In the list for March to July 1436 the regular garrisons contained 5,762 men out of the 7,442 total, representing 77.4 per cent of the total number of troops in the duchy. Thirty-seven different garrison locations are listed (as opposed to forty-three in the October 1434 list). In the case of Rouen, as in 1434, there is further subdivision into the three garrisons of town, bridge and castle, the troops being noted as the same size as the regular garrisons (‘de lordinaire’) for the previous year.53 For Dreux there is a gloss explaining The muster for Caudebec taken on 4 January 1436 was of fifty-eight men-at-arms, twenty-one foot men-at-arms and 329 archers, BNF, manuscrit français 25772/1050, close, in total at least, to the four hundred in the list in BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1071, which delineates a composition of sixty mounted men-at-arms, forty foot men-at-arms and three hundred archers. The muster taken on 20 June 1436 was of 60 + 40 + 308: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1102. A muster at Dreux for the December 1435-March 1436 quarter indicates a creu of twenty-four men ‘avec son nombre ordinaire des nations

52

de France et dAngleterre’: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1069, which would have taken the total number to the eighty-four found in the list.

There was also a garrison of English soldiers at St Catherine-du-Mont, a monastery to the east of Rouen throughout the period of the two lists (see, for instance, AN, K 64/10/4 dated 30 May 1436 which speaks of six additional archers assigned to its defence from Michaelmas 1435 because of enemy threats from Beauvais). The place is omitted from the list presumably because the soldiers’ wages were paid by the monks at this point,

53

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that, of its garrison of twenty-six mounted lances and fifty-eight archers, six men-at-arms and eighteen archers (all of whom were required to be English) were paid at the wage rates of Normandy (and therefore accounted by the receiver-general of Normandy), but the remainder were to have the French form of monthly payment of 10 francs for the men-at-arms and 100 sous for the archers. The twenty men-at-arms paid in the French style were not obliged to account for gains of war, as their ‘English’ counterparts were.54 This split financing for Dreux was a common practice, reflective of its border position between Normandy and the Chartrain. Furthermore, Frenchmen were in command.55 Two locations, Vernon and Rouen, are noted in the list as having a creu. Together, these creus add a further 1,083 troops to the garrisons, constituting 14.6 per cent of the total number of troops in the list, and producing a grand total of 6,845 troops based in garrison (92 per cent). Rouen has creus noted for all three of its constituent parts, totalling 963 men (908 in the town, fifteen at the bridge and forty in the castle). Vernon has a creu of 120 men under the command of Sir Richard Lowych (commonly spelled as Lowick) and William Penytourne. Vernon was at this point captained by Sir Henry Redford,56 but a muster taken on 13 April survives for part of Sir Richard Lowick’s creu.57 Lowick had served in the conquest of Normandy under Henry V, being rewarded on 26 April 1419 by the grant of the seigneurie of

although documents concerning its defence are found in the archives of the chambre des

comptes. Another puzzling omission from the lists is Pontaudemer, for which we also have evidence of a garrison in 1436 in the same archives. See also BNF, Clairambault 142/105 for a muster of twenty archers on 24 May 1436 at La Roche Guyon, held in fief by Guy Boutellier, indicating that there were further troops in addition to those indicated in the lists. 54 That is what treitoyer means, as is more fully explained in the gloss for Dreux in the list for June to October. For an order in April 1436 that exclusively English troops should be held in Dreux even though there was a French captain there, see BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1097. 55 Sir William Broullart was captain but Sir Eustace Gaudin governor and bailli of Dreux and captain of the Tour de Dannemarche. Gaudin was in office until at least 8 June 1436: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1097. Broullart was still in command at the loss of Dreux to the French in 1438 and indeed continued in the same office under the French: BNF, manuscrit français 26064/3404, manuscrit français 26065/3608, manuscrit français 32510 fol. 372. For a similar gloss in 1434 see the transcript of College of Arms, Arundel XLVIII fols 274r-276v printed in Curry, ‘John, Duke of Bedford’s Arrangements for the Defence of Normandy in October 1434’.

BNF, Clairambault 143/35 (12 November 1435). He served until 24 November 1436, Evreux, Archives Départementales de l’Eure II F4068; although William, Lord Fauconberg was deemed to have taken over on 10 November 1436: BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2994. 57 BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1078, listing Lowick, two men-at-arms and sixteen archers. 56



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Criquetot in the Cotentin.58 On 15 April 1421 he was appointed governor of Mantes, a post he still occupied in August 1422.59 He was involved in the second siege of Mont-Aimé in 1426–27, the siege of Orléans in 1428–29 and the siege of Louviers in 1431.60 By the end of 1436 he had become lieutenant of Verneuil under William Neville, Lord Fauconberg who crossed with the duke of York in the summer of that year.61 William Penytourne has so far eluded identification.62 The baillis of Caen and Rouen are listed immediately after the garrisons of those places: each holds twenty-six troops under his command. The regular retinues of the master of the ordnance, treasurer of Normandy, receiver-general of Normandy and controller of the receipt are given, totalling forty-five men, with an additional retinue of sixty assigned to the treasurer for the field. In total, therefore, 157 soldiers (2.1 per cent) are found within the retinues of these office holders. A further 440 (5.9 per cent) are in the retinues of three peers. Lord Scales holds a personal retinue of eighty men, the customary size for the personal retinue of commanders, with an additional 160 men under his command with no specific purpose given. Lord Willoughby is assigned eighty men for his escort and for the field. Lord Talbot holds 120 men for his escort. Many entries for the garrisons show a ratio of men-at-arms to archers is 1:3, the standard English preference in this period. With respect to men-atarms a distinction is drawn between mounted and foot. All garrisons have foot men-at-arms as well as mounted save for Dreux, Bacqueville and Pont d’Ouve which contain only mounted men-at-arms and the creus at Rouen bridge and castle which contain only foot men-at-arms. With respect to the archers, whilst no distinction between mounted and foot is drawn it is likely that they were made up of both kinds of troops. A ratio of 1:3 would be expected so that, for instance, at Gournay with seventy mounted men-atarms and twenty foot men-at-arms we would expect 210 of the 270 archers to be mounted and sixty to be foot. Fifteen garrisons have foot outnumbering mounted troops (Pont de l’Arche, Lisieux, Honfleur, Touques, Caen, Bayeux, St-Lô, Coutances, 58

Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 41 (London, 1880), p.  782, printed in full in ‘Rôles normands’, no. 457. 59 Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 42 (London, 1881), p. 427, printed in ‘Rôles normands’, no. 1294; Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 42, p. 452. The office was in the hands of Sir Alan Buxhill by 18 December 1422: BNF, pièces originales 483 Buxhill 2. 60 BNF, manuscrit français 32510, fol. 369v; L. Jarry, Le comte de l’armée anglaise au siège d’Orléans 1428–1429 (Orléans, 1892), pp.  565–6; BNF, manuscrit français, 25769/542. (I am grateful to Dr Aleksandr Lobanov for some of these references.) According to a chronicle of the late 1450s he was in the English army at Cravant in 1423: College of Arms, MS M9, fol. 48v. 61 62

Archives Départementales de l’Eure, II F/4069. A William Peniton mustered as a foot archer in the creu of Rouen on 1 June 1436 under

Guillotin de Lansac (BL, Additional Charter 189) but this is unlikely to be the same man.

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Carentan, Avranches, Cherbourg, Regnéville, Falaise, Fresnay). The conclusion we can draw is that these locations were not deemed, in early 1436, to be under major threat from French troops in the vicinity. Almost all these locations are in Lower Normandy. By contrast those garrisons with higher proportions of mounted men indicate locations where the English considered it useful to have mobile forces for reconnaissance and to act against French advances. The list indicates clearly recent French successes through large accumulations of troops in the handful of remaining garrisons in the pays de Caux (Arques, Caudebec, plus Bacqueville, a village 17km to the south of Dieppe which had not previously held a royal garrison since it had been granted out by Henry V first to John, Lord Roos, and subsequently to Sir Thomas Beaumont),63 in the Vexin (Vernon, Gournay, Gisors, Neufchâtel) and in the valley of the Avre (Évreux, Dreux). Most striking, however, is the reinforcing of Rouen. Whilst the regular garrisons in the Norman capital were kept at the level of the previous year, 963 men were installed as creus, the majority in the town (908), with fifteen at the bridge on the Seine and forty in the castle: in this last case the reinforcements were foot as was appropriate for a largely sedentary garrison. Further useful contrasts can be drawn between the list for October 1434 and that for March–July 1436. The former indicates a total garrison establishment of 4,366, including the companies assigned to certain garrisons for the field. In the March–July 1436 list, the garrison establishment stood at 6,845, an increase of 63.3 per cent. In 1434 the average regular garrison size had been sixty-two; adding in the field companies takes the average to eighty-six. The average size of regular garrisons in the list for March to July 1436 was 156, which is boosted to 185 when the creus at Vernon and Rouen are added in. In October 1434 twenty regular garrisons housed fewer than fifty men, the figure being reduced to twelve if the mobile field companies are added in. In the list for March–July 1436 only one place housed under fifty men, the customarily small fortalice of Pont-d’Ouve at the coastal end of the oversands route to Mont-Saint-Michel, well removed from areas of threat in 1436. Only five places in 1434 exceeded two hundred men, and one of these was the bastide at Ardevon temporarily established to renew the siege of Mont-Saint-Michel. In 1436, twelve places housed more than two hundred, and five exceeded three hundred. We can also compare the distribution of troops on a regional basis (Table 11.2). For comparison it is useful to deploy the six divisions of Normandy suggested by Richard Newhall (Map 11.1):64 the heartlands of Upper Bacqueville had been granted to John, Lord Roos in April 1419 and following his death at the battle of Baugé to Sir Thomas Beaumont: Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 41, p. 763,

63

42, p. 415. Beaumont had crossed with reinforcements but had been captured in April 1436. R. A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy 1416–1424. A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare (New Haven, 1924), pp. 216–22.

64



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Normandy along the Seine, including Harfleur, Honfleur and Rouen (area 1); the upper Seine from Château-Gaillard towards Paris, including the pays de conquête (area 2); the northern area of the pays de Caux, including Arques, Dieppe, Gournay (area 3); the bailliage of Caen and the northern part of the Cotentin, including Caen, Bayeux, Cherbourg (area 4); the south-west frontier including Avranches, Domfront (area 5); the southern frontier, including Alençon, Falaise, Verneuil (area 6). Four of the six areas experienced a major increase in troops held in garrison. The most notable growth is seen in the lower Seine valley based on Rouen, reflecting fears for the capital’s security. But also notable is the reinforcement of the pays de Caux and Norman Vexin in the light of English losses and French pressures. Two areas, 5 and 6, which had contained over 50 per cent of the total troops in 1434 as areas key to Bedford’s strategic aspirations, had their numbers reduced. Although both still retained good numbers of troops, since the English did not wish to leave any area vulnerable, they were no longer the main priority. Of the thirty-six places in both lists, seven showed a reduction of garrison effectives. Five of these lay in area 6 (Alençon, Argentan, Dreux, Essay, Fresnay-le Vicomte).65 With such an increase in the number of troops, we must ask where the additional soldiers had come from. Detailed work on the surviving musters would be necessary to shed light on this question, and might reveal, for instance, whether soldiers from the lost places in the pays de Caux had joined other garrisons, or whether troops had been moved across the duchy to meet the new needs. For the present, some general observations can be made. We know that several hundred men from Bedford’s former household and associates were kept in Rouen from November 1435 until York’s arrival.66 It was in this context that we find Sir Andrew Ogard, still described as conseiller du roi, mustering with two mounted men and forty archers as part of the creu for the town of Rouen on 2 June 1436.67 The 908-strong creu was indeed made up of many small companies, troops under Sir Bernard de Montferrant, his fellow Gascon Sir William de Lansac, Sir Thomas Dring, Sir Thomas Fleming, Sir John Handford being in evidence.68 The first reinforcements from England were largely used to strengthen the garrisons, most Elsewhere, Conches was reduced from sixty-eight to sixty men, and Pont-de-l’Arche from 128 to eighty, somewhat surprisingly given the significance of the place as an outer bulwark for Rouen. 66 TNA, E 28/56/50; BNF, manuscrit français 25772/1053–7; BNF, manuscrit français 26060/2805; AN, K 64/1/20. 67 BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1093; BNF, nouvelle acquisition française 1482/1333. 68 Montferrant, BNF, manuscrit français 26060/2805; manuscrit français 25773/1062; Lansac, Rouen Bibliothèque Municipale Martainville 198/11 (16); BL, Additional Charter 189; Dring, BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2824; Fleming, BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1092, Rouen, Archives Départementales de la Seine Maritime 100 J 33/11; Handford, BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1084, 1095, 1100. Also John Stanys, BNF, 65

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especially that of Rouen.69 It cannot be a coincidence that the high proportion of archers in the companies of Wasteneys and Norbury are echoed in the high proportion of archers in the creu at Rouen, which comprised sixty mounted men-at-arms, forty foot and eight hundred archers. Furthermore, William Etton, one of the soldiers who had taken out a protection for service under Wasteneys, subsequently joined the garrison of St Catherine-du-Mont at the abbey just to the east of Rouen as a mounted man-at-arms.70 Another who had crossed with Norbury, Robert Pedley, was an archer in the garrison of Rouen castle in September.71 According to Pollard the influx of such reinforcements to Rouen allowed some of Talbot’s personal retinue to be sent to Paris. Early in April Talbot was certainly using Mantes as a base to gather supplies for the rescue of the capital but faced a major challenge because of the presence of the comte de Richemont at Pontoise.72 After Willoughby’s return to Rouen after the fall of Paris, his personal retinue of eighty men was largely used to supplement the defence of the Norman capital.73 As Pollard points out, the fall of Paris could have led to a major assault on Normandy.74 The French took Gisors in early May but Talbot and Scales were able to come to its rescue.75 The Norman capital proved too well defended for Richemont to chance any attack. Even though on 1 May 1436 Louis Oursel, the Frenchman entrusted with the defence of the Tour de Vernonnet at Vernon, was discharged under suspicion of treason,76 the place remained secure. The distribution of troops as described outlined in the list for March to July 1436 had proved effective in preserving English interests in Normandy.

manuscrit français 25773/1091, and William Ecton, BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1094; Henry Bowes, BL, Additional Charter 11,913. 69 See BNF, pièces originales 3047 Wastness 2 and BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2871 for quittances made by Richard Wasteneys on 25 April and 5 July 1436, indicating that after the first three months of wages paid before his departure from England, the costs of his retinue transferred to the charge of the Norman receiver-general. 70 BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1134 (31 August 1436). 71 BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1136 (11 September 1436), although marked as absent. 72 Pollard, John Talbot, pp. 23–4. 73 BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2844. 74 Pollard, John Talbot, p. 24. 75 For letters of 7 May 1436 mentioning the victory, see Archives Départementales de la Seine Maritime 100 J 38/37. Scales then had to return to the Cotentin against the French who recently had taken Granville: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1107. Sir John Fastolf, captain of Fresnay, was actually absent from his garrison for the whole of the March to June quarter of 1436, at Caen and in the company of Scales against Granville: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1105. 76 BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1104.



