Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (2) (Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard) [2] 9004118616, 9789004118614

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
PREFACE (Philipp W. Rosemann)
The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss (Marcia L. Colish)
Stephen Langton (Riccardo Quinto)
The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales (Hubert Philipp Weber)
The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St.-Cher (Magdalena Bieniak)
Thomas Aquinas and his Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (John F. Boyle)
Robert Kilwardby's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Gerhard Leibold)
William de la Mare (Hans Kraml)
Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito (William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel)
On the Limits of the Genre: Roger Roseth as a Reader of the Sentences (Olli Hallamaa)
Richard FitzRalph's Lectura on the Sentences (Michael Dunne)
Peter of Candia's Commentary on the Sentences (Peter Lombard by Stephen F. Brown)
Martin Luther (Pekka Kärkkäinen)
Conclusion: The Tradition of the Sentences (Philipp W. Rosemann)
Bibliography
Index of Manuscripts
Index of Names

Citation preview

Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard Volume 2

Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard Volume 2

Edited by

Philipp W. Rosemann

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN 978 90 04 11861 4 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Abbreviations ..................................................................................... Preface ................................................................................................. Philipp W. Rosemann

vii ix

The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss ................................................ Marcia L. Colish Stephen Langton ................................................................................ Riccardo Quinto The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales .... Hubert Philipp Weber The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St.-Cher ........................ Magdalena Bieniak Thomas Aquinas and his Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi ...................................................... John F. Boyle Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard ............................................................................... Gerhard Leibold William de la Mare ............................................................................ Hans Kraml Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito .............................. William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel On the Limits of the Genre: Roger Roseth as a Reader of the Sentences .......................................................................................... Olli Hallamaa Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences .............................. Michael Dunne Peter of Candia’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard ............................................................................... Stephen F. Brown Martin Luther ..................................................................................... Pekka Kärkkäinen Conclusion: The Tradition of the Sentences .................................. Philipp W. Rosemann

1 35 79 111

149

175 227 263

369 405

439 471 495

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contents

Bibliography ........................................................................................ Index of Manuscripts ........................................................................ Index of Names ..................................................................................

525 537 543

ABBREVIATIONS AFH

Archivum franciscanum historicum (Grottaferrata). Vol. 1 (1908) ff. AHDLMA Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge (Paris). Vol. 1 (1926) ff. Colish, Peter Lombard Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vols. (Leiden/New York/Cologne, 1994). CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, 96 vols. to date, ed. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna, 1866 ff.). CCSL Corpus christianorum, series latina, 186 vols. to date (Turnhout, 1953 ff.). Mediaeval Commentaries, Mediaeval Commentaries on the “Senvol. 1 tences” of Peter Lombard: Current Research, vol. 1, ed. Gillian R. Evans (Leiden/Boston/ Cologne, 2002). Peter Lombard, Sentences Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., 2 vols. (Grottaferrata, 1971–81). Vol. 1 contains Books I and II; vol. 2 contains Books III and IV. PL Patrologia latina, cursus completus, 221 vols., ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–65). Rosemann, Great Philipp W. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s “Sentences” (Peterborough, Ont., 2007). Rosemann, Peter Lombard Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (New York, 2004). RTAM Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale (Louvain). Vol. 1 (1929)–63 (1996). Continued as RTPM. RTPM Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales (Louvain). Started with vol. 64 (1997).

viii Stegmüller, Repertorium

abbreviations Friedrich Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947).

PREFACE Philipp W. Rosemann In 2002 Brill published a volume, edited by the Cambridge medievalist Gillian Evans, which was devoted to the tradition of commentaries upon Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences. Entitled Mediaeval Commentaries on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard: Current Research, the volume aimed to fill a major lacuna in the literature on medieval intellectual history; for there existed no comprehensive account of the way in which the most influential textbook in the history of Western theology had been received through the centuries, shaping the thought of generations of theologians, from the twelfth century up to (and even beyond) the time of Martin Luther. Mediaeval Commentaries took an important first step in the direction of such a comprehensive account, bringing together fifteen contributions by an international group of experts. These contributions ranged from case-studies of individual commentators, such as Richard Fishacre or Marsilius of Inghen, to broad surveys, including a fine synthetic conclusion by Russell Friedman that summarized the main points of the different chapters and thus established the status quaestionis on the history and Wirkungsgeschichte of the Sentences. Yet—not surprisingly given the magnitude of the task that Mediaeval Commentaries addressed—there remained large areas that the contributors to the volume were not able to cover. For example, the volume contained only a single chapter on the early, twelfth-century history of the Sentences and nothing at all on the fate of the work in the crucial fifteenth century, that is to say, at the dawn of the Reformation and of modernity. This is why Gillian Evans, at the end of her brief introduction, expressed the hope that a second volume would “complete a work of reference which will fill a need for decades to come.”1

1

G. R. Evans, “Introduction,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, xiii–xiv, at xiv.

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preface The Second Volume

Given my authorship of a recent book on Peter Lombard and of a study on the history of the Sentences, Brill asked me to take responsibility for the second volume that Gillian Evans envisaged. After some discussion, both with the prospective contributors and with Dr. Julian Deahl at Brill, it was decided that the best way to approach volume two would indeed be to conceive it as complementing and completing volume one. Thus, one of the main goals of the present volume is to fill some of the most obvious gaps in the coverage provided by its predecessor. This attempt could evidently succeed only within the limits of current research and its emphases. Fifteen scholars agreed to collaborate in this project. All these colleagues have either edited (portions of ) the Sentences commentaries of the authors to whom their chapters are devoted, or have published scholarly studies on their work and thought. Apart from my conclusion, the volume contains only research on individual Sentences commentators, rather than attempting surveys of particular periods or currents. This is because at the current stage of research, it seems important to add to our knowledge of the precise structure and content of the commentaries that medieval thinkers composed—for most of these commentaries remain unedited, and even the edited ones are often neglected. (Take the example of Thomas Aquinas, the medieval theologian whose thought has doubtless received the greatest scholarly attention in the twentieth century: his Sentences commentary is still not critically edited; no English, German, or French translation is available. Studies usually avoid it, preferring the “more mature” doctrinal statements that are contained in the Summa or in Quaestiones disputatae.) The contributions cover the four centuries during which the Sentences exercised their most decisive influence. Their somewhat uneven distribution among those centuries indicates the strengths and weaknesses of research in the area: there is one chapter on the earliest continuous gloss upon the Sentences, the so-called Pseudo-Poitiers gloss; six chapters on authors who composed their commentaries in the thirteenth century; four chapters on fourteenth-century authors; and unfortunately only one chapter, devoted to the young Martin Luther, on the “long” fifteenth century. Kent Emery, Jr., who agreed to write a chapter on Denys the Carthusian for this volume, was prevented by his

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many other obligations from completing the work. Quite deliberately, I solicited no chapters on commentators such as Duns Scotus or William of Ockham, whose work contemporary scholarship has already explored fairly thoroughly. Focus and Character of the Chapters In order for the volume to achieve a certain degree of unity, the authors were asked to address a number of questions that appear significant in the context of the Sentences literature. The first set of questions concerns paleographical and editorial issues: what can we say about the manuscript tradition of the particular glosses or commentary being examined? Are there any important or unusual features about the way in which the manuscripts present a commentary (for instance, diagrams and arbores ramificatae)? The second set of questions has to do with the issue of the Sentences commentary as a literary genre: how did a particular commentator structure his glosses or his commentary? Indeed, to what extent was it a “commentary” at all? How faithfully did he follow the plan of the Sentences? Closely connected with the problem of literary genre is that of method: what is the internal structure of each book, chapter, distinction, question, or article? What are the structures of reasoning that are employed to present, develop, and resolve arguments? Finally, each chapter endeavors to address some of the traditional questions of intellectual history. Thus, at the end of each chapter, the reader should have a clear idea of who the Sentences commentator was, when he composed his commentary and under what circumstances, what his principal sources were and into what “current” he belongs, how he adopted and adapted existing strategies of commenting on the Sentences, what his main doctrinal emphases were, and how his work influenced later thinkers. This tentative list of questions was obviously not meant to impose homogeneity upon the individual chapters. Each author was encouraged to structure his or her chapter in the manner that he or she believed best suited to the subject matter, not treating some of the questions I just mentioned if they were not relevant and adding others. On the other hand, each contribution addresses at least some of the questions from each of the major divisions in the tripartite list provided above.

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preface Volume Three

Research on the Sentences literature is still only at its beginnings. Even the present volume had to pass by many important figures and currents—one could think, for example, of John Capreolus’s transformation of the genre of the Sentences commentary in his Defensiones of Thomistic thought; of Denys the Carthusian’s monumental yet eccentric work (for what audience was it composed and what purpose was it meant to serve, given the fact that Denys did not write from within the traditional scholastic milieu?); of the tradition of the Sentences in eastern Europe; or even of the role of the genre in early modern times. Of course, the late twelfth century is still under-researched as well. Brill has therefore expressed an interest in a third volume of Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. It is hoped that the publication of such a volume could be preceded by an international conference on the Sentences literature, a conference that would specifically focus on areas that have hitherto received the least attention.

THE PSEUDO-PETER OF POITIERS GLOSS Marcia L. Colish* Surveys of the use of Peter Lombard’s Sentences as an introduction to systematic theology still, anachronistically, see Alexander of Hales as the scholastic who launched that policy.1 But, as students of twelfthcentury theology have known for some time, an early and durable initiative in this field was made by the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss. The original author of this gloss was a Paris theologian in the circle of Peter Lombard. He composed the first version of the gloss, a continuous commentary on the Sentences, between 1160 and 1170. Among early commentators, he appears to have been preceded only by Peter Comestor, Paganus of Corbeil, and a mysterious Master Udo or Odo, whose glosses survive as marginalia attached to early copies of the Sentences.2 Their comments did not draw scholastic attention for very long. But the work of the author of the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss, who treated all four books of the Sentences as a text in its own right, was perpetuated by three later, if equally anonymous, continuators. The second version of the gloss dates to ca. 1170–80; the third dates to the last quarter of the twelfth century; and the fourth dates to the period around 1230. There are three complete manuscripts of the first version of the gloss, one of which is bound in a codex unique in containing all four of its versions, while thirteen other manuscripts preserve parts of the gloss. These manuscripts and their interrelations have been known to scholars for decades. Yet the influence of the gloss, which remains * I would like to acknowledge the support of the Franklin Research Grant program of the American Philosophical Society and of Oberlin College, which made possible the research on which this paper is based. 1 For a recent example, citing much older literature and reflecting a complete lack of interest in twelfth-century data, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols., trans. Robert Royal (Washington, 1996), 1: 40. 2 2. See Artur Michael Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, ed. Albert-M. Landry and trans. Louis-B. Geiger (Montreal, 1973), 136–7. Among the papers of Joseph N. Garvin is a transcription of a commentary by one Odo who may be this Odo; see Kent Emery et al., “Quaestiones, Sententiae and Summae from the Later Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries: The Joseph N. Garvin Papers,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 47 (2005): 11–68 (esp. 12, 29) and 48 (2006): 15–81 (esp. 20, 61–3).

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unedited, has not been fully incorporated into the history of the Lombardian tradition or into the history of early scholastic theology. Earlier scholars discovered these texts, identified their successive versions, and clarified their relationships and chronology.3 Helpful in this regard are the glossators’ references to current events and use of changing terminology. Good examples are the citation of the marriage decretals of Pope Alexander III (1159–81), which reinforce the Lombard’s position,4 and the term spiratio to denote the procession of the Holy Spirit, which was not in use until the last quarter of the twelfth century.5 But content analysis and the chronology derived from it do not tell the whole story. Paleographic evidence shows that some gloss manuscripts were redacted up to fifty years later than the versions of

3 The most important are Artur Michael Landgraf, “Notes de critique textuelle sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard,” RTAM 2 (1930): 80–99; idem, “Problèmes relatifs aux premières Gloses des Sentences,” RTAM 3 (1931): 140–57; idem “Recherches sur les écrits de Pierre le Mangeur,” RTAM 3 (1931): 341–72; idem, “Mitteilungen zum Sentenzenkommentar Hugos a S. Charo,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 58 (1934): 396–400; “Drei Zweige der Pseudo-Poitiers-Glosse zu den Sentenzen des Lombarden,” RTAM 9 (1937): 167–204; “Sentenzenglossen des beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts,” RTAM 10 (1938): 36–55; idem, “The First Sentence Commentary of Early Scholasticism,” The New Scholasticism 13 (1939): 101–33; summarizing his and others’ findings in idem, Introduction, 54, 131–8, 147; Odon Lottin, “Le prologue des Gloses sur les Sentences attribués à Pierre de Poitiers,” RTAM 7 (1935): 70–3, reprinted in idem, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 6 vols. (Gembloux/Louvain, 1942–60), 6: 119–24; Raymond-M. Martin, “Notes sur l’œuvre littéraire de Pierre le Mangeur,” RTAM 3 (1931): 54–66; Heinrich Weisweiler, “Eine neue frühe Glosse zum vierten Buch der Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus,” in Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, ed. Albert Lang et al., vol. 1 (Münster, 1935), 360–400. For the most recent summary, which does not discuss the manuscripts of the gloss, see Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 39, 41–51, 57–8, 65, 114, 121, 123, 185–6, 192. 4 Specialists on this topic note that, while Alexander’s marriage decretals cannot be dated precisely, they are most likely to have been issued starting in ca. 1173, based on the cases he was called upon to adjudicate. The most important analysis is that of Charles Donahue, “The Dating of Alexander the Third’s Marriage Decretals: Dauvillier Revisited after Fifty Years,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteilung 68 (1982): 70–124; see also idem, “The Policy of Alexander the Third’s Consent Theory of Marriage,” in Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Canon Law, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Vatican City, 1976), 251–81; James A. Brundage, “Marriage and Sexuality in the Decretals of Pope Alexander III,” in Miscellanea Rolando Bandinelli papa Alessandro III, ed. Filippo Liotta (Siena, 1986), 59–83; idem, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago, 1987), 268–9, 331–7. 5 See Marcia L. Colish, “From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the Summa: Parisian Theology, 1130–1215,” in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 9–29, at 21; reprinted in eadem, Studies in Scholasticism, Collected Studies Series 838 (Aldershot, 2006), no. XII.

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the text they preserve. Moreover, an examination of the marginalia in these manuscripts shows that they remained in pedagogical use well into the thirteenth century and even beyond, despite the development of new genres of theological literature, new subject matter, and new methodologies that presumably would have made the gloss passé. The survival and use of the gloss over its extended life span thus urge us to reconsider how the Lombard was received and appropriated in the century after his death, and how at least some scholastics were initiated into the study of theology. I But first, why is this text called the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss? And what is it like? The gloss acquired this name because it was misattributed to Peter of Poitiers, the Paris theologian and disciple of the Lombard who held the chair of theology at Notre Dame (1169–93) before ending his career as chancellor of the nascent University of Paris (1193–1205).6 His major work is a sentence collection in five books, composed in 1173. It is available in print in PL 211. Starting in the 1930s, in the effort to prepare for a new critical edition of Peter of Poitiers’s Sentences, scholars located and collated the manuscripts of his work, sometimes confused with that of Peter Comestor. In the event, only the first two books of Peter of Poitiers’s Sentences received a critical edition—an enterprise whose completion would be a fine idea. The census of manuscripts brought to light the manuscripts of the gloss and established that it was not the work of Peter of Poitiers. His own Sentences cite it as a source. Once scholars had ascertained this fact, and once they had discovered, described, dated, and placed in sequential order the manuscripts of the gloss, they lost interest in it. While this text, or the single version of it closest at hand to the author, has sometimes been cited by students of this or that topical theme in early scholastic thought, there the matter has rested. There has been

6 See, most importantly, Philip S. Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers (Washington, D.C., 1936). For additional literature on this figure, see Colish, “From the Sentence Collection,” 10 n. 6, 21 n. 20; eadem, “The Development of Lombardian Theology, 1160–1215,” in Centres of Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (Leiden, 1995), 207–16, at 210 n. 5 (reprinted in eadem, Studies in Scholasticism, no. XIII).

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no discussion of the reception of the gloss itself, and what it can tell us in turn about the reception of the Lombard. Before beginning my own investigation of the gloss, I shared the view that there were three twelfth-century modes of entry into the study of Peter Lombard, aside from the early glosses that survive only as marginalia.7 At the decidedly low end, there are abridgements of the Sentences, starting in ca. 1170 with the work of Bandinus and ending as late as ca. 1245 with Filia Magistri. These abridgements preserve the Lombard’s schema while gutting the text of his methodology, the analysis and criticism of sources on which he grounds his solutions. Typically, the abridgers cut to the chase and just give the Master’s conclusions—sometimes incorrectly—without showing the reader how he arrived at them. At the decidedly high end, there are commentaries written by mature masters, such as Stephen Langton, who use this genre as a platform on which to erect their own theological constructs, and who see no need to cover all the points discussed in the Sentences. In between these two extremes lies the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss, a middle-brow, middle-of-the-road, conservative effort to survey the full text of the Lombard, with the unambitious goal of explaining simply what the Master says. Innovation and originality are not the goals of the gloss. In the generation marked by Alexander of Hales’s commentary on the Sentences (ca. 1225/30), and whether or not they used that format, the scholastics’ preoccupation with the reception of Aristotle meant that the gloss lost its appeal. This was the received wisdom with which I started. What I have learned since is that the gloss remained in use far longer than we might have thought. One indication of its survival is the fact that texts of the gloss are quite often found in codices that contain other texts of interest to scholastics, including texts composed decades later. This finding occurs both in codices that remain as originally written and bound and in those subsequently compiled and rebound. Aside from the fact that the gloss was meant to be studied in conjunction with other texts, there are marginalia attached to gloss manuscripts, often in hands considerably later than those redacting the gloss itself. In both respects, the gloss manuscripts indicate that the gloss succeeded in remaining an introduction to the Lombard, whose ideas it so conservatively reports, into and beyond the age of Alex7 On the earliest glossators, abridgers, and twelfth-century commentators, see Colish, “From the Sentence Collection,” 17–21; Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 27–40.

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ander of Hales. I would like to show how selected manuscripts of the gloss illuminate that fact, after which some conclusions can be drawn on how this information nuances our understanding of the teaching of early scholastic theology. II My first set of examples addresses the issue of the company in which the gloss traveled. First, consider MS. Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Misc. Patr. 128, fol. 128r (plate 1). The codex in which this material is located has been rebound. However, the folio shown presents two texts as originally written on the same page. Column a gives the end of a passage commenting on Gratian’s Decretum, dealing with marriage. Column b gives the beginning of Book IV of the gloss, in the 1160–70 version, starting with the Lombardian catchword Samaritanus. Both texts are written in early thirteenth-century hands. Book IV is the only part of the gloss preserved in this manuscript. Its version is both early and influential, based on MS. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII C 14, one of the three earliest and only complete texts. The Bamberg manuscript is a good example of an early version of the gloss written in a notably later hand. Whoever planned the layout of the passages bound in the present codex clearly wanted the gloss to acquaint readers with Peter Lombard side by side with Gratian on marriage, an area in which the Lombard drew on Gratian’s sources but often disagreed with him, or offered a contrasting rationale when the two masters were in substantive accord. Acquired from the monastery of Ripoll, where it arrived somehow from Paris, my second example, MS. Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll 76, is in its original binding. The codex contains parts of the gloss along with the Sentences of Peter of Poitiers. Here too the gloss preserves the 1160–70 version, although in a hand that dates to 1170–90. On fol. 83v (plate 2) we find a marginal nota bene sign. The same sign in the same hand is present in the margins of the Peter of Poitiers text. The reader who made this sign was clearly interested in both texts. On another page, fol. 80va (plate 3), we see two different marginal hands, both thirteenth-century, and both produced in the Ripoll scriptorium. One annotates the gloss in a book hand, the other in a cursive. While Ripoll by then had passed its glory days as a monastic school and a center of Romanesque art, at least two members

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of the monastic community were reading and annotating the gloss in the thirteenth century. Even more unexpected is another feature of this Barcelona manuscript. Its gloss text treats parts of Book I and Book IV. The text of Book 1 ends at the bottom of fol. 77va. The text of Book IV does not begin until the top of fol. 78va, in a different if contemporary hand. The differing hands and the gap of a page and a half in between the two books indicate production in the pecia system of the Parisian stationers. In the intervening space, someone has added two musical texts, not shown here, the first of which is written in column b of fol. 77v, while the second occupies all of fol. 78r. In genre, both musical pieces are sequences. The texts of both omit the initial letters of the words beginning each phrase. The verse of the longer text speaks of Jacob and his virtues, but breaks off in mid-word on the last line. One wonders whether it was a Ripoll monk who added these musical texts, why the longer of the two is incomplete, and whether the chosen theme is an editorial comment on the value of scholastic theology. The manuscript yields no answers to these questions. Yet, in this apparently unlikely milieu, we see the ongoing appeal of the gloss, well after it was both composed and redacted in this manuscript. A manuscript in which the gloss traveled in the company of texts still later than Peter of Poitiers’s Sentences is MS. Oxford, Balliol College, 210, a codex assembled and bound in the fourteenth century. I will illustrate another aspect of this particular manuscript below. But here let me note that two of the traveling companions of the gloss are the Disputationes on the Sentences by Simon of Tournai and the Summa theologica of Praepositinus of Cremona, composed respectively in the late twelfth century and at the turn of the thirteenth. Simon was not a Lombardian but a follower of Odo of Ourscamp, at whose school in Paris he served as precentor.8 Praepositinus was a Lombardian who ended his career as chancellor of the University of Paris (1206–10). Quite up-to-date, he embraced the very latest conceptual hardware derived from the later logic of Aristotle. Praepositinus put this material to use in his rigorous, and highly controversial, semantic theory, argu-

8 On Simon, see Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai, ed. J. Warichez (Louvain, 1932); P. Glorieux, “Simon de Tournai,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique 14/2 (1941): 2124–36.

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ing that terms could be applied univocally to God and creatures.9 In the section of the codex devoted to Praepositinus, the anthologist has reorganized his four-book Summa, binding it in the following order: Book I, Book IV, Book II, Book III. This order represents the sequence in which the Lombard’s Sentences were studied in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries at Oxford, at Paris, at the Dominican studium in Florence, and more widely among the mendicants.10 As with Praepositinus’s Summa, the works of Simon and the gloss in the Balliol codex were redacted in thirteenth-century France. Each book was parceled out to a different scribe, a standard phenomenon by the early thirteenth century, which facilitated this pedagogical reshuffling of the material. The anthologist who put this codex together interleaves the gloss with Simon’s text. First comes Simon on Books II, III, and IV of the Sentences, followed by the gloss on Books II, III, and IV. Then comes Simon on Book 1 of the Sentences, followed by the gloss on Book I. While the scribes redacting the gloss wrote in a thirteenth-century hand, they copied the version of the gloss dating to 1160–70. The latest item included in this codex is a treatise by one Giles van der Hoye, dean of Courtrai, dated to 1349. In the estimation of the fourteenthcentury anthologist, the gloss, in its earliest form, still deserves to be read, side by side with early scholastic masters both pro- and

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See, most recently, Luisa Valente, Logique et théologie. Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220 (Paris, 2007), 234–56. 10 This approach is found at Paris and Oxford from the late thirteenth up to the mid-fourteenth century, as is noted most recently by William J. Courtenay, “The Course of Studies in the Faculty of Theology at Paris in the Fourteenth Century,” in “Ad Ingenii Acuitionem.” Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù, ed. Stefano Caroti et al. (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2006), 67–92, at 86–7, with bibliography at n. 61 and 62. On early fourteenth-century Dominican pedagogy at Santa Maria Novella in Florence under Remigio de’ Girolami, see M. Michèle Mulchahey, First the Bow Is Bent in Study: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto, 1998), 393–4, who reprints and translates the preface to Remigio’s commentary found in MS. Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. G.IV.936, fol. 337ra–rb. Mulchahey, at 295, thinks that Remigio introduced this sequencing of his commentary as an innovation; she does not consider the practice as found elsewhere. Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 72, states that, already in the mid-thirteenth century, Bonaventure followed this Book I, IV, II, III practice, citing Jacques-Guy Bougerol as his source at 218 n. 46. However, Bougerol, Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, N.J., 1964), 101 n. 7, asserts that “Bonaventure began with the fourth Book of Sentences and ended with the third.” Bougerol references previous scholars who confirm this sequence in Bonaventure’s commentary, starting with his Quaracchi editors.

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anti-Lombardian, and along with a contemporary, if academically peripheral, author.11 III Moving to the issue of marginalia, some of the annotations found in gloss manuscripts are simply corrections, or insertions of material inadvertently omitted by the scribe, either by himself or a contemporary supervisor. However, as with the Barcelona manuscript, marginalia are sometimes addenda made in a hand considerably later than that of the scribe who redacted the text. Thirteenth-century annotators have a marked propensity for adding diagrams visually schematizing and emphasizing subject-matter divisions in the text. In some cases these diagrams simply render visually what the gloss, or the Lombard, says. But in other cases they include material not in either text, offering doctrinal alternatives drawn from other sources that develop or move beyond Lombardian theology. A double-barreled set of annotations is attached to the gloss text on fol. 28ra of the Bamberg manuscript (plate 4). Here, in a hand contemporary with that of the scribe, the first commentator summarizes the discussion in the text in an addendum placed at the immediate left of the text. Farther to the left and extending into the margin below the text, a second and later commentator provides more detail on the passage from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana referred to at that point in the Lombard and the gloss. More schematic are my next examples. A thirteenth-century addendum to the Naples manuscript, fol. 46r (plate 5), visually diagrams the habitations of souls in the next life, amplifying in so doing on both the Lombard and the gloss. The author subdivides the locus retributionis into coelum-locus glorificationis, justius locus dampnationis, and gehenna, reflecting a development of the doctrine of purgatory that postdates the Lombard.12 On the other hand, in the Balliol College

11 For a detailed description of this codex, see Catalogue of Manuscripts of Balliol College Oxford, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1963), 205–07. This anthology was a bequest; for its relevance to the curriculum at Balliol, founded in 1263 as a school of the liberal arts which did not teach theology until 1340, see ibid., xii–xiii; H. W. C. Davis, A History of Balliol College, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1963), 18; John Jones, Balliol College: A History (Oxford, 1998), 2–3. 12 See Jacques LeGoff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1984), although he dates the emergence of this doctrine too late. For a guide to the

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manuscript, a text with the 1160–70 version of the gloss written in a thirteenth-century hand, on fol. 116rb (plate 6) we find a diagram that reprises visually the Lombard’s doctrine of the Fall, a topic by no means uncontroversial.13 Following the analysis of the psychogenesis of the Fall given by the Lombard and summarized by the gloss, the annotator agrees that, of the three parties involved, the serpent was motivated by sensualitas, Eve (the mulier) by misinformed scientia, and Adam (the vir) by defective sapientia. Unlike masters who held that Eve was more emotional and less rational than Adam, or that Eve’s sin was one of intellect while Adam’s was one of love, the Lombard, the gloss, and the annotator hold that the sins of both primal parents were sins of intellect, the misuse of knowledge in Eve’s case and the misuse of wisdom in Adam’s. In the gloss text found in MS. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 22288, fol. 112r, where the scribe’s and the annotator’s hands both date to 1170–90 (plate 7), the marginal diagram comments on and schematizes the occasions when canonists and the more stringent moral theologians taught that spouses should refrain from marital relations. This is a subject on which the Lombard and the gloss are dismissive, regarding the needs of spouses as more important than these canonical desiderata.14 But the annotator is quite willing to give the theme extended consideration. I have already indicated evidence of the pecia system in gloss texts, not only in the Balliol College manuscript, the date of whose scribes makes its presence unexceptionable, but also in the Barcelona manuscript copied in 1170–90—a finding which places that system rather early, from what is known about the university book trade.15 But other

criticism of LeGoff, see Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 (New York, 1995), 280–3, esp. 280 n. 2. 13 See Colish, Peter Lombard, 1: 372–81. 14 See Colish, Peter Lombard, 2: 662; Hans Zeimentz, Ehe nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik. Eine moralgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Anthropologie und Theologie der Ehe in der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux, bei Hugo von St. Viktor, Walter von Mortagne und Petrus Lombardus (Düsseldorf, 1973), 226–8, 237–45; for the canonists see Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society, 154–64, 198–9, 366–7. 15 Scholars who have studied this development have noted evidence in the form of pecia tie-marks in the manuscripts but have looked above all to documentation enabling them to identify the personnel involved in the book trade and to track their economic activities in contracts, wills, tax records, and the like. While observing that manuscripts were parceled out for rapid copying as early as the Carolingian Bibles and patristic works produced by scriptoria such as Tours in the ninth century, they have seen the pecia system as actually regulating the production of books in

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manuscripts of the gloss indicate that the pecia system was already in use still earlier in the twelfth century. Witness to this fact is one of the three original and complete versions of the gloss, whose hand and text both date to 1160–70, MS. London, British Library, Royal 7 F XIII. The scribe who wrote Book III of this text finished it with room to spare on fol. 38rb (plate 8), as his explicit and the extra ruled lines on that page make clear. Book IV commences on fol. 39ra (plate 9), in a different if contemporary hand; we recognize the Samaritanus catchword at the head of that book. This mode of producing gloss manuscripts indicates their use in the schools and suggests that the method of duplicating copies of academic books typical of high medieval Paris had begun well before the formal emergence of its university and of the evidence usually cited to document its existence. Another striking feature of the gloss manuscripts which points inescapably to their pedagogical use in the thirteenth century is the insertion of distinction numbers in the margins by later hands. It is well known that Peter Lombard numbered the chapters within each book of his Sentences but that the subdivision of his text into distinctions as well was first made by Alexander of Hales in his commentary on the Sentences.16 When later annotators add Lombardian distinction numbers to the gloss manuscripts they do so quite selectively. In manuscripts that contain material from more than one book of the gloss, distinction numbers are applied neither to each and every book nor to all parts of the books in which they appear. These data indicate

university centers such as Bologna and Paris only from ca. 1220 at the earliest. See Jean Destrez, La pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle (Paris, 1935); Hughes V. Shooner, “La production du livre par la pecia,” in La production du livre universitaire au moyen âge, ed. Louis J. Bataillon, Bertrand G. Guyot, and Richard H. Rouse (Paris, 1988), 17–37; Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, “The Book Trade at the University of Paris, ca. 1250–ca. 1350,” in ibid., 41–114; idem and eadem, Illiterati et uxorati: Manuscripts and Their Makers. Commercial Book Producers in Medieval Paris, 1200–1500, 2 vols. (Turnhout, 2000), 1: 17–49, 85–7. None of these scholars has studied the manuscripts of the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss. On Carolingian practice, see David Ganz, “Mass Production of Early Medieval Manuscripts: The Carolingian Bibles from Tours,” in The Early Medieval Bible, ed. Richard Gameson (Cambridge, 1994), 53–62; Rosamond McKitterick, “Carolingian Bible Production: The Tours Anomaly,” ibid., 63–77; eadem, “Script and Book Production,” in Carolingian Culture: Emulation and Innovation, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, 1994), 221–47. 16 See Ignatius C. Brady, “The Rubrics of Peter Lombard’s Sentences,” Pier Lombardo 6 (1962): 5–25; idem, “The Distinctions of Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 25 (1965): 90–116.

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both that finding tools were deemed necessary in the teaching of the gloss and that users of these manuscripts flagged only those passages that drew their interest. This kind of treatment is found in all three of the earliest versions of the gloss, as well as in later manuscripts. In the Naples manuscript, all the added distinction numbers are applied to passages from Book IV, as with distinctions 29 and 30 on fol. 62ra (plate 10). Also in arabic numerals are the distinction numbers applied by the scribe only to passages in Book II in the British Library manuscript, as with distinctions 31 and 32 on fol. 36rb (plate 11). On the other hand, as with distinction iii, all the distinction numbers added to MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14423, as on fol. 44va (plate 12), are in roman numerals. These and other gloss manuscripts to which later hands have added marginal distinction numbers offer an as yet unexamined source of information on the Lombard’s reception. IV In the ultimate stages of the history of the gloss, two new developments occur, beginning in the early thirteenth century and continuing even after the texts stop being copied in ca. 1230. One of these new developments is the excerpting of individual points in the gloss, reformulated as quaestiones. Quaestiones of this sort are found in three manuscripts written in hands of the first third of the thirteenth century. The two most interesting are Vatican manuscripts. One, MS. Vat. lat. 411, contains part of the gloss as well as quaestiones derived from it. The other, MS. Vat. lat. 10754, contains annotations to the quaestiones written in a fourteenth-century hand. Another, quite different, indicator of late-blooming interest in the gloss is found in a contract, dated 1316, in which Master Jean de Gonesse of the Sorbonne agreed to deposit his copy of the gloss as a pledge against payment for a copy of Peter Comestor’s Historia scholastica that he ordered from a Paris stationer.17 Regarding the master’s gloss text, nothing further is known about its state of completion, the version it contained, or the date of the copyist’s hand. But it was clearly seen as valuable by him and by the stationer he commissioned.

17

On this see Rouse and Rouse, “The Book Trade,” 78.

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The second major shift reflects the retrogression of a text which, up until the turn of the thirteenth century, and beyond, had been preserved as a continuous commentary on all or parts of the Lombard’s Sentences, physically separate from that text. In one form of its last hurrah, however, the gloss was now reduced to a selection of marginalia attached to complete manuscripts of the Sentences itself. As these texts continued in use, gloss material came to share the marginal space with citations from other authorities, whether classical, patristic, early medieval, or recent. The hands supplying the gloss marginalia in all cases differ from those of the scribes who wrote the Sentences texts. However, the layout in each case indicates that the designers of these manuscripts had a clear sense of how much space they wanted to allocate to gloss marginalia, and exactly where they wanted to place them. They planned ahead, reserving space, neatly ruled, for the gloss passages they wanted to include. In sections of the text where they chose not to cite any gloss material, they provided no such rulings in the margins. As with manuscripts to which distinction numbers were later added, these Sentences manuscripts display an unsystematic interest in the gloss text. Some parts of the Lombard’s work are annotated heavily with passages from the gloss; other parts lack them entirely. These manuscripts contain frequent corrections, interlineations, comments, and other addenda, and many schematic diagrams of the type so appealing to thirteenth-century readers. There are three glossed Sentences manuscripts of this type: MSS. Vatican, Barberini lat. 608, Paris, Bibliothèque mazarine, lat. 758, both written at the turn of the thirteenth century, and Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, 1539, written in the first third of the thirteenth century. I would like to illustrate some features of the latter two manuscripts. The opening page of the Brussels manuscript, fol. 4v (plate 13), which begins with Peter Lombard’s own preface to his Book I, is a good example of a heavily annotated text of this type, in which passages from the gloss, closest to the columns of the text, are supplemented, in a number of thirteenth-century hands, with material from other sources, as well as visual diagrams. Both the Lombard and the gloss have had to do battle with more recent authors whose rationales for the enterprise of systematic theology have become more elaborate than those of the twelfth century. On another level, on fol. 4rb (plate 14), the annotator of the Mazarine manuscript freely flaunts his knowledge of classical literature with a reference to Ovid, however inapposite, attached to the distinction between uti and frui, which the

1. MS. Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Misc. Patr. 128, fol. 2r.

2. MS. Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll 76, fol. 83v.

3. MS. Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll 76, fol. 80va, detail.

4. MS. Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Misc. Patr. 128, fol. 28ra, detail.

5. MS. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII C 14, fol. 46r, detail.

6. MS. Oxford, Balliol College, 210, fol. 116rb. Courtesy of the Master and Fellows of Balliol College.

7. MS. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 22288, fol. 112r. Courtesy of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich.

8. MS. London, British Library, Royal 7 F XIII, fol. 38rb. © British Library. All Rights Reserved.

9. MS. London, British Library, Royal 7 F XIII, fol. 39ra. © British Library. All Rights Reserved.

10. MS. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII C 14, fol. 62r.

11. MS. London, British Library, Royal 7 F XIII, fol. 36rb. © British Library. All Rights Reserved.

12. MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14423, fol. 44va. Courtesy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.

13. MS. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier, 1539, fol. 4v. © Royal Library of Belgium.

14. MS. Paris, Bibliothèque mazarine, lat. 758, fol. 4rb, detail.

15. MS. Paris, Bibliothèque mazarine, lat. 758, fol. 1ra, detail.

16. MS. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier, 1539, fol. 132ra, detail. © Royal Library of Belgium.

17. MS. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier, 1539, fol. 1v. © Royal Library of Belgium.

18. MS. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier, 1539, fol. 1va, detail. © Royal Library of Belgium.

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Lombard takes from Augustine and expands on, the gloss following suit. The same annotator, commenting on the sin of lying, uses language not found in the Lombard or the gloss but adheres faithfully to their sense, condemning all lies however graded as inadmissible, although he places his diagram schematizing the point at the beginning of Book I on fol. 1ra (plate 15), rather than in Book III, where the Lombard and the gloss treat the topic. In his diagram on fol. 132ra (plate 16), a later user of the Brussels manuscript amplifies on the theme of the legitimate, but subsacramental, grounds for marriage found in the Lombard and the gloss,18 adding his own references to sources and examples, such as the vexed relationship between Jacob and Laban. The shrinking of the scope accorded to the gloss in these last-mentioned cases notwithstanding, their citations of it reflect the retention of Lombardian positions, and doctrinal developments compatible with them. I would like, finally, to show another trait of the Brussels manuscript, placing it squarely in its thirteenth-century academic context. Its first two pages, planned for by the manuscript’s designer, contain a detailed alphabetical index. I show fol. 1v (plate 17) and a detail from the same page (plate 18). The locations of the topics indexed are given in both roman and arabic numerals, specifying the locations in the text where they may be found. Although the Brussels manuscript is a relatively elegant product, it is manifestly intended for pedagogical use and reference.19 This is a setting in which the gloss, even in reduced circumstances, continued to find readers during the thirteenth century. V That said, what do these gloss manuscripts tell us more generally about the study of scholastic theology in the century and more after the Lombard’s death? First, the paleographic evidence tells us that there

18

See Colish, Peter Lombard, 2: 511–14. For this type of finding tool, among others, in scholastic manuscripts, see Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, “Statim invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page,” in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 210–25, reprinted in idem and eadem, Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts (Notre Dame, 1991), 191–219; idem and eadem, “The Development of Research Tools in the Thirteenth Century,” in Authentic Witnesses, 226–36. 19

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is no automatic correlation between the date of the hand of a scribe and the date of the version of the gloss that he redacted. More than once, a quite early version of the text was copied in a much later hand, the text deemed still pertinent generations after it was composed. Second, the paleographic evidence also tells us that the hands in which the gloss text were written are northern French book hands, of the sort found between the late twelfth and the mid-thirteenth centuries. Wherever their wandering may have taken them, these manuscripts were produced exactly where one would expect, Paris and environs, and indicate that the pecia system had developed there as early as the third quarter of the twelfth century. As their marginalia show, they were used by scholastics who wanted a clear, accurate, straightforward, general, and jargon-free introduction to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. This perceived need continued to be met by the gloss until its selective conversion into quaestiones and marginalia in Sentences manuscripts in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. There are some exceptions to this rule. We have already met the Ripoll monks who annotated the Barcelona manuscript. There is also an even less predictable exception, of which I cannot provide a legible illustration. Unlike the Ripoll manuscript, this gloss manuscript was both copied and annotated in a monastic scriptorium, that of Mont St. Michel, in thirteenth-century hands. It is now MS. Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale, 36. This manuscript contains the 1160–70 version of Books I and II and selected parts of Books III and IV in a later version. The annotations are scanty and mainly address the sacraments, citing biblical texts and liturgical references of interest to monks, whether pertinent or not to the Lombard and the gloss. While Ripoll and Mont St. Michel were not monastic communities that began to send their members to universities in the thirteenth century, these two manuscripts remind us that contemporary monks and scholastics did not live in hermetically sealed containers. Still, these two manuscripts are exceptions that prove the rule. As to the conclusions which the rule yields, scholastic theologians saw no discrepancy in teaching and studying the largely conservative Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss side by side with more up-to-date texts. Nor did they hesitate to study the gloss, and the Lombard, in conversation with authorities with whom these authors disagreed. Rather than discontinuing the use of the gloss when they found it wanting, they preferred to retain and to supplement it, whether this led to the amplification of Lombardian doctrine or the taking of a different tack.

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While the three complete, and earliest, manuscript texts of the gloss naturally draw attention, there is much to be learned from the incomplete texts, as from texts to which distinction numbers and marginalia have been added. Rosamond McKitterick’s analysis of the partial texts of Carolingian annals found in manuscripts stemming from various parts of the Frankish empire offers a useful model here.20 The partial gloss manuscripts copied and the addenda and finding tools inserted for the use of its readers are likewise instructive. They tell us what scribes, teachers, and students found valuable, interesting, or problematic in the gloss and in the wider Lombardian inheritance. The parts of the gloss tradition that are most thoroughly represented are Books I and IV. The continuing interest in Book I, dealing with the divine nature, is both surprising and unsurprising. Unsurprising, since Lombardians in the second half of the twelfth century were among those at the head of the line, eager to draw on the later logic of Aristotle, and on para-Aristotelian developments in logic and semantics, as a source for up-to-date technical tools to be applied to the problem of theological language. Yet surprising, since the gloss shies away from such matters, being less interested in the problem of theological language than the Lombard himself is. As for the interest in Book IV, this is wholly understandable. Discussion of the sacraments remained a high priority in the period marked by the shelf-life of the gloss. Some controversies in which the Lombard had engaged, such as the support of the consent principle in marriage formation, had won the day; but his parallel defense of contrition, not confession, as the point when a penitent’s status was changed in God’s eyes, remained at issue, and a new consensus on penance did not emerge until the mid-thirteenth century.21 Although some of the Eucharistic questions discussed in the Lombard’s day lost their appeal, orthodox theologians reinforced his view that Aristotelian language should be used to conceptualize the doctrine of the real presence; the transubstantiation formula of Lateran IV, to which they subscribed, continued to spark their disagreements concerning its precise philosophical meaning.22 20 See Rosamond McKitterick, History and Memory in the Carolingian World (Cambridge, 2004); eadem, Perceptions of the Past in the Early Middle Ages (Notre Dame, 2006), 63–89. 21 On this topic see Colish, Peter Lombard, 2: 583, 588–609. 22 See Gary Macy, “Reception of the Eucharist according to the Theologians: A Case of Diversity in the 13th and 14th Centuries,” in Theology and the University, ed. John Apczynski (Lanham, Md., 1990), 15–36; idem, “The Dogma of Transubstantiation

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By comparison, the relative lack of interest in Books II and III of the Lombard’s Sentences, as witnessed in the gloss texts, is remarkable, given the period’s devotion to the human Christ, its interest in ethics, and the Lombard’s controversial equation of the Holy Spirit with the virtue of charity.23 The gloss ignores the debate provoked by the erroneous attribution of Christological nihilianism to the Lombard; in any case different ways of formulating the topic appealed in the early thirteenth century.24 On the other hand, the lack of gloss users’ interest in the Lombard’s Book II, on creation, the Fall, and the consequences and transmission of original sin, is not at all surprising. On many issues the Lombard’s positions were, or became, consensus positions, stimulating little discussion. After a lull in the second half of the twelfth century, the intense interest in the metaphysical constitution of angels in the succeeding period25 found little resonance in the gloss. The Lombard himself has a sketchy interest in creation as such; nor does the gloss seek to stimulate readers intrigued by natural philosophy. In this connection, it is worth recalling that only one of the gloss manuscripts to which distinction numbers were added applied them to Book II. in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 45 (1994): 11–41; reprinted in idem, Treasures from the Storeroom: Medieval Religion and the Eucharist (Collegeville, Minn., 1999), 36–58, 81–119; Alain de Libera and Irène Rosier-Catach, “Les enjeux logico-linguistiques de l’analyse de la formule de la consécration eucharistique au moyen âge,” Cahiers de l’Institit du moyen-âge grec et latin 67 (1997): 33–77; idem and eadem, “L’analyse scotiste de la formule de la consécration eucharistique,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century), ed. Costantino Marmo (Turnhout, 1997), 171–201; Paul J. J. M. Bakker, “Hoc est corpus meum. L’analyse de la formule de consécration chez les théologiens du XIVe et XVe siècles,” ibid., 527–51; Giorgio Pini, “Substance, Accident, and Inherence: Scotus and the Paris Debate on the Metaphysics of the Eucharist,” in Duns Scot à Paris, ed. Olivier Boulnois et al. (Turnhout, 2004), 273–311. 23 See Edward A. Synan, “Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1974), 2: 219–42, at 227–30; Philip W. Rosemann, “Fraterna dilectio est Deus: Peter Lombard’s Thesis on Charity as the Holy Spirit,” in Amor amicitiae: On the Love That Is Friendship. Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy, ed. Thomas A. F. Kelly and Philipp W. Rosemann (Louvain, 2004), 409–36; idem, “New Interest in Peter Lombard: The Current State of Research and Some Desiderata for the Future,” RTPM 72 (2005): 135–52, at 142–3. 24 See Marcia L. Colish, “Christological Nihilianism in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century,” RTAM 63 (1996): 146–55, reprinted in eadem, Studies in Scholasticism (see note 5 above), no. XV; Walter H. Principe, Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, 4 vols. (Toronto, 1963–75). 25 See Marcia L. Colish, “Early Scholastic Angelology,” RTAM 62 (1995): 81–109, reprinted in eadem, Studies in Scholasticism, no. XIV.

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Altogether, the message conveyed by the gloss and its later fortunes is that there remained a market for an older, less adventurous, and more conservative approach to scholastic theology well into the thirteenth century and beyond, even as this subject underwent major changes both generic and methodological, and even as new philosophical and scientific materials enriched the curriculum. Given the ferment in the schools in the period spanned by the textual history of the gloss, its perceived viability as an introduction to systematic theology confronts us with a fact that we as historians tend not to acknowledge, except for those studying the elementary and intermediate theological education of the mendicants.26 We typically focus on the new, in the effort to track and account for development and change. We are aware that theology, in the high Middle Ages, was a key discipline, drawing vast financial support and social capital and the best minds and boldest of risk-takers. But the attention accorded the gloss should nuance this picture. With the gloss in view, early scholastic theology emerges as an enterprise welcoming to thinkers who did not seek to push back the frontiers of their subject. For them, the lure of the new did not displace the appeal of the familiar. The reception of Peter Lombard thus needs to be expanded to acknowledge the theologians who cut their intellectual teeth on the gloss, and not just those who rushed to occupy the cutting edge of their discipline. And, as this paper suggests, we still have much to learn about the theology of theologians who found a comfortable berth in the study and perpetuation of the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss.

26

See Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent, 134–41, 215, 553; Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (ca. 1210–1517) (Leiden, 2000), 7, 9–11, 43, 65–97, 114–15, 123, 127–34. As both authors note, many Dominican and Franciscan friars, even those among the small minority who attained terminal degrees in theology at their orders’ highest studia, returned to teach at lower levels of their educational systems. They also note that friars often depended on the Sentences commentaries of illustrious members of their own orders, such as Aquinas and Bonaventure, as well as abbreviations of those works. For further discussion and bibliography on these and other mendicants as theology students, see William J. Courtenay, “Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic and Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century,” in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement (note 5 above), 325–50, at 346–9; idem, “The Course of Studies,” 81–92.

STEPHEN LANGTON Riccardo Quinto 1. Introduction Stephen Langton’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard can be considered the first of his theological works to have received a scholarly edition. If we leave aside a sermon on Thomas Becket edited in 1682 by Christian De Wulf, later included in Jacques-Paul Migne’s Patrologia latina,1 and a sermon on the interdict of 1208– 1213 published in 1930 by George Lacombe,2 the first initiative to place the theological texts of the famous archbishop of Canterbury at the disposal of scholars was the edition of the brief commentary on the Sentences published in 1952 by Artur Michael Landgraf.3 Despite this fact, the fifty years and more that separate us from the date of the edition have not seen the wealth of studies that we might perhaps have expected, so that this text, which is certainly the oldest commentary on the Sentences available in print,4 is still enigmatic in many respects

1 The Tractatus de translatione beati Thomae martyris, PL 190: 407–24, is now edited in Phyllis B. Roberts, Selected Sermons of Stephen Langton (Toronto, 1980), 65–94. 2 See George Lacombe, “An Unpublished Document on the Great Interdict 1207– 1213,” Catholic Historical Review 14 (1930): 408–20; the sermon was published again in Roberts, Selected Sermons, 15–34. The papal interdict on England was imposed by Innocent III in March 1208. 3 See Artur Michael Landgraf, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton (Münster, 1952). There is a reprint edition of the volume, published on the occasion of the editor’s centenary, with a foreword by Ludwig Hödl (Münster, 1995). 4 In the period which extends from the death of Peter Lombard (1160) to the end of the twelfth century we find (a) a series of abbreviations of the Sentences, on which see Artur Michael Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, ed. Albert-M. Landry, trans. Louis-B. Geiger (Montreal/Paris, 1973), 51–2; (b) the glosses by Peter Comestor (see Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 203 and n. 21 at 248–9) and Master Udo (see Landgraf, Introduction à la l’histoire, 136; Rosemann, Peter Lombard, n. 22 at 249), as well as (c) an anonymous gloss, partially dependent on the work of the Comestor, which enjoyed a certain success and is known as the Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss (it is preserved, as well as in several other witnesses, in the single manuscript which contains Langton’s commentary); cf. Landgraf, Introduction à la l’histoire, 136–9; Ludwig Hödl, “Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus in der Diskussion seiner Schule,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 25–40; Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 41–51; and the article by Marcia Colish in this volume.

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today. This situation is due in no way to chance: any edition and study of Langton’s Sentences commentary comes up against a series of difficulties which have put to the test even the competence of such an excellent historian of early scholasticism as Artur Landgraf (1895–1958). The difficulties are linked to the characteristics of the transmission of the text, preserved in a single manuscript, and to the nature of the work: as we will see, the “commentary” that has come down to us is in reality only the copy of a series of notes or preparatory jottings, probably used by Langton for his lectures on the Lombard’s text. Furthermore, it has come down to us without the name of its author; thus, the attribution to Langton was put forward by Landgraf above all on the basis of criteria internal to the text, that is to say, on the basis of comparisons with other theological works by the same author. Since these were in turn also for the most part unedited and are characterized by a particularly complex manuscript tradition, the results obtained by this method were not as certain as all the critics would have desired.5 The attribution itself, however, can be taken as sure, having been confirmed by recent research. The reconstruction of the text can be considered equally satisfactory, even though later studies, above all through closer comparison with other theological works such as the Quaestiones theologiae and the Summa magistri Stephani, allow us to propose several emendations.6 As far as the date of this work is concerned, finally, the editor expressed himself vaguely and was forced to leave a very wide chronological span; later studies, though criticizing Landgraf ’s lack of precision, have not been able to put forward satisfactory alternatives.7 Indeed, even the attempt at dating that will be undertaken later in this study, although based on elements which have emerged thanks to more recent studies, is of a conjectural nature. As we will see, the problems of dating are by no means of secondary importance in placing this text within the history of the reception of the Sentences and in identifying, as far as possible, its specific character. In order to tackle these problems, it will be necessary to go briefly over the facts regarding Stephen Langton’s scholarly and ecclesiastical career.

5 I am thinking in particular of Eligius M. Buytaert’s review of Landgraf ’s edition in Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 216–17: “ . . . it is hard to see how Landgraf ’s arguments in favor of the authenticity surpass the stage of great probability” (217). 6 See a list of proposed emendations in the appendix to this paper. 7 The dating to between 1203 and 1215, proposed by Buytaert in the review cited in note 5, does not in turn stand up to careful scrutiny.

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2. Stephen Langton’s Career8 Stephen Langton was born into a Lincolnshire family of the lesser nobility between 1150 and 1155.9 He arrived in Paris probably before 1170, and around 1180 he became a master of theology there. He taught in Paris up until the moment, between February and June 1206, at which he was called to Rome by Innocent III: according to the testimony of Walter of Coventry, Stephen taught theology there endowed with a prebend;10 soon the pope appointed him cardinal priest of St. Chrysogonus. In December 1206 he proposed Stephen as a candidate to the representatives of the monks of Canterbury, who had come to Rome to elect the successor to Archbishop Hubert Walter (d. July 1205). Langton was elected and was consecrated in Viterbo on June 17, 1207, but King John refused to recognize the election, moreover preventing the new archbishop from coming to England. The pope retaliated by placing an interdict over England (March 1208) and excommunicating the king personally (January 1209). At this point, Langton resided at the Abbey of Pontigny, in the diocese

8 We can indicate at least three major summaries of the life and works of our author. First of all, there is the volume by Frederick M. Powicke, Stephen Langton (Oxford, 1928). The main contribution made by this work is that it indicated the interest of Langton’s vast literary oeuvre for understanding his actions at crucial moments of British history (this line of investigation has been followed, for example, by David L. d’Avray, “Magna carta: its Background in Stephen Langton’s Academic Biblical Exegesis and its Episcopal Reception,” Studi Medievali, 3a serie, 38 [1997]: 423–38). Next to note are two works which collect all the bibliography prior to their publication: Phyllis Barzillay Roberts, Stephanus de Lingua-Tonante: Studies in the Sermons of Stephen Langton (Toronto, 1968); Riccardo Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus. Stefano Langton († 1228) e la tradizione delle sue opere (Münster, 1994). Successive studies up until 2007 have been recorded in Riccardo Quinto, “Stefano Langton e la teologia dei maestri secolari di Parigi tra XII e XIII secolo,” Archa Verbi: Yearbook for the Study of Medieval Theology 5 (2008), 122–42. An international conference on Étienne Langton prédicateur, bibliste et théologien was held in Paris, September, 13–15, 2006; its proceedings will be edited by Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, Nicole Bériou, and Riccardo Quinto and published by Brepols (Turnhout). 9 We will see below whether it is possible to be more precise concerning his date of birth: cf. note 24 below. 10 See Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria (ad annum 1206), ed. W. Stubb (London, 1872–1873), vol. II, 198: “Stephanus cardinalis presbyter ad titulum sancti Grisogoni, Anglicus natione, sed a domino papa ad ecclesiam Romanam, ubi praebendatus erat et theologiam docebat, accitus, Romae ad Cantuariensem archiepiscopatum eligitur.” James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work, 2nd ed. (New York, 1983), 155–6, thinks this means that Stephen was teaching at the cathedral school of San Giovanni in Laterano, to be distinguished from the studium romanae curiae, which was established in 1245 by Innocent IV. Cf. Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 18–19.

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of Auxerre (where Thomas Becket had spent his exile).11 In 1213 the king gave in and allowed the archbishop’s entry (June/July 1213). The situation in England was explosive: the lesser nobility was in revolt and, with the support of Langton, obtained from the king the concession of a document which established the reciprocal rights of the crown and its vassals (the famous Magna Charta libertatum, June 1215). However, the king subsequently appealed to the pope, who annulled the charter and suspended Langton from his functions as archbishop. Stephen left England for Rome and took part in the Fourth Lateran Council. His rehabilitation took place only after the death of Innocent III (July 16, 1216), thanks to Honorius III. The archbishop returned to Canterbury in May 1218. He was in Rome again in 1221; in the following year, we find him at Oxford, where he celebrated the first provincial council after Lateran IV. He died in Slindon (Sussex) on July 9, 1228. As we see, Stephen’s life can be divided quite neatly into two parts: the first includes his period of teaching in Paris, while the second begins around the middle of 1206 with his journey to Rome, his elevation to the cardinalate, and his election as archbishop. The period of his episcopacy can be divided further into the period of exile chiefly spent at Pontigny (1207–1213) and the period which begins in 1213 with his arrival in the British Isles. If Stephen’s activities during the years of his episcopacy can be reconstructed fairly clearly thanks to the numerous documents that were issued by the archiepiscopal chancellery12 and a certain number of mentions in chronicles, our knowledge of Stephen’s life before 1207 is extremely scanty: we do not know with precision the date of his birth nor that of his arrival in Paris or of his mastership,13 and there are serious difficulties involved in the dating

11 There is no certainty regarding the reason that may have led Langton to stay at the Cistercian monastery. A careful examination of the documents available and hypotheses as attractive as they are reasonable can be found in the recent study by Valeria De Fraja, “La ricezione cistercense delle opere di Stefano Langton,” in Étienne Langton, ed. Bataillon et al. (see note 8 above). 12 See Acta Stephani Langton Cantuariensis archiepiscopi, ed. Cathleen Major (Oxford, 1950). At the conference mentioned above (note 8) Prof. Nicolas Vincent presented 44 newly discovered charters to be added to the 143 documents published by Major. 13 Phyllis Roberts’s dating of Langton’s inaugural lecture to 1180 (Stephanus de Lingua-Tonante, 224, and Selected Sermons, 15) ultimately rests on Powicke’s conjectures (see Stephanus de Lingua-Tonante, 1, n. 6). On this lecture, one can now consult Nancy Spatz, Principia: A Study and Edition of Inception Speeches Delivered before the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris, ca. 1180–1286 (Ph.D. thesis,

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of most of his works. Fortunately, some certain dates seem to have emerged from recent research. 3. Dating Langton’s Theological Works 3.1. It has long been known that Stephen Langton’s commentary on Peter Comestor’s Historia scholastica has been preserved in two different versions, which Friedrich Stegmüller distinguished as the expositio litteralis14 and the expositio moralis.15 Mark J. Clark has noted, however, that it makes no sense to talk of a “moral exposition” in connection with a work which explicitly presents itself as a handbook concerning the historical sense of Scripture, and that the two texts are to be distinguished simply as a first and a second version of the same commentary.16 Moreover, the first version is a reportatio, while the second is a redaction written by the Master himself, who used the text of the reportatio to produce a revised version with an added prologue.17 George Lacombe had already established that Langton was at work on this second version in 1193.18 Clark adds that it is even possible to establish a terminus ante quem for the first version: this version in fact opens by observing that Peter Comestor dedicated his work ad Dominum Senonensem,19 that is to say, to William of Champagne (or William aux Blanches Mains), archbishop of Sens.20 The second version Cornell University, 1992), 93–5. On the theological relevance of biblical principia an interesting new paper is Thomas Prügl, “Medieval Biblical Principia as Reflections on the Nature of Theology,” in What is Theology in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (12th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in Their Self-Understanding, ed. Michał Olszewski, Archa Verbi, Subsidia 1 (Münster, 2007), 265–87. 14 See Friedrich Stegmüller, Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi, vol. V (Madrid, 1955), nos. 7710–30, pp. 235–9. 15 See ibid., nos. 7731–43, pp. 239–41. 16 See Mark J. Clark, “The Commentaries on Peter Comestor’s Historia scholastica of Stephen Langton, Pseudo-Langton, and Hugh of St.-Cher,” Sacris erudiri 46 (2005): 301–446, esp. 321. In addition to the manuscript witnesses listed and described by Clark on pp. 387–96, parts of both commentaries exist in MS. Melbourne, Victoria State Library, 206 (see Quinto, “Stefano Langton e la teologia dei maestri secolari,” 130 n. 43). 17 See Clark, “The Commentaries,” 319–24. The prologue to the second version is published on pp. 4151–41628. 18 See George Lacombe, “Studies on the Commentaries of Cardinal Stephen Langton. Part I,” Achives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 5 (1930): 5–151, esp. 21–3; Clark, “The Commentaries,” 314–15. 19 See Clark, “The Commentaries,” 411. 20 See Pius Bonifatius Gams, Series episcoporum ecclesiae catholicae (Regensburg, 1873–1886), 608, 629; Michel Bur, “Guillaume aux Blanches Mains,” in Dictionnaire d’histoire et géographie ecclésiastiques XXII (1988), 857–9.

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takes up this text, but specifies—in 1193—that the dedicatory letter of the Historia scholastica is addressed achiepiscopo Remensi quondam Senonensi.21 Therefore, since William of Champagne moved from the metropolitan see of Sens to that of Rheims in 1176, the first version of Langton’s commentary must have been written, or at least begun, before (or in) 1176. This gives us a first objective point of reference to date at least one of Stephen’s oldest works, probably the first he wrote.22 We can therefore state that Langton “read” the Historia scolastica in the first half of the 1170s, in 1176 at the latest. As for the terminus post quem, this depends on the point at which we consider the Comestor’s work to have been completed. This in turn is difficult to determine with certainty, but the date can prudently be placed toward the end of the 1160s.23 Langton’s commentary on the Historia scholastica can therefore be dated to the years between 1170 and 1176.24 3.2. A second argument in our attempt to date the Sentences commentary requires us both to distinguish Stephen’s theological works, and to establish a relative chronology among them. We must distinguish (a) the Quaestiones theologiae (disseminated in different collections), (b) a Summa Magistri Stephani,25 and (c) the Sentences commentary itself. (a) Regarding the Quaestiones theologiae, I undertook a first attempt to date them in 1994.26 I have recently gone back and perfected this hypothesis.27 It is based on a study of the complex manuscript tradition of this work, which can be considered to be made up of at least three elements:

21

Clark, “The Commentaries,” 41629–30. Lacombe, “Studies in the Commentaries,” 19, notes: “it is usually assumed that this charge [scil. commenting on the Historia] was the first step towards the mastership of theology.” 23 See Clark, “The Commentaries,” 302–03, n. 3. 24 This allows us to return to the problem of Langton’s date of birth. Depending on whether we see him at work on the Comestor’s Historia closer to 1170 or to 1176, we can place his date of birth sooner or later, in the period which extends from 1150 to 1155. 25 Although not entirely edited, this work has been published in its essential parts; see Sten Ebbesen and Lars Boje Mortensen, “A Partial Edition of Stephen Langton’s Summa and Quaestiones with Parallels from Andrew Sunesen’s Hexaemeron,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 49 (1985): 25–244. 26 See Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 132–6. 27 See Quinto, “La constitution du texte des Quaestiones theologiae d’Étienne Langton,” in Étienne Langton, ed. Bataillon et al., forthcoming. 22

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• two collections of questions, different from one another in the number and the order of the questions contained therein, each represented by more than one manuscript, and constituting therefore two textual “families” depending on two different archetypes (β, α);28 • two further collections, differing in the number and order of questions contained in them, each preserved in a single manuscript (Chartres, Bibliothèque municipale, 43029 and Cambridge, St. John’s College Library, C 7 [57] = MS. C); • several quaestiones and reportationes preserved in short collections, which sometimes reflect, in an isolated way, a state of the text prior to the oldest of the two archetypes that we distinguished above, that is to say, prior to the writing of archetype β. Now, it is possible to establish an absolute chronological reference point only for the first two collections: in fact, for reasons set out in detail in other studies which it would be too tedious to summarize here, the two archetypes from which the two families of witnesses to the Quaestiones derive must be placed one (namely, β) before and the other (namely, α) after Stephen’s consecration as archbishop, that is to say, one before and one after June 17, 1207.30 (b) The Summa Magistri Stephani can be considered to have been composed in the period which lies between the oldest and the most recent archetype of the Quaestiones theologiae.31 So far, therefore, we can establish the following relative chronology: creation of the first archetype of the Quaestiones theologiae (β); redaction (or at least the beginning of the redaction) of the Summa Magistri Stephani; creation of the second archetype of the Quaestiones theologiae (α); copying of 28 To be consistent with the conventions used in previous publications, I call the oldest archetype β, and the more recent archetype α. 29 See Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 109–11. This manuscript was destroyed during World War II; copies made before the war, however, allow us to study the text. 30 See ibid., 135–6. 31 This can be mantained for the following reasons: a section of the Summa is transmitted—although not as a separate work—in the manuscripts that derive from the most recent archetype, α. With its own title, however, and clearly distinguished from other items, the Summa is found only in MS. C, fols. 147r–170v, which was certainly copied after the the second archetype (α) was made (see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 99–101). Moreover, the Summa contains some references to the text of the Quaestiones, and in particular to the Quaestiones as they are found in the manuscripts of family β (see Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 124, 129; Magdalena Bieniak, “A Critical Edition of Stephen Langton’s († 1228) Theological Question De persona,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 77 [2006]: 85–109, esp. 86).

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MS. C. Archetype β must be dated before Stephen’s archiepiscopal consecration, archetype α thereafter; the Summa Magistri Stephani is to be placed between the two, but—at this point in our reasoning—we have no elements for dating it in relation to the consecration of 1207. 3.3. A further element of chronology has been suggested by Sten Ebbesen and Lars Boje Mortensen in the introduction to their partial edition of the Summa Magistri Stephani.32 They note that the text of Hexaemeron, a theological poem by Anders Sunesen (archbishop of Lund, 1202–24; d. 1228), presupposes that its author knew at least some of the parts of the Summa Magistri Stephani and some of the Quaestiones theologiae in written form. The two Danish scholars furthermore assume that Anders Sunesen’s Hexaemeron must be dated to the period between 1190 and 1195, which leads them to advance the hypothesis that a redaction of the Summa (and, on the basis of our reasoning, also a first archetype of the Quaestiones theologiae) must have existed around this date, that is, before 1195. Unfortunately, this argument comes up against some difficulties. First of all, as I have discussed more in detail in another paper33—and as Ebbesen himself recognizes in his introduction to the edition of the Hexaemeron34—the dating of the Hexaemeron itself is far from sure; some clues seem to point to the possibility that the theological poem was composed during Anders Sunesen’s service as archbishop of Lund, that is, between 1202 and 1224. Moreover, in the Quaestiones there is also an element which allows us to set a terminus a quo for archetype β. In fact, within the quaestio CAMB034 (de originali peccato)35 we find four biblical quotations immediately following each other, all of them introduced with a reference to the biblical book and chapter. These references reflect the modern chapter division of the Bible.36 This circumstance was already noted by Maurice Powicke, but he tended to see the use of the modern chapter numeration limited to the “more

32 See Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 31; also see Sten Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity according to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen,” in Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la “logica modernorum,” ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples, 1987), 401–36, at 404. 33 See Quinto, “La constitution du texte des Quaestiones theologiae,” forthcoming. 34 See Anders Sunesen, Hexaëmeron, ed. Sten Ebbesen and Lars Boje Mortensen, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1985), in particular vol. 1, 42: “The only certain terminus ante quem is 1228, the year Andrew died.” 35 See Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 190. 36 These quotations are: Romans, chap. 9 [vv. 20–3]; Isaiah, chap. 45 [v. 9]; Numbers, chap. 23 [v. 19]; and First Book of Kings (= First Book of Samuel), chap. 15 [v. 29].

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mature and deliberate collection of questions” that he considered to be represented by the first section of MS. C. 37 On the contrary, I was able to verify that the same version of the quaestio CAMB034 is found also in the manuscripts of family “b,” depending on archetype β.38 When did the new chapter division of the Bible come into use? What we know is that a witness of Langton’s commentary on the twelve Minor Prophets—MS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 1046—is dated by the scribe to the year 1203.39 Now this commentary, from the beginning to Sophonia, chapter 2, is organized according to the modern chapters, the beginning of each of which is marked by the principal scribe. On the basis of the colophon of the Troyes manuscript and of a reference it contains to the pastoral activity of Folques of Neuilly,40 the commentary can be dated to the time between 1196 and 1201. Moreover, in commenting on the beginning of Haggai, chapter 2, Stephen shows that he is aware of the transition between chapters 1 and 2, as well as of the fact that the subdivision of the two chapters is not wholly satisfactory.41 All this suggests that the new capitulation of the Bible, for the Minor 37

Powicke, Stephen Langton, 69 with n. 1. The passage containing the four biblical quotations, always bearing the correct chapter numbers, is found in MS. C, fol. 175va–vb; MS. Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale, 230, fol. 225ra; MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16385, fol. 19rb–va; and MS. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4297, fol. 15va. Biblical quotations according to the modern chapter numeration in the Vatican MS. of the Quaestiones (fol. 51) have been pointed out also by Artur Michael Landgraf, “Die Schriftzitate in der Scholastik um die Wende des 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert,” Biblica 18 (1937): 74–94, at 85. 39 See MS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 1046, fol. 180v: “Explicit moralitas super XII prophetas amen. Anno gracie M°.CC°.III°.” I owe this information to Louis-Jacques Bataillon’s article, “Les douze prophètes enseignés et prêchés par Étienne Langton,” to be published in Étienne Langton, ed. Bataillon et al., forthcoming. 40 See Langton, In Aggaeum 2:20 (MS. Troyes 1046, fol. 141v): “Vel melius: semen est auditor per bonam cogitationem, vinea per saluberrimam compunctionem, ficvs per dulcedinis benignitatem, malogranatvm per diuersorum bonorum operum multiplicationem, lignvm olive per opera misericordie. Que omnia iacto fundamento spirituali in corde doctoris non statim apparent, sed tractu temporis habundant et apparent, sicut apparet in predicatione domini Fulconis qui per triennium clamauit antequam appareret fructus predicationis illius qui postmodum habundauit manifeste, unde apparet quod Dominus benedixit semini eius, uinee, ficui et malogranato et ligno oliue, antequam germen et flos appareret” (quoted from Bataillon, “Les douze prophètes,” n. 20). 41 Commenting on Haggai 2:1 Langton observes: “In die uicesima et quarta mensis in sexto mense in anno secundo Darii regis, sunt egressi et fecerunt opus Domini. Istud enim est finis precedentis capituli, licet uideatur principium sequentis esse” (MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 505, fol. 103vb). On Haggai 2:2, he also adds: “In septimo mense, uigesima et prima mensis. Incipit hic capitulum et est illud factum anno secundo Darii et ita in spirituali generatione” (ibid., fol. 104ra; quotations from Bataillon, “Les douze prophètes,” notes 43 and 44). 38

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Prophets at least, was already complete between 1196 and 1201, and that Langton should not be considered as the only author responsible for this undertaking (since in one case at least he does not agree with the way the chapters were subdivided!).42 For these reasons, we not only have a terminus ante quem for the time when archetype β was written— namely June 17, 1207, Langton’s archiepiscopal consecration—but we also have a terminus a quo, namely, the introduction of the new chapter division of the Bible, which allow us to date β after 1196, and probably to the very last years of the twelfth century. 43 3.4. By summarizing the information presented so far, we can now attempt to reconstruct the development of Langton’s activity as a teacher in the period up to 1206. We can hypothesize that Langton began to hold his lectures on the text of the Historia scholastica— without having yet become magister theologiae—before 1176. Between this date and around 1180 he must have obtained the title of magister and, from this moment onward, he must have started to preside over theological disputes, of which there could have existed, at the beginning of the 1190s, some type of written record; yet the first collection of which we know, consisting of around 170 quaestiones (those that are present in the manuscripts of family “b”),44 could not have been assembled until the end of the twelfth century, and definitely after 1196. It also makes sense to hold that Stephen, having gathered the results of his disputations in a first collection of Quaestiones, began working on a literary genre different from that of the quaestiones disputatae, that is to say, on a summa theologiae. As we will see, one of the aims of Stephen’s theological work was to reach a certain degree of axiomatization of theological discourse, that is to say, to identify a certain number of basic notions and to clarify the rules of reference of 42

These are the prudent conclusions of Bataillon, “Les douze prophètes.” The argument that I have presented here does not prove that Sunesen’s Hexaemeron cannot have been written as early as 1190–1195; it only states that, if Andrew knew Langton’s theology in witten form at that date, he cannot have used the most ancient Quaestiones collection of which we know, namely, that represented by archetype β. Since Andrew Sunesen was probably closely associated with Langton in Paris, he could have attended his lectures and the disputations over which he presided, he could have taken notes of his own or even used the master’s notes, so that his acquaintance with Langton’s teaching in the early 1190s does not imply that Stephen had already authorized the dissemination of his works. The need to distinguish between oral disputation, transcription of the same, and insertion of the written text into a collection for publication has rightly been stressed by Lars Boje Mortensen, “The Sources of Andrew Sunesen’s Hexaemeron,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 50 (1985): 113–216, esp. 168. See also Quinto, “Stefano Langton e la teologia dei maestri secolari,” 132 n. 67). 44 See Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 169–70. 43

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these terms when they are used in the field of theology. This work of conceptual and syntactic clarification must have led him to collect a set of rules guaranteeing the coherence of those statements that constitute the basis of faith, rather than to introduce specific conceptual tools to resolve problems raised by individual texts.45 This aim can be reached more effectively by a short, linear work such as a summa, rather than by a series of quaestiones theologiae, each of which should, in principle at least, contain all the premises necessary for its discussion. By comparing these observations with what we said above regarding the manuscript tradition of the Quaestiones and the Summa,46 it seems possible to state that Stephen started writing his Summa when he had already released a first collection of Quaestiones (= archetype β). The existence of archetype α, which dates from the period during which he was archbishop and contains questions that are new by comparison with those collected in the manuscripts depending on archetype β, as well as the existence of MS. C, which dates from about 1207–1214/1547 and transmits the Summa Magistri Stephani as a work in its own right, allow us to state that Stephen continued to work on this theological project at the beginning of the thirteenth century, at least until his consecration as archbishop in 1207. Nevertheless, a comparison with his theological production as a whole suggests that in the years of his “full maturity” Langton devoted himself to this project less exclusively, instead placing greater emphasis upon a biblical exegesis oriented toward preaching and upon the redaction of a series of tools aimed at supporting the pastoral work of the clergy.48 45

See Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 434. Let me state the principal points again: archetype β (written between the end of the twelfth century and 1207) does not contain any of the texts that were to go into the Summa; archetype α (after 1207) does contain them; the Summa refers to the Quaestiones and the text of family β allows us to find these references. 47 Alys L. Gregory, “The Cambridge Manuscript of the Questiones of Stephen Langton,” The New Scholasticism 4 (1930): 165–225, at 188–89 proposes a series of clues in order to date the manuscript before 1214. I had recently the possibility to study MS. C together with Mme Patricia Stirnemann of IRHT (Paris). The competent paleographer thinks that both handwriting and ornamentation of this manuscripts suggest that it was copied in Paris (or anyway North France) not later than 1215. Now, since the rubrics of this manuscript (fol. 171r and fol. 346v) give Langton the title of “Cantuariensis archiepiscopus”, it seems possible to conclude that the manuscripts was copied between 1207 and 1215. Such datation is fully compatible with Alys Gregory’s remark that the marginal note of C, fol. 314v (“in qua opinione est cantor londoniensis”) refers to Benedict of Sansetun, who held the office of Precentor of Saint Paul’s, London, 1203–1214, before becoming bishof of Rochester (“The Cambridge Manuscript”, 189). 48 See Quinto, “Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature of the Pastoral Care,” in In principio erat uerbum. Mélanges offerts en hommage à Paul Tombeur par des 46

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3.5. We have thus dated a first redaction of the Quaestiones and, probably, the beginning of the Summa Magistri Stephani to the late 1190s and the early years of the thirteenth century. Where can we place the Sentences commentary in relation to these works? There have been attempts to maintain that the commentary dates from a period even before the Quaestiones or, at least, before they were gathered into a first collection.49 Against this opinion, however, one can cite the numerous cases in which, in the course of his Sentences commentary, Stephen refers to other texts with the adverb extra; the editor has, in many instances, been able to trace these references to the text of the Quaestiones.50 We can exclude, therefore, that the Sentences commentary predates the Quaestiones51 and the Summa; on the contrary, it presupposes the

anciens étudiants à l’occasion de son émeritat, ed. Benoît-M. Tock (Turnhout, 2005), 301–55. A point of arrival of this “second phase” of Langton’s theological career can be considered to be the Fourth Lateran Council, in which the archbishop took part. The conciliar constitutions put particular emphasis on preaching and the sacrament of confession, two themes developed at great length in Stephen’s biblical commentaries; see, for instance, the chapters from the Leviticus commentaries published in Quinto, “La parabola del Levitico,” in La Bibbia del XIII secolo: storia del testo, storia dell’esegesi, Convegno della Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medieovo Latino (SISMEL), Firenze 1–2 giugno 2001, ed. Giuseppe Cremascoli and Francesco Santi (Florence, 2004), 169–249. 49 See Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 86: “The theological question [de persona— a question existing in archetype β and even preserved in an earlier redaction] was probably written when the Commentary was ready.” There was an attempt to prove this statement in Bieniak’s paper at the 2006 Langton conference (see note 8 above). In her oral presentation (though not in the text submitted for publication) Bieniak indicated a clue to the early date of the Sentences commentary: in his quaestio de persona Langton decidedly rejects the Lombard’s opinion that after the death of a man his soul can be considered a person (thus resembling an angel; see Sentences, Book III, dist. 5, chap. 3, no. 2; vol. 2, 48), something that he does not yet do in the commentary. On the contrary, if I understand his position correctly, Langton already rejects the Lombard’s opinion with the words, “Si ergo anima esset persona, non veniret in constitutionem alterius” (Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 109). And even if these words were not intended to reject the Lombard’s statement, this would only be an argument ex silentio, which can hardly support the claim of a doctrinal evolution as grounds for dating a work. 50 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, xvii–xxxiii. Particularly clear is the passage at Sentences III, 3, 3.1, with a reference to the exegesis of Heb. 7:9: “De hoc plenius extra super epistolam ad Hebreum et in questione extra” (ibid., xxi and 107). The reference is verified by Langton’s question De Leui decimato in Abraham, which exists in two redactions probably originating at an early date; see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 272, 286, and 298. It is interesting that the commentary on Hebrews also refers back to the Quaestiones. 51 The fact that in MS. C we find some additions to the question De persona which depend on the Sentences commentary, as pointed out by Bieniak (“A Critical Edition,” 89), is not an objection against the thesis that the question predates the commentary.

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existence of the Quaestiones, to which it frequently refers. Moreover, the commentary must have been written when another of Stephen’s important theological works already existed, namely, the Glossa in Magnam Glosaturam, that is to say, his commentary on the Letters of St. Paul (accompanied by the Lombard’s commentary) and the Catholic Epistles. In fact, this text also corresponds to some of the references found in the Sentences commentary. It appears, therefore, that in the years from around 1180 to the end of the century Langton, who had already commented on the Historia scholastica, worked essentially on the following principal activities: presiding over theological disputes (later gathered into a collection of Quaestiones), commenting on the Letters of the New Testament,52 and starting the redaction of his own Summa.53 The Quaestiones as a whole show the master’s great familiarity with the text of the Sentences. Although some of the Quaestiones discuss In these cases, C in fact updates the source from which it was copied, and this operation, as we have seen, takes place at a late stage in the redactional history of the Quaestiones theologiae. We do not know whether the interventions carried out while MS. C was copied should be attributed to Langton himself or (more probably) to somebody else (see Gregory, “The Cambridge Manuscript,” passim). 52 Lacombe’s argument for dating the Postille super Apostolum after 1200 is in my opinion quite weak: it rests on Langton’s mention of Peter of Corbeil as actually being archbishop of Sens, which he became in that year (see Lacombe, “Studies, Part I,” 61; the argument is taken up again by Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique, 169). If we admit that Langton “read” the Epistles in the Paris schools before 1200, and that his lectures were reported, we can also easily admit that the text was later revised by the master, who added a prologue and possibly updated some of the information, exactly as he did with the final redaction of his commentary on the Historia scholastica. Now, the relevant passage reads: “Unde, propter hoc, ut dicit Magister Petrus Corbolegensis (!), nunc archiepiscopus Senoniensis (!), dicunt quidam quod potentia peccandi non est potentia sed impotentia” (Lacombe, “Studies, Part I,” 61, from MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14443, fol. 295va). In order to distinguish between oral lecture and written text transmitted by the manuscripts, it is not even necessary to suppose that there circulated two versions of Langton’s Epistles commentary, a reportatio and a revised text, as in the case of the Historia; it is sufficient to assume that there existed a reportatio which Langton revised, marking changes, additions, and references to other works in the margins, and that this revised manuscript is at the origin of the manuscript tradition. The words “nunc archiepiscopus Senoniensis” may well have been such a gloss, subsequently incorporated into the text. On the other hand, the present dicit can well be, as Lacombe notes, an argument to maintain that the commentary on the Epistles was written, and even finished and revised, when Peter of Corbeil (d. 1222) was still alive. Moreover, if this arguments holds, it can also back the assertion that the commentary predates 1200, since it also refers in the present tense dicit to the teaching of Peter the Chanter (d. 1197), as Lacombe himself points out (“Studies, Part I,” 62). In any case, research on the Epistles commentary has made very little progress after Lacombe’s (and Smalley’s) work. 53 As we have seen, in the last years of the twelfth century Langton also wrote his commentary on the Minor Prophets. See notes 39–42 above.

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issues that find their origin directly in one or the other biblical text, or even deal with problems of concrete historical relevance,54 many of the disputes originate from problems discussed by the Lombard.55 Must we therefore assume that the redaction of the Sentences commentary occurred during the same period in which the Quaestiones were disputed? This conclusion is quite probable, and it can be further refined. The Sentences commentary itself contains an “external” clue as to its date, pointed out by the editor and taken up in a review by Eligius Buytaert:56 on at least one occasion a scriptural quotation is identified by the biblical book and chapter in a way that corresponds to the modern subdivision.57 Buytaert concludes from this fact that the work

54 Quaestiones CAMB106, De obedientia, and 208, De usu obedientie (see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 231 and 269), for instance, discuss such concrete problems as whether a priest must obey a bishop who orders to excommunicate someone the priest knows to be innocent, or whether a police officer must obey the king or a magistrate who wants to condemn someone to death unjustly. They even raise particulars issues concerning the possibility for the church to use public force directly in some specific cases. These quaestiones are edited in John Baldwin’s article, “Maître Étienne Langton, futur archevêque de Canterbury. Les écoles de Paris et la Magna Carta,” in Étienne Langton, ed. Bataillon et al., forthcoming. An English version of his Paper is J. W. Baldwin, “Master Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The Paris Schools and Magna Carta”, English Historical Review, 123 (2008): 811–46. 55 To give a few examples, the three long quaestiones devoted to the fear of God can be considered as a discussion of Book III, dist. 34, of the Sentences, since they exploit the auctoritates gathered by the Lombard in this part of his work; see Quinto, “Die Quaestiones des Stephan Langton über die Gottesfurcht,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin 62 (1992): 77–165. Other examples are question no. 207, De frui et uti, beginning “Magister in sententiis inter frui et uti ita distinguit . . . ” (see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 269), and several quaestiones dealing with Christology, which relate closely to parallel discussions by Peter Lombard (see Lauge Olaf Nielsen and Sten Ebbesen, “Texts Illustrating the Debate about Christology in the Wake of Alexander III’s 1177 Condemnation,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 66 (1996): 217–51; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, “Logic and the Hypostatic Union: Two Late Twelfth-Century Responses to the Papal Condemnation of 1177,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium “The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy,” January 10–13, 1996, ed. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 251–79). As Sten Ebbesen summarizes the situation, “Langton’s Quaestiones deal with all the main disputabilia that one would expect to be raised in cursuses based on Peter Lombard’s Sentences” (“A Partial Edition,” 27). The Summa Magistri Stephani can also be seen, in its first chapters at least, as a development of the problems discussed by Peter Lombard in Book I, dist. 22 (esp. chap. 1: “De nominum differentiis quibus utimur loquentes de Deo”); see Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 40, critical apparatus. 56 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, xviii; Buytaert, review (cited in note 5 above), 217. 57 The quotation is found in the commentary on the Book III, dist. 7, chap. 3: “‘Non tamen’ ‘dicitur homo dominicus,’ quia hoc nomen possessivum. Et terminus in secundo Regum capitulo VII° in glosa sic invenitur: dominum huius populi domi-

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dates from after 1203.58 As we have seen, the new chapter division of the Bible is already found in Langton’s commentary on the Minor Prophets, a work that can be dated between 1196 and 1201; thus the terminus a quo taken from the quotation of the second Book of Kings, chapter 7, can be moved back to the second half of the 1190s. This terminus holds both for the redaction of archetype β of the Quaestiones and for the Sentences commentary. Since the latter also postdates a first collection of the Quaestiones, we can conclude that Langton’s Sentences commentary must be dated to the period between the last years of the twelfth century (definitely after 1196) and 1206/1207. Thus, the Sentences commentary could reflect a course given by Langton in one of his final years of teaching in Paris or in the only year of his teaching in Rome, that is to say, in the academic year 1206/1207 (between June 1206 and June 1207). 4. Transmission and Structure of Langton’s Commentary As we have already noted, Langton’s Sentences commentary has come down to us in only one witness. This is MS. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII C 14, dating from the beginning of the thirteenth century. This manuscript contains (1) a copy of the PseudoPoitiers Gloss on the Sentences, (2) another gloss on the Sentences (which, according to Artur Landgraf, should be linked to Langton’s school),59 (3) Langton’s Sentences commentary, (4) another gloss on nicum hominem intelligimus; quem de Egipto, id est mundo; de utero uirginis, Dei filius“ (Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 115). The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss on II Kings 7:23. 58 See Buytaert, review of Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 217. 59 The rationale for this assumption is provided in an older article by Landgraf, “The First Sentence Commentary of Early Scholasticism,” The New Scholasticism 13 (1939): 101–32, esp. 127–31. Among Landgraf ’s arguments for linking this gloss to Langton’s circle is the use of the word facultas to indicate the different disciplines, each one with its peculiar linguistic conventions. One can question whether this feature points specifically in the direction of Langton’s school, since it can also be found among the so-called “Little Porretans”; for instance, we find it more than once in Everard of Ypres’s Dialogus Ratii et Everardi: “At memor esto in doctrina tua satyrici dicenti tractent fabrilia fabri theologica theologi propria facultatis illius de qua loqueris non ad aliam extendens facultatem . . . ” (Nikolaus M. Häring, “A Latin Dialogue on the Doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers,” Mediaeval Studies 15 [1953]: 245– 89, at 258; cf. p. 272). According to Antoine Dondaine, Écrits de la “petite école” porrétaine (Montreal/Paris, 1962), 19–20, this way of speaking “est commun aux porrétains de toutes nuances.” Also see Quinto, “Trivium e teologia. L’organizzazione scolastica nella seconda metà del secolo dodicesimo e i maestri della sacra pagina,” in Storia

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the Sentences, interrupted at the beginning of the third book, and (5) a copy of Langton’s “second commentary” on the Historia scholastica.60 Langton’s Sentences commentary is what Landgraf called a “catchword gloss” (Stichwortglosse), that is to say, a commentary, structured by lemmas, which does not quote the text of the Sentences in full. The scribal errors which are found in the manuscript (and which the editor has managed to recognize with notable skill) suggest that the model from which the text was copied was organized in the same way.61 The commentary, therefore, probably came into being in the form of marginal notes to a copy of the Sentences; the notes were later copied as a continuous text, with the addition of brief lemmas referring to the place in the Sentences to which Langton’s observations refer. The continuous text was then copied at least once, and the result of this operation is the text which has come down to us. We do not know if the text from which the present witness was copied contained a commentary on the whole text of the Sentences: the text preserved breaks off in chapter 6 of the second distinction of Book IV. Stephen’s commentary therefore covers the first three books and a brief section of the fourth.62 Hence, we do not have Stephen’s commentary on the Lombard’s treatment of the sacraments and Last Things. But the text as we have it allows us to exclude a lack of interest on Langton’s part in these subjects: his commentary on the first distinction, and what we have of the second, is particularly lengthy, discussing almost the entire “general” part of the doctrine of the sacraments (the definition of sacrament, the difference between the sacraments of the Old and the New Testaments—in particular between circumcision and baptism—and finally the difference between the baptism of John and the baptism of Christ). Furthermore, in his Quaestiones Langton developed a particularly rich sacramental theology,63 and also treated various problems relating to man’s eschatological destiny. della Teologia nel Medioevo, II: La grande fioritura, ed. Giulio D’Onofrio (Casale Monferrato, 1996), 435–68, esp. 453–4. 60 A detailed description is found in Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, xiii–xvii. Langton’s Sentences commentary is found on fols. 86r–99v. Since the manuscript also contains Langton’s commentary on the Historia scholastica (second version), we find a new description in Clark, “The Commentaries,” 393–4. 61 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, xvi–xvii. 62 The text breaks off in the middle of a quaestio, after announcing the subject and an objection; the solution is missing. 63 This part of Langton’s theology has attracted particular scholarly attention: see John F. Veal, The Sacramental Theology of Stephen Langton and the Influence upon

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The brief lemmas found in Landgraf ’s edition, which faithfully reflect the state of the single manuscript witness, link the master’s explanations, often developed in the form of a quaestio, to a particular chapter of Lombard’s Sentences. Any understanding of the commentary therefore presupposes that the reader refer to the text of the Sentences.64 Like some of his other works,65 Langton’s Sentences commentary is not preceded by a prologue to explain the nature and the aim of the

him of Peter the Chanter (Rome, 1955); Irène Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacré (Paris, 2004), passim. Sacraments and Last Things are discussed in some forty-five of Langton’s Quaestiones (see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 249–66). Beside his monograph, John Veal prepared an edition of 36 quaestiones on the sacraments, which were not published because of his sudden death on May 22, 1958. His typewritten edition is still preserved in the University of Notre Dame Archives; see Kent Emery, Jr., Cheryl M. Jones, Andrew I. Irving, and Victor Kotusenko, “Quaestiones, Sententiae and Summae from the Later Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries: The Joseph N. Garvin Papers,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 47 (2005): 11–68, at 51–5. 64 Langton’s Sentences commentary was written before Alexander of Hales divided the four books of the Sentences into distinctiones; see Ignatius Brady’s Prolegomena to Peter Lombard, Sentences, vol. 1, 143*–44*, Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 62–4. In order to facilitate the reader, Landgraf introduced the distinctiones and chapter numbers from the Sentences into his edition of Langton’s commentary. However, when he prepared his text, the most recent edition of the Sentences was the second edition prepared by the Franciscans of the Collegium S. Bonaventurae in Quaracchi: Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum, studio et cura Pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae in lucem editi (Quaracchi, 1916). This edition counts the paragraphs continuously within each book; these numbers do not match the ones used in Brady’s third edition, which counts the paragraphs within each chapter. The easiest way to locate the exact point in the text of the Sentences, therefore, is to use the medieval system of indicating the chapters and the paragraphs by means of their first words, bearing in mind however that Langton sometimes does not quote the initial words of a chapter or paragraph, but rather some other words in them, to indicate the exact passage his commentary refers to. 65 As we have seen, the first commentary on the Historia scholastica lacks a prologue, as do the different collections of the Quaestiones theologiae and the Summa Magistri Stephani. On the other hand, we find a prologue in the second commentary on the Historia scholastica, as well as in the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Magna Glosatura. The commentary on the twelve Minor Prophets also opens with a prologue. See Lacombe, “Studies, Part I,” 54; Stegmüller, Repertorium Biblicum, nos. 7842–43; 7855; 7862; 7907 (pp. 283–95). Other published prologues to Langton’s biblical commentaries are: Leviticus (Quinto, “La parabola del Levitico,” 239–40), Ecclesiastes (Gilbert Dahan, “Les prologues des commentaires bibliques [XIIe–XIVe siècles],” in Les prologues médiévales, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse [Turnhout, 2000], 427– 70, at 461– 3), Gloss on the four Major Prophets (Reiner Haussherr, “Petrus Cantor, Stephan Langton, Hugo von St. Cher und der Isaias-Prolog der Bible moralisée,” in Verbum et signum. Beiträge zur mediävistischen Bedeutungsforschung. Studien zu Semantik und Sinntradition im Mittelalter, ed. Hans Fromm, Wolfgang Harms, and Uwe Ruberg, vol. 2 [Munich, 1975], 347–64, at 360–2), Lamentations (Athanasius Sulavik, “Principia and introitus in Thirteenth Century Christian Biblical Exegesis with Related Texts,” in La Bibbia del XIII secolo, ed. Cremascoli/Santi [see note 48 above], 269–321, at 298–304).

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work. A brief prologue is however found at the beginning of the fourth book.66 It probably has the aim of placing this part of the Sentences within the general plan of the work; it stresses that it is precisely in the transition between the third and the fourth books that the principle which the Lombard had used to organize his great textbook (“Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum”)67 comes to fruition: the “things” (the Trinity, the creation, the history of salvation which culminates in the Incarnation, and the gifts and virtues that are its fruit) were dealt with in the first three books; the fourth on the other hand is devoted to “signs.”68 5. Langton’s Theological Method Langton’s Sentences commentary is an extremely selective commentary: the commentator does not examine all the distinctions of the Liber Sententiarum,69 and even less all the chapters. Rather, he takes the opportunity offered by the text of the Sentences to discuss a number of characteristic themes of his own theology, devoting his attention to some of the themes most debated in the theological discussions of the period. The literary genre of the commentary on the Sentences also offers an opportunity to grasp a fundamental characteristic of Langton’s theological method: his theology, in fact, although making ample use of the philosophical tools taken from the faculty of arts, is in no way a “philosophical theology.”70 Rather, it presents itself as a technique of clarifying and elaborating upon a complex of truths already given, expressed in the Bible and in the dogmatic propositions accepted by the tradition. The task of the theologian is to show

66

See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 146–7. Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 1, chap. 1, no. 1 (vol. 1, 55), from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, I, 2, 2. 68 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 146: “Ut ex hiis, que in principio huius libri dicta sunt, colligitur, omnis doctrina aut est ex rebus aut signis. De rebus in premissis agitur. De signis in hoc quarto.” 69 If we consider that, as already noted, Langton did not work on a text divided into distinctiones, the following observation could be considered misleading; it can however serve as an indication of the distribution of the commentary over the text. Leaving aside the fact that many distinctions are commented on with just a short note of a couple of lines, the following distinctions are completely omitted: in Book I, dist. 9–10 and 21; in Book II, dist. 17, 20, 22–3, 26–7, 37, 40, 43–4; in Book III, dist. 16. 70 For instance Langton’s Sentences commentary pays no attention to Peter Lombard’s “proofs of the existence of God” under the heading quomodo per creata possit cognosci Creator (Sentences I, 3, 1, 1–6; vol. 1, 68–70); cf. Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 73–7. 67

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that this traditional corpus of texts, although originating in different periods and linguistic contexts, transmits a coherent message; in other words, that they do not contain irresolvable contradictions.71 There is nothing particularly innovative in this approach: it is an aim already announced by Abelard in the prologue to Sic et Non,72 and which is found again, in the authors closest to Langton, in the prologues to Peter the Chanter’s De tropis loquendi and to William de Montibus’s Tropi.73 While Abelard, in order to resolve the apparent contradictions among the theological auctoritates, listed a long series of rules, based certainly on the “arts of language,” but also on other considerations (such as the need to establish the authenticity of the various texts and to verify the faithfulness of their wording with respect to the originals, as well as the possibility of recognizing various levels of authority), Langton aims at constructing “a formal system based on a limited number of essential elements: classes of terms, the distinction of the different semantic elements of these terms, postulates concerning the identity or the distinction between the entities signified by the terms.”74 In pursuing this aim of formalizing theological discourse Langton showed himself to be particularly innovative and audacious by comparison with the theologians of his generation, and in particular with those who considered themselves to be followers of the Lombard.75 This method seems to have been developed above all 71 See Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 29: “One should . . . think of Langton and his contemporaries as facing a vast mass of Scriptural and patristic propositions known to be true. The task, then, is to find a consistent interpretation such that any explanatory principle invoked in a particular case is generalizable. Although there is an awareness that the different auctoritates may have adhered to different linguistic conventions and that there may be some infelicitous expressions in the writings of the Fathers, the basic idea is that the whole corpus of authoritative dicta form one consistent set if properly interpreted.” Also see Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 434. An interesting illustration of Langton’s awareness of the diachronic changes in the use of language can be see in his distinction of how the term persona was used antiquitus and how it is used modo; see Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 104282–90. 72 See Peter Abailard, Sic et Non, ed. Bianca Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago, 1976–1977), 98–104; Lambertus M. de Rijk, La philosophie au moyen âge (Leiden, 1985), 96–98; Quinto, Scholastica. Storia di un concetto (Padua, 2001), 362–6. 73 For Peter the Chanter, see Franco Giusberti, Materials for a Study on Twelfth Century Scholasticism (Naples, 1982), 104; for William de Montibus, see Joseph Goering, William de Montibus (c. 1140–1213) (Toronto, 1992), 357; also see Quinto “Trivium e teologia,” 443–6. 74 Luisa Valente, “Logique et théologie trinitaire chez Étienne Langton,” in Étienne Langton, ed. Bataillon et al. This character of Langton’s theology was highlighted by Sten Ebbesen in his seminal 1985 paper “The Semantics of the Trinity.” 75 According to Luisa Valente, the most significant precedent of this attempt at formalizing theological discourse can be identified in the Summa Zwettlensis, a

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to guarantee the coherence of Trinitarian theology, but Langton also applies it to other arguments. The system of rules which governs the construction of theology aims at “justifying” theological statements (Trinitarian above all) and “deducing” other propositions from them, in such a way that from the propositions admitted, only propositions are deduced that are in conformity with what was considered orthodox by tradition; on the other hand, the exclusion of certain propositions could not lead to the exclusion of principles which were commonly accepted. Although this approach may be considered as the specific characteristic of Langton’s theology, this system of rules is not set out ex professo and with completeness in any of his works.76 Rather, it has been reconstructed by scholars who have tried to reduce to a coherent system the principles and rules that Langton announces in various places in his works while looking for the solution to particular problems. Given its character as a series of preparatory notes, probably not intended for publication, Langton’s Sentences commentary is not an easy text. Instead of providing an abstract of its contents, I will focus here on some topics of particular interest, and I will try to explain them with the help of other published texts, where the same subject matter is developed more fully. 6. The Contents of Langton’s Sentences Commentary 6.1. The Trinity An example of the way in which Stephen applies his method of theological investigation can be found at the beginning of the Sentences

Porretan treatise of theology which, according to its editor, was written before 1150; see Nikolaus M. Häring, Die Zwettler Summe (Münster, 1977). Also see Luisa Valente, “Talia sunt subiecta qualia praedicata permittunt. Le principe de l’approche contextuelle et sa genèse dans la théologie du XIIe s.,” in La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XIIe– XVe s.), ed. Joël Biard and Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain/Paris, 2003), 289–311, esp. 302. This part of my paper greatly depends on the works mentioned in this and the preceding footnote. 76 The system is not fully developed even in the most “systematic” of Langton’s works, that is, the Summa Magistri Stephani (see Ebbesen, “A Partial Edition,” 37–164). A further development of a consistent theological system based on Langton’s principles can be found in Anders Sunesen’s theological poem Hexaemeron, which deals with most theological topics—excluding the sacraments, on which the Danish theologian is credited to have written another poem, now lost. See Anders Sunesen, Hexaëmeron.

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commentary (Book I, dist. 1, chap. 2), when he examines the distinction between the things that can be enjoyed and the things to be used. Where the Lombard’s text has, “Res igitur quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus,”77 the commentary observes: Hoc nomen res ponitur hic ad supponendum pro personis, licet sit nomen essentiale. Eadem ratione dici posse videtur: duo dei sunt, qui procedunt a Patre, quia due persone; et tres dei sunt, quia IIIes persone et quilibet Deus est, et Deus et aliquis Deus non est Pater, quia Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus.78

This short quotation, which formulates a quaestio to which the following lines will provide a solutio, contains at least three terms that point to some of the typical tools of Langton’s theology, namely supponendum pro personis, nomen essentiale, and eadem ratione. Let us try to explain each in turn, which will give us an opportunity to set out Langton’s “system” of analyzing theological propositions. (a) One of the cornerstones of Langton’s Trinitarian theology consists of the distinction between nomina essentialia, notionalia, and personalia, as can be gathered from the same Sentences commentary, a few pages further on: Nota, quod terminorum alius essentialis, ut hoc nomen essentia; alius notionalis, ut paternitas, filiatio, spiratio; alius personalis, ut Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.79

The axiomatization of Trinitarian discourse is therefore based upon the recognition of nine basic entities, which are the following:80 • the single divine essence, indicated by the terms essentia, usia, substantia, natura, deitas, deus; • the three persons: Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus; • the five notiones (that is to say, the properties which distinguish the persons): paternitas (which is equivalent in some contexts to generatio), innascibilitas, spiratio, filiatio, and processio.

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Peter Lombard, Sentences I, 1, 2, no. 4 (vol. 1, 56). Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 3 (my punctuation in angle brackets). 79 Ibid., 7. This distinction is repeated more than once (cf. note 83 below); it enjoyed a certain fortune in posterity, since it entered William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea I, vii, 1 (ed. Jean Ribaillier [Paris/Grottaferrata, 1980–1987], vol. I, 113–14). See Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 408–09. 80 See Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 406. 78

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Of the five notions, three are in the Father (paternitas, innascibilitas, and spiratio), two in the Son ( filiatio and spiratio), and one in the Holy Spirit (processio).81 The three classes into which the nine entities are distributed constitute, in Trinitarian discourse, the equivalent of what, in ordinary language, are the ten Aristotelian categories: they cannot be reduced to one another, and they cannot be further unified; thus they could be called “theological quasi-categories.”82 There is a use of pronouns corresponding to the tripartition of substantives: quid to indicate the essence, quis the persons, quae the notions.83 (b) Besides the identification of the three quasi-categories and the elements that they contain, the full development of Langton’s strategy for overcoming the seeming contradictions among theological statements also requires a distinction of the semantic components of each term. The fundamental semantic functions of terms are significatio and suppositio. Significatio concerns substantives and adjectives, consisting of the ability of a term to convey an intellectual content associated with a certain signifier (vox). This same intellectual content is also called significatio: the significatio of iustitia, for example, is the ability to evoke, to call to mind, the fact of being just; at the same time, precisely this “being just” is the significatio of the term iustitia (if we ask, “what does iustitia signify?” the answer is, “it signifies the fact of being just”). The suppositio, on the other hand, is the function whereby a term in a proposition stands for something else. Significatio and suppositio, in one and the same term, can coincide or not. For an abstract term like iustitia they coincide: “being just” is what iustitia signifies, what the term calls to mind, and, at the same time, it is also what iustitia supposits,84 what the term stands for in the sentence. In the case of

81 See Langton, Quaestio CAMB003, ed. in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Parial Edition,” 208: “Quinque sunt notiones: tres in patre (paternitas, innascibilitas, spiratio), duae in filio (filiatio et spiratio), una in spiritu sanctu (processio).” 82 Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 405–06. 83 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44: “Sunt tres modi terminorum, scilicet persona, notio, essentia. Et termini personales personas supponunt et significant quis, notionales que, essentiales quid.” Also see Stephen Langton, Quaestio 219, ed. in Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 99139–141: “Sunt enim in hac facultate tres modi supponendi, scilicet essentialiter, ut ‘esse quid’ est ‘esse essentiam’; personaliter, ut ‘esse quem’ est ‘esse personam’, et notionaliter, ut ‘esse quam’ est ‘esse notionem.’ ” 84 Supponere is not easy to translate into English. Sten Ebbesen rendered it as “to suppone” in his article, “The Semantics of the Trinity according to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen” (in Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains, cited in note 32

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iustus, on the other hand, the significatio is again the fact of being just (as for iustitia), but the suppositio is different, because the term stands for a person, that is to say, for him who is just. Now, this distinction turns out differently depending on whether it is applied to natural language or to theological language. For a man, “being just” means possessing a certain form, since a man can be called just because he possesses justice, a characteristic (or form) different from the form by which that same man is a man. God, on the other hand, is absolutely simple, so that no predication by inherence is possible in Him: that by which He is just is His very essence. If, therefore, in the statement “Petrus est iustus” iustus signifies the justice of Peter (due to which he is just) and supposits Peter (him who is just), in the statement “Deus est iustus,” on the other hand, what iustus supposits is God, but what the term signifies is the divine essence, because God’s justice, by which God is just, is God Himself. Consequently, in two statements like “Deus est iustus” and “Deus est iustitia,” iustus and iustitia end up having not only the same significatio, but also the same suppositio, so that both are equivalent to “Deus est Deus.” And equivalent to this last statement (and hence equivalent to one another) are also “Deus est iustus” and “Deus est misericors,” because the two terms iustus and misericors do not signify different “forms,” but the same divine essence, whereby God is all that He is. What, then, can save theological predication from being a simple repetition of tautologies? It is the distinction of the semantic components of terms which comes to our aid in this case again. Besides significatio and suppositio, Stephen also distinguishes other semantic components, such as connotatio and modus significandi. Connotatio (which other authors also call consignificatio) could be defined as a sort of “secondary meaning”: while iustitia (in its principal significatio) signifies the divine essence itself (by which God is just), it also signifies, secondarily, an effect in creatures, that is to say, the fact that God judges everyone according to his merits.85 It is this secondary meaning which allows us to distinguish above, 401–35); but the word “to suppone” meant something quite different when it still existed in English. Admittedly, my choice, “to supposit,” is not ideal either. At least, however, the noun “supposit(e)” is a word that the Oxford English Dictionary lists as still being in use. 85 See Luisa Valente, “Iustus et misericors. L’usage théologique des notions de consignificatio et connotatio dans la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century),

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two statements like “Deus est iustus” and “Deus est misericors”: although, speaking of God, iustus and misericors both have the same significatio and the same suppositio, they have a different connotatio because they indicate two different effects in creatures of the same immutable divine nature. The first term indicates that God rewards each person according to his or her merits, the second that God reduces punishment or bestows grace independently of merit. What, finally, distinguishes two statements like “Deus est iustus” and “Deus est iustitia,” which do not differ even at the level of connotatio? Langton’s reply is that the two statements differ from each other in their modus significandi, which prevents the two statements from having a perfectly identical meaning: “hoc enim nomen ‘iustitia’ praedicat divinam essentiam ut supponentem, haec dictio ‘iustus’ praedicat essentiam ut inhaerentem.”86 (c) Apart from presupposing a precise number of elements of theological predication (the nine “entities”) and the distinction of the semantic components of terms (significatio, suppositio, connotatio, and modus significandi), a use as rigorous as possible of language in diuinis also requires the establishment of postulates that regulate the equivalences among these terms. Stephen does this in the Sentences commentary immediately after distinguishing the three quasi-categories: Hee ergo vere: (1) persona est notio et (2) econverso; (3) notio est essentia; (4) persona est essentia et (5) econverso.87

The aim of this system of rules is to respect the principle of absolute divine simplicity,88 without however foreclosing every type of theological predication, and at the same time to avoid that admitting the Trinity of persons leads to a multiplication of the divine essence. The first postulate (“persona est notio”) is not to be understood in the sense

ed. Costantino Marmo (Turnhout, 1997), 37–59. A new substantial study of the same author is Valente, Logique et théologie. Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220 (Paris, 2008), which I was not able to use when writing this paper (on Langton, pp. 257–66, 337–93). 86 Summa Magistri Stephani, ed. in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 37; also see Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 426–7. 87 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44 (cited in note 83 above). 88 On this point, one can usefully read Luisa Valente, “Alla ricerca dell’autorità perduta: Quidquid est in Deo, Deus est,” Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della filosofia medievale 25 (1999–2000): 713–38. We find a slightly different formulation of the principle in the Sentences commentary (Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 43): “ . . . nichil est in Deo, quod non sit Deus.”

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that each person is any notion, but in the sense that each person is the notion thanks to which it is distinguished (“Pater est paternitas” is a true proposition, whereas “Pater est filiatio” is false). The inverse (“notio est persona”) is also valid in the same sense (“paternitas est Pater,” “filiatio est Filius,” etc.).89 Furthermore, according to postulates four and five, each person is the essence (4) and the essence is identical to each person (5). Postulate three, on the other hand, is valid only in one sense: “notio est essentia,” but the essence is not the notion (it is not possible therefore to say: “essentia est Paternitas”).90 The five postulates, which we have listed as (1)–(5) above, do not however involve the complete identification of all the semantic components of the terms implied. After spelling out these identities, Langton in fact adds six postulates concerning the suppositio of the terms, that is to say, postulates which concern the differences among the entities, thus preventing the formation of unacceptable statements by substituting equivalent terms in different contexts: Et tamen supposita persona non supponitur notio nec econverso. Nec supposita notione vel persona supponitur essentia nec econverso.91

We can derive the following postulates from this text: (i) supposita persona non supponitur notio, (ii) supposita notione non supponitur persona, (iii) supposita notione non supponitur essentia, (iv) supposita essentia non supponitur notio, (v) supposita persona non supponitur essentia, and (vi) supposita essentia non supponitur persona. (d) Eadem ratione. A further tool invoked by Langton in the passage quoted above (p. 55) is the so-called “eadem ratione principle,” which Sten Ebbesen describes as follows: “This principle, which is ever-present though never explicitly formulated, states that if some proposition or inference, p, is true or valid, then q is too unless it can be shown that q differs from p in some relevant respect.”92

89 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44: “Nulla notio est illa persona, a qua distinguit. . . . Notiones autem distingunt personas, quibus insunt, ab aliis personis . . . ” 90 The reason for this limitation is explained more clearly in the Quaestio de notionibus (CAMB003, ed. in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 208): “Item, notio est persona et in persona, quia eam distinguit ab alia persona. Notio est essentia, sed non in essentia, quia eam non distinguit.” Also see Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 45: “ . . . notio non potuit inesse essentie ad distinguendum inter essentias (!) et personas, cum non distinguant (!) inter eas, que ipse sunt.” 91 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44. 92 Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 28.

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In light of these explanations we can now re-read the passage quoted above: “Res igitur, quibus fruendum” etc. Hoc nomen res ponitur hic ad supponendum pro personis, licet sit nomen essentiale. Eadem ratione dici posse videtur: duo dei sunt, qui procedunt a Patre, quia due persone; et tres dei sunt, quia IIIes persone et quilibet Deus est, et Deus et aliquis Deus non est Pater, quia Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus.93

At this point we are in a position to understand Langton’s solution, which consists of demonstrating that the similarity between the two propositions (the one admitted and the one which seems to be implied by the admitted proposition) is only apparent: Solutio: Hec falsa: duo dei sunt, qui procedunt etc. et omnes, que sequuntur. Nec est simile, quia hoc nomen res ponitur in quadam generali significatione, licet quandoque ex adiuncto personalem habeat suppositionem.

In fact, we can recognize the truth of the principle stated by the Lombard and expressed in terms borrowed from Augustine (that is, “the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three ‘things’”), but an inadmissible consequence must not be allowed to follow from this truth: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three “things” in the sense of three substances and, therefore, three gods. The noun res can be used to refer both to the persons and to the substance; that is to say, it has a general meaning (quedam generalis significatio) and, according to the context (ex adiuncto), it can also supposit the persons—and this is necessary, for example, when res is accompanied by the numeral tres. Postulate (v)—supposita persona non supponitur essentia—prevents the multiplication of the substances deriving from the Trinity of persons. In practice, the term res can stand for both quis and quid, but the predicates it receives by virtue of one of its meanings (quis) cannot be transferred to the other meaning (quid) without grave consequences for orthodoxy.94 In an analogous way, in a theological context, person and notion, that is to say, quis and quae, must remain rigorously distinct, as one can gather from another rather enigmatic passage of Langton’s Sentences commentary:

93 94

Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 3. See Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 408.

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Hec notio spiratio est due persone, scilicet Pater et Filius.95 Hec notio processio est Spiritus Sanctus et non sunt plures persone. Inde sic: omnis processio notionalis spiratio: set omnis notio est persona: ergo omnis notio est processio vel spiratio. Sillogismus in primo prime. At hoc falsum: ergo primum.96

The argument—probably corrupted in the text—has been reconstructed by Sten Ebbesen as follows: Omnis persona est processio vel spiratio;97 omnis notio est persona; ergo omnis notio est processio vel spiratio.98

The meaning of the passage, if I understand it rightly, is the following: from the premises, both of them true, the conclusion seems to derive necessarily, yet it is false (in fact there are five notions, not only processio and spiratio). It would seem necessary, therefore, to deny the major premise (“At hoc falsum: ergo primum”). The text of the solution requires a minor emendation,99 but it perfectly articulates the reason as to why the premises are true, yet the conclusion is false: Responsio: Paralogismus est. Minor enim extremitas non recte sumitur. Deberet enim sumi sub medio ita ut haberet eundem predicandi modum. Quod hic non fit, quia hoc nomen “persona” significat quis et hoc nomen “notio” que significat. Et dictum est, quod supposita persona non supponitur notio nec econverso.100

The argument reveals itself to be a paralogism: the syllogism constructed according to the first mode of the first figure in fact allows us to attribute the predicate of the major premise (“est processio vel spiratio”) to the subject of the minor premise (that is to say, to minor extremitas: “omnis notio”), but only if this transfer takes place within the same category. In the argument we are discussing, however, although it is true that “omnis notio est persona (in qua est),” this judgment is quite different from what constitutes the minor premise in

95 In fact, spiratio is in both the Father and the Son (see note 81 above); but notio est persona (in qua est) by rule (2), p. 58 above; hence spiratio is two persons. 96 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44. 97 In fact, spiratio is in both the Father and the Son, while processio alone is in the Holy Spirit. 98 Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 407. 99 Provided ibid. Also see the appendix to this chapter. 100 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 44 (Landgraf ’s orthography, Ebbesen’s emendations, my italics).

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a first-figure syllogism. In the case of the latter, the individual is subsumed under the species or the species under the genus, always within the category of substance (for instance, “omne risibile est animal”). In Trinitarian discourse, on the other hand, notion and person belong to two different “quasi-categories” (quis, quae), so that it is not permissible to attribute the predicate of the person (middle term) to the notion (minor extremitas).101 * * * Finally, let us examine a couple of cases in which Stephen Langton’s method of theological discussion is useful precisely to resolve problems posed directly by Peter Lombard in the Sentences, or at least to make Peter’s own attempts at a solution more rigorous. In Book I, dist. 34, chap. 2 (vol. 1, 251), Peter Lombard discusses the problem “Utrum ita possit dici unus Deus trium personarum vel tres personae unius Dei, ut dicitur una essentia trium personarum et tres personae unius essentiae.” Since God is His own essence, it would seem that by substituting essentia with Deus in Trinitarian statements we should obtain statements which are just as true as the statements we started with; thus, if the statements “una essentia trium personarum” and “tres personae unius essentiae” are acceptable, then “unus Deus trium personarum” and “tres personae unius Dei” should also be acceptable. Why, then, is this not the case? Peter Lombard identifies the reason as having to do with usage: expressions such as those mentioned should not be admitted in theology because they are uncommon in “Holy Scripture.”102 Langton, on the other hand, looks

101 For the logical terminology employed by Langton, see for instance Abbreviatio montana, ed. in Lambertus M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terministic Logic, vol. I, part II (Assen, 1967), 98. 102 See Peter Lombard, Sentences, I, 34, 2; vol. 1, 251: “In his locutionibus Scripturae usus nobis aemulandus videtur, ubi frequenter reperitur ita dictum: ‘una est essentia trium’ et ‘tres sunt personae unius essentiae’; nusquam autem occurrit legisse ‘unum Deum trium personarum’ et ‘tres sunt personae unius essentiae.’ ” It is worth noting that, with reference to the accepted formulations, the editor observes (ibid., critical apparatus): “Minime in Scriptura, sed apud Ss. Patres huiusmodi reperiuntur.” The passage is very eloquent regarding what Peter Lombard considered to be Holy Scripture: he does not see any rigid division between what we consider to be inspired “canonical writings” and the writings of the Christian authorities (Patres, Sancti). See Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 206 (“sacra pagina”). It may well be that this attitude of Peter Lombard is rooted in Hugh of St.-Victor’s conception of Holy Scripture: see Rainer Berndt, “Gehören die Kirchenväter zur Heiligen Schrift? Zur Kanontheorie des Hugo von St. Viktor,” Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 3 (1988): 191–9. According to Adriano Oliva (Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la

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for a solution within his logico-semantic system, which recognizes a certain analogy between ordinary language and theological language. As we have seen, a substantive supposits an individual and signifies a form (iustus supposits him who is just and signifies justice, that is to say, that form by which the just man is just); in Trinitarian discourse, however, only the divine essence or the notions can represent the significatio of a term: “both ‘deus’ and ‘deitas’ signify the essence; ‘pater’ and ‘paternitas’ both signify a notion (paternity). No term signifies a person.”103 And yet, deus and deitas cannot be substituted in all contexts because deus and deitas—which supposit and signify the same, that is, the divine essence—have different modi significandi and modi supponendi: deitas signifies the essence, just as the essence is signified by nouns of mere forms, that is to say, by abstract nouns (in Langton’s language, deitas signifies the essence ut formam), whereas deus signifies the essence, just like nouns that together co-signify supposita, that is to say, concrete nouns (in Langton’s language, deus signifies the essence ut proprietatem).104 The genitive of a concrete noun indicates possession by him to whom the name refers (that is, suum appellatum), while the genitive of an abstract noun can be used to indicate the essence shared by all the subjects for which the nominative supposits by which the genitive is governed (that is, it can be used in demonstratione essentiae). Those statements, therefore, will be admitted which affirm the existence of the one God (the one essence) in three persons; those will be rejected which appear to affirm that the relationship between God and the persons is one between possessor and possessed (“quia . . . nulle persone sunt possessio Dei”):105 Hec vero vera: sunt unius deitatis, quia hic genitivus construitur cum nominativo in demostratione essentie, qualiter alius genitivus ibidem contrarium ponit, quia ad hoc, quod genitivus construatur cum alio in demonstratione essentie, oportet, quod significat ut formam. Unde falsa dictio est: mulier egregie rei, quia ille genitivus rei non significat formam propter communitatem sue significationis. Similiter: tres sunt persone unius Dei. Hic genitivus significat ut possessorem, non ergo ut formam. Ille vero genitivus deitatis, etsi significat idem, quod hoc

“sacra doctrina” [Paris, 2006], 281), still much later in the thirteenth century, “Thomas englobe sous l’expression sacra Scriptura aussi bien la Bible que les écrits des Pères et l’ouvrage de Pierre Lombard lui-même.” 103 Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 414. 104 See ibid., 416. 105 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 46.

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stephen langton nomen Deus,106 non tamen eodem modo, quia ut proprietatem et ideo construi potest in demonstratione essentie. Dei vero significat †ut suppositiones† suum appellatum. Quod ergo significat attributive, non ponit ut formam, immo supponit ut suscipientem formam, qui modus significandi alienus est.107

Deus signifies the divine essence as if it were a subiectum that receives a form; this modus significandi, however, is “alien” to theology, that is to say, it belongs to another context (common language, which reflects realities characterized by composition between form and suppositum). According to Langton, this is the real reason as to why expressions such as tres persone unius Dei are not correct theological statements. The Lombard, by contrast, “rationem non assignat nisi usum”108—as Langton observes not without stressing the unsatisfactory nature of this solution. In an analogous way, in Book I, dist. 4, chap. 1 (vol. 1, 77–8), Peter Lombard discusses in what sense the proposition “Deus genuit Deum” can be accepted. At first sight, it would seem to imply one of the following two unacceptable consequences: either God has generated another god, or He has generated Himself (something impossible even for Him). The solution to this difficulty seems to be easy, as the proposition we started with can easily be justified through the Constantinopolitan creed: “Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine.”109 In the following paragraph, however, the difficulty returns. Although it is clear that the orthodox sense of the proposition is “Deus Pater Deum Filium genuit,” it appears that it can be transformed into a further statement: “Deus genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater.” Should this statement be considered true or false? The formulation leaves room for ambiguity because “qui non est Deus Pater” would seem to imply that God the Son is another god in addition to God the Father. For his solution the

106 Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 419, proposes the emendation Dei. Although this certainly contributes to greater clarity, the passage can also be understood as it stands. 107 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 46, with Landgraf ’s orthography; emendations by Ebbesen (“The Semantics of the Trinity,” 419) and by myself. 108 Ibid., 46. The edition places this sentence in a new paragraph and supplies a lemma, but needlessly: the observation simply closes the previous paragraph, stressing the difference between the Lombard’s and Langton’s solutions; moreover ratione, the supplied lemma, does not appear anywhere in the chapter. 109 See Peter Lombard, Sentences, I, 34, 1, 1; vol. 1, 78; also see Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum, 31st ed. (Barcelona/Freiburg i. Br./Rome, 1960), no. 86 (cf. nos. 132 and 169).

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Lombard has to have recourse to a series of complicated circumlocutions to specify the orthodox sense of the formula: Si vero additur: “Genuit Deum qui non est Deus Pater,” hic distinguimus, quia dupliciter potest intelligi: “genuit Deum qui non est Deus Pater,” scilicet Deum Filium, qui Filius non est Pater qui Deus est, hic sensus verus est. Si vero intelligatur sic: “genuit Deum qui non est Deus Pater,” id est qui non est Deus qui est Pater, hic sensus falsus est. Unus enim et idem Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; et e converso Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus est unus Deus.110

Langton provides a more concise explanation, and by the use of technical terminology recognizes that the formula is effectively ambiguous (propositio duplex)111 insofar as the context is not sufficient to determine completely the suppositio of the term “qui non est Deus Pater.” Deus in fact has a broad semantic content capable of referring both to the essence and to the persons: if Pater is associated with Deus in adjectival form,112 it “restricts”113 Deus to supposit the Father, since “qui non est Deus Pater” supposits the Son114 and the proposition is true:

110

Peter Lombard, Sentences, I, 4, 1, 2; vol. 1, 78. Recognition of the ambiguity of propositions is frequent in Langton’s works, including the Sentences commentary. Thus, in commenting on the third book, Langton invokes such ambiguity more than once in order to safeguard the divine immutability in the course of his discussion of the Incarnation. Many statements are true if they are referred to the person of the Word incarnate, but false if they are referred to the divine essence; see Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 112 (on III, 7, 1): “‘Deus est aliquid, quod non semper fuit.’ Hec duplex: si quod supponit verbo, falsa est; si apponit, vera”; ibid., 117–18 (on III, 10, 3 [n. 70]): “Et hec duplex est: hec persona incipit esse. Si enim hoc verbum esse ponitur proprie, secundum quod commune est Deo et creature, falsa est; si copulat proprietatem creatam, vera. Sicut et hec: hec persona fit”; ibid., 118; (on III, 11, 1 [n. 71]): “Et cum dicitur: Christus fit aliquid, duplex est: Si enim fit non copulat aliquid, quod in eo sit, vera est.” 112 A particularly clear explanation of the substantival/adjectival distinction is found in Nielsen, “Logic and the Hypostatic Union” (see note 55 above), 261–2: “ . . . predicate terms are ambiguous. They may be interpreted in two ways; they can be read as either substantives or as adjectives. If a predicate term is interpreted in the substantival sense it is true to say that the term is supponing for something in the world of ‘id quod’s—to use the Boethian terminology. If, on the other hand, a predicate term is interpreted in the adjectival sense it holds good that the term points to a property which is either claimed or denied to be inherent in the thing pointed to by the subject term.” Cf. Langton’s Summa, in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 37. 113 See Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 404–05 and 419–25. 114 In fact, if Pater is taken in an adjectival sense,“qui non est Deus Pater” is the same as “qui non est Pater.” 111

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stephen langton “Set adhuc opponitur.” Hec duplex: Deus genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Si enim Pater apponatur huic dictioni Deus, falsa; si adiective vera, quia tunc restringitur ille terminus qui non est Deus Pater ad supponendum pro Filio.115

6.2. Persona Peter Lombard quotes Boethius’s definition of persona twice in his Sentences—both times not in the original wording, naturae rationabilis individua substantia,116 but in a slightly different form, which he found in the anonymous (probably originating in the school of Hugh of St.-Victor)117 Summa sententiarum:118 “Persona enim est substantia rationalis indiuiduae naturae.”119 The first occurrence is in the discussion of the problem as to whether, in assuming human nature in Christ, the divine Word assumed a person. One of the positions rejected by Peter maintained that the Word effectively assumed a person because, by assuming human nature, He assumed a soul and the soul is the person (in fact, in the Summa sententiarum the definition of person is attributed to the soul, probably as a consequence of a dualistic anthropology which identifies man with his soul). Peter rebuts this position (he denies, that is, that the Word assumed a person), but he does not distance himself completely from the anthropological presuppositions on which it is based. Thus, he affirms that, although the soul united to the body cannot be considered a person, it becomes such after its separation from the body,

115

Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 6–7. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 3, in De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula teologica, ed. Claudio Moreschini, 2nd ed. (Munich and Leipzig, 2005), 214. 117 Despite Ferruccio Galstaldelli’s “La Summa sententiarum di Ottone da Lucca. Conclusione di un dibattito secolare,” Salesianum 42 (1980): 537–46, the attribution of this work still deserves further discussion: see Quinto, “Trivium e teologia,” 458–60 and 468. The difference between Boethius’s and the Lombard’s formulations has been pointed out by Pietro B. Rossi in his paper, “Contra Lombardum: reazioni alla cristologia di Pietro Lombardo,” in Pietro Lombardo. Atti del XLIII Convegno Storico Internazionale, Todi, 8–10 ottobre 2006 (Spoleto, 2007), 123–92. It would be very interesting—but not within the scope of this paper—to determine whether the position of the Summa sententiarum faithfully reflects the teaching of Hugh of St. Victor. A good starting point is the appraisal of Hugh’s Christology in Lauge O. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study on Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Exposition of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180 (Leiden, 1982), 193–213. 118 See Summa sententiarum I, 15 (PL 171: 1097B = PL 176: 70D). 119 Peter Lombard, Sentences III, dist. 5, chap. 3, no. 2 (vol. 2, 48), and III, 10, 1, 2 (vol. 2, 72). 116

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when it exists per se. The soul of Christ, however, never exists per se, insofar as, during the brief period in which it was not united with the body (in triduo mortis), it was nevertheless united to the divinity and is therefore never a person.120 Langton briefly considers this chapter of the Sentences, clearly identifying both the Lombard’s imprecision in quoting Boethius’s definition, and what he holds to be the weak point of his argumentation. In fact, for a rational substance to be individual and, hence, to be able to have the character of person attributed to it, it is not enough for this substance not to be united in a compound, but it is necessary for it not even to have the tendency or the capacity (aptitudo) to become so united. The soul, however, is united to the body from the moment of its creation and, even after death, it is destined to reunite with the body at the resurrection. Therefore, the individuality of the rational substance which makes it a person excludes that it can become part of a compound (venire in constitutionem alterius). For Langton, the error in the Lombard’s argument lies the fact that he regarded what is common to every soul as being proper to the soul of Christ.121 The human soul, therefore, is never person: “Hic a quibusdam” “individue.” Non debet ita dici, set individua. Individuum enim hic dicitur, quod in partes sui similes non dividitur et quod non venit in constitutionem alterius. Si ergo anima esset persona, non veniret in constitutionem alterius.122

This extremely concise passage is fully confirmed, also terminologically, in the recently published Quaestio de persona: . . . cum anima ueniat in compositionem hominis, non est persona, quia non est substantia indiuidua, idest incommunicabilis compositione. . . . Pars enim alicius rei non potest esse persona. Magister tamen in Sententiis dicit quod anima dum est in corpore non est persona, set dum est extra corpus est persona, quia tunc, ut dicit, est substantia indiuidua;

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See ibid., III, 5, 3, 2 (vol. 2, 48): “anima non est persona quando alii rei est unita personaliter, sed quando per se est. Absoluta enim a corpore, persona est, sicuti angelus. Illa autem anima numquam fuit quin esset alii rei coniuncta; ideoque non, ea assumpta, persona est assumpta.” 121 What is peculiar to Christ, actually, is the fact that—unlike other men—qua man He is not a person even when His soul and body are united. This is because his body and his soul, which constitute human nature, are in turn united to divinity. 122 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 109 (on Sentences III, 5, 3, 2). Cf. also what Langton says in commenting on Sentences I, d. 26, 1 [n. 227]: “Et nota, quod hoc nomen individua notat aptitudinem in actum, id est non communicabilem. Et hoc dico propter animam, que est communicabilis, ut pars a toto” (Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 27).

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This quaestio also allows us to affirm that, unlike the Lombard, Langton interpreted the definition of persona by reflecting directly on Boethius’s text. In the first article of the quaestio, we find a summary of the lengthy passage in which Boethius had presented the origin of the term persona and its relationship with its Greek equivalents124—a point that is taken up again at some length in the Sentences commentary.125 This detailed examination in the Sentences commentary also allows Langton to contest another observation by the Lombard, in which he had denied that Boethius’s definition could apply, not only to created persons but to the divine persons as well.126 For Langton, to deny that the definition of persona can be applied to the divine persons would be equivalent to rendering vain all the research carried out by Boethius in his famous treatise: “Illud tamen” “non est data” etc. Hoc falsum. Alioquin nisi univoce conveniret hoc nomen persona personis creatis et increatis, nichil probaret Boethius per illam descriptionem persone, quam ponit.127

The intention of the short passage above can be clarified yet again by turning to the Quaestio de persona: Quod autem conueniat [scil. predicta descriptio] creatis patet per eius partes. Item, quod coueniat increatis patet per intentionem Boetii de personis contra hereticos disputantis. Et ita conuenit tam creatis quam increatis, quod concedimus in quadam communi significatione huius

123 Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 100–01. Another text devoted to the problem of the person is found in one of the chapters of Langton’s Summa; see Ebbesen/ Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 124–34. 124 See Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 95–7, and Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 3 (ed. Moreschini, 214–9). For a recent account of the ancient and medieval use of persona, as well as relevant bibliographical information, see Enrico Peroli, Essere persona. Le origini di un’idea tra grecità e cristianesimo (Brescia, 2006). Another fruitful reading is Nico Den Bok, Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor († 1173) (Turnhout, 1996). 125 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 25–9 (on Sentences I, 26, 1). 126 See Peter Lombard, Sentences III, dist. 10, chap. 1, no. 4 (vol. 2, 73): “Illa tamen personae descriptio non est data pro illis tribus personis” (my italics). 127 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 117. Cf. the conclusion of Boethius’s argumentation in Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 2 (ed. Moreschini, 214152–53): “at hominis dicimus esse personam, dicimus Dei, dicimus angeli.”

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nominis “substantia.” Est enim ibi commune ad omnes ypostases primi predicamenti et ad ypostases increatas.128

6.3. Christology Langton’s conception of the person, more precise than the Lombard’s, is also useful in the context of one of the most controversial arguments of the Sentences, namely, the discussion of whether Christ qua man is aliquid. The Lombard had presented the problems of whether Christ as man is aliquid and whether He is persona as being closely linked.129 He had then denied that He is a person, precisely because qua man Christ never exists per se.130 Many readers of the Sentences believed that this denial also implied the position that Christ qua man is not aliquid. Likewise, in discussing whether Christ was man during the triduo mortis, in Book III, dist. 22, the Lombard seems unable to deny that the dead Christ was homo without denying at the same time that He was aliquid.131 It is well known that this thesis was condemned in 1177 in a letter by Alexander III to the archbishop of Rheims;132 it is still controversial whether this thesis should properly be ascribed to the Lombard.133

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Bieniak, “A Critical Edition,” 102 (I have slightly changed the punctuation). See Peter Lombard, Sentences III, dist. 10, chap. 1, no. 1 (vol. 2, 72): “Solet etiam a quibusdam inquiri utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit persona, vel etiam sit aliquid.” 130 See ibid., no. 4 (2, 73). 131 See ibid., dist. 22, chap. 1 (2, 135–6). 132 See Denzinger, Enchridion, no. 393, p. 192: “Cum Christus perfectus Deus perfectus sit homo, mirum est, qua temeritate quisquam audeat dicere, quod ‘Christus non sit aliquid secundum quod homo.’” The reactions of Paris theologians to the letter have been thoroughly researched in Nielsen, “Logic and the Hypostatic Union.” I merely point out that on p. 252, n. 5 Nielsen underlines the “irony” whereby Alexander III condemned a theory of which he was an early proponent. In fact, the sentence “Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo” is denied in the Sentences of Roland, who was traditionally identified with Rolandus Bandinelli, the same person who later became Pope Alexander III. This identification, however, has been challenged; see J. T. Noonan Jr., “Who was Rolandus?” in Law, Church and Society. Essays in Honour of Stephan Kuttner, ed. K. Pennington and R. Somerville (Philadelphia, 1977), 21–48; R. Weigand, “Magister Rolandus und Papst Alexander III,” Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht 149 (1980): 3–44; Robert Wielockx, Review of Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology, in Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 59 (1985): 204–08; Quinto, “Trivium e teologia,” 458–9; Giuseppe Mazzanti, “La teologia a Bologna nel secolo XII,” in L’origine dell’Ordine dei Predicatori e l’Università di Bologna, ed. Giovanni Bertuzzi (Bologna, 2006), 118–35, at 118–20 (= Divus Thomas 44:2 [2006]). 133 For an account of the controversial question known as “Christological nihilianism,” one can start with Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 131–3; for deeper insight, see Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy, 264–70; Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 1, 399–427, 129

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It is clear, however, that this is the position which Langton attributes to the Magister sententiarum: “Hic queritur,” si Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo. Cum in triduo ex corpore et anima eius non sit unum, in triduo non fuit homo. Magister aliter dicit, quia non dicit, quod fuit aliquid secundum quod homo.134

For Stephen, the orthodox position, established by Alexander III’s letter, to which he refers more than once in his works,135 requires affirming that Christ is truly man, in the sense that the noun homo is predicated univocally of Him and, say, Peter.136 As for the explanation of this assumption, it cannot be said that Stephen is crystal clear. Yet it seems possible to state that for him human nature coincides essentially with the soul and the body, so that since the Word of God assumed a soul and a body it is possible to affirm that He assumed human nature, and that Christ is truly man. Nevertheless, Christ’s individuality, his personality, is not constituted—as in other human beings—by the reciprocal union of body and soul,137 but rather by the union of both with the divinity. Nor is the divinity united to a man, but to human nature, that is, to body and soul.138 Although Christ is verus homo, He is never purus homo; indeed, the union of body and and eadem, “Christological Nihilianism in the Second Half of the 12th Century,” RTAM 63 (1996): 146–55. 134 Landgraf, Sentenzenkommentar, 127 (to Sent. III, 22, 1). 135 Besides the text quoted in the following footnote, see the quaestio CAMB059, De homine assumpto, et utrum Christus sit duo, in Nielsen/Ebbesen, “Texts Illustrating the Debate about Christology” (cited in note 55 above), 229: “Super hoc est triplex opinio. Una, quae asserit, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod est homo. . . . haec opinio relegata est per decretalem Alexandri, quae praecipit, quod Christus dicatur aliquid secundum quod homo.” 136 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 105: “‘Communem speciem.’ Huic fortissime innituntur sequentes magistri, qui tamen iam recesserunt ab aula. Nemo enim est, qui non audeat confiteri, quod hoc nomen homo non dicatur proprie de Christo sicut et de me. Et hoc propter decretalem, que hoc affirmat et contrarium quasi hereticum dampnat. Dixit ergo magister occasione huius auctoritatis, quod hec species homo non est communis Christo et Petro, id est quod hoc nomen homo non predicatur univoce de illis.” 137 See ibid.: “In puris hominibus species est totum esse sui individui. Totum enim esse hominis est ex coniunctione corporis et anime eius, ita quod ex illis duobus surgit tertium, differens ab utroque, compositum. Et hec est natura humana. In Christo autem non est ita.” 138 See ibid., 127 (on Sentences III, 21, 1): “Set nulla est unio deitatis ad hominem, set deitatis ad animam et corpus.” According to Nielsen (“Logic and the Hypostatic Union,” 271), “Christ’s human nature as a formal principle is given no part to play in Langton’s exposition, and he constantly views human nature as being identical with

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soul with the divinity is much more fundamental than that of the soul and the body to each other. The divino-human nature of Christ is not conditioned by the existence in act of Christ qua man, so that, even were it true that the divinity is united to the body by means of the soul (as the Lombard seems to have maintained),139 this in no way means that the union of the divinity to the soul and to the body depends on the union between body and soul: “Post.” In IIIo libro capitulo assumpsit dicitur, quod mediante quodam spiritu subtili unita est anima divinitati et mediante anima unita est divinitas corpori. Qualiter autem hoc intelligendum sit, ibi dictum est.140 Set secundum hoc videtur, quod separatio anime a corpore operetur separationem divinitatis a corpore. Responsio: Non valet.— Instantia: Consensus facit matrimonium. Ergo soluto consensu solvitur matrimonium.141

The same example will also be found again, in the same context, in Hugh of St.-Cher’s Commentary on the Sentences: Mediante anima: Ergo quando anima fuit separata a corpore, tunc non fuit unitus carni Filius Dei sive deitas. Dico ergo quod argumentatio non valet.—Instantia: Consensus est causa matrimonii. Ergo, si desinit esse consensus, desinit esse matrimonium: Matth. 5.142

We can be fairly sure that Hugh took the argument from Langton’s Sentences commentary. In fact, in the parallel passage of Langton’s Quaestio Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo mortis, preserved by a larger number of manuscripts, there is a similar argument, but the example is taken from the sacrament of confession, not marriage.143

soul and body in their mutual association.” This already was Peter Lombard’s point of view; see Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 1, 423–4. 139 See Peter Lombard, Sentences III, 2, 2, 1 (2, 29): “Assumpsit igitur Dei Filius carnem et animam, sed carnem mediante anima. . . . Tantae enim subtilitatis atque simplicitatis est divina essentia, ut corpori de limo terrae formato uniri non congruerit nisi mediante rationali essentia” (my italics). 140 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 106 (on Sentences III, 2, 2). 141 Ibid., 127 (on Sentences III, 21, 1). 142 Hugh of St. Cher, In III Sent., dist. 2, in Walter H. Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1970), 166. I wish to thank Magdalena Bieniak for pointing this text out to me. 143 Langton, Quaestio Vtrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo mortis, in Nielsen/ Ebbesen, “Texts Illustrating the Debate about Christology,” 248: “Nec valet haec argumentatio ‘Deitas unita est carni mediante anima, ergo separata anima a carne, separatur deitas a carne.’ Et sic dicitur instantia, ‘Mediante contritione homo est unus specie cum Deo, ergo cessante contritione dissolvitur homo a Deo.’ ”

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Moreover, this particular example is not found in William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea, which in several cases represents the most obvious trait-d’union between Langton and Hugh of St.-Cher.144 So, despite its meager manuscript tradition, Langton’s Sentences commentary appears to have enjoyed a certain influence on later theologians. 7. Stephen Langton and Peter Lombard We have already seen several cases in which Langton criticizes some of the opinions held by the Master in the Sentences, or at least shows that the arguments used to support them are not cogent. The examples can be multiplied:145 at I, 17, 1 he rejects Peter’s opinion that charity, by which we love God and neighbor, is the same as the Holy Spirit,146 and the disagreement is repeated at III, 32, 1, 1.147 At I, 24, 1, 1 Langton does not share Peter’s opinion that numerals predicated of the persons do not say or “couple” anything, but only remove and deny.148 At I, 29, 3 he takes the position opposite to Peter, who maintains that the statement “Filius est principium de principio sine principio” is false.149 144

See Quinto, “Hugh of St.-Cher’s Use of Stephen Langton,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, ed. Ebbesen and Friedman, 281–300; idem, “Le Commentaire des Sentences d’Hugues de St.-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,” in Hugues de Saint-Cher († 1263), bibliste et théologien, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, and Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout, 2004), 299–324. 145 An almost complete list of “individual opinions” held by Langton, despite the Lombard’s different position, is found in Landgraf, “The First Sentence Commentary” (cited in note 59 above), 120–7. A good number of these opinions match the “articuli in quibus magister sententiarum non tenetur communiter ab omnibus,” a list of rejected teachings that, ever since the beginning of the thirteenth century, very frequently accompany the text of the Sentences in the manuscripts. The list can be found at the end of the Prolegomena to the 1916 edition of the Sentences (see note 64 above), lxxviii–lxxx; it enumerates four points for the first book, four for the second, three for the third, and fifteen for Book IV (six of them occur in the first two distinctions, for which we possess Langton’s commentary). A list of the Lombard’s rejected opinions is also included in Bonaventure’s commentary on the Sentences, Book II, dist. 44. 146 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 18: “Magister in hac opinione fuit, quod caritas non fuit aliqua uirtus, et quod nichil est caritas aliud quam Spiritus Sanctus et quod Spiritu Sancto tantum diligimus Deum et proximum. Non sumus in hac opinione, quia caritas uirtus est sicut fides, qua diligimus.” 147 See ibid., 138: “ ‘Que non est alia quam illa.’ Hoc falsum, quia dilectio, qua diligit nos, est divina essentia. Dilectio, qua diligimus eum, est virtus.—Responsio: Loquitur secundum suam opinionem. . . .” 148 See ibid., 22: “ ‘Hic diligenter.’ Magister dicit, quod nomina numeralia de personis dicta nichil copulant vel notant, set removent et privant. Quod non dicimus.” 149 See ibid., 37: “Est principium sine principio de principio. Quod verum est. Et magister dicit hic contrarium.” For Langton, the Son is a principium sine principio only if this expression supposits the divine essence, and He is also a principium de

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At I, 35, 7, 4, after having given his solution to the problem of whether there could be foreknowledge in God even if nothing happened in the future, he observes, “Magister solvit hec predica salva pace sua suo modo.”150 At I, 40, 1, 4 he dismisses with the same words Peter’s opinion that a proposition concerning the possible damnation of someone predestined to salvation is ambiguous; for Langton it is simpliciter falsa.151 The same case recurs at I, 43, 1, 2.152 At I, 46, 7, 3 Peter discusses the following problem: that there is some evil is true; but every truth comes from the Truth, which is God; hence the fact that there is some evil also comes from God. Peter dismisses this objection as an evident sophism, but Stephen observes that in the argument there is a real difficulty, which the Lombard underestimates.153 At II, 5, 6 Peter distinguishes two opinions on angels: either they merit their beatitude through the deeds that they accomplish, thanks to divine grace, or the grace that they receive also makes them ipso facto eternally blessed; Peter adheres to the second opinion, whereas Stephen frankly confesses to preferring the first.154 In the third book, as we have seen, the shortcomings of the Lombard’s Christology are pointed out, and Peter’s idea that a soul not united to a body can be a person is criticized.155 At III, 7, 1, 13 Langton remarks that, in order to show that divinity is not a “part” of the divine person of the Son, the Lombard lists an opinion which has become definitely out of date, and also that the way in which he explains it is not particularly effective.156 A few lines later (III, 7, 2, 1) he observes that the verse of Phil. 2:7—Habitus inventus est ut homo—can be used to interpret the hypostatic union only if it is taken in a metaphorical sense, so that it cannot support the Lombard’s opinion (or even “dream”) according to which humanity does not belong to Jesus Christ as a form, but as a dress covering divinity.157 At principio if these words are taken as suppositing the person; see quaestio CAMB005 (in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 121). 150 Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 47. 151 Ibid., 55. 152 See ibid., 60. 153 See ibid., 67: “Magister parvipendit hanc obiectionem, que tamen difficultatem habet.” 154 See ibid., 79. 155 See ibid., 109. 156 See ibid., 114: “ ‘Est’ ‘et aliud.’ Hanc opinionem nemo tuetur hodie. . . . ‘Alioquin.’ Contra: eadem ratione dici potest, quod corpus non est pars Christi hominis, quia aliquando non fuit pars eius corpus.—Responsio: Hec ratio, quam ponit, non multum efficax est. . . . ” 157 See ibid., 115: “Habitu inventus, id est susceptione habitus, antequam tegatur et celetur divinitas, ut homo habitu, quo induitur. Et ideo dicitur metaphorice, quod

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III, 14, 2, 1 the Lombard’s understanding of the difference between the Father and the Son in power and in knowledge is considered insufficient.158 At III, 22, 1 Langton maintains that the Lombard’s rejection of the statement “Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid” makes it impossible for him to answer correctly the question of whether Christ was a man at the time between His death and His resurrection (in triduo).159 At III, 25, 5, 2 he provides a different reason from the Master for maintaining that faith and hope precede charity.160 Finally, at III, 30, 3 the way in which Peter explains why loving one’s enemy is greater than loving one’s friends is criticized.161 Even the short part of Langton’s commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences which has been handed down to us offers an opportunity to grasp his freedom vis-à-vis the Master’s opinions. At IV, 2, 6, 1–3, Peter maintains a distinction among those baptised by John the Baptist: those who put their hope in that baptism needed to be baptised again with the baptism of Christ, but those who did not put their hope in John’s baptism, and believed in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit did not need a new baptism. For Langton, however, all needed to be baptised again because John’s baptism did not confer anything.162

habitu inventus ut homo. Non ut magister sompniat, quod hoc nomen homo non predicat speciem de Christo, set habitum.” This paragraph belongs to a section of the commentary (pp. 114–15) that should be referred to chap. 2 of dist. 7; Landgraf fails to indicate this. 158 See ibid., 120–1: “ ‘Si vero queritur.’ Sic formatur questio: Christus potest omnia, que Pater, et ideo est eque potens, quia non similiter, si Christus scit omnia, que Pater, est eque sciens Patri. Non est autem eque sciens, quia nescit creare, secundum quod homo scilicet . . . Magister solvit, ut vult” (the text probably needs emendation). 159 For Peter, “licet homo mortuus fuerit, erat tamen in morte Deus homo” (Sentences III, 22, 1, 3; vol. 2, 136); but Langton replies: “Cum in triduo ex corpore et anima eius non sit unum, in triduo non fuit homo. Magister aliter dicit, quia non dicit, quod fuit aliquid secundum quod homo” (Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 127). 160 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 133. 161 See ibid., 137. Langton again shows his independence from the Master’s opinions at III, 36, 3, 1 and III, 37, 2, 2 (ibid., 141–2). The commandment to love one’s neightbor is the subject of question CAMB099, now edited by Lauge Olaf Nielsen (see his paper, “Langton’s Questions on the Ten Commandments: Biblical Scholarship and the Art of Disputation,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 78 [2008]: 3–36). 162 See Sentenzenkommentar, ed. Landgraf, 152: “‘Hic considerandum.’ Magister dicit, quod illi sunt rebaptizandi baptismo Christi, qui non habuerunt spem in baptismo Iohannis. Nos dicimus, quod omnes baptizati a Iohanne sunt baptizandi baptismo Christi, quia nichil est eis collatum in baptismo Iohannis.” Langton holds the same opinion in his quaestio CAMB147, “De baptismo Iohannis” (MS. C, fol. 310rb, see Quinto, Doctor Nominatissimus, 252).