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The distribution of troops, June to October 1436 (BNF manuscrit français 25773/1121) The second list, which is dated from 29 June 1436 to 1 October, does not include Bacqueville. It is uncertain whether the place had been lost or that a decision had been taken to remove its garrison, or to restore it to its grantee. That is the only difference in terms of locations and retinues. More significant, however, is the reduction in the total number of troops. Whilst 7,442 troops are found in the first list, the total for the second is 6,252, a decrease of 1,190 (15.9 per cent). The number and distribution of troops under the three principal commanders remained the same at 440, a figure which now constituted 7 per cent of the total.77 For the officials there was an insignificant decrease of three (from 157 to 154) arising from a corresponding reduction of archers in the retinue of the master of the ordnance. The proportion of troops in the retinues of the officials constituted 2.5 per cent of the whole force. With respect to the numbers in the regular garrisons, we find a reduction of 459 (8 per cent) from 5,762 to 5,303. But the greatest difference is in the creus. There is no creu in Vernon in the second list, indicating it was no longer seen as vulnerable. Whilst all three elements of the garrison of Rouen continue to have a creu, the total number of soldiers was now 355 as opposed to 963, a reduction of 608 (63 per cent). Overall, therefore, whilst creus constituted 1,083 (14.6 per cent) of the troops in the first list, in the second they provided only 355 (5.7 per cent). The total troops in garrison, spread over thirty-six locations, is therefore 5,658 in the second list (90.5 per cent of the total establishment), a reduction of 1,187 (17.3 per cent) from the 6,845 in the earlier list. Comparing the two lists, we find reductions in the total size of garrisons at fifteen of the thirty-six locations (Table 11.1). Mantes, which had held 480 men in the first list, making it the largest regular garrison, now housed four hundred, the same as Caudebec.78 Reductions were also seen at Verneuil (320 to 240), Évreux (240 to 200), Alençon (240 to 210), Caen (170 to 120), Lisieux (160 to 100), Essay (100 to 80), Château-Gaillard (80 to 60), Exmes (60 to 40), Conches (60 to 40), Bayeux (60 to 40), Touques (40 to 32) and Pont-d’Ouve (31 to 21). Whilst some reductions were in places which were not deemed vulnerable in the spring and early summer, we can see that other decreases, such as at Verneuil and Mantes, reflected an increased

Scales is described as having only one retinue totalling 240 men whereas in the first list the numbers were split between his personal escort and another company with unspecified use. 78 A quittance speaks of an additional 103 men put into Mantes between 22 February and 1 77

June 1436 after the rebellion in Pontoise: BNF, manuscrit français 26062/3117.

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feeling of security even in the Seine valley since the French aborted plans for a full invasion of the duchy after their capture of Paris. The sense of security at Rouen is apparent in the diminution of the creu from 963 to 355. The creus at the bridge and castle are noted at the same level as in the first list but the town creu had been reduced from 908 to three hundred. The entry here is glossed: whilst the town creu is given as ‘iijC combatans’, the text continues ‘dont il y a de present ix lances a cheval et iiijxx xv archiers et le surplus sera mis’. The implication is therefore that most of the troops present before the end of June had gone but that the full intended new complement of 300 had not yet arrived: 196 men were still to come.79 That said, the ordinary garrison of Rouen had been increased to 171 from 132, a rise of thirty-nine (29 per cent) and the only rise in garrison size across the whole duchy. The most likely scenario here was that some troops in the creu had been transferred to the regular garrison. The list for March–July had an average regular garrison size of 156, boosted to 185 adding in the creus. In the second list the average garrison size is 147, rising to 157 if the creu at Rouen is included. But even with reductions eleven places still housed more than 200 men and four exceeded 300, in both cases only one fewer than in the earlier list. As can be seen from Table 11.2, all areas experienced a reduction in troops, the lower Seine valley (area 1) showing the highest proportionate decrease of 33 per cent, and a reduction in average garrison size from 293 to 198, although the area still contained the largest share of the soldiers. The lower reduction in area 3, still troubled by the loss of authority in the pays de Caux, boosted its share of the establishment. Reductions in the Seine valley as a whole (areas 1 and 2) also meant that areas 5 and 6 held a higher proportion of the troops than in March to June, although by no means as high as in October 1434. Here too we must recall that from May 1436 the French were also threatening English interests in the Cotentin through their seizure of Granville, aided by peasant rebellion: this no doubt explains why there was very little decrease in the garrison sizes in area 5. The evidence of the list suggests that a decision had been taken during June 1436 to reduce the overall size of the garrison establishment and to redistribute defensive strength according to a revised assessment of needs. Through the example of Essay, the underlying policy is revealed. Sir William Oldhall was ordered, in June 1436, to reduce the number in his garrison of Essay from one hundred to eighty men as part of a ‘moderation et diminution … du nombre des gens de guerre estans a nos soldees en telles et semblables gardes et cappitaneries et dont certaines lettres patents furent Of those who had headed companies within the creu before the end of June none can be proved to be in service in the period of the second list but as Sir Andrew Ogard and Sir John Handford also mustered in early October it is likely that they had continued in service: BNF, nouvelle acquisition française 8606/54; manuscrit français 25773/1145. 79



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faites’.80 These figures reflect precisely the different numbers for Essay given in the two lists. The duke of York had landed at Honfleur in the duchy as lieutenantgeneral on 7 June 1436.81 It is possible, therefore, that he was involved in the discussions at the council for the distribution of troops as outlined in the second list, although the authorisation was by the council alone, as in the earlier list. York’s arrival with a new army from England, 4,200 strong, enabled a renewal of offensive warfare in the duchy, rather than simply the maintenance of a defensive position. By this means places such as Fécamp and Lillebonne were recovered by the early autumn,82 although no progress was made against the major places in French hands, Dieppe and Harfleur. By early October York was paying attention to the defensive arrangements for the next year, holding a convention at Honfleur to discuss problems of military discipline and inviting written submissions of complaints since the death of the duke of Bedford.83 This was in itself an acknowledgement that the crisis was ebbing and attention could again be paid to local rather than simply military dictates. Significantly too, the indenture for the captain of Mantes for the period of service commencing at Michaelmas 1436 clearly delineated the areas from which appatis could be legitimately levied and used for garrison pay, a reflection of the immense pressure which had been placed on the vicinity of Mantes by the presence of so many troops earlier in the year.84 A new set of indentures for all garrison captains was drawn up from 10 November but backdated to Michaelmas and valid to June 1437, that date being the formal end of York’s one-year office as lieutenant general. Evidence for thirty-three garrisons survives, from which we can conclude that York had reduced the garrisons below five thousand, producing an AN, K 64/12/2. John Stanlowe at Verneuil received a similar order: AN, K 64/10/27. Both men were reluctant to enforce the change, claiming that the instructions had been received too late. Stanlowe added that he had been too busy in the field. Yet captains might also request increases, as Sir Eustace Gaudin had done at the Tour de Dannemarche. A muster taken there on 8 June for the quarter from 1 April to 30 June lists the requisite forty plus an additional fifteen at the request of the knight himself: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1097. 81 Johnson, Duke Richard, p. 29 citing BL, Additional Charters 1162 and 3790. On 22 May 80

1436 a commission was given to Sir John Popham and William Gloucester, the master of the ordnance, to muster York’s army when it arrived in France: CPR, 1429–36, p. 608. But there were delays in the arrival of the army. Already on 12 May York had been urged to take his passage in all haste to avoid ‘ye gret hurt and losse that dayley renneth upon us as wel for your long abode as for the cost of ships’, the latter having been gathered but now lying idle: TNA, E 28/57/23. 82 Basin, i, p.  249; BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1135, 1144. There was also activity closer to Paris such as the siege of Creil and an effort to recover St-Germain-en-Laye, involving the earl of Salisbury: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1128. 83 84

BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2921. BL, Additional Charter 11,013.

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average garrison size of around 129. York also ordered a simultaneous muster of all garrisons on 9 December, later postponed to 27 December, aimed at checking the captains had the new revised numbers.85 York’s authority had replaced that of the council, fulfilling the desire of the Norman delegates in December 1435 for a man of high status to replace Bedford. Indeed, it is notable that York also tried to meet their other requests put forward at the beginning of the crisis.86 One of these was that unnecessary and vulnerable fortifications should be demolished, not simply to save the burden of maintenance but also to prevent their possible use by the enemy.87 Indeed, by the time the new indentures were struck on 10 November it had even been decided to dismantle the fortifications of Essay and Exmes on the southern frontier, free-standing castles in relatively isolated positions with little civilian settlement in their shadow, and to remove their garrisons, although in the event both were retained.88 York also paid some attention to the complaint against multiple captaincies, a practice which the council had done nothing to resolve earlier.89 The indentures of 10 November also tightened up on the residence requirements of captains, forbidding their return to England without permission. Conclusion The lists of the military establishment in Normandy in 1436 enable us to appreciate the massive effort made by the English to preserve their position in the wake of a veritable crisis. As we have seen, they indicate that in the early summer of 1436 the number of troops deployed in the protection of Normandy was 7,442, the highest figure known for the defensive establishment over the whole occupation, with the figure for the late summer, at 6,252, being the second highest level known. Furthermore, the lists were not simply wishful thinking: where musters and quittances survive for the relevant periods they confirm that the intended levels were achieved, or else 85 R. A. Newhall, Muster and Review: A Problem of English Military Administration, 14201440 (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), p. 134.

See note 34, above. Demolitions in December 1436 of St-Germain-sous-Cailly, Fontaine-le-Bourg and Fontaine-le-Chastel, all north-east of Rouen, are known: BNF, manuscrit français 26062/3036; BL, Additional Charter 7984. 88 On 10 November 1436 Sir John Grey, who had held the captaincy of Exmes from at least April 1433, was reappointed and ordered to hold forty troops from Michaelmas 1436 to June 1437 if the place was not demolished as intended: BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2985. See also BNF, manuscrit français 26061/2989, 26063/3221. 89 See above, n. 48. At least fourteen changes in captaincies are known at this point, although York himself held multiple commands as Bedford had done: Curry, ‘Military Organization’, Appendix VIII. 86 87



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came very close.90 These levels are all the more impressive when the English were also raising large numbers of troops for expeditionary armies not only to Normandy but also to Calais, in the face of the siege laid by the duke of Burgundy in June 1436. This year therefore sees an exceptionally high level of militarisation on the part of the English in defence of their French interests, roughly on a par, in terms of total troops, with the great expeditions of Henry V and even Edward III in 1359–60. Whilst it took the English time to recover the territorial losses – Harfleur for instance was not retaken until 1440 – and some places such as Dieppe and Paris were never recovered, nonetheless the extent of English control was kept at a high level by the defensive actions of the council in 1436. Yet there is also a sense in which this was a holding measure under emergency conditions with ad hoc solutions by the council, even if applied across the whole duchy. Not until the end of the crisis and the entry of the duke of York to his position of lieutenant-general was there full restoration of the military administration in all its dimensions. Otherwise, essentially, the arrangements made in October 1434, and the indentures created at that point, remained formally in place for the two years originally intended. We should not ignore what the boosting of the garrisons by the council indicates, namely that decisions on the numbers of troops which captains were required to hold were centrally dictated. In turn, this has significant implications – as does a garrison system tout court with a turnover in captaincies generated by central control – for the link between a captain and his men. Further research in The Soldier Database would increase our understanding of this phenomenon as well as giving some further insights into how it was possible for the English to recruit so many soldiers in 1436, and also the implications of standing down such soldiers in the years to come: undoubtedly the expansion of 1436 contributed to the problem of the gens vivans sur le pays, veterans now without military employment, in the following years.91 The financial implications of the boosting of the defensive establishment would also repay further study. Whilst some funds were provided

See for instance the muster at Conches on 2 April with the right number and distribution; BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1072. Cherbourg was due to hold 160 men but the muster of 28 July lists 150 men: BL Additional Charter 11,918. At Exmes on 13 July forty-three men mustered whilst the list gives forty: BL, Additional Charter 11,915. At Lisieux 160 mustered on 19 May BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1085. The same number mustered there on 3 July even though the second list suggests the garrison was intended now to be one hundred men: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1113. At Honfleur ninetyeight mustered on 16 April and ninety on 25 May: BNF, manuscrit français 25773/1079, 1087 respectively. The troops were divided in the muster into the garnison ordinaire and the creu, a division not drawn in the lists. 91 Curry, ‘Les gens vivans sur le pays’, pp. 209–21. 90

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from England,92 the burden fell on the Normans themselves and, because of the loss of much of the pays de Caux, on a decreasing number of local tax payers. The impact of the military efforts of 1436 is seen in the following year: by midsummer 1437 reserves were so low that it was ordered that garrisons should receive only half of the wages due for the quarter from March to June of that year.93 Despite an additional vote of taxation in the bailliage of Caen in April 1437, wages were only paid in full when the earl of Warwick arrived in early November with English money ‘pour secourir a ses guerres et affaires diceulx’.94 Yet the response to the crisis of 1435–36 also provides insights into the relationships between the governments of England and Normandy and the role of talented go-betweens such as Jean Rinel. The solution was found by responses in both areas of English rule, stimulated by the persuasions of the loyal Normans themselves. Documents such as the two lists of 1436 remind us also of the high level of sophistication of military administration in this period. Whilst the lists linked to Sir John Fastolf and William Worcester mentioned at the outset of this chapter may not be the direct product of this administration they were only made possible by its bureaucratic achievements in general. Indeed, Denise Angers has speculated that the English were too bureaucratic in their administration of France and that this contributed to their eventual failure.95 But where would Andrew Ayton and all the contributors to this volume be if so many records had not been produced for the sake of English war efforts?

See, for instance, TNA, E 364/70 and E 101/53/8 on the earl of Suffolk being charged with the distribution of English money for the defence of Rouen, Meaux, Montargis, Montereau and Le Crotoy. 93 BNF, manuscrit français 26062/3080, manuscrit français 26063/3292, 3299. 94 BNF, manuscrit français 26062/3164; BNF, Clairambault 134/121. 95 D. Angers, ‘La guerre et le pluralisme linguistique: aspects de la guerre de Cent Ans’, 92

Annales de Normandie 43 (1993), pp. 125–39.



the garrison establishment in lancastrian normandy

263

Table 11.1. Total sizes of garrisons and retinues as indicated in the lists (Oct. 1434, College of Arms Arundel XLVIII fols 274r–276r; March–July 1436, BNF manuscrit français 25773/1071; June-October, BNF manuscrit français 25773/1121). For ease of reference the garrison data are presented in alphabetical order.