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8. Conclusion: The General Character of Stephen Langton’s Sentences Commentary In assessing Langton’s Sentences commentary, we must bear in mind that the text which has come down to us was probably not meant for publication, but rather originated as notes to be used for lectures. In a text intended for publication, Stephen might possibly have been more prudent.163 Nevertheless, the number of disagreements openly stated is quite impressive, which suggests that Langton thought of the Sentences not as a text endowed with any particular authority, but rather as a simple schoolbook that provided him with an opportunity to set out his own theology. Just after presenting a list of Langton’s disagreements from the Lombard, Artur Landgraf concluded that Langton’s Sentences commentary does not represent a “gloss” intended to explain the Master’s text, but rather the first example of “the type of the genuine Sentence-commentary.”164 For the same reasons, Langton’s Sentences commentary is most likely not the work of a young bachelor, but rather that of a well-established master who had both developed a personal view of many theological subjects and had attained a position of some esteem by the ecclesiastical establishment. This corresponds precisely to the picture that I have painted of Stephen Langton in the early years of the thirteenth century, in the wake of his summons to Rome, where he was to be invested as cardinal by Innocent III (second half of 1206). The freedom with which he addresses Peter Lombard’s positions probably also points to a period prior to the Lateran Council of 1215 (where Peter’s Trinitarian theology was defined as a cornerstone of orthodoxy),165 and possibly even prior to his involvement in the Magna Charta (1213– 1215). There is no question, in fact, of Langton teaching theology in this period, nor could the archbishop be sure of the pope’s favor after

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Nevertheless, we have several examples of Langton’s boldness in assuming an independent attitude toward views expressed in standard tools such as the Gloss on the Bible; see Quinto, “Giubileo e attesa escatologica negli autori monastici e nei maestri della sacra pagina,” Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 26 (2001): 25–109, at 81–2. 164 Landgraf, “The First Sentence Commentary,” 127. 165 See Constitutio 2, in Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo, Pericle P. Joannou, Claudio Leonardi, and Paolo Prodi (Freiburg i. Br., 1962), 207; Denzinger, Enchiridion, no. 432, p. 201: “Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro Lombardo, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus . . . ”

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having sided with the barons. In this sense, internal criteria match the external information concerning the date of this commentary. A second final observation is that a full understanding of Langton’s Sentences commentary would greatly profit from a comparison with Langton’s full-scale quaestiones, where many of the commentary’s topics are treated at greater length. I hope to provide the reader with an edition of the Quaestiones in due course.165a

165a The project of a complete edition of Langton’s Quaestiones theologiae has been accepted by the British Academy for publication in the series “Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi.” The first volume, containing qu. 1 through 23, is being prepared by Magdalena Bieniak, Valeria De Fraja, Giovanni Paolo Maggioni, and Riccardo Quinto.

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Appendix: A List of Suggested Emendations to the Text To Book I, dist. 34 (p. 46) [C. 2 n. 308]: see p. 64 above (with footnotes 106–08) and Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity,” 419. To Book I, dist. 46 (p. 67) [n. 426]: “Sophistice” in Ecclesia, qui sophiste Deo odibiles sunt. The text should be: “‘Sophistice’ in Ecclesia, qui sophiste Deo odibiles sunt.“ Langton’s remark is just a gloss intended to render explicit the Lombard’s implicit quotation of Ecclus. 37:23: “Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est.” To Book II, dist. 21 (p. 90) [C. 5 n. 171]: “Dixit ad mulierem.” Diabolus loquebatur per presentem utens eo ut instrumento. Presentem is to be emended to serpentem (the error is to be explained paleographically). To Book III, dist. 17 (p. 123) [C. 1 n. 107] “Quocirca.” Inproprie dicitur sensualitas voluntas quia omnis voluntas secundum rationem est secundum Aristotelem. Landgraf suggests that this passage could be a reference to De anima III, 9, 432 b. The text of James of Venice’s translatio vetus, existing by 1150, reads: “In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit et in irrationabili desiderium et animus.”166 The same idea, however, can be found in Topica IV, 5, 126 a, translated by Boethius: “ . . . si amicitia in concupiscibili, non erit voluntas; omnis enim voluntas in rationabili.”167 To Book III, dist. 17 (p. 124) [C. 2 n. 109]: Responsio: Hec non valet: Volita sunt contraria: ergo voluntates contrarie, quia sensualitas subdita fuit rationi et ratio voluit et approbavit voluntatem sensualitatis, quia omnia animalia pecora erant in archa Noe. The MS. has peccata, Landgraf writes pecora, but the right emendation is pacata: see Langton’s quaestio CAMB061, “De duabus voluntatibus in Christo”: “Omnia animalia erant pacata in archa Noe; glosa: omnes motus pacati in Christo.”168 To Book IV, prol. (pp. 146–7): In prima curatione caput nostrum fortissimam gratiam in maxima quantitate sumere voluit, et virtus petitionis in omnes partes corporis diffusa omnia membra corporis plenissime curavit. The emendation potionis seems to me to be necessary, because of the following words.— . . . per adhibita sacramentorum fomenta liniretur et eiecta sanie cicatrice, que prius orta fuit, sanaretur. Changing cicatrice into cicatrix appears to be necessary in order to obtain a grammatically consistent text.

166

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354. 167

Aristoteles latinus V, 1–3, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod (Leiden, 1969), 79. 168 Langton, quaestio CAMB061, “De duabus voluntatibus in Christo,” in Ebbesen/Mortensen, “A Partial Edition,” 178.

THE GLOSSA IN IV LIBROS SENTENTIARUM BY ALEXANDER OF HALES Hubert Philipp Weber Alexander of Hales, an Englishman, master of theology at the University in Paris, who at the height of his career entered the Franciscan order, is an important but little known figure of the thirteenth century. His commentary on the Sentences is an early example of this genre and an early expression of his theology. Its form and method are still fluid. After a short history of the scholarship and some historical remarks I will characterize Alexander’s commentary formally by describing the known manuscripts and attempting to establish its date. Then I will discuss Alexander’s method and his approach to the Sentences, which he was the first master to use for his ordinary lectures. Finally, a few texts on various theological questions will provide an insight into Alexander’s theology.1 History of Scholarship For seven centuries the search for Alexander of Hales’s commentary on the Sentences was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, there is an early testimony in the writings of Roger Bacon, who claimed that Alexander was the first to give lectures on Peter Lombard’s textbook.2 Surely Alexander was not the first to use the Sentences with his students, but he gave the work a new importance in that he employed it as the one

1 In would like to thank Sandra Lang, who helped me with the English text of this chapter.—Alexander of Hales, Glossa in IV libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi, 4 vols., Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 12–15 (Quaracchi, 1951–1957), is cited as Glossa; idem, Summa theologica [seu ab origine dicta Summa fratris Alexandri], 4 vols. [= Books I–III] (Quaracchi, 1924–1948), is cited as Summa; the prolegomena to vol. 4 are a separate volume. 2 See Roger Bacon, Opus minus, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1859), 325–9; cited in the preface to Glossa I, 24*–26*. Also see Rega Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 289–343, at 299.

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textbook in his ordinary lectures.3 Yet his commentary was not quoted in the schools or copied in the scriptoria. Some scholars assumed erroneously that the Summa universae theologiae or Summa fratris Alexandri was the Sentences commentary that resulted from Alexander’s lectures.4 The history of scholarship on this commentary is therefore closely connected with that of the Summa. For hundreds of years, the Summa was regarded as Alexander’s principal work; furthermore, he was thought to be its sole author.5 When, in the nineteenth century, the Franciscan friars of Quaracchi (near Florence, Italy) started the critical edition of St. Bonaventure’s works, first doubts regarding Alexander’s authorship appeared. Book IV of the Summa was completed by William of Middleton after Alexander’s death. This fact had been well known before, but now it was discovered that even the other books include texts by William of Middleton and Bonaventure.6 At the time when the edition of the Summa was started, however, the patres editores did not pay attention to these historical facts. Their prolegomena to the first book still defended Alexander’s sole authorship of the first three books. Subsequently, this approach came under much criticism, and the Summa’s varied sources—texts 3 See Marcia L. Colish, “From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the Summa. Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130–1215,” in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’ enseignement dans les universités médiévales. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9–11 septembre 1993), ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 9–29, esp. 17; also see Arthur Michael Landgraf, Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik unter dem Gesichtspunkte der Schulenbildung (Regensburg, 1948), 45. Colish is right that the Book of Sentences already was “an authoritative textbook in its own right” (17) before Alexander of Hales, but after Alexander the Sentences replaced the other textbooks of the twelfth century. 4 This mistake can be found, for example, in Jacques Quétif and Jacques Échard, Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum, vol. 1 (Paris, 1721), 497a. Later, Cardinal Franz Ehrle and the editors of the first volume of the Summa assumed that Alexander did not leave us a commentary on the Sentences. See François-Marie Henquinet, “Le commentaire d’Alexandre de Halès sur les Sentences enfin retrouvé,” in Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, vol. 2: Litteratura medioevale (Vatican City, 1946), 359–82, at 359–61. 5 Many codices from the thirteenth century are without title; others have titles such as Summa fratris Alexandri or Summa Sententiarum. They regard Alexander as the author of the work (see Summa IV, prolegomena, l–liv), as does the papal bull De fontibus paradisi (see Glossa I, 22*). Stegmüller lists some manuscripts of the Summa as commentaries on the Sentences; see Repertorium, nos. 59–61, pp. 31–3. Victorin Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. F. Stegmüller (Quaracchi, 1954), 14, identifies additional manuscripts of the Glossa. 6 See Summa I, nos. 262, 333, and 514–18; II, nos. 427–523. See Friedrich Pelster, “Literaturgeschichtliche Probleme im Anschluß an die Bonaventuraausgabe von Quaracchi,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 48 (1924): 500–32, esp. 500–06.

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by Alexander himself, but also by Jean de La Rochelle and others— were identified, so that in the 1930s the editors took a radical step. The printed sheets of the fourth volume (which was to contain Book III) were not released7 while the editors devoted themselves to a new extended introduction. This process lasted until 1948, when a fresh volume of prolegomena appeared, with more than 300 pages.8 In it, the editors succeeded in identifying the sources of most of the parts of the work. A further milestone was reached in 1945, with rediscovery of the commentary on the Sentences. On May 18 of that year François-Marie Henquinet, O.F.M., discovered that an anonymous manuscript preserved at Assisi contained a work by Alexander of Hales.9 This text turned out to be an important source for the Summa fratris Alexandri. Comparing the text of the newly discovered work with the incipits of other known commentaries, Henquinet came to the conclusion that a commentary in a London manuscript which had been ascribed to Nicholas Trivet was in fact identical to Alexander’s work in the Assisi codex. The circumstances of the time, however, did not allow him to examine the London manuscript personally. It was the Benedictine abbot Odon Lottin who described the codex and the specifics of the text it contains.10 Finally, in an article on the critical edition of the Summa and its new prolegomena Bernhard Geyer announced the discovery of a third manuscript: a codex from the municipal library of Erfurt, which contains the whole commentary.11

7 See Johannes M. Bissen, “De motivo Incarnationis. Disquisitio historico-dogmatica,” Antonianum 7 (1932): 314–36, at 317–23, used the critical text for his study. Also see Bernhard Geyer, “Der IV. Band der Summa des Alexander Halensis,” Franziskanische Studien 31 (1949): 1–14, esp. 1. 8 See Summa IV, prolegomena. Also see Victorin Doucet, “De Summa fratris Alexandri Halensis historice considerate,” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 40 (1948): 1–44; idem, “Autour des Prolegomena ad Summam fratris Alexandri,” AFH 43 (1950): 196–200; Ignatius Brady, “The Summa Theologica of Alexander of Hales (1924–1928),” AFH 70 (1977): 434–47; Geyer, “Der IV. Band.” 9 See Henquinet, “Le commentaire d’Alexandre de Halès,” 359–82. Also see Victorin Doucet, “A New Source of the Summa Fratris Alexandri: The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 6 (1946): 403–17; idem, “Quelques commentaires sur les Sentences de Pierre le Lombard,” Miscellanea lombardiana (Novara, 1957), 275–94, esp. 278; Glossa I, 106*. 10 See Odon Lottin, “Le commentaire d’Alexandre de Halès sur les Sentences,” RTAM 14 (1947): 93–6. 11 See Geyer, “Der IV. Band,” 5–10.

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The critical edition of the commentary was prepared on the basis of these three manuscripts. It appeared under the title, Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombard nunc demum reperta atque primum edita: vol. 1 in 1951, vol. 2 in 1952, vol. 3 in 1954, and vol. 4 in 1957.12 Father Henquinet passed away in 1950,13 before the publication of the first volume. After the appearance of the Glossa, his confrere Victorin Doucet edited the first series of Quaestiones disputatae (“antequam esset frater”), which appeared in 1960.14 He also embarked upon the edition of the second series (“postquam fuit frater”) but died suddenly in the same year. Current research concentrates on these later questions; a few of them have been edited in different places.15 Beryl Smalley has described Alexander’s commentaries on the four Gospels.16 They are another important field for further research. 12 The following reviews are of interest: Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale 6 (1950–1953): no. 1158, no. 2156; 7 (1954–57): no. 1052, no. 2618; Ignatius Brady, “The Series ‘Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica’ (1903–1968),” AFH 70 (1977): 412–20, at 419; Bonaventura a Mehr, “De operibus recenter critice editis Alexandri de Hales, Ioannis Duns Scoti, S. Bernardini Senensis,” Collectanea franciscana 21 (1951): 411–29, at 417–20. 13 See Glossa I, 5*. 14 See Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones disputatae “antequam esset frater,” 3 vols. (Quaracchi, 1960). 15 See Alexander of Hales, Quæstiones “de eternitate, evo, et tempore” et “de duratione mundi,” ed. Donald Melvin Nathanson (PhD thesis, University of Southern California, 1986); “Magistri Alexandri de fato. Questio est de fato, ed. J. Goergen aus Bologna cod. lat. 1158 (2312) sowie Bologna 2554, Bodleiana, Oxford cod. 292,” Franziskanische Studien 19 (1932): 23–39; Francisco Chavero Blanco, “La Quæstio de doctrina theologiæ del manuscrito Vat. Lat. 782. Introducción y Edición,” Carthaginensia 15 (1999): 31–72; Francisco Chavero Blanco (†) and Francisco Martínez Fresneda, “La Quæstio de beatitudine de Alejandro de Hales. Introducción y edición,” Carthaginensia 18 (2002): 115–38; Aleksander Horowski, “Questione disputata ‘De dotibus animae’ di Alessandro di Hales. Introduzione ed edizione,” in Verum, pulchrum et bonum. Miscellanea di studi offerti a Servus Gieben in occasione del suo 80° compleanno, ed. Yoannes Teklemariam (Rome, 2006), 337–95; Aleksander Horowski, “Le questioni disputate sul giudizio finale di Alessandro di Hales. Introduzione ed edizione,” Collectanea franciscana 75 (2005): 27–101; Aleksander Horowski, “Aleksander z Hales a zasady interpretacji Pisma Świętego,” Studia antyczne i mediewistyczne 4 [39] (2006): 195–206 (contains a part of Quodlibet IV on 205–06). 16 See Beryl Smalley, “The Gospels in the Paris Schools in the late 12th and Early 13th Centuries: Peter the Chanter, Hugh of St.-Cher, Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle,” in eadem, The Gospels in the Schools c. 1100–c. 1280 (London, 1985), 99–196. Only short parts are edited; see Abigail Ann Young, “Accessus ad Alexandrum: The Praefatio to the Postilla in Johannis Evangelium of Alexander of Hales (1186?–1245),” Mediaeval Studies 52 (1990): 1–23; Aleksander Horowski, “I prologhi delle ‘Postillae’ ai vangeli sinottice di Alessandro di Hales,” Collectanea franciscana 77 (2007): 27–62. Also see Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 34–6; Aleksander Horowski,

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The discovery of these authentic writings, above all of the Glossa, allows us a fresh perspective on the state of theology in the first half of the thirteenth century. Although the Quaestiones disputatae contain parts of Alexander’s theology, only the Glossa presents the various arguments in their overall coherence, thereby affording us the chance to see Alexander’s authentic theology as a whole. Thanks to the discovery of the Glossa, there is now some literature that takes a systematic approach to this famous medieval thinker.17 Historical Background We do not know much about Alexander’s early life. As usual in the medieval period, his surname indicates his origin, Hales in Shropshire, England, where he was born around 1185. He stayed in contact with England throughout his life. In the first years of the thirteenth century he arrived at the University of Paris, where he studied and taught artes liberales. From about 1220 he taught at the theological faculty. During the conflict between the university and the bishop of Paris in 1229–1231 Alexander went into exile. In 1241–1244 he took part in the condemnations of Aristotle. In 1236 he became a Franciscan friar, which gave the friars a chair in the theological faculty. In 1245 he participated in the First Council of Lyons. Just after he returned to Paris, he died suddenly and was buried in the church of the Franciscans.18 “ ‘Postillae Magistri Alexandri super Isaiam.’ Alla ricerca del loro autore,” Collectanea franciscana 77 (2007): 519–40. 17 In chronological order: Horst Graen, Die Seelenlehre des Alexander von Hales dargestellt nach seiner Sentenzenglosse und den “Quaestiones antequam esset frater” (Ph.D. thesis, Munich, 1965); Walter H. Principe, Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1967); Venicio Marcolino, Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte. Untersuchung zum dogmatischen Verständnis des Alten Testaments als heilsgeschichtliche Epoche nach Alexander von Hales (Münster, 1970); Italo Fornaro, La teologia dell’immagine nella Glossa di Alessandro d’ Hales (Louvain-la-Neuve/ Vicenza, 1985); Hubert Philipp Weber, Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter (Innsbruck, 2003); Aleksander Horowski, La “visio Dei” come forma della conoscenza umana in Alessandro di Hales. Una lettura della “Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum” e delle “Quaestiones disputatae” (Rome, 2005). 18 Sources on Alexander’s life: Victorin Doucet, “Alessandro di Hales,” in Enciclopedia cattolica, vol. 1 (Vatican City, 1948), 784–7; Ignatius Brady, “Alexander of Hales,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1 (New York, 1967), 73–5; Werner Dettloff, “Alexander Halesius,” in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1978), 245–8; Kenan B. Osborne, “Alexander of Hales (Precursor and Promoter of Franciscan Theology),” in The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (St. Bonaventure,

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As magister regens Alexander was the first to use the Lombard’s Sentences as a textbook for his ordinary lectures. The Glossa is a fruit of these lectures on the Sentences. Nevertheless, Alexander also composed commentaries on the Bible—for example, on the four Gospels, on Job, and on Isaiah—but most of them remain unedited.19 It is clear, therefore, that he also gave lectures on the Bible and did not intend to replace the Bible with the Sentences. Alexander left more then 200 quaestiones disputatae on various topics20 and a small series of sermons.21 An early work, probably from the time he taught in the faculty of arts, is the small Exoticon,22 a textbook containing twenty-two Greek verses with translations and explanations. In 1241–1242 a team of four Franciscan theologians that included Alexander wrote an exposition to the Rule of Saint Francis, the Expositio quattuor.23 The Summa fratris Alexandri is a work by Alexander and his entire school (Jean de La Rochelle and Eudes Rigaud, among others; William of Melitona compiled the last book, which includes texts by Bonaventure).24 The Textual Tradition of the Glossa and its Three Redactions Having completed the fourth volume of their edition of the Summa fratris Alexandri with the prolegomena, the editors started working on Alexander’s authentic texts, and first on the Sentences commentary. Although for centuries it was believed to be lost, we now know several manuscripts containing the text partly or as a whole. N.Y., 1994), 1–38; Christopher M. Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, Mass., 2003), 104–07; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 11–41. 19 For editions see above note 16. 20 For editions see above notes 14–5. A list can be found in Summa IV, prolegomena, cli–cciii. 21 See Johannes Baptist Schneyer, “Eine Sermonesreihe des Mgr. Alexander von Hales in der Hs. Pavias, Univ. Aldini 479, f. 128ra–180vb,” AFH 58 (1965): 537–51; idem, Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150– 1350, vol. 1 (Münster, 1969), 269–70; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 36–7. 22 See Alexander of Hales, “Exoticon,” in Teaching and Learning Latin in Thirteenth-Century England, vol. 1: Texts, ed. Toni Hunt (Cambridge, 1991), 298–322. Also see Victorin Doucet, “Alessandro di Hales,” 785; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 37. 23 See Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241– 1242). Accedit eiusdem Regulae textus cum fontibus et locis parallelis, ed. Livarius Oliger (Rome, 1950). Also see Dieter Berg, Armut und Wissenschaft. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Studienwesens der Bettelorden im 13. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 1977), 72–3. 24 See above note 8.

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The critical edition of the Glossa is based upon five main sources. These codices principales are, first, MS. Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, 189 (A), written in a Gothic minuscule of the thirteenth century. Today the codex contains only a complete text of the Glossa. It seems to have been written in Paris, by a scribe uneducated in theology and in Latin. The catalog from 1381 describes the codex as follows: “Lectura super quatuor libros Sententiarum et questiones theologice diversarum materiarum.” The quaestiones theologicae that the catalog mentions are lost. Although the catalog and the codex do not specify an author, marginal notes by a later hand that appear on the first folio and on a paper sheet glued onto the second folio indicate: Glossa Alexandri.25 The second manuscript is MS. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. Amplon. O. 68 (E), which dates from the thirteenth century as well. It was written in a small cursive bookhand in Germany by a single scribe who was well versed in theology. The codex contains no hint of the author. Overall, the text is the same as the one in A, though much better: with fewer mistakes and a number of additions.26 The third codex is MS. London, Library of Lambeth Palace, 347 (L), from the thirteenth century. It contains William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea (fols. 4a–154d) and the first three books of Alexander’s commentary (fols. 155a–246d). The latter part is written in a semi-cursive English hand. A marginal note on the first folio tells that est opus fratris Nicholai Trivet. However, the text is overall identical with the one in A, so that it has to be attributed to Alexander. The books are in varying condition: the text in the first book is very good and similar to A, in the second book the text is very poor, yet also similar to A, whereas the text of the third book differs considerably from A.27 Two codices contain only the fourth book of Alexander’s commentary, namely, the MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16406 (P), a codex from the thirteenth century written in Gothic script. It contains 53 of Alexander’s quaestiones (fols. 2a–152d), Questiones et postille super IV librum Sententiarum usque ad XXIII. Dist., as the index describes them (fols. 153r–217v), and finally, nine quaestiones, one by Alexander, the others by Odo de Castro Radulphi.28 The MS. Todi, Biblioteca comunale, 121 (T)—from the thirteenth century

25 26 27 28

Descriptions are found in Glossa I, 77*–80*; Summa IV, prolegomena, ccvi. See Glossa I, 80*–81*. See Lottin, “Le commentaire,” 93–9; Glossa I, 81*–83*. See Glossa I, 83*–84*; Summa IV, prolegomena, cxxxvii–cxxxviii and cxciv.

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and written in small Gothic script—contains 58 of Alexander’s quaestiones (fols. 3a–61a), a commentary on the Sentences, Book I–III, by an unknown author (fols. 62a–143d), as well as Book IV of the Glossa (fols. 145a–182b). The text is essentially the same as in A, E, and P. A final part contains 25 of Alexander’s quaestiones (fols. 183a–200b).29 These five manuscripts are the principal sources from which the edition was prepared. There are also a number of auxiliary codices containing parts of the text, citations, excerpts, often together with other works, so for instance with Hugh of St.-Cher’s commentary on the Sentences, Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de bono, William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea, works by Albert the Great, etc.30 The principal codices allow us to infer that there were three redactions of the Glossa’s text. The differences can be explained if we assume that there was a reportatio of Alexander’s lecture which was copied several times. The editors assert a “unity in the tradition of manuscripts.”31 Thus errors and omissions can often be explained as simple mistakes in writing. There are also many additions, however; these significant differences among the redactions require discussion. A is the oldest manuscript with the shortest and least perfect text, which is accompanied by marginal corrections and additions in another hand. A appears to be the oldest copy of the reportatio of the Glossa; it gives the most authentic but erroneous text. But it cannot be A from which the other copies were made.32 In the first and second books codex L provides more or less the same text as A, but in the third book there are signs of another redaction: arguments have been rearranged, and new notes, questions, and arguments have been added. Furthermore, the order of arguments and the quotations from the Sentences have been checked and corrected. Almost the entire text from A is found in L as well. The editors consider L as authentic.33 Does it contain the report of another set of lec-

29

See Glossa I, 84*–85*; Summa IV, prolegomena, cxxxv–cxxxvi. See Glossa I, 85*–102*. Another manuscript is MS. Arras 855 (526), Parisian, late thirteenth century. It contains the text of Book I, mixed with Hugh of Saint-Cher’s commentary. It was discovered after the edition of the first book was already complete. See Pierre Bougard, “À propos d’Alexandre de Hales: le ms. 855 (526) d’Arras,” AFH 50 (1957): 212–17. 31 Glossa I, 119*. 32 See Glossa I, 116*; III, 7*. 33 See Glossa I, 120*–126*; II, 6*–8*; III, 7*–8*. 30

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tures or does it represent an improved written version of the Glossa? Was it prepared by the master himself or by one of his disciples? A solution to these questions is no longer possible. The critical edition of the third book separately offers the complete texts of AE and L for each distinction, followed by a list of additions in E, with cross-references in brackets at the end of each number. Redaction E corrects many errors found in A. But there are also many additions, especially in the second and third books. Sometimes the answers to questions are introduced by the word respondeo, but these answers are frequently infelicitous or use texts that do not make sense or are cited anyway a few lines later in the text. Most of these additions are taken from other works, such as Praepositinus’s Summa, William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea, Hugh of St.-Cher’s commentary on the Sentences, Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de bono, Stephen Langton’s Quaestiones, and Alexander’s other writings.34 The text of E, therefore, was written after the Summa de bono, so that the additions cannot be considered authentic. In the critical edition, there is a distinct apparatus in Books I, II, and IV for the longer additions from E. In Book III, these additions appear after the text of L, as I have already pointed out. In all manuscripts, the Glossa is unfinished. Book IV ends with distinction 39.35 Thus, the treatise on Last Things (dist. 43–50) and parts of the treatise on matrimony (dist. 40–42) are missing.36 We do not know whether they got lost or never existed. The Summa fratris Alexandri usually makes use of A and L while ignoring the additions of E, but there are also examples where its text is similar to that of E. This “mysterious” fact37 throws light upon the history of the Summa. Regarding the reliability of the Glossa’s text, normally the text of two redactions is valid over against the sole variant (AE over against L; AL over against E; LE over against A). The additions of L in the third book are a special case, since they are to be understood as another authentic redaction of Alexander’s text.

34 35 36 37

See Glossa III, 7*–8*. Codex B ends with distinction 34 no. 4, P even with distinction 25 no. 1. See Glossa IV, 7*. Glossa III, 8*.

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Both the Chronicon de Lanercost38 and the Firmamenta trium ordinum S. Francisci39 testify to the fact that Alexander provided a lectura on the Sentences. But is the Glossa handed down to us in codex A and the other codices identical with this commentary? The quotations and excerpts found in Richard Rufus, Albert the Great, Eudes Rigaud, in anonymous commentaries,40 and in the Summa de anima of Jean de La Rochelle indicate the age of this text. Moreover, the compilers of the Summa fratris Alexandri used it as their main source. Then, there are external criteria which militate in favor of Alexander’s authorship, namely, the twofold ascription of the Glossa to him in codex A. Codex L, on the other hand, is ascribed to Nicholas Trivet and contains a marginal note, “Istam positionem mutavit frater Alexander et reliquit in Summa.”41 Some citations from the Glossa in other manuscripts are identified as stemming from “A.”—thus, for example, eighteen times in the anonymous MS. Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, 103.42 It is therefore very plausible that the Glossa is authentic and identical with the lectura mentioned by the Chronicon. When did the master give the lectures which a student transcribed from his notes? It seems that this occurred before Alexander became a friar—that is to say, before 1236—because he was already a famous magister regens of the theological faculty when he joined the Franciscan order. If this is correct, the Glossa forms part of his earlier works. By examining the sources used in the Glossa and citations from it that appear in other works the date of the lectures can be established more accurately. Let us first search for the terminus ante quem. The Glossa is known and used by Albert the Great, Eudes Rigaud, and the anonymous compilers of MSS. Assisi 103, Todi 121 and Vat. lat. 691 (written about 1240). Texts from the Glossa appear in the Summa fratris Alexandri

38

See Glossa I, 33*. See Glossa I, 46*. 40 These commentaries are found in MSS. Vat. lat. 691, Todi 121, Assisi 103, etc. 41 Glossa I, dist. 37, no. 36 (p. 386, note). 42 See Glossa I, 85*–91* and dist. 2, no. 1 (p. 153, note). Citations of the Glossa, identified as the work of “A,” are also found in Richard Rufus, Commentarius oxoniensis (see ibid., 99*–100*), in the anonymous Tractatus de fide (see ibid., 101*), in MS. Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, conv. soppr. G.V.347 (see ibid., 93*–94*), in the Speculum iuniorum, and in Henricus Merseburgensis (see ibid., 98*–99*). 39

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(ca. 1240–1245), also in Richard Fishacre (ca. 1235–1240) and Jean de La Rochelle, who wrote his Summa de anima in 1235–1240. On the other hand, the texts compiled in MS. Douai 434 (ca. 1230–1235), Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de bono (before 1235), and Hugh of St.-Cher’s Sentences commentary (ca. 1232) seem to have been written after the Glossa. Between 1229 and 1232, Alexander was absent from Paris so that he did not deliver any lectures during this period.43 Finally, the nearly 700 quotations of juridical texts from old compilations in Book IV indicate that the text had to be complete before 1234 or even 1227. For in 1234 the Decretales Gregorii IX, which came into use in 1226–1227, were made authoritative for all schools and universities; but the Glossa does not appear to know of them.44 On the other hand, Alexander quotes the Periphysion of John Scottus Eriugena, which was forbidden in 1225.45 The text of the Glossa, then, must have been completed before 1227. Alexander’s relation to the Dominican Hugh of St.-Cher is a special one. History shows them often together. Hugh joined the Dominican order in 1225 as magister regens, just as Alexander would do with the Franciscans in 1236. At the first Council of Lyons, in 1245, they took part in a commission for the canonization of Edmund of Abingdon, Hugh as cardinal and Alexander as master of theology.46 Alexander’s biblical commentaries, composed after 1236, make use of Hugh’s works. The Glossa, on the other hand, is earlier than Hugh’s commentary on the Sentences, so that parallel passages in the two works should be interpreted as Hugh using the Glossa, rather than vice versa.47

43

See Glossa I, 66*–68*. See Kilian F. Lynch, “A terminus ante quem for the Commentary of Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 10 (1950): 46–68; idem, “Some Fontes of the Commentary of Hugh de Saint Cher: William of Auxerre, Guy d’Orchelles, Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 119–146; Glossa IV, 19*–21*. 45 See Glossa II, 20*–21*. The (anonymous) quotation appears in Glossa II, dist. 8, no. 12 (pp. 79–80). 46 See Luchesius Spätling, “Der Anteil der Franziskaner an den Generalkonzilien des Spätmittelalters,” Antonianum 36 (1961): 300–40, esp. 308–10; Palémon Glorieux, “Les années 1242–1247 à la faculté de théologie de Paris,” RTAM 29 (1962): 234–49, esp. 244; Hans Wolter and Henri Holstein, Lyon I/Lyon II (Mainz, 1972), 72; António Domingues de Sousa Costa, “Presenza di Alessandro di Hales e di Vincentius Hispanus al I Concilio di Lione,” Antonianum 59 (1984): 71–218, at 210–14; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 20–1. 47 The editors mention this relationship in each volume. See Glossa I, 112*–113*; II, 18*–20*; III, 15*–16*; IV, 36*–44*. In their prolegomena to Book IV the editors discuss thoroughly the position of Kilian F. Lynch, “Some Fontes of the Commentary 44

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As for the terminus post quem, it is sure that the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) occurred a few years before Alexander’s lectures on Peter Lombard. Alexander cites it as “recently held” (nuper habitum) and says that it addressed the question of “the three almighties” (tres omnipotentes).48 This is not the text found in the Decretals, where the three persons are called coomnipotentes;49 Alexander quotes the expression from an older version. It is probable that Alexander knew William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea (composed in 1220 or a few years later). Although this text is not quoted by name, there are some arguments that the Glossa ascribes to “others” (aliqui) or to “someone” (quidam) which are from the Summa aurea.50 The composition of Alexander’s commentary, therefore, cannot have occurred before 1220 (the editors even mention 1223 as the earliest date) and not after 1227.51 Alexander’s Method The editors have given Alexander’s commentary the title of Glossa, following the notes in MS. A. The Chronicon de Lanercost and an old catalog in Assisi, on the other hand, call the work lectura. Now lectura does not mean scriptum; the word designates a commentary given in lectures and written down by the students (in reportationes). It is not a text written or corrected or edited by Alexander, but represents only students’ notes. Thus, the text is not absolutely reliable in terms of giving an accurate picture of Alexander’s teaching.52 The redactors of the Summa, however, used the Glossa extensively for their compilation. So it enjoyed a good deal of authority in Alexander’s circle.

of Hugh de St. Cher,” who defends the priority of Hugh’s commentary; they reaffirm that the Glossa has to be dated before Hugh’s commentary. See Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 25–7, 35–6. 48 Glossa I, dist. 22, no. 9 (pp. 219–20). 49 Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion symbolorum, 37th ed. (Freiburg i. Br., 1991), no. 800. 50 Glossa I, 114*–116*, specifies seven passages and compares them with the Summa aurea. 51 This date follows from Glossa I, 110*–116*; II, 20*–21*. Also see Odon Lottin, Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale 6 (1951): nos. 759 and 1158. 52 See Glossa I, 108*–110*.

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In his lectures Alexander employs a range of different methods.53 Most of the time he provides literal expositions and additions to the Lombard’s text. To make use of this textbook Alexander divided the Sentences into “distinctions,” as the Chronicon de Lanercost reports54— which is why Richard Rufus calls the master the divisor.55 This division is meant to emphasize the structure of Peter Lombard’s book. The Lombard provided only a division into chapters. In Alexander’s work the 210 chapters of Book I, for example, are bundled into 48 thematic distinctions.56 The particular passages in the Sentences on which Alexander is commenting are indicated by means of lemmata; these are sometimes introduced with super, as is the case in older commentaries such as Peter Comestor’s or Stephen Langton’s, but also in later works such as the Sentences commentary by Philip the Chancellor.57 Sometimes the Lombard’s “sentences,” or authoritative statements, are also cited within the text, by means of distinction and chapter numbers.58 Earlier glosses gave literal expositions in the form of marginal notes; later commentaries would use the form of questions. Alexander stands between these two forms, marking a transition. He goes new ways, setting an example for later generations. Some examples will show the different forms of commentary that occur in the Glossa. Short literal explications are similar to marginal glosses; for instance: Toward sensuality. But human sensuality, where venial sin resides, is not common; therefore it pertains to reason.59

The first verse of Genesis is commented upon as briefly as possible: In the beginning, that is, in the Son.60

53 Later commentaries followed set conventions concerning their form and method, but these did not yet exist when Alexander gave his lectures. See Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 67. 54 The text of the Chronicon can be found in Glossa I, 33*–34*. 55 See Glossa I, 108*. 56 See Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 62–4. 57 For further details, see Ignatius Brady, “The Distinctions of Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 25 (1965): 90–116; Peter Lombard, Sentences I/1, 143*–144*; Glossa I, 107*–108*; Ludwig Hödl, “Petrus Lombardus,” in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol. 26 (Berlin, 1996), 296–303, at 298. 58 See, for example, Glossa I, dist. 31, no. 14 (p. 303). 59 “Ad sensualitatem. Sed sensualitas humana, in qua est veniale peccatum, non est commune; ergo ad rationem pertinet” (Glossa II, dist. 24, n. 11 [p. 213]). 60 “In principio, id est in Filio” (Glossa II, dist. 1, no. 3 [p. 2]).

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The Sentences themselves are a collection of quotations from authorities. Alexander often adds a few arguments to Peter Lombard’s discussion, as well as authorities not found in Peter Lombard. One of them is Anselm of Canterbury, but also Bernard of Clairvaux, the Victorines, the Glossa ordinaria, occasionally Aristotle. Peter Lombard himself is also cited, in the form of cross-references such as: Usually is asked, etc. In distinction 34, chapter A bad will, this matter is treated.61

Most of Alexander’s remarks are in the form of proto-quaestiones. The highlighted passages of Peter Lombard are used as arguments for the discussion; sometimes other arguments are adduced, introduced with adhuc. Alexander will advance an alternative argument by means of contra or sed contra. Finally the answer, indicated with the word dicendum or respondeo, offers a solution to the problem. Sometimes there are more arguments or more solutions, added with item, or some additional notes, introduced with nota or with notandum est. It is rare to encounter self-contained treatises in the Glossa, treatises that take a catchword from the Sentences and then develop an entire theological theme. Examples of such treatises are the discussions concerning the notiones divinae 62 or concerning conscience as synderesis.63 Alexander uses a similar question format in his Quaestiones disputatae, but it is shorter and simpler in the Glossa. The quaestio format, which dominates the Glossa, shows that the Glossa marks a new mode of using the Sentences; it also points to a new manner of giving university lectures. It foreshadows the later question-style commentaries of authors like Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, although Alexander’s commentary “is far more bound to the text” than these later types.64 So it is quite impossible to read the Glossa without having the Sentences at hand. Alexander’s quotations from the Sentences are abridged and often full of mistakes; indeed, occasionally they cannot even be found in the

61 “Solet etiam quaeri etc. XXXIV distinctione, cap. Mala voluntas, habetur de hoc” (Glossa II, dist. 22, no. 16 [p. 201]). 62 See Glossa I, dist. 34, no. 6 (pp. 341–6). 63 See Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 (pp. 380–5). 64 Russell L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320: General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. I, 41–128, at 88.

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Lombardian text! Some of them can be traced to the copy that Alexander used for his lectura.65 Holy Scripture, too, is quoted with many mistakes; the same holds true for passages from the Church Fathers. The editors attribute these flaws to the reportatio of Alexander’s lecture from which all other texts were copied. Otherwise we would have to assume that a book which the master himself wrote und used was full of such errors and mistakes, but that seems unlikely.66 Of course, a few of the incorrect quotations may also have been caused by the loose way of quoting that is typical in a lecture. Alexander’s Conception of the Theology of the Sentences Alexander begins his lecture course with a brief introitus in which he outlines his views on the first book of the Sentences and on the work as a whole. He does not examine the term theologia, which he does not even use in a technical sense in the Glossa,67 although he would investigate it in the later Quaestio de theologia,68 which is the source for the relevant question in the Summa fratris Alexandri. In the Glossa he introduces his students to the Master’s systematic approach, also making some remarks about the method and content of the work. At the beginning of the fourth book Alexander provides another introduction, which looks back at the first three books and then ahead to the sacraments, which constitute the ever-present and ever-renewing participation in salvation.

65 In Glossa I, dist. 31, no. 14 (p. 303), he quotes and interprets the phrase ingenita largitate, “unbegotten abundance,” but Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 14, chap. 2, no. 2 (p. 226 l. 24) writes ingenti largitate, “enormous abundance.” 66 See Glossa I, 108*–109*. 67 The word is used only once in the Glossa, as a synonym for Holy Scripture: “Primus enim liber theologiae, Genesis, licet . . .” (“The first book of theology, that is to say, Genesis . . .”; Glossa II, dist. 1 no. 3 [p. 1]). 68 See Francisco Chaverio Blanco, “La Quaestio de doctrina theologiae del manuscrito Vat. Lat. 782. Introducción y edición,” Carthaginensia 15 (1999): 31–72. Doucet, Summa IV, prolegomena, cxcix–cciii, has doubts on Alexander’s authorship of this question (qu. 238), but the scholarly discussion has shown clearly that the question belongs to the authentic works; see Marcolino, Das Alte Testament in der Heilsgeschichte, 20–1, note 35.

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Alexander begins his introitus to the first book69 with a discussion of its materia, its content, taking inspiration from two words from Exodus. The content of the first book is God, the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the God of Moses, who revealed himself in the burning bush (see Ex. 3:14–15: “And God said to Moses, ‘i am who i am’ . . . the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob . . .”). The other three books treat of God as the savior of Israel, the poor and oppressed people, in accordance with Ex. 3:7–8: “And the lord said, ‘I have surely seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt. . . .’ ”70 From this first paragraph Alexander draws two conclusions. First, the content of theology, its materia or subiectum,71 is always God, who is known because He made himself known in His self-revelation. He is the God testified in Holy Scripture, the God of Israel, and the God of Jesus Christ, as will be shown later. Secondly, Alexander conceives of theology as based upon the history of salvation. The book does not start with a theory of theology like the Summa.72 God reveals himself in showing mercy to his people, giving them the promise of salvation, and leading them into the freedom of the Promised Land. Thus, the experience of God and the faith following from it precede any reflection. The order of the four books is explained following an exegesis of the biblical quotation cited in the first paragraph. Theology is salvation history, telling the story of Israel’s liberation from slavery in Egypt as the story of the liberation of man from the slavery of sin by grace.73 Alexander pursues his argument with two Augustinian distinctions from the De doctrina christiana which play a prominent role in the Sentences.74 The fundamental division between “things” (res) and 69 See Glossa I, introitus (pp. 1–4). Also see Ulrich G. Leinsle, Einführung in die scholastische Theologie (Paderborn, 1995), 143; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 45–6; Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 64–7. On the other hand, Ulrich Köpf, Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1974), 67–9, does not use this text. 70 Glossa I, introitus, no. 1 (p. 1). See Hans Kraml, Die Rede von Gott sprachkritisch rekonstruiert aus Sentenzenkommentaren (Innsbruck, 1984), 91; Leinsle, Einführung, 143; Fornaro, La teologia dell’immagine, 48–51; Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 45–6. 71 See Kraml, Die Rede von Gott, 78–9; Köpf, Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie, 82–6. 72 See Summa I, no. 1–7 (pp. 1–13). 73 Glossa I, introitus, n. 3–7 (pp. 2–4). 74 See Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 1, chap. 1, no. 1 (p. 55).

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“signs” (signa) allows us to understand the task and formal object of theology. This distinction does not imply an essential incompatibility between things and signs: signs are also things, although things are not always signs. The “things” are distinguished following another Augustinian division, namely, that between “using” (uti) and “enjoying” ( frui). Some things should only be enjoyed—as Augustine says, they should be loved for their own sake. Only the one and Trinitarian God belongs in this category. Other things should only be used, that is, they should be loved for God’s sake. This applies to creation. Alexander goes on to distinguish a third group of things which should be both enjoyed and used: Christ, the God-Man, and the gifts of God, that is to say, the virtues (virtutes) and commandments (praecepta).75 The first three books of the Sentences concern things, while the fourth deals with signs, that is, the sacraments of the church.76 Once again we see Alexander’s tendency to view theology through the lens of salvation history. The theologian speaks about God, but about a God with whom man wants to be in communion. Human life as Christian life is aimed at this communion with the Trinity. Thus the first and fundamental question is not how to know something about God, but how to live and to reach beatitude. Theology speaks about God from an existential human point of view. This also means that theology speaks about man as creature, as made by God; it speaks about man from God’s point of view, as it were. Alexander introduces another organizing principle in the last paragraph of the introitus: There is a twofold order. There is an order of things as they emerge from the Creator or Recreator or Renewer, and this is how this work proceeds. And there is an order of things as they are led back to the Creator . . .77

The idea of exitus and reditus, creation and recreation, opus creationis and opus recreationis serves as the structuring pattern of Hugh of

75 This third group differs from the Augustinian original. The Bishop of Hippo distinguishes things to be used, things to be enjoyed, and things to be both used and to enjoy; see De doctrina christiana I, chap. 4, no. 4. 76 Glossa I, introitus, no. 2 (p. 1). 77 “Duplex est ordo. Est ordo rerum prout exeunt a Creatore vel Recreatore vel Reparatore, et sic proceditur in hoc opere. Et est ordo rerum prout reducuntur ad Creatorem . . .” (Glossa I, introitus, no. 8 [p. 4]). See Hermann J. Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Scotus (Freiburg i. Br., 1973), 47–8.

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St.-Victor’s De sacramentis christianae fidei.78 The order of theology is God’s own order. Thus God is the “subject” of theology in both senses of the word, the medieval and the modern: He is its subject matter (materia), but He is also the one who reveals the truth. That is why Alexander can use the term theologia as a synonym for Holy Scripture.79 The Introitus to Book IV The introduction to the fourth book80 also starts with a biblical quotation, in this case from the fourth book of Kings: “Go and wash in the Jordan seven times” (IV Kings 5:10). The book is devoted to the seven sacraments: Here the sacraments are treated, and grace, received through the sacraments, and beatitude, which follows all the graces.81

After this first remark Alexander adds an outline of the structure of the Sentences as a whole, including the topics of the four books: The first book deals with those [things] which belong to the Creator as far as the unity of His essence and the Trinity of persons [are concerned], and with His knowledge, will, and power, which are spoken about in relation to creature.82

Thus, the doctrine of God forms the subject matter of Book I, beginning with God’s unity and Trinity. The terms “essence” and “person” describe the immanent Trinity, whereas “knowledge,” “will,” and “power” identify God’s economic relation to the created world. The first book, then, discusses God as the Creator. Book II is dedicated to creation: The second book speaks about the threefold creature, namely, corporeal, spiritual, and composed of both, every one of which [comes] from nothing. And it speaks about what proceeds from the twofold creature—the simply or partly spiritual one—insofar as it is nothing. Similarly, there is a

78 Hugh talks about opus conditionis and opus restaurationis as the materia of Holy Scripture. See Hugh of St.-Victor, De sacramentis, I, prologus, chap. 2 (PL 176: 183–4). 79 See note 65 above. 80 See Glossa IV, introitus (pp. 1–8). 81 “Hic agitur de sacramentis, et de gratia suscepta per sacramenta, et de beatitudine consequente omnes gratias” (Glossa IV, introitus, no. 1 [p. 1]). 82 “In primo libro agitur de iis quae pertinent ad Creatorem quoad unitatem essentiae et trinitatem personarum, et de scientia, voluntate et potentia, quae respectu creaturae dicuntur” (Glossa IV, introitus, no. 2 [p. 1]).

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threefold difference in the latter, that is, in sin, which is likewise touched upon there. For it is sin that damages the person, it is sin that damages the nature; [and there is] a third [kind of sin], which damages the person by reason of the nature. The first is called “actual,” the second is called “the sin of the first parents,” the third “original.”83

Creature, Alexander explains, is either material or spiritual, or it unites both dimensions. Common to all forms of creation is that they come from nothing (ex nihilo), so that creature itself produces nothingness. Men’s contribution to salvation history, therefore, is sin, which shows its effect only in damage. The second book ends with a detailed discussion regarding the origins and forms of sin. In the third book the One who repairs the damage of that [kind of ] creature is treated which can be repaired, that is to say, of the composite one; for the purely spiritual one was not able to be repaired. [It also treats] the graces and the precepts.84

The central idea of the third book is called “renewal,” “restoration,” or “reparation” (reparatio). Only the human creature, however, is capable of being renewed—purely spiritual creatures (the angels who have fallen) cannot be renewed, nor are purely corporeal creatures subject to renewal, since they do not require it. Christ, of course, is the renewer, and renewal is brought to humanity through grace and the commandments. Since these [graces and precepts] are not yet sufficient for salvation, this fourth book deals with the sacraments and the graces of the sacraments. These graces of the sacraments do not only concern what flows directly from God, but also what [comes] through the Mediator; and it deals with beatitude and the punishment [opposed to it]. This is first touched upon at the beginning of the authority, where is said, “Go and wash in the Jordan seven times” (IV Kings 5:10), and secondly it is touched upon by this [word] which says, “Your flesh will receive sanity etc.” [ibid.].85

83 “In secundo autem libro dicitur de creatura triplici, videlicet corporali, spirituali et composita ex utraque, quarum unaquaeque ex nihilo; et de eo quod procedit ex creatura duplici, spirituali simpliciter vel in parte, in quantum nihil est. Et est similiter triplex differentia illius, id est peccati, quae similiter tangitur ibi. Est enim peccatum quod corrumpit personam, et est peccatum quod corrumpit naturam; tertium quod personam corrumpit ratione naturae. Primum dicitur actuale; secundum dicitur peccatum primorum parentum; tertium originale” (Glossa IV, introitus, no. 2 [p. 1]). 84 “In tertio vero libro agitur de reparatore corruptionis illius creaturae quae reparabilis, scilicet compositae: pure enim spiritualis non fuit reparabilis; et de gratiis et praeceptis” (Glossa IV, introitus, no. 2 [pp. 1–2]). 85 “In hoc quarto libro, quia nondum est in iis sufficientia ad salutem, agit de sacramentis et gratiis sacramentorum: quae gratiae sacramentorum non respiciunt solum

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The last book, then, is devoted to the sacraments, that is, to the concrete signs of grace in life and in faith. The grace of the sacraments flows through the Mediator, so that the theology of the sacraments is connected both with Christology and with the theology of grace. The last part of this book should contain a treatment of Last Things, but—as we saw earlier—this part is missing in Alexander’s Glossa. The following paragraphs of the introitus offer an exegesis of the story of Naaman’s salvation in the Jordan in relation to the sacraments. The Divisio Textus of Book III Alexander’s commentary on Book II starts immediately with the first distinction. The third book, however, contains an extensive divisio textus,86 which serves in lieu of an introitus. Yet while the introitus are brief theological texts with a systematic approach, the divisio only provides an overview of the contents of the book in a more technical way—almost like a table of contents: In the third book the Renewer is treated, as well as the gifts through which the renewal is brought about and the precepts by whose fulfillment there is merit according to the state of first perfection. The first part, which is about the Renewer, extends up to the distinction 23, which starts with, “But since above”; the second extends up to distinction 37, which starts with, “For there are two precepts of charity.”87

Similar divisiones textus can be found later in the tradition; for example, at the beginning of each question in Bonaventure’s commentary. The divisio textus indicates a tendency toward a more formalized style of giving lectures on the Sentences.88

quod immediate influit a Deo, sed quod per Mediatorem; et de beatitudine et poena opposita. Tangitur primum per hoc quod dicitur in principio auctoritatis, per hoc quod dicit: Vade et lavare septies in Iordane; secundum autem tangitur per hoc quod dicitur: Recipiet sanitatem caro tua etc.” (Glossa IV, introitus, no. 3 [p. 2]). 86 See Glossa III, divisio textus (pp. 1–9) (MSS. AE); the parallel text from MS. L appears at the end of the book, pp. 552–62. 87 “In tertio libro agitur de Reparatore, et de donis quibus fit reparatio, et de praeceptis in quorum adimpletione est mereri secundum statum primae perfectionis. Prima pars quae est de Reparatore, extenditur usque ad XXIII distinctionem, quae sic incipit: Cum vero supra; secunda extenditur usque ad XXXVII distinctionem, quae sic incipit: Cum duo sint praecepta caritatis” (Glossa III, divisio textus, no. 1 [p. 1]). The text of MS. L differs slightly. For statum primae perfectionis it has statum perfectionis personae, and for prima pars it has summa pars. See ibid., p. 552. 88 See Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 64–5.

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Some Texts A brief selection of texts will enable us to grasp something of Alexander’s way of thinking. I have chosen some discussions of themes that were to become important in the wake of Alexander’s commentary: the term “person,” conscience and synderesis, and the question concerning the reasons for the Incarnation. The Definition of “Person” Although the use of the term “person” in theology is full of difficulties, it is crucial for the Christian doctrine of God. In Alexander’s Glossa the term occurs in the first three books. He defines “person” in his own way, adding an original definition (later called definitio magistralis) to the existing ones and demarcating the field of its use. This example of his theology has a rich Wirkungsgeschichte, or history of reception. The first book contains a threefold definition. Alexander does not reduce the three ways to one. In fact, each of the three definitions has a significance of its own and is therefore used in specific contexts. The first definition is taken from Boethius. Here is the full text of the relevant paragraph: But here is asked. Boethius [writes] in the book On the Two Natures: “A person is an individual substance of a reasonable nature.” But although there are three persons, there are nevertheless not three substances, but three hypostases. Hence Boethius [writes] there: “With this definition of persons we have determined what the Greeks call ‘hypostasis.’ ” And the same [Boethius says] later: “The Greek language is not poor in words, but it renders ‘essence,’ ‘subsistence,’ ‘substance,’ ‘person’ by so many words: ‘essence’ [is called] ousia, ‘subsistence’ ousiosis, ‘substance’ hypostasis, ‘person’ prosopon. The Greeks, however, called individual substances ‘hypostases’ because they underlie the other things and are the supposites and subjects for certain things that are like accidents. But this is understood about created hypostases.89

89 “Sed quaeritur hic. Boethius, libro De duabus naturis: ‘Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia.’ Sed licet tres personae, non tamen tres substantiae sed tres hypostases. Unde Boethius, ibi: ‘Nos hac definitione personarum eam quam Graeci dicunt hypostasim terminavimus.’ Et infra idem: ‘Neque verborum inops Graecia est, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam totidem nominibus [reddit]: essentiam usiam, subsistentiam usiosim, substantiam hypostasim, personam prosopon appellans. Ideo autem Graeci hypostases individuas substantias vocaverunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi accidentibus suppositae et subiectae sunt.’ Sed hoc intelligitur de hypostasibus creatis” (Glossa I, dist. 29, no. 9 [pp. 225–6]).

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The question here in the context of Trinitarian theology is how Greek terms can successfully be translated into Latin. The triune God is one and three. Theology therefore has to distinguish the one God and the three . . . Father, Son, Holy Spirit. To designate the three, the Latin tradition uses the term persona, which must however not be understood as the literal translation of prosopon, but rather of hypostasis. Boethius’s definition emphasizes two fundamental aspects of what being a person means. Only a reasonable being can be a person; that is, God, angels, and humans. Moreover, individuality is indispensable for being a person. In various places—when his definition is sufficient—Alexander cites only the authority of Boethius.90 His argument as a whole, however, is not sufficient. This is why Alexander embraces another definition, which he found in Richard of St.-Victor’s small treatise De Trinitatae: Master Richard: “A person is something subsisting through itself alone as a certain singular mode of rational existence.”91

There are two strongly connected elements in Richard’s definition. The first one is that the person is “incommunicable,” as Richard explains.92 Turned positively, this means that the person is itself, independent, and self-contained. Such independence is the condition for any relationship to another person. Secondly, existence—literally ek-sistentia, “standing out”—means that the person owes itself and its being to another. The Boethian definition, based as it is on the term “substance,” is insufficient to talk about the divine persons. Richard developes his new definition to explain the Trinity as being three in one substance. Alexander uses “subsistence” synonymously with “existence,” which shows that for him this argument is an ontological one. The person

90 Thus in Trinitarian theology Glossa I, dist. 26, no. 1 (p. 250), or in Christology Glossa III, dist. 10, no. 2 (p. 114). 91 “Magister Richardus: ‘Persona est subsistens per se solum iuxta singularem quemdam rationalis exsistentiae modum’ ” (Glossa I, dist. 29, no. 9 [p. 226]). Citation from Richard of St.-Victor, De Trinitate IV, chap. 24 (ed. Jean Ribaillier [Paris, 1958], 189). Richard gives also another definition which Alexander uses synonymously: “Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.” Richard, De Trinitae IV, chap. 23 (p. 188), cited in Glossa I, dist. 25 no. 1c (p. 238); III, dist. 5 no. 18 (Red. AE, p. 63); no. 47 (Red. L, pp. 69–70). The Summa cites both as separate definitions. Summa I, no. 387, obi. 9 (p. 570). 92 Richard defines also: “Persona est exsistentia incommunicabilis intellectualis naturae” (Richard of St.-Victor, De Trinitate IV, chap. 24, p. 189).

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is an ens distinctum, which can be captured either in Boethius’s or in Richard’s definition. The first definition “concerns the thing” (respicit ad rem), Alexander writes, showing the person as it is in itself. The second one concerns “the reason of the noun” (ad rationem nominis), elucidating the meaning of the noun as it is used in the Trinitarian context.93 Richard points out the relationship among the persons. Alexander, on the other hand, places emphasis on the identity of each person and their separation from each other. For him the definitions based on the concepts of “substance” and “existence” do not go far enough. He needs a definition that includes the “properties” of each person. Therefore, Alexander adds a third definition, which appears under the name definitio magistralis in the Summa fratris Alexandri.94 There are good reasons to assume that it originates in Alexander’s teaching. The definition is: It can also be defined in this way: “A person is a hypostasis through a distinct property which pertains to its dignity.”95

Divine persons must not be defined through their substance, because there is only one substance for the three persons. So Alexander chooses another path, concentrating on the collectio proprietatum, the “set of properties.”96 This approach can be used for divine as well as for created persons. The third definition is developed from the Boethian but is not based on the “substance” of a being. These definitions differ in this way: The first one concerns the thing of this noun “person”; the second the reason of the noun: for a person, as Isidore says, is “a thing which is through itself one” (res per se una); the third [concerns] the use of the noun, and it can be drawn out of Boethius’s definition, by which he brings together the ratio of the person. For he removes the noun “person” from accidental being; from the

93 See Glossa, I dist. 23, no. 9 [p. 226]). Alfons Hufnagel, “Die Wesensbestimmung der Person bei Alexander Halensis,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 4 (1957): 148–74, at 152, explains this passage by using the parallel text in the Summa, were ratio and natura are synonymously. 94 See Summa I, no. 387 (p. 570). 95 “Potest autem et sic definiri: ‘Persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente’ ” (Glossa I, dist. 23, no. 9 [p. 226]). 96 Glossa I, dist. 19, no. 24 (p. 203); see also Summa I, no. 337, ad 6 (p. 501). See Brigitte Th. Kible, “Person. II. Hoch- und Spätscholastik; Meister Eckhart; Luther,” Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 7 (Basel, 1989), 283–300, here: 285–6.

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hubert philipp weber being of a substance of an incorporeal part like the soul; from the being of an inanimate, senseless, irrational substance, and [from the being of ] a universal substance that subsists only in singulars and is called “second substance”; likewise from the being of human nature in Christ. From this the ultimate ratio of person becomes clear: a distinct hypostasis etc.97

A special problem is the connection between God and man in Jesus Christ, that is to say, the hypostatic union. Alexander asks what place the person occupies in the order of being. Philosophy is classically divided into three fields, namely, rational, natural, and moral philosophy (philosophia rationalis, naturalis, moralis). This division throws light upon the concept of person applied to the hypostatic union. Christ’s human individuality or essence points to the rational dimension of reality, the nature or subject of the hypostatic union is related to the natural dimension, and person is related to the moral dimension. That a person is a “moral thing” (res moris) means that it has “dignity”. But the moral being does not solely indicate an ethical dimension; rather, it is used in an ontological way. Dignity points to the concrete possibility of man to act freely and take responsibility for himself. Just as there is only one center of action in man, so also in Christ, the GodMan, is one person. This unity of His person is the presupposition for His dignity and a necessary condition of His personal being.98 These ideas are formulated in different versions of Alexander’s Glossa. MS. L is more elaborate than MSS. AE and focuses on the hypostatic union:

97 “Differunt autem sic istae definitiones. Prima respicit ad rem huius nominis ‘persona’; secunda ad rationem nominis: persona enim, ut dicit Isidorus, est ‘res per se una’; tertia ad usum nominis, et potest elici ex definitione Boethii, qua colligit rationem personae. Removet enim nomen personae ab esse accidentis; ab esse substantiae incorporeae partis, ut animae; ab esse inanimati, insensibilis, irrationalis, et universalis substantiae, quae non subsistit nisi in singularibus et secunda substantia nuncupatur; similiter ab esse humanae naturae in Christo. Ex quo patet ratio ultima personae: hypostasis distincta etc.” (Glossa I, dist. 23, no. 9 [p. 226]). 98 See Glossa III, dist. 6, no. 18 (p. 80) (MSS. AE); no. 38 (p. 87) (MS. L). MS. E uses this threefold schema but interprets it differently. The noun subiectum belongs to natural philosophy, individuum to rational philosophy, and persona to moral philosophy. See Glossa I, dist. 25, no. 7 (pp. 236–7, note). Hufnagel, “Wesensbestimmung der Person,” 165–6, uses this text without paying attention to its problematic provenance.

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MSS. AE

MS. L

But you should note that this threefold opinion is founded upon a threefold being. [For] there is natural, moral, and rational being. And note that when Christ is spoken of according to his person, then he is spoken of according to moral being. But when he is spoken of according to his human nature, then he is spoken of according to natural being; but when [he is spoken of ] according to his essence, then he is spoken of according to rational being. Hence Christ is one insofar as he is man and insofar as he is God, speaking according to the moral being. According to natural being, however, Christ is two, because [there are] two natures. According to rational being, however, Christ is called not “what” but “what kind of.”99

These three opinions have appeared according to a threefold being: natural, moral, [and] rational. And according to these three, there is a threefold way to talk about Christ. The person is a moral thing, because it names the property of dignity; to speak personally about him means to speak morally. When we speak according to the essence that is man, since it is a common form of reason, we speak rationally. [When] there is talk of the union of natures—in what way the natures are two—we speak naturally. Morally, Christ is one person (unus), not one thing (unum); rationally, he is one thing (unum), insofar as it participates in the unity of the person; naturally, he is of two natures. According to the rational being, whatsoever is added beyond the species, are the individualizing characteristics (individuantia). So whatsoever is added to the hypostasis of the Son of God, what is quasi the species, are the individualizing characteristics. Thus also the humanity of Christ and his accidents are like accidents of the divine hypostasis.100

99 “Sed notandum quod haec triplex opinio fundata est super triplex esse. Est [enim] esse naturale, et morale, et rationale. Et nota quando Christus dicitur secundum personam, tunc dicitur secundum esse morale; quando autem secundum naturam humanam, tunc dicitur secundum esse naturale; quando autem secundum essentiam, tunc dicitur secundum esse rationale. Unde Christus est unus secundum quod homo et secundum quod Deus, loquendo secundum esse morale; secundum vero esse naturale, Christus est duo, quoniam duae naturae; secundum vero esse rationale, Christus non dicitur quid, sed quale” (Glossa III, dist. 6, no. 18 [p. 80]). 100 “Ortae autem sunt istae tres opiniones secundum triplex esse: naturale, morale, rationale; et secundum haec tria tripliciter contingit loqui de Christo. Persona res

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The unity of God and man in Christ, which the Council of Chalcedon described as two natures in one person (hypostasis),101 is captured in the concept of “person.” A union other than the personal (that is, “hypostatic”) one would not make it possible to unify the personal dignity of the God-Man and a perfect humanity. The term “person” is located in three contexts: the doctrine of God, theological anthropology, and the theology of hypostatic union.102 Since the Incarnation constitutes the highest point of human being, discussions concerning the hypostatic union are closely connected with Christian anthropology.103 Conscientia and Synderesis In distinction 40 of Book II Alexander offers us a self-contained treatise on conscience, in which he clarifies the meaning of synderesis. The relevant passage from the Sentences is only a starting point for him to embark upon a much more systematic argumentation. He uses the terms conscientia and synderesis (mostly spelled synteresis) to distinguish different aspects of conscience. First he provides a sketch of various problems in relation to synderesis: After that it is necessary to add about the acts etc. Whether synderesis is a power or a habit; [and] if a power, whether it is part of reason or not; and whether it pertains to judgment or to will in free choice; and whether there is sinning according to synderesis; and whether it is extinguished in any wayfarer; and whether it is extinguished in the damned.104

moris est, quia dicit proprietatem dignitatis; personaliter loqui de ipso, est loqui moraliter. Quando autem loquimur secundum essentiam quae est homo, cum sit communis forma rationis, rationaliter loquimur. [Quando] loqui autem est de unione naturarum, quomodo duae sunt naturae, naturaliter loquimur. Moraliter Christus est unus, non unum; rationaliter unum, prout participat unitatem personae; naturaliter est duae naturae. Secundum esse rationale, quaecumque ultra speciem adiciuntur, sunt individuantia. Sic quaecumque adiciuntur hypostasi Filii Dei, quae est quasi species, individuantia sunt. Sic et humanitas Christi et eius accidentia sunt quasi accidentalia hypostasi divinae” (Glossa III, dist. 6, no. 38 [p. 87]). 101 See Enchiridion symbolorum, 37th ed., no. 302. 102 Theo Kobusch, Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild (Freiburg i. Br., 1993), 23–5, regards this tripartite division as crucial in the concept of person. See also Corinna Schlapkohl, Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia. Boethius und die Debatte über den Personbegriff (Marburg, 1999), 173–4. 103 See Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 118–41; Hufnagel, “Die Wesensbestimmung der Person”; Kible, “Person. II.” 104 “Post haec de actibus adiciendum etc. Utrum synderesis sit potentia vel habi-

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Alexander’s discussion begins with Jerome’s exegesis of Ez. 1:10, the vision of four living creatures each with four faces, that of an eagle, a man, a lion, and an ox. The eagle flying above, Alexander explains, stands for the scintilla conscientiae, the “spark of conscience,” which is in fact called “synderesis.” Thus conscience is a more common term, to which synderesis lends greater specification. Since the other faces represent the three potencies of the soul, should synderesis be understood as a potency? Or is it a habit? Alexander answers the question as follows: To the first is to be said that the term synderesis is used in a material and a formal way. [It is used] in a formal way when it is called a connatural habit; in a material way when it is called an inborn seat of judgment (iudicatorium). Indeed, since the soul is not entirely deprived of the good so that it would not have help against the tinder [of sin], just as the tinder turns downward from the corrupted nature, so synderesis arises in those in whom it is not extinguished or cast down. And just as there is a certain material light in the sense for seeing and in the intellect for understanding the true, why should there not be a light in the motive power which always turns away from the bad to the good?105

Alexander does not want to define synderesis formally as a potency, for it does not belong to the potencies of the soul. But he specifies the designation as habitus with the term connaturalis, thus pointing to the fact that this habit is not extraneous but comes from the human being itself. This “inborn seat of judgment” assists human reason in identifying the tinder of sin, that is to say, in identifying how evil has influence on human actions. Is it therefore part of human reason? It has to be said that reason can be considered insofar as it is reason, or insofar as it is a certain nature. In the first manner synderesis is above

tus; [et] si potentia, utrum pars rationis vel non; et utrum pertineat ad iudicium vel ad voluntatem in libero arbitrio; et utrum sit peccare secundum synderesim; et utrum sit exstincta in aliquo viatore; et utrum sit exstincta in damnatis” (Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 [p. 380]). 105 “Ad primum dicendum quod synderesis dicitur materialiter et formaliter. Formaliter, ut cum dicitur habitus connaturalis; et materialiter, cum dicitur iudicatorium innatum. Anima enim cum non omnino sit destituta a bono, ita quod non habeat adiutorium contra fomitem, quemadmodum fomes est declinans deorsum a natura corrupta, ita synderesis sursum in quibus non est exstincta aut praecipitata. Et quemadmodum in sensu est quoddam lumen materiale ad videndum et in intellectu ad intelligendum verum, propter quid in vi motiva non esset lumen in bonum semper a malo declinans” (Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 [p. 382]).

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hubert philipp weber reason and not in reason; in the second manner it is in reason and not in free choice because [synderesis] is above reason.106

Synderesis is not part of reason and also not of free choice, but rather stands above them. Reason and free will constitute the foundations that carry synderesis. It is the light that shows the right path to practical reason. So is it possible to sin according to synderesis? In other words, can conscience be erroneous? This question throws into relief an important difference between synderesis and conscience: whereas synderesis, as the “spark of the conscience,” cannot err, conscience can.107 Another question is whether synderesis can be extinguished in anyone. In his response, Alexander identifies two functions of synderesis, namely, to guide to the good and to advise against evil: To the first [question] it is to be said that falling down occurs according to synderesis, but sinning properly speaking occurs according to free choice. Hence it is to be said that there is no merit as such according to synderesis, but there is merit through it in the free choice, and likewise any other power. To the other [question] it is to be said that in one way it is extinguished in the wayfarer, and in another way it is not. Since synderesis grumbles at evil every time, in this manner is not extinguished. But it does not stimulate to the good every time; hence according to this aspect it is extinguished in the wayfarer. To the other [question] is to be said that it is extinguished in the devil in a twofold manner, because it never grumbles at evil nor ever stimulates to the good. But nevertheless it is not extinguished according to the fact that it grumbles every time at the evil of punishment.108

106 “Dicendum quod ratio considerari potest ut est ratio, vel ut est natura quaedam. Primo modo est synderesis supra rationem, et non in ratione; secundo modo est in ratione, et non in libero arbitrio, quoniam supra rationem” (Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 [p. 383]; also see dist. 24, no. 14 [p. 217]). 107 See Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 (pp. 383–4); dist. 24, no. 14 (p. 217). 108 “Ad primum dicendum quod secundum synderesim est praecipitare, sed secundum liberum arbitrium proprie peccare est. Unde dicendum quod secundum synderesim non meretur per se, sed ipsa in libero arbitrio meretur, et similiter unaquaeque alia vis. Ad aliud dicendum quod exstinguitur in viatore secundum aliquid, et secundum aliquid non; quoniam synderesis semper remurmurat malo, et sic non exstinguitur. Sed non semper stimulat ad bonum; unde secundum istam partem exstinguitur in viatore. Ad aliud dicendum quod in diabolo exstincta est dupliciter, quoniam nunquam remurmurat malo nec unquam stimulat ad bonum; sed tamen secundum hoc non est exstincta, quin semper remurmuret malo poenae” (Glossa II, dist. 40, no. 1 [pp. 384–5]; also see III, dist. 3, no. 12 [pp. 41–2]).

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Synderesis adverts to the danger of evil and points the way to the good. It helps the wayfarer to act in a good way and warns him, if he is going to fall in sin. In the damned it acts as part of the punishment, providing the knowledge of having lost the good. Some years later Alexander would discuss the term conscientia in a Quaestio disputata.109 The Reason for the Incarnation We know from revelation that the second divine person became man. Following St. Paul the Incarnation occurred to redeem men from sin: “God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons” (Gal. 4:4–5). Thus, from a soteriological point of view, the answer to the question of why God sent his son into the world is clear. From the twelfth century onward, however, this question was also discussed in a more abstract and speculative way. Is it possible, it was asked, that God would have sent his son even if sin had not occurred? Duns Scotus would solve this problem with his thesis of absolute predestination. Yet this solution has a prehistory that reaches back two centuries. Alexander addresses this problem especially in two Quaestiones disputatae which date from the time before 1236.110 But in the third book of the Glossa this theme receives attention as well. The following text from distinction 1 shows Alexander’s way of solving the problem: The cause as to why the Son has become incarnate is manifold. The first is that in this [action] the extreme charity of the Father is demonstrated, [the charity] out of which “he did not spare his own son” (Rom. 8:32).—The second reason is lest the name of the Son be transferred to the Father or to the Holy Spirit, because, if the Father or the Holy Spirit had become incarnate, he would have been the Son of Man.—The third reason is that, since everything was created in the Word of God, the due recreation must occur through the same through whom the creation had occurred.—The fourth reason is that humankind was lost by the fact that

109 See Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 107–17; Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, vol. 2 (Gembloux, 1948), 105–08. 110 These are the Quaestio de incarnatione, in Quaestiones disputatae “antequam esset frater,” no. 15, vol. 1, 193–223, and the Quaestio de praedestinatione Christi, ibid., no. 12, vol. 1, 151–9. See Weber, Sünde und Gnade, 270–8.

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hubert philipp weber it wanted “to know good and bad” (Gen. 3:5) and so by wisdom; hence it is suitable that it is redeemed by wisdom, and so by the Son.—The fifth reason is that, since man was made “in the image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26; Wis. 2:23), the image of God can be restored to the one to whom it belongs only through the image of the Father; but the Son is the image of the Father; therefore through the Son.—Further, through the redemption we are all adoptive sons (Rom. 8:16); but that can occur only by the natural son; therefore the Son has to be incarnated.—Further, through the redemption we are “joint heirs with Christ” (Rom. 8:17); but only the Son can confirm the inheritance; therefore it will be confirmed for us through Him.111

Concerning the problem of why the mission of the Son is to become incarnate, a number of questions are solved in this passage. The Incarnation, Alexander argues, is the most fitting and most worthy way of redemption, for in this way the Son by whom everything was created is also the one through whom everyone and everything is redeemed. There is an intimate connection, therefore, between the creation and the redemption, both of which are approached from a Trinitarian perspective. The Redeemer restores man, the fallen image of God, returning him into community with Trinity. These ideas are derived from motives found in the New Testament: the Son will let men participate in his “inheritance” (Rom. 8:17; Gal. 4:7); the Son came to let men become sons of God (Gal. 4:4; Mt. 5:45). All these arguments show the fittingness of incarnation for redemption of man. The question as to whether the Incarnation was a consequence of sin or also could have occurred without the first sin is solved neither here nor, it appears, in Alexander’s other works. This question remains open. 111 “Multiplex est causa quare Filius incarnatus est. Prima est quod in hoc ostenditur maxima caritas Patris, ex quo non pepercit proprio Filio.—Secunda ratio est, ne nomen Filii transferatur ad Patrem vel ad Spiritum Sanctum, quoniam, si incarnatus esset Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus, esset utique filius hominis.—Tertia ratio est, quod, cum omnia creata fuerint in Verbo Dei, merito fieri debet recreatio per ipsum per quem fiebat creatio.—Quarta ratio est, quod genus humanum deperditum erat per hoc quod voluit esse sciens bonum et malum et ita per sapientiam; unde dignum est ut redimatur per sapientiam, et ita per Filium.—Quinta ratio est, quod, cum homo factus sit ad imaginem et ad similitudinem, non potest imago Dei reformari ad ipsum cuius est, nisi per imaginem Patris; sed Filius est imago Patris; ideo per Filium.—Adhuc, per redemptionem omnes sumus filii adoptivi; sed hoc non potest fieri nisi per filium naturalem; ergo Filius est incarnandus.—Adhuc, per redemptionem sumus coheredes Christi; sed solius Filii est confirmare hereditatem; ergo per ipsum nobis confirmabitur” (Glossa III, dist. 1, no. 4 [pp. 12–13]. MS. L, ibid., no. 24 [pp. 19–20], differs only slightly from AE).

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Conclusion Alexander’s introduction of the Sentences as the textbook for the ordinary lectures in the theology faculty marks a decisive change in the theological education of the Middle Ages. The Sentences made it possible to view theology more systematically; they facilitated the tendency toward a “transformation of sacra pagina into theology as a system of doctrine.”112 This tendency is evidenced in Alexander of Hales’s own development. In the 1220s Alexander still used the term theologia as a synonym for Holy Scripture. The Summa fratris Alexandri, compiled in the 1240s, already has an initial treatise on theology (derived from one of Alexander’s quaestiones) in which it is described as a science. The Lombard’s textbook was a compilation of authoritative statements. That gave it its great pedagogical value. The systematic arrangement of the sententiae allowed teachers to give an overview on theology, which was seen as a precondition to interpreting Holy Scripture in the context of faith. Because of its character as a compilation the Book of Sentences acquired its authority only through the authority of the statements that it contained from Holy Scripture and their interpretation by the Fathers. For this reason, Alexander believed that using the Sentences could not be a betrayal of Scripture and Tradition. His own Glossa, then, primarily intended to lead its users to a better understanding of the biblical texts.

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Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 61; also see 65.

THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY OF HUGH OF ST.-CHER Magdalena Bieniak Introduction Hugh of St.-Cher1 occupies an important position among the commentators on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. His commentary exercised significant influence over subsequent generations of theologians.2 Moreover, as John Fisher has pointed out, Hugh’s work occupies a crucial place between two stages in the evolution of the genre of the Sentences literature: the gloss, which was strictly related to the littera of the Sentences, and the more developed commentary, which left much more space to personal theological speculation.3 Indeed, the innovative form of Hugh’s work probably contributed to the development of a new type of commentary, in which the link to the text of the Sentences played a much less prominent role.4 Consequently, a

1 Born probably around 1190, Hugh joined the Order of Preachers in 1224/1225; from 1230 to 1235 he taught theology in Paris; and in 1244 he became the first Dominican cardinal. He died in 1263. For more about Hugh’s life and works, see Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi (Rome, 1970), vol. 2, 269–81; Walter H. Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1970), 14–21; Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Cardinali di curia e “familiae” cardinalizie dal 1227 al 1254 (Padua, 1972), vol. 1, 257–9; Artur Michael Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, trans. Louis-B. Geiger and Albert M. Landry (Montreal/Paris, 1973), 175–7; Jean-Pierre Torrell, Théorie de la prophétie et philosophie de la connaissance aux environs de 1230. La contribution d’Hugues de Saint-Cher (Louvain, 1977), 88–103; Alessandro Ghisalberti, “L’esegesi della scuola domenicana del sec. XIII,” in La Bibbia nel Medio Evo, ed. Giuseppe Cremascoli (Bologna, 1996), 291–304, esp. 293–4. 2 Hugh’s commentary influenced, for example, the Compendium theologiae of John of Treviso; the Sentences abbreviation Filia Magistri; the Sentences commentary of Richard Fishacre; the questions in MS. Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Misc. Patr. 98; two anonymous summas and two anonymous Sentences commentaries. On this point, see Landgraf, Introduction, 177; Johannes Gründel, Die Lehre von den Umständen der menschlichen Handlung im Mittelalter (Münster, 1963), 430–9. 3 See John Fisher, “Hugh of St. Cher and the Development of Medieval Theology,” Speculum 31 (1956): 57–69, esp. 58–9. 4 On the importance of the form of Hugh’s commentary, see also Martin Grabmann, Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, vol. 2 (Freiburg i. Br., 1911; reprinted: Graz, 1957), 392–8, esp. 394-395, and Barbara Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits du commentaire des Sentences d’Hugues de St. Cher,” in Hugues de Saint-Cher († 1263),

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considerable portion of this chapter concerns the original structure of the opus. Just like most of his writings, Hugh’s Sentences commentary is still unedited.5 Therefore, our knowledge regarding its doctrinal contents remains fragmentary and haphazard. As a consequence, the overview of Hugh’s theological opinions that occupies the second half of this chapter includes only a small selection of topics, leaving aside a significant number of important and interesting argumentations which still have to be studied. Date of Composition The exposition of Peter Lombard’s Sentences is, as far as we know, Hugh’s first theological work. However, the date of its composition is still uncertain.6 First, it is undoubtedly closely related to Hugh’s lectures on Peter Lombard’s work; however, Hugh may have lectured on the Sentences in 1226–1227, in 1229–1230, or even in 1230–1231:7 we do not have any precise information on this matter. In any case, it is improbable that the commentary was composed much later. The work reveals little effort of organization of the material; in fact, it is characterized by an oral style and an often incoherent structure;8 it seems, therefore, that Hugh did not revise his text. Secondly, Hugh already quotes Alexander of Hales’s Glossa on the Sentences. This work was composed in 1227 at the latest, so that we may conclude that

bibliste et théologien, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, and Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout, 2004), 273–98, at 288–95. 5 There is an eighteenth-century edition of his Postillae: see Hugo de Sancto Charo, Opera omnia in universum Vetus et Novum Testamentum, 8 vol. (Venice, 1754). 6 According to Kilian F. Lynch, Hugh’s commentary was written before 1234, “since he quotes the Compilationes Antiquae and not the Decretales Gregorii IX”; see idem, “Some Fontes of the Commentary of Hugh de Saint Cher: William of Auxerre, Guy d’Orchelles, Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 119–46, at 145–6. 7 1229–1230 according to Friedrich Stegmüller, Analecta Uppsaliensia Theologiam Medii Aevi Illustrantia, vol. 1: Opera Systematica (Uppsala and Wiesbaden, 1953), 100; 1230–1231 according to Gerhardt Powitz, “Ein Exemplar des Sentenzenkommentars von Hugo de Sancto Caro,” Codices Manuscripti 17 (1997): 2–7, at 2; and 1226–1227 or 1230–1231 according to Jacques Verger, “Hugues de Saint-Cher dans le contexte universitaire parisien,” in Hugues de Saint-Cher, 13–22, at 20. 8 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 294–5.

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Hugh’s commentary is posterior to this date.9 What is most significant, however, is that Hugh draws extensively upon the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre,10 which was certainly completed before 1226.11 The way in which Hugh uses this text is very characteristic: he copies long passages of his source verbatim, but only to give them his own interpretation or an independent solution. Hugh employs the same method in his theological questions, which he wrote between 1230 and 1236; however, the principal literary source of his quaestiones is no longer the Summa aurea, but Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de bono. By contrast, there are no evident traces of Philip’s Summa in the commentary on the Sentences.12 Unfortunately, we do not know the date of composition of Philip’s Summa; according to Nicolaus Wicki, it may have been written even before Alexander’s Glossa.13 In any case, it is quite probable that some time passed between the composition of Hugh’s commentary and that of his disputed questions, especially if we consider the fact that, as far as we know, the Dominican master quotes Aristotle in his questions much more often than in his first theological work. It seems plausible, therefore, that the commentary dates from the very beginning of the 1230s, if not from the last years of the preceding decade. Manuscripts The most complete list of manuscripts containing Hugh’s opus14 has recently been compiled by Barbara Faes de Mottoni,15 whose work

9 See Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1951–1957), vol. 3, 32*. 10 See, for example, Landgraf, Introduction, 175. 11 See Johannes Arnold, Perfecta Communicatio. Die Trinitätstheologie Wilhelms von Auxerre (Münster, 1995), 10–16. 12 See Odon Lottin, “Un petit traité sur l’âme de Hugues de Saint-Cher,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 34 (1932): 468–75. 13 See Nicolaus Wicki, “Introduction,” in Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono (Berne, 1985), vol. 1, 65*–66*. 14 The commentary runs to about 200 folios in most manuscripts; for example, B contains 163 fols., L 265 fols., A 192 fols., and Aa 204 fols. 15 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 279–80. I have added manuscript Ar, which was described by Pierre Bougard, “À propos d’Alexandre de Halès: le ms. 855 (526) d’Arras,” AFH 50 (1957): 212–17, at 212. According to Bougard, the margins of this manuscript of Peter Lombard’s Sentences contain some passages from Alexander of Hales’s Glossa together with excerpts from Hugh’s commentary.

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corrects and completes the previous catalog by Thomas Kaeppeli.16 In this chapter I will use the following abbreviations: A Aa Ab Ar B Bu C D E Ea Eb Ei Ev F Fa Fb G H I J K L M N O P Pa Pb

16

Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, Fondo Antico, 131 Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, Fondo Antico, 130 Assisi, Biblioteca comunale, Fondo Antico, 103 (excerpts) Arras, Bibliothèque municipale, 855 (526) (excerpts) Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B II 20 Budapest, Országos Széchényi Kònyvtár, 19 Canterbury, Christ Church Library, 42 (A 12) Padua, Biblioteca universitaria, 853 Edinburgh, University Library, 76 Erfurt, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt-Gotha, Amploniana, Fol. 109 Erfurt, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt-Gotha, Amploniana, Oct. 29 Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek, 471 Évreux, Bibliothèque municipale, 15 Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppressi J.VI.32 Florence, Biblioteca medicea laurenziana, S. Croce Plut. XXVIII dext. 1 Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppressi J.VII.47 Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 178 Prague, Archiv Pražského Hradu, D.XI.2 (?) Alba Iulia, Biblioteca Centralǎ de Stat, Filiala Batthyáneum, I. 143 Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, 11422/11423 Frankfurt am Main, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, Barth. 103 Lisbon, Bibliotheca nacional, Alcob. 147 (223) Metz, Bibliothèque municipale, 448 Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 21121 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Rawlinson C 241 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3073 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3032 (excerpts) Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3406

See Kaeppeli, Scriptores, vol. 2, 272; vol. 4, 125.

the sentences commentary of hugh of st.-cher Pc R Ra Rb Rc Rd S So T U V W Y Z

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Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 10728 Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1098 Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 106 Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1174 Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4255 Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 14345 Stockholm, Kungl. biblioteket, A 150 (excerpts) Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque municipale, 288 Toledo, Librería del cabildo, 1818 Uppsala, Universitetsbibliotek, C 165 Venice, Biblioteca nazionale marciana, lat. III 174 (2785) Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 1688 (codex theol. 617, olim 287) Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 1965 Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 573

The purpose of this subsection is to summarize some important aspects of commentary’s transmission and to provide some additional information about a few manuscripts that I have examined in original17 or in microfilm.18 (1) The Number of Codices Barbara Faes de Mottoni’s list includes forty-one manuscripts. Among them, only thirteen contain the entire commentary.19 Thus, the majority of the manuscripts transmit only a part of the books and hence an incomplete or abridged version of the scriptum. In her article, Faes de Mottoni gives particular attention to the fact that ten manuscripts contain only Prologue I, and seven or eight of them transmit only liber quartus together with the question De dotibus resurgentium. It appears, in fact, that the first and the fourth books were copied more often than

17

Namely, D, F, P, Pb, and Pc. Namely, A, Aa, B, Ev, Rc, So, T, and Y. 19 Namely, A, Aa, B, D, F, G, J, L, P, R, T, U, and V. Six of these manuscripts (A, Aa, L, P, R, and V) transmit an incomplete version of the question De dotibus resurgentium, which is situated at the end of the commentary; J omits the question entirely. G omits the final part of Book III and the beginning of Book IV. 18

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other parts of the work. The success of these parts is probably due to their doctrinal contents, as well as on their well-ordered structure.20 (2) The “Gloss Manuscripts” The major part of the manuscripts present a continuous form of the commentary, contained in the main column or columns, with some marginal notes which, in a sense, complete Hugh’s work. But there are also six codices21 which transmit the scriptum in the margins of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, in the form of a gloss. Some particularities characterize this group of manuscripts. First of all, only two of them— namely, F and T—contain the whole of the commentary. Manuscripts Ab, Pa, and Rd transmit only some extracts of Hugh’s work; moreover, Pa, Rd, and S combine the passages from our commentary with some texts by contemporaries of Hugh’s. It is worth noting that no manuscript transmits a partial version in a continuous form. MS. S has received particular attention from scholars. In an article concerning this manuscript, Friedrich Stegmüller concluded that it transmits a first, shorter version of the commentary. The main argument in favor of this assumption was the form of the text: a gloss could have given origin to a continuous text, but not vice versa.22 This hypothesis is in harmony with the study of John Fisher, who affirms that the earliest type of commentaries on the Lombard’s Sentences was written in the form of marginal and interlinear glosses. What is more, among the six manuscripts mentioned above, five have quite an early

20

See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 280–4. Namely, Ab, F, Pa, Rd, S, and T. For descriptions of F and S, see Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, “The Apopeciae of the Manuscrips of Hugh of St. Cher’s Works,” Medioevo 25 (1999–2000): 1–167, esp. 30–32, and Friedrich Stegmüller, “Die älteste Redaktion des Sentenzenkommentars Hugos von St. Cher in einer Handschrift der königlichen Bibliothek zu Stockholm,” Nordisk Tidskrift för Bok- och Biblioteksväsen 35 (1948): 69–79; a description of Pa appears in Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue général des manuscrits latins, vol. 4, nos. 3014–3277 (Paris, 1958); a short description of T is in Riccardo Quinto, “Doctor Nominatissimus.” Stefano Langton (†1228) e la tradizione delle sue opere (Münster, 1994), 45; as for Rd, see Ottorino Bertolini, Inventarium codicum Vaticanorum latinorum 14234–14665 (Vatican City, 1977), 27, and Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 278. It is possible that MS. Assisi 855 (526) should be added to this list; see Bougard, À propos, 212. 22 See Stegmüller, “Die älteste Redaktion,” 78–9. 21

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date.23 Should we conclude, then, that the manuscripts which transmit Hugh’s gloss in the margin of the text of the Sentences are closer to the original version of his work than those which contain a continuous text in the main column or columns? It seems that the argument based on the commentary’s form is not satisfactory. In fact, Walter Principe has shown that the version offered by S is not the original redaction, but rather “a sometimes rather clumsy abridgement,” since it is frequently incomprehensible without reading the full version offered by the majority of manuscripts.24 Moreover, according to John Fisher, commentaries in the form of glosses were still being composed in the second half of the thirteenth century, even while much more evolved works—for instance, those of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas—were already available. Nevertheless, the “gloss manuscripts” do deserve particular attention. On the one hand, the fragmentary versions transmitted by Ab, Pa, Rd, and S have not been compared yet: do they have a common ancestor, or are they four independently prepared abridgements? On the other hand, the two manuscripts which transmit the complete version of the commentary as a marginal text illustrate in an excellent manner Hugh’s approach to the text of the Sentences. From this point of view, T is particularly useful, because it places Hugh’s glosses as closely as possible to the corresponding passages of the Sentences. As a result, we obtain a certain quantity of folios that do not contain any commentaries at all; other margins are densely packed with the text of the opus. This kind of layout helps one to see immediately which parts of Sentences Hugh comments upon and which of them he passes over. (3) Pecia Manuscripts Another question, which has already been thoroughly discussed, concerns the apopeciae of the commentary. A few years ago, Anja Inkeri

23 S is from the mid-thirteenth century; F dates from before 1244; Pa is from the second quarter of the thirteenth century; Rd can be dated to the years 1235–1240; Ab is from the thirteenth century. Only T dates from the beginning of the fourteenth century (see Kaeppeli, Scriptores, vol. 2, 272). 24 See Walter H. Principe, “Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Stockholm ‘Gloss on the Sentences’: An Abridgement rather than a First Redaction,” Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963): 372–6.

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Lehtinen published a systematic and comprehensive study on this subject.25 Her article includes detailed descriptions of almost all the known manuscripts of the commentary that have been transmitted per peciam, with the exception of A and Aa, which have been studied by Barbara Faes de Mottoni.26 The complete list of the manuscripts transmitted per peciam includes A, Aa, C, G, J, F, R, Rb, S, U, and Z. All of them appear to have quite an early date: they date from the thirteenth century. Moreover, according to Faes de Mottoni, who personally studied five of them, A, Aa, F, R, and Rb originate from the same exemplar.27 This archetype—namely, Z—has been preserved until today; Gerhardt Powitz discovered and studied it.28 (4) Indices Quaestionum Two of the manuscripts that I have examined contain a complete or partial list of the questions that Hugh discusses in his commentary. The complete index is preserved in the four opening folios of P, while the partial one can be found in the lower margin of B (fols. 49rb, 61ra). The first list of topics undoubtedly originates from the short marginal

25 See Lehtinen, “The Apopeciae.” About the pecia system in general, see Jean Destrez, La pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIIIe et du XIVe siècles (Paris, 1935); Guy Fink-Errera, “Une institution du monde médiéval: la pecia,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 60 (1962): 184–243; Graham Pollard, “The Pecia System in the Medieval Libraries,” in Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts and Libraries: Essays Presented to N. R. Ker, ed. Malcolm B. Parkes and Andrew G. Watson (London, 1978), 145–61; Leonard E. Boyle, “Peciae, Apopeciae, and a Toronto MS. of the Sententia Libri Ethicorum of Aquinas,” in The Role of the Book in Medieval Culture: Proceedings of the Oxford International Symposium, 26 September–1 October 1982, ed. Peter F. Ganz (Turnhout, 1986), vol.1, 71–82; La production du livre universitaire au moyen âge. Exemplar et pecia. Actes du symposium tenu à Grottaferrata, 1983, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Bertrand G. Guyot, and Richard H. Rouse (Paris, 1988); Louis-Jacques Bataillon, “Exemplar, pecia, quaternus,” in Vocabulaire du livre et de l’écriture au moyen âge. Actes de la table ronde, Paris 24–26 septembre 1987, ed. Olga Weijers (Turnhout, 1989), 206–19. 26 See Barbara Faes de Mottoni, “Ugo di S. Cher e i manoscritti 130 e 131 della Biblioteca Comunale di Assisi,” in Revirescunt chartae codices documenta textus. Miscellanea in Honorem fr. Caesaris Cenci OFM (Rome, 2002), 151–69. 27 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 287–8 : “Tous ces manuscrits reflètent la subdivision en pièces de l’exemplar de Leipzig.” 28 See Powitz, “Ein Exemplar,” 2–5.

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notes29 that the copyist added in order to facilitate the use of the text.30 Its utility is nevertheless limited by the fact that it includes not only the questions actually treated by Hugh, but also those that are only announced in his divisiones textus and then omitted. In addition, not all the questions have received a corresponding marginal note. The second index concerns only one part of the commentary on the second book, namely, distinctions 16 through 44. Unlike the first index, it does reflect the exact contents of Hugh’s questions and is independent of the marginal notes that accompany the text. Furthermore, the inventory specifies the number of the distinction where each question begins. As a result, the index contained in B turns out to be a useful guide to the second part of the commentary on the second book of the Sentences. The Structure of the Commentary Hugh’s commentary can be divided into eight main parts:31 two prologues, the exposition of Peter Lombard’s own prologue to the Sentences, the commentary on the four books, and, finally, as a sort of appendix, a long question32 De dotibus resurgentium.33 It seems that this question was originally part of the commentary: according to Faes de Mottoni, the fact that the exemplar of the commentary discovered by Gerhardt Powitz contains the question, confirms this hypothesis.34 What is more,

29 The problem of the marginal glosses has been thoroughly examined by Barbara Faes de Mottoni, with some useful examples in the appendix to her article, where she considers the position of different types of glosses in six different manuscripts, namely A, Aa, D, R, Rb, and V (“Les manuscrits,” 290–3; 296–8). 30 The hand which has written the index and the marginal notes is identical with the one of the principal copyist. 31 As for the incipits and explicits of the main parts of the opus, see Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 274–5. 32 It occupies about two folios; for example, in MS. B is occurs on fols.162rb–163vb. 33 The question is thematically related to a problem treated in the second part of the fourth book, namely, the resurrection. Nicolaus Wicki cites the question and compares it with other texts by Hugh and Hugh’s contemporaries in his book, Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg [Switzerland], 1954), 202–80. 34 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 275–80.

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only three manuscripts which contain the complete commentary on Book IV do not also transmit the question De dotibus.35 (1) Prologue I The first of the prologues, which Barbara Faes de Mottoni calls “Prologue I,”36 is witnessed by ten manuscripts as a separate text apart from the rest of the commentary.37 According to the testimony of Leonardus Huntpichler de valle Brixinensi,38 it was still used as a manual in the Dominican convent of Vienna in the first half of the fifteenth century.39 These facts prove the strong and long-lasting influence of this short treatise, at least among the fratres praedicatores. The importance of the prologue is also confirmed by manuscript B, which dates from the fourteenth century. In fact, the largest arbor ramificata contained in this manuscript summarizes the contents of Prologue I.40 It is the only arbor added in the margin of B; all the others are integrated into the main column of text. According to Faes de Mottoni, the manuscripts that transmit only the prologue of the commentary call it tractatus or tractatulus “on the Trinity of Persons” (de trinitate personarum), “on the predicates of God” (de divinis predicationibus), or “on the attributes predicated of God” (de attributis que predicantur de deo).41 The last two titles are more appropriate than the first. The purpose of this treatise is, in fact, to present the basic laws of any discourse about God, in order to prepare the reader of the commentary to the complicated Trinitarian questions that occupy the greater part of the first book. Consequently, Prologue I contains above all a classification of different kinds of words that can be used when speaking about God. This catalog is summarized in a very transparent way by the arbor that appears in MS. B (fol. 1v, in the lower margin):

35

Namely, I, J, and C. Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 274. The prologue occupies about one folio. 37 See ibid., 279–80. 38 In MS. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 27318, fol. 199ra; see Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 283–4. 39 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 282–4. 40 I have not found this diagram in any other manuscript. 41 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 274. 36

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B f. 1v, marg. inf.: Dictorum de deo aliqud

personale, ut pater et filius et spiritus sanctus et trinitas

essentiale

substantiuum

adiectiuum

notionale

abstractiuum, ut patrenitas, innascibilitas et similia

concretiuum, ut innascibilis et similia

quedam partitiua, ut aliquis, alius et huiusmodi

quedam naturalia ut unus, duo, tres, totus et huiusmodi

naturaliter connotando, ut ens, bonum et similia medium, ut sapientia, lumen

concretiuum, ut deus, creator et similia abstractiuum, ut essentia, deitas et similia

que significant pure essentiam

quedam aliquid connotando

quedam positiue

quedam connotando effectum in creatura quedam in habitu, ut iustus, et misericors, et huiusmodi: hec eterne horum quedam in actu, ut iustificans, miserator: temporaliter iustificat et m

quedam priuatiue, ut eternus, immensus et similia

quedam respectu

persone ad personam, ut similis, equalis et huiusmodi creatoris ad creaturam, ut “deus est refugium” et huiusmodi

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The treatise offers a set of grammatical and logical rules concerning each category of divine predicates. Here is an example: Item alia regula: Omne nomen pure essentiale predicatur de qualibet persona per se et de omnibus in simul singulariter et non pluraliter. Verbi gratia: Pater est deitas, Filius est deitas, Spiritus sanctus est deitas, et hi in simul sunt una deitas.42

Undoubtedly, an introduction of this kind must have been precious for didactic purposes.43 (2) Prologue II The nature of the second prologue is definitely different from that of the first one. The contents and the structure of Prologue I prepare, in fact, the commentary on the first book of the Sentences. As a consequence, this treatise has little in common with Peter Lombard’s prologue, and it does not refer to the totality of his work. It is Prologue II that plays the role of a general introduction.44 Its principal purpose is to present the function of the Sentences and their close correlation to the Holy Scripture. The style of this preface is more elegant compared to the technical approach of Prologue I. The main part of Prologue II consists in an allegorical interpretation of Exodus, in particular chapter 19, which presents the scene of the revelation on Mount Sinai. First of all, Hugh reminds his reader that only Moses could cross the borders to the mountain, beyond which the revelation took place. Then he compares five different types of people from the chapter (namely, Moses, Josue, Aaron and Ur, those who obeyed the prohibition, and those who transgressed the borders) to Christians with different attitudes toward Holy Scripture. In this way, Aaron and Ur are allegorically interpreted as those who do not meditate on the meaning of the Holy Scripture because they are afraid to misunderstand it; the Israelites, who do not cross the borders of Mount Sinai, are compared to

42

Stegmüller, Analecta, 36–7. Fisher, “Hugh of St. Cher,” 61–9, offers a detailed description of the contents of Prologue I. For both prologues, see also Adriano Oliva, Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la “sacra doctrina” (Paris, 2006), 258–9. 44 According to Landgraf, Prologue II is influenced by the glosses of Peter Comestor and Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers; see Artur Landgraf, “Mitteilungen zum Sentenzenkommentar Hugos a S. Charo,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 58 (1934): 391–400, esp. 396–8. For a detailed description of the passage contained in the gloss of PseudoPeter of Poitiers, see Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 35–7. 43

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those who are lazy; finally, those who do not respect the prohibition are the blasphemers. The Master’s work, Hugh explains, is addressed in particular to these three categories of people, because it is short, easy, and cites many authoritative writings. After describing those for whom the Sentences were written, Hugh shows how the general structure of the four books reflects the construction of the Bible: Tractaturus autem Magister sacram Scripturam compendiose, consideravit, quod sacra Scriptura tantum agit de duobus, scilicet de creatore et opera creatoris. Opus autem creatoris dividitur in opus creationis et in opus recreationis et opus ultimae retributionis. Item opus recreationis subdividitur in opus, quod gessit Christus in propria persona, et huiusmodi opera sunt incarnatio, passio et similia; et in opus ecclesiae, que recreat per sacramenta. Eleganter ergo distinguit Magister opus suum in quatuor volumina . . . .45

In this natural and seamless way Hugh passes on to the first divisio textus. (3) Divisiones Textus46 The schematic description of liber primus which immediately follows the second prologue divides the first book of the Lombard’s Sentences into seven thematic sections. For each of these Hugh provides a very brief list of contents, the incipit, and the number of distinctions contained in each part. This first divisio textus does not present the division of the remaining three books, even though it precedes the expositio litterae of the Lombard’s prologue. In fact, a short list of contents can be found at the beginning of each book, including the commentary on Book I. As a consequence, Hugh offers the reader two different divisiones textus of the first book: one that precedes the commentary on Peter Lombard’s prologue and one that follows it. The second merely repeats the topics of the seven parts of Book I without any additional information; it is immediately followed by the commentary on the first section of the book. This kind of division into partes can be found at

45

Stegmüller, Analecta, 46. The divisiones textus should not be considered as distinct parts of the opus; rather, they form part of the commentaries on the individual books, except for the first divisio of Book I, which belongs to Prologue II. 46

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the beginning of each liber. The second and the third books each contain five parts, while the last is divided into only three. (4) Commentary on Books I–IV Although Hugh’s commentary contains numerous divisiones textus, it is not easy to define the structure of the four books. In fact, the text is divided in three different ways, namely, into distinctions, thematic parts, and expositiones litterae/quaestiones. The first and most evident partition consists of the distinctiones that Alexander of Hales introduced into the Sentences. In almost all the manuscripts, the commentary on a new distinction starts, indeed, in a new line and is marked by a distinction number in the margin. However, contrary to what the first divisio textus of the first book suggests, the inner, thematic structure of the commentary is not based on these distinctions. Rather, Hugh introduces a different division of his own, which is based on the doctrinal contents of each book. In this way, a thematic section can incorporate a number of distinctions, but some distinctions also contain more than one thematic section. The inner structure of a liber contains up to six levels. The main subdivisions, which are listed at the head of each book, always receive the name of partes. The lower levels, by contrast, can be called partes, capituli, or quaestiones. The number of subdivisions and of their levels is not constant: for example, the prima pars of the first book contains five chapters, but only the first one is further divided into capituli (I.1.1.1–3).47 In this way the structure of the pars prima (I.1) has only four levels while, for example, the pars quinta of the first book is divided into six levels.48 As already indicated, the main parts of each book are meant to reflect the contents of the Sentences. This is not always true for the other levels. In general, the lower the position of a chapter inside the book’s structure, the less it follows the contents of the Lombard’s text. Unfortunately, the thematic division introduced by Hugh is often inconsistent. In fact, Hugh’s commentary fully takes up only the main

47 48

See MS. B, fol. 3rb–va. See MS. B, fols. 15ra–17ra.

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parts of the divisiones textus, whereas the smaller chapters are often announced but then omitted from the discussion.49 The structure of the commentary can also be considered from another point of view. In fact, the work combines at least two literary genres, namely, expositio litterae and quaestiones. These two forms reflect two different approaches to Peter Lombard’s text. The first one is strictly connected with the littera of the Sentences. The expositio highlights a single word or short phrase from the Lombard’s text and comments on it very briefly. In general, the expositio litterae follows the order of the Sentences; exceptions to this rule remain unimportant.50 Hugh does not comment on all the words of the Sentences, but only on those that appear most significant to him;51 furthermore, the selection is not made in a systematic way. Thus, sometimes entire chapters lack an expositio. The explanations following the highlighted expressions can be very brief (a few words), but they can also be of medium size (a short phrase) or even quite long (that is to say, an explanation composed of a few sentences). The commentaries, especially the short and medium ones, usually begin with such expressions as idest, scilicet, ut, supple, or quasi diceret;52 but we can also frequently find et ita, ergo, quia, immo, et, vel, among others. As Faes de Mottoni has already remarked,53 these short clarifications serve various purposes: some of them are grammatical notes; others provide references to the Bible or to the Fathers; finally, they can contain examples, paraphrases, or other explanations. As for the longer glosses, they are normally introduced by the words queritur, notatur quod, videtur quod, and similar ones. Expositiones of this type often assume the form of short quaestiones;54 in

49 See Eugenio Randi, “Potentia Dei conditionata: una questione di Ugo di Saint-Cher sull’onnipotenza divina,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 39 (1984): 521–36, at 526. 50 For example, MS. B, fol. 24rb–va. However, comments that do not follow the order of the Sentences might be useful for reconstructing the transmission of the text, as they probably originate from marginal insertions. 51 See Faes de Mottoni, “Les manuscrits,” 289. 52 See ibid., 289–90. 53 See ibid. As examples of different types of expositiones, the article cites some passages from the commentary on Book III partially edited by Principe, Hugh of SaintCher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 163–243. 54 See, for example, In III Sententiarum, dist. 5, no. 10, in Principe, Hugh of SaintCher’s Theology, 17038–54: “Hic Deus [567, 4]: Hoc videtur minus bene dictum, sicut si diceretur ‘Hic Socrates.’—Solutio: Si li hic tenetur adjective, facit discretionem in suppositione hujus termini ‘Deus’ tantum, non in forma, et sic revera sumitur improprie; et non est simile ‘hic Socrates,’ quia ‘Socrates’ est singulare quoad formam et quoad

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other words, they draw attention to a difficult point in the Lombard’s text and then give a short solution to the problem.55 All the expositiones litterae share one common feature: they are almost always very difficult to understand without reading the corresponding passage of the Sentences. This characteristic does not concern the second literary genre, namely, the quaestiones. Even though they are normally opened by a quotation from the Sentences, the questions are often constructed as if they were independent treatises. What is more, many of them develop problems that are not treated by Peter Lombard. This is particularly evident in case of distinctions 23 and 25 of the first book, which discuss the notion of person.56 The structure and contents of the two distinctions have certainly more in common with William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea than with Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. At the head of a series of questions devoted to the subject of persona, we find a list of four opinions, including that of Peter Lombard; then Hugh introduces the questions that he will treat—and these do not correspond to the contents of the Sentences. In particular, Hugh thoroughly examines Boethius’s definition of “person,” which Peter Lombard does not consider at all. In distinction 25 we also find a long digression on the four basic metaphysical notions considered in Boethius’s Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (namely, substantia, subsistentia, essentia, and persona).57 A similar excursus can be found, for example, in works of Stephen Langton58 or William of Auxerre,59 but not in the Sentences. The structure of the questions on the notion of person is very similar to the schema of a classical quaestio disputata: first we find an introduction to the problem, then arguments pro and contra, followed by a

suppositionem. Si autem li ‘hic’ sumitur substantive et ‘Deus’ adjungatur ei per appositionem, tunc proprie sumitur et personaliter et demonstrat personam Filii.” 55 See Gilbert Dahan, L’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval, XIIe– e XIV siècles (Paris, 1999), 131–4. 56 See Wilhelm Breuning, Die hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St. Cher und Rolands von Cremona (Trier, 1962), 381–7. 57 See Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ed. C. Moreschini (Monaco, 2005), 214 (PL 64: 1343D). 58 See Artur Michael Landgraf, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton (Münster, 1952), 25–6; Magdalena Bieniak, “A Critical Edition of Stephen Langton’s Question ‘De persona’,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 77 (2006): 85–109, at 95–7. 59 See William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, Book I, treatise 4, chap. 1, ed. Jean Ribailler (Rome, 1982), 79–80.

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solutio and responseses to the objections. This schema recurs in many other questions in Hugh’s commentary; however, it is also frequent to observe a structure in which a very small number of arguments are directly followed by a short solution, which subsequently becomes the object of a further dispute.60 The distribution of the two literary genres is completely irregular. The commentary on a single distinction can be composed mainly of quaestiones, but it can also contain only the expositiones litterae. The questions can be placed at any point of a distinction; indeed, the expositiones might interrupt a question, or separate one question from another. As an illustration of the structure of Hugh’s opus, it will be useful to present the schema of a passage from the commentary on the first book.61 The selected portion of text—namely, the commentary on distinction 29—contains, first, the divisio of the relevant passage of the Sentences, followed by the divisio of the corresponding commentary, three questions, and three portions of expositiones litterae. The schema presents the incipit of each section. I have italicized the quotations from the Sentences, adding page and line numbers from the Grottaferrata edition. Paragraphs containing expositiones litterae have been indented. In order to show the location of this distinction within Hugh’s commentary as a whole, I have attributed a number to each chapter which is treated, or even just announced. Accordingly, the first digit indicates the number of the book, the second the number of the principal pars, and these are followed by other subsections. MS. B, fol. 24vb

Est preterea aliud nomen215, 11 etc. 62 Hic magister agit de conmuni spiratione, set non sub hoc nomine “conmunis spiratio”: sub hoc nomine “principium,” quia uel tempore suo non fuit adhuc inuentum illud nomen, uel quia non fuit usitatum. Et iste est ordo:

60 See, for example, the question on Christ’s human nature (In III Sententiarum, dist. 2, nos. 7–15, in Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology, 16423–16680). 61 On the structure of a typical distinction, also see Fisher, “Hugh of St. Cher,” 60. 62 I = Book I; I.6 = De proprietatibus; I.6.2 = De innascibilitate et communi spiratione; I.6.2.2 = De communi spiratione.

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primo determinat quod hoc nomen “principium” dicitur multipliciter; secundo dicit uel querit utrum pater eodem modo sit principium filii et spiritus sancti, et determinat quod non, quia est principium filii per generationem, set spiritus sancti per spirationem; tercio querit utrum eodem modo pater et filius sint principium spiritus sancti, et dicit quod sic, quia ab utroque procedit per spirationem: hoc continet locutio ista. Set hic tria queri possunt: primum est quomodo pater et filius sint unum principium spiritus sancti; secundum utrum communis spiratio sit personalis proprietas; tercium utrum essentia sit principium spiritus sancti. De primo igitur dicit Augustinus: “Fatendum est patrem et filium esse unum principium spiritus sancti, non duo principia.” Item dicit Boethius . . . Principium ad filium215, 14, per generationem et ad spiritum sanctum per communem spirationem. Et notatur quod licet filius sit principium de principio, tamen non habet principium, quia sic notaretur quod haberet principium in tempore. Spiritus uero sanctus non ab eterno principium est ratione connotati. Auctor ostenditur218, 13 . . . Ideo apostolus intelligens216, 17 etc., immo uidetur quod per hoc potius debeat intelligi quod sint diuersa principia propter diuersas prepositiones cum diuersis casualibus et propter duas copulationes. Solutio . . .

Vnum autem principium sunt pater et filius219, 3 etc. Hic queritur utrum communis spiratio sit personalis proprietas. Et uidetur quod sic . . . Tertia questio fuit utrum essentia sit principium spiritus sancti. Et uidetur quod sic, quia principium spiritus sancti et persona spirans spiritum sanctum idem omnino est, et essentia est persona spirans spiritum sanctum, ergo . . . Nomen eius non habemus219, 14, uel non inuentum, quia scilicet non fuit in usu; non habemus219, 14 . . .

* * * The formal features of the commentary reveal, to some extent, Hugh’s attitude toward the text of the Sentences. First, it is evident that the internal structure of the commentary is independent from Alexander of Hales’s distinctions. Secondly, the lower levels of the thematic partition often do not reflect the contents of the Sentences. Finally, the

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role played by the theological questions is at least as important as the one of the expositiones litterae. These characteristics confirm John Fisher’s observations. It seems, indeed, that from the formal point of view Hugh’s commentary is already largely independent from the commented work. Doctrinal Contents Anyone who expects from this section an exhaustive and systematic exposition of Hugh’s theology as outlined in his Sentences commentary will be disappointed. An exposition of this kind would presuppose an advanced stage of research on Hugh’s text; instead, most of his commentary has never been studied or even edited. To be sure, some portions of the opus have been published;63 only a few studies, however, have presented transcriptions of entire distinctions or given exhaustive analyses of specific problems. The widest range of questions has been examined by Odon Lottin.64 Many doctrinal aspects of Hugh’s commentary that were first treated by Lottin have subsequently been analyzed more thoroughly by other scholars; nevertheless, in a number of cases his study still remains the only source of information about Hugh’s opus. Lottin’s work has the merit of placing Hugh’s arguments in a wide context of other theological writings of his time. As for the text of the commentary, however, Lottin sheds only small spots of light on the vast unedited material. What is more, most likely because of the fragmentary character of his transcriptions, Lottin’s interpretations are not always completely reliable.65

63

For a complete list, see the appendix to this chapter. See Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 6 vols. (Gembloux, 1942–1960). 65 For instance, see Lottin’s discussion of the problem of the plurality of substances in the human soul according to Philip the Chancellor, in Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 467, 478–9, and compare with Roberto Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes (Louvain, 1951), 407–09, 497–8; or the evaluation of Hugh of St.-Cher’s psychology in his disputed question De anima, in Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 428–35, and compare with Bieniak, “Una questione disputata di Ugo di St.-Cher sull’anima. Edizione e studio dottrinale,” Studia antyczne i mediewistyczne 37:2 (2004): 127–84, at 150–2. 64

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Among the scholarship devoted to Hugh’s Sentences commentary after Lottin’s pioneering work, the study by Walter Principe66 merits particular attention. The volume not only contains a careful edition of nine complete distinctions and a comprehensive study of Hugh’s theory of the hypostatic union, but it also is the only study that attempts to define the significance of the basic metaphysical notions that the Dominican master employs throughout his commentary. This is certainly the first step necessary to obtain a more unified picture of the opus. Before I set out to discuss some of Hugh’s doctrinal contributions, some preliminary observations regarding his method are in order. In his Sentences commentary, Hugh composes most of his questions by copying long passages literally or with few changes from recent theological works, especially from William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea. In fact, it is very probable that Hugh attended William’s lectures in Paris.67 In most of the questions the argumentation of the Dominican master is either entirely copied from William’s Summa, or it contains only a few original arguments. William’s influence is also evident in the solutions, although Hugh quite frequently modifies or rejects his opinions. This does not mean that each time Hugh assumes a critical attitude toward William’s Summa, he proposes an innovative solution: in fact, very often Hugh abandons his principal source only in order to quote another theological work. The list of his sources is quite long: it is evident that Hugh had a good acquaintance with the theological literature of his day and of the preceding generations. He eagerly cites Alexander of Hales’s Glossa68 and the theological questions of Stephen Langton;69 he knows the writings of Guy d’Orchelles,70 Guiard of Laon,71 Godfrey of Poitiers,72 Praepositinus,73 Peter of Corbeil,74 Peter 66

See Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union. See Kilian F. Lynch, The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period (New York, 1957), vol. 1, 144. 68 See Lynch, “Some Fontes.” 69 See Damien Van den Eynde, “Stephen Langton and Hugh of St. Cher on the Causality of the Sacraments,” Franciscan Studies 11 (1951): 141–55. 70 See Charles de Miramon, “La place d’Hugues de Saint-Cher dans les débats sur la pluralité des bénéfices (1230–1240),” in Hugues de St-Cher, 341–86, esp. 362. 71 See Riccardo Quinto, “Le commentaire des Sentences d’Hugues de Saint-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,” in Hugues de Saint-Cher, 299–324, esp. 318–19. 72 See Christian Trottmann, “Syndérèse et liberté dans le commentaire des Sentences de Hugues de Saint-Cher. Éléments de théologie morale, ” in Hugues de St-Cher, 325–40, esp. 327. 73 See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. III.1, 351–2. 74 See Nicole Bériou, “Federico Visconti, archevêque de Pise, disciple de Hugues de Saint-Cher,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 253–69, esp. 256, 266. 67

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the Chanter,75 Peter Comestor,76 Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers,77 and Simon of Tournai.78 Moreover, he inserts almost the entire Summa de matrimonio of Tancred of Bologna79 into his commentary, and he quotes John the Teutonic as well.80 Considering the quantity of the incorporated material, it is impossible to evaluate Hugh’s theological contributions adequately without a thorough examination of his literary sources. In particular, a careful comparison between the commentary and William’s Summa is necessary in order to determine the most significant opinions of the Dominican master. For this reason, the following section considers above all those passages of the commentary which contradict William’s solutions or where Hugh inserts some interesting personal remarks. I have left aside arguments that do not differ significantly from the corresponding chapters of the Summa. (1) The Basic Metaphysical Vocabulary Hugh of St.-Cher generally composes his works in a fairly simple and transparent way. According to this policy, he is usually explicit about the signification of the basic ontological terms that he employs in the commentary. First of all, a useful guide to his philosophical vocabulary can be found in Prologue I. Later, Hugh offers a classical distinctio terminorum in the commentary on Book I, dist. 23, while examining the definition of persona.81 Finally, he elucidates some elements of his metaphysical principles at the beginning of some solutiones to particular questions. In most cases, the signification of the basic notions used in Hugh’s commentary is the same as in William’s Summa aurea. Hugh is conscious, however, of the different meanings that these terms assumed

75

See Beryl Smalley, The Gospels in the Schools (c. 1100–c. 1280) (London, 1985), 126–7. 76 See ibid. 77 Compare Hugh’s Sentences commentary, Book I, dist. 3 (MS. B, fol. 4vb) with the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss on the same passage (MS. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, VII C 14, fol. 5rb); also compare MS. B, fol. 5ra of Hugh’s work with the Pseudo-Poitiers Gloss (in the Naples MS., fol. 4vb). 78 See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. IV, 291–2 (concerning Book II, dist. 30). 79 See Alain Boureau, “Hugues de Saint-Cher, commentateur des Sentences. Le cas du sacrement du mariage,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 427–64, esp. 436–8. 80 See ibid., 452. The quotation is in Book IV, dist. 38 (MS. R, fol. 185va–vb). 81 See the edition in Breuning, Die hypostatische Union, 383–5 n. 184; also see ibid., 186–9, and Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 29–38.

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in various contexts and periods. Thus, he quotes various definitions of “substance” according to different philosophers: Aristotle describes it as something que proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur82 or as ens per se accidentium susceptibile;83 similarly, Boethius employs this notion in the sense of res distincta suis proprietatibus84 or indiuiduum predicamenti primi . . . quia substat accidentibus indiuiduantibus, therefore identifying substance with hypostasis.85 In contrast, Hugh affirms that his contemporaries normally identify substance with essence.86 Hugh himself frequently goes along with this identification,87 especially in the case of such derivatives as substantialis/essentialis or substantialiter/essentialiter.88 In many cases, however, he clearly prefers the Aristotelian sense of “first substance.”89 Hugh’s explicit definition for essence is forma faciens esse pure et simpliciter, that is, the form through which something simply is.90 A few times, Hugh identifies essentia with ens;91 it seems, therefore, that Hugh has an “essentialist” concept of being.92 In Trinitarian theology, Hugh generally opposes essentia to persona as the first term points to the divine nature; accordingly, he “quotes St. Hilary with approval concerning the identification of natura with essentia.”93 “Nature” usually designates the specific difference, but in the case of problems that are related to natural philosophy, he uses it as “the intrinsic principle of motus et quies.”94

82

Hugh of St. Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 23 (MS. A, fol. 19vb). Hugh of St. Cher, De anima III, ed. Bieniak in “Una questione disputata,” 181. 84 Hugh of St. Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 23 (MS. A, fol. 19vb). 85 Ibid. (ed. Breuning, 384 n. 184). 86 Ibid., dist. 25 (ed. Breuning, 386 n. 189). 87 See, for example, ibid., dist. 35 (MS. B, fol. 30ra): here Hugh speaks of God’s substance as opposed to the divine Persons. 88 See ibid., dist. 3 (in Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 486–7). 89 See Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 43–5. See also Hugh’s De anima III, ed. Bieniak, 181. 90 Hugh of St. Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 23 (ed. Breuning, 383–4 n. 184); see also Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 35–7. Hugh’s definition derives from Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, ed. Moreschini, chap. 3, 218 (PL 64: 1345A): “Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est ousia . . . : ousia quidem atque essentia, quoniam est.” 91 See, for instance, Hugh of St. Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 16 (in Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 96). 92 See Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 30. 93 Ibid., 38. 94 Ibid., 37. 83

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Another notion listed in the distinctio terminorum of I, dist. 23, is the notion of subsistence. According to Hugh, subsistentia or usiosis is the general form faciens esse quid, such as, for example, animalitas or humanitas. It is opposed to the essence, which is the form simply faciens esse. The term esse can be translated as “being” in the general sense. In some cases it is also used in sense of existence, as Walter Principe has pointed out.95 (2) The Personal Notions The discussion about the Creator, which occupies Hugh’s commentary on the first book, concerns mainly four kinds of problems: the divine essence, the distinction of persons, the five personal notions or properties, and God’s essential features in relation to His creatures. The section regarding the divine essence has received almost no attention from scholars, apart from the passages that are related to some psychological questions; I will return to them later. In the same way, for the moment I will leave aside the distinctions concerning the divine persons, since the scholarly literature has always treated them in connection with the notion of person in the hypostatic union. Hugh’s theory of the personal notions has not received much attention either; we do, however, have at our disposal two recent editions of the commentary on distinctions 26 and 28 of Book I.96 The commentary on I, dist. 26 contains a general introduction to the problem of personal properties.97 Hugh presents four famous opinions about

95

See ibid., 33. See the appendix to this chapter. 97 William of Auxerre’s treatment of this subject, which is extensively quoted by Hugh, has been thoroughly studied by Arnold, Perfecta Communicatio, 192–261; see also, Summa aurea, Book I, treatise 7, chap. 1, ed. Ribailler, 110–16. A useful guide to the problem of the personal notions as treated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries can be also found in Giuseppe Angelini, L’ortodossia e la grammatica. Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della teologia trinitaria di Prepositino (Rome, 1972), 49–57; Sten Ebbesen, “The Semantics of the Trinity according to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen,” in Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Actes du septième symposium européen d’histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales, ed. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples, 1987), 401–35; Fabio Gibiino, La “Glose” de Richard Fishacre sur la distinction 27 du premier livre des “Sentences” de Pierre Lombard. À propos des différents noms des propriétés des personnes divines. Mémoire pour l’obtention de la maîtrise de philosophie présenté par Fabio Gibiino sous la direction du prof. Ruedi Imbach (Paris, 2004–2005), 8–11. 96

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their status and number. The first opinion identifies notions and subjects, maintaining that Pater and paternitas indicate the same thing. According to this opinion, the personal properties are nothing but “ways of speaking” (modi loquendi). The second point of view attributes a real and eternal being to the notions, identifying them with the divine persons; consequently, there can be only three personal properties. The third opinion, which is supposed to go back to Gilbert of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai, states that the notions possess real being, yet they are neither the divine persons, nor are they God, nor do they belong to the persons in any way. According to this view, the properties derive from the persons and are infinite, since they express numerous relations among the divine hypostases. Finally, the fourth opinion, described as communis et celebris, affirms the real existence of exactly five distinct notions, which are identical with the divine persons.98 Hugh decidedly rejects the second opinion, according to which the notions have real being and are something different from the divine persons. He argues in favor of the existence of five different personal properties, namely, paternity (paternitas), filiation ( filiatio), procession (processio), unbegottenness (innascibilitas), and common spiration (communis spiratio). Therefore, he disagrees with the second theory. Hugh does not determine, however, if the personal notions have real being or if they are only simple modi loquendi: “utrum autem prima uel ultima uera sit, non determinamus ad presens.”99 As Fabio Gibiino has recently shown, Hugh’s commentary on Book I, dist. 26–27 has strongly influenced the corresponding distinctions of the Sentences commentary by Richard Fishacre.100 The commentary on Book I, dist. 28 concerns the notion of the unbegottenness (innascibilitas) of the Father. As usual, Hugh follows the exposition of William of Auxerre very closely:101 first, he defines

98

See Hugh of St. Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 26, in Fabio Gibiino, La “Glose” de Richard Fishacre sur la distinction 26 du premier livre des “Sentences” de Pierre Lombard. Mémoire pour l’obtention du Master II présenté par Fabio Gibiino sous la direction du prof. Ruedi Imbach (Paris, 2005–2006), 47–8. 99 Ibid., 51. 100 See ibid., 46–60. My thanks to Fabio Gibiino, who allowed me to consult some unedited material on which he is working. 101 See William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, Book I, treatise 8, chap. 5, ed. Ribailler, 13535–52. William’s text has been analyzed by Johannes Arnold, Perfecta Communicatio, 210–16, and Emmanuel Durand, “Généalogie de la typologie médiévale sur l’innascibilitas du Père. Pierre Lombard, Guillaume d’Auxerre et Alexandre de Halès,” AHDLMA 74 (2007): 7–26, at 16–21.

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the unbegottenness as a privative notion, which, however, can be defined as a distinctive feature of the Father; secondly, he insists on the relative character of this property. Hugh’s own contribution to the debate consists in defining the relation indicated by innascibilitas. The notion of unbegottenness signifies the relation between the person who is not generated and the non-parent (non-genitor). This relationship possesses merely logical being; in other words, it does not refer to any real person. As a result, the notion of non-parent cannot be considered a personal property.102 (3) God’s Omnipotence Among the fourteen distinctions devoted to God’s essential features, so far only one has been edited and studied.103 Distinction 42, in which Hugh discusses God’s omnipotence, appears to contain an important and original contribution. Eugenio Randi, the editor of the text, affirms, in fact, that Hugh is the first author to use the opposition conditioned power/absolute power (potentia conditionata vs. potentia absoluta) in a theological context.104 The expression previously belonged only to the juridical tradition, where it occurred in the context of certain inheritances.105 Alain Boureau, however, has recently questioned the originality of Hugh’s solution.106 According to his study, Hugh’s contribution amounts to nothing more than a linguistic modification, as he simply replaces the term determinata, already used by William of Auxerre, with a similar expression, namely, conditionata.107

102

See Bieniak, “L’innascibilitas du Père,” 163. See Randi, “Potentia Dei conditionata.” 104 Randi, “Potentia Dei conditionata,” 534 quotes Hugh’s Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 42: “Ad tertium dicimus quod duplex est potentia dei, idest dupliciter dicitur, absoluta et conditionata; absoluta potentia est ipsa in se considerata, hac potest in se omnia, et Petrum dampnare et Iudam salvare ecc. Huiusmodi potentia conditionata dicitur inquantum respicit conditione vel legem quam deus sua bonitate rebus indidt, qua manente non potest deus facere contrarium, quod faceret si dampnaret Petrum et salvaret Iudam, quia veritas et iustitia dei exigit ut Petrus habeat vitam eternam et Iudam penam eternam; hec est enim lex data a deo ut bonos remuneret et malos puniat; hanc potentiam conditionatam vocat glossa super Ge. xix. iustitiam, ubi agitur de Loth.” 105 See Randi, “Potentia Dei conditionata,” 524. 106 See Boureau, “Hugues de Saint-Cher,” 463–4. 107 Unfortunately, Boureau does not indicate the exact passage of William’s Summa which he appears to have in mind. For some recent literature concerning the debate on the distinction of two God’s powers, see William J. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages,” in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in 103

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magdalena bieniak (4) The Divine Persons

The notion of person figures mainly in two different contexts in Hugh’s commentary: first, in Book I, dist. 23–25, where it is defined in the context of the Holy Trinity; secondly, in the first half of the third book, in a Christological context. Furthermore, both sections contain a number of passages that are devoted to the problem of the term persona as applied to the human being, the soul, and the angels. All these applications are closely related to each other; therefore, I will treat them together, only partially respecting the order of Hugh’s commentary. Hugh, as well as William of Auxerre, constructs his theory of the person upon the basis of Boethius’s definition: “persona est rationalis naturae indiuidua substantia.” In order to ensure a coherent use of the term in all possible contexts, Hugh, however, stresses the second part of the definition, emphasizing its relational character more than his older colleague. Accordingly, the primary meaning of persona is “individual substance,” that is to say, intrinsic relation, while the rational nature or essence constitutes only a secondary meaning of the term.108 Moreover, in the Trinitarian context Hugh considers the relation between person and essence as a mystery of faith, which it is impossible for the human mind to understand. Hugh’s main contribution to the discussion concerning the meaning of “person” when the term is applied to God, appears to be a brief history of the concept. Hugh distinguishes three periods in the use of this term. First, before heretics challenged the Christians on the doctrine of the Trinity, the word “person” indicated simply the divine nature.

Medieval Philosophy, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht, 1985), 243–69; idem, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power (Bergamo, 1990), esp. 65–87; Henri Veldhuis, “Ordained and Absolute Power in Scotus’ Ordinatio I 44,” Vivarium 38 (2000): 222–30; Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden, 2004). 108 Breuning, Die hypostatische Union, 186–9 n. 383 quotes Hugh’s Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 23: “Persona igitur quantum ad rem oblique significatam dicitur secundum substantiam, quantum uero ad rem recte significatam dicitur secundum relationem. Persona enim significat relationem intrinsecam, idest intra se finitam, non ad aliud extra, quod patet. Persona enim est ‘rationalis nature indiuidua substantia.’ ‘Indiuiduum’ autem est indiuisibile et diuisum ab alio. Ecce per hoc quod dico ‘diuisum,’ significatur relatio, siue distinctio. Set relatio ista est finita per hoc quod dico ‘alio,’ et ita ‘persona’ intra finit suam relationem, quemadmodum ‘magnus’ uel similes.”

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Secondly, after the question qui tres was asked, the term was used in the plural to indicate the hypostases—that is to say, those who have the divine nature—while in the singular it still denoted the essence. Finally, Hugh affirms that in his own time the term “person” is always used in the sense of “hypostasis,” that is to say, res distincta per se ens. This definition emphasizes once again the relational and individual character of person.109 (5) Christ as Person: The Problem of the Hypostatic Union In order to reconcile the double nature of Christ with the unity of a hypostasis, Hugh develops an original, almost purely privative conception of person. Just as in case of his Trinitarian speculations, the central role is assumed by the notion of individuality. Hugh knows well the rule persona consumpsit personam, which he interprets it in the same way as William:110 a person must be individual, that is to say, singular (unlike a universal), unable to be a part of a whole (unlike the soul), and not united to a nobler being (unlike Jesus as a human being).111 As for the last condition, Hugh states explicitly that distinctio dignitatis is not an additional form that completes the form of humanity; rather, it denotes the negation of being united with a nobler being. Consequently, the perfection of person consists in a privation. “Here what was virtual and implicit in the positions of William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales becomes formal and explicit.”112 In order to solve the problem of Christ’s unity, William of Auxerre had defined the humanity of Christ as a quasi-accident of His. This solution does not satisfy Hugh. In contrast, he prefers to introduce a distinction between the existence and the nature of Christ, a distinction between esse and essentia. Accordingly, Christ has two diverse natures; his uncreated being, however, can be distinguished only logically or mentally from his created being: his essentia is double, but his esse is one.113 109

See ibid., 186–9 n. 384–5. See William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, Book III, treatise 1, chap. 3, qu. 8, ed. Ribailler, 3653–3769. 111 See Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 25 (in Breuning, Die hypostatische Union, 384–5). 112 Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 85. 113 See ibid., 94–8. Before Hugh, Alexander of Hales already framed the unity of Christ in terms of being; however, Hugh’s use of essentia and esse is independent of Alexander’s Glossa (see ibid., 98). 110

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magdalena bieniak (6) The Human Being as Person

According to Hugh’s privative conception of person, the form of humanity is sufficient to guarantee the personal character of the human being. The human nature, however, consists of two different substances, body and soul, the latter with a rational nature. Consequently, Hugh, like many thinkers of the preceding generations, raises the question as to whether the human soul can be defined as a person. His response resembles William’s discussion of the subject;114 Hugh, however, gives emphasis to an aspect that is not mentioned in Summa aurea. Following Alain of Lille and Stephen Langton,115 he affirms that a soul can never be a person, neither when it is united to the body nor in its separate state, that is to say, after death. This solution is closely connected with two important assumptions. First, the soul is not per se unum so that it constitutes only a part of an individual being; consequently, the separated souls of the saints naturally desire to be given back their bodies. Secondly, there is a substantial difference between the soul and an angel. An angel, in fact, possesses an individual and personal being, as his faculties are independent from any bodily organs. For this reason, Christ could have assumed an angel’s nature, but he could not have become a soul without assuming a body.116 (7) The Soul in Comparison with the Trinity Whereas Hugh discusses the moral dimension of the soul in his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, the questions related to the ontological status of the human soul can be found above all in his commentary on the first book. Human memory, intellect, and will were traditionally considered to be an image of the eternal Trinity. Hugh, therefore, asks if the three rational potencies are identical with

114

See note 108 above; also see Louis-B. Gillon, “La noción de persona en Hugo de San Caro,” Ciencia Tomista 64 (1943): 171–7. 115 See Palémon Glorieux, “La somme ‘Quoniam homines’ d’Alain de Lille,” AHDLMA 20 (1953): 113–364, at 172–4; for Langton, see Bieniak, “A Critical Edition” (cited in note 58 above), 100–01. See also Magdalena Bieniak, “La définition de ‘persona’, d’Étienne Langton à Hugues de Saint-Cher,” in Étienne Langton. Prédicateur, bibliste et théologien. Colloque international 13–15 septembre 2006, Paris, Centre d’études du Saulchoir, EPHE-CNRS, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Nicole Bériou, Gilbert Dahan, and Riccardo Quinto (Turnhout, forthcoming). 116 See Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 3 (in Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 48); Book III, dist. 2 and 5 (in Breuning, Die hypostatische Union, 340, 351–2).

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the essence of the human soul. He responds that, indeed, they are: “memoria, intelligentia et uoluntas substantialiter siue essentialiter sunt in anima.”117 The human soul cannot be conceived without these faculties; consequently, it is the soul itself that remembers, understands, and loves. In this way, Hugh contradicts William’s position,118 returning to the traditional theory that was commonly ascribed to Augustine.119 Hugh compares the relative simplicity of the soul to the absolute lack of composition in God and to the complexity of the body.120 His discussion contains a characteristic passage in which he provides a list of possible types of composition: concretio, that is to say, the composition of accidents; the composition of integral parts and essential parts (for instance, form and matter);121 potential composition; and, finally, the composition of quo est (for example, “potentias quibus anima est, ad minus quoad bene esse”) and quod est (for example, “ipsa substantantia animae”). Hugh affirms the relative simplicity of the soul, since it certainly lacks the composition of integral and essential parts, and perhaps also the potential composition.122 (8) Free Will, Synderesis, and the First Movements Hugh’s theory of the liberum arbitrium is connected with his doctrine of the identity of the soul with its faculties. Will and reason constitute the same faculty so that they can be distinguished only according to their acts. The liberum arbitrium cannot be superior to them, because reason, which is the specific difference of the human being, must be the supreme part of the soul. Furthermore, the liberum arbitrium is strictly connected to the will; therefore, it can be identified with the faculty of will and reason. This intellectualist solution is inspired by

117

Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 3 (MS. D, fol. 5rb–6rb). See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 486–7. 119 This attribution was mainly an effect of the strong influence of the PseudoAugustinian treatise De spiritu et anima. About the origins of the theory of the identity of the soul with its faculties, see Pius Künzle, Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen (Freiburg [Switzerland], 1956), 38. 120 See Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 8 (in Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 430–1). 121 See Hugh of St.-Cher, De anima (in Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 438, and in Bieniak, “Una questione disputata,” 150–2). 122 See Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology, 40–2, and Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 430 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book I, dist. 8). 118

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texts of William and Praepositinus; it is opposed to the solution adopted by Godfrey of Poitiers.123 Hugh embraces a definition of freedom that was clearly rejected by William: “flexibilitas ad id quod vult habens liberum arbitrium.” Following Bernard of Clairvaux, he affirms that a good will is assisted by the synderesis and the grace of God, while it is opposed by the fomes peccati. In accordance with his doctrine on the identity of the potencies of the soul, Hugh does not consider the synderesis as a faculty distinct from reason, rather defining it as reason in its action of celestia contemplari. In fact, Hugh appears to assign more importance to the contemplative function of synderesis than to its function of providing moral guidance.124 Furthermore, the commentary on Book II, dist. 24 also contains an original and influential theory of the so-called first movements (primi motus), that is to say, of the first natural reactions—also called “prepassions”—that are prior to any cognition. Hugh distinguishes two levels of the first movements of human sensuality: the motus primo primi, which have their origin in our nature and lie outside the control of reason, and the motus secundo primi, which are already due to the judgment of reason. While the former are necessarily innocent, the latter can be sinful if they concern illicita. This theory modifies William of Auxerre’s solution significantly, and it contradicts Peter Lombard’s point of view as well. A similar doctrine appears to have inspired Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the subject in his commentary on the Sentences.125 (9) Original Sin While William of Auxerre remained faithful to the Augustinian tradition in defining original sin through the concepts of fomes or pronitas, Hugh seems to be influenced by Stephen Langton’s doctrine as he tends to consider original sin as a macula.126 This point of view is important above all for Hugh’s theory of baptism. According to Wil-

123 See Trottmann, “Syndérèse et liberté,” 325–40, and Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. I, 96–103 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 24). 124 See Trottmann, “Syndérèse et liberté,” 330–7. 125 See Boureau, “Hugues,” 456, and Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. II, 526–8 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 24). 126 See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. IV, 118–29 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 30).

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liam, original sin consists in a certain degree of concupiscientia; in consequence, baptism only diminishes the intensity of the concupiscientia and renders it governable by the reason, so that it ceases to be sinful. Hugh reasons differently: as original sin, properly speaking, consists in a macula and the fomes or concupiscentia is only a consequence of sin, baptism has the capacity to eliminate this macula completely, while its partial effect on the fomes concerns nothing but the consequence of sin. As a result, Hugh’s solution confers a more powerful role to the sacrament of baptism.127 (10) The Intrinsic Morality of Actions The question concerning the moral character of human actions is one of a few passages in his commentary where Hugh does not take William’s exposition into account. In brief, he tries to reconcile the two opposite opinions quoted by Peter Lombard. The first one considers all external actions, apart from the agent’s intentions, to be morally indifferent, whereas the second postulates the existence of three kinds of actions: those which are in se morally bad so that they cannot be made good by a noble intention; those which are in se morally good so that they remain de genere bonorum under any circumstances; and finally, those which are intrinsically indifferent. Hugh’s solution is based upon a distinction concerning the definition of an action. Every action can be divided into its essence and its circumstances. Now the essence is always morally indifferent; only the circumstances can make an action bad. In this way, according to Hugh, both opinions are correct: the first one, because it considers only the essence; the second one, because it concentrates on the circumstances.128 (11) Is Ignorance Sinful? In his commentary on Book II, dist. 22, Hugh only modifies the exposition contained in the Summa aurea. According to William, not to know what we should know is never a sin. Hugh basically agrees with this point of view; he adds, however, that if our ignorance is voluntary,

127

See ibid., 291–2 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 30). See ibid., vol. II, 428–9; vol. IV, 421–2 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 40). 128

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it is no longer innocent. Both authors affirm, however, that ignorance of the law is always sinful.129 (12) May a Heretic’s Earthly Goods be Confiscated? At the beginning of his commentary on Book II, in a chapter concerning the causes of man’s creation, Hugh inserts a short but captivating passage on the heretics’ property. The human being, affirms Hugh, was created in order to serve God with all his capacities and belongings; consequently, the material world is not man’s property, but a sort of fief. As a result, if a heretic does not serve God with his faith, it is licit and just to deprive him of his material goods, just as it is moral to deny a fief to a rebellious vassal.130 (13) The Gifts of the Holy Spirit After treating the Christological questions in the first half of his commentary on Book III, Hugh, following the order of the Sentences, discusses the problems concerning the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit. In general, he rejects William’s opinion, according to which the gifts are all identical with the cardinal virtues. Hugh prefers to reaffirm the position held by Peter Lombard and Praepositinus of Cremona, as he identifies only four gifts—namely, fear, fortitude, piety, and wisdom— with the virtues in the Ambrosian sense, that is to say, the spiritual virtues.131 Among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, fear is mentioned particularly frequently. Hugh distinguishes two meanings of fear: first, it is a movement of our spirit (animus); secondly, it is a passion. The passion is a gift and results from the movement; consequently, it is not a virtue, because it does not come from us and is only a kind of prize. On the contrary, we are responsible for the movement of fear; this movement,

129

See ibid., vol. III.1, 26–7 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 22). See Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 1 (MS. B, fol. 41va); compare with Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book II, dist. 1 (p. 3335). Hugh quite frequently inserts digressions concerning legal probems into his commentary; he appears to have had a good acquaintance with juridical and notarial practice in the society of his time. See Miramon, “La place d’Hugues” (cited in note 70 above), 362. 131 See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. III.1, 345–6, 437–43 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book II, dist. 34). 130

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however, is not proper to only one virtue, rather belonging to many virtues at once.132 Then Hugh raises the question of the different kinds of fear. He reconciles two different classifications. On the one hand, William of Auxerre, who adopted Stephen Langton’s position, listed six kinds of fear—namely, timor naturalis, humanus, mundanus, servilis, initialis, and filialis. On the other hand, John Damascene distinguished segnites, verecundia, erubescentia, admiratio, stupor, and agonia. Hugh affirms that both divisions derive from the same principle: according to Augustine, in fact, all kinds of fear can be defined as fuga mali. The two classifications can be derived from a threefold distinction of evil (malum), which is divided into tristabile, dampnosum, and indecens. Therefore, the former division can be reduced to the latter: segnites and erubescentia are the same as timor naturalis, humanus, and servilis, because they are all a fear of some malum tristabile; verecundia, stupor, and admiratio are a sort of timor filialis, because they all fear a malum indecens; and finally, agonia is reducible to timor mundanus, since they both refer to a malum dampnosum.133 (14) The Sacraments Most of the commentary on the fourth book concerns the theory of the sacraments. Hugh’s exposition of this matter seems to be particularly influenced by Aristotelian metaphysics. Thus, the Dominican master explains the composition of the sacraments by using the oppposition materia vs. forma. The meaning he gives to these notions is truly philosophical: although Hugh does not totally abandon the traditional division into materia/elementum and forma verborum, he uses the Aristotelian distinction primarily in the sense of material vs. formal cause. This new interpretation of the two terms could guarantee a uniform composition to all sacraments, including those that traditionally did not imply any material element, such as marriage. The introduction of the Aristotelian metaphysics also opened up the possibility to consider the sacrament as a substance; in this way, the accidental aspects of the sacrament could be given consideration. This

132

See ibid., 352. See Hugh of St.-Cher, Sentences Commentary, Book III, dist. 34, in R. Quinto, “Hugh of St.-Cher’s Use of Stephen Langton,” in Medieval Analysis in Language and Cognition, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 281–300, at 294. 133

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theory, however, entailed a difficulty: the role of the Church seemed to become unnecessary. For this reason, Hugh also considers a more traditional composition of res and sacramentum as he tries to reconcile both visions.134 (15) Miracles Just like other contemporary theologians, Hugh distinguishes different types of miracles according to the degree to which they deviate from the natural course of events. Following William, Hugh arrives at this classification by using the Aristotelian notions of act and potency. Contrary to William, however, he distinguishes between potency and collatio potentie, or “the act of receiving the potency.” In this way the virginal conception of Christ, for example, is understood as a miracle both in the potency given to Mary and in the act of generation. The blind healed by Christ, on the other hand, is regarded as receiving the potency in a miraculous way, but the potency itself and the act of seeing are natural.135 Finally, Hugh is the first author to insert a question on the miraculous status of the resurrection into a Sentences commentary.136 Conclusion An accurate evaluation of Hugh’s opus is not a simple task. On the one hand, it is difficult to find a commentary composed before Hugh’s which would include a similar number of long digressions not directly related to the Sentences. On the other hand, most of his arguments can

134 See Boureau, “Hugues,” 455–62 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book IV, dist. 26). Also see Van den Eynde, “Stephen Langton and Hugh of St. Cher” (see note 69 above); idem, “The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism (1125–1240),” Franciscan Studies 11 (1951): 1–20, 117–44; 12 (1952): 1–26. Concerning the sacrament of marriage, see also Pedro Abellan, “La doctrina matrimonial de Hugo de San Caro,” Archivo Theólgico Granadino (1938): 27–56. 135 See Maaike van der Lugt, “Le miracle chez Hugues de Saint-Cher. De la théorie à la pratique,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 387–425, esp. 391–407 (quoting Sentences Commentary, Book III, dist. 4). Van der Lugt judges Hugh’s theory to be confused and less lucid by comparison with William’s authentically Aristotelian solution. 136 Although—as van der Lugt remarks—the commentaries by Stephen Langton and Alexander of Hales on the last part of Book IV have not come down to us. Concerning the eschatological distinctions in Hugh’s commentary, see also Wicki, Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit, 157, 185, 196–227.

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be found in other theological works of his time, above of all in William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea, and the solutions he offers frequently follow the opinions adopted in his sources. The actual weight of Hugh’s contributions cannot be determined without a more complete examination of his work. Nevertheless, Hugh’s theory of the sacraments or his doctrine of the unity of being in Christ prove that the Commentary is more than a mere compilation. Even a partial knowledge of the opus allows us, therefore, to consider Hugh of St.-Cher’s Sentences commentary as a reliable source of information on his personal theological opinions.

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magdalena bieniak Appendix: A List of Edited or Partially Edited Passages from Hugh of St.-Cher’s Sentences Commentary137

• Prologues, including the exposition of Peter Lombard’s prologue; Book I, dist. 1: F. Stegmüller, Analecta uppsaliensia theologiam medii aevi illustrantia, vol. 1: Opera systematica (Uppsala amd Wiesbaden, 1953), 35–57. • Prologues, including the exposition of Peter Lombard’s prologue; divisiones textus of Books I–IV; the incipits of Book I, dist. 1, 2, 10, and 48 (MS. S): idem, “Die älteste Redaktion des Sentenzenkommentars Hugos von St. Cher in einer Handschrift der königlichen Bibliothek zu Stockholm,” Nordisk Tidskrift för Bok- och Biblioteksväsen 35 (1948): 69–79, at 71–8. • Prologues, including the exposition of Peter Lombard’s Prologue; divisiones textus of Books I–IV (Ms. U): idem, “Die endgültige Redaktion des Sentenzenkommentars Hugos von St. Cher,” Classica et Mediaevalia 9 (1948): 246–65. • Book I, dist. 3 (partial) : O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles (Grembloux, 1942–1960), vol. I, 486–7. • Book I, dist. 8 (partial) : idem, “Un petit traité sur l’âme de Hugues de SaintCher,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 34 (1932): 468–75; reprinted in Psychologie et morale, vol. 1, 429–31. • Book I, dist. 21, 23, and 25 (partial): W. Breuning, Die hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St. Cher und Rolands von Cremona (Trier, 1962), 381–7. • Book I, dist. 26 : F. Gibiino, La “Glose” de Richard Fishacre sur la distinction 26 du premier livre des “Sentences” de Pierre Lombard. Mémoire pour l’obtention du Master II présenté par Fabio Gibiino sous la direction du prof. Ruedi Imbach (Paris, 2005/2006), 46–53. • Book I, dist. 28 : M. Bieniak, “L’innascibilitas du Père dans le commentaire d’Hugues de Saint-Cher sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Édition du texte (In Sent. I, dist. 28),” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 74 (2007): 161–71, at 167–71. • Book I, dist. 42 (partial): E. Randi, “Potentia Dei conditionata: una questione di Ugo di Saint-Cher sull’onnipotenza divina,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 39 (1984): 521–36, at 532–6. • Book II, dist. 22 (partial) : Lottin, Psychologie et morale, vol. III.1, 26–7. • Book II, dist. 24 (partial) : ibid., I, 99–101, 102–03; II, 127, 527. • Book II, dist. 30 (partial) : ibid., IV, 119–21, 123–9, 291–2. • Book II, dist. 40 (partial) : ibid., II, 429; IV, 421–2.

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This inventory contains every part (of a certain length) of Hugh’s commentary that has been published, irrespectively of the number of manuscripts used or the form in which the text is presented. Thus, the list also includes short transcriptions that appear in footnotes.