Oct. 1434 totals

March–July 1436 totals

June–Oct. 1436 totals

Alençon

256

240

210

Ardevon

400

Argentan

128

120

120

120 (incl. Eu)

320

320

160

200

200

Garrison

Arques Avranches

40

Bacqueville Bayeux

12

60

40

Caen

120

170

120

Carentan

16

80

80

24

400

400

Château-Gaillard

40

80

60

Cherbourg

100

160

160

Conches

68

60

40

Coutances

32

80

80

Dieppe

16

Domfront

152

160

160

Dreux

100

84

84

Essay

120

100

80

200

240

200 40

Caudebec

Eu Évreux

with Arques

Exmes

52

60

Falaise

80

120

120

Fresnay

256

200

200

Gisors

156

240

240

360

360

Gournay Harfleur

120

Honfleur

48

100

100

Lisieux

28

160

100

Longny

50

0

168

480

Mantes

400

264

anne curry Garrison

Meulan Montivilliers

Oct. 1434 totals

March–July 1436 totals

June–Oct. 1436 totals

200

200

80 At 300 f. p.a.

Neufchâtel

68

Poissy

16

Pont-de-l’Arche

128

80

80

7

31

21

Pont-d’Ouve Pontoise

112

Regnéville

24

40

40

Rouen town

132

1040

471

25

40

40

100

100

Rouen bridge Rouen castle

60

St-Germain-en-Laye

92

St Lô

40

80

80

Tombelaine

96

120

120

Tour de Dannemarche

40

40

40

Touques

8

40

32

Verneuil

260

320

240

Vernon

48

240

120

Vire

108

160

160

bailli of Caen

26

26

26

bailli of Rouen

26

26

26

master of ordnance

13

18

15

treasurer

75

75

75

receiver-general

9

10

10

controller of the receipt

2

2

2

Lord Scales

240

240

Lord Talbot

120

120

Lord Willoughby

80

80



the garrison establishment in lancastrian normandy Table 11.2: Distribution of troops in garrison by area (including field troops and creus)

Area

October 1434 (100%=4,366)

1436 March–July (100%=6,845)

1436 June–October (100%=5,658)

1

537 (12.3%)

1760 (25.7%)

1191 (21%)

2

444 (10.2%)

800 (11.7%)

580 (10.3%)

3

472 (10.8%)

1160 (16.9%)

1120 (19.8%)

4

592 (13.6%)

1050 (15.3%)

852 (15.1%)

5

979 (22.4%)

791 (11.6%)

781 (13.8%)

6

1342 (30.7%)

1284 (18.8%)

1134 (20%)

265

266

anne curry

Appendix Bibliothèque Nationale manuscrit français 25773/1071 Cest la declaration des gens darmes et de trait ordonnes et necessaires pour la garde seurete et deffense des ville portes et murs de Rouen des chastel et pont de Seine dillec et des autres villes et chasteaulx et forteresses des pays et duchie de Normandie et de conqueste fait par feu de bon memoire le roy Henri d’Angleterre derrainement trespasse dont Dieu ait lame selon ladvis sur ce fait par messeigneurs du grant conseil du roi notre seigneur pour certain temps commencant le trentieme jour de mars avant pasques mil cccc trente cinq ou environ et finissant au premier jour de juillet prochainement venant Et premierement

Mante lxx lances acheval cinquante apie et iiic lx archiers Vernon x lances acheval xx apie et iiijxxx archiers Et de creu tant soubz messier Richard Lowych chevalier comme soubz Guillaume Penytourne escuier xiiij lances a cheval iij apie et Ciij archiers Pont delarche v lances acheval xv apie et lx archiers Evreux xxx lances acheval xxx apie et ixxx archiers Dreux xxvj lances acheval et lviij hommes de trait Dont il y a vj lances et xviij archiers qui seront paiez au pris de gaiges de Nomandie et les autres xx lances et xl hommes de trait seront paies a x francs par mois pour hommes darmes et C sous pour homme de trait sans treitoyer pour lesdis xx lances et seront lesdis xviij archiers Angloiz Audit lieu pour la tour de Dannemarche x lances apie et xxx archiers Verneuil l lances acheval xxx apie et xiixx archiers Lisieux x lances acheval xxx apie et vjxx archiers Honnefleu x lances acheval xv apie et lxxv archiers Touque ij lances acheval viij apie et xxx archiers Caen iij lances acheval xxvij apie et vijxx archiers Le Bailli de Caen ij lances acheval et xxiiij archiers Baieux ij lances acheval xiij apie et xlv archiers Vire xx lances acheval xx apie et vjxx archiers Saint Lo ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Coustances ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Carenthan ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Avranches xxxij lances acheval xviij apie et vijxx x archiers Tombeleine xx lances acheval x apie et iiijxx x archiers Chierebourg v lances acheval xxxv apie et vjxx archiers Reneville ij lances acheval viij apie et xxx archiers Pont doue j lance acheval et xxx archiers Faloise ij lances acheval xxviij apie et iiijxx x archiers Dompfront xx lances acheval xx apie et vjxx archiers Argenthen xx lances acheval x apie et iiijxxx archiers Exmes x lances acheval v apie et xlv archiers Alencon xl lances acheval xx apie et ixxx archiers Fresnay xx lances acheval xxx apie et vijxxx archiers Essay xv lances acheval x apie et lxxv archiers Conches x lances acheval v apie et xlv archiers Monsieur de Scales xl lances acheval et vjxx archiers Item lui pour sa conduite xx lances acheval et lx archiers Le maistre des ordonnances j lance acheval et xvij archiers Le Tresorier de Normandie j lance acheval et xiiij archiers



the garrison establishment in lancastrian normandy

Lui pour les champs xv lances acheval Le receveur general de Normandie j lance a cheval Le controlleur de la recette general Monsieur de Willoughby pour sa conduite et pour les champs sa personne comprise xx lances acheval Monsieur de Talbot pour sa conduite xxx lances a cheval Rouen pour la ville de lordinaire Selon lanne passee vj lances a cheval xx apie Et de creu pour le dit temps lxviij lances acheval xl apie Item le pont de lordinaire Selon lanne passee j lance acheval iiij apie Et de creu pour le dit temps v lances apie et x archiers Le chastel de Rouen de lordinaire ij lances acheval xiij apie Le creu pour le dit temps [x lances apie deleted] x lances apie Le Bailli de Rouen ij lances a cheval Caudebec lx lances acheval xl apie Arques lx lances acheval xx apie Bacqueville x lances acheval Neufchastel xxx lances acheval xx apie Gournay lxx lances acheval xx apie Gisors xl lances acheval xx apie Gaillart x lances acheval x apie Par le Roy a la relation du grant conseil Je[han] Rinel

267

et xlv archiers et ix archiers ij archiers et lx archiers et iiijxxx archiers et Cvi archiers et viijc archiers et xx archiers et xlv archiers et xxx archiers et xxiiij archiers et iijc archiers et ijc xl archiers et xxx archiers et viixx x archiers et ijc lxx archiers et ixxx archiers et lx archiers

Bibliothèque Nationale manuscrit français 25773/1121 Cest la declaration des gens darmes et de trait ordonnez et necessaires pour la garde et deffense des ville portes et murs de Rouen, des chastel et pont de Seine dillec et des autres villes chasteaulx et forteresses des pays et duchie de Normandie et de conqueste fait par feu de bon memoire le roy Henri d’Angleterre derrain trespasse dont Dieu ait lame selon ladvis sur ce fait par messeigneurs du grant conseil du roi notre seigneur pour certain temps commencant le vingtneufieme jour de juing mil cccc trente six et finissant au premier jour doctobre ensuivant Et premierement

Mante lx lances acheval xl apie et iijc archiers Vernon x lances acheval xx apie et iiijxxx archiers Pont de larche v lances acheval xv apie et lx archiers Evreux xx lances acheval xxx apie et viixxx archiers Dreux xxvj lances acheval et lviij hommes de trait Dont le capitaine sera paie pour sa personne au pris appurtenant a chevalier bachelier chacun des autres lances au pris de dix livres tournois et chacun archier au pris de cent soulz tournois par moys sans tretoyer sur leurs gaignes de guerre excepte sur vj lances qui avoient gaiges et regards accoustumes La tour de Dannemarche une lance acheval ix lances apie et les archiers Verneuil xl lances acheval xx apie et ixxx archiers Lisieux x lances acheval xv apie et lxxv archiers Honnefleu x lances acheval xv apie et lxxv archiers Touque j lances acheval vj apie et xxiiij archiers Caen iij lances acheval xxvij apie et iiijxx x archiers Le Bailli de Caen ij lances a cheval et xxiiij archiers Baieux ij lances a cheval viij apie et xxx archiers

268

anne curry

Vire xx lances acheval xx apie et vjxx archiers Saint Lo ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Coustances ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Carenthan ij lances acheval xviij apie et lx archiers Avranches xxxij lances acheval xviij apie et vijxx x archiers Tombelaine xx lances acheval x apie et iiijxx x archiers Chierbourg v lances acheval xxxv apie et vjxx archiers Renneville ij lances acheval viij apie et xxx archiers Pont doue i lance acheval et xx archiers Faloise ij lances a cheval xxviij apie et iiijxx x archiers Dompfront xx lances a cheval xx apie et vjxx archiers Argenthan xv lances acheval xv apie et iiijxx x archiers Exmes v lances acheval v apie et xxx archiers Alencon xxx lances acheval xxx apie et vijxx x archiers Fresnay xx lances acheval xxx apie et vijxxx archiers Essay x lances acheval x apie et lx archiers Conches v lances acheval v apie et xxx archiers La ville de Rouen vj lances a cheval xx apie et vijxxv archiers Et de creu iijC combatans Dont il y a de present ix lances a cheval et iiijxxxv archiers et le surplus y sera mis Le pont de Rouen je lance a cheval iiij apie et xx archiers Et de creu v lances apie et x archiers Le chastel de Rouen ij a cheval xiij apie et xlv archiers Et de creu x apie et xxx archiers Le Bailli de Rouen ij lances a cheval et xxiiij archiers Caudebec lx lances acheval xl apie et iijc archiers Arques lx lances acheval xx apie et ijc xl archiers Neufchastel xxx lances acheval xx apie et vijxx x archiers Gournay lxx lances acheval xx apie et ijc lxx archiers Gisors xl lances acheval xx apie et ixxx archiers Gaillart v lances acheval x apie et xlv archiers Monsieur de Talbot xxx lances acheval et iiijxx x archiers Monsieur de Scales lx lances acheval et ixxx archiers Monsieur de Willoughby xx lances acheval et lx archiers Le maistre des ordonnances j lance a cheval et xiiij archiers Le Tresorier de Normandie j lance a cheval et xiiij archiers Lui pour la conduite des finances Et pour les champs xv lances acheval et xlv archiers Le receveur general j lance a cheval et ix archiers de Normandie Le controlleur de la recette generale de Normandie ij archiers Par le Roy a la relation du grant conseil Je[han] Rinel

Map 11.1: Map of Norman Garrisons

Bibliography of the Writings of Andrew Ayton

Authored Books Knights and Warhorses. Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III

(Woodbridge, 1994. Reprinted in paperback with new preface, 1999) (with P. Preston), The Battle of Crécy 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005. Paperback edn, 2007) Edited Books

Editor of Pál Engel,  The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526 (London and New York, 2001. Paperback edn, 2005) (with J. L. Price), The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (London, 1995. Paperback edn, 1998) Databases Shipping, Mariners and Ports in Fourteenth-Century England: A database of 10,289 records concerning voyages made by English ships and mariners during the fourteenth century. UK Data Service. From ERSC project: RES-000–22–4127 (co-author with Dr Craig Lambert) Articles and Chapters ‘From Brittany to the Black Sea: Nicholas Sabraham and English Military Experience in the Fourteenth Century’, in Courts of Chivalry and Admiralty in Late Medieval Europe, ed. A. Musson and N. Ramsay (Woodbridge, forthcoming, 2018) ‘Shipping the Troops and Fighting at Sea: Essex Ports in England’s Wars, 1320–1400’, [co-authored with Craig Lambert], in The Fighting Essex Soldier: Recruitment, War

272

bibliography of the writings of andrew ayton

and Society in the Fourteenth Century, ed. C. Thornton, J. Ward and N. Wiffen, (Hatfield, 2017) pp. 98–142 ‘The Military Careerist in Fourteenth Century England’, JMH, 43:1 (2017), pp. 4–23 ‘In the Wake of Defeat: Bannockburn and the Dynamics of Recruitment in England’, in Bannockburn, 1314–2014: Battle and Legacy, ed. M. Penman (Donington, 2016), pp. 36–56 ‘A Maritime Community in War and Peace: Kentish ports, Ships and Mariners, 1320–1400’ [co-author with Craig Lambert], Archaeologia Cantiana, 134 (2014), pp. 67–103 ‘János Thuróczy:  Chronica Hungarorum’, in Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History, Volume 5 (1350–1500), ed. D. Thomas, A. Mallett et al. (Leiden and Boston, 2013), pp. 551–9 ‘The Mariner in Fourteenth-Century England’ [co-author with Craig Lambert], in Fourteenth Century England VII, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 153–76 ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A. R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–59 ‘Armies and Military Communities in Fourteenth-Century England’, in Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen, ed. P. Coss and C. Tyerman (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 215–39 ‘From Muhi to Mohács: Armies and Combatants in Later Medieval European Transcultural Wars’, in Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the Twenty-First Century, ed. Hans-Henning Kortüm (Berlin, 2006), pp. 213–47 Chapters in A. Ayton, P. Preston and F. Autrand (eds), The Battle of Crécy, 1346: ‘The Battle of Crécy: Context and Significance’, pp. 1–34; ‘The Crécy Campaign’, pp. 35–107; ‘The English Army at Crécy’, pp. 159–251; ‘Crécy and the Chroniclers’, pp. 286–350; ‘Topography and Archery: Further Reflections on the Battle of Crécy’, pp. 351–77 (Woodbridge, 2007) Entries in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) ii, 683; xxv, 764–5; xxv, 769–70; xxxix, 236–7; xxxxi, 155–6; lv, 860–1 ‘Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J. S. Bothwell (York, 2001), pp. 107–32 ‘Arms, Armour and Horses’, in Medieval Warfare. A History, ed. M. Keen (Oxford, 1999; paperback edn, 2001), pp. 186–208 ‘Edward III and the English Aristocracy at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford 1998), pp. 173–206 Chapters in A. Ayton and J. L. Price (eds), The Medieval Military Revolution: ‘The military revolution from a medieval perspective’ [co-author J.L. Price), pp. 1–22; ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry’, pp. 81–104 (London, 1995) ‘English Armies in the Fourteenth Century’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 21–38 ‘The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346’, in England and Normandy in the Middle Ages, ed. D. Bates and A. Curry (London, 1994), pp. 253–68



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‘Katonai forradalom a 14. századi Angliában’ [‘The Military Revolution in Fourteenth-Century England’], Aetas: történettudományi folyóirat (1994), no. 4, 5–26 ‘Military Service and the Development of the Robin Hood Legend in the Fourteenth Century’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, 36 (1992), 126–47 ‘War and the English Gentry under Edward III’, History Today, 42 (March 1992), 34–40 ‘Domesday Book Re-Bound, c. 1346’, Notes and Queries, New Series, 36/3 (September 1989), 298–9 ‘John Chaucer and the Weardale campaign, 1327’, Notes and Queries, New Series, 36/1 (March 1989), 9–10 ‘William de Thweyt, Esquire: Deputy Constable of Corfe Castle in the 1340s’, Notes and Queries for Somerset and Dorset, 32/329 (March 1989), 731–8 ‘Ecclesiastical Wealth in England in 1086’ [co-author with V. Davis], in The Church and Wealth, ed. W.J. Sheils and D. Wood, Studies in Church History, 24 (1987), pp. 47–60