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• Book II, dist. 40 (partial): J. Gründel, Die Lehre von den Umständen der menschlichen Handlung im Mittelalter (Münster, 1963), 422–3. • Book III, dist. 1–2, 4–8, 10–12, 22 (partial): Breuning, Die hypostatische Union, 334–80. • Book III, dist. 2, 5–7, 10–12, 21–2: W. H. Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1970), 163–243. • Book III, dist. 31 (partial): N. Wicki, Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg, 1954), 185, 259, 262, 273–4. • Book III, dist. 34 (partial): Lottin, Psychologie et morale, III.1, 352–5, 440–1. Book III, dist. 34 (partial): R. Quinto, “Hugh of St.-Cher’s Use of Stephen Langton,” in Medieval Analysis in Language and Cognition, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 281–300, at 291–4. A more complete edition, based on a larger number of manuscripts, is in press; see idem, “Le commentaire des Sentences d’Hugues de Saint-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,” in Hugues de Saint-Cher († 1263), bibliste et théologien, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, G. Dahan, and P.-M. Gy, (Turnhout, 2004), 299–324. • Book III, dist. 36 (partial): Lottin, Psychologie et morale, III.1, 211. • Book IV, dist. 1: H.-D. Simonin and G. Meersseman, De sacramentorum efficientia apud theologos ord. praed. (Rome, 1936), vol. I, 6–10; partially reprinted in D. Van den Eynde, “Stephen Langton and Hugh of St. Cher on the Causality of the Sacraments,” Franciscan Studies 11 (1951): 141–55, at 146–8. • Book IV, dist. 1: Stegmüller, Analecta, 58–95. • Book IV, dist. 7: K. L. Lynch, The Sacrament of Confirmation in the EarlyMiddle Scholastic Period (New York, 1957), vol. I, 13–20. • Book IV, dist. 16–17 (partial): Gründel, Lehre von den Umständen, 423–6. • Book IV, dist. 26–7, 38 (partial): P. Abellan, “La doctrina matrimonial de Hugo de San Caro,” Archivo theólgico granadino (1938): 27–56, at 34–49. • Book IV, dist. 26, 30, 37–8 (partial): A. Boureau, “Hugues de Saint-Cher, commentateur des Sentences. Le cas du sacrement du mariage,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 427–64, at 435–6, 442–61. • Book IV, dist. 43 (partial): M. van der Lugt, “Le miracle chez Hugues de Saint-Cher. De la théorie à la pratique,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 395–6. In preparation: • Book I, dist. 3 (M. Bieniak) • Book I, dist. 27 (F. Gibiino) • Book II, dist. 24–5 (C. Trottmann; see idem, “Syndérèse et liberté dans le commentaire des Sentences de Hugues de Saint-Cher. Éléments de théologie morale,” in Hugues de St-Cher, 325–40) • Book II, dist. 24–7 (R. Saccenti) • Book III, dist. 24–5 (A. Oliva)

THOMAS AQUINAS AND HIS LECTURA ROMANA IN PRIMUM SENTENTIARUM PETRI LOMBARDI John F. Boyle 1. Thomas Aquinas and the Liber sententiarum Thomas Aquinas first commented on Peter Lombard’s Liber sententiarum at the beginning of his career at the University of Paris in 1252–1256. In its final form the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is a stunning intellectual achievement in its breadth, coherence, and even its size.1 Prior to its completion, Thomas incepted in 1256 as a master in one of the two Dominican chairs in theology and began his first Parisian regency.2 This Parisian Scriptum follows the standardized division of the Sentences into distinctions. Thomas’s consideration of each distinction is threefold. He begins with a divisio textus. Typical of a scholastic division, Thomas’s divisio textus first divides the whole of the Sentences and then proceeds by further division to break down each distinction in such a way as to provide a conceptual frame for the whole of the Sentences and each of its parts. One of the great achievements of scholasticism, the divisio textus is a formidable tool for commenting on texts, and Thomas shows his command of the technique here at the beginning of his career. Following the divsio textus are Thomas’s own questions on the material of the distinctions. The questions are divided into articles

1

See Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, ed. Pierre Mandonnet and Marie Fabien Moos, 4 vols. (Paris, 1929–1947). All citations will be to this edition by internal division followed by volume and page numbers in parentheses. This edition is over 4,500 pages long and still lacks the second half of the commentary on Book IV (the first half itself being over 1,000 pages). 2 See James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Washington, D.C., 1983), 53–80, 93–6, and Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C., 1996), 39–45. For the most thorough consideration of the difficult textual questions concerning the Scriptum and their implications for our understanding of Thomas’s career in Paris, see Adriano Oliva, Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la “sacra doctrina” (Paris, 2006).

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(and sometimes further divided into quaestiunculae), which are in the short modified form of the disputed question increasingly common to scholastic commentaries. For each question, Thomas provides a divisio quaestionum. While the topics are broadly those of the distinction at hand and the specific questions asked may come from the Sentences itself, they may also arise from the disputes of Thomas’s own day, or be topics that Thomas thinks necessary or interesting. Finally, each distinction has an expositio textus in which Thomas briefly touches on specific issues arising directly from Peter Lombard’s text but which do not merit articles of their own. The result is a work that is simultaneously commentary and personal work of systematic theology. The purpose of such a work was not simply to comment on the Lombard; it was as well to show one’s own mastery of theology. A commentary on the Sentences was evidence of one’s qualification to be a university master. This was perhaps especially so for the young Thomas Aquinas, whose Scriptum surely put to rest any doubt as to his abilities. Thomas was not, however, to be long in Paris. In 1265, the general chapter of the Order of Preachers ordered Thomas to return to his home province, the Roman province, where he was to undertake the education of Dominicans beginning their theological training.3 It is perhaps only natural that Thomas would turn to the Sentences as his textbook. He taught it for one year, 1265–1266. Thomas never published this second classroom commentary. In fact, it all but disappeared. The only reference to it is found in the biography of Thomas from around 1317 by Tolomeo of Lucca. Tolomeo was a younger confrere of Thomas who had been his student in Naples at the end of the master’s life. It is Tolomeo who tells us that Thomas taught Peter Lombard a second time; moreover, he is very precise that Thomas was already a master and at Rome. Tolomeo tells us that he has even seen a manuscript of it.4 Perhaps by 1317, forty years after

3 See Leonard E. Boyle, The Setting of the “Summa theologiae” of Saint Thomas (Toronto, 1982), 9–12, reprinted with revisions in Leonard E. Boyle, Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2000), 65–91; Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 142–4; and M. Michèle Mulchahey, “First the Bow is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education Before 1350 (Toronto, 1998), 278–80. 4 See Leonard E. Boyle, “ ‘Alia lectura fratris Thome,’ ” Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): 418–29, at 418; reprinted with slight corrections in the edition of the Lectura romana (see next note), 58–69, at 58; and Mark F. Johnson, “ ‘Alia lectura fratris thome’: A List of the New Texts of St. Thomas Aquinas found in Lincoln College, Oxford, MS. Lat. 95,” RTAM 57 (1995): 34–61, at 35–6.

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Thomas’s death, doubt had been cast on Tolomeo’s claim; hence his insistence on having seen it with his own eyes. But it was already missing and would remain missing for seven hundred years. 2. The Lectura romana5 Fortunately, at least one copy survives and was identified by Leonard Boyle. It is an Italian manuscript of the latter part of the thirteenth century, now in Oxford (MS. Lincoln College, lat. 95). The principal text of the manuscript, in two columns covering 120 folios, is Thomas’s Parisian Scriptum, that is, his first commentary on the Sentences. In addition to the Parisian Scriptum, however, this manuscript contains another commentary, written in the margins and feet of the manuscript as well as on the front and back guard folios. It has its own prologue, ninetyseven articles and three short notes. The articles cover the prologue of the Sentences, distinctions 1 through 17, and distinction 23. The notes are to distinctions 3 and 24. This marginal commentary represents a reportatio of Thomas’s second commentary, now known as the Lectura romana. This second commentary, which is also in an Italian hand of the latter part of the thirteenth century, has been placed in this manuscript very carefully in relation to the first commentary. We know little of the circumstances of the manuscript, but what little we know is tantalizing. The manuscript carries a note that it was sold by one Frater Jacobus Raynucii. There is, in fact, a Jacobus Raynucii of the Roman province of the Order of Preachers. This Jacobus died shortly after his appointment as bishop of Florence in 1286. As the manuscript refers to him simply as “Frater” he likely sold it prior to his appointment. He was also appointed conventual lector in 1273, and since the manuscript makes no reference to that either, it might possibly antedate 1273. While we know little of the early career of Jacobus Raynucii, Leonard Boyle argued from what we do know that it would not be unreasonable to think that he began his theological training in the mid-1260s; he could well have been a student of Thomas at Santa Sabina in the year in which the master taught the Sentences. If so, it would certainly account for the

5

See Thomas Aquinas, Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. Leonard E. Boyle and John F. Boyle (Toronto, 2006). References to the text of the Lectura romana will be to this edition by the internal division followed by the page number in parenthesis.

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care with which the text is copied into the manuscript. One could easily enough imagine Jacobus acquiring a manuscript of the Parisian Scriptum and carefully copying his own reportatio of the Lectura romana into the manuscript so as to have both together for his own study and teaching.6 We find in the margins references to an alia lectura fratris Thomae which, as Leonard Boyle has famously argued, are a key to understanding this manuscript. While from our vantage point, the alia lectura would be the “other” or second, Roman commentary, from the vantage point of one of Thomas’s students in Rome, the alia lectura would not be the commentary in front of him, but that other commentary from Paris, the Scriptum. And indeed, this makes sense of the use of the phrase secundum aliam lecturam fratris Thomae as a placement guide in the manuscript. As the scribe, at least, sees it, we have two commentaries of Brother Thomas on the Sentences, and the perspective is precisely that of someone who first has the Lectura romana and only secondly the Parisian Scriptum, which he considers as the “other” commentary.7 Still, with only a single manuscript witness, we are left with a number of questions. Is the text complete? As we have it, there is a gap between distinction 17 and distinction 23. Did Thomas simply not comment on these distinctions?8 If not, did he jump to distinction 23 or treat it out of order? One article, 4.4, though announced in a divisio quaestionum, is not to be found in the manuscript. Is it missing, or did Thomas simply not present that article? Perhaps more important is the question of the reliability of the text we have. Again, we cannot be certain. What is clear is that the scribe was a very careful copyist who reviewed and corrected his work. Of course, the scribe may have been copying carefully from a corrupt exemplar. On this point it is noteworthy that Thomas does from time to time quietly quote himself from earlier and contemporaneous works; as well, he will mine the Lectura romana for later works. In these generally modest cases, we find the verbatim parallels to be quite exact.9 Thus, while one would do well to keep in mind the limitations of a work available in only one manuscript, we can make use of it as representative of Thomas’s lectura romana.

6

See L. E. Boyle, “ ‘Alia lectura,’ ” 427–9 (reprinted in Lectura romana, 67–9). See ibid., 420–2 (60–2). 8 There are reasons to think that he did not, although Thomas may have taught selected articles of distinction 19 of the Parisian Scriptum. See John F. Boyle, “Introduction,” in Lectura romana, 1–57, esp. 54. 9 See ibid., 14–15. 7

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The Lectura romana as we have it in MS. Lincoln College, lat. 95, is a much simpler work than the Parisian Scriptum. There are no divisiones textus or expositiones textus. We have only articles, often with a divisio quaestionum. In this simplified form, the Lectura romana is actually less of a commentary than is the Parisian Scriptum. Nor is it a text to prove one’s competence in and mastery of theology. By 1265, Thomas had nothing to prove. So what is it? It is a teaching text. More precisely, it is a reportatio of Thomas’s classroom, in which he used the Sentences. Thus, while it is not precisely a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, it is a work in which the Sentences play an essential and, in some regards, determinative role. In all of this we have something unusual. From the side of Thomas, we have his return to the Sentences as a master of theology. But he does not return to the Parisian Scriptum. Twelve of the ninety-seven articles of the Lectura romana are not found in the Parisian Scriptum. Of these twelve, nine are unique in Thomas’s works. More importantly, while questions and topics often overlap with the Parisian Scriptum and other works, the arguments and formulations of the arguments are frequently new. Thomas has embarked on a new consideration of the Sentences. Because it is the only reportatio of his classroom apart from Scripture commentaries, it represents a privileged witness to Thomas as a teacher and, even more remarkably, to Thomas as a teacher of beginners. From the side of Peter Lombard, we have the Sentences in the hands of a master at the height of his career and his powers, not at the beginning. It is a notable meeting of these two figures and it is to that we now turn. 3. The Lectura romana and the Teaching of Theology Thomas’s charge is to teach the science of theology, sacra doctrina. As he states in the prologue to the Lectura romana, all who teach science are concerned with two things: the demonstration of the truth and the acquisition of happiness. Theology is no different, except that it most perfectly embraces these two goals. It has the highest truths, those inaccessible to the natural light of reason, which are handed on in Sacred Scripture.10 The subject of this science is God and then all

10

See Lectura romana, prol. (73).

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things which stand in relation to Him.11 This is what has Thomas’s attention in his classroom of 1265–1266. What does this have to do with the Sentences? Thomas himself answers. One might argue that since everything is found in Scripture, there is no need for any other books, such as the Sentences or even the writings of the saints.12 Thomas replies that Scripture is handed on to all, but not all can grasp what is particularly subtle and lofty in it. For this, we need the works of the saints, whose writings were culled in the making of the Sentences.13 The Sentences provide the material occasion for the teaching of theology, but they are not themselves the subject of theology and therefore not the subject of teaching in Thomas’s classroom. A. Topics The most immediate and obvious influence of the Sentences on the Lectura romana lies in the topics covered. The topics of a given distinction determine to a great degree the topics of the Lectura romana. A strict commentary would work its way through the Sentences chapter by chapter. Thomas has no such desire for completeness. Instead, he takes the general topic of the distinction as his starting point. Occasionally he follows some of the specific topics of a distinction closely and even in order. We find this, for example, in the articles of distinction 1, which is devoted to the Augustinian distinction between “use” (uti) and “enjoy” ( frui). Thomas begins with articles of definition: what is it to enjoy (1.1.1) and what is it to use (1.1.2). What follows are four precise questions: whether man ought to use or enjoy himself (1.1.3.1), whether what Augustine says is true, that “insofar as we are, we are good” (1.1.3.2), whether God uses us (1.1.3.3), and whether the virtues are to be enjoyed (1.1.3.4). These four topics are found in chapter 3 of the first distinction, in this same order.14 The final article of the first distinction asks whether this doctrine concerns things or signs (1.2.1). This is the other principal topic in distinction 1 of the Sentences: things and signs. By treating this topic at the end of the distinction, Thomas

11

See ibid., prol., 2.1, resp. (76). See ibid., prol., 4.1, arg. 4 (78). 13 See ibid., prol., 4.1, ad 4m (79). Thomas made much the same point in the Parisian Scriptum; see Super I Sent., prol. 5.1, sol. (I.18). 14 See Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 1, chap. 3, nos. 4–7 (I.58–9). 12

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inverts the order of the Lombard, who first dealt with things and signs and then turned to use and enjoyment. Even though he reverses the order, Thomas notes the reversal in his opening divisio quaestionum: “Here is a twofold question concerning a twofold division. First concerning the first; second concerning the second. Concerning the first division at the end of this distinction.”15 Thomas thinks it important to indicate that he has reversed the Lombard’s order in his own treatment of the material. The abbreviated nature of the divisio makes it clear that knowledge of distinction 1 is presumed. The relative weighting of the topics in favor of use and enjoyment is Thomas’s.16 Such relatively close adherence is not particularly common in the Lectura romana.17 Instead, Thomas will look to what he takes to be the principal theme of the distinction and ask questions about it that he thinks need to be asked. In some cases, these questions will indeed be provoked by something in the distinction, but this is not necessarily so. In this way, Thomas’s treatment of distinction 2 is of a different character from that of distinction 1. In the five chapters of the second distinction, the Lombard begins his consideration of the Trinity. He addresses the mystery of the Trinity, the intention one should have in writing about it, the order to be observed in treating of it, and then the witnesses to it in both the Old and the New Testaments. Thomas’s articles share little with the Lombard’s chapters. The eight articles fall into three groups. The first group—really but a single article—asks whether the words said of God signify one thing in God or many (2.1.1). This is the question of how words applied to God work. Although this is not a question found explicitly in the Sentences, it is fittingly put here at the beginning of the theological consideration of speaking about God. What then follows in the second group are four articles on the highest good. The Lombard touches on the highest good in distinction 2 insofar as he quotes Augustine to the effect that the highest good is seen only by minds purified.18 For Thomas, this becomes an occasion to consider a specific divine name, “good” (2.2.1–4). The final group of three articles addresses the word “God” (Deus) and how it is to be

15

Lectura romana, 1.1.1, divisio quaestionum (84). In the Parisian Scriptum, Thomas touches on things and signs only in the expositio textus; there is no article on the subject. 17 Similarly close adherence to the Lombard can be found, for example, in distinctions 6, 7, and 12. 18 See Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 2, chap.1, no. 1 (I.61). 16

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understood (2.3.1–3). That Peter Lombard quotes Ambrose as claiming that “God” is a term of nature (nomen naturae) is sufficient warrant, should it be needed, for Thomas to attend to the question of how to understand the word.19 Peter Lombard, then, does not so much provide the matter for Thomas’s articles as the occasion. Thomas’s intention is perhaps not entirely foreign to the Lombard’s, at least in this, that he is setting out preliminary points which he deems essential to the theological task ahead, but at best they share an intention generally conceived. We see the reality of Thomas’s classroom. If both Thomas and Peter Lombard are laying out preliminaries, Thomas’s are more basic than the Lombard’s. Thus, while Thomas does not disregard the topics treated in the Sentences, he does not feel bound to cover all of them or only them, nor to treat them with the same respective weight or the same focus as had Peter Lombard. B. Authorities The genius of the Sentences is, in part, Peter Lombard’s extensive yet judicious use of patristic authorities—sententiae—in a skillful and systematic way. This is fitting for a discipline that understands itself as built on revelation and tradition. When Thomas turns to the Sentences, one might expect some consideration of the role of authority in theology, and indeed we find it in the Lectura romana in the articles of the prologue on the nature of theology. The Lombard does not explicitly address the nature of theology as an intellectual discipline (what in the thirteenth century will become the question of theology as a science), nor does he address how the theologian is to proceed.20 The theologians of the thirteenth century, with their increasing concern for theology as a science and its modes of procedure, come to pose questions on these topics in the articles of the prologue. Such was the case for Thomas in the Parisian Scriptum and so it is as well in the Lectura romana.

19

See ibid., dist. 2, chap. 4, no. 1 (I.64). These matters are not wholly absent from the Sentences. Peter Lombard’s prologue speaks to his purpose in general, and he turns to specific points on the mode of proceeding from time to time, as in distinction 2 when he begins his consideration of the Trinity by treating the proper goal or intention of the theologian. 20

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The concern for beginners is evident in the articles of the prologue that are devoted to sacra doctrina. We find the usual questions as to whether it is a science (prol. 1.1), whether God is its subject (prol. 2.1), and whether it is practical (prol. 3.1). Thomas is clear that sacra doctrina is indeed a science; as such it entails reasoned deliberation on the revealed truths of faith. These articles can be found too in the Parisian Scriptum, although the treatment in the Lectura romana is rather more streamlined and simple. In addition to these articles, however, there are four articles on the way of proceeding in this science. The Parisian Scriptum had only one such article (prol. 1.5). In the Lectura romana, Thomas asks whether the way of proceeding in this science is fitting (prol. 4.1), and whether man ought to attend to those things that are above him (prol. 4.2). Especially interesting are these two further questions: whether it is right to use the authorities of the saints in Sacred Scripture (prol. 4.3), and whether it is right to use the authorities of the philosophers (prol. 4.4). The first of the four articles is especially concerned with the reading of Sacred Scripture. In sacred doctrine, the articles of faith that are handed down in Scripture have pride of place. Arguments that proceed from Scripture hold, Thomas says, the place of demonstration. But Scripture is not the only authority. Since the authority of the saints is to the forefront for readers of the Sentences, it receives an article in the Lectura romana. The authority of the saints was not treated in the Parisian Scriptum. That it receives attention here is a matter of the introductory classroom and the presence of the Sentences. Thomas will treat the topic in the Summa theologiae (also for beginners), but it will not receive it own article.21 Here in the Lectura romana, Thomas affirms the use of the authority of the saints, neatly distinguishing it from that of Sacred Scripture. While Scripture has the place of demonstration and therefore has the force of necessary reason, the authority of the saints has the weight of probable reason.22 Even more arresting is the article on the use of the authorities of the philosophers. This article extends beyond the Sentences to the debates of Thomas’s own day and his own unflappable defense of philosophy.

21

See Summa theologiae I, qu. 1, art. 8, ad 2m. See Lectura romana, prol., 4.3, resp. (81). Readers familiar with the Summa theologiae will recognize the idea that the authority of the saints is probable: see ST I, qu. 1, art. 8, ad 2m. Thomas speaks of “saints” where we might now be more inclined to speak of “fathers.” Thomas reserves “fathers” for the patriarchs of the Old Testament and the fathers of the councils. 22

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In the article of the Lectura romana, Thomas defends the use of the philosophers on three counts: first, what is said by philosophers is not contrary to faith; second, since all truth is from God, we can fittingly use the truths of the philosophers; and third, their arguments are efficacious against infidels who accept neither the authority of Scripture nor the authority of the saints. Yet Thomas warns that the theologian is not to be ruled by philosophy; rather, philosophy is ruled in accordance with the teachings of Sacred Scripture.23 The expansion of this material in the Lectura romana is indicative of the demands of Thomas’s classroom: the material represents essential knowledge for theologians in training. Much of the theologian’s task, at least as Thomas understands it, is the consideration of authorities. And we find many authorities cited in the Lectura romana: there are over 110 references to Scripture, approximately 120 to the saints, and just over twenty to the philosophers. The citations of the saints are especially fitting, given their role as expositors of the difficulties of Scripture. Early on, Thomas establishes a principle for the reading of the saints in essential matters of faith. An argument against the use of the authorities of the saints notes that they disagree in many things, as did Jerome and Augustine on the observances of the Law. Thomas’s reply says nothing to the matter of Jerome and Augustine in particular, but addresses the principle: the expositors of Sacred Scripture are not contrary to each other in matters of faith, but only in those points that are matters of opinion.24 In none of this is he particularly new. The very problem of reading the saints gave rise to the Sentences in the first place. Nor is this the only work in which Thomas is attentive to reading authorities; he does so throughout his career, which is marked by his assiduous study of Scripture, the saints, and the philosophers. Still, the attention given to the question of authority is a consistent feature of this work and fittingly so, given his classroom and his textbook. Given all this, we might expect significant engagement with the sententiae of the Sentences in the Lectura romana. But here too we find Thomas’s independence. He uses the authorities of the Sentences in a number of ways, but is not bound to or limited by them.

23 See Lectura romana, prol., 4.4, resp. (82). The distinction between ruling and being ruled with regard to philosophy is unique to the Lectura romana. 24 See Lectura romana, prol., 4.3, ad 4m (81).

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In many cases, Thomas appeals to an authority precisely as an authority in answer to a question. We find such sententiae especially in the sed contras. As in the Summa theologiae, the authority in the sed contra is not the last word; rather, it is the affirmation of the position which is to be explained in the responsio. Sometimes the authority is explicitly noted to be from the Sentences; thus, in affirming that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, Thomas says, “Against, there is the argument by Augustine, which he posits in the text.”25 Twice Thomas speaks generally of the “authorities of the saints” in the Sentences.26 More frequently, however, the authorities in the sed contra from the Sentences are not explicitly identified as such. As might be expected, we usually find the saints from the distinction under consideration; for example, in answer to the question of whether God is a term of operation or nature, Thomas writes: “Against this is what Ambrose says, that ‘God’ is a term of nature.”27 But sometimes, Thomas cites authorities from other distinctions. For example, in 2.1.1—on whether names said of God signify one thing in God or not—Thomas cites Boethius, but the passage in question is to be found in distinction 8.28 Four of the authorities from Scripture in sed contras are also found in the Sentences.29 In some instances the sententiae of the saints appear in the initial arguments.30 Only one of these arguments explicitly refers to the Sentences.31 Furthermore, there are two citations of Scripture shared by the Sentences and the initial arguments of the Lectura romana.32 In

25 Ibid., 10.1, sed contra (157); the other such formulation is in 12.3, sed contra (170). 26 See ibid., 6.1, sed contra (131) and 14.2, sed contra (176). 27 Ibid., 2.3.1, sed contra (102). See also 3.3.3, sed contra (118), with a reference to Augustine; 5.1.2, sed contra (127), with a reference to Augustine and Hilary; 6.2, sed contra (132), with a reference to Hilary; and 23.1, sed contra (202), with a reference to Boethius. In one case—3.3.1, sed contra (113)—Thomas cites Augustine without reference to a specific work; the words are, in fact, Peter Lombard’s. 28 See ibid., 2.1.1, sed contra (93); see also 15.1, sed contra (179), where Thomas cites Augustine from distinction 14, and, more notably, 17.2.1, sed contra (195), where he cites Augustine from distinction 29 of Book III. 29 See ibid., 2.3.2, sed contra (103); 5.2.2, sed contra (129); 8.2.1, sed contra (143); 8.2.2, sed contra (145). 30 This occurs most frequently in the early articles: see ibid., 3.3.1, arg. 1 (113); 3.3.4, arg. 1 (119); 4.3, arg. 3 (124); 10.1, arg. 4 (157). 31 See ibid., 23.3, arg. 1 (204): “Et hoc patet per auctoritatem Augustini in littera.” 32 See ibid., 1.1.3.3, arg. 1 (89) and 17.2.2, arg. 1 (196).

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the initial arguments, too, Thomas draws sententiae from elsewhere in the Sentences.33 Patristic sententiae provide the substance of some articles. The two articles on the problems of what it is to enjoy (1.1.1) and what it is to use (1.1.2) are both analyses of Augustine’s definitions of the two terms. In this same distinction we find an entire article devoted to whether this sententia of Augustine is true: “insofar as we are, we are good” (1.1.3.2). Later in distinction 16, Thomas addresses a tricky sententia of Hilary, namely, that with regard to divinity, the Father is greater than the Son but the Son is not less than the Father (16.4). Each of these sententiae was treated in an expositio textus of the Parisian Scriptum; in the Lectura romana each receives its own article. Once again, we can see the effect of the Sentences on Thomas’s classroom. Thomas’s use of the sententiae of the saints found in the Sentences is overall relatively modest. He uses them as he sees fit and as they are of interest to him. Nor does he feel limited to those authorities that appear in the Sentences. Of the approximately 120 named citations in the Lectura romana only about twenty are drawn from the Sentences. With regard to specific authorities, the most frequently cited is Augustine (just over thirty times), but less than half of Thomas’s reference to Augustine are found in the Sentences. Boethius is cited ten times, which is not especially surprising in articles concerned with the Trinity. Perhaps more surprising is his relative absence from the Sentences themselves.34 John Damascene is cited six times, and two of these references are found in the Sentences. With ten citations, Dionysius the Areopagite is prominent among the authorities of the Lectura romana. All but one of Thomas’s citations are to the De divinis nominibus, which is not found in the Sentences; Peter Lombard only cites De caelesti hierarchia, and that in Book II. As the article on the authority of philosophers makes clear, Thomas does not limit himself to theological authorities. The philosophers are present, especially Aristotle. Cited more than twenty times, Aristotle is second only to Augustine in the number of citations. Although Plato,

33 See ibid., 2.3.2, arg. 1 (103), where he cites John Damascene from distinction 19; 6.2, arg. 2 (132), where he cites Augustine from distinction 20. 34 Boethius is cited by name but once in the Sentences, namely, in Book I, dist. 8, chap. 8, no. 1 (I.101–02).

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Simonides, Pythagoras, and the Liber de causis put in appearances, they are not significant players in the Lectura romana. The authorities are sometimes set in relation to each other. This is most obvious in the case of Aristotle, who is often placed both implicitly and explicitly in relation to revealed truths as found in Scripture or expounded by the saints. A notable instance of such considerations of authorities in relation to one another occurs in distinction 3, in the discussion of mind (mens) and the psychological images of God from Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine had famously found images of the Trinity in the mind itself. Of interest to both Peter Lombard and Thomas is the image of memory, intellect, and will. The trick, as Thomas sees it, is to get the mind and its operations right. In so doing, two issues with regard to authorities come to the fore. First is the relationship of Augustine’s understanding of memory, intellect, and will to Aristotle’s. The second is the Lombard’s interpretation of Augustine. The first article, which is without parallel in the Scriptum, is simply entitled, “What is the mind?” (3.3.1). The initial arguments deal first with Augustine, then with Aristotle, and then with the difference between Aristotle and Augustine on memory. The sed contra appeals to Augustine. The response is entirely Thomas with no appeal to authority. The question lurking here is whether by “mind” one means the essence of the soul or some power of the soul. Thomas rejects that the mind is the essence of the soul; to do this he distinguishes the key terms that can make for confusion: intellectus, ratio, mens, and spiritus. Once this is done, he can not only articulate his own position, but account for various other formulations. At this point he can navigate the differences between Augustine and Aristotle, which he does in the replies to the initial objections. In the second article, Thomas asks whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind according to memory, intellect, and will. The response attends to what an image is and how it is fitting that memory, intellect, and will are an image of God. For the purpose of Thomas’s consideration of authorities, the reply to the third objection is notable. The objection is a speculative one without any appeal to authority: in God, one person is from another, but in the mind, one power is not from another. Therefore, three powers of this kind are not an image of the three persons of the Trinity. In the reply, Thomas provides a speculative answer: while all powers indeed derive from the essence of the soul

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and not from other powers, one power can act, nonetheless, by the mediation of another. But this is the second half of the reply. The first half is about authorities, and it is here that Thomas first distinguishes Peter Lombard’s account from Augustine’s. He states bluntly that the Lombard’s words and Augustine’s, if rightly considered, do not mean the same thing and, in fact, the Master has not understood the intention of Augustine. For the Master, memory, intellect, and will are three powers of the soul. For Augustine, however, memory, intellect, and will are not powers but rather acts of the soul. Although Thomas does not say so explicitly, his point in the speculative answer to the speculative objection is simply this: if, with the Lombard, one understands the three as powers, then the objection holds; if, with Augustine, one understands the three as acts, then the objection fails. In these articles we see Thomas not only answering the questions, but guiding his young confreres in how to read authorities, be cautious with regard to Peter Lombard as an expositor, and situate the saints in relation to what is articulated by reason. C. Words and Propositions The reading of authorities depends upon the proper understanding of words and propositions. Sophisticated grammatical and logical analysis of words and propositions—so prominent among the schoolmen—is used consistently by Thomas throughout his work. As Thomas’s students would already have completed their studies in grammar and in the “arts” (that is to say, philosophy), it is no surprise to find such considerations of words and propositions in the Lectura romana. Words are notoriously tricky and controverted in theology. It is the peculiarity of words in dealing with the divine that is often enough the source of controversy among authorities. Distinction 24, which consists of nothing but a brief note, is devoted precisely to the dangers of words misconstrued in that most difficult of thickets: the Trinitarian faith. Thomas takes his starting point from the errors of Arius and Sabellius, the former introducing a plurality of essence, the latter removing the Trinity of persons. Thomas articulates a simple principle: “when we speak of the Trinity, we should avoid all words that might provide an occasion for these errors.”35 The bulk of the note

35

Lectura romana, 24, nota (207).

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offers a review of words in light of the principle. Because of the teachings of Arius, one should avoid certain words in speaking of the divine essence: diversum, divisum, alienum, and dispar. Instead, one ought to say unum, simplex, simile, and aequale. Because of the teachings of Sabellius, one should avoid certain words in speaking of the divine persons: singulare, unicum, confusum, and solitarium. Instead, one ought to say: plurale, distinctio, discretio, and consonantia. Thomas formulates a principle to which he adheres without falter: words should not be taken, if at all possible, in such a way as to violate the revealed truth of God. In the case of the terms discussed in distinction 24, heresy in history has helped clarify which words are more fittingly to be used and which are more fittingly to be avoided. If we return to distinction 2, already discussed above, we find Thomas explicitly turn his attention to words. The first article is the most general: whether words said of God signify one or many things in God (2.1.1). In this way, Thomas addresses the question of how our words signify divine attributes. His answer is clear: all words said of God are not synonyms, even though they signify one and the same thing in God, for they differ by reason, but by reason only.36 Distinction 2 also contains articles on the word “God”: whether the word “God” is a term of operation or of nature (2.3.1), whether the word “God” may be predicated of three persons in the plural (2.3.2), and whether the word “God” is a more proper word than others for Him (2.3.3). Insofar as Thomas even dealt with “God” as a word in the Parisian Scriptum, he did so obliquely in distinction 4. In the Lectura romana, the discussion has been moved forward to distinction 2, where it receives direct and sustained attention. In the first of the articles devoted to the word “God” Thomas asks whether “God” is a term of operation or of nature. This foundational— or perhaps elementary—question is without parallel in the works of Thomas, with the exception of the expositio textus of the Parisian Scriptum. The question arises in part from a sententia of Ambrose that is found in the Sentences and cited in the sed contra: according to Ambrose, “God” is a term of nature. On the other hand, John Damascene, cited in the first of the initial arguments, maintains that theos is

36

See ibid., 2.1.1, resp. (93).

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taken from divine operations.37 Thomas has set up the problem both as speculative and as a conflict between authorities. In his response, he explains that the answer depends on how the word is considered, for a word may be considered in two ways: from the point of view of that from which it takes its name and of that which it signifies. The example is lapis, which takes its name from “harming the foot” (laedere pedem) but signifies a rock. In the case of “God,” the word takes its name from governing (according to John Damascene’s etymology of theos) but signifies the divine nature. Thus, from one vantage point it is a term of operation and from another a term of nature.38 The simple speculative answer serves to resolve many a seeming contradiction among authorities as Thomas’s own setup of the question indicates. He uses the same distinction in distinction 8, on whether “Who Is” (qui est) is the proper name of God, and again in distinction 23, on whether “person” is said properly in the divine.39 A variation in the theme of the signification of words, with an eye to their context, occurs in the final article on “God,” in which Thomas asks whether the word “God” is a more proper word than any other for Him. In the third of the initial objections, Thomas quotes Exodus: “I have not shown them my greatest name Adonai” (Ex. 6:3).40 In the reply Thomas addresses the Jewish practice of replacing the unspeakable Tetragrammaton with “Adonai,” which means “Lord.” It was imposed, Thomas says, to signify the divine nature; thus in these cases, it does not signify “Lord” but the divine nature, which is what is signified by “God.”41 Since words are used in sentences, the theologian must be attentive to propositions. Theological propositions can create much mischief. The Lombard himself had addressed specific propositions from the Fathers and his contemporaries. Thomas does so as well. As with words, so too with propositions, we find Thomas adhering to a foundational theological principle that he articulates in the Lectura romana: “when we speak of the Holy Trinity, we ought to speak so as not to

37 Although the quotation from Ambrose is found in the Sentences, the one from John Damascene is not. 38 See Lectura romana, 2.3.1, resp. (102). 39 See ibid., 8.1.2, ad 2m (141) and 23.2, resp. (203–04). 40 Ibid., 2.3.3, obj. 3 (104). 41 See ibid., 2.3.3, ad 3m (105). This consideration of the Jewish practice is found uniquely in the Lectura romana.

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detract from the unity of the essence or the plurality of persons.”42 This theological principle is unfailingly at work in Thomas’s determinations of a proposition’s truth or falsehood, or, more often, his determination of whether and to what extend it can be used legitimately. Particularly notable are the articles of distinctions 4 and 5. In these two early distinctions, Thomas focuses on propositions. All but one of the ten articles of these distinctions are in the form of whether a given proposition is true. Distinction 4 of the Lectura romana is divided into four articles: whether this is true: “God begat God”; whether this is true: “God is a Trinity” or “God is three persons”; whether this is true: “God begat Himself or some other God”; and whether this is true: “He who is God the Father begat God” or “He who is not God the Father begat God.”43 Each of these has its source directly in distinction 4 of the Sentences. The first and fourth articles arise from chapter 1, the second and third arise from chapter 2. While the Lombard does not approach these topics in a strictly propositional way, such an approach is not foreign to the distinction. Compare these with the five articles of distinction 4 in the Parisian Scriptum. The first of these asks whether there is generation in God (4.1.1). This fits easily enough in distinction 4, which does indeed deal with generation. In the Lectura romana, however, Thomas moves this question to distinction 9 (9.1). Having asked the general question in the Scriptum, Thomas then asks the propositional question: whether this proposition, “God begat God,” is false (4.1.2). Then follows whether God begat God Himself or some other God (4.1.3). Here again, we see the same topic as in the Lectura romana but not cast in propositional form. The last two articles of the Scriptum form a separate question: whether a proposition can be formed about divine things (4.2.1), and whether “person” can be predicated of “essence” (4.2.2). The first of these has already been answered in the first article of distinction 2 of the Lectura romana, devoted to the question of whether words said of God signify one or many things in God. The second article has no real parallel in the Lectura romana, although its ad quintum addresses the topic of Lectura romana 4.2. With the articles of distinction 4 of

42

Ibid., 4.3, resp. (124). The fourth article, which Thomas announces in the divisio quaestionum, is not to be found in MS. Lincoln College, Lat. 95. 43

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the Lectura romana narrower in focus than those of the Parisian Scriptum, Thomas has turned the distinction to instruction on Trinitarian propositions. In the analyses of the Lectura romana, propositions add to the complexity of a word’s signification by its use in the proposition. In the Lectura romana this idea tends to appear in the scholastic language of supposition. Thus, in the first two articles of distinction 4, Thomas applies the distinction between signification and supposition in order to disentangle a number of propositions the controversial character of which depends on which terms are understood as essential and which personal, and how they function in propositions. The result is that propositions are rarely rejected as such by Thomas; rather, he rejects certain modes of signification and supposition in the interpretation of specific propositions. This strategy yields simultaneously greater clarity in Trinitarian doctrine and greater facility in navigating texts that can be misconstrued.44 Not all propositions are easily navigated, however, especially when they originate in the works of the saints. Thomas asks, in 4.3, whether God begets Himself or some other God. The origin of the question is a text of Augustine found here in distinction 4 of the Sentences: Deus genuit se alterum, which Thomas cites in the third of the initial arguments. In the response, he shows, without appeal to authority, in what ways one can say that God begat Himself or begat another God. Depending on the signification of se and aliud, the proposition will be true or false. But Thomas is not happy with a merely speculative answer so that he uses the ad tertium to address the reading of Augustine’s sententia. If se is taken as a relative pronoun of identity, then the proposition is false; Augustine does not mean this. Rather, Augustine takes se improperly, and on this basis the proposition can be read as true. Such expositions, however, are particularly contorted and should not be advanced.45 Augustine can be saved, but his is a way of speaking that is best set aside. Distinction 5 is even more notable in its shift to the analysis of propositions. In the Sentences, distinction 5 continues the consideration of generation begun in distinction 4 but turns more directly to 44

For further consideration of the speculative argument of these two articles, see John F. Boyle, “The Analogy of ‘Homo’ and ‘Deus’ in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Lectura romana,” Nova et vetera 6 (2008): 663–7. 45 See Lectura romana, 4.3, ad 3m (125).

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the relationship between persons and divine essence in generation. Of the five articles of the Parisian Scriptum, none are formally questions on the truth of propositions. By contrast, of the five articles of the Lectura romana, all but one are about propositions. As with distinction 4, the Sentences are not directly concerned with propositions, but the work is readily enough open to such a consideration. The articles of distinction 5 of the Lectura romana follow the Sentences closely while keeping the pedagogic focus on propositions. The first article asks whether this is true: “essence generates or is generated,” which is the issue of the first long chapter of distinction 5.46 Thomas sets this question up as a controversy between Peter Lombard, who denies the truth of the propositions, and Joachim of Fiore, who asserts their truth.47 For Thomas the dispute arises from differing starting points. Joachim considered the nature of the thing whereas the Lombard considered the mode of signification. The perspective determines the truth or falsehood of the proposition. Thomas concludes with an observation about the Lombard’s reading of authorities more generally. According to Thomas, when the Master found authorities from the saints which seemed to imply acts of this kind, he always added a supposit such that if the authority reads “light from light,” this should properly be understood as “the Son, who is light, from the Father, who is light,” or if the authority reads, “essence from essence,” it should properly be understood as “the Son, who is essence, from the Father, who is essence.”48 Thomas not only engages the topic of the Sentences, but, having turned it into an occasion for deliberating on particular Trinitarian propositions, he alerts his students to a particular approach to such propositions favored by the Lombard which, while correct, need not necessarily be followed to avoid error. The article contrasts with the Parisian Scriptum parallel, which asks whether essence generates (5.1.1). Thomas answers the question without referring to the debate between the Lombard and Joachim and, therefore, without an analysis by which the competing propositions might be considered. In the Lectura romana, then, we again are in the presence of Thomas the teacher of the Sentences.

46

See Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 5, chap. 1, nos. 1–17 (I.80–7). While Joachim is indeed Peter Lombard’s antagonist, he is not named in the Sentences; see the editor’s note to Sentences I, dist. 5, chap. 1, no. 1 (I.80). 48 Lectura romana, 5.1.1, resp. (126). 47

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The third article again directly engages Peter Lombard. Thomas asks whether this is true: “the Son is of (de) the substance of the Father.” At the end of chapter 1 the Lombard only grudgingly conceded that, although he did not like the expression, it could be made legitimate.49 Thomas takes modest exception to the Lombard: “It is to be said that in this sentence, namely, ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father,’ there is more truth than the Master says.”50 He distinguishes the prepositions ex and de in order to show how de legitimately speaks of a consubstantial principle. Thomas again resists the Lombard’s inclination to introduce supposits in what he takes to be purely essential propositions.51 None of this is new in Thomas. Elaborate analyses of terms and propositions are to be found in his other works before, after, and contemporaneous with the Lectura romana. What is notable in the Lectura romana, however, is the simplicity and consistency of the analysis. He does not presume sophisticated facility on the part of his students; he seeks to train them and is therefore inclined to keep focused and repeat basic ideas and ways of analysis. The Lombard provides the topic, sometimes the sententiae and the theological problem, but the tools are not the Lombard’s. These are the tools—streamlined for the beginners’ classroom—of the schoolmen. D. The Theological Landscape Such considerations as the reading of the saints (and more generally theological sources) and the analysis of terms and propositions have a context, that is, they have a place in what we might call the theological landscape, and to this Thomas is not inattentive. The modified disputed question form accomplishes this task naturally for each article since it provides some context for each question posed. The presence of the authorities of Scripture, saints, and philosophers in the initial arguments is in part calculated to provide such a landscape throughout

49

See Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 5, chap. 1, no. 17 (I.86–7). Lectura romana, 5.2.1, resp. (128). 51 The next article follows much the same lines. The question is whether this proposition is true: “the Son is the Son of the substance or of the charity of the Father.” This question has its origin in St. Paul’s Letter to the Colossians (1:13), in which the Apostle speaks of “the Son of his [the Father’s] love.” The Master had addressed this question in chapter 1, along the lines that we have seen already. By an elaboration on the meaning of the genitive, Thomas again takes modest exception to the Master, articulating a way in which the propositions can be read legitimately without the Master’s recourse to a personal supposit. See Lectura romana 5.2.2 (129). 50

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the teaching. Beyond this, Thomas will, from time to time, explicitly address the speculative geography of a question. Thus, for example, in 5.1 discussed above, Thomas situates the question within the context of the debate between Peter Lombard and Joachim of Fiore. At other times, Thomas speaks of the anonymous quidam who so populate scholastic writing. For Thomas in the Lectura romana they serve a pedagogic purpose: they help his students see a landscape of opinions, which once seen makes for safer navigation among them. We see an example of this approach in the articles on charity in distinction 17. Thomas asks whether charity can be increased (17.2.1). The response considers a number of opinions. On the one side are those who deny that charity can be increased according to its essence. Thomas distinguishes four opinions. Only the first is identified with an individual: it is Peter Lombard in the Sentences. Thomas’s discussion, however, is not particularly informed by the Sentences, but rather by the debates of his day. Thus, the second position is found in and rejected by William of Auxerre and Bonaventure. The third and fourth opinions are found in Albert the Great. After reviewing the four opinions in the negative, Thomas follows with his own opinion on precisely how an increase in charity is to be understood. This is a contentious issue, not least because it is one of those areas where Aristotelian categories are coming to be applied to topics of faith and the means of application are not obvious. Likewise, when Thomas asks whether charity grows by way of addition (17.2.3), we find two opinions, with Thomas on one side and quidam (representing Bonaventure and Albert) on the other. In the final article, Thomas asks whether charity can be diminished (17.2.4). Here too we find two opinions, with Thomas on one side and quidam on the other; in this instance the quidam include not only Bonaventure and Albert, but also Thomas himself in the Parisian Scriptum.52 Thomas, then, places his discussion in a principally contemporary theological landscape. He is aware, at least in part, of some twelfthcentury debates, as seen in his reference to the dispute between Peter

52 A similar landscape of theological opinions can be found in distinction 7, on the question of whether the potentia generandi is essential or notional. This is another instance in which Thomas changes his mind over the course of his career; see John F. Boyle, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Analogy of potentia generandi,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 581–92.

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Lombard and Joachim of Fiore.53 In those instances, however, where a speculative landscape is especially articulated (as in the articles of distinction 17), the geography is that of the thirteenth century rather than the twelfth. The Lombard’s eye for essential topics means that the topic will be treated, but the issues that frame the debate are not those of the Sentences. Here we see Thomas’s speculative independence as well as his desire to keep focused on the needs of mid-thirteenth-century students. E. The Order of the Material Finally, we have the question of Peter Lombard’s order of the material. In a general sense, Thomas must follow the Lombard’s order, but it seems to be a matter of frustration for him. Here, Thomas is not a happy commentator. We can consider two instances of this frustration. In distinction 2, Thomas asks a series of questions on the highest good. This is not a significant topic in distinction 2 of the Sentences, but Thomas gives it a central place in the Lectura romana as a divine attribute. The last of the four articles on the highest good asks whether there can be a plurality of persons in the highest good (2.2.4). The response is a relatively lengthy one in three parts. First, Thomas affirms that since no perfection can be lacking in God, God must have the principal perfections found in created things: to understand (intelligere) and to will (velle). In created intellects, the thing understood is in the mind of the one understanding as word; in created wills, the thing loved is in the one loving as the thing loved. Such must also be the case in God, who understands Himself and loves Himself and thus has within Himself the word of Himself and Himself as loved. Secondly, Thomas describes these perfections of understanding and willing in God as two processions: the precession of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Thirdly, Thomas carefully distinguishes the difference between these operations in God and in us. What is immediately remarkable in this response is that it does not answer the question posed; Thomas never does.

53 Moreover, in 11.2 (165–7), Thomas situates Anselm (arg. 1) and Richard of St.-Victor (sed contra) in relation to each other on the question of whether the Holy Spirit could be distinguished from the Son if the former did not proceed from the latter; in 4.2 (123) he refers to the Porretani in considering speculative options for the signification of Deus and homo.

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Thomas’s attention is diverted, but why to this topic? Readers of the Summa theologiae will recognize the analysis of the divine processions of intelligere and velle as the starting point in Thomas’s consideration of the Trinity. Thomas begins with procession (I.27), from which he moves to relation (I.28), and thence to person (I.29). Having established a speculative foundation, Thomas then turns to each of the three persons. From a Thomistic point of view, the introduction of the topic of procession in the first distinction to treat of the Trinity is not surprising; it is the foundation of Thomas’s own Trinitarian thinking. Unfortunately for Thomas, it has no natural place in distinction 2 of the Sentences. And so, Thomas awkwardly slips it in here. But this is only the opening indication of Thomas’s problem with the order of material in the Sentences. If Thomas has in his own mind a speculative order from procession to relation to person, this is certainly not the Lombard’s order. Peter Lombard does not address procession in the way in which Thomas does, and thus this topic has no natural place in a commentary on the Sentences. The Lombard does address relation and person: relation in distinction 26, person in distinction 23, following the distinctions on the specific persons. Thomas’s order in the Summa theologiae differs radically from the Lombard’s in the Sentences. As already noted, in the Lectura romana Thomas jumps right from distinction 17 to distinction 23, on person. Given Thomas’s own approach to the Trinity, the jump rather makes sense. Even if Thomas did not treat the distinction out of order, he would certainly not want his students to be without the final culminating piece of the procession, relation, person sequence. One could easily enough imagine that the year is coming to far too swift a close and Thomas undertakes intellectual triage, leaving some distinctions behind in order to save the vital ones. As for the middle piece of the sequence—relation—Thomas offers no comments on distinction 26 but, rather like slipping procession into distinction 2, he has slipped relation into other distinctions, specifically distinction 9 on the Son and 10 on the Holy Spirit.54 A second instance of Thomas’s frustration is also found in this very same article of distinction 2. It will be recalled that the conceptual foundation for the Trinitarian analysis here is divine perfection. As

54 This point can be found laid out rather more fully in John F. Boyle, “The Ordering of Trinitarian Teaching in Thomas Aquinas’ Second Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences,” RTAM, Supplementa 1 (1995): 125–36.

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he prepares for that analysis, Thomas says, “Because God is most perfect, there is no perfection lacking in Him, as will be shown below.” Although we are in a section dealing with divine attributes, perfection is not among the ones that Peter Lombard discusses in distinction 2. But it is essential to Thomas, so he simply affirms it with a promissory note of its consideration later. But even that poses a difficulty. The Lombard never treats of divine perfection as a specific topic. Perhaps for this reason, neither does Thomas himself in the Parisian Scriptum. Yet it is now important to his own line of reasoning so that he must at least assert it. What never appears, however, is the promised treatment. Perhaps Thomas had a place for it beyond the articles he commented on; perhaps he forgot. Either way, Thomas’s order ill fits Peter Lombard’s. 4. Conclusion In the end, Thomas abandoned the commentary. The next year, he undertook a new work of his own devising, the Summa theologiae. In its prologue, Thomas speaks to the need for such a work. The problem with the education of beginners in theology is that it does not seem to follow the order of learning, but instead is sidetracked by the exposition of books and the disputation of questions, the repetition of which hearers find confusing and distasteful. Might he be describing, at least in part, his own experience of teaching Book I of the Sentences? Did the need to follow Peter Lombard’s text and ask, at least in part, the required questions of the distinctions, produce confusion and even distaste in his students? Or maybe the Sentences simply frustrated Thomas. In Thomas’s mind the teaching at Santa Sabina was not a success. Curiously, he did not mine the Lectura romana for the Summa. Little of it is found verbatim in the Summa, although many of the ideas were to find a home. Although the Summa theologiae is for beginners and is much trimmer than the disputed questions, it is still formidable. But the Summa theologiae is not Thomas’s only systematic work of this period. While working on the Summa theologiae, Thomas undertook another work, the Compendium theologiae. This work is yet leaner than the Summa, a work in short chapters, not even in disputation form. For this work, Thomas did return to the Lectura romana; we

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find more verbatim borrowings, although still not many, in the Compendium theologiae than in any other work.55 This seems fitting. If Thomas considered the Lectura romana something less than a success, we can nonetheless be grateful for its survival. Every scholastic theologian of the Middle Ages stands in relation to the Sentences. Thomas Aquinas is no exception. The Lectura romana helps us appreciate, as Thomas’s career unfolds, his own complex and difficult relationship with the Sentences.

55

See Boyle, “Introduction,” in Lectura romana, 14–15.

ROBERT KILWARDBY’S COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD* Gerhard Leibold 1. The Life and Works of Robert Kilwardby Robert Kilwardby, a member of the Dominican order, was born around 1215 in Leicestershire, England.1 Most likely no earlier than 1231, he enrolled as a student in the arts faculty at the University of Paris. In accordance with university regulations, he could have received a Master of Arts degree around 1237 and held the position of master until 1245. He joined the Dominican order, most likely in England, before 1250 and studied theology at Oxford. After lecturing on the Sentences and the Bible, he received his Masters degree in theology probably around 1256, before being elected provincial of the English Dominicans in September 1261—and this is the earliest certain known date of his biography. To ward off an impending conflict with the foreign superiors of the order upon Kilwardby’s reelection, Pope Gregory X appointed him archbishop of Canterbury on October 11, 1272. In 1278 he was appointed cardinal-bishop of Porto (near Rome). He died in Viterbo, Italy, on September 10, 1279. Even before he entered the order, Kilwardby’s role as master at the arts faculty (ca. 1237–1245) was far from insignificant. His lectures on logic, grammar, and ethics provide comprehensive insight into this faculty’s curriculum during the first half of the thirteenth century. In accordance with a request from the superiors of his order, around 1250 he composed the treatise De ortu scientiarum, one of the best introductions to the theory of science the Middle Ages ever brought forth.

* English translation by Cornelia Oefelein, with revisions by Philipp Rosemann. 1 For this entire section, see Gerhard Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby,” in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 7 (Munich, 1995), 907–08.

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gerhard leibold 2. The Textual Tradition of the Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum

Our knowledge of the Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum derives from four textual witnesses that also form the basis for the five-volume critical edition; each is described in detail in the relevant introductions.2 Books I and IV are found only in two manuscripts, Book II in four, and Book III in three. 2.1. The Extant Manuscripts (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Worcester, Cathedral Chapter Library, F 43; Oxford, Merton College, L.1.3 (Coxe 131); Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottob. lat. 161; Toulouse, Bibliothèque municipale, 61.

The manuscripts preserved at Worcester and Oxford contain all four books of the Sentences commentary. The Worcester codex also includes a detailed index to the complete work. The Vatican manuscript contains only Books II and III, the one at Toulouse only Book II. Fragments of the questions on faith from Book III may be found in a manuscript from London.3 2.2. The Lost Manuscripts The five manuscripts of the Sentences commentary described by Stegmüller4 are considered lost. These are the manuscripts from the Oxford colleges Jesus and Oriel, as well as those from the Dominican convent at Exeter, the abbey St. Augustine at Canterbury, and the Brigittine monastery of Syon House at Isleworth. The Dunholme

2 See Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich, 1986); Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, ed. Gerhard Leibold (Munich, 1992); Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, Part 1: Christologie, ed. Elisabeth Gössmann (Munich, 1982); Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, Part 2: Tugendlehre, ed. Gerhard Leibold (Munich, 1985); Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, ed. Richard Schenk (Munich, 1993). 3 I would like to express my gratitude to the late Fr. Osmund Lewry for pointing out this manuscript to me: it is MS. London, British Library, Harley 5431, fols. 261r–264v. 4 See Friedrich Stegmüller, “Les questions du commentaire des Sentences de Robert Kilwardby,” RTAM 6 (1934): 55–79 and 215–28, at 60.

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codex that Stegmüller mentions contains only the questions to the first three books of the Sentences. 2.3. The Numbering of the Quaestiones Editors of the Quaestiones have spent a great deal of thought on the problem of suitably organizing the text. They concur that a division into questions is the only option, a division into distinctions being inappropriate, given the highly selective process involved in compiling the commentary. As a matter of fact, only the Worcester manuscript carries a consecutive numbering of the questions in its margins, most likely the result of a later redaction. The numbering in the Merton manuscript differs, is full of gaps and incomplete. The sporadic numbering of the Vatican manuscript is similar to Worcester’s, while the Toulouse manuscript is unnumbered. As it appears, all witnesses seem to refer to certain questions specifically by number, that is to say, all testimonies suggest a text organized in consecutively numbered questions. In any case, the numbering of the questions in the Worcester manuscript must be regarded as the oldest extant system. Noteworthy as well is an alphabetical index at the beginning of the Worcester manuscript, preceding the text that lists the individual themes of the questions in all four books, which adopts the numbering of that manuscript. It can therefore be deduced that while the numbering of the questions in the Worcester manuscript may not be regarded as original, it was nevertheless executed by an editor at a very early stage. Thus, the argument of the editor of Book I of the questions appears quite plausible: “It is correct to retain the oldest available order of the text, despite some inconsistencies, when there is no alternative at hand offering substantial advantages.”5

5 Kilwardby, In I Sent., 25*. The editors of the other books did not follow Schneider’s advice, proceeding to number the questions at will without regard for the manuscript evidence. This appears to me, in retrospect, one of the edition’s great shortcomings. Thus, Ludwig Hödl’s remarks, that the numbering of the questions of this work is muddled and each new attempt to number them only adds to the confusion, are by no means unjustified; see Ludwig Hödl, Review of Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, Part 1: Christologie, ed. Elisabeth Gössmann, Theologische Revue 80 (1984): 38–40.

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gerhard leibold 2.4. Formal Characteristics of the Quaestiones

The editor of the first part of Book III of Kilwardby’s Sentences commentary, Elisabeth Gössmann, focused in particular on the structure of the Christological questions.6 What she was able to ascertain for the Christology is also valid in part for the second part of Book III, which contains the doctrine of virtue, as well as for Book I.7 The structure of the questions in Books II and IV, on the other hand, basically follows the same simple scheme, although even here, the scope of the presentation of the material varies greatly in the individual questions: De . . . quaeritur an . . . Quod sic videtur . . . Item . . . Item . . . Contra . . . Item . . . Item . . . Responsio . . . Ad primum contra . . . Ad secundum . . . Ad tertium . . . Kilwardby, however, deviates extensively from this system, especially in Books I and IV, confronting the reader with quite a complex literary form. Here one must differentiate between fully developed questions and subordinate ones. The latter are frequently situated, either singly or combined, between the main questions and are dependent upon their structure. Occasionally, the answers immediately follow a question, or the replies are given in the order of the questions. Usually the introductory formula allows one to recognize which type of question one is dealing with. Iuxta hoc quaeritur . . ., Quaeres inde forte . . ., Ex his patet quod solet quaeri . . ., Si quis quaerit de . . ., Cum hoc quaeritur . . ., etc. are typical formulas introducing subordinate questions, while the main questions begin with formulas such as: Consequenter quaeritur . . ., Sed tunc quaeritur . . ., Deinde quaeritur . . ., etc.

6

See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, 17*–36*. It is quite understandable that the editor of Book 1, Johannes Schneider, was reminded of the complex structure of John Duns Scotus’s questions; see In I Sent., 23*. 7

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This interplay between fully developed questions and inserted or subordinate secondary ones not only results frequently in an extremely artificial structure, but demonstrates as well that the author had free command over the full repertoire of topics expected in a Sentences commentary in those times. Gössmann writes: He himself decides which question he consideres to be worthy of discussion, which one he will use to elucidate another theme or which he might merely mention for the sake of being complete. This unusual structure is not produced by the alternation between the subordinate questions and the main questions alone. The main questions themselves can, for many different reasons, be multifariously structured: in the case of alternative questions, for example, necessitating discussions of both groups of the preceding arguments to achieve an appropriately differenciated solution; or in questions in which the author adopts an opinion contrary to the prevalent view, in order to reply first to the arguments from the position of the opinio communis, and then from his own standpoint.8

Kilwardby assigned many topics to subordinated and inserted secondary questions, as well as to the objections and counters to them, which are treated separately in their own respective questions in other Sentences commentaries. This may be perceived as a tendency toward systematization in view of the sheer vastness of the subject matter. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that again and again subordinated questions take up more space than some of the fully developed main ones. Particularly in Books I and III, the process of commenting upon Peter Lombard’s text is significantly dictated by the author’s own interests, since he takes the liberty of passing right over major topics and adding others. Those topics on which he does decide to comment, however, are discussed in all thoroughness. In order better to illustrate these general remarks, I have provided a few diagrammatic representations of questions as examples. The first example is of a question into which subordinated questions have been incorporated. It is question 1 from the Christology:9

8 9

Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 2, 18*. Ibid., 19*.

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Q. 1: De incarnatione primo quaeritur an possit esse . . . Quod sic … (lin. 3) Item … (lin. 5) Contra … (lin. 7) Item … (lin. 9) Item … (lin. 11) Item. Quae uniuntur, aliquod tertium constituunt … (lin. 16) Sed hoc non est hic … (lin. 17) Juxta hoc quaeritur: Quid est quod haec unio non constituit unum tertium … ? (lin. 19) Item. Cum sit unio in his, quaeritur an etiam compositio. (lin. 21) Videtur enim quod sic … (lin. 21) Sed quod non videtur … (lin. 23) Item … (lin. 24) Responsio. Firmiter tenendum est quod possunt uniri. (lin. 27) Ad primum obiectum … (lin. 28) Ad secundum … (lin. 47) Ad tertium … (lin. 54) Ad quartum … (lin. 62) Inde patet responsio ad primum iuxta quaesitum … (lin. 70) Item … (lin. 73) Ad reliquum iuxta quaesitum … (lin. 76)

Here, the first subordinated question ensues from the last objection to the contra. There appears to be only an associative connection between the first and the second subordinated questions. Question 17 of the Christology is also quite interesting:10

10

Ibid., 22*.

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Q. 17: Deinde quaeritur, cum praedicetur ‘homo’ de Christo et Paulo utrum aequivoce vel univoce. Si aequivoce … (lin. 3) Item … (lin. 5) Item … (lin. 6) Si univoce … (lin. 8) Responsio. Dicitur quod neque pure aequivoce, neque pure univoce. Non aequivoce … Non univoce … quia comparatur praedicatum aliter ad Paulum et aliter ad Christum; ad illum praedicatione essentiali … (lin. 9 ss.) Sed adhuc quaero: Quid exigitur ad praedicationem essentialem? … (lin. 14) Responsio. Duo in praedicatione sunt … (lin. 17) … Quia autem in Christo … (lin. 38) Plures tamen condiciones habet univocationis quam aequivocationis … (lin. 43) Ad hoc quod dictum est opponendo … (lin. 52)

This scheme differs in that here, the subordinated question follows the response of the main question, which it renders it more specific. The response to the secondary question is much more important to the author and is thus more broadly discussed than the main question. Since the response to the subordinated question links the topic of predication with that of univocation and predication, intent at the same time on its Christological applicability, it may in a sense be regarded as an extention of the response to the main question. The subordination accounts for the fact that the response occurs twice in this configuration. Finally there is the scheme of an alternative question in which the subordinated part elucidates the refutation of the objection. It is question 2 from the Christology:11

11

Ibid., 35*.

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Q. 2: Consequenter quaeritur: Si potuit Deus in carnari, quae causa vel causa vel congruitas quare oportuit? Et ponuntur diversae huius rationes. (lin. 3) Una, universitatis perfectio … (lin. 3) Item. Alia ponitur causa, divinae gloriae manifestatio, et hoc ex parte bonitatis … (lin. 7) Item. Sicut Deum decet iustitia … et ceterae virtutes, sic et humilitas … (lin. 12) Ex his omnibus argue: Si decuit Deum propter dicta unire sibi creaturam, maxime illam … quae in se continet plures creaturas … sed talis est homo … (lin. 19 ss.) Quod autem iam ostensum est de bonitate divina, potest ostendi de potentia … (lin. 23) Idem etiam ostendi potest et de sapientia … (lin. 26) Quod autem humana reparatio fuerit causa incarnationis … (lin. 29) Item. Divinum propositum de homine non potuit neque debuit frustrari … (lin. 30) Item. Homo peccator per solam misericordiam reparari non debuit, sed et per iustitiam … (lin. 37) … Item. Ex poenitentia primo homini concessa idem sequitur … (lin. 55) Videntur igitur iam ostendi tres causae incarnationis divinae, id est universi completio, divinae gloriae manifestatio et humana reparatio. (lin. 58 s.) Contra duas primas videtur … (lin. 60) Item … (lin. 64) Contra tertiam causam … (lin. 67) Item … (lin. 70) Item … (lin. 72) Item. Si haec est vera causa, videtur quod debuit univisse sibi naturam humanam in omni persona … (lin. 75) Responsio. Hic sunt diversae sententiae. Quia quidam dicunt quod sola reparatio humana fuit causa incarnationis, ita quod si non peccasset homo, non fuisset incarnatio Verbi … (lin. 79 ss.) Quidam econtra dicunt quod sic … (lin. 82) Secundum primos respondeo ad obiecta. (lin. 87) Ad primum … (lin. 87) Ad secundum … (lin. 92) Ad tertium … (lin. 99) Per idem patet responsio ad illud quod insinuatum est de potentia et sapientia … (lin. 103) Cetera quae sequuntur ad partem illam problematis, concedunt isti, (lin. 105) similiter et duas rationes primas ad oppositum. (lin. 106) Ad tertium quod contra se est … (lin. 107) Ad quartum … (lin. 111) … Ad quintum … (lin. 122) … Ad sextum dicendum quod non est simile, quia omnes in primo peccante fuerunt materialiter … In Reparatore autem non sunt nisi spiritualiter … (lin. 149 ss.) Si autem quaeris, quare non assumpit omnes humanas personas …, (lin. 160) respondendum … (lin. 161) Item … (lin. 164) Item … (lin. 167) Item … (lin. 170) Secundum secundos concedenda sunt omnia praeter duo prima obiecta ad partem secundam quaestionis ad quorum primum … (lin. 173) Ad secundum … (lin. 176) … Verumtamen licet iste modus rationabilis videatur et quasi philosophicus, tamen multum movere debet quod sancti loquuntur de incarnatione fere ubique quasi non sit alia eius causa nisi hominis reparatio … (lin. 196 ss.)

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In this very complexly constructed question, the author reveals a personal preference for the “more philosophical” opinion. This he abandons, however, in favor of what appears to him to be the more bountifully documented Church doctrine.12 2.5. Authenticity and Title of the Sentences Commentary The authenticity of the Sentences commentary, which has never been questioned, has been convincingly confirmed yet again by the editors.13 The editors have chosen for Kilwardby’s Sentences commentary titles such as Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, and so forth, never Scriptum or Ordinatio. The editor of Book I, Johannes Schneider, argued against referring to the Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum as a Sentences commentary.14 Both Schneider and Wood15 are certainly correct when they call attention to the great gaps in parts of the commentary, stating that this might be indicative of a revision of Kilwardby’s actual lectures on the Sentences (lectura). This is no reason, however, for not classifying the work as a commentary, albeit an incomplete one. The author treats the subjects, for the most part, in the same order as they appear in the text of Peter Lombard’s Sentences and closely adheres to other commentaries, for example the one by Richard Rufus. Thus, the title Quaestiones represents a fitting characterization of this commentary. 2.6. The Sources of the Quaestiones An author’s individual bent may be gleaned, in an intial step, from the sources that are in evidence in his work.16 Among the theological sources, Holy Scripture and the glosses on Scripture play the most prominent role. Among the authors from the period of the Church Fathers, we find Ambrose, Bede, Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite, Fulgentius of Ruspe, Gennadius, Gregory the Great, Jerome, Hilary of Poitiers, Pope Innocent III, Isidore of Seville,

12

Further examples, also of other types, may be found ibid., 19*–35*. The introduction to each of the five volumes of the edition provides detailed information on the respective manuscript evidence, on the entries from the Stams catalog (ca. 1325), and on the testimony of a Parisian taxation list from 1275. 14 See Kilwardby, In I Sent., 22*. 15 See Rega Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 289–343, at 290 n. 5. 16 For this section, see Kilwardby, In I Sent., 25*–31*. 13

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John Chrysostom, John Damascene, Papias Vocabulista, and above all Augustine of Hippo with an impressive host of references. From among the theologians of the following centuries and from early scholasticism, Kilwardby is familiar with the writings of Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, Gandulph of Bologna, Rhabanus Maurus, Hugh of St.-Victor, Nicholas of Amiens, Peter Comestor, Peter Lombard, Praepositinus, Simon of Tournai, Richard of St.-Victor, the Summa Sententiarum, and William of Auxerre. Kilwardby, who was once master of arts at Paris University, cites Aristotle, Averroës, Boethius, Cicero, the Liber de causis, the Liber sex principorum, Plato, Plotinus as transmitted by Macrobius, Porphyry, the grammarian Priscian, Ptolemy, and Seneca. He uses the Nicomachean Ethics along with the commentary by Eustratius in Robert Grosseteste’s translation. Verifying the anonymous citations reveals the large influence of Kilwardby’s contemporaries Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus, and William of Melitona. In many of his questions Kilwardby discusses controversial topics. He directs arguments at Bonaventure, Richard Rufus, and Richrd Fishacre, taking his own firm stand but avoiding harsh rhetoric. There is no trace yet here, in Kilwardby’s work, of the controversy that led to the condemnation of certain philosophical teachings in Paris and Oxford,17 nor any traces of a specific education, such as doctrines typical of his order. “It is valid to designate his doctrine as Augustinian, since he draws from an unusual wealth of knowledge of the writings of the Church Father, but also because we may assign him to the school of thought commited to the authority of Augustine.”18 2.7. Time and Place of Composition There has been some disagreement among scholars over the last decades about the question as to when the Sentences commentary was written. Stegmüller was unwilling to be any more precise than the timespan between 1248 and 1261.19 Recent research on the sources

17 See Heinrich Denifle and Alain Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1889–97), I: 544, 559; Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), 402–04. 18 Kilwardby, In I Sent., 22*-23*. 19 See Stegmüller, “Les questions,” 60.

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has unearthed some interesting new facts, however, that help narrow down the time of composition considerably. Particularly revealing is Kilwardby’s relationship to Richard Rufus and his Bonaventure abbreviatio. According to Wood, we may now be reasonably certain that the commentary was composed around 1255.20 That the Sentences commentary was composed at Oxford is undisputed. 3. Other Works on the Sentences In several publications, Daniel Callus has drawn attention to the great popularity that Kilwardby’s study aids for using the Church Fathers and the Sentences enjoyed, a popularity to which a wide distribution testifies.21 The most important aid for the Sentences commentary must have been the Tabula, published as an appendix to the critical edition of the Sentences commenatry.22 This Tabula, found in MS. Worcester, Cathedral Chapter Library, F 43, fols. 4r–17r, represents an alphabetical index to all four books of the Sentences commentary. Certain characteristics of the Tabula suggest that it is closely related to the text of the Sentences commentary as found in the Worcester manuscript. On the other hand, however, other features indicate that the Tabula was composed in conjunction with another, more complete manuscript. The Tabula is most likely based on a lost version of the text in which all the questions were consecutively numbered. This numbering was preserved most consistently by the Worcester manuscript.23 There are several hypotheses regarding the date of the Tabula. This could just as well lie before as after the composition of the questions themselves.24 4. Book One 4.1. Themes and Contents of Book One The questions to Peter Lombard’s first book of the Sentences do not follow the Lombard’s distinctions without gaps, nor do they rigidly 20

See Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 290 n. 6. For this section, see Kilwardby, In IV Sent., 47*–50*. 22 See Kilwardby, Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum, Appendix: Tabula ordine alphabeti contexta (cod. Worcester F 43), ed. Gerd Haverling (Munich, 1995). 23 See ibid., 13*. 24 See Kilwardby, In IV Sent., 48*–49*. 21

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adhere to the Lombard’s arrangement of the work.25 What is notable about the questions to the first book is the uneven treatment given to the individual topics. The discussion on the concept of theology, in questions 1–14, and the secondary question as to whether or not one can hate truth, in questions 15–17, is followed by a broad exposition of the terms uti and frui in questions 18–30. This is followed by the question as to the natural knowability of God and the unicity of the essence of his Being, in questions 31–2; the concept of person and a discussion of the plurality of persons and the Trinity, in questions 33–5; the question as to whether there can be more than three persons in God, in question 26; finally, a detailed treatment of each of the persons, in questions 37–42. The vestigium Trinitatis (qu. 43–58) and the imago Trinitatis (qu. 59–71) are explored in unusual depth. Question 72 returns to the doctrine of the Trinity with the question of whether or not the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit. Questions 73–87 are devoted to the doctrine of ideas. The last questions (88–95) address problems pertaining to divine knowledge. Some portions of the Lombard’s first book are missing in their entirety, for example the treatment of the divine attributes (except for divine knowledge). In the case of the doctrine on the Trinity, not only are many distinctions missing, but many problems that were central to scholastic theology are left untreated, such as the relationship of the properties to one another. As a remark in qu. 36 illustrates, it cannot be ruled out that there never was a complete program for the first book, or that it remained unfinished. Kilwardby refers to a later discussion of the problem regarding the number of notions by using the words, sicut suo loco patere poterit Deo praestante.26 There is in fact no treatment of this topic in our text. Kilwardby’s text also differs in length from those of other contemporary Sentences commentaries, being significantly shorter than those of Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus, for example. Also notable is the lack of care given to the formal arrangement of the questions. Questions of only a few lines alternate with others that are many pages in length. It is not easy to follow the course of the arguments of the longer questions, the secondary questions, and their respective responses.

25 See the remarks in the introduction to Schneider’s edition, Kilwardby, In I Sent., 22*–23*. 26 Ibid., qu. 36 (p. 117, ll. 796–7).

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4.2. What is Theology? The Four Causes Theory Kilwardby composed his commentary on the Sentences in an age of great theological controversy. Should one continue to give the highest priority to the study of Scripture, as Robert Grosseteste, Oxford’s greatest scholar, emphatically demanded in the early thirteeth century, or should one also seek to concern oneself with other topics of a historical and methodological nature? Should the Bible suffice for theology, or should Peter Lombard’s Sentences and the scientific-philosophical principles of Aristotle also be taken into consideration? In the first fourteen questions of Book I, Kilwardby addresses these issues. There is no formal prologue preceding Kilwardy’s questions. However, in the first fourteen questions he does discuss those subjects typically regarded as being introductory to theological doctrine. The systematic principle behind his considerations is the Aristotelian model of the four generic causes,27 which serves only as a model for categorization, however, without deeper philosophical significance. Kilwardby begins with the material cause, to which he assigns the question concerning the subject of Scripture.28 The formal cause consists in the method, that is to say, in the way in which theological problems are addressed and taught and in which we attain certitude in theology.29 God is designated as being the efficient cause.30 With regard to the final cause, Kilwardby inquires as to the utility of Holy Scripture.31 He concludes his brief introduction to theology by posing three questions on the scientific character of Holy Scripture,32 on the habitus it engenders,33 and compares it to other sciences.34 27

See Aristotle, Met. V 2 (1013 a 24–1014 a 25). See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 2–6 (pp. 7–17); qu. 2: “De his causis ad dilucidationem potest quaeri per ordinem, et primo de causa materiali sive de subiecto Sacrae Scripturae.” 29 See ibid., qu. 7 (p. 18, l. 1–p. 19, l. 52): “Consequenter quaeritur de causa formali quae consistit in duobus scilicet in modo tractandi et in modo docendi”; qu. 8 (p. 20, l. 1–p. 21, l. 34): “Secundo quaeritur an sit hic modus certitudinalis.” 30 See ibid., qu. 9 (p. 22, l. 1–p. 23, l. 38): “Consequenter quaeritur de causa efficiente quae Deus est.” 31 See ibid., qu. 10–11 (p. 24, l. 1–p. 28, l. 9): “Consequenter quaeritur de fine sive de utilitate huius Scripturae.” 32 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 29, l. 1–p. 32, l. 94): “Quoniam in praecedentibus saepe suppositum est quod haec Scriptura sit scientia, quaeritur an hoc sit verum.” 33 See ibid., qu. 13 (p. 33, l. 1–p. 34, l. 35): “Habito ergo quod sit scientia, quaeritur quem habitum facit.” 34 See ibid., qu. 14 (p. 35, l. 1–p. 37, l. 65): “Ultimo quaeritur de comparatione huius scientiae ad alias . . . ” 28

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Conspicuously, Kilwardby does not offer his own solution regarding the question of the material cause, but cites five opinions: according to Alexander of Hales, God is the main subject, recognizable to us in Christ’s redemptive work; a second opinion—Hugh of Saint-Victor’s— claims just the opposite: the subject of Scripture are acts of redemption such as the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, the sacraments, the acts of creation, and so forth. A third opinion, which Kilwardby attributes to Peter Lombard, is a combination of the first two: the subject of Holy Scripture is God, the divine being, and his works. According to others, being is the subject, insofar as its knowledge is directed toward the restoration of the Kingdom of God. Others again claim that the subject matter of Scripture is the whole Christ, that is to say, Christ and the Church. This opinion, which Kilwardby prefers to all the others, determines the subject according to the order of grace. Conceived in this way, the subject comprises a twofold sacred union of grace, one manifest in the union of the humanity of Christ with the Eternal Word, the other in the union of the members of the Church with Christ as their head. The formal cause sets theology, also called Holy Scripture, fundamentally apart from philosophy and the secular sciences.35 They differ in both origin and objective. The driving force behind theology is divine illumination, whereas the secular sciences derive from human invention. From an anthropological perspective, above man, the rational animal, lies the first, uncreated truth; outside and within him there are the sensory and intelligible worlds. Man draws truth from both areas. Yet the theological truth—that of the Scriptures—comes “from above” (desuper) by divine illumination, while the truth of the other sciences has its foundation in human causes. Since theology draws its certitude from truth itself, without human investigation, it has no need of the methods of the secular sciences. Theology also differs from the other sciences with respect to its objective.36 Philosophy is a theoretical science, striving for knowledge

35 See ibid., qu. 7 (p. 18, ll. 9–18): “Respondeo: Scientia haec differt ab aliis in duobus scilicet in origine et fine . . . . Duplex est modus scientiae, unus divina inspiratione, alius humana inventione . . . . Rationalis enim creatura constituta est inter duo habens supra se primam veritatem increatam, extra se et intra se sensibilia et intelligibilia. Ab utrisque haurit veritatem. Sed veritas huius Scripturae tantum desuper hausta est per inspirationes, non per rationes.” 36 See ibid., qu. 7 (p. 19, ll. 35–49): “Item differt haec Scriptura ab aliis quoad finem. Est enim scientia ut scientia solum intendens rerum notitiam, et haec est philosophica.

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for its own sake. Theology is wisdom, being directed toward love of the truly good and toward glorifying God. Rational investigation, therefore, does not suffice for theology, which involves admonition, encouragement, prayer, and the like. To be sure, Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences forms part of the Holy Scriptures, that is, of theology. The Lombard’s arguments, however, are not aimed at demonstrating the neccessity of this science, but rather at relieving human weakness. As we can see, Kilwardby clearly distances himself from the scientific-philosophical principles of Aristotle with regard to the method that attains certitude.37 Kilwardby’s position is interesting, since as a master of arts at Paris he was well familiar with Aristotle’s philosophical works. On the one hand, there is science—or philosophy—which strives only toward theoretical knowledge; on the other hand, however, there is theology, which is affectively rooted in the love for the primary truth. Theology engenders the more constant habitus than philosophy, issues directly from the authority of the primary truth, and cannot err. Faith in the Scriptures is a more secure and stronger habitus than intellect and philosophical science. The principles of faith are also more certain than the principles of argumentation. In every respect, faith in theology surpasses in certitude the secular sciences, which can only invoke reason and the Aristotelian standards for science.38

Et est scientia ut sapientia intendens amorem veri boni et cultum Dei scilicet pietatem, quae consistit in fide, spe et caritate. Prima nihil habet facere nisi illuminare aspectum et ipsum certificare. Secunda habet praeparare affectionem et accendere affectum in consensum summi veri per se et amorem summi boni; et ideo ad ipsam pertinet non ratiocinatio quae satisfacit soli aspectui, sed praeceptio, exhortatio, oratio et huiusmodi. . . . Sed tunc quaeritur, cum iste liber Sententiarum sit pars huius Scripturae, ad quid Magister utitur hic diffinitionibus, divisionibus et collectionibus? Respondeo: Hoc facit non propter huius scientiae necessitatem, sed propter aliorum infirmitatem . . . ” 37 See ibid., qu. 8 (p. 20, l. 1–p. 21, l. 34): “Secundo quaeritur an sit hic modus certitudinalis.” 38 See ibid., qu. 8 (p. 20, ll. 11–24): “Respondeo: Est scientia simplicis notitiae tantum quae radicatur in consensu apectus nudi ad ratiocinationem aliquam vel visionem; et est scientia notitiae amantis quae radicatur in consensu affectus per amorem rectum. Prima est in philosophicis, secunda in theologicis. Et haec secunda facit habitum firmiorem quam prima. . . . Item certior est, quia hic novimus testimoniis omni exceptione maioribus, quia haec scientia prodiit immediate ab auctoritate primae veritatis, quam omnino nequit mentiri nec falsum dicere . . . Sic igitur fides in Sacra Scriptura certior est et firmior quam intellectus vel scientia in philosophicis. Similiter et principia fidei licet credantur, firmiora sunt et certiora principiis demonstrationum.”

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The efficient cause of theology, that is to say, the author of Scripture, is God.39 The notion that angels could be the authors of Scripture is explicitly rejected.40 Men, inspired by God, have certainly made their contributions as promulgators and authors of holy doctrine—such as the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, evangelists, and others—but they are not the authors of the Holy Scriptures.41 The authorship of the Book of Sentences is different. Here, God is also the author of the truths imparted in the Sentences. The efficient cause and author of the compilation, however, is Peter Lombard himself.42 The objective of Scripture is to redeem man, whose cognitive faculties are impaired by sin. Man was originally created to attain the beatific vision and eternal happiness in the presence of God. Unlike the angels, however, man is unable to recognize his own destiny. Although the world manifests to him in manifold ways that he must search for God, it does not reveal to him the Savior and Mediator. Therefore it was neccessary to give man knowledge that instructs him on how to attain salvation. This is precisely the objective of Scripture. It ingnites in man the love of God, a dislike of the world, and obedience to God, so that his life becomes a preparation for eternal beatitude.43

39 See ibid., qu. 9 (p. 22, l. 1): “Consequenter quaeritur de causa efficiente quae Deus est . . . ” 40 See ibid., qu. 9 (p. 22, ll. 12–13): “Item quod nec angelus est huius auctor, patet per priorem dictarum rationum.” 41 See ibid., qu. 9 (p. 22, ll. 17–22): “Angeli autem et homines sunt huius doctrinae promulgatores vel scriptores vel etiam compilatores . . . Homines ut patriarchae, prophetae, apostoli et evangelistae et alii a Deo inspirati.” 42 See ibid., qu. 9 (p. 23, ll. 33–5): “Nota quoque quod licet veritatis traditae in Sententiis Deus auctor est, compilationis tamen efficiens vel auctor secundum quod compilatio est bene et vere dicitur Magister.” 43 See ibid., qu. 10 (p. 24, l. 7–p. 25, l. 32): “Respondeo: Haec Scriptura horum reparationem et entium manifestationem aliquo modo intendit, ad quem nulla alia potest attingere. . . . Et iterum quamvis mundus ostenderet Deum esse quaerendum, non tamen evidenter ostendit mediatorem. Propter quod necessaria fuit homini scientia ipsum in his omnibus instruens et informans, ut sciret homo quomodo tenderet ad salutem, . . . Sic igitur utilis et necessaria est Sacra Scriptura ad instruendum hominem super salute sua. Sed quia cognitio ordinatur ad opus, ideo ulteriorem habet utilitatem, scilicet ut in homine accendatur amor Dei et odium mundi et divina oboedientia.”

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4.3. Theology—a Science? The question for Kilwardby is: is Holy Scripture a science (scientia)?44 Kilwardby knows well the Aristotelian requirements for science:45 can theology fulfill the conditions of universality, necessity, and demonstrability of its conclusions? A list of distinctions to consider precedes Kilwardby’s answer.46 There is purely theoretical (speculative) science, which is philosophy, and there is active science, which is mechanical or moral in nature. Moral science is either imperfect, because it is unable to direct man entirely toward one purpose (this we call moral philosophy), or it is perfect, in which case it is moral theology, directed toward unifying man with God. Moral theology works in two ways: it is contemplative when it is referred by love directly to God (in this case it is called “wisdom”), or it is directed toward God through charity, in which case it it called “science” in the original sense. With yet another distinction, Kilwardy approaches the solution:47 one type of science is based on divine inspiration—which is theology—another on human investigation, and that is philosophy. Kilwardy’s response to Aristotle’s objections is also quite interesting.48 “Knowledge” and “science” are used differently by theologians,

44 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 29, ll. 1–2): “Quoniam autem in praecedentibus saepe suppositum est quod haec Scriptura sit scientia, quaeritur an hoc sit verum.” 45 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 29, l. 3–p. 30, l. 53): “. . . scientia est de universalibus secundum Aristotelem . . . scientia est de his quae impossibile est aliter se habere . . . Sed Aristoteles nihil dicit scitum nisi conclusionem causaliter demonstratam.” 46 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 30, ll. 31–42): “Respondeo: Est scientia speculativa tantum, ut philosophia quae vocatur speculativa tantum, et est scientia activa. Et haec vel propter corporis indigentiam reparandam ut mechanica, vel propter animae indigentiam ut moralis. Et haec aut est imperfecta, quia scilicet non plene reparat hominem in finem ad quem est. Et haec est moralis philosophica quae ponit virtutem ab homine esse per assuescentiam et finem eius beatitudinem actum perfectum secundum virtutem. Aut perfecta, quia plene reparat hominem quantum in ipsa est. Haec moralis est theologia, quae intendit unire hominem Deo et virtutem a Deo esse. Haec est activa ad hominis perfectionem, tum per amorem Dei immediate, et haec pars eius est contemplativa et pertinet ad primum mandatum et proprie dicitur sapientia, tum per amorem proximi directum in Deum, et haec pars eius est activa et pertinet ad secundum mandatum et proprie dicitur scientia apud theologos.” 47 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 30, ll. 45–7): “Ex hac distinctione patet solutio quaestionis, vel potest dici sicut prius tactum est, quod duplex est modus scientiae, unus divina inspiratione, alter humana inventione.” 48 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 30, l. 50–p. 31, l. 60): “Ad prima igitur tria obiecta de Aristotele respondeo quod scientia aliter accipitur apud theologos et sanctos et aliter apud Aristotelem. Theologi enim et sancti scitum dicunt omne quod mente cognoscitur, sive credatur sive videatur. Sed Aristoteles nihil dicit scitum nisi conclusionem causaliter demonstratam. Et hoc requirebat necessitas doctrinae quam docebat. Quia

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Kilwardby claims, than by Aristotle. For theologians, something is known (scitum) which they have perceived through the Holy Spirit or by faith. For Aristotle, only that is known, in the strict sense, which ensues as the causal conclusion of a syllogistic proof. Science is habitus conclusionis, its conclusions are universal and necessary. Knowledge gained in this manner is a human accomplishment. Theology or Scripture, by contrast, derives from divine inspiration, thus being certain through truth itself. It is not required, therefore, to fulfill Aristotle’s conditions of universality and necessity, since these pertain only to purely human knowledge.49 The only definition applicable to theology is that of Augustine: “all knowledge of what is true perceived by the soul is science.”50 What kind of habitus is caused by theology?51 The habit caused is faith, which occupies a rather peculiar position within the complex of intellect, science, wisdom, and opinion. Faith assents to the primary truth, not for the sake of reason, however, but out of love and because of the testimony of Holy Scripture.52 Faith and reason are for theology what intellect and knowledge are for the theoretical sciences. Intellect is a habit of greater certitude than knowledge. This is also true of faith. The habit of theology may nevertheless be called “science,” because it is relevant to things human and divine, temporal and eternal.53 It is better, though, to refer to this habitus as “wisdom.” “Wisdom” (sapientia) comes from “taste” (sapere) and leads to the tasting of love.54

enim humana ratio investigando non invenit verum nisi decurrendo a termino in terminum per medium, et hoc non est universaliter possibile nisi ab universali ad aeque universale vel particulare, propterea posuit scientiam esse habitum conclusionis et ab universalibus exire. Et quia non est certa cognitio in humana inventione, nisi fuerit causa medium, et necessaria causa talis effectus, ideo dixit scientiam esse ex his quae non possunt aliter se habere, et esse demonstrativam et causalem.” 49 See ibid., qu. 12 (p. 31, ll. 64–70): “In theologia igitur quia non est facta notitia humana inventione, et dico de canone Bibliae, sed divina inspiratione, non oportet illam esse ex universalibus. Et quia certa est ex ipsa veritate per se quae intra inspiravit eam, non oportet esse ex aliquibus praemissis universalibus causis vel demonstrationibus quae nequeunt aliter se habere. Unde illae rationes de Aristotele assumptae non contingunt Sacram Scripturam, nec usquam locum habent nisi in scientiis humana investigatione inventis.” 50 Ibid., qu. 12 (p. 31, ll. 74–5): “. . . secundum Augustinum omnis veri notitia animo percepta est scientia.” 51 See ibid., qu. 13 (p. 33, l. 1): “Habito ergo quod sit scientia, quaeritur quem habitum facit.” 52 See ibid., qu. 13 (p. 33, ll. 12–17). 53 See ibid., qu. 13 (p. 33, l. 18–p. 34, l. 28). 54 See ibid., qu. 13 (p. 34, ll. 28–31).

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The last question of the introduction deals with theology’s status in respect to the other sciences.55 This status cannot be understood within the context of subordination (subalternatio), but rather within the context of preeminence (principalitas) and service ( famulatus).56 Theology has the most in common with metaphysics, but there are similarities with the natural sciences as well.57 Indeed, all science comes “from the Lord God” (Ecclus. 1:1), but in different ways, of course. Theology (in the sense of Holy Scripture) originates directly from God, being the testimony of the Spirit of truth, whereas the other sciences are founded upon human deliberation and the testimony of creation.58 Despite its similarity to metaphysics, theology is practical in nature, considering the mystery of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the salvation of (sinful) man. “Theology surpasses all sciences, is about God, and comes from God.”59 4.4. Primacy of Biblical Theology? Robert Grosseteste was the greatest thinker at the University of Oxford in the early thirteenth century.60 It was his emphasis on biblical theology that set the stage for a controversy among members of the mendicant orders: Grosseteste tried to make sure that the main lectures of the day were on the Bible. As far as we know, Richard Fishacre was the first and only person to confront Grosseteste’s opposition to putting lectures based on the patristic works or systematic, as opposed to Biblical, theology at the heart of the curriculum. Fishacre justified his practice by claiming that Lombard’s Sentences were excerpts from Scripture . . . Contrary to Fishacre, Richard Rufus strenuously affirmed the sufficiency of the Bible for theology and denied any identification of Lombard’s Sentences with Scripture.61

55 See ibid., qu. 14 (p. 35, ll. 1–2): “Ultimo quaeritur de comparatione huius scientiae ad alias, an contineatur in illis, aut sit continens eas, aut neutro modo.” 56 Ibid., qu. 14 (p. 35, ll. 12–13). 57 See ibid., qu. 14 (p. 35, ll. 13–15). 58 See ibid., qu. 14 (p. 35, ll. 22–7). 59 Ibid., qu. 14 (p. 36, l. 39): “Haec igitur omnes excellit et est de Deo et a Deo.” 60 In this section I rely heavily on the article by Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” cited in note 15 above. 61 Ibid., 292–3.

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Kilwardby offered a compromise. He held that the special purpose of Lombard’s Sentences was to assemble a compendium of patristic authorities.62 But Kilwardby also held that the Sentences were part of Scripture and shared its primary purpose: human salvation. Like Rufus, Kilwardby saw commenting on the Sentences as an exercise in Patristic theology. But unlike Rufus, Kilwardby regarded lectures on the Sentences as a part of scriptural studies, a distinct part, but not a different discipline from scriptural studies.63

To justify supplementing scriptural studies, Kilwardby makes a distinction: the Bible does not contain everything useful, but everything useful for salvation, and he claims that Scripture contains everything useful “implicitly”: “Hence systematic theology is justified in part by the profound need of Scripture for exposition. . . . Kilwardby considers and rejects the Parisian position stated in the Summa Halesiana, according to which secular sciences independently investigate truth as truth.”64 To summarize: Grosseteste’s reservation about making systematic theology central to theological education prompted a debate at Oxford. It was an important debate, to which Fishacre, Rufus, and Kilwardby made interesting contributions. Fishacre justified the Sentences on a narrow basis as organized biblical excerpts. Kilwardby defended systematic theology as one aspect of Scripture studies. In comparison, Rufus minimized the importance of systematic theology, distinguishing it from biblical theology.65 4.5. Can we Hate the Truth? Following Fishacre and Rufus, Kilwardby raises the problem of the Aristotelian dictum, “all men by nature desire to know” (Met. I 1,

62 See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 10 (p. 27, ll. 83–7): “Notandum vero quod doctrinae libri Sententiarum est unus finis communis totius Sacrae Scripturae, qui scilicet iam proximo traditus est. Alius est finis sibi specialis et hic duplex, scilicet utilitas studiosorum scholasticorum primo et immediate, sed non principaliter, scilicet ut haberent sententias Patrum in quodam facili et evidenti compendio . . . ” 63 Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 294–5. 64 Ibid., 295. 65 See ibid., 298–9.

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980 a 21),66 quoting Augustine’s claim according to which beatitude is rejoicing in the truth.67 His basic solution to the problem is simply stated. No one hates the truth per se but only accidentally insofar as it offends. How can we be offended? Either on account of the insufficiency of our understanding or the inordinacy of our wills. . . . His example of insufficiency is a person whose friend dies; she hates hearing the truth, since she is not yet in the state of perfection, in which she will be entirely given over to divine justice. Kilwardby’s example of inordinacy is sexual: If we are bent on fornication, we will be irritated when we are truthfully scolded, since what we want is peace and a place of refuge in which to enjoy ourselves.68

This problem found little consideration on the Continent: “Neither Alexander of Hales, the Summa Halesiana or Albert the Great treated it. . . . Fishacre deserves credit for introducing the topic to the Oxford audience.”69 4.6. Understanding Matter Like hating the truth, understanding matter is a problem Aristotle poses for Christian theologians. In the Metaphysics (Met. VII, c. 10, 1036 a 8) Aristotle states that matter as such is not knowable. But on the Christian account God creates matter, and theologians cannot affirm that he does so ignorantly, without understanding what he creates. So since God created matter, it must be intelligible, and he must have an idea of it.70

Although any theologian might have concerned himself with this problem, it was primarily English theologians who discussed it.

66 See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 15 (p. 38, ll. 1–4): “Quaeritur an possit odiri veritas. Quod non, videtur quia quod ex necessitate amatur, non potest odiri. Et talis est veritas; amor enim eius naturalis est. ‘Omnes enim homines natura scire desiderant.’ Et non scitur nisi verum.” 67 See ibid., qu. 15 (p. 38, ll. 8–9): “Item nemo potest odire beatitudinem. Sed ipsa ‘est gaudium de veritate’ secundum Augustinum libro Confessionum X, c. 24. Ergo etc.” 68 Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 306–07; see Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 15 (p. 39, ll. 35–44): “Sic in proposito mens rationalis sive voluntas offenditur ex veritate, tum propter sui insufficientiam, tum propter sui inordinationem: Propter insufficientiam, cum offenditur ex malis ponae. . . . Hoc autem est, quia nondum es in statu perfectionis tuae, ubi addictus eris totaliter divinae iustitiae. . . . Per inordinationem, cum offenditur quis in malis culpae. Verbi gratia amas fornicari et per consequens amas latibulum et pacem in tua delectatione.” 69 Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 307. 70 Ibid., 327.

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“Kilwardby’s own opinion comes most directly from Bonaventure. . . . According to that opinion matter as essence has an idea, while matter as privation does not. It assumes that matter can have an essence without a form.”72 Wood has difficulties imagining that a thirteenthcentury theologian would make such a claim without citing a theological authority; according to her, the authority lies in an unacknowledged citation from the pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon. The Hypomnesticon states that whatever God makes has an essence.73 However, this is a text quoted by Rufus, not by Kilwardby and Bonaventure. Kilwardby’s reply to Fishacre’s contrary argument is twofold. First Kilwardby declares a related major premise invalid: “the more material something has the less entity it has.” Entity does not track actuality. Prime matter lacks actuality but not entity and hence it is not unintelligible. Second . . . Kilwardby distinguishes our knowledge of matter from God’s. God knows everything equally; it is only we who understand less about more material objects. For the human, though not for the divine, intellect, Kilwardby concedes that matter is known only accidentally and by privation.74

The theological defense of the claim that matter is intelligible, at least by God, is a remarkable feature of the later Franciscan tradition, in

71 Ibid., 338; see Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 79 (p. 253, l. 1–p. 254, l. 44): “Consequenter cum iam sunt creaturae quarum sunt ideae, quaerendum ut sciatur an omnes habeant ibi ideas proprias an non. Et primo quaeritur an materiae sit ibi idea.” 72 Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 338; see Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 79 (p. 253, ll. 20–2): “Materia dupliciter considerari potest scilicet secundum essentiam, et sic habet ideam, vel secundum privationem et imperfectionem et sic non habet.” 73 See Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 338. The quotation from Pseudo-Augustine may be found in footnote 185: Hypomnesticon I, chap. 4, no. 5 (PL 45: 1616): “Quidquid Deum fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam.” 74 Ibid., 339; see Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 79 (p. 254, ll. 32–8): “. . . distinguendum quod est aliquid intelligibile Deo et nobis. Si de Deo fit sermo, tunc est haec falsa: Quanto aliquid materialius, tanto minus intelligibile, quia aeque intelligit Deus omnia materialia et non-materialia. Si de nobis fit sermo, distinguendum quod aliquid est nobis intelligibile dupliciter, uno modo per se positive et sic intelligimus formas et formata, alio modo per accidens et per privationem et sic intelligimus materiam et materialia secundum quod huiusmodi.”

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particular as represented by English theologians. This philosophical and theological issue received only minimal consideration in Paris.75 4.7. On the Notion of Idea In Book I, Kilwardby devotes a conspicuous amount of attention to the notion of idea. In questions 73–95 he discusses in detail various problems relating to the concept of idea, in particular the positions of Bonaventure and Richard Rufus.76 4.7.1. The Term “Idea” In question 73, Kilwardby discusses the question as to whether there are ideas in God and, if so, what they are. For his argumentation, he draws on two loci classici of the scholastic doctrine of ideas: first, question 46 in Augustine’s book De 83 quaestionibus; second, Seneca’s Epistola 58.77 According to these texts, ideas are forms inherent in the divine intelligentia and eternal models of what is realized in accordance with nature. A third argument is based on an analysis of action. A being acting by reason is effective neither by chance nor by necessity, but rather follows his perception; in other words, he carries within him an image of that which is to be realized. This image, which is known and exerts causality, is what we call “idea.”78 It should be noted that this line of argumentation is already found in Richard Rufus, who in turn draws upon Bonaventure. Kilwardby thus follows traditional doctrine here. In accordance with Seneca’s Epistola 58, he differentiates between the form as idea and the form as eidos, listing as well the Platonic

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See Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 340. See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 73–95 (pp. 229–302). 77 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 229, ll. 1–8 and 24–5): “An sit idea in Deo quaeritur. Quod sic, quia dicit Seneca Epistola 94 sic: ‘Quid sit idea, id est quid Platoni esse videatur, audi. Idea est eorum quae natura fiunt exemplar aeternum.’ Et hoc apparet quod non sit alibi quam in Deo qui solus est aeternus. Item Augustinus De 83 quaestionibus q. 46: ‘Ideae sunt quaedam principales formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles quae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur.’ Ecce aperte dicit quod in Deo sunt ideae. . . . Respondeo: Primae rationes procedunt in quibus non solum patet quod idea in Deo est, immo etiam quid est.” 78 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 229, l. 9–12): “Item agens rationalis qui non agit a casu nec ex necessitate, cognoscens agit. Ergo habet in se similitudinem rei. Sed similitudo illa causalis est in Deo, quia secundum philosophos et sanctos sua scientia est causa rerum. Ergo est idea, quia ideam dicimus similitudinem cognitionalem et causalem.” 76

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system of five causes as expounded in Epistola 65.79 In the first case, the form serves as a model (exemplar), whereas in the second it is part of an image of the model (pars exemplati). Again, in the former case the form exists in God, whereas in the latter this is not so. The objection that there obtains no resemblance (convenientia) between God and his creatures80 Kilwardby counters with a distinction: there is the similarity of participation and one of imitation. In the former, there is no similarity between God and His creatures. There is, however, similarity in the second kind, inasmuch as the creature imitates the idea, not vice versa.81 A final objection to the thesis according to which the idea is to be considered as a model in God (exemplar),82 Kilwardby counters with reference to Peter Lombard: no dependency of God on his creature may be deduced from the relationship between exemplar and exemplum. “Creator” does not denote a relation within

79 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 229, l. 26–p. 230, l. 37): “Ad primum contra dicendum est quod est forma quae est idea, et forma quae est idos. De quarum differentia dicit Seneca in supra memorata Epistola parum infra sic: ‘Idea operis exemplar est. Quod ex hac artifex traxit et operi suo imposuit, idos est.’ Ex hoc patet quod forma dupliciter dicitur: Uno modo est exemplar, alio modo pars exemplati. Et primo modo est forma sive species in Deo, secundo modo non. Sed isto secundo modo processit oppositio. Et quia talis duplex est forma, distinxit Plato quinque causas entium, ut docet Seneca Epistola 102, sic dicens: ‘Quinque causae sunt ut Plato dicit. Id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod, novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam in statua id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is qui facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est ipsa statua est.’ ” 80 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 229, ll. 17–19): “Item similitudo habet convenientiam et paritatem similium in hoc in quo similes sunt. Sed Dei et creaturae non videtur esse convenientia, quae infinite distant, nec aliquo modo paritas.” 81 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 230, ll. 38–40): “Ad secundum quod est duplex convenientia, scilicet participationis et imitationis. Primo modo non est inter Deum et creaturas convenientia, secundo modo est, non ita quod idea imitetur creaturam, sed e converso.” Here it quite apparant that Kilwardby has adopted the distinctions from Bonaventure and Richard Rufus; see Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 35, qu. 1 (Quaracchi, 1882–1902), vol. I, 601a–b; Richard Rufus, In I Sent., dist. 35 qu. 1 (MS. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, ms. theol. qu. 48), fol. 131 va: “Ad secundum dicendum quod est similitudo duplex, scilicet participationis et imitationis. Prima non est in Deo, quia nihil est commune Dei ad creaturam, secunda est licet modica . . . ” 82 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 229, ll. 20–3): “Item cum idea sit exemplar, videtur quod relativa est. Sed relativum dependet aliquo modo a suo correlativo, et ad illud ordinatur. Ergo si idea in Deo est, Deus aliquo modo relativus ad creaturas et ad illas est ordinatus. Et ita esse divinum aliquo modo dependet ab esse creaturae, quod non videtur possibile.”

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God, but only within the creature. The idea in God relates to the creature only by means of the creature’s relation to God.83 4.7.2. Does an Eternal Relation to His Creatures Exist in God? This last statement regarding the relationship between God and his creation leads to question 74, where Kilwardby asks if there is an eternal relation in God to his creation.84 According to Schneider’s observations, behind Kilwardby’s discussion lies a controversy over a thesis posed by Fishacre: creator designates, according to the opinio communis, the divine being, with the secondary meaning of his effect within the creature. The position taken in the Book of Sentences, however, must be interpreted as meaning that nothing is said about God, but only about that aspect of his which is within the creature.85

This opinio finds even clearer expression in Bonaventure. According to him, the act of creation is predicated of the divine being. God is his actio, including his creatio, which is ascribed to his essence and is from him. Creator therefore designates the divine being in relation to the creature. The relationship predicated of God is merely conceptual, although it is by no means an empty notion (vanus intellectus). The causality implied in creator is indeed a causality. Causality represents no real relationship, but is in reality the divine essence.86 Richard Rufus gives a brief summary of Bonaventure’s doctrine,87 but presents yet another opinion, according to which the relationship 83 See ibid., qu. 73 (p. 230, ll. 43–6): “Ad tertium potest dici quod idea relativa est erga creaturam, non per relationem quae in Deo sit, sed quae in creatura per modum quo dicit Magister Sententiarum, lib. I, dist. 30 cap. paenultimo de hoc nomine ‘creator’ quod significat relationem quae in creatura est, non in creatore.” 84 See ibid., qu. 74 (p. 231, ll. 1–4): “Sed de hoc ultimo propter sequentia opus est hic dubitare. Quaeritur igitur utrum fuerit in Deo aeterna relatio respectu creaturae, ita quod idea quae aeterne fuit in Deo, designet aliquam aeternam relationem Dei ad creaturas quae quidem relatio in Deo sit.” 85 Kilwardby, In I Sent., 34*. 86 See Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 30, qu. 2 (ed. Quaracchi I, 524 a–b); dist. 35, dub.4 (ed. Quaracchi I, 615 b). 87 See Richard Rufus, In I Sent., dist. 30, qu. 3, fol. 126ra: “Utrum huiusmodi nomina dicantur secundum substantiam aut secundum relationem quae sit vera relatio. Respondeo: Dicunt aliqui quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo non important relationem in Deo secundum rem, sed tantum secundum modum intelligendi. Non est enim ut dicunt in divinis relatio secundum rem nisi personarum inter se . . . . dicunt quod haec nomina circa Deum dicunt pure essentiam secundum rem, sed relationem secundum modum intelligendi, in creatura secundum rem” (quoted from Kilwardby, In I Sent., 34* n. 13).

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described in these terms is predicated of the divine essence. Rufus attempts to reconcile this view with Peter Lombard’s thesis, that the relation is not in the Creator, namely, sicut accidens. Rather, the Creator himself in relation to the creature is the relation: Deus sic relatus haec relatio est. Rufus states as well that not every relation is an accidens, but only the kind that is accompanied by a change in the thing of which it is predicated, according to the meaning of the word accidens. From this, however, one may not deduce any dependenc of God on his creature.88 It is evident from the text of question 74 that Kilwardby’s discussion is directed at Richard Rufus. Kilwardby’s thesis is that God’s relationship to his creation says nothing about God himself, but only about what is from God within his creature. According to Kilwardby, no real relation exists without dependency or a mutual natural order. A relation identical to the divine essence could not form or cease to be without change, except in a manner of speaking. Thus Rufus’s opinion is rejected. But Kilwardby dismisses Bonaventure’s opinion as well, that creator signifies the divine essence, with a secondary meaning of his effect within the creature. He declares that when the Creator is compared to the creature, there is only one relation allowing such a comparison, that is that of the creature. Within God, on the other hand, there is no such mutual order or relation to the creature whatsoever.89 4.7.3. Does Every Creature Have its Own Idea? Kilwardy begins the investigation by applying this question to matter.90 The problem is as follows: matter, being created, is an object of divine

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See ibid., 34*–35*. See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 74 (p. 236, ll. 142–52): “. . . quando creaturae ad invicem comparantur secundum antecessionem et consequentiam, ita quod una sit prior et reliqua posterior, diversae sunt relationes prioritas et posterioritas et in diversis. Sed quando comparantur ad invicem creator et creatura, unica est relatio qua Deus dicitur prior et creatura posterior in re licet duae ratione, et illa est posterioritas creaturae. Deus enim nullum respectum vel ordinem vel relationem in se habere potest respectu creaturae. Unde prius isto modo de Deo dictum nihil aliud est nisi post quod est vel erit aliud, et posterius de creatura dictum est id quod est post aliud. Ecce quod utrumque per creaturae posterioritatem exponitur, et sic est una relatio a qua utrumque dicitur, una dico secundum rem, licet ratione sit altera, ut iam patebit.” 90 See ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, ll. 1–3): “. . . quaerendum ut sciatur an omnes habeant ibi ideas proprias an non. Et primo quaeritur an materiae sit ibi idea.” 89

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knowledge.91 On the other hand, it is, in the words of Augustine, minime ens92 and recte nihil.93 Indeed, quanto materialius aliquid, tanto minus intelligibile.94 In his reply, Kilwardby distinguishes between essence and privation.95 As a form of existence, matter has an essence and is therefore similar to God, so that it possesses its own idea. If it is imperfect, however, it does not possess this similarity. With respect to the knowability of matter, Kilwardy maintains that God recognizes material and immaterial things in the same way. In the case of human reason, however, he distinguishes: we recognize the forms per se and matter per accidens. The question remains: is matter entitled to an idea only if it participates in the actualization of form, or independently of form as well? Kilwardby’s response, that we can know matter per accidens only, suggests the first alternative. Although matter, in his opinion, has no actuality, it nevertheless possesses existence, so that it also possesses an idea.96 “With this view,” Schneider rightly observes, “our author is at variance not only with the doctrine of Aquinas, but also with Fishacre’s, who denies matter’s possessing an idea . . . with the same train of thought.”97 Here Kilwardby adopts Bonaventure’s argument, who explicitly affirms that matter in itself possesses its own idea, not just in conjunction with form: the entitas and veritas of matter are similar to the primary truth.98 Richard Rufus abridges Bonaventure’s

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See ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, ll. 4–7): “. . . quia Deus creavit materiam . . ., non nescivit quae fuerat facturus. Ergo in Deo est ratio qua cognoscitur materia et creatur. Sed haec est idea.” 92 Ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, l. 12): “cum materia sit minime ens.” 93 Ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, l. 18): “recte nihil dicitur.” 94 Ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, l. 14). 95 See ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, ll. 20–2): “Respondeo: Materia dupliciter considerari potest scilicet secundum essentiam et sic habet ideam, vel secundum privationem et imperfectionem et sic non habet.” 96 See ibid., qu. 79 (p. 253, l. 27–p. 254, l. 31): “. . . potest inferri instantia talis: Quanto materialius est aliquid, tanto minus habet de entitate. Ergo quod est pura materia, nihil habet de entitate. Hoc falsum est. Et nota quod in hac ratione quae ad instandum illata est, entitas debet sumi pro actualitate. Et sic potest concedi conclusio, quia materia de se nihil habet de actualitate, sed per accidens solum.” 97 Ibid., 39* n. 11; see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 15, art. 3, ad 3; and Richard Fishacre, In I Sent., dist. 36, qu. 1, fol. 62 va–vb: “Ad primum dico quod ubi multum est de materia, minus est de intelligibili per se. Et ideo ubi totum est materia, sequitur quod non est intelligibile per se, sed per aliud, nec sequitur quod non sit omnino intelligibile.” 98 See Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 36, art. 3, qu. 2 (ed. Quaracchi I, 629 b).

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question. His reply is identical almost verbatim to Kilwardby’s, although he speaks more specifically of materia prima.99 Kilwardby continues the discussion with the question as to whether created substantial form corresponds to an idea in God. For his response in question 80, he returns to an objection already raised in question 73: the infinite distance between God and his creature discloses an infinite dissimilarity.100 Kilwardby responds with an analysis of the meaning of similarity: the difference between finite and infinite does not exclude the similarity of imitation, if simililarity is understood in the original sense of quality.101 Similarity and dissimilarity may be applied to quantity, however, and then be understood as equality and inequality.102 In that way the difference between finite and infinite remains, but also the similarity of truth, goodness, etc., according to the relationship of cause and effect. This similarity of imitation constitutes the concordance of idea and ideatum.103 In this context, Johannes Schneider makes an important observation regarding Kilwardby’s sources:

99

See Richard Rufus, In I Sent., dist. 36, qu. “Utrum mala sint in Deo,” fol. 134ra: “Materia prima ratione essentiae suae aliquid est et opus Dei est, et ideam habet in Deo, ratione vere privationis quae nulla non.” 100 See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 80 (p. 255, ll. 4–8); cf. ibid., qu. 73 (pp. 229, ll. 17–19 and p. 230, ll. 38–42). 101 See ibid., qu. 80 (p. 255, ll. 17–20, 24–6): “. . . dicendum quod dissimilitudo inter Deum et creaturam dupliciter intelligi potest: Uno modo proprie secundum modum qualitativum prout dicitur similitudo conveniens in qualitate, et dissimilitudo disconvenientia in qualitate vel ei simili. . . . Primo modo sumendo similitudinem neganda est haec: Inter Deum et creaturam est infinita dissimilitudo vel distantia. Est enim inter illos assimulatio imitationis, et ita modo qualitativo assimulantur.” 102 See ibid., qu. 80 (p. 255, ll. 20–3): “Alio modo improprie et communiter prout similitudo dicitur esse convenientia in quantitate vel ei simili, et dissimilitudo disconvenientia in quantitate, ut large dicatur aequalitas similitudo et inaequalitas dissimilitudo”; ibid. (p. 255, l. 26–p. 256, l. 32: “Secundo modo sumendo distinguenda est haec: Inter Deum et creaturas est infinita dissimilitudo, quia in Deo est veritas, bonitas, entitas, pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Similiter etiam sunt eadem in creatura per analogiam. Et quoad hoc non est vera propositio, sed dicta omnia ut in Deo sunt infinita sunt, ut in creatura finita. Et sic est infinita dissimilitudo et distantia, quia in nullo par est creatura Creatori, neque eo comparabilis.” 103 See ibid., qu. 80 (p. 256, ll. 33–40): “Infinite ergo dissimiles sunt et distantes quantum ad rationem finiti et infiniti, sed nihilominus similes et propinquae quantum ad rationem veritatis, bonitatis et huiusmodi, sicut est propinquitas causae et effectus. Sed cum sic inveniantur dissimiles secundum rationem finiti et infiniti, haec dissimilitudo est inaequalitas, et haec non impedit similitudinem assimulationis et imitationis. Infinite ergo distant et dissimiles sunt quoad paritatem, non tamen ad imitationis assimulationem. Et secundum hanc assimulationem debet esse convenientia ideae et ideati.”

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A parallel to the discussion of the idea of form may be found in Fishacre’s work. In an entirely different train of thought, he responds in a very similar manner to the question of whether the forms are in God. He surmises that the forms of things produce an image in our intellect, which, according to his doctrine of knowledge, originates in the divine idea. He deduces from the similarity of form and image in the human mind a more perfect knowledge and therefore greater similarity of form in God’s mind. It becomes evident from this suggestion that Kilwardby was quite possibly inspired by Fishacre’s question to examine the similarity between idea and form.104

Kilwardby also discusses the problem as to whether the composite of matter and form possesses its own idea.105 The argument in favor of the thesis is derived from the insight that the individual parts of the essence possess ideas, so that a whole composed of these parts possesses an idea as well. In the same manner in which the whole comprises its parts, the idea of the whole comprises the idea of the parts.106 Kilwardy accepts this explanation, reminding us of the nature of ideas: ideas are rationes cognitionales and causales, and in God’s mind engender neither composition nor plurality.107 The question of whether accidents possess their own ideas is worth mentioning also.108 Kilwardby attributes their own ideas to accidents: an accidenct possess its own truth and its own being. The truth is known by God and the existence was created by him, both by means

104 Ibid., 40*. The corresponding text may be found in Richard Fishacre, In I Sent., dist. 36, qu. 2 (MS. Oxford, Balliol College, 57, fol. 62vb): “Solutio: Res vel forma gignunt similitudinem suam in sensum vel potius in intellectum, quae tamen est ab idea sua in mente divina. Et ita est similitudo aliqua ipsius formae et ideae et eiusdem formae et vestigii eius in mente creata intelligente eam. Sed aestimo quod similitudo formae et ideae est multo maior quam formae et similitudinis eius in mente . . . ” 105 See See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 81 (p. 258, l. 1): “Deinde quaeritur an compositum ex materia et forma habeat ideam.” 106 See ibid., qu 81 (p. 258, ll. 2–5): “Sicut enim partes compositi habent suas singulas ideas quasi partiales, sic totum ut videtur habet unam ex illis partialibus quasi totalem; sicut enim totum continet partes, sic idea totius ideas partium ut videtur.” 107 See ibid., qu. 81 (p. 258, ll. 6–12). Kilwardby must have adopted this question from Richard Fishacre, In I Sent., dist. 36, qu. 3 (MS. Oxford, Balliol College, 57, fol. 63 rb): “Sequitur tertia quaestio scilicet quomodo composita sint in Deo vel in scientia Dei, et quia composita ex materia et forma non sint nisi individua, et haec quaestio quomodo individua sunt in Deo vel in eius notitia.” For qu. 82 (“Deinde quaeritur an diversorum compositorum diversae sint ideae, praecipue quando illa composita sunt eiusdem generis vel speciei”), there are also indications that Fishacre is the probable source. 108 See Kilwardby, In I Sent., qu. 84 (p. 263, l. 1): “Deinde quaeritur utrum accidentium sint ideae propriae sicut substantiarum.”

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of individual ideas.109 The counterargument, that substance is the cause of the accident and so that substance and accident are known simultaneously by means of the same idea, Kilwardby responds with a distinction between causa propinqua and causa remota.110 The idea of the substance is, he concedes, causa remota et non propria for the accident. But for the coming to be as well as for the knowledge of the accident, a causa propinqua et propria is necessary, and that means, a proper idea of the accident.111 Kilwardby concludes his considerations with an analogy: just as man knows accidents through their peculiar species, so God knows accidents through their ideas.112 Another question that arises regards the hierarchical order of the ideas.113 The masters’ explanation for the general view that there is no order among the ideas, Kilwardby states, is that only a simul esse exists among them.

109 See ibid., qu. 84 (p. 263, ll. 2–6): “Quod sic, quia Deus ea distincte novit et causat, quod non facit nisi per ideas eis proprias ut videtur. Item accidens aliquid entitatis habet quod non est de entitate substantiae, ergo et aliquid veritatis quod non est de veritate substantiae. Sed haec a Deo noscitur et causatur.” 110 See ibid., qu. 84 (p. 263, ll. 10–11 and 12–17). 111 See ibid., qu. 84 (p. 263, l. 20–p. 264, l. 24): “Et ad primum contra dici potest quod causa causae propinqua et propria est causa causati remota et non propria. Et sic se habet idea substantiae ad accidens causandum. Sed oportet praeter causam remotam et non propriam esse aliam causam propriam et propinquam. Et ita oportet ad causandum accidens in substantia et per substantiam ad esse propriam ideam accidentis causalem.” 112 See ibid., qu. 84 (p. 264, ll. 34–6): “Et tunc oportet per propriam ideam cognoscere accidens, sicut oportet hominem cognoscere illud per propriam speciem aliam a substantia specie.” Again, Kilwardby may have adopted the topic from Fishacre. Fishacre denies that the accident possesses its own idea. In his opinion, the idea of the substance is also the idea of its accident, due to the causal relationship between substance and accident. The same holds true for rationes seminales; see Fishacre, In I Sent., qu. 3 (MS. Oxford, Balliol College, 57, fol. 64 rb): “De accidentibus an habeant singulae species in novem generibus, et ipsa generalissima ideam in mente divina. . . . Non video quomodo speciebus accidentium per replicationem minimi in illo genere factis respondeat per se idea. Immo sicut causa per se accidentis est forma substantialis a qua causatur, sic per illam formam cognoscitur, et a Deo per ideam formae substantialis . . . Insuper cum rationes seminales formarum substantialium sint in materia, non aestimo accidentia habere in materia rationes seminales nisi per accidens easdem, sicut ex grano nudo tamquam ex semine est granum et palea extra vestiens. Et eadem ratione nec habebunt accidentium species rationes causales in primo agente nisi ratione formarum substantialium a quibus causantur.” 113 See ibid., qu. 87 (p. 273, l. 1): “Consequenter quaeritur utrum in ideis sit ordo ad invicem.”

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5. Book Two 5.1. Themes and Contents of Book Two In contrast to the first book, throughout Book II Kilwardby respects the sequence of distinctions that he found in the Sentences—at least up to distinction 37, after which he omits distinctions 38 through 44, that is to say, up to the end of the second book. Here we find discussions of the standard more general (qu. 1–5) as well as more specialized (qu. 6–13) questions pertaining to the doctrine of creation. The discussion of the doctrine of angels is quite extensive (qu. 14–60), including the two especially interesting topics of the principle of individuation (qu. 17) and the mode of existence of the universals (qu. 18). The doctrine of angels is only briefly interrupted for some reflections on the period that elapsed between creation and the fall of man (qu. 23–4). All the traditional themes are discussed, such as the fall of the angels (Lucifer) and the angelic hierarchies. In questions 61 through 88 a treatment of the hexameron follows. Here, question 78 is remarkable because of its debate of Averroës’s thesis concerning the unicity of the soul. From question 89 to 125 Kilwardby treats in succession man’s condition before his fall from grace, the procreation of man before sin, the temptation of man, and the origin of sin. Of particular interest are questions 126 to 135 on free will (liberum arbitrium, dist. 25). Finally, in quaestions 136 to 170 Kilwardby closes with discussions on grace, grace and virtue, as well as—again quite extensively—on original sin and culpability. 5.2. On Free Will (Liberum Arbitrium) As mentioned above, Kilwardby discusses the topic of free will in questions 126 through 135, to which question 147 may be added, on the relation of grace and free will with respect to the resistence to temptation. Kilwardby opens this discussion with the question of how to define free will and establish its form of existence, that is, whether liberum arbitrium is a substance of the rational mind or its power, an act or a habit.114 He quotes the definitions of Augustine (“Liberum arbitrium

114 See Kilwardby, In II Sent., qu. 126 (p. 322, ll. 4–6): “Circa definitionem liberi arbitrii primo quaeritur quid est liberum arbitrium formaliter et secundum rectam

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est rationalis et vitalis animae motus”), of Anselm (“Libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se ipsam”), of Bernard (“Liberum arbitrium est consensus voluntatis et rationis”), and of Peter Lombard (“Liberum arbitrium ist liberum de voluntate iudicium,” also “facultas rationis et voluntatis”).115 Kilwardby leaves the definition open, not appearing to favor any one in particular, and proceeds to devote himself to the problem of free will’s mode of existence, concurring with the opinion of those who call the liberum arbitrium a habit. Only in a secondary sense could one consider free will to be a power or even a substance.116 It is within this context that Kilwardby exhibits his preference for the definitions of Bernard and Peter Lombard. The designation of the free will as a habitus explains not only the ease and agility with which the will may be exercised through continuous practice, but also the constancy of the free will itself. An impression (impressio) is made upon the soul that is not easily destroyed. Echoing Augustinian tradition, Kilwardby states that reason is always present in the art of living a virtuous life in immutable truth. Frequent consideration of this truth enables one to decide what one would like to do and what not, what one would care to choose and to avoid. The ability one gains is an ability of one’s reason and one’s will; that is to say, the will is a rational striving and can be voluntary only when reason precedes it.117 Only when the will chooses in accordance with reason does it choose the good, without reason it chooses evil. Kilwardby cites Bernard for confirmation: “The will, whenever exercised, always has reason as its constant companion and servant, so to speak.” The

praedicationem, utrum scilicet sit substantia mentis rationalis vel potentia eius vel actus aut habitus.” 115 Ibid., qu. 126 (p. 322, ll. 14–26). 116 See ibid., qu. 126 (p. 324, ll. 57–9): “Alii vero probabilius dicunt quod liberum arbitrium formaliter et in recto dicit habitum, in obliquo autem et consequenter potentiam et postremo substantiam.” 117 See ibid., qu. 127 (p. 327, ll. 48–65): “Inde enim fit quaedam impressio in anima non facile delebilis . . . Sic in proposito ars recte vivendi in veritate incommutabili semper praesens est rationi ad quam per crebram et intimam ac ordinatam conversionem fit agilis discernere quid expedit et quid non, et quid eligendum et quid fugiendum. Et haec agilitas est ‘facultas rationis et voluntatis.’ . . . Voluntas est rationalis appetitus. . . . Ex hac siquidem arte recte vivendi contemplata inest voluntati habilitas ad eligendum proprie quod ad rationalem voluntatem spectat, non tamen ad appetendum. Appetere enim potest brutaliter voluntas per se ipsam, sed rationaliter et proprie voluntarie non potest nisi praevia ratione.”

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will never acts without, but often enough against reason.118 Thus it becomes clear that the ability to judge arises within reason through comparison with the virtuous life. And because it is easy for reason to judge, the will finds it easy as well to strive and choose reasonably.119 Kilwardby summarizes as follows: the habit of free will, which signifies the ability to decide and to choose, is created by two natural causes, one internal and one external. They are natural because the rational mind is naturally drawn directly to the virtuous way of life, which exists in the immutable truth.120 Free will may therefore be called the habit to choose of the rational mind, or a power of the mind to choose in accordance with reason and will. Anselm, too, was correct in defining free will as the habitual affect to choose freely. Likewise, in Bernard’s words, one may call the librium arbitrium the concordance of reason and will.121 One may say that Kilwardby’s discussion of the free will as the deliberate power to choose arising from the will belongs within the sphere of a psychological analysis of the relation of reason and will. In any case, he concedes that will has priority over reason. In this position, the influence of Augustine’s authority is clearly manifest.

118 See ibid., qu. 127 (p. 328, ll. 66–74): “Item inde dicitur eligere bonum vel malum voluntas, quia bene vel male, et hoc inde quia secundum rationem vel sine. Quod autem eligat cum ratione et bene vel contra rationem et male, non est ei nisi ab eo quod praevia est ei ratio, et ideo habilitas eligendi voluntarie vel rationaliter vel bene vel male inde est ei unde rationem discernere. Unde Bernardus De libero arbitrio . . . : ‘Voluntas habet, quodcumque volverit se, rationem semper comitem et quodammodo pedissequam: non quod semper ex ratione sed quod numquam absque ratione moveatur, et ita multa faciat per ipsam contra ipsam, hoc est per eius quasi ministerium, sed contra eius consilium sive iudicium.’ ” 119 See ibid., qu. 127 (p. 328, ll. 76–8): “Et ex his patet quod ex collatione rationis ad artem recte vivendi inest ei facultas iudicandi. Et ex hoc quod sic est ratio facilis ad iudicandum, est voluntas rationalis facilis et apta ad rationaliter appetendum et eligendum.” 120 See ibid., qu. 127 (p. 328, ll. 88–91): “Ex his patet quod habitus liberi arbitrii qui est agilitas eius ad discernendum et eligendum, ex duobus est, scilicet a causa interiori naturali et exteriori quae similiter naturalis dici potest, quia naturaliter mens rationalis coniungitur immediate arti recte vivendi quae est in incommutabili veritate.” 121 See ibid., qu. 127 (p. 329, ll. 101–07): “Liberum arbitrium prout sonat in habitum, potest nominari habitus mentis rationalis ad eligendum vel facultas mentis secundum rationem et voluntatem ad eligendum . . . Item affectio habitualis ad arbitrarie eligendum secundum Anselmum. Item arbitrium habitus quantum ad rationem . . . Item consensus habitus secundum Bernardum quantum ad voluntatem.”

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Book III of the Sentences commentary is traditionally devoted to Christology and the doctrine of virtue. 6.1. Christology 6.1.1. Themes and Elements of Christology In the Christology of his Sentences commentary, Kilwardby’s primary focus is on the development of a theory of the hypostatic union and of the predications possible in it.122 “This is his true contribution to the Christology of his time, and here he demonstrates on a high level a process of thought devoted to a given doctrine of faith.”123 Regarding the themes, Kilwardby is quite selective in this portion of the third book. He skips over distinctions 3 and 4 entirely. After making some introductory comments on distinctions 1 and 2 (in questions 1–7), his endeavors to present a logical and flawless predication in Christological sentences culminate in his commentary on distinctions 5–8—that is, questions 8–26. The commentary on the ninth distinction (qu. 27–37) is remarkably expanded to encompass not only questions pertaining to the veneration of Christ and the problems involved in the adoration of the Cross and of images, but also more general questions regarding to what extent human nature is worthy of veneration. In this context Kilwardby addresses issues of social policy and Church politics. After a brief commentary on the tenth distinction, Kilwardby jumps to distinction 14 (qu. 42–5), apparently owing to his own epistomological interest in the doctrine of Christ’s knowledge. The final major section of Kilwardby’s Christology comprises the doctrine of Christ’s ability to suffer and Christ’s passion in distinctions 15–18 (questions 46–50). Here he opposes contemporary speculations regarding infinity in soteriology. He denies the necessity of infinite atonement, which the Summa Halensis and Thomas Aquinas had maintained. In Kilwardby’s opinion, fallen man is not debitor aeternae peonae in principle, because according to scriptural witness

122 Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, has been edited by Elisabeth Gössmann. For this part of my essay, I am greatly indebted to the introduction to this edition. 123 Ibid., 42*.

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the patres antiqui of the Old Testament rendered poenitentia. Rather, he conceives Christ’s redemptive act from a more positive aspect: the oblatio perfectae oboedientiae et perfectissimae iustitiae (qu. 48). For this reason he is able to reject any reference to Christ’s passion as eternal (qu. 49). Indeed, he can even admit that in some respects, other human acts of martyrdom are greater than Christ’s passion. Kilwardby’s Christology ends rather abruptly with the question of the necessity of Christ’s passion (qu. 50). It is evident that the approach taken in commenting on Peter Lombard’s text is primarily dictated by the author’s own interests, who takes the liberty of simply skipping over whole groups of topics while adding other subjects. 6.1.2. Problems Concerning the Christological Concept of Person The concept of person is ideally suited to demonstrating the characteristic aspects of Kilwardby’s method of dealing with Christologicalanthropological questions.124 In question 8—Utrum assumendo talem carnem et animam assumpsit personam vel naturam125—there appears for the first time in Kilwardby’s Christology the tripartite concept of person that was prevalent in summae and Sentences commentaries since William of Auxerre:126 Some . . . say that with the word individuum in the definition of the person three aspects have to be understood: singularity (singularitas), incommunicability (incommunicabilitas), and supereminent dignity (supereminence dignitas).127

In the context of these three distinctions, Kilwardby makes an important cross-reference to Book II of his Sentences commentary regarding the individuation principle (causa individuationis).128

124

On this subject, see ibid., 49*–64*. See ibid., qu. 8 (pp. 36–42). 126 See Artur Michael Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, vol. II, 1 (Regensburg, 1953), 113–14. 127 Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, qu. 8 (p. 40, l. 136–p. 41, l. 138). The reference to aliqui might be an indication that Bonaventure’s Sentences commentary is being quoted; see ibid., 49*. 128 See Kilwardby, In II Sent., qu. 17: “Consequenter quaeritur de secunda proprietate naturali quam attribuit Magister angelis in principio huius distinctionis, scilicet de personalitate. Et quia personalitas est individuatio quaedam, primo quaeritur de causa individuationis et quae est proprietas personalis discretionis.” 125

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6.1.3. On the Principle of Individuation Let us consider the problem concerning individuality and personhood. Question 8 of Book III discusses the possibility of assuming a human nature without the accompanying human personality, which is a fundamental theme of the doctrine of the Incarnation. By referring back to the question of the individuation principle, which Kilwardby answered in question 17 of Book II, he provides the philosophical foundation for the Christological discussion in Book III. Indeed, he declares explicitly that he has no intention of solving the Christological problems of individuality and personhood in any other way than through those philosophical principles developed earlier. Question 17 of Book II on the principle of individuation not only contains Kilwardby’s doctrine on the pluralitas formarum;129 this question is significant also because it makes an important contribution to the problem of the universals and to the philosophy of science in the thirteenth century. After examining three possible principles of individuation—matter, substantial form,130 and accidental form—Kilwardby proceeds to reject them all.131 The following passage leads up to his own solution: To this one responds that the principal cause of individuation is the efficient cause. The necessary cause or the causa in qua is matter. The causa de qua is the species, because the efficient cause draws the individual form out of the universal one, thus individualizing matter as well as the composite. . . . just as different specific forms are drawn from the genus, so different individual forms [are drawn out of] the species.132

Kilwardby contrasts his own opinion with the one just cited, although there are evident similarities: One could also say, and maybe even with greater probability, that the true designation (signatio) is the cause of individuation and the exter-

129 This is an indication that at the time when he composed his Sentences commentary, Kilwardby had already firmly established the principles that would later, in 1277 when he was archbishop of Canterbury, lead him to condemn those who defended the uniqueness of form. 130 See Kilwardby, In II Sent., qu. 17 (p. 61, l. 8–p. 62, l. 39). 131 See ibid., qu. 17 (p. 62, l. 40–p. 63, l. 68). 132 Ibid., qu. 17 (p. 63, ll. 69–74): “Respondetur ad hoc quod principalis causa individuationis est efficiens. Causa autem sine qua non vel in qua est materia. Causa de qua est species, quia efficiens educit de universali formam individuam, et per hoc individuat tam materiam quam compositum. . . . sicut diversae formae specificae educuntur de genere, sic diversae formae individuae de specie.”

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nal relationship the cause of this or that individual. I am not speaking of the designation of the intellect, but of that which is outside of the soul. Neither do I speak of the designation of place and time, but of the designation of matter and form, or, better still, of the designation of matter through form, which in corporeal things follows the designation of place and time, which are accidental for the individual. I refer to the designation as acting as well as being acted upon. . . . The activity of the form with respect to matter, therefore, is a designation as activity, and the being acted upon of matter through the form is a designation as being acted upon. From this a real being and individual is caused. Therefore, the principle of individuation is matter as well as form, but matter is the receptive and form the active principle. Thus, matter and form are first, followed by the designation of matter through form, and third, the individual that through them is an actual being. Hence take note that form, by designating and individuating matter, designates and individuates itself from that which follows.133

It is important to bear in mind that the doctrine recapitulated in question 8 of Book III, according to which matter and form are designated by an ultimate designation, finds further elucidation in the passage quoted above.134 “Ultimate designation” indicates the completion of the individual in itself, such that even the accidental determinations of time and place, pertaining only to what is corporeally individual, may be neglected: it is the ultimate, but not further determinable designation of this matter through substantial form and of the composite as actual being. The Christological applicability of this concept of individuation is evident: the composite of body and soul that is united with the form of a higher genus—namely, of the persona Verbi—does not meet the conditions for individuation pertaining to the human race. Despite his frequent quotation of the words of Damascene according to which the Son of God took on human nature in atomo, Kilwardby therefore refrains from addressing the question of Christ’s individuality. That the expression signatio ultima also suggests the concept of the plurality of forms ( pluralitas formarum) is clear from his determination

133

Ibid., qu. 17 (p. 64, ll. 93–108). See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, qu. 8 (p. 39, ll. 97–102): “Quod autem sic debeant intelligi dictae definitiones, testatur determinatio in secundo libro facta circa individuationem. Ibi enim dicebatur quod causa individuationis est materia et forma signatae signatione ultima. Ex quo sequitur quod personalis proprietas sit actualis existentia et determinata ac signata per se. Sicut enim hoc est verum communiter in omni alio individuo, sic in individuo rationalis naturae quod est persona.” 134

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of the individual property (individualis proprietas), which Kilwardby calls “essential for the individual” but “accidental for the species, because the species can subsist well without this or that actually existing being. Nevertheless, one should not say that the existence of the actual individual is an accident, although it is accidental to the species.”135 Matter, according to Kilwardby, is subject to a threefold consideration—absolute, in comparison to form as such, and in comparison to this designated form—and one may speak of individuation only in the third case. The case of form, however, is different: “On the side of form, more ways of consideration are found than in matter, because in one [piece of ] matter, several forms constitute a single individual; for example, in this fire there exist a form of substance, a form of body, and a form of fireness.”136 Each of these forms, like matter, may also be considered “absolutely” or “in comparison,” although only “comparison with this matter” constitutes the individuating cause.137 Against this background, we are able to gain insight into Kilwardby’s concept of individuation in its Christological application: Christ’s human nature lacks ultima signatio, thus he has no proprietas individualis, since his humanitas exists applicatum formae nobilioris generis, and only thus can he become an ens actuale. Therefore, Christ’s ultima signatio comes from his divine and not from his human side.138

These conditions explain why Kilwardby attaches such great significance to the three above-mentioned designations of the term individuum in William of Auxerre’s definition of person, that is to say, singularity, incommunicability, and supereminent dignity: Robert Kilwardby interprets William of Auxerre’s definition of person or the missing tercia conditio in the human nature of Christ . . . as an absence of signatio ultima on the part of the genus humanum, replaced by the forma nobilior of the persona divina. Because the forma nobilior—easily identifiable as the dignitas of the tertia conditio—is guaranteed in Christ

135 Kilwardby, In II Sent., qu. 17 (p. 65, ll. 122–8): “Et si quaeritur utrum sit substantialis vel accidentalis, forte dicendum quod est essentialis individuo et tamen est accidentalis speciei . . . Nec tamen dicendum quod existentia actualis individuo sit accidens, quamvis sit accidentale speciei . . . ” 136 Ibid., qu. 17 (p. 65, l. 146–p. 66, l. 148): “Ex parte vero formae plures inveniuntur considerationes quam in materia, quia plures formae sunt in una materia in constitutione unius individui, sicut in hoc igne est forma substantiae, forma corporis et forma igneitatis.” 137 Ibid., qu. 17 (p. 66, ll. 148–58). 138 Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, 54*.

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through the person of the Logos, modification through the second conditio, the incommunicabilitas, is also necessary: in Kilwardby’s opinion, one may speak of human individuality and personality only when referring to a singular human nature . . . and not to a naturaliter coniunctum vel coniungibile ad constitutionem alicuius tertii, such as when the soul conjoined with the body constitutes the tercium man.139

In addition to this incommunicability, the Christological aspect demands that the individual reasonable nature may not be conjoined with one of higher rank. Richard of St.-Victor’s definition of person is cited to substantiate this claim: “The person exists of itself in some singular manner of resonable existence.”140 In Kilwardby’s opinion, in the hypostatic union a singular human nature does exist, but it lacks the ultimate designation (signatio ultima) or the complete reality on the human side. “Thus the human nature in Christ is neither an individual nor a person, sed tantum aliquo modo singulare.”141 6.2. The Doctrine of Virtue 6.2.1. Themes and Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue In the text of Peter Lombard, distinctions 23 to 40 of the third book are devoted to the doctrine of virtue. In his questions, Kilwardby adopts the Lombard’s arrangement quite faithfully, but ends his commentary of the third book with distinction 36. Thus, the questions on distinctions 37–40 regarding the Ten Commandments are missing. The other standard themes on the doctrine of virtue are discussesd at varying length: the theological virtues in questions 1 through 24; the cardinal virtues, including the political virtues, in questions 25 through 35; Kilwardby devotes much space to a detailed treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in questions 36 through 58; and finally, variuos questions concerning the relationship between the virtues and the gifts are discussed (qu. 59 through 64).

139

Ibid., 55*. Richard of St.-Victor, De Trinitate, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris, 1967), Book IV, chap. 24, p. 189, ll. 4–5: “Persona est existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum.” 141 Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 1, 56*. 140

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6.2.2. The Various Concepts of Virtue The concept of virtue is so fundamental to ethics in both antiquity and the Middle Ages that one can generally speak of an ethics of virtues.142 Virtue, without any further specification, is in effect the epitome of humanity; it is that which corresponds to human dignity. Classical virtue is a habit, that is to say, bearing, character, condition, practically lived conviction, derived from the restrospective impact of acts, an ability caused in part through the aid of practice. The doctrine of virtue represents the primarily practical-scientific form of the doctrine of good and bad. The system of virtues provides the framework for considerations that, ideally, should maintain close proximity to individual cases that are best able to convey an appreciation for a science that is at once practical and designed to govern conduct. Since Lottin, scholars have distinguished two separate definitions of virtue valid for the twelfth century: the theological and the philosophical.143 “The theological definition first emerges with Hugh of St.Victor, receives its decisive character from Peter Lombard, and from Peter of Poitiers its enduring definitive formulation: ‘Virtue is a state of mind which enables one to lead a virtuous life, of which no one makes bad use, which God alone effects in man.’ ”144 This definition, a combination of various passages from Augustine, became generally accepted among theologians in the thirteenth century.145 On the other hand, we find the so-called philosophical definition of virtue in Abelard, amongst others, and thus at a time when there was no influence

142 In this section I will draw from my previously published article, “Alte Tugenden—neu gefragt? Zur Tradition der Tugendethik am Beispiel Robert Kilwardbys,” in Weite des Herzens, Weite des Lebens. Beiträge zum Christsein in moderner Gesellschaft, Festschrift zum 25jährigen Abtsjubiläum des Abts von St. Bonifaz München/Andechs, Dr. Odilo Lechner OSB, ed. Michael Langer and Anselm Bilgri (Regensburg, 1989), vol. 1, 629–40. 143 See Odon Lottin, “Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge,” in his Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, vol. 3 (Louvain, 1949), 100–05. 144 Georg Wieland, Ethica—scientia practica. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert (Münster, 1981), 222. One finds the definition in Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book II, dist. 27, chap. 1, no. 1 (vol. 1, 480): “Virtus est . . . bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur.” 145 See Johannes Gründel, Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens von den Verstandestugenden auf dem Hintergrund der Seelenlehre (Munich/Paderborn, 1976), 236. It is noteworthy that this occurred at a time when Aristotelian ethics was beginning to gain acceptance in the arts faculty. It is almost as if the reception of Aristotle provoked, in response, a revival of Augustinian thought.

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of the Nicomachean Ethics yet. The philosophical definition of virtue as “state of a well-ordered mind” is taken from Boethius, who adopted the genus habitus from Aristotle’s list of categories.146 The preference shown for the theological definition of virtue over the philosophical one could be interpreted as an awareness of theology’s own sphere of inquiry, in the face of the emergence of philosophy as an independent discipline in the course of the thirteenth century and the ensuing deepening awareness of the fundamental differences between philosophy and theology. For Kilwardby as well, throughout his teaching on virtue, the theological definition is the definitive one. He cites it in the third book of his Sentences commentary in his discussion of the theological virtues,147 as well as in his treatment of the cardinal virtues.148 In addition, Kilwardby cites numerous other definitions of virtue, most of which are taken from Augustine. He quotes De civitate Dei, Book XV: “Definitio brevis et vera virtutis: est ordo amoris,”149 a quotation that is followed by another one from Book XIX: “Virtus est ars vivendi.”150 Then Kilwardby quotes from the De quantitate animae (“Virtus est aequalitas vitae, undique rationi consentanea”151), from the De moribus Ecclesiae (“Virtus simpliciter est amor Dei”),152 from Epistola 167 (“Virtus est caritas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur”),153 and, finally, from Soliloquia, Book I (“Virtus est recta ratio perveniens ad suum finem quem beata vita consequitur”).154 Compared to this profusion of Augustinian definitions of virtue, Kilwardby makes almost no reference to philosophical doctrines of virtue, not even Aristotle’s. Peter Lombard discusses the cardinal virtues in distinction 33 of Book III of the Sentences. In his commentary on the relevant passages, Kilwardby emphasizes the Augustinian core of his theological intentions, refusing to concede independent ends to the classical-pagan forms of virtue. The only virtues that may be considered true and

146 See Boethius, De differentiis topicis II (PL 64: 1188): “Virtus est habitus mentis bene constitutae.” Also see In Cat. 3 (PL 64:242). 147 See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 2, qu. 2 (p. 11, ll. 7–8). 148 See ibid., qu. 27 (p. 98, ll. 13–15 and 32–3). 149 Ibid., qu. 1 (p. 3, l. 23). 150 Ibid., qu. 1 (p. 3, l. 25). 151 Ibid., qu. 2 (p. 11, ll. 9–10). 152 Ibid., qu. 16 (p. 50, l. 9). 153 Ibid., qu. 16 (p. 50, l. 12). 154 Ibid., qu. 28 (p. 107, ll. 37–8).

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genuine, therefore, are the supernatural ones. The natural virtues have no relevance for human salvation. Nevertheless, in the first question on distinction 33 Kilwardby asserts the necessity of the cardinal virtues.155 These have the purpose of guiding man through life with his fellow man and to protect him from sins like injustice and intemperance. In the second question Kilwardby discusses the origin of the cardinal virtues.156 One special focus of his considerations is an examination of the opinion which Aristotle voices in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he states that the moral virtues are acquired by habit. According to Aristotle, man himself is the cause of his virtues.157 So how exactly does virtue result from human actions?158 Kilwardby’s reflections take him well beyond Aristotle’s answer. Virtue is a practical habitus, whose aim is the good act and which results—here Kilwardby concurs with Aristotle—from repeated acts. Kilwardby proceeds to describe this process in greater detail.159 When someone accomplishes works of virtue, by acting justly and temperately for example, he relates in an inner vision to the immutable art of living a life of justice and temperence. Performing the exterior act frequently causes one to direct oneself frequently toward the immutable art and its loving contemplation. The more often the soul contemplates this art, the more similar does it become to it and the more does it take on its form. In this manner, man acquires such joy from the inner vision of the art that the will forms within him to act constantly in accordance with this art. Thus does man acquire the inclination (habilitas, promptitudo) to act which is called habitus. The profound influence of Augustine, so manifest here, is just as evident in the doctrine of the cardinal virtues in the third question, where Kilwardby adresses the question as to whether it is possible to possess the virtues acquired by habit in another way, purely as a divine gift, for example.160 He responds with a distinction.161 The practical virtues may be considered in two ways, either from the point of view of a state of imperfection or from that of a state of perfection—in other 155 156 157 158 159 160 161

See ibid., qu. 25 (p. 87). See ibid., qu 26 (pp. 89–97). See ibid., qu. 26 (p. 89, ll. 3–8). See ibid., qu. 26.1 (p. 90). See ibid., qu. 26 (p. 90, ll. 46–64). See ibid., qu. 27 (pp. 98–105). See ibid., qu. 27 (p. 98, l. 23–p. 99, l. 44).

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words, as mere virtues (nudae virtutes) or as virtues that are capable of bestowing grace upon the one who possesses them and render his life meritorious. In the former manner, as imperfect virtues, they may be acquired through human acts. In the latter, as perfect supernatural virtues, they can only be infused by God. Although, in the course of this question, Kilwardby repeatedly distinguishes between virtus consuetudinalis and virtus formata, between natural and supernatural virtue, it is equally evident that all “true” virtues are caused by God: “It is obvious that virtue itself, even that which is not supernatural, is caused by no one but God, and even without us.”162 What can it mean, then, to claim that human beings may possess their virtues through their own acts? For Kilwardby this may only be understood in the sense of a disposition that makes man willing to receive virtue. Human independence merely plays a preliminary role during the preparation for the reception of virtue.163 Kilwardby does, however, acknowledge a certain difference between the theological and the “other” virtues.164 This is manifest in the different ways in which man can prepare himself for the reception of the virtues. The preparation for the theological virtues possesses a special power (specialis vis) from an inscrutable inspiration (occulta inspiratio); this power exceeds the one that it is granted in preparation for the virtutes consuetudinales. Our understanding of such an idea of virtue is hindered, in my opinion, by the prevailing lack of a clear concept of the supernatural in theology today. Obviously the distinction between virtus informis and virtus formata must not be understood in the sense of natural and supernatural virtue. Not once does Kilwardby employ the terms virtus naturalis and virtus supernaturalis. From Kilwardby’s approach to the problem it becomes apparent, however, that it was possible to begin theological reflections on the relation of natural and supernatural from within the context of the doctrine of virtue.165 The cause for the preponderance of the theological foundation of all virtue lies in the designation of virtue as God’s gift, a designation that prevents a full

162 Ibid., qu. 27 (p. 100, ll. 82–3): “Patet quod ipsam virtutem etiam informem non faciat nisi Deus et hoc etiam sine nobis.” 163 See ibid., qu. 27 (p. 100, l. 84–p. 101, l. 93). 164 See ibid., qu. 27 (p. 101, ll. 111–21). 165 See Artur Michael Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, vol. I, 1 (Regensburg, 1952), 161–83; also see Wieland, Ethica—scientia practica, 223.