Index Abberbury, Sir Richard de ‘junior.’  194–6 Achard, Robert  104 Acton, William  67 Alard, Gervase  221 Alard, John  234 Albert III, duke of Austria  209 Albon, Thomas  201–5 Alençon 243 garrison of  250 n.48, 255, 257, 263, 266, 268 Alen, Gerhard von  201–3, 208 Alfonso XI, king of Castile and León 131–2, 133 n.36, 145 Alresford 218 Amadeus VI, count of Savoy  139 Amanieu, Sir Pierre, captal de Buch  55 Anglo-Scottish truce (1323)  79, 93 Anonimalle chronicle  148 n.4, 169, 171 n.84, 172 Antwerp, Lionel, duke of Clarence  166, 188 n.27 ap Adam, Sir John  59 appatis (protection money)  149, 171, 259 Aquitaine, duchy of  74, 113, 138, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156, 172, 178 archers alforrats (Catalan)  15 n.3 armed/armoured  172 n.87 foot  248 n.41, 253 mounted  15–16, 29, 30, 40–1, 47, 48, 63–4, 163 ratio to men-at-arms  147, 248, 253 socio-economic origins of  28, 41–2 Saracen  15 n.3 turcopoles  15 n.3 Ardevon, garrison of  254, 263 Argentan, garrison of  255, 263, 266, 268 Argenton-le-Châtel, Geoffroi d’  205 Argenton-le-Châtel, lord Gui d’  205 aristocracy crystallization of identity  39–40 diversity of martial roles  26–7

language of  141 martial role & ideology  32–6, 123, 151, 152, 181–2, 199 armed men (at sea)  178, 221, 231, 232, 233, 234 armies, English structurally hybrid  40–41, 54–60 organisation in the field  54–8 structurally uniform  41, 147, 169, 178, 185–7, 229 organisational experimentation (1370)  150–3, 158–70, 176–7 armour, military equipment  21–6, 28–9 Arques, garrison of  243, 245, 254, 255, 263, 267, 268 Arras, negotiations at  243, 246 n.29, 247 Arundel 222 Ashton, Sir Robert de  157 Assize of Arms  25 Astley, Sir Andrew  58, 59 Audley, Hugh de, earl of Gloucester (d.1347)  112, 118 n.63, 120 Audley, Hugh (d.c.1326)  103 Audley, Sir James  153 Audray, Simon de  81–2 Audrehem, Arnoul d’  173 Avenele, Sir John  160, 163 Avranches, garrison of  254, 255, 263, 266, 268 Avre, valley of  254 Aylesford 220 Aysterby, Sir John  159, 161, 165 Baa, Robert  46 Bacqueville, garrison of  242, 253, 254, 257, 263, 267 Baddeby, John  162 Baille, Pierre  242 n.13, 249 Balliol, Sir Alexander, of Cavers  55, 58, 59 Baltic crusades definition of  181–2 economic impact of  207–9 funding/financing of  182–3, 191–209 identification of English

276 index crusaders 184–5 motivation to serve  184 recruitment for (English)  182, 185–91 reisen  183–5, 189, 191–2, 200, 201, 203, 207–8 Bamburgh castle  86, 87 banking/coinage bills of exchange  196–97 coinage  109, 196–8, 207 English/German system transferring funds  196–206 exchange rates  204 n.93, 207 Italian banking system  196–97 bannerets  39, 51–75 at zenith under Edward I and Edward II  53, 62, 64, 69, 71 decline of  51–53, 63, 64, 68–69, 71, 74–75 depicted on funerary monuments  34, 39 differentiation from knights bachelor 54 leadership role of  52, 54–63, 68–73, 75 martial ideology  34 origins of  51 promotion to rank of  69 recruiters/recruitment of  54–71, 73–5 repeat service of  69–73 retinue size of  55–7, 61–4, 68–9, 71, 73–4, 167 Bar, Sir Jean de  55 Barde, Sir Edmund  99–100 Barde, John  99–100 Barde, Peter (of Barton)  84, 100 Barde, Peter (of Sandwich)  219 Bardeore, Hugh  89 Bardolf, Sir Hugh  68 Barnby (Yorks.)  86 Barton-upon-Humber  79 n.7, 86, 98, 100, 224, 227 Basin, Thomas, bishop of Lisieux  244 n.18, 245 Basset, Sir Ralph (of Drayton)  59–60 ‘bastard’ feudalism  40, 84 battles, sieges, & skirmishes Alençon, siege of (1049–51)  27 Clontarf (1014)  18 Móin Mhór (1151)  19 Irfon Bridge (1282)  13 Maes Moydog (1295)  13 Falkirk (1298)  8, 13–14, 32, 39, 54–61, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73 Courtrai (1302)  14 Bannockburn (1314)  14, 53, 70, 71, 73, 77, 92, 93 n.94, 96, 97, 102, 103 Boroughbridge (1322)  90, 97

Dupplin Moor (1332)  81, 94 Halidon Hill (1333)  46 Dunbar, siege of (1338)  111 Sluys (1340)  216 Algeciras, siege of (1343)  133 Crécy (1346)  16, 52, 135 Winchelsea (1350)  113 Poitiers (1356)  113 Auray (1364)  190 Nájera (1367)  151 Pontvallain (1370)  148, 173 Vaas (1370)  173 La Rochelle (1372)  231 Tannenberg (1410)  184 Agincourt (1415)  44, 194 Baugé (1421)  254 n.63 Cravant (1423)  253 n.60 Verneuil (1424)  51 Mont-Aimé, siege of (1426–27)  253 Orléans, siege of (1428–29)  253 Patay (1429)  142 n.74 Louviers, siege of (1431)  253 Calais, siege of (1436)  261 Criel, siege of (1436)  259 n.82 Baunfield, Sir Thomas  159, 161, 163 Bavent, Robert  11 Bawdsey  224, 227–8 Bayeux, garrison of  243, 250 n.48, 253, 255, 257, 263, 266, 267 Bayeux Tapestry  2 Beauchamp, Guy, earl of Warwick (d.1315)  55, 64, 84, 102, 110 Beauchamp, Richard, earl of Warwick (d.1439) 262 Beauchamp, Sir Roger (of Bletsoe)  188 n.26 Sir Roger de ‘le fils’ (his son)  187–8 Beauchamp, Thomas, earl of Warwick (d.1369)  52–3, 58, 63, 64, 65–6, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118 n.63, 187 Beauchamp, Thomas, earl of Warwick (d.1401)  63, 64, 120, 186–7 prior to earldom  63 Beauchamp, Sir Walter  11, 12, 57, 68 Beauchamp, William de, lord Abergavenny (d.1411) 187–8 Beauchamp, William, earl of Warwick (d.1298)  12, 63, 110 Beauchamp, Sir William  4 Beaufey, William  155 n.36 Beaufort, Edmund, count of Mortain (later duke of Somerset) (d.1455)  245–6 Beaufort, Henry, (cardinal)  246 n.29 Beaufort, John  185 n.16 Beaufort, Thomas, duke of Exeter  217 Beaumont, Agnes  188 Beaumont, Alice (née Comyn)  79, 85 n.48, 102

index 277 Beaumont, Sir Henry, earl of Buchan (contested); (d.1340)  14, 77–104 Beaumont, Henry lord (d.1369)  80, 187–8, 192 Beaumont, John, lord (d.1396)  188, 200 Beaumont, Sir John (d.1342)  80, 83, 85, 88, 99–101 Beaumont, Louis, bishop of Durham  79, 90, 93, 95, 97, 103 Beaumont, Sir Thomas  248–9, 254 Beauregard, tower of; Guernsey  157 Beauvais  244 n.20, 251 n.53 Beauxamys, William  6, 8 Bebys, John  200 n.83 Bedford 90–1 Bek, Antony, bishop of Durham  4, 54–55, 57–60, 62 Bek, John (of Eresby)  59 Bel, Jean le (chronicler)  141 Benedict XII, pope  137 Benet, John (chronicler)  243 n.15 Benfleet 218 Berkeley, Sir Maurice  59, 65–6, 67 Berkeley, Sir Robert  66 Berkeley, Sir Thomas  59, 65–7 Berkeley, Sir Thomas ‘junior’  67 Berwick-upon-Tweed  8, 71 n.90, 72 n.91&92, 153 castle/garrison of  22, 28–9 Beurse, Matheus van der  202–5 Bever, John  200 n.83 Bigod, Roger, earl of Norfolk; earl Marshal (d.1306)  13, 55, 58, 61, 63, 65–6 Black Prince; see Woodstock, Edward of Blois, Jean de  204, 209 Blumendale, Lefardus  192, 200 Bohun, Elizabeth (née Badlesmere), countess of Northampton  190 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (d.1298) 55 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (d.1322)  63–4, 103–4 prior to earldom  55 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (d.1361) 189 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (d.1373)  64, 113, 183, 189–91, 192, 195, 201–5, 208–9 Bohun, William de, earl of Northampton (d.1360)  64, 107 n.10, 110, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 189, 190, 195, 199, 204 n.94 Boke of Noblesse (1475)  141–2, 240 n.10 Bolingbroke  85 n.48 Bolle, Thomas  215 Bordeaux  221 n.61, 229, 232 Bordeaux, Sir Piers de  55 Boruma, Brian of  18

Boston (Lincs.)  156 n.36, 224, 227 Boteler, Thomas  82 Botetourt, Guy  14 Botetourt, Sir John  12, 13, 14, 69 Bothwell castle  22 Botreux, William, lord  200 Boulogne  216, 247 Boulwas, Sir John  163–4 n.52 Bourchier, Sir John  151–2, 160–3, 174 Bournay, Stephen  82 Boutellier, Guy  252 n.53 Bouvier, Gilles le (the Berry Herald)  243 Bowes, Henry  256 n.68 Boynton, Thomas  187 Brabant 117 Bradeston, Robert  67 n.69 Bradfield 218 Braose, Giles de  98 Brembre, Nicholas  201, 202 n.88 Bretagne, Sir Jean de, earl of Richmond (d.1344) prior to earldom  54–5 Brétigny, treaty of  80 n.22, 131 n.28, 148, 149, 176, 214 Breton, Sir Robert  77 n.1, 81 n.28, 86, 90, 98, 103 Breton, Richard (fl.1311–14)  81 n.28, 98 Breton, Richard (fl.1391)  185 n.15 Breton, Roger  81 Brian, Sir Guy (d.1390)  157 Brienne, Louis de, vicomte de Beaumontau-Maine 78 Brightlingsea  217–18, 223, 226, 235 n.110 Bristol  121, 224–5, 227–9 Brittany  111, 112, 118, 120, 168, 172, 173, 177, 216, 227, 235 Brotherton, Thomas, earl of Norfolk  84 Broullart, Sir William  252 n.55 Browe, Sir Hugh  41 Bruges  195, 199, 201–2, 203 n.91, 204–9 Brut, Robert le  22 Buckminster, Sir William de  77 n.1, 99 Burges, Sir Mistelburgh van  185 n.16 Burgoyne, Thomas  84 Burgundy/Burgundians  216, 246 n.28, 247 Burley, Sir John de  189–91, 195, 199, 202 Burnham-on-Crouch 218 Burstall, Philip  82, 89 n.75 Burstall, Robert de  89 Bussy, Sir William  159, 161, 165 Buxhull, Alan, lord (d.1325)  151 Buxhull, Sir Alan (d.1381)  151–3, 160, 162–4, 171–2, 174–5 Buxhull, Sir Alan (fl.1422)  253 n.59 Byron, Sir Richard  77 n.1, 81

278 index Caen  173, 262 garrison of  242, 243, 250 n.48, 253, 255, 256 n.75, 257, 263, 266, 267 Calais  149, 155, 157, 158 n.43, 170, 190 n.37, 197, 203, 204, 221, 246 n.28&29, 247 Calveley, Sir Hugh  47–8, 172, 173 Camber 222 Cambridgeshire 163 campaigns & wars Hastings (1066)  26–7 Barons’ War (1264–67)  35, 54 Crusade (1271–72)  60 Wales (1277)  4, 53 Wales (1282–83)  4, 9, 12, 60 France/Gascony (1294–99)  54, 65, 66, 69 Wales (1294–95)  60, 61 n.41, 65, 66 Scotland (1296)  10, 12, 13, 16, 59, 67, 82–3 Scottish March (1297–98)  61, 63–4 Flanders (1297)  10, 12, 13, 54, 59, 60, 61, 66, 69, 73, 82–3 Falkirk (1298)  1, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 54–61, 64–71, 73, 82–3 Scotland (1300)  12, 13, 65, 69, 71, 73, 74, 82–83 Scotland (1301)  67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 82–3 Scotland (1303–4)  12, 13, 16, 65, 69, 71, 73, 82–3, 91 Scotland (1306)  65, 69, 71, 92 Scotland (1307)  67, 69; 73 Scotland (1310–11)  69; 73, 83, 92 Bannockburn (1314)  69, 72 n.93, 74, 88, 92, 95, 103 Berwick, siege of (1319)  69, 90, 93, 95 Lancaster’s rebellion (1321–22)  90, 93 War of St Sardos (1324–25)  164, 216 Weardale campaign (1327)  101 Rising against Mortimer (1329)  90 Disinherited, Scotland (1332)  16, 80–1, 93, 101 Roxburgh (1334–35)  112 Scotland (1335)  83, 112, 115, 219 Scotland (1336)  80, 99, 112, 115 Scotland (1337)  112, 219 Scotland (1337–38)  111, 112, 118 Cambrésis-Thiérache (1338–39)  80, 83, 99, 110, 112, 219–20, 233 Sluys and Tournai (1340)  80, 88, 99, 112 Scotland (1341–42)  80, 83, 112, 115 Brittany (1342–43)  111, 112, 120–1, 216, 235 Gascony (1345–46)  107 n.9, 109–10, 113, 115, 118