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reception of the secular Aristotelian concept of the acquisition of the habitus of virtue through habituation. Since Plato, the doctrine of virtue has been closely linked to the doctrine of the soul. Kilwardby represents traditional medieval thought as well, according to which the virtues have their foundation in the soul and its faculties. What are the underlying foundations of the cardinal virtues? In the soul, one may discern a reasonable and an unreasonable part; furthermore, two powers can be distinguished in the unreasonable part. Kilwardby adopts this common system of a threefold differentiation of the powers of the soul, with a rational power (potentia rationalis) on the one hand, and, belonging to the unreasonable part, powers of concupiscience (potentia concupiscibilis) and irascibility (potentia irascibilis). To which part do the virtues belong, to the reasonable or unreasonable part of the soul? The cardinal virtues belong—like all virtues, moral as well as intellectual—to the soul’s reasonable part.166 Thus they fall into the category of the rational powers of the soul. Question 30 of the doctrine on virtue appears to me to be of special interest.167 Here Kilwardby addresses the question of whether the virtues belong to the contemplative (aspectus) part of the soul’s rational powers or to the affective-practical part (affectus). The discussion includes his own views on theology’s affective-practical character. This question only applies to prudence (prudentia), however, since the other virtues (justice, fortitude, temperance) are already generally attributed to the practical part of the rational soul. Not a few of the philosophers, Kilwardby begins his response, support the notion that prudence belongs to the reasonable part of the soul’s powers.168 With this he cannot concur, however, because prudence is a virtue. If prudence consisted only in contemplation, someone could possess it without acting virtuously. Here Kilwardby cites the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI (1140 a 29–31), where Aristotle describes phronēsis in the following terms: “the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom.”169 Thus, anyone who has the capability of correct deliberation possesses prudence 166

See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 2, qu. 28 (p. 107, ll. 40–71). See ibid., qu. 30 (p. 113, ll. 1–3): “Conseqenter quaeritur utrum sint in aspectu rationalis potentiae vel in affectu. Et est haec quaestio specialiter pro prudentia, quia ceteras ponunt omnes in affectu.” 168 See ibid., qu. 30 (p. 114, l. 30–p. 115, l. 72). 169 English translation from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. William David Ross (Oxford, 1908), quoted from the Internet Classics Archive at www.classics.mit.edu. 167

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in aspectu, though not as virtue. Thus Kilwardby argues for a distinction within prudence: prudence can either be speculative or practical. Anyone may possess speculative prudence, whether this person is good or evil. Such a person possesses virtue, at most, in the sense of intellectual virtue as described by Aristotle at the end of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics (1103 a 4–6). Prudence is practical, according to Aristotle in Book VI (1140 b 4–6) when it is a practical habit: “The remaining alternative, then, is that it [sc. practical wisdom] is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.”170 It is within this conception that prudence is one of the cardinal virtues. Prudence may thus be defined as love of one’s purpose, as love of the true good. For it is because he loves the true good or the art of living virtuously that man is able to perceive how he may attain that good. Prudence therefore encompasses the ability to discern between what is conducive to achieving an aim and what is an obstacle. In this conception, Kilwardby sees a confirmation of Augustine’s definition of prudence.171 That which enables man to act prudently, however, is not a scientia aspectus, because many have such knowledge and still do not act accordingly, but rather an amor affectus, which guides the aspectus on how to even the path toward the aim of its act. From this perspective, according to Kilwardby, Augustine (and not Aristotle) provides the best definition: “Prudence is the love which teaches the power of deliberation how to pick out precisely that which is conducive from that which is an obstacle.”172 Kilwardby therefore strongly endorses defining prudence as a practical virtue. But it is just as apparent that he is well aware of its problematic position within the context of the Aristotelian division of the virtues into speculative and practical. For him, prudence occupies a special though not an intermediate position among the speculative and practical virtues: prudence conforms exactly to the form of a speculative virtue while simultaneously, as a practical virtue, being directed toward action. The unity of prudence as a practical virtue remains entirely unaffected by this mixed nature.

170 171 172

Trans. W. D. Ross. See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 2, qu. 30 (p. 113, ll. 21–2). Augustine, De moribus Ecclesiae, chap. 15, no. 25 (PL 32: 1322).

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For Kilwardby there is no contradiction in the fact that prudence, as a deliberative virtue (virtus discretiva vel ratiocinativa), is practical (in affectu) while the act of deliberation itself is speculative (in aspectu). Just as it is possible to consider the truth as either true or good—the former being theoretical, the latter practical—the same obtains when one considers the theoretical and practical themselves. The aspectus can be regarded as aspectus or affectus, or conversely the affectus as affectus or aspectus. The respective acts of contemplation or inclination differ according to their purposes. The aim of the aspectus is the true, whereas the aim of the affectus is the good. The activites of prudence, which are to counsel and to choose, may, according to their repective purposes, belong either to a theoretical or to a practical habitus. Therefore prudence itself is sometimes defined as an intellectual, at other times as a practical habit. The theoretical activities of deliberation and of correctly asserting or negating become, as acts of prudence, “practical theory” (speculatio practica), they become aspectus ut affectu” and, therefore, ultimately practical. In this question 30, we find, in my opinion, a consistent application of the notion of theology being a practical science. When even in theology as a science the primary objective is not the acquisition of knowledge, as Kilwardby established in the question on the nature of theology, but rather to impart a faith, which in its practical life testifies to its love of the first truth, then it becomes clear that the doctrine of the virtues, too, as the doctrine of good and evil, must be constituted practically, and hence include prudence as well. Fundamental observations on the characteristics of the Christian concept of virtue over against the classical-pagan one are made in question 32, which discusses the permanence of the cardinal virtues.173 Here Kilwardby speaks of the orientation of the cardinal virtues toward the theological virtues in earthly life, and of the orientation of the aims of the cardinal virtues toward the aims of the theological virtues in eternal life. This reveals an important feature of the entire theory of virtue, namely, its teleological aspect. This teleological conception of virtue is the reason why the concept of virtue emerges to its fullest extent only within the context of man’s purpose, that is to say, with the reason for and the fulfillment of human life. The teleological definition

173 See Kilwardby, In III Sent., Part 2, qu. 32: “Sed nunc incidit quaestio de duratione harum virtutum.”

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of the concept of virtue means, first of all, that virtue itself is not the purpose but only a means and a way to achieve this purpose. What, then, is the purpose of human existence? At this point of the discussion of classical-pagan philosophy and Christian theology, irreconcilable differences arise. For Aristotle, analysis of the teleology that pervades human praxis leads to a final purpose that is pursued for its own sake, which is also called happiness (eudaimonia). For him, happiness is a human good that man achieves by an “actvity of the soul in accordance with virtue,” that is to say, through its own abilities. Such a definition of the final purpose of human activity is of course not acceptable for the Chritian conception. According to the latter, it lies within the competence of theology to determine man’s final purpose, his perfection. For Augustine, whose views exerted the greatest influence upon the Christian conception of man’s perfection, this is only possible in union with God. Kilwardby has placed his own teaching on the cardinal virtues within this basically Augustinian foundation of the Christianian conception of life and of the world. In sum, he allows the cardinal virtues, together with their aims, only a small measure of independence. In any case, they possess no relevance for man’s salvation. For his salvation, man needs God’s divine grace. This notion is manifest in Kilwardby’s conception of the cardinal virtues as dona Dei. This is why his teaching of the cardinal virtues becomes a theological discourse. 7. Book Four 7.1. Themes and Contents of Book Four The center of focus of the questions in Book IV is a contemplation of the sacraments of the Old Covenant.174 This is manifest not only in questions 15–38, but also in other sections of the book: in the introduction to the more “general” aspects of the doctrine of the sacraments, with its comparison of the different epochs of salvation-history (qu. 1–4), as well as in the more “specialized” analysis of the sacraments of the natural religions (qu. 5–14) and of the New Covenant

174 In this section, I will follow the analysis of the editor of the fourth book, Richard Schenk; see Kilwardby, In IV Sent., 67*–71*.

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(qu. 39–42). In questions 43 through 51 the sacraments of the two Covenants are compared. In the main section of his work, Kilwardby argues in favor of holding the sacraments of the Old Covenant in high esteem, with a programmatic intensity that is hardly surpassed by any other medieval Christian theologian. He defends the immanent meaning of the Old Law partly with pragmatic arguments, partly with theological ones. Its role as a prefiguration of future Christian mysteries appears only in third place. Similar to Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, Kilwardby associates the efficacy of circumcision—nearly every medieval theologian conceded that it accomplished the remission of original sin—with the gift of transforming grace. Kilwardby goes beyond this interpretation, however, by denying that circumcision is exceptional. Rather, the sacrament of initiation is prototypical of the other ritual acts. They, too, are ordained by God for the purpose of justification and sanctification, and wherever they were performed according to their genuine intent, they fulfilled this purpose. Kilwardby rejects the assertion found in William of Auxerre, Hugh of St.-Cher, and Richard Fishacre, according to which the cult of the Old Covenant was not ordained by God, but was “as though extorted” (quasi extorta) and only tolerated to avoid idolatry. On the contrary, in Kilwardby’s opinion, since the cult was ordained by God, it must also have been sanctifying at the time. The ritual acts, which were in their own time understood primarily as obedience to God to attain justification and sanctification, were only secondarily a prefiguration of future Christian sacraments. This is why they were not immediately abolished after Christ’s death. Kilwardby states, echoing Augustine, that an abrupt abolition of the Old Law would have led to the erroneous assumption it had been comparable to idolatry. Kilwardby goes a step further than Augustine, however, in allowing that the older rituals retained their sanctifying powers for a time even after Christ’s death. The exact time of their abolition, which is assumed to have definitely occurred, cannot be determined, since this depends on an awareness of the proclaimed Gospel. 7.2. The Judeo-Christian Sacraments of the Covenant and the Cult of Other Religions After Kilwardby’s explicit distinction between the cult of the Old Covenant and idolatry, one might expect that he would adopt a negative attitude toward the cult of non-Jewish and non-Christian religions.

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Quite to the contrary, however, Kilwardby emphasizes—along with Hugh of St.-Victor—the positive effects of natural religions. To support his opinion he surmises that, although God may not have revealed or ordained the contents of the oblationes, decimations, and sacrificia, he nevertheless inspired them in order to counter the despair of the time through hidden consolation and edification. His silence was merely the divina simulatio irae et dissimulatio pietatis to increase the peoples’ yearning for salvation. Although there was no way for the people of that time to practice their faith in explicit obedience to a divine institution as they performed those sacraments, they nevertheless assumed they were acting in accordance with the divine will. For this reason their religion was neither indifferent nor neutral with regard to the path of salvation. The central aporia becomes manifest, however, when Kilwardby is compelled to deliver an explanation as to why such a salutary religion needed to be abolished by the sacraments of the Covenant. His response, that people at the time of Abraham were acutely in danger of reverting to idolatry, raises doubt in the efficacy of divine inspiration. The essential difference between an inspired cult of the religions and idolatry is not elucidated. A similar aporia surfaces in the discussion of the establishment of the New Covenant. 7.3. The Sacraments of the Old Covenant and the Christian Self-Understanding Like all medieval Christian theologians before him, Kilwardby takes great interest in determining the essence of the Christian sacraments by constrasting them with the sacraments of the Old Covenant. In questions 15–38 Kilwardby rejects various previous attempts at distinguishing between the two sacramental orders: by denying the divine institution of the older sacraments; by equating them with other nonChristian cults; by reducing them to the moment of faith during their performance; by deriving their significance and efficacy exclusively from the future mysteries of salvation; by limiting them to a purely forensic remission of sins or to private grace; as well as by excluding all other aspects of the Old Law from the acknowledged efficacy of the initiatory sacrament. With his discussion of the sacraments of the New Covenant—starting in question 39—Kilwardby turns to another distinction, according to which the older sacraments were mere signs, while the newer sacraments also represent efficient causes. Kilwardby rejects the category of

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efficient cause taken in its strictest sense as a suitable expression of the sacramental conferral of grace. He cannot avoid, however, granting the sacramental orders of salvation in both Testaments a dispositive efficacy: efficaciter ordinando ratione divinae pactionis.175 Kilwardby adopts the covenantal interpretation of the sacraments that he encountered in the works especially of Richard Fishacre and Bonaventure. Bonaventure, always eager to reconcile different views, adheres to the idea of the participation of God’s spirit and his power in the sacraments. Fishacre, by contrast, attempts to place more emphasis on the gift of grace as opposed to the execution of the sacraments. Kilwardby adopts elements of both variations of the pactum-theory. He attempts to avoid the looming dualism of the pactum-theory by interpreting the physical performance of the sacraments as a form of obedience and justice.176 In this way, the voluntaristic aspect of the covenantal model becomes even more evident, which leads to a decrease of interest in the symbolism of the sacraments. Just as Fishacre noted that, for example, the choice of water for the sacrament of baptism was entirely arbitrary, Kilwardby now underscores the secondary importance of the symbolic meaning of the sacraments. What is essential is their divine institution, to which man must comply in faithful obedience. After rejecting the distinction of the newer from the older sacraments through the contrast between mere symbolism and effective causality, and after adopting the covenantal interpretation instead, in questions 43–51 at the end of Book IV Kilwardby examines the traditional distinguishing features that were originally established by Peter Lombard. He justifies the differences by denying that the vast majority of people of the Old Covenant conformed in character to its essence. Thus the unsolved problem surfaces as to why the covenant of grace, with its aims of justice and sanctity, failed to achieve its purpose among the majority of its people. Furthermore, to what extent is there a difference here with the majority of people of the New Covenant? By introducing a difference between the community of the faithful of the Old Covenant and the Covenant itself, Kilwardby is able to salvage the traditional juxtapositions, but these hardly reflect the dominant trend of his reflections throughout the fourth book.

175 176

Ibid., qu. 39 (p. 203, ll. 165–6). See ibid., qu. 39 (p. 204, ll. 172–82).

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8. Conclusions In the conclusion of her contribution to Early Oxford theology in volume one of Mediaeval Commentaries on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Rega Wood calls medieval Oxford an important center of theological reflection in the mid-thirteenth century, second to Paris.177 I am inclined to agree. But what accounts for the independence of the Oxford tradition? The answer seems to lie in the fact that at Oxford some important issues were discussed which found little consideration in Paris. In the greater context, we must emphasize that Kilwardby is less original than either Fishacre or Rufus. He is thorough and wellorganized in making explicit the different definitions of science in his debate on whether or not theology is to be considered a science. Drawing the parallel between faith in theology and first principles in Aristotelian science, Kilwardby prefers the Augustinian view. Most importantly, he is acutely aware of the potential for conflict between Christian theology and Aristotelianism.

177

See Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” 340–3.

WILLIAM DE LA MARE Hans Kraml 1. Introduction When in 1282 the capitulum generale of the Franciscan order instructed all its members to copy Thomas Aquinas’s works only together with the annotations of William de la Mare, not in the margins of the manuscript but on separate sheets, this decision surely gave credit to a reputed master of theology.1 A few years earlier, this master had collected a series of critical remarks on several “sentences” held by Thomas Aquinas, mainly in his Summa theologiae. These remarks, which became known as the Correctorium fratris Thomae, provoked several counter-correctoria by Dominican and even secular defenders of Thomas and his doctrines. These rejoinders can be considered the roots of an early version of Thomism, as Maarten Hoenen recently emphasized.2 Thomas was a highly reputed master when William produced his criticism of some of his doctrines. This high reputation can be seen in the use that William’s own commentary on the Sentences made of Thomas’s commentary on the same work; furthermore, the directive that the general chapter at Straßburg issued demonstrates the importance accorded to Thomas’s work. Neither medieval life nor its philosophy or theology was ever without controversies. From the beginning of the reception of Aristotle’s philosophy, there were quarrels over the extent to which credit had to be given to this philosophy. There were those who, like Albert and Thomas, attempted to accept the challenge to the scientific character of theology that stemmed from the constraints on scientific knowledge formulated in Aristotle’s work. In the eyes of these theologians, there was a theory of science to which theology needed to adhere. There was, however, another line of theological thought that remained closer to the Augustinian and patristic tradition, with its preference

1 See Gerold Fussenegger, “Definitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinae celebrati anno 1282,” AFH 26 (1933): 127–40, at 139. 2 Personal remarks to the author.

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for Platonic principles. For the advocates of this approach, the task of theology was to promote faith and to pursue a good life as well as the perfection of the human soul, rather than scientific knowledge. Aristotle was well known to both parties, but there were differences in the importance attributed to certain themes and goals. Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure are the most prominent representatives of this second current of thought; we can point to John Peckham and Henry of Ghent as further examples, among many others. Within this line of theological inquiry William de la Mare occupies a prominent position, precisely because he was the one to throw these differences into sharp relief with his Correctorium fratris Thomae. Nevertheless, William de la Mare cannot really be considered to have been hostile to Thomas’s theology from the beginning; indeed, I think that even his Correctorium is not truly hostile to Thomas, although it sometimes appears too harsh in its criticism. This criticism has to do with fundamentally different philosophical attitudes, even in the very interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy. Furthermore, we have to take into account the fact that, between the time of William’s lectures on the Sentences and the redaction of the Correctorium, the condemnation of 1277 had occurred. This condemnation placed some of Thomas’s sentences in the vicinity of condemned theses, even if it was not in fact Thomas himself who was targeted by the condemnations. In addition, the Correctorium was obviously meant as a guide for those Franciscan friars who wanted to read Aquinas’s writings, which had become more problematic after the Parisian condemnations. In this introduction to William’s commentary on Peter Lombard, I will discuss some of the main differences between William’s and Aquinas’s respective approaches. 2. Life As it is the case with many medieval figures, we do not know very much about the life of William de la Mare. Indeed, whereas for a good number of important personalities we can ascertain at least the date of their death, this is not so with William. There are only three dates that can be considered somewhat certain: the approximate date at which he composed his first version of the Correctorium fratris Thomae, namely, shortly after the condemnations of 1277, probably in the year 1278; the fact that in 1282 he must have been well known as a theologian among

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the Franciscans; and, thirdly, the fact that he worked on a revised and extended version of the Correctorium before or until 1285. As a Franciscan, he lectured on the Sentences at Paris before 1270, because his commentary contains no hints at the condemnation which occurred in Paris that year;3 on the other hand, the condemnation of ten errors of 1241 is explicitly mentioned in the second book.4 Since the topics touched upon by the condemnation of 1270 are treated on several occasions, one can assume that he would also have mentioned the condemnation itself had he lectured considerably after 1270. Nevertheless, this is a mere argumentum ex silentio. It has for a long time been taken as quite certain that William was regent master at Paris in the year 1275, because the manuscripts containing a sermon that he delivered on June 29, 1275, introduce him as such.5 According to Glorieux, he probably held the regency for the years 1274–1275 following John Peckham (1269–1271), with another master in between.6 Glorieux assumed a second regency of Eustache of Arras, which is not documented, although he stayed in Paris from 1269 until 1273, as some sermons delivered to the court show.7 A second regency for Eustache is surely not entirely impossible, but there is no way as yet to decide what really happened. Be this as it may, there is still William of Falegar as a possible candidate, since his regency could have occurred before 1274.8 Although this seems quite plausible, there is still much doubt about the sequence of masters. Again it was Palémon Glorieux who raised these doubts,

3 For the content of the condemnation, see “Decem errores contra theologicam veritatem,” in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain, vol. 1 (Paris, 1891), no. 128, p. 171. 4 See Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml (Munich, 1995), dist. 3, qu. 8, p. 66. Except for the first occurrence of the respective books, I will henceforth cite William de la Mare’s Sentences commentary as In Sent. 1 (2, 3, or 4), followed by distinction and question numbers, as well as the page in my edition. 5 According to Palémon Glorieux, “D’Alexandre de Hales à Pierre Auriol. La suite des maîtres franciscains de Paris au XIIIe siècle,” AFH 26 (1933): 257–81, at 273–4. The MSS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 1788, and Oxford, Merton College, 237, contain a sermon by William de la Mare with this date with the remark that he was then regent master at Paris: regente Parisius. 6 See ibid. 7 See Johannes Baptist Schneyer, Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350 (Münster, 1970), 40–5. 8 See Palémon Glorieux, “Maîtres franciscains régents à Paris. Mise au point,” RTAM 18 (1951): 324–32.

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because in his mise au point of the sequence of masters in Paris he placed William before John Peckham as regent master while reaffirming John Peckham as regent for the years 1269–1271.9 This would mean that William held the regency probably in the years 1268–1269. But considering the fact that William makes extensive use of parts of the works of Roger Bacon that were produced in 1267, and that his lectures on the Sentences had to be completed before his inception could take place, Glorieux’s hypothesis seemed utterly impossible to me for a long time. One has to remember, too, that William borrows extensively from parts of John Peckham’s commentary on the Sentences. To be sure, sometimes it is difficult to determine who used whose work,10 even if there is an evident dependence of one work on the other, but I used to think that all the evidence in this case shows that William must have used John’s commentary, not the other way around. For example, in his recapitulation of different definitions of the subject matter of theology, he mentions the case where the salutare bonum—the Good for the salvation of man—is taken to be the subject matter of theology: this is exactly John Peckham’s definition. It is certainly possible that, for some reason, John Peckham read the Sentences before William, but was then admitted to the chair after William, but I cannot see any reason for such an assumption, and the problem of the dependence on Roger Bacon would still remain anyway. As for the date of the sermon that occasioned this change in the once proposed sequence of masters, the year when William gave the reported sermon could well have been 1275, which is what is usually assumed today.11 Nevertheless, some years ago Louis-Jacques Bataillon made me aware of his doubts concerning the sequence and chronology of the Franciscan masters at Paris in the 1260s. In a recent publication he has offered his arguments for moving back William’s lectures on the Sentences and his regency, and for placing William’s regency before

9

See ibid. On this point Adriano Oliva is surely correct. See his review of “Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in secundum librum Sententiarum,” AFH 89 (1996): 307–09. 11 See Franz Pelster, “Einige ergänzende Angaben zum Leben und zu den Schriften des Wilhelm de la Mare OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 37 (1955): 75–80. Even more recent publications assume the correctness of this chronology. See, for example, Schneyer, Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350, 493. 10

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John Peckham’s.12 I see Bataillon’s point that the collection of the sermons does not settle the dates for the individual sermons contained in it. The coincidence of day and liturgical celebration shows that the years 1274–1275 are candidates for William’s regency, but on this criterion the years 1267–1268 are possible as well.13 I have no qualms about moving William’s commentary (or at least his lectures) on the Sentences back considerably, even with regard to the quotations from Bacon, because it may well be that Bacon wrote some of the texts that were to appear in his Opus maius long before, as he was a notorious rewriter of texts on the same topic. But I cannot so easily accept the hypothesis that William read the Sentences before John Peckham, because in my view there are indications that William depends on John, yet no indications—as far as I can see—that it could have been the other way around. I admit, however, the relevance of Oliva’s remarks on the problem of determining dependence.14 The question has to be settled one day, probably with an edition of John Peckham’s commentary. It is clear that William composed his Correctorium fratris Thomae some time between 1277 and 1282, because in this work he often refers to the Parisian condemnations under Bishop Étienne Tempier; moreover, as already indicated, in 1282 the general chapter of the Franciscans at Straßburg ordered the use of the Correctorium. The controversy as to whether William’s annotations that are mentioned in the general chapter are in fact identical with the Correctorium or represent an earlier and shorter version of it, as Franz Pelster strongly suggested,15 must now be considered to be settled definitively in favor of the Correctorium. In its first version, which is generally better known than the second, extended one,16 the Correctorium must have been written considerably

12

See Louis Jacques Bataillon, “Guillaume de la Mare. Note sur sa régence parisienne et sa prédication,” AFH 98 (2005): 367–422. I wish to thank Fr. Bataillon and Fr. Oliva for their personal and friendly interest in this subject. 13 See ibid., 368; also see Palémon Glorieux, “Sermons universitaires parisiens de 1267–1268,” RTAM 16 (1949): 40–71. 14 In favor of Bataillon’s position, also see Federica Caldera, “Guglielmo de la Mare tra Bonaventura, Tommaso d’Aquino e Pietro di Tarantasia. Dipendenze testuali e originalità del Commento alle Sentenze,” AFH 98 (2005): 465–508. 15 See Franciscus Pelster, Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. de variis sententiis S. Thomae Aquinatis (Münster, 1956). 16 On the second version see Raymond Creytens, “Autour de la littérature des correctoires,” Archivum fratrum praedicatorum historicum 12 (1942): 313–30. See also

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before 1282, probably before or about 1278.17 In the years following the Straßburg chapter and up until 1285, William extended his former Correctorium by twenty-five articles, dropping nine articles of the first redaction that had to do with the Sentences commentary, and thus produced a second redaction of the Correctorium.18 Interestingly, in their various counter-correctoria or correctoria corruptorii, as they are sometimes called, the Dominicans responded to the first redaction. This must mean that the responses to the Correctorium and William’s second edition occurred at roughly the same time, William not knowing of the responses, the Dominicans not knowing that William was still working on an enlarged version of the Correctorium. But the Declarationes, which Franz Pelster had taken to be the first version of William’s corrections of Thomas’s opinions,19 prove to be dependent on the enlarged version.20 Therefore, the general chapter could not have meant the Declarationes. William’s acquaintance with Roger Bacon’s writings, which is very clear in the commentary on the Sentences, may have come about in connection with his work on the biblical texts in their original languages. Almost every theologian, in commenting on texts of the Bible, made remarks on the textual problems that had inevitably occurred in the long process of manuscript copying. However, as Roger Bacon vividly complains, most of those alleged “corrections” of the texts were corruptions rather than anything else.21 Bacon himself provided many suggestions for correcting biblical texts, suggestions that focused on older manuscripts in different monasteries, which, Bacon assumed, had to be much less corrupt than the Parisian exemplar of the Bible. Above all, he recommended returning to the texts in the original languages. This means that only someone who was well-acquainted with the biblical languages should try to correct the corrupt tradition of the Latin version. For this reason, Bacon proposed to the pope that

Roland Hissette, “Trois articles de la seconde rédaction du Correctorium de Guillaume de la Mare,” RTAM 51 (1984): 230–41. 17 See Valens Heynck, “Zur Datierung des ‘Correctorium fratris Thomae’ Wilhelms de la Mare. Ein unbeachtetes Zeugnis des Petrus Johannes Olivi,” Franiskanische Studien 49 (1967): 1–21. 18 See Creytens, “Autour de la littérature des correctoires,” 320. 19 See Pelster, Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. 20 See Hissette, “Trois articles.” 21 See Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, ed. John Sherren Brewer (London, 1859), chap. XXV, p. 94.

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the universities should introduce language studies. There were several efforts to establish such studies at different times, but not with lasting results. Heinrich Denifle discovered that William de la Mare was one of the few masters of the thirteenth century who was able to perform correctory work in Bacon’s sense.22 Denifle claimed that William was the most educated corrector of his century, doing his work very much in the spirit of Bacon’s proposals. Denifle’s observations were adopted by Samuel Berger23 and Beryl Smalley.24 Interestingly, the old sources on William de la Mare, such as Wadding and Sbaralea, do not mention any connection on William’s part with the correction of biblical texts or with any thorough study of languages.25 Yet there are manuscripts that ascribe such work on the Bible to William,26 and there are no good reasons to doubt these claims—lack of further information notwithstanding. It must be admitted, however, that there is little evidence in the Sentences commentary that William had any thoroughgoing knowledge of the biblical languages. For example, he uses the widespread erroneous etymology of the Greek word for man, anthropos, as stemming from ana, “upward,” and tropos, “version.”27 This he could have taken from many sources, for instance from Vincent of Beauvais, whose voluminous work he presumably used in several other instances as well.28 The same is true of the case where he makes an allusion to the hebraica veritas, in the same question, arguing the acceptability of the use of a dove as a symbol for the Holy Spirit. There he says that it is the fecundity of doves that justifies its use as such a symbol, because in

22 See Heinrich Denifle, “Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien des 13. Jahrhunderts,” Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 4 (1888): 263–311; 471–601, at 545. 23 See Samuel Berger, Quam notitiam linguae hebraicae habuerint christiani Medii Aevi temporibus in Gallia (Paris, 1893), 32–45. 24 See Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1952), 335–6, 338, 349, 369. 25 See Luca Wadding, Annales minorum seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum, vol. 5 (Quaracchi, 1931), 268; J. Hyacinthus Sbaralea, Supplementum et castigatio ad scriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci a Waddingo aliisve descriptos (Rome, 1908), part 1, pp. 340–1. 26 For example, MS. Einsiedeln, Stiftsbibliothek, 28. 27 See Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml (Munich, 1989), dist. 16, qu. 2, p. 201. 28 See Vincentius Bellovacensis, Speculum quadruplex naturale, doctrinale, morale, historiale (Douai, 1624), Spec. nat., lib. 23, cap. 6, col. 1656 C.

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the “Hebrew truth” it is said that God’s spirit “bred” over the waters.29 This follows the interpretation of Jerome,30 which of course was accessible to medieval theologians. In the Quaestiones disputatae, there is one other remark on the Greek text of the New Testament; it concerns the interpretation of a verse in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (6:23). William refutes an interpretation given by “some people” by remarking that the interpretation’s erroneousness is clear from the Greek. But even here William could simply have followed Augustine, whom he mentions in this context. Therefore, we do not find evidence of any profound knowledge of the biblical languages in the commentary on the Sentences. Clearly this does not say too much, because Sentences commentaries were not a place for linguistic discussions of the text of the Bible. Wadding mentions that in 1290, William de la Mare was a professor and doctor of the Franciscan order teaching in England, along with one Thomas Bungay.31 This is the last information that we have about William. One sometimes finds the claim that William died around 1285. This view could be due to the fact that he must have completed his extended version of the Correctorium before that time, and that there is no further mention of later activities, with the sole exception of Wadding’s. As I cannot find any source that would confirm 1285 as the time of his death, I presently take Wadding’s claim seriously, assuming therefore that William died some time after 1290.32 Considering his academic career and assuming an average development, I would suppose that he was born about 1230 or somewhat later, possibly in 1235. For curiosity’s sake I would like to draw attention to a suggestion that was made some 120 years ago by Samuel Berger in his treatise on the knowledge of Hebrew among Christians in medieval France.33

29 See Guillelmus de la Mare, In Sent. 1, dist. 16, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 201): “Columba enim inter ceteras aves est maioris et frequentioris cubationis et ex hoc habet naturalem aptitudinem ad significandum personam spiritus sancti qui secundum hebraicam veritatem legitur cubasse super aquas in principio Genesis.” The Vulgate text of Gen. 1:2 reads, “et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas.” 30 Jerome, Hebraicae quaestiones in Genesim 1:2 (PL 23:939A, CCSL 72:3). 31 See Wadding, Annales minorum, vol. 5, 268: “Duo floruerunt hoc tempore in Anglia viri docti huius instituti professores, Thomas Bungejus . . . Secundus fuit Guillelmus de la Mare Professor et Doctor Oxoniensis, diligens sancti Bonaventurae sectator, serius nimis indagator eorum . . .” 32 Oddly, in his Repertorium (vol. 1, p. 131) Stegmüller gives 1298 as the date of William’s death. 33 See Berger, Quam notitiam linguae hebraicae habuerint Christiani.

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Berger reports Heinrich Denifle’s discovery of several manuscripts attributing a correctorium of biblical texts to William de la Mare.34 This fact of course indicates a profound acquaintance with the relevant languages and the adoption of critical methods according to the suggestions by Roger Bacon. Roger Bacon in turn once mentions a man of profound erudition who he says had been correcting and explaining the biblical text “for almost forty years.”35 Berger suggests that this wise man could have been William de la Mare, without definitely affirming this identification. If William is in fact the one meant by Roger Bacon, we would have to assume that he was born before 1210, that he became regent master in Paris at an age of 65 or more, and that he compiled the extended version of the Correctorium fratris Thomae at the age of 75—which, although possible, sounds quite unbelievable. Still more surprising, then, would be the fact that no contemporary or later sources provide any hint of such an outstanding career or mention his activity as a corrector and expositor of the literary sense of the biblical texts. Therefore, I think, the identity of Roger Bacon’s sapientissimus vir must remain in the dark for the time being. 3. Works 3.1. Sermons • “In conventu Lingonensi Angliae coram clericis. Erit radix Jesse (Rom. 15:12)—Apostolus recitans alterius idest Isaiae prophetiam insinuat Christum in carne venisse . . . Ps. reges eos in virga ferrea” (MS. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A 11 sup., fol. 29). • “Sermo de Petro et Paulo. Praecurrens ascendit in arborem sycomorum (Luke 19:4)—Fratres orate, ut sermo Dei currat (2 Thess. 3:1)—Verba ultima sunt apostoli Pauli petentis suffragia orationum, ut sermo Dei currat et clarificetur . . . oportet te humiliare, si vis ad aeternam gloriam pervenire” (MS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municiplale, 1788, fol. 113r). • “Sermo de Nicolao. Ab infantia crevit mecum misericordia (Job 31:18)—Verba ista scripta sunt in Job et possunt convenienter assumi ad laudem commendationem beati Nicolai . . . coxerunt filios suos” 34 35

See Denifle, “Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien.” Bacon, Opus tertium, chap. XXV, p. 94.

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(MSS. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ashmole 757, fol. 138rb; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 10698, fol. 5v; Bordeaux, Bibliothèque municipale, 305, fol. 11va). • “Sermo fer. 6. in parasceve. Dux fuisti illis in misericordia tua (Ex. 15:13)—Verba ista sunt Moysi Domino gratias agentis pro liberatione filiorum Israel . . . quale potest dari de re non aeterna ad aeternam. Rogabimus Dominum” (MS. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ashmole 757, fol. 195ra).36 3.2. Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi • Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, vol. 15 (Munich, 1989). • Scriptum in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, vol. 18 (Munich, 1995). • Quaestiones in tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, vol. 22 (Munich, 2001). 3.3. Quaestiones disputatae These have been transmitted in several manuscripts; amongst them there also is a complete, albeit short, Quodlibet.37 3.4. Correctorium fratris Thomae • Palémon Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes. I: Le correctorium corruptorii “Quare” (Kain, 1927).

36 See Schneyer, Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelaltes für die Zeit von 1150–1350, 493. 37 See Palémon Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique, vol. 2 (Paris, 1935), 117–18. For a short account of the contents of the Quodlibet, see Hans Kraml, “The Quodlibet of William de la Mare,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 151–70. I have transcribed one of the most complete manuscripts of the whole series of Quaestiones disputatae with the intention of producing an edition within the next few years.

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• Correctorium fratris Thomae editio largior The extended version of the Correctorium remains as yet unedited. It is contained, for instance, in MS. Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4413.38 3.5. Biblical Works 3.5.1. Correctio textus Bibliae 3.5.2. De hebraeis et graecis vocabulis glossarium bibliae39 4. The Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard William’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences is strongly dependent upon the important and voluminous commentary by Bonaventure, to which William refers in numerous cases simply as scriptum. Nevertheless, his work is a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and not, as had been suggested by Ephrem Longpré, a commentary on Bonaventure’s commentary.40 This can clearly be seen from the prologue, where Peter Lombard, bishop of Paris, is expressly named as the author of the work to be commented upon, and from the cases where William treats dubia circa litteram Magistri. Moreover, every now and then there are references to Magister in littera.41 Besides Bonaventure, the most prominent contemporary source for William’s commentary is John Peckham, who is referred to in many places and even quoted verbatim quite frequently—without his name, as is usual with contemporaries in the Middle Ages. Interestingly, the thinker who has most deeply influenced the content of the commentary, again apart from Bonaventure, is no other than Thomas Aquinas! His solutions to questions and responses to arguments are often preferred to Bonaventure’s, although the points of disagreement between Thomas

38

See Creytens, “Autour de la littérature des correctoires.” See Denifle, “Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien.” 40 See Ephrem Longpré, “La Mare, Guillaume de,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 8 (Paris, 1924), col. 2467. 41 See, for instance, Wilhelm de la Mare, In Sent. 1, dist. 27, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 313); dist. 40, qu. 4 (ed. Kraml, 490); dist. 46, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 550); dist. 47, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 559); In Sent. 2, dist. 25, qu. 7 (ed. Kraml, 337); dist. 38, qu. 4 (ed. Kraml, 491); Quaestiones in tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml (Munich, 2001), lib. 3, dist. 5, qu. 5, p. 21. 39

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and the Franciscans with regard to several typical problems appear clearly. Nevertheless, the respect for Thomas’s thought is evident. Indeed, in several cases, it would have been impossible to reconstruct the text of the quaestiones concerning the third and fourth books of the Sentences without the aid of Thomas’s text. The recourse to Thomas within the Franciscan tradition is not so surprising if one considers the fact that Thomas himself used Bonaventure’s commentary extensively, and that in some cases at least Thomas’s arguments could be understood as interpretations of Bonaventure’s ideas. This is the case, for example, in the attempt to clarify the relation between divine essence and divine attributes. Here Thomas proposed his well-known solution of a distinctio virtualis cum fundamento in re as an interpretation of Bonaventure’s somewhat cryptic account. This interpretation was taken over by John Peckham with only a slight explanatory modification, whereas William (referring to Peckham) was the first to propose a different interpretation of Bonaventure’s theory, which paved the way, even terminologically, for Scotus’s distinctio formalis.42 There are several other authors who influenced William, among them Walter of Bruges and Peter of Tarantaise, but in my view the influence of Roger Bacon is especially interesting. With him an outsider in the medieval tradition of learning gained influence, and that influence figured indirectly in the formation of humanist and Renaissance thought and played a role on the way to modern science.43 4.1. Observations on the Form of William’s Commentary The transmission of William de la Mare’s commentary on the Sentences is rather uniform. There are five extant manuscripts of the first book, seven of the second, and two manuscripts of books three and four. The manuscripts that contain the first book are the following: MSS. Avignon, Bibliothèque municipale, 316; Todi, Biblioteca comunale, 59;

42 See Hans Kraml, “Beobachtungen zum Ursprung der ‘distinctio formalis,’ ” in Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 9–11 marzo 1993, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, 1995), 305–18. See also Hans Kraml, “The Quodlibet of William de la Mare.” 43 For the case of the perspectivist movement, see Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988). See also Hans Kraml, “Roger Bacon’s Theory of the Rainbow as a Turning Point in the Pre-Galilean Theory of Science,” in Analyomen 1: Proceedings of the 1st Conference “Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy,” ed. Georg Meggle and Ulla Wessels (Berlin and New York, 1994), 353–61.

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Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, conv. soppr. F.IV.729; Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, conv. soppr. A.II.727; Toulouse, Bibliothèque municipale, 252. These manuscripts contain the second book as well, whereas the MSS. Danzig, Marienbibliothek, F 273, and Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, 295 contain only book two. Books three and four are extant only in MSS. Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, conv. soppr. A.II.727, and Toulouse, Bibliothèque municipale, 252. Even a quick examination shows that the manuscripts for books one and two can be traced to an archetype, with the exception of the last part of book two in the Danzig manuscript. This manuscript contains the second book on folios 59r through 168v, but on folio 155v a change in the scribe’s hand occurs, together with a change in the form of the text. Whereas the other manuscripts, as well as the Danzig one up to this point, present one question after the other within every distinction, from folio 155v on the Danzig text introduces the questions cumulatively: in most cases three questions are bundled together with their arguments pro and con, to be answered afterwards one question after the other. This type of textual order is used with varying degrees of frequency in several other commentaries, such as those by Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, and John Peckham, but it is not the form chosen by Bonaventure, which William followed in the first book and in the other extant manuscripts of the second book. The questions to the third and fourth books, however, are composed in the same way as the Danzig text from folio 155v onward. I take this to be indicative of the fact that William composed these texts before completing the final redaction of his scriptum in the case of the Danzig manuscript, whereas I could imagine that he left books three and four without a final revision. At any rate, it is this change of the form of the text in the Danzig manuscript which made me give up the idea that books three and four might not be William’s work—a thesis that Ephrem Longpré once defended.44 There is an interesting connection between MS. Florence, A.II.727 and the Danzig manuscript. Both contain a large number of additional questions—exactly the same ones. I excluded these additions from my edition of the first book for stemmatic reasons and also because many of them seemed to be of different origin. In many cases, the added 44

See Ephrem Longpré, “Maîtres franciscains de Paris. Guillaume de la Mare O.F.M.,” in La France franciscaine 4 (1921): 288–302, at 294–5; also see the same author’s entry, “La Mare, Guillaume de,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 8:2 (1925), 2467–70.

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questions constituted mere repetitions, in a different style and with slight variations in content, of questions that had first been treated in William’s typical style. Some of them are marked with “p.” or “p.g.” at the end, which I take to be abbreviations for the names of other commentators. Yet, although I tried hard, I was not able to identify the source of these additional questions, although I am convinced that they are of Franciscan origin. My stemmatic and material arguments for the exclusion of these questions were strongly supported by the fact that in the second book, all the additional questions that appear in the Florence manuscript are marked by va—cat and ex—tra in the Danzig manuscript. If I am correct in supposing that the style in the last part of book two in the Danzig manuscript as well as in books three and four is due to the fact that this text represents the first draft or a reportatio of the commentary, whereas the form of books one and two in the other manuscripts reflects William’s final redaction, his scriptum, then this could be an indication of a new theological approach. This new approach moves away from the form of a commentary in the strict sense, developing instead a problem-oriented style of treating theological issues. At a very early stage of this problem-oriented approach, we have Robert Kilwardby’s commentary, which consists of selected questions on the Sentences, and here with William we have again a work that focuses upon thematic questions, leaving out the exposition of the text and the dubia on the littera Magistri. This thematic focus would become common later in the century and more generally in the fourteenth century, although the other type of commentary survived as well. The first and the second books of William’s commentary treat all the distinctions of the Sentences, but the third and fourth books pick up only several themes from the material presented in Peter Lombard. In particular, the third book omits distinctions 11 through 22. This means that William focuses on the themes of Mariology, Christology, and on the virtues. The questions on the fourth book of the Sentences deal exclusively with the sacraments, first generally and then with a special focus on baptism and the Eucharist. Only the very last question has to do with eschatology, being devoted to the identity of the resurrected beings with what they were formerly, a question much debated nowadays among theologians and theologically inclined philosophers.45

45 See, for instance, Peter van Inwagen, The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder, Colo., 1998).

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In the prologue to the first book William develops a theory of the scientific character of theology. In this theory, he follows the general outlines of the concept and role of the sciences as proposed in Roger Bacon’s Opus maius. It is to this theme that we now turn. 4.2. Theology as a Science During the twelfth century the tensions between monastic spirituality and theology, on the one hand, and the scientific development in the different schools outside the monasteries, on the other hand, became more and more obvious. The movement toward “science” was partly provoked by the early translations of Aristotelian and Arabic works into Latin. First, there was an increasingly rationalist tendency at schools like Laon or Chartres; this was followed by the influence of Peter Abelard and his quarrels with Bernard of Clairvaux; and then there was the rise of Peter Lombard, theologian and bishop of Paris, whose circle finally won more and more influence, prevailing against counter-movements exemplified by the person of Walter of St.-Victor and his Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae.46 In the course of the developing habit of commenting on the Sentences of Peter Lombard— from Alexander of Hales, through other Franciscans like Odo Rigaldi and Dominicans like Hugh of St.-Cher, to the final establishment of the obligation to comment upon Peter Lombard’s work for everybody wishing to become master of theology—it became increasingly important to reflect on the scientific status of theology. At the beginning of almost every commentary, therefore, we find a prologue treating the question of whether theology is a science, what kind of science it is, what its subject is, in what way or according to what methods it should be carried out, and how the scientific treatment of theological problems is to be justified.47 It is not surprising that William de la Mare’s commentary largely tackled these questions in accordance with the way in which they were treated by his predecessors and successors. Yet William’s theory of theology as a science is in several respects singular.

46

Edited by Palémon Glorieux in AHDLMA 19 (1952): 187–335. For the development of theology as a science see Ulrich Köpf, Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1974). For the development of the prologue literature, see Leonardo Sileo, Teoria della scienza teologica. Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230–1250), 2 vols. (Rome, 1984). 47

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4.2.1. Theology as Lex et Legis Expositio If it is asked whether theology is a science or not, it has to be determined first in what sense the word “science” is used. If one understands science in a strict sense as a body of sentences that have to do with truth and falsity, one might say that theology is not a science strictly speaking,48 because it primarily concerns the way in which human beings should lead their lives, not mere doctrinal knowledge. Theology therefore deals with statements that are prescriptive or normative, and much less with descriptive sentences, of which science consists. It would therefore seem acceptable to deny that theology is a science.49 Rather, it has the character of law—lex. The use of the term lex in this context is unusual and therefore of interest, although it is not completely surprising. First of all, at the time of William de la Mare theologians usually interpreted the word “theology” as sermo de Deo,50 which means at once talk about God and God’s own speech as addressed to human beings. Up to William’s time, “theology” was used for the biblical texts and revelation in general, as well as for the monastic exploration of the different senses of these texts, including their spiritual sense. It also designated the scholarly interpretation of these texts in the classrooms of the schools and universities, the systematization of the traditional contents of the faith that was provided in the collections of sentences and the great summae, and, finally, the solution of questions about these texts. To characterize theology in general as lex therefore indicates, in continuity with the explanation just offered, that theology is founded in the revelation of God’s will to mankind. Furthermore, William is clearly aware of the difference between God’s revelation and the human response to it, on the one hand, and the theoretical enterprise of a scholarly theology, on the other. This is like the difference between a law and its scientific exposition as it is taught in the juridical faculty. To understand William’s characterization of theology in terms of law, it is important to remember that, in Latin, the basic scriptures of the Christian faith are called Lex vetus and Lex nova, a designation that echoes the Hebrew term “Torah.” Moreover, Peter Lombard begins the first distinction of his first book of sentences with the words, Veteris

48 49 50

See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 1, resp. (ed. Kraml, 12–13). See ibid., 13. See ibid., qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Kraml, 17).

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ac novae legis continentiam . . ., words that are meant to allude to the content of the themes to be treated in the following work. Throughout the works of the ancient fathers it is obvious that Christian life has to do with the right conduct and with a way of life directed by the will of God. William de la Mare accepts this practical orientation of religion in general, making it the basis for his consideration of theology as a science. With this approach, William renders more precise, in a way, the widespread expression according to which theology is wisdom, thus being comparable to metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense and philosophy in general in the sense of the Hellenistic philosophers; however, in contradistinction to metaphysics, theology is wisdom as wisdom, not wisdom as science. This means that theology has to do not so much with knowing what the right way of life consists in, but rather with the right way of life as such and, indeed, as practiced. Theology in this sense—and this is the next step in the traditional series of questions—is a practical science, not a theoretical one. This is a typically medieval distinction, belonging to the thirteenth century. Aristotle had distinguished between theoretical, practical, and poietical knowledge.51 In the Middle Ages, this distinction, though originally threefold, was usually boiled down to the twofold distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge; finally, in our own time, it has been reduced to the simple and, in fact, nonsensical opposition between theory and practice. Already in the Middle Ages, the result of this simplification was the assumption that practical knowledge has to do with that which is made by human beings.52 The other possibility—namely, that of considering practical knowledge as knowledge that has to do with the goals that human beings may set themselves and with judging the righteousness of these goals—was rarely taken into account. Probably for the sake of the scientific respectability of theology, its practical character was minimized in favor of an “objective” theoretical contribution of theology to the general knowledge of mankind. William, however, was one of the theologians who opted for the practical importance of theology in the sense of its contribution to the orientation of human life. He was by far not the only one, but for some time his position seemed

51 For the difference between praxis and poiesis see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, chap. 4, 1140a16. 52 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 15).

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to be very conservative.53 It is connected with the Baconian principle that the will is better and more important than the intellect,54 a principle that St. Thomas criticized in arguing that theology, although practical in many respects, is ultimately and most importantly of a speculative character. William’s position was also diametrically opposed to Henry of Ghent’s sentence, that undoubtedly knowledge of truth is better than the realization of the good; for the aim of good actions is to purify one’s soul in order to be able to see the truth and contemplate God.55 William’s argument against Thomas’s similar account was that in theology the aim is not knowledge about the contemplation of God but rather the act of contemplation itself, which is practical.56 Theology in this sense prescribes how human beings should act in their lives in view of their orientation to God. With John Duns Scotus’s introduction of a more developed concept of praxis and of the role of the practical intellect, this position was to become dominant during the Renaissance, even in those schools that usually took Thomas’s Summa as the general source of theological reflection; in fact, Thomas himself was interpreted in light of central Scotist ideas.57 One could even attempt to reconcile Henry of Ghent’s theology with the characteristics of Franciscan theology, taking into account that Henry considered the speculative goal of human life as guiding human actions in this life. Depending on the interpretation of terms like “praxis” and “practical,” theological speculation is not merely a theoretical enterprise but something that gives orientation to 53 Theologians from very different backgrounds subscribed to this position: the Dominican Robert Kilwardby, for example; most of the Franciscans; and, interestingly, to some extent Albert the Great. Even Thomas Aquinas is not totally opposed to the practical character of theology. Only Henry of Gent is very explicit in favoring a speculative character of theology—yet even his position is not completely unambiguous. For this problem, see Hans Kraml, Die Rede von Gott, sprachkritisch rekonstruiert aus Sentenzenkommentaren (Innsbruck, 1984). 54 See Roger Bacon, Opus maius, ed. John H. Bridges, vol. 3 (London, 1900), part 3, chap. 2, p. 85. 55 See Henry of Gent, Summa quaestionum ordinariarum (Paris, 1520; reprinted, New York, 1953), art. 8, qu. 3, resp., fol. 65vS: “Nunc autem indubitanter constat quod melior est ex se veri cognitio quam boni operatio.” 56 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 16): “Ad ultimum quod docet contemplari dicendum quod hoc non obstat quin sit practica. In hoc enim quod docet contemplari non ponit finem scire contemplari sed magis ipsam contemplationem sive actum contemplandi. Unde in hoc etiam non est propter scire, sed propter operari.” 57 This is typical of the Jesuit movement, for instance, in which the voluntaristic traits of Ignatius of Loyola’s spirituality were combined with an adherence to Thomas’s theology.

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human life, in such a way that the entire theological project becomes a practical one.58 William’s approach to theology as being primarily of lawlike content has a second root. During the Middle Ages the term “religion,” religio, was usually employed in the context of religious orders. The faith of the people, on the other hand, was designated by the term “law,” lex. In this sense, the Jewish religion was called lex Iudaeorum, the religion of, for instance, the Mongols was referred to as lex Tartarorum, and so on. The word lex was not used, however, to denote the different religions as cultural phenomena; secta comes closer to religion in this sense. The term lex comprised ways of life and conduct, religious and social rules, laws, and customs, together with religious ceremonies. Roger Bacon’s Opus maius reflects this usage in its description of different religions.59 Now it appears that William adopted the general outlines of a philosophy of culture, or at least of religion, that can be found in Bacon. And this may be an additional reason for his characterization of theology as lex. At any rate, theology has to do with religion, and its general function is the exposition of the religious doctrines which, according to William and his main sources, concern the question of how to organize one’s own life in view of the obligation and desire to lead a good life—one that ultimately reaches its goal. If religion is considered as something lawlike, and therefore practical, it is clear that theology, conceived as the exposition of that religion, is lawlike as well. This at least is what William expressly states.60 The Bible teaches mankind the right way of living, and in this sense its content is primarily normative. In a broader sense, it offers guidance to everyone on how to respond adequately to the offer of God’s grace. Whatever is treated in Scripture in a descriptive manner, such as history and nature, concerns the preliminaries and external conditions of the activities in which a good life consists. The purpose of the whole theological enterprise is, in the

58 For such considerations, see Kraml, Die Rede von Gott, sprachkritisch rekonstruiert, 129–32. 59 See Bacon, Opus maius, partis 7 pars 4, chap. 1, ed. John H. Bridges, vol. 2 (London, 1900), pp. 366–404. 60 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 2, resp. (ed. Kraml, 15): “Ideo potest dici quod theologia cum sit lex et omnis lex practica est, quod theologia est scientia practica quia omnis lex aliquod opus praecipit, et quia doctrina libri Sententiarum convenit cum sacra scriptura in fine sicut expositoria ipsius, ideo est doctrina sive scientia practica sicut illa quam exponit.” Also see ibid., qu. 3, art. 2 (ed. Kraml, 27).

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words of Bonaventure, ut boni fiamus: “that we may become good.”61 As it is treated in the Sentences, theology is nothing but the systematization and exposition of the Holy Scriptures; therefore, it has to be considered as primarily practical in nature as well.62 4.2.2. The Subject Matter of Theology If theology is considered to be prescriptive in principle, we may ask what it is that theology prescribes. What is the subject matter of the prescriptions that are made in both types of theology, that is to say, in the Scriptures as well as in the exposition of the Scriptures? The question aims at the specific theological matter that distinguishes the theological project from similar endeavors, for example, metaphysics. After a long discussion of the different definitions of the subject matter of theology that were current in his time, William has recourse to philosophy, the handmaiden of theology, without which one easily goes wrong in this kind of question.63 There are three ways to approach the contents of a science: one in which the scientific propositions are referred back to one starting point or principle, another one in which scientific knowledge is considered as the totality that encompasses what is treated in the science, and a final one in which scientific knowledge is brought together in something common, an element to be found in all the subjects that are treated in the science. According to the different emphases in these approaches—either on the starting point of a science or on the whole treated in it or on an element common to everything that belongs to it—there are at least three different types of determination for the subject matter of a science. By means of this threefold distinction William attempts to catalogue the different definitions of the subject

61 Bonaventure, In Sent. 1, prooemium, qu. 3, resp., in Opera omnia, vol. 1, ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi, 1882), 13b: “Unde hic [habitus] est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus.” William de la Mare quotes this In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 15). 62 Ibid.: “et quia doctrina libri Sententiarum convenit cum sacra scriptura in fine sicut expositoria ipsius, ideo est doctrina sive scientia practica sicut illa quam exponit.” 63 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Kraml, 19): “In huius quaestionis solutione vocanda est ancilla ad arcem, scilicet philosophia, quia sine ipsa contingit hic de facili deviare.” There is possibly an allusion to Alain de Lille’s Planctus naturae in this quotation. See Nikolaus Häring, “Alan of Lille, ‘De Planctu Naturae,’” Studi medievali, 3a serie, 19 (1978): 797–879, esp. 827. My attention was drawn to this connection by Prof. Johannes Köhler, Heidelberg.

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matter of theology that have been advanced by his predecessors and contemporaries. In his own contribution to the determination of the subject matter of theology, William returns to his definition of theology as lex. He asks what kind of activity or work it is that is prescribed by theology in general; for if theology belongs to some type of law, it has to prescribe something that is to be done. In the case of theology this is, according to William, worship of God: cultus divinus.64 Of course, the question now arises of what this means more precisely. According to William, “worship of God” or cultus divinus is concerned with two things: on the one hand, the liturgical forms of human institutions and, on the other hand, the way in which human beings lead their lives. Consequently, there are two kinds of works that are prescribed by the law of religion, namely, figurative or symbolic works or sacrifices, and real sacrifices.65 Whereas the figurative sacrifices occur in liturgical acts, real sacrifices consist in the works of virtue.66 In this point, William finds himself in accord with Augustine.67 The reference to Augustine that he makes in the first question of the prologue is obviously quite deliberate. In the Enchiridion the question of what Christian wisdom means is treated extensively, and Augustine explains in this context that the worship of God consists in faith, hope, and love. These are the theological virtues that give all the other human virtues their ultimate importance. 4.2.3. Method in Theology Just like the question concerning the subject matter of theology, the question about the manner in which theology ought to proceed was the object of controversies from earlier times. The main point of contention was whether theology ought to proceed in a scientific and rational manner or differently—which practically meant that it should rely on insights coming immediately from God. In the latter case, theology’s task was to praise God for his great deeds and for his self-revelation to mankind, and to preach this message to others in order to strengthen

64

Wilhelm de la Mare, In Sent 1, prol., qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 15). This distinction comes from Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book 10, chap. 5 (PL 41:282–3; CCSL 47:277). 66 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Kraml, 25): “Cultus divinus, sicut haberi potest ex 10. libro De civitate Dei, consistit in duplici genere sacrificiorum, in sacrificiis veris et sacrificiis significativis. Sacrificia vera sunt opera omnium virtutum, sacrificia figurativa sicut thurificatio, immolatio animalium.” 67 See Augustine, Enchiridion, Book 1, chap. 3 (PL 40:232; CCSL 46:49). 65

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their faith. Clearly, this is in many respects the aim of monastic theology. With the rise of Aristotelian science in the beginning thirteenth century, however, theologians felt the need to demonstrate the compatibility of this new view of science with the traditional wisdom offered in the Holy Scriptures. Thus, a broad range of answers to the Aristotelian challenge developed. There were strong opponents to the Aristotelian approach on one end of the spectrum; on the other, there were those who were convinced that they had to show that theology could satisfy even the highest standards of Aristotelian learning and science. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas were the most rigorous defenders of the second course of action. After all, it was the Dominican office to preach to those who were either infidels or somehow fell outside the Christian faith. In order to convince, they had to be rigorous in their arguments, so that only the best and most convincing theoretical tools were good enough. This requirement, together with the exigencies of the schools, an inquisitive mind in many scholars, and an agonistic feudal culture in general, led to discussions on a very sophisticated level in theology, as well as in many other scientific disciplines. But to what extent were such sophistication and rational argumentation permissible in theology? This was the question of the legitimacy of argumentative reasoning in theology, which was closely connected with the problem of how much influence pure philosophy should enjoy within theological studies. William addressed these questions by consulting the writings of Roger Bacon. For the question as to the branches of philosophy that are most important for theology, as well as for the question of whether and to what extent philosophical reasoning should be adopted in theology, William closely followed Bacon’s suggestions for a renovation of theological studies in his Opus maius.68 Bacon was convinced that every science is useful for a better knowledge and deeper understanding of Scripture; indeed, in some cases such knowledge is mandatory, such as knowledge of the biblical languages and knowledge of grammar in general. Interestingly but not surprisingly, Bacon insists on the importance of mathematical knowledge in theology, not only because of biblical number symbolism but for exact calculation and geometrically correct description of natural

68 This influence is documented in my introduction to the edition of the first book of William’s commentary on the Sentences: Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml, 71*–83*.

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processes. William generally takes over these views. The close affinity between him and Bacon with respect to the concept of religion and its role in human life has already been mentioned above. We can say that, throughout his commentary, William again and again invokes Bacon’s theories as they appear in various works.69 4.3. The Doctrine of God Since, according to William, theology possesses an intrinsically normative character, it may be asked what role talk of God should play in such a normative context. If theology is normative in nature, it cannot be its aim to explore God as the highest and ultimate principle of a coherent explanation of the world as a whole. The normativity of theology does not consist in the prescription of a certain ontology or of a certain outlook on the cosmos, but rather in its intention to promote a particular comportment with regard to the world and human life within it. This means that the factual world, as an object of description, is regarded as something finite in principle, as fundamentally limited insofar as it cannot provide ultimate guidance for the life of a human being, or of a rational agent. In this sense, the world is seen as a limited whole, even if it were infinite in extension or duration. The ability to grasp these limits shows that there is an aspect of transcendence in the position of the rational or intelligent agent capable of such a judgment. This transcendence has been felt by people of all times, and it has been expressed differently, sometimes more descriptively, sometimes with more weight being placed upon its importance for the development of a rational or intelligent personality. William is explicitly concerned with this theme in the prologue to his commentary. When he speaks of the subject matter of theology, he quotes an author who determines the subject of theology as being “things and signs.” This phrase of course represents the description of the subject matter of theology in the Book of Sentences itself, where it is taken from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana. Peter Lombard and, following him, many theologians during the Middle Ages refer 69 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 2, dist. 2, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 34), where he quotes from Bacon’s Communia naturalium, Book I, part 4, dist. 1, chap. 4 (ed. Steele, 256– 7). Long and partly verbatim quotations are also to be found In Sent. 2, dist. 8, qu. 9 (ed. Kraml, 126–8), where Bacon’s optics is used to explain possible illusions produced by demons (see Opus maius, partis 5 pars 3, dist. 2, chap. 4 through dist. 3, chap. 4 [ed. Bridges, vol. 2, 155–66]).

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extensively to this work. In the Sentences, the beginning of the De doctrina christiana serves as the basis for a propaedeutical introduction of the most central themes and concepts of the Christian faith. This introduction then paves the way for the following theological considerations, which start in the first distinction, which is devoted to Augustine’s distinction between things and signs, and between those things that are to be used and others that are to be loved and adhered to for themselves: res quibus utendum est et res quibus fruendum est.70 The only thing to be loved for itself is of course the divine essence in its Trinity.71 Everything else must be referred to this ultimate goal of human activity, which means that all created things, all things besides God, are to be used only, and not to be sought for their own sakes. This position functions as the fundamental principle in every commentary on the Sentences. Everything that is treated in theology finds its place within this framework. If one deals with theological matters, one has to be aware of the fact that there is never merely talk of things neutrally, but always in their connection with the final goal of human life and with the means to arrive at that goal. Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, can sometimes be entirely different: although we usually strive for scientific knowledge in order to find means to achieve our more direct and immediate goals of everyday life, there is nevertheless no obligation for us to apply such knowledge. This is different in the case of theology. Theological knowledge is in itself knowledge of how to form one’s life. It is intrinsically directive. This means that to speak about God always has to do with one’s attitude toward life, and never merely with descriptively acknowledgeable facts. Within the context of the demand for scientific neutrality, this connection between theology and lived existence is problematic, because there can be no such neutrality in theology. One could say that theology is always evaluative. Whatever is treated in theology has to be related to problems of evaluation that arise within human life in general. Therefore, talk of God is never merely descriptive. It is not really appropriate to call it normative either, although I used to interpret William’s and even Bonaventure’s attitude in this sense.72 The theological attitude might best be compared to a case in which persons 70

Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Book 1, chap. 3 (PL 34:20; CCSL 32:8) See ibid., chap. 5 (PL 34:21). William de la Mare discusses these passages in In Sent. 1, prol., qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Kraml, 20). 72 See Kraml, Die Rede von Gott, sprachkritisch rekonstruiert. 71

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address other persons and thus put those persons under the constraint of being attentive, demanding respect and perhaps benevolence. It is the attitude of regarding the addressee of one’s utterance as a person. Such an attitude is quite different from any consideration of circumstances as mere facts in a strictly descriptive sense. In this respect theology is utterly different from other sciences, if it can be considered scientific at all. It surely has nothing in common with natural sciences as we know them. These sciences are concerned with the observable regularities of changing states and events. Nothing of this sort is of importance in the context of theology. Theology involves every person in the formation of her life and personality.73 This approach is typical of the Augustinian way of thinking as it is represented by most of the medieval Franciscan authors. From this point of view God is understood as the exemplary ideal of every creature’s perfection. For each creature, but above all for all reasonable beings such as humans, God is the final fulfillment of their being. Rational beings consciously strive for their perfection, which consists in the acquisition of properties that are not in themselves limiting. This means that these properties could be possessed in an infinitely intensive way if only the subject of the property were capable of an infinite realization of that property. The acquisition of such a property, therefore—even if its realization remains limited in the created being—constitutes an imitation of God’s essence. For created beings, which are essentially limited, this imitation of God can happen only in a limited way. This means that creatures imitate God through the acquisition of different perfections which are the effect of God’s infinitely perfect essence. It is one infinite perfection in God that creatures imitate in different ways because of their essential limitation. The difference of attributes that we ascribe to God is therefore a result of God’s infinite power that can be imitated by created beings only in limited and different respects. In the case of God, the attributes are different from each other only virtually, whereas they are really different in the things that imitate God’s infinite perfection.

73 When linguistic philosophy and speech-act theory were at their peak, this theme was emphasized by Donald Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator (London, 1963). Looking at theology in this way seems to be out of fashion nowadays.

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What I just explained is Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of the situation; this interpretation, in turn, is based upon Bonaventure’s position. Bonaventure says that in God all perfections are one; they differ only insofar as they are imitated differently by limited beings.74 Several Franciscan scholars, among them Walter of Bruges and John Peckham, were to adopt Bonaventure’s view as interpreted by Aquinas. John Peckham explains, in fact, that the different properties which can count as perfections exist in God causally insofar as his absolute perfection causes the various perfections in limited beings; for limited beings can realize only parts of the divine perfection. Then he explicitly states that the different perfections that are in God causally, are not in him formally.75 William de la Mare, for his part, interprets the efficiency of God’s essence like Peckham, but deliberately stresses that despite the difference which obtains between God’s perfection and the limitations of creatures, the perfections found in creatures are in God even formally: etiam formaliter. William’s answer to the question as to whether there is a plurality of essential attributes in God runs as follows: Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo est ponere pluralitatem attributorum. Cuius ratio est quia omnis perfectio quae est in causato debet inveniri in causa vel formaliter vel causaliter. Formaliter sicut calor invenitur in omnibus calidis per naturam ignis et in igne est calor formaliter, causaliter sicut forte calor est in istis inferioribus per corpora superiora et in eis est causaliter tantum. Et ideo, cum in creatura rationali invenitur sapientia, bonitas, pulchritudo, fortitudo, prudentia et huiusmodi, oportet quod ista sint in Deo, et quia nihil potest esse causa bonitatis nobilior quam bonitas, bonitas enim a nullo causatur ita bene sicut a bonitate, nec causa nobilior sapientiae quam sapientia et sic de aliis, ideo ista attributa sunt in Deo etiam formaliter, sed tamen alio modo quam in creatura quia in Deo sunt ut unum et sola ratione distincta, in creaturis autem differunt etiam secundum rem.76

William’s main argument for the formal presence of the attributes of God is that perfections are best caused by the very perfection itself. So if God causes wisdom, goodness, beauty, and the like in creatures, it 74

See Bonaventure, In Sent. 1, dist. 22, qu. 2 (ed. Quaracchi, 393–4). See John Peckham, In Sent. 1, dist. 2, qu. 1, art. 3 (MS. Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, conv. soppr. G.IV.854, fol. 11rb). If it is the case that William succeeded John Peckham as baccalaureus Sententiarum, he may be considered to stress the formal presence of the different attributes in God deliberately. If it was John Peckham who followed William, on the other hand, this passage indicates that Peckham did not share William’s exemplarism, without however rejecting it explicitly. 76 William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, dist. 2, qu. 2, resp. (ed. Kraml, 63–4). 75

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is necessary that he himself be wise, good, beautiful, and so on. The difference between God and creatures is that these perfections differ in God only by reason—ratione—whereas in creatures they differ in reality: differunt etiam secundum rem. This can mean that the perfections appear as different things or that they are properties of different things, therefore existing in different things. The essential properties of God are of course of a kind that allows for the co-presence of the different properties in God. Even more, in God, according to William (clearly following Bonaventure), these properties are one, but they remain distinct by reason, and only by reason.77 This distinction by reason appears in almost every discussion of the divine attributes. It is invoked by Thomas as well as by Bonaventure, but its use leads them and their respective followers to different considerations. What does “by reason,” ratione, mean in this case? We can find an attempt to clarify this term in Walter of Bruges’s commentary on the Sentences. First he states that in this context ratio means an intention by which the intellect captures the meaning of a word.78 Even in this sense, however, the word ratio can be understood in a number of ways. It can either signify the similitude of something existing in reality outside the mind; or the similitude of something that does not exist outside the mind, yet is conceived in the mind as something that has to do with the way things outside the mind are apprehended, as for instance an abstract entity; or it can, thirdly, be understood as the similitude of something that is utterly fictitious and thus not to be found in any kind of reality. Accordingly, ratio has to do with the intellectual conception of a thing, a conception either evoked by things with which we may be confronted or by the reflection on the way in which we conceive such things or, thirdly, by mere fantasy. Conceptions such as potency, wisdom, goodness, and so on designate different attributes among created things, but they are completely one in God’s unique and absolutely simple essence. Therefore, they cannot possess similarities that are distinguishable in God’s essence, but only conceptions or intentions that are different by consideration—by reason—alone. This is the way in which Walter explains Bonaventure’s central point. 77

See Bonaventure, In Sent. 1, dist. 22, qu. 4, resp. (ed. Quaracchi, 398). See Walter of Bruges, In Sent. 1, dist. 2, qu. 2, art. 2 (MS. Todi, Biblioteca comunale, 42, fol. 10rb): “Ratio hic dicitur intentio qua intellectus apprehendit de significatione alicuius nominis.” 78

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In William de la Mare’s interpretation, God’s essence is the exemplary cause for the different attributes found in creatures. What is conceived or intended by these attributes in the case of creatures therefore concerns God’s essence, but is not an attribute in God. According to William, however (who in this case goes beyond the reflections of Thomas and John Peckham), what the creatures imitate of God’s essence exists in God not only causally, but—God being the exemplary cause of the attributes in the creatures—formally as well. This means that we can truly predicate the relevant perfections of God, without admitting that these predicates signify attributes distinguishable from his essence. William’s way of explicating Bonaventure’s conception is, I think, meant as an alternative to Thomas’s solution regarding the issue of the relationship between God’s essence and the perfections that are predicated of him. It may be that Bonaventure as well as Thomas were influenced by Moses ben Maimon, although “Rabbi Moyses” is not mentioned in this context. Considering the general, although somewhat neglected, influence of Maimonides on medieval Christian thinkers, it could well be that his treatment of the divine attributes inspired them.79 Even the ideas of Averroës that are akin to those of Maimonides could have influenced them. This could especially be the case with Thomas Aquinas, who seems to have had access to the texts of Maimonides as well as to those of Averroës, besides his generally known commentaries on Aristotle’s works. The extent to which Thomas was acquainted with and influenced by Averroës’s personal thought is still disputed, as far as I know, and at the time of his lectures on the Sentences his access to these texts was still much more limited. But this is a theme that cannot be treated here.80 To sum up, the idea of a formal distinction of the perfections constituting God’s essence found its origin in discussions among the Franciscans, triggered by the commentaries on the Sentences by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Especially Walter of Bruges, John Peckham, and William de la Mare made important contributions to

79

See Maimonides, Dux perplexorum, Book 1, chaps. 53–60. For some of the details see Mahmoud Qasim, Théorie de la connaissance d’après Averroès et son interpretation chez Thomas d’Aquin (Algiers, 1978); Laureano Robles, “En torno a una vieja polémica: el ‘Pugio fidei’ y Tomás de Aquino,” Revista española de teologia 35 (1974): 321–49 and 36 (1975): 21–41. 80

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this debate. It is well known among historians of theology and philosophy that the formal distinction was developed further in Peter John Olivi, Peter of Trabibus, and Alexander of Alessandria until it began to play an important role for several problems in the thought of John Duns Scotus. The importance of the formal distinction lies in the possibility that it offers to find a way of reconciling oppositions without doing violence to different approaches, thus avoiding controversies in religious questions. Ewert Cousins emphasized this point in his work on Bonaventure’s theory of the coincidence of opposites.81 Undoubtedly, it is not merely by chance that Bonaventure played an important role in the attempt at a reconciliation between the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox churches at the council of Lyons in 1274. William de la Mare, in his turn, tried to make plausible a reconciliation with respect to the much-debated controversy over the Filioque, pleading for a Greek interpretation of the formula.82 The agreement achieved at the council did not last, but this was probably not due to the theological difficulties. The general importance of the idea of a coincidence of opposites in God and, more generally, in cases where infinity plays a role was developed further during the end of the thirteenth century and in the fourteenth, but I cannot do more here than provide a few hints. A first lesson could be taken from the road to agreement found in Ramón Lull’s Libre del gentil e los tres savis, where three wise men, having explained to each other the best aspects of their respective religions, find that they have to leave the scene without awaiting the decisive statement of the heathen as to which of their religions is the best one. In the fifteenth century, we encounter the topic again in several works of Nicholas of Cues, who advocates the coincidence of opposites in the context of the talk about God. He also envisions something like a coincidence of religions, if these religions are understood at their highest levels.83

81 See Ewert H. Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago, 1978), 269–88. 82 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 1, dist. 11, qu. 1 (ed. Kraml, 161) 83 See Nicolaus de Cusa, De pace fidei: cum epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia, ed. Raymund Klibansky (London, 1956).

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The standard medieval picture of the universe saw the world as a spherical entity that consisted of several—usually nine—spheres contained in the outer sphere, and forming a descending order down to the last sphere, that of the moon, which contained the earth and its immediate cosmic environment up to the moon. The outermost sphere carried the fixed stars, and then each sphere was assigned to one planet, including the sun and the moon. These spheres were thought to be moved by their individual movers or intellects, with the exception of the last intellect: this one had its origin in the mover of the sphere of the moon, but did not produce or move an additional sphere but was responsible for the formation of the beings in the sublunar world, especially on the earth. For this function it was named “giver of forms” (dator formarum) or “active intellect,” especially in the tradition relying on al-Fārābī.84 There were several different versions of this general picture, but there was little doubt about its overall accuracy. The general idea behind this view was Platonic. In Plato’s opinion the cosmos as a whole was a huge spherical being, alive and rational. These characteristics were disputed from the very beginning. The second and perhaps most controversial issue concerned the question of the eternity or temporality of the universe as a whole. According to Plato, the world was not eternal, but according to Aristotle it could not be proven that it was not so. The attitude toward this controversy constituted something like a demarcation-line between philosophers and theologians in different religious cultures. The principal point was whether it could be proven that the world was temporally finite or not. Many people of great authoritative weight believed that the world was temporally finite and created in time, but they held that this could not be proven. This tension was at the center of Moses Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed.85 Among the commentators on the Sentences in the thirteenth century the most prominent figure to follow Maimonides was Thomas Aquinas, whereas the Franciscans in general maintained that it could indeed be demonstrated that the world was temporally

84 See al-Fārābī, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. Étienne Gilson, in “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,” AHDLMA 4 (1929): 115–26. Also see Der Musterstaat, trans. Friedrich Dieterici (Leiden, 1900). For the reception of this cosmology, see for example Maimonides, Dux perplexorum, Book 1, chap. 72. 85 See especially ibid., chap. 71.

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finite. John Peckham disputed this question in a personal encounter with Thomas Aquinas.86 I am inclined to follow those experts who assume that Thomas was acquainted with the relevant texts of Maimonides and Averroës, accepting their view with the intention not to expose the Christian position to ridicule. William belonged to the camp of those who held that the temporal creation of the world could be demonstrated by reason since, according to Aristotle, an actual infinity is impossible. Therefore, the only task was to show that the existence of the world from eternity would imply an actual infinity of created beings existing together. This consequence was generally assumed as being implied in different remarks by Aristotle. William deals with the question of whether the world is eternal (utrum mundus sit aeternus) in book two, distinction 1, question 2 of his Sentences commentary.87 There he lists the most prominent arguments of his time in favor of the eternity of the world and against it. I would like to compare William’s position with that of Thomas Aquinas, which was well known to him. William was of course just one figure in this controversy, as almost every Franciscan theologian after Bonaventure developed his ideas on the background of Thomas’s theory. As for Thomas, he presents three positions in his Sentences commentary. The first is that of the philosophers, who hold that the world is eternal, just as God is. There are different accounts of this position, of which the most plausible is Aristotle’s, but these positions are all false and heretical.88 The second position maintains that the world began to be after it had not been, and that God cannot have made the world from eternity—not because of lack of power but because it is impossible for something created to be eternal. Defenders of this position argue, moreover, that the temporal existence of the world is not only accepted by faith but can be demonstrated. The third position holds that everything except God has a beginning of its existence, although God could have created eternal things. It is therefore not demonstrable that everything except God has a temporal beginning, but it is believed by revelation and prophetically

86

See, for instance, James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino (Oxford, 1975), 287. See William de la Mare, In Sent. 2, dist. 1, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 5–9). 88 See S. Thomae Aquinatis Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, tomus II, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), Book 2, dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 5, pp. 32–3. 87

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proclaimed by Moses. This is Thomas’s own view.89 All the reasons adduced in order to show that the world is finite in time, he argues, have been considered and refuted by the philosophers. Therefore, it is more likely that the faith of the believers would be ridiculed rather than strengthened if one tried to demonstrate the temporal beginning of the world.90 William is not completely at odds with Thomas. He in fact stresses that the temporal beginning of the world is a matter of faith transmitted from Moses. William does not seem to insist on the demonstrability of the beginning of the world, although he thinks that this position has the more powerful arguments on its side.91 William has a highly skeptical attitude toward anything coming close to an infinity of actually existing things. According to Aristotle the world has always been full of human beings and animals.92 The eternity of the world would therefore lead to an actual infinity of existing souls if one does not assume that the souls are mortal or that they return in other bodies (which Aristotle himself denies).93 Following this general line of argumentation, then, as most Franciscan (and many other) theologians did, Aristotle’s own arguments against an actual infinity of numbers, and against actual infinity in general, apply to the very problem of the eternity of the world. The argument of most of the philosophers in favor of an eternally existing world has to do with God’s productivity, for which there is no limit and which therefore has no reason to produce the world at one time rather than at any other; therefore, it eternally demonstrates its goodness as diffusion of itself. This eternity does not imply an illegitimate acceptance of actual infinity, because, while it is admitted that essentially ordered causes could not be infinitely many, accidentally ordered causes could well be infinite: these causes need not be actual all together in order to bring about their respective effects. An eternal 89 See ibid., p. 33: “Et huic positioni consentio: quia non credo, quod a nobis possit sumi ratio demonstrativa ad hoc.” 90 See ibid.: “et ideo potius in derisionem quam in confirmationem fidei vertuntur si quis talibus rationibus innixus contra philosophos novitatem mundi probare intenderet.” 91 See William de la Mare, In Sent. 2, dist. 1, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 7): “Opinio Moysi, immo fides Moysi, fuit et est omnium fidelium quod mundus coepit ex tempore nec fuit ab aeterno. Et licet hoc vera fides teneat, adhuc ad istam partem sunt efficaciores rationes quam ad aliam.”. 92 See Aristotle, De plantis, chap. 2, 817b38–40. 93 See Aristotle, De anima, Book 1, chap. 3, 407b22–3.

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world would thus not have to be founded on an infinity of essentially ordered principles, and a potential infinity of accidentally ordered causes would not be a threat to the conception of an eternal world. The distinction between essentially and accidentally ordered causes is usually connected with Averroës. Thomas Aquinas accepts this conception, since he believes that it would ridicule the seriousness of faith if it were assumed that something could be demonstrated which in fact eludes demonstration. William, conscious of Thomas’s warning, avoids speaking of demonstrations. Nonetheless, as we have seen, he contends that there are better reasons for a finite and temporally limited world. One line of argument which he pursues is that an actual infinity cannot be avoided, even if one distinguishes between essentially and accidentally ordered causes. For, whether it is essential or accidental, an infinite series cannot be passed through. To show this point, William invokes Aristotle himself: according to Aristotle, numbers are among the most accidentally connected things because no mathematical unit is the cause of any other unit and each unit could be the first or the last. Nevertheless, infinitely many units of numbers cannot be passed through, which is shown in the following way: whatever can be counted, can be passed through, so every number can be passed through. If it is impossible to pass through infinitely many things, it is impossible to count infinitely many things.94 If it is not possible to count infinitely many things, it is not possible to pass through infinitely many units of numbers. But numerical units stand in an accidental relation to each other; therefore accidentality does not play any role in the question as to whether infinitely many things can be passed through.95 Furthermore, if the world had existed eternally, infinitely many things must already have occurred—infinitely many revolutions of the celestial spheres, for instance—and therefore infinitely many things must have been passed through. If it is impossible, however, to arrive at a particular point if one has to pass through infinitely many steps, then the idea of an eternal world must be given up. Even if this argument represents no decisive demonstration, it would in William’s view tilt the scales in favor of the finitude of the world.

94 95

See Aristotle, Physics, Book 3, chap. 5, 204b8–10. See William de la Mare, In Sent. 2, dist. 1, qu. 2 (ed. Kraml, 6).

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Ultimately, the problem behind the discussion over the eternity of the world is that of contingency and necessity, that is to say, it is the problem as to whether the world emanates necessarily from its origin or is produced voluntarily. The type of religious discourse that is put forward by people who deny any kind of necessity to the world is animated by the idea of a personal relationship with God, a relationship in which he shows his intention to human beings and wishes for them to respond to his will. God reveals himself and his will to human beings in a way which offers them the opportunity of responding freely to an offer that is in turn freely given. The emphasis on God’s will and the relatively lower importance accorded to the intellect within the Franciscan tradition reflect the centrality of a personal relationship between God and human beings, or intelligent and rational beings. It goes almost without saying that, in a personal relationship between freely acting beings, reason plays a crucial role, because reason has to guide human action in order to lead it to the right response to the challenge coming from the other person. Yet the final goal of life is not compliance with reason but the ability to give a personal response to a personal challenge.96 Among Christian theologians, as well as perhaps among theologians of other religious communities, the difference between intellectualists and voluntarists may in the last analysis well be due to personal attitudes, and these attitudes may not necessarily lead thinkers to adopt mutually exclusive positions. However, the intellectualist attitude, when it becomes exclusive, tends to give rise to a somewhat distanced stance on religion, whereas a more voluntarist position tends to include a religious commitment. This may explain why intellectualism and rationalism are often seen as being dangerous to religious communities, as shown by many of the controversies among Muslims, Jews, and Christians.97

96 The path leading to this attitude was paved by Roger Bacon’s opinion (which was in line with Bonaventurian theology) that the will is more important than the intellect; this position culminates in Scotus’s and Ockham’s view that it is the human will which, aided by reason, freely responds to God’s free will, thus being enabled by God’s offer to find the fruition of beatitude. 97 This suspicion vis-à-vis intellectualism and rationalism is evidenced by the attitude toward Averroës among some of his Muslim contemporaries, by the criticisms of Moses ben Maimon, and the condemnation of 1277 at Paris. William de la Mare’s reaction to Thomas Aquinas belongs in this category as well, although I am sure that William never suspected Thomas of not being a faithful Catholic.

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5. Historical Influence With his Correctorium fratris Thomae William de la Mare was surely quite influential, and I do not hesitate to agree with those who believe that the development of a Thomistic school in theology was in no small measure due to William’s criticism and the subsequent reactions to it. But did his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences leave any traces in history? As I have pointed out in the preceding pages, William played a role in the genesis of the idea of a formal distinction between God and his attributes. William developed this idea in reflecting upon and refining Bonaventure’s position on the subject. Other thinkers who contributed to the early history of the formal distinction are Peter John Olivi and Peter of Trabibus. Whereas it is not easy to find a direct influence of William in Olivi’s subtle and voluminous questions on the second book of the Sentences or, indeed, in his other works, this is quite different for the case of Peter of Trabibus. In 1964, Alois Huning edited the second prologue of his commentary on the Sentences.98 This prologue, which contains the usual introductory material, is strongly influenced by William de la Mare, whose ideas and solutions are either taken into close consideration or even adopted, including what William has to say on the question of the scientific character of theology and its status as lex et legis expositio. William’s influence is evident, as well, in the questions concerning the subject of theology and whether theology is a practical science or not. Even in the question on the proper form of theology William plays a prominent role; through him some of the central ideas of Roger Bacon are passed on to other theologians, even if Bacon’s name is never mentioned.99 Comparing William de la Mare and Peter we can see that certain discussions take a more sophisticated shape. This is the case, for instance, with the problem of the subject of a science and of theology especially. The subject of a science, Peter explains, should focus upon that with which the sentences of that science deal, and upon that to

98 See Hildebert Alois Huning, “Die Stellung des Petrus von Trabibus zur Philosophie,” Franziskanische Studien 46 (1964): 227–68. 99 Although Huning tried to identify the sources of Peter’s commentary and found similarities in the work of Walter of Bruges, he could hardly have come up with the idea of examining William de la Mare’s unedited commentary. I myself found the connection by mere chance.

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which everything that is considered in it is attributed; furthermore, it should explain the name of the science under consideration. William’s definition of the subject matter of theology as cultus divinus is true insofar as the Scriptures, and theology in general, teach the right way to adhere to God; it is deficient, however, insofar as not everything taught in theology and in the Scriptures is attributed to the divine cult. In addition, the term “theology” is not derived from the worship of God.100 Peter therefore proposes a different theory, which assumes that there is no one single subject of theology; rather, there are different subjects, depending upon the different aspects of human life and of its orientation to God. Theology deals with things that are to be believed, to be done, to be hoped, and to be loved: these areas are quite different, not belonging to one and the same genus of things. This focus on the subject of attribution is a step toward greater precision in discussing the subject of a science, and would be taken seriously by later theologians, for example by John Duns Scouts. His aim was to show that everything treated in theology is ultimately attributed to God. This idea found a direct follower in William of Ockham, who, like Peter of Trabibus, denied that there is only one subject in theology. William de la Mare may not have been a theological genius,101 but we find in his writings a step in the tradition and transformation of thought which was eventually to lead to astonishingly new perspectives. It is the possibility, then, to comprehend something about the emergence of new ideas and the development of thought which makes this kind of study worthwhile.

100

See Huning, “Die Stellung des Petrus von Trabibus,” 242. A (perhaps rightly) more enthusiastic assessment of William de la Mare is to be found in the article by Federica Caldera, “Guglielmo de la Mare tra Bonaventura, Tommaso d’Aquino e Pietro di Tarantasia,” cited in note 14 above. 101

HENRY OF HARCLAY AND AUFREDO GONTERI BRITO William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel* Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I of the Sentences holds a special place in the history of the genre. Of the Parisian Sentences commentaries composed by secular theologians in the golden age of medieval philosophical theology, from the Sentences lectures of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure in the 1250s down to the Black Death, Harclay’s commentary on Book I is the earliest that survives, the most extensive, the most copied, and the most influential. The clearest evidence of its impact is found in the commentary on Book I of the Franciscan Aufredo Gonteri Brito, who incorporated verbatim the greater part of Harclay’s commentary into his own. In his commentary on Book II as well, Gonteri absorbed part of what may be Harclay’s commentary on that book. Yet Gonteri’s own commentary—surviving for the first three books—is in itself worthy of attention, since it is one of the largest of its kind and an early, interesting, and complex example of a theologian writing or lecturing secundum alium, to use the modern phrase invented to describe the phenomenon of one theologian copying another or others. Building on the detective work of some of the giants of twentieth-century scholarship—Balić, Doucet, Maier, Pelster, Schmaus—this chapter presents both of these commentaries, offering in an appendix a complete question list that includes the explicit citations of university theologians.1 Henry of Harclay Henry of Harclay was born ca. 1270 in the diocese of Carlisle in northwest England near the Scottish border; he was ordained priest in 1297

* We would like to thank Mark Henninger for cheerfully answering our queries, as well as the University of Cyprus and the Onderzoeksraad of the Catholic University of Louvain for funds for the procurement of microfilms. 1 In what follows, for Latin text taken from these commentaries, see in general the appropriate spot in the question lists. We do not claim to have succeeded in being exhaustive with the citations.

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in England. “Henricus Anglicus,” as Harclay was called on the continent, pursued his theological education in Paris, and evidence suggests that he heard John of Paris there slightly before the year 1300. Harclay was still in Paris as a bachelor of theology in late 1307, which suggests that his Sentences lectures took place sometime in the period 1305–1308, shortly after the Franciscan John Duns Scotus, a major influence on Harclay, had completed his own Parisian Sentences lectures. Returning to Oxford and a magistry in theology soon after 1310, Harclay was chancellor of the University of Oxford from December 1312 until his death in Avignon on June 25, 1317. Among intellectual historians, Harclay is best known as an early atomist (or indivisibilist) with regard to the continuum, a position of his which attracted a great deal of negative attention among his near contemporaries. His Quaestiones ordinariae, composed at Oxford while he was master of theology and chancellor, are today considered his most significant writing, since they record his mature thought on a number of issues and display more independence of mind than he had shown in the Sentences commentary, in which he stayed closer to Scotus’s doctrine. Understandably, therefore, Harclay’s main modern editor, Mark Henninger, has focused on the Ordinary Questions, having just completed a critical edition and English translation of the entire work.2 From the perspective of the literary history of theology and later generations of theologians, however, there is little doubt that Harclay’s Sentences commentary holds pride of place. For while quaestiones ordinariae, quodlibeta, summae, and other writings composed at the magisterial level were popular genres of theological literature for secular theologians before the Black Death, their bachelor lectures on the Sentences apparently were not as well received. The greatest of the secular theologians—Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Gerard of

2 See Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions, ed. and trans. Mark G. Henninger, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2008). See the introduction (esp. vol. 1, xvii–xxxi) for Harclay’s life and works and for bibliography; we are indebted to Henninger for much of our information on Harclay’s life. See also idem, “Henry of Harclay,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford, 2003), 305–13. On Harclay’s indivisibilism, and his related view on the possibility of an actual infinite, see John E. Murdoch, “Henry of Harclay and the Infinite,” in Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, ed. Alfonso Maierù and A. Paravicini Bagliani (Rome, 1981), 219–61.

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Abbeville, Peter of Auvergne, Thomas of Bailly, and John of Pouilly— left either no Sentences commentary at all or just small fragments.3 In Russell Friedman’s survey of the genre between 1250 and 1320 in the first volume of this work, due to the dearth of surviving texts by secular theologians, Harclay’s Sentences commentary was the only one by a secular to be treated. The shorter, less significant, slightly later (1308–09) commentary on Book I by the otherwise better-known Radulphus Brito comes down to us in only one manuscript and did not warrant more than a footnote in Friedman’s chapter. The only other secular theologian Friedman mentions is Thomas Wylton, bits of whose commentary, dating from around 1310, have been found by Stephen Dumont.4 Likewise, in their surveys of Paris commentaries from around 1320 to the Black Death, Schabel and Bakker list nothing from secular theologians.5 The situation with regard to commentaries by seculars was not much different at Oxford, which is why in the first volume of this work an entire chapter was devoted to the fragment of the Mertonian Thomas Bradwardine’s Sentences commentary (probably from 1332–33) that Jean-François Genest and Katherine Tachau identified on a mere ten folios of MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de

3 For example, Peter of Auvergne has a few questions from the beginning of his Sentences commentary preserved in MS. Bologna, Archiginnasio, A.913. 4 See Russell L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 41–128, at 68 n. 74 (Radulphus), 73–4 (Harclay), and 81 n. 111 (Wylton). Radulphus’s commentary is extant in MS. Pavia, Biblioteca universitaria, 244, fols. 15ra–54va. Recently the two questions on divine foreknowledge (= Book I, dist. 38–39) were published in Marco Rossini and Chris Schabel, “Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists. Texts on Future Contingents by Alexander of Alessandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005): 237–338, at 299–304, as was the question on first and second intentions (= Book I, dist. 23) in Lambertus Marie de Rijk, Giraldus Odonis O.F.M., Opera Philosophica, vol. 2: De intentionibus: Critical Edition with a Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350 (Leiden, 2005), 643–50. Radulphus’s commentary is contained on only forty folios in the Pavia manuscript. This is deceiving, however, because in the form of a critical edition 100 lines of text would roughly correspond to only one column in the manuscript, so that the entire commentary would require roughly 500 pages to print. Incidentally, the questions on future contingents show Radulphus to be somewhat of a Scotist, like Harclay himself. For the remnants of Wylton’s commentary, see Stephen D. Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 9 (1998): 341–79. 5 See Chris Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 221– 65, and Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century,” Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 425–64.

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France, lat. 15805 (fols. 40–49). It is only with the rather short commentary on all four books by Bradwardine’s fellow Mertonian and adversary Thomas Buckingham, probably dating from 1339–40 or 1340–41, that we can speak of a “complete” Sentences commentary by a secular theologian.6 After 1350 secular commentaries become much more prevalent, and significant, as the examples from Pierre d’Ailly, Henry Totting of Oyta, Henry of Langenstein, and Marsilius of Inghen demonstrate.7 Harclay’s Commentary on Book I Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I is preserved in two more or less complete witnesses:8 • C = Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, B2, fols. 1ra–84rb (7 quires of 6 bifolia); 6

See Jean-François Genest, “Les premiers écrits théologiques de Bradwardine. Textes inédits et découvertes récentes,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 395–421, for Bradwardine, and 396 and 412 on Buckingham, whose (relatively) brief commentary was printed in Paris in 1505 and survives in various manuscripts. 7 On the first three see Bakker/Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century,” and for Marsilius, see Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, “The Commentary on the Sentences of Marsilius of Inghen,” Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 465–506. Most recently on d’Ailly, see Monica Calma, “Pierre d’Ailly: le commentaire sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 47 (2007): 139–94. 8 For details on editions of questions from Harclay’s Sentences commentary, see the question list in the appendix, referring to Vladimir Richter, Studien zum literarischen Werk von Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1988), 86–94 (I, dist. 2, qu. 1–3); Russell L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 72 (2001): 89–168, at 113–25 (I, dist. 11); Stephen D. Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), 39–125, at 106–09 (Book I, dist. 17, qu. 2, partial); Mark G. Henninger, “Henry of Harclay’s Quaestio on Relations in His Sentences Commentary,” in Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., ed. William J. Carroll and John J. Furlong (New York, 1994), 237–54, at 245–54 (I, dist. 30, qu. 1); Chris Schabel, “Aufredo Gonteri Brito secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents,” Disputatio 2 (1997): 159–96, at 165–95 (I, dist. 38–39); Michael Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto. Intorno alla prescienza di Dio,” Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 24 (1932): 327–55, at 345–55 (I, dist. 41—as anonymous of Vat. lat. 1113). Hermann Köstler, Gotteserkenntnis im Sentenzenkommentar Heinrichs von Harclay (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Innsbruck, 1978), contains editions of three questions on human knowledge of God (I, dist. 2, qu. 4–5, dist. 3, qu. 1); we have not had access to this work, but there is a short description in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 100 (1978): 686.

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• H = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 13687, fols. 13ra–97vb (manuscript consists of 17 numbered quires of varying length, mostly 6 bifolia; Harclay’s text is on nos. 2–9, but no. 7 has fallen out). In addition, excerpts from Harclay’s Book I are contained in the margins of MS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 501 (= T), and Harclay’s dist. 17, qu. 4, and dist. 24 are preserved in MS. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8717, fols. 94va–b and 92va–93rb respectively (= M). It was Charles Balić who first identified the commentary as Harclay’s more than a half century ago. Building on the work of Franz Pelster, Balić compared marginal notations in T, to which the name “Harkley” or “Harkela” or “Harkeley” was attached, with the text in H, demonstrating that the commentary in H belongs to Harclay. It was only later that he found that C attributes the commentary to “Henry, chancellor of Oxford,” in a different hand in the upper margin of the first folio, which further solidified the attribution.9 Explicit citations of “Henricus Anglicus” in Peter Auriol’s Scriptum on Book I of the Sentences prove the attribution beyond doubt.10 H lacks its original first quire, consisting of questions from the prologue. Thus H’s text only begins to correspond to C’s in what is H’s second quire, at 13ra, at which point the hand changes and the text matches the remainder of C’s question 3. Balić discovered that the

9 See Carolus Balić, “Adnotationes ad nonnullas quaestiones circa Ordinationem I. Duns Scoti,” Iohannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, vol. IV (Vatican City, 1956), 1*–46*, at 6*–9*; Carolus Balić, “Henricus de Harclay et Ioannes Duns Scotus,” in Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson (Toronto/Paris, 1959), 93–121, 701–02. Balić was building on Pelster’s two ground-breaking articles: “Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford und seine Quästionen,” in Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle. Scritti di storia e paleografia, vol. 1 (Rome, 1924), 307–56, and especially “Theologisch und philosophisch bedeutsame Quästionen des W. von Macclesfield O.P., H. von Harclay und anonymer Autoren der englischen Hochscholastik in Cod. 501 Troyes,” Scholastik 28 (1953): 222–40. Balić showed that in places in his Book I Harclay was using a version of Scotus’s Sentences commentary quite close to the one found in MSS. Todi, Biblioteca comunale, 12, and BAV, Borghese lat. 50; this claim has been generally accepted. In addition, Balić thought that this version of Scotus’s text was a reportatio of his Cambridge lectures. But the suggestion that Scotus ever lectured in Cambridge has been challenged, most recently by Klaus Rodler, Die Prologe der Reportata Parisiensia des Johannes Duns Scotus. Untersuchungen zur Textüberlieferung und kritische Edition (Innsbruck, 2005), 42*–48*, 92*–111*. Rodler maintains that the Scotus text upon which Harclay relied is a reportatio of Scotus’s Parisian lectures, which Rodler calls “Reportatio 1C.” 10 On Auriol’s references to Harclay, see note 23 below.

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present first quire in H (fols. 2ra–12va) actually contains two questions from a Reportatio of John Duns Scotus and then a fragment from the Ordinatio.11 Moreover, on fol. 98ra–va H has a tabula quaestionum for Scotus’s Ordinatio in primum, and then on fols. 99ra–158vb a copy of Scotus’s commentary on Book II; thus, the compiler of H probably confused the texts of Scotus and Harclay. The question list shows that H is also missing material between fol. 76vb and fol. 77ra, corresponding to the end of question 48 (dist. 24) through question 59 (dist. 30, qu. 2), where an entire quire (no. 7 in the manuscript) has fallen out. Even if these two quires had been preserved, however, H would still not have corresponded to C precisely. First, Harclay’s question 9 (dist. 2, qu. 2) is also missing in H, either deleted there or added to C. Thus, H lacks fifteen questions in their entirety and two others in part. Secondly, in Harclay’s question 14 (dist. 3, qu. 1), “Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris ex puris naturalibus,” C has within it another question, “Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum,” which in H constitutes question 17 (dist. 4, qu. 2). This is not a simple matter of moving a question, however, for in C the question is divided into two sections, the questions are intertwined, and there is the addition of two sections of text (6 and 26 lines) absent in H. It is difficult to tell whether C or H represents the earlier structure, but there is no doubt that the text was reworked at some point. Previous editing work has also confirmed that neither of the two manuscripts was the source for the other. The only other notable irregularity is that the important distinction 17, on grace and the intension and remission of forms, is located between distinctions 11 and 12 in both of the Harclay manuscripts. Since in C, distinction 17, questions 1–4, are on fols. 37vb–45rb, whereas in H they are on fols. 45vb–55va, this irregularity does not stem from a misplaced quire in either of the extant manuscripts, and since no material appears to be otherwise out of place or missing, it does not seem that a quire was misplaced in the exemplar either. Nevertheless, the material is in fact out of place, because in distinc-

11 See Balić, “Adnotationes,” 4*. The material is as follows: Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae [H 2ra–9ra]; Secundo quaeritur utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris [H 9ra–12va]; Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa [H 12vb]; Secundo quaero utrum ex ordine ad proximum ut ad finem dicatur per se scientia practica [H 12vb].

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tion 14 we read, “and search below (infra) in distinction 17, the first question,” whereas in CH distinction 17 is actually located supra, that is “above”. Balić also understood that there was a close relationship between Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito. In the prologue and first three distinctions of Book I, there is an indication that some material in Harclay’s commentary found its way into that of Gonteri, for example a reference to Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed in Harclay’s dist. 3, qu. 1, and in Gonteri’s dist. 3, qu. 11. After the first fifteen questions, however—that is, starting with distinction 4—Gonteri begins incorporating most of Harclay’s questions verbatim, so that of the remaining 64 questions in Harclay’s commentary, we find that 57 are also extant in the manuscripts containing Gonteri’s commentary on Book I: • A = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1113, Harclay questions within fols. 74vb–185va; • W = Wrocław, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, A 21 (olim Breslau I.F.184), Harclay questions within fols. 131vb–306ra. Gonteri’s procedure in copying Harclay’s questions will be dealt with below. For now it suffices to note that, aside from the omission of the first fifteen questions, the other seven just mentioned, and the occasional paragraph, AW are faithful witnesses to Harclay’s text and therefore useful for critically editing Harclay’s commentary. Although Gonteri does not copy the material corresponding to the missing first quire in H, AW are especially important for the second quire missing in H, for which C is our only witness from the Harclay tradition. As for the oddly and erroneously placed distinction 17, Gonteri situates these questions in their proper sequence, probably because he had a correct exemplar, although it is possible that he did the rearranging himself. We have followed Gonteri’s ordering in the question list below, although for distinctions 12–17 we have put in square brackets the question numbers following the ordering found in the Harclay manuscripts. Gonteri does rearrange other questions on occasion, so that there is probably more borrowing than we have indicated. Further specificity will require a critical edition of Harclay’s text, which should employ all four witnesses and follow C’s ordering, except for distinction 17. Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I is a simple question commentary, consisting merely of three questions on the prologue and

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76 distributed over the 48 distinctions. There is no lemma from Peter Lombard or description of the Master’s text, nor are the distinctions announced in the body of the text on a regular basis; however, they are occasionally marked in C and in the margins of H. Nevertheless, the commentary as we have it has numerous cross-references and many detailed citations of other recent and contemporary theologians, suggesting that we are dealing with an ordinatio of some sort. As was common, the earlier distinctions are generally longer and contain more questions, but some of the later distinctions are also important. Harclay asks six questions in distinction 2; four in distinction 1, 17, and 27; three in distinctions 9 and 19; two in distinctions 3–5, 7–8, 11–12, 26, 30, 36, and 43; and only one in the rest. If the size of the treatments is anything to judge by, then Harclay focused his greatest interest on the following questions: the first three questions of the commentary (qu. 1–3) dealing with theology and human knowledge of divine truths; qu. 9 on the infinity of the first cause; qu. 12 devoted to the univocity of predicates between God and creatures, and substance and accident; qu. 15 on the powers of the soul; qu. 37 on whether charity can grow; qu. 51 on the distinction among the persons in the Trinity; and qu. 54 on the nature of concepts (mental words). A critical edition of the entire commentary on Book I would probably require about 700 pages. Henry of Harclay’s Commentary on Book II While Harclay’s commentary on Book I of the Sentences is somewhat straightforward, this is not true for Book II. That Harclay lectured on Book II and probably composed a corresponding written commentary is clear from several references in Book I. For example, in question 23 (dist. 8, qu. 2), Harclay refers to what “we will say in the second [book] when dealing with the eternity of the world and creation”; there are two references in question 26 (dist. 9, qu. 2), one to the first question of Book II; in question 41 (dist. 19, qu. 1), Harclay says, “it will be clearer concerning this in [Book] II, distinction 12”; in question 72 (dist. 42), he again cites the first question of Book II. But the actual attempt to identify an extant commentary on Book II of the Sentences as being Harclay’s had to wait until the twentieth century, and once again Charles Balić took the lead. Balić argued that MS. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghese lat. 346, fols. 1ra–94va, contains Harclay’s commentary on Book

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II. He admitted that the second quire of Borghese 346, fols. 11r–20v, is from William of Ware’s commentary on the second book,12 but the rest, Balić maintained, is Harclay’s. Balić recognized stylistic similaries between Harclay’s Book I and the commentary on Book II in the Borghese witness, especially the very idiosyncratic way of citing Scotus (“Iohannes”) according to column numbers. Moreover, just as he used the marginalia in Troyes 501 to identify Harclay’s Book I, Balić employed an explicit citation of Harclay in a work of the Oxford Dominican William Crathorn (from MS. Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, Q.395a) to show that the commentary in Borghese 346, containing text with the position that Crathorn claimed was Harclay’s, belonged to Harclay. Balić also found parallel passages and cross-references between Harclay’s own Ordinary Questions and Book I, on the one hand, and the Book II commentary in the Borghese manuscript, on the other, further strengthening his theory. Finally, Balić claimed that Aufredo Gonteri Brito copied into his own commentary on Book II contained in MS. Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 5 much of the commentary on Book II found in Borghese 346. Thus, since Gonteri’s main source for Book I was Harclay’s own Book I, it stood to reason that the same was the case with Book II.13 Once Balić had asserted that the relationship between Borghese 346 and Pamplona 5 in Book II was parallel to that between the two Vatican manuscripts (H and A) for Book I, his main concern was to show that two different writers or compilers—namely, Harclay and Gonteri—had composed these commentaries on the first two books, and not the same writer or compiler. Thus, Balić did not further support his claim that Book II was strictly parallel to Book I, with the exact same authors, other than to declare that, of the 60 questions of

12 This quire contains: Circa istum secundum librum quaesitum fuit primo utrum emanatio creaturarum a primo principio praesupponit (!) emanationem personarum in divinis—quaere hanc quaestionem in primo, d. 27, q. 6, Ricardo etiam, d. 13, q. ultima. Utrum multitudo creaturarum possit esse immediate ab uno principio [11vb–13ra]; Quaeritur utrum Deus possit producere aliquid totaliter ad esse vel creare aliquid de nihilo [11ra–vb]; Quaeritur utrum creatio sit mutatio [13ra–va]; Quaeritur utrum creatio passio sit aliquid absolutum additum essentiae creaturae [13va–15vb]; Quaeritur utrum creatio passio differat realiter a conservatione passione ipsius creaturae [15vb–16va]; Quaeritur utrum creatura virtute propria vel virtute alia sibi immissa existente in ipsa possit creare [16va–19va]; Quaeritur utrum mundus realiter fuerit aeternus [19va–20vb]. 13 Balić, “Adnotationes,” 7*–8*, 10*–12*, 14*–16*, 18*.

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Harclay’s Book II in Borghese 346, Gonteri more or less copied 20, abbreviated 9, employed 17 more loosely, and omitted the other 14 entirely, although 8 of these were just short questions at the end, following the Lombard himself.14 Just two years later, in 1958, Anneliese Maier called into doubt the attribution to Harclay of Book II; she did so again in 1960 after Balić had replied briefly to her doubts in 1959.15 Noting that what holds for Book I does not necessary hold for Book II, she refuted each of Balić’s arguments in turn. Thus, Maier noted that other medieval authors refer to Scotus and his work in the way that Balić had observed both Harclay and the anonymous commentary to do. Further, she contended that, while it is true that Crathorn refers to a view as being Harclay’s, nevertheless that very view is rejected in Borghese 346. Finally, she showed that none of the references from Harclay’s actual commentary on Books I and II could be convincingly shown to refer to the proper places in Borghese 346. In sum, Maier firmly rejected Harclay’s authorship of the Book II commentary in Borghese 346, offering instead Gonteri himself as a possible author of that text. Since Maier wrote her devastating critique of Balić’s arguments, the common opinion has been that Harclay was not the author of the commentary on II Sentences found in Borghese 346. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to decide the issue of the authorship; nevertheless we can offer new evidence that rules out Gonteri as the author of the Borghese commentary and that makes desirable a more detailed study of the commentary and the evidence for and against Harclay’s authorship. We can do this on the basis of a comparison between the Borghese commentary and Gonteri’s commentary on Book II. As we shall see below, Gonteri’s commentary on Book II in fact survives in two redactions, the one in Pamplona 5 being a later, Parisian commentary, while Wrocław A 21 preserves an earlier Barcelona text dated 1322. Balić knew of the existence of the Wrocław manuscript through

14

See ibid., 18*. See Anneliese Maier, “Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren des 14. Jahrhunderts,” AFH 51 (1958): 369–409, reprinted in eadem, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1 (Rome, 1964), 265–305 (with addenda, 482–5), Borghese 346 being treated on 289–301; Balić, “Henricus de Harclay et Ioannes Duns Scotus”; Anneliese Maier, “Der anonyme Sententiarius des Borgh. 346,” AFH 53 (1960): 3–29, reprinted in Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1, 307–34 (addenda, 485–9). We use the reprinted versions. 15

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Victorin Doucet,16 but he did not have access to it. Comparing the text in Borghese 346 to that in both Pamplona and Wrocław yields interesting results. Gonteri’s distinction 4, question 1, “Whether good angels were blessed in the first instant of their creation and bad angels were wretched in the first instant of their creation,” contains an explicit discussion of Peter Auriol in both redactions. The presence of this reference in the corresponding question in Borghese 346 (question 12) would rule out Harclay’s authorship, and in any case a comparison should determine the relative chronology of the three texts. Below is a table of the incipits of the paragraphs in article 1 in all three witnesses, as well as in article 2, which is absent in Borghese. The table clearly demonstrates two things: first, the Auriol discussion in Wrocław and Pamplona is not contained in Borghese; secondly, the chronological order of the texts is Borghese, Wrocław, Pamplona. Borghese introduces the question and gives opening arguments (paras. 1–9), divides it into two articles (11), gives an opinion (12–13), and gives the critiques of that opinion by Thomas Aquinas (14–15), citing explicitly the Summa and then the Scriptum, qu. 24, and by Henry of Ghent (16–22), referring to Quodlibet VIII, qu. 9. But the author does not agree (23) and refutes these arguments (24–41)—explicitly mentioning Aquinas’s question De aeternitate mundi—before concluding (42 and 59) and beginning article 2 (64). The conclusion in Borghese begins, “Et ponitur supra, hac columna 904,” meaning that in the author’s autograph or exemplar this remark was found on fol. 226vb or thereabouts. In Wrocław, Gonteri’s opening paragraphs (1–13) are different, but in some ways they parallel those of Borghese (parallel paragraphs are designated by italics in the table). Gonteri will have three articles, not two. But beginning with Borghese’s presentation of Aquinas, Wrocław follows Borghese mostly verbatim for the next 28 paragraphs, that is, about 80% of the entire text in Borghese (14–41; verbatim matches are designated in bold print). Having copied Borghese’s Aquinas and Henry of Ghent arguments and having given Borghese’s counterarguments in the first person singular, including remarks such as et bene (14), videtur mihi (18), and even, sicut dictum est in quaestione de

16 See Balić, “Adnotationes,” 19*, citing Victorin Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus Lat. 1113, Fr. Anfredus Gonteri O.F.M. (1325),” Franziskanische Studien 25 (1938): 201–40, at 217–18.

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aeternitate mundi et in materia de praedestinatione, libro primo (38), Wrocław omits the Borghese reference to column 904 and instead begins the discussion and refutation of Peter Auriol’s position (42–56), before concluding the article (57–60) with some parallels to Borghese’s conclusion in para. 59. Wrocław’s second article, not present in Borghese, is a mere three paragraphs long (61–63), then Wroclaw moves on to article 3, parallel to article 2 in Borghese. Pamplona contains nothing that is not present in Wrocław, it omits 27 paragraphs contained in Wrocław, and what it does have is in the same order as in Wrocław. Of the 27 paragraphs omitted in Pamplona, 18 are in Borghese. Of the paragraphs Pamplona does contain, nine are also in Borghese. What it omits are the second argument of Aquinas (15) and the second through seventh and final arguments of Henry of Ghent (17–22), along with the refutations of these arguments (30–31, 33–41), rightly having in 32 Ad secundum rather than Ad tertium. Pamplona also omits one of the Auriol arguments (47) and some of the refutation (51–52, 56). It is clear that the Borghese text was written earlier than that of Wrocław and Pamplona and that the relative chronological order is Borghese-Wrocław-Pamplona. The original manuscript of the Borghese redaction finished article 1 on fol. 226vb and discussed explicitly the positions of Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. In 1322, in Barcelona, Gonteri rewrote the introductory material, copied the body of the article verbatim from Borghese, and then added a discussion of a “doctor novus,” identified as Peter Auriol in the margin. Then he added in Wrocław a very small second article. In Paris, a few years later, Gonteri took his Wrocław redaction and simply abbreviated it by omitting paragraphs, which, as we shall see below, was Gonteri’s standard practice. Pamplona preserves this redaction. The possibility which Maier suggested, that Gonteri was the author of the Borghese commentary, is essentially eliminated by inspecting the Wrocław manuscript, along with Borghese and Pamplona.17 Unless we are prepared to admit the possibility that Gonteri wrote a redaction of his II Sentences prior to 1322 (which would be the first of three),

17 It should be noted that Maier herself claimed that the best way to decide whether Gonteri is the author of the commentary on II Sentences in Borghese 346 would be to examine the Wrocław manuscript; see Maier, “Der anonyme Sententiarius,” 331 n. 53. (Maier suggests there, 332–3, that Pierre Roger, the later Pope Clement VI, might be the author of the commentary, mostly based upon her belief that the author was French-speaking.)

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before he learned of Auriol, we have to say that the Borghese version is not by Gonteri. Moreover, as we shall see below, Gonteri explicitly describes the Barcelona redaction in Wrocław as a “compilation” in which he was “adhering to the steps of venerable doctors.” If the text in Borghese were original to Gonteri, then the Wrocław redaction could hardly be a “compilation.” Borghese is not by Gonteri. But who did write it? Again, we cannot give a definitive answer here, and only further editing work on Harclay’s Book I as well as the anonymous Book II will be able either firmly to eliminate Harclay as the author or to give us further evidence that he is the author. But here are some reasons to think that Harclay should at least be considered as a possibility. We know that Harclay wrote a commentary on Book II, and Borghese most likely stems from a manuscript that contained at least Books I and II by the same author, given the reference to column 904. Gonteri’s copying of the phrase quoted above, “sicut dictum est in quaestione de aeternitate mundi et in materia de praedestinatione, libro primo,” makes best sense if Gonteri knew he was copying material in both Book I and Book II from the same venerable doctor, that is to say, Henry of Harclay.18 Harclay’s references in Book I to his own treatment of the eternity of the world in Book II could be to a text that did not make it into the confused Borghese codex and is yet to be identified, or they could be to his own extant Quaestio de aeternitate mundi, which either itself was supposed to have been included in Harclay’s Book II, or, more likely, was intentionally published separately by Harclay (which would explain the various references in Borghese 346 to a Quaestio de aeternitate mundi).19 Moreover, in Book I, Harclay’s explicit citations are primarily to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus, which is entirely understandable for a theologian writing in the first decade of the fourteenth century. This is also the case for the commentary on Book II found in Borghese. In both commentaries we find the same rather early practice of giving detailed and precise citations of Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. Maier’s evidence that the Borghese commentary rejects Harclay’s view 18 As we will explain at note 55 below, we find it very unlikely that Gonteri did not know that he was copying Harclay. 19 By the time the addenda to “Der anonyme Sententiarius” had been written, Maier had had the chance to examine Harclay’s Quaestio de aeternitate mundi, which John Murdoch had recently identified. She claimed that there were no close parallels between this authentic question of Harclay’s and the references in the Borghese commentary to a question of this title. This would have to be further investigated.

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on indivisibles should be checked, but even if it is the case, it could be explained by Harclay having changed his view. All in all, the evidence presented here indicates that we should bear Harclay in mind as a possible author of this commentary used so heavily by Aufredo Gonteri Brito, and it should give us a reason to study more closely the commentary in Borghese 346. In order to facilitate that study, we have included a question list of the Borghese 346 commentary in this chapter. Correspondence of Paragraphs via Incipits in Distinction 4, Question 1, Article 1 MS. BAV, Borghese lat. 346, fols. 33vb–35rb

MS. Wrocław, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, A 21, fols. 441va–444vb

MS. Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 5, fols. 43vb–44vb

(1) (2)

Utrum angeli boni Praeterea, Augustinus

Circa primum quaero

(3) (4)

Dicetur ad primam Sed contra, angelus

(5)

Confirmatur illud, quia causa Praeterea, secundo de malis Praeterea, ibidem auctoritas Praeterea, de malis, quod Praeterea, auctoritas Origenis

Circa primum quaero Hoc etiam probatur auctoritate Item, Augustinus Hoc probatur per rationem Confirmatur, quia causa efficiens Item, arguo de malis

(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)

Ad quaestionem duo in generali De primo videndum est Primo quod angelus Sed ista[m] ratio[nem] Praeterea, idem Praeterea, alius doctor Praeterea, per Tertia ratio ibidem Praeterea, si in primo

Hoc probatur per rationem

Illud quoque investigare dignum Oppositum arguitur

Oppositum arguitur

Ad evidentiam istius q. Similiter distinguendum Ista distinctione

Ad evidentiam istius q. Similiter distinguendum Ista distinctione

Circa primum opiniones Tenent ergo multi Sed ista ratio

Circa primum opiniones Tenent ergo multi Sed ista ratio

Praeterea, idem Praeterea, alius doctor Praeterea, per Tertia ratio ibidem Praeterea, si in primo

Praeterea, alius doctor

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Cont.

(20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47)

MS. BAV, Borghese lat. 346, fols. 33vb–35rb

MS. Wrocław, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, A 21, fols. 441va–444vb

Praeterea, Anselmus Praeterea, actio creaturae Praeterea, nullus potest Sed hiis non obstantibus Ad primum . . . cum dicitur Sed per ipsummet in Praeterea, dico quod Item, non generans Praeterea, operatio quae Ad confirmationem Ad secundum argumentum Praeterea, dico quod in Ad tertium de operatione Ad quartum, nego Ad auctoritatem Anselmi Sed dico quod non Ad quintum, dico quod Sed ad minorem istius Ad sextum, dico quod Ad septimum, dico quod Ad octavum, dico quod Ad ultimum, dico quod Et ponitur supra

Praeterea, Anselmus Praeterea, actio creaturae Praeterea, nullus potest Sed ista argumenta non Ad primum, cum dicitur Sed per ipsummet in Praeterea, dico quod Item, non generans Praeterea, operatio quae Ad confirmationem Ad secundum argumentum Praeterea, dico quod in Ad tertium de operatione Ad quartum, nego Ad auctoritates Anselmi Sed dico quod non Ad quintum, dico quod Sed ad minorem istius Ad sextum, dico quod Ad septimum, dico quod Ad octavum, dico quod Ad ultimum, dico quod Aliter respondet unus Primum probat Confirmatur Secundum probat Et confirmatur Hoc probatur secundo sic

MS. Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 5, fols. 43vb–44vb

Sed ista argumenta non Ad primum, cum dicitur Sed per ipsummet in Praeterea, dico quod Item, nec generans Praeterea, operatio quae Ad confirmationem

Ad secundum de operatione

Aliter respondet unus Primum probat Confirmatur Secundum probat Et confirmatur

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Cont. MS. BAV, Borghese lat. 346, fols. 33vb–35rb

(48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59)

De beatitudine beatorum

(60) (61) (62) (63) (64)

Alia quaestio est de secundo

MS. Wrocław, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, A 21, fols. 441va–444vb

MS. Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 5, fols. 43vb–44vb

Sed iste modus dicendi Minor probatur ex dictis Confirmatur, quia omnis Praeterea, iste actus ab Rationes suae pro Contra rationem primam Ad exemplum autem Ad aliud exemplum Ad aliud, quando dicitur Respondeo ergo quantum Et hoc probo sic Consimili ratione dico

Sed iste modus dicendi Minor probatur ex dictis Confirmatur, quia omnis

Similiter ad recipiendum Sed quantum ad secundum Si dicas Respondeo quod ista Quantum ad tertium

Contra rationem primam Ad exemplum autem Ad aliud exemplum

Respondeo ergo quantum Et hoc probo sic Consimili ratione dico Similiter ad recipiendum Sed quantum ad secundum Si dicas Respondeo quod ista Quantum ad tertium

The Dating, Sources, and Reception of Harclay’s Sentences Commentary According to the explicit in C, Harclay’s commentary on Book I is the product of his bachelor years in Paris. Exactly when Harclay lectured on the Sentences and composed his written commentary is unclear, although, as mentioned above, there is evidence that he was studying in Paris just prior to 1300 (hearing lectures of John of Paris) and was still a bachelor of theology as late as 1307. On that basis, the best suggestion available is that he read the Sentences sometime in the period 1305–1308. In question 3 of the prologue he refers to the “opinion

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of the antiqui doctors Alexander [of Hales], Bonaventure, [and] Friar Thomas,” so he was already writing at a time when Aquinas was considered an antiquus in some circles. Perhaps for this reason—the question list shows—Harclay cites Aquinas explicitly more than any other university theologian by far, referring frequently not only to the Sentences commentary (the Scriptum) and the Summa theologiae, but also to the Summa contra gentiles. We also find references to the great secular theologians whom Harclay can be assumed to have read carefully, namely, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. As noted, there are numerous citations of Scotus, called simply “Io[hannes],” with the text’s column number in the Scotus manuscript in Harclay’s possession. In any case, it appears that in the prologue and in distinction 2 of Book I Harclay did use a Parisian reportatio, which should not be surprising.20 Scholars have long known that Harclay was inspired by Scotus to a great degree and can even be considered a Scotist in many contexts, especially in his early Sentences commentary, as opposed to the later Ordinary Questions.21 In most of the questions that have been edited thus far, Harclay shows himself to be a follower of Scotus. In Trinitarian theology, Russell Friedman has noted that Harclay fits squarely into the Franciscan and particularly Scotist tradition, and when he speaks of the Filioque (I, dist. 11, qu. 1–2) the influence of Scotus is obvious. There he cites Scotus thus: “Note the rest of the argument in John’s Collations, 43 and 42.” In his question on relations (I, dist. 30, qu. 1), Mark Henninger also finds that Harclay adopts a Scotistic solution that emphasizes realism. Likewise, when speaking of divine foreknowledge and predestination (dist. 38–41), Harclay follows a distinctively Scotist line; in both cases Harclay is in explicit opposition to Aquinas and the Dominican tradition. Nevertheless, Vladimir Richter has shown that in his distinction 2 Harclay criticizes Scotus, and so Mark Henninger’s overall assessment is that even in his Sentences commentary Harclay “was not a slavish disciple, but, as an acute commentator, offered independent criticisms which may have influenced Scotus’s final edition of his own commentary, the Ordinatio.”22

20

See note 9 above, as well as Richter, Studien, 79–85. This is the commonly accepted view; see Henninger, “Henry of Harclay,” 305. 22 Henninger, “Henry of Harclay,” 305. Balić, “Henricus de Harcley et Ioannes Duns Scotus,” 102–14, discusses the relation between Harclay and Scotus on several 21

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Whether or not Harclay had an influence on Scotus, Harclay’s Sentences commentary was of great significance in the period after the Subtle Doctor wrote. Harclay’s commentary certainly had an important direct impact on the Parisian Franciscan Peter Auriol, whose citations of the commentary of Henricus Anglicus—spread throughout Auriol’s huge Scriptum on the first book of the Sentences—outnumber those of all other theologians except Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St.-Pourçain, Bonaventure, and Richard of Menneville (Mediavilla), all Dominicans or Franciscans whose Sentences commentaries are the most significant of the age. But Henry’s commentary is also cited by theologians from the other mendicant orders active in the decade after his death: Carmelites, Augustinians, and Dominicans, which is something that cannot be said for just anyone.23 The most striking evidence of his impact, however, is the incorporation of a large part of his commentary into that of the Franciscan Aufredo Gonteri Brito.

issues, including theology as a science, univocity of the concept of being, the formal distinction, the cause of predestination, voluntarism, grace, and sin. 23 See Chris Schabel, “Auriol’s Rubrics: Citations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol’s Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, 3–38. Auriol’s eight citations of Harclay are in the former’s prologue, qu. 3 (Scripto primo suo) and 4 (I, qu. 3); dist. 24 (twice, the second as Scripto); dist. 29 (twice, the first as Scripto primo, d. 29); dist. 35, qu. 3, and dist. 39. Note that the 1596 Rome edition of Auriol’s Scriptum records only two of these citations, both of them with added errors (one citing a Summa and the other a Quodlibet). In Oxford, Adam Wodeham cited Harclay several times, including two references to Harclay’s prologue, qu. 1, in one redaction of the Franciscan’s Sentences commentary; see William J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), 57 and n. 54.

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Aufredo Gonteri Brito, O.F.M.24 The Franciscan Aufredus, Anfredus, or Amfredus Gonteri the Breton25 was a significant author in his own right. His Quaestio de paupertate Christi survives in some four manuscripts, and he composed various works that are apparently no longer extant. In the mid-fifteenth century William Vorillon could still quote at length from Gonteri’s Quodlibeta, and his ideas have been cited by historians writing about the sixteenth-century Church.26 Gonteri’s Sentences commentary survives in a respectable number of manuscripts, two each for the first three books, a total of four witnesses, plus fragments:27

24 On Gonteri (the anonymous of Vat. lat. 1113), see Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo”; Hermann Schwamm, Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern (Innsbruck, 1934), 187–206; Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist”; León Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M., discípulo de Escoto y lector en el estudio general de Barcelona. Su comentario al lib. II y III de las Sentencias. Cod. 5 de la Bibl. de la Cat. de Pamplona,” Revista española de teología 1 (1941): 545–72; Juan Alfaro, “La Immaculada Concepción en los escritos de un discípolo de Duns Escoto, Aufredo Gontier,” Gregorianum 36 (1955): 590–617; Werner Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Franziskanertheologen (Münster, 1963), 180–5; Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 1, 482 (note to p. 290); eadem, Die Vorläufer Galileis. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik (Rome, 1941), 244–5; Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988), 317–18, 322–7; Stephen D. Dumont, “The Scotist of Vat. lat. 869,” AFH 81 (1988): 254–83, at 255–6. 25 For instances of the variants of the name, see Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 213 n. 44, and Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 547, to which we add “Aufredus” found in the Paris, BnF, lat. 15864 manuscript of Hugh of Novocastro, I Sent., dist. 11, qu. 1, art. 2 (see Latin text from Hugh’s commentary quoted below between notes 68 and 70). 26 For the treatise on poverty, see Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 562–3; for Vorillon, see William Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta after Scotus,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Chris Schabel (Leiden, 2007), 569–49, at 621–5, and note 38 below; according to Hubert Jedin, History of the Council of Trent, trans. Ernest Graf (London 1957–1961), vol. II, 251, the “‘sacramental argument,’ that is, a certitude based on the objective efficacy of the sacraments, had actually been hinted at . . . by the early scholastics, from Anselm of Laon and Peter Lombard, but it was only developed after 1300 by the Dominicans Peter de Palude and Durandus de S. Porciano. It was fully worked out and integrated in the scholastic tradition by the Franciscans Walter Chatton and Anfred Gonteri.” 27 Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 239, mentions fragments. The ones for Book I are actually Harclay’s, it seems, but Vat. lat. 869 contains Book II, dist. 41–42, qu. un., and dist. 43–44, qu. 2, on fols. 114ra–va and 118vb–119ra, respectively.

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• A = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1113, fols. 1ra–185va (Book I);28 • L = Lüneburg, Ratsbücherei, Theol. 2° 19, fols. 93ra–172va (Book III); • P = Pamplona, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 5, fols. 1ra–119ra (Book II) and 121ra–196vb (Book III);29 • W = Wrocław, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, A 21, fols. 1ra–306ra (Book I) and 309vb–708va (Book II).30 This number of manuscripts is nothing remarkable for a Franciscan commentary from the early 1320s, however. Nor did Gonteri’s commentary have any particularly notable impact, although it still had readers two centuries later. But it is distinguished by its size and its composition. The commentary is huge. The witness containing Books I and II, Wrocław, consists of around 700 folios, some 2,800 columns of text. The Pamplona manuscript, which contains Books II and III, adds some material to the version of Book II in the Wrocław witness, while the Lüneburg copy of Book III is itself 80 folios long, 320 columns. Even without a known copy of Book IV, the critical edition of Books I–III of just one version of Gonteri’s Sentences commentary would require at least 5,000 pages! One of the distinctive characteristics of Gonteri’s Sentences commentary is the often very extensive divisio textus placed before each distinction, in which the author summarizes what the Master, Peter Lombard, himself had to say. The history of the divisiones textus for Peter Lombard’s Sentences is still untold, yet these texts can provide useful clues about influences. Many of the major thirteenth-century authors of Sentences commentaries had gone so far as to include the entire text of the Lombard before beginning their own questions. This is the case, for example, with Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, Richard of Menneville, and Peter of Tarentaise. Afterwards, they often summarized in a paragraph or two the text that they had just reproduced, describing in brief the major “divisions” of the text and sometimes noting the main points.31 By about 1300 the text of the 28

See A. Pelzer, Codices vaticani latini, vol. I.2, pars prior (Rome, 1931), 735–6. See J. Guñi Gaztambide, “Catálogo de los manuscritos teológicos de la Catedral de Pamplona,” Revista española de teología 17 (1957): 231–58, at 250–1; Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 218; and Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.” 30 See Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 217. 31 It is not always readily apparent from printed editions how often these elements are present in the manuscripts while absent in the editions. 29

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Sentences itself was eliminated, while some theologians even dropped the divisio textus as well, as did John Duns Scotus and Henry of Harclay. By the 1320s, where it was present, the divisio textus was frequently reduced to a couple of lines, but it was usually eliminated altogether, at a time when Sentences commentaries were often already becoming a mere series of questions following the Lombard’s general ordering, a trend more pronounced at Oxford in the 1330s and afterwards in Paris.32 Hence an inspection for the topic of divine foreknowledge reveals that, in the two decades immediately preceding Gonteri’s Parisian lectures on the Sentences (1325), the following either had no divisio textus at all or merely stated briefly what the general topic was: his fellow Franciscans Alexander of Alessandria, John Bassols, Robert Cowton, William of Nottingham, Hugh of Novocastro, Landulph Caracciolo, Francis of Marchia, Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Navarre, and Peter Thomae; the Dominicans James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis, and Peter of Palude; the Augustinians Dionysius of Borgo San Sepolcro and Gerard of Siena; and so on. In this sense, Gonteri’s commentary is very conservative, but a conservative structure does not entail conservative ideas, and, when it comes to utilizing divisiones textus, Gonteri was in good company with several other highly independent theologians. We have edited Gonteri’s divisio textus for Book I, distinction 39, comparing it with other thirteenth- and fourteenth-century examples. Gonteri’s text does not resemble the major thirteenth-century divisiones textus. Among those who still retained more traditional organizations with a large divisio textus in the 1310s and 1320s were Peter Auriol and Gerard Odonis, each of whom had a great impact on Gonteri. But Gonteri’s divisio textus for distinction 39 is not at all close to either of these, which differ among themselves as well.33 There is a distinct resemblance, however, between Gonteri’s text and that of the Dominican Durand of St. Pourçain. Durand was responsible for three redactions of his Sentences commentary on Book I, but the first does not have a divisio textus for distinction 39 and the second is lost. The following reproduces the parallel passages of Gonteri’s commentary and of

32 33

On this trend, see various chapters in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1. The variety of summaries of the same text is rather surprising.

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Durand’s third redaction, dating from after 1317 (bold = verbatim, underlined = different order):34

Gonteri, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (A 169va; W 280rb–va)

Durand, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (Venice 1571, fols. 105va–b)

Praeterea solet quaeri etc. Prius determinavit Magister de divinae scientiae causalitate respectu rerum. Hic determinat de modo causalitatis sive de eius immutabilitate. Et dividitur, quia primo determinat de divinae scientiae immutabilitate, secundo de eius universalitate. ibi: “Ei vero quod praedictum est.” Prima in tres. Primo movet quaestionem de scientiae divinae varietate et eam solvit, secundo obicit in contrarium et solvit, tertio ponit opinionem quorundam circa variationem divinae scientiae. Secunda ibi: “Hic opponitur a quibusdam,” tertia ibi: “A quibusdam dicitur.”

Praeterea quaeri solet. Superius determinavit Magister de causalitate divinae scientiae. Hic intendit aliqua inquirere circa modum causalitatis. Et dividitur in duas. Primo enim determinat de ipsius scientiae invariabilitate, secundo de eius universalitate. Secunda ibi: “Ei vero quod praedictum est.” Prima dividitur in tres. Primo movet quaestionem et solvit, secundo obiicit in contrarium et solvit, tertio ponit quorundam opinionem circa varietatem divinae scientiae. Secunda ibi: “Hic opponitur a quibusdam,” tertia ibi: “Item a quibusdam.” Secunda vero pars principalis, in qua inquirit de divinae scientiae universalitate, dividitur in tres partes. Primo obiicit contra intentum, secundo solvit, tertio recapitulat determinata. Tertia ibi: “Simul itaque.”

34 On the redactions of Durand’s commentary on Book I, see Chris Schabel, Russell L. Friedman, and Irene Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Foreknowledge and Future Contingents,” Archivum fratrum praedicatorum 71 (2001): 183–300. Further evidence for the former existence of a second redaction of Durand’s commentary on Book I comes from James of Lausanne, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1314–15, before Durand’s third redaction. James produced two commentaries, one a question commentary without divisiones textus, the other merely an expositio textus, essentially a series of divisiones textus (see ibid., 245–6). James’s divisio textus for Book I, dist. 39, in the expositio version matches Durand’s divisio textus in his third redaction except for the first paragraph. Since Durand’s extant first redaction contains no divisio textus, and his extant third redaction postdates James’s text, James would seem to be copying from Durand’s lost second redaction. Further, since the first paragraph does not match, it could be something Durand himself changed from the second to the third redaction.

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Cont. Gonteri, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (A 169va; W 280rb–va)

Durand, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (Venice 1571, fols. 105va–b)

In prima parte quaerit Magister utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui vel mutari. Et arguit quod sic, quia Deus potest multa facere quae non facit et multa futura possunt non fieri, ut ille qui non est lecturus hodie potest legere; sed nihil potest fieri quod Deus non sciat; ergo potest scire quod non scit, et ita potest scientia sua augeri. Et eodem modo potest probari quod scientia eius potest minui, quia potest ille quem Deus scit lecturum omnino non legere. Et tunc solvit, dicens quod scientia Dei in se, cum sit eadem cum sua essentia, secundum Augustinum, XV De Trinitate 13, est omnino invariabilis, tamen aliquid potest esse subiectum secundarium suae scientiae sine variatione aliqua in sua scientia. Et sic Deus potest scire quod non scit et nescire quod scit. Deinde sequitur pars illa: “Hic opponitur,” in qua opponit in contrarium, quia si Deus potest scire quod non scit, ergo potest aliquid scire de novo et ex tempore. Et solvit dicens quod Deus potest scire quod nescit et velle quod non vult nunc sicut ab aeterno, absque novitate vel mutatione in scientia sua intrinsece vel voluntate, intelligendo divisim, coniunctim tamen intelligendo non. Non enim potest intelligi quod Deus aliquid nesciverit et quod simul sciverit. Sed divisim verum est quod illud quod scivit ab aeterno et etiam nunc potuit non scire, et non velle similiter quod voluit, loquendo de notitia approbationis, quae dependet ex voluntate sua libera. Tunc sequitur parts illa: “Item a quibusdam,” in qua ponit quorundam opinionem circa divinae scientiae mutabilitatem et variationem, dicens quod opinio quorundam fuit quod Deus potest plura scire quam sciat sine sui mutatione, sed tantum ponitur variatio et mutatio in obiectis.

In speciali vero sic procedit Magister. Et quaerit primo utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui vel mutari. Et probat quod sic, quia poterit Deus facere multa quae non faciet et multa futura possunt non fieri quae Deus faciet; sed sicut possunt res non fieri vel fieri, ita Deus potest scire vel non scire; ergo scientia Dei potest variari, et sic augeri vel minui. Postea respondet dicens quod scientia Dei idem est quod sua essentia quae variari non potest, potest tamen aliquid variabile esse subiectum scientiae Dei sine aliqua mutatione facta in sciente. Et sic potest Deus scire quae non scit et nescire quae scit. Deinde obiicit et dicit quod si Deus potest aliquid scire de novo, ergo potest aliquid scire ex tempore. Et respondet quod Deus potest scire quae nescit et velle quae non vult, non tamen quod aliqua novitas in eo fiat. Unde propositio dicta potest dupliciter exponi vel intelligi, scilicet coniunctim et divisim. Non enim potest esse simul quod Deus aliquid prius nesciat et postea sciat, sed divisim intelligendo, et sic vera est quod Deus libertatem habet sicut habuit ab aeterno sciendi vel non sciendi omnia, loquendo de notitia approbationis. Item, res ipsa quantum est de se potest sciri vel non sciri. Postea subiungit quod secundum quosdam Deus potest plura scire quam sciat, non tamen aliqua mutatio sit in eius scientia, sed solum in rebus suis.

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Cont. Gonteri, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (A 169va; W 280rb–va)

Durand, I Sent., dist. 39, divisio textus (Venice 1571, fols. 105va–b)

Tunc sequitur pars illa: “Ei vero quod praedictum est,” in qua inquirit de scientiae divinae unitate. Et primo arguit per auctoritatem beati Hieronymi super Abacuc quod Deus non omnia simul videt vel semper et scit. Secundo solvit ibi: “Ex tali itaque sensu,” dicens quod beatus Hieronymus non intendit dicere quod Deus aliqua nesciat, sed intendit dicere quod scientia sua particulatim et per temporum momenta non incipit, et quod non aequaliter providet creaturis irrationabilibus et rationabilibus, secundum illud Apostoli, prima Corinthos 9: “Numquid cura est Deo de bobus.” Tertio recapitulat ibi: “Simul itaque.”

Postea probat per auctoritatem Hieronymi quod Deus non sciat omnia et quod sua providentia non sit omnium. Respondet quod immo, non enim vult dicere Hieronymus quod Deus aliquid nesciat, sed quod non sciat particulatim et per intervalla temporum, sicut res per intervalla temporum oriuntur et desinunt. Nec aequaliter providet rationabilibus et irrationabilibus. Ultimo concludit quod scientia Dei extenditur ad plura.

It is possible, of course, that Durand and Gonteri have a common source that we have not identified, but it would still be the case that Gonteri worked not with the Lombard directly but with a model when composing his divisio textus for each distinction, perhaps but not necessarily that of the Dominican Durand. After the divisio textus Gonteri presents a few brief introductory words about the distinction followed by the questions themselves. The number of questions in Gonteri’s Sentences commentary is astronomical: 221 for Book I alone. Gonteri asks 28 questions for the prologue and 18 for distinction 3, concerning the popular metaphysical topic of the univocity of the concept of being and similar issues. Distinctions 1 and 2 both contain 8 questions, as does distinction 17, on the often physical problems related to the intension and remission of forms, also stressed in Harclay. Seven questions are asked in distinction 27, on relations and personal properties, a hot topic at the time, and in distinction 38, on divine foreknowledge and future contingents. Further, there are 6 questions in distinctions 13 (on productions, divine and otherwise), 31 (also on relations), and 40 (on providence and predestination). Gonteri asks 5 questions in distinctions 13, 30, 34, and 39. Thus the most popular sections are grouped around the prologue and the first three distinctions, with “spikes” at distinctions 17, 27, 30, and 34,

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and another sustained focus on distinctions 38–40, on issues related to foreknowledge. Then there are 4 questions in twelve distinctions: 4, 5, 7, 8, 19, 32, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, further demonstrating that the early section of Book I was important, but also reflecting how significant the problems of divine knowledge and power in distinctions 36–44 were in the 1320s. There are 3 questions asked in eleven distinctions, 2 questions in ten, and only 1 in the remaining three distinctions. Gonteri does not trail off in Book II, where—in the Pamplona version, which differs in some respects from the Wrocław redaction—he devotes 26 questions to distinction 1, 16 to distinction 2, and 18 to distinction 3: a total of 60 questions in the first three distinctions, popular fora for philosophical discussions of ontology surrounding creation, time, space, motion, individuation, and of course angels. The next most popular distinction is 14, with 11 questions on cosmology and the elements, followed by distinction 12, with 9 questions on matter and form. Seven questions are devoted to distinctions 7, 17, and 24. He asks 6 questions in distinctions 15, 16, and 25; 5 questions in distinction 11; and 4 questions in distinctions 6, 9, and 23. In twelve distinctions there are 3 questions: 5, 8, 13, 18, 20, 21, 22, 27, 29, 30, 32, and 33. In six there are only 2: 4, 19, 26, 28, 31, and 34. He devotes only one question to distinctions 10 and 35–38, and for the last six distinctions he asks 3 questions, each of which covers two distinctions. Clearly Gonteri’s interest trails off in distinctions 18–22 and, more markedly, starting in distinction 26. Nevertheless, all told, Book II contains 201 questions. Some of the reason for the enormity of Gonteri’s commentary lies in the nature of its composition: it is in large part a compilation. Not only is the work an early example of what has come to be known among historians of fourteenth-century thought as the phenomenon of reading secundum alium, or “according to another”;35 explicits in the manuscripts expressly call it a compilatio. Moreover, judging from these explicits, Gonteri produced two versions of this compilatio, one corresponding to his time as lector at the Franciscan convent in

35

On this phenomenon, see especially Damasus Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956): 146–274; Bakker-Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century”; Chris Schabel, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism,” in The Origins of European Scholarship: The Cyprus Millenium Conference, ed. Ioannis Taifacos (Stuttgart, 2006), 163–75.

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Barcelona and dated 1322, the other stemming from his period as sententiarius in Paris, dated 1325. Evidence for the Barcelona compilatio is given in W’s explicit for Book II (fol. 708va): Here ends the compilatio and ordinatio on the second book of the Sentences edited (edita) by Brother Amfredus Gonteri the Breton of the Order of Friars Minor and of the province of Touraine, then lector in the province of Aragon in the convent of Barcelona at the studium generale, in the year from the Incarnation of the Lord 1322.36

At the start of Book II (fol. 309vb) W reads: I, Brother Amfredus Gonteri of Brittany, of the diocese of Quimper, of the Order of Friars Minor, of the province of Touraine, lector at Barcelona in the year of the Lord 1322, on the orders of my superiors, at the insistence of the scholars, wanted to communicate my lecture on the second book of the Sentences by way of a certain reportatio and correction, for the introduction of the younger ones, by adhering to the steps of venerable doctors, mainly John Scotus, doctor of sacred theology.37

Gonteri was thus a Breton, specifically from the diocese of Quimper, where he probably professed as a Franciscan,38 Brittany being in the order’s province of Touraine. As we shall see at note 51 below, a quotation from Gonteri’s Book I shows that he heard John Duns Scotus’s theological lectures, presumably in Paris, where documents of 1303 have him as a resident in the Minorite convent.39 Afterwards he was sent to teach theology at the Barcelona studium of the Friars Minor. In 1322 the Franciscans’ Barcelona convent was one of the order’s most important studia, since around that time prominent Iberian authors Peter Thomae, Peter of Navarre, and probably William Rubio were active at the convent.40 It was at Barcelona that Gonteri “compiled”

36 In general, the reader should seek the Latin in the appropriate place in the appendix. This explicit is also quoted in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 318 n. 9. A similar statement is found on fol. 708va; cf. Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 213 and 218, and Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 550. 37 Also quoted in Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 550. 38 William Vorillon, who calls Gonteri a discipulus of Scotus, writes ca. 1447–48 that Gonteri was “licentiatus in theologia Parisius, Brito natione, conventus Corisopitensis,” suggesting that he professed in Quimper. For both quotations, see Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 548, and for the second, Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 623. 39 See Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 212–15; Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 547 and 549; and William J. Courtenay, “The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1303,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 155–73. 40 On the Barcelona Franciscans, see recently Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 621–9, and Chris Schabel and Garrett M. Smith, “The Franciscan Studium at

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his treatise on poverty as well.41 Finally, Gonteri was assigned to read the Sentences in Paris itself, which he did in 1325, probably afterwards reworking either his Paris lecture notes or his Barcelona commentary into the extant Parisian commentary. The words compilatio, ordinatio, and edita all suggest that the first version of this Sentences commentary was at least partly a written work, not necessarily a faithful record of Gonteri’s reading of the Sentences at Barcelona. That the work is termed a compilatio already is perhaps significant for our identification of the commentary on Book II found in Borghese 346, because the nature of the compilation changed in the second version, according to the explicit in P (fol. 119ra): Here ends the compilatio and ordinatio on the second book of the Sentences edited by Brother Anfredus Goytterus the Breton of the Order of Friars Minor, with certain dicta of Master Brother Francis of Marchia and Master Brother Francis of Meyronnes and Brother Gerard, bachelor in theology, added.

The Pamplona version of Book II in fact differs from the Wrocław version, which explicitly adheres to the views of Scotus, particularly with respect to the addition in Pamplona of material from Francis of Marchia and Gerard Odonis, active in Paris after 1320.42 Thus one must ask what exactly went into the “compilation” contained in the Wrocław manuscript. Clearly, much of Wrocław’s Book II is not original to Gonteri. At the very least, the material also found in Borghese 346 was copied by Gonteri from someone else. The explicit to Book I in W (fol. 306ra) reads as follows:

Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and the Papal Court, ed. William J. Courtenay and Kent Emery, Jr. (Turnhout, forthcoming). 41 Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 550–1, quotes the incipit and explicit from the Madrid manuscript: “Dicta Fratris Anfredi Gonteri, lectoris Barchinonae,” and: “Explicit quaestio compilata (!) per Fratrem Anfredum Gonteri, lectorem Barchinonae, ad informationem Minorum contra sequaces Magistri Guillielmi de Sancto Amore.” 42 On Francis of Marchia, especially his Sentences commentary, see Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences. Question List and State of Research,” Mediaeval Studies 63 (2001): 31–106, and the Introduction to Francis of Marchia, Theologian and Philosopher: A Franciscan at the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 1–20. On Gerard Odonis, especially the Sentences commentary, see Chris Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 46 (2004): 115–61, and the special issue of Vivarium 47:2–3 (2009) devoted to him, edited by William O. Duba and Chris Schabel.

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william o. duba, russell l. friedman, and chris schabel Here ends the compilatio of the lectura of the first [book] of the Sentences, ordinata by Brother Aufredus Gonteri the Breton of the Order of Friars Minor, bachelor of sacred theology in Paris, in the year of the Lord 1325 . . .43

Here it seems that this compilation is reworked, ordinata, but based on Gonteri’s reading (lectura) of the Sentences at Paris in 1325. Despite Amorós’s claim to the contrary, except for the first couple of questions, A and W carry the same redaction of Book I, and both contain a reference to an incident that took place in Paris (see note 47 below). On this basis, we agree with Doucet that nothing survives of the Barcelona commentary on Book I, aside from whatever is incorporated into the second version.44 It is probable that the material in Book I based on Francis of Marchia, for example, was added to the extant version in Paris after 1322. 1325, then, would be a logical date for the version of Book II found in the Pamplona manuscript.45 Since Gerard Odonis’s Parisian lectures on the Sentences did not take place until the fall of 1326 or perhaps even 1327, however, the written version of Gonteri’s Parisian lectures was probably produced after 1325. Nevertheless, it is possible that Gonteri was employing Gerard’s earlier Reportatio in secundum based on lectures given at Toulouse before 1320. There is no indication of the date of Book III. Although Gonteri’s commentary on Book IV is cited in his commentaries on Books I– III, it does not survive, or at least it has not been identified. Based on internal citations in general, Gonteri probably lectured on Books I–IV–II–III in Barcelona, a common sequence at the time, and the revised version written after the Paris lectures was composed in the order I–II–III–IV.46 43 Also quoted in Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 213 and 217; Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 551; and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 318 n. 9. 44 See also Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 217, 220, and 225. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 322, discussing material in Gonteri’s Book I using W, interprets it as witnessing the spread of Auriol’s views to Barcelona by 1322. But this applies the explicit in W for Book II to Book I, which, as Tachau herself notes (318 n. 9), has a 1325 explicit. Still, Gonteri was aware of Auriol by 1322, for in Book II, dist. 4, qu. 1, there is a reference to Auriol as a doctor novus. Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 555, rightly ties Book I in W to the 1325 lectures, but he suggests that A, the Vatican manuscript, carries a different redaction of Book I, probably from Barcelona 1322. The question list below and previous editions, however, indicate that there is only one redaction, except for the very first couple of folios, where the differences can be explained in other ways. In any case, the Paris reference proves otherwise. 45 This is also the conclusion of Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 555. 46 For discussions of the internal citations with examples, see Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 223–5, and Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 555–8, although

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Book I There probably existed an earlier Barcelona redaction of Gonteri’s commentary on Book I, but, as mentioned, it appears no longer to be extant. Two independent manuscripts, A and W, contain the Paris version of Book I. Despite the fact the most previous scholarship has focused on A, the Vatican witness, due to its availability, the editions of eight questions from distinctions 11 and 38–39 have demonstrated that W, the Wrocław witness, is superior. For example, A commits three or four times more large omissions per homoioteleuton than does W. With that said, any attempt at a critical edition would have to make use of both manuscripts. As mentioned, the extant text is a second version from (probably) 1325, revised on the basis of Gonteri’s experiences in Paris after 1322. Although references to what Gonteri “heard” are rare and vague, one passage in distinction 34, question 3, present in both manuscripts, clearly refers to his Sentences lectures in Paris: But on account of a controversy of Master Benedict of the Preachers, this truth was determined for me in Paris by all the masters regent and non-regent in the theological faculty, and it was promulgated publicly by the beadle and recorded in the common book of the masters, although the aforesaid Master [Benedict] publicly dogmatized otherwise in the schools that this determined truth is heretical. All the aforesaid masters determined that the contrary is true, Catholic, and sound.47

Gonteri then goes on to argue further against Master Benedict of Assignano, implicating in the dispute the Dominican John of Prato, Master William the Little, and the Benedictine Master Pierre Roger (later Pope Clement VI). Pierre Roger was made master in 1323, while Benedict of Assignano was lector in Bologna in 1326, further confirming a 1325 date.48

because he maintains wrongly that A contains the 1322 Barcelona version of Book I, and early in that witness there are references to Book IV as already completed, Amorós has to propose the unusual IV–I–II–III sequence for Barcelona. This is one more reason to reject his dating of A. 47 Also quoted in Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 206, and in his edition on 230. Doucet employed A, but W has the text on fol. 260ra. 48 Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 207–09, notes this, adding that John of Prato (Pratis) was probably master by 1321 and Guillaume le Petit (G. Parvus) was master in Paris by 1322. See also Ludwig Hödl, “Der trinitätstheologische Relationssatz des Boethius in der Schule des Thomas von Aquin im 14. Jahrhundert,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 73 (2006): 175–94, at 185–94.