Crécy-Calais (1346–47)  52, 58, 63–4, 66, 113, 119, 135, 137–8, 149, 151, 176, 216, 217 n.46, 230 Gascony (1350s)  113, 121 France (1355–56)  113, 151 n.17, 217, 227 n.66 Reims (1359–60)  106 n.5, 113, 122, 176, 217, 261 Satalia (1361)  189–90, 209 Breton civil war (1341–65)  151–2, 168, 190 Prussia (1362–63)  190 Auray (1364)  190 Italy (1365)  190 Nájera (1367)  153 northern France (1369)  148, 151 n.17, 167, 176, 190, 191 Knolles’ expedition (1370)  147–79 Naval (1371)  190, 191 Brittany (1372)  177 Naval expedition (1372)  44, 64, 190 Gaunt’s ‘Great March’ (1373-74)  63, 64, 175, 179 Brittany (1375)  150, 179 Buckingham’s campaign (1380)  230 Portugal (1381)  177 Calais to Brittany (1381)  179 Flanders (1383)  177 Scotland (1385)  63, 68–69, 71, 179, 190, 217 Naval (1387)  186 Crusade (1390–91)  168 Percy’s rebellion (1403)  166 n.60 Agincourt (1415)  186, 194, 227, 229 n.77 France (1417)  229 n.77, 230, 235 France (1423)  217 France (1424)  217 Coronation expedition (1430–31)  217 Duke of York’s campaign (1436) 245–6, 259 Formigny campaign (1450)  235 Canterbury  219, 220 Cantilupe, Sir John  58, 59 Capgrave, John  81 n.23, 101 captains see retinues Carentan, garrison of  254, 263, 266, 268 Carlisle  28, 29, 72 n.93, 74 Carru, Sir Nicholas  61 n.41 Cartington 87 Castile  133, 151 Castillon, Sir Pons de  55, 68 Castle Cornet  157 Cauchon, Pierre, bishop of Lisieux  247, 249 Caudebec, garrison of  243, 244, 245, 247, 250, 251, 254, 257, 263, 267, 268

index 279 Caynes, John  89 Cazeneuve, Sir Otton de  55 Chalk (Kent)  220 chambre des comptes (Court of Accounts) 238, 240, 241, 252 n.53 Chandel, John  82 Chandler, Stephen le  86 Chandos, Sir John  153, 168 Chandrier, John  205 Channel, the English  153, 154, 157, 178, 237 Chaplain, Sir Edmund (or Edmund the chaplain)  77 n.1, 80 n.26, 103 Charles II of Évreux, king of Navarre  148–9, 154–5, 157, 163, 171, 174 Charles V, king of France  148, 155, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175 Charles VI, king of France  129, 246 Charles VII, king of France as Dauphin  237 Charlton (N’thumb.)  87 Charlton, Sir John  69 Chartney, John  89 Chartrain, the  252 Château-Gaillard, garrison of  243, 245, 250 n.48, 255, 257, 263, 267, 268 Châtellault 173 Chaucer, Geoffrey  47, 187 Canterbury Tales 182–3 Chaucer, Thomas  196 Cherbourg  157, 221 garrison of  250 n.48, 254, 255, 261 n.90, 263, 266, 268 Cheshire  42, 48 Chester 9 Chester-le-Street 77 chevauchée  42, 147, 173, 175, 178, 179, 246 Chichester 222 chivalry culture of  15, 94–6,108 mentality of, to warfare  95, 181 chroniclers  13, 30, 78, 101, 137, 141, 188, 243 n.15, 245 and the Falkirk campaign (1298)  54–5 and Knolles’ campaign (1370)  147 n.1, 167, 168–9, 171–2 common toppos of disputes between leaders to explain defeat  92 imprecision related to military matters 54 keen to record deaths of prominent figures 71 on Edward III’s adoption of title ‘King of France’  137 Cinque Ports  155 n.36, 211–36 decline of (under Tudors)  235 manning of vessels from  230–4

militarised population of  235–6 obligatory naval service  211–13 supposed decline of in medieval period  212–15, 225–30 used by the crown for ships  214–30, 234–5, 248 n.39 Clanvowe, Sir John  163–4 n.52, 168, 173, 185, 194 Clare, Gilbert de, earl of Gloucester (d.1295) 60 Clare, Gilbert de, earl of Gloucester (d.1314)  92 n.92 Clarendon Palace  155 Claron, Sir John  82 Clavering, Sir John  58, 74 n.104 Cley-next-the-Sea  224, 227 Cliffe 220 Clifford, Sir Robert (d.1314)  12, 57, 67, 72, 74 n.104, 86, 87 Clinton, William de, earl of Huntingdon  115, 120, 143 n.82 Clisson, Olivier de  173, 174 Close rolls  195 Cocking, John  149 Codex Manesse  3 Coffer, Roger le  82 Coggeshall 218 Cok, John  156 Colchester 218 Columbers, Sir John  61 n.41 Columbers, Matthew  13 commissions of array  22, 34, 38, 40, 42, 148 n.39 for naval service  231 Commond, Arnold  82 Comyn, John, earl of Buchan  79 Comyn, Margaret  85 n.48 Conches, garrison of  242, 243, 255 n.65, 257, 261 n.90, 263, 266, 268 Condy, John  219 Condy, Stephen  232 Constantinople 185 Corbeil 170 Corbet, Sir Peter  58, 59 Cornherth, Richard  60 Cornwall  153, 155 n.36, 156 n.37 Cotentin, the  149, 155, 243, 249, 253, 255, 256 n.75, 258 Cotton, Bartholomew  54–5 Coun, Sir Thomas  160, 162, 166, 167, 168 Courtenay, Sir Edward  187–8 Courtenay, Sir Hugh  12 Courtenay, Hugh, earl of Devon (d.1340) 111 Courtenay, Hugh, earl of Devon (d.1377) 110–11, 114 n.42, 115, 120 Courtenay, Sir Philip  173

280 index Court of Chivalry  37, 41, 42, 45–46, 48, 151, 182 Coutances, garrison of  250 n.48, 253, 263, 266, 268 Craon, Maurice de  4 Creal, Geoffrey de  26 Cressy, Sir John (d.1445)  244 creus  245, 251 n.52, 252–8, 261 n.90, 265–8 Criquetot 253 Cromer 235 Crouchback, Edmund, earl of Lancaster 34, 65 Croupes, Richard de  85 Crumwell, Sir John  74 n.104 Cumberland  161, 165 Cumbria  72 n.90 Curson, Richard  244 customs  see under finance (government) d’Albret, Sir Amanieu  55 d’Orville, Jean Cabaret  173 n.95 Dalleson, William  187 Dannemarche, tower of  252 n.55, 259 n.80, 264, 266, 267 Danzig (Gdańsk)  192, 200, 201 Darcy, Hugh  89 Darcy, John  88 Darcy, Sir Norman  77 n.1, 88, 89–90, 103 Darcy, Sir Philip  58, 59, 88–90 Darcy, Robert  68 n.80 Dartmouth  224–5, 227–8, 235 n.108 Deal  220, 223, 226 Denmark, the Danish  157 Derbyshire 162 Derval  172, 173 Despenser, Edward le, lord (d.1375)  187 Despenser, Sir Hugh le, earl of Winchester (1322–26)  88, 121 prior to earldom  11 n.69, 12, 57, 59, 65–66 Despenser, Sir Hugh le, ‘the younger’ (d.1326)  38, 80, 88, 121 Despenser, Sir Hugh le, (fl.1367–70)  173, 187 Despenser, Sir Philip le  64 Despenser, Thomas, earl of Gloucester (d.1400) 194 Devereaux, Sir Walter  189–90, 199, 202 Devon  115, 153, 155 n.36, 156 n.37&38 Deyncourt, Sir William  92 Dieppe, garrison of  243, 244, 247, 254, 255, 259, 261, 263 disability/mental illness  165 n.58, 166 n.60 Ditchburn 87 Domfront, garrison of  250, 255, 263, 266, 268 Douglas, James  199

Doun, Arnold  83 Dover  211, 220, 223, 224, 226, 228, 233, 235 n.108 castle 216 Dreux, garrison of  242, 251–5, 263, 266, 267 Driby, John  84 Dring, Sir Thomas  255 Droxford, Sir John  12, 13, 68 Dudsburg, Peter von  183 Dulmen, Herman de  205 Dummer, Sir Edmund  159, 161–2, 173 Dunbar, Patrick, earl of Dunbar (d.1308) 55 Dunbar, Patrick, earl of Dunbar (d.1369) 55 Dundarg castle  80 Dundee  72 n.91 castle 22 Durant, Thomas  155 n.36 Durant, William  67 n.69 Durham 86 castle 59 cathedral priory  77 Liber Vitae  77, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 100, 103–4 Dykeswell, Robert  163 Eastbourne 222 Echingham, William  12 Ecton, William  256 n.68 Edenham  79 n.7 Edinburgh castle  22 Edington, William  109, 117, 120 n.75 Edom, John  44–5 Edward I, king of England  7, 13, 14, 53, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67 n.75, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 88, 110, 212, 233; attempts to improve quality of warhorses  4, 8, 9; stable accounts  4–6, 8, 9; household account (1292–93)  5; injured by destrier (1298)  8; personal mounts  5, 9; wardrobe accounts (1297)  25 (1300) 11; use of hobelars  16, 24; militarisation/ evolution of gentry under  32–33, 36; utilises deception on campaign  54; on Falkirk roll of arms  55; as crusader  60, 193; daughter of  60; leads final campaign to Scotland (1307)  73; grants Bamburgh castle to Isabella de Vescy  86; appropriates the earldom of Devon  111; extensively recruits shipping from the Cinque Ports  234–5 Edward II, king of England  28, 53, 62, 64, 67 n.75, 69, 70, 74, 83, 84 n.36, 96, 121, 212, 219, 230–31; militarisation/evolution of gentry under  32, 36, 39; appears

index 281 of roll of arms  39 n.25; campaigns in Scotland as Prince of Wales (1301), and as king (1310)  72 n.91, 73; as Prince of Wales  78–9; deposition of  80; quarrels with Thomas of Lancaster over the siege of Berwick (1319)  90; relationship with Henry Beaumont  86, 88, 93, 96–8, 102; travels to France for knighting of Philip IV’s sons (1313)  94; proud of Castilian heritage  133; plans to marry the future Edward III to a sister of Alfonso XI  133 n.36; financial experimentation under  179 n.118, Edward III, king of England  17, 32, 52, 53, 63, 64, 74, 148, 149; 168, 179, 188 n.27, 189, 194, 204 n.94, 219, 220, 226, 230, 235, 261; militarisation/evolution of gentry under  33; requires large numbers of mounted archers  42; recruitment by bannerets under  58; coup of 1330  80; supports the disinherited  80; as earl of Chester  90; process of assignment under  107–19; manipulation of wool trade  119–20, 122; plans to lead campaign in 1342  120; ‘grand alliance’ strategy (1342)  121; relationship with his earls  105–23; and Order of the Garter (1348)  125–31, 134–45; love of chivalric display  134, 140; interest in King Arthur and the Round Table  134–5, 144; diplomatic relations with Castile  133; proclaims himself King of France (1340)  136–8; war aims in France  138; chronicler’s view of 141; and the campaign of 1370  148 n.4, 149–55, 171, 172, 176; and visit of Charles of Navarre to England  154–5, 157 163 n.52; battle-seeking strategy in France  170; supposed decline of the Cinque Ports under  212–14; difference in strategic thinking with Henry V  237 Edward Balliol, king of Scotland  80, 81, 88 Elbing (Poland)  201, 209 Eleanor of Castile, queen of England  8, 9, 78 Eleford, Robert de  195 Elkington, Galfrid de  161, 165 Ellerker, John  117 Elsham 86 Erard, Guillaume  247 Eschenbach, Sir Wolfram von  3 n.10 esquires, sergeants, armigers  see men-atarms Essay, garrison of  255, 257, 258–9, 260, 263, 266, 268 Essex  38, 115, 119, 162–3, 211, 217–18, 231

Estlington, John  83, 86, 87 Etton, William  256 Eu, garrison of  243–5, 263 Eure, Sir John de  77 n.1, 78 n.3, 86, 87, 88, 93, 96, 98, 101, 102, 103 Eure, Stephen de  86, 87 Évreux 149 garrison of  242, 243, 249 n.41, 254, 257, 263, 266, 267 Exmes, garrison of  257, 260, 261 n.90, 263, 266, 268 Eythorne 220 Falaise, garrison of  243, 254, 255, 263, 266, 268 Falconberg, Sir Walter  74 n.104 Falkirk Roll of Arms  39, 55, 57, 59, 61, 69, 72 n.91 Fastolf, Hugh  155 n.35 Fastolf, Sir John  51, 75, 142 n.74, 239, 250 n.48, 256 n.75, 262 Fauconberg (Faucomberge), Sir Thomas  162, 165–6 Fauconberg, William, lord  252 n.56, 253 Faversham  220, 223, 226 Fécamp  243, 259 Felbrigg church, (Norf.)  185 Felbrigg, Roger de  185 Felbrigg, Sir Simon  185 Felton, Sir Robert  74 n.104 Fenwick, Sir John de  77 n.1, 81, 87, 88 Ferrers, Sir Ralph  155 Ferrers, Sir William (d.1325)  59 finance (government) assignment, process of  106–7, 109–19, 121, 122 availability of cash  106–22, 149, 158 borrowing 158 costs of war  109, 121, 149–50, 154 n.28, 156–8, 178–9 customs revenues & accounts/ officials  106, 112 n.36, 115, 118, 119, 120–1, 150, 158 n.43, 228–9 exemptions from  119–20 expenses of government  157–8 loans  107, 157, 202 n.88 reform of  109 taxation  36, 38, 42, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116–18, 122, 138, 150, 158, 193, 230, 251, 262 poll taxes  43, 179, 233 Walton Ordinances (1338)  116 finance (personal)  13, 191–96, 198–209 recognizances of debt  199–200 Finch, Henry  221 Fishlake, Robert  48 FitzAlan, Sir Brian, of Bedale  68

282 index FitzAlan, John, earl of Arundel (d.1435) 244 n.20 FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d.1302) 55 FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d.1376) 112, 115, 118, 119, 143 n.82, 158, 189 FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d.1397) 186 FitzMarmaduke, Sir Richard  74 n.104 FitzOsbern, William, earl of Hereford  27 FitzPayn, Sir Robert  14, 57 FitzRalph, Richard  87 FitzRalph, Roger  87 FitzRoger, Sir Robert  58, 68 FitzWalter, Walter, lord (d.1386)  160, 163, 166, 172, 173, 174, 186–8, 192 FitzWalter, Walter, lord (d.1406)  188 FitzWarin, Ivo  187 FitzWilliam, Sir Ralph  71, 74 n.104 Flanders  see Low Countries Fleming, Sir Thomas  255 Fobbing 218 Fog, Sir Thomas  174 Foix, Gaston de  208–9 Folkestone  217, 220, 223, 226, 232, 235 n.110 Folkingham  79 n.7 Follifoot, Thomas  173 Fontaine-le-Bourg, fortress of  260 n.87 Fontaine-le-Chastel, fortress of  260 n.87 Forcadel, Étienne  142 n.74 Fordham 218 Forth, river  79 Forz, Isabella de, suo dure countess of Devon 111 Fowey  224–5, 227 France, the French, French Wars  4, 16, 19, 20, 26, 32, 41, 43, 51, 62 n.45, 63, 64, 79, 80, 90, 94, 109, 113, 130 n.28, 133, 135–8, 141, 145, 147–51, 153–7, 166, 167, 170–5, 178, 179, 183, 184, 190, 196, 209, 214, 215, 217, 225–7, 235–6, 240, 245–52, 258, 259 n.81, 262 Fraser, Sir Simon  55 Frenshe, John ‘junior’ and ‘senior’  232 Fresnay, Sir Gerard  83 Fresnay-le-Vicomte, garrison of  243, 250 n.48, 254, 255, 263, 266, 268 Froissart, Jean  188 n.27 Frost, Walter  156 n.36, 157 Furnivall, Sir Thomas  59, 60–1, 74 n.104 Furnivall, William de  187 Fyton, Sir Richard  160, 163 Gacelyn, John  67 n.69 Gallet, Louis  247 Galloway 88