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Generally Gonteri’s procedure in Book I is to defend John Duns Scotus against the attacks of Peter Auriol, sometimes using arguments of Francis of Marchia, sometimes opposing Marchia’s arguments.49 There are references to Thomas Aquinas and, more seldomly, to Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Durand of St. Pourçain, Robert Cowton, and Hervaeus Natalis, but Scotus, Auriol, and Marchia play the major parts. Scotus, under whom Gonteri had studied in the early 1300s, is very frequently referred to in the text itself as doctor subtilis, doctor noster, or even simply doctor. Together with the fact that Gonteri often mentions his sequentes, this suggests that Scotus was the unofficial doctor of the Franciscan order. Katherine Tachau asserts that in the prologue Gonteri quotes “nearly verbatim from Scotus,” citing the latter’s Ordinatio, but, since he had been a student of Scotus in Paris, it is also possible that he had access to a Reportatio; in any case, Gonteri cites Scotus’s Quodlibet as well.50 Auriol, on the other hand, is usually called a certain doctor novus, but he is often identified in the margins and sometimes in the text itself. Gonteri describes his general methodology early on, in question 6 of the prologue: For the third [article], against this conclusion I adduce the arguments of a certain doctor [margin: Auriol] who everywhere tries to refute the venerable doctor and brother John Scotus, whom as much as I can I follow basically (quasi) everywhere, because I heard him for a long time and I find his sayings Catholic, reasonable, and, for those who understand rightly, less able to be impugned (calumniabilia).51

As the question list shows, Gonteri expresses his loyalty to Scotus at several other junctures,52 repeatedly defending him against Auriol’s arguments. But this is not blind loyalty, since Gonteri only follows Scotus as far as he can. At the end of question 25 of the prologue he remarks:

49 On Auriol, see, for example, Lauge O. Nielsen, “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s First and Fourth Books of the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 149–219; Russell L. Friedman, “Auriol (Aureol, Aureoli), Peter,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/auriol/). 50 See Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 324 n. 28, referring the reader back to passages from the Ordinatio that she had cited earlier. Gonteri cites Scotus’s Quodlibet at least once, in dist. 45, qu. 1. 51 Also quoted in Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 202, and Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero, O.F.M.,” 551, from A, and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 322–3 n. 23, from W. 52 See also Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 201.

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In this question, because of a defect in my abilities (ingenium), I am contradicting my master, forced by arguments from statements made by Aristotle, because I do not see how I can sustain his conclusion without contradicting the Philosopher in the Physics, which I do not find right. Let everyone go easy on me in this.53

It is probable that in almost all references to a doctor novus Peter Auriol is meant. As we shall see, in distinction 11 Gonteri quotes from Auriol’s Scriptum on Book I, completed around the end of 1316 and largely written while Auriol was away from Paris. In distinction 7, question 2, Gonteri cites the Scriptum explicitly, writing that “recently I read the opinion of a certain new doctor in the Scriptum on Book I of the Sentences, distinction 5 . . .” That Gonteri had access only to the Scriptum would make sense, given that Auriol died in early 1322 when Gonteri was still in Barcelona. Yet Werner Dettloff and Katherine Tachau have found Gonteri employing Auriol’s Parisian Reportatio (based on lectures given in 1316–18) in distinction 17 and in the prologue, respectively.54 It would seem that Gonteri had access to both the earlier Scriptum and the later Parisian Reportatio. On the other hand, in Book II, for which Auriol has no pre-Parisian Scriptum, Gonteri appears to cite Auriol only twice (dist. 4, qu. 1, and dist. 5, qu. 1). Further research is required to determine whether Gonteri’s knowledge of Auriol’s Reportatio was merely indirect. Francis of Marchia, for example, was Gonteri’s source for Auriol’s Reportatio in some contexts. In quantitative terms, of course, the main influence on Gonteri is not Scotus, but rather Henry of Harclay. But why? It could be that Gonteri found Harclay’s somewhat succinct but rather Scotistic commentary more convenient to copy than Scotus’s own text, be it the Lectura, the Ordinatio, or a Parisian Reportatio. It seems impossible that Gonteri thought he was actually copying Scotus, on account of Harclay’s many references to “Iohannes” and to Scotus’s works. Moreover, given that Auriol, one of Gonteri’s major opponents, could cite specific places in Harclay’s commentary just a few years before Gonteri himself compiled the versions of his Sentences commentary, it even

53

Also quoted in Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 202. See Dettloff, Die Entwicklung, 183; Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 322. In that place, Tachau writes that Auriol’s Scriptum was from Paris and the Reportatio (for Books I and II) perhaps from lectures given before 1316 at a studium outside Paris, but the manuscripts she cites (n. 22) carry a Reportatio she (correctly) assigns elsewhere to Paris (see 87–9 and notes 5 and 11). 54

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seems likely that Gonteri knew that the commentary he was copying was in fact written by Harclay.55 At any rate, it is certainly possible that Gonteri thought that Harclay’s commentary was in fact a clever attempt to “compress” Scotus, and as such a worthy foundation for his own work. In any case, starting with distinction 4 Gonteri seems to take his point of departure in Harclay’s text, building on that where necessary. This he does in various ways. Sometimes Gonteri copies Harclay’s text verbatim from start to finish, as in questions 1–2 of distinction 11 on the Filioque, where Friedman’s edition shows that the texts match, although naturally the wording in AW often differs from that in CH. If Gonteri had left things at that, however, merely copying Harclay’s Filioque treatment, he would not have dealt with any of the scholastic discussion in the years following the composition of Harclay’s text. Thus Gonteri adds a third question to distinction 11,56 the sole purpose of which is to confront the opinion of Peter Auriol: “For further evidence of what has been said in the preceding second question, on account of the opinion of a certain new doctor, I ask whether active spiration pertains intrinsically to the personality of the Son.” After the opening arguments, the question is divided into three articles, the first being the presentation of the opinion of the “new doctor,” who is identified as Peter Auriol in the margin. Gonteri gives three propositions from Auriol’s Scriptum, distinction 11, article 3. In the second article, Gonteri accepts the first two propositions but refutes the third, and in the final article he refutes Auriol’s arguments in support of his third proposition. Likewise, Gonteri asks several other questions in his commentaries specifically to deal with a new opinion, for example, that of Peter Auriol (dist. 8, qu. 1) or of Francis—presumably of Marchia (prologue, qu. 15; dist. 2, qu. 5–6; dist. 7, qu. 4)—but it is not always immediately clear to whom Gonteri refers when he asks something “on account of certain things said by a certain doctor” (dist. 1, qu. 5).

55 In connection with Gonteri and upon whom he thought he was relying, Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 202–03, 224–5, mentions references to a falsa reportatio of Scotus (for example, in prologue, qu. 14, A fol. 13). 56 Edited for the project of Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, The Filioque in Parisian Theology from Scotus to the Black Death. With Texts and Studies on Sentences Commentaries, 1308–1348 (Leuven, forthcoming).

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In other cases, however, Gonteri adds a significant amount of text to Harclay’s question. For distinction 41 on predestination, which Schmaus edited from A,57 not knowing that the bulk of the text was from Henry of Harclay, a collation against Harclay’s question reveals that, of the roughly 370 lines, almost 100 were added by Gonteri to Harclay’s text, whereas Gonteri omitted only two lines from Harclay. What Gonteri adds is, first, an explanation of the question, “Utrum in electis et praedestinatis et praescitis praecessit aliqua causa meritoria vel demeritoria suae praedestinationis et reprobationis”58—which, incidentally, is much reworded from Harclay’s “Utrum in praedestinato sit causa suae praedestinationis,” although the question itself is more or less the same, a fact that indicates that parallels between Harclay’s and Gonteri’s texts cannot always be ascertained on the basis of question titles alone. Then, after Harclay’s presentation of Henry of Ghent’s arguments against Aquinas’s opinion, Gonteri adds three more arguments with citations of Aristotle’s Physics, Augustine’s De Trinitate, and Boethius’s De consolatione that are not in Henry of Ghent.59 It is possible that Gonteri was paraphrasing Francis of Marchia.60 Later, Gonteri inserts an important “Et ideo dicitur aliter,” in which he presents Peter Auriol’s solution and then argues against it.61 In this case, however, Gonteri’s source for both the position and the arguments contra is Francis of Marchia, since Gonteri’s text is extremely different in wording and sequence from any redaction of Auriol:

57

In Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto.” Ibid., 346. 59 See ibid., 348–9. 60 Compare Gonteri, in Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto,” 348–49, to Marchia in Chris Schabel, “La dottrina di Francesco di Marchia sulla predestinazione,” Picenum Seraphicum 20 (2001): 9–45, at 25–6. 61 Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto,” 352. 58

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Gonteri, ed. Schmaus, p. 352

Marchia, ed. Schabel, pp. 30–31, 34–35

Et ideo dicitur aliter, quod nonresistentia divinae gratiae a Deo omnibus aequaliter oblatae in bonis est prima causa praedestinationis eorum et resistentia econverso est causa reprobationis in malis, quia Deus, inquantum est de se, “vult omnes homines salvos fieri” etc.

Ideo est tertius modus dicendi quod radix distinctionis . . . venit . . . ex resistentia et non-resistentia previsa gratiae . . . Et ita reprobatio malorum habet causam positivam ex parte malorum, scilicet resistentiam gratiae . . . et causam tantum negativam ex parte bonorum, scilicet non-resistentiam . . . Sed Deus uniformiter et indifferenter, quantum est de se, “vult omnes homines salvos fieri” . . . Unde dicitur quod sunt ibi duo sillogismi: unus sillogismus est quod Deus proponit dare gratiam cuilibet non-resistenti; sed Petrus non resistit; ergo Petrum elegit. Alius sillogismus est ex parte malorum quod Deus ordinat ad penam quemcumque resistentem; sed Iudas resistit; ideo ipsum damnavit. Item, sic debemus distinguere praedestinationem a reprobatione quod in electione reluceat principaliter misericorida et secundario iustitia, et in reprobationes reluceat principaliter iustitia . . . Sed contra istam opinionem sunt omnes rationes Augustini contra priorem opinionem. Patet inductive, quia parvulis nulla est resistentia, quae est prima ratio . . . Item . . . quando ad unum effectum concurrunt causa prima et causa secunda, determinatio causae secundae non est prior determinatione causae primae, sed magis posterior; sed voluntas divina et voluntas creata concurrunt ad quemcumque actum voluntatis creatae; ergo . . . sed quod iste eligatur “non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei.”

Ita quod arguunt isti sic: Deus ab aeterno voluit dare gratiam et gloriam omni naturae intellectuali non resistenti et vult non dare eam resistenti et sic unum salvare et aliam damnare; sed ab aeterno Deus praevidit hunc non velle resistere et illum velle resistere; ergo etc. Per hoc enim salvatur divina misericordia principaliter et etiam iustitia et evitatur acceptio personarum.

Sed contra hanc opinionem potest argui sic, sicut contra secundum, primo de parvulis non resistentibus, quorum aliqui salvantur, alii damnantur. Praeterea, quando ad unum effectum concurrunt duae causae, prima est principalis et secunda est minus principalis. Causa secunda non determinat primam, sed econverso; sed voluntas divina ut causa prima et liberum arbitrium rationale ut causa secundum concurrunt ad praedestinationem et reprobationem; ergo etc. Et Apostolus Rom. 9 dicit: “Non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei.”

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Finally, after Harclay’s presentation of Scotus’s position, Gonteri inserts some authoritative statements from Peter Lombard and Augustine,62 before presenting “new” arguments against Scotus.63 Earlier in his article Schmaus had provided extensive quotations from the material in Gonteri corresponding to Harclay’s distinctions 38 and 39 on divine foreknowledge. Here again the questions are a mix, for in Gonteri’s distinction 38, edited by Schabel, of the roughly 380 lines of text, about 280 are from Harclay and the other 100 are added by Gonteri. But again the material is quoted via Francis of Marchia, except that Gonteri answers Marchia’s refutation of Scotus’s doctrine with a defense of the Subtle Doctor. In distinction 39, by contrast, Gonteri adds nothing and instead eliminates one of Harclay’s opening arguments and its later refutation, so that Gonteri copies only two thirds of the ca. 225 lines of Harclay’s text. Thus, Schmaus’s quotations turn out to be a mix, some ultimately from Harclay, others from Marchia, others from Gonteri himself. Just as in “new” questions, then, in material added to Harclay’s question Gonteri first of all refutes Auriol in defense of Scotus and, secondly, either uses the arguments of Francis of Marchia against Auriol or himself attacks Marchia’s views. But Harclay, Scotus, Auriol, and Marchia are not Gonteri’s only important sources and interlocutors in the first book of his Sentences commentary. In some footnotes64 Schmaus provides passages from questions not taken from Harclay at all, and here they turn out to be paraphrases of Hugh of Novocastro:

62 63 64

See ibid., 353–4. See ibid., 354. See ibid., 342 n. 3 and 343 n. 1.

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Gonteri, ed. Schabel65

Hugh of Novocastro, ed. Schabel66

Sed hic movent aliqui dubia. Primum est: quomodo divina voluntas indeterminata respectu futurorum determinavit se ad alteram partem sine sui mutatione? Secundo: quid est illa determinatio et quid addit super divinam voluntatem? Tertio: quomodo illud quod in se est simpliciter necessarium potest esse contingens respectu alterius? Quantum ad primum, dico quod divina voluntas non fuit indeterminata indeterminatione potentiae passivae, sed activae. Ideo, sicut voluntas nostra indeterminata determinat se distinctis actibus formaliter respectu diversorum obiectorum, quod est ex eius perfectione cum imperfectione annexa, ita divina voluntas infinita ex se ab aeterno determinavit se ad volendum diversa obiecta uno actu infinito indistincto et a potentia et essentia, et formaliter uno, virtualiter et eminenter continente perfectionem diversorum actuum in nobis propter eius infinitatem.

Sed hic oriuntur tria dubia. Primum est quomodo voluntas primi indeterminata ad opposita ab aeterno potuit se determinare sine sui mutatione. Secundum est quid ista determinatio addit super voluntatem divinam. Tertium, quomodo in simpliciter necessario potest esse aliquid simpliciter contingens? Ad evidentiam primi dubii, sciendum quod voluntas nostra sic est in potentia ante actum quod tempore potentia praecedit actum. Secundo, sic est in potentia quod est in potentia ad actus diversos et etiam oppositos. Tertium quod invenitur in voluntate nostra est quod per diversos actus determinat se ad diversa obiecta volita. Quartum, quod mediantibus diversis obiectis volitis producit diversos effectus extra, nihil enim producit extra quod non sit primo sibi volitum. Prima duo dicunt imperfectionem, et ideo non sunt in voluntate divina. Non enim est ibi potentia ante actum, sed potentia volitiva ab aeterno est sub actu volendi. Similiter, non sunt ibi actus diversi, sed unus actus aeternus infinitus. Sed ibi sunt suo modo tertium et quartum, ita quod sicut voluntas creata per diversos actus potest se determinare ad plura, ita quod per actum novum formalem determinat se ad aliquid novum, ita voluntas divina per unum actum illimitatum virtute continente omnem actum volitivum potest se determinare ab aeterno ad hoc vel ad illud. Ita quod voluntas divina

65 Rossini and Schabel, “Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists,” 334–5, ll. 44–65 (Gonteri) (= Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto,” 343 n. 3). 66 Rossini and Schabel, “Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists,” 320–1, ll. 68–111. On Hugh and his Sentences commentary, see León Amorós, “Hugo von Novo Castro O.F.M. und sein Kommentar zum ersten Buch der Sentenzen,” Franziskanische Studien 20 (1933): 177–222; Valens Heynck, “Der Skotist Hugo de Novo Castro, OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 43 (1961): 244–70.

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Cont. Gonteri, ed. Schabel

Quantum ad secundum, dico quod determinatio divinae voluntatis non est aliud quam actus voluntatis formaliter unus, virtualiter plures, cum respectu rationis ad obiectum volitum constitutum in esse volito.

Ad tertium, dico quod voluntas divina et sua determinatio et notitia divina, totum est per se summe necessarium formaliter, virtualiter tamen dicitur contingens et principium contingentium in re extra, sicut voluntas nostra in se incorruptibilis et immutabilis secundum naturam suam intrinsecam potest esse principium diversorum actuum contingenter, licet ipsa sit quoddam ens necessarium naturaliter in genere.

Hugh of Novocastro, ed. Schabel per unum actum illimitatum potuit facere quicquid posset fieri per omnes actus formales distinctos in creaturis, sicut per unum, scilicet per essentiam suam, intelligit omnia quae a creaturis per distincta principia cognoscuntur. Ad secundum dubium, dico quod determinatio ista non dicit super voluntatem nisi respectum voluntatis in actu respectu talis obiecti. Et est iste respectus non ex natura rei, sed ex libertate voluntatis divinae, et est quasi libere creatus ab aeterno a voluntate divina. Exemplum aliquale potest poni in voluntate nostra: sicut enim voluntas nostra volendo aliquid potest suam volitionem extendere in aliquid aliud ipsum intendendo, quae quidem intensio secundum aliquos dicit solum respectum voluntatis, ita voluntas divina actum suum infinitum potest quasi extendere ad aliquid aliud volibile extra, quae quidem extensio non est nisi respectus quidam causatus a voluntate divina libere, sicut dictum est. Qui potest capere, capiat. Ad tertium dubium, dico quod summe necessarium potest considerari secundum se, et sic nihil est in eo nisi necessarium simpliciter; alio modo in comparatione ad aliquid extra, et sic potest esse contingens simpliciter sicut velle hoc vel illud, non ratione substantie actus, sed ratione respectus voluntarii ad obiectum connotatum. Sicut enim intellectus divinus ab aeterno causat in se quasdam habitudines ad intelligibilia extra, sic voluntas divina ab aeterno causat in se habitudines quasdam ad diversa volibilia, et hoc libere, non ex natura rei. Et hoc est quod alii volunt dicere, quod voluntas Dei potest considerari vel secundum se vel secundum quod transit super obiectum. Tamen difficile est istum transitum intelligere.

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In all, at least four of Gonteri’s questions from distinctions 38–40 parallel closely and sometimes paraphrase questions from Hugh of Novocastro’s own commentary on the Sentences. Whether Gonteri used Hugh’s text in a like manner elsewhere, or whether Gonteri employed other theologians in this way, is a difficult matter for further study.67 The reader will have noticed from the parallel passages from Gonteri, on the one hand, and Marchia and Hugh, on the other, that, unlike in the case of Harclay, Gonteri has not taken these texts verbatim in either case. The question is, why? One possibility is that he copied from redactions of their commentaries that have not survived. We know that Hugh of Novocastro produced two redactions of his commentaries on other books of the Sentences, but only one survives for Book I; perhaps Gonteri was taking questions verbatim from a lost version. Likewise Marchia produced at least three redactions of Book I, but one has come down to us in mere fragments. Of course, Gonteri may simply have decided to paraphrase rather than copy, perhaps because he was now following living scholars and felt awkward about his borrowing. There is another possibility: Gonteri may have been using his own notes taken from lectures. He may have heard Marchia lecture at Paris in 1319–20 or on some other occasion. For Hugh of Novocastro, we are actually on firmer ground. Notice that, in the parallel passage above, a section that Gonteri does not paraphrase concludes, “Qui potest capere, capiat,” which suggests that the scribe did not understand what he had copied.68 Gonteri, apparently agreeing with the scribe, skips this section and gives a different solution to the dubium. Even more importantly, there is evidence that Gonteri himself was directly involved in the diffusion of Hugh’s commentary. In distinc-

67 If it is the case, Gonteri would not have been alone in using Hugh’s text in this way. See Hermann Schwamm, Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern (see note 24), 289–96, for Peter of Aquila’s use of Hugh, and Walter Volz, Die Lehre des Johannes de Bassolis von den Produktionen in Gott. Ein Vergleich mit der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1969), 59, who claims: “Hugo de Novocastro scheint tatsächlich unter den ersten Schülern des Duns Scotus besonders geschätzt worden zu sein und für manche von ihnen die Rolle eines Vermittlers der skotischen Lehre bzw. eines zweiten literarischen Vorbilds neben Duns Scotus gespielt zu haben.” 68 This same remark is to be found in several places in Hugh’s commentary. For another instance, see Guido Alliney, “La ricezione della teoria scotiana della volontà nell’ambiente teologico parigino (1307–1316),” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005): 339–404, esp. 352 n. 23.

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tion 11 of Book I, just as everyone else, Hugh treats the procession of the Holy Spirit. In question 1, “Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son,” Hugh discussed the Greeks’ negative opinion in article 2, which concludes with a doubt from Scotus that in the margin of one of the four manuscripts is called “Scoti dubitatio, d. XIa, quaestione prima”: Sed adhuc est fortior dubitatio quam Scotus tetigit: cum enim Pater habeat prioritatem originis respectu Filii, in illo priori habet omnem perfectionem simpliciter, alioquin non posset omnem perfectionem communicare Filio; ergo in illo priori habet voluntatem fecundam et ita potest producere Spiritum Sanctum. Et si potest producere, producit. Ergo non postea in signo posteriori originis producitur a Filio, iam enim idem bis produceretur, quod est inconveniens. Unde videtur quod oporteat dicere quod a solo Patre Filius et Spiritus Sanctus procedant, ita quod Filius non habeat respectu Spiritus Sancti prius originis, sed solum prius rationis, in quantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi intellectio praesupponitur voluntati et forte ex natura rei.69

Immediately afterwards three manuscripts give one solution to the doubt, but the fourth has something rather different:

Hugh of Novocastro, I Sent., dist. 11, qu. 1, art. 2 (MSS. Florence, Gdansk, Lübeck)

Hugh of Novocastro, I Sent., dist. 11, qu. 1, art. 2 (MS. Paris, BnF, lat. 15864)

Dicendum quod in illo signo priori originis Pater habet memoriam fecundam et voluntatem fecundam, sed ordine quodam, quia prius in comparatione ad actum est in eo fecunditas memoriae quam fecunditas voluntatis, et ideo necessario prius producit Filium quam Spiritum Sanctum. In isto autem priori Filius accipit a Patre voluntatem fecundam ad producendum Spiritum Sanctum, et ideo Spiritus Sanctus producitur a Patre et Filio.

Quaere solutionem huius dubii. Sic forte est quia intellectus prius origine habet terminum adaequatum quam voluntas. Dato enim quod intellectus et voluntas convertentur cum essentia divina solum virtualiter et eminenter, adhuc haberent eundem ordinem ac si converterentur formaliter. Ubi autem convertentur formaliter, semper intellectus prius operatur quam voluntas. Haec Aufredus.

69 For the edition, see Friedman-Schabel, The Filioque in Parisian Theology from Scotus to the Black Death, forthcoming. The four manuscripts of Hugh’s commentary on Book I are: Florence, Biblioteca laurenziana, Plut. XXX dext. 2; Gdańsk, Biblioteka Gdańska Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1969; Lübeck, Bibliothek der Hansestadt Lübeck, theol. lat. 2o 116; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15864.

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What is the nature of Gonteri’s intervention here? If previous editions of sections from the end of Book I of Hugh’s commentary are correct and can be applied to distinction 11, then three branches of a tradition deriving from a common exemplar are represented by, respectively, the Florence-Lübeck, Gdańsk, and Paris manuscripts.70 It is possible that the stemma for Hugh’s Book I could be more complicated in distinction 11, and Paris could preserve an earlier version that was modified later in the other three manuscripts. In this case Gonteri might have been Hugh’s reportator. It is more likely, however, that either Gonteri was merely the scribe of (or dictated) the Paris manuscript/version, or that the scribe replaced Hugh’s response with Gonteri’s. The use of virtualiter et eminenter supports this latter alternative, since it appears to reflect, once again, Francis of Marchia’s influence on Gonteri.71 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in distinction 11 of his own extant commentary Gonteri copies Harclay’s question (or rather two questions combined in one) verbatim, without additions, and then adds a third against Peter Auriol, and the passage in Hugh’s Paris manuscript is nowhere present. In any case, we can be certain that the Paris manuscript or version of Hugh’s Sentences commentary, at least, is connected to Gonteri, who knew Hugh’s work intimately and paraphrased it extensively. In his Parisian commentary on Book I, then, Gonteri appears to have proceeded as follows. He incorporated the bulk of the secular Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I verbatim, sometimes from start to finish, sometimes omitting sections, sometimes making additions. Gonteri also either paraphrased questions from the Franciscan Hugh of Novocastro’s commentary on Book I, to which Gonteri was somehow intimately connected as reportator or producer of one witness/version, or he copied or paraphrased questions from a lost version of Hugh’s commentary or from his own notes from Hugh’s lectures. Finally, Gonteri argued extensively against the Franciscan Peter Auriol’s attacks on Scotus, often via the Franciscan Francis of

70 Editions in Eugenio Randi, Il sovrano e l’orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio nel dibatitto sulla “potentia absoluta” fra XIII e XIV secolo (Florence, 1986), 131–72 (125– 30 on the commentary), and Rossini/Schabel, “Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists,” 303–30 (manuscript discussion: 279–92). 71 For Marchia’s use of the terms eminenter and virtualiter in just this context, see Russell L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (Leiden, forthcoming), chap. 12, §2.

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Marchia, defending Scotus via Marchia and, where necessary, against Marchia’s own critique. Book II As was stated above, Gonteri’s Book II survives in two redactions, one from Barcelona dated 1322, the other from Paris and presumably dated 1325. The questions that are extant in both versions of the commentary sometimes match each other verbatim, but frequently the later Paris redaction is abbreviated in Pamplona by eliminating paragraphs. Besides omitting preliminary words (not noted in the question list below), Pamplona sometimes skips opening arguments and those of other theologians, along with their refutations. Since this material in Gonteri can be very extensive, the abbreviation can likewise reduce questions by one or more columns. Some examples are noted in the question list (for instance, dist. 14, qu. 10: “P drops 2+ columns”). As in the case of Book I, Gonteri’s commentary on Book II is a compilation. For example, as we have seen, the Barcelona redaction in the Wrocław manuscript absorbs a large portion of the commentary on Book II (perhaps by Henry of Harclay) found in Borghese 346, although some of this material is omitted in the Paris redaction in the Pamplona witness. The most noticeable difference between the two redactions, however, is the insertion into Gonteri’s later Paris redaction of several questions actually composed by Francis of Marchia and Gerard Odonis. The numbering of the questions, therefore, sometimes differs between P and W. As mentioned, P often drops the preliminary clauses, but in cases where it retains them and questions have been added, P sometimes keeps W’s old numbering, as in distinction 3, question 5: Hic quarto . . . (This shows that Gonteri based his Parisian Sentences commentary at least in part upon the written Barcelona version.) No fewer than 15 questions from Marchia’s Book II are present in Gonteri’s text (further research may uncover more). Unlike in the case of Book I, however, these questions are usually announced as such in the margins, as the question list shows. The questions come from the most popular version of Marchia’s commentary, the one stemming from his Parisian lectures. Gonteri’s procedure here is to abbreviate Marchia’s text, often severely, but copying verbatim from what he considers the most important statements. For example, Book II, dist. 2, qu. 16, of Gonteri’s text is taken from Marchia’s very interesting book II, qu. 16, on the place and motion of angels. Schabel has edited article 5, on the possibility of instantaneous motion:

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Gonteri, II Sent., dist. 2, qu. 16, art. 5 (P 30rb)

Marchia, II Sent., qu. 16, art. 5 (ed. Schabel)72

Quantum ad 5, utrum angelus possit moveri in instanti, dico breviter quod angelus virtute propria non potest moveri naturaliter in instanti. Quod probo sic: illud quod in eodem instanti movetur de loco ad locum per medium in eodem instanti est in termino a quo et in termino ad quem; sed angelus non potest esse simul virtute propria in pluribus locis sibi aequalibus; ergo non potest de loco sibi aequaliter proportionato moveri ad alium distantem ab illo loco priori.

Quantum ad 5, utrum . . . angelus possit moveri in instanti . . . dico . . . quod angelus virtute sua non potest naturaliter moveri localiter in instanti. Quod probo sic: illud quod in eodem instanti movetur de loco ad locum per medium in eodem instanti est in termino a quo et in termino ad quem; sed angelus non potest simul esse in pluribus locis sibi aequalibus; ergo non potest de loco sibi aequali et proportionato moveri in instanti ad alium distantem ab illo loco priori.

But this is only about 80 words from a total of some 1,200 (that is to say, about 6.5% of the total) and from a fascinating article that is simply not reflected in the paragraph Gonteri copied. Gonteri includes (at least) 15 questions from Gerard of Odonis’s commentary on Book II. We have edited Odonis’s Book II, dist. 1, part 1, qu. 2, which corresponds to Gonteri’s Book II, dist. 1, qu. 22. Again, Gonteri’s choice is impressive, since this question asks “whether before its creation a creature has any being distinct from the being of its cause,” and Odonis outlines nine sorts of being that a creature has before creation, in addition to the one being it receives at creation itself. Of the over 300 lines of text in this realist question, Gonteri copies verbatim about 35%, except for transitional statements where he abbreviates, saying for example, et sic de aliis. These ten modes of being are explained in the first 35% of the question, of which Gonteri copies a full 70%. In the second 35% of the question Odonis presents and responds to some objections; Gonteri omits this section entirely. Gonteri then abbreviates heavily in the last 30% of the question, incorporating only about 30% of that section. Of the three manuscripts preserving Odonis’s text, the witness in Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, CCl 291, belongs to the family from which the questions in Pamplona 5 were taken. This may be significant, because although Klosterneuburg and the other two manuscripts,

72 Chris Schabel, “Francis of Marchia,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/archive/fall2007/entries/francis-marchia/).

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Valencia, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 200 and Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, E.98 carry the same basic text, usually verbatim, there are occasionally variants in V and S that seem to reflect the reworking of the author. Since Odonis lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1327–28 (and perhaps 1326–27), having lectured a decade or so earlier at Toulouse, it is tempting to suggest that Klosterneuburg represents the Toulouse text, to which Gonteri had access between 1322 and 1325. The problem is that Book II in Klosterneuburg has an explicit dating it to 1327 and Paris: In Whose honor and glory are completed the reportationes on the second book of the Sentences according to the lecture (lectura) of Brother Gerard Odonis of the Order of Friars Minor, bachelor in theology reading the Sentences at Paris in the year of the Incarnation 1327 . . .73

It is possible that the explicit was merely copied from another witness, but the most likely explanation is that Gonteri’s Book II in the Pamplona version was composed, as one might be tempted to deduce from the explicit in Pamplona, in 1327 or 1328, while Odonis was still bachelor of the Sentences in Paris.74 Book III Book III survives in the Lüneburg and Pamplona manuscripts, both witnessing the same redaction. It follows the same structure as for the previous books. Each distinction begins with a divisio textus for the Lombard, which is followed by one or more questions. The lead-in to the first question often specifies the thematic arrangement of the questions in the distinction. The questions frequently raise opinions of contemporaries, to whom Gonteri usually refers simply as aliqui, but sometimes by using their names (for example, Scotus, Auriol, Marchia, Meyronnes). In its surviving form, Book III belongs to the same redaction as the Paris redaction of Books I and II; thus, in dist. 1, qu. 3, Gonteri refers to Book I, dist. 34 and his arguments against Benedict of Assignano, establishing beyond question the Parisian pedigree of this redaction.75

73

Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM,” 149. Pamplona even calls Odonis a “doctor” in the text itself, where “Geraldus” is in the margin. This would entail a terminus post quem of 1328 for Pamplona. 75 See Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 225. 74

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Further evidence for the Parisian dating of the redaction of Book III comes from Gonteri’s mention of a controversy involving the opinion of Francis of Meyronnes, who, according to Gonteri, argued that God, according to his absolute power (de potentia Dei absoluta), could make it so that there existed real relations of maternity and filiation between the Virgin Mary and John the Evangelist; that is, that, just as Christ’s words at the Last Supper could make bread and wine into real body and blood, so could his words on the cross make Mary and John into real mother and son: In this question, the opinion of Master Francis of Meyronnes was that, by the absolute power of God, it could come about that Christ, the Son of God, in saying those words from John 19[:26]: Woman behold your son, etc., could have made him to be the son of the Blessed Virgin, and the Blessed Virgin to be his mother, for the reasons touched upon in the opposing arguments. But some presumptuous and fatuous people have taken this as the occasion to dare to assert even to the people that, in fact, Christ, by saying those words, made himself the true brother of St. John the Evangelist, and made St. John the true son of the Blessed Virgin and the Blessed Virgin to be his mother, just as in the supper, by saying, “This is my body,” he made his body to exist truly under the species of bread.76

Gonteri asserts that Meyronnes never took this last step of moving from de potentia Dei absoluta to de facto, so that those who attribute it to Meyronnes do so wrongly.77 Nevertheless, Gonteri rejects even Meyronnes’s view.

76 L 144va, P 182vb: “In ista quaestione opinio Magistri Francisci de Mayronis fuit quod de potentia Dei absoluta potuit fieri quod Christus Filius Dei, dicendo illa verba quae leguntur Io. 19, Mulier ecce filius tuus etc., potuit facere quod esset filius beatae virginis et beata virgo mater eius propter rationes tactas in oppositum.—Aliqui autem praesumptuosi et fatui ex verbis eius occasionem accipientes in novis et vanis gloriantes ausi fuerunt asserere etiam popularibus quod de facto Christus dicendo illa verba fecit se verum fratrem beati Iohanni Evangelistae et beatum Iohannem verum filium virginis beatae et beatam virginem esse matrem eius veram sicut dicendo in cena Hoc est corpus meum fecit sub specie panis esse verum corpus eius.” 77 Jean Noël Claquot, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire littéraire des dix-sept provinces des Pays-Bas, de la principauté de Liège, et de quelques contrées voisines, vol. 11 (Louvain, 1768), 301–04, treats André Boucher, Rationes contra Transubstantionem corporis S. Joannis Evangelistae in Corpus Christi quam Bonetus et Maronius (a) factam volebant per verba Christi in cruce pendentis: Mulier ecce filius tuus, where this opinion is attributed to Meyronnes and Nicolas Bonet (Franciscan master of theology in Paris, ca. 1333). In addition, the fifteenth-century Venetian humanist and theologian Dominicus de Dominicis apparently authored his Tractatus de relationibus against Vorillon, who would have been defending Meyronnes’s position. Curiously, the printed edition

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If there was a Barcelona version of Book III, it, too, would not have had entirely identical questions with the Paris version that we actually possess. In the Pamplona (that is, Paris) version of Book II, dist. 27, qu. 1, “Whether a virtuous habit in the soul is an absolute form . . .,” we are simply told to “seek this question in Book III, dist. 23, qu. 1,” and indeed that question in the redaction here turns out to be “whether a virtuous habit is an absolute or relative form.” The Wrocław (that is, Barcelona) version of Book II, dist. 27, qu. 1 (fols. 638rb–641ra), on the other hand, has the same question title as its Pamplona counterpart, but whereas the Pamplona version refers the reader to Book III for the question, Wrocław provides the actual text of the question. This gives us good reason to think that Gonteri moved material around from at least Book II to Book III, when writing his Paris version of his Sentences commentary. Book III refers to Books I and II in the past tense, and to Book IV in the future (for instance, ut habet videri), suggesting that this last book had not yet been written. Since Book III is incomplete—both manuscript witnesses end at the same place in distinction 24—it is unlikely that Gonteri ever got around to Book IV in this redaction.

of Meyronnes’s Sentences commentary does not contain this view; most likely the discussion relates to question 52 in the unprinted commentary on Book III witnessed by MS. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 995 (fol. 56ra): “Quaeritur, utrum Christus in cruce moriens potuerit facere, quod b. Johannes evangelista fuerit vere filius Virginis benedictae.” See Heribert Roßmann, “Die Sentenzenkommentare des Franz von Meyronnes OFM,” Franziskanische Studien 53 (1971): 129–227, at 216. In the Venice 1493 edition of Meyronnes’s Sermones de sanctis, one finds five sermons on Saint John the Evangelist: (1) Dilectus mihi et ego illi qui pascitur inter lilia donec aspirent dies et inclinentur umbrae (fols. 28ra–32vb); (2) Ego Ioannes vidi civitatem sanctam (fols. 32vb–34va); (3) Gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est (fols. 34va–36rb); (4) Aquila grandis magnarum alarum longo membrorum . . . in urbem negociatorum posuit illam (fols. 147va–150va); (5) Viae eius viae pulchrae et omnes semitae illius pacificae (fols. 150va–151rb). Sermon 1 states explicitly that John “fuit factus filius virginis adoptivus sicut Christus naturalis” (fol. 30rb); sermon 4 as printed contains a require referring the reader to the same passage in sermon 1. Sermon 2, on the other hand, is more ambiguous, stating, “Primum fuit quia factus fuit virginis filius ex singularissima gratia, sicut Christus erat eius filius ex humana natura, per verbum Christi suo sermone divina efficientis, iuxta illud Ipse dixit et facta sunt” (fol. 33vb). The printed text of sermon 3 refers the reader to sermon 2. Sermon 5 is likewise ambiguous: “Quartum, quia propter suam singularem virginitatem matri Domini fuit commissum quod nulli alteri Apostolorum concessum est, Io. XIX capitulo dicit discipulo Ecce mater tua” (fol. 150vb). So, whatever Meyronnes may have argued in the classroom about the possibility of John the Evangelist’s being made a natural son of Mary, the possibility or actuality does not enter into his sermons as printed.

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The copyist of the Lüneburg manuscript apparently sought to complete Book III with another Sentences commentary. Corresponding to distinction 25, he copies what is marked as a quaestio de fide by Ger. (Odonis?); after this question follow additional questions on the theme; then questions on distinction 26, and so on until the end of Book III (distinction 40). The style is completely different from that of Gonteri, with very few questions per distinction, no divisio textus of Peter Lombard’s text, and few references to the distinction being treated. In confirmation of the fact that the material in Lüneburg from dist. 25 on does not belong to Gonteri, a reference to distinction 27 does not match satisfactorily the treatment there. In Book III, dist. 9, qu. 1, Gonteri argues: Charity (caritas) that is acquired by behavior and the frequency of acts motivated by prudence or acquired faith can be called and is friendship (amicitia), which is the most perfect virtue, as will be said below, in distinction 27.78

In distinction 27 of the continuation in Lüneburg (utrum sit aliqua virtus inclinans hominem ad Deum super omnia diligendum), the closest parallel is the response to the first argument non: if such a virtue existed, it would be friendship, which only holds between equals; hence man and God can never be friends.79 Replying to this argument, the author admits that acquired charity is friendship, but only in a broad sense, and makes no mention of it as the most perfect virtue: To the first argument, when it is said that, if there were some virtue, it would be friendship, but friendship is not there, the major premise is conceded, namely, that friendship, taken broadly, itself inclines man to loving God above all, and this friendship is charity. And then, to the proof of the minor premise, when it is said, “friendship is only between those who are in some way equal,” I say that this is true of the friendship

78 L 114rb–va, P 147rb: “Caritas autem acquisita ex more et frequentia actuum in ordine ad prudentiam vel fidem acquisitam ut mensuram directivam mobilem potest dici et est amicitia quae est virtus perfectissimum, ut dicetur infra, d. 27.” 79 L 160va: “Circa distinctionem 27 quaeritur utrum sit aliqua virtus inclinans hominem ad Deum super omnia diligendum. Et videtur quod non, quia si esset virtus, illa esset amicitia; sed amicitia non est ad Deum; ergo nulla virtus talis est. Probo minorem per Philosophum, IX Ethicorum, qui dicit quod amicitia est aliquo modo inter aequales; sed Deus non est aequalis amanti; ergo ad Deum non est amicitia, nec per consequens aliqua virtus inclinans hominem ad Deum super omnia diligendum.”

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of which Aristotle speaks, but when friendship is taken in a broad way, it can exist between unequals.80

Therefore, it is unlikely that the continuation contained in Lüneburg is the text that Gonteri had in mind in his internal reference in distinction 9. Thus, its authorship is uncertain. Book IV In his commentaries on all three books, Gonteri refers to a commentary on Book IV. Sometimes these references are in the past tense, and at others they imply the future. Doucet suggests that Gonteri’s remarks in the past tense refer to the Barcelona text, and the future to a putative Parisian text.81 Both forms, however, are found in both versions of Gonteri’s text. For example, both the Pamplona and Wrocław versions of Book II, dist. 7, qu. 2 include the reference “sicut habet videri quarto libro, distinctione 16” (P 51rb, W 466rb), while for dist. 12, qu. 6 of the same book, they both read, “sicut declaravi libro quarto, distinctione 6, ergo etc.” (P 65vb, W 513vb). In any case, if this commentary was ever composed, it has not yet been found.82 In addition to references to Book IV, Gonteri also mentions a Tractatus de beatitudine, which he also occasionally calls “quaedam quaestio disputata super quartum.” This text would be different from his commentary on Book IV, and in any case has not been identified.

80 L 162ra: “Et secundum hoc ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum, quando dicitur quod ‘si esset aliqua virtus, illa esset amicitia; sed ista non est’, conceditur maior, quod large sumpta amicitia ipsa inclinat hominem ad Deum summe diligendum, et ista est caritas. Et tunc ad probationem minoris, quando dicitur ‘amicitia est aliquo modo inter aequales,’ dico quod verum est de amicitia de qua loquitur Aristoteles, sed largo modo sumpta potest esse inter inaequales.” 81 See Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 225. 82 The commentary secundum alios on Book IV in MS. Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 169, fols. 3rb–136rb, could possibly be Gonteri’s. The commentary is a compilation by a Scotist active in the mid–1320s, surely at Paris. (In private correspondence, Anja Lehtinen dates the manuscript itself to Paris in the 1320s on codicological grounds.) It is a blend of the commentaries on that book of Landulph Caracciolo and Francis of Meyronnes, preceded in the manuscript by an excerpt from Hugh of Novocastro, and Gonteri is known to have employed Meyronnes and Novocastro elsewhere. The collatio has the lemma “Quartus fluvius ipse est Eufrates,” from Genesis; Eufrates could be an anagram for Aufredus. The author even cites his own commentary on Book III with words that we have just seen Gonteri use: “ut habet videri in tertio.” There is no other evidence at present to support the identification of the author with Gonteri, however, and checking cross-references has produced negative results.

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Since both versions mention this quaestio, it must have existed before Gonteri’s Barcelona compilation.83 Conclusion In the Sentences commentaries of Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito, substantially the same text serves different purposes. In itself, Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I (and perhaps on Book II) is a rare secular witness to a genre dominated by the mendicant orders, and it reveals the thought of a bachelor heavily influenced by Scotus in the period immediately following the Subtle Doctor’s lectures. A decade and a half later, Harclay’s text, with its general support of Scotus’s views, served the Franciscan Aufredo Gonteri Brito’s ambitious project of compiling into a single Sentences commentary a comprehensive collection of doctrine roughly in line with Scotus’s views. Initially while lector at the convent of Barcelona in 1322, and in a revised form at Paris starting in 1325, Gonteri combined a classic divisio textus of the Lombard’s text with questions from Henry of Harclay, as well as from many Franciscan thinkers, to update and defend the thought of Scotus against his more recent critics.

83 See Amorós, “Anfredo Gontero,” 560–61; Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist,” 225–7; Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 622.

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Appendix Nearly all of our work on the question lists was done from microfilms. We have included very few variants in the lists; basically the only times we have included them are when they reveal structural differences between manuscript versions of the same text (for example, missing questions). We have normalized orthography throughout. After nearly all questions we have noted in parentheses the initial answer to the question posed, usually either “Sic” or “Non,” in order to indicate the general thrust of the discussion. Thereafter, in square brackets we note where in the manuscripts the question can be found, followed by explicit citations in the text or the margins of medieval university theologians, as well as notes about any major anomalies in the text of the question in any particular manuscript. We make no claims to having been exhaustive with the citations. Finally, if a question has been published, we note that fact. The following abbreviations have been used to indicate the editions: Doucet = Victorin Doucet, “Der unbekannte Skotist des Vaticanus Lat. 1113, Fr. Anfredus Gonteri O.F.M. (1325),” Franziskanische Studien 25 (1938): 201–40 Dumont = Stephen D. Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), 39–125 Friedman = Russell L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 72 (2001): 89– 168 Friedman/Schabel = Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, The Filioque in Parisian Theology from Scotus to the Black Death. With Texts and Studies on Sentences Commentaries, 1308–1348 (Louvain, forthcoming) Henninger = Mark G. Henninger, “Henry of Harclay’s Quaestio on Relations in His Sentences Commentary,” in Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J., ed. William J. Carroll and John J. Furlong (New York, 1994), 237–54 Köstler = Hermann Köstler, Gotteserkenntnis im Sentenzenkommentar Heinrichs von Harclay (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Innsbruck, 1978) Richter = Vladimir Richter, Studien zum literarischen Werk von Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1988), 86–94 Rossini/Schabel = Marco Rossini and Chris Schabel, “Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists. Texts on Future Contingents by Alexander of Alessandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005): 237–338 Schabel = Chris Schabel, “Aufredo Gonteri Brito secundum Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents,” Disputatio 2 (1997): 159–96

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Schmaus = Michael Schmaus, “Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto. Intorno alla prescienza di Dio,” Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 24 (1932): 327–55 The question lists are arranged in the following order: (1) Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito, In primum librum Sententiarum (2) Henry of Harclay (?), In secundum librum Sententiarum (BAV, Borghese 346) (3) Aufredo Gonteri Brito, In secundum librum Sententiarum84 (4) Aufredo Gonteri Brito, In tertium librum Sententiarum In the question lists we use the following symbols: x is added to the text by the present editors [x] x is deleted from the text by the present editors * lectio incerta

84 The microfilm of Wrocław from which we worked is in places (especially toward the end of Book II) extremely difficult to read. For this manuscript there is therefore somewhat greater uncertainty in our readings and foliation with regard to this question list (our foliation, it should be noted, differs considerably at times from earlier literature). We have not been exhaustive in our references between Gonteri’s commentary on Book II and the commentary found in Borghese 346, but have indicated obvious overlaps.

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(1) Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito, In primum librum Sententiarum Henry of Harclay, Prologue to Distinction 3 Harclay 1, Prologue, qu. 1: Utrum cognitio quam potest viator in via habere de veritatibus mere theologicis necessariis sit scientia proprie dicta, et dico “veritates theologicae necessariae” propter quasdam veritates contingentes theologicas quarum non potest esse scientia, ut Deum esse incarnatum et passum, et huiusmodi, sed est quaestio de veritatibus necessariis simpliciter, ut est ista: Deus trinus et unus (Sic) [C 1ra–6vb; H deest]. (Subquestion, 2va: Quaestio ad hoc facta est ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et personis praeter incarnationem necessariis rationibus, auctoritatibus Sacrae Scripturae probari possunt.) Ga mg.2; articulum episcopi 152; Lyncon. Harclay 2, Prologue, qu. 2: Utrum theologia viatoris consideret Deum absoluta ratione deitatis vel sub alia ratione comparativa ut ratione Glorificatoris et huiusmodi (Non sub ratione deitatis) [C 6vb–9ra; H deest]. in Scripto super I Sent. Harclay 3, Prologus, qu. 3: Utrum illa scientia sit una (Sic) [C 9ra–11vb; H 13ra–15vb (part)]. (Subquestion: Iuxta hoc utrum sit practica vel speculativa.); opinio G mg.2; opinio doctorum antiquorum Alexandri, Bonaventurae, Fratris Thomae; in principio Scripti et Summae; prima parte Summae, q. 64, a. 1. Harclay 4, dist. 1, qu. 1: Utrum solo Deo sit fruendum (Non) [C 11vb–12ra; H 15vb]. Harclay 5, dist. 1, qu. 2: Utrum sola creatura rationalis beata fruatur (Non) [C 12ra–vb; H 15vb–17ra]. Harclay 6, dist. 1, qu. 3: Utrum dilectione naturali homo diligat se ipsum plus quam Deum (Sic) [C 12vb–13vb; H 17ra–18ra]. (Subquestion: Utrum aliquis maxime debeat se ipsum amare.) Go 10 Quod., q. 1/7. Harclay 7, dist. 1, qu. 4: Utrum fruitio sit idem quod delectatio (Sic) [C 13vb– 14rb; H 18rb–vb]. Harclay 8, dist. 2, qu. 1: Utrum necessaria ratione et evidenti possit demonstrari quod in entibus sit aliquod ens simpliciter primum a nullo alio creatum (Non) [C 14rb–15ra; H 18vb–19va]. Ed. Richter, pp. 86–8 (part) in diversis locis . . . 5 vias. Harclay 9, dist. 2, qu. 2: Utrum prima causa sit infinita (Non) [C 15ra–17ra; H deest]. Ed. Richter, pp. 88–90 (part) ; alibi; Contra gentiles, libro I, c. 43. Harclay 10, dist. 2, qu. 3: Utrum primum sit tantum unum numero (Non) [C 17ra–vb; H 19va–20rb]. Ed. Richter, pp. 90–4. Harclay 11, dist. 2, qu. 4: Utrum distinctio attributorum in Deo accipiatur per comparationem essentiae divinae ad creaturas distinctas, vel per comparationem ad intrinseca ipsi Deo (Per comparationem ad extrinseca) [C 17vb–18ra; H 20rb–vb]. Ed. Köstler.

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Harclay 12, dist. 2, qu. 5: Quaeritur utrum illae perfectiones attributales sint unius rationis in Deo et creaturis (Sic) [C 18ra–20rb; H 20vb–23vb]. (Subquestion: Iuxta hoc utrum ens dictum de substantia et accidente importet unam rationem communem substantiae et accidenti. (Sic)) Doctor S/G 32. Ed. Köstler. Harclay 13, dist. 2, qu. 6: Utrum in divinis sint tres personae realiter distinctae (Non) [C 20rb–21rb; H 23vb–25ra]. ut patebit in secundo; habetur col. 14; d. 2, col. 17 in principio; in Quolibet v* q.* 5 et d. 2, col. 28; patet responsio d. 2, col. XI ad signum hoc Q (xi . . . q] ix H). Harclay 14, dist. 3, qu. 1: Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris ex puris naturalibus (Non) [C 21rb–22va; H 25rb–26ra] (C incorporates subquestion corresponding to Harclay 17, d. 4, q. 2, in H: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.) Rabi Moyse libro I De duce neutrorum. Ed. Köstler. Harclay 15, dist. 3, qu. 2: Utrum potentiae animae sint idem realiter cum essentia animae (Sic) [C 22va–25ra; H 26ra–28vb]. (H ends in mid-column, “Nichil deficit . . .” Then more text fills the rest of the column, with: opinio Henrici de Gandavo mg.2) (Cf. Gonteri, II Sent., dist. 16, qu. 2) Godofredus 8 Quo. q. 6; doctor super 4 Sent., d. 44, a. 3, q.* 2,* ubi quaerit utrum in anima separata remaneant actus potentiae sensitivae; opinio H Quo. 3, q. 15. Aufredo Gonteri Brito, Prologue to Distinction 3 Gonteri Principium A: Transite ad me omnes . . . [A deest; W 1ra–va]. Gonteri Principium B: Quoniam, ut ait Beatus Ambrosius super epistolas Pauli . . . [A 1ra; W 1va–2ra]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 1: Utrum virtute luminis naturalis intellectus homo viator possit acquirere certam et infallibilem notitiam de aliquo ente cognoscibili sine illuminatione luminis supernaturalis (Non) [A 1ra–3ra; W 2ra–5ra] Doctor (several times). Gonteri, Prologue, qu. A2: Secundo quaeritur adhuc in generali utrum in processu scientifico veritas conclusionis sit alia a veritate principii* causata* realiter* ab ea (Sic) [A 3ra–4vb]. W2: Secundo quaeritur utrum intellectus eodem actu intelligat principium et terminos principii [W 5ra–va]. ut dixi in quadam quaestione disputata super eis* in tractatu de beatudine. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. W3: Tertio quaero utrum intellectus uno et eodem actu intelligat principium et conclusionem datam* a principio [W 5va–8vb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 4 (A3): Deinde/Tertio quaeritur adhuc in generali utrum discursus requiratur necessario ad notititam scientificam conclusionum ut distinguitur contra notitiam principiorum (Non) [A 4vb–5va; W 8vb–9vb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 5 (A4): Consequenter/Quarto adhuc in generali quaeritur utrum de ratione notitiae scientificae sit habere principia evidentia (Non) [A 5va–6rb; W 9vb–11rb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 6 (A5): Consequenter/Quinto quaeritur de unitate scientiae in generali . . . et quaero utrum de ratione unius scientiae sit habere unum subiectum primum contentivum virtualiter omnium veritatum

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scibilium in illa scientia (Non) [A 6rb–7vb; W 11rb–13vb]. Dicit Lincol’ primo Posteriorum; Aureoli primo mg.; ad tertium adduco contra hanc conclusionem argumenta cuiusdam doctoris qui ubique nititur reprobare venerabilem [doctorem et add. W] fratrem Iohannem Scotum, quem pro posse quasi ubique sequor, quia ipsum diu audivi et dicta eius catholica et rationabilia et minus calumniabilia recte intelligentibus invenio. Arguit ergo unus doctor contra hanc conclusionem primo sic . . . (mg. infra2: Nota ibi supra quomodo doctor iste se declarat inimicum Petri Aureoli et discipulum fidelissimum Scoti quantum quod* illum constat* extollere); secundum Doctorem primum et sequentes eum; instantia* Aureoli mg.; declaravi alias in quadam quaestione de quolibet. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 7 (A6): Consequenter/Sexto quaeritur utrum unitas scientiae proprie dictae sumatur ex unitate rationis formalis unius obiecti virtualiter contentivi veritatum scibilium in illa scientia (Non) [A 7vb–9vb; W 13vb–17ra]. Opinio tertia P Aureoli, prologo* q. 8 mg.: Quidam novus doctor dicit; arguo secundum opinionem Doctoris Subtilis, quem ubi possum sequor; Secunda opinio H mg.; Opinio tertia Sco mg.; ideo dico secundum opinionem Doctoris Subtilis. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 8 (A7): Consequenter/Septimum quaeritur adhuc in generali de scientia utrum aliqua scientia possit acquiri in aliquo sine logica (Non) [A 9vb–10va; W 17ra–18rb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 9 (A8): Deinde in speciali quaeritur circa scientiam theologiae quantum ad eius causam formalem, et primo utrum de Deo sub ratione deitatis sit possibilis acquiri notitia scientifica proprie dicta quantum ad veritates intrinsecas et necessarias scibiles de eo (Non) [A 10va–11rb; W 18rb–19vb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 10 (A9): Consequenter/Secundo quaero specialiter utrum huiusmodi notitia scientifica possibilis haberi de Deo sub ratione deitatis etc. possit a Deo revelari et communicari alicui viatori manenti viatori (Non) [A 11rb–13rb; W 19vb–24ra]. Aureoli mg.; ut dicit Doctor Subtilis, quem sequor; Doctor. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 11 (A10): Deinde/Tertio quaero in speciali utrum notitia scientifica de Deo secundum rationem deitatis quantum ad veritates suas intrinsecas et necessarias possibilis communicari viatori inquantum/ manenti viatori possit stare cum fide in eodem intellectu respectu earundem veritatum (Non) [A 13rb–15rb; W 24ra–27vb]. Frater Thomas, doctor venerabilis, secunda secundae, q. 5, articulo primo; argumenta quorundam Solemnium Doctorum (Godofridus mg.). Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 12 (A11): Consequenter/Quarto quaeritur in speciali utrum homo virtute luminis naturalis intellectus ex sensibus possit acquirere de Deo notitiam illam scientificam quantum ad veritates necessarias et intrinsecas de eo secundum rationem deitatis sine infusione vel influentia divina speciali (Sic) [A 15rb–16va; W 27vb–30va]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 13 (A12): Ultimo de possibilitate notitiae possibilis haberi de Deo etc. quaeritur adhuc in speciali de eius veritate utrum aliqua notitia supernaturalis de Deo quantum ad veritates intrinsecas et necessarias sit homini viatori necessaria ad quam non potest attingere naturaliter (Non) [A 16va–17va; W 30va–32va]. Praeterea rationes quas adducit

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Doctor Subtilis contra philosophos (mg. A: Vide Scotum, primo libro, q. prima, et 4, d. 49, q. 8, ubi videtur contradicere sibi); Opinio H mg.; Doctor Subtilis (2x) libro 4, d. 49, a. 8; doctor iste primo libro, q. prima. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 14 (A13): Consequenter/Sexto quaeritur adhuc in speciali utrum notitia theologica de Deo et veritatibus theologicis necessariis, ut quod Deus sit trinus et unus, prout habetur in Scriptura Sacra, sit proprie scientia in intellectu hominis viatoris (Sic) [A 17vb–19va; W 32vb–36rb]. Circa primum dicit unus doctor (Opinio G** mg.); Alius doctor dicit (Opinio H mg.); Alii novi doctores distinguunt (Opinio tertia Dura mg.); alius doctor novus; Nunc recitanda est et declaranda opinio Doctoris Subtilis quem, ut possum convenienter, communiter sequi volo (Scotus mg.); Doctor . . . licet in quadam falsa reportatione tertii, d. 24; Item, in articulo episcopi Parisiensis excommunicato 149 et 150; Item, contra dicta Doctoris Subtilis in quinta et ultima opinione recitata et declarata arguit unus doctor sic (Contra Scotum mg.). Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 15 (A: “Qu. 15”!): Consequenter quaero propter opinionem F utrum theologia prout traditur in Sacra Scriptura sit scientia proprie dicta procedens ex principiis per se notis (Non) [A 19va– 20vb; W 36rb–38ra]. In ista quaestione, quae diffuse mota est propter prolixitatem vitandam, est unus modus dicendi qui dicit (Opinio Francisci mg.) (Cf. Francis of Marchia, Scriptum, Prologue, qu. 3). Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 16 (A: “Qu. 16”): Ultimo circa causam formalem theologicae notitiae in speciali quaeritur utrum notitia theologica prout traditur in Sacra Scriptura sit proprie sapientia (Non) [A 20vb–21va; W 38ra–39va]. Ad quaestionem respondet unus doctor (Opinio Pe mg.). Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 17 (A16): Circa causam materialem notitiae theologicae et obiectivam consequenter inquirendum est primo utrum Deus vel aliquid aliud a Deo sit subiectum in notitia theologica (Deus non sit subiectum) [A 21va–22rb; W 39va–41ra]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 18 (A: “Qu. 18”): Consequenter circa hunc articulum quaeritur utrum Deus sit subiectum in notitia theologica sub ratione absoluta suae deitatis (Non) [A 22rb–24ra; W 41ra–44ra]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 19 (A: “Qu. 19”): Circa causam finalem notitiae theologicae consequenter inquirendum est, et quaero utrum finis per se et principalis notitiae theologicae traditae in Sacra Scriptura sit cognitio Dei vel eius dilectio (Cognitio Dei) [A 24ra–va; W 44ra–vb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 20 (A: “Qu. 20”): Ad videndum autem utrum notitia theologica de Deo in Sacra Scriptura sit speculativa vel practica, quaeritur ideo circa causam finalem huius notitiae theologicae utrum dilectio Dei, ad quam notitia theologica principaliter sicut ad finem ordinatur, ut patet ex quaestione praecedenti, sit vere et proprie praxis (Sic) [A 24va–26va; W 44vb–48rb]. Contra Scotum mg.2; Contra Scotum mg.2 Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 21 (A: “Qu. 21”): Consequenter quaeritur utrum notitia practica distinguatur a notitia speculativa penes finem vel penes suum obiectum (Penes finem) [A 26va–28rb; W 48rb–51va]. ad argumenta Doctoris; Alius doctor (P.* Aureoli mg.).

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Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 22 (A: “Qu. 22”): Visum est quod notitia practica habitualis distinguitur a speculativa ex obiecto et ex fine, sed ex obiecto primo vel ex fine in quantum habet rationem obiecti. Nunc consequenter quaeritur utrum finis ille notitiae practicae sit operatio vel actus intrinsecus intellectus elicitus vel actus imperatus sive directus (Sic) [A 28rb–29rb; W 51va–53va]. P. Aureoli mg.2; argumentum novi doctoris. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 23 (A: “Qu. 23”): Consequenter quaero utrum practicum et speculativum sint differentiae essentiales et per se notitiae intellectivae in communi ipsius per se et essentialier divisivae et specierum sub ea constitutivae (Sic) [A 29rb–30va; W 53va–55vb]. in tertia ratione Doctoris. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 24 (A: “Qu. 24”): Ultimo quaeritur utrum notitia theologica in Scriptura Sacra tradita sit speculativa vel practica (Practica) [A 30va–33ra; W 55vb–60ra]. Opinio Scoti mg.2; Ista opinio Subtilissimi Doctoris. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 25 (A: “Qu. 25”): Ultimo de quantitate et proprietate sive habitudine notitiae theologicae ad alias scientias quaero utrum ipsa sit subalterna metaphysicae (Sic) [A 33ra; W 60ra]. A (om. W): In hac quaestione, propter defectum mei ingenii, contradico magistro meo, coactus rationibus ex dictis Aristotelis formatis, quia non video quod possim sustinere conclusionem suam quin contradicam Philosopho in Physicis, quod mihi non est conveniens. In hoc quilibet mihi parcat portat*. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 26 (A: “Qu. 26”): Secundo quaero utrum sit subalternata scientiae beatorum (Sic) [A 33ra; W 60ra–b]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 27 (A: “Qu. 27”): Tertio quaero utrum notitia theologica subalternet sibi metaphysicam et alias scientias speculativas (Sic) [A 33ra; W 60rb]. Gonteri, Prologue, qu. 28 (A: “Qu. 28”): Quarto quaero utrum notitia theologica subalternet sibi aliquam scientiam practicam (Sic) [A 33ra–34ra; W 60rb–61vb]. Gonteri, Distinctio 1: Veteris ac novae legis . . . [A 34ra; W 61vb–62ra]. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 1: Utrum solus Deus sit obiectum per se fruitionis (Non) [A 34ra–35rb; 62ra–64ra]. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 2: Consequenter quaeritur utrum Deus unus et trinus sit unum obiectum fruitionis unius tantum vel plurium (Plures) [A 35rb–37va; W 64ra–68rb]. unus Doctor Subtilis (Scotus mg.2); Scotus contra se mg.2; Contra opinionem huius subtilis doctoris arguit unus doctor (P.* Aureoli* mg.); Ad argumenta secundi doctoris (Tertio* ad argumenta Aurioli mg.). Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 3: Consequenter quaeritur de obiecto fruitionis utrum sola creatura rationalis beata fruatur (Non) [A 37va–38rb; W 68rb–69va]. Cf. Harclay 5*. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 4: Consequenter quaerendum est de frui quantum ad eius quidditatem et naturam utrum fruitio sit operatio elicita in voluntate distincta realiter a dilectione (Non) [A 38rb–39vb; W 69va–72rb]. Durandus. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 5: Ad videndum modum quo voluntas creata se habet in habitudine ad finem ultimum in fruendo eo utrum necessario vel contingenter, quaero unam quaestionem primam propter quaedam dicta a

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quodam, utrum voluntas creata ante quemcumque actum suum elicitum unionis vel fruitionis sit formaliter libera (Non) [A 39vb–40vb; W 72rb– 74ra]. audivi quemdam dicentem voluntatem ante actum suum elicitum nullo modo esse liberum formaliter, sed tantum virtualiter; sed contra istum modum dicendi novum. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 6: Consequenter quaeritur de frui comparando ipsum ad subiectum et obiectum quantum ad consequentem eius proprietatem et modum, utrum fine ultimo apprehenso ab intellectu viatoris in universali vel particulari secundum rationem summi boni voluntas necessario fruatur eo (Non) [A 40vb–43ra; W 74ra–77vb]. instatur a Doctore Subtili; aliter instat unus doctor novus; alius doctor novus instat aliter; secundum argumenta cuiusdam doctoris; per rationes unius alterius qui non fuit doctor; Robertus Cowton. Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 7: Consequenter quaeritur utrum fine ultimo apprehenso ab intellectu clare, scilicet Deo viso intuitive sicut videtur a beatis, sit necessarium voluntatem frui eo (Non) [A 43ra–44va; W 77vb–80vb]. secundum mentem et processum Subtilis Doctoris; instat unus doctor novus; arguo contra primam conclusionem per rationes cuiusdam doctoris novi (P. Aureoli mg.). Gonteri, dist. 1, qu. 8: Postea quaerendum est de ipso uti et quantum ad eius obiectum et subiectum, et quantum ad eius quidditatem et ipsius frui distinctionem, et circa haec omnia moveo unam quaestionem: utrum homo possit bene uti omni re (Sic) [A 44va–45va; W 80vb]. Gonteri, Distinctio 2: Haec itaque . . . [A 45va; W 82rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 1: Utrum ex effectibus et causis in ordine entium possit demonstrative probari esse aliquid ens increatum primum simpliciter et independens actualiter existens, quod ‘Deum’ dicimus (Non) [A 45vb– 46va; W 82va–83vb]. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 2: Secundo quaerendum est utrum possit demonstrari ens primum independens et increatum, quod ‘Deum’ dicimus, esse causam primam omnium aliorum a se in quolibet genere causae non includente imperfectionem, quod dico propter causalitatem materiae et formae informantis (Non) [A 46va–47va; W 83vb–86rb]. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 3: Tertio quaeritur utrum possit demonstrari Deum esse infinitae virtutis et perfectionis (Non) [A 47va–49rb; W 86rb–89rb]. doctor unus; alii subtilius et evidentius probant. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 4: Consequenter quaero utrum ex infinitate motus extensiva possit probari virtus primi motoris infinita intensive (Sic) [A 49rb; W 89rb]. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum ex debita velocitate et finitate intensiva potest concludi virtus primi motoris esse finita intensive (Sic) [A 49rb–va; W 89rb–vb]. Ad quaestionem illam dicit Fr ut alias audistis quod ex determinata et finita velocitate et finita quantitate motus et mobilis potest concludi virtus motoris esse finita; ut dictum est in arguendo contra opinionem F. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 6: Deinde quaero utrum potentia motiva infinita secundum quod infinita possit movere mobile finitum motu et tempore finito (Non)

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[A 49va–50ra; W 89vb–90rb]. Ad istam quaestionem dixit F ut alias audistis quod virtus in vigore ut infinita est non potest movere mobile finitum motu et tempore finito. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 7: Consequenter inquirendum est de divina unitate, et quaero utrum possit evidenter probari esse tantum unum Deum ita quod impossibile sit esse plures (Non) [A 50ra–52ra; W 90rb–93va]. Et hoc confirmat P. Aur. primo libro, distinctione 2* quaestione prima* (P. Aureoli mg.); quidam novus doctor probat; Doctor noster Subtilis; unus novus doctor; unus doctor novus; unus doctor novus; doctor novus; ad primam illarum rationum respondet P. Aureoli. Gonteri, dist. 2, qu. 8: Ultimo quantum ad hanc distinctionem quaeritur utrum sint tantum tres personae in divinis (Tantum duae) [A 52ra–va; W 93va–94rb]. Gonteri, Distinctio 3: Apostolus namque ait etc. . . . [A 52va; W 94rb–vb]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 1: Utrum illa propositio: “Deus est,” sit per se nota (Sic) [A 52va–54rb; W 94vb–97va]. Doctor Subtilis; Doctor Subtilis; rationes cuiusdam novi doctoris. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 2: Ultimo de cognoscibilitate Dei ex creaturis quantum ad si est consequenter inquirendum de eius cognoscibilitate . . . Utrum intellectus naturaliter ex creaturis possit acquirere conceptum unum et univocum et communem Deo et creaturis qui conceptus est maxime conceptus entis (Non) [A 54va–57rb; W 97va–102va]. Lincol’; ratio Doctoris Subtilis; quidam novus doctor; argumenta cuiusdam novi doctoris (Pe. Aur. mg.); ad rationes novi doctoris; ad auctoritatem Lincol’. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 3: Consequenter quaero, supposito ex praecedenti quaestione conceptum entis esse communem et univocum Deo et creaturis, quaero utrum ei correspondeat una realitas extra animam (Non) [A 57rb–60ra; W 102va–106vb]. aliqui dicunt quod intellectus potest (Opinio* Francisci* mg.); Respondit F; sed ad hoc arguit F. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 4: Ad videndum perfectius entis univocitatem quibus est univocus et quibus non, quaero consequenter utrum conceptus entis sit communis univoce omni enti creato et increato (Non) [A 60ra–62ra; W 106vb–110rb]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 5: Quia in quaestione praecedenti ostensum est conceptum entis univocum esse substantiae et accidenti, ideo consequenter ad videndum ordinem intelligibilium naturaliter ab intellectu nostro in vita illa quaero utrum in acquisitione illius conceptus communis substantiae et accidenti substantia prius intelligatur naturaliter ab intellectu quam accidens (Substantia) [A 62ra–63va; W 110rb–113ra]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 6: Viso quod in acquisitione conceptus communis entis prius intelligitur sub illo conceptu communi accidens quam substantia prioritate generationis, consequenter ad hoc quaero utrum in acquisitione conceptus communis entis intelligatur naturaliter ab intellectu singulare prius quam universale (Universale) [A 63va–64vb; W 113ra–115ra]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 7: Deinde utrum intellectus noster in hac vita naturaliter possit acquirere conceptum quidditativum et essentialem proprium de formis accidentalibus (Non) [A 64vb–65rb; W 115ra–vb].

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Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 8: Consequenter quaero utrum intellectus naturaliter possit attingere ad aliquem conceptum proprium et essentialem et positivum alicuius substantiae in hac vita (Non) [A 65rb–66ra; W 115vb–117rb]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 9: Deinde quaeritur utrum intellectus animae coniunctae corpori in hac vita intelligat substantiam vel propriam speciem (Non solum per speciem accidentis) [A 66ra–67ra; W 117rb–119ra]. secundum mentem nostri Doctoris Subtilis, ut patet ex d. 3 primi libri, q. 1, 2, et 7*. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 10: Viso de cognitione Dei naturali in generali, nunc consequenter quaerendum est de cognitione Dei naturali in speciali, et quaero primo utrum intellectus noster in vita illa possit ex creaturis acquirere conceptum quidditativum Dei proprium quo distinguatur a creatura (Non) [A 67ra–68ra; W 119ra–121ra]. Rabi Moyses primo libro De duce neutrorum* (Cf. Harclay, qu. 14). Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 11: Deinde quaero utrum conceptus perfectior possibilis acquiri de Deo ex creaturis naturaliter in intellectu nostro possibili sit conceptus eius sub ratione entis infiniti (Non) [A 68ra–vb; W 121ra–122rb]. sequendo Doctorem nostrum Subtilem. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 12: Circa secundum principale in hac 3 distinctione, scilicet circa vestigium et vestigii rationem, quaero primo utrum quaelibet creatura sit vestigium Trinitatis (Non) [A 68vb–70ra; W 122rb–124rb]. sed oppositum audivi a quodam; Opinio Pe. Aur. mg. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 13: Consequenter quaero utrum respectus creaturae in qua est vestigium Trinitatis sit de conceptu quidditativo et per se creaturae in ordine ad Deum (Sic) [A 70ra–va; W 124rb–125rb]. Doctor Subtilis. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 14: Adhuc in generali quaero utrum ratio imaginis formalius et perfectius conveniat memoriae, intelligentiae, et voluntati, quae sunt potentiae animae rationalis, inquantum sunt potentiae praecise, vel inquantum sunt sub actibus, vel inquantum sunt obiecta per actus potentiarum in esse obiectali posita (Obiecta) [A 70va–71va; W 125rb–127ra]. una nova opinio; opinio unius doctoris discordans ab omnibus; unius doctoris (Opinio Pe. Aur. mg.). Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 15: Consequenter quaero utrum in parte intellectiva ut distinguitur contra partem sensitivam sit potentia memorativa et recordativa praeteritorum (Non) [A 71vb–72rb; W 127ra–128ra]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 16: Consequenter quaero utrum in parte intellectiva ut distinguitur contra partem sensitivam sit ponenda species conservanda in ea cessante actu intelligendi, quia sicut recordari praeteritorum attribuitur memoriae a philosophis et sanctis, ita conservare species (Non) [A 72rb– 73rb; W 128ra–129vb]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 17: Postea quaeritur utrum actus memoriae aliquo modo sit prior et praecedat actum intelligentiae (Actus memoriae praecedat) [A 73va–74rb; W 129vb–130vb]. Gonteri, dist. 3, qu. 18: Deinde quaero utrum memoria ut est prima pars imaginis conveniat in se actum primum productivum intellectionis in acie intelligentiae, quae est secunda pars imaginis vel actum productivum intellectionis (Sic) [A 74rb–vb; W 130vb–131vb].

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Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito, Distinctions 4–48 Gonteri, Distinction 4: Hic oritur quaestio etc. . . . [A 74vb; W 131vb]. Gonteri, dist. 4, qu. 1 (Harclay 16, dist. 4, qu. 1): Utrum haec sit vera: “Deus genuit alium Deum” (Non) [A 74vb; C 25ra–26ra; H 29ra–30rb; W 131vb]. (H mg, infra: Haec duo folia fuerunt scripta ante quattuor praedicta . . .) Thomas primo libro q. 33; doctor Thomas; patet responsio in Io libro primo, col. 26 in fine; Io col. 27. Gonteri, dist. 4, qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum haec sit vera aliquo modo: “Deus non genuit Deum” (Non) [A 74vb–75ra; W 132ra]. Gonteri, dist. 4, qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum haec sit vera aliquo concedenda: “Deus genuit vel generat alium Deum” (Sic) [A 75ra; W 132ra]. Gonteri, dist. 4, qu. 4: Quarto quaeritur utrum haec sit vera: “Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus” (Non) [A 75ra–76va; W 132ra–135rb (f. 133 absit)]. Haec est ratio Subtilis Doctoris in Quolibet, q. 3, a. 2. (Gonteri, dist. 4, qu. 1–4, answered together) Harclay 17, dist. 4, qu. 2: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum (Sic) [C = q. 14, d. 3, q. 1; H 30rb–vb]. (C’s text, on 21rb–va and 22ra–b, has 6 + 26 additional lines; H ends mid-column on vb, “nichil deficit sed . . .,” starts again next folio.) Gonteri, Distinction 5: Post haec quaeritur etc. . . . [A 76va; W 135rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 5, qu. 1 (Harclay 18, dist. 5, qu. 1): Utrum haec sit concedenda: “Essentia divina generat vel generatur” (Sic) [A 76va–77va; C 26ra–27va; H 31ra–33ra; W 135va–136vb]. (A is missing end of one question and beginning of next; 77rb: “Hic est magnum defectum.”) In Io d. 5, col. 28. Gonteri, dist. 5, qu. 2 (Harclay 19, dist. 5, qu. 2): Utrum Filius sit genitus de substantia Patris (Non) [A 77va–78ra; C 27va–29ra; H 33ra–35rb; W 136vb–137va]. Thomas p. q. 41, a. 3; Thomas 41 q. p. Gonteri, dist. 5, qu. 3: Viso quod divina essentia non generetur subiective ad modum materiae in generatione Filii a Patre, ad videndum utrum generetur obiective et terminative et utrum ipsa sit terminus formalis in generatione Filii vel proprietas relativa, quaero utrum ad quamlibet formam distinctam realiter ab alia et materia vel subiecto possit terminari productio vel generatio per se qua acquiritur materiae vel subiecto (Non) [A 78ra–vb; W 137va–138vb]. Secundum mentem Doctoris Subtilis in q. 7 Metaphysicae. Gonteri, dist. 5, qu. 4: Consequenter quaero utrum in generatione Filii a Patre essentia divina sit terminus formalis (Non) [A 78vb–79va; W 138vb– 139vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 6: Praeterea quaeri solet . . . [A 79va; W 139vb–140ra]. Gonteri, dist. 6, qu. 1: Utrum actus intelligendi et volendi in Patre, qui sunt essentiales, processerint aliquo modo prioritatis actum generandi Filium et actum spirandi Spiritum Sanctum, qui sunt actus notionales (Non) [A 79va–80ra; W 140ra–vb]. de quo videbitur in principio secundi libri. Gonteri, dist. 6, qu. 2: Deinde quaeritur utrum cognitio Filii et Spiritus Sancti processit in intellectu Patris prius ordine eorum productionem (Non) [A 80ra–vb; W 140vb–142ra]. Sed istam opinionem sustinendo respondet F.* aliter.

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Gonteri, dist. 6, qu. 3 (Harclay 20, dist. 6): Utrum Pater genuit Filium necessitate vel voluntate. Quaestio est Magistri (Voluntate) [A 80vb–81rb; C 29ra–vb; H 35rb–36ra; W 142ra–vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 7: Hic solet quaeri . . . [A 81rb–va; W 142vb–143ra]. Gonteri, dist. 7, qu. 1: Utrum actus essentialis sit ratio formalis productiva vel actio productiva actus notionalis, verbi gratia, utrum actus intelligendi in Patre sit ratio vel actio productiva Filii a Patre et similiter* actus volendi in Patre et Filio sit ratio vel actio productiva Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio (Sic) [A 81va–82ra; W 143ra–144rb]. opinionem H; secundum mentem Doctoris Subtilis. Gonteri, dist. 7, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum in Patre sit potentia realiter productiva respectu personae Filii et elicitiva actus generationis (Non) [A 82rb–83va; W 144rb–146rb]. Circa primum sciendum quod nuper legi opinionem cuiusdam novi doctoris in Scripto suo super primum Sententiarum, distinctione 5, et distinctione* 7,* quaestione prima, et distinctione 28, quaestione prima, qui dicit (Opinio Pe. Aureoli mg.); secundum modum dicendi nostri Subtilis Doctoris. Gonteri, dist. 7, qu. 3 (Harclay 21, dist. 7): Utrum potentia generandi sit quid absolutum vel proprietas relativa (Proprietas relativa) [A 83va–84va; C 29vb–31ra; H 36ra–38ra; W 146rb–148ra]. in Io col. 23; parte prima, quaestione 77, articulo primo. Gonteri, dist. 7, qu. 4: Ad videndum autem perfectius quid est principium formale in Patre respectu productionis Filii adhuc recitabo opinionem F, dicentis quod generatio in divinis univoca potest considerari [A 84va–85va; W 148ra–149va]. ratio Doctoris Subtilis; rationis Doctoris Subtilis. Gonteri, Distinction 8: Nunc de veritate . . . [A 85va; W 149va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 8, qu. 1: Utrum esse in creatura differat ab essentia. Vide secundo libro, distinctione 3, quaestione prima et in primo articulo recita opinionem P. Aureoli, distinctione 8 primi, qui dicit . . . [A 85vb–86ra; W 149vb–150va]. Harclay 22, dist. 8, qu. 1: Utrum Deus sit simpliciter immutabilis (Non) [C 31ra–va; H 38ra–va]. Gonteri, dist. 8, qu. 2 (Harclay 23, dist. 8, qu. 2): Utrum solus Deus sit immutabilis (Non) [A 85ra–87ra; C 31va–32va; H 38va–39vb; W 150va–151vb]. Contra gentiles libro II, 79* capitulo; dicemus [dicendum est de hoc A] in secundo quando agetur de aeternitate mundi et creatione. Gonteri, dist. 8, qu. 3 (Harclay 24, dist. 9, qu. 1): Utrum solus Deus sit vere simplex (Non) [A 87ra–vb; C 32va–33vb; H 39vb–41ra; W 151vb–153ra]. supra d. 2, col. 24; quaere supra d. 2, col. 24; in Scripto, 62 q. Gonteri, dist. 8, qu. 4 (Harclay 25, dist. 9, qu. 2): Utrum Deus sit in genere (Sic) [A 87vb–88va; C 33vb–34va; H 41ra–42ra; W 153rb–154rb]. dicetur in 2o libro; d. 8 Xa 38* col.; et de hoc libro secundo, q. prima. Harclay 26, dist. 9, qu. 3: Utrum Pater possit dici aliquo modo prior Filio, et intelligo de persona quae est Pater utrum sit aliquo modo principium* Filio*, non quaero simultate* relativorum (Sic) [C 34va–35ra; H 42ra–vb].

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Gonteri, Distinction 9: Nunc ad distinctionem personarum etc. . . . [A 88va–b; W 154rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 9, qu. 1: Utrum in Deo ad intra possibilis sit productio realis qua aliquid producatur in essentia divina distinctum realiter a producente (Non) [A 88vb–90ra; W 154va–156va]. Gonteri, dist. 9, qu. 2: Secundo quaeritur utrum generatio Filii a Patre sit aeterna (Non) [A 90ra–vb; W 156va–157va]. Gonteri, dist. 9, qu. 3: Deinde quaeritur utrum Pater ex natura rei et positive sit prior Filio [A 90vb–91vb; W 157va–159rb]. dico ad quaestionem sequendo doctrinam nostri Subtilis Doctoris. Gonteri, Distinction 10: Nunc vero post Filii aeternitatem . . . [A 91vb–92ra; W 159rb]. Harclay 27, dist. 10: Utrum voluntas sit principium producendi Spiritum Sanctum (Non) [C 35ra–36ra; H 42vb–43vb]. Gonteri, dist. 10, qu. 1: Utrum personae Spiritus Sancti quae est aeterna et necesse esse simpliciter repugnet produci per modum voluntatis libere (Sic) [A 92ra–93vb; W 159rb–162ra]. Gonteri, dist. 10, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio ut Amor et dilectio subsistens ex vi suae productionis (Non) [A 93vb–94rb; W 162ra–vb]. unus doctor (Pe. Aur. mg.). Gonteri, Distinction 11: Hic dicendum est quod . . . [A 94ra; W 162vb– 163ra]. Gonteri, dist. 11, qu. 1 (Harclay 28, dist. 11, qu. 1): Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio (Non) [A 94ra–vb; C 36ra–va; H 44ra–va; W 163ra–vb]. Ed. Friedman, pp. 113–16. Nota residuum in Iohannis Collationibus 43 et 42; doctor Thomas, prima parte 36, 2; Lincon’. Gonteri, dist. 11, qu. 2 (Harclay 29, dist. 11, qu. 2): Iuxta hoc quaero utrum illa consequentia sit bona (Non) [A 94vb–95vb; C 36va–37vb; H 44va– 45vb; W 163vb–165ra]. Ed. Friedman, pp. 116–23. Contra gentiles libro 4, c. 24; alius doctor, Godefredus, 7 Quolibet, q. 4; doctor (= Godefredus); parte prima, q. 36, 2, ad ultimum. Gonteri, dist. 11, qu. 3: Ad evidentiam dictorum ampliorem videndum in secunda quaestione praecedenti propter opinionem novi doctoris quaero utrum spiratio activa pertineat intrinsece ad personalitatem Filii (Sic) [A 95vb–96rb; W 165ra–166ra]. Ed. Friedman/Schabel. opinionem unius novi doctoris; unus novus doctor; opinio unius novi doctoris (Pe. Aur. mg.). (Here CH insert Harclay’s questions from distinction 17, out of sequence; we have placed them below in the proper order following Gonteri’s rearrangement.) Gonteri, Distinction 12: Item quaeritur . . . [A 96rb; W 166ra]. Gonteri, dist. 12, qu. 1 (Harclay 30 [34], dist. 12, qu. 1): Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum inquantum unum vel unus (Non) [A 96rb–vb; C 45rb–vb; H 55va–56va; W 166ra–vb]. In concilio Lugdunensi. Gonteri, dist. 12, qu. 2 (Harclay 31 [35], dist. 12, qu. 2): Utrum ista debet concedi: “Pater et Filius sunt duae spiratores” (Sic) [A 96vb; C 45vb–46ra; H 56va–b; W 166vb–167ra].

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Gonteri, dist. 12, qu. 3: Adhuc quaero utrum Pater et Filius spirent uniformiter (Sine argumentis) [A 96vb–97ra; W 167ra–b]. Gonteri, Distinction 13: Post hoc considerandum . . . [A 97ra; W 167rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 1: Utrum alicui naturae finitae et limitatae repugnet diversimode communicari in divinis vel suppositis eiusdem speciei diversis productionibus secundum speciem (Sic) [A 97ra–98rb; W 167va–169rb]. Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum alicui naturae possit convenire quod sit principium productivum distinctorum effectuum in specie in certo numero determinatarum respectu eiusdem passi vel materiae (Sic) [A 98rb; W 169rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum alicui naturae creatuae possit convenire quod sit principium producendi eundem effectum naturaliter et libere (Sic) [A 98rb–99ra; W 169va–170va]. Two qu. answered together. Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 4: Consequenter quaeritur utrum in Deo possint esse plures productiones alterius rationis (Non) [A 99ra–101rb; W 170va– 174rb]. tres articuli condemnati Parisius per dominum Stephanum episcopum de consensu omnium magistrorum. Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 5 (Harclay 32 [36], dist. 13): Utrum processio Spiritus Sancti possit dici generatio (Sic) [A 101rb–102ra; C 46ra–47ra; H 56vb– 58vb; W 174rb–175rb]. Doctor Thomas primo Scripto q. 82; de isto in Iohanne col. 84 et supra d. 10 col. 48; primo Scripto 82 . Gonteri, dist. 13, qu. 6: Ex hoc patet solutio quaestionis unius quae solet moveri hic: utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit Filius (Non) [A 102ra–b; W 175rb–va]. Gonteri, Distinction 14: Praeterea diligenter . . . [A 102rb; W 175va]. Gonteri, dist. 14, qu. 1 (Harclay 33 [37], dist. 14): Utrum Spiritui Sancto inter personas divinas conveniat temporalis processio (Non) [A 102rb–vb; C 47ra–vb; H 58vb–60rb; W 175va–176rb]. quaere infra d. 17, q. prima; primo Scripto q. 81; primo Scripto q. 85. Gonteri, dist. 14, qu. 2: Secundo quaeritur utrum processio temporalis Spiritus Sancti et aeterna ponant in numerum, ita quod dicantur duae processiones Spiritus Sancti (Non) [A 102vb–103ra; W 176rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 14, qu. 3: Ad evidentiam quorundam dictorum supra, distinctione 10, et dictorum in hac distinctione 14, quaero utrum Spiritus Sanctus in processione sua aeterna et temporali procedat libere a Patre et Filio (Non) [A 103ra–vb; W 176va–178ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 15: Hic considerandum est . . . [A 103vb–104ra; W 178ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 15, qu. unica (Harclay 34 [38], dist. 15): Utrum missio conveniat tantum Spiritui Sancto (Non) [A 104ra–va; C 47vb–48rb; H 60rb– 61va; W 178ra–vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 16: Nunc de Spiritu Sancto videndum . . . [A 104va; W 178vb–179ra]. Gonteri, dist. 16, qu. unica (Harclay 35 [39], dist. 16): Utrum Spiritui Sancto conveniat missio visibilis corporalis (Non) [A 104va–105ra; C 48rb–vb; H 61va–62va; W 179ra–va]. Gonteri, Distinction 17: Iam nunc accedimus . . . [A 105ra–b; W 179va–180ra]. In CH Harclay’s dist. 17 is placed between dist. 11 and 12.

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Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 1: Utrum sit necessarium simpliciter habitum caritatis existere in voluntate hominis viatoris secundum statum praesentem ad hoc quod a Deo acceptetur et meritorie operetur actus dignos vita aeterna (Sic) [A 105rb–vb; W 180ra–vb]. Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 2: Secundo quaero, supposito quod Deus voluntate infundat animae caritatem et gratiam, utrum sit ratio necessaria eam habentem acceptandi et diligendi a Deo (Sic) [A 105vb–106va; W 180vb–182ra]. Ed. Dumont, pp. 106–09 (part). Opinio unius doctoris novi (= Auriol); doctor unus novus (= Auriol). Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 3: Tertio ad videndum opinionem Magistri quam ipse tractat in hac 17 distinctione quaero utrum caritas qua diligimus Deum et proximum sit aliquid creatum in anima (Non) [A 106va–107rb; 182ra– 183ra]. (Some of next question, from Harclay, incorporated here.) Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 4 (Harclay 36 [30], dist. 17, qu. 1): Utrum caritas qua diligimus Deum et proximum sit* aliquid creatum in anima (Non) [A 107rb–109ra; C 37vb–40ra; H 45vb–48va; W 183ra–185va]. Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 5 (Harclay 37 [31], dist. 17, qu. 2): Utrum caritas possit augeri—quaestio generalis ut comprehendat multa (Non) [A 109ra– 111ra; C 40ra–43vb; H 48va–53rb; W 185vb–188ra]. (AW add 1.3 cols.) primo Scripto q. 111; Thomas primo Scripto; accipe probationem in Io, libro 4, col. 6*; (AW: Durandus). Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 6: Consequenter quaero utrum caritas possit augeri in infinitum (Sic) [A 111ra–112rb; W 188ra–189vb]. respondet Doctor Thomas primo Scripto, q. 113* (from Harclay?). Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 7 (Harclay 38 [32], dist. 17, qu. 3): Utrum caritas possit minui (Sic) [A 112rb–vb; C 43vb–44va; H 53rb–54va; W 189vb–190vb]. Gonteri, dist. 17, qu. 8 (Harclay 39 [33], dist. 17, qu. 4): Utrum aliquis potest scire se esse in caritate certitudinaliter in statu viae (Sic) [A 112vb–113va; C 44va–45rb; H 54va–55va; M 94va–b; W 190vb–191va] Gonteri, Distinction 18: Hic quaeritur cum Spiritus Sanctus . . . [A 113va–b; W 191va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 18, qu. 1 (Harclay 40, dist. 18): Utrum donum in divinis dicat proprietatem personalem Spiritus Sancti (Non) [A 113vb–114va; C 48vb– 49va; H 62va–64ra; W 191vb–193ra]. Gonteri, dist. 18, qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum spiratio passiva et proprietas Doni sit eadem proprietas (Non) [A 114va–b; W 193ra–b]. Gonteri, Distinction 19: Nunc post coaeternitatem . . . [A 114vb–115ra; W 193rb–vb]. Gonteri, dist. 19, qu. 1: Utrum tres personae sint omnino aequales in magnitudine perfectionis (Non) [A 115ra–vb; W 193vb–195ra]. Gonteri, dist. 19, qu. 2: Consequenter quaero, supposito quod personalis proprietas personae divinae constitutiva sit ex natura rei formaliter distincta a divina essentia vel sibi non eadem, utrum ipsa realiter sit simpliciter infinita, propria et intrinseca infinitate* (Non) [A 115vb–117ra; W 195ra–197ra]. Harclay 41, dist. 19, qu. 1 (= Gonteri, dist. 20, qu. 1): Utrum in divinis sit aequalitas ex natura rei (Non) [C 49va–50vb; H 64rb–67ra]. De isto magis patebit in secundo, d. 12.

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Gonteri, dist. 19, qu. 3 (Harclay 42, dist. 19, qu. 2): Utrum una persona possit vere dici esse in alia et e converso (Non) [A 117ra–vb; C 50vb–51va; H 67rb–68va; W 197ra–198ra]. Gonteri, dist. 19, qu. 4 (Harclay 43, dist. 19, qu. 3): Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio totaliter vel maioriter (Sic) [A 117vb–118rb; C 51va–52ra; H 68va– 69va; W 198ra–vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 20: Nunc ostendere restat etc. . . . [A 118rb; W 198vb]. Gonteri, dist. 20, qu. 1 (= Harclay 41, dist. 19, qu. 1): Utrum in divinis sit aequalitas ex natura rei (Non) [A 118rb–119va; W 198vb–200vb]. Gonteri, dist. 20, qu. 2 (Harclay 44, dist. 20): Utrum personae divinae sint aequales in potentia (Non) [A 119va–120ra; C 52ra–vb; H 69va–70va; W 200vb–201va]. Gonteri, Distinction 21: Hic oriri quaestio etc. . . . [A 120rb; W 201va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 21, qu. 1: Utrum dictiones exclusivae possint poni in divinis (Non) [A 120rb–va; W 201vb–202rb]. Gonteri, dist. 21, qu. 2: Consequenter quaeritur utrum dictio exclusiva addita uni relativo excludit aliud relativum respectu praedicati pertinentis ad esse et coexistere reali cui additum, ut dicendo “Tantum Pater est” vel “Solus Pater est” excludatur Filius (Non) [A 120vb–121ra; W 202rb–203ra]. Gonteri, dist. 21, qu. 3 (Harclay 45, dist. 21): Utrum haec sit concedenda: “Solus Pater est Deus” (Sic) [A 121ra–122ra; C 52vb–54ra; H 70va–72va; W 203ra–204va]. Thomas prima parte 31; de isto in Io col. 66. Gonteri, Distinction 22: Post praedicta disserendum nobis . . . [A 122rb; W 204va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 22, qu. 1 (Harclay 46, dist. 22): Utrum Deus sit nominabilis a creaturis (Non) [A 122rb–123rb; C 54ra–55ra; H 72va–74rb; W 204vb– 205vb]. De hoc Iohanne 68. Gonteri, dist. 22, qu. 2: Ad videndum autem quomodo aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo privatione et negatione, quaero primo in generali utrum privatio in suo conceptu primo quo distinguitur a negatione includat aliquid positivum formaliter (Sic) [A 123rb–124rb; W 206ra–207ra]. Gonteri, dist. 22, qu. 3: Consequenter quaeritur utrum privationes formarum realium sint formaliter in re extra animam, ut caecitas in oculo et in aere tenebra (Sic) [A 124rb–vb; W 207ra–vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 23: Praedictis autem adiciendum est . . . [A 124vb–125ra; W 207vb–208ra]. Gonteri, dist. 23, qu. 1 (Harclay 47, dist. 23): Utrum nomen personae proprie conveniat Deo (Non) [A 125ra–vb; C 55ra–56ra; H 74rb–75rb; W 208ra–209ra]. Gonteri, dist. 23, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum nomen substantiae conveniat Deo (Non) [A 125vb–126ra; W 209ra–b]. Gonteri, Distinction 24: Hic diligenter inquiri debet . . . [A 126ra; W 209rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 24, qu. 1: Utrum ens et unum significent eandem naturam (Non) [A 126ra–127rb; W 209va–210vb]. Gonteri, dist. 24, qu. 2: Consequenter quaero utrum numerus quo numerantur differat differentia extra animam a rebus numeratis (Sic) [A 127rb–128ra; W 210vb–212ra].

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Gonteri, dist. 24, qu. 3 (Harclay 48, dist. 24): Utrum in divinis sit aliqua pluralitas numeralis (Sic) [A 128ra–vb; C 56ra–57vb; H 75va–76vb; M 92va– 93rb; W 212ra–213rb]. (H ends abruptly at bottom of 76vb with extensive marginalia; hand changes at top of 77ra, and a quire must be missing.) Opinio doc. H. 4* Quo. q. 6; prima parte q. 30. Gonteri, Distinction 25: Praeterea considerandum est . . . [A 128vb–129ra; W 213rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 25, qu. 1: Utrum intentio prima sit quidditative et essentialiter res ipsa ut est in praedicamento (Sic) [A 129ra–va; W 213va–214rb]. Gonteri, dist. 25, qu. 2 (Harclay 49, qu. 25): Utrum persona secundum quod est tribus commune dicat rem primae intentionis vel tantum sit nomen secundae intentionis (Nomen secundae intentionis) [A 129va–130rb; C 57vb– 58vb; H deest; W 214va–215va]. Thomas primo Scripto d. 25, q. 154. Gonteri, Distinction 26: Nunc de proprietatibus etc. . . . [A 130rb–va; W 215va– 216ra]. Gonteri, dist. 26, qu. 1 (Harclay 50, dist. 26, qu. 1): Utrum in divinis sit aliquod suppositum absolutum (Sic) [A 130va–131rb; C 58vb–59vb; H deest; W 216ra–217ra]. Gonteri, dist. 26, qu. 2 (Harclay 51, dist. 26, qu. 2): Utrum persona divina constituatur in esse formaliter personali per relationem originis (Non) [A 131rb–133ra; C 59vb–62ra; H deest; W 217ra–220ra]. Thomas q. 159. Gonteri, Distinction 27: Hic quaeri potest . . . [A 133ra–b; W 220ra–va]. Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 1: Utrum generatio activa in Patre sit actio de genere actionis distincta formaliter a paternitate et utrum generatio passiva in Filio sit passio de genere passionis distincta formaliter a filiatione (Sic) [A 133rb–134va; W 220va–222rb]. Dixit F.* quod non; sed ista opinio non sustineri potest (Improbatio F.* mg.). Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 2: Consequenter quaero utrum paternitas et filiatio in divinis personis sint relationes reales (Non) [A 134va–135va; W 222rb– 224ra]. secundum intentionem Doctoris Subtilis (Scotus mg.); contra Doctorem Subtilem; ad rationes cuiusdam credentis contrarium (ad rationes Fr mg.). Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 3 (= Harclay 54, dist. 27, qu. 3): Quantum ad secundam partem huius distinctionis quaero primo de verbo creato in mente rationali notiore nobis, et primo quantum ad eius quidditatem, utrum sit actualis intellectio inhaerens menti (Non) [A 135va–136vb; W 224ra–226rb]. Harclay 52, dist. 27, qu. 1 (= Gonteri, dist. 28, qu. 2): Utrum in divinis sint tantum quinque notiones (Non) [C 62ra–va; H deest]. Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 4 (Harclay 53, dist. 27, qu. 2): Utrum intellectus in formando verbum se habeat passive (Sic) [A 136vb–138va; C 62va–63vb; H deest; W 226rb–229ra]. Harclay 54, dist. 27, qu. 3 (= Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 3): Utrum verbum intellectus creati sit actualis cogitatio intellectio (Non) [C 63vb–65va; H deest]. De hoc quaere Io 25 et 84; quaere Io 26. Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 5: Deinde quaero de Verbo increato, et primo in divinis utrum sit Verbum personale vel utrum ibidem esse Verbum essentiale (Personale) [A 138vb–139ra; W 229ra–va].

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Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 6 (Harclay 55, dist. 27, qu. 4): Utrum in divinis sit proprietas secundae personae Verbum (Non) [A 139ra–vb; C 65va–66rb; H deest; W 229va–230va]. Opinio Thomae primo Scripto q. 164; prima parte q. 33, a. primo; idem doctor ubi supra, primo Scripto q. 164; (AW: Doctor Subtilis). Gonteri, dist. 27, qu. 7: Deinde quaero utrum procedatur a Patre per modum intellectus (Non) [A 139vb–140rb; W 230va–231rb]. Gonteri, Distinction 28: Praeterea considerari oportet . . . [A 140rb; W 231rb– va]. Gonteri, dist. 28, qu. 1 (= Harclay 52, dist. 27, qu. 1): Utrum in divinis sint tantum quinque notiones (Non) [A 140rb–vb; W 231va–232rb]. Gonteri, dist. 28, qu. 2 (Harclay 56, dist. 28): Utrum ingenitum sit proprietas constitutiva personae Patris (Non) [A 140vb–141vb; C 66rb–67va; H deest; W 232rb–233vb]. Gonteri, Distinction 29: Est praeterea aliud notum . . . [A 141vb; W 233vb– 234ra]. Gonteri, dist. 29, qu. 1: Utrum generatio activa sive paternitas et spiratio activa in Patre sint duae res (Non) [A 141vb–142vb; W 234ra–235va]. Thomas, primo Scripto, d. 27. Gonteri, dist. 29, qu. 2 (Harclay 57, dist. 29): Utrum principium dicatur univoce de principio notionali et essentiali (Non) [A 142vb–143ra; C 67va–b; H deest; W 235va–236ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 30: Sunt enim quaedam etc. . . . [A 143ra–b; W 236ra]. Gonteri, dist. 30, qu. 1: Utrum relatio in creaturis sit res distincta ab esse in, qui est modus communis ei et aliis accidentibus, et ab esse ad, qui est modus proprius ei et passio inseparabilis (Sic) [A 143rb–144ra; W 236ra– 237va]. quidam novus doctor; Alius doctor (Hervaeus mg.). Gonteri, dist. 30, qu. 2: Consequenter quaeritur utrum relatio realis in creaturis habeat causam aliam effectivam ab extremis, scilicet fundamento et termino (Non) [A 144ra–va; W 237va–238va]. Gonteri, dist. 30, qu. 3: Deinde quaeritur utrum in relativis mutuis in creaturis unum relativum terminet dependentiam alterius relativi per rationem formalem relationis vel per rationem formalem fundamenti relationis [A 144va–145ra; W 238va–239rb]. Gonteri, dist. 30, qu. 4 (Harclay 58, dist. 30, qu. 1): Utrum in Deo sit aliqua relatio realis ad creaturam (Sic) [A 145ra–vb; C 67vb–68vb; H deest; W 239va–241va]. Ed. Henninger, from C. Harclay 59, dist. 30, qu. 2: Utrum nova relatio creaturae ad Deum coexigat necessario novam relationem rationis in Deo (Sic) [C 68vb–69rb; H deest]. Quaere Io 92 in fine et 93 in principio. Gonteri, dist. 30, qu. 5: Consequenter quaero utrum Deus referatur relatione nova in temporali secundum rationem ad creaturam de novo in tempore productam (Non) [A 145vb–147rb; W 241va–243ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 31: Praeterea considerari oportet . . . [A 147rb–va; W 243ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 1: Utrum sint relationes reales in creaturis (Non) [A 147va–148va; W 243rb–244vb]. Doctor Subtilis.

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Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 2: Consequenter quaeritur utrum aequalitas fundata inter duo alba aeque intensa sit relatio distincta realiter a similitudine qua dicuntur similia (Non) [A 148va–149ra; W 244vb–245vb]. Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 3: Consequenter quaero utrum in divinis sint aequalitas ex natura rei (Non) [A 149ra–150ra; W 245vb–247rb]. Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 4 (Harclay 60, dist. 31): Utrum aequalitas similitudo in divinis sint relationes reales (Sic) [A deest; C 69rb–70rb; H 77ra– 78ra; W 247rb–248rb]. (A 150ra: Hic est omissa quaestio utrum identitas et similitudo in divinis personis sint relationes reales. Vide eam in fine huius libri.) primo Scripto 179; Thomas dicit ubi supra; nota bene Io 69. Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 5: Deinde quaeritur utrum in divinis sint relationes distinctae identitas, similitudo, et aequalitas (Non) [A 150ra; W 248rb]. Gonteri, dist. 31, qu. 6: Deinde quaero utrum relationes istae sint eiusdem rationis in personis (Non) [A 150ra–b; W 248rb–va]. Gonteri, Distinction 32: Hic quaeritur quaestio . . . [A 150rb–va; W 248va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 32, qu. 1 (Harclay 61, dist. 32): Utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto (Non) [A 150va–151ra; C 70rb–71ra; H 78ra–79ra; W 248vb–249va]. parte prima 37 q. Gonteri, dist. 32, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus diligant nos Spiritu Sancto (Sic) [A 151ra; W 249va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 32, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita (Sic) [A 151ra–b; W 249vb–250ra]. Gonteri, dist. 32, qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum Filius sit sapiens sapientia ingenita (Sic) [A 151rb; W 250ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 33: Post supradicta . . . [A 151rb–va; W 250ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 33, qu. 1: Utrum sint distinctae ab essentia realiter, secundo utrum sint distinctae secundum rationem tantum, secundum intellectum tantum, tamen inadaequate, tertio sint utrum distinctae vel non eaedem formaliter ex natura rei sive secundum rationem quidditativam per se primo modo propter diversas opiniones doctorum in hac materia difficillima. Et ad istas simul arguo quod sint distinctae realiter ab essentia divina . . . [A 151va–154rb; W 250rb–255ra]. prima Thomae, q. 28 et 29, et 3 Quolibet, q. 3 et 3* Quolibet, 60 d’, q. 2; unus novus doctor (mg.: Opinio Pe. Aur.); Durandus; contra istam opinionem novam; unius Doctoris Subtilis; haec sunt verba Doctoris; et hoc dicit Doctor Thomas primo Scripto, q. 180* in solutione primi argumenti. Gonteri, dist. 33, qu. 2 (Harclay 62, dist. 33): Utrum proprietas personalis sit idem realiter quod divina essentia (Non) [A 154va–155va; C 71ra–72va; H 79ra–81ra; W 255ra–257ra]. Thomas expresse primo Scripto q. 189; in quaestione de attributis; de isto Magister (!) Io 99*. Gonteri, Distinction 34: Praedictis adiciendum est . . . [A 155va–b; W 257ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 34, qu. 1: Utrum persona vel suppositum creatum constituatur formaliter per aliquid positivum (Non) [A 155vb–156va; W 257rb–258va]. opinio Subtilis Doctoris; Doctor Subtilis; de mente Doctoris Subtilis Gonteri, dist. 34, qu. 2: Deinde quaero ad maiorem evidentiam dictorum utrum proprietates in personis et similiter ipsae personae se ipsis totaliter

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distinguantur (Sic) [A 156va–157va; W 258va–259vb]. de mente Doctoris Subtilis quem sequi credunt. Gonteri, dist. 34, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum ex natura deitatis sint tria esse distincta in divinis (Non) [A 157va–158vb; W 259vb–261ra]. Ed. Doucet, pp. 227–40. Obiectiones Magistri Benedicti Praedicatoris; Haec autem veritas, propter controversiam Magistri Benedicti Praedicatoris, pro me per omnes magistros regentes et non-regentes in theologica facultate determinata extitit Parisius et promulgata publice per bedellum et redacta in libro communi magistrorum, licet hanc determinatam veritatem alias praedictus magister publice in scholis dogmatizaverit esse haereticam, cuius contrarium omnes praedicti magistri determinaverunt esse verum, catholicum, atque sanum; Nunc tertio contra dicta adduco argumenta Magistri Benedicti; Ex dictis infero correlarium contra Magistrum Petrum Rogerii; Adhuc ad videndum opinionem Magistri (Io add. W) Praedicatoris et Magistri G. Parvi sequentis eum; Una novella opinio; Praedictus Magister Iohannes de Pratis de Ordine Praedicatorum. Gonteri, dist. 34, qu. 4 (Harclay 63, dist. 34): Utrum sit dicendum: “Tres personae sunt unum esse” (Non) [A 158vb; C 72va–b; H 81ra–b; W 262rb– va]. parte prima, quaestione 39, articulo 8. Gonteri, Distinction 35: Cumque supra dixerimus etc. . . . [A 158vb–159ra; W 263va]. Gonteri, dist. 35, qu. unica (Harclay 64, dist. 35): Utrum in Deo sit scientia ex natura rei (Non) [A 159ra–vb; C 72vb–73vb; H 81rb–82vb; W 263va– 264ra]. prima parte q. 14; Rabi Moyses. Gonteri, Distinction 36: Hic solet quaeri . . . [A 159vb–160ra; W 264ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 36, qu. 1: Utrum quidditates omnium creaturarum fuerint contentae in Deo ab aeterno virtualiter (Non) [A 160ra–161vb; W 264rb– 267va]. Lincol’ (2x); Ad auctoritatem Lincol’. Gonteri, dist. 36, qu. 2: Viso quod creaturae contineantur in Deo virtualiter, consequenter quaerendum est utrum quidditates creaturarum ut in Deo contentae fuerint in Deo contentae unitive et indistincte (Distincte) [A 161vb–163ra; W 267va–269rb]. Gonteri, dist. 36, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum in creaturis quae fuerunt virtualiter contentae in Deo ab aeterno—sicut in praecedentibus extitit determinatum—suum esse intelligibile praecessit suum esse intellectum (Non) [A 163ra–va; W 269rb–270va]. Gonteri, dist. 36, qu. 4: Deinde quaero consequenter utrum creaturae intellectae ab aeterno a Deo distincte secundum earum quidditates habuerunt verum esse quidditativum distinctum inter se et ab essentia divina (Sic) [A 163va–165rb; W 270va–273rb]. recitabo unam opinionem unius Doctoris Solemnis; ut dicit Doctor Subtilis, q. 13, articulo 2, conclusione secunda. Harclay 65, dist. 36, qu. 1: Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus divinus intelligat alia a se necesse sit ponere quod requirat distinctas ideas cognoscibilium (Non) [C 73vb–75ra; H 82vb–84rb]. Harclay 66, dist. 36, qu. 2: Utrum Deus habeat distinctas ideas omnium eorum quae distincte cognoscit (Non) [C 75ra–76va; H 84rb–86rb]. una

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opinio est talis, 7 Quodlibet, q. prima (Gand mg.2); in libro secundo Io; alia opinio prima , q. 15, articulo tertio. Gonteri, Distinction 37: Et quoniam demonstratum est . . . [A 165rb; W 273rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 37, qu. 1: Utrum substantia corporea circumscripta quantitate et separata ab ea quantitate per divinam potentiam haberet esse in loco circumscriptive (Sic) [A 165rb–166ra; W 273va–274va]. articulus excommunicatus episcopi Parisiensis. Gonteri, dist. 37, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus (Non) [A 166ra; W 274va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 37, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Deo sit proprium esse ubique (Non) [A 166ra–b; W 274vb–275ra]. Gonteri, dist. 37, qu. 4 (Harclay 67, dist. 37): Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus tantum per essentiam, praesentiam, et potentiam (Non) [A 166rb; C 76va–77ra; H 86rb–vb; W 275ra–va]. Et haec omnia vide Quolibet tertio Aureolis* q. 16. Gonteri, Distinction 38: Nunc ad propositum etc. . . . [A 166va–b; W 275va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 1: Utrum distincta cognitio actualis quam habuit Deus ab aeterno de creaturis procedentibus ab eo requirebat distinctas rationes ideales in eo per quas distincte et determinate cognoscebantur (Non) [A 166vb–167vb; W 275vb–277va]. opinio vera secundum mentem Scoti; Lincol’. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum (Non) [A 167vb; W 277va–b]. Quaeretur Quodlibet Aureoli, q. 5. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 3: Ex his patet solutio unius quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum Deus potest cognoscere non-entia . . . [A 167vb; W 277vb]. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 4: Ex his etiam patet solutio unius quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum Deus cognoscat mala . . . [A 168ra; W 277vb]. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 5: Ex his patet solutio faciliter unius quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum intellectus divinus intelligat singularia (Sic) [A 168ra; W 277vb]. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 6: Ex his patet solutio unius quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum Deus cognoscat infinita (Sic) [A 168ra; W 277vb–278ra]. Gonteri, dist. 38, qu. 7 (Harclay 68, dist. 38): Utrum Deus habeat determinatam scientiam futurorum contingentium (Non) [A 168ra–169va; C 77ra– 78rb; H 86vb–88vb; W 278ra–280rb]. Ed. Rossini/Schabel, pp. 165–84. Opinio Thomae parte prima q. 14, 13 articulo, et in Scripto q. 225; Scripto; Scripto; doctor tamen Thomas, Scripto q. 225 et Summa in parte prima q. 14, articulo 13; Scripto (AW: Doctor Subtilis). Gonteri, Distinction 39: Praeterea quaeri solet . . . [A 169va; W 280rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 39, qu. 1: Utrum scientia Dei de futuris contingentibus sit fallibilis (Sic) [A 169va–b; W 280va–b]. Ed. Schabel, pp. 331–2. Gonteri, dist. 39, qu. 2 (Harclay 69, dist. 39): Utrum Deus immutabiliter sit praescius futurorum contingentium (Non) [A 169vb–170rb; C 78rb–79va; H 88vb–90rb; W 280vb–281vb]. Ed. Schabel, pp. 184–95. Magister Obligationum (+ 3x Magister; = William of Sherwood).

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Gonteri, dist. 39, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Deus habeat necessariam scientiam futurorum contingentium (Sic) [A 170rb–va; W 281vb–282ra]. Ed. Rossini/Schabel, pp. 333–5. Gonteri, dist. 39, qu. 4: Consequenter quaero utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate, vel aliqua eveniant contingenter (Omnia eveniant de necessitate) [A 170va–b; W 282ra–va]. Ed. Rossini/Schabel, pp. 336–8. Gonteri, dist. 39, qu. 5: Consequenter quaero utrum omnia sint subiecta divinae providentiae (Non) [A 170vb–171rb; W 282va–283rb]. (Loose parallel to Hugh of Novocastro, dist. 39, qu. 3.). Gonteri, Distinction 40: Praedestinatio vero etc. . . . [A 171rb; W 283rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 1: Utrum Deo conveniat habere de aliis rebus a se providentiam (Non) [A 171rb–va; W 283va]. Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Deus habeat providentiam omnium aliorum a se (Non) [A 171va; W 283va–b]. Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Deus provideat immediate omnibus rebus (Non) [A 171va–b; W 283vb–284ra]. Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 4: Consequenter quaero utrum conveniat Deo aliquem praedestinare ad vitam aeternam (Non) [A 171vb; W 284ra–b]. (Parallel to Hugh of Novocastro, dist. 40, qu. 1.). Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum praedestinatio et divina providentia imponat praevisis et praedestinatis sic quod necessarium sit praedestinatum a Deo ad gratiam et gloriam ab aeterno finaliter salvari (Sic) [A 171vb–172ra; W 284rb–vb]. secundum intentionem nostri Doctoris Subtilis, 4 libro, d. 16, q. secunda. Gonteri, dist. 40, qu. 6 (Harclay 70, dist. 40): Utrum possibile est (!) aliquem praedestinatum damnari (Non) [A 172ra–va; C 79va–80ra; H 90rb–91ra; W 284vb–285rb]. Gonteri, Distinction 41: Si autem quaerimus meritum etc. . . . [A 172va–b; W 285rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 41, qu. 1 (Harclay 71, dist. 41): Utrum meritum in praedestinato sit causa suae praedestinationis (Sic) [A 172vb–174ra; C 80ra–81ra; H 91ra–93ra; W 285va–287vb]. Ed. Schmaus, pp. 345–55. Doctor Thomas 23 q. articulo 5, ad 3; doctor ubi supra; idem doctor; retractatione habitum est supra in tractando opinionem Magistri Henrici. Gonteri, dist. 41, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus ita quod augeri non possit nec minui (Non) [A 174ra; W 287vb]. Gonteri, dist. 41, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus sanctorum (Non) [A 174ra–b; W 287vb–288ra]. Gonteri, dist. 41, qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum aliquis deleatur de libro vitae (Non) [A 174rb; W 288ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 42: Nunc autem de omnipotentia . . . [A 174rb; W 288ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 42, qu. 1: Utrum in Deo respectu aliorum a se sit potentia (Non) [A 174rb–va; W 288rb]. Gonteri, dist. 42, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum potentia Dei infinita productiva ad extra sit divina voluntas et divinum velle efficax formaliter praesupposito divino intelligere (Non) [A 174va–b; W 288rb–vb]. licet oppositum dicit Petrus Aureoli.

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Gonteri, dist. 42, qu. 3: Consequenter quaero utrum potentia dividens ens contra actum, secundum Philosophum, 9 Metaphysicae, erit potentia subiectiva mere vel obiectiva, a qua denominatur possibile obiectivum quod potest esse terminus potentiae activae productivae (Non) [A 174vb–175rb; W 288vb–289va]. Gonteri, dist. 42, qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum aliquid debet iudicari possibile simpliciter secundum causam primam vel secundum causas inferiores (Sic) [A 175rb; W 289va–290ra]. Gonteri, Distinction 43: Quidam tamen . . . [A 175rb–va; W 290ra–b]. Gonteri, dist. 43, qu. 1: Utrum evidenter possit probari quod Deus sit vere omnipotens (Non) [A 175va–b; W 290rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 43, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum divina omnipotentia excedat se immediate ad omne illud solum quia possibile est fieri in creaturis a quadam causa secunda (Non) [A 175vb–176rb; W 290va–291rb]. Circa primum dicit Petrus Aureoli. Gonteri, dist. 43, qu. 3 (Harclay 72, dist. 42): Utrum Deus possit facere ea quae sunt impossibilia in natura (Non) [A 176rb–vb; C 81rb–vb; H 93ra– 94ra; W 291rb–292ra]. dicetur prima quaestione secundi . Gonteri, dist. 43, qu. 4: Consequenter/Deinde ad maiorem evidentiam dictorum in praecedenti quaestione quaero utrum ratio prima rei possibilis obiective in quam potest Dei omnipotentia et ratio impossibilitatis ei oppositae sumatur a re ipsa vel a divina potentia activa (A divina potentia) [A 176vb; W 292rb]. Gonteri, Distinction 44: Nunc illud restat . . . [A 176vb–177ra; W 292rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 44, qu. 1 (Harclay 73, dist. 43, qu. 1): Utrum Deus possit facere alio modo quam facit—quaestio est Magistri in littera (Non) [A 177ra–b; C 81vb–82ra; H 94ra–va; W 292va–293ra]. Gonteri, dist. 44, qu. 2 (Harclay 74, dist. 43, qu. 2): Utrum Deus agat de necessitate iustitiae (Sic) [A 177rb–va; C 82ra–va; H 94va–95ra; W 293ra–va]. Gonteri, dist. 44, qu. 3 (Harclay 75, dist. 44): [Consequenter quaero A]. Utrum Deus potest (!) facere meliora quam facit—quaestio est Magistri (Non) [A 177va–178ra; C 82va–b; H 95ra–va; W 293va–294ra]. Gonteri, dist. 44, qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum Deus posset producere aliquod ens unum creatum quod esset actu infinitum (Sic) [A 178ra–vb; W 294ra– 295va]. Gonteri, Distinction 45: Iam de voluntate Dei etc. . . . [A 178vb–179ra; W 295va]. Gonteri, dist. 45, qu. 1: Utrum perfectiones attributales, cuiusmodi sunt intellectus et voluntas etc., sint in Deo formaliter distinctae inter se et a divina essentia (Non) [A 179ra–181ra; W 295va–298vb]. dicit Doctor Subtilis, quem sequor; secundum Doctorem Subtilem; a quodam doctore novo; hoc dicit Doctor Subtilis, d.* 5*, in Quolibet, q. 5, articulo primo. Gonteri, dist. 45, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum in Deo sit voluntas formaliter secundum rationem potentiae volitivae vel solum secundum rationem actus qui est purum velle (Non) [A 181ra–b; W 298vb–299rb]. ad illas 3 rationes Petri Aureoli; sicut arguit Petrus Aureoli. Gonteri, Distinction 46: Hic oritur quaestio etc. . . . [A 181rb–va; W 299rb–va].

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Gonteri, dist. 46, qu. 1 (Harclay 76, dist. 45): Utrum voluntas divina sit omnium eorum quae fiunt causa sufficiens (Non) [A 181va–b; C 82vb– 83va; H 95va–96rb; W 299va–300rb]. Gonteri, dist. 46, qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Deus velit necessario quaecumque vult (Sic) [A 181vb–182ra; W 300rb–va]. Gonteri, dist. 46, qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum determinatio divinae voluntatis praeexigatur in Deo ad ponendum libere et contingenter quicquid extra se producit (Non) [A 182ra–vb; W 300va–301va]. Quantum ad primum est una opinio Petri Aureoli. Gonteri, Distinction 47: Voluntas quippe etc. . . . [A 182vb; W 301va]. Gonteri, dist. 47, qu. 1 (Harclay 77, dist. 46): Utrum voluntas beneplaciti semper impletur (Non) [A 182vb–183ra; C 83va–b; H 96rb–vb; W 301va– b]. primo Scripto, q. 260. Gonteri, dist. 47, qu. 2 (Harclay 78, dist. 47): Utrum nihil fiat praeter voluntatem Dei (Sic) [A 183ra; C 83vb–84ra; H 96vb–97ra; W 301vb–302ra]. Gonteri, dist. 47, qu. 3: Deinde quaeritur utrum aliquid possit fieri contra voluntatem divini beneplaciti (Sic) [A 183rb–va; W 302rb–vb]. habet videri in libro secundo, d. 38. Gonteri, Distinction 48: Sciendum quoque etc. . . . [A 183va; W 302vb]. Gonteri, dist. 48, qu. 1: Utrum ad creationem actuum humanorum et virtutum moralium principalius concurrat intellectus practicus sive obiectum ratione apprehensum vel appetitus activus sive voluntas (Intellectus) [A 183va–185rb; W 302vb–305va]. primo recitabo unam opinionem unius Doctoris Sollempnis. Gonteri, dist. 48, qu. 2 (Harclay 79, dist. 48): Utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad voluntatem divinam consistit (!) in velle id quod Deus vult, id est in unitate obiecti voliti (Sic) [A 185rb–va; C 84ra–b; H 97ra–vb; W 305va–306ra]. (A: sicut magis videtur in secundo, d. 48). A 185va: . . . qui est ipse Deus Christus Ihesus Filius Dei qui cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto vivit et regnat in saecula saeculorum. Amen. Explicit Expliceat. C 84rb: Explicit primus liber Sententiarum secundum Henricum Anglicum, bakallarium Parisiensem. Deo gratias. H 98ra–va: Tabula quaestionum for Scotus’s Ordinatio in primum. W 306ra: Explicit compilatio Lecturae primi Sententiarum ordinata per Fratrem Aufredum Gonteri Britonem de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, sacrae theologiae baccalareum Parisius anno Domini MCCCXXVo . . . W Tabula quaestionum 306ra–307vb; 308 blank.

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(2) Henry of Harclay (?), In secundum librum Sententiarum (BAV, Borghese 346) Qu. 1: Circa secundum quaeritur primo utrum omne aliud a Deo sit creatum ab eo (Non) (1ra–3va) 1vb: sicut arguitur in quaestione de aeternitate mundi; 2ra: primo per rationes factas in quaestione de aeternitate mundi, rationes tamen alterius adduco; 2va: doctor; 2vb: patet responsio Io. 38, tamen in hoc concedo quod, cuicumque fuerit opinio, non concludit contradictionem quod aliquid effectum ab alio sit aequalis necessitatis [est] alio, cuius causa patet in quaestione de aeternitate mundi; 3rb: respondet doctor. Qu. 2: Utrum potentia creandi possit communicari alicui creaturae (Sic) (3va–4vb) 3vb: Contra gentiles c. 41 ille idem; 4ra: patet etiam ex dictis eius in alio libro || dicit enim in secundo Scripto, q. 3 || alia est opinio; 4va: dico sicut ipse dicit in Scripto; 4vb: patet responsio primo , d. 2, cel’ (pro col.) 25, ad quartum. Qu. 3: Utrum creaturae habent (!) verum esse quidditativum (Sic) (4vb–6va) (In the bottom margin of 5va there is a truncated question omitted in the tabula quaestionum: Utrum creaturae in infinitum possint fieri a Deo secundum gradum nobiliorem et nobiliorem [Sic]) 5rb: arguit unus doctor sic; 5vb: contra opinionem ex propriis, ipse contendebat; 6ra: ro. (pro Io.?) col. 8 2 libri; 6rb: Ad ultimum patet Io., 9 in fine || patet Io. 9 similiter || sicut dicit Tho. 2 Contra gentiles c. 93. Qu. 4: Utrum creatio passiva sit idem cum natura creata (Non) (6va–8va) 7ra: Contra id nota Io. secundo; 7va: sed de hoc patet primo libro, d. 33, de relatione divina, et eodem modo libro , d. 35, de intellectu et voluntate, et patet Io. secundo || dicit unus doctor Ge. con. (pro Contra gentiles?), q. 5; 7vb: Ad primum principale patet Io. secundo, col. 24, ad ultimum; 8ra: dicit 17 (pro Io.?) hac quo (!) primo quaestione 3. Qu. 5: Utrum duratio angelorum mensuretur alia mensura quam tempore, quod est quaerere utrum aevum quod ponitur mensura angelorum sit mensura realiter distincta a tempore (Non) (8va–10va: ends abruptly in line 9 of 10va “hoc probatur multis modis,” and the rest of the column and 10vb are blank; the next quire—ff. 11–20—is from William of Ware’s commentary on book II); 9vb: unus doctor dicit (mg.: Contra M H) || ipse dicit 5 Quolibet, q. 13; 10ra: Tho. etiam, secundo Scripto, q. 12, ad 4. Qu. 6: Utrum angeli sint in loco (Non) (21ra–23rb) 21rb: de hoc magis habetur libro 1, d. 34, col. 74; 22rb: una opinio Tho. in primo Scripto, q. 25 (mg: opinio Tho.) || ubique in Summa vero, prima parte, q. 52, articulo primo || ipse in Scripto; 22va: (1277) a. 204 || (1277) a. 219 || dicit unus doctor Got., 12 Quolibet, q. 6* || opinio autem Tho . . . in Scripto; 22vb: arguit Tho., 1 Scripto, q. 215; 23ra: quaestione 215, primo Scripto. Qu. 7: Utrum angelus moveatur localiter (Non) (23rb–25ra) 23va: dicit unus doctor Tho.; 24ra: quidam doctor H., 4 Quolibet.

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Qu. 8: Utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma (Sic) (25ra–26vb) 25rb: H. de G, 4 Quolibet, q. 16; 25va: ut patet d. 27, libro primo; 25vb: sed de isto fiet quaestio prima, d. 14; 26ra: libro primo, d. 8, col. 45, in secundo articulo, et supra, isto libro, d. 1, col. 6. Qu. 9: Utrum in angelis potest (!) esse plurificatio individuorum in eadem specie (Non) (26vb–29va) 26vb: Adhuc ponitur primo in Scripto, quia 21 (pro q. 221?) (mg.: Opinio Tho.); 27ra: secundo Contra gentiles 9*1 capitulo || Raby Moyses . . . secundo libro De duce nectorum (!), capitulo primo, propositione 16; 27rb: (1277) unus articulorum episcopi || (1277) alius articulus 96; 27vb: per ipsum, libro 4, d. 44, articulo primo, secundo, q. 2 (= Aquinas?); 29rb: de ista duplici materia quaere secundo Io., col. 40; 29va: patet responsio secundo Io., 2, col. 4, in fi. nota || patet responsio Io.* 2, col. 40* || nota Io. secundo, col. 40 || ad ultimum argumentum, sicut patet Io. col. 41, nota ad hoc signum (sign not copied). Qu. 10. Utrum angeli cognoscant res alias a se per suam essentiam, id est per essentiam angelorum (Sic) (29va–31vb) 30ra: arguit alius doctor H., 7 Quolibet, q. 14; 30vb: Contra istam opinionem (mg.: Contra Henricum); 31rb: de isto quaere libro primo, d. 37, col. 81, in principio auct. 3 De anima, c. 6, col. 80, auct. 3 De anima in fine. Item, sed col. 111, 4 ratione; 31vb: ut dictum est libro primo, d. 24. Qu. 11: Utrum angelus potest (!) accipere cognitionem a rebus (Non) (31vb– 33vb) 32ra: Praeterea, notas duo argumenta sequentia istud supra in argumento ad quaestionem praecedentem, col. 2* || quidam doctor Tho., prima parte q. 55 || eadem quaestione in solutione dicit; 32va: sicut ostensum est libro primo, d. 30; 33ra: quaere auctoritatem istam d. 30 libro primo, cel. (pro col.) 35, ad “pro opinione.” Qu. 12: Utrum angeli boni fuerint beati in primo instanti creationis suae et angeli mali miseri etiam in primo instanti creationis suae (Sic) (33vb–35va) 34ra: a doctore Tho. in Summa (mg.: I, 45 q., articulo quinto) || idem in eodem Scripto, 24 q. || alius doctor, H. G., 8 Quolibet, q. 9; 34vb: (1277) articulis 8, 50, et similiter 163; 35ra: sicut patet d. 25 || sicut dictum est in quaestione de aeternitate mundi et in materia de praedestinatione, libro primo; 35rb: ponitur supra, hac col. 904 (404?) || nota de ista mora Io. 2, col. 58. Qu. 13: Utrum in angelis beatis praemium praecesserit meritum (Non) (35va–36ra) 35vb: Tho. in Scripto, secundo libro, d. 5, q. ultima || parte , q. 62, articulo 4. Qu. 14: Utrum angelus potuerit peccare (Non) (36ra–38rb) 37rb: (1277) articulus enim 158 . . . sicut articulus 163; 37va: illi (pro ille) doctor quem illi sequuntur, scilicet Go. || (1277) articulus 219* || (1277) articulus 130 || (1277) articulus sequens, 131 || quidam doctor H., 10 Quolibet. Qu. 15: Utrum angelus malus appetuerit aequalitatem divinam et sic in appetitu primo in quo peccavit (Non) (38rb–39ra) 39ra: de hoc 4 libro in materia de resurrectione. Qu. 16: Utrum primum peccatum angeli sit superbia (Non) (39ra–39vb) 39rb: dicit doctor Tho., 35 q., secundo Scripti.

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Qu. 17: Utrum Lucifer qui cecidit supremus omnium angelorum fuerit (Non) (39vb–40rb). Qu. 18: Utrum boni angeli possunt (!) peccare (Sic) (40rb–42vb) 40va: dicit Tho. doctor; 41rb: d. 6, libro I; 42ra: sicut J. d. 22. Qu. 19: Utrum angelus potest (!) assumere corpus in quo possit excercere opera vitae (Non) (42vb– 44ra) (Not marked with illustrated initial, not in tabula quaestionum) 43vb: Tho. q. 523, libro (pro q. 52, 3 libro?). Qu 20: Utrum unus angelus potest (!) loqui alteri angelo distanti a se localiter (Non) (44ra–45vb) (Not in tabula quaestionum) 45va: nota 4 exempla Io. 2, col. 83 || illud est improbatum libro primo, distinctione 3. Qu. 21: Utrum omnes angeli mittantur in ministerium (Sic) (45vb–46va) 45vb: 2 Scripto, q. 84. Qu. 22: Utrum cuilibet homini deputetur angelus ad sui custodiam (Non) (46va–b). Qu. 23: Utrum in aliqua re creata sit materia, utrum in omni re creata corporali sit materia, quia de re spirituali habitum est distinctione 3 ([Non]) (46va–48va). Qu. 24: Utrum in omni re corporali sit materia, et hoc est utrum in caelo sit materia (Sic) (48va–49vb). Qu. 25: Utrum materia prima fuerit creata (Sic) (49v–51ra). Qu. 26: Utrum lux sit actus luminis (Non) (51ra–53vb) 51rb: ut ostensum est in libro primo, 2 || Contra hoc arguit doctor Tho. 855.; 51va: dicit doctor ubi supra; 53ra: Raby Moyses, libro I, cap. 7. Qu. 27: Utrum omnis res generalis alia ab elementis requirat ad sui esse compositionem 10 (!) elementorum (Non) (53vb–55rb). Qu. 28: Utrum autem (lege: aliqua) creatura possit dici esse ad imaginem Dei (Non) (55rb–vb). Qu. 29: Utrum paradisus in quo positus fuit Adam fuit (!) locus conveniens habitationi humanae (Non) (55rb–57va) (Article two of this question is marked with an illustrated initial and listed in the tabula quaestionum, although it is not a separate question: Utrum paradisus sit locus conveniens habitationi humanae, et hoc secundum eius situs intelligi dupliciter [56rb–57va]). Qu. 30: Utrum mulier potuit (!) fieri de costa viri (Non) (57va–59vb) 57vb: doctor Tho. q. 3. Qu. 31: Utrum in statu innocentiae homines habuissent corpora immortalia (Sic) (59vb–60va) 60rb: patet Scripto Tho. Qu. 32: Utrum pueri nati in statu innocentiae fuissent statim perfecti quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, scilicet quantum ad cognitionem (Sic) (60va–61ra). Qu. 33: Utrum peccatum Adae fuit (!) gravissimum (Sic) (61ra–vb). Qu. 34: Utrum peccatum primi parentis fuit vel potuit (!) fuisse veniale (Sic) (61vb–62rb). Qu. 35: Utrum Deus posset conferre alicui creaturae ut ex condicione suae naturae peccare non possit (Sic) (62rb–63rb) 62va: unus doctor, parte 63, articulo primo; 62vb: ratio doctoris in secundo Scripto,

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23 d., q. prima; 63rb: ut dictum est supra, d. 4, q. prima, col. 26 in fine et 27 in principio. Qu. 36: Utrum ratio superior et inferior sit eadem potentia in homine ([Non]) (63rb–64ra) 63va: patet libro I, d. 27. Qu. 37: Utrum aliquid in voluntate causet effective actum volendi (Non) (64ra–67va) 64ra: una opinio fuit quondam Tho.; 65vb: (1277) articulus 103*; 66ra: (1277) articulus 120; 67rb: libro primo, d. 3, col. 35. Qu. 38: Utrum gratia gratum faciens in essentia animae sit in subiecto et in aliqua eius potentia (In potentia) (67va–68va) 68ra: patet d. 17 libri I. Qu. 39: Utrum aliquis possit mereri vitam eternam de condigno (Non) (68va–69rb) 68vb: dicit doctor quidam, d. 27, q. 170; 69ra: responsio istius doctoris; 66rb: ipsemet doctor ista quaestione ad 4. Qu. 40: Utrum homo per liberum arbitrium sine gratia possit vitare peccatum (Sic) (69rb–71ra) 70rb: secundum doctorem Tho.; 70va: ut dictum est d. 17 I libri || ut patet d. 17 primi libri || de hoc libro I, d. 17, c. (pro col.?) 99; 70vb: sicut exponit doctor Tho., q. 175 et 176, libro 2, d. 28 || q. 175 ad quaestionem. Qu. 41: Utrum iustitia originalis quam habuit Adam ante peccatum fuit (!) dampnum (lege: donum) aliquod supernaturale (Non) (71ra–72rb) 71rb: Haec est una opinio doctoris H., 6 Quolibet, q. 5. Qu. 42: Utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia carnis (Non) (72rb– 74ra) 73ra: unus doctor primo* 282. Qu. 43: Utrum alimentum transeat in virtutem (lege: unitatem) naturae humanae (Non) (74ra–75rb) 75ra: ipsemet ponit libro 4, d. 44. Qu. 44: Utrum originale peccatum possit transire in posteros per originem carnis (Non) (75rb–76ra). Qu. 45: Utrum culpa originalis tollatur per baptismum (Non) (76ra–va). Qu. 46: Utrum peccato originali debeatur poena sensus—intelligo per poenam sensus tantum tristitia in affectu, modo quo nunc anima dampnatur, habent et habebunt amplius respectum corporis (Sic) (76va–77va) 76vb: et ponitur libro 4, d, 4. Qu. 47: Utrum bonum sit causa mali (Non) (77va–80vb) 78ra: opinio Tho. 34 d.; 78rb: aliam rationem ponit doctor Tho. q. 204. Qu. 48: Utrum peccatum consistat in aliquo actu (Sic) (80vb–81vb). Qu. 49: Utrum peccatum sit corruptio alicuius (Non) (81vb–82vb) 82ra: modo dicit Tho. q. 208 || d. 17, primi libri; 82va: unus doctor Tho. bene dicit. Qu. 50: Utrum peccatum unum sit paena peccati (Non) (82vb–83vb) 83va: dicit doctor bene q. 214. Qu. 51: Utrum actus subtractus peccato sit a Deo (Non) (83vb–85ra). Qu. 52: Utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis (Non) (85ra–va). Qu. 53: Utrum nutus sit actus voluntatis quo est ad finem* et qui est ad id quod ordinatur in finem (Non) (85va–86ra) (Not in tabula quaestionum). Qu. 54: Utrum superior scintilla rationis possit extingui os (lege: ita?) quod non remaneat in hominibus alia portio rationis quae remurmuret malo (Sic) (86ra–87ra). Qu. 55: Utrum conscientia aliquando erret (Non) (87ra–va).

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Qu. 56: Utrum actus exterior aliquid bonitatis vel malitiae addit super actum voluntatis interiorem (Non) (87vb–89rb) 89rb: de isto patet d. 41, primo libro. Qu. 57: Utrum actus hominis infidelis bonus esse possit (Non) (89rb–vb) 89vb: Ista autem auctoritas Jacobi habet suam expositionem libro 4, d. 16. Qu. 58: Utrum distinctio de peccato quae ponitur in littera, scilicet quod peccatum aliud consistit in cognitione, aliud in sermone, aliud in opere, sit distinctio conveniens (Non) (89vb–91vb). Qu. 59: Utrum peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum sit irremissibile (Non) (91vb– 93ra). Qu. 60: Utrum potentia peccandi sit a Deo (Non) (93ra–vb). 93vb: Explicit, expliceat ludere, scriptor eat. 94ra–va: tabula quaestionum.

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(3) Aufredo Gonteri Brito, In secundum librum Sententiarum “Hic est liber generationis Adam,” Genesis 5 capitulo. Verbum propositum primo sumi potest ad commendationem Scripturae Sacrae et doctrinae Magistri libri Sententiarum in quatuor libros traditae generaliter, secundo potest sumi ad commendationem doctrinae eius in secundo libro specialiter. Primo ergo etc. . . . Haec omnia liber vitae et testamentum altissimum et agnitio veritatis [P 1ra–vb]. Secundo principaliter dico quod verbum propositum potest specialiter applicari ad commendationem et evidentiam* aliqualem scientiae divinae traditae in secundo Sententiarum quem prae manibus exponere habeo, Domino adiuvante. Totus enim liber Sententiarum in quatuor libros dividitur partiales, in quorum primo Magister tractat de summa perfectione Dei, in secundo mira creatione mundi, in tertio de pia reparatione rerum, in quarto de congrua sanctificatione lapsi per sacramenta Ecclesiae. [W joins 309ra]. Licet autem in secundo Sententiarum Magister tractet de productione cuiuslibet creaturae quae communi nomine ‘generatio’ potest dici, quia tamen productio hominis quodammodo est finis cuiuslibet extrinsecae productionis, sicut etiam homo quodammodo finis est omnium, ut dicitur II Physicorum, et a fine iustum sit unumquodque denominari, ut dicitur II De anima, ideo totus liber secundus Sententiarum liber generationis Adam, scilicet hominis . . . ad quam nos perducat. [P 1vb–2rb; W 309ra–vb]. Distinctio 1: Creationem rerum etc. . . . Circa primam distinctionem secundum processum Magistri inquirendum sunt aliqua, et primo [Pars I] circa creationis principium effectivum . . . Circa primum . . . ideo in principio huius secundi quaero [P 2rb–vb; W 310ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum scilicet distincta cognitio omnium producibilium praecessit ab aeterno in Patre generationem Filii a Patre et spirationem Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio (Non) [P 2vb–4rb; W 310va–315ra]. P 3va: Dico igitur probabiliter . . . (mg.: Opinio Amf ’). Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum quidditates omnium creaturarum fuerint in Deo ab aeterno virtualiter (Non) [P 4rb–5rb; W deest]. Qu. 3: Viso quod creaturae contineantur in Deo virtualiter, consequenter quaerendum est utrum quidditates creaturarum sic in Deo contentae fuerint unitive et indistincte vel distincte (Distincte) [P 5rb–vb; W deest]. P 5rb: opinio quorundam (mg.: F. Mayr.). Qu. 4: Quarto quaeritur utrum in creaturis quae fuerunt virtualiter in Deo contentae ab aeterno, sicut in praecedentibus extitit declaratum, suum esse intelligibile praecesserit suum esse intellectum (Non) [P 5vb–6rb; W deest]. Qu. 5: Ad maiorem evidentiam praedictorum quaero quinto utrum distincta cognitio actualis quam habuit Deus ab aeterno de creaturis producibilibus ab eo requirebat distinctas rationes ideales in eo per quas distincte et determinate cognoscuntur (Non) [P 6rb–va; W deest]. P 6rb: quidam dicunt (mg.: Opinio Scoti).

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Qu. 6: Sexto quaero consequenter ex dictis utrum creaturae intellectae a Deo ab aeterno distincte secundum earum quidditates habuerint esse quidditativum distinctum inter se et ab essentia divina (Sic) [P 6va–7va; W deest]. Qu. 7: Consequenter inquirendum est [distinctione] 7, circa potentiam Dei productivam, et primo utrum possit demonstrari Deum esse principium omnium effectivum (Non) [P 7va–8ra; W 315ra–318rb]. Qu. 7a: Viso quod . . . quaero utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sint unum principium productivum omnium creaturarum* (Non) [P deest; W 318rb–323rb]. Qu. 8: Utrum potentia Dei creativa possit referri relatione reali ad creaturam secundum aliquod suum esse (Sic) [P 8ra–b; W 323rb–325va]. Qu. 9: Utrum potentia Dei creativa referatur relatione nova et temporali secundum rationem ad creaturam de novo in tempore productam (Non) [P 8rb–va; W 325va–328vb]. Qu. 9a: Consequenter dictis quaero utrum possit evidenter probari ex motione* potentiam Dei creativam esse infinitam in vigore et perfectione* (Non) [P deest; W 328vb–333va]. Qu. 10: Post illa quae quaesita sunt de creatione in comparatione ad suum principium productivum consequenter inquirendum est de creatione in comparatione ad terminum productum [Pars II], et primo in generali quaero utrum producere aliquid de nihilo sive creare implicet vel includat repugnantiam terminorum per se secundo modo (Sic) [P 8va–9ra; W 333va–335vb]. Qu. 11: Consequenter quaero utrum Deus per potentiam suam creativam infinitam possit aliquid de novo producere de nihilo sive creare (Non) [P 9ra–va; W 336ra–340ra]. Qu. 12: Utrum Deus ab aeterno potuerit aliquid creare sive aliquid de novo/nihilo producere (Non) [P 9va–11va; W 340ra–347ra]. P 10vb: Rationes secundae opinionis . . . (mg.: Thomae); mg.: Hug.; P 11ra: secundum Hugonem. Qu. 13: Utrum aliquid possit creari ab aliquo agente creato quantumcumque perfecto per potentiam sibi collatam a Deo (Sic) [P 11va–13rb; W 347ra– 353vb]. P 12ra (W 347va): Unus doctor (mg. Opinio Thomae); Alius doctor (mg.: Opinio Aegidii); Doctos Subtilis (mg.: Scotus); Alius doctor (W 348va) (mg.: Jacobus de Esculo); P 12va: alterius doctoris (mg.: Aegidii); alterius doctoris (mg.: Scoti); alterius doctoris (mg.: Jacobi de Esculo). Qu. 13a: Ultimo et ideo* quaero de creatione in comparatione ad terminum eius in specialis, utrum videlicet, actio Dei creativa et productiva possit intelligi ad aliquid ens rationis (Non) [W 353vb–355rb; P does not have this question, but does mention it in its tabula quaestionum]. Qu. 14: Post illa quae quaesita sunt de creatione in comparatione ad suum principium productivum et in comparatione ad suum terminum, nunc inquirendum de creatione secundum se et in comparatione ad suum subiectum [Pars III], et primo de creatione activa, deinde de creatione passiva se tenente ex parte creaturae. Quaero ergo de creatione activa secundum se utrum actio Dei creativa qua aliquid a Deo secundum esse totum de nihilo producitur sit actio de genere actionis (Sic) [P 13rb–va; W 355rb–357rb].

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Qu. 15: Consequenter de creatione activa in comparatione . . . utrum creatio activa sit in Deo formaliter sicut in subiecto vel in ipsa creatura eadem actione* cum creatione* passione* (Sic) [P 13vb–14rb; W 357rb–361rb]. Qu. 16: Utrum creatio activa in Deo necessario praesupponat divinarum personarum productionem, scilicet Filii a Patre et Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio (Non) [P 14rb–15rb; W 361rb–364rb]. P 14va: dicunt quidam . . . (mg.: Opinio Thomae). Qu. 17: Post illa quae quaesita sunt de creatione activa, inquirendum est de creatione passiva existente in creatura utrum creatio passiva quae est in creatura sit eadem cum creatura (Non) [P 15rb–16vb; W 364rb–368rb]. P 16ra: dicit Scotus (mg.: Scotus); P 16rb: Posset tamen probabiliter . . . (mg.: Opinio Amfredi). Qu. 18: Ultimo quaero de creatione passiva in comparatione ad conservationem utrum creatio passiva et conservatio rei eiusdem sit eadem realiter (Non) [P 16vb–17rb; W 368rb–370rb]. Qu. 19: Prius aliqua sunt quaesita de creatione quantum ad eius principium productivum et quantum ad terminum, hic tertio et ultimo inquirendum est de ea quantum ad eius finem et complementum, et quaero utrum Deus creaverit mundum propter aliquem finem (Non) [P 17rb–vb; W 370rb– 372ra]. Qu. 20: Utrum esse principium omnium sit naturaliter demonstrabile (Sic) [P 17vb–18ra; W deest]. There is a blank line before the question, with “Geraldi” in the margin; cf. Gerard Odonis, Principium in II Sent. Qu. 21: Utrum haec intentio ‘creabile’ importet aliquid impossibile (Sic) [P 18ra–vb; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., d. 1, pars I, q. 1. Qu. 22: Utrum creatura ante sui creationem habuit aliquod esse distinctum a Deo (Non) [P 18vb–19va; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 1, pars I, qu. 2. Qu. 23: Utrum creare sit aliqua res alia a creante (Non) [P 19va–20ra; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 1, pars I, qu. 4. P 19vb mg.: Scotus. Qu. 24: Utrum creatio sit actio (Non) [P 20ra–b; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 1, pars. II, qu. 2. Qu. 25: Utrum creari sit passio [P 20rb; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 1, pars II, qu. 3. Qu. 26: Utrum creare et creari sint unus actus (Non) [P 20rb–va; W deest]. Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 1, pars II, qu. 4. Distinctio 2: De angelica itaque natura etc. . . . In hac distinctione 2 Magister tractat . . . Idcirco circa ista duo sunt aliqua inquirenda, primo de quando sive mensura durativa angelorum [Pars I] . . . Ideo primo de tempore sunt aliqua inquirenda, et primo quaero [P 20va–b; W 372rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum tempus habeat esse unum reale extra animam (Non) [P 20vb– 21rb; W 372va–375va]. P drops 1.7 cols. Qu. 2: Quaesitum est de ipsius aeternitate, nunc inquirendum de ipsius unitate, quia unum immediate sequitur ens, ut patet 4 et X Metaphysicae, et quaero hic secundo utrum tempus respectu omnium temporalium sit unum (Non) [P 21rb–22va; W 375va–381rb]. Same explicit.