Galoun, John  86, 87 Gamage, William  67 Garcia of Spain  8 Gascony  79, 121, 149, 221, 227 n.66, 255 Gaudin, Sir Eustace  252 n.55, 259 n.80 Gaunt, John of, duke of Lancaster  63, 106, 152, 154, 156, 167, 171, 175, 194–5, 196 Gaveston, Piers  79, 88, 98 gentry  28, 31–49, 57, 75, 151, 166, 168 administrative/public careers of  32–3, 34, 35–6 appeal of martial career  41, 167 demilitarization of  42–4 formation/evolution/development of 31–3, 36, 37–9, 48–9 importance of status  36–7, 41, 45–8 knightly  see knights bachelor through sepulchral monuments  36, 47–8 militarisation of  32, 37, 43 military culture  33–4, 37 parliamentary representation  36 recruitment by in 1298  57 social gradation within  33, 37–9 gentlemen, emergence of  40–7 Gerald of Wales  17, 18, 20–1, 22, 23, 30 Gerberoy 244 Giffard, Sir Gilbert  159, 162, 173 Gillingham  220–1, 223, 226, 227 Gisors, garrison of  243, 245, 250 n.48, 254, 256, 263, 267, 268 Gloucestershire  67 n.72, 85, 162 Gloucester castle  166 n.60 Gloucester, William  242 n.13, 259 n.81 Gloucester, Sir Walter de  77 n.1, 84 Glyn Dŵr, Owain  186 Gobion, Hugh  68 n.80 Goldhanger 218 Gosport 153 Gôte, Heinrich  209 Gournay, garrison of  243, 244, 253, 254, 255, 263, 267, 268 Gourneye, Sir John  160, 163 Graa, Thomas  185 n.15 Grandison, Thomas, lord  151–2, 159, 162, 163, 172, 173, 174 Grange 221 Granville  256 n.75, 258 Gravesend 220 Gray, Sir John (of Rotherfield)  58, 59 Gray, Sir Thomas (d.1344)  77 n.1, 78, 86, 87, 89, 91–3, 95, 97, 99–103 Gray, Sir Thomas (d.1369; chronicler)  41, 46, 78, 92, 93, 95 Great Yarmouth  156 n.36, 224–5, 227–8 Green, David  173 Green, Richard  173

index 283 Gresley, Peter  65 Grey, Henry, lord of Codnor (d.1308)  71 Grey, Sir John  260 n.88 Grey, Sir Richard of Codnor (d.1335)  71 Grey, Reynold, third baron Grey of Ruthin 45–6 Grimsby  155 n.36 Grosmont, Henry of, duke of Lancaster 112, 113, 115, 129, 141 n.72, 183, 217 as earl of Derby  115, 119, 120, 133, 134 Grosvenor, Sir Robert  41, 45, 151, 189 Gubaud, John  85 Guernsey  156 n.36, 157 Guesclin, Bertrand du  148, 172–3, 175 Gurney, Sir Thomas  67 n.69 Guyenne, Louis, duke of  246 Gyene, Robert  121, 123 Haconthorpe, John  99 Hadleigh 218 Halow, Roger  82–3, 99 Hambury, Henry  115 Hamme, William  194 Hampshire  155 n.36, 156 n.37, 162 Hampton-in-Arden 8 Handford, Sir John  255, 258 n.79 Harfleur, garrison of  243, 245, 255, 259, 261, 263 Harwich 218 Hastang, Sir Robert  74 n.104 Hastings  211, 221–3, 226, 228, 233 Hastings, Sir Edmund  71 Hastings, Sir Edward  45, 48 Hastings, Sir Hugh de  41 Hastings, John, earl of Pembroke (d.1375) 44, 149, 153, 156, 231 Hastings, Laurence, earl of Pembroke  112, 115, 120 Hastings, Sir William de  195 Hawkwood, Sir John  2 Heckington  79 n.7 Henley, Walter de  153, 155 n.36, 156 n.37 Henry II, king of England  27 Henry III, king of England  193, 194 Henry IV, king of England  166 n.60, 225 as earl of Derby  184, 192, 193, 194–5, 197 Henry V, king of England  42, 44, 46, 53, 71, 143 n.77, 176, 227, 229 n.77, 230, 235, 237, 241, 243, 246–7, 252, 254, 261 Henry VI, king of England  51, 126 n.2, 136 n.50, 216, 217, 239, 247, 250 n.48, 251, 266, 267 Henry VIII, king of England  142–3 n.77, 217, 235 heralds, heraldry & display  34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44–5, 154, 168

Order of St George (1326)  131 n.30 Order of the Band (1330)  131–4, 139–40 Order of the Garter (1348)  125–31, 132 n.32, 134–5 badge 139–44 influence of Order of the Band 134 knights of  152, 153, 190 motto, explanation of  135–8, 143–4 origins and symbolism of 126–30, 134–5, 140–3 Order of the Star (1351)  142 Company of the Holy Spirit of the Right Desire (1352–53)  139 Society of the Buckle (c.1355)  139 Order of the Collar (1364)  139 Herefordshire  162, 168 Heron, John  88 Heron, Sir Odinel  77 n.1, 86, 87, 97, 103 Heron, Sir Robert  86 Heron, Sir Roger  87, 89 Hertyngdon, Adam  155 n.36 Heselarton, John  68 Heton, William de  86, 87 Hewitt, Sir Walter  149, 154, 156 Heydour 84 Hilton, Roger  149 Hireis, John le  28–9 hobelars 15–30 as garrison troops  22 equipment  16, 17–18, 22, 30 lack of historiography on  15–16 longevity of utilisation  16 origins  15–17, 20, 22, 24, 28–30 recruited via commissions of array  22 relationship to esquires/sergeants  24 similarity to ‘muntators’  22 social standing of  28 Holgrave, David  173 Holland, Thomas, duke of Surrey  186 Holme, William de  98 Holy Land  168, 192, 193 Honfleur, garrison of  243, 248, 253, 255, 259, 261 n.90, 263, 266, 267 Hoo, Henry de  46 Hoo, Sir Thomas (d.1455)  245 Hoo St Werburgh  220 horse compensation (restauro equorum) 9, 13, 27–8, 92, 106, 110, 112 horse inventories/valuation lists  9–11, 14, 28, 56, 57, 58, 66, 67 n.69, 82–3, 101 n.139 Horseman, Thomas  232 horses (general) allowances on campaign  13 n.81

284 index armour  2, 3, 7, 60 breeding 19 colour  9, 10, 11, 12, 13 cost 11 death on campaign  13–14, 92, 110 fodder  4–6, 13 import of  4, 8, 19 royal purchase of/stud farms  11, 20 size & weight of  23 transported overseas for war  178 use only of stallions for war  8 valuation of  10–11 horses (types of ) carthorses  7, 8, 11 Clydesdale 1 cobs 7 coursers  9, 10, 27 destriers 1–14 breeding 8 cost to buy  11, 13 depicted on funerary monuments 34 diet  6–7, 8, 14 origin of term  1 size & weight of  1–4, 6–7, 14 status of owners  12 temperament 8–9 training 9 turnover in use  12–13 utility on campaign  13–14, 27 valuation 9–13 hackneys  8, 10 packhorses  8, 11 palfreys 10 rounceys  9, 10, 27 Shetland pony  3 n.10 shire  7 n.38 sumpters  10, 11 Horwood, Fulk of  202 n.88 Hospitallers, the knights  194 Hotoft, Richard  249 n.42 Hull, (Kingston upon)  155–6 n.36, 157, 224–5, 227–9, 235 n.111 Hungary 207 Hunt, Thomas  242 n.13 Huntercombe, Sir Walter  11, 57 Hythe  211, 217, 219, 220, 223, 226, 228, 232, 233, 235 n.110 Iberia  41, 153 Spain  4, 196 Île-de-France  244 n.19 Illey, Edmund  89 Illey, John  89 Imworth, Richard de  156 n.36 indentures/indenture system  14, 56, 102, 121, 151, 193, 245 n.24, 250 n.49, 260

for service in peace and war  35, 38, 61, 66, 67 n.44, 102, 154, 186 life retainers  61, 66, 97, 154 of military service  41, 56, 61, 106 n.5, 147, 148, 150–2, 160, 164, 165, 185, 246, 248 n.41, 249 n.46, 250, 259–60 sub-contracts  107, 164, 167, 186, 193 two year  244, 261 infantry, levies  13–14, 41, 42, 193 inquisitions post mortem  84 n.36 Ipswich  156 n.36, 224, 227–8 Ireland, the Irish, Irish Wars (general)  16, 22, 24, 27, 30, 176, 225 character of warfare in  20–1 import of horses into  19 use of horses in warfare  17–20 Isabella of France, queen of England  9 n.56, 78, 80 Isle of Wight  157 issue rolls  110 n.20, 112 n.36, 155–6, 185 Italy  188 n.27, 190, 196, 197 Joan of Acre, countess of Gloucester  60 Joan of England (daughter of Edward III) 133 John II, king of France  122, 136 n.48 John XXII, pope  81, 197 Jolivet, Robert  249 Jolliffe, John  84 Julius Caesar  27 n.46 Károly (Charles) I, king of Hungary  131 n.30 Kent  115, 162–3, 211, 213, 217, 219, 220–1 Kerdeston, William de  191–2, 195, 199–200 King’s Lynn  156 n.36 Kingston (Kent)  232 Kingston, John  45, 68 Kirketon, John  185 n.15 Kirketon, William  185 n.15 knights bachelor; knighthood (general)  13, 23, 24, 26–9, 32–3, 35–40, 44–5, 85, 181, 236 chivalric ideology of  33–4, 39, 95 declining status of  51 distraint of  38 numerical decline of  43, 53 of the royal household  78, 79, 80, 82, 88, 96–7, 151, 168, 185, 193–4 popular image of  2, 14, 47 Knolles, Constance  167–68 n.67 Knolles, Sir Robert  42, 148, 149 n.4, 150–79 Knowle (Knole), royal stud of  8, 14 Königsberg (Kaliningrad, Russia)  201, 208

index 285 Kydale, Adam de  84, 98–9, 102 Kyme, Sir William de  81 Kynwas, John  81 Kyriel, Sir Thomas  235, 244 Lacy, Henry de, earl of Lincoln  4, 55, 56, 58 La Hogue, Normandy  149 Lancaster, Henry of, earl of Lancaster (d.1345) 90, 101 prior to earldom  55 Lancaster, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester  44, 247 Lancaster, John, duke of Bedford  142 n.74, 239–40, 243, 244–5, 247, 249–51, 255, 259, 260 Lancaster, Thomas of, earl of Lancaster  55, 59, 62 n.44, 84, 85, 90, 97, 101, 102 Lancaster, Thomas, duke of Clarence  44 Langford, John  65 Langley, Edmund of, earl of Cambridge and duke of York  153, 187 Lansac, Guillotin de  253 n.62 Lansac, Sir William de  255 Lare, Gerard de  205 La Roche Guyon, garrison of  252 n.53 La Rochelle, Poitou  205 Lathum, Robert  68 Latimer, Thomas  68 Latimer, William, lord (d.1305)  62 n.44, 67, 68, 74 n.104 Latimer, William, lord (d.1381)  155, 231 Launde, John de la  89 Le Crotoy  262 n.92 Lee, John  46 Lee, Sir John (d.1370)  166 Lee, Sir Walter atte/de la  161, 163, 166–7 Legbourne, Henry de  81 n.28, 85, 98 Legbourne, Robert de  81 Legg, John  155 n.36, 156 Leicestershire  79, 85, 94, 101 Le Mans  173 Les Andeleys  250 n.47 Le Tréport  247 letters of exchange  187, 192, 197, 208 letters of protection & attorney  56, 57, 58, 59, 65, 66–7, 73, 74, 81, 83, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 103, 104, 154, 160, 163–4 n.52, 165–6, 167, 168, 184, 185 n.15 & 17, 190, 248 n.39&41, 249 n.42, 256 Leyburn, Sir William  9 liberate rolls  112 n.36 licences de passagio  186, 192, 195, 197 Lillebonne  243, 259 Lincolnshire/Lincoln  59, 79, 81, 84, 86, 88, 90, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, 161, 165, 174 n.100

Lindisfarne 77 Lindsay, Sir Alexander  55 Linlithgow castle  22 Lisieux, garrison of  242, 243, 253, 257, 261 n.90, 263, 266, 267 Lisle, Sir John de  160, 162–3, 173 n.92 Lisle, Sir Walter de  77 n.1, 98, 99 Lithuania/Lithuanians  151, 181–2 Lokinton, John  67 n.69 Lombardy 197 Londenes, Richard  221 London  2, 3, 6, 8, 119, 148, 155, 185 n.15, 192, 200, 201, 203, 204 n.94, 235 Tower of  151, 155, 175 treaty of (1362)  189 Longespée, Sir William  193 Longny, garrison of  263 Long Whatton  85 Louthre, John de  159, 161, 165 Lovell, Sir John, baron Lovell (d.1311)  58 Lovell, John, baron Lovell (d.1408)  45–6 Loveryk, John  219 Loveryk, Thomas  219 Loveryk, William  219 Low Countries  110, 112, 119, 121, 148 n.4, 151, 196 Flanders, the Flemish/Flemings  137, 201, 204–8, 247 Holland  153, 155 n.36 Zealand  153, 155 n.36 Lowdham, Sir John, de  194 Lowych (Lowick), Sir Richard  252–3, 266 Lübeck 208–9 Lucy, Anthony, lord; (the ‘St Bees man’) (d.1368)  186–8, 192, 195 Lucy, Thomas, lord (d.1365)  188 Lucy, Sir William  159–60 Lussac-les-Châteaux 168 Luttrell, Sir Geoffrey  2, 34–5 n.11 Luttrell Psalter  128 Luxembourg, Louis of, bishop of Thérouanne  246, 249 Lydd  220, 223, 226, 228 Lymbury, Edmund  89 Lymbury, Sir John  89, 90 Lyme Regis  156 n.36 Lymington  224, 227–8 Lyndhurst, John  11 Macfeloun, Oliver  88 Maidstone 220 Maine 244 Maingre, Jean de (Marshal Boucicaut)  199 Maldon 218 Malet, Sir John  160, 163 Manningtree 218 manors

286 index Arnesby (Leic.)  85 Barton (Lincs.)  84 Baston (Lincs.)  84 Benham Valence (Berks.)  195 Brunden (Suff.)  190 Dembleby (Lincs.)  85 Driby (Lincs.)  84 n.37 Harefield (Glouc.)  191 Heckington (Lincs.)  84 Keisby (Lincs.)  84, 86 Newton Tony (Wilts)  188 n. 26 Radstone (Northants.)  195 Stratford Tony (Wilts.)  188 n.26 Whitgift (Yorks.)  169 manorial records  11 Mantes, garrison of  242, 243, 244, 247, 253, 256, 257, 259, 263, 266, 267 Manton, Ralph  11 Marburg, Wigand von (chronicler)  183, 188 Mare, Sir John de la  12 Mareschal, Elias le  67 Margate  220, 223, 226 Marienberg, Germany  201 mariners  153–4, 155, 177, 216, 217 n.39, 218, 220, 222–4, 231–2, 233, 234, 235 impressment of  231 Market Harborough  3 Marmion, Sir John  77 n.1, 81, 84, 94 Marmion, Sir William  77 n.1, 84, 86, 89, 94–5, 98, 103–4 Marshal, William ‘the Marshal’, earl of Pembroke 27 Marshal, William le  82 Martel, Geoffrey, count of Anjou (d.1060) 27 Martorell, Joanot  126 n.2 Maulever, Sir Richard  187 Mauquenchy, Jean de, lord of Blainville (d.1391) 173 Mayet 173 McCulloch, William  88 Meaux, garrison of  262 n.92 Mediterranean  41, 168, 189, 196 Medway, river  153, 220 Melrose, Robert  88 Melsa, Godfrey de  86 memoranda rolls  110 n.20, 112 n.36 Ménagier de Paris  10 men-at-arms  13, 15, 24 n.40, 28, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47–8, 56–9, 63–9, 72 n.92&93, 73–4, 81–3, 88–9, 95, 106, 147, 150, 154, 156, 159–63, 170, 172, 178, 191, 242, 245 n.24, 246 n.28, 247–8, 251–3, 256 equipment  23–4, 26, 28–9 employment in ‘non-traditional’

martial roles  26–7 esquires, sergeants, armigers  22, 32, 58, 68, 194 equipment  23, 24, 26 relationship to hobelars  24, 30 relationship to muntators  23 ‘rise’/social gradation of  37–40, 43–8 merchants  4, 48, 153, 155 n.35, 189, 191, 192, 196–208, 230 Mereworth, Sir John  77 n.1, 78 n.3, 81, 100, 103 Mersea 218 Merton, David  159, 163 n.52 Meulan  244, 264 Meynill, Sir Nicholas  74 n.104 Mézières, Philippe de  151 Middlesex 119 Middleton, Sir Gilbert de  79, 90, 93, 97 Milan 166 Mildenhale, Simon  82 military assessment (1340s)  179 n.118 military communities  28, 32, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48, 52, 53, 61, 62, 67, 71, 181, 191, 199 n.178 divisions within  39 ideology of  34 militarisation of gentry under Edward I & Edward II  32 movement between ‘ranks’  48 pool of manpower  41 pre-dominance of mounted archers in 41 social status of  42 war of the host’ & ‘war on the frontier’ soldiers  151 Minsterworth, Sir John  159, 161–2, 166, 167, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175 Mitford castle  90, 97 Mohaut, Sir Robert (d.1329)  73 Monkston, Thomas  83 Montague, John, lord  192, 195, 200 Montague, William, earl of Salisbury (d.1344)  112, 120, 133, 134 Montague, William, earl of Salisbury (d.1397)  113, 114 n.42 Montargis, garrison of  262 n.92 Montereau, garrison of  262 n.92 Montferrant, Sir Bernard de  255 Montfort, Simon de, earl of Leicester (d.1265) 193 Montgomery, Sir John  244 n.16 Monthermer, Ralph, earl of Gloucester  55, 59, 60–1, 62, 63, 64–5, 66, 67, 104 Montivilliers, garrison of  243, 264 Mont-Saint-Michel  244, 254 Morforte, William  216

index 287 Morice, Pierre, master  247 Moriceby, Hugh  110 Morieux, Sir Thomas junior.  160, 162–3 Morlee, Thomas de  185 n.15 Morley, Thomas, Lord  45–6 Morley, Sir William  59, 60, 61 Mortimer, Sir Roger, earl of March  11, 80 Mortimer, Sir Roger (of Chirk)  12, 57 Mortimer, William  68 n.80 Mounteneye, Theobald  195 Mowbray, John de (d.1322)  103 Mowbray, John, duke of Norfolk (d.1432) 194 Mowbray, Thomas, earl of Nottingham 186 Multon, Sir John (of Frampton) de  187–8, 195 muntators equipment 23 links with hobelars  21–2, 29, 30 origins of  22–3 relationship to esquires  23 Murimuth, Adam  216 n.34 muster rolls  29 n.56, 154, 158, 167, 169, 186, 237–8, 241, 260 musters  73, 74, 155, 243 n.14, 248 n.39, 250 n.47, 251 n.52, 252, 255, 259 n.80, 260, 261 n.90

reform of by the duke of Bedford (1434)  244–245, 251, 261 North Africa  168 Northamptonshire/Northampton 117 Northfleet 220 North Sea  157 Northumberland  28, 78–9, 86–8, 91, 93, 96, 97, 150 Nottinghamshire/Nottingham  117, 165 n.59 Nowell, Jankyn  41 Nulle, William  83

Navarre, kingdom of  148 Neufchâtel, garrison of  243, 244, 254, 264, 267, 268 Neville, Hugh de  38 Neville, John, baron (d.1388)  155 Neville, Sir Ralph  74 n.104 Neville, Ralph (of Raby)  103 n.149 Neville, Richard, earl of Salisbury (d.1460) 245–6, 259 n.82 Neville, Sir Robert  77 n.1, 78 n.3, 81, 103 Neville, Sir Robert (d.1373)  174 Neville, Sir William  163–4 n.52, 168, 173, 185, 194 Newcastle upon Tyne  74, 155–6 n.36, 224–5, 227, 235 New Hythe  220 Newmarch, Roger  85–6 Newmarch, Sir Thomas  86 Norbury, Sir Henry  248, 256 Norfolk  109, 119, 162, 199 Norham castle  93, 95 Normandy  62, 149, 155, 166, 171, 173, 213, 235, 254, 256, 260, 261 baillis in  242, 243, 252 n.55, 253, 264, 266–8 English garrison establishment within 237–69 financing of  262

papacy 193 Papen, Reynold  203 pardons, charters of  98, 147, 164, 167, 169, 176–7, 216 Paris  170, 172, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249–50, 255, 256, 258, 259 n.82, 261 Paris, John  100 Paris, Ralph  81 Paris, William  81 n.28, 84, 100 parliament  35, 44, 79, 96, 110, 150, 174, 176, 179, 245 crisis of 1339–41  116, 143 n.82 House of Commons  33 opening address  141 n.72 Parliamentary Rolls of Arms  39, 64 representation in  36, 38, 51, 235 of shipowners  229–30 statutes Additions (1413)  40, 43, 46, 48 Liveries (1390)  44 war-weariness of  137–38 Patent rolls  169, 176 Paternoster, John  86 Pauley, Sir John  185, 194 Pauncefoot, Richard  67 pay  see wages pays de Caux  243, 244, 248, 254–5, 258, 262

Oakhampton (Dev.)  111 Ogard, Sir Andrew  249, 255, 258 n.79 Oise, river  250 Oldhall, Sir William  258 Ordainers, the  98 Ordinances, the (1311)  79, 96, 99 ordnance 217 master of  242 n.13, 253, 257, 259 n.81, 264, 266, 268 Orléans 170 Osberneby  88 n.71 Ostinchusen, Wynand  192, 200 Oursel, Louis  256 Oxfordshire 162 oyer and terminer, commissions of  93 n.93, 96, 98, 121

288 index pays de conquête  62, 244, 255 Pedley, Robert  256 Pedro II, king of Castile  133 Pembridge, Sir Fulk  162, 165–6, 168 Pembridge, Sir Richard  168 Pembrokeshire  22, 30 Pende 222 Peniton, William  253 n.62 Penytourne, William  252–3, 266 Percy, Sir Henry (d.1314)  63, 74 n.104, 87 Percy, Sir Henry (d.1352)  93, 101 Percy, Sir Henry ‘Hotspur’ (d.1403)  184 Percy, Henry, earl of Northumberland (d.1408) 184 Périgord 153 Perrers, Alice  195 Perth  72 n.91 castle of  22 Peter I, king of Cyprus  189 Pevensey  26, 222–23, 226, 228 Philip II, king of France  27 Philip IV, king of France  94 Philip VI, king of France  133, 136 n.50, 141 Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy  243, 247, 261 Philippa of Hainault, queen of England 130 Picardy 216 Pinkeney, Sir Henry  59 pipe rolls  112 n.36, 204 n.94 Pizan, Christine de  1 n.1 plague (also Black Death)  41, 47, 150, 168, 218, 233, 234 n.103 Plumpton, Sir Robert  160, 163, 166 Plymouth 153 Pointz, William  82 Poissy, garrison of  264 Poitou  171, 173, 205 Poland 207 Pole, Sir Michael de la (d.1415)  185 n.15 Pole, William de la, earl (later duke) of Suffolk (d.1450)  245–6, 249 n.46, 251, 262 n.92 Polthus, Arnold  203 Pompey Magnus  27 n.46 Pontaudemer, garrison of  252 n.53 Pont-de-l’Arche, garrison of  242, 250 n.48, 253, 255 n.65, 264, 266, 267 Pont d’Ouve, garrison of  243, 253, 254, 257, 264, 266, 268 Pontefract, Richard  65 Pontoise  244, 257 n.78, 264 Ponynges, Sir Thomas de  186 Poole  224, 227–28 Popham, Sir John  249 n.46, 259 n.81 Porchester castle  115

Portsmouth  157, 247, 248 Poynings 222 Princes Risborough  8 problems of ‘modern’ martial terminology in medieval context  24–27, 29, 30 professionalism/military careerists  41, 62, 64, 69, 75, 177, 190 Prophecy of John of Bridlington 144 Prussia/Prussian  41, 181, 183, 185–6, 188–9, 191–5, 197–201, 203–6, 208–9 Pulesdon, Thomas  60 purveyance  98–99, 102 Pyrenees 148 Queenborough 220 Quercy 153 ransoms  80, 87, 122, 149, 173–4 Raymond, John  201 n.88 Reading Street  220 recruitment  31, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 52–75, 78, 82–94, 99–101, 149, 150, 156, 164, 169–70, 177, 182–3, 185–91, 193, 214, 231–6 demobilization, (post 1436)  261 finance required for  105–23, 182–3, 191–6 Redford, Sir Henry  252 Redmane, Matthew  159, 161–2, 167, 173, 174 Regnéville-sur-Mer, garrison of  243 n.14, 254, 264, 266, 268 respites of debt  56, 58 retainers  100–2, 154 rewards for service  85–6, 97 retinues  34, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 47, 52–74, 78, 80–5, 88–94, 96, 99–102, 103–4, 107, 110, 152, 157, 159–69, 185–91, 194, 242, 253 captains  41, 48, 52, 91 n.88, 105–10, 114, 125, 152, 159–69, 239, 260 sub-captains  106 n.5, 164, 168, 169 lists of  159–69 civilian use of  35 mixed  40–41, 147 social composition of  42, 166–7, 176 pledges required for service 164–6, 169 mobile field companies  244, 254 repeat service/stability (or lack) of  41, 61, 64, 67, 69–74, 78, 82–3, 99–101, 125, 186–91 size of  55–7, 61, 65–6, 74, 82–3, 101, 104, 119, 159–61, 164, 167, 261 social networks in  94–5, 105, 181–2, 186–91, 209

index 289 sub-retinues  35, 52–3, 63, 65, 66, 68, 89, 190 Rhine, river  196 Rhodes 194 Riburgh, William  159, 161–3 Richard, count of Le Mans  27 Richard, earl of Cornwall and king of Germany (d.1272)  193 Richard I, king of England  193 Richard II, king of England  45, 63, 179, 185, 190 n.37, 194 Richard III, king of England  239 Richemont, Arthur, comte de  256 Rinel, Jean  242, 246–7, 248 n.39, 249, 262, 267, 268 Rishanger, William, chronicler of St Albans  54, 60 Rither, Sir John de la  61 n.41 Robert I, king of Scotland  70 Robesart, Sir Louis de  143 n.74 Robessart, Sir John  245 n.24 Rochester 220 Roges, John  66, 67 n.69 Romney  155 n.36, 211, 212, 220, 223, 226, 228, 232, 233, 235 n.110 Roos, John, lord (d.1421)  254 Ros, Robert  99 Ros, William  60 Rothemberg, John  191, 199 Roucliffe, Richard  99 Roucliffe, Sir Robert  99 Rouen  240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 260 n.87 garrisons at  242, 243, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 262 n.92, 264, 266, 267, 268 routiers  149, 151, 152, 170, 173 Roxburgh 88 castle  22, 79 Ryal (N’thumb.)  87 Rydesdale, Robert  248 n.41 Rye  153, 155, 163, 211, 214, 217, 222–6, 228, 233, 235 Ryland, Laurence  249 n.41 Saâne, Jean, lord  247, 249 Sage, Sir Raoul le  249 Saint-Mathieu, Brittany  174 Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte, garrison of  149, 154, 171–2, 174, 190 n.37 Salcott 218 Salman, John  153, 155 n.36 Saltmarsh, Edward  91 Saltmarsh, Sir Peter  77 n.1, 90–1, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103 Saltmarsh, Robert  85–6, 91, 98, 99 Saltmarsh, Thomas  91

Salveyn, George  99 n.130 Salveyn, Sir Gerard  68, 88, 97, 99 n.130 Salveyn, John  99 n.130 Salveyn, Nicholas  99 n.130 Sancerre, Louis de  173 Sandwich  211, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 223–6, 228, 233, 235 Sapy, Sir Robert de  97 Sarre 220 Satalia (Antalya), Turkey  189–90, 209 Savage, Roger le  68 Scalacronica  41, 78, 91–95, 97, 103 Scales, Sir Robert (d.1324)  11 Scales, Sir Robert (d.1369)  53, 58 Scales, Sir Roger  64 Scales, Thomas, lord  242, 244 n.19, 249 n.46, 250, 253, 256, 257 n.77, 264, 266, 268 Scandinavian ‘ostmen’  18 schiltroms  13, 14, 54 Schönhals, Heinrich  201–4, 208 Scotch/Scottish Rolls  58, 65 Scotland, the Scottish, Scottish Wars  5, 12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 27, 33, 35, 40, 54, 55, 59, 62–73, 77–83, 86, 88–93, 95, 99–103, 107, 111–12, 115, 120 n.75, 138 n.59, 150, 157, 215, 217, 219, 225, 235, 236 Scotre, Roger de  98 Scrope, Henry le, baron (of Masham) (d.1392) 155 Scrope, Richard, first baron Scrope  41, 45, 151, 189 Scrope, Sir William (of Bolton)  189 Seaford  156 n.36, 217, 222–3, 226, 231 See, Richard atte  160, 161, 165 Segrave, Sir John  72 Seine, river/valley/garrison  170, 241, 242, 243, 244, 247, 250, 254–55, 258, 266, 267 Selsey 222 Sempy, Jean, lord of  199 n.78 Seymore, Ralph  162 Sherborne 8 sheriffs  35, 195 Sherman, William  248–49 n.41 ships/shipping (English) conversion required for transporting horses 178 hiring of foreign ships  230 manning of  231–6 names of Barge Esmon of Sandwich  219 Barge of Rye of Rye 232 Barge of Wyhnchils of Winchelsea  221, 232, 233 Cog John of Dover  231–32 Godbyete of Sandwich  219 Godyer of Dover  233