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Qu. 3: Tertio quaero de tempore in comparatione ad motum utrum tempus differat realiter a motu (Sic) [P 22va–23va; W 381rb–383va]. Qu. 4: Utrum duratio differat ab ipsa re durante (Non) [P 23va; W deest]. P in margin next to question title: Franc’ de Marc’; Cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 5. Qu. 5: Utrum instans, quod est continuativum temporis, maneat idem in toto tempore (Non) [P 23va–24rb; W 383va–385va]. Same explicit. P in margin next to question title: Amf’; indicating again that previous question was from Marchia, not Gonteri. Qu. 6: Post illa quae quaesita sunt de tempore, inquirendum est de aevo quod ponitur mensura durationis angelicae [Pars II], et quaero utrum sit ponere aliquam mensuram secundum rem distinctam ab aeternitate proprie dicta et a tempore quae sit proprie mensura alicuius esse creati (Non) [P 24va– 25rb; W 385va–388rb]. P drops 1.7 cols. Qu. 7: Utrum in aeviterno sive in aevo quod ponitur eius mensura sit successio (Sic) [P 25rb–vb; W 388rb–390vb]. Same explicit. P 25rb opinio unius doctoris (mg.: Opinio Bonaventurae). Qu. 8: Utrum omnium aeviternorum sit unum aevum (Non) [P 25vb–26ra; W 390vb–393rb]. P drops 1.3 cols. Qu. 9: Utrum operationes intrinsecae angelorum et animarum mensurentur tempore vel aevo (Tempore) [P 26ra–va; W 393rb–395vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 10: Post ea quae quaesita sunt circa primam partem huius distinctionis, scilicet quando angeli fuerunt creati, consequenter inquirendum est circa secundam partem, scilicet ubi angeli creati fuerunt locati, et quaero primo utrum angeli sint vel fuerint in aliquo loco corporali (Non) [P 26va–27ra; W 395vb–400rb]. Qu. 11: Adhuc quantum ad modum existendi angelum in loco quaero utrum angelus existens in loco requirat locum determinatum secundum magnitudinem et parvitatem ita quod in maiori vel minori esse non possit (Sic) [P 27ra–va; W 400rb–402rb]. P 27rb: Alius doctor sic declarat istas duas quaestiones . . . (mg.: Geraldus); cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 2, qu. 6. Qu. 12: Utrum unus angelus possit esse in pluribus locis (Non) [P 27va–28ra; W 402rb–404vb]. P in margin next to question title: Amf ’, indicating that previous question was from Odonis, not Gonteri. 27va: quidam doctor (mg.: Opinio* Thomae). Qu. 13: Utrum plures angeli possint esse simul in eodem loco (Sic) [P 28ra– va; W 404vb–406rb]. Qu. 14: Utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter (Non) [P 28va–29ra; W 406rb– 408vb]. Qu. 15: Utrum posito vacuo per divinam potentiam angelus posset moveri localiter in illo vacuo (Non) [P 29ra–va; W 408vb–410va]. Qu. 16: Alius doctor sic declarat: primo videbitur utrum angelus sit in loco, secundo utrum plures possint esse in eodem loco, tertio utrum possit esse in loco indivisibili vel necessario in continuo et divisibili, quarto quomodo movetur localiter utrum motu instantaneo vel continuo et divisibili, quinto utrum movetur in instanti vel in tempore. P in margin next to question title: Franc* de Marc*; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 16.

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Qu. 16.1: Quantum ad primum dico quod aliquid esse in loco potest esse dupliciter . . . [P 29va–b; W deest]. Qu. 16.2: Quantum ad secundum articulum utrum angelus sit in loco vel indivisibili, dico quod vel loquitur hic . . . Hoc de secundo. [P 29vb–30ra; W deest]. Qu. 16.3: Quantum ad tertium, dico quod plures angeli possunt esse in eodem loco . . . Hoc de tertio. [P 30ra; W deest]. Qu. 16.4: Quantum ad quartum, scilicet utrum moveatur motu continuo vel instantaneo, videtur primo quod mutatione instantanea . . . De hoc alias. [P 30ra–b; W deest]. Qu. 16.5: Quantum ad 5, utrum angelus possit moveri in instanti, dico breviter quod angelus virtute propria non potest moveri naturaliter in instanti [P 30rb; W deest]. Distinctio 3: Ecce ostensum est ubi angeli fuerunt mox ut creati sunt etc. . . . In hac 3 distinctione . . . et ideo secundum processum Magistri quaero circa primum, scilicet de angelorum simplicitate et compositione [Pars I], et primo quaero [P 30rb–vb; W 410vb–411va]. Qu. 1: Utrum in angelis sit compositio ex esse et essentia sicut ex rebus realiter distinctis (Sic) [P 30vb–31rb; W 411va–412vb]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma (Sic) [P 31rb–32ra; W 412vb–415rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 8. Qu. 3: Alius doctor quaerit quatuor in Distinctio 9, primo utrum angeli sint compositi ex corpore et anima, secundo utrum in angelis fuerit distinctio ordinum ante confirmationem, tertio utrum homines assumendi sint ad ordines secundum numerum stantium vel secundum numerum cadentium, quarto utrum angeli sint compositi ex forma et materia. P in margin next to question title: Geraldus; cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 8–9, qu. 1–4. Qu.3.1: Ad primam quaestionem breviter dico quod non . . . [P 32ra; W deest]. Qu.3.2: De secundo arguitur quod sic . . . [P 32rb–vb; W deest]. P 32rb: Modo dico . . . (mg. Amf ’*). Qu.3.3: De tertio arguitur quod homines assumuntur ad ordines angelorum secundum numerum stantium . . . [P 32vb; W deest]. Qu.3.4: De quarto autem quaesito principali, scilicet de compositione, utrum angeli sint compositi de materia et forma, arguitur quod sint compositi . . . solutionem quaestionis accipe conclusionem Amfredi [P 32vb; W deest]. Qu. 4: Circa secundum principale, scilicet circa angelorum personalem distinctionem et distinctionem [Pars II], quaero primo de uno et numero, quia unum est in se indivisum et divisum ab alio, et numerus est distinctio unitatum cum sit multitudo mensurata uno, et quaero hic in generali utrum ens et unum significent eandem naturam (Non) [P 33ra–vb; W 415rb–417rb]. Qu. 5: Adhuc ad maiorem evidentiam personalis distinctionis et numerationis angelorum inquirendum est de numero, et quaero hic quarto (!) utrum in angelis sit numerus realiter distinctus ab ipsis angelis numeratis (Sic) [P 33vb–34va; W 417rb–419vb].

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Qu. 6: Ad evidentiam distinctionis personalis in angelis quaero utrum in angelis sit individuatio et ratio individuationis (Non) [P 34va–35vb; W 419vb–422va]. P 35rb: secundum opinionem Subtilis Doctoris, quam credo veram. Qu. 7: Viso utrum in angelis sit ratio individuationis, quaero consequenter utrum in eis sit personalitas vel ratio personae (Non) [P 35vb–37ra; W 422va–425rb]. P 35vb: opinionem unius doctoris . . . doctor unus subtilis (mg.: Scotus). Qu. 8: Viso quod in angelis est individuatio et personalitas septimo (!) quaero utrum in una specie angelica sint vel possint esse plures angeli individualiter et personaliter distincti (Non) [P 37ra–b; W 425rb–426vb]. Qu. 9: Utrum angelus et anima intellectiva differant in specie (Non) [P 37rb– vb; W 426vb–427va]. Qu. 10 [Pars III]: Utrum angelus qui peccavit fuerit a Deo creatus malus. Arguitur quod sic . . . ordinavit ad bonum [P 37vb–38ra; W 427va–428ra]. Then P continues 38ra: Unus doctor . . . (mg.: Geraldus M). Circa istam materiam quaerit iste primo utrum sint creati mali, secundo utrum omnes sint creati in gratia, tertio utrum fuerint creati beati, quarto utrum inter instans creationis et instans adversionis et conversionis eorum fuerit mora—de ista quarta vide ubi tale signum “M.” Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 4, qu. 1–4. Qu. 10.1: Circa primam quaestionem ponit duas conclusiones . . . [P 38ra; W deest]. Qu. 10.2: De secunda quaestione dicit quod angeli fuerunt creati in gratia . . . [P 38ra–b; W deest]. Qu. 10.3: In tertia quaestione primo aliquas divisiones praemittit . . . [P 38rb– va; W deest]. Qu. 10.4: Unus doctor . . . [P 38va; W deest]. Qu. 10.5: Alior (!) doctor declarat in quaestione utrum in substantiis separatis possint esse plura individua in eadem specie, qualiter quantitas possit esse ratio et causa individuationis et materia quae est altera pars compositi . . . [P 38va; W deest]. P 38va mg.: Franc. de Marchia. Cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 14. Qu. 10.6: Quid ergo est principium individuationis? Dico quod . . . [P 38va–b; W deest]. P 38va mg.: Opinio propria. Qu. 11: Utrum angeli sint compositi ex actu et potentia (Non) [P 38vb–39rb; W deest]. P in margin next to question title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 15. Qu. 12: Circa quartum principale, scilicet circa cognitionem angelorum, aliqua sunt inquirenda [Pars IV], et quaero utrum angelus cognoscat se per essentiam suam (Non) [P 39va–b; W 428ra–429rb]. Qu. 13: Utrum angelus per essentiam suam intelligat alias res a se (Sic) [P 39vb–40ra; W 429rb–431rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 10. Qu. 14: Utrum angeli superiores intelligant res alias a se per species a Deo eis communicatas magis universales (Sic) [P 40ra–vb; W 431rb–433vb].

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Qu. 15: Utrum angelus possit proficere in cognitione rerum recipiendo aliquas species de novo a rebus (Non) [P 40vb–41vb; W 433vb–436vb]. 40vb: doctor unus solempnis et eius sequaces. P drops 1.5 cols. Qu. 16: Utrum species singularium eiusdem speciei existentes in intellectu angeli per quas distincte intelligit ista singularia sub propriis eorum rationibus, sicut patet ex quaestione praecedenti, sint eiusdem speciei vel alterius (Alterius) [P 41vb–42rb; W 436vb–437vb]. P drops much. Qu. 17: Utrum in intellectu angeli possint simul esse cognitio abstractiva et intuitiva de quocumque obiecto (Non) [P 42rb–43rb; W 437vb–439va]. Qu. 18 [Pars V]: Utrum angelus dilectione naturali diligat seipsum plus quam Deum (Sic) [P 43rb–va; W 439va–441rb]. P drops much. Distinctio 4: Post haec videndum est . . . In hac distinctione 4 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Circa primum quaero primo [P 43va–b; W 441rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum angeli beati fuerint in primo instanti suae creationis beati et angeli mali in primo instanti suae creationis miseri (Fuerunt) [P 43vb–45ra; W 441va–445rb]. P 43vb/W 441vb: non potest ex naturalibus, sed divina gratia mediante, sicut declaravi alias in tractatu De beatitudine; quaestio autem haec non quaerit de beatitudine naturali, sed supernaturali; P 44ra/ W 442ra: Sed ista ratio excludatur a doctore thoma in Summa et bene || Alius doctor, scilicet Henricus, VIII Quodlibet, q. 10* . . . (mg.: Henricus); P 44va, W 443vb: Aliter respondet unus doctor novus . . . (mg.: Petrus Aureoli) || dicit Doctor Subtilis || rationes Subtilis Doctoris || Ex his patet solutio ad instantias adductas contra rationes Subtilis Doctoris, quae praecedunt ex malo intellectu, ut patet intuenti. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 12. Qu. 2: Circa secundum, scilicet circa praescientiam angelorum bonorum et malorum quantum ad suum statum vel casum, quaero utrum angeli boni fuerint praescii sui status et mali angeli praescii sui casus (Fuerunt) [P 45ra–va; W 445rb–vb]. Same explicit. Distinctio 5: Post haec consideratio adducit inquirere etc. . . . In hac distinctione 5 intentio Magistri . . . ideo circa utrumque simul quaero [P 45va–b; W 445vb–446rb]. Qu. 1: Utrum angeli boni in sua conversione ad Deum suam beatitudinem meruerint et utrum meritum in ipsis praecessit praemium ([Sic]) [P 45vb– 46vb; W 446rb–448vb]. Same explicit. P 45vb mg.: Opinio ??; 46rb: Ideo ad istam conclusionem ab alio doctore adducuntur aliae rationes (mg.: Rationes Scoti); Sed licet istae rationes bonae sint et Subtilis Doctoris, contra eas tamen arguitur . . . (mg.: P. Aureoli); 46va mg.: Solutio ad primam Petri Aureoli. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero ad maiorem evidentiam eorum quae dicta sunt utrum aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem bonorum angelorum et eorum beatitudinem (Non) [P 46vb–47ra; W 448vb–449rb]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum mali angeli ante suum casum habuerint cognitionem matutinam (Sic) [P 47ra–b; W 449rb–va]. Distinctio 6: Praeterea sciri oportet etc. . . . In hac 6 distinctione versatur intentio Magistri . . . ideo circa istam distinctionem quaero primo [P 47rb– va; W 449va–450ra].

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Qu. 1: Utrum angelus potuerit peccare (Non) [P 47va–48ra; W 450rb–453rb]. P 47vb: Sed aliqui doctorum istorum in diversis videntur sibi contradicere, nam ista quae dicta sunt sunt secundum intentionem eorum prima parte Summae, 63 q., articulo primo (mg.: opinio Thomae). Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum angelus peccando appetuerit divinam aequalitatem (Non) [P 48ra–49ra; W 453rb–456ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 15. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum peccatum primum quo peccavit angelus fuerit superbia (Non) [P 49ra–va; W 456ra–457vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 16. Qu. 4: Quarto quaero utrum Lucifer qui cecidit supremus angelorum omnium fuerit (Non) [P 49va–50rb; W 457vb–458va]. Same explicit. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 17. Qu. 5: Ultimo videndum est utrum peccatum primi angelus fuerit occasio aliis peccandi [P 50ra–b; W 458va–vb]. With four small subquestions. Distinctio 7: Supra dictum est etc. . . . In hac distinctione 7 versatur consideratio Magistri principaliter circa bonorum angelorum confirmationem et malorum obstinationem . . . et quaero primo circa primum [P 50rb–va; W 458vb–459rb]. Qu. 1: Utrum boni angeli possint peccare (Sic) [P 50va–51rb; W 459rb–464rb]. Same explicit. P 50va: opinionem Doctoris Subtilis. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum angeli damnati possint paenitere (Sic) [P 51rb– 52ra; W 464rb–468ra]. P 51va: opinionem Doctoris Subtilis. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 18. Qu. 3: Alius doctor circa istam materiam ponit 6 quaestiones per ordinem, primo utrum aliqua condicio intellectus angelici sit causa obstinationis. Respondet quod non . . . Secundo quaerit utrum aliqua condicio voluntatis sit causa obstinationis malorum angelorum. Respondet quod non . . . Tertio quaerit utrum habitus infusus sit causa obstinationis malorum angelorum. Respondet quod non . . . Quarto quaerit utrum passio mala causa sit obstinationis, quinta quaestio utrum habitus malus sit huius causa, sexta quaestio utrum desertio divinae gratiae . . . [P 52ra–b; W deest]. P 52ra mg.: eraldus* Cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 7, qu. 1–6. Qu. 4: Circa secundum principale, id est circa potentiam daemonum, est inquirendum, et quaero utrum daemones sint acuti et ingentes* in potentia cognitiva in cognitione rerum (Non) [P 52rb–vb; W 468ra–469ra]. Qu. 5: Utrum divinatio et praenuntiatio futurorum possit fieri per daemones (Non) [P 52vb–53ra; W 469ra–vb]. Qu. 6: Utrum per potentiam daemonum possint vere formae substantiales introduci in materia (Sic) [P 53ra–va; W 469vb–471rb]. Qu. 7: Utrum virtute daemonum possint fieri opera magica vel quacumque natura nostros sensus deludentia per homines malos (Non) [P 53va–54rb; W 471rb–473ra]. P drops 1 col. Distinctio 8: Solet etiam in quaestione versari . . . In hac autem distinctione 8 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Circa primum quaero primo [P 54rb–va; W 473ra–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita (Sic) [P 54va–b; W 473rb–474ra].

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Qu. 2: Utrum angelus possit assumere corpus in quo possit exercere opera vitae (Non) [P 54vb–55ra; W 474ra–475va]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 19. Qu. 3: Circa secundum principale scilicet de divina apparitione in corporalibus formis, nihil quaero in hac distinctione, quia haec principaliter pertinent ad 16 distinctionem primi libri, sed circa tertium quaero unum breve utrum daemones possint intimare sive illabi humanis corporibus et animabus (Non) [P 55ra–b; W 475va–476rb]. Distinctio 9: Post praedicta etc. . . . In hac distinctione 9 . . . primo* procedendum est in hac distinctione . . . ideo quaero primo circa hoc . . . [P 55rb–56ra; W 476rb–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum possit unus angelus alium angelum illuminare et ex hoc patebit utrum possit perficere et purgare (Non) [P 56ra–56vb; W 476vb–481vb]. P 56rb: secundum opinionem Subtilis Doctoris (mg.: Opinio Subtilis Doctoris). Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum angelus superior illuminet angelum inferiorem de omnibus sibi notis et a Deo revelatis (Non) [P 56vb–57rb; W 481vb– 482va]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum unus angelus possit loqui alteri (Non) [P 57rb– 58ra; W 482va–486ra]. Qu. 4: Quarto quero utrum unus angelus possit loqui alteri angelo distanti ab eo localiter (Non) [P 58ra–vb; W 486ra–488va]. P 58rb: Ad tertium articulum dicit Thomas, parte prima, q. 7, ar. 4 . . .; 58va: Doctor autem Subtilis (mg.: Opinio Scoti). Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 20. Distinctio 10: Hoc etiam investigandum est . . . Circa distinctionem 10 quaero [P 58vb–59ra; W 488va–489ra]. Utrum omnes angeli mittantur in ministerium (Sic) [W 489ra–490rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 21. Qu. unica: Utrum angeli missi hic inferius ad ministeria hominibus exhibenda simul et uno actu cognoscant res in Deo et in genere proprio (Non) [P 59ra–va; W 490rb–492va]. Distinctio 11: Illud quoque sciendum . . . In hac distinctione 11 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Circa primum [Pars I] quaero secundum processum Magistri [P 59va–60ra; W 492va–493rb]. Qu. 1: Utrum cuilibet homini ad sui custodiam sit a Deo angelus deputatus (Non) [P 60ra; W 493rb–vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 22. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero breviter utrum angelus deputatus ad hominis custodiam ipsum quandoque deserat custodire (Sic) [P 60ra–b; W 493vb– 494ra]. Qu. 3: Ex hoc patet solutio alterius quaestionis quae solet hic quaeri, utrum angelus custos hominis incurrat tristitiam de malo hominis quem custodit (Dico breviter) [P 60rb; W 494rb]. Qu. 4: Solet etiam quaeri hic utrum inter angelos homines custodientes quandoque sit pugna et discordia in custodia (Respondeo breviter) [P 60rb; W 494rb–va]. Qu. 5: Circa secundum principale, scilicet circa profectum angelorum homines custodientium [Pars II], quaero hic utrum angelus bonus videns divinam essentiam videat in eo necessario omnia contenta in divina essentia

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vel continue proficiat in videndo unum post alium (Omnia) [P 60rb–61ra; W 494va–497va]. Distinctio 12: Haec de angelicae naturae condicione . . . Circa hanc distinctionem 12, in qua Magister principaliter tractat . . . quaero primo [P 61ra–b; W 497va–498ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum materia et forma in composito sint res praecisibiles (Non) [P 61rb–62ra; W 498ra–500va]. Qu. 2: Quaero hic secundo utrum in aliqua re creata sit materia realiter distincta a forma (Non) [P 62ra–vb; W 500va–503rb]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum in omni re corporali sit materia proprie dicta, et hoc est directe quaerere utrum in caelo sit materia (Sic) [P 62vb–63va; W 503rb–506va]. P drops 1/2 col. Qu. 4: Quarto quaero hic utrum forma accidentalis acquisita per motum et mutationem quae est existens per se in genere accidentis habeat propriam materiam sive principium potentiale intrinsecum de quo educatur ex quo realiter componatur, sicut materia in genere substantiae se habet ad compositum substantiale in genere substantiae (Sic) [P 63va–64rb; W 506va–509va]. Qu. 5: Quinto quaero utrum materia prima fuerit creata in formis (Sic) [P 64va–65va; W 509va–513ra]. Same explicit. Qu. 6: Sexto quaero utrum potentia materiae sit eadem cum materia (Sic) [P 65va–b; W 513ra–vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 7: Septimo quaero utrum potentia dividens ens contra actum sit potentia subiectiva materiae vel obiectiva (Non) [P 66ra–va; W 513vb–514vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 8: Octavo et ultimo quaero ad maiorem evidentiam praedictorum utrum materia possit immediate informari aliqua forma accidentali prius quam informetur aliqua forma substantiali (Non) [P 66va–67ra; W 514vb–516ra]. P drops 1/3 col. P’s Tabula Quaestionum omits qu. 8. Qu. 9: Alius doctor circa istam distinctionem quaerit primo utrum materia prima fuerit forma sub forma confusionis, secundo quaerit utrum per essentiam suam sit potentia, tertio utrum per essentiam suam sit substantia, utrum per essentiam suam sit quantitas. [P 67ra; W deest]. P in margin next to question titles has “Geraldus”; cf. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 12, qu. 1–4. Qu. 9.1: De primo arguitur quod non . . . [P 67ra–va; W deest]. 67ra mg.: inanis. vacua. Qu. 9.2: De secundo dicit una opinio quod . . . [P 67va; W deest]. Qu. 9.3: De tertio ponit duas conclusiones . . . [P 67va–b; W deest]. Qu. 9.4: De quarto arguitur quod materia per essentiam suam non sit quantitas . . . [P 67vb–68rb; W deest]. Distinctio 13: Prima autem distinctionis operatio . . . Circa istam distinctionem 13 quaero [P 68rb–va; W 516ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum lux vel lumen sit forma substantialis vel accidentalis (Non) [P 68va–69rb; W 516va–518va].

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Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum species lucis et universaliter species quaecumque intentionalis in medio educatur de potentia medii (Non) [P 69rb–70rb; W 518va–520vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum lux vel lumen sit primum obiectum ipsius visus (Non) [P 70rb–vb; W 520vb–522vb]. Same explicit. 70va: Alius doctor in ista quaestione ponit duas conclusiones (mg.: Geraldus*). Distinctio 14: Dixit quoque Deus . . . Circa hanc distinctionem 14 versatur intentio magistri . . . Ad primum [Pars I] quaero [P 70vb–71rb; W 522vb– 523va]. Qu. 1: Utrum caelum sit animatum (Sic) [P 71rb; W 523va–524va]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; abbreviation of Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 29. Qu. 2: Utrum ultima sphaera sit in loco per se (Sic) [P 71rb–va; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; abbreviation of Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 31. Qu. 3: Utrum aquae sint super firmamentum (Non) [P 71va; W 524va–525rb]. P drops ca. 2 lines. P in margin next to title has “Amf ’.” Qu. 4: Utrum firmamentum sit de natura istorum corporum inferiorum (Sic) [P 71va–72ra; W 525rb–526rb]. P in margin next to title has “Amf ’.” Qu. 5: Utrum caelum moveatur ab intelligentia creata sive ab angelo (Non) [P 72ra–b; W 526rb–527ra]. P drops 1/2 col. Qu. 6: Utrum motus caeli sit naturalis (Sic) [P 72rb–va; W 527ra–528vb]. Qu. 7: Circa secundum principale, scilicet circa naturam elementorum et motum eorum quantum ad opus tertiae diei [Pars II], quaero utrum in generatione elementi ex elemento forma aliqua accidentalis possit esse principium producendi formam substantialem de potentia materiae (Sic) [P 72va–73va; W 528vb–533ra]. Qu. 8: Utrum in generatione unius elementi ex alio maneant eadem dimensio interminata cum qualitate symbola in elemento generato et corrupto (Sic) [P 73va–74rb; W 533ra–536va]. P drops 1/4 col. Qu. 9: Utrum elementum existens extra locum suum naturalem moveatur naturaliter ad ipsum per formam suam ut grave deorsum vel leve sursum (Non) [P 74rb–75ra; W 536va–537vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 10: Utrum elementum vi sua activa possit se movere ad formam sibi ipsi adquirendum, ut puta aqua calefacta possit se reducere ad aliquem gradum frigiditatis (Non) [P 75ra–vb; W 537vb–560va85]. P drops 2+ cols. Qu. 11: Circa tertium principale, scilicet circa naturam luminarium, motum, et influentiam eorum quantum ad opus quartae diei [Pars III], quaero utrum sit tantum unum caelum (Sic) [P 75vb–76rb; W 560va–562ra]. P drops 2/3 col. Distinctio 15: Dixit etiam Deus . . . Intentio Magistri in hac distinctione 15 . . . Quantum ad primum quaero [P 76rb–va; W 562ra–va].

85

W numbers fol. 540 as 560, and the foliation continues sequentially from there.

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Qu. 1: Utrum omnis res generabilis alia ab elementis requirat ad sui esse compositionem quatuor elementorum (Non) [P 76va–77rb; W 562va–564vb]. P drops 1/4 col. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 27. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum in corporibus animalium elementa activa praedominentur passivis quantum ad virtutem (Non) [P 77rb–vb; W 564vb– 565vb]. Same explicit. Qu. 3: Utrum elementa maneant in mixto tantum in potentia passiva (Sic) [P 77vb; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 33. Qu. 4: Utrum elementa sint in mixto tantum in actu virtuali per modum quo effectus est in causa efficiente (Sic) [P 77vb–78ra; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 34. Qu. 5: Utrum elementa sint in mixto tantum in actu perfectionali secundum quandam convenientiam aequivocam perfectionis ipsorum in mixto (Sic) [P 78ra; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 35. Qu. 6: Utrum elementa sint in mixto in actu formali secundum proprias formas eorum (Sic) [P 78ra–b; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 36. Distinctio 16: His excursis . . . In hac distinctione 16 tractat Magister . . . Idcirco circa eam quaero primo [P 78rb–va; W 565va–566ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse ad imaginem Dei (Non) [P 78va–b; W 566ra–va]. P drops 3/4 col. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 28. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum potentiae animae secundum quas est homo ad imaginem Dei sint eaedem realiter cum essentia animae (Sic) [P 78vb– 79va; W 566va–571rb]. P drops 1.5 cols. P 78vb mg.: Opinio Thomae; 79ra: Opinio alterius doctoris H, tertio Quolibet, quaestione 14. Qu. 3: Utrum potentiae sensitivae in homine et aliis animalibus sint eiusdem speciei (Sic) [P 79va–b; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 17. Qu. 4: Utrum anima intellectiva sit immortalis (Non) . . . Sed est dubium utrum immortalitas animae possit naturaliter demonstrari a priori vel a posteriori (Sic) [P 79vb–80ra; W deest] = Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 18–19 (scribe forgot to write “Franciscus”). Qu. 5: Utrum intellectus et voluntas in homine et angelo sint eiusdem rationis (Sic) [P 80ra–b; W deest]. P in margin next to title has “Franciscus”; cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 20. Qu. 6: Utrum sit idem subiectum (lege: obiectum) intellectus et voluntatis (Idem) [P 80rb; W deest]. Cf. Francis of Marchia, IIA Sent., qu. 21. Distinctio 17: Hic de origine animae . . . In hac distinctione 17 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Quantum ad primum quaero [P 80rb–va; W 571rb–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum anima intellectiva fuerit forma corporis Adae et universaliter sit forma cuiuslibet hominis (Non) [P 80va–81ra; W 571vb–573va]. P drops 1/2 col. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum in Adam et universaliter in quolibet homine praeter animam intellectivam sit alia forma substantialis (Non) [P 81ra– 82ra; W 573va–576va].

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Qu. 3: Quia per actum intelligendi . . . quaero hic tertio utrum intellectus agens illustrans fantasmata causet in eis aliquam dispositionem per quam possit movere intellectum possibilem ad actum intelligendi (Sic) [P 82ra–va; W 576va–578rb]. P drops 1 line. Qu. 4: Adhuc quaero quarto utrum intellectus agens sit nobilior intellectu possibili (Sic) [P 82va–83rb; W 578rb–580va]. Same explicit. Qu. 5: Quinto quaero utrum intellectus noster in via ista intelligens per speciem abstractam a fantasmatibus et causatam actione intellectus agentis secundum modum tactum in praecedenti quaestione possit intelligere substantiam per propriam speciem substantiae* (Non) [P 83rb–84ra; W deest]. W dropping this question appears to be a scribal error since in W the next question is “sexto.” Qu. 6: Circa secundum . . . quaero sexto utrum paradisus in quo fuit positus Adam fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae (Non) [P 84ra–b; W 580va–582vb]. Gerard Odonis, II Sent., dist. 20, qu. 2, announces same question, but it is not found in the extant mss. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 29. Qu. 7: Septimo et ultimo quaero utrum aliqua pars terrae ultra circulum aequinoctium sit habitabilis (Non) [P 84rb–vb; W 582vb–583va]. Distinctio 18: In eodem quoque paradiso . . . In hac distinctione 18 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Quantum ad primum quaero [P 84vb–85ra; W 583va– 584ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum corpus mulieris potuerit formari de costa viri (Non) [P 85ra– va; W 584ra–585ra]. Same explicit. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 30. Qu. 2: Quantum ad secundum . . . sed circa tertium quaero utrum in materia sint rationes seminales respectu formae naturaliter inducendae/educendae (Non) [P 85va–86va; W 585ra–588ra]. Same explicit. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum opera quae fiunt a Deo immediate in rebus praeter rationes seminales dicantur opera mirabilia (Non) [P 86va–b; W 588ra–589ra]. P drops 3/4 col. Distinctio 19: Solent quaeri plura etc. . . . In hac distinctione 19 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Ideo primo quaero circa istam distinctionem de animae humanae immortalitate [P 86vb–87ra; W 589ra–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum naturaliter sit immortalis et incorporalis (Non) [P 87rb; W 589vb–591ra]. Qu. 2: Circa secundum et tertium simul quaero utrum in statu innocentiae homines habuissent corpora immortalia (Sic) [P 87rb–vb; W 591ra–592rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 31. Distinctio 20: Post haec videndum est etc. . . . In hac distinctione 20 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Circa primum quaero faciliter [P 87vb–88ra; W 592rb–593ra]. Qu. 1 Utrum in paradiso terrestri si Adam non peccasset per carnalem copulam facta fuisset prolis generatio (Non) [P 88ra–va; W 593ra–594va]. W adds ½ col. Qu. 2: Circa secundum principale quaero utrum pueri nati in statu innocentiae fuissent statim perfecti quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, scilicet quantum ad cognitionem (Sic) [P 88va–b; W 594va–595rb]. P drops 1/5 col. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 32.

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Qu. 3: Tertio/Secundo quaero utrum pueri nati in statu innocentiae fuissent nati cum iustitia originali et in ea confirmari (Sic) [P 89ra–b; W 595rb– 596ra]. Same explicit. Distinctio 21: Videns igitur Diabolus . . . In hac distinctione 21, postquam tracativit Magister . . . Ideo circa primum quaero [P 89rb–va; W 596ra–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum invidia fuerit primum motivum Diaboli in temptatione priorum parentum (Non) [P 89va–b; W 596vb–597rb]. P drops 1/5 col. Qu. 2: Circa secundum principale quaero utrum possit esse temptatio a carne sine temptatione ab hoste (Non) [P 89vb–90rb; W 597rb–598va]. P drops 1/5 col. Qu. 3: Circa tertium principale quaero utrum peccatum Adae fuerit gravissimum (Sic) [P 90va–b; W 598va–599va]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 33. Distinctio 22: Hic videtur diligenter investigandum . . . In hac distinctione 22 determinat Magister . . . Circa primum quaero [P 90vb–91rb; W 599vb– 600vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum primum peccatum priorum parentum potuerit esse veniale (Sic) [P 91rb–vb; W 600vb–601vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 34. Qu. 2: Secundo quaerendum est utrum primum peccatum priorum parentum fuerit superbia (Non) [P 91vb–92rb; W 601vb–603rb]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaeritur utrum peccatum priorum parentum processerit ex ignorantia (Sic) [P 92rb–vb; W 603rb–604rb]. Distinctio 23: Praeterea quaeri solet . . . In hac distinctione 23 in qua Magister . . . Circa primum quaero [P 92vb–93ra; W 604rb–605ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum Deus posset/potuerit conferre alicui creaturae habenti usum liberi arbitrii ut ex condicione suae naturae peccare non possit (Sic) [P 93ra–vb; W 605ra–606rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 35. Qu. 2: Quantum ad secundum principale quaero utrum primus homo in statu innocentiae viderit Deum per essentiam (Sic) [P 93vb–94ra; W 606rb– 607ra]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum cum notitia scientifica quam habuit de Deo et divinis in statu innocentiae habuit simul fidem respectu earundem scibilium de Deo (Non) [P 94ra–95va; W 607ra–611ra]. Qu. 4: Quarto et ultimo quaero utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuit omnium rerum cognitionem (Sic) [P 95va–b; W 611ra–612ra]. Distinctio 24: Nunc diligenter investigari oportet . . . In hac distinctione 24 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Sed circa secundum quaero primo in generali [P 95vb–96rb; W 612ra–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum distinctae potentiae animae possint habere idem obiectum sub/ cum eadem ratione formali (Non) [P 96rb–va; W 612vb–613vb]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero magis in speciali utrum portio superior et inferior sit eadem potentia in homine (Non) [P 96va–97ra; W 613vb–614vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 36. Qu. 3: Tertio quero utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus sit eadem potentia (Non) [P 97rb–va; W 614vb–615va]. Q 4: Circa memoriam et intelligentiam qualiter distinguuntur nihil quaero . . . Ideo circa sensualitatem et appetitum sensitivum inquirendum est utrum

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sensualitas sive appetitus sensitivus sit tantum una potentia (Non) [P 97va– 98ra; W 615va–617ra]. Qu. 5: Quantum ad tertium principale circa peccati initium secundum progressum quod potissime incipit in nobis per passiones appetitus sensitivi . . . ut tractat in littera quaero quinto* utrum passiones concupiscibiles sint priores passiones concupiscibilibus (Sic) [P 98ra–b; W 617ra–va]. Qu. 6: Adhuc ad videndum progressum et consummationem peccati quaero sexto utrum ad actus et habitus bonos vel malos, laudabiles vel vituperabiles, in nobis principalius operetur intellectus practicus vel voluntas sive appetitus electivus (Intellectus) [P 98rb–99ra; W 617va–620va]. Qu. 7: Septimo quaero utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum (Non) [P 99ra–vb; W 620va–622ra]. Distinctio 25: Iam vero ad propositum redeamus etc. . . . In hac distinctione 25 tractat Magister . . . quaero primo [P 99vb–100ra; W 622ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum liberum arbitrium formaliter sit in Deo (Sic) [P 100ra–b; W 622va–623va]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi (Sic) [P 100rb– vb; W 623va–624vb]. Qu. 3: Tertio . . . utrum obiectum in intellectu apprehensum causet actum volendi in voluntate in qua formaliter et principaliter consistit ratio libertatis . . . (Sic) [P 100vb–101vb; W 624vb–629vb]. Qu. 4: Ad videndum modum libertatis voluntatis in causando suum actum adhuc quarto quaero utrum pura passivitas sive motio passiva repugnet libertati voluntatis (Non) [P 102ra–vb; W 630ra–631vb]. Qu. 5: Adhuc ad maiorem evidentiam libertatis voluntatis quae libere movet se ad actum volendi vel nolendi quaero hic quinto generaliter utrum aliquid unum et idem esse in potentia formaliter et esse reale virtualiter implicet aliquam repugnantiam (Sic) [P 102vb–103rb; W 631vb–632vb]. Qu. 6: Sexto et ultimo quaero utrum ad rationem et essentiam per se liberi arbitrii concurrant potentia intellectiva et volitiva (Non) [P 103rb–vb; W 632vb–634ra]. Distinctio 26: Haec est gratia operans, etc. prius determinavit magister . . . In hac distinctione 26 versatur intentio Magistri circa gratiam dei . . . Quantum ad primum quaero primo [P 103vb–104ra; W 634ra–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum gratia sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima (Non) [P 104ra–va; W 634vb–636rb]. Qu. 2: Tertio (!) quaero utrum gratia gratum faciens sit eadem realiter cum caritate, quae est virtus theologica (Non) [P 104va–105ra; W 636rb–637vb]. P 104vb: Contra* est opinio extrema cuiusdam qui non fuit doctor qui dicit . . . Distinctio 27: Hic videndum est quid sit virtus . . . In hac distinctione 27 . . . Et ideo primo in generali inquirendum est de virtute [P 105ra–b; W 637vb– 638rb]. Qu. 1: Utrum habitus virtuosus in anima sit forma absoluta, sive sit virtus intellectualis, sive moralis, sive theologica, sive infusa: quaere istam quaestionem libro tertio, distinctione 23, quaestione prima [P 105rb; W 638rb– 641ra].

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Qu. 2: Secundo quaero in speciali utrum gratia vel caritas quae est virtus infusa sit omnium virtutum excellentissima (Non) [P 105rb–106ra; W 641ra–643vb]. Tertio quaero utrum praeter gratiam et caritatem infusam sit necessario ponere aliam ex actibus acquisitam (Non) [P 106ra–b; W 643vb–644vb]. Distinctio 28: Id vero inconcussae . . . Circa istam distinctionem 28 quaero [P 106rb–va; W 644vb–645va]. Qu. 1: Utrum aliquis possit de condigno mereri vitam aeternam (Non) [P 106va–b; W 645va–646va]. P 106va: Ad quaestionem dicit Doctor, d. 27, q. 3 . . . Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 39. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum homo per liberum arbitrium sine gratia possit vitare peccatum (Sic) [P 106vb–107va; W 646va–649ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 40. Distinctio 29: Post haec considerandum est . . . In hac distinctione 29 versatur consideratio Magistri . . . Circa primum quaero [P 107va–b; W 649ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum iustitia originalis quam habuit Adam ante peccatum fuerit aliquod supernaturale vel solum donum naturale (Non supernaturale) [P 107vb–108rb; W 649va–651ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 41. Qu. 2: Circa secundum . . . utrum Adam ante peccatum habuerit* gratiam gratum facientem (Sic) [P 108rb–va; W 651ra–652ra]. Qu. 3: Circa tertium principale et ultimo quaero utrum poena homini inflicta propter peccatum per quod gratiam amisit convenienter* determinetur et assignetur a Magistro in littera (Non) [P 108va–b; W 652ra–vb]. Distinction 30: In superioribus insinuatum etc. Prius determinavit magister de hominis . . . In hac distinctione 30 Magister tractat . . . Circa primum quaero [P 108vb–109ra; W 652vb–653ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum in parvulis qui secundum legem propagationis descendunt ab Adam ab origine sua sit aliquod peccatum (Non) [P 109ra–b; W 653ra–vb]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia carnis (Non) [P 109rb–110ra; W 653vb–656rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 42. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum alimentum transeat in unitatem naturae humanae (Non) [P 110ra–110vb; W 656rb–658rb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 43. Distinctio 31: Nunc super est etc. . . . In hac distinctione 31 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Ideo quaero primum circa hoc [P 110vb–111ra; W 658rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum peccatum possit transire a parentibus in prolem per originem carnis (Non) [P 111ra–b; W 658va–659vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 44. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum peccatum originale primo et principaliter sit in essentia animae ut in aliqua eius potentia (Sic) [P 111va; W 659vb– 660va]. Distinctio 32: Quoniam supradictum est etc. . . . In hac distinctione 32 versatur intentio Magistri . . . Circa primum quaero [P 111vb–112ra; W 660va– 661ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum peccatum originale tollatur per baptismum (Non) [P 112ra–b; W 661ra–662ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 45. Qu. 2: Circa secundum principale quaero utrum concupiscentia et originalis infectio quae est in homine ex peccato sit a Deo effective (Sic) [P 112rb–vb; W 662ra–662bisrb].

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Qu. 3: Circa ultimum . . . quaero utrum omnes animae sint aequales ex sua causatione (Non) [P 113ra–b; W 662bisrb–663ra]. Distinctio 33: Praedictis adiciendum est etc. . . . In hac distinctione 33 primo quaero [P 113rb–va; W 663ra–663va]. Qu. 1: Utrum peccata proximorum parentum transeant ad posteriores et eis imputentur quantum ad paenam et ad culpam (Ad culpam) [P 113va–b; W 663va–664vb]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum peccatum originale in uno homine sit tantum unum vel plura (Non unum) [P 113vb–114ra; W 664vb–665va]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum peccato originali correspondeat paena sensus, et per paenam sensus intelligo omnem tristitiam in effectu modo quo nunc animae damnantur habent vel habebunt ante* resumpsis corporibus (Sic) [P 114ra–b; W 665va–667ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 46. Distinctio 34: Post peccata de peccato etc. . . . In ista distinctione 34 quaero primo in generali [P 114rb; W 667ra–rb]. Qu. 1: Utrum privatio includat in suo conceptu formali aliquid positivum per quod distinguatur a negatione pura (Sic) [P 114rb–va; W 667rb–669ra]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum bonum sit causa mali (Non) [P 114va–115ra; W 669ra–671vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 47. Distinctio 35: Post haec videndum est . . . Circa istam distinctionem 35 quaero primo [P 115ra–b; W 672ra–va]. Qu. unica: Utrum omne peccatum consistat in aliquo actu (Sic) [P 115rb; W 672va–673vb, quaestio secunda 673vb–674ra; quaestio tertia 674ra–675vb]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 48. Distinctio 36: Sciendum est tamen etc. . . . Circa istam distinctionem 36 quaero [P 115va; W 675vb–676rb]. Qu. unica: Utrum paena possit esse in aliquo sine praecedenti culpa (Non) [P 115va–b; W 676rb–678va, quaestio secunda 678va–679ra]. Distinctio 37: Nunc autem et alii plurimi . . . Circa istam distinctionem 37 quaero [P 115vb–116ra; W 679ra–rb]. Qu. unica: Utrum peccatum sive malum culpae pertineat ad ordinem et perfectionem universi (Sic) [P 116ra; W 679rb–681rb, quaestio secunda 681rb–va, quaestio tertia 681va–682rb]. Distinctio 38: Post praedicta de voluntate etc. . . . Circa istam distinctionem 38 quaero [P 116rb; W 682rb–va]. Qu. unica: Utrum fine ultimo apprehenso ab intellectu in statu meriti in universali vel particulari secundum rationem summi boni, voluntas necessario tendat in ipsum ipsum diligendo (Sic) [P 116rb–vb; W 682va–683va, quaestio secunda (Circa secundum principale . . .) 683va–684ra]. Distinctiones 39–40: Hic oritur quaestio . . . Post haec de actibus adiciendum est etc. . . . Circa istas duas distinctiones quaero [P 116vb–117ra; W distinctio 39 684ra–rb, quaestio prima 684rb–685va, quaestio secunda (Circa secundum principale . . .) 685va–687rb, quaestio tertia 687rb–688ra, distinctio 40 688ra–va, quaestio prima 688va–689rb, quaestio secunda 689rb–691vb]. Qu. unica: Utrum omnis actus factus bona intentione sit iudicandus simpliciter bono (Sic) [P 117ra–b].

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Distinctiones 41–42: Cumque intentio . . . Cum autem voluntas . . . Circa istas duas distinctiones quaero [P 117rb–vb; W distinctio 41 692ra–rb; quaestio prima 692rb–693rb, quaestio secunda (Circa primum principale) 693rb–694ra; distinctio 42 694rb–vb, quaestio prima 694vb–696vb, quaestio secunda 697ra–699va]. Qu. unica: Utrum actus hominis infidelis bonus esse possit (Non) [P 117vb– 118ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 57. Distinctiones 43–44: Est praeterea quoddam . . . Post praedicta consideratione dignum occurit etc. . . . Circa istas duas ultimas distinctiones quaero [P 118ra–vb; W distinctio 43 699va–700ra, quaestio prima 700ra–701va, quaestio secunda 701va–702vb, distinctio 44 702vb–703vb, quaestio prima 703vb–704vb, quaestio secunda 704vb–705vb, quaestio tertia 705vb–707ra, quaestio quarta 707ra–708va]. Qu. unica: Utrum potentia peccandi sit a Deo (Non) [P 118vb–119ra; W 703vb–707ra]. Cf. Borgh. 346, qu. 59. Explicit P 119ra: Explicit compilatio et ordinatio super secundum librum Sententiarum edita per Fratrem Anfredum Goytteum Britonem de Ordine Fratrum Minorum cum quibusdam dictis Magistri Fratris Francisci de Marchia et Magistri Fratris Francisci de Mayronis et Fratris Geraldi bachalarii in theologie additis. Explicit W 708va: Explicit compilatio et ordinatio super secundum librum Sententiarum edita per Fratrem Amfredum Gonteri Britonem de Ordine Fratrum Minorum et de provincia Turoniae, tunc lectorem in provincia Arragoniae in conventu Barchinone in studio generali, anno ab Incarnatione Domini millesimo CCCoXXII. Incipit W 309vb: Ego, Frater Amfredus Gonteri de Britania, Corisopitensis diocesis, de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, de provincia Turoniae, lector Barchinone anno Domini 1322, ex iussu superiorum meorum, ad instantiam scolarium, lecturam meam super secundum Sententiarum per modum cuiusdam reportationis et correctionis, ad introductionem iuniorum, volui communicare doctorum venerabilium, principaliter Iohannis Scoti, sacrae theologiae doctoris, vestigiis inhaerendo.

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Transite ad me omnes qui concupiscitis me et a generationibus meis adimplemini Ecclesiastici 24. Sicut dictum fuit alias in principio libri primi Sententiarum Sacra Scriptura generaliter et doctrina Magistri Sententiarum specialiter tractat de quadruplici generatione tamquam de materia subiectiva, scilicet de duplici generatione Christi Filii Dei creatoris et de duplici generatione creature ab eo et a Patre et Spiritu Sancto dependentis. Tractat enim Magister in primo libro de aeterna Filii Dei generatione qua fuit a Patre ante saecula . . . et nos apparebitis cum Christo in gloria colorum ad quam nos perducat Christus gloria beatorum. Amen. [L 92ra–b; P 121ra–b]. Distinctio 1: Cum venerit igitur plenitudo temporis. Iste liber tertius Sententiarum sic continuatur ad praecedentes: postquam Magister determinavit in libro primo de summa perfectione Dei, in secundo de mira creatione mundi, in isto tertio determinat de pia reparatione rei, id est lapsi . . . Quaero primo circa hunc tertium librum unam quaestionem difficilem ceteris primam [L 92rb–93va; P 121rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum possibilis fuerit unio naturae humanae personae divinae qua unione natura humana dicitur personata personalitate divina (Non) [L 93va–94vb; P 121va–123rb]. Qu. 2: Circa istum tertium librum Sententiarum quaero propter quandam novam opinionem utrum inter illa quae uniuntur adinvicem manentibus eorum naturis et essentiis distinctis, sicut unitur forma materiae et accidens subiecto et natura humana Verbo divino, cadat unio media quae sit respectus quidam (Non) [L 94vb–95va; P 123rb–124rb]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum persona Filii potuit assumere naturam in unitate personae, persona Patris et Spiritus Sancti scilicet non assumente (Non) [L 95va–96rb; P 124rb–125ra]. Sed ibi sunt tria esse personalia sicut sunt tres personae, sicut dixi alias contra Magistrum Benedictum Praedicatorem, libro primo, distinctione 34 (L: 24). Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum natura humana assumpta nunc a persona Filii stante sua unione et personatione in persona Filii possit simul assumi a persona Patris et Spiritus Sancti secundum suas personalitates (Non) [L 96rb–vb; P 125ra–vb]. Distinctio 2: Et quia in homine etc. In distinctione praecedenti Magister determinat . . . in hac distinctione determinat . . . Circa istam distinctionem primo quaero [L 96vb–97ra; P 125vb–126ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum Filius Dei de potentia Dei absoluta potuerit vel possit assumere naturam substantialem irrationalem ad unitatem suppositi sicut de facto credimus ipsum assumpsisse naturam humanam (Non) [L 97ra–98ra; P 126ra–127va]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum aliqua natura accidentalis possit terminare hypostatice et assumi a persona Filii Dei (Non) [L 98ra; P 127va–b]. Qu. 3: Deinde ad videndum ordinem assumptionis naturae humanae a Verbo in comparatione ad animam et corpus quaero utrum, supposita quod anima

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intellectiva sit forma corporis humani in homine, in Christo et in quolibet homine sit forma totius, quia dicitur humanitas qua Christus dicitur homo distincta realiter a corpore et anima simul sumptis. Vide eam 4 q. Aur. q. 4. [L 98ra–b; P 127vb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum humanitas secundum rationem suae totalitatis prius et immediatius fuit assumpta a Verbo quam anima et corpus quae sunt partes (Non) [L 98rb–vb; P 127vb–128rb]. Distinctio 3: Quaeritur etiam de carne Verbi. Prius determinavit Magister . . . hic determinat . . . Quia in hac distinctione 3 Magister determinat . . . ideo circa primum quaero primo [L 98vb–99ra; P 128rb–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum possibile fuerit animam beatae virginis in instanti quo uniebatur carni ex parentibus contractae vi generativa secundum rationem seminalem generatae peccatum originalem non contraxisse (Non) [L 99ra–b; P 128vb–129ra]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum supposito quod beata virgo peccatum originale contraxerit in instanti infusionis suae animae suo corpori sicut fide tenemus de omnibus hominibus de viro et muliere genitis potuerit per divinam potentiam fuisse in peccato per solum instans et toto tempore sequenti esse in gratia (Sic) [L 99rb–100ra; P 129ra–130ra]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum de facto secundum potentiam Dei ordinatam quae innotescit nobis ex testimonio Sacrae Scripturae et sanctorum et ecclesiae possit ostendi beatam virginem matrem Christi per aliquam temporis morulam peccatum originale contraxisse de quo virtute Spiritus Sanctus purgata fuit ante Filii Dei conceptionem (Sic) [L 100ra–101rb; P 130ra–131va]. Qu. 4: Ultimo quantum ad istam distinctionem quaero utrum simul et in eodem instanti facta fuerit corporis Christi ex virgine formatio et organizatio et corporis organizati animatio et totius naturae ex anima et corpore compositae ad Verbum divinum unio sive assumptio (Non) [L 101rb–vb; P 131va–132ra]. Distinctio 4: Cum vero incarnatio Verbi etc. Postquam determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem 4 in qua Magister tractat de incarnationis auctore quaero [L 101vb; P 132ra–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum beata virgo fuerit active cooperata in conceptione filii sui una cum virtute Spiritus Sancti (Non) [L 101vb–103ra; P 132rb–133rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum beata virgo plus gaudeat quia fuit virgo vel quia fuit mater Christi Filii Dei (Quia virgo) [L 103ra–b; P 133rb–va]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum generatio Christi temporalis ex matre sive conceptio fuerit naturalis (Sic) [L 103rb–va; P 133va–b]. Qu. 4: Deinde sine argumentis quaero utrum conceptio Christi ex virgini matre debeat attribui Spiritui Sancto. Et dico breviter quod hic nulla est difficultas quia ista conceptio potest considerari dupliciter . . . [L 103va; P 133vb–134ra]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum Christus secundum quod homo conceptus de Spiritu Sancto possit dici esse filius Spiritus Sancti (Non) [L 103va–b; P 134ra].

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Qu. 6: Deinde quaero utrum aliquis homo meruerit Filium Dei incarnari. Ad hanc quaestionem respondeo breviter et dico quod incarnatio Filii Dei potest dupliciter considerari . . . [L 103vb; P 134ra–b]. Distinctio 5: Praeterea inquiri oportet etc. In distinctione praecedenti determinavit Magister . . . Quia in hac distinctione tractat Magister . . . ideo quaero primo [L 103vb–104ra; P 134rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum natura divina assumpsit naturam humanam (Sic) [L 104ra–b; P 134va–b]. Vide supra distinctione 1. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum circumscriptis personis divinis per impossibile natura divina posset assumere naturam humanam (Non) [L 104va; P 134vb–135ra]. Ut dictum est supra, distinctione 1. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum persona divina potuit assumere vel assumpsit personam humanam (Sic) [L 104va–b; P 135ra–b]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum persona divina potuit assumere naturam humanam prius personatam personalitate propria, non assumendo personam (Non) [L 104vb; P 135rb–va]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum homo secundum quod est de consideratione philosophi naturalis posset assumi a persona Verbi absque omni quantitate et qualitate sensibili eo modo quo nunc de facto natura humana est assumpta (Non) [L 105ra–106ra; P 135va–137ra]. Vide supra distinctione 1, quaestionem de hoc determinatam. Qu. 6: Deinde quaero utrum unio naturae humanae ad Verbum sit aliquid creatum (Non) [L 106ra–vb; P 137ra–138ra]. Distinctio 6: Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . In hac distinctione Magister tractat . . . Quaero primo [L 106vb– 107ra; P 138ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum Christus dicatur esse homo propter unionem animae cum corpore vel propter unionem animae et corporis cum Verbo divino (Propter unionem animae cum corpore) [L 107ra–va; P 138ra–vb]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum in Christo sint plura esse, scilicet creatum et increatum (Non) [L 107va–108rb; P 138va–139va]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum in Deo sint plura esse creata (Non) [L 108rb– 109ra; P 139va–140rb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum anima intellectiva informans corpus possit assumi a Verbo divino personaliter non assumendo corpus (Potuit) [L 109ra–va; P 140rb–141ra]. Distinctio 7: Secundum vero primam etc. Postquam movit . . . In hac distinctione Magister inquaerit . . . ideo circa eam quaero primo [L 109va–110ra; P 141ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum ista propositio exprimens veritatem huius unionis per verbum essendi dicendo “Deus est homo” sit vera (Non) [L 110ra–vb; P 141va– 142va]. Ut patet ex dictis supra, distinctione 1. Qu. 2: Consequenter quaeritur circa propositiones exprimentes hanc benedictam unionem per verbum fiendi, et primo utrum haec sit vera “Deus factus est homo” (Non) [L 110vb–111ra; P 142va–143ra].

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Qu. 3: Consequenter quaeritur de locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem secundum processum Magistri in littera utrum Christus sit praedestinatus esse Filius (Non) [L 111ra–b, P 143ra]. Distinctio 8: Post praedicta inquiri debet. Postquam de verificatione propositionum exprimentium Verbi incarnationem posuit Magister . . . Circa istam distinctionem processum Magistri quaero primo [L 111rb– va; P 143ra–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum natura divina sit de virgine nata in Christo (Sic) [L 111va, P 143va]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum natura humana in Christo sit de virgine nata (Sic) [L 111va; P 143va]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum in Christo fuerint duae nativitates (Non) [L 111va; P 143va]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum debeat concedi Christus esse bis natus (Non) [L 111va–112ra; P 143va–144ra, treating qu. 1–4 together]. Qu. 5: Deinde ad videndum utrum in Christo sint duae filiationes reales quarum una secundum generationem aeternam referatur ad Patrem et alia referatur ad matrem secundum generationem temporalem, ut ex notioribus procedam quaero utrum in eodem homine, puta Sorte, sint duae filiationes reales ad patrem suum et matrem (Non) [L 112ra–vb; P 144ra–145ra]. Qu. 6: Deinde quaero utrum in Christo sint duae relationes filiationis (reales addist. P), una aeterna qua referatur ad Patrem et alia temporalis qua referatur ad matrem (Non) [L 112vb–114ra; P 145ra–146va]. Distinctio 9: Praeterea investigari oportet etc. Postquam determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem quaero de latria quantum ad eius speciem et genus sive praedicamentum. Secundo quantum ad eius subiectum. Tertio quantum ad eius obiectum. Quarto quantum ad eius oppositum. Quantum ad primum, quaero [L 114ra; P 146va–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum latria sit virtus aliqua specialis (Non) [L 114ra–va; P 146vb– 147rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Deus unus et trinus sub ratione deitatis sit obiectum unius adorationis latriae (Non) [L 114va–115ra; P 147rb–vb]. Vide libro primo, distinctione 1. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum cultus latriae sit exhibendus humanitati Christi (Non) [L 115ra–va; P 147vb–148va]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero circa latriae oppositum, quod est idolatria et quaero utrum sit maximum peccatum (Non) [L 115va–116ra; P 148va–149ra]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero de dulia utrum sit virtus distincta specie a latria (Non) [L 116ra–b; P 149ra–va]. Distinctio 10: Solet etiam a quibusdam inquaeri etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem secundum processum Magistri quaero primo [L 116rb; P 149va–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum Christus secundum quod homo est persona (Sic) [L 116rb–vb; P 149vb–150rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde ad videndum utrum Christus secundum quod homo possit dici Filius Dei adoptivus secundum processum in littera quaero utrum conveniat Deo aliquem adoptare in filium (Non) [L 116vb–117ra; P 150rb–va].

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Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum haec sit propositio vera et concedenda: “Christus secundum quod homo est filius Dei adoptivus” (Non) [L 117ra–vb; P 150va–151rb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero circa Christi praedestinationem quia secundum Apostolum Ro. I praedestinatus est filius Dei etc., et quaero utrum praedestinatio Christi fuerit causa nostrae praedestinationis (Non) [L 117vb–118ra; P 151rb–vb]. Distinctio 11: Solet etiam quaeri etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem 11 quaero primo [L 118ra–b; P 151vb–152ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum Christus inquantum est Filius Dei sit creatura (Sic) [L 118rb– va; P 152ra–b]. Ut declaratum fuit primo libro distinctione 9. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum haec propositio sit vera et concedenda absque specificatione et determinatione: Christus est creatura (Non) [L 118va– 119rb; P 152rb–153ra]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum ista propositio sit vera et concedenda: Christus secundum quod homo est creatura (Non) [L 119rb–va; P 153ra–va]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum “Christus secundum quod homo coepit” vel “Christo demonstrato iste homo coepit esse” sit propositio vera et concedenda (Non) [L 119va–b; P 153va–vb]. Distinctio 12: Solet etiam quaeri etc. Postquam determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem 12 quaero primo [L 119vb–120ra; P 153vb–154ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum natura humana, si fuisset assumpta a Verbo in puris naturalibus sine gratia et gloria, ex vi suae unionis cum divino supposito fuisset impeccabilis ita quod peccare non posset (Sic) [L 120ra–va; P 154ra–va]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum natura humana unita Verbo divino intellectu eius vidente clare et intuitive divinam essentiam, ex vi huius unionis ad Verbum et cognitionis intuitivae fuerit impeccabilis quod omnino peccare non possit (Sic) [L 120va–121rb; P 154va–155vb]. Contra istas rationes instat unus novus doctor; per rationes magistri Petri Aureoli; ut alias declaravi, libro primo, distinctione 1. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum natura humana eo modo quo fuit unita Verbo divino cum summa sapientia et gratia in Christo ut videbitur in distinctione sequenti potuit peccare ita quod diceretur Christus potuit vel potest peccare (Sic) [L 121rb–vb; P 155vb–156rb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum Filius Dei debuit assumere naturam humanam in qua esset humani generis redemptor de stirpe et genere Adae et in sexu masculino (Non) [L 121vb–122ra; P 156rb–va]. Distinctio 13: Praeterea sciendum est etc. Postquam Magister . . . Circa istam distinctionem 13, in qua Magister tractat . . . quaero primo de necessitate gratiae vel caritatis [L 122ra; P 156va–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum ad hoc quod voluntas animae Christi fruatur Deo indigeat habitu gratiae necessario. Vide eam, primo libro, distinctione 1, quaestione 6 conclusione secunda [L 122ra; P 156vb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero de perfectione gratiae in se primo, secundo de perfectione gratiae in Christo. Quantum ad primum quaero primo utrum gratia possit augeri in infinitum quod quacumque gratia data possit alia perfectior a Deo creari vel aeque perfecta (Sic) [L 122rb–123va; P 156vb–158rb].

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Qu. 3: Deinde quaero ad maiorem evidentiam eorum quae dicta sunt in praecedenti quaestione utrum Deus de potentia sua absoluta posset creare caritatem vel gratiam actu infinitam in magnitudine perfectionis et etiam in multitudine (Non) [L 123va–124va; P 158rb–159vb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum summa gratia quae numquam fuit vel erit possibilis conferri a Deo alicui naturae intellectuali creatae fuit collata voluntati animae Christi, et idem intelligendum est de summa fruitione et de summa sapientia et intuitiva visione respectu potentiae suae intellectivae (Non) [L 124va–125ra; P 159vb–160rb]. Qu. 5: Ultimo quaero faciliter utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit caput ecclesiae (Non) [L 125ra–va; P 160rb–vb]. Distinctio 14: Hic quaeri opus est etc. Postquam determinavit Magister . . . Quia in hac distinctione Magister . . . ideo quaero primo de cognitione animae Christi in Verbo, deinde de cognitione eius respectu rerum in genere proprio. Quantum ad primum quaero [L 125va–b; P 160vb–161ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum intellectus animae Christi videat clare et intuitive divinam essentiam mediante aliqua specie intelligibili repraesentativa (Non) [L 125vb– 126vb; P 161ra–162rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum intellectus animae Christi videns clare et intuitive divinam essentiam videat omnia in divina essentia (Sic) [L 126vb– 128ra; P 162rb–163vb]. (mg. P: Op. Th.). Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum intellectus animae Christi cognoscens res in divina essentia simul actu uno cognoscat illas res in essentia divina et in proprio genere (Non) [L 128ra–129ra; P 163vb–165ra]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum intellectus animae Christi ab instanti suae conceptionis habuit notitiam omnium rerum cognoscibilium in genere proprio a Deo sibi infusam (Non) [L 129ra–va; P 165ra–vb]. Distinctio 15: Illud quoque praetereundem non est etc. Prius determinat Magister . . . Quia in hac distinctione Magister . . . ideo quaero primo in generali de passionibus, postea de passionibus Christi in speciali. Circa primum quaero [L 129vb–130ra; P 165vb–166ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum passiones subiective sint in anima secundum aliquam eius potentiam (Non) [L 130ra–va; P 166ra–166vb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero de passionibus quantum ad earum causam et principium, utrum passiones causenter ex obiectis vel potentiis (A potentiis) [L 130va–b; P 166vb–167ra]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero de comparatione passionum animae adinvicem et quaero utrum passiones concupiscibiles sint priores passionibus irascibilibus (Non) [L 130vb–131va; P 167rb–168ra]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero circa passiones doloris et tristitiae specialiter in Christo, de quibus specialiter tractat Magister in hac distinctione, et primo utrum in Christo patiente fuerit vera passio doloris et tristitiae sensibilis (Non) [L 131va–132rb; P 168ra–vb]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum in voluntate animae Christi tempore passionis cum summa fruitione et delectatione beatifica fuit simul tristitia de aliquo malo ab eo volito (Non) [L 132rb–133ra; P 168vb–169vb].

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Distinctio 16: Hic oritur quaestio etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Quia in hac distinctione Magister . . . ideo quaero primo in generali [L 133ra–b; P 169vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum necessitas moriendi et mori fuit homini inflicta propter peccatum (Sic) [L 133rb–va; P 169vb–170rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum in Christo fuit necessitas moriendi (Non) [L 133va–134ra; P 170rb–vb]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Iudei qui Christum occiderunt credentes ipsum esse blasphemum peccaverunt gravius quam si ipsum non occidissent astimantes quod ipsum occidere secundum leges tenerentur (Gravius si eum non occidissent stante tali estimatione) [L 134ra–va; P 170vb–171va]. Qu. 4: Ultimo quaero utrum in natura humana cum mortalitate assumpta a Filio Dei in Christo fuerit aliqua de dotibus gloriosis (Sic) [L 134va–135ra; P 171va–b]. Distinctio 17: Post praedicta considerari oportet etc. Postquam Magister . . . Circa istam distinctionem quaero primo [L 135ra; P 171vb–172ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum in Christo fuerit tantum una voluntas, scilicet divina (Sic) [L 135ra–b; P 172ra–b]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum voluntas humana in Christo in omni actu fuit conformis voluntati divinae (Sic) [L 135rb–vb; P 172rb–vb]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum conveniens fuit Christum orare (Non) [L 135vb– 136rb; P 172vb–173va]. Qu. 4: Ultimo quaero utrum Christus secundum quod homo dubitaverit (Sic) [L 136rb–va; P 173va]. Distinctio 18: De merito Christi etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa istam distinctionem quaero primo [L 136va–b; P 173va–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum divinae naturae et humanae in Christo fuerit et sit una operatio (Sic) [L 136vb–137ra; P 173vb–174rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Christus meruit (Non) [L 137ra–va; P 174rb–vb]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Christus in instanti suae conceptionis potuit mereri vel de facto meruit (Non) [L 137va–b; P 174vb–175ra]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum Christus per passionem suam meruit sibi aliquid et nobis (Non) [L 137vb–138ra; P 175ra–b]. Distinctio 19: Nunc igitur quaeramus etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem quaero primo [L 138ra; P 175rb–va]. Qu. 1: Utrum Christus per passionem suam omnibus hominibus meruit gratiam et gloriam (Non) [L 138ra–va; P 175va–b]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum per passionem Christi fuerit omnes homines liberati ab omni culpa (Non) [L 138va–b; P 175vb–176rb]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum per passionem Christi fuerint homines liberati a servitute diabolica et ab omni temporali et aeterna poena (Non) [L 138vb– 139ra; P 176rb–va]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum solus Christus sit mediator (Non) [L 139ra; P 176va–b]. Distinctio 20: Si vero quaeritur. Prius Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem quaero primo [L 139ra–va; P 176vb–177ra].

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Qu. 1: Utrum ad reparationem ruinae hominis per peccatum fuit Filius Dei incarnatus ita quod si homo non peccasset, Filius Dei incarnatus non fuisset (Non) [L 139va–b; P 177ra–b]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum fuit conveniens humanam naturam in primis parentibus lapsam per Christi passionem liberari (Non) [L 139vb–140ra; P 177rb–va]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum conveniens fuerit naturam humanam a servitute Diaboli liberari per satisfactionis poenam a Christo collatam (Non) [L 140ra–b; P 177va–b]. Qu. 4: Ultimo quaero utrum aliqua pura creatura, homo vel angelus, potuerit Deo satisfacere pro peccato hominis (Sic) [L 140rb–va; P 177vb–178ra]. Ut dictum fuit [fuit] distinctione 19. Distinctio 21: Post praedicta considerandum est. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem quaero primo [L 140va; P 178ra–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum in hora mortis Christi qua anima fuit separata a corpore ipsa simul fuerit separata a Verbo divino et similiter ipsum corpus (Simul fuit) [L 140va–141ra; P 178rb–vb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum in Christo homine vivente fuit corporeitatis forma qua corpus est corpus distincta ab anima intellectiva (Non) [L 141ra–142va; P 178vb–180va]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum in morte Christi anima separata a corpore remansit forma corporeitatis eadem qua corpus fuit idem corpus numero (Non) [L 142va–143ra; P 180va–181rb]. Qu. 4: Ultimo quaero utrum corpus Christi post animae separationem debuit putrefeci (Sic) [L 143rb–va; P 181rb–va]. Distinctio 22: Hic quaeritur utrum in triduo etc. Postquam determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem quaero [L143va, P 181va–vb]. Qu. 1: Utrum in triduo mortis Christi Christus fuit homo (Sic) [L 143va– 144ra; P 181vb–182rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum Christus fuerit totus in sepulchro et totus in inferno in illo triduo suae mortis (Sic) [L 144ra–b; P 182rb–182va]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum Christus Filius Dei virtute verborum quibus dixit beato Iohanni in cruce moriens ecce mater tua et matri ecce filius tuus potuerit creare in beato Iohanni veram relationem filiationis qua esset verus filius virginis et in beata virgine veram relationem maternitatis qua ipse esset verus eius filius et ipsa vera eius mater dato quod ipse non fuerit ab ea genitus nec ipsa ipsum genuerit (Sic) [L 144rb–vb; P 182va–183rb]. (P: 182vb, L 144va: In ista quaestione opinio Magistri Francisci de Mayronis fuit.) Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum Christus secundum animam descenderit ad infernum anima in morte separata a corpore (Non) [L 145ra–b; P 183rb–vb]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero ad hoc in hac distinctione aliqua brevia et facilia circa Christi resurrectionem, et primo quaero utrum Christus resurrexit tertia die (Non) [L 145rb–va; P 183vb–184ra]. Qu. 6: Ultimo quaero utrum conveniens fuit Christum ascendere super omnes caelos (Non) [L 145vb–146ra; P 184ra–va].

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Distinctio 23: Cum vero supra perhibitum sit etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Circa hanc distinctionem in qua Magister incipit determinare de perfectione virtutum in Christo quaero in generali circa habitus virtuosos [L 146ra–b; P 184va–b]. Qu. 1: Utrum habitus virtuosus sit forma absoluta vel respectiva (Non) [L 146rb–147va; P 184vb–186rb]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum virtutes insint nobis a natura, vel aliquae, saltem intellectuales et morales, causentur ex actibus. (A natura) [L 147va–149rb; P 186rb–188ra]. ut alias dixi in quadam quaestione ordinaria. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum habitus virtuosi possunt ex actibus augeri (Non) [L 149rb–150rb; P 188ra–189rb]. Qu. 4: Deinde quaero utrum si habitus virtuosi augeantur et intendantur per additionem gradus ad gradum vel in adventum gradus posterioris, praecedens corrumpitur (Sic) [L 150rb–152ra; P 189rb–191rb]. Qu. 5: Deinde quaero utrum habitus virtuosus sit principium activum actuum virtuosorum quantum ad substantiam et naturam eorum intrinsecam (Non) [L 152ra–153va; P 191rb–193ra]. Distinctio 24: Hic quaeritur si fides etc. Prius determinavit Magister . . . Et quia in distinctione praecedenti, 23, et in ista sequenti Magister tractat in speciali de fide quae est prima virtus theologica, ideo quaero primo [L 153va; P 193ra]. Qu. 1: Utrum fides infusa sit virtus theologica (Non) [L 153va–154ra; P 193ra–va]. Qu. 2: Deinde quaero utrum in credibilibus quibus fidelis per fidem credit indubitanter et certitudinaliter in Sacra Scriptura sit devenire ad aliquod unum complexum evidenter et per se notum propter quod credit illis credentibus indubitanter (Sic) [L 154ra–155vb; P 193va–196ra]. Qu. 3: Deinde quaero utrum actus fidei sit certior et perfectior actu scientiae et cuiuscumque habitus acquisiti (Certior) [L 155vb–156va; P 196ra–vb]. Anonymous Continuation in Lüneburg MS Qu. 4: Ad evidentiam ampliorem secundi articuli adhuc quaero utrum fidei possit subesse falsum (Sic) [L 156va–157ra]. Distinctio 25 Qu. 1: Adhuc circa fidem quaeram quatuor de forma fidei, de efficiente, de materia et de causa finali fidei, et quia forma exprimi solet per definitionem quaero de definitione fidei utrum fides definitum sit substantia rerum sperandarum argumentum non apparentium, sicut dicit Apostolus Ad Heb. 1 (Non) [L 157ra–va]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum fides insit nobis a natura vel a doctrina vel ex consuetudine, vel per infusionem ad istud (Sine argumentis . . .) [L 157va]. Qu. 3: Tertio quaero utrum prima veritas sit obiectum fidei (Non) [L 157va–b]. Qu. 4: Quarto quaero utrum fides iustificet sine operibus (Non) [L 158ra–va]. Qu. 5: Utrum Antichristi adventum fides fuerit necessaria homini viatori de omnibus quae modo credimus (Non) [L 158va–159va].

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Distinctio 26 Qu. 1: Circa distinctionem 26 quaeritur utrum sperare sit desiderare (Non) [L 159va–b]. Qu. 2: Secundo quaero utrum spes sit virtus theologica (Non) [L 159vb]. Qu. 3: Circa distinctionem 26 quaeritur utrum spes sit virtus theologica distincta a fide et caritate (Non) [L 159vb–160vb]. Distinctio 27, Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 27 quaeritur utrum sit aliqua virtus inclinans hominem ad Deum super omnia diligendum (Non) [L 160vb–162ra]. Distinctiones 28 et 29 Qu. 1: Circa distinctionem 28 et 29 simul quaeritur utrum eodem habitu sit diligendus Deus et proximus (Non) [L 162ra–vb]. Qu. 2: Utrum quilibet post Deum teneatur plus diligere seipsum quam aliquid aliud (Non) [L 162vb]. Distinctio 30 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 30 quaeritur utrum necesse sit ex caritate diligere inimicum (Non) [L 162vb–163vb]. Distinctio 31 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 31 quaeritur utrum omnes habitus theologici remaneant in patria (Non) [L 163vb–164rb]. Distinctio 32 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 32 quaeritur utrum Deus diligat omnia ex caritate aequaliter (Non) [L 164rb–165ra]. Distinctio 33 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 33 quaeritur utrum virtutes cardinales sint in voluntate tamquam in subiecto (Non) [L 165ra–vb]. Distinctio 34 Qu. un.: Circa 34 distinctione quaeritur utrum virtutes, dona, beatitudines et fructus sint idem habitus vel inter se distincti specie (Sic) [L 165vb– 167rb]. Distinctio 35 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 35 quaeritur utrum sapientia, scientia et intellectus et consilium sint virtutes intellectuales (Sic) [L 167rb–va]. Distinctio 36 Qu. 1: Circa distinctionem 36 quaeritur utrum virtutes morales sint necessario connexae adinvicem (Non) [L 167va–b]. Qu. 2: Utrum virtutes morales sint necessarius connexae cum prudentia quam ad se invicem (Non sunt seinvicem connexae) [L 167vb–168va]. Distinctio 37 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 37 quaeritur utrum omnia praecepta decalogi fuerint de lege naturae (Non) [L 168va–169vb]. Distinctio 38 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 38 quaeritur utrum omne mendacium sit peccatum (Non) [L 169vb–171ra].

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Distinctio 39 Qu. un.: Circa 39 quaeritur utrum omne periurium sit perfectum (lege peccatum) morale (Non) [L 171ra–vb]. Distinctio 40 Qu. un.: Circa distinctionem 40 quaeritur utrum lex nova sit gravior legi veteri (Sic) . . . et onus meum leve sicut dictum est supra in corpore quaestionis. Cui sit laus per infinita saecula saeculorum. Amen. [L 171vb–172va].

ON THE LIMITS OF THE GENRE: ROGER ROSETH AS A READER OF THE SENTENCES Olli Hallamaa The Author and his Work In the autumn of 1337 in the Franciscan convent of Norwich brother Nicholas Comparini began to copy recent theological treatises written by English confreres. Nicholas, who came from Assisi, was in England in order to study. We do not know how successful a student he was because it is only his work as a copyist that has been preserved for posterity. By Advent Nicholas had worked through the first treatise, Roger Roseth’s Lectura super Sententias.1 After finishing Roseth’s treatise, he went on to copy texts from Haverel2 and Bartholomaeus de Repps.3 Thereafter he moved to Oxford, where he acquired John Went’s Sentences.4 At a later date, these texts were bound together in a single volume that is now preserved at the Vatican Library.5 Thanks to

1 The dating is based on the marginal note that appears on folio 10v: “Scriptum apud Norwen anno domini 1337 circa adventum domini Dei et est fratris de Assisi[o] de manu propria.” According to Victorin Doucet the scribe first wrote the name ‘Petri’ but rewrote it as ‘Nicolai’. See Victorin Doucet, “Le studium franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d’après le MS Chigi B. V. 66 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane,” AFH 46 (1953): 85–98, at 89. William Courtenay confirms Doucet’s reading; see William Courtenay, “Nicholas of Assisi and Vatican MS. Chigi B. V. 66,” Scriptorium 36 (1982): 260–3, at 261 n. 6. The scribe’s name also appears on fol. 86r, where it reads ‘fr. Nicolao de Assisio’. 2 The scribe calls the author ‘Haverel Norvici’. The text seem to originate from Haverel’s lectures, which he held for two academic years around 1337. See Courtenay, “Nicholas of Assisi,” 261–2. 3 Bartholomæus de Rippes was, according to Thomas of Eccleston, the fifty-first lecturer at Cambridge. See Thomas de Eccleston, Tractatus de adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam, ed. A. G. Little (Manchester, 1951), 60. Comparini copied his Determinationes from a reportatio at Norwich; see Doucet, “Le studium franciscain de Norwich,” 95. 4 John Went was the sixty-fourth Franciscan lector at Oxford and regent master around 1340. Since, at Oxford, regent masters lectured on the Bible whereas the bachelors read Peter Lombard, Went must have held his lectures on the Sentences several years earlier. See Thomas de Eccleston, Tractatus, 60; Courtenay, “Nicholas of Assisi,” 262. 5 MS. Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiani B.V.66. The manuscript once belonged to the convent of Assisi, which may indicate that Nicholas came from Assisi, since the Franciscan custom was to return the books that a friar had in

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Comparini, we now have a unique document depicting English Franciscan theology from the second half of the 1330s. Brother Nicholas was not alone in his interest in Roseth’s Sentences. Over the next few decades it was copied a number of times, and of all the texts in Nicholas’s collection it enjoyed the widest popularity. At least seventeen manuscripts have survived that contain Roseth’s lectures or parts of them.6

his possession, upon his death, to his original convent. See Courtenay, “Nicholas of Assisi,” 262–3. 6 Roseth’s Lectura is preserved, in its entirety, in only three manuscripts: MSS. Assisi, Bibliotheca comunale, 173, fols. 1r–61r; Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 192, fols. 1r–44v; and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiani B.V.66, fols. 5r–86r. Two manuscripts break off shortly before the end of the work: MSS. Oxford, Oriel College 15, fols. 243r–287r (breaks off in question 5, article 1); and Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, 1551, fols. 1r–90v (in question 5, article 2). MS. Kassel, Landesbibliothek, 2o theol. 53, fols. 13r–30r, contains most of the questions but is partly abbreviated. Also the order of the questions and articles differs from that of the majority of manuscripts. MS. Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus-Hospital, 90, fols.1r–23r is strongly abbreviated and contains many idiosyncratic readings. MS. Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 238, Scaff. XI, fols. 1r–35rb, breaks off soon after the beginning of question 2, article 3. MS. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1108, fols. 1r–43r, 45r–52v, 96r–103r, begins with the second question. The manuscript contains passages from most of the questions but is far from complete. The first article of the first question also circulated as a separate treatise with the name De maximo et minimo. It is found in the following manuscripts: MSS. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 4o 107, fols. 87r–101v; Fribourg, Bibliothèque cantonale et universitaire, Cordeliers 26, fols. 1r–9v; Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon. Misc. 177, fols. 171r–182r; Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina, 7–7–29, fols. 145r–165r; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiani E.V.161, fols. 50r–63v; Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. XIII 38, fols. 55r–66r; Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI 155, fols. 1r–17r; and Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI 62, fols. 121r–138v. An abbreviated version of the first and second articles of the first question was printed as part of Robert Holcot’s Determinationes in Lyons (1518). Friedrich Stegmüller, in his Repertorium, 369 (no. 751), also attributed a text entitled Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia to Roger Roseth, O.F.M. This is preserved in one single manuscript: MS. Prague, Národní knihovna ČR, 2297 (XIII D.5), fols. 24v–26v. Subsequently other scholars like Doucet (“Le studium franciscain de Norwich,” 91) and Richard Sharpe (A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 [Turnhout, 2001], 594) repeated this attribution. However, it must be erroneous. The Prague text is preserved in a late thirteenth-century manuscript and as such is too old to have been Roseth’s work. Moreover, its style differs radically from that of the Lectura, as does its content; therefore, it is evident that these works do not originate from the same author. A possible candidate for the author of the treatise Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia is a Frenchman by the name of Rogerus de Roseto, who acquired his arts degree in 1290 and become a master of theology 1309. See H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, tomus II, sectio prior (Paris, 1891), 46 (no. 569).

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Although one of the titles in the manuscripts attributed to Roseth (namely, Lectura)7 refers to classroom instruction, there is no evidence of exactly when and where he delivered the lectures. The content and style of his book show a strong Oxford influence, but he could as well have taught at one of the custodial schools of the order, as did many Franciscan bachelors who were waiting their turn to incept as regent masters at the university. For example, William Ockham was assigned to the convent of London while Adam Wodeham lectured both in London and Norwich.8 Neither Roseth’s text nor the manuscripts contain any references to his whereabouts. Since his name does not appear in Thomas Eccleston’s list of lectors at Oxford or Cambridge, it is probable that he never completed his theological studies. This would not have been unusual, since university regulations allowed several Franciscan bachelors to lecture on the Sentences, whereas only one could hold the position of regent master. If Roseth ever lectured on the Sentences, the lectures could have taken place at Oxford, Cambridge, or even Norwich.9 However, the fact that the Lectura was first copied at Norwich does not necessarily indicate that the lectures were held there. If the history of Roseth’s Sentences remains hidden to us, so does the person behind the text. We know practically nothing about the author: his name is spelled in the marginal notes in some manuscripts in various ways, and two manuscripts state that the author is an English Franciscan.10 Most manuscripts roughly agree on the name of the author;11 only the MSS. Oriel College 15 and Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiani B.V.66, attribute the text to Swyneshed. The attribution in Oriel College 15 raises several questions: Who could this Swyneshed be? Why is the work attributed to Swyneshed? Could the attribution be correct?

For a detailed discussion of the manuscripts that contain the Lectura super Sententias, see Roger Roseth, Lectura super Sententias, ed. Olli Hallamaa (Helsinki, 2005), 54–8. 7 For example, Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 192, fol. 44ra. 8 See William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), 66–9. 9 See ibid., 109. 10 These manuscripts are Brussels, Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier, 1551, fol. 1r, and Fribourg, Bibliothèque cantonale et universitaire, Cordeliers 26, fol. 1r. 11 The variants are Rogerus Roseth, Rogerius Rogeth, Rogerii Roger, Roseti, Rossetus, magistri Rosete, Rogerii Rugosi.

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There are three possible answers to the first question: John, the lawyer and fellow of Merton College; Roger, the natural philosopher and Benedictine monk; and Richard, the famous Mertonian calculator. Of these John can be excluded since his name first appears in the Merton records in the 1340s, so that he is too young to be the author of a mid 1330s commentary on the Sentences. Since no text of his survives, he may not have been a prominent writer. In terms of age Roger better suits the picture. Roger wrote his treatises on logic and natural philosophy in the early 1330s and, if he continued his studies at the theological faculty as is indicated by the fact he was later known as a doctor of theology, he would have become a bachelor of the Sentences about the time when the Lectura was written. Moreover, there is no other text that could have been identified as Roger’s Sentences commentary. Richard, in turn, is probably too young to be the Swyneshed in question. His name first appears in the Merton records in the 1340s, at which point he most likely studied at the faculty of arts. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Richard continued his studies at the faculty of theology.12 Although both Richard and Roger belong to the same calculatory tradition as the author of the Lectura, the Benedictine connection speaks for Roger being the person referred to in Oriel College 15. The manuscript is of Benedictine origin; it was copied in 1389 by Nicholas Fawkes, who was a monk at Glastonbury Abbey.13 Although the scribe appears to have been a plain copyist, who had only a vague understanding of the content of the Lectura, he (or more likely the one who commissioned the copy) may have assumed that the text was the missing commentary of Roger Swyneshed.13a

12 For a detailed account on the life and works of the Oxford Swyneheds, see James A. Weisheipl, “Roger Swyneshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian,” in Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus (Oxford, 1964), 231–52. 13 See Katherine H. Tachau, “Introduction,” in Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot, ed. Paul A. Streveler and Katherine H. Tachau (Toronto, 1995), 1–98, at 40–1. 13a After completing this article, I gained access to a Vatican manuscript that confirms the argument presented here. After a passage taken from Roseth’s Lectura, the copyist inserts the following concluding note: “Explicit Tractatus de maximo et minimo secundum Rogerum Suynsset” (MS. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiani E.V.161, fol. 63v). This second manuscript ascribing the Lectura to Roger Swyneshed does not, however, present compelling reasons to reconsider the authorship of Lectura.

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Even though there are grounds for identifying Roger Swyneshed as the writer referred to in Oriel College 15, the attribution might also be based on a misreading of the author’s name. Medieval orthography was vague and the name ‘Swyneshed’ was spelled in various ways. Some variants like ‘Suisset’, ‘Suisseth’, and ‘Suiseth’ may have looked very similar to ‘Roseth’, especially if the handwriting was unclear. Could the ascription in Oriel College 15 then be correct? Hardly, I think, because it is highly unlikely that Nicholas Comparini, who made his copy in 1337 at a Franciscan studium, was misinformed about the author. On the other hand, it is more likely that a Benedictine scribe who made his copy over fifty years after the publication of the Lectura got it wrong. Also, a small literary feature bears out the fact that Roseth was a Franciscan rather than a Benedictine. The Lectura contains a number of examples which refer to religious orders. Whenever Roseth mentions the religious orders, he speaks of the Friars Minor. For a Franciscan it would be natural to pick examples from his own milieu whereas for a Benedictine to use Grey Friars for his examples seems incongruous.14 General Features of Roseth’s Lectura Fourteenth-century Sentences commentaries often deviate notably from the earlier examples of the genre. The change in style is typically evident in the following features: the connection with Lombard’s Sentences becomes looser, the number of questions diminishes whereas the length of the questions grows, new themes are introduced, and finally the former understanding of the salient role of biblical interpretation in the Sentences gives way to philosophical theology. In Roseth’s commentary we find an extreme example of this development. Roseth’s Lectura is not at all concerned with biblical interpretation.15 His references to the Bible are extremely few: just a handful in the whole work. The biblical narrative that appeals to Roseth is the story

14 The Benedictine background of MS. Oriel College 15 is apparent in the opening question, which asks whether a superior can order an unwilling subordinate to read the Bible. In the Oriel manuscript the term used for subordinate is ‘monk’ (monachus) instead of ‘brother’ ( frater), which is used in the other manuscripts. 15 For early Oxford discussions on the relation of the Sentences to the Bible, see Peter Raeds, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology (Oxford, 1987), 142–3.

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of Abraham’s sacrifice in Genesis 22, which Roseth briefly discusses in the second article of the first question,16 and to which he returns in the first article of question 5.17 Even this small detail concerning Roseth’s use of the Bible is telling: his interests involve the rationality of norms, whereas he disregards the religious aspects of the story. Roseth’s Lectura also exemplifies another typical feature of the fourteenth-century commentaries, namely, a loose connection to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Its composition already differs dramatically from that of the Sentences. The four books, 182 distinctions, and 933 chapters of the restructured original18 have, in Roseth’s treatment, diminished to five questions and seventeen articles.19 The contents of Roseth’s Lectura is as follows (based on Oriel College 15): Questio 1: Utrum aliquis in casu possit ex praecepto obligari ad aliquid quod est contra conscientiam suam Art. 1: Tangit de ista divisione Philosophi de maximo et minimo Art. 2: Utrum omne illud quod est licitum et non contra salutem animae possit praecipi rationabiliter a Deo Art. 3: Utrum habenti conscientiam quod Deus non sit diligendus possit rationaliter praecipi quod diligat Deum Subart. 1: Utrum homo posset habere conscientiam erroneam Subart. 2: Utrum habens conscientiam erroneam potest se conformare illi conscientiae sine peccato Subart. 3: Utrum talis conscientia erronea obliget Art. 4: Erit respondere ad quaestionem et ad argumenta principalia Questio 2: Circa primam distinctionem quaeritur utrum voluntas creata libere vel necessario causet actus fruendi respectu Dei Art. 1: Utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus Art. 2: Posito quod voluntas causet suum actum, utrum causet illum actum subito vel succesive Art. 3: Utrum aliqua causa libera poterit unquam causare effectum suum Art. 4: Erit respondere ad questionem et ad argumenta principalia

16

See MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fols. 255ra–rb. See Roseth, Lectura super Sententias, qu. 5, art. 1 (ed. Hallamaa, 248, 256–8). 18 For the division of the Sentences into distinctions, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (New York, 2004), 64–5. 19 This number includes three sub-articles in article 3 of question 1. 17

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Questio 3: Utrum divina essentia, quae est creatrix omnium, possit aliquid ostendi Art. 1: Utrum modi arguendi et regulae traditae a Philosopho ad regulandum modos arguendi tenet in divinis Art. 2: Utrum argumenta Philosophi per quae probat, quod est deveniendum ad unum primum in entibus, et per quae probat, quod infinite est virtutis, concludant Questio 4: Circa materia de caritate quaero utrum caritas possit augeri Art. 1: Utrum tot sunt partes in medietate alicuius caritatis sicut in tota caritate Art. 2: Utrum caritas possit augeri in perfectione sine aliquo adveniente Questio 5: Utrum si caritas augeatur, utrum augeatur per opera meritoria Art. 1: Utrum actus exterior addat aliquid ad actum interiorem meriti vel demeriti Art. 2: Utrum utrum aliqua creatura posset esse infinita Art. 3: Est respondere ad quaestionem principalem et ad argumenta principalia

The table of contents attests to significant differences between Roseth’s work and the Lombard’s Sentences. This dissimilarity does not only pertain to the number of chapters but involves the whole outlook of the work. While the Lombard’s aim was to provide a systematically organized general view on Christian doctrine, Roseth’s interest lies in the philosophical analysis of questions that relate to theology only loosely. Although Roseth’s questions bear titles that indicate some theological substance, they are too few to give an overall picture of Christian doctrine. The titles of the articles are even less theological, reflecting, rather, the author’s actual interest in philosophy. It seems that Roseth’s book possesses only a superficial theological framework, whereas the author’s main interest lies in philosophical questions. Another way to evaluate Roseth’s connection to the Lombard is to see whether the authors treat common subjects. A comparison of the contents of their respective works shows that there is, in fact, but one question with which both authors deal. This is the question on the increase of charity, which Peter Lombard discussed in book I, distinction 17, chapter 5. However, identical titles do not ensure similar treatment; in fact, Roseth’s treatment seems entirely uninfluenced by Lombard’s discussion. Moreover, Roseth expands his discussion far beyond the original: while Peter Lombard manages to discuss the augmentation of charity in 586 words, Roseth spends some 24,900

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words for the topic.20 These figures reveal another structural feature typical of Roseth’s Lectura: while the number of questions decreases, the length of individual chapters increases. For this reason, Roseth’s book is still of considerable length. So far my remarks concerning the extent to which Roseth’s work is based on the Sentences have been based on the composition of the Lectura. A more substantial way to trace Roseth’s connection to the Lombard is to look for references to the Sentences. This inquiry also yields rather meager results, since Roseth refers to Peter Lombard only six times. In addition, all these references occur in the second question, giving the impression that the Sentences only momentarily crossed Roseth’s mind. To sum up, it is apparent that, for Roseth, Peter Lombard was not major authority, but rather an author among many others. Furthermore, the Lectura is not a commentary on the Sentences in the strict sense; it is part of the genre mostly because of the institutional setting in which it originated. Characteristics of Roseth’s Style The length of Roseth’s questions has a direct effect on the structure of the text. To demonstrate how Roseth composes his work, I will now focus on the second article of question four. While the passage reveals characteristic features in Roseth’s writing, one should bear in mind that the composition of individual articles varies considerably. Roseth’s text does not slavishly repeat a uniform pattern, as some previous Sentences commentaries did. The second article of the fourth question focuses on mechanisms producing an augmentation in qualities in animate and inanimate entities. Roseth begins his inquiry by asking whether charity may become more perfect without any external addition. After the opening question, he presents two alternative meanings for the expression ‘to become more perfect’ (augeri in perfectione). According to Roseth, this expression has a proper sense and an improper sense. In the proper sense, the subject is first less perfect and later becomes more perfect,

20 By comparison, the same question in Bonaventure’s commentary consists of 4,600 words, whereas the length of William Ockham’s corresponding passage is only 968 words.

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whereas the improper sense describes cases where the change of a species is based on the acquisition of new parts of the same species. Based on this distinction, Roseth then puts forward six conclusions, which form the foundation of the subsequent discussion. These conclusions lead to the position Roseth argues for, namely, that inanimate entities grow only in the improper sense, whereas living creatures augment in the proper sense of the word. The diagram below illustrates the structure of the beginning of the article:21 Question

Distinction

Concl. 1

Concl. 2

Concl. 3

Concl. 4

Concl. 5

Concl. 6

Figure 1

The rest of the article consists of a discussion based on the six conclusions. Each of these receives a distinct treatment, in which Roseth first presents arguments against the conclusion and thereafter refutes the objections. Some of the answers give rise to further counterarguments, which then lead to a long series of pros and cons. The next two diagrams depict the structure of conclusions one and three. I have chosen these two since they represent the extremes: the first is the shortest, whereas the third is the most complex. Both conclusions share the same feature, in contrast to the remaining four, in that the conclusion itself comprises several arguments. In the others the conclusion consists of a single argument. Although the first conclusion consists of four different arguments, Roseth discusses only the first one, leaving the remaining three aside. He presents three counterarguments against the first conclusion and then goes on to respond to them. Hence, the structure of the first conclusion is as follows:

21 The lines show the connections among the arguments. Solid lines indicate arguments that directly follow each other whereas arguments joined by dotted lines are separated from each other by intervening text.

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Arg. 2

Arg. 1

Arg. 3

Con 1

Con 2

Con 3

Resp.

Resp.

Resp.

Arg. 4

Figure 2

This unsymmetrical composition raises several questions. Did Roseth skip some arguments on purpose or are they missing by accident? If he deliberately omitted the arguments, how crucial were they to Roseth? On the other hand, Roseth may also have passed over the arguments in order to write these passages later. This would indicate that Roseth never finished the book. Or could it be the case that the text is based on incomplete lecture notes? Whatever the truth may be, it will probably remain hidden. The structural complexity of Roseth’s arguments is clearly visible in the third conclusion:

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Concl. 3 Conclusio principalis Arg. 2

Arg. 1

Arg. 3

Con 1

Con 2

Pro

Pro

Con 3

Arg. 4

Arg. 5

Con 4

Arg. 7

Con 5

Pro

Con

Arg. 6

Pro

Con

Pro

Pro

Con

Con

Con

Pro

Pro Con

Pro 1

Con

Con

Pro

Pro 1

Pro 3

Con 3

Con 4

Con 5

Con 6

Con 7

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro 3

Pro 5

Pro 6

Con

Pro 4

Con 8

Pro Pro

Pro

Pro

Con Doubts concerning the principal conclusion: D1 Con

D2

D3

Pro

Pro

Con Pro 2

Pro 3

Pro 4

Pro

Con 1 Con 2 Con 3 Con 4 Pro

Pro 8

Pro

Pro

Pro 9

Pro Con Pro

Figure 3

Pro 4

Con 9 Con 10 Con 11 Con 12 Con 13 Con 14

Pro

Pro 1

Pro 7

Con

Con 2

Pro 2

Pro 4

Pro 1 Pro 2 Pro 3 Arguments against the position presented in Pro 1–9 above

Pro

Con 1

Pro 2

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The third conclusion comprises seven proofs showing that change does not affect the identity of an animate being. Next Roseth gives five arguments presenting the opposite view. None of the counterarguments directly relates to any of the seven proofs, rather challenging the initial claim (conclusio principalis). The discussion is divided into two sections. The first part consists of the answers that Roseth gives to the five counterarguments; in the second section Roseth presents three new doubts over the principal conclusion and finally responds to them. The diagram shows not only the complexity of Roseth’s arguments, but also illustrates how he manages to be consistent throughout the discussion. Each line of argument, except for one, ends with a pro argument that is compatible with the principal conclusion. This coherence is important, since Roseth’s writing is based on a method that resembles indirect proofs. The conclusions with which Roseth begins the articles represent his own opinion, thus the counteraugments challenge his views. The refutation of all the con arguments, including the last one, shows that the initial conclusion was justified. If the last argument were a con argument, it would show that the original conclusion is flawed. It is hard to say how compelling Roseth thought these kinds of arguments were. Did he consider them proofs, or did he merely think that they increased the credibility of the initial conclusions? Whatever the answer may be, his method certainly makes it difficult to follow Roseth’s reasoning. From time to time it is not clear which arguments really support Roseth’s own views, since even a counterargument may reveal essential features of the author’s thought. Furthermore, some of the counterarguments are clearly designed to be refuted. Do such arguments really challenge the author’s views? And finally, a method which concentrates on the possible weaknesses of arguments instead of trying to prove them, easily gives a one-sided picture of the author’s thinking. Roseth treats the four other conclusions in a manner similar to the first and the third. After bringing the discussion of the sixth conclusion to an end, he returns to the question on the augmentation of charity. Thus, Roseth ends the second article by answering the problem that question four explores. However, Roseth does not cast the theme of the second article aside, since the answer to the question is based on the distinction between the two meanings of the expression ‘to increase in perfection’. The answer gives rise to the last objection, which Roseth resolves using the distinction introduced in the first arti-

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cle. Hence, in his closing remarks, Roseth pulls together the themes of both articles and thereby concludes the question. The way in which Roseth concludes the fourth question differs from that of the first, second, and fifth questions, in which Roseth placed the answers in a separate article. The solution is not unique, however, because the third question also lacks a concluding article. There is no apparent reason why Roseth did not write a concluding article for the third and fourth questions. Both questions have only two articles, but so does the fifth. Whatever the reason for this variation may be, it again shows that structural unity was not one of Roseth’s major concerns. The external features of Roseth’s Lectura are in accordance with changes in the Sentences tradition. Like so many other fourteenth-century authors, Roseth discarded the traditional division of the Sentences into books, distinctions, and chapters. Instead, he split the text into questions, which are further divided into articles. Furthermore, Roseth built the articles without limiting himself to the schema employed by the early commentators. These commentators—such as Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure among others—used a five-step dialectical format that comprised a question, arguments for one side, arguments for the opposing view, the author’s solution, and finally further remarks on the initial argument.22 Instead of using a fixed dialectical format, Roseth employed, as we have seen, a freely composed series of arguments in which the pro and con arguments follow each other in turns. This lengthy series of arguments pushes the question method to its utmost limits as arguments and responses become widely separated from each other, which complicates following the author’s reasoning. One may wonder how a student attending Roseth’s lectures could have kept up with the intersecting arguments. Their structural complexity may even suggest that Roseth was, in fact, writing a literary work instead of lecture notes. Roseth’s departure from the earlier Sentences tradition reflects changes in the intellectual environment. For an English Franciscan writing in the 1330s, the most influential figures of the day were John Duns Scotus and William Ockham. Although Roseth was not a direct adherent of either, he belonged to the Franciscan tradition,

22

See Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 96.

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which Scotus’s and Ockham’s theories had greatly shaped. In particular, Ockham’s novel ideas in metaphysics and logic, which marked a departure from realistic ontology and a movement toward the philosophy of language, laid the foundations for later developments in English theology.23 The other important factor in Roseth’s intellectual background was the rise of natural philosophy. During the 1320s and the next three decades the study of physics flourished at Oxford. In contrast to early modern experimental science, Oxford natural philosophy was speculative. The new physics was based on conceptual and mathematical analysis, which is why the Oxford natural philosophers earned themselves the name of ‘calculators’.24 This new speculative physics had an impact on other fields, including theology. Indeed, its influence on theology was so strong that some scholars even speak of the mathematization of theology.25 Roger Roseth was one of the leading figures in this movement; he absorbed the calculators’ methods to such an extent that modern historians have come to the judgment that “most of his Sentences commentary turns out to be almost pure philosophy.”26 This remark poses at least two questions: What kind of a philosopher was Roseth, and what was the role of theology in his thinking? I will address these questions by first exploring Roseth’s use of logic, then I will describe some of the main features of his natural philosophy, and finally I will evaluate the substance of his theology. Roger Roseth as a Logician When Roger Roseth composed his Lectura, the study of logic was flourishing in England. William Ockham had completed his huge Summa logicae some years earlier, and his critic Walter Burley, who

23

See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 185–218. For a detailed description of the calculators, see Edith D. Sylla, “Oxford Calculators,” in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Krezmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), 540–63. 25 See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 262. John Murdoch has in many of his scholarly articles analyzed the interaction between philosophy and theology. His most detailed analysis of the impact of natural philosophy on theology is in John E. Murdoch, “From Social to Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning,” in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (Dordrecht, 1975), 271–348. 26 See Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century”, in Mediaeval Commentaries, vol. 1, 425–64, at 432. 24

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can be considered a realist, was still active, now as a member of Bishop Richard de Bury’s household. Many of Roseth’s contemporaries—such as Thomas Bradwardine, Richard Kilvington, Roger Swyneshed, and William Heytesbury—had all contributed to the study of logic.27 Although Roseth was clearly interested in the logic of the arts masters, his Lectura does not directly refer to any particular logical treatise. Yet, every now and then he utilizes ideas from recent developments in the study of logic. The basic logical theories that Roseth uses include the properties of terms (supposition) and rules of inferences (conversion rules and consequences). Furthermore, he deploys various branches of contemporary logic, such as sophismata (ambiguous sentences posing logical problems), insolubia (logical paradoxes), and obligationes (a form of disputation in which opponent and respondent are “obliged” to follow the rules governing the format). The logic that Roseth had learned, probably at one of the Franciscan schools, was terminist and modern in nature. It was called ‘modern’ (logica moderna) in contrast to the ‘old’ logic (logica vetus) that was comprised of Boethius’s translations of ancient logic and Boethius’s own logical works.28 The new logic extended the old corpus with the newly translated logical works of Aristotle and new doctrines that emerged when logic began to develop from the middle of the twelfth century onward.29 The modern logic was called ‘terminist’ since it focused on the properties of terms. Furthermore, the salient part of the terminist approach was the theory of supposition. Supposition, one of the components of medieval semantic theory, in some ways corresponds to the modern notion of reference. It explains what a term, as a constituent of a proposition, stands for. However, the congruence between supposition and modern notion of reference is only partial; one major difference is the division of supposition into many different

27 On the works of Burley, Bradwardine, and Heytesbury, see James A. Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” Mediaeval Studies 31 (1969): 174–224. A list of Roger Swyneshed’s works is to be found in Weisheipl, “Roger Swyneshed,” 243–52. For Kilvington’s works, see Elżbieta Jung-Palczewska, “Works by Richard Kilvington,” AHDLMA 67 (2000): 181–223. For an overview of late medieval English logic, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 221–40. 28 For details, see Paul V. Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory (published on the Internet under http:// pvspade.com/Logic/docs/thoughts1_1a.pdf, 2002), 35–7. 29 For a list of new translations of Aristotle, see ibid., 38.

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modes.30 What the modes were and how the various modes of supposition should be categorized were matters of dispute among the medieval logicians. It is possible that Roseth got to know William Ockham’s version of supposition, according to which proper supposition31 is divided into three kinds: a term has (1) a material supposition when it refers to the word itself, (2) a simple supposition when it refers to a concept, and (3) a personal supposition when it refers to concrete individuals existing outside the soul. Moreover, personal supposition is divided into two branches, which are discrete supposition (of which proper names are an example) and common supposition (which occurs in general terms). Again, common personal supposition is divided into determinate and confused supposition, and the latter into merely confused and distributive supposition. The supposition that a term gains is based upon a set of rules which, for example, take account of whether the term is used as subject or predicate, whether it refers to all or just some things, or whether it falls within the scope of a negation.32 These rules refer to another essential distinction, namely, the distinction between significative and non-significative terms. The former were called ‘categorematic’ terms. These are terms that signify something independently and therefore also have a supposition. Only a significative term can appear as a subject or predicate term in a proposition. The non-significative terms—that is, the syncategorematic terms—signify something only in association with categorematic terms. Syncategorematic terms include logical particles such as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘not’, ‘and’ ‘or, ‘if . . . then’, but also words like ‘be’, ‘necessary’ or ‘infinite’.33 Although a syncategorematic term does not supposit, it may change the supposition of categorematic terms that fall within its scope (vis confundendi). In logic, the exposition of supposition theory is part of its subject matter, whereas in other disciplines, supposition is taken as one of the analytical tools. This is precisely how Roseth employs supposition theory in his Lectura: he does not discuss the basics of the theory, nor does he describe it in detail, but instead he uses it in practice. 30 See Stephen Read, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/medieval-terms/). 31 There is improper supposition too. For its definition, see Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 250–3. 32 See Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 279–81; Read, “Medieval Theories.” 33 See Alexander Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic (Oxford, 1987), 11–14.

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This occurs, however, infrequently and even then often in an imprecise manner. Instead of precisely defining the exact mode of supposition, Roseth merely refers to supposition in general. For Roseth’s purposes this suffices, since the examples to which he applies supposition analysis do not necessarily require rigorous analysis. Typically, Roseth uses supposition to establish whether the signification of a term that is used in a formal argument remains the same throughout the inference. If this prerequisite is not fulfilled, the argument is not valid.34 Supposition can also serve as a means to classify sentences on the basis of truth conditions.35 Although these examples attest to the loose use of supposition, there are also passages which show that Roseth was familiar with the theory. In one such section, Roseth explains why, in this particular case, the syngategorematic quantifier ‘every’ does not affect the subsequent term, which has a merely confused supposition.36 The remark shows that Roset knew the various modes of personal supposition, and realized that a syntegarematic term has the power to change the supposition of the following categorematic term. Yet, references to

34

See Lectura, qu. 1, art. 2 (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fol. 252ra): “Et sicut est de ista, ita dicendum est de omnibus consimilibus. Unde si arguatur sic: Omnibus dicens verum transibit pontem, iste sic dicens dicit verum; ergo sic transibit pontem. Dicitur quod discursus non valet isto casu posito, quia ly ‘verum’ in minori supponat pro aliquo pro quo non sit distributo in maiori et ideo variatur medium et est fallacia accidentis.” 35 See Lectura, qu. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 209–10): “Ad istud dicitur quod ista non est differentia inter propositiones, quae sunt verae per se primo modo, et propositiones accidentaliter verae. Sed ista est differentia quod in illis, quae sunt per se primo modo, praedicatum significat essentiam huius, quod significatur per subiectum vel partem essentiae, quod dico pro differentia. Sic non est in propositionibus accidentaliter veris, quia ibi praedicatum non significat essentiam subiecti nec partem essentiae subiecti. In ista enim propositione: ‘Sortes est albus’ hoc praedicatum ‘album’ non significat nisi albedinem, quia secundum Philosophum ‘album’ solam qualitatem significat. Tamen connotat et supponit in ista propositione pro Sorte et non pro illo, quod significat, et ista est differentia inter propositiones per se primo modo et propositiones per accidens.” 36 See Lectura, qu. 4, art. 1 (ed. Hallamaa, 113–14): “Praeterea, si aliqua foret tota multitudo etc., ergo eodem modo aliqua foret tota multitudo omnium partium eiusdem quantitatis in isto continuo, quo posito omnes partes illius multitudinis, accipiendo ly ‘omnes’ collective, sunt eiusdem quantitatis. Quaero cuius quantitatis, nam hoc satis bene possum quaerere, ex quo iste terminus ‘omnis’ non habet vim confundendi terminum immediate sequentem confuse tantum, quando accipitur collective. Quia talis propositio, in qua hoc signum ‘omnis’ tenetur collective, semper aequivalet uni propositioni singulari, in qua demonstrantur omnia singularia simul collecta, et per consequens non est propositio universalis, quando ly ‘omnes’ tenetur collective, et non potest dari, cuius quantitatis forent ille omnes partes. Praeterea, si aliqua foret tota multitudo etc., ergo eodem.”

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the modes of personal supposition are so few that it is not possible to establish how profound Roseth’s knowledge of the supposition theory really was. The previous example illustrates what one could call the standard use of personal supposition. Roseth does, however, also use the notion in an original manner. This idiosyncratic use of personal supposition occurs in the article dealing with Trinitarian logic. Here Roseth distinguishes between two modes in which Trinitarian terms can supposit: essentially and personally.37 According to Roseth, a Trinitarian term has a personal supposition when it refers to one of the divine persons, whereas a term jointly referring to all the divine persons has an essential supposition.38 This latter concept does not appear in standard theory of supposition. The former concept, personal supposition, raises the question of whether it reflects any kinship with the standard theory of supposition. On a very general level there are some parallels: in both cases personal supposition is used to explain the semantics of a term signifying, as Roseth would insist, an object of extramental reality. Yet, Roseth does not in any way link Trinitarian personal supposition to the standard notion as it was used in terminist logic. Hence, the only common denominator between the two concepts of personal supposition is that both relate to semantics; the common name is arbitrary and does not reflect any profound connection. Roseth uses the distinction between essential and personal supposition to analyze identity predications in Trinitarian inferences. This question emerged in syllogisms containing nonstandard Trinitarian terms, which signify something that can be either one or three. In such syllogisms true premises often lead to an untrue conclusion, which 37 Roseth appears to have used Adam Wodeham’s Trinitarian logic as the basis for his discussion. He did not, however, slavishly follow Wodeham but used the material selectively, systematizing and simplifying some of Wodeham’s ideas. The notions ‘essential’ and ‘personal’ seems to derive from Wodeham. See Adam Wodeham, Adam Goddam super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Abbreviatio Henricus Totting de Oyta, ed. Iohannes Maior (Paris, 1512), I, dist. 33, qu. 2, fol. 79vb. Although Roseth employs supposition to analyze certain Trinitarian paralogisms, he regards it as a secondary means to deal with Trinitarian inferences. For a detailed analysis of Roseth’s Trinitarian logic, see Olli Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality: Roger Roseth on Trinitarian Paralogisms,” Vivarium 41 (2003), 84–119. 38 See Lectura, qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Hallamaa, 72): “Quarta suppositio quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ et hoc nomen ‘essentia’ aliquando supponunt essentialiter, aliquando personaliter. Tunc enim supponunt personaliter, quando supponunt respectu alicuius praedicati, quod non competit simul tribus personis; tunc autem supponunt essentialiter, quando supponunt respectu alicuius praedicati, quod competit omnibus simul.”

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seemed to jeopardize either the validly of logic or the rationality of the faith. With the distinction between essential and personal supposition, Roseth intended to show that the flaw in Trinitarian paralogisms can be resolved. Thus, for example, in the syllogism, “Omnis essentia divina est Pater, omnis Filius est essentia divina; ergo omnis Filius est Pater,” the conclusion is false even though the premises seem to be true. Roseth resolves the paralogism by saying that the syllogism would be valid if the subject terms in the premises had a personal supposition. However, this would make the major premise untrue.39 Roseth’s remark involves the claim that the major premise would be true if the subject term supposited essentially. Furthermore, it is obvious that the subject term in the minor premise has a personal supposition. Thus, when both of the premises are true, they signify differently, and the argument is a fallacy. If the premises signify similarly, the major premise is false; therefore, the falsity of the conclusion does not arise from defects in the syllogistic form. The medieval theory of valid inference gives an account of how two categorical propositions40 with the same categorematic terms relate to each other. One of the ways in which two categorical propositions may be related to each other is conversion, which, in short, states the cases in which the subject and the predicate of a categorical proposition can be reversed while maintaining its truth value. Conversion originates from Aristotle’s syllogistics, and, indeed, Roseth also refers to Aristotle as an authority in this matter. According to Roseth, Aristotle taught that conversion is suited only to propositions that can be used as premises in syllogisms.41 This remark, however, is not an adequate description of Aristotle’s theory, nor does it precisely describe Roseth’s way of using the theory. For Aristotle, the theory of conversion was essential for his account of how syllogisms in other figures could be restored to those of the first figure, whereas Roseth tests propositions in order to find out whether they meet the requirements for premises. Secondly, he uses conversion to study the truth values of sentences.42 In addition, several times Roseth echoes the terminology pertaining 39

See ibid. (75). Categorical propositions are those that can be analyzed according to their quality (affirmative or negative) and their quantity (universal, particular, indefinite, singular); see Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things, 14. 41 See Lectura, qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Hallamaa, 72). 42 See, for example, Lectura, qu. 1, art. 2 (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fols. 253ra– 254vb); Lectura, qu. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 135–6). 40

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to conversion rules to describe a valid inference or to weigh the interchangeability of certain propositions. In discussing the problematic Trinitarian propositions, Roseth uses simple conversion (conversio simplex), in which the converse proposition has the same quality and quantity as the convertend proposition. According to Roseth, conversion of the universal negative proposition “nulla essentia generat” to the untrue converse “nullum generans est essentia” is illicit since the convertend is not a genuine universal proposition. However, if the terms in both propositions supposited personally, the conversion would be valid. But this would, as Roseth notes, make both the convertend and converse false.43 Roseth gives a similar treatment to accidental conversion (conversio per accidens), in which the converse has the same quality as the convertend but a different quantity.44 When applying conversions to Trinitarian sentences, Roseth focuses on the formal structure of the propositions. The other purpose for which Roseth uses conversion is to explore the truth values of propositions. This is what Roseth does, for instance, when he discusses epistemic propositions. These can, he says, either be true, doubtful, or untrue. Since the truth value of such propositions is not always evident, conversion may be of help. This is because the converse may reveal the truth value of a proposition better than the convertend, and since valid conversion preserves the truth value: for a true convertend the converse must be true also.45 Roseth applies these guidelines to the proposition, “Hic homo scitur a te esse hoc animal,” which yields the following converse: “Quod scitur a te esse hoc animal est iste homo.” Roseth’s example is based on the assumption that we do not know whether the one referred to by the term ‘homo’ is really a human being; thus, the latter proposition pinpoints the problem better than

43

See ibid., qu. 3, art. 1 (76–7). For instance, a universal affirmative preposition is converted into a particular affirmative proposition. 45 See Lectura, qu. 1, art. 3 (MS. Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 192, fol. 17rb): “Sexto notandum est quod quia multae propositiones in quibus tale verbum mediat sicut verbum principale huius propositionis. Sic se habent quarum alique sunt falsae, alique sunt verae, et aliquae sunt dubiae, est difficile est scire quando sunt dubiae, verae vel falsae et quando dubiae. Ideo ad hoc sciendum reputo fore melius ut convertas tales propositiones, bene in propositio sic conversa statim ostendit tibi si sit vera vel falsa vel dubia. Et sicut maior est de illa convertente, sic debes iudicare de propositione quae convertitur, quia si unum convertibilium sit verum et reliquus.” 44

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the convertend. Since the predication in the converse is not certain, the convertend cannot be true or false but is, instead, doubtful.46 In his use of conversion rules, Roseth, again, shows that his interest is primarily practical. He leaves aside a comprehensive discussion of the theory, but at the same time he is clearly aware of the theory’s essential features. Roseth exploits the theory only inasmuch as it serves his practical needs. Since this approach is repeated in Roseth’s use of other theories in logic—for example, in his use of consequences—I will not discuss them here, but I will instead concentrate on certain features that are distinctive to Roseth’s use of logic, namely, on his remarks concerning obligationes, sophismata, and deontic logic. Obligational disputations were a fairly popular field of medieval logic. The disputations were developed as part of the university curriculum, but what the exact purpose of the disputations was remains a mystery. In short, the exercise followed the model of an academic disputation between two parties, an opponent and a respondent. The opponent launches the disputation by positing a proposition (positio), which the respondent must either grant or deny. Then the opponent proposes new propositions, to which the respondent must react by accepting, denying, or doubting the proposition. The respondent’s obligation—hence the name—is to answer according to the rules defining the game: these rules state when a proposition is relevant (pertinens) or irrelevant (impertinens) in respect to the positum or to circumstances known to the respondent. The disputation ends when the opponent announces that time is up.47 The rules stating the demands for the positum and specifying the requirements for appropriate answers varied from author to author. At Oxford, Walter Burley’s approach (De obligationibus, 1302) was very popular, becoming more or less the standard theory. However, the rules remained a matter of dispute so that several subsequent authors modified them. One such author was Roger Swyneshed, who published his revision in the early 1330s. In Swyneshed’s approach, the decision on whether a propositum is relevant or irrelevant is solely based on the positum and not on the previous answers. From this new understanding of the respondent’s duties arose Swyneshed’s rule on

46

See ibid. (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fols. 260vb–261ra). See Paul Vincent Spade, “Medieval Theories of Obligationes,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/obligationes/). 47

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granting of conjunctions and disjunctions: “Because of granting parts of a conjunction, the conjunction is not to be granted, nor because of granting a disjunction is any part of the disjunction to be granted.”48 In his Lectura Roseth refers to obligation logic twice. In the third article of the first question he presents a series of arguments which he builds as if they had originated from an obligation disputation. Roseth ends one of these arguments with a resolution in which he seems to deviate from the standard approach.49 Somewhat later he returns again to this example and makes a remark concerning the duties of the respondent. In this passage Roseth seems to support the view that the assessment of whether a propositum is relevant or irrelevant follows from the positum alone.50 Roseth refers again to obligations in the second article of the fourth question where he sets out to prove the claim that a whole (totum) is not merely the sum of its parts. He justifies this claim by referring to the treatment of compound propositions in obligations, where in certain cases one has to grant both conjuncts and yet deny the conjunction. Similarly, there are cases where the disjunction should be granted, even though both component parts must be denied.51

48 “Propter concessionem partium copulativae non est copulativa concedenda nec propter concessionem disjunctivae est aliqua pars eijus concedenda” (Paul Vincent Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes: Edition and Comments,” AHDLMA 44 (1977): 243–85, at 257). The translation is by Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Obligationes: 14th-Century Logic of Disputational Duties (Helsinki, 1994), 90. 49 See Lectura, qu. 1, art. 1, subart. 1 (MS. Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, 1551, fol. 42vb): “Et ideo ista regula est neganda: sequitur ex posito et bene concesso, ergo est concedendum, et multae aliae regulae quae conceduntur ab aliquibus in obligationibus.” 50 See ibid. (fol. 43rb): “Unde ista conclusio concedenda est in casu obligationum, quod aliqua propositio est concedenda a te et postquam illam concessas tu habes negare te concedere illam, quia te concedere illam esse falsam in casu et impertinens et non in casu argumenti habeo concedere illam ‘A est verum’, quia positum, et tamen negatur me concedere illam ‘A est verum’. 51 See Lectura, qu. 3, art. 1 (ed. Hallamaa, 176–7) “Nam in casu obligationum copulativa est neganda et utraque pars concedenda, quia si positum sit falsum, tunc copulativa facta ex posito falso et vero impertinente est neganda, quia falsa est et impertinens. Quod talis copulativa sit falsa patet, quia una pars est falsa, puta positum. Quod sit impertinens ad positum patet, quia numquam copulativa sequitur formaliter ex altera parte. Sed solum altera pars talis copulativae est posita; ergo. Similiter disiunctiva est concedenda et utraque pars neganda, quia si ponatur una disiunctiva cuius utraque pars est falsa, tunc illa disiunctiva est concedenda, quia posita, et utraque pars neganda, quia falsa et impertinens ad talem disiunctivam positam, quia quaelibet pars disiunctivae est impertinens ad disiunctivam, quia nulla earum sequitur formaliter ex tali disiunctiva.”

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Roseth’s remarks on the rules of obligation show that he adopted Swyneshed’s controversial new theory. In fact, he was among the first proponents of Swynehed’s rules.52 This shows that Roseth was well aware of recent developments within logic and was quick to absorb new ideas. This may also explain, at least partly, why the Benedictine manuscript which later ended up at Oriel College attributed the Lectura to Swyneshed.53 So far, the extracts from Roseth’s treatment of logic indicate that he was aware of the basic theories, as well as being informed of the current trends in the field. However, Roseth was not only an adapter of ideas, he was also an independent creative mind. It is this third aspect of Roseth’s logic that I would like to address by focusing on his discussion of deontic notions.54 Roseth’s discussion on the rationality of norms appears in the second article of the first question. He begins the article by stating five rules that assure rationality for the system of norms. The rules are: (i) Every precept can be considered rational when it concerns an obligation that is permitted and in my power, and that may be willed in accordance with moral law and can be fulfilled without extreme loss.55 (ii) No precept is rational according to moral law which obliges me to do something that is permitted but may not be willed unless I am thus obliged.56 52 According to Spade, Swyneshed wrote his Obligationes some time after 1330 and certainly before 1335; see Paul Vincent Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes,” 246. 53 See the discussion on pp. 371–3 above. 54 My discussion of deontic notions is based upon the following literature: Simo Knuuttila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century,” in New Studies in Deontic Logic, ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht and Boston, 1981), 225–48; Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London and New York, 1993), 190–6; Simo Knuuttila and Olli Hallamaa, “Roger Roseth and Medieval Deontic Logic,” Logique et analyse 149 (1995): 75–87; Simo Knuuttila, “Medieval Modal Theories and Modal Logic,” in Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam, 2008), 505–78, at 564–7. 55 See Lectura, qu. 1, art. 2 (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fol. 249rb): “Prima conclusio est quod omne praeceptum per quod praecipitur mihi aliquod licitum quod est in potestate mea, quod licite possum velle secundum legem statutam sine praecepto aliquo, est praeceptum rationabile secundum legem statutam. Et hoc si sum potens ad implendum illud praeceptum sine gravi dispendio.” 56 See ibid. (fol. 249rb–va): “Secunda conclusio quod nullum praeceptum est rationabile secundum legem statutam per quod mihi praecipitur aliquid licitum quod non possum licite velle secundum legem statutam absque hoc quod mihi praecipitur.”

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(iii) Some obligations that do not interfere with the salvation of the soul cannot be prescribed according to moral law, since there are things that do not interfere with the salvation of the soul yet moral law does not allow me to will them unless I am thus obliged.57 (iv) Not everything that promotes the salvation of the soul can rationally be prescribed by moral law.58 (v) Whatever is permitted in the second sense (that is, something permitted that may not be willed) I may, by God’s absolute power, will licitly.59 The two first rules define the requirements for the formal rationality of a system of norms, whereas principles (iii) and (iv) cover the question of how the divine command ethics put forward by Roseth relates to religious obligations. The fifth rule states that God can, in his absolute power, modify the system of norms. Roseth’s principles indicate that, in his opinion, moral norms are God-given and that moral good and obedience to God’s will interlink. Furthermore, the distinction between permission and what may be willed is crucial to Roseth’s argument. In the second argument against the first conclusion, Roseth takes up problems that arise in deontic inferences. The problem that he addresses relates to consequences which are implications by their logical structure: (1) p → q

Roseth begins the discussion by pointing out that there are cases in which one can licitly will the antecedent (p) and also will the consequent (q). Such an inference can be found in following proposition: “You are sleeping; therefore you do not benefit from an elicited act.” To will to sleep is not forbidden by any moral norm and likewise not

57 See ibid. (MS. Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 192, fol. 8vb): “Tertia conclusio est quod non omne quod non est contra salutem animae potest praecipi secundum legem statutam, quia aliquid est tale quod non est contra salutem animae meae quod non possum licite velle secundum legem statutam absque hoc quod mihi praeciperetur …” 58 See ibid. (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fol. 249va): “Quarta conclusio est quod non omne quod est pro salute animae, alicuius potest sibi praecipi rationabiliter secundum legem statutam.” 59 See ibid.: “Quinta conclusio est quod de potentia Dei absoluta omne illud quod est licitum secundo modo potest esse volitum licite a me.”

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to will to perform meritorious acts does not violate any moral norm. On the basis of this example it seems that in a valid consequence, if one can will the antecedent, one can also will the consequent. But is this a general rule that applies to all consequences? Roseth argues against this by presenting the following example: “I repent of my sin; therefore I am in sin.” In this case it is permitted to will to repent one’s sins but one may not will to be in sin. The example shows that a permissible antecedent does not necessarily lead to a permitted consequent. Roseth’s remark seems to involve a sophisticated logical insight. Since moral law commands us to repent of our sins, there are obligations that are rational only after some other norm has been violated. Such conditional norms, which in contemporary deontic logic are called ‘contrary-to-duty imperatives’, distinguish deontic inferences from those of modal logic. In modal logic from (1) follows (2) ☐p → ☐q

and (3) ◊p → ◊q

where ‘☐’ stands for necessity and ‘◊’ for possibility. Although deontic concepts in certain respects resemble modal notions, analogous inference is not possible in the case of conditional norms when p stands for something forbidden. Conditional obligation should be formulated in the following manner: (4) p → Oq

where ‘O’ stands for obligation. Here Roseth’s example is transformed into a consequence: “I am in sin; therefore I must repent.” However, Roseth notes that this is not yet a sufficient analysis of conditional obligation. The problem that he analyzes in conditional obligation is whether one can will to fulfill the obligation q in a case when the condition p does not prevail. He formulates the problem by asking whether Socrates, who wills to repent without having committed any sin, should repent or not. According to Roseth, each of the alternatives leads to a contradiction. He resolves the problem arising from this example by assuming two principles. First he assumes that the intention of the rule-giver is that Socrates ought to will to repent of his sins only when he is guilty of sin. Secondly, the act of willing to repent without having committed a sin is different from the prescribed act of repenting. According to this analysis, in the case of Socrates being

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willing to repent even though he has not committed any sin, Socrates violates the intention of the rule-giver, thus failing to act according to the moral law. This is paradoxical since repenting of one’s sins in most cases fulfils the moral obligation. These problems indicate that the formula for conditional norms (4) requires a further qualification, which states that fulfilling the condition p of a conditional obligation does not fulfill the obligation q: (5) ( p →Oq) &

☐( p→q).

This addition states that producing q can be an obligation for a moral agent only if q does not necessarily appear together with p. Thus the fulfillment of the obligation described by the consequent must be based on the will of the agent instead of being a logical entailment. There is, however, a further problem that Roseth notices. In the last argument against (i), he presents a semantic paradox in which Socrates, who is obliged to cross a bridge if and only if he says something true, says, “I shall not cross the bridge.” Now the sentence is true and the condition fulfilled. Yet, the obligation cannot be fulfilled since crossing the bridge would make the sentence untrue.60 The example shows that obligation is rational only if it is possible to fulfill it. Hence, the final form for conditional obligations is: (6) ( p → Oq) &

☐( p → q) & ◊( p&q)

The reconstruction of Roseth’s argument based on notation that was not accessible to him may appear historically problematic; yet it reveals the precision of his logical argumentation. Roseth appears to be an independent mind who does not only absorb logical theories but also develops them. In the case of conditional obligations his influence may not have been marked; subsequent generations appear to have appreciated his work on natural philosophy more. Features of Roseth’s Natural Philosophy To a large extent the material that Roseth incorporates into his Lectura from natural philosophy pertains, in one way or another, to infinity and continuity. Here Roseth adheres to Aristotelian presuppositions, 60 See the text in footnote 34, which contains Roseth’s concluding remark concerning the paradox.

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which influence his treatment of issues such as the increase of charity, the limits of potencies, and God’s ability to perform unending operations. Aristotle’s account of infinity was essentially finitist: “For in general infinity exists through one thing always being taken after another, what is taken being always finite, but never other and other.”61 For Aristotle infinity is always produced by addition or division; it is potential in the sense that it always has something outside it. Actual infinity, which is something beyond which there is nothing, was an unacceptable notion for him.62 Most medieval thinkers followed Aristotle’s denial of the actual infinite, refuting the existence of a magnitude so great that it could not be greater (tantum quod non maius). In contrast, acceptable potential infinity was defined as a quantity that was not so great but could be greater (non tantum quin maius).63 The aversion that the Aristoteleans had to actual infinity determined the way in which continuity was defined. In short, continuity requires infinite divisibility of magnitudes. Thus, any continuous magnitude contains an infinite number of possible divisions, commonly either points or instants of time. The points are never contiguous; however close two points are to each other, there is always an infinite number of points in-between. This is, according to the Aristotelian position, the prerequisite for continuous change, since if a continuum consisted of extensible indivisibles, change would occur as leaps from one indivisible to another. As Aristotle thought, the potentially infinite number of divisions makes the continua traversable, but we cannot traverse an infinity of actually existing divisions.64 This is the general framework within which Roseth examined infinity. He did this not only in a short article (qu. 5, art. 2) especially devoted to the subject, but also in numerous examples scattered throughout the Lectura. The examples may be divided into two principal groups. To begin with, a significant number of his examples deals with unending series, either produced through addition or division. Although such a mathematical approach basically applies to the potential infinite, Roseth typically formulates the problems so that addition or division 61 Aristotle, Physics 3, chap. 6, 206a27–29; trans. Richard Sorabji in The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 ad: A Sourcebook, vol. 2: Physics, ed. Richard Sorabji (London, 2004), 189. 62 See Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983), 210–12. 63 John E. Murdoch, “Infinity and Continuity,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (see note 25 above), 564–91, at 567. 64 See Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 213.

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lead to something that seems to be actually infinite. In the second type of examples, infinity comes about through qualitative distance between finite entities. Such an infinity, which is based on the essence of creatures, often seems to involve some kind of actual infinity. Both groups include examples in which infinity somehow originates from God’s omnipotence; for this reason they have a metaphysical flavor. It may at first seem strange that Roseth, who is committed to the Aristotelian presuppositions, would construct examples that postulate actual infinity. The problematic infinite does, however, have an integral place in Roseth’s strategy for building arguments, and their resolution brings us to the core of his view on infinity. The examples based on qualitative difference comprise only a minor part of Roseth’s examples on infinity. These few examples also receive a shorter treatment, which gives the impression that Roseth did not consider these cases as a real challenge to the correct understanding of infinity. Roseth was convinced that the distances between created things (such as between venial and mortal sin or between a fly and an angel), which easily engender an illusion of actual infinity, must in fact be finite. He argued that the infinite divisibility of mortal sin does not make it actually infinite,65 and that the qualitative difference between an angel and a fly is not infinite either, since it is not possible to know when a creature transcends the limit toward having infinite properties. Furthermore, in the case of the latter example, God could create flies that had properties similar to angels.66 With the latter remark Roseth seems to claim that the qualitative differences between creatures are contingent and that the assumption that God could abolish these differences involves no contradiction. Roseth was consistent in claiming that actual infinity is something that cannot exist in the created realm. However, there is one example that seems to challenge this principle. This is the claim that it is infinitely good for human nature to be united with God (that is, with the second person of the Trinity). In this example divine infinity seems,

65

See Lectura, qu. 2, art. 1. (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fols. 265rb–266ra). See Lectura, qu. 5, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 276–7). Peter Cheffons, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1348–1349, quoted this example verbatim. Cheffons however seems to have deviated from Roseth’s view on the possibility of infinite distance between creatures. See John E. Murdoch, “Subtilitates Anglicanae,” in Machaut’s World: Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century, ed. Madeleine Pelner Cosman and Bruce Chandler (New York, 1978), 51–86, at 61–3. See also Murdoch, Infinity and Continuity, 582. 66

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inevitably, to produce a property that is actually infinite. Roseth resolved this argument by considering the phrase ‘to be united’. This phrase does not signify a thing of substance, according to Roseth, and to prove this point he refers to an example in the Analytica posteriora where Aristotle observes that one should walk after supper for the sake of one’s health. Roseth claims that walking after supper is not a thing itself, even though it produces a beneficial effect. What Roseth appears to mean by this enigmatic remark is that walking after supper is not an entity itself. The union of the divine and human natures in Christ is a relation which does not give rise to anything that could be considered an entity.67 Therefore, nothing that is, in actuality, infinite is produced by the hypostatic union.68 Although Roseth’s remark is exiguous, it is noteworthy since it is about the only place where he reveals some sympathy for parsimonious ontology. In Roseth’s thought experiments in which infinity is produced by division, he typically uses a continuum that is divided into proportional parts. The proportional parts are produced through a series of bisections that divide it into a series of diminishing parts so that the first part is 1/2 of the continuum, the second 1/4, the third 1/8, the fourth 1/16, and so forth. Such a proportionally divided continuum is used in the following way: presuming that a person does a good deed, that person’s charity increases on the first proportional part of the day, on the second proportional part the action ceases, on the third it restarts, and so forth until the end of the day. Since there is an infinite number of proportional parts in a continuum, the question is whether charity has become infinite by the end of the day. Roseth gives two answers to this puzzle. In the first, exterior acts are seen to increase charity but only indirectly: the increment of charity is based on interior acts of will, which are not affected by the constant repetition of exterior acts. Secondly, very soon the proportional parts would become so small that it would not be possible to perceive them. Thus, since the

67 See Lectura, qu. 5, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 274–5). Roseth’s solution is straightforward in comparison to Ockham’s, for whom it is not quite clear whether the union is an entity. A union is clearly not an absolute thing, but whether it should be classified as real relative thing remains unresolved. See Vesa Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology (Dordrecht, 2004), 45–6. 68 Roseth’s remarks concerning the hypostatic union and infinity are similar to Scotus’s solution to the question, “Utrum possibile fuerit intellectum animae Christi videre omnia in Verbo, quae verbum videt.” See Duns Scotus, Opus oxoniense, liber III, dist. 14, qu. 2, nos. 284–300 (ed. Wadding, vol. 7.1, col. 1639).

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presumed alternation between acts and rests is a natural impossibility, no infinite quality could be generated.69 Roseth seems to have found the latter answer, which is based on man’s insufficient ability to perceive the proportional parts, quite convincing because he uses it more than once. Another example in which he applies the same solution describes an angel flying over a surface and stopping for a moment whenever he reaches a line separating the proportional parts from each other. The question, then, is whether the angel could reach the end of the continuum, that is, is it possible to traverse an infinite series? Roseth answers the problem by pointing out that very soon the proportional parts would be too small even for an angel to perceive, so that the task is impossible.70 However, here Roseth does not limit himself to such an halfhearted answer, instead proceeding to evaluate the case from God’s point of view. From God’s standpoint the question appears as a logical problem in which natural capacities play no role. So, even if the angel cannot perceive all the infinitely diminishing proportional parts, God can, and he is therefore able to move the angel in the way that the example describes. According to Roseth, such an assumption does not involve any contradiction and is, therefore, possible. But then the question is whether the angel moved by God can reach the end of the continuum. Roseth chooses the affirmative answer as a positum and then continues by exploring its consequences.71 His first response is particularly interesting. Here he argues that if the angel reached the end, it would mean that the continuum would be divided into its full number of proportional parts. In other words, the continuum would have an infinite number of actual proportional parts. Roseth ends his discussion of the first argument by rejecting this conclusion with the claim that there is no number that would be the number of parts into which a continuum can be divided.72 Since his last answer is directed against the positum, 69

See Lectura, qu. 5, art. 3 (ed. Hallamaa, 287–8). See Lectura, qu. 4, art. 2 (144). 71 See ibid. (145). 72 See ibid. (146, 149): “Ex quo illud sic motum a Deo veniet ad finem, volo quod Deus, quandocumque illud mobile quiescet in fine alicuius partis proportionalis, quod Deus dividat illud continuum. Cum ergo in finibus infinitarum partium proportionalium quiescet, sequitur quod illud continuum in infinitis partibus proportionalibus erit divisum, et ita continuum dividetur in quot potest dividi. . . . Et cum infertur adhuc ultra, ergo continuum dividitur in tot in quot potest dividi, nego, quia illo casu posito non dividetur illud continuum in tot in quot potest dividi nec etiam dividetur in tot illo casu posito quot dividetur, quia nullae partes erunt tot in quot dividetur, quia nec 70

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he seems be arguing for the opposite position, that is, that even God cannot make the angel traverse the continuum. Roseth’s treatment shows that he was an adherent of the traditional understanding of infinity: in the finite world only potential infinity is acceptable. Yet, the example appears to lead him to the difficulty that arises from combining God’s omnipotence with an unending series. Roseth seems to suggest that mathematical truths are examples of basic laws of thought that restrict Gods omnipotence, so that genuine unending series are unending even for God. On the other hand, the example depicts God as a supreme calculator who is not bound by the limitations of the finite. However, the distinction between the potential and actual infinite begins to appear problematic. This difficulty is evident in Roseth’s claim that God cannot make the angel traverse all the divisions of the continuum. If we recall Aristotle’s argument on traversing infinite divisions, the problem of traversing infinite divisions arises only if they actually exist. But this is exactly how God sees continuous magnitudes, whereas finite beings are confined to the merely potential infinite. The example of angelic motion raises another question pertaining to the Aristotelian notion of infinite divisibility. Aristotle had considered motion and other types of change to be absolutely continuous in the sense of being infinitely divisibile. The Oxford natural philosophers of the fourteenth century continued along Aristotelian lines, treating issues such as how possible degrees of the quality may vary in diverse entities (latitudo) or how to assign limits, whether the temporal limits of beginning and ending or the maximum and minimum boundaries of various capacities. The limit decision problem arose from Aristotle’s definition of a continuum, which states that no points or instants of time lie next to each another. If this definition is assumed, then how one can conceive the transition from rest to change, as there cannot be both a last instant of rest and a first instant of change? The moment of transition between rest and motion was the object of study in treatises dealing with first and last instants or with the terms ‘to begin’ and ‘to cease’.73

duae nec tres nec quattuor, et sic in infinitum, ex quo illo casu posito in infinitum dividetur.” 73 See John E. Murdoch and Edith D. Sylla, “The Science of Motion,” in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), 206–64, at 241–6. See also Nico Strobach, The Moment of Change: A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time (Dordrecht, 1998), 84–110.

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The limit decision problem occurs several times in Roseth’s Lectura, one such instance being the example of the flying angel discussed above. Here two of the counterarguments are founded on the difficulty related to the instant of termination. In the second argument, Roseth puts forward the claim that if the angel moves immediately before the instant of termination (B), it must also cease to move before B and therefore the angel would be simultaneously moving and at rest. The third argument says that the angel moves immediately before B but does not stop moving. Roseth rejects both arguments, the latter straightaway since it contradicts the case and the former after a short discussion.74 He discusses the limit decision problem with greater precision when he uses the same example that appears in Richard Kilvington’s Sophismata75 and when, in the opening article of the Lectura , he deals with the maximum and minimum limits of capacities.76 The motivation for the latter inquiry is, to some extent, theological, since the problem presented is whether a superior can order a friar to study Scripture against his will. Roseth suggests that the instruction is only reasonable if there is either a maximum amount of study that will satisfy the order or a minimum amount of study that will not satisfy it. Applying this (for a modern reader) somewhat obscure distinction, Roseth attempts to define the upper limit for the capacity of reading. Since the Aristotelian theory of continuity does not allow contiguous stages (equivalent to instants and points), the maximum limit of reading must be defined either as the last stage in which the friar is still reading or as the first stage in which he has ceased to read. In other words, the question is whether the stage of transition still is part of the process (maximum quod sic, intrinsic limit) or if it is the first stage in which the process has ceased (minimum quod non, extrinsic limit). After presenting the problem Roseth goes on to discuss the limits of capacities like the capacity to lift a stone or see someone from a dis-

74

See Lectura, qu. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 146, 150–2). For a detailed discussion on this particular example, see Olli Hallamaa, “On the Borderline between Logic and Theology: Roger Roseth, Sophismata, and Augmentation of Charity,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 11 (2000): 351–74. 76 On assigning limits to capacities, see John Longeway’s study in William Heytesbury, On Maxima and Minima: Chapter 5 of Rules for Solving Sophismata, with an Anonymous Fourteenth-Century Discussion, trans. John Longeway (Dortrecht, 1984), 133–73. 75

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tance. Such problems have little to do with reading the Bible but were widely discussed in natural philosophy.77 Roseths’s interest in infinity and other related issues is an essential feature of the Lectura. An observant reader will soon notice that the author shares the traditional Aristotelian finitist interpretation of the infinite, which allows only potential infinities. Arguments that assume actual infinity are rejected by Roseth altogether. Thus his argumentation often repeats a three-part pattern: first he puts forward a conclusion, then he presents a counterargument based on actual infinity, and finally he rebuts this counterargument. Since the counterarguments are designed so that they can be overruled, Roseth’s Lectura does not appear to be, as such, a study on infinity itself; however, infinity has a methodological role to play: examples dealing with infinity serve as a means for gathering indirect support for Roseth’s own views.78 The role that infinity, or any other theme relevant to natural philosophy, plays in the Lectura indicates that its author was not merely writing a treatise in natural philosophy. The question then remains in what sense Roseth’s Lectura is a theological work. The Lectura as a Theological Treatise Roseth’s Lectura is a Sentences commentary with a strong inclination toward philosophical analysis. But even though logic and natural philosophy occupy an extensive role in Roseth’s writing, the composition of the work indicates that it was not meant solely as a treatise in logic or natural philosophy. On the other hand, it is evident even from the table of contents that Roseth’s Lectura is not a contribution to doctrinal theology either. Roseth ignores, for instance, such theologically central themes as creation, redemption, and the sacraments. Unlike Lombard and his earlier commentators, he does not aim to provide an overall description of Christian doctrine. Roseth is even less interested in practicing biblical theology. In this respect Roseth’s approach deviates from that of his thirteenth-century predecessors at Oxford,

77

See Lectura, qu.1, art. 1 (MS. Oxford, Oriel College, 15, fol. 243ra–rb). To a certain extent the second article of question 5 differs from this general outlook since it addresses infinity directly. However, even here Roseth’s objective is to prove that no creature can be actually infinite. 78

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for whom the exposition of Scripture was the primary task of theology. For Robert Grosseteste and his circle the use of the Sentences in the curriculum was a threat to the role of theology as the study of Scripture.79 In its neglect of Scripture Roseth’s Lectura seems to represent the very development that Robert Grosseteste and his followers feared the introduction of the Sentences into the curriculum would eventually lead to. In comparison to most Sentences commentaries there is very little theology in the Lectura. The question is whether the little theology that it contains is enough to bring theological substance to Roseth’s work. I will explore this question from three standpoints: the composition of the Lectura, Roseth’s theological outlook, and the theological examples he uses. The list of the questions and articles in Roseth’s Lectura gives an impression of a book that handles theologically relevant questions. Some significant words in the titles, such as ‘God’ or ‘enjoyment’, suggest theological content; moreover, one of the questions deals with the classical theological theme of good deeds and merit. Furthermore, Roseth discusses Trinitarian logic, which was a theme that appealed to theologians, but not as much to logicians. Thus, there are some passages in Roseth’s work that appear to address theologically relevant themes. In some cases this impression is, however, misleading since, as is the case with beatific enjoyment, the titles do not necessarily correspond with the content, which is not as theological as the titles may imply. Despite this discrepancy between title and content, the choice of themes indicates that Roseth consciously wrote his lectures within a theological framework. However, as a work cannot be classified solely on the basis of its context, the Lectura should also include at least some theological agenda in order to be considered a theological treatise. In Roseth’s case such a theme could be the compatibility of faith and reason. The rationality of the faith is an issue to which he returns over and over again in different contexts. In his inquiry into the rationality of morality he suggests that the system of norms is ordained by God so that the basic issue is whether the divine commandments are rational. When discussing Trinitarian theology, Roseth’s concern is whether the rules of logic apply to the Trinity. If not, the rationality of the faith is jeopardized, a

79

See James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 2000), 160–5.

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conclusion which would be untenable for him. Roseth’s treatment of Trinitarian paralogisms appears rather formal; he does not engage in a detailed discussion on God’s essence or intra-Trinitarian relations. Instead, he treats God and the divine persons in the Trinity merely as logical subjects of Trinitarian sentences. Yet, since Trinitarian doctrine holds the criteria for determining the truth values of Trinitarian sentences, the discussion contains a genuine theological component. The reconciliation of faith and reason plays a role again in the discussions on infinity. Here one of Roseth’s concerns is the relation between God’s metaphysical infinity and mathematical infinity. In Roseth’s finitist account the only permissible infinite within the created order is potential; the mathematical infinite never leads to the actual infinite. From God’s point of view, however, the finitist claim is not categorical. Roseth seems to suggest that God, in his omnipotence, may deal with mathematical infinities in such a manner that the result approximates actual infinity. And yet, even though God is able perceive any chosen proportional part of a continuous magnitude, he is not able complete a true unending series. In other words, God’s omnipotence is restricted by the conditions of common rationality. The third indication that Roseth’s Lectura is at heart a theological treatise comes from the examples that Roseth uses, for they go far beyond the limits philosophy. Often the theme that the Lectura treats may belong to natural philosophy, but in Roseth’s treatment a theological flavor becomes apparent. His examples may examine continuous motion from the angle of angelic movement or relations in terms of the hypostatic union. Other examples of a notably theological nature occur where Roseth asks whether the joy that a saint named Linus can experience in heaven is infinite, or whether the pain of eternal punishment is eternal as well. Although such examples constitute only a small number of Roseth’s examples, they indicate that he felt free to handle topics which an arts master was not usually at liberty to discuss.80 When friar Nicholas Comparini, during his journey to England, set out to collect recent theological studies, he included Roseth’s Lectura in his compilation because it epitomized the latest trends in Oxford theology. The tools of new logic and physics offered Roseth and his

80 I am grateful to Dr. Cecilia Trifogli for her information concerning the absence of examples exploiting the angels in Physics commentaries, in particular in thirteenthcentury English texts.

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colleagues new perspectives on theological problems, keeping them close to the cutting edge of academic research. In Roseth’s writing this approach was taken to the utmost limits, apparently, at the expense of theological substance. Although the centuries that separate us from medieval scholars make it difficult to capture fully the fascination English theologians had for contemporary logic and physics, their texts reveal a serious attempt to preserve the scientific character of theology.

RICHARD FITZRALPH’S LECTURA ON THE SENTENCES Michael Dunne 1. Introduction Richard FitzRalph was born in Dundalk around 1300. Although his contemporaries referred to him to as “Hibernicus,” he was, like Peter of Ireland (ca. 1200–1265), born of an Anglo-Norman family. He was a fellow of Balliol College, where he gained his MA, and later went to University College, where he graduated with a doctorate in theology in 1331. He became chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1332, embarking thereafter on a successful ecclesiastical career both in England and in Ireland. On his first visit to Avignon, only five years after concluding his lectures on the Sentences, FitzRalph was consulted as one of the eighteen leading theologians of Europe by Pope Benedict XII to correct the views of his predecessor, John XXII, on the beatific vision. He became archbishop of Armagh in 1347. He is perhaps best known for his opposition to the mendicant orders on the question of evangelical poverty and his defense of the rights of the secular clergy against the friars. It was while pursuing his suit against the mendicants that he died at Avignon in 1360. In the company of Ockham, Bradwardine, and Wodeham, FitzRalph became one of the four most frequently cited insular theologians in the fourteenth century. FitzRalph was bachalarius in sacra pagina after August 1328 and completed his lectures on the Sentences before October 1329. He then went to Paris as tutor to his patron, Bishop Grandisson’s nephew John Northwode, from 1329 to 1330. His inception as doctor seems to have taken place in the summer of 1331. His visit to Paris is explained because, according to the statutes of the university, a bachalarius was not allowed to respond in any of the lecture halls for a full year after completing his lectures on the Sentences.1 Thus, FitzRalph would have

1 See Statuta antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis, ed. Strickland Gibson (Oxford, 1931), cx, 48–50. See also A. G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians (Oxford, 1934), 25–9.

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been free to leave Oxford for a year, and so chose this free year to visit the University of Paris.2 Although FitzRalph later turned away from scholasticism,3 his lectures on the Sentences have turned out to be of greater importance than might have at first been realized by authors such as Gordon Leff.4 Leff sees FitzRalph’s approach as heavily influenced by the neo-Augustinian movement deriving ultimately from Henry of Ghent. Leff ’s summation of FitzRalph is rather negative, holding that FitzRalph is not an original thinker, that he shows an unwillingness to be deeply involved in the controversies of his time, and that he was content to “restate what his contemporaries re-formulated.”5 Indeed, Leff ’s book leaves one wondering what there was about FitzRalph’s ideas that his contemporaries such as Holcot and Wodeham, and later, Gregory of Rimini, found so challenging. In fact, Leff ’s assessment is being questioned by recent scholarship, which sees FitzRalph as one of the protagonists of his day: one can, it seems, be orthodox and intelligent at the same time. Again, part of the importance of FitzRalph’s commentary is that it becomes the point of reference for the discussion of a number of contemporaries, such as Holcot and Wodeham, at a time when Oxford was the center of theological speculation.