290 index James of Sandwich  215 Jesus of Winchelsea  234 Jonette of Winchelsea  221 n.61 Katherine of Sandwich  232 Leonard of Winchelsea  221 n.61 Marie of Sandwich  219 Mary of Winchelsea  216 Mighel of Dover  232 Peter of Sandwich  215 Plente of Winchelsea  221 Seintemariecogg of Winchelsea 221 n.61 Trinitie of Winchelsea  216 naval dominance  154, 156 naval flotillas/armatas  154, 155, 157, 177–8, 215, 216, 231, 233 numerical size of merchant fleet/ contribution to war  156, 223, 228–30 requisition, process of  155–6 royal vessels  154–5, 157 ship survey (1572)  217–18 transport fleets  148 n.4, 149 n.6, 150, 153, 154 n.28, 155–7, 193, 216–17, 226–7, 229–30, 235, 248–9 Shoreham 222 Shropshire  22, 162, 166 n.60, 186 Sibill, Walter  185 n.15 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 130–31 n.28, 132 n.32, 135 n.46, 142 n.74 Siward, Sir Richard  55 Skele, William  221, 232 Skelton, Nicholas de  160, 161, 165 Small Hythe  217, 220, 223, 226, 228 Somerset 161 Somerton castle  90 Somme, river  250 Sondes, Richard  160, 163 Sone, Richard  67 n.69 Song of Caerlaverock  72 n.91, 73 Sothill, John  68 Southampton  153, 155, 156 n.37, 157, 162, 224–5, 227–8 South Ferriby  84 Southworth, Thomas de  187 Spanish Armada  235 Spencer, Hugh  243 n.14 Sprouston (Scot.)  88 St Amand, Sir Aimery  52, 58 St Catherine-du-Mont, monastery, garrison of  251, 256 St Cuthbert, relics of  77 St Denis  244 n.19, 249 St-Germain-en-Laye  244, 250 n.48, 259 n.82 St-Germain-sous-Cailly, fortress of  260 St John, Bernard de  156

St John, Hugh  60 St John, Sir John  74 n.104 St-Lô, garrison of  243, 249 n.46, 250 n.48, 253, 264, 266, 268 St Mary’s Abbey, York  169 St Mary’s Church, Sandwich  219 St Osyth  218 St Philibert, Hugh  68 St Quentin, Raymond  68 n.80 St Vaast la Hogue  230 Stafford, Ralph, earl of Stafford (d.1372)  113, 121–2 prior to earldom  120 Stafford, Sir Richard  121 Staffordshire 22 Stanlowe, John  242 n.13, 259 n.80 Stanys, John  255 n.68 Stapleton, Sir Miles de  189–91, 199, 202 Staunton, Robert  65 Steveynbergh, Nicholas  191, 199 Stirling castle  22, 91–2 Stoket, Master Nicholas  185 n.15 Stowe, Nicholas  67 n.69 Strange, Piers  160, 163 Stratford, John de, archbishop of Canterbury 90 Stratford, Robert, bishop of Chichester  115 Strikeland, Robert  162 Strood 220 Suffolk  115, 119 sumptuary laws  25, 40, 43, 46, 129 Surreau, Pierre  238 Surrey 115 Sussex  115, 211, 217, 221–2 Suthle, William  10 Swinburne, Sir Adam de  97 Symond, Sir Thomas  160, 162–3 tactics (battlefield)  95–6, 97, 101 Taillour, John le  65 Taillour, Robert le  67 n.69 Talbot, Gilbert  68 Talbot, John, earl of Shrewsbury (d.1453)  142 n.74, 242, 245, 250, 253, 256, 264, 267, 268 Tamworth, Sir Nicholas  157, 224 Tancarville 243 Tateshall, Sir Robert  9, 68, 70 n.85 Tateshall, Sir Robert, ‘junior’  68 n.80, 70 n.85 taxation; see under finance (government) Templars, the knights  194 Teutonic Order/Knights  181, 183, 184, 194, 197, 199, 201, 203–6, 209 Thames, river  153, 155 n.36 Thorn (Toruń, Poland)  189, 192, 201, 203 n.92, 204, 205, 208–9

index 291 Thorp, John de  155, 156 n.36 Thurgarton, Richard de, prior of Thurgarton 117 Tillesbury, John de  98 Tiptoft, Sir John  74 Tombelaine, garrison of  264, 266, 268 Touques, garrison of  243, 253, 257, 264, 266, 267 Touraine 171 tournaments  35, 39, 80, 134, 190 n.78 trade cloth  201, 230 coastal 229–30 export (general)  230 networks of (European)  183, 198, 201, 206–9, 225 smuggling of  219 wool trade  119–20, 122, 201, 202, 207 n.88, 203–4, 230 Transylvania 41 Trickingham, John de  100 Trickingham, Sir Walter de  77 n.1, 85, 100 Tril, Walter  67 n.69 Trivet, Nicholas  60 Trivet, Sir Thomas  160 Troye, Chrétien de  19 Erec and Enide 19–20 Troyes, treaty of  237, 246, 247 Turkey 189 Turk, Robert  185 n.15 Tweed, river  93 Tychbourne, Sir John  162 Tyes, Sir Henry  74 Ufford, Robert, earl of Suffolk  113, 115, 116, 120 Ufford, Thomas de  183 Ufford, William, earl of Suffolk  164 Ughtred, Peter  160, 161, 167 Ughtred, Sir Thomas (d.1365)  52, 58, 166 Ughtred, Sir Thomas (d.1401)  160, 163, 166, 167 Umfraville, Gilbert, earl of Angus  55 Urswyk Robert  187 Usk, Thomas  141 n.72 Vaas, abbey of  172, 173 vadia guerre accounts; see wages Valence, Aymer de, earl of Pembroke  34, 84, 102 prior to earldom  12, 55, 59, 61, 65–7, 71 Valence, William de, earl of Pembroke (d.1296)  4, 61, 65, 193 Valmont 243 Valognes 249 Vavassour, Sir William  58

Vendômois 171 Venice 192 Vere, John de, earl of Oxford (d.1360)  115, 118 n.63, 120 n.75 Vere, Robert de, earl of Oxford (d.1331)  55 Vergil, Polydore  126 Verneuil, garrison of  242, 253, 255, 257, 259 n.80, 264, 266, 267 Vernon, garrison of  242, 252, 254, 256, 257, 264, 266, 267 Vernonnet, tower of  256 Vescy, Isabella (née Beaumont)  78, 86, 87, 91, 96 Vescy, John de, lord of Alnwick  4, 86 Vexin  245, 254–5 Vievy-le-Rayé, castle of  188 n.27 Villejuif 170 Vire, garrison of  243, 264, 266, 268 river 243 Visconti, Violante  188 n.27 Vistula, river  189 Vita Edwardi Secundi  92 n.92 Vivonne, Renaud/Reynold de, lord of Pouillé  199, 203 n.92, 204–205, 209 wages  56, 75, 107, 110, 111–12, 147, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 161–3, 191 n.41, 193, 194, 234, 249, 252, 256 n.69, 259, 262 pay package’  106–7, 123, 147, 167 payrolls; army (vadia guerre accounts)  120 n.75, 156, 158, 163, 194 payrolls; naval (vadia nautarum/ marinariorum)  215, 222 prests  106, 107, 109–10, 120–2, 156, 159, 194, 228–9, 231–2 rates of  24, 28, 109, 150, 152, 178, 194, 234, 248, 252 regard  106, 150, 157 speed of payment  110–13, 122, 167 Wake, Sir Thomas de  81 Waldegrave, Sir Richard de  189–90, 195, 199, 202 Wales, Welshman, the Welsh Wars  4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 n.3, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 35, 53, 60, 61 n.41, 62, 65, 66, 69, 115, 186 in initial conquest of Ireland  21, 30 Welsh Marches  21, 29, 30, 115, 166 Wallace, Sir William  54, 60, 63 Walter of Guisborough  13, 54 Walton-on-the-Naze 218 Warde, Sir Robert de la  59, 60, 64–5, 66 wardrobe books/accounts  11, 12, 13, 26, 57, 68, 110 n.20, 112 n.36, 136 n.48 wardrobe debentures  112, 120 n.75 war effort/strategy, English  148–50, 176, 177–9, 226, 237, 254

292 index battle-seeking  170–1, 215 ‘decline narrative’ (1369–96) 42–3, 214–15, 225–6, 228–9 downturn (after 1435)  243 naval strategy (1369–96)  177–9, 226, 229–32, 234, 236 French Fabian strategy (avoidance of battle)  148, 175 Warenne, John de, earl of Surrey & Warenne (d.1304)  55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63 warrants for issue  112 n.36 Warwickshire  110, 115 Wasteneys, Richard  248, 256 Waurin, Jean de (chronicler)  143 n.77 Wauton, John  160 Wauton, Sir William  67 n.69 Welby, Richard de  187, 195 Welles, Sir Adam  12–13 Westminster 245 Westminster Abbey  34, 155 Westmorland 150 West, Thomas  115 West Wittering  222 Wetwang, Thomas  156 n.36 William I, king of England  26–7 William, duke of Julich-Guelders (d.1402) 209 William of Poitiers  27 n.46 Willoughby, Robert, lord (d.1452)  217, 242, 244 n.17, 249–50, 253, 256, 264, 267, 268 Wiltshire 155 Winceby 84 Winchelsea  8, 153, 155, 163, 211, 216, 217, 221–8, 232, 233, 235 n.110

Windsor 144 tournament at  134 Winteringham  84, 86 Wogan, Sir John de  16 Woodstock, Edward of (the Black Prince)  106, 149, 150, 153, 156, 175, 227 n.66 Woodstock, palace of  5, 6, 8 Woodstock, Thomas, duke of Gloucester 184–5 as earl of Buckingham  230 Worcester, William of  141–2, 239–40, 262 Worcester, William junior.  239, 240 n.10 Worcestershire  110, 115 Worsley, Sir Geoffrey  173, 174 Woubourne, Robert  156 Wouldham 220 Wylde, William le  89 Wynnere and Wastoure (Winner and Waster)  135 n.46 Wyntoun, Andrew (chronicler)  81 n.23 Wyse, Matthäus  201–3, 208 yeoman (valetti)  14, 28, 43, 48 Yol, John  232 York  8, 90, 107, 235 n.108 York, Richard of, duke of York (d.1460)  239, 245–7, 249–50, 253, 255, 259–61 Yorkshire  54, 71 n.90, 85, 86, 90, 96, 160, 165, 166, 168 Zouche, Sir Alan la  54, 58 Zouche, William lord  160, 163

Tabula Gratulatoria Mark Allen

Robert Kinsey

Gary P. Baker

Craig L. Lambert

Adrian R. Bell

Sean McGlynn

Matthew Bennett

Tony K. Moore

Doug Biggs

Stephen Morillo

Christine Carpenter

Ian Mortimer

David Cleverly

J. J. N. Palmer

Peter Coss

Philip Preston

Anne Curry

Michael Prestwich

Daniel P. Franke

Matthew Raven

David Green

Clifford J. Rogers

Nicholas A. Gribit

Nigel Saul

Michael Hicks

David Simpkin

Jane Hoggarth-Allen

Andrew M. Spencer

Robert W. Jones

Colin Veach

Andy King

Matthew Woodcock

Warfare in History

The Battle of Hastings: Sources and Interpretations, edited and introduced by Stephen Morillo Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology, Kelly DeVries The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340 (second edition), J.F. Verbruggen Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside, Nicholas Wright Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War, edited by Christopher Allmand The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, edited by Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History, Gervase Phillips The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066, Kelly DeVries The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, edited by Clifford J. Rogers The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, Anne Curry War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360, Clifford J. Rogers The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, edited by Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach The Battle of the Golden Spurs (Courtrai, 11 July 1302): A Contribution to the History of Flanders’ War of Liberation, 1297–1305, J.F. Verbruggen War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger Swein Forkbeard’s Invasions and the Danish Conquest of England, 991–1017, Ian Howard Religion and the Conduct of War, c.300–1215, David S. Bachrach Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 1356–1406, Sergio Boffa Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity, 1450–1600, Yuval Harari The Place of War in English History, 1066–1214, J.O. Prestwich, edited by Michael Prestwich War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century, Adrian R. Bell German War Planning, 1891–1914: Sources and Interpretations, Terence Zuber The Battle of Crécy, 1346, Andrew Ayton and Sir Philip Preston

The Battle of Yorktown, 1781: A Reassessment, John D. Grainger Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550, Yuval Noah Harari Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative, Natasha R. Hodgson The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn, David Simpkin The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558, David Grummitt Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480–1560, David Potter Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield, Robert W. Jones Alfred’s Wars: Sources and Interpretations of Anglo-Saxon Warfare in the Viking Age, Ryan Lavelle The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588–1688, Olaf van Nimwegen In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356, Peter Hoskins Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, Charles D. Stanton Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century, Craig L. Lambert Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377, Graham Cushway The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, edited by Adrian R. Bell and Anne Curry Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, David S. Bachrach Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century, Timothy Guard The Norman Campaigns in the Balkans, 1081–1108, Georgios Theotokis Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282–1422, Adam Chapman Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352, Mike Carr Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345–1346: Military Service and Professionalism in the Hundred Years War, Nicholas A. Gribit Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332–1357, Iain A. MacInnes

Military Communities…TJ.qxp_Layout 1 09/04/18 17:41 Page 1

DAVID SIMPKIN teaches history at Birkenhead Sixth-Form College.

Cover image: One of Sir John Charlton’s sons (c.1340) from St Mary’s Church, Shrewsbury. Photograph by Andy King. © Churches Conservation Trust.

Warfare in History GENERAL EDITORS: Matthew

Bennett, Anne Curry, Stephen Morillo

MILITARY COMMUNITIES IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW AYTON

Baker, Lambert and Simpkin (Eds)

CONTRIBUTORS: Gary P. Baker, Adrian R. Bell, Peter Coss, Anne Curry, Robert W. Jones, Andy King, Craig L. Lambert, Tony K. Moore, J.J.N. Palmer, Philip Preston, Michael Prestwich, Matthew Raven, Clifford J. Rogers, Nigel Saul, David Simpkin.

The essays in this volume, ranging from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century, address various aspects of this idea. They offer investigations of soldiers’ and mariners’ equipment; their obligations, functions, status, and recruitment; and the range and duration of their service.

MILITARY COMMUNITIES

CRAIG L. LAMBERT is Lecturer in Maritime History at the University of Southampton.

IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

GARY P. BAKER is a Research Associate at the University of East Anglia and a Researcher in History at the University of Groningen.

From warhorses to the men-at-arms who rode them; armies that were raised to the lords who recruited, led, administered, and financed them; and ships to the mariners who crewed them; few aspects of the organisation and logistics of war in late medieval England have escaped the scholarly attention, or failed to benefit from the insights, of Dr Andrew Ayton. The concept of the military community, with its emphasis on warfare as a collective social enterprise, has always lain at the heart of his work; he has shown in particular how this age of warfare is characterised by related but intersecting military communities, marked not only by the social and political relationships within armies and navies, but by communities of mind, experience, and enterprise.

EDITED BY GARY P. BAKER , CRAIG L. LAMBERT AND DAVID SIMPKIN