2 Information regarding the stay of FitzRalph and Northwode has been uncovered by William J. Courtenay in his Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait (Cambridge, 1999). Courtenay edited a computus, or financial record, of a tax levied on the members of the University of Paris in the academic year 1329– 1330. This computus contains the names, financial level, and addresses of the majority of masters and most prominent students of the university. The computus reveals that a certain Richardus filius Rodulfi cum discipulo suo was lodging in the rue de Sorbonne. FitzRalph, now a baccalaurius formatus in theology (that is to say, a bachelor who has completed his obligations with regard to lecturing) was entitled to be accounted as a magister within the university and to have students. 3 See below, pp. 436–7. 4 See Gordon Leff, “Richard FitzRalph’s Commentary on the Sentences,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 45 (1963): 390–422; idem, Richard FitzRalph, Commentator of the “Sentences”: A Study on Theological Orthodoxy (Manchester, 1963). 5 Leff, Richard FitzRalph, 175.

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2. The Manuscript Tradition 2.1. List of Manuscripts of FitzRalph’s Commentary on the Sentences 2.1.1. Full Text6 F1 = Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppr. A.III.508, saec. XIV, fols. 1r–109v F2 = Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppr. A.VI.611 (S. Croce 611), saec. XIV, fols. 1r–109v P1 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 15853, saec. XIV, fols. 1ra– 191va V1 = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 11517, saec. XIV, fols. 1ra–175va 2.1.2. O1 = T = W1 =

Shorter Text Oxford, Oriel College, 15, saec. XIV (1389), fols. 1–114 Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, 505, saec. XIV, fols. 1r–70v Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q 71, saec. XIV, fols. 1r–168r.

2.1.3. Extracts B = Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, 8197 M = Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8943, fols. 81va–83rb, 87rb–89va. O2 = Oxford, Magdalen College, 16, fols. 109r–113r P2 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 6441, fols. 51r–83v V2 = Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottoboni lat. 179, saec. XIV/XV, fols. 59ra–67rb, 69vb–87vb V3 = Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Ottoboni lat. 869, saec. XV, fols. 60r–130r W2 = Worcester, Cathedral Library F65, ff. 63-92.

6 The distinction between “full text” and “shorter text” is to be found in Richard Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout, 1997), 478–9. 7 See Jean-François Genest, “Une collection de discours inauguraux pour l’enseignement des arts au collège Saint-Bernard (XIVe siècle),” in Du copiste au collectioneur. Mélanges d’histoire des textes et des bibliothèques en l’honneur d’André Vernet, ed. D. Nebbiai-Dalla Gurada and J.-F. Genest (Turnhout, 1999), 191–218, at 192. I have not yet had the opportunity to examine this manuscript.

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Attested Copies • a text of saec. XIV at O.F.M. in Todi • a text of saec. XIV at O.S.A. in Oxford • a text seen by Bale at Ramsey (see John Bale, Scriptorum illustrium maioris Brytannię catalogus [Basle, 1557], 443—similar to O) • a text “Questiones amachani super sentencias,” among the books listed in an “Inventory of Books at Canterbury College, Oxford in 1524” (see M. R. Jones, The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover [Cambridge, 1903], 167). • Cambridge, Gonville Hall, seen by Leland (see J. Lelandi antiquarii de rebus Britannicis Collectanea [London, 1774], vol. 4, p. 20) • Syon House, D.31, D.42 • York, Austin Friars, 219 2.2. Table of Quaestiones8 Principium [or Introitus] Sententiarum: Fluminis impetus letificat ciuitatem dei Prologus [1]

Qu. 1

Utrum possibile sit viatori scire demonstrative deum esse Art. 1 Utrum deum esse sit per se notum Art. 2 Utrum fides et sciencia eiusdem rei possint simul esse in eodem Art. 3 Ad questionem

[2]

Qu. 2

Utrum theologia sit sciencia speculativa vel practica Art. 1 Numquid theologia sit sciencia Art. 2 Utrum vita contemplativa sit melior quam activa Art. 3 Utrum aliqua sciencia dicitur speculativa vel practica Art. 4 Ad questionem9

8 This order of questions and articles is based primarily upon P1 and follows the suggestions by Leff, Richard FitzRalph, 194–7, with some corrections and additions. As will be noted, however, P1 is not a perfect text, as evidenced by the fact that it omits material which is definitely authentic (such as the question Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus, which is only found in W1). 9 The introitus sententiarum and the two introductory quaestiones are only given in O1. They end on fol. 4c and are then immediately followed by the third questio, which is given by most manuscripts as Book I, qu. 1.

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Book I [3]

Qu. 1 Utrum sola trinitate incommutabili sit fruendum Art. 1 Utrum fruitio dei sit homini possibilis Art. 2 Utrum sit possibile aliquem frui una persona non fruendo alia vel essentia dei absque persona Art. 3 Utrum voluntas libere libertate contradictionis fruatur ultimo fine Art. 4 Ad questionem

[4]

Qu. 2

Utrum beatitudo sit actus intellectus vel voluntatis Art. 1 Utrum voluntas sit potentia nobilior quam intellectus Art. 2 Utrum passiones intellectus et voluntatis distinguantur10 Art. 3 Utrum delectatio sit beatitudo Art. 4 Ad questionem principalem

[5]

Qu. 3

Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus

[6]

Qu. 4

Utrum in divina essentia sit trinitas personarum Art. 1 Utrum cum simplicitate divine essentie stet pluralitas personarum Art. 2 Utrum omne quod dicitur de deo ad se sive absolute dicatur singulariter de tribus personis Art. 3 Utrum divina essentia sit gignens vel genita [Art. 4 An sit aliqua distinctio a parte rei formalis vel aliqua inter attributa]11 Art. 5 Responsio ad questionem principalem

[7]

Qu. 5

Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a patre et a filio. Art. 1 Utrum posito quod spiritus sanctus non procederet a filio distingueretur ab eo Art. 2 Utrum spiritus sanctus mittatur sive detur a patre et filio Art. 3 Ad questionem

10 This is the article treated in the text, although in the divisio textus it is given as: Utrum gaudium vel delectatio sit ipsa voluntas (P1, fol. 12vb). 11 This article does not appear in the text.

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[8]

Qu. 6

Utrum mens humana sit ymago trinitatis increate Art. 1 Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas distinguantur ab invicem realiter Art. 2 Utrum in spiritu rationali sit aliquis habitus cognitivus Art. 3 Utrum actualis cogitatio distinguatur realiter a specie in memoria Art. 4 Utrum cognitio et volitio sint idem realiter Art. 5 Utrum partes ymaginis create sint equales Art. 6 Ad questionem principalem

[9]

Qu. 7

Utrum mens ipsa et ceteri habitus sibi presentes sint principia in memoria respectu sui [No articles, but the reply to the question is given as “Ad articulum.”]

[10]

Qu. 8

Utrum ex presentia speciei in memoria sequatur necessario cogitatio actualis per illam

[11]

Qu. 9

Utrum intellectus agens sit aliqua pars ymaginis12

[12]

Qu. 10

Utrum amor procedat ab aliqua notitia. Art. 1 Utrum voluntas sit activa respectu sue actionis vel passiva Art. 2 Utrum actus voluntatis fiat subito vel in tempore Art. 3 Utrum ex actuali notitia alicuius obiecti sequatur necessario amor sive volutio Art. 4 Ad questionem principalem

[13]

Qu. 11

Utrum appetitus contrarii vel passiones contrarii possint esse in voluntate [Not determined.]

[14]

Qu. 12

Utrum caritas possit augeri Art. 1 Utrum intensio forme accidentalis fiat per additionem alicuius Art. 2 Utrum caritas potest minui per actum demeritorium

12 Note, however, that O1 treats qu. 7–9 as articles of qu. 6, which is perhaps more correct.

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[15]

Qu. 13

Utrum sit ponenda alia caritas in anima quam spiritus sanctus

[16]

Qu. 14

Utrum deus sit prescius omnium futurorum

[17]

Qu. 15

Utrum deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia

[18]

Qu. 16

Utrum creatura rationalis possit prescire in verbo aliquod futurum contingens13

[19]

Qu. 17

Utrum deus sit immutabilis et incircumscriptus Art. 1 Utrum quilibet spiritus sit circumscriptus in loco Art. 2 Utrum angelus vel anima humana possit moveri subito et per se Art. 3 Utrum aliquis spiritus creatus possit per se moveri localiter successive Art. 4 Ad questionem

[20]

Qu. 18

Utrum Deus sit omnipotens Art. 1 Numquid potest probari ex puris naturalibus deum esse infinite potentie in vigore14 Art. 2 Numquid Aristoteles et commentator Averroys hoc senserunt15

13

This question was omitted as spurious by Leff but has recently been established as authentic and edited as FitzRalph’s Quaestio biblica, given in 1329 before he left for Paris; see J.-F. Genest, “Contingence et révélation des futures. La questio biblica de Richard FitzRalph,” in Lectionum varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kałuza, and A. de Libera (Paris, 1991), 199–246. By FitzRalph’s time the requirements for the bachelor to lecture on the Bible had been reduced to a Quaestio biblica, a formal academic exercise consisting of lectures on a biblical topic. As Courtenay writes, “By the second quarter of the [fourteenth] century lectures on the Sentences were usually completed in one year (a change that took place in Paris as well), and the bachelor lectures on the Bible were given in one term or during the long vacation in the summer after reading the Sentences” (W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England [Princeton, 1987], 42). In style, the Quaestio biblica is different from the rest of the text, adopting the more “modern” method of conclusiones. In content it has nothing to do with the Bible (as had then become the norm), dealing as it does with the problem of future contingents, a topic to which FitzRalph had promised his listeners in the Lectura to return. The full text is only found in W1 and part of it in P1. It is uncertain whether it was included by FitzRalph in his opus correctum or by the anonymous compilators of W1 and P1. 14 Not treated in P1, V1, F1, F2. 15 Only in O1.

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michael dunne Art. 3 Ponendo quod ex puris naturalibus possit convinci deum esse potentie infinite numquid convinci possit quod sit omnipotens et agens infinitum16 Art. 4 Numquid voluntas dei sit prima causa rerum Art. 5 Ad questionem principalem

Book II [21]

Qu. 1

Utrum deus in principio temporis creavit mundum de nihilo Art. 1 Utrum includit contradictionem deum produxisse mundum ex nihilo Art. 2 Utrum motus et tempus distinguantur realiter Art. 3 Utrum creatio vel aliqua relatio sit aliud a suo fundamento Art. 4 Utrum creatio soli deo conveniat Art. 5 Ad questionem principalem

[22]

Qu. 2

Utrum angeli peccaverunt per libertatem arbitrii

[23]

Qu. 3

Utrum omnes angeli confirmati sint in statu merendi

[24]

Qu. 4

Utrum angeli habeant cognitionem distinctam omnium creaturarum [Not determined.]

[25]

Qu. 5

Utrum angeli cognoscant per species

[26]

Qu. 6

Utrum angeli fuerunt creati in caritate17

[27]

Qu. 7

Utrum quilibet homo concupiscentialiter propagatus concipiatur in peccato originali Art. 1 Utrum quilibet homo habeat aliquid de corpore Ade Art. 2 Ad questionem principalem18

16

Not treated in any manuscript. Qu. 2–6 seem as though they could have been arranged into articles of a single quaestio on angels but remained unedited by the author. 18 This includes the dubitatio, Quomodo originalis iniustitia sive peccatum originale dicatur pcccatum, treated in O1 as a separate article (art. 2). 17

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Book III [28]

Qu. 1

Utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus allectivus vel inclinativus ad actionem

Book IV [29]

Qu. 1

Utrum in sacramento altaris sit corpus Christi sub speciebus vini et panis Art. 1 Utrum accidentia in sacramento altaris sint ibi sine subiecto Art. 2 Recitabo opiniones doctorum19 Art. 3 Ad questionem20

[30]

Qu. 2

Utrum suffragia Ecclesie prosint defunctis in purgatorio21

There are two further quaestiones which may or may not be authentic: Utrum Deus possit facere infinitum in actum Utrum voluntas creata teneatur se conforme ultimo fine22 2.3. The Order of Quaestiones in Some of the Principal Manuscripts23 2.3.1. Full Text P1: 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, (missing: 1, 2, 5) 1 F : 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 18) V1: 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 19, 20, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 15, 17, 18) 2.3.2. Shorter Text T: 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 8, 11, 28, 12, 19, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 26, 22 (missing: 1, 2, 5, 13, 18, 23, 29)

19

Not treated as distinct from art. 1. Not reached in text, which breaks off at ad 8m argumentum of art. 1. 21 W1 in its first tabula includes this quaestio, which is not found elsewhere, nor is it now included in the text of W1. On its contents, see below p. 417. 22 These are only contained in P2. 23 An asterisk indicates that material normally found together in a single quaestio is to be found divided up into one or more parts in this codex. 20

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O1: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8*, 12, 9, 10, 8*, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 20, 19, 22, 26, 24, 25, 23, 27 (missing: 5, 13, 18, 28, 29) W1: 14, 15, 6, 7, 19*, 21*, 3, 26, 17, 27, 12, 23, 4, 5, 21*, 22, 20*, 10, 11, 8, 28, 29, 25, 24, 18, 20*, 16, 19* (missing: 12, 9, 13) 2.3.3. Extracts P2: 17, 12, 4, 14*, 15, 14*, 3, 21, 19, 20*24 2.4. Conclusions What can one conclude from this analysis? Both Gwynn and Leff identified P1 as being the best and most reliable copy of the text.24a However, P1, left to the Sorbonne by Jean Gorre in 1360, cannot be a copy from an exemplar or final text since it omits at least one certainly authentic question that is contained only in W1. W1 is one of the most chaotically ordered copies and yet it is the only manuscript to contain qu. 5 and a full copy of qu. 18 (the Quaestio biblica). Again, P1 and W1 differ inasmuch as P1 contains the full text and W1 the shorter text. P1, T, V1, O1, and W1 are all independent witnesses, not depending upon each other, whereas F1 seems to depend upon a source common to itself and P1, but not upon P1 itself since it omits qu. 18. Further, F1 is the only manuscript to contain “determinationes Ybernici sive Phyraph.” O1, which was copied by a monk of Glastonbury in 1389, also contains material that is not to be found elsewhere, while omitting other material. In fact, no one manuscript can be said to contain the full text. Indeed, it would seem that the distinction between complete texts and extracts may be an artificial one since all of the manuscripts can be considered as containing extracts to a greater or larger extent. The situation is complicated by the fact that we have a full text and a shorter text—and yet an early “shorter” text such as that of Troyes (copied 1335–1350 and originally belonging to the Abbey of Clairvaux) contains “shortened” paragraphs that are not to be found in a so-called “full” text such as that of P1. Troyes calls the text a reportatio but Courtenay has argued, upon the basis of an analysis of Adam Wodeham’s quotations from FitzRalph, that none of the texts that survive are from the original lectures given in 1328–1329; rather, all would 24

This codex also contains two further quaestiones that may or may not be authentic: Utrum Deus possit facere infinitum in actum; Utrum voluntas creata teneatur se conforme ultimo fine. 24a See Leff, Richard FitzRalph, 179; Aubrey Gwynn, “Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh,” Studies 25 (1936): 81–96.

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seem to be from FitzRalph’s opus correctum, an incomplete revision of his lectures, made by the author in 1330 and never turned into an ordinatio.24b This is clear from the fact that sometimes articles promised in the introduction to the question are not given; single quaestiones, or rather articuli, float without being incorporated into their relevant quaestio; a Quaestio biblica is included, which goes against the author’s opinion as put forward in his lectura. What can one say regarding the order of the quaestiones? The situation seems to be fairly chaotic. Let us examine a possible explanation for this. The following is a remark made by the scribe in the colophon to MS. Oriel 15: This book was written through the diligence of Brother Nicholas Fawkes, monk of Glatonbury, in the year of the Lord 1389, at which time it was hard to find many questions of Holcot’s work.

Holcot, who was a slightly younger contemporary of FitzRalph, had lectured on the Sentences during the years 1331–1332, that is, during FitzRalph’s regency. And yet, over fifty years later his work was still circulating in unbound quires—the same may well have been true of FitzRalph’s work. It would seem that scribes made copies from what was available, or made selections from what was available, or (more likely again) made selections depending upon their own interests (the marginal notes in O1 made by Fawkes seem to have been made by way of preparation for his own commentary on the Sentences—he had incepted in theology by 1395). The arrangement of the quaestiones in the manuscripts may reflect the order in which the material became available as it was returned by borrowers. How, then, are we to solve the problem of the quaestiones? It may be that some help may be given by the text itself where it refers to the Sentences. There is no problem with the introitus and the first two quaestiones since they deal with introductory material. As regards the first book: [3] and [4] refer to the first distinction of the first book; [6] refers to the third distinction; [7] could refer to the eleventh distinction; [8] and [12] refer to dist. 3; [9], [10], and [11] to dist 8; and so forth. Obviously, if we were to establish the order of the quaestiones in relation to Peter Lombard’s text (presuming that FitzRalph followed that order!), we would get an order not found in any surviving manuscript; it would look something like this: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 5, 12, 9, 24b See William J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), 77–8.

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10, 11, 19 (?), 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. The problem will perhaps be solved only by an editorial decision, guided by the principle enunciated by Schabel: getting a good text is not hard, getting the right text is not so easy.25 MS. Worcester Q 71 sheds an important light upon how a text of the Lectura was put together.26 The manuscript has two tables of contents, the first of which corresponds to the actual contents of the codex. It is written on the flyleaf of an earlier analytical table of contents which now occupies folios i–xii. This second table was written by the same first hand, α, who copied the text from fol. 1 to the middle of fol. 18r, as well as other parts of the text later on. In all, there are five hands copying the text, all probably Benedictine students at Oxford.27 Now, whereas the order of the quaestiones given in table 1 is that followed in the compilation of the text, the second table seems to be a “wish list” of quaestiones assembled by scribe a to guide him and his collaborators in compiling the text of FitzRalph’s Lectura. It would seem that there were a definite editorial process and supervision in operation, with missing material added toward the end of the codex. Thus, two articles (2 and 3) of the question “Utrum solus Deus sit inmutabilis et incircumscriptibilis” (fol. 16b) are given on fols. 154b–159b. However,

25 Paraphrasing Chris Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Paul of Perugia, O.Carm., with an Edition of his Question on Divine Foreknowledge”, RTPM 72 (2005): 54–112, at 88: “The relationship among the manuscripts is quite complicated, and although getting a good text is not hard, getting the right text, if there is one, is not so easy.” 26 For a description of this manuscript, see R. M. Thomson, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library (Woodbridge, Suffolk, and Rochester, N.Y., 2001), 167. 27 The text is copied as follows: fols. 1r–middle of 18r = hand α fols. 18r–24b (end of quire), fols. 31–middle of 52v = γ fols. 52v–54r = δ fols. 55r–middle of 69r = ε fols. 69r–70v = γ fols. 71r–73r (73v blank) = β fols. 74r–74v (middle) = α fols. 74v–77v = ε fols. 78r–95r (middle; rest of the gathering is blank) = δ fols. 101r–110v (rest of the gathering is blank) = δ fols. 109r–138v (finishes 2/3 of the way down) = γ fols. 138v–139r (rest of the gathering is blank) = β fols. 141r–146v (third of the page) = α fols. 146r–169r (169v is blank) = β

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at times the copyists seem to have operated alone so that we find large amounts of unused parchment. Again, we find the following comments: “Require in questione de a et ponitur hic argumentum de a cum omnibus suis racionibus” (fol. 75v), which then appears as the difficultas to be found in fols. 163v–169r; “Hec argumenta que sequuntur sunt ad primi articuli prime questionis illius quartem vel incipientis in quaterno precedenti scilicet Utrum fruicio Dei sit homini possibilis, quia si sic tunc illam reciperet homo ex multis et per consequens . . .” (fol. 87), which refers back to the note on fol. 49a, “Hec deficiunt multa et ponuntur in quaterno incipiente secundus articulus in [. . .] in homo in 3° fol. 1 [. . .].” The Worcester manuscript is important because it includes material that is not to be found elsewhere: • the full text of the Quaestio biblica; • the article “Utrum unicus actus intellectus vel voluntatis sit respectu diversorum distinctus” as part of the question, “Utrum beatitudo sit actus intellectus vel voluntatis” (the text of the article is truncated, however); • the contents of the question “Utrum suffragia ecclesiae prosint defunctis in purgatorio” are given in the second table but the students did not seem to be successful in finding the text.28 Returning to the matter of the versions of the text, it does seem clear, following Courtenay, that the text as it has come down to us was left in a partial state of revision by the author. The original Lectura appears

28 The contents given are as follows: Qu.: Vtrum suffragia ecclesiae prosint defunctis in purgatorio. art. 1: Quod peccatum aliquod remanebit inorditum et inpenitum. art. 2: Quod equaliter merentibus non equaliter prosunt suffragia ecclesie. art. 3: Quod orationes ecclesie sint infiniti meriti. art. 3: Quod isti presentes in via et in purgatorio non recipient totum premium quod debetur eis pro sufragiis ecclesie. art. 4: Quod indulgentie non prosunt illis qui eas generunt prosunt beneficium factum in vita. art. 4: Quod ille qui magis meruit magis premietur quam qui minus. art. 5: Quod eque faciliter liberatur aliquis a pena debita mortali peccato sicud a pena debita venali. art. 6 et 7: Quod nullus premiatur pro premio alterius. art. 8: Quod oratio specialis sit maioris meriti quam generalis. Courtenay, in Adam Wodeham, 33, refers to a perhaps related question in MS. Vat. lat. 13002, fols. 43r–44v: “Vtrum suffragia viatorum proficiant animabus defunctorum.”

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to have consisted of a series of articuli, which the author was gradually working together into a series of quaestiones, some of which have been completed whereas others have not. This, at least, seems clear, but the rest is not. The proposed division of the textual tradition into a “full text” and a “shorter text” does not seem to work very well. Instead, Jean-François Genest’s analysis of the text into three different forms offers a better solution to the problem.29 Genest proposes three versions: (1) the “common” version of the text, found in six manuscripts, namely, F1F2O1P1V1V3; (2) an earlier text found in P2W1; (3) an earlier but shorter text transmitted by T and V2. Genest comments that version 2 is a very different text from that present in version 1. Neither manuscript containing this version has been copied from the other but they depend upon the same source, even copying the same mistakes. These manuscripts are among the oldest; indeed, W1 seems to have had access to a model close to FitzRalph’s personal notes since it is the only one to transmit the full text of the Quaestio biblica. Genest also comments that version 3 is the shortest, with manuscripts among the oldest, and that on many points it agrees with version 2; it does differ from other versions in terms of the arrangement of the text and statements by the author of how he intends to proceed in developing the text. Genest comments that the multiplicity of editions confirms Adam Wodeham’s statement according to which FitzRalph revised his Lectura and produced an opus correctum, just as he had also corrected his Quaestio biblica. The “common” text contained in version 1 is the closest we have to an ordinatio, but it still contains remarks addressed to an audience that the author as editor should have deleted. The fact that all three versions contain these “remarks to the audience” indicates that we are dealing with versions of a reportatio, or even reportationes; indeed, that is what T calls the text. The situation with FitzRalphy seems to mirror the textual tradition of his contemporary John of

29 See J.-F. Genest, “Aux origines d’une casuistique: la révélation des futurs contingents d’après la lecture de Richard Fitzralph sur les Sentences,” AHDLMA 69 (2002): 239–98; 70 (2003): 317–46 (at 244).

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Rodington, who also lectured on the Sentences in 1328–1329. There are perhaps two reportationes of the same lectures, with a third group of manuscripts presenting a mixed redaction sometimes agreeing with one reportatio, sometimes with the other, but virtually never agreeing with both.30 Let us imagine, then, in the case of FitzRalph that versions 2 and 3 are two reporationes of the original lectures α, and that version 1 is the partially revised edition by FitzRalph of his original text. The revision was interrupted when he became chancellor of the University of Oxford. This, however, would not explain why version 1 has some of the characteristics of a reportatio. Could there then be three reportationes of the original lectures, with version 1 being an edited version of an earlier reportatio (let us call it β) that FitzRalph had in front of him? This would work except for the fact that versions 2 and 3 contain some of the elements of what appears to be the partial editing and arrangement of the text found in version 1. There is also the possibility that FitzRalph read the Sentences more than once, but without any evidence this assumption must remain merely a possibility. Again, none of the manuscripts seems to have been copied from another. If we take the manuscripts from version 1, the three that are closest to each other are P1, F1 and V1; yet P1 includes part of the Quaestio biblica that is not in F1. V1 cannot be a copy of P1 since it amends the incorrect order of articles in qu. 8 in P1. F2 gives an abbreviated text of material contained in F1 and also has additional material. O1 contains the introitus and introductory questions that are not found in any other manuscript. Again, since it is missing a number of articles, V3 could perhaps qualify as an extract from the Lectura rather than as an attempt at a full copy. On the basis of the preceding considerations, a provisional stemma might look something like this:

30 See Chris Schabel and Russell L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III: Oxford 1312–1329—Walsingham, Greystanes, Fitzralph and Rodington,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 74 (2003): 39–88, at 44.

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β

P2W1 (version 2)

TV2 (version 3)

F1F2O1P1V1V3 (version 1)

3. Some Notabilia in the Lectura 3.1. FitzRalph’s Attitude toward his Sources Although it would take an in-depth and far-ranging study of the entire Lectura to speak comprehensively about FitzRalph’s attitude to his sources, it is still possible to make some general observations. Some writers such as Leff have sought for some radicalism in FitzRalph’s Lectura as an anticipation of the polemical Armachanus, who was able to take on all of the mendicant orders at the papal court at Avignon and indeed to get a good hearing. One could also mention the socially conscious prelate who reprimands his Anglo-Irish audience about how they treat the aboriginal Gaelic population, or his teaching on dominium, which would have long-term implications through his influence on Wyclif 31 or rejection by later authors such as de Vitoria.32 Others, indeed, have hypothesized an Averroistic trend in his writings, whereas Leff concluded that FitzRalph was part of a conservative revival of Augustinianism against the radical Ockhamists. As our knowledge of the period grows, we find that much of what was taken to be a struggle between radicals and conservatives, anticipating conflicts that emerge into the open at the time of the Reformation, is not really borne out by the facts. Universities then as now were essentially conservative and 31

See Stephen E. Lahey, Philosophy and Politics in the Thought of John Wyclif (Cambridge, 2003). 32 See Michael Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph of Dundalk (c. 1300–1360) and the New World,” Archivium hibernicum 58 (2004): 243–58.

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especially so in the theology faculty. FitzRalph is essentially cautious, and the places where he does give rise to debate are often not where some people expected them to be. He is the product of a time of highly analytical philosophy, so that the contested positions which he takes are often on some very subtle points of the existing tradition. Some broad outlines can, however, be detected in the choices of authors that he makes. In philosophical matters he generally follows Aristotle, but an Aristotle who is constantly read through the lens of his Commentator. Averroës is taken to be the authentic interpreter of Aristotle despite the condemnations of the 1270s, but in doing so FitzRalph is following the accepted practice of his times. He is not, however, as one would expect, Averroistic in accepting the doctrine of a single soul and indeed doubts whether it is truly Averroës’s teaching.33 Aquinas when mentioned is treated with respect, and FitzRalph follows him on a number of important points. Anselm gets quite an amount of attention, but this may be due to a certain “nationalism,” due to which Anselm is regarded as “one of our own.” However, FitzRalph can criticize Anselm as a natural philosopher while retaining respect for him as a theologian. Again, as one might expect, Augustine is the guide in theological matters, but FitzRalph does not content himself to give references to Augustine’s works. In fact, he tends to provide long quotations from Augustine, indicating a close personal reading that may in fact have led him to read Scripture more closely and ultimately to reject his academic life as “croaking in the pond with the other toads”34 (an echo of Ovid). Contemporaries are not named (contrary to the practice of Wodeham or Holcot a few years later), and the great debate (ostensibly at least) for FitzRalph is between the approaches of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. As we know, if was the practice of medieval writers to think through their sources, but if one were to hazard an opinion as to the position to which FitzRalph

33 See Konstantin Michalski, La philosophie au XIVe siècle. Six études, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt, 1969), 79–80: “Ista responsio non est vera, quia illa sententia . . . non est sententia Aristotelis nec alicuius alterius philosophi, sed est ficta ab eo solo [scil. Commentatore] et est contra rationem naturalem et contra sententiam eiusdem Commentatoris in aliis locis” (79). (Michalski gives a rich selection of quotations from FitzRalph on a number of topics, quotations which he transcribed from MS. Oriel College 15.) Again, Michalski points out that for FitzRalph Averroës identifies the agent intellect with God and so cannot regard it as part of the individual man. Averroës has been misunderstood—is he not doing the same as Augustine or Grosseteste? (80) 34 See below, p. 437.

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would have felt closest in spirit (even though not always agreeing with it), it would probably be the neo-Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent; in method and approach, however, he is closest to Duns Scotus. Ultimately, as in the case of any major thinker, his thought is his own. 3.2. To What Extent is FitzRalph’s Lectura a Commentary? The controversy initiated by Grosseteste around the introduction of the Sentences into Oxford and its threat to the study of Scripture seems to have led to a compromise which shortened the time allotted to the bachelarius Sententiarum to one year. Instead of seeking to cover all of the Sentences, FitzRalph—like his contemporaries—dealt with it per modum quaestionum, except that by his time even the questions seem to have acquired a life independent of the text. Thus, the Lectura probably has the same link to the Sentences as FitzRalph’s Quaestio biblica has to the Bible: it is very tenuous indeed. The Lectura does not consciously follow the plan of the Sentences; indeed, at times (as we have seen above) seeking to find an order for the quaestiones by linking them to the order of the distinctions in the Sentences has not always yielded very clear results. It is only in the introitus that there is a conscious relationship with the work of the Lombard, but this is perhaps only a conventional device: the author of the Sentences is praised in the same way that other introitus praise philosophy, etc. What is unusual is perhaps the role assigned to Peter Lombard in defeating heresy and the lists of the various heresies given by FitzRalph there. It brings to mind the list of heretics and infidels which FitzRalph mentions in his autobiographical prayer.35 3.3. The Introitus Sententiarum FitzRalph’s inaugural speech on the Sentences has been preserved in the Oxford manuscript Oriel College 15, where it is described as a sermo in opus.36 The speech is not an inception speech, a principium,

35

See below, pp. 436–7. The text has been edited in Michael Dunne, “A Fourteenth-Century Example of an Introitus Sententiarum at Oxford: Richard FitzRalph’s Inaugural Speech in Praise of the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” Mediaeval Studies 63 (2001): 1–29. 36

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such as might be given at Paris, but perhaps is more properly described as an introitus Sententiarum.37 The Oxford course in theology was long and difficult. Students were admitted to the degree of bachalarius after seven years of theological studies. They were then expected to lecture on the Sentences for a year and after this to lecture on some book of the Bible, as well as attending a certain number of public disputations in which the young bachalarius was expected to appear as a repondens in the schools of the various regent masters of the year. Two full years had to go by after the completion of the lectures on the Sentences before the candidate could be admitted to the doctorate.38 FitzRalph’s introitus begins with the theme, Fluminis impetus letificat ciuitatem Dei. Both at the beginning and at the end of the sermo the waters that bring joy to the city of God are likened to the work of Peter Lombard. FitzRalph discusses the Fall and the consequences of original sin as pointed out by Augustine: in ignorantiam et difficultatem

37 The contemporary use of the term introitus is attested in a number of manuscripts. There were also final speeches, which were termed sermones finales. If FitzRalph ever gave such a sermo finalis, it has not survived. 38 See Katherine H. Tachau, Introduction to Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents, ed. P. E. Streveler and K. H. Tachau (Toronto, 1995), 1–98, at 3. Some texts have survived from FitzRalph’s time as regent master; thus, a number of determinationes are contained in a manuscript in Florence: Biblioteca nazionale, Conv. soppr. A.III.508. At the bottom of fol. 109vb: Hic incipiunt determinationes ybernici. The determinationes are followed by a table of contents on fol. 138vb, which finishes: Expliciunt tituli questionum ybernici siue phyraph. The titles are: no. 1 (fol. 109vb): Utrum cuiuscumque actionis meritorie sit caritas principium effectivum. no. 2. (fol. 113va): Utrum per omnem actum meritorium augmentatae caritatae minuatur caritas. no. 3 (fol. 120ra): Utrum ammitata caritate necessario minuatur cupiditas. no. 4 (fol. 120vb): Utrum cupiditas possit augeri. no. 5 (fol. 121ra): Utrum per omnem actum augmentandem caritatem minuatur cupiditas. no. 6 (fol. 121vb): Utrum caritas et cupiditas in eadem anima possint simul augeri. no. 7 (fol. 129ra): Utrum sit possibile antichristum fore bonum pro omni tempore quo conversabitur in terra. Much of the content is a reply to the Ockhamist theory regarding the intensification and remission of forms. However, the authorship of at least one of the determinations is contested. See J.-F. Genest, “Les premiers écrits théologiques de Bradwardine: textes inédits et découvertes récentes”, in Medieval Commentaries, vol. 1, 395–421. On pp. 404–07 Genest argues that no. 1 should be attributed to Bradwardine.

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mentis et mortalitatem corporis natura mutaretur humana. These consequences handed on to every human generation. Again, Augustine in the City of God provides FitzRalph with the contrast between the “two cities”: in this world the citizens of heaven will suffer from ignorance of mind and bodily affliction, but they receive consolation from Scripture and also—almost on an equal footing!—from the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Indeed, in the four parts that follow the complementary roles of Scripture and the Sentences are stressed. In the first part (prima pars principalis) Peter Lombard is described as another David fighting Goliath in combatting the various heresies. In the second part the Lombard is described as someone who fights false philosophy, for example, those philosophers who assert that the world is eternal (which might seem to sit rather uneasily with FitzRalph’s later discussion; see below). In the third part, the different senses of Scripture are addressed, as well as the heresies regarding the nature of Christ, which Peter Lombard helps the faithful to avoid, in choosing the path of humility (rather than being puffed up with secular learning) and being consoled by the passion of Christ. The fourth part deals with our hope of arriving in heaven, which is the goal of Scripture and of all of our actions. As a help on our journey, Peter Lombard is seen as fighting errors concerning baptism, sins, marriage, and life after death in the fourth book of his Sentences. 3.4. The Prologue Introductory material that is to be found only in the Oxford manuscript Oriel College 15 sheds some light on our author’s view of both the Sentences and of the nature of theology itself. 3.4.1. Demonstrating the Existence of God The first question (Utrum possibile sit viatori scire demonstrative Deum esse) opens with FitzRalph’s typical manner of setting out a quaestio in the Lectura. The question is whether the wayfarer can know that God exists by means of philosophical proof, and a number of arguments are presented, six against and six for. Then there comes the decisio quaestionis, where he tells us how he will deal with the question (in ista questione sic est procedendum). Firstly he will deal (primo tractabo) with the question as to whether the existence of God as such can be known and then, secondly, whether one can have both faith and knowledge of the same thing at the same time. Then, thirdly, he will reply to the question (dicam ad questionem), in this case by quoting

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various authorities (recitando opiniones doctorum). This is the basic structure followed in the rest of the Lectura, even if FitzRalph did not always reorganize his material fully in this manner, since sometimes individual articles remain on their own or questions are left unresolved. FitzRalph quotes the views of Henry of Ghent on demonstrating the existence of God, but he accepts the position of Aquinas.39 Again, regarding whether God’s existence is evident or not, he follows Aquinas.40 3.4.2. The Nature of Theology: Speculative or Practical? 41 In the first article FitzRalph deals with the question as to whether theology is a science by distinguishing among three kinds of science: (1) the kind where one has knowledge of first principles; (2) the kind where there is information derived from evidence; (3) the kind of science constituted by assent to that which is firmly believed. Clearly theology is a science in the third manner. A distinction, however, can be made between the way in which God is known in philosophy and in theology.42

39 See MS. Oriel College 15, fol. 2va: “Ad questionem dicit Henricus in Summa, articulo 21, questione 4ta, quod aliquem esse demonstrabile est dicitur vel ex natura vel ex disposicione intellectus naturaliter. primo modo dicit ipse non potest demonstrari Deum esse quia Deum esse, dicit ipse, non est cognicio sensibile per medium—non est medium dicit ipse inter eius esse et essenciam, set idem est in ipso esse et essencia. In creaturi vero non est idem esse et essencia, ut ipse dicit questione immediate precedente. Secundo modo dicit ipse Deum esse est demonstrabile. Contra iste de diversitate inter esse et essencia in creaturis arguo primo sic . . . Thomas dicit, et recte, ad questionem prima parte Summe, questione et articulo 2o demonstracio est duplex que quedam ‘propter quid’ que procedit a prioribus simpliciter. Et alia est ‘quia’ que procedit ab effectu primo modo demonstracionis non potest demonstrari Deum esse. Set secundo modo potest. Hec ille. Unde dico sicut ipse dicit.” 40 See ibid., fol. 2vb: “Thomas in prima parte Summe, questione et articulo primo, et prima parte Scripti, dist. 3, q. 2, dicit quod proposicionem esse per se notam est aut in se vel quoad nos. Primo modo dicit ipse est quelibet proposicio nota per se cuius predicatum includitur in racione subiecti, sicut ista ‘Homo est animal’, quia cognitis terminis, dicit ipse, ista scitur et sic est hec nota per se ‘Deus est’ quia predicatum est idem subiecto, set secundo modo non.” 41 Is the inclusion of the topic here perhaps an echo of the debate between Wylton and Auriol? See Lauge Olaf Nielsen, “The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue,” Vivarium 38 (2000): 35–98. 42 See MS. Oriel College 15, fol. 2ra: “Ad primum argumentum concedo quod principia huius sciencie saltem multa sunt credita tantum ita quod non sunt scita primo modo vel secundo quia sunt articuli fidei set non omnia sunt articuli fidei sicut ‘Deum esse’. unde hoc principium ‘Deum esse’ non est articulus fidei intelligendo per hoc nomen ‘Deus’ significatum commune omnibus scilicet illud quo non est aliquid melius quia hoc scitur ex naturalibus istam sentenciam dicit Thomas et bene prima parte Summe, questione 4a, articulo 2o. Set certe intelligendo per hoc nomen ‘Deus’

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The second article deals with the problem as to whether the contemplative life is superior to the active life. An interesting “case” begins the discussion: the active life must be best since, given that one should not set aside a greater good for a lesser, in a case of mortal danger to someone, we are held to set aside contemplation to act and help this person.43 As a secular priest and with an important benefactor in Bishop Grandisson, it is not surprising the FitzRalph opts for a mixed form of life as most suitable for the wayfarer.44 Although the third article was announced as Utrum aliqua sciencia dicitur speculativa vel practica, in the text it is given as Utrum sciencia sit practica a suo fine scilicet proxima, with this statement being attributed to Henry of Ghent. The arguments of Duns Scotus are presented in the arguments ad oppositum.45 In his reply FitzRalph tends toward a middle position between the two doctors.46

sicut Christiani intelligunt scilicet ens omnipotens quo nichil magnus vel melius cogitari potest sic hec proposicio ‘Deus est’ est articulus fidei qui non potest sciri ex naturalibus et ideo concedo conclusionem huius articuli scilicet quod hec facultas non est sciencia primo modo vel secundo set 3o modo et eandem conclusionem probat 7m principale et non plus.” 43 See ibid., fol. 3rb: “Arguitur primo quod actiua sit nobilior quia nullus ex alico precepto tenetur magis bonum siue melius dimittere propter minus bonum set homo tenetur dimittere contemplacionem propter accionem, ergo accio melior est contemplacione et per consequens vita actiua est melior quam contemplatiua. Maior patet quia aliter preceptum obligaret aliquem ad diminucionem sui meriti quod non videtur verum. Minor patet posito quod aliquis qui contemplatur percipiat aliquem hominem moriturum nisi ipse sibi subueniat et quod ipse possit ei subuenire tunc ipse tenetur ei subuenire et dimittere contemplacionem, ergo et cetera.” 44 See ibid., fol. 3vb: “. . . sicut allegatum fuit in 4to argumento de hoc Ezechialis quod pastores tenentur vestiare infirmes et pascere esurientes et cetera. Isto modo sicut fecerunt prophete et Apostoli et nunc boni pastores in ecclesia faciunt. et certe ista vita est optima in homine viatore propter condicionem sue nature corrupte quia enim non potest continue contemplari indiget ideo tempore recreacionis. et certe in tempore recreacionis magis meretur quam religiosus in tempore recreacionis quia ocupacior in melioribus accionibus habet. et forte propter eandem causam magis meretur contemplando potest perseverare et feruentius propter meliorem disposicionem corporis quam habet ex meliori recreacione. unde patet quod ista vita non est melior quam illa vita in viatore que est totaliter contemplatiua . . .” 45 See ibid., fol. 4rb: “Iohannes dicit primo libro, questione 7, quod sciencia non dicitur primo practica a fine set a causa intrinseca priore scilicet ab eius conformitate aptitudinali ad voluntatem rectam que aptitudo prior est ipso fine.” 46 See ibid., fol. 4rb: “Ad istum articulum, dico quod sciencia inmediate dicitur practica a fine et quod potest scilicet quia potest in actum moralem vel artificialem tanquam regula directiua illius accionis inmediate set primo est sciencia practica ex sua forma sicut dicit Iohannes Scotus scilicet quia ipsa habet conformitatem ad accionem ex qua conformitate intrinseca inmediate sequitur ipsa posse regulare accionem inmediate non dico quacunque quia secundum hoc, sicut Iohannes dicit, loyca esset practica cum sit regulatiua omnium sillogizorum cuiuscunque sciencie. set accionem

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Finally, in his reply to the central question (ad questionem principalem) FitzRalph sides with Henry of Ghent in that he holds that theology is principally a speculative science, even though parts of it may be practical.47 3.5. Trinitarian Theology In a recent publication, Schabel and Friedman have examined something of FitzRalph’s thoughts on the distinction between the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and presented an edition of his article, Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio, posito quod non procederet ab eo (Sent. I, qu. 4, art. 1).48 Unlike, say, regarding the topic of future contingents, where FitzRalph initiates a discussion among his colleagues or at least makes a major contribution to it, here is an instance where FitzRalph’s contribution seems to lie at the end-point of a discussion. As the authors point out, the metaphysical side of the Trinitarian discussion, including the issue of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, seems to disappear from Oxford after 1330. FitzRalph treats of the Holy Spirit in general in terms of both his eternal procession and his temporal mission; the authors note that the first article of question 4 concentrates upon whether the Son and the Holy Spirit would be distinct from one another if the latter did not come from the former. Schabel and Friedmann judge that FitzRalph was a cautious theologian, which accords well with what other commentators have observed. Perhaps this caution stemmed partially from his personal insecurity as a secular student. Regulars such as Wodeham and Holcot could perhaps be more adventurous since they did not have to rely upon patronage.

moralem vel artificialem ita quod sciencia practica semper est respectu accionis contingentis sicut dicit Philosophus, 6 Ethicorum, et solum respectu illorum que fiunt ab intellectu nostro cuius sunt artificia vel a voluntate nostra cuius sunt moralia sicut dicit Philosophus, 6 Metaphisice, et Commentator, commento 1, unde patet quod non recte dicit scienciam Dei esse practicam nisi loquatur magis communiter quam Philosophus.” 47 See ibid., fol. 4rb: “Ad questionem ergo principalem dico quod ista sciencia est principaliter speculatiua sicut dicit Henricus in Summa, articulo 8, questione 2, licet secundum aliquas eius partes principales sit practica . . . [f. 4va] Unde dico quod cognicio principaliter in theologia viatoris est cognicio Dei abstracta scilicet non sicut directiua et similter amor coniunctus eo quod talis est speculatiuus set alie cognicione precedentes sint directiue amoris Dei et proximi et ideo hec sciencia est principaliter speculatiua ut dixi.” 48 See Schabel and Friedmann, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III.”

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In discussing this question, FitzRalph leans toward the general Franciscan position, setting up a contrast between the positions of Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent, on the one hand, and the positions of Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome. FitzRalph, it would appear, typically seeks to reconcile the differences between the two major views on the issue, through analysis; here he makes a distinction between two kinds of necessary repugnancy, per se and per accidens. FitzRalph holds that Scotus and Henry asked the question according to the first kind, whereas Thomas, Godfrey, and Giles did so according to the second type. Schabel and Friedmann note that FitzRalph’s description of the positions on the question, in contrast to that of Robert Greystanes (O.S.B., read Sentences 1321–1322), is not very detailed but rather general. This raises the question as to how someone prepared to lecture on the Sentences. Clearly, from the marginal notes that survive, the intending bachelarius Sententiarum read and familiarized himself with some of the principal authors (in FitzRalph’s case this was principally Duns Scotus but also Aquinas) as well as some more recent authors. However, someone such as FitzRalph must have spent years attending the lecturae of his contemporaries who lectured on the Sentences before him, thus forming a very clear idea of what they had to say, as well as picking up a general idea of the main positions. Apart from Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, the editors have identified among the moderni an influence of William of Nottingham.49 3.6. Some Philosophical Discussions in the Lectura The most extensive treatment to date of FitzRalph’s thought as presented in the Lectura is that by Gordon Leff.50 Leff ’s book gives a good overview of FitzRalph’s thought and is generous with quotations from 49

See ibid., 76 n. In his book on FitzRalph’s Sentences commentary, Leff was mainly interested in his philosophical doctrines, examining the text under the following headings: Chap. II: “The Divine Nature” (essence, omnipotence, future contingents); Chap. III: “The Mind and its Faculties” (the mind as a trinity, the intellect and the relation of its knowledge to species and the active intellect, external or sensory knowledge, inner knowledge, the will and its relation to the intellect); Chap. IV: “The Order of Creation” (infinity and the eternity of the world, relation, creation, spiritual beings, the physical world); Chap. V: “Free Will, Grace and Predestination” (original sin, grace and merit, predestination). 50

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the text itself. What emerges from Leff ’s examination is that a good deal of FitzRalph’s Lectura was not concerned with theology at all, or at least only tangentially so. For example, as we shall see below, on the question of the creation of the world, the discussion focuses on topics (such as the eternity of the world) that FitzRalph had already dealt with in his commentary on the Physics. 3.6.1. De Potentia Dei Leff judged that it was Ockham and his followers who pushed the consequences of the discontinuity between faith and reason to often irreverent conclusions in the debate on the de potentia Dei. Thus, in the hands of thinkers such as Robert Holcot and Adam of Wodeham there seems to be a sheer fascination with the paradoxes open to God in his absolute power, a fascination that led them to positions which were hardly in keeping with traditional Christian teaching. FitzRalph is seen as opposing such views by appealing to the Augustinian tradition. God’s potentia absoluta merely refers to God’s ability to act outside the present dispensation. Furthermore, God’s omnipotence entails His inability to sin and to deceive, just as it also excludes his dying. In other words, what God cannot do is to act against his own nature: God cannot be other than the summum bonum. God’s power does not consist simply and solely of doing anything whatsoever; his limit is not just his freedom from contradicting himself, as others held—rather it is his own nature. Since God is most good, most merciful, and most just, his omnipotence must be in accordance with these aspects of his nature. For God to act otherwise would not be a sign of omnipotence but of impotence, since it would involve a denial or negation of his own nature. Thus, what is possible from the point of view of omnipotence taken in itself, is impossible from the point of view of God’s goodness, mercy, and justice, and thus impossible not ratione potentie but ratione iustitie vel bonitatis. 3.6.2. Creation, Time and Infinity FitzRalph’s views on motion, time, and infinity were the topics upon which his near contemporaries, especially Wodeham and Holcot, most frequently quoted him.51 FitzRalph deals with these topics in Book II,

51 Wodeham changed many of his opinions in the light of FitzRalph’s, especially regarding infinity. The question in Book III of Wodeham’s Oxford Lectura, in which he followed FitzRalph word for word on the issue, involved a rejection of Wodeham’s

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qu. 1: Utrum Deus in principio temporis creavit mundum de nihilo. One of the more striking features of the text is its predominantly philosophical flavor and its comparative lack of theological material. The principal question (quaestio principalis) is devoted to the general problem of the eternity of the world. FitzRalph begins by putting forward arguments against the beginning of the world in time. One goes as follows: if God’s power is always the same, then it was the same before the world was created; therefore, God could always from eternity have produced the world. Thus, there is no contradiction in stating that the world has always existed. FitzRalph attributes this position to the Commentary on the Sentences of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, he continues that, even if the world is not from eternity, we can argue that in the future God might make it so, since what he once can do, he can always do. In other words, it remains part of God’s power to make a universe that has always existed, just as it remains possible for God to destroy this universe, or again, to create other universes that have always existed. Another argument among the many put forward is that if some contradiction can be found in the notion of a world existing from eternity, then this should be shown through the use of reason. If it were possible to show that the world and time began at a certain instant, then the philosophers of the past would have proven it. FitzRalph quotes Aristotle as saying, in the first book of the Topics, that either position is possible and can be argued for, but neither position can be shown to be conclusive. Thus, FitzRalph concludes that the creation of the world ex nihilo et de tempore can be taken only as an article of faith; indeed, if this were not the case, then there would be no merit in believing in the creation of the world. When dealing with the associated question of the infinity of the number of souls FitzRalph discusses the nature of the infinite. He comments that the eternity of the world does not necessarily imply an infinity of souls, since the first man could have been made at a certain time and so have a finite number of descendants. Again, through reincarnation a finite number of souls could be continually reborn throughout a perpetual time. FitzRalph continues by pointing out that own argument as expressed in Book I. Again, Gregory of Rimini recognized FitzRalph as the source for the common view of infinity held by Holcot, Wodeham, and repeated FitzRalph’s arguments, albeit in order to reject this position. See, for example, Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 76–8.

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some people say that an infinity of souls is in no way impossible, or, at least, does not involve a contradiction, since God can make an actual infinite number of souls, angels, or beings at once, or he can do so successively, so that an actual infinite will exist at some future time, even given that the world began at a certain point. Again, in every body there is an infinite number of proportional parts (partes proportionales)52 that are completely distinct one from another (totaliter diverse). Thus, God can make something exist at once which is actually infinite, and the same is as true of souls or angels as it is of bodies. That there is an infinite number of proportional parts in a body is considered by FitzRalph to have been shown by Aristotle in Book III of the Physics and in Averroës’s commentary, since every continuum is composed of an infinite number of proportional parts, each of which is distinct from the other. Again, it can be argued that in any line there is an infinite number of points, that there is an infinite number of lines in any surface, and an infinite number of surfaces in every body, and yet each is distinct from the other. FitzRalph continues his argument by stating that if there is an actual infinity within bodies, that is to say, if they can actually be divided to infinity, then it is clear that it is possible for God to make an infinite number of other things. Thus, there is no contradiction in their being an infinite number of human souls. Nor is there any problem with God not knowing which is first and which is last in an infinite series; this is not because of any ignorance on God’s part but because, quite simply, there is no first and last. In the end he refers his audience back to his discussion of the topic in his commentary on the Physics, now lost.53 In the article, Utrum motus et tempus distinguantur realiter, FitzRalph makes a digression while defending the species in medio theory

52 The terminology is Chatton’s, and the source for the treatment that follows is probably the De indivisibilibus of Wodeham. 53 See MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15853 fol. 141ra: “Et loquitur de punctis intrinsecis et hoc est quia nullum est punctum ultimum intrinsecum alicuius linee quia illud esset inmediatum puncto extremo quod reprobat Philosophus 6 Phisicorum in principio et alias. Ego satis reduco principalis argumenti contra instantias illud claudere contradiccio in una questione 6 libri Phisicorum scilicet ‘Utrum continuum conponatur ex indiuisibilibus.’ Et ideo in talibus vbi nullum est ultimo corruptum non est inconueniens quod Deus nesciat quid est vltimo corruptum et ita est in proposito de istis animabus potest aliquis dicere.”

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and refers to a very respected person (valens) who had argued against the theory.54 He also tells us that he himself once shared a similar opinion and gives the reason why.55 The valens in question could well be Ockham, since FitzRalph was old enough to have heard him speak before the former left Oxford in 1324.56 Nor was FitzRalph alone in defending the theory of the species in medio. As Katherine Tachau points out: “Ockham’s attack on the species elicited an almost immediate and prolonged negative response.”57 Ockham’s position was criticized by John of Reading and also by Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, William Crathorn, and Wodeham. Thus, FitzRalph found himself in the company of many who would normally be seen as close to the position of Ockham.58 As Tachau concludes, “in epistemology at any rate, there seems at Oxford to have been no school of Ockhamistae.”59 Again, FitzRalph makes an interesting distinction between philosophy and theology. In the ninth argument, where Anselm’s assertion (in the Monologion, chap. 22) that time is composed of parts is addressed, FitzRalph begins by stating that he is concerned here with Anselm’s standing (authoritas) as a natural philosopher and not as a theologian. In fact, FitzRalph goes further: “here we must follow reason more than the standing (auctoritas) of any theologian.”60

54 Ibid., fol. 147rb: “Puto, dico, quod isti, si non sentirent species in oculis suis nec sonos participent in auribus omnino non crederent talia esse, set dicerent quod visus esset sua visio et auditus audicio, et aer lucidus esset lumen sicud ego quemdam valentem aliquando audiui dicentem sic. Et dicunt aliqui quod omnis color est lux et omnis sapor est qualitates prime conmixte et odor est sapor. Immo ego aliquando non credebam aliquid esse nisi substanciam vel aliquam quinque qualitatum primarum scilicet quattuor elementares et lucem innitens paucitati rerum.” 55 Ibid., fol. 147rb: “Et causa fuit quod cogitabam de paucis et illa poteram saluare positione tali. Et ideo credebam illam esse verum secundum illud principium positum. Et sic errant homines communiter exercitati in logica a divinis pauca respicientes, alii vero econtrario logicam ignorantes cuilibet sermoni rem nouam adiciunt ponentes plures res vnquam Deus vel natura ordinauit.” 56 The suggestion that the valens in question might be Ockham was proposed by Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Rome, 1959), 16n. Maier also discusses Fitzralph’s text in the context of the later debate regarding primary and secondary qualities. 57 Katherine H. Tachau, “The Problem of the Species in Medio at Oxford in the Generation after Ockham,” Mediaeval Studies 44 (1982): 394–443, at 395. 58 As has been pointed out, the idea of a conservative FitzRalph fighting together with Chatton and Crathorn against the spread of Ockhamism, and Holcot and Wodeham defending it, is no longer tenable. See Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 101. 59 Tachau, ‘The Problem of the Species in Medio,” 443. 60 MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15853 fol. 148ra: “. . . in hoc enim articulo [Anselmus] est mere phisicus. Et hic sequenda est racio magis quam auctoritas alicuius theologici.”

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3.6.3. Future Contingents One of the topics which exercised the minds of FitzRalph and his contemporaries was the topic of the revelation of future contingents. Indeed, FitzRalph discussed it on three separate occasions. His first treatment occurs in the Sentences commentary,61 where he considers the matter so important that he promises his audience he will return to it: “Nescio tamen probare inpossibilitatem talis reuelacionis argumento ostensivo; sed si aliquando occureret, non abscondam . . .” and again, “Hoc non est uerum . . . sicut declarabitur si Deus uoluerit.”62 He kept this promise a few months later when he gave his Quaestio biblica63 and, according to Genest, before he left for Paris in October, 1329. Again, he returned to the problem in his Summa de quaestionibus Armenorum, where the matter is treated in a dialogue form.64 The specific way in which FitzRalph addresses the problem is in terms of the revelation of future contingents. Given that future contingents have a determinate truth—namely, that they will happen and cannot not happen—how can their truth, as known by God, be revealed by him to a created intellect without their losing their contingency? As Leff points out, the problem as set out by his contemporaries was whether God’s knowledge of the future was different from that of the present and the past.65 According to Wodeham, Buckingham, and Holcot, it was necessary to relate God’s knowledge about the future to the contingency of the future; in other words, it had to be of a kind different from his knowledge of the past and present. FitzRalph accepts the distinction, seeking to defend his position as being consonant with Augustine in the 83 Questions and De Trinitate. It was, in fact, a position rejected by Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini. Genest points out that from the sources which we have FitzRalph is the first to devote an entire question to the problem of the revelation of future contingents—namely, Utrum Deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia—and that it is no less remarkable that it is six

61 This text has been edited and analysed by Genest; see his article, “Aux origines d’une casuistique,” cited in note 30 above. 62 Ibid., 297. 63 Genest points out that, originally, there appear to have been two reportationes of the Quaestio biblica before FitzRalph transformed them into a corrected version around the time when he was also editing the Lectura, that is, around 1330. 64 The topic has been the subject of an unpublished M.Litt. thesis by James Gorman, “Richard FitzRalph, Summa de Quaestionibus Armenorum, Book XVI: An Edition and Translation with Introduction” (University of Dublin, 1999). 65 See Leff, Richard FitzRalph, 40.

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times the length of his question on divine foreknowledge, Utrum Deus sit prescius omnium futurorum.66 Again, Genest draws attention to the fact that FitzRalph’s treatment of the topic marks a turning point in the history of the problem, as is clear from comparing it what Ockham had written on the topic just before 1324 (in his Quodlibet IV, qu. 4). Whereas Ockham dealt with the problem in 800 words, FitzRalph—in a sign of the growing complexity of the problem—writes 20,000 words on the matter. While Ockham sought to remove all necessity from the proposition, Hoc fuit revelatum, by showing that it has only a verbal resemblance of the past, FitzRalph, without contesting this thesis (then nearly universally accepted), has to resolve a series of difficulties that this thesis leaves open. Against the possibility of a revelation of the future, FitzRalph lists fourteen arguments, which Genest examines in some detail. One of the central themes that emerge is a disjunction between the certitude of revelation and the conditions of acting for a creature, conditions which presuppose that in order to be free, there must be a certain ignorance of the future on the part of the creature. To take but one example: if God reveals to a just man that he will be damned, should he pray for his salvation? FitzRalph makes a distinction between a prophesy through which people are deceived, on the one hand, and lying on the other; thus a person may be deceived by the prophesy and yet God did not lie to them. As Leff comments: It is here that the interest of FitzRalph’s position lies for by means of it he was able to meet and rebut the arguments of the Ockhamists, accepting with them the uncertainty of free future actions and yet disallowing any of the implications they drew from it. With God’s nature as his foundation the question of any discrepancy between revelation and contingency was narrowed to those events which concerned free will: doubt over either the foundations of faith or the reliability of God’s word did not arise. Thus, having established that God and Christ cannot lie, even if what is revealed in the word can lead to false faith on the part of the disciples, FitzRalph deals with the other main issues which the contemporary discussion had raised. These all concerned the effect that revelation would have on a man’s status and actions.67

For FitzRalph God is good and does not act arbitrarily or irrationally. The revelation of free actions is contingent so that, if God should reveal to someone that he will be ultimately damned, this cannot relate

66 67

See Genest, “Aux origines d’une casuistique,” 240. Leff, Richard FitzRalph, 46–7.

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to the person’s present state of grace but to actions freely undertaken in the future. This is because, for FitzRalph, if someone were to act necessarily his or her actions would be neither just nor unjust. Someone might freely sin even if the future consequences were revealed to him, but that does not mean that he is compelled to sin. As Genest points out, with the exception of the final argument, all of the quod nons are based upon “cases” or particular circumstances (in isto casu, in casu posito).68 Some are examples taken from Scripture, others we might call scholastic “mind experiments,” but most of them are accompanied by cases of conscience. What was FitzRalph’s personal contribution in the compilation of these cases? According to Genest, many of them had already been put forward by his predecessors and many are to be found in the Lectura of the Franciscan John of Rodington, who, as we have pointed out above, read the Sentences at roughly the same time as FitzRalph; Rodington’s treatment is briefer, however.69 The stock of hypotheses must have been more of less complete when FitzRalph composed his question, but it is the breadth of the treatment which marks FitzRalph’s text as an important witness to the debate at Oxford at the end of the 1320s. A sign of this importance is the attention given to FitzRalph’s text by Wodeham in his Lectura oxoniensis (1333–1334), where he devotes five long questions to the topic (Sent. III, qu. 5–9). Again, when Holcot came to deal with the matter, he practically repeated what FitzRalph had said. Since Wodeham gives large extracts from both the Lectura and the Quaestio biblica, Genest writes: Ce serait sûrement l’un des resultants les plus utiles d’une édition critique de la lectura Oxoniensis de Wodeham que de mettre en évidence le dialogue serré qui page après page se poursuit entre les deux hommes et qui mériterait une étude spéciale.70

68

See Genest, “Aux origines d’une casuistique,” 242–3. See ibid., 243. 70 Ibid., 243. Genest also notes that Gregory of Rimini explicitly rejected the position of both FitzRalph and Wodeham, but that it was through Marin Mersenne’s reading of Ariminensis that the notion came down into modern philosophy in the Objections to Descartes. 69

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This brief overview has served, it is hoped, to bring out something of FitzRalph’s views. Clearly, the somewhat disjointed nature of the arrangement of his arguments makes it difficult to arrive at a concise statement of precisely the positions he adopted. What does emerge is a thinker who is independent, inventive, and confident to enter vigorously into debate with others. On the other hand, he does display a tendency to adopt provisional positions vis-à-vis the various authorities and again at other times not to continue the argument to a conclusion. It may well prove that the task of providing a definitive interpretation and summary of the personal doctrines put forward by FitzRalph in the Lectura is rather challenging. The debate on many central points covered by FitzRalph continued at Oxford until about 1350, when the Black Death brought this flowering of theologia anglicana to a close. On the continent, however, English authors, including FitzRalph, continued to exert an influence until the end of the century and beyond. There is, however, still a lot of work to be done to shed light on the subtleties of the arguments, and this, inevitably, requires the edition of unedited texts. These subtilitates anglicanae may have been too subtle for many then, as they can be today. The heaping up of arguments, the inconclusive positions, the frivolity of the examples can be seen sometimes as deserving of the kind of criticism that scholasticism in general often comes under. However, as examples of an analytical method, consisting of thought experiments and sophismata, these texts hold their own interest. Something more than rigor and method was required, however, and it seems to me that although this approach in philosophy and theology promised much, it delivered little. It did not solve problems but multiplied them endlessly, leaving someone such as FitzRalph to describe the situation as chaos infinitum. FitzRalph, like his contemporary Bradwardine, underwent a religious conversion, due—I would argue—to a personal reading of Augustine. In many ways he anticipated future developments; in particular, in his teaching on dominium, in his attacks upon the mendicant orders, but especially in his rejection of scholasticism in his autobigraphical prayer. There he wrote: Nor were You, the Solid Truth, absent from me in those six years [while he was at Avignon, 1337–1343], but, in Your Holy Scriptures you shone upon me as in a certain radiant mirror; whereas in my former years, in the trifles of the philosophers, you had been hidden from me as in a kind

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of dark cloud. For previously, I used to think that through the teachings of Aristotle and certain argumentations that were profound only to men profound in vanity—I used to think that I had penetrated to the depths of Your Truth, with the citizens of Your Heaven; until You, the Solid Truth, shone upon me in Your Scriptures, scattering the cloud of my error, and showing me how I was croaking in the marshes with the toads and frogs. For until I had You, the Truth, to lead me, I had heard, but did not understand, the tumult of the philosophers chattering against You . . . At last, O Solid Truth, You so shone upon me from above, that I burned to seize and hold You, the Truth, Jesus promised to us in the Law and the Prophets. And when in the turmoil of lawsuits a certain spell of serenity had smiled upon me, I sought You in Your sacred Scriptures, intimately and importunately, not only by reading, but also with prayer, until You came to meet me joyously in Your ways.71

An emerging trend in the rest of the fourteenth century would be an anti-intellectual and anti-scholastic position, which would deliberately use Scripture instead of scholastic arguments to defend certain positions. Indeed, as FitzRalph’s later career shows, particularly in his antimendicant polemic, the tone of the debate became more embittered and violent. Some people, indeed, might have preferred his earlier “croaking.” However, it would be anachronistic to compare his views on scholasticism to a later author who wrote something in the same spirit in the prologue to his commentary on the Sentences about the philosophers: And certainly, to occupy oneself devotedly with these thorn bushes, weeds, and what is close to sheer jokes—what else does this amount to, I ask, but to build oneself labyrinths from which there is no return . . . What will be the end of opinions and most pugnacious sects?72

That, of course, was written by someone whose thoughts would serve to undermine much of scholastic theology, Martin Luther.

71 Quoted in W. A. Pantin, The English Church in the Fourteenth Century (Notre Dame, 1963), 132–3. 72 Quoted in Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 174.

PETER OF CANDIA’S COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES OF PETER LOMBARD Stephen F. Brown Peter of Candia, baptized as Pitros Philargis (Petrus Philaretus), was born on the island of Crete around 1340. He was left an orphan at an early age, and the Italian Franciscans cared for him. He joined the Franciscan order in 1357; because of his great intellectual talents, the friars sent him to Padua to do his studies in the arts. He did his beginning theological studies at the Franciscan studium generale at Norwich and continued them at Oxford. From 1378 to 1380 he lectured ordinarie on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Paris. He quite likely became a lecturer in theology in Lombardy shortly thereafter, since we know that he was lecturing on theology at the convent of St. Francis in Pavia from 1384 to 1385. Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the duke of Milan, made him one of his counselors, and Peter served as prime minister to Galeatus and his son for more than a decade. He also was a leading member of the literary circle of the duke of Pavia and a close friend of Hubertus Decembris, the leading representative of humanism in Lombardy, and Antonius Lusco, chancellor to the duke of Milan. His talents were also noted by Pope Urban VI, who named him bishop of Placenza in 1386. He became bishop of Vincenza in 1388, then of Novara, and, on May 17, 1402, archbishop of Milan. He became cardinal in 1405. Clement VII challenged the legitimacy of Pope Urban VI’s tenure, causing a great schism. Many saw a general council as the solution to this conflict; at the general council, called at Pisa on March 25, 1409, they declared both popes deposed. At the nineteenth session they elected Peter as pope. He took the name of Alexander V, setting up residence in Bologna in January, 1410. He died there, in the convent of St. Francis, on May 3 of the same year. It was on the September 28, 1378, that Peter of Candia began his lectures as a bachelor of the Sentences in Paris.1 He completed them in the spring of 1380. Long before his day, the literal exposition of 1 See Franz Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia (Münster, 1925), 24, citing MS. Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, Fol. 94, fol. 210: “Explicit quaestio collativa

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the Lombard’s text that we find in the commentaries of Alexander of Hales at Paris or of Richard Fishacre, who initiated the routine of commenting on the Sentences at Oxford, had disappeared.2 St. Bonaventure, over a century before Peter of Candia, commented on the text of the Lombard, but also added many questions that, although they were stimulated by the reading of the text, went far beyond the discussions of Peter Lombard himself.3 Sentences commentaries in the earlier part of the fourteenth century varied even more. A glance at the commentaries of Adam Wodeham on the Lombard’s work illustrates that authors in the 1320s were no longer covering the materials that the Lombard treated in all 48 distinctions on Book I of the Sentences.4 They selected the questions that were most pressing for them, and treated them usually in great detail and with frequent references to their predecessors or contemporaries, giving thorough responses to these burning questions. Peter of Candia’s commentary follows in the same late mold. He comments on all four books of the Sentences, but his questions concerning each book are limited in number, if not in detail. He narrows his discussion on Book I to six questions; Book II has three questions; and Books III and IV examine only one question each.5

pro primo principio domini Petri de Candia compilata, Parisius anno Domini 1378 die 28 Septembris recitata.” 2 See Richard J. Long and Maura O’Carroll, The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre OP (Munich, 1999), 39–48. 3 See Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, 4 vols. (Quaracchi, 1882–1889). 4 See William J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: an Introduction to his Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978), 183–214. 5 At the end of each sermon, Peter of Candia summarizes the full contents of each book of the Sentences. However, in his lectures he limits himself to the following questions: Book I (1) Whether the mind of a wayfarer through his theological efforts acquires evident knowledge of the articles of the faith. (2) Whether the divine essence totally and completely perfect in itself is the object of heavenly enjoyment. (3) Whether the fullness of all essential perfections is formally contained in some one ratio to which this fullness intrinsically belongs. (4) Whether any kind of multiplicity of real distinct rationes is compatible with the simplicity of the divine substance. (5) Whether a rational creature with either uncreated or created grace in his soul can be accepted by God as worthy of an eternal reward. (6) Whether the divine essence has a distinct knowledge of any level of possibly or actually existing being. Book II (1) Whether the immensity of divine power is such that it can extend itself as an efficient cause to more things than a limited intellectual substance can grasp in its

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Inaugural Sermons If Peter of Candia cut back his focus on the complete text of the Sentences, he certainly did not cut back on his tribute to the Lombard as a model for the members of his listening audience. Inaugural sermons given by bachelors of the Sentences have not received very much attention.6 Yet, the mid-fourteenth century statutes of the University of Paris demanded that every bachelor in the faculty of theology offer a solemn introduction to their commentaries on each book of the Sentences.7 These principia or solemn introductions were made up of three parts: a sermon in praise of theology or the Sentences, a disputatio or presentation in debate form of a theological question, and a profession of faith.8 The principia of Peter of Candia are especially significant: they contain both the sermons and disputed questions for all four books, whereas often in catalogs we find that principia refer to the sermons alone or the disputed questions alone. The scriptural lemma that Peter of Candia chose for his sermons was, Stetit ante me in veste candida (“He stood before me in a shining white garment”). It is a line from the tenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. At one level the choice of this text is a personal signature, since in the scriptural passage that Candia uses the last word, candida, is a subtle self-reference, associating candida with Candia, the island of Crete where the preaching bachelor of the Sentences was born. More important than the self-reference, however, is the fact that the text suggests a Peter who stands forth in veste candida, as “a shining example.” This will be the theme of all four sermons: Peter Lombard as a shining example for the different communities of the listening audience.

knowledge. (2) Whether any intellectual nature that is circumscribed by the limits set by the body is subject to natural influences from without. (3) Whether the form that establishes man to be a man is by its nature an incorporeal intellectual entity. Book III (1) Whether the ineffable divine Word assumed from his Virgin Mother a nature that could suffer in order to liberate the human race from the power of the devil. Book IV (1) Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament truly signifying by divine institution the body and blood of Christ really contained under the species of bread and wine. 6 For a general introduction, see Siegfried Wenzel, “Academic Sermons at Oxford in the Early Fifteenth Century,” Speculum 70 (1995): 305–29. 7 See H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chartularium universitatis parisiensis, vol. II (Paris, 1891), nos. 1188–9, pp. 691–704, esp. 692 and 700. 8 See Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar, 39–56.

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The preacher informs his listeners that Peter Lombard, by the virtues he developed at each stage of his theological life, stands as a model for the beginning scholars, the developing bachelors, the adept masters, and the guiding bishops, who make up “the community of masters and students,” the original meaning of the word “university” (universitas magistrorum et studentium). Peter of Candia tells us that if we want to understand the meaning of in veste candida (“a shining white garment”), we must return to the Scriptures. There, he tells us, it has four meanings: (1) the possession of acknowledged truth, as the Book of Daniel describes the character of the wise “Ancient One who took his throne, his clothing white as snow”;9 (2) the revelation of truth which is still uncertain, as the Gospel of Mark suggests was the condition of Christ’s disciples when they arrived at the tomb and found there “a young man, dressed in a white robe”;10 (3) the acknowledgement of outstanding leadership, as the Book of Machabees describes the divinely given leader for Machabeus and his small army: “a horseman appeared at their head, clothed in white, and brandishing weapons of gold”;11 (4) the anointing or crowning of established excellence, as Ecclesiastes urges the righteous and wise man: “Let your garments always be white and do not let oil be lacking on your head.”12 As Peter preaches on each book of the Sentences, he ties these four meanings of in veste candida to the life of the scholar, the bachelor, the master, and the bishop, showing how Peter Lombard serves as “a shining white example” for each of those living at each of these theological stages of life. The goal of the scholaris (“scholar”) is to gain the possession of acknowledged truth. Peter of Candia takes lessons from the Book of Proverbs and from the writings of Hugh of St.-Victor, Venerable Bede, and Peter of Blois to suggest to the beginning theologians the virtues which they must develop if they wish to succeed in attaining their goal. Proverbs teaches that the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; so, of necessity, the beginner in theological studies must foster in his soul this filial fear that respects the wisdom from above which is contained

9

Dan. 7:9: “Et antiquus dierum sedit vestimentum eius quasi nix candidum.” Mark 16:5: “Viderunt iuvenem sedentem in dextris coopertum stola candida.” 11 II Mach. 11:8: “Apparuit praecedens eos eques in veste candida, armis aureis hastam vibrans.” 12 Eccl. 9:8: “Omni tempore sint vestimenta tua candida et oleum de capite tuo non deficiat. 10

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in the Scriptures. He also needs effective study habits, so he should be attentive to the requirements for study listed by Hugh of St.-Victor: Three things are necessary for those who study: natural endowment, practice, and discipline. By natural endowment is meant that they must be able to grasp easily what they hear and to retain firmly what they grasp; by practice is meant that they must cultivate by assiduous effort the endowment they have; and by discipline is meant that by leading a praiseworthy life, they must combine moral behavior with their knowledge.13

Venerable Bede makes more specific the need for proper behavior, as he urges the searcher for wisdom “to throw off the weight of distracting cares, dig a trench of humility, and not rest until he has found his treasure.”14 Peter of Blois goes a step further, not only telling young students to avoid distracting cares. Going more to the heart of the matter, he urges: “You cannot have time equally for studies and materials things. Wisdom does not consent to set up home in a soul contaminated with temporal desires and involved with earthly cares.”15 The preacher tells the scholars, indeed the whole audience, that Peter Lombard stands out as a model for the beginning student. If they study his writings, they will see that he was a man who had a filial fear of God, was effective in his working regime, showed that he had a humble and persevering fervor in carrying out his project, and that he led a deeply attractive and modest life. He finishes the sermon with a list of the questions that they will study together during the first semester under the guidance of their common Magister, who has given them in his Sentences not only a model of how they should study but also points to the central truths of the faith that should be the center of their academic attention.

13 Hugh of St.-Victor, Didascalicon, ed. C. H. Buttimer (Washington, D.C., 1939), Book III, chap. 7, p. 57: “Tria sunt studentibus necessaria: natura, exercitium, disciplina. In natura consideratur ut facile audita percipiat et percepta firmiter retineat; in exercitio, ut labore et sedulitate naturalem sensum excolat; in disciplina, ut laudabiliter vivens mores cum scientia componat.” 14 Beda Venerabilis, Super Parabolas Salomonis allegorica expositio, Book I, chap. 2 (CCSL 119B:34): “Et qui thesauros sapientiae invenire desiderat, quidquid sibi terrenum inesse deprehenderit expurget, carnales illecebras abscindat, fossam in se humilitatis faciat, nec quiescat ab agendo, priusquam se viam veritatis invenisse cognoverit.” 15 Petrus Blesensis, Epist. 81 (PL 207:251): “Studiis equidem et divitiis pariter vacare non potes. Nec animam illam dignatur inhabitare prudentia quam videt infectam desideriis et curis temporalibus involutam.”

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The baccalareus (“bachelor”) is the beginning teacher who needs virtues beyond those of the scholar. In his second inaugural sermon Peter of Candia reaches back to Walafrid of Strabo, Gregory the Great, Sidonius Apollinaris, and Cassiodorus for the advice he might give teachers as they face the challenges of their new office. Christ the Teacher gave the best possible guidance for teachers, especially those whose teaching is challenged: “The works which I do bear witness for me”;16 and again: “If you do not wish to believe me, then accept the evidence of my deeds.”17 The teacher’s life must never conflict with what he is teaching, given that he is teaching the truths of the faith. Walafrid of Strabo applied this lesson in particular to young teachers: “A teacher who is young in years will never be looked down upon when his life and conduct recommend him.”18 A teacher needs more than consistency between his teaching and his life; he also needs a great deal of patience. He will meet a great number of trials and face numberless difficulties. In facing them, he must develop patience. In one of his homilies, Gregory the Great points out how important patience is for a teacher: “To be patient shows intelligence. The less learned a man is, the less patient is he.”19 A teacher also needs proper proportion and perspective. His teaching must bear an even tenor and manifest a true balance. Sidonius Apollinaris has noticed this to be a necessity especially in difficult situations.20 It is in facing these that one sees the true balance of great teachers. Finally, the teacher must see things through to the end, and not only to the end of the course he is teaching but also to the end of the course of life he is running. Ecclesiasticus teaches this lesson: “A man’s end reveals his true character. Call no man happy before he dies, for not until death is a man known for what he is.”21 The judgment of Cassiodorus must be kept

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John 5:36: “Ipsa opera quae ego facio testimonium perhibent de me.” John 10:38: “Et si mihi non vultis credere, operibus meis credite.” 18 Walafrid Strabo, Glossa ordinaria super Ecclesiasticum, chap. 42, v. 8 (PL 113:1224): “Nec aetas juvenilis in doctore despicienda, quem vita et discretio commendat.” 19 Gregory the Great, Homiliae super Evangelia, hom. 35 (CCSL 141:325): “Tanto ergo quisque minus ostenditur doctus, quanto convincitur minus patiens.” 20 Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistolae, VIII, ep. 10 (PL 58:602–03): “Nam moris est eloquentibus viris, ingeniorum facultatem negotiorum probare difficultatibus et illic stylum peritum, quasi quemdam fecundi pectoris vomerem figere, ubi materiae sterilis argumentum, velut arida cespitis macri gleba, jejunat . . . Sic et magnus orator, si negotium aggrediatur augustum, tunc amplum plausibilius manifestat ingenium.” 21 Ecclus. 11:29–30: “In fine hominis denudatio operum illius; ante mortem ne laudes hominem quemquam, quoniam in filiis suis agnoscitur vir.” 17

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in mind: “we must keep the goal always before us, as wise men do. Only when something is completed does it deserve praise. It rather deserves blame when one gives up in the middle of the task.”22 If we study the Sentences of Peter Lombard, it is not hard to realize that he is a model for these virtues of the beginning teacher or bachelor. Peter produced a work that could be useful and inspiring to all who read it, and he also lived a life in conformity with what it teaches. Likewise, he persevered, and his untiring effort is an inspiration to those who might be tempted to give up too easily. If we compare his work to the productions of many others, we easily discover that he deals with the difficult doctrinal questions of the Christian faith in this work with eloquence and with great balance. We also come to realize that he not only completed the work of the Sentences, but also that he persevered in the pursuit of wisdom to the end of his life. In this second sermon Peter of Candia ends his reflection on Peter Lombard as a model for bachelors by applying to him the words of the Book of Wisdom that so appropriately can be attached to the context of Book II of the Sentences, which deals with creation: It is he who gave me true knowledge of all that is, who taught me the structure of the world and the properties of the elements, the beginning, middle and end of the times, the alternation of the solstices and the succession of the seasons, the revolution of the year and the positions of the stars, the natures of animals and the instincts of wild beasts, the powers of spirits and the mental processes of men, the varieties of plants and the medical properties of roots. All that is hidden, all that is plain I have come to know, instructed by Wisdom.23

Peter of Candia was scheduled next to lecture on Book III of the Sentences, and in his third inaugural sermon he discussed the special rank of the magister (“master”). As the title Philosophus (“the Philosopher”) was given antonomastically to Aristotle, so the title Magister (“the Master”) was given to Peter Lombard. It was given to acknowledge his outstanding theological leadership. Such recognition could be based only upon the possession of the qualities for such leadership. As Peter of Candia views these qualities, the virtues that

22 Cassiodorus, Variarum libri duodecim, IV, ep. 31 (PL 69:629; CCSL 96:162): “Ad finem debet perducere, quae prudentum intentio visa est suscepisse; quia sicut perfecta laudem pariunt, ita et vituperationem generant, quae in mediis conantibus aegra deseruntur.” 23 Wisdom 7:17–21.

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a master must develop are gained by imitating those of the honored Magister whose Sentences they are treating. The first requirement for outstanding theological leadership is that a master teach God’s law in a sound and infallible manner. Venerable Bede summed this up in his treatise De templo Salomonis: “In vain does someone take unto himself the office of teacher who lacks discretion in his Catholic faith. Neither does he build a sanctuary for the Lord but ruin for himself who attempts to teach others a way of life which was not handed down to him.”24 Furthermore, the tradition he hands down must be presented clearly and richly and marked with love. Cassiodorus stressed this in his Commentary on the Psalter when, citing Pliny, he noted that “the good teacher begins aptly, conveys his message in a suitable way, argues precisely and cogently, builds up his speech with power, ornaments it expertly, teaches, delights and moves.”25 A master must also keep things simple, not complicating them. The divine Teacher gave a lesson to masters when he summarized the Old Testament: “You must love the Lord your God and your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the whole law, and the prophets also.”26 Peter of Blois, in one of his sermons, notes the importance of succinct lessons: “The memory is weak and incapable of handling a throng of things. Therefore, he seems to advise teachers well who says: ‘Whatever lessons you teach, let them be brief, so that receptive spirits will quickly perceive and faithfully retain what you have said. Everything superfluous seeps out of a well-stocked mind.’ ”27 Lastly, 24 Beda Venerabilis, De templo Salomonis, chap. 4 (PL 91:745): “Frustra sibi officium doctoris usurpat, qui discretionem catholicae fidei ignorat. Neque sanctuarium Domino, sed ruinam sibi aedificant, qui docere alios regulam quam ipsi non didicere, conantur.” 25 This quotation is not found in Cassiodorus, Expositio in Psalterium. But see Pliny, Epistolarum libri novem, ed. M. Schüster (Leipzig, 1933), p. 39, l. 18–20: “. . . prohemiatur apte, narrat aperte, arguit acriter, colligit fortiter, ornat excelse, docet, delectat et afficit.” 26 Matt. 22:37–40: “Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et in tota anima tua et in tota mente tua, hoc est maximum et primum mandatum; secundum autem simile est huius: diliges proximum tuum sicut te Ipsum. In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet et prophetae.” 27 Moralium dogma philosophorum, ed. J. Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929), 5: “Quia fragilis est memoria et rerum turbae non sufficit, ideo egregie doctorem informare videtur qui dicit: ‘Quidquid praecipies, esto brevis, ut cito dicta percipient animi dociles teneantque fideles. Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat.’ ” Cf. Horace, Ars poetica, ed. C. O. Brink (Cambridge, 1971), 335–7, p. 67. Here Peter of Candia, in quoting from the Moralium dogma philosophorum, seems to suggest another author, Peter of Blois, for this work. On the discussion of the authorship of Moralium dogma

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the master must find suitable expression for his teaching and preaching. Valerius Maximus notes the importance of suitable speech and apt bodily gestures for teaching when he says: “The ornaments of eloquence consist in fit diction and suitable bodily movements. He who would instruct others should approach men in three ways: by reaching their ears, pleasing their eyes, and invading their souls.”28 Certainly, it is through these qualities that Peter Lombard earned the title Magister. In rhymes leonines our preacher demonstrates why Lombard is so deserving of the title: he Refreshes us with healthful sources which keep away poisonous error; Provides us with clear teaching which is attractive to our hearts and minds; Stimulates us with blossoms of wisdom that help us overcome our carnal selves; And wraps it all in suitable language so truth is experienced as beauty.29

Peter of Candia then summarizes the contents of Book III of the Sentences, whose focus is Christ—the Way, the Truth, and the Life. It is his nature and message that is at the center of the Lombard’s life and work; and it is in turn in the Lombard’s life that hopefully every master, and every theologian, no matter his rank, will by the grace of God share. In the audience is the bishop of Paris, and we can presume that many other listeners, including Peter of Candia himself, will become bishops. Peter Lombard, the model for all four levels of theology teachers and students, also himself became bishop of Paris. In honoring him, Peter of Candia dedicates his fourth sermon to the highest teaching level that the Lombard attained. He also shows how his episcopal virtues make of the author of the Sentences a model for bishops, and their flocks. In this last sermon, vestis candida signifies the anointing

philosophorum, see J. R. Williams, “The Quest for the Author of the Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, 1931–1956,” Speculum 32 (1957): 736–47. 28 Valerius Maximus, Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri novem, ed. D. R. Shakelton Bailey (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), Book VIII, chap. 10, p. 248: “Eloquentiae autem ornamenta in pronuntiatione apta et convenienti motu corporis consistent. Quibus cum se instruxit, tribus modis homines adgreditur, animos eorum ipsa invadendo, horum alteri aures, alteri oculos permulcendos tradendo.” 29 Peter of Candia, MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 219vb: Sanis irrigatur fontibus erroris exclusivis Claris ornatur dotibus mentium allectivis Brevibus gaudet floribus corporis propulsivis Aptis dotatur partibus decoris expressivis.

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or “crowning of established excellence.” This is the meaning that Solomon gave to the phrase when he told the wise man: “Let thy garment be always white, and let thy head lack no ointment.”30 The bishop, the anointed one, should be a wise man whose established excellence is crowned by his ordination as bishop. Once again, four virtues stand out in Peter of Candia’s vision of a bishop who walks in the footsteps of Peter Lombard. St. Jerome lays down the first prerequisite, that a bishop’s life be dedicated to the understanding and observance of God’s law: “Such must be the knowledge and teaching of a bishop that his every movement and step, and every one of his works, must be an example. He must conceive truth with his mind and sound it out with his whole manner and appearance. Whatever he does and whatever he speaks must be a lesson to his people.”31 St. Ambrose, in his letter, On Priestly Dignity, adds a second requisite, fighting error: “By wisdom let the bishop move, so that not only does he sufficiently teach the people depending on him truth, but that he be able to repel the contradiction of every heresy from the Catholic Church.”32 A bishop will have to make many decisions regarding both doctrine and life in his diocese. In doing so, he must, Peter of Ravenna advises, be a pillar of justice: “Nothing shines forth more gloriously in a ruler than to love and show justice without any respect to persons.”33 Finally, the bishop must be a man of sound judgment when he comforts his people. St. Gregory, the prince of moral guidance, advises bishops in his Moralia on Job that “leniency must be mixed with severity, blending from each a balance so that subjects are not embittered by too much harshness nor spoiled by excessive kindness.”34 Once again Peter of Candia shows that he is not just providing a theoretical lesson for his audience. He restores to 30 Eccl. 9:8: “Omni tempore candida sint vestimenta tua et oleum de capite tuo non deficiat.” 31 Jerome, Epistolae, ep. 65 (PL 22:622): “Tanta debet esse scientia et eruditio Pontificis Dei, ut et gressus ejus, et motus, et universa vocalia sint. Veritatem mente concipiat, et toto eam habitu resonet et ornatu: ut quidquid agit, quidquid loquitur, sit doctrina populorum.” 32 Ambrose, De dignitate sacerdotali, chap. 4 (PL 17:573): “Sic polleat episcopus sapientia ut non solum creditum sibi populum sufficienter doceat; verumetiam et cunctarum quaeat haeresum contradictiones a catholica repellere ecclesia.” 33 The quotation is, in fact, from Peter of Blois, Epistolae, ep. 95 (PL 207:302): “Nihil adeo gloriose lucet in principe, sicut amare et exhibere justitiam sine omni acceptione personae.” 34 Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, XX, 5 (CCSL 143A:1012): “Miscenda est ergo lenitas cum severitate, faciendum quoddam ex utraque temperamentum, ut neque multa asperitate exulcerentur subditi, neque nimia benignitate solvantur.”

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their imaginations one final time the image of Peter Lombard, who, as bishop, illustrated these very virtues. Thus, the Lombard’s Sentences reveal a man whose life had a truly apostolic dedication to God’s law, a man in whose face the bright wisdom of the Scriptures never failed to shine. His judgments always showed a balanced measure about them, and the gospel teaching informed all his actions with love. Each member of his audience, whether scholar, bachelor, master, or bishop could certainly say after these inaugural sermons, delivered at the beginning of each semester, that Peter Lombard stood before him as a shining white example to imitate at each level of the theological life. Inaugural Disputations Each of the four inaugural sermons was followed by a disputed question. These questions, like the sermons, were very much tied to the immediately present audience. The first of the inaugural questions centers on the nature of theology, as will also the prologue of Peter’s commentary on Book I. However, the prologue discussion of theology will bring the reader into contact with authors that are generally known: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, and Gregory of Rimini. The first inaugural question, on the other hand, provides references to Peter of Candia’s immediate contemporaries, bachelors known to few today, yet authors who sat as his listeners. They include Malivus of Saint-Omer, Gerard of Calcar, Lambert of Marches, Francis of Saint-Michel,35 and two unnamed bachelors (a Carmelite and a Dominican). Peter also gives specific references and citations from their still to be discovered commentaries on the Sentences. The largest influence on him in this inaugural question comes from Richard Brinkley, a Franciscan contemporary, who died in 1379.36 Brinkley’s position regarding the nature of theology is the one authoritative stance that Peter of Candia sets in opposition to his

35 Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar, 42–4, provides some limited information and references for Gerard, Lambert, and Francis. 36 Brinkley’s Commentarium in Sententias survives only in abbreviated form: MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16535, fols. 123r–129r, and MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16408, fols. 40r–42r. From the passage cited by Peter, it is impossible to judge how much of the six responses that he gives to his opponents depends also on the text of Richard Brinkley. Cf. Z. Kaluza, “L’œuvre théologique de Richard Brinkley, O.F.M.,” AHDLMA 57 (1990): 169–273.

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Parisian contemporaries who for different reasons respond negatively to the question “whether the open profession of the Christian faith should be matched by a reasonable effort to attain understanding of it by our knowing powers.”37 Malivus of Saint-Omer contends that, since the profession of the Christian faith more depends on the will than on the intellect, faith could not be matched by a rational justification that aims at the intellect rather than the will. Gerard of Calcar argues that the divine ideas which represented things that are different specifically and individually seem incompatible with the essential, and thus unified, divine light. If God knows eternally that “a man is not a donkey,” what is the object of such knowledge? Since his knowledge is eternal, the objects cannot be created things, which are temporal. Nor can it be, as Plato imagined, a world of ideas distinct from God, since this would make God dependent on something distinct from himself. God’s knowledge must have as its object the divine essence, but this then seems to imply that there are contradictories, such as “man” and “donkey,” in God’s essence. The Carmelite bachelor objected that Christian faith sets as man’s goal something which is beyond man’s ability to obtain, and that this claim cannot be rationally confirmed. Lambert of Marches, in claiming that beatitude is more properly an act of the intellect than an act of the will, contests that this position means that the intellect as a natural faculty is superior to the will, which is a free faculty. This position, however, makes a natural faculty superior to a free faculty and thus seems to be defending a position that is rationally unjustifiable. Francis of Saint-Michel presents a different challenge: Christian faith teaches those who accept it that our proper concept of God is of one God; it also teaches that our proper concept of God is of three persons. A corollary of this teaching is that, since each of the divine persons is distinct, each can be seen in the beatific state without any of the others. How can this seeming contradiction be justified rationally? Finally, the Dominican bachelor notes that the Christian law seems to go against the fair distribution of merits and demerits by demanding 37 Peter of Candia, MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 2va: “Utrum candida Christianae religionis professio sit a qualibet perceptiva potentia rationabiliter imitanda?” For the objections of these bachelors, Peter of Candia’s responses, and the edition of the Latin text, see Stephen F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Portrait of Late Thirteenth-Century Problems concerning Faith and Reason in Book I of the Sentences,” in Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB, ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, 2007), 254–82.

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more of religious, who have taken vows, than of others, who have not. This apparent lack of fairness is hard to justify. Peter of Candia prefers to follow the position of his fellow Franciscan, Richard Brinkley, who claims that divine revelation excels all human authorities and measures their reasons. Thus, the profession of the Christian faith should judge the worth of all human objections, and its perfection should be matched as reasonably as possible by our efforts to show its superiority. Brinkley, and Peter of Candia, claim to walk in the footsteps of St. Augustine, who, in Book XI of The City of God, claimed: “The city of God we speak of is the same as that to which testimony is borne by that Scripture which excels all the writings of all nations by its divine authority, and has brought under its influence all kinds of minds, and this not by any chance efforts of men, but clearly by an express providential arrangement.”38 Calling upon God for help, Peter attempts to answer the objections of his six fellow bachelors. He argues that Malivus has an impoverished view of reason. He tells him to go back and read St. Augustine, Hugh of Saint-Victor, and Cassiodorus. The latter, in his Treatise on the Soul, portrayed reason as intellectual imagination that allowed believers to envision better the truths that they believed. All three authorities portrayed reason as establishing or confirming intellectual grounds for faith. Faith is not pure will; it is an intellectual assent, supported by reason. Gerard of Calcar, in Peter of Candia’s view, fails to reconcile the multiplicity of created things and the simplicity of the divine. Peter appeals to John Duns Scotus’s formal distinction as a vehicle that best explains how God’s knowledge of diverse creatures does not compromise divine simplicity. Peter agrees with the Carmelite bachelor that God has proposed to man a goal that he cannot attain on his own. However, God also makes it that this does not involve an impossible situation: God can elevate, and in fact has elevated, man’s powers so that the divine essence can be for our created intellect the object of our beatific vision and can also bring the enjoyment fulfilling our created will. Lambert of Marches contended that according to Christian teaching, as found in John’s Gospel (“This is eternal life, that they may know

38

Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XI, chap. 1 (PL 41:315–17): “Civitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea Scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitus motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione providentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras, omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subiecit.”

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you . . . ”),39 formal beatitude is found more properly in the intellect than in the will, and that this implies the unreasonable position that a natural faculty is superior to a free faculty. Peter, however, argues that, although the beatific life involves the vision of God, still the highest perfection of the Christian religion is grounded in, and perfected more fully in, the burning acts of love belonging to the will. Francis of Saint-Michel objected that the Christian faith seems unreasonable since it teaches that a proper concept of God is that God is one and also that a proper concept of God is a concept of the three persons. A corollary of this observation is that since each of the divine persons is distinct, each can be seen in the beatific state without the others. On the contrary, argues Peter, St. Augustine’s words in De doctrina christiana—“the things that make us blessed and that we must enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the same Trinity, the one highest reality that is common to all who enjoy it”40—must be understood as intending that the three supposits produce blessedness in us, so that they are the efficient cause, not the formal object of our blessedness. The formal object of our beatitude is the divine essence, which in reality is triune, but the proper formal object of our blessedness is the divine essence. Finally, the Dominican bachelor claimed that the Christian law did not hand out rewards and punishments according to the rule of justice presented by Aristotle, and that it demanded more of religious, who have taken vows, and of priests, who have embraced a more demanding way of life, than of the ordinary believer. Peter argues in a contrary way that the Gospel itself does not impose vows of poverty, chastity, or obedience but demands a way of life that binds all equally. If some Christians follow a higher kind of life, this is rather due to Gospel counsels which offer a special calling; those who have responded to this calling have taken upon themselves further obligations. Such counsels, followed freely by those who have chosen this higher way of life, are thus not unfair, although indeed they are more demanding. In all six considerations Peter attempts to show how reasonable explanations regarding these various challenges to Christian belief and life can bring understanding to believers. It is also worth

39 40

Ioan. 17:3. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Book I, chap. 5, no. 5 (PL 34:21).

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noting that many of these same points are dealt with in great detail in the questions that are treated in Book I of Peter’s commentary.41 Prologue to Book I of the Sentences The inaugural question of Book I of the Sentences commentary of Peter of Candia, just discussed, brought up six objections to the claim that theology is an intellectual discipline that brings some understanding to the truths of the Christian faith. In the prologue proper, however, Peter presents us with the broader framework of a century-long discussion over the scientific character of theology.42 Peter’s discussion of the nature of theology begins with what he describes as two extreme positions. The first is that of Thomas Aquinas, who claims that theology is science in the proper sense of the term, although the model he supplies is that of a subalternated science, the form of science that depends on a subalternating science as the source of its principles. Following the theme of early criticism of Aquinas, Peter says that evidence is the necessary requirement for science in any proper sense of the term. Since we do not assent to the principles of theology, which are the articles of the Creed, due to evidence, theology cannot legitimately be described as properly scientific. Thomas’s view of theology as science therefore claims too much, since in reality we do not assent to the articles of the faith because of evidence. The other extreme is that proposed by Bernard of Auvergne. Generally, this position, which claims that the “scientific” character belonging to theology is due to its scientific procedure, is often described as a “theology of consequences.” In short, theologians devoted to this method of study can always be counted on for their logical consistency. Their conclusions formally follow from their premises, even though the premises themselves are premises accepted on faith. From Peter of Candia’s viewpoint, this approach to the study of theology claims too little: it speaks of the procedures for arguing about the faith, but it provides no knowledge concerning the realities of the faith.

41

See above, no. 5. For a detailed study and the Latin text of Peter’s Prologue question to Book I, see Stephen F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 156–90. 42

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These are the two extreme positions which are rejected by Peter, the one claiming too much, the other too little. Peter wants to follow a middle-of-the-road route, a way he finds achieved in the writings of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Without indicating how exactly he follows his two more balanced teachers, he goes on to examine two opposed positions that are not as extreme as the approaches of Thomas Aquinas and Bernard of Auvergne. These two moderate opposed portraits of theology belong to the Franciscan Peter Auriol and the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini. Peter Auriol is recognized today as the great defender of declarative theology. For Auriol, declarative theology is the traditional imitation of the theological approach of St. Augustine, who at the beginning of Book XIV of the De Trinitate tells his readers that they should pursue “the kind of knowledge by which our most wholesome faith, which leads to eternal life, is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.”43 Auriol’s particular form of declarative theology considered that the types of knowledge which best accomplished these goals were of four kinds. Asking what causes misunderstanding for believers, he found four root causes for confusion among believers. Sometimes believers are bewildered by definitions that they find unclear: they might be confused when they hear someone use the words “nature,” “essence,” “substance,” “person,” or “subsistent relations” in speaking of the Trinity. Such technical expressions might leave them puzzled. They can be helped out of their confusion if someone can provide clear explanations of the meanings of such technical terms. Others might find a theological statement confusing because they cannot envision or imagine what a theological proposition is really saying. It might help them very much if someone could provide them with examples or analogies that lead them to a better understanding of what is being said. Others might be hungry for arguments which confirm what they believe. Such supports show that a particular belief has a certain reasonableness about it and some arguments to support it. Finally, believers might often hear people ridicule the teachings of the Christian faith and attack basic beliefs. If they themselves cannot respond to these challenges, they become confused. This confusion can be overcome if

43 Augustine, De Trinitate, Book XIV, chap. 1, no. 3 (CCSL 50A:424): “Huic scientiae . . . illud tantummodo attribuitur quo fides saluberrima quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur.”

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there are believers who can defend Christian truths with persuasive arguments that confront the attacking positions and show the hidden fallacies that are found in the arguments of the opponents of the faith. Gregory or Rimini was one of the strongest critics of Peter Auriol’s presentation of declarative theology: I ask that the Reverend Master whose opinion of what is proper theological discourse I have disproven to go back to the De Trinitate and find anywhere in that or in Augustine’s other books places where he proves from probable propositions that God is three in one. I think he could not find any. But he will only find what Augustine proved from the authorities of Scripture.44

For Gregory, theology is not properly declarative; it is properly deductive. His portrait of deductive theology, however, is very much anchored in Scripture. He tells us that if a person accepts the truth of Sacred Scripture and is strong in intellectual habits, reflection on the Scriptures will bring him to new conclusions. No matter whether or not they are knowable through other sciences, or whether or not they are determined as revealed truths by the Church, he sees that they necessarily flow from what is formally revealed as such in Sacred Scripture. Theology, in this way, extends the content of the faith; it is a certain acquired faith. Peter of Candia is essentially in agreement with the affirming positions of both Peter Auriol and Gregory of Rimini. He criticizes them principally for holding that their stances are exclusive of each another. His view of theology avoids the exclusive accents in the positions of Auriol and Rimini by fostering a marriage of declarative and deductive theology. The marriage, however, is not exactly a union of equal partners. Auriol’s declarative theology has the upper hand. The very first conclusion of Peter of Candia is that through theological study the student acquires a habit distinct from faith.45 This is one of Auriol’s basic theses, and Candia’s arguments in its favor are taken from Auriol’s

44 Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, Book I, prol., qu. 1, ed. A. D. Trapp and Venicio Marcolino (Berlin, 1981), 19: “Sed rogo illum reverendum magistrum: Ubi in praedictis libris praedictas veritates probavit Augustinus ex propositionibus probabilibus aut aliis qualibuscumque ex mundanis sumptis doctrinis? Puto quod invenire non poterit, sed hoc solum inveniet quod ex auctoritatibus probavit scripturae.” 45 See Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History,’” p. 182, ll. 209–10: “Prima conclusio: intellectus viatoris per exercitium theologicum adquiirit habitum ultra fidem.”

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text.46 Declarative theology does not extend the content of faith. It helps the theologian as he attempts to follow the urging of I Peter “to be ready to render an account of the faith”47 that is in him, or, in the words of St. Augustine, it helps him to show “in what way this belief itself may both help the pious and be defended against the impious.”48 It helps him to achieve these goals by clarifying the meaning of terms in the Church’s declarations of the truths of revelation and by arguing with probable arguments for these truths. It focuses on the unified message that is expressed in the Creed. Accepting on faith the whole revelation with equal immediacy, the theologian in his declarative role links together one truth within the revelation with another, attempting to show how these mysteries stand together, indicating how one truth infers the other and how all are interrelated. Such an approach to the mysteries of the faith does not bring out or deduce new beliefs, but rather shows the coherence of the fundamental mysteries.49 This account of the interrelationship of the essential mysteries of the faith is certainly distinct from faith itself, since the simple believer does not have this developed ability. In an even more fundamental sense is this ability distinct from faith: none of the activities flowing from the declarative habit brings about faith or makes the believer believe more firmly. He assents to the whole revelation as presented by the Church because of his trust in the revealing God, the First Truth, and not because of the harmony of the mysteries of faith or the power of probable arguments supporting them.50 There is, however, another way of looking at the truths of the faith, and this is the basis for also practicing deductive theology. The deductive theologian examines the truths individually and in terms of the primacy of some over others. Some truths of the faith are conclusions that are deduced from and are thus dependent upon or subordinated to other truths. Deductive theology centers its attention on how new truths stand in relation to prior ones. The new ones are held because of their relations to the ones that are prior. Adherence to the newly

46 47 48 49 50

See ibid., p. 182, l. 210–183, l. 254. I Petr. 3:15. Augustine, De Trinitate, Book XIV, chap. 1, no. 3 (PL 42:1037). See Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History,’ ” p. 183, ll. 252–64. See ibid., p. 183, ll. 258–64.

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deduced truths is due to adherence to the premises or principles, and thus they are not assented to with equal immediacy.51 If there is a fundamental weakness in the positions of Auriol or Rimini, it is that they do not see both ways of approaching divine revelation as legitimate: it is false to speak of declarative or deductive theology as two distinct opposed theologies. Theologians should develop both abilities as legitimate and necessary theological habits.52 As Auriol already noted, theologians may also develop many other habits in the theology faculty, such as the ones they develop as metaphysicians or natural philosophers. Through such abilities theologians may acquire evidence for some of the truths they are examining, but not qua theologians.53 Theologians as theologians through their declarative and deductive habits, which are properly theological, do not acquire faith-causing evidence.54 Peter of Candia’s formal reply to the original questions states at the end of the prologue that “through theological study only declarative and faith-extending habits are developed, and through these developed abilities no evident knowledge of the articles of the faith is acquired.”55 Beatific Enjoyment Following Augustine’s56 and Peter Lombard’s57 leads proclaiming that “all teaching concerns things and signs . . . and in the case of things, we must consider that there are some things which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, and yet others which we enjoy and use,” Peter of Candia opens his discussion of Book I with the treatment

51

See ibid., p. 183, ll. 254–8. See ibid., p. 183, ll. 252–64. 53 See Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952–56), prooem., sect. 1, art. 2, nos. 75, 77–9 (vol. I, pp. 154–5). Cf. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History,’” p. 187, ll. 409–27. 54 See Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History,’” p. 182, l. 211–183, l. 264. 55 Peter of Candia, In I Sent., prol., qu. 3 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 20ra): “Per exercitium theologicum non adquiritur nisi habitus creditivus vel declarativus per quos de articulis fidei nulla notitia evidens adquiritur.” 56 See Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Book I, chap. 2, no. 2 (CSEL 80:9, CCSL 32:7). 57 See Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book I, dist 1, chap. 2 (vol. 1, pp. 55–6). 52

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of beatific enjoyment.58 His treatment of the subject introduces us to his sources, which are mainly Franciscan. We encounter Alexander of Hales, who records the three descriptions of “enjoyment” that the Lombard takes from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana and De Trinitate.59 The first description of the nature of enjoyment declares that “to enjoy is to inhere with love in something for its own sake.” The second states that “we enjoy the things that we know, when the will rests, by delighting in them for their own sake.” The third strikes a different accent when it tells us that “to enjoy is to use with gladness, not merely through hope, but already in reality.” Alexander explains that these descriptions manifest the three distinct aspects of enjoyment both in regard to the subject that experiences it and in regard to the object causing the enjoyment. He claims, therefore, that an adequate account of beatific enjoyment must take into consideration the subject experiencing it (that is, the human soul or its faculties of will and intellect) and the object or objects of beatitude (that is, the beatitude which the subject enjoys: the Trinity or the divine essence). Peter complements Alexander’s treatment of beatitude with that of St. Thomas, which summarizes what Augustine was driving at with his many descriptions of beatitude and then pulls them all together in his own description of enjoyment as an appetitive act generated by the habit of charity, motivated by the vision of God, and associated with exceptional delight. Candia believes that this well describes what St. Augustine pointed to with his multiple descriptions of beatitude. Peter’s treatment of the character of enjoyment shows his great familiarity with the works of earlier Franciscans: John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, John of Ripa, Francis of Marchia, Landulph Caracciolo, and Richard Brinkley, his Oxford contemporary who played such a big part in his solution to the inaugural question to Book I of his commentary on the Sentences. The questions he examines are the following: (1) Can the love of some limited substance satisfy the created will? (2) Can the eternal relations, each on its own, offer a ground for enjoyment distinct from the divine essence? (3) Can the supreme substance as an object necessitate the elicited enjoyment of

58 See Severin V. Kitanov, “Peter of Candia on Demonstrating that God is the Sole Object of Beatific Enjoyment,” Franciscan Studies 68 (2008): 1–62. 59 See Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Quaracchi, 1951), Book I, dist. l, no. 16, ll. 10–19: “Ponuntur autem tres definitiones eius quod est ‘frui’ . . .”

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the created will? In response to the first query, Peter defends four conclusions. First of all, he argues that one cannot demonstrate by natural reason in the present life that the divine essence ought to be enjoyed or loved. Secondly, he contends that in this life natural reason cannot demonstrate the impossibility of enjoying something other than God. In his third conclusion, Peter proclaims that it is not evidently impossible for the will in the present life to find total satisfaction in something finite or limited. Finally, he states that it is strictly speaking indemonstrable, even though probable, that God alone must be enjoyed and that nothing created can satify our will. In each of these discussions the presence of Scotus’s debate with Avicenna is clearly felt. Peter agrees with Scotus’s conclusions, but he contends that the Subtle Doctor’s arguments are not demonstrations but are only of probable worth. In regard to the second query (Can the eternal relations, each on its own, offer a ground for enjoyment distinct from the divine essence?), Peter’s answer is definitive: since only the deity as such embraces the plenitude of goodness, only the divine essence can serve as the adequate terminus of beatific love.60 Peter’s response to the third query (Can the supreme substance as an object necessitate the elicited enjoyment of the created will?) is that liberty is inseparable from the nature of the will insofar as it makes the faculty of the will to be what it is. This does not imply that the blessed can turn away from God, since God has established a law prohibiting his assistance with respect to any volition contrary to the soul’s formal beatitude. Given this divine law, the blessed cannot have shifting or changeable thoughts contrary to the will’s formal beatitude. God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents The sixth and last question of Book I deals with the issue of God’s knowledge of future contingents. This question has three articles; articles two and three focus on different aspects of the points involved in discussions of God’s knowledge of future contingents.61 In article 2 of 60 See Severin V. Kitanov, “Peter of Candia on Beatific Enjoyment: Can One Enjoy the Divine Persons Separately from the Divine Essence?” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35:1 (2006): 145–66. 61 On God’s knowledge of future contingents according to Peter of Candia and Peter Auriol, see Christopher Schabel, The Quarrel with Aureol: Peter Aureol’s Role in the Late-Medieval Debate over Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, 1315–1475

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question 6 Peter asks “whether the intellective ‘part’ of the divine substance has distinct and infallible knowledge of future contingents.”62 He begins his discussion by presenting a digest of Aristotle’s position on future contingents as confirmed by Averroës. Unlike many others, he does not focus on chapter 9 of Book I of the Perihermeneias (which says, “For we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future”)63 as his source for speaking of this issue, but rather concentrates on the Philosopher’s position in the Metaphysics, which affirms that God cannot know particulars and cannot know corruptible things.64 Peter then challenges Aristotle’s position, which denies divine knowledge of contingents, by recalling the various refutations of it given throughout the fourteenth century by his favored sources: Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, William of Ockham, John of Ripa, and Richard Brinkley. Peter in a special way records the position of Peter Auriol: since God is eternity and excludes every temporal consideration whereas creatures are temporal and consequently exclude every eternal consideration, strictly speaking there is no prior time, future time, or simultaneity in the relationship between God and creatures. Therefore, God can neither be said to be distant from any creature according to duration nor to exist at the same time with creatures. God thus knows the actuality of a contingently future creature by means of some sort of negative non-distance.65 Peter of Candia also criticizes the position of

(diss. University of Iowa, 1994), 335–42, 693–713; idem, Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot, Hamps./Burlington, Vt., 2000), 308–14. On the influence of Auriol on Candia, Peter de Rivo, and others, see also Stephen F. Brown, “The Treatise De arcanis Dei,” in Cardinal Bessarion, De arcanis Dei, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn (Rome, 1997), 20–52. 62 Peter of Candia, In I Sent., qu. 6, art. 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 116ra): “Utrum intellectiva divinae substantiae habeat distinctam et infallibilem notitiam futurorum contingentium.” 63 Aristotle, Perihermeneias, Book I, chap. 9, 19a6–10. 64 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, text 51, 1074 b 15–37. 65 See Peter of Candia, In I Sent., qu. 6, art. 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 120ra): “Quia enim Deus est aeternitas et per consequens excludens omnem rationem temporalem, creatura vero quaelibet est temporalis et per consequens excludens formaliter rationem aeternitatis, ideo proprie nec est prioritas nec posteritas nec simultas inter Deum et creaturam. Ideo nec dicitur ab ea durative distare nec simul esse, quia aut hoc esset per rationem aeternitatis aut per rationem temporalitatis; non per aliquam illarum, cum neutra sit communis alteri. Et ideo vere et proprie cognitio Dei attingit actualitatem creaturae contingenter futurae per quandam indistantiam negativam.” Peter de Rivo later claimed that Peter of Candia gave a clearer description of Auriol’s position than Auriol himself had. See Peter de Rivo, Tractatus responsalis ad oppugnationes

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Auriol, in particular on three points: (1) No purely negative ground is the ground for knowing something positive; (2) non-distance does not indicate any way by which God can distinguish between possible futures that will not be realized and real futures that come about; (3) if Auriol, or a follower, were to claim that non-distance is something positive, then he in reality would be positing that future contingents are eternally present in eternity, so that they would in fact exist eternally.66 He summarizes the various positions, including Auriol’s, at the very end of article 2 in the following manner: Recapitulating, on the basis of all these things, it seems that we are able to understand that God knows future contingents in six ways: either through their distinct ideal reasons, or because God by reason of his immensity is present to the whole imaginary flow of time, or because he is negatively non-distant from future actualities, or because of the various contingent reasons of things, or because God sees clearly the determination of his own will, or at least because the divinity itself is in an eminent way a likeness of all things and has an intuitive cognition of them. Each of these ways expresses some imperfection, for the first tells us that God has knowledge only of the objects of simple comprehension; the second posits that these objects have in some way existed eternally; the third does not show the difference between a possible thing and a future thing; the fourth, according to the common evaluation of it, attributes to God some sort of imperfection, namely, that of contingency; the fifth, according to some interpretations, posits in God discursive knowledge;

cuiusdam qui postea deprehensus est fuisse dominus Wilhelmus Bondini, chap. 5, in Chris Schabel, “Peter de Rivo and the Quarrel over Future Contingents at Louvain: New Evidence and New Perspectives (Part II),” in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 7 (1996): 369–435, esp. 405. 66 See Peter of Candia, In I Sent., qu. 6, art. 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 130rab): “Pro cuius declaratione quatuor pono conclusiones, quarum prima sit ista: nulla indistantiae positiva vel negativa conditio est Deo formalis ratio cognoscendi futura contingentia. Ista conclusio ponitur contra primam opinionem, videlicet fratris Petri Aureoli, qui, ut prius declaratum est, imaginatur ex hoc Deum cognoscere futura contingentia, quia indistat a talibus negative. Ista conclusio sic probatur: nulla ratio mere negativa est formaliter ratio cognoscendi aliquod positivum. Sed quaelibet talis indistantia est ratio mere negativa; ergo nulla talis est formaliter ratio cognoscendi aliquod positivum, et per consequens nec aliquod futurum contingens . . . Praeterea, nulla ratio aeque respiciens aliqua, utputa A et B, est magis cognitio unius quam alterius. Sed indistantia negativa aeque respicit aliqua, utputa possibilia et futura; ergo non magis per talem indistantiam cognoscetur futura quam possibilia, et per consequens ita iudicabit omne possibile esse futurum sicut econverso . . . Ex hoc etiam apparet quod nec indistantia positiva potest poni, quia tunc omnia essent praesentia aeternitati.”

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stephen f. brown the sixth essentially says nothing but only responds to arguments. All things considered, the fifth way—that of the Subtle Doctor—is more satisfying to the intellect than the others. The sixth way, because it is easy to follow, is the one that is commonly held; however, it is the explanation that John of Ripa ridicules more than the others. I have, like a little dog, started the hare running for you. May you track it down by whatever path you wish from among the ones provided.67

When one sees the representation and criticism that Candia brings to all six positions, it could be tempting to think that he is simply recording theological history, not being a theologian.68 It is important, however, to keep in mind that he is primarily, albeit not exclusively, a follower of declarative theology. In his view of theology, among the principal tasks is the need to bring understanding to the basic truths of the faith. Different theologians, through the arguments, analogies, and clarifications they bring in support of truths based on faith, offer understanding of different kinds and can help others overcome the misunderstandings under which they suffer. Although he criticizes Scotus’s solution to the question of God’s knowledge of future contingents, he tells us that it is more satisfying to the intellect than the other explanations. He also notes that the common position has in its favor that it is easy to follow, which is precisely why it is the common position and also why John of Ripa ridicules it more than the others: it is a little too simple for more sophisticated thinkers. In short, 67 Ibid., fol. 131rb–va: “Ex quibus omnibus recapitulando, apparet quod sex modis possumus intelligere Deum cognoscere futura contingentia: vel per distinctas ipsorum rationes ideales; vel per hoc quod Deus ratione suae immensitatis est praesens toti fluxui imaginario temporis; vel per hoc quod indistat negative ab actualitatibus futurorum; vel per rationes rerum varias contingentes; vel per hoc quod Deus conspicit limpide determinationem propriae voluntatis; aut certe per hoc quod ipsa Deitas est eminenter similitudo omnium et ipsorum notitia intuitiva. Et quilibet istorum modorum aliquid imperfectionis dicit, nam primus non declarat nisi quod Deus habet notitiam incomplexorum; secundus ponit aeternaliter quodammodo fuisse; tertius non assignat differentiam inter possibile et futurum; quartus iuxta communem aestimationem Deo attribuit aliquam imperfectionem, videlicet contingentiam; quintus ponit interpretative in Deo discursum; sextus fundamentaliter nihil declarat, sed solum ad argumenta respondet. Unde omnibus computatis, magis satisfacit intellectui quintus modus, videlicet Doctoris Subtilis, quam aliis. Sextus vero modus, quia facilis est, communiter tenetur, quem tamen prae ceteris magis deridet magister Ioannes de Ripa. Ego autem, sicut parvus canis, excitavi vobis leporem. Capiatis eum per quamcumque praedictarum viarum semitam vultis.” 68 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 309, passes the following judgment: “Indeed, Candia seems most interested in presenting the opinions of others, to such a degree that he is more an historian of theology than a theologian.”

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Peter of Candia senses that the many different positions, which are not of all equal strength, can help different students overcome misunderstandings of different kinds. He might prefer one to another, and he criticizes all, but any of them could be helpful in promoting understanding. If we return to the discussion of beatific enjoyment and look at Scotus’s disagreement with Avicenna’s conclusion, we realize that Candia accepts Scotus’s conclusion—but he judges that it is not a demonstration. To consider it a demonstration, as Scotus does, is to go beyond the warrant of the argument. Still, he considers it to be a beneficial position to hold. His criticisms do not totally negate its worth; they put it in perspective. In article 3 of question 6 Peter asks “whether God’s eternal foreknowledge necessitates a created will when it produces its own act.”69 Here Candia has one opponent in mind: Thomas Bradwardine. The whole article is a presentation of the position of the Doctor Profundus in De causa Dei, with his many nuances concerning the meanings of liberty and necessity and his numerous arguments in support of his position. Peter of Candia criticizes Bradwardine’s thesis and the arguments supporting it, explaining and defending in great detail through three conclusions and thirteen corollaries the more probable opinion of the doctors that is commonly approved.70 Eternity of the World When Peter turns to Book II, which centers on creation, he begins by setting the framework within which he will pose his first question. That framework is God’s omnipotent power to create things distinct from Himself and our limited ability to understand such a limitless power.71 His first question has three articles based on three objections concerning God’s omnipotence. The first article flows from the

69 Peter of Candia, In I Sent., qu. 6, art. 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 131va): “Tertius articulus erat iste: utrum Dei aeterna praescientia volitivam creatam necessitet ad actum proprium producendum.” 70 See ibid.: “Pro cuius articuli declaratione sic procedam: primo namque recitabo opinionem Doctoris Profundi cum suis coloribus et motivis. Secundo contra ipsum obiciam et suis rationibus respondebo. Et tertio probabilior doctorum sententia approbata communiter explicabitur secundum posse.” 71 See Stephen F. Brown, “Aristotle’s View on the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia,” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern

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objection arguing that it seems that God’s power is not infinite, since he cannot create a being who is infinite. The second article derives from the objection that God seems to be limited in his power in regard to certain accidents. He cannot separate certain accidents from their substances: he cannot, for example, produce time without motion or motion without a mobile body. The third article centers on the eternity of the world and has its roots in the objection claiming that God cannot create something distinct from himself that would be co-eternal with himself. Candia deals with the problem of the eternity of the world in relation to God’s power and our limits in understanding it, thus forcing his students to focus on what is possible in itself and what is impossible in itself. His first approach to the eternity of the world issue begins with actual human accounts of the eternal aspects of the world that we inhabit. The third article thus is broken down into two parts: the first part examines the positions of the philosophers, especially the position of the Peripatetics, that is, Aristotle and his followers.72 It is only after this preface, where Peter presents a refutation of the philosophical arguments for an eternal world, that he attempts to handle the issue of its possibility. De facto, according to the first part of the third article, the world is not eternal. However, could God have created something distinct from himself that would have been co-eternal with himself ?73 This is the question faced in the second part of the third article. Before Peter turns to this main issue, he does his preparatory work by studying the actual positions held by the ancient philosophers. He notes that all philosophers, generally speaking, have admitted that something distinct from God has eternally existed. As Aristotle portrayed his predecessors Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Plato in his Physics74 and De caelo et mundo,75 they all in some way held that material elements were eternal. Empedocles held that the four basic

Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev’d Dr. Robert D. Crouse, ed. Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten, and Walter Hannam (Leiden, 2007), 371–404. 72 See ibid., 385, no. 3.10: “Tertius articulus erat iste: Utrum aliqua quidditas essentialiter a Deo distincta potuerit aeternaliter a deitatis omnipotentia produci causaliter effective? Pro cuius articuli declaratione sic procedam: Primo, videbitur quae fuerit circa hoc philosophorum opinio, et maxime Peripateticorum.” 73 See Peter of Candia, In II Sent., qu. 1, art. 3, part 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fols. 176rb–181rb). 74 See Aristotle, Physics, Book I, chap. 4, 187a22–26. 75 See Aristotle, De caelo et mundo, Book 3, chap. 2, 300b27–301a20.

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elements—earth, water, fire, and air—were eternal elements that composed all things. Love and hate, he claimed, generate and break down the different combinations that form the diverse objects that make up the world. Anaxagoras, on his side, contended that in everything there is eternally a portion of all the basic elements. Mind (Nous) brings forth the dominant elements that allow a concrete thing to be the particular kind of thing it becomes, while permitting the non-dominant elements to remain hidden and stand in potency for future developments. Plato, as Augustine reported, taught that only the organizing principles or forms that material things take on are marked by generation or corruption. It is, for him, only the material principles or elements that are eternal. In Peter’s account of the positions of all three ancient philosophers, it is the material principles that are eternal, either by themselves or in union with the efficient causes which generate and corrupt visible things.76 Although the discussion of these authors was important to St. Augustine in his City of God, these authors did not play a great role in medieval discussions of the eternity of the world. This change was due to the strong critique that Aristotle brought against them. It is Aristotle’s position itself that survived and held a central position in the medieval discussions. Peter is well aware that the medieval tradition was not united in representing Aristotle’s teaching. He tells us that some have tried to make Aristotle a Catholic. Some of those who have done so even went beyond the efforts of Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor to show that Aristotle did not deal with the question of the eternity of the world but only developed a philosophy of nature that assumed the world as already existing. For them, Aristotle analyzed the existing world; he did not pursue the question of how it came about.77 In Peter’s scenario those who wanted to make Aristotle a Catholic in his day went a lot further than Alexander and Philip had done. They went to the texts of Aristotle, claiming that the Philosopher would be contradicting himself if he held that the world was eternal. If he held the world to be eternal, he would have been violating some of his basic teachings: (1) it is impossible that an infinite number of things 76

See Brown, “Aristotle’s View,” 385, no. 3.11: “Et sic apparet generaliter philoophi in materiali principio fuerunt consentientes quod aeternaliter fuerit, sed in formali fuerunt diversificati.” 77 See ibid., 375–6.

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has existed; (2) it is impossible that an infinite number of things exist actually; (3) it is impossible that one infinite be greater than another; (4) it is impossible that an infinite have something added to it; (5) it is impossible that a part be equal to its whole.78 Peter rejects these efforts to bring Aristotle into agreement with Catholic teaching regarding creation79 and notes how forced such arguments are and how dangerous it is to teach them.80 Peter then turns to what he considers Aristotle’s authentic opinion. He calls on many both outside and inside the Christian world to support his view that Aristotle taught that the world is eternal.81 Averroës is his first witness; Peter quotes his commentary on De caelo et mundo, where the Commentator claims that Aristotle was the first to speak of the heavens as eternal. Averroës was so sure of this that he cited the positions of all the other ancient philosophers just to stress the uniqueness of the Philosopher’s position.82 The Christian tradition likewise confirms that the Philosopher taught the eternity of the world. An expert on time and eternity, Boethius, in his Consolation of Philosophy taught that Aristotle thought of time in the same way as he thought about the world: neither had a beginning, nor will they have an end.83 Likewise, Peter Lombard, in his rare citation of Aristotle, declared that for the Philosopher the world always is and has existed eternally.84 Not satisfied by an appeal to these authorities, Peter of Candia turns to the texts of Aristotle himself. He lists the arguments that the Philos78

See ibid., 377–9 and 385, no. 3.10–388, no. 3.18. See ibid., 379–81 and 389, no. 3.2–393, no. 3.285. 80 See ibid., 392, no. 3.273: “Unde mirandum est de multis doctoribus qui volunt veritatem fidei per tales aestimationes rudibus demonstrare. Quod non reputo consonum nec conveniens fidei puritati. Bene vellem quod Aristoteles fuisset Christicola, sed loquela sua ipsum reddit cunctis legentibus manifestum.” 81 See ibid., 379–80. 82 See ibid., 392, no. 3.281: “. . . dicit opiniones mundi sunt quattuor: aut credere ipsum nec esse generabilem nec corruptibilem, et haec est opinio Aristotelis, et ipse fuit primus dicens hoc philosophorum Graecorum, et consequenter narrat alias opiniones.” 83 See ibid., 379 and 393, no. 3.283. Cf. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, ed. E. K. Rand (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 5.6, p. 422, ll. 18–20: “Quod igitur temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec coeperit umquam esse nec desinat.” 84 See Brown, “Aristotle’s View,” 379–80 and 392–3, no. 3.282. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, Book 2, dist. 1, chap. 3, no. 4: “Aristoteles tria.—Strabus. Aristoteles vero duo principia dixit, scilicet materiam et speciem, et tertium ‘operatorium’ dictum; mundum quodque semper esse et fuisse.” 79

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opher himself gave for the eternity of the world in chapter 2 of Book VIII of his Physics. He lines up the proofs very much in the same way as did Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Physics.85 Like Aquinas, and Maimonides before him, Peter argues that these three proofs of Aristotle are not demonstrations, even though some followers of the Philosopher (namely, Alexander of Aphrodisias and al-Fārābī according to Maimonides)86 considered them to be such.87 Peter thus feels that the fallacy in these three arguments needs to be exposed. Not only that; he also senses that many arguments that might be considered demonstrations by some in his own day have been added over the centuries to Aristotle’s basic three. He thus gathers ten more arguments from philosophers in favor of the eternity of the world and argues against each of them.88 Having realized that according to divine revelation, the world is not eternal and having made the effort to show the faulty nature of the argumentation present in proofs garnered from Aristotle and other philosophers contending that it is, Peter opens the second part of his discussion of the eternity of the world with the words: Having made a judgment concerning what should be thought regarding the opinion of the philosophers concerning the eternity of the world, and having to some degree refuted their arguments, it seems that de facto nothing distinct from God is eternal. Now we have to look into its possibility—namely, we have to ask whether God could have produced a creature eternally.89

Peter tells us that the doctors of theology seem to provide dramatically different responses. Some hold that it is impossible for the world to exist eternally and that neither a finite nor an infinite power could

85 See Brown, “Aristotle’s View,” 393, no. 3.284–394, no. 3.286. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, Book 8, chap. 1, lect. 2 (Turin, 1965), nos. 505–11. 86 See Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), Book 2, chap. 15, 289–92. 87 See Brown, “Aristotle’s View,” 393, no. 3.284: “. . . nonne hoc idem probat ex intentione, VIII Physicorum, cap. 2, per tres rationes quae aliquibus fuerunt in se demonstrationes quas adducam et solvam.” 88 See ibid., 395, no. 3.411–399, no. 3.50. 89 Peter of Candia, In II Sent., qu. 1, art. 3, part 2 (MS. Vat. lat. 1081, fol. 176rb): “Habito secundum opinionem philosophorum iudicio quid sit de mundi aeternitate censendum, et ipsorum rationibus aliquantulum dissolutis, appareat quod de facto nihil aliud a Deo fuerit aeternum. Nunc consequenter investigandum est de ipsius possibilitate, an, videlicet, Deus creaturam potuerit producere ab aeterno.”

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make it happen. Candia cites twelve arguments in support of this position, although he breaks up their presentation to avoid wearing down the attention of his audience. After criticizing each of these twelve arguments, Peter goes on to present the opinion which claims that it is possible for God to create an eternally existing world and the arguments supporting this claim. He likewise criticizes them, leaving the judgment that one cannot demonstrate the impossibility or the possibility of an eternal world. He thus leaves the gate open for his audience to pick the side that they find more agreeable to them.90 Concluding Reflection Peter of Candia endorses to a very great extent the declarative theology of Peter Auriol. Auriol’s declarative theology, as described above, aims at solving certain problems: attacks on the truths of the faith by heretics and other opponents of Church teaching, imprecise or unclear meanings related to technical theological terms, a lack of suitable examples or analogies to illustrate Church teachings, or a dearth of suitable arguments supporting or confirming truths of the faith. To remedy these weaknesses that cause misunderstanding in the minds of students and challenge their teachers to help them to overcome them, Peter of Candia sets up the main tasks that have to be met by those practicing declarative theology. To replace misunderstanding with understanding, they have to be adept at uncovering the fallacious arguments of those attacking the faith, at defining key terms precisely, at finding suitable analogies, and at providing strong confirming arguments for the essential beliefs of the Church. The way in which Peter of Candia pursues theology in his commentary on the Sentences has many different facets, but his main approach is that of declarative theology. In gathering the positions and arguments

90 See ibid.: “Circa quam quaestionem contradictoria videntur sentire doctores. Quidam tenent quod mundum posse existere aeternaliter est impossibile per quamcumque potentiam finitam vel infinitam. Alii vero oppositum istius tenent. Primo igitur declarabo primae opinionis modum per multiplicia argumenta ad quae per ordinem respondebo. Et consimiliter faciam de alia, ut quilibet sibi placibiliorem eligat partem. Adducam igitur pro primae opinionis declaratione duodecim rationes quibus multi magni doctores fuerint moti ad tenendum quod creatura non potuit a Deo aeternaliter produci. Et primo faciam octo et consequenter solvam, et sic de aliis quattuor faciam cum subsequenti solutione, ne nimia arguendi prolixitas taedium audientibus inferat sine responsione.”

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of his opponents and supporters, he is not just cataloging positions. He views them as providing the resources for a deeper understanding of the various questions he considers. When the positions of theologians are not true with the character of certainty and their arguments are not demonstrations, they leave grounds for dispute. Yet, they still offer to some degree “the kind of knowledge by which our most wholesome faith, which leads to eternal life, is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened.”91 This is the description of the kind of knowledge that St. Augustine considered should be sought by Christian teachers and which came to be known as declarative theology.

91 Augustine, De Trinitate, Book XIV, chap. 1, no. 3 (CCSL 50A:424): “Huic scientiae . . . illud tantummodo attribuitur quo fides saluberrima quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur.”

MARTIN LUTHER Pekka Kärkkäinen Introduction Martin Luther (1483–1546) wrote his marginal notes on Peter Lombard’s Sentences as baccalaureus sententiarius during the years 1509– 1511. He had graduated as master of arts from the university of Erfurt in 1505 and in the same year, after some dramatic events, entered into the monastery of the Augustinian hermits, where he began his theological studies. After the years as bachelor of the Sentences Luther never lectured on the Lombard again, although his later marginal notes on Gabriel Biel’s Collectorium reveal some interest in the tradition of the Sentences commentary. Because of the discontinuation of the Sentences tradition during the Reformation, Luther’s interpretation of the work did not influence any succeeding commentators. Yet there is still the interesting question of how the intensive reading of the Lombard and his commentators influenced Luther’s later reformatory theology. This has been a key question in the studies of Luther’s marginal notes on the Sentences, and it has not yet been exhaustively answered.1 The manuscript containing the marginal notes on Peter Lombard (together with Luther’s handwritten notes on some other works) was found in 1889–1890, the edition was published 1893,2 and since then the notes have received the attention of scholars as the earliest witnesses of Luther’s theological thinking. Already the earliest interpretations have highlighted themes that were to reappear in an important

1 See Josef Wieneke, Luther und Petrus Lombardus. Martin Luthers Notizen anläßlich seiner Vorlesungen über die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus Erfurt 1509/11 (St. Ottilien, 1994), 7–21, for a detailed history of research. See also Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, “Die Erforschung des ‘jungen Luther’ seit 1876,” Lutherjahrbuch 50 (1983): 48–125. 2 Edited by Georg Buchwald in volume 9 of the Weimar edition of Luther’s works: D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar, 1883–), henceforth referred to as WA [volume], [page], [lines]; all references concern the section Schriften, unless indicated otherwise. A new edition of Luther’s various marginal notes is currently being prepared by Jun Matsuura.

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role in Luther’s later reformatory theology.3 Luther’s relationship to earlier commentary traditions was likewise a disputed question already in the early years of the twentieth century. Generally, scholars have never denied at least some influence of the via moderna (or “nominalism” or “Ockhamism”) on Luther’s views in the marginal notes, but the significance of these influences has been judged variously. Heinrich Denifle, one of the earliest Catholic Luther scholars, strongly underlined the importance of “Ockhamism” for Luther’s views. Since he considered the theology of Ockham and his followers as a degenerated form of medieval theology, he consequently blamed these influences as the main source of Luther’s erroneous views. Luther’s views were thus viewed as the result of a “most unhappy encounter” of Augustine and Ockham, which began already in the early marginal notes.4 Protestant scholars adopted, fairly early on, a view of a substantial discontinuity in Luther’s theological thinking. This led to a distinction between genuine reformatory and pre-reformatory elements in Luther’s theology. The latter were often considered as medieval remnants, which were in essential disagreement with Luther’s reformatory aspirations. Rudolf Otto regarded Luther’s comments on Trinitarian theology as part of the medieval heritage, which had nothing to do with the core of Luther’s theology. The historian of dogma Friedrich Loofs detected an influence of Augustine which to a certain degree surpassed the overall influence of the nominalist tradition. Other influential histories of dogma (Otto Ritschl, Reinhold Seeberg) developed the view of Heinrich Boehmer, who maintained that already in the marginal notes Luther adopted the Augustinian interpretation of the righteousness of God, which made a definite difference from medieval scholasticism. Seeberg even contended that Luther’s notes reveal an affinity only to philosophical “nominalism,” while any theological “Ockhamism” is almost completely absent.5

3

See Wieneke, Luther, 7. Cited ibid., 9. 5 See ibid., 8–12. Similar discussions have taken place later in the form of debates about the dating of Luther’s Reformation “breakthrough.” See Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development, ed. and transl. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis, 1999), 85–95. On Otto see also Pekka Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes (Mainz, 2005), 5–6. Here it should be noted at once that such evaluations of Luther’s relationship to medieval theology reveal as much of their writers’ understanding of Luther as of medieval theology. However, the history of research on late medieval theology is outside the scope of this article. For 4

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Martin Scheel’s analysis of Luther’s marginal notes in his comprehensive biography (1917–1930) constituted a new initiative in the research history. Basing himself on extensive knowledge of Luther’s philosophical teachers, Scheel argued strongly for a view according to which all Luther’s doctrines during that phase remained safely inside the borders of the via moderna. Unlike Denifle, Scheel did not discover much continuity between Luther’s early and reformatory theologies, but rather argued for a strong discontinuity, like the majority of the Protestant scholars. Scheel admitted that there are certain points where Luther shows a heightened interest in Holy Scripture, but these merely indicate a relative independence from the scholastic background, which anticipates his reformatory theology to a certain degree.6 Another influential study in the first half of the twentieth century was Paul Vignaux’s Luther, commentateur des Sentences (livre I, distinction XVII), which according to its title concentrates on Luther’s treatment of distinction 17 of the first book, but actually touches on other themes like the doctrine of Trinity as well. Apart from having initiated a certain line of tradition in Luther research, Vignaux’s study is also an interesting milestone in the research on Sentences commentaries in general. Vignaux does not confine himself to studying Luther, but he analyzes a host of earlier commentators from Scotus to Gabriel Biel in order to compare Luther with them.7 Since the expansion of research on Luther’s theology after the Second World War, the marginal notes on the Lombard have only seldom received special attention. Helmar Junghans contributed new insights on the sources of Luther’s views by carefully pointing out the similarities with contemporary humanist writers. Lawrence Murphy’s dissertation calls for a fresh evaluation of the relationship between Luther and the medieval tradition through minute analyses of particular questions; Josef Wieneke’s study partially responds to this plea, but ends

the views of such important scholars as Emanuel Hirsch, Johann von Walther, and Karl Holl, see Wieneke, Luther, 10–11. 6 For a similar approach, see the Herbert Rommel’s dissertation, discussed ibid., 12–14. 7 See Paul Vignaux, Luther, commentateur des Sentences (livre I, distinction XVII) (Paris, 1935). Further analyses on the same passage include Reinhard Schwarz, Fides, Spes und Caritas beim jungen Luther (Berlin, 1962), 12–40; Risto Saarinen, “Ipsa dilectio Deus est. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte von 1. Sent. dist. 17 des Petrus Lombardus bei Martin Luther,” in Thesaurus Lutheri, ed. Anja Ghiselli and Simo Peura (Helsinki, 1987), 185–204; Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 180–3.

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up emphasizing the fundamental difference between Luther and his scholastic predecessors.8 Other topics of interest have been Luther’s views on theology, Christology, and the doctrine of grace.9 Luther wrote his marginal notes in the edition of the Sentences printed by Nikolaus Keßler of Basel in 1489, which included summaries by a Cologne Thomist, Henry of Gorkum.10 Luther commented on Books I through III, but for some reason left the last book almost without comments. The notes may be divided into groups according to their length and content.11 There are underlinings of the printed text and notes on the structure of Lombard’s text, such as divisions of the distinctions into parts, and summaries of the contents. Furthermore, there are references to scriptural and patristic quotations. Interlinear and marginal glosses on individual words and expressions are reminiscent of those found in Luther’s first lectures on the Psalms and the Pauline epistles. There are also several diagrams on the meanings of terms similar to the ones frequently found in the outlines of Luther’s later lectures. Similarly, there are lengthier discussions on the issues raised by the Lombard which approximate to the scholia of the first Psalm and Romans lectures. To some of the discussions Luther attaches a summary with the title “corollary.” Similar passages are found in Biel and in Luther’s own lecture on Romans. Even the longest discussions are not very exhaustive by comparison to those found in Biel, d’Ailly, and Ockham, but it is hard to decide to what extent this brevity is due to the fact that the earlier commentators were at that time readily available in printed editions, and to what extent it is due to Luther’s new unscholastic style of exposition.12

8 See Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten (Göttingen, 1985); Lawrence Francis Murphy, S.J., Martin Luther, Commentator on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Theological Method and Selected Theological Problems (unpublished PhD dissertation, Marquette University, 1970); Wieneke, Luther. On the doctrine of the Trinity in the marginal notes, see also Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie, 47–61. 9 See Wieneke, Luther, 17–29. 10 See Wieneke, Luther, 48. Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 173, provides a picture of a page with Luther’s notes. 11 For the following, see Wieneke, Luther, 52–3; Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 177–9. 12 For an evaluation of Luther’s personal style, a comparison with similar contemporary cases would be most helpful. Jun Matsuura (“Restbestände aus der Bibliothek des Erfurter Augustinerklosters zu Luthers Zeit und bisher unbekannte eigenhändige Notizen Luthers,” in Lutheriana, ed. Gerhard Hammer and Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen [Cologne, 1984], 315–32, at 327–8), has described three commentaries on the Sen-

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Luther’s Intellectual Context It is difficult to make a firm judgment on Luther’s theological position in his marginal notes, but there are reasons to believe that he was more or less consciously following the local tradition of the via moderna. The most distinctive indication of this kind of orientation is that Luther did not hesitate to refer to “modern” authorities such as William Ockham, Pierre d’Ailly, and Gabriel Biel. It seems implausible that a writer who identified himself with the via antiqua would refer to these thinkers in a favorable way.13 On the other hand, it has been noted that already in these early marginal notes, Luther formulates certain criticisms of authorities of the via moderna.14 It is unclear, however, whether such criticisms should be considered as an early departure from the via moderna or, more likely, as part of internal discussions that were not uncommon inside that tradition. It is hardly to be denied that Luther wrote his marginal notes in the context of the late medieval via moderna, whether or not he can be considered to have been an orthodox representative of that school. More difficult is to show how this fact coheres with Luther’s identity as an Augustinian. Earlier research took it for granted that Luther’s monastery was dominated by the via moderna, but since the beginning of research of Augustinianism in Luther’s time, this view

tences with marginal notes among the volumes surviving from the library of the Augustinian monastery in Erfurt, but they have not been studied in depth. See also Matsuura, “Restbestände,” 328–30 for unedited marginal notes from Luther’s hand in some of Ockham’s works. 13 According to Adolar Zumkeller, Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters (Würzburg, 1984), 460, Luther apparently had great freedom in choosing his sources for the lectures, which would explain why his sources were not particularly connected with the theology of the Augustinian order. Zumkeller further refers to the statutes of the theological faculty, which required students to present drafts of their expositions either to their masters or to the dean of the faculty, whose corrections had to be followed. The dean of the faculty at that time was the doctor of theology Sigismundus Thomae de Stockheim, under whom Luther received the degree of sententiarius and started lecturing on the Sentences (see Erich Kleineidam, Universitas studii Erffordensis, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1992), 293; see also Luther’s letter of December 21, 1514, no. 10 [WA Briefwechsel 1, 30, 18]). Sigismundus apparently had no affiliation to a religious order, so that he was most likely an adherent of the via moderna as the secular theologians used to be in Erfurt. The most remarkable among the secular theologians, Jodocus Trutfetter, was at that time dean of the faculty of theology in Wittenberg (see Kleineidam, Universitas, 291), but he returned to Erfurt in 1510. 14 See Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 49.

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has been severely questioned. Although there is no final consensus about the nature of Augustinian theology in Luther’s Erfurt, there seem to be no indications that other theologians of that order cited authorities of the via moderna to such an extent and as favorably as Luther did.15 Humanist or Scholastic? There are indications that the schools of late medieval theology were not the only frame of reference when Luther wrote his marginal notes. Inside the front cover of his copy of the Sentences Luther jotted a note that has been read as a programmatic announcement for his lectures on the Sentences: Although I have held that the spoils of philosophy are not to be utterly rejected insofar as they are suitable to the sacred matters of theology, nevertheless the prudent restraint and unsullied purity of the Master of the Sentences seem extremely proper, in that in every respect he so relies upon the lights of the Church, and especially upon Augustine (the brightest light, whose praise is never sufficient), that he seems to hold in suspicion, as it were, whatever is anxiously explored but not yet known by the philosophers . . . The world is full of Chrysippuses, yes even Chimeras and Hydras! The poets could fashion nothing more expressive and humorous to ridicule the quarrels, battles, and sects of the philosophers, than such monsters as these: laughable indeed, yet also appropriate and most acute in their witty pungency. Therefore, love sound, faithful, and pure authors, or at least (if necessarily it must be so) join them to you in secular familiarity, the philosophers I mean, that is to say, the doubters full of opinions.16

Several points seem obvious concerning the ideal of theology that Luther outlines here: (a) philosophy is sometimes acceptable for theological use, (b) a good theologian, such as Peter Lombard, derives his teaching from the authorities of the Church (above all Augustine), and (c) to consider a multitude of (philosophical) opinions in theology is futile. At first glance this kind of approach would seem to contradict Luther’s obvious use of scholastic terminology and methods in his marginal notes. Moreover, the disregard of “philosophy,”

15 On the Augustinian theology in the Erfurt monastery, see Zumkeller, Erbsünde, 461–5. 16 WA 9, 29, 1–19; trans. Rosemann, Great Medieval Book, 179.

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including the common medieval harmony between philosophy and theology, sounds very much like the humanist critique of scholasticism. A comparison with some notes found in the printed version of Biel’s Sentences commentary from 1501 justifies this observation to a certain extent. At the beginning of the volume, the poet Heinrich Bebel encourages the students to study of the Bible and the Fathers, whereas Biel himself had expressed suspicion of individual study of the sources in his preface, and encouraged study of the commentators whose findings he presented in a digested form in his volume.17 However, Luther’s hostile attitude to philosophy seems to be largely similar to the theology of the via moderna as expressed in Biel’s prologue to his Canonis missae expositio.18 Apart from the return to the Bible and the Fathers, traces of a humanist influence have been seen in the following features of Luther’s marginal notes: use of ancient metaphors, source criticism, quotations from humanist authors, and interest in ancient rhetoric. As we shall see in the following, Luther’s approach is very much like that of the moderate humanists within the via moderna of Tübingen and Erfurt, who did not abandon the use of scholastic methodology, but at the same time strove for a return to the sources.19

17 See Junghans, Der junge Luther, 106–08. There were also two notable theologians of the via moderna in fifteenth-century Germany—namely, John Rucherat of Wesel and Wessel Gansfort—who spoke emphatically in favor of the authority of the Scriptures in theology. See Heiko A. Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 54 (2003): 641–70, at 660. For possible sources of Luther’s criticism of philosophy, see Zumkeller, Erbsünde, 493–5. On Jean Gerson’s similar critique, see Michael M. Shank, “Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand”: Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, 1988). 18 For an analysis and comparison with Luther’s prologue, see Murphy, Martin Luther, 131–96. 19 Wieneke, Luther, 59, gathers the observations of Junghans, Der junge Luther, 94–239. In addition to the topics discussed below, there are some further interesting themes in Luther’s marginal notes, but their inclusion would not alter the overall picture. These themes include discussions on God’s foreknowledge (WA 9, 57–8), on free will (WA 9, 70–2), and on faith (WA 9, 90–2). Also, Luther’s marginal notes on Gabriel Biel’s Collectorium, the earliest of which were composed in 1516 (WA 59, 29– 51), are cited only occasionally in the following, since they belong to a later period of Luther’s life when his theological thinking had already undergone substantial changes. The most important themes in these notes are Christology, the doctrine of grace, and the theological virtues.

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Discussions on the Trinity play a prominent role in the marginal notes.20 Luther’s encounter with the theology of the Trinity did not take place, as was usual, merely on the basis of Peter Lombard’s Sentences and its scholastic commentaries. Already in his early studies he had shown enthusiasm toward the Bible itself, and, concurrently with his lectures on the Sentences, he also read Augustine’s works. By studying Augustine’s De Trinitate Luther was able to acquaint himself with the roots of western Trinitarian theology, as presented by the Lombard and his commentators. With the De Trinitate Luther could trace back to Scripture most of the arguments for doctrines that the Sentences defended on the basis of the authority of Augustine and other Church Fathers. Equipped with this knowledge, it is no wonder that Luther was gradually to form a theology of the Trinity that regarded itself as firmly grounded in the Scriptures, but at the same time owed much to Augustine. Luther’s marginal notes are extremely brief, but they still reveal some distinctive traits in his early method of interpreting the theological tradition. The first of these traits is Luther’s appeal to scriptural authority.21 On the front cover of his copy of the Sentences he cites a passage from Hilary’s De Trinitate which states that God’s own words express most adequately the truths about God.22 A similar kind of attitude is reflected in the discussion of individual questions. Thus, in his discussion of the emanations of the Son and the Spirit, Luther explicitly rejects the Scotist idea of the divine nature and will as two (formally distinct) principles of emanation.23 He argues that such a view destroys the correspondence between the divine persons and the powers of the soul, that is to say, the psychological analogy of the Trinity. Luther does not stop here, but maintains that such a violation of the coherence of the psychological analogy is actually a sign of a neglect of the scriptural authority, since it is stated in the Bible that

20 For the Trinitarian discussions in the marginal notes, see Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie, 48–61; Wieneke, Luther, 65–160. 21 On this point, see Wieneke, Luther, 86. 22 See WA 9, 29, 20–25. Cf. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, 7, 38. 23 Luther does not, contrary to Wieneke’s suggestion (Luther, 144–5), completely reject the use of the distinction per modum voluntatis/naturae in Trinitarian matters since he explicitly mentions a satisfactory interpretation of the idea of the Holy Spirit’s emanation per modum voluntatis.

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the “soul is an image of God.” Although Luther strongly stresses here the idea of scriptural authority, which was hardly questioned by any Western theologian, his argument is focused on the alleged incoherence of the Scotist position.24 Another noteworthy feature in Luther’s interpretation is his moderate criticism of Augustine and the Church councils. One may perhaps consider this as a sign of his tendency to turn back to the scriptural roots of theology. Moreover, Luther notes inconsistencies among some statements in Peter Lombard’s text, but this time this does not lead him to disagreement, which was the case in his criticism of Scotus. In one such case Luther questions the internal coherence of Augustine’s way of using the notion of relation in Trinitarian theology. Luther presents a view according to which the Father is Father only through the Son, whose sonship is constitutive of the Father’s fatherhood. This corresponds to the notion that the Father is wise only through the Son, who is the wisdom of the Father. Luther is not willing to insist on this position, however, or the one following from it, namely, that “being Father differs from being wise,” since he considers the contrary view as being “consonant with the truth as defined by the blessed Augustine.”25 With similar caution Luther presents doubts against the commonly accepted doctrine of an infused habit of charity, granting that the Lombard’s rival theory is “not entirely absurd,” since the notion of habit derives from “the words of Aristotle, the stinking philosopher.” It has been noted that this remark is preceded by a passage where Luther makes use of a standard distinction between God as efficient cause and human love as formal cause of neighborly love. However, it is not clear whether Luther assumes even there any notion of a created habit of love. Human love may well be understood as an act, rather than a habit, of love. Interpreting the passage in this way would reinforce the view that Luther saw only little use for the concept of a created habit of love, which motivated his stance against

24 See WA 9, 45, 37–46, 20. Luther’s inference from the biblical idea of the human being as created in the image and likeness of God to the proposition that the human soul is an image of the Trinity, is by no means self-evident, even if it is, in the light of the long tradition of psychological analogy, not to be considered as far-fetched or at least not unintelligible to his contemporaries. On different interpretations of the psychological analogy in the late Middle Ages, see Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Interpretations of the Psychological Analogy from Aquinas to Biel,” in Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West, ed. Pekka Kärkkäinen (Helsinki, 2007), 256–79. 25 WA 9, 20, 41–21, 16; 38, 28–37.

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its theological plausibility. Again, however, Luther is not willing to contradict the doctrine accepted by the Church, but rather highlights the plausibility of the Lombard’s position.26 Furthermore, Luther uses a doctrinal formulation of the Fourth Lateran Council which states that the essence does not generate, as a basis for disputing the universal validity of a semantic distinction between two meanings given to the attributes of the divine essence, one of them denoting the essence, the other the persons.27 It is clear, therefore, that Luther, despite his programmatic note on scriptural authority in theological matters, in his practice of interpreting the Sentences continued to accept the formal authority of the Church and even that of Augustine. The majority of Luther’s notes on Book I consist of discussions on Trinitarian questions raised by Peter Lombard, which Luther deals with in a similar manner as his scholastic predecessors, above all d’Ailly and Biel. The names of God are, according to Luther, derived from creatures; they designate God only in an improper manner by means of similarity.28 In his notes on De vera religione from the same period of time, Luther discusses Augustine’s view that the similarity between God and creation is based on Christ as the creative Logos. According to Luther, Christ is the similarity itself that establishes the similarity between God, on the one hand, and the image of God in human beings and all the creatures, on the other.29 In good Augustinian manner, Luther stresses the ineffability of Trinitarian matters.30 Nonetheless, he is not shy in using the semantic machinery of his predecessors to address the problems of Trinitarian theology. That is, for example, how Luther tries to solve the problems involving distinction 25, where quotations from Augustine seem to suggest that person is the same as essence. Luther notes that “person

26

See WA 9, 42, 39–43, 8. On the interpretation of this passage, see Saarinen, “Ipsa dilectio,” and other studies mentioned above in note 7. Wieneke, Luther, 156 considers Luther’s remarks in WA 9, 44, 1–5 as a partial acceptance of the Lombard’s view, but they may equally well be read as Luther’s explication of the Lombard’s position without any personal commitment to its truth or falsity. Perhaps Luther was merely eager to show the theological genius of the Master in solving the apparent contradictions in Augustine, even without the conceptual tools of later authors, such as the notion of a created habit and the distinction between created and uncreated love. 27 See WA 9, 34, 35–35, 5. 28 See WA 9, 47, 9–17; 58, 10–12. 29 See WA 9, 13, 35–14, 10. 30 See WA 9, 20, 22–28; 47, 9–17.

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is a common name (nomen commune), whereas essence is a common thing (res communis).” Luther’s wording resembles a distinction made by Pierre d’Ailly, according to which certain names of God, such as “person” and “suppositum” are classified as “common personal names.” The source of confusion is that such names designate all three persons as common nouns and, due to the identity between essence and persons, even the divine essence. “Essence” names the divine essence common to all the persons, but does not designate the persons qua persons.31 A noteworthy feature in Luther’s Trinitarian semantics is his interpretation of the traditional notion of Trinitarian appropriation (appropriatio). “Love” as a property of the Holy Spirit is appropriated to the third person on the basis of the biblical mode of speech; there are no logical reasons for such a procedure, so that “love” might as well designate the common divine essence, which is in fact another acceptable use of the term for Luther.32 He also uses the notion of appropriation to substantiate his criticism of Scotus’s notion of formally distinct principles of generation and spiration in God. Like Pierre d’Ailly, he solves the related problems with the help of the appropriation of the will of God to the Holy Spirit.33 Luther also devotes considerable attention to another related theme: whether it is permitted to use the terms “God,” “essence,” and “wisdom” to denote both divine persons and the divine essence. In one case he seems to reject the use of a term “God” to denote the individual persons, since that would imply that there are three Gods and three objects of adoration. Later on he notes that it is allowed to use “God” in this way, calling on the authority of Pierre d’Ailly, who even considers such sentences as “there are three Gods” to be true, although he does not allow them to be used because of the possibility of heretical misunderstanding. There is also a very strong reason for allowing the application of the term “God” to the individual persons: the wording of the Nicene Creed. Without allowing such a use of language, the

31 See WA 9, 48, 23–31. The end of the text (“Non autem sic est omnino de essentia, quia hoc est actu significans terminus”) is a bit obscure. Wieneke (Luther, 128) maintains that Luther is simply identifying person with essence. 32 See WA 9, 51, 16–33; Kärkkäinen, Luthers trinitarische Theologie, 50–2; Wieneke, Luther, 135. 33 See WA 9, 45, 37–46, 7; Pierre d’Ailly, Quaestiones magistri Petri de Ailliaco cardinalis Cameracensis super libros Sententiarum (Straßburg, 1490; reprinted, Frankfurt am Main, 1968), Book I, qu. 6.

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formulation “God from God” would became suspect. In distinction 5, Luther notes that on the grounds of such a use of language, one could argue against Peter Lombard’s position that the Father did not beget the divine essence: if “God,” “wisdom,” and “light” can be predicated of individual persons, why not “essence”? He concludes that the philosophical reasons (rationes) are not decisive, but that the theological ones are: in this case the decree of the Second Lateran Council must guide the use of the terms.34 It should be noted that even if Luther did not allow “essence” to be used as a designation of the individual divine persons, in another context he notes that the Fathers, such as Augustine, sometimes use “nature” in a sense that makes it a “transcendental term.” Luther apparently means that it can be used in the same way as res (“thing” or “entity”) and other transcendental terms. According to traditional usage, res could be predicated either of the essence or of the persons; in this sense nature, too, could then be predicated of the persons. Luther is aware that this kind of usage contradicts distinction 5 of the first Book.35 Luther is inclined to limit the use of some attributes like “wisdom” and “goodness” to denote only the persons of the Son and the Spirit. He is aware that Augustine did not make such a restriction, but used those terms as names of the divine essence also. On that matter Luther does not dare to contradict the Church Father. Nonetheless, he expresses his own opinion, which would be to treat those terms as relational, analogously to such terms as “father” and “son.” This would imply that the divine Father could be called “wise” only in regard to having a Son, who is the wisdom of the Father. Similarly, the Father would be called “good” only through the Holy Spirit, who is his goodness.36

34 See WA 9, 34, 35–35, 5. It is too much to say, as Wieneke does (Luther, 117), that Luther is negating the distinction between essence and person; he merely applies Peter Lombard’s idea that the divine essence is present in each of the persons (see Sentences I, dist. 5, chap. 1, no. 1), which makes it possible to say that “God the Father is the divine essence” (chap. 1, no. 3). If one applied the same idea to the Son, it would be entirely consistent to say that an essence begets an essence, although, according to Luther, this is obviously not acceptable. See WA 9, 35, 6–8. 35 See WA 9, 84, 28–35. 36 See WA 9, 38, 28–37; see also WA 9, 19, 16–23; 20, 22–21, 16 (marginal notes on Augustine’s De Trinitate). Luther argues that there is an inconsistency in Augustine’s wording in different passages, but warns about rash statements because of the ineffability of the matter. See Graham White, Luther as Nominalist (Helsinki, 1994), 196–200.

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On the question of whether the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (Filioque) is fundamental for the distinction between persons of the Son and the Spirit, Luther seems to favor Pierre d’Ailly’s view rather than Biel’s. Luther ties the procession of the Spirit as love to the notion of the human soul as an image of the Trinity.37 His criticism of Scotus, then, seems to be his only emphatic comment in relation to the work of the Trinity toward the world, which was to become the main focus of Luther’s Trinitarian theology in later years. Luther considers Scotus’s position, according to which the enjoyment of one Trinitarian person without the enjoyment of another is not contradictory, as an almost heretical statement.38 Luther’s own statements on the matter are largely governed by the Augustinian principle of the indivisibility of the works of the Trinity ad extra.39 However, this principle does not prevent him from ascribing some works of the Trinity to individual persons, such as the infusion of charity to the Holy Spirit.40 His anti-Scotist overtones and use of semantic strategies mark Luther’s notes on the first Book as belonging distinctly to via moderna-style commentary. There are nonetheless some signs of a humanist return to the sources, above all to Augustine and the Bible. Second Book: Original Sin Peter Lombard discusses original sin in distinctions 30 to 33 of the second book. Luther’s remarks on this topic are relatively long, which may reflect the general interest in this topic in late-fifteenth-century Erfurt. A closer look at some contemporary writers reveals that Luther did not formulate his position in a historical vacuum. In his commentary on distinction 30, Gabriel Biel makes a threefold distinction that elucidates the problematic Luther is coping with, although he does not explicitly mention Biel in this case. Biel presents 37 See WA 9, 46,9–20; d’Ailly, Quaestiones, I, qu. 8; Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. Wilfrid Werbeck and Udo Hofmann, 5 vols. and Index (Tübingen, 1973–1992), Book I, dist. 13, qu. un. A. 38 See WA 9, 43, 18–24: “error et heresi proxima sententia Scoti”; 43, 37–42. On this view and the related late medieval discussions, see Severin Kitanov, Beatific Enjoyment in Scholastic Theology and Philosophy, 1240–1335 (ThD dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2006), 178–216. 39 See, for example, WA 9, 39, 21–24; 43, 18–27; 37–42. 40 See WA 9, 42, 36–38.

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three views on the nature of original sin. The first is Peter Lombard’s position, which identifies original sin with concupiscence or the “tinder of sin.” The second view defines original sin in negative terms as a lack of original righteousness, together with an obligation to have it. This view is attributed to Anselm of Canterbury and further to Scotus and Ockham. Biel himself prefers the third option, which follows Aquinas and Bonaventure in combining the two previous views into the following definition of original sin: according to its material part it consists of concupiscence, and according to its formal part it is lack of original righteousness. Biel explicates this definition by stating that the expression “original sin” stands for (supponit) concupiscence, but connotes the absence of original righteousness.41 Luther also adopts the third view when he notes that original sin is a privation regarding its form (quoad formale), while regarding its essence (quoad essentiale), it is the flesh that acts in concupiscence because of the lack of virtue and grace.42 However, Luther’s wording is strikingly different from Biel’s in two respects, namely, in his use of “nothing” in this context and in his explicit rejection of the Lombard’s position. Luther does not hesitate to use the word “nothing” (nihil) in speaking about original sin. He notes that as a privation original sin is “nothing”; this is consonant with Luther’s view that, metaphysically speaking, all sin is nothing, since evil qua evil has no positive being.43 If this manner of speaking was something that Biel was consciously trying to avoid, as it seems, he had good grounds for doing so: the famous Erfurt theologian John Rucherat of Wesel had been condemned in 1479 by the archbishop of Mainz, among other things, because of his denial of original sin. Wesel had initially built his position on the

41 See Biel, Collectorium, II, dist. 30, qu. 2, art. 1; cf. Sentences, II, dist. 30, chap. 8, no. 2 (500). On Biel’s view of original sin, see Wilhem Ernst, Gott und Mensch am Vorabend der Reformation (Leipzig, 1972), 316–20; Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 3rd ed. (Durham, 1983), 120–31; John L. Farthing, Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel (Durham, 1988), 50–1. Farthing notes that Biel conceives of all three positions as acceptable and seems to favor the second and the third positions for different reasons. 42 See WA 9, 73, 31–35. Luther’s wording is not particularly scholastic. 43 See WA 9, 73, 31–32: “Peccatum originale est nihil seu privatio sicut omne peccatum quoad formale.” In his note on distinction 36 of the first book, Luther explicitly connects good and evil to being and nothingness; on the convertibility of the transcendentals and evil as nothing in early Luther, see further Sammeli Juntunen, Der Begriff des Nichts bei Luther in den Jahren von 1510 bis 1523 (Helsinki, 1996), 209–28.

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Anselmian view, from which he deduced the thesis that original sin is “nothing.” He further radicalized it by claiming that the distinction between original and actual sin is an invention that has no scriptural roots and was not found in the Fathers’ writings prior to Augustine.44 Against this background the syllogism in Luther’s marginal notes: “Every evil is nothing, every sin is an evil, therefore, every sin is nothing” may seem rather daring, even if there is no reason here to posit any direct line of influence between Wesel and Luther.45 It should be noted, however, that Luther does not deny the presence of original sin in unbaptized infants, as Wesel did.46 Another difference between Luther and Biel is found in their respective attitudes toward the Lombard’s position on the matter. Whereas Biel considered the third view as one that could harmonize the authoritative views of Anselm and Peter Lombard, Luther points to an inner contradiction in the Lombard’s position. In his notes on distinction 32, Luther comments that when concupiscence is understood exclusively in terms of a rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, as the Sentences’ wording suggests here, this is not what original sin is, since it is not removed in baptism and is not sinful in itself, but only prompts the baptized to actual sins. According to Luther, there is also another meaning of concupiscence in Augustine’s texts and even in the Sentences. This meaning includes the notion of guilt that consists of absence of original righteousness or absence of fleshly obedience; this is the concupiscence as original sin which exists in the unbaptized and is consequently removed in baptism. Luther clearly repudiates the authority of that part of Peter Lombard’s text, although he does not entirely reject his position. Augustine’s authority is affirmed

44

See Kleineidam, Universitas, 107. See WA 9, 73, 6–10. In his tract “On the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary,” Wesel defends a thesis that “original sin is nothing” with three arguments, drawing a conclusion that children do not inherit original sin from their parents. The text of the tract is edited in Gerhard Ritter, Studien zur Spätscholastik, vol. 3: Neue Quellenstücke zur Theologie des Johann von Wesel (Heidelberg, 1927), 86–99; see esp. 88–9. Luther once mentioned Wesel as one “who ruled through his writings in the University of Erfurt,” but this has usually been understood as a reference to Wesel’s philosophical writings since Luther connects this remark to his studies in the faculty of arts. On similarities between Wesel and Luther, see Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna.” 46 See WA 9, 73, 31–5. 45

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with the help of a distinction between two meanings of the term “concupiscence.”47 With regard to Luther’s intellectual context, one may note a heightened tendency by the end of the fifteenth century to include once again the notion of concupiscence in the concept of original sin. In addition to Wesel’s extreme position of the 1470s, Johannes Dorsten, an influential contemporary Augustinian in Erfurt, argued for the exclusion of concupiscence from the concept of original sin, even against his great authority, Giles of Rome.48 In the 1480s Biel, in his commentary on Sentences, adopted a harmonizing position, which affirmed concupiscence as the material part of the original sin. Immediately after the turn of the century, the Augustinian Johannes Paltz disagreed with his teacher Dorsten and, like Giles and Biel, included concupiscence in the concept of original sin.49 Luther’s remark on the twofold meaning of concupiscence in Augustine, as well as his general treatment of the question, fit well with the thought of his closest contemporaries, but do not reveal much of his affinity to any particular theological school. His departures from Biel are generally less significant than his outspoken disagreement in the case of the question about the material inheritance of the body from parents to children. Regarding this issue, Luther favors the Lombard’s view according to which all human beings originate from a part of their parents’ body that grows by multiplying itself into an individual body. Therefore, all human bodies are ultimately derived from Adam’s body. Biel, for his part, adopted the later common opinion according to which human beings originate from semen and bodily humors, which are not considered as parts of the parents’ bodies, but rather as inanimate substances that the parents produce. According to Biel’s view, there is no material, but rather a causal continuity between the bodies of Adam and his offspring. Luther correctly notes that Biel based his refutation of Peter Lombard’s position on philosophical arguments; therefore, he finds the Lombard’s view more acceptable.50

47

WA 9, 75, 16–41. See Zumkeller, Erbsünde, 320–1. 49 See ibid., 396–7. The Augustinian John Staupitz does not reveal his position on the matter of concupiscence as part of original sin in unbaptized infants. See Zumkeller, Johannes von Staupitz und seine christliche Heilslehre (Würzburg, 1994), 34–9. 50 See Biel, Collectorium, III, dist. 4, qu. un. O. Cf. Murphy, Martin Luther, 56–8. Murphy notes that Biel also argues his position on a theological basis, but I cannot 48

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Third Book: Christology It has been customary to consider Luther’s treatment of Christological questions in the marginal notes against the backdrop of the via moderna, particularly that of Pierre d’Ailly and Gabriel Biel. Several scholars have agreed that Luther is reacting to the discussions of his predecessors, but the overall evaluation of Luther’s contribution varies considerably, particularly concerning the question of whether the marginal notes are anticipating his later Christological position.51 In distinction 6 of Book III Luther uses “human being” (homo), when applied to Christ in the Incarnation, as an equivocal concept; this is also how the concept appears in Pierre d’Ailly’s commentary.52 The equivocation is due to the difference between the definitions of human being in the incarnate Christ and in other human beings, including the human nature assumed by the divine Logos in the Incarnation. When applied to Christ as a divine person, “human being” denotes a being that is both human and divine; for other human beings it denotes a human nature that can be defined as something consisting merely of a soul and a body. By means of this equivocation Luther dissolves the incongruities in one of the opinions on the person of Christ that Peter Lombard presents in the same distinction 6. Luther does not explicitly say that this view would be acceptable to him, but the use of equivocation would, according to Luther, free the opinion from the errors that made Biel reject it. Biel, by contrast, does not allow for equivocation in the concept of human being, but defines it as “rational animal,” which is true both of the incarnate person of Christ and of other human beings.53 Another matter of disagreement between Luther and Biel lies in the question of the personhood of the human soul, which does not directly relate to the Christology, but rather to the metaphysics of the human being. In distinction 5, Biel clearly denies that a soul separated from its body would be a person, but in his notes on the distinction, Luther

find such arguments in his refutation of Peter Lombard’s position on the inheritance of the body from the parents. 51 See Wieneke, Luther, 174–81. 52 See d’Ailly, Quaestiones, III, qu. un.; Pekka Kärkkäinen, “On the Semantics of ‘Human Being’ and ‘Animal’ in Early 16th Century Erfurt,” Vivarium 42 (2004): 236– 56, at 245–6; White, Luther, 262–5. 53 See WA 9, 85, 36–86, 12; Biel, Collectorium, III, dist. 7, qu. un. See also Kärkkäinen, “On the Semantics,” 246–8.

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affirms the opposite, adopting Peter Lombard’s view on the matter. Furthermore, Luther maintains that a soul, both separated and united with the body, should be considered the proper bearer of personhood, so that the union with the body adds nothing to the personhood of the soul. Luther thus refutes even the Lombard’s view, which states that before the Incarnation, the soul of Christ was not a person, since it was not yet united with a body. Luther explains that the soul should be considered as the principal bearer of human personhood in the sense that its union with the body adds as little to its individuality as a garment does to a body. Moreover, the soul carries the body in manner similar to the way in which the incarnated Logos carries its human nature.54 The starting point of Luther’s argumentation is the Lombard’s view that affirms the personhood of the soul after bodily death. Biel denies this position with the help of a definition of personhood that stipulates an absence of any actual or potential union (privatio communicabilitatis) with another substance, including that of a separated soul with a body. At the same time, Biel grants the soul, both separate and united with the body, a status of “discrete and individual substance, which is really distinct from all other substances.” This kind of entity is not a person precisely because of the above-mentioned definition of personhood, which denies that separated souls can be called “persons” and, generally, that forms separated from matter can be called “individuals” (supposita) because of their communicability. Forms separated from matter include the accidents of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which due to the miracle of transubstantiation exist without the substance of the bread and wine. According to Biel, these accidents should also consequently be called “individuals,” “which nobody does.”55 Luther does not address the last argument in his early marginal notes, but he returns to the subject in his later remarks on Biel’s Collectorium, which date from his time at Wittenberg (perhaps even as late as the 1530s). There he notes that Biel’s arguments are “arbitrary.” On the argument on the accidents of the Eucharist he remarks: “This is

54 See WA 9, 85, 6–28. Murphy (Martin Luther, 51 n. 25) calls Luther’s ontology here “Platonist.” It is to be noted that, despite his rejection of Biel’s and Peter Lombard’s arguments, Luther does not seem to think that the second person of the Godhead assumed a human person rather than a human nature. I will return to this point below. 55 Biel, Collectorium, III, dist. 5, art. 3, dub. 1 D.

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nothing. Why so? If you maintain this [i.e., that the accidents are communicable in the same manner as substantial forms], concede also the consequence. Why then are the accidents not substances? However, it is stupid to infer natural things from miracles.”56 One should not hastily overstate the metaphysical implications of Luther’s position in contrast to Biel’s, since even Biel grants that a united soul is an individual and really distinct from matter, although he does not want to call a soul “person.” This may be due to Luther’s general attitude toward the problem that the Lombard and Biel tried to solve. Their purpose was to show that the human soul that Christ assumed was not a person, although Peter Lombard thought that in its union with the body a soul receives some permanent property, due to which it is a person even after the separation of soul and body in death. Luther appears to think that the answer to the question of whether the divine Word assumed a person or not, does not depend on whether there was a human person to assume or not. His attitude resembles that of Pierre d’Ailly, who posited several hypothetical cases about the Incarnation, including cases where there was clearly a human person whose nature the Word assumed. Against this background it might have seemed irrelevant to Luther to construct any limitations for the personhood of Christ’s human nature before the Incarnation, since it could be stated simply that Christ did not assume a human person, but only the human nature of that person. The loss of individuality of the human nature at the Incarnation would be a sufficient reason to say that after the hypostatic union there is only one person, who is both human and divine. However, neither d’Ailly nor Luther discusses the problem of whether the assumed human nature, being a rational individual nature, was a person before the Incarnation or not. On the basis of his equivocal concept of human being, d’Ailly conceded that a divine person assumed a human nature, while denying that a divine person assumed a human person in the Incarnation.57 Luther reveals his primary concern in a reference to the biblical mode of speech which refers to the body as “the garment of the soul.”58 He also expresses abhorrence at

56 57 58

WA 59, 31, 37–9. On Pierre d’Ailly, see White, Luther, 262–7. WA 9, 85, 25: “Corpus autem vestimentum animae est secundum scripturam.”

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speaking of personality as a property of the soul, as though personality were a mere addition to the essence (merum accedens) of the soul resulting from its union with the body, as it might seem to be according to the Lombard’s view. There is something genuinely dualist in Luther’s position, but his reasoning does not really go beyond the boundaries of the via moderna.59 Perhaps Luther’s remarks anticipate something of his later uneasiness about the Aristotelian hylomorphic view of the human being, which led him to reject the notion of the soul as a substantial form of the body in his Heidelberg disputation (1518). In his early marginal notes, however, we do not find traces of such a suspicion; after all, the view that the human soul is a substantial form of the body was a doctrine canonized by the Council of Vienna in 1312.60 The via moderna has also been seen as the source of statements by Luther that allow the human nature to be predicated “accidentally” of the person of Christ. Several studies have criticized Luther’s use of the substance/accident distinction in the definition of the relationship between Christ’s two natures; these studies have argued that the distinction derives them from the (allegedly bad) influence of Ockham and his followers.61 On the basis of Theobald Beer’s observations, Josef Wieneke has argued that Luther pushed the approach of his scholastic teachers to an extreme. In particular this applies, according to Wieneke, to Luther’s treatment of the designation “Christ.” Wieneke considers such formulations as, “ ‘Son of God’ and ‘Christ,’ although they are the same, have different connotations, like ‘Peter’ and ‘white’ ” to be extremely problematic. In his eyes this formulation and similar ones indicate that Luther considered Christ as an accident of the second person of the Godhead (“Son of God”), which is even worse than the nominalist application of the substance/accident distinction to the relationship between the Christ’s two natures.

59 Cf. Luther’s remarks on Christology in his late disputation on the divinity and humanity of Christ (WA 39/2, 115, 31–116, 13). There he explicitly denies that the Word assumed (suscepit) a human person, since this would have involved a duality of persons in Christ. Luther bases his position clearly on d’Ailly’s views. For an interpretation of the passage, see White, Luther, 281–2. 60 On this discussion in Luther’s teachers and on Luther’s later stance toward the doctrine, see Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Nominalist Psychology and Limits of Canon Law in Late Medieval Erfurt,” in Lutheran Reformation and the Law, ed. Virpi Mäkinen (Leiden, 2006), 93–110. 61 See Wieneke, Luther, 172.

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Graham White has attacked Reinhard Schwarz’s view according to which Biel’s Ockhamist manner of using the concept “accidental” implies that he considered Christ’s human nature as an accident in a metaphysical sense. The source of the confusion lies, according to White, in the inability to distinguish between syntax and semantics.62 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Luther would have substantially changed his attitude toward this kind of Christology later in his life, as Schwarz suggests.63 Even the manner in which Luther considered the designation “Christ” does not seem radically different from the language of his predecessors, since even Biel defines “Christ” as a term that designates a person having a divine and a human nature, unlike such terms as “Word” or “God,” which connote only a divine nature.64 Understood in this way, it is logical to point out, as Luther did, that “as the logicians say: Christ was from eternity,” that is to say, the person who is presently Christ (both God and human being), is the same person as the second person of the Trinity, who has been eternally, “but he was not eternally Christ,” that is, he is not to be designated as Christ before the Incarnation, in a proper manner of speaking. Nevertheless, there may still be a difference between Luther and Biel, since Biel was careful in stressing that human nature is not an accident of the divine Word, although it is something that is not necessarily part of the divine person, since it is united with it at a certain point in time; Luther, on the other hand, calls the designation “Christ” an accidental (as opposed to substantial) name and states that “just as ‘white’ is in relation to human being, so is ‘Christ’ in relation to the Son of God.”65 However, the placement of terms into categories was not a trivial task even for Biel. He was familiar with the usual manner, practiced by the via moderna, of considering terms belonging to the category of substance as absolute, whereas those belonging to other (accidental) categories were connotative. In his discussion of whether the term “human being” fits into this classification as a substantial

62 See White, Luther, 271–80; White is commenting on Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 63 (1966): 289–351, quoted also by Wieneke, Luther, 174. 63 See White, Luther, 287–93. 64 See Biel, Collectorium, III, dist. 22, puncta summaria; see also III, dist. 6, qu. 2 C, and dist. 22, qu. un. F, where Biel states that in its descent into hell the person of the Word could not properly be called “Christ.” As he was reading Biel in later years Luther underlined these words (WA 59, 40, 3). 65 Biel, Collectorium, III, dist. 6, qu. 2 C; WA 9, 87, 33–39.

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term, he ended up providing two possible answers: the first one is to include certain connotative terms, such as concrete terms for substance, among the substantial terms; the second one is to consider concrete terms for substances as absolute, despite the fact that they connote some substantial disposition, such as being an individual. Regardless of the answer, it would not have been unnatural for Biel to consider such a term as “Christ,” which is clearly connotative and affirmed and denied of the same person at different moments of time, as an accidental term, just as Luther did.66 If this kind of reasoning lies behind Luther’s short note, it shows that he was deeply involved in semantic considerations like Biel’s and perhaps drew some conclusions not found in the previous commentaries; but he did not do so in an extraordinary or extreme way. The same can be said of Luther’s further considerations of the designation “Christ,” which are obviously based on an understanding of the term as connotative. Luther denies that the human and divine natures can properly be designated as parts of the divine person of the Son of God, or that the Son of God is composite rather than constituted of these natures. However, it seems logical to him to say, concerning the nature of the concept “Christ,” that the divine and human natures are parts of Christ, even though Christ and the Son of God are identical in reality. The analogy between “Christ” and concrete accidental terms lies basically in their nature as connotative concepts: a proper name such as “Peter” (just like “Son of God”) designates an individual who is not composed of a human substance and whiteness, whereas the concrete term “white” designates something composed of a substance and whiteness that may as well be identical with Peter. Luther’s motivation still turns out to be mainly semantic rather than metaphysical, although he finds a way here to justify John Damascene’s “heretical” mode of speaking as cited by the Lombard.67

66

On Biel, see Kärkkäinen, “On the Semantics,” 246–8. See WA 9, 86, 26–87, 1. It may also be possible to read Luther’s note as an explication of the further consequences of a heretical mode of speaking, without his own consent to these statements. This reading would be more consonant with his overall tendency in the marginal notes to avoid doctrinally suspect opinions. Generally speaking, the above analysis of Luther’s Christological remarks calls for a thorough comparison between Luther and his predecessors, particularly the commentaries of Ockham, d’Ailly, and Biel, which exceeds the limitations of this contribution. Such a study would also benefit from a truly reliable edition of Luther’s marginal notes, since minor inaccuracies here may cause severe problems of interpretation. 67

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Conclusion: The Sentences and Luther’s Later Theology On the basis of the questions analyzed above it appears obvious that Luther commented on the Sentences as both a scholastic and a humanist. He shows deep familiarity with the commentary tradition of the via moderna, particularly in the form represented by Biel. At times he clearly favors the “unsullied purity of the Master” and of Augustine; many times he attempts to establish a firm basis for theological doctrine in the Scriptures. During the years following his notes on the Sentences several topics discussed above underwent radical transformation in Luther’s theology. As early as 1515–1516 he explicitly rejected both the doctrine of original sin as a privation of original righteousness, and the view of the virtue of righteousness as an infused habit.68 Due to his gradual rejection of the formal authority of the pope and the councils, Luther considered himself not to be obliged to affirm all the doctrines included in the books of canon law, unlike the majority of late medieval theologians who considered these to demarcate the line between orthodox and heterodox teaching. A symbolic culmination of these developments was the burning of several books of canon law together with the papal bull Exsurge Domini, which Luther carried out in Wittenberg in December, 1520.69 However, his interest in the tradition of the Sentences did not come to an end. As Leif Grane has shown in detail, Luther’s criticism of scholastic theology during the years 1516–1517 took shape while he was reading Biel’s commentary on distinctions 27 and 37 of the third Book.70 However, the practice of lecturing on the Sentences was discontinued at Wittenberg in the early sixteenth century; gradually Philipp Melanchthon’s Loci communes and similar works took its place in universities following the Lutheran Reformation.71

68 See Simo Peura, Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von 1513 bis 1519 (Mainz, 1994), 113–15. 69 On this event, see Martin Brecht, Martin Luther. Sein Weg zur Reformation 1483–1521 (Stuttgart, 1981), 403–06. 70 See Leif Grane, Contra Gabrielem. Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio Contra Scholasticam Theologiam 1517 (Copenhagen 1962), 348–68. 71 See Thomas Kaufmann, “Martin Chemnitz (1522–1586). Zur Wirkungsgeschichte der theologischen Loci,” in Melanchthon in seinen Schülern, ed. Heinz Scheible (Wiesbaden, 1997), 183–253, at 183–91.

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This change in literary forms, however, did not cause a complete discontinuation in the doctrinal tradition. Especially the reintroduction of scholarly disputations at the university of Wittenberg in the 1530s brought back some medieval discussions. In the records made of these disputations, we find Luther once again condemning Scotus’s view on the inner-Trinitarian relations. Luther’s attitude oscillates between rejection and preservation of the tradition: in rejecting the notion of a created habit of charity, he stresses the importance of distinguishing between created and uncreated love; in disfavoring the Lombard’s canonized view that the divine essence does not generate, he uses the logical analyses learned from Pierre d’Ailly; and finally, in his late disputation on Christology, Luther joins the discussion of his nominalist predecessors, but with an even more cautious tone than in the early marginal notes. These instances indicate the need for a detailed comparison between late medieval Sentences commentaries and early Reformation theology. Such a comparison would greatly contribute to a proper evaluation of the theological continuities and discontinuities between the late Middle Ages and the Reformation.72

72 On Luther’s late disputations, see White, Luther, and Stefan Streiff, “Novis linguis loqui.” Martin Luthers Disputation über Joh. 1, 14 “Verbum caro factum est” aus dem Jahr 1539 (Göttingen, 1993).

CONCLUSION: THE TRADITION OF THE SENTENCES Philipp W. Rosemann In a previous publication, The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s “Sentences” (2007), I offered a preliminary sketch of the structure of the tradition of Sentences commentaries. In that study, I understood structure primarily in terms of literary form, so that my analysis focused upon the development of the literary shape that Sentences commentaries took between 1158, when Peter Lombard released the final redaction of his magnum opus, and 1511, the year in which Martin Luther completed his term as baccaleureus Sententiarum. In addition, I showed how changes in the literary form of the Sentences literature went hand in hand with corresponding shifts in the conception of the theological project itself; in other words, how literary history and the history of ideas are connected. Quickly summarized, The Story of a Great Medieval Book argued that the Sentences literature unfolded in a dialectical movement of expansion and contraction; furthermore, the book suggested that this movement was itself inscribed within the larger, but similarly structured history of the reception of Sacred Scripture. Scripture stands at the center of a tradition that developed around it in increasingly distant layers of explanation and gradual transformation of the biblical narrative into theological doctrine. This centrifugal movement soon came to be balanced by a countermovement “inward”: the Christian intellectual tradition, spawned by reflection upon the sacred text, proliferated, yet the more it broadened in scope, the greater was the need which was felt to prevent its fruits from dispersing. As early as the fifth century, Prosper of Aquitaine’s Liber sententiarum Sancti Augustini, the first sentences collection, endeavored to boil the Bishop of Hippo’s huge and frequently doctrinally ambiguous oeuvre down to a more manageable form so that it could be studied more methodically. By the twelfth century, sacra pagina—the study of the “sacred page,” understood as not only grounding but encompassing all theological reflection—had advanced to such an extent that the time had come for a comprehensive summary. Peter Lombard addressed this task in his Book of Sentences, which henceforth became

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the center of a second set of circles of expansion and contraction. For, the new sacra doctrina or scientia divina, which arose out of and in the Sentences commentaries of the thirteenth century, was no longer grounded directly in Scripture but rather indirectly, precisely through the Sentences and the Sentences literature. Bit by bit even the Book of Sentences, however, lost its paradigmatic force. Theology, as a consequence, while gaining in conceptual sophistication, lost much of its immediacy to the sacred text and spiritual appeal. Moreover, it lost its synthetic force as a comprehensive account of the Christian faith. This crisis, which was characteristic of the nominalism of the fourteenth century, led to a vigorous movement backward, back to the sources: back to Augustine, back to the acknowledged authorities of an earlier age, back to the Sentences, and ultimately back to Scripture itself. These developments in theological method were accompanied, mirrored, and facilitated by parallel developments in the literary form of the Sentences commentaries: initially, the glosses and commentaries followed Peter Lombard’s text very closely; in the thirteenth century, the theologians’ advanced debates began to take off, as it were, from the text of the Sentences; and the “commentators” of the fourteenth century normally used the Book of Sentences as a mere pretext to develop their own reflections on topics of contemporary interest—topics, moreover, which not infrequently appealed to them for their logical rather than properly theological relevance. Then, in the long fifteenth century, authors such as Denys the Carthusian and Gabriel Biel once again offered complete and comprehensive Sentences commentaries. These were the salient theses of my earlier book. Since The Story of a Great Medieval Book was based upon the analysis of a small selection of Sentences commentaries—for the most part, works available in modern critical editions by some of the better-known theologians of the later Middle Ages—these theses could not claim to be more than working hypotheses awaiting confirmation, qualification, and correction as research in the field would advance. Now the contributions to the present volume have added significantly to our picture of the reception of the Sentences. This is why I would like to employ these concluding pages to update the findings from The Story of a Great Medieval Book. The following remarks will take their starting point from claims about the tradition of the Sentences that I advanced in my earlier book; they will then proceed to examine how these claims are

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corroborated, nuanced, or refuted by the contributions to the present volume. * * * The first stage in the Wirkungsgeschichte of the Sentences, as I reconstructed it in The Story of a Great Medieval Book, was marked by glosses, on the one hand, and abbreviations, on the other. Marginal (or interlinear) glosses soon gave rise to keyword glosses, in which certain phrases from the Sentences, instead of being explained in the margins (or in between the lines), were quoted as lemmata followed by more extended commentary. Well-known examples of abbreviations are an early one (from the second half of the twelfth century) by a certain Master Bandinus and another, later one called Filia Magistri. The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss is the earliest known keyword gloss on the Sentences. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that there was a clear-cut move from less to more advanced forms of Sentences literature, such that earlier forms were abandoned and lost their influence as soon as later, more developed ones appeared on the scene. Master Bandinus’s abridgment of the Sentences even survived the transition from manuscript culture to early modern printing; despite the “primitive” reading of the Lombard that it reflects (not detailed commentary and learned theological reflection is what it offers, but a simplified summary of Peter Lombard’s basic points), it was still considered useful in the sixteenth century. Similarly, Filia Magistri, an abbreviation composed around 1232–1245, was copied into the fifteenth century. The lesson here is that the reception of the Sentences was more complex, and occurred at more levels, than a study of merely the most advanced, cutting-edge literature would suggest. Even while, in the fourteenth century, most Sentences commentaries, at least in the form in which they were disseminated by their authors, indicate little interest in Peter Lombard’s own text, there were still readers of these abridgments— students perhaps, who used the genre as “Cliff notes” for their classes on the Sentences. Marcia Colish’s chapter emphasizes the same point with regard to the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss. Although the first version of this keyword gloss dates from the decade immediately following Peter Lombard’s death, it was still being added to and revised around 1230. In the manuscripts, copies of the gloss were placed side by side with

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other relevant and often later theological literature, to be studied in conjunction with it. The additions, too, tended to reflect more recent advances, such as the division of the Sentences into distinctions or the use of diagrams to grasp the overall structure of a multipartite concept or portion of text. Moreover, even after the Pseudo-Poitiers gloss stopped being copied as a whole, excerpts continued to be made. In an interesting “retrogression” of the text, as Professor Colish terms it, selections from the gloss were placed in the margins of copies of the Book of Sentences to aid in the understanding of individual passages. To sum up her argument, Colish writes: Altogether, the message conveyed by the gloss and its later fortunes is that there remained a market for an older, less adventurous, and more conservative approach to scholastic theology well into the thirteenth century and beyond, even as this subject underwent major changes both generic and methodological, and even as new philosophical and scientific materials enriched the curriculum. Given the ferment in the schools in the period spanned by the textual history of the gloss, its perceived viability as an introduction to systematic theology confronts us with a fact that we as historians tend not to acknowledge, except for those studying the elementary and intermediate theological education of the mendicants. We typically focus on the new . . .1

Such an exclusive focus, however, distorts the reality of the practice of scholastic theology “on the ground.” Since Artur Michael Landgraf, Stephen Langton’s work on the Sentences has been regarded as the first commentary properly speaking, therefore marking an important step in the history of the genre.2 Recent scholarship has confirmed Landgraf’s view, and Riccardo Quinto’s essay on Stephen Langton in the present volume concurs with it as well.3 This consensus may appear surprising, given the manuscript evidence that Langton’s commentary originated in a series of marginal glosses which a later scribe arranged in the form of a continuous text structured by lemmata. What distinguishes Langton’s work from earlier marginal glosses and even from keyword glosses like the PseudoPoitiers gloss, however, is the freedom that the author takes in it with regard to Peter Lombard’s text. Quinto describes Langton’s commen-

1

Marcia L. Colish, “The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss,” 33. See Artur Michael Landgraf, “The First Sentence Commentary of Early Scholasticism,” The New Scholasticism 13 (1939): 101–32. 3 See Riccardo Quinto, “Stephen Langton,” 75. 2

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tary as being “extremely selective” as the author uses the discussion of the Sentences as an opportunity to articulate his own theology and to address “some of the themes most debated in the theological discussions of the period.”4 What is interesting also is the fact that Langton overtly repudiates many of the Lombard’s opinions—so much so that, according to Quinto, he does not appear to have considered the Sentences as particularly authoritative: for him, it was “a simple schoolbook that provided him with the opportunity to set out his own theology.”5 At the time when Langton jotted down his notes on the Sentences (after 1196 and perhaps as late as 1206/07), the Lombard’s work had not yet gained its subsequent status as the respected standard manual of scholastic theology. The principal aim that Langton pursues in his commentary is a certain logical formalization of theological discourse. This aim is distinct, as Quinto explains, from the goals of philosophical theology, which attempts to demonstrate that a number of theological truths, such as the existence of God, can be established by natural reason. Rather, Langton’s formalization is aimed at establishing the logical coherence of orthodox faith: from a number of given principles other propositions necessarily follow, such that the resulting web of principles and deductions forms a cogent whole. Although this approach was by no means revolutionary (Abelard had already laid out its principles in his Sic et non), it became a cornerstone of the transformation of sacra pagina into scientia divina which occurred in the thirteenth century. One of the central differences between these two kinds of theology has to do precisely with the language that they speak. Sacra pagina always remained centered on the biblical text itself. It is worth reminding ourselves that the text which codified the fruits of sacra pagina and handed them down to the tradition—namely, the Glossa ordinaria—consisted of nothing but glosses, culled from the most authoritative writers of the Christian tradition and inscribed between the lines and in the margins of Sacred Scripture. The language that sacra pagina employed was the language of Scripture itself: a language suffused with metaphors, an ultimately narrative language, a language whose images functioned as prisms capturing the connections between the Old Testament and the New,

4 5

Ibid., 52. Ibid., 75.

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God and his Son, the Creator and creation, as well as the multifaceted ways in which different aspects of the created order itself reflected each other. In The Story of a Great Medieval Book, I quoted the following passage from the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss to explain the characteristics of the language of sacra pagina, and how it differed from that of the “scientific” theology of the universities: There is some difference between the signs (signa) of the theologian and the signifiers (significantia) of the liberal arts; for in the latter utterances are called “signifiers,” in the former things [are called] “signs.” In fact, in the sacred page any thing is called “sign” by which something is signified in it, but any thing whatsoever can have as many significations as it has internal or external properties, or harmonies (convenientias) with another thing.6

When sacra pagina transformed into scientia divina, Christian thought increasingly adopted the univocal conceptual language of logic, that is to say, of the liberal arts: that is the historical significance of Stephen Langton’s formalization of theological discourse. “Signs” do not rest in themselves, but rather point beyond themselves, forming a universal network of signification that is ultimately anchored in the Creator. “Signifiers,” on the other hand, are analyzed as material utterances that obey certain grammatical rules and laws of logic. That the move from the paradigm of signs to that of signifiers could harbor certain difficulties for theology should not surprise us. It is often said that Alexander of Hales’s adoption of the Sentences as the textbook for his ordinary lectures represented a decisive step in the reception of the work and in the history of medieval theology more generally. This view calls for nuance. As the earlier Sentences literature shows—beginning with the Pseudo-Poitiers gloss—the Book of Sentences served as a theology textbook of some sort long before Alexander’s move, which occurred in the years between 1220 and 1227. I am saying, “of some sort,” because it is not clear how exactly the Sentences and its glosses were employed in the schools of the twelfth century and

6 MS. Naples, Biblioteca nazionale, VII C 14, fol. 3r, col. a: “non nulla tamen est differentia inter theologie signa et liberalium artium significantia. In illis enim uoces significantia, in hac res signa dicuntur. In sacra enim pagina signum dicitur omnis res per quam in ea aliquid significatur. Res autem quelibet tot significationes habere potest, quot habet proprietates intrinsecas uel extrinsecas uel cum alia re convenientias.” See Great Medieval Book, 57–8, for commentary on the passage, as well as the literature cited ibid., 215 n. 12.

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the nascent University of Paris. Furthermore, there are doubts on the precise meaning of Alexander’s decision to lecture on the Sentences (which Roger Bacon reports in his Opus minus):7 as Hubert Philipp Weber explains in his contribution to the present volume, “he also gave lectures on the Bible and did not intend to replace the Bible with the Sentences.”8 There is one fact that we do know for certain, however: toward the middle of the thirteenth century, the Universities of Paris and Oxford made it a requirement for the bachelors to lecture on the Book of Sentences. The Sentences, therefore, did not ultimately replace Scripture as the basis for theology lectures, but rather complemented the Holy Writ in this function.9 Alexander of Hales’s name is also frequently mentioned in discussions concerning the Sentences because he was the one to divide the work into the famous “distinctions.” Peter Lombard himself had provided only a division into books and chapters. The point of the distinctions was to introduce a clearer structure into the Sentences, one that would bind together chapters devoted to a single theological theme. At the beginning of his commentary on Book III, Alexander took advantage of his new distinctions to demonstrate the coherence of the contents of an entire book. In a detailed divisio textus, he threw into relief the conceptual skeleton behind Peter Lombard’s text—the way in which the logic of his treatment of the Redeemer calls for three parts, and how each of these parts is further articulated into subdivisions. Thus, what holds the Sentences together is no longer just a certain horizontal narrative flow, but rather the logic of rigorously connected ideas, vertically derived from each other. Still, as Dr. Weber points out, the “form and method” of Alexander’s Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum “are still fluid.”10 The divisiones textus are not executed consistently, since Books I and IV open with biblically conceived prologues which connect the subject matter of the Sentences with scriptural passages; Book II has no formal introduction at all. In his analysis of the introitus to Book I, Dr. Weber comes to the conclusion that Alexander does not yet have a “theory of theology”11 as 7

See Roger Bacon, Opus minus, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1859), 325–9. Hubert Philipp Weber, “The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,” 84. 9 The question of the introduction of the Sentences as a university textbook is examined in Great Medieval Book, 60–2. 10 Weber, “The Glossa,” 79. 11 Ibid., 94. 8

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a methodically constituted field of investigation; rather, he approaches the study of God through salvation history, such that “the order of theology is God’s own order.”12 Weber quotes from the introitus: There is a twofold order. There is an order of things as they emerge from the Creator or Recreator or Renewer, and this is how this work proceeds. And there is an order of things as they are led back to the Creator . . .13

This conception of theology is the reason why the Glossa does not yet use the term “theology” in the sense to which we have become accustomed: the “scientific” investigation of God and his revelation. In the Glossa, theologia carries its etymological sense—“the logos of the theos”—and hence signifies Scripture itself.14 Interestingly, later on in his career Alexander would author a Quaestio de theologia in which the term theologia already has the new “subjective” meaning of a human science. In the 1240s, the Summa fratris Alexandri (which is not the work of Alexander alone but a compilation by his entire school) therefore opens with a treatise on theology as a science, based upon the earlier Quaestio. To the same period of ferment, when both the literary form of the Sentences commentaries and the conception of theology accompanying it had not yet settled into any shared mold, belongs the Sentences commentary of Hugh of St.-Cher, which dates from the late 1220s or early 1230s. As Magdalena Bieniak demonstrates in her chapter, Hugh’s work is difficult to classify and presents many puzzles. It was widely read and has consequently come down to us in numerous manuscript witnesses, six of which transmit the work in the form of marginal glosses. Since four of these six manuscripts contain shorter versions of the text, one might be tempted to interpret them as representing earlier redactions, which subsequently “took off ” from the pages of the Sentences and migrated onto pages of their own to form an independent work. But, Bieniak argues following research by Walter Principe, this is not the case. Rather, we are once again dealing with the phenomenon of a “retrogression” of the text: portions of Hugh’s text were transferred into the margins of copies of the Sentences by

12

Ibid., 96. “Duplex est ordo. Est ordo rerum prout exeunt a Creatore vel Recreatore vel Reparatore, et sic proceditur in hoc opere. Et est ordo rerum prout reducuntur ad Creatorem . . .” (quoted ibid., 95). 14 See ibid., 96. 13

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users who wished to read the latter in the light of Hugh’s exposition. At any point of the tradition of the Sentences, then, we must reckon with a variety of literary genres existing side by side, influencing each other, although it is likely that the more “primitive” forms tended to serve relatively basic pedagogic needs whereas the more developed ones belonged to the cutting edge of theological reflection. Hugh of St.-Cher was aware of Alexander of Hales’s distinctions: “[i]n almost all the manuscripts, the commentary on a new distinction starts . . . in a new line and is marked by a distinction number in the margin.”15 However, the distinctions remain extrinsic to the inner structure of Hugh’s argument, which is framed in a hierarchy of books (libri), parts (partes), chapters (capituli), and questions (quaestiones). The content of the commentary is of a twofold nature, as close literal exposition (expositio litterae) alternates with questions that “are often constructed as if they were independent treatises. What is more, many of them develop problems that are not treated by Peter Lombard.”16 What we see foreshadowed in this mix of expositiones litterae and quaestiones is the form that the Sentences commentary would take in the more clearly structured works of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, in which each thematic section of the Sentences would be summarized in a divisio textus and further analyzed in dubia circa litteram or an expositio textus, while also serving as the point of departure for more independent and topical quaestiones. It is clear, then, why Dr. Bieniak characterizes Hugh’s commentary as a transitional work. It occupies, she writes, “a crucial place between two stages in the evolution of the genre of the Sentences literature: the gloss, which was strictly related to the littera of the Sentences, and the more developed commentary.”17 Hugh’s commentary has two prologues, whose different approaches reflect the past as well as the future—one could say—of theological discourse. Prologue II, as Barbara Faes de Mottoni has termed it, pays homage to the old conception of theology as sacra pagina, explaining how the four books of the Sentences reflect the structure of Sacred Scripture itself. (In doing so, Prologue II draws on the Mount Sinai allegory which the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss adapted from Peter

15 16 17

Magdalena Bieniak, “The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St.-Cher,” 124. Ibid., 126. Ibid., 111.

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Comestor.)18 Prologue I, on the other hand, is devoted to a systematic derivation of terms that can be predicated of God: some terms are essential, others personal, again others notional. The first can either be substantives or adjectives—and so on and so forth. In one of the manuscripts, Prologue I is summarized in a large arbor ramificata, which illustrates an interesting fact: the gradual transformation of sacra pagina into scientia divina appears to have been accompanied by a certain spatialization of theological discourse. Simply put, those thinkers who first created theology as a methodical, comprehensive, and scientific account of the faith seem to have needed certain visual “crutches” to help them envisage the whole in a new way, namely, not as narrative but as a vertically organized logical structure. As far as I know, Richard Fishacre was the most prolific “ramifier” among the authors of Sentences commentaries. Robert Kilwardby, too, employed elaborate ramified trees in his tables on the Sentences, which The Story of a Great Medieval Book discusses in some detail.19 Just as the phenomenon of textual retrogression should caution us against overly schematic “grand narratives” of the development of the Sentences literature, so too another aspect of Hugh of St.-Cher’s Sentences commentary makes it clear that there are many overlapping strands in the tradition of the Sentences: I mean the fact, pointed out in Magdalena Bieniak’s chapter, that Hugh’s work incorporates large portions from William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea. In The Story of a Great Medieval Book, I interpreted such a lectura secundum alium as indicative of “a certain tiredness with the genre” such as appears to have characterized the second half of the fourteenth century.20 This interpretation may or may not be accurate for the fourteenth century; it certainly does not do justice to attitudes toward the Sentences in the first half of the thirteenth. In the 1250s, Sentences commentaries found a balanced form which reconciled the need for attention to Peter Lombard’s text with the desire to advance theological reflection beyond the scope of the Book of Sentences—I mean the form that one finds in the works of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, for example. This “ideal” form was abandoned, however, almost as soon as it was achieved. In fact, there developed

18 19 20

On this allegory, see Great Medieval Book, 41–51. See ibid., 85–90. Ibid., 126.

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a sense that the genre was reaching its limits. The story of Thomas Aquinas’s abandoned attempt to compose a second Sentences commentary illustrates this fact. The co-editor of the commentary, John F. Boyle, tells this story in his chapter. The Oxford manuscript Lincoln College, lat. 95, contains a text of Aquinas’s first, Parisian Sentences commentary accompanied, “in the margins and feet of the manuscript as well as on the front and guard folios,”21 by another commentary which represents, in all likelihood, student notes from the lectures on the Sentences that the Angelic Doctor delivered in Rome in the academic year 1265–1266.22 This Roman commentary is much shorter than the Parisian one, covering as it does only portions of Book I. It omits those elements of the earlier work that treated the Sentences as a work worthy of attention in its own right, namely, the divisiones textus and the expositiones textus. “We have only articles,” Boyle explains, “often with a divisio quaestionum. In this simplified form, the Lectura romana is actually less of a commentary than is the Parisian Scriptum.”23 More significantly, the theological material that Aquinas treats in the marginal notes does not always relate to parallel discussions in the Book of Sentences. This disconnection leads to notes that appear out of place. Further, since certain theological topics that are central to Thomistic thought are absent from the Book of Sentences, Aquinas fails to address them although he should, given the logic of his theology. All in all, therefore, “the Lombard’s order . . . seems to be a matter of frustration for him.”24 This is, Professor Boyle submits, why Aquinas left the project of a second Sentences commentary unfinished, resolving to compose a more personal work instead, the Summa theologiae, in which he could arrange and apportion weight to the theological material as he saw fit. Yet the Summa theologiae never replaced Peter Lombard’s Sentences as the standard theology textbook of the Middle Ages; even the Dominicans, who were soon to start aligning themselves into a Thomistic school, for a long time continued to prefer the Angelic Doctor’s Sentences commentary to his Summa. This is why I spoke 21 John F. Boyle, “Thomas Aquinas and his Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,” 151. 22 Admittedly, some scholars harbor doubts on the attribution of the marginal notes to Thomas Aquinas. Chris Schabel raised some of them in his recent review of the edition in Speculum 84 (2009): 224–6. 23 Boyle, “Thomas Aquinas and his Lectura romana,” 153. 24 Ibid., 170.

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of a “failed coup” in The Story of a Great Medieval Book.25 But what explains the continued use of the Sentences, even as the work became not only hopelessly outdated, but as its basic architecture was found lacking? A couple of explanations suggest themselves here, one more general, the other more specific. More generally, the theology of history of the Middle Ages placed at least as much emphasis on the past as on the future; indeed, the future was, in a certain sense, nothing but a return of the paradisical past. While it would be untrue to maintain that medieval thinkers were unable to conceive of history as a source of progress,26 this progress was not the modern self-directed unfolding of reason toward no other goal than precisely progress formally understood—rather, it was teleologically aimed at recovering the unity with the Creator that humankind had lost as a result of the Fall. This is one of the reasons—one, but not an insignificant one—why scientific, technological, economic, and social developments occurred so much more slowly in the Middle Ages than they do in modernity. Could we still imagine studying medicine from a textbook composed several hundred years ago? Would we even make our students learn theology from literature published in the nineteenth century? Of course not, since this literature would be regarded as being out of date. More specifically, the Book of Sentences continued to enjoy its status as the basic manual of theology even as masters found it less and less suitable to develop their own ideas because, as largely a collection of “sentences” by the great authorities of the Christian past, it represented a shared common core of the tradition. Peter Lombard’s theology was largely “positive,” rather than being based upon a particular philosophical foundation. This lack of a philosophical foundation makes the work less cohesive than, say, the Summa theologiae, but “[t]he fact that the coherence of the Book of Sentences is real, but not rigid, afforded it the malleability necessary to make it a classic.”27 Even before Thomas Aquinas experimented with a Sentences commentary without commentary, so to speak, only to abandon the idea in order to free himself from the structure laid out by Peter Lombard, Robert Kilwardby had tried the same concept at Oxford. Around 1255, he composed quaestiones on the Book of Sentences which no longer 25

Great Medieval Book, 80. See Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, trans. Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971). 27 Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 64. 26

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retained the system of distinctions. As Gerhard Leibold explains in his contribution to this volume, due to Kilwardby’s “highly selective” treatment of Peter Lombard’s text, it no longer made sense to organize his work in accordance with an order that was intended to throw into relief the structure of the Sentences.28 However, there may have been an additional reason as to why Kilwardby did not feel bound to the distinctions. In a comprehensive set of tables that were meant as a study aid for the Book of Sentences, Kilwardby demonstrated that the original chapter divisions did not adequately capture the logic of the Lombard’s argumentation. Therefore, by means of arbores ramificatae—the logical diagrams that were so popular in the thirteenth century—Kilwardby systematically derived new chapter divisions, 1,870 in all for the entire Book of Sentences. Given his painstaking work of restructuring, it is no wonder that his questions on the Sentences no longer abide by the old chapters and distinctions.29 The internal articulation of Kilwardby’s quaestiones is more complex than the question structure favored by his Parisian contemporaries Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, the editor of the first book of the Quaestiones, Johannes Schneider, regarded Kilwardby’s questions as a forerunner of the literary form of Scotus’s lectures on the Sentences.30 This is because, within their relatively straightforward “classical” form of arguments pro, arguments con, response, return to the initial arguments, Kilwardby’s questions frequently contain sub-questions that complicate and obscure the dialectical format. Dr. Leibold interprets this hierarchical arrangement of primary and secondary question as a tendency toward systematization: Kilwardby assigned many topics to subordinated and inserted secondary questions, as well as to the objections and counters to them, which are treated separately in their own respective questions in other Sentences commentaries. This may be perceived as a tendency toward systematization in view of the sheer vastness of the subject matter.31

If the literary form of Kilwardby’s questions on the Sentences marks the work as belonging to an advanced stage in the thirteenth-century

28 Gerhard Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” 177. 29 I discuss Kilwardby’s tables on the Sentences, which are preserved in MS. London, British Library, Royal 9.B.VI, in Great Medieval Book, 85–90. 30 See Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 178 n. 7. 31 Ibid., 179.

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reception of the Lombard’s opus, Kilwardby’s conception of the theological project, by contrast, remained fairly conservative—one understands why he would, in the 1270s, be among the opponents of the influence of Aristotle and his Arabic commentators on Christian thought. (That Kilwardby was a Dominican, not a Franciscan, shows that reservations regarding the new paradigm in theology were not limited to the sons of St. Francis.) Kilwardby regards the Book of Sentences as forming part of Scripture (that is to say, of theology, the word of God). Consequently, then, he recognizes Peter Lombard as the author of the Sentences only insofar as he was responsible for the compilation of the authoritative truths that the work gathers together; the truths themselves have God as their author. It is clear: for Kilwardby theology has not yet separated itself from sacra pagina. Therefore, he refuses to approach it through the Aristotelian paradigm of scientia. If a science it is, it is so only on its own, specifically Christian terms. But it is better to call it “wisdom.” A faithful follower of Peter Lombard in this regard, Kilwardby is also reluctant to acknowledge the existence of any kind of purely natural virtue, caused exclusively by habit (as Aristotle had argued). Rather—as Leibold quotes from Book III of the quaestiones on the Sentences—“virtue itself, even that which is not supernatural, is caused by no one but God, and even without us.”32 William de la Mare is best known as the author of the Corruptorium fratris Thomae, which he composed shortly after the condemnations of 1277. Yet he should not be caricatured, as Hans Kraml emphasizes in the essay that he has written for this volume, as radically hostile to Thomism. Indeed, in his lectures on the Sentences, which he must have delivered before 1270, William relies upon Thomas Aquinas as one of his principal sources, along with Bonaventure, John Peckham, Roger Bacon, and others: “the respect for Thomas’s thought is evident.”33 Nevertheless, William clearly belongs in the Franciscan tradition of thought that was beginning to crystallize at the time; in some respects, Dr. Kraml points out, his work already points in the direction of Duns Scotus. Let us first have a close look at the form of William de la Mare’s commentary. There is a significant difference between Books I and

32 33

Ibid., 217. Hans Kraml, “William de la Mare,” 238.

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II, on the one hand, and Books III and IV, on the other; for while, in the first two books, William’s questions cover all of Peter Lombard’s distinctions, Books III and IV offer only a selective treatment of the Book of Sentences. Dr. Kraml takes this difference as an indication of the possibility that William may have revised the commentary on the first two books, whereas the remaining books were left in the state of an author’s draft or a student’s reportatio. Even in the fully redacted version of his work, however, William de la Mare omits any expositiones textus or dubia circa litteram, just as Robert Kilwardby and the mature Thomas Aquinas had already done before him. What is more, the arrangement of the questions in Books III and IV (and parts of one manuscript of Book II) exhibits a notable departure from that found in most previous commentaries: the “classic” form of the scholastic quaestio dissolves (if one wants to speak of such a classic form at all, given the fact that it assumes a standard imposed on medieval literature from a much later perspective). For William no longer deals with each question individually, in the sequence of arguments pro and con, solution, response to the arguments, but rather bundles usually three questions together. This has the effect of emphasizing the solutions while introducing large amounts of text between the arguments and their responses, with the consequence that it becomes difficult to follow the dialectical movement of argument and counterargument. What we are witnessing here is, in Hans Kraml’s words, the movement toward a “problem-oriented style of treating theological issues.”34 It is no longer the reconciliation of authorities that stands in the foreground of the discussion, but rather the theological “things themselves.” William articulates an original conception of the nature of theology as lex et legis expositio. Rather than embracing the norms of Aristotelian science for theological discourse, William takes his inspiration, as Hans Kraml explains, from two elements of the medieval Christian tradition: the designation of the Old and New Testaments as Lex vetus and Lex nova (which is reflected in the opening lines of Book I of the Sentences: “Veteris ac novae legis continentiam . . .”), and the use of the term lex to designate religious custom, both Christian and non-Christian (for example, lex Tartarorum referred to the religious practices of the Mongols). To think of theology as a reflection on religious law, of course, means to see it as dealing with prescriptive norms on how

34

Ibid., 240.

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to lead one’s life: “theological speculation is not merely a theoretical enterprise but something that gives orientation to human life, in such a way that the entire theological project becomes a practical one.”35 Whereas the tradition of Christian theology that was influenced by Aristotelian epistemology privileged intellect over will—as Aristotle himself had done: the goal of human life, for him, was theōria, while he defined his god as self-thinking thought—the Franciscan current to which William belongs considers the will to be the center of the human person. This voluntarism finds its explanation in the fact that the will, as the power behind the fundamental choices of human life, is a more personal principle than the intellect, which is, after all, a power of abstraction. The medieval Franciscans’ voluntarist anthropology has its natural counterpart in their conception of God. Kraml writes: The emphasis on God’s will and the relatively lower importance accorded to the intellect within the Franciscan tradition reflect the centrality of a personal relationship between God and human beings, or intelligent and rational beings. It goes almost without saying that, in a personal relationship between freely acting beings, reason plays a crucial role, because reason has to guide human action in order to lead it to the right response to the challenge coming from the other person. Yet the final goal of life is not compliance with reason but the ability to give a personal response to a personal challenge.36

There is, according to Kraml, another aspect concerning the ways in which William de la Mare’s Sentences commentary paved the way for later thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham: just like Scotus, William argued in favor of a formal distinction among God’s perfections. In God, perfections such as wisdom, goodness, and beauty are not simply identical (which would make it difficult to understand God as a person); rather, they exist in God etiam formaliter. I wrote in The Story of a Great Medieval Book that “the condemnation of 1277 [threw] into question the very thrust of thirteenth-century theology.”37 I would now formulate more carefully: the condemnation of 1277 confirmed the misgivings of those—like William de la Mare and Robert Kilwardby, but also the late Bonaventure—who saw grave dangers in the enthusiastic incorporation of Aristotelian principles into Christian theology. The condemnation created serious headwinds 35 36 37

Ibid., 244–5. Ibid., 260. Great Medieval Book, 187.

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for the project of transforming sacra pagina into scientia divina. As a consequence, this project stalled, indeed to such an extent that the voluntarism which we saw emerge in the Sentences literature of the second half of the thirteenth century gained the upper hand throughout the fourteenth. Thus, with the next two Sentences commentators treated in the present volume, Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito, we are already firmly on Scotist terrain. Thomas Aquinas remained a respected and much-quoted authority even after the condemnation, but both Harclay and Brito aligned themselves with Scotist positions. Harclay’s Sentences commentary is based upon lectures that he delivered in Paris sometime in the period between 1305 and 1308, just a few years after Scotus himself. It is a question commentary of the sort that we already encountered in Aquinas’s Lectura romana, as well as in Kilwardby and William de la Mare. Harclay’s work stands out, as William Duba, Russell Friedman, and Chris Schabel explain in their chapter, because, as a secular priest, he composed an influential Sentences commentary at a time when the genre was dominated by mendicant authors. That Harclay’s commentary did indeed exert considerable influence becomes clear through a study of the other author to whom Duba, Friedman, and Schabel have devoted their chapter: Aufredo Gonteri Brito. Gonteri was a Franciscan who wrote on the Sentences in the 1320s. Although his Sentences commentary did not have a large readership, his work is of interest because of a number of features. (1) First, there is its length: “Even without a known copy of Book IV,” Duba, Friedman, and Schabel explain, “the critical edition of Books I–III of just one version of Gonteri’s Sentences commentary would require at least 5,000 pages!”38 Our three authors use the word “astronomical” to describe the sheer number of questions that Gonteri asks about each of the Lombard’s books that he treats.39 (2) Gonteri’s commentary is unusual in that it really is a commentary, not just a series of questions occasioned by the task of lecturing on Peter Lombard’s text. I know of no other example of a genuine commentary on the Sentences from the fourteenth century. The

38 William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel, “Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito,” 282. 39 Ibid., 286.

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divisiones textus that became a standard feature of the Sentences commentaries in the decades after Alexander of Hales had long disappeared when Gonteri reactivated them. According to Duba, Friedman, and Schabel, however, “Gonteri’s text does not resemble the major thirteenth-century divisiones textus”;40 from the sample passage that they have edited, it appears that this remark applies both to the content and to the form of Gonteri’s “divisions of the text.” For the content is not derived from the divisiones textus of any of the great thirteenth-century commentators (although there are distinct parallels with his close contemporary Durand of St.-Pourçain), and neither does Gonteri logically deduce the structure of Peter Lombard’s work in the manner of the earlier authors. The presence of extensive divisiones textus in Gonteri’s commentary raises a question that we already encountered in the context of what Marcia Colish has termed “retrogression.” The question is whether there were distinct trends in the reception of the Sentences at the high and low ends of the intellectual spectrum. In other words, at a time when Duns Scotus was formulating lofty formal distinctions in his Ordinatio, which had lost practically all connection with the text of the Book of Sentences, students in the European theology faculties still had to familiarize themselves with the basics of Peter Lombard’s arguments. To do so, they used well-worn abbreviations such as Filia Magistri, copied excerpts from earlier commentaries into the margins of the Sentences, and employed—perhaps—works of the type of Gonteri’s in order to come to grips with the major issues of Peter Lombard’s opus. (3) The fact that Gonteri’s commentary is compiled from other sources supports such a “low-end” hypothesis. Gonteri’s commentary borrows most extensively from Henry of Harclay, but his lectura secundum alium also incorporates texts from Scotus himself, from Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Hugh of Novocastro, and others. The authors of our chapter summarize Gonteri’s method in Book I in the following terms: In his Parisian commentary on Book I, then, Gonteri appears to have proceeded as follows. He incorporated the bulk of the secular Henry of Harclay’s commentary on Book I verbatim, sometimes from start to finish, sometimes omitting sections, sometimes making additions.

40

Ibid., 283.

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Gonteri also either paraphrased questions from the Franciscan Hugh of Novocastro’s commentary on Book I, to which Gonteri was somehow intimately connected as reportator or producer of one witness/version, or he copied or paraphrased questions from a lost version of Hugh’s commentary or from his own notes from Hugh’s lectures. Finally, Gonteri argued extensively against the Franciscan Peter Auriol’s attacks on Scotus, often via the Franciscan Francis of Marchia, defending Scotus via Marchia and, where necessary, against Marchia’s own critique.41

(4) Gonteri shows interest in some of the typical themes of Scotist thought; indeed, his commentary illustrates the extent to which some aspects of the Franciscan voluntarism that fourteenth-century thinkers embraced so overwhelmingly after 1277 began to become problematic themselves. As William J. Courtenay’s research has established,42 and as I have argued in The Story of a Great Medieval Book, one of the central conceptual tools that the Franciscans employed in order to combat Aristotelian tendencies toward overemphasizing the reach of reason in theological matters was the distinction between God’s absolute and ordered powers, potentia absoluta and ordinata. As a kind of non-Dionysian negative theology, this distinction emphasizes that there is an aspect of God which remains absolutely unknowable to the human mind: God at the very depths of his will. For there is no necessity to any of the arrangements that we know in God’s created order, be it the order of nature or the order of grace. God could have created a world completely different from the one we know (indeed, he could still do so); he could extend his saving grace to sinners in ways different from the sacraments of the Church, or even outside the Church. In other words, God’s “ordered power” and his “absolute power” do not coincide; furthermore, all that has been revealed to us is his ordered power. If we can nevertheless trust the present arrangements, this is not due to the reliability of our intellectual penetration of the created and the divine; rather, we can trust that God, who has entered into a covenantal relationship with his people, will not betray us but will honor the covenant. In other words, we can trust God’s personal commitment.

41

Ibid., 302–03. See, in particular, William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in FourteenthCentury England (Princeton, 1987), as well as the same author’s Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought: Studies in Philosophy, Theology, and Economic Practice, Variorum Reprint CS206 (London, 1984). 42

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The distinction of the two powers is a potent device to secure the freedom and inscrutability of God’s will. Moreover, it expresses an indisputable truth in Christian theology: no orthodox theologian could deny God’s absolute freedom and, hence, the radical impossibility of plumbing the depths of his mysterious plans. Unfortunately, however, the theory of the two powers also lends itself to a playful, facetious, and ultimately irresponsible use: wild speculation about what God could have done or could do, from the point of view of his absolute power. Examples of such abuse abound in the theological literature of the fourteenth century. Duba, Friedman, and Schabel provide one instance from Gonteri’s Sentences commentary: In this question, the opinion of Master Francis of Meyronnes was that, by the absolute power of God, it could come about that Christ, the Son of God, in saying those words from John 19[:26]: Woman behold your son, etc., could have made him to be the son of the Blessed Virgin, and the Blessed Virgin to be his mother, for the reasons touched upon in the opposing arguments. But some presumptuous and fatuous people have taken this as the occasion to dare to assert even to the people that, in fact, Christ, by saying those words, made himself the true brother of St. John the Evangelist, and made St. John the true son of the Blessed Virgin and the Blessed Virgin to be his mother, just as in the supper, by saying, “This is my body” he made his body to exist truly under the species of bread.43

Gonteri repudiates not only the latter view, but even Francis of Meyronnes’s more moderate position. Nonetheless, the passage shows the direction in which the theory of the two powers was being taken by many of his contemporaries. While Gonteri’s work is a moderate and, in its literary form, conservative example of a fourteenth-century Sentences commentary, Roger Roseth furnishes us with a more extreme one. Roseth’s Lectura super Sententias, which dates from the late 1330s, is the work of an English Franciscan strongly influenced by Scotus as well as Ockham. In the judgment of Olli Hallamaa, the author of our chapter on Roger Roseth, it requires some effort to recognize the Lectura super Sententias as a theological work at all. To be sure, the text addresses some theological topics, such as the traditional question concerning the language of Trinitarian theology. However, one cannot avoid the

43 Quoted in Duba, Friedman, and Schabel, “Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito,” 306.

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impression that Roseth “treats God and the divine persons in the Trinity merely as logical subjects of Trinitarian sentences.”44 In his thought, speculation regarding God’s absolute power has become a tool of philosophical thought experiments. In discussing the infinity of qualitative differences, Roseth maintains, for example, that God could create flies with angelic properties! Roseth’s primary interest, then, lies in logic and natural philosophy, to which he made some original contributions. Dr. Hallamaa highlights, in particular, his analysis of the logic of deontic notions. Against this background, it should not surprise us that Roseth’s Sentences commentary contains only a handful of references to Scripture and to Peter Lombard’s text. Indeed, Hallamaa writes of the Lectura super Sententias that it creates “the impression that the Sentences only momentarily crossed Roseth’s mind.”45 Furthermore, Roseth does not attempt a comprehensive coverage of the great themes of Christian theology—which was, of course, the original goal of the Book of Sentences. Even cornerstones of Christian theology such as Christology and the sacraments are passed over in silence. Roseth asks only five questions on the entirety of Peter Lombard’s four books, and “[a]lthough Roseth’s questions bear titles that indicate some theological substance, they are too few to give an overall picture of Christian doctrine.”46 The structure of Roseth’s questions is worth considering. As Dr. Hallamaa’s diagrams impressively demonstrate, Roseth pushes “the question method to its utmost limits.”47 The relentless to and fro of arguments becomes so complex, departing so radically from the dialectical structure of the classic quaestio, that one wonders how any of Roseth’s students were able to keep up with their master’s reasoning. Perhaps, as Hallamaa submits, the Lectura does not represent lecture notes but rather a text that was meant to be read and contemplated in private. Richard FitzRalph completed his lectures on the Sentences at Oxford before 1329, that is to say, a few years before Roseth composed his commentary, also somewhere in England (Hallamaa mentions Oxford, Cambridge, and Norwich as possibilities). Although FitzRalph’s Lectura

44 Olli Hallamaa, “On the Limits of the Genre: Roger Roseth as Reader of the Sentences,” 403. 45 Ibid., 376. 46 Ibid., 375. 47 Ibid., 381.

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avoids some of the more extreme tendencies that we discovered in Roseth—he appears to be more cautious, for example, with regard to speculation on the two divine powers—his work reflects a similar approach to the task of commenting on Peter Lombard. Thus, there is a highly uneven treatment of the contents of the Lombard’s four books: whereas Book I receives 18 questions, Book II is dealt with in only seven; Books III and IV are dispatched even more briefly, in one and two questions, respectively. What is more, according to Michael Dunne, “a good deal of FitzRalph’s Lectura was not concerned with theology at all, or at least only tangentially so.”48 For instance, in discussing creation, FitzRalph spends a large amount of time on the possibility of an actual infinite, a topic more germane to natural philosophy and logic than to theology. Dr. Dunne also notes a tendency on FitzRalph’s part “to adopt provisional positions vis-à-vis the various authorities and again at other times not to continue the argument to a conclusion.”49 Perhaps FitzRalph sensed that there was a certain vacuity to an approach to theology which dispensed with a treatment of the most important issues of the discipline, instead concentrating its energies on other matters. At any rate, we know for certain that, later in life, FitzRalph became dissatisfied with the scholasticism of his earlier career. His autobiographical prayer captures a feeling that was becoming widespread among his contemporaries: Nor were You, the Solid Truth, absent from me in those six years [while he was at Avignon, 1337–1343], but, in Your Holy Scriptures you shone upon me as in a certain radiant mirror; whereas in my former years, in the trifles of the philosophers, you had been hidden from me as in a kind of dark cloud. For previously, I used to think that through the teachings of Aristotle and certain argumentations that were profound only to men profound in vanity—I used to think that I had penetrated to the depths of Your Truth, with the citizens of Your Heaven; until You, the Solid Truth, shone upon me in Your Scriptures, scattering the cloud of my error, and showing me how I was croaking in the marshes with the toads and frogs. For until I had You, the Truth, to lead me, I had heard, but did not understand, the tumult of the philosophers chattering against You . . . At last, O Solid Truth, You so shone upon me from above, that I burned to seize and hold You, the Truth, Jesus promised to us in the Law and the Prophets. And when in the turmoil of lawsuits a certain spell of serenity had smiled upon me, I sought You in Your sacred Scriptures,

48 49

Michael Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” 429. Ibid., 436.

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intimately and importunately, not only by reading, but also with prayer, until You came to meet me joyously in Your ways.50

It appears, then, that by the end of the first third of the fourteenth century, Sentences commentaries were no longer able to satisfy even their own authors’ longing for a theologically rich, edifying reflection upon their faith. As I have suggested in The Story of a Great Medieval Book, this situation can be considered the logical outcome of the move from the paradigm of signs to that of signifiers, that is to say, from a theological to a grammatico-logical understanding of language. The rising importance of the distinction of potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata contributed further to the evacuation of meaning from scholastic theology. For “[i]f there obtains no necessary, metaphysical connection between the Creator and creation—if the connection is historical, covenantal, and hence contingent—then creation needs to be analyzed in itself, without recourse to a foundation in meta-realities such as God or universal, abstract natures that sustain it.”51 This is the origin of nominalism: after Scotus and Ockham, even commentators on the Sentences, a theology textbook, were no longer interested in discussing the cosmos, an ordered whole in which creation reflects its Creator; their interest shifted toward analyzing the immanent logic that governs the signifiers which we use to speak about the world. That there is value in such an analysis, there can be no doubt: contemporary analytic philosophers (who are generally not enamored of theological speculation) have discovered much that is worthwhile in the logic and natural philosophy that the thinkers of the fourteenth century produced. One place where a certain traditional piety survived in the Sentences literature were the introitūs and principia. In Paris, bachelors “reading” the Sentences were expected to hold so-called principia at the beginning of their lectures on each book. (Stephen Brown reminds us, in his chapter on Peter of Candia, that principia had three parts: “a sermon in praise of theology or the Sentences, a disputatio or presentation in debate form of a theological question, and a profession of faith.”)52 At Oxford, the introductory speech was called introitus and perhaps,

50

Quoted ibid., 436–7. Great Medieval Book, 187. 52 Stephen F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” 441. 51

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as Michael Dunne suggests, differed from the Parisian principium. At any rate, the opening speech was an occasion for the baccaleureus Sententiarum to laud Peter Lombard—not, however, through a scholarly discussion of the theological strengths of his Book of Sentences, but in a much more general way, through praise of the guidance that the faithful can obtain from the virtues of Peter Lombard and his work. Thus, Peter of Candia, who lectured on the Sentences between 1378 and 1380, uses his principia to extol the Lombard’s virtues as a theologian and to recommend him as a model for the four groups who make up the university community: the beginning students, the bachelors, the masters, and the bishops. Each of his four inaugural sermons is devoted to one of these groups. Peter of Candia’s praise for the Lombard is strangely disconnected from the body of his Sentences commentary, however: his eloquent tribute to the Master cannot hide the fact that Peter Lombard no longer functions as a theological authority. In the prologue to Book I, in which Peter of Candia deals with the traditional question concerning the nature of theology, the authorities he has chosen reflect the main currents of the past one hundred years of scholasticism; Professor Brown speaks of “Peter of Candia’s hundred-year ‘history’ of the theologian’s role.”53 Rejecting views that he considers extreme—namely, Aquinas’s claim that theology functions like an Aristotelian science and Bernard of Auvergne’s opposing view according to which theology has no basis in evidence, but consists of statements logically derived from principles accepted on faith—Peter proceeds to embrace a more contemporary theory inspired by Scotus and Ockham. With Peter Auriol and Gregory of Rimini, Peter opts for a declarative-deductive definition of the theologian’s task: in other words, the theologian’s role is to show the coherence of the mysteries of the faith and their logical interrelationship in terms of priority and posteriority. With regard to the substantial theological issues that he examines in his highly selective commentary, Peter of Candia has a similarly “historical” approach, that is to say, he establishes detailed catalogs of the positions of other thinkers, usually in the Franciscan tradition. Brown elucidates the intention behind this approach as follows:

53 See Stephen F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 156–90.

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When one sees the representation and criticism that Candia brings to all . . . positions, it could be tempting to think that he is simply recording theological history, not being a theologian. It is important, however, to keep in mind that he is primarily, albeit not exclusively, a follower of declarative theology. In his view of theology, among the principal tasks is the need to bring understanding to the basic truths of the faith. Different theologians, through the arguments, analogies, and clarifications they bring in support of truths based on faith, offer understanding of different kinds and can help others overcome the misunderstandings under which they suffer.54

Peter of Candia’s thought, then, appears to be characterized by a certain syncretism. A different expression of the same tendency is his willingness simply to recount the major positions on an important issue and then let the reader decide for himself what he finds more agreeable: “et consimiliter faciam de alia, ut quilibet sibi placibiliorem eligat partem.”55 Such an “anything goes” approach is not untypical of a theologian at the end of the fourteenth century. As I noted in The Story of a Great Medieval Book, Marsilius of Inghen, a contemporary of Peter of Candia, embraced the same strategy in his own Sentences commentary. Long lists of positions possible within orthodox Christianity thus replace a coherently argued theology; only when the Church has pronounced herself decisively on a particular issue—through a council or papal decree that has entered into canon law—is Marsilius prepared to be unambiguous. What distinguishes Marsilius from Peter of Candia is the former’s willingness to include a broad range of authors in his doxographies—not just followers of various shades of nominalism, but also thirteenth-century thinkers such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent. Thomas Aquinas even receives the title of “Holy Doctor.” While such breadth holds the danger of incoherence, it is evidence of Marsilius’s longing to recover the tradition of theology before its dissolution into logic and natural philosophy. The trend toward a recovery of the tradition was the major characteristic of the Sentences commentaries of the fifteenth century. It is regrettable that the present volume does not contain a single chapter on this fascinating period of “harvest” and “waning”; the lacuna speaks to the fact that there is a dearth of current research on the reception of

54 55

Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Commentary,” 462. Quoted ibid., note 90.

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the Sentences at the end of the Middle Ages and the dawn of modernity. All I can do here, therefore, is recapitulate the major findings at which I arrived in The Story of a Great Medieval Book. There I examined the Sentences commentaries of three major authors from the fifteenth century, namely, John Capreolus, Denys the Carthusian, and Gabriel Biel.56 Along the lines of the expansion-contraction model proposed at the beginning of this essay, the fifteenth century marks a contraction of the tradition of the Sentences. Like Marsilius of Inghen, the authors of this century deliberately renounce further expansion of the tradition, instead endeavoring to hold it together through a movement in reverse. Although their strategies to accomplish this contraction are diverse, they all attempt large-scale syntheses: John Capreolus (ca. 1380–1444) uses the literary structure of the Sentences commentary to offer a synthetic reading of the entire Thomistic corpus, coupled with a refutation of those parts of the tradition that he considers incompatible with Thomism—nominalism, in particular. John’s Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis faithfully follow the structure of the Sentences, thus once again covering the entire field of Christian theology, not just a few topics chosen in function of extra-theological concerns. Yet Peter Lombard himself is of no interest to him. The case of Denys the Carthusian (1402/03–1471) is different in that he does, at the beginning of his monumental Sentences commentary, write old-style expositiones textus on each of the Lombard’s distinctions. It must have been his intention to produce a Sentences commentary after the manner of a Bonaventure or Thomas Aquinas, brought up to date by including later (non-nominalist) authors and elements of Dionysian mysticism. The mystical aspect of Denys’s work reflects, on the one hand, his own mystical bent of mind; however, there was a more general sense in the fifteenth century that theology could not and should not be conducted in an atmosphere of scientific neutrality. Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Denys even incorporates the text of the Book of Sentences into his commentary. The expositiones textus, however, break off quickly after only two distinctions. Denys must have realized that literal commentary on the Book of Sentences was no longer a theologically fruitful exercise.

56 The following five paragraphs are based on material in the conclusion of The Story of a Great Medieval Book, esp. pp. 189–90.

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The nominalists were not exempt from the desire to overcome the dissolution of theology in the fourteenth century through a recovery of the tradition. Thus, Gabriel Biel’s Collectorium represents a similar attempt to accomplish a synthetic reading of the scholastic tradition, but from a nominalist perspective. Books I and II of his Sentences commentary are mainly inspired by Ockham, whereas the balance of sources in Books III and IV is tilted in favor of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. Book IV breaks off after distinction 22 due to the death of its author; all the other parts of the work are completely covered. Biel (1425–1495) thus avoids the typically nominalist focus on a few topics that are particularly susceptible of logical analysis. To take stock of the tradition in this manner required all three authors to develop doxographies, that is to say, ordered accounts of the relationship of the systems of thought preceding them. Furthermore, some fifteenth-century commentators displayed a vivid sense of history in elaborating these doxographies. Gabriel Biel’s work is least impressive in this regard, but John Capreolus shows historical awareness even in the relatively narrow Thomistic framework of his Defensiones, realizing that the Angelic Doctor’s thought evolved and matured, so that views he expressed in his later works must take precedence over earlier ones. On the basis of this principle, Capreolus gave up the traditional Thomistic preference for Aquinas’s Sentences commentary as his most authoritative work, replacing it with the Summa theologiae. As far as Denys the Carthusian is concerned, the prologue to his Sentences commentary contains a fully worked-out theology of history: the Christian theological tradition, according to Denys, radiated out from its scriptural center; was for a first time synthesized in the Book of Sentences; expanded once again from this new, richer center; only to call for another movement of contraction in a second Peter Lombard: Denys the Carthusian himself. What is perhaps most striking about the Sentences commentators of the fifteenth century is their ability to step back, in a certain sense, outside the tradition preceding them, in order to consider and assess it as a whole. This element of fifteenth-century thought, more than any other, indicates the dawn of a new age. John Capreolus, Denys the Carthusian, and Gabriel Biel sensed that they were at the end of a certain stage of the tradition, that it was time to sum up. This brings us to Martin Luther, to whom the final chapter of this volume is devoted. First of all, the very fact that Luther composed

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a Sentences commentary—or rather, glosses on the Sentences—is in itself remarkable. It shows how deeply the young Luther was steeped in medieval traditions of theology when he lectured on Peter Lombard in 1509–1511. Although there is no consensus among Luther scholars on how profoundly Luther’s later reformatory theology continued to be indebted to his medieval heritage (a controversy that Pekka Kärkkäinen briefly summarizes in his chapter), in his notes on the Sentences he exhibits “deep familiarity with the commentary tradition of the via moderna, particularly in the form represented by Biel.”57 Luther’s glosses are valuable outside the field of Luther studies as well; they remind us that the tradition of commenting upon the text of the Sentences was not dead even at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Was this “primitive” approach to the Sentences through literal commentary peculiar to Martin Luther? Or do his glosses simply reflect the fact that, throughout the tradition of the Sentences, close commentary remained the rule in lectures that were intended for beginners in theological studies? The prologue which Luther scribbled on the inside front cover of his copy of the Sentences gives the customary homage to the virtues of the Lombard and his work a new bent—he invokes Peter Lombard as a guarantor of doctrinal soundness because of the Master’s distance to philosophy: Although I have held that the spoils of philosophy are not to be utterly rejected insofar as they are suitable to the sacred matters of theology, nevertheless the prudent restraint and unsullied purity of the Master of the Sentences seem extremely proper, in that in every respect he so relies upon the lights of the Church, and especially upon Augustine (the brightest light, whose praise is never sufficient), that he seems to hold in suspicion, as it were, whatever is anxiously explored but not yet known by the philosophers.58

Luther’s contraction of the Christian tradition, however, goes beyond his recognition of the authority of Peter Lombard and the text of the Sentences. Just one generation before Luther, Gabriel Biel’s Collectorium still described Sacred Scripture as an ocean too large and spacious for beginners in theology; Luther, by contrast, in his Sentences glosses consistently “appeal[s] to scriptural authority.”59 As Dr. Kärkkäinen 57 58 59

Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Martin Luther,” 493. Quoted ibid., 476 (from Great Medieval Book, 174). Ibid., 478.

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asserts, he wants to “turn back to the scriptural roots of theology.”60 This is perhaps why he tentatively begins to explore doctrines that appear closer to the letter of the Bible than those developed by scholastic theologians—especially under the influence of Aristotle, the “stinking philosopher.” Thus, in his notes on Book I Luther declares that Peter Lombard’s teaching on charity is “not entirely absurd,” stressing as it does man’s radical dependence on grace: our love of God and neighbor is not an “infused habit” (which conforms to the structures of human nature) but the presence of the Holy Spirit itself. After Luther, the influence of the Book of Sentences declined. At Protestant universities, Peter Lombard’s opus was gradually replaced with Melanchthon’s Loci communes and similar works.61 At Catholic institutions, this “great medieval book” survived until the Council of Trent (1545–1563), after which Aquinas’s Summa was instituted as the basic textbook for theological studies. The transition occurred slowly, however. As an example, The Story of a Great Medieval Book notes that there is evidence of a chair devoted to the Sentences at the University of Louvain as late as 1568; the Summa was not officially introduced there until 1596. What exactly the story of the Sentences was in the sixteenth century and beyond must be the subject of future research. I hope that the planned third volume of the present work will include material on the fate of Peter Lombard in early modern theology.

60

Ibid., 479. Nevertheless, recent Protestant scholarship has noted significant continuities between late scholasticism and nascent Reformation theology; see, for example, Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (New York, 2002). 61

BIBLIOGRAPHY The following bibliography is not intended to be comprehensive. It represents a selection of literature that the contributors to be present volume have judged to be most important to research on the Book of Sentences and its commentaries. Edition of the Book of Sentences Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. Ignatius Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata, 1971–81). Stegmüller’s Repertorium and its Supplements (Arranged Chronologically) Stegmüller, Friedrich, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947). Buytaert, Eligius, “Damascenus latinus. On Item 417 of Stegmüller’s Repertorium Commentariorum,” Franciscan Studies 13 (1953): 37–70. Doucet, Victorin, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller (Quaracchi, 1954). Korolec, Jerzy B., Andrzej Póltawski, and Zofia Włodek, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 1 (1958): 28–30. Golaszewska, Maria, Jerzy B. Korolec, Andrzej Póltawski, Zofia K. Siemiątkowska, I. Tarnowska, and Zofia Włodek, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 2 (1958): 22–7. Kuksewicz, Zdzisław, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 5 (1960): 45–9. Włodek, Zofia, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 5 (1960): 144–6. ——, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d’après les MSS de la bibliothèque du Grand Séminaire de Pelplin,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 8 (1961): 33–8. Palacz, Ryszard, “Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 9 (1961): 46–7. Korolec, Jerzy B., and Ryszard Palacz, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 11 (1963): 140–5. Rebeta, Jerzy, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 12 (1967): 135–7. Třiška, Josef, “Sententiarii Pragensis,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 13 (1968): 100–10. Wójcik, Kazimierz, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 13 (1968): 111–14. Włodek, Sophie, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d’après les MSS de la bibliothèque de l’Université de Wroclaw,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 6 (1964): 100–04.

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——, “Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de F. Stegmüller d’après les MSS des bibliothèques de Prague,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 7 (1965): 91–5. General Literature on the Book of Sentences and its Commentary Tradition Bakker, Paul J. J. M., La raison et le miracle: les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250– c. 1400) (Nijmegen, 1999). Berg, Dieter, Armut und Wissenschaft. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Studienwesens der Bettelorden im 13. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 1977). Bianchi, Luca, La filosofia nelle università: secoli XIII–XIV (Florence, 1997). Brady, Ignatius, “The Rubrics of Peter Lombard’s Sentences,” Pier Lombardo 6 (1962): 5–25. Colish, Marcia L. “Christological Nihilianism in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 63 (1996): 146–55; reprinted in Studies in Scholasticism, no. XV. ——, “From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary to the Summa: Parisian Theology, 1130–1215,” in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain-laNeuve, 1994), 9–29; reprinted in Studies in Scholasticism, no. XII. ——, Peter Lombard, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1994). ——, Studies in Scholasticism (Aldershot, Hamps./Brookfield, Vt., 2006). ——, “The Development of Lombardian Theology, 1160–1215,” in Centres of Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (Leiden, 1995), 205–16; reprinted in Studies in Scholasticism, no. XIII. Courtenay, William J., “Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic and Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century,” in Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 325–50. ——, Schools & Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, N.J., 1987). ——, “The Course of Studies in the Faculty of Theology at Paris in the Fourteenth Century,” in “Ad Ingenii Acuitionem”: Studies in Honor of Alfonso Maierù, ed. Stefano Caroti, Ruedi Imbach, Zénon Kaluza, Giorgio Stabile, and Loris Sturlese (Louvainla-Neuve, 2006), 67–92. de Ghellinck, Joseph, Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle. Sa préparation lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard, ses rapports avec les initiatives des canonistes. Études, recherches et documents (Bruges/Brussels/Paris, 1948). de Hamel, C. F. R., Glossed Books of the Bible and the Origins of the Paris Booktrade (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1984). Denzinger, Heinrich, and Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion symbolorum, 40th ed. (Freiburg i. Br., 2005). Destrez, Jean, La pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle (Paris, 1935). Emery, Kent, Cheryl M. Jones, Andrew I. Irving, Victor Kotusenko, and Stephen M. Metzger, “Quaestiones, Sententiae and Summae from the Later Twelfth Century and Early Thirteenth Century: The Joseph N. Garvin Papers (I) and (II),” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 47 (2005): 11–68; 48 (2006): 15–81. Giusberti, Franco, Materials for a Study on Twelfth Century Scholasticism (Naples, 1982). Glorieux, Palémon, “Sentences (commentaries sur les),” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 14/2 (Paris, 1941), 1860–84.

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Grabmann, Martin, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vols. (Freiburg i. Br., 1909–11; reprinted, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1988). Köpf, Ulrich, Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1974). Kraml, Hans, Die Rede von Gott sprachkritisch rekonstruiert aus Sentenzenkommentaren (Innsbruck, 1984). Landgraf, Artur Michael, Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik unter dem Gesichtspunkte der Schulenbildung (Regensburg, 1948). ——, Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, ed. Albert-M. Landry and trans. Louis-B. Geiger (Montreal, 1973). La production du livre universitaire au moyen âge. Exemplar et pecia. Actes du symposium tenu à Grottaferrata, 1983, ed. Louis-J. Bataillon, Bertrand-G. Guyot, and Richard H. Rouse (Paris, 1988). Leinsle, Ulrich G., Einführung in die scholastische Theologie (Paderborn, 1995). Maier, Anneliese, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik (Rome, 1949). Mediaeval Commentaries on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard: Current Research, vol. 1, ed. G. R. Evans (Leiden, 2002). Miscellanea lombardiana (Novara, 1958). Mulchahey, M. Michèle, “First the Bow is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto, 1998). Quinto, Riccardo, Scholastica. Storia di un concetto (Padua, 2001). ——, “Trivium e teologia. L’organizzazione scolastica nella seconda metà del secolo dodicesimo e i maestri della sacra pagina,” in Storia della Teologia nel Medioevo, II: La grande fioritura, ed. Giulio D’Onofrio (Casale Monferrato, 1996), 435–68. Randi, Eugenio, Il sovrano e l’orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio nel dibatitto sulla “potentia absoluta” fra XIII e XIV secolo (Florence, 1986). Roest, Bert, A History of Franciscan Education (ca. 1210–1517) (Leiden, 2000). Rosemann, Philipp W., “New Interest in Peter Lombard: The Current State of Research and Some Desiderata for the Future,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 72 (2005): 133–52. ——, Peter Lombard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). ——, “Sacra pagina or scientia divina? Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and the Nature of the Theological Project,” Philotheos: International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 4 (2004): 284–300. ——, The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s “Sentences” (Peterborough, Ont., 2007). Rouse, Richard H. and Mary A. Rouse, Illiterati et uxorati: Manuscripts and Their Makers. Commercial Book Producers in Medieval Paris, 2 vols. (Turnhout, 2000). ——, “Statim invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page,” in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 201–25; reprinted in Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts (Notre Dame, 1991), 191–219. ——, “The Book Trade at the University of Paris, ca. 1250–ca. 1350,” in La production du livre universitaire au moyen âge, ed. Louis-J. Bataillon, Bertrand-G. Guyot, and Richard H. Rouse (Paris, 1988), 41–114. ——, “The Development of Research Tools in the Thirteenth Century,” in Authentic Witnesses, 63–89. Sharpe, Richard, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout, 2001). Smalley, Beryl, The Gospels in the Schools, c. 1100–c. 1280 (London, 1985). Tachau, Katherine, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988).

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——, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 156–90. ——, “Peter of Candia’s Portrait of Late Thirteenth-Century Problems concerning Faith and Reason in Book I of the Sentences,” in Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB, ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, 2007), 254–82. ——, “Peter of Candia’s Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard,” in Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor, ed. Romano S. Almagno and Conrad L. Harkins (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1976), 141–76. Ehrle, Franz, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. (Münster, 1925). Emmen, Aquilinus, “Petrus de Candia, O.F.M. De immaculata Deiparae conceptione,” in Tractatus quatuor de immaculata conceptione B. Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1954), 233–334. Kitanov, Severin V., “Peter of Candia on Beatific Enjoyment: Can One Enjoy the Divine Persons Separately from the Divine Essence?” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35 (2006): 145–66. ——, “Peter of Candia on Demonstrating that God is the Sole Object of Beatific Enjoyment,” Franciscan Studies 67 (2009), forthcoming. Schabel, Chris, “Early Franciscan Attacks on John Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Divine Foreknowledge,” in What is “Theology” in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in their Self-Understanding, ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Münster, 2007), 301–28. ——, Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot, Hamps., 2000). Martin Luther’s Glosses on the Sentences Edition D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesammtausgabe, vol. 9 (Weimar, 1893), 28–94. Secondary Literature Grane, Leif, Contra Gabrielem. Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio contra Scholasticam Theologiam 1517 (Copenhagen, 1962). Murphy, Lawrence Francis, Martin Luther, Commentator on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Theological Method and Selected Theological Problems (PhD dissertation, Marquette University, 1970). Vignaux, Paul, Luther commentateur des Sentences (livre 1, distinction XVII) (Paris, 1935). Wieneke, Josef, Luther und Petrus Lombardus. Martin Luthers Notizen anläßlich seiner Vorlesungen über die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus Erfurt 1509/11 (St. Ottilien, 1994). zur Mühlen, Karl-Heinz, “Die Erforschung des ‘jungen Luther’ seit 1876,” Lutherjahrbuch 50 (1983): 48–125.

INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS An attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive index of all the manuscripts cited in this volume, both in the main text and the footnotes. For linguistic consistency, the English versions of place names have been used—for example, Brussels rather than Brussel or Bruxelles. Alba Iulia Biblioteca Centrală de Stat Filiala Batthyáneum, I.143: 114, 120 n. 35

B II 20: 113 n. 14, 114, 115 n. 18–19, 118–19, 119 n. 32, 120–1, 124 n. 47–8, 125 n. 50, 127–8, 131 n. 77, 132 n. 87, 142 n. 130

Arras Médiathèque (formerly Bibliothèque municipale) 855 (526): 86 n. 30, 114

Berlin Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz theol. qu. 48: 198 n. 81

Assisi Biblioteca comunale 103: 88, 114, 116, 116 n. 21, 117, 117 n. 23 130: 113 n. 14, 114, 115 n. 18–19, 118, 119 n. 29 131: 113 n. 14, 114, 115 n. 18–19, 118, 119 n. 29, 132 n. 82 n. 84 173: 370 n. 6 189: 85–9, 90, 98 n. 86, 100 n. 91, 102–03, 108 n. 111 855 (526): 116 n. 21 Avignon Bibliothèque municipale 316: 238 Avranches Bibliothèque municipale 36: 30 230: 43 n. 38 Bamberg Staatsbibliothek Misc. Patr. 98: 111 n. 2 Misc. Patr. 128: 5, 8, plate 1, plate 4 Barcelona Archivo de la Corona de Aragón Ripoll 76: 5–6, 30, plate 2, plate 3 Basel Universitätsbibliothek

Bernkastel-Kues St. Nikolaus-Hospital 90: 370 n. 6 Bologna Biblioteca comunale dell’Archiginnasio A.913: 265 n. 3 Biblioteca universitaria 1158 (2312): 82 n. 15 2554: 82 n. 15 Bordeaux Bibliothèque municipale 305: 236 Brentford (Middlesex) Syon House D.31: 408 D.42: 408 Bruges Stadsbibliotheek 178: 114, 115 n. 19, 118 192: 370 n. 6, 371 n. 7, 388 n. 45, 392 n. 57 819: 407 Brussels Bibliothèque royale Albert Ier 1539: 12, 29, plate 13, plates 16–18 1551: 370 n. 6, 371 n. 10, 390 n. 49 11422/11423: 114, 115 n. 19, 118, 120 n. 35

538

index of manuscripts

Budapest Országos Széchényi Kònyvtár 19: 114 Cambridge St. John’s College Library C 7 [57]: 41–3, 45, 46 n. 51, 74 n. 162 Canterbury Christ Church Library 42 (A 12): 114, 118, 120 n. 35 Casale Monferrato Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile B2: 266–70, 278, 294, 313–14, 321–34 Chartres Bibliothèque municipale 430: 41 Douai Bibliothèque municipale 434: 89

Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale conv. soppr. A.II. 727: 239–40 conv. soppr. A.III. 508: 407, 411 n. 14, 413–14, 418–20, 423 n. 38 conv. soppr. A.VI. 611: 407, 411 n. 14, 418–20 conv. soppr. F.IV. 729: 239 conv. soppr. G.IV. 854: 252 n. 75 conv. soppr. G.IV. 936: 7 n. 10 conv. soppr. G.V. 347: 88 n. 42 conv. soppr. J.VI. 32: 114, 115 n. 17 n. 19, 116, 116 n. 21, 117 n. 23, 118 conv. soppr. J.VII. 47: 114 Frankfurt am Main Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Barth. 103: 114 Fribourg Bibliothèque cantonale et universitaire Cordeliers 26: 370 n. 6, 371 n. 10

Edinburgh University Library 76: 114

Gdańsk Biblioteka Gdańska Polskiej Akademii Nauk 1969: 301–02 Marienbibliothek F 273: 239–40

Eichstätt Universitätsbibliothek 471: 114

Graz Universitätsbibliothek 295: 239

Einsiedeln Stiftsbibliothek 28: 233 n. 26

Kassel Landesbibliothek 2º theol. 53: 370 n. 6

Erfurt Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha Amplon. Fol. 94: 439 n. 1 Amplon. Fol. 109: 114 Amplon. O.68: 85–7, 98 n. 86, 100 n. 91, 102–03, 108 n. 111 Amplon. Oct. 29: 114 Amplon. Q.395a: 271 Dep. Erf., CA 4º 107: 370 n. 6

Klosterneuburg Stiftsbibliothek CCl 291:304–05

Évreux Bibliothèque municipale 15: 114, 115 n. 18 Florence Biblioteca medicea laurenziana S. Croce Plut. XXX dext 2: 301–02 S. Croce Plut. XXVIII dext 1: 114

Leipzig Universitätsbibliothek 573: 115, 118 Lisbon Bibliotheca nacional Alcob. 147 (223): 113 n. 14, 114, 115 n. 19 London British Library Harley 5431: 176 n. 3 Royal 7 F XIII: 10–11, plate 8, plate 9, plate 11 Royal 9 B VI: 507 n. 29

index of manuscripts

539

Lambeth Palace Library 347: 85–8, 98 n. 86–7, 100 n. 91, 102–03, 108 n. 111

Merton College 237: 229 n. 5 L.1.3 (Coxe 131): 176–7

Lübeck Bibliothek der Hansestadt Lübeck theol. lat. 2º 116: 301–02

Oriel College 15: 370 n. 6, 371–4, 385 n. 34, 387 n. 42, 389 n. 46, 391, 392 n. 58, 396 n. 65, 401 n. 77, 407, 408 n. 9, 410 n. 12, 411 n. 15, 412 n. 18, 414–15, 418–20, 421 n. 33, 422, 424

Lüneburg Ratsbücherei Theol. 2º 19: 282, 305–06, 308–09, 358–68 Melbourne Victoria State Library 206: 39 n. 16 Metz Bibliothèque municipale 448: 114 Milan Biblioteca Ambrosiana A 11 sup.: 235 Munich Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 8717: 267 Clm 8943: 407 Clm 21121: 114 Clm 22288: 9, plate 7 Clm 27318: 120 n. 38 Naples Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III VII C 14: 5, 8, 11, plate 5, plate 10, 49–50, 500 Oxford Balliol College 57: 203 n. 104 n. 107, 204 n. 112 210: 6–9, plate 6 Bodleian Library Ashmole 757: 236 Canon. Misc. 177: 370 n. 6 Rawlinson C 241: 114 Lincoln College Lat. 95: 149–73, 505 Magdalen College 16: 407

Padua Biblioteca Antoniana 169: 309 n. 82 238, Scaff. XI: 370 n. 6 Biblioteca universitaria 853: 114, 115 n. 17 n. 19, 119 n. 25, 139 n. 117 Aldini 479: 84 n. 21 Pamplona Biblioteca de la Catedral 5: 271–8, 281 n. 24, 282, 287, 289–90, 303–07, 309–10, 340–57, 358–66 Paris Bibliothèque mazarine lat. 758: 12, 29, plates 14–15 Bibliothèque nationale de France lat. 505: 43 n. 41 lat. 3032: 114, 116, 116 n. 21, 117, 117 n. 23, 118 lat. 3073: 114, 115 n. 17 n. 19 lat. 3406: 114, 115 n. 17 lat. 6441: 407, 413 n. 22, 414, 418, 420 lat. 10698: 236 lat. 10728: 115, 115 n. 17 lat. 14423: 11, plate 12 lat. 14443: 47 n. 52 lat. 15805: 265–6 lat. 15853: 407, 408 n. 8, 411 n. 13–14, 413–14, 418–20, 431 n. 53, 432 n. 54–5 n. 60 lat. 15864: 281 n. 25, 301–02 lat. 16385: 43 n. 38 lat. 16406: 85–6, 87 n. 35 lat. 16408: 449 n. 36 lat. 16535: 449 n. 36 Pavia Biblioteca universitaria 244: 265 n. 4

540

index of manuscripts

Prague Archiv Pražského Hradu D.XI.2: 114

Valencia Biblioteca de la Catedral 200: 305

Národní knihovna ČR 2297 (XIII D.5): 370 n. 6

Vatican City Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Barberini lat. 608: 12 Borgh. lat. 50: 267 Borgh. lat. 106: 115 Borgh. lat. 346: 270–8, 289, 303, 312 n. 84, 335–9, 344–5, 347–8, 350–3, 355–7 Chigiani B.V.66: 369 n. 1, 370 n. 6, 371 Chigiani E.V.161: 370 n. 6, 372 n. 13a Ottob. lat. 161: 176–7 Ottob. lat. 179: 407, 418, 420 Ottob. lat. 869: 407, 418–20 Vat. lat. 411: 11 Vat. lat. 691: 88 Vat. lat. 782: 82 n. 15 Vat. lat. 869: 281 n. 27 Vat. lat. 1081: 447 n. 29, 450 n. 37, 457 n. 55, 460 n. 62 n. 65, 461 n. 66, 462 n. 67, 463 n. 69–70, 464 n. 73, 467 n. 89, 468 n. 90 Vat. lat. 1098: 115, 115 n. 19, 118, 119 n. 25 Vat. lat. 1108: 370 n. 6 Vat. lat. 1113: 266 n. 8, 269, 271, 282, 284–6, 290–1, 294–5, 314–34 Vat. lat. 1174: 115, 118, 119 n. 25 Vat. lat. 4255: 115, 115 n. 18 Vat. lat. 4297: 43 n. 38 Vat lat. 4413: 237 Vat. lat. 10754: 11 Vat. lat. 11517: 407, 411 n. 14, 413–14, 418–20 Vat. lat. 13002: 417 n. 28 Vat. lat. 13687: 267–71, 294, 313–14, 321–34 Vat. lat. 14345: 115–16, 116 n. 21, 117, 117 n. 23

Saint-Omer Bibliothèque municipale 288: 115, 115 n. 18 Sarnano Biblioteca comunale E.98: 305 Sevilla Biblioteca Capitular y Colombina 7–7–29: 370 n. 6 Stockholm Kungl. biblioteket A 150: 115, 116 n. 21, 116–17, 117 n. 23, 118, 146 Todi Biblioteca comunale 12: 267 n. 9 42: 253 n. 78 59: 238 121: 85–6, 88 Toledo Librería del cabildo 1818: 115, 115 n. 18–19, 116, 116 n. 21, 117, 117 n. 23 Toulouse Bibliothèque municipale 61: 176–7 252: 239 Troyes Médiathèque (formerly Bibliothèque municipale) 501: 267, 271 505: 407, 413–14, 418, 420 995: 307 n. 77 1046: 43 1788: 229 n. 5, 235 1965: 115, 115 n. 18 Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek C 165: 115, 115 n. 19, 118, 146

Venice Biblioteca nazionale marciana lat. III 174 (2785): 115, 115 n. 19, 119 n. 25 lat. VI 62: 370 n. 6 lat. VI 155: 370 n. 6 lat. XIII 38: 370 n. 6 Vienna Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1688 (codex theol. 617, olim 287): 115

index of manuscripts Worcester Cathedral Chapter Library F 43: 176–7, 185 F 65: 407 Q 71: 407, 408 n. 8, 411 n. 13, 413 n. 21, 414, 416–18, 420

541

Wrocław Biblioteca uniwersytecka A 21 (olim Breslau I.F.184): 269, 272–8, 282, 284–91, 294, 303, 307, 309–10, 312 n. 84, 314–34, 340–57

INDEX OF NAMES This index includes names of both persons and places. The places are mainly of interest insofar as they indicate the geographical distribution of the medieval Sentences literature. Personal names have been included only if they occur in significant contexts; for example, the author of a piece of secondary literature cited in a footnote has been indexed, but the editor of the collective volume in which that contribution was published has not. If an author’s name appears in the main text of a page and in footnotes on the same page, only the page number itself has been recorded. Authors writing before 1500 have been alphabetized according to their first names, those writing after 1500 according to their last names. Peter Lombard’s name has been omitted, since it occurs passim. Abellan, P., 144 n. 134, 147 Adam Wodeham, 280 n. 23, 371, 386 n. 37, 405–06, 414, 421, 427, 429, 430 n. 51, 431 n. 52, 432–3, 435, 440 Alain of Lille, 138, 246 n. 63 Albert the Great, 86, 88, 169, 195, 227, 244, 248 Alexander III, pope, 2, 69–70 Alexander V, pope, see Peter of Candia Alexander of Alessandria, 255, 283 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 467 Alexander of Hales, 1, 4–5, 10, 51 n. 63, 79–109, 112, 124, 128, 130, 137 n. 113, 144 n. 136, 184, 188, 195, 227, 241, 279, 440, 458, 465, 500–03, 512, 521 Alfaro, J., 281 n. 24 Alliney, G., 300 n. 68 Ambrose of Milan, 142, 156, 159, 163, 183, 448 Amorós, L., 281 n. 24–6, 282 n. 29, 288 n. 36–9, 289 n. 41, 290, 292 n. 51, 298 n. 66, 310 n. 83 Anaxagoras, 464–5 Anders (Andrew) Sunesen, 40 n. 25, 42, 44 n. 43, 54 n. 76 Angelini, G., 133 n. 97 Anselm of Canterbury, 92, 170 n. 53, 184, 206–07, 421, 428, 432, 484–5 Anselm of Laon, 281 n. 26 Antonius Lusco, 439 Aristotle (and Aristotelianism), 4, 6, 31, 56, 77, 83, 92, 113, 132, 143–4, 160–1, 169, 184, 187, 189, 191–2, 194–5, 214 n. 145, 215–16, 218–19, 221, 225, 227–8, 241, 243, 248, 254–5, 258–9, 293, 295, 309, 383, 387, 394–7,

399–40, 421, 430–1, 437, 445, 452, 460, 464–7, 479, 490, 508, 510, 513, 516, 518, 523 Arius, 162–3 Armagh, 405 Arnold, J., 113 n. 11, 133 n. 97, 134 n. 101 Assisi, 368 Aufredo Gonteri Brito, 263–368, 511–14 Augustine of Hippo (and Augustinianism), 8, 12, 29, 52 n. 67, 60, 94–5, 139–40, 143, 154, 158–62, 166, 184, 192, 195–7, 200, 205–07, 214–16, 219, 221–2, 225, 227, 234, 247, 249–51, 295–7, 406, 420–1, 423–4, 428–9, 433, 436, 451–2, 454–8, 465, 469, 472, 475–6, 478–83, 485–6, 493, 495–6, 522 Averroës, 184, 205, 254, 257, 259, 260 n. 97, 420–1, 431, 460, 466 Avicenna, 459, 463 Avignon, 264, 405, 420, 436, 516 d’Avray, D. L., 37 n. 8 Bagliani, A. P., 111 n. 1 Bakker, P. J. J. M., 32 n. 22, 265, 266 n. 7, 382 n. 26 Balcoyiannopoulou, I., 284 n. 34 Baldwin, J., 48 n. 54 Bale, J., 408 Balić, C., 263, 267–73, 279 n. 22 Bandinus, 4, 497 Barcelona, 272, 274–5, 287–91, 293, 303, 307, 309–10 Bartholomaeus de Repps, 369 Bataillon, L.-J., 43 n. 39–40, 44 n. 42, 118 n. 25, 230–1

544

index of names

Bebel, H., 477 Bede, 183, 442–3, 446 Beer, T., 490 Benedict XII, pope, 405 Benedict XVI, pope, see Ratzinger, J. Benedict of Assignano, 291, 305 Benedict of Sansetun, 45 n. 47 Berg, D., 84 n. 23 Berger, S., 233–5 Bériou, N., 130 n. 74 Bernard of Auvergne, 453–4, 518 Bernard of Clairvaux, 92, 140, 184, 206–07, 241 Berndt, R., 62 n. 102 Bertolini, O., 116 n. 21 Bieniak, M., 41 n. 31, 46 n. 49 n. 51, 53 n. 71, 56 n. 83, 68 n. 123 n. 124, 69 n. 128, 71 n. 142, 76 n. 165a, 111–47, 502–04 Bissen, J. M., 81 n. 7 Blanco, F. C., 82 n. 15, 93 n. 68 Boehmer, H., 472 Boethius, 66–7, 77, 99–101, 126, 132, 136, 159, 160, 183, 184, 215, 295, 383, 466 Bologna, 291 Bonaventure, 33 n. 26, 80, 84, 92, 117, 169, 184–5, 196–7, 198 n. 81, 199–201, 209 n. 127, 222, 224, 227, 237–9, 246, 250, 252–5, 257, 260 n. 96, 261, 263, 279–80, 282, 381, 440, 484, 503–04, 507–08, 510, 519–21 Boucher, A., 306 n. 77 Bougard, P., 86 n. 30, 113 n. 15, 116 n. 21 Bougerol, J.-G., 7 n. 10 Boureau, A., 131 n. 79–80, 135, 140 n. 125, 144 n. 134, 147 Boyle, J. F., 149–73, 505–06 Boyle, L. E., 118 n. 25, 150 n. 3–4, 151–2 Brady, I. C., 10 n. 15, 51 n. 63, 81 n. 8, 82 n. 12, 83 n. 18, 91 n. 57 Brecht, M., 493 n. 69 Breuning, W., 126 n. 56, 131 n. 81, 132 n. 85–6 n. 90, 136 n. 108, 137 n. 111, 138 n. 116, 146–7 Broadie, A., 384 n. 33 Brown, S. F., 439–69, 517–19 Brundage, J. A., 2 n. 4, 9 n. 14 Buchwald, G., 471 n. 2 Bur, M., 39 n. 20 Buytaert, E., 36 n. 5 n. 7, 48–9 Bynum, C. W., 9 n. 12

Caldera, F., 231 n. 14, 262 n. 101 Callus, D., 185 Calma, M., 266 n. 7 Cambridge, 267 n. 9, 369 n. 3, 371, 408, 515 Canterbury, 37–8, 175–6, 210 n. 129 Carlisle, 263 Cassiodorus, 444–6, 451 Chartres, 241 Chatelain, A., 184 n. 17, 229 n. 3, 370 n. 6, 441 n. 7 Cicero, 184 Clairvaux, 414 Claquot, J. N., 306 n. 77 Clark, M. J., 39, 40 n. 21 n. 23, 50 n. 60 Clement VI, pope, 274 n. 17, 291 Clement VII, antipope, 439 Colish, M. L., 1–33, 35, 69 n. 133, 71 n. 138, 80 n. 3, 497–8, 512 Costa, A. D. de S., 89 n. 46 Courtenay, W. J., 7 n. 10, 33 n. 26, 135 n. 107, 280 n. 23, 288 n. 39, 369 n. 1–2 n. 4–5, 371 n. 8–9, 382 n. 23 n. 25, 383 n. 27, 406 n. 2, 411 n. 13, 414–15, 417, 430 n. 51, 432 n. 58, 440 n. 4, 513 Cousins, E., 255 Crete, 439, 441 Creytens, R., 231 n. 16, 232 n. 18, 237 n. 38 Cullen, C. M., 84 n. 18 Dahan, G., 51 n. 65, 126 n. 55 Davis, H. W. C., 8 n. 11 Deahl, J., x De Fraja, V., 38 n. 11, 76 n. 165a de Libera, A., 32 n. 22 Den Bok, N., 68 n. 124 Denifle, H., 184 n. 17, 229 n. 3, 233, 235, 237 n. 39, 370 n. 6, 441 n. 7, 471, 473 Denys the Carthusian, x, 496, 520–1 Denzinger, H., 64 n. 109, 69 n. 132, 75 n. 165, 90 n. 49 de Rijk, L. M., 53 n. 72, 62 n. 101, 265 n. 4 Descartes, R., 435 n. 70 Destrez, J., 10 n. 15, 118 n. 25 Dettloff, W., 83 n. 18, 281 n. 24, 293 De Wulf, C., 35 Dieterici, F., 256 n. 84 Dionysius of Borgo San Sepolcro, 283 Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-), 160, 183, 513

index of names Dominicus de Dominicis, 306 n. 77 Donahue, C., 2 n. 4 Dondaine, A., 49 n. 59 Doucet, V., 80 n. 5, 81 n. 8–9, 82, 83 n. 18, 84 n. 22, 263, 273, 281 n. 24–6, 282 n. 29–30, 288 n. 36 n. 39, 290, 291 n. 47–8, 292 n. 51–2, 293 n. 53, 294 n. 55, 305 n. 75, 309, 310 n. 83, 311, 330, 369 n. 1 n. 3, 370 n. 6 Duba, W. O., 263–368, 511–14 Dumont, S., 265, 266 n. 8, 281 n. 24, 311, 325 Dundalk (Co. Louth), 405 Dunne, M., 405–37, 515–18 Dunholme (Lincolnshire), 176–7 Durand, E., 134 n. 101 Durand of St.-Pourçain, 280, 281 n. 26, 283–6, 292, 512 Ebbesen, S., 40 n. 25, 41 n. 31, 42, 45 n. 45, 48 n. 55, 53 n. 71 n. 74, 54 n. 76, 55 n. 79 n. 80, 56 n. 81–2 n. 84, 58 n. 86, 59 n. 90 n. 92, 60 n. 94, 61, 63 n. 103–04, 64 n. 106–08, 65 n. 112–13, 68 n. 123, 70 n. 135, 71 n. 143, 73 n. 149, 77, 133 n. 97 Échard, J., 80 n. 4 Edmund of Abingdon, 89 Ehrle, F., 80 n. 4, 439 n. 1, 441 n. 8, 449 n. 35 Emery, K., Jr., x, 1 n. 1, 51 n. 63 Empedocles, 464–5 Erfurt, 471, 475 n. 13, 476–7, 483–4, 485 n. 45, 486 Ernst, W., 484 n. 41 Étienne Tempier, 231 Eudes Rigaud, 84, 88 Eustache of Arras, 229 Eustratius, 184 Evans, D., 251 n. 73 Evans, G. R., ix Everard of Ypres, 49 n. 59 Exeter, 176 Faes de Mottoni, B., 111 n. 4, 112 n. 8, 113–15, 116 n. 20–1, 118–20, 125, 503 al-Fārābī, 256, 467 Farthing, J. L., 484 n. 41 Fink-Errera, G., 118 n. 25 Fisher, J., 111, 116–17, 122 n. 43, 127 n. 61, 129 Florence, 7, 151 Folques of Neuilly, 43 Fornaro, I., 83 n. 17, 94 n. 70

545

Francis, Saint, 84, 508 Francis of Marchia, 283, 289–90, 292–3, 294–7, 300, 302–05, 458, 512–13 Francis of Meyronnes, 283, 289, 305–06, 309 n. 82, 514 Francis of Saint-Michel, 449–50, 452 Friedman, R., ix, 92 n. 64, 263–368, 419 n. 30, 427–8, 511–14 Fulgentius of Ruspe, 183 Fussenegger, G., 227 n. 1 Gabriel Biel, 471, 473–5, 477, 480, 483–9, 491–3, 496, 520–2 Gams, P. B., 39 n. 20 Gandulph of Bologna, 184 Ganz, D., 10 n. 15 Garvin, J. N., 1 n. 1, 51 n. 63 Gastaldelli, F., 66 n. 117 Gelber, H. G., 136 n. 107 Genest, J.-F., 265, 266 n. 6, 407 n. 7, 411 n. 13, 418, 423 n. 38, 433–5 Gennadius, 183 Gerard Odonis, 283, 289–90, 303–05, 308 Gerard of Abbeville, 264–5 Gerard of Calcar, 449–51 Gerard of Siena, 283 Geyer, B., 81 Ghisalberti, A., 111 n. 1 Gian Galeazzo Visconti, 439 Gibiino, F., 133 n. 97, 134, 146–7 Gibson, S., 405 n. 1 Gilbert of Poitiers, 134, 170 n. 53 Giles of Rome, 282, 428, 486 Giles van der Hoye, 7 Gillon, L.-B., 138 n. 114 Gilson, É., 184 n. 17, 256 n. 84 Giusberti, F., 53 n. 73 Glastonbury (Benedictine abbey), 372, 414 Glorieux, P., 6 n. 8, 89, 138 n. 115, 229–30, 236, 241 Godfrey of Fontaines, 264, 279, 292, 428 Godfrey of Poitiers, 130, 140 Goergen, J., 82 n. 15 Goering, J., 53 n. 73 Gössmann, E., 176 n. 2, 177 n. 5, 178–9, 208 n. 122–3, 209 n. 124–5, 212 n. 138, 213 n. 139 Gorman, J., 433 n. 64 Grabmann, M., 111 n. 4 Graen, H., 83 n. 17 Grane, L., 493 Gratian, 5

546

index of names

Gregory I, the Great, pope, 183, 444, 448 Gregory X, pope, 175 Gregory, A. L., 45 n. 47, 47 n. 51 Gregory of Rimini, 406, 430 n. 51, 433, 435 n. 70, 449, 454–5, 457, 518 Gründel, J., 111 n. 2, 147, 214 Guiard of Laon, 130 Guñi Gaztambide, J., 282 n. 29 Guy d’Orchelles, 130 Gwynn, A., 414 Hales (Shropshire), 83 Hallamaa, O., 369–404, 514–15 Häring, N. M., 49 n. 59, 54 n. 75, 246 n. 63 Hausherr, R., 51 n. 65 Haverel Norvici, 369 Haverling, G., 185 n. 22 Heidelberg, 490 Henninger, M., 263 n. *, 264, 266 n. 8, 279, 311, 328 Henquinet, F.-M., 80 n. 4, 81–2 Henry of Ghent, 228, 244, 264, 273–5, 279, 292, 295, 406, 421–2, 425–8, 519 Henry of Gorkum, 474 Henry of Harclay, 263–368, 511 Henry of Langenstein, 266 Henry of Merseburg, 88 n. 32 Henry Totting of Oyta, 266, 386 n. 37 Hervaeus Natalis, 280, 283, 292 Heynck, V., 232 n. 17, 298 n. 66 Hilary of Poitiers, 132, 159 n. 27, 160, 183, 478 Hirsch, E., 473 n. 5 Hirvonen, V., 397 n. 67 Hissette, R., 232 n. 16 n. 20 Hödl, L., 35 n. 3–4, 91 n. 57, 177 n. 5, 291 n. 48 Hoenen, M. J. F. M., 227, 266 n. 7 Holl, K., 473 n. 5 Holstein, H., 89 n. 46 Honorius III, pope, 38 Horace, 446 n. 27 Horowski, A., 82 n. 15–16, 83 n. 17 Hubert Walter, 37 Hubertus Decembris, 439 Hünermann, P., 90 n. 49 Hufnagel, A., 101 n. 93, 102 n. 98, 104 n. 103 Hugh of Novocastro, 281 n. 25, 283, 297–302, 309 n. 82, 512–13 Hugh of St.-Cher, 71–2, 86, 87, 89, 111–47, 222, 241, 502–04

Hugh of St.-Victor, 62 n. 102, 66, 95–6, 184, 188, 214, 223, 442–3, 451 Huning, H. A., 261 Hunt, T., 84 n. 22 Ignatius of Loyola, 244 n. 57 Innocent III, pope, 37–8, 75–6, 183 Innocent V, pope, see Peter of Tarantaise Irving, A. I., 51 n. 63 Isidore of Seville, 183 Isleworth (Middlesex), 176 Jacobus Raynucii, 151–2 James of Lausanne, 284 n. 34 James of Metz, 283 James of Venice, 77 Jean de Gonesse, 11 Jean de La Rochelle, 81, 84, 88–9 Jean Gerson, 477 n. 17 Jean Gorre, 414 Jedin, H., 281 n. 26 Jerome, Saint, 105, 158, 183, 234, 448 Joachim of Fiore, 167, 169, 170 Johannes Dorsten, 486 John, king of England, 37–8 John XXII, pope, 405 John Bassols, 283 John Capreolus, 520–1 John Chrysostom, 184 John Damascene, 143, 160, 163–4, 184, 211, 492 John Duns Scotus (and Scotism), 107, 178 n. 7, 238, 244, 255, 260 n. 96, 262, 264, 267 n. 9, 268, 272, 275, 279–80, 283, 288–9, 292–4, 297, 301–02, 305, 310, 381–2, 397 n. 68, 421–2, 426, 428, 449, 451, 454, 458–60, 462–6, 473, 478–9, 481, 483–4, 494, 508, 510–14, 517–18 John Grandisson, 405, 426 John Northwode, 405, 406 n. 2 John of Paris, 164, 278 John of Pouilly, 265 John of Prato, 291 John of Reading, 432 John of Ripa, 458, 460, 462 John of Rodington, 418–19, 435 John of Treviso, 111 n. 2 John Peckham, 228–30, 237–9, 252, 254, 257, 508 John Rucherat of Wesel, 477 n. 17, 484–6

index of names John Scottus Eriugena, 89 John Swyneshed, 371–2 John the Teutonic, 131 John Went, 369 John Wyclif, 420 Johnson, M. F., 150 n. 4 Jones, C. M., 51 n. 63 Jones, J., 8 n. 11 Jones, M. R., 408 Junghans, H., 473, 474 n. 8, 477 n. 17 n. 19 Jung-Palczewska, E., 383 n. 27 Juntunen, S., 484 n. 43 Kaeppeli, T., 111 n. 1, 114, 117 n. 23 Kärkkäinen, P., 471–94, 522–3 Kaufmann, T., 493 n. 71 Keßler, N., 474 Kible, B. T., 101 n. 96, 104 n. 103 Kitanov, S. V., 458 n. 58, 459 n. 60, 483 n. 38 Kleineidam, E., 475 n. 13, 485 n. 44 Knuuttila, S., 391 n. 54 Kobusch, T., 104 n. 102 Köpf, U., 94 n. 69 n. 71, 241 Köstler, H., 266 n. 8, 311, 313–14 Kotusenko, V., 51 n. 63 Kraml, H., 94 n. 70–1, 227–62, 508–10 Künzle, P., 139 n. 119 Lacombe, G., 35, 39, 40 n. 22, 47 n. 52, 51 n. 65 Lahey, S., 420 n. 31 Lambert of Marches, 449–51 Landgraf, A. M., 1 n. 1, 2 n. 3, 35–6, 43 n. 38, 47 n. 52, 49–51, 72 n. 145, 75, 77, 80 n. 3, 111 n. 1–2, 122 n. 44, 126 n. 58, 209 n. 126, 217 n. 165, 498 Landulph Caracciolo, 283, 309 n. 82, 458 Laon, 241 Leff, G., 406, 408 n. 8, 411 n. 13, 414, 420, 428–9, 433–4 LeGoff, J., 8 n. 12 Lehtinen, A. I., 116 n. 21, 117–18, 309 n. 82 Leibold, G., 175–226, 507–08 Leinsle, U. G., 94 n. 69–70 Leland, J., 408 Leonardus Huntpichler de valle Brixinensi, 120 Lewry, O., 176 n. 3 Little, A. G., 405 n. 1 Lohse, B., 472 n. 5, 475 n. 14

547

London, 45 n. 47, 371 Long, R. J., 440 n. 2 Longeway, J., 400 n. 76 Longpré, E., 237, 239 Loofs, F., 472 Lottin, O., 2 n. 3, 81, 85 n. 27, 90 n. 51, 107 n. 109, 113 n. 12, 129–30, 131 n. 78, 132 n. 88, 139 n. 118 n. 120–2, 140 n. 123 n. 125–6, 141 n. 127–8, 142 n. 129 n. 131, 143 n. 132, 146–7, 214 Louvain, 523 Lund, 42 Luther, M., 437, 471–94, 495, 521–3 Lynch, K. F., 89 n. 44 n. 47, 112 n. 6, 130 n. 67–8, 147 Macrobius, 184 Macy, G., 31 n. 22 Maggioni, G. P., 76 n. 165a Maier, A., 263, 272, 274–6, 281 n. 24, 432 n. 56 Maimonides, 254, 256–7, 260, 269, 467 Mainz, 484 Major, C., 38 n. 12 Malivus of Saint-Omer, 449–51 Mandonnet, P., 149 n. 1, 257 n. 88 Marcolino, V., 83 n. 17 Marsilius of Inghen, 266, 519 Martin, R.-M., 2 n. 3 Matsuura, J., 471 n. 2, 474 n. 12 Mazzanti, G., 69 n. 132 McEvoy, J., 402 n. 79 McKitterick, R., 10 n. 15, 31 Meersseman, G., 147 a Mehr, B., 82 n. 12 Melanchthon, P., 493, 523 Mersenne, M., 435 n. 70 Michalski, K., 421 n. 33 Milan, 439 Miramon, C. de, 130 n. 70, 142 n. 130 Moore, P. S., 3 n. 6 Moos, M. F., 149 n. 1 Mortensen, L. B., 40 n. 25, 41 n. 31, 42, 44 n. 43, 48 n. 55, 53 n. 71, 56 n. 81, 58 n. 86, 59 n. 90 n. 92, 65 n. 112, 68 n. 123, 73 n. 149, 77 n. 168 Mulchahey, M. M., 7 n. 10, 33 n. 26, 150 n. 3 Muller, R. A., 523 n. 61 Murdoch, J. E., 264 n. 2, 275 n. 19, 382 n. 25, 395 n. 63, 396 n. 66, 399 n. 73 Murphy, L., 473, 474 n. 8, 477 n. 18, 486 n. 50, 488 n. 54

548

index of names

Mynors, R. A. B., 8 n. 11 Naples, 150 Nathanson, D. M., 82 n. 15 Nicholas Comparini, 369–70, 373, 403 Nicholas Fawkes, 372, 415 Nicholas of Amiens, 184 Nicholas of Cues, 155 Nicholas Trivet, 81, 85, 88 Nicolas Bonet, 306 n. 77 Nielsen, L. O., 48 n. 55, 65 n. 112, 66 n. 117, 69 n. 132–3, 70 n. 135 n. 138, 71 n. 143, 74 n. 161, 292 n. 49, 425 n. 41 Noonan, J. T., Jr., 69 n. 132 Norwich, 369, 371, 439, 515 Novara, 439 Oberman, H. A., 477 n. 17, 484 n. 41, 485 n. 45 O’Carroll, M., 440 n. 2 Odo, see Udo Odo de Castro Radulphi, 85 Odo of Ourscamp, 6 Odo Rigaldi, 241 Oliger, L., 84 n. 23 Oliva, A., 62 n. 102, 122 n. 43, 147, 149 n. 2, 230 n. 10, 231 Osborne, K. B., 83 n. 18 Otto, R., 472 Ovid, 421 Oxford, 7, 38, 175–6, 184, 187, 193, 195, 225, 264–7, 280, 283, 369, 371–2, 382, 399, 401–03, 405–06, 408, 416, 419, 423, 427, 429 n. 51, 432, 435–6, 439–40, 458, 501, 506, 515, 517–18 Padua, 439 Paganus of Corbeil, 1 Paltz, J., 486 Pantin, W. A., 437 n. 71 Papias Vocabulista, 184 Paris, 3, 6–7, 10–11, 30, 37–8, 44, 47 n. 52, 49, 79, 83, 89 n. 46, 111 n. 1, 130, 149–53, 175, 183 n. 13, 184, 189, 194, 197, 225, 228, 229–32, 241, 260 n. 97, 263–5, 267 n. 9, 272, 274, 278–9, 283, 284 n. 34, 288–93, 300, 303, 305–07, 309–10, 396 n. 66, 405–06, 411 n. 13, 414, 423, 433, 439, 441, 447, 450, 501, 505, 511–12, 517 Pavia, 439 Pelster, F., 80 n. 6, 230 n. 11, 231–2, 263, 267, 405 n. 1

Pelzer, A., 282 n. 28 Peroli, E., 68 n. 124 Peter Abelard, 53, 214, 241, 499 Peter Auriol, 267, 273–5, 280, 283, 290 n. 44, 292–5, 302, 305, 425 n. 41, 449, 454–8, 460–1, 468, 512–13, 518 Peter Cheffons, 396 n. 66 Peter Comestor, 1, 3, 11, 35 n. 4, 39–40, 44, 47, 51 n. 65, 91, 122 n. 44, 131, 184, 503–04 Peter de Rivo, 460 n. 61 n. 65 Peter John Olivi, 255, 261 Peter of Aquila, 300 n. 67 Peter of Auvergne, 265 Peter of Blois, 442–3, 446 Peter of Candia, 439–69, 517–19 Peter of Corbeil, 47 n. 52, 130 Peter of Ireland, 405 Peter of Navarre, 283, 288 Peter of Palude, 281 n. 26, 283 Peter of Poitiers, 3, 5, 6, 214 Peter of Poitiers, Pseudo-, 1–33, 35 n. 4, 49, 122 n. 44, 131, 497–8, 500, 503 Peter of Ravenna, 448 Peter of Tarantaise, 238–9, 282 Peter of Trabibus, 255, 261–2 Peter the Chanter, 47 n. 52, 130–1 Peter Thomae, 283, 288 Peura, S., 493 n. 68 Philip the Chancellor, 86–7, 89, 91, 113, 129 n. 65, 465 Pierre d’Ailly, 266, 474–5, 480–1, 483, 487, 489, 490 n. 59, 492 n. 67, 494 Pierre Roger, see Clement VI, pope Pini, G., 32 n. 22 Pisa, 439 Placenza, 439 Plato (and Platonism), 160–1, 184, 197–8, 218, 228, 256, 450, 464–5 Pliny the Younger, 446 Plotinus, 184 Pollard, G., 118 n. 25 Pontigny (Cistercian monastery), 37–8 Porphyry, 184 Porto (near Rome), 175 Powicke, F. M., 37 n. 8, 38 n. 13, 42, 43 n. 37 Powitz, G., 112 n. 7, 118–19 Praepositinus of Cremona, 6–7, 87, 130, 140, 142, 184 Principe, W. A., 32 n. 24, 71 n. 142, 83 n. 17, 111 n. 1, 117, 125 n. 53–4, 127 n. 60, 130, 131 n. 81, 132 n. 89

index of names n. 90–4, 133 n. 95, 137 n. 112, 138 n. 116, 139 n. 122, 147, 502 Priscian, 184 Prosper of Aquitaine, 495 Prügl, T., 39 n. 13 Ptolemy, 184 Pythagoras, 161 Qasim, M., 254 Quétif, J., 80 n. 4 Quimper, 288 Quinto, R., 35–77, 130 n. 71, 143 n. 133, 147, 498–9 Radulphus Brito, 265 Raeds, P., 373 n. 15 Ramón Lull, 255 Ramsey (Benedictine abbey), 408 Randi, E., 125 n. 49, 135, 146, 302 Ratzinger, J., 506 n. 26 Read, S., 384 n. 30 n. 32 Rhabanus Maurus, 184 Rheims, 40 Richard Brinkley, 449, 451, 458, 460 Richard de Bury, 383 Richard Fishacre, 89, 111 n. 2, 134, 184, 186, 193–6, 199, 201, 203, 204 n. 112, 222, 224–5, 440, 504 Richard FitzRalph, 405–37, 515–17 Richard Kilvington, 383, 400 Richard of Mediavilla (Menneville), 280, 282 Richard of St.-Victor, 100–01, 170, 184, 213 Richard Rufus, 88, 91, 183–6, 193–7, 198 n. 81, 199–202, 225 Richard Swyneshed, 371–2 Richter, V., 266 n. 8, 279, 311, 313 Ripoll, Santa Maria de (Benedictine monastery), 5–6, 30 Ritschl, O., 472 Ritter, G., 485 n. 45 Robert Cowton, 283, 292 Robert Greystanes, 428 Robert Grosseteste, 184, 187, 193–4, 402, 421 n. 33, 422 Robert Holcot, 370 n. 6, 406, 415, 421, 427, 429, 430 n. 51, 432–3, 435 Robert Kilwardby, 175–225, 240, 244 n. 53, 504, 506–11 Roberts, P. B., 35 n. 1–2, 37 n. 8, 38 n. 13 Robles, L., 254 n. 80 Rodler, K., 267 n. 9

549

Roest, B., 33 n. 26 Roger Bacon, 79, 230–3, 235, 238, 241, 244–5, 248–9, 260 n. 96, 261, 501, 508 Roger Roseth, 369–404, 514–15 Roger Swyneshed, 371–3, 383, 389–91 Rogerus de Roseto, 370 n. 6 Rolandus Bandinelli, see Alexander III, pope Rome, 37–8, 49, 75, 150–3, 505 Rommel, H., 473 n. 6 Rosemann, P. W., ix–xi, 2 n. 3, 4 n. 7, 7 n. 10, 32 n. 23, 35 n. 4, 51 n. 64, 52 n. 70, 62 n. 102, 69 n. 133, 91 n. 53 n. 56, 94 n. 69, 98 n. 88, 109 n. 112, 122 n. 44, 374 n. 18, 381 n. 22, 437 n. 72, 473 n. 7, 474 n. 10–11, 476 n. 16, 495–523 Rosier-Catach, I., 32 n. 22, 51 n. 63 Rossi, P. B., 66 n. 117 Rossini, M., 265 n. 4, 298 n. 65–6, 302, 311, 331–2 Roßmann, H., 307 n. 77 Rouse, M. A., 10 n. 15, 11 n. 17, 29 n. 19 Rouse, R. H., 10 n. 15, 11 n. 17, 29 n. 19 Saarinen, R., 473 n. 7, 480 n. 26 Sabellius, 162–3 Saccenti, R., 147 Sbaralea, J. H., 233 Schabel, C., 263–368, 382 n. 26, 416 n. 25, 419 n. 30, 427–8, 459 n. 61, 461 n. 65, 462 n. 68, 505 n. 22, 511–14 Scheel, M., 473 Schenk, R., 176 n. 2, 221 n. 174 Schlapkohl, C., 104 n. 102 Schmaus, M., 263, 266 n. 8, 281 n. 24, 295–7, 311, 332 Schneider, J., 176 n. 2, 177 n. 5, 178 n. 7, 183, 186 n. 25, 199, 201–03, 507 Schneyer, J. B., 84 n. 21, 229 n. 7, 230 n. 11, 236 n. 36 Schwamm, H., 281 n. 24, 300 n. 67 Schwarz, R., 473 n. 7, 491 Seeberg, R., 472 Seneca, 184, 197 Sens, 39–40, 47 n. 52 Shank, M. M., 477 n. 17 Sharpe, R., 370 n. 6, 407 n. 6 Shooner, H. V., 10 n. 15 Sidonius Apollinaris, 444 Sileo, L., 241 n. 47 Simon of Tournai, 6, 7, 131, 134, 184 Simonides of Ceos, 161

550

index of names

Simonin, H.-D., 147 Slindon (Sussex), 38 Smalley, B., 82, 131 n. 75–6, 233 Smith, G. M., 288 n. 40 Sorabji, R., 395 n. 61–2 n. 64 Spade, P. V., 383 n. 28, 384 n. 31–2, 387 n. 40, 389 n. 47, 390 n. 48, 391 n. 52 Spätling, L., 89 n. 46 Spatz, N., 38 n. 13 Stams (Cistercian monastery), 183 n. 13 Staupitz, J., 486 n. 49 Stegmüller, F., 39, 51 n. 65, 80 n. 5, 112 n. 7, 116, 122 n. 42, 123 n. 45, 146–7, 176–7, 184, 234 n. 32, 370 n. 6 Stephen Langton, 4, 35–77, 87, 91, 126, 130, 138, 140, 143, 144 n. 136, 498–500 Stirnemann, P., 45 n. 47 Straßburg, 231–2 Streiff, S., 494 n. 72 Strobach, N., 399 n. 73 Sulavik, A., 51 n. 65 Sylla, E. D., 382 n. 24, 399 n. 73 Synan, E. A., 32 n. 23 Tachau, K. H., 238 n. 43, 265, 281 n. 24, 288 n. 36, 290 n. 44, 292–3, 372 n. 13, 423, 432 Tancred of Bologna, 131 Thomae de Stockheim, S., 475 n. 13 Thomas Aquinas (and Thomism), 33 n. 26, 62 n. 102, 92, 117, 140, 149–73, 201, 208, 222, 227, 232, 237–9, 244, 248, 252–4, 256–9, 260 n. 97, 261, 263, 273–5, 279–80, 282, 292, 295, 381, 421, 425, 428, 430, 449, 453–4, 458, 467, 484, 503–09, 511, 518–21, 523 Thomas Becket, 35, 38 Thomas Bradwardine, 265, 383, 405, 423 n. 38, 433, 436, 463 Thomas Buckingham, 266, 433 Thomas Bungay, 234 Thomas of Bailly, 265 Thomas of Eccleston, 369 n. 3–4, 371 Thomas Wylton, 265, 425 n. 41 Thomson, R. M., 416 n. 26 Tolomeo of Lucca, 150–1 Torrell, J.-P., 1 n. 1, 111 n. 1, 149 n. 2, 150 n. 3 Toulouse, 290, 305 Tours, 10 n. 15 Tübingen, 477 Trapp, D., 287 n. 35

Trifogli, C., 403 n. 80 Trottmann, C., 130 n. 72, 140 n. 123–4, 147 Trutfetter, J., 475 n. 13 Udo, 1, 35 n. 4 Urban VI, pope, 439 Valente, L., 7 n. 9, 53 n. 74–5, 57 n. 85, 58 n. 88 Valerius Maximus, 447 Van den Eynde, D., 130 n. 69, 144 n. 134, 147 van der Lugt, M., 144 n. 135–6, 147 van Inwagen, P., 240 n. 45 Veal, J. F., 50 n. 63 Veldhuis, H., 136 n. 107 Verger, J., 112 n. 7 Vienna, 120 Vignaux, P., 473 Vincenza, 439 Vincent, N., 38 n. 12 Vincent of Beauvais, 233 Viterbo, 37, 175 Vitoria, F. de, 420 Volz, W., 300 n. 67 Wadding, L., 233–4, 397 n. 68 Walafrid of Strabo, 444 Walter Burley, 382–3, 389 Walter Chatton, 281 n. 26, 431 n. 52, 432 Walter of Bruges, 238, 252–4, 261 n. 99 Walter of Coventry, 37 Walter of St.-Victor, 241 Walther, J. von, 473 n. 5 Warichez, J., 6 n. 8 Weber, H. J., 95 n. 77 Weber, H. P., 79–109, 501–02 Weigand, R., 69 n. 132 Weisheipl, J. A., 37 n. 10, 149 n. 2, 257 n. 86, 372 n. 12, 383 n. 27 Weisweiler, H., 2 n. 3 Wenzel, S., 441 n. 6 Wessel Gansfort, 477 n. 17 White, G., 482 n. 36, 487 n. 52, 489 n. 57, 490 n. 59, 491, 494 n. 72 Wicki, N., 113, 119 n. 33, 144 n. 136, 147 Wieland, G., 214 n. 144, 217 n. 165 Wielockx, R., 69 n. 132 Wieneke, J., 471 n. 1, 473–4, 477 n. 19, 478 n. 20–1 n. 23, 480 n. 26, 481 n. 31, 482 n. 34, 487 n. 51, 490, 491 n. 62

index of names William Crathorn, 271, 432 William de la Mare, 227–62, 508–11 William de Montibus, 53 William Heytesbury, 383, 400 n. 76 William of Auxerre, 55 n. 79, 72, 85–7, 90, 113, 126, 130–1, 133 n. 97, 134–45, 169, 184, 209, 212, 222, 504 William of Champagne, 39–40 William of Falegar, 229 William of Melitona, 84, 184 William of Middleton, 80 William of Nottingham, 283, 428 William of Ockham (and Ockhamism), 260 n. 96, 262, 371, 376 n. 20, 381–2, 384, 397 n. 67, 405, 420, 423 n. 38, 429, 432, 434, 449, 454, 458, 460, 472, 474–5, 484, 490–1, 492 n. 67, 510, 514, 517–18, 521 William of Ware, 271

551

William Rubio, 288 William the Little, 291 William Vorillon, 281, 288 n. 38, 306 n. 77 Williams, J. R., 447 n. 27 Wittenberg, 488, 493–4 Wolter, H., 89 n. 46 Wood, R., 79 n. 2, 183, 185, 193 n. 60–1, 194 n. 63–5, 195 n. 68–70, 196, 197 n. 75, 225 Young, A. A., 82 n. 16 Yrjönsuuri, M., 390 n. 48 Zavalloni, R., 129 n. 65 Zeimentz, H., 9 n. 14 Zumkeller, A., 475 n. 13, 476 n. 15, 477 n. 17, 486 n. 48–9 zur Mühlen, K.-H., 471 n. 